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A STUDY OF
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A STUDY OF HISTORY

BY

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

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(both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)

'Work . . . while it is day . . .'

JOHN IX. 4

'Nox ruit, Aenea . . .'

AENEID VI. 539

'Thought shall be the harder,
Heart the keener,
Mood shall be the more,
As our might lessens.'

THE LAY OF THE BATTLE OF MALDON

901
Toy



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NOTE

IN this, as in the fifth, impression of Volumes I-VI, the opportunity has been taken for bringing a few statements up-to-date and for correcting misprints and mistakes on points of fact that have been noticed by the author or have been pointed out to him by readers who have been so kind as to do him this very valuable service. The number of misprints so far detected has been small, thanks to the excellence of the original printing.

These corrections have all been within limits that have not required any considerable re-setting of the type. In addition to these, however, the writer has notes of a number of passages in which he will have eventually to make additions, deletions, or other changes in the light either of new discoveries—especially in the field of archaeological research—or of improvements in his own acquaintance with facts that were already known and accessible at the time when these six volumes were being written.

The most striking of the archaeological discoveries made between A.D. 1939 and A.D. 1950 were those which showed that, even on the shortest of the reckonings worked out on the basis of the previous information at the disposal of chronologists, the events of Sumeric history, down to and including the sack of Babylon by the Hittites, had been ante-dated by something between 150 and 200 years. Another archaeological achievement, of comparable importance, was the confirmation, by archaeological evidence, of the Sinic tradition that the Chóu culture had not been the first civilization to establish itself in the Yellow River Basin, but had been preceded there by an antecedent Shang culture.

The writer hopes to be able to make the more extensive alterations that this new knowledge demands in a future edition of the first six volumes of the book. The publication of Volumes VII-X on the 14th October, 1954, makes it possible for him to begin to reconsider Volumes I-VI with an eye to an eventual revision of the whole work.

29 July, 1954

NOT 100F ARNOLD TOYNBEE

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

DURING the six months that have passed since the publication of the first edition of these first three volumes of the book, a number of readers have been so kind as to draw the writer's attention to certain printer's errors and author's mistakes, besides com-

municating to him their observations and criticisms on general questions of presentation, proportion, and principle. The definite errors and mistakes of which the writer has been made aware in this way have been corrected in this second edition (though, no doubt, there are others which have remained undetected by the writer and his friends). As for the general criticisms, the writer has not attempted to deal with these in this new edition of Volumes I-III, partly because that would have meant virtually rewriting certain passages, and partly because the writer feels that he can probably do greater justice to the suggestions which his critics have made by taking account of them in later parts of the book which are still in process of being written, than by recasting those parts that have already set hard in print.

For the rest, the writer wishes to renew the expression of his thanks to the persons and institutions whose names are mentioned in the first edition, and to add to these the name of the Leverhulme Research Fellowship Fund, which has greatly assisted him in the work of producing Parts IV-VIII, on which he is at present engaged, by generously making it possible for him to release a larger proportion of his time and energy than before.

This preface to the second edition of Parts I-III has been written on the day on which the manuscript of Part IV has been completed.

LONDON,
New Year's Day, 1935.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THESE three volumes contain Parts I-III of the thirteen parts which are set out in the plan of the book on page v above. The writer hopes to publish the rest in two more batches: Parts IV-VIII in one batch and Parts IX-XIII in the other.

The index to the volumes now published has been made by the writer's colleague, Miss V. M. Boulter. In a book like this, which is an attempt to expound and illustrate a system of ideas, the index is a particularly important and a particularly difficult part of the work; and the writer has been fortunate in having this index made for him by Miss Boulter. But his debt to her is much greater than that. It is her collaboration with him in his other work—a collaboration on which he has always known that he can absolutely rely—that has given him, in his margin of leisure, the freedom of mind which the writing of the present work has required.

Both the writer and the printer have been fortunate in the fact that the whole of a long and rather intricate manuscript has been

typed out by Miss Reddin, from whose accuracy and patience they have also both benefited annually—till they have perhaps too easily come to take these virtues for granted—in the production and publication of another work.

The writer is also deeply indebted to a number of other friends of his—all of them very busy people—who, in their kindness, have found time to read parts of these volumes in the typescript and to give him their comments. The writer is very conscious of the use which he has been able to make of these observations in diminishing a number of weaknesses in his original draft, though of course this does not involve any of his kind critics in any sort of responsibility for the final product. The friends in question, to whom the writer wishes to express his most sincere gratitude, are Professor Gilbert Murray, Dr. G. P. Gooch, Professor H. J. Paton, Professor N. H. Baynes, Professor H. A. R. Gibb, Mr. and Mrs. J. L. Hammond, Professor A. E. Zimmern, Sir Arnold Wilson, Professor C. K. Webster, Mr. David Davies, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, and Mr. G. F. Hudson.

The writer also takes this opportunity of expressing his gratitude to several learned institutions. The Stevenson Research Professorship in International History which he has the honour to hold in one of the constituent bodies of the University of London—the London School of Economics and Political Science—has made an inestimably valuable addition to the amount of leisure which has been at his disposal while he has been writing these volumes, through releasing time and energy which otherwise he would have had to spend on 'pot-boiling'. He is equally grateful to the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs for their action in making, out of a grant which they have received from the Rockefeller Fund for research in the field of international studies, an allocation for the purpose of releasing the writer's time and energy further by giving him additional assistance in his work as a member of the staff of Chatham House.

Finally, the writer cannot lay down his pen without mentioning one earliest debt of all, which has been in his mind throughout; and this is the debt which he owes to his Mother, who first turned his thoughts towards History by being a historian herself.

LONDON
16th May, 1933.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

The sum and substance of a considerable part of the first three volumes of this book was presented orally, before publication, in two different courses of lectures which were delivered on the invitation of two foundations in the United States: the Lowell Institute at Boston, Mass., and the Norman Wait Harris Foundation at Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. The course of Lowell Lectures, delivered in October, 1933, covered the ground of Parts I. A, I. B, II. C II (a), II. C II (b), III. A, III. B, III. C I, III. C II (a). The course of Norman Wait Harris Lectures, delivered in November, 1933, covered the ground of Parts I. A and B, II. C II, III. B, III. C I, III. C II (a), III. C II (b). The author is glad to take this opportunity to express his appreciation of these invitations from the Norman Wait Harris Foundation and the Lowell Institute, and his gratitude for the courtesy and hospitality with which he was received in Evanston and in Boston while the lectures were being given.

ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΩΣ ΒΙΟΣ

ΚΗΡΕΞ ὅσαι θανάτοιῳ πιέζετέ μ', οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ὕμνῳ
 εἷξας ὀφλήσω αὐτὸς ἐκὼν κακίην,
 οὐδ', μὰ θεοῦ μέγαν ὄρκον, ὃς ὥμοσε μὴ με ματαίως
 οἰχήσεσθαι, ἅπαξ καλὸν ἰδόντα φάος
 ἡελίου, ῥέξαντα δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἀέθλους·
 τῷ πίσυνος κείναις οὐκέτι δοῦλος ἐγώ.
 Ἄλλ' ἔρξω, καιρὸς γάρ· ἀλάστορες ὦ σκιάοντες,
 ἔρρετε· σωτείρας ἡῦρον· ὑποτρέσατε.

Μοῦσαι μελιχίαι ἐλεήμονες, ἤλθετε κάμοι,
 χειμερίῳ 'ν πόντῳ νηῖ τινασσομένη
 πένθεος ἐν χειμῶνι· καὶ αἰνῶς μ' ἐστυφέλιξεν
 ἱς ἀνέμων, κοῦδέν τέρμ' ἐπέφαντο κακοῦ,
 αἰανὴς δ' ἐπὶ μόχθος, ἐφίκετο δ' ὅσσον ὀπωπὴ
 ἀήρ τ' ἄξενά τ' ἦν κύματα παλλόμενα.
 τῶν μ' ἄπο, σώτειαί, τότε' ἐλύσατε, καὶ πάλιν ὀρθῇ
 στείρῃ λευγαλέης ποντοπορῶ δι' ἄλός.
 Μούσας ὕμνήσω νόος ἔμπεδος εἰς ὃ κ' ἔπηται,
 Μούσαις λατρεύσω παντὶ χειρὸς σθένει,
 Μούσας ἂν δὲ προδῶ, τῷ γ' ἤματι κάμῃ προδοίης,
 φιλάτῃ ὠκυμόρων—μηδ' ἐλεοῖς με—βροτῶν.

Ἄλλ' ἔραμαι· Μοῦσαι δὲ καλοῦσί με. τηλόθι, Μοῦσαι,
 στρωφᾶσθ' ἀνθρώπων, τῇλ', Ἑλικωνιάδες.
 πίδακες ὕμνῳ ἐκεῖ καὶ τέμπεα δενδρήεντα,
 τρηχὺς ὃ δ' οἶμος ἐὼν ζῆλον ἐνῆκε ποδί,
 τέρμα δ' ὁδοῦ προὔστηκε μέγα ρίον αἰθερίῃ τε
 στίλβουσ' εὐαγὴς—εἶθε θίγοιμι—νιφάς.
 οὐκέτ' Ἐρως ἔταρος δέ· τὰ μελιχα ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων
 κείνος δὴ νέμεται· τὸν δ' ἄρα θελγόμενος
 καλλείπω στρεφθεὶς πρὸς τῶρεα· ἄλλ' ἔραμαί σου.
 ἴσχε, φίλη, μ', ὥμοις χεῖρα βαλοῦσα πέρι.

Ἔσχες ἀδημονέοντά μ', ὑπέστρεψεν δ', ἀπιὼν περ,
 σῇ χειρὶ θελγόμενος, κοῦκ ἄρα φροῦδος, Ἐρως·
 ἀλλ' ἔπεται τρίτος αὐτὸς ὁδοιπóρος—οὐ τρίτος οἶος,
 Μουσῶν γὰρ θιάσου κείνος ἄμ' ἡγέται.
 χαίρετέ μοι, στίλβουσαν ἔδρην Ἑλίκωνα λιπούσαι
 πότνιαι· ἡ δὲ γελῶσ' Ἰλαα Καλλιόπη
 "Τέκνω," ἔφη, "στείχωμεν ὁμὴν ὁδόν, ἧς ῥα πέφανται
 τέρμ' οὐ δῆθ' Ἑλίκων, οὐ ρίον οὐδὲ νιφάς·"

ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΩΣ ΒΙΟΣ

τῇλε γὰρ οὐ στρωφώμεθ'—ἔπος φύγεν ἕρκος ὀδόντων
κεῖνό σοι εἰκαῖον—κοινὸς ὀδηγὸς ὄδε.”

Ἐρχόμενον γὰρ ὄρω σε, τελεσφόρε παυσιμέριμνε
πασὶ βροτοῖς, κάμοι καίριε νῦν, Θάνατε—
χαῖρέ μοι οὐ ρά μάτην βεβιωκότι, ὦ Ῥοσαλίνδῃ
σύζυγος, ὀργεῶνες Μοῦσαι, ὀδηγὸς Ἔρως.

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ERRATA AND ADDENDA

While the second edition was in the press, the following valuable comments on volume I reached the author too late to allow of the appropriate changes being made in the text:

Page 23, footnote 2: To call administrative efficiency a new Italian 'invention' perhaps does less than justice to the native administrative efficiency which was displayed in England, at any rate, if not in other Transalpine kingdoms, in the Middle Ages. 'New Italian methods' would be a truer description of the Transalpine effects of Italian influence in the administrative sphere.

Page 28, lines 18-19: The statement in the text is too sweeping; for there was, of course, a fitful co-operation between France and the Ottoman Empire against the Hapsburg Power from the generation of Francis I and Suleymān the Magnificent onwards, while in the eighteenth century Sweden and Poland were drawn towards the Ottoman Empire by their common concern over the rising power of Russia.

Page 212: An apologist for the English Protestant colonists in North America might perhaps be inclined to suggest that the difference between their way and the Spanish Catholics' way of treating the 'Native' peoples of the New World was due not so much to a difference between the respective moral standards of these two sets of European intruders as to a difference between the respective social conditions of the two sets of American 'Natives' upon whom they happened respectively to stumble. The 'Red Indians' whom the English Protestants exterminated were a handful of incorrigibly militant savages, whereas the subjects of the Aztecs and the Incas, whom the Spanish Catholics spared, were a numerous and peaceful peasantry whose native level of culture was relatively high. This apologia would be plausible if the English Protestants' colonization of North America and the Spanish Catholics' colonization of Central and South America had been the only two European colonizing enterprises in the New World. When, however, we see the French Catholics colonizing North America side by side with the English Protestants and there fraternizing with those 'incorrigibly militant savages' whom the English Protestants were exterminating, we are confirmed in our view that the difference in the respective outcomes of these Protestant and Catholic colonizing activities in the New World is accounted for by some moral difference between the two sets of colonizers rather than by any social differences between the several sets of 'Natives' whom they respectively encountered. On the other hand, in the matter of the Negro slave-trade, it should have been mentioned that the Genoese and Portuguese Catholics (as well as the Dutch Protestants) had had a share in it before the monopoly of it was acquired by the English Protestants in A.D. 1713.

Page 232, last line of text: While the Black Race perhaps cannot be credited for certain with having made any active contribution to any civilization, there is some indication of a Negroid strain in certain of the occupants of the Lower Nile Valley during the twilight before the dawn of the Egyptian Civilization (see page 241).

Page 245, footnote 1: An acceptance of Monsieur Demolins' exposure of the racial fallacy does not, of course, involve us in capitulating of this scholar's own environmental thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

A. THE RELATIVITY OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT

'The Aethiopians say that their Gods are snub-nosed and black-skinned, and the Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired. If only oxen and horses had hands and wanted to draw with their hands or to make the works of art that men make, then horses would draw the figures of their Gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and would make their bodies on the model of their own.'¹

XENOPHANES.

IN any age of any society the study of history, like other social activities, is governed by the dominant tendencies of the time and the place. The Western World in our age has been living under the dominion of two institutions: the Industrial System of economy and a hardly less complicated system of politics which we call 'Democracy' as a short title for responsible parliamentary representative government in a sovereign independent national state. These two institutions, the one economic and the other political, attained a general supremacy in the Western World at the close of the age preceding our own² because they offered provisional solutions for the chief problems with which that age had been confronted. Their enthronement signified the completion of the age which had sought and found salvation in them; their survival bears witness to the creative power of our predecessors; and we, who

¹ *Αἰθιοπὲς τε θεοὺς σφετέρους σιμοὺς μέλανις τε
Θρηκῆς τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρροὺς φασὶ πέλεσθαι.
ἀλλ' εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον γε βόες θ' ἵπποι τ', ἐθέλοντες
ἢ γράψαι χεῖρεσσι ἢ ἔργα τελεῖν ἄτερ ἄνδρες,
ἵπποι μὲν θ' ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βοσύν ὁμοίαις
καὶ κε θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν
τοιαῦθ', οἷον περ καὶ αὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ἕκαστοι.*

(Text as in Diehl, E.: *Anthologia Lyrica*, i (Leipzig 1922, Teubner), pp. 58-9.)

² For the Western World as a whole the close of this preceding age may be equated approximately with the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century of our era. The idea that the 'sixties and 'seventies of the nineteenth century were a time of transition from one age of our common civilization to another is familiar to Continental Europeans and to Americans (both in the United States and in Canada). It is less familiar to people brought up in Great Britain, who usually think of these decades not as the close but as the zenith of an age—the Victorian Age—which began earlier and ended later than this. From the standpoint of Great Britain, that is perhaps the natural view; but it will be suggested below (in I. C (iii) (b), pp. 171-1, and III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63) that the position of Great Britain in the Western World at that time was exceptional. In the invention of Industrialism and 'Democracy' the people of Great Britain had been pioneers; and the process by which the supremacy of these two institutions was established was already past history in Great Britain at the time when it was attaining or approaching completion in other parts of the Western World. Hence the people of Great Britain were conscious of relative continuity at a time when the peoples of most other countries in the Western World were conscious of a transition from one age to another. The sense of the majority must be taken as the standard when we are considering the Western World as a whole.

did not create them, have grown up under their shadow. In the Industrial System and the Parliamentary National State we still live and move and have our being; and the power of these two inherited institutions over our lives is reflected in the hold which they possess over our imaginations. Their prestige is apparent at almost every point in the work of our historians.

The Industrial System has a human aspect in the Division of Labour and a non-human aspect in the application of modern Western scientific thought to the physical environment of human life. Its method of operation is to maintain, up to the maximum of its productive capacity, an incessant output of such articles as can be manufactured from raw materials by the mechanically co-ordinated work of a number of human beings. These features of the Industrial System have been reproduced in the theory and even in the practice of Western thought during the past half-century.

When I was a child I used to stay from time to time in the house of a distinguished professor of one of the physical sciences. There was a study lined with book-shelves, and I remember how, between one visit and another, the books used to change. When first I knew the room, many shelves were filled with general literature, with general scientific works, and with general works on that branch of science in which my host was an expert. As the years passed, these shelves were invaded, one after another, by the relentless advance of half a dozen specialized periodicals—gaunt volumes in grim bindings, each containing many monographs by different hands. These volumes were not books in the literary sense of the word, for there was no unity in their contents and indeed no relation whatever between one monograph and another beyond the very feeble link of their all having something to do with the branch of science in question. The books retreated as the periodicals advanced. I afterwards rediscovered them in the attics, where the *Poems* of Shelley and *The Origin of Species*, thrown together in a common exile, shared shelves of a rougher workmanship with microbes kept on gelatine in glass bottles. Each time I found the study a less agreeable room to look at and to live in than before.

Those periodicals were the Industrial System 'in book form', with its Division of Labour and its sustained maximum output of articles manufactured from raw materials mechanically. In my dislike of those rows of volumes I used to regard them as the abomination of desolation standing in the place where it ought not,¹ but I am now ready to believe that they may not have been out of place in a physical scientist's work-room in the early years of the twentieth century of our era. Since the Industrial System, in its

¹ Matt. xxiv. 15; Dan. ix. 27.

non-human aspect, is based on Physical Science, there may well be some kind of 'pre-established harmony' between the two; and so it is possible that no violence is done to the nature of scientific thought through its being conducted on industrial lines.¹ At any rate, this may well be the right way of handling any branch of Physical Science in its early stages—and all our modern Western Science is still very young, even compared with the age of our Western Society—since discursive thought of any kind needs an initial supply of 'data' on which to work. The same method, however, has latterly been applied in many realms of thought beyond the bounds of Physical Science—to thought which is concerned with Life and not with Inanimate Nature, and even to thought which is concerned with human activities.² Historical thought is among these foreign realms in which the prestige of the Industrial System has asserted itself; and here—in a mental domain which has had a far longer history than our Western Society and which is concerned not with things but with people—there is no assurance that the modern Western Industrial System is the best régime under which to live and to labour.³

The subjugation of this ancient kingdom of historical thought by the modern Industrialism of Western life is illustrated in the career of Theodor Mommsen. In his younger days Mommsen wrote a great book, which certainly will always be reckoned among the masterpieces of Western historical literature. This book was *The History of the Roman Republic*, published in 1854-6; but Mommsen had hardly written it before he became almost ashamed of it and turned his magnificent energy and ability into other channels. Mommsen made it his life work to organize the exhaustive publication of Latin inscriptions and the encyclopaedic

¹ Physical Science and Industrialism may be conceived as a pair of dancers, both of whom know their steps and have an ear for the rhythm of the music. If the partner who has been leading chooses to change parts and to follow instead, there is perhaps no reason to expect that he will dance less correctly than before.

² On this point, see Dilthey, W.: *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. vii (Leipzig and Berlin 1927, Teubner). The Geisteswissenschaften tend to borrow the methods of the Naturwissenschaften, owing to the seniority of these latter disciplines, notwithstanding the fact that their respective *Verfahrungsweisen* differ *ab initio* (p. 130). 'Die realen Kategorien sind . . . in den Geisteswissenschaften nirgends dieselben als in den Naturwissenschaften' (p. 195).

³ It is noteworthy that while many of our historians still acquiesce in this régime, and even hug their chains, the leading minds in the field of contemporary Physical Science have already passed the stage of study in which the Industrial System seems to be a fruitful and adequate method of research. The organized Division of Labour for the extraction and 'working up' of raw 'data' has now ceased to be the guiding principle of their work. In the work of Einstein, for instance, the layman—however far he may fall short of understanding the great man's thought—can at least perceive that he is thinking about the Physical Universe as a whole and not just about this or that slice of physical reality. Perhaps the layman may even venture further and conjecture that this broad attitude of mind—this comprehensive way of thinking—has been an essential condition of Einstein's achievement. 'I have not found so great faith, no not in Israel' (Matt. viii. 10). Let our historians take heed. For when the Gentiles are flocking into the Kingdom of God, it is assuredly time for the children of the Covenant to move (Acus. iii. 25).

presentation of Roman Constitutional Law. *Das Römische Staatsrecht* and the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* were the monuments by which, in later life, he would have preferred to be remembered; and the volumes of his collected works—a congeries of unrelated monographs and articles—are like so many volumes of a learned periodical which happens to have had only one contributor. In all this, Mommsen was representative of the Western historians of his generation—a generation in which the prestige of the Industrial System imposed itself upon the ‘intellectual workers’ of the Western World. Since the days of Mommsen and Ranke, historians have given their best energies to the ‘assemblage’ of raw materials—inscriptions, documents, and the like—in ‘corpus’es and periodicals; and, when they have attempted to ‘work’ these materials ‘up’ into ‘manufactured’ or ‘semi-manufactured’ articles, they have had recourse, once again, to the Division of Labour and have produced synthetic histories like the several series of volumes now in course of publication by the Cambridge University Press. Such series are monuments of the laboriousness, the ‘factual’ knowledge, the mechanical skill, and the organizing power of our society. They will take their rank with our stupendous tunnels and bridges and dams and liners and battleships and skyscrapers, and their editors will be remembered among the famous Western engineers. In invading the realm of historical thought, the Industrial System has given scope to great strategists and has set up marvellous trophies of victory. Yet, in a detached onlooker’s mind, the doubt arises whether this conquest may not, after all, be a *tour de force* and the confidence of victory the delusion of a false analogy.

Some historical teachers of our day deliberately describe their ‘seminars’ as ‘laboratories’ and, perhaps less consciously but no less decidedly, restrict the term ‘original work’ to denote the discovery or verification of some fact or facts not previously established.¹ At the furthest, the term is extended to cover the interim reports upon such work which are contributed to learned journals or to synthetic histories. There is a strong tendency to depreciate works of historical literature which are created by single minds, and the depreciation becomes the more emphatic the nearer such works approximate to being ‘Universal Histories’. For example, Mr. H. G. Wells’s *The Outline of History* was received with unmistakable hostility by a number of historical specialists. They criticized severely the errors which they discovered at the points where the writer, in his long journey through Time and Space, happened to traverse their tiny allotments. They seemed not to

¹ ‘Established’, that is, in the subjective meaning of the French verb *constater*.

realize that, in re-living the entire life of Mankind as a single imaginative experience, Mr. Wells was achieving something which they themselves would hardly have dared to attempt—something, perhaps, of which they had never conceived the possibility. In fact, the purpose and value of Mr. Wells's book seem to have been better appreciated by the general public than by the professional historians of the day.

The industrialization of historical thought has proceeded so far that it has even reproduced the pathological exaggerations of the industrial spirit. It is well known that individuals or communities whose energies are concentrated upon turning raw materials into light, heat, locomotion, or manufactured articles are inclined to feel that the discovery and exploitation of natural resources is a valuable activity in itself, apart from the value for Mankind of any results produced by the process. They are even tempted to feel it reprehensible in other people when they neglect to develop all the natural resources at their disposal; and they themselves readily become slaves to their fetish if they happen to live in a region where natural resources, and opportunities for developing them, abound. This state of mind appears to European observers to be characteristic of a certain type of American business man; but this type is simply an extreme product of a tendency which is characteristic of our Western World as a whole; and our contemporary European historians sometimes ignore the fact that in our time the same morbidity, resulting in the same loss of proportion, is also discernible in their own frame of mind.

The point may be brought home by an illustration. After Alexander the Great had broken up the Achaemenian Empire, the Dynasty of the Ptolemies built some of the fragments into a Great Power based on Egypt, while the Seleucids built up another Great Power out of the former provinces of the Empire in Asia. No one who studies these two Great Powers in their historical perspective can doubt which of them is the more interesting and important. The Seleucid Monarchy was the bridal chamber in which the Hellenic and Syriac civilizations were married, and their union there produced titanic offspring: to begin with, a divine kingship as a principle of association between city-states which was the prototype of the Roman Empire,¹ and then a whole series of syncretistic religions: Mithraism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Islam. For nearly two centuries the Seleucid Monarchy was the greatest field of creative human activity that existed in the World; and long after it had fallen the movements generated during its comparatively brief span of existence continued to mould the

¹ For this institution, see further Parts V and VI below.

destinies of Mankind. Compared with this, the marriage of Hellenism with the Egyptian Civilization in the Ptolemaic Empire was unfruitful. The introduction into the Roman Empire of the worship of Isis and of certain forms of economic and social organization is really all that can be placed to its account. Owing, however, to a climatic accident, the amount of raw information regarding these two monarchies which happens to be accessible to us is in inverse ratio to their intrinsic importance in history. The dry-as-dust soil of Upper Egypt yields the scientific Western excavator a wealth of papyri, beyond the dreams of the scholars of the Renaissance, and these papyri afford minute information regarding local methods of agriculture, manufacture, trade, and public administration, whereas the history of the Seleucid Monarchy has to be pieced together from scattered coins and inscriptions and from fragments of literary records. The significant point is that the Ptolemaic papyri have attracted almost all the spare energies of Western scholarship in the field of Ancient History, and that the comparatively large number of scholars who have been devoting themselves, with admirable skill and patience, to elucidating the minutiae of papyrus texts have tended to measure the historical importance of the Ptolemaic Monarchy by the amount of raw material accessible for the reconstruction of its history and by the intensity of the labour which they themselves have devoted to this reconstructive work.

An outside observer is tempted to regret that part of this energy was not reserved for equally intensive work upon the meagre and hardly increasing quantity of materials that is at our disposal for the reconstruction of Seleucid history. One additional gleam of light thrown upon the darkness of this page might add more to our understanding of the History of Mankind than floods of light thrown upon the social and economic organization of Ptolemaic Egypt. And, beyond this, the observer is moved to a psychological reflection. He suspects that the scholar who has become a Ptolemaic papyrologist has seldom asked himself the prior question: 'Is Ptolemaic Egypt the most interesting and important phenomenon to study in the particular age of the particular society to which it belonged?' More probably he has asked himself instead: 'What is the richest mine of unworked raw material in this field?' And, finding that the answer is 'Ptolemaic papyri', he has become a papyrologist for the rest of his working life without thinking twice about it. Thus in modern Western historical research, as in modern Western industry, the quantity and location of raw materials threaten to govern the activities and the lives of human beings. Yet there is little doubt that our imaginary papyrologist

has made a wrong choice by all humane standards. Intrinsically, the Seleucid Monarchy and not the Ptolemaic Monarchy is the field in which the pearl of great price awaits the historical explorer. For this judgement it is sufficient to quote the authority of Professor Eduard Meyer¹—a scholar who has been not without honour in his own generation, though he has used his mastery of modern scientific equipment and technique in order to write 'Universal History' in the great tradition of *Essai sur les Mœurs* or *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, like some son of Anak born out of due time.

This tendency for the potter to become the slave of his clay is so evident an aberration that a corrective may be found for it without abandoning the fashionable analogy between the processes of historical thought and the processes of industry. In industry, after all, to be hypnotized by the raw material does not pay. The successful industrialist is the man who first perceives that there is a strong economic demand for some particular commodity or service, and then lays hands upon just those raw materials and that 'man power' with which, at a profit to himself, he can manufacture that object or perform that service efficiently. Raw materials and 'man power' which do not happen to serve the purpose have no interest for him. In other words, he is a master of natural resources, and not their slave, and so he becomes a captain of industry and makes his fortune.

This, however, is a digression from the course of our argument, which has been leading us up to the point of calling in question the analogy between historical thought and industrial production altogether. In the world of action, we know that it is disastrous to treat animals or human beings as though they were stocks and stones. Why should we suppose this treatment to be any less mistaken in the world of ideas? Why should we suppose that the scientific method of thought—a method which has been devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature—should be applicable to historical thought, which is a study of living creatures and indeed of human beings? When a professor of history calls his 'seminar' a 'laboratory', is he not wilfully expatriating himself from his natural environment? Both names are metaphors, and either metaphor is apt in its own sphere. The historian's *seminarium* is a

¹ See Meyer, Eduard: 'Der Gang der alten Geschichte' in *Kleine Schriften* (Halle 1910, Niemeyer); and *Blüte und Niedergang des Hellenismus in Asien* (Berlin 1925, Curtius). In another place, Meyer points out that the historian's access to historical evidence is always and everywhere at the mercy of Chance, so that there is no rational correspondence between the intrinsic importance and interest of any given historical event and the quantity and credibility of the historical evidence that is at our disposal for the study of it (*Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 211-12).

nursery-garden in which living ideas about living creatures are taught to shoot. The physical scientist's *laboratorium* is—or was till the other day¹—a workshop in which manufactured or semi-manufactured articles are produced mechanically out of inanimate raw materials. No practical man, however, would think of conducting a nursery garden on the principles of a factory or a factory on the principles of a nursery garden; and, in the world of ideas, the corresponding misapplications of method ought to be avoided by scholars. We are sufficiently on our guard against the so-called 'Pathetic Fallacy' of imaginatively endowing inanimate objects with life. We now fall victims to the inverse 'Apathetic Fallacy' of treating living creatures as though they were inanimate.

If the Industrial System had been the sole dominant institution in contemporary Western life, the influence of its prestige over Western historical thought might have broken down under its own weight; for the Industrial System can only be applied to historical thought by a very drastic Division of Labour. In industry, the Division of Labour is readily (perhaps too readily) accepted by Mankind as a price which has to be paid for material well-being; and there appears—or appeared till recently—to be little repugnance to it in that realm of thought which is concerned with the Physical Universe. It is conceivable that, as Bergson suggests, the mechanism of our intellect is specifically constructed so as to isolate our apprehension of Physical Nature in a form which enables us to take action upon it.² Yet even if this is the original structure of the human mind, and if other methods of thinking are in some sense unnatural, there yet exists a human faculty, as Bergson goes on to point out, which insists, not upon looking at Inanimate Nature, but upon feeling Life and feeling it as a whole.³ This deep impulse to envisage and comprehend the whole of Life is certainly immanent in the mind of the historian; and such violence is done to it by the Division of Labour which the analogy of the Industrial System imposes on historical thought, that our historians would almost certainly have revolted against this tyranny if there had not been a second dominant institution in contemporary Western life which has appeared to make unity of vision still compatible with the industrialization of historical

¹ The pioneers of to-day in the field of Physical Science would probably admit this description as being true of the *laboratorium* of their 'classical' predecessors, but would indignantly—and perhaps justly—deny that their own work was being conducted on 'classical' principles or under the shadow of 'classical' traditions.

² See Bergson's inquiry into the 'Fonction Primordiale de l'Intelligence' in *L'Évolution Créatrice*, 24th edition (Paris 1921, Alcan), pp. 164–79. In this suggestion, Bergson has been anticipated by Turgot. See the 'Plan de Deux Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle' in *Œuvres de Turgot*, nouvelle édition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 654.

³ See Bergson, Henri: *op. cit.*, especially chapter iii.

thought. This second institution, which has peacefully divided with the Industrial System the allegiance of modern Western historians, is the Sovereign State, which is inspired in our 'democratic' age by the spirit of Nationality.

Here, again, an institution dominating a particular age of a particular society has influenced the outlook and activity of historians who happen to have been brought up under its shadow. The spirit of Nationality is a sour ferment of the new wine of Democracy in the old bottles of Tribalism. The ideal of our modern Western Democracy has been to apply in practical politics the Christian intuition of the fraternity of all Mankind;¹ but the practical politics which this new democratic ideal found in operation in the Western World were not oecumenical and humanitarian but were tribal and militant.² The modern Western democratic ideal is thus an attempt to reconcile two spirits and to resolve two forces which are in almost diametrical opposition; the spirit of Nationality is the psychic product of this political *tour de force*; and the spirit of Nationality may be defined (negatively but not inaccurately) as a spirit which makes people feel and act and think about a part of any given society as though it were the whole of that society.³ This strange compromise between Democracy and Tribalism has been far more potent in the practical politics of our modern Western World than Democracy itself. Industrialism and Nationalism, rather than Industrialism and Democracy, are the two forces which have exercised dominion *de facto* over our Western Society in our age; and, during the century that ended about A.D. 1875, the Industrial Revolution and the contemporary emergence of Nationalism in the Western World were working together to build up 'Great Powers', each of which claimed to be a universe in itself.

Of course this claim was false. The simple fact that there were more Great Powers than one proved that no single one of them was coextensive with the sum total of that society which embraced them all. Every Great Power, however, did succeed in exerting a continual effect upon the general life of Society, so that in some

¹ 'La démocratie est d'essence évangélique, et . . . elle a pour moteur l'amour'—Bergson, Henri: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 304-5.

² In exhibiting these characteristics, our modern Western politics are not peculiar. Monsieur Bergson has pointed out that parochialism is a normal feature of human social groups, from the most primitive to the least imperfectly civilized; and the philosopher goes on to suggest that this parochialism, and the militancy between different parochial groups which is its corollary, is not only normal but is even in a certain sense 'natural'. (See Bergson, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 25-8, 249-50, and 306-9.)

³ A political counterpart to the sin which is denounced in the Qur'ān as *شِرْكٌ* (For the bearing of this political aberration upon the prospects of our Western Civilization, see further Part XII below.)

sense it could regard itself as a pivot round which the whole of Society revolved; and every Great Power also aspired to be a substitute for Society in the sense of being self-contained and self-sufficient, not only in politics and economics but even in spiritual culture. The state of mind thus engendered among the people of communities which constituted Great Powers spread to communities of lesser calibre. In that age in the history of our Western Society, all national states, from the greatest down to the least, put forward the same claim to be enduring entities, each sufficient unto itself and independent of the rest of the World. The claim was so insistently advanced and so widely accepted that the true duration and true unity of the Western Society itself were temporarily obscured; and the deep human impulse to feel Life as a whole, which is perpetually seeking to find satisfaction in the changing circumstances of Life as it passes, attached itself to particular nations rather than to the larger society of which those nations were members. Such fixations of social emotion upon national groups became almost universal, and historians have been no more immune from them than other people. Indeed, the spirit of Nationality has appealed to historians with special force, because it has offered them some prospect of reconciling the common human desire for unity of vision with the Division of Labour imposed upon them by the application of the Industrial System to their work. To grapple with 'Universal History' on industrial principles is so evidently beyond the compass even of the most gifted and the most vigorous individual that, for a scientific historian, the admission that unity could not be found in anything short of 'Universal History' would be tantamount to renouncing unity of vision altogether—a renunciation which would take the light out of any historian's landscape. If, however, he could seize upon a unit of historical thought which was of more manageable proportions yet was still in some sense a universe too, the psychological problem of reconciling his intellect with his emotions might be solved; and such a solution appeared to be offered by the Principle of Nationality.

On this account the national standpoint has proved specially attractive to modern Western historians, and it has been commended to their minds through more than one channel. They have been led to it not only because it has been prevalent in the communities in which they have grown up, but also because their raw material has presented itself to a large extent in the form of separate national deposits. The richest mines which they have worked have been the public archives of Western Governments. Indeed, the abundance of this particular natural resource is what chiefly

accounts for their astonishing success in increasing their volume of production. Thus our historians have been drawn partly by professional experience, partly by a psychological conflict, and partly by the general spirit of their age in one and the same direction.

The lengths to which this tendency may go can be observed in the work of a distinguished historian belonging to one of the greatest nations of the modern Western World. Monsieur Carnille Jullian is perhaps the foremost living authority upon the 'pre-history' of that portion of Continental Europe which at the present time constitutes the territory of 'France', and in 1922 he published a book called *De la Gaule à la France: Nos Origines Historiques*.¹ This book is a first-rate piece of historical writing; yet, in reading it, it is difficult to keep the attention fixed upon the matters with which Monsieur Jullian intends to deal, because the reader is continually being made aware that the writer is not only a historian but a Frenchman, and a Frenchman who has lived through the General War of 1914-18. The sub-title—*Nos Origines Historiques*—gives the key. All the time Monsieur Jullian is projecting back into the past his own burning consciousness of France as she exists for him to-day—a spiritual France which furnishes him with the experience of human life so exhaustively that, if the rest of the World were to be annihilated and France left solitary but intact, Monsieur Jullian would perhaps hardly be sensible of any spiritual impoverishment; and a material France with clear-cut frontiers which have been constantly overrun by invaders and constantly re-established by the patriotism of the French nation. The self-sufficiency of France and her separateness from the rest of the World are ideas which dominate Monsieur Jullian's imagination even when he is dealing with the history of this piece of territory at dates hundreds or thousands of years before such a conception as 'France' existed. Into however distant a past he travels back, he carries France with him—contented if he can do so with ease, embarrassed if he cannot do so without difficulty, but ever incapable of leaving France behind him. For example, he is gravely embarrassed when he has to deal with the incorporation of the several dozen independent states of Gaul into the Roman Empire, and he does his best to make credible the thesis that, even during the five centuries that intervened between the generation of Julius Caesar and the generation of Sidonius Apollinaris, the local individuality of Gaul was a more important fact in the life of its inhabitants than their membership in an Empire which embraced the whole *orbis terrarum* of the Mediterranean Basin. On the other

¹ Paris 1922, Hachette.

hand, Monsieur Jullian cannot contain his delight when he discerns the lineaments of France upon the face of Europe in the Neolithic Age. Here is a passage¹ which occurs at the end of a brilliant reconstruction of certain aspects of Neolithic life through an examination of the trails along which the Neolithic people did their travelling:

'L'on peut parler maintenant de ces routes vitales, par lesquelles, pour une si grande part, se fera la France. Aussi bien, ce trafic ne sort pas des limites qui seront plus tard celles de la Gaule, comme si l'entente humaine reconnaît déjà la valeur de ces limites.'

Here, in the twinkling of an eye, the scientific Western historian of the Neolithic Age has been transfigured into the French patriot of A.D. 1918, crying: 'Ils ne passeront pas!'

This is perhaps an extreme case of the emotional and intellectual substitution of a nation for Mankind. At the same time, when the nation thus magnified happens to be France, the degree in which history is thrown out of perspective is the least possible in the circumstances. After all, some entity corresponding to the name 'France' actually has maintained its individuality within the universe of our Western Society for nearly a millennium;² and though a thousand years is not a long time in the history of Mankind, it covers almost the whole lifetime of our own Western Society, which only began to emerge from the ruins of the Roman Empire about 250 years before France herself began to emerge as a distinct element in this new Western World.³ Moreover, France, since her emergence, has continuously played a central and a leading part in Western history; and thus, while Monsieur Jullian's attempt to present the Roman Empire or the Neolithic Age in terms of France is a palpable *tour de force*, the distortion is not so apparent to the eye when modern Western history is focused from the French standpoint, with France in the centre and everything else on the periphery. France perhaps approaches nearer than any other national state to being co-central and co-extensive with the whole of our Western Society. If, however, instead of France, we were to take Norway or Portugal, or even Holland or Switzerland, and attempt to write the history of the Western Society round any one of these countries, we can see at once that the attempt would break down. As a *reductio ad absurdum*, let us try to imagine ourselves

¹ Op. cit., p. 62, chapter ii: 'L'Époque des Agriculteurs (Temps Néolithiques).'

² Nearly a millennium, but certainly not longer than this; for 'Vor einem Jahrtausend, zur Zeit der Zersetzung der Karolingischen Monarchie, kaum ein einziges der Völker des gegenwärtigen Europas existiert hat, nicht nur seinem äusseren Bestande, sondern seinem inneren Wesen nach' (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 78.)

³ For the emergence of France, in the present meaning of the name, see further II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 197-201, below.

writing the history of the Western Society round one of those national states which have only attained their statehood since the termination of the General War of 1914-18. That would involve writing the history of a society which has been in existence for more than twelve centuries round a nation whose existence is not yet securely established. Whether a Czechoslovak or a Yugoslav national consciousness yet exists has hardly ceased to be a debatable question. Certainly such consciousnesses were non-existent as recently as fifty years ago; and even if we attempted to present the history of the West in terms of the constituent parts of these nascent nationalities—in terms, that is, of Czechs or Slovaks or Croats or Serbs, whose history as distinct groups goes back further—the absurdity, while less great in terms of relative age, would be greater in terms of relative population and territorial extension. Western history cannot be conceived in terms of nationalities of this calibre. Indeed, short of writing a Slovako-centric or a Croato-centric history of the West, we should find it impossible to write even a Slovako-centric history of Slovakia or a Croato-centric history of Croatia. In contrast to France, Slovakia and Croatia fall so far short of constituting historical universes in themselves that, when isolated, they cease to be intelligible. It would be impossible to write intelligible histories of Slovakia or Croatia in which those territories, or their peoples, were given the role of protagonists, even in their own small corners of the broad Western stage. It would be impossible, in their case, to distinguish from their external relations an internal history which was something specifically their own. It would be found that every experience which they underwent and every activity into which they entered had been shared by them with other communities whose share had been greater than theirs, and in attempting to make their history intelligible we should find ourselves extending our field of vision to include one after another of these other peoples. Possibly we should have to extend it until we had included the whole of our Western Society. In any case, the intelligible field, when we found it, would certainly prove to be some field of which Slovakia or Croatia itself was a small and comparatively unimportant fraction.¹

The emergence of new national states like Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia which have no history at all, and whose component parts have no history that is intelligible in isolation, signifies the

¹ Dr. H. W. V. Temperley's masterly *History of Serbia* (London 1917, Bell) illustrates the difficulties with which a historian has to contend in attempting to write a history of a nation of this calibre. In order to make Serbian history intelligible and consecutive, he has to present it within the successive frameworks of Byzantine and Ottoman History and finally in relation to the 'Eastern Question': that is to say, as a function of the modern European Balance of Power. There are few chapters in which he succeeds in disengaging Serbian history from its context and treating it in isolation.

arrival of a new age and indicates what its character is to be. The general conditions of our Western Society have already become profoundly different from those which were in the ascendant during the century ending about A.D. 1875 and which have stamped the minds of Western historians with an impress which they still retain. Down to about 1875, the two dominant institutions of Industrialism and Nationalism were working together to build up Great Powers. After 1875 they began to work in opposite directions—Industrialism increasing the scale of its operations beyond the compass of the greatest of the Great Powers and feeling its way towards a world-wide range, while Nationalism, percolating downwards, began to implant a separate consciousness in peoples of so small a calibre that they were incapable not only of forming Great Powers but even of forming minor states possessed of full political, economic, and cultural independence in the established sense of those terms.

The General War of 1914-18 brought to the surface a tendency which had been at work for nearly half a century before its outbreak. By the end of the year 1918, one out of the eight Great Powers which existed in 1914 had completely disappeared, two others had been mutilated and laid prostrate, and one of those which had survived more or less intact was undergoing rapid structural transformations in the direction of 'Dominion Self-Government'. The general upshot of these partly revolutionary and partly evolutionary changes is the same. The stage has ceased to be dominated by the Great Powers with their pretension to be universes in themselves, and the characteristic communities of the new age are states whose independence is limited on one or other plane. Some of these (for example the Dominions of the British Commonwealth) are not completely separate political entities; others (for example Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary) possess no seaboard; and others, again, no distinctive or satisfying national culture. In this new world, moreover, even the surviving Great Powers are dwarfed in the economic sphere by the world-wide scale on which Industrialism has now come to conduct its operations. All states alike are feeling less and less able to stand by themselves economically and are either kicking violently against the pricks by pursuing militant monetary and tariff and quota and migration policies or else are turning for assistance to the technical organizations of an international scope which are being built up round the Secretariat of the League of Nations and the International Labour Office at Geneva. Finally, all but the strongest or the most recalcitrant states are also beginning to feel the same lack of self-sufficiency on the political plane and are displaying a readiness

(which would have been inconceivable in 1914) to accommodate their sovereign independence to the international procedure of the League of Nations Council and Assembly or to some other form of international limitation and control such as is implied in the Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of War as an instrument of national policy.¹

These multiple tendencies can be summed up in a single formula: In the new age, the dominant note in the corporate consciousness of communities is a sense of being parts of some larger universe, whereas, in the age which is now over, the dominant note in their consciousness was an aspiration to be universes in themselves. This change of note indicates an unmistakable turn in a tide which, when it reached high-water mark about the year 1875, had been flowing steadily in one direction for four centuries. It may portend a return, in this respect, to the conditions of the preceding phase (the so-called 'medieval' phase) of Western history, when the consciousness of the Western Society was dominated by institutions like the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire which incorporated some aspect of its life as a whole, while kingdoms and city-states and fiefs and other local institutions were felt to be something parochial and subordinate. At any rate, that is the direction in which the tide seems to be flowing now—as far as it is possible to discern its direction so short a time after it has turned.

If this observation is correct, and if it is also true that historians cannot abstract their thoughts and feelings from the influence of the environment in which they live, then we may expect to witness in the near future a change in the outlook and activities of Western historians corresponding to the recent change in the general conditions of the Western Society. Just as, at the close of the age which we have left behind, the historians' work was brought into conformity with the Industrial System and their vision was caught and bounded by the idea of Nationality, so, in the new age upon which we have entered, they will probably find their intelligible field of study in some landscape where the horizon is not restricted to the boundaries of a single nationality, and will adapt their present method of work to mental operations on a larger scale.

This raises two questions, one of immediate interest: 'What is the intelligible field of study which Western historians will discover for themselves in this new age?'—and another of permanent importance: 'Is there some intelligible field of historical study

¹ The play and interplay of Industrialism and Nationalism, the two dominant forces in the life of our Western Society in our age, are examined more closely in Parts IV and XII below. For the contrast between the coincidence in the direction of the two forces during the century ending about A.D. 1875 and the divergence since about 1875, see further Toynbee, A. J.: *The World after the Peace Conference* (London 1925, Milford), pp. 13-25, and the present work, IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 167-85, below.

which is absolute and not merely relative to the particular social environment of particular historians?' So far, our inquiry seems to have brought out the fact that historical thought takes a deep impress from the dominant institutions of the transient social environment in which the thinker happens to live. If this impress proved to be so profound and so pervasive as actually to constitute the *a priori* categories in the historian's mind, that conclusion would bring our inquiry to an end. It would mean that the relativity of historical thought to the social environment was absolute; and in that case it would be useless to gaze any longer at the moving film of historical literature in the hope of discerning in it the lineaments of some abiding form. The historian would have to admit that, while it might be possible for him to work out a morphology of his own mind by analysing the influences exerted upon it by the particular society in which he lived, it was not possible for him to discover the structure of that society itself, or of the other societies in which other historians and other human beings had lived in different times and places. That conclusion, however, does not yet confront us. So far, we have simply found that in the foreground of historical thought there is a shimmer of relativity, and it is not impossible that the ascertainment of this fact may prove to be the first step towards ascertaining the presence of some constant and absolute object of historical thought in the background. Our next step, therefore, is to take up the search for an intelligible field of historical study independent of the local and temporary stand-points and activities of historians upon which we have focused our attention hitherto.

B. THE FIELD OF HISTORICAL STUDY

I. THE TEST CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN

In setting out to look for some objective 'intelligible field of historical study', it seems best to start with what is the usual field of vision of contemporary Western historians, that is, with some national state. Let us pick out, from among the national states of the West, whichever one seems most likely, at first sight, to correspond to our contemporary historians' ideal of what their field should be, and then let us test their outlook in this instance in the light of the 'historical facts' (taking 'historical facts' in the popularly accepted sense and begging provisionally the prior philosophical question as to the meaning of the word 'fact' in this term).

Great Britain seems as good a choice as any. She is not merely a national state but a Great Power. Her principal constituent, England, who incorporated herself into Great Britain two centuries ago without any breach of continuity or change of identity, is as old a figure in Western history as France, and on the whole as important a figure, though she has performed quite a different historical function.¹ Her peculiar merit for our purpose is that, to an exceptional degree, she has been kept in isolation—first by certain permanent features of physical geography, and secondly by a certain policy on the part of her statesmen in the age during which she has been most creative and most powerful. As regards her geographical isolation, the shores of an island provide frontiers which are incomparably more clear-cut than the land-frontiers of France, however precise and eternal Monsieur Jullian may feel those land-frontiers to be. For instance, we should not smile at Monsieur Jullian if he made the discovery that the Neolithic trails in Britain broke off along the same line at which the roads and railways of Britain break off to-day, or if he quoted *et penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos*² in describing the position of Britain in the Roman Empire. As regards her political isolation, Britain has been something of an *alter orbis*³ throughout Western history—though less so in the Middle Ages than since England lost her last territorial foothold on the continental side of the Channel in A.D. 1558. Of course it is easy to exaggerate the degree of this 'splendid isolation'. Great Britain has never been able to disinterest herself from continental negotiations or wars in which the European

¹ For the function of England in modern Western history as a 'creative minority', see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63, below.

² Vergil: *Eclogue I*, l. 66.

³ See Freeman, E. A.: *Historical Essays: Fourth Series*, ix: 'Alter Orbis' (London 1892, Macmillan).

Balance of Power has been at stake; and, even when successfully maintained, the isolation has been deliberately one-sided. The *alter orbis* which Great Britain has aspired to be is not simply a world apart from continental Europe but a world embracing non-European continents and islands overseas. Like her daughter, the United States, she has only detached herself from the old world which lies near to her in order to liberate her energies for the creative task of calling into existence a new world far away. Yet, when all is said, her relative isolation is perhaps the most important single distinctive fact about her. At any rate, we shall not easily discover a Western nation which is more isolated than she is and which yet has played so prominent a part over so long a span of Western history. In fact, if Great Britain (as the heir and assign of England) is not found to constitute in herself an 'intelligible field of historical study', we may confidently infer that no other modern Western national state will pass muster.

Is English history, then, intelligible when taken by itself? Can we abstract an internal history of England from her external relations? If we can, shall we find that these residual external relations are of secondary importance? And in analysing these, again, shall we find that the foreign influences upon England are slight in comparison with the English influences upon other parts of the World? If all these questions receive affirmative answers, we may be justified in concluding that while it may not be possible to understand other histories without reference to England, it is possible, more or less, to understand English history without reference to other parts of the World. The best way to approach these questions is to direct our thought backwards over the course of English history and recall the principal chapters.

In this inverse order, we may take those chapters to be:

- (a) The establishment of the Industrial System of economy (since the last quarter of the eighteenth century of our era);
- (b) the establishment of Responsible Parliamentary Government (since the last quarter of the seventeenth century);
- (c) the expansion overseas (beginning in the third quarter of the sixteenth century with piracy and developing gradually into a world-wide foreign trade, the acquisition of tropical dependencies and the foundation of new English-speaking communities in overseas countries with temperate climates);
- (d) the Reformation (since the second quarter of the sixteenth century);
- (e) the Renaissance, including the political and economic as well as the artistic and intellectual aspects of this movement (since the last quarter of the fifteenth century);

- (f) the establishment of the Feudal System (since the eleventh century);
- (g) the conversion of the English from the religion of the so-called 'Heroic Age'¹ to Western Christianity (since the last years of the sixth century).

This summary glance backwards from the present date over the general course of English history would appear to show that the further back we look the less evidence do we find of self-sufficiency or isolation. The conversion, which was really the beginning of all things in English history, was the direct antithesis of that: it was an act which merged half a dozen isolated communities of barbarians in the common weal of a nascent Western Society. As for the Feudal System, Vinogradoff has brilliantly demonstrated² that the seeds of it had already sprouted on English soil before the Norman Conquest. Yet, even so, the sprouting was stimulated by an external factor, the Danish invasions;³ these invasions were part of the Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung* which was stimulating simultaneously a similar growth in France; and the Norman Conquest of England, though it may not have sown the seed, undoubtedly brought the harvest to a rapid maturity. Thus it may fairly be said that any account of the establishment of the Feudal System in England would not be intelligible unless France and Scandinavia, at least, were brought into the picture. As for the Renaissance, in both its cultural and its political aspects it is universally admitted to have been a breath of life from Northern Italy. If, in Northern Italy, Humanism, Absolutism, and the Balance of Power had not been cultivated in miniature, like seedlings in a sheltered nursery garden, during two centuries that fall approximately between A.D. 1275 and A.D. 1475,⁴ they could never have been bedded out north of the Alps from about 1475 onwards. The Reformation, again, was not a specifically English phenomenon, but a general movement in the Promethean North of Western Europe (where the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Atlantic all beckoned towards new worlds) for emancipation from the Epimethean South (where the Western Mediterranean held the eye fixed upon worlds that were dead and gone).⁵ In the Reformation, England did not take the initiative, nor did she take it even in the competition between the European nations of the Atlantic

¹ See Part VIII below.

² Vinogradoff, Paul: *English Society in the Eleventh Century* (Oxford 1908, Clarendon Press).

³ On this point, see further II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 196-201, below.

⁴ For the role of the medieval Italian city-states as a 'creative minority' in Western history, see further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 341-50, below.

⁵ For the role of such 'ghosts from the past' in the histories of civilizations, see further Part X, below.

sea-board for the prize of the new worlds overseas. She won that prize as a comparatively late comer, in a series of struggles, which lasted for several centuries, with Powers which were before her in the field. In order to understand the history of English expansion overseas, it is necessary to appreciate the consequences of all the general European wars, and indeed to take into account all the vicissitudes of the European Balance of Power, from about the last quarter of the fifteenth century onwards—in fact, to extend the field of vision across the whole horizon of modern Western history.

It remains to consider the two latest chapters: the geneses of the Parliamentary System and of the Industrial System—institutions which are commonly regarded as having been first evolved locally on English soil and afterwards propagated from England into other parts of the World. For our purpose, these are the crucial chapters in English history, and an inquirer who is an amateur in this field will be wise to fall back here upon quoting recognized authorities. For the Parliamentary System, the following passage from Lord Acton's lecture on Henry IV and Richelieu¹ will serve:

'General History naturally depends on the action of forces which are not national, but proceed from wider causes. The rise of modern kingship in France is part of a similar movement in England. Bourbons and Stuarts obeyed the same law, though with a different result.'

In other words, the Parliamentary System, which was the local result in England, was the product of a force which was not peculiar to England but was operative in England and in France simultaneously.²

As regards the Industrial Revolution in England, its genesis is thus summed up by two of the foremost living English students of the subject, Mr. and Mrs. Hammond:

'Why did this revolution come to England in the eighteenth century?

'For the new commerce the Atlantic was as important as the Mediterranean had been for the old. The most active trading peoples, after the discoveries of Columbus, were those who looked out on the Atlantic. Of these peoples the English were in a specially favourable position, in the middle of the eighteenth century, as a result of their geographical situation, their climate, and their history. The Spaniards used their control of the New World for politics, and the wealth they drew from the American mines was spent, in the main, in ways that discouraged industrial expansion. The English colonists in America, on the other hand, settled where there was little gold and silver, and they grew into communities which needed British goods for their own consumption, and sent home products that were useful for industry.

'Events in Europe also favoured the more rapid expansion of English

¹ Lord Acton: *Lectures on Modern History* (London 1906, Macmillan).

² On this point, see further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 359-63, below.

industry, for the European wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did more harm to industry on the Continent than in England, and the religious and political strife of the seventeenth century left England with a constitution and a government more favourable to commercial development than those of France. Among other advantages which a comparison of the state of England with that of France discloses are the supremacy of the common law, internal free trade, an aristocracy interested in commerce, a mistrust of State regulation, fostered by memories of the Stuarts, and toleration in religion. The stagnation of politics, religion, and local life in the eighteenth century encouraged the concentration on industry, and this concentration drew to mechanical invention all the ardour and imagination that had been fired by the revival of mathematics and the discoveries of physical science. For these reasons England was the most likely theatre for the Industrial Revolution.¹

This authoritative judgement regarding a chapter in English history which is commonly regarded as national *par excellence* is particularly significant. While, in the latter part of the last paragraph here quoted, the writers certainly mention several factors which might be classified as internal to England and even as peculiar to her, it is clear that, in their view, the factor which goes furthest towards accounting for the genesis of the Industrial Revolution in England is England's general position in the world of the day—her geographical position in respect of the Atlantic and her political position in respect of the European Balance of Power. Evidently they would pronounce that, if these general factors were ignored, an intelligible account of the rise of modern industry in England could not be given. It seems, then, that Great Britain is not an 'intelligible field of study' in itself even in this most recent and most British chapter of all; and the advocate of the national field of study cannot take refuge in conjectures regarding the future, for the Industrial Revolution itself, with its conquest of distance, its thoroughgoing internationalization of trade even in bulky staple commodities, and its latest inventions, the submarine and the aeroplane, has unmistakably laid the foundations for an unprecedented solidarity—for good or for evil—between Great Britain and other parts of the World. Thus British national history is not, never has been, and almost certainly never will be an 'intelligible field of study' in isolation; and if that is true of Great Britain, it must surely be true *a fortiori* of any other national state. Therefore, if we are to pursue our quest, it is clear that we must take some larger entity than the nation as our field.

'Ce n'est . . . pas la forme politiquement agrégative qui donne la vie

¹ Hammond, J. L. and Barbara: *The Rise of Modern Industry*, Preface, pp. viii-ix (London 1925, Methuen).

intellectuelle à des multitudes, qui leur fait une volonté, qui leur inspire une manière d'être. Elles ont tout cela sans posséder de frontières propres. Ces dons résultent d'une impulsion suprême qu'elles reçoivent d'un domaine plus haut qu'elles-mêmes. Ici s'ouvrent ces régions inexplorées où l'horizon élargi dans une mesure incomparable ne livre plus seulement aux regards le territoire borné de tel royaume ou de telles républiques, ni les fluctuations étroites des populations qui les habitent, mais étale toutes les perspectives de la société qui les contient, avec les grands rouages et les puissants mobiles de la civilisation qui les anime. . . . Avant d'écrire l'histoire d'un pays distinct et de prétendre expliquer les problèmes dont une pareille tâche est semée, il est indispensable de sonder, de scruter, de bien connaître les sources et la nature de la société dont ce pays n'est qu'une fraction.¹

II. THE FIELD OF WHICH GREAT BRITAIN IS A PART

Our brief examination of English history, though its direct result has been negative, has given us a clue. The chapters which caught our eye in our glance backwards over the course of English history were real chapters in some story or other, but that story was the history of some society of which Great Britain was only a part, and the experiences were experiences in which other nations besides the English were participants. The 'intelligible field of study', in fact, appears to be a society containing a number of communities of the species represented by Great Britain—not only Great Britain herself but France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and so on—and the passage quoted from Lord Acton indicates the historical relation between these parts and this whole.

The forces in action are not national but proceed from wider causes, which operate upon all the parts simultaneously and which are not intelligible in their partial operation unless a comprehensive view is taken of their operation throughout the society. At the same time, different parts are differently affected by an identical general cause, because they each react, and each contribute, in a different way to the forces which that same cause sets in motion. In this analysis, Lord Acton has employed the scientific metaphors of his generation, while we, who are learning to be on our guard against the 'Apathetic Fallacy', might find it more natural to describe the experience of History in human terms. A society, we should say, is confronted in the course of its life by a

¹ De Gobineau, J. A.: *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (Paris 1853-5, Firmin-Didot, 4 vols.), vol. iv, pp. 327-8 and 333. For an authoritative, as well as emphatic, rejection of the idea that any mere national histories can be 'intelligible fields of study', see Meyer, E.: 'Zur Theorie und Methodik der Geschichte' in the writer's collected *Kleine Schriften* (Halle 1910, Niemeyer), p. 41; and his *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 198-9.

succession of problems, which every member has to solve for himself as best as he may. The presentation of each problem is a challenge to undergo an ordeal, and through this series of ordeals the members of the society progressively differentiate themselves from one another.¹ On each occasion some fail, while others succeed in finding a solution; and, again, some of the solutions found are imperfect or commonplace or inimical to success in solving subsequent problems, while others are exact or original or fertile in possibilities of further progress. As ordeal follows ordeal, some members of the society at some moment fail altogether to adjust themselves, and fall by the way; others struggle on, strained or warped or stunted; others grow in wisdom and stature, and in making their own way discover new avenues for a general advance of the society to which they belong.² Throughout, it is impossible to grasp the significance of a particular member's behaviour under a particular ordeal without taking some account of the similar or dissimilar behaviour of his fellows and without viewing the successive ordeals as a series of events in the life of the whole society.

'Thus English history does not become intelligible until we view it as the history of a wider society of which Great Britain is a member in company with other national states, each of which reacts, though each in its own way, to the common experiences of the society as a whole.' Similarly, Venetian history has to be viewed as the history of a temporary sub-society including Milan, Genoa, Florence, and the other 'medieval' city-states in Northern Italy;³ Athenian history as the history of a society including Thebes, Corinth, Sparta, and the other 'ancient' city-states in Greece.' In each case we have to think in terms of the whole and not of the parts; to see the chapters of the story as events in the life of the society and not of some particular member; and to follow the fortunes of the members, not separately but concurrently, as variations on a single theme or as contributions to an orchestra which are significant as a harmony but have no meaning as so many separate series of notes.' In so far as we succeed in studying history from this point of view, we find that order arises out of chaos in our minds and that we begin to understand what was not intelligible before.'

This method of interpreting 'historical facts' will perhaps be

¹ For the nature and extent of the differentiation that arises out of successive responses to successive challenges, see further III. C (iii), vol. iii, below.

² This last kind of response is exemplified in the historic English response to the ordeal of adapting Transalpine political constitutions to suit the new Italian invention of administrative efficiency—an ordeal to which all the Transalpine countries of Western Christendom were subjected from the close of the fifteenth century onwards. The differentiating effect of this particular ordeal upon the constitutional histories of the several communities that were exposed to it—e.g. England, France, and the Iberian kingdoms—is very striking. (See further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 359–63, below.)

³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 341–50, below.

made clearer by a concrete example, which may be taken from the history of the city-states of ancient Greece during the four centuries falling approximately between 725 and 325 B.C.

Soon after the beginning of that age, the society of which these numerous states were all members was confronted with the problem of the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence—means which the Hellenic peoples at that time were apparently obtaining almost entirely by raising a varied agricultural produce in their home territories for home consumption. When the crisis came, different states contended with it in different ways. Some, like Corinth and Chalcis,¹ disposed of their surplus population by seizing and colonizing agricultural territories overseas—in Sicily, Southern Italy, Thrace, and elsewhere—where the native population was either too sparse or too incompetent to resist invasion. The Greek colonies thus founded simply extended the geographical area of the Hellenic Society without altering its character. The agriculture which they practised and the institutions under which they lived were substantially reproductions of the conditions which they had left behind them in their home countries.

On the other hand, certain states sought solutions which entailed a variation in their way of life. Sparta,² for instance, satisfied the land-hunger of her citizens not by colonizing overseas territories outside the previous geographical limits of the Hellenic World³ but by attacking and conquering her nearest Greek neighbours in Messene. The consequences were that Sparta only obtained her necessary additional lands at the cost of obstinate and repeated wars with neighbouring peoples of her own calibre; that, even when the conquest was completed, the retention of the conquered territories required a permanent military effort; and that this permanent strain bore upon Sparta herself and not upon some independent daughter-state overseas who would have been responsible for her own security. In order to meet this situation, Spartan statesmen were compelled to militarize Spartan life from top to bottom—which they did by reinvigorating and adapting certain primitive social institutions, common to a number of Greek communities, at a moment when, in Sparta as elsewhere, these institutions were on the point of disappearance.⁴

Athens reacted to the population problem in a different way again.⁵ At first she neglected it—neither planting colonies over-

¹ For Chalcis, see further II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 42–35, below.

² For Sparta, see further III. A, vol. iii, pp. 50–79, below.

³ The only Spartan overseas colony was Tarentum, and the foundation of Tarentum appears to have been an exceptional measure.

⁴ See Nilsson, M. P.: 'Die Grundlagen des spartanischen Lebens', in *Klio*, xii (1912).

⁵ For a fuller discussion of the part played by Athens in this crisis of Hellenic history see II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 39–42, and III. B, vol. iii, p. 122, below.

seas nor conquering the territory of her Greek neighbours—until the pressure threatened to find vent in a social revolution. At that point, when the solutions sought by other states were no longer open to her, she discovered an original solution of her own by specializing her agricultural production for export, starting manufactures also for export, and then developing her political institutions so as to give a fair share of political power to the new classes which had been called into being by these economic innovations. In other words, Athenian statesmen averted a social revolution by successfully carrying through an economic and a political revolution; and, discovering this solution for the common problem as far as it affected themselves, they incidentally opened up a new avenue of advance for the whole of the Hellenic Society. This was what Pericles meant when, in the crisis of his country's material fortunes, he claimed that she was 'the education of Hellas'.¹ In so far as she lived unto herself, as a city-state, Athens came to grief before that age of Hellenic history had reached its close. In so far as she lived for Hellas, Pericles' claim was justified by the event; for in the next age of Hellenic history, which began about 325 B.C., the new ideas and institutions which had been worked out by Athens in order to discover a particular solution for the general problem of the preceding age, were adopted by the rest of the Hellenic Society (which by that time had expanded far beyond the narrow domain of the Greek-speaking peoples) as their common social heritage. This phase of Hellenic history is commonly called 'the Hellenistic Age', but 'the Atticistic Age' is the proper name for it.

From this angle of vision, which takes not Athens or Sparta or Corinth or Chalcis but the whole of the Hellenic Society as its field, we are able to understand both the significance of the histories of these several communities during the period 725-325 B.C. and the significance of the transition from this period to that which followed. Questions are answered to which no answer could be found so long as we looked for an intelligible field of study in Chalcidian history or Corinthian history or Spartan history or Athenian history examined in isolation. From this point of view it was merely possible to observe that Chalcidian or Corinthian history was in some sense normal, whereas Spartan and Athenian history departed from the norm in different directions. It was not possible to explain the way in which this departure took place; and historians were reduced to suggesting that the Spartans and Athenians were already differentiated from other Greeks by the possession of special innate qualities at the dawn of Hellenic

¹ Thucydides, Book II, chap. 41.

history. This was equivalent to explaining Spartan and Athenian development by postulating that there had been no development at all,¹ and that these two particular Greek peoples were as peculiar at the beginning of the story as at the end of it. That hypothesis, however, is in contradiction with established historical facts. In regard to Sparta, for example, the excavations conducted by the British Archaeological School at Athens have produced striking evidence that, down to about the middle of the sixth century B.C., Spartan life was not abnormal in the ways which thereafter were to differentiate it so sharply from life in other Hellenic communities. After the middle of that century there was a revolutionary change which has to be explained, and an explanation can only be found through looking at Spartan history in this period as a special local response to an ordeal which confronted the whole of the Hellenic Society.² The special characteristics of Athens, which she communicated to the whole Hellenic World in the so-called 'Hellenistic' Age (in contrast to Sparta, whose peculiar turning proved to be a blind alley), were likewise acquired characteristics, the genesis of which can only be apprehended from a general standpoint. It is the same with the differentiation between Venice, Milan, Genoa, Florence, and the other city-states in Northern Italy in the so-called 'Middle Ages' of our Western history, and with the differentiation between France, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the other national states of the West in more recent times. In order to understand the parts, we must first focus our attention upon the whole, because this whole is the field of study which is intelligible in itself.

III. THE EXTENSION OF OUR FIELD IN SPACE

It is of little practical use, however, to come to the conclusion that an intelligible field of study exists, of which the conventional fields are parts, so long as we have only defined this field negatively as the whole to which the parts belong. The parts which we know may not be intelligible in themselves, but at least they are palpable. Great Britain, for example, has an ascertained geographical situation and spatial extension; the English nation, as a nation, has an ascertained age. We cannot be content until we have defined the whole society of which Great Britain is a member in similarly positive and concrete terms. Let us explore its extension first in Space and then in Time.

¹ For this fatal weakness of all the 'racial' explanations of history, see further II. C (ii) (a) 1, below. Bagehot points out that neither race nor climate will explain the historic contrast between Sparta and Athens. (*Physics and Politics*, 10th edition (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 84-6.)

² See Wade-Gary, H. T.: 'The Growth of the Dorian States' in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1925, University Press).

In exploring the spatial extension of the society which includes Great Britain, it seems best to start by reviewing those chapters which caught our eye when we first glanced backwards over the course of English history. In our first examination of them, we found that they were events in the life of a society of which Great Britain and her sister countries were only parts, and we thus established the fact that the 'intelligible field of historical study' in this instance was something larger than any single national state. Let us now re-examine these same chapters with a view to discovering where the outer spatial limits of this 'intelligible field of study' lie. Is the society to which these chapters belong coextensive with Mankind? Or, as we extend our horizon from Great Britain outwards, do we reach, sooner or later, a line at which the intelligibility of history, expressed in terms of these chapters, is at its maximum? And beyond that line, if we do reach it, do we find that these chapters cease to correspond to the order of the facts which there confront us—in other words, do we find that there are other societies, existing simultaneously with ours and side by side with it, whose history falls into quite different chapters and is not intelligible in terms of ours?

If we start with our latest chapter—the establishment of the Industrial System—we find that the geographical extension of the 'intelligible field of study' which it presupposes is world-wide. In order to explain the Industrial Revolution in England, we have to take account of economic conditions not only in other West-European countries but in Tropical Africa, America, Russia, the Levant, India, and the Far East. When, however, we go back to the establishment of the Parliamentary System, and pass, in so doing, from the economic to the political plane, our horizon contracts. 'The law' which 'Bourbons and Stuarts obeyed' in France and England was not in force for Romanovs in Russia or for 'Osmanlis in Turkey or for Timurids in Hindustan or for Manchus in China or for the contemporary Shoguns in Japan.' The political histories of these other countries under these other dynasties cannot be explained in the same terms. If we examine them, we find that the chapters into which they fall, and the 'intelligible fields of study' which those chapters presuppose, are quite different. The laws which can be observed at work in the political history of England and France do not apply to them, and, conversely, the laws which can be observed at work in their political history throw no direct light upon contemporary political phenomena in England or France. We lay our finger here upon a frontier which is a sharper and a deeper line of division than Monsieur Jullian's emotional frontiers of France—sharper and deeper even than our

own physical frontiers of Great Britain. The operation of 'the law' which 'Bourbons and Stuarts obeyed' in France and England extended to the other countries of Western Europe and to the new communities planted overseas by West-European colonists. On the European Continent, however, the domain of this law stopped short at the western frontiers of Turkey and Russia. Eastward of that line, other political laws were being obeyed at the time with other consequences.¹

Again, the expansion overseas in which England began to participate in the third quarter of the sixteenth century was confined not merely to Western Europe but almost entirely to West-European countries with sea-boards on the Atlantic and the North Sea. The overseas activities of Denmark and Sweden and Courland were feeble, while the states of Germany and Italy hardly participated at all. Even when we consider this expansion, as we must, in relation to a wider balance of power, we find that for several centuries this particular balance did not transcend the limits of Western and Central Europe. For example, no Islamic countries entered into it until the General War of 1792-1815, and no Far Eastern countries until the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a dozen years before the outbreak of the General War of 1914-18.

As for the Reformation, while it is impossible to understand it without extending our horizon from England and Scotland to the whole of Western Christendom, this understanding would be confused and not clarified if we attempted to extend the horizon still further. In studying the Reformation, we may ignore the history of the Orthodox Church since the schism of the eleventh century after Christ, and the history of the Monophysite and Nestorian Churches since the schisms of the fifth century after Christ. Conversely, no light is thrown upon the histories of these churches in the sixteenth century after Christ by the phenomena of the West-Christian Reformation of that time.

The Renaissance, again, was produced by a bedding-out of North-Italian ideas and institutions not merely in England but in the other Transalpine countries of Western Europe and in their new colonies overseas; but those were the limits of the area brought under this form of Italian cultivation. At the very time when Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Germans, and Poles were falling

¹ Compare the following passage in E. A. Freeman's lecture on 'The Unity of History' which is published in his *Comparative Politics* (London 1873, Macmillan): 'European history forms one whole in the strictest sense, but between European and Asiatic history the connexion is only occasional and incidental. The fortunes of the Roman Empire had no effect on the internal revolutions of the Saracenic Caliphate, still less effect had they on the momentary dominion of the House of Jenghiz or on the Mogul Empire in India.' (Op. cit., p. 333.)

under the spell of Italian culture, the Greeks were declaring 'the turban of the Prophet' preferable to the 'tiara of the Pope'¹ and were becoming converted in greater numbers to Islam than to Humanism. Nor did the spell of Italian culture produce any appreciable effect upon the Turks, though they were in close and continuous contact with the Venetians and Genoese in the activities of trade, diplomacy, and war.² The only prominent trace of Italian cultural influence upon Turkish life is to be found in the architecture of certain eighteenth-century mosques in Constantinople. In Muslim India, the Italian influence (through a Portuguese medium) upon the art and architecture of the Mughal Court, during and after the reign of Akbar, was exotic and transitory. As for the Hindus or the peoples of the Far East, they were probably unaware, at the time, that Western Europe was experiencing a renaissance and *a fortiori* unaware of the Italian source from which the stimulus came.

The establishment of the Feudal System, again, as it came about in England, was a specifically West-European development. It is true that there were feudal phenomena in the contemporary Byzantine and Islamic worlds, but it is not proven that these phenomena were derived from the same origins as those in the West, and many superficial resemblances are found on closer inspection to be false analogies. The feudal systems of Western Europe, of the Byzantine Empire, and of Islamic Egypt, Turkey, and Hindustan, not to speak of feudalism in Japan, have to be studied as distinct and separate institutions.

Finally, the conversion of the English to Western Christianity since the last years of the sixth century has admitted us to membership in one society at the cost of excluding us from the possibility of membership in others. Down to the Synod of Whitby in A.D. 664, the English were potential converts to the 'Far Western' Christianity of the 'Celtic Fringe';³ and had Augustine's mission eventually proved a failure the English might have joined the Welsh and Irish in founding a new Christian church out of communion with Rome—as veritable an *alter orbis* as the world of the Nestorians on the Far Eastern fringe of Christendom.⁴ Later on, when the Muslim Arabs appeared on the Atlantic seaboard, these 'Far Western' Christians of the British Isles might have lost touch as completely as the Christians of Abyssinia or Central Asia with their co-religionists on the European Continent. They might even conceivably have become converts to Islam, as so many

¹ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chapter lxviii.

² Italian was actually the official language of the Ottoman navy.

³ See further II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 334-6, below.

⁴ See further II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 369-84, below.

Monophysites and Nestorians actually did when the Middle East came under Arab rule. These suggested alternatives may be dismissed as fantastic. Possibly they are not so fantastic as they appear at first sight.¹ At any rate, the contemplation of them serves to remind us that while the conversion of A.D. 597 has made us one with Western Christendom it has not made us one with all Mankind, but has simultaneously drawn a sharp line of division between ourselves as Western Christians and the members of other religious communions (not only the now extinct Far Western Christians but the Orthodox Christians,² Monophysites, Nestorians, Muslims, Buddhists, and so on)—a line by which we were not circumscribed in the days of our indeterminate paganism, when we were potential converts to any would-be 'universal church' which might choose to compete for our allegiance.

This second review of our chapters of history has given us the means for taking spatial cross-sections, at several different dates, of that society which includes Great Britain and which is the 'intelligible field of historical study' as far as Great Britain is concerned. In taking these cross-sections we shall have to distinguish between certain different planes of social life—the economic, the political, and the cultural³—because it is already evident, from the foregoing analysis, that the spatial extension of this society differs perceptibly according to the plane on which we focus our attention. For example, if we take our first cross-section at the present day, we find that on the economic plane at this moment the society which includes Great Britain is undoubtedly coextensive with the whole habitable and navigable surface of the planet. There is hardly any habitable portion of the Earth's surface with which Great Britain herself does not at present exchange goods and services.⁴ On the political plane, again, the world-wide character of this society at the present day is almost equally apparent. The United Kingdom is now linked with 60 out of 66 other states in the World (including the self-governing Dominions of the British Crown and the Kingdom of Egypt) by the Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of War as

¹ See Gibbon's reflections upon what might have happened in Western Europe if the Arabs had won the Battle of Tours in A.D. 732 (*The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chapter lii). These speculations are taken up again in II. D (vii), Annex IV, vol. ii, pp. 427-33, below.

² Since the Protestant Reformation in the West, there have been overtures on at least two occasions—once in the early seventeenth century, when the Oecumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople was occupied by Cyril Loukaris (A.D. 1621-37), and again in our own day—for a re-establishment of communion between the Anglican fragment of the Western Church and Orthodox Christendom.

³ For an examination of this refraction of social life into three distinct 'planes', see Parts VIII and IX, below, as well as Part II. A, vol. i, p. 187, Part III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 151-3, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 196-203.

⁴ The World Economic Conference that met in London on the 12th June, 1933, was attended by representatives of no less than sixty-six states—the sole absentee being Panama.

an instrument of National Policy,¹ and with 56 of these by the further and more positive bond of common membership in a formal association of states, the League of Nations, which has a constitution, a budget, and a regular programme of activities. Moreover, of the nine states which have so far remained non-members of the League (the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Egypt, Afghanistan, the Najd-Hijaz, the Yaman, Iceland, Danzig, and Ecuador)² and the two ex-members which have withdrawn (Brazil and Costa Rica),³ all except the three which lie in Latin America are of intimate concern to Great Britain politically, apart from the special importance of at least three of them in the international relations of Great Britain on the economic plane. A more detailed political survey of the World from a British standpoint would probably show that Latin America and Eastern Europe were the only regions in which Great Britain's political interests³ could conceivably be written off as negligible quantities, and even that would only be by contrast with her absorbing political interests elsewhere. Negatively, Latin America, which is the field of the Monroe Doctrine, and Eastern Europe, which is the crux of the 'post-war' problem of European security, both affect Great Britain, even on the political plane, profoundly.

When, however, we pass to the cultural plane, the present geographical extension of the society to which Great Britain belongs appears to be very much smaller. Substantially, it is confined to the countries occupied by Catholic and Protestant peoples in Western Europe and America and the South Seas; and when we examine the culture of even these peoples more closely we detect the influence of cultural elements of other origin, such as Russian literature, Far Eastern painting, and Indian religion. In the Catholic and Protestant countries, however, these influences, though magnified by the genius of some of the minds by which they have been conveyed, are really exotic and superficial. In spite of them, and in spite of the much stronger cultural influences of the modern West upon living non-Western societies, the members of such societies—for example, the Orthodox and other Oriental Christians, the Muslims, the Hindus, and the peoples of the Far East—are still living, with few exceptions, beyond the pale of that cultural world to which England and Scotland belong.

¹ These are the figures as they stood in the June of the year 1933. The states which were still not parties to the Pact at that date were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Salvador, Uruguay, Yaman.

² This is the list as it stood in the June of the year 1933. At this date 57 out of 68 states in the World were League members. Out of these 57, however, 2—namely Japan and Mexico—had given notice of intention to withdraw.

³ The economic interests of Great Britain in Latin America were, of course, enormous at this time; and, beyond a point, it is hardly possible to divorce economic and political interests from one another.

As we take further cross-sections at earlier dates, we find that, on all three planes, the geographical limits of the society which we are examining contract progressively. In a cross-section taken about A.D. 1675, while the contraction is not perhaps very great on the economic plane (at least if we take into account the mere extension of international trade and ignore its matter and volume), the boundaries on the political plane shrink until in Europe they coincide approximately with those on the cultural plane at the present day, while overseas they only include the fringes of America. In a cross-section taken about A.D. 1475, the overseas portions of the area disappear on all three planes alike, and even on the economic plane the boundaries contract until they too coincide approximately with those on the cultural plane—now confined to Western and Central Europe—except for a fast dissolving chain of commercial outposts round the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. In this cross-section, the boundaries of the society on all three planes are more or less coincident with those of the area in which the ecclesiastical primacy of the Pope was at that time effectively asserted. In a primitive cross-section, taken about A.D. 775, the boundaries shrink still further on all three planes, while becoming still more closely coincident as between one plane and another. At this date, the area of our society is almost restricted to what were then the dominions of Charlemagne on the West-European Continent and to the English 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire in Britain. It consists substantially of what the Romans had known as Gaul, with no foothold yet south-west of the Pyrenees and with only a narrow foothold north-east of the Rhine, but with lateral extensions into the northern parts of Italy beyond the Alps and into the southern parts of Britain beyond the Channel.¹ These limits are thrown into relief by the presence of recognizably alien societies on the further side of them. The Iberian Peninsula (apart from one enclave in Asturia) at this date belongs to the domain of a Muslim Arab Caliphate, Northern and North-Eastern Europe is in the hands of unconverted barbarians, the north-western fringes of the British Isles are held by 'Far Western' Christians who are unwilling to accept the pretensions of the Papacy, and South-Eastern Italy is under the ascendancy of the Byzantines.

A closer examination of this earliest cross-section enables us to give the cradle of our society a local name. As the ecclesiastical

¹ The late Sir J. W. Headlam-Morley defines the geographical nucleus of the Western World as the triangle Paris-Rome-Barcelona, and the furthest limits of its [eastward] expansion as Budapest-Prague-Cracow-Warsaw-Riga-Reval ('The Cultural Unity of Western Europe', in *The New Past*, ed. by Carter, E. H. (Oxford 1925, Blackwell), pp. 84-5). 'All outside [the] original homeland is foreign conquest; and other races, though apparently assimilated, still remain alien.' (Op. cit., p. 87.)

domain of the Pope it may be called Western Christendom;¹ as the political domain of Charlemagne, whose home territory was the Frankish State of Austrasia, it may be called the World of the Franks—a name which survives in the Oriental Christian word 'Frangia' and in the Muslim word 'Feringhistan'.²

This 'Frankish' name is not altogether apt, for even in Charlemagne's time, when the geographical extension of our society was smaller than it has ever been since, while Charlemagne's dominions covered a larger portion of Western Europe than has ever subsequently been united under a single government, the Kingdom of the Franks and the area of our society did not exactly coincide. The English, for example, had become members of the society by that time without ever having come under Frankish rule, and there were other prominent members, like the Lombards, over whom the Frankish dominion was only transitory. Moreover, the name has been obsolete among the 'Franks' themselves since the close of the so-called 'Middle Ages'. At the same time, this name, as applied to us collectively by members of other societies, is the only common name which exists to-day for the whole of our society, and the fact that we have ceased to apply any common name to ourselves is historically significant. It means that we are no longer conscious of the presence in the World of other societies of equal standing; and that we now regard our society as being identical with 'civilized' Mankind and the peoples outside its pale as being mere 'Natives' of territories which they inhabit on sufferance, but which are morally as well as practically at our disposal, by the higher right of our assumed monopoly of civilization, whenever we choose to take possession.³ Conversely, we regard the internal divisions of our society—the national parts into which this society has come to be articulated—as the grand divisions of Mankind, and classify the members of the Human Race as Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans, and so on, without remembering that these are merely subdivisions of a single group within the human family.

It is no accident that our common name for ourselves became extinct, and our separate names for our various national allegiances became prominent, towards the beginning of the so-called 'modern' period of our history, when our society began to establish what

¹ Not, of course, 'Christendom' without qualification, since the Christians of the Far West, the Near East, and the Middle East had at least an equal claim to the name, though Western Christendom (like these other Christendoms) did in practice call itself and think of itself as Christendom *par excellence* until the close of the so-called 'Middle Ages', when it ceased to have any common name for itself at all.

² 'All the Franks appear to have a uniform character to the Eastern nations.'—Hume, David: *Of National Characters*. Compare La Rue Franque, which was the principal commercial street in Smyrna before the great fire of 1922; Firank Zahmeti, the Turkish name for syphilis; and the term *lingua franca*.

³ What is the converse of 'Natives'? 'Lords of Creation'? For the connotation of the word 'Natives', see further I. C (iii) (b), below.

seemed until lately to be a secure and permanent ascendancy over the other living societies of the same class.¹ The historical fact, however, which is implicit in this oblivion of our common name is chiefly a feature of our own microcosm. It is not a fact which has an objective existence in the field of study which we are seeking to explore. The other societies have not ceased to exist simply because we have ceased to be aware of their existence; and we can hardly advance further in our search for an 'intelligible field of study' without reviving or inventing some name to denote our society as a whole and to distinguish it from other representatives of the species. Since the word 'Franks' has always been inaccurate and has now become exotic, it seems preferable to revive the name 'Western Christendom'. The objection to this is that, since the Reformation, religious allegiance has not only ceased to be the principal expression of the unity of our society, but has actually become one of the principal factors in its internal differentiation. It is therefore perhaps more accurate, as well as more concise, to omit the word 'Christendom' and to speak simply of 'the West' or 'the Western Society' or 'the Western World'—a geographical title which combines the logical merits of being without prejudice and without ambiguity with the practical merit of being equally applicable to a cross-section taken in Charlemagne's time and to a cross-section taken to-day, when this society has spread westward across the Atlantic Ocean and the American Continent until it now confronts the Far Eastern World, on the opposite shores of the Pacific, from the Philippines and Australia.

As soon as we bring our mental image of our own society into focus by finding a name for it, the images and the names of its counterparts in the contemporary world come into focus side by side with it, especially if we keep our attention fixed upon the cultural plane. On this plane, we can distinguish unmistakably the presence, in the world of to-day, of at least four other living societies of the same species as ours:

first, an 'Orthodox Christian' or Byzantine Society—whichever title we prefer²—in South-Eastern Europe and Russia³;

¹ From the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation, 'expansion abroad and dissolution at home' became the key-notes of our Western history. (Headlam-Morley, *op. cit.*, p. 86.)

² The title 'Orthodox Christian' is not inappropriate, since in this society (unlike our Western Society) religious allegiance has remained the principal expression of social unity. The alternative title 'Byzantine' has the merits of a geographical term. The geographical title which it would be most natural for a Western observer of the Byzantine World to employ, from his standpoint, is 'Near Eastern'. This, however, is inconvenient, because, in the modern Near East, the Byzantine Society is not the only inhabitant. An Islamic Society is also established there; and for this reason the title 'Near Eastern' is inconveniently ambiguous.

³ Notwithstanding the Communist régime which has been attempting, since A.D. 1917, to transform the complexion of society in Russia out of all recognition.

second, an 'Islamic' Society¹ with its focus in the arid zone which stretches diagonally across North Africa and the Middle East from the Atlantic to the outer face of the Great Wall of China;

third, a 'Hindu' Society² in the tropical sub-continent of India, south-east of the arid zone;

fourth, a 'Far Eastern' Society in the sub-tropical and temperate regions between the arid zone and the Pacific.

On a closer inspection, we can also discern two sets of what appear to be fossilized relics of similar societies now extinct, namely:

one set including the Monophysite Christians of Armenia, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Abyssinia and the Nestorian Christians of Kurdistan and Malabar,³ as well as the Jews and the Parsees;

a second set including the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia and the Hinayanian Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, as well as the Jains in India.

It is interesting to notice that, when we turn back to the cross-section at A.D. 775, we find that the number and the identity of the societies on the world-map are nearly the same as at the present time. Substantially, the world-map of societies of this species has remained constant since the first emergence of our Western Society. In the struggle for existence, the West has driven its contemporaries to the wall and has entangled them in the meshes of its economic and political ascendancy, but it has not yet disarmed them of their distinctive cultures.⁴ Hard pressed though they are, they can still call their souls their own, and this means that the mental strife has not yet reached a decision.⁵ In the gladiatorial arena, the Secutor, even when the Retiarius's net was about his

¹ This title is not inappropriate, for the same reason that the title 'Orthodox Christian' is not inappropriate for the Byzantine Society; and there is no simple geographical label ready to hand.

² Not 'Indian', since this society extends beyond the geographical boundaries of Continental India—e.g. into the Indonesian Archipelago (Hali)—while in Continental India it is not the only inhabitant, the Islamic Society being established there also, as in the Near East.

³ The Nestorian community in Malabar, after half a century of union with the Roman Church, transferred its allegiance to the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch in the third quarter of the seventeenth century after Christ.

⁴ 'In the valley of the Rhine, throughout the whole of France and the Latin countries,* one can never be far away from the consciousness of the Roman period, which is the matrix from which all later stages have sprung. In Cologne or Trèves, that which is of the tenth or eleventh century already begins to wear the air of modernity; in Danzig or in Cracow, anything before the fourteenth century is remote antiquity. And, as you go still farther east, new, strange and foreign elements intrude themselves upon you—the cupolas and minarets of Russia and the Moslem—but nowhere do we find anything comparable to the succession of the Gothic and the Renaissance. Here we find that our familiar formulas no longer serve us.' (Headlam-Morley, in *op. cit.*, p. 83.)

⁵ This phenomenon of 'collisions' between societies of this species ('Contact in Space') is examined in Part IX, below.

shoulders, had no cause to despair so long as he had not let the sword fall from his hand.¹

This reflection concludes our inquiry into the geographical situation and spatial extension of that 'intelligible field of historical study' which first attracted our attention as the unknown whole of which English history proved to be a part. We have succeeded in giving this 'intelligible field of study' a name—the 'Western Society'—and we have reached the positive conclusion that while even the original nucleus of this Western Society had a much wider geographical extension than any one of the nations into which it has become articulated, and while this extension has increased as the Western Society has grown older, the West has never become coextensive with the World on all planes of social life, and other societies of the same species have never ceased to exist in the World side by side with it.²

This conclusion on matters of historical fact carries with it a corollary regarding methods of historical study. It is evident that we must draw a sharp distinction between relations of two kinds: those between communities within the same society and those of different societies with one another. In the technical language of contemporary Western historians, who have perhaps over-emphasized the individuality of national communities and unduly ignored the individuality of the societies of which the nations are parts, these two kinds of relation are at present confounded under the ambiguous title 'international'; and hitherto much more attention has been paid to international relations in the literal sense of the term than to the other kind. For the advancement of historical knowledge, it seems desirable that our historians should distinguish the parochial relations between states within societies from the oecumenical relations between the societies themselves, and should devote a larger share of their energy and acumen to the study of these.

IV. THE EXTENSION OF OUR FIELD IN TIME

Having explored the extension of our Western Society in Space, we have next to examine its extension in Time. We are at once con-

¹ The representatives of the non-Western societies might find relief for their feelings in addressing us in the language in which Job replies to his comforters:

'No doubt but ye are the people, and wisdom shall die with you.

'But I have understanding as well as you; I am not inferior to you: yea who knoweth not such things as these?' (Job xii. 2-3.)

² 'We cannot write a history of Western Europe and of China in the same work. We can indeed write two separate histories and bind them in one volume, and include in it tracts on the history of India and that of the Bantu races, of the South American Indians and the Dyaks of New Guinea; but none the less we shall have no history here in any reasonable sense which we may give to the word, because throughout the greater part of their existence these different tribes and peoples lived their own life, completely independent of one another.' (Headlam-Morley in op. cit., p. 98.)

fronted with the difficulty that we cannot see into the future—a limitation which greatly restricts the amount of light that the contemporary historical study of this Western Society can throw upon the nature of the species to which the Western Society belongs. *Ex hypothesi*, we cannot survey the whole life of a society of which we ourselves are members, and which therefore will still be living its life as long as we remain alive to observe it. Western history will only become visible at full length and in true perspective after the Western Society has become extinct; and this spectacle—if it is ever to be beheld by human eyes—is necessarily reserved for future historians living in a different social environment from ours and taking their historical observations from a different angle of vision. For our part, we must inevitably be content to explore the time extension of the Western Society in the direction of its origins only, and must resign ourselves to ignorance of its latter end.¹

Let us try to analyse the geographical nucleus which was revealed by our earliest spatial cross-section, taken about A.D. 775; and let us begin by examining the analysis of this nucleus which our Western predecessors of that age made for themselves.

When Charlemagne's dominions were partitioned between his three grandsons by the Treaty of Verdun in A.D. 843, Lothaire as the eldest established his claim to possess his grandfather's two capitals of Aachen and Rome; and, in order that these might be connected by a continuous belt of territory, Lothaire was assigned a portion which straggled across the face of Western Europe from the mouths of the Tiber and the Po to the mouth of the Rhine, ignoring the barrier of the Alps and uniting Northern Italy under a single sovereignty with the Rhineland and the Netherlands. Lothaire's portion is commonly regarded as one of the curiosities of historical geography, chiefly because it finds no place on the political map of modern Europe as it is now articulated into national states. Nevertheless, the three Carolingian brothers were right in believing that Lothaire's portion was a zone of peculiar importance in our Western World. If we produce this zone north-westwards (ignoring the Channel as the treaty of A.D. 843 ignored the Alps) by adding to Lothaire's continental dominions the *dolmain* in Britain over which King Ecgberht of Wessex had established his hegemony before his death in A.D. 839, we shall find that we have plotted out the locus of a line which twice over has constituted one of the structural axes in the human geography of Western Europe.

If we go back to our spatial cross-section of the Western Society

¹ On this point see further Part V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 313, as well as Part XII, below.

at A.D. 775, and then watch it grow until it becomes the cross-section of the present day, we observe that a straight line running roughly south-east and north-west and drawn from Rome to the Roman Wall is, so to speak, the transverse axis of our geometrical figure. Its mid-point falls near Metz in Lorraine (Lotharingia)—once the capital of the Austrasian State which was the nucleus of Charlemagne's Empire, and now the principal fortress on the frontier between France and Germany. If, through Metz, we proceed to draw another line, at right angles to the first and therefore running roughly south-west and north-east, we obtain the main axis along which the Western Society has increased its geographical extension overland in both directions. South-westwards, this main axis was carried across the Pyrenees by Charlemagne himself in A.D. 778, extended to the mouth of the Guadalquivir by the Castilian conquests in the thirteenth century after Christ, and eventually produced across the Southern Atlantic into what is now Latin America. North-eastwards the same line was carried forward from the Rhine bridge-heads to the Elbe by Charlemagne between A.D. 772 and 804; to the Baltic, the Vistula, and the Carpathians within two centuries of Charlemagne's death, when Scandinavia, Poland, and Hungary were admitted to membership in Western Christendom; and to the Pacific at the close of the seventeenth century, when the Muscovite Empire, which had expanded to the Pacific rather more than half a century earlier, was received into the Western Society as a proselyte.

The West has also increased its extension by producing first one end of the transverse axis and then the other across the sea. In 'the Middle Ages', the North Italian arm was produced first into Southern Italy and Sicily and then over the Mediterranean into its eastern hinterlands, in the movement of political and economic expansion which is conveniently though inadequately described as 'the Crusades'.¹ In its day, this south-eastward expansion went very far. The thrust, at its strongest, carried Venetian trade to India across the Isthmus of Suez and the Venetian traveller Marco Polo to Peking across the Eurasian Steppe in the hinterland of the Black Sea. Ultimately, the movement was a failure, and nearly all the ground gained in four centuries had been lost by A.D. 1475.² The production of the transverse axis from its north-western extremity in England, which followed in the succeeding age of Western history, has achieved results which are to all appearance of a more enduring character. It has filled North America with an English-speaking population from the Rio Grande to the Arctic

¹ For the character of this movement, see further V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 242-4, as well as Parts IX and X, below.

² For the nature of the failure, see further Parts IX and X, below.

Circle, and, radiating from the North Atlantic into all the other seas of the World, it has planted new communities of English origin and Western culture round the southern rim of the Pacific to share the possession of that ocean with the peoples of India and the Far East. This was the bearing of the line embedded in Lotharingia upon the subsequent geographical expansion of the Western Society; but Lothaire and his brothers were no more able to look into the future than we are; and, if they divined that this line was important, that was because they in their generation were living under the shadow of a past in which the geographical significance of the line had also been great, though in relation to a different geometrical figure.

Both Lothaire and his grandfather ruled from Aachen to Rome under the title of Roman Emperor; the Imperial title was also occasionally assumed by the English Kings of Wessex, who in the Carolingian Age exercised a miniature hegemony of their own in the *alter orbis* of Britain; and the line stretching from Rome across the Alps to Aachen and from Aachen across the Channel to the Roman Wall had once been one of the principal bulwarks of the then extinct Roman Empire. By running a line of communications north-westwards from Rome across the Alps, establishing a military frontier along the left bank of the Rhine, and covering the left flank of that frontier by the annexation of Southern Britain, the Romans had cut off the western extremity of Transalpine Continental Europe and annexed it to an empire which, except in this quarter, was substantially confined to the periphery of the Mediterranean Basin. Thus the line embedded in Lotharingia entered into the geographical structure of the Roman Empire before Lothaire's time as well as into that of the Western World after it; but the geometrical figures of the Roman Empire and the Western World were not the same, and the function of this particular line in their respective geographical structures was utterly different. In the Roman Empire it was the latest outer frontier of a society, at the limit where its expansion in one direction had come to an end; in the Western World it has been the original base-line from which a society has expanded in all directions. During the deep sleep of the interregnum (*circa* A.D. 375-675) which intervened between the break-up of the Roman Empire and the gradual emergence of our Western World out of the chaos, a rib was taken from the side of the older society and was fashioned into the backbone of a new creature of the same species.

This geographical analysis has been pursued at some length because it offers us a clue for following the Time-extension of our Western Society further back towards its ultimate origins. It

indicates two things: first, that in tracing the life of the Western Society back behind our earliest spatial cross-section at A.D. 775, we begin to find it presented to us in terms of something other than itself—in terms of the Roman Empire and of the society to which the Roman Empire belonged—and, second, that any elements which we can trace back from Western history into the history of that other society may have quite different functions and different degrees of importance in these two different associations.

Lothaire's portion became the base-line of the Western World because 'the Church', pushing up towards the Roman frontier from the rear, here encountered 'the Barbarians' pressing down upon the frontier from the 'no-man's-land' outside, and eventually here gave birth to a new society. Accordingly, the historian of the Western Society, in tracing its roots down into the past from this point, will concentrate his attention at lower levels (that is to say, at earlier dates) upon the histories of 'the Church' on the one hand and of 'the Barbarians' on the other; and he will find it possible to follow both these histories downwards (that is to say, backwards in time) as far as the economic and social and political revolutions of the last two centuries B.C. into which 'the Graeco-Roman World' was thrown by the vast shock of the Hannibalic War. Why did Rome stretch out a long arm towards the north-west and gather into her Empire the western corner of Transalpine Europe? Because she was drawn in that direction by her life-and-death struggle with Carthage. Why, having once crossed the Alps, did she stop at the Rhine and not push on to the better physical frontier of the Baltic, the Vistula, and the Dniestr? Because in the Augustan Age her vitality gave out after two centuries of exhausting wars and revolutions. Why did 'the Barbarians' ultimately break through? Because, when a frontier between a more highly and a less highly civilized society ceases to advance at the more backward society's expense, the balance does not settle down into a stable equilibrium but inclines, with the passage of time, in the more backward society's favour.¹ Why, when 'the Barbarians' broke through the Roman frontier, did they encounter 'the Church' on the other side? Materially, because the economic and social revolutions following the Hannibalic War had brought multitudes of slaves from the Oriental World to work in the devastated areas of the West, and this forced migration of Oriental labour had been followed by the peaceful propagation of Oriental religions through 'the Graeco-Roman World'.² Spiritually, because these religions, with their promise of an 'other-worldly' personal salvation, found

¹ For an examination of this phenomenon see Part VIII, below.

² For this, see further II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213-6, below.

fallow fields to cultivate in the devastated souls of a 'dominant minority' which had failed, in this world, to save the fortunes of the 'Graeco-Roman' Society.¹

At this point the student of Western history will be inclined to stop. He will have traced the roots of his Western Society down as far as it seems possible to distinguish them. It is noticeable, however, that although by the time he reaches this level he is forced to think almost entirely in 'Graeco-Roman' and not in Western terms, the elements in 'Graeco-Roman' history which are engaging his attention are not those which would appear to be of capital importance to a historian who was studying 'Graeco-Roman' or 'Hellenic'² history in the same age for its own sake.

To the student of Hellenic history, both the Christians and the Barbarians would present themselves as creatures of an alien underworld—the 'internal' and the 'external' proletariat,³ as he might call them, of the Hellenic Society in its last phase.⁴ He would point out that the great masters of Hellenic culture, down to and including Marcus Aurelius, almost ignore their existence, and that in fact they did not begin to come into existence until after the Hannibalic War. He would diagnose both the Christian Church and the Barbarian war-bands as morbid affections which only appeared in the body of the Hellenic Society after its physique

¹ For this spiritual movement, see further V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 80-2, below.

² 'Hellenic' seems a better title than 'Graeco-Roman' for this society. The name is not only shorter and less clumsy but also really more accurate, since this society was originally created by the ancient Greeks or 'Hellenes' and the Romans only entered into the 'Hellenic' inheritance at a late date, when the Hellenic Civilization was already in decline. Accordingly, the term 'Hellenic' will be used in this sense in this Study hereafter. The term does, of course, beg the question—which the hyphenated compound 'Graeco-Roman' leaves open—of the relative importance of the roles which were played in the history of this civilization by the Romans and the Greeks respectively.

³ The word 'proletariat' is used here and hereafter in this Study to mean any social element or group which in some way is 'in' but not 'of' any given society at any given stage of such society's history. That is, it is used in the sense of the Latin word *proletarius* from which it is derived. In Roman legal terminology, *proletarii* were citizens who had no entry against their names in the census except their progeny (*proles*). The following definition is given in the *Compendiosa Doctrina per Litteras* of Nonius Marcellinus: 'Proletarii dicti sunt plebei qui nihil rei publicae exhibeant sed tantum prolem sufficient.' (Quoted by Bruns, C.C., in *Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui*, ed. 7 (Tübingen 1909, Mohr), Pars Posterior, p. 65.) To say that 'proletarians' contribute nothing to the community but their progeny is a euphemism for saying that the community gives them no remuneration for any other contributions that they may make (whether voluntarily or under compulsion) to the common weal. In other words, a 'proletariat' is an element or group in a community which has no 'stake' in that community beyond the fact of its physical existence. It is in this broad sense that the word 'proletariat' is used throughout this Study, and not in the specialized sense of an urban labouring population which employs the modern Western economic technique called 'Industrialism' and is employed under the modern Western economic régime called 'Capitalism'. This restricted usage of the word, which is current to-day, was given this currency by Karl Marx, as one of the technical terms which he coined in order to convey the results of his study of history. More than one of these Marxian coinages have become current even among people who reject the Marxian dogmas.

⁴ For an examination of the phenomena of 'the internal proletariat' and 'the external proletariat', see the present Part, Division C (i) (a), pp. 53-62, below, and also Parts IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII, *passim*, especially V. C (i) (c) 2 and 3, vol. v, pp. 58-337.

had been permanently undermined and its character enfeebled by that great disaster; but the Hannibalic War, he would add, set a term to the creative period of Hellenic history. The student of Hellenic history who wishes 'to add to the knowledge of his own subject' should concentrate his attention on what went before. From the Hannibalic War onwards, it is his melancholy task to trace how the healthy native tissues of the stricken society were gradually eaten away by cancerous growths until death at last put an end to the victim's disorders. He is not called upon to study the physiology and the growth of these cancers themselves. It is sufficient for him to record the destructive results of their ravages. 'I have described the triumph of Barbarism and Religion', Gibbon writes as he brings his history to a close.¹

Thus a student of Hellenic history and a student of Western history may both be studying the last phase of Hellenic history and yet their fields of study may show very little common ground. The reason is that they are concerned respectively with two histories which overlap in time but which are nevertheless distinct from one another. The student of Hellenic history, who is following up the social stratum that here still occupies the surface towards a point where this particular stratum disintegrates and disappears, is not primarily interested in the social stratum beneath it, which only appears on the surface beyond the point at which the object of his own study comes to an end. Conversely, the student of Western history, who is tracing this second stratum backwards from those sections of it which lie exposed on the surface to the section which is buried underground, regards the overlying stratum of the Hellenic Society, which can teach him little about the subsequent history of the Western Society, as so much useless rock, which has to be blasted away if he is to succeed in laying bare the subterranean section of the Western stratum which he is attempting to trace back to its starting-point.

This investigation enables us to draw a positive conclusion regarding the backward extension of our Western Society in Time. Just as we found that the spatial extension of this 'intelligible field', while wider than that of any single nation belonging to it, was narrower, even in its most extensive spatial cross-section, than the entire surface of the Earth and than the whole living generation of Mankind, so we now find that its backward extension in Time, while somewhat longer than that of any single nation belonging to it, is not so long, even when we take into account the length of its roots underground, as the span of Time during which the species of which it is a representative has been in existence. This conclusion

¹ *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chapter lxxi.

follows from the fact that, in the process of tracing the history of our Western Society backward towards its origins, we strike upon the last phase of another society of the same kind, the origins of which evidently lie considerably further back in the past.

This conclusion regarding the age and origins of the Western Society carries with it a corollary regarding 'the continuity of history'.

'The continuity of history' is the most attractive of all the conceptions which have been framed on the analogy of the 'classical' Western Physical Science by Western historians; yet, in view of its suspect origin, we must harden our hearts and criticize it in the light of the foregoing investigation. What, precisely, did the inventors of the term mean to imply? If they simply meant that 'the continuity of history' was a particular instance of the continuity of Life, then their formula is an unimpeachable but not very illuminating truism. Between all the manifestations of Life some kind of continuity is certainly discernible—between the amoeba and the vertebrate, between the ape and the human being, between parents and offspring in a family—but this continuity is so abstract that the apprehension of it only brings us to the threshold of understanding what Life is. We hardly begin to learn anything about the nature of Life until we succeed in distinguishing the points of relative discontinuity in the ever-rolling stream—the bends which intervene between the straight reaches, the rapids which isolate from one another the quiet navigable stretches, the crests and troughs of the waves which arise when the waters are troubled, the seracs and crevasses which are fashioned by age-long pressure into a myriad forms when the waters are frozen into a glacier. In other words, the concept of continuity is only significant as a symbolic mental background on which we can plot out our perceptions of discontinuity in all their actual variety and complexity. Let us apply this general observation concerning the study of Life to the study of History. Does the term 'continuity of history', as used by modern Western historians, tacitly imply that the mass, momentum, volume, velocity, and direction of the social stream of human life are constant, or, short of being literally constant, vary within such narrow limits that the variations have no historical significance? If the term carries any such implication as this, then however attractive it may seem at first sight it is seriously misleading, as is shown by the results of our inquiry into the backward Time-extension of our Western Society.

In studying Time-relations in History, our inquiry has demonstrated that we must distinguish sharply between two degrees of continuity: the continuity between successive chapters, or successive periods and phases, in the history of one and the same

society, and the continuity between the lives of different societies. In the abstract, no doubt, the fact of continuity can be demonstrated in the latter case as well as in the former, however great the difference in the degree of continuity may be; but if we merely consider the two cases in the abstract and in isolation from one another, we shall not increase our understanding of either. We must consider them comparatively, and from this angle of vision it is the relative discontinuity in the second case which is the significant phenomenon.

We might express the qualitative difference between these two kinds of continuity by an analogy from the lives of human beings. The chapters in the history of one and the same society resemble the successive experiences of a single person; the 'affiliations' and 'apparentations' between one society and another resemble the relations between parent and child. First, the child physically inherits certain qualities from the parents at conception; then, after the crisis of birth has produced a violent separation between mother and child, the child's life is unconsciously moulded in infancy by the parental environment; next, after it attains consciousness, its childish imagination is dominated by parental emotions and images; and later, as it grows up, it educates itself by deliberately studying its parents' grown-up feelings and thoughts and imitating or eschewing their grown-up actions. The sum total of these parental influences upon the child is no doubt very great. Nevertheless, the child is in some sense a separate individual from the moment when it is conceived; and unless at maturity it makes itself independent of its parents and succeeds in solving the problems of life out of its own resources, it will not have become a new 'grown-up' person fit to procreate and educate children of its own. When we compare the continuity between the lives of parent and child with the continuity between the successive experiences in the life of one or other of these individuals, the relative discontinuity in the phenomena of 'apparentation' and 'affiliation' is the feature that strikes us as significant. Conception, birth, and death fix a great gulf between the lives of one individual and another:

Inter enim iectast vitae pausa, vageque
Deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes.¹

V. SOME PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS

The first stage of our inquiry has now reached its term, and it may be convenient to sum up our provisional conclusions. They can be stated as follows:

- (a) The 'intelligible fields of historical study', whose limits we

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 861-2.

have roughly established by working outwards and backwards from the standpoint of our own country in our own day, are societies which have a greater extension, in both Space and Time, than national states or city-states, or any other political communities.¹

(b) Such political communities (national states, city-states, and the like) are not only narrower in their spatial extension and shorter-lived in their Time-extension than the respective societies to which they belong, but their relation to these societies is that of inseparable parts to indivisible wholes. They are simply articulations of the true social entities and are not independent entities in themselves. Societies, not states, are 'the social atoms' with which students of history have to deal.

(c) The societies of which national states like Great Britain or city-states like Athens are parts, while they are (unlike their parts) independent entities in the sense that each of them constitutes, by itself, an 'intelligible field of historical study', are at the same time related to one another in the sense that they are all representatives of a single species of society.

(d) No one of the particular societies which we have been studying embraces the whole of Mankind or extends spatially over the whole habitable and navigable surface of the Planet or is coeval with the species of which it is one representative. Our Western Society, for example, which is still alive, was not conceived until the Hellenic Society had passed its maturity, while the Hellenic Society—even if (as is not the case) it proved, on being traced back, to be one of the original representatives of the species—has been extinct for twelve and a half centuries, so that in any case its complete life-span would fall short of the still uncompleted life-span of the species by that much already.

(e) While the continuity between the histories of one society and another is very much slighter in degree than the continuity between different chapters in the history of any single society (indeed, so

¹ This conception of societies was already familiar, three-quarters of a century ago, to de Gobineau:

'Il est nécessaire de bien expliquer d'abord ce que j'entends par une société. Ce n'est pas le cercle plus ou moins étendu dans lequel s'exerce, sous une forme ou sous une autre, une souveraineté distincte. La république d'Athènes n'est pas une société, non plus que le royaume de Magadha, l'empire du Pont ou le Califat d'Égypte au temps des Fatimites. Ce sont des fragments de société qui se transforment sans doute, se rapprochent ou se subdivisent sous la pression des lois naturelles que je cherche; mais dont l'existence ou la mort ne constitue pas l'existence ou la mort d'une société. Leur formation n'est qu'un phénomène le plus souvent transitoire, et qui n'a qu'une action bornée ou même indirecte sur la civilisation au milieu de laquelle elle éclôt: Ce que j'entends par société, c'est une réunion, plus ou moins parfaite au point de vue politique, mais complète au point de vue social, d'hommes vivant sous la direction d'idées semblables et avec des instincts identiques. Ainsi l'Égypte, l'Assyrie, la Grèce, l'Inde, la Chine, ont été ou sont encore le théâtre où des sociétés distinctes ont déroulé leurs destinées, abstraction faite des perturbations survenues dans leurs constitutions politiques.' de Gobineau, le Comte J. A.: *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines*. (Paris 1853-5, Firmin-Didot, 4 vols., vol. i, pp. 11-12.)

much slighter as virtually to differ in kind), yet in the Time-relation between two particular societies of different age—namely, the Western and the Hellenic—we have observed features which we may describe metaphorically as ‘apparentation’ and ‘affiliation’.

In the light of these conclusions on matters of historical fact, we can draw certain other conclusions regarding History as a humane study. Its true concern is with the lives of societies in both their internal and their external aspects. The internal aspect is the articulation of the life of any given society into a series of chapters succeeding one another in time and into a number of communities living side by side. The external aspect is the relation of particular societies with one another, which has likewise to be studied in the two media of time and space.

This view of history may be supported by a further quotation from Lord Acton, one of the greatest minds among modern Western historians, in whose career the sterilizing influence of Industrialism upon historical thought is tragically apparent. Less daring than Mommsen, Acton did not write his great book before reaching middle age, and so he never wrote it at all. The spirit of the times, which transformed Mommsen into an editor of Latin inscriptions and an encyclopaedist of Roman Constitutional Law, established its ascendancy over Acton also. Mommsen’s *History of the Roman Republic* was safely published in 1856 before the author had completed his thirty-ninth year. The idea of a History of Liberty never faded out of Acton’s mind as long as he lived, but after his death in 1902 no manuscript of such a work was found among his papers, and several volumes of essays were all that could be gleaned for posthumous publication by his literary executors. Acton’s power of creative action was paralysed, partly perhaps by his inborn temperament, but almost certainly in larger measure by the unfavourable atmosphere of the times in which he lived. His ‘History of Liberty’ would assuredly have been committed to paper if he had been a contemporary of Voltaire or Gibbon or Turgot;¹ but in the industrial age his vision of the intelligible whole was perpetually being obstructed by the misapplied ideals of the

¹ Turgot’s contributions to the study of history were juvenilia. At the threshold of maturity he was permanently diverted from study to administration, and it is as a philosophic administrator rather than as an effective philosopher that he has made his mark. Yet in these immature and fragmentary essays he has made a greater permanent contribution to the understanding of history than Acton succeeded in making by devoting a long and laborious life to historical industry. Turgot’s essays on the study of history are: the two discourses ‘Sur les avantages que l’établissement du Christianisme a procurés au genre humain’, delivered at the Sorbonne on the 3rd July and the 11th September, 1750; the ‘Esquisse d’un plan de géographie politique’; the ‘Plan de deux discours sur l’histoire universelle’; and the ‘Plan du second discours sur l’histoire universelle, dont l’objet sera les progrès de l’esprit humain’. These essays, together with some illuminating ‘pensées et fragments’, will be found on pp. 589–678 of the second volume of the edition of Turgot’s collected works which was published at Paris in 1844 by Guillaumin.

exploitation of raw materials and the Division of Labour.¹ Just as Mommsen's name will always be associated with the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, so Acton's name will be with *The Cambridge Modern History*—though, less fortunate than Mommsen in this again, he did not live to carry to completion the great composite work which he planned and initiated.

In his letter to the contributors to *The Cambridge Modern History*, dated the 12th March 1898, Acton gave this glimpse of the vision that was in him:

'By Universal History I understand that which is distinct from the combined history of all countries, which is not a rope of sand, but a continuous development, and is not a burden on the memory, but an illumination of the soul. It moves in a succession to which the nations are subsidiary. Their story will be told, not for their own sake, but in reference and subordination to a higher series, according to the time and degree in which they contribute to the common fortunes of Mankind.'

It was a tragedy that the great historian who gained this Pisgah sight of the Promised Land should not have lived to cross over at the head of the followers whom he had led to the threshold. Was not Moses a greater leader than Joshua? And was not David, who hewed and assembled and fashioned the materials for the building of the Temple, a greater hero than Solomon, who had simply to put together the laboriously wrought blocks and beams which his father had placed ready to his hand? Could Solomon ever have built the Temple if he had not been able to begin where David left off? Could Joshua ever have conquered the Promised Land if Moses had not shepherded the Israelites across the Wilderness to the brink of Jordan? Who are we to criticize our predecessors into whose labours we have entered? If Acton's career was a tragedy, is not our criticism of Acton and the other Western historians of his generation and his school an act of ingratitude and impiety?

¹ 'It was . . . the desire not to speak before he had read everything that was relevant, whether in print or manuscript, that hindered so severely his output. His projected *History of Liberty* was, from the first, impossible of achievement. It would have required the intellects of Napoleon and Julius Caesar combined, and the lifetime of the patriarchs, to have executed that project as Acton appears to have planned it. A *History of Liberty*, beginning with the ancient world and carried down to our own day, to be based entirely upon original sources, treating both of the institutions which secured it, the persons who fought for it, and the ideas which expressed it, and taking note of all that scholars had written about every several portion of the subject, was, and is, beyond the reach of a single man. Probably towards the close of his life Acton had felt this. The *Cambridge Modern History*, which required the co-operation of so many specialists, was to him really but a fragment of this great project.

'His life marks what, in an age of minute specialism, must always be at once the crown and the catastrophe of those who take all knowledge for their province.

'His achievement is something different from any book. Acton's life-work was, in fact, himself. . . . Those who are nice in comparisons may weigh against the book lost the man gained. Those who loved him will know no doubt.' (Introduction to *The History of Freedom and other Essays* by John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, first Baron Acton, edited with an introduction by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence (London 1907 Macmillan).)

Perhaps we may defend ourselves by pointing out that Acton and his contemporaries, in their day, were no less critical of their own predecessors—the Gibbons and the Voltaires. In the world of scholarship, to give and take criticism is all in the day's work; and, each in our day, we may criticize our predecessors without becoming guilty of presumption so long as we are able to look forward without rancour to being criticized in our turn by our successors when our day is past. This is simply one out of many applications of an ethical 'law' which is so fundamental that its classic illustrations are to be found in primitive ritual and mythology. In the ritual of the Golden Bough at Nemi, 'the priest who slew the slayer and shall himself be slain' was free from blood-guiltiness because he had paid for doing what his predecessor had done by dooming himself to suffer his predecessor's fate at the hands of his successor. In the mythology of Olympus, Cronos overthrew Uranus in order to be overthrown in his turn by Zeus.

ὅς δ' ἔπειτ' ἔφν, τρια-
κτῆρος οἴχεται τυχών.¹

Moreover, in the realm of thought, this inevitable destiny is no tragedy on a philosophic view, because the thinker who is surpassed is not thereby superseded. If the touchstone of criticism proves his thought true metal, this means that he has added one more burnished link to the golden chain. He has poured into the ever-rolling stream of thought one more bucketful of pure water which will swell the river's volume and flow onward in its current far beyond that point on the bank where the mortal who made his contribution has stood for a moment of Time, and long after his intervention has been forgotten.

Cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas
semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest;
nec quisquam in barathrum nec Tartara deditur atra:
materies opus est ut crescant postera saecula;
quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur:
nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere, cadentque.
sic aliud ex alio nunquam desistet oriri
vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu.²

Furthermore, these universal conditions—the three conditions of criticism, transitoriness, and succession under which the scholar has to do his work—are not mere arbitrary decrees, imposed from without, to which the wise man bows, as the Stoic Cleanthes bowed to the dictates of Zeus,³ because he knows that they are ineluctable.

¹ Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 171-2.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 964-71.

³ The passage will be found in von Arnim, J.: *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. i, p. 118.

They are conditions that arise from the nature of scholarship itself, which makes its progress by a rhythmic alternation between two activities—the collection of materials and their arrangement, the finding of facts and their interpretation—just as a physical organism lives and grows by an alternation between eating and digestion. The old fable of the belly and the members points the moral that neither activity is superior or inferior, prior or posterior, primary or parasitic, but that each is inseparable from the other as a part of the same whole and complementary to the other as a phase in the same recurrent process. For the alternation perpetually recurs in virtue of the very nature of thought. When the mind is employed in finding facts, its sheer success inhibits it sooner or later from fact-finding uninterruptedly *ad infinitum*. Sooner or later it finds itself so formidably beleaguered by the mass of facts which it has gathered round it that, until it has sorted them out and arranged them in some kind of order, it can no longer sally out into the Universe to gather more. Then the mind changes its activity perforce and employs itself for a season in making syntheses and interpretations. Yet now, once again, its sheer success inhibits it from working, uninterruptedly and *ad infinitum*, at bringing order out of chaos. Sooner or later, it finds that it has reduced to order all those materials which it had collected in its last fact-finding reconnaissance. Fresh facts must now be found before the process of synthesis and interpretation can be carried further. And so, in due course, the mind changes its activity once more and issues out, by the new paths which it has cleared for itself, into the Universe that ever awaits its coming in order to gather facts there again, as before, until the time approaches for the next attempt at synthesis and interpretation on a new plan and perhaps on a larger scale. No collection of facts is ever complete, because the Universe is without bounds. And no synthesis or interpretation is ever final, because there are always fresh facts to be found after the first collection has been provisionally arranged.

This rhythm is native to thought in all its different channels. In the channel of Physical Science, we have seen that thought has recently passed out of a fact-finding phase into the next phase of synthesis and interpretation.¹ In the channel of historical thought,

¹ A clear-sighted recognition of this change of phase in the process of scientific thought will be found, for example, in the Harveian Oration which was delivered on the 19th October 1931 in London, at the Royal College of Physicians, by Dr. Robert Hutchison, as reported in *The Times* of the 20th October 1931:

'In the apparatus of knowledge, they had immense advantages compared with the men of Harvey's day. Our danger rather was that, owing to the accumulation of knowledge, Science might be suffocated in its own secretions; a remedy for that was one of the pressing needs of our generation. It was no longer possible for any man to take all knowledge for his province. Specialism was inevitable; but though favourable to the accumulation of facts, it was bad for the philosophy of knowledge. There was too little

we may foresee that a corresponding transition from the fact-finding to the synthetic and interpretative activity is destined to take place to-day or to-morrow.

'Data of one kind or another are not so difficult to obtain; but generalisation is another matter. The social scientist may resent the premature generalisations of his predecessors. He will himself not get very far unless he himself tentatively generalises; unless, in a word, he has ideas as well as data. Essays and investigations may be piled mountain-high; they will never by themselves constitute a science or a philosophy of economics, psychology or society. The two processes—the making of hypotheses and the gathering of data—must go on together, reacting upon each other. For in the social sciences, as elsewhere, generalisation is at once a test of and a stimulus to minute and realistic research. The generalisations will not endure; why should they? They have not endured in mathematics, physics and chemistry. But, then, neither have the data. Science, social or other, is a structure: "A series of judgments, revised without ceasing, goes to make up the incontestable progress of Science. We must believe in this progress, but we must never accord more than a limited amount of confidence to the forms in which it is successively vested."'¹

As we pursue our Study of History, we shall find² that this rhythmic alternation between two antithetic yet complementary activities, which is native to thought in general and to historical thought in particular, is also native to History itself.

speculation and too little use of the imagination; and most scientific literature was barren in ideas. It might be a good thing if there were a close time in laboratory work for, say, five years, to enable them to digest the huge accumulation of knowledge they already possessed and to think out new lines of advance.'

¹ Flexner, Abraham: *Universities: American, English, German* (Oxford 1930, University Press), pp. 12-13, quoting Duclaux, E.: *Pasteur: the History of a Mind* (English translation: Philadelphia and London 1920, Saunders), p. 111.

² In Part II. B, below.

C. THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CIVILIZATIONS

I. A SURVEY OF SOCIETIES OF THE SPECIES

(a) A PLAN OF OPERATIONS

IN the preceding investigation¹ we have established the existence of societies which (unlike their articulations called states) are independent entities in the sense that each of them constitutes by itself an 'intelligible field of historical study', but which at the same time are all representatives of a single species. The next step in a study of History is to find out more about the species to which such societies belong; and the natural way to proceed is to make a comparative study of the societies belonging to it. The necessary prelude to this comparative study is to identify as many representatives of the species as we can.

For this preliminary survey, certain simple operations suggest themselves.

First, we start with five living representatives of the species—the Western, Orthodox Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and Far Eastern societies—which we have identified already.

Second, we may search for representatives of the species, belonging to an older generation, to which the other four of the living five may be 'affiliated' in the way in which our Western Society has been found to be 'affiliated' to a now extinct society which we have called the Hellenic.

Third, we may examine our two sets of what appear to be fossilized relics of societies now extinct: namely, the one set which includes the Monophysite Christians of Armenia, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Abyssinia, the Nestorian Christians of Kurdistan and Malabar, the Jews, and the Parsees; and the other set which includes the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia and the Hinayanian Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, and the Jains of India. These fossils may either prove to be remnants of extinct societies which we have identified already, or they may give us clues to other representatives of the species on which we have not yet laid hand.

Fourth, we may trace back to its source the life-history of any extinct society which we have succeeded in identifying in this way, in order to find out whether it is 'affiliated' or otherwise related, in its turn, to some other society that is one generation older again.

Fifth, if the preceding operations succeed even so far as to enable us to double the number of specimens with which we start,

we may find ourselves in a position to pass over from the genealogical to the comparative method: that is to say, we may be able, in a survey of our literary and archaeological records, to identify, by analogy with the specimens identified already, some additional representatives of the species which are neither themselves alive to-day nor are related to any of the living representatives by 'apparentation' or any other kind of relation, either in the first or in the second degree, and which have not left their trace on the world of our day in the form of fossils.

Sixth and last, we may search (on the lines of the second of our operations) for otherwise unidentified societies which may be 'apparented' or otherwise related to any of the societies which the fifth of our operations may have brought to light.

Before we attempt to carry out this plan of campaign, there is a question of procedure which we have to decide: What are the tokens of Apparentation-and-Affiliation which we are to look out for, and which we are to accept as valid if we find them, in operations two, four, and six?¹ Let us try, for working purposes, to determine our tokens empirically by examining the particular example of Affiliation-and-Apparentation which has come to our notice already:² namely, the historical relation between the Western Society and the Hellenic Society. In investigating the relation between these two societies, we came across several social phenomena which were evidently of the essence of the relation and which were also so distinct and striking in this instance that we might reasonably expect to recognize other instances of them if they occurred in our survey of relations between other societies.

The first of these phenomena was the Roman Empire: a 'universal state',³ incorporating the whole of the Hellenic Society in a single political community in the last phase of Hellenic history, upon which we stumbled in trying to trace the history of the Western Society back to its roots. This phenomenon of a 'universal state' is striking because it stands out in sharp contrast to the multiplicity of local states—*peritura regna*⁴—into which the Hellenic Society had been articulated before the Roman Empire arose, and in equally sharp contrast to the similar multiplicity of local states into which our own Western Society has been articulated ever since it emerged from the ruins in which the Hellenic Society

¹ In the life of the Hellenic Society, in which parents were permitted by social convention, and not forbidden by law, to repudiate responsibility for new-born children and to expose them either to perish or to be brought up by some compassionate passer-by, it was the custom to leave with the exposed child some tokens of identity (*γνωστικα*), in order that a possibility of re-establishing relations between child and parents might be kept open to meet the perhaps improbable contingency of the child surviving.

² In I. B (iv), above.

³ This phenomenon of 'Universal States' is examined further in Part VI, below.

⁴ Virgil, *Georg.* ii, l. 498.

was left after the Roman Empire's fall.¹ The outlines of the Roman Empire in the time-dimension are still further sharpened by the qualitative difference between it and the dispensations which preceded and followed it immediately. We found that it was immediately preceded by what we may call a 'Time of Troubles',² going back at least as far as the Hannibalic War,³ in which the Hellenic Society was no longer creative and was indeed patently in decline—a decline which the establishment of the Roman Empire arrested for a time but which proved in the end to be the symptom of an incurable and deadly disease that eventually destroyed the Hellenic Society, and the Roman Empire with it.⁴ Again, the Roman Empire, when it fell, was immediately followed by a kind of 'interregnum' between the disappearance of the Hellenic Society and the emergence of our Western Society.

In that part of the former domain of the Roman Empire which eventually became the cradle of our Western Society, the vacuum in the time-dimension which is represented by this 'interregnum' was filled by two institutions which were alike in being transitional, though there was a vast difference in the degree of importance of their respective historical functions. These institutions were 'the Church' established by the spread of the Christian religion through the interior of the Roman Empire, and a bevy of ephemeral 'successor-states' arising on the former territory of the Empire out of the so-called *Völkerwanderung*⁵ of 'the Barbarians' from the no-man's-land beyond the Imperial frontiers.

Placing ourselves at the standpoint of the Hellenic Society,⁶ we have called the Christians 'the internal proletariat' and the Barbarians 'the external proletariat' of this society in its last phase, when the leaven of creativeness in the Hellenic culture had lost its power to transfigure Mankind, and when even the salt of the Hellenic tradition had lost its savour, so that 'the heirs of the kingdom'⁷ of Hellenism had ceased to perform their fathers' function as pioneers in one of the great experiences of Humanity and had degenerated into a 'dominant minority', holding down by might

¹ This double contrast between the Roman Empire and the political formations by which it was preceded and succeeded respectively is brought out by Freeman in the eloquent passages quoted on pp. 342 and 344, below.

² The classical 'Time of Troubles', for which the name was originally coined, was a passage of Russian history at the opening of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era (the episode of 'the False Dmitri' and its sequel).

³ On closer investigation, we shall find that this 'Time of Troubles' in the Hellenic World, immediately preceding the establishment of the Roman Empire, went back not merely to the Hannibalic War but to the Peloponnesian War, i.e. twice as far back as the Hannibalic War from the date of the establishment of the Empire, which for convenience we may equate conventionally with the date of the Battle of Actium, i.e. 31 B.C. (See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 62-3, below.)

⁴ For the course of this decline, see further Part V, *passim*, below.

⁵ 'The Wandering of the Nations'.

⁶ See pp. 41-2, above.

⁷ James ii. 5.

and main a proletarian underworld which no longer voluntarily followed their lead, as, in our own Western World in the eighteenth century of the Christian era, the English Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland held down the Catholic Irishry.

The progressive estrangement of the 'internal proletariat' of the Hellenic World from the 'dominant minority' in the course of the decline of the Hellenic Civilization has been vividly portrayed by a nineteenth-century French philosopher from whose work we have quoted already.

'On a admiré avec raison l'extrême homogénéité d'idées et de vues qui, dans les états grecs de la belle époque, dirigeait le corps entier des citoyens. . . . A Rome, avant les guerres puniques, il en était de même, et la civilisation du pays était uniforme, incontestée. Dans sa façon de procéder, elle s'étendait du maître à l'esclave; tout le monde y participait à des degrés divers, mais ne participait qu'à elle. Depuis les guerres puniques chez les successeurs de Romulus, et chez tous les Grecs depuis Périclès et surtout depuis Philippe, ce caractère d'homogénéité tendit de plus en plus à s'altérer. Le mélange plus grand des nations amena le mélange des civilisations, et il en résulta un produit extrêmement multiple, très savant, beaucoup plus raffiné que l'antique culture, qui avait cet inconvénient capital, en Italie comme dans l'Hellade, de n'exister que pour les classes supérieures, et de laisser les couches de dessous tout à fait ignorantes de sa nature, de ses mérites et de ses voies. La civilisation romaine, après les grandes guerres d'Asie, fut sans doute une manifestation puissante du génie humain; cependant, à l'exception des rhéteurs grecs, qui en fournissaient la partie transcendante, des jurisconsultes syriens, qui vinrent lui composer un système de lois athée, égalitaire et monarchique, des hommes riches, engagés dans l'administration publique ou dans les entreprises d'argent, et enfin des gens de loisir et de plaisir, elle eut ce malheur de ne jamais être que subie par les masses. . . . De sorte qu'au-dessous de ce qu'on pourrait appeler les classes sociales, vivaient des multitudes innombrables, civilisées autrement que le monde officiel, ou n'ayant pas du tout de civilisation. C'était donc la minorité du peuple romain qui, en possession du secret, y attachait quelque prix. Voilà un exemple d'une civilisation acceptée et régnante, non plus par la conviction des peuples qu'elle couvre, mais par leur épuisement, leur faiblesse, leur abandon.'¹

The state of mind in which 'the dominant minority' lives out its life-in-death—a life which eventually becomes as burdensome to those who live it as it is for those who pay for it to be lived—has been described with profound psychological insight by a Roman poet of the last generation of the 'Time of Troubles', who knew

¹ De Gobineau, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 93-4. It is evident that we may regard 'the internal proletariat' and 'the external proletariat' of a declining civilization either as victims of or as parasites upon 'the dominant minority', according to the standpoint in which we place ourselves.

at first hand the distracted Roman masters of a devastated Hellenic World:

Si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur
pondus inesse animo quod se gravitate fatiget,
e quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde
tanta mali tanquam moles in pectore constet,
haud ita vitam agerent ut nunc plerumque videmus
quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper
commutare locum quasi onus deponere possit.
exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille
esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque [revertit],
quippe foris nilo melius qui sentiat esse.
currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter,
auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans;
oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae,
aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit,
aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit.
hoc se quisque modo fugitat, quem scilicet, ut fit,
effugere haud potis est; ingratis haeret et odit
propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger.¹

These lines of Lucretius may be capped by a passage from Goethe, in which the modern Western poet describes the same spiritual malady with the same masterly touch:

Soll er gehen, soll er kommen?
Der Entschluss ist ihm genommen;
Auf gebahnten Weges Mitte
Wankt er tastend halbe Schritte,
Er verliert sich immer tiefer,
Siehet alle Dinge schiefer,
Sich und andre lästig drückend,
Atem holend und erstickend;
Nicht erstickt und ohne Leben,
Nicht verzweifelnd, nicht ergehen.
So ein unaufhaltsam Rollen,
Schmerzlich Lassen, widrig Sollen,
Bald Befreien, bald Erdrücken,
Halber Schlaf und schlecht Erquickern
Heftet ihn an seine Stelle
Und bereitet ihn zur Hölle.²

This was the moral incubus against which 'the internal proletariat' and 'the external proletariat' of the declining Hellenic Society reacted each after its kind—'the internal proletariat' through the Christian Church³ and 'the external proletariat' through the

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 1053-70.

² Goethe: *Faust*, ll. 11471-86.

³ It is significant that Lucretius's cure for the spiritual malady which he describes in the passage here quoted is commended in language of such a Christian flavour that

Barbarian *Völkerwanderung*—and in the institutions through which these proletarian reactions were expressed we have two more phenomena which may serve our turn as tokens of Apparentation-and-Affiliation.

The Christian Church is, of course, as striking a phenomenon as the Roman Empire—in the first place by reason of the ‘universality’ which it acquired from the Empire by growing up within its framework and deliberately taking the Empire’s organization as the basis of its own.¹ The Roman ‘universal state’ incorporated in itself the whole of the disintegrating Hellenic Society—the ‘dominant minority’ which was maintaining itself on the surface, ‘the internal proletariat’ which was pressing up from below, and ‘the external proletariat’ which was pressing in from outside. The ‘Catholic Church’² in its first phase conformed to the pattern of the Roman political universe by incorporating into itself the whole of ‘the internal proletariat’. In this phase, the universality of the Church fell short of that of the Empire inasmuch as it embraced only one of the three elements which the Empire in some sense held together. On the other hand, the Church’s hold over the affections and the allegiance of ‘the internal proletariat’ was far greater than the Empire’s hold over either portion of the proletarian underworld, because the Church had been established by ‘the internal proletariat’ themselves out of their own spiritual and material resources in order to satisfy their own sense of their own needs, whereas the Empire presented itself to them as an alien institution imposed upon them by force.

Thus, while the Empire was a house built upon the sands, which collapsed at a touch when the waters of ‘the external proletariat’ came and went in the spate of the *Völkerwanderung*, the Church proved, under this ordeal, to be a house founded upon the rock. We might express the same contrast in another simile by comparing the Empire to an old tree whose roots gradually decayed until a breath of wind was enough to tear them up and overthrow the solid trunk which tempests could not bend, and the Church to a young sapling whose stem swayed in the breeze while its roots remained firmly planted deep in the soil. In short, during the time when the Empire and the Church coexisted as occupants of the same field, the Empire was dead-alive while the Church was

no reader who scanned these lines without knowing their authorship would guess that they were written by a pre-Christian poet. The passage proceeds:

Quam bene si videat, iam rebus quisque relictis
naturam primum studeat cognoscere rerum,
temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae,
ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis
aetas, post mortem quae restat cumque, manenda.

¹ For a general examination of the institution of universal churches, see Part VII, below.

² The Greek adjective *καθολικός* = the Latin adjective *universus*.

animated by a fresh vitality. And so, when the moribund Empire fell, the ensuing 'interregnum' gave the living Church an opportunity to perform an act of creation. The Church then played the part of a chrysalis out of which there emerged in the fullness of time a new society of the same species as the old society which had disappeared—but disappeared without carrying away the Church in its ruin as it carried away the Empire. Thus the Catholic Church, like the Roman God Janus, was a figure with two faces: in one aspect the refuge of 'the internal proletariat' of an old society in decline, and in another aspect the chrysalis of a new society in gestation. Since the two societies—the Hellenic and the Western—into whose histories the Church entered in these quite different ways stood to one another in the relation which we have called Apparentation-and-Affiliation, we may take the phenomenon of a universal church playing this dual role *vis-à-vis* any two given societies as one of our tokens that such a pair of societies are 'apparented-and-affiliated' to one another.

The essence of the Christian Church, which at once differentiates it as an institution from the Roman Empire and explains how it was able to go on living and growing when the Empire perished, was the germ of creative power which it harboured, under apparently unfavourable conditions, in a social environment where the once potent indigenous forces of creation had failed.¹ We have found that this spark of life which was afterwards fostered and fanned into a flame was in fact introduced into the Hellenic World by 'natives' of Oriental worlds from whose broken ranks 'the internal proletariat' of the Hellenic Society was forcibly recruited—expatriated Oriental slaves and Oriental populations that were subjugated *in situ* by Macedonian and Roman arms without being uprooted.² This alien origin of the spark of life latent in the Christian Church—alien, that is, from the indigenous tradition of the society by whose internal proletariat the Church was established—is another point which may possibly serve as a token for identifying other universal churches that have played an analogous role in the Apparentation-and-Affiliation of other societies. At the same time we need not treat the presence of this feature as essential, and need not rule out other churches from our category *a priori* if we happen to find that their 'sparks of life'—or 'germs of creative power'—are not alien from but indigenous to the societies among whose internal proletariats these churches have arisen.³

¹ Excessere omnes, adytis arisque relictis

Di quibus imperium hoc steterat. (Virgil, *Aeneid*, Book II, ll. 351-2.)

² See pp. 40-1, above.

³ For a classification of universal churches on the criterion of the predominantly 'alien' or predominantly 'indigenous' origin of their inspirations, see V. C (iii), Table III, vol. vi, p. 329, below.

A third phenomenon which is associated with the Apparentation-and-Affiliation of the Hellenic and the Western Society is the *Völkerwanderung* in which 'the external proletariat' of the Hellenic Society came down in spate from the no-man's-land beyond the frontiers of the Roman Empire—Germans and Slavs from the forests of Northern Europe, Sarmatians and Huns from the Eurasian Steppe, Saracens from the Arabian Peninsula, Berbers from the Atlas and the Sahara. The ephemeral 'successor-states' which were set up on the former territories of the Roman Empire by these barbarian war-bands shared the stage of history with the Church during the interregnum between the disappearance of the Hellenic Society and the emergence of our Western Society—an interregnum which was the barbarians' 'heroic age'.¹

We may observe, however, that in comparison with the role of the Church the role of the Barbarians during this interlude was insignificant. The Church, as we have seen, was intimately concerned and not just accidentally associated with the 'affiliation' of our Western Society to the Hellenic Society. Its role *vis-à-vis* the 'affiliated' society was creative. It was the chrysalis out of which our Western Society emerged. On the other hand, the Barbarian 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire were not the chrysalides of the local states into which the Western Society eventually articulated itself after its emergence. Almost all of them perished by violence before the interregnum following the fall of the Roman Empire came to an end.² The Vandals and Ostrogoths were overthrown by counter-attacks on the part of the Roman Empire itself. The last convulsive flicker of the Roman flame sufficed to burn these poor moths to cinders. Others were overthrown in fratricidal warfare: the Visigoths received the first blow from the Franks and the *coup de grâce* from the Arabs; the Gepids were exterminated by a concerted attack on the part of the Avars and the Lombards; the struggle for hegemony between the states of the Barbarian 'Hep-tarchy' in Britain ended in the overthrow of all the rest by Wessex. The few survivors of this Ishmaelitic struggle for existence incontinently degenerated and then vegetated on as *fainéants* until they were extinguished by new political forces which possessed the indispensable germ of creative power. Thus the Merovingian and the Lombard dynasties were brushed aside by the Carolingians in order to clear the ground at last for laying the political foundations of a new Western Society. The Umayyads were brushed aside by the 'Abbasids in order to resume, in the life of an old Oriental Society, an indigenous movement which had been interrupted, a

¹ This phenomenon of 'heroic ages' accompanied by *Völkerwanderungen* is examined in Part VIII, below.

² On this point see further Part VIII, below.

thousand years earlier, by the violent intrusion of the Hellenic Society through the conquests of Alexander the Great.¹ In fine, there are only two out of all the Barbarian 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire that can be shown to have any lineal descendants among the local states into which the Western World is articulated to-day. The first of these two states is Austrasia, a fragment of the Frankish 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire which was rescued from decay by the Church and was fashioned into the nucleus of the Carolingian Empire. Through this process of reconstruction, the Austrasian-Frankish 'successor-state' indirectly gave rise to the local states which arose in the West out of the Carolingian Empire's ruins. The second 'successor-state' that has left issue is Wessex, which incorporated itself into the Kingdom of England, which eventually incorporated itself in turn into the United Kingdom of Great Britain. This historical continuity between the Wessex of the interregnum preceding the emergence of our Western Society and the Great Britain of to-day may be regarded as one of those exceptions that prove a rule.²

Thus the *Völkerwanderung* and its ephemeral products—the Barbarian 'successor-states'—are tokens, like the Church and the Empire, of the 'affiliation' of the Western Society to the Hellenic; but, like the Empire and unlike the Church, they are tokens and no more. When we turn from the study of symptoms to the study of causes, we find that, whereas the Church belonged to the future as well as to the past, the Barbarian 'successor-states', as well as the Empire, belonged to the past wholly and exclusively.³ The rise

¹ For the collisions between civilizations ('Contact in Space') see Part IX, below.

² Why was Wessex exceptional, among the Barbarian 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire, in having a future? At first sight the explanation might be expected to be geographical—the sheltered geographical situation of a state established in an *alter orbis* which was insulated from the European continent. Actually the real explanation is precisely the contrary of this. Wessex won a future for herself because she reacted successfully to an ordeal; and the challenge to which she responded was the intrusion into her *alter orbis* of invaders from Scandinavia. It was this that quickened her dry bones into life in King Alfred's day. On this point, see further II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 195-6 and 198-200, below.

³ 'Les Francs ont bien accepté le Christianisme, mais ils se montrent aussi incapables d'en faire la règle de leurs mœurs que de le propager autour d'eux. . . . La démoralisation et l'inertie du peuple valent celles de ses rois. Ce n'est pas la jeunesse mais la déchéance qu'atteste la société des temps mérovingiens et Grégoire de Tours (538-94), qui a vécu au milieu d'elle et en a été épouvanté, résume mélancoliquement son impression dans ces paroles découragées: *Mundus senescit*.' (Pirenne, H., in an article entitled 'Mahomet et Charlemagne', published in *La Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire*, i (1927).) In this and other articles, as well as in a book entitled *Les Villes du Moyen Age* (Brussels 1927, Lamartin), Monsieur Pirenne puts forward at the same time the thesis that the long-distance maritime commerce which, under the Roman Empire, had linked together the whole circumference of the *Orbis Romanus* round the coasts of the Mediterranean, continued right through the ensuing interregnum and was only brought to an end by the Arab conquest of North-West Africa at the turn of the seventh and eighth centuries of our era, which was the last convulsion of the *Völkerwanderung*. In *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. xix, Part 2 (London 1929, Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies), pp. 230-3, Monsieur Pirenne's thesis is combated by Mr. N. H. Baynes, who submits that 'the unity of the Mediterranean world was broken', as early

of these 'successor-states' was merely the obverse of the Empire's fall, and that fall inexorably portended theirs. Their destruction had been decreed before their foundation fell to be recorded. When the house built upon the sands had been carried away by the spate of the *Völkerwanderung*, what expectation of life could there be for a collection of hovels heaped up on the same treacherous foundations out of the boulders and shingle which the flood happened to have deposited as it came and went?

This low estimate of the Barbarians' contribution to the life of our Western Society would have shocked our Western historians of the last generation, who were inclined to place the Barbarians almost on a par with the Church itself as creators of our Western culture. Their over-estimate of the importance of the Barbarians' role can be traced to the influence on their thought of features in their environment which we have studied in other instances already.

For instance, the conceit of historical continuity led them to view the modern Western institution of responsible parliamentary representative government in a sovereign national state as a development of certain institutions of self-government which the Teutons were supposed to have brought with them from no-man's-land. An unprejudiced study indicates that these 'primitive Teutonic liberties', if they existed at all, were rudimentary institutions which are characteristic of Primitive Man in almost all times and places; and that, such as they were, they did not survive the *Völkerwanderung*. The leaders of the Teutonic Barbarian warbands were military adventurers of the same type as the contemporary masters of the Roman soldiers who opposed them.¹ The constitution of the 'successor-states', like that of the Empire itself at the time, was a despotism tempered by revolution. And if, in certain cases, the substitution of one régime for the other brought a temporary alleviation for the miserable inhabitants of the warlord-ridden Roman provinces, that was only because the Barbarian rulers were less efficient than their Roman predecessors and not because they were more disposed to give their subjects freedom.²

as the middle of the fifth century of our era, 'by the pirate fleet of Vandal Carthage, and that the shattered unity was never restored'.

¹ 'La République fut asservie dès que le commandement des armées fut continué aux proconsuls pour plusieurs années, et qu'ils purent conserver sous le drapeau les mêmes soldats. Il se forma pour lors entre le proconsul et ses soldats une sorte d'association, un nouveau corps politique, une nation nouvelle, si l'on peut ainsi dire; et pour la République cette nouvelle nation ne ressemblait pas mal à un peuple barbare qui serait survenu' (*Œuvres de Turgot*, nouvelle édition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 672). The encounter between Aetius's Romans and Attila's Huns 'presented the image of civil war' because the troops engaged on either side so much resembled one another (Adams, B.: *The Law of Civilisation and Decay*, 2nd edition (New York 1898, Macmillan), p. 40).

² See, for example, Sir Samuel Dill's account of the Merovingian 'successor-state' in *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), especially pp. 109-15.

The last of these Barbarian military despotisms was extinguished many centuries before the real beginning of the new growth which has gradually produced the political institutions that are now characteristic of the Modern Western World.¹

The prevalent over-estimate of the Barbarians' contribution to the life of our Western Society can also be traced in part to the false belief that social progress can be explained by the presence of certain inborn qualities of race.² A false analogy from the phenomena that were being brought to light by the Physical Science of the day led our Western historians of the last generation to picture races as chemical 'elements' and their miscegenation as a chemical 'reaction' which might be presumed to release latent energies and so be expected to produce effervescence and change where there had been stagnation and immobility before. Self-hypnotized by the imagery of this misleading simile, our historians deluded themselves into believing that 'the infusion of new blood', as they metaphorically described the racial effect of the *Völkerwanderung*, could account for those long-subsequent manifestations of life and growth which constitute the history of the Western Society. In this pseudo-scientific delusion they were confirmed by the vanity of nineteenth-century Nationalism, which has indulged in the invention of genealogies for nations after the obsolete fashion of royal families and noble houses. This latter-day pedantry has borrowed from medieval heraldry its taste for fabulous beasts and its superstition that nobility derives from conquest; and hence we see half the peoples of modern Europe industriously striving to prove their descent from the Barbarians of the *Völkerwanderung*, in the mistaken belief that these casual war-bands from no-man's-land were 'pure races' of conquerors whose blood still invigorates and ennobles the bodies of their supposed descendants to-day.³

In reality, the Barbarians who were deposited in the Roman Empire by the *Völkerwanderung* were not the authors of our spiritual being. They were not even drones who were no longer permitted to cumber the hive after they had performed their sole function of fertilizing the queen bee; for the Church was already great with child when she encountered them, and the subsequent extirpation of the Barbarians had nothing to do with the genesis of our Western Society. The Barbarians made their passage felt by being in at the death of the Hellenic Society; but they cannot even

¹ On this point see further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 359-63, below.

² This fallacy is examined in II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. ii, below.

³ 'Les faits donnent le démenti le plus tragique au thème convenu de l'invasion germanique rajeunissant et vivifiant par un afflux de forces fraîches la décrépitude romaine.' (Pirenne, H., in *La Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* i (1922).)

claim the distinction of having delivered the death-blow;¹ for by the time when they overran the Roman Empire, the Hellenic Society was already moribund—a suicide slowly dying of wounds self-inflicted during a 'Time of Troubles' centuries before.² Thus the Barbarians were not the assassins of the mighty dead. They were merely the vultures feeding on the carrion or the maggots crawling in the carcass.³ And the very process of dissolution which had brought them on to the scene determined the duration of their existence; since this transitory interregnum of corruption and decay was the only environment in which they were able to thrive. Their 'heroic age' was an epilogue to Hellenic history, not a prelude to ours. Their epic was a swan-song⁴.

These considerations bring out a point of practical importance for our survey. The values of our three tokens, as evidence for the presence of the phenomenon of Apparentation-and-Affiliation, are not the same. The evidential value of 'universal churches' is absolute, because churches belong by nature to the future as well as to the past. The evidential value of 'universal states' and 'Völkerwanderungen' is conditional. Where we find one or both of these other tokens in conjunction with a church, we may take them as corroborative evidence for the instance of Apparentation-and-Affiliation which the existence of that church establishes. Where, however, we find one of these subsidiary tokens, or even both of them together, without finding a church there likewise, we cannot press the evidence so far. We can still infer the existence of an earlier society behind the horizon of the society in whose background the two subsidiary tokens appear; but since both 'universal states' and Völkerwanderungen belong by nature to the past wholly and exclusively, we cannot infer, from these tokens alone, that the earlier society is 'apparented' to the later. We must be content to establish the two facts of its existence and its chronological priority, and to recognize that, if it is related to the later society in any significant meaning of the term, this relation—as far as the evidence goes—is something less close than that which Apparentation-and-Affiliation imply.

There is one more symptom in the Apparentation-and-Affilia-

¹ The Barbarians 'n'ont vaincu l'empire romain que divisé, abattu, mal gouverné' (*Œuvres de Turgot*, nouvelle édition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 672).

² 'So kann eine Kultur in sich selbst zu Grunde gehen, auch ohne dass sie dem Angriff äusserer Feinde erliegt, wie die antike Kultur im dritten Jahrhundert (denn nicht die Germanen haben sie zerschlagen, sondern sie haben nur das Werk der Zerstörung vollendet, als sie innerlich schon abgestorben war.' (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (1), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 85. Cf. p. 248.)

³ 'Le but des envahisseurs n'était pas d'anéantir l'Empire Romain, mais de s'y installer pour en jouir.' (Pirenne, Henri: *Les Villes du Moyen Age* (Brussels 1927, Lamartin), p. 11.)

⁴ For their epitaph read Robert Bridges: *The Testament of Beauty* (Oxford, 1929, Clarendon Press), Book I, ll. 534-60.

tion between the Hellenic Society and the Western Society which we may notice before we make our attempt to identify other representatives of the same species; and this is the geographical displacement of the cradle or original home of the 'affiliated' society from the original home of the society which is 'apparented' to it. We have seen¹ that the base-line from which our Western Society has expanded—a line stretching from Rome across the Alps to Aachen and from Aachen across the Channel to the Roman Wall—coincides with a section of the frontier of the Roman Empire, and that this frontier marked the limit at which the expansion of the Hellenic Society in that direction came to an end. The original base from which the Hellenic Society itself had expanded to that north-western limit lay far away in the Aegean. In studying examples of the relation between an earlier and a later society elsewhere, we may obtain light upon the object of our study by taking the degree of such geographical displacement into account.

(b) OPERATIONS ACCORDING TO PLAN

The Orthodox Christian Society

After having observed these several distinctive features in that part of the landscape which is already within our view, we may now make the attempt to enlarge our field of vision by carrying out the several operations which we have planned. We were to begin by scanning the backgrounds of the histories of the other living societies of the same species as our Western Society, in the hope of recognizing features analogous to those which, in the background of our Western history, are recognizable tokens of the 'affiliation' of this Western Society to another society—the Hellenic—that lies beyond the horizon.

What lies, for example, in the background of the history of the Orthodox Christian Society? In this first reconnaissance we have an easy task, for here we find a universal state, a universal church, and a *Völkerwanderung* which are not only analogous to but identical with those which we have already found in the background of our own Western history: our familiar Roman Empire, Catholic Church, and *Völkerwanderung* of Teutons, Eurasians, Berbers, Arabs, and Slavs. From this we learn at once the particular fact that the Orthodox Christian Society as well as our own Western Society is 'affiliated' to the Hellenic Society, and the general fact that a society may be 'apparented' to more 'affiliated' societies than one. The phenomenon of geographical displacement explains how this is possible.

When we look for the original base-line of the Orthodox Christian World, we find that, like the base-line of the Western

¹ In I. B (iv), on pp. 37-41, above.

World, this shows a displacement from the original base of the Hellenic World in the Aegean. It has been displaced, however, in a different direction and to a slighter degree. While in the one case the displacement is in a north-westerly direction from the Aegean to Lotharingia, in the other it is in a north-easterly direction from the Aegean to a base-line which runs diagonally across the interior of Anatolia between Constantinople and Caesarea Mazaca. This line is not only much less distant from the Aegean than the line between Rome and the Roman Wall. It is also a much shorter line; and the eventual expansion of the Orthodox Christian World from this base has been on a decidedly smaller scale than the expansion of our Western World, of which we have taken a bird's-eye view in a previous chapter.¹

In the expansion of the Orthodox Christian Society, the main axis has coincided with the base-line itself, which has been produced in both directions in the figure of a crescent with its horns pointing respectively north-east and north-west. North-eastward, Orthodox Christendom first embraced Georgia, at the foot of the Caucasus, and towards the beginning of the eighth century of the Christian Era it leaped the range and secured a foothold beyond it in Alania, as Western Christendom, before the end of the same century, leaped the Pyrenees and secured a foothold in the Iberian Peninsula. Alania opened out on to the great Eurasian Steppe—that arid ocean across which caravans can travel with the same mobility as caravels across the face of the waters²—and from this point of vantage the Orthodox Christian Society might conceivably have dominated the Steppe and have found fresh hinterlands to occupy on its further coasts, as, from the vantage-ground of the Iberian Peninsula, our Western Society has eventually mastered the South Atlantic and made itself at home in what has since become Latin America.³ At this juncture, however, while Orthodox Christendom was still pausing at the northern foot of the Caucasus on the brink of the Steppe, Judaism and Islam cut in—Judaism captivating the Khazars who ranged between the Lower Volga and the Don,⁴ and Islam the White Bulgars on the Middle

¹ I. B (iii), above. ² For the Eurasian Steppe, see further Part III. A, vol. iii, below.

³ It is noteworthy that Leo the Syrian, the first great statesman of Orthodox Christendom, began his career by pioneering in Alania, and made his mark there (for Leo's personal history, see further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 274-6, below). Presumably he had his eye on the openings for expansion in this direction; but he was called away to organize the defence of Orthodox Christendom against the last assault of the Umayyads upon Constantinople in A.D. 717, and he devoted the rest of his life to two other tasks: first, the evocation of the ghost of the Roman Empire (a task which Leo accomplished in Orthodox Christendom, while in Western Christendom Charlemagne attempted it and failed: see Part II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 344, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 322-3 and 340-7, as well as Part X, below); second, the promotion of the religious movement which has come to be known by the misleadingly negative title of Iconoclasm (see V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 116-17, below).

⁴ For the conversion of the Khazars to Judaism, see further II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 410, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 285, below.

Volga. This put a stop to the expansion of Orthodox Christendom along its main axis north-eastward.

Along the same axis north-westward, Orthodox Christendom leaped the Balkans and made a thrust towards Central Europe; but here it found itself in competition with Western Christendom, which enjoyed the double advantage of having started operations earlier¹ and of conducting them on a wider front. In the ninth century the two competing societies each sought to entrench itself at the gates of its rival's citadel. The Papacy made a bid for the ecclesiastical allegiance of the Bulgarians; the 'Byzantine' or 'East Roman' Empire—a ghost of the Roman Empire which was evoked with such success that it became the 'empire state' of Orthodox Christendom—sent its missionaries Cyril and Methodius to the Slavs of Moravia and Bohemia. The competition was interrupted by the irruption of the pagan Magyar Nomads from the Eurasian Steppe into the enclave of steppe-country which is now called the Alföld of Hungary. The boundary between Western and Orthodox Christendom in this quarter was eventually fixed at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries by the entry of the Hungarians (simultaneously with the Poles and the Scandinavians) into the society of the West.²

Orthodox Christendom also expanded along a transverse axis which intersected the main axis at Constantinople—the expansion along this transverse axis being not overland but oversea. The sea-route leading out of the Dardanelles into the Aegean carried Orthodox Christendom into the former homelands of the 'apparented' Hellenic Society; and here it followed the ancient track of Hellenic maritime expansion into Southern Italy, where it laboriously won a foothold between the Muslims and the Western Christians—only to lose it again in the eleventh century, when this Orthodox Christian outpost was captured for Western Christendom by the Normans. On the other hand, the production of this maritime axis in the opposite direction—out of the Bosphorus into

¹ The Irish and English missionary enterprises in Central Europe, which inaugurated the advance of Western Christendom on this front, were put in hand as early as the eighth century of the Christian Era (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 332 and 336, below). The corresponding operations in Orthodox Christendom—the conquest of the Slavonic settlers in Greece and the conversion of the Bulgarians by 'the East Roman Empire' (the ghost of the Roman Empire which had been evoked by Leo the Syrian)—were not carried out until the latter end of the ninth century.

² Thus the expansion of Orthodox Christendom along the line of its main axis was brought to a halt, by the more successful expansion of other societies of the same species, in both directions. Relatively, the expansion north-westward opened up more fruitful ground for the Orthodox Christian Society than its expansion towards the north-east, as is shown by the shifting of the centre of gravity of Orthodox Christendom in the former direction. In the tenth century the centre of gravity was unmistakably still on the Asiatic side of the Black Sea Straits. By the twelfth century it had come to be unmistakably on the European side. (On this point, see further Part II. D (iii), vol. ii, p. 79, below.)

and over the Black Sea—carried Orthodox Christendom much farther than the ‘apparented’ Hellenic Society had ever penetrated in that direction. Leaping the Black Sea and the strip of steppe that then skirted its northern shores,¹ Orthodox Christendom established itself in the eleventh century in Russia; and from this second home it expanded through the forests of Northern Europe and Asia, first to the Arctic Ocean and finally, in the seventeenth century, to the Pacific—outflanking the great Eurasian Steppe and making contact, round the corner, with another living society of the same species in the Far East.

This sketch of the expansion of Orthodox Christendom, in juxtaposition to the sketch of the expansion of Western Christendom which has been given before,² explains in geographical terms how the Hellenic Society came to be ‘apparented’ to two separate ‘affiliated’ societies. In terms of life and growth, we can trace the differentiation of Western and Orthodox Christendom into two separate societies in the schism of their common chrysalis, the Catholic Church, into two bodies: the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. The schism took rather more than three centuries to work itself out, and the final result was the cumulative effect of three crises. The first crisis was the conflict in the eighth century between the Iconoclasts and the Papacy over a matter of ritual—a conflict which immediately followed the successful evocation of the ghost of the Roman Empire in Orthodox Christendom by Leo and immediately preceded the abortive evocation of the same ghost in Western Christendom by Charlemagne. The second crisis was the conflict in the ninth century between the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Papacy over a question of ecclesiastical authority—a conflict which centred ostensibly upon the personality of the Patriarch Photius but fundamentally upon the competition between the Sees of Constantinople and Rome for the ecclesiastical allegiance of South-Eastern Europe. The third crisis was the fresh conflict and final rupture between the two sees in the eleventh century over a question of theological dogma—a conflict which was closely connected with the contemporary political struggle in Southern Italy between the East Roman Empire, which was striving to maintain its rule over the local Latins, and the Norman adventurers who had come upon the scene as mercenaries of the East Roman Government and who were carving out a kingdom for themselves in the guise of knights errant for the Holy See.

The final rupture of A.D. 1054, which completed the schism of the

¹ See II. D (iii), vol. ii, p. 80, footnote 2, below.

² See I. B (iii) and (iv), above.

Catholic Church into two churches, the Roman and the Orthodox, likewise completed the fission of the social fabric which was growing up within the ecclesiastical chrysalis into the two new societies of Western and Orthodox Christendom; and this simultaneous separation of the two churches and the two societies was accompanied by a differentiation into two utterly different morphological types. The Catholic Church in the West had become centralized under the authority of the Roman See—a Great Power which succeeded in humiliating its only conceivable peer, the Holy Roman Empire, and in retarding for some centuries the articulation of the Western Society into the sharply defined and narrowly self-centred local states of the Modern Age. In the meantime, the Orthodox Church had become a department of state, first in the revived East Roman Empire and then in each of the other states which were brought into the circle of the Orthodox Christian Society by conversion; so that Orthodox Christendom, in the age corresponding to 'the Middle Ages' of the West, presented a spectacle which was most unlike medieval Western Christendom but not so unlike the Protestant part of the Modern Western World, where the map of ecclesiastical allegiances conforms to the map of political sovereignties¹ and where people of one faith, instead of being united in the bosom of one church, are divided between a number of local churches which are separate, not because they differ in practice or in creed, but because they are borne upon the establishments of separate sovereign states.

The Iranic and Arabic Societies

The next living society which we have to examine is Islam; and when we scan the background of Islamic history, we discern there a universal state, a universal church, and a *Völkerwanderung* which are not identical with those in the common background of Western and Orthodox Christendom but which are unmistakably analogous to them. The Islamic universal state is the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad.'² The universal church is of course Islam itself. The *Völkerwanderung* which overran the domain of the Caliphate at its fall proceeded from the Turkish and the Mongol Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe, the Berber Nomads of the Sahara and highlanders of the Atlas, and the Arab Nomads from the Arabian Peninsula who raided 'Irāq under the leadership of the Carmathians and also flooded over North-West Africa—meeting and

¹ On the principle 'Cuius regio, eius religio'.

² The subsequent 'Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo was an evocation of a ghost of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, that is to say, it was a phenomenon of the same kind as 'the East Roman Empire' in Orthodox Christendom and 'the Holy Roman Empire' in the West. This phenomenon of the evocation, in 'affiliated' societies, of ghosts of the universal states of 'apparented' societies is examined further in Part X, below.

overcoming the corresponding movement of the Berbers—in the migration of the Banu Hilāl and the associated tribes of Arab *badu*.¹ The interregnum occupied by this Völkerwanderung and by the ephemeral lives of the barbarian 'successor-states' to the Caliphate extended over about three centuries which may be expressed in terms of the Christian Era by the conventional dates A.D. 975–1275.² The latter date represents approximately the *terminus post quem* the Islamic Society, as we find it living in the world to-day, has emerged.

Here, by all analogy, we have tokens of an 'apparented' society, beyond the horizon, to which the extant Islamic Society is 'affiliated'; and at first sight it looks as though we were in the presence of a relation between two parties only, in contrast to the tripartite relation involved in the double 'affiliation' of the Western Society and the Orthodox Christian Society to the Hellenic. On closer inspection, however, we find that this appearance of simplicity is an illusion. The single Islamic Society that exists to-day is not unique in origin but only in consequence of an act of union. That is to say, it is not the only society that has ever been 'affiliated' to the older society—still to be identified—of which the 'Abbasid Caliphate represents the last phase. If it is the only society with this 'affiliation' that survives, that is because in the course of its history it has incorporated into itself a sister society, with the same 'affiliation', which originally emerged from the same interregnum as an independent social entity.

When we look for the cradle of the society which is represented by the Islamic Society of to-day without any breach of continuity or change of identity as we trace its history back to the moment of its first emergence, we find this cradle in one particular part—and this a relatively small part—of the present Islamic World. The society that has become the Islamic Society of to-day first emerged in a zone of territory extending from the Asiatic hinterland of the Sea of Marmara to the delta of the Ganges. This zone was narrow relatively to its length. For the most part it consisted of a single chain of countries: Anatolia, Azerbaijan, Khurāsān, Afghanistan, and Hindustan (in the narrower usage of the name which covers the plains of Northern India from the Panjab to Bengal but excludes the Deccan). Only towards the middle this narrow zone swelled out north-eastwards to embrace the basin of the Rivers Oxus and

¹ i.e. people of the desert: plural *badu*, singular *badawi*. The word is more familiar to English readers in the Gallicized form *bedouin*. For the Völkerwanderung of the Banu Hilāl in Africa, see further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 322–4, and also V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 247, below.

² When we thus transpose the post-'Abbasid Völkerwanderung on to our own time-scale, we find that there was an interval of about six centuries between it and the post-Hellenic Völkerwanderung, to which we may assign the conventional dates A.D. 375–675.

Jaxartes on the threshold of the Eurasian Steppe. The Islamic Society that began to emerge in this zone towards the end of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era eventually articulated itself into states from which almost all the states of the present Islamic World are derived—the only notable exception being the Sharifian Empire of Morocco.

There is not, however, any striking contrast in the Islamic World of to-day between Morocco on the one hand and all other Islamic countries on the other; and such a division of Dār-al-Islām into a Moroccan and a non-Moroccan section is certainly not the first that occurs to our minds. When we ask ourselves what is the main division in the Islamic World to-day, we find ourselves answering that it is the schism between Sunnīs and Shi'īs; and when we translate this religious cleavage into geographical terms, we find that it cuts right across the zone which we have just plotted out as the original home of the society. Azerbaijan and Khurāsān, in the middle of the chain of countries of which that zone consists, are at this day provinces of Persia; and on the present map Shi'ism occupies the whole territory of Persia, with outposts in Transcaucasia and 'Irāq and Hasā and India and the Yaman. This wedge of Shi'is splits the Sunnīs into two groups which are geographically isolated from one another: to the east, the Sunnīs of Central Asia and India; to the west, the Sunnīs in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, Europe, and Africa, from the western frontier of Persia to the eastern frontier of Morocco, together with the Sunnīs of Morocco itself.

This map of an Islamic World divided into Sunnī and Shi'ī portions has become so familiar that it needs an effort of imagination to recall how recent it is. Down to the year 1500 of the Christian Era, no Muslim would have been likely to anticipate that the zone which we have defined as the original home of this Islamic Society was about to be split into fragments by a religious schism. At that time Shi'ism was a minoritarian religion, endemic throughout the zone in question but dominant nowhere. The situation was transformed by a revolution which segregated the adherents of the Shi'ī and the Sunnī faiths and made Shi'ism locally dominant in one state; and this revolution was accomplished in the career of a single statesman, Ismā'il Shāh Safawī (*dominabatur* A.D. 1500-24).¹ Down to the year A.D. 1500, again, no Muslim observer would have been likely to anticipate that the Ottoman Empire was about to expand over those Muslim countries in Asia and Africa—from Syria southwards and westwards—in which Arabic had become the

¹ This revolution—which was really the evocation of a ghost from the life of the 'apparented' society—is examined further, in this aspect, in Part X, below.

current vernacular as well as the acknowledged classical language. Down to that time the Ottoman Empire had expanded entirely within the limits of the domain of Orthodox Christendom, as these limits have been sketched above; and if the expansion was to continue, the natural line of further Ottoman advance must have appeared at the time, to contemporary observers, to be either north-westward into Western Christendom or else south-eastward into Azerbaijan and the other countries of the zone which was the birth-place of the new Islamic society to which the 'Osmanlis themselves belonged. The Shī'ī revolution which suddenly debarred the Ottoman Empire from expansion in the latter direction also compelled the 'Osmanlis to extend their dominion over the Arabic countries in order to forestall an extension of the new Shī'ī Power in that quarter; and between A.D. 1516 and A.D. 1574 the structure of the Ottoman Empire was changed and its centre of gravity was shifted by the annexation of all the Arabic countries from Syria to the Yaman and from 'Irāq to Algeria inclusive.

This reminds us that, down to that time, these Arabic Muslim countries had lain outside the domain of the neighbouring Islamic society, in the zone to the north-east of them, to which the Safawis of Gilān belonged as well as the 'Osmanlis of Anatolia. And, when we look closer, we find that this Arabic World—and particularly Egypt and Syria—was the home of a different society which had emerged from the same interregnum independently and which was 'affiliated', likewise, to the older society—still to be identified—of which the 'Abbasid Caliphate represents the last phase.

Thus, after all, we find ourselves here in the presence of a relation between three societies, not two. Our pair of Islamic societies, both 'affiliated' to a single older society in the background, below the horizon, corresponds to the more familiar pair of societies—the Western and the Orthodox Christian—that are 'affiliated' to the Hellenic Society. And, comparing the two pairs of 'affiliated' societies with one another, we can see that the Islamic Society which emerged in what we may call the Perso-Turkish or Iranian zone bears a certain resemblance to our Western Society, while the other Islamic Society which emerged in what we may call the Arabic zone bears a certain resemblance to Orthodox Christendom.

For example, the ghost of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad which was evoked by the Mamlūks at Cairo in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era reminds us of the ghost of the Roman Empire which was evoked at Constantinople by Leo the Syrian in the eighth century. The Mamlūks' political construction, like Leo's, was relatively modest, effective, and durable, by contrast

with the Empire of Timur in the neighbouring Iranian zone—a vast, vague, ephemeral shape which appeared and disappeared like the Empire of Charlemagne in the West.¹ Again, the classical language which was the vehicle of culture in the Arabic zone was Arabic itself, which had been the language of culture in the society of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad. In the Iranian zone, a new culture found a new vehicle for itself in Persian—a language which had been cultivated since the time of the Caliphate of Baghdad by grafting it on to Arabic, as Latin was cultivated by grafting it on to Greek. Latin, of course, has been the classical language of the Western Society and Greek that of the Orthodox Christian Society;² so that, in that matter again, the Islamic Society that emerged in the Iranian zone resembles the Western Society, while the Islamic Society that emerged in the Arabic zone resembles the Orthodox Christian Society.³ Finally, we may notice that the conquest and

¹ Timur's Empire has a certain affinity with the Cairene 'Abbasid Caliphate—as 'the Holy Roman Empire' has a certain affinity with 'the East Roman Empire'—inasmuch as it was a deliberate and conscious attempt to revive the universal state which had broken up in the foregoing interregnum. Timur in Transoxania, like the Mamlūks in Egypt, was a champion of the Islamic tradition against the paganism and barbarism of the Mongol Nomads who had overrun the Iranian zone of the 'Abbasid Empire in the last convulsions of the post-'Abbasid interregnum. (For Timur's role as a Warden of the Marches of the Islamic World against Eurasian Nomadism, see further II. D (v), vol. II, pp. 144–50, below.) In the Iranian zone for the best part of a century (circa A.D. 1225–1325) beginning with the Mongol Conquest, political power had been in the hands of pagan Mongol feudatories of the Mongol Great Khan of Qaraqorum who were not merely non-Muslims but were positively anti-Islamic.

² The masterful descendants of Chingiz Khān were more ready to put forward descent from this world-conqueror as a justification for their exercise of authority than seek a diploma of investiture from the alleged descendants of that 'Abbasid Caliph whom their relatives had put to death in 1258. (Arnold, Sir T. W.: *The Caliphate* (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press), p. 109.)

³ This statement has to be qualified, inasmuch as the break-up of the Orthodox Church into a bevy of local churches living on the establishments of the several states into which Orthodox Christendom came to be articulated was accompanied by the translation of the Liturgy and the Scriptures, for local use, from Greek into certain local languages. In this way, other classical languages (e.g. Classical Georgian and 'Old Slavonic') became established in Orthodox Christendom side by side with Classical Greek. Here, again, the evolution of the Orthodox Church in the Middle Ages resembled the evolution of Protestantism in the Modern Age of the Western Society.

⁴ The fission of the derelict domain of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, in the course of the post-'Abbasid interregnum, into an Arabic and an Iranian World can be measured by the shrinkage of the area in which the Arabic language was in current use as the literary vehicle of culture—just as the fission of the derelict domain of the Roman Empire, in the course of the post-Hellenic interregnum, into an Orthodox Christian and a Western World can be measured by the shrinkage of the area of the literary use of Greek.

At the height of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, Arabic works of literature were written and read in every part of the 'Abbasid dominions; and men of letters, as well as men of business, circulated freely from one end of the Empire to the other (just as, at the height of the Roman Empire, Greek was written and read in every part of the Empire by cultivated people). The break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, which was consummated by the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, was followed by a reduction of the domain of literary Arabic to those regions in which Arabic was the current vernacular. Previously, a great Arabic writer might arise in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin or Khurāsān or the Iberian Peninsula; but after the close of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era the field of secular Arabic literature came to be virtually confined to Egypt and Syria (with a few brilliant exceptions like Ibn Khaldūn (died A.D. 1332–1404) in the Maghrib). Thenceforth, the only hold which the classical Arabic language retained in those parts of Dār-al-Islām in which the current vernaculars were non-Arabic was in virtue of its being the language of the Qur'ān. This ensured its

absorption of the Islamic Society of the Arabic zone by the Islamic Society of the Iranian zone, which occurred in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, has its parallel in the aggression of Western Christendom upon Orthodox Christendom during the Crusades. When this aggression culminated, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, in the diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople, it looked for a moment as though Orthodox Christendom would be permanently conquered and absorbed by the sister society—the fate which actually overtook the Islamic Society of the Arabic zone some three centuries later, when the Mamlūk Power was overthrown and the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo was extinguished by the Ottoman Pādishāh Selīm in A.D. 1517.

It would be out of proportion to study the histories of these two Islamic societies further in this place.¹ In distinguishing them from each other we have served our immediate purpose, and we have only to find names for them before we pass on. We may call them 'Iranic'² and 'Arabic', after the two geographical zones in which they respectively emerged.

The Syriac Society

Having thus paused to distinguish and name two Islamic societies—the Iranic and the Arabic—beneath the surface of the tardily and forcibly unified Islamic Society with which we started, we may now proceed towards our original objective of identifying the older society, 'apparented' to this 'affiliated' pair, whose existence in the background, below the horizon, is betokened by the three phenomena of the universal state represented by the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, the universal church represented by Islam, and the Völkerwanderung in which the former domain of the Caliphate of Baghdad was overrun by barbarians within the three centuries between about A.D. 975 and A.D. 1275.

maintenance, throughout the Islamic World, as the vehicle of scholastic theology; but, outside the Arabic-speaking regions, Arabic ceased to be employed as the vehicle either of secular literature or of political administration; and in the Iranian zone its place was taken for these purposes by Persian. In the Iranian zone, during the post-'Abbasid interregnum, Persian gained the ground which Arabic lost (just as, in Western Christendom during the post-Hellenic interregnum, Latin secured a literary monopoly at the expense of Greek). It was Persian, and not Arabic, that became the culture-language of the Turkish-speaking barbarian invaders from the Eurasian Steppe by whom the Iranian zone was overrun (just as, in Western Christendom, it was Latin that became the culture-language of the Teutonic barbarians). In so far as the descendants of the Turkish barbarian invaders succeeded in creating new literatures in their own vernaculars, they moulded these on Persian rather than on Arabic models.

¹ A more detailed study will be found in I. C (i) (b), Annex I, below.

² 'Iranic' is less cumbersome than 'Perso-Turkish', and it is not really less accurate. 'Perso-Turkish' expresses the fact that most of the peoples in the original home of this society spoke either Persian or Turkish vernaculars (as one might coin the name 'Latino-Teutonic' to express a corresponding fact about Western Christendom). 'Iranic', however, expresses the more significant fact that the vehicle of the new culture which was emerging in this region was the classical language and literature of Iran.

Let us try to identify this unknown society by formulating an equation between its history, of which we know the latter end, and the history of the Hellenic Society, which we happen to know in all its stages. The universal state of the Hellenic Society was the Roman Empire, and the immediate antecedent phase of Hellenic history was a 'Time of Troubles' against which the régime of the universal state stands out in sharp contrast. The Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' was an age in which the Hellenic World was articulated into a multiplicity of states instead of being incorporated in one state; and these local states inflicted mortal wounds on Society in a series of ever more destructive wars which only ended in the overthrow of all the other contending states by one victorious survivor, the Roman Empire. If we peer into the immediate antecedents of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, do we find a similar situation?

The answer to this question is in the negative. The 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad did not establish itself by the slow and laborious process that went to the making of the Roman Empire. It did not begin as one local state among many and then gradually grow into a universal state by conquering all its fellows in succession in a prolonged and internecine struggle for 'the survival of the fittest'. It won its position at a stroke, by capturing the greater part of the dominions of a single state which actually ruled over a somewhat larger area than the 'Abbasid Caliphate succeeded in acquiring from it. This single victim, out of whose ruin the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad made its fortune, was the Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus; and the Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus was one of the 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire.

Why did the Umayyads succumb to the 'Abbasids? And why was the change of dynasty followed by a transfer of the capital from Damascus in Syria to Baghdad in 'Irāq? The two breaks of continuity can be traced to one identical cause. While the Primitive Muslim Arab war-bands which prepared the ground for the establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate had been conquering the Roman provinces in Syria and Egypt with their right hands—breaking through this sector of the Roman Imperial frontiers from a no-man's-land in Arabia¹—their left hands had been employed in conquering the entire domain of the adjoining empire of the Sasanidae. Since the Sasanian Empire covered the whole of 'Irāq and Iran, its annexation upset the balance and altered the nature of the Arab 'successor-state' to the Roman Empire which was

¹ Arabia lay south-east of the Roman dominions in Syria, and perhaps this was why the Muslim Arabs came to be known as 'Saracens' or 'Easterners'. The Greek adjective Σαρακηνός is derived from the Arabic substantive سَرْجِي = 'the East', and this etymology indicates that the name was coined by the western Arabs under the rule of the Banu Ghassān who were the Wardens of the Marches of the Roman Empire in this quarter at the time when the Muslim Arabs broke through.

organized from a base in Syria by the founder of the Umayyad Dynasty, Mu'āwīyah (*regnabat* A.D. 656-80);¹ and this casual inclusion of a huge extraneous member in the structure of the Umayyad Caliphate explains its peculiar end. While the other 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire ended in being either re-conquered by the expiring Empire or else conquered by one of their own kind,² the Umayyad 'successor-state' met the exceptional end of being superseded by another state of approximately the same extent—the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad—which left an enduring mark on history. The 'Abbasids left this mark because they made a social unity out of the two areas—one originally conquered from the Romans and the other from the Sasanids—which had been united politically under the preceding Umayyad régime. This process of social unification had indeed begun some time before the Umayyads fell and the 'Abbasids reigned in their stead. It can be traced as far back as the time of the Umayyad Caliph Hishām (*imperabat* A.D. 724-43) or even to the reign of 'Umar II (*imperabat* A.D. 717-20). But the process was consummated by the 'Abbasids³ and it was symbolized in the transfer of the capital to Baghdad—the true centre of gravity of an empire which extended from North Africa to Transoxania. Damascus, which the Umayyads had chosen for their capital, had been too eccentric, in the literal sense, to become the permanent seat of government of this immense empire (though Damascus was admirably placed for serving simply as the capital of an Arab 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire if Mu'āwīyah had been content to combine the former Roman provinces in Syria and Egypt with the no-man's-land in Arabia out of which he and his war-bands had come).⁴ As it was, there were two alternative ends for the Umayyad Caliphate. Either it must break up into its two constituent parts, or if these parts were to be permanently held and fused together there must be a closer union of the kind which was actually consummated in the end after the Caliphate had been forcibly taken over from the Umayyads by the 'Abbasids.

¹ Reckoning Mu'āwīyah's effective rule in Syria to have begun at the death of the Caliph 'Uthmān and not at the death of the Caliph 'Ali, though it was not till the latter date that Mu'āwīyah assumed the title to the Caliphate. During the years when 'Ali was ruling the former domain of the Sasanids from Kūfah, while Mu'āwīyah, from Damascus, was ruling the former Roman provinces in Syria and Egypt, the union of these territories, which had been brought about by the Arab conquest, was temporally dissolved.

² See p. 58, above.

³ For an examination of the internal social evolution of the Caliphate in greater detail, see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 128, below.

⁴ Mu'āwīyah's domain was confined to these manageable limits so long as the Caliph 'Ali was ruling from Kūfah the former dominions of the Sasanidae in 'Irāq and Iran. During this brief phase the Arab 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire which was being ruled from Damascus resembled, both in extent and in character, the premature and abortive 'successor-state' which had been ruled from Palmyra by Zenobia four centuries earlier.

The fact that this second alternative was the actual outcome indicates that there was something in the situation which told in its favour. The merely external union between the former Oriental provinces of the Roman Empire and the former dominions of the Sasanidae, which had been brought about casually by the primitive Muslim Arab conquerors and had been maintained under the Umayyad régime, was apparently unsatisfactory not because it was unwieldy but because it was superficial. Some social current was drawing the inhabitants of the two constituent parts of the Umayyad Caliphate towards union of a closer and a deeper kind; and it appears to have been this current that swept the House of Umayyah away and carried the House of 'Abbās into power in order that the new dynasty might do with a will the work of unification which the old dynasty had been doing only half-heartedly.

In setting out to discover whence this powerful trend towards unification came, we shall seek for a clue in the antecedent history of that division between the Roman and the Sasanian part of the Umayyad Empire which the 'Abbasids succeeded in effacing.

When the frontier between the Roman and Sasanian Empires was restored for the last time in A.D. 628, on the eve of the Arab conquest, it had been in existence for nearly 700 years, since the original organization of the Roman province of Syria by Pompey in 64 B.C. During those seven centuries the line had been singularly stable, varying within quite a narrow range; and in a more fluctuating condition it can be traced back as far as 140 B.C., when the Seleucid Monarchy, of which the Roman province of Syria was a kind of residuary legacy, had lost 'Irāq, as well as all its former dominions further east, in Iran, to the Arsacids who were the predecessors of the Sasanids. As soon as we recall the whole history of this dividing line,¹ we realize what its historical significance was. It was the line along which equilibrium was provisionally restored after the immense upheaval which attended the overthrow of the Empire of the Achaemenidae by Alexander the Great. Hellenism, following in the Macedonian conqueror's train, spread eastward over the former domain of the fallen Achaemenian Empire and established its ascendancy from end to end of it for about two centuries.² Then the pendulum swung back towards the west with a violence proportionate to the original momentum of Alexander's stroke, so that there were times between the collapse of the Seleucid Monarchy and the Oriental campaigns of Pompey when it looked as though the insurgent Orientals might not only sweep Hellenism

¹ For a further examination of the line, see Parts IX and XI, below.

² i.e. from the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander in 334-330 B.C. to the discomfiture of Hellenism in Iran and 'Irāq during the latter part of the second century B.C.

out of Asia but might subjugate Greece itself.¹ The intervention of the Romans sent the pendulum swinging eastward again; but this time it was arrested, about half-way across the former Achaemenian domain, along the line which we are studying; and during the seven centuries preceding the Arab conquest the provisional balance along this line was never permanently upset either by the occasional insurrections of the Jews and other Orientals on the Roman side of the line or by the wars between the Romans and the Arsacidae and Sasanidae which occurred with increasing frequency and intensity from Crassus's inconclusive defeat to Heraclius's inconclusive victory.²

Thus, in tracing back to its historical origins the line which the 'Abbasid Caliphs ultimately effaced by fusing together the two territories which had been divided by it, we find that this line came into existence owing to the break-up of an earlier empire—the Empire of the Achaemenidae—in which these same territories had been united once before. In fact, the union of the territories under the 'Abbasid régime proves to have been a reunion; and this observation gives a hint of what the social current may have been which was making for this union so strongly at the time when the Umayyads gave way to the 'Abbasids. It may have been an impulse—mainly, no doubt, unconscious, yet certainly not less potent and probably more persistent than if it had been clearly envisaged—to join together again the parts of a whole which had been put asunder by force, and thereby to undo completely a deed which had been left in suspension—half undone and half still to undo—during those centuries in which an arbitrary line of division had cleft the former domain of the Achaemenian Empire in twain. In this light, the cataclysmic conquests of the primitive Muslim Arabs seem to respond antistrophically, in the rhythm of history, to the cataclysmic conquests of Alexander. Like these, they changed the face of the World in half a dozen years; but instead of changing it out of recognition, *more Macedonico*, they changed it back to a recognizable likeness of what it had been once before. As the Macedonian conquest, by breaking up the Achaemenian Empire, prepared the soil for the seed of Hellenism, so the Arab conquest opened the way for the later Umayyads, and after them the 'Abbasids, to reconstruct a universal state which was the equivalent of the Achaemenian Empire. If we superpose the map of either empire upon the map of the other, we shall be struck by the closeness with which

¹ e.g. in the years 87 and 86 B.C., during the first part of Sulla's operations against Mithradates of Pontus, when Greece was the theatre of war. In these campaigns the armies of Mithradates penetrated as far into continental European Greece as the armies of Xerxes had penetrated in 480-479 B.C.

² The rhythm of this series of wars is examined below in Part XI.

the outlines correspond, and we shall find that the correspondence is not simply geographical but extends to methods of administration and even to the more intimate phenomena of social and spiritual life.¹ We may express the historical function of the 'Abbasid Caliphate by describing it as a 'reintegration' or 'resumption' of the Achaemenian Empire—the reintegration of a political structure which had been broken up by the impact of an external force, and the resumption of a phase of social life which had been interrupted by an alien intrusion.

Is it fantastic to conceive the possibility of such a relation between two institutions which were separated in time by an interval of more than a millennium? If this seems fantastic at first sight, we may reflect that an interval which measured thirty-six generations of human lives was wholly occupied by a single historical event: the collision between the Hellenic Society and that other society—still to be identified—which manifested itself (as we suggest) alike in the Achaemenian Empire before the collision and in the 'Abbasid Caliphate after it. We must also allow for the fact that in this collision the non-Hellenic party was the victim. This society's career was suddenly and violently interrupted by the intrusion of an alien force; and such an abnormal interference with the course of life might be expected to produce an abnormal reaction in the shape of a paralysis lasting as long as the intrusion itself. As soon, however, as the alien intruder was expelled, we should expect the victim to reassume the posture out of which he had been shaken by the original impact and to resume the career which the intrusion had arrested.² If these expectations are reasonable, it does not seem fantastic to interpret the 'Abbasid Caliphate—a universal state which followed the interlude of Hellenic intrusion upon our still unidentified society's life—as a 'reintegration' or 'resumption' of the universal state which preceded the interlude, that is to say, the Achaemenian Empire. This is surely less fantastic than to dismiss as fortuitous coincidences the remarkable resemblances between two universal states which stand in this peculiar historical relation to one another.

¹ This correspondence is examined in greater detail in Part VI, below.

² When a hedgehog crawling across a field is attacked by a dog, it stops dead, curls itself up into a spiny ball, and remains motionless in this rigid defensive posture until the dog is tired of trying to find a weak spot in its armour. As soon as the dog gives up and goes away, the hedgehog uncurls itself, reassumes the crawling posture which the dog's attack had forced it to abandon, and resumes its journey across the field towards its original goal. It acts like this however long the interruption may have lasted. Yet there is no reason to suppose that any step in the action is purposive or even conscious. On this analogy, we may imagine a society to behave similarly in corresponding circumstances. This supposition does not involve the fallacy of interpreting the behaviour of a society as though it possessed the faculties of a rational self-conscious human being. 'Le passé n'a pas besoin d'être connu pour peser lourdement sur le présent. Il laisse au fond de l'inconscient des instincts, plus puissants que des souvenirs précis.' (Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), p. 414.)

This problem will be studied more closely in later chapters.¹ Our present concern is to identify further representatives of the species of society which we are studying; and, in our pursuit of this objective, we may here allow ourselves at least provisionally to regard the 'Abbasid Caliphate as a 'resumption' of the Achaemenian Empire, ignoring for our present purpose the Hellenic intrusion which intervened between them.² If we accept this postulate, we may now inspect the immediate antecedents of the Achaemenian Empire in search of that phenomenon which we failed to detect in the immediate antecedents of the 'Abbasid Caliphate: that is to say, a 'Time of Troubles' resembling the time which in Hellenic history immediately preceded the establishment of the Roman Empire. And this time our search is not in vain; for the Achaemenian Empire did arise out of a multiplicity of states which eventually disappeared in a series of ever more destructive wars.

The general similarity between the genesis of the Achaemenian Empire and the genesis of the Roman Empire is unmistakable. The chief difference of detail is that the Hellenic universal state grew out of the very state, among the superseded parochial states, which had been the principal agent of destruction in the foregoing struggle for existence, whereas in the genesis of the Achaemenian Empire the part of Rome was played by different parochial states in different acts of the tragedy. The Achaemenian Power which actually established the universal state in the last act was not the Power which, in previous acts, had prepared the ground by beating down its neighbours. That Power was Assyria; but when Assyria had been on the point of completing her work she had brought destruction upon herself by the very excess of her militarism.³ Just before the grand finale, the protagonist had been dramatically struck down; and his role had been assumed unexpectedly by a performer who had hitherto been content to play a minor part in a sheltered corner at the back of the stage.⁴ The Achaemenidae reaped where the Assyrians had sown. Yet this substitution of one performer for another at the eleventh hour did not change the plot;

¹ See Parts VI and IX below.

² There was, of course, an aspect of the 'Abbasid régime in which it came to fulfil Hellenism and not to destroy it; for under the 'Abbasid dispensation Oriental minds made the Hellenic philosophy and science their own far more thoroughly than they had ever assimilated Hellenic culture during the centuries when a large part of the *ci-devant* Achaemenian dominions were under Macedonian or Roman rule. For this cultural philhellenism of the 'Abbasids and their subjects, see further Part IX, below.

³ For a further examination of Assyrian militarism, see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (x), vol. iv, pp. 467-84, below.

⁴ The Achaemenian Power started as a backward and unimportant local state in what is now the Persian province of Fars (Persis) on the south-western edge of the Iranian Plateau. The overthrow of Elam by Assyria in 655-639 B.C.—Assyria's last great act of destruction before she was destroyed herself—gave the Achaemenidae their first opportunity for aggrandizement. They descended into the derelict lowlands of Elam (in what is now the Persian province of Khuzistan) and established their capital in Susa, the former capital of the defunct Elamite State.

and we cannot compare the two performances which ended respectively in the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire and in the establishment of the Roman Empire without perceiving that the differences between them were mere variations on an identical theme.

Having thus discerned a 'Time of Troubles' antecedent to the Achaemenian Empire, we can now perhaps at last identify the society which lived through the successive experiences of this 'Time of Troubles' and the Achaemenian Empire and the Hellenic intrusion and the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad and the universal church of Islam and the Völkerwanderung that followed the fall of the 'Abbasid Empire and occupied the interregnum which the emergence of the Iranic and Arabic societies brought to an end.

Negatively, we can make out that this society was not identical with that to which the Assyrians belonged. In the history of this society, the Assyrians at an earlier stage, like the Macedonians at a later stage, played their part as intruders who came and went. Indeed, the culture which the Assyrians represented did not long survive the political *débâcle* in which Assyrian militarism ended. We can trace the process of its peaceful ejection from the culture upon which it had intruded by force in the gradual replacement of the Akkadian language and the cuneiform script by the Aramaic language and Alphabet.

The Assyrians themselves, in their latter days, employed the Aramaic Alphabet for writing on parchment as a supplement to the normal employment of their traditional cuneiform script, which they inscribed on stone or impressed on clay tablets. When they employed the Aramaic Alphabet, they may be presumed to have written the Aramaic language.¹ At any rate, after the destruction of the Assyrian State and of the short-lived Neo-Babylonian Empire which intervened between the fall of the Assyrians and the rise of the Achaemenidae, the Aramaic language and Alphabet, advancing concurrently, continued to gain ground upon both the kindred Akkadian language and the unrelated cuneiform script in which Akkadian was conveyed,² until, in the course of the last century before the beginning of the Christian Era, both of these

¹ This would have come natural to them, since the Aramaic language was a member of the same family—the Semitic family—as the Akkadian language in which the Assyrians expressed themselves in cuneiform.

² The cuneiform script was not an Alphabet but a phonetic syllabary combined with a collection of ideograms. It had been evolved originally to convey the Sumerian language, which had no affinity whatever with the Akkadian dialect of Semitic for which the script came to be used. The employment of cuneiform to convey two unrelated languages perhaps partly explains why the ideograms held their own side by side with the phonetic characters. The ideograms were written identically in Sumerian and Akkadian, though they were, of course, translated vocally into quite different words. Some characters which were used as ideograms in Akkadian had a phonetic value in Sumerian.

became extinct throughout their former homelands in Assyria and Babylonia.¹

A corresponding process can be traced in the history of the Iranian language, which emerged suddenly from obscurity because it was the native language of the Achaemenidae and of their countrymen the Persians and the Medes, who were the ruling peoples in the Achaemenian Empire. Confronted with the problem of making records in a language which had evolved no script of its own, the Iranians of the Achaemenian Age adapted both the cuneiform script and the Aramaic Alphabet in order to convey their mother-tongue in the respective media of stone and parchment. The cuneiform inscriptions of the Achaemenidae themselves are the only monuments of the language that survive from this age; but during the Hellenic intrusion, when there was no Great King in Iran to carve a record of his deeds in cuneiform characters on the face of the mountains, the scriptures of the Zoroastrian Church, which were composed in an Iranian dialect akin to that of the Achaemenian inscriptions, continued to be copied on parchment rolls in Aramaic letters, with the result that in Iran, as in 'Irāq, the cuneiform characters became extinct and the Aramaic Alphabet prevailed. Moreover, in the train of the Aramaic Alphabet, the Aramaic language gained a lodgement in the body of the Iranian language—in spite of the fact that Iranian, which was a member of the Indo-European family, had none of that natural affinity with Aramaic which had assisted Aramaic in supplanting its own Semitic sister Akkadian. In 'Pehlevi'² some of the Iranian words were spelt out in the Aramaic Alphabet phonetically, but others were represented by the equivalent words in the Aramaic language. It is supposed that these Aramaic words were treated as ideograms which were rendered phonetically by their Iranian synonyms.³ In the next stage, however, when 'Pehlevi' was transformed into what is now called 'Persian'⁴ by the substitution of the Arabic Alphabet and Arabic loan-words for the Aramaic Alphabet and Aramaic loan-words in consequence of the Arab conquest,⁵

¹ See the present chapter, p. 119, and II D (v), vol. ii, p. 138, below.

² Literally 'Parthian'. The name indicates that this phase of the Iranian language, as spoken and written, came to maturity in the time of the Arsacidae, though the later age of the Sasanidae was the time when it most flourished.

³ It seems strange that the Iranians should have lapsed into the use of ideograms for writing their language in an Alphabet which was free from ideograms, considering that they avoided the use of ideograms and used none but phonetic characters when they borrowed the cuneiform script, in which ideograms abounded.

⁴ 'Farsi', that is to say, the dialect of Iranian current in the province of Fars (Persis).

⁵ This substitution was easy because Arabic, like Akkadian, was a member of the same family of languages—the Semitic family—as Aramaic, while the Arabic Alphabet was derived from an earlier form of that Aramaic Alphabet which was employed for conveying Pehlevi.

these Arabic loan-words were pronounced as they were written, and became integral elements in the living speech.

Here we discern a process which was going on peacefully and steadily during and after and in the teeth of the successive intrusions of Assyrians and Macedonians: two elements of culture, one from Syria and the other from Iran, were asserting themselves contemporaneously and were at the same time entering into an ever closer association with one another. From the latter end of the 'Time of Troubles' preceding the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire, when the conquered Aramaeans were beginning to captivate their Assyrian conquerors, down to the time of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, when the Persian language was being equipped with Arabic loan-words and was being transliterated into the Arabic Alphabet, we have been contemplating this process in the mirror of languages and scripts. If we wish to discern it at an earlier stage, we may look into the mirror of religion and observe how the same 'Time of Troubles' breathed the same inspiration into Zarathustra, the prophet of Iran, and into the contemporary prophets of Israel and Judah.¹

In analysing this Syro-Iranian culture, can we determine whether it was the Syrian or the Iranian element that made the greater contribution? And can we perhaps push our analysis even further, and determine which of the two was the original contributor? The history of religion gives us no certain clue²; but the history of literature suggests that Syria and not Iran was the dominant partner.³ And if we now try to extend our survey further into the

¹ It is now recognized on all hands that, during the four centuries or so that preceded the political union of the Iranians and the Syrians in the Empire of the Achaemenidae, the religions of Iran and Israel had been developing on certain remarkable lines which differentiated them both from all other contemporary religions and at the same time led them into convergence towards one another. Was this convergence due to the influence of one party upon the other (e.g. the influence of Israelites who had been transplanted by the Assyrians to 'the cities of the Medes')? Or was it that an identical affliction, in the shape of Assyrian militarism, produced identical spiritual effects through independent but similar reactions in the souls of those who suffered under it? For our immediate purpose here, the question is immaterial. Whichever alternative may prove to be the truth, the Israelites and Iranians of this age were already going through the same spiritual experiences, and in virtue of that were already becoming members one with another in the same society.

² If there is some ground for suspecting a religious influence of Syria upon Iran in the Assyrian Age (see the preceding footnote), there is perhaps stronger ground for believing that in the Achaemenian Age the main current of religious influence flowed in the opposite direction. (See Gall, A. von: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter).)

³ In support of the view that the Syrian element is the predominant element in the Syro-Iranian culture, we can cite the high authority of Professor Edward G. Browne:

'Persians . . . have continued ever since the Muhammadan conquest—that is to say, for more than twelve hundred years—to use the Arabic language almost to the exclusion of their own in writing on certain subjects, notably theology and philosophy; while during the two centuries immediately succeeding the Arab invasion the language of the conquerors was, save amongst those who still adhered to the ancient national faith of Zoroaster, almost the sole literary medium employed in Persia. To ignore this literature would be to ignore many of the most important and characteristic manifestations of the

past behind the 'Time of Troubles' into an antecedent age of growth, we shall find that in this age Iran fades out of the picture, while we shall catch a glimpse of a society in Syria, in the generation of King Solomon and his contemporary King Hiram, which was just discovering the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean and had discovered the Alphabet already.¹

Here at last we have identified the society, antecedent and 'apparented' to the Islamic, of which we have been so long in search. It remains to give this society a name. Perhaps the name 'Syriac' is the most convenient.²

In the light of this identification, let us look again at Islam—the

Persian genius, and to form an altogether inadequate judgement of the intellectual activity of that ingenious and talented people. . . .

It is a remarkable thing how great at all periods of history has been Semitic influence on Persia: Arabian in the late Sasanian and Muhammadan time; Aramaic in earlier Sasanian and later Parthian days; Assyrian at a yet more ancient epoch. And indeed this fact can scarcely be insisted upon too strongly; for the study of Persian has suffered from nothing so much as from the purely philological view which regards mere linguistic and racial affinities as infinitely more important and significant than the much deeper and more potent influences of literary and religious contact. . . . If, as an adjunct to my equipment for the study of Persian thought and literature, I were offered my choice between a thorough knowledge of the Semitic and the Aryan languages, I should, from this point of view alone, unhesitatingly choose the former. A good knowledge of the Aramaic languages is essential for the study of Pahlawi, and a fruitful investigation of the post-Muhammadan literature and thought of Persia is impossible without a wide acquaintance with Arabic books; while in both these fields a knowledge of Sanskrit is practically of very little use, and even in the interpretation of the Avesta it must be employed with some reserve and due regard to the Pahlawi tradition.' (Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. i (London 1908, Fisher Unwin), pp. 3-4 and 36-7.)

¹ For the origin of the Alphabet, see further the present section, p. 102, footnote 3; II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 50-1; and II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 386, footnote 2, below.

² When a cross-section of this society is taken in the age of the Achaemenian Empire, the name 'Syro-Iranian' suggests itself, on the analogy of 'Graeco-Roman', which seems the natural name for the Hellenic Society when a cross-section of that is taken in the age of the Roman Empire. As between 'Graeco-Roman' and 'Hellenic', however, we have found the name 'Hellenic' preferable (see p. 41, footnote 2, above); and the same considerations recommend 'Syriac' in preference to 'Syro-Iranian'. It is not only less clumsy but also more accurate; since, when we trace back to its origins the 'Syro-Iranian' Society that came to be incorporated in the Achaemenian Empire, we find, as we see, that its original home was in Syria and that its original members were Syrian peoples—Phoenicians, Philistines, Israelites, and Aramaeans—whereas the Iranians did not enter into it until later.

The adjective 'Syriac' (from the Latin *Syriacus*) is more convenient than 'Syrian' (from the Latin *Syrius*), because 'Syrian' has come to be used in English in a geographical sense, to denote indifferently anything or anybody belonging to the territory called Syria at any time—e.g. at the present day or at the time when 'the Tell-el-Amarna Letters' were written in the fourteenth century B.C. Now at the present time the 'Syriac' Society is virtually extinct in its Syrian home. Except for a few Syriac fossils (Jews, Jacobite Monophysite Christians, and Maronite ex-Monothelites) and a few Orthodox Christians (locally called Melchites), the soil of Syria is now occupied by a different society, related to the Syriac Society by 'affiliation', namely the Islamic Society. Again, in the fourteenth century B.C., the Syriac Civilization had not yet emerged and the soil of Syria was then occupied by the debris of a dead 'Sumeric' Society upon which two other societies—the 'Egyptiac' and the 'Hittite'—were at that time intruding. Hence the employment of the familiar adjective 'Syrian' to denote the 'Syriac' Society would be confusing. These considerations have led scholars already to employ the word 'Syriac' to denote a modification of the Aramaic language and script which emerged in the region between Aleppo and Mosul in the first century of the Christian Era and which eventually became the vehicle of the liturgy and literature of the Nestorian Dyophysite and the Jacobite Monophysite Christian Churches. It is simple and convenient to extend the usage of the word 'Syriac' to cover all aspects and ages of the society to which this Syriac language and literature belonged.

universal church through which our Syriac Society came to be 'apparented' to the Iranic and the Arabic societies. We can now observe an interesting difference between Islam and Christianity—the church through which the Hellenic Society came to be apparented to Western and to Orthodox Christendom. We have noticed¹ that the germ of creative power in Christianity was not of Hellenic but of alien origin (in fact of Syriac origin, as we can now identify it). By contrast we perceive that the germ of creative power in Islam was not alien from, but native to, the Syriac Society. The founder, Muhammad, drew his inspiration primarily from Judaism, which was a purely Syriac religion, and secondarily from Nestorianism, a form of Christianity in which the Syriac element had recovered its preponderance.² The subsequent development of Islam took place in the environment of a Syriac Society from which the intrusive culture of Hellenism had been expelled by the conquests of the Primitive Muslims. Of course a great institution like a universal church is never 'pure bred' from a single society, any more than a community is ever 'pure bred' from a single physical race. In Christianity, for example, we are aware of Hellenic elements—drawn from the Hellenic mystery religions and from Hellenic philosophy—which the original Syriac germ assimilated in building up the tissues of the Church, so that the Church, by the time when it reached maturity as an institution of the Hellenic internal proletariat, had come to be a syncretism of an alien Syriac germ with indigenous Hellenic accretions. Similarly, though to a slighter extent, in Islam we can detect alien Hellenic accretions to the original Syriac germ in the shape of influences from Hellenic philosophy upon Islamic theology. Broadly and substantially, however, it is correct to formulate an antithesis between Christianity as a universal church originating in a germ that was alien to the society in which the church played its part, and Islam as a universal church originating in a germ that was indigenous.³

Finally, before passing on, we may measure the respective degrees of displacement of the original homes of the 'affiliated' Iranic and Arabic societies from the original home of the 'apparented' Syriac Society. We see that the base-line of the Iranic Society, which we have traced within a zone extending from the Anatolian hinterland of the Black Sea Straits through Azerbaijan and Khurāsān to the Bay of Bengal, with a north-eastward protuberance in the basin of the Oxus and Jaxartes, was relatively far removed from the geographical nucleus of the 'apparented' society

¹ See p. 57, above.

² For Nestorianism as an abortive Syriac reaction against the intrusion of Hellenism upon the Syriac World, see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 286-7, below.

³ The causes of this antithesis are examined in Part IX, below.

in Syria. Even if we extend our conception of the nucleus of the Syriac Society to include the homelands of the Medes and Persians on the western rim of the Iranian Plateau, the zone in which the Syriac Society may be said to have emerged still does not overlap the zone in which the Iranic Society emerged subsequently.¹ On the other hand, we see that the original home of the Arabic Society, which we found in Syria and Egypt, not only overlaps the original home of the Syriac Society but includes the whole of it. In short, the displacement of the Iranic Society was relatively great and that of the Arabic Society relatively small; and in this point, again, the Iranic resembles the Western Society, while the Arabic Society corresponds to Orthodox Christendom.

The Indic Society

The identification of the Syriac Society is the first result which we have achieved in putting into execution our plan of campaign for adding to our muster-roll of societies of the same species as our own. In order to achieve this first result, we have had to spend some time and trouble in unravelling a perplexingly tangled skein of history. But now that we have successfully untied the last knot, we may take our success as a good omen and continue our operations with a good heart, without feeling that our trouble has been labour lost or that the complexity of the historical landscape is something that passes our understanding. The main cause of the complexity in Syriac history is to be found in the successive intrusions of two alien forces—Assyrian militarism and Hellenic culture—upon the Syriac World. These alien intrusions have interrupted the course of Syriac history, or at any rate they have overlaid it with a deposit of foreign detritus. But now that we have disinterred the *disiecta membra* of Syriac history and have pieced them together, we shall find that the peculiar complexity of this particular inquiry has served us well by introducing us to a new phenomenon—the contact and collision between different societies—which we have hardly had occasion to notice hitherto, but which will constantly occupy our attention hereafter as one of the most important of the phenomena which a study of history has to take into account.² Indeed, in our very next inquiry, it will provide us with a valuable clue.

The next living society which we have to examine is the Hindu, and here again we discern in the background our standard tokens

¹ Azerbaijan, of course, corresponds to Media Atropatene; but the homeland of the Medes was farther south in Media Magna, the region round Hamadan which the Arabs called Jibāl or 'Irāq 'Ajami; and this region lay outside the original home of the Iranic Society.

² The contact in the Space-dimension between contemporary civilizations is the subject of Part IX.

of the existence of another, 'apparented', society beyond the horizon. The universal state in this case is the Empire of the Guptas (*imperabant circa* A.D. 375-475).¹ The universal church is Hinduism, which attained supremacy in India in the Gupta Age—expelling and supplanting Buddhism after Buddhism had been dominant for about seven centuries (since the time of Aśoka) in the Indian 'sub-continent' which was the common cradle of both religions. The Völkerwanderung which overran the domain of the Gupta Empire at its fall proceeded from the Huns of the Eurasian Steppe, who were assailing the Sasanian and the Roman Empires simultaneously. The interregnum occupied by this Völkerwanderung and by the lives of the 'successor-states' to the Gupta Empire which the Huns and their associates the Gurjaras set up in North-Western India lies approximately within the dates A.D. 475-775.² Thereafter, there began to emerge on Indian soil that Hindu Society which is still alive. The father of Hindu philosophy, Śāṅkara, flourished about A.D. 800; and in the ninth century of the Christian Era the society began to articulate itself into states on a pattern which can still be discerned in the political map of India to-day.

In seeking to identify the older society, 'apparented' to the Hindu Society, whose existence is betokened by these phenomena, we shall now find, as we have forecast, that our labours have been lightened by the foregoing investigation in which we have traced the 'affiliation' of the Islamic Society to the Syriac Society. That investigation was complicated by the presence of an abnormal phenomenon: the intrusion and subsequent eviction of an alien force, in consequence of a collision between the Syriac Society and the Hellenic. Now we know that the Hellenic Society also collided with that society in India—still to be identified and named—which eventually became 'apparented' to the Hindu Society; and so, if we find the antecedents of the Gupta Empire in a tangle, we may hope

¹ The Gupta Empire was actually founded about A.D. 350 and did not collapse till the death of Skandagupta in A.D. 480; but the Empire did not actually acquire the dimensions of a universal state until A.D. 390, and it had ceased to perform the functions of such a state before the second Hun invasion of India began in A.D. 470.

² The break in tradition in India at the time of the Hun and Gurjara invasions is emphasized by Mr. Vincent Smith in *The Early History of India* (3rd edition, Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 408. A number of facts which bear out Mr. Vincent Smith's view are mentioned by Mr. C. V. Vaidya in *The History of Mediaeval India*, vol. ii (Poona 1924, Oriental Book Supplying Agency). For example, by about the year 800 of the Christian Era, both Buddhism and the pre-Buddhist Indian ritual of the Vedic sacrifices had become extinct throughout the greater part of India (op. cit., p. 1). The ancient vernaculars (the so-called 'prakrits') had ceased to be spoken, and the modern vernaculars—Hindi, Bengali, Maratti, Gujarati, Panjabi, and so on—were already full-fledged (p. 3). The Rājput dynasties of the modern Rājputāna can mostly trace their genealogies back to this epoch but not beyond (p. 46). *Pace* Mr. Vaidya, this last fact supports Mr. Vincent Smith's view that the Rājputs are descended from the Huns and Gurjaras who entered India in the post-Gupta Völkerwanderung and were converted to Hinduism.

to unravel them, as we succeeded in unravelling the antecedents of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, by taking the same abnormal phenomenon as our clue.

The first step is to make out when the Hellenic intrusion upon India began and ended. We cannot equate its beginning with Alexander's Indian campaign; for this raid, though justly celebrated in military history as a brilliant *tour de force*, had no effects which have made a mark in the history of culture. In India the Hellenic intrusion did not really begin until Demetrius the Greek King of Bactria—the Hellenic 'successor-state' of the Achaemenian Empire in the basin of the Oxus and Jaxartes—crossed the Hindu Kush in order to annex Indian territories to his kingdom about the year 190 B.C. On the other hand, this Hellenic intrusion did not come to an end when the last Greek principality south-east of the Hindu Kush was extinguished at some date in the first century of the Christian Era; for these Greek rulers were followed in India, as in Bactria whence they had come, by barbarian rulers of Nomadic origin from the Eurasian Steppe who took a veneer of Hellenic culture from the representatives of that culture whom they had supplanted. These 'Philhellenic', if not Hellenized, barbarians descended upon India in two waves: the Sakas and the Parthians in the last quarter of the second century B.C., and then, in the first century of the Christian Era, the Kushans. The Sakas ruled in Kathiawar from the last century B.C. to A.D. 390, when their dominions were annexed by the Guptas. 'Indo-Parthians' ruled in the Indus Valley, side by side with Greeks, until the Kushans supplanted them both simultaneously. The Kushan Empire—which bestrode the Hindu Kush like its predecessor the Kingdom of Bactria but surpassed the Greek Kingdom in extent and duration—lasted from the first century of the Christian Era into the third. It will be observed that the Hellenic intrusion upon India came to an end only just before the establishment of a universal state by the Guptas. On the analogy of the history of the Hellenic intrusion upon the Syriac Society, we should now look out for another universal state in India immediately preceding the Hellenic intrusion and standing to the Gupta Empire in the relation of the Achaemenian Empire to the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad. When we look for this, we find it, at the point in history where we should expect, in the Empire of the Mauryas, which was established by Chandragupta in 323–322 B.C., was made illustrious by the reign of Açoka in the third century B.C., and was extinguished by the usurper Pushyamitra in 185 B.C., five years after the Hellenic intrusion upon India had been started by Demetrius's invasion. In the background of the Maurya Empire we catch glimpses of a 'Time

of Troubles' in the familiar form of a series of destructive wars between a multiplicity of local states: for example, the conquest of Kosala and Vaisali by King Ajatasatru of Magadha,¹ the younger contemporary of Siddhārtha Gautama the Buddha, and the destruction, somewhat later, of Gautama's own city-state, Kapilavastu. Gautama's life, and attitude towards life, are the best evidence that the society of which he was a member was in a bad way in his time²; and this evidence is corroborated by the life and attitude of his contemporary Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, and by the host of less distinguished men of the age who were turning away from this world and seeking to find the way to another world through the practice of asceticism. In the furthest background of all, behind this 'Time of Troubles', we can make out a time of growth which has left its record in the Vedas. And so we have identified the society 'apparented' to the Hindu Society. Let us call it 'Indic'.

We can now observe that Hinduism—the universal church through which this Indic Society came to be 'apparented' to the Hindu Society of to-day—resembles Islam, and differs from Christianity, inasmuch as the germ of life in which it originated was native to, and not alien from, the society in whose history it played its part. No doubt, certain non-Indic accretions can be detected in Hinduism. The most prominent of these is the worship of deities in iconic form—a feature which is of the essence of Hinduism, though it was lacking in the primitive religion of the Indic Society as this is mirrored in the Vedas, and was lacking, likewise, in primitive Buddhism. It must therefore have been borrowed from the religion of some alien society—most probably from Hellenism through the medium of the modified Buddhism of the Mahayana. However, the chief differences between Hinduism and the Indic religion of the Vedas—and these differences are striking—are due to elements in Hinduism which were borrowed from Buddhism: that is, from a religion which was a reaction against the primitive Indic religion of the Vedas but a reaction of an entirely indigenous Indic origin. The most important elements, lacking in the religion of the Vedas, which Hinduism borrowed from Buddhism were its monasticism and its philosophy.

The original home of the Indic Society, as we know from its records, was in the valleys of the Indus and the Ganges; and from this base the society had expanded over the whole sub-continent of India before it came to the end of its universal state.³ The area

¹ See Smith, Vincent: *The Early History of India* (3rd edition, Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 28 and 35-7.

² For the life-history of Siddhārtha Gautama, see further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 270-2, below.

³ The Maurya Empire at its greatest extent—at which it stood when Aśoka renounced

which the Indic Society had thus come to cover at the close of its history was all embraced in the original home of the 'affiliated' Hindu Society, which occupied the whole sub-continent from the outset and afterwards expanded eastward overseas into Indonesia and Indo-China. Thus the geographical displacement of the Hindu Society from the domain of the Indic Society was comparable in degree to the displacement of the Arabic Society from the domain of the Syriac Society.

The Sinic Society

It remains to explore the background of the fifth of the living societies, which has its home in the Far East; and here our tokens are not difficult to distinguish. The universal state here is the empire that was established by Ts'in She Hwang-ti in 221 B.C. and was maintained for the next four centuries by the dynasties known as the Prior and Posterior Han. The universal church is the Mahayana—the variety of Buddhism which made its way into the Empire of the Posterior Han and so became the chrysalis of the present Far Eastern Society. The *Völkerwanderung* after the fall of the universal state proceeded from the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe, who descended upon the basin of the Yellow River at a time when the dominions of the Han were reunited, after a century of disunion, under the rule of an indigenous 'successor-state', the so-called Western Tsin (*regnabant* A.D. 280-317). The interregnum preceding the emergence of the present Far Eastern Society must be reckoned to have set in at least a century before this *Völkerwanderung* took place. The universal state had really collapsed by A.D. 172, though the Posterior Han dragged out a shadowy existence until A.D. 221, so that the interregnum includes this half-century of impotence—and the ensuing half-century in which the dominions of the Han were divided between the indigenous 'successor-states' which are known as 'the Three Kingdoms'—as well as the age of the Barbarian 'successor-states', which did not begin until after the interlude of reunion in the time of the Western Tsin.¹

If we turn now to the antecedents of the universal state which was established by Ts'in She Hwang-ti, we shall discern the lineaments of a 'Time of Troubles' here as clearly as we discerned them

War after the conquest of Kalinga—was practically conterminous with the present British-Indian Empire except that it did not include Burma but did include the greater part of what is now Afghanistan. It covered not only the whole basin of the Indus and Ganges but also the whole of India south of the Vindya Range except for the extreme tip of the peninsula. The Gupta Empire, which had the same capital as the Maurya Empire (at Pataliputra, in the present province of Bihar), never, at its largest, attained the same extension. Yet it exercised a hegemony over all India; and, thanks to the Mauryas' work, all India, North and South, constituted a social though not a political unity in the Gupta Age.

¹ The history of this interregnum is analysed further in V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 272-4; V. C (i) (d) 6 (2), vol. v, pp. 477-8; and Part X, below.

first in the antecedents of the universal state which was established by Augustus. They are stamped upon the very name—*chan kwo*: 'the [period of] contending states'—which Chinese historians have given to the two and a half centuries that intervened between the death of Confucius in 479 B.C. and the assumption of the title *She Hwang-ti*—'the first universal monarch'—by King Chêng of Ts'in in 221 B.C. The conquest of Ts'i by Ts'in in that year completed a long-drawn-out process by which a multiplicity of local states was converted into a single universal state through a struggle for existence in a series of destructive wars.¹ The two marks of the age—a suicidal statecraft and an intellectual vitality which was principally directed towards the philosophy of practical life—recall the age of Hellenic history between the generation of Zeno and Epicurus and the Battle of Actium. Moreover, in this case as in that, we can see that these last centuries before the establishment of the universal state were only the climax of a 'Time of Troubles' which had begun at some earlier date. The flame of militarism which burnt itself out in the post-Confucian Age was already alight before the great philosopher took his measure of human affairs. We hear of an abortive disarmament conference, attended by representatives of fourteen states, in 546 B.C.,² and we can read the same signs of the times in the mundane conservatism of Confucius and in the other-worldly quietism of Lao-Tse. The sun had already passed his zenith in the heavens when both these sages saw the light.³ They both realized that, in the history of their society, the age of growth already lay behind them. What name shall we give to the society upon whose past the one sage looked reverently backward like Epimetheus while the other deliberately turned his back on it like Christian taking leave of the City of Destruction? We may perhaps conveniently call this society 'Sinic'.⁴

We can now observe that the Mahayana—the church through which this Sinic Society came to be 'apparented' to the Far Eastern Society of to-day—resembles the Christian Church, and differs

¹ It will be noticed that Ts'in, like Rome, fought her way through the struggle for existence until she issued from it as the sole survivor and incorporated herself into the universal state which replaced the multiplicity of states that she had destroyed. On the other hand, Ts'in resembled Assyria in collapsing, not indeed on the eve of complete victory, but on the morrow of it, so that the fruits of her militarism were reaped by the Han, as the fruits of Assyrian militarism were reaped by the Achaemenidae.

² Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920-1, Geuthner, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 135.

³ That is, if Lao-Tse ever did see the light—for he may be a fictitious character, invented to provide a founder for the school of philosophy that passes under his name.

⁴ From the Latin names 'Sinae', denoting the inhabitants, and 'Sinica', denoting the territory, of the universal state which was brought into being by the sole survival of the state of Ts'in. The name is not altogether apt, since Ts'in did much to destroy, and little or nothing to create, the culture of the society which we are calling by its name. The work of creation was brought to an end by the destructive warfare in which Ts'in made its fortune—only to lose it to Han. Nevertheless, the name is convenient, since 'Sinae' is the original of our 'Chinese'.

from Islam and Hinduism, inasmuch as the germ of life in which it originated was not indigenous to the society in which it played its part, but was derived from elsewhere. Christianity was begotten in Syriac territories that had been incorporated into the Hellenic universal state, and it was introduced into the Hellenic World by Syriac 'Natives' who had been forcibly enrolled in the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society. The Mahayana appears to have been begotten in Indic territories which were subject successively to the Greek Kings of Bactria and to their 'Philhellenic' successors the Kushans; and it had undoubtedly taken root in the provinces of the Kushan Empire in the Tarim Basin before these provinces were reconquered and re-annexed to the Sinic universal state by the Posterior Han towards the close of the first century of the Christian Era.¹ Through this door, the Mahayana entered the Sinic World and was there adapted by the internal proletariat of the Sinic Society to its own needs.

The original home of this Sinic Society was in the basin of the Yellow River, and thence the society expanded, in the course of its history, over the basin of the Yangtse. The basins of both rivers together were embraced in the original home of the 'affiliated' Far Eastern Society, which expanded from this base south-eastward on to what has since become the south-eastern coast-land of China² and north-eastward into Korea and Japan. Thus the geographical displacement of the Far Eastern Society from the Sinic was comparable in degree, not to the wide displacement of our Western Society from the Hellenic or of the Iranic Society from the Syriac, but rather to the narrower displacement of the Arabic from the Syriac and of the Hindu from the Indic.

'The Fossils'

The information which we have now obtained by investigating the 'affiliations' of all the living societies will enable us at once to identify the extinct societies which are represented to-day by certain 'fossils'.

The Jews and Parsees are manifestly fossils of the Syriac Society in the state in which this society was when it was developing under

¹ The Tarim Basin had been previously conquered and annexed at the close of the second century B.C. by the Prior Han, but had passed out of their control in the course of the last century B.C.

² This coast-land (the modern provinces of Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi) may have been incorporated politically into the Empire of the Han, but, even in this last phase of Sinic history, it never became an integral part of the Sinic World. To-day the people of these provinces call themselves 'T'ang people', in contrast to the 'Han people' of the rest of China. This nomenclature implies that the South China coast was not brought within the pale of Society until the age of the T'ang Dynasty (A.D. 618-907); that is, not until after the interregnum which intervened between the disappearance of the Sinic Society and the emergence of the 'affiliated' society that is still alive in the Far East to-day.

the Achaemenian Empire, before its normal development was suddenly and violently interrupted by the intrusion of the Hellenic Society in the wake of Alexander the Great. The Monophysite and Nestorian Christians are relics of the subsequent reaction of the Syriac Society against the alien intruder. They represent a stage of this reaction at which the internal proletariat of the submerged society was strong enough to resist complete assimilation to the internal proletariat of the intrusive society, but was not yet strong enough to expel the alien intruder altogether and to resume its own development at the point at which its course had been interrupted. The Nestorian and Monophysite 'heresies' were successive and alternative protests against a process of syncretism and adaptation which had been turning Christianity—a religion sprung from a Syriac germ—into an institution of the Hellenic internal proletariat and into a chrysalis from which new societies, 'affiliated' to the Hellenic Society, were to emerge. Nestorianism and Monophysitism were attempts to retain a religion which was Syriac in origin as an heirloom in the Syriac heritage. Christianity, however, in the fifth century of the Christian Era, was already too deeply imbued with Hellenic influences to serve as an effective instrument for an anti-Hellenic reaction. Hence the Nestorian and Monophysite movements were foredoomed to failure. The achievement of completing the expulsion of Hellenism from the Syriac World and providing the internal proletariat of the Syriac Society with a universal church of its own was reserved for Islam—a 'totalitarian' Syriac religion which was anti-Hellenic *au fond*.¹

Similarly, the Jains of India and the Hinayanian Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam can be seen to be fossils of the Indic Society in the state in which this society was when it was developing under the Maurya Empire,² before its normal development was interrupted by the intrusion of the Hellenic Society in the wake of the Greek conquerors from Bactria. The Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia correspond to the Nestorians and Monophysites in representing a reaction that was abortive. The Lamaistic or Tantric form of the Mahayana is the relic of a vain attempt to turn the Mahayana back from the historic path along which this originally Indic religion, after travelling through the Kushan Empire and there becoming imbued with Hellenic influences, eventually fulfilled its great destiny in the Sinic World. The Tantric Mahayana was a half-hearted and therefore unsuccessful forerunner of Hinduism—the 'totalitarian' Indic religion out

¹ For the significance and the fortunes of the Nestorian and the Monophysite movement, see further I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 155; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 236-8; and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 286-7, below.

² Legend ascribes the conversion of Ceylon to the Maurya Emperor Açoka's brother.

of which the internal proletariat of the Indic Society eventually fashioned its indigenous universal church.

These fossils have not given us clues to identifying any other-wise unknown members of the species of societies which we are studying; but they have given us some insight into the 'faults' and 'malformations' and 'stratifications' which occur when two or more societies of this kind collide. Later, we shall have occasion to examine this aspect of 'social geology' in detail.¹

The Minoan Society

Let us go back to the extinct societies which we have identified, by several of our standard tokens, in the backgrounds of the living societies. If we now examine, in their turn, the backgrounds of these extinct societies, and if, in these older backgrounds, we discern the same tokens again, we may hope in this way to identify other extinct societies of an older generation which would prove to be related to the younger extinct societies as these are related to the living representatives of the species.

In the background of the Hellenic Society, certain tokens of the pre-existence of an older society stand out quite clear. The universal state is the maritime empire, maintained by command of the Aegean Sea from a base in the island of Crete, which left a name in Hellenic tradition as 'the thalassocracy of Minos'² and a mark on the face of the Earth in the topmost strata of the palaces at Cnossos and Phaestus which have been excavated, since the beginning of the twentieth century, by our Western archaeologists.³ The *Völkerwanderung* after the fall of this universal state can be seen through a glass darkly in the oldest monuments of Hellenic literature, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. These poems appear to be the remnant—or the quintessence—of an epic cycle which had gathered round two stories, 'the Siege of Troy' and 'the Seven against Thebes'. The final form in which the poems have come down to us seems to have been assumed as late as the sixth century B.C. and to be the last stage in a long process of literary evolution; but the *Völkerwanderung* which remotely inspired the poetry of 'Homer'—or the 'Homeridae'—is also known to us from the contemporary official records of 'the New Empire' of Egypt under

¹ In Part IX, below.

² For the possibility that the historical name of this Cretan imperial people may be preserved in the three names *Mínos*, *Mwítrai*, and *Mwíai*, see I. C (i) (b), Annex II, below.

³ The strata known as 'Late Minoan I and II' would appear to be the material remains that correspond in date to 'the thalassocracy of Minos'. The establishment of the 'thalassocracy' would appear to have been subsequent to the great catastrophe which devastated the Cretan palaces at the break between 'Middle Minoan II' (the age of the Kamáres pottery) and 'Middle Minoan III' (a time of transition which shades off gradually into 'Late Minoan I').

the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth Dynasties; and although these records do not refer to the particular incidents which 'Homer' professes to record, they do give a picture of a historical situation in which such incidents are quite in place; and which the archaeological evidence corroborates. The Völkerwanderung seems to have begun with an irruption of barbarians—Achaeans and the like—from the European hinterland of the Aegean, who took to the sea and overcame the Cretan 'thalassocrats' on their own element. The archaeological evidence of their handiwork is the destruction of the Cretan palaces at the end of the age which the archaeologists call 'Late Minoan II'.¹ The movement culminated in a kind of human avalanche in which the peoples of the Aegean—mainlanders and islanders, victors and vanquished—descended *en masse* upon 'the New Empire' of Egypt and upon the contemporary Empire of Khatti² in Anatolia. The Hittites were overwhelmed. The Egyptians survived to tell the tale to posterity. Scholars agree that the destruction of the Cretan palaces at the end of 'Late Minoan II' is to be dated about 1400 B.C.³ The Egyptian records enable us to date the two supreme convulsions of the Völkerwanderung about 1230/1220 and 1200/1190 B.C. respectively. We can thus take 1425–1125 B.C. as the approximate span of the interregnum which intervened between the disappearance of the older society in the Aegean and the emergence of its Hellenic successor.

When we seek to trace the history of the older society back towards its origins, we find ourselves hampered by having no access to written records—a handicap from which we shall suffer until we succeed in reading the several varieties of Minoan script and interpreting the language or languages conveyed in them. At present, we are wholly dependent on archaeological evidence, which is notoriously difficult to translate into historical terms⁴ and which, even when rightly translated, often fails to answer the questions which humanists are most concerned to ask. The

¹ The sack of the palace at Cnossos at the end of 'Late Minoan II' must have caused a shock like that which (as we know from the recorded evidence of contemporaries) was produced by the sack of Rome in A.D. 410.

² Khatti was the name, in its native form, of the people who appear in the Old Testament as the Children of Heth or Hittites.

³ e.g. Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (i) (2nd edition, Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 238; Glotz, G.: *La Civilisation Égée* (Paris 1923, Renaissance du Livre), p. 61; Fimmen, D.: *Die Kretisch-Mykenische Kultur* (3rd edition, Leipzig 1929, Teubner), synchronistic table.

⁴ e.g. Glotz interprets the archaeological evidence of 'Late Minoan II' as indicating that a universal state, governed by sea-power from Cnossos, was in existence during this period and this period only. M. P. Nilsson (*Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion* (London 1927, Milford), pp. 25–7) argues from the same evidence that, during 'Late Minoan II', Cnossos was leading a parochial existence and was not at that time the capital of an empire extending to the coasts of Continental Greece.

geographical range of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' can be inferred from the fact that a material civilization, known to have been evolved in Crete, was suddenly propagated across the Aegean to the Argolid towards the end of the seventeenth century B.C.¹ and gradually spread over the whole of the Peloponnese and Central Greece during the two centuries preceding the catastrophe in which the fifteenth century closed.² In the opposite direction, we infer the maintenance of diplomatic relations between two Great Powers from the pictures of envoys from people called the Keftiu that appear in wall-paintings in Egyptian tombs of the first half of the fifteenth century B.C. The clothes which these envoys wear and the presents which they carry are recognized by archaeologists as being characteristic of Crete in 'Late Minoan II'.³ If we seek to know the duration of the 'thalassocracy' we can perhaps equate its establishment with the building of new palaces at Cnossos and Phaestus at the beginning of 'Middle Minoan III', and can detect the culmination of a foregoing 'Time of Troubles' in the destruction of the earlier palaces at the close of 'Middle Minoan II', when Crete was overtaken by a catastrophe comparable in magnitude to that in which the 'thalassocracy' ended towards 1400 B.C.: that is, three or four centuries later. Below this particular archaeological stratum there lie others which carry the evidence for the existence of the society backwards—or, in archaeological terms, downwards—to the Neolithic Age. The most convenient name for this society in all its ages and all its works is perhaps 'Minoan'.⁴

The original home of the Minoan Society was in the islands of

¹ 'Tout d'un coup, vers la fin du dix-septième siècle, l'Argolide subit une transformation générale. On apprend à cultiver la vigne et l'olivier. Tout se crétoise. Les femmes s'habillent à la mode de Cnossos. Dans des sanctuaires de type crétois s'installe la déesse crétoise, avec les animaux, les attributs, les objets rituels qui lui sont familiers. Toutes les cérémonies, tous les jeux célébrés en son honneur dans l'île l'accompagnent sur le continent. Les demeures princières s'ornent de fresques et se remplissent de vases précieux et de bijoux où ne se trahit plus guère l'inexpérience helladique.' (Glotz, *op. cit.*, p. 55.)

² Glotz, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-9.

³ Fimmen, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-5. It may be noted that this archaeological stratum called 'Late Minoan II' is equated by Glotz, *op. cit.* (synchronistic table), with the second half of the fifteenth century B.C., not the first.

⁴ This name has already become so well established that it might seem pedantic to coin a new name: for example, 'Archipelagic' (to cover the twin starting-points in Crete and in the Cyclades). It seems simpler to extend the use of the name Minoan—which primarily describes the manifestations of the 'Archipelagic' culture in the single great island of Crete—to cover the 'Cycladic' manifestations of the same culture in the other islands of the Archipelago and the 'Helladic' manifestations in Continental European Greece. At the same time, 'Minoan' is open to the same objection as 'Sinic'. In using the word, we are naming a society after the people who established the universal state into which that society was incorporated in its last phase; and the analogies of the Ts'ing and the Romans render it probable that these people did not make their mark on the history of the society until late in the day, and made it then as destroyers rather than as creators. Our use of the terms 'Middle Minoan' and 'Early Minoan' to denote the archaeological strata to which we apply them may be as much of a solecism as it would be to call the Parthenon a Roman building or the *Iliad* a Roman poem. The Muslims do use 'Rūmī' as an omnibus word for 'Graeco-Roman' or 'Hellenic'; and in our ears this sounds bizarre, e.g. 'Iskandar Rūmī' for Alexander of Macedon.

Crete and the Cyclades, and thence the society spread overseas through the Archipelago to the Aegean coast of Continental European Greece. The original home of the Hellenic Society embraced this coast, at which 'the thalassocracy of Minos' reached its limit, together with the western coast of Anatolia, along which the archaeological evidence for Minoan influence is singularly slight. Thus the geographical displacement of the Hellenic Society from the Minoan Society was considerable. In fact, when due allowance is made for the difference in scale between 'the thalassocracy of Minos' and the Roman Empire, the displacement of the Hellenic Society from the Minoan is comparable in degree to the displacement of Western Christendom, rather than to that of Orthodox Christendom, from Hellas.¹

Before, however, we permit ourselves to make this comparison, we must ask ourselves the prior question: Are we warranted in treating the Minoan and the Hellenic Society as though they were related to one another in the way in which the Hellenic Society is related to Orthodox and to Western Christendom? Can we regard the Minoan and Hellenic societies as being 'apparented-and-affiliated' in any sense? In all the cases of Apparentation-and-Affiliation that we have investigated, the social link between the two parties has been a universal church, which has been created by the internal proletariat of the older society and has afterwards served as the chrysalis within which the younger society has come into existence and has gradually taken shape. In the 'apparentation' of the Hellenic Society to Orthodox and Western Christendom, this role was played by the Christian Church; in the 'apparentation' of the Syriac Society to the Arabic and the Iranic, it was played by Islam; in the 'apparentation' of the Indic to the Hindu, it was played by Hinduism; in the 'apparentation' of the Sinic to the Far Eastern, it was played by the Mahayana. Can we discern any universal church which has established a similar liaison between the Minoan Society and the Hellenic?

In order to answer this question in the affirmative, it is not enough to cite any and every instance of continuity between the religious histories of the two societies. For example, the temples of the state goddesses in the Hellenic city-states of Mycenae and Tiryns and Athens appear to have occupied the same sites as the chapels of the household goddesses in the 'Mycenaean'² palaces

¹ The respective functions of the Aegean coast of Continental Greece as a limit in the expansion of the Minoan Society and a base-line in the expansion of the Hellenic may be compared with the respective functions, in Hellenic and in Western history, of the line running across Western Europe from Rome to the Roman Wall. (See pp. 37-9, above.)

² The term 'Mycenaean' is used by archaeologists to denote the variant of the Minoan material civilization which maintained itself in Continental Greece from about the end of the seventeenth century B.C. until the cessation of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung.

from which the same districts of Continental Greece had been governed in Minoan times.¹ For our purpose, however, this example of continuity is irrelevant; for the essence of these worships was their local character; and this distinctive feature, which suggests that they all survived because each was deep-rooted in its own soil, warns us that it is idle to look for the traces of a universal church in them. It is more to the point that a similar continuity can be detected in the sanctuaries at Delos, Eleusis, and Delphi²; for the worships in these sanctuaries were not local but 'Pan-Hellenic' in Hellenic times. Yet there was nothing Minoan about the principal expression of 'Pan-Hellenism' in Hellenic religion: that is, the Olympian Pantheon. This Pantheon took its classical form from the Homeric epic—an echo of the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*—and here we see Gods made in the image of the barbarians who descended upon the Minoan World from the European hinterland of the Aegean after 'the thalassocracy of Minos' had broken down. Zeus is an Achaean war-lord; the other Olympians are his war-band; and the divine adventurer has made his fortune, like any 'Zeus-born' king of men, by robbery under arms. Zeus reigns on Olympus as a usurper who has supplanted his predecessor Cronos by force; and he has divided the spoils of the Universe—giving the Waters and the Earth to his brothers Poseidon and Hades and keeping the Air for himself. This Olympian Pantheon is Achaean through and through and post-Minoan altogether.³ We cannot even see a reflection of a Minoan Pantheon in the older divinities who are dispossessed; for Cronos and the Titans, as the Hellenic Mythology presents them, are simply projections into the past of Zeus and the Olympians themselves. We are reminded of the religion which had been abandoned by the majority of the Teutonic barbarians in the no-man's-land beyond the northern frontiers of the Roman Empire before their *Völkerwanderung* began,⁴ and which was retained and refined by

¹ Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-17.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 400-2 and 533-6.

³ This derivation of Zeus and his Olympians from the barbarian war-lord of the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* and his war-band has been pointed out by Gilbert Murray in *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, 2nd edition (Oxford 1925, Clarendon Press), pp. 66-9. The Scandinavians appear to have re-made their ancestral gods in the corresponding image in the Viking Age (Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 parts in 2 vols.), Part II, pp. 252-3). M. P. Nilsson, in *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), Chapter IV, argues, as against Murray, that the human prototype of Olympus is not the war-band of the *Völkerwanderung* but the grander and stabler Mycenaean monarchy which preceded the *Völkerwanderung* in Continental Greece in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries B.C. Since, however, Nilsson is at pains to distinguish the Mycenaean from the Minoan and to emphasize the links which connect the Mycenaeans with their Hellenic successors, his argument, even if it were accepted, would make no difference for our present purpose.

⁴ Most of these barbarians were converted to the Arian form of Christianity in the course of the fourth century of the Christian Era, before they overran the Roman Empire, and were subsequently converted again to Catholicism—the religion of their subject

their kinsmen in Scandinavia—to be abandoned by these in turn in the course of their own Völkerwanderung five or six centuries later. If anything in the nature of a universal church existed in the Minoan World at the time when the barbarian avalanche descended it must have been something as different from the worship of the Olympian Pantheon as Christianity was from the worship of Odin and the Aesir.

Did such a thing exist? There are faint indications that it did, when we survey our scanty evidence.

From the archaeological evidence, which is at any rate at first hand, though it is not always easy to interpret, some striking conclusions are drawn by the greatest master of the subject:

'So far as it has been possible to read the evidences of the old Cretan worship, we seem to discern not only a prevailing spiritual essence but something in its followers akin to the faith that for the last two millennia has moved the adherents of successive Oriental religions: Iranian, Christian and Islamic.¹ It involves a dogmatic spirit in the worshipper far removed from the true Hellenic standpoint. . . . Broadly comparing it with the religion of the Ancient Greeks, it must be said that it had a more spiritual essence. From another aspect, it had a more personal bearing. On the "Ring of Nestor", where the symbols of resurgence are seen above her head in chrysalis and butterfly shape, she [the Goddess] has clearly the power of giving life beyond the grave to her worshippers. She was very near to her votaries. . . . She guarded her children even beyond the grave. . . . Greek religion had its Mysteries, but the Gods of both sexes, more or less on a par, by no means stood in such a close personal relation as is indicated by the evidences of the Minoan Cult. Their disunion, marked by family and clannish feuds, was as conspicuous as their multiplicity of form and attributes. In contrast to this, throughout the Minoan World, what appears to be the same paramount Goddess constantly reappears. . . . The general conclusion is that we are in the presence of a largely monotheistic cult, in which the female form of divinity held the supreme place.'²

This universal Goddess is also represented in Minoan art as the Divine Mother, holding up her infant child for adoration.³

populations. The English and the Franks were exceptional in carving out their 'successor-states' as pagans and in being converted thereafter to Catholicism without an intermediate Arian stage.

¹ The author cites archaeological evidence (in the same work, on p. 38) which seems to show that, in the period which 'corresponds with that of the great Minoan expansion in Mainland Greece', the Minoan religion 'had its propagandist side'. Stocks of Minoan religious emblems and furniture, dating from that age, have been unearthed in the quondam Minoan harbour at Niru Khani, on the north coast of Crete, near Cnossos. 'The inference is almost inevitable that we have here the evidence of an organized attempt to provide for the religious needs of co-religionists overseas. May there not even have been some actual propaganda in *partibus infidelium*?'

² Evans, Sir Arthur: *The Earlier Religion of Greece in the Light of Cretan Discoveries* (London 1931, Macmillan), pp. 37-41.

³ Evans, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-6.

And her symbols of immortality—the chrysalis and the butterfly—have been found in Minoan graves in the form of gold amulets.¹

Another source of evidence for a Minoan belief in an after-life is to be found in Hellenic literature. For example, in one passage of Homer² there is a description of an after-life in 'Elysium' which is not compatible with the ordinary Homeric picture of the after-life in Hades. The shadow-world of Hades reproduces the unsubstantial fabric of barbarian life during a *Völkerwanderung*. The state of blessedness in Elysium looks like a cultivated seafaring people's idea of their own world made perfect.³ Again, the Hellenic tradition has preserved the legend of a 'Zeus' in Crete who cannot really be the same divinity as the Zeus on Olympus. This Cretan 'Zeus' is not the leader of a war-band who comes on the scene, full-grown and fully armed, to take a kingdom by storm and reign happily ever after. He appears as a new-born babe, nursed by the nymphs and suckled by a beast of the field;⁴ and he is not only born—he dies! Was his emblem the double-headed axe—a religious symbol which became as ubiquitous in the Minoan World as the cross in Christendom?⁵ And were his birth and death re-enacted in the birth and death of Dionysus—the Thracian God with whom, in the course of Hellenic history, the God of the

¹ Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

² *Odyssey*, iv, ll. 561 seqq.

³ Nilsson, *op. cit.* (on p. 93 above), pp. 540-4. He thinks that the Minoan idea of Elysium was coloured, if not originally inspired, by the imagery of the Osirian religion (*op. cit.*, pp. 544-8). He interprets the Haghia Triádhia Sarcophagus as a representation of the apotheosis of the dead with the external forms of the Osiris worship—e.g. the ritual garment of hide and the barque—supplemented by traditional Minoan religious symbols: double axe, pillar, bird, horns of consecration, and tree. 'The idea of the divinization of the dead, borrowed from Egypt and developed under Egyptian influence, has caused a superimposition of the divine cult upon the cult of the dead with some Egyptianizing details. It is only natural that those details were neither exactly understood nor applied in strict Egyptian fashion' (*op. cit.*, p. 378). 'Whether the idea of the deification of Man was an original element in Minoan belief and developed under Egyptian influence, or whether it was borrowed from Egypt and remodelled in accordance with the forms of the Minoan religion—a borrowing, however, pre-supposing a congenial disposition of the Minoan religious temper—it is contrary to Greek ideas' (*op. cit.*, p. 380). This conjecture is commended by the fact that the Haghia Triádhia Sarcophagus belongs to the so-called 'Late Minoan' period—an age which included the Minoan universal state and the ensuing interregnum, and which was contemporary with the period of 'the New Empire' in Egypt. If the internal proletariat of the Minoan Society did create anything like a universal church, this is the age in which we should look for traces of it; and if the germ of life in the hypothetical new religion was derived from Osirism, this again, is the age in which we should expect Osirian influences to have spread to the Minoan World; for it was an age in which intercourse between Egypt and Crete was close; and in Egypt the Osirian religion had by then already asserted itself. It is also observed by Evans (*op. cit.*, p. 41) that 'a certain moral ingredient—taken over, it may be, from Ancient Egypt—is perceptible in the idea of the weighing of the Soul in butterfly form, evidenced by the gold scales from the Mycenae tomb and by the scene on the "Ring of Nestor" where the deceased are led before the Griffin Inquisitor, enthroned before the Goddess'. For earlier connexions between the Minoan and the Egyptian religion, going back to 'Pre-Dynastic' times, see *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10.

⁴ For this motif, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 259-62, below.

⁵ The comparison is made by Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 162 and 192. The cross itself appears to have been a Minoan religious symbol, as well as the double axe; but the comparative rarity of the examples that have been recovered in the process of archaeological research indicates that in this religion it was a symbol of minor importance.

Eleusinian Mysteries became identified? Were the Mysteries in Classical Greece, like witchcraft in Modern Europe, a survival from the religion of a submerged society?

If Christendom had succumbed to the Vikings—falling under their dominion and failing to convert them to its Faith—we can imagine the Mass being celebrated mysteriously for centuries in the underworld of a new society in which the prevailing religion was the worship of the Aesir. We can also imagine this new society, as it grew in wisdom and stature, failing to find satisfaction in the religious heritage of the Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung* and seeking for the bread of spiritual life in the soil on which, when the *Völkerwanderung* had subsided, the new society had found rest for the sole of its foot. In such a spiritual famine the remnant of an older religion, instead of being stamped out as in our Western history witchcraft was stamped out when it caught the attention of the Church, might have been rediscovered as a hidden treasure; and some religious genius might have met the needs of his age by an exotic combination of the submerged Christian rite with latter-day barbarian orgies derived from the Finns or the Magyars.

On the analogy of this imaginary religious history of the West, we might reconstruct the actual religious history of the Hellenic World: the revival of the ancient and traditional Mysteries of Eleusis and the invention of Orphism—a speculative religion, created by a religious genius¹—out of a syncretism between the orgies of the Thracian Dionysus and the Minoan Mysteries of the birth and death and resurrection of Zagreus, the Divine Child.² Undoubtedly both the Eleusinian Mysteries and the Orphic Church did provide the Hellenic Society in the Classical Age with spiritual sustenance which it needed but could not find in the worship of the Olympians; and the vital element which the Olympian religion lacked and which the Mysteries and Orphism both contained was a transcendental other-worldly spirit such as we should expect to find in a religion which had been conceived in a 'Time of Troubles' and not in an age of youth and growth. It is a spirit that we recognize as characteristic of the universal churches, created by the internal proletariats of societies in decline, which we have been

¹ Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 510–11.

² If there really was a revival of Minoan religion in the Hellenic World in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., the revivalists may not always have understood rightly the Mysteries which they were resuscitating. One of the great names with which this supposed revival is traditionally connected is that of the Cretan 'prophet' Epimenides of Cnossos; and the verse, abusing Epimenides' own Cretan countrymen, which St. Paul quotes from Epimenides' poem 'Minos' in his epistle to Titus i. 12, appears to have been evoked by Epimenides' indignation at the sacred pillar of the dying and re-arising Minoan 'Zeus'—a Bethel or habitat of the deity which the latter-day Hellenic religious reformer mistook for his tomb. (See Evans, Sir Arthur: *The Earlier Religion of Greece in the Light of Cretan Discoveries* (London 1931, Macmillan), pp. 17–18.)

passing in review: the Mahayana, Catholicism, Islam. And these churches bequeathed this vital element to the nascent societies for which they served as chrysalides. On this showing, when we see the same element of religion being communicated to another nascent society by a church which appears to spring suddenly from the ground in order to perform this office, we may speculate whether this Orphic Church is really new or old. The seed from which it is newly sprung may not have been newly sown but have been lying for ages underground, ready to germinate when a favourable moment arrived. It may have been like those seeds which have come to flower in the soil of English gardens after being buried with dead Pharaohs in Egyptian sands. Thus Shi'ism was raised from the dead by Ismā'il Safawī in Iran, some four or five centuries after it had been buried in the grave of the Syriac Society with the Buwayhids and the Carmathians and the Fātimids.¹ And thus, in the days of St. Francis of Assisi, Manichaeism was suspected of covertly revisiting, in the guise of Catharism, a world in which it had hardly been heard of since the days of Augustine of Madaura.²

On these analogies it is not altogether fantastic to espy, in the Mysteries and Orphism, the ghost of a Minoan universal church which the Hellenic Society succeeded in conjuring up from the tomb. Yet even if this speculation hits the truth, this hardly warrants us in regarding the Hellenic Society as being 'affiliated' to the Minoan in the sense in which we have come to speak, in this Study, of the 'affiliation' of one society to another. For why did this church require resurrection unless it had been slain? And who were its slayers unless the barbarians who had overrun the Minoan World? In taking the Pantheon of these murderous Achaeans for its own, the Hellenic Society had proclaimed them its parents by adoption. It could not 'affiliate' itself to the Minoan Society without taking the blood-guiltiness of the Achaeans upon its head and confessing itself a parricide.

If we turn now to the background of the Syriac Society we shall find what we have found in the background of the Hellenic. On the surface, at any rate, we shall fail to detect any signs of a universal church; but we shall perceive a universal state and a *Völkerwanderung*; and, what is more, these will prove to be the identical universal state and *Völkerwanderung* which appear in the background of the Hellenic Society as the last chapters in Minoan history.

The final convulsion of the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*, which the Egyptian records enable us to date about 1200/1190 B.C.,

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 69-70, above, together with Annex I, below.

² These phenomena are examined in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 368-71, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, pp. 624-34, as well as in Part X, below.

was not a raid in quest of plunder but a migration in search of new homes; and the migrants seem to have been a mixed multitude of Achaeans and Minoans, driven pell-mell by the impetus of a new human avalanche from the European hinterland of the Aegean: the 'Dorians'.¹ The refugees—a mighty host of fighting men and non-combatants, people and cattle, carts and ships—seem to have descended upon the mainland of Asia and then travelled along the Asiatic coast south-eastward—breaking, like a tidal wave, first upon the Empire of Khatti in Anatolia and then upon 'the New Empire' of Egypt. The Egyptian records inform us that the impact broke the Empire of Khatti in pieces, while 'the New Empire' withstood the shock in a great battle on the border between Palestine and Egypt; but in both areas the sequel was the same: the migrants failed to win a footing in the hinterland but made permanent settlements in the coast-lands. On the north-western coast of the broken Empire of Khatti they settled in the districts which, as Aeolis and Ionia, became part of the original home of the Hellenic Society.² On the north-eastern coast of 'the New Empire' of Egypt (an empire which survived, dead-alive) the

¹ The names 'Minoans', 'Achaeans', and 'Dorians' are used here with no connotations of language and *a fortiori* none of race. By 'Minoans' are meant all people who were members of the Minoan Society during its last phase when it was embodied in 'the thalassocracy of Minos'. By 'Achaeans' are meant those members of the external proletariat of the Minoan Society who descended from the European hinterland of the Aegean at the end of the 'thalassocracy' and who made their mark in the sack of Cnossos about 1400 B.C. By 'Dorians' are meant the backwoodsmen who followed in the footsteps of the 'Achaeans' at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. It is likely that the Minoan Society, like other societies, included peoples belonging to various races and speaking various languages. The members of the Society in Crete and the Cyclades probably did not speak Greek. The 'Minoanized' inhabitants of Continental Greece probably did speak Greek (of the dialects afterwards called Arcadian, Ionic, and Aeolic) at the time when they first came within the orbit of the Minoan Society; and they doubtless continued to speak it as their vernacular. Greek was also almost certainly the vernacular language of both the 'Achaeans' and the 'Dorians' (and they appear to have spoken dialects of the same group, which is now known as Doric and North-Western). These linguistic affinities and differences are of more interest to the philologist than to the historian; and a Western historian of the present day must take care not to view them through the spectacles of a modern Western linguistic nationalism. Unless he takes off these spectacles, he will be inclined to equate affinities and differences of language with affinities and differences of culture and with the sympathies and antipathies to which these cultural affinities and differences give rise. This equation, which seems self-evident in our 'post-war' Western World, is quite invalid for the Aegean World in the times of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' and the subsequent *Völkerwanderung*. The Greek-speaking 'Mycenaeans' of Continental Greece about the year 1400 B.C. assuredly regarded the non-Greek-speaking 'Minoans' of Crete and the Cyclades as their brethren and the Greek-speaking Achaeans as barbarians beyond the pale. Again, about the year 1200 B.C., the Doric-speaking 'Achaeans' who were the ruling element in the 'successor-states' among which the former domain of the Minoan 'thalassocracy' was partitioned from about 1400 to 1200 B.C., quite probably regarded the Doric-speaking 'Dorians' very much as the 'Achaeans' themselves had been regarded by the 'Minoans' some two centuries earlier.

² For the original home of the Hellenic Society, see p. 95, above. When this home is examined closely, it can be dissected into two nodes or nuclei. One of these is the Aegean coast of Continental Greece, which had been the limit up to which the Minoan Society had expanded in that direction. The other is the Aegean coast of Anatolia, which the Minoans did not make their own until they settled there as refugees during the interregnum which followed the breakdown of their 'thalassocracy'.

intruders settled in a district which, as Philistia¹ (Palestine), became part of the original home of the Syriac Society. Along the border between the coast-lands and the interior, between the low-lands and the highlands, the Philistine refugees from the Minoan World encountered the Hebrew Nomads who had been drifting into the Syrian dependencies of 'the New Empire' of Egypt out of a no-man's-land in Arabia. Farther north, the mountain-range of Lebanon set a limit to the simultaneous infiltration of the Aramaean Nomads and gave shelter to the Phoenicians of the coast, who had managed to survive the passage of the Philistines and had learnt to lean no longer on the broken reed of an Egyptian protectorate. Out of these elements, a new society—the society which we have already identified in the background of the Islamic Society, and which we have decided to call 'Syriac'—emerged slowly as the convulsion subsided.²

As far as the Syriac Society was related at all to any older member of the species, it was related to the Minoan, and this in the degree in which the Hellenic Society was related to the Minoan—neither more nor less. One heritage of the Syriac Society from the Minoan may have been the Alphabet;³ another may have been the taste for long-distance sea-faring which declared itself in the exploration of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and in the discovery of the Atlantic.⁴ That the Syriac Society, too, should

¹ More accurately, 'Philistia and Teucra'. The Teucrians or Zakkari settled at Dor, under the lee of Mount Carmel; the Philistines or Prsta settled on the coast southward of Dor as far as Gaza. Another war-band of Teucra settled immediately to the north of the Aeolians, under the lee of Mount Ida in the Troad, on the ruins of Ilium.

² In the traditions of the Israelites, the genesis of this Syriac Society was accurately described in the form of a prophecy after the event. 'God shall enlarge Japheth [the mythical eponymous ancestor of the peoples of the Minoan World, who appears in the Hellenic Mythology as the Titan Iapetos], and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem [the mythical eponymous ancestor of the Hebrews and Aramaeans]; and Canaan [the eponym of the inhabitants of the Syrian dependencies of 'the New Empire' of Egypt] shall be his servant (Gen. ix. 27, cited by Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (i), 2nd edition, p. 561). 'La Palestine avait été convertie à la Civilisation Égéenne' (Glotz, G.: *La Civilisation Égéenne* (Paris 1923, Renaissance du Livre), p. 437). It will be seen that the geographical displacement of the Syriac Society from the Minoan was considerably greater than that of the Hellenic from the Minoan.

³ Scholars have surmised that the Minoan scripts which Archaeology has brought to light may be the ancestors of the Alphabet, which first appears in history as a possession of the Syriac Society and which has since supplanted every other script that has ever been invented except the Sinic characters which are still employed in the Far East. This surmise is not ruled out by the discovery in the Sinai Peninsula of an inscription in an archaic form of the Alphabet which is believed to date from the sixteenth century B.C. This might only mean that the settlement of Minoan refugees in Syria at the beginning of the twelfth century B.C. had been preceded by an infiltration of Minoan culture during the foregoing centuries when Syria had formed part, first of the Hyksos Empire and then of 'the New Empire' of Egypt. (For the origin of the Alphabet, see further II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 50-1, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 386, footnote 2, below.)

⁴ There had been a local coastwise traffic between the ports of Phoenicia and the Delta of the Nile since the first half of the third millennium B.C., but the long-distance voyages of the Phoenicians to the Western Mediterranean do not seem to go back beyond the beginning of the first millennium B.C. On the other hand, during the second millennium B.C., the Minoans ventured to sail from Crete as far as Egypt in one direction and Sicily in the other. Was it this tradition of seamanship—brought to Syria by Philistines

stand in this relation to the Minoan is somewhat surprising. One would rather expect to discover that the universal state in the background of Syriac history was not 'the thalassocracy of Minos' but 'the New Empire' of Egypt, and that the Monotheism of the Jews was a resurrection of the monotheism of Ikhnaton. The evidence, however, as far as it goes, does not warrant the hypothesis of such an 'affiliation'. Nor is there any evidence that the Syriac Society was either 'affiliated' or related in any lesser degree to the society represented by the Empire of Khatti—the Anatolian Power which had been contending with 'the New Empire' of Egypt for the dominion over Syria during the two centuries before the great migration of 1200/1190 B.C. occurred. Finally, there is no evidence of any 'affiliation' of the Syriac Society to the society represented by an earlier empire to which Syria had belonged some centuries before her Egyptian and Hittite conquerors appeared on the scene: that is to say, the Empire of Sumer and Akkad which had been established by the Sumerian Dynasty of Ur (*imperabant circa* 2295–2180 B.C.) and had been restored by the Amorite Dynasty of Babylon in the reign of Hammurabi (*imperabat circa* 1947–1905 B.C.).¹ The culture of the society of which this empire was the universal state made a deep impress upon all the countries and peoples which it embraced; and for seven centuries after Hammurabi's death the Akkadian language, conveyed in the cuneiform script, continued to be the *lingua franca* of commerce and diplomacy through all South-Western Asia. The impress of this culture was as deep in Syria as in any other country outside the actual homeland of the culture in 'Irāq. It is stamped upon the manners and customs of the Syrian people as we see them, from the sixteenth century B.C. to the thirteenth, through Egyptian eyes. Yet this impress, though it lasted so long, was not destined to reproduce itself in a new order of society.² When the darkness which descends upon the history of Syria after the migration of 1200/1190 begins to lift, the old impress has disappeared. The cuneiform script has been superseded by the Alphabet without leaving a trace of its former currency in Syria. The Minoan influence has prevailed.

and Teucrians in the migration of 1200/1190 B.C.—that inspired the Phoenicians in the first millennium to emulate the Minoans and surpass themselves?

¹ The dates given in this work for events in Sumeric, Babylonian, Hittite, and Egyptian history are those of Eduard Meyer in *Die Ältere Chronologie Babylonien, Assyrien und Ägyptens* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1925, Cotta), except where another authority is expressly cited.

² It is true that we can discern some faint traces of an incipient Syriac Society which was related, not to the Minoan Society, but to the society, still to be identified, of which the Empire of Sumer and Akkad was the universal state. This first attempt at a Syriac Society, however, was abortive. This first, abortive, Syriac Society is examined in II. D (vii), vol. II, pp. 388–91, below.

The Sumeric Society

When we turn to the background of the Indic Society, the first thing that strikes us is that the religion of the Vedas, like the worship of the Olympians, shows evidence of having arisen among barbarians in the course of a *Völkerwanderung*, and bears none of the distinguishing marks of a religion that has been created during a 'Time of Troubles' by the internal proletariat of a society in decline.

In this case the barbarians were the Aryas, who appear in North-Western India at the dawn of Indic history as, at the dawn of Hellenic history, the Achaeans appear in the Aegean. On the analogy of the relation in which we have found the Hellenic Society standing to the Minoan, we should expect to discover in the background of the Indic Society some universal state with a no-man's-land beyond its frontier in which the ancestors of the Aryas were living as an external proletariat until the universal state broke down and left the way open for a *Völkerwanderung* to overrun its derelict provinces. Can that universal state be identified and that no-man's-land be located? We may perhaps obtain answers to those questions by first asking ourselves two others: Whence did the Aryas find their way to India? And did any of them, starting from the same centre of dispersion, arrive at a different destination?

The Aryas spoke an Indo-European language; and the historical distribution of this family of languages—one group in Europe and another group in India and Iran—shows that the Aryas must have entered India from the Eurasian Steppe, crossing the Hindu Kush from the basin of the Oxus and Jaxartes into the basin of the Indus and Ganges as the Bactrian Greeks crossed in the second century B.C. and the Kushans in the first century of the Christian Era and a succession of Turkish invaders, from Mahmūd of Ghaznah to Bābur of Farghāna, between the eleventh century and the sixteenth. Now when we study the dispersion of the Turks, during those centuries, from the common point of departure where they all broke out of the Steppe into Transoxania, we find that while some of them turned south-eastward and invaded India, others moved on south-westward across Iran and did not come to a halt until they had reached Anatolia and Syria. It was the advance of the Saljūq Turks from the Oxus to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Straits in the eleventh century—at a time when other Turks were advancing from the Oxus to the Indus—that provoked the First Crusade. In the twelfth century the war-bands of Turkish Mamlūks in the service of Saladin passed on into Egypt; and in the thirteenth century the successors of these Mamlūks supplanted Saladin's descendants and took the dominion of Egypt and Syria

for themselves.¹ The records of ancient Egypt give us evidence that, during the first half of the second millennium B.C., the Aryas, breaking out of the Eurasian Steppe at the point where the Turks broke out of it about 3,000 years later, anticipated the Turks in their subsequent dispersion. While some Aryas (as we know from Indian sources) crossed the Hindu Kush into India, others made their way across Iran and 'Irāq to Syria and thence overran Egypt towards the beginning of the seventeenth century B.C. The Hyksos, as the Egyptians called these barbarian war-lords,² ruled an empire, embracing Egypt and Syria and perhaps Mesopotamia³ as well, which was probably as extensive as Saladin's and was certainly as ephemeral. When, about 1580 B.C., the Hyksos were expelled from Egypt by their vassal the native prince of Thebes, who thus became the founder of 'the New Empire', the war-bands of the petty rulers who entered into the Hyksos' inheritance⁴ in Syria continued to be called by an Aryan name,⁵ and the kings of Mitanni, in Mesopotamia, continued to worship Aryan Gods.⁶

What caused the Völkerwanderung of the Aryas? What carried them from the Oxus to the Indus and the Nile? We may reply by asking: What caused the Völkerwanderung of the Turks, 3,000 years later, and carried the Turks along the same divergent roads to the same distant goals? The answer to our last question is a matter of common knowledge. The ancestors of the Turks had been living as an external proletariat of the Syriac Society in the no-man's-land of the Steppe beyond the north-eastern frontier of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad—the universal state of the Syriac Society in its last phase. When the Caliphate broke down, the Turks drifted in to take possession of its derelict territories, which now lay open to them from end to end. In one direction the provinces of the Caliphate extended continuously all the way from Transoxania to Egypt; but there was also a detached province in the valley of the Indus, extending from the coast up-river to Multan and beyond, which was accessible from Transoxania by

¹ They sought to legitimize their power by exercising it in the name of a line of nominal caliphs of 'Abbasid descent whom they maintained as their prisoners at Cairo. (See the present section, p. 70, with p. 71, footnote 1, above.)

² The Hyksos were probably a mixed multitude of Aryas and other adventurers (e.g. Kharrians) who had joined their ranks on their way across South-Western Asia, as the war-bands who entered Egypt with Saladin were a mixed multitude of Turks, Kurds, and Syrians.

³ i.e. Mesopotamia in the strict sense, meaning the middle basin of the Euphrates and Tigris between Armenia on the north-west and 'Irāq on the south-east.

⁴ The Aryan element among the Hyksos is inferred from the Aryan element among the successors of the Hyksos in Syria and Mitanni, for which we have direct evidence in the records of 'the New Empire' of Egypt from the sixteenth century B.C. onwards. For the whole subject see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (i), 2nd edition, pp. 33-8.

⁵ 'Maryanni' = 'men'. These Aryan 'maryanni' corresponded to the Turkish 'mamluks' = 'property' (i.e. slaves brought up as fighting men).

⁶ e.g. Mitra, Varuna, Indra, the Nasatyas.

way of the Hindu Kush. The political geography of the Caliphate thus explains the dispersion of the Turkish raiders very simply. They spread in every direction in which a province of the derelict universal state awaited the spoiler.¹ Does this explanation give us a clue to the corresponding dispersion of the Aryas 3,000 years earlier? Assuredly it does. For when we look at the political map of South-Western Asia in the first century of the second millennium B.C., we find it occupied by a universal state which, like the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, was governed from a capital in 'Irāq, and whose territories extended in the same directions as the territories of the Caliphate from the same centre.

This universal state was 'the Empire of the Four Quarters of the World' or 'the Empire of Sumer and Akkad'—established *circa* 2298 B.C. by the Sumerian Ur-Engur of Ur and restored *circa* 1947 B.C. by the Amorite Hammurabi²—which we have encountered already as the empire to which Syria belonged some centuries before she became the battle-field of the Egyptians and the Hittites.³ The interval between the break-up of Hammurabi's Empire, after his death about 1905 B.C., and the establishment of 'the New Empire' of Egypt in the sixteenth century B.C., was occupied in the history of Syria by the domination of the Aryan migrants who came to be known as the Hyksos. These Aryas must have migrated across South-Western Asia and made themselves masters of Syria before they used Syria as their base for conquering Egypt in the early years of the seventeenth century B.C. The dates indicate that the Empire of the Hyksos began as an Aryan 'successor-state' to the universal state of Sumer and Akkad in Syria—a 'successor-state' that afterwards lost its equilibrium and changed its character by incidentally conquering another country—Egypt—which had never been included in the Empire of Sumer and Akkad and which belonged to the domain of a different society.⁴ Thus the

¹ The Turks who overran the 'Abbasid Empire in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, like the majority of the Germans who overran the Roman Empire in the fifth century, did not cross the frontier of the universal state until they had become members of the universal church which had spread through the territories of the Empire and into the no-man's-lands beyond. The Muslim inhabitants of the 'Abbasid Empire, finding their Turkish co-religionists from no-man's-land awkward guests, in spite of their conversion, tried to 'pass' these guests 'on' to their neighbours by encouraging them to take up the Holy War against the Unbelievers. The van-guard of the Saljūqs, after drifting right across the territory of the Caliphate, was successfully 'passed on' into the domain of Orthodox Christendom in Anatolia. (And the East Romans promptly retaliated by similarly 'passing on' the Normans from Apulia into Dār-al-Islām.) Mahmūd of Ghaznah was encouraged to turn his energies against the Hindu World by invading the Panjab; but when once he had descended into the Valley of the Indus, he did not respect the boundary of the 'Abbasid province but overran Dār-al-Harb and Dār-al-Islām alike. Is it conceivable that the Hyksos were 'passed on' into the Egyptian World by the statesmen of Sumer and Akkad?

² Hammurabi was consciously restoring the universal state, for he revived its style and title (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, 3rd edition, vol. i, part (ii), p. 633).

³ See p. 103, above.

⁴ The history of the Hyksos Empire displays points of likeness to the history of the

political geography of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad explains the migration of some Aryas to Syria. Does it also explain the contemporary migration of other Aryas to India? Was there a province of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad in the Indus Valley to attract these other Aryas across the Hindu Kush, as some of the kinsmen of the Saljūq Turks were attracted in the same direction by the existence in the Indus Valley of a province of the 'Abbasid Caliphate?

A priori, this would be not unlikely. The 'Abbasid province in Sind was connected with the political centre of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in 'Irāq by the sea-route, down the Persian Gulf, from the estuary of the Tigris and Euphrates to the Delta of the Indus. The political centre of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad likewise lay in 'Irāq; its later capital was Babylon, at a point on the Euphrates corresponding to the position of Baghdad on the Tigris; its earlier capital was Ur, which in the third millennium B.C. was as near to the head of the Gulf as Basrah has been in this second millennium of the Christian Era. We know that the Sumerians were a sea-faring people who navigated the waters of the Gulf. What more likely than that they should have explored it as far as its exit into the Indian Ocean and so have discovered the Delta of the Indus? And, if they did discover that, what more likely again than that they should have ascended a river so like the Tigris and Euphrates and have colonized a country so like their own—creating there a new land of Sumer overseas?¹ As it happens, these *a priori* surmises now find some support in the results of recent archaeological research in the Indus Valley.

At Mohenjo-Daro in north-western Sind and at Harappā in the Panjab, north-east of Multan, excavations carried out by the Archaeological Department of the Government of India have brought to light the material remains of an ancient culture which is closely related to the ancient culture of the Sumerians in 'Irāq. The affinity falls short of absolute identity. It recalls the affinity of the Mycenaean culture of Continental Greece to the Minoan

Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyad Caliphate started as a 'successor-state' in Syria to the Roman Empire; the Hyksos Empire started as a 'successor-state' in Syria to the Empire of Sumer and Akkad. The Umayyad Caliphate lost its equilibrium by incidentally conquering the former domain of the Sasanian Empire; the Hyksos Empire lost its equilibrium by incidentally conquering the former domain of 'the Middle Empire' of Egypt (the empire of the Eleventh and the Twelfth Dynasty). The Umayyad Caliphate paid the penalty of being supplanted by the 'Abbasid Caliphate; the Hyksos Empire paid the penalty of being supplanted by 'the New Empire' of Egypt.

¹ The likeness of the Lower Indus Valley to the Lower Euphrates and Tigris Valley round about the turn of the fourth and third millennia B.C. appears to have been still greater than it is to-day; for at that time Sind, as well as 'Irāq, is believed to have been a land of two rivers. There are traces of a waterway, the so-called 'Great Mihran', which flowed from the Panjab to the Indian Ocean more or less parallel to the Indus, eastward of the latter river. (See Sir John Marshall in *The Times*, 5th January, 1928; and Childe, V. G.: *The Most Ancient East* (London 1922, Kegan Paul), p. 201.)

culture of Crete; and we may explain this in either of two ways. Either we may conjecture that 'the Indus Culture', like the Mycenaean, was a 'colonial' variation, produced by the transplantation overseas of a culture which had originated and grown up elsewhere—in this case, in the basin of the Tigris and Euphrates—or else we may see in it a sister-culture, derived from a common parent unknown, which grew up simultaneously and independently.¹ The two sites of 'the Indus Culture' which have been excavated up to date contain a number of successive strata; and this fact indicates that the duration of the communities which occupied them was considerable. Correspondences between stratified objects at Mohenjo-Daro and similar objects occurring in strata at Susa and Ur suggest that the life-span of the community at Mohenjo-Daro is to be dated between 3250 and 2750 B.C.²

In the Indus Valley, as in the Aegean, it is not easy to translate archaeological evidence into historical terms. Yet it is not unreasonable to suppose that a region in which a society propagated its culture—or held intercourse with a sister-society of kindred culture—in its age of expansion eventually became a province of the universal state into which the paramount society incorporated itself towards the end of its history. If we allow ourselves to suppose that the Indus Valley, in which the Indian variant or sister of the Sumeric culture took shape,³ was eventually embraced in the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, we shall have found a possible answer to the question why some Aryas, like some Turks, crossed the Hindu Kush and descended upon India, while other Aryas, like other Turks, made their way westward as far as Syria. If this answer is right, it means that the *Völkerwanderung* of the Aryas and the creation of the Vedic religion were events of the inter-

¹ This second view is taken by Sir John Marshall and by Professor V. G. Childe. For Sir John Marshall's own exposition of his view, see further the present section, Annex III, below.

² For 'the Indus Culture' see the magnificent publication entitled *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilisation* (London 1931, Probsthain, 3 vols.) by the Director-General of Archaeology in India, Sir John Marshall. See also the articles by the same authority in *The Times* newspaper of London, issues of the 26th February, 1926, and the 4th and 5th January, 1928; and in *The Illustrated London News*, issues of the 20th and 27th September and the 4th October, 1924; the 27th February and the 6th March, 1926; the 7th and 14th January, 1928. The articles in *The Times* of the 26th February, 1926, and the 5th January, 1928, as well as those in *The Illustrated London News*, are accompanied by photographs.

³ See Sir John Marshall: *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilisation*, vol. i, chapter vii: 'Extent of the Indus Civilisation'. 'There is direct evidence for the diffusion of 'the Indus Culture' over the whole of Sind and the Central Panjab. There is complete uniformity of culture between Mohenjo-Daro and Harappā, though the sites are 400 miles apart. 'We have no sufficient grounds as yet for affirming positively that this civilisation was limited to the Indus Valley and the plains of the Panjab' (op. cit., p. 91). The domain of the culture extended into Baluchistan; but Baluchistan was not an important seat of it, and there was a rival culture in Western Baluchistan and Seistan. In the opposite direction, there is no evidence yet forthcoming for the presence of 'the Indus Culture' in the Ganges Basin.

regnum after the fall of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, and that the Indic Society is related to the society to which that empire belonged in the same manner and in the same degree in which the Hellenic Society and the Syriac are related to the Minoan.

Can we identify the society in whose history the Empire of Sumer and Akkad was the universal state? When we examine the antecedents of this universal state, we find symptoms of a 'Time of Troubles', in the form (with which we have become familiar) of a series of ever more destructive wars between local states. Immediately before the establishment of a universal state by Ur-Engur, the contending local states had exhausted themselves and one another to such a degree that the homeland of the society in 'Irāq had been overrun by barbarians from the foot-hills of the Iranian Plateau: the Gutaeans (*dominabantur* in 'Irāq circa 2429-2306 B.C.). The exhaustion which had made this calamity possible is explained by the foregoing careers of the two great military conquerors of the Dynasty of Akkad: Naramsin (*dominabatur circa* 2572-2517 B.C.) and his ancestor Sargon or Sharrukin (*dominabatur circa* 2652-2597). The Akkadian militarist Sargon of Agade began his career by overthrowing the Sumerian militarist Lugalzaggisi of Erech (Uruk) and Umma (*dominabatur circa* 2677-2653). Lugalzaggisi had begun by overthrowing Urukagina of Lagash, who had come into power by leading a kind of popular revolution against the local priesthood. Peering farther back into the past, we catch glimpses of earlier and apparently more temperate contests between Lagash and Umma and the other city states into which the society was by then already articulated. Before the wars became destructive, there was an age of growth and creation on which the recent excavations at Ur have thrown light. How far back into or beyond the fourth millennium B.C. this age extended we do not yet know.

What name shall we give to the society which has thus come into view? The title of its universal state—"The Empire of Sumer and Akkad"—commemorates the fact that, by the time when the society had reached this stage of its history, its homeland had come to consist of two regions inhabited by two peoples whose difference of origin—long transcended by the unity of their culture—was still betrayed by a difference of language. The Akkadians spoke a language of the Semitic family, the Sumerians a language with an utterly different structure and vocabulary which has no known affinities. In the time of the universal state and in the 'Time of Troubles' which preceded it, the two peoples stood upon so equal a footing in the society which embraced them both that, if we confined our attention to these ages, we should be inclined to

name the society 'Sumero-Akkadian'. When, however, we examine the cuneiform script in which both the Sumerian and the Akkadian language was conveyed, we find, by conclusive internal evidence, that this script was originally evolved in order to convey Sumerian and was adapted to convey Akkadian subsequently. The adaptation remained imperfect, since the syllabic character of the cuneiform script, which was well suited to the 'agglutinative' structure of Sumerian, was at variance with the consonantal structure of a Semitic language. The history of the script proves to be an epitome of the history of the society; for when we dig down to the age of growth we find that the Akkadians recede into the background and leave the Sumerians in possession of the stage. Naming the society in accordance with its origin and not its end, we shall call it 'Sumeric'.¹

The Hittite Society.

Having identified this Sumeric Society, we can go on to identify two others by proceeding, this time, not from the later to the earlier, but in the reverse order.

If we turn our attention again to the interregnum following the fall of the Sumeric universal state after the death of Hammurabi (*imperabat circa 1947-1905 B.C.*), we shall find that the *Völkerwanderung* which occupied this interregnum was not confined to the dispersion of the Aryas from the Eurasian Steppe into Syria and India. While the Sumeric Society, in the course of its long history, had propagated its culture westward round the Arabian Desert into Syria and perhaps also south-eastward down the Persian Gulf into the Indus Valley, as well as north-eastward over the Iranian Plateau as far as Transcaspia,² it had also been propagating it north-westward over the Taurus Range on to the eastern part of the Anatolian Plateau which was afterwards called Cappadocia. In the twenty-seventh century B.C., Sargon of Agade made a military expedition across the Taurus into Cappadocia in response to an appeal from Assyrian traders who had settled in the country and had fallen out with the local ruler. Clay tablets, impressed with business documents in cuneiform, which have been found in Cappadocia by Western archaeologists, prove that these Assyrian settlements north-west of Taurus survived and flourished and that, like Assyria itself,³ they were included within the domain

¹ 'Sumeric' stands to 'Sumero-Akkadian' as 'Hellenic' to 'Graeco-Roman' and as 'Syriac' to 'Syro-Iranian'.

² Its expansion as far as Transcaspia—that is to say, up to the threshold of the gate through which the Aryas eventually broke out of the Steppe into the Sumeric World—has been revealed by the excavations of the Pumpelly Expedition at Anau.

³ Assyria (Asshur) was the northernmost of the city-states into which the homeland of the Sumeric Society came to be articulated. Owing to its geographical position, its people naturally took the lead in pioneering in the wild north-west. Presumably they

of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad under the Dynasty of Ur and probably again during the reign of Hammurabi. When, after Hammurabi's death, the Sumeric universal state broke down finally, its Cappadocian provinces were occupied by barbarians from the no-man's-land beyond the north-western frontier; and about 1750 B.C. the ruler of the principal barbarian 'successor-state' in this quarter, King Mursil I of Khatti, raided and sacked Babylon itself and overthrew the last descendant of Hammurabi.

The raiders from Khatti retired with their booty, but the political vacuum which they left behind them in 'Irāq was promptly filled by the descent of other barbarians, the Kassites, from a no-man's-land on the north-east, on the rim of the Iranian Plateau. The Kassites founded a dynasty which ruled in Babylon from 1749 to 1173 B.C. After the double catastrophe of *circa* 1750-1749 B.C., which seems to mark the climax of the post-Sumeric interregnum and the last convulsion of the Völkerwanderung,¹ a darkness soon descends upon the history of the whole region which had once been irradiated by the culture of the Sumeric Society and incorporated into the Sumeric universal state. From the middle of the seventeenth century until after the beginning of the fifteenth, the very names of the Hittite rulers in Cappadocia and the Kassite rulers in Babylonia are lost. The darkness is first pierced by light from Egypt: the records of the campaigns in which Thothmes III (*imperabat solus circa* 1480-1450 B.C.) intruded upon the former domain of the Sumeric Society by conquering Syria. As the light grows, we begin to distinguish the outlines of two nascent societies in South-Western Asia beyond 'the New Empire's' frontiers.²

The home of one of these two societies lay in the former

ascended the Tigris to its source, crossed the Euphrates Valley by the route of the modern road from Kharput to Malatiah, and mounted over the rolling hill-country which the Turks call the Uzun Yayla into the Valley of the Halys (Qyzyl Yrmāq). In this age, however, when the Assyrians were pioneers and traders, Assyria was not a military power. It was to the distant King of Akkad, not to their own 'patesi' of Asshur, that the Assyrian merchants appealed in the twenty-seventh century B.C. The militarism for which Assyria has become a by-word belongs to a later phase of Assyrian history which did not begin until long after the history of the Sumeric Society had come to an end.

¹ There is no direct evidence as to whether the Hittite raid and the Kassite descent upon Babylon occurred before or after the dispersion of the Aryas from the Eurasian Steppe into India and Syria. Since the Hyksos' invasion of Egypt did not take place before about 1680 B.C., it is chronologically possible that their migration from the Oxus to Syria took place after 1749 B.C. Military considerations, however, make it seem more likely that they traversed Iran and 'Irāq at a time when the Kassites were still confined to their mountain fastnesses and when 'Irāq was under the feeble régime of the epigoni of Hammurabi, rather than at a time when the passage was blocked by the Kassite 'successor-state' in Babylonia. Having acquired the choicest portion of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, the Kassites would assuredly have either fended off rival barbarian claimants or perished in the attempt (as the Achaeans perished when they failed to fend off the Dorians).

² Two, that is, in addition to the nascent Indic Society in the Indus Valley, which may, as we have conjectured, have been an outlying province of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad. (See pp. 107-9, above.)

provinces of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad in Cappadocia and in the adjoining Anatolian territories which had once been the no-man's-land beyond the Empire's Cappadocian frontier. This society borrowed freely from the Sumeric; yet we can hardly describe its relation to the Sumeric Society as 'affiliation'; for there is no indication that the two societies were linked together by the middle term of a universal church. The later society did indeed take over and assiduously practice the Sumeric system of divination. This illusory form of applied science must be regarded, however, as an offspring of magic rather than of religion; and in any case it was an elaboration of a primitive practice perpetuated by the dominant minority in the Sumeric Society and was not the product of a new religion developed by the internal proletariat—a development of which there is no trace.¹ When we turn to the later society's representation and worship of the Gods, we find here in general not a transmission or reflection of the Sumeric Pantheon and the Sumeric ritual,² but a religion with a distinctive character of its own which must have been derived either from elements indigenous in Cappadocia before the infiltration of the Sumeric culture in the third millennium B.C., or from elements introduced by barbarian invaders after the breakdown of the Sumeric universal state at the turn of the twentieth and nineteenth centuries B.C., or from some fusion or amalgamation of the two elements.

Again, when we study the scripts in which the later society made its records, we find that it began by employing cuneiform³ but went on to invent a pictographic script of its own.⁴ Moreover, while it began by taking over the Akkadian language together with the cuneiform script—and this for local records as well as for diplomatic correspondence—it afterwards adapted the cuneiform script to convey at least five of its own vernaculars, translating Akkadian and Sumerian texts as a nucleus for the development of vernacular literatures. By the time when these local vernaculars were conveyed in the new local pictographic script, the literary independence of the new society in Cappadocia from the Sumeric Society had become complete.

The diversity of local vernacular languages had its counterpart

¹ See footnote 1 on p. 115, below.

² There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. For instance, the name, if not the ritual, of the Goddess Ishtar of Niniveh was perpetuated by the Hittites in the regions north-west of Taurus into which this worship had been introduced by the Assyrian colonists of Cappadocia in the third millennium B.C. (See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. II (i), 2nd edition, p. 520.)

³ In the style of the First Dynasty of Babylon (i.e. the imperial style of the Sumeric universal state in the age of Hammurabi), and not in the style of the former Assyrian commercial colonies in Cappadocia (i.e. the local style in the preceding age of the Dynasty of Ur).

⁴ This pictographic script has so far defied the efforts of our Western scholars to decipher it.

in the multiplicity of local states. The oldest established of these languages seems to have been one with no known affinities which was called Khatti-li; and the same name—Khatti—was adopted by a local state which took the city of Khattusas (the present Boghazkiöi) as its capital in the course of an expansion that carried it to a position of predominance in its own world by the beginning of the fifteenth century B.C.¹ 'Khatti' is the original of the name 'Hittite' which appears in the Old Testament; and it will be convenient to use this latter name for the society that embraced all the states over which the Empire of Khatti exercised its hegemony² and all the languages which the peoples of these states employed.³

The destinies of this Hittite Society were decided by the history of the Khatti State. In the fourteenth century B.C., when 'the New Empire' of Egypt lost its grip upon its dominions in Syria, Subbiluluma King of Khatti (*regnabat circa 1380-1346 B.C.*), the contemporary of Amenhotep IV Ikhnaton (*imperabat circa 1370-1352 B.C.*), did not resist the temptation to fish in troubled waters. Subbiluluma substituted Khatti for Egypt as the paramount Power in Northern Syria by an adroit combination of fraud and force, and in Mesopotamia he extended his hegemony over the Kingdom of Mitanni; but he left a fatal legacy to his successors in a series of destructive wars between Khatti and Egypt, in which the Hittite Power, with its less substantial economic foundations, suffered relatively more severely than its adversary—to the point

¹ We may suppose that this Empire of Khatti, which dominated the Hittite World from some time before 1480 B.C. until 1200 B.C., stood to the Hittite 'successor-state' of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, whose war-bands sacked Babylon about 1750 B.C., as the Carolingian Empire, which dominated the Western World from about A.D. 775 to 875, stood to the foregoing Merovingian 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire.

² This distinction of terms is suggested by Dr. D. G. Hogarth in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. ii, pp. 252-3.

³ The official language of the Empire of Khatti was not the language called 'Khatti-li' but a quite different language which seems to have been called 'Nasian' or 'Kanisian'; and this 'Kanisian', as well as the closely related 'Luvian', turns out to belong to the Indo-European family. It does not, however, belong to the so-called 'Satem'-Group of Indo-European languages which includes Sanskrit (the language of the Aryan invaders of Syria and India) and Iranian, but to the so-called 'Centum'-Group, which is otherwise represented by the westernmost of the Indo-European languages (e.g. by all those that are alive in Europe now except the Letto-Lithuanian, Albanian, and Slavonic) and by one isolated language in the far north-east (the now extinct 'Tokharian', which has become known to Western scholars through the discovery in the Tarim Basin of documents in this language dating from the fourth and subsequent centuries of the Christian Era). From the geographical distribution it looks as though the 'Centum' and 'Satem' languages were dispersed successively from an identical centre on the Eurasian Steppe from which they spread in two concentric circles—the 'satem' wave following behind the 'centum' wave and eventually almost effacing it everywhere except in the remote peninsula of Europe. 'Kanisian', like 'Tokharian', is saturated with non-Indo-European elements, and this fact suggests that both these languages were on the forefront of the 'centum' wave; that they were, in fact, its broken crest of foam. (The Teutonic languages, which are also much modified from the Indo-European 'Ur-Sprache', may represent another 'breaker' at another point on the circumference of the circle.) The nearest affinity of 'Kanisian-Luvian' seems to be to Latin. This suggests that the language was brought into Anatolia from Central Europe, as the ('Satem'-Group) Thracian language was afterwards brought in by the Phrygians and the ('Centum'-Group) Celtic by the Galatians.

of permanently overstraining both itself and the society upon which it had become an incubus. When the two Powers at length made peace about the year 1278 B.C. on the basis of a partition of Syria, Khatti appears to have indulged a now ingrained habit of imperialism by conquering Western Anatolia up to the Aegean coast.¹ In this last adventure it merely blazed a trail for the great migration of 1200/1190 B.C., which brought the Khatti Empire down with a crash and buried the Hittite Society under the ruins.²

For about five centuries longer, the prematurely stricken society was represented on the map by settlements of refugees in Northern Syria and Cilicia—a sheltered nook between the cradles of the two new societies—the Syriac and the Hellenic—which were arising on either side. When the Phoenicians and the Greeks began to compete for the mastery of the Mediterranean, the remnant of the Hittite Society appears to have entered into the competition by sending out colonists who successfully established themselves overseas and became known in their new Italian home as the Etruscans.³ Yet this transplantation failed to awaken the stricken society to new life. It only rendered the colonists more

¹ The monuments of this conquest are the Hittite sculptures overlooking the last stages of the roads that lead from the interior of Anatolia to the west coast. The most famous of these monuments is the rock-carved figure of the Hittite Mother-Goddess which is popularly known as the 'Niobe' of Mount Sipylus.

² The history of the Empire of Khatti during the two centuries which ended in this catastrophe may be compared with the history of the East Roman Empire during the century that ended in the catastrophe of Manzikert (A.D. 1071). After the overthrow of the Empire of Khatti by the great migration from the Aegean, the interior of Anatolia was silted up by two drifts of barbarians. The Phrygians (speaking a language belonging to the Thracian branch of the 'Satem'-Group of the Indo-European family) drifted in from South-Eastern Europe; the Moschians and Tibarenians drifted in from the Caucasus. These barbarians from the hinterland divided the heritage of the Empire of Khatti with the Minoan refugees (Teucrians, Aeolians, Ionians, Tramilae) and their 'Dorian' pursuers who occupied the west coast of Anatolia from the Troad to Lycia. (Compare the division of Syria between the Israelites and the Aramaeans on the one hand and the Philistines and the Teucrians on the other.)

³ In a simpler form, the Etruscan name appears already as that of one of the sea-peoples in the Egyptian records of the great migration at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. (Tursha = Turs-sci or Etrusci = Turs-ani or *Tuppywēl*). Some scholars have inferred that this was the time when the Etruscans planted their colonies in Italy from their earlier home in the Levant; but this inference is not borne out by analogy. The same Egyptian records also mention the Aqaiwasha (Achaean) in association with the Tursha (Etruscans); and at a later date we find Achaean settlements in Italy as well as Etruscan. We know, however, that these Achaean settlements in Italy were made, not at the time of the great migration during the post-Minoan interregnum, but at least four centuries later, in the course of the eighth century B.C. The Phoenician colonies in the Western Mediterranean appear to have been founded at a not much earlier date. It seems natural to suppose that the Etruscan settlements—the third group of Levantine settlements in the Western Mediterranean besides the Phoenician and the Greek—were contemporary.

Exactly whence the Etruscans sailed to Italy we do not know; but since the Asiatic coast of the Mediterranean was in Philistine, Teucrian, and Phoenician hands from the borders of Egypt as far north as Aradus, and in Greek, Lycian, and Teucrian hands from the eastern extremity of Pamphylia all the way round to the Dardanelles, the possible locus for the Etruscans' point of departure would appear to be reduced to the Asiatic coast of the Mediterranean between Aradus and Side.

The Tyrrhenians who were expelled by the Athenians from Lemnos in the sixth century B.C., but whose survivors still held their own in the fifth century on the Athos Peninsula, as well as under Macedonian rule in Crestonia and under Achaemenian rule

susceptible to assimilation; and, while the Etruscans were being Hellenized, the Hittite communities which remained in Asia were first ground to powder by the Assyrians and were then absorbed into the body of the Syriac Society by the Aramaeans.

The Babylonian Society.

The other society which comes into view in Western Asia, side by side with the Hittite Society, when the darkness lifts in the fifteenth century B.C., had its home in the former homeland of the Sumeric Society in 'Irāq.

If we test the relation of this other society to the Sumeric by the criterion of religion, we shall again fail to find that middle term of a universal church which we have taken as the essential token of Apparentation-and-Affiliation. When, however, we examine what the religion of this other society was, we find that it was not, like the Hittite religion, of non-Sumeric origin. On the contrary, it was virtually identical with the state religion of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad in the time of the Amorite Dynasty of Babylon—a religion which had been created neither by the 'internal proletariat' nor by the 'external proletariat' of the Sumeric Society, but by the dominant minority.¹

at Placia and Scylacē on the Asiatic coast of the Marmara, were presumably the representatives of an abortive attempt, on the Etruscans' part, to compete with the Greeks for the mastery of the Dardanelles and for the command of the Black Sea. (For these Lemnian Tyrrhenians, and their confusion with the Lemnian Pelasgi whom they appear to have overlaid and assimilated, see further I. C. (i) (b), Annex II, below.)

From what is known of the culture which the Etruscans brought with them to Italy, it looks as though its affinities are with the Hittite culture; but the imprint cannot have been very strong, since after their arrival in Italy the Etruscans adopted the Alphabet from the Greeks, and there is no archaeological record of their having ever employed the Hittite hieroglyphic script, which remained in use among the Hittite refugees in Northern Syria. It may be conjectured that the Etruscans were a people living on the south-western fringes of the Hittite World in the shelter of the Western Taurus, with an outlet on the Mediterranean in the neighbourhood of Western Cilicia. There is little to recommend the alternative conjecture that the Etruscans of Italy were an indigenous European people. (See further II D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 85-6, below.)

¹ There is nothing in the religious life of the Sumeric Society that can be interpreted as a new religious movement—even a rudimentary or an abortive movement—proceeding from the 'internal proletariat' in the 'Time of Troubles' and in the universal state. We cannot so interpret either the cult of Tammuz or the Penitential Psalms—the two features of the Sumeric religion in which we find the nearest approach to the religious spirit of an 'internal proletariat' as we know it elsewhere—for there is no evidence that either of these features asserted itself as a reaction to the established religion of the 'dominant minority'. As for Tammuz, 'il suo nome ricorre soltanto—e non molto spesso—nei tempi più antichi, specialmente in documenti di Lagash: nel periodo assiro non se ne fa più menzione' (Furlani, G.: *La Religione Babilonese e Assira*, vol. i (Bologna 1928, Zanichelli), pp. 279-80). This chronological fact possibly supports the conjecture that the similarities between the cults of Tammuz, Attis, Adonis, and Osiris are due to the propagation of an originally Sumerian cult into Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt (see Langdon, S.: *Tammuz and Ishtar* (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 1); but it certainly forbids us to be led by the suggestive meaning of the God's name (Dāmu-zi in Sumerian means 'faithful son': see Langdon, op. cit., p. 2) into regarding the Tammuz cult as either the rudiment or the vestige of a religion created in the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' by the Sumeric 'internal proletariat'. As for the Penitential Psalms, there seems to be no clue to their date (Jastrow, M.: *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* (Boston 1898, Ginn), p. 317). Thus, in the present state of our knowledge, the question whether the 'internal proletariat' of the Sumeric Society ever created anything in the nature of a universal

The Babylonian pantheon reflects the life, and the attitude towards life, of the dominant minority in the Sumeric Society of that age as faithfully as the Olympian pantheon reflects the life and outlook of the barbarians who overran the Minoan World during the interregnum after the fall of the 'thalassocracy of Minos'. Here too, the relations between the Gods were simply a transposition of political facts into theological terms. In the Babylonian phase of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, the political organization of the Sumeric Society into a universal state with its capital at Babylon entailed the subordination of all other Gods to the local God of Babylon, Marduk; and in the time of Hammurabi's immediate successor, Samsuiluna (*imperabat circa 1904-1867 B.C.*), Marduk's supremacy was confirmed by identifying him with Enlil the Lord (Bel) of Nippur—the God who, during the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles', had conferred a political hegemony upon whichever one of the contending states had been able, at any given moment, to establish a command over his shrine.

When we look at the society that was in existence in 'Irāq in the fifteenth century B.C., we observe that this political system of religion had been taken over from the past with the least amount of change that was required in order to adapt it to the political conditions of the day. The Society was now articulated into three states¹—Babylonia, Assyria, and Elam—and in each state the local State-God was given the sovereignty over the pantheon without any other change in the names, number, and attributes of the Gods or any change at all in cult and ritual. Thus in Babylonia the sovereignty over the pantheon was retained by the Babylonian Marduk-Bel (masked under the Kassite name Kharbe so long as a Kassite dynasty remained on the throne),² while in Assyria the Assyrian God Asshur occupied Marduk-Bel's place; but in every other respect the religions of Babylonia and Assyria were

church has to be answered in the negative; but this answer cannot be regarded as definitive. 'Anche la religione babilonese-assira ha avuto, come tutta la civiltà mesopotamica, la sua storia e non v'ha dubbio che tra non molto si potrà scrivere anche una storia dello spirito religioso in Mesopotamia. . . . Pel momento conviene rinunciare a dare una vera e propria storia della religione babilonese-assira' (Furlani, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-3). In Professor Langdon's opinion (*op. cit.*, p. 183), the astral theology into which the myth of Tammuz and Ishtar—originally a vegetation myth (*op. cit.*, p. 5)—was eventually taken up, presents 'all the essential conditions for the construction of a universal religion, based upon the sufferings of a divine son'.

¹ The Kingdom of the Sea-Land, under the so-called Second Dynasty of Babylon (which never ruled in Babylon), had been established in the time of Samsuiluna, Hammurabi's immediate successor on the throne of Sumer and Akkad, as an indigenous 'successor-state' of the Sumeric universal state, and it had been annexed to the barbarian 'successor-state', subsequently established by the Kassites at Babylon, at the turn of the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries B.C. Thus the Kingdom of the Sea Land was simply a phenomenon of the post-Sumeric interregnum. It is perhaps to be interpreted as a last attempt on the part of the Sumerians to preserve their distinctive nationality.

² The Kassite dynasty flickered out of existence in 1173 B.C.; but the date is of no historical importance, since the descendants of the barbarians had been 'Babylonized' long before they ceased to rule.

identical both with one another and with the religion of the Sumeric universal state in its last phase.¹

In the secular sphere, we do find certain important changes. For instance, the units of political articulation were no longer city-states—as they had been from the dawn of Sumeric history to the breakdown of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad²—but larger states which each contained a number of cities without political individuality. There were also changes in the currency of languages. Sumerian, which had begun to lose ground to Akkadian during the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' but had still survived as a living language down to the end of the Sumeric universal state,³ had now become extinct—though, as a dead language, it was still assiduously studied because the Akkadian Semitic language and the cuneiform script were instruments that could not be used without a grasp of the Sumerian classical background. In both Babylonia and Assyria, the Akkadian language still held its own as a medium for public and private records. On the other hand, in Elam, where Akkadian had acquired the same currency as in 'Irāq at the time when Elam had been a province of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, the political independence of the country in the new era was expressed linguistically in the reinstatement of the vernacular language.⁴

These secular changes in the aspect of Society are considerable. Nevertheless, if we take the degree of continuity or change in religious life as our touchstone, we shall hesitate to describe the society of the later age as being 'affiliated' to the Sumeric Society; and our reason for hesitating will be the exact opposite of that which weighed with us when we were considering the relation

¹ See Jastrow, M.: *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* (Boston 1898, Ginn), p. 189.

² The Empire of Sumer and Akkad, like the Roman Empire, was a union of city-states in which the units did not lose their individuality and in which the Central Government confined its activities to functions which were beyond the local Governments' compass.

³ The Sumerian language was already dying out in Hammurabi's time, and at the same time the geographical centre of gravity of the society was shifting from Sumer to Akkad: from Ur and Nippur and Isin to Babylon. (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, 3rd edition, vol. i, part ii, pp. 630-2.)

⁴ The Elamite language was a non-Semitic language with no known affinities. (It is noteworthy that it had no affinity with Sumerian.) Elam was the first region outside 'Irāq into which the Sumeric culture expanded. A monument of this expansion was the invention of an Elamitic script which was inspired by the Sumerian cuneiform but which struck out a new set of characters for conveying the Elamite language, instead of adapting the existing Sumerian characters, as these had been adapted to convey another non-Sumerian language: Akkadian. During the latter half of the third millennium B.C., however, the Elamitic script was supplanted by the Sumerian cuneiform after all; and after the establishment of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, when Elam had become a province of the Sumeric universal state, the Elamite language itself was supplanted for purposes of record (though not as a spoken vernacular) by Akkadian—and this even in private transactions. By the time when our series of records from Elam begins again in the thirteenth century B.C., after the break during the interregnum, this process of linguistic assimilation had been not only checked but undone. (See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, 3rd edition, vol. i, part ii, pp. 501-2, 560, and 662.)

between the Sumeric Society and the Hittite. In that instance the relation seemed too slight to be called Apparentation-and-Affiliation. In this instance it seems to be too intimate. We hesitate to say that the society which we find existing in 'Irāq in this later age is 'affiliated' to the Sumeric Society, because we are not sure that it may not be identical with it—that it may not, in fact, be the Sumeric Society itself in the act of attempting, after the play is over, to repeat its historic part on a derelict remnant of the stage. Here is a problem of identity which we must try to solve sooner or later. We may find ourselves in a better position to solve it when our present survey of societies has been completed. Provisionally, and without prejudice, let us treat the society which we find in possession in 'Irāq in the fifteenth century B.C. as a separate representative of the species in its own right, and let us lend it a name—for convenience 'Babylonian'.¹

In Babylonian history—or the epilogue to Sumeric history, whichever title we may eventually decide to use—there was one portentous event: the militarization of Assyria. When the Empire of Sumer and Akkad broke up and the barbarians overran its territories—Aryas from one side, Hittites from another, Kassites from a third—Assyria was the only fraction of the Sumeric World that was not overwhelmed. By a superhuman effort the Assyrians kept successive invaders at bay; and their ordeal was prolonged for centuries. After surviving a Mitannian domination in the fifteenth century, they bore the brunt of the Aramaean expansion in the eleventh. Yet they never succumbed, and for this they had their reward and paid their penalty.² If the waters did not go over their soul, the iron did enter into it; and the Assyrian state emerged from the ordeal as a blade of tempered steel which would never allow the hand that held it to rest from shedding blood.³ We have already encountered this Assyrian militarism as the scourge of the Syriac Society in its 'Time of Troubles'; but the injuries which it inflicted on an alien society were far exceeded by those which it inflicted on its own. An intermittent duel with Babylonia cul-

¹ 'Babylonian' (Latin *Babylonicus*) rather than 'Babylonian', in order to avoid the ambiguity that arises if an adjective with a geographical connotation is used as the label for a society. 'Babylonian' seems an apt name for this society on the analogy of 'Byzantine', since the city of Babylon played as dominant a part in its history as the city of Constantinople has played in the history of Orthodox Christendom. Babylon was not merely the capital of one of the states into which the society was articulated. It was the citadel of the common culture in which the people of all these states lived and moved and had their being; and political rancour did not diminish the city's cultural prestige. The Assyrians who made war on Babylonia in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. could not escape the spell of Babylon, any more than the Bulgars who made war on the East Roman Empire in the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era could escape the spell of Byzantium.

² For the reward, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 133-6, and for the penalty, Part IV, below.

³ *Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐφέλκεται ἄνδρα σίδηρος.* (*Odyssey*, xix, l. 13.)

minated in the Hundred Years' War of the seventh century B.C., in which Babylon fell first, to rise again, and Nineveh next, to rise no more. Assyria's last great exploit before her annihilation was the overthrow of Elam; and Babylonia was so sorely stricken that she only survived her victory over Assyria for three-quarters of a century. The last survivor among the three states of the Babylonian World lost its independence when Cyrus entered Babylon in 538 B.C.; and though the Empire of the Achaemenidae was ruled from Babylon and Susa,¹ its ultimate mission was to serve as a universal state for the Syriac and not for the Babylonian Society.² In the course of five centuries, the Babylonian Society gradually faded away. Before the beginning of the Christian Era, it was extinct.³

The Andean Society

As far as this point in our survey of societies we have been identifying extinct representatives of the species that have left some monument or other in the world of our time, either in the shape of fossils or else in the shape of living societies to which they are 'apparented'—or related in a less intimate way—in the first or the second degree. In order to complete our survey up to the limits of our knowledge here and now, we must also try to identify, by analogy with the specimens identified already, those representatives of the species which are neither themselves alive to-day nor are related in any way to any of the living representatives nor have left their trace in the form of fossils, but which are known to us solely from our literary and archaeological records.

We know in this way of two societies in the New World which were both incorporated into our Western Society by conquest during the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, at the very time when in the Old World the Arabic Society was being incorporated by the same process into the Iranian Society to constitute the unitary Islamic Society of to-day.⁴ At the time of the Spanish conquests in the New World one of these two indigenous societies occupied Central America, from the basin of the Mexican lakes to the peninsula of Yucatan. The other occupied the Andean Plateau, together with the lowlands between the western escarpment of the plateau and the Pacific Coast of South America, in a long narrow zone extending north and south from what is now the Republic of Colombia to what are now the north-eastern corner of Chile and the north-western corner of Argentina. In the quite different

¹ Susa—the capital of Elam—had been one of the three great cities of the Babylonian World.

² On this point, see pp. 80–1, above, and also II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 138, below.

³ See pp. 79–80, above.

⁴ See pp. 68–72, above, and I. C (i) (b), Annex I, below.

physical environments of the Pampas on the south and the tropical forests of the Amazon Basin on the east, the 'Andean' Society had failed to secure a footing.

Our knowledge of these two societies is derived partly from archaeological research and partly from literary records made by the Spanish conquistadores, or by members of the conquered societies at the instance of the conquistadores, on the morrow of the conquests, before the traditions of the conquered societies had been obliterated by the disappearance of the societies themselves.¹ From this evidence we can discern that at the respective moments when the histories of the two societies were interrupted by the shattering impact of an overwhelming alien force, the Andean Society had recently emerged from a 'Time of Troubles' into a universal state, while the Central American Society was in the last convulsions of a 'Time of Troubles' from which a universal state was about to issue.

The Andean universal state was the Empire of the Incas, which had already overthrown all the other Powers of the Andean World, had incorporated into itself the whole domain of the Andean Society except the northern extremity of the plateau beyond Quito, and had organized on a uniform plan the various peoples and territories that had come to be embraced within its frontiers.² As a result of the Spanish conquest, this indigenous Andean universal state was replaced by an alien universal state in the shape of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru. The prospective Central American universal state was the Aztec Empire of Tenochtitlan, which had been ruining the Central American Society since about A.D. 1375 by a career of militarism comparable, in its blood-thirstiness and destructiveness, to the militarism of Assyria. At the moment when the Spaniards arrived, the city-state of Tlaxcala was the only considerable Power in the Central American World which the Aztecs had not yet succeeded in overthrowing; and the Tlaxcalacs had their backs to the wall. It was by entering into an alliance with the Tlaxcalacs that Cortez overthrew the Aztecs and anticipated, at the eleventh hour, the transformation of the Aztec Empire into an indigenous Central American universal state by establishing in place of it an alien universal state in the shape of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Mexico.

¹ The disappearance of these two societies through their incorporation into our Western Society was a rapid process. The last surviving community of the Central American Society—a refugee community of Mayas who had migrated from Yucatan to the shores of Lake Peten—had become extinct before the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era. In the Andean Society, the last flicker of self-consciousness came and went in the rebellion of Tupac Amaru against the Spanish régime in Peru in 1780-3.

² For a description of the administrative organization of the Empire of the Incas, see Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie).

In attempting a retrospective reconnaissance of Andean and Central American history from our own date of entry into contact with these two societies at the moment of the Spanish Conquest, it may be convenient to deal with Andean history first, since its course is easier to survey than the course of Central American history on the whole.

The Empire of the Incas, which was suddenly and violently superseded by the Spaniards in A.D. 1530, had been fulfilling the functions of an Andean universal state for about a hundred years before its catastrophic overthrow in mid-career. At least, we may say that the Inca Empire could fairly lay claim to the title of an Andean universal state from the moment when it succeeded in incorporating the Kingdom of Chimú; for Chimú was not merely the second greatest Power in the Andean World, next to the Inca Empire itself, on the eve of the Inca conquest; it was also the foremost of the twin birth-places of the Andean culture, which had first emerged, and then risen to its zenith, partly in Chimú and partly in Nazca. Thus the conquest of Chimú by the Inca Power in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era established a political union between the oldest and the youngest elements in the Andean Society; for the rise of the Andean culture to its zenith in Chimú and Nazca appears to have taken place during the first five centuries of the Christian Era,¹ whereas the first Inca sovereign of the historical ten does not appear to have entered upon his reign at Cuzco until after the beginning of the twelfth century.² The conquest of Chimú by the Incas also consummated a political union between the lowlands of the coast and the highlands of the interior, which were the two different, and culturally as well as physically distinctive, areas which together constituted the Andean World; for Cuzco, which was the original nucleus of the Inca Empire, was a highland canton, while both Chimú and Nazca were lowland coastal states—Chimú being situated towards the northern and Nazca towards the southern end of the Peruvian coastline. For this combination of reasons, the conquest of Chimú by the Incas in the fifteenth century is perhaps to be taken as the epoch-making event that marks the establishment of the Andean universal state. The war in which this conquest was achieved was the culminating action in the military career of the Inca Pachacutec;³ and, since Pachacutec reigned from about A.D. 1400 to A.D. 1448,⁴ we shall not be far out in our reckoning if we date his annexation of Chimú not earlier than A.D. 1430, and if we therefore

¹ See the chronological tables on pp. 47-9 of Means, P.A.: *Ancient Civilisations of the Andes* (New York 1931, Scribner).

² Means, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

³ For this war, see Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-1.

⁴ Means, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

allot a span of a century, or rather less, to the universal-state phase of Andean history.

This conquest and annexation of Chimu by the Inca Power was the climax¹ of a process of Inca empire-building which had begun, three centuries earlier, in the reigns of the second and third of the historical Inca sovereigns, Lloque Yupanqui (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1140-95) and Mayta Capac (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1195-1230). These two Incas laid the foundations of the Empire by annexing the basin of Lake Titicaca to their ancestral principality of Cuzco and extending their dominions to the sea at Moquechua, towards the southern extremity of the Peruvian coast.² And the ever more intensive militarism through which the Inca Empire was built up in the course of these three centuries, beginning in the twelfth century of the Christian Era,³ was one symptom of a 'Time of Troubles' which was to come to its close in the fifteenth century and which appears to have had its beginning some time between A.D. 900 and A.D. 1100.

When we peer back into the origins and antecedents of this Andean 'Time of Troubles', several abiding features in the Andean historical landscape begin to stand out clear. We perceive that the 'Time of Troubles' manifested itself on the Plateau and in the Coast-lands simultaneously; we perceive that both regions were already playing their historical parts in the age of growth by which the 'Time of Troubles' was preceded; and finally we perceive that the predominance of the Plateau over the Coast—a predominance which eventually reached its zenith when an Inca Empire, with its head-quarters on the Plateau, erected itself into an Andean universal state embracing the Coast—was not the original relation in which the Coast and the Plateau had stood to one another.

If we now project our thoughts right back to the beginning of Andean history and then follow the growth of the Andean Society forwards from the earliest point at which our archaeological evidence begins to give us light, we find, as we have noticed by anticipation, that this Andean culture originated in two districts of the coastal lowlands—Chimu and Nazca—and that it was in Chimu and in Nazca that the makers of this culture did their creative work during the first five centuries of the Christian Era. The art of early Chimu—in the modelling and painting of its pottery and, above all, in its plastic portrayal of the human coun-

¹ The climax only, and not the term; for the reign of Pachacutec, while it marked the zenith of the Inca Empire's greatness, did not see the end of its territorial expansion. Both Northern Chile and the Ecuadorian section of the Andean Coast and Plateau were added to the Empire by Pachacutec's successor Tupac Yupanqui (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1448-82).

² See Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-9.
³ For the vicissitudes in the fortunes of the Incas in their empire-building age, see further II. D (iv), vol. ii, pp. 102-3, below.

tenance—is not unworthy to be compared with the art of early Hellas. In this creative age, the people of the Coast were the pioneers, while the people of the Plateau were backward. It was not till about the sixth century that the highlanders were stimulated into creative activity in their turn by a contact and conflict with the lowlanders in which it was the lowlanders that took the initiative. Thereafter, there was a second chapter in the growth-phase of the Andean Society in which the Plateau acquired the lead in art, and, above all, in architecture, as well as in politics and war. The outstanding monument of this and of all other ages of Andean history is the highland city of Tiahuanaco, at the south-eastern corner of Lake Titicaca, whose huge monoliths still defy the ravages of a cruel climate. But this first age of highland predominance was followed by the beginning of the general 'Time of Troubles' of which we have already taken note; and when this common adversity fell upon both parts of the Andean World, it was the Plateau, on which the culture had a shorter history and shallower roots, that suffered the more severely. On the Plateau, after the onset of the 'Time of Troubles', there was a relapse to a level of culture which was scarcely above the primitive, whereas in the Lowlands a less depressing cultural set-back was followed, both in Chimu and in Nazca, by a revival of the old lowland culture at about the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian Era. Thus the Lowlands reasserted their cultural superiority over the Plateau from the beginning of 'the Time of Troubles' onwards, and in this sphere they never yielded the palm to the Plateau again—not even when the military and political genius of the Incas imposed upon the lowlanders a highland pattern of an Andean universal state.

The Yucatec, Mexic, and Mayan Societies

By comparison with Andean history as we have sketched it above, the course of Central American history is complicated; for when we examine the home of the Central American Society as we find it at the time of the Spanish conquest, we observe that it had two distinct nodes, one on the Mexican Plateau and the other on the peninsula of Yucatan. And a closer examination reveals the fact that these nodes correspond to the former homes of two societies which were originally separate, and which we may call respectively the 'Mexic' and the 'Yucatec'. The Yucatec Society was apparently incorporated into the Mexic Society by conquest at about the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era;¹ and the Central American Society which the

¹ The Mexic conquerors of Yucatan at this juncture were not Aztecs but Toltecs. The Aztecs at that time were outer barbarians, living by hunting in the no-man's-land

Spaniards found in existence on their arrival in the New World was a composite society, brought into existence by this act of incorporation, as the composite Islamic Society that is extant in the Old World to-day has been brought into existence by the incorporation of the Arabic Society into the Iranic. The Mexic conquest of the Yucatec Society occurred (according to one view) because the city-states into which the Yucatec World was articulated had fallen into a state of internecine warfare and had sought to increase their military strength against one another by recruiting Mexic mercenaries who eventually made themselves their employers' masters.¹ In any case, the arrival of Mexic mercenaries in Yucatan and the outbreak of internecine warfare in Yucatan are both well-established historical facts, whatever their relation to one another. The warfare, too, was undoubtedly a sign that the Yucatec Society had fallen into a 'Time of Troubles'; and it appears to be generally agreed that, after the union of the Yucatec Society with the Mexic into a single Central American Society, the trouble eventually spread throughout the wider common weal and grew with time. By the middle of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, at the latest, the social crisis in Central America had become acute;² and its denouement in the forcible establishment of a universal state through the agency of Aztec militarism was in sight when the Spaniards arrived.³

If we now trace the separate histories of the Yucatec Society and the Mexic Society back before the beginning of their common 'Time of Troubles' into their separate ages of growth, we shall find that they were related to one another, as the Iranic Society

to the north of the Mexic World. The Toltecs were the creators of the Mexic Society. The Aztecs did not gain a footing in the Mexic domain until the Toltecs had fallen into a 'Time of Troubles'. The creators of the Yucatec Society were Mayas.

¹ The other view is that the arrival of these Mexic mercenaries in Yucatan marks the beginning and not the end of the Yucatec age of peace and prosperity. (See the next footnote.)

² The experts are at present at variance over the chronology of Yucatec history. It seems to be agreed that there was a prosperous period, approximately two centuries long, during which the several Yucatec city-states were at peace with one another in virtue of the so-called 'League of Mayapan', and that this peace ended catastrophically in 'the War of Mayapan', which was a revolt of the other cities against the city of Mayapan's hegemony. Some scholars, however, place these two centuries of peace before the arrival of the Toltecs in Yucatan and others after it. This difference of view comes out in *The History of the Maya* (London 1931, Scribner) by T. Gann and J. E. Thompson. One of the two joint authors dates the two prosperous centuries between A.D. 1004 and A.D. 1201, and suggests that the 'multiplicity of small states, constantly at war with each other', which the Spaniards found in Yucatan in the sixteenth century, arose in A.D. 1201 (p. 18). The other author dates the same catastrophe A.D. 1451 (pp. 84-8).

³ The Yucatec Society had originally been relatively pacific, the Mexic Society relatively warlike; and the reciprocal influence of the two spirits, at the time of the union of the two societies, is likely to have been disturbing and disintegrating (see *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, ed. xiii, new volume i, p. 195). The union was followed by an infiltration of the Aztecs and other Chichimecs (that is to say, hunting tribes from a no-man's-land on the north); and these newcomers cultivated a peculiar vein of savagery, both in warfare and in religion, which reached its climax in the latter days of the Central American 'Time of Troubles', on the eve of the arrival of the Spaniards.

and the Arabic Society were related, through an identic relation to a third society of an older generation. In their different homes, they both emerged, before the beginning of the eleventh century of the Christian Era, from an interregnum which had followed the fall of a universal state into which this older society had incorporated itself in its last phase.¹ This universal state was the so-called 'First Empire' of the Mayas,² which came to a rapid and mysterious end in the seventh century of the Christian Era, after having flourished for two or three hundred years.³ The great cities of this empire, which lay in the rain-soaked country to the south of Yucatan, in what are now the Republic of Guatemala and the British Colony of Honduras, were suddenly abandoned, one after another, to the tropical forest,⁴ in which their remains—long since engulfed and overgrown—are being discovered in our day by our Western archaeologists. The majority of the population migrated northwards into Yucatan,⁵ which had been a colonial appendage of the older society's domain;⁶ and the Yucatec Society which emerged there eventually, after the interregnum, was the creation of these refugees. As for the causes of the catastrophe in which the older society's history ended, it can only be said—in the present state of our knowledge—that the triumph of the tropical forest over the works of Man was probably a consequence of the catastrophe and not its cause;⁷ since there is nothing to suggest that there was at this time any change of climate which might have given the tropical forest the upper hand at last over a

¹ This interregnum is dated *circa* A.D. 690–990 by Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilisations of the Andes* (New York 1931, Scribner), p. 38.

² The 'First Empire' appears to have been a genuine universal state, in which all the Maya cities of the age obeyed a single Central Government. (For the archaeological indications of this, see Gann and Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–9.) The so-called 'Second Empire' of the Mayas belongs to the history of the later Yucatec Society and was not really an empire at all but an association of city-states, 'the League of Mayapan' (so called after one of the three participating states). This League kept the peace in the Yucatec World during the two centuries preceding the beginning of the 'Time of Troubles'. For the controversy over the chronology, see p. 124, footnote 2, above.

³ The 'First Empire' of the Mayas *flourished circa* A.D. 300–600 according to Spinden, H. J.: *The Ancient Civilisations of Mexico and Central America* (New York 1922, American Museum of Natural History), p. 67; *circa* A.D. 400–600 according to *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, ed. xiii, new volume 1, p. 194; *circa* A.D. 450–700 according to Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilisations of the Andes* (New York 1931, Scribner), p. 35. On the other hand, its fall is placed as late as the first half of the ninth century of the Christian Era by Thompson, J. E.: *The Civilisation of the Mayas* (Chicago 1927, Field Museum of Natural History), pp. 11–12.

⁴ In *The History of the Maya* (London 1931, Scribner), Messrs. Gann and Thompson—who follow Spinden's and not Thompson's own chronology in this joint work—estimate that these successive sudden abandonments extended over about a century, *circa* A.D. 530–630, from first to last (p. 60).

⁵ A minority moved out in the opposite direction to Quen Santo, on the inland slope of the Pacific Highlands.

⁶ The first Maya colony in Yucatan is thought to have been Tulum, on the east coast. A monument at Tulum bears a date which corresponds on Spinden's chronology to A.D. 304. (Gann and Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 41. Cf. pp. 71–8.)

⁷ For this victorious counter-offensive of the tropical forest, see further II. D (i), vol. ii, pp. 3–4, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 304–6, below.

society which had been successfully keeping it at bay for many centuries. Here, as elsewhere, the catastrophe is more likely to have been due to some human failure in Society itself; but Archaeology gives us no clue to what this failure was.¹ It only tells us that the 'First Empire' of the Mayas did not perish by violence of any kind: not by revolution and not by war. Indeed, this older society seems to have been unusually pacific. The only evidence that it practised the art of war at all comes from the north-western fringe of its domain, where it had to deal with outer barbarians in the quarter in which the Mexic Society eventually emerged after the interregnum.² The arts in which the older society excelled were Astronomy (turned to practical account in a

¹ The problem is discussed systematically and critically but inconclusively by Messrs. Gann and Thompson in *op. cit.* on pp. 61-6.

'The abandonment of the area as a whole was a gradual one, and occupied approximately a century. It commenced in the extreme south, at Copan, and in the extreme west, at Palenque, extending thence eastward and northward till it reached the cities of north-eastern Peten, of which the group including Naranjo, Tikal, Uaxactun, Benque Viejo and Nakum was the last to be deserted. The exodus from each city was, however, apparently a sudden one, as the last created stelae are almost in the best style of the Great Period, and show no signs of any degeneration in the sculptor's art.

A number of reasons have been assigned for this remarkable exodus, none of them, however, entirely satisfactory. They include:—1. National decadence; 2. Epidemic disease; 3. Earthquakes; 4. War, internecine or foreign, or both combined; 5. Climatic changes; 6. Exhaustion of the Soil; 7. Religious or superstitious reasons' (pp. 60-1).

The authors examine each of these suggested explanations in turn and find them all unconvincing, with the possible exception of a combination of nos. 6 and 7. As regards the possibility of soil-exhaustion, an observation of latter-day native agriculture in the area once covered by the 'First Empire' of the Mayas seems to show that a repeated clearing and burning-off of the tropical forest for the purpose of agriculture does tend eventually to exhaust the soil of the clearing and to end in its surface becoming covered with a tough mat of coarse grass. If this economic calamity occurred in the latter days of the Maya Empire on an unparalleled scale, and at a time when the Maya cultivators had given hostages to Fortune by being fruitful and multiplying and replenishing the Earth with a teeming population on the strength of an abundant food-supply which now unexpectedly began to fail, it is conceivable that the dominant minority of the Mayan Society—in which the ruling class appears to have been an esoteric priesthood—may have lost its nerve. In that event, the social effect of the exhaustion of the soil may have been reinforced and accentuated by religious terrors and tabus. The once fruitful and now barren corn-lands may have become an object of superstitious aversion as well as economic despair; and the two motives together may perhaps suffice to explain the wholesale trek into Yucatan.

The theory that an exhaustion of the soil may have been at least part cause of the trek is supported by the fact that, during the century (*circa* A.D. 530-630) during which the great cities of the 'First Empire' were being progressively deserted, the first step taken by their former inhabitants was to found a bevy of new small towns in their neighbourhoods. The purpose of this local change of residence may have been to bring the cultivators closer to the fringes of the cultivated areas that surrounded each of the great cities; for presumably the soil was less seriously exhausted on these fringes, where cultivation would previously have been less intense, than on the immediate outskirts of the previous centres of population. On this showing, the foundation of these small towns represents an attempt to compromise with 'economic necessity' by local decentralization—an attempt which proved vain and which was therefore followed, in the end, by an outright emigration to Yucatan. (See Gann and Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-2 and 56-7.)

For a discussion of the fifth of Messrs. Gann and Thompson's alternative explanations—namely climatic changes—see II. D (vii), Annex I, vol. ii, below.

² There are only two sculptures that relate to war, and these have both been found at Piedras Negras (Gann and Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 63—where, however, the view is expressed that the Mayas and the Nahuas did not actually come into contact with each other). In this connexion it may be noted that two, at least, of the 'Old Empire' colonies in Yucatan, namely Tulum and Ichpaatun, were walled cities (*op. cit.*, pp. 40 and 42).

system of chronology which was remarkably exact in its calculations and painstaking in its records) and Calligraphy (in a grotesque pictographic script, carved on stone, which our Western scholars have not yet succeeded in deciphering). The people who created this society were the Mayas, and we may call the society 'Mayan'.¹

What was the relation between the Mayan Society on the one hand and the Yucatec and Mexic Societies on the other? If we take as our touchstone the presence or absence of a middle term in the shape of a universal church, we shall hesitate to pronounce either the Yucatec Society or the Mexic Society to be 'affiliated' to the Mayan—and this for the reason that weighed with us when we were examining the relation of the Babylonian Society to the Sumerian. In the age of the Mayan universal state we can perceive no religious movement that can be confidently interpreted as the rise of a universal church created by an internal proletariat.² By that time, the dominant minority of the Mayan Society had organized its religious practices and beliefs into an elaborate and esoteric system; and this system appears to have been transmitted to the Yucatec Society and to the Mexic Society, as the somewhat similar religious system of the Sumerian dominant minority was transmitted to the Babylonian Society. The only change seems to have been that the Mexic Society failed to preserve the refinements of its Mayan heritage, in religion as in other aspects of culture, and even brutalized what it retained by lapsing into the practice of human sacrifice.³ In a general way, the fortunes of the Mayan religion in Mexic hands resemble the fortunes of the Sumerian religion in the hands of the Assyrians.

When we turn to consider the relative displacement of the original homes of the Yucatec Society and the Mexic Society from the original home of the Mayan, the displacement of the Mexic Society—from a moist tropical plain to a dry plateau in the far

¹ The Mayas stand to the histories of the Mayan, Yucatec, and Mexic Societies as the Sumerians stand to the histories of the Sumerian, Babylonian, and Hittite Societies; moreover, there are certain material points of resemblance between the two groups: for instance, the turn for astronomy and the contrast between the unusually pacific character of the earlier society in either group and the unusually vicious militarism in which the history of the later societies culminated. In this, the early Mayas stand to the Aztecs as the early Sumerians stand to the Assyrians.

² In the Mayan religion, perhaps the nearest approach to the religious spirit of an 'internal proletariat', as we know it elsewhere, is the cult of the Plumed Serpent God Tutulcan or Kukulcan, which was transmitted to the Mexic Society (the God's name there being translated into the local Nahuatl language as Quetzalcoatl). This Mayan Culture-God recalls the Sumerian Culture-God Ea. In considering the worship of Tutulcan, however, we are confronted with the difficulty which we encountered when we were considering the Sumerian worship of Tammuz. We are in ignorance of the historical relation of this cult to the organized religion of the dominant minority. (See the footnote on p. 115, above.)

³ The Mayan religious system was possibly (though not unquestionably) innocent of human sacrifice, but it did contain a brutal element in the shape of outlandish and revolting penitential self-mortifications which recall those of Hinduism.

north-west—recalls the similar displacement of the Hittite Society from the Sumeric. The original home of the Mexic Society on the plateau was at, if not beyond, the extreme limit reached by the Mayan Society in this direction at the time of its greatest expansion. On the other hand, the peninsula which was the original home of the Yucatec Society appears to have been brought completely within the ambit of the Mayan Society in its latest age. At the same time, Yucatan lay right outside the region of tropical forest which was the birth-place of the Mayan Society; and although in actual distance it lay much nearer to the Mayan homeland than the Mexican Plateau lay, the essential differences in the physical environment were much the same on the peninsula as they were on the plateau. Whereas, in the Mayan homeland, the society had to contend with a superabundance of rainfall and of vegetation, Yucatan, like the plateau, was deficient in water and in trees.¹ Thus as far-reaching an adaptation of the material conditions of life to a new physical environment was demanded when the Yucatec Society was founded in an outlying province of the 'First Empire' by Mayan refugees as when the Mexic Society was founded by barbarians who had been irradiated by the Mayan culture in a no-man's-land beyond the frontier. In this respect the relation of the Yucatec Society to the Mayan was unlike that of the Babylonian Society to the Sumeric, for in this latter case the birth-place of the later society was coincident with the homeland of the earlier society and there was no geographical displacement at all.

The Egyptian Society

Finally there is one representative of the species which has lived through a longer span than any other whose history we know, and this, apparently, without ever entering into the relationship either of 'affiliation' or of 'apparentation'. This is the society which emerged in the lower valley of the Nile, between the First Cataract and the Mediterranean, during the fourth millennium B.C., and which became extinct in the fifth century of the Christian Era² after existing, from first to last, at least three times as long as our own Western Society has existed so far.³ This 'Egyptian'⁴ Society

¹ Yucatan is a low-lying shelf of limestone which has been elevated above sea-level without the strata being tilted out of the horizontal plane. In physical character the Yucatanian peninsula resembles the south-eastern extremity of Italy, from the plain of Foggia to the tip of the 'heel'.

² This is the extreme date down to which some vestiges of the Egyptian tradition survived. As a 'going concern', the Egyptian culture did not outlive the third century of the Christian Era.

³ It is not yet thirteen centuries since our Western Society emerged from the interregnum which followed the fall of the Roman Empire. The span of Egyptian history extends over at least four millennia.

⁴ 'Egyptian' (from the Latin *Aegyptiacus*), in order to avoid the ambiguity of the geographical adjective 'Egyptian' (from the Latin *Aegyptius*).

is not represented in the world of our day, as far as we can see, by any human heirs or assigns—not by any fossil of itself and not by any living society to which it might be either ‘apparented’ or related in some less intimate way. All the more triumphant is the immortality which it has sought and found in stone. It seems probable that the Pyramids, which have already borne inanimate witness to the existence of their makers for four or five thousand years without yielding to the ravages of Time, will continue steadfastly to perform their Atlantean task for hundreds of thousands of years to come. It is not inconceivable that they may outlast Mankind itself, and that, in a world where there are no longer human senses to receive their testimony or human minds to comprehend it, they will testify still of the Egyptiac Society that made them: ‘Before Abraham was, I am.’

II. A PROVISIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIETIES OF THE SPECIES

In the foregoing survey we started with six representatives of the species of society which we are studying—five living representatives and one extinct specimen—and with two sets of fossils. As a result of the survey, we have succeeded in identifying thirteen representatives more. Thus we now have at our disposal nineteen representatives in all; and it may be convenient to run through their names in the order in which they have presented themselves. Our nineteen societies are the Western, the Orthodox Christian, the Iranic, the Arabic (now incorporated with the Iranic into the Islamic Society of to-day), the Hindu, the Far Eastern, the Hellenic, the Syriac, the Indic, the Sinic, the Minoan, the Sumeric, the Hittite, the Babylonian, the Andean, the Mexic, the Yucatec, the Mayan, and the Egyptiac.¹

The practical operations by which we have carried out our survey suggest a basis for a provisional classification of the results that

¹ This list of nineteen societies may be compared with the list of ten societies which was compiled by Count J. A. de Gobineau nearly a century ago. (See vol. i, pp. 362-5, of the 1st edition of *L'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (Paris 1853-5, Firmin Didot, 4 vols.)). In introducing his list, de Gobineau declares:

‘Du sein de ces multitudes de nations qui ont passé ou vivent encore sur la terre, dix seulement se sont élevées à l’état de sociétés complètes. Le reste, plus ou moins indépendant, gravite à l’entour comme les planètes autour de leurs soleils.’

The list itself is as follows. (N.B. Wherever one of de Gobineau’s societies coincides with one of the societies identified in this Study, the name employed in this Study has been used to convey de Gobineau’s description or title.)

I. Indic [= our Indic+Hindu].

II. Egyptiac.

III. ‘Assyriac’ [= our Syriac approximately, since it is described as including the Jews, Phoenicians, Lydians, Carthaginians, Himyarites, and Zoroastrian-

we have obtained. In exploring the background of a society we have sometimes come upon an earlier society which is 'apparented' to it through the middle term of a universal church or is related to it in some less intimate or more intimate way. Sometimes, on the other hand, we have explored the background of a society without striking upon any earlier representative of the species. Thus we can provisionally classify our nineteen societies according to whether they are unrelated to earlier societies or related in this or that degree. In attempting this provisional classification, we shall give first place to the criterion that we have employed in our survey when we have been identifying representatives of the species, namely the presence or absence of a universal church. We have also at our command a secondary criterion which we can apply in sub-dividing the set of 'related' societies, namely the degree of displacement, if any, of the original home of the later society from the original home of the earlier society.¹ By combining these two criteria, we may perhaps construct a 'yard-stick' with which we may be able to measure off all our societies on a single scale and assign them specific places in a continuous series.

In our primary religious classification, we may arrange our specimens in the following groups: first, societies that are not related in any way either to earlier or to later societies; second, societies that are not related in any way to earlier societies but are related to later societies; third, societies that are related to earlier societies, but in a less intimate way than by 'affiliation' through universal churches, the relation in this case consisting simply in the fact that the later society has been precipitated by a *Völkerwanderung* which has accompanied the fall of the earlier society's universal state;² fourth, societies that are 'affiliated' through universal churches to older societies that are 'apparented' to them through the same middle term;³ fifth, societies that are related to

Iranians. The author remarks that this 'Assyriac' Society had its 'renaissance iranienne', and that this was the best thing about it.]

IV. Hellenic.

V. Sinic [= our Sinic+Far Eastern].

VI. Italic [= a fringe of our Hellenic].

VII. Germanic [= our Western].

VIII. Alleghanian [= a fringe of our Mexic].

IX. Mexic.

X. Andean.

When we compare this list with ours, we find that nine of our societies are omitted. Of these nine, six (the Minoan, Sumeric, Hittite, Babylonian, Yucatec, Mayan) are societies whose existence has been rescued from oblivion by the discoveries of Western archaeologists since de Gobineau's day. The other three, however, are living societies (the Orthodox Christian and the two constituents of the Islamic). Either de Gobineau has deliberately ignored these societies or he has intended to include them respectively in his Hellenic and in his 'Assyriac'.

¹ See pp. 62-3, above.

² See p. 62, above.

³ See pp. 56-7, above.

earlier societies, but in a more intimate way than by Apparentation-and-Affiliation, the relation in this case amounting to an inheritance of the organized religion of the dominant minority of the earlier society with little or no change.¹ Within the group of 'affiliated' societies, we can distinguish two sub-groups, according to whether the germ of creative power in the internal proletariat of the 'apparented' society, out of which the intermediary universal church has sprung, has been alien from the 'apparented' society or indigenous to it in origin.² This primary classification gives the following results:

Wholly Unrelated Societies

Egyptiac
Andean

Societies Unrelated to Earlier Societies

Sinic
Minoan
Sumeric
Mayan

Infra-affiliated Societies

Indic (?)³
Hittite
Syriac
Hellenic (?)⁴

Affiliated Societies I

(affiliated through a chrysalis church of the *alien-origin* type)

Western
Orthodox Christian
Far Eastern

¹ See pp. 115-18, above.

² See p. 57, above.

³ On the assumption that the domain of the 'Indus Culture' was, at any rate latterly, an outlying province of the Sumeric universal state, and that this was the magnet that drew the Aryas on their Völkerwanderung to India from the Eurasian Steppe. (See pp. 104-9, above.) If this assumption is unwarranted, then the Indic Society ought to be placed in the preceding group of Societies Unrelated to Earlier Societies.

⁴ On the view that the Mysteries and the Orphic Church which emerge in the course of Hellenic history represent no more than the rudiments of a universal church which the internal proletariat of the antecedent Minoan Society had attempted to create with only partial success (see pp. 95-100, above). If this view is mistaken, and if the Mysteries and Orphism are rather to be regarded as manifestations of a full-fledged universal church, then the Hellenic Society ought to be placed in the following group of Affiliated Societies. On the whole, however, it seems more probable that 'the memory of what she owed to her older population was effaced almost as effectually in Greece as it was in India'. (Marshall, Sir. J.: *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilisation* (London 1931, Probsthain, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. vii.)

Affiliated Societies II(affiliated through a chrysalis church of the *indigenous-origin* type)

Iranic

Arabic

Hindu

Supra-affiliated Societies

Babylonian

Yucatec

Mexic

In our secondary geographical classification, which applies only to the 'related' societies, we may arrange our specimens in the following groups: first, societies whose original home is entirely non-coincident with the domain of the related earlier society at its widest range; second, societies whose original base-line coincides with a frontier of the universal state of the related earlier society, so that their original home lies partly in the former no-man's-land beyond that frontier but is also partly coincident with the domain of the related earlier society at its widest range; third, societies whose original home lies wholly within the domain of the related earlier society at its widest range but not wholly within the original home of the related earlier society; fourth, societies whose original home does lie wholly within the original home of the related earlier society. This secondary classification gives the following results:

<i>Related Earlier Society</i>	<i>Related Later Society</i>			
	<i>Non-coincident</i>	<i>Partly coincident</i>	<i>Wholly coincident</i>	
			<i>With widest range</i>	<i>With original home</i>
Sinic	Far Eastern in Korea and Japan Syriac	Hellenic Indic + Hittite Mexic	Far Eastern (main body)	Babylonian ¹
Minoan Sumeric				
Mayan Indic Syriac Hellenic	Orthodox Christian in Russia	Iranic Western	Yucatec Hindu Arabic Orthodox Christian (main body)	

¹ The original home of the Babylonian Society was coincident with Sumer + Akkad + Assyria + Elam; and the two latter countries were not actually part of the original home

Let us now combine our two criteria of classification into a single 'yard-stick', retaining the groups established by our primary classification, but arranging the several societies within each group according to the order resulting from our secondary classification (so far as this secondary classification extends). In both the arrangements which are now to be combined we have proceeded always from the less intimate to the more intimate degree of relationship, so that, in our combined order, the 'direction' of the classification, from top to bottom of the list, will be the same. The series now works out as follows:

Egyptiac+Andean
 Sinic+Minoan+Sumeric+Mayan
 Syriac
 Indic+Hittite+Hellenic
 Western
 Orthodox Christian (in Russia)+Far Eastern (in Korea and Japan)
 Orthodox Christian (main body)+Far Eastern (main body)
 Iranic
 Arabic+Hindu
 Mexic
 Yucatec
 Babylonian

As the result of our three classificatory operations, we have incidentally increased the number of our specimens from nineteen to twenty-one (the Orthodox Christian Society and the Far Eastern Society each falling into two parts which take different places in the series). We have arranged these twenty-one specimens in a series of twelve degrees, beginning with the degree represented by the Egyptiac Society and the Andean Society, which show no trace of being related in any way to any other society, either earlier or later than themselves, and ending with the degree represented by the Babylonian Society, which is related to the Sumeric Society so intimately that already we have asked ourselves the question whether the relation may not almost amount to identity.¹

It may be opportune, before passing on, to ask ourselves this question again, and to seek this time for an answer; for after all

of the Sumeric Society, though they were embraced in its domain at so early a stage as to count as parts of its homeland. In so far, the original home of the Babylonian Society cannot be said to have been wholly coincident with that of the Sumeric Society in the strictest sense. On the other hand, it was far more nearly coincident with the original home of the Sumeric Society than with its widest range, which included not only Elam but possibly the Indus Valley as well, and not only Assyria but Cappadocia and Syria into the bargain.

¹ See pp. 117-18, above.

the equivocal status of the Babylonian Society is only an extreme case. The same question might arise over the status of a number of other societies in our list—all, in fact, that lie below the line occupied by the Western Society in our descending series. In the course of our Study down to this point, we have treated all these societies as distinct and separate representatives of the species, because in exploring their respective backgrounds we have found there some or all of the tokens with which we are familiar in the background of our Western Society—a universal state, a universal church, and a *Völkerwanderung*—and because we have found, again, that these tokens are phenomena in the decline and fall of some earlier society, as the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church and the *Völkerwanderung* in the background of our Western Society are phenomena in the decline and fall of the Hellenic Society. We took it for granted that our Western Society was a distinct and separate representative of the species. It did not occur to us to regard this society as identical with the Hellenic Society or to treat our Western history as a mere epilogue to Hellenic history on account of the relation between the two societies and between their two histories to which the familiar tokens bear witness. By analogy, we have assumed that all these other societies are distinct and separate likewise. We have made the assumption confidently in cases where we have found not only a universal state and a *Völkerwanderung* but also a universal church. We have made it, again, where instead of a universal church we have found a new religion introduced, in the *Völkerwanderung*, by barbarians. We have made it with some hesitation in three cases where the token of a universal church is lacking, but where we have found, instead, the organized religion of the dominant minority of the earlier society living on. Even in these cases, however, we have accepted the analogy provisionally. We now have to reconsider how all these societies stand to their predecessors.

If we begin with our Western Society and ask ourselves, in regard to it, the question which we have hitherto begged—Is our Western Society identical with the Hellenic Society, and is our Western history a mere epilogue to Hellenic history?—no doubt we shall abide by our previous assumption. We shall pronounce our Western Society to be a distinct and separate representative of the species on mature consideration. But this does not pre-judge the answer to our question in the other cases in which we have to ask it. For while Analogy is a vastly suggestive and significant pointer, we cannot afford to follow its indications blindly and mechanically. It is open to critics to sweep our 'tokens' aside and to pronounce—if they choose, on subjective, intuitive grounds

—that, however our 'tokens' are to be interpreted, they cannot bring themselves to regard our 'Orthodox Christian' Society as independent of the Hellenic Society, or our 'Far Eastern' as independent of the Sinic, or our 'Iranic' and 'Arabic' as independent of the Syriac, or our 'Hindu' as independent of the Indic, or our 'Mexic' and 'Yucatec' as independent of the Mayan, any more than they can regard our 'Babylonian' as independent of the Sumerian. They may remind us that in this last extreme case we ourselves have hesitated; and they may refer us back to a simile which we have applied in a somewhat different connexion.

At an earlier point of our Study¹ we compared the Roman Empire to an old tree whose roots decayed until the wind tore them up and overthrew the solid trunk. The Roman Empire was a universal state, one of those institutions into which decaying societies incorporate themselves in the last phase of their lives. Why not extend the simile from a single institution to the whole life of a society *in extremis*?² Why not apply it, for instance, to the Sumerian Society *in extremis*? In this light, instead of viewing what we have called the Babylonian Society as a distinct and separate entity with a life of its own, we might view it rather as the dead trunk of the Sumerian Society—dead but not yet dissolved into dust, fallen but still cumbering the ground. Think how long a time it takes for a dead, fallen trunk to rot away. The time may be almost as long as the lifetime of the tree before it died and fell. If the lifetime of the Sumerian Society covered perhaps two thousand years (from the early centuries of the fourth millennium B.C. to the early years of the nineteenth century B.C.), there is nothing extravagant in the supposition that the carcass of the Sumerian Society should have cumbered the ground of 'Irāq for nearly two thousand years more (from the nineteenth century B.C. to the last). Are not the social phenomena which we observe in that region during that latter period of time more aptly described in these terms than on the hypothesis of a new society coming to birth, growing up, breaking down, and disintegrating in its turn?

¹ See p. 56, above.

² This very use of our simile has actually been made by Oswald Spengler (*Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 154):

'When the goal and the idea [of a "culture"] are attained, when the entire range of its inner possibilities has been traversed in a series of external realizations, then the "culture" suddenly goes stiff; it dies off, its blood coagulates, its forces fail, it turns into a "civilization". In this condition it is capable, like a dead giant of the primeval forest, of keeping its withered branches outstretched for century after century. We see this in the cases of Egypt, of India, of China, of the Islamic World. In the same way, the Hellenic Civilization towered up, in the Imperial Age, in gigantic dimensions and with all the appearance of youthful strength and exuberance—depriving the young Arabic Culture in the east of air and light.'

N.B. In Spengler's terminology, a 'culture' means what, in this Study, is meant by a 'civilization', while Spengler's 'civilizations' are the debris of dead 'cultures'.

Is it not misleading to treat these phenomena as though they were on a par with the preceding phenomena of Sumeric history and to lend them a distinctive name, as though they were the manifestations of a separate society existing in its own right? Would it not be better to wipe out the name 'Babylonian Society' and label the phenomena instead as the debris of the Sumeric Society? In principle we have already conceded that an extinct society may leave fossilized remains of its fabric behind. We have identified a number of fossil remnants of two extinct societies—the Syriac and the Indic—in the world of our own day. May not what we have labelled the 'Babylonian Society' be really just such another fossil of somewhat larger size and greater age?¹ And may not our 'Yucatec' and 'Mexic' and 'Hindu' and 'Arabic' and 'Iranic' and 'Far Eastern' and 'Orthodox Christian' societies be fossils likewise? If so, no less than ten² out of our twenty-one societies will have to be struck off the list and sent to limbo.

In meeting this criticism, we may admit at once that the conception of a society cumbering the ground as a carcass, long after the life has gone out of the body, is by no means absurd *a priori*. Indeed, we can assist our critics by pointing out an instance in which this conception is indisputably apt.

If we examine the history of the Egyptian Society, we find that little more than a quarter of its vast time-span of four millennia was a period of growth. The impetus which manifested itself first in the mastery of a peculiarly formidable physical environment—in the clearing, draining, and cultivation of the jungle-swamp that originally occupied the lower valley and the Delta of the Nile to the exclusion of Man³—and which then displayed its increasing momentum in the precocious political unification of the Egyptian World at the end of the so-called Predynastic Age, reached its climax in the stupendous material performances of the Fourth Dynasty. The Age of the Fourth and Fifth Dynasties was the zenith of Egyptian history, by whatever criteria we measure the

¹ This view is forcibly expressed by Eduard Meyer in the following description of Babylonia under the rule of the Kassites:

'Business life maintains its movement in the traditional forms, and the culture and religion handed down from the past are spun out; but, in the sharpest contrast to Egypt, Babylonia failed to create anything new whatever through all these centuries. If we happened to possess monuments of the art of the age, the progressive decline of artistic power would doubtless leap to the eye. The fact is that the role of Babylonia in world history was played out by the end of the First Dynasty of Babylon' [i.e. during the interregnum after the death of Hammurabi]. 'Only the petrified forms preserve their existence without preserving any content.' (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, 2nd edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 154.)

² Reckoning the Orthodox Christian Society in Russia as distinct from the main body of Orthodox Christendom, and the Far Eastern Society in Korea and Japan as distinct from the main body of the Far Eastern Society.

³ The setting and the significance of this achievement are discussed in II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, on pp. 302-15, below.

curve of its progress and decline. It was the zenith in the characteristic achievement of the Egyptiac Society: the co-ordination of human labour in great engineering enterprises ranging from the reclamation of the swamps to the construction of the Pyramids. It was also the zenith in the spheres of political administration and of art. Even in the sphere of religion, where wisdom is proverbially born of suffering,¹ the so-called 'Pyramid Texts' testify that this age likewise saw the creation, the collision, and the first stage in the interaction of the two religious movements—the worship of the Sun and the worship of Osiris—which came to their maturity after the Egyptiac Society had gone into its decline.

The zenith was passed and the decline set in at the transition from the Fifth Dynasty to the Sixth *circa* 2424 B.C.;² and at this point we begin to recognize in Egyptiac history the familiar symptoms of decline in the order in which they have presented themselves to us in the histories of other societies. The break-up of the Egyptiac United Kingdom into a plurality of local states indulging in more and more destructive internecine warfare bears the unmistakable stamp of a 'Time of Troubles'. This 'Time of Troubles' entered upon its last and most acute stage about 2242 B.C., when the local princes of Heracleopolis brushed aside the last legitimate Pharaohs of Memphis and usurped a title which had long since become a vain pretension. The Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles' was superseded, *circa* 2070/2060 B.C., by an Egyptiac universal state. The founder was that member of the local dynasty of Thebes³ who commemorated his achievement by taking the title 'Uniter of the two Lands'.⁴ This Egyptiac universal state was consolidated under the Twelfth Dynasty (*imperabant circa* 2000–1788 B.C.); and that Egyptiac 'Age of the Antonines' was succeeded in due course by an 'Age of the Thirty Tyrants'.⁵ During the century that followed the period of the Twelfth Dynasty, the Egyptiac universal state broke down; and the consequent interregnum brought its *Völkerwanderung* in the shape of the invasion of the Egyptiac World by the Hyksos.⁶

Here then, near the mid-point in the time-span of Egyptiac history, we have found at any rate two of our standard 'tokens': a *Völkerwanderung* and a universal state. Supposing that, in our exploration of Egyptiac history, we had followed our usual

¹ The Aeschylean *πάθει μάθος* (*Agamemnon*, 1. 177).

² This is Meyer's date in *Die Ältere Chronologie Babylonien, Assyrien und Aegyptens* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1925, Cotta), p. 68.

³ The so-called Eleventh Dynasty.

⁴ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (ii), 3rd edition, p. 257.

⁵ This latter comparison is suggested by Meyer in *op. cit.*, pp. 302–3.

⁶ See I. C (i) (b), pp. 105 and 106, above.

procedure of starting at the latter end and working backwards chronologically instead of forwards, we should probably have paused at this point and said to ourselves: 'We have now traced the march of Egyptiac history back, from its last fading foot-prints in the fifth century of the Christian Era, through a span of twenty-one centuries, until, in the early part of the seventeenth century B.C., we have struck upon a *Völkerwanderung* following the fall of a universal state. By all analogy, we should infer that we have traced the history of the Egyptiac Society to its source, and have discovered, in its background, the tokens of the presence of an earlier society, related to the Egyptiac in some degree. Let us give this earlier society a name of its own and call it, let us say, "Nilotic" in order to distinguish it from its "Egyptiac" successor.' This is the path into which Analogy would lead us; yet we shall not only hesitate but positively refuse to take this path when we have considered the facts on their merits.

We shall refuse because, if we now resume our exploration of Egyptiac—or 'Nilotic'—history in the forward direction, we shall not find a new society emerging within the chrysalis of a universal church after the interregnum has run its course and the *Völkerwanderung* has played itself out. We shall find quite a different outcome. The barbarian 'successor-state' is overthrown; the Hyksos are expelled from Egypt; the interregnum is retrieved; the Egyptiac universal state is restored; and all this is done by another dynasty¹ from the Thebaid—the self-same locality that has previously sent forth the Eleventh Dynasty to found the Egyptiac universal state and the Twelfth Dynasty to maintain it. An Egyptiac universal state with its capital at Thebes is in existence once again; and the restoration of the old institution is not only exact; it is deliberate and self-conscious. In terms more familiar to us, it is as if Justinian had succeeded in exterminating not only the Vandals in Africa and the Ostrogoths in Italy but all the other barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire: the Visigoths in Spain, the Franks in Gaul, the Angles in Britain; and as if the Roman Imperial Restoration had been not only universal instead of local but also enduring instead of ephemeral. Indeed, the Egyptiac Imperial Restoration is a still more remarkable achievement than this imaginary parallel implies. In order to grasp its full magnitude we have further to imagine that in the fifth century of the Christian Era the Roman Empire had broken down completely everywhere—in the Greek and Oriental provinces as well as in the Latin

¹ The so-called Seventeenth Dynasty and Eighteenth Dynasty, which are really one single dynasty. The fiction that a new dynasty begins with Amosis, the expeller of the Hyksos, symbolizes the fact that in Amosis' reign and through Amosis' achievement a local state in the Thebaid is converted into the universal state of the Restoration.

provinces—and that thereafter the barbarians had all been exterminated and the Empire had been restored in its full extent by some descendant of 'Romulus Augustulus' who had been permitted to retain a local dominion over Rome itself by the contemptuous tolerance of an Odovacer and a Theodoric!

This extraordinary¹ restoration of the Egyptiac universal state was the sole significant historical event, in what had been the domain of the Egyptiac Society, that occurred between the sixteenth century B.C. and the fifth century of the Christian Era—the sole event, that is to say, except the abortive revolution of Ikhnaton (and that was evidently one of those exceptions which prove a rule). The duration of the restored universal state—its long Indian summer, its still longer autumn, its repeated overthrow and repeated rehabilitation—fills the whole span of these two millennia. When we examine these phases of existence, we cannot reasonably interpret them as the genesis, growth, breakdown, and disintegration of a new society, distinct and separate from the society which had passed through its 'Time of Troubles' between 2424 and 2070/2060 B.C. and had enjoyed the respite of a universal state from 2070/2060 B.C. until the early years of the seventeenth century and had fallen then into an interregnum accompanied by a *Völkerwanderung*. We cannot regard the phenomena that confront us, in the same geographical area, between the sixteenth century B.C. and the fifth century of the Christian Era in any other light than as an epilogue to the history of the society which had risen and fallen in the same area before. The object that occupied the field in the later age was not a new tree with a life of its own, but the old tree's dead trunk artificially re-erected, and many times re-erected again, during the ages that elapsed while its massive bulk was weathering away and its hard grain rotting into dust.

Now if we take this view of Egyptiac history; if we insist upon

¹ The restoration of the Egyptiac universal state is examined in IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (3), vol. iv, p. 412; Part V. A, vol. v, pp. 2-3; and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 152, below. At this point it is sufficient to say that, like the resumption of the Syriac and Indic universal states (see pp. 76-7 and 86, above), the restoration of the Egyptiac universal state is to be explained by the exasperating effect of an alien intrusion. The Hyksos, by the time when they arrived at the borders of the Egyptiac World, were no longer quite indeterminate barbarians. They were members of the external proletariat of another society—the Sumeric—and they had taken a tinge of Sumeric colouring in their passage across the whole expanse of the Sumeric universal state (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 389-90, below). This tinge doubtless accounts for the fanatical hatred which the Hyksos inspired in the Egyptians; and this fanaticism was the stimulus which gave the Egyptians the energy to drive the Hyksos out. We may compare the similar hatred which was inspired in the Chinese, with similar consequences, by the tinge of Nestorian Christian colouring which had been taken by the Mongols before they conquered the continental part of the Far Eastern World in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era. (For the influence of the Nestorian Christian culture upon the Mongols, see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 122, footnote 2, and II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 237-8, below.)

the historical continuity of the social phenomena which occupy the field here from the fourth millennium B.C. to the fifth century of the Christian Era; if we refuse to regard the events that fill this immense span of time as constituting the histories of two distinct and separate societies and declare that they constitute the history of an Egyptiac Society one and indivisible: our critics may reasonably ask us why we take a different view of Sumeric history; why we 'cut off its tail with a carving knife' for the pleasure of calling the lifeless appendage a 'Babylonian Society' and making believe that this is a distinct and separate living representative of the species. If our 'Egyptiac Society' is one and indivisible, are not our 'Sumeric' and 'Babylonian' societies one and indivisible by the same token? And if it comes to tokens, have we not more warrant for dividing Egyptiac history in two than for making our division between Sumeric and Babylonian? What chiefly made us hesitate to treat the Babylonian Society as an independent representative of the species in its own right was our observation that the Babylonian religion was simply the religion of the dominant minority of the Sumeric Society taken over practically unchanged, and our failure to discover anything in the nature of a universal church created by the internal proletariat of the Sumeric Society and constituting a middle term between the Sumeric Society and the Babylonian. If we study the religious history of the Egyptiac Society, we find that here, too, after the interregnum, a religion prevailed that had been taken over from the dominant minority of the preceding age of decline. Yet it did not prevail definitively here without a struggle; and it first secured its position by coming to terms with a universal church which had been created in the preceding age of decline by the Egyptiac internal proletariat out of the worship of Osiris.

The Osiris worship came from the Delta. Originally it may have come from farther afield, if there is any substance in the speculation that it was ultimately derived from the Tammuz worship of the Sumerians.¹ At any rate, it did not spring from the soil of Upper Egypt, where the political history of the Egyptiac Society was made.² The main thread in the religious history of the Egyptiac Society is the rivalry between this God of terrestrial and subterranean Nature—the spirit of the vegetation that alternately appears above the ground and disappears beneath it; the spirit of the Nile, whose waters cause the vegetation to appear—and the

¹ See p. 115, footnote 1, above.

² Eduard Meyer points out that the foundation of the United Kingdom circa 3200 B.C., the foundation of the universal state circa 2070/2060 B.C., and the restoration of the universal state circa 1580 B.C., were all accomplished by Powers arising in the south of Upper Egypt. (*Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii (i), 2nd edition, pp. 60-1.) The point is examined further in II. D (v), vol. ii, on pp. 114-15, below.

Sun-God of Heaven.¹ The essence of the rivalry was not the theological difference between two conceptions of the divine power, but a political difference between two sections of the Egyptiac Society in which the two worships respectively arose. In consequence of the political precocity of the Egyptiac Society—a precocity which showed itself in the foundation of the United Kingdom at the end of the Predynastic Age—the cult of Re, the Sun-God, was ‘politicized’. The process was completed in the time of the Fifth Dynasty (*regnabant circa* 2564–2424 B.C.), when, under the influence of the priesthood of Heliopolis, the Pharaoh became the son of Re, while Re was re-conceived in the image of the Pharaoh.² On the other hand, the worship of Osiris was a popular religion.³ ‘In the solar faith we have a state theology, with all the splendour and the prestige of its royal patrons behind it; while in that of Osiris we are confronted by a religion of the people, which made a strong appeal to the individual believer.’⁴

The crucial difference between the two religions in their original forms, before the interaction between them began, was the difference in the prospects which they offered to their devotees after death. Osiris ruled the multitudes of the dead in a shadow-world underground or in the West.⁵ Re—for a consideration—redeemed his devotees from death and raised them alive to the sky;⁶ but this apotheosis was reserved for those who could pay the price; and since the material equipment in which the price was reckoned was steadily elaborated to the staggering proportions which it attained in the time of the pyramid-builders, the solar immortality was virtually a monopoly of the Pharaoh and those members of his court to whose immortalization-equipment he chose to contribute.⁷ ‘The Great Pyramids of Gizah, while they are to-day the most imposing surviving witness to the earliest emergence of organized Man and the triumph of concerted effort, are likewise the silent but eloquent expression of a supreme endeavour to achieve immortality by sheer physical force.’⁸ In the construction of the Pyramids, the organizing genius of the Egyptiac Society, which had drained the swamps and had established the United Kingdom, mobilized all the economic and political resources over which it had acquired command in an effort so tremendous that the structure of Society was irreparably overstrained.⁹ The material

¹ Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder and Stoughton), pp. 8–9.

² Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–17.

³ Breasted, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁴ Breasted, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁵ Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 139 and 142.

⁶ Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 99 and 142.

⁷ Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–75 and 103.

⁸ Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 178–9.

⁹ For the significance of the building of the Pyramids in the history of the Egyptiac Society, see further III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 153, below.

consequences were the economic, political, and artistic decline which marked the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles'. The spiritual consequences were complicated.

The first spiritual consequence seems to have been an increase in the power of Osiris owing to an increase in the devotion of the masses to the Osirian religion. The shadowy existence of their dead in the Osirian other-world might be a poor thing compared to the immortal life of the Pharaoh and his courtiers in Re's heaven. Yet it was the one consolation to which the masses could look forward under the grinding oppression to which they were being subjected in this life in order to secure the everlasting happiness of their masters in the life to come. The increase in the power of Osiris was a symptom that the oppression had become intolerable and that the Egyptiac Society was on the verge of fission into a proletariat and a dominant minority. Confronted with this danger, the solar priesthood of Heliopolis sought to render Osiris innocuous by taking him into partnership with their own God;¹ but in this transaction Osiris succeeded in taking far more than he gave. While he entered into the Pharaoh's solar cult, he captured the solar ritual of apotheosis, which had been a monopoly of the few, for the mass of Mankind.² The first stages of the process have left their mark in the so-called 'Pyramid Texts'³—'Osirianized' solar liturgies which were still, apparently, the exclusive possession of the Pharaohs of the Fifth Dynasty who inscribed them.⁴ The monument of the completion of the process is 'the Book of the Dead'—an 'everyman's guide to immortality' which was already current under the Eighteenth Dynasty in the Restoration Period after the interregnum, and which dominated the religious life of the Egyptiac Society throughout the epilogue that occupied the last two millennia of its Time-span.⁵

The process was assisted by the disillusionment of the dominant minority themselves, who piled stone on stone up to the apex of the Great Pyramid without ever attaining that complete inward

¹ The dread which Osiris inspired in the votaries of Re is betrayed in the magical formulae for preventing Osiris from appropriating the royal pyramids. (Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-5.)

² Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 403 and 150-60. Compare the Hellenic myth of Prometheus, who stole fire from the Olympians for the use of Man. In the Aeschylean version of the Prometheus myth, Zeus is represented as an egotistical tyrant, who feels no concern for the welfare of Mankind and who is incensed with Prometheus for his revolutionary labour of love in imparting to Man some share in the Olympians' blessings, because, for Zeus, the essential value of these blessings consists in their being his own monopoly. For an interpretation of the contest between Prometheus and Zeus as a mythical representation of the cosmic conflict between Growth and Stagnation, see Part III. B, below.

³ See p. 137, above.

⁴ Breasted, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

⁵ A 'canonical redaction' of the Book of the Dead does not appear to have been made until the fourth century B.C. In the Book of the Dead, hardly anything from 'the Pyramid Texts' survived. (Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-4.)

assurance of immortality for which they craved.¹ Under the Fifth Dynasty, the idea that Re demanded righteousness rather than big buildings began to prevail;² and this moralization of the God of the Pharaohs was extended in the 'Time of Troubles' to the God of their subjects. The temper of the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles' is revealed in the surviving fragments of a prophetic literature³ comparable to the literature of the Syriac 'Time of Troubles' which is familiar to us in the books of the prophets of Israel and in the Gathas of Zarathustra. We discern the same spiritual progress from scepticism through pessimism towards a new hope; and this new hope sprang from 'the democratisation of blessedness beyond the grave'.⁴ Osiris had become a moral judge, in another world, of men's good and evil deeds in this world; the souls of all the dead must appear before his judgement-seat; and any soul whose good deeds outweighed its evil deeds in the balance became identified with Osiris himself and thus attained that blissful immortality which had once been the guerdon of material performances and the monopoly of Pharaohs who could command the labour of other men to perform them on a sufficient scale. The worship of Osiris—the God who died and rose again to endow the righteous dead with his own eternal life—was centralized in the time of the Twelfth Dynasty in a holy sepulchre at Abydos—the derelict tomb of some forgotten Thinite Pharaoh of the First or Second Dynasty of the old United Kingdom. This holy sepulchre became a place of pilgrimage and the scene of an annual passion-play.⁵

Here, under the Egyptiac universal state, we discern the lineaments of a universal church created by an internal proletariat. What would have been the future of this Osirian Church if the Egyptiac universal state had not been restored? If the interregnum had run its course, would the Osirian Church then have become the chrysalis of a new society, 'affiliated' to the Egyptiac Society

¹ This lack of assurance was justified by the event. During the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles' the pyramids which had been built by the Pharaohs of the United Kingdom all became derelict, in spite of the endowments which had been left for their liturgical upkeep. By the time of the Eleventh and Twelfth Dynasties, these colossal monuments of their predecessors had become a by-word for the futility of mere material effort. (Breasted, op. cit., pp. 66-8, 83, 180-3.)

² Breasted, op. cit., pp. 170-9.

³ The majority of the fragments, as we have them, appear to date from the time of the Twelfth Dynasty; that is to say, from the time of the Egyptiac universal state; but the spirit which they breathe and the historical setting in which they are placed belong to the foregoing 'Time of Troubles'. (Breasted, op. cit., p. 198.)

⁴ Breasted, op. cit., p. 252.

⁵ Breasted, op. cit., pp. 285-9. See further Schaefer, H.: *Die Mysterien des Osiris in Abydos unter Sesostrius III nach dem Denkstein des Oberschatzmeisters I-cher-Nofret* (Leipzig 1904, Hinrichs = Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Altertumskunde Aegyptens, herausgegeben von K. Sethe, vol. iv, Heft 2). According to Schaefer (in op. cit., pp. 28-9), the Pharaoh whose grave was appropriated by Osiris was the third king of Dynasty III. For a summary of the acts of the passion-play, see op. cit., p. 31.

but possessing a distinct and separate life of its own? First of all, we should have expected to see this religion of the Egyptian internal proletariat captivate the external proletariat—the Hyksos—but this did not happen. The Hyksos remained faithful to the cult of their own God Set;¹ and the intrusion of this ‘abomination of desolation’ evoked an unnatural ‘union sacrée’ between the nascent religion of the internal proletariat of the Egyptian Society and the moribund religion of the dominant minority. This defensive fusion of worships was one aspect—and ultimately the most important aspect—of that fanatical reaction against the Hyksos which also manifested itself in the restoration of the Egyptian universal state by the Eighteenth Dynasty. The religious result of the Restoration was a permanent syncretism in which the Osirian religion was taken up by the priesthood of the dominant minority and was sterilized. The priests were prudent enough not to rob the internal proletariat of their hard-won Osirian immortality, but they were also shrewd enough to exploit the popular craving by making it easier to satisfy. Professional ingenuity was exercised—as of old, for a consideration—in teaching Man how to make up for deficiencies in righteousness by magical methods of taking the kingdom of Osiris by storm; and the magic was adroitly purveyed in guaranteed formulas at popular prices. The immortality which had once been bought by Pharaohs for the price of pyramids was now brought within the reach of every man for the price of a few texts written on papyrus rolls.² We may conjecture that, in this business as in others, the mass production of a cheap article for a small margin of profit brought the manufacturer the best return. At any rate, the priesthood profited more than any other class in the Egyptian Society in the course of the two millennia that elapsed before the society became extinct. The religious syncretism of the age had its political counterpart in an alliance between Church and State; and in this partnership the priesthood steadily gained the upper hand, until in the eleventh century B.C. the chief priest of Amon-Re of Thebes dethroned the last Ramses and reigned in his stead.

Thus the Restoration of the sixteenth century B.C. was something more than a rehabilitation of the Egyptian universal state. It was an amalgamation of the living tissues of the Osirian Church with the dead tissues of the Egyptian Society into a single mass—a kind of social concrete that was far harder than any natural rock. Osiris, who had proclaimed to his worshippers ‘I am the resurrection and

¹ More accurately, the cult of the Unknown God of the Hyksos whom the Egyptians identified with their Set. (See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (ii), 3rd edition, p. 315.)

² See Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 281, 284, 290, 296, 308-9.

the life', had shown himself no better than a mummy. The Osirian Church, which had set out to lead a chosen people from a city of destruction to a promised land, had found an abomination of desolation in her path, and—fearing to look forward, lest the Gorgon's head might turn her to stone—had looked back and had been turned, like Lot's wife, into a pillar of salt. If this church was great with child, the child was petrified in the womb before ever it was due to be born.

The best proof that the restored figure of the Egyptiac Society was void of life is to be found in the utter failure of the solitary attempt that was made to awaken the dead. The Egyptiac restoration, as well as the foregoing Egyptiac decline and fall, had its abortive universal church; and this time one man, Ikhnaton,¹ sought to repeat, by an instantaneous gesture from above downwards, the miracle of religious creation which had been performed once already by the Egyptiac internal proletariat, in a gradual movement from below upwards, during the eight centuries of a 'Time of Troubles' and a universal state.² Ikhnaton was called to act, because that first time the miracle had been performed in vain and now could not be repeated by a people who had been content to accept a stone for bread and to relapse from a lofty religion to the magical practices of Primitive Man. Ikhnaton was driven to take drastic action by the desperate need of the age. Yet if there was no other way of retrieving the failure of the past, this fact proved the failure irretrievable, for universal churches cannot be created in Ikhnaton's way.³ By sheer genius Ikhnaton did create a new conception of God and Man and Life and Nature⁴ and expressed it in a new poetry and a new art; but a dead society could not be brought to life by the vicarious vitality of one individual, and even genius armed with the power and prestige of Pharaoh could not break through the serried phalanx of the priesthood⁵ to reach the people marshalled in docile ranks behind. Clad in the whole armour of his faith and power, Ikhnaton leapt, like Curtius, into the abyss; and then the Egyptian earth closed over his head without leaving a trace of his passage. It swallowed him up as the Ocean might engulf some swimmer who had pre-

¹ Ikhnaton *imperabat circa* 1370-1352 B.C.

² For Ikhnaton's abortive Atonian Church, see further V. C. (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 605-6, below.

³ This point is discussed further *ibid.*

⁴ Ikhnaton's solar monotheism was inspired by the worship of Re as this had been refined at Heliopolis. Ikhnaton was indifferent and perhaps hostile to the degenerate worship of Osiris. (Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 321, 333, 340.)

⁵ Ikhnaton's last predecessor but three, Thothmes III (*imperabat solus circa* 1480-1450 B.C.), had organized the priests of all the Gods in all the 'nomes' (provinces) of Egypt into a single corporation under the presidency of the chief priest of Amon-Re of Thebes. Hence Amon was singled out by Ikhnaton for his chief attack in the war which he waged against the united Egyptiac Pantheon on behalf of his own Jealous God Aton. (Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 319 and 321-2.)

sumptuously cast himself upon the face of the waters where only the brooding spirit can move and live.

Ikhnaton's failure is conclusive evidence that we are justified in regarding the social phenomena which occupied the former field of the Egyptiac Society from the sixteenth century B.C. to the fifth century of the Christian Era as an epilogue to Egyptiac history rather than as the history of a distinct and separate society. Ought we, on this analogy, to refuse recognition to our 'Babylonian Society' and to the nine other societies on our list whose status we have allowed our critics to call in question? Ought we to regard their histories, too, as epilogues to the histories of societies and not as the histories of independent societies existing in their own right? When we make our comparative study of societies in their geneses, growths, breakdowns, and disintegrations, in their universal states and universal churches and heroic ages, in their contacts in Time and in Space, are we to leave these ten societies severely alone and rule it out of order to take their histories into account? No doubt our critics are entitled to an answer; but if they press for it we can only answer 'Wait and see'. Our method in this study is empirical; and there is no particular reason at this point for proceeding *a priori*. In our survey of societies, we have spent some time and trouble in rounding up twenty-one representatives of the species; and now that we are going to put our mustangs through their paces, are we to disqualify nearly half the stud before we have seen how they run? We prefer to let them alone and go ahead. If any of them are bad stock, they will fall by the way; but, until they fall, let us put them through their paces all together. Whatever may happen, we shall learn more about horse-flesh by watching each and all of them in action, seeing how they shape, and comparing their performances than we can expect to learn if we make an arbitrary selection beforehand on points.

At any rate our provisional classification has established one general fact. The representatives of our species constitute a continuous series ranging between two extremes. At one extreme we find societies that are wholly unrelated to any others either earlier or later than themselves. At the other extreme we find societies that are related so intimately to their predecessors that the relation verges upon identity. Exactly which of the societies that we have identified fall fairly within these limits is a question that may be left to answer itself in the course of our study. *Solvitur eundo*.

III. THE COMPARABILITY OF SOCIETIES OF THE SPECIES

(a) THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS AND PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES

We have now identified twenty-one societies of the species to which our Western Society belongs and have classified them provisionally according to the criteria which we employed in surveying them. The next step in a study of history is to put these twenty-one societies through their paces and compare their performances in their geneses and growths, their breakdowns and disintegrations, their universal states and universal churches and heroic ages, their contacts in Time and in Space. First, however, before we begin to carry out a plan of operations which will occupy us almost to the end of this book, it may be well to forestall possible criticisms by debating the prior question: Are these twenty-one societies really comparable at all? For their comparability may be challenged on several different and partly contradictory grounds.

The first and simplest argument against the comparability of our twenty-one societies may be stated thus: These societies have no common characteristic beyond that of all being 'intelligible fields of historical study'; and this characteristic is so general and so vague that it cannot be turned to any practical account for our purpose.

The answer to this objection is to point out that societies which are 'intelligible fields of historical study' are a genus within which our twenty-one representatives constitute one particular species. Societies of this species are commonly called 'civilizations' in order to distinguish them from 'primitive societies', which are likewise 'intelligible fields of historical study' in the meaning of the term which we have worked out empirically at an earlier stage of this study.¹ If, when we started our inquiry by examining a single community, we had happened to take as our test case not Great Britain but some other community in the British Empire—for instance, the Todas of the Nilgiri Hills in the south of India or some tribe of Blackfellows in Central Australia—we should likewise have arrived empirically at a set of societies which were all 'intelligible fields of study', but they would all have been 'primitive societies' and not 'civilizations'.² These two terms correspond to

¹ See Part I. B, above.

² An empirical survey of our kind in this other field, resulting in a list of 'primitive societies', will be found in the introduction to *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples: An Essay in Correlation*, by Hobhouse, L. T., Wheeler, G. C., and Ginsberg, M. (London 1915, Chapman and Hall; reprinted in 1930). In the remainder of their book the authors put their 'primitive societies' through their paces and compare their performances as we propose to do with our 'civilizations'.

a real specific difference within the genus 'societies'; and for the sake of clearness and accuracy we shall employ the terms in our study from this point onwards. Meanwhile, the fact that 'primitive societies' constitute a distinct species disposes of the first objection to our plan of operations by indicating that our twenty-one civilizations must have some specific distinguishing characteristic in common with one another over and above their generic characteristic of being 'intelligible fields of study'.

We can at once remark a specific difference of a purely quantitative kind. The number of known civilizations is small. In a survey of human societies in all parts of the World in every age from the present to the remotest past on which our modern Western Archaeology yet throws any light, we have succeeded in collecting only twenty-one specimens of civilizations, and we have been compelled to concede that no less than ten of these twenty-one may possibly turn out not to be distinct and separate specimens in their own right. The number of known primitive societies is vastly greater. In 1915 three Western anthropologists, setting out to make a comparative study of primitive societies, and confining their attention to societies about which they happened to find information that was sufficiently full and sufficiently trustworthy for their purpose,¹ drew up a list of about 650 societies of this species² for use in their work. Almost all the societies that found a place in this list were alive at the time; and the authors point out that 'the great bulk of anthropological inquiry dates from the last three or four centuries'. If we allow further for the (probably few) living primitive societies whose existence is unknown to modern Western observers; for the perhaps not very large number which, though known to exist, were omitted from the above-mentioned list for lack of sufficiently full and trustworthy information about them; and for the certainly immense number that have come into and passed out of existence, mostly unknown to us even by name, since Mankind first became human,³ it becomes evident that the numerical preponderance of primitive societies over civilizations is overwhelming.

This preponderance of the primitive societies in numbers is obscured by the equally overwhelming preponderance of the civilizations in their individual dimensions. The two species stand to each other like elephants and rabbits. The primitive societies, in their legions, are relatively short-lived, are restricted to relatively narrow geographical areas, and embrace a relatively small number

¹ Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

² List in *op. cit.*, pp. 30-44.

³ Sir James Jeans puts the present antiquity of Man at about 300,000 years (*The Universe around Us* (Cambridge 1929, University Press), p. 13).

of human beings either at any given moment or from first to last throughout their histories. The civilizations, whose muster-roll only just rises to double figures, are relatively long-lived, they spread from their original homes over relatively large areas, and the number of human beings that they embrace is relatively great. They spread by exterminating, subjecting, or assimilating other societies¹—sometimes societies of their own species,² but primitive societies much more frequently.³ Primitive societies, like rabbits, have their lives cut short by violence more often than not, and an encounter with some civilization is the way in which violent death commonly overtakes them. As for the disparity in the numbers of human beings that civilizations and primitive societies respectively embrace, it is probable that if we could take a census of the membership of the five living civilizations up to date, during the small number of centuries through which these have yet lived since they first emerged, we should find that each of our Leviathans, singly, has embraced a greater number of human beings already than could be mustered, in the aggregate, by all the primitive societies that have ever existed since the emergence of the Human Race. This counting of human heads, however, is irrelevant to the matter in hand. The individuals of the genus and the species that we are studying are not human beings but societies; and the significant fact for our purpose is that, when we compare the number of known civilizations with the number of known primitive societies, the latter number is vastly the greater of the two.

(b) THE MISCONCEPTION OF 'THE UNITY OF CIVILIZATION'

The second argument against the comparability of our twenty-one civilizations is the contrary of the first. Having answered the objection that our specimens are too heterogeneous for comparison, we may now be told that the homogeneity which we have established is too great; that the specific likeness amounts to identity; in fact, that there are not twenty-one civilizations but only one, which is no more susceptible of comparison than anything else that is unique of its kind.

This thesis of 'the Unity of Civilization' in this sense is a misconception into which our modern Western historians have been led by the influence of their social environment on their thought.⁴

¹ For a general examination of these alternative processes see V. C (i) (c) 2 and 3, *passim*, in vol. v, as well as Parts VIII and IX, below.

² For an examination of these processes in the contact in Space between two civilizations, see Part IX, below.

³ For an examination of these processes in the contact in Space between a civilization and a primitive society, see Part VIII, below.

⁴ See Part I. A, above.

There is, indeed, another sense in which our twenty-one civilizations are united with one another in virtue of their all alike being representatives of one single species of society; and it is, of course, in virtue of this specific unity that they lend themselves to a comparative study. On the other hand, the view that 'Civilization' is a species of society that has only one representative which is *ex hypothesi* unique of its kind is an error which can only be entertained by taking a distorted view of history.

The misleading feature in the social environment has been the fact that, in modern times, our own Western Civilization has cast the net of its economic system round the World and has caught in its meshes the whole living generation of Mankind and all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face of the Planet.¹ This economic unification on a Western basis has been followed up by a political unification on the same basis which has gone almost as far; for though the conquests of Western armies and governments have been neither as extensive nor as thorough as the conquests of Western producers and manufacturers and carriers and technicians, it is nevertheless a fact that almost all the sixty or seventy states in the contemporary world, including the surviving states of non-Western origin, are now members—in various ways and in different degrees—of a single world-wide comity of states;² and this world-wide comity is a direct extension of the system of states into which our Western Society has articulated itself since the beginning of the modern age. These facts are remarkable (though by no means unparalleled or unprecedented),³ and to Western observers they are gratifying; and this explains how Western historians have come to exaggerate both the range of these facts and their import.

They have exaggerated the range of the facts in two directions. First, they have assumed that the present more or less complete unification of the World on a Western basis on the economic plane and the large measure of unification on the same basis which has been accomplished on the political plane are together tantamount to a perfect unification on all planes. Secondly, they have equated unification with unity. They have assumed the pre-existence and the perpetuity of a state of affairs which has really come into existence only recently on any plane, which has not yet been established on all planes, and which may conceivably pass out of existence again without ever being established through and through. Having thus exaggerated the range in Time and Space of a phenomenon in their environment which is really still recent

¹ See pp. 27 and 30, above. ² See pp. 30-1, above.

³ For parallels and precedents see Part IX, *passim*.

and superficial and which may prove to be transient, they have interpreted it to mean that Civilization (in the singular and with a capital 'C') is not merely a species of societies but is to be identified with a single particular society; that this concrete unique Civilization is in essence one and indivisible; that after a long probation it has fulfilled its destiny at last by attaining world-dominion in our day through our exertions; that the network of the Western economic system which now holds the whole of Mankind in its meshes is 'the glorious liberty of the children of God' for which 'the whole of creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now'; and that 'the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us' now that 'the manifestation of the sons of God'¹ has been made.

This thesis that the present unification of the World on a Western basis is the consummation of a single continuous process which accounts for the whole of human history requires a violent distortion of historical facts and a drastic limitation of the historian's field of vision.

In the first place, his vision of the contemporary world must be confined to the economic and political planes of social life and must be inhibited from penetrating to the cultural plane, which is not only deeper but is fundamental. While the economic and political maps of the World have now been 'Westernized' almost out of recognition, the cultural map remains to-day substantially what it was before our Western Society ever started on its career of economic and political conquest. On this cultural plane, for those who have eyes to see, the lineaments of the four living non-Western civilizations are still clear.² Even the fainter outlines of the frail primitive societies that are being ground to powder by the passage of the ponderous Western steam-roller have not quite ceased to be visible. How have our historians managed to close their eyes lest they should see?³ They have simply put on the spectacles—or the blinkers—of their generation; and we may best apprehend what the outlook of this generation has been by examining the connotation of the English word 'Natives'⁴ and the

¹ Paul: Epistle to the Romans, ix, 18-22. This translation of our modern Western concept of the consummation of human history into Pauline terms is not inappropriate, since the line of thought out of which this modern Western concept has arisen is actually of Syriac origin.

² See pp. 31 and 34-5, above.

³ The Acts of the Apostles, xxviii, 26-7.

⁴ The following extract from the *New English Dictionary* speaks for itself:

Native, substantive. 4. One of the original or usual inhabitants of a country, as distinguished from strangers or foreigners; now esp. one belonging to a non-European and imperfectly civilized or savage race.

1603 R. Johnson *Kingd. & Commw.* 153 He committed no lesse an error in suffering the Natives to keepe their possessions and to inhabit all their townes. 1652-62 Heylin *Cosmogr.* iv (1673), 94 Inhabited by the Natives only, though the Portugals did some-

equivalent words in the other vernacular languages of the contemporary Western World.¹

When we Westerners call people 'Natives' we implicitly take the cultural colour out of our perceptions of them. We see them as trees walking, or as wild animals infesting the country in which we happen to come across them. In fact, we see them as part of the local flora and fauna, and not as men of like passions with ourselves; and, seeing them thus as something infra-human, we feel entitled to treat them as though they did not possess ordinary human rights. They are merely natives of the lands which they occupy; and no term of occupancy can be long enough to confer any prescriptive right. Their tenure is as provisional and precarious as that of the forest trees which the Western pioneer fells or that of the big game which he shoots down.² And how shall the 'civilized' Lords of Creation treat the human game, when in their own good time they come to take possession of the land which, by right of eminent domain, is indefeasibly their own? Shall they treat these 'Natives' as vermin to be exterminated, or as domesticable animals to be turned into hewers of wood and drawers of water? No other alternative need be considered, if 'niggers have no souls'. All this is implicit in the word 'Natives', as we have come to use it in the English language in our time.³ Evidently

times endeavour a Plantation in it. 1695 *Temple Hist. Eng.* (1699) 5 The North-East part of Scotland was by the Natives called *Cal Dun*. [&c.]. (*A New English Dictionary*, edited by Sir James Murray, vol. vi (Oxford 1908, Clarendon Press).)

¹ e.g. 'indigènes' in French; 'Eingeborenen' in German.

² This point of view was translated into action by the Government of the United Kingdom in A.D. 1932-3, when they threw open the Native Reserves in Kenya Colony to European gold-diggers.

It may be observed that the Westerners of our age are not the only people who have ever taken this view of the rest of Mankind. The Mongols once had the same outlook on the World, as witness the following conversation which took place in the year 1254 of the Christian Era, at Mangu Khan's Court at Qaraqorum, between the Great Khan's secretaries and the envoy of St. Louis, King of France, the Friar William of Rubruck:

'And they began to question us greatly about the Kingdom of France, whether there were many sheep and cattle and horses there, and whether they had not better go there at once and take it all. And I had to use all my strength to conceal my indignation and anger; but I answered: "There are many good things there, which you would see if it befel you to go there".' (*Itinerarium fratris Willielmi de Rubruquis de Ordine Fratrum Minorum, Galli, anno gratiae 1253, ad Partes Orientales*, chapter xxxiii, translated by Rockhill, W. W., in the publications of the Hakluyt Society, Second Series, vol. iv (London 1900, Hakluyt Society).)

This conversation must have confirmed our Western observer's first impression of the Mongols as recorded in Chapter xi of his narrative, which is entitled '*Qualiter ingressi sunt inter Tartaros, et de ingratitude eorum*':

'Valde importunè et impudentè petunt quae vident. Et si dat homo eis perdit, quia sunt ingrati. Reputant se dominos mundi, et videtur eis quod nihil debeat eis negari ab aliquo.'

These passages are illuminating from more than one point of view. They show how once a Westerner felt at being treated as a Native at a time when Westerners were themselves exposed to a treatment which it is at present their privilege to inflict upon others. We may also reflect that the Mongols, in their time, enjoyed the privilege for not much more than one century. Is our own tenure of 'the Lordship of Creation' likely to last much longer?

³ The present derogatory connotation of the word is less than a century old. Its original colour was neutral, and in that stage of its history it was given a laudatory con-

the word is not a scientific term but an instrument of action: an *a priori* justification for a plan of campaign. It belongs to the realm of Western practice and not of Western theory; and this explains the paradox that a classificatory-minded society has not hesitated to apply the name indiscriminately to the countrymen of a Gandhi and a Bose and a Rabindranath Tagore, as well as to 'primitives' of the lowest degree of culture, such as the Andaman Islanders and the Australian Blackfellows. For the theoretical purpose of objective description, this sweeping use of the word makes sheer nonsense. For the practical purpose of asserting the claim that our Western Civilization is the only civilization in the World, the usage is a militant gesture. It signalizes the fact that all the non-Western societies which are alive in the World to-day, from the lowest to the highest, have been swept up into our economic net, and it postulates the contention that this common predicament is the only important fact about any of them. In short, the word 'Natives' is like a piece of smoked glass which modern Western observers hold in front of their eyes when they look abroad upon the World, in order that the gratifying spectacle of a 'Westernized' surface may not be disturbed by any perception of the native fires which are still blazing underneath.

In the second place, the dogma of 'the Unity of Civilization' requires the historian to ignore the difference—of kind rather than mere degree—which distinguishes the continuity between the histories of two related civilizations from the continuity between two successive chapters in the history of a single civilization. The nature and extent of this difference have been investigated above¹ and may therefore be taken for granted for the purpose of the argument here. At this point we need only observe that, by shutting their eyes to this, our historians enable themselves to

notation as often as not: for instance, in such phrases as 'native land', 'native valour', 'native hue of resolution'. A solitary surviving instance of this laudatory usage is 'natives' = oysters bred in English oyster-beds! Apropos of the change in the Western attitude towards the Sinic and the Far Eastern Civilization between the time of Gibbon and the time of Freeman, it is suggested below (in I. B (iv), Annex) that the devaluation of all non-Western culture in our Western estimation may have been a consequence of the rather sudden and sensational victory of our Western Society over all other contemporary societies on the economic and political planes. In this connexion it may be observed that the derogatory usage of the word 'Natives' became current about the same time as this condescending attitude, and it may be inferred that the attitude and the usage both reflect the influence of the same change in the social environment. In India, where the change in the economic and political relations of the parties within the same span of time was still more sudden and sensational than it was in the Far East, the change in the attitude of the Westerners was still more striking. Its extent can be measured by reading *The Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan in Asia, Africa, and Europe during the years 1799-1803* (translated by Charles Stewart, Esq., London 1810, Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 2 vols.). When this Indian gentleman visited the British Isles on the eve of the British conquest of India, it is evident from his narrative that he was received in 'Society' as an interesting and honoured guest, and his memoirs reveal no shadow of an 'inferiority complex'.

¹ See I. B (iv), above, and I. B (iv), Annex, below.

regard Hellenic history as just an earlier chapter in the history of our Western Civilization (which they have already equated with 'Civilization' *sans phrase*), and Minoan history in the same way. Thus they telescope three civilizations into one, and trace the history of this singular 'Civilization' back in a straight line from the ubiquitous Western Civilization of their own day to the primitive society in the 'Neolithic' stage of material technique out of which the Minoan Civilization emerged about the beginning of the third millennium B.C., and thence, through the upper and lower strata of the 'Palaeolithic' technique, to the pre-human ancestors of Mankind. It is true that, in presenting the evolution of Civilization in this figure of a single straight line, they are compelled to admit the entrance of one tributary from a separate source in order to account for the germ of creative activity, derived from the Syriac Society, out of which the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society generated the Catholic Church.¹ Yet, however important they may acknowledge this contribution to be, they insist upon treating it as exceptional; and in any case they derive 'Modern Civilization' from no more than two sources: the main stream from 'Greece and Rome', the tributary from 'Palestine'.²

In the third place, they ignore the histories, or the chapters in the histories, of civilizations that do not happen to fit into the frame within which they have confined their picture³—dismissing them as 'semi-barbarous' or as 'decadent'⁴ or as belonging to 'the

¹ See pp. 40 and 57, above.

² This manoeuvre was denounced nearly a century and a half ago by Volney:

'On ne s'est occupé que des Grecs et des Romains, en suivant servilement une méthode étroite et exclusive, qui rapporte tout au système d'un petit peuple d'Asie, inconnu dans l'antiquité, et au système d'Hérodote, dont les limites sont infiniment resserrées; l'on n'a voulu voir que l'Égypte, la Grèce, l'Italie, comme si l'univers était dans ce petit espace; et comme si l'histoire de ces petits peuples était autre chose qu'un faible et tardif rameau de l'histoire de toute l'espèce.' ('Leçons d'Histoire, Sixième Séance', *Œuvres Complètes de Volney* (Paris 1876, Firmin Didot), p. 588.)

³ The distortion which results from this third manoeuvre is particularly violent, and a startling loss of proportion may be the penalty for even a slight *penchant* in this direction—as witness the classification of societies in Carr-Saunders, A. M.: *The Population Problem* (Oxford 1922, Clarendon Press), p. 243. This example has been taken on purpose from a work of fine scholarship, written from a broad point of view, which the writer of this Study admires. If great scholars are subject to this infirmity of vision, what can be expected from the small fry?

⁴ This gesture is really incompatible with their main position; for if civilizations are to be ruled out of account for being 'decadent' or 'semi-barbarous', it becomes impossible to maintain the thesis of the absolute continuity between Western history and Hellenic and between Hellenic history and Minoan—the thesis on which their main argument rests. No one can deny that the Minoan and Hellenic civilizations were 'decadent' in their last phases or that the Hellenic and Western civilizations were 'semi-barbarous' in their first phases. If, however, these chapters of Minoan, Hellenic, and Western history were for these reasons to be ruled out of account, then the three histories would not only cease to be one history but would cease to have any relation with one another at all. An ingenious attempt to escape from this dilemma was made by Saint-Simon. He treated the histories of the Hellenic Civilization and our Western Civilization as successive chapters in a single series, but he regarded the continuity of this series as consisting in a rhythmic alternation of 'organic' and 'critical' periods. The first of his

Unchanging East' which is declared to be without significance for 'the History of Civilization'.¹

On such grounds they ignore, to begin with, all those chapters in Syriac history which are subsequent to the fertilization of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society with the Syriac germ of the Catholic Church. They ignore, for example, the Nestorian and Monophysite movements in which the Syriac Society attempted to turn the Christian syncretism to its own account;² they ignore Islam, the universal church which the internal proletariat of the Syriac Society eventually succeeded in creating for itself out of indigenous elements after Hellenism had been expelled at length from the Syriac World;³ they ignore the Umayyad and 'Abbasid Caliphates, the political instruments by which the final expulsion of Hellenism was accomplished and by which a barbarian 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire was then converted into a reintegration of the Syriac universal state of the Achaemenidae.⁴ Again, they ignore the histories of the Egyptian, Sumeric, Babylonian, and Hittite societies, except in so far as these civilizations influenced the Minoan or the Syriac or the Hellenic.⁵ Finally, they ignore critical periods covered the decadence of the Hellenic Civilization and the semi-barbarous beginnings of our Western Civilization. (See Part II. B, pp. 199-200, below.) The Minoan Civilization presented no problem to him because it had not yet been disinterred in his day.

¹ A classic example of this dismissal of the East may be found in Bazard's *Exposition de la Doctrine Saint-Simonienne* (a series of lectures delivered in 1829 and 1830):

'On a élevé quelques doutes sur la rigueur des démonstrations tirées de la série historique adoptée par notre école: on a demandé si cette série était assez longue, et s'il n'y avait pas imprudence à négliger toutes les traditions de l'Orient. A cette objection, nous répondons que l'histoire de la série de civilisation dont la société européenne est aujourd'hui le dernier terme embrasse environ trois mille ans, et que le développement de l'humanité pendant cette période, si vaste et si féconde, n'a pas seulement l'avantage de présenter une longue suite de termes, mais encore qu'aucune autre époque historique n'est mieux connue, et qu'elle est celle dont le dernier terme constitue l'état de civilisation le plus avancé. Les Orientalistes sont loin d'avoir rempli les lacunes de l'histoire de l'Asie, et comme à chaque pas, dans cette histoire, il y [a] solution de continuité, il est impossible d'y suivre un développement régulier; il en est de ces fragments historiques comme des lambeaux de terrain sur lesquels le géologue peut faire des hypothèses plus ou moins ingénieuses, mais où il ne porte jamais le cachet de certitude scientifique qu'il imprime aux contrées où les terrains se recouvrent successivement et sans interruption; il y a plus, on peut affirmer à l'avance que, si l'interpolation de cette série (celle de la civilisation orientale) est complétée, elle n'offrira dans son ensemble que l'un des termes qui nous sont connus. (Nous ne craignons pas même de dire que les Européens seuls sont capables d'apprendre aux Indiens leur propre histoire, et de voir dans leurs traditions, dans leurs monuments, des idées, des faits qui ne sauraient être découverts et compris par les Indiens eux-mêmes.) Remarquons en outre que la Grèce avait transporté chez elle tous les progrès épars chez les autres peuples, et qu'elle se présente comme le résumé de toutes les civilisations qui avaient grandi jusqu'à elle. On se souvient que, plus de six cents ans avant l'ère chrétienne, Thalès, arrivant de l'Égypte, étonna les Grecs par la prédiction d'une éclipse de soleil; on sait encore que les philosophes qui brillèrent au Lycée avaient étendu leur savoir par de longs voyages dans les pays les plus éclairés de l'Orient.' (*Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, vol. xli (Paris 1877, Leroux), pp. 141-3.)

² See I. C (i) (b), p. 91, above, and II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 236-8, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 286-7, below.

³ See p. 91, above.

⁴ See pp. 73-7, above.

⁵ This attitude of our Western historians towards these four civilizations is the more remarkable inasmuch as we do not feel towards them the animus which we undisguisedly display towards the four non-Western civilizations that are alive to-day. The existence

the histories of all the other civilizations completely. Orthodox Christendom, for instance, is either tacitly subsumed under Western Christendom on the strength of the common element in their names, or else it is disposed of, in terms of Western history, as a sort of temporary excrescence on the body of our Western Society which served it in its infancy as a shield against Oriental attacks and which afterwards atrophied and dropped off in the course of nature when its services had ceased to be necessary, as a tadpole's gills and tail disappear after the creature has turned into a frog.¹ As for the other three living non-Western civilizations—the Islamic, the Hindu, and the Far Eastern—they are refused recognition and their members are disposed of by being tied, as 'Natives', to our Western chariot wheels.² Moreover, Indic history is telescoped into Hindu history and Sinic history into Far Eastern history by the same high-handed manipulation that is applied to Minoan, Hellenic, and Western history; and thus the Indic and the Sinic civilizations are eliminated likewise. This only leaves the four civilizations of the New World—the Mayan, the Yucatec, the Mexic, and the Andean—and these are explained away as irrelevant phenomena of an *alter orbis*, or more bluntly

of these four living civilizations is unpalatable to Westerners because it is a standing challenge to the Western thesis that Civilization is one and indivisible and that this Civilization with a capital 'C' is identical with our Western Civilization in the contemporary world. On the other hand, the four extinct civilizations here in question are all in our good graces, partly for the negative reason that, just because they are now extinct, they do not challenge our claim to a monopoly of civilization in these latter days, and partly for the positive reason that their histories have been rescued from oblivion by the enterprise of our modern Western archaeologists, whose brilliant discoveries are a feather in our cap. On this account, we look upon these disinterested representatives of 'the Unchanging East' with less disfavour than we show to the living survivors. The mummies make no presumptuous claim to independence. They are our humble protégés, whose resuscitation is a perpetual monument to our archaeological skill.

¹ A characteristic expression of this view of 'Byzantium' will be found in *The Times Literary Supplement* of the 20th December, 1928, p. 1004, in a review of volume iv of *The Universal History of the World*. This metaphor of a shield—a thing which is no part of its owner's body yet at the same time has no use or significance apart from it—simply slurs over the question of what the relation between Orthodox Christendom and Western Christendom really is. The metaphor would be more apt apropos, not of Orthodox Christendom or of the East Roman Empire, but of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, which really did come into existence in order to shield Western Christendom from the attacks of the 'Osmanlis' and which did begin to atrophy as soon as the Ottoman pressure began to slacken—the decline and fall of the Ottoman and the Danubian Hapsburg Powers proceeding *pari passu* from the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era down to the final disaster which overtook them both in the General War of 1914–18 (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 177–88, below). Even here, however, the metaphor is inexact; for the relation of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy to our Western Society was not like that of a shield to a human being. The Hapsburg Monarchy was not, like a shield, a piece of matter external to and alien from the body which it was its function to protect. It was an excretion from the living substance of our Western Society—a special political articulation which was evoked by the need of guarding against a particular external attack. Thus it is strictly comparable not so much to a shield as to the carapace of a tortoise or an armadillo.

² There is already one significant exception. Few Westerners have had the effrontery to call the Japanese 'Natives' since the Japanese Empire has become one of the Great Powers. If the thesis of 'the Unity of Civilization' is to be preserved intact, it must be assumed that the Japanese have become Westerners by adoption. But can this assumption be made? The last word here lies not with us but with the Japanese themselves.

as abortive attempts at civilization which fell too far short of success to be taken into account.

By such Procrustean operations, the thesis of 'the Unity of Civilization' is maintained to this day. That a Freeman should have maintained it in a generation when seven of our twenty-one representatives of the species had not yet been disinterred by the archaeologist's spade was a venial error.¹ That a de Gobineau, at an earlier date and with less information at his command, should have perceived that civilizations are a species and that there is no such thing as a unique 'Civilization' with a capital 'C', was a brilliant feat of historical intuition.² That any Western historian in the year 1933 should follow Freeman and not de Gobineau in this matter, in the face of the facts as they have become apparent, is at first sight difficult to understand.³ Perhaps this survival of the misconception of 'the Unity of History' is to be explained by the persistence of three underlying misconceptions: the ego-centric illusion, the catchword of 'the Unchanging East', and the misconception of growth as a movement in a straight line.

In examining the current Western view that the Western Society of our day is the consummation of human history and is synonymous with 'Civilization' itself, we have treated it as an instance of the influence of the social environment on historical thought and have seen in it a consequence of the world-dominion which this particular civilization has succeeded in establishing in modern times on the economic and political planes. On second thoughts, however, we may wonder whether this explanation is not, after all, too flattering to the human capacity for objective judgement.

If this world-dominion on these two planes happened to have been established by some living society other than ours of the West, and if Western observers held that the consummation of human history and the unique entity called 'Civilization' were to be found in this other society and not in ours, then their view would be entitled to respectful consideration; and although we should reject it still, on the same grounds on which we have rejected it above in its application to the Western Society, we should allow in these hypothetical circumstances that it might have an element of rationality and objectivity. We should make the same allowance, in the actual circumstances of the World in our day, if the current Western view regarding the role of the Western Society

¹ See the note at the end of I. B (iv), Annex, below. The figure becomes eight out of twenty-two if 'the Indus Culture' turns out to be an independent representative of the species. (See I. C (i) (b), Annex III, below.)

² See I. C (ii), footnote 1 on p. 129, above.

³ For an effective protest against this misconception of 'the Unity of History', see the passage quoted from Headlam-Morley in I. B (iii) on p. 36, footnote 2, above.

were generally held by non-Western students of human affairs. It would be possible, no doubt, to find a number of non-Western observers who do take that view. Yet a census of opinions would almost certainly reveal that, in the actual circumstances of the World, there are still at least as many Orthodox Christian and Islamic and Hindu and Far Eastern observers who each regard their own respective society as the consummation of human history and as severally synonymous with Civilization itself, and who hold this view with the same assured conviction that sustains the corresponding but incompatible view among their Western contemporaries.¹ The same assurance proclaims itself in the utterances of all the extinct societies, in all the chances and changes of their mortal lives, wherever a record survives. The Pyramid-Builders of Egypt possessed this assurance in greater measure than the most triumphant captain of industry in the Western World of to-day; the revivalists of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty, and the priesthood which continued to preserve the long-since petrified tradition of the Egyptiac culture under the Achaemenian and Ptolemaic and Roman régimes, inherited the assurance of the Pyramid-Builders, regardless of the fact that in their times the Egyptiac Society was in contact with other representatives of the species to which any unprejudiced observer would have given precedence over the Egyptiac Society unhesitatingly if he had been asked to pick out the Chosen People of the age. Doubtless the last scribe who knew how to write the hieroglyphic script and the last sculptor who knew how to carve a bas-relief in the Egyptiac style cherished the same illusion, when the Egyptiac Society was *in articulo mortis*, that had been cherished by their predecessors at the time when the Egyptiac Society was still holding its own among its kind and at the still earlier time when, for all that its members knew, it was the only society of the kind that ever had existed or was destined ever to exist in the World. All this suggests that the current Western misconception of 'the Unity of Civilization' through its assumed identity with the Western Society has deeper psychological roots than those which are grounded in the momentary state of our social environment. At bottom, the misconception is founded on an egocentric illusion which is always and everywhere ingrained in human minds.

Of course it is possible that the omnipresent illusion may accidentally coincide with reality in any given case. At any moment in the history of any civilization, so long as the society remains alive, its members may be right in believing that their own local

¹ For a further examination of the alternative psychological reactions towards a dominant alien civilization, see Part IX, below.

and temporary movement is in the main line of evolution—that it is on the point of vindicating its claim to be the consummation of human history by accomplishing the transformation of Sub-Man through Man into Super-Man.¹ Yet the chances in favour of this coincidence cannot ever be very great. We know of twenty-one cases in which the enterprise of civilization has been attempted hitherto. We know of no case in which the goal of human endeavours has been attained yet, while on the other hand we know of fourteen cases in which attempts to attain the goal are proved to have failed irretrievably by the fact that the societies which made them have become extinct. The possibility of attaining the goal is still an open question in the seven cases² of the civilizations that are still alive. While there is life there is hope; but in such a complicated and mysterious question it would be rash to prophesy—even on the most plausible appearances—that the prospects of any one of the seven still surviving candidates are assuredly better than those of any of its competitors; and it remains possible and indeed probable that none of the seven is destined to see the Promised Land. The goal of human endeavours may be attained, perhaps thousands or hundreds of thousands of years hence, by some society yet unborn; or the Human Race itself may become extinct without the goal ever having been attained at all.

Moreover, in the nature of the case, it is quite impossible for members of a living society to forecast, with any degree of probability whatever, the chances of this achievement being accomplished (if it is to be accomplished) by their own civilization.³ Compared with the life-span of a human being, the time-span of a civilization is so vast that a human observer cannot hope to take the measure of its curve unless he is in a position to view it in a distant perspective;⁴ and he can only obtain this perspective *vis-à-vis* some society that is extinct. He can never stand back sufficiently far from the history of the society in which he himself lives and moves and has his being. In other words, to assert of any living society, at any moment in its life, that it is the consummation of human history is to hazard a guess which is intrinsically unsusceptible of immediate verification. When we find that a majority of the members of all societies at all times make this assertion about their own civilizations, it becomes evident that

¹ See Part II. B, below.

² Seven and not five, if we count Orthodox Christendom in Russia as a separate society from Orthodox Christendom in South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, and if we look upon the Far Eastern Society in Korea and Japan as being likewise separate from the Far Eastern Society in China.

³ On this point see I. B (iv), *init.*

⁴ The curve is not only on an immense scale but is subject to abrupt and violent fluctuations which can be observed in retrospect but which it is beyond the wit of Man to predict. (See Parts IV and XI, below.)

their guesses have really nothing to do with any objective calculation of probabilities but are pure expressions of the egocentric illusion.

Now we have learnt to overcome this illusion in our study of the stellar universe. We no longer postulate a geocentric system because the Earth happens to be the stellar body whose surface we inhabit. We have taught ourselves to discount the false appearances arising from our accidental point of observation and to conceive of the Universe as a system of nebulae and galaxies in which our own planet and our own sun and even our own star-cluster is less conspicuous than a grain of dust in a cathedral. Again, in our personal relations with other human beings, we have learnt, if not to overcome the illusion, at least to be on our guard against it. In any human society, practising solipsists are treated as madmen and the tendency towards solipsism called egotism is regarded, according to its degree, as an absurdity or a vice. There are certain situations, however, in which the egocentric illusion still has the mastery over us.

On the political plane, for example, the illusion, projected as 'patriotism', is still 'the last infirmity of noble minds' as well as 'the last refuge of a scoundrel'. In the Western World of our day, almost every Englishman, Frenchman, Czechoslovak, and Lithuanian is influenced in his political feelings, thoughts, and actions by the irrational assumption that his own national state is a more precious institution than his neighbour's. Similarly, on the cultural plane, we have hardly yet begun to suspect that our own civilization may not, after all, be the consummation of human history or a synonym for Civilization itself. Indeed, we people of the West, so far from shaking ourselves free from the illusion as it besets us in this form, have apparently sunk deeper into this slough of error in the course of our history. In the so-called Middle Ages we portrayed one of the three Magi as a negro¹ and looked forward to the intervention of an Oriental champion of Christendom called Prester John. In the eighteenth century, when we had degraded the negro to the role of a slave, we were still capable of admiring the culture of the Far East.² To-day, after dismissing the artists and philosophers of China to the limbo—or corral—which we have constructed for 'Natives', we are apparently even losing our admiration for Hellenism, the civilization to which ours is 'affiliated'. When we have closed this last door against the humanities, we shall have touched the nadir of our fall from grace.

The best cure for such insanity is ridicule, and we can apply it

¹ The phenomenon of Race-feeling is examined in II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, below.

² See the note at the end of I. B (iv), Annex, below, and p. 152, footnote 3, above.

by observing how exquisitely ridiculous our 'Anglo-Saxon attitude' looks when it is struck by other people. Consider, for instance, the following missive which was presented in A.D. 1793 by the philosophic Emperor Ch'ien Lung to a British envoy for delivery to his master the mad King George III of Britain:

'You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas; nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial. . . . I have perused your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is couched reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy.

'In consideration of the fact that your Ambassador and his deputy have come a long way with your memorial and tribute, I have shown them high favour and have allowed them to be introduced into my presence. To manifest my indulgence, I have entertained them at a banquet and made them numerous gifts. . . .

'As to your entreaty to send one of your nationals to be accredited to my Celestial Court and to be in control of your country's trade with China, this request is contrary to all usage of my Dynasty and cannot possibly be entertained. . . . If you assert that your reverence for Our Celestial Dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy might become, nothing would be gained thereby.

'Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State. Strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to despatch them from afar. Our Dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated into every country under Heaven, and kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures.'¹

The Emperor's attitude evokes a smile to-day when we read his words in the light of all that has happened during the period of rather more than a century that has elapsed since those words were indited. It seems scarcely credible to us, here and now, that a Manchu philosopher-king, receiving a plain announcement of the approaching impact of the West newly armed with the tremendous weapons of Industrialism, should have shown himself so blind to the signs of the times. Yet there is no doubt that

¹ Quoted from Whyte, A. F.: *China and Foreign Powers* (London 1927, Milford), Appendix, p. 41.

Ch'ien Lung was an able and experienced statesman with a distinguished mind; and the sequel to the episode does not really expose him as a fool. Rather, it suggests that a contemporary Western statesman of equal ability, if he had been standing in Ch'ien Lung's shoes, would have reacted in the same way; and this suggests, in turn, that our own attitude towards 'Natives' may come to appear equally obtuse a century hence.

Again, we may recall the story of the Sharif of Morocco who, returning home after a visit to Europe at some date which was later than the establishment of the French protectorate over his country, was yet heard to exclaim, as he sighted the Moroccan coast: 'What a comfort to be getting back to Civilization!' When our great-grandchildren make the same remark as their ship enters the Solent or the Mersey, will the joke be published in the comic papers of China and—Morocco?

We may also reflect upon a conversation which took place between a British statesman and a Persian visitor some time after the peace-settlement which followed the General War of 1914-18. The Persian was saying that he could not understand how the British Government, which he acknowledged to be intrinsically honourable and liberal-minded, had brought itself to pursue in Persia, from A.D. 1907 onwards, a policy which he could only describe as a cynical sacrifice of the rights and welfare of an innocent, friendly, and defenceless country on the altar of the Anglo-Russian *entente*. The British statesman, who had been largely responsible for the policy and who was of a frank, straightforward disposition, admitted to his visitor that Persia had been deliberately sacrificed; 'but', he added, 'the British policy which you criticize was not pursued by us in a cynical frame of mind. In matters of statesmanship, choices are usually limited; and in this case, with only two alternatives before us, we were simply choosing the lesser of two evils: the risk of allowing Russia to destroy the independence of Persia rather than the risk of seeing Russia remain neutral or even take the German side in the then imminent event of a European War. If, seven years later, Germany had started the Great War with Russia as an ally or indeed as a neutral, she would certainly have won the War; and that would not only have been the end of the British Empire. It would have been the end of Civilization. When Civilization was at stake, how could we act otherwise than we did? Put yourself in our place, and answer me with your hand on your heart.'

At this the Persian, who had at first been mildly puzzled and aggrieved, completely lost his temper. His heart burnt within him and a torrent of denunciation issued from his lips: 'Your

policy was infinitely more wicked than I had suspected! The cynicism of it is beyond imagination! You have the effrontery to look me in the face and tell me complacently that you have deliberately sacrificed the unique treasure which Persia preserves for Humanity—the priceless jewel of Civilization—on the off-chance of saving your worthless Western Society from the catastrophe which its own greed and pugnacity were inevitably bringing upon its head! Put myself in your place, indeed! What should I have cared, and what do I care now, if Europe perish so long as Persia lives! Therewith, he indignantly took his leave; and the British statesman found himself unable to feel certain that his visitor's indignation was unjustified or his point of view unreasonable. Was it Europe or Persia that held the seed from which the life of the future was to spring? Perhaps the answer to that question could not, after all, be taken for granted. Perhaps it could only be given by Time and only be read correctly by some historian looking back upon the year 1907 of the Christian Era from a distance of many centuries.

I will conclude these illustrations with a trivial incident which I witnessed myself at a meeting of the Board of Studies in History of a prominent and cosmopolitan Western university. We were considering the subjects for theses that were being offered by candidates for higher degrees, and I had fallen into a stupor as I listened to one title after another being recited and approved. Some of the subjects offered and accepted for research bore upon the minutiae of administration in the Kingdom of England and in one or two other parochial states of the Western World in the Middle Ages; others related to the diplomacy of the Western Balance of Power in more recent times. Suddenly I was roused by hearing the Secretary read out a proposal to investigate the social and political conditions of India in the age of the Guptas, and my mind immediately began to work. More light on one of those universal states that stand out as landmarks in the histories of civilizations; a study of the age in which Hellenism was finally expelled from the Indic World and in which the Buddha became a prophet without honour in his own country? Here at last was something on our agenda that might make our meeting worth while. This train of thought, which went through my mind in a flash, was cut short by a titter which ran round the Board. 'May we ask the Secretary to read that name again?' said a member on my left; and, at the repetition of the word 'Guptas', the titter turned to loud laughter. I found that I was laughing, too—at the laughter of my colleagues—and, glancing round the room, I caught the eye of an Orientalist, sitting opposite. Silently we

signalled to each other that we were enjoying a private joke of our own.

In Western minds the egocentric illusion, illustrated above, is fortified by the catchword of 'the Unchanging East', which confounds the three living civilizations of Islam, Hinduism, and the Far East under the nondescript epithet 'Oriental', and which carries the assumption that they all differ in equal measure from the civilization of the West and that they are indistinguishable from one another and from any of the extinct civilizations except the Hellenic and perhaps the Minoan. In reality, Islam has less in common with either the Hindu or the Far Eastern Civilization than it has with the Orthodox Christian and the Western,¹ while the gulfs that divide the Hindu and the Far Eastern Civilization from ours are possibly not so wide as the gulf which divides them from one another. As for the extinct civilizations, we have found no evidence that any living civilization, either Western or non-Western, is in any way related to the Egyptian; and it is certain that none of them are related to any of the four extinct civilizations of the New World.² The catchword of 'the Unchanging East' collapses at a touch; and we are left wondering how this vulgar error can ever have obtained its hold. It appears to be based on two confusions of thought, one general and the other particular.

In the first place, Western students of non-Western histories—unconsciously influenced in their historical thought by their social environment—have concentrated their attention upon the political plane because this is the plane on which the Western Society chiefly lives and in which Western minds are chiefly interested; and in many histories the political plane presents at first sight the appearance of a static condition of irresponsible despotism. This appearance is largely an illusion; and Western students might have seen through it if they had studied non-Western politics more thoroughly, even without looking deeper. If, however, their mental vision had penetrated through the political plane to the cultural plane beneath, they would have realized that, even if the first appearances on the political plane had been entirely confirmed by closer investigation, the static condition, on this plane, of the societies which they were studying was of little or no significance in view of the wealth and life which reveal themselves in the histories of these same societies as soon as the observer's attention is transferred from the superficial to the

¹ On this point, see two studies by C. H. Becker: 'Der Islam als Problem' and 'Der Islam im Rahmen einer allgemeinen Kulturgeschichte', which are both published in his *Islam Studien* (Leipzig 1924, Quelle und Meyer).

² Pace the 'Diffusionist School' of contemporary British anthropologists. For a discussion of the issue between the Diffusion Theory and the Uniformity Theory, see I. C (iii) (b), Annex, below.

fundamental plane of social existence. By ignoring the cultural plane¹ and by equating politics with Life, Western observers arrive at an opinion about non-Western histories which exposes the confusion of their thought as much as it ministers to their self-esteem.

The other confusion of thought that is responsible for the catchword of 'the Unchanging East' arises from the historical accident of the origins of our Western religion. The germ of creative power from which the Christian Church has sprung was derived by the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society from Syriac 'Natives' who were forcibly enrolled in its ranks;² these recruits contributed to the common stock not only their personal religious experience but an inherited religious literature which was adopted by the Church as its 'Old Testament'; for Westerners brought up in the Christian tradition, the 'Old Testament' came to stand for Oriental Literature *par excellence*; and no part of the 'Old Testament' has made such a general appeal to the Western imagination as the stories of the Hebrew Patriarchs. In these stories, the characters and events are mythical, but the social background against which they are set is the life along the border between the North Arabian Steppe and the cultivated lands of Syria as this life was actually lived by the Hebrew and Aramaean tribes in their heroic age (*circa* 1425-1125 B.C.), when they were just breaking out of the Desert into the Sown and were beginning to exchange a Nomadic for a sedentary system of economy. The conditions of this life in this age, as portrayed in the Book of Genesis, have made a deep impression on Western minds, partly owing to the great literary power of many of the passages³ and partly because the conditions themselves are so picturesquely different from those of our Western life in any age. With their minds thus prepared, our modern Western travellers have visited the Holy Land of Christianity and have observed, with mingled feelings of astonishment and of delight, that, in the Transjordanian borderland between the Desert and the Sown, the life which is being lived to-day corresponds, in point after point, with the description in Genesis of the life of the Patriarchs. Since, in their tradition, the 'Old Testament' is tantamount to Oriental Literature and its scene of action to 'the East', they interpret these correspondences between their reading and their observations as evidences of an 'Unchanging

¹ For the Western habit of ignoring this plane, see pp. 151-3, above. For examples of societies which are static on the political and dynamic on the cultural plane, see the two passages quoted, in III. C (iii), vol. iii, on pp. 384-5 and 388, below, from Sir Charles Eliot.

² See pp. 40 and 57, above.

³ This literary quality has not been lost in the translation of the Old Testament into Greek and Latin and the modern Teutonic vernaculars.

East', without reflecting that they are making a generalization about half the World on the strength of the local conditions in a small area with a peculiar character of its own.

In reality, our travellers have encountered, not an 'Unchanging East,' but an unchanging North Arabian Steppe. On the Steppe, the physical environment is so hard and so imperious a task-master to human beings that their ability to adapt themselves to it is confined within narrow limits. Life on the Steppe is a perpetual battle with Nature which is lost in a moment if ever the human combatants break their formation or relax their discipline; and there is only one kind of formation and one kind of discipline that enables them to hold their own. In other words, the North Arabian Steppe imposes upon all human beings in all ages who have the hardihood to be its inhabitants a rigid and unvarying way of life.¹ Yet this steppe, after all, is an infinitesimal fraction of an 'Unchanging East' which, in the popular Western imagination, is conceived as extending from the Mediterranean to the Pacific and perhaps from China to Peru. If the Old Testament had happened to contain equally minute and vivid descriptions of life in Ur, at the time when Abraham's father was supposed to have migrated thence to Haran,² or of life in Egyptian Thebes, at the time when Abraham was supposed to have visited Pharaoh's court,³ the modern Western traveller, with these descriptions in his mind, would certainly not have found them reproduced with any remarkable closeness of correspondence in life as he saw it being lived in Baghdad and Cairo nowadays. It follows that, in all probability, he would not have been caught by the catchword of 'the Unchanging East' if an accident of his Western tradition had not focused his attention upon one small and unrepresentative fraction of the field.

Let us imaginarily invert the situation by constructing the intellectual history of a fictitious Baghdadi boy, who has been born since the arrival of the British at Baghdad in 1917 and whose father has determined to give him a thoroughly Western scientific education in order to fit him for making his way in the Westernized East of to-morrow. The father begins by giving the boy some direct insight into Western scientific methods by showing him Western scientists at work in his own country. He takes him to see the archaeological excavations at Ur. Let us assume that the boy is as intelligent as his father, and that this visit arouses in him a general interest in modern Western Archaeology, ranging over the whole field as far as it has been explored by Western scholars. Among other things, the life of the lake-dwellers in the Alps in the

¹ For a description of the Nomadic way of life, see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 7-22, below.

² Gen. xi. 31.

³ Gen. xii. 10-20.

'Eneolithic Age' is sure to appeal to the Baghdādī boy for the same reasons which invest the conditions of life on the North Arabian Steppe with a special interest for Western readers of the Book of Genesis. The boy's interest in the lake-dwellers will broaden out into a study of all aspects of their life, including the manner in which they adapted themselves to the imperious conditions of the local terrain and climate in keeping their cattle. He will follow the ancient lacustrine herdsmen as they drive their cattle up from the lake-side to ever higher upland pastures with the advance of spring and then gradually down again from alp to alp to the water's edge with the retreat of summer. This study will become his hobby; and when the time comes for him to visit Europe, he will make a bee-line first for Switzerland. There, herded by some tourist agency into Alpine hotels, he will observe, with astonishment and delight, that the pastoral life with which he is familiar from the books about the ancient lake-dwellers which his father gave him to read at home is being lived, apparently unchanged, by the Swiss herdsmen of to-day. With what extraordinary persistence social phenomena perpetuate themselves in this strange and romantic Western World! How different from 'Irāq, where the disinterred vestiges of Ur and Babylon and Nineveh proclaim to any Baghdādī who sets eyes on them that, in his country, Life is a flux and history a synonym for change. And now this Baghdādī has discovered 'the Unchanging West'. What a tale to tell to his countrymen when he goes home again!

Of course our intelligent young man from Baghdad would not have rushed into this ludicrously erroneous generalization if the romance of the Alpine pastures had not absorbed his attention to the extent of preventing him from studying with equal thoroughness the histories of those sites on Western soil that are now occupied by the cities of Zürich and Lausanne—not to speak of Paris and London and Berlin and New York and Chicago. If he had studied these likewise, he could not conceivably have imagined that the West was 'unchanging' by comparison with 'Irāq (immense though the changes in 'Irāq have been, on every plane of social life, over the span of five or six thousand years within which we happen to know something about the country's history). He has been misled by a failure to realize that he has been making a generalization about half the World on the strength of local conditions in a small area with a peculiar character of its own. While the Alps impose upon all human beings in all ages who have the hardihood to be their inhabitants as rigid and as unvarying a way of life as is imposed by the North Arabian Steppe, it is likewise true that the Alps are as small a fraction of the Western World

as the North Arabian Steppe is of the East. An extravaganza? Yet *quid rides?* For *mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*,¹ you Western traveller, whoever you may have been, who first brought home to us the catchword of 'the Unchanging East'.²

It is possible that neither this catchword nor its obverse, the egocentric illusion, would have sufficed in itself to support the misconception of 'the Unity of History' on a Western basis, without being reinforced by an underlying misconception of the process of growth as a movement in a straight line.

This is nothing but the primitive image of the magic bean-stalk in the fairy-story, which shoots up perpendicularly from the earth and grows on and on, without ever failing to draw the sap after it into its perpetually receding tendrils or ever crumpling under its perpetually increasing weight, until it strikes its head against the under side of the firmament. While our Western historians are still thinking in terms of this image, our Western physical scientists have long since discarded it, in their studies of evolution in non-human fields, in favour of what we may call the image of the pollarded willow. The workaday willow, like the magic bean-stalk, starts its growth perpendicularly in a single line; but, before it has time to grow top-heavy, a man comes along with an axe and pollards its head. The willow's upward movement in a single perpendicular line has been cut short violently by an external force. Will the tree die of the shock, or will it adapt its manner of growth to the new conditions that have been imposed on it from outside? Possessing the will to live, the tree chooses the latter alternative; and from its mutilated summit it now puts forth half a dozen shoots instead of one and sends these up in all directions, not perpendicularly but at a slant. Each of these shoots attempts, in its own growth, to overcome the effects of the blow which the trunk has received and to carry the life of the tree forward one stage farther. Most of the shoots come to nothing and wilt away; a minority—perhaps a single shoot—grows on until the man comes round with his axe and pays it the compliment of pollarding it in its turn; and so the story repeats itself: from its mutilated head the next cluster of shoots arises.

¹ Horace: *Satires*, I (i), ll. 69-70.

² It may be objected that even an ingenuous and unobservant Oriental traveller who visited the Alps to-day with a picture in his mind of the local conditions of life in the 'Eneolithic Age' could not really fail to notice, side by side with many points of correspondence, at least as many and as remarkable evidences of change. It can only be replied that Western travellers have contrived to ignore similar evidences on the North Arabian Steppe, where the conditions portrayed in the Book of Genesis have been changed profoundly, since that portrait was drawn, by at least two far-reaching innovations: the introduction of the horse and the introduction of fire-arms (not to speak of dry farming and motor-cars, which are both still too recent introductions to have had time to produce their full effects).

This is the true image of evolution as it has come to be conceived by our Western botanists and zoologists.¹ At an earlier point in this Study, we have already attempted to transpose it into terms of human history.² We have suggested that the histories of individuals and communities and societies fall into successive chapters, in each of which a number of representatives of whichever the species may be are confronted by some identical challenge which imposes an ordeal. Under each of these common ordeals, the parties react in different ways. The majority succumb outright; some just manage to survive, but at the cost of such wear and tear that they are good for nothing afterwards; others discover a response to the challenge which is so satisfactory that it not only carries them through the ordeal of the moment but puts them in a favourable posture for undergoing the next; others, again, follow these path-finders as sheep follow their leader into a gap which he has forced through a hedge. This seems to be a more illuminating conception of evolution than the old-fashioned image of the beanstalk, and we shall be guided by this conception throughout our Study. Meanwhile, the old image still cramps the thought of many Western historians.

In their 'periodizations', our historians still dispose their periods in a single series end to end, like the sections of a bamboo-stem between joint and joint or the sections of the patent extensible handle on the end of which an up-to-date modern chimney sweep pokes his brush up a flue. On the brush-handle which our contemporary Western historians have inherited from their predecessors as part of their stock-in-trade, there were originally two joints only—the 'Ancient' and the 'Modern', corresponding to the 'Old Testament' and the 'New Testament' of the Bible and to the dual back-to-back reckoning by years 'before Christ' and by 'years of Our Lord' in our traditional Janus-faced system of chronology. This dichotomy of historical time was a relic of the

¹ Of course this conception is not altogether new. It has been conceived in flashes of insight by seers in other times and places: e.g. by Aeschylus, when he addresses Zeus as *τὸν πάθει μάθος / θέντρα κυρίως ἔχειν* (*Agamemnon*, ll. 177-8), and by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, when he exclaims (xii, 6): 'For whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth.' These images represent the Power that wields the axe as pollarding the willow with the conscious purpose and expectation of making it grow better than it could grow if it were left to itself. That is to say, the pruner's policy is assumed to be directed towards the same end as the willow's instinctive *élan vital*. The blow which the tree dreads is struck for its good; the shock which it suffers is administered as a tonic to its vitality. This assumption, however, is not essential. The conception still holds good if we assume, instead, that the axe is wielded not with intent to invigorate but with intent to mutilate and stunt and kill. On this assumption, the Power that wields the axe manifests itself not as God but as the Devil, who does God's work in spite of himself 'und muss, als Teufel, schaffen'. Conversely, in the sight of the Devil, the willow transforms itself into the Hydra—the monster which baffles Hēraklēs by sprouting two new heads in place of each head that the hero strikes off. This line of thought is followed up in II. C (ii) (b) i, vol. i, below.

² See I. B (ii), above.

Weltanschauung of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society, in which the proletariat expressed its sense of alienation from the Hellenic dominant minority by making an absolute antithesis between the old dispensation of the Hellenic Civilization and the new dispensation of the Christian Church, and succumbed to the egocentric illusion by treating the transition from the one dispensation to the other as the turning-point of all human history.¹ The retention of these two periods in our modern Western historians' conventional scheme is due to that consciousness of 'affiliation' to the Hellenic Society which still pervades all cultivated minds in a Western Society which has had the Christian Church for its chrysalis. The Primitive Christians, however, when they divided History into two periods and two only, were assuming that its origin was recent² and its end not far off. As time has gone on, our Western historians have found it convenient to extend their telescopic brush-handle by adding a third section, which they have called 'medieval' because they have chosen to insert it between the other two. They have not yet realized that they are the victims of a malicious trick. If only they would remove their heads from the chimney for a moment and take a walk round the house, they would observe that the builder is at work all the time on the roof and that he is heightening the chimney-stack faster than they are adding fresh sections to the handle of their brush. At this rate they have no more chance of ever poking their brush up to the top of the flue than the Danaïds have of filling their sieves or than Sisyphus has of planting his boulder on the summit of the mountain.

While the division between 'Ancient' and 'Modern' stands for the break between Hellenic and Western history, the division between 'Medieval' and 'Modern' merely stands for the transition from one chapter in Western history to another. The break (if there was one) which this transition involved was so much slighter than the other break that the difference in degree amounts to a difference in kind.³ The formula 'Ancient+Medieval+Modern' is thus wrongly constructed. It should be rewritten 'Hellenic+Western (Western=Medieval+Modern)'. Yet even this version is not altogether correct; for the transition from one chapter of

¹ This Christian scheme of history was not, of course, struck out in an instantaneous flash of thought. The point of view which it embodies had been gradually taking shape in the religious thought of Judaism and Zoroastrianism. (See Gall, *Freiherr von: Bausteine des Theos* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), *passim*.)

² Archbp. Ussher's dating of the Creation in the year 4000 (or 4004!) B.C. and the Jewish and other varieties of the chronological reckoning by 'Years of the World' all placed the origin of the material universe at about the date at which we, with our rather greater knowledge, at present place the origin of the species of human societies called civilizations. How recently our greater knowledge has been acquired is pointed out by Mr. Lionel Curtis in the passage quoted at the end of this Part of the present Study (I. C. (iii) (e), Annex, on p. 464, below).

³ On this point, see I. B (iv) *ad finem* and I. B (v), above.

Western history to another about the year 1475 of the Christian Era which receives recognition in the division between 'Medieval' and 'Modern' is by no means the only transition of that kind and that degree which has occurred in the course of our Western history up to date. There is no warrant for laying greater stress on 1475 than on 1075 or on 1875. Round about each of these other dates, we can observe transitions which are not less strongly pronounced than that which we find in the neighbourhood of 1475;¹ and if, in working out a scheme for the internal 'periodization' of Western history, we decide to begin a new chapter about 1475 and to call this chapter by a special name, we must also begin other new chapters, with names of their own, about 1075 and 1875. The conventional formula will then have to be revised a second time and will come out as follows: 'Hellenic+Western (Western = Western I (*circa* A.D. 675-1075)+Western II (*circa* 1075-1475)+Western III (*circa* 1475-1875)+Western IV (*circa* 1875-x)).' The formula is now correct as far as it goes, but it is not yet complete. In order to complete it, we should have first to expand the term on the Hellenic side of the main copula by the operation which we have carried out already on the Western side. Then we should have to attach Minoan history by another copula in front of Hellenic history and expand this additional element in the same way; and after that we should have to treat the other civilizations on uniform lines. We should find it impossible to bring them all within a single comprehensive formula, however ingeniously we handled their relations. Fortunately, we need not pursue the fantasy further. It has served its turn in demonstrating that the conventional formula 'Ancient+Medieval+Modern' is not only inadequate but misleading.²

¹ For the transition in Western history round about A.D. 1875, see Part I. A *ad init.*, above, and III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 375, footnote 2, below. The equivalent transition round about A.D. 1075 was acutely felt by Westerners in that age. It produced in them a profound *malaise* which was really a form of growing pains, but which found expression, in terms of Christian theology, in a revival of the Primitive Christian belief that the end of the World was at hand. In the Primitive Church the Second Coming of Christ was expected immediately to follow His Ascension. At the transition from the first to the second chapter of our Western history, it was thought to be due on the thousandth anniversary of the Ascension.

² For a particularly effective as well as authoritative criticism of the conventional tripartite formula, see 'Der Gang der antiken Geschichte' by Eduard Meyer (printed in his *Kleine Schriften* (Halle 1910, Niemeyer)). For an attack upon the older dichotomy of history into 'Ancient' and 'Modern', see the passage from Freeman's essay on 'The Unity of History' (*Comparative Politics*, pp. 336-7) which is quoted on p. 341, below. The transition in the nineteenth century from the 'post-medieval' modern age to an 'ultra-modern' age whose beginning marks as much of a new departure as the transition to the 'post-medieval' age from the medieval is emphasized in the following passage by the late Professor J. B. Bury:

'The field of what we call "Modern History" has a roughly marked natural boundary at the point where it starts, towards the end of the fifteenth century. . . . But the phrase is used to cover all post-medieval history, and therefore the hither limit is always shifting. . . . The question arises whether this conventional nomenclature is any longer appropriate, whether all post-medieval history can be scientifically classified as a period, with

(c) THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEMPORANEITY OF ALL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SPECIES

We have now dealt with two incompatible objections to our plan of comparative study: on the one hand, that our twenty-one societies have no common characteristic beyond that of all being 'intelligible fields of historical study'; on the other, that 'the Unity of Civilization' reduces the apparent plurality of civilizations to the singular number. We have shown that the twenty-one societies which we have mustered in our survey are so many representatives of a single species of the genus. Yet our critics, though compelled to go with us thus far, may make a stand at this point and still deny that our twenty-one civilizations are comparable on the ground that they are not contemporary. While seven¹ of them are still alive, the other fourteen are extinct; and at least three of these fourteen—the Egyptian, the Sumerian, and the Minoan—go back to 'the dawn of history'. These three certainly, and perhaps others, are separated from the living civilizations by the whole span of 'historical time'.

The answer to this objection is that Time is relative, and that the span of something less than six thousand years which bridges the interval between the emergence of those three earliest known civilizations and our own day has to be measured for the purpose of our study on the relevant time-scale: that is to say, not in terms of the lifetimes of human beings but in terms of the time-spans of the civilizations themselves. Now, in surveying the relations of civilizations in Time, the highest number of successive generations that we have met with in any case is three; and in each case these three between them more than cover our span of six thousand years, since the last term in each series is a civilization that is still

the same 'right and meaning as the Middle Ages. "Ancient History" is of course a merely conventional and convenient, unscientific term; is this true of "Modern History" also? It may be thought that the answer is affirmative. It may seem probable that the changes which began at the end of the eighteenth century, the great movements of thought which have thrilled the nineteenth century, the implications of the far-reaching vistas of knowledge which have been opened, mark as new and striking a departure as any to which our records go back, and constitute a *Neuzeit* in the fullest sense of the word; that in the nineteenth as in the sixteenth century Man entered into a new domain of ideas; that of the nineteenth as of the sixteenth are we justified in saying

Ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo.

If so, our nomenclature should be altered. The three centuries after Columbus should be called by some other name, such as "post-medieval", and "modern" should be appropriated to the period ushered in by the French Revolution and the formation of the American Commonwealth, until in turn a new period shall claim a name which can never be permanently attached.' (Bury, J. B.: 'The Place of Modern History in the Perspective of Knowledge', in *Selected Essays* (Cambridge 1930, University Press), pp. 55-6.)

¹ Counting the Far Eastern Society in Korea and Japan and the Orthodox Christian Society in Russia as separate from the main bodies of the respective societies.

alive.¹ If we were to ask the opinion of recognized authorities on the study of any species of any form of Life as to whether, in principle, it is sound practice to compare with one another representatives of a species which are spread over as many as three successive generations, they would answer that it is incontestably sound practice to draw instances for comparison from a series of generations extending to many times that number, because it is one of the universal features of Life on this planet, as we know it by observation in any of its forms, that it takes many more generations than three for specific characters to change so far as to produce any specific difference.

The fact that, in our survey of civilizations, we have found in no case a higher number of successive generations than three, when read together with the fact that we have found no more than twenty-one representatives of the species altogether, means that this species is very young in terms of its own time-scale. Moreover, its absolute age up to date is very short compared with that of the sister species called 'Primitive Societies'. We have noted already that we cannot date the emergence of the earliest known civilizations quite as far back as six thousand years before our own time. On the other hand, we have reason to believe that the Human Race has been in existence for several hundred thousand years;² and primitive societies are coeval with Mankind itself—or rather, they are anterior to Mankind, since social life is a condition which the evolution of Man out of Sub-Man presupposes and without which that evolution could not conceivably have taken place.³

¹ The several series in question are Minoan-Hellenic-Western, Minoan-Hellenic-Orthodox Christian, Minoan-Syriac-Islamic, and Sumeric-Indic-Hindu (supposing that the relation which we have conjectured between the Sumeric and the Indic Civilization is established).

² The following figures are suggested by Sir James Jeans in *The Universe around Us* (Cambridge 1929, University Press), p. 13:

Age of the Earth	about 2,000,000,000 years
" Life	" 300,000,000 "
" Man	" 300,000 "
" Civilizations	" 6,000 "

³ This statement may be sufficiently supported by citing two authorities, one Hellenic and the other Western:

'*Ἀνθρώπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ἰὸ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαῖλός ἐστιν ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος . . . ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος . . . ὁ δὲ μὴ δινύμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.*

'Man is by nature a social animal; and an unsocial person who is unsocial naturally and not accidentally is either unsatisfactory or superhuman. . . . Society is a natural phenomenon and is prior to the individual. . . . And any one who is unable to live a common life or who is so self-sufficient that he has no need to do so is no member of Society, which means that he is either a beast or a god.' (Aristotle: *Politics*, i. 1, 9-12 (p. 1253 A).)

'Man is precluded by both his bodily and his spiritual constitution from existing as an isolated individual. . . . Man really belongs to the gregarious animals: that is to say, to those races of animals in which the single individuals live permanently in fixed associations (*Verbände*). Such associations can be described as social associations (*soziale*

We can now see that the objection which we are answering rests on a simple mistake in reasoning. The 'historical time' which is represented as being so vast a span that it fixes a great gulf between the histories of civilizations which lie at opposite extremities of it is really a synonym for the time which has elapsed since the earliest date at which representatives of the species 'civilizations' are known to have existed. Therefore, *ex hypothesi*, some representatives of this species go back to 'the dawn of history' in this sense; and, with 'history' implicitly defined in this way, the statement is tautologous and its chronological implications are void of significance. The significant chronological measures are, first, the ratio between the time during which the species has existed up to date and the average duration of its representatives as indicated by the highest number of generations that we can find; and, second, the ratio between the time during which the species has existed up to date and the time during which primitive societies have existed since the date when, under their aegis, Sub-Man transformed himself into Man. If we take the antiquity of Man to be something like 300,000 years, then the antiquity of civilizations, so far from being coeval with human history, will be found to cover less than 2 per cent. of its present span: less than 6,000 years out of 300,000 \pm . On this time-scale, the lives of our twenty-one civilizations—distributed over not more than three generations of societies and concentrated within less than one-fiftieth part of the lifetime of Mankind—must be regarded, on a philosophic view, as contemporary with one another.¹

Verbände) in virtue of the fact that they unite a number of homogeneous single individuals in a fellowship.

'The entire spiritual development of Man presupposes the existence of group-associations with definite limits. First and foremost, it is impossible that Man's most important tool, speech—the first thing that makes him human and the first thing that created the conditions for building up our formulated thinking—can have been fashioned in the single human being or in the relation of parents to children. Speech grows out of the need for communication between equals who are bound together by common interests and by a regulated system of intercourse. Besides, the invention of tools, the acquisition of fire, the taming of domestic animals, the settlement in fixed habitations, and so on, are only possible within a group, or at any rate have only attained importance through something which began as the happy idea of some individual becoming the property of the whole association. That at any rate custom, law, religion, and every other kind of spiritual possession can only have arisen in such associations is a fact which needs no exposition. This means that organization in such associations (hordes, tribes), which we come across empirically everywhere where we find the presence of human beings, is not only coeval with Man but is far older than he is. It is the precedent condition without which the Human Race could not have come into existence at all.' (Eduard Meyer: 'Elemente der Anthropologie', *Geschichte des Altertums*, i (i), 4th edition: (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 5-8. Compare Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th edition (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 136-7.)

¹ The following illustration of the philosophic contemporaneity of civilizations is trivial but illuminating:

'Jamais, dans les variations continuelles de la mode, les Minoennes n'eurent la noblesse d'attitude que donneront aux Grecques et aux Romaines les plis des voiles flottants et la retombée naturelle des molles draperies. Ce qui les caractérise plutôt, à la grande surprise de ceux qui les voient pour la première fois, c'est le cachet occidental

(d) THE PHILOSOPHICAL EQUIVALENCE OF ALL REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE SPECIES

At this point our critics may perhaps concede that civilizations are comparable, but they will probably object that this comparability is merely formal. Is not its scope confined to certain external characteristics? And when we take account of inner values, do we not find that the differences in value between one civilization and another are so vast that no comparative judgements of value can be made as between them? In respect of value, therefore, must we not draw an absolute distinction between the valuable civilizations and the valueless? And, supposing that the valuable category proved to be represented by not more than one specimen, would not that bring us back, by another road, to 'the Unity of Civilization' ('Civilization' in the singular being equated with the rare element of value in 'civilizations' in the plural)?

The first answer to this objection is one that we have given before, when 'the Unity of Civilization' was under discussion. Value is intrinsically subjective; and we shall find that the members of each civilization, if forced to abandon the assertion that their own civilization is the only civilization that exists, will fall back upon the assertion that it is the only civilization that possesses any value. This is simply the old egocentric illusion in a new form.

The second answer is that value, like Time, is relative. If we examine our species 'civilizations' *in vacuo*, we are bound *ex hypothesi* to arrange them on a value-scale on which they are distributed from extremity to extremity, just as we had to distribute them over the whole span of 'historical time' when 'historical time' was equated with the time during which the species

de toilettes qui semblent parfois copiées sur les derniers modèles de Paris. Certaines dames de Cnosse, de Haghia Triad[h]a ou de Pseira donnent d'abord une extraordinaire impression de luxe et d'élégante recherche par le bariolage des étoffes et la richesse des ornements: les couleurs s'harmonisent et s'opposent; les dessins les plus variés se combinent gracieusement, et l'étoffe est parsemée à profusion de plissés et de bouillonnés, de broderies et de passementeries multicolores. Mais plus étonnantes encore sont les formes qu'affectent les deux pièces dont se composent [? compose] le vêtement, la jupe et le corsage. Le coupe en rappelle à chaque instant les modes les plus singulières, parfois les plus extravagantes, qu'on ait imaginées depuis la Renaissance jusqu'à nos jours.

'De pareilles ressemblances seraient inexplicables, si elles ne provenaient pas d'une filiation commune et d'une évolution parallèle, quoique non synchronique. Il fut un temps, bien avant l'âge du métal, où les races destinées à vivre dans l'Égée et celles qui devaient peupler l'Europe occidentale s'habillaient pareillement. Du costume néolithique et peut-être paléolithique sortirent, par un développement plus ou moins prompt, le costume minoen et le costume moderne. Avec les différences résultant de climats différents ou dues à des fantaisies individuelles, les Égéens ont, dans l'espace de deux millénaires, fait subir au costume féminin les modifications que les peuples septentrionaux, retardés par la longue prédominance des modes grecques et romaines, ont mis trois millénaires de plus à produire. Ayant à faire des costumes qui prenaient leur point d'appui à la taille, les couturières de l'époque minoenne et celles d'aujourd'hui n'ont pu satisfaire l'éternelle coquetterie des femmes qu'en donnant à des créations forcément indépendantes des formes semblantes et les mêmes accessoires.' (Glotz, G.: *La Civilisation Égée* (Paris 1923, La Renaissance du Livre), pp. 88-9.)

'civilizations' has been in existence. In order to obtain a value-scale for civilizations which, instead of being simply relative, is in some sense absolute, we must compare them, in respect of value, not only with one another, but also on the one hand with the common goal of their endeavours, and on the other hand with the primitive societies from which they are distinguished by a common specific difference. We must measure the degrees of value by which they all fall short of the goal of their own endeavours and likewise the degrees by which they all surpass the greatest common measure of value that the primitive societies have attained; and in making these several judgements of value we must assess the value of each civilization at the highest degree at which it is known to have stood at any time in its history.

This last proviso is important because civilizations are not static conditions of societies but dynamic movements¹ of an evolutionary kind. They not only cannot stand still, but they cannot reverse their direction without breaking their own law of motion, as motor-cars in a 'one-way street' break the traffic regulations if, instead of passing out through the prescribed exit at the farther end, they reverse their engines and try to back out through the prescribed entrance by which they have come into the street with full cognizance of the 'one-way' rule. If we apply this simile to our twenty-one civilizations, we see that none of them, to our knowledge, has ever yet succeeded in travelling over the whole length of the street and passing out through the exit; and that fourteen of them have come to grief by reversing, in defiance of the rule, before they had completed their transit and then either colliding with one another or being warned off the road as dangers to the public. As for the seven which are to be seen in the street at this moment, we will not attempt, off-hand, to ascertain which of them are already backsliding and which, if any, are still obeying the law of civilizations by moving forward.² We have followed out the simile far enough for our present purpose. It is clear that if we wish to measure, on an absolute scale of achievement, the respective performances of all the cars that have ever entered our street, then the points on their courses that have significance for us are the furthest points which they have ever reached respectively from first to last. These points give us the distances by which they have each fallen short of gaining the exit from the street, which is the

¹ This is implied in the form of the supposititious Latin word *civilisatio* from which the English word 'civilization' is derived. In Latin, abstract nouns formed from verbal roots by adding the stem '-tion-' always connote movements or processes or actions. For the significance of this characteristic of civilizations, see further Part II. B, below.

² This problem will be taken up in Part XII, below, after the phenomena of the geneses and growths of civilizations have been examined in Parts II-III and the phenomena of their breakdowns and disintegrations in Parts IV-VIII.

common goal of their endeavours, as well as the distances by which they have each advanced beyond the entrance to the street, which is the point where those old-fashioned horse-drawn vehicles called primitive societies have been compelled by the traffic regulations to halt. We should learn nothing about their relative achievements if we took our measurements from points in their courses after they had begun to backslide, when they would be re-traversing, in the reverse direction, the ground which they had once put behind them in their advance. Again, we should learn nothing if we took our measurements from points in their courses at such an early stage of their forward movements that they were still on ground which even the least successful car that had ever entered the street had managed to put behind it before its backsliding began. Therefore, for our purpose of comparing performances, we must measure off our distances from the furthest points ever attained by the several entrants in their respective courses from first to last, and we must work out our calculations on this basis.

Now if we plot out these twenty-one points on a plan of our street, to scale, we shall discover that the points are not scattered up and down the whole length of the street from entrance to exit. We shall find them clustered together within the limits of a short section of the thoroughfare. Behind them there will be a relatively long stretch which all entrants, from the least to the most successful, have alike succeeded in putting behind them before they have reached the respective limits of their advance. In front of them there will be another stretch which no wheel has ever yet touched; and this stretch of virgin ground will be long not only by comparison with the short section in which the twenty-one points of farthest attainment are concentrated, but also by comparison with the stretch of common ground at the lower end of the street. Of course, if we were to confine our attention to the section containing the twenty-one points and postulate that this section is to be regarded as being the whole length of the street, we should arrive at a different result; but no significance could be attached to calculations based on such an arbitrary excerpt from the plan. If we take account of the positions of the points in their complete setting—that is, in relation to the street-plan as a whole—we shall see that the greatest distance which separates any one of them from any other is inconsiderable by comparison with the distances which separate them collectively from the entrance to the street in one direction and from the exit in the other. On a philosophic view, they must be regarded as all approximately equal to one another in value.

(e) THE COMPARABILITY OF THE 'FACTS' ENCOUNTERED IN THE STUDY OF CIVILIZATIONS

At this point our critics may shift their attack from the histories of civilizations to historical 'facts'. Conceding that civilizations are separate representatives of a particular species of societies which are all philosophically contemporary with one another and philosophically equal to one another in value, they may lodge the final objection that while a comparative study of civilizations may thus be proved possible in theory, it is rendered impossible in practice by the intractability of the materials. The histories of civilizations, they may assert (and we will let the assertion pass at the moment, for the sake of the argument) are nothing but strings of historical 'events' and 'facts'; and every historical fact is intrinsically unique and therefore essentially incomparable with any other fact.¹ The catchword that 'History repeats itself' has no truth in it.

To this criticism, which is perhaps the shrewdest of all that have been levelled at us yet, we shall return a soft answer. We shall merely ask our critics to agree with us that a given phenomenon may be unique and therefore incomparable in some respects, while at the same time in other respects it may be a member of a class and therefore comparable with other members of that class in so far as it is covered by the classification.² This duality in the nature of certain phenomena is reflected in the use of the word 'individual', which is not only ambiguous but has two at first sight diametrically opposite connotations. Sometimes it is used to convey the idea of uniqueness,³ sometimes to convey the idea of a cipher about which nothing can be said except that it is a member of a class.⁴ We may observe that this ambiguous word is not used of inanimate things. It belongs to the vocabulary of Life. And we will now concede to our critics, in return for the concession which they have made to us, that all the phenomena of Life are phenomena of this Janus-headed build which are at the same time, but in different aspects, both unique and comparable. Every manifestation of Life is in one sense unique, inasmuch as it contains within itself—and this as its essential characteristic—a capacity for variation and mutation which is uniquely creative and original. Yet certain manifestations of Life are shown to be in some sense comparable by the existence of the sciences of Physiology, Biology, Botany, Zoology,

¹ This objection really repeats, apropos of the supposed parts of the histories of civilizations, the objection which has been examined and rebutted in I. C (iii) (a), above, apropos of these histories taken as wholes.

² For an analysis, on these lines, of the nature of Rhythm, see IV. C (i), vol. iv, 'pp. 24-8, below.

³ This is always the connotation of the word 'individuality'.

⁴ In such phrases as 'a commonplace individual', 'a nameless individual', and so on.

and Anthropology. Physiology and Biology compare the material structures and mechanisms of Life statically and dynamically. Botany and Zoology compare individual living creatures in order to classify them and to discover how the classes are related to one another and in what chronological order they have emerged. Zoology includes in its field of comparative study the animal called Man; but, since this animal was gregarious before it became human, so that Mankind cannot exist and cannot be studied except in a social environment,¹ there is evidently room besides for a comparative study of human societies, which are manifestations of Life without being living creatures.² A science which makes a comparative study of primitive societies exists under the name of Anthropology;³ and no one doubts that primitive societies are really susceptible of being studied in this way. There is, however, a widespread notion that the comparative method employed by Anthropology is applicable only to the study of 'the peoples that have no history'; and this notion rests on the assumption that comparative study and historical study are incompatible because 'History does not repeat itself'. If certain societies are being studied comparatively with success, this fact is assumed to imply that such societies are in some sense 'unhistoric'.

'The peoples that have no history', meaning primitive societies, is of course a question-begging phrase; for even if all extant primitive societies were shown to be in a completely static condition at the present day, that would not prove that they had always been in this condition from the beginning. In surveying the histories of civilizations we have found that, in the vicissitudes of societies of that species, an actionless epilogue sometimes follows the denouement of the plot; that the dead trunk sometimes remains intact after the sap has ceased to run.⁴ May not primitive societies likewise cumber the ground with their mortal remains? And may not all the extant primitive societies, as we see them now, be the dead trunks of once living trees, and their static conditions be the epilogues of histories which were dynamic in their day? After all, these primitive societies cannot have been in motionless existence from eternity. This species of societies must have come into existence once upon a time; and we know that, after it had been brought into existence through the adoption of a gregarious way of life by a certain species of animal, this animal underwent—under the aegis of the primitive social environment which it had created

¹ See p. 173, footnote 3, above.

² The relation between societies and the human beings who are their members is discussed in III. C (ii), vol. iii, below.

³ The application of this name to this science is rather arbitrary. One would expect Anthropology to mean the branch of Zoology that is concerned with the *Genus Homo*.

⁴ See I. C (ii), above.

for itself—the mutation from Sub-Man into Man. Here we catch glimpses of a history of primitive societies which must have been as dynamic in its movements and has certainly been as momentous in its consequences as that history of civilizations which is sometimes asserted to be the only history worthy of the name.

Thus the description of primitive societies as 'peoples that have no history' proves to be a misnomer—our actual inability to study their history being due, not to some intrinsic quality of their nature, but to the external and accidental fact that their histories have left no records, or at any rate none that are at present accessible to us.¹ Yet the fact remains that these primitive societies are admittedly susceptible of comparative study as far as we know them. What warrant is there for assuming that the same method of study could not be extended to their past histories if ever the missing records were to come into our hands? And, on this analogy, what warrant is there for assuming that the histories of civilizations—which happen to have left records that are sometimes equated with 'History' *par excellence*—could not be studied comparatively likewise?

Seeing that so many different manifestations of Life do prove to be susceptible of comparative study, at least in certain respects, the onus of proof surely lies with those who assert that the 'facts' and 'events' in the histories of one particular manifestation of Life—the species of societies called civilizations—are exceptions to the prevailing rule in being incomparable not merely in some respects but in all respects whatsoever. *A priori*, the implied abnormality of civilizations appears improbable. Moreover, if we make an empirical investigation into the facts of human life as manifested in civilizations, we actually come across an element of regularity and recurrence, that is to say an aspect to which the comparative method of study can be applied. This element is particularly prominent at the present time in the life of that civilization of which we ourselves happen to be members. While our Western historians are disputing the possibility of making a comparative study of historical facts, our Western men of business are all the time making their living out of a comparative study of the facts of life around them. The perfect example of such a comparative study for practical ends is the collection and analysis of the statistics on which the business transactions of insurance companies are based; and some such study, in which statistics are collected and averages are taken for the purpose of making forecasts, is at the basis of almost all profitable business enterprises in

¹ For this question of the lost histories of primitive societies, see further Part II. B, pp. 192-5, below.

the Western World nowadays. Now if, in practice, a comparative study of the facts of life in a civilization is being made with such effect that business transactions based on it yield profit, while business transactions that neglect to make it are apt to result in loss, this is surely conclusive and indeed superabundant proof that a comparative study of such facts is theoretically possible. Thus Western business men step in where Western scholars fear to tread; and in this adventure, at any rate, we need not hesitate to follow the lead of our latter-day masters.

We will begin forthwith, at the natural starting-point, by attempting a comparative study of the histories of civilizations in their geneses.

II

THE GENESES OF CIVILIZATIONS

A. THE PROBLEM OF THE GENESES OF CIVILIZATIONS

HAVING satisfied ourselves that societies of the species called civilizations are intrinsically comparable with one another, and having decided to attempt a comparative study of the twenty-one representatives of the species which we find at our command, we may now start our inquiry, at the natural starting-point, by considering how civilizations come into existence, or, in subjective terms, how they emerge above the lower limit of our mental field of vision. In this inquiry, we must take account of the different modes in which they emerge; and if we attempt to give some general description and explanation of the phenomenon, it must be such as to cover all the modes of emergence which we have observed.

When we were identifying representatives of the species,¹ our explorations revealed certain features in the backgrounds of civilizations which first served us as landmarks for a survey of the historical landscape and afterwards enabled us to make a provisional classification of the specimens which we had identified. This classification was determined by two criteria.

Our primary criterion was the origin of a society's religion; our secondary criterion was the original range of its geographical habitat. On the religious criterion, we classified our twenty-one civilizations into five groups: first, civilizations which carried on the traditions of earlier civilizations by taking over the religions of these earlier civilizations' dominant minorities; second, civilizations which 'affiliated' themselves to earlier civilizations by growing up within chrysalides constituted by churches which had been created by these earlier civilizations' internal proletariats. Such 'affiliated' civilizations fell into two sub-groups: one in which the germs out of which the chrysalis-churches had been created by the internal proletariats of the 'apparented' societies had been indigenous to these 'apparented' societies, and another in which those germs had been alien from them. The fourth group consisted of civilizations which were related to earlier civilizations by the looser tie of having derived their religions from these earlier civilizations' external proletariats. In the fifth place, we found civilizations

¹ In I. C (i), above.

which, so far as we could see, were not related to any earlier civilizations by any tie, however tenuous.

On the geographical criterion, we classified our twenty-one civilizations into four groups: first, civilizations whose original home lay wholly within the original home of some earlier civilization; second, civilizations whose original home lay wholly within the widest range which some earlier civilization had eventually attained, but not wholly within the area which that earlier civilization had occupied originally; third, civilizations whose original home lay partly within the widest range which an earlier civilization had eventually attained, but also partly outside it, on virgin soil; fourth, civilizations whose original home lay on virgin soil altogether.

By combining the results of these two systems of classification, we were able to arrange our twenty-one civilizations in a continuous series and to discern what the termini of this series were. At the one extremity we found societies which were so closely attached to certain earlier civilizations that we speculated whether we ought not to regard them as these earlier civilizations' 'dead trunks' (and their histories as epilogues to these earlier civilizations' histories) rather than as distinct and separate civilizations in their own rights. At the other extremity we found societies which appeared to have emerged in complete independence, without there being any traces of earlier civilizations in their backgrounds. In making a comparative study of the geneses of civilizations, we have to take all these various modes of emergence into consideration.

It is evident that the problem becomes more acute as we travel down the series. In the case of those societies whose distinct and separate existence is in doubt, it is possible that we may be relieved of the task of explaining their geneses by finding that they are merely survivals of earlier civilizations which have lost their vitality without having been rejuvenated by a second birth. In the case of those societies which show no traces of earlier civilizations in their backgrounds, we start with no clue to indicate how their geneses have occurred.

We may observe that the societies of this latter class—which we may call the 'unrelated' civilizations, in order to distinguish them from all those that are related to earlier civilizations in any manner and degree—are in a minority of six out of twenty-one¹ and belong chronologically to the infancy of the species. Of course, *ex hypothesi*, they include every civilization that stands at the head of any

¹ The six are the Egyptian, Andean, Sumeric, Minoan, Sinic, and Mayan civilizations. If the Indic Civilization proves not to be related to the Sumeric, the number rises to seven; and it rises to eight if 'the Indus Culture' proves to have been independent of the Sumeric in its origin.

genealogical tree representing the relations between civilizations in the Time-dimension; but when we turn from relative to absolute dates, we observe further that no 'unrelated' civilization has emerged in the Old World within the last three, or in the New World (so far as we know) within the last two, of the six millennia during which the species has been in existence up to date.¹ On the other hand, we observe that no less than eight 'related' civilizations have emerged in the Old World, and two in the New World, within the three and the two millennia within which there have been no fresh emergences of 'unrelated' civilizations in the Old and in the New World respectively.² These chronological observations can be tabulated as on the following page.³

From this table it would appear that, both in the Old World and in the New, the mode of emergence of the 'unrelated' civilizations—that is, the mode, whatever it was, in which civilizations of the first generation emerged *ex hypothesi*—became obsolete almost as soon as certain of these civilizations had brought an alternative mode of emergence into operation through their own vicissitudes. In these 'unrelated' civilizations' break-downs and disintegrations, the earliest of the 'related' civilizations took their rise; and, under the conditions of our day, when the whole World has become emmeshed in the net of our Western Civilization, it is still quite possible to imagine this Western Civilization itself breaking down and disintegrating in its turn, but hardly possible any longer to imagine new civilizations emerging without their being related to the antecedent Western Civilization in some degree. In other words, the possibility of 'unrelated' civilizations ever emerging again seems now to be definitely excluded by the accomplished fact of the world-wide expansion of our Western Civilization on the economic and political planes; and this suggests what may have been the reason why the mode of emergence of the 'unrelated'

¹ In the Old World, the Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations emerged in the fourth millennium B.C., the Minoan perhaps in the third, the Sinic perhaps in the second. In the New World, the Mayan Civilization appears to have emerged in the last millennium B.C.; and the Andean, as we find it at the moment of the Spanish conquest, has all the appearance of having had a long history, though we lack at present the necessary evidence for reconstructing its chronology with precision. (See, however, the table on p. 47 of Means, P.A.: *Ancient Civilizations of the Andes* (New York and London 1931, Scribner), where the emergence of the Andean Civilization is dated at least as far back as the beginning of the Christian Era.)

² The two related civilizations that are younger than any unrelated civilization in the New World are the Yucatec and the Mexic; the eight in the Old World are the Far Eastern (main body), the Far Eastern (in Korea and Japan); the Western, the Orthodox Christian (main body), the Orthodox Christian (in Russia), the Hindu, the Iranian, the Arabic. The civilizations related to the Sumerian and to the Minoan—that is, the Indic (?), the Hittite, the Babylonian, the Hellenic, and the Syriac—are excluded from the count because it is possible that they emerged earlier, or not later, than the Sinic.

³ The names of the civilizations of the New World are printed in italics and those of the civilizations of the Old World in ordinary type in order to disentangle the two chronologies from one another.

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	'Unrelated Civilizations'	related through external proletariats	'Related Civilizations'		attached through dominant minorities
			with alien creative germs	with indigenous creative germs	
B.C. 4000	Egyptiac + Sumeric				
B.C. 3000	Minoan				
B.C. 2000	Sinic (?)	Indic + Hittite Syriac + Hellenic			Babylonian
B.C. 1000	Mayan Andean (?)				
B.C. 0000 A.D.			Far Eastern (main body) Far Eastern (Korea and Japan) Western + Orthodox Christian (main body)	Hindu	Yucatec + Mexic
A.D. 1000			Orthodox Christian (Russia)	Iranic + Arabic	
A.D. 2000					

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civilizations became obsolete in fact more than three thousand years ago in the Old World and probably more than two thousand years ago in the New World, at dates which in our age, when the species is still young, already seem to belong to its infancy. The reason is that the world-wide expansion which our Western Civilization has achieved on two planes of social life in modern times is merely the most conspicuous manifestation up to date of a tendency towards expansion which has been displayed in lesser measure by all civilizations that have ever come into existence. Apparently it is in the nature of civilizations to exert upon Mankind beyond their borders certain social influences which may be likened metaphorically to the physical pushes and pulls which, in scientific terminology, are called radiation and attraction. The forces of social radiation and attraction resemble their physical namesakes in their capacity for exerting effects at immense distances from their sources, even if only in minute degrees. We can observe this characteristic of their operation in the activities of the civilizations that are alive to-day; and our records show that the same powers were possessed and exerted by the earliest representatives of the species. Hence we may infer that, after the first few civilizations had emerged, it did not take long (on the time-scale of societies of this species) for the whole of Mankind to be affected by their existence—consciously or unconsciously, in greater measure or less. 'Verily their sound went into all the Earth and their words unto the ends of the World';¹ and the world-wide vibrations, by occupying the entire field of action, may have made it impossible for other vibratory movements of the same kind any longer to be generated independently at fresh centres in the manner in which these earliest vibrations, which had thus monopolized the field, had themselves been generated originally. This would explain why all the later vibratory movements that occurred were generated in a new way, by derivation. To drop our metaphor, it would explain why the mode of emergence of the 'unrelated' class of civilizations became obsolete and the mode of the 'related' class became the rule.

We have seen already² what the latter mode is. We have seen that, if and when a civilization begins to lose its creative power, the people below its surface and beyond its borders, whom it is all the time irradiating with its influence and attracting into its orbit, begin to resist assimilation, with the result that the society which, in its age of growth, was a social unity with an ever expanding and always indefinite fringe, becomes divided against itself by the sharp lines of division between a dominant minority and an

¹ Romans x, 18.

² In I. C (i) (a), pp. 55-7, above.

internal and an external proletariat. The minority, having lost the power to influence and attract, seeks instead to impose itself by force. The proletariat, inwardly alienated, remains in, but not of, the disintegrating society until the disintegration has gone so far that the dominant minority can no longer repress the efforts of the proletariat to secede. In the act of secession, at length accomplished, a new society is conceived.¹

This, in brief, seems to be the mode of emergence of the 'related' civilizations, in so far as we have investigated it yet; but how are we to account for the emergence of the 'unrelated' civilizations? *Ex hypothesi*, they did not emerge through secessions from older societies of the same species. We can only suppose that they emerged through mutations of societies previously belonging to the sister species—that is, through mutations of primitive societies into civilizations. The supposition is in accord with chronology; for we know that the primitive species of societies had been in existence hundreds of thousands of years before the first civilizations came into existence. Indeed, we know that primitive societies were anterior to Mankind itself, which only became human under their aegis.² The supposition is also in accord with what we know about the general trend of Evolution, which normally proceeds from the simpler to the more complex. Finally, the supposition is virtually forced upon us by the absence of any alternative possibility; οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης;³ and if the unrelated civilizations were derived neither from other civilizations nor from primitive societies, they must have originated in fortuitous concourses of non-social human beings—*quod est absurdum*, since non-social human beings are as fabulous as Cyclops or Leviathan. It would be as reasonable to revive the fantasies of Mythology and to assert that the first civilizations sprang from the earth or dropped from the skies.

Assuming, then, that the 'unrelated' civilizations have emerged through mutations of primitive societies and the 'related' civilizations through secessions from pre-existent civilizations, we have to explain how and why civilizations have emerged in terms which apply to both the modes in which their emergence comes under our observation.

¹ We have seen that it is sometimes an internal and sometimes an external proletariat from which a new society, in the class of 'related' societies, derives its being; and we have left it an open question whether a society which carries on the existence of a dominant minority can be regarded as a distinct and separate society in its own right. (See I.C (ii), above.)

² See pp. 173-4, above.

³ *Odyssey*, xix, 1. 163.

B. THE NATURE OF THE GENESES OF CIVILIZATIONS

IN setting out to inquire how civilizations have emerged, we have the choice of starting either with the mutation of primitive societies into 'unrelated' civilizations or with the emergence of 'related' civilizations through secessions of proletariats from pre-existent civilizations. The second of these modes of emergence has actually occurred more frequently than the former already; and we have seen reason to believe that the future belongs to it. On the other hand, the mutational mode might be expected, on the face of it, to involve a greater and therefore more conspicuous change; so that, if we examine this mode first, we may hope to find less difficulty, from this angle of approach, in obtaining some insight into the general nature of the phenomenon which we are studying in this place.

The measure of the mutation of primitive societies into civilizations will be given by the difference between the two species of societies now that they exist side by side. Hitherto, we have taken this difference for granted. Our next step is to look for the features in which it resides.

This difference does not consist in the presence or absence of institutions; for we find¹ that institutions, being the vehicles of the impersonal relations in which all societies have their existence, are attributes of the whole genus and therefore common properties of the two species. Primitive societies have their own characteristic institutions—the *ἐνιαυτός* *δαίμων* and his cycle; totemism and exogamy; tabus, initiations, and age-classes; segregations of the sexes, at certain stages of life, in separate communal establishments—and some of these institutions are certainly as elaborate and perhaps as subtle as those which are characteristic of civilizations.²

Nor are civilizations distinguished from primitive societies by the Division of Labour; for though in general this plays a more important part in their lives, and its importance tends to increase as they grow, we can discern at least the rudiments of the Division of Labour in the lives of primitive societies also. For instance, primitive kings, who seem like undifferentiated 'all-round men' by

¹ See I. C (iii) (e), Annex, pp. 454-5, below.

² The elaborateness and subtlety which primitive institutions sometimes display are illustrated in the Melanesian institution of the Kula, which is brilliantly described and studied in *The Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London 1922, Routledge) by B. Malinowski.

contrast with the executive heads of political communities in societies which are in process of civilization, can be seen to be specialists when we observe them in their own social environment and compare them with the rank and file of their tribesmen. Primitive magicians and smiths and minstrels are specialists in the same degree.¹

Indeed, the Division of Labour may be a necessary condition of the existence of institutions and therefore a generic feature in the lives of societies, since it is difficult to conceive how institutions could exist without in some way being embodied in the persons of particular human beings who are thus invested with special social functions. In primitive societies these incarnations are sometimes complete—the institutions and their human embodiments being absolutely identified with one another in the thoughts and feelings of those who participate in the social relations that are maintained by this means. In civilizations there is usually a greater ability to distinguish offices from office-holders and personalities from titles and uniforms; and there is sometimes a conscious endeavour to eliminate the personal factor and to place these essentially impersonal relations on an avowedly impersonal basis. Yet the tendency to make institutions incarnate dies hard. In the United States, where official titles have been abolished and official uniforms reduced to a minimum, the ingrained desire for these outward shows has found non-official outlets—for instance, the ceremonials of private associations like the Rotarians or the Elks or the Knights of Columbus or the Daughters of the American Revolution or the Ku-Klux-Klan. In the British Empire, where 'the Crown' has been piously preserved after its powers have been transferred to half a dozen parliaments, this medieval incarnation of political unity has latterly acquired a new and unforeseen institutional value as the *trait d'union* between the States Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The relation in which these nations stand, and wish to stand, towards one another involves a logical antinomy between the parliamentary self-government of each State Member and the political unity of the Commonwealth as a whole; and hence this relation cannot be expressed in the

¹ The most celebrated mythical representatives of these three professions—e.g. Merlin the magician, and Hephaestus the smith, and Homer the minstrel—were conceived in communities whose members, through contact with civilizations, had ceased to be altogether primitive and had been transformed from savages into barbarians. (For this transformation see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 196-7, below.) The lameness of Hephaestus and the blindness of Homer indicate that in primitive societies, even of the more sophisticated kind, the tendency towards the Division of Labour is still so weak that it normally fails to assert itself except in people who are debarred from becoming 'all-round men' by insuperable physical defects. This negative condition has to exist before the positive forces of personal aptitudes and social needs can come into play in favour of specialization. For the stimulating effect of physical penalization, as illustrated by these examples, see further II. D (vi), *ad init.*, vol. ii, below.

logical terms of a constitutional relation between the parliaments that have severally inherited the powers once possessed by 'the Crown'. On the other hand, it can and does find expression in the incarnate institution of a personal monarch who 'reigns but does not govern' in each of his dominions.

Here we see an apparent anachronism acquiring a new value in a new age. Yet in every age of every society institutions depend for their maintenance upon the services of specialists in some measure; and in that measure these human beings become invested with symbolic significance and prestige in their fellows' hearts and minds. This happens even in spheres of life in which tradition is at a discount. While millions of human beings who think of themselves as British subjects find their incarnations of the British Empire in the King or in the Prince of Wales, other millions who think of themselves as American citizens find their incarnations of 'Americanism' in Edison or in Henry Ford. For almost all Westerners in our generation, the prowess of the Western Society in abstract science is incarnated in Einstein, its prowess in applied science in Marconi, its spirit of adventure in Lindbergh, its physical skill in its professional athletes, its physical strength in its professional pugilists, its physical beauty in its film-stars. It is a universal condition of social life that the majority of the members of any given society should be perpetually extending the narrow radius of their personal lives by living vicariously through the representative activities of a small number of their fellows; and the Division of Labour between this majority and this minority is inherent in the nature of Society itself.

The complement and antidote to the Division of Labour is social imitation or mimesis,¹ which may be defined as the acquisition, through imitation, of social 'assets'—aptitudes or emotions or ideas—which the acquirers have not originated for themselves, and which they might never have come to possess if they had not encountered and imitated other people in whose possession these assets were already to be found. Mimesis, too, is a generic feature of social life.² Its operation can be observed both in primitive societies and in civilizations. It operates, however, in different

¹ In this Study, the Greek word (*mimēsis* from *mimēsthai*) is used in order to avoid the connotations of 'unintelligent imitation' or 'satirical imitation' which attach to the derivative English word 'mimicry'. Mimesis, as used here, denotes social imitation 'without prejudice'.

² The historical importance of mimesis was discerned by David Hume, as witness the following passage in his essay *Of National Characters*: 'The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together without acquiring a similitude of manners and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity to company and society is strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition which gives us this propensity makes us enter deeply into each other's sentiments and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion through the whole club or knot of companions.'

directions in the two species. In primitive societies, as we know them, mimesis is directed towards the older generation of the living members and towards the dead ancestors who stand, unseen but not unfelt, at the back of the living elders, reinforcing their power and enhancing their prestige. In a society where mimesis is thus directed backward towards the past, custom rules and the society remains static. On the other hand, in societies in process of civilization, mimesis is directed towards creative personalities which command a following because they are pioneers on the road towards the common goal of human endeavours. In a society where mimesis is thus directed forward towards the future, 'the cake of custom'¹ is broken and the Society is in dynamic motion along a course of change and growth.

In this contrast between a dynamic movement and a static condition, we have come at last upon a point of difference between civilizations and primitive societies; but when we ask ourselves whether the difference thus empirically observed is permanent and fundamental, we find that the answer is in the negative.

We have noted already that, if we only know of primitive societies in a static condition, this is merely an accidental consequence of the fragmentariness of our knowledge.² All our 'data' for the study of primitive societies happen to come from representatives of the species which are in the last phases of their histories; but where direct observation fails us, a train of reasoning informs us that there must have been earlier phases in the histories of the primitive societies in which these were moving more dynamically than any civilizations have ever moved yet, as far as our knowledge goes. We have noted³ that the primitive societies must be prior to Humanity, since Mankind could not have become human except in a social environment; and this mutation of Sub-Man into Man, which was accomplished, in circumstances of which we have no record, under the aegis of primitive societies, was a more profound change, a greater step in growth, than any progress which Man has yet achieved under the aegis of civilizations.⁴

Primitive societies, as we know them by direct observation, may

¹ Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th edition (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 27 and 35.

² See pp. 179-80, above, in I.C (iii) (e).

³ See pp. 173-4, above.

⁴ We cannot measure the degree of this change and growth unless and until we obtain more knowledge than we possess at present about 'the missing link' between Man and the earlier ancestor who is common to Man and to the anthropoid apes. We cannot reconstruct this 'Sub-Man' by analogy with the anthropoids, since these represent a divergent line of growth from the common ancestry. Yet, even in the present state of our knowledge, we can assert with confidence that there was a greater gulf between 'Sub-man' and Primitive Man than there is between Primitive Man and Man in process of civilization. Bagehot postulates a kind of 'pre-primitive' stage in which our ancestors were 'savages without the fixed habits of savages'. (Op. cit., pp. 112-13. Cf. pp. 134-5.)

be likened to people lying torpid upon a ledge on a mountain-side, with a precipice below and a precipice above; civilizations may be likened to companions of these 'Sleepers of Ephesus' who have just risen to their feet and have started to climb on up the face of the cliff; while we, for our part, may liken ourselves to observers whose field of vision is limited to the ledge and to the foot of the upper precipice and who have come upon the scene at the moment when the different members of the party happen to be in these respective postures and positions. At first sight we may be inclined to draw an absolute distinction between the two groups, acclaiming the climbers as athletes and dismissing the recumbent figures as paralytics; but on second thoughts we shall find it more prudent to suspend judgement.¹

After all, the recumbent figures cannot be paralytics in reality; for they cannot have been born on the ledge, and no human muscles but their own can have hoisted them to this halting-place up the face of the precipice below. So far from being paralytics, they must be seasoned athletes who have successfully scaled the 'pitch' below and are still taking a well-earned rest from their recent labours.² On the other hand, their companions who are climbing at this moment have only just left this same ledge and started to climb the face of the precipice above; and, since the next ledge is out of sight, we do not know how high or how arduous this next 'pitch' may be. We only know that it is impossible to halt and rest before the next ledge, wherever that may lie, is reached. Thus, even if we could estimate each present climber's strength and skill and nerve and courage, we could not judge whether any of them have any prospect of gaining the unseen ledge above, which is the goal of their present endeavours. We can, however, be sure that certain of them will never attain it.

We are watching here, under a new guise, the same spectacle that we watched before when we saw civilizations in the likeness of drivers seeking to pass out through the exit from a one-way street.³ We have simply to give this one-way street an up-hill gradient, and then to steepen the gradient until it becomes

¹ This point is made by Plato in *The Republic* (372 D-E), at the close of the first sketch of what a society (*πόλις*) involves (369 D-372 D). In this sketch, Plato makes the dramatic personae of his dialogue rough out the lineaments of a society of the primitive species. Thereupon, Glaucon complains that they have sketched 'a society of swine' (*ὡὸν πόλιν*)—with a possible reminiscence of a famous passage in the *Odyssey* (Book X, ll. 133-574) in which the companions of Odysseus are turned into swine by Circe. (This passage is quoted in II. D (i), vol ii, p. 23, below.) Socrates then consents to study a luxurious (*τροφῶσαν*) or feverish (*φλεγμαίνουσαν*) society—i.e., in our terminology, a society in process of civilization—but he remarks in passing that, in his opinion, the (primitive) society which they have just sketched is the genuine type of the genus, in the sense that it is representative of the genus when it is in a normal state of health.

² On this point see Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th edition (London 1894, Kegan Paul), p. 42.

³ In I. C (iii) (d), above.

precipitous, in order to transform the car-drivers of one simile into the climbers of the other. Just as the cars, when once they had entered the street, had no alternatives except to pass out through the exit or to backslide, so the climbers, when once they have started on the 'pitch', have no alternatives except to reach the ledge above or to fall; and as we saw many cars backsliding till they were warned off the road, and others till they met with fatal accidents, so we can see many of our climbers already falling—some to their death and others to an ignominious life-in-death on the ledge below. These others lie side by side with the decomposing corpses of their companions who—*felices opportunitate mortis*¹—have escaped the pains of failure through annihilation, and also side by side with the recumbent forms of those apparent paralytics who have not yet essayed the 'pitch' by which these unfortunates have already been defeated. Disqualified from essaying the 'pitch' again and denied the *coup de grâce* of annihilation, they would lie 'fast bound in misery and iron',² enduring the torments of Prometheus with the vulture devouring his liver, if the Gods did not take pity on them and grant them insensibility by turning them into stone, to weather away, with the lapse of centuries, like Niobe on the flank of Mount Sipylus. By the time when we have come on the scene, a majority of the climbers on the precipice above our ledge have fallen to meet one or other of the penalties of defeat—petrification or annihilation—and there are only a few to be seen still working their way upward. If we could look down the face of the precipice below our ledge to the next ledge beneath, and translate ourselves back into the age when this lower 'pitch' was the scene of action, we should almost certainly discover that the mountaineers who have attained our ledge, to rest from their labours before essaying the 'pitch' next above, are in a still smaller minority by comparison with the unnumbered and unremembered casualties which the scaling of that 'pitch' likewise cost in its time.

We have now followed out our simile far enough to have ascertained that the contrast between the static condition of primitive societies, as we know them, and the dynamic motion of societies in process of civilization is not a permanent and fundamental point of difference, but an accident of the time and place of observation. All the primitive societies which we now observe at rest must once have been in motion; and all societies which have entered upon the process of civilization will come to rest sooner or later in one way or another. Some may eventually come to rest by attaining (though none has attained it yet) the goal of human endeavours: the mutation of Man into Superman. Others have come to rest already by

¹ Tacitus, *Agricola*, chap. 45.

² Psalm cvii. 10.

relapsing, long before the goal has been attained, to the level of primitive humanity from which they have started. The condition of these *ci-devant* civilizations which have failed in their endeavours is static like the condition of those primitive societies which are extant to-day because they have succeeded in theirs.¹ In every other respect, there is all the difference between them; and this difference—the difference between failure and success—is wholly in the primitive societies' favour. The primitive societies, as we see them to-day, are static because they are recuperating from the strain of a successful effort to attain the state in which they now persist. Their stillness is the stillness not of death but of sleep; and even if they may be destined never to awake, they are at least still alive. The *ci-devant* civilizations are static because they have lost their lives in an unsuccessful attempt to transcend the state into which they have now relapsed. Their stillness is the stillness of dead things in decay; and they are dead equally beyond doubt and beyond recall, whether they happen to be disintegrating as rapidly as a putrefying corpse or as slowly as a rotting tree-trunk or a weathering rock.

We have failed to find the immediate object of our search, a permanent and fundamental point of difference between primitive societies and civilizations; but incidentally we have obtained some light on the ultimate objective of our present inquiry: the nature of the geneses of civilizations. Starting with the mutation of primitive societies into civilizations, we have found that this consists in a transition from a static condition to a dynamic activity; and we shall find that the same formula holds good for the alternative mode of emergence of civilizations through the secession of proletariats from the dominant minorities of pre-existent civilizations which have lost their creative power. Such dominant minorities are static by definition; for to say that the creative minority of a civilization in growth has degenerated or atrophied into the dominant minority of a civilization in disintegration is only another way of saying that the society in question has relapsed from a dynamic activity into a static condition. Against this static condition, the secession of a proletariat is a dynamic reaction; and in this light we can see that, in the secession of a proletariat from a dominant minority, a new civilization is generated through the transition of a society from a static condition to a dynamic activity, just as it is in the mutation which produces a civilization out of a

¹ If we take the direction of mimesis as the test of whether a given society at a given moment is in a static condition or in a dynamic activity, we shall find that mimesis is directed backward towards the forefathers in the dominant minority of a *ci-devant* civilization, just as it is in an extant primitive society, in common contrast to the direction of mimesis forward—towards creative personalities—in a society in process of civilization which has not broken down.

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primitive society. The geneses of all civilizations—the unrelated and the related class alike—could be described in a sentence written by a Western philosopher-statesman of our age one month after the close of the General War of 1914-18:

‘There is no doubt that Mankind is once more on the move. The very foundations have been shaken and loosened, and things are again fluid. The tents have been struck, and the great caravan of Humanity is once more on the march.’¹

Can we yet say anything more about the transition from a static condition to a dynamic activity in which the genesis of every civilization consists? We know this much more already: this instance of the transition is not unique. When we were studying it in our simile of the mountain-side, we realized that the ledge on which we saw the primitive societies lying dormant and the *ci-devant* civilizations lying dead, while the societies in process of civilization were scaling the face of the precipice above, was only one ledge in a series, the other terms of which were outside our field of vision. All extant primitive societies must have reached our ledge from an unseen ledge below, and all societies in process of civilization are endeavouring to reach an unseen ledge above; and, for all we know, the number of other ledges above this and below that may be infinite in both directions. The heights that tower above us are quite beyond our powers of estimation, but we have some inkling of the dizzy depths below. We know that we have to descend below the ledge from which Sub-man rose to Man in order to find the level of the common ancestor of Mankind and the anthropoids.² And how many hundreds and thousands of lower ledges should we have to leave behind us in our descent if we sought to trace the rise of mammals from the lowest vertebrates and of vertebrates from the rudimentary forms in which Life itself first emerged out of the abyss?

Without venturing down that dark descent or even allowing ourselves to speculate whether the alternating series of ledge and precipice, precipice and ledge, is infinite or finite, we can observe that the alternation between horizontal and perpendicular surfaces on the mountain-side repeats itself in a kind of pattern, and that the corresponding alternation between a static condition and a dynamic activity in the energies of the living creatures that are seeking to scale the mountain similarly recurs in a kind of rhythm. This rhythm has been pointed out by a number of observers, living

¹ Smuts, J. C.: *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion* (London 1918, Hodder and Stoughton), p. 71.

² See p. 192, footnote 4, above.

in different ages of different societies, who all agree in regarding it as something fundamental in the nature of the Universe.

It is pointed out, for example, by the contemporary Western philosopher-statesman whom we have just quoted, General Smuts, in an exposition of his philosophy of 'holism':

'Holism, as its very idea implies, is a tendency towards unity, a blending and ordering of multiple elements into new unities. From the more or less homogeneous to the heterogeneous; from heterogeneous multiplicity again to greater, more advanced harmony, to a harmonious co-operative ordered structural unity; such a formula may serve as a rough-and-ready description of the holistic process.'¹

The same rhythm in the Universe is discerned, from his own standpoint, by a contemporary Western psychologist:

'In general terms we can say that all evolution is from the complex to the expressed, from the diffuse to the intense and back again to the resolved. Life is a constant process of focus and expansion. This is the systole and diastole of Time itself, the alternating current that drives the Universe. From co-consciousness has been evolved self-conscious individuality, and from individuality ought there not to be developed, in the course of evolution, a super-consciousness, a common self-consciousness?'²

We will take our third quotation from a contemporary Western anthropologist, and this at greater length, since this observer's standpoint is almost coincident with ours:

'An avenue of approach to the psychology of Primitive Man may be found in the principle of the Quest for Unity which, it appears to us, is fundamental in Human Nature. It is a tendency traceable and profoundly influential through all Man's thinking and practical life as soon as, and wherever, he is recognisably human. Its presence in the mental life of Civilised Man needs no demonstration. Mr. Bosanquet defined Reason as "the spirit of totality", and again as "the nisus towards the whole". Certainly, the characteristic activity of the mind, from the formation of a general idea to the great system of Philosophy, from the humblest perception to the laws of Science and the Uniformity of Nature itself, from the vaguest conception of spirit to the monistic unity of the Supreme Personality of Religion, is the endeavour to create "wholes" in thought, to organise experience into some form or other of coherent totality.

'It was one of the works of Herbert Spencer's genius for generalisation to show that this tendency in Man's mind is but a particular instance of the general course of the evolutionary process. This is evident from his illustrations of his famous definition of that process as a passage of matter from "an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite,

¹ Smuts, J.C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd edition (London 1927, Macmillan), p. 241.

² Heard, Gerald: *The Ascent of Humanity* (London 1929, Cape), p. 260.

coherent heterogeneity"¹ through a continuous series of "integrations" and "differentiations". We shall find these latter terms useful in the exposition of the principle of the Quest for Unity; for we conceive that Man's progress towards and in civilisation proceeds by a series of integrations, by the formation of more and more comprehensive and yet more definite wholes, which are linked together by successive Differentiations. What happens is that Man with his unifying tendency forms a primitive integration, whether in his mental or practical life. This integration, on the emergence of some new power or idea in Man, is found inadequate, and is broken through by a differentiation which applies the new power or idea to wider areas of experience. Out of the more differentiated phenomena and relations thus arrived at, the mind with its determined search for unity creates a new integration, larger, richer and more organised than the former one. This again is followed by a differentiation; and so the process goes on, Man ever becoming more capable of more comprehensive, higher, and finer integrations, both of his own inner life and of his outward social relations. . . .

'The transition between the integrations, inseparable from each as the trough of the wave from the crests before and after, is made by a differentiation, resulting from the pressure of some new necessity, or the acquisition of a new power, or whatever change of Man's inner life or outward circumstances compels his mind to grasp and organise, by its native hunger for unity, a wider range and content of experience. . . .

'In considering for a little the stage of Differentiation, it may be noted that its characteristic feature is that an earlier Integration has been broken up and a new one has not yet been formed. It is like the Children of Israel, released from Egyptian bondage, in which a certain unification of order and appointed task was imposed upon them from above by their masters, bursting out into the larger and freer life of the wilderness. It is to them, however, a life of wandering, more vague, more diffused, less organised than the more unified existence on the lower plane of slavery, upon which, indeed, they are more than inclined to lapse back at times, were it not that a higher integration beckons them onward to settlement in the Promised Land. . . . Any differentiation in this sense means that a larger range of phenomena and activity is opened to Man than before; and for a time they elude the grasp of his mind and of his practical endeavour to reduce them to some unity of mental comprehension or some form of unified life. He wanders about in the wide new field, trying many wrong paths and culs-de-sac, making many false integrations, before his unifying power is sufficiently developed to form the new and higher integration.'²

Looking back to the last generation in the age of Western history that immediately preceded our own, we find our rhythm pointed out—this time in the histories of civilizations—by a Western

¹ *First Principles* (4th edition), p. 307.

² Murphy, J.: *Primitive Man: His Essential Quest* (London 1927, Milford), pp. 24-5, 26, and 28-9.

sociologist, Saint-Simon. Saint-Simon saw these histories as a series of alternating 'organic' and 'critical' periods:¹

'La loi du développement de l'humanité . . . nous montre deux états distincts et alternatifs de la société: l'un que nous appelons état organique, où tous les faits de l'activité humaine sont classés, prévus, ordonnés par une théorie générale; où le but de l'action sociale est nettement défini; l'autre, que nous nommons l'état critique, où toute communion de pensée, toute action d'ensemble, toute coordination a cessé, et où la société ne présente plus qu'une agglomération d'individus isolés et luttant les uns contre les autres.

'Chacun de ces états a occupé deux périodes de l'histoire. Un état organique précéda l'ère des Grecs que l'on nomme ère philosophique, et que nous préciserons avec plus de justesse par le titre d'époque critique. Plus tard, une nouvelle doctrine est produite, elle parcourt ses différentes phases d'élaboration et de perfectionnement, et établit enfin sa puissance politique sur tout l'Occident. La constitution de l'Église commence une nouvelle époque organique qui s'arrête au quinzième siècle, à l'instant où les réformateurs donnèrent le premier signal de la critique continuée jusqu'à nos jours.² . . .

'Quelle est la destination de l'homme par rapport à son semblable, quelle est sa destination par rapport à l'univers? Tels sont les termes généraux du double problème que l'humanité s'est toujours posé. Toutes les époques organiques ont été des solutions, au moins provisoires, de ces problèmes; mais bientôt les progrès opérés à l'aide de ces solutions, c'est-à-dire à l'abri des institutions sociales qui avaient été réalisées d'après elles, les rendaient elles-mêmes insuffisantes, et en appelaient de nouvelles; les époques critiques, moments de débats, de protestation, d'attente, de transition, venaient alors remplir l'intervalle par le doute, par l'indifférence à l'égard de ces grands problèmes, par l'égoïsme, conséquence obligée de ce doute, de cette indifférence.³ Toutes les fois que ces grands problèmes sociaux ont été résolus, il y a eu époque organique; toutes les fois qu'ils sont demeurés sans solution, il y a eu époque critique. . . .

'Dans toutes les époques d'une même nature, organique ou critique,

¹ Through this *Anschauung*, he attempted to reconcile with the empirically observed phenomena of decadence and emergence the theory of the continuity of history as a single movement in a straight line. (See p. 155, footnote 2, above.)

² A more exact definition of these periods is given in a later passage of the same work:

'Deux périodes critiques nettement prononcées nous apparaissent dans la durée de vingt-trois siècles: 1° celle qui sépara le polythéisme du christianisme, c'est-à-dire qui s'étendit depuis l'apparition des premiers philosophes de la Grèce jusqu'à la prédication de l'Évangile; 2° celle qui sépara la doctrine catholique de celle de l'avenir, et qui comprend les trois siècles écoulés depuis Luther jusqu'à nos jours. Les époques organiques correspondantes sont: 1° celle où le polythéisme grec et romain fut dans la plus grande vigueur, et qui se termine aux siècles de Périclès et d'Auguste; 2° celle où le catholicisme et la féodalité furent constitués avec le plus de force et d'éclat, et qui vint finir, sous le rapport religieux, à Léon X, sous le point de vue politique, à Louis XIV.' (*Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, vol. xli (Paris 1877, Leroux), pp. 170-1.)

Saint-Simon believed that his own generation was on the eve of passing out of the prevailing 'critical period' into a new 'organic period'. (Op. cit., vol. xli, p. 179; vol. xlii, pp. 49-50.)

³ 'Le cachet des époques critiques, comme celui des grandes déroutées, c'est l'égoïsme.' (Op. cit., vol. xli, p. 113.)

quels que soient le lieu et le temps, les hommes sont toujours occupés, dans la durée des premières, à édifier, pendant la durée des secondes, à détruire. . . .

'Dans les premières, de tous les points de la circonférence sociale on voit se diriger sympathiquement tous les esprits et tous les actes vers un centre d'affection; dans les secondes, au contraire, les vieilles croyances, signalées dans leurs vices par des sentiments, par des besoins que l'antique lien social n'avait pu comprendre, attaquées par un présent qui ne se lie plus aux traditions, et qui ne les rattache à aucun avenir, tombent en ruines de toutes parts.'¹

Leaping, next, from Saint-Simon to Empedocles (a member of a society which is distinct and separate from, though 'apparented' to, ours), we again find our rhythm pointed out—this time, in the ebb and flow of the Physical Universe—by this Hellenic man of science.² Empedocles attributes the changes in the face of the Universe, of which we are empirically aware, to the alternate ebb and flow of two forces which are complementary to one another and at the same time antithetical: an integrating force which he calls 'Love' and a disintegrating force which he calls 'Hate':

'I will tell of a twofold [rhythm]. In one movement a unity builds itself up out of a plurality into sole existence; in another movement it disintegrates, to make a plurality out of a unity.'³ . . . This perpetual alternation never ceases. In one movement all things coalesce into a unity in Love; in another movement they all disperse apart in the enmity of Strife. Thus, inasmuch as a unity has learnt to grow out of a plurality and then, through the disintegration of this unity, a plurality arises again, they have a beginning and their existence is not eternal. Yet, in virtue of that perpetual never-ceasing alternation, they are also everlasting—immovable in their cycle.⁴ . . . As it was aforetime, so it will be; nor ever, I trow, will Infinite Time be emptied of these two.⁵ . . . [We see Love expelled from the Universe by Strife.] But as soon as great Strife has waxed fat upon the members [of the Universe] and has sprung to the place of honour in the fullness of the time which has been struck out for them, by a broad oath, to fulfil turn and turn about,⁶ [Strife begins to recede and Love to advance again. In this reverse movement,] when Strife has touched the bottommost depth of the eddy and Love has penetrated to the centre of the vortex, then in Love all

¹ Bazard: 'Exposition de la Doctrine Saint-Simonienne', in *Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, vol. xli (Paris 1877, Leroux), pp. 86-7, 171-2, 177, 205.

² The thoroughly scientific nature of Empedocles' thought is sometimes overlooked, partly because of the brilliance of the imagery in which he conveys ideas which could not be expressed at all except through some kind of symbolism, and partly because, like Erasmus Darwin and Lucretius, he has chosen to expound his system of Natural Science in verse and has employed a traditional and highly mannered style which was originally created for dealing with wholly different subjects and can only be pressed into the service of Physical Science by a *tour de force*.

³ Empedocles, Fragment 17, ll. 1-2. (This and the following references are to Diehls, H.: *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, vol. i: Empedokles.)

⁴ Fragment 17, ll. 6-13.

⁵ Fragment 16.

⁶ Fragment 30.

things coalesce into a sole unity—not abruptly, but spontaneously coming into integration from different quarters. From this mixing flow innumerable families of mortal creatures. Yet many things remain unmixed in the interstices between those that are mingling—namely, all things that Strife still holds back in suspension. For Strife has not made a complete and blameless withdrawal to the uttermost limits of the circle,¹ but has partially continued to inhere while partially withdrawing from the members [of the Universe]. As fast as Strife accomplished each stage of his retreat, blameless Love followed him up in her gentle divine onset; and swiftly there grew into mortal things what before had learnt to be immortal, and there became fused what had formerly been separate: they made the alternation in their courses. From this mixing flow innumerable families of mortal creatures, manifold in their structures, a wonder to behold.² . . . [But Love only completes her conquest in order to be expelled from the Universe in her turn once more.] This is manifest in the members of the human body. In one movement they coalesce into a unity—all the limbs that have been embodied in the hey-day of lusty life; and then in another movement they are dismembered by the evil forces of Strife and are tossed about, each by itself, in the surf where the sea of Life breaks on Life's shore. So is it likewise with plants, and with fish that dwell in the waters, and with beasts that lurk in the mountains, and with birds that plunge on the wing.³

The two alternating forces or phases in the rhythm of the Universe which Empedocles calls Love and Hate have also been detected—quite independently of the movement of Hellenic thought—by observers in the Sinic World, who have named them Yin and Yang.⁴ The nucleus of the Sinic character which stands for Yin seems to represent dark coiling clouds overshadowing the Sun, while the nucleus of the character which stands for Yang seems to represent the unclouded Sun-disk emitting its rays. In the original every-day usage, Yin appears to have signified the side of a mountain or a valley which is in the shadow, and Yang the side which is in the sunshine.⁵ Sinic philosophers conceived Yin and Yang as two different kinds of matter. As substances, Yin symbolized water and Yang fire.⁶ As phases of the Universe, they symbolized the seasons; and the regular annual alternation of the

¹ Presumably 'circle' here means 'sphere', since Empedocles, like some Western men of science of our generation, conceives of the Universe as a finite sphere, though there is no evidence that he shares their further conception of this finite sphere as being unbounded.

² Fragment 35.

³ Fragment 20. The only other relevant passage of Empedocles' poem that survives is Fragment 26, which describes the rhythm in identical terms (by repeating, verbatim, vv. 7-13 of Fragment 17) apropos of the production of living creatures through the rhythmical alternating interaction of the Four Elements.

⁴ They are always mentioned in this order—Yin, the static condition, first, and Yang, the dynamic activity, second—and never the other way round (Forke, A.: *Die Gedankenwelt des chinesischen Kulturkreises* (Munich and Berlin 1927, Oldenbourg), p. 110).

⁵ Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), p. 482.

⁶ Compare the antithesis, in the conceptions of Hellenic physical science, between the damp, foggy, inert, cold *ἀήρ*, and the dry, clear, energetically circulating, fiery *αἰθήρ*.

seasons suggested the Sinic conception of how Yin and Yang are related to one another. Each in turn comes into the ascendant at the other's expense; yet even at the high tide of its expansion it never quite submerges the other, so that, when its tide ebbs, as it always does after reaching high-water mark, there is still a nucleus of the other element left free to expand, as its perpetual rival and partner contracts, until it arrives in due course at the opposite turning-point where the whole movement begins all over again.¹

This Sinic conception of Yin and Yang was taken up and was worked out systematically in metaphysical terms² by the thinkers of the Far Eastern Society (the civilization 'affiliated' to the Sinic) at the intellectual renaissance which occurred in the age of the Sung Dynasty. According to the philosopher Shao Yung (*vivebat* A.D. 1011-77), at the beginning of motion Yang is produced, at its close, Yin; at the beginning of rest the soft is created, at its end, the hard; rest and motion, Yin and Yang, softness and hardness continually alternate and follow one another. According to the five Neo-Confucian philosophers (*vivebant* A.D. 1017-1200), whose thought was summed up by the last and greatest of the five, Chu Hsi (*vivebat* A.D. 1131-1200), the Yin-Yang rhythm is like the rhythmic movement of the lungs in breathing;³ Yin and Yang are contraction and expansion; 'Yang emits and Yin transforms'; it is rare to find either in a pure state, and each brims over into the other;⁴ they are not material substances but abstract correlates of the movement of the fundamental principle of the Universe, Li, which 'rests on Yin and Yang as a rider sits his horse'.⁵

'The Absolute (T'ai-chi) moves and engenders Yang. The movement having reached its climax, rest ensues. From rest springs Yin; and when rest has reached its utmost limit, again movement follows. So we have alternately now movement, now rest. They together form the basis from which by separation grow Yin and Yang, so that these are the two modes.'⁶

The conception, in its final form, is expounded by a gifted Western student of Sinic and Far Eastern thought as follows:

'The Ultimate Principle has operated from all eternity, and now

¹ For the Sinic conception of Yin and Yang, see Forke, A.: *The World-Conception of the Chinese* (London 1925, Probsthain), pp. 161-200.

² This metaphysical treatment, by Far Eastern philosophers, of a Sinic conception which had been applied originally to the Physical Universe, seems to have been suggested by the influence of the Buddhist thought which had entered the Far Eastern world in the vehicle of the Mahayana. (Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), pp. 346-7.)

³ Forke: *Die Gedankenwelt des chinesischen Kulturkreises*, p. 114.

⁴ Hackmann: *Chinesische Philosophie*, p. 335.

⁵ Chu Hsi, quoted by Forke: *Die Gedankenwelt des chinesischen Kulturkreises*, p. 64.

⁶ 'T'ai-chi t'u: Hsing-li ching-i', I. 5 v, quoted by Forke in *The World-Conception of the Chinese*, p. 201. The whole of the foregoing account of the Far Eastern elaboration of the concept of Yin and Yang is taken from Forke, op. cit., pp. 200-23, except where other references are given.

ceaselessly operates, by a dynamical process in virtue of which Animate and Inanimate Nature has existed from all eternity. This process is represented as pulsative, as a succession of active expansive and passive intensive states; which succession, as already indicated, never had a beginning. The Ultimate Principle, in its active expansive operation, constitutes and produces the Yang or Positive Essence; in its passive intensive operation it constitutes and produces the Yin or Negative Essence. When the active expansive phase of the process has reached its extreme limit, the operation becomes passive and intensive; and when the passive intensive phase has reached its extreme limit, the operation again becomes active and expansive: each phase roots in the other in the course of a sort of subjective vibration or twofold expansive and intensive action, which is, however, no motion in space. Not only did all material and mental existence of which we are cognisant originate by the process described—if we may speak of the origination of that which has existed from eternity—but all existences do now subsist in virtue of the same process, operating in ceaseless repetition.¹

Of the various symbols in which different observers in different societies have expressed the alternation between a static condition and a dynamic activity in the rhythm of the Universe, Yin and Yang are the most apt, because they convey the measure of the rhythm direct and not through some metaphor derived from psychology or mechanics or mathematics. We will therefore use these Far Eastern symbols in this Study henceforward; and we shall find that this notation lends itself readily to the music of other civilizations. In the *Magnificat* we shall hear Yin's song of joy at passing over into Yang:

My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour;

For he hath regarded the lowliness of his handmaiden.

In the Chorus Mysticus which is the culmination of the Second Part of *Faust* we shall hear Yang's song of joy at passing back again, when his race is run, into Yin:

Alles vergängliche
Ist nur ein Gleichnis;
Das Unzulängliche,
Hier wird's Ereignis;
Das Unbeschreibliche,
Hier ist's getan;
Das ewig-Weibliche
Zieht uns hinan.²

¹ Meadows, T. T.: *The Chinese and their Rebellions* (London 1856, Smith, Elder), p. 343. Compare Eduard Meyer's 'Was zersetzt, baut auf; und was baut auf, führt wieder zur Zersetzung' (*Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 161); and his 'Jede Idee, sobald sie sich verwirklicht, in ihr Gegenteil umschlägt; denn kein Gedanke vermag die Wirklichkeit in ihrer Totalität zu umfassen' (op. cit., p. 182).

² Goethe: *Faust*, ll. 12104-11.

In the self-revelation of the Spirit of the Earth to the scholar who evokes this mighty power by the vehemence of his mental strife, we shall hear the very beat of the alternating rhythm itself:

In Lebensfluten, im Tatensturm
 Wall' ich auf und ab,
 Webe hin und her!
 Geburt und Grab
 Ein ewiges Meer,
 Ein wechselnd Weben,
 Ein glühend Leben,
 So schaff' ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit
 Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.¹

¹ *Faust*, ll. 501-9.

C. THE CAUSE OF THE GENESES OF CIVILIZATIONS

I. A POSSIBLE NEGATIVE FACTOR: *VIS INERTIAE*

WE have now ascertained the nature of the geneses of civilizations. They are particular beats of a general rhythmical pulsation which runs all through the Universe. Evidently this is as far as we can go in understanding how the geneses of civilizations occur. In this quest we have reached the Pillars of Hercules; τὸ πῶρσω δ' ἔστι σοφοῖς ἄβατον κάσόφοις. οὐ νιν διώξω· κενὸς εἶην.¹ Yet we may still inquire why the geneses of civilizations have occurred when they have. Why did they not begin to occur until less than 6,000 years ago, when Man, after his ascent from Sub-Man, had been lying torpid on the level of Primitive Humanity for some 300,000 years? And if Man was content with his primitive condition so long, what has moved him, during these last six thousand years, to make a score of dynamic efforts to rise above himself and ascend to the level of Superman?

A negative factor which may account for the long pause on the primitive level, before the first attempts at civilization were made, is *vis inertiae*. The effect of this factor is well described by that contemporary Western anthropologist whom we have already quoted² apropos of Yin and Yang, or, as he calls them, 'integrations' and 'differentiations':

'The integrations . . . might with some truth be called resting-places, encampments, on [Man's] nomadic march. For in the evolution of Man, as in that of every other living thing, there are action and reaction between Inertia and Variability. Throughout all the range of Life, resting is easier than movement: there is economy of energy, which, other things being equal, makes for survival. Hence the tendency of organisms to remain in an integration which "works well", that is, in which there is more or less perfect equilibrium between the living creature and the conditions of its survival. So long as the adaptation of the organism to its surroundings is maintained, it may continue to exist unchanged for whole geological periods. This accounts for the persistence down to the present age of archaic forms of life, like *Peripatus*, almost an intermediate form between insect and worm, *Amphioxus*, a very primitive vertebrate, and the Marsupials. In like manner, Man may remain within a certain integration of his life for immense ages, provided the adaptation of his needs and powers to the environment continues substantially the same and no differentiation in his own life, or in that of his fellows, or in the external conditions of existence, calls

¹ Pindar's Third Olympian Ode, *ad fin.*

² On pp. 197-8, above.

for a new effort to secure survival or for an advance to a further stage in his development. Thus he remains for an enormous period at the Palaeolithic stage of culture, as regards his tools and weapons—no doubt because these unpolished flints are sufficient to ensure his survival against the natural conditions which threaten his existence, against the competing animals, and the members of his own species who are no better armed or equipped than he.¹

Our anthropologist calls this Yin-phase, in which Mankind was resting on the level of Primitive Humanity, 'the Integration of Custom', while he gives the name 'Integration of Instinct' to the preceding Yin-phase, in which Sub-Man was resting on his lower ledge before he embarked on his ultimately successful endeavour to achieve humanity.²

'The Integration of Custom, it is vital to observe, recovers much of the static nature and stability of the instinctive stage and of the Integration of Instinct, and thus resists differentiation to a remarkable degree, in virtue of its adaptation to immense variations of the environment—in other words, in virtue of its power of survival without the necessity of new departures. The stability and resistance to differentiation or change on the part of this Integration are so great that it retains a vast portion of uncivilised Mankind at the cultural stage of Tribal Custom through countless generations, and but for the irruption of civilised influences and conditions would, and in many cases does, keep these people in a state of arrested development, resembling those primeval forms of animal and plant life which survive down to the present age. The Integration of Custom is, however, broken through at last by inevitable differentiations. . . .'³

In detail, this observer describes the effect of *vis inertiae*, as operative in the customs of primitive societies, in the following terms:

'The strength of Custom, the custom of the tribe, lies . . . in its adaptation to a stage of mental development in which the effort of action is preferred to the more exacting effort of thought, especially if coordinative and prolonged. Its powerful appeal consists in its evasion, by practical solutions of life's problems, of the strain which reflection imposes upon

¹ Murphy, J.: *Primitive Man: His Essential Quest* (London 1927, Milford), pp. 26-7.

² Can we name the Yang-phases with which these two Yin-phases have alternated? 'The Integration of Custom' has been followed, in the geneses of civilizations, by a 'Differentiation of Intellectual Activity'. Were the two differentiations which respectively followed and preceded 'the Integration of Instinct' intellectual likewise? We have no data that enable us to answer this question in the line of evolution which has led to Man from the common ancestor of Mankind and the Anthropoid Apes. We are more likely to obtain an answer if we turn our attention to the line represented by the insects who still remain in 'the Integration of Instinct'. At least one student of insect life is inclined to think that 'Instinct began as a reasoned act' and that it 'became automatic'—that is, 'became instinctive'—only through a long process of repetition. (Hingston, R. W. G.: *Problems of Instinct and Intelligence* (London 1928, Arnold), p. 268.) This question is taken up again in Part III. A, below, vol. iii, on p. 110.

³ Murphy, op. cit., p. 31.

the ill-developed co-ordinative powers of the savage brain. The result is the formation of a system of belief and practice which so dominates a great portion of Mankind in all ages down to the present, and is, in its own way, so deeply unified, that it deserves to be called the Integration of Custom. . . . Its supreme disadvantage is that the mental effort to break through tribal traditions and age-long practices is as difficult as for the individual to conquer ingrained personal habits, and indeed much more so; for the collective consciousness in the primitive state, and even beyond it, with the social instincts in the heart of it like the iron in reinforced concrete, is extremely resistant to alteration. The tendency to rest in what has proved safe is stronger by far than the adventurous impulse to launch out upon the new and the unknown. This accounts for the innumerable culs-de-sac in the history of the race, the stagnation in which so many tribes remain for long periods. Self-preservation seems all on the side of inertia. . . . This Integration of Custom, Man's next and prolonged resting-place after the Integration of Instinct, is an illustration of the difficulty of maintaining the erect posture of the mind, and of the tendency to relapse to various forms of rest from mental strain and fatigue, which are characteristic of Primitive Man.¹

Vis inertiae, thus entrenched in Custom, accounts well enough for Man's pause on the level of Primitive Humanity for something like 300,000 years; but why is it that, within the last 6,000 years, certain members of the Human Race, in certain societies, have so far overcome their inertia as to pass out of this Yin-state into a new fit of Yang-activity? The more weight we attach to *vis inertiae* as a negative retarding factor, the greater the momentum which we must ascribe to the positive factor, whatever it may be, which has set human life in motion again by its impetus. This unknown quantity must be the next object of our research.

II. POSSIBLE POSITIVE FACTORS

(a) RACE AND ENVIRONMENT

1. Race

The Race Theory and Race Feeling

We are now in search of the positive factor which, within the last 6,000 years, has shaken part of Mankind out of the Yin-state which we may call the 'Integration of Custom' into a Yang-activity which we may call 'the Differentiation of Civilization'. There are several alternative directions in which this positive factor may be looked for. It may be sought in some special quality in the human beings who have made this particular transition from

¹ Murphy, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-3. Compare Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th edition (London 1897, Kegan Paul), pp. 58-60.

Yin to Yang on the twenty-one occasions of which we have knowledge; or it may be sought in some special feature in the environments in which the transition has taken place; or again it may be sought in some interaction between the microcosm and the macrocosm, in some prowess of the Race when confronted with some challenge from the Environment. Let us explore these alternatives one by one. Let us consider first the factor of Race, and second the factor of Environment, each in and by itself. If neither factor appears capable, in isolation, of generating the momentum for which, *ex hypothesi*, we have to account, then we must find our unknown quantity in some product of the two factors, if we are to find it at all. It may be that, when they interact under certain conditions, they produce effects which do not follow from their action under other conditions either separately or together—as air and petrol vapour, when mixed in a carburettor and introduced into a combustion chamber, produce explosions powerful enough to drive the engine of a motor-car, though the air in the atmosphere and the petrol in the petrol-tank remain inert.

Race is the term used to denote some distinctive innate quality in any genus or species or other class or group of living creatures. The racial elements which concern us here are distinctive psychic or spiritual qualities, possibly innate in certain societies of human beings, which may prove to be the positive factor impelling these societies towards civilization. Psychology, however, and particularly Social Psychology, is a study which is still in its infancy; and all discussions of Race, up to date, in which Race is considered from our point of view, depend on the postulate that there is a permanent and precise correlation between hypothetical racial characteristics of a psychic order in human beings and the racial characteristics which are manifest in our human bodily physique. The distinctive marks of Physical Race leap to the eye—even when the eye is untrained and the distinctions are subtle and minute. This general human sensitiveness to Race, in the physical aspect of Human Nature, may be an excrescence from the sexual faculty—though this suggestion is rather discredited by the fact that, within the *Genus Homo*, there are no differences of Physical Race which have the sexual effect of making cross-union sterile. Whatever the explanation of our sensitiveness to Physical Race may be, its undoubted existence as an element in our consciousness is apt to produce two intellectual consequences which are fertile in errors. It makes us assume that a phenomenon of which our perceptions are so acute must be proportionately plain to our understandings, whereas our scientific knowledge about Race in its physical aspect is really not appreciably greater than our knowledge about Race in

its psychic aspect. In the second place, we are led into taking for granted—without proof and even without presumptive evidence—the postulate of a correlation between Physical Race and Psychical Race which we have mentioned just above. Before making these hazardous intellectual leaps in the dark, we seldom pause to reflect that we are setting out to explain one unknown quantity in terms of another.¹

In the Western World of our day, 'racial' explanations of social phenomena are much in vogue. Racial differences of human physique, regarded as immutable in themselves and as bearing witness to likewise immutable racial differences in the human psyche, are supposed to account for the differences which we observe empirically between the fortunes and achievements of different human societies. These 'racial theories', which always start from the two assumptions to which we have drawn attention, are striking examples of one social phenomenon which we have now learnt to discount: to wit, the influence of social environment on historical study.

The belief that differences of Physical Race are immutable is not peculiar to our age or our society. The rhetorical question: 'Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?'² anticipates, in poetic imagery, the modern Western racist's travesty of the modern Western biologist's proposition that acquired characteristics are not transmissible—and the doctrine is not the more securely established for being formulated in prose. The present vogue of racialism in the West, however, has really little to do with current scientific hypotheses. A prejudice so strong as this cannot be accounted for by a cause so rational. Modern Western racial prejudice is not so much a distortion of Western scientific thought as a pseudo-intellectual reflection of Western race-feeling; and this feeling, as we see it in our time, is a consequence of the expansion of our Western Civilization over the face of the Earth since the last quarter of the fifteenth century of our era.

The feeling has been aroused by contact, often under untoward conditions, between societies whose members happen to stand at opposite extremes of the range of variety in Physical Race which is to be found in the *Genus Homo*. Our Western Civilization happens to have emerged and developed among peoples in Western Europe who belong, in their physique, to certain varieties of 'the White Race' which our ethnologists have labelled 'Caucasian'. In

¹ 'Hier hat erst unsere Zeit dem äusseren Gegensatz eine innere Bedeutung beigelegt, und manche ins Absurde überspannte Theorien haben dem Rassenfaktor eine Bedeutung zugeschrieben, die ihm niemals zugekommen ist und aller geschichtlichen Erfahrung ins Gesicht schlägt.' (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 77.)

² Jeremiah, xiii. 23.

exploring the whole surface of the planet, these White Westerners have come across representatives of all the other physical races of Mankind; and in most of the permanent settlements which they have made, beyond the narrow borders of Western Europe, overseas, they have come to live intermingled geographically with members of one or more of these other races: in America, South Africa, and East Africa with African negroes; in the two latter regions with representatives of the dark-skinned races of India, as well; in Australia with the altogether primitive 'Blackfellows'; in New Zealand with the Polynesian Maoris; and in all parts of Australasia, as well as along the Pacific coast of North America, with representatives of the so-called Yellow Race from China and Japan.

In all these countries overseas where White people from Western Europe have settled cheek by jowl with representatives of other races, there are three elements in the situation which between them go far towards accounting for the strength and virulence of Western race-feeling in our time. First, the White people have established an ascendancy over the people of other races with whom they have come to share their new homes. Secondly, these White masters have almost everywhere abused their power in some way and in some degree. Thirdly, they are haunted by a perpetual fear that some day the positions may be reversed; that by weight of superior numbers or by more successful adaptation to the local climate or by ability to survive on a lower level of subsistence or by readiness to do harder physical or intellectual work, the Man of Colour may eventually bring the White Man's ascendancy to an end and perhaps even establish an ascendancy of his own over the White Man. The 'first shall be last, and the last first';¹ and, if ever this comes to pass, the White Man's children must expect to have the sins of their fathers visited on their heads, for, in the consciousness of 'under-dog', the past is ever present. These considerations enter into the race-feeling of Western settlers overseas; and it is the feeling of these frontiersmen on the subject of Race that determines the feeling of our Western Society as a whole.²

¹ Mark x. 31.

² In the homelands of our Western Society in Europe, which are thickly populated by White people with no appreciable admixture of other racial strains, no contact with members of other races in the experience of daily life, and no fear of Coloured people coming into Europe from abroad to swamp or subjugate the White Race here at home, race-feeling is dormant most of the time, and, even when aroused, is seldom excited to a high pitch. Yet, just on this account, public opinion among White people at home is prone to acquiesce in the attitude and the policy, with regard to Race, which are pressed upon them by White people who have settled in countries overseas. They acquiesce because they feel that, after all, Race is the overseas peoples' problem and not theirs and that they ought not to withhold support from their own kinsmen out in the wilderness, who, in enlarging the domain of the White Race at the expense of other races, are in some sense fighting the battle of all White Men, wherever they happen to be domiciled. Hence, in this matter, it is not the White Man in Europe but the European settler overseas who sets the tone.

The Protestant Background of our Modern Western Race-feeling

The race-feeling which is thus aroused in our Western Society by the present situation and temper of our settlers overseas also springs naturally from the religious background of those Western people who are of the Protestant persuasion.¹

In our Western history, the Protestant movement started immediately before the movement of overseas settlement; and, in the eighteenth century of our era, the competition between the peoples of Western Europe for the command of the overseas world ended in the victory of the English-speaking Protestants, who secured for themselves the lion's share of those overseas countries, inhabited by primitive peoples, that were suitable for settlement by Europeans, as well as the lion's share of the countries inhabited by adherents of the living non-Western civilizations who were incapable at the time of resisting Western conquest and domination. The outcome of the Seven Years' War decided that the whole of North America, from the Arctic Circle to the Rio Grande, should be populated by new nations of European origin whose cultural background was the Western Civilization in its English Protestant version, and that a Government instituted by English Protestants and informed with their ideas should become paramount over the whole of Continental India. Thus the race-feeling engendered by the English Protestant version of our Western culture became the determining factor in the development of race-feeling in our Western Society as a whole.

This has been a misfortune for Mankind, for the Protestant temper and attitude and conduct in regard to Race, as in many other vital issues, is inspired largely by the Old Testament; and in matters of Race the promptings of this old-fashioned Syriac oracle are very clear and very savage.² The 'Bible Christian' of European origin and race who has settled among peoples of non-European race overseas has inevitably identified himself with Israel obeying the will of Jehovah and doing the Lord's work by taking possession of the Promised Land, while he has identified the non-Europeans

¹ As the following analysis of the historical relation between Protestantism and modern Western race-feeling might conceivably be misinterpreted as an expression of religious prejudice in the mind of the writer, it may be pertinent for him to mention that he was brought up as a Protestant and that he has not become a Catholic.—A. J. T.

² The Old Testament, of course, is only representative of the Syriac religious genius in its young and callow phase; and even in this phase, towards its latter end, there was an outburst of spiritual experience and spiritual creation—recorded in the Books of the Prophets—which points forward to the New Testament. It is in the New Testament, manifestly, that the Syriac religious genius is revealed at its zenith. It was an unfortunate perversity that led the founders of Protestantism in our modern Western Christendom to seek their main inspiration partly in the pre-prophetic books of the Old Testament and partly in the theology of one latter-day Syriac man of genius, St. Augustine of Hippo (a Syriac saint whose true spiritual legacy to Mankind was not the doctrine of Predestination).

who have crossed his path with the Canaanites whom the Lord has delivered into the hand of his Chosen People to be destroyed or subjugated.¹ Under this inspiration, the English-speaking Protestant settlers in the New World exterminated the North American Indian, as well as the bison, from coast to coast of the Continent, whereas the Spanish Catholics only exterminated the Indian in the Caribbean Islands and were content, on the Continent, to step into the shoes of the Aztecs and the Incas—sparing the conquered in order to rule them as subject populations, converting their subjects to their own religion, and inter-breeding with their converts.²

Again, the English Protestants took up the trade in negro slaves from Africa to the New World and afterwards obtained the monopoly of this trade as one of the perquisites in the Peace Settlement at Utrecht (A.D. 1713). The Spanish and Portuguese Catholic settlers bought the human merchandise which the Protestant slave-traders offered them; but the Spanish and Portuguese Empires and the 'successor-states' which eventually took their place as independent states members of the Western Society were not the fields in which the institution of plantation slavery, which had thus been introduced into the New World, struck deepest root and grew to the most formidable proportions. The stage on which the tragedy of negro slavery in the New World was played out on the grand scale was an English-speaking Protestant country: the United States.

Finally, in Continental India, where the English could not think of supplanting the conquered 'natives' as they had supplanted them in North America,³ but could only impose their rule on them as the Spaniards had imposed theirs on the 'Natives' of Mexico and Peru, the sequel was not the same as it had been in the Spanish Indies. In British India, unlike Spanish America, only a negligible number of the 'Natives' were converted to the religion of the ruling race or were physically assimilated to it by interbreeding. For

¹ When the first translation of the Bible into a Teutonic language was made by Ulfilas, the apostle of the Goths, in the fourth century of our era, the translator wisely omitted the Books of Samuel and Kings, on the ground that war and bloodshed were too much in the minds of the Goths as it was, without their proclivity in this direction being consecrated and confirmed by the authority of the sacred book of their new religion. It is a pity that Luther and the English translators did not follow Ulfilas' example—or, indeed, improve on it by omitting Joshua and Judges as well! King James I's English Authorized Version of the Bible, which presents the Old Testament complete and unexpurgated, was published in A.D. 1611. A book called *The New English Canaan*, by Thomas Morton, was published in 1637!

² For the history of the vein of ruthlessness in English colonization, see II. C (ii) (a) 1, Annex, below.

³ The reasons are almost too obvious to need mentioning. In the first place, Europeans could not hope to make themselves at home in the Indian climate, even if they had found, or made, the soil of India free from other human occupants. In the second place, the existing 'Native' population of India was too numerous and too far advanced in civilization to be exterminated, even if our British Israelites had ever contemplated treating the Canaanite in India as they treated him in America.

good or evil, the English Protestant rulers of India have distinguished themselves from all other contemporary Western rulers over non-Western peoples by the rigidity with which they have held aloof from their subjects. They took to the Hindu institution of caste as readily¹ as if they had not found it established in India when they came but had invented it for their own convenience.

I once had an opportunity of seeing our old-fashioned Protestant zeal for the Lord through other Western eyes.

At a date some time after Signor Mussolini's march on Rome, I was lecturing at a summer school in a university in New England where one of my colleagues was a Senator of the Kingdom of Italy. The Senator's subject was the present position of Italy in the World—her achievements and her necessities, her claims and her grievances. This exposition was punctuated by rattlings of his sabre and tramlings of his jack-boots; and his English-speaking Protestant audience was neither impressed nor amused. As I watched their composed, disapproving countenances, I could read what was passing in their minds: 'Here is another foreigner, another naughty child—naughty, but not dangerous, because he cannot really act up to his parade; but it is shocking behaviour, and it shall have no encouragement from us.' I soon realized that the poor Senator read their minds as clearly as I did. (He had lived in England for years and understood the 'Anglo-Saxon' mentality.) In each successive lecture in the course, he struck his attitudes with less and less verve and breathed his fire and slaughter with less and less conviction. Undoubtedly he realized that his performance was producing just the opposite effect to what was intended; but, no less certainly, he was bound by precise instructions and had been warned to produce documentary evidence (in the shape of a short-hand record) that he had carried out these instructions to the letter, under pain of losing his head—or at any rate his senatorial *lati-clavium*—on his return to his native land. I became quite sorry for the Senator as his unheroic self-martyrdom went on; and I could see that the President of the university—a kindly man—was sorry too. As a mark of courtesy and esteem, the President invited the Senator, who was a bibliophil, to inspect the university library one day when our session was drawing to a close, and I happened to be included in the party. The chief treasure of the library was a Bible printed in the seventeenth century in the language of the Red Indians who had inhabited this part of New England at that time;

¹ 'Readily', but not instantaneously, for the English in India did not fall into the practice of complete social segregation from 'the Natives' immediately upon their first arrival. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was a certain amount of social intercourse and racial intermixture between English and Indians which was discontinued in the nineteenth century and has not been renewed in the twentieth century on any considerable scale or with any noteworthy success.

and as the Senator handled the precious volume, his features relaxed and lighted up. 'This book is very rare, then?' he asked. 'There are not half-a-dozen copies known', replied the President proudly. 'Then the Indians do not read it nowadays?' the Senator went on. 'Why, no, you see', explained the President, 'the Indians are no longer there.' 'Why, what happened to the Indians?' asked the Senator brightly, with an innocent air—and at that question the President's speech became confused. He hummed and hawed, he stuttered and stammered, till at last the words came out like the knocks of the engine in a motor-car if you try to start it on top gear: 'What happened to the Indians? Well, the Indians, you know—the fact is, the Indians disappeared.' The Senator, listening politely, said never a word; but a smile appeared at either corner of his mouth and spread so broadly that I began to wonder whether, like the smile of the Cheshire Cat, it would meet round the back of his head. In that moment, weeks of suffering were revenged; and as I saw him savouring his revenge in his cultivated Latin way, I found myself repeating, under my breath, the ballad of those true-blue Protestant pioneers, the Walrus and the Carpenter, who wept with pity as the devouring Zeal of the Lord constrained them to eat up the devoted and defenceless oysters. Between this Protestant method of conversion by extermination and the methods of the Jesuit missionaries in Canada and Paraguay there is indeed a great gulf fixed.

Of course the fanaticism and ferocity of the race-feeling which the Old Testament once instilled into Protestant souls have both considerably abated as Protestantism itself has evolved through Rationalism towards Agnosticism. First the traffic in negro slaves, and finally the very institution of negro slavery in the New World, have been abolished by the English-speaking peoples themselves under the promptings of their own consciences and at the price of their own blood and treasure; and the attitude of the Englishman in India towards the people of India is no longer the attitude of unmitigated aloofness and superiority that it used to be. The improvement in feeling and conduct has certainly been very great. Yet even now this improvement is only partial and is still precarious.

The slavery once imposed nakedly on uprooted and transplanted Black Men by immigrant White Men of English speech and Protestant faith in the New World will be imposed under camouflage, in our generation, on other Black Men in the homeland of the Black Race by the Dutch and English settlers in South and East Africa, if these settlers once obtain a free hand to deal with the native African peoples at their discretion; and this revival of negro slavery—this time on the negro's native continent—will not be the

less pernicious for being hypocritically disguised. The battle over negro slavery, which was fought out in the New World during the century ending with the end of the American Civil War, may have to be fought out in Africa once again; and even if Light discomfits Darkness for the second time, the sequel to the American battle over this issue shows how hard it is for the Light to drive the Darkness altogether off the field. In the United States, where negro slavery has been abolished at so great a cost, race-feeling remains to perpetuate the social evils of racial inequality and racial segregation. We can foresee that in Africa, too, the sequel, at the best, will be the same. The young communities of English-speaking White people in the United States and in the Union of South Africa and in Kenya Colony, upon whose future the more distant prospects of our 'Anglo-Saxon' version of Western culture very largely depend, are already in the grip of the paralysing institution of Caste.¹

Meanwhile, the successive phases of Protestant race-feeling have left their mark on our Western thought in the form of various race-theories, as a slowly dying volcano leaves a record of successive eruptions in the petrified streams of lava that permanently disfigure its flanks.

Among English-speaking Protestants there are still to be found some 'Fundamentalists' who believe themselves to be 'the Chosen People' in the literal sense of the term as it is used in the Old Testament. This 'British Israel' confidently traces its physical descent from the lost Ten Tribes. We may leave it to dispute its claim to the title with the rival claimants, the most redoubtable of whom are the Afghans and the Abyssinians.²

There are other English-speaking Protestants—or ex-Protestants, for these would count themselves among the number of the intellectually emancipated—who hold the doctrine of 'British Israel' in a figurative or metaphorical sense. Without contending that the English-speaking peoples of the White Race³ are descended from the Children of Israel after the flesh, these transcendentalist 'British Israelites' do maintain that they have succeeded to the Israelites' role of being 'the Chosen People' in a spiritual sense—that the mantle of Elijah has fallen upon Elisha, whether by some divine

¹ This institution is discussed in Parts VIII and IX, below.

² Perhaps the Abyssinians ought strictly to be regarded as *hors concours*, since they have 'gone one better' than their competitors. The Abyssinians have scorned the Ten Tribes and have claimed Judah for their father. The Negus Negusti styles himself officially, down to this day, 'the Lion of the Tribe of Judah' (see Genesis xlix. 9, and Revelations v. 5).

³ This qualification has to be added for strict accuracy, since 'the English-speaking peoples' in the literal sense include nowadays some millions of Negroes and cross-breeds who speak English as their mother tongue, and many peoples, from India to Japan inclusive, for whom English is a second language, supplementing the mother tongue as an indispensable *lingua franca*.

slight of hand or by the accident of which way the wind blew when the mantle was in the air. However it may have happened, the English-speaking peoples have become (on this view) the Heirs of the Kingdom, the depositories of the hopes and capacities of Mankind, the chosen vessels through whose instrumentality the Human Race is destined to attain to the goal of its endeavours. This doctrine is resonantly enunciated in Mr. Rudyard Kipling's *Recessional*.

There are others, again, who seek justification for their race-feeling in theories that purport to be objective, rational, and scientific. These rationalists are chasing a will-o'-the-wisp; for the race-feeling which is the *primum mobile* of their intellectual antics is an emotion fired by a religious spark, and any theory in which this emotion is reflected will prove, on analysis, to be emotional and religious like its original. The irrational nucleus can never be conjured away, however scientifically it may be fumigated or sterilized. *Tamen usque recurret*.¹ The most popular of the idols that have been set up by this rather priggish and pedantic school of superstition is 'Nordic Man': the xanthotrichous, glaucopian, dolichocephalic variety of *Homo Leucodermaticus* whose pet name (given him by Nietzsche) is 'the Blond Beast'. The votaries of this Racial God Incarnate maintain that all human achievements of any value in their eyes are his doing, and his alone. Before we bow down and worship this false god, let us see how far we may be able to account for his cult by the social environment in which it has arisen and maintained itself.

'Nordic Man' was first placed on his pedestal by a French aristocrat, the Count de Gobineau, who was active between the Restoration of A.D. 1815 and the Revolution of 1848.² De Gobineau's idolization of 'the Blond Beast' was an incident in the French political controversies of the age. In the Revolution of 1789, when the French nobility were being dispossessed of their estates by the peasantry and were emigrating as refugees to Coblenz, the pedants in the revolutionary ranks, who were never happy if they could not present the events of the day in classical guise, proclaimed that the Gauls, after fourteen centuries of subjection, were driving their Frankish conquerors back into the outer darkness beyond the Rhine from which they had originally emerged, and were resuming possession of the Gallic soil which, despite the long barbarian

¹ Horace: *Epistles*, Book I, Epistle 10, verse 24.

² It is noteworthy that David Hume (*vivebat* A.D. 1711-76), in his essay *Of National Characters*, deals with the problem of the empirically observed differences between one human society and another almost exclusively in terms of the question whether the physical environment or the social environment is the differentiating factor to which these differences are to be ascribed. In Hume's essay, the Race-theory is barely mentioned—except for one footnote in which the author records some considerations which incline him 'to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites'.

usurpation, had never ceased to be rightfully their own. De Gobineau's cult of 'Nordic Man' was a reactionary 'scientific' counterblast to this revolutionary classical conceit.

'I accept your identifications', de Gobineau replied in effect to the revolutionary pedants of the generation before him. 'Let us agree that the populace of France is descended from the Gauls and the aristocracy from the Franks; that both races have bred pure; and that there is a definite and permanent correlation between their physical and their psychical characteristics. Well, now you have delivered yourselves into my hands. You imagine, do you, that your Gauls stand for civilization and my Franks for barbarism? Let me tell you that you have got hold of the wrong end of the stick. Whence came such civilization as your Gauls ever acquired? Of course, from Rome. And what made Rome grow great? Why, a primeval infusion of the same Nordic blood that flowed in my Franks' veins. The first Romans—and likewise the first Greeks, the Achaeans of Homer—were fair-haired, blue-eyed conquerors who descended from the invigorating North and established their dominion over the feebler natives of the enervating Mediterranean. As long as their blood remained pure, their civilization went from strength to strength; but, alas, climate and numbers were both working against them. In the long run, their blood was diluted and their race enfeebled, and *pari passu* their power and their glory declined. The Roman civilization of which the Gauls were privileged to partake was no longer the Roman civilization of the great age; and within five centuries of Caesar's conquest of Gaul the Roman stock was exhausted altogether. The time had come for another rescue-party of fair-haired, blue-eyed conquerors to descend from the invigorating North in order to set the pulse of civilization beating again. My Franks were the heroes who volunteered!'

This political *jeu d'esprit* was given countenance by a contemporary scientific discovery which de Gobineau was quick to take up and turn to account. It was discovered that almost all the living languages of Europe as well as ancient Greek and Latin, and the living languages of Persia and Northern India as well as the classical Iranian of the Avesta and the classical Sanskrit of the Vedas, were related to one another as members of a single vast linguistic family. It was rightly inferred that there must have been an *Ursprache*, a primeval 'Aryan' or 'Indo-European' language, from which all the known languages of the family derived their common descent. It was wrongly inferred that the peoples among whom these languages were current were physically related in the same degrees as the languages themselves, and that they were all descended from a primeval 'Aryan' or 'Indo-European' race which

had spread conquering and to conquer, east and west and south and north, from its original home. A race which had brought forth the religious genius of Zarathustra and Gautama Buddha, the artistic genius of Greece, the political genius of Rome, and the all-embracing genius of our Western Society! Why, this race was responsible for practically all the achievements of human civilization. By comparison, anything that any other races had ever accomplished was negligible. The Indo-European stock must have some unique quality which distinguished it *in toto* from all other breeds of *Genus Homo*. It only remained to identify this hypothetical and almost certainly fabulous 'Indo-European Race' with the well-known fair-haired, blue-eyed, long-headed type of White Man, and the apotheosis was complete.

Starting from the pedantic polemics of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary French politics, and taking the Indo-European hypothesis in his stride, de Gobineau worked out a racial theory of history which he expounded in a brilliant book with the provocative title *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines*. The following passage presents the gist of his thesis in clear and forcible terms:

'Il est donc établi:

'1° Que les tribus actuellement sauvages l'ont toujours été, quelque soit le milieu supérieur qu'elles aient pu traverser, et qu'elles le seront toujours; 2° que, pour qu'une nation sauvage puisse même supporter le séjour dans un milieu civilisé, il faut que la nation qui crée ce milieu soit un rameau plus noble de la même race; 3° que la même circonstance est encore nécessaire pour que des civilisations diverses puissent, non pas se confondre, ce qui n'arrive jamais, seulement se modifier fortement l'une par l'autre, se faire de riches emprunts réciproques, donner naissance à d'autres civilisations composées de leurs éléments; 4° que les civilisations issues de races complètement étrangères l'une à l'autre ne peuvent que se toucher à la surface, ne se pénétrer jamais et s'excluent toujours.'

De Gobineau's theory has been plagiarized, refurbished, elaborated, and popularized, but never reproduced in its original brilliance nor enriched with a single new idea, by a host of adepts since his time, each of whom has had his own axe to grind. The hare which the vivacious Frenchman had started was run by heavy-footed German philologists who improved the word 'Indo-European' into 'Indo-Germanic' and located the original home of the primeval 'Indo-Germans' on that portion of the North European plain which happened to be occupied in their day by the Kingdom of Prussia. In the reign of the Emperor William II, an

¹ De Gobineau, le Comte J. A.: *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (Paris 1853-5, Firmin Didot, 4 vols.), vol. I, p. 293.

English Germanophil joined in the chase with a 'zeal of the convert' which put the German devotees of 'Nordic Man' out of countenance. Houston Stewart Chamberlain's insatiable imagination ranged through the great civilizations and the great peoples and the great men and women of history, seeking whom it might devour, and it did not rest until it had swept them all into the Blond Beast's maw. Not content with finding a Nordic ancestry for Charlemagne and for 'fair-haired Menelaus', he found it for Dante and for Jesus Christ. Is it not written in *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*?¹ The fine flower of Nordicism, for Houston Stewart Chamberlain, was the Imperial Germany which was on the eve of coming to grief in the General War of 1914-18.²

Cheviated out of Europe by the clash of arms, de Gobineau's hare audaciously leapt the Atlantic and created a furore in the United States, where 'top-dog' was just in the mood for the sport. In the Southern States, where the Nordic strain in the physical race of the White population is perceptibly strong, the Nordic Gospel brought its converts glad tidings of effortless superiority, not only over the despicable negro in their midst, but over the formidable Yankee in the North. In the rivalry between South and North, the Yankee had won the last round—the Civil War—but during the ensuing half century he had mixed his 'Nordic' gold with the 'Alpine' and 'Mediterranean' alloy of a stupendous immigration—from Southern and Eastern Europe which had given the South the go-by. Racially, the Yankee was no longer the man he once was, while the Southerner had been saved by misfortune from the temptation to sell his birth-right. Through the days of adversity, he had kept intact the priceless heritage of the finest blood in the World. His heart beat faster as the Nordic Gospel proclaimed to his eager ears that he was not down-and-out after all, and that if ever he tried conclusions with the Yankee again, the verdict of the Civil War might be reversed. His lips hummed a new song: 'My strength is as the strength of ten, because my race is pure.' And meanwhile, in the North, where the immigrants from Europe were being re-inspired by forgotten sentiments and recalled to discarded loyalties through the psychic effects of the European War, the same Gospel was producing, not elation, but a revival, in a terrifying guise, of that old Protestant fear of eternal damnation which had ceased to haunt the descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers in its primitive theological form.

'What shall we do to be saved? We had flattered ourselves, in our

¹ *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, by Chamberlain, H. S.: English edition (London 1911, Lane, 2 vols.).

² This chapter was written before the cult of Nordic Man became part of the officially established creed of the German Reich as a result of the National-Socialist Revolution of 1933.

foolish pride, that the United States was a melting-pot in which any kind of Europeans could be turned into a-hundred-per-cent. Americans in any quantities. We were living in the same fool's paradise as those medieval alchemists who thought that they had discovered the art of transmuting base metal into gold; and now, under the test of the War, the futility of our social alchemy is exposed. We have not given the immigrant an American soul; we have only given him a hyphen; and when it comes to a tug of war between the two loyalties on either side of the line, it is the German- or the Irish- or the Polish- or the Italian-, and never the -American, that wins. And why have we failed to Americanize the immigrant's soul? Confronted with this vital question, we have opportunely discovered the new Science of Race, which supplies a convincing answer and indicates the action which we ought to take. We have failed to Americanize the immigrant's soul because Soul and Body are rigidly correlated by the first law of Race, while the second law of Race informs us that bodily characteristics are immutable. The descendants of the "Alpine" Jew from the Pale and of the "Mediterranean" peasant from Sicily will remain "Alpines" and "Mediterraneans" still unto the third and fourth and four-hundredth generation¹; and, as far as they inter-marry with our own

¹ In the time immediately before the outbreak of the General War of 1914-18, when the volume of annual net immigration from Europe into the United States was at its maximum and the confidence of the American people in their own powers of assimilation was at its height, an American ethnologist, Professor Boas of Columbia University, conducted an investigation in New York at the instance of the United States immigration authorities and presented evidence purporting to show that the American-born children of the 'Alpine' Jewish immigrant from the Pale, with his brachycephalic skull, and of the 'Mediterranean' immigrant from Sicily, with his dolichocephalic skull, were both alike born with a skull which differed perceptibly from the skulls of the parents in each case, but tended in both cases to approximate towards the mesocephalic skull-type of the 'a-hundred-per-cent American' New Yorker. (See Hendrick, B. T.: 'The Skulls of our Immigrants', in *McClure's Magazine*, May 1910; and the following works by Professor Franz Boas himself: *Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants* (Washington, D.C. 1912, Govt. Printing Office = 61st Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Documents, vol. 64, Document No. 208); *Kultur und Rasse* (Leipzig 1914, Veit), chap. iii; *Materials for the Study of Inheritance in Man* = Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology, vol. vi (New York 1928, Columbia University Press, and London 1929, Milford). Compare also the belief, which was held by the Arabic philosopher Ibn Khaldūn, that Negro peoples which migrate northwards eventually turn white and that White peoples that migrate to the tropics eventually turn black (Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG., vol. i (Paris 1863, Imprimerie Impériale), p. 172. Ibn Khaldūn's view is upheld by one school of modern Western ethnologists. See, for example, Dixon, R. B.: *The Racial History of Man* (New York 1923, Scribner), pp. 479-81 and 494-5; and Taylor, Griffith: *Environment and Race* (Oxford 1927, University Press), pp. 33-4.)

Professor Boas's evidence produced a flutter in the dove-cots of Ethnological Science, since the majority of modern Western ethnologists had formed the opinion that the proportions between the length and breadth of the human skull were transmitted without change through any number of generations, and they had accordingly taken these skull-measurements as their chief criterion for classifying Mankind into races. It is not surprising to learn that Professor Boas's contention was rejected by the majority of his fellow-ethnologists as non-proven. In this controversy, we may be content, for our part, to be neutrals and agnostics. We will merely point out that, whereas Professor Boas's opponents regarded him as a subversive revolutionary who was proposing to destroy the whole basis on which the modern Western Science of Ethnology had been

American stock, they will merely contaminate our Nordic purity without eliminating those inalienable "Alpine" and "Mediterranean" qualities of body and soul which the immigrants have brought with them. In the language of our ancestral Calvinistic theology, it is impossible by human efforts to wash away the taint of original sin or to save a vessel of destruction. All that human providence can do—and it is common prudence to do it—is to exclude the lost soul and tainted body from the community of the just.'

This 'scientific' version of orthodox Protestant theology is expounded in the works of Mr. Madison Grant and Mr. Lothrop Stoddard. The efforts of a nation, converted to the Nordic Gospel wholesale, to save its 'a-hundred-per-cent Americanism', have gone into action in the United States Immigration (Restriction) Acts of 1921 and 1924.

The most ethereal of the intellectual forms in which our modern Western race-feeling has expressed itself is the theory of 'the Diffusionist School' of British anthropologists with which we deal in this Study in another chapter.¹ In this theory, the egocentric mania which stalks naked in the cults of 'British Israel' and 'Nordic Man' is so modestly clad and so scientifically presented that it gives us something of a shock to detect its presence here too. In each of the race-theories that we have examined so far, the monopoly of the unique magical quality, to which all human achievement is ascribed, is attributed to some fraction of Mankind in which the theorist himself is included. The 'British Israelites' claim this monopoly for British-born British subjects domiciled in the United Kingdom; the Nordacists claim it for all White Men with fair hair and blue eyes and a middling-shaped skull; others claim it for all White Men whatsoever. These theories differ only in regard to the size of the fraction of Mankind in which the monopoly of the magical quality is supposed to be vested. They all agree in selecting a fraction, large or small, which happens to include the people by whom the several theories are held. In

erected, he never challenged what is the fundamental postulate of all race-theories: that is, the postulate that physical and psychical characteristics are correlated. The assumption underlying Professor Boas's argument was that, if the children of immigrants turned out to have 'a-hundred-per-cent American' skulls, this meant that they also had 'a-hundred-per-cent American' souls. ('This fact [i.e. the alleged difference in skull-measurements between immigrants and their children] is . . . suggestive . . . because it shows that not even those characteristics of a race which have proved to be most permanent in their old home remain the same under the new surroundings; and we are compelled to conclude that when these features of the body change, the whole bodily and mental [sic] make-up of the immigrants may change'—Boas: *Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants*, p. 5. The postulate of a fixed correlation between bodily and mental changes is made with still greater emphasis on p. 76.) From this assumption it would follow logically that, if their skulls proved to have remained un-American after all, their souls must have remained un-American likewise. From our standpoint, Professor Boas and his opponents are in the same camp.

¹ In I. C. (iii) (b), Annex, below.

contrast with all these vulgar egoists and 'low-brows', the 'British Diffusionists' bestow the priceless monopoly upon a fraction of Mankind which lived between four and five thousand years ago and from which the founders of this school are not themselves descended. In their view, 'the Chosen People', the uniquely gifted and creative race, were the ancient Egyptians of the age of the pyramid-builders. In their belief, the inhabitants of Egypt in that age invented 'Civilization', and their descendants, 'the Children of the Sun',¹ conveyed the invention at least half-way round the World: from Egypt to 'Irāq, from 'Irāq to India and China, from India to Indonesia, from China to Peru. The patrons of these *Kulturträger* maintain that their passage has left traces which, where found in combination, may be taken as sure evidence that 'the Chosen People' did once pass that way. The chief of these tokens are the techniques of agriculture and irrigation, the institutions of Caste and War, the art of carving the human form in stone, and the worship of the Sun.² Nowadays, however, these traces are mostly vestigial; for the civilization thus invented and propagated could not outlast the race of the propagators. While the advance-guard of this ever-advancing race has been perpetually carrying its 'heliolithic' civilization to fresh societies of primitive men, the garrisons which they have left behind at the successive halting-places on their march have been perpetually dying out; and, wherever this has happened, the primitive population whom the god-like strangers found when they came, and left behind them when they disappeared, have been unable to maintain the civilization which had been imparted to them—or imposed on them—by alien hands. Hence, in every successive zone in which it has been planted, the 'heliolithic' civilization has burst into sudden flower, enjoyed a brief bloom, and then degenerated, like the seed of the sower in the parable when it fell upon stony places.

The preachers of this 'diffusion theory' marshal, on behalf of it, such a mass of anthropological evidence that at first sight we may fail to perceive that they are simply showing off de Gobineau's 'Nordic Man' in a new suit of clothes, and that their anthropological frills are just as adventitious as de Gobineau's philological war-paint. Yet so it is. The lay figure employed in the staging of both theophanies is the same.

¹ How different from 'the Citizens of the Sun' who were led to die in a forlorn hope by Aristonicus of Pergamum. These were not a 'Chosen People' but proletarians who naturalized themselves as citizens of another heavenly body, because, on the surface of this planet, they had not where to lay their heads. (For these Heliopolites, see further Part V below.)

² The full list of fifteen culture elements which are alleged to be characteristic of 'the Children of the Sun' will be found in Perry, W. J.: *The Children of the Sun* (London 1923, Methuen), p. 406.

In placing their treasure in the ancient Egyptians instead of in 'Nordic Man', the 'British Diffusionists' have merely performed the psychical operation which psychologists call 'transference'. They have transferred their interests and affections and delusions from the living society of which they themselves are members to one of those extinct societies which their own society has adopted as its protégées¹; but, in doing this, they have not exorcized the self-regarding emotion from which the impulse to spin a race-theory arises, and therefore have not escaped the intellectual errors to which all theories inspired by egoism are prone. 'The Children of the Sun', spreading the light of civilization, widdershins, from Suez to Panama, are wraiths of 'Nordic Man' spreading the same light southwards from the sunny shores of the Baltic to the Cimmerian darkness of the Mediterranean. The resemblance extends to details; for, in both theories, the illumination is ever ephemeral. The Sun of Civilization has to rise afresh day by day; the inferior races of Mankind have to be invigorated again and again with fresh grafts from Nordic or Egyptian monkey-glands. What is to become of poor Humanity on the evil and inevitable day when the magic store of Simian vitality is exhausted?

We have now completed our examination of our modern Western race-feeling, the social environment in which it has arisen, and the theories in which it has expressed itself. We can discount the theories to the extent to which the environment accounts for them; and it accounts for them so largely that we might safely venture to discount them altogether. We prefer, however, to give them the *coup de grâce* by deploying certain positive facts against which they cannot stand.

The first of these facts is that our modern Western race-feeling—inspired, as we have seen it to be, by the spirit imbibed from the Old Testament by Protestantism—was unknown in our Western Society in earlier times and has failed to assert itself in certain sections of this Western Society down to this day. During the so-called 'Dark Ages' and 'Middle Ages'—that is to say, during the eight centuries ending about the last quarter of the fifteenth century of our era—the members of our Western Society, when they thought of Mankind as a whole, were accustomed to divide the human family into two categories, as we divide it nowadays. The principle of division, however, was utterly different. Instead of dividing Mankind, as we do, into White people and Coloured people, our forefathers divided it into Christians and Heathen; and

¹ For the indulgence shown by Western public opinion towards extinct civilizations which have been rescued from oblivion by the brilliant achievements of Western archaeologists, see above, I. C (iii) (b), p. 155, footnote 5.

we are bound to confess that their dichotomy was better than ours both intellectually and morally. It was better intellectually because a human being's religion is a vastly more important and significant factor in his life than the colour of his skin, and is therefore a vastly better criterion for purposes of classification. Again, the dichotomy into Christians and Heathen is better morally than the dichotomy into White and Coloured, because the gulf between religions, unlike the gulf between races, is not impassable. It is a division between sheep in the fold and sheep astray on the mountains, not between sheep and goats.

In the eyes of the medieval Western Christian, when he looked abroad upon the World, the Heathen, wandering unkempt in the wilderness, were neither incurably unclean nor irretrievably lost. Potentially, they were Christians like himself; and he looked forward to a time when all the lost sheep would be gathered into the fold. Indeed, he looked forward to this with assurance as the fore-ordained consummation of terrestrial history, the fulfilment of God's purpose in the World. In this spirit, medieval Western artists used to portray one of the three Magi as a Negro. How different from the spirit in which the white-skinned Western Protestant of modern times regards his black-skinned convert. The convert may have found spiritual salvation in the White Man's faith; he may have acquired the White Man's culture and learnt to speak his language with the tongue of an angel; he may have become an adept in the White Man's economic technique, and yet it profits him nothing so long as he has not changed his skin. Surely he can retort that it profits the White Man nothing to understand all mysteries and all knowledge and have skill so that he can move mountains, so long as he has not charity.¹

This medieval Western freedom from the prejudice of race-feeling has survived among Western peoples who have remained more or less in the medieval phase of our Western Civilization: for instance, the Spaniards and Portuguese and the descendants of Spanish and Portuguese settlers who have established new Western communities in America.² Among these rather backward Western

¹ 1 Corinthians, xiii. 1-3.

² This is not to say that the condition of non-White populations under White rule in Spanish and Portuguese Africa and in Latin America is happier to-day than the condition of contemporary non-White populations under British or American rule. On the contrary, the condition of the non-White populations in the Hispanic countries and their present or former colonies, in the Old World and the New, is probably almost everywhere the less happy of the two at the present time. This, however, is because the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking peoples of the Western World are at present on the whole in a less happy condition themselves than the English-speaking peoples. As far as the non-White populations in the Hispanic countries suffer, they suffer equally with their White fellow-countrymen of the same social classes; that is to say, they suffer from the prevailing political disorders and economic injustices—but not from any racial discrimination.

peoples, the racial criterion has never superseded the criterion of religion¹; but it is more interesting to observe the same freedom from race-feeling surviving among another Western people, the French, who have ever been in the forefront of Western progress and have distinguished themselves (for good or evil) by the radical thoroughness with which they have secularized their national life.

The French have discarded, as decidedly as the English-speaking peoples, the medieval Western dichotomy of Mankind into Christians and Heathen; but the dichotomy which they have substituted for it is one of the same humane and significant kind. When the modern Frenchman looks abroad upon the World, he divides the human family into people who possess, and people who lack, the modern French version of the Western culture; and in his eyes everybody, whatever the colour of his skin, is potentially a cultivated Frenchman. A negro from the Senegal who possesses the necessary qualities of intellect and character can rise, and does rise, to positions of power and honour in French society, without being made to feel that he is being enfranchised grudgingly or esteemed with reservations. The freedom of the French from race-feeling has been a fact of common knowledge all through the modern age of Western history. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of our era, in North America, when the English settlers were expelling or exterminating the Red Indians, the French settlers were intermarrying with them and assimilating them. During the General War of 1914-18, the Negro citizens of the United States who were serving in the American Army in France were astonished at the social liberality with which the French Whites treated the African Negro subjects of the French Republic serving in the French Army, whose cultural level was much lower than that of the North American Negroes on the average. The justice of this observation can be verified by any English-speaking White man who takes the trouble to visit a garrison town in a French colony or in France itself and watch the White and Black soldiers of the Republic passing the time of day together when they are off duty.²

¹ The sense of religious solidarity and fraternity did not, however, restrain the Spaniards and the Portuguese in South America, a century and a half ago, from cold-bloodedly and brutally destroying—out of sheer greed for (non-existent) gold and for (to them, unutilizable) land—the wonderful society which had been conjured into existence, by the genius of the Jesuit missionaries, among the primitive peoples of Paraguay.

² Ardent 'Anglo-Saxon' racialists will argue that this fact of observation does not refute, but confirms, their racial theories. It is easy enough, they will say, for a 'Latin' to consort with a 'nigger', for a 'Latin' is a very doubtful sort of White Man. 'To speak frankly, he is half-way to being a 'nigger' himself, so it is a case of 'birds of a feather'! This gun can be silenced by a single shot. We have merely to point out that in the population of France to-day all the three conventional varieties of White Man—the 'Mediterranean', the 'Alpine', and the 'Nordic'—are well represented. Normandy and other districts of Northern France can supply pure specimens of 'the Blond Beast' as abundantly as Scandinavia or Appalachia themselves.

We may next point to the fact that while, in our Western Society, race-feeling was once unknown and is not now universal, there are other societies in which the prejudice has taken shape on different and sometimes diametrically opposite lines.

For instance, the Primitive Arabs who were the ruling element in the Umayyad Caliphate called themselves 'the swarthy people', with a connotation of racial superiority, and their Persian and Turkish subjects 'the ruddy people', with a connotation of racial inferiority: that is to say, they drew the same distinction that we draw between blonds and brunets but reversed the values which we assign to the two shades of White. Gentlemen may prefer blondes; but brunettes are the first choice of Allah's 'Chosen People'. Moreover, the Arabs and all other White Muslims, whether brunets or blonds, have always been free from colour-prejudice *vis-à-vis* the non-White races; and, at the present day, Muslims still make that dichotomy of the human family which Western Christians used to make in the Middle Ages. They divide Mankind into Believers and Unbelievers who are all potentially Believers; and this division cuts across every difference of Physical Race. This liberality is more remarkable in White Muslims to-day than it was in White Western Christians in our Middle Ages; for our medieval forefathers had little or no contact with peoples of a different colour, whereas the White Muslims were in contact with the Negroes of Africa and with the dark-skinned peoples of India from the beginning and have increased that contact steadily, until nowadays Whites and Blacks are intermingled, under the aegis of Islam, through the length and breadth of the Indian and the African Continent. Under this searching test, the White Muslims have demonstrated their freedom from race-feeling by the most convincing of all proofs: they have given their daughters to Black Muslims in marriage.

I had an opportunity to observe this Muslim freedom from race-feeling at first hand when I was an undergraduate at Oxford. At that time there were two Egyptian Muslim undergraduates in my college: one a grandee, the other a man of the same social class as the rest of us. Physically, this latter was a pure specimen of the Mediterranean Race. To look at him you could not have told that he was not a Sicilian or a Catalan or a Provençal. On the other hand, the young Egyptian grandee had a Negro strain in him which was not merely unmistakable but obtrusive. If this young man had been brought up in England, or *a fortiori* in the United States, he would have been made to feel his Negro traits as a crushing misfortune which would have permanently oppressed his spirits and undermined his self-confidence. Having been brought up in Egypt,

he arrived at Oxford quite un-race-conscious. From his bearing, it was evident that he felt himself distinguished from other people, not at all by his Negro traits but by his noble descent. He bore himself accordingly, while the bearing of his socially less distinguished fellow countryman, who could easily have passed himself off to the United States immigration authorities as a full-blooded European, was modest and unassuming. This was not from lack of spirit—he has since made his mark by some particularly adventurous feats of exploration—but because, at Oxford, he felt himself to be living among his social equals, whereas the young grandee was evidently accustomed to regarding the people among whom he lived as his inferiors. How deeply outraged the grandee would have been if he had realized how his Negro traits were regarded by his English and American fellow undergraduates! The fact that he remained un-race-conscious during his years at Oxford speaks well, no doubt, for the manners of the English upper-middle class; but the more important fact that he had previously grown up un-race-conscious at home in Egypt speaks, surely, far better for the broad humanity of the spirit of Islam.

Race and Civilization

It is an established fact of Physiology that, in all human beings, the pigment secreted in the skin is qualitatively the same; and that the different shades of colour which strike the eye and affect the feelings and give rise to theories and classifications correspond to mere differences in the quantity in which this qualitatively uniform human pigment happens to be present beneath the skin of any given specimen of the Human Race.¹ We can verify this on the body of an African Negro; for the palms of his hands and the soles of his feet are of a different shade from the rest of his skin and of practically the same shade as the whole skin of a White man—the explanation being that, on his palms and soles, a Negro has about the same quantity of pigment that a White man has all over, while on the rest of his body the Negro has rather more. This fact indicates that our colour-prejudice has not a shadow of physiological justification and shows it up for what it is: a particular instance of the irrational but universal aversion from whatever is abnormal. 'Nordic Man', who rejoices in the rather low quantity of pigment in his skin, eyes, and hair which happens to be normal in human beings of his kind, is repelled by the abnormal case in which this quantity is reduced to zero and 'the Blond Beast' transformed into an albino, though logically, if colourlessness is the

¹ On this point see, for example, Taylor, Griffith: *Environment and Race* (Oxford 1927, University Press), p. 33.

pink of perfection, the rare albino ought to be hailed by his commonplace Nordic relatives as a king of men. Again, even the relative lack of colour which is normal and therefore comely in the sight of a White man is abnormal and therefore unbecoming in the sight of a Red Indian, who expresses his aversion by calling the White man a 'pale-face'. It even happens that a human being comes to regard his own colour with aversion if he lives for some time in a minority of one among people of a different colour—the colour of the majority setting the norm. For example, it is said that David Livingstone, on one of his expeditions, after passing many months in Central Africa with no White companions and none but Negroes round him, began to find that the sight of his own naked skin turned him sick, as though he were looking at some deformity of nature.

This craving for the normal in physical appearance (whatever the normal may be in the particular circumstances) is not of course confined to the single feature of colour. For example, in the United States, where the physical appearance of the White people is the norm for the Coloured people,¹ the Coloured women try to lessen their unlikeness from the White women by straightening their hair. On the other hand, the White women, who have no fear of looking like Negroes, take pleasure, as White women do in other countries, in having their hair waved or curled. Thus, in the same American town at the same moment, some barbers may be busy straightening women's hair in the Negro quarter while others are busy curling women's hair in the White quarter—in both cases alike, for the satisfaction of the universal human craving to be 'in the fashion'.²

Hair, indeed, is just as good—or just as bad—a criterion of Race as pigment.³ The North American Whites and Negroes are sensi-

¹ This is not because the Negroes are in a minority; for though they are in a minority of about 10 versus 90 per cent. in the United States as a whole, they usually live in a milieu of their own race owing to the tendency towards local segregation. The reason why the Coloured people aspire to resemble the White people is that the White people have the prestige of being the ruling race. Moreover, the Coloured population of the United States is crossed with White blood in all degrees; and the Coloured people who are seven-eighths or fifteen-sixteenths White look forward to the possibility of 'passing' surreptitiously into the White community. It may be questioned, however, whether even if, in the course of generations, all visible traces of their Negro origin were bred out of the Coloured population of the United States, their descendants would be permitted by the descendants of the pure Whites to 'pass' wholesale and thus extinguish 'the colour-bar'. The precedent in India suggests that, even if the visible difference of colour eventually disappeared, the social barrier originally founded on this difference would survive, as rigid or more rigid than ever, in the form of Caste. In India to-day the caste divisions are reflected only slightly, or not at all, in any corresponding differences of colour; yet Philology shows that Caste—for which the Hindu word is Varna, meaning 'colour'—originated in a colour-bar such as exists in the United States to-day.

² It may be added that, in this generation, 'nigger' is a popular colour for White women's clothes, and that the colour of a Negro woman's skin is one of the favourite shades of White women's silk stockings, which are intended to convey to White men's eyes a suggestion of the naked flesh.

³ Hair is taken as the primary basis of racial classification by Haddon, A. C., in *The Races of Man and their Distribution*, revised edition (Cambridge 1929, University Press).

tive to the straightness or curliness of the hair on the head. The Japanese are sensitive to the general hairiness of the human body, because, in Japan, this happens to be a more significant feature than the colour of the skin. The Japanese people (like almost every other people that has ever distinguished itself) is of mixed race; and its original racial components must have differed widely in colour; for there is a considerable diversity of colour among the Japanese people to this day. In the same district and in the same social class and in the same family you may find skins varying from copper-colour to what White people call white. Hence, the differences of colour within this range do not excite race-feeling among the Japanese any more than this is excited among Europeans by differences in the quantity of hair on their bodies. On the other hand, Japanese of all shades of skin are alike in being more or less hairless except on their heads, in contrast to the aboriginal inhabitants of the Japanese Islands who, like Nordic Man in the unshaven state of nature, have bushy beards and hairy chests.¹ For this reason, the Japanese call these aborigines (the remnant of whom are now philanthropically preserved, on the northern island of Hokkaido, in 'reservations') 'the Hairy Ainu'. In the local circumstances of Japan, it is just as natural to emphasize the hairiness of the inferior race as it is in the United States or in the Union of South Africa to emphasize their colour; and as the people of European origin apply the colour-classification, which suggests itself in their own local circumstances, to the whole of Mankind, so we might expect the Japanese to divide the human family, not into a 'White Race' and a 'Coloured Race' but into a 'Hairless Race' and a 'Hairy'.

Logically there is nothing to choose between one classification and the other; but it may be edifying for us to glance at the classification with which we are less familiar. It yields what, to our minds, are disconcerting results. It brackets 'Nordic Man' with the Hairy Ainu of Hokkaido and the Blackfellows of Australia and the Veddahs of Ceylon and the Todas of the Nilgiri Hills in Southern India, as one of the representatives of a race whose abnormal hairiness makes them not as other men are.²

'What nonsense', the indignant Nordic ethnologist exclaims. 'Is it likely that there is any racial relation between these tribes,

¹ The Ainu also resemble 'Nordic Man' in being white-skinned. In fact, their physical resemblance to him is so close that, if they choose to claim that they are his poor relations, he would find it difficult to disprove the embarrassing assertion.

² All the races mentioned in this sentence are bracketed together as members of the 'cymotrichous' or wavy-haired family by Haddon in op. cit. (e.g. in 'An Arrangement of the Main Groups of Mankind', on pp. 14-15). The author duly notes (in op. cit., on p. 6) that 'some cymotrichous peoples have very hairy bodies, e.g., Ainu, Toda, some Australians, some Europeans. The Xanthoderms [i.e. Mongoloid Asiatics, Bushmen, and Hottentots] usually have an almost hairless body, as have most Negroes.'

considering that their homes are separated by the whole breadth of Europe and Asia?' But the Japanese ethnologist has his answer up his sleeve. Courteously he points out to his Nordic colleague that 'the Hairy Race' is the nearest of all living races to the Apes in that feature which is fundamental for Japanese purposes of racial classification. It follows that 'the Hairy Race' is the nearest of all living breeds of Man to the common ancestor of Apes and Men. In other words, 'the Hairy Race' is the most primitive, rudimentary experiment in *Homo Sapiens* that survives; and it is natural enough that it should only survive in holes and corners. If we assume that the original breeding-ground of Mankind lay somewhere in the heart of the Old World, and that 'the Hairy Race' was one of the earliest human swarms to hive off, then we should expect to find *Homo Hirsutus* pushed outwards in all directions, to the ends of the Earth, to Australia and to Hokkaido and to Ultima Thule, by younger and superior races—*Homo Mediterraneus* and *Homo Dravidicus*, *Homo Alpinus* and *Homo Mongolicus*—which have issued from the common breeding-ground at later dates to multiply and replenish the Earth in their turns. Thus the vast distances which separate the several surviving tribes of *Homo Hirsutus* to-day are presumptive evidence for and not against the racial kinship of these tribes which their common shagginess betrays. Their present homes are not their respective cradles but their respective retreats from a common birthplace. They are fragments of the circumference of the circle in which *Homo Hirsutus* has spread—or has been cheviéd—over the face of the Earth from his original centre of dispersion. We may compare his now widely dispersed representatives with the disturbances which remain here and there on the surface of a pond when the last of the ripples produced by the fall of a stone into the water is dying away. If the Japanese ethnologist presents his case on these lines, it will be difficult for the Nordic ethnologist to rebut it.¹

¹ Our more enterprising ethnologists seem inclined nowadays to explain the distribution of the Races of Man, as we find it at the earliest date to which our records extend back, by the hypothesis of successive waves of emigration, in all directions, from a common original centre. See, for example, Taylor, Griffith: *Environment and Race* (Oxford 1927, University Press), especially pp. 4-5 and chapter xx: 'The Migration-Zone Theory of Race Evolution'. The author's theory is summed up in the eight propositions on pp. 220-1, and is presented visually in the frontispiece.

Of course our *Homo Hirsutus* is not really the earliest breed of Man known. From fragments of skeletons, our palaeontologists have been able to reconstruct several much more rudimentary types, and indeed *Homo Hirsutus* is not quite the most primitive breed of Man that is still living. Beyond the Nordic remnant of *Homo Hirsutus*, which still clings to the north-western fringes of Europe and Asia, from the Normans in the lower valley of the Seine to the Eastern Finns in the lower valley of the Obi, we find a still more primitive race—the Lapps in Northern Scandinavia and the Samoyeds along the Arctic coasts of Russia, while in Arctic America we have the Esquimaux—who are supposed to be a remnant of the hunters that roamed over Europe in the Upper Palaeolithic Age. (See Dixon, R. B.: *The Racial History of Man* (New York 1923, Scribner), pp. 484-6.) Again, beyond the Ainu remnant of *Homo Hirsutus* in Hokkaido and Sakha-

Another racial feature which acts as a stimulus of race-feeling, no less powerfully than hairiness or colour, is smell.

'I hope you have been enjoying yourself', said an English dramatic critic to a celebrated Japanese actress who had been having a season in the West End of London. 'Yes, on the whole', the lady replied, 'but of course there have been hardships to put up with.' 'Hardships? I am sorry to hear that', the Englishman exclaimed (rather taken aback, for the Japanese artist had been received enthusiastically by the English public). 'Oh yes', she burst out. 'And the worst of all was the smell. The people in this country smell like lions and tigers. . . . But not you, of course', she added hastily, solicitous for her own manners and for her interlocutor's feelings, 'you only smell of mutton-fat and scented soap.' The truth is that the Japanese, whose national odour is kept sweet and wholesome by a mainly vegetarian diet, are considerably distressed by the rank and foetid odour of the carnivorous peoples of the West—an odour of which we are hardly conscious ourselves because we are living in the reek of it all the time.

It is not only the Japanese who are upset by the White Race's smell. A highly cultivated and fastidious English lady of my acquaintance once went to stay for several months in South Africa and engaged a staff of native servants—among them, a little Kaffir maid. It happened several times that the maid, on being summoned into her employer's presence, fell into a sudden faint; and the lady, who was kind-hearted, felt some concern. What could be the matter with the girl? Was it heart-disease? Or was it just acute nervousness at finding herself *tête-à-tête* with a member of the superior race? The lady questioned the other servants, only to have her questions parried and eluded in the usual provoking fashion; but at last an older servant, who saw that her mistress was becoming really upset and alarmed, succeeded in conquering her own reserve and embarrassment. 'You needn't worry, Madam', she assured my friend, 'there is nothing serious the matter with

lin, we find the still more primitive Palaeo-arctic peoples in the north-eastern corner of Continental Asia. Finally, beyond the Australian Blackfellows, we find (or, rather, found, before we exterminated them) the still more primitive natives of Tasmania.

All the same, this wave-theory of race-distribution leads to conclusions which must be horrifying for those of us who are addicts to race-feeling. A National-Socialist Mecklenburger who is thrilled to feel, coursing through his veins, the 'pure' blood of 'Nordic' Odin may be convicted by the expert of being a 'bleached' 'Proto-Australoid' or 'Proto-Negroid' (Dixon, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-5), and may be grateful, in the circumstances, to the amateur who has been content to call our Mecklenburger nothing worse than a Germanized Slav. Nordic Man is firmly put in his place by Mr. Griffith Taylor: 'I have come to the conclusion that the so-called Nordic races do not stand out as the most advanced type of Man. . . . One result of the study of the distribution of Man is to lead the writer to the belief that the so-called 'yellow' or Mongolian type of Man is a later product of human evolution than many western members of the so-called 'white' or European type. In other words, the Eastern Asiatic is further from the primitive anthropoid stock, while the Negroid and West-European peoples are earlier, lower offshoots from the line of human evolution.' (Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 336 and 337.)

the girl. The fact is, she has come straight from her village to you; this is her first place in White people's service, and she isn't yet quite used to the White people's smell. But don't you worry. She will get used to it soon enough. Why, look at us! We all used to faint at first, but now we have quite got over it. It will be the same with her, you'll see!'

Here, then, are three different physical features—colour, hairiness, and smell—which all excite race-feeling and are all equally suitable, or unsuitable, for being taken as bases for racial classifications. For our purpose it has merely to be pointed out that these alternative classifications, between which there is nothing to choose from a logical standpoint, yield results which are quite incompatible with one another.

Let us now take up the colour classification—a choice which is arbitrary in itself but apt for our argument, because this happens to be the currently accepted classification in the modern Western World. Let us briefly survey the contributions which peoples of the several races of Man, as classified by colour, have actually made to our twenty-one civilizations. We will confine our attention to active, creative contributions, leaving mere passive membership out of account (for, if we took account of that, we should have to inscribe, as contributors to the contemporary Western Civilization, the entire living generation of Mankind). Taking account, then, of creative contributions and of these alone,¹ we obtain the results set out in the following table:

<i>Race</i>	<i>contributing to Civilizations</i>
White ('Nordic')	Indic + Hittite (?) + Hellenic + Western + Orthodox Christian (in Russia)
White ('Alpine')	Egyptiac (?) ² + Sumeric + Minoan (?) ³ + Hittite + Hellenic + Western + Orthodox Christian (main body) + Orthodox Christian (in Russia) + Iranic
White ('Mediterranean')	Egyptiac + Sumeric ⁴ + Minoan + Syriac + Hellenic + Western + Orthodox Christian (main body) + Iranic + Arabic + Babylonian
White ('Polynesian')	Far Eastern (in Korea and Japan)
Brown ⁵	Indic + Hindu
Yellow ⁶	Sinic + Far Eastern (main body) + Far Eastern (in Korea and Japan)
Red ⁷	Andean + Mayan + Yucatec + Mexic
Black ⁸	None

¹ The contributions, if any, which have been made to the 'related' civilizations by the external proletariats of the antecedent civilizations to which they are related, are not here counted as creative except in the cases of four related civilizations—the Indic, Hittite, Syriac, and Hellenic—in which the external proletariat, and not the internal proletariat, has been the living link through which the relation has been established.

For notes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, see the opposite page.

It will be seen that, when we classify Mankind by colour, the only primary race that has not made a creative contribution to any civilization is the Black Race (on the assumption that the Dravidians are, not 'black', but 'brown'). This single exception should not deter us from drawing the general inference which the remainder of the evidence suggests. If every primary race except one has made a creative contribution to at least one of the twenty-one civilizations which have emerged up to date, we must infer that the capacity for civilization is not a monopoly of any fraction or fractions of the human family, but is the universal birthright of Mankind; and there is no warrant for supposing that one particular fraction—the Black Race—has been born without this birthright and is congenitally incapable of civilization just because it has failed to make one of these creative contributions so far. In order to see the position and prospects of the Black Race in proper perspective, we must remind ourselves of a consideration which has been before our minds at an earlier stage of this Study.¹ The species of human societies called civilizations, which has been in existence less than 6,000 years so far, has an 'expectation of life' which is at least eighty-three million times as long as its present age, on the most 'conservative' estimate of astronomical probabilities.²

We can make the meaning of these figures intelligible to our minds if we think of the enterprise of civilization as a 'Marathon Race' in which a white, brown, yellow, red, and black man are

¹ For the evidence of the presence of an 'Alpine' as well as a 'Mediterranean' strain in the peoples who created the Egyptian Civilization by mastering the physical environment of the Nile Valley below the First Cataract, see Smith, C. Elliot: *The Ancient Egyptians* (London and New York 1923, Harper), chapter vii, and *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. i, 2nd edition, pp. 33-4 and 244-5.

² For evidence of the presence of an 'Alpine' as well as a 'Mediterranean' strain in the people who created the Minoan Civilization by mastering the physical environment of the Aegean Archipelago, see Myres, J. L., in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1906, pp. 700-1, and in *Who were the Greeks?* (Berkeley 1930, University of California Press), ch. ii, pp. 30-1.

³ The Sumerians are supposed to have been 'Alpines'; but it is also supposed that the creation of the Sumerian Civilization, through the conquest of the physical environment of the lower valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, was the joint achievement of Sumerian immigrants and Semitic aborigines whom they found already squatting on the brink of the Tigo-Euphratean jungle-swamp; and these Semitic contributors to the creation of the Sumerian Civilization were presumably 'Mediterraneans'.

⁴ The term 'Brown Race' is used here to cover both the Dravidian population of Continental India and the Malay population of Indonesia.

⁵ The term 'Yellow Race' is a misnomer; for many members of this race in China and Japan are as white as any 'White Man'. The real distinguishing marks of this race are not the colour of its skin but the texture of its hair and the set of its eyes.

⁶ The term 'Red Race' is no more appropriate than the term 'Yellow Race'. Here again, the real distinguishing marks are the texture of the hair and the set of the eyes; and, by these criteria, 'the Red Race' and 'the Yellow Race' ought perhaps to be classified as two branches of a single race which might be labelled the Mongolo-American.

⁷ The term 'Black Race' is used here to cover the Australian Blackfellows, the Papuans and Melanesians, the Vedda of Ceylon, and the Todas of Southern India, as well as the Negro population of Africa south of the Sahara.

¹ See I. C (iii) (c), p. 173, above.

² See I. C (iii) (e), Annex, below, *ad fin.*

competitors. The pistol has been fired; and an instantaneous photograph, taken at that instant, shows that the runners are off—that is, four of them are off out of the five, for the fifth still stands toeing the line. What is the matter with him? Is he in a day-dream? Is he paralysed? Is he out of the running? We can only answer that all these questions are premature; for the time which has elapsed between the moment when the signal was heard and the moment recorded in our instantaneous photograph is no more than one eighty-three-millionth part of the time which the five runners have to run. It is no doubt possible that the runner who has been this infinitesimal degree slower than his competitors in getting away may never get away at all; but there is no ground for this expectation in the position which our instantaneous photograph reveals, unless we wilfully ignore the time-factor which is of the essence of the situation. We have no more warrant for assuming that the black competitor will not get away, or that he will not eventually win the race, than we have for assuming that his red or yellow or brown or white competitor will be incapacitated, *en courant*, by some other kind of mishap—by failure of heart or wind, or by stumbling and breaking his leg. These contingencies are all just as possible as the contingency that the black competitor will remain toeing the line for eighty-three million times the infinitesimal length of time during which he has been toeing it so far since the moment when the starter's shot rang out.

As a matter of fact, there are certain features in the Negro's circumstances which convincingly account for his failure to take an active part in the enterprise of Civilization during these first five or six thousand years, without creating any presumption that this failure may be insurmountable and definitive. On this point, we will cite the opinion of an able, experienced, and sympathetic French observer:

'Lorsque nous disons des Nègres qu'ils sont de grands enfants, nous entendons que ce sont des adultes à mentalité puérile, et nous sous-entendons que la mentalité à laquelle nous assimilons la leur est celle de nos enfants à nous: en quoi nous retombons dans l'éternelle erreur qui nous fait juger des autres d'après nous-mêmes. C'est, si l'on veut, une définition comparative, basée sur des analogies plus ou moins superficielles, non sur des faits considérés en eux-mêmes.

'Elle est viciée à sa base, parce que reposant sur une pétition de principe. Nous supposons *a priori* que notre race est le prototype de la civilisation en soi, mais qu'elle ne réalise celle-ci que par l'organe de ses adultes, et nous voulons bien accorder à la race noire un pied de pseudo-égalité avec la nôtre, à condition de ne la mettre qu'au rang de nos enfants, c'est-à-dire de ceux d'entre nous auxquels nous refusons la faculté d'atteindre au niveau de la masse. C'est, en termes plus

aimables, mais non moins absolus, proclamer de nouveau cette infériorité des races de couleur, soutenue avec plus d'âpreté, sinon plus de logique, et en tout cas avec moins d'hypocrisie, par Gobineau et son école. . . .¹

'Les Nègres africains forment-ils une race intellectuellement inférieure aux autres races humaines? On l'a souvent affirmé, mais sans jamais en donner de preuves convaincantes et en prenant généralement un point de départ faux.

'On a dit que les Noirs seraient actuellement inférieurs, sous le rapport du développement intellectuel, à ce que sont les autres types de l'humanité. Il me paraît qu'on a, ce disant, confondu "ignorance" avec "inintelligence". Le plus grand génie du monde, s'il n'était jamais allé à l'école et n'avait jamais vécu qu'au milieu des sauvages, aurait été sans doute dans la complète impossibilité de manifester sa haute intelligence naturelle, ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'il ne l'eût pas possédée effectivement. . . .

'Or les Noirs de l'Afrique ont eu cette malechance funeste de ne pouvoir évoluer comme l'ont fait les autres grandes races humaines, sans qu'ils y aient été d'ailleurs pour rien. Alors que, depuis de nombreux siècles, les descendants des Gaulois nos ancêtres se sont trouvés constamment en contact avec des populations plus évoluées ou autrement évoluées qu'eux-mêmes, mais d'une civilisation contemporaine de la leur, et ont pu, prenant aux unes, s'inspirant des autres, devenir les Français d'aujourd'hui, les malheureux Nègres ont été, durant le même période, à peu près complètement isolés du reste de l'humanité. . . .

'Les Nègres africains offrent ce spectacle, sans doute unique au monde, de toute une race n'ayant jamais eu à compter que sur elle-même pour progresser et n'ayant rien reçu de l'extérieur, ou en ayant reçu autant de ferments de régression que d'éléments de progrès, sinon plus. Aurions-nous fait mieux qu'eux si nous nous étions trouvés dans la même situation?

'L'isolement dans lequel des barrières naturelles ont enfermé trop longtemps leur habitat a fait des Nègres de l'Afrique, par rapport aux Européens plus favorisés, des arriérés ou, plus exactement, des attardés: ils ont perdu beaucoup de temps et ils ne sauraient le rattraper en un jour ni même en un siècle. Mais ils n'ont certainement pas dit leur dernier mot et leur histoire n'est pas finie. Peut-être ne fait-elle que commencer.'²

We may add that the Black Race is by no means the only fraction of Mankind which has failed to take an active part in the enterprise of Civilization up to date. The races which have made the most numerous and the most brilliant contributions to those civilizations which have emerged within the last 6,000 years are all of them still represented, besides, in primitive societies which have not risen above the level of barbarism or even above the level of savagery. If we classify by hairiness, we can confront the Nordic specimens

¹ Delafosse, M.: *Les Nègres* (Paris 1927, Rieder), pp. 8-9.

² Delafosse, M.: *Les Noirs de l'Afrique* (Paris 1922, Payot), pp. 156-60.

of *Homo Hirsutus* who have helped to create the Indic and Hittite and Hellenic and Western civilizations, and the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia, with their poor relations the Hairy Ainu and the Australian Blackfellows and the Veddahs and the Todas, who have remained on the primitive level down to this day. If we classify by colour, we can confront the White Men who have helped to create perhaps half the civilizations of which we know, with our latter-day White barbarians: the fair-haired, blue-eyed highlanders of North-West Africa who have defied both the assaults and the blandishments of one civilization after another in the fastnesses of the Rif and the Atlas and Kabylia; their Nomadic kinsmen in the Sahara, whose deficiency of pigment is betrayed in their hair and eyes even when their skins are tanned by a scorching sun; the fair-haired, blue-eyed highlanders of Albania, who have contrived to evade civilization in fastnesses which overlook the high road between Greece and Rome; the highlanders of the Caucasus, who are such magnificent specimens of the White Race that our Western ethnologists have taken their name in vain as a scientific term for the whole breed of *Homo Pallidus*; the highlanders of Kurdistan; the highlanders of the borderland between Afghanistan and India; and—once again—the Ainu who, despite the whiteness of the skin that peeps through their shaggy fur, have fought the losing battle of Barbarism against 'the yellow peril' of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan. Again, we can confront the Yellow Men who have created this Far Eastern Civilization and its predecessor, the Sinic Civilization, with the Yellow barbarians who still survive, in a few scattered enclaves, among the mountains that divide the southern watershed of the Yangtse from the southern coast-line of China, and with the Yellow savages in the interior of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. We can confront the Brown creators of the Indic and Hindu Civilizations with the wild tribes of Continental India—Bhils and Ghonds and the like—and with the head-hunters of Sumatra and Borneo. We can confront the Incas with the Araucanian barbarians of Chile and with the savages of Amazonia and of the Tierra del Fuego. We can confront the Mayas and the Toltecs with 'the Noble Savage' of North America who has established his fame as the Redskin *par excellence*.

If those who despair of the capacities of the Black Race were right in their thesis that a failure to make any creative contributions to the first twenty-one civilizations during the first six thousand years of the existence of the species is proof of an inherent and incurable incapacity, then it would be impossible to explain how other races, which still have their savage and their barbarous representatives to-day, have also produced the creators of all the

civilizations that have emerged hitherto. The only way to reconcile the thesis and the facts would be to suppose that those White, Brown, Yellow, and Red populations which have helped to create civilizations are really of different race from the respective populations of the same colours which have never yet distinguished themselves in this fashion—that we can know them by their spiritual fruits, though we cannot tell them apart by their physical appearances. This way out of the impasse, however, could not be taken by the racialists, because it abandons the postulate of an absolute correlation between physical and psychical characteristics which is the indispensable foundation for all racial theories. Nor will it be taken by unprejudiced inquirers; for the ethnological evidence, considered objectively, does not at all suggest that the Yellow barbarians of Southern China are different in race, as well as in culture, from the Southern Chinese, or the White barbarians of Morocco, Albania, the Caucasus, Kurdistan, and the Indo-Afghan border from their White neighbours and contemporaries who are members to-day of the Western and Orthodox Christian and Islamic civilizations.

Indeed, in all these cases, our records show that the barbarians who still survive as such are a remnant of barbarian populations which the neighbouring civilizations have assimilated, and that this process of assimilation is still going on.¹ If we had taken our survey of White barbarians two centuries ago instead of to-day, our list would have included the Scottish highlanders, who have been so completely assimilated by our Western Society during the half-dozen generations that have come and gone between 1745 and 1933 that in this latter year a descendant of these barbarians is Prime Minister of one of the leading states of the Western World. If the survey is taken again two centuries hence, it may seem as strange then to our descendants that the Albanians and the Rifis should have been still barbarians in our time as it seems to us now that the Scottish highlanders should have been still barbarians in the reign of King George II. Similarly, a survey of Yellow barbarians taken about the year 1000 B.C. would have returned as barbarians almost the whole of the Chinese people of to-day except those living in two relatively small areas, in the lower and the middle basin of the Yellow River, to which the Sinic Civilization was confined in that early age.² The enlargement of the borders of civilizations and the recruitment of their 'man-power' by the assimilation of their barbarian neighbours has been one of the

¹ The assimilation of primitive societies by civilizations is examined further in Part VIII, below.

² On this point see Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), p. 11.

constant features in the lives and activities of civilizations since this species of society first came into existence.

If we assume that all human beings of all races are capable of civilization, this process of assimilation, which is an empirically established fact, is also a fact which presents no difficulties to the understanding. If, on the other hand, we assume that one whole race, and certain sections of other races, are incapable of civilization because they have failed to contribute to the creation of civilizations down to a certain date or dates, the process of assimilation ceases to be intelligible. How, on this showing, could the Cantonese become converted to the Far Eastern Civilization a dozen centuries ago, or the Scottish highlanders to our Western Civilization one century ago, when they had proved their inherent and incurable incapacity for civilization by having previously remained outside the pale? At the moment of their cultural conversion, did they undergo some kind of racial transubstantiation? Were they suddenly and mysteriously endowed with some inward spiritual grace of which no outward visible sign could be detected even by the trained ethnologist's eye? Such are the extravagances into which we find ourselves driven in the last resort if we proceed on the hypothesis that some fractions of Mankind are racially capable and others racially incapable of civilization *a priori*, and that a race stands convicted of inherent and incurable incapacity if it happens not to have contributed to the creation of any civilizations by the time in the history of the species when the censorious observer is moved to take his observations. No such *reductio ad absurdum* lies in wait for us if we adopt, instead, the hypothesis by which the French observer, quoted above, explains the failure of the Black Race to make creative contributions up to date, and if we apply this hypothesis to other races, or portions of races, which have played the same passive role as the Black Race during the whole or some of the time during which the species of societies called civilizations has been in existence. We can attribute these retardations to the interplay between a Human Nature which is common to all Mankind and certain exceptionally unfavourable circumstances in the local environments of some sections of the human family during certain periods of time; and we need seek no further than this in order to explain why it is that, within these first six thousand years, the Black Race has not helped to create any civilization, while the Polynesian White Race has helped to create one civilization, the Brown Race two, the Yellow Race three, the Red Race and the 'Nordic' White Race four apiece, the 'Alpine' White Race nine, and the 'Mediterranean' White Race ten.¹

¹ See the table on p. 232, above.

The upshot of our inquiry is to discredit the hypothesis of a natural law in which the creation of civilizations is supposedly revealed as the peculiar racial function of particular branches of the human family. Indeed, the only vestige of a law relating civilizations and races which our inquiry has brought to light is one which puts a very different complexion upon the relation between them.

If we transpose the table of contributions of races to civilizations which we have given on p. 232, above, we obtain the following results:

<i>Civilizations</i>	<i>contributed to by Races</i>
Hellenic	White ('Nordic') + White ('Alpine') + White ('Mediterranean')
Western	White ('Nordic') + White ('Alpine') + White ('Mediterranean')
Egyptiac	White ('Alpine') + White ('Mediterranean')
Sumeric	White ('Alpine') + White ('Mediterranean')
Minoan	White ('Alpine') + White ('Mediterranean')
Indic	White ('Nordic') + Brown
Hittite	White ('Nordic') + White ('Alpine')
Far Eastern (in Korea and Japan)	White ('Polynesian') + Yellow
Orthodox Christian (main body)	White ('Alpine') + White ('Mediterranean')
Orthodox Christian (in Russia)	White ('Nordic') + White ('Alpine')
Iranic	White ('Alpine') + White ('Mediterranean')
Babylonian	White ('Mediterranean')
Syriac	White ('Mediterranean')
Arabic	White ('Mediterranean')
Hindu	Brown
Sinic	Yellow
Far Eastern (main body)	Yellow
Andean	Red
Mayan	Red
Yucatec	Red
Mexic	Red

Thus, on our classification, two civilizations have been created by contributions from three different races, nine by contributions from two different races, and ten by the unaided endeavours of a single race in each case. On this showing, nearly half the civilizations that have emerged hitherto have been created by a mixture of races; but our table considerably understates the frequency of this phenomenon in the creation of civilizations because our racial classification is imperfect. We have treated four varieties of White Man as separate races because that is the regular practice of our ethnologists; but we have not brought the rest of our classification

into line with this section by subdividing the non-White races on the criteria employed in distinguishing the 'Nordic' White from the 'Alpine', the 'Alpine' from the 'Mediterranean', the 'Mediterranean' from the 'Polynesian'. If we had carried our racial analysis to this point all through,¹ we should certainly have found that several, at least, of the seven civilizations which here appear as created by the Brown or the Red Race exclusively had been created by two races ('Brown No. 1' and 'Brown No. 2') or by three ('Yellow No. 1' and 'Yellow No. 2' and 'Yellow No. 3'). The number of civilizations created by the unaided endeavours of a single race in each case would then turn out to be relatively so small that these cases would present themselves as exceptions to a prevalent law—a law to the effect that the geneses of civilizations require creative contributions from more races than one.²

The discovery of a law to this effect would not be surprising. Indeed, we might have discovered it, before this, as a corollary to another law which we have noted at an earlier stage in this Study:³ the law that civilizations exert, upon Mankind beyond their borders, both a push and a pull—a centrifugal push in the nature of radiation and a centripetal pull in the nature of attraction. While a civilization is radiating out its material products as exports, its human members as traders, conquerors, colonists, and missionaries, and its culture in the shape of technique, institutions, ideas, and emotions, it is all the time drawing in other commodities and other beings and other techniques, institutions, ideas, and emotions from abroad. The roads which diverge from or converge upon it (whichever term we choose to employ) carry a two-way traffic—exports and imports, emigrants and immigrants, cultural influences emitted and cultural influences received. This simultaneous and perpetual movement in two contrary directions is the breath of Life, and we can observe it in operation wherever Life is being lived: in the circulation of the blood, with its outward movement from the heart to the limbs along the arteries and its return movement from the limbs to the heart along the veins; or in the economy of a Western industrial city, which draws its 'man-power' and its 'raw materials' from the ends of the Earth while it is sending out its manufactures to the ends of the Earth again.

¹ As is attempted by Mr. Griffith Taylor in his *Environment and Race* (Oxford 1927, University Press).

² There is a suggestion of this law in Taylor, *op. cit.*, on p. 336. A distinguished Italian Orientalist regards 'il risveglio . . . morale e materiale che segue sempre al incrocio di varie razze' as a 'legge costante della genesi di civiltà nell'evoluzione dei popoli'. (Caetani, L.: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. i (Milan 1911, Hoepli), p. 141.) Authority for the same view can be found in the works of the professional ethnologists. See, for example, Dixon, R. B.: *The Racial History of Man* (New York 1923, Scribner), pp. 514-16.

³ See p. 187 in Part II. A, above.

In this setting, the subsidiary law that the geneses of civilizations require creative contributions from more races than one becomes self-evident. We can catch a glimpse of this law in the fragmentary picture of racial conditions in Egypt, during the ages when the Egyptiac Civilization was being brought to birth, which has been pieced together by the ingenuity of our Western archaeologists. The so-called 'Badarians', who in Upper Egypt made the momentous transition from hunting to the rudiments of agriculture and stock-breeding in the sixth millennium B.C., appear to have been autochthonous representatives of the 'Mediterranean' variety of the White Race who had acquired a Negroid strain.¹ The early Predynastic Egyptians, who succeeded the 'Badarians' and carried the development of the Egyptiac Civilization a stage further, appear to have been descendants of the 'Badarians' in whose racial composition the Negroid strain had been replaced by a 'Mediterranean' strain, distinct from that of the Badarians themselves, which was introduced into the Lower Nile Valley at this stage by an infiltration of 'Getulan' Nomadic hunters from North-West Africa.² Thereafter, in the so-called Second Predynastic Age, we begin to find evidence of a racial infiltration into the Lower Nile Valley from South-Western Asia. The earliest evidence for this Asiatic contribution is indirect: it is an inference from the appearance, in Egypt, of Asiatic *motifs* in art and devices in technique³; of the cult of Osiris, with its Asiatic affinities⁴; of domesticated breeds of sheep and goats whose wild ancestors had their habitat not in Africa but in Asia.⁵ The direct evidence in the form of 'Alpine' racial traits, of the so-called 'Armenoid' sub-variety, in skeletons recovered from Egyptiac burials, is not found before the beginning of the Dynastic Age.⁶ Nevertheless, it will be seen that, in the course of the period of two thousand years or so during which the Egyptiac Civilization was in gestation, the population of the Lower Nile Valley was recruited from at least four racial elements: a

¹ Childe, V. G.: *The Most Ancient East* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), pp. 51-2 and 60-2.

² Childe, op. cit., pp. 62-3 and 77.

³ Childe, op. cit., pp. 94-5.

⁴ Childe, op. cit., loc. cit.

⁵ Newberry, P. E.: *Egypt as a Field of Anthropological Research* (British Association for the Advancement of Science, Report of the Ninety-first Meeting, Liverpool 1923, Presidential Address to Section H (London 1924, Murray), p. 187).

⁶ 'If it be asked when this alien influence first made itself apparent in the physical characters of the people of Egypt, it can be stated with certainty that there is no definite trace of it in Upper Egypt in Predynastic times, and only rare sporadic instances before the time of the Fifth Dynasty, when foreign traits became fairly common among the aristocracy. Lower Egypt has not yet afforded much evidence of the archaic period; but the information now in our possession seems to prove that Armenoid traits occurred in some few skeletons of Protodynastic date and became common in the times of the Third and Fourth Dynasties, i.e. long before they appeared in Upper Egypt.' (Smith, C. Elliot: *The Ancient Egyptians* (London and New York 1923, Harper), pp. 42-3.)

'Mediterranean' element which was autochthonous; a Negroid element which was presumably drawn in from the south; a second 'Mediterranean' element from the north-west, and finally an 'Armenoid Alpine' element from the north-east.

This fragmentary evidence from the homeland of the Egyptiac Civilization is remarkable; and it is reinforced by the corresponding evidence from the homelands of the Sumeric Civilization and the Indus Valley Culture,¹ and likewise by the fuller evidence which presents itself in the field of Western Europe (the only region of the World in which scientifically accurate and statistically adequate racial surveys have yet been made). When we search here for 'pure' specimens of the three European White races, we can only find them on the peripheries or in holes and corners: 'pure Nordics' in Sweden,² 'pure Alpines' in Slovakia and Savoy and the Cevennes and Brittany; 'pure Mediterraneans' in Sardinia and Corsica.³ Conversely, we find more than one of the European races represented in the central parts of Western Europe, and, in particular, in each of those four West European countries which at present rank as Great Powers. There are 'Mediterranean' as well as 'Nordic' strains in the population of Great Britain, 'Alpine' as well as 'Nordic' strains in the population of Germany, 'Alpine' as well as 'Mediterranean' strains in the population of Italy, and strains of all three races in the population of France. We find an equal or greater variety of racial strains in the populations of the other three Great Powers of the 'Post-War' World: a 'Polynesian' White strain as well as a Yellow strain in Japan, an 'Alpine' as well as a 'Nordic' White strain in Russia, and in-

¹ See Marshall, Sir J.: *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilization* (London 1932, Probsthain, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 108-9. Cf. Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 80.

² There is a small but conspicuous dark Alpine strain in the populations of Denmark and Norway, and an English visitor to Sweden is surprised to find the Nordic traits less uniformly prevalent there than the ethnological handbooks have led him to expect *a priori*. Still more surprising is the well-attested racial mixture in the population of Iceland—an Ultima Thule in which the abortive Scandinavian Civilization (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 340-60, below) achieved its greatest triumphs (see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 88-100, below). In the colonization of Iceland at the end of the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era, Scandinavian freemen from many parts of Norway were mingled with Irish thralls; and we may assume that the Scandinavian stock was crossed with this Irish strain—even if no contribution to the racial composition of the Icelandic people was made by the Irish hermits who had found their way to Iceland before the Norsemen's arrival. (See Olrik, A.: *Viking Civilisation*, English translation (London 1930, Allen & Unwin), pp. 102-3 and 175-6.)

³ The one Corsican family that has ever 'made history' (though this is by no means the same thing as 'making civilization') was not of Corsican origin. The Buonaparti are known to have come to Corsica from Florence—that is to say, from a district of the Italian mainland in which the several White races have been crossed and re-crossed an exceptional number of times: pre-Indo-European Neolithic 'Mediterraneans' with Bronze-Age Indo-European 'Alpines' speaking the Umbrian variety of the Italic branch of the Indo-European family of languages; these with Iron-Age non-Indo-European Alpines from the Levant (the Etruscans); and these, again, with 'Nordic' Lombards from the southern shores of the Baltic. With this Tuscan racial background Napoleon cannot be registered, either for good or for evil, as a 'pure Mediterranean'.

redients from all the races of Europe in 'the melting-pot' of the United States.¹

It is remarkable that this racial diversity in the populations of these countries, on which the ethnologists lay such stress, is of no significance to the people themselves. An 'Alpine' Cevenol is conscious of no special affinity with an 'Alpine' Piedmontese or an 'Alpine' Slovak. His sense of affinity has nothing whatever to do with the configuration of his skull and hardly anything to do with the colour of his hair and eyes. It is determined to some extent by language and to a still greater extent by citizenship. The 'Alpine' Frenchman from the Cevennes will feel himself alien to the 'Alpine' Italian from Piedmont and to the 'Alpine' Czechoslovak from Slovakia because these speak foreign languages and are citizens of foreign states. He will feel a greater affinity towards a 'Nordic' Belgian from Brussels whose mother-tongue is French, and a greater affinity still towards a 'Nordic' Frenchman from the Pas de Calais whose mother-tongue is Flemish. Here, in France, we observe a sense of common nationality precluding the consciousness of an objectively existing and empirically observed diversity of race.² If we turn from France to India, we there observe the converse phenomenon: a sense of caste distinction, originally corresponding to a diversity of race, which has perpetuated itself long after the diversity of race which first evoked it has actually been obliterated.³

In fine, the further our modern Western ethnologists push their analysis of Physical Race by determining the racial likenesses and

¹ This is without taking into account the representatives of the Black and Red Races in the U.S.A. or the representatives of the Yellow Race (not to speak of the rudimentary races represented by the Palaeo-arctics and the Samoyeds) in the U.S.S.R.

² It may be noted that France, which is the only European country in which all three of our ethnologists' three primary European races are represented in force, has also been the first European country in which the consciousness of a common nationality has asserted itself. Even at the present day, this consciousness of national unity and uniformity is less highly developed and less widely disseminated in Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, with their two races apiece, than it is in France with her three races.

³ The racial origin of caste is proved by the etymology of the earliest name of the institution, 'Varna', which literally means 'colour' (see footnote 1 on p. 228, above). This original colour distinction between the castes has long since broken down—partly, no doubt, through surreptitious inter-breeding (which social tabus never effectively prevent between races, however different from one another in physique, which are living permanently cheek by jowl with one another). Another cause of the break-down of the colour distinction between the castes has been the deliberate policy of the Hindu Brahmins in recognizing as Brahmins the sacerdotal families of primitive societies which they were assimilating to the Hindu Civilization, and the deliberate policy of the Hindu Kshatriyas in recognizing as Kshatriyas the fighting men of non-Hindu tribes (e.g. the Huns and Gurjars who overran North-Western India in the *Völkerwanderung* during the interregnum between the dissolution of the Indic Society and the emergence of the Hindu Society). By these various processes, the original colour distinction between Hindu castes has been almost completely broken down; yet this disappearance of the racial factor which originally evoked the sense of caste has not entailed the disappearance of caste-consciousness. In India to-day there is hardly a sign that the sense of caste divisions is yielding to any sense of common nationality, transcending caste, on the objective basis of a common country and a common race.

differences that are discernible both in Mankind as it exists to-day and in Primeval Man in so far as we have discovered his skeletal remains, the further does the resultant scientific conception of Race diverge from the popular notions about Race that are mirrored in the ordinary expressions of race-feeling. A perusal of the recent scientific literature on Race makes it evident that all serious ethnologists are arriving, by different paths, at a common conception of racial characters, in which these characters are reduced to mere factors that may actually be found in almost every possible permutation and combination but are never found 'pure' in a state of nature. Those ethnologists who have the courage to follow where the argument leads them are even beginning to ask themselves whether any concrete examples of 'pure' races would really be forthcoming, even if the fullest material evidence for the physique of the earliest types of Man were to be placed in their hands by some miracle. They are beginning to entertain the idea that the fundamental racial characters, when exhaustively analysed and defined, may prove to be nothing but an illuminating set of classificatory abstractions, which have never had any objective or independent existence at all 'in real life'.¹

The foregoing considerations will perhaps be sufficient to guard us against the error of supposing that some special quality of Race in some fraction of Mankind is the positive factor which, within the last 6,000 years, has shaken part of Mankind out of the Yin-state which we call 'the Integration of Custom' into the Yang-activity which we have decided to call 'the Differentiation of Civilization'. We may add that even if Race had proved, on inquiry, to be the positive factor of which we are in search, we should have discovered no more than the occasion of the geneses of civilizations as opposed to the cause, which would still have remained the unknown quantity which it was when our inquiry started. We should have ascertained (on this supposition) that the geneses of our twenty-one civilizations were really due to a racial superiority of the people who created these civilizations over the common run of Mankind, only to find ourselves still confronted with our original question in a new form of words. Instead of asking why a fraction of Mankind had distinguished itself from the

¹ This question is discussed in the concluding chapter of R. B. Dixon's *The Racial History of Man* (New York 1923, Scribner), on pp. 501-6. This scholar's conclusion is that: 'The "types" whose distribution and hypothetical migrations we have . . . been attempting to trace are not races in the ordinary sense of the term, and are not to be confounded with the many more or less clearly differentiated racial groups into which we may divide the peoples of the World to-day. These various living races are each the result of some particular combination of the original "types" or elements; and the difficulty which we find in deciding just how many races there are is largely due to the fact that the elements have been blended so variously and in such varying proportions. Moreover, from this point of view, a race is not a permanent entity' (pp. 502-3).

rest of the human family by creating civilizations, we should have now to ask why the racial qualities which had enabled this fraction to distinguish itself in this way had been acquired at some previous time by one part of the human family and by one part only. We could not take this supposed prior diversity of racial endowment for granted, any more than the empirically observed diversity of cultural achievement which it was alleged to explain. Nor could we take it on trust as an inexplicable and unintelligible fact which had existed from all eternity, since it is evident that racial differences between branches of the human family cannot be older than Mankind itself, and Mankind, so far from having existed from all eternity, is a recent product of the evolution of Life on a planet which is one of the youngest bodies of the stellar universe. Thus we should not have genuinely solved the problem of finding an intelligible value for our original unknown quantity, the cause of the geneses of civilizations, but should have simply re-formulated the problem by presenting this original unknown quantity in terms of another unknown quantity, namely, the cause of the diversity of racial endowment within the human family. If we were clear-headed and intellectually honest, we should have had to admit that the operation which we had performed had made our equation more intricate without having brought us a single step nearer to working it out. In other words, the so-called racial explanation of differences in human performance and achievement is either an ineptitude or a fraud.¹

It is noteworthy that the makers of the Jewish and Christian theological systems, from which all our modern Western 'race theories' are lineally descended, have faced the fact that the empirically observed differences between the performances and

¹ We have exposed this racial fallacy once before in the course of this Study (in I. B (ii), above, on pp. 25-6), when we were considering differences in performance and achievement between communities within a single society: e.g. the differences within the Hellenic Society, in the second period of its history, between the special part played by Athens and the special part played by Sparta and the ordinary part which was played by almost all the other city-states of the Hellenic World of that age with little or no variation. We saw that we should not be explaining the individuality of the initiatives which the Athenians and the Spartans respectively took, in circumstances which were the same for them and for their neighbours, if we ascribed this to a hypothetical pre-existing individuality in the Spartan and the Athenian 'racial' characters. We should either have to explain how these supposed prior differences of racial character between the peoples of the Hellenic World originally arose, or else admit that we had failed, after all, to explain the subsequent differences in their performances and achievements in which the supposed prior differences of racial character were alleged to have unfolded themselves. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If Race does not account for the special contributions of the Athenians and Spartans to the progress of the Hellenic Civilization, it is no use trying to account for the geneses of civilizations in general by the racial myths of 'Nordic Man' and 'the Children of the Sun'. The racial fallacy has been exposed succinctly by Monsieur Edmond Demolins: 'La race n'explique rien, car il reste encore à rechercher ce qui a produit la diversité des races. La race n'est pas une cause, c'est une conséquence.' (Demolins, E.: *Comment la Route crée le Type Social* (Paris no date, Firmin-Didot), p. vii.)

achievements of different fractions of the human family can neither be left unexplained nor yet be explained away, but have to be accounted for ultimately as effects of some differentiating act. Like Faust at the end of his soliloquy, they have divined that 'Im Anfang war die Tat'.¹

The Jews have been intensely conscious of being not as other men are. In their view of the World, there is a great gulf fixed between them and the Gentiles; and they are as sincerely convinced as the English or the Americans of their own immeasurable superiority to 'the lesser breeds without the Law'. Yet they have not taken for granted this tremendous difference between one breed of human beings and another without postulating a correspondingly tremendous cause. In their belief, they are a peculiar people because they are a 'chosen people';² and the divine choice, which has made them what they are, is not irrevocable. It has been given effect in a covenant between their God Yahweh and their forefather Abraham; and the precariousness of the privileges which the Covenant confers is symbolized in the physical hall-mark which is its token; for this hall-mark is not a skin which cannot be changed nor a stature to which one cubit cannot be added, but the artificial and optional mark of circumcision.³ Even so, the invidious racial conception that the privileges of the Covenant are immutable has crept into the Jewish consciousness. In the classic account of the Covenant in the Book of Genesis, Yahweh is made to declare:

'I will establish my Covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee in their generations for an everlasting covenant;'⁴

and this proclamation of everlastingness is echoed in a hundred later passages in the Jewish scriptures.⁵ Yet, in their heart of hearts, the Jews—unlike the English-speaking Protestants who claim to be their spiritual heirs—have ever been aware that Yahweh's choice is neither irrevocable like the Law of the Medes and Persians nor immutable like 'the Laws of Nature'; and their self-complacency was not impervious to John the Baptist's mortal thrust:

'Think not to say within yourselves: "We have Abraham to our father"; for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham.'⁶

¹ Goethe: *Faust*, Part I, l. 1237.

² Deuteronomy xiv. 2: "The Lord hath chosen thee to be a peculiar people unto himself."

³ See the classical account of the Covenant in Genesis xvii.

⁴ Genesis xvii. 7.

⁵ e.g. in Psalm cv. 8-10.

⁶ Matthew iii. 9. The point is elaborated in the Epistle to the Romans, ch. ix. Echoes of the same saying are placed in the mouth of Jesus himself in John viii. 33 and 39.

This text is a profound criticism of the fallacy of Race—a fallacy to which the Jews, to their credit, have never succumbed completely.

The Jewish dichotomy of Mankind into Jews and Gentiles was reproduced in the Pauline dichotomy into 'vessels of wrath fitted to destruction' and 'vessels of mercy afore prepared unto glory'.¹ The dividing line was now drawn no longer between communities but between individuals; yet the underlying conception remained unaltered. The distinction between Jews and Gentiles was ascribed to Yahweh's choice, the distinction between the Damned and the Elect to God's predestination; and, so long as an act of will was postulated as the first cause in the background, it was in vain for theologians to lay down that predestination was irrevocable, since it was logically impossible to believe that an omnipotent power was incapable of revoking its own decrees. Thus the Pauline doctrine was never completely stultified until, through the minds of Punic Augustine and Latin Calvin, it reached the mind of Nordic Man. Our modern Western racialists have rationalized their Calvinism by substituting Black and White skins for damnation and grace, and expurgated it by omitting the divine cause. The result is not science but fetishism.

The Jewish and Christian doctors have never fallen into the error of accepting Race as an explanation of the actual differences in human performance and achievement, whether between communities or between individuals; and they have satisfied their intellectual demand for an adequate cause by postulating an act of God. This postulate, which Syriac and Western theologians have made in all good faith, has been commended by a Hellenic philosopher as a pious fraud which is required by social expediency and is justified by *raison d'état*. In the half-humorous, half-cynical Spirit of Voltaire's *si Dieu n'existait pas il faudrait l'inventer*,² Plato, in a famous passage of *The Republic*, has propounded 'a noble lie' which is to reconcile the citizens of his utopia to the different stations in life to which it may please the Government to call them after having tested and brought out their innate abilities by a strenuously competitive course of education.

"What we now need," I said, "is some dodge in the nature of an opportune lie: a single noble lie which will do the trick of convincing—if possible the Government themselves and in any case the rest of the community."

"What do you mean?" he said.

"Nothing out of the way," I said; "Just a *welsh*³ which has been worked on ever so many occasions before now, as the poets credibly

¹ Romans ix. 22-3.

² Voltaire: *Épîtres*, xcvi, A l'Auteur du Livre des Trois Imposteurs (A.D. 1771), l. 22.

³ Φωβηκικόν τι.

inform us, though it has not been worked in our time and now could only be worked, if at all (of which I am not sure), at the cost of a great deal of tact and patience."

"How shy you seem to be of your idea," he said.

"You will feel," I said, "that I have every reason to be shy when I tell you what it is."

"Speak out," he said, "and don't be afraid."

"Here goes, then—though I don't know how I shall have the face to say it or whether I shall find words to say it in. Well, I shall try to convince first the Government and the Army and then the rest of the community that the upbringing and education which we gave them was all a dream and that all the time they were really being moulded and brought up underground in the bosom of the Earth, they and their arms and the rest of their equipment, which was likewise being manufactured there. Then, I shall tell them, when they had been completely finished off, their mother the Earth produced them—thus placing them under an obligation to defend their country, if she is attacked, with all their mind and all their strength, as their mother and their nurse, and also to look after their fellow-citizens as their brothers born of the same Mother Earth."

"Really," he said, "how can you have the effrontery to go on and on with a lie like that?"

"You have every reason to be shocked," I said, "but, all the same, do hear my fairy-story out. It goes on like this: 'All of you members of the community are brothers; but when God moulded you, he put a streak of metal into each at the moment of birth—gold into those of you who were fit to govern, because they were the most precious; silver into the soldiers; and iron and bronze into the peasants and the workmen. As you are all akin, you will generally breed true to type; but it will occasionally happen that the golden stock will have silver offspring and the silver stock golden offspring and so on, *mutatis mutandis*. Now the first and chiefest commandment that God lays upon members of the Government is this: the paramount call upon their honour and efficiency as guardians of Society is to be on the watch for any of these flaws in the psychic composition of the members of the rising generation and to take the proper action in each case. If it is a case of their own children showing traces of bronze or iron, they must have no mercy on them but must degrade them to the ranks of the workmen or the peasants to which they intrinsically belong. Conversely, if the children of peasants or workmen show traces of gold or silver, they must rate them at their intrinsic value and must promote them to be members of the Government or of the Army, as the case may be.' We must find scriptural authority for the prophecy that the community will come to grief on the day when a member of the iron race or the bronze race enters the Government. Well, can you think of any dodge for getting this fairy-story believed?"

"Certainly not for getting it believed by grown-up people now alive; but we might manage it with their children and their descendants and the whole of posterity."

In this passage, Plato drives home the truth that the racial explanation of differences in human ability and achievement cannot be put forward by any rational mind except as a deliberate and cold-blooded piece of deception, in which the differentiating effects of 'upbringing and education' are mendaciously ascribed to pre-existing differences of a racial order—and this with the calculated object of producing certain effects in the practical field of social and political action.

In Plato's 'noble lie', the fallacy of Race thus receives its final exposure; and here we may leave it; for we can now see beyond the fallacy to an ulterior truth. In discarding the conception of racial powers that are supposed to be peculiar to this or that branch of the human family, we have attained the conception of one omnipresent power which manifests itself in the performances and achievements of all Mankind and all Life. We may conceive of this power as a transcendent first cause and call it God,¹ or as an immanent source of continuous creation and call it (as Bergson calls it) *Évolution Créatrice* or *Élan Vital*. On either view, our conception of its nature and activity and range of operation will be the same; and on either view we shall have to admit that, although the recognition of this power may illuminate the rest of our Study, it has not in itself brought us face to face with the immediate object of our research. We have still to find the positive factor which, within the last six thousand years, has shaken part of Mankind out of the Yin-state called 'the Integration of Custom' into the Yang-activity called 'the Differentiation of Civilization'. If Race is too trivial a phenomenon to be identified with this factor, God, who 'maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust',² is too great. His action is ubiquitous and eternal; and a power which manifests itself in Life, or even merely in Humanity, at large cannot, in and by itself, be the unknown quantity which, in certain times and places, has given an impetus to a part of Mankind and not to the whole. We must continue our search.

2. *Environment*

We have next to see whether we can find our unknown quantity in the environments in which the geneses of civilizations have occurred.

The modern Western concept of Race, which we have now weighed in the balance and found wanting, was evoked, as we have

'Est deus in nobis. Agitante calescimus illo.
Impetus hic sacrae semina mentis habet.'

(Ovid: *Fasti*, Book VI, ll. 5-6 (quoted by David Hume in his essay *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*).)

² Matthew v. 45.

noticed, by the expansion of our Western Society over the World from the close of the fifteenth century of our era onwards. This expansion brought the peoples of the West into intimate contact with peoples of other physique and other culture; the differences, thus empirically observed, between human beings who were living on the surface of the same planet at the same time presented a problem to Western minds; and these minds solved that problem to their own satisfaction by improvising the concept of Race from the theological materials at their command. Hellenic minds were confronted with the same problem in consequence of a similar expansion of the Hellenic Society, which began towards the close of the eighth century B.C., and they solved the problem—also to their own satisfaction—by working out a theoretical explanation on quite different lines. It is noteworthy that although in Hellenic history this intellectual problem presented itself some four centuries earlier than in our Western history,¹ the Hellenic solution, instead of being the cruder, as might be expected *a priori*, was actually superior to the Western solution in all points. It was more imaginative, more rational, and more humane; and, above all, it was unprejudiced. The self-regarding element which is so general, so prominent, and so ugly a feature in our Western race-theories is conspicuous by its absence here. For, so far from being roused to race-consciousness by contact with human beings who were not as they were, the Hellenes drew an inference which made them more sceptical about Race than they had been before.² They explained the manifest differences between themselves and their newly-discovered neighbours as being the effects of diverse environments upon a uniform Human Nature, instead of seeing in them the outward manifestations of a diversity that was somehow intrinsic in Human Nature itself.³

¹ The Hellenic Society probably began to emerge before the close of the twelfth century B.C., and it began to expand before the close of the eighth. Our Western Society began to emerge before the close of the seventh century of the Christian Era, failed in its first attempt at expansion ('the Crusades'), and did not begin to expand successfully until the close of the fifteenth century: i.e. not until it had been in existence, in its original home, for some eight centuries, in contrast with the achievement of the Hellenic Society in expanding successfully within some four centuries of its first emergence.

² In the first age of Hellenic history Hellenic minds had passed through the stage of being under the dominion of the concept of Race, as is shown by the two facts that the earliest Hellenic institutions were based on kinship and that the earliest Hellenic efforts at historiography took a genealogical form.

³ The fact that the same problem of the diversity of Mankind evoked a Race-theory in Western minds and an Environment-theory in Hellenic minds may be explained to some extent by the difference in the instances of human diversity with which the Western and the Hellenic voyagers were confronted respectively. The Westerners were first confronted with the problem of human diversity on the Guinea Coast of Africa and in the East and West Indies, where the physique of the indigenous populations was strikingly different from the European type, whereas there were no striking features in the local geographical environments which readily suggested themselves as causes of the particular turn which human life had taken there. In these circumstances, Western minds evolved the theory of Race. On the other hand, the Hellenes were first confronted with

The *locus classicus* in which the Hellenic 'environment theory' may be studied is a treatise entitled *Influences of Atmosphere, Water, and Situation* which dates from the fifth century B.C. and is preserved among the collected works of the Hippocratean School of Medicine. As the best exposition of the theory in any literature within our range, this monograph deserves quotation:

'The countries which have the greatest and the most frequent seasonal variations of climate also have the wildest and most highly diversified landscape and present the greatest array of mountains, forests, plains and meadow-lands, while in countries where the seasonal variations are slight the uniformity of landscape is at its maximum. Consideration will show that the same equations hold good for Human Nature. Human physiognomies may be classified into the well-wooded and well-watered mountain type, the thin-soiled waterless type, the meadowy marshy type, the well-cleared and well-drained lowland type. Here, too, there is the same effect of environmental variation upon physique; and if the variation is great, the differentiation of bodily type is increased proportionately. . . .

Inhabitants of mountainous, rocky, well-watered country at a high altitude, where the margin of seasonal climatic variation is wide, will tend to have large-built bodies constitutionally adapted for courage and endurance, and in such natures there will be a considerable element of ferocity and brutality. Inhabitants of sultry hollows covered with water-meadows, who are more commonly exposed to warm winds than to cold and who drink tepid water, will, in contrast, not be large-built or slim, but thickset, fleshy and dark-haired, with swarthy rather than fair complexions and with less phlegm than bile in their constitutions. Courage and endurance will not be innate in their characters to the same degree, but will be capable of being produced in them by the coefficient of institutions. If there are rivers in the country which drain it of the stagnant water and the rainfall, the population will be healthy and in good condition; while, if there are no rivers and their drinking-water comes from stagnant lakes and marshes, their bodies will run to spleen and incline to be pot-bellied. Inhabitants of rolling, wind-swept, well-watered country at a high altitude will be large-built and un-individualized, with a vein of cowardice and tameness in their characters. Inhabitants of thin-soiled, waterless country without vegetation, where the seasonal climatic variations are abrupt and violent, will tend to have

this same problem of human diversity in the Delta of the Nile and along the north coast of the Black Sea on the fringe of the Eurasian Steppe—that is to say, in regions where the physique of the indigenous population was not strikingly different from the European type, while the local geographical environments did present certain striking features—the Nile in the one case and the Steppe in the other—which readily suggested themselves as causes of the particular turns which human life had taken in Egypt and in Scythia respectively. In these circumstances, Hellenic minds evolved the theory of Environment. The notion of a correlation between the Steppe and Nomadism or between the Nile and the Egyptian Civilization was more obvious than any notion of a correlation between the tropical climate of the Guinea Coast and the primitive social life of the West African Negro. For the European explorer in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, the colour of the Negro's skin was a more sensational novelty than the temperature of the atmosphere which the Negro was breathing.

bony, muscular bodies, fair rather than swarthy complexions, and headstrong, self-willed characters and temperaments. Where seasonal changes are most frequent and show the widest margin of variability, there you will find the greatest differentiation in the human body, character and organism.

'These are the most important varieties of organism; and then there is the effect of the country and the water which constitute the Human Race's environment. In the majority of cases, you will find that the human body and character vary in accordance with the nature of the country. Where the soil is rich and soft and well-watered, and where the water remains extremely near the surface, so that it is tepid in summer and chilly in winter, and where the climatic conditions are also favourable, the inhabitants will be fleshy, loose-jointed, flaccid, unenergetic and poor-spirited as a general rule. Laziness and sleepiness will be prominent among their characteristics, and they will be clumsy instead of being neat or quick at skilled occupations. Where the country is rocky, waterless and without vegetation, and suffers from severe winters and from scorching suns, you will find the inhabitants bony and without spare flesh, with well-articulated joints and muscular, shaggy bodies. Such constitutions are instinct with energy and alertness, and their possessors have headstrong, self-willed characters and temperaments, with a tendency towards ferocity instead of tameness, and with a superior quickness and intelligence in skilled occupations and a superior aptitude for war. You will further find that the non-human fauna and flora of a given soil likewise vary according to the quality of that soil. I have now described the extreme contrasts of type and organism; and if you work out the rest for yourself on the analogy of these, you will not go wrong.'¹

This passage is a commentary on the differences in physical structure and proportions and in psychological qualities which the Hellenes had observed among the inhabitants of Europe; but the favourite Hellenic illustrations of the 'environment theory' were taken from farther afield. They were the effect of life in the Lower Nile Valley upon the physique and character and institutions of the Egyptians, and the effect of life on the Eurasian Steppe upon the physique and character and institutions of the Scythians.²

¹ Hippocrates: *Influences of Atmosphere, Water, and Situation*, chs. 13 and 24. (English translation by A. J. Toynbee in *Greek Historical Thought from Homer to the Age of Heraclitus* (London 1924, Dent), pp. 167-8.)

² For the effect of the climatic and topographical or hydrographical environment on the Egyptians, see Herodotus, Book II, *passim*, especially chapter 5 (*Αἰγυπτος . . . ἐστὶ Αἰγυπτίοισι ἐπικτητός τε γῆ καὶ δῶρον τοῦ ποταμοῦ*) and chapter 35 (*Αἰγύπτιοι ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ τῷ κατὰ σφῆας ὄντι ἐτεροίω, καὶ τῷ ποταμῷ φύσιν ἄλλοιην παρεχομένω ἧ οἱ ἄλλοι ποταμοί, τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἔμπαλιν τοῖσι ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποισι ἐστέρωντο ἢ βλά τε καὶ νόμους*); for the effect on two primitive peoples of the Black Sea Coast in what is now called Transcaucasia, the Macrocephali and the Phasians, see Hippocrates, *op. cit.*, chs. 14-15; for the effect on the Scythians, see *op. cit.*, chs. 17-22. See also a passage in Plato's *Republic* (435E-436A), where the writer gives, as illustrations of regional group-characteristics, the hot-temperedness of the peoples of Thrace, Scythia, and the North, the intellectual curiosity of Hellas, and the acquisitiveness of the Phoenicians and Egyptians. In a later work, *The Laws* (747D-E), Plato accepts, in general terms, the theory that the

The Environment-theory of the geneses of civilizations has none of the moral repulsiveness of the Race-theory, yet intellectually it is no less vulnerable. Both theories attempt to account for the empirically observed diversity in the psychical behaviour and performance of different fractions of Mankind by supposing that this psychical diversity is fixedly and permanently correlated, in the relation of effect to cause, with certain elements of diversity, likewise given by empirical observation, in the non-psychical domain of Nature. The Race-theory finds its differentiating natural cause in the diversity of human physique, the Environment-theory finds it in the diversity of the climatic, topographical, and hydrographical conditions in which different human societies live; but this discrepancy between the two theories is not fundamental. They are merely two different attempts to find a solution for the same equation by assigning different values to the same unknown quantity. The structure of the equation which is postulated in the two theories is identical; and neither can stand if the common underlying formula will not bear examination. The essence of the formula is a correlation between two sets of variations; and this correlation must be demonstrated to be fixed and permanent—it must maintain itself in every instance under all conditions—before any theories founded on it can claim the status of scientific laws. Under this test, we have already seen the Race-theory break down; and we shall now see the Environment-theory fare no better.

Let us start with the two favourite Hellenic illustrations of the Environment-theory: the supposed relations of cause and effect between the peculiarities of the environment on the Eurasian Steppe and in the Lower Nile Valley and the peculiarities of the Nomadic and the Egyptian Society. In isolation, these two illustrations are no more than suggestive. They can only provide cogent evidence for the truth of the theory founded on them if we extend our survey to all the other specimens of either environment on the face of the Earth and find that every area resembling the Eurasian Steppe has become the seat of a society resembling the Eurasian Nomadic Society and every area resembling the Lower Nile Valley the seat of a society resembling the Egyptian.

In attempting any such survey, we must take care to make our comparisons between areas which are genuinely distinct from one another. The Eurasian Steppe, for example, is a vast area extending

psychical as well as the physical characteristics of human beings are determined and differentiated by the physical environment; but, after enumerating various elements in this environment—winds, waters, foods—he suggests that πάντων μέγιστον διαφέρουσιν ἂν τόποι χώρας ἐν οἷς θεὰ τις ἐπίνοια καὶ δαιμόνων λήξεις εἶεν, τοὺς δὲ κατοικιζομένους θεῶν δεχόμενοι καὶ τοῦναντίον. In other words, he regards divine influences, or acts of God, as being the most potent creative forces in human affairs.

from the Arctic Circle to the 40th parallel of latitude and from the 23rd degree of longitude, at the Iron Gates of the Danube, to the passage of the Amur through the mountains a hundred degrees to the east, with a girdle of outlying enclaves all round: the Hungarian Steppe beyond the Carpathians, the Manchurian Steppe beyond the Khingan Range, the Seistan Steppe beyond the Hindu Kush, the Azerbaijan Steppe beyond the Caucasus, the Thracian Steppe beyond the Balkan. The Nomadic life which Hellenic voyagers observed, from the eighth or seventh century B.C. onwards, in the immediate hinterland of the northern coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, was being lived in a more or less uniform way throughout the area which we have indicated, and it has continued to be lived in the same way from then till now, though nowadays it only maintains itself in a remnant of its former domain and its complete extinction is in sight.¹ Within these limits of Time and Space, the Nomadic life of the Eurasian Steppe is a continuum; and it therefore proves nothing to our present purpose to demonstrate that the life lived by one Nomadic people on one portion of the Steppe in one age is the same as that lived by another people on another portion in another age. We must make our comparisons, not between different parts of the same wholes, but between whole areas and whole societies that are separate from and independent of one another. It is only under these conditions that the emergence of similar societies in similar environments can properly be taken as evidence for the truth of the Environment-theory of the geneses of civilizations.

Taking, then, the Eurasian Steppe and its dependencies as one whole, we may set beside it, first, the nearest area which offers a similar environment for human life. This area extends from the western shore of the Persian Gulf to the eastern shore of the Atlantic and from the southern foot of the highlands of Iran, Anatolia, Syria, and North-West Africa to the northern foot of the highlands of the Yaman and Abyssinia and to the northern fringe of the forests of Tropical Africa. We may call this steppe the 'Afrasian', to give it a comprehensive name; and now we can put our test question: Is the similarity between the environments offered by the Eurasian and Afrasian steppes matched by any corresponding similarity between the respective human societies that have emerged in these two areas? The answer is in the affirmative. The Afrasian Steppe has its Nomadism too—a Nomadism which displays just those resemblances to and differences from the Nomadism of the Eurasian Steppe which, on the Environment-theory, we should expect to find in view of the resemblances and differences

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 7-22, below.

between the two areas. This comes out when we compare the Eurasian and Afrasian Nomads' domesticated animals. Both Nomadic societies have domesticated the camel (an animal which has all but failed to survive on either steppe in the wild state)¹; but the fact that the domesticated Bactrian camel of the Eurasian Steppe and the domesticated Arabian camel of the Afrasian Steppe represent different breeds indicates that the two feats of domestication have been achieved independently. Again, the herds on whose milk and flesh the Eurasian Nomads live consist mainly of horses and cattle, whereas the Afrasian Nomads, in their drier climate and on their scantier pastures, have to content themselves with herds of sheep and goats.²

In this first test, our survey of the Steppes and their inhabitants has revealed the correlation between type of environment and type of society which is demanded by the theory that similar environments always and everywhere produce similar societies, not by mimesis, but on the principle of the Uniformity of Nature. Under further tests, however, the correlation breaks down. For we find that the other areas in the World which offer environments for Nomad societies—the Prairies of North America, the Llanos of Venezuela, the Pampas of Argentina, the Australian grass-lands in Western Queensland and Western New South Wales—have not fulfilled the requirements of the Environment-theory by producing independent Nomadic societies of their own. Their potentialities are not open to question. They have been realized by the enterprise of our Western Society in modern times; and the pioneering Western stockmen—North American cowboys and South American Gauchos and Australian cattlemen—who have won and held these untenanted ranges for a few generations, in the van of the advancing plough and mill, have captivated the imagination of Mankind as triumphantly as the Scythian and the Tatar and the Arab. The potentialities of the American and Australian steppes must have been powerful indeed if they could transform into Nomads, if only for a generation, the pioneers of a society which had no Nomadic traditions, having lived by agriculture and manufacture ever since

¹ The problem of the desiccation of the Steppes, and its bearing upon the genesis of the Nomadic societies and upon the almost complete failure of both the Bactrian and the Arabian camel to survive on the Steppe except under the Nomad's aegis, is discussed below in II. C (ii) (b), 2 on pp. 302-6, and in Part III. A, vol. iii, on pp. 8-13 and 23 and in Annex II.

² The horse was only introduced into South-Western Asia, South-Eastern Europe, and North-Western Africa by the Eurasian Nomads who overran the domain of the Empire of Sumar and Akkad during the post-Sumeric interregnum, circa 1875-1575 B.C. (see I. C (i) (b), pp. 104-7, above). Even then it was only naturalized among the sedentary societies in that part of the World. The Afrasian Nomads did not succeed in making the horse at home on their steppe until perhaps 2,000 years later. For all his fame, the Arab horse is a recent and exotic denizen of the Afrasian Steppe, and his maintenance there has never ceased to be a *tour de force*. He is a luxury animal who is spared hard labour and is nourished on camel's milk.

it first emerged. It is all the more remarkable that the peoples whom the first Western explorers found in occupation had never been stimulated by the potentialities of the environment into Nomadism, but had found no better use for these Nomads' paradises than to use them as hunting-grounds—remaining on the primitive hunting and food-gathering level of economy to the end.

If we next test the Environment-theory by a survey of areas resembling the Lower Nile Valley, our experience will be the same.

The Lower Nile Valley is, so to speak, a 'sport' in the landscape of the Afrasian Steppe. Egypt has the same dry climate as the vast surrounding area in which it is an enclave; but it has one exceptional asset—an ample and unfailing supply of water and alluvium, provided by a great river which rises, beyond the limits of the Steppe, in a different area which enjoys an abundant rainfall. The creators of the Egyptiac Civilization realized the potentialities of this asset by evolving a society which presents a sensational contrast, in every aspect of life, to the Afrasian Nomadism all round. Then is the special environment offered by the Nile in Egypt the positive factor to which the genesis of the Egyptiac Civilization is due? In order to establish that thesis we should have to show that in every other separate area in which an environment of the Nilotic type is offered, a civilization of the 'fluvial' type has independently emerged. Here, again, the Environment-theory stands the test in a neighbouring area in which the required conditions are fulfilled: that is to say, in the Lower Valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The conditions are substantially the same: the encompassing Afrasian Steppe, the dry climate, the ample supply of water and alluvium provided by great rivers which rise in rain-swept highlands in the back of beyond. And, sure enough, the independent 'fluvial' civilization, for which we are looking, is there—the Sumeric Civilization emerging in the Lower Valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris to match the emergence of the Egyptiac Civilization in the Lower Valley of the Nile.¹ When we extend our survey, however, the correlation breaks down, as it did when we were surveying the environments of the class represented by the Afrasian Steppe.

It breaks down, to begin with, in the Jordan Valley—an area,

¹ Pace the 'Diffusionist School' of British anthropologists, we take it for granted that the Sumeric and Egyptiac civilizations emerged independently of one another and that they did not come into effective contact until after each of them had developed its own individual character. This is not to deny that the contact really was effective, or that it can be traced back to a very early date. (On this matter see Childe, V. G.: *The Most Ancient East* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), especially pp. 112-22, 167-8, 196-8, 217-18, 221-4.)

situated nearer to Egypt than 'Irāq, in which the required conditions are fulfilled equally well on a miniature scale.

'The Jordan Valley below Betše'an and Pella, the Ghor, a broad deep rift between two mountain walls, with a glowing hot climate, lay completely desolate [in the sixteenth century B.C.] and has remained as good as uninhabited to this day. Much light is thrown on national character (*Volkscharakter*) by the fact that here the attempt has never been made—as it was made under the substantially similar conditions in the Nile Valley—to take advantage of the soil and to render it productive by systematic irrigation. It is only when we draw this comparison that we become able fully to appreciate the energy with which the Egyptians have made their country the most productive agricultural country in the World for thousands of years on end.'¹

After our inquiry into Race, we may decline to accept—even at the hands of the great historian from whose pen this passage comes—the postulate that some hypothetical difference between 'the national characters' of the local populations accounts for the actual difference between the respective states of the Lower Nile Valley and the Jordan Valley during the last three or four thousand years; but, on Eduard Meyer's authority, we may accept this actual difference as a matter of fact and may recognize the historical acumen which has taken note of the fact and has brought it to our attention. In the Jordan Valley, the same environment has been offered as in the Lower Valley of the Nile and in the Lower Valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris, without having evoked the same response in the shape of another independent fluvial civilization.

The correlation may prove to break down again in the Lower Indus Valley, which is a 'sport' in the landscape of 'the Indian Desert' or 'Thar', as the Lower Nile Valley and the Jordan Valley and the Lower Valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris are 'sports' in the landscape of the Afrasian Steppe.² The Lower Indus Valley has not indeed suffered the perennial neglect which has been the fate of the Jordan Valley hitherto. Its potentialities have been turned to account; and this may prove to have been done, not by a local society on its own initiative, but by settlers from the Lower Valley of the Tigris and Euphrates who found the Indus Valley virgin soil and planted there, ready made, the Sumeric Civilization which they brought from home. In the present state of our knowledge,

¹ Meyer, Eduard: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii (i), 2nd edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 96. In vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 65, Meyer points out that the river-valleys of America have not become the cradles of any independent fluvial civilizations either, and that no independent archipelagic civilizations have arisen either in Indonesia or in the Caribbean.

² Climatically, the Indian Desert may be regarded as an outlying enclave of the Afrasian Steppe, if it receives such rainfall as it does receive from the Atlantic and not from the Indian Ocean. (See Childe, *op. cit.* pp. 23 and 201; but cf. the present volume, p. 303, footnote 2, below.)

it is perhaps not yet possible to decide between this explanation of the origins of 'the Indus Culture' and the alternative explanation of a related but still autonomous local growth.¹ Yet if, in the Indus Valley, the test does not, for the moment, yield a conclusive result, the conclusive result which it does yield in the Jordan Valley unmistakably repeats itself elsewhere. The defenders of the Environment-theory, after requiring us to suspend judgement in the case of the Indus Valley, may proceed to rule the Ganges Valley out of consideration as being too moist and tropical, and the Yangtse Valley as being too moist and temperate. On the latter grounds, they may rule out the Lower Mississippi Valley too, even though New Orleans, at the apex of the Mississippi Delta, lies in the very latitude of Egyptian Memphis and Arabic Cairo at the apex of the Nile Delta. Yet the most captious critics cannot deny that the environment offered by the lower valleys of the Nile and of the Indus and of the Tigris and Euphrates is also offered by the valleys of the Rio Grande and the Colorado River in the South-Western United States. Under the hands of the modern European settler, equipped with the resources of a civilization which he has brought with him from the other side of the World, these rivers of America have performed the miracles which Nile and Euphrates once performed for Egyptian and Sumerian irrigation-engineers; but this magic has never been taught by the Colorado or the Rio Grande, any more than it has been taught by the Jordan, to people who were not adepts in it already through having learnt it elsewhere.² In fine, we have half a dozen instances of the Nilotic type of environment³ and only two or three separate and independent instances of the 'fluvial' type of civilization. The geneses of the Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations in such environments thus turn out to be exceptions and not the rule; and it follows that the environmental factor cannot be the positive factor which has brought these two civilizations into existence.

We shall be confirmed in this conclusion if we examine the environments in which the geneses of other civilizations have occurred.

The Andean Civilization came into existence on a plateau of such

¹ For these alternative explanations of the origin of 'the Indus Culture' in the Lower Indus Valley, see I. C (i) (b), pp. 107-8, above, and Annex III, below.

² On the Colorado and the Rio Grande, the work of the European settlers was anticipated by that of the Pueblo communities; but the Pueblo culture was not an autochthonous product of the rivers on whose banks it found a footing. Like the European culture which eventually effaced it, it came in from outside—not, indeed, from the further shore of the Atlantic, but from the southern extremity of the Mexican Plateau.

³ The number of instances would be greater if we allowed ourselves to take account of debatable cases like the Ganges Valley and the Yangtse Valley and the Lower Mississippi Valley—or, again, the Basin of the Murray and the Darling Rivers in Australia, where the modern European settler, bringing with him the technique of irrigation, has produced results which the previous inhabitants of Australia had never been moved to produce by the direct stimulus of the local environment.

an altitude that it offered a temperate climate and vegetation in equatorial latitudes, in contrast to the tropical climate of the low-lying basin of the Amazon, into which the waters of the plateau found their way. There is a corresponding contrast between the high level of culture which the Andean Society once attained and the primitive savagery from which the tribes of the Amazonian forest have not emerged.¹ Then was the Andean Plateau the cause of the Andean Civilization? Before we answer in the affirmative, let us extend our survey eastwards round the equatorial zone, crossing the Atlantic, letting our gaze hover over the Amazon-like basin of the Congo, and bringing it to rest on the Andean-like chain of highlands which runs up the east side of Africa, south and north, from Table Mountain to the Highlands of Abyssinia. In the low-lying tropical forests of the Congo, we shall find persisting the same kind of primitive savagery that has persisted in the low-lying tropical forests of the Amazon; but the East African highlands can show no civilization to match the civilization of the Andean Plateau. In this case, the same offer of a temperate climate and vegetation in equatorial latitudes has not met with the same response. The indigenous societies of the East African highlands have remained on a level of culture which is hardly less primitive than that of the Congolese. The two civilizations which have a footing on the highlands to-day—a fossil of the Syriac Civilization in Abyssinia and a string of outposts of our Western Civilization from Kenya to the Cape—have both been introduced ready-made from overseas, our Western Civilization by settlers from Europe and the Syriac by settlers from the Yaman.² Thus the correlation breaks down again.

Similarly, we observe that the Minoan Civilization emerged in a cluster of islands, situated in an inland sea and blessed with the climate of the Mediterranean. Yet before we pronounce that the

¹ This contrast between Andean civilization and Amazonian savagery, great as it is, tends to appear somewhat less extreme in the light of the latest archaeological and ethnographical discoveries. 'The Indians east of the Andes, in their relations with the higher civilization in the west, were not only receivers but also givers' (Nordenskiöld, E.: *Modifications in Indian Culture through Inventions and Loans* (Göteborg 1930, Elander), p. 63). Amazonia turns out to be the birthplace of a surprisingly large proportion of the original inventions of the New World (op. cit., p. 22). 'It is possible that the Amazonas, if manioc was known there before maize, possessed a highly developed civilization earlier than the Peruvian coastland. This is at all events a possibility to be reckoned with' (Nordenskiöld, E.: *Origin of the Indian Civilisations in South America* (Göteborg 1931, Elander), p. 52).

² We must not leave out of account the culture of Uganda, which is a primitive culture of the highest level—a strikingly higher level than that of the surrounding indigenous societies—although the progressive Baganda, like their savage neighbours, are members of the Black Race and show no trace of any infusion of 'White' blood. This enclave of exceptionally high native culture cannot be accounted for by immigration. Is it a product of the radiation of the Egyptian Civilization up the Nile? The radiation of a civilization, like the radiation of star-light, may go on travelling through Space for ages after the body which once emitted it has ceased to exist. (See Part II. A, p. 187, above.)

Aegean environment was the cause of the Minoan Civilization, we must ask why a similar environment failed to evoke another civilization of the 'archipelago' type round the Inland Sea of Japan. We must ask why Japan never gave birth to an independent civilization, corresponding to the Japanese environment, but was eventually found vacant, and annexed, by the continental, non-maritime Far Eastern Civilization which had first emerged in the interior of China.

The Sinic Civilization, to which the extant Far Eastern Civilization is 'affiliated', is sometimes represented as being the offspring of the Yellow River, because it happened to emerge in the Yellow River Valley; but before this account of the genesis of the Sinic Civilization is accepted, it has to be explained why the Danube Valley, with much the same disposition of climate and soil and plain and mountain,¹ has failed to produce a sister-civilization of the same physiognomy.²

And what of the Mayan Civilization? Are we to regard the tropical rainfall and vegetation of Northern Guatemala and of British Honduras as the positive cause of the emergence of this civilization there? Then it has to be explained why human beings were stimulated into civilization in Central America by an environment which is still keeping them, more than two thousand years later, on the most primitive level of savagery in the basins of the Amazon and the Congo. It may be objected that while these two latter areas lie actually on the Equator, the original home of the Mayan Civilization lies on the 15th degree of latitude north, towards the outer edge of the tropical zone. In order to meet this objection, we will abandon the comparison with the Amazon and the Congo and will compare the country in which the Mayan Civilization emerged with another low-lying rain-sodden jungle-clad country in approximately the same latitude on the other side

¹ The geographical configuration of the Danube Valley, with a lower plain extending from the mouth of the river to the Iron Gates and an upper plain in Hungary, is singularly like the configuration of the Yellow River Valley, with its lower plain in Shantung and Honan and its upper plain, on the further side of a defile, in Shansi and Shensi.

² Modern Western archaeological research has, indeed, revealed traces of an incipient Danubian Civilization dating from the third millennium B.C.; but this was abortive. Unlike the Sinic Civilization, it did not succeed in striking out along an independent line of growth. It is possible that the difference in the fortunes of the Sinic Civilization and this abortive Danubian Civilization was due to the fact that although their climatic and topographical environments were similar, their human environments, in the shape of neighbouring societies, were different. The Sinic Society, at the time of its emergence during the second millennium B.C., seems to have had no direct contact with any societies that were above the primitive level. On the other hand, the abortive Danubian Civilization, at the time when it was in gestation, was probably within the range of both the Minoan Civilization and the Sumerian Civilization. The radiation and attraction exerted by these older and stronger civilizations upon the incipient Danubian Civilization in its embryonic state might account for its miscarriage. (For this abortive Danubian Civilization, see *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. i, ch. ii, 'Neolithic and Bronze Age Cultures', by J. L. Myres; and *The Danube in Prehistory*, by V. G. Childe (Oxford 1929, University Press).)

of the World. We plunge into the forests of Cambodia and discover, at Angkor Wat, as mighty a monument to the passage of a civilization as any which the forests of Central America have yielded up. What is the conclusion? That these low-lying rain-sodden tropical forests infallibly produce civilizations when their latitude happens to be round about 15 degrees? This conclusion might perhaps be forced on us, unconvincing though it seems *a priori*, if the civilization commemorated by the ruins of Angkor Wat, as well as the civilization commemorated by the ruins of Copan or Ixkun, were found to be indigenous.¹ Actually, the archaeological evidence tells us that the civilization which expressed itself so magnificently in Cambodia was not native to the soil but was imported ready-made from overseas. Cambodia was a colonial outpost of the Hindu Civilization, and not a region with an independent civilization of its own. The remains of the Hindu Civilization at Angkor Wat tell not for but against the hypothesis of a correlation, in the nature of cause and effect, between the existence of certain types of environment and the emergence of certain types of civilization. Angkor Wat testifies, first, that Cambodia did offer, like Central America, a tropical environment in which the existence of a civilization was possible; and, second, that in Cambodia the particular civilization which has proved that first point by establishing itself there cannot have been a spontaneous product of this environment, since its remains bear evidence that it originated far away, in India. In the light of this testimony, it is impossible to contend that because the Mayan Civilization happens to have been indigenous to Central America, the environment common to Central America and to Cambodia is the positive factor to which the genesis of the Mayan Civilization is due.²

By the same logic, the suggestion that the Russian variety of the Orthodox Christian Civilization is a product of the Russian forests, the Russian rivers, and the Russian cold can be rebutted by pointing out that no civilization has been generated by the similar environment of Canada. Or if it is suggested that the environment offered by Western Europe is the efficient cause of our Western Civilization, it may be pointed out that all the motley ingredients

¹ It is taken for granted here that the Mayan Civilization was indigenous to Central America, *pace* the 'Diffusionist School' of British archaeologists, and without intervening in the controversy as to whether one of the figures in a lost Mayan work of art, now only known at second hand from a drawing by a seventeenth-century French artist, represents an elephant or a macaw. (The Diffusionists' case in this controversy is presented in *Elephants and Ethnologists*, by G. Elliot Smith (London 1924, Kegan Paul). For a general discussion of the Diffusion Theory, see I. C (iii) (b), Annex, below.)

² Dr. Ellsworth Huntington contends that, in reality, the rain-soaked tropical jungle did not give birth to a civilization in Central America any more than in Cambodia. He seeks to show that the birthplace of the Mayan Civilization enjoyed a different climate, and was clad in a different vegetation, at the time when the Mayan Civilization arose there. For Dr. Huntington's views on this point, see further II. D (vii), Annex I, vol. ii, below.

of the West-European environment exist, without ever having combined to produce an independent civilization on their own account, within the present frontiers of the United States: another Norway in Maine, another Sweden in Minnesota, another England in New York State, another Riviera in Southern California, another Castile in Colorado, and so on to the end of the list. Why has a similarly compounded environment not begotten a similar civilization on both sides of the Atlantic?

At this point our critics may protest that, in our last two illustrations, we have not played fair. They may point out that the climatic and topographical environments of our Western Civilization and of the Russian variety of the Orthodox Christian Civilization, which we have just been comparing with similar climatic and topographical environments in the New World, are not the whole of the environment in which each of these two civilizations respectively emerged; and they may contend that the comparisons which we have made, being limited to a part of the environment which has been arbitrarily torn from its context by us, are illegitimate. The environment of any society, they may proceed, is always twofold. There is the non-human environment, consisting of the climate and topography and hydrography of the area in which the civilization originates and in which it expands; and it is this element in the environment that has been exclusively considered in this Study so far. There is also, however, a human environment, and this consists of all the other societies with which any given society has relations in either of the two dimensions of Time and Space.¹

For instance, the environment in which the genesis of our Western Civilization took place includes the 'affiliation' of this Western Society to the Hellenic Society, as well as the climate and topography and hydrography of the geographical area which was the Western Society's original home. Moreover, they may proceed (pressing home their counter-attack), these two elements in the environment in which the Western Civilization emerged are bound up with one another. The Western Civilization, being 'affiliated' to the Hellenic, could not have arisen in some area which had lain quite beyond the horizon of the Hellenic Civilization even at its widest range; and it is therefore idle to point out an area in the New World in which all the features of the non-human environment of the Western Civilization can be found, unless it can also be shown that the human environment in which the genesis of the

¹ This duality of the Environment is taken into account in chapter 16 of the Hippocratican *Influences of Water, Atmosphere, and Situation*, and also in the second paragraph of David Hume's essay *Of National Characters*.

Western Civilization in Western Europe occurred was offering itself in North America contemporaneously. In other words, the proposition that an identical environment gave birth to a civilization on one side of the Atlantic and failed to give birth to one on the other is not proved by establishing the climatic, topographical, and hydrographical similarity of two geographical areas. It must also be proved that North America was as accessible as Western Europe to the radiation and attraction of the Hellenic Civilization in the age when the 'affiliation' of the Western Civilization to the Hellenic Civilization occurred; and on this point the case for the identity of the two environments breaks down. The horizon of the Hellenic World, which had expanded in the course of some twelve centuries from the coasts of the Aegean to the banks of the Ganges and the Elbe, remained bounded until the end by the coasts of the Atlantic. And when a latter-day poet, hailing from the Far West of the Hellenic *Orbis Terrarum*, divined, in a flash of inspiration, that the Atlantic was merely a vaster Mediterranean and that the Spirit of Man, which had triumphed over the estranging Sea, would one day conquer the Ocean,¹ no Hellenic Columbus arose to translate the poet's dream into the mariner's achievement. Thus there never was an opportunity for a civilization 'affiliated' to the Hellenic to emerge in the New World as well as in the Old; and, in the absence of this human environment, the climate and topography and hydrography of North America offered itself in vain as a cradle for a nascent civilization. Had not the similar non-human environment in Western Europe remained equally sterile until its frozen soil was touched and thawed by the last rays of the declining Hellenic sun?

On the same lines, it could be argued by our critics that the similarity of the non-human environment in Canada to the non-human environment in Russia does not confute the thesis that the Russian variety of the Orthodox Christian Civilization was a

¹ Nunc iam cessit pontus et omnes
patitur leges; non Palladia
compacta manu regum referens
inclita remos quaeritur Argo;
quaelibet altum cymba pererrat;
terminus omnis motus, et urbes
muros terra posuere nova;
nil qua fuerat sede reliquit
pervius orbis.

Indus gelidum potat Araxem,
Albim Persae Rhenumque bibunt.
Venient annis saecula seris,
quibus Oceanus vincula rerum
laxet, et ingens pateat tellus,
Tethysque novos detegat orbes,
nec sit terris ultima Thule.

(Seneca, *Medea*, ll. 364-79.)

product of the environment; for the whole environment must be taken into account, and, in confining our attention to the forests and the rivers and the cold, which Russia offers in common with Canada, we were attempting to make a part of the environment do duty for the whole. Why, the very name which we ourselves have given to this civilization ought to have guarded us against falling into that error. We have not named it 'the Russian Civilization', as though its affinities were solely with the geographical area in which it happens to have emerged. We have rightly called it 'the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia', in order to put on record the fact that it is an offshoot of a society whose original stem stands not in Russia but elsewhere; and this fact rigidly limits the range within which any civilization resembling the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia could have established itself. It limits it to the geographical radius within which it was possible for offshoots from the original stem to take root at the particular stage in the growth of the tree at which the actual offshoot did establish itself in Russian soil.¹ Since Canada lay far beyond this radius, it is incorrect and misleading to suggest that the identical environment which gave birth to a civilization in Russia existed in Canada likewise without giving birth to a civilization there. The Canadian environment lacked one of the essential elements of the Russian environment taken as a whole.

Against such assaults from our critics we are not entirely defenceless. For instance, we might concede that the area, now occupied by the United States, which offered substantially the same non-human environment as Western Europe for the genesis of a civilization, but offered it in vain, was not able to offer exactly the same human environment as Western Europe inasmuch as North America was never subject to social radiation from the Hellenic World. Having made this concession with a good grace, we could point out to our critics that, even when both elements in the environment are taken into account, the difference between the two environments, in their geographico-social totality, turns out after all to be not so great as might appear at first sight. Though the rays of Hellenism never played upon any part of the New World, the section of North America between the Rio Grande and the Great Lakes was no more immune than Western Europe from the radiation of any

¹ The process by which the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia and the Far Eastern Civilization in Korea and Japan respectively became self-supporting and independent of the main bodies of the two societies may be likened to the process by which the branches of banyan trees strike roots of their own and so draw sustenance from the soil on their own account. It is clear that the range of these subsidiary roots lies within limits which are narrow and rigid. These roots cannot strike in soil which lies beyond the furthest spread of the branches, however suitable the chemical composition of the soil at some greater distance from the main stem.

civilization whatsoever. The New World, as we have seen, has indigenous civilizations of its own; and by the time when the first modern European explorers reached the Atlantic sea-board of what is now the United States, the Mexic Civilization had already radiated that far from its home on the Mexican Plateau—at any rate on the economic plane, as is proved by the fact that the Pilgrim Fathers found the Red Indian tribes of Massachusetts practising the Mexic art of maize cultivation. If the non-human environment which is common to Western Europe and to the United States did successfully combine in Western Europe with the human environment which is represented by the radiation of the Hellenic Civilization, in order to give birth to a new civilization 'affiliated' to the Hellenic, why, in North America, did a similar non-human environment not combine with the corresponding human environment which was provided by the radiation of the Mexic Civilization in order to give birth to another new civilization 'affiliated' to the Mexic?

Thus, the test which we have been applying to the theory that Environment is the positive factor in the geneses of civilizations may not, after all, be invalidated by the broader conception of the Environment which our critics have put into the field. At the same time, it remains true that the human environment in North America, while comparable to both that in Western Europe and that in Russia, is not identical with either of them; and there are also other elements of difference—for instance, the Time-factor¹—

¹ A non-correspondence, in the Time-factor, between the radiation of Hellenism over Western Europe and the radiation of the Mexic Civilization over North America may suggest the answer to the question asked at the end of the last paragraph: Why, in North America, did not the non-human environment combine with the human environment which was provided by the radiation of the Mexic Civilization, in order to give birth to another new civilization 'affiliated' to the Mexic? The Pilgrim Fathers landed in Massachusetts not quite a hundred years after Cortez had conquered Mexico; and, at the moment of the Spanish Conquest, the Mexic Society was still in the last convulsions of a 'Time of Troubles' which had not yet reached its apparently inevitable end in the foundation of a universal state by the Aztec Empire of Tenochtitlan. (See I. C (i) (b), p. 124, above.) On this showing, if we reduce the chronology of Mexic history to the Time-scale of Hellenic and Western history, Mexic 1521 of the Christian Era corresponds approximately to Hellenic 100 B.C. Now by 100 B.C. Hellenism was not yet radiating more widely or more vigorously over Western Europe than the Mexic Civilization was radiating over North America by A.D. 1521. From the beginning of the last century B.C. some seven or eight centuries—during which the Hellenic universal state came into existence and passed out again into an interregnum—had still to run before, in Western Europe, a new civilization, 'affiliated' to the Hellenic, began to emerge. Supposing that the Spaniards, English, French, and Dutch had never set foot in Central and North America, and that Mexic history had run its course to the end without ever being exposed to the impact of our Western Civilization, who can say that its radiation over North America, which had reached Massachusetts before A.D. 1620, might not by 1933 have produced effects which would have enabled European observers at this date to forecast that, though the disintegration of the Mexic Civilization itself might be beyond repair, some new civilization or civilizations, 'affiliated' to the Mexic, might be expected to emerge, in about the twenty-third century of the Christian Era, in the basins of the Mississippi and the St. Lawrence? As things have turned out, we cannot tell whether the human environment of the Mexic Civilization might not eventually have combined with the non-human environment of North America to generate a new civilization, as the

to be taken into account. Accordingly, in order to be on the safe side, we will now rule out of account all applications of our test except those in which the civilization playing the part of the human environment in either case is one and the same.

Confining our attention to such cases, we may still ask, for example, whether the genesis of the Hittite Civilization is completely accounted for by the non-human environment of the Anatolian Plateau in combination with the human environment provided by the Sumeric Civilization, to which the Hittite Civilization is related through the Sumeric Society's external proletariat. If a plateau exposed to the radiation of the Sumeric culture was really the positive factor by which the genesis of the Hittite Civilization was brought about, then the advocates of the Environment-theory have to explain why it was that a sister-civilization, related to the Sumeric Civilization in the same manner and in the same degree, did not emerge contemporaneously on the Iranian Plateau. The plateau of Iran offers the same non-human environment as the plateau of Anatolia; it is geographically nearer than the latter to the homelands of the Sumeric Society from which the radiation of the Sumeric culture was emitted; and there cannot be anything in the Iranian environment which is inimical to civilizations *a priori* and in perpetuity, for we know that Iran became the second home of the Syriac Civilization a dozen centuries or so after it had failed to make a home for a sister-civilization to the Hittite Civilization of Anatolia.

We may ask just the same question about the genesis of the Mexic Civilization on the Mexican Plateau. If a plateau exposed to the radiation of the Mayan culture was really the positive factor by which the genesis of the Mexic civilization was brought about, then why did no sister-civilization emerge contemporaneously on those Central American highlands, overhanging the coast of the Pacific from Southern Guatemala to Panama, which adjoin the homelands of the Mayan Civilization in Northern Guatemala on

human environment of Hellenism actually did combine with the non-human environment of Western Europe to bring our Western Civilization to birth. We cannot tell, because the intrusion of our Western Civilization into the New World deprived North America of the Mexic radiation and subjected it to a Western radiation instead, long before the Mexic radiation could have been expected to produce in North America the results which were produced eventually by the long and never interrupted radiation of Hellenism over Western Europe. (For an expert discussion of this problem, see Huntington, Ellsworth: *Civilisation and Climate*, 3rd edition (New Haven 1924, Yale University Press), pp. 369-72. Dr. Huntington points out that the material apparatus of the Mexic Civilization did not include either tools of iron or beasts of burden, and that, without these two equipments, any human attempt to overcome the North American forest and transform it into fields would have been more difficult than we can readily imagine. To this it may be replied that, in spite of that handicap, the Mayan Civilization, to which the Mexic was 'affiliated', had actually performed this very feat upon the Central American forest—a tropical monster which was assuredly not less formidable to cope with than the temperate forest of the Mississippi and St. Lawrence basins.)

the south-west, and are actually nearer to them than the Mexican Plateau is? Why did a civilization related to the Mayan emerge on the more distant Mexican Plateau and not on the less distant Central American highlands? For the environment in these highlands was no more inimical *a priori* to civilizations than the environment in Iran, as is proved by the fact that, a dozen centuries or so after the Central American highlands had failed to make a home for a sister-civilization to the Mexic Civilization of the north-western plateau, they were occupied by the Spanish pioneers of an intrusive civilization from overseas whose descendants are the ruling element in the six Central American Republics of our day.¹

And what of the environment which gave birth to the Syriac Civilization? The non-human environment here was provided by the climate and topography of the Syrian coast-lands, the human environment by the Minoan Civilization—inasmuch as the Syriac Civilization emerged among Minoan refugees who secured a footing on the coast of Syria during the post-Minoan interregnum and there encountered the Hebrew and Aramaean barbarians who were drifting into Syria out of its North-Arabian hinterland.² If a Mediterranean coast-line, exposed to the radiation of the Minoan culture, was really the positive factor by which the genesis of the Syriac Civilization was brought about, then why did no sister-civilization emerge contemporaneously along the opposite coast-line of Southern Italy and Sicily and North-West Africa from Taranto to Gabes? These coasts offer the same peculiar and distinctive climate and topography, of the Mediterranean type, that are offered by the coasts of Syria; they are no more distant, or more difficult to reach, than the Syrian coasts are from the homelands of the Minoan Civilization in Crete and the Cyclades; and the researches of our modern Western archaeologists seem to bear out the traditions of Hellenic Mythology by informing us that the Minoan Society, in its last days, was radiating its culture not only eastwards on to the coasts of Syria but also westwards as far as the coasts of Sicily and perhaps farther still. Why was it then that, during the post-Minoan interregnum, when one swarm of Minoan refugees settled on the Syrian coasts and sowed the seed of the Syriac Civilization among Hebrew and Aramaean barbarians from the Arabian hinterland, another swarm did not sow the seed of a sister-civilization by hiving off in the opposite direction and settling on the South Italian and Sicilian and North-West African coasts, where Libyan and Italic barbarians from the hinterlands were

¹ On this, see further II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 34-6, below.

² See I. C (i) (b), pp. 100-2, above.

waiting to receive the same seed and to bring forth, in due course, a similar harvest. There was certainly nothing about these western coast-lines that was inimical to civilizations *a priori*. They were the very fields which brought forth so abundantly when they were taken in hand by Syriac and Hellenic settlers eventually, a few centuries later. If Southern Italy was capable of becoming a 'Magna Graecia' and Sicily and Africa of becoming foster-mothers to a Syracuse and a Carthage,¹ why did they all lie fallow during the post-Minoan interregnum, when, in Syria, precisely the same geographico-social environment was bringing a new civilization to birth?

And what of the 'transplantation' of the Far Eastern Civilization to Korea and Japan? If this phenomenon of 'transplantation' is wholly accounted for by the presence of soil of a certain quality at a certain range from the main stem of the tree, then why did not another offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization take root simultaneously in the Malay Peninsula and in Indonesia? For the Far Eastern Society did expand some distance in this direction too. At the very time when it was advancing north-eastwards upon Korea and Japan, it was also advancing south-eastwards upon the long coast-land which is now occupied by the four Chinese provinces Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi² and the two French possessions Tongking and Annam. This advance of the Far Eastern Civilization on a south-eastern front was as fruitful, as far as it went, as the advance in the north-easterly direction; for, if the one movement has produced the modern Japanese, the modern Cantonese are a product of the other. Then why did the south-eastward movement stop dead at the coast instead of taking to the sea and passing over into Indonesia, as the north-eastward movement of the Far Eastern Civilization actually took to the sea and passed over from the Asiatic mainland into Japan? Geographically, Indonesia is not more distant than Japan is from the homelands of the Far Eastern Civilization in Central China. Nor is it more difficult to reach. The Philippines can be reached from Central China by way of Formosa as easily as Japan by way of Korea; and the access to Sumatra by way of the Malay Peninsula is easier still. Nor, again, can there be anything in the Indonesian environment which is inimical to civilizations *a priori*; for this field, in which the Far Eastern Civilization neglected to strike root, was successfully occupied and cultivated by the Hindu Civilization, though Indonesia is sundered from the Coromandel

¹ Hellenic Syracuse and Syriac Carthage each surpassed and put out of countenance her mother-city in 'the old country'—Syracuse her mother Corinth, Carthage her mother Tyre.

² Kwangsi does not actually touch the coast.

Coast by half the breadth of the Indian Ocean. Striking out boldly across this gulf, the Hindu mariners called into existence in Indonesia a new Hindu World of such power and splendour that its ruins—a Cambodian Angkor Wat and a Javan Borobodoer—are not put out of countenance by any monuments of Hindu Art that survive in Continental India. But why is it the Hindu Civilization, and not the Far Eastern Civilization, that has left its mark upon an archipelago which the Far Eastern mariners could have reached without ever having to venture out of sight of land?

These illustrations perhaps suffice to show that even the total geographico-social environment, in which the human as well as the non-human element is taken into account, cannot be regarded as the positive factor by which our twenty-one civilizations have been generated. It is clear that a virtually identical combination of the two elements in the environment may give birth to a civilization in one instance and fail to give birth to a civilization in another instance, without our being able to account for this absolute difference in the outcome by detecting any substantial difference in the circumstances, however strictly we may define the terms of our comparison. Conversely, it is clear that civilizations can and do emerge in environments which are utterly diverse. The non-human environment may be of 'the fluvial type' which has given birth to the Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations and perhaps to an independent 'Indus Culture' as well; or it may be of 'the plateau type' which has given birth to the Andean and the Hittite and the Mexican civilizations; or it may be of 'the archipelago type' which has given birth to the Minoan and the Hellenic civilizations, and to the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan; or it may be of 'the continental type' which has given birth to the Sinitic and the Indic and the Western civilizations, and to the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia; or it may be of 'the jungle type' which has given birth to the Mayan Civilization. This catalogue suggests that any kind of climate and topography is capable of serving as an environment for the genesis of a civilization if the necessary miracle is performed by some positive factor which still eludes our search. And when we turn to the human environment, in the shape of other civilizations, we see that the diversity of possible conditions is just as great here. Of the twenty-one civilizations which have come to birth so far to our knowledge, six show no trace of being related to any earlier civilizations in their backgrounds, while the remaining fifteen all appear to be related to certain earlier civilizations in various manners and degrees. Moreover, two of these fifteen are offshoots which have taken separate root and have grown up side by side with the main stems of which they

once were branches. It seems as though the genesis of a civilization can take place in any kind of human environment or—on the evidence of the ‘unrelated’ civilizations—without any human environment at all.

We have now drawn the covert of Environment, and we have had the same experience as when we drew the covert of Race. We have not found the quarry which we are hunting; but we have fought our way through the thicket and have come out on the other side into open country again. We have seen through the Environment-theory as we saw through the Race-theory before. We have seen it for what it is: the hallucination of a wanderer lost in the forest, who has turned and turned again in an ever narrowing circle till he cannot see the wood for the trees. When we struggled clear of the first thicket in our path we found that we had liberated ourselves from the conception of racial powers peculiar to this or that branch of the human family and had attained the conception of an omnipresent power, manifesting itself in the conduct and achievements of all Mankind and all Life, in which we recognize the philosopher’s *Élan Vital* or the mystic’s God. Looking back now upon the second thicket from which we have just broken out into the daylight, we shall find that, this time, we have shaken ourselves free from the conception of environmental stimuli, peculiar to this or that climate and area, or this or that human background, or this or that combination of the two. The Environment resolves itself into an omnipresent object confronting the omnipresent power which manifests itself in Life. We may conceive of this object as an obstacle lying across the path of the *Élan Vital* or as an Adversary challenging a living God to halt or do battle. On either view, we shall have to admit, once again, that we are not here face to face with the immediate object of our research. We have not yet found the positive factor which, within the last six thousand years, has shaken part of Mankind out of the Yin-state which we have called ‘the Integration of Custom’ into the Yang-activity which we have called ‘the Differentiation of Civilization’.¹ An object which presents itself perpetually in every part of the field of Life cannot, in and by itself, be the unknown quantity which, in certain times and places, has given an impetus to part of Mankind and not to the whole. Our hunt must go on; and, with two coverts drawn, only one possibility remains open. If our unknown

¹ ‘Deutlich zeigt sich . . . dass die Natur und die Geographie nur das Substrat des historischen Lebens der Menschen bildet, dass sie nur Möglichkeiten einer Entwicklung bietet, nicht Notwendigkeiten. . . . Die Geschichte ist keineswegs in der Natur eines Landes vorgezeichnet . . . sondern das Entscheidende sind überall im menschlichen Leben die geistigen und individuellen Faktoren, welche das gegebene Substrat benutzen oder vernachlässigen.’ (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 66; cf. p. 84.)

quantity is neither Race nor Environment, neither God nor the Devil, it cannot be a simple quantity but must be a product of two: some interaction between Environment and Race, some encounter between the Devil and God. That is the plot of the Book of Job and the plot of Goethe's *Faust*. Is it, perhaps, the plot of Life and the plot of History?

(b) CHALLENGE-AND-RESPONSE

1. *The Action of Challenge-and-Response*

In searching for the positive factor which, within the last six thousand years, has shaken part of Mankind out of 'the Integration of Custom' into 'the Differentiation of Civilization', we have so far been employing the tactics of 'the classical school' of our modern Western Physical Science. We have been thinking in abstract terms and experimenting with the play of soulless forces: *Vis Inertiae* and Race and Environment. Now that these manœuvres have ended, one after another, in our drawing blank, we may pause to consider whether our successive failures may not point to some mistake in method. Perhaps, under the insidious influence of the spirit of an outgoing age, we have fallen victims to 'the Apathetic Fallacy' against which we took warning at the outset of our inquiry.¹ Have we not been guilty of applying to historical thought, which is a study of living creatures, a scientific method of thought which has been devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature? In making a final attempt to solve the riddle that has been baffling us, let us follow Plato's lead and try the alternative course. Let us shut our eyes, for the moment, to the formulae of Science in order to open our ears to the language of Mythology.²

So far, by the process of exhaustion, we have made one discovery: the cause of the geneses of civilizations is not simple but multiple; it is not an entity but a relation. We have the choice of conceiving this relation either as an interaction between two inhuman forces—like the petrol and the air which interact in the engine of a motor-car—or as an encounter between two superhuman personalities. Let us yield our minds to the second of these two conceptions. Perhaps it will lead us towards the light.

An encounter between two superhuman personalities is the plot of some of the greatest stories and dramas that the human imagination has conceived. An encounter between Yahweh and the Serpent is the plot of the story of the Fall of Man in the Book of Genesis; a second encounter between the same antagonists (transfigured by a progressive enlightenment of Syriac souls) is the plot

¹ See Part I. A, pp. 7-8, above.

² For the nature of Mythology, see I. C (iii) (e) Annex, p. 442, below.

of the New Testament which tells the story of the Redemption; an encounter between the Lord and Satan is the plot of the Book of Job; an encounter between the Lord and Mephistopheles is the plot of Goethe's *Faust*; an encounter between Gods and Demons is the plot of the Scandinavian *Voluspà*; an encounter between Artemis and Aphrodite is the plot of Euripides' *Hippolytus*.

We find another version of the same plot in that ubiquitous and ever-recurring myth—a 'primordial image', if ever there was one—of the encounter between the Virgin and the Father of her Child. The characters of this myth have played their allotted parts on a thousand different stages under an infinite variety of names: Danae and the Shower of Gold; Europa and the Bull; Semele the stricken Earth and Zeus the Sky that launches the thunderbolt; Creusa and Apollo in Euripides' *Ion*; Psyche and Cupid; Gretchen and Faust. The theme recurs, transfigured, in the Annunciation. In our own day in the West, this protean myth has re-expressed itself as the last word of our astronomers on the genesis of the Planetary System, as witness the following *credo*:

'We believe . . . that, some two thousand million years ago, . . . a second star, wandering blindly through Space, happened to come within hailing distance of the Sun. Just as the Sun and Moon raise tides on the Earth, this second star must have raised tides on the surface of the Sun. But they would be very different from the puny tides which the small mass of the Moon raises in our oceans; a huge tidal wave must have travelled over the surface of the Sun, ultimately forming a mountain of prodigious height, which would rise ever higher and higher as the cause of the disturbance came nearer and nearer. And, before the second star began to recede, its tidal pull had become so powerful that this mountain was torn to pieces and threw off small fragments of itself, much as the crest of a wave throws off spray. These small fragments have been circulating round their parent Sun ever since. They are the Planets, great and small, of which our Earth is one.'²

Thus, out of the mouth of the mathematical astronomer, when all his complex calculations are done, there comes forth, once again, the myth of the encounter between the Sun Goddess and her ravisher that is so familiar a tale in the mouths of the untutored children of Nature.

The parable is taken up by the modern Western biologist. His speech bewrays him, however vehemently he may deny that there is any mythological content in his thought:

'Darwin assumed two operative factors in the organic world: Variation in the reproduction and inheritance of living beings and Natural

¹ The genius who conceived 'The Sibyl's Vision' has not chosen to reveal his name.

² Jeans, Sir James: *The Mysterious Universe* (Cambridge 1930, University Press), pp. 1-2.

Selection, or the survival of the fittest, as Herbert Spencer called it. . . . There is no doubt that both Variation and Natural Selection are essential elements in the Darwinian theory. Darwinism, in fact, implies two factors: an internal factor, operating mysteriously in the inmost nature and constitution of living organisms, and an external factor working along independent lines on the results achieved by the internal factor. The inner factor, Variation, is positive and creative, producing all the variations which are the raw material for progress. The external factor, Natural Selection, is essentially negative and destructive, eliminating the harmful or less fit or useful variations and leaving the more fit or useful variations free play to continue and multiply, and in this process fitting and adapting the individual to the character of its environment. As de Vries has phrased it, the inner factor explains the arrival, and the external factor the survival, of the fit or useful variation or organism.¹

The presence and potency of the internal as well as the external factor is admitted by the modern Western archaeologist, whose studies begin with a concentration of attention upon the environment and end with an intuition of the mystery of Life.

'Environment . . . is not the total causation in culture-shaping. . . . It is, beyond doubt, the most conspicuous single factor. . . . But there is still an indefinable factor which may best be designated quite frankly as x , the unknown quantity, apparently psychological in kind. . . . If x be not the most conspicuous factor in the matter, it certainly is the most important, the most fate-laden.'²

Even in our present study of history, this insistent theme of the superhuman encounter has asserted itself at least twice already. At an early stage we observed that 'a society . . . is confronted in the course of its life by a succession of problems' and that 'the presentation of each problem is a challenge to undergo an ordeal'.³ We were feeling our way towards an expression of the same idea when we attempted to conceive Evolution through the simile of an encounter between a growing tree and a man with an axe: 'the image of the pollarded willow'.⁴

Let us try to analyse the plot of this story or drama which repeats itself in such different contexts and in such various forms.

We may begin with two general features: the encounter is

¹ Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd edition (London 1927, Macmillan), pp. 195-7.

² Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilisations of the Andes* (New York and London 1931, Scribner), pp. 25-6. It should be noted, however, that while this scholar agrees with the other scholars here quoted in finding the cause of genesis in a relation between two factors, he differs from them in regarding this relation, not as a collision or an encounter, but as a harmony. The last of the passages omitted in the present quotation from Mr. Means runs as follows: 'If x be in harmony with the environment factors—and it is so comparatively rarely—culture will progress and civilization will be constructed, to continue, we may suppose, until x ceases to be in harmony with the environment factors. From this it follows that . . .'

³ I. B (ii), pp. 22-3, above.

⁴ I. C (iii) (b), pp. 168-9, above.

conceived as a rare and sometimes as a unique event; and it has consequences which are vast in proportion to the vastness of the breach which it makes in the customary course of Nature.

Even in the easy-going world of the Hellenic Mythology, where the Gods saw the daughters of men that they were fair, and had their way with so many of them that their victims could be marshalled and paraded in poetic catalogues,¹ such incidents never ceased to be sensational affairs and invariably resulted in the births of heroes. In the versions of the plot in which both the parties to the encounter are superhuman, the rarity and the momentousness of the event are apt to be thrown into stronger relief. In the Book of Job, 'the day when the sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan came also among them', is evidently conceived as an unusual occasion; and so is the encounter between the Lord and Mephistopheles in the 'Prologue in Heaven' (suggested, of course, by the passage in the Book of Job) which starts the action of Goethe's *Faust*.² In both these dramas, the consequences on Earth of this unusual encounter in Heaven are tremendous. The single ordeals of Job and Faust represent, in the intuitive language of fiction,³ the infinitely multiple ordeal of Man; and, in the language of theology, the same vast consequence is represented as following from the superhuman encounters that are portrayed in the Book of Genesis and in the New Testament. The expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden, which follows from the encounter between Yahweh and the Serpent, is nothing less than the Fall of Man; the passion of Christ in the New Testament is nothing less than Man's Redemption.

In the New Testament, the uniqueness of the divine event is of the essence of the story; and this has been a stumbling-block to the Western intellect ever since the geocentric conception of the material universe was first impugned by the discoveries of our modern Western Astronomy. Milton, who was acquainted with, and probably convinced by, the heliocentric system of Copernicus, avoided this stumbling-block by deliberately following the geocentric system of Ptolemy when he set the stage for *Paradise Lost*. And in our generation, when the Sun itself has been dwarfed by comparison with an ever-expanding Universe to a still more overwhelming degree than the Earth by comparison with the Sun, astronomical facts have been invoked to confound theological dogmas. 'You tell us that your God, who by definition is the maker of our Universe, took flesh and suffered and died in order to redeem

¹ e.g. the catalogue in the *Odyssey*, Book XI, ll. 225-330, a passage which is probably a fair sample of the lost Hesiodic *Ehoiai*.

² *Mephistopheles*: 'Von Zeit zu Zeit seh' ich den Alten gern' (*Faust*, I, 350).

³ See I. C. (iii) (e) Annex, pp. 452-3, below.

the Human Race on Earth? If the Earth were the centre of the Universe and Man the image of his Maker, your myth might not be contradicted by common sense, though it would still remain incapable of verification. But what happens to this myth in a Universe in which the Earth is one of a myriad myriad floating specks of dust, and life on Earth an accident? If God chose this speck for the scene of the unique divine event, His choice was infinitely capricious and therefore infinitely frivolous. How do you conceive that He made it? By drawing lots or by throwing dice? The only alternative is to suppose that the divine event was not unique after all, and that the tragedy of the Incarnation and the Crucifixion has been enacted on every speck of dust in the Universe. But then does not the very multiplication of the performance somehow rob it of its sublime and awful significance? A myriad myriad crucifixions on a myriad myriad earths? We make nonsense of them by the simple process of writing out the astronomical figure in arabic numerals, as the Shakespearian hyperbole of the 40,000 brothers is made nonsense of by Straker in Mr. Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman*.¹

Yet this modern astronomical conception of immensity, which appeared, only yesterday, to confute the ageless myth of the unique divine event, may appear to rehabilitate it to-morrow; for the immensity of the reputed extent of empty space is out of all proportion to the immensity of the reputed number of the stars; and it follows from this that the encounter between the Sun and a star unknown, which is supposed to have given birth to our Planetary System, 'is an event of almost unimaginable rarity'.²

'Millions of millions of stars wandering blindly through Space for millions of millions of years are bound to meet with every sort of accident, and so are bound to produce a certain limited number of planetary systems in time. Yet the number of these must be very small in comparison with the total number of stars in the sky.

'This rarity of planetary systems is important, because, so far as we can see, Life of the kind we know on Earth could only originate on planets like the Earth. It needs suitable physical conditions for its appearance, the most important of which is a temperature at which substances can exist in the liquid state.

'The stars themselves are disqualified by being far too hot. We may think of them as a vast collection of fires scattered throughout Space,

¹ This *reductio ad absurdum* of the myth of Christianity is of course by no means absolute (even granting the astronomical hypothesis which is its premiss). It may carry conviction to Syriac and Western minds, but it would leave a Platonist or a Mahayanian Buddhist unmoved. In the scriptures of the Mahayana, 'we remain dazzled by an endless panorama of an infinity of universes with an infinity of shining Buddhas, illuminating infinite space' (Sir Charles Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Edward Arnold), vol. II, p. 26).

² Jeans, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

providing warmth in a climate which is at most some four degrees above absolute zero—about 484 degrees of frost on our Fahrenheit scale—and is even lower in the vast stretches of Space which lie out beyond the Milky Way. Away from the fires there is this unimaginable cold of hundreds of degrees of frost, close up to them there is a temperature of thousands of degrees, at which all solids melt, all liquids boil.

'Life can only exist inside a narrow temperate zone which surrounds each of these fires at a very definite distance. Outside these zones Life would be frozen; inside, it would be shrivelled up. At a rough computation, these zones within which Life is possible, all added together, constitute less than a thousand million millionth part of the whole of Space. And even inside them Life must be of very rare occurrence, for it is so unusual an accident for suns to throw off planets, as our own Sun has done, that probably only about one star in 100,000 has a planet revolving round it in the small zone in which Life is possible.'

Thus, in this portrayal of the encounter between two stars which is supposed to have led to the appearance of Life on Earth, the rarity and the momentousness of the event turn out to be almost as much of the essence of the story as they are in the Book of Genesis and in the New Testament, where the encounters are between God and the Devil and the consequences are the Fall and the Redemption of Man. The traditional plot of the play has a way of reasserting itself in exotic settings.

The play opens with a perfect state of Yin. In the Universe, Balder keeps all things bright and beautiful through keeping himself alive. In Heaven,

Die unbegreiflich hohen Werke
Sind herrlich, wie am ersten Tag.²

On Earth, Faust is perfect in knowledge; Job is perfect in goodness and prosperity;³ Adam and Eve, in the Garden of Eden, are perfect in innocence and ease; the virgins—Gretchen, Danae, Hippolytus—are perfect in purity and beauty. In the astronomers' universe, the Sun, a perfect orb of incandescent matter, is travelling on an unimpeded course through Space. In the biologist's universe, the Species is in perfect adaptation to its environment.

When Yin is thus complete, it is ready to pass over into Yang. But what is to make it pass? A change in a state which, by definition, is perfect after its kind can only be started by an impulse or motive which comes from outside. If we think of the state as one of physical equilibrium, we must bring another star to raise a tide on the spherical surface of the Sun, or another gas to evoke an explosion from the inert air in the combustion-chamber of the motor-engine. If we think of the state as one of psychic beatitude

¹ Jeans, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

² *Faust*. ll. 249-50.

³ Job i. 1-5.

or nirvana, we must bring another actor on to the stage: a critic to set the mind thinking again by suggesting doubts; an adversary to set the heart feeling again by instilling distress or discontent or fear or antipathy; in fact, an enemy to sow tares in the field;¹ an access of desire to generate karma. This is the role of the Serpent in the Book of Genesis, of Satan in the Book of Job, of Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust*, of Loki in the Scandinavian Mythology, of Aphrodite in Euripides' *Hippolytus* and Apollo in his *Ion*, of the passing star in Sir James Jeans's cosmogony, of the Environment in the Darwinian theory of Evolution. In the language of our modern Western Science, 'the inner creative factor in a measure acts directly under the stimulus of the external factor, and the variations which emerge are the result of this intimate interaction'.²

The role is interpreted most clearly when it is played by Mephistopheles. First, the Lord propounds it in the Prologue in Heaven:

Des Menschen Tätigkeit kann allzuleicht erschaffen,
Er liebt sich bald die unbedingte Ruh';
Drum geb' ich gern ihm den Gesellen zu
Der reizt und wirkt und muss, als Teufel, schaffen.³

Afterwards, Mephistopheles gives the same account of his role in introducing himself, on Earth, to Faust:

Ich bin der Geist, der stets verneint!
Und das mit Recht; denn alles, was entsteht,
Ist wert, dass es zugrunde geht;
Drum besser wär's, dass nichts entstünde.
So ist denn alles, was ihr Sünde,
Zerstörung, kurz das Böse nennt,
Mein eigentliches Element.⁴

Finally Faust explains the adversary's role, by implication, from his own experience, in his dying speech:

Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben
Der täglich sie erobern muss.⁵

In prose we may put it that the function of 'the external factor' is to supply 'the inner creative factor' with a perpetual stimulus of the kind best calculated to evoke the most potently creative

¹ Matthew xiii. 24-30.

² Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd edition (London 1927, Macmillan), p. 227.

³ *Faust*, ll. 340-3. In the oddly different language of Rationalism, precisely the same idea is expressed by Turgot in his *Plan de Deux Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*: 'La Raison et la Justice, mieux écoutées, auraient tout fixé, comme cela est à peu près arrivé à la Chine. . . . Le genre humain serait resté à jamais dans la médiocrité. . . . Mais ce qui n'est jamais parfait ne doit jamais être entièrement fixé. Les passions tumultueuses, dangereuses, sont devenues un principe d'action, et par conséquent de progrès.' (*Œuvres de Turgot*, nouvelle édition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 632.)

⁴ *Faust*, ll. 1338-44.

⁵ *Faust*, ll. 11575-6.

variations. If we take, as a sample of 'the external factor', the climatic and geographical environment of human life, we shall find that our proposition agrees with Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's thesis 'that a relatively high degree of storminess and a relatively long duration of the season of cyclonic storms have apparently been characteristic of the places where civilization has risen to high levels both in the past and at present'.¹ The converse of Dr. Huntington's equation between 'the cyclone belt' and the habitat of civilizations² is the thesis, which he likewise propounds, that all monotonous climates are unfavourable to civilization by very reason of their monotony, however greatly they may differ from one another in every other feature. According to this thesis, the various monotonies of Central Asian summers and winters,³ with their extremes of heat and cold, or of Tropical lowlands and highlands,⁴ with their extremes of humidity and dryness, all produce on human spirits the same uniformly depressing and deadening effects.⁵ Supposing, again, that we reckon our bodily physique among the components of 'the external factor' which acts upon 'the inner creative factor' in the human psyche, then, in the light of what we have come to regard as 'the external factor's' function, we shall see the reason for a 'law' which we have stumbled upon empirically⁶—the law that the geneses of civilizations require contributions from more races than one. If the mongrel is found by experience to be more apt for civilization than the thoroughbred, we may attribute his prowess to the stimulus administered to his psyche by the physical disturbance that results from the crossing of two distinct physical strains.

To return to the language of Mythology, the impulse or motive which makes a perfect Yin-state pass over into a new Yang-activity comes from an intrusion of the Devil into the universe of God. The event can best be described in these mythological images because they are not embarrassed by the contradiction that arises when the statement is translated into logical terms. In logic,

¹ Huntington, Ellsworth: *Civilization and Climate*, 3rd edition (New Haven 1924, Yale University Press), p. 12. The passage here quoted gives the main theme of the book. See especially chapter x: 'The Ideal Climate', where the author suggests that the best climate, for work and for health, is determined by three factors. It is a climate 'in which the mean temperature rarely falls below the mental optimum of perhaps 38°, or rises above the physical optimum of about 64°', but varies seasonally to the full extent of these limits. It is a climate in which the daily changes of temperature are numerous and extreme. In the third place it is a climate with the maximum of storminess (i.e. the greatest number of cyclonic storms, not the greatest number of inches of rainfall) (op. cit., pp. 398-9).

² For a graphic visual presentation of this equation, see op. cit., the pair of maps on p. 295.

³ Op. cit., p. 226.

⁴ See op. cit., pp. 235-8, for further illustrations of the same thesis apropos of Greenland and Siberia.

⁵ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, pp. 239-43, above.

⁶ Op. cit., pp. 226-7.

if God's universe is perfect, there cannot be a Devil outside it, while, if the Devil exists, the perfection which he comes to spoil must have been incomplete already through the very fact of his existence. This logical contradiction, which cannot logically be resolved, is intuitively transcended in the imagery of the poet and the prophet,¹ who give glory to an omnipotent God yet take it for granted that He is subject to two crucial limitations.

The first limitation is that, in the perfection of what He has created already, He cannot find an opportunity for further creative activity. If God is conceived as transcendent, then

Die unbegreiflich hohen Werke
Sind herrlich, wie am ersten Tag²;

the works of creation are as glorious as ever they were, but they are not 'changed from glory to glory'.³ At this point, the principle that 'where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty'⁴ fails; and, if God is conceived as immanent, the same limitation still holds:

Der Gott, der mir im Busen wohnt
Kann tief mein Innerstes erregen,
Der über allen meinen Kräften thronet,
Er kann nach aussen nichts bewegen.⁵

The second limitation upon God's power is that when the opportunity for fresh creation is offered to Him from outside, He cannot but take it. When the Devil challenges Him, He cannot refuse to take the challenge up. 'Live dangerously', which is the Nietzschean Zarathustra's ideal, is God's necessity. This limitation is illustrated in the Parable of the Tares:

'So the servants of the householder came and said unto him: "Sir, didst thou not sow good seed in thy field? From whence, then, hath

¹ The contradiction cannot be resolved by translating its terms into impersonal and abstract language, as they are translated by General Smuts in the following passage of his *Holism and Evolution* (2nd edition, pp. 180-1):

'Science has made clear . . . that the physico-chemical system is a structure, a structure composed of elements in more or less of equilibrium. . . . The equilibrium of the structure is . . . only approximate; were it complete, little room would be left for change; the physical world would be a stereotyped system of fixed stable forms, and little or no room would be left for those changes and developments which make Nature a great system of events, a great history moving onward through Space-Time. The fundamental structures of Nature are thus in somewhat unstable equilibrium.'

In this passage, the contradiction between the perfection of God's universe and the existence of a Devil outside it lurks in the formula 'unstable equilibrium', which is, in fact, a contradiction in terms. To say that events in Space-Time are accounted for by an 'unstable equilibrium' is equivalent to saying that the creation of the World is the work of a supreme being called 'Devil-God'. An 'unstable equilibrium' is the same monstrosity in logic as a 'Devil-God' would be in Mythology. The only difference is that our minds are slower to protest when the monstrosity is presented to them in the terminology of our modern Western Physical Science, because this terminology, being brand-new, has not yet become so highly charged with meaning as the ancient language of poetry and prophecy. In translating our thoughts from more into less significant terms, we needlessly increase the danger—to which we are always exposed—of being led astray by words.

² 2 Corinthians iii. 18.

⁴ 2 Corinthians iii. 17.

⁵ *Faust*, ll. 1566-9.

it tares?" He said unto them: "An enemy hath done this." The servants said unto him: "Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up?" But he said: "Nay; lest, while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them. Let both grow together until the harvest."¹

God is bound to accept the predicament that is thrust upon Him by the Devil because He can only refuse at the price of renouncing His own purposes and undoing His own work—in fact, at the price of denying His own nature and ceasing to be God, which is either an impossibility or another story.

If God is thus not omnipotent in logical terms, is He still mythologically invincible? If He is bound to take up the Devil's challenge, is He equally bound to win the ensuing battle? In Euripides' *Hippolytus*, where God's part is played by Artemis and the Devil's by Aphrodite, Artemis is not only unable to decline the combat but is foredoomed to defeat. The relation between the Olympians—all peers of one another in a barbarian war-lord's war-band²—is anarchic:

'Twas the will
Of Cypris that these evil things should be,
Sating her wrath. And this immutably
Hath Zeus ordained in heaven: no God may thwart
A God's fixed will; we grieve but stand apart.³

And Artemis can only console herself by making up her mind that one day she will play the Devil's role herself to Aphrodite's hurt:

My hand shall win its vengeance, through and through
Piercing with flawless shaft what heart soe'er
Of all men living is most dear to her.⁴

Thus, in Euripides' version of the plot, the victory in the battle falls to the Power which assumes the Devil's role, and the outcome is not creation but destruction. In the Scandinavian version, destruction is likewise the outcome of Ragnarök—when 'Gods and Demons slay and are slain'⁵—though the unique genius of the author of *Voluspá* makes his Sibyl's vision pierce the gloom to behold the light of a new dawn beyond it. On the other hand, in another version of the plot, the combat which follows the compulsory acceptance of the challenge takes the form, not of an exchange of fire in which the Devil has the first shot and cannot fail to kill his man, but of a wager which the Devil is apparently bound to lose. The classic works of art in which this wager-motif is

¹ Matthew xiii. 27-30.

² See I. C (i) (b), pp. 96-7, above.

³ Euripides: *Hippolytus*, ll. 1327-30, Gilbert Murray's translation.

⁴ Op. cit., ll. 1420-2.

⁵ Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 parts in 2 vols.), part II, p. 302.

worked out are, of course, the Book of Job and Goethe's *Faust*; and it is in *Faust*, again, that the points are made most clear.

After the Lord has accepted the wager with Mephistopheles¹ in the Prologue in Heaven, the terms are agreed on Earth, between Mephistopheles and *Faust*, as follows:

Faust. Werd' ich beruhigt je mich auf ein Faubett legen,
So sei es gleich um mich getan!
Kannst du mich schmeichelnd je belügen
Dass ich mir selbst gefallen mag,
Kannst du mich mit Genuss betrügen—
Das sei für mich der letzte Tag!
Die Wette biet' ich!

Mephistopheles.

Topp!

Faust. Und Schlag auf Schlag!

Werd' ich zum Augenblicke sagen:
'Verweile doch! Du bist so schön!
Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen,
Dann will ich gern zugrunde gehn!
Dann mag die Totenglocke schallen,
Dann bist du meines Dienstes frei,
Die Uhr mag stehn, der Zeiger fallen,
Es sei die Zeit für mich vorbei!²

The bearing of this mythical compact upon our problem of the genesis of civilizations can be brought out by identifying Faust, at the moment when he makes his bet, with one of those 'awakened sleepers' who have risen from the ledge on which they had been lying torpid, and have started to climb on up the face of the cliff, in our simile of the climbers' pitch.³ In the language of our simile, Faust is saying: 'I have made up my mind to leave this ledge and climb this precipice in search of the next ledge above. In attempting this, I am aware that I am courting danger and deliberately leaving safety behind me. I am aware that if once I pause I shall fall, and that if once I fall I shall fall to destruction. Yet, for the sake of the possible achievement, I am ready to take the inevitable risk.'

In the story as told in this version of the plot, the intrepid climber, after an ordeal of mortal dangers and desperate reverses, succeeds in the end in scaling the cliff triumphantly. In both *Job* and *Faust*, the wager is won by God; and again, in the New Testament, the same ending is given, through the revelation of a second encounter between the same pair of antagonists, to the combat between Yahweh and the Serpent which, in the original version in the Book of Genesis, had ended rather in the manner of the combat between Artemis and Aphrodite in the *Hippolytus*.⁴

¹ *Faust*, II, 312-17.

² See this Part, Division B, pp. 192-5, above.

³ *Faust*, II, 1692-1706.

⁴ The hint of a future reversal of fortune, which is darkly conveyed in 'it shall bruise

Moreover, in *Job* and *Faust* and the New Testament alike, it is suggested, or even declared outright, that the wager cannot be won by the Devil; that the Devil, in meddling with God's work, cannot frustrate but can only serve the purpose of God, who remains master of the situation all the time and gives the Devil rope for the Devil to hang himself. This seems to be implied in Jesus's words to the chief priests and captains of the Temple and the elders: 'This is your hour and the power of darkness';¹ and in his words to Pilate: 'Thou couldst have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above'.² And the implication is worked out in the following passage from the pen of a modern Christian theologian:

'Not *through* pain and defeat and death does Christ come to victory—and after Him all we who are Christ's because of Him—but . . . these things are the victory. . . . It is . . . in the Risen Christ that we can see how Evil, against which we yet must strive, runs its course and is found at the end to be the good which it seemed to be resisting and destroying: how God must abandon us in order that He may be the more sure of us'.³

So, in Goethe's *Faust*, in the Prologue in Heaven, after the wager has been offered and taken, the Lord declares to Mephistopheles:

Du darfst auch da nur frei *erscheinen*,⁴

and announces that He gladly gives Mephistopheles to Man as a companion, because he

reizt und wirkt und *muss*, als Teufel, *schaffen*.⁵

Stranger still, Mephistopheles, when he opens his attack upon Faust, introduces himself to his intended victim as

Ein Teil von jener Kraft

Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.⁶

In fact, Mephistopheles, notwithstanding the fearful wickedness and suffering which he manages to produce, is treated throughout the play as a buffoon who is destined to be a dupe. This note is struck by the Lord Himself in the passage just quoted from the Prologue in Heaven, where He proceeds:

Ich habe deinesgleichen nie gehasst.

Von allen Geistern die verneinen

Ist mir der Schalk am wenigsten zur Last.⁷

thy head and thou shalt bruise his heel', is hardly more comforting than Artemis' assurance to Hippolytus that he shall become the object of a cult and the hero of a song (*Hippolytus*, ll. 1423-30).

¹ Steuart, R. H. J. (S.J.): *The Inward Vision* (London 1930, Longmans), pp. 62-3. An expression of the same truth, in remarkably similar language, from the standpoint of a contemporary psychologist, will be found in Jung, C. G.: *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), pp. 274-5.

⁴ *Faust*, I. 336.

⁶ *Faust*, II. 1335-6.

² Luke xxii. 53.

³ John xix. 11.

⁵ *Faust*, I. 343, quoted above.

⁷ *Faust*, II. 337-9.

The same note persists throughout the first part of the play and is intensified in the second, until, in the scene of his final discomfiture,¹ which is written in a deliberately comic vein, Mephistopheles is turned into a positive figure of fun. Faust repeats, in his dying speech, the very words

Verweile doch, du bist so schön

on which his wager with Mephistopheles turns; and Mephistopheles gloats over the corpse in the belief that he is the winner; but he has congratulated himself too soon; for Faust has recited the crucial formula not affirmatively apropos of the present, but only conditionally apropos of the future:

Zum Augenblicke *möcht'* ich sagen

'Verweile doch, du bist so schön!' . . .

Im Vorgefühl von solchem hohen Glück

Genieß' ich *jetzt* den höchsten Augenblick.²

Mephistopheles has not won the wager after all; and he is ignominiously pelted off the stage with volleys of roses strewn by a chorus of *putti*, who distract him with their sensuous charms while they spirit away the dead Faust's immortal part from under his nose. In his mingled self-pity and self-contempt for so much labour lost, Mephistopheles cuts a poorer figure than the discomfited Shylock in the denouement of *The Merchant of Venice*.

These ludicrously discomfited villains who have been created by our two great modern Western dramatists have their prototype in the Scandinavian Loki: a figure who played his part in a traditional and anonymous drama which was performed as a religious rite before it crystallized into a myth. In this ritual drama, Loki

'was the sacril actor whose business was to draw out the demon, to bring the antagonism to a head, and thus to prepare for victory—hence the duplicity of his nature. . . . Such a figure has to bear the blame of the tricks and feints necessary to provoke the conquest of Life, he becomes a comic figure—the trickster who is predestined to be overreached.'³

Has the Devil really been cheated? Did God accept a wager which He knew all the time that He could not lose? That would be a hard saying; for, if that were true, the whole transaction would have been a sham. God would have been risking nothing; He would not have been 'living dangerously', after all; and, surely, 'Nothing venture, nothing win.' An encounter that was no encounter could not produce the consequence of an encounter—the vast cosmic consequence of causing Yin to pass over into Yang.

¹ *Faust*, II. 11167-843.

² *Faust*, II. 11581-2 and 11585-6.

³ Grönbeck, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 parts in 2 vols.), part II, pp. 331 and 332.

Perhaps the explanation is that the wager which the Devil offers, and which God accepts, covers not the whole of God's creation but only a part. The part, not the whole, is at stake; yet the chances and changes to which the part is thus exposed cannot possibly leave the whole unaffected. In the language of our modern Western Physical Science:

'A change in equilibrium does not mean an alteration in the position and activity of one element of the structure only; there is a redistribution which affects all the elements. It is the very nature of the structure in changing its equilibrium to distribute the change over all its component elements. No demon is at work among these elements to transmute them, to rearrange them, and to vary their functions slightly so as to produce the new balance or equilibrium of the whole. It is an inherent character of the physico-chemical structure as such, and is explicable on purely physical and chemical principles which do not call for the intervention of an extraordinary agent.'¹

In the language of Mythology, when one of God's creatures is tempted by the Devil, God Himself is thereby given the opportunity to recreate the World. By the stroke of the Adversary's trident, all the fountains of the great deep are broken up. The Devil's intervention has accomplished that transition from Yin to Yang, from static to dynamic, for which God had been yearning ever since the moment when His Yin-state became complete, but which it was impossible for God to accomplish by Himself, out of His own perfection. And the Devil has done more for God than this; for, when once Yin has passed over into Yang, not the Devil himself can prevent God from completing His fresh act of creation by passing over again from Yang to Yin on a higher level. When once the divine equilibrium has been upset by the Satanic instability, the Devil has shot his bolt; and the restoration of equilibrium on a new plan, in which God's purpose is fulfilled, lies wholly within God's power. In this act of creation, which is the sole permanent and significant result of the transaction between God and the Devil, 'no demon is', or can be, 'at work'.

Thus the Devil is bound to lose the wager, not because he has been cheated by God, but because he has overreached himself.² He has played into God's hands because he would not or could not deny himself the malicious satisfaction of forcing God's hand.

¹ Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd edition (London 1927, Macmillan), p. 181.

² This is the *motif* of the Syriac myth (preserved in Genesis xxxii. 24-32) of the mysterious being—man or angel or demon or God himself—who assails Jacob before dawn and, in doing so, goes out of his way to bring about his own discomfiture. The assailant, in virtue of his nature, must be gone before dawn; and when he fails to overcome Jacob's resistance and break free—even after using his supernatural power in the hope of putting Jacob out of action—he is driven to confess that Jacob has prevailed and to comply with Jacob's terms: 'I will not let thee go except thou bless me.'

Knowing that God would not or could not refuse the wager if it were offered, the Devil did not observe that God was hoping, silently but eagerly, that the offer would be made. In his jubilation at obtaining an opportunity to ruin one of God's choicest creatures, the Devil did not foresee that he would be giving God Himself an opportunity to renew the whole work of creation. And so God's purpose is fulfilled through the Devil's instrumentality and in the Devil's despire.¹

It will be seen that this denouement of the plot turns upon the role of God's creature who is the object of the wager; and here again we find ourselves beset by logical contradictions on all sides. A Job or a Faust is at once a chosen vessel and a vessel of destruction; and, in the fact of being subjected to his ordeal, he has already fulfilled his function, so that it makes no difference to the drama in Heaven whether he, on Earth, is blasted by the fire or whether he emerges more finely tempered. Even if the Devil has his way with him—even if his destruction is complete—God's purpose is nevertheless fulfilled and the Devil's purpose frustrated; for, in spite of the sacrifice of the creature, the Creator lives, while, through the sacrifice of the creature, the work of creation proceeds:

'Of old hast Thou laid the foundation of the Earth, and the Heavens are the work of Thy hands.

'They shall perish, but Thou shalt endure. Yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt Thou change them, and they shall be changed.

'But Thou art the same, and Thy years shall have no end.'²

Again, this chosen vessel of destruction which is the object of the wager between God and the Devil is their common field of action, the arena in which they do battle, the stage on which they play; but he is also the combatants as well as the arena and the dramatis personae as well as the stage. Created by God and abandoned to the Devil, he is seen, in the prophet's vision, to be an incarnation of both his Maker and his Tempter, while, in the psychologist's analysis, God and the Devil alike are reduced to conflicting psychic

¹ It would seem to follow that, if the Devil had known his business, he would have played just the opposite game. Instead of naively vaunting his own ability to ruin one of God's creatures—a Faust or a Job—he would have hypocritically chimed in with the Archangels in hymning the omnipotence of God and the perfection of His works. His song would have been not a candid satire on God's chief creation, Man:

'Der kleine Gott der Welt bleibt stets von gleichem Schlag,

Und ist so wunderbarlich als wie am ersten Tag',

but a disingenuous

'God's in His Heaven,
All's right with the World'.

Perhaps the Devil does play this game sometimes. We shall recur to this, apropos of the breakdowns of civilizations, in studying the myth of 'the Envy of the Gods'. (See IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, pp. 245-61, below.)

² Psalm cii, 25-7.

forces in his soul—forces which have no independent existence apart from the symbolic language of Mythology.

The conception that the object of the wager between God and the Devil is an incarnation of God is familiar. It is the central theme of the New Testament; and it is readily translated into the language of our modern Western Physical Science:

'The individual and its parts are reciprocally means and end to one another; neither is merely self-regarding, but each supports the other in the moving dynamic equilibrium which is called Life. And so it happens that the central control of the whole also maintains and assists the parts, and the functions of the parts are ever directed towards the conservation and fulfilment of the whole.'¹

The conception that the object of the wager is at the same time an incarnation of the Devil is less familiar but perhaps not less profound. It is expressed in the encounter between Faust and the Earth Spirit, who prostrates Faust by proclaiming Faust's likeness to the spirit whom he understands—the still unmanifested Mephistopheles:

Faust. Der du die weite Welt umschweifst,
Geschäftiger Geist, wie nah fühl' ich mich dir!
Geist. Du gleichst dem Geist den du begreifst,
Nicht mir! (*Verschwindet*).
Faust (*zusammenstürzend*). Nicht dir!
Wem denn!
Ich Ebenbild der Gottheit!
Und nicht einmal dir!²

It remains to consider the role of this 'Devil-God', this part and whole, this creature and incarnation, this arena and combatant, this stage and player; for, in the wager version of the plot, the encounter between the Powers of Hell and Heaven is only the prologue, while the passion of a human figure on Earth is the substance of the play.

In every presentation of this drama, suffering is the keynote of the human protagonist's part, whether the part is played by Jesus of Nazareth, or by Job, or by Faust and Gretchen, or by Adam and Eve, or by Hippolytus and Phaedra, or by Hoder and Balder. 'He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief.'³ 'He will be scourged, racked, shackled, blinded with hot irons and be put to every other torment, ending with being impaled.'⁴ Faust makes his entry in a state of utter disillusionment with his mastery of human knowledge⁵; turns to magic only to

¹ Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd edition, pp. 218-19.

² *Faust*, II, 510-17; cf. lines 1744-7.

³ Isaiah liii. 3.

⁴ Plato: *Respublica*, Book II, 361E-362A.

⁵ *Faust*, II, 354-417.

receive a shattering rebuff from the Earth Spirit;¹ and then accepts from Mephistopheles an initiation into the life of sense and sex which leads him to the tragic moment in Margaret's prison, at the dawn of her dying day, when he cries, like Job,² in his agony: 'O, would that I had never been born.'³ Gretchen, entering carefree,⁴ is made to pass through the Valley of the Shadow of Death:

Mein Ruh' ist hin,
Mein Herz ist schwer;
Ich finde sie nimmer
Und nimmermehr.⁵

The subjective experience of the human being who is cast for this part is conveyed with unusual vividness and poignancy in the following dream of a woman undergoing an operation under insufficient ether, which is cited by William James:

'A great Being or Power was travelling through the sky, his foot was on a kind of lightning as a wheel is on a rail, it was his pathway. The lightning was made entirely of the spirits of innumerable people close to one another, and I was one of them. He moved in a straight line, and each part of the streak or flash came into his short conscious existence only that he might travel. I seemed to be directly under the foot of God, and I thought he was grinding his own life up out of my pain. Then I saw that what he had been trying with all his might to do was to *change his course*, to *bend* the lightning to which he was tied, in the direction in which he wanted to go. I felt my flexibility and helplessness, and knew that he would succeed. He bended me, turning his corner by means of my hurt, hurting me more than I had ever been hurt in my life, and at the acutest point of this, as he passed, I *saw*. I understood for a moment things that I have now forgotten, things that no one could remember while retaining sanity. The angle was an obtuse angle, and I remember thinking as I woke that had he made it a right or acute angle, I should have both suffered and "seen" still more, and should probably have died.

'If I had to formulate a few of the things I then caught a glimpse of, they would run somewhat as follows:

'The eternal necessity of suffering and its eternal vicariousness. The veiled and incommunicable nature of the worst sufferings;—the passivity of genius, how it is essentially instrumental and defenceless, moved, not moving, it must do what it does;—the impossibility of discovery without its price;—finally, the excess of what the suffering "seer" or genius pays over what his generation gains. (He seems like one who sweats his life out to earn enough to save a district from famine, and just as he staggers back, dying and satisfied, bringing a lac of rupees to buy grain with, God lifts the lac away, dropping one rupee, and says, "That you

¹ *Faust*, ll. 418-517.

² Job, ch. iii.

³ *Faust*, l. 4596.

⁴ *Faust*, ll. 2607-8.

⁵ *Faust*, ll. 3376-413.

may give them. That you have earned for them. The rest is for ME.") I perceived also, in a way never to be forgotten, the excess of what we see over what we can demonstrate.'¹

Objectively, the ordeal consists of a series of stages which the sufferer has to pass through in order to serve God's purpose.

In the first stage, the human protagonist in the drama takes action—in reaction to an assault from the tempter—which sets up a change from passivity to activity, from rest to motion, from calm to storm, from harmony to discord, in fact from Yin to Yang. The action may be either dynamically base, as when the Ancient Mariner shoots the Albatross or Loki shoots Balder with the blind God Hoder's hand and the mistletoe shaft; or dynamically sublime, as when Jesus, in the temptation in the wilderness which immediately follows his baptism in Jordan, rejects the traditional Jewish role of the militant Messiah who was to raise the Chosen People to dominion in this world by the sword.² The essence of the act is not its moral character but its dynamic effect. The Ancient Mariner's act changes the fortunes of the ship and her crew; Jesus's act gives the conception of the Messiah a new turn and therewith a power which had not resided in it before.³ The corresponding act in the ordeal of Job is his cursing of the day of his birth⁴—a protest which raises the whole issue of Job's deserts and God's justice. In the ordeal of Faust, the point is elaborated and brought out more clearly.

Before Mephistopheles intervenes, Faust is already making efforts on his own account to break out of his Yin-state—his unsatisfyingly perfect mastery of human knowledge. He seeks escape from his spiritual prison through the arts of magic and is repelled by the Earth Spirit;⁵ he seeks escape through suicide and is checked by the song of the choir of angels;⁶ he is driven back from action to meditation; yet his mind still runs upon action and transposes 'Im Anfang war das Wort' into 'Im Anfang war die Tat'.⁷ At that moment, already, Mephistopheles is present in a theriomorphic disguise; but it is not till the tempter stands before him in human form that Faust performs his dynamic act by cursing the whole moral and material universe.⁸ Therewith, the foundations of the great deep are loosed; and an invisible choir of

¹ Dream of a woman undergoing an operation under insufficient ether, cited by William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 33rd impression (London 1922, Longmans), pp. 392-3.

² Matthew iii. 13-iv. 11; Mark i. 9-13; Luke iii. 2-22 and iv. 1-13.

³ The non-violence of Jesus and his followers, and its contrast with the militancy of the abortive messianic movements of a Theudas or a Judas of Galilee, did not escape the observation of Gamaliel (Acts v. 34-40).

⁴ Job iii.

⁵ *Faust*, ll. 418-521.

⁶ *Faust*, ll. 602-807.

⁷ *Faust*, ll. 1224-37.

⁸ *Faust*, ll. 1583-1606.

spirits laments and exults that the old creation is shattered and a new creation begun.

Weh! Weh!

Du hast sie zerstört,

Die schöne Welt

Mit mächtiger Faust;

Sie stürzt, sie zerfällt!

Ein Halbgott hat sie zerschlagen!

Wir tragen

Die Trümmern ins Nichts hinüber,

Und Klagen

Über die verlorne Schöne.

Mächtiger

Der Erdensöhne,

Prächtiger

Baue sie wieder,

In deinem Busen baue sie auf!

Neuen Lebenslauf

Beginne

Mit hellem Sinne,

Und neue Lieder

Tönen darauf.¹

In the song of these spirits, whom Mephistopheles claims as his own,² the first note of Yang resounds. The hymn of the Archangels—

Die unbegreiflich hohen Werke

Sind herrlich, wie am ersten Tag—

is now transcended.

So, too, in the Scandinavian universe, when, at Loki's prompting, blind Hoder performs his unwittingly dynamic act, and Balder is slain,

'Life is blighted and the curse spreads from the Gods to the dwelling-place of human beings. The thoughts of men are darkened and confused by the upheaval in Nature and the tumult of their own minds, and in their distraction men violate the very principles of Life. The bonds of kinship give way to blind passion: brothers fight with one another, kinsmen shed their own blood, no one trusts his fellow; a new age dawns: the age of swords, the age of axes; the ears of men are filled with the din of shields being splintered and of wolves howling over the bodies of the slain.'³

¹ *Faust*, ll. 1607-26.

² *Faust*, ll. 1627-8.

³ Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 parts in 2 vols.), part II, p. 302. There is a curious congruity between the language of the anonymous author of the *Voluspá* and Virgil's language in the First Georgic, ll. 505-11:

Quippe ubi fas verum atque nefas; tot bella per orbem,
tam multae scelerum facies, non ullus aratro
dignus honos, squalent abductis arva colonis,
et curvae rigidum falces constantur inensem. . . .
vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes
arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe.

In the story of the Fall of Man in the Book of Genesis, the dynamic act is Eve's eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge at the Serpent's prompting; and here the application of the myth to the geneeses of civilizations is direct. The picture of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden is a reminiscence of the Yin-state to which Primitive Man attained in 'the food-gathering phase' of economy, after he had established his ascendancy over all the rest of the flora and fauna of the Earth—the state which is remembered in the Hellenic Mythology as 'the Times of Cronos'.¹ The Fall, in response to the temptation to taste the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, symbolizes the acceptance of a challenge to abandon the achieved integration and to venture upon a fresh differentiation out of which another integration may—or may not—arise. The expulsion from the Garden into an unfriendly outer world in which the Woman must bring forth children in sorrow and the Man must eat bread in the sweat of his face, is the ordeal which the acceptance of the Serpent's challenge has entailed. The sexual intercourse between Adam and Eve, which follows, is an act of social creation. It bears fruit in the birth of two sons who impersonate two nascent civilizations: Abel the keeper of sheep and Cain the tiller of the ground.²

The equation of civilization with agriculture, and progress with toil, is also to be found in Hellenic literature in the famous line of Hesiod

τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρουσιν ἔθικαν³

which is echoed in Virgil's

Pater ipse colendi
 haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem
 movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,
 nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno.⁴

In more general terms and with less poetic imagery, the same story is retold by Origen—a thinker who, in the second century of our era, became one of the fathers of the Christian Church without ceasing to be a Hellenic philosopher:

'God, wishing Man's intelligence to be exercised everywhere, in

¹ ὁ ἐνὶ Κρόνου βίος. (See, for example, Plato, *Leges*, 713C-D, where the myth is adapted to illustrate the philosopher's social theory.)

² The story of Cain and his descendants, which is given as an epilogue (Gen. iv. 16-25) to the story of Cain and Abel (Gen. iv. 1-15), represents Cain as the father of civilization in general and all its works. In this epilogue, Cain himself builds a city and his descendant, Lamech, has two sons, Jubal and Tubal-Cain, who are respectively 'the father of all such as handle the harp and organ' and 'an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron'. Here we have the picture of a civilization with an agricultural basis evolving an urban life and industry. At the same time, Jubal and Tubal-Cain are given a brother, Jabal, who is 'the father of such as dwell in tents and such as have cattle', so that Cain's descendant, Lamech, is made progenitor of the Nomadic stock-breeding civilization and the sedentary agricultural and industrial civilizations alike.

³ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, l. 289.

⁴ Virgil, *Georg.* i, ll. 121-4.

order that it might not remain idle and without a conception of the arts, created Man with needs, in order that sheer need might force him to invent arts for providing himself with food and providing himself with shelter. It was better for those who would not have used their intelligence in seeking after a philosophic knowledge of God that they should be badly enough off to use it in the invention of arts, rather than that they should be well enough off to leave their intelligence altogether uncultivated.¹

In the language of our modern Western rationalism, the same theme has been expounded by the eighteenth-century French philosopher Volney:

'L'on s'apperçoit que toute activité, soit de corps, soit d'esprit, prend sa source dans les besoins; que c'est en raison de leur étendue, de leurs développemens, qu'elle-même s'étend et se développe; l'on en suit la gradation depuis les élémens les plus simples jusqu'à l'état le plus composé. C'est la faim, c'est la soif qui, dans l'homme encore sauvage, éveillent les premiers mouvemens de l'âme et du corps; ce sont ces besoins qui le font courir, chercher, épier, user d'astuce ou de violence: toute son activité se mesure sur les moyens de pourvoir à sa subsistance. Sont-ils faciles; a-t-il sous sa main les fruits, le gibier, le poisson: il est moins actif, parce que en étendant le bras il se rassasie, et que, rassasié, rien ne l'invite à se mouvoir, jusqu'à ce que l'expérience de diverses jouissances ait éveillé en lui les désirs qui deviennent des besoins nouveaux, de nouveaux mobiles d'activité. Les moyens sont-ils difficiles; le gibier est-il rare et agile, le poisson rusé, les fruits passagers: alors l'homme est forcé d'être plus actif; il faut que son corps et son esprit s'exercent à vaincre les difficultés qu'il rencontre à vivre; il faut qu'il devienne agile comme le gibier, rusé comme le poisson, et prévoyant pour conserver les fruits. Alors, pour étendre ses facultés naturelles, il s'agite, il pense, il médite; alors il imagine de courber un rameau d'arbre pour en faire un arc; d'aiguiser un roseau pour en faire une flèche; d'emmancher un bâton à une pierre tranchante pour en faire une hache: alors il travaille à faire des filets, à abattre des arbres, à en creuser le tronc pour en faire des pirogues. Déjà il a franchi les bornes des premiers besoins, déjà l'expérience d'une foule de sensations lui a fait connaître des jouissances et des peines; et il prend un surcroît d'activité pour écarter les unes et multiplier les autres.'²

¹ πανταχοῦ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σύνεσιν γυμνάζεσθαι βουλόμενος ὁ θεὸς ἵνα μὴ μὲν ἀργὴ καὶ ἀνεπιπόνητος τῶν τεχνῶν, πεποιήκε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιδεῖν, ἵνα δι' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιδεῖν αὐτοῦ ἀναγκασθῇ εὐρεῖν τέχνας, τινὰς μὲν διὰ τὴν τροφήν, ἄλλας δὲ διὰ τὴν σκέπην· καὶ γὰρ κρείττον ἦν τοῖς μὴ μέλλουσι τὰ θεῖα ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ ἀπορεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τῆς συνείσεως χρήσασθαι πρὸς εὐρεσιν τεχνῶν, ἥπερ ἐκ τοῦ εὐπορεῖν πάντῃ τῆς συνείσεως ἀμελεῖν. Origenes contra Celsum, iv. 76, xix, p. 116, ed. Lommatsch (cited by Nock, A. D., in his edition of Sallustius, *Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge 1926, University Press), p. xlv).

² Volney, C. F.: *Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte pendant les Années 1783, 1784 et 1785*, 2^e édition (Paris 1787, Desenne et Volland, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 428-9.

In our own generation, one of our most distinguished and original-minded students of the physical environment of human life takes up the parable:

'Ages ago a band of naked, houseless, fireless savages started from their warm home in the torrid zone and pushed steadily northward from the beginning of spring to the end of summer. They never guessed that they had left the land of constant warmth until in September they began to feel an uncomfortable chill at night. Day by day it grew worse. Not knowing its cause, they travelled this way or that to escape. Some went southward, but only a handful returned to their former home. There they resumed the old life, and their descendants are untutored savages to this day. Of those who wandered in other directions, all perished except one small band. Finding that they could not escape the nipping air, the members of this band used the loftiest of human faculties, the power of conscious invention. Some tried to find shelter by digging in the ground, some gathered branches and leaves to make huts and warm beds, and some wrapped themselves in the skins of the beasts that they had slain. Soon these savages had taken some of the greatest steps toward civilisation. The naked were clothed; the houseless sheltered; the improvident learned to dry meat and store it, with nuts, for the winter; and at last the art of making fire was discovered as a means of keeping warm. Thus they subsisted where at first they thought that they were doomed. And in the process of adjusting themselves to a hard environment they advanced by enormous strides, leaving the tropical part of Mankind far in the rear.

'To-day, Mankind resembles these savages in certain respects. We know that we are limited by climate. As the savages faced the winter, so we are face to face with the fact that the Human Race has tried to conquer the arctic zone, the deserts, and the torrid zone, and has met with only the most limited success. Even in the temperate zone he has made a partial failure, for he is still handicapped in hundreds of ways. Hitherto we have attributed our failure to economic conditions, to isolation and remoteness, to racial incapacity, or to specific diseases. Now we see that it is probably due in part to lack of energy or to other unfavourable effects produced directly upon the human system by climate. There is no reason for despair. We ought rather to rejoice because, perhaps, we may correct some of the evils which hitherto have baffled us.'¹

Finally, a contemporary classical scholar translates the story into the orthodox scientific terminology of our age:

'It is . . . a paradox of advancement that if Necessity be the mother of Invention, the other parent is Obstinacy, the determination that you will go on living under adverse conditions rather than cut your losses and go where life is easier. It was no accident, that is, that Civilisation, as we know it, began in that ebb and flow of climate, flora and fauna

¹ Huntington, Ellsworth: *Civilisation and Climate*, 3rd edition (New Haven 1924, Yale University Press), pp. 405-6.

which characterises the four-fold 'Ice Age'. Those primates who just 'got out' as arboreal conditions wilted retained their primacy among the servants of Natural Law, but they forwent the conquest of Nature. Those others won through, and became men, who stood their ground when there were no more trees to sit in, who "made do" with meat when fruit did not ripen, who made fires and clothes rather than follow the sunshine; who fortified their lairs and trained their young and vindicated the reasonableness of a world that seemed so reasonless.¹

The first stage, then, in the human protagonist's ordeal is a transition from Yin to Yang through a dynamic act—performed by God's creature under temptation from the adversary—which enables God Himself to resume His creative activity. But this progress has to be paid for; and it is not God—a hard master, reaping where He has not sown, and gathering where He has not strawed²—but God's servant, the human sower, who pays the price.

The second stage in the human protagonist's ordeal is the crisis. He realizes that his dynamic act, which has re-liberated the creative power of his Master and Maker, has set his own feet on a course which is leading him to suffering and death. In an agony of disillusionment and horror,³ he rebels against the fate which, by his own act, he has brought upon himself for God's gain. The crisis is resolved when he resigns himself consciously to be the instrument of God's will, the tool in God's hands; and this activity through passivity, this victory through defeat, brings on another cosmic change. Just as the dynamic act in the first phase of the ordeal shook the Universe out of Yin into Yang, so the act of resignation in the second phase reverses the rhythm of the Universe—guiding it now from motion towards rest, from storm towards calm, from discord towards harmony, from Yang towards Yin again.

¹ Myres, J. L.: *Who were the Greeks?* (Berkeley 1930, University of California Press), pp. 277–8.

² Matthew xxv. 24.

³ This agony, arising out of a spiritual conflict, may be suffered on the unconscious plane of the psyche; and there, unless and until it is transcended, it produces the psychic phenomena which our modern Western psycho-analysts call neuroses.

"The challenge of Life asks different things of each individual. It may be marriage or celibacy, staying at home or going abroad, self-assertion or self-effacement: the problem takes countless different forms. Often the intolerable situation against which the neurosis is a defence appears outwardly safe and attractive; and the victim of the neurosis accepts other people's estimate of it and is entirely unaware of his own resistance and fear. In general, however, these varied problems can be reduced to simple terms of the choice between growing up and remaining children: the choice between a progressive and a repressive reaction to Life. In so far as progress means self-help, and in so far as self-help is incompatible with self-pity, it is obvious that the neurosis which gives an opportunity to self-pity is an effective barrier to progress." (Crichton Miller, H.: *The New Psychology and the Teacher* (London 1921, Jarrolds), pp. 139–40.)

Compare the quotation from Joseph Conrad—"Neither his fellows, nor his gods, nor his passions will leave a man alone"—in *op. cit.*, p. 128, and the passage in *The New Psychology and the Preacher* (London 1924, Jarrolds), pp. 162–3, on the challenge of Religion.

In the cry of a Hellenic poet, we hear the note of agony without a note of resignation to follow:

μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' ὠφελλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι μετείνειν
ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρόσθε θανεῖν ἢ ἔπειτα γενέσθαι.¹

The tragedy rises to a higher level in the Scandinavian vision of Odin, on the eve of Ragnarök, mentally striving with all his might to wrest the secret of Fate from the powers that hold it—not in order to save himself alive but for the sake of the universe of Gods and Men who look to him, the All Father, to preserve them. In the passion of Jesus, we are initiated into the whole psychological experience.

When Jesus first realizes His destiny, in the course of His last journey from Galilee to Jerusalem, He is master of the situation; and it is His disciples, to whom He communicates His intuition immediately before,² and again immediately after,³ His transfiguration, who are perplexed and dismayed. The agony comes upon Him, on the eve of His passion, in the Garden of Gethsemane,⁴ and is resolved in the prayer: 'O my Father, if this cup may not pass away from me except I drink it, Thy will be done.'⁵ Yet the agony recurs when the sufferer is hanging on the Cross, where the final cry of despair—'My God, My God, Why hast Thou forsaken me?'⁶—precedes the final words of resignation: 'Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit',⁷ and 'It is finished.'⁸

The same experience of agony and resignation is presented—here in purely psychological terms—in the Epistle to the Romans, where the cry—'O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?'—is followed by the antiphony: 'I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin.'⁹

The same experience, again, is narrated to the Wedding-Guest by the Ancient Mariner, who has brought upon himself the ordeal of 'Life-in-Death' by his criminal yet none the less dynamic act of shooting the Albatross:

Alone, alone, all, all alone,
Alone, on a wide wide seal
And never a saint took pity on
My soul in agony.

¹ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 174-5.

² Matthew xvi. 13-23; Mark viii. 27-33; Luke ix. 18-22.

³ Matthew xvii. 10-12; Mark xi. 11-13.

⁴ Matthew xxvi. 36-46; Mark xiv. 32-42; Luke xxii. 39-46. Compare John xii. 23-8.

⁵ Matthew xxvi. 42.

⁶ Matthew xxvii. 46; Mark xv. 34.

⁷ Luke xxiii. 46.

⁸ John xix. 30.

⁹ Romans vii. 24-5. The whole of chapters vii and viii is a lyrical meditation upon this theme.

The many men, so beautiful!
 And they all dead did lie:
 And a thousand thousand slimy things
 Lived on; and so did I.

In this ordeal, the curse is lifted when the sufferer resigns himself to the consequences of his act and has a vision of beauty where he had only perceived hideousness so long as his heart remained hard:

O happy living things! No tongue
 Their beauty might declare:
 A spring of love gushed from my heart,
 And I blessed them unaware:
 Sure my kind saint took pity on me,
 And I blessed them unaware.

The self-same moment I could pray;
 And from my neck so free
 The Albatross fell off, and sank
 Like lead into the sea.

This is the turning-point in the Romantic Odyssey. The divine powers which had magically becalmed the ship now magically waft her to port and bring the villain—or the hero—of the ballad home to his own country.

So, too, Job humbles himself to God at the end of his colloquy with his friends, when Elihu has shown how God is just in His ways and is to be feared because of His great words in which His wisdom is unsearchable, and when the Lord Himself, addressing Job out of the whirlwind, has challenged the sufferer to continue the debate with Him.

Then Job answered the Lord and said:

'Behold, I am vile. What shall I answer thee? I will lay mine hand upon my mouth.

'Once have I spoken, but I will not answer; yea, twice, but I will proceed no further. . . .

'I know that Thou canst do everything, and that no thought can be withholden from Thee. . . .

'I have uttered that I understood not—things too wonderful for me, which I knew not. . . .

'I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee.

'Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes.'

In this Syriac poem, the psychology is crude. The resignation comes, not through a spiritual intuition in the soul, but through a physical manifestation to the eye of God's irresistible force. In Goethe's version of the drama, the sequence of agony and resignation

holds its place as the crisis and the culmination of the plot—Gretchen passes through it in the last scene of Part I¹ and Faust, in his turn, at the climax of Part II²—but the *êthos* is transformed beyond recognition.

In the scene in Gretchen's prison, in the grey dawn of her last day, Mephistopheles seeks to take advantage of Gretchen's agony in order to induce her to forgo her salvation by escaping her doom. It seems the easiest enterprise that he has yet essayed. His victim is distraught with horror at the imagination of what lies before her; it is the hour at which human vitality is at its lowest ebb; the pains of death are imminent; the prospect of escape is offered suddenly and unexpectedly; and it is Gretchen's lover Faust himself who implores her to flee with him through the magically opened prison doors. Yet Gretchen, raving in her agony, seems insensible to Faust's appeal, until at last Mephistopheles, in his impatience, intervenes himself. That is the moment of the tempter's defeat; for Gretchen, recognizing him for what he is, awakes from her frenzied trance and takes refuge in the judgement of God—no longer rooted to the spot in a nightmare like the Aeschylean Cassandra, but deliberately rejecting, like the Platonic Socrates, a possibility of escape of which she is fully aware:

Margarete. Was steigt aus dem Boden herauf?
Der! Der! Schick' ihn fort!
Was will er an dem heiligen Ort?
Er will mich!

Faust. Du sollst leben!

Margarete. Gericht Gottes! Dir hab' ich mich übergeben!

Mephistopheles (zu Faust).

Komm! Komm! Ich lasse dich mit ihr im Stich.

Margarete. Dein bin ich, Vater! Rette mich!

Ihr Engel! Ihr heiligen Scharen,

Lagert euch umher, mich zu bewahren!

Heinrich! Mir graut's vor dir.

Mephistopheles. Sie ist gerichtet!

Stimme (von oben).

Ist gerettet!

Mephistopheles (zu Faust).

Her zu mir!

(Verschwindet mit Faust).

Stimme (von innen, verhallend). Heinrich! Heinrich.³

¹ *Faust*, II. 4405-612.

² *Faust*, II. 11384-510.

³ *Faust*, II. 4601-12. This is, psychologically, the end of the play; for Mephistopheles' defeat is irrevocable; and although the light which has broken upon Gretchen's soul in this dawn does not enlighten Faust till many more years have passed over his head, yet his ultimate salvation is ensured by hers, and the labyrinthine second part of the play is therefore psychologically as well as artistically superfluous. By comparison with the last scene of Part I, the corresponding scene in Part II, in which Faust confronts and defies the four grey women—Want and Guilt and Care and Need—is an anti-climax. The last ten lines of Part I already convey the mystery—'Das ewig Weibliche / Zieht uns hinan'—which is uttered, in the last two lines of Part II, by the Mystic Choir. The poet had no need to point his meaning by an epilogue which almost quadruples the length of his work.

In the third stage, the reversal of the cosmic rhythm from Yang towards Yin, which was initiated in the second stage, is carried to completion. At the climax of Ragnarök, when Thor has met the Dragon and Odin the Wolf,

'The Sun is darkened, the Earth sinks back into the waves, stars rain down, and the flames leap up and lick the heavens.' But then 'the barking' of the Wolf 'is heard for the last time as the world-fire flickers down'. And 'when the roar and the voices are stilled, the Earth once more rises out of the sea in evergreen freshness; brooks leap down the hills; the eagle wheels on high, peering into the streams. The Gods meet among self-sown fields, they call to mind the tale of deeds and former wisdom, and in the grass before their feet the golden tables are found lying. A new hall rises golden-roofed and fairer than the Sun. Here a race of true-hearted men will dwell and rejoice in their heart's desire. Then from above descends the mighty one, all-powerful. The dusky dragon flies past, brushing the ground with his wings weighted down by dead bodies; he sinks into the abyss and disappears.'¹

In this new creation, which the ordeal of one of God's creatures has enabled God to achieve, the sufferer himself returns to a state of peace and harmony and bliss on a higher level than the state which he left behind when he responded to the tempter's challenge. In the Book of Job, the achievement is startlingly crude—the Lord convinces Job that He is answerable for His acts to no man—and the restoration is naïvely material: 'the Lord blessed the latter end of Job more than his beginning' by giving him fairer daughters than those that he had lost and twice as many sheep and camels and oxen and asses.² In the New Testament, the agony and resignation and passion of Jesus achieve the redemption of Man and are followed by the Redeemer's resurrection and ascension. In the Scandinavian Mythology, Odin returns to life after hanging upon a tree, and has keener vision in his one eye than he had before he plucked out his other eye and cast it from him as the purchase-price of wisdom.³ In Goethe's *Faust*, the last scene of the second part, in which the Virgin Goddess, with her train of penitents, grants an epiphany to the pilgrims who have scaled the rugged mountain to its summit, is the counterpart of the Prologue in Heaven with which the first part of the play opens. The two scenes correspond, as, in the Christian version of the myth, Man's state of blessedness after the Redemption corresponds to his state of innocence before the Fall. The cosmic rhythm has come round, full circle, from Yin

¹ Grönbech, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 302-3. Compare Virgil's Fourth Eclogue.

² Job xlii. 12-17, compared with i. 2-3.

³ Contrast the fable of Solomon's choice (1 Kings iii. 5-15), in which the hero merely forbears to ask for long life or riches for himself, or for the life of his enemies, in order to ask for an understanding heart to judge the people, yet is rewarded by being given, not only a wise and understanding heart, but riches and honour into the bargain.

through Yang to Yin; but the latter Yin-state differs from the former with the difference of spring from autumn. The works of creation, which the Archangels hymned¹ and which Faust's curse shattered,² arise in splendour again, to be hymned by the Pater Profundus;³ but this time they are in the tender shoot instead of being ripe for the sickle. Through Faust's dynamic act and Gretchen's act of resignation, the Lord has been enabled to make all things new; and, in this new creation, the human protagonists in the divine drama have their part. Gretchen, whose salvation had been proclaimed by the voice from Heaven at the dawn of her last day on Earth, appears, transfigured as Una Poenitentium, in Mary's train, and the *visio beatifica* is vouchsafed to Faust, who rises to join her, transfigured as Doctor Marianus.

Das Unzulängliche,
Hier wird's Ereignis;
Das Unbeschreibliche,
Hier ist's getan.⁴

Thus the manifestation of God as a hard master proves not to have been the ultimate truth. The ordeal of God's creature appears in retrospect as a revelation, not of God's callousness or cruelty, but of His love.

So ist es die allmächtige Liebe
Die alles bildet, alles hegt.⁵

'For whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth.'—'Πάθει μάθος.'⁶

Finally, the sufferer triumphant serves as a pioneer. 'Strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.'⁷ The human protagonist in the divine drama not only serves God by enabling Him to renew His creation, but also serves his fellow-men by pointing a way for others to follow.⁸ Job's intercession averts the Lord's wrath from Job's friends.⁹ Gretchen's intercession wins for Faust the *visio beatifica*.¹⁰ When Jesus first foreshadows his ordeal to his disciples, he proclaims, 'If any man will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me';¹¹ and on the eve of his passion he adds: 'And I, if I be lifted up from the Earth, will draw all men unto me.'¹²

¹ *Faust*, ll. 243-70.

² *Faust*, ll. 11866-89.

³ Pater Profundus, in *Faust*, ll. 11872-3.

⁴ For these last two quotations, see I. C (iii) (b), p. 169, footnote 1, above.

⁵ Matthew vii. 14.

⁶ In the Hellenic story of Prometheus, the two services are incompatible, and the hero suffers because he has served Man in God's despite. For an interpretation of Aeschylus's version of the Prometheus Myth, see Part III. B, below.

⁷ Job xlii. 7-10.

⁸ Matthew xvi. 24-8; Mark viii. 34-8; Luke ix. 23-7.

⁹ *Faust*, ll. 1583-1606.

¹⁰ *Faust*, ll. 12106-9.

¹¹ *Faust*, ll. 12069-111.

¹² John xii. 32.

Democritus's intellectual pilgrimage breaches the walls of the prison house in which Superstition had incarcerated the human spirit:

Humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret
in terris oppressa gravi sub religione
quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat
horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans,
primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contra
est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra,
quem neque fama deum nec fulmina nec minitanti
murmure compressit caelum, sed eo magis acrem
inritat animi virtutem, effringere ut arta
naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret.
ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra
processit longe flammantia moenia mundi
atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque,
unde refert nobis victor quid possit oriri,
quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique
quam sit ratione et alte terminus haerens.
quare religio pedibus subiecta vicissim
opteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo.¹

In this magnificent passage of Lucretius, the feat of the pathfinder is extolled in the language of the intellect; but the paean must be transposed into the language of the soul if the victor-victim is to reveal himself in his ultimate sublimity:

'Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God; believe also in me.

'In my Father's house are many mansions. . . . I go to prepare a place for you.

'And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself, that, where I am, there ye may be also.

'And whither I go ye know, and the way ye know. . . .

'I am the way, the truth and the life.'²

2. *A Survey of Challenges and Responses in the Geneses of Civilizations*

The Unknown God

By the light of Mythology, we have gained some insight into the nature of challenges and responses. We have come to see that creation is the outcome of an encounter, or—to re-translate the imagery of myths into the terminology of Science—that genesis is a function of interaction. Let us now return to our immediate quest: our search for the positive factor which has shaken part of Mankind out of 'the Integration of Custom' into 'the Differentiation of Civilization' within the last six thousand years. Let us look

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book I, ll. 62-79.

² John xiv. 1-6.

again into the origins of our twenty-one civilizations in order to ascertain, by an empirical test, whether the conception of Challenge-and-Response answers to the factor of which we are in search any better than the hypotheses of Race and Environment, which we have already weighed in the balance and found wanting.¹

In this fresh survey, we shall be concerned with Race and Environment once more, but we shall regard them in a new light and shall place a different interpretation upon the phenomena. We shall no longer be on the look-out for some simple cause of the geneeses of civilizations which can be demonstrated always and everywhere to produce an identical effect. We shall no longer be surprised if, in the production of civilizations, the same race, or the same environment, appears to be fruitful in one instance and sterile in another. Indeed, we shall not be surprised to find this phenomenon of inconstancy and variability in the effects produced, on different occasions, by one and the same cause, even when that cause is an interaction between the same race and the same environment under the same conditions. However scientifically exact the identity between two or more situations may be, we shall not expect the respective outcomes of these situations to conform with one another in the same degree of exactitude, or even in any degree at all. In fact, we shall no longer make the scientific postulate of the Uniformity of Nature, which we rightly made so long as we were thinking of our problem in scientific terms as a function of the play of inanimate forces. We shall be prepared now to recognize, *a priori*, that, even if we were exactly acquainted with all the racial, environmental, or other data that are capable of being formulated scientifically, we should not be able to predict the outcome of the interaction between the forces which these data represent, any more than a military expert can predict the outcome of a battle or a campaign from an 'inside knowledge' of the dispositions and resources of both the opposing general staffs, or a bridge expert the outcome of a game or a rubber from a similar knowledge of all the cards in every hand.

In both these analogies, 'inside knowledge' is not sufficient to enable its possessor to predict results with any exactness or assurance, because it is not the same thing as complete knowledge. There is one thing which must remain an unknown quantity to the best-informed onlooker, because it is beyond the knowledge of the combatants, or the players, themselves; and their ignorance of this quantity makes calculation impossible, because it is the most important term in the equation which the would-be calculator has to solve. This unknown quantity is the reaction of the actors to the

¹ See II. C (ii) (a), above.

ordeal when it actually comes. 'Les causes physiques n'agissent que sur les principes cachés qui contribuent à former notre esprit et notre caractère.'¹ A general may have an accurate knowledge of his own man-power and munition-power and almost as good a knowledge of his opponent's; he may also have a shrewd idea of his opponent's plans; and, in the light of all this knowledge, he may have laid his own plans to his own best advantage. He cannot, however, foreknow how his opponent, or any of the other men who compose the force under his opponent's command, will behave, in action, when the campaign is opened and the battle joined; he cannot foreknow how his own men will behave; he cannot foreknow how he will behave himself. Yet these psychological momenta, which are inherently impossible to weigh and measure and therefore to estimate scientifically in advance, are the very forces which actually decide the issue when the encounter takes place. The military genius is the general who repeatedly succeeds in divining the unpredictable by guesswork or intuition; and most of the historic military geniuses—commanders of such diverse temperament and outlook as a Cromwell and a Napoleon—have recognized clearly that man-power and munition-power and intelligence and strategy are not the talismans that have brought them their victories. After estimating all the measurable and manageable factors at their full value—insisting that 'God is on the side of the big battalions', that 'God helps those who help themselves', that you should 'trust in God and keep your powder dry'—they have admitted frankly that, when all is said and done, victory cannot be predicted by thought or commanded by will because it comes in the end from a source to which neither thought nor will have access. If they have been religious-minded, they have cried 'Thanks be to God which giveth us the victory';² if they have been sceptical-minded, they have ascribed their victories—in superstitious terms—to the operations of Fortune or to the ascendancy of their personal star; but, whatever language they have used, they have testified to the reality of the same experience: the experience that the outcome of an encounter cannot be predicted and has no appearance of being predetermined, but arises, in the likeness of a new creation, out of the encounter itself.

With this preface, we will now survey the origins of our twenty-one civilizations once more—taking note of any challenges which we may find to have been presented by the environment and of any responses which we may find to have been evoked, and contenting

¹ Turgot: 'Plan de Deux Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle', in *Œuvres de Turgot*, nouvelle édition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 647. Cf. Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 83 and 174.

² 1 Corinthians xv. 57.

ourselves with observing, empirically, the phenomena of Challenge-and-Response in each particular instance, without postulating uniformity or expecting to discover a scientific law.

The Genesis of the Egyptian Civilization

Let us proceed in the same order as before, taking first the challenges presented by the physical environment and afterwards those presented by the human environment at the geneses of the several societies by which the species called civilizations has been represented so far.

On this plan of operations, the first challenges which we have to consider are those presented by the valleys of certain rivers—the Nile, the Jordan, the Tigris and Euphrates, and the Indus with its once existent sister-stream—which traverse, as rare exceptions and at wide intervals, the otherwise riverless expanse of what is now the Afrasian Steppe.¹ The first responses which we have to consider are those made to the Nile Valley at the genesis of the Egyptian Civilization, to the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates at the genesis of the Sumeric Civilization, and to the valley of the Indus and its former companion at the genesis of the so-called 'Indus Culture', supposing that this culture proves not to have been a colonial offshoot of the Sumeric Civilization but to have had an independent origin.²

Our reference to the sister-stream of the Indus which has now ceased to flow calls our attention to an element in the situation which we have not taken into account so far. Up to this point, we have assumed that the physical environment presented by the Afrasian Steppe, with its exceptional river-valleys, is static. We have made this assumption because there has actually been no appreciable change in its state within the twenty-four centuries or so which lie between our time and the time when this environment became familiar to those Hellenic observers whose speculations first gave us occasion, in a previous chapter,³ to study the Afrasian environment ourselves. In going back, however, some two or three thousand years further, towards the origins of the civilizations which have arisen in this environment, we have already found one notable difference in the landscape. In a place where there is no river to-day there was a river then. In other words, the environment has changed, in at least one place, within the last four or five or six thousand years, and it has changed in a particular direction:

¹ See II. C (ii) (a) 2, pp. 256-8, above.

² For the openness of this question in the present state of our knowledge, see I. C (i) (b), p. 108, above, and Annex III, below, as well as II. C (ii) (a) 2, pp. 257-8.

³ II. C (ii) (a) 2, pp. 249-53, above.

from humidity towards aridity.¹ As a matter of fact, we know that this phenomenon of the drying-up of the Indus's sister-stream has not been an isolated or an exceptional occurrence. It has been an incident in a process of desiccation which has manifested itself in all parts of our Afrasian area since the last glacial and pluvial paroxysm in that period of geological time which is popularly known as 'the Ice Age'.

'While Northern Europe was covered in ice as far as the Harz, and the Alps and the Pyrenees were capped with glaciers, the Arctic high pressure deflected southwards the Atlantic rainstorms. The cyclones that to-day traverse Central Europe then passed over the Mediterranean basin and the northern Sahara and continued, undrained by Lebanon, across Mesopotamia and Arabia to Persia and India.² The parched Sahara enjoyed a regular rainfall, and farther east the showers were not only more bountiful than to-day but were distributed over the whole year, instead of being restricted to the winter. On the Iranian Plateau the precipitation, although insufficient to feed extensive glaciers, filled the great hollows that are now salt deserts with shallow inland seas whose presence tempered the severity of the climate. . . .

'We should expect in North Africa, Arabia, Persia and the Indus Valley parklands and savannahs, such as flourish to-day north of the Mediterranean, at a time when much of Europe was tundra or wind-swept steppe on which the dust was collecting as loess. While the mammoth, the woolly rhinoceros and the reindeer were browsing in France and Southern England, North Africa was supporting a fauna that is found to-day on the Zambesi in Rhodesia. . . .

'The pleasant grasslands of North Africa and Southern Asia were naturally as thickly populated by Man as the frozen steppes of Europe, and it is reasonable to suspect that in this favourable and indeed stimulating environment Man would make greater progress than in the ice-bound north. In fact it is somewhere in this region that many would locate the first cradle of *Homo Sapiens*. Lower Palaeolithic men have left their hand-axes all over North Africa from Morocco to Egypt, in Somaliland, in Palestine and Syria and in many parts of India. These agree so exactly in form with those made in Western Europe during the last interglacial [period] and before it that one assumes a more or less uniform population, of course very sparse and physically very primitive, common to Western Europe, Africa, and Southern Asia . . . a loose chain of interrelated bands of hunting folk ranging all along the temperate

¹ For the evidence of this climatic change, within this period of time, in the domain of 'the Indus Culture', including Baluchistan as well as Sind and the Lower Panjab, see Marshall, Sir J.: *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilization* (London 1931, Probsthain, 3 vols.), vol. i, chapter i: 'The Country, Climate and Rivers.' The sister-stream of the Indus seems not to have dried up completely until the fourteenth century of the Christian Era (op. cit., loc. cit., p. 5); and its latter-day name is known to have been Mühran.

² Sir John Marshall (in op. cit., vol. i, pp. 4-5) suggests that the more abundant rain which gave Baluchistan and the Indus Valley a moister climate in the third millennium B.C. than they enjoy to-day is more likely to have been monsoon rain from the Indian Ocean than cyclone rain from the Atlantic.—A. J. T.

grassland of North Africa and Arabia and extending even into India on the one hand and into South-Eastern Spain on the other.¹

After the close of 'the Ice Age', our Afrasian area began to experience a profound physical change in the direction of desiccation; and simultaneously two or more civilizations arose in an area which had previously been occupied solely by primitive societies of the Palaeolithic order. Our archaeologists encourage us to look upon the desiccation of Afrasia as a challenge to which the geneses of these civilizations were responses.

'Now we are on the brink of the great revolution, and soon we shall encounter men who are masters of their own food-supply through possession of domesticated animals and the cultivation of cereals. It seems inevitable to connect that revolution with the crisis produced by the melting of the northern glaciers and consequent contraction of the Arctic high-pressure over Europe and diversion of the Atlantic rain-storms from the South Mediterranean zone to their present course across Central Europe.

'That event would certainly tax the ingenuity of the inhabitants of the former grassland zone to the utmost. . . .

'Faced with the gradual desiccation consequent upon the re-shift northward of the Atlantic cyclone belt as the European glaciers contracted, three alternatives were open to the hunting populations affected. They might move northward or southward with their prey, following the climatic belt to which they were accustomed; they might remain at home eking out a miserable existence on such game as could withstand the droughts, or they might—still without leaving their home-land—emancipate themselves from dependence on the whims of their environment by domesticating animals and taking to agriculture.²

In the event, those hunting and food-gathering communities of the Afrasian grasslands that changed neither their habitat nor their way of life when they were challenged by the change in the climate, paid the penalty of extinction for their complete failure to respond. Those that avoided changing their habitat by changing their way of life and transforming themselves from hunters blindly wandering in pursuit of their game into shepherds skilfully leading their flocks on a seasonal orbit of migration, became the Nomads of the Afrasian Steppe. Their achievement and their fate will demand our atten-

¹ Childe, V. G.: *The Most Ancient East* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), ch. ii.

² Childe, op. cit., ch. iii. Cf. the same work, chapter ii, 'The Setting of the Stage', and chapter iii, 'The Oldest Farmers', *passim*. See further Huntington, Ellsworth: *Civilisation and Climate* (New Haven 1924, Yale University Press), ch. xiv, 'The Shifting of Climatic Zones'; and Caetani, Leone: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. i (Milan 1911, Hoepli), ch. ii: 'L'Arabia Preistorica e il progressivo Essiccamento della Terra'. The link between the particular Egyptian and Sumeric responses to the particular challenge constituted by the desiccation of the Afrasian Steppe and the general conception of Challenge-and-Response will be found in the story of the Fall of Man in the Book of Genesis, with the quotations from Hesiod, Virgil, Origen, Volney, Huntington, and Myres which have been made, apropos of the story of the Fall, in II. C (ii) (b) 1, pp. 290-3, above.

tion hereafter.¹ Of those that elected to change their habitat rather than change their way of life, the communities which avoided the drought by following the cyclone belt as it shifted northward exposed themselves, unintentionally, to a new challenge—the challenge of the northern cold—which evoked a new creative response in such as did not succumb to it;² while the communities which avoided the drought by retreating southward into the monsoon belt³ came under the soporific influence emanating from the climatic monotony of the Tropics.⁴ Finally, there were communities that responded to the challenge of desiccation by changing their habitat and their way of life alike, and this rare double reaction was the dynamic act which created the Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations out of the primitive societies of the vanishing Afrasian grasslands.

The change in these creative communities' way of life was the thoroughgoing transformation of food-gatherers into cultivators. The change in their habitat was small in point of distance but vast if measured by the difference in character between the grasslands which they abandoned and the new physical environment in which they made themselves at home. When the grasslands overlooking the lower valley of the Nile turned into the Libyan Desert and the grasslands overlooking the lower valley of the Tigris and Euphrates into the Rub 'al-Khālī and the Dasht-i-Lūt, these heroic pioneers—inspired by audacity or by desperation—plunged into the jungle-swamps of the valley-bottoms, never before penetrated by Man, which their dynamic act was to turn into the Land of Egypt and the Land of Shinar. To their neighbours, who took the alternative courses described above, their venture must have seemed a forlorn hope; for, in the outlived age when the area that was now beginning to turn into the inhospitable Afrasian Steppe had been an earthly paradise,⁵ the Nilotic and Mesopotamian jungle-swamp had been a forbidding and apparently impenetrable wilderness. As it turned out, the venture succeeded beyond the most sanguine hopes in which the pioneers can ever have indulged. The wantonness

¹ In Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 7–22, below.

² See Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's parable, quoted in II. C (ii) (b) 1, on p. 292, above.

³ For the traces left by these southward emigrants in the Great Rift Valley in East Africa, see Leakey, L. S. B.: *The Stone Age Cultures of Kenya Colony* (Cambridge 1931, University Press), especially chs. x and xi. For their supposed descendants who still survive, nearer home, in the tropical part of the Sudan, see the present chapter, pp. 312–13, below.

⁴ See II. C (ii) (b) 1, p. 278, above, and II. D (i), vol. ii, pp. 26–8, below.

⁵ 'Paradise' in the literal meaning of the Greek word *παράδεισος*, which is the transliteration of a Persian word signifying a stretch of savannah—a mixture of grassland and woodland abounding in game—which was artificially preserved in its virgin state in order to enable the dominant minority in an agrarian and urban society to enjoy, as a sport, the primitive occupation of hunting.

of Nature was subdued by the works of Man; the formless jungle-swamp made way for a pattern of ditches and embankments and fields; the Lands of Egypt and Shinar were reclaimed from the wilderness; the Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations were created.

The simultaneous creation of the Egyptian Civilization and of the Land of Egypt itself in the Lower Nile Valley, in response to the challenge presented by the gradual desiccation of the once hospitable regions round about, has been portrayed as follows by a distinguished Egyptologist:

'We are accustomed to regard Egypt as a paradise, as the most fertile country in the World, where, if we but scratch the soil and scatter seed, we have only to await and gather the harvest. The Greeks spoke of Egypt as the most fit place for the first generations of men, for there, they said, food was always ready at hand, and it took no labour to secure an abundant supply. But there can be no doubt that the Egypt of to-day is a very different place from the Egypt of pre-agricultural times. There has been a great, but gradual, change in the physical condition of the whole country. In the mortuary chapels of tombs of the Old and Middle Kingdoms, as well as in many of the Empire, are scenes of papyrus swamps and reed marshes; in these swamps and marshes are figured the animals and birds that then frequented them. Among the animals are the hippopotamus and the wild boar, the crocodile, the ibis, and a great variety of water-fowl. These animals, and some of the birds, have now disappeared from the region north of the First Cataract.¹ . . .

'Much is known about the ancient fauna of the desert wadies from the paintings and sculptured scenes in the tombs of the Old and Middle Kingdoms and of the Empire. On the walls of many of these tombs are depicted hunting scenes, and among the wild animals figured in them are the lion, leopard, Barbary sheep, wild ass, wild ox, hartebeest, oryx, ibex, addax, dorcas gazelle, fallow deer, giraffe, and ostrich. As several of these animals are not now known in Egypt it has been argued that the scenes do not faithfully represent the ancient fauna of the country. But I can see no reason to doubt that the scenes depict actual hunts that took place in the Arabian and Libyan Deserts not far from the localities in which the tombs figuring them are found. . . .

'At the present day all but one of the animals represented in these ancient hunting scenes are found in the Nubian Deserts to the south of Egypt. The exception is important; it is the fallow deer, which belongs

¹ Similarly, in the Indus Valley, there is evidence that, in the age when the city of Mohenjo-Daro was 'a going concern' (i.e. from the turn of the fourth and third millennia down to the middle of the third millennium B.C.), the region was inhabited by a moist-country fauna—the tiger, the rhinoceros, the elephant, but not the lion—which is not to be found there to-day. (Marshall, Sir John: *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilization* (London 1931, Probsthain), vol. i, p. 2.) The works of Man tell the same story. At Mohenjo-Daro and the other sites of 'the Indus Culture', kiln-dried bricks have been employed at all exposed points (op. cit., loc. cit.). In the sites of this culture in Baluchistan, there are traces of dams in places where there is nowadays no water to catch (op. cit., vol. i, p. 3). In the Indus Valley itself, 'if there is one fact that stands out clear and unmistakable, it is that people must have lived in ever-present dread of the river'. (Op. cit., vol. i, p. 6).—A. J. T.

to the Holarctic, not to the Ethiopian, zoological zone. Although most of the animals that were hunted by the dynastic Egyptians have now disappeared from their northern home, many have been recorded in recent years as occurring in the Arabian and Libyan Deserts. We can, in fact, follow them gradually receding southwards. . . .

'Now the appearance of all these animals in Egypt and in its bordering deserts in dynastic times presupposes that the vegetation of the wadies was much more abundant then than now, and this again presupposes a greater rainfall than we find at present. . . .

'The characteristic wild trees of the dynastic flora of Egypt, as we know from the remains of them that have been found in the ancient tombs, were the heglík (*Balanites aegyptiaca*), the seyal (*Acacia seyal*), the sùnt (*Acacia nilotica*), the tamarisk (*Tamarix nilotica*), the nebak (*Zizyphus spina-Christi*), the sycomore-fig (*Ficus sycomorus*), and the moringa (*Moringa aptera*). The dom palm (*Hyphaene thebaica*) and the Dellach palm (*H. argun*) were also common. The heglík does not now grow wild north of Aswân, and, of the other trees, only the sùnt and the tamarisk are really common in the Lower Nile Valley. All these trees, however, now grow in abundance in the region north of the Athara, and it is here, in what is called the Taka country, that we find also the fauna that was once so abundant in more northerly regions.

'But if the fauna and flora of the Arabian and Libyan Deserts in dynastic times approached more closely to that now seen in the Taka country, we have to go further south again for the earliest pre-dynastic fauna and flora of the Lower Nile Valley. This pre-dynastic fauna is particularly interesting, because, in addition to several of the animals already mentioned as occurring in dynastic times, we meet with others, such as the elephant, the kudu (*Streptoceros kudu*), the gerenuk gazelle (*Lithocranius walleri*), a species of *Sus* (which is certainly not the wild boar, i.e. *Sus scrofa*), and the marabou stork (*Leptoptilus crumenifer*). From the nature and habits of these mammals and birds it is evident that there must have been a considerable rainfall in the Valley of the Nile north of Aswân when they frequented Egypt. Dr. Anderson has referred to this subject in his monograph on the Reptilia of Egypt.¹ He notes that the physical features on both sides of the Nile "indicate the existence of a period long antecedent to the present, in which a considerable rainfall prevailed, as in the eroded valleys of the desert may be observed rocky ravines which have been carved out by the action of water, which has left behind it dry channels over which waterfalls had once precipitated themselves, and others down which cataracts once raced. The rainfall of the present is not sufficient to account for such a degree of erosion." This evidence sanctions the conclusion that a material change in the character of the climate of North-Eastern Africa, so far as its rainfall is concerned, has taken place since pre-dynastic days. The flora of the valley of the Lower Nile also points to the same conclusion. Dr. Schweinfurth has drawn attention to the fact that many plants, now known in Egypt only under cultivation, are found in the primeval

¹ A. Anderson, *Zoology of Egypt* (Reptilia), p. xlvii.

swamps and forests of the White Nile. He not unreasonably draws the inference that in ages long ago the entire Nile Valley exhibited a vegetation harmonising in its character throughout much more than at present. The papyrus swamps and reed marshes that lined the Lower Nile Valley in pre-agricultural days have been changed into peaceful fields, in which now grow the cereal grains, wheat and barley, and the other crops that have made Egypt famous as an agricultural country. It was the canalisation of the Valley, carried out by Man, and the consequent draining of the swamps and marshes, that displaced the ancient flora from its northern seat, and made it, as at the present day, only to be found hundreds of miles higher up the river. The land of Egypt has, in fact, been drained by Man; each foot of ground has been won by the sweat of his brow with difficulty from the swamp, until at last the wild plants and animals which once possessed it have been completely exterminated in it. The agricultural Egypt of modern times is as much a gift of Man as it is of the Nile.

'I have dwelt at some length on the ancient fauna and flora because I want to bring out as clearly as I can two facts concerning the Egypt of pre-agricultural days—the Egypt of the time before Man began to win the alluvial soil for the purposes of agriculture. (1) The aspect of the Lower Nile must have been very different from what it is now; it was a continuous line of papyrus swamps and marshes inhabited by hippopotami, wild boars, crocodiles, and immense flocks of wild-fowl of all kinds; it was singularly destitute of trees or plants that could be put to any useful purpose, and timber-trees were non-existent; its physical conditions resembled those prevailing on the banks of the White Nile to-day. (2) The deserts bordering the Lower Nile Valley on both sides were much more fertile, and their fauna and flora resembled that of the Taka country in Upper Nubia. Of the animals that frequented the wadies only the ass and the wild ox were capable of domestication. If Man inhabited Egypt in pre-agricultural times—and there is no valid reason to suppose that he did not—he probably lived a wandering life, partly hunter, partly herdsman, in the fertile wadies that bordered the valley, only going down to the river to fish or to fowl or to hunt the hippopotamus. In the valley itself there was certainly no pasture-land for supporting herds of large or small cattle.

'It was probably also in these wadies that agriculture was first practised in Egypt. Even at the present day a considerable number of Ababdeh roam the wadies of the Arabian Desert between Keneh and the Red Sea, where, at certain seasons of the year, there is fair pasturage for small flocks of sheep and goats. I have myself seen many of these people in the course of several journeys that I have undertaken to the Red Sea coast. Some of these Nomads sow a little barley and millet after a rain-storm, and then pitch their tents for a while till the grain grows, ripens, and can be gathered. They then move on again with their little flocks. What the Ababdeh do on a very small scale the Hadendoa of the Taka country do on a much greater one. If we turn to the Taka country we see there people living under much the same physical conditions as those

which must have prevailed in the Arabian and Libyan Deserts in early times. The inhabitants of the Taka country are Hamite; and, as Professor Seligman has pointed out, the least modified of these people are physically identical with the pre-dynastic Egyptians of Upper Egypt. I would suggest that they, like the fauna and flora of ancient Egypt, receded southwards under the pressure of the advance of civilisation, and that the physical conditions of the country have preserved them to a great extent in their primitive life and pursuits. The picture of the Taka as Burckhardt draws it¹ would, I believe, describe almost equally well the earliest pre-dynastic Egyptians.²

The foregoing testimony from an archaeologist may be supported by the following testimony from a physiographer, who, in the light of his own science, reconstructs as follows the original state of the lowest section of the Nile Valley, from Assuan to Cairo, and the original state of the Nile Delta:

'Where a silt-laden river inundates its flood-plain the greatest amount of deposition takes place along the banks, where the velocity is first checked, so that these are raised, and beyond them the country slopes away from the river; this is well shown in Upper Egypt, where there is a difference of up to 3 metres in height between the land by the river and that along the edge of the desert. Branches which leave the main stream flow out along this lower country, which in the natural state of the valley contains swamps and lagoons which are filled with water in the flood season and, being imperfectly drained, remain as waste tracts covered with swamp-loving plants. At an earlier period of the Nile Valley's history there must have been a belt of such land along the edge of the western desert which bounds it, and here and there traces of it still exist; the present Sohagia canal probably occupies the line of one of the branches of an earlier time, and the Bahr Yusef is certainly one, as it has all the characteristics of a stream meandering in its flood-plain.'³

'In the early times of ancient Egyptian history the delta was largely an area of marsh; the main arms, of which seven are recorded by Greek authors, divided into numerous branches and followed meandering courses to the sea. In the flood season all these overflowed their banks, depositing their load of silt to raise the delta and fill the low-lying depressions with water so that they remained as water-logged marshes throughout the year; the river arms and smaller water channels, until they were trained and embanked in much later times, eroded their banks, and cut across their bends to leave deep crescent-shaped lakes where their channels had formerly been, as is to be seen in all deltas of rivers which periodically rise in flood. At this period the larger settlements

¹ Burckhardt, *Travels in Nubia*, pp. 387 seqq.

² Newberry, P. E.: *Egypt as a Field for Anthropological Research* (British Association for the Advancement of Science, Report of the Ninety-first Meeting, Liverpool 1923, Presidential Address to Section H (London 1924, Murray), pp. 176-80). See also Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, 3rd edition, vol. i, part (ii) (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 57-8.

³ Lyons, H. G.: *The Physiography of the River Nile and its Basin* (Cairo 1906, National Printing Department), p. 312.

must have been in the neighbourhood of the larger branches where sufficient high ground had been formed to provide areas of cultivable land, until the marshes became silted up, forming a plain suitable for cultivation.¹

Since a river can only have one delta, the state of Nature which the works of Man have effaced in the Delta of the Nile cannot be found extant now in any other part of the Nile Basin. On the other hand, the section of the Nile Valley which human interference with Nature has made into Upper Egypt is not without its counterparts farther up-stream, in regions where Nature still wears her original aspect to-day either because Man has never yet attempted to transform her or because she has succeeded, here, in defying his efforts and frustrating his purpose. The pre-human aspect of Nature along the Lower Nile, above the Delta, may be inferred to some extent from her present aspect along the Bahr-al-Jabal and the Bahr-az-Zaraf; and even her pre-human aspect in the Delta may perhaps be reflected, in some of its features, in the present aspect of the region round Lake No, where the Bahr-al-Jabal and the Bahr-al-Ghazal now mingle their 'Sudd'-laden waters.

'North of Gondokoro the Bahr-al-Jabal passes from its mountain tract to its plain tract and henceforth flows as a meandering stream in the flood plain which occupies the valley. . . . In this old flood plain the Bahr-al-Jabal has eroded a very shallow valley which it has since partially refilled, while the Bahr-az-Zaraf has carved out no valley but only the channel that it flows in. . . . The Bahr-al-Jabal flows down its valley with a very low slope . . . and all the features which it presents are those characteristic of such low grade streams carrying a small load of silt and situated in a tropical climate. The length of the Bahr-al-Jabal from Gondokoro to Lake No is about the same as that of the Nile Valley from Esna to Cairo, and . . . on the whole their respective valleys do not differ greatly in area.'²

The following description of the Bahr-al-Jabal Valley as it is to-day gives some idea of what the Lower Nile Valley must have been like when its terrors were first braved by the fathers of the Egyptian Civilization:

'The scenery of the Bahr-al-Gabal throughout its course through the 'Sudd' region is monotonous to a degree. There are no banks at all, except at a few isolated spots, no semblance of any ridge on the water's edge. Reedy swamps stretch for many kilometres upon either side. Their expanse is only broken at intervals by lagoons of open water. Their surface is only a few centimetres above that of the water-level in the river when at its lowest, and a rise of half a metre floods them to an immense distance. These marshes are covered with a dense growth of water-weeds extending in every direction to the horizon. Of these reeds the

¹ Lyons, H. G., *op. cit.*, p. 338.

² Lyons, H. G., *op. cit.*, pp. 91-2.

principal is the papyrus, which grows in extreme luxuriance. The stems are so close together that it is difficult to force a way through them, and the plants reach a height of from 3 to 5 metres above the marsh. . . .

"Throughout this whole region, more especially between Bor and Lake No, it is extremely rare to see any sign of human life. Even hippopotami, which in the White Nile swarm, appear to shun the swamps of the Bahr-al-Gabal. Beyond a few night herons bird life is unrepresented, especially in the lower part of its course. The water, on the contrary, teems with fish, and crocodiles are constantly to be seen. The Bahr-al-Gabal has an evil name for mosquitoes, and one that is well deserved. With the disappearance of the sun they come forth in countless myriads, and make life a burden until the luminary reappears above the horizon. The whole region has an aspect of desolation beyond the power of words to describe. It must be seen to be understood. The dark-green masses of the papyrus which hedge in the channel, although possessing a certain gloomy beauty, become monotonous to the eye, when kilometre after kilometre is passed without any change in the aspect of the landscape. Even on the rare occasions when it is possible to see over this hedge no relief is experienced. In every direction the sea of vegetation extends without a break. An occasional stunted mimosa is welcomed as a landmark. The air is hot and steamy, while the whole region is malarious to a degree. No one can remain long in this portion of the river without experiencing a feeling of depression. Through these dreary marshes the river winds in a continual succession of loops and curves. As soon as one is passed another commences."¹

This picture may be supplemented by another which is equally graphic:

"The "sudd" (in Arabic *sadd* = block)² is a generic name by custom applied to the huge marshes through which the Bahr-al-Jabal, Bahr-al-Ghazal, Bahr-az-Zaraf and the lower portion of their tributaries wind their way. It forms an irregular triangle of which the northern base extends about 200 miles west from the mouth of the Bahr-az-Zaraf, and the southern apex lies about Bor, 250 miles S.S.E. of Lake No. It is difficult to estimate the area of these vast marshes, but it cannot be much less than 35,000 [square] miles. . . .

"A great part of this area is covered with a shallow sheet of water, over almost the whole extent of which thick reeds and swamp-grasses have sprung up. Except in the actual river channels this water is probably nowhere more than 2 to 6 feet deep.

"To the eye the effect is one of a vast extent of brilliant green papyrus, feathery reeds and sword grass, 5 to 15 feet above the water, broken by occasional patches of light ambach trees, with channels of water, pools and lagoons dotting the "swamp-scape", and here and there a sparse tree

¹ Garstin, Sir William: *Report upon the Basin of the Upper Nile*, enclosed in a dispatch from His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo = Egypt No. 2 (1904) = Cmd. 2165 (London 1904, H.M. Stationery Office), pp. 98-9.

² For an expert account of the formation of the 'Sudd', see Sir W. Garstin, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-18.—A. J. T.

or two on the horizon. Occasionally, and more especially towards the south, ridges, or patches of mud or solid ground, are visible, and in such parts there is much bird and animal life. In the lower (northern) reaches of the Sudd nearly all signs of life—except the brilliant little bee-eater, an occasional heron, fish-eagle, or “anvil-bird”, the ubiquitous crocodile, and, of course, the insects—disappear; but in the more southerly parts are found many varieties of game.

‘On the Bahr-al-Jabal, for the first 150 miles south of Lake No there are no human inhabitants visible. Thereafter occasional Dinkas and their villages are seen up to about Bor (384 miles); whilst beyond this the Bari country commences, the population as the Lado Enclave is approached being considerably thicker on the east than on the west bank. The Bahr-al-Ghazal swamps and banks are almost uninhabited.’¹

They are uninhabited because the people who live on their outskirts are not confronted here and now, as the fathers of the Egyptiac Civilization were confronted when they were squatting on the borders of the Lower Nile Valley some five or six thousand years ago, with the hard choice between plunging into the forbidding ‘Sudd’ and clinging to an ancestral habitat in process of transformation from an earthly paradise into an inhospitable desert. If our scholars are right in their surmise, the forefathers of these people who now live on the margin of the ‘Sudd’ were living, in what is now the Libyan Desert, cheek by jowl with the fathers of the Egyptiac Civilization, at the time when these responded to the challenge of desiccation by making their momentous choice. At that time, it would seem, the forefathers of the modern Dinka and Shilluk parted company with their heroic neighbours and followed the line of least resistance by retreating southwards to a country where they could continue to live, without changing their way of life, in physical surroundings partly identical with those to which they were accustomed.² They settled in the tropical part of the Sudan, within the range of the treacherously genial equatorial rains; and here their descendants remain to this day, living, on the outskirts of the Bahr-al-Jabal ‘Sudd’, the self-same life that their forefathers lived, on the outskirts of the Lower Nile ‘Sudd’, in common with the fathers of the Egyptiac Civilization, some thousands of years ago, before the Afrasian paradise was turned into a desert

¹ Gleichen, Lord Edward: *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: A Compendium prepared by Officers of the Sudan Government* (London 1905, H.M. Stationery Office, 2 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 299–300.

² The identity was partial and not complete; for while the climate, past and present, of the Equatorial Zone resembles the prehistoric climate of the zone which has now become the Afrasian Steppe in respect of enjoying that sufficiency of rainfall with which the Afrasian area has now ceased to be blessed, there are also differences which are no less important in their effects on human life—and this altogether to the disadvantage of the inhabitants of Equatoria. The rain-bringing cyclones which used to pass over Afrasia during ‘the Ice Age’ gave the local climate a stimulating rigour and variety which must have been the antithesis, in its effects on Human Nature, to the soporific monotony of the rain-bringing monsoons. (See above, pp. 303–4.)

by Nature and the Lower Nile 'Sudd' into a cradle of civilization by Man.

In their new home, the sluggish and unambitious emigrants found what their soul desired. They had successfully transferred their habitat from a changing environment to a static environment in which nothing was destined to happen to them or to their descendants for the next five or six thousand years:

'On the Upper Nile there dwell to-day people allied to the oldest Egyptians in appearance, stature, cranial proportions, language and dress. These are ruled by rain-maker magicians or by divine kings who were until recently ritually slain, and the tribes are organised in totemic clans. The Shilluk, ruled by a centralised king with animal (i.e. totem) ancestry who was ritually slain, illustrate a stage immediately prior to the divine monarchy of Menes. A still older phase is seen among the Dinka: they are a congeries of autonomous totemic clans, often at war with one another, and each ruled by a "rain-maker" who was ceremonially killed before old age overtook him. It really looks as if among these tribes on the Upper Nile social development had been arrested at a stage that the Egyptians had traversed before their history began. There we have a living museum whose exhibits supplement and vivify the prehistoric cases in our collections.'¹

This living museum, furnished by the Shilluk and Dinka societies of to-day, stands next door to the inanimate museum, constituted by the jungle-swamp of the Bahr-al-Jabal and the Bahr-al-Ghazal, which we have just been studying; and here again, in this juxtaposition of Primitive Man and Virgin Nature, the present faithfully reproduces the past. Just so, some five or six thousand years ago, the fathers of the Egyptian Civilization (perhaps accompanied by the forefathers of the Dinka and the Shilluk before the parting of their ways) were squatting on the edge of the jungle-swamp which at that time occupied the Lower Nile Valley and the Delta.

This parallel between earlier conditions in one part of the Nile Basin and present conditions in another part invites certain speculations. Supposing that the challenge of desiccation had never been presented to the human inhabitants of the Nile Basin in those parts of it which, under our present climatic conditions, are beyond the pale of the equatorial rains: in that event, would the Delta and the Lower Valley of the Nile have been left in that original state of Nature—a wilderness of jungle and swamp and 'Sudd'—from which the valleys of the Bahr-al-Jabal and the Bahr-al-Ghazal have never been redeemed? And would Egypt never have been made nor the

¹ Childe, V. G.: *The Most Ancient East* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), pp. 10-11. For a detailed description of the life of these primitive Nilotic peoples at the present day, see Seligman, C. G. and B. Z.: *Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan* (London 1932, Routledge).

Egyptiac Civilization have arisen? What would have happened, then, to the descendants of those heroic pioneers who actually made themselves the fathers of the Egyptiac Civilization by descending, in response to the challenge of desiccation, into the valley of the shadow of death? Would nothing have happened to them at all? Would they be squatting, still, upon the edges of an untamed Lower Nile Valley, in that primitive state of society in which the Shilluk and the Dinka are living, now, upon the edges of an untamed Bahr-al-Jabal? And there is another line of speculation which concerns not the past but the future. We may remind ourselves that, on the time-scale of the universe or of our planet or of Life or even of the *Genus Homo*, a span of five or six thousand years is an almost negligible lapse of time—as brief as the twinkling of an eye.¹ Supposing that another challenge, as formidable as that which presented itself to the inhabitants of the Lower Nile Basin yesterday, at the end of ‘the Ice Age’, were to present itself to the inhabitants of the Upper Nile Basin to-morrow: is there any reason to believe that these are incapable of responding, on this hypothetical occasion, by some equally dynamic act which might have equally creative effects?

We need not require that this hypothetical challenge to the Shilluk and the Dinka in our time shall be the same in kind as the historic challenge which was presented some five or six thousand years ago to the fathers of the Egyptiac Civilization. Indeed, there seems no reason to expect, in any near future, a desiccation of Equatorial Africa which might challenge the inhabitants of the tropical Sudan to master the Bahr-al-Jabal ‘Sudd’ and there to re-enact the genesis of the Egyptiac Civilization by creating a second Egypt on the upper reaches of the same great river. So let us imagine that, this time, the challenge in the Nile Basin comes not from the physical but from the human environment—not from a transformation of the local climate but from the intrusion of an alien civilization. Is not this very challenge actually being presented, under our eyes, to the primitive societies of Tropical Africa by the impact of our own Western Civilization—a human agency which, in our generation, is playing the mythical role of Mephistopheles towards every other extant civilization and towards every extant primitive society on the face of the Earth? This challenge is still so recent in our time that we cannot yet forecast the ultimate response that any of the challenged societies will make to it. All that we can tell for certain is that they are being subjected to an impact of immense dynamic energy. Assuredly the Shilluk and the Dinka have never been exposed to any challenge of the

¹ On this point, see I. C (iii) (e), Annex, *ad fin.*, and II. C (ii) (a) 1, pp. 233–8, above.

same order of magnitude since the time, some five or six thousand years ago, when their forefathers (if our modern Western scholars have guessed aright) evaded the challenge of desiccation by migrating towards the Equator through fifteen or twenty degrees of latitude. How will these primitive societies respond this time? We can only say (in contradiction to the doctrine of 'Original Sin') that the failure of the fathers to respond to one challenge, even if such failure were proven, would not predispose the children to fail in face of another challenge when their own hour came. It is not inconceivable that the challenge of Westernization may evoke from the Shilluk and the Dinka in our day a response as creative in its effects, though not necessarily of at all the same kind, as the response which the challenge of desiccation evoked from the fathers of the Egyptiac Civilization in the fifth or the fourth millennium B.C.

The Genesis of the Sumeric Civilization

Having studied the genesis of the Egyptiac Civilization at some length, we shall find ourselves able to deal with the genesis of the Sumeric Civilization much more briefly; for we shall be dealing with a challenge which was identic and with a response which was the same in kind. The desiccation of Afrasia, which impelled the fathers of the Egyptiac Civilization to penetrate the jungle-swamp of the Lower Nile Valley and transform it into the Land of Egypt, likewise impelled the fathers of the Sumeric Civilization to come to grips with the jungle-swamp in the Lower Valley of the Tigris and Euphrates and transform it into the Land of Shinar. The material aspects of these two geneses of civilizations almost coincide. In both challenges we find the same two material elements: the increasing inhospitality of the Afrasian grasslands as they changed into steppe and desert, and the ever forbidding wilderness of rank vegetation and treacherous water. In both responses we find the same material results: a new landscape of ditches and embankments and fields, in which the original face of Nature has been utterly transfigured by the works of Man. The spiritual characteristics of the two resultant civilizations—their religion, their art, and even their social life—display much less similarity: another indication that, in the field of our studies, identic causes cannot be presumed, *a priori*, to produce identic effects.

The ordeal through which the fathers of the Sumeric Civilization passed is commemorated in Sumeric legend. The slaying of the dragon Tiamat by the God Marduk and the creation of the World out of her mortal remains signifies the subjugation of the primeval wilderness and the creation of the Land of Shinar by

the canalization of the waters and the draining of the soil. The story of the Flood records Nature's revolt against the shackles which Man's audacity had placed upon her. In the Biblical version (a literary heritage of the Jews from their exile by the waters of Babylon), 'the Flood' has been a household word in our Western Society ever since its genesis. It has remained for our modern Western archaeologists first to unearth and decipher the original version of the legend as it crystallized in its homeland, and latterly to find direct material evidence of a particular flood of abnormal severity in a thick layer of flood-laid clay which intervenes between the earliest and the later strata deposited by human habitation on the sites of certain historic seats of the Sumeric culture.

Besides this direct material evidence for an exceptional calamity, in the shape of a flood, with which the fathers of the Sumeric Civilization once had to contend, the Basin of the Tigris and Euphrates, like the Basin of the Nile, displays for our observation a museum in which we can study the normal aspect of inanimate Nature in the wilderness which Man has transformed into the Land of Shinar, as well as the life that was lived in this wilderness by the first Sumeric pioneers. In the Land of the Two Rivers, however, this museum is not to be found, as in the Nile Basin, by travelling up-stream.¹ On the contrary, it lies in a new delta, at the head of the Persian Gulf, which has been laid down by the confluence of the sister streams in times posterior not only to the genesis of the Sumeric Civilization but to its extinction, and also to the extinction of its Babylonian successor. The marshes which have come into existence gradually, during the last two or three thousand years, in the triangle of territory in Lower 'Irāq between 'Amārah on the Tigris and Nāsiriyyah on the Euphrates and Basrah on the Shatt-al-'Arab, have remained in their virgin state because, from their formation down to this day, no human society with the will or the power to master them has appeared on the scene. The marshmen by whom they are haunted have learnt to adapt themselves to this forbidding environment in a passive way (as witness their nickname, 'the web-feet', which they received from the British soldiers who encountered them during the General War of 1914-18), but they have never yet girded themselves for the task,

¹ In the geography of the Tigris and Euphrates Basin, 'Irāq, from the head of the Persian Gulf up to the neighbourhood of Hit on the Euphrates and a point in the same latitude on the Tigris, corresponds to Egypt from the coast of the Mediterranean to Assuan; the barren tract through which the two rivers run between reaching these points and leaving the Armenian highlands corresponds to Nubia; the highlands of Armenia and Kurdistan, in which the two rivers and their principal tributaries take their rise, correspond to the highlands of Abyssinia and British East Africa; but there is nothing in the Basin of the Tigris and Euphrates that corresponds to the 'Sudd'-choked valleys of the Bahr-al-Jabal and the Bahr-al-Ghazal.

which the fathers of the Sumeric Civilization accomplished in the immediate vicinity some five or six thousand years ago, of transfiguring the marshes into a network of canals and fields.

Here is a description, by a recent Western observer, of this latter-day wilderness and its human denizens:

'Soon branching off from our arrow-straight waterway, we began to wind once more among reeds which grew taller, until we were surrounded by *mardi*, the giant of the marshes, which provides the *Ma'dan* with their long *mashruf*-poles; here it towered above our heads to a height of twenty-five feet. Slowly we threaded our way among these silent, stately monarchs of the waste, until, suddenly breaking through the gloom, we came out upon a wide sea of sunny open water, blue as the Mediterranean and covered with white-crested waves. The wind, which in the shelter of the *mardi* we had not felt, was here blowing freshly, and Haji Rikkan had doubts as to the wisdom of attempting to cross; for the loss of a marsh boat in these squalls of wind is by no means infrequent. In the end he decided to skirt the edge of the reeds, and with a pious "We are in the hands of Allah" gave the word to cross. Rocking and tossing, and shipping a good deal of water, we reached the other side in safety, and slid into the calm waters of a channel which wound between walls of *shabab*, the stout but pliable reed from which the marshman makes the arched frame-work of his hut. Only the waving of their silver feathery heads showed that above the shelter of our little channel the wind blew as strongly as before.

'Always changing from hour to hour as we penetrated more and more deeply into its heart, yet always the same, the quiet marsh opened its waterways to receive us. Like some Belle Dame sans Merci, it seemed to beckon us on and on, ever revealing fresh beauties, yet closing fast the way of retreat. Its towering ramparts rose silently behind us as though, having once laid bare the wonders of its inmost hidden life, the marsh would keep us for ever in its embrace, lest we should go forth again and tell the secret of its winds and waters to the world outside. . . .

'In front, the friendly reeds seemed to open of themselves to provide a way for us; behind, they closed their ranks in dark and threatening masses against the sky, as though prepared to oppose our return. The scream of an unseen bird might echo across the stillness, or a startled beating of wings die away as suddenly as it had arisen; then once more silence held the marsh. Here the reeds were taller; old, thick, and towering masses, so far from any marsh settlements that they had never been disturbed by Man seeking material for hut-building, for buffalo fodder, or for mats. The solitude was intense—more intense than that of the desert. There countless tracks reveal the presence of man or beast, but here the flowering weeds close up again, leaving no trace. Only very rarely did we come across a few reeds twisted together and bent—a landmark or wordless message from a marshman to his fellows, seeming only to intensify the lonely silence of the wilderness.

'When at last we came upon a settlement of marsh-dwellers, it was a

village so small, so remote from the river, that at first sight of us the men seized their rifles and leapt in among the reeds, from the shelter of which they could best defend their homes. . . .

'The ground on which I stepped was covered with broken pottery, some unglazed, some a bright sky-blue. Fragments of all shapes and sizes lay jumbled together, with here and there a flat square brick inscribed with cuneiform symbols.'¹

Those relics of the Sumeric Civilization in the untamed wilderness bore silent but eloquent witness to the dynamic acts which, in the language of Sumeric Mythology, were once performed by the god Marduk who slew the dragon Tiamat,² and by the hero Uta-Napishtim who built his ark in anticipation of the Flood and kept her afloat on the waste of waters when the great inundation came.

The Genesis of the Sinic Civilization

If we consider, next, the genesis of the Sinic Civilization in the Lower Valley of the Yellow River, we shall find its explanation in a human response to a challenge from Physical Nature which was perhaps even more severe than the challenge of the Two Rivers or the challenge of the Nile. In the wilderness which Man once transfigured into the cradle of the Sinic Civilization, the ordeal of marsh and bush and flood was capped by the ordeal of a temperature which varied seasonally to severe extremes of summer heat and winter cold. The fathers of the Sinic Civilization do not seem to have differed in race from the peoples occupying the vast region to the south and south-west which extends from the Yellow River to the Brahmaputra and from the Tibetan Plateau to the China Sea.³ If certain members of this wide-spread race created a civilization while the rest remained culturally sterile, the explanation may be that a creative faculty, latent in all alike, was evoked in those particular members, and in those only, by the presentation of a challenge to which the rest did not happen to be exposed. The challenge and response which gave birth to the Sinic Civilization are depicted by a distinguished Western Sinologist as follows:

'The Chinese would appear to be the northernmost branch of the sedentary agricultural peoples whose western branch is formed by the Tibeto-Burman tribes of Tibet, Sechwan and Yunnan (Tibetans, Lolos, Mossos, Burmans, &c.), its southern branch by the Thai in the south of China and in the north of Indo-China, and its central branch by the Miao-tse of Hunan and Kweichow.

¹ 'Fulanain': *Haji Rikhan, Marsh Arab* (London 1927, Chatto & Windus), pp. 24-5 and 249-50.

² The superhuman effort of breaking in the River with embankments and forbidding the angry waters to break their way out again is vividly conveyed in the story of Abu Mā'itayn ('The Father of Two Dead Men') in *op. cit.*, pp. 85-93.

³ On this point, see II. C (ii) (a) 1, p. 236, above.

'None of these related peoples with a more southerly habitat are likely to have had so rough a life as the Chinese must have had since the dawn of the historical period. It was probably in the great plain of the North-East, between the sea and the escarpment which forms the [eastern] boundary of the Shansi Plateau, that the Chinese began to develop their civilisation. It was from there that this civilisation hived off, at that remote epoch, towards the west into the fine valley of the Wei and thence along the Fen into the little basins of Shansi, and towards the south in the direction of the Hwai and the River Han and the mountains leading over into the immense basin where the River Han falls into the Yangtse.

'The climate of this region was extremely severe: sultry in summer, icy in winter, while the spring was ushered in by storms of chilly wind, laden with sand, which were even more cruel than the great winter cold. The rivers, which all through the winter were frozen or at any rate choked with floating ice, thawed rapidly at the first fine weather and became transformed almost immediately into torrents; and all this combined to make communications difficult during more than a third of the year. The great artery, the Yellow River, with its rapids and sandbanks, is dangerous to navigate; its innumerable branches wandered off capriciously across the low, level plains, where there is hardly any fall. This was the country which was called the Nine Rivers, because, it was said, the Yellow River had there nine principal branches. It extended over a broad zone at the foot of the Shansi Plateau; for its course at that time was different from its present course, and it proceeded, after a long detour, to flow out into the sea along the present course of the Pei-ho, in the neighbourhood of Tientsin.

'Every year, moreover, the floods changed the river's course and sought new channels; the shallows became water-logged and turned into great swamps . . . some of which still remain in existence to-day. These swamps were jungles of water plants, giving shelter to wild geese and cranes and swarming with fish. They were surrounded by belts, varying in width, of land which was too wet for agriculture and which was covered with a tall grassy vegetation broken by thickets of white elms, plums and chestnuts. This was not real forest: that was only to be found on the periphery of the region, on the slopes of the mountains, on the east in Shantung, on the west in Shansi; and the line where the forest began marked the beginning of the domain of the barbarians. [The Sinic wilderness was not a forest but] was a thick bush, haunted by wild beasts—tigers, panthers, wild cats, leopards, bears, wild cattle, even elephants and rhinoceroses, wolves, wild boars, foxes—as well as by game of all kinds, herds of stags and antelopes, monkeys, hares, rabbits and birds of every species. . . .

'Only the fringes were "broken in" (*aménagées*)—either into pastures for domesticated horses and cattle or into mulberry-plantations for breeding silk-worms. The best lands, which were protected against the floods by dykes and were regularly cultivated, produced millet and sorghum in Chihli, rice to the south of the Yellow River, and some wheat

more or less everywhere. Haricot beans, gourds, indigo, and hemp were also made to grow. . . .

'It was not without toil and trouble, however, that the Chinese countryside had been successfully "broken in" like this, in face of the extreme difficulties with which Nature confronted the pioneers. All these fine fields of millet, rice, and wheat had had to be conquered by the pioneers, in the sweat of their brow, from the bush and from the waters. . . . The process had been long and cruel. Dykes had had to be built as bulwarks against the floods, canals had had to be dug to drain the swamps and turn them into dry land. All these works were so ancient that the memory of them was lost in the fog of Legend. They were attributed to the heroes of remote antiquity. At the beginning of things, the heroes had come down from Heaven to Earth to set the Earth in order, in accordance with the instructions of the Lord above, and to make it possible for Mankind to inhabit it.'

If we want to see with our own eyes what the future site of China once looked like before China herself was brought into existence by Chinese labour, we may catch a glimpse of this long-vanished scene by travelling northwards from the basin of the Yellow River to the basin of the Amur—the next, in this direction, of the great river-systems of Eastern Asia—and alighting among the swamps that fringe Lake Khanka, at the head-waters of the River Ussuri. For this swampy valley, hemmed in by forest-clad mountains, remains to-day not far removed from the virgin state in which the Chinese found the valley-bottoms of Shensi when they first won them for the plough from the woodland barbarians.

'The Ussuri District is mainly woodland. Open plains are to be found only in the valleys of the larger rivers: on the banks of the Ussuri itself and along the lower courses of its right-bank tributaries and on the shores of Lake Khanka. The higher one goes up into the mountains, the rarer become the patches that are suitable for agricultural settlement. There are merely isolated clearings, at long distances from one another; and beyond these there stretches the gloomy Taiga, unending, wild, and desolate.

'In these woods the day dawns late and the sun only penetrates feebly through the thick lace-work of branches. The perpetual twilight of this wilderness exhales a damp chill, and the forest prison-house oppresses the spirit. In these surroundings the eye soon grows weary and longs for a free field of vision.

'Even the most audacious hunter and forester who dives into the gorges of the Sikhote Alin Range feels, in spite of himself, a secret terror in face of these uncanny, gigantic tracts of primeval forest. The endlessness and tracklessness of the Taiga, the storms, the floods, the intolerable plagues of insects, the wild beasts, the occasional dearth of game, and a host of other dangers—mostly encountered without warning

¹ Maspero, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), pp. 20-6.

—often seal the doom of isolated adventurers who have the hardihood to take up the struggle with Nature in a region where Nature interposes her veto.

'In the southern part of the Ussuri District the flora of the Taiga is extraordinarily rich in variety and magnificent in the spectacle which it presents. The spectator is taken by surprise at the intermingling of tropical and northern species. His vision is overwhelmed and confounded by the exuberance of this luxuriant growth and by the sight of butterflies hovering round flowers and blossoms: a feature which a European hardly expects to see here in this corner of Siberia. The tangled thickets of this virgin primeval forest are almost impassable. They catch and crush the explorer at every step as he painfully edges his way through them; and they hide the game from his eyes until he has come within a few paces of it, when the creature starts up from its lair and tears away before the startled wanderer's face, through crackling sticks and rustling bush.'¹

The Geneses of the Mayan and Andean Civilizations

While the Egyptian and Sumeric and Sinic civilizations were responses to the challenges of drought and flood and swamp and thicket, the challenge to which the Mayan Civilization was a response was the luxuriance of the tropical forest:

'The Mayan culture was made possible by the agricultural conquest of the rich lowlands where the exuberance of Nature can only be held in check by organized effort. On the highlands the preparation of the land is comparatively easy, owing to scanty natural vegetation and a control vested in irrigation. On the lowlands, however, great trees have to be felled and fast-growing bushes kept down by untiring energy. But when Nature is truly tamed she returns recompense many fold to the daring farmer. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the removal of the forest cover over large areas affects favourably the conditions of life which under a canopy of leaves are hard indeed.'²

This challenge of the tropical forest, which called the Mayan Civilization into existence in one part of the New World, was offered to no effect on the other side of the Isthmus and the Equator. The civilization which arose in South America was a response, not to a challenge from the forests of the Amazon Basin,³

¹ Arsenjew, W. K.: *Russen und Chinesen in Ostsibirien* (German translation: Berlin 1926, Scherl), pp. 14-15.

² Spinden, H. J.: *Ancient Civilisations of Mexico and Central America* (New York 1917, American Museum of Natural History, Handbook Series, No. 3), p. 65. The fact that 'the highest native American civilization grew up in one of the worst physical environments of the whole Western Hemisphere' is likewise noted by Dr. Ellsworth Huntington (in *The Climatic Factor as illustrated in Arid America* (Washington 1914, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 192), on p. 220). For Dr. Huntington's attempt to explain this fact—which in his view is a paradox—by the hypothesis of a periodical shifting of climatic zones, see II. D (vii), Annex I, vol. ii, below.

³ See, however, II. C (ii) (a) 2, p. 259, footnote 1, above, for the actual cultural achievements of the inhabitants of Amazonia.

but to the two quite different challenges of the Andean Plateau and the adjoining Pacific Coast.

'In no other region of the World have the forces of Nature played a more formative part in human history. . . . In the Andean area Man has always been if not the slave at any rate the pupil of that exigent mistress, Mother Nature; and his history has largely consisted of varyingly successful struggles against many of her enactments.'¹

The modern observer from the United States, here quoted, thus describes the upland basin of Lake Titicaca in the neighbourhood of Tiahuanaco—the deserted city whose stupendous masonry is the most notable of all the earlier monuments of the Andean Civilization on the Plateau:

'The locality is not, at any rate to-day, one that seems propitious to the development of high civilisation. A flattish valley, gray to red in hue, sodden with stagnant water in many places, hemmed in by rounded hills, grim in their sterile grayness, a zinc-coloured sky that seems to weigh upon one's very head, and a prevailing sombreness and faintness of daylight—these go to make up the scene in the vicinity of Tiahuanaco as I saw it. . . . Far off to the west and south, snow-clad peaks of the Eastern Cordillera—Sorata, Huayna Potosí and Illampu—bite into the sky with glistening white teeth. The traveller looks upon it all and sees that the keynote of that land is majesty, distinctly cold and grim, but majesty all the same, and very seldom tempered by any softer or more genial note.'²

The same observer thus describes the Coast, as seen first from the sea and then from the air:

'Lengthwise of the sea-board, where long, unhurrying rollers ceaselessly roar amid a haze of their own making, stretch fifteen hundred miles of barren desert, interspersed with westward-dipping streaks of green, nestling in valley-bottoms. . . . The traveller voyaging along this weirdly exquisite shore gazes long upon the somewhat awful grandeur of these plains, half-unconsciously begins to seek, and with satisfaction finds evidences of Man's presence and of his industry, crowded for the most part into richly verdant valleys wherein winding rivers flow tranquilly through fields of cotton, maize and other crops, and through groves of fruit trees, all of which combine to make a little world hemmed in by high bright bluffs, margins of the deserts beyond. . . . In order really to grasp the essential character of that wondrous sea-board, one must view it from the air. Seen from aloft, its conformation, so bewildering to earth-bound wanderers, becomes exquisitely simple; the puzzling jumble of hills, bluffs and hillocks smooth themselves out into sand-clad

¹ Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilisations of the Andes* (London 1931, Scribner), p. 415.

² Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–30. The writer qualifies his description by suggesting that 'perhaps at seasons of the year other than November, when the rainy-season is on, the landscape is less forlorn and repellent'.

undulations of merely local importance and combine to form a westward-tilted desert plain crossed frequently from east to west by river-nurtured strips of green—the justly celebrated coastal valleys of Peru.¹

Thus, on the Plateau, the fathers of the Andean Civilization were challenged by a bleak climate and a grudging soil; on the Coast they were challenged by the heat and drought of an almost rainless equatorial desert at sea-level, which could only be made to blossom as the rose by the works of Man. The pioneers of civilization on the Coast conjured their oases out of the desert by husbanding the scanty waters that descended from the western scarp of the Plateau and giving life to the plains by irrigation.² The pioneers on the Plateau transformed their mountain-sides into fields by husbanding the scanty soil on terraces preserved by an ubiquitous system of laboriously constructed retaining walls.³

The Genesis of the Minoan Civilization

We have now explained, in terms of responses to challenges from the physical environment, the geneses of five out of our six 'unrelated' civilizations. The sixth, which we have called the Minoan Civilization, was a response to a physical challenge which we have not yet encountered in this survey: the challenge of the Sea.

The map shows at a glance that the region in which the Minoan Civilization arose has experienced, in an age not very remote from the present on the scale of geological time, a physical catastrophe from which the regions round about have been exempt. The Aegean lies in a zone of exceptional geological formation, and within that zone the Aegean itself is an exception to the local rule.

In the zone to which the Aegean belongs, the crust of the Earth has been folded into mountain ranges, like some giant's blanket which has been ruckled up by the uneasy movements of the sleeper beneath. Starting from the Pamir Plateau—'the Roof of the World' and the navel of Asia—the folds run westward, now diverging and now converging, now straightening out and now bending back upon themselves, until the furthest range reaches the remote Atlantic. One fold runs through the Suleyman Mountains and the Zagros and the Taurus and the Pindus and the Dinaric Alps; another through the Hindu Kush and the Elbruz and the northern escarpments of the Armenian and Anatolian plateaux, to reappear in Thrace as the Istranja; yet another runs through the Balkans of Transcaspia and through the Caucasus and the Crimea and the Balkans of Europe and the Carpathians and the Alps and the Appennines and the Atlas, recoils from the Ocean at the Pillars of

¹ Op. cit., pp. 7-9.

² See Means, op. cit., pp. 11 and 24.

³ See Means, op. cit., fig. 145, opposite p. 241.

Hercules, and sweeps back, right round the geologically older core of Spain, through Granada and the Palearic Islands and the Pyrenees, before it reconciles itself to finding its term at last at Cape Finisterre.

This long-drawn-out and tortuous bunch of folded mountains stands out in contrast to the comparatively featureless Eurasian and Afrasian regions, north and south of it, in which the strata are tilted here and there out of the horizontal plane but are nowhere contorted. On the north, the great Eurasian plain stretches from the Kirghiz Steppes to the Netherlands with a hardly perceptible undulation at the Urals; on the south, the Afrasian terrace runs parallel to the zone of folding like a loosely-laid pavement of huge, uneven, ill-fitting slabs: the Deccan, Arabia, Libya. By contrast to these planes and peneplanes on either flank, the zone of folding presents, on a bird's-eye view, an appearance of homogeneity and continuity throughout its length from the Pamirs to the Atlantic; but this appearance breaks down under a practical test; and the sector in which it breaks down is the Aegean.

Let us now imagine that some primitive society has made itself at home among the mountain-folds towards the eastern end of the zone, in Iran; and let us imagine, further, that, having adapted themselves to this particular physical environment, these people are then impelled or compelled to expand or migrate. In what direction will they seek an outlet? Presumably they will follow the line of least resistance; and this will not lead them into the lowlands, where their special asset of adaptation to a highland environment would give them no advantage in a contest with the peoples already in possession. If they follow the line of least resistance they will move neither northward nor southward into the plains but either eastward or westward along the mountain-zone itself, where they can change their dwelling-place without changing their environment. If, however, they move eastward, they will soon be brought to a halt by the blank wall which bears up 'the Roof of the World'. By a process of elimination, therefore, we are left to imagine them moving through the mountain-zone in a westerly direction: from Iran into Armenia and from Armenia into Anatolia. In these first stages of their movement they will find themselves everywhere at home; they will meet with no challenge from Physical Nature which they have not already met and mastered in their Iranian homeland; but when they gird up their loins for the next stage in their westward march, which should lead them on from the mountain-folds of Asia Minor into those of South-Eastern Europe, they will stumble, in the Aegean, upon a barrier which has never stood in their path before.

In the Aegean, by contrast with the two continents between which it intervenes, the process of folding has not been the last event in geological history. A second process, the process of subsidence, has here come into play. The exact relation between these two geological phenomena has not yet been quite clearly established by our modern Western scientists; but it seems probable that it is a relation of cause and effect and that subsidence is an outcome of folding where folding has gone to extremes. Apparently the strain imposed by an extreme degree of folding upon the upheaved and contorted strata of the Earth's crust cracks and snaps the crust along lines transverse to the lines of folding, until the pressure is relieved by the subsidence of an entire cross-section to a level which permits an overlap between its broken edges and the corresponding broken ends of the undisturbed strata on either side of the rift. The still upstanding sections expand into, without closing, the void which the collapse of the intermediate section has created; and the first impression which the resulting formation makes upon the eye is as if these upstanding sections, which now face one another across a gulf, had originally been in contact, end to end, and had afterwards drawn apart. The same mountain-folds that traverse the face of the Earth in Asia from the Pamirs to the east coast of the Aegean are seen to traverse it in Europe from the west coast of the Aegean to the Atlantic. Each range that breaks off abruptly at one coast can be identified with some range that begins with equal abruptness at the other. The pattern stands out clear; but the very features which make it clear are also evidence that the first visual impression of an original contact between the two continental coasts is an illusion. We are able to identify range with range in Asia and in Europe just because the intervening sections of these ranges, which have subsided below sea-level in the Aegean, have not vanished without leaving a memorial. The missing link is supplied by the mountain peaks which still hold their heads above water in chains of islands to point the way from continent to continent. Thus the eye is carried from Asiatic Taurus to European Taenarum over the island-chain of Rhodes and Carpathos and Crete and Cythera; from Mycale to Pindus over Samos and Euboea; from Tmolus to Pelion and Ossa and Olympus over Chios and Scyros; from Ida to Athos over Tenedos and Lemnos.

These chains of islands, with the sea-passages between them and the continental mountain ranges on either side, bring the fact of subsidence to the eye; and the ancient inhabitants of the Aegean described this geological phenomenon in mythological imagery as the work of the Earth-Shaker Poseidon, who cleft the mountains

with his trident in order to make way for the waters to pass.¹ Poseidon did not rest from his labours until he had pierced the last range and led the salt waters of the Mediterranean through the breaches and out beyond to lave the skirts of the Eurasian Steppe in the Sea of Azov.²

In this exercise of his power, which divided Europe from Asia and transformed the submerged section of the continent into the Aegean Archipelago,³ the Earth-Shaker was presenting a challenge.

The islands feel the enclaspings flow,
And then their endless bounds they know. . . .

O then a longing like despair
Is to their farthest caverns sent!
For surely once, they feel, we were
Parts of a single continent.
Now round us spreads the watery plain—
O might our marges meet again!

Who order'd that their longing's fire
Should be, as soon as kindled, cool'd?
Who renders vain their deep desire?—
A God, a God their severance rul'd;
And bade betwixt their shores to be
The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea.⁴

The poet who has taken the severance of isle from isle as a symbol of the isolation of human souls assumes that the challenge remains unanswered, that the deep desire for communion is rendered vain. Yet in reality, though the islands themselves have remained in that state in which it once pleased the primeval Earth-

¹ Compare the similar exploits of the Sinic culture-hero Yu. (Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-8.) In the age of Hellenic rationalism, Poseidon was recognized by men of science to be a mythological presentation of a natural force. See, for example, Herodotus, Book VII, ch. 129.

² The present fantastic configuration of the successive basins and straits through which the Mediterranean communicates with the Sea of Azov becomes explicable if we make the assumption that these land-locked seas cover the submerged estuary of a great river, in which the narrower reaches alternated with wide-spreading lakes. On this hypothesis, the former lakes would be represented now by the Sea of Crete, the Aegean, the Marmara, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov; the narrower reaches by the channels through the Archipelago and by the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and the Straits of Kertch. When this great river flowed into the Mediterranean round the eastern or western end of the former continental mountain range which now survives as the Island of Crete, it will have numbered among its tributaries many streams which have won their subsequent renown as independent rivers: the Maeander, Cayster, and Hermus; the Peneus and Axios and Strymon and Hebrus; the Simois and the Scamander; the Halys and the Phasis; the Kuban and the Don; the Dniepr and Dniestr and Danube. As the salt waters of the Mediterranean flooded up the subsiding bed of the main river, these former tributaries gained their independence one after another by coming to discharge directly into the sea and thereby becoming each a river in its own right.

³ Archipelago = ἄγιον πέλαγος: 'Sacred Sea'. This formal consecration has been conferred upon the Aegean by Christian piety; but the Archipelago remains the inalienable domain of the pre-Christian divinity who is its mythical creator.

⁴ Matthew Arnold: *Isolation*.

Shaker to leave them, the challenge which has intimidated the Goddess Nature has met with a victorious response from Mortal Man. 'The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea' has been changed into a medium of human communication by the art and audacity of the navigator¹—a greater transformation of Nature than any which Poseidon's trident is capable of producing by its barbaric strokes.

Illi robur et aes triplex
Circa pectus erat, qui fragilem truci
Commisit pelago ratem
Primus nec timuit praecipitem Africum
Decertantem Aquilonibus. . . .

Nequicquam deus abscidit
Prudens Oceano dissociabili
Terras, si tamen impiae
Non tangenda rates transiliunt vada.²

By what men, in what age, was Poseidon's challenge taken up? When our hypothetical primitive society which had adapted itself to life in the mountain-zone at some point in Asia eventually stumbled upon the Aegean in the course of its hypothetical westward march, we may imagine that it no more attempted to make itself at home in the inhospitable Archipelago than the primitive societies of the Afrasian grasslands attempted—before the challenge of desiccation impelled them—to make themselves at home in the jungle-swamps of the Nile or of the Tigris and Euphrates. We may conjecture that at the forbidding shores of the Aegean the highlanders turned aside and reconnoitred the western coasts of the Asiatic mainland until they struck the shores of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles, where an opposite continent in full view heartened them to hazard the easy transit of the Straits. We may also conjecture that, by this passage, they had made their way from the highlands of Asia into the highlands of Europe before they embarked upon the Aegean, and had ensconced themselves among the Alpine Lakes before they set foot on Delos or on Santorin. If so, the highlanders really evaded Poseidon's challenge instead of responding to it; and indeed our ethnologists and archaeologists tell us that the challenge presented in the Aegean Archipelago was first taken up, not by the occupants of the immediately adjoining continents, but by more distant adventurers who, in order to reach the land-locked sea, had first to cross the open waters of the Eastern Mediterranean.

¹ In the language of Greek Mythology, the Black Sea was transformed from 'the inhospitable' (*ἄξεστος*) into 'the hospitable' (*εὐξείνους*) sea by the heroic enterprise of the Argonauts.

² Horace: *Carm.* i. 3, ll. 9-13 and 21-5. For the significance of the epithets 'prudens', 'impiae', and 'non tangenda', see the passage on 'the Envy of the Gods' in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, pp. 245-61, below.

328 THE CAUSE OF THE GENESES OF CIVILIZATIONS

The oldest trace of human habitation in the Archipelago which is yet known to our archaeologists is the Neolithic stratum on the site of Cnossos in Crete.

'Crete was discovered and occupied by people from elsewhere at a time which cannot be fixed precisely but cannot be less than many hundreds of years, and was probably some thousands, before this Neolithic community and its culture were superseded by those of the Minoan Bronze Age. . . . In the Cycladic Islands . . . nothing has been found hitherto of purely Neolithic culture.'¹

Whence came these earliest human occupants of Crete? On this question, Ethnology is able to throw some light; for it appears to be established that, among the earliest known inhabitants of the continents surrounding the Aegean, there were certain clear distinctions of physical type. The earliest known inhabitants of the highland-zone of folded mountains were 'broad-heads'; the earliest known inhabitants of the Afrasian grasslands were 'long-heads'; and an analysis of the oldest relics of human physique in Crete seems to indicate that the island was first occupied wholly or mainly by 'long-heads', while the 'broad-heads', though they eventually became predominant, were originally either not represented in the population of Crete at all or only in a small minority.² This ethnological evidence points to the conclusion that the first human beings to secure a footing in any part of the Aegean Archipelago were immigrants from the Afrasian grasslands on the far side of the Eastern Mediterranean.³ The challenge of desiccation could not be evaded by the people of the Afrasian grasslands, as the challenge of population pressure could be evaded by the Asiatic highlanders in virtue of the easy passage from the Asiatic to the European highlands which was afforded by the constriction of the estranging waters at the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. And this inexorable challenge, to which some Afrasian communities had responded by plunging into the jungle-swamps of the Nile and the Tigris and the Euphrates, impelled other kindred communities to brave the terrors of the salt, estranging sea and make themselves at home in the Aegean Archipelago. The genesis of the Minoan

¹ Myres, J. L.: *Who were the Greeks?* (Berkeley 1930, University of California Press), p. 215.

² Myres, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-5.

³ Theoretically, the evidence offered by long skulls is ambiguous, since 'dolichocephaly' is a trait which the 'Mediterranean' variety of the White Race shares with the 'Nordic' variety—the differentia between the two varieties being given by pigmentation and not by skull-form. Thus, in theory, any given 'dolichocephalic' skull may be attributed—in the absence of evidence as to the pigmentation of the human being to which the skull once belonged—either to a 'Mediterranean' or to a 'Nordic' physique. In practice, however, geographical and historical considerations allow us to rule out the theoretical alternative that the 'dolichocephalic' aborigines of Crete were not 'Mediterranean' immigrants from the Afrasian grasslands but were 'Nordic' immigrants from the Eurasian Steppe.

Civilization can thus be traced back to the same first cause as the geneses of the Egyptian and Sumeric civilizations.

If this analysis is correct, it offers a fresh illustration of the truth that, in the geneses of civilizations, the interplay between challenges and responses is the factor which counts above all others—in this case, for example, above proximity. If proximity had been the determining factor in the human occupation of the Archipelago, then the inhabitants of the nearest continent—that is to say, the 'broad-headed' highlanders in the Asiatic portion of the zone of mountain-folding—would have been the first occupants of the Aegean islands. In point of proximity, they had a notable advantage over the 'long-headed' inhabitants of the Afrasian grasslands, who were separated from the Aegean Archipelago by the whole breadth of the open Mediterranean. Apparently, however, the determining factor was not proximity but Challenge-and-Response. The peoples of the Afrasian grasslands had to respond to the inexorable challenge of desiccation at a time when the peoples of the Asiatic highlands were still able to evade the challenge of population pressure by following the line of lesser resistance which led them across the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus into the adjacent highlands of Europe. Hence it was the distant Afrasians and not the neighbouring Asiatics who first braved, under duress, the terrors of the sea and so became the fathers of the Minoan Civilization. It was only in the later stages of the human occupation of the Archipelago that the 'broad-headed' highlanders from the adjoining continents came to play a prominent part. In Crete, which appears to have been the first of the islands to be occupied, the 'broad-heads', as we have seen, were later comers than the 'long-heads'. On the other hand, the Cyclades, which apparently were not occupied until a much later date than Crete,¹ appear to have been occupied by 'long-heads' and 'broad-heads' concurrently²; and the ethnological evidence on this point is confirmed by Archaeology, which finds in the Cyclades a mingling of techniques and *motifs* derived from Libya³ and from Anatolia.⁴

¹ Myres, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-15, summarizes the archaeological evidence up to date. 'At present the only coherent series of material illustrating the Aegean Stone Age comes from the stratified deposit of village debris, from twenty to twenty-five feet deep, which underlies the "palace" building at Cnossos. Even this long series begins with material arts, pot-making, implement-grinding, and adobe-building, which are far from primitive. Crete, therefore, was discovered and occupied by people from elsewhere, at a time which cannot be fixed precisely, but cannot be less than many hundreds of years, and was probably some thousands, before this neolithic community and its culture were superseded by those of the Minoan Bronze Age. . . . In the Cycladic islands . . . nothing has been found hitherto of purely neolithic culture.'

² Myres, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

³ e.g. there is a type of decoration on early Cretan and Cycladic pottery which proclaims its derivation from grass-woven basketry of a kind that is still plaited to this day in North Africa (Myres, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-17). Again, the earliest known Cycladic boats seem to have been modelled on the boats of the pre-dynastic age in Egypt (Myres, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-18).

⁴ Myres, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-33, apropos of 'red ware'.

Broadly, it may be said that the first response to Poseidon's challenge in the Aegean was made by Afrasian 'long-heads' single-handed; but that the work which had been begun by these Afrasian pioneers was carried on and completed by convergent movements into the Archipelago from the other side of the Mediterranean and from the adjoining continents¹—the 'broad-headed' continental highlanders participating in the later stages partly, perhaps, in sheer imitation of the 'long-headed' Mediterranean navigators and partly, perhaps, because the saturation of the highlands on the European as well as the Asiatic side of the narrow seas eventually forced the 'broad-heads', in their turn, to seek a new outlet upon the waters of the Aegean from which they had always hung back so long as any other outlet lay open to them.

Physical Challenges at the Geneses of the 'Related' Civilizations

We have now surveyed the interplay between challenges from the physical environment and responses to these challenges in the geneses of the six 'unrelated' civilizations. When we pass on to the 'related' civilizations, we find our problem complicated *a priori* by the very fact that here, *ex hypothesi*, there is in every case an older civilization in the background and that this older civilization has been in occupation of a geographical area within which the original home of the 'related' civilization may be included, either partly or wholly.²

In the extreme case—illustrated by the geographical relation of the Babylonian Civilization to the Sumeric—in which the original home of the 'related' civilization is included not merely within the widest eventual range but actually within the original home of its predecessor, it is evident that a challenge from the physical environment cannot have entered into the genesis of the 'related' civilization at all—except, perhaps, in so far as, during the interregnum between the disappearance of the older civilization and the emergence of its successor, their common cradle may have relapsed into its primitive state of nature and thus have challenged the fathers of the 'related' civilization to fight a repetition of the same battle with the physical environment that the fathers of the antecedent civilization had once fought out on the same spot. There are, however, other cases in which we can see that the fathers of the 'related' civilization responded to some challenge from the physical environment with which the fathers of the antecedent civilization had never been confronted. In the case of the Yucatec Civilization, for instance, we can see that, although the original home of the

¹ Myres, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-5.

² For a conspectus of the geographical relations between the several 'related' civilizations and their predecessors, see the table in Part I. C (ii), on p. 132, above.

'related' civilization was wholly included within the domain of the antecedent Mayan Civilization at its widest range, it was not only non-coincident with the original home of the Mayan Civilization but also presented a challenge of an entirely different character: the challenge of the waterless, treeless, and almost soil-less limestone shelf of the Yucatan Peninsula (a magnified counterpart of the Italian Tavole di Puglia),¹ as contrasted with the challenge of the deep-soiled rain-soaked country to the south of it, where agriculture had to wage a never-ceasing warfare against the luxuriance of the tropical forest.²

In thus being exposed, at its genesis, to the stimulus of a new and still unmastered physical environment, the Yucatec Civilization would appear to be unique among the 'related' civilizations of its own group. In the cases of all the other four members of this group—the Hindu Civilization, the Far Eastern Civilization (main body), the Orthodox Christian, and the Arabic—even that part of the original home of the 'related' civilization which was not included in the original home of the antecedent civilization no longer presented the challenge of virgin soil, since it had been mastered and broken in, some time before the genesis of the 'related' civilization, either by the antecedent civilization itself or by some alien civilization which the antecedent civilization had encountered and assimilated in the course of its expansion. For instance, the Yangtse Basin, which fell within the original home of the Far Eastern Civilization (main body), though not within that of the antecedent Sinic Civilization, had been broken in by the Sinic Civilization before the Far Eastern Civilization came into being.³ The Deccan and the tip of the Indian Peninsula, which fell within the original home of the Hindu Civilization, though not within that of the antecedent Indic Civilization, had been broken in by the Indic Civilization before the Hindu Civilization came into being.⁴ The Anatolian Plateau, which fell within the original home of the Orthodox Christian Civilization, though not within that of the antecedent Hellenic Civilization, had been broken in, before the Orthodox Christian Civilization came into being, not by the Hellenic Civilization itself but by the Hittite,⁵ the debris of which, after its premature downfall,⁶ had been encountered by the Hellenic Civilization and assimilated. The Lower Valley of the Nile, which fell within the original home of the Arabic Civilization,⁷ though not within that of the antecedent Syriac Civilization,

¹ See I. C. (i) (b), p. 128, above.

² See I. C. (i) (b), pp. 125-6, and also the present section, p. 321, above.

³ See I. C. (i) b, p. 90, above.

⁴ See p. 87, above.

⁵ See p. 112, above.

⁶ See pp. 101 and 113-15, above.

⁷ See p. 70, above.

had been broken in, long ages before the Arabic Civilization came into being, not by the Syriac Civilization itself, but by the Egyptian, which had been encountered and eventually assimilated by the Syriac.

Thus none of these four 'related' civilizations happened to be exposed, at their geneses, to a challenge from a new and still unmastered physical environment in that part of their original home which was not included within the original home of the antecedent civilization in each case; and when we turn to the next group—namely, the 'related' civilizations whose original home was only partly coincident with that of the antecedent civilization, even at the latter's widest range—we find the same absence of a physical challenge at the genesis of one representative: namely, the Iranic Civilization. Those parts of the original home of the Iranic Civilization which lay wholly outside the domain of the antecedent Syriac Civilization, even at its widest range, were Anatolia at one extremity and Hindustan at the other¹; and both these regions—which had been captured by the nascent Iranic Civilization from Orthodox Christendom and from Hinduism respectively, and which had previously been taken over by these civilizations from the Hittite Civilization and from the Indic—had naturally been broken in long ages before.

In this absence, however, of a fresh physical challenge at its genesis, the Iranic Civilization appears to be as exceptional, within its own group, as the Yucatec Civilization appears to be, in the foregoing group, on the opposite account. When we survey the other five civilizations which belong to the same group as the Iranic—that is to say, the Mexic, the Western, the Indic, the Hittite, and the Hellenic—we find that they differ from the Iranic Civilization, and agree with the Yucatec, on the point with which we are at present concerned. For instance, the Mexic Civilization agrees with the Yucatec, not only in being 'related' to the Mayan, but also in having been exposed at its genesis to a physical challenge—the challenge of the Mexican Plateau—which was as different as the challenge of the Yucatan Peninsula from the challenge of the tropical forest with which the Mayan Civilization had been confronted. Again, our Western Civilization was exposed at its genesis to a challenge from the forests and the rains and the frosts of Transalpine Europe which had not confronted the antecedent Hellenic Civilization. The Indic Civilization, at its genesis, was exposed, in the Ganges Valley, to a challenge from the moist tropical forest which was to confront the Mayan Civilization, centuries later, on the other side of the globe, but which had not confronted the Indic

¹ See pp. 68–9, above.

Civilization's predecessor in the Indus Valley.¹ The Hittite Civilization, at its genesis, was exposed, in Anatolia, to a challenge from the plateau which had not confronted the antecedent Sumeric Civilization, though, in later times and in distant places, this new challenge was likewise to confront both the Andean Civilization and the Mexic. It is true that the highland environment, which was so strange to the internal proletariat of the Sumeric Civilization in its home on the alluvial plains of the Land of Shinar, may have been the native environment of that external proletariat, coming from beyond the Cappadocian frontier of the Sumeric universal state, which probably played the leading part in bringing the Hittite Civilization into existence²; and, in so far as the Hittite Civilization is to be regarded as this external proletariat's handiwork, the likelihood of a contribution to the genesis of this civilization having been made by a physical challenge from a new and unmastered physical environment has to be discounted on the assumption that the barbarian fathers of the Hittite Civilization may have been at home on the Anatolian Plateau already, before their *Völkerwanderung* carried them into the Anatolian provinces of the Sumeric World in Cappadocia. In the case of the Hellenic Civilization—in the genesis of which, the influence of the external proletariat was apparently predominant likewise³—the situation is inverted. The challenge to which the Hellenic Civilization was exposed at its genesis—the challenge of the sea⁴—was precisely the same as that which had confronted the antecedent Minoan Civilization.⁵ At the same time, this challenge of the sea was entirely new to the external proletariat beyond the European land-frontier of 'the Thalassocracy of Minos'; and these continental barbarians—Achaeans and the like—were facing and surmounting as great an ordeal, when they took to the sea in the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*, as the pioneers of the Minoan Civilization themselves had faced and surmounted when they made the first human conquest of the Aegean Archipelago.

Finally, we come to those 'related' or 'transplanted' civilizations,⁶ at the opposite end of the series from the Babylonian, whose original home was altogether non-coincident with the domain of the antecedent civilization, even at its widest range; and here we find, as we should expect, that a challenge from a new and still unmastered physical environment was presented, at their geneses, in all cases.

¹ For the present purpose, it is immaterial whether 'the Indus Culture' was a civilization in its own right or a colonial offshoot of the Sumeric Civilization. (On this question see I. C (i) (b), pp. 107-8, above, and Annex III, below.)

² See pp. 111-12, above.

³ See pp. 96-100, above.

⁴ See p. 93, above.

⁵ See II. C (ii) (a) 2, p. 259, and the present chapter, pp. 323-30, above.

⁶ For the distinction between 'related' civilizations and 'transplanted' civilizations or 'offshoots', see I. C (ii), p. 133, and II. C (ii) (a) 2, pp. 269-70, above.

For instance, the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia was exposed, at its transplantation, to a challenge from forests and rains and frosts which was even more severe than the similar challenge to which the Western Civilization in Transalpine Europe was exposed at its genesis.¹ Thus, in Russia, the Orthodox Christian Civilization not only received a fresh physical stimulus, like our Western Civilization in Transalpine Europe, but it actually received the same stimulus in a higher degree which made it still more different from any physical challenge that had ever confronted these two civilizations' common Hellenic predecessor. Again, the Far Eastern Civilization in the Korean Peninsula and in the Japanese Archipelago was exposed, at its transplantation, to a challenge from the sea which resembled the challenge that had once confronted both the Afrasian pioneers and the Continental European supplanters of the Minoan Civilization in the Aegean,² but which was utterly different from any challenge that had ever confronted the first Far Eastern navigators' own predecessors who had created, in a continental environment of swamp and bush, the antecedent civilization which we have called the Sinic.³

Similarly, the Philistine refugees from the Minoan World who found asylum on the Syrian coast, and the Hebrew and Aramaean Nomads who simultaneously drifted into the interior of Syria out of the Afrasian Steppe, at the genesis of the Syriac Civilization,⁴ were both exposed to the challenge—new in different ways to each—of having to make the desert bear fruit by irrigation (the same challenge that, at the genesis of the Andean Civilization, was to confront the occupants of the Peruvian coast-land).⁵ The Philistines, when they came to Syria from the Aegean, were already well acquainted with agriculture; but they had acquired the art in a climate which yielded the tiller of the soil the easy return of rain-grown crops, and they were novices in the practice of husbandry in an arid environment. Conversely, the Hebrews and Aramaeans, when they came in from the North Arabian Steppe, were already inured to life in an arid environment, but this as Nomadic stock-breeders and not as sedentary husbandmen. Thus both the intrusive human elements out of whose arrival in Syria, and encounter there, the Syriac Civilization eventually arose,⁶ had to

¹ In Transalpine Europe, the rigours of the northern climate are tempered by the proximity of the Atlantic Ocean and by the flow of the Gulf Stream, which washes the European coasts from Portugal to Norway. As one moves eastward from the coast into the interior, from Europe into Russia, one finds the influence of these moderating climatic factors steadily diminishing until it reaches vanishing point.

² See II. C (ii) (a) 2, p. 259, and the present chapter, pp. 323-30 and 333, above.

³ For the physical challenge encountered at the genesis of the Sinic Civilization, see the present chapter, pp. 318-21, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), pp. 101-2, above.

⁵ See the present chapter, pp. 322-3, above.

⁶ See I. C (i) (b), p. 102, above.

make a formidable effort of adaptation to unfamiliar physical conditions before they 'dwelt safely, every man under his vine and under his fig tree',¹ in the oases watered by the springs of Beersheba and Baalbek and Jericho and by the rivers of Aleppo and Hamath and Damascus, as their predecessors in the land had dwelt before them.² Indeed, the ordeal was so severe that it left a permanent mark on Syriac 'folk-memory'; and the successful response to it, out of which the Syriac Civilization arose, was ascribed by latter-day poets not to the heroism of their human ancestors but to the might and mercy of their God, who

'gathered them out of the lands, from the east and from the west, from the north and from the south.

'They wandered in the wilderness in a solitary way; they found no city to dwell in.

'Hungry and thirsty, their soul fainted in them.

'Then they cried unto the Lord in their trouble, and he delivered them out of their distresses.

'And he led them forth by the right way, that they might go to a city of habitation. . . .

'He turneth the wilderness into a standing water, and dry ground into watersprings.

'And there he maketh the hungry to dwell, that they may prepare a city for habitation;

'And sow the fields and plant vineyards, which may yield fruits of increase. . . .

'O that men would praise the Lord for his goodness, and for his wonderful works to the children of men!'³

Challenges from the Human Environment

This concludes our survey of challenges from the physical environment at the origins of our twenty-one civilizations. We have detected the operation of physical challenges at the geneses of a certain number of 'related' civilizations, as well as at the geneses of all the civilizations of the 'unrelated' category; but it is in this latter category, which we examined first, that the role played by physical challenges has come out the most clearly. We have now to complete the task which we have set ourselves in this chapter by considering the phenomenon of challenges from the human

¹ 1 Kings iv. 25.

² Before the emergence of a distinctive Syriac Civilization, Syria had received the cultural impress of the Sumeric Civilization and had been included politically first in the Sumeric Universal State (the Empire of Sumer and Akkad); then in the local 'successor-state' founded, during the post-Sumeric Völkerwanderung, by the Hyksos; and finally in 'the New Empire' of Egypt. (See I. C (i) (b), pp. 103 and 105, above.) For the abortive Syriac Civilization, related to the Sumeric Civilization, which the Hyksos might have brought to birth if they had not been diverted by the attraction of the Egyptian World, see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 388-91, below.

³ Psalm cvii. 3-7, 35-7, and 8.

environment; and here we shall find it convenient to begin our examination with the 'related' civilizations and to consider the 'unrelated' civilizations afterwards.

At the genesis of every 'related' civilization, a challenge from the human environment is given and taken *ex hypothesi*. This challenge is implicit in the relation itself, which begins with a differentiation and culminates in a secession.¹ The differentiation takes place within the bosom of the antecedent civilization when that civilization begins to lose the creative power through which, in its period of growth, it has once upon a time inspired a voluntary allegiance in the hearts of people below its surface or beyond its borders. When this happens, the ailing civilization pays the penalty for its failure of vitality by becoming disintegrated into a dominant minority which attempts to find a substitute for its vanishing leadership in a régime of force, and a proletariat (internal and external) which responds to this challenge by becoming conscious that it has a soul of its own and by making up its mind to save its soul alive. The dominant minority's will to repress evokes in the proletariat a will to secede; and the conflict between these two wills continues² while the declining civilization verges to its fall, until, when it is *in articulo mortis*, the proletariat at length breaks free from a *ci-devant* spiritual home which has been transformed first into a prison-house and finally into a city of destruction. In this conflict between a proletariat and a dominant minority, as it works itself out from beginning to end, we can discern one of those dramatic spiritual encounters which renew the work of creation by carrying the life of the Universe out of the stagnation of autumn through the pains of winter into the ferment of spring.³ The secession of the proletariat is the dynamic act, in response to the challenge, through which the change from Yin to Yang is brought about;⁴ and, in this dynamic separation between the proletariat and the dominant minority of the antecedent civilization, the 'related' civilization is born.

Thus, in the geneses of the 'related' civilizations, the factor of response to a challenge from the human environment is not merely visible but prominent. With this aid to our vision, can we now discern a challenge from the human environment, and a response to it, in the geneses of the 'unrelated' civilizations likewise?

In this quarter, the state of the evidence makes the investigation

¹ See above, I. B (iv), p. 41; I. C (i) (a), pp. 53-6; I. C (ii), pp. 130-2; II. A, pp. 187-8; II. B, p. 195.

² The successive phases and moods of this conflict are analysed in Part V, below.

³ See II. C (ii) (b) 1, above.

⁴ See Part II. B, above, pp. 201-4, for the symbolism of Yin and Yang; for the secession of the proletariat, see I. B (iv), pp. 41-2, and I. C (i) (a), pp. 53-6.

more difficult. In the case of the 'related' civilizations, we have seen that the presence of an antecedent civilization in the historical background produces contrary effects upon the field of investigation in different spheres. In the sphere of the physical environment, it tends to obscure the operation of physical challenges at the geneses of 'related' civilizations, while on the other hand in the sphere of the human environment it throws the operation of human challenges into relief. In the case of the 'unrelated' civilizations, the absence of any antecedent civilization likewise has contrary effects upon the field of investigation in the human and in the physical sphere, but in this case the contrast is inverted. When we are surveying the genesis of an 'unrelated' civilization, it is the response to some challenge from the physical environment that leaps to the eye, because the physical environment is virgin soil when the 'unrelated' civilization encounters it (the contingency that it may have already been broken in by some antecedent civilization being ruled out *ex hypothesi*). When, however, we pursue our study of the geneses of 'unrelated' civilizations into the human sphere, and seek light on the role which challenges from the human environment may have played here, we find that the very absence of an antecedent civilization, which has facilitated our investigation in the physical sphere, becomes a handicap which may turn out to be insurmountable.

Let us consider once again, for a moment, the origins of the six 'unrelated' civilizations in our catalogue: the Egyptian, Sumeric, Sinic, Mayan, Andean, and Minoan. The physical environment in which the miracle of genesis occurred has proved here to be ascertainable in every instance. At each attempt, we have always found ourselves able to reconstruct the face of Physical Nature, as it must have appeared at that remote time in the past, by scanning its aspect in the present. In following this line of investigation, we have never failed to discover sufficient clues—either on the actual scene of the historic event or else in some adjoining region where Nature, left in peace by God and Man, remains down to this day as she was then. On the other hand, if we now seek to reconstruct the human environments in which the geneses of these six civilizations took place, we shall be pulled up short, at the outset of our inquiry, by the dearth or indeed almost complete absence of direct evidence. Here, instead of the historically recorded secession of a proletariat from a dominant minority, such as is presented to us at the geneses of the 'related' civilizations, we find nothing more substantial to work upon than the hypothetical mutation of a primitive society into a civilization.¹

¹ See Part II. A, p. 188, above.

Assuming the truth of the hypothesis, shall we venture to build, on this airy foundation, the further hypothesis that 'mutation' and 'secession', being morphologically equivalent, are also spiritually akin to one another? Shall we conjecture, for example, that the pioneers of the Egyptiac Civilization, when they responded to the physical challenge from the jungle-swamp of the Nile Valley, were also responding simultaneously to a human challenge from the older generation of their fellows, whose static primitive way of life had to be thrown to the winds if the pioneers were to gird themselves for their great adventure?¹ We do know for a fact² that when the pioneers of our Western Civilization were responding to the physical challenge which was presented to them by the forests and rains and frosts of Transalpine Europe, they were also responding simultaneously, in their role as the proletariat of the Hellenic Society, to a human challenge from the Hellenic dominant minority, whose way of life—which was as static, in its decline, as the way of any primitive society in its Yin-phase³—had undoubtedly to be thrown to the winds if these Western pioneers were to embark on their enterprise unencumbered. Does the analogy hold? Perhaps we can only say that it casts, into this dark corner of our present field of inquiry, a ray of light which at least indicates the limit beyond which it would hardly be possible to push conjecture further. At this point, accordingly, we will desist from our survey of challenges and responses in the geneses of civilizations and will attempt to draw some provisional conclusions from the results which we have obtained so far.

¹ This conception of a human challenge from the older generation, which the younger generation have to overcome before they can take up the challenge from the physical environment effectively, appears in the Syriac Mythology in the legend of the forty years' wandering in the wilderness, which was imposed upon the Children of Israel by Yahweh when, on the threshold of Canaan, their resolution failed them and they desired to return to the flesh pots and task-work of Egypt rather than try conclusions with the gigantic sons of Anak. The forty years' delay was neither a punishment nor a probation but a purgatory. Yahweh's purpose in decreeing it was to give time for the whole adult generation to die out save only for the two stalwarts, Caleb and Joshua. The Chosen People would not be fit to enter into the Promised Land until the older generation had passed away and the younger generation had grown to manhood. (Numbers xiv, especially vv. 28-34.)

² See I. C (i) (a), pp. 53-6, above.

³ See the present Part, II. B, pp. 194-5, above.

ANNEXES

ANNEX TO I. B (iv)

E. A. FREEMAN'S CONCEPTION OF 'THE UNITY OF HISTORY'

THE conception of 'the Continuity of History' which is criticized on pages 42-4, above, is sometimes associated with the name of E. A. Freeman; and some readers may perhaps have interpreted what is really an impersonal criticism of a debatable formula as an implicit disparagement of a great historian. There was no thought of this in the writer's mind; for, as far as he knows, Freeman did not conceive 'the Continuity of History' in the sense in which it is criticized here; but, before leaving the subject, it may be opportune to inquire what Freeman's own conception actually was. For one thing, any point of historical study upon which the light of Freeman's genius has been directed is likely to have been illuminated by it. Apart from this, the present writer is moved by a personal consideration. For a smaller mind to make light of a greater is always presumptuous and in bad taste; and for the writer of this Study to make light of Freeman would be an act of ingratitude as well, since he owes a greater debt than he can repay to the reading of Freeman's *Historical Essays* as a boy. A brief examination of his relevant works will suffice to make Freeman's view clear.

The *locus classicus* in which Freeman's view appears is his lecture on 'The Unity of History'. And it is to be noted that, in his title, he employs the word 'Unity' and not the word 'Continuity', and that the lecture is printed in the same volume as a set of lectures entitled *Comparative Politics*.¹ Moreover, in the phrase 'the Unity of History' Freeman is using the word 'History' in the original subjective meaning of an inquiry (the Ionic *ἱστορίη*)² and not in the derived objective meaning of a field of inquiry consisting of events in a time-series.³ Freeman means, by his phrase, 'the Unity of the Study of Historical Facts'; and, though one of the cases which he discusses is that in which the unity of study depends on the continuity of the objective events studied, he also includes

¹ Freeman, E. A.: *Comparative Politics* (London 1873, Macmillan).

² Herodotus calls his work *ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις*, 'the exhibition of his inquiry'. (Herodotus, Book I, *ad init.*)

³ In the vernaculars of the Modern West, the words 'History', 'Histoire', 'Storia', 'Geschichte', and so on are used ambiguously sometimes in the objective sense and sometimes in the subjective. In Herodotus's Ionic this ambiguity is avoided; and in translating into it the title of the present work—'A Study of History'—it would be 'Study' and not 'History' that would have to be represented by the Ionic word *ἱστορίη*.

in his conception of 'the Unity of History' the comparative method of studying analogies and parallels.

'We might carry out the same doctrine of the unity of history into many and various applications. I have as yet been speaking of branches of the study where its oneness takes the form of direct connexion, of long chains of events bound together in the direct relation of cause and effect. There are other branches of history which proclaim the unity of the study in a hardly less striking way, in the form of mere analogy. Man is in truth ever the same; even when the direct succession of cause and effect does not come in, we see that in times and places most remote from one another like events follow upon like causes.'¹

He explicitly commends the comparative method of study both in this lecture² and in the set of lectures on *Comparative Politics*. At the beginning of these, he speaks of the invention of the method in Philology and Mythology as 'the greatest intellectual achievement of our time';³ and in another passage he affirms that

'to master analogies, . . . to grasp the laws which regulate the essential likeness and not to be led away by points either of likeness or unlikeness which are merely incidental, is the true philosophy of history.'⁴

More than that, he perceives the implications of these principles of study for the policy of the historian.

'Of some branches he must know everything, but of every branch he must know something.'⁵

Freeman thus had the insight and the courage to go against the fashion—dictated by Industrialism and Nationalism—into which most of his contemporaries were falling in obedience to the law of the relativity of historical thought.⁶ Freeman was great enough to rise above that law, though its influence upon his generation was so powerful that it mastered historians of the heroic build of an Acton and a Mommsen.

At the same time Freeman, like all historians and all human beings, was to some extent governed in his thinking by the mental environment of his time, and particularly by the current intellectual controversies in which he was a protagonist; and, as happens to critics, he was sometimes led by the impetuosity of his attack upon his opponents' errors to fall into opposite errors himself. In 'The Unity of History', for example, he was attacking that arbitrary division of historical studies into water-tight compartments which was an established tradition in the Western World of his day.⁷ In

¹ Freeman, E. A.: 'The Unity of History' in *Comparative Politics* (London 1873, Macmillan), pp. 332-3.

² Op. cit., pp. 301-2.

³ Op. cit., p. 1.

⁴ Op. cit., pp. 32-3.

⁵ Op. cit., p. 308.

⁶ See Part I. A, above.

⁷ The vogue of this myopic view, like that of 'the Continuity of History', is explained by the relativity of historical thought. It was a 'function' (in the mathematical sense) of

detail he was attacking, first, a division of studies between a Greek and a Roman 'classical period' of 'Ancient History' (a division which still prevailed in the School of Literae Humaniores at Oxford in A.D. 1933, sixty years after the publication of Freeman's lecture!). In the second place he was attacking the division between the study of 'Classical Greece' and 'Classical Rome' on the one hand and the study of the Western Society on the other. This disposition of the battle-field in which Freeman was breaking his lance caused him, in his struggle to attain true insight, to fall into certain mistakes of proportion and perspective.

He victoriously attained a perception of the truth that Hellenic and Western history are philosophically contemporary—an insight which, by implication, rules out the misconception of growth as a movement whose track is a straight line.¹

'Forget, if we can, the whole line of thought implied in the distinctions of "ancient", "classical", and "modern", to proclaim boldly that no languages are more truly living than those which are falsely called dead, that no portions of history are more truly "modern" than the history of the times which in mere physical distance we look upon as "ancient".'²

At the same time, Freeman was led by the *elan* of his onslaught to pass the line at which the relation between the Hellenic Society and the Western Society could be seen in its true perspective as one of 'apparentation' and 'affiliation', and to take up a position in which he expressed his vivid realization and his inevitably propagandist assertion of the link between them in terms of absolute continuity. No doubt, if the prevailing error of Freeman's contemporaries had been (as that of his successors is) precisely the assumption that the continuity between Hellenic history and Western history was absolute, that the rhythm of the tune was unbroken and the tempo unchanged in the transition, then Freeman would have emphasized (and perhaps even over-emphasized) the element of discontinuity in the relation between an 'apparented' and an 'affiliated' society in comparison with the degree of the continuity obtaining between successive chapters in the history of one

the aesthetic and intellectual renaissance which had occurred in the sub-society constituted by the city-states of Northern Italy at the close of the Western 'Middle Ages' and which had been communicated, at the opening of 'the Modern Age', to the rest of the Western World. Under the influence of this renaissance, history was approached from the standpoint of Greek and Latin philology, and all the activities of Mankind were charted, for study or neglect, in accordance with the classical stylist's chart of the history of literature—a picture in which two brief 'golden ages', with silver fringes, stood out against a dark background of literary vulgarity and linguistic impurity. (For the Italian renaissance as a ghost of the Hellenic Society evoked by the 'affiliated' Western Society, see further Part X, below.)

¹ This misconception is dealt with above in I. C (iii) (b). The philosophical contemporaneity of all societies of the species to which the Hellenic Society and the Western Society belong is dealt with in I. C (iii) (c).

² Op. cit., pp. 336-7.

and the same society. Actually, of course, Freeman was contending against contemporaries who, so far from exaggerating the degree of continuity involved in 'apparentation' and 'affiliation', ignored the existence of the relation altogether. Hence Freeman was led to emphasize its reality and importance, and so was led on to exaggerate the degree of continuity implied in his own thesis. A fair example of this exaggeration (and of its context in Freeman's thought) is offered by the following passage:

'We are learning that Greek and Roman history do not stand alone, bound together by some special tie, but isolated from the rest of the history of the World, even from the history of the kindred nations. We are learning that European history, from its first glimmerings to our own day, is one unbroken drama, no part of which can be rightly understood without reference to the other parts which came before and after it. We are learning that of this great drama Rome is the centre, the point to which all roads lead, and from which all roads lead no less. It is the vast lake in which all the streams of earlier history lose themselves, and from which all the streams of later history flow forth again. The world of independent Greece stands on one side of it; the world of modern Europe stands on the other. But the history alike of the great centre and of its satellites on either side can never be fully grasped, except from a point of view wide enough to take in the whole group, and to mark the relations of each of its members to the centre and to one another.'¹

This over-statement of the degree of continuity between Hellenic history and Western history betrayed Freeman into two mis-judgements.

First, he dismissed, as a hallucination, the phenomenon of the evocation of 'ghosts' from the life of an 'apparented' society into the life of an 'affiliated' society—a phenomenon which is one of the outstanding traits in the morphology of history, but a trait that does not come into focus unless the nature of 'apparentation' and 'affiliation' is rightly apprehended.² He reveals this blindness in a passage like the following:

'[The] position [of Rome] in the history of the World . . . is unintelligible to those who break up the unity of history by artificial barriers of "ancient" and "modern". Much that in a shallow view of things passes for mere imitation, for mere artificial revival, was in truth abiding and unbroken tradition.'³

The very language of the second sentence displays a strange bias. The creative effort of re-evoking something that has passed away is represented as a less noble and less valuable activity than the

¹ Freeman, E. A.: 'The Unity of History', in *Comparative Politics* (London 1873, Macmillan), p. 306.

² For an examination of this phenomenon, see Part X, *passim*, below.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 325-6.

retention of something that has never ceased to be there. Yet 'tradition', after all, is itself merely a form of imitation which is of a more passive and more feeble kind than the imitation which Freeman belittles; and if one were to replace this word 'tradition' by its synonym 'survival', to point the antithesis to 'revival', it would become apparent that in Freeman's sentence the true values are actually reversed. Perhaps, unconsciously, Freeman and his school preferred 'survivals' to 'revivals' for the subjective reason that 'survivals' afforded them the intellectual and aesthetic pleasure of tracing—as they imagined—the continuity of this thread and that, as its colour flashed out and vanished and flashed out again in the shot-silk texture of historical sequences. This pleasant exercise of the fancy has sometimes led historians who have indulged in it into irrelevant conceits and barren controversies.

A brilliant example of such a conceit is the eloquent opening passage of *The Holy Roman Empire*:

'Of those who in August, 1806, read in the English newspapers that the Emperor Francis II had announced to the Diet his resignation of the imperial crown, there were probably few who reflected that the oldest political institution in the World had come to an end. Yet it was so. The Empire which a note issued by a diplomatist on the banks of the Danube extinguished, was the same which the crafty nephew of Julius had won for himself, against the powers of the East, beneath the cliffs of Actium; and which had preserved almost unaltered, through eighteen centuries of time, and through the greatest changes in extent, in power, in character, a title and pretensions from which all meaning had long since departed. Nothing else so directly linked the old world to the new—nothing else displayed so many strange contrasts of the present and the past, and summed up in those contrasts so much of European history.'¹

Bryce presents the institution which came to an end in A.D. 1806 as bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of the institution which had been established in 31 B.C. after the Battle of Actium, and introduces the last Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperor as the lineal successor of Caesar and Augustus. The author insists that this ostensible continuity is the theme of his book; yet the book itself expounds in the reader's mind a theme that is the exact contrary of the author's thesis. It renders the history of the Holy Roman Empire intelligible by making it apparent that this shade flitting across the stage of Western history was not, after all, the Roman Empire's self, but the Roman Empire's ghost; and it explains the paradox of the Emperor Francis being the legitimate successor of the Emperor Augustus by showing that he was so by a far-fetched legal fiction. Bryce had a great book to write, and he wrote

¹ Bryce: *The Holy Roman Empire* (7th edition, London 1884, Macmillan), p. 1.

it in the grand manner of his age. Yet it is great in spite of, and not because of, the current conceit of continuity which had captivated his imagination and perhaps actually inspired him to take up his pen.

Examples of barren controversies into which the will-o'-the-wisp of 'Continuity' inveigled historians in Freeman's time are the dispute over the question whether the self-governing communes which emerged in the cities of Northern Italy at the transition from 'the Dark Ages' to 'the Middle Ages' of Western history were survivals, or 'mere revivals', of the self-governing municipalities which were known to have existed in those same cities under the early Roman Empire; and the not less acrimonious dispute over the question whether the Greeks who fought the War of Independence against the Turks in 1821-9 were physically descended from the Greeks of the Periclean Age or from 'mere graecized Slavs' who had supplanted the ancient population of Greece in the Dark Ages. In both these controversies, the historical evidence, such as it is, appears to tell decidedly in favour of the hypothesis of 'revival'; but under the influence of the prejudice that 'mere imitation, mere artificial revival', is somehow a poorer thing than 'abiding and unbroken tradition', the 'revivalists' were denounced by Greek and Italian scholar-patriots as foreign enemies who were maliciously seeking to despoil two ancient nations of some of the most valuable properties in their lumber-rooms; and a hypothesis of 'survival' was intrepidly brought into action, in the teeth of the historical evidence, as a counterblast.

The second misjudgement into which Freeman was betrayed by his over-statement of the continuity of history was that he equated with 'Universal History' the histories of the two particular societies, the Hellenic and the Western, which he had fused together in his imagination through failure to apprehend the exact relation in which they really stood to one another. He enunciated this judgement with characteristic vigour:

'The history of Rome is the history of the European World. It is in Rome that all the earlier states of the European World lose themselves; it is out of Rome that all the states of the later European World take their being. The true meaning of Roman history as a branch of universal history, or rather the absolute identity of Roman history with universal history, can only be fully understood by giving special attention to those ages of the history of Europe which are commonly most neglected.'¹

Yet, notwithstanding such passages as the above, Freeman was not given over to this second error completely. In the back of his mind he was aware all the time that other worlds with other histories did exist outside the limits of the Hellenic and the

¹ Freeman, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

Western World and beyond the range of Hellenic and Western history. Moreover, he realized that, in this broader historical landscape, 'the Unity of History' could still be discerned and that here it was discernible not at all in the form of a continuity of objective events but wholly in the form of similarities in tendency and structure.¹

'European history forms one whole in the strictest sense, but between European and Asiatic history the connexion is only occasional and incidental. The fortunes of the Roman Empire had no effect on the internal revolutions of the Saracenic Caliphate, still less effect had they on the momentary dominion of the House of Jenghiz or on the Mogul Empire in India. Yet the way in which the European Empire and its several kingdoms broke in pieces had its exact parallel in those distant Eastern monarchies.'²

From this passage we may conjecture that if, in Freeman's time, Western historians had had at their disposal as much knowledge of the history of other societies besides the Hellenic Society and the Western Society as we have in our generation, Freeman would have realized that Hellenic and Western history only covered a fraction of the field of universal history, and that in equating the relation between them with 'continuity' *sans phrase* and endeavouring to stretch the two histories, thus erroneously fused together, into covering the whole field, he was falling into a misconception of growth, as a movement whose track is a straight line, from which his appreciation of the comparative method of study ought to have emancipated him.

So much in justice, and in tribute of admiration, to Freeman.

Additional Note

It may be observed that in Freeman's time the histories of two out of the four living non-Western societies—namely the Islamic and the Hindu—and also the histories of two extinct societies—the Syriac and the Indic—which were respectively 'apparented' to these, were considerably less well known than they are to-day; that the knowledge of the histories of the Egyptian, Sumeric, Babylonian, Mayan, Central American, and Andean societies was in his time still so rudimentary as to be practically useless for the purpose of comparative study; and that the existence of the Minoan and the Hittite societies was not only unknown but unsuspected (as was also the existence of 'the Indus Culture', if this turns out to be an independent representative of the species). On the other hand, Freeman possessed, and made use of, the materials for studying Byzantine history without apparently appreciating their significance for the morphology of universal history. Moreover, he ignored Sinic history and Far Eastern history, though, had he cared to study these, they were almost as accessible to him as they are to a Western

¹ In this context, however, he rather disparages 'mere analogy' by contrast with 'long chains of events bound together in the direct relation of cause and effect'. (Op. cit., p. 333, quoted above.)

² Op. cit., p. 333. On pp. 333-5 he discusses another parallel: the tendency for the prestige of 'universal states' like the Roman Empire and the Arab Caliphate to outlast their material power in such strength that the very 'successor-states' which have forcibly taken the material power to themselves are unable to dispense with some form of legitimation at the hands of the nominal 'world-rulers' whom they have supplanted *de facto* but who remain *de jure* the sole founts and dispensers of lawful authority.

historian in 1933; for the materials which had been communicated to Western scholars by the magnificent researches and publications of the Jesuit missionaries in China during the century *circa* A.D. 1675-1775 have not been appreciably increased or improved from that day to this. (On this point, see Hudson, G. F.: *Europe and China* (London 1931, Arnold), pp. 326-7.)

Why was it that Freeman did not turn this great body of accessible knowledge about Sinic history and Far Eastern history to account for the purpose of comparative study? His neglect of this valuable resource is thrown into relief by the good use that had been made of it, immediately after it had been opened up, by his predecessors Voltaire and Gibbon. Voltaire gives the Sinic and Far Eastern Society the place of honour in his *Histoire des Mœurs*; and it is impossible to read *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* without becoming aware that a contemporary empire of equal scale and pretensions was declining and falling in another quarter of the World—and this though the Celestial Empire only enters into Gibbon's story incidentally, apropos of the migrations of the Huns and the Mongols. Thus, among Western scholars a hundred years before Freeman's time, as among Western scholars to-day, an interest in Sinic history and Far Eastern history was 'in the air'. Why was this interest in suspense in Freeman's time? Was the eighteenth-century *penchant* towards Sinology replaced by the nineteenth-century *penchant* towards Sanskrit studies? Or is the explanation to be found in the sensitiveness of movements on the cultural plane to movements on the political plane? Was the change in the attitude of Western scholars towards the Sinic and Far Eastern culture, from a mood of respect and curiosity to a posture of contempt and indifference, an indirect effect of the revolution in the political relations between the Manchu Empire and the Western Powers which had occurred between Gibbon's and Freeman's times?

In the interval, 'the Barbarians from the South Sea' had taken the Celestial Empire by storm, opening Chinese ports to Western trade by force of arms and compelling the Manchu Imperial Government to grant to Western Governments and their nationals those extra-territorial privileges in the newly opened 'treaty-ports' of China which the Ottoman Imperial Government already accorded to them in the *Échelles du Levant*. Before the wars and treaties of 1839-61 the Celestials had been accepted by 'the South Sea Barbarians' more or less at their own valuation as superior persons. In less than a quarter of a century the roles had been reversed, and the Westerners had established themselves in China as a privileged minority among a herd of 'Natives'. Could Western historians who had seen the hand of the Lord revealed in their day in this discomfiture of the heathen be expected to waste their time in exploring 'native' footpaths when they might be mapping out the great highway along which the Chosen People had travelled from Greece through Rome to the Promised Land in the West? *Ex Oriente lux?* An exploded fallacy. After all, 'can any good thing come out of Nazareth?'

Some such change of outlook, induced by the triumph of Nationalism and Industrialism in Western historians' minds, may perhaps explain the paradox that a Freeman should have neglected a field of comparative historical study which had been assiduously cultivated by a Gibbon and a Voltaire.

For an authoritative discussion of 'the eclipse of Chinese cultural prestige' in the nineteenth century, see further Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-8.

ANNEX I TO I. C (i) (b)

THE SCHISM IN THE IRANIC WORLD AND THE INCORPORATION OF THE ARABIC SOCIETY INTO THE IRANIC

The Differentiation of the Iranic and Arabic Worlds during the Post-Syriac Interregnum

ON pages 68-72, above, we have observed that after the post-'Abbasid interregnum, in which the Syriac Society went into dissolution, two new societies, both 'affiliated' to the Syriac, arose in different parts of the derelict Syriac domain. We have called these two sister societies the Arabic and the Iranic respectively; and we have drawn a comparison between this pair of Islamic societies 'affiliated' to the Syriac Society and the pair of Christian societies—the Orthodox and the Western—that are 'affiliated' to the Hellenic Society. Our comparison, however, has brought out an important point of difference between the respective histories of these two pairs of societies of the second generation; and while this difference was not strictly relevant to the purpose of the chapter in which it came to light, it may prove to have some bearing on our Study of History nevertheless. On this account it may be convenient to pursue the investigation in the present Annex.

This difference in the histories of the pair of Christian and the pair of Islamic societies may be recapitulated as follows. The two Christian societies, when once they had become differentiated and segregated from one another during the interregnum, continued thereafter to follow separate paths. The attempt made by our Western Society to incorporate Orthodox Christendom into itself by main force during the Middle Ages, in the course of the Crusades, was unsuccessful; and it is only within the last two centuries and a half that the enterprise has been attempted again (and attempted, this time, with greater success, inasmuch as the West has been wise enough to refrain, on this second occasion, from imposing itself upon Orthodox Christendom by violence and has been content to win its way peacefully and gradually through the attraction which our modern Western culture has exercised upon Orthodox Christian hearts and minds). In this respect, the history of the relations between the Iranic and the Arabic Society has taken a markedly different turn. For, as early as the first quarter of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, about two hundred and fifty years after the emergence of the two Islamic societies from the

post-'Abbasid interregnum, the Iranic Society took the offensive against the Arabic Society and won a decisive victory.

This Iranic offensive was taken, and this Iranic victory was won, by one particular state among those into which the Iranic Society had come to be articulated; and this state was the Ottoman Empire. As a result of the Ottoman conquests of Syria and Egypt (in A.D. 1516-17) and Algeria (in A.D. 1512-19), almost the whole of the Arabic World with the exception of Morocco was incorporated into the Iranic World. The Ottoman occupation of Cairo in A.D. 1517 was the analogue, in Islamic history, of the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in A.D. 1204; but there was a vital difference in the sequel, since the Ottoman act of aggression in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era resulted in the annexation of the sister-society for a period of no less than four hundred years, whereas the Fourth Crusade was as ineffectual as it was discreditable. Thus, while Orthodox Christendom enjoyed a thousand years of independent life between its emergence from the post-Hellenic interregnum towards the end of the seventh century and its pacific incorporation into 'the Great Society' of our latter-day Westernized World since the latter part of the seventeenth century, the Arabic Society only enjoyed its independence for some two centuries and a half (approximately A.D. 1275-1525) before it was forcibly incorporated into the Iranic Society by the 'Osmanlis in order to be merged in the united Sunnī Islamic World which has existed from the sixteenth century of the Christian Era down to the present day.

This sharp divergence between the respective histories of the two Islamic and the two Christian societies evidently requires explanation. Why was it that the Ottoman offensive against the Arabic World in the first quarter of the sixteenth century was successful? In a previous passage (on pp. 69-70) we have mentioned by anticipation that the conquest of the Arabic World at this juncture was virtually forced upon the 'Osmanlis in consequence of a religious schism within the bosom of the Iranic Society to which the 'Osmanlis themselves belonged; and that this schism arose through the unexpected and revolutionary resuscitation of Shi'ism as a militant political force by Ismā'il Shāh Safawī (*dominabatur* A.D. 1500-24). In other words, the incorporation of the Arabic World into one part—that is to say, the Ottoman part—of the Iranic World was the consequence of a sudden and violent and disruptive social convulsion by which the Iranic World itself was first overtaken. In the present Annex, we have to trace out, in greater detail, the concatenation of events which thus abruptly and surprisingly deflected the course of Islamic history.

We may preface this investigation by pointing out, once again, how completely unexpected the sixteenth-century course of Islamic history really was.

Down to about the year A.D. 1500, the segregation and differentiation between the infant Arabic and Iranic societies showed every sign of persisting and indeed of becoming more sharply accentuated. Geographically, a clearly defined frontier had arisen between the two worlds; and this frontier extended continuously from the waters of the Indian Ocean in the Persian Gulf to the waters of the Mediterranean in the Gulf of Alexandretta. The province of 'Irāq, which had been the metropolitan province of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, had lain waste since the sack of the Imperial City of Baghdad by the Mongols in A.D. 1258; and in consequence the lower valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates had become a positive barrier, instead of being a link, between the regions on either side of it. Farther to the north-west, the line of the Euphrates, in the sector between the North Arabian Steppe and the Taurus Range, had become once again the military frontier that it had formerly been, for some seven centuries, in the Roman Age. From the first century B.C. to the seventh century of the Christian Era, the Romans had held the line of the Euphrates first against the Arsacids and then against the Sasanids. From the latter part of the thirteenth century onwards, the Mamlūks of Egypt held the same river-line against the Mongols and their successors. Finally, between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean, the Arabic World was insulated by the barrier of the Taurus from the territories which the nascent Iranic Society had conquered from Orthodox Christendom in Anatolia,¹ while Anatolia itself was linked up with the main body of the Iranic World through Azerbaijan.

Thus the geographical frontier between these two worlds was clearly defined from one end to the other by A.D. 1500; and the geographical insulation of the two regions on either side of this line had been accompanied, as we have seen, by a divergence in the political and cultural development of the two societies which were growing up separately in these two different geographical cradles. In politics, the Arabic Society looked back to the 'Abbasid Caliphate while the Iranic Society looked back to the Eurasian Nomad

¹ This Iranic conquest of Anatolia had begun, during the post-'Abbasid and pre-Iranic interregnum, with the irruption of the Saljūq Turkish barbarian invaders into Anatolia from the Eurasian Steppe, via Iran, in the latter half of the eleventh century of the Christian Era. The process was completed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by the Turkish successor-states of the Anatolian Saljūqs and first and foremost by the 'Osmanlis (who were spoken of by their co-religionists, in consequence, as 'the Ghāzis of Rūm': the periphrasis by which the 'Osmanlis are commonly described in the memoirs of the Emperor Bābur (*ẖitebat* A.D. 1483-1530). See Bābur, *Zahīr-ad-Dīn Muḥammad: Memoirs*, translated by Beveridge, A. S. (London 1922, Luzac, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 564).

Empire of Chingis Khan. In culture, the Arabic Society remained faithful to the Classical Arabic language, while the Iranic Society had discarded Arabic in favour of Persian as its secular literary vehicle. In fact, in every important aspect of social life, the differentiation between the Iranic and the Arabic Society appeared, by A.D. 1500, to be definitive.

Moreover, although both societies were expanding geographically with great vigour, neither showed any inclination to trespass seriously upon the other's ground. The Arabic Society was directing its expansion across the Sahara into Tropical Africa and across the Indian Ocean into Indonesia. The Iranic Society was expanding out of Anatolia into South-Eastern Europe and out of Hindustan into the Deccan and out of Transoxania over the Eurasian Steppe; but until the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era the two sister-societies stood, so to speak, back to back, and rarely collided with one another. Their mutual trespasses down to that date can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The invasions of Syria by Mongol armies in the years 1260, 1281, 1299-1300, and 1303, and by Timur in 1400-1, may be reckoned as Iranic incursions into the Arabic domain; and we may count it as an Arabic incursion into the Iranic domain when the Mamlūk Sultan Beybars defeated the Mongols at Abulusteyn in the fastnesses of the Taurus and occupied Caesarea on the Anatolian Plateau in A.D. 1277. But these incursions were exceptional. For the most part, the two societies steered clear of one another from the middle of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era until the opening of the sixteenth.

The next point to observe is that although, during this period, the Arabic and Iranic worlds were more or less isolated from one another, the intercommunication between the different parts of each of these two worlds was actively maintained. In the Arabic World in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, the statesman and philosopher Ibn Khaldūn moved freely from his birth-place at Tunis to Fez and Granada in one direction and to Cairo and Damascus in the other; and he appears to have found himself almost equally at home in any of these local seats of the Arabic culture.¹ Similarly, in the Iranic zone, the poet and philosopher Muhammad Jelāl-ed-Dīn (*vivebat* A.D. 1207-73) found no difficulty in migrating from his birth-place at Balkh, in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, to Qonīyah in Anatolia, where he made himself so thoroughly at home that he is remembered at this day not as Balkhī but as Rūmī. With equal facility, a Turkish soldier of fortune like Ertoghrul, the father of 'Osmān the eponym of the 'Osmanlis, could traverse

¹ For Ibn Khaldūn's career, see further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 321-8, below.

the Iranic World from the Transoxanian fringe of the Eurasian Steppe to the north-western escarpment of the Anatolian Plateau,¹ while other Eurasian adventurers, turning their faces in a different direction, were able as easily to traverse Afghanistan, in order to seek and find their fortunes in India, from the days of Mahmūd of Ghaznah to the days of Bābur of Farghana. In fact, down to the generation of Bābur the Timurid (*vivebat* A.D. 1483-1530) and Ismā'il Shāh Safawī (*dominabatur* A.D. 1499/1500-1523/4) and the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (*imperabat* A.D. 1512-20), this active social intercommunication between the different parts of the Iranic World—a healthy circulation of the blood in the body social—continued without intermission.

From the remote domain which they had carved out for themselves in the European provinces of Orthodox Christendom, the Ottoman 'Ghāzis of Rūm' still looked to the heart of the Iranic World for intellectual light and leading. The Ottoman Sultan Bāyezīd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1481-1512), who was the father of Selim I and the son of Mehmed the Conqueror, was in correspondence with the divines and the men of letters of Khurāsān, including the poet Jāmī and the Sunni doctor Farīd-ad-Dīn Ahmad-i-Taftāzānī: the Shaykh-al-Islam of Herat who was put to death by Shāh Ismā'il in A.D. 1510 for refusing to pay lip service to the Shī'ī creed.² The Timurid ruler of Herat, Sultan Husayn b. Mansūr b. Bayqarā (*regnabat* A.D. 1468-1506), was Jāmī's patron, and his patronage was not confined to Persian literature. For it was Sultan Husayn's minister of state Mīr 'Alī Shīr Nawā'ī (*decessit* A.D. 1501) who gathered round him a literary circle which created a new Turkī literature on the Persian model; and, while this Turkish literary movement in Khurāsān was an artificial and ephemeral plant, which did not long survive the ensuing political and religious storms to which Khurāsān was exposed, it had a permanent effect in stimulating the growth of another Turkish literature, in the kindred Ottoman Turkish language, at the opposite extremity of the Iranic World.³

In return for these cultural gifts,⁴ the Court of Constantinople gave asylum to the prince Badī'az-Zamān, the son of Sultan Husayn Bayqarā, after the overrunning of Khurāsān, about A.D.

¹ For Ertoghul's trek, see further II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 151, below.

² Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1928, University Press), p. 69. Letters addressed by Bāyezīd to Jāmī, Farīd-ad-Dīn, and other leading lights in Khurāsān are preserved in the first volume of Firidūn Bey's *Munsha'āt-i-Salātīn*: a collection of state papers which was compiled in A.D. 1574 and printed at Constantinople in A.D. 1858.

³ For the influence of Mīr 'Alī Shīr Nawā'ī's literary circle at Herat upon Ottoman Turkish literature, see Browne, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 398-9 and 422-3.

⁴ For the cultural achievements of the Timurids, see further II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 148-50, below.

1507, by the Uzbeg Nomad invaders from the Eurasian Steppe.¹ And there are other instances, besides, of a reciprocal give-and-take between the two extremities of the Iranic World. While literary inspirations and political refugees were travelling westward from Khurāsān to Rūm, Rūmī technique and technicians were travelling eastward from South-Eastern Europe to Khurāsān and Transoxania. The Timurid Emperor Bābur repeatedly refers in his Memoirs to his employment of the Rūmī battle array: a formation of wagons, linked to one another by chains, with firing-parties of artillery and musketeers posted in the intervals.² These tactical arrangements were superintended for Bābur by a Rūmī soldier of fortune named Mustafā,³ who incurred the jealousy of Bābur's official master of arms, Ustād 'Alī Qūlī.⁴ Nor was the Ottoman

¹ For the Uzbeg invasion see pp. 371-7, below. Badī'-az-Zamān found asylum with Shāh Ismā'il in the first instance, and was brought from Tabriz to Constantinople by Sultan Selīm when the 'Osmanlis evacuated Tabriz after their momentary occupation of the Safawī capital in A.D. 1514. (See pp. 385-6, below.)

² This self-same military formation was employed in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era by the Hussites in Bohemia; and the resemblance in detail between the Hussite and the Mughal 'lagers' is too close to be fortuitous—in spite of the remoteness of the Bohemian plains from those of Northern India. Since we know, on Bābur's own evidence, that this formation, as used by him in India, was derived from an Ottoman source, we may conjecture that the Hussites, on their side, derived it from the same quarter. The channel of communication in this case was doubtless Hungary: Bohemia's south-eastern neighbour, who, throughout the fifteenth century, was in intimate political and military relations with Bohemia on the one side and with the Ottoman Empire on the other. In any case, the Rūmī battle-formation was as novel, and therefore as effective, when it was introduced by the Hussites into Western Europe as when it was introduced into India by Bābur. It was designed, of course, to baffle the heavy cavalry which at that time were the staple arm in the Western and the Iranic worlds alike. The combination of wagons with artillery and musketeers was just what might be expected from the 'Osmanlis with their Nomadic tradition and their aptitude for Western technique.

Count Lützow gives the following account of the lager-tactics which were employed by the Hussite forces in Bohemia, during their warfare with the anti-Hussite Crusaders (*bellum gerebatur circa* A.D. 1419-36), on the initiative of the Hussite leader Žižka (*vivebat circa* 1378-1424):

'The *hradba vozová* ('Wagenburg', wagon-fort or lager of wagons), if not absolutely Žižka's invention, became, entirely through him, a serious feature in Bohemian warfare. From the scanty and contradictory accounts that have reached us it appears that the wagons or chariots of the Bohemian armies were linked together by strong iron chains, and were used not only for defence, but also for offensive movements. All the warriors, except the few horsemen as well as the women and children who accompanied the armies, found shelter in these wagons, which in time of battle were generally formed in four lines or columns. The wagons were covered with steel or iron—iron-clad, to use a modern term—and the best marksmen were placed next to the driver of each of them. In case of defeat, the wagons formed what was practically a fortified entrenchment. When an offensive movement was undertaken, the drivers of the wagons at one end of the line of battle attempted to outflank the enemy, and after Žižka's men had become accustomed to warfare, often succeeded in doing so. It may be noticed that the wide plains of Bohemia, which then—as now—were little intersected by ditches or fences, offered every advantage to this novel system of warfare. Žižka also seems to have given his attention to fire-arms, as the picked marksmen whom he placed next to the drivers of the wagons soon became the terror of the Germans, through the precision of their fire, whilst the few and unwieldy field-pieces which accompanied the Bohemian armies were yet far superior to anything the Germans and other enemies could then bring to battle against them.' (Lützow, Count Francis: *Bohemia: An Historical Sketch* (London 1896, Chapman & Hall), pp. 184-9.)

³ For Bābur's references to Mustafā Rūmī or to the Rūmī battle-formation, see the *Memoirs*, ed. Beveridge, vol. ii, pp. 469, 550, 564, 635.

⁴ Bābur, ed. cit., vol. ii, p. 550. From 'Alī Qūlī's name and profession, one might

technique which found its way eastward exclusively military. Bābur mentions a Rūmī medical remedy¹; and, three generations earlier,² a certain Salāh-ad-Dīn Mūsā Qādi-zāda-i-Rūmī³ was one of the savants who compiled for the Timurid prince Ulugh Beg the famous set of astronomical tables that were completed in A.D. 1437/8.⁴

It must be added that there was not, within the interior of either of our two worlds, any regional segregation of communities on the basis of language; for though Turkish as well as Persian was current in the Iranic World, and Berber as well as Arabic in the Arabic World, the Berber and the Turkish vernaculars were simply the vulgar tongues of camp and court; and they did not dispute the claims of Arabic and Persian, in their respective geographical spheres, to be the vehicles of official transactions and of literary works of art. In the Iranic World, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the literary use of the Turkish language was still in its infancy; and this infant literature in the vulgar tongue was not a symptom of linguistic or regional nationalism in the modern Western sense. It is a remarkable fact that the two grim antagonists Ismā'il Shāh Safawī and Selīm Pādishāh 'Osmanlī were both poets as well as men of blood. But in Western eyes it is perhaps still more remarkable that Ismā'il, the political founder of 'Modern Persia', followed the new fashion of Mir 'Alī Shīr Nawā'ī in writing his verses almost exclusively in the Turkish idiom which was his native vernacular, whereas Selīm, the sovereign of 'Turkey', persisted in writing almost exclusively in Persian.⁵

Thus, down to about A.D. 1500, the Arabic and Iranic worlds were more or less isolated from one another, while at the same time either world was substantially a unity in itself. This state of affairs, however, was radically and permanently upset by the career of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī, the resuscitator of Shī'ism as a militant political force.

The Eclipse of the Shī'ah

In order to understand the revolutionary character of Shāh Ismā'il's work, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the history of the Shī'ah before Shāh Ismā'il's time.

hazard the guess that he was a refugee Shī'ī from Anatolia who had entered Shāh Ismā'il's service and afterwards transferred into Bābur's.

¹ Bābur: *Memoirs*, ed. cit., vol. ii, p. 657.

² Bābur was Timur's great-great-grandson, Ulugh Beg his grandson.

³ Browne, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 386.

⁴ For Ulugh Beg's patronage of astronomical research, see further II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 149.

⁵ Browne, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 12-13.

Down to the moment of Shāh Ismā'il's dramatic entry upon the stage, the survival of Shi'ism in the Iranic and Arabic worlds must have seemed to intelligent Sunnī observers to be really nothing more than one of the curiosities of history: a relic of the past which could have little or no significance for the future. The Shi'ism which had survived the post-'Abbasid interregnum in the crannies and corners of Dār-al-Islām was in fact the flotsam and jetsam of a movement which belonged to the last chapter in the history of the extinct Syriac Society and which reflected the social conditions of that now obsolete age.

In its origin, the Shi'ah was the faction of one of the rival Meccan houses that laid claim to the Caliphate in a domestic quarrel over the spoils of victory among the primitive Arab Muslim conquerors, who had reunited under one rule the vast territories that had once been embraced in the Achaemenian Empire before the Hellenic intrusion upon the Syriac World. Thereafter, when the House of 'Alī had been worsted in the competition for the Caliphate, first by the House of Umayyah and finally by the House of 'Abbās, the Shi'ah still perpetuated its own existence, in its already stereotyped role as an embodiment of frustrated ambitions, by broadening its basis and identifying itself with the reaction of the non-Arab subjects of the Caliphate against the Arab ascendancy. The most important of these non-Arab communities were the Iranians in the eastern and the Berbers in the western provinces of the Arab Empire; and, of these two, the Iranians were the more highly cultivated and the more self-conscious party. Accordingly, under the 'Abbasid régime at Baghdad, from the latter part of the eighth century of the Christian Era onwards, we find Shi'ism perpetually seeking to propagate itself into Iran in the one direction and into the Maghrib in the other direction from its original stronghold in Lower 'Irāq, which was a meeting-place of the Aramaic, Iranian, and Arabic elements of the Syriac culture.¹

In Iran, it was the (Zaydī) Shi'ī and not the Sunnī version of Islam that was adopted by the outlying Iranians in the fastness of the Caspian Provinces when they tardily abandoned their ancestral Zoroastrianism in the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era;² and in the tenth century these recently converted Daylamīs

¹ See the note by Professor H. A. R. Gibb at the end of this Annex.

Compare the conversion of the Teutonic barbarians in the no-man's-land beyond the European frontiers of the Roman Empire to Arian instead of Catholic Christianity in the fourth century of the Christian Era. In both these cases we may detect the result of two convergent tendencies: a tendency on the part of trans-frontier dissidents or barbarians to maintain some show of individuality in the form in which they eventually succumb to an expanding civilization, when they cannot avoid succumbing to some extent; and the tendency for a discountenanced or persecuted minoritarian religion to abandon the interior of the world to which it belongs and to seek compensation by winning new converts on the periphery. (For this latter tendency, compare the centri-

produced a Shī'ī dynasty, the Buwayhids, who overran the whole of Western Iran and descended upon 'Irāq and imposed their will upon the 'Abbasid Caliphs at Baghdad.¹ In the Maghrib, a Shī'ī principality which held its own for nearly two centuries (A.D. 788-985) between the remnant of the Umayyad Caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula and the 'Abbasid dominion over the rest of the Syriac World was founded in Morocco in A.D. 788 by an 'Alid, Idrīs b. 'Abdallāh, after he had tried and failed to make head against the 'Abbasids at Medina. At about the same time, a Khārijī ['Dissident'] principality which endured for a century and a half (A.D. 761-908) was founded in the hinterland of Ifriqiyah by a Persian adventurer named Rustem who won the allegiance of the Zenāta Berbers.² The Rustemids extended their rule or influence from the coast of Algeria to the hinterland of Tripoli, and severed the communication by land between the 'Abbasid Caliphs at Baghdad and their Aghlabid lieutenants in Tunisia.³ Finally, in A.D. 909, both the Sunnī Aghlabids and the Khārijī Rustemids were supplanted in Ifriqiyah and its hinterland by the Fātimids, who made their fortunes by winning the allegiance of the Katāma Berbers, as the Rustemids had made theirs by winning the allegiance of the Zenāta.⁴ The actual founder of the Fātimid Power in Ifriqiyah was the head of a Shī'ī propaganda organization in Syria who styled himself al-Mahdī Abu Muhammad 'Ubaydallah and claimed descent from 'Alī and Fātimah through the Seventh Imām—though his real name was said by the opponents of the Fātimids to be Sa'id b. al-Husayn b. 'Abdallah b. Maymūn al-Qaddāh, and his grandfather 'Abdallah, who had created the propaganda organization which al-Mahdī had inherited, was reputed to have been no true descendant of 'Alī but merely the son of an oculist who was a native of the town of Ahwāz in the Iranian province of Khuzistan.

In A.D. 969 the Fātimids, at the head of their Katāma henchmen, succeeded in conquering Egypt and Southern Syria (a country which was apt to share the political fortunes of Egypt in this age);

fugal movements of the Russian Orthodox Christian 'Old Believers' from the centre to the circumference of the Russian Empire, of the Pilgrim Fathers overseas, and of the Mormons into Utah (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 221-2, below), and the expansion of the Syriac religions—Judaism, Christianity, Islam—in concentric waves (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, Annex, below.)

¹ See II. D (vii), Annex (viii), vol. ii, p. 448, below.

² For the 'Ibādi sect, which is a survival of the Khārijī Power that once created and maintained the Rustemid principality, see further II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 239, below.

³ The confederates of the Rustemids in the hinterland of Tripoli were their fellow-Khārijīs the Berbers of Jabal Nafūṣah. (See Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 294-6.) Compare the hemming in of the Carthaginian dominions from sea to sea by the Numidian Power in the second century B.C.

⁴ For the recurrent common features of these Shī'ī and Khārijī principalities in the Maghrib—the arrival of an adventurer from the Levant and his adoption as a leader by some local Berber people—see Gautier, op. cit., p. 312.

and for a time it seemed as though not only the 'Abbasid Caliphate at Baghdad but Sunnism itself might be overwhelmed by a convergence of victorious Shī'ī Powers from all quarters of the compass. The Carmathians, who were co-religionists of the Fātimids,¹ had built up a military, and militant, Power in Arabia which terrorized the fringes of Syria and 'Irāq for about a century (*circa* A.D. 890–990). In A.D. 930 the Carmathians actually sacked Mecca and carried off the Black Stone from the Ka'bah. At the same time, 'Irāq and Western Iran were under the dominion of the Shī'ī Buwayhids, who dictated the policy of the 'Abbasid Caliphs at Baghdad. There were actually forty weeks, in A.D. 1058–9, when, in Baghdad itself, the Khutbah was recited in the name of the Fātimid Caliph Mustansir.² This was not, however, the outcome of any fraternization between the Daylamī Iranian Shī'ī henchmen of the Buwayhids and the Katāma Berber Shī'ī henchmen of the Fātimids in an *union sacrée* against the 'Abbasid Caliphate and the Arab ascendancy. For the momentary master of Baghdad who gave this fleeting recognition to the Fātimids' pretensions was not a Buwayhid but an ephemeral Turkish war-lord who temporarily occupied Baghdad after the overthrow of the Buwayhids, in A.D. 1055–6, by the Saljūqs. The Buwayhids differed in religion from the Fātimids, as well as from the Carmathians, inasmuch as they belonged to the Zaydī or Six-Imām and not to the Seven-Imām branch of the Shī'ah;³ and, apart from religious considerations, they found their political interest in keeping the 'Abbasid Caliphs on their throne in Baghdad as puppets manipulated by Buwayhid hands; and therefore the Buwayhids, so long as they remained in power, were steadfast in refusing to recognize the Fātimids' claims to the Caliphate. Indeed, these claims were not even recognized by the Carmathians, who contested the possession of Syria with the Fātimids by force of arms. Through this failure to make common cause, the three Shī'ī Powers that had arisen simultaneously in the tenth century of the Christian Era threw away the opportunity for securing the triumph of Shi'ism which offered itself between the entry of the Fātimids into Cairo in A.D. 969 and the entry of the Saljūqs into Baghdad in A.D. 1055. Thereafter, the political power of Shi'ism receded in the Syriac World as rapidly as it had previously advanced.

¹ The Fātimids and the Carmathians were co-religionists in the most exact sense, since they were both adherents of the Ismā'īlī or Seven-Imām form of Shi'ism which had been created by 'Abdallah b. Maymūn. The founder of the Carmathians, Hamdān Qarmat, was one of 'Abdallah's missionaries, while the founder of the Fātimids was 'Abdallah's grandson.

² Lane-Poole, S.: *A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages*, 2nd edition (London 1914, Methuen), pp. 138–9.

³ The Shī'ī missionaries who had converted Daylam from Zoroastrianism in the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era had been Zaydis.

This political collapse of Shi'ism was an accomplished fact before the end of the interregnum (*circa* A.D. 975-1275) which intervened between the break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate and the emergence, from its ruins, of the nascent Arabic and Iranic societies which stood to the defunct Syriac Society in the relation of 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation'. In Ifriqīyah, Sunnism regained the ascendancy over Shi'ism *circa* A.D. 1044-6, when the chieftain of the Sanhāja Berbers, to whom the Fātimids had delegated their authority in their original dominions after their conquest of Egypt, revolted against his overlord, renounced the Shi'ī doctrine, and accepted investiture from the hands of the 'Abbasid Caliph at Baghdad. The subsequent Berber masters of the Maghrib and Andalusia—the Murābīts (*circa* A.D. 1056-1147) and the Muwahhids (*circa* A.D. 1130-1269)—followed the established Berber practice of expressing their political self-consciousness in a religious form; but, among these outer barbarians from the Sahara and the Atlas, the form which this expression took was not Shi'ism but an exaggeration of the Sunnī Orthodoxy.¹ In Iran, again, the Turkish Saljūqs from the Eurasian Steppe, who overthrew and superseded the Iranian Buwayhids from Daylam, were as faithful to Sunnism and as hostile to Shi'ism as their Murābit Berber contemporaries and counterparts in the Maghrib. The final blow to Shi'ism was struck when the Fātimid Caliphate was snuffed out in Egypt itself by Saladin in A.D. 1171, as the result of a competition for the mastery of Egypt between the Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem and the successors of the Saljūqs in Syria and the Jazīrah.²

Thereafter, it was only in the crannies and corners of Dār-al-Islām that Shi'ism survived as a political force.

In the highlands of the Yaman, for example, the Zaydī form of Shi'ism asserted itself at an early date, and has maintained itself down to the present day, as a religious expression of local particularism: the reaction of the highlander against the lowlander, of the cultivator against the Nomad, and of the ancient culture of the Yaman against the *parvenue* culture of the Hijāz.³ The present Zaydī Imāms, who have reigned at San'ā since the end of the first Ottoman occupation in A.D. 1633, are the successors of the Rassid Imāms who founded a Shi'ī principality in the more remote fastness of Sa'dah as early as A.D. 893; and, at the moment when

¹ This contrast between the Shi'ism of the relatively cultivated Katāma and the Sunnism of their more barbarous kinsmen and successors the Murābīts and Muwahhids may be compared, in the history of the Teutonic Völkerwanderung during the post-Hellenic interregnum, with the contrast between the Arianism of the Goths and the Catholicism of the Franks and Angles.

² This competition had begun with the invasion of Egypt by King Amaury of Jerusalem in A.D. 1163.

³ It will be seen that the role of Shi'ism in the Yaman has been not unlike its role in Iran.

Shi'ism was collapsing politically in the Maghrib and in Iran, the whole of the Yaman, including the San'a, was conquered by the short-lived Shi'i dynasty of the Sulayhids (*circa* A.D. 1037-1101).

On the other hand, the Ismā'īlī or Seven-Imām sect of the Shī'ah, which had been politically paramount in fully half of Dār-al-Islām when the Fātimids and the Carmathians were at the height of their power, was restricted, before the end of the twelfth century of the Christian Era, to two groups of fastnesses—one in Northern Iran on the southern slopes of the Elbrūz Range, and the other in Northern Syria in the Jabal Ansariyah—which were held by a remnant of the 'Ismā'īlīs who made themselves notorious under the name of the Assassins.¹ And the Assassins barely outlasted the post-'Abbasid and pre-Iranic interregnum. Their Iranian fastnesses were reduced to submission by the Mongol conqueror Hulāgū about A.D. 1255; and the temporary recovery of the citadel of Alamūt by the last 'Grand Master' of the 'Order', Rukn-ad-Dīn Khurshāh, in A.D. 1275-6, simply resulted in the extirpation of the sect in Iran by Hulāgū's successor Abāqā. The Syrian fastnesses of the sect were reduced by the Egyptian Mamlūks in A.D. 1270. Since then, the Ismā'īlīs have been represented by the Syrian branch of the sect, which survived the loss of its independence and has lived on in obscurity, and by a diaspora in India, where, under new social and psychological conditions, the descendants of the Assassins have undergone their astonishing transformation into the mild 'nation of shopkeepers' who pay Peter's Pence to the Agha Khan under the name of Khwājas.² Their last surviving fastness is in Hunza, between Gilgit and the Pamirs.

In the last quarter of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, when the post-'Abbasid interregnum was drawing to its close and the nascent Arabic and Iranic societies were beginning to emerge, almost the only overt adherents of Shi'ism that were still to be found within the boundaries of Dār-al-Islām were the Zaydīs in the Yaman and the Imāmīs—that is to say, the followers of the Twelve-Imām sect of the Shī'ah, as opposed to the Seven-Imām Ismā'īlīs—who were maintaining themselves here and there: for example in the Jabal 'Āmil at the southern end of the Lebanon

¹ The Assassins were a militant branch of the Ismā'īlīs who were organized by Hasan-i-Sabbāh about A.D. 1090. Their method of action was the assassination of princes; and they did their work impartially, for the list of their victims includes their fellow-Ismā'īlī the Fātimid Caliph al-Āmir, whom they assassinated in A.D. 1130, as well as a host of Sunnis and Christians. The word 'assassinate' itself is derived from the name of the Assassins, and their name is derived in turn from the *hashish* or hemp-fumes with which their desperadoes used to intoxicate themselves before making their *attentats*. For Hasan-i-Sabbāh and the Assassins, see Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. ii (London 1906, Fisher Unwin), pp. 201-11, and Yule, Sir Henry: *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, 3rd edition (London 1903, Murray, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 139-48.)

² For the Khwājas, see further II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 238-9, below.

Range in Syria, in the East Arabian provinces of Bahrayn and Hasā, and at Hillah in the neighbourhood of the Shī'ī holy places in the original stronghold of Shi'ism in Lower 'Irāq.¹ One reason why these Imāmīs survived when the Ismā'ilīs went under was that, in striking contrast to the Ismā'ilīs, the Imāmīs were committed to non-violence by the very nature of their special beliefs;² and they therefore did not invite persecution at the hands of the Sunnī majority among whom they had to live. At this time, no observer could have suspected that this Imāmī sect of the Shī'ah was destined to achieve by violence a great political renaissance of Shi'ism two centuries later.

During the two hundred years or so which elapsed between the emergence of the Arabic and Iranic societies out of the interregnum and the opening of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī's career in the last year of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, Shi'ism must have seemed a lost cause both on external evidence and *a priori*—*a priori* because, as we have observed already, the social conditions on which it had thriven during the first few centuries after the Hijrah had been completely transcended, and on external evidence because it was manifest that in point of numbers the Shī'ah, which at its strongest had never been more than a strong minority, had now dwindled to an insignificant fraction of the Islamic community.

In regard to the *a priori* consideration, our survey of the history of Shi'ism to this point has brought out the fact that, by the end of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, the motives which had evoked and sustained the Shī'ī movement during the first three centuries of Islam had been put out of action by radical changes of circumstance. The personal appeal to right the wrongs of the disinherited and persecuted House of 'Alī had lost much of its effect by the time when a line of Caliphs who at any rate laid claim to an 'Alid and Fātimid ancestry had enjoyed two centuries of power and prosperity as rulers of Egypt, which was the most desirable province in the whole heritage of the primitive Arab Muslim conquerors with the one possible exception of 'Irāq. By the year A.D. 1171, in which the Fātimid rule in Egypt was extinguished by Saladin, the usurping House of Umayyah had already been extinct for 160 years, even in its last refuge in Andalusia, while the usurping House of 'Abbās was only lingering on at Baghdad as a puppet Power whose strings were pulled by Iranian

¹ For a daily ritual which was performed at Hillah by the Imāmī Shī'īs in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, see III. C (ii) (b), Annex I, vol. iii, pp. 463-4, below.

² The central point in the Imāmī doctrine was the duty (symbolized in the daily ritual which is referred to in the preceding footnote) of waiting passively for the advent of 'the Expected Imām', instead of attempting to bring the Millennium about (as the Ismā'ilīs attempted) by human force.

Shi'is or by Turkish barbarians. After the overwhelming catastrophe of the Mongol sack of Baghdad in A.D. 1258, it was altogether impossible to feel that, at the end of the story, the House of 'Abbās had profited appreciably, in comparison with the fortunes of the House of 'Alī, by that usurpation of the Caliphate in A.D. 750 which had embittered the Shi'ah so grievously at the time. The ghost of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, which was maintained at Cairo by the Egyptian Mamlūks for their own convenience from A.D. 1261 onwards, was no object of envy but rather an object of pity as a token of the depths to which the once mighty House of 'Abbās had fallen.

And if the personal or dynastic appeal of Shi'ism had been effectively estopped by these complete changes in family fortunes, the racial or national appeal had become every whit as obsolete. By the year A.D. 1300, the ascendancy of the Arabs over the Iranian and the Berber populations in the domain of the *ci-devant* Arab Empire had been over and done with for fully five centuries; and, in the course of these centuries, the parts of 'top-dog' and 'under-dog' had actually been reversed. Under the Idrisid and Rustemid and Fātimid régimes in the west, and the Tāhirid and Saffārid and Sāmānid and Buwayhid régimes in the east, the former Berber and Iranian subjects of the Arabs had enjoyed their turn of ruling over their former Arab masters. By A.D. 1300 even this chapter of history was a thing of the past,¹ and all the peoples of the derelict Caliphate—Arabs and Berbers and Iranians alike—were being ruled by intrusive barbarians from the no-man's-land beyond the frontiers: Nomad Turks and Mongols from the Eurasian Steppe and wild Berbers from the Sahara and the Atlas. Thus the entire political and psychological situation which had first evoked and

¹ The actual political ascendancy of Iranian dynasties in the eastern provinces of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, between Baghdad and the coasts of the Eurasian Steppe, lasted for hardly more than two centuries (circa A.D. 825–1025) round about the transition from the universal state to the ensuing interregnum; but this Iranian political revival was only one manifestation, and a superficial manifestation, of a cultural revival which was far deeper and far more enduring. The great age of Persian literature set in at the very time when, on the Iranian Plateau as well as in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, Iranian rulers were yielding up the sceptre to Turkish Eurasian Nomads. But in these alien Turkish-speaking princes, from Mahmūd of Ghaznah in the eleventh century of the Christian Era down to the Timurids in the fifteenth, the great Persian men of letters found their most appreciative patrons, with the result that the new civilization which emerged in these regions after the interregnum was fundamentally 'Iranic' in its cultural background. It is one of the ironical curiosities of history that the great age of Persian literature, which began at the moment when the political régime of the Iranian Sāmānids and Buwayhids was supplanted by the rule of Turkish barbarian adventurers, should have come to an end at the moment when, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the rule of the Turkish Timurids was replaced by that of the Safawis, which heralded an Iranian political restoration (in spite of the fact that the Safawis themselves were apparently Türkmens). On the empirical evidence, it looks as though the Iranians were incapable of achieving greatness simultaneously in literature and in politics. (For the historical role of the great Persian literature of the post-Syriac and pre-Iranic interregnum as an aftermath of the Syriac culture, see further II. D (iii), vol. ii, p. 77, footnote 1, below.)

then sustained Shi'ism in the early centuries of Islam had now passed away; and, by the same token, Shi'ism might now be deemed to have become an anachronism.

It might also be written off as a mere lingering relic of the past on the test of numbers. In the Maghrib, Shi'ism had left no trace of its former political dominance. In Egypt, where the Fātimids had reigned for two full centuries with every opportunity to turn their political power to account for religious propaganda and with every inducement for their subjects to consult their material interests by adopting the religion of the reigning dynasty, Shi'ism appears to have gained a singularly small foothold among the population.¹ At any rate, there is no record of any formidable or persistent local religious opposition to the eviction of the last Shī'ī Fātimid Caliph by the Sunnī intruder, Saladin, and no trace of any lingering subterranean survival of Shi'ism in the country when once the Shī'ī dynasty had been brushed aside. So far from that, the trouble which was taken by the Ayyūbid conquerors of Egypt to obtain the blessing of the 'Abbasid Caliphs at Baghdad, and the elaborate fiction of governing Egypt in the name of a refugee 'Abbasid Caliph, which was promptly introduced and sedulously maintained by the Ayyūbids' Mamlūk successors, are historical facts which suggest that, on the morrow of the overthrow of the Fātimids, Egypt not only acquiesced passively in the substitution of a Sunnī for a Shī'ī régime but was positively Sunnī rather than Shī'ī in sentiment.²

A still more striking historical fact is the numerical weakness of the Shi'ah in Iran on the eve of Shāh Ismā'il's conquest of Iran during the first decade of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era. This fact is attested by several convergent lines of evidence. For example, in the time of the poet Jāmī (*vivebat* A.D. 1414-92), the province of Khurāsān appears to have been predominantly Sunnī, as it had been in the age of the Sāmānids and the Saljūqs (though Baghdad was now perhaps predominantly Shī'ī);³ and when the Timurid prince of Herat, Sultan Husayn b. Mansūr b. Bayqarā (*regnabat* A.D. 1468-1506) displayed a proclivity towards Shi'ism, he was restrained by his minister of state the Turkī man

¹ The only Fātimid Caliph of Egypt who seems to have exerted himself in religious propaganda was Hākim (*imperabat* A.D. 996-1020); and the peculiar version of Ismā'ilī Shi'ism which Hākim put into circulation, with his own personality in the centre of the picture, survives to-day not in Egypt but in Syria, as the religion of the Druses. (For the Druses see further II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 258, below.)

² There was a movement for a Fātimid restoration in A.D. 1184, which Saladin crushed. Professor H. A. R. Gibb, who has brought this fact to the writer's attention, suggests that 'probably the imminent danger of the Crusades weighed more than religious enthusiasm in winning popular support for Saladin and his dynasty (as a fear of the Byzantines may have played a part in the Egyptian acceptance of the Fātimids' two centuries earlier).

³ See Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 510-11.

of letters Mir 'Alī Shīr Nawā'ī (*decessit* A.D. 1501).¹ Again, when Ismā'il conquered the city of Tabrīz, the capital of Azerbaijan, in A.D. 1501/2, he was informed by the local Shī'ī divines that two-thirds of the population were Sunnīs; and these Shī'ī divines themselves attempted (though without success) to dissuade their militant co-religionist from imposing public conformity to Shi'ism upon the Sunnī majority of their fellow citizens at the sword's point.² When Ismā'il conquered the province of Fars in A.D. 1503, a number of the Sunnī doctors of the law in the city of Kāzārūn were put to death³; and their colleagues at Herat (including the local Sunnī Shaykh-al-Islam himself) shared the same fate when the province of Khurāsān was conquered by Ismā'il in A.D. 1510.⁴ The numerical weakness of the Shī'ah in Iran at this date is also attested in another way by the dearth of Shī'ī theological works at Tabrīz in A.D. 1501/2 when these were required for the instruction of the forcibly converted Sunnī majority;⁵ and, still more strikingly, by the dearth of Shī'ī divines throughout the territories of the Safawī Empire that was brought into existence by Ismā'il's conquests. This dearth was so extreme that, during the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, the Safawī Government found it necessary to import Shī'ī divines into Iran from the two Imāmī Shī'ī fastnesses in the Jabal 'Āmil and in Bahrayn, in spite of the linguistic barrier that divided these Arabic-speaking exponents of Shi'ism from the Persian-speaking converts whom it was their mission to instruct.⁶ And if Shi'ism was as weak as this, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, in Iran, it was weak *a fortiori* in the outlying regions in which the young Iranic Civilization had recently propagated itself. In Anatolia, for example, when the Ottoman Pādishāh Selīm (*imperabat* A.D. 1512-20) retorted to Ismā'il Shāh Safawī's forcible extirpation of the Sunnah in Iran by a wholesale massacre of the Shī'ī element in the Ottoman dominions, the number of the victims is estimated by contemporary authorities at the low figure of 40,000.⁷

Nor was Shi'ism weak in numbers only during the five centuries ending in the generation of Shāh Ismā'il. During this long intermediate period, as during the first four centuries of Islam, it was not—as it was to be from Shāh Ismā'il's generation onwards—the

¹ Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 456, following Bābur, ed. Beveridge, vol. i, p. 258.

² Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 22 and 53-4.

³ Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 55.

⁴ Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 63; see also Haydar Dūghlāt, Muhammad: *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, English translation by Elias, N., and Ross, E. D. (London 1895, Sampson Low & Martin), pp. 235-6.

⁵ Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 54.

⁶ See Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 360 and 427-8.

⁷ See Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 71-3. Sultan Selīm's massacre of the Anatolian Shī'is appears to have been perpetrated in A.D. 1514.

principal expression of an Iranian social consciousness. During this intermediate period, the Iranian social consciousness found its expression not in religion but in literature; and, at least ostensibly, the leading lights of Persian literary history, from Firdawsī (*vivebat circa* A.D. 930-1020)¹ to Jāmī (*vivebat* A.D. 1414-92)² inclusive, were not Shi'is but Sunnīs.³ While Shi'ism remained endemic in Iran, and indeed became endemic throughout the whole Iranic World, beyond the narrow limits of the Iranian Plateau, it was apparently regarded during these centuries as an obsolete faith which reflected the vanished conditions of a past age rather than anything vital in the contemporary life of the young Iranic body social.

The same tale is told by the nature of the relations between Shi'ism and Sunnism in the Iranic World after the emergence of the new society from the post-'Abbasid interregnum, in so far as the nature of these relations can be ascertained; for they appear, on the whole, to have been both static and tolerant. Between the close of the thirteenth and the opening of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, records of conversions to Shi'ism from Sunnism, or of militant Shi'ī outbreaks in the traditional style of the Khārijīs and the Carmathians and the Assassins, are few and far between. A certain proclivity towards the Shi'ah appears to have been shown by the Mongol Il-Khan Ghāzān (*regnabat* A.D. 1295-1304), who was the first convert to Islam in his dynasty,⁴ and by Ghāzān's brother and successor Uljaytū (*regnabat* A.D. 1305-16).⁵ But this *penchant* may be accounted for partly by the psychological bent towards empiricism and eclecticism in religion which was characteristic of all branches of the House of Chingis Khan, and partly by the political enmity between the Mongol Il-Khans and the Egyptian Mamlūks. Since the Mamlūks had proclaimed their Sunni orthodoxy ostentatiously by setting up at Cairo, in A.D. 1261, a ghost of that 'Abbasid Caliphate which the Mongols had overthrown at

¹ Firdawsī was accused of Shi'ism by his enemies.

² From the story cited by Browne in *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 510-11, it would appear that Jāmī himself, like his patron Sultan Husayn Bayqarā, had certain Shi'ī proclivities.

³ It will be seen that the Golden Age of Persian literature coincides with the period during which Shi'ism was under eclipse, as well as with the period during which the political power in Iran was in Turkish and Mongol but not in Iranian hands (see p. 360, footnote 1, above). These two chronological coincidences can hardly be accidental; and they are susceptible of a psychological explanation. We may perhaps venture to suppose that the Iranian spirit insisted upon finding some medium of self-expression in all ages and therefore resorted to different alternatives at different times according to the circumstances of the day. From the eleventh to the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, when Shi'ism was under eclipse, and when a political outlet was precluded by the political ascendancy of the Eurasian barbarian invaders, the whole power of the Iranic genius was concentrated upon literature. Conversely, Persian literature wilted as soon as the military triumph of Shāh Ismā'il had opened new political and religious outlets for the Iranian spirit by asserting in Iran the political ascendancy of the Iranians over the Turks and of the Shi'ah over the Sunnah. For the positive inclemency of the Safawī régime towards intellectual culture, see an extract, quoted on pp. 393-4, below, from a letter by a Persian friend of Professor Browne's in *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 26-8.

⁴ Ghāzān was converted in A.D. 1295.

⁵ Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 44 and 50-1.

Baghdad in A.D. 1258, it was natural that the Mongol masters of Iran and 'Irāq, when they decided to adopt the religion of their subjects, should think of adopting it in a form which was opposed to the Mamlūks' form of it, and which could not be taken to imply any recognition of the shadowy 'Abbasid Caliphate which the Mamlūks were maintaining in Egypt for their own political purposes. The fact that the Il-Khans eventually became Sunnīs and not Shi'is after all is another indication of the weakness of the Shi'ah and the strength of the Sunnah in Iran at this time. The Shi'ite proclivities of Sultan Husayn Bayqarā of Herat (*regnabat* A.D. 1468-1506) have been referred to already.¹ In the early part of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era and at the other end of the Iranic World, there seems to have been at least a tinge of Shi'ism, as well as Christianity, in the social revolutionary movement in the Ottoman Empire which came to a head in the revolt of Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn of Simāv against the Ottoman Government in A.D. 1416.² This movement, however, was abortive. In fine, the only effective and permanent conversion from Sunnism to Shi'ism of which there is a record in the Iranic World in this age is the conversion of the Safawī House: a family which possessed the hereditary headship of a religious order with its head-quarters in the Caspian Province of Gilān.³ The conversion of the Safawīs was of course an event of supreme historical importance, since these were the ancestors of Shāh Ismā'il.

It is certainly one of the curiosities of history that Shaykh Safiyu'd-Dīn, the founder of the Safawī House (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1252-1334), should not have been a Shi'i. Yet there is no evidence of his having held Shi'i tenets or even of his having had Shi'i proclivities, while he is positively asserted to have been a Sunnī in a letter addressed to Shaykh Safi's descendant Tahmāsp Shāh Safawī by the Uzbek Prince 'Ubaydallah Khan.⁴ The first head of the Safawī House whose Shi'ism is beyond question is Shaykh Safi's grandson and second successor, Shaykh Khwāja 'Alī (*pontificali munere fungebatur* A.D. 1392-1427). The conversion of the House to the Imāmī (i.e. the Twelve-Imām) version of Shi'ism—whether abruptly or gradually (as is perhaps more probable)—must have taken place between the pontificates of the grandfather and the grandson.⁵

¹ On p. 361, above.

² The revolt was started by a disciple of Bedr-ed-Dīn's at Qaraburun in Aydin, whereupon Bedr-ed-Dīn himself raised his standard in Rumelia (Delī Ormān). For Bedr-ed-Dīn see Babinger, Fr.: 'Schejch Bedr-ed-Dīn', in *Der Islam*, vols. xi and xii.

³ The modern Gilān corresponds approximately to the ancient Daylam.

⁴ See Browne, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 43-4. The letter, which was written in A.D. 1529/1530, is preserved in a contemporary historical work.

⁵ Khwāja 'Alī's contemporaries the Qāra Qöyünlü lords of Western Iran and 'Irāq (see p. 369 below) were also Shi'is according to Minorsky, V.: *La Perse au xiv^e siècle entre la Turquie et Venise* (Paris 1933, Leroux), p. 4.

This exceptional case of conversion from Sunnism to Shi'ism round about the fourteenth century of the Christian Era does not appear to have occasioned, on either side, any immediate outbreak of either aggressive or defensive fanaticism. Indeed it is Shaykh Khwāja 'Alī, the first of the Safawī line who was unquestionably a Shi'ī, who is reported to have prevailed upon Timur Lenk to liberate a number of his 'Osmanli prisoners' of war, notwithstanding the fact that the 'Osmanlis were a Sunnī community.¹ And the tolerant and humane attitude towards the adherents of the opposite sect, which this story ascribes to an enthusiastic Shi'ī, appears to have been also the attitude of the Sunnīs in this age towards the Shi'ah. The tolerance of the Ottoman Government, which was one of the principal Sunnī Powers of the day, is attested by the fact that Shāh Qūlī, who was a propagandist of the Shi'ī faith in the Ottoman dominions and a political agent of the Safawī Power into the bargain, was receiving a pension from the Ottoman Sultan Bāyezid II (*imperabat* A.D. 1481-1512), and was in friendly relations with Bāyezid's son Qorqūd, who was the Sultan's viceroy at Mānysa, down to the eve of the great rebellion of A.D. 1511-12, in which Shāh Qūlī sought to overthrow the Sunnī Ottoman Power in order that the Shi'ī Safawī Power might reign in its stead. In fact, the normal relation between the Sunnah and the Shi'ah, during the two centuries ending in the first decade of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, seems to have been the relation of 'live and let live' which still tempers the feud between them in India at this day.²

¹ Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 46. The liberated 'Osmanli prisoners and their descendants, the Sūfiyān-i-Rūmlū, became, of course, pious Shi'īs as well as devoted adherents of the Safawīs.

² In India, too, relations were often bad, and in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province they were apt to rankle into warfare. Nevertheless, the recrudescence of the feud seems to have been less violent in India than elsewhere, and this difference—if such there was—may have had several causes. For one thing, the subversive effect of Shāh Ismā'il's career upon the life of the other Iranic countries did not extend to Hindustan; for although Ismā'il's career affected Indian history indirectly by leading (as will appear below) to the invasion of India by Bābur, Bābur (as will also appear) was a Laodicean in his attitude towards the Sunnī-Shi'ī quarrel. Another manifest ground for the relative tolerance shown by Shi'īs and Sunnīs towards each other in India is the common consciousness of being members of an Islamic diaspora among a numerically overwhelming majority of Hindus to whom both forms of Islam are equally anathema. Though Bābur reverted to Sunnism after his final expulsion from Transoxania (see p. 379, below), and though his descendants in India remained Sunnīs thereafter, the paramount concern of the Mughals, as of all other Islamic Powers in India, was to maintain as large as possible an inflow of Muslim recruits from Dār-al-Islām to sustain the Islamic ascendancy in Hindustan; and they did not inquire too narrowly into the religious views of the Muslims who responded to their call. Since Iran was the nearest part of Dār-al-Islām to India, and since Iran had become an exclusively Shi'ī country in consequence of the Safawī conquests and the Safawī policy, the Shi'ī contingent in the Muslim immigration into India was considerable. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that although the Muslim masters of Orthodox Christendom were likewise a small minority dispersed among a numerically stronger non-Muslim subject population, this state of affairs did not here deter the Sunnīs from extirpating their Shi'ī co-religionists. The reason for this Ottoman ruthlessness towards the Shi'ah in Anatolia was that Anatolia was far more dangerously exposed than India was to attack by Shāh Ismā'il and his successors.

This amiable and reasonable relation between the two ancient sects of Islam in the Iranic World augured well for the prospects of the rising Iranic Civilization. Unhappily, persecution was substituted for toleration and hatred for indifference or goodwill by the action of two princes: the Safawī Shāh Ismā'il (*dominabatur* A.D. 1499/1500-1523/4) and the 'Osmanlı Sultan Selim I (*imperabat* A.D. 1512-20)—an adversary in whom the violent and implacable character of Ismā'il found its match, to the undoing of the Iranic Society which had given birth to both these men of blood. In this savage encounter, which changed the course of Islamic history by reopening a breach which has only begun to close again within living memory, the initiative was taken by Ismā'il; and it continued to remain with him even after his signal discomfiture by Selim in A.D. 1514. Accordingly, the career of Ismā'il, and not the career of Selim, is the guiding thread which we have to follow.

The Career of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī down to A.D. 1511

Ismā'il's career provokes two questions: First, how was it that the heir to the headship of a religious order—and an order which was committed to non-violence by its tenets¹—now burst upon the World as a military conqueror and became the founder of a political empire? And, second, what was Ismā'il's ultimate military and political aim?

The answer to the first question is that the metamorphosis of the Safawī organization from a religious order propagating itself by pacific missionary enterprise² into a political power extending its dominion by military force had been accomplished already by Ismā'il Shāh's grandfather Shaykh Junayd (*militabat* A.D. 1447-56), who was the grandson of Shaykh Khwāja 'Alī and the great-great-grandson of Shaykh Safī. Shaykh Junayd was evidently tempted to abandon Imāmī principles, revolutionize Safawī practice, and try his fortune in the political and military arena by the political vacuum that was created in Iran and 'Irāq by the utter disintegration of the Timurid Empire after the death of Shāh Rukh—an event which occurred in the very year of Shaykh Junayd's accession. Shaykh Junayd raised a military force of ten thousand 'Saints Militant' (*Ghuzāt-i-Sūfiyah*); and his son and successor Shaykh Haydar (*militabat* A.D. 1456-88), who was the father and predecessor of Shāh Ismā'il, gave the Safawī troops their distinctive uniform, the scarlet cap of twelve gores, which gained them their nickname of 'Red Heads' (*Qyzyl Bāsh*). Both Shaykh

¹ On this point see p. 359, above.

² By the time of Shaykh Junayd, who was the head of the House from A.D. 1447 to A.D. 1456, the Safawīs had gained adherents throughout the Iranic World, 'from the remotest West to the limits of Balkh and Bukhārā'. (See Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 51.)

Junayd and Shaykh Haydar fell in battle.¹ It will be seen that the Safawī military tradition was inherited and not created by Ismā'il, though Ismā'il himself was the first of his line to pursue the military career with success. For weal or woe, however, the Safawī House had taken decisively to militarism between Junayd's accession in A.D. 1447 and Ismā'il's in A.D. 1499/1500.²

When we inquire into Ismā'il's ultimate aim when in A.D. 1499/1500, at the age of thirteen, he started to turn his inherited military power to account, we find that he aimed at nothing less than the military conquest of the entire Iranic World and that he proposed to use his power in order to impose the faith of the Shī'ī minority of the Iranic Society upon the consciences of the Sunnī majority by sheer force. The two objectives have to be distinguished, because the second was a sensational and deplorable departure from the Iranic practice of 'live and let live', whereas the former was a natural reflection of the social unity of the Iranic World, which had remained unbroken down to Ismā'il's day.³

Ismā'il's oecumenical ambitions are revealed in the organization of his army. Two of his army corps bore the names of Türkmen tribes—the Avshārs and the Qājārs⁴—and this Turkish tribal element was perhaps the nucleus,⁵ since the Safawī battle-cry was in the Turkish language,⁶ and a Turkish vernacular was Ismā'il's own mother-tongue, as is testified by the evidence of his poetical works.⁷ The majority of the corps, however, bore geographical names which corresponded to the dominions of various Sunnī Powers of the day.⁸ Presumably the soldiers who served in each of these Safawī corps were actually recruited from the respective countries after which the corps were named; and the names were tantamount to an announcement of Ismā'il's intention to extend his rule over each of these countries through the military prowess of his local adherents who had already rallied to his banner. If this

¹ For Shaykhs Junayd and Haydar, see Browne, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 47-8.

² The history of the Safawis is one example of the historical phenomenon of a would-be universal church becoming militant and paying the penalty of military success by turning into a local state. Other examples are the transformation of the Zoroastrian Church into the Sasanian Empire, and the history of the Sikhs. This phenomenon is examined further in Part VIII, below.

³ See pp. 350-3, above.

⁴ Sections of the Avshārs ranged as far afield as the Uzun Yayla (the watershed between the Euphrates and the Halys) on the west and Khurāsān eastward. The Khurāsāni Avshārs gave birth, two centuries later, to Nādir Shah. The Qājārs, who had established themselves in the Caspian Provinces, gave birth to the Turkish dynasty that ruled the Empire of Iran from A.D. 1779 (officially from 1796) to A.D. 1925.

⁵ Mirza Haydar Dūghlāt calls the Safawī troops 'Türkmens' in the *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, and Mirza Haydar's cousin Bābur gives them the same name in his *Memoirs* (e.g. on pp. 635-6 of vol. ii of Beveridge's edition).

⁶ Browne, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 15.

⁷ For Ismā'il's Turkish verses, see the citation from Browne on p. 353, above.

⁸ For the names of Ismā'il's army corps, see Browne, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 14 and 52, footnote 1.

interpretation is right, the names tell their own tale. The Rūmlū corps was presumably recruited from the descendants of those 'Osmanlī prisoners of war whose liberty had been obtained from Timur Lenk by one of Ismā'il's ancestors.¹ The Hāmyd-lī and the Tekke-lī were presumably recruited from the South-West Anatolian principalities of Hāmyd and Tekke²: two Turkish 'successor-states' of the Anatolian Saljūq Empire which had been conquered, in A.D. 1381-91 and A.D. 1450 respectively, by the 'Osmanlis, after the 'Osmanlis had grown to be a match for all the other 'successor-states' of the Saljūqs combined, in consequence of their conquests in Europe. Hāmyd and Tekke had submitted, perforce, to the Ottoman yoke; but their people had never forgotten that their new 'Osmanlī masters had been the least among the successors of the Saljūqs in the beginning; and their consequent restiveness under Ottoman rule apparently found expression in Shi'ism. The Hāmyd-lī and the Tekke-lī fought for Ismā'il Shāh Safawī as their future liberator from their present Ottoman masters. Another of Shāh Ismā'il's corps, the Dhu'l-Qadar,³ were presumably recruited from the principality of that name in the highlands of South-Eastern Anatolia which was the buffer-state between the 'Osmanlis and the Egyptian Mamlūks. The Shāmlū were presumably recruited from the Mamlūk dominions in Shām or Syria (e.g. from among the Imāmī Shī'īs of the Jabal 'Āmil). The Mawsyl-līs must have been Arab or Kurdish recruits from Mawsil (Mosul): a key-point on the line of march between Ismā'il's base of operations in Gilān and the Shī'ī holy cities in 'Irāq.

While this list of names reveals Ismā'il's ambitions, his prospects of success, when he started on his career of conquest in A.D. 1500, can hardly be appreciated without a preliminary glance at the political state of the Iranic World in that year.

The two governing factors in the situation were, first, the collapse and disintegration of the empire which had been established over the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and Iran and 'Irāq, a century earlier, by Timur Lenk;⁴ and, second, the settled policy of the 'Osmanlis, which was to concentrate all their energies upon making conquests in Europe and to limit their action in Asia to the minimum necessary in order to cover their rear.

¹ For this incident, see p. 365, above.

² Hāmyd-lī recruits in Ismā'il's army are mentioned by Babinger in op. cit. (*Der Islam*, vol. xi, p. 85). In A.D. 1534, at the moment when the Ottoman Sultan Suleymān invaded 'Irāq, a Tekke-lī garrison was holding Baghdad for Shāh Ismā'il's son and successor, Shāh Tahmāsp. (See Longrigg, S. H.: *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq* (Oxford 1926, Clarendon Press), p. 23.)

³ An Ilyas Beg Dhu'l-Qadar was Ismā'il's first governor of Shīrāz (Browne, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 56).

⁴ For Timur's career as a response of the Iranic Society to the challenge of Eurasian Nomadism, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 144-50, below.

Timur's Empire had proved ephemeral.¹ In Western Iran and 'Irāq, it had not outlasted its founder's lifetime. In these regions, the dominion had passed in A.D. 1405, the very year of Timur's death, to Türkmen tribes of the same breed as Ismā'il's Avshārs and Qājārs. From A.D. 1405 to 1411, Western Iran and 'Irāq had been partitioned between the Qāra Qōyūnlū and the Jalayrs, while since A.D. 1411 the two territories had been dominated by a single Türkmen tribe: the Qāra Qōyūnlū from A.D. 1411 to 1469, and the Āq Qōyūnlū thereafter. In Khurāsān and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, the Timurid Empire had held together, in a ramshackle fashion, for half a century longer; but, after the death of Shāh Rukh in A.D. 1447, it had fallen to pieces even in its homelands. During the last half of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, the Timurid domain in these regions was partitioned among a multitude of small, shifting, warring Timurid principalities which presented as melancholy a contrast to the Empire of Timur as was presented to the Empire of Charlemagne by the Carolingian principalities after the Partition of Verdun in A.D. 843.²

This collapse of the Timurid Power had given the 'Osmanlis relief without tempting them either to take their revenge for the wanton blow which Timur had dealt them, or again to indulge their ambitions by occupying the new vacuum on their Asiatic frontier. They contented themselves with restoring their Asiatic dominions to the limits at which they had stood before Timur intervened in Anatolia: and when, half a century after the overthrow of Bāyezīd I by Timur at Angora in A.D. 1402, Bāyezīd's successor Mehmed the Conqueror (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81) found the Ottoman Power sufficiently recuperated to go into action again, he deliberately pursued the established policy of his House. In spite of his name and fame, Mehmed Pādishāh 'Osmānlī was not a 'conqueror' in the same sense as either Timur Lenk or Ismā'il Shāh Safawī; for he was not aiming at an oecumenical dominion. He is famous because he set himself with success to round off an empire which had expanded steadily within definite limits. The 'Osmanlis were an Iranic community which had started life in the borderland between the Iranic and the Orthodox Christian worlds and had acquired an empire by conquering Orthodox Christian territories.³

¹ The main cause of Timur's failure was the perversity with which he repeatedly turned aside from his mission of imposing the Iranic Civilization upon the Eurasian Steppe in order to wage an internecine warfare in the interior of the Iranic World against other Iranic Powers. (On this point, see further Part IV, below.) Timur's waywardness contrasts strikingly with the steadfastness of the 'Osmanlis in confining themselves to their own mission of conquering Orthodox Christendom.

² For the tripartite partition of the Carolingian Empire in A.D. 843 and its historical significance, see I. B (iv), above.

³ For the growth of the Ottoman Empire as a response to the challenge which confronts a warden of the marches, see II. D (v), vol. II, pp. 150-4, below.

The historical function of the Ottoman empire-builders was to bring the Orthodox Christian Society's 'Time of Troubles' to a close by uniting the whole of the main body of Orthodox Christendom politically into one universal state under an alien Pax Ottomanica.¹ And this Ottoman task, which had been interrupted, on the verge of completion, by Timur's tempestuous passage, was duly completed by Sultan Mehmed II.

Mehmed spent his life in wiping out those enclaves of territory in the Balkan and Anatolian peninsulas which had not yet fallen under Ottoman sovereignty; and with one or two exceptions—e.g. the Hungarian stronghold in Belgrade and the stronghold of the Knights of St. John on the Island of Rhodes and a few Venetian strongholds in the Aegean—he had substantially achieved his life-work before his death in A.D. 1481. The conquest of the East Roman Imperial City of Constantinople in A.D. 1453 was simply the most conspicuous achievement in this limited and definite series. On his Asiatic land-frontier, Mehmed's programme included the annexation of the Greek principality of Trebizond and the Turkish principality of Qāramān (the senior 'successor-state' of the Anatolian Saljūq Empire, and a more formidable adversary than the shadow of the East Roman Empire).² And when he had conquered Trebizond in 1461 and Qāramān in 1465, he refused to be drawn on farther eastward. His non-expansion policy in this quarter became apparent when he was threatened with an attack on the part of Uzun Hasan, the prince of the Āq Qōyūnlū Türkmens who was alarmed at the fall of Qāramān and Trebizond and at the same time elated by his own succession to the lordship of 'Irāq and Western Iran. Mehmed forestalled this danger by an offensive defensive, invaded Uzun Hasan's territory, and inflicted a defeat on the Türkmens at Bayburt in 1473. But he made no motion to follow this victory up. It is true that Mehmed's death on the 3rd May 1481 overtook him marching eastward again; but his objective on this occasion was probably limited to the buffer-state of Dhu'l-Qadar in South-Eastern Anatolia; and before his death he had dispatched another expeditionary force, in exactly the opposite direction, to occupy Otranto in the heel of Italy.³ When these two simultaneous military enterprises at the end of Mehmed the Conqueror's reign are taken together, they give the impression that Death found him still at work upon his precise and limited pro-

¹ For the means by which the 'Osmanlis equipped themselves for performing this function, see Part III A, vol. iii, pp. 28-44, below.

² For the rivalry between the 'Osmanlis and the Qaramanlis, which ended, after continuing for two centuries, in the definitive Ottoman victory of A.D. 1465, see further II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 151-3, below.

³ This force had duly occupied Otranto in July 1480; but, after Mehmed's death, it was soon withdrawn by Mehmed's unenterprising successor Bāyezid II.

gramme of making the Ottoman Empire conterminous with the area once covered by the East Roman and Bulgarian Empires; and the Taurus Range and Trebizond marked the historical limits of the East Roman Empire in Asia. Until the appearance on the scene of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī, with his programme of oecumenical conquest and forcible conversion to Shi'ism, there is no indication of any Ottoman ambition to expand in Asia, outside the historical limits of Orthodox Christendom, at the expense of other Islamic Powers, just as there is none of any Ottoman intolerance towards the Shi'ah. The military and religious aggressiveness of Ismā'il eventually forced a profound change of policy upon the 'Osmanlis on both these heads.

At the outset, however, the persistent and deliberate passivity of the Ottoman policy in Asia worked together with the disintegration of the Timurid Power to give Ismā'il Shāh Safawī's ambitions a free field. The derelict Timurid domain was virtually at the disposal of the first comer; and the portion of the prize that lay nearest to Ismā'il's base of operations in Gilān was the western half, in which the Timurid régime had not only broken down but had disappeared altogether. The Āq Qōyūnlū Türkmens, who had squatted, in the Timurids' place, in 'Irāq and in Western Iran, were no match for the Avshār and Qājār Türkmens of Ismā'il, whose native Nomad hardihood and energy were fortified by religious fanaticism as well as by hereditary devotion to the family of their leader, and whose numbers were reinforced by recruits from the Shi'i minority in the dominions of the Shi'ite paladin's Sunnī adversaries. Ismā'il's first military success was the defeat and slaughter of the King of Shīrwān (the slayer of Ismā'il's father Haydar) in A.D. 1500. The decisive victory in this first stage of Ismā'il's career was the overthrow of the Āq Qōyūnlū at the Battle of Shurūr in A.D. 1501/2: a triumph which was followed by the crowning of Ismā'il in Tabriz and by the sensational inauguration of his religious policy of wholesale conversion by force. Between A.D. 1500 and A.D. 1508 (the year of his conquest of Baghdad), Ismā'il had eliminated all powers and principalities, great or small, that challenged his mastery over an area which extended from the province of Shīrwān, at the south-eastern foot of the Caucasus, to the province of Kirmān on the south-western border of the Dash-i-Lūt, the Central Desert of Iran.

What were to be Ismā'il's relations with the petty Timurid princes who still retained a precarious hold upon Khurāsān and Transoxania between the north-eastern border of the Central Desert of Iran and the southern fringe of the Eurasian Steppe? This question was answered for Ismā'il by the apparition of a rival

aspirant to the Timurid inheritance who had been conquering the north-eastern half of it while Ismā'il had been similarly engaged in the west. This competitor was a new Eurasian Nomad intruder upon Iranic soil, in the shape of Shaybāk or Shaybānī Khan, the leader of the Uzbegs.

This fresh invasion of the Islamic World by a Eurasian Nomad horde within less than a century after the death of Timur Lenk was a signal proof that Timur's life-work was utterly undone. It had been Timur's mission to liberate the oases of Transoxania from Nomad domination and to establish an Iranic military and political ascendancy over the Eurasian Nomadic World.¹ But Timur had turned aside from the completion of this constructive task in order to exhaust the energies of the Iranic Society in barren fratricidal conflicts with the contemporary Iranic Powers in Western Iran and 'Irāq and Hindustan and Anatolia.² The return of the Nomadic tide within less than a century was the nemesis for the wanton misdirection of aim which had wrecked Timur's career. The Uzbeg invasion of Transoxania and Khurāsān in the first decade of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era was the more portentous inasmuch as it was not, apparently, occasioned by any deterioration in the physical environment of the Nomadic life on the Uzbegs' Eurasian ranges. The physical pressure resulting from a desiccation of the Steppe accounts for many of the most violent and sensational eruptions of Nomadic conquerors from 'the Desert' into 'the Sown'; but 'the Pulse of Asia' appears to beat in a rhythmical alternation of aridity and humidity; and the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era appears to fall within what was a relatively humid period in the alternating rhythm. Thus the Uzbegs' irruption into the Iranic World at this date can hardly be accounted for by a physical push from behind; and it must therefore be attributed to a social pull from in front.³ The political vacuum left by the collapse of the Timurid Empire was drawing in the Uzbegs from one quarter at the moment when it was drawing in the Qyzyl-Bāsh from the other.

The horde which thus undid Timur's work within a century of his death was not one of those hordes that Timur himself had encountered and chastised. Timur had crushed the Chaghatāy horde of Mughalistan or Zungaria who had been the previous

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 144-50, below.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (xi), vol. iv, pp. 491-501, below.

³ For these two alternative external agencies which apparently account, between them, for all the recorded eruptions of the Nomads from the Eurasian and the Afrasian Steppe alike, see further Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, below. There does, however, appear to be some evidence for at least a subsidiary and temporary fluctuation in the direction of aridity round about A.D. 1500 (see vol. iii, pp. 439 and 447).

Nomad suzerains of Transoxania; and he had crushed the Jūji hordes of Qipchāq, whose vast appanage had embraced a suzerainty over Khwārizm at one extremity and over Russia at the other.¹ Though Timur had harried the Eurasian Steppe victoriously from coast to coast—a feat which many sedentary Powers had attempted but which none had achieved before him²—there were other tenants of the vast Steppe whose ranges were so remote from Samarqand that they had lain beyond the reach of even Timur's arm; and one of these was the horde whose alternative eponyms were Shaybān and Uzbek and whose proper ranges were in Western Siberia.

In the middle of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era these Uzbeks, who had escaped unscathed by Timur's passage, attempted to dispossess their neighbours and cousins the White Horde, who had received the full shock of the impact. The White Horde's ranges lay on the Steppes of Eastern Qipchāq, between the western foot of the Altai and the east bank of the Lower Volga: a less inclement region than the Uzbeks' sub-arctic appanage on the banks of the Irtysh and the Ob. This enterprise, which was undertaken about A.D. 1428 by the Uzbek Khan Abu'l-Khayr, was unsuccessful; for after the Uzbek leader's death in A.D. 1469/70 the White Horde, whom he had temporarily driven out of Qipchāq into Mughalistan, surged back westward into their hereditary domain and forcibly incorporated the majority of the Uzbek intruders into their own tribal organization. Towards the close of the fifteenth century, Abu'l-Khayr's grandson, Muhammad Shaybānī, found himself—with only a remnant of an Uzbek horde that he could call his own—constrained to seek a livelihood, off the Steppe, in the service of some sedentary Power.

Muhammad Shaybānī had the choice of seeking his fortune in either of two alternative directions. He might turn towards Russia or turn towards Transoxania; and, if he had come upon the scene a century or so earlier, he would probably have chosen the former objective, for Russia had been one of the easiest as well as the widest conquests of 'the Sown' which the Eurasian Nomads had made in their latest and greatest eruption out of 'the Desert', under Mongol leadership, in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era. At the close of the fifteenth century, the Mongol Khanate of Jūji's appanage which had exercised this Nomad dominion over Russia was still in existence at the Saray on the left bank of the Volga, just below the elbow where that river's course approaches closest to the

¹ Chaghatāy and Jūji were sons of Chingis Khān whose descendants and followers had received these domains as their appanages (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 144-5 and 146-7, below).

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 146, below.

course of the Don.¹ But Saray now offered no attractive prospect to a Nomad soldier of fortune; for Russia had become more than a match for the Nomads after the union of the two strongest Russian states—the Grand Duchy of Muscovy and the Republic of Novgorod—in A.D. 1478; and the Russians did not wait long before they passed over to the offensive. In 1502, when Muhammad Shaybānī was busy carving out a kingdom for himself at the expense of his fellow Muslims in Transoxania, Saray was annexed by Russia; and this was the first step in a Russian advance which only found its term, four centuries later, on the coast of the Pacific and on the summit of the Pamirs.²

Meanwhile, Shaybānī Khān Uzbek had made better provision for his own fortunes—though not for the interests of the Iranic Society or of Islam—by turning his face in the other alternative direction. He repaired to Transoxania; took service with the Timurid Government at Bukhārā; changed sides in a battle between his Timurid master and the Chaghatāy Khān of Western Mughalistan; was rewarded by his new patron with the governorship of Tashqand; and used this post as ‘a jumping-off ground’ for springing, on his own account, upon the Timurid dominions of Bukhārā and Samarqand.³

Muhammad Shaybānī’s conquest of the two chief cities of Transoxania was achieved in the same year—A.D. 1500—in which Ismā’il Safawī made his military début at the opposite end of the *ci-devant* Timurid Empire by conquering the Transcaucasian province of Shīrwān;⁴ and thereafter the two conquerors pushed

¹ The Khans who ruled at Saray at the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era were descendants of Toqatmysh, the Khan of the White Horde who had momentarily united all the hordes of Jūji’s appanage under a single leadership in A.D. 1381—for the first and last time—and had sacked Moscow in 1382 (in reprisal for the first Russian attempt to shake off the Tatar yoke), before he crossed the path of Timur. (For the collision between Toqatmysh Khan and Timur, see further II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 146–8, below.)

² The fate which overtook the Khanate of Saray in A.D. 1502 was shared, in 1552 and 1554 respectively, by the sister-Khanates of Qāzān and Astrakhān; and the Khanate of the Crimea was only saved by its previous acceptance of an Ottoman protectorate. Even the ‘Osmanlis were defeated by the Russians when they attempted, in 1568–70, to seize the isthmus between the Don and the Volga in order to link the two waterways by a canal. (For this incident, see further II. D (vii), Annex VII, vol. ii, below.) The Russians consolidated their victory by building the fortress of Cherkask on the River Don, almost within sight of the sea of Azov. In the subsequent Russian advance, the pioneers were the Cossacks, who duly accomplished the feat, which Timur had brilliantly essayed, of being the first sedentary Power to bring the Eurasian Nomadism into lasting subjection. (See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 154–7, below.) The homeland of the Uzbeks in Western Siberia was overrun by the Cossacks before the end of the sixteenth century.

³ Muhammad Shaybānī’s residence at Tashqand as governor on behalf of the Western Chaghatāy Khān appears to have lasted at least a decade; for the battle in which he deserted from the Timurids to the Chaghatayids seems to have been fought about 1488–9, while Shaybānī’s conquest of Bukhārā and Samarqand did not take place till A.D. 1500. He may have spent the interval in gathering round him the scattered sheep—or wolves—of his ancestral Uzbek horde. For Muhammad Shaybānī’s career down to A.D. 1500, see Muhammad Haydar Dughlāt: *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, English translation by Elias and Ross, cited above, *passim*, and especially pp. 82, 92, 115–16, 158–60, 166, 272–3.

⁴ See p. 371, above.

forward into Iran with equal speed from the north-east and the north-west towards 'the natural frontier' of the Central Desert. The Timurids were as utterly outmatched by the Shaybānī as the Āq Qōyūnlū were by the Safawī. In A.D. 1501-2, the young Timurid prince Bābur, who had inherited the small and out-of-the-way province of Farghānā, made his first entry upon the stage of history in a gallant attempt to retrieve for his House their lost Transoxanian dominions. He actually recovered Samarqand for a moment—only to be driven out and to lose his own patrimony of Farghānā into the bargain. Thereafter, in A.D. 1502-3, Bābur persuaded the Chaghatāy Khans of Western and Eastern Mughalistan to join forces with each other and with himself in an attempt to drive the Uzbeks out of Farghānā; but the Shaybānī was stronger than the coalition. He took the two Khans prisoner and annexed the greater part of the Chaghatay Horde's ranges, as well as the province of Tāshqand, which he had formerly governed as their agent, while Bābur fled to Afghanistan. Thereupon, in A.D. 1505-8, the Shaybānī conquered Khwārizm with one hand and Khurāsān with the other, until, of all the House of Timur, Bābur, and Bābur only, was left in the field; and Bābur was a fugitive from his home.

Muhammad Shaybānī's next enterprises, however, were less successful. In A.D. 1509, when he turned on his tracks and invaded the Qipchāq Steppe, he was roughly handled by the White Horde and the *ci-devant* Uzbeks whom they had incorporated;¹ and in 1510 he committed the folly of poaching upon Ismā'il Safawī's preserves. In this year he crossed the Iranian desert, raided the province of Kirmān,² and sent 'a most insulting letter in reply to Ismā'il's politely worded remonstrance'.³ The Safawī retorted to this provocation by marching against the Shaybānī and bringing him to battle at Tāhir-ābād, near Merv. In this second decisive battle in Shāh Ismā'il's career, which was fought on the 1st or 2nd December 1510, the Uzbeks were heavily defeated by the Qyzyl Bāsh, and Muhammad Khān Shaybānī himself was among the slain.

This victory doubled Ismā'il's power at one stroke; and the events which followed played still further into his hands. Upon the news of Tāhir-ābād, Bābur promptly issued out of his fastness in Afghanistan and attempted once again to recover Transoxania with the aid of 20,000 Chaghatāy Mughals who had been transplanted from Zungaria to Khurāsān by Muhammad Shaybānī. The Uzbeks,

¹ Muhammad Haydar Dūghlāt: *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, translation by Elias and Ross, pp. 230-1.

² Perhaps this raid was executed in the same campaign as an unsuccessful expedition (likewise attributed to the year 1510) against the Hazaras, a stray Mongol tribe which had been left stranded on the south side of the Hindu Kush.

³ Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 64.

however, had been defeated by Ismā'il without being annihilated; and Bābur found that they were still too strong for him when he measured his strength against them once more in January 1511. At this juncture, when Bābur was marking time, baffled, at Qūndūz, on the south side of the Oxus, Ismā'il intervened. He sent an embassy to Bābur bringing Bābur's sister (she was Shaybānī's widow) and an offer of friendship; and this courtly gesture on Ismā'il's part seems to have been followed by negotiations between the heir of the Safawis and the heir of the Timurids over which the later historians of Bābur and his orthodox Sunnī descendants have discreetly drawn a veil.¹ The fact seems to be that the two princes struck an unholy bargain. Bābur, on his part, seems to have asked for, and received, a promise of military assistance from Ismā'il; while Ismā'il, on his part, seems to have made his military assistance conditional upon Bābur's conversion to Shi'ism, and to have received Bābur's assurance that he would accept Ismā'il's help on Ismā'il's terms.²

Whatever the understanding may have been, there is no question about the sequel.

The first result was that, in October 1511, Bābur returned to the attack with a Qyzyl Bāsh army supporting him; and that, with this support, he achieved in the autumn what he had failed to achieve in the preceding winter. He successfully reoccupied Samarqand and drove the Uzbek invaders out of the Transoxanian oases into their native steppes. This victory, won with Ismā'il's aid by a fugitive prince who had become Ismā'il's lieutenant, was Ismā'il's own victory in effect; and thereafter, during the interval between the campaigning seasons of A.D. 1511 and A.D. 1512, Ismā'il stood at the height of his power. He had crowned the conquests of the past twelve years by assuming the position of Warden of the North-Eastern Marches of South-Western Asia over against the Great Eurasian Steppe; and two thousand years of history bore witness that, time and again, the effective wardens of these marches had derived from their wardenship the title to be the ruling, or at any rate the paramount, Power in the region which they were defending, as far south as the Indian Ocean and as far west as the Mediterranean. The Medes had won this power by expelling the Scyths; the Achaemenids by keeping out the Massagetae; the Umayyads by expelling and the 'Abbasids by keeping out the Türgesh; Timur Lenk by expelling the Mughal 'jātah'; and at other times there had

¹ We do not know how Bābur handled this delicate and dubious transaction himself, since the relevant section of his *Memoirs* is lost.

² The lukewarmness, to say the least of it, towards the Sunnah, which this reputed bargain presupposes on Bābur's part, may perhaps be brought into relation with the reported Shi'ite proclivities of a kinsman of Bābur's in the preceding generation, Sultan Husayn Bayqarā (see p. 361, above).

been other wardens of the same marches—the Greek princes of Bactria and the Sāmānids and the Khwārizm Shāhs—who, short of being the masters of all South-Western Asia, had been the foremost Powers in the South-Western Asia of their day.¹ In the winter of A.D. 1511–12, the Imperial mantle conferred by this wardenship, which had been worn last by Timur a century back, appeared to have descended upon the shoulders of Shāh Ismā'il in virtue of the mutually advantageous compact between the Safawī empire-builder and the last of the Timūrids, Bābur. At this point, however, which was the zenith of his career, Shāh Ismā'il was overtaken by the nemesis of his dual ambition: the ambition to win an oecumenical empire by conquest and to use this political power in order to impose the minoritarian religion of Shi'ism upon a Sunnī majority by main force.

The Career of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī after A.D. 1511

The first chapter in the story of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī's discomfiture (which also involved the temporary and local discomfiture of Bābur Pādishāh Tīmūrī) is plainly set out in the following passages in the *Tarikh-i-Rashidī*:

'Now when the Emperor [Bābur] arrived in Bokhārā, he sent back the auxiliaries of Shāh Ismā'il, after praising them for their services and bestowing upon them adequate rewards, while he himself, victorious and covered with glory, proceeded to Samarqand. All the inhabitants of the towns of Mā-warā-an-Nahr²—high and low, nobles and poor men, grandees and artizans, princes and peasants—alike testified their joy at the advent of the Emperor. He was received by the nobles, while the other classes were busy with the decoration of the town. The streets and the bazaars were draped with cloth and gold brocades, and drawings and pictures were hung up on every side. The Emperor entered the city in the middle of the month of Rajab in the year 917,³ in the midst of such pomp and splendour as no one has ever seen or heard of, before or since. The angels cried aloud: "Enter with peace", and the people exclaimed: "Praise be to God, Lord of the Universe." The people of Mā-warā-an-Nahr, especially the inhabitants of Samarqand, had for years been longing for him to come, that the shadow of his protection might be cast upon them. Although, in the hour of necessity, the Emperor had clothed himself in the garments of Qyzył Bāsh (which was pure heresy; nay, almost unbelief), they sincerely hoped, when he mounted the throne of Samarqand (the throne of the Law of the Prophet), and placed on his head the diadem of the holy Sunnah of Muhammad, that he would remove from it the crown of royalty (Shāhī), whose nature was heresy and whose form was as the tail of an ass.

¹ This wardenship of the marches, and the political perquisites which it was apt to bring with it, are dealt with further in II. D (v), vol. ii, on pp. 138–44, below.

² i.e. Transoxania.—A. J. T.

³ i.e. the October of A.D. 1511.—A. J. T.

'But the hopes of the people of Samarqand were not realised. For, as yet, the Emperor did not feel able to dispense with the aid of Shāh Ismā'il; nor did he consider himself sufficiently strong to cope single-handed with the Uzbek; hence he appeared to overlook (*mudāra*) the gross errors of the Qyzyl Bāsh. On this account, the people of Mā-warā-an-Nahr ceased to feel that intense longing for the Emperor which they had entertained while he was absent—their regard for him was at an end. It was thus that the Emperor began (already) to flatter the Türkmens [i.e. the Qyzyl Bāsh], and associate himself with them. . . .

'When the Emperor, in Rajab 917,¹ mounted the throne of Samarqand, as has been stated above, the learned men and nobles of Mā-warā-an-Nahr were indignant at his attachment to Shāh Ismā'il and at his adoption of the Türkmen style of dress. When that winter had passed and spring had set in (the plentiful drops of her rain having clothed the earth in green raiment) the Uzbek advanced out of Turkistan. Their main body marched against Tāshqand, while 'Ubaydallah² went to Bukhārā by way of Yati Kuduk. As the citadel of Tāshqand had been fortified by Amir Ahmad Qāsim Kuhbur, (the Emperor) sent him some reinforcements, under the command of such men as Amir Dust Nāsir, Sultan Muhammad Dulādī,³ and others, while he himself (the Emperor) advanced on Bukhārā. When he neared the town, news of his approach reached 'Ubaydallah Khan, who (becoming alarmed) immediately drew his bridle and returned along the road by which he had just come. The Emperor pursued him, overtook him at Kūl Malik, and compelled him to retreat. 'Ubaydallah Khan had 3,000 men with him, while the Emperor had 40,000. 'Ubaydallah Khan having repeated to the end of the verse: "And how often has not a small force defeated a large one, by the permission of God?" (faced the Emperor), and a fierce battle began to rage. God, the most high, has shown to the peoples of the Earth, and especially to kings and rulers, that no boast is to be made of, no reliance to be placed in, the numbers of an army nor [in] their equipment; for He in His might gives victory to whomsoever He will.

'Thus 'Ubaydallah Khan, with 3,000 shattered (*rikhta*) men, who eight months previously had retreated before this same force, now entirely defeated an army of 40,000, perfectly equipped and mounted on fine horses (*tupchāq*).⁴ This event occurred in Safar of the year 918.⁵ The Emperor had reigned eight months in Samarqand.

'When the Emperor returned to Samarqand, he was unable to get a firm footing upon the steps of the throne, and so, bidding farewell to the sovereignty of Samarqand, he hastened to Hisār. He sent one ambassador after another to Shāh Ismā'il, to inform him of what had passed, and to beg for succour. Shāh Ismā'il granted his request, and sent Mīr Najm, his commander-in-chief, with 60,000 men, to his aid. Thus at the beginning of the winter succeeding that spring, (the allies)

¹ i.e. the October of A.D. 1511.—A. J. T.

² 'Ubaydallah was the nephew of Muhammad Khān Shaybānī, and his successor in the leadership of the Uzbek Horde.—A. J. T.

³ ? Dūldā'i.—A. J. T.

⁵ i.e. the April and May of A.D. 1512.—A. J. T.

⁴ ? Tūpūchāq.—A. J. T.

once more marched against the Uzbek. On reaching Qarshī, they found that Shaykhīm Mirzā, the uncle of 'Ubaydallah Khan, had strengthened the fort of Qarshī. They, therefore, began by laying siege to the fort, which they quickly reduced. Then they put to death Shaykhīm Mirzā, and massacred the whole of the people of the fort, killing both high and low—the sucklings and the decrepit.¹

'Of the Uzbek Sultans, each one had fortified himself in his own castle. Thus Jānī Beg Sultan had stood on the defensive in the fort of Ghajdavān. When the Türkmens had finished with Qarshī they asked the Emperor about the condition of all the fortified cities of Mā-warā-an-Nahr, and he described them one by one. It appeared that the easiest of all to take was that of Ghajdavān; towards it, therefore, they marched. The Uzbek Sultans heard of their coming, and entered the fort on the same night that the Türkmens and the Emperor, who were encamped before the place, were busy preparing their siege implements. At dawn they arranged their forces in the midst of the suburbs, and stood facing (the enemy). On the other side, too, preparations were made for a fight. Since the Uzbek were in the midst of the suburbs, the field of battle was narrow. The Uzbek infantry began to pour forth their arrows from every corner, so that very soon the claws of Islam twisted the hands of heresy and unbelief, and victory declared for the True Faith [i.e. for the Sunnah]. The victorious breezes of Islam overturned the banners of the schismatics. (The Türkmens) were so completely routed that most of them perished on the field; all the rents that had been made by the swords of Qarshī were now sewn up with the arrow-stitches of vengeance. They sent Mīr Najm and all the Türkmens Amirs to Hell. The Emperor retired, broken and crestfallen, to Hisār.²

Every line of this passage breathes an implacable Sunnī hatred of the Shi'ah and the Qyzyl Bāsh and the Safawī and all their works; and this fanatical spirit is the more remarkable when we recall the fact that the author, Mirzā Haydar Dūghlāt, was the son of a Chaghatāy beg who had been murdered by 'Ubaydallah Khān Uzbek's predecessor Muhammad Khān Shaybānī,³ and that Bābur, who had thrown in his lot with Shāh Ismā'il in order to retrieve his ancestral dominions from the common enemies of the Mughal and the Timurid, was Haydar's cousin, benefactor, and hero. Indeed, Mirzā Haydar was actually in Bābur's service at this time (though he was not present at all the military actions here recorded); and he shared the unpleasant consequences of Bābur's discomfiture. For, after the making of peace between Shāh Ismā'il and 'Ubaydallah Khān in A.D. 1513,⁴ the Chaghatāys as well as the Timurids gave up the struggle to save their Central Asian heritage from passing under

¹ Among their victims was the poet Bannā'i (Browne, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 63).—A. J. T.

² Haydar Dūghlāt, Mirzā Muhammad: *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, English translation by Elias, N., and Ross, E. D. (London 1895, Sampson Low & Marston), pp. 245-6 and 259-61.

³ Bābur: *Memoirs*, ed. Beveridge, vol. i, p. 22.

⁴ See p. 381, below.

the Uzbegs' dominion. In A.D. 1514, the Chaghatāys abandoned Tāshqand and turned their energies to the enterprise of recouping themselves by reasserting their authority in the Tarim Basin¹—a movement which eventually carried Haydar himself into Tibet and Kashmir and placed him on the throne of the latter country from A.D. 1541 to his death in 1551. Thus Haydar's career was upset as violently as Bābur's career by the outcome of the decisive battle which had been fought at Ghajdavān (Ghujduwān) on the 12th November 1512; and, at the time when he was writing the *Tarikh-i-Rashīdī*, the memory of that disastrous defeat was not softened for Haydar by Bābur's consolations; for the throne of Kashmir was not a dazzling reward for a forced migration across the Tibetan Plateau, whereas Bābur won a consolation prize in India which almost eclipsed the empire of his ancestor Timur when, in A.D. 1519, he finally turned his back upon the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin for ever and descended, from his Afghan fastness, upon the Basin of the Indus and the Ganges. Thus every personal consideration must have militated, in Mīrzā Haydar's mind, against his rejoicing in Bābur Pādīshāh's defeat and in 'Ubaydallah Khān's victory; and if Mīrzā Haydar's religious feelings, as a Sunnī, were strong enough to override these personal interests and to cause him to rejoice in his own side's defeat all the same, we may infer that the rest of Haydar's Central Asian Sunnī co-religionists, who had no comparable personal interests at stake, must have rejoiced at the outcome of the Battle of Ghujduwān *a fortiori*.

We may also infer that the hostility of the Sunnī population of Transoxania to the Safawī, and therefore, at second hand, to Bābur for having consented to put on the Safawī's Qyzyl Bāsh uniform, was the decisive military factor in the Transoxanian campaign of A.D. 1512. For the wardens of the Transoxanian marches of South-Western Asia had never held the frontier by the unaided strength of their own arms. They had merely been the leaders of the warlike frontiersmen of the Transoxanian oases. The Achæmenidae had been able to rely upon those Soghdian barons who offered such a strenuous resistance to Alexander the Great after the fall of the last Darius;² and Timur had only succeeded in expelling the Chaghatāy Nomads from Transoxania in the six hard-fought campaigns of A.D. 1362–7 because he, likewise, had been the leader of a popular movement.³ Indeed, at the crisis of this struggle between Transoxania and the 'jātah', when the Battle of the Mire had resulted in as severe a defeat for Timur and his braves as Bābur

¹ *Tarikh-i-Rashīdī*, translation by Elias and Ross, pp. 284–5.

² For this resistance, see further II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 139–40, below.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 146, and footnote 1, below.

and his Qyzyl Bāsh auxiliaries suffered at Ghujduwān in A.D. 1512, a military disaster which left the Nomad invader in possession of the open country was actually retrieved by the indomitable resistance of the townspeople of Samarqand under the leadership of their 'ulamā. This repulse of the Nomad besiegers of Samarqand by the townspeople themselves in A.D. 1365 had been the turning-point of this previous Central Asian war between 'the Desert' and 'the Sown'; and there is no reason to suppose that in A.D. 1512 the townspeople and peasantry of Transoxania were any less averse from the prospect of falling again under Nomad dominion than they had been in A.D. 1365. The difference between the two situations was that, on the earlier occasion, these Transoxanian Sunnīs had not been torn in two directions between two conflicting loyalties; for their champion, Timur, was Sunnī like themselves, as well as their enemy the 'jātah'. On the other hand, in A.D. 1512 their descendants had to choose between acquiescing in the dominion of a Eurasian Nomad barbarian who was their co-religionist and striking a blow for their own hereditary champion and ruler the Timurid Bābur when Bābur had thrown in his lot with the Shi'ī heretic Ismā'il and when Ismā'il had shown unmistakably his determination to impose Shi'ism upon his Sunnī subjects by force. In this painful dilemma, the Transoxanians appear to have taken the line of least resistance and to have accepted the outcome of the Battle of Ghujduwān as the judgement of God. And their unwillingness to step into the breach, as their ancestors had stepped in 147 years before, actually sealed the discomfiture of Bābur and his Qyzyl Bāsh allies and the victory of the Uzbek Khan 'Ubaydallah.

If Shāh Ismā'il's hands had now still been free, it is conceivable that he might have retrieved the disaster of Ghujduwān unaided by driving the Uzbeks out of Transoxania again once and for all and converting the Sunnī townspeople and peasantry of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin to Shi'ism by main force as he did succeed in converting their neighbours and kinsmen on the Iranian Plateau. As it was, he not only launched no further campaign in this quarter, but in the autumn of A.D. 1513 he made peace with 'Ubaydallah Khān Uzbek on a basis of *uti possidetis*—the Uzbeks retaining their conquests in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin while the Safawīs retained Khurāsān. This admission of failure in the east was forced upon Shāh Ismā'il because, in the meantime, his fixed policy of occumenical conquest combined with religious intolerance had committed him to a life-and-death struggle with his Western neighbours, the 'Osmanlis.

Shāh Ismā'il need have found no difficulty in keeping his hands free in the west, if he had wished, in order to concentrate his

energies upon objectives in Central Asia; for, of his two western neighbours, the 'Osmanlis, as has been explained already, had no further Asiatic territorial ambitions, while the Egyptian Mamlūks had no territorial ambitions at all. Fortune had further favoured Ismā'il by preserving on the Ottoman throne, for the first twelve years of Ismā'il's reign, a *roi fainéant*, in the person of Sultan Bāyezīd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1481-1512), whose character and conduct were in utter contrast to those of his immediate predecessors and successors. It may have been the very incompetence and complacency of Sultan Bāyezīd that tempted the headstrong Ismā'il to rouse the sleeping Ottoman lion and provoke a reversal of the established Ottoman policy of non-aggression in Asia. At any rate, Ismā'il did offer such provocation, intentionally or unintentionally, by promoting—or at any rate countenancing—a subversive Shī'i propaganda in the Ottoman Sultan's Asiatic dominions in Anatolia; and in the campaigning season of A.D. 1511, when Ismā'il was far away on the Oxus, preparing to reap the fruits of his recent victory over the Shaybānī Muhammad Khān Uzbek by restoring the Timurid Bābur to the Transoxanian throne of his fathers as Ismā'il's vassal, the Shī'i movement in Anatolia came suddenly and violently to a head. Whether this happened in spite of, or in accordance with, Shāh Ismā'il's instructions we do not know, but it is certain that, in the spring of 1511, his agent in Anatolia, Shāh Qūlī,¹ rose in arms against the Ottoman Government.

The rising, which turned into a general Shī'i insurrection, was a formidable affair, and a punitive column of Janissaries, led by the Grand Vizier in person, was routed, and their leader killed in battle, before the Ottoman Government eventually recovered control of the situation. Considering the fact that Sultan Bāyezīd's son and viceroy at Manysa, Qorqūd, had been in friendly relations with Shāh Qūlī,² and that there was already a keen competition between the several sons of the old and incompetent Sultan for the succession to the Ottoman throne, it is not altogether inconceivable that, if Shāh Qūlī had been able to receive, in A.D. 1511, the military support which was actually given by Ismā'il to Bābur, the Shī'i insurrection in Anatolia might have triumphed and might then have carried on to the Ottoman throne a new Sultan who would have been bound to the Safawī Empire by the same political and religious bonds that Bābur was actually forced to accept. Such an event would probably have changed the course of history. But as it was, with Shāh Ismā'il engaged at the opposite extremity of the Iranic World and unable to come to the rescue of his Anatolian

¹ This Shāh Qūlī was a native of the Anatolian Turkish principality of Tekke whose father, Hasan Khalīfah, had been a disciple of Shāh Ismā'il's father, Shaykh Haydar Safawī. (Browne, *op. cit.* vol. iv, p. 70.)

² See p. 365, above.

supporters now that they had put their fortunes, and their master's fortunes, to the touch, Shāh Qūlī's rising was really a forlorn hope, notwithstanding its initial success; and it was also a stroke which could not be repeated. Shāh Qūlī himself appears to have lost his life; and all that his lieutenant, Ustādīy Oghlu, could do was to cut his way through to Tabriz with the remnant of his followers. These survivors of the abortive Shī'ī insurrection in Anatolia were not well received by their Safawī master;¹ and indeed Shāh Ismā'il had good reason to be displeased; for in the Ottoman dominions, as it had turned out, the master-stroke of the Safawī policy had miscarried; and the baffled Safawī empire-builder had now to await a counter-stroke from the most formidable military Power in the contemporary world, whose hostility had been wantonly provoked by his own henchmen.

Indeed, before Ustādīy Oghlu had been driven out of the Ottoman dominions in Asia, Shāh Ismā'il's great Ottoman adversary, Sultan Bāyezīd's son Selīm, was already on the move.

This Ottoman Prince Selīm—a poet who was as competent and as ruthless in politics and war as his father was good-natured and inefficient—had long before made up his mind that the traditional Ottoman policy of non-aggression in Asia was not adequate for dealing with the new problem presented by the emergence, on the Asiatic frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, of the new Safawī Power, with its formidable tactics of preparing the ground for a military offensive by religious and political propaganda. His father, who shrank from Selīm's militant ideas, had marooned him in the governorship of Trebizond; but in the self-same year in which Shāh Qūlī raised his Shī'ī standard of revolt in Anatolia, Selīm likewise took the law into his own hands.² He sailed from Trebizond to Caffa, won over the Janissary garrison there, and obtained troops and supplies from his father-in-law the Khan of the Crimea (a successor-state of the Mongol appanage of Jūjī which had avoided Russian conquest by accepting Ottoman suzerainty). Thereupon, Selīm marched upon Constantinople down the west coast of the Black Sea; reached Chorlu in Thrace before he was intercepted and defeated by the Government troops; was allowed by his father, after the battle, to escape to the Crimea by sea; and was then bold enough to present himself in Constantinople, unaccompanied by an army, in the winter of 1511-12.

¹ They appear, however, to have been enrolled in the Qyzył Bāsh forces. At least, the so-called Ustādīy corps of the Safawī Army (for the name, see Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 52, note 1) may be presumed to have been formed out of Ustādīy Oghlu's Anatolian recruits.

² The exact dates are uncertain, so that it is impossible to say whether Selīm made his move in the hope of forestalling Shāh Qūlī, or whether he was goaded into making it by the bankruptcy of his father's policy, after this had been exposed by Shāh Qūlī's stroke.

His boldness was justified by the event; for by this time the shock produced by Shāh Qūlī's revolt—which had revealed in a flash both the gravity and the imminence of the danger with which the Ottoman Power was now confronted in the militant policy of the Qyzyl Bāsh—seems to have had its effect upon the minds of the Ottoman Pādishāh's administrative and military slave-household, which was the ultimate ruling power behind the Ottoman throne.¹ They had made up their minds that Selīm, with his energy, his ruthlessness, and his militancy against the Qyzyl Bāsh (which was quite as vehement as Shāh Ismā'il's militancy against the Sunnah), was the man of the hour. In the spring of A.D. 1512, before 'Ubaydallah Khān Uzbek had driven Bābur out of Transoxania for the second time, the Janissaries at Constantinople had compelled Sultan Bāyezīd II to abdicate and had placed Sultan Selīm I on the Ottoman throne in his stead. By the end of the campaigning season of A.D. 1513, Selīm had secured his personal position at home by extirpating all his brothers and nephews except one nephew who escaped to Shāh Ismā'il's court at Tabriz and two who escaped to the Mamlūk Sultan's court at Cairo. Shāh Ismā'il had no choice now but to make peace on his eastern front with 'Ubaydallah Khān, for on his western front he was now threatened for the first time in his career by an adversary of his own temper.

The now inevitable collision between the Safawī and the Ottoman Power duly occurred in the campaigning season of A.D. 1514. Shāh Ismā'il took the offensive by sending Selīm's refugee nephew Murād—to whom the Shāh had given his own daughter in marriage—on a cavalry raid into Anatolia, accompanied by the late Shāh Qūlī's lieutenant Ustādījy Oghlu. But the prospects of this manœuvre—which depended for its success upon a responsive Shī'i uprising in the Anatolian countryside—had been prejudiced in advance by the failure of Shāh Qūlī's insurrection three years before; and Selīm now made assurance doubly sure by extirpating the Shī'i remnant in the Anatolian population—massacring some of them and deporting the rest to the Ottoman territories in Europe.² Murād and Ustādījy Oghlu penetrated no farther west than Sivās before they were compelled to retreat; and Selīm now marched

¹ For some account of this Ottoman slave-household, see further Part III. A, vol. iii, below.

² For Selīm's extirpation of the Shī'ah in Anatolia, which seems to have been carried out in A.D. 1514, see p. 362, above. Compare the massacre and deportation of the Armenians in the same region, by the orders of a latter-day Ottoman Government, in A.D. 1915-16, during the General War, when the 'Osmanlis were once again engaged in a life-and-death struggle with another Great Power—this time Russia—for the possession of their Asiatic dominions. In 1915, as in 1514, the Ottoman Government's purpose in committing its atrocities against a subject minority in the interior of its own dominions was to forestall the risk of being attacked in the rear by insurgents acting in concert with the foreign invader.

eastward with the Ottoman Regular Army, while Ismā'il assumed the defensive (for the first time in his career)—devastating the western provinces of his empire through which the Ottoman invaders' route lay, and awaiting their arrival, with the main body of his army, in a position covering his own capital, Tabrīz.

Selīm, whose literary tastes had acquainted him with the Alexander Romance in its Persian version, now dreamed of emulating the exploits of this legendary European conqueror of Asia; for Selīm was a Rūmī like Iskender himself, and he was aware that his own 'Osmanlis, like Alexander's Macedonians, had not their match as a fighting force in the world of his day. As far as fighting-power went, Selīm's expectations were not disappointed; for when the Ottoman Army made contact with the Safawī Army at Chāldirān, on the 22nd August 1514, the 'Osmanlis won the day, in spite of having to encounter an unharassed enemy after their own long and harassing march across a zone that had been purposely laid waste. From behind the regular 'Rūmī' battle-lager,¹ the Ottoman musketry and artillery swept the Qyzyl Bāsh cavalry away; and in little more than a fortnight after the battle Selīm marched into Ismā'il's capital city of Tabrīz as a conqueror.

Ismā'il's ignominious retreat from the traditional capital of North-Western Irān, after his heavy defeat at Chāldirān, bade fair to extinguish the prestige which the Safawī had first acquired, a dozen years earlier, when he was solemnly crowned king in Tabrīz after his resounding victory at Shurūr.² And Selīm was able to enter Tabrīz not merely as a conqueror but as a liberator; for his first act was to reconvert to the service of the Sunnah the mosques which had been arbitrarily converted to the service of the Shī'ah when Ismā'il had signalized his original triumph by imposing his own religion by main force upon the Sunnī majority of the Tabrīzīs. With Shāh Ismā'il discredited by his first great military disaster, and with the majority of his subjects waiting to welcome Ismā'il's conqueror as the victorious champion of their own persecuted faith, Selīm, at this moment, had the entire Iranic World at his feet. He might have marched on, eastward, unopposed by hostile arms and warmly received by public opinion, from Tabrīz to Merv, along the road trodden by Ismā'il four years before; and if the 'Osmanlī had now appeared in place of the Safawī on the borders of Transoxania and had offered himself to the Transoxanians, in his turn, as a saviour of the Iranic Civilization from the barbarism of the Eurasian Nomad Uzbeks, it is certain that the Transoxanians would have greeted Selīm with open arms as a second Timur; for when Sunnī

¹ For the use of this Rūmī battle-lager by Bābur, see p. 352, above.

² See p. 371, above.

Orthodoxy was united in the same person with cultural superiority and military invincibility, their allegiance to such a prince could hardly be in doubt. But the temper of Selīm's invincible troops was fatal to this brilliant prospect of Asiatic conquest; for, if Selīm had the talent and ambition of an Alexander, his Janissaries were by no means as amenable to their prince's will as Alexander's Phalangites had been.

The Macedonian peasants who served in Alexander's army were Europeans who had been born and bred on the very threshold of Asia; and they did not strike against being led into the interior of the familiar neighbouring continent till they had reached the bank of the Ganges. On the other hand, the Serb and Bosniak peasants who were the raw material of Selīm's Janissaries were Europeans through and through. Their native waters were the Adriatic and the Danube, not the Bosphorus or the Aegean. They could not make themselves at home on Asiatic soil; and when they were marched eastward beyond the ancient bounds of Orthodox Christendom in Anatolia, they were utterly *dépaysés*. They had mutinied already on the march from Amāsiyeh to Chāldirān; and, after the occupation of Tabriz, they refused point-blank to go into winter quarters in the Qārabāgh, where Timur's mobile Transoxanians had wintered contentedly at least three times in an earlier chapter of Iranic history.¹ This intractability of Selīm's military machine settled Selīm's plans for him inexorably. He found himself compelled to start on his march back westward after having stayed in Tabriz for little more than a week; and this Ottoman retreat from Tabriz threatened at times to turn into the same kind of disaster as the French retreat from Moscow, before the army regained Amāsiyeh in mid-winter. Thus the homesickness of the Janissaries gave the Qyzył Bāsh a reprieve; and this reprieve decided that Ismā'il Shāh Safawī's life-work should have permanent results. These results, in their turn, were to be decisive for the destinies of the Iranic World. But the destinies of the Iranic World were not the Janissaries' business. Their duty, as they felt it, was to be the apostate policemen of Orthodox Christendom, not the champions of the Sunnah against the Shī'ah.

¹ Sultan Selīm's European troops did not always show themselves as fastidious as this about being quartered in alien continents. For example, in A.D. 1520, only six years after the Chāldirān campaign, Selīm sent a force of Bosniak troops up the Nile into Nubia as a corollary to his conquest of Egypt in A.D. 1516-17 (see pp. 387-8, below). The landscape and climate of Nubia presumably seemed more exotic to these Dinaric highlanders than the landscape and climate of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Yet for the next three centuries the descendants of these Europeans maintained themselves in the section of the Nile Valley between the First Cataract at Aswān and the Third Cataract a little below (i.e. north of) Dongola. Nor was their continued residence there forced upon them, for they soon made themselves virtually independent of the Ottoman Empire. (See Budge, E. A. Wallis: *The Egyptian Sudan, its History and Monuments* (London 1907, Kegan Paul, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 207-8.)

Thus the first round in the conflict between the Safawis and the 'Osmanlis had ended in a stalemate; and, just because it had ended in this way, this internecine struggle between the two foremost Powers of the Iranic World was bound to have, as its sequel, an Iranic movement of aggression against the Arabic World. At first sight it may seem paradoxical that the division of the Iranic Society against itself—a division which was manifestly draining the strength and sapping the vitality of the Iranic body social—should be accompanied by an apparently wanton attack upon inoffensive neighbours. But on closer inspection the paradox is resolved; for this apparently aggressive movement against a third party, so far from being superfluous, turns out to have been an inevitable incident in the trial of strength between the two Iranic Great Powers.

The truth was that the stalemate between the Ottoman and the Safawī Power could not be resolved by any further direct attack on either combatant's part upon the home territory of the other. By the end of the campaigning season of A.D. 1514 it had been proved by trial and error that the Safawī could make no permanent conquests in Anatolia and the 'Osmanli none in Iran. On this showing, the even balance could only be upset, in one party's favour or in the other's, by aggrandisement at the expense of some third party which would be too weak to defend itself against an attack from either of the two Iranic belligerents. The two weakest states that lay nearest to Constantinople and Tabriz, and approximately equidistant from the 'Osmanli and from the Safawī capital, were the buffer-state of Dhu'l-Qadar in the highlands of South-Eastern Anatolia and the Empire of the Mamlūks in Syria and Egypt, and this Mamlūk Empire was the leading state in the Arabic World. Accordingly, after the indecisive outcome of the campaign of A.D. 1514, the next stage in the struggle between the 'Osmanli and the Safawī Power was bound to be a race between these two Iranic Powers for the conquest of the adjacent Arabic provinces. Either the Safawī Empire would spread to the shores of the Mediterranean and hem the 'Osmanlis into the Anatolian Peninsula as the East Roman Empire had once been hemmed in by the 'Abbasids, or else the Ottoman Empire would advance to the line of the Euphrates and bar the Safawis out from the Levant as the Arsacid and Sasanian Empires had once been barred out by the Romans.

In this race, Shāh Ismā'il had a certain start over Sultan Selīm; for the Imāmī Shi'is had an ancient Syrian stronghold in the Jabal 'Āmil, and the Imāmī Shāh already had his eye on Syria, as is shown by the fact that one of the Qyzył Bāsh army-corps was called 'the Syrian Corps' or Shāmlū. Accordingly, Selīm had to act

quickly if he was to steal a march on his Safawī rival; and he lost no time, indeed. In A.D. 1515, which was the season following the year of Chāldirān, Selim occupied and annexed the buffer-state of Dhu'l-Qadar (thus bringing his Asiatic frontier up to the line of the Euphrates one hundred and twenty-two years after the date at which the European frontier of the Ottoman Empire had reached the line of the Danube). In the next season, A.D. 1516, Selim proceeded to invade the Mamlūk dominions; overthrew the Mamlūk Army on the plain of Marj Dābiq, in North Syria, on the 24th August 1516; and occupied the Mamlūk capital Cairo itself on the 26th January 1517. Selim's entry into Cairo, unlike his entry into Tabriz, was definitive. It established a political connexion between the Ottoman Empire and the Arabic provinces of Syria, Egypt, and the Hijāz which—sometimes in the form of direct Ottoman rule and at other times in the form of an Ottoman suzerainty—was to last altogether for three hundred years. Ismā'il proved unable either to prevent or to undo this last piece of Selim's work. And thus, before Selim died in 1520 and Ismā'il in 1524 (and they both died young), the results of their collision had changed the face of the Arabic as well as the Iranic World beyond recognition.

The Historical Consequences of Shāh Ismā'il's Career

We may now bring this excursus to a close by attempting to sum up and appraise these changes, including both the immediate effects and the ultimate consequences.

The most conspicuous tangible effect, which was not only immediate but was also enduring, was the abrupt and violent break-up of the former Iranic World into three separate fractions: one consisting of Transoxania and the Iranic 'colonial' domain in India, the second consisting of Iran proper, and the third consisting of the other Iranic 'colonial' domain which had been created by the Turkish conquests in Orthodox Christendom. These three fractions of the former Iranic World were prised asunder and held apart by two new frontiers: a new frontier between Iran and Transoxania which ran from the north-western face of the Hindu Kush northwards to the Qāra Qūm Desert or alternatively to the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea; and a new frontier between Iran and the Ottoman domain which ran from the southern face of the Caucasus southwards to the Syrian Desert or alternatively to the head of the Persian Gulf.

Strictly, these two new frontiers were not fresh cuts but ancient wounds which had broken open and begun to bleed again along the lines of the old scars, under the stress of a tremendous social shock. The frontier which now divided the Safawī Empire from the Uzbek

Empire had once divided the Seleucid and Arsacid and Sasanian and Umayyad Empires in Iran from a series of Hellenic and barbarian principalities in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin over a span of about a thousand years extending from the third century B.C. into the eighth century of the Christian Era.¹ Similarly, the frontier which now divided the Safawī Empire from the Ottoman Empire had once divided the Arsacid and Sasanian Empires from the Roman Empire over a span of about seven hundred years extending from the last century B.C. into the seventh century of the Christian Era.

The Ottoman Government of Rūm began to reorganize this *ci-devant* frontier of its eponym the Roman Empire as early as A.D. 1514,² when the temper of the Janissaries made it apparent to Selīm that he had no prospect of driving Ismā'il beyond the horizon and annexing the whole of the Safawī Empire to his own; for this made it evident that he must content himself with the more modest alternative of carrying the existing defensive frontier of the Ottoman Empire in Asia a few degrees farther eastward. The temper of the Janissaries also made it evident that, in making and maintaining even this modest eastward advance, the Ottoman Government would have to rely upon securing the loyalty of one of the local 'martial races', rather than attempting to induce its own regular European soldiery to do garrison duty against the grain in this (to them) outlandish region. For this purpose, the Ottoman Government picked out the Kurds: a local race of pugnacious highlanders who were linked with the 'Osmanlis by their common Sunnī faith and were no more cut off from these new Turkish partners by their Persian *patois* than they were from the Qyzyl Bāsh Türkmens, while they were up in arms against Shāh Ismā'il's attempt to dragoon them into becoming Shī'is.

The Ottoman Government appointed a Kurdish Sunnī 'cleric', Mawlā Idrīs of Bitlis—an ex-secretary of Ismā'il's former victim Ya'qūb Khān Āq Qōyūnlū—to act in Kurdistan as an agent of the Sunnī faith, in much the same way as Shāh Qūlī had once acted for Shāh Ismā'il and for the Shī'ah in Anatolia. Mawlā Idrīs was either more competent himself, or else more effectively supported by his principals, than Shāh Qūlī had been, for he appears to have performed his function without disaster from A.D. 1514 to A.D. 1535. Under Mawlā Idrīs's guidance or advice, a number of measures were taken for turning the Kurds into a bulwark of the Ottoman Empire in Asia. As an inner line of defence against future

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141, footnote 2, below.

² The account of this organization which is given here is taken from a passage in an unpublished work on *Armenians and Kurds* by Mr. A. S. Safrastian, which the author has been kind enough to show to the present writer.

Safawī invasions, Kurdish military colonies were settled astride the east-and-west routes between Iran and Anatolia on the north side of the Anti-Taurus. As an advanced line, the Kurdish tribal chiefs in Kurdistan proper (i.e. on the western face of the Zagros Range which formed the western escarpment of the Iranian Plateau) were nominally incorporated into the Ottoman feudal system—receiving the styles and titles of Ottoman feudatories without being asked to renounce their hereditary tenures. In the religious sphere, the Kurds were fortified in their Sunnī faith by the importation, into the principal Kurdish centres, of Arab Sunnī Shaykhs, who were distinguished by the title of Sa'dat from the native Kurdish 'ulamā.¹

This Kurdish frontier effectively covered the Ottoman dominions in Anatolia; but it did not completely preclude the Safawī Power from striking at the new Ottoman provinces in Syria and Egypt so long as the Safawīs remained masters of 'Irāq; and therefore the 'Osmanlis, like the Romans before them, had to choose between the shorter but vaguer line running from the Caucasus to the North Arabian Desert and the longer but more definite line that ran from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. Sultan Selīm's son Sultan Suleymān rounded off his work by annexing Baghdad in A.D. 1534 and Basrah in A.D. 1546, as Pompey's work had been rounded off by Trajan. The 'Osmanlis differed from the Romans in preferring the longer line to the shorter after having made a trial of both; but, in both cases alike, the price paid for the drawing of the frontier along either line was a series of recurrent, and progressively more devastating, wars between the opposing Powers on either side of the barrier.²

As for the other frontier of the Safawī Empire over against the Uzbegs, the role of frontiersmen, which was played for the Ottoman Empire by the Sunnī Kurds, was here played for the Uzbek principalities by the Sunnī Türkmens of the Transcaspian oases, who were as violently up in arms against Shāh Ismā'il's Qyzył Bāsh Türkmens as the Kurds were. On this frontier, social conditions eventually relapsed so far towards barbarism that the opposing forces on either side of the barrier became incapable of waging formal wars like those which were fought periodically between the Safawīs and the 'Osmanlis. In the borderland between Iran and

¹ Compare the importation of Arab Shi'ī Shaykhs from the Jabal 'Āmil and Bahrayn into the Safawī dominions, which has been noticed in another connexion on p. 362, above. Presumably these two applications of an identical religious propaganda policy were not thought out by the Ottoman and the Safawī Government independently, but there seems to be no means of ascertaining which one of the two Governments was copying the other.

² For the rhythm of such recurrent wars along frontiers of such a kind, see further Part XI, below.

the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, the warfare between Safawī and Shaybānī, or between Shī'ī and Sunnī, degenerated into raids; and, after the collapse of the Safawī Power in the first quarter of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the Sunnī Türkmen slave-raiders took the offensive and ranged almost at will over Iran until their lairs in Transcaspia were captured by the Russian Army, and their criminal activities suppressed by the Russian Government, between 1863 and 1886.

On both fronts, however, the warfare was uniformly bitter, because the hostility which inspired it was not merely political but was also religious. For these two new frontiers not only divided the Safawī Empire from the Uzbeg principalities on the one hand and from the Ottoman Empire on the other. They also now divided the domain of the Imāmī Shī'ah from the domain of the Sunnah.¹

As a result of the partial success and partial failure of Shāh Ismā'il's work, the relations between the Sunnah and the Shī'ah in the Islamic World had been changed out of recognition without being changed *in toto*. Before Shāh Ismā'il started on his career, the adherents of the two sects had been living cheek by jowl, geographically intermingled with one another, from end to end of the Iranic World, with the Shī'ah everywhere in a decided minority and with a tolerant spirit of 'Live and let live' presiding over the relations between the two sects. Shāh Ismā'il had set out to reduce this religious dualism of the Iranic World to a unity by imposing the minority's religion upon the majority of the Iranic Society by sheer military force; and this *tour de force* had finally proved to be beyond his powers. At the end of his career, as at the beginning, both sects were still in being in the Iranic World side by side; and, although the Shī'ah had obtained a net numerical increase through the excess of Ismā'il's forcible conversions of Sunnis to Shī'ism over Selīm's forcible conversions of Shī'is to the Sunnah, the Shī'ah still remained in a minority on the whole. In these two fundamental points, the situation was still what it had been before. The great change—and this was not only a change out of all recognition, but was also a change that was wholly for the worse—consisted, first, in the forcible sorting out and geographical segregation of the two sects by the violent means of massacre and deportation and compulsory conversion, while the second new feature was the fiery

¹ Compare the situation in the age of the Sasanidae, when the frontier between the Sasanian Empire and the Roman Empire had also been a frontier between Zoroastrianism and Nestorian Christianity on the one side and Catholic and Monophysite Christianity on the other, while the frontier between the Sasanian Empire and the Ephthalite and Turkish principalities in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had then been a frontier between Zoroastrianism and Buddhism. (For this latter religious frontier, see further Part II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 371-5, below.)

hatred between Sunnī and Shī'ī which had flamed up on both sides owing to the introduction of these 'methods of barbarism'—first on the Shī'ī side by Ismā'il, and then on the Sunnī side by Selīm. This schism of the Iranic Society on the moral and religious as well as the political plane severed all the threads that had previously knit the Iranic social fabric together; and this 'sawing asunder' took the life out of the Iranic Civilization and stopped its progress dead.

When we examine the subsequent condition of each of the three fragments, we observe, in different forms, the unmistakable symptoms of the same moral sickness.

To take the central or Iranian fragment first, it is manifest that the new Imāmī Shī'ī Empire, as Shāh Ismā'il left it, fell far short of its founder's ambitions and intentions. It was indeed a great empire within which the Shī'ah was the only religion that was permitted to exist; and its frontiers did embrace all the principal Imāmī Shī'ī holy places: the martyrs' tombs at Najaf and Karbalā and Kāzimayn and the mosque of the Expected Imām¹ at Hillah in the Arab 'Irāq; the holy cities of Qumm and Qāshān in the Achaemenian 'Irāq;² and the Mashhad of the Imām Rizā at the opposite corner of the Safawī dominions, in Khurāsān. Yet, even so, this was not the oecumenical Shī'ī Empire that Shāh Ismā'il had dreamed of; and the increase in the numbers of the Shī'ah which he had secured by the forcible conversion of the Sunnī majority in the territories which he had succeeded in conquering was partly set off by the loss of the Shī'ī minority which was exterminated, in retaliation, by the Uzbeks in Transoxania and by the 'Osmanlis in Anatolia. In fact, Ismā'il fell so far short of establishing a world empire that the state which he formed became a kind of hermit kingdom, whose internal uniformity and solidarity as the earthly domain of Imāmī Shī'ism was counterbalanced by its isolation from a Sunnī World which still hemmed it in on either side. It was the deliberate policy of the Safawī Government to keep their Shī'ī subjects both materially and spiritually insulated from Sunnī contagion by discouraging pilgrimages to Holy Places outside the Safawī dominions. This policy applied not only to the Pan-Islamic Holy Places—Mecca and Medina and Jerusalem—but even to the specifically Shī'ī Holy Places when these were under Sunnī rule. It applied, for example, to Najaf and Karbalā and the Kāzimayn at times when the Arab 'Irāq was in Ottoman and not in Safawī hands.³ Under this régime, the Imāmī Shī'ism which Shāh

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), Annex I, vol. iii, pp. 463-4, below.

² 'Irāq 'Ajami, otherwise known as the Jibāl, in Western Iran.

³ On this point, see Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 29-30.

Ismā'il had made into the exclusive regional religion of Iran dwindled from a would-be world religion into something which may be called a 'national' religion without any serious misapplication of our Western terminology. Moreover, in modern Shi'i Iran, as in the Protestant parts of our modern Western Christendom, the national religion has become the matrix of a secular or political national consciousness.¹

It will be seen that Ismā'il Shāh Safawī's Shi'i Revival in the Iranic World resembled the contemporary Protestant Reformation in Western Christendom both in the violence with which it was carried out and in the political consequences which eventually followed from it. A third point of resemblance is that, in both cases, the violent religious change was accompanied by a disastrous set-back in culture. This cultural set-back in modern Iran is described and explained in the following terms by a Persian correspondent of the late Professor Browne, Mirzā Muhammad Khān of Qazwīn:

'There is . . . no doubt that during the Safawī period literature and poetry in Persia had sunk to a very low ebb, and that not one single poet of the first rank can be reckoned as representing this epoch. The chief reason for this . . . seems to have been that these kings, by reason of their political aims and strong antagonism to the Ottoman Empire, devoted the greater part of their energies to the propagation of the Shi'ah doctrine and the encouragement of divines learned in its principles and

¹ For this analogue of our modern Western Nationalism in the modern ethos of Shi'i Iran, see further II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 254-5, below. It is perhaps worth noting that this indigenous Iranian Nationalism also resembles our Western Nationalism in the fact that its original basis was religious and dynastic but not linguistic. The factors which produced the modern Persian national consciousness were the two common bonds of Safawī government and Shi'i faith, and not any community of mother-tongue. We have noticed already that Turkish, not Persian, was the mother-tongue of Shāh Ismā'il, and that the nucleus of his army was formed, not of Persians, but of Türkmens. Tabriz, which he chose for his capital, was a Turkish-speaking city situated in the Turkish-speaking province of Azerbaijan. And Tabriz remained the second city of the Empire, and the seat of the heir-apparent, even after the capital had been moved to Isfahān—a move which was made because Isfahān was less exposed to Ottoman attack and was also nearer the centre of the Safawī Empire after its expansion had been cut short on the west. Even then, the Safawīs seem still to have retained their Turkish mother-tongue to the end, in spite of the fact that Isfahān was a Persian-speaking city in a Persian-speaking region. (See the anecdote of the last Safawī, Shāh Husayn (*regnat* A.D. 1694-1722), which is recounted by Browne in op. cit., vol. iv, p. 113.) Moreover, Nādir Shāh Avshār (*dominabat* A.D. 1730-47) was also a Turk by race and mother-tongue; and so were the Qājārs, who were the rulers of Persia from A.D. 1779 to A.D. 1925. The Qājār Dynasty had a private law that no member of the family could qualify for succeeding to the throne of Persia unless his mother were a Qājār princess—unless, that is to say, he were descended on both sides from the same Turkish tribe. Perhaps the greatest paradox of all is the fact that the new-fangled form of Persian Nationalism, *alla Franca*, arose first in the Turkish-speaking province of Azerbaijan—the reason being that Azerbaijan, through its geographical situation, was more exposed than other parts of Persia to Western influences. In fact, the ultra-modern type of Western Nationalism, in which the linguistic factor is paramount, did not really capture Persia until after the rise of Shāh Riza. This parvenu ruler's adoption of the dynastic name Pahlawī is quite in the manner of our nineteenth-century Western political Romanticism; and it is also noteworthy that, in conscious opposition to the dynastic law of the Qājār Dynasty, the founder of the Pahlawī Dynasty has enacted that his descendants must be born of Persian mothers in order to qualify for succeeding to the throne. (For this enactment, see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 537, footnote 6.)

laws. Now although these divines strove greatly to effect the religious unification of Persia (which resulted in its political unification), and laid the foundations of this present-day Persia, whose inhabitants are, speaking generally, of one faith, one tongue, and one race, yet, on the other hand, from the point of view of literature, poetry, Sūfī-ism, and Mysticism, and, to use their own expression, everything connected with the "Accomplishments" (as opposed to the "Legalities"), they not merely fell far short in the promotion thereof but sought by every means to injure and annoy the representatives of these "Accomplishments", who were generally not too firmly established in the Religious Law and its derivatives. In regard to the Sūfis particularly, they employed every kind of severity and vexation, whether by exile, expulsion, slaughter, or reprimand, slaying or burning many of them with their own hands or by their sentence. Now the close connexion between poetry and Belles Lettres on the one hand, and Sūfī-ism and Mysticism on the other, at any rate in Persia, is obvious, so that the extinction of the one necessarily involves the extinction and destruction of the other. Hence it was that under this dynasty learning, culture, poetry and Mysticism completely deserted Persia, and the cloisters, monasteries, retreats, and rest-houses of the *darwishes* were so utterly destroyed that there is now throughout the whole of Persia no name or sign of such charitable foundations, though formerly, as, for instance, in the time of Ibn Battūtah,¹ such institutions were to be found in every town, hamlet, and village, as abundantly appears from the perusal of his *Travels*, wherein he describes how in every place, small or great, where he halted, he alighted in such buildings, of which at the present day no name or sign exists. Anyone ignorant of the circumstances of the Safawī period might well wonder whether this Persia and that are the same country, and the creed of its inhabitants the same Islām; and, if so, why practically, with rare exceptions, there exists now not a single monastery throughout the whole of Persia, while in those parts of Turkey, such as Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, and Sulaymāniyah, which did not remain under the Safawī dominion, there are many such buildings, just as there were in Ibn Battūtah's days.²

The 'Iconoclastic' or 'Calvinistic' spirit³ which wrought this havoc in Iran when it incarnated itself in the person of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī did not ravage Turkey until some four centuries later, when it found its incarnation there in President Mustafā Kemāl.⁴

¹ *Peregrinabatur* A.D. 1325-53.—A. J. T.

² Letter, dated the 24th May 1911, from Mirzā Muhammad Khān to Professor E. G. Browne, quoted in Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 26-7.

³ In a further sentence, Mirzā Muhammad Khān describes the Shi'ī theologians who now took the place of the great poets and philosophers in Iran as 'great indeed' themselves, 'but harsh, dry, fanatical, and formal'—a combination of qualities which is equally characteristic of the ethos of their Calvinist contemporaries in Western Christendom.

⁴ The source of Mustafā Kemāl's inspiration with this spirit is manifest. He is a palpable convert to our modern Western Nationalism with its fanatical, barbarizing vein. The source of Ismā'il Safawī's inspiration with the same spirit, four centuries earlier, remains mysterious; for, although Ismā'il's Shi'ī Revival was contemporary with the Protestant Reformation in Western Christendom, there seems to be no trace of any direct connexion between the two movements.

Nevertheless, the sudden impoverishment of culture in Iran, which Ismā'il brought about, dealt the Iranic culture of the 'Osmanlis a deadly blow by cutting its roots; and during the following four centuries the 'Osmanlis lived a cultural life-in-death until, in our time, they have thrown off the cerements of their dead Iranic culture and have sought to adopt our Western culture, like a suit of ready-made clothes, as a counsel of despair. We have observed already that the territories which were conquered from Orthodox Christendom by the Saljūqs and the 'Osmanlis successively were a kind of 'colonial' extension of the Iranic World; and that the representatives of the Iranic Society in these *partibus infidelium*, like its representatives in Hindustan, depended for the maintenance of their culture upon a steady inflow of arts and ideas, and of immigrants to import them, from the homelands of the Iranic Civilization in Iran itself. The last of these immigrant *Kultur-träger* were the fugitive Timurid prince Bādī'-az-Zamān¹ and the seven hundred families of indigenous skilled artisans whom the Ottoman Sultan Selīm brought home with him from Tabriz in 1514 as the sole substantial souvenir of his one week's sojourn in that great home of Iranic culture. Thereafter, the ancient channels of intercourse along which the vivifying stream of culture had been flowing into Anatolia from Iran for the past four hundred years were blocked by the new frontier between the Ottoman and the Safawī Empire and between the segregated domains of the Sunnah and the Shi'ah—a frontier which was established by the 'Osmanlis themselves. Yet, even if they had forborn to choke up the channel, the waters would still have ceased to flow; for, as we have seen, the Shi'i Revival in Iran was now drying up the springs of Iranic culture at their source.

Nor did the 'Osmanlis find equivalent compensation for this cultural drought by tapping fresh waters in the Arabic World in which they had now for the first time obtained a footing through their conquest of Syria and Egypt and the Hijāz. The Arabic culture was incapable of taking the place of the Iranic culture in Ottoman life for two reasons: first because it was alien, and second because it was only half alive. The contemporary culture of the Arabic World was alien to the 'Osmanlis in the sense that they had drawn hitherto through a Persian, and not through an Arabic, medium upon the Classical Arabic version in which the ancient culture of the antecedent Syriac Society had been cultivated, in its last phase, in the age of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad. It would hardly have been possible for the 'Osmanlis to take an Arabic in exchange for a Persian medium of communication with

¹ See pp. 351-2, above.

this cultural past, even if the contemporary Arabic culture had been as vital as the contemporary Iranian. But, as a matter of fact, the Arabic culture of Egypt, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, was sadly cut-and-dried. The genius of the Maghribī Ibn Khaldūn had proved to be a *lusus Naturae*, a flash in the pan.¹ The Egyptian version of the Arabic Civilization had prevailed; and this Egyptian Arabic culture stood to the Iranian culture of a Jāmī and a Hāfiz and a Sa'dī and a Firdawsī rather as the Byzantine culture of medieval Orthodox Christendom stood to the contemporary Latin culture of the West. The Arabic Civilization had acquired in Egypt an Epimethean instead of a Promethean outlook; and this rearward stance was not confined to the things of the spirit. It was also adopted in the field of politics, where the Byzantine resuscitation of an 'East Roman Empire' had its analogue in the Cairene ghost of the 'Abbasid Caliphate.

It is true that our modern Western scholarship has exploded the legend that a formal transfer of the Caliphate to the Ottoman Sultan Selīm I was made by the last 'Abbasid puppet of the Egyptian Mamlūks after the last Mamlūk Sultan himself had been overthrown by Selīm. It appears that the Ottoman Sultans had long since made play with the title of Caliph and had also long since ceased to value a faded title which had been likewise usurped by every other contemporary Islamic Dynasty.² Yet this fact does not mean that the conquest of Egypt and the Hijāz was without effect upon the Ottoman Government's political and religious outlook. For the same scholarship has shown³ that Sultan Selīm I did take over—not from the Cairene 'Abbasid Caliphs, but from their masters the Mamlūk Sultans—the title of 'Servant of the two Holy Sanctuaries' [of Mecca and Medina], and that he valued this title very highly.

In fact, the annexation of the principal provinces of the Arabic World did affect the 'Osmanlis profoundly in their politics and in their religion and in their culture. And the effect was not for good; for the Ottoman and the Arabic Society were ill-assorted partners,⁴ and the partnership always remained uncomfortable and unfruitful so long as it lasted. The 'Osmanlis were compelled to annex this great Arabic domain in order to forestall its annexation by the Safawīs; but the Arabic half of their dominions hung like a mill-stone round their necks.⁵

¹ For Ibn Khaldūn, see further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 321–8 with Annex III, below.

² This is shown by Sir T. W. Arnold in *The Caliphate* (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press), chapters xi and xii.

³ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

⁴ The spirit and structure of the Ottoman Society are examined in Part III. A vol. iii, pp. 22–50, below.

⁵ The 'Osmanlis might, no doubt, have reaped a dazzling economic reward from these

It remains for us to glance at the fate of the third of the fragments into which the *ci-devant* Iranic World had been broken up. This third fragment was the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin; and its fate may be summed up in the one word 'barbarization'. Transoxania had depended almost as much as the Ottoman Empire upon the inflow of culture from Iran, and it suffered still more severely from the blocking of the channels and the drying-up of the springs; for at this moment Transoxania had need of an additional cultural stimulus in order to leaven the barbarism of her Uzbeg conquerors who now sat on the thrones of the cultivated Timurids. When the stimulus, so far from being intensified, was removed altogether, the Iranic culture of Transoxania was doomed to decay.¹

The bare chance remained that the Transoxanians and the 'Osmanlis might save their relics of Iranic culture by putting them into common stock, if they could succeed in getting into touch with one another again by somehow circumventing the obstacle of the hostile and alien Safawī Empire that now intervened between them. Now that the direct line of communication south of the Caspian was closed, the only alternative was to open up a new route, north of the Caspian, across the Eurasian Steppe. The western end of a potential northern passage was already in the

Arabic conquests if only they had pushed them a little bit farther. For the Arabic World—extending, as it did, from the Arabian and Egyptian coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to a Moroccan seaboard on the Atlantic—commanded the interior lines of the new Oceanic highway between Europe and India which was just being opened up, at this very time, by the Portuguese. The 'Osmanlis gained possession of Suez in A.D. 1517; they held the Yaman from 1517 to 1633; and they occupied Basrah in 1546; while in the opposite direction they established themselves in Algeria in A.D. 1512-19. But they never pushed on across Morocco to the Atlantic, they never seriously contested the supremacy of the Portuguese on the west coast of India, and they never made effective use of the incomparable combination of strategic and commercial points of vantage which they had actually acquired. It was the Dutch and English and French, and not the 'Osmanlis, who challenged the Spanish and Portuguese monopoly of the Overseas World. (On this point, see further II. D (vii), Annex VII, vol. ii, below. See also Kahle, P.: *Die Verschollene Columbus-Karte von 1498 in einer türkischen Weltkarte von 1513* (Berlin and Leipzig 1933, de Gruyter.)

¹ During the span of a thousand years extending from the third century B.C. to the eighth century of the Christian Era, during which Transoxania had been divided by a political frontier from Iran, the country had also been overrun by Eurasian Nomad barbarians—Sakas, Yuechi, Ephthalites, Turks—on at least four occasions. But in this epoch the situation had never been entirely comparable to that in which Transoxania found herself during the period which intervened between the Uzbeg and the Russian conquest; for in the earlier epoch Transoxania, even when she was under a barbarian yoke, had never been entirely insulated from the radiation of culture from outside. For one thing, the political frontier dividing Transoxania from Iran had only been a religious frontier in this epoch during the lifetime of the Sasanian Empire; and throughout those thousand years Transoxania had never been cut off from Buddhist cultural influences emanating from India. It is true that, under the Uzbeg régime, Transoxania was likewise in cultural contact with India, while culturally isolated from Iran. But, unhappily for Transoxania in these latter days, the only culture from India which was now accessible to her was no indigenous Indian civilization with its roots in Indian soil. It was merely the 'colonial' version of the Iranic culture which had been transplanted to India as an incidental consequence of Turkish military conquests; and this exotic Iranic culture in India was just as dependent upon Iran for sustenance as was the Iranic culture of Transoxania itself; so that Transoxania could derive no culture from India at second hand when once the springs in Iran had been dried up.

'Osmanlis' hands; for the Ottoman Empire had taken over the Genoese maritime stations of Caffa in the Crimea and Tana at the head of the Sea of Azov as far back as A.D. 1475, and the Crimean 'successor-state' of the Mongol appanage of Jūji had also passed under Ottoman suzerainty. From this base of operations an Ottoman expeditionary force actually attempted, in A.D. 1569, to take possession of the isthmus between the elbows of the Don and the Volga, with the intention of opening up an all-Ottoman inland waterway from the Black Sea to the Caspian.¹ But they had taken action too late; for the Muscovites had just secured control of the line of the Volga by conquering Qāzān in A.D. 1552 and Āstrakhān in 1554. The Ottoman expeditionary force withdrew ignominiously without having achieved anything; the Ottoman outpost of Tana was masked by the new Muscovite foundation of Cherkaskon-Don;² and the insulation of Transoxania from the Ottoman World was thus consummated by the combination of a Muscovite with a Safawī barrier: a dual barrier which it was quite impossible to turn, since it extended, south and north, from the Indian to the Arctic Ocean. By this stroke, the Russians virtually put Transoxania 'into cold storage' until they found it convenient to annex this derelict fragment of the Iranic World to the Russian Empire some three hundred years later.

These were some of the portentous historical consequences of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī's extraordinary career. And it is the sum of these consequences that accounts for the break-up of the former Iranic World and the formation of 'the Islamic World' as we know it to-day. It will be seen that this latter-day Islamic World is really not an organic unity but a pile of wreckage; and that the wreck was the consequence of a collision between *two* former Islamic worlds—the Iranic and the Arabic—which occurred some four hundred years ago as the after-effect of a great social explosion in which one of these two worlds—the Iranic World—had burst into fragments. The explosion was produced by Shāh Ismā'il; and it would be difficult to find any other public character in history who has been so highly 'explosive' as this, with the possible exception of Lenin.

¹ This Ottoman enterprise of A.D. 1569 has a remarkably close historical precedent in the contact which had been established, exactly a thousand years before, between the Imperial Roman Government at Constantinople and the Transoxanian city-states of the day, via this self-same northern passage across the Eurasian Steppe north of the Caspian. The motive, too, was the same; for, in the sixth century of the Christian Era, the direct land-route between the Roman Empire and Transoxania, south of the Caspian, as well as the water-route to China via the Indian Ocean, was being deliberately blocked by the Iranian Empire of the Sasanids, just as the direct route was being blocked in the sixteenth century by the Iranian Empire of the Safawis. In the sixth century, the northern route was actually opened up with success, since at that time the paramount Power on the Steppes was not a hostile Muscovy but a friendly Turkish Great Khan, who was anxious to foster the commerce of his Transoxanian vassals. (See Hudson, G. F.: *Europe and China* (London 1931, Arnold), pp. 122–33.)

² For this episode, see further II. D (vii), Annex VII, vol. ii, below.

There is, in fact, an obvious parallel between the sudden schism of the Iranic World, in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, into a Shī'ī and a Sunnī camp, divided by a virulent and implacable mutual hatred, and the sudden schism of our latter-day 'Great Society', in the twentieth century, into a Communist and a Capitalist camp, with an equally great gulf of hatred fixed between them.

This recrudescence of the ancient feud between the Shī'ah and the Sunnah in the heart of the former Iranic World has received very poor compensation in that uneasy union of part of the Iranic World with part of the Arabic World which has been brought about by Sultan Selīm I's compulsory conquest of the Empire of the Egyptian Mamlūks. It is this composite Ottoman Society—part Iranic and part Arabic—that is uppermost in our minds when we think of 'the Islamic World' as a unity to-day; and we are rather apt to leave the obstinate dissidence of Shī'ī Iran out of the picture as an anomalous feature. Actually, the feud between this Shī'ī Iran and the rest of the modern Islamic World has had a disastrous effect upon the fortunes of both parties to it; and it has proved exceedingly intractable to any attempts at reconciliation.

In the first place, this feud was probably the most important single factor in the *débâcles* of the three Islamic Great Powers—the Ottoman Empire in Orthodox Christendom and the Arabic World, the Safawī Empire in Iran, and the Timurid Empire which had been established by Bābur's grandson Akbar in India—which all went to pieces simultaneously, at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era, some two centuries after the time of Bābur and Ismā'il and Selīm. Thereafter, the tyrant Nādir Shāh (*dominabatur* A.D. 1730–47), who arose in the vacuum which the downfall of the Safawis had left, made an abortive attempt to bring the feud to an end by reconverting Iran from the Shī'ah to the Sunnah; but his failure demonstrated that, with the lapse of two centuries, a minoritarian religion which had originally been imposed by sheer force upon the majority of the people of Iran by Ismā'il Shāh Safawī had entrenched itself in the hearts of the Persians as their national religion. After Nādir Shāh's fiasco, there was no further serious attempt to heal the feud till the last decade of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, when the rising pressure of the Western World upon all Islamic countries alike evoked the Pan-Islamic Movement.

The programme of Pan-Islamism has been to compose even the most serious internal differences in the bosom of the Islamic Society in order to close the ranks of Islam in face of the overwhelming common danger which now confronts the whole Islamic

World. But this movement has had no time to gather momentum before it has been overtaken, and overruled, by an alternative programme for dealing with 'the Western Question' on diametrically opposite lines. This rival scheme of salvation proposes to exorcize the menace of the West by an 'offensive defensive'. The Islamic peoples are to make sure of their footing in a Westernized World by adopting the aggressive Western Civilization themselves and adopting it *in toto*. This policy of radical Westernization involves, of course, among other things, the adoption of the Western theory and practice of Nationalism; and it now looks as though it were the destiny of the Islamic World to be incorporated piecemeal into our Western World as one Islamic people after another 'goes nationalist'. The Ottoman Turks have already taken the plunge; the Egyptians are following in their wake at a less revolutionary pace; and the Persians, for their part, are finding it peculiarly easy to fall into line, because, as we have seen, the Shi'ism which was imposed by Shāh Ismā'il upon modern Iran has already produced in Persian minds a political consciousness which is closely analogous to the Nationalism which has been the product of Protestantism in our Western World.

On this showing, it seems possible that the wreckage left by the great Islamic catastrophe of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era may be cleared up, in this twentieth century, at last through the incorporation of all the broken fragments of the former Iranic and Arabic societies into the wholly different structure of a Western World which has grown into an oecumenical 'Great Society'.

Note by Professor H. A. R. Gibb

The following valuable note on the first draft of this Annex (which has been amended accordingly) has been communicated to the writer by Professor H. A. R. Gibb:

'The chief point which I should question is the historical survey of the Shi'ah background, and especially the tendency to identify it with Persia as "the principal expression of an Iranian social consciousness" in opposition to the Arabs. Though this view had the powerful backing of Professor E. G. Browne, I do not think it can be sustained. The real history of Shi'ism is still uncertain, but there are several facts which are now more or less generally accepted.

'1. The historic centre of Shi'ism is Lower 'Irāq, where Arab, Aramaic, and Persian elements were most closely mingled. Its existence in all other centres—Bahrayn, the Jabal Summāq and Jabal 'Āmil districts of Syria, Qumm, N.W. Persia, Yaman, &c.—was due to propagation, directly or indirectly, from 'Irāq. Specially noteworthy is the very small extent of the areas of Persia in which the Shi'ah were in a

majority—only Daylam and the neighbourhood, and one or two isolated towns, notably Qumm and Mashhad—and Qumm was an Arab colony from Kūfah.

'2. Elsewhere in Persia, Shi'ism appears to have been associated with a special element in the population of the great cities, provisionally identified with the artisan classes, as an expression of "class-consciousness" against the aristocracy, whether Arab or Iranian, or in later times Turkish. Thus the Shi'ah were opposed to the Iranian dynasty of the Sāmānids (which certainly embodied a reviving Iranian social consciousness) quite as much as to the 'Abbasids or the Turkish princes. Even in Daylam it may be regarded as a movement directed against the feudal aristocracy, who were (with rare exceptions) supporters of the Sunnī "Established Church".

'3. Shi'ism was thus in close relations with the trade guilds, and it is noteworthy that the Fātimids are credited with having done a great deal to foster the development of trade guilds in their dominions.

'4. The political failure of the Shi'ite movements under Buwayhids, Fātimids, and Carmathians probably played its part in producing a fresh orientation of this social movement in the form of religious brotherhoods under Sūfī auspices. While the specifically doctrinal variations of Shi'ism were rejected in the new organizations (at least for the most part), its programme of social reform and its historical theory, which was concentrated upon 'Alī, passed over into them; and it is significant that the ceremonies of initiation &c., were taken over with some modifications from those of the trade guilds.

'5. Thus, during the 6th (12th) and 7th (13th) centuries, by an act of unconscious statesmanship and the exercise of a wide toleration, the Sunnī community succeeded in absorbing, or at least reaching a kind of "Ausgleich" with, the greater part of moderate Shi'ism, and the extreme forms were practically rooted out.

'6. In the 8th (14th) century, it is evident from Ibn Battūtah that Lower 'Irāq was still (with al-Hasā and Bahrayn) the chief centre of Shi'ism. It would seem that relations between Shi'ites and Sunnīs were temporarily exacerbated by competition for the favour of the Mongol Il-Khans, but Baghdad, Shīrāz, and Isfahān are specifically mentioned as centres of resistance to the efforts of the Shi'ites.

'7. Ismā'il Shāh Safawī's action seems to me in consequence a particularly wanton abuse of military power, which succeeded only because the people of Persia rallied round the Safawids in defence of their land (but hardly, as yet, their "nation") against the Ottoman and Uzbeg menaces. The price which they paid was religious conformity; and, by the double effect of political and religious particularism, the idea of a Persian nationality was in due course created.

'8. The final proof that Shi'ism was not a natural outcome or expression of the national Iranian genius is given by the intellectual deterioration which followed. Isolation and economic decay played their part in this; but, as Mirza Muḥammad has remarked in the letter that you quote, the intellectual and literary genius of the Persians lay in the field

of Mysticism. Shi'ism in power was bitterly hostile to Mysticism—perhaps partly because of the incongruity with the authoritarian doctrine of the Shi'ah, more (I think) because the Sūfī movement had been captured by the Sunnis. Shi'ism thus killed the Persian “humanities” and left no outlet for intellectual activity except in scholasticism—for which the Persian genius seems totally unfitted. I should go further and hazard that it survived as a religion only because of the emotional outlet offered by the Muharram ceremonies. Apart from this, the average intelligent Persian, as de Gobineau remarked, seems to have sunk into a kind of sceptical religious lethargy.’

ANNEX II TO I. C (i) (b)

NAMES AND NATIONS OF THE LATE MINOAN AND THE EARLY HELLENIC AGE

1. *Minōs, the Mnōiā, and the Minyae*

THE legendary name of Minōs, the sovereign of the seas, may preserve the historical name of an imperial people. For, in the Hellenic tradition, we seem to catch echoes of *Mίνως* in the plural number instead of the singular in the names *Μνωῖται* and *Μινύαι*.

The *Μνωῖται* (collectively called *Μνωία*, *Μνωία*, or *Μνώα*) were the native serfs of the 'Dorian' conquerors of Crete; and in this term we may trace the degradation, in the latter-day Hellenic World, of a people who, in the *Odyssey*, are still remembered as the *Ἐτεόκριτες μεγάλητορες* (*Odyssey*, Book XIX, l. 176).

The Minyae were a people of the pre-Hellenic Heroic Age who were located by Hellenic legend at three different points on the mainland of European Greece: along the southern part of the west coast of the Peloponnese at Pylos;¹ in the interior of Central Greece, midway between the Corinthian Gulf and the Euripus, at Orchomenos;² and on the fringe of Northern Greece, at the head of the Gulf of Volo, at Iolcōs.³

The bare name of Minyae is not the only common property of these three legendary Minyan settlements. The common worship of a god of healing seems to be indicated by a comparison of the name of the Minyan hero *Ἰάσων* (i.e. 'the Healer') of Iolcos with the name *Ἀσκάλαφος*—an obvious variant of *Ἀσκληπιός*—which is given to one of the two kings of Minyan Orchomenos in the Homeric Catalogue of Ships (*Iliad*, Book II, l. 512). Another link

¹ In the Homeric epic, Pylos is not called 'Minyan' as Orchomenos is, nor are the Pylians called 'Minyae' as are the Argonauts who sail from Iolcos. On the other hand, we hear casually of a *παραμὸς Μινυήσις* in the Pylian territory (*Iliad*, Book XI, l. 722); and in the fifth century B.C. the Greek inhabitants of one fragment of the *ci-devant* Pylian domain—the territory on the west coast of the Peloponnese, between Messenia and Elis, which is called first Paroreatis and afterwards Triphylia—are said to be *Μινύαι* by Herodotus (in Book IV, chap. 148). True, Herodotus brings his Minyae to the Paroreatis at a fairly recent date, as the last stage in a long migration which ultimately fetches them from Iolcos via Lemnos and Mount Taygetus. But this Herodotean saga (Book IV, chaps. 145–8) is a patchwork which is easily picked to pieces. The only solid fact which remains is that the Paroreatae who were conquered by the Eleans in the fifth century B.C. laid claim to the Minyan name; and the simplest explanation of this claim is to suppose that they had inherited the name from their predecessors on the spot in the Heroic Age: that is to say, from the time when the Paroreatis was a part of the Pre-Hellenic principality of Pylos, at a date anterior to the pre-Hellenic and post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*.

² The standing epithet of this Orchomenos is *Μινύαιος* or *Μινυήσιος* (e.g. in *Iliad*, Book II, l. 511).

³ The heroes who sail from Iolcos under Jason's command on board the legendary ship Argo in quest of the Golden Fleece are called *Μινύαι* collectively.

is the name 'Αμυθάων which appears as a personal name in the genealogy of the Minyan rulers of Iolcos and as a place-name—'Αμυθαονία¹—in the Peloponnesian domain of the Minyans round Pylos. And if we take the name Amythaon and the cult of a healing god as clues to the presence of Minyan settlers, we can perhaps espy, in two passages of the *Iliad*, the traces of a fourth Minyan settlement of which the Hellenic tradition has not preserved a record. For the 'Αμυδάων on the banks of the Axios, from which the Paeones came according to *Iliad*, Book XVI, l. 288, is simply the name 'Αμυθάων applied in Paeonia, as in the Peloponnese, to a place instead of a person and transliterated into its philologically correct equivalent in the Macedonian Greek dialect (in which the ordinary Greek θ is represented by δ).² And in another passage a Paeonian hero, Asteropaeus, whose grandsire is the River Axios himself, is given 'Ακεσσαμενός ('the Healer') for his great-grand-sire on his grandmother's side (*Iliad*, Book XXI, ll. 140-3). It would, indeed, be natural enough that a people which had picked out the head of the Gulf of Volo as one site for a settlement should plant a sister-settlement at the head of the Gulf of Salonica.

Where was the centre of dispersion from which the Minyae radiated to these four widely scattered points in Continental European Greece? Three out of the four points lie on the coast; two of these—namely Iolcos and the hypothetical Minyan settlement at the mouth of the Axios—are ideal sites for commercial *entrepôts* between the Aegean Archipelago and its Continental European hinterland; and the fourth Minyan settlement, Orchomenos, which is the only one of the four that lies inland, is at the same time situated at the key-point of one of the portages between the Aegean Sea and the Corinthian Gulf. (The spur of Mount Acontius, on which the city of Orchomenos stands, commands the passage across the River Cephissus for anybody travelling overland from the Aegean port of Larymna, on the Euripus, to the Corinthian Gulf port of Cyrrha, at the head of the Bay of Crisa.) We may therefore conjecture that the Minyae were a maritime commercial people who came by sea to the four points on the Continent at which we find their settlements.

From what base of operations overseas did the Minyae come? If we take the resemblance between the names *Μινύαι* and *Μινωες* as an indication that they came from Crete, we shall find independent legendary evidence of a Cretan origin for all four of the Minyan settlements. In the case of Iolcos, we may notice that the legendary

¹ Stephanus Byzantius, s.v., cited by Nilsson, M. P.: *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), p. 141.

² Strabo (*Geographica*, p. 330) identifies the Homeric 'Αμυδάων with an historic fortress called 'Αβυδάων which overlooked the lower valley of the Axios.

name of Amythaon's father is *Κρηθεύς*. In the case of Orchomenos, we may notice that the route from Orchomenos to the head of the Crisaean Gulf passes, via the famous *σχιστή ὁδός*, through Delphi; and that, in the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo*, the historic Delphians are represented as being the descendants of a ship's company of *Κρήτες ἀπὸ Κνωσοῦ Μινωίου* (line 393), whose ship the God himself wafts to Crisa in order that these Cretans may settle at Delphi to preside over the Apollinean worship there. A connexion between Crete and Pylos is suggested in the point, incidentally mentioned in the Hymn (lines 397-9 and 469-70), that this Cretan ship was originally bound on a commercial venture from Crete to Pylos, and was only diverted to Crisa from its intended destination by the supernatural intervention of the God. The Cretan origin of our hypothetical Minyan settlement at the head of the Gulf of Salonica is suggested by the Hellenic tradition which ascribes a Cretan origin to the *Βοττιαῖοι*; for these Bottiaeans were the people who were found in possession of the lowlands at the head of the Gulf by the Chalcidian Greek colonists who settled in the neighbourhood at the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. and by the Macedonian Greek conquerors who descended upon this same coast from the continental hinterland at about the same date.¹

On this showing, the Minyae may be regarded as Minoan pioneers who settled at these four points on the mainland of European Greece at the time when the waters and coastlands of the Aegean were subject to 'the thalassocracy of Minos'. But here a difficulty suggests itself. The results of our modern Western archaeological research would appear to show that Pylos, Orchomenos, Iolcos, and Amydôn were all alike situated on the outermost fringe of the Minoan World. The map of the distribution of the Minoan culture on the mainland, as it is revealed by the archaeological evidence up to date, seems now unlikely to be modified appreciably by future discoveries. We have thus to ask ourselves why the Minoan thalassocrats should have chosen to plant their colonies so far afield, instead of planting them on those coasts of Continental Greece that lay nearest to Crete.

Perhaps we may obtain an answer to this question by asking ourselves the corresponding question about the colonies which were planted upon Continental Greek coasts, in the course of Hellenic history, by the Hellenic thalassocrats of Chalcis and Corinth. Why did the Chalcidians sail right out of the northern end of the Euripus, and then on past the dangerous coast of Magnesia, in order to plant their overseas Chalcidicê, at last, *ἐπὶ Θράκης*? And

¹ For references to the original Hellenic authorities by whom the Bottiaeans are declared to be of Cretan origin, see Hogarth, D. G.: *Philip and Alexander of Macedon* (London 1897, Murray), p. 6.

why did the Corinthians sail right out of their own gulf in order to plant their colonies on the coasts of Acarnania and Epirus? In these cases, the answer is fairly clear. A colonizing Power can only plant its colonies on the territories of peoples who are so inferior to the intruders in culture that they are incapable of self-defence. But the immediate neighbours of the Chalcidians and the Corinthians were fellow Hellenes; and for one Hellenic community to attempt the subjugation of another was a superhumanly formidable undertaking for psychological as well as for material reasons. The inadvisability of making the attempt is illustrated by the history of the Spartan conquest of Messene and its sequel.¹ The Chalcidians and Corinthians showed their greater prudence by letting their Hellenic neighbours alone. In their voyages in search of new lands for Chalcidian and Corinthian ploughs, they did not put to shore till they had reached and passed the bounds of the Hellenic World as these bounds stood at the time. It is only at the outermost edge of the Hellenic World of the eighth century B.C. that the Chalcidian and Corinthian colonial areas begin.

On this analogy we may conjecture that the Cretan colonies at Pylos and Orchomenos and Iolcos and Amydôn were planted at the outer edge of the Minoan World of the day at a time when the regions of Continental European Greece that were less distant from Crete had already been 'Minoanized'—partly, perhaps, by Minoan cultural influences which had radiated out of Minoan Crete without any physical transfusion of blood from the island to the mainland, and perhaps also partly by earlier colonization which had proceeded not from Crete itself but from some of the other islands in the Aegean Archipelago which were likewise cradles of the Minoan Civilization. For example, Perseus, who is the mythical founder of Mycenae, is brought by the legend to Argos from Seriphos;² and Cadmus, the eponym of the *Καδμείοι* who are

¹ See I. B (ii), p. 24, above, and III. A, vol. iii, pp. 50-79, below. Our own Western history affords another illustration in the shape of the policy and fortunes of the Teutonic Knights. So long as the Teutonic Knights confined their enterprise to the subjugation of the heathen Prussians and Lithuanians and Letts and Ests, right beyond the north-eastern pale of Western Christendom, the Order prospered. The trouble which was to end in disaster can be traced to the moment when the Teutonic Knights turned their arms against their own fellow Western Christians nearer home, in Pomerania. They ventured upon this fratricidal warfare because the Poles in the thirteenth century, like the English two centuries earlier, at the time of the Norman Conquest, were still only in the penumbra of the Western Civilization. Yet, even so, the Poles were too little inferior in culture to the aggressive Teutonic Knights to submit tamely to a fate which was resisted desperately even by the heathen Prussians. The Poles fought for their existence with all the determination of the Messenians in their struggle against Sparta, and ultimately with a success which the Messenians never achieved. For the ultimate discomfiture of the Teutonic Knights by the Poles in alliance with the Lithuanians, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 172-4, below.

² See Nilsson, M. P.: *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), pp. 40-1. The legend, of course, makes Perseus come from Argos originally, so that he withdraws from Argos in infancy in order to return to his birth-place in his manhood (for the Perseus legend as a mythical illustration of the pheno-

the mythical occupants of Boeotian Thebes in the pre-Hellenic Heroic Age, is brought by the legend to Thebes from Thera.¹ We may therefore perhaps picture our Minoan colonists from Crete as planting their colony of 'Minyan' Orchomenos just beyond the radius of the 'Cadmean' colony which had been planted at Boeotian Thebes by earlier settlers from a sister island. Moreover, there are a number of correspondences between place-names and cult-names that survived into Hellenic times in the 'Cadmean' part of Boeotia on the one hand and on the other hand in a district along the west coast of the Gulf of Volo which in Hellenic times was called the Phthiotic Achaea.² These correspondences suggest that 'Cadmean' colonists from the Cyclades may have founded the Phthiotic Thebes on the west coast of the Gulf of Volo at the same time as the Boeotian Thebes in Central Greece, and that the 'Minyan' colonists from Crete, who followed in the Cadmeans' wake, may have planted their Iolcos just beyond the Phthiotic Thebes in the one direction as they planted their Orchomenos just beyond the Boeotian Thebes in the other.

There is yet a third Thebes to be taken into account: the Asiatic Θήβη Ὑποπλακίη which lies at the southern foot of Mount Ida at the head of the Gulf of Edremid.³ And, here again, we find a Minyan settlement in the offing, on the Island of Lemnos. Between the Asiatic and the Phthiotic Thebes there is no known connexion beyond the bare identity of name. There seems to be no attempt to bring the two places into any historical relation with each other in the Hellenic tradition. On the other hand, the Minyae of Lemnos are represented in the *Iliad* as an offshoot of the Minyae of Iolcos. The King of Lemnos at the time of the Siege of Troy is

menon of 'Withdrawal-and-Return', see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 259-61, below). For our present purpose, we may regard Perseus as the mythical representative of some social movement which brought the Minoan culture to the Argolid from Seriphos. In the Hellenic Age, the island of Seriphos was so unimportant and obscure that nobody would have thought of making the founder of Mycenae come from Seriphos unless his Seriphian origin was already an established feature of the legend. It was doubtless just because of this obscurity of Seriphos that Perseus was now said merely to have been brought up there and to have been born in Argos itself. In the Hellenic Age, it would have seemed incredible that culture should ever have originated in Seriphos and spread thence to Argos at second hand. To us, with the knowledge of early Aegean culture which we have obtained through our archaeological research, a Seriphian origin of Mycenaean culture is not incredible at all, since it is quite in harmony with the archaeological evidence.

¹ Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 147.

² In both Cadmean Boeotia and Phthiotic Achaea there were places called Θήβαι and Κορώνεια. In Cadmean Boeotia there was a cult of an Athena who was called Ἰρωνία after a place named Ἰρων in Phthiotic Achaea; and, conversely, in Phthiotic Achaea, at Halos, there was a cult of a Zeus who was called Λαφύστιος after a mountain named Λαφύστιον in Cadmean Boeotia. These correspondences seem too numerous to be accidental. If they do point to a Cadmean settlement in Thessaly, perhaps we may find an echo of this in Herodotus's statement that the ancestors of the Dorians were driven by Cadmeans from the Thessalian district of Histiaeotis (Herodotus, Book I, chap. 56).

³ See Leaf, W.: *Troy: A Study in Homeric Geography* (London 1912, Macmillan), pp. 213-16.

described as being a son of Jason, the Minyan hero from Iolcos who was the legendary leader of the Argonauts (*Iliad*, Book VII, ll. 468-9, and Book XXI, l. 41). Perhaps, in spite of the legendary voyage of the Argonauts from Iolcos to Colchis and back, 'Jason' never really sailed further from Iolcos than Lemnos, after all! Perhaps the Minyan principality on Lemnos and the Asiatic city of Thebes are the respective relics of two rival attempts, by the Minyan and the Cadmean settlers in the Gulf of Volo, to force their way up through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea—attempts which both alike failed because Troy was then still standing to bar the passage through the Straits against all interlopers.

2. *Minyae, Pelasgi, and Τυρσηνοί.*

Lying, as it does, at the focus of maritime communications in the North Aegean, the Island of Lemnos in Late Minoan and Early Hellenic times was the scene of successive interminglings of peoples; and these interminglings gave rise to a confusion of tongues and of names.

In the sixth century B.C., both Lemnos and the two neighbouring islands of Imbros and Samothrace¹ were inhabited by *Πελασγοί*; but before 500 B.C. the Lemnian and Imbrian *Πελασγοί* were conquered by the Achaemenian Empire (Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 26-7) and they were then not only conquered for the second time, but were this time also evicted, by the Athenian Miltiades, who was at that time the despot, under Achaemenian suzerainty, of the Gallipoli Peninsula (Herodotus, Book VI, chaps. 136-40).

Who were these Lemnian Pelasgi? To judge by their name, they were an offshoot of the Pelasgi of Continental Greece whose name was preserved in Hellenic times in the name of the Thessalian district of Pelasgiotis. And the original Pelasgi of the historical Pelasgiotis were presumably the same people as the historical *Πελαγόνες* or *Πηλαγόνες* of Macedonia and the legendary *Φλεγύαι* of Central Greece. (At least, if *Πελασγοί* stands for *Πελαγ-σκοί*, then the same root, PELAG-, can be discerned in all three names.) The Pelasgi of Lemnos and Imbros are not the only transmarine offshoot of this widespread Continental Greek people that has left a record of itself. On the Asiatic mainland, for example, the town of Antandros which was situated in the plain of 'Hypoplacian' Thebes on the shores of the Gulf of Edremid is called *Πελασγίς* by Herodotus (Book VII, chap. 42); and these historical Pelasgi in the Troad may reasonably be regarded as descendants of the Pelasgi

¹ For the presence of Pelasgi on the Island of Samothrace before the arrival of the Thracian population which occupied the island in Herodotus's day, see Herodotus, Book II, chap. 51.

who are mentioned among the allies of the Trojans in the *Iliad* (Book II, ll. 840-3); for, in this passage of the *Iliad*, these Pelasgi are located in a place called Larisa; and the existence of a Larisa in the Troad, in the neighbourhood of Cape Lectum (Baba Burnu), is attested, at the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., by Thucydides (Book VIII, chap. 101) and Xenophon (*Hellenica*, III. i. 16). Another overseas settlement of the Pelasgi—and this in Crete—is mentioned in a famous passage of the *Odyssey* (Book XIX, l. 177). In addition to the bare community of national or racial name, the Pelasgi of Thessaly and the Troad and Crete have other properties—place-names and genealogical names—in common not only with each other, but also with the Pelagones of Paonia and with the Phlegyae of Central Greece.¹

¹ The following correspondences between place-names and genealogical names may be cited in support of the view that a real community of origin underlies the affinity of name between the Pelasgi, Pelagones, and Phlegyae in the several regions in which these national or racial names are found:

1. *Ληθαῖος* is the name of the river on which the town of Tricca stands in the Thessalian district of Histiaeotis (Strabo, p. 647) and likewise of the river on which the town of Gortyna stands in the plain now called the Mesarà in South-Central Crete (Strabo, p. 478). In the *Iliad* (Book II, l. 843) the two leaders of the 'Trojans' Pelasgian allies from Larisa are described as *υἱὲ δὲ Νύκῃ Ληθαίοιο Πηλεσγόου*. Compare the name of the city called *Λητή*, just east of the Lower Axios, in the district called Crestonia.

2. *Γυρτών* is the name of a town in the Thessalian district of Pelasgiotis (Strabo, pp. 329 and 441-3). *Γορτυνία* is the name of a town in the Paenonian district of Amphaxitis (Thucydides, Book II, chap. 100). *Γόρτυν* or *Γόρτυνα* is the name of a town in the Mesarà of Crete, on the banks of the river *Ληθαῖος*.

3. *Εὐρώπης* is the name of a river which flows from the Perrhaebian district of Thessaly into the Peneus close to Gyrtion (Strabo, p. 329), and *Εὐρώπη* is the name of a town in the Paenonian district of Amphaxitis, just below Gortynia (Thucydides, Book II, chap. 100). Compare the name of the mythical heroine called *Εὐρώπη* whose adventures are located in Crete.

4. *Εἰδομένη* is the name of a town in the Paenonian district of Amphaxitis, just above Gortynia (Thucydides, Book II, chap. 100). Compare the name of the mythical hero called *Ἰδομενεύς* who is represented in the Homeric epic as being the leader of the Cretan contingent in Agamemnon's army at the siege of Troy.

5. *Ἀλαλκομενά* is the name of a village in Boeotia between Haliartus and Coronea (Pausanias, *Graeciae Descriptio*, Book IX, chap. 33) in the neighbourhood of the traditional home of the legendary Phlegyae (op. cit. ix. 36). It is also the name of a village in the canton of Deuriopus in what is now the plain of Monastir, which is drained by a tributary of the River Axios; and Deuriopus, like the Amphaxitis, was a district of Paonia, since the Deuriopes were a subdivision of the Pelagones who, in their turn, were a subdivision of the Paenones. For this Pelagonian Alalcomenae, see Strabo, p. 327. It may also be noted that the Homeric hero Asteropaeus, the leader of the Paenones, is a son of *Πηλεγών* as well as a grandson of the River Axios (*Iliad*, Book XXI, ll. 140-2).

These correspondences are surely too numerous to be accidental.

We may equate the historical *Δευπίωνες* of *Δευπίονος* in Paonia with the *Δωριεῖς* of *Δωρίς* in Central Greece, who are the only historical Dorians in the Hellenic World apart from the inhabitants of the group of islands and peninsulas called *Δωρίς* off the south-western corner of the Anatolian Peninsula. The links are supplied by the legendary names of the father, *Δῖος*, and the grandfather, *Τεύτραμος*, of the twin leaders of the Trojans' Pelasgian allies (*Iliad*, Book II, l. 843); for, according to Herodotus (Book I, chap. 56), the Dorians of Doris in Central Greece had migrated to this Doris, via the Pindus highlands, from the Thessalian district of Histiaeotis; and *Δῖος* is the eponym of the River *Ληθαῖος* in Histiaeotis, while *Τεύτραμος* may be identified with the *Τέκτραμος* 'son of *Δῖος*' who is named by Diodorus of Agyrium (*A Library of Universal History*, Book IV, chap. 60, and Book V, chap. 80) as a war-lord who led a war-band of 'Aeolians

What is the historical relation between the Pelasgi and the Minyae? The Pelasgi who are located by the *Odyssey* in Crete, and whose Cretan settlement is to be identified, on the evidence of place-names,¹ with the subsequent Hellenic city-state of Gortyna, in the Mesarà, must evidently have been deposited here by the last and greatest wave of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung, which deposited Achaeans and 'Dorians' in Crete likewise, on the evidence of the same Homeric passage, besides depositing Ionians and Aeolians on the coast of Anatolia and Philistines on the coast of Syria.² In fact, the Pelasgi of Crete must have been one of the hordes of barbarian conquerors who reduced the Imperial people of Minos—the *Ἐπεόκρητες μεγάλητορες*—to the status of a servile *Μνωία*. Were the Pelasgi who inhabited Lemnos in the sixth century B.C. in the same relation to the Minyae who are represented as being the masters of Lemnos in the Homeric epic? This is what is conjectured by Herodotus, who holds that the grandchildren of the Argonauts had been driven out of Lemnos by the ancestors of those Pelasgi whom the Athenians found in possession of the island (Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 145). But is it not also possible that the Lemnian Pelasgi and the Lemnian Minyae were really one and the same people? For the Lemnian Minyae derive, according to the legend, from the Minyae of Iolcos; and Iolcos lay on the narrow seaboard of the Thessalian district of Pelasgiotis. Any Pelasgian

and Pelasgi', or a war-band of Dorians, on a Völkerwanderung from Continental European Greece to Crete.

The upshot seems to be that the historical Dorians of Central Greece were Pelasgi, as the historical Deuriopes of Paconia are known to have been Pelagones; and this would mean that the genuine Central Greek Dorians were originally 'Aeolians' and not 'Dorians' in the conventional generic sense in which the name Dorian was applied to a number of Hellenic communities in the Peloponnese and the Archipelago who spoke varieties of the North-Western dialect of the Greek language and who traced their descent to the barbarians that had come down upon the Aegean from the Continental Greek hinterland in the last convulsion of the post-Minoan and pre-Hellenic Völkerwanderung. This later Hellenic usage of the name 'Dorian', which was primarily a linguistic classification, was doubtless derived from the Doris off the south-west corner of Anatolia, where a settlement of 'Doric'-speaking Greeks had established themselves in juxtaposition to the 'Ionic'-speaking Greeks of Ionia and the 'Aeolic'-speaking Greeks of Aeolis. It must have been some time after this linguistic usage of the name 'Dorian' had been extended from the Anatolian Doris to the Peloponnese that the Peloponnesian 'Dorians' provided themselves with a fictitious descent from the genuine Central Greek Dorians in order to reconcile their acquired 'Dorian' name with their traditional North-Western origin, and at the same time to secure representation in the Central Greek Amphictyony, of which the Central Greek Dorians were old-established members.

Finally, we may take note of a kinship between the genuine Dorians of Central Greece and the Macedonians. It is recorded by Herodotus (loc. cit.) that the Central-Greek Dorians were called *Μακεδνολ* (an obvious variant of *Μακεδόνες*) during their sojourn in the Pindus highlands; while Diodorus (op. cit., Book IV, chap. 37) reports a legend that, during their previous sojourn in Histiaeotis, these Central-Greek Dorians came into collision with the *Λαπίθαι* of Pelasgiotis whose leader was *Κόρανος*, son of *Καυεύς* (compare the *Iliad*, Book II, l. 746); and these Lapith heroes *Κόρανος* and *Καυεύς* reappear in Macedonian legend as *Κάρανος* and *Κοῖνος*. (See Hoffmann, O.: *Die Makedonen* (Göttingen 1906, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht), pp. 122-7.)

¹ See the preceding footnote.

² For this great upheaval circa 1200/1190 B.C., see I. C (i) (b), pp. 93 and 100-2, above.

adventurers from Pelasgiotis who were in search of new homes overseas would have to set sail from Iolcos or thereabouts. Is it not conceivable that the Minyan settlers at Iolcos coalesced with the Pelasgian natives of their Thessalian hinterland, and that the colonization of Lemnos was the joint work of a composite people which had an equal right to call itself by the Minyan and by the Pelasgian name?

Be that as it may, we have one more puzzle still to solve. Were the Pelasgi (and their congeners the Pelagones and the Phlegyae) a Greek-speaking or a non-Greek-speaking people? *A priori*, it would be somewhat strange if a non-Greek language had been the mother-tongue of this group of peoples; for the vast stretch of country (from Boeotia to Paeonia) which had once been occupied by peoples of this name was inhabited by Greek-speaking populations afterwards in Hellenic times. Nor can the *floruit* of these peoples in this region have been very remote; for, in Hellenic times, the name of the Pelasgi was still preserved in that of the Thessalian district of Pelasgiotis, while the Pelagones still survived as an independent people, so that it was only the Phlegyae that had passed altogether into the realm of legend. The Phlegyae or Pelasgi or Pelagones must have been the occupants of Central and North-Eastern Continental Greece immediately before the beginning of Hellenic history—that is to say, in the latter part of the second millennium B.C.; and it is hardly possible to imagine that the mass of the population of these regions was not already Greek-speaking by that date. As a matter of fact, the Pelasgian place-names and genealogical names which we have examined above¹ are all transparently Greek, with the possible exception of Gyrton or Gortyn. On this showing, it would be natural to suppose that the Pelasgi were a Greek-speaking people, and perhaps to equate them with the ancestors of those North-Eastern and Central Greek communities which were speakers, in Hellenic times, of the particular dialect of Greek which had come to be called 'Aeolic'.

At this point, however, we are pulled up short by the evidence of Herodotus and Thucydides, who both attest that, in their day, in the fifth century B.C., the scattered remnants of the Lemnian Pelasgi who survived as refugee communities in the regions round about were all speakers of a single specific language which was definitely non-Greek. Herodotus knew of Pelasgi who were to be found in his day at Placia and Scylacê on the south coast of the Marmara and of others who were to be found in a place called *Κρηστῶν* which was presumably the capital of the district called Crestonia, just to the east of the Lower Axios. And he testifies

¹ See the footnote on pp. 407-8, above.

that these two peoples still spoke, in his day, one identical non-Greek language which had no affinity with any of the languages of their respective neighbours in their new homes on the Asiatic and on the European Continent (Herodotus, Book I, chap. 57). Herodotus also states in the same passage, by implication, that the extant Pelasgi in the Marmara were of Lemnian Pelasgian origin.¹ The Crestonian Pelasgi he traces direct to Thessaly; but it seems much more probable that these also were the descendants of Lemnian refugees, since Thucydides (Book IV, chap. 109) positively attests that, in his day, Pelasgians of Lemnian origin constituted the majority of the mixed population of the Athos Peninsula. The most natural supposition is that Herodotus's Crestonian Pelasgi were a batch of these Lemnian Pelasgian refugees on the Athos Peninsula who had been given a new home in Crestonia by the Macedonian King Alexander I, when he annexed this district to his dominions after the ebb of the Achaemenian tide from Europe in 479-478 B.C.,² while Herodotus's Pelasgi on the Asiatic coast of the Marmara had presumably been planted there by the Achaemenian Government itself, to whom these victims of Miltiades and the Athenians would be *personae gratae*. Thucydides states that his Pelasgi on the Athos Peninsula were one of four non-Greek peoples who occupied the Peninsula between them and who were all bilingual. The inference is that Greek was their *lingua franca* and that their second language, whatever it might be in each case, was their mother-tongue. When this statement is taken together with Herodotus's statement that one and the same non-Greek language was spoken by the Pelasgi of Creston and of the Marmara, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that the Pelasgi who were evicted from Lemnos by Miltiades in the sixth century B.C. were a non-Greek-speaking people.

How are we to reconcile this conclusion with our previous conclusion that Greek was the mother-tongue of the original Pelasgians of Continental Greece from whom the Pelasgians of Lemnos were presumably descended? Herodotus—proceeding, scientifically enough, from the known to the unknown—takes the ascertainable and ascertained fact that the extant Pelasgi of his own day spoke a

¹ He says that they had once lived with the Athenians; and it was an Attic legend that the Lemnian Pelasgi had once sojourned for a time in Attica.

² For Alexander I's annexation of the country between the Lower Axios and the Lower Strymon to the Macedonian Kingdom, see Geyer, F.: *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II* (Munich and Berlin 1930, Oldenbourg), pp. 46-7. It was the standing policy of the Kings of Macedon to extend their dominions eastwards by annexing successive strips of the barbarian hinterland; and if we may judge by the acts of King Alexander I's father, King Amyntas I, it was also their policy to secure and to civilize their new acquisitions in this quarter by planting them with cultivated refugees from the Aegean. On this principle, Amyntas I planted the evicted despot of Athens, Peisistratus, at Παικῆλος (Aristotle: *The Constitution of Athens*, ch. 15) and afterwards offered Anthemus to Peisistratus's evicted son Hippias (Herodotus, Book V, ch. 94).

non-Greek language as evidence that the original Pelasgi were non-Greek-speaking likewise; and he seizes upon this hypothetical non-Greek and pre-Greek Pelasgian stratum of population in Greece to fill the perplexing void in the background of Hellenic history with which the Hellenic historian was confronted owing to his ignorance of the previous existence of the Minoan Society in the Aegean World. For us, with our archaeological knowledge of this antecedent Minoan Society, this historical void no longer exists; and at the same time our linguistic knowledge of the comparative philology of the Indo-European languages informs us, by inference, that the Greek branch of the Indo-European *Ursprache* must already have been current in Greece before the middle of the second millennium B.C., when an Indo-European Centum-language is known, by direct evidence, to have been current in East Central Anatolia¹ and an Indo-European Satem-language in Palestine.² For us, therefore, the supposition that the original Pelasgi of North-Eastern Continental Greece were a non-Greek-speaking people is neither attractive nor plausible. Yet we shall be forced into accepting the Herodotean solution of the contradiction with which we are confronted unless we can find an alternative solution of the problem on other lines. If the Pelasgi were originally a Greek-speaking people, can we explain how it could be that, by the sixth century B.C., the Pelasgian colonists of Lemnos should have lost their Greek mother-tongue? A possible explanation is offered by a further piece of information which Herodotus and Thucydides afford us between them.

Herodotus states (Book I, chap. 57) that the Pelasgi of Creston lived 'above' (i.e. inland of) the *Τυρρηνοί*; and Thucydides states (Book II, chap. 109) that the Pelasgi of the Athos Peninsula actually were *Τυρρηνοί*—a remnant of 'the *Τυρρηνοί* who had once inhabited Lemnos'. From these statements it is evident that the people who were evicted from Lemnos by Miltiades in the sixth century B.C. were called *Τυρρηνοί* as well as Pelasgi; and the double name may mean either one of two things. It may mean that the Pelasgian settlers on Lemnos happened to belong to a particular fraction, called *Τυρρηνοί*, of the Continental Pelasgian people; or else it may mean that the Pelasgian settlers on Lemnos had been overlaid subsequently by a fresh layer of settlers from elsewhere to whom the name *Τυρρηνοί* belonged. As between these two alternative explanations of the application of both names to the same population on the Island of Lemnos, our judgement will be inclined in favour of the second explanation when we recall the other

¹ See I. C (i) (b), p. 113, footnote 3, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), pp. 104-5, above.

contexts, apart from Lemnos, in which the two names respectively occur. For while the name Pelasgi is connected, as we have seen, with North-Eastern Continental Greece, the connexions of the name *Τυρρηνοί* are not with Greece at all but with South-Eastern Anatolia;¹ and the monuments of the Etruscan language which have survived from the settlements of these *Τυρρηνοί* or Etruscans in Italy show that the language which they carried with them from Anatolia overseas was not only non-Greek but non-Indo-European. Two inscriptions in an unknown non-Greek language were actually discovered in A.D. 1885 on Lemnos, in the village of Kaminia; and these have been interpreted as Etruscan by a number of scholars; but our knowledge of Etruscan itself is still too slight to warrant our regarding this identification as assured.

Nevertheless, the clue provided by this non-Greek inscription and by the non-Lemnian context of the Tyrrhenian or Etruscan name does perhaps warrant us in reconstructing the history of Lemnos, tentatively and provisionally, as follows. In the latest age of Minoan history, the island was occupied by Minyae from Iolcos, in the Thessalian district of Pelasgiotis, who were either identical with the Pelasgi whom we subsequently find on Lemnos or else were evicted by these Pelasgi in the course of the post-Minoan and pre-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung*. Thereafter, these Pelasgian settlers on Lemnos were themselves not evicted but overlaid by a layer of Tyrrhenian or Etruscan settlers from South-Eastern Anatolia,² whose non-Greek language had ousted the Greek language of their Pelasgian predecessors by the time when the mixed Pelasgian-Tyrrhenian population of Lemnos was evicted from the island by Miltiades (before the year 493 B.C.). It was this Tyrrhenian or Etruscan language that was still spoken in the time of Herodotus and Thucydides by the descendants of the Lemnian refugees on the Athos Peninsula and at Creston and in Placia and Scylacê.³ The people of these refugee communities were known as

¹ For the possible Hittite affinities of the Tyrrhenians or Etruscans, see I. C (i) (b), p. 114, footnote 2, above.

² For the probable date and purpose of the Etruscan settlement on Lemnos, see loc. cit., above.

³ The testimony of Herodotus and Thucydides to the non-Greek character of the language that was spoken in their day by the various extant descendants of the Lemnian refugees is not our oldest testimony to the fact that Lemnos, before its colonization by the Athenians, was inhabited by a people who spoke a non-Greek language. There are two passages in the Homeric epic (*Iliad*, Book I, l. 594, and *Odyssey*, Book VIII, l. 294) in which Lemnos is described as being inhabited by a people called the *Σίντιες*; and in the second passage these *Σίντιες* are described as *ἀπρόφθονοι*, which implies that their language was not only non-Greek but that it sounded unmusical in Greek ears. In both passages, the *Sinties* are mentioned in connexion with the worship of Hephaestus. In the first passage they are said to have picked Hephaestus up when he fell on Lemnos after having been hurled out of Olympus by Zeus. In the second passage it is suggested that Hephaestus has gone on a visit to the *Sinties* on Lemnos from his Olympian home. It is hardly possible not to connect these legendary *Σίντιες* on Lemnos with the historical *Συροί* whose presence in the Strymon Valley is attested from the time of Thucydides

Pelasgi and *Τυρσηνοί* indifferently; and it was this local equivalence of the two names which gave rise to the mistaken belief that the Pelasgi and the *Τυρσηνοί* were one and the same people and that therefore the Pelasgi were not Greeks.

This disquisition on names will have served its purpose if it has helped to disperse some of the fog that still obscures our field of historical vision between the last glimmers of Minoan history and the first gleams of Hellenic.

(Book II, chap. 98) onwards. And since these Sinti are reputed to be Thracians in virtue of their habitat in Thrace, it is usual to write the Sinties down as Thracians too and to assume that they crossed over to Lemnos from the European mainland, in order to add to the confusion of peoples and tongues on the island, at some date unknown. It is conceivable, of course, that the Pelasgi of Lemnos, like those of Samothrace, were overlaid by a stratum of Thracian population from the European mainland before they were overlaid by the *Τυρσηνοί* from Anatolia. But no Thracian conquest of Lemnos is recorded by Herodotus, who is our authority for the Thracian conquest of the Pelasgi of Samothrace (Book II, chap. 51). The Lemnian picture would be simplified if it were permissible to identify the non-Greek-speaking Sinties on Lemnos with the non-Greek-speaking *Τυρσηνοί*, and to suppose that the Sinti in the Strymon Valley were an extreme outpost of Lemnian refugees which was planted here by King Alexander I of Macedon when he annexed the region between the Lower Axios and the Lower Strymon after 479-478 B.C. The domain of the Sinti in the Strymon Valley, as defined by the site of the town of Heraclea Sintice, lies next door to Crestonia, where the presence of a Pelasgian settlement, 'above the *Τυρσηνοί*', is attested in the fifth century B.C. by Herodotus (Book I, chap. 57).

ANNEX III TO I. C (i) (b)

THE RELATIONS OF 'THE INDUS CULTURE' WITH THE SUMERIC SOCIETY AND WITH THE INDIC SOCIETY

IN the main body of this Study, on p. 108, the writer has raised, without attempting to answer, the question whether 'the Indus Culture' which has been brought to light by the Director-General of Archaeology in India, Sir John Marshall, at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappā is a 'colonial' offshoot or variation of the Sumeric culture of the Tigris-Euphrates Delta, or whether it is an independent culture of the same species as the Sumeric but without any closer connexion with the Sumeric than is displayed by any other representative of this class of societies. It may be convenient for the reader to have set before him, in the original, the views of Sir John Marshall himself, who is the first authority on the subject.

Sir John Marshall takes the view that 'the Indus Culture' is no more closely related to the Sumeric culture than it is to the cultures of the Egyptian or the Minoan World. At the same time, he also takes the view that these four cultures have a special relation with one another which they do not share with the other representatives of the class: that they constitute, in fact, a sub-species within their species. Behind all four of them, he discerns a common parent—or, around all four, a common social environment—in the culture of the 'Chalcolithic' phase of material technique which was already diffused, at the simultaneous dawn of these four civilizations, over the whole region, extending from the south-eastern face of the Atlas to the south-western face of the Himalayas, which has since dried up (except for the valleys of four great rivers) into the Afrasian Steppe. In fact, Sir John Marshall almost goes so far as to regard this common Afrasian Chalcolithic culture as a unity of which 'the Indus Culture' and the Sumeric and the Egyptian and the Minoan are mere articulations.

Sir John Marshall's exposition of these views needs to be quoted here, because the view which is expounded in this Study of History is not altogether the same. In the Second Part of this Study, which deals with the genesis of civilizations, the reader will find¹ that the cultures which have arisen in the several great river-valleys that cut across the face of Afrasia are grouped together, inasmuch as they have all alike arisen in response to one identical challenge: the challenge presented by the desiccation of the former Afrasian grasslands into the present Afrasian Steppe. When confronted by this

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, pp. 302-18, above.

challenge, certain communities among the 'Chalcolithic' population of Afrasia plunged into the jungle-swamp of the lower valleys of the Nile and the Tigris and Euphrates—and possibly already, at this same epoch, into the jungle-swamp that likewise filled the lower valleys of the Indus and of its vanished sister-stream—and conjured out of these wildernesses the Egyptiac and the Sumeric worlds, and possibly the world of 'the Indus Culture' as well (if this was really an independent growth, and not a product of Sumeric 'colonial' expansion in a later age). In this Study, however, the common origin of the Egyptiac and the Sumeric cultures (and possibly also 'the Indus Valley Culture') in response to a common challenge is not regarded as making of these three cultures a kind of trinity in unity in contradistinction to all the other cultures of the same class. This sub-classification seems inapt, for one reason, because, in the writer's view, any special resemblances between the particular cultures are more convincingly explained as independent identic responses to a uniform challenge than as a common heritage from an age before this uniform challenge was presented. Another reason for refusing to make a special sub-class of these particular cultures is that the same challenge of the desiccation of Afrasia evoked not only the river-valley cultures, in which there is an obvious uniformity of physical environment, but also the maritime culture of the Minoan World,¹ as well as the Nomadic Culture which is common to the desiccated Steppes of Afrasia and Eurasia.² This Nomadic Culture is so distinctive that, if sub-classifications were to be made within the class, there would be more to be said for placing the Nomadic Culture in a sub-class by itself and including in a second sub-class all the sedentary civilizations of the Old World and the New, than for making a special sub-class out of the Afrasian river-valley cultures. On this showing, it has seemed better to eschew any attempt at sub-classifications and to leave each and all of these societies on an equal footing with one another as so many separate representatives of the species of societies called 'civilizations'. We have then to ask ourselves the question whether 'the Indus Valley Culture' is a civilization in its own right or whether it is a 'colonial' offshoot of the Sumeric Society.

Since this way of formulating the question is not quite the same as Sir John Marshall's, it may be convenient for the reader to acquaint himself with Sir John Marshall's view as it is set forth in the following passage:

"That this Indus Civilisation was part and parcel of that greater civilisation which during the Chalcolithic Age extended across the broad

¹ For the genesis of the Minoan Culture in the Aegean Archipelago, see II. C (ii) (b), 2, pp. 323-30, above.

² For the Nomadic Culture, see further Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 7-22, below.

Afrasian belt, and that it was intimately related to other branches of that civilisation in Western Persia and Mesopotamia, became clear almost from the first moment of its discovery. And this, indeed, was only to be expected. . . . With the contributions to the common stock of this civilisation made by the other great rivers of Afrasia—by the Nile in Egypt, by the Euphrates and Tigris in Mesopotamia, by the Kārūn and Karkheh in Western Persia—we have long since been tolerably familiar, and we knew a little, too, of the part played by the Helmand. It can hardly surprise us, therefore, to find the river valleys of Sind and the Panjab—the broadest and richest of all the valleys of Southern Asia—taking their share in the evolution of this civilisation; nor will it surprise us if, as the field of exploration widens, we find that the valleys of the Jumna and the Ganges in India, of the Oxus and other rivers of Transcaspia, prove to have been vital centres of human activity and progress in the Chalcolithic Age. . . .

‘In the nature of things a civilisation as widely diffused as the Chalcolithic, with ramifications extending as far west as Thessaly and Southern Italy, and as far east, perhaps, as the Chinese provinces of Honan and Chih-li, could not have been homogeneous throughout. The peoples who participated in it were of different races, spoke different languages, wrote different characters, worshipped different deities, and in other ways displayed different orders of mentality. It is too much, therefore, to expect that there should have been a close correspondence in their material cultures. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to exaggerate the differences between them or to regard them as entirely self-centred and self-sufficient communities. Each, no doubt, had its own particular type of civilisation, which was adapted to suit local conditions. But between them all was a fundamental unity of ideas which could hardly have been the result of mere commercial intercourse.

‘Let me illustrate what I mean by taking one or two concrete examples. The signs which each country devised to record its speech differed materially from those of its neighbours—the hieroglyphs of Egypt from those of Crete, the Cretan from the Sumerian, the Sumerian from the Elamite, and so on. But, however much these scripts differed from one another, however much they demonstrated the independence of their authors, they were all based on one and the same idea—the idea of using pictured signs to represent not only objects or concepts but actual sounds. When, therefore, we attempt to estimate the degree of unity or diversity in the Chalcolithic Civilisation, we must admit that this wonderful invention, which is fundamental to each and every mode of writing, counts for far more than the diversity which distinguishes the various systems of pictured signs. Another typical illustration may be taken from spinning and weaving. On the Indus, cotton was used for the thinner textiles; on the Nile, flax. Each in its own way was an important discovery and a valuable contribution to the common stock of human knowledge. But more valuable than either was the discovery of how to spin, and how to weave, and this discovery was the universal possession of the then Civilised World—one of the many factors that

justify us in regarding this culture as a more or less coherent whole. It is the same with the painted pottery. Each of the river valleys in which this civilisation was centred had its own ceramic wares, with shapes and designs adapted to local needs or ideas; but all alike shared the secret of the potter's wheel and of how to fix the colouring on the vessels by firing—secrets which are not likely to have been discovered independently.

“These examples—and many more might be cited—will suffice to make clear what I mean by the fundamental unity of this civilisation. The point is one that needs to be stressed, because it has been the fashion to emphasise the diversity of this civilisation, while ignoring its essential homogeneity; and, in the case of the particular branch with which we are now concerned, we should certainly misunderstand its evolution if we conceived of it as a wholly isolated and independent growth. It is just as individual, just as national, in character as other branches are—the Sumerian, for example, or the Egyptian; and it is no less typical of the region where it took shape than the former is of Southern Mesopotamia, or the latter of the Valley of the Nile. Thus, to mention but a few of its leading features, there are, first and foremost, the domestic houses, the unique character of which has already been emphasised; and with the private houses must be coupled also the great public baths, for which there is no parallel elsewhere until we come down to Roman times. A feature of another kind, but no less distinctive, is the remarkably naturalistic quality of the Indus art, which is wholly unlike the contemporary art of Elam, Sumer or Egypt; another is the decoration of its painted pottery, easily distinguishable from any other red-and-black wares known to us, still more easily from the paler wares of Persia and Mesopotamia; another, the use of cotton instead of flax for light textiles; another, the highly evolved type of the characters devised for writing. But behind these and manifold other traits that are peculiar to the Indus Civilisation and give it its national character, is a tissue of ideas, inventions, and discoveries which were the common property of the then Civilised World and cannot be traced to their respective sources. Some may have originated among the Indus people, but many must have been derived from elsewhere, borrowed, may be, from other regions, or in some cases inherited from earlier ages, when the races of Afrasia were perhaps less heterogeneous. Such are the domestication of animals; the cultivation of wheat, barley and other grains; the growing of fruits; the irrigation of land with the aid of artificial canals and embankments; the building of houses; the organisation of society in cities; spinning and the weaving of textiles and the dyeing of them in various colours; the use of the potter's wheel and the decoration of earthenware with encaustic designs; navigation by river and the use of wheeled vehicles on land; the working of gold and silver, of copper, and of tin; the recording of speech by means of picture signs; and the fashioning of ornaments from faience, ivory, bone, shell and semi-precious stones. Seeing that these and many other elements were basic to civilisation throughout the entire Afrasian belt and just as distinctive of it in other regions as they are in the Indus Valley, we should clearly

be in danger of straying from the truth if we failed to recognise that the Indus Civilisation is an integral part of the whole. On the other hand, we should be equally far from the truth if we ignored those other and hardly less important features which are the special attributes of the Indus Civilisation and which give it its local and national complexion.¹

The general view of the relation between 'the Indus Culture' and the Sumeric culture which is put forward by Sir John Marshall in the foregoing passage is based, as will be seen, upon evidence taken from a number of different spheres of social life: for example, from the material arts and from the art of writing and from religion. The religion of 'the Indus Culture' with its dominant mother goddess, with its male god who performs the same function as the Minoan 'Master and Mistress of the Animals' besides being the prototype of Siva, with its tree-worship and personification of tree-spirits, and with its cult of phallic and baetylic stones, seems to have more points of contact with the Minoan Religion² and with latter-day Hinduism than with the Sumeric religion.³ As for the Indus script, Sir John Marshall's collaborators, Messrs. C. J. Gadd and Sidney Smith, find no evidence of its having any direct connexion with the Sumeric script;⁴ while another collaborator, Professor Langdon, pronounces that 'the Indus inscriptions resemble the Egyptian hieroglyphs far more than they do the Sumerian linear and cuneiform system'.⁵ After a study, however, of some tablets inscribed with a prehistoric form of the Sumeric script which have been found at Jamdat Nasr in 'Irāq, Professor Langdon adds in a post-script⁶ that he wishes 'to emphasise more definite connexion between the most archaic Sumerian script and the Indus Valley script than' he had been 'disposed to admit in' his 'preceding study'.

The question of the relation between 'the Indus Culture' and the Sumeric culture is also affected by the chronology of 'the Indus Culture', in so far as this can yet be ascertained.

The culture revealed in all the strata of human deposits that have been excavated at Mohenjo-Daro is uniform from bottom to top (except that the higher, i.e. the later, strata are the meaner).⁷ Sir John Marshall estimates⁸ that these strata correspond, from first to

¹ Marshall, Sir John: *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilisation* (London 1931, Probsthain, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 93-5.

² For the Minoan religion, see I. C (i) (b), pp. 95-100, above.

³ See Marshall, op. cit., vol. i, chap. v. The points of special resemblance between the Sumeric religion and the religion of 'the Indus Culture' are the conception of the Tree of Life, the fantasy of mixed and semi-human monsters, and the portrayal of monsters and animals in the role of officient genii.

⁴ Marshall, op. cit., vol. ii, chap. xxii, p. 411.

⁵ Marshall, op. cit., vol. ii, ch. xxiii, p. 424. Cf. p. 427.

⁶ In op. cit., loc. cit., p. 454.

⁷ Marshall, op. cit., vol. i, p. 103.

⁸ In op. cit., loc. cit.

last, to a span of about 500 years; but he adds that this particular span, which happens to have left its material record in the debris of this one particular site, represents no more than a snippet out of the total life-span of 'the Indus Culture'. The state of the culture as it is revealed at Mohenjo-Daro presupposes many millennia of antecedent human endeavour;¹ and Sir John Marshall, believing 'the Indus Culture' to have arisen out of the Afrasian 'Chalcolithic Culture' independently, concludes that it is coeval with the early culture of Sumer and with the pre-diluvian culture of Egypt and Mesopotamia, and finds indications of a lively intercourse between the Indus Valley and both Sumer and Elam by the close of the fourth millennium B.C.

It remains to identify, if possible, the particular five centuries during which the city at Mohenjo-Daro was 'a going concern'; and some evidence has come to light in the shape of seals, recognizable by their style as products of 'the Indus Culture', which have been unearthed in deposits, left by the Sumeric culture in 'Irāq, of which we can approximately calculate the date. Five such seals are taken by Sir John Marshall² and by Professor Langdon³ to prove, by the Sumeric context in which they have been found, that 'the Indus Culture', in the stage revealed at Mohenjo-Daro, was older than the Dynasty of Akkad (*in Sumeria imperabant circa 2652-2456 B.C.*); and Sir John Marshall infers⁴ that Mohenjo-Daro itself flourished between 3250 and 2750 B.C. On the strength of another 'Indus Culture' seal found in 'Irāq, another scholar, Mr. H. Frankfort, the Field Director in 'Irāq of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, concludes that 'the Indus Culture' of Mohenjo-Daro was contemporary with the Dynasty of Akkad rather than anterior to it.⁵

Even on this lower dating, it will be noticed that there is a chronological gap of at least 500 years between the terminal date of the history of 'the Indus Culture'—at least, at Mohenjo-Daro—and the arrival in the Indus Valley of the Aryan Nomads whose eruption out of the Eurasian Steppe into India and into South-Western Asia is to be dated, as we have seen,⁶ between 1900 B.C. and 1700 B.C. This chronological discontinuity between 'the Indus Culture' and the advent of the Aryas, which is suggested by the chronological evidence, such as it is, is supported by the circumstantial evidence of Archaeology and of Literature.

¹ Marshall, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. viii.

² Marshall, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 103.

³ In Marshall, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 426.

⁴ In *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 104.

⁵ See a letter from Mr. Frankfort dated Baghdad, 5th March 1932, and published in *The Times* newspaper of London on the 26th March 1932. For the whole question of the chronological testimony of these seals, see Gadd, C. J.: 'Seals of Ancient Indian Style found at Ur'—offprint of *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. xviii (London 1932, Milford).

⁶ On pp. 104-7, above.

'A comparison of the Indus and Vedic cultures shows incontestably that they are unrelated. Thus, the picture of Indo-Aryan Society portrayed in the Vedas is that of a partly pastoral, partly agricultural people who have not yet emerged from the village state, who have no knowledge of life in cities or of the complex economic organization which such life implies, and whose houses are nondescript affairs constructed largely of bamboo. At Mohenjo-Daro and Harappā, on the other hand, we have densely populated cities with solid, commodious houses of brick equipped with adequate sanitation, bathrooms, wells, and other amenities. The metals which the Indo-Aryans used in the time of the Rigveda are gold and copper or bronze; but a little later, in the time of the Yajurveda and Atharvaveda, these metals are supplemented by silver and iron. Among the Indus people silver is commoner than gold, and utensils and vessels are sometimes made of stone—a relic of the Neolithic Age—as well as of copper and bronze. Of iron there is no vestige. For offensive weapons the Vedic-Aryans have the bow and arrow, spear, dagger, and axe, and for defensive armour the helmet and coat of mail. The Indus people also have the bow and arrow, spear, dagger, and axe, but, like the Mesopotamians and Egyptians, they have the mace as well, sometimes of stone, sometimes of metal; while, on the other hand, defensive armour is quite unknown to them—a fact which must have told against them in any contests with mailed and helmeted foes. The Vedic-Aryans are a nation of meat-eaters, who appear to have had a general aversion to fish, since there is no direct mention of fishing in the Vedas. With the Indus people fish is a common article of diet, and so too are molluscs, turtles, and other aquatic creatures. In the lives of the Vedic-Aryans the horse plays an important part, as it did in the lives of many nations from the northern grasslands. To the people of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappā the horse seems to have been unknown; it has no place, at any rate, among the many animals figured at these places; and though some bones of a horse (*equus caballus*) were found on the surface at the former site, it is more than probable that they belong to a later, may be quite modern, period. By the Vedic-Aryans the cow is prized above all other animals and regarded with special veneration. Among the Indus people the cow is of no particular account, its place with them being taken by the bull, the popularity of whose cult is attested by the numerous figurines and other representations of this animal. Of the tiger there is no mention in the Vedas, and of the elephant but little, but both these animals are familiar to the Indus people. The Vedic religion is normally aniconic. At Mohenjo-Daro and Harappā iconism is everywhere apparent. In the Vedic pantheon the female element is almost wholly subordinate to the male, and neither the Mother Goddess nor Siva (with whom, however, the Vedic Rudra was afterwards to be identified) has any place among its members. Among the Indus cults those of the Mother Goddess and Siva are prominent, and the female elements appear to be co-equal with, if not to predominate over, the male. Fire (Agni) ranks among the foremost deities of the Veda, and the domestic hearth or fire-pit (*agni-kunda*) is a characteristic feature of every house. In the houses of

Mohenjo-Daro the fire-pit is conspicuously lacking. To the Indo-Aryan, phallic worship was abhorrent. Among the Indus people there is abundant evidence of its existence.¹

In another passage,² Sir John Marshall draws a comparison between the effacement of the memory of 'the Indus Culture' from the tradition of the subsequent Indic Society and the effacement of the memory of the Minoan culture from the tradition of Hellas.

How is this chronological gap and this cultural discontinuity to be explained? Without venturing to pronounce on the question whether 'the Indus Culture' was an independent culture or a 'colonial' offshoot of the Sumeric culture, we may perhaps point out that this hiatus in the evidence, so long as it remains unbridged in any other way, will permit us still to play with our conjecture³ that, between the decay of Mohenjo-Daro and the arrival of the Aryans, the Indus Valley may have been temporarily relegated to an obscure and subordinate role on the stage of History as an outlying province of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad (*florebat circa 2275-1875 B.C.*) which was the universal state of the Sumeric Society of the Tigris and Euphrates Delta. If this conjecture proves to hit the mark, then it will follow that, in so far as the Indic Society can be regarded as being related to any antecedent society at all, its relations are with the Sumeric Society of the Tigris and Euphrates Delta, and not with 'the Indus Culture' which had once flourished in the plains upon which the Aryas descended when they made their way across the Hindu Kush from the Eurasian Steppe at some time in the first half of the second millennium B.C.

¹ Marshall, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 110-11.

² In *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. viii.

³ For this conjecture, see pp. 106-9, above.

ANNEX TO I. C (iii) (b)

THE UNIFORMITY THEORY AND THE DIFFUSION THEORY

IN the relevant chapter, we have contradicted two of the principal dogmas of 'the Diffusionist School' of contemporary British anthropologists in two statements: the first being, 'We have found no evidence that any living civilization, either Western or non-Western, is in any way related to the Egyptian'; the second, 'It is certain that none of them are related to any of the four extinct civilizations of the New World.'¹ These two negative statements, which we have made *en passant*, may appear, as they stand, to be as curtly dogmatic as the usual formulations of the two contrary dogmas of the 'Diffusionist' creed. It therefore seems desirable to look more closely into the issue between the Diffusion Theory and the Uniformity Theory of the acquisition of techniques and aptitudes and institutions and ideas—partly in order to make sure that we do not do less than justice to 'the Diffusionist School', but still more because this is an issue which will continue to arise in the course of this Study.

The British Diffusionists are believers in 'the Unity of Civilization' in a special sense: not as a fact of yesterday or to-morrow, which has just been accomplished, or is just about to be accomplished, by the world-wide diffusion of our own Western Civilization on the economic plane,² but as a fact which was accomplished several thousand years ago by the diffusion of an older civilization, the Egyptian. In their belief, the Egyptian Civilization is something unique; for they believe that the Egyptian World is the one and only place in which such a thing as a civilization has ever yet been created independently, without assistance from outside. All other manifestations of the species of society called civilizations are regarded by these British Diffusionists as derivative. They seek to reduce the semblance of plurality to an original underlying unity by deriving all these other civilizations from the Egyptian Civilization; and they apply this method of reduction to the pre-Columbian civilizations of the New World as well as to the non-Egyptian civilizations of the Old World. Not content with explaining the origin of all the civilizations of the Old World by postulating the diffusion of the Egyptian culture from the meeting-place of the three

¹ I. C (iii) (b), p. 164, above.

² At the same time, this latter-day diffusion of our own Western Civilization has manifestly had a profound effect upon our British Diffusionists' thinking. (On this point, see further pp. 427-8, below.)

continents of the Old World into the furthest extremities of Africa, Europe, and Asia, our Diffusionists waft the Egyptiac culture eastward through the Indonesian and Melanesian and Polynesian archipelagos and then carry it, in a flying leap, across the great gulf beyond Hawaii and Easter Island in order to land at last, triumphantly, on the western coasts of North and South America for the purpose of sowing there the seeds that have come to flower in the cultures of the Mayan and the Andean World.¹

This bare summary of the British Diffusionist Doctrine in its canonical form is perhaps sufficient to indicate why, and to what extent, it is unacceptable. No one, of course, who was not an equally dogmatic doctrinaire of 'the Uniformitarian School' would seek to deny the validity of the Diffusion Theory *in toto*. The most cursory empirical survey of recorded history, from the history of Singer's sewing-machines *retrosum* to the history of the Alphabet, makes it manifest that Diffusion has been one of the means by which the techniques and aptitudes and institutions and ideas of human societies have actually been acquired; and at a later stage of this Study we shall be tracing out some of the processes of Diffusion for ourselves when we examine the contacts between civilizations and barbarians in Part VIII and the contacts which civilizations have had with one another—in Space in Part IX and in Time in Part X. Moreover, it is no doubt theoretically possible that the diffusion of the achievements of one single original civilization might account for the existence of all the representatives of the species that are known up to date. But this is clearly the limit of the Diffusion Theory's legitimate application. For, *ex hypothesi*, the theory cannot be called upon to account for the original creation of the subsequently diffused hypothetical primary civilization, be it the Egyptiac or any other. And then, when once it is conceded that one civilization has been acquired by one human society through an original act of creation (instead of through an imitative act of adoption) at least once upon a time, it becomes sheer arbitrary caprice to deny that the same thing may have happened a second time already in some instance recorded or unrecorded, or at least that it is capable of happening at some unpredictable date in the future.

The simple fact is that, in every manifestation of Life, we find empirically, by observation, that a creative power is exhibited, and that acts of creation are performed, by some, but not by all,

¹ Two standard expositions of the British Diffusionist Doctrine by the two foremost authorities in this school of anthropology will be found in Professor G. Elliot Smith's *The Ancient Egyptians and the Origins of Civilisation* (2nd edition: London 1923, Harper), and in W. H. Peery's *The Children of the Sun: A Study in the Early History of Civilisation* (London 1923, Methuen). See also Professor G. Elliot Smith's *Human History* (London 1930, Cape).

representatives of any given species. And this fact in itself implies that there are two alternative independent means by which any given quality may have been acquired by any manifestation of Life in any given instance. One of these alternative means is original creation, since without creation the diffusion of the products of creation is impossible *ex hypothesi*. At the same time, it is not admissible to ascribe every acquisition of every quality by every representative of every species to a separate and original creative act, since our empirical observation shows us that, in any species, the creative individuals are in a minority, and that, in the life of any creative individual, his creative acts are rare events. Thus, in any objective study of the process of acquisition (or, in vital terms, the process of genesis and growth), we have to allow for the operation, side by side, of two different principles: the principle of the Uniformity of Nature and the principle of Diffusion through Radiation-and-Mimesis. The Uniformity of Nature guarantees that the germ or spark of creative power which is manifested in one or more representatives of a species is capable of reappearing in any other representative of the same species, though experience enables us to predict with confidence that, as a matter of fact, the creative gift will prove to be confined in practice to a rather small minority. Conversely, the same experience informs us that Diffusion is the means by which acquisitions are actually made in many cases, and perhaps in the majority. The proper task of the student of Life is not to magnify the potency of either principle tendenciously at the other principle's expense but to render to both principles their real due. Our attitude should be not fanatical but scientific, and our method not dogmatic but empirical. The right attitude of mind has been described, towards the close of a classical work of scholarship, by the greatest of living comparative anthropologists:

'If there is one general conclusion which seems to emerge from the mass of particulars, I venture to think that it is the essential similarity in the working of the less developed human mind among all the races, which corresponds to the essential similarity in their bodily frame revealed by comparative anatomy. But while this general mental similarity may, I believe, be taken as established, we must always be on our guard against tracing to it a multitude of particular resemblances which may be and often are due to simple diffusion, since nothing is more certain than that the various races of men have borrowed from each other many of their arts and crafts, their ideas, customs and institutions. To sift out the elements of culture which a race has independently evolved and to distinguish them accurately from those which it has derived from other races is a task of extreme difficulty and delicacy, which promises to occupy students of Man for a long time to come; indeed, so complex are the facts and so imperfect in most cases is

the historical record that it may be doubted whether in regard to many of the lower races we shall ever arrive at more than probable conjectures.¹

This balanced judgement from the pen of a great scholar might dispose of the current controversy between the Diffusionists and the Uniformitarians, were it not for a fault of temper and a weakness of thought in the Diffusionist camp. The fault of temper is the curious vein of intolerance by which the British Diffusionists appear to be animated, as though they were conducting some kind of religious propaganda rather than collaborating with scholars of other schools in an attempt to discover the truth about a problem of common interest. The weakness of thought is the proneness of our contemporary British Diffusionists to allow their thinking about the phenomenon of Diffusion in general, in all times and places, to be dominated by the ephemeral fact of the contemporary world-wide diffusion of our Western Civilization—an instance of Diffusion which happens to loom large just here and just now. In the manifest—though mainly unconscious—distortion of our British Diffusionists' vision through this cause, we have a conspicuous illustration of that 'relativity of historical thought' which has been the first subject to engage our attention in this Study.² On these accounts, it seems advisable to carry our criticism of the British Diffusionist Doctrine rather further.

There are, in fact, two fallacies in the assumption that the geneses of civilizations can be accounted for by the fact that certain techniques and aptitudes and institutions and ideas can be proved historically to have been acquired, by the majority of those who have eventually acquired them, through the process of Diffusion.

Diffusion does, of course, account for the present ubiquity of such modern Western manufactures as Singer's sewing-machines, Mauser rifles, and Manchester cotton goods. More than that, it accounts for the present ability, on the part of a certain number of non-Western communities, to manufacture rifles and cotton goods for themselves by a mastery of the Western processes. Diffusion accounts likewise for the ubiquity of the Syriac Alphabet, which has now killed out and superseded every other known script that has ever been invented by any other society except the Sinic.³

¹ Frazer, Sir J. G.: *The Golden Bough*, 3rd edition, Part VIII: 'Balder the Beautiful' (London 1913, Macmillan), Preface, pp. vi-vii.

² In Part I. A, above.

³ The diffusive power of the Alphabet, in virtue of its unrivalled technical merits, is impressively demonstrated by the fact that the scripts of the Mongols and the Manchus are of Syriac origin, notwithstanding the facts that these two peoples live at the opposite end of Asia from Syria; that they have been living for ages on the threshold of the Far Eastern World; and that the Manchus, at any rate, have been imitators of the Far Eastern culture in almost everything else. (As for the Mongols, they have taken their religion, in the form of Lamaistic or Tantric Mahayanian Buddhism, from the Indic Civilization, besides taking their script from the Syriac.) We may add that, nowadays, the currency

Diffusion accounts, again, for the ubiquity of the Far Eastern beverage tea, of the Arabic beverage coffee, of the Central American beverage cocoa, of the Amazonian material rubber,¹ of the Central American practice of tobacco-smoking, of the Sumeric practice of duodecimal reckoning, and of the so-called 'Arabic numerals', which are perhaps originally a Hindu system of mathematical notation.² But the fact that the rifle has attained its ubiquity through diffusion from a single place where it was once, and once only, invented is no proof that the bow-and-arrow attained its earlier ubiquity exclusively in this same manner. It remains equally possible, and indeed equally probable, that the bow-and-arrow has become ubiquitous not only through diffusion from one place but also through independent invention in others. Nor does it follow that, because the technique of spinning and weaving by power-driven machinery can be traced to a single point of origin, the technique of metallurgy must be traceable to a single point of origin likewise. This dogmatic line of argument from inference in circumstances in which the inference is manifestly inconclusive is our British Diffusionists' first major fallacy. Their second major fallacy lies in the tacit assumption that the essence of what we mean by a civilization is comprised either in those things that can be proved to have become ubiquitous through diffusion, or in those other things that may be inferred inconclusively to have attained their ubiquity through the same means on the strength of analogy.

As a matter of fact, it is instructive to take a glance at our foregoing list of the proved and acknowledged triumphs of Diffusion; for we have certainly hit upon the notorious examples which naturally come first to mind, and one glance is enough to show that they are all trivialities which do not touch the heart of what we

of the Sinic Script is no longer secure even in the Far Eastern World, where this script has been inherited directly from the antecedent Sinic Civilization. In Japan, and even in China, the substitution of the Latin form of the Alphabet for the Sinic script is now coming under consideration.

¹ Not merely the existence but the utility of rubber became known to our Western World through contact with the peoples of Amazonia. The peoples of Amazonia had already discovered for themselves how to make rubber bulbs and rubber balls in pre-Columbian times (see Nordenskiöld, E.: *Modifications in Indian Culture through Inventions and Loans* (Göteborg 1930, Elander), p. 13).

² One may perhaps add the military technique of infantry-fighting in phalanx formation, which may be regarded as a Sumeric invention, since the earliest evidence for its employment is the stele of the Sumeric militarist Eannatum of Lagash (*dominabatur* in Shinar some time between *circa* 3000 and *circa* 2800 B.C.). Thereafter we find the phalanx in use both in the Egyptian World and in the Hellenic; and in the latter world it is diffused from the city-states round the Aegean into Macedonia (perhaps in the fifth century B.C.: see Geyer, F.: *Macedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II* (Munich and Berlin 1930, Oldenbourg), pp. 88-9) and later (by the beginning of the second century B.C.) up the Axios Valley, into Dardania (Livy, Book XXXI, chap. 43). Finally, in our own Western World, we find the phalanx turning up, from the twelfth century of the Christian Era onwards, in Flanders and Northern Italy, and thereafter in Switzerland, to become eventually the standard Western infantry-technique until it is gradually driven off the field by the diffusion of fire-arms. (See further vol. iii, p. 165, footnote 1.)

mean by a civilization in any respect. A civilization does not consist in machine-sewing or rifle-shooting or tea- and coffee- and cocoa-drinking or tobacco-smoking. It does not even consist in reading and writing or in metallurgy (assuming it to be proved that metallurgy, like the Alphabet, has been invented once, and once only, in a single place). To equate this kind of thing with 'Civilization' with a capital 'C' is an absurdity which would be inconceivable to a cultivated mind that was either Hindu or Hellenic or Western of an earlier generation;¹ and, if this palpable absurdity is plausible to the minds of one school among our contemporary Western scholars, this is presumably because they have been born and brought up in an ultra-modern social environment in which the material plane of human life looms large out of all proportion to the spiritual.²

We are here confronted, once again, by the relativity of historical thought. The ultra-modern Western scholar is apt to be betrayed insidiously, by the mental atmosphere in which his mind is constrained to work, into persuading himself that, because Western sewing-machines and Western rifles and Western cotton goods have been diffused throughout the Orthodox Christian and Islamic and Hindu and Far Eastern worlds in these latter days, this diffusion of Western knick-knacks is tantamount to the conversion of these four other living societies to our Western Civilization. For those Westerners that have eyes to see, there is no obligation to accept this preposterous hallucination; and in this Study we have had occasion to see through it more than once already.³ At this day, when we have diffused all our Western knick-knacks with all the 'salesmanship' that we can command, the living non-Western civilizations that have been flooded by the mass-produced spate of our labour-saving machines and our lethal weapons and our textiles

¹ The point is well illustrated by the following anecdote of the Emperor Theodore of Abyssinia (*imperabat* A.D. 1855-67). *Imperator ipse loquitur*:

'A man came to me riding on a donkey, and said that he was a servant of the great Emperor of the French, and that he had come to my country for the sole purpose of establishing friendship between me and his sovereign. I said: "I do not object to making friends with great Christian kings; you are welcome." The next day he said he wished to see me on business, and I assented; but to my astonishment he came to me with a bundle of rags. I asked him what those were. He replied that the French had a large town in their country where they make silks, and that the merchants of that place had commissioned him to bring them to me for the sake of barter. I said to myself: "What have I done that these people insult me thus by treating me like a shopkeeper?" I bore the insult then and said nothing.'

This is part of a conversation between the Emperor and Mr. Hormuzd Rassam (a special envoy to the Emperor from Queen Victoria), as recorded by Mr. Rassam himself. The passage is quoted from Rassam's *Narrative of the British Mission to Theodore King of Abyssinia* (London 1869, Murray, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 60-1, by Woolf, L. S., in *Empire and Commerce in Africa* (London 1920, Allen & Unwin), p. 142.

The offender was the French Consul, Monsieur Lejean; Monsieur Lejean's Imperial Master was Napoleon III; the bundle of rags was a pattern-book of silks; the city from which it came was Lyons.

² See I. C (iii) (b), p. 151, above.

³ See I. B (iii), pp. 31 and 35, above.

can nevertheless lift up their heads and justly boast that, though they 'sink in deep mire, where there is no standing', and are 'come into deep waters, where the floods overflow' them, yet still 'the waters are' *not* 'come in unto' their 'soul'.¹ In spite of the overwhelming diffusion of our Western material technique, these non-Western civilizations can still call their souls their own. In their inner spiritual life, which is their real life, it is as true as ever, for them, that 'the Earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof, the world and they that dwell therein';² and if ever they do open the 'everlasting doors' of their spiritual citadel, it will assuredly not be in order to grant admittance to the spirit that has been embodied in a Singer or a Ford.

It is no accident that the outstanding triumphs of Diffusion are mostly trivial and external and few of them intimate or profound; for, as we shall have occasion to observe at later points in this Study,³ the process of Radiation-and-Mimesis, through which Diffusion works in human affairs, is vigorous and effective in inverse ratio to the value and importance of the social properties that are conveyed by it from the communicative party to the receptive party in this social commerce. The process operates with the greatest rapidity and the longest range on the economic plane; less quickly and penetratingly on the political plane; and least potently of all on the cultural or spiritual plane. It is the easiest thing in the world for a Western manufacturer to export a sewing-machine to Bombay or Shanghai. It is infinitely harder for a Western man of science or a Western poet or a Western saint to kindle in non-Western souls the spiritual flame that is alight in his own. Thus the importance of Diffusion in human history will be vastly over-estimated if it is accepted at its face value in quantitative terms; for the greater the volume of the social commerce, the lower, as a rule, is the spiritual value of the social goods that are exchanged.⁴

On this showing it seems both legitimate and desirable, here and now, to emphasize the part that has been played in human history by original creation, while being careful to give Diffusion no less than its due. And we may remind ourselves that the spark or germ of original creation may burst into flame or flower in any manifestation of Life in virtue of the principle of the Uniformity of Nature.

We may at least go so far as to place the *onus probandi* on the Diffusionists' shoulders in cases where it is an open question

¹ Psalm lxxix. 2 and 1.

² Psalm xxiv. 1.

³ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 151-2, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 196-203, below, as well as Parts VIII and IX.

⁴ This proposition is discussed in Part IX, below.

whether Diffusion or Uniformity of Nature is entitled to claim the credit for some particular human achievement.

‘There can be little doubt that many of the most essential inventions of civilized life have been invented over and over again in distant times and countries, as different nations have reached those particular points of social advancement when those inventions were first needed. Thus, printing has been independently invented in China and in medieval Europe;¹ and it is well known that a process essentially the same was in use for various purposes in Ancient Rome, though no one took the great step of applying to the reproduction of books the process which was familiarly used for various meaner purposes.² What happened with printing we may believe also to have happened with writing, and we may take another illustration from an art of quite another kind. There can be no doubt, from comparing the remains of the earliest buildings in Egypt, Greece, Italy, the British Islands, and the ruined cities of Central America, that the great inventions of the arch and the dome have been made more than once in the history of human art.³ And moreover, much as in the case of printing, we can see in many places strivings after them, and near approaches made to them, which still never reached complete success. Nor need we doubt that many of the simplest and most essential arts of civilised life—the use of the mill, the use of the bow, the taming of the horse, the hollowing out of the canoe—have been found out over and over again in distant times and places. It is only when we find the unmistakeable witness of language, or some other sign of historical connexion, that we have any right to infer that the common possession of inventions of this kind is any sign of common derivation from one primitive source. So it is with political institutions also. The same institutions constantly appear very far from one another, simply because the circumstances which called for them have arisen in times and places very far from one another. The whole system of historical analogies rests on this doctrine. We see the same political phenomena repeating themselves over and over again in various times and places, not because of any borrowing or imitation, conscious or unconscious, but because the like circumstances have led to the like results. . . .’⁴

The judgement here recorded by a great Western historian some sixty years ago may be supported by a quotation from the work of a distinguished living Western anthropologist:

‘The resemblances in Man’s ideas and practices are chiefly traceable to the similarity in structure of the human brain everywhere, and in the consequent nature of his mind. As the physical organ is, at all known

¹ For a recent inquiry into this question, see Carter, T. F.: *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward*, revised edition (New York 1931, Columbia University Press).—A. J. T.

² Compare the history of the invention of the steam-engine in the Hellenic World.—A. J. T.

³ the true arch and the true dome appear to have remained undiscovered by the Mayas.—A. J. T.

⁴ Freeman, E. A.: *Comparative Politics* (London 1873, Macmillan), pp. 31–2. Compare pp. 16–17.

stages of Man's history, substantially the same in constitution and nervous processes, so the mind has certain universal characteristics, powers and methods of action.¹ . . . This similarity in the operation of the brain is seen in the nineteenth-century intellects of Darwin and Russell Wallace, which, working on the same data, arrived simultaneously at the Theory of Evolution;² and it accounts for numerous claims in the same age to priority with respect to the same invention or discovery. The similar operations of the common mind of the Race—more fragmentary in their data, more rudimentary in their powers, and vaguer in their results—explain the appearance of such beliefs and institutions as Totemism, Exogamy, and the many purificatory rituals, in most widely separated peoples and portions of the globe.³

In particular, the data for the thoughts and inferences of Primitive Man are very limited and are much the same everywhere. The nearer we come to the earliest type of Man, the more the means to his ends tend to coincide over the whole Race, as is shown by flint tools and weapons scattered all over the World and in many strata of Time. Hence the similarity of the means he takes in various peoples and ages to express his early religious and social ideas, and to attain his crude moral and spiritual ends.⁴

In the two foregoing passages the potency of the principle of the Uniformity of Nature in human affairs is effectively brought out; but such representations as these are sometimes met with the objection that certain inventions—e.g. the invention of the metallurgical art—are so complicated that they virtually must have been unique. The test case of metallurgy is presented as follows by a distinguished living archaeologist:

“Where did the revolutionary discovery of metallurgy originate?”

It is, of course, theoretically possible that the properties of copper were independently realised in Egypt and Hither Asia, or even in illiterate Spain and Hungary, and that the barbarians of Cornwall and Bohemia spontaneously hit upon the alloy, known before 3000 B.C. in Sumer and India. Practically, in the case of the Old World where the first metal-using civilisations had such wide foreign relations and were bound together by so many common traits, no one, unprejudiced by the passions evoked by a perverse Diffusionism, will suggest that all the complex processes involved were elaborated separately at two or more

¹ ‘Our reason is in its very essence more than individual; it is expressive of universality; it is a part of that Order which regulates the Universe, and in a deep sense it is a creative factor or co-creator of the Universal.’—Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd edition (London 1927, Macmillan), p. 252.

² For this and other instances of one and the same invention being made independently but simultaneously by two or more inventors, see III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 237–9, below.—A. J. T.

³ For the extreme complexity of some of the identic ‘primordial images’ which are imprinted on the common mind of the Human Race and which reveal themselves in individual human minds of every age and place and social environment, see Jung, C. G.: *Psychological Types* (English translation: London 1923, Kegan Paul).

⁴ Murphy, J.: *Primitive Man: His Essential Quest* (Oxford 1927, University Press), pp. 8–9.

comparatively adjacent points in Eurasia. . . . The discoveries and inventions implicit in metal-working are so abstruse and complex that independent origin at several points—in the Old World at any rate—is excluded as fantastically improbable; knowledge of the essential techniques must, that is to say, have been diffused from some centre.¹

The reader of this passage will have noticed that the writer of it, with scholarly caution, explicitly confines his contention to the ambit of the Old World. And well he may! For, had he ventured to extend to the New World his claim that the art of metallurgy has become ubiquitous through diffusion from a single place of origin, he would have been challenged at once by another scholar who is at least his peer as an adept in the archaeology of the New World, and who is an anthropologist into the bargain. Nordenskiöld can testify that, in the original home of the Andean Civilization, the metallurgical art is coeval with the civilization itself. 'The people of the Proto-Chimu period . . . were acquainted with gold, copper, and their alloys, and possibly also silver, and knew how to smelt and cast these metals.'² 'In all parts where at the time of the Discovery the Bronze Age prevailed, that cultural stage—which appears to have originated in the region surrounding Lake Titicaca—had been preceded by a copper age.'³ In Colombia and Central America, moreover, at the same epoch, bronze was still unknown—in contrast to the knowledge of bronze as well as copper which was current, by then, in Mexico on the one side as well as in Peru on the other. These facts demonstrate, between them, that the unquestionably abstruse art of making and working bronze was not introduced into the New World all of a piece (as it must have been if it had been introduced by Diffusion from the Old World), but was invented out of the prior art of copper-working in the New World independently—however unlikely this independent invention might seem to be, *a priori*. 'The art of metallurgy, at any rate from the point when metal-casting became known, is in America an independent invention.'⁴ More than that, the Incas had achieved, before the Discovery, 'an invention that we of the Old World only in recent times have succeeded in accomplishing—and then by a method quite different to that of the Indians—namely, the art of welding copper'.⁵

¹ Childe, V. G.: *The Bronze Age* (Cambridge 1930, University Press), pp. 23-4 and 10. See, again, the same author's *The Most Ancient East* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), pp. 224-7. In this latter work, Professor Childe also applies the Diffusion Theory to the invention of the wheel and the cart (p. 211) and to the device of artificial food-production by cultivation (pp. 228-31).

² Nordenskiöld, E.: *Origin of the Indian Civilisations in South America* (Göteborg 1931, Elander), p. 35.

³ Nordenskiöld, *op. cit.*, loc. cit. Compare the same author's *Modifications in Indian Culture through Inventions and Loans* (Göteborg 1930, Elander), p. 41, and his *The Copper and Bronze Ages in South America* (Göteborg 1921, Elander), *passim*.

⁴ Nordenskiöld: *Origin of the Indian Civilisations in South America*, p. 75.

⁵ Nordenskiöld: *Modifications in Indian Culture through Loans and Inventions*, p. 17.

The astronomical discoveries of the Mayas can be demonstrated, by similar proofs, to have been made independently of the identical discoveries in the Babylonian World; and in general the original creative capacity and achievement of the peoples who were in occupation of the New World, before its discovery by the Europeans, is summed up by Nordenskiöld in the following terms:

'I think we must admit that the Indians' contribution—as discoverers and inventors—to the cultural progress of Man is considerable. It may even surpass that of the Teutonic peoples during the era preceding the discovery of America. It is a proven fact that the Indians have achieved many discoveries and inventions that in pre-Columbian times were unknown in the Old World. They have invented many things that are adaptations to exceptional geophysical conditions. They have further made a number of inventions in connexion with culture-elements that in post-Columbian times have been introduced to them by Whites and Negroes. Many inventions have in America such an isolated area of distribution that they may properly be supposed to have been made there. Seeing that the Indians have discovered and invented a great deal that was unknown in the Old World at the time of the discovery of America, it does not seem unreasonable to wonder whether they may not also have invented something or other that also was known there. The actual fact of their having done so is proved by it being possible to trace several inventions of that class from their simplest to their most elaborate forms. In the case of certain very important inventions it can be shown that in America they in all probability were preceded by simpler devices founded on the same principles.'¹

If this cumulative testimony from historians and archaeologists and anthropologists has failed to convince the reader that every human society is a potential vehicle of the creative spirit in virtue of the uniformity of a Human Nature which is instinct with this creative power, then we will win our case by calling next into the witness-box an eminent zoologist, to be followed by an eminent physiologist who is still more eminent as a philosopher. The zoologist shall speak first:

'I . . . have time', he says, 'to dwell on only a few of the many considerations suggested by the singular parallelisms or convergencies between the Termites and the Ants, such as the development in both of wingless worker and soldier castes, similar nesting and fungus-growing habits, trophallaxis, relations to guests, &c. The duplication of these phenomena in groups so wide asunder that they are placed by the systematists at the opposite poles of our classification of insects, may be

¹ Nordenskiöld, E.: *Modifications in Indian Culture through Inventions and Loans* (Göteborg 1930, Elander), pp. 89–90. See further the same author's résumé in seventeen points, on pp. 74–6 of his *Origin of the Indian Civilisations of South America*, in which he sums up the likenesses and differences and the contact and absence of contact between the primitive cultures and the civilizations of the New World among themselves, and also between the cultures of the New World, taken as a whole, and the cultures of the Old World and of Oceania.

of some interest to the anthropologist, because the study of human cultures reveals the same or very similar institutions and linguistic peculiarities in geographically widely separated peoples. Some anthropologists attribute such similarities to community of origin, while others insist that they are often inventions of independent origin and development. When we reflect that Ants and Termites have been able, through slow physiological and instinctive processes, independently to evolve such strikingly analogous peculiarities as those I have described, we can scarcely doubt that different human communities, belonging to the same species and endowed with some intelligence, may frequently have hit upon the same inventions.¹

As for our physiologist-philosopher, he is no less a scholar than Monsieur Henri Bergson; and the evidence that we are going to take from him is presented in the most famous of all his published works. In a characteristic passage of *L'Évolution Créatrice*,² a masterly physiological study, on comparative lines, of the eye of the Vertebrates and the eye of the Molluscs leads up to the following philosophical result:

'At every instant, before our eyes, Nature arrives at identical results, in species which are sometimes close to one another, by embryo-genical processes which are altogether diverse. . . . To take, as a case in point, . . . our comparison between the eye of the Vertebrates and the eye of the Molluscs, we shall observe that, in the Vertebrates, the retina is produced by an expansion that is emitted by the rudiment of the brain in the young embryo. It is a veritable nervous centre that has transferred itself to the periphery. On the other hand, in the Molluscs, the retina derives from the ectoderm directly, and not indirectly through the intermediary form of the embryonic *encephalus*. Here, again, we really have two different evolutionary processes which result, in Man and in the Scallop, in the development of an identical retina.'³

If the creative power which is instinct in all Life is able to invent independently the economic techniques of agriculture and stock-breeding and the social system of morphologically diversified castes in incarnations of Life which are so far removed from one another as the Termites and the Ants, and if it is also able to invent independently an identical structure for the eye in the Vertebrates and in the Molluscs, in a clam and in a human being, then it is assuredly not incredible that the economic technique of fusing copper and tin into bronze, or the social system of Totemism, should have been invented independently by different human societies—considering that, within the ambit of the Human Race, the Uniformity of Nature is, after all, so close that human beings

¹ Wheeler, W. M.: *Social Life among the Insects* (London, no date, Constable), pp. 280-1.

² Bergson, Henri: *L'Évolution Créatrice*, 24th edition (Paris 1921, Alcan), pp. 67-92.

³ Bergson, Henri, op. cit., pp. 81-2.

of every physical variety are able to interbreed, while human beings of every cultural variety are able to master one another's languages and to exchange their ideas.

Perhaps we have now sufficiently reasserted the potency of original creation, and the role of the Uniformity of Nature, in human affairs; but, in our desire to restore a just balance between the Uniformity Theory and the Diffusion Theory, we must be on our guard against depreciating, as well as against over-estimating, the historical part which Diffusion has actually played. It may therefore be well to examine, briefly, the role of Diffusion, in contrast to original creation, in the geneses of civilizations both of the 'unrelated' and of the 'related' class.

The 'unrelated' civilizations, as we have found in another chapter,¹ have apparently emerged through the mutation, into civilizations, of primitive societies; and if we inquire into the role of Diffusion here we shall observe at least two instances in which more than one civilization has emerged from a single society of a transitional character: from a society, that is to say, which has not yet taken the shape of a civilization, though it has already differentiated itself from the primitive societies pure and simple.

One of these intermediate societies out of which several civilizations have sprung is that Afrasian culture in which Sir John Marshall discerns the common substratum of 'the Indus Culture' and the Sumeric culture and the Egyptian and the Minoan.² The antecedent diffusion of this common intermediary culture from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean over the vast Afrasian area within which—at four separate points—the four civilizations in question afterwards arose, is the cause to which Sir John Marshall ascribes the points of family likeness which these four civilizations display when they are compared with one another and are contrasted with the remaining representatives of the species. And this common substratum of culture, within these geographical limits, upon which the archaeologist strikes when he digs down below the foundations of the four Afrasian civilizations, is also encountered by the anthropologist when he makes his own researches for his own hidden treasure in the same area. Having once cited Sir James Frazer on behalf of the Uniformity of Nature, we are in duty bound to cite him on behalf of Diffusion as well.

'If there is any truth in the analysis of the Saturnalia and kindred festivals which I have now brought to a close, it seems to point to a remarkable homogeneity of civilisation throughout South-Eastern Europe and Western Asia in prehistoric times. . . . In the far east of

¹ In II. A, on p. 188, above.

² See the passage quoted from Sir John Marshall's *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilisation* in I. C (i) (b), Annex III, on pp. 417-20, above.

Asia we have met with temporary kings whose magical functions and intimate relation to agriculture stand out in the clearest light; while India furnishes examples of kings who have regularly been obliged to sacrifice themselves at the end of a term of years. All these things appear to hang together; all of them may, perhaps, be regarded as the shattered remnants of a uniform zone of religion and society which at a remote era belted the Old World from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.¹

This Afrasian intermediary culture has its analogue in the New World in the so-called 'Archaic Culture' which emerged above the primitive level, in the last millennium B.C., throughout the arid zone of Tropical America, over an area extending from what is now Southern Mexico, at one end, to what are now Colombia and Venezuela and Ecuador at the other. Over this area in this age, the fathers of 'the Archaic Culture' appear to have diffused an art of agriculture and an art of pottery and an art of weaving which were the common foundations of the corresponding arts, as these are found in a higher stage of development at a later date in both the Mayan World and the Andean.²

Thus the Mayan and Andean civilizations in the New World, as well as 'the Indus Culture' and the Sumeric, Egyptiac, and Minoan civilizations in the Old World, are found to possess certain characteristics in common which are traceable, in each of these two instances, to an antecedent process of Diffusion. In the light of this, are we to say that we really find ourselves in the presence, not of six separate and independent civilizations, but of two and two only—one in Afrasia and the other in Tropical America—which have each spread by Diffusion to such an extent that they have assumed a superficial appearance of multiplicity: an appearance which is contradicted, nevertheless, by the fundamental unity which persists below the surface all the time in either case? The answer to this question is in the negative; and this negative answer is formulated with admirable judgement and exemplary clarity by the Swedish scholar whom we have cited a number of times already.

'The connexion between the Central American and Peruvian Indians did not cause any fusion of cultures. The South American high civilization cannot be said to have been an off-shoot of the Central American or Mexican civilizations, or *vice versa*. On the other hand, I believe we are bound to assume that the civilizations of Western South America and

¹ Frazer, Sir J. G.: *The Golden Bough*, 3rd edition: 'The Scapegoat' (London 1913, Macmillan), p. 409.

² For this 'Archaic Culture' of the New World, see Spinden, H. J.: *Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America* (New York 1922, American Museum of Natural History), pp. 49-60 (especially the maps on pp. 59 and 60); Thompson, J. E.: *The Civilization of the Mayas* (Chicago 1927, Field Museum of Natural History), pp. 5-6; *Encyclopædia Britannica*, edition xiii, new volume i, p. 193, s.v. 'Archæology'.

Central America at some very remote period possessed a common origin. By this I do not mean that in some particular locality, say in Central America, at an earlier date than elsewhere, there existed some highly developed civilisation from which the South American higher civilisations took their rise, but that in America, in different regions, from a more primitive stage, and more or less independent of each other, the high cultures developed. Here development in the main proceeded on parallel lines, and in parts arrived at very divergent results.¹

The truth is that, although the two civilizations of the first generation in the New World and the four civilizations of the first generation in Afrasia may have emerged, in each case, from a common substratum which was intermediate in its cultural level between the relatively low level of the preceding and surrounding primitive cultures and the relatively high level of the subsequently super-imposed civilizations, these civilizations cannot be regarded simply as the automatic products of the diffusion of that 'archaic culture' which is the common platform upon which they severally stand. As we have seen at other points in this Study, every one of these civilizations has differentiated itself from the common archaic culture by a dynamic act;² and each of these separate and independent dynamic acts has taken the form of an individual response to a particular challenge. The Mayan Civilization arose out of the American 'Archaic Culture' in response to the challenge of the rain-soaked tropical forest,³ in contrast to the Andean Civilization, which arose out of the same 'Archaic Culture' in response to the antithetical challenge of the waterless desert.⁴ And in Afrasia, while it is true that the first impetus to the rise of the four Afrasian civilizations was given by a common challenge in the shape of the simultaneous desiccation of the grass-lands from one end of Afrasia to the other,⁵ it is equally significant that a second and final impetus was given, in each case, by a peculiar local challenge which evoked an individual response. The Minoan Civilization was a response to the challenge of the sea,⁶ the Egyptiac Civilization a response to the challenge of the Nile,⁷ the Sumeric a response to the challenge of the Tigris and Euphrates,⁸ while 'the Indus Culture' (on the assumption that it is to be reckoned as an independent civilization in its own right)⁹ was a response to the challenge of the river after which it has been named.

¹ Nordenskiöld, E.: *Origin of the Indian Civilisations in South America* (Göteborg 1931, Elander), p. 70.

² See II. C (ii) (b) 2, p. 321, above.

³ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, pp. 321-3, above.

⁴ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, pp. 302-6, above.

⁵ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, pp. 323-30, above.

⁶ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, pp. 306-15, above.

⁷ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, pp. 315-18, above.

² See Part II. A, p. 188, above.

⁹ See I. C (i) (b), Annex III, above.

We can convey the situation in a simile by likening our two sets of civilizations—the set of four in Afrasia and the pair of civilizations in the New World—to two groups of pyramids which do not rise directly, in either case, out of the plain which they respectively dominate. The architects of each group have sought to enhance the imposing effect of their work by planting the pair of pyramids—or the foursome, as the case may be—not down upon the low-lying plain but up upon a ledge or shelf of natural rock that projects from the foot of the adjoining mountains, with the result that the plain is dominated by the very bases of the pyramids, not to speak of their summits. Here, then, in either case, we have a set of pyramids standing on a common platform which rises already in itself above the surrounding levels. And we are presented with the question: ‘Ought the four pyramids in the one case, and the two pyramids in the other, to be regarded, in virtue of their common platforms, as four parts and as two parts respectively of one single building?’ When this question is presented in these terms, we can see at once that the answer turns upon the question whether the common platform is an artificial structure of the same construction as the pyramids that rise from it, or whether it is a natural elevation of the same substance as the surrounding plains and the adjoining mountains. If the platform were artificial too, then the pyramids would certainly have to be regarded as parts of a single edifice in which the platform itself would be not only the connecting link but also, perhaps, the principal architectural member. When, however, we find, as we do find, that the platform is actually a natural elevation which has been singled out by the architect’s eye but has not been constructed by the builder’s hand, then, clearly, we have to pronounce that the building begins at the point where the builder has laid his foundations, and that, on this showing, each single pyramid is to be reckoned as a separate building, in spite of the common natural elevation on which the whole set of buildings has been planted.

Thus the individual independence of each of the six civilizations of the first generation which are here under consideration is not impaired by the palpable underlying diffusion of the Afrasian and the Tropical American intermediate cultures. And when we pass on from the ‘unrelated’ to the ‘related’ cultures, we shall find that, in their geneses too, Diffusion has played a role which is not to be ignored and yet is not of capital importance.

Ex hypothesi, every ‘related’ civilization has arisen in some kind of contact with an antecedent civilization either of the ‘related’ or of the ‘unrelated’ class; and this means that it is in some sense a product of Diffusion. Indeed, we have found grounds for the belief

that genesis through relation to an antecedent civilization, or, in other words, through Diffusion in a certain sense of the term, is the only form of genesis by which civilizations have actually been brought to birth at any time since the first generation.¹ In order, however, to estimate this form of Diffusion at its true importance, we must remind ourselves of the way in which it works; and, as a matter of fact, it works by contraries.

A 'related' civilization is one which is created by the proletariat—either internal or external—of the antecedent civilization with which it is in relation; and we have already seen what the relation of a proletariat to a dominant minority is.² It is not a relation of Radiation-and-Mimesis but a relation of Challenge-and-Response. And the dynamic act in which the creation of a new civilization by a proletariat is accomplished is not an act of conversion but an act of secession—not a centripetal movement but a centrifugal one. The creative proletariat is not seeking to enter into an apostolic succession through a 'laying on of hands' on the part of a creative minority in the society to which it belongs; the proletariat is revolting against the domination of a minority which has ceased to be attractive because it has lost its creative power. Thus it will be seen that, in the geneses of the 'related', as in those of the 'unrelated', civilizations, Diffusion plays only a minor part. The Diffusion of the antecedent civilization may provide the stimulus to creation, but it cannot itself be identical with the creative force, since, *ex hypothesi*, it emanates from a source which has already become impotent. The creator, in this case, is a proletariat which resists the diffusion of the dead and deadening culture of the dominant minority; and this creative proletariat performs its act of creation by kicking against the pricks.

So much for the role of Diffusion in the geneses of civilizations.

¹ See Part II. A, pp. 185-7, above.

² See I. C (i) (a), pp. 54-6; and compare Part II. A, pp. 187-8 and 195-6, above.

ANNEX TO I. C (iii) (e)

METHODS OF APPREHENSION, SUBJECTS OF STUDY, AND QUANTITIES OF 'DATA'

IN the relevant chapter, we have found that the comparability of the facts which are encountered in the study of social life in civilizations is vindicated by the practical operations of every-day business life in the contemporary Western World. Why is it, then, that this truth continues to be disputed in the teeth of our experience? This question cannot be answered without making a rather wider survey of the methods which we employ in our intellectual activities.

We have empirical knowledge of three different methods of viewing and presenting the objects of our thought, and, among them, the phenomena of human life. The first method is the ascertainment¹ and record of particular 'facts'; the second is the elucidation and formulation of general 'laws' through a process of comparative study; the third is the form of artistic creation and expression known as 'fiction'. We need not doubt that the clear distinction between the techniques of these three methods—a distinction of which we are empirically aware—corresponds to some equally clear distinction between the respective phenomena which are viewed and presented in these different ways. We are not bound, however, to accept without question either the names by which the three techniques are popularly known or the popular anatomy of their respective provinces.

According to the popular view, the ascertainment and record of particular 'facts' is the technique of 'History'; and the phenomena in the province of this technique are the social phenomena of civilizations. The elucidation and formulation of general 'laws' through a process of comparative study is the technique of 'Science'; and, in the study of human life, the science is Anthropology and the phenomena in the province of the scientific technique are the social phenomena of primitive societies. 'Fiction' is the technique of the Drama and the Novel; and the phenomena in the province of this technique are the personal relations of human beings. These popular equations have a respectable origin—they can be traced back to Aristotle²—but they break down under examination.

¹ Ascertainment or 'establishment' in the subjective sense of the French word *constatation*.

² In the following passage of the *Poetics* (1451b) Aristotle draws the contrast between the first and the third equation as follows:

Τούτω διαφέρει [ὁ ἱστορικὸς τοῦ ποιητοῦ] τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἱ ἂν γένοιτο· διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ

In the first place, 'History', in the popular sense of the study of the social phenomena of civilizations, does not really present the facts, all the facts, and nothing but the facts in the lives of societies of this species. Besides presenting facts, it has recourse to fictions and it appeals to laws; and on the other hand there are certain facts which it leaves alone because they are not grist to its mill.

'History' grew out of Mythology, a primary intuitive form of apprehension and expression in which the Drama and the Novel likewise took their origin. In Mythology, the distinction between facts and fictions is left undrawn;¹ and while 'History' has differentiated itself from Mythology by making an effort to extract the facts, it has never succeeded in dispensing with fictitious elements altogether.

For instance, it is hardly possible to write two consecutive lines of historical narrative without introducing fictitious personifications of institutions² and ascribing to them anthropomorphically the desires, feelings, thoughts, actions, and in fact all the psychic activities of human beings. In so doing, we are succumbing to 'the pathetic fallacy' just as much as if we were personifying the objects and forces of inanimate Nature; for though institutions are manifestations of Life, and of human life, they are not human beings and do not become persons in virtue of being personified in a figure of speech. In making use of these mythological counters we are misrepresenting reality;³ yet, however conscious we may be of their falsifying effect, we cannot do without them.

For example, if we are recording the history of our Western Society in our day, we cannot avoid using the mythological proper names of the states into which this society is at present articulated—Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and their sixty or seventy

ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει· ἔστι δὲ καθόλου μὲν τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποι' ἅπτα συμβαίνειν λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον—οὐ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη· τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τί 'Αλκιβιάδης ἐπραξεν ἢ τί ἐπαθεν.

The historian differs from the poet in this, that the historian presents what did happen while the poet presents what might happen. For this reason Poetry is more philosophic and less trivial than History; for Poetry presents generalities, History merely particulars. Generalities mean the kind of thing that this or that person is apt or bound to say or do; and this is what Poetry aims at presenting under the mask of the proper names which it confers on its characters. Particulars mean what Alcibiades did or had done to him.

In identifying the creations of 'Fiction' with generalities, Aristotle would appear to be confusing the technique of the Drama and the Novel with the technique of Science, in order to distinguish them both from the technique of 'History' (so called).

¹ How this is psychologically possible may be understood by observing how a child takes a fairy-story.

² For the nature of institutions, see pp. 453-5, below.

³ 'We must avoid thinking of either the State or the Community as ends in themselves, as self-subsistent and individual realities similar to, or greater than, the persons who are members of them. We must never say that the State desires this or the Community wills that or the Church is aiming at so-and-so, without realizing clearly that the only wills that really exist are the wills of the individual human beings who have become members of these bodies. There is no such thing, strictly speaking, as the "will" of an association or institution; there are only the co-operating wills of its members.' (Cole, G. D. H.: *Social Theory* (London 1920, Methuen), p. 22.)

companions—and treating these fictitious persons as though they were human beings in personal relations with one another. The official-sounding and abstract-seeming name France is not nearer to reality than 'Marianne' or 'the Gallic Cock'; nor 'Britain' than 'Britannia' or 'John Bull' or 'the British Lion'; and we gain nothing by writing 'République Française' or 'His Majesty's Government'. We do not even solve the problem by making 'H.M.G.' govern a plural verb; for the decisions officially ascribed to 'His Majesty's Government' are not taken by the persons, all the persons, and none but the persons who happen at the moment to be holding office; and even if they were taken by just those persons and no others, we should still find ourselves confronting the age-long philosophical problem, never yet solved, of 'the common will'. The vice of fictitiousness inherent in 'H.M.G.' inheres equally in 'My Lords' of the Treasury or the Admiralty and in 'the Secretary of State' whose departmental letters are signed by the hand and his answers to parliamentary questions delivered through the mouth of men of flesh and blood who perpetuate his fictitious existence by impersonating him successively. No less fictitious is the simple 'secretary' to whom, in the printed letter-heads of all manner of private associations, it is stated that 'all communications should be addressed'. We can apply the same destructive analysis to the organs and officers and activities of 'the Church', 'the Bar', 'the Press', 'the Turf', and 'the Trade'. We can apply it to the twenty-one civilizations which we have identified and named in this Study, as Adam named the animals. We know with our minds that we have encountered these civilizations simply as objects of our thought—as intelligible fields of historical study—but we cannot express our notions of them in words without treating them to some extent anthropomorphically as 'men of like passions with ourselves'.

In fact, in viewing and presenting social institutions and recording their work, the use of fiction appears to be an indispensable artifice of thought; and the most blatant forms of the artifice are really the least objectionable, because they are the least likely to be mistaken for realities instead of being taken for what they are. This point is raised by the practice of the Hellenic Society, which had two alternative usages. One usage was to present the states of the Hellenic World under the guise of divinities—'Αθήνη Πολιούχος ('the keeper of the state') standing for Athens, 'Αθήνα Χαλκίοικος for Sparta, Τύχη 'Αντιοχείων for Antioch, Fortuna Praenestina for Praeneste, Dea Roma or Divus Caesar for Rome, and so on.¹ In the other usage, states, corporations, classes, and

¹ Some of these divinities had their animal counterparts, e.g. Athene's owl (the distinguishing mark of the Athenian coinage) and the Roman wolf and eagle. Compare

other associations of human beings were represented by the collective names of their members in the plural number¹—οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι for Athens, οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι for Sparta, οἱ ἐν τέλει for the Government, οἱ θιασῶται for a church, οἱ φράτορες for a fraternity.² This second usage is realistic in appearance rather than genuinely expressive of reality as it is.³ It does not answer the questions: 'Did all or only some of the Lacedaemonians do this or that? And, if only some of them, how did these arrive at their "common will" and how did they impose it on their fellow citizens?' In order to come to grips with reality we should have—*quod est absurdum*—to record the same transaction from the personal standpoint of every Lacedaemonian citizen in turn;⁴ and even if we had the information and the industry to accomplish this labour, we should find ourselves hardly any nearer to our goal, for we should still have somehow to compose or abstract a single narrative from the several thousand different narratives which we should have accumulated. This is a feat which our minds, as they are, could only perform intuitively, and, in this last step, the leap in the dark would be just as great as the intuitional leap which we make when we take as our jumping-off-ground not the collective name οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι but the name of the tutelary Goddess of the Lacedaemonian state, Ἀθὰνα Χαλκίαικος. It seems wiser to admit to ourselves that it is at present beyond our intellectual capacity to express the realities of institutions in direct terms; that we can only present institutions through the medium of fictions which misrepresent the realities for which they stand; that the best that we can hope to do is to make full allowance all the time for a distorting effect which we cannot avoid; and that we shall be least likely to

the British lion which is the counterpart of John Bull, the Gallic cock which is the counterpart of Marianne, and the Austrian, Prussian, Russian, Polish, and American eagles.

¹ There were, of course, variations on this usage. For instance, the constitutional monarchy of Macedonia was represented by coupling the community name with the name of the reigning king, as 'King Antigonus and the Macedonians' (see Tarn, W. W.: *Hellenistic Civilisation* (London 1927, Arnold), p. 44). On the other hand, the official designation of the Roman State, 'Senatus Populusque Romanus', which simply substitutes the names of two component institutions for the name of the institution which they together compose, is nearer to our modern Western usage than to the usual practice of the Hellenic World.

² These two Hellenic usages had their counterparts in our Western Society in the Dark and Middle Ages, when states were sometimes presented under the guise of Saints (e.g. St. Mark of Venice with his winged lion, St. Denis of France, St. George of England, St. Peter of the Holy See) and sometimes as incarnated in their reigning sovereigns under their territorial titles (e.g. 'France' meaning 'the King of France' in Shakespeare—a usage which still survives in England in the signatures of bishops, who substitute the territorial title of their bishopric for their personal surname, and of peers, when their personal surnames are replaced by place-names in their titles).

³ It does not dispose of the problem of institutions, any more than Euhemerus's theory that the Olympian Gods were deified human beings disposes of the problem of Religion.

⁴ This problem of the relation between a society and the individual human beings who are its 'members' is discussed further in III. C (ii), vol. iii, below.

forget to make this allowance when the fictions which we employ are least realistic in form.¹

Another sphere in which historians find themselves compelled to have recourse to fiction is the presentation of the workings of public feeling and opinion; and here again the franker they are with themselves the better they fare. In this sphere, no school of historians has been so successful as the Hellenic School, who were not afraid to retain and turn to account the artifice of fictitious speeches and dialogues—an artifice that had been brought to perfection in the Homeric Epic, which was the literary vehicle of the Hellenic Mythology and the common parent of Greek historical and Greek dramatic literature. The passages in Thucydides' work which purport to reproduce the debates at Sparta and Athens in 432 B.C. on the eve of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War or the debate at Athens in 427 B.C. over the punishment of the Mitylenaeans or the dialogue at Melos in 416 B.C. between the *parlementaires* of the Athenian expeditionary force and the Melian notables are not only literary masterpieces; they also present the play of feeling and opinion in a more illuminating way, and with greater psychological profundity, than has ever been achieved by any other expedient. Our modern Western historians, who reject this aesthetically and psychologically valuable method of presentation with scorn, in the names of 'science' and 'reality', are deluding themselves if they suppose that their own subterfuge of 'composite photographs'—mechanically produced by the compression of ten thousand newspaper cuttings—is any the less fictitious for being aesthetically and psychologically jejune. It is idle for them to protest that the state papers, parliamentary debates, leading articles, letters to editors, private correspondence, diaries, and other raw materials which they have worked into their syntheses are the *ipsissima verba* of the people by whom, on each occasion, public opinion was formed and public policy decided. The question remains: 'How did the final resolution of these forces come about?' And this question can neither be answered nor be evaded by substituting a narrative presented in the historian's name for speeches and dialogues put into his characters' mouths. His *oratio obliqua* is not more objective than Thucydides' *oratio recta*. It is merely more likely, by its specious appearance of objectivity, to delude the reader as well as the writer himself.

¹ If this conclusion is right, it is a misfortune that our Western Society in modern times has degraded the representative divinities of Hellenic usage and the representative saints of medieval Western usage into caricatures. Our consciousness that John Bull, Marianne, Uncle Sam, Uncle Jonathan, and the rest are not merely fictions but fictions which we do not take seriously betrays us into assuming that the fictions which we do take seriously—Britain, France, the United States, and so on—are not mere fictions but realities.

Finally, we may take note of certain works of literature which are concerned with public affairs in the histories of civilizations and for this reason can only be classified as historical, although the technique of 'fiction' is employed throughout, so that these works are indistinguishable in form from other dramas and novels. Such works are Aeschylus's *Persae*, Thomas Hardy's *The Dynasts*, Feuchtwanger's *Jew Süß*, and Benet's *John Brown's Body*.¹

So much for the recourse to fiction in 'History'. As for its appeal to scientific laws, we may remind our Western historians that they have latterly taken into their service a number of ancillary sciences which formulate general laws not about those primitive societies which are the province of Anthropology, but about civilizations. Such sciences are Political Economy,² Political Science, and Artistic and Literary Criticism.³ Our historians are apt to pride themselves on the enrolment of these scientific auxiliaries as being the greatest advance which the study of history has made in recent times; and we may venture to agree with them in this without exposing ourselves to a charge of inconsistency; for while we have criticized them at the beginning of this Study⁴ for trying to apply the technique of Science outside its province, we have never objected to their employing the sciences in a menial capacity as hewers of wood and drawers of water. The Israelites, who were forbidden to adopt the practices of the heathen, were permitted to enslave the Gibeonites and spoil the Egyptians; and so for us historians, in the intellectual arena, *fas est et ab hoste doceri*.⁵

The facts of human life which 'History' leaves alone because they are not grist to its mill are of two kinds. First, there are all

¹ Tolstoy's *War and Peace* does not, on the whole, come under this category. It does, of course, contain elements of historiography—for example the thesis, on which the author harps, that military commanders are passive instruments who register events without determining them, and again the rather wearisomely repeated comparison of the Grande Armée in retreat to a wounded beast. In essence, however, *War and Peace* is a true novel in the popular sense inasmuch as it is primarily concerned with the personal relations of human beings.

² The *Homo Economicus* of the 'classical' political economists, against whom Ruskin tilted, is a fictitious character employed as a mannequin for showing off 'economic laws' to advantage.

³ There is also one ancillary science—Ethics—whose services have been found indispensable by historians always and everywhere.

⁴ In Part I. A, above.

⁵ Ovid: *Metamorphoses*, Book IV, l. 428. This position can be defended, if it needs defence, by appeal to another classical authority:

THE APPALLING DIFFUSION OF TASTE

'Much as he hates a joke, Sir Pompey Bedell has a still greater loathing for Nature, Poetry, and Art, which he chooses to identify with Postlethwaite, Maudle and Co.; and Grigsby's lifelike imitations of these gentlemen—whom, by the bye, Sir Pompey has never seen—have so gratified him that he honours our funny friend with a call.

'Sir Pompey (aghast): "What, Mr. Grigsby, can this room really be yours? With a Dado!—and Artistic Wall-Paper!!—and a Brass Fender!!! and, gracious Heavens, a Bunch of Lilies in a Blue Pot!!!!"

'Grigsby: "They're not for Luncheon, Sir Pompey; they're only to smell and to look at, I assure you! Let me offer you one!"

'Sir Pompey: "Not for the world, Mr. Grigsby." ' *Punch*, 19th March 1881.

the facts relating to primitive societies, which are the province of Anthropology—for instance, the facts presented in Sir James Frazer's *The Golden Bough*. Second, there are all the facts relating to the private lives of human beings, whether these happen to be members of primitive societies or of societies in process of civilization¹—for instance, the facts presented in the *Confessions* of Saint Augustine and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in John Henry Newman's *Apologia*, in John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography*, in Paul Sabatier's *Life of Saint Francis of Assisi*, and in Lytton Strachey's *Life of Queen Victoria*.

The distinction between these biographical facts and the facts that come within the province of 'History' is apt to be obscured because persons whose private lives come to be recorded are apt to be persons who have lived public lives as well—persons, that is to say, who have impersonated institutions or movements or ideas and have served as vehicles for 'historical' events. Saint Augustine, Saint Francis, and Cardinal Newman all made their marks upon the history of the Christian Church; Marcus Aurelius and Queen Victoria were not only human beings but 'heads of states'; Rousseau's ideas were among the spiritual forces that carried our Western Society out of the so-called 'modern' age into the 'post-modern' age in which we are living to-day.² The lives of such persons are interesting to their fellow men by reason of their accidental 'historical' significance as well as in virtue of their intrinsic human significance. Hence the vast majority of biographies are literary hybrids in which the significant events of a private life are overlaid in the portrayal or are even crowded out of the picture by the mass of public affairs with which they happen to be mixed up. This is perhaps the reason why biographies are seldom good works of art; for private lives are not the pivots on which public affairs turn or the standpoints from which they can be seen in true proportion, however eminent the lives of these lives may be.³

To make biography a peg for history is as great a mistake in method as to make the record of historical transactions an occasion for illustrating the points of human interest in private lives. Both are false routes; but the lure of historical biography leads more writers astray than the lure of biographical history. Mr. Strachey's *Life of Queen Victoria* is a rare and noteworthy example of a work

¹ Of course, the great majority of private lives that come to be recorded are the lives of members of societies that belong to the latter class. Records of the lives of savages and barbarians are rare, and such as exist are mostly slight and superficial.

² For the transition between these two ages, see pp. 1 and 170-1, above.

³ This point is brought out clearly by Eduard Meyer in his 'Zur Theorie und Methodik der Geschichte' (*Kleine Schriften* (Halle 1910, Niemeyer), p. 66).

of art in which this wrong turning has been avoided. The author disentangles the life of Victoria from the history of the Victorian Age and ignores public transactions except in so far as these throw light on the personality of the woman with whom he is concerned. This clarity of vision and sense of form are less rare in autobiographies. The supreme example of the disentanglement of a private from a public life is the *Meditations* of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius—a book which provides no grist for the mill of historians of the Roman Empire,¹ but which has a human interest that is so deep and direct and permanent that the book is read to this day by innumerable people to whom the Roman Empire is no more than a name.

When we turn from 'History' to Anthropology, we find that, here too, the popular equation breaks down. Anthropology does not really present the laws, all the laws, and nothing but the laws, that govern the lives of primitive societies. Besides formulating laws, it ascertains facts and has recourse to fictions; and on the other hand there are certain laws which it leaves alone because they are not grist to its mill. As a matter of fact, Anthropology is only just beginning, in our generation, to emerge from the preliminary stage of fact-finding (a stage through which every science has to pass in its infancy) into the stage of using the 'data' which it has collected as a basis for elucidating and formulating those laws which anthropologists regard as their objective. Again, Anthropology shows off its laws by draping them round a mannequin called 'Primitive Man' who is a fictitious character of the same make as *Homo Economicus*. At the same time, it has no use for the laws of Political Economy and the other ancillary sciences of 'History', because these laws apply not to 'Primitive Man' but to Mankind in process of civilization.

Lastly, the Drama and the Novel do not present fictions, complete fictions, and nothing but fictions regarding the personal relations of human beings. Besides fictions, they present facts and laws, and there are some fictions that do not come within their province.

We have observed already that the Drama and the Novel grow out of Mythology, which is likewise the source of 'History', and that in Mythology the distinction between facts and fictions is left undrawn. We have also noted that the Hellenic Drama and Hellenic History had a common literary parent in the Homeric Epic, which

¹ This is perhaps too sweeping a statement; for, though the *Meditations* yield no single piece of information on the administration of the Roman Empire or on the policy of the Roman Government during Marcus Aurelius's reign, there is a historical significance in the bare fact that a 'philosopher-king' occupied the highest position in the Roman State at this time (see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 99, below).

was the literary vehicle of the Hellenic Mythology; and when we examine the plots of the earliest known Greek plays, we find that they are taken from this or that incident or situation in the Epic Cycle.¹ Similarly, the 'Mystery Plays' in which our Western drama first emerged took their plots from the Gospels and from the legends of Christ and the Saints, which may be regarded as the epic cycle in the background of our Western history.² Thus, in Greek tragedies and in Western 'Mystery Plays' alike, the plots originally belonged to a realm in which the question 'Is this fact or fiction?' did not arise; and although our Western Drama made haste to step out of this Garden of Eden,³ Greek Tragedy was content to stay within its borders to the end.⁴

Moreover, even in a mental atmosphere in which the distinction between facts and fictions is consciously felt, the Drama and the Novel can never dispense completely with facts or employ the technique of fiction exclusively. When we call a piece of literature a 'work of fiction', we mean no more than that the characters could not be identified with any persons who have lived in the flesh, nor the incidents and scenes with any events or situations that have actually occurred. In fact, we mean that this work has a fictitious personal foreground; and if we do not mention that the background is composed of authentic social facts, that is simply because this seems so self-evident that we take it for granted. Of course, if the background as well as the foreground were constructed of

¹ Aeschylus, in a famous epigram, describes his plays as 'slices from the mighty banquets of Homer'. (*Τὰς αὐτοῦ τραγωδίας τεμάχη εἶναι ἔλεγε τῶν Ὁμήρου μεγάλων δείπνων*: Athenaeus, Book VIII, 347 E.)

² The germ of this epic cycle of Christian legend was transmitted to our Western Society by the internal proletariat of the 'apparented' society, whereas the germ of the Homeric Epic was transmitted to the Hellenic Society by the external proletariat of the earlier society to which the Hellenic Society was related. This difference in the origins of the two epic cycles is connected with the difference (investigated in I. C (i) (b), on pp. 95-100, above) in the origins of Western and Hellenic religion, which likewise differed in being derived from the earlier society's internal and external proletariat respectively. The Barbarians who overran those provinces of the Roman Empire which eventually became the home of our Western Society did, of course, produce an epic; but this epic is not the parent of our Western literature, for it met with a premature death and left no issue. The Christian epic tradition conquered Teutonic poetry when Teutonic paganism was conquered by the Church; and the literary as well as the religious victory was so complete that Christian legend actually took possession of the Barbarians' epic form before flinging it on the scrap-heap. In the English version of the Teutonic Epic, which happens to be the best preserved, the lay of Beowulf was followed, before the *genre* became extinct, by the lay of the *Heliand* (the Saviour). On this, see Ker, W. P.: *Epic and Romance* (London 1922, Macmillan), pp. 27-9 and 90, and Bridges, Robert: *The Testament of Beauty* (Oxford 1929, Clarendon Press), Book III, ll. 534-81. See further II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 320, below.

³ In the English version of the Western Drama, the plots had become differentiated, as early as the Elizabethan Age, into a fictitious and a historical class. The division between these two classes roughly corresponded to the division between Comedy and Tragedy.

⁴ On the other hand, Greek Comedy reacted to the influence of the Athenian soil in which the Greek Drama had its roots. 'The Old Comedy' learnt to take its plots from contemporary history by playing upon public events and caricaturing public men. 'The New Comedy' became a comedy of manners which portrayed the personal relations of private life.

fictitious materials,¹ the work would make nonsense. It would convey no intelligible or sensible image of human life, and would therefore make no appeal either to the understanding or to the emotions of readers or spectators.²

The narrowness of the limits within which, in so-called 'works of fiction', the technique of fiction can be employed with success may be gauged by considering the *genre* which is represented by *Gulliver's Travels* or by the fantasias of Jules Verne or Edgar Allan Poe or H. G. Wells. These writers, who all possess a fine literary tact, are not attempting the folly of writing fiction through and through. The *tour de force* which they have set themselves to perform is to substitute fictions for facts in only one or two points in the backgrounds of their stories. Swift changes the size of human bodies while leaving human nature as it is in every other respect. Verne and Poe and Wells exaggerate—or in some cases merely anticipate by a few years—the performances of our modern Western Physical Science in its practical applications. In a numerical metaphor, one might put it that, whereas the fictitious element in ordinary 'works of fiction' is confined to the foreground and amounts, say, to ten per cent. of the whole, these daring writers, in their *tours de force*, have raised the percentage from ten to twelve by introducing a few grains of fiction into the background. Nor have they made this trifling departure from the ordinary percentages with ease. In order to make their few grains of fiction in the background plausible, they have had to exert all their literary power in giving additional touches of realism to that part of the background (and it is still the major part) which they construct out of real social facts in the ordinary way. This trick of the trade is never performed with success except by writers of uncommon ability. The difficulty of it gives a measure of the extent to which the employment of facts in 'works of fiction' is indispensable.

¹ Even a fictitious foreground must be plausible: that is, it must not be in flagrant contradiction with palpable facts in the real social environment of the fictitious plot. This point is made by Aristotle in the *Poetics* (1460a): *Δεδίδαχε δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψεύδη λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. . . προαιρεῖσθαι τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ διωτὰ ἀπίθνα, τοὺς τε λόγους μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν ἔχειν ἀλογον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος.* 'Homer is the great master of the art of telling falsehoods right. . . From him one learns to prefer what is impossible but plausible to what is possible but incredible, and not to construct works of literature out of irrational elements, but if possible to avoid irrationalities altogether and in any case to keep them out of the action of the piece.'

² This is why it is difficult to achieve success in writing 'historical' plays and novels, i.e. plays and novels in which the social background is not that of the writer or of the public for whom he is writing. The effort to resuscitate an alien social background seldom produces effects that do not seem either shoddy or laboured. The reason is that social facts, when presented as a setting for personal relations, must be sketched in with a touch which is at the same time light and sure; and this touch is difficult to achieve except when the artist is portraying social facts with which he is intimately acquainted at first hand.

Moreover, there are certain works of literature—biographies and autobiographies—which present pure records of facts without any fictitious elements at all but which are not 'History'. We can now see what the affinities of this biographical literature are. In spite of being entirely non-fictitious, it clearly comes under the same literary category as the Drama and the Novel because, like these, it is concerned with the personal relations of human beings. This is the converse of a fact of which we have already taken note, namely, the fact that certain other works of literature, such as *The Persae* or *The Dynasts* or *John Brown's Body* or *Jew Süss*, which in form are 'works of fiction', come under the category of 'History', because they are concerned, not with the personal relations of human beings, but with public affairs.

Finally, even if we do not go with Aristotle so far as to say that Poetry (meaning Dramatic Poetry) 'presents generalities' in contrast to 'History', which 'presents merely particulars',¹ we may declare without fear of contradiction, in this age of 'problem plays' and 'problem novels', that our dramatists and novelists are not indifferent to the 'laws' of the science of Ethics; and, if we are challenged, we can put Aeschylus and Sophocles and Euripides into the witness-box, to testify on our behalf side by side with Henrik Ibsen and Bernard Shaw. We have already come across Ethics among the ancillary sciences which historians have taken into their service; so that we find this versatile science serving two masters, neither of whom are men of science themselves.

As for the fictions which do not come within the province of the Drama and the Novel, these are, of course, the fictions which we have found in use among the historians and the anthropologists. Having examined them above, we need not recapitulate them here.

Our survey has perhaps sufficiently disproved the accuracy of the popular equations between the employment of certain literary techniques and the study of certain phenomena of human life. Each of the three techniques—the ascertainment and record of 'facts', the elucidation and formulation of 'laws', and the creation of 'fiction'—is employed on occasion in each of the three studies: in the study of social life in civilizations which is popularly called 'History', in the study of social life in primitive societies which is the province of Anthropology, and in the study of personal relations in the branch of literature which comprises plays, novels, and biographies. This shows that there can be nothing in the intrinsic nature either of the studies or of the techniques to equate any one study with any one technique *a priori*. Yet this negative result of our survey does not dispose of our problem; for although the

¹ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451B, cited in footnote 2 on p. 441, above.

popular equations do not hold good absolutely, they do hold good on the whole. Each study does tend to employ one of the three techniques either more frequently or more effectively or more characteristically than it employs either of the other two; and although in each case we can point out occasions on which it employs the other two as well, these occasions are still the exception and not the rule. Thus the popular equations, while not accurate, do nevertheless approximate to the truth; and indeed, if they did not justify themselves as a rule, the popular mistake of assuming that their validity is absolute could scarcely have arisen. Our problem remains unsolved until we have explained the equations as far as they go.

If, with this in mind, we now examine the three techniques again, we may observe a difference between them which we have not yet noticed: among other differences, they differ in their respective suitability for dealing with 'data' in different quantities. The ascertainment and record of particular facts is all that is either possible or necessary in a field of study where the 'data' happen to be few; the elucidation and formulation of general laws through a process of comparative study is both possible and necessary where the 'data' are too numerous to tabulate but not too numerous to survey. The form of artistic creation and expression known as 'fiction' is the only technique that either can be employed or is worth employing where the 'data' are innumerable.

Here, as between the three techniques, we have an intrinsic difference of a quantitative order. The techniques differ intrinsically from one another in their utility for handling different quantities of 'data'. Can we discern any corresponding difference in the quantities of the 'data' that actually present themselves in the respective fields of our three studies?

To begin with the study of personal relations which is the province of plays, novels, and biographies, we can see at once that students of human life in this province are confronted with innumerable instances of certain universally familiar experiences: for example, the experience of Marriage, which is the stock subject of Attic Comedy, and the experience of Death, which is the stock subject of Attic Tragedy.¹ In dealing with such experiences as these, an exhaustive record of the facts is utterly impossible; and a record of particular instances which have actually occurred is seldom worth while, because the chances are that any given single instance will contain nothing beyond what everybody feels and knows about the experience already from his or her own personal

¹ For this analysis of the two *genres* of Attic Drama, see Murray, Gilbert: *The Classical Tradition in Poetry* (London 1927, Milford), pp. 52-5.

life, and will therefore be without any special significance, either emotional or psychological. This is another way of saying that it will be so commonplace and dull that to single it out from the host of 'data' at command would seem arbitrary, and to place it on record would seem a misdirection of energy. It does, of course, occasionally happen that actual instances of such experiences have value and significance as they stand. The experiences recorded in the biographies and autobiographies which have been cited above are examples. Yet if we reflect how infinitesimal is the number of actual instances that have been found worthy of record compared with the number that are perpetually being allowed to pass into oblivion, we realize that the accident occurs so rarely as to be almost negligible. Again, any 'laws' that could conceivably be formulated about experiences so frequently re-experienced, and therefore so familiar, as these, would seem either intolerably platitudinous or intolerably crude. In such circumstances, the 'data' cannot as a rule be expressed significantly or even intelligibly except in some kind of notation which gives an intuition of the infinite in finite terms or (in the language of Hellenic philosophy) sets a *πέρας* to an *ἄπειρον*. And this is the virtue of those fictitious characters and fictitious situations and events which occupy the foreground of 'works of fiction' and give this category of literature its conventional name. They may be regarded, in one aspect, as notations for expressing intuitively certain phenomena of human life which happen to be so frequently repeated and so familiar that their significance is fined down to subtleties and niceties which, except in rare cases, can be seized by intuition alone.¹

Having now found, in quantitative terms, at least a partial explanation of the empirical fact that, in the study of personal relations between human beings, the technique known as 'fiction' is usually, though not exclusively, employed, let us see if we can find similar, if only partial, quantitative explanations for the usual though not exclusive employment of the law-making technique in the study of primitive societies and of the fact-finding technique in the study of civilizations.

The first point to observe is that both these other studies are

¹ It will be seen that the fictitious names by which historians and anthropologists designate institutions, and the anthropomorphic language in which they describe the workings of institutions (see pp. 442-6 and 448, above), are notations of the same kind as the fictions in 'works of fiction', and that, in all three *genres*, this artifice is employed in similar circumstances. The working of any given institution means in reality the outcome of the individual behaviours of each of the hundreds or thousands of human beings whom this particular institution holds in an impersonal relation with one another. The outcome of these innumerable individual behaviours cannot be apprehended by human minds, as they are, except intuitively; and an intuition of either the infinitesimal or the infinite in finite terms can only be expressed by using the notation called 'fiction'. Hence, when the circumstances arise, recourse is had to this technique in all our three studies of human life.

likewise concerned with human relations, but not with relations of the familiar personal kind which come within the direct experience of every man, woman, and child almost from the moment of birth.¹ The social relations of human beings extend beyond the furthest possible range of personal contacts,² and these impersonal relations³

¹ Within a month of birth, a child distinguishes its mother or nurse from other people. This is true of social relations in primitive societies as well as in civilizations. The truth is perhaps more readily apparent in the Time-dimension than in the Space-dimension. In any society at almost any moment of its existence the majority of members are already dead (as is recognized in the formula of Roman funerary inscriptions: 'Migravit ad plures'). If we think of the Time-relation in generations, we realize that effective personal relations in Time hardly ever exist between individuals further removed from one another than grandparents and grandchildren, whereas institutional relations may exist between individuals whose lifetimes are separated by intervals of centuries or even millennia. In primitive societies 'the ancestors' whose prestige is the sanction of social custom comprise many more past generations than the earliest with which the life-span of any living member of the society at any given moment has overlapped. In civilizations, the possible extension of institutional relations in the Time-dimension is far longer. Millions of members of our Western Society who are alive in 1933 are in such relations with Abraham Lincoln or John Wesley or St. Francis of Assisi or St. Paul. In fact, social relations are distinguished from personal relations in being four-dimensional. (Personal relations cannot arise exclusively in the Time-dimension, and indeed cannot subsist in it exclusively except in so far as people are influenced by the memory of contemporaries who have predeceased them.)

² To call institutional relations 'impersonal' is to state a matter of fact which carries no implications. In particular, their impersonality does not imply that these relations are less momentous than personal relations or less compelling. In the Western Society of our generation, the number of people who have been called (and have responded to the call) to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the institutions called states is vastly greater than the number who have been called to make the same supreme sacrifice for their relatives or friends. Again, the spiritual significance and emotional intensity of a man's relations to his parents or wife or children may be far surpassed by his devotion to John Wesley if he is a devout Methodist or to St. Francis if he is a devout Catholic or to George Washington if he is a patriotic citizen of the United States or to Johann Sebastian Bach if he is a passionate musician. These examples show that, while institutional relations are truly 'impersonal', they are in no sense 'unreal'. Indeed, they are the element in human life in virtue of which we have accepted the definition of Man as being 'a social animal'. (See the quotation from Aristotle in footnote 3 on p. 173 above.)

At the same time, we must not let ourselves slip into the error of assuming that institutional relations and personal relations cover, between them, the whole field of human experience. There are certain human experiences that do not take the form of relations of any kind with other human beings—for example, such experiences as those of mystical religion or aesthetic perception (*Anschauung*) or mathematical apprehension (which Plato considered to be the only perfect pleasure in life).

It may be noted, however, that mystics and artists and mathematicians are seldom so divinely or so bestially unsocial as to be content to keep their experiences to themselves. As a rule, they feel an impulse to communicate their individual experience, and this impulse is apt to be strong in proportion to the intensity of the experience which is the object of it. 'I am come to send fire on the Earth, and what will I if it be already kindled? But I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened until it be accomplished?' (The Gospel according to St. Luke, ch. xii, vv. 49-50.) When attempts to communicate the individual experiences of religion take the form of the institutions called churches, there is sometimes the Devil to pay; and yet, as we shall see at a later point in this Study (in III. C (ii), vol. iii, below), it is in the nature of the mystical experience to discharge itself in action—so much so that a mysticism which stops short at ecstasy, without going on to tread the agonizing but creative path of return to the World from which the mystic has previously withdrawn, is thereby virtually confessing itself to be a mysticism *manqué*. Indeed, the very source and fountain-head of creation in social affairs is this non-social experience of religious or aesthetic or intellectual ecstasy which the psychological movement of 'Withdrawal-and-Return' enables rare souls to attain. Thus, while it is true that there are certain human experiences which do not take the form of relations with other human beings, it cannot be said that these non-social experiences have nothing to do with social life. On the contrary, these non-social experiences are socially creative just because they are individually intense; and it is their potent social effect that gives them part—though, of course, only part—of the importance which they are universally recognized as possessing.

are maintained through social mechanisms called institutions. Without institutions, societies could not exist. Indeed, societies themselves are simply institutions of the highest order—institutions, that is, which comprehend without being comprehended by others.¹ The study of societies and the study of institutional relations are one and the same thing.²

We can see at once that the quantity of 'data' confronting students of institutional relations is very much smaller than the quantity confronting students of personal relations. This follows directly from the two points in our definition of institutional relations: first, that they are relations with a wider range than personal contacts, and, second, that they are maintained through social mechanisms (unlike personal relations, which maintain themselves spontaneously). We can see further that the quantity of recorded institutional relations that are relevant to the study of primitive societies will be considerably greater than the quantity of those relevant to the study of civilizations, inasmuch as the number of extant primitive societies runs to more than 650,³ whereas our survey of civilizations both extant and extinct has not so far enabled us to identify more than twenty-one of these, even when we include in our reckoning the ten representatives of the species whose claims to a distinct and separate existence may be challenged.⁴ Now six or seven hundred instances of a phenomenon, while far from necessitating the employment of the technique known as 'fiction', are just enough to enable students to make a beginning in the elucidation and formulation of general laws; and this is, as we have seen, the stage which the infant science of Anthropology has reached to-day. On the other hand, students of a phenomenon of which only one dozen or two dozen instances are known can hardly do more than tabulate the facts; and this, as we have seen, is the stage in which 'History', in the sense of the study of social life in civilizations, has remained so far.

At first sight it may seem a paradox to assert that the quantity of 'data' which students of civilizations have at their command is inconveniently small, when our modern Western historians are complaining that they are being overwhelmed by the multitude and the mass of their materials. The paradox vanishes if we recall our observation—made at an earlier point in this Study⁵—that this complaint arises from a hallucination. Our historians cannot see the wood for the trees; and, being unable to distinguish parts from

¹ This is merely a statement in objective terms of the proposition that societies are the 'intelligible fields of study'. (See Part I. A, and p. 443, above.)

² For the nature of these institutional relations, see further III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, below.

³ See p. 148, above.

⁴ See I. C (ii), above.

⁵ See Part I. A, pp. 3-4 and 6, above.

wholes, they disintegrate the twenty-one 'intelligible fields of study' which are the only true integers on the board into an innumerable quantity of minute fractions and then complain of the chaos which they themselves have brought about. The legion of facts with which they believe themselves to be beset are phantoms conjured up by some pathological refraction of their mental vision. In reality, the integral 'facts' confronting students of civilizations are not overwhelmingly numerous, like the trees in a forest or the sands on the sea-shore or the integral 'facts' of personal relations. On the contrary, they are inconveniently few. In this study, the known number of 'facts' of the highest order—that is, the known number of the civilizations themselves—amounts up to date to twenty-one and no more.

Having thus cleared the ground, we may sum up the results of our present inquiry tentatively as follows. Our three techniques are intrinsically suited for dealing respectively with quantities of 'data' in different orders of magnitude; and their spheres of application are at least partially determined by this quantitative factor, whatever the nature of the 'data' may be. On the other hand, the techniques have no intrinsically and rigorously determined qualitative provinces; and the popular equations in which the three techniques are severally equated with the study of three different kinds of relations between human beings are found to be inaccurate. In each of these three studies, all the three techniques are actually employed. At the same time, the popular equations, though inaccurate, hold good as a rule; for in each study one particular technique is employed predominantly, while the other two play subordinate roles. This is perhaps largely because the quantities of 'data' at present confronting students of these different kinds of relations happen to differ in order of magnitude in degrees which render one or other technique at present particularly suitable for employment in one or other study on quantitative grounds.

At this point we can observe that the quantitative difference between the amounts of the 'data' which present themselves in the field of each of the three studies is not on a par with the qualitative differences between the natures of the relations which are the objects of study and between the natures of the techniques employed. The differences between the objects of study and between the techniques are intrinsic, invariable, and absolute; the difference in the quantities of 'data' is accidental, variable, and relative to the passage of Time. In the nature of things, the instances of any phenomenon or any experience tend to multiply so long as the phenomenon continues to appear or the experience to occur, and the representatives of a species tend to multiply so long

as the species continues to exist; and, if these instances and representatives are regarded as 'data' for study, it is evident that the 'data' for the study of any object whatsoever will tend, as they multiply, to travel successively through the spheres of application of our three techniques so far as Time allows. At the outset, the 'data' will always be so few that the establishment and record of particular facts will be all that is either possible or necessary as a rule; and if the phenomenon ceases to appear or the experience ceases to be experienced or the species becomes extinct before this quantity of 'data' has been exceeded, the occasion for employing either of the other two techniques will seldom arise. If, however, Time allows the 'data' to accumulate to a quantity too numerous to tabulate but not too numerous to survey, then it will become both possible and necessary to handle the same 'data'—which will have changed in quantity merely and not in kind—by the elucidation and formulation of general laws through a process of comparative study (the ascertainment and record of particular facts still retaining a value for certain purposes). Finally, if Time spares the phenomenon or the experience or the species so long that the quantity of the 'data' becomes innumerable, then students will have to fall back upon the technique of 'fiction'; and the other two techniques will become less and less possible to employ and at the same time also less and less worth employing.

It is evident that the 'data' for some studies will accumulate more rapidly than those for others. For instance, the 'data' for the study of personal relations are so prolific that for practical purposes the periods during which they were travelling through the two spheres of fact-finding and law-making may be ignored. In a flash, both these periods had been left behind, before Man had realized that he had become himself and long before he had acquired the mental and material means of self-study. In fact, the 'data' for the study of personal relations had already entered the sphere of application of the technique of 'fiction' before the study was or could be initiated. On the other hand, the 'data' for the study of the impersonal relations that are maintained through the institutions of primitive societies are so much less prolific that in our generation we can watch the 'data' for this study just passing out of the sphere of fact-finding into the sphere of law-making. Again, the 'data' for the study of that other set of impersonal relations that are maintained through the institutions of civilizations are still so few in number that they have not yet passed the limits within which the technique of fact-finding can be applied.¹

¹ While the 'data' consisting of impersonal relations are not numerous up to date, we have seen that any given impersonal relation, in its nature and in its working, involves—

We have now reached, by a second route, the answer to the question from which our present inquiry started. We set out, in the chapter to which this Annex attaches, to discover whether it was true, as our critics asserted, that every 'fact' encountered in the study of civilizations was intrinsically unique and therefore essentially incomparable with any other fact in the same field. We have now ascertained that the true facts in this field—that is, the facts which are integral and therefore intelligible—are at present not unmanageably numerous, as our critics suppose them to be, but inconveniently few. We have discerned that this smallness of the quantity of the integral 'data' that are to be found in this field up to date will account for the fact (which we freely admit) that in the study of civilizations hitherto the technique of fact-finding has been predominantly (though, as we have shown, by no means exclusively) employed. We now arrive at the conclusion that the facts encountered in the study of social life in civilizations are not unique intrinsically but only accidentally and provisionally, pending the multiplication of the data to a quantity suitable for the application of the technique in which laws are elucidated and formulated through a process of comparative study. In fine, the facts encountered in the study of social life in civilizations are not incomparable essentially or *a priori*.

Are they comparable in the quantity which is at our command here and now? Our critics may seize upon our observation that the study of institutional relations in primitive societies has not begun to employ the comparative, law-making technique until the number of integral facts of the highest order—that is, the number, known to students, of such societies themselves—has risen to a figure exceeding six hundred. In the study of institutional relations in civilizations, where the known number of integral facts of the highest order has not yet risen, on the most liberal reckoning, above the modest figure of twenty-one, can we seriously hope to apply the comparative method without having to allow for a margin of error relatively so wide that it will stultify our efforts by eliminating all certainty from our results? Notwithstanding the increase in the number of known civilizations which has been achieved by the recent discoveries of our Western archaeologists,¹ are we appreciably better equipped in our day for attempting a comparative study of civilizations than a Freeman and a de

in the multitude of human beings partaking in the relation—an innumerable factor which cannot be presented except intuitively by the technique of fiction. Thus, paradoxically, the fact-finding technique is applied in the study of social life in civilizations, and the law-making technique in the study of social life in primitive societies, to 'data' which are themselves presented in the form of fictions.

¹ For an appreciation of the value of these discoveries see, above, the note at the end of I. B (iv), Annex; footnote 1 on p. 129 in I. C (ii); and p. 157 in I. C (iii) (b).

Gobineau were in their day or a Gibbon and a Voltaire in theirs? In the empirical spirit in which we propose to conduct this study throughout, we may reply (as we have replied, on occasion, already): 'Wait and see.' At our own peril, we intend to hazard the attempt; and, through our failure or success, our critics' question will answer itself.

There is one assertion, however, which we can make here and now with confidence. If the quantity of 'data' available for the study of civilizations grows beyond the present modest figure and accumulates *ad infinitum*, it will not only become possible, without question, to employ in this study the comparative, law-making technique; it will eventually become patently impossible to employ any technique except that of 'fiction'. The sole but indispensable condition for the eventual supremacy of the technique of 'fiction' in the domain of 'History' is the passage of Time without the annihilation of the record.

This condition might be realized in either or both of two possible ways: either through the rescue from oblivion of civilizations which have come and gone and been forgotten in the past, or through the rise and fall and commemoration of fresh civilizations in the future.

When human minds contemplate the passage of Time, they often dwell upon the oblivion of human affairs which has followed in the train of Time's passage in the past—whether or not they believe, or play with the belief, that the record of the past is not obliterated beyond all hope of decipherment. This attitude of mind may be illustrated by two passages of Western poetry, one inspired by the Syriac tradition and the other by the Hellenic:

A thousand ages in thy sight
Are like an evening gone,
Short as the watch that ends the night
Before the rising Sun.

Time, like an ever rolling stream,
Bears all its sons away;
They fly forgotten, as a dream
Dies at the opening day.

Isaac Watts is presenting, in Hebrew imagery, the same poetic vision that Shelley beholds with Hellenic eyes:

Worlds on worlds are rolling ever
From creation to decay
Like the bubbles on a river
Sparkling, bursting, borne away.

The same idea is prosaically expressed by a Byzantine historian

whose mind was formed through an education in the Hellenic humanities:

'Time, flowing unrestrainably and always on the move, carries away and carries off all things that come into being and engulfs them in the deep sea of oblivion, whether they be things not worth a song or things great and memorable. In the language of Tragedy, Time bringeth what was not to birth, and as for that which hath seen the Light, lo, Time shroudeth it and it is gone.'

For an expression of the idea which is at once poetically imaginative and intellectually precise we may turn to the Hellenic philosopher who was Anna's and Shelley's master: Plato himself. The following passage occurs in the dialogue called *The Laws*:²

ATHENIAN STRANGER. . . . What is to be our theory of the origins of political life? I know the angle of vision which commends itself to me.

CLEINIAS OF CRETE. What angle?

ATH. The same angle that gives a perspective of the evolution of communities for better or for worse as the case may be.

CL. And what angle is that?

ATH. Why, the angle of the duration—the infinite duration—of Time and the changes proper to that medium.

CL. I don't understand.

ATH. Well, do you think that you could ever estimate the length of time that has elapsed since communities, and people living in them, first came into existence?

CL. Not at all an easy estimate to make!

ATH. You mean, it would be an enormous, overwhelming length of time?

CL. It would indeed.

ATH. Then must we not suppose that myriads upon myriads of communities have come into existence in this length of time and that, in the same ratio, as many myriads have been destroyed? And that in these communities, during their existence, every form of political life has been tried, many times over, in every part of the World? And that they have passed through all the permutations of increase and diminution in size and of improvement and deterioration in quality?

CL. One cannot suppose otherwise.

This intuition of the immense possibilities of oblivion through the passage of Time in the past has flashed upon Plato's inner vision without any ocular demonstration from the archaeologist's spade.³ Had Plato lived in our generation in a world in which our

¹ Anna Cornnena in her *Alexias*, ad init. 'Ρέων ὁ χρόνος ἀκάθεκτα καὶ αἰετὶ κινούμενος παρασύρει καὶ παραφέρει πάντα τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ ἐς βαθὺ ἀφανείας καταποντοῖ ὅπου μὲν οὐκ ἄξια 'λυθίου' πράγματα, ὅπου δὲ μεγάλα καὶ ἄξια μνήμης, καὶ τὰ τε ἄδηλα φύων κατὰ τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὰ φανέντα κρυπτόμενος. This is, of course, merely Anna's version of a Byzantine commonplace which has found its way into the prefaces of a number of Byzantine historians and which is perhaps originally a learned reminiscence of the famous exordium of Herodotus.

² Plato: *Leyes*, 676.

³ In Plato's world in Plato's age, the Minoan palaces at Cnossos and Phaestus were buried out of sight, and the walls of Tiryns and Mycenae dominated the landscape of the

Western archaeologists have disinterred no less than seven buried and forgotten civilizations¹ during the century and a half that has passed since Volney wrote *Les Ruines*,² he would assuredly have presented his conjecture as a certainty. Would his judgement have been right? That is to say, is it probable that our archaeologists are to-day only at the beginning of their discoveries, and that, a few generations or a few centuries hence, the tale of forgotten civilizations that will have been rescued from oblivion since the end of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era³ will have grown from seven to seventy or seven hundred? Such a prospect seems decidedly improbable to-day, though the present state of our archaeological knowledge would hardly warrant our denying the possibility dogmatically. On the whole, it seems more probable that in broad outline the picture of the history of civilizations which has been painted for us by the archaeological discoveries of the last century and a half is now substantially complete, and that future research, while greatly increasing our knowledge of detail, will not extend our range of historical vision in this domain more than perhaps one millennium farther back into the past, and will not add more than perhaps one or two still disinterred civilizations to the tale of its new discoveries. The fact that the picture, as we now have it, is incomparably vaster and fuller than the picture which we had before our archaeologists first set to work gives no ground for expecting that, after the archaeologists have remained at work for as long a period again, the picture will have been enlarged and articulated further to anything like the same degree.⁴ It is more likely that the final effect of our archaeological research, when it eventually reaches the limits of what it can achieve, will be to refute Plato's brilliant conjecture by demonstrating conclusively that the age, up to date, of the species of human societies called civilizations

Argive plain without arousing sufficient curiosity among Plato's contemporaries to make them dig among the foundations. The record of Minoan history in the Hellenic tradition was reduced to a tenuous thread of legend: the Thalassocracy, the Labyrinth, the Minotaur. Still, it is at least a curious coincidence that Plato should have chosen Crete for the site of the imaginary commonwealth of *The Lates*, and it is an interesting suggestion that the legend of Atlantis which captivated Plato's imagination may have been an echo of the westward expansion of the Minoan Society in its latest age.

¹ These seven civilizations are the Egyptian, Sumeric, Babylonian, Hittite, Minoan, Yucatec, and Mayan; and the number rises to eight if 'the Indus Culture' is entitled to take an independent place, side by side with the Sumeric, as a civilization in its own right. On the other hand, the Indic and the Sinic civilizations cannot be included in the list; for although the knowledge of their existence came as a new discovery to Western scholars, it had never been forgotten by scholars in the 'affiliated' Hindu and Far Eastern societies.

² Volney, C. F., Comte de: *Les Ruines, ou Méditation sur les Révolutions des Empires* (1st edition, Paris 1791).

³ The rediscovery, by Western archaeologists, of civilizations of which no memory had survived in the living tradition of any extant society may be said to have been begun by the French savants who landed in Egypt with Napoleon in A.D. 1798.

⁴ In venturing this opinion, we can support it by the authority of Eduard Meyer. See his *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 212.

is extremely young by comparison with the age of the species called primitive societies and with the age of the Human Race and with the age of life on the Planet and with the age of the Planet itself.¹

We have still to consider the possibility that, in the future, as many myriads of civilizations may come into existence and pass out of existence again as Plato imagined to have come and gone in the past; and on this question, on which our archaeologists are necessarily silent, we may ask the opinion of our astronomers. Here is one opinion:

'Take a postage-stamp, and stick it on to a penny. Now climb Cleopatra's Needle and lay the penny flat, postage-stamp uppermost, on top of the obelisk. The height of the whole structure may be taken to represent the time that has elapsed since the Earth was born. On this scale, the thickness of the penny and postage-stamp together represents the time that Man has lived on Earth. The thickness of the postage-stamp represents the time he has been civilised, the thickness of the penny representing the time he lived in an uncivilised state. Now stick another postage-stamp on top of the first to represent the next 5,000 years of civilisation, and keep sticking on postage-stamps until you have a pile as high as Mont Blanc. Even now the pile forms an inadequate representation of the length of the future which, so far as Astronomy can see, probably stretches before Civilised Humanity. The first postage-stamp was the past of Civilisation; the column higher than Mont Blanc is its future. Or, to look at it in another way, the first postage-stamp represents what Man has already achieved; the pile which out-tops Mont Blanc represents what he may achieve if his future achievement is proportional to his time on Earth.'²

When the astronomer changes his medium of expression from imagery to figures, he tells us³ that the Earth—which has existed up to date for about 2,000 million years altogether, and for about 300 million years as a habitat of Life, and for about 300,000 years as a habitat of Man, and for 5,000 or 6,000 as a habitat of civilizations—may remain habitable from now onwards for another 1,000,000 million years. In order to be on the safe side, let us halve this astronomical figure in applying it to the expectation of life of the species of human societies called civilizations.⁴ On this 'conservative estimate', the species has at least 500,000 million years still ahead of it, as against the 5,000 or 6,000 years that are already

¹ On this point see I. C (iii) (c), above, especially p. 173, footnote 2.

² Jeans, Sir James: *The Universe Around Us* (Cambridge 1929, University Press), p. 342.

³ Jeans, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-43.

⁴ We must allow for the possibility that the figure itself may be excessive for any form of Life, and for the further possibility that the Earth may cease to be habitable for civilizations, or for human beings, or for mammalia, before it ceases to be habitable for any form of Life at all. This second possibility does not, on the whole, seem probable; for, in a struggle to survive under increasingly adverse physical conditions, the mental intelligence of Man will surely prove a more valuable asset, in the last resort, than the physical simplicity of the Amoeba.

behind it: that is to say, its present expectation of life is more than 83 million times as great as its present age. Let us assume, for the moment,¹ that, during these $83,000,000 \times 6,000$ years which are apparently to come, human affairs continue to be governed with as little wisdom as has been shown in their government during the 5,000 or 6,000 years that have actually passed since the first civilizations emerged;² or, in other words, let us assume that the expectation of life of any given specimen of the species remains as short as it has been hitherto. On this basis, a simple calculation shows that, if the species has thrown up 21 representatives of itself in 6,000 years, then, before the day of civilizations is done, the number of them that will have come and gone from first to last will be in the order of magnitude of $21 \times 83,000,000 = 1,743,000,000$!

Placing ourselves in the position of historians in those latter days, we have to imagine ourselves confronted by 1,743 million instances of the phenomena of civilizations; their geneses and growths and breakdowns and disintegrations, their universal states and universal churches and heroic ages, their contacts in Time and in Space. Imagine 1,743 million completed histories, each of which has been as long and as lively as the history of the Hellenic Society; 1,743 million reproductions of the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church and the Teutonic *Völkerwanderung*; 1,743 million repetitions of the relations between our Western Society and the Hellenic and between our Western Society and the other societies that are alive to-day! Our powers of imagination fail. By what technique should we handle historical 'data' that had accumulated in quantities so great as these? In this situation, the integral, intelligible facts in the histories of civilizations would really have become as unmanageably numerous as our present historians—mistaking fractions for integers and parts for wholes—erroneously suppose them to be now. In this historical landscape of the future,

¹ This assumption, while perhaps more reasonable than any other, is not, of course, beyond challenge. On this point, see further IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 9–10, as well as Parts XI and XII, below.

² The famous phrase was not coined until the species of societies called civilizations had been in existence for as long as 5,000 years. It was coined in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, in the Western World, as a comment on the government of Western states during the so-called modern age of Western history. The new Western statecraft had been worked out experimentally on a miniature scale in Northern Italy towards the latter end of 'the Middle Ages' (see p. 19, above); since the close of the fifteenth century, it had been communicated to the Western World at large; and before the close of the seventeenth century it had brought forth its fruits in sufficient abundance to be known by them. This bitter knowledge was enshrined in an anonymous saying which can be found in the works of a famous seventeenth-century man of letters and will be searched for in vain among the writings of a famous seventeenth-century man of action to whom the coinage of the phrase has come to be ascribed. 'Thou little thinkest what a little foolery governs the whole world' (Selden: *Table Talk*: ed. Pollock, p. 97; see also Note (a)); 'Quam, mi fili, parva sapientia mundus regitur' or 'Quantula sapientia nos regamur' (the variant forms in which the saying has been ascribed—though, at earliest, not until about fifty years after his death—to Axel Oxenstierna). For these references, the author of this Study is indebted to the kindness and the scholarship of Professor Harold J. Laski.

the features which loom largest in our present-day landscape—the Catholic Church, the Roman Empire—would be scarcely visible through the most powerful lens of the specialist's microscope. To require a specialist in universal states to identify our actual Roman Empire among the 1,743 million extant specimens of the institution would be to set him Psyche's task. To ask him to formulate the laws implicit in the workings of universal states would be to assume him capable of a synoptic vision beyond the capacity of human intelligence. Then by what technique could this hard-driven latter-day historian communicate the results of his studies to his contemporaries' minds? Only, perhaps, by the technique called 'fiction' which our dramatists and novelists employ in our time in order to communicate to their fellow men their thoughts and feelings about the personal relations of human beings—about those human loves and deaths, those personal successes and failures, those individual hopes and fears, which have repeated themselves, since Mankind became human, until their name is legion.

This distant prospect may daunt our minds, but it elates our hearts; for Hope steps in where Knowledge shrinks back abashed, and, flinging herself upon the abyss of Time, she flies forward invincibly to the farthest verge that Science reveals, irradiating the formidable void with the colour and warmth of Life. Here is the astronomer's vision translated into the language of a man of action:

'We have time in front of us. I do think that our political views are still to an immense degree coloured and over-coloured by the theological conceptions of the past. I am old enough to have been brought up to believe that the World was actually manufactured four thousand and four years before Christ, and also to believe that it might come to an end at any minute and almost certainly would come to an end in the next few generations. No doubt a decreasing number of people hold those views now; but they have been held so long in the Christian World that I honestly think they have coloured our political conceptions and have helped to bring about this feeling of a practical statesman that a man who is talking of results which can only be brought about generations ahead is not a practical person and you need not listen to him. If Science has taught us anything it is this, that in all human and reasonable probability we have more time in front of us than the anthropologists have shown that we have behind us; and I submit to you that it is not only practicable but wise to hold in front of our minds the goal to which we are travelling, . . . not to lose sight of the vision of the New Jerusalem descending on Earth itself as something which may be realised, and to hold in mind that memorable saying of the Book of Proverbs: "Where there is no vision, the people perish."'¹

¹ Curtis, Lionel: Lecture delivered at the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Mass., on the 28th July 1925.

THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE VEIN OF RUTHLESSNESS IN THE MODERN ENGLISH METHOD OF OVERSEAS SETTLEMENT

THE wholesale extermination of the previously established population, which has distinguished our English method of overseas settlement from the method of overseas settlement practised by most other West-European peoples in modern times, is a trait which likewise distinguished the settlement of the English on the territories of the Roman Empire from the settlement of the other Barbarians during the interregnum which followed the break-up of the Empire and the dissolution of the Hellenic Society. In that *Völkerwanderung*, most of the Barbarian war-bands from beyond the former frontiers simply stepped into the shoes of the former Roman soldiers and officials—taking their places in ruling and exploiting the provincials, in the same fashion as in the New World, a dozen centuries later, the Spanish conquistadores took the place of the Aztecs and the Incas. The English war-bands alone more or less exterminated the local provincials in the provinces which they overran, and re-populated the country themselves,¹ instead of being content to rule and exploit the population which they found there, just as, a dozen centuries later, it was the English settlers alone who exterminated the population which they found in the New World. Thus, on two occasions, many centuries apart, the English have distinguished themselves from their fellows and contemporaries by a peculiar ruthlessness in their treatment of an alien population which they have conquered.

Is this repeated appearance in the same distinctive role no more than a coincidence, or were these two bouts of English ruthlessness historically connected, notwithstanding the long interval of time by which they are separated chronologically? Was there some tradition of ruthlessness towards 'Natives' which may have been driven under the surface or into a corner without ever quite dying out of English life? Conceivably there was; for we may observe that, at the time when the English began to settle in North America, their settlement of the British Isles was still incomplete. The movement which had turned the greater part of the *ci-devant* Roman island of Britain into English soil during the *Völker-*

¹ The results of recent research tend, on the whole, to diminish the blackness of the traditional picture; yet the replacement, in Britain, of the conquered people's language by that of the conquerors, in contrast to the survival of the Latin vernaculars on the Continent, is a hard fact which tells a tale.

wanderung in the post-Hellenic interregnum had slowed down before the previous population had been exterminated in every corner of the island; and the struggle for existence between invaders and invaded had become transformed into a border warfare which was conducted with all the old ferocity but without the old decisiveness in its results. Thus the tradition of the first English settlers in Roman Britain was kept alive in the English Marches on the fringe of Wales and along the line which divided the Lowlands from the Highlands of Scotland; and this ferocious frontier spirit afterwards asserted itself along the border between the Kingdoms of England and Scotland (though here the frontiersmen on both sides came of the same English stock) and also along the line of the Irish Pale.

In the seventeenth century of our era, the Governments of England and Scotland under all régimes—in the reign of James I and under the protectorate of Cromwell—were as active in ‘planting’ Ireland and the Hebrides with settlers from England and the Lowlands of Scotland as they were in ‘planting’ the Atlantic seaboard of North America; and on both frontiers the attitude towards the ‘Natives’—whether ‘Wild Highlanders’ or ‘Wild Irish’ or ‘Red Indians’—was the same. The ‘Natives’ were to be uprooted, in order that the settlers of English stock, from England and the Scottish Lowlands, might be planted in their stead. Thus, for a century or more, the border warfare which had never ceased in the British Isles since the time of the *Völkerwanderung* was going on in the British Isles and in North America contemporaneously. In the British Isles, this border warfare was brought to an end, during the half century between the Battle of the Boyne and the Battle of Culloden, by the complete union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland and the complete subjugation of the Scottish Highlanders and the ‘Wild Irish’ to the authority of the United Kingdom. Therewith, the frontiersmen found their occupation gone, and their craft at a discount, on all the extinct frontiers—in Ulster and on the Border and along ‘the Highland Line’—and many of them emigrated to the Indian frontier of the North American plantations, where, in following their habitual pursuits, they would still be looked upon as performing a public service rather than as leading a life of lawlessness and crime.

These were the ancestors of the ‘Indian-fighters’ who, in less than a century, carried the frontier of the United States from the Appalachian Mountains to the Pacific coast, exterminating the Indians as they advanced. It has been remarked that these English-speaking Protestant frontiersmen became assimilated to their Indian foes and victims—in dress, in habits, and above all in ferocity—

and that, as soon as they had completed the extermination of the Indians, they died out themselves (except in the fastnesses of the Appalachians, where their descendants are living the old life to this day). An assimilation between the Indian-fighters and the Indians certainly did take place, as usually happens on barbarian frontiers of this kind.¹ At the same time, it may not be fanciful to suggest that, in this instance, the assimilation was facilitated by the fact that the English-speaking Protestant frontiersmen in the New World had brought with them a ruthless tradition of their own which had been handed down unmitigated from an age when their forefathers had been no better than Red Indians themselves.

When Severn down to Buildwas ran
Coloured with the death of man,
Couched upon her brother's grave
The Saxon got me on the slave.

The sound of fight is silent long
That began the ancient wrong;
Long the voice of tears is still
That wept of old the endless ill.

In my heart it has not died,
The war that sleeps on Severn side;
They cease not fighting, east and west,
On the marches of my breast.²

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 312, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), vol. v, pp. 478-80, as well as Part VIII, below.

² Housman, A. E.: *A Shropshire Lad*. For the assimilation of Indian-fighters to Indians, see Turner, F. J.: *The Frontier in American History* (New York 1921, Holt), especially the eloquent passage on p. 4; for the historical connexion between the old English frontiers in the British Isles and the new English frontier in North America during the seventeenth century, see Macleod, W. C.: *The American Indian Frontier* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), ch. xiii: 'Celt and Indian: Britain's Old World Frontier in Relation to the New', especially the evidence, cited on pp. 153-4 and 168-9, which shows that some of the seventeenth-century 'Indian-fighters' on the American frontier had been first apprenticed in the British Isles by fighting the Scottish Highlanders and 'the Wild Irish', and the evidence, cited on p. 161, for James VI/I's policy of extermination in the Scottish Highlands. For the latter-day barbarism of the Appalachian 'Mountain People', see further II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 310-12, below.

DAVID HUME'S CONCEPTION OF THE FUNCTION OF ENVIRONMENT AS A FACTOR IN THE GENESSES OF CIVILIZATIONS

OUR inquiry into the rival claims of Race and Environment to be regarded as possible positive factors in the geneses of civilizations will be manifestly incomplete unless we take some account of the views of a great eighteenth-century Western philosopher who was familiar with the Hellenic Environment-theory but who lived and died before the modern Western Race-theory had been distilled out of the theology of Protestantism by the genius of a de Gobineau.

As we have remarked, in passing, above,¹ the latter-day attempt of a certain school of Western thought to explain the empirically observed differences between one human society and another as the outward visible signs of an inward and innate diversity of Race is scarcely anticipated by Hume—apart from a footnote to his essay *Of National Characters* (published in A.D. 1748), in which he admits to a suspicion that 'the Negroes' are 'naturally inferior to the Whites',² and another passage in the same essay, in which he suggests that 'the manners of a people change very considerably from one age to another either by great alterations in their government, by the mixtures of new people, or by that inconstancy to which all human affairs are subject'. It will be seen that, in this passage, Hume mentions Race merely as one possible factor out of three; and while, in the illustrations with which he proceeds to support his proposition, he seems to regard a change of race as being responsible for the striking contrast in national character between the ancient and the modern inhabitants of Greece and of Britain, he apparently does not contemplate a racial explanation of the equally striking contrasts between the ancient and modern inhabitants of Rome and Spain and Holland.

Hume virtually ignores the Race-theory in order to concentrate his attention upon the Environment-theory which had once been paramount in the Hellenic World; but here, again, he considers

¹ In II. C (ii) (a) 1, on p. 216, footnote 2.

² Ibn Khaldūn concurs with Hume in tentatively admitting the possibility that the inhabitants of the extreme climates—that is, the First or Equatorial and the Seventh or Arctic Climate—may be racially inferior to the rest of Mankind. But, with this possible exception, he insists upon the racial equality of all members of the Human Race; and he explains the inferiority of the Magribī culture to the Eastern Islamic culture in his own time as the outcome of a historical difference in the respective social environments of the two regions in question, as against the vulgar view that this inferiority of culture reflected an innate inferiority of racial quality. (*Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 445-8.)

the claims of the Physical Environment only to reject these claims outright.

'As to physical causes, I am inclined to doubt altogether of their operation in this particular; nor do I think that men owe anything of their temper or genius to the air, food or climate. . . . If we run over the globe or revolve the annals of history, we shall discover everywhere signs of a sympathy or contagion of manners,¹ none of the influence of air or climate.'

In support of this contention, which runs counter to the paramount Hellenic doctrine, Hume cites the authority of the Hellenic social geographer Strabo;² and he also presents some telling illustrations of his own under no less than nine heads: the uniformity of national character throughout China, in spite of the climatic diversity between one region and another of the Chinese Empire; the contrast in manners between ancient Athens and Thebes,³ or between eighteenth-century Wapping and St. James's; the contrast in temperament between the contemporary populations on either side of the Pyrenees; the uniformity of the Jewish or the Armenian or the Jesuit *diaspora* with itself, however far it may be flung, and its constant difference from the various local majorities among which it is dispersed; the contrast between the Turks and Greeks who were geographically intermingled, in Hume's day, in the Ottoman Empire;⁴ the diversity in manners between the Spanish, English, French, and Dutch colonies in the Tropics owing to their respective persistence in the diverse manners which had been imported by the colonists from their several mother-countries in the West-European section of the Northern Temperate Zone; the differences in manners between the successive inhabitants of certain countries in different ages; the almost Chinese social uniformity of 'the Franks' from Tromsø to Cadiz; with an exception, proving the rule, in the unparalleled social variety of the English.

'The only observation with regard to the difference of men in different climates on which we can rest any weight is the vulgar one that people in the northern regions have a greater inclination to strong liquors and those in the southern to love of women'—but here, too, Hume gives reasons for thinking that 'perhaps the matter may be accounted for by moral causes'.⁵ Otherwise Hume

¹ The passage of this essay in which Hume points out the potency of Mimesis in human affairs has been quoted already in this Study in Part II. B, p. 191, footnote 2, above.

² The relevant passage of Strabo will be found in his *Geographica*, Book II, p. 103.

³ For a discussion of this contrast between Athens and Thebes, see the present Study, II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 37-42, below.

⁴ For the group-characteristics of *διασποράι* and other penalized minorities, see II. D (vi), vol. ii, below, *passim*.

⁵ Hume, *Of National Characters*, *ad fin.*

comes—apparently quite independently—to the same conclusion as the Arabic philosopher Ibn Khaldūn. He rejects altogether the climatic explanation of the empirically observed differences between the various peoples of the Northern Temperate Zone—between those peoples, that is to say, among whom, alone, the societies of the species called civilizations have arisen in the Old World hitherto—and he is only prepared, and this rather dubiously, to recognize climate as a possible differentiating factor in regions where the climatic conditions are at their extremes. 'There is some reason to think that all the nations which live beyond the Polar Circles, or between the Tropics, are inferior to the rest of the species and are incapable of all the higher attainments of the human mind.' But he adds the suggestion that 'the poverty and misery of the northern inhabitants of the globe, and the indolence of the southern, from their few necessities, may perhaps account for this remarkable difference, without having recourse to physical causes'.¹

Thus Hume not only ignores Race but, for practical purposes, rejects the Physical or Climatic Environment into the bargain as a possible cause of the actual difference in cultural achievement between one human society and another. The social environment is the differentiating factor to which Hume ascribes almost exclusive, and at the same time almost unlimited, potency.

In his essay *Of National Characters* he draws attention to the stock professional characters of priests and soldiers, which are to be ascribed to the standardizing influence that is exerted upon diverse individual characters by the respective social environments of these

¹ Ibn Khaldūn is likewise prepared to ascribe a differentiating effect to climatic influences in Climates I and II (i.e. the Tropics) and VI and VII (i.e. the Arctic Regions), but not in Climates III, IV, and V (the Northern Temperate Zone). He observes that both the Negro savages in the Tropics and the White savages (Slavs, Franks, Turks) in the Arctic Regions live almost like wild beasts. (Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, French translation by de Slane, Baron (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 169-70.) Ibn Khaldūn also ascribes the gaiety of the Negro temperament to the physical effect of the tropical heat. He adds that a kindred tendency to take no thought for the morrow can be observed among the inhabitants of Egypt and of a district on the coast of Ifriqiyah called the Jarid—the climate of both the Jarid and Egypt being exceptionally hot for their latitudes. As a contrast to the light-hearted ethos of the inhabitants of hot countries, he cites the ethos of the inhabitants of the Moroccan city of Fez. Fez is encompassed by cold uplands, and the people of Fez behave accordingly. When you see them as they walk through the streets, you would imagine that they were all plunged in gloom; and it is their practice to keep a reserve stock of food in their houses. Rather than break into this reserve, they will go to the trouble and expense of going out marketing (Ibn Khaldūn, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 174-5). Incidentally, Ibn Khaldūn avails himself of this concession which he makes to the Physical Environment theory of differentiation in the extreme cases in order to avoid being compelled to make any concession at all to the Race-theory. He maintains (in op. cit., vol. i, pp. 170-4) that the outstanding external differences in human physique—e.g. the difference between black and white skins—are not innate characteristics deriving from a racial inheritance but are the outcome of climatic influences. Like Professor Boas (see II. C (ii) (a) 1, p. 220, footnote 2, above), Ibn Khaldūn believes that physical characteristics change as a result of migration from one climatic environment to another. According to Ibn Khaldūn, Negroes who go north eventually turn White, while Whites who go to the Tropics eventually blacken into Negroes.

two professions. Again, in his essay *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences* (published in A.D. 1742), Hume ascribes the empirically observed differences of capacity and achievement in the cultural sphere to a particular difference in political institutions—the elementary difference between Republicanism and Monarchy—which had been taken by Hellenic thinkers in the fifth century B.C. as an explanation for the empirically observed differences in military valour.¹ 'It is impossible', Hume lays down in this essay, 'for the arts and sciences to arise at first among any people unless

¹ The popularity of this hypothetical correlation between military qualities and political institutions among Hellenic thinkers in the latter part of the fifth century B.C. is indicated by the fact that it is taken by Herodotus (in Book V, ch. 78) to explain the difference in the military prowess of the Athenians before and after the expulsion of the Peisistratidae, and by the author of the Hippocratean treatise on 'Influences of Atmosphere, Water, and Situation' (ch. 16) to explain the difference in military prowess between different communities of Asiatics in the author's own generation.

'The universal currency of the social value of civic equality (*ισογονία*) is demonstrated', says Herodotus, 'by the particular instance of the Athenians, who displayed no greater military prowess than their neighbours so long as they were under despotic government, but became far and away the first in the field as soon as they had thrown their despots off. This demonstrates that, so long as they were held down politically, the Athenians were deliberate shirkers on the field of battle because they felt that they were fighting for a master, whereas, when they had secured their freedom, each individual Athenian felt that he was fighting for himself and was therefore game to fight to a finish.'

The corresponding passage in the Hippocratean treatise runs as follows:

'The greater part of Asia is under monarchical government; and wherever men are not their own masters and not free agents, but are under despotic rule, they are not concerned to make themselves militarily efficient but, on the contrary, to avoid being regarded as good military material—the reason being that they are not playing for equal stakes. It is theirs, presumably, to serve and struggle and die under compulsion from their masters and far from the sight of their wives and children and friends. Whenever they acquit themselves like men, it is their masters who are exalted and aggrandized by their achievements, while their own share of the profits is the risking and the losing of their lives. And not only this but, in the case of people so circumstanced, it is also inevitable that the inactivity consequent upon the absence of War should have a taming effect upon the temperament, so that even a naturally courageous and spirited individual would be inhibited mentally by the prevailing institutions. A strong argument in favour of my contention is furnished by the fact that all the Hellenes and non-Hellenes in Asia who are not under despotic rule, but are free agents and struggle for their own benefit, are as warlike as any populations in the World—the reason being that they stake their lives in their own cause and reap the rewards of their own valour (and the penalties of their own cowardice, into the bargain).'

It will be seen that in this passage the author of the Hippocratean treatise finds an explanation, in the influence of the Social or Institutional Environment, not only (like Herodotus) for differences in military prowess, but also (like Hume) for differences in mental achievement. This tribute to the potency of the Social Environment is remarkable when it is remembered that it is made, as a parenthesis, in a treatise which is otherwise devoted to asserting the claims of the Physical or Climatic Environment—and this in an extreme form.

The climatic or regional explanation of differences in social *ethos* is likewise rejected, in favour of an institutional explanation, by C. F. Volney, apropos of the Egyptian fallāhin, in his *Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte pendant les Années 1783, 1784, et 1785* (Paris 1787, Desenne and Volland, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 177–86. In op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 422–51, the argument is taken up again by Volney in general terms and in explicit opposition to Montesquieu. On pp. 434–5 of this volume, Volney quotes the passage from the Hippocratean treatise which has been quoted in the present footnote, above. Turgot seems to refer to the same Hippocratean passage in the notes for his *Géographie Politique*. His comment is, 'Nécessité d'avoir épuisé les causes morales avant d'avoir droit d'assurer quelque chose de l'influence physique des climats' (*Œuvres de Turgot*, nouvelle édition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 616). This topic is expanded by Turgot—this time, like Volney after him, in explicit opposition to Montesquieu—in his *Plan de Deux Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* (op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 646–7).

that people enjoy the blessing of a free government'; and, after defending this thesis, he goes on to argue, in detail, 'that though the only proper nursery of these noble plants be a free state, yet may they be transplanted into any government; and that a republic is most favourable to the growth of the sciences, a civilized monarchy to that of the polite arts.'

In his exposition of the differentiating effect of social institutions upon the group-characters of the societies in which the different institutions respectively prevail, Hume shows the acumen that is to be expected of him. Yet, if his analysis ended here, it would carry us no farther than the point which we have reached in this Study as it is, without Hume's aid. For social institutions can only be regarded as a proximate, and never as an ultimate, cause of social conditions—and this for the simple reason that the institutions themselves are part and parcel of the conditions in question.

To take the cases in point, we may have succeeded in proving to our own satisfaction that a republican government is favourable, and a monarchical government inimical, to the display of military prowess or to the rise and progress of the arts and sciences. We may be able to point to an actual republican government which is patently producing the favourable effect in Attica, and to an actual monarchy which is patently failing to produce it in the Achaemenian Empire. But, when we have got thus far, we have still to discover how this momentous local diversity of political institutions itself has originated. Why, in the fifth century B.C., is the Syriac World united under a single universal monarchy, while the contemporary Hellenic Society is articulated into a multiplicity of tiny republics? Unless and until we can account for the antecedent differentiation of the differentiating institutions, we have accomplished no more than is accomplished by the people who seek to explain the diversity of *êthos* between fifth-century Athens and fifth-century Sparta by an antecedent diversity of Race.¹ Instead of having found a solution for our problem, we have merely pushed the unsolved problem backwards in Time from the present into the past.

Thus Hume's ascription of the differences in achievement between one society and another to corresponding differences in the several societies' respective institutions is inconclusive. As it happens, however, this is not Hume's last word on the problem under consideration; for we shall find, if we look closer, that Hume has not confined his inquiry to an examination of possible single differentiating factors: the Race-factor and the factors of Physical Environment and Social Environment and the like. He has also

¹ I. B (ii), pp. 25-6, and II. C (ii) (a) 1, pp. 244-5, above.

observed the play of the composite factor of Challenge-and-Response: a form of interaction or encounter which has come to our attention already in this Study, and will continue to occupy our attention throughout the second volume.

In his essay *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*, Hume has put his finger on a significant historical fact to which we have frequently made reference here already: namely, the fact that, in the Hellenic World, the political field was occupied by a multiplicity of local states before these were all eventually superseded, in the last chapter of Hellenic history, by the single universal state which we call the Roman Empire. Hume has also noticed that, in common contrast to the universality of the Roman Empire, a multiplicity of local states is the political structure of the post-Roman modern Western World, as it was the political structure of pre-Roman Hellas; and in the relationship between a number of communities which are each and all independent politically without being economically or culturally isolated from one another, he has divined the presence of an abundant source of life and growth.

'Nothing is more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning than a number of neighbouring and independent states connected together by commerce and policy. The emulation which naturally arises among those neighbouring states is an obvious source of improvement; but what I would chiefly insist on is the stop which such limited territories give both to power and to authority. . . . Where a number of neighbouring states have a great intercourse of arts and commerce, their mutual jealousy keeps them from receiving too lightly the law from each other in matters of taste and reasoning, and makes them examine every work of art with the greatest care and accuracy. The contagion of popular opinion spreads not so easily from one place to another. It readily receives a check in some state or other, where it concurs not with the prevailing prejudices. And nothing but Nature and Reason, or at least what bears them a strong resemblance, can force its way through all obstacles and unite the most rival nations into an esteem and admiration of it.

'Greece was a cluster of little principalities which soon became republics; and, being united both by their near neighbourhood and by the ties of the same language and interest, they entered into the closest intercourse of commerce and learning. . . . Each city produced its several artists and philosophers, who refused to yield the preference to those of the neighbouring republics; their contention and debates sharpened the wits of men; a variety of objects was presented to the judgement, while each challenged the preference to the rest; and the sciences, not being dwarfed by the restraint of authority, were enabled to make such considerable shoots as are even at this time the objects of our admiration.

'After the Roman Christian or Catholic Church had spread itself over

the Civilised World and had engrossed all the learning of the times—being really one large state within itself, and united under one head—this variety of sects immediately disappeared, and the Peripatetic Philosophy was alone admitted into all the schools, to the utter devaluation of every kind of learning. But, Mankind having at length thrown off this yoke, affairs are now returned nearly to the same situation as before, and Europe is at present a copy at large of what Greece was formerly a pattern in miniature. . . .

'If we consider the face of the globe, Europe, of all the four parts of the World, is the most broken by seas, rivers and mountains; and Greece of all countries of Europe. Hence these regions were naturally divided into several distinct governments. And hence the sciences arose in Greece, and Europe has been hitherto the most constant habitation of them.'¹

This diversity in unity and unity in diversity which, as Hume perceives, is characteristic both of Greece in the Hellenic World and of Europe in the Western World in a certain phase of their respective histories, is life-giving to the whole society because each part is constantly presenting challenges to the other parts and is thereby constantly provoking creative responses. And the converse of this truth is the relative deadness of societies that are consolidated into universal churches or universal states: a condition in which, *ex hypothesi*, the stimulus of multiplicity and variety and emulation is absent. Hume perceives that this is true not only of the Catholic Christian universal church but also of the universal state which was stifling the Far Eastern World in Hume's own day.

'In China there seems to be a pretty considerable stock of politeness and science, which in the course of so many centuries might naturally be expected to ripen into something more perfect and finished than what has yet arisen from them. But China is one vast empire, speaking one language, governed by one law, and sympathising in the same manners. The authority of any teacher, such as Confucius, was propagated easily from one corner of the Empire to the other. None had courage to resist the torrent of popular opinion; and posterity was not bold enough to dispute what had been universally received by their

¹ Hume: *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*. The same idea appears, in a more nebulous form, in Turgot's *Second Discours sur les Progrès Successifs de l'Esprit Humain*, which was delivered at the Sorbonne on the 11th December 1750 (see *Œuvres de Turgot*, nouvelle édition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 602-3). Cf. Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 181. See also Headlam-Morley, J. W.: 'The Cultural Unity of Western Europe', in *The New Past*, ed. by Carter, E. H. (Oxford 1925, Blackwell). In this essay, Headlam-Morley points out (pp. 88-9) that the political pluralism of the Western World has made possible an immense variety of political experimentation; and (p. 93) that 'the political history of the Continent is marked . . . first by the absence of any kind of formal unity; secondly, by the presence of a real underlying unity, which belongs to the spirit and the intellect'. Apropos of the modern Western culture-languages, 'we may say that they were merely dialects, through which the common ideas and common thoughts found a varied expression' (p. 95).

ancestors. This seems to be one natural reason why the sciences have made so slow a progress in that mighty Empire.¹

If Hume had pursued his inquiry into Sinic and Far Eastern history, he would have found that the Continental Far Eastern Universal State which was embodied, in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, in the Manchu Empire was the ghost of a previous Sinic Universal State—the Empire of Ts'in and Han²—a ghost which had been conjured up in the sixth century of the Christian Era and had continued to haunt the Far Eastern World ever since. And if he had then transported himself in imagination backwards through time into the age of the Han, and, from that age, had looked before and after over the course of Sinic and Far Eastern history, he would have found himself gazing, *mutatis mutandis*, at the historical landscape with which he was already familiar, nearer home, in ancient Hellas and in the modern West. In the Sinic, as in the Hellenic, World he would have watched the rise and progress of the arts and sciences being stimulated by the mutual emulation of 'a cluster of little principalities', to be checked at last when this variety was swallowed up in the uniformity of a single universal state. The history of Sinic philosophy ends at the moment when the Sinic universal state comes into existence, just as the history of Hellenic philosophy comes to an end upon the foundation of the Roman Empire. But it was also true in the Far East that, 'Mankind having thrown off this yoke, affairs . . . returned nearly to the same situation as before'; for the interregnum which followed the fall of the Empire of the Han was succeeded by an outburst of fresh life—first in the field of Art and afterwards in the field of Philosophy—until this delicate flower of Far Eastern culture prematurely withered under the blighting influence of the Far Eastern *imperium redivivum* of the Sui and the T'ang and the Sung and the Ming and the Ts'ing.

Hume's study of Sinic and Hellenic history did enable him, however, to apprehend the social value of the impulse to sweep away the debris of dead or moribund civilizations: an impulse which we shall have occasion to examine, at a later stage of our own Study, under the name of Futurism.³

'I have sometimes been inclined to think that interruptions in the periods of learning, were they not attended with such a destruction of ancient books and the records of history, would be rather favourable to the arts and sciences by breaking the progress of authority and dethroning the tyrannical usurpers over human reason. In this particular, they

¹ Hume: *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*.

² See I. C (i) (b), pp. 88-9, above.

³ For the futurist state of mind, as one of the normal psychological phenomena of the disintegrations of civilizations, see V. C (i) (d) 9, vol. vi, pp. 97-132, below.

have the same influence as interruptions in political governments and societies. Consider the blind submission of the ancient philosophers to the several masters in each school and you will be convinced that little good could be expected from a hundred centuries of such a servile philosophy.¹

From these passages in Hume's essay *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*, it is apparent that the penetrating mind of this eighteenth-century Western philosopher had gone far towards divining the fundamental as well as the superficial factors in the geneses and growths and breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations.

The writer has received the following observations on II. C (ii) (a) 2 from Mr. Sydney Herbert of the University College of Wales:

'In your discussion of the Environment-theory in Vol. I you make a very striking comparison between human groups living in the steppes of different parts of the World. You contrast the Nomads of Eurasia and Afrasia with the peoples of "other areas in the World which offer environments for Nomad societies" (p. 255), and you argue that the theory breaks down because these peoples did not, in fact, produce "independent Nomadic societies of their own". I do not contest the general justice of your view, but I suggest that, so far as one of the human groups in question is concerned, the comparison fails because its environment differed markedly from those of the other groups. I refer to the Indians of the North American Prairies.

"These Indians, as you say, remained "on the primitive hunting and food-gathering level of economy to the end". I suggest that the reasons for their failure to develop Nomadism are to be found in their environment.

'(a) The Indians had at hand a source of food that was practically inexhaustible, viz., the buffalo. This not only gave them food but a great range of other necessary commodities. "The great, almost the sole, basis for Indian life lay in the immense, countless herds of buffalo . . . the buffalo herds meant sustenance of many kinds and products for trade.' (Brebner: *The Explorers of North America*, p. 332.) This source of subsistence was not seriously affected till the commercial exploitation of the buffalo was taken up by white men in the nineteenth century. The Indian, therefore, was not subjected to a challenge from his environment sufficient to induce him to change his hunting economy.

'(b) Had a sufficient reason, e.g. the disappearance of the buffalo, arisen to confront him with the need for change, he would not have been able to develop Nomadism because his environment did not include any animal capable of use for riding and pack-carrying. The Spaniards took the horse and the donkey to America, and the Indian could not have acquired either from them before the middle of the sixteenth century.

¹ Hume: *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*.

According to Brebner (p. 345) the Indians wore out horses quickly and were for long unable to breed them; as late as the eighteenth century they seem to have relied largely on trade with the Spaniards to obtain them. But by that date the Indian's independent career was already coming to an end.

'I suggest, therefore, that the Indian could not, in any event, have developed Nomadism on the Eurasian or Afrasian models, because his environment did not provide him with the necessary instrument. Had the buffalo failed him, he would have had to fall back on agriculture, of which he had some knowledge. His development then would have been along the same lines as those of the Transcaspian people whom you describe in Vol. III, p. 8.'

Additional Note on the Annex to I. C (iii) (e)

Mr. E. F. Carritt, of University College, Oxford, has been kind enough to communicate to the writer a criticism on the thesis of this Annex, to the following effect:

'The difficulty I find in this arises fundamentally from the assumption that the methods correspond to (and I think, to be consistent, you ought to say: are in the end only distinguishable by) three different subject matters—just as I think Plato was wrong in trying to distinguish capacities not only (as he should) by *ὁ ἀπεργάζεται* but also by *ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται*. If I have had three illnesses, may I not (i) write a diary of each, with temperature charts, &c.; (ii) by comparison and inductive methods endeavour to understand their causes and laws; (iii) write a lyric on each?

'I do not feel that your distinction of the methods by quantitative differences of the subject matter is convincing. We may record things that are very numerous: e.g. millions of criminal finger-prints. We may deal scientifically with very scarce things—e.g. comets—or very frequent things: e.g. embryos, excretion. We may deal artistically with very rare things—e.g. Robinson Crusoe's solitude or Keats' reading of Chapman—more easily than with very common ones: e.g. excretion.

'These attempts at discrediting your conclusion are all directed to urging that really we have three distinguishable activities, never, perhaps, separately exercised: (1) sense perception and memory, (2) thought, (3) "imagination". (1) has for its subjects real things or events in their individuality; (2) has the *same* things in their universal connexions; (3) uses the *same* things (objects seen, felt, tasted, smelt or heard—including words as names of them) to "express" or "embody" human feelings. Obviously, all "books" do all of these. A "history book" or portrait or historical novel will do most of (1), a "science book" most of (2), a "poetry book" or "romantic painting" or music-score most of (3).'

*Civilization and Agriculture: An Additional Note
on II. C (ii) (a) 2 and II. C (ii) (b) 2*

The following criticisms, which mainly relate to these two

chapters, are taken from a letter which Dr. Ellsworth Huntington has been so kind as to send to the writer:

'My main criticisms deal with geographical interpretation. For example, the Jordan river is discussed as if it afforded unused possibilities for agriculture like those of the Nile or Euphrates. Such does not seem to me to be the case. To-day the Jordan river flows in a deep, narrow channel and has very little in the way of a flood plain. At none of the four points where I have crossed the river did I see any indication of the kind of floods which would favour a development like that of the Nile. Moreover, the soil is largely saline. The valley may, to be sure, have been different under the climatic conditions of earlier times, but even then it does not seem to me comparable to the Nile and Euphrates.

'A similar case occurs in the discussion of the Andean Civilization. As I understand it, the oldest civilization in the Andean region grew up on the low, desert coastal plain of Peru. There the floods on the alluvial fans and in the alluvial valleys at the base of the Andes appear to have afforded much the same challenge—and, I would add, much the same opportunity—as the Nile and Euphrates. Civilization appears to have grown up there in much the same way as in the Euphrates Valley. Then it spread to the highlands and there persisted, just as the Babylonian culture swept up into the highlands of Persia.

'Another query pertaining to rivers arises in regard to China. It seems to me somewhat misleading to compare a protected and relatively warm valley such as that of the Wei in latitude 35° with a far colder and vastly more rigorous valley 15° farther north, in the Amur region. The mean temperature at Si-an is about 32° in January and 78° in July, whereas on the Amur at Blagoveshchenk there are 46° of frost in January and a July temperature of about 70° . To a geographer this seems so great a difference that the two places are not comparable.

'I may be wrong, and I have not looked the matter up since reading your book, but my conception of the origin of agriculture in China does not make it a response to the floods of the Hwang-ho. I had supposed that those were too great a problem for men in the early stages of human culture. Were not the early Chinese agriculturists located on the flood plains of small streams coming out of the mountains and tributary to the Hwang-ho? In other words, the conditions appear to have been similar to those which fostered the development of the early Mexican and Peruvian cultures: namely, summer rain with floods from small streams spreading over alluvial plains.

'In this connection let me add something else. Are we justified in assuming that agriculture arose in the lowland areas occupied by the Mayas? In this respect I have had to change my own former opinion. Recent investigations seem to show abundant traces of a high culture in the relatively dry highlands in Guatemala as well as Mexico. There, as in each of the other places where agriculture developed very early, seasonal floods are accompanied or followed by a period of warmth during which crops can grow.

'In your discussion of the origins of Civilization have you not perhaps

been fearful of attributing too much to a single cause? It looks to me as if the early development of agriculture occurred in every case under essentially the same conditions. The Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates, the Indus, the branches of the Hwang-ho, the piedmont Peruvian streams, and the small rivers of the North American highlands, from Guatemala to New Mexico, all seem to present the same general situation—that is, flood plains where agriculture was feasible for primitive people.

‘I do not think that Crete should be brought into this same group. My own interpretation is that the riverine areas just mentioned form a distinct group. From each of these groups primitive civilization spread out into different habitats. Egypt, for instance, presumably gave agriculture to Crete, whereupon the presence of the sea and its challenge led to a new development. Similarly the Tigris-Euphrates Civilization penetrated the Persian highlands and was correspondingly modified. The Indus type spread to the wetter parts of India. In China the early valley type ultimately became strong enough and skilful enough to cope with the far more tremendous floods of the Hwang-ho. In South America, again, Peruvian agriculture spread from the lowlands into the comparatively cold highlands where life was more difficult. In North America, on the contrary, the highlands, being lower than in South America, were the regions where agriculture was feasible and yet difficult enough, so that the region offered a real challenge to Man, stimulating but not defeating him. Later, having acquired skill in the highlands, he was able to go down into the low, tropical forest and meet the far greater challenge of still another type of environment.’

In view of Dr. Huntington’s great authority, and of the interest of the questions which he here raises, the writer may perhaps allow himself to make some comment on certain particular points and on one matter of general importance.

As regards the question of the comparability or incomparability of the Jordan Valley with the Nile Valley and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, the writer accepts Dr. Huntington’s judgement as against that of Professor Eduard Meyer, whose special knowledge and intuition did not lie in the climatological field and who did not, as far as the writer knows, ever make a first-hand study of the Jordan Valley on the spot. If the Jordan Valley has to be ruled out as a possible site for one of the ‘fluvial’ civilizations, and if the ‘fluvial’ civilization of the Indus Valley proves to have arisen independently of the ‘fluvial’ civilization of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley (see vol. i, pp. 107–8 and 257–8 and 416–23), and if the oasis civilization of Transcaspia proves to have arisen independently, in its turn, of the ‘fluvial’ civilization of the Indus Valley (see vol. iii, p. 9), then we may find ourselves left with no example in the Old World of a cultivable river-valley in a dry climate which did not become the seat of an agricultural civilization; yet even then we shall still be

able to cite our examples from the New World—the valleys of the Rio Grande and the Colorado River in the South-Western United States (see vol. i, p. 258)—in support of our contention that a particular type of physical environment which happens to provide the cradle for a civilization in some instances will not necessarily be found to perform this role invariably.

As regards the original home of the Andean Civilization, Dr. Huntington has put his finger upon an inconsistency between certain passages in this Study. As far as the writer is competent to form any opinion on the archaeological and physiographical evidence, he agrees with Dr. Huntington in believing that the Andean Civilization arose on the coastal plain, and that, in its second home on the plateau, it was not an original creation but was an importation from its coastal place of origin. This view is stated in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 121-3, and again in II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 33-4. On the other hand, in II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, pp. 258-9, the plateau is credited with being the original home of the Andean Civilization, and in II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 321-3, it is assumed that the plateau and the coast were twin cradles of the Andean Civilization and that they were of approximately equal importance. These two last passages require correction; but perhaps such correction will not invalidate the particular argument that is presented in each of the passages in question. The purpose of the second passage (vol. i, pp. 321-3) was to show that the Andean Civilization arose in a harsh environment, and Dr. Huntington does not dispute the contention that the Andean Coastal Plain comes within this category as well as the Andean Plateau. The purpose of the former passage (vol. i, pp. 258-9) was to show that the type of physical environment which provided the cradle for a civilization in Equatorial America did not provide the cradle for a civilization in Equatorial Africa. Certainly, if the Andean Plateau was only a secondary seat of the Andean Civilization, the contrast which we have sought to draw between the social history of the Andean Plateau and that of the East African highlands turns out to be beside the point, since the East African highlands have, as we have pointed out, eventually been occupied, likewise, by civilizations that have originated elsewhere. The question then arises whether, in the African analogue of Equatorial America, there is any region which corresponds physiographically to the plain that lies between the Andean Plateau and the shore of the Pacific Ocean. Perhaps we may find an analogy in the lowlands that lie between the Abyssinian Plateau and the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea; for this, too, is a desert region across which the rivers that descend from the plateau make—or

just fail to make—their way to the coast. If there is any validity in this comparison, then it duly illustrates our contention that a particular type of physical environment which provides the cradle for a civilization in some instances will not necessarily be found to perform this role invariably; for in the happy hunting grounds of the Somali and the Danakil we shall search in vain for the equivalent of a Chimu or a Nazca.

As regards the question whether the actual present state of the Ussuri Valley is comparable to the hypothetical primeval state of the original home of the Sinic Civilization (vol. i, pp. 320-1), the writer of this Study would point out that he was not, as Dr. Huntington assumes, proposing to compare the Ussuri Valley with the Wei Valley, since he has followed Maspéro (see the passage quoted in vol. i, pp. 318-20) in taking the view that the original home of the Sinic Civilization lay, not in the Wei and Fen valleys, but in the North China plain. The northern end of this plain, in the neighbourhood of Tientsin, to which Maspéro, in the passage quoted, is expressly referring, lies only about 5° south of Lake Khanka, and the winter on the Pei-ho, while not comparable in severity to that on the Ussuri (as the writer knows from having tasted both in quick succession at the turn of the years 1929 and 1930), is quite as severe as the winter on the North European plain, while on the other hand the summer on the Ussuri is surprisingly hot (see vol. i, p. 321). If we further take into account the probability that the neighbourhood of Tientsin, like the neighbourhood of Winnipeg, was considerably harsher in its climate before it was brought under cultivation than it is to-day, the difference in original climate between the two places that are compared in the passage in question may prove to be not so extreme as Dr. Huntington suggests. At the same time, the writer will readily admit that his comparison of the Yellow River Basin with the Amur Basin—and, for that matter, his comparison of Egypt with the Upper Nile Valley—is climatologically imperfect. In fact, he has made the admission, in principle, at the beginning of the second volume (vol. ii, pp. 2-3), and he has taken this as the starting-point for the inquiry in II. D (i).

In regard to the question whether the fathers of the Sinic Civilization served their apprenticeship in harnessing the Yellow River himself, or whether they practised first upon his less formidable tributaries, the writer is prepared to accept Dr. Huntington's view—which is presumably no less applicable to the history of the harnessing of the Nile and the Indus and the Tigris and Euphrates.

The writer also agrees with Dr. Huntington in feeling that the

distinctive feature of the genesis of the Minoan Civilization is a response to the challenge of the Sea; and he is prepared to believe that the fathers of the Minoan Civilization brought with them to Crete a technique of agriculture which had previously been invented in Egypt. He has already followed Myres in the view that the first human inhabitants of Crete came from some part of the dying Afrasian grasslands that was in the vicinity of the Lower Nile Valley (see vol. i, p. 328).

Dr. Huntington's tidings of new archaeological discoveries in the home and hinterlands of the Mayan Civilization are tantalizing. Our archaeological knowledge in this field has hitherto been so fragmentary that any scholar who has attempted to make use of it must have been conscious that his hypothetical structures might be upset any day by a radical reconstruction of their foundations. It is manifestly possible that the lowlands of Northern Guatemala may prove, after all, not to have been the Mayan Civilization's original home; and if this civilization did prove to have originated either on the highlands overhanging the Pacific coast of Central America or else on the Mexican Plateau, then, no doubt, its origins might turn out to have a different bearing from that which the writer has believed them to have upon the problem of the geneses of civilizations.

Much turns upon the sense in which the culture that is coming to light in these hinterlands of the 'First Empire' of the Mayas is to be described as 'high'. Do these latest archaeological discoveries indicate that the spiritual and artistic and intellectual accomplishments of the Mayan Civilization, as we can infer these from the monuments of the 'First Empire', had already been anticipated by forerunners in these other regions? Or do they merely tell us that, before the Mayan Civilization, as we have known it hitherto, arose on the plains of Northern Guatemala, there were communities in these neighbouring, and less forbidding, regions who were conversant with the technique of agriculture? In the first of these two possible alternative cases, the new archaeological discoveries may throw new light upon the geneses of civilizations; in the second, the illumination might perhaps touch little or nothing beyond the origins of agriculture.

In regard to the origins of agriculture, Dr. Huntington has arrived at the most interesting conclusion that this wonderful piece of human technique has been invented 'in every case under essentially the same conditions'—the fundamental condition being the presence of 'flood plains where agriculture was feasible for primitive people'. A living instance of this kind of agriculture is the agriculture that is practised by the Hadendoa tribesmen in the

Taka country of Upper Nubia, to the north of the Atbara tributary of the Nile, as this is described by Burckhardt in a passage cited by Newberry (see vol. i, pp. 308-9). We may observe that the Hadendoa have remained almost as primitive down to the present day as they may be presumed to have been when they first took to this form of agriculture—some five or six thousand years ago—at the time when it was also taken to by the fathers of the Egyptian Civilization; and this observation brings us to the matter of general importance which Dr. Huntington's letter raises: namely, the relation between agriculture and civilization. Surely the invention of agriculture, which is a piece of technique, is something quite distinct from the genesis of a civilization, which is a condition of the soul.

Of course the technical invention and the spiritual mutation might turn out, on an empirical survey, to go together in every known case; but, as a matter of fact, there is more to be said, on the evidence, for the view that the invention of agriculture is always prior to the genesis of a civilization; is not bound to lead on to it; is not an invariable or indispensable preliminary to it; and may actually be relegated to a subordinate role, or even abandoned altogether, as part of that response to a challenge through which a civilization is eventually brought to birth.

In another connexion (in I. C (iii) (b) Annex, vol. i, pp. 436-9, above), we have noticed that agriculture was an element both in 'the Archaic Culture' of the New World which was apparently the common ground of the Mayan and Andean civilizations and in the Afrasian intermediary culture which was apparently the common ground, in the same sense, of 'the Indus Culture' and the Sumeric, Egyptian, and Minoan civilizations. On the other hand, the fathers of the Eskimo Civilization raised themselves above the primitive level without ever taking to agriculture or ceasing to gain their livelihood by hunting (see vol. iii, pp. 4-7). Conversely, there have been communities like the Hadendoa which have duly taken to agriculture—in this instance perhaps at an early date—without ever having entered upon the path of Civilization. Again, the fathers of the Minoan Civilization subordinated their old technique of agriculture to their new technique of seamanship when they created the Minoan Civilization by responding to the challenge of the Sea; and the fathers of the Nomadic Civilization actually abandoned an agriculture which they have previously practised, when they created the Nomadic Civilization by responding to the challenge of the Steppe (see vol. iii, pp. 11-14). Even in the cases of those civilizations in which agriculture was retained as the master-technique, the creation of the civilization and the invention of

agriculture are separate events which are clearly distinguishable, as Dr. Huntington himself points out. This is clear, for example, in the case of the Sinic Civilization, if Maspéro is right in his view that the Sinic Civilization was created by Man's conquest of the Hwang-ho, and Huntington right in his view that in this region agriculture had been invented previously—not on the Yellow River himself, but on his tributaries. Similarly, we may still equate the creation of the Mayan Civilization with Man's conquest of the tropical forest of Northern Guatemala, and not with the previous invention of agriculture on the adjoining highlands—even if this previous invention be demonstrated by the progress of archaeological discovery.


On this showing, the writer is ready to agree with Dr. Huntington in believing that the technique of agriculture has been invented everywhere under more or less uniform conditions, but is at the same time inclined to retain his own belief (see vol. i, p. 438) in the essential diversity of the challenges and responses that have resulted in the geneses of civilizations.



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A STUDY OF HISTORY

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'Work . . . while it is day . . .'

JOHN IX. 4

'Nox ruit, Aenea . . .'

AENEID VI. 539

'Thought shall be the harder,
Heart the keener,
Mood shall be the more,
As our might lessens.'

THE LAY OF THE BATTLE OF MALDON



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
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D. THE RANGE OF CHALLENGE-AND-RESPONSE

I. ΧΑΛΕΠΙΑ ΤΑ ΚΑΛΑ

The Return of Nature

WE have now studied the action of Challenge-and-Response and have attempted to survey the role which challenges and responses have played in the genešes of civilizations. In embarking upon this survey, we have implicitly rejected the view that civilizations are apt to be generated in environments—physical or human—which offer unusually easy conditions of life to Man. This view is popularly held, or at any rate widely aired, in the modern Western World, though it is contradicted by the theory of our modern Western Physical Science as well as by the deeper intuition of Mankind which has found expression in the Mythology of various societies in various ages.¹ In the course of the survey which we have just concluded, we have ignored this false view; but we may find that, besides implicitly rejecting it, we have also indirectly refuted it by exposing the fallacy on which it is founded.

This fallacy springs from a failure to conceive the genesis of a civilization as an act of creation involving a process of change in Time. The final appearance of the scene, as it looks when the drama of genesis has been played to the finish, is thoughtlessly equated with the primitive appearance of the same scene in the prehistoric age before the site was taken in hand by Man to serve as the stage for a great human action. For example,

'we are accustomed to regard Egypt as a paradise, as the most fertile country in the World, where, if we but scratch the soil and scatter seed, we have only to await and gather the harvest. The Greeks spoke of Egypt as the most fit place for the first generations of men, for there, they said, food was always ready at hand, and it took no labour to secure an abundant supply.'²

The fallacy of this view is pointed out by the distinguished archaeologist who has formulated it in these sentences in order to refute it. His refutation is presented in the latter part of a passage which has already been quoted, in the preceding chapter of this Study, at greater length.

'There can be no doubt', he goes on to say, 'that the Egypt of to-day is a very different place from the Egypt of pre-agricultural times. . . .

¹ For this contrary scientific and mythological *Weltanschauung*, see above, II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, *passim*.

² Newberry, *op. cit.* in II. C (ii) (b) 2, above, vol. i, p. 306.

The agricultural Egypt of modern times is as much a gift of Man as it is of the Nile.¹

In fact, the fallacious popular view entirely overlooks the stupendous human effort involved, not only in once transforming the prehistoric jungle-swamp of the Lower Nile Valley into the historical Land of Egypt, but also in perpetually preventing this magnificent but precarious work of men's hands from reverting to its primeval state of Nature.

What this state of Nature was, we have indicated, in the two instances of the Land of Egypt and the Land of Shinar, by citing² first-hand descriptions of the present state of certain other sections of the Nile Valley and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley which have remained, down to this day, in the primitive condition out of which Egypt was conjured up in the Lower Nile Valley by the fathers of the Egyptian Civilization and Shinar by the fathers of the Sumerian Civilization in what used to be the Lower Tigris-Euphrates Valley before the present provinces of Basrah and 'Arabistan were built out into the Persian Gulf by the progressive deposit of alluvium during the last five or six thousand years. The present state of the Bahr-al-Jabal section of the Nile Valley³ and of the 'Amārah-Nāsiriyyah-Basrah triangle in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley⁴ testifies to the feat which was performed by the pioneers who, some five or six thousand years ago, succeeded in transforming similar tracts of inhospitable jungle-swamp, out of all recognition, into an ordered network of dykes and fields, where soil and water are subject to human control for the service of human purposes. The view that civilizations are begotten in environments where the conditions are unusually easy is clearly shown to be untenable when we compare those howling wildernesses, which reproduce, in their virgin state to-day, the primeval state of Egypt and Shinar, with the actual state of Egypt and Shinar as we see it to-day side by side with the Bahr-al-Jabal and with the swamps in which the Tigris and Euphrates lose themselves below 'Amārah and Nāsiriyyah. At the same time, just because the works of Man which have effaced the primeval state of Nature in the Lower Nile Valley and in the Lower Tigris-Euphrates Valley are still 'going concerns', we cannot observe the primeval state of Nature here directly. We have to be content with the reflections of it which we can discern in the watery mirrors of the Bahr-al-Jabal and the 'Amārah-Nāsiriyyah-Basrah triangle; and though the scientific student may feel morally

¹ Newberry, *op. cit.*, quoted in vol. i, pp. 306 and 308, above. For the celebrated aphorism of Herodotus, to which Professor Newberry takes exception in the second sentence here quoted, see footnote 2 on p. 252 in II. C (ii) (a) 2, in vol. i, above.

² In II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 309-12 and 316-18, above.

³ See vol. i, pp. 309-12, above.

⁴ See vol. i, pp. 316-18, above.

certain, in his own mind, that these surviving reflections give a fair picture of the long-obliterated originals, he must be prepared to find the layman declaring, like doubting Thomas, that only direct observation will convince him.

Are there theatres of civilization, other than Egypt and Shinar, which can provide the layman with the direct evidence which he demands and which Egypt and Shinar cannot give him? Yes, there are, for the human feat of maintaining Egypt and Shinar as 'going concerns'—a feat only less remarkable than the original feat of creating them—is something exceptional. In general it is true that 'naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurrit'.¹ At various times and places, recalcitrant Nature, once broken in by human heroism, has broken loose again because later generations have ceased for some reason to keep up the constant exertions required of them in order to maintain the mastery which had been won for them and transmitted to them by the pioneers. In such cases of reversion, the primeval state of Nature, as it was before Man ever took it in hand, can be seen to-day—not merely in the mirror of some similar piece of Nature which has happened to remain in its virgin state—but by direct observation on the very spot which has temporarily been the scene of a signal human achievement. Such spectacles, in which the primeval state of Nature and the subsequent works of Man and the eventual reversion of Nature to her primeval state are all displayed together on one spot like geological strata, are certainly more striking, as visual demonstrations, than the spectacle—striking though this is—of the contrast between the present state of Egypt and the present state of the Bahr-al-Jabal, in which the two objects that have to be brought into simultaneous focus lie a thousand miles apart. Where Nature has actually reasserted her ascendancy over some spot that has once been the birth-place of a civilization or the scene of some other signal human achievement, it is impossible to behold Nature flaunting her ultimate triumph over these works of Man and still to doubt that here, at any rate, the conditions in which those human works were performed were not unusually easy but unusually difficult. We will therefore try to clinch our argument by passing a few instances of such reversions under review.

In Central America

One remarkable instance is the present state of the birth-place of the Mayan Civilization. Far different from the dykes and fields of Egypt and Shinar, which are still being kept in order by Man and

¹ Horace, *Epistles*, Book I, Ep. x, l. 24.

still duly serving his purpose in yielding him a livelihood, the works of the Mayas are no longer 'going concerns' to-day. Their sole surviving monuments are the ruins of the immense and magnificently decorated public buildings which now stand, far away from any present human habitations, in the depths of the tropical forest. The forest, like some sylvan boa-constrictor, has literally swallowed them up, and now it is dismembering them at its leisure: prising their fine-hewn, close-laid stones apart with its writhing roots and tendrils. The contrast between the present aspect of the country and the aspect which it must have worn when the Mayan Civilization was in being is so great that it is almost beyond imagination.¹ There must have been a time when these immense public buildings stood in the heart of large and populous cities, and when those cities lay in the midst of vast stretches of cultivated land which furnished them with their food-supplies. The masterpieces of Mayan architecture which are now being strangled by the forest must have been built as works of super-erogation with the surplus of an energy which, for leagues around, had already transformed the forest into fruitful fields. They were trophies of Man's victory over Nature; and, at the moment when they were raised, the retreating fringe of the vanquished and routed sylvan enemy was perhaps barely visible on the horizon, even from the highest platforms of the palaces or from the summits of the temple-pyramids. To the human beings who looked out over the World from those vantage-points then, the victory of Man over Nature must have seemed utterly secure; and the transitoriness of human achievements and the vanity of human wishes are poignantly exposed by the ultimate return of the forest, engulfing first the fields and then the houses, and finally the palaces and the temples themselves. Yet that is not the most significant or even the most obvious lesson to be learnt from the present state of Copan or Tikal or Palenque. The ruins speak still more eloquently of the intensity of the struggle with the physical environment which the creators of the Mayan Civilization must have waged victoriously in their day. In her very revenge, which reveals her in all her gruesome power, Tropical Nature testifies unwillingly to the courage and the vigour of the men who once, if only for a season, succeeded in putting her to flight and keeping her at bay.²

¹ The imaginative feat of conveying this contrast in words has been accomplished by Mr. Rudyard Kipling in his description of 'the Cold Lairs': a fictitious Hindu city which the Indian Jungle has swallowed up. (Read the story called 'Kaa's Hunting' in *The Jungle Book*.)

² Dr. Ellsworth Huntington suggests that the Nature whom the fathers of the Mayan Civilization once put to flight was a different (and less formidable) antagonist from the Nature who has since got the better of these men's descendants in the selfsame region. For Dr. Huntington's hypothesis of a periodic shifting of climatic zones, see II. D (vii), Annex I, below.

In Ceylon

With the same dumb eloquence, the creeper-covered ruins of Angkor Wat testify to the prowess of the men who once propagated the Hindu Civilization on soil conquered from the tropical forest of Cambodia; and the equally arduous feat of conquering the parched plains of Ceylon for agriculture is commemorated in the breached bunds and overgrown floors of the tanks which were once constructed on the wet side of the hill-country, on a colossal scale, by the Sinhalese converts to the Indic religion of the Hinayana.

'To realise how such tanks came into being one must know something of the history of Lanka. The idea underlying the system was simple but very great. It was intended by the tank-building kings that none of the rain which fell in such abundance in the mountains should reach the sea without paying tribute to Man on the way.

'In the middle of the southern half of Ceylon is a wide mountain zone, but to the east and north dry plains cover thousands of square miles, and at present are very sparsely populated. In the height of the monsoon, when armies of storm-swept clouds rush on day after day to match their strength against the hills, there is a line drawn by Nature that the rains are unable to pass. . . . There are points where the line of demarcation of the two zones, the wet and the dry, is so narrow that within a mile one seems to pass into a new country; for the whole character of the forest alters, and in size and kind and distribution the trees differ completely from those one can still see behind one. The wild flowers take new forms and colours; different birds sing in the bushes; cultivation changes abruptly; and wealth ends. The line curves from sea to sea and appears to be stable and unaffected by the operations of Man, such as felling forests.'

Yet the missionaries of the Indic Civilization in Ceylon once achieved the *tour de force* of compelling the monsoon-smitten highlands—where 'rain pours down at a higher rate for the month than the rainfall of London for the whole of a very wet year'²—to give water and life and wealth to the plains which Nature had condemned to lie parched and desolate.

'Hill streams were tapped and their water guided into the giant storage-tanks below, some of them four thousand acres in extent; and, from those, channels ran on to other large tanks farther from the hills, and from them to others still more remote. And below each great tank and each great channel were hundreds of little tanks, each the nucleus of a village; all, in the long-run, fed from the wet mountain-zone. So gradually the ancient Sinhalese conquered all, or nearly all, of the plains that are now so empty of men.'

The arduousness of the labour of first conquering and then

¹ Still, John: *The Jungle Tide* (Edinburgh 1930, Blackwood), pp. 74-5.

² Still, op. cit., p. 74.

³ Still, op. cit., pp. 76-7.

holding for a man-made civilization these naturally barren and desolate plains is demonstrated by the two outstanding features in the landscape of Ceylon at the present day. The first feature is the relapse of that once irrigated and cultivated and populated countryside into its primeval barrenness and desolation upon the stoppage of the continuous human exertions which had been required in order to produce and maintain this miraculous transformation of the face of Nature.¹ The second feature is the avoidance of these derelict plains, which were once the seat of a civilization, by our modern Western coffee and tea and rubber planters who have come to Ceylon to make their fortunes there in these latter days.

On the first of these two points, the following testimony is borne by the modern Western eyewitness whom we have quoted already:

'The tank age endured for more than fifteen centuries, and then the jungle tide rose over it and all signs or memory of it became lost. . . . In the forest which covers the ancient kingdom, far from the sounds of men, one comes upon the bunds of tanks, now utterly forgotten, where the banks have given way and the beds become like natural glades for deer to graze in. . . .

'I know [a] city . . . [which] lies below the bund of an enormous tank whose area may well have been thousands of acres, for the bund is miles long. But now the very name of the tank is lost, for the bund burst hundreds of years ago and its bed is but a low-lying region in the unbroken forest, a deeper area amid the sea of trees. The only name it now bears is a Tamil one meaning Tank of the Great Breach. At a waterhole in a rock in the bed of that tank I saw a bear stoop and drink, and it was curious to think how he sought for that small hole of stagnant water, as for a rare treasure, in a place that for many centuries was at the bottom of an inland sea where waves broke and pelicans sailed in fleets. More than anything else, it brought home to me most vividly how brief had been the age of tanks in the long history of the jungle. For a million years animals drank from that narrow hole; then, for a thousand years, the rock, hole and all, was underneath the waves; and now the jungle drinks again where animals drank when Man used stone arrowheads, and before he invented them, and before Nature invented him.'²

The second feature in the present landscape of Ceylon which demonstrates the arduousness of the feat which the ancient

¹ The cause of the breakdown of the ancient Sinhalese irrigation system was an incessant civil war which was waged with alien mercenaries from Southern India. These mercenaries deliberately cut the canals and breached the bunds as a short cut to military decisions; and eventually this will to destroy overcame the will to repair. Therewith, the plains not only went out of cultivation through the stoppage of the water-supply, but they also became hot-beds of malaria when the running waters dwindled into stagnant pools which were too shallow to harbour the fish that live by eating up the anopheles mosquito's larvae. (Still, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-92.) For the role of War in the breakdowns of civilizations, see Part IV, *passim*, in vol. iv. and especially IV. C (iii) (b) 3; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (?); and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (x) and (β), below.

² Still, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 and 79 and 111-12.

Sinhalese bund-builders temporarily accomplished is the avoidance of the derelict plains by our modern Western planters who have interested themselves in Ceylon not in order to propagate a civilization there but in order to get rich quick.

'It is a curious fact that . . . the bulk of the population and most of the wealth have been found on the wet side of the line during the four centuries of European rule. . . . To make money, one stays as a rule on the wet side, but to see the ruins of temples or monasteries, of palaces or engineering works, one must go to the dry side of the line.¹ . . . For the hills where we grow tea and rubber [the ancient Sinhalese] did not care. Few ancient remains are to be found among them, and the forests we found there, and destroyed, were of immense age and probably of true virgin growth. . . . Must one be ranked as opposed to civilization if one prefers the dry and thinly populated side of the monsoon's frontier to the prosperous and wet one? That is a question I find it impossible to answer without first settling what the word "civilization" means.'²

The irrefutable testimony of the return of Nature is repeated even where there are no stupendous ruins to work upon our imagination. We may perceive it in the last agonies of the poor village in the jungle—as witness the following passage from a modern Western work of fiction in which the scene of action is likewise Ceylon:

'The years had brought more evil, death and decay upon the village. . . . Disease and hunger visited it year after year. It seemed, as the headman said, to have been forgotten by gods and men. Year after year, the rains from the north-east passed it by; only the sun beat down more pitilessly, and the wind roared over it across the jungle; the little patches of chena crop which the villagers tried to cultivate withered as soon as the young shoots showed above the ground. No man, traveller or headman or trader, ever came to the village now. No one troubled any longer to clear the track which led to it; the jungle covered it and cut the village off. . . .

'They struggled hard against the fate that hung over them, clinging to the place where they had been born and lived, the compound they knew, and the sterile chenas which they had sown. No children were born to them now in their hut, their women were as sterile as the earth; the children that had been born to them died of want and fever. At last

¹ This geographical segregation of the fields of the ancient indigenous and the modern European enterprise in Ceylon has its analogue in Central America, where the modern Spanish colonists have similarly kept clear of the plains which were once the seat of the Mayan culture, and have established themselves in the highlands which were left unoccupied by both the fathers and the children of the Mayan Civilization. (See II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, p. 267, above, and II. D (ii), pp. 34-6, below.) In this connexion, it is immaterial that, in contrast to the climatic conditions in Ceylon, the Central American plains are relatively wet and the Central American highlands relatively dry; for whereas, in Ceylon, an abundance of rain affords economic ease while a scarcity demands economic effort, in Central America the relations of economic effect to climatic cause are just the inverse, owing to the inverse correlation between climate and landscape.—A.J.T.

² Still, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-6 and 77 and 92.

they yielded to the jungle. They packed up their few possessions and left the village for ever. . . .

"They tried to induce Punchi Menika to go with them, but she refused. . . . The only thing left to her was the compound and the jungle which she knew. She clung to it passionately, blindly. . . .

"The jungle surged forward over and blotted out the village up to the very walls of her hut. She no longer cleared the compound or mended the fence, the jungle closed over them as it had closed over the other huts and compounds, over the paths and tracks. Its breath was hot and heavy in the hut itself, which it imprisoned in its wall, stretching away unbroken for miles. Everything except the little hut with rotting walls and broken tattered roof had gone down before it. It closed with its shrubs and bushes and trees, with the impenetrable disorder of its thorns and creepers, over the rice-fields and the tanks. Only a little hollowing of the ground where the trees stood in water when rain fell, and a long little mound which the rains washed out and the elephants trampled down, marked the place where before had lain the tank and its land. The village was forgotten, it disappeared into the jungle from which it had sprung, and with it she was cut off, forgotten. It was as if she was the last person left in the World, a world of unending trees above which the wind roared always and the Sun blazed. . . .

"But life is very short in the jungle. Punchi Menika was a very old woman before she was forty. She no longer sowed grain, she lived only on the roots and leaves that she gathered. The perpetual hunger wasted her slowly, and when the rains came she lay shivering with fever in the hut. At last the time came when her strength failed her; she lay in the hut unable to drag herself out to search for food. The fire in the corner that had smouldered so long between the three great stones was out. In the day the hot air eddied through the hut, hot with the breath of the wind blowing over the vast parched jungle; at night she shivered in the chill dew. She was dying, and the jungle knew it; it is always waiting; can scarcely wait for death. When the end was close upon her a great black shadow glided into the doorway. Two little eyes twinkled at her steadily, two immense white tusks curled up gleaming against the darkness. She sat up, fear came upon her, the fear of the jungle, blind agonising fear.

"Appochchi, Appochchi!" she screamed. "He has come, the devil from the bush. He has come for me as you said. Aiyo! save me, save me! Appochchi!"

"As she fell back, the great boar grunted softly, and glided like a shadow towards her into the hut."

As the reader closes the book, he speculates on the meaning of the tale which has this ending. Throughout the story, the writer has drawn in for us, stroke by stroke, his picture of the jungle as a sinister beast of prey which only lives its own life in order to

¹ Woolf, L. S.: *The Village in the Jungle* (London 1913, Edward Arnold), ch. ix, pp. 301-7.

bring human life to destruction—a sylvan counterpart to the animated skeleton which is our image of Death.

Haud igitur leti praeclusa est ianua caelo
nec soli terraeque neque altis aequoris undis,
sed patet immane et vasto respectat hiatus.¹

Under the shadow of this inhuman monster, ever watching and waiting with a leer on its obscene countenance till it finds its opportunity to close in upon its victim, the human life of the poor villagers seems unbearably wretched. The odds against them are so heavy; the pressure upon them is so grinding; would it not have been better for them never to have been born? And yet the story of their lives, as it is told by the author in this painful setting, is undoubtedly worth the telling. We read the tale to the end and feel that these lives have not been lived for nothing, even though at last the jungle overwhelms them. What is the significance and the interest of them? Perhaps it is that the cruel and unceasing struggle with the jungle, which at first sight seems almost to divest them of their humanity—to degrade them to the level of the beasts that perish² or of the creeping things that creep upon the earth³—subtly reveals them in another light to the inward eye. If the jungle is a malevolent beast of prey, then the villagers who have fought it with their bare hands are heroes whose story is an epic. Without the jungle the village could hardly have risen to be a theme for literature. And when the jungle swallows the village up, we realize in retrospect that we have been reading a tale of human prowess which surpasses the tale told by the ruins of Angkor Wat.

In the North Arabian Desert

A celebrated and indeed almost hackneyed illustration of our theme is the present state of Petra and Palmyra—a spectacle which has inspired a whole series of modern Western essays in the philosophy of history, from *Les Ruines*⁴ onwards. To-day, these former homes of the Syriac Civilization are in the same state as the former homes of the Mayan Civilization at Copan and Tikal, and their monuments astonish and confound the spectator for the same reason. The parallel is indeed exact, except that hostile Nature is

¹ Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 373-5. ² Psalm xlix, vv. 12 and 20.

³ Leviticus xi. 29.

⁴ Volney, C. F., Comte de: *Les Ruines, ou Méditation sur les Révolutions des Empires* (1st edition, Paris 1791). For an attractive general account of the caravan cities which is based upon first-hand and recent archaeological research, especially at Dura, see Rostovtzeff, M.: *Caravan Cities* (Oxford 1932, Clarendon Press). For Petra see also Kammerer, A.: *Petra et la Nabaténe* (Paris 1929-30, Geuthner, 1 vol.+atlas). For Palmyra, see also Février, J. G.: *Essai sur l'Histoire Politique et Économique de Palmyre* (Paris 1931, Vrin) and Pertsch, J.: *Palmyra: Eine historisch-klimatische Studie*, Sitzungsberichte Ak. Leipzig, lxxiv (1922).

represented here by the Afrasian Steppe instead of the tropical forest.¹ Here, too, we see the ruins of huge and splendid public buildings which are likewise desolate and likewise isolated from the nearest present human habitations by many leagues of surrounding wilderness—the Afrasian wilderness of dry rock and gravel and sand which is not less forbidding than the tropical wilderness of sodden and matted vegetation. The desert has swallowed up Petra and Palmyra, as the forest has swallowed up Tikal and Copan; and here, again, the ruins survive to point a contrast between present and past which is so great as to be almost unimaginable.

The ruins tell us that these elaborate temples and porticoes and tombs, at the time when they stood intact, must have been ornaments of cities which rivalled the Mayan cities in wealth and population; and here the deductions from the evidence of Archaeology, which are our sole means of composing a picture of the Mayan Civilization, are reinforced by the written testimony of historical records. The economic foundations on which the wealth and population of Petra and Palmyra were supported are not matters of conjecture. We know that the historical pioneers of the Syriac Civilization who conjured these cities up out of the desert were masters of the magic which the Syriac Mythology attributes to Moses.

These magicians knew how to bring water out of the dry rock and how to find their way across the untrodden wilderness. In their prime, Petra and Palmyra stood in the midst of irrigated gardens like those which still surround Damascus to-day or those which the Prophet Muhammad depicts in the Qur'an whenever he wishes to evoke in the minds of the faithful an image of Paradise; but Petra and Palmyra did not live then, any more than Damascus lives to-day, exclusively or even principally on the fruits of their narrow-verged oases.² Their rich men were not their market-gardeners but their merchants, who kept oasis in communion with oasis, and continent with continent, by a busy caravan-traffic from point to point across the intervening tracts of steppe and desert: gravelly hamād and sandy nafūd. The Nabataeans of Petra, operating the trans-desert route from the Mediterranean ports of Syria to the Ocean ports of the Yaman, competed with the Greek seamen of Alexandria for the trade between the Roman Empire and India;³

¹ Dr. Ellsworth Huntington seeks to explain the rise and fall of Petra and Palmyra, like the rise and fall of Copan and Tikal, by his hypothesis of a periodic shifting of climatic zones. For his application of the hypothesis to the case of Palmyra, see *Palestine and its Transformation* (London 1911, Constable), ch. xv. For a general discussion of Dr. Huntington's application of his hypothesis to the histories of civilizations, see II. D (vii), Annex I, below.

² The same point is made apropos of Jerash (Gerasa) by Rostovtzeff in op. cit., on pp. 67-8.

³ See Rostovtzeff, op. cit., pp. 56-7.

the Palmyrenes, operating the trans-desert route from Syria to 'Irāq, virtually monopolized the trade between the Roman Empire and those regions lying east of it which were ruled successively by the Arsacids and the Sasanids.¹ The economic control of trade-routes brought political power in its train; and the Nabataean Kingdom, extending from Sinai to Damascus and from Taymā to Beersheba, ranked as one of the principal client-states of Rome before its annexation by Trajan.² As for Palmyra,³ during those decades of the third century of the Christian Era when the Roman Empire was prostrated by a paralytic stroke premonitory of its coming dissolution, Queen Zenobia succeeded momentarily, before Aurelian carried her captive, in ruling from the Palmyrene oasis a premature and abortive 'successor-state' which anticipated, by four centuries, the principality of the Caliph Mu'awiyah.⁴

Such were the achievements of the Syriac Civilization under the stimulus of the desert. And the ruins of Petra and Palmyra, in testifying, as they stand, to the final victory of the desert over Man, also testify, by the selfsame posture, to the previous victory of Man over the desert. Since the day when the Syriac Society—overcome by the pressure of the human environment in the shape of the Roman Empire⁵—relaxed its grip upon the physical environment at these two points and allowed the desert to have its way with Petra and Palmyra again, no other society has ever attempted to repeat the achievement of the Syriac pioneers by recalling either of these dead cities to life. The attempt has not even been made up to the present by Western enterprise, though in our day we dispose

¹ See Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-4.

² The Nabataean régime in this region lasted altogether for nearly three centuries, beginning *circa* 164 B.C. (Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, p. 50).

³ Palmyra is first heard of in 41 B.C. (Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, p. 121). The earliest extant Palmyrene inscription was cut in 8 B.C. (Février, *op. cit.*, p. 6).

⁴ See vol. i, p. 74, above, footnote 4. It may be noted that while the Nabataean client-state of the Roman Empire was based on the single oasis of Petra and Zenobia's abortive 'successor-state' on the single oasis of Palmyra, the successful 'successor-state' which was established—or usurped—by Mu'awiyah was based on a pair of oases: those of Medina and Mecca. The political union of these two oases was the supreme political achievement of Muhammad. In achieving it, he laid the foundations of a state which grew, first into a 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire in its Syriac provinces, and then into a reintegration or resumption of the Syriac universal state which had been built by the Achaemenids and overthrown by Alexander the Great. (See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 73-7, above.)

⁵ Petra and Palmyra each rose in turn to greatness by finding places for themselves in the interstices between the dominions of mutually hostile Great Powers whose hostility was too great to admit of their coming to a direct understanding with each other, while it was not great enough to drive them into forgoing the advantage of doing business with one another indirectly through the agency of commercial go-betweens who would also serve as political buffers. Petra rose in this way in an interstice between the Seleucid and the Ptolemaic 'successor-state' of the Achaemenian Empire; Palmyra rose in an interstice between the Roman Empire and the Arsacid Power. Petra was doomed when the Roman Empire supplanted both the Seleucid and the Ptolemaic Power alike; Palmyra was doomed when the decay of the Arsacidae left Rome momentarily without a rival in this quarter likewise—pending the rise of the Sasanidae. (See further Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-35.)

of technical facilities which the Nabataeans and the Aramaeans never dreamed of: artesian wells that can tap subterranean water-supplies quite beyond the reach of picks or the ken of divining-rods; and petrol-driven six-wheeled motor-cars which can traverse in a day a tract of desert which is a week's journey for a camel.¹ Thus the ruined monuments and the dried-up oases and the abandoned caravan-routes of Petra and Palmyra declare unmistakably, to the observer who considers them to-day, a fact which is not revealed in those lovely gardens that are still watered by the rivers of Damascus: the fact that the physical environment in which the Syriac Civilization came to birth was not unusually easy but, on the contrary, was unusually difficult for Man to master.

On Easter Island

In a different environment again, we may draw a corresponding conclusion concerning the origins of the Polynesian Civilization² from the present state of Easter Island.³ At the time of its discovery by modern Western explorers, Easter Island was inhabited by two races: a race of flesh-and-blood and a race of stone; an apparently primitive human population of Polynesian physique, and a highly accomplished population of statues. The living inhabitants in that generation possessed neither the art of carving statues such as these nor the science of navigating the thousand miles of open sea that separate Easter Island from the nearest sister-island of the Polynesian Archipelago. Before its discovery by the seamen of the West, Easter Island had been isolated from the rest of the World for an unknown length of time. Yet its dual population of flesh and stone testifies, just as clearly as the ruins of Palmyra or Copan, to a vanished past which must have been utterly different from the visible present.

Those human beings must have been begotten, and those figures must have been carved, by Polynesian navigators who once found their way across the Pacific to Easter Island in flimsy open canoes,

¹ In the year 1930 of the Christian Era, the motor-car and the artesian well were being used by one great man who was not a Westerner but an Arab—King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ūd of the Najd-Hijāz—in order to reassert Man's ascendancy over Nature in one of the most forbidding tracts of the Afrikan Steppe, namely Central Arabia. With the aid of Western technique, Ibn Sa'ūd was evoking, in a region which had previously been utilized for nothing better than the ranges of pastoral Nomads, a new world of irrigated oases, linked together by trans-desert routes which served the dual purpose of commerce and government. The empire ruled by the Wahhābi King from Riyād promised, if it endured, to reproduce at last, in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, an image of the empires which had once been ruled by King Hārith from Petra and by Queen Zenobia from Palmyra. (See Rihani, Ameen: *Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia: His People and his Land* (London 1928, Constable); Philby, H. St. J. B.: *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (London 1928, Constable), and *Arabia* (London 1930, Benn).)

² For the arrested Polynesian Civilization, see further Part III. A, below.

³ See Routledge, S.: *The Mystery of Easter Island* (London 1919, Sifton Praed); and Brown, J. Macmillan: *The Riddle of the Pacific* (London 1924, Fisher Unwin).

without chart, compass or chronometer and with no other motor-power than the wind behind their sails and the muscular force that plied their paddles. And this voyage can hardly have been an isolated adventure which brought one boat-load of Polynesian pioneers to Easter Island by a stroke of luck that was not repeated; for on that supposition it would really be impossible to account both for the presence of the population of statues and for the inability of the latter-day population of human beings to carve them. The art of sculpture must have been brought to Easter Island by the pioneers, and lost on Easter Island by their descendants, together with the art of navigation. The relapse of these distant colonists from the cultural level of the Polynesian Society elsewhere must have been due to the breaking of their contact with the rest of Polynesia. On the other hand, the population of statues is so numerous that it must have taken many generations to produce; and during those generations the art of sculpture, which has been lost in this latter-day age of isolation, must have been kept alive on Easter Island by continual transmarine intercourse. Taken together, these considerations point to a previous state of affairs in which the navigation across those thousand miles of open sea was carried on regularly over a long period of time. Eventually, for some reason which still remains a mystery to us, the sea, once traversed victoriously by Man, closed in round Easter Island, as the desert closed in round Palmyra and the forest round Copan. Yet, here again, Nature's reassertion of her power bears testimony to the prowess of Man in once overcoming her and thus indicates that there were certain features of unusual difficulty in the physical environment in which the Polynesian Civilization came to birth.

The truth thus proclaimed in unison by Past and Present on Easter Island is, of course, in flat contradiction to the popular Western view that the South Sea Islands are an earthly paradise and their inhabitants children of Nature in the legendary state of Adam and Eve before the Fall. Perhaps this view arises from a mistaken assumption that one portion of the Polynesian environment constitutes the whole of it. The physical environment of the Polynesian Society consists, in reality, of water as well as land: water which presents a formidable challenge to any human beings who propose to cross it without possessing any better means of navigation than those, described above, which were actually the only means at the Polynesian navigators' command. It was by responding boldly and successfully to this challenge of the estranging sea—by achieving, with their rudimentary means of navigation, the *tour de force* of establishing a regular maritime traffic across the open waters between island and island—that the Polynesian

pioneers won their footing on the specks of dry land which are scattered through the vast watery wilderness of the Pacific Ocean almost as rarely as the stars are scattered through the depths of Space. Even granting that these beaching-places which constitute such an infinitesimally small fraction of the Polynesian environment do offer an earthly paradise to any human beings who may succeed in reaching them, it must be borne in mind that the Polynesians reached them by their own exertions, after hazarding their lives upon the waters, whereas the Adam and Eve of the Syriac Mythology were placed in the Garden of Eden by the act of their creator, and did not begin either to exert their minds and bodies or to hazard their lives until they had been driven out of the Garden, and kept out of it, by the angel with the flaming sword.¹

It is possible that, in the environment where the Polynesian Civilization came to birth, there was an untoward degree of sharpness in the contrast between the difficulty of the first ordeal which had to be passed and the ease of the conditions of life with which the successful response to this first challenge was rewarded. The toils and dangers of Polynesian navigation on the Pacific were so formidable and the sweets of repose on the islands were so alluring that the children may well have been tempted to abandon that great Oceanic world of land and water which their fathers had opened up for them, in order to sink back—each on the island which he had inherited in virtue of his father's efforts—into a life of primitive ease and isolation. That seems to have been the history of the decline and fall of the Polynesian Civilization on Easter Island: the island which had to be won and held at the price of the longest sea-passage of all. The colonists of Easter Island must have been the flower of the Polynesian pioneers; and the virtue² that was in them not only carried them across a thousand miles of open sea² but availed them—before it went out of them—to commemorate their achievement for ever by creating, at their distant journey's end, some of the finest masterpieces ever produced by Polynesian art. The history of the Polynesian Civilization on Easter Island may supply the clue to the history of the Polynesian Civilization as a whole. That is a problem which will demand our notice again hereafter.³ In this place we are simply concerned to point out that the popular Western view of the Poly-

¹ For the significance of this myth of the Garden and the Fall, see above, II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, pp. 290-3.

² "The nearest land to Easter now inhabited, with the exception of Pitcairn Island, is in the Gambia Islands, about 1,200 miles to the westward; the little coral patch of Ducie Island, which lies between the two, is nearly 900 miles from Easter, and has no dwellers." (Routledge, S.: *The Mystery of Easter Island* (London 1919, Sifton Praed), p. 292.)

³ It is touched upon again in Part III. A, vol. iii, below.

nesian environment is mistaken and to explain how it has arisen; and the explanation turns out to be very simple. The Western observers who have given it currency have only had eyes for the land and have ignored the sea which covers all but a fraction of the area over which the Polynesian Civilization once ranged. Presumably they would not have ignored it if they had had to traverse it themselves in the craft of the Polynesian navigators, instead of travelling, as they have done, as passengers in modern Western ocean-going liners, leaving the responsibility of navigation to be borne by professional Western navigators with the assistance of compass and chart.

In New England

Before closing this review of reversions to a state of Nature, the writer may permit himself to cite two instances—one somewhat out of the way and the other exceedingly obvious—which happen to have come within his own personal observation.

I was once travelling in a rural part of the State of Connecticut in New England, when I came across a deserted village—a not uncommon spectacle, so I was told, in this section of the United States, yet a spectacle, nevertheless, which is inevitably surprising and even disconcerting to a European in America. This particular village—it was called Town Hill—had evidently been laid out much like other New England villages, still inhabited, in some of the more fertile districts of the same state through which I had already passed on my journey that very day. For some two centuries, perhaps, Town Hill had stood with its plank-built Georgian Church in the middle of the village green, and with the houses round the church, and with the orchards beyond the houses, and with the corn-fields stretching away beyond the fruit-trees. In 1925 the church still stood (it was being kept in repair by the State Archaeological Society as an ancient monument); the houses had vanished (though their former positions could still be traced by the remnants of their foundations); the fruit-trees had gone wild and had been swallowed up in the resurgent undergrowth. As for the fields, they had faded away altogether into the rocks and scrub of the barren hill-side.

Lingering on the spot and allowing my thoughts to play about the strange sights here presented to me, I marvelled first at an apparent paradox. Within the hundred years ending in this year 1925, those vanished New Englanders had wrested from Nature the whole breadth of a continent. In these few generations they had spread from the spot where I was standing, on the Atlantic slope, to the shores of the Pacific. Yet at the same time they had suffered Nature to recapture from them this village in the heart of their

homeland—a village which their forefathers had founded almost as soon as they had set foot on American soil; a village where, for perhaps two hundred years before ‘the Winning of the West’, the ascendancy of Man over Nature had seemed to be established as securely as in any village in Europe. These were my first thoughts; but on second thoughts I began to understand the significance of what I was looking at. The rapidity, the thoroughness, the *abandon* with which Nature had reasserted her dominion over the site of Town Hill as soon as Man had relaxed his grip, surely gave the measure of the exertions which Man had formerly made, first to capture this position from Nature and then to hold it. Those exertions must have been extreme; and, when one came to think of it, only an energy as intense as the energy which the breaking-in of New England had called into play could have been sufficient for the Herculean labour of breaking-in a whole continent. Thus, so far from ‘the Winning of the West’ making the loss of Town Hill inexplicable, the truth was that, in the loss of Town Hill, the secret of ‘the Winning of the West’ was laid bare. The portent of this village in Connecticut, deserted to-day, explained the miracle of those great cities in Ohio and Illinois and Colorado and California which had sprung into existence overnight. In this hard environment of New England, an apprenticeship had been served for the hard task of building the United States. When the apprentice had felt himself fully trained in nerve and muscle and skill, he had simply left the place which had been his training-ground and had gone to the place where he was to do his work in life. The desertion of Town Hill was not a paradox after all; it was of one piece with the great human enterprise which had founded and peopled Cincinnati and Chicago and Denver and San Francisco.

On the Roman Campagna

Similar considerations resolve the apparent paradox in the present state of the Roman Campagna. It is beside the point to marvel, with Livy, that an innumerable multitude of yeoman-warriors should formerly have subsisted in a region which in his day, as in ours,¹ was a wilderness of barren gray fell and feverish

¹ In 1931, when the writer of this Study revisited the Roman Campagna after an interval of twenty years, he found that this statement required qualification. In 1911 the student who made the pilgrimage of the Via Appia Antica found himself walking through a wilderness almost from the moment when he passed beyond the City walls through the Porta San Sebastiano till the moment when he approached the outskirts of Albano. When he repeated the pilgrimage in 1931, he found that, in the interval, Man had been busily reasserting his mastery over the whole stretch of country that lies between Rome and the Castelli Romani. The Via Appia Antica itself was unchanged (being carefully preserved, like the church at Town Hill, by archaeological piety); but there was now no point along its course where the wayfarer was out of sight of modern motor-roads, aerodromes, wireless-masts and—more impressive than all these—newly cultivated fields. The tension of human energy on the Roman Campagna is now beginning to rise

green swamp where the only surviving vestiges of human habitation were the frail straw huts of a few miserable shepherds.¹ It is more apposite to reflect that this latter-day wilderness has reproduced the pristine state of the forbidding landscape which was once transformed by Latin or Volscian pioneers into a cultivated and populous countryside; and that the energy generated in the process of breaking-in this narrow plot of dour Italian soil was the energy which afterwards conquered the World in a radius extending from the Campagna to Britain and Egypt, and from the Alban Hills to the Atlas and the Caucasus.² If an energy which sufficed, in its diffusion, to build the Roman Empire was first generated and concentrated within the limits of the Campagna, this indicates the degree of human effort involved in first conquering the Campagna from the wilderness and then maintaining it against reversion. Is it any wonder that the cradle of the Roman Commonwealth did revert to its pristine state when the body politic which this cradle had nurtured eventually turned its energies outwards over all the kingdoms of the Earth? Surely it would have been more surprising if the Campagna had still continued to yield increase to the Roman husbandman and recruits to the Roman drill-sergeant in those latter days when the Roman Army was guarding the frontiers of the Empire, and tilling the *prata legionum*, far away on the fringe of the Afrasian Steppe and on the banks of the Rhine and the Danube?

We have now passed under review a number of sites—in the American and Asiatic Tropics, in the Afrasian Steppe, in the Pacific Archipelago, in North America, in the Mediterranean—which have reverted to their pristine state of Nature after having been the scene of signal human achievements that are now commemorated by deserted ruins. In this array, there is the utmost diversity both in the character of the local physical environment and in the shape of the yoke which Man has once laid upon it; yet all these sites agree in bearing unanimous witness to one essential condition of successful human activity:

Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben
Der täglich sie erobern muss.³

Even when the efforts of the pioneers have succeeded in conquering some position from Nature, the conquered ground has to be

again for the first time since the end of the third century B.C., when, during the War of Hannibal, it began its great decline towards the zero point at which it has stood throughout the first nineteen centuries of the Christian Era.

¹ 'Innumerabilem multitudinem liberorum capitum in eis fuisse locis quae nunc, vix seminario militum exiguo relicto, servitia Romana ab solitudine vindicant' (Livy, Book VI, ch. 12). Compare the allusions in Horace, *Epistles*, Book I, Ep. xi, ll. 7-8 and 30.

² This is the theme of Professor Tenney Frank in *The Economic History of the Roman Republic* (2nd edition, Baltimore 1927, Johns Hopkins University Press).

³ *Faust* II. 11575-6, quoted above in vol. i on p. 277.

held, by unremitting efforts on the part of the pioneers' successors, against Nature's unremitting counter-attacks. The fields of Egypt or the gardens of Damascus, which seem at first sight to yield their fruits automatically to any one who scratches the soil,¹ are really only maintained as 'going concerns' by constant and strenuous labour. How much greater, then, must have been the labour which it cost the fathers of the Egyptian and the Syriac Civilization to bring the Land of Egypt and the Ghūtah of Damascus into existence out of the primeval jungle-swamp and the primeval desert? Perhaps we may now consider that we have proved the proposition which we first took for granted. It seems evident that the conditions offered to Man by the environments that have been the birth-places of civilizations have been not unusually easy but unusually difficult.

Perfida Capua

Having studied the character of certain environments which have actually been the scene of the geneses of civilizations or of other signal human achievements, and having found empirically that the conditions which they have offered to Man have been not easy but rather the contrary, let us pass on to a complementary study. Let us examine certain other environments in which the conditions offered to Man have in fact been easy, and study the effect on human life which such environments have produced. In attempting this study, we must distinguish between two different situations. The first is one in which people are introduced into an easy environment after having lived in some difficult environment of one of the kinds that we have examined above. The second situation is that of people in an easy environment who have never, so far as is known, been exposed to any other environment since their pre-human ancestors became men. In other words, we have to distinguish between the respective effects of exposure to an easy environment upon Mankind in process of civilization and upon Primitive Man. Let us deal with the two situations separately, in this order, and let us once more follow the empirical method of inquiry which we have employed so far.

Let us begin with a classic example of an easy environment which is suggested by the last example of a difficult environment that has occupied our attention. In Classical Italy, Rome found her antithesis in Capua—another great and famous city whose destinies were as different from those of Rome as her surroundings. The

¹ This seems to be the philosophy of Brazil, to judge by the following amiable saying which is reported to be current among the Brazilians: 'For twelve hours in the day we do our worst with the country; but for the other twelve hours we sleep, and then God and the country put things right again!'

Capuan Campagna was as kindly to Man as the Roman Campagna was dour;¹ and while the Romans went forth from their forbidding country to conquer one neighbour after another, the Campanians sat in their smiling country and allowed one neighbour after another to conquer them. From her last conquerors, the Samnites of the Abruzzi, Capua was delivered, at her own invitation, by the intervention of Rome herself; and then, at the most critical moment of the most critical war in Roman history, on the morrow of the Battle of Cannae, Capua repaid Rome by opening her gates to Hannibal, in the hope of recovering her freedom by exchanging one patron for another.² As far as Capua was concerned, the futility of this hope was written large in her previous history; but for Hannibal, in his war against the first city of Italy, the defection of the second city of Italy from Rome's side to his looked like a gain which was quite beyond question. In fact, Hannibal and his Roman opponents were of one mind in regarding Capua's change of sides as being the principal immediate consequence of the Battle of Cannae and perhaps the decisive event in the war. Hannibal responded to the Campanians' overtures by repairing to Capua and taking up his winter-quarters there—whereupon something happened which falsified everybody's expectations. A winter spent in Capua demoralized the troops who had just annihilated the greatest Roman army that had ever taken the field.

"The Carthaginian army, which [Hannibal] kept under cover there [in Capua] for the greater part of the winter, had been long and thoroughly hardened against all the ills that can afflict Mankind; but when it came to the good things of this life, the troops lacked both familiarity and experience. Accordingly these heroes who had resisted the utmost assaults of adversity were undone by an excess of prosperity and enjoyment; and they fell headlong, because their long abstinence made them plunge in head-over-ears. The round of sleeping, drinking, eating, whoring, bathing and taking their ease became sweeter to them as each passing day confirmed the habit, until they became so enervated by it, body and soul, that their safety came to rest in the prestige of their past victories rather than in the present strength of their right arms. It was

¹ The name Campagna, which clings to-day to the cradle of the Roman Commonwealth in the lowlands between the left bank of the Tiber and the Alban Hills, originally belonged (in its Latin spelling 'Campania') to the lowlands surrounding Capua, through which the Volturnus flows on its way from the Abruzzi to the sea, just north of Naples. The name was extended from the gates of Naples to the gates of Rome by Augustus, to designate one of the 'regions' into which he re-mapped Roman Italy; and the name has persisted in a territory to which it was thus artificially applied, after having died out (except as a pedantically applied archaism) in the territory where it was indigenous.

² It is noteworthy that while Capua, after Cannae, betrayed Rome who had fought the Samnites on her account, the Samnites, who had been fought and conquered by Rome on account of Capua, remained loyal to Rome, with the single exception of the south-easternmost canton of the former Samnite Confederation, the Hirpini. The loyalty of the Samnites to the Romans during the Hannibalic War was as remarkable as that of the Sikhs to the British during the Indian Mutiny.

the opinion of military experts that, in allowing them to come to this pass, their commander committed a still greater fault than in failing to march on Rome immediately after the Battle of Cannae. It might be argued that his dilatoriness after Cannae had merely postponed the hour of final victory, whereas his error at Capua had deprived him of the strength to win the war at all.¹

Hannibal's fatal error was never committed by the Roman Government to the end of its days. When Rome gave up the conscript army—exercised by the laborious husbandry of her Campagna—with which she had conquered the World, in order to place her conquests under the guard of an army of professionals, she did not make the mistake of stationing this new model army in Capua or even in any of those delectable places along the Riviera² where the spoilt children of our modern Western Society take up their winter-quarters nowadays. She took care that the soldiers of the Empire should be tempered by an environment which was not less severe than that which had produced the redoubtable soldiers of the Republic. The legionaries who were no longer to be exercised as yeomen in the Campagna by keeping its marshes in drainage and its fells under the plough were now stationed along the Rhine and the Danube among the Transalpine forests and rains and frosts, to be exercised by this new challenge from Physical Nature for their border warfare with the North-European barbarians. The avoidance of Hannibal's error by Augustus prolonged the life of the Roman Empire by some four hundred years.³

Augustus clearly divined the incompatibility between military efficiency and an easy environment, and he set himself to reform the spoilt and insubordinate soldiery which he inherited from the civil wars by banishing it to guard the frontiers on the bleaker side of the Alps. While the great Roman statesman was carrying this difficult policy through, was he ever confirmed in his resolution by any reminiscences of the Greek literature in which he had been educated?

The principle which governed the military policy of Augustus had been made the subject of a fable by the Greek historian Herodotus four centuries earlier. The fable was celebrated, since the great Greek writer had given it prominence by telling it as the tail-piece of his work;⁴ and the fable was also apt, since it was told by

¹ Livy, Book XXIII, ch. 18.

² The Riviera—constituting, as it did at the time, the principal overland route between Italy and Transalpine Europe—would have offered a convenient station for the Imperial forces from a purely geographico-strategical point of view.

³ Of course even the statesmanship of an Augustus was only able to delay the doom of Rome without being able permanently to avert it. For the eventual transference of the military and political power in the Roman Empire from the hands of the Romans themselves to the hands of the Transalpine barbarians, see II. D (v), pp. 164-5, below.

⁴ Herodotus, Book IX, ch. 122.

Herodotus of the Persians—a military people who once upon a time had performed a feat which had afterwards proved to be beyond the genius of Hannibal and had barely been achieved by the staying-power of the Romans: the feat of establishing, by force of arms, a universal state.¹

As Herodotus tells the story, it was a Persian grandee named Artembares, in the generation of the conquest,

‘who first suggested to his Persian fellow-countrymen the proposition which they adopted and laid before Cyrus, to the following effect:

“Now that Zeus has put down Astyages from his seat and has given the dominion to the Persians as a nation and to you, Sire, as an individual, why should we not emigrate from the confined and rocky territory which we at present possess, and occupy a better? There are many near at hand and many more at a distance, of which we have only to take our choice in order to make a greater impression on the World than we make as it is. This is a natural policy for an imperial people, and we shall never have a finer opportunity of realising it than now, when our Empire is established over vast populations and over the entire continent of Asia.”

‘Cyrus, who had listened and had not been impressed, told his petitioners to do as they wished, but he qualified his advice by telling them in the same breath to prepare their minds for exchanging positions with their present subjects. Soft countries, he informed them, invariably breed soft men, and it is impossible for one and the same country to produce splendid crops and good soldiers. The Persians capitulated to the superior intelligence of Cyrus, confessed their error, abandoned their proposition, and elected to live as an imperial people in a rough country rather than to cultivate the lowlands as some other nation’s slaves.’²

¹ The Syriac universal state had taken the form of a Persian Empire. Whether the coming Hellenic universal state should take the form of a Carthaginian Empire or a Roman Empire was the real issue of the Hannibalic War,

omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu
horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris oris,
in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum
omnibus humanis esset terraque marique.

(Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 834-7.)

² Whatever the historical value of this fable may be, it is certainly an historical fact that the rough country of Persis—the modern province of Fars and the ancient homeland of ‘the Persians’ in the original narrower sense of a name which was afterwards extended to cover all the kindred peoples of Iran—continued, unlike Latium, to be a breeding-ground for soldiers not only so long as its empire lasted but even after its fall. More than five centuries after the overthrow of the Empire of the Achaemenidae by Alexander the Great, the country which had bred the armies of Cyrus produced, in the Empire of the Sasanidae, a new military power which contended on equal terms with Rome and almost anticipated the Arabs in expelling an intrusive Hellenism from its last footholds in the Syriac World (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 75-6, above). Thus the Persians, in their day, did better than either the Romans or the New Englanders. They managed to make use of their high energies in a great feat of expansion without at the same time losing their grip upon the rough country within whose confines those high energies had been generated. Though the Persian soldiers of the Great King served their time, in the garrisons of the Achaemenian Empire, as far afield as Egypt and Anatolia, their homesteads in the highlands of Fars did not go the way of Town Hill, Connecticut, or of Latin Ulubrae (Juvenal, *Satires*, x, l. 102). And so it was in vain that Alexander smirched his

The Temptations of Odysseus

This fable of the Persians' Choice, like the true story of Hannibal's Army at Capua, signifies that when human beings who have been living under pressure are set at ease, their energies are not released but are rather relaxed by this pleasurable change in their conditions of life. The same conception appears in a work of classical literature that is older and more famous than the histories of Herodotus and Livy. It is the theme of those four books of the *Odyssey*¹ in which the hero tells Alcinous the story of his wanderings from the day when he sailed with his companions from Troy to the day when he was washed up, the sole survivor, on the shores of Calypso's island.

In that long series of adventures, it is not when he is encountering his difficulties and dangers—running the gauntlet of the Laestrygons or confronting the Cyclops or making the passage between Scylla and Charybdis—that Odysseus comes nearest to failure in his struggle to make his way home to Ithaca. Rather, these ordeals speed him on his course towards the goal of his endeavours by calling his faculties of audacity and nimbleness of wit and endurance and ingenuity into action.² He comes nearest to failure when the resolution to persevere on the difficult and dangerous course towards the journey's end has to compete with the attractions of an assured and immediate ease.

Thus, when the three companions whom he sent out on a reconnaissance into the land of the lotus-eaters fell in with the inhabitants,

'the lotus-eaters did not bethink them to do our companions to death, but gave them of the lotus to taste. And which soever of them did eat that honey-sweet fruit, he no longer had the will to bring back tidings nor in any wise to return; but their will was to remain there with the lotus-eaters, feeding on lotus, and to think no more of the homeward voyage. So I took them to the ships weeping, under duress, and in the hollow ships I dragged them under the benches and bound them there. And then I bade the rest of my companions come aboard the swift ships

glory by burning the Great King's palace at Persepolis. The stony fields and bleak pastures amid which the ruined palace stood (and stands to-day) did not cease to breed warriors. Alexander himself was so deeply impressed by the military virtues of the Imperial People whom he had just overthrown that he enlisted the defeated Persians in his own army on equal terms with his victorious Macedonians. Had Herodotus lived a century later than he did, and carried his narrative of the secular conflict between the Syriac and Hellenic worlds down to the close of Alexander's dramatic contribution to the story, he might have capped his fable with a prophecy (in his ironic vein) that the rough country which had bred soldiers for Cyrus and soldiers for Alexander would continue to bear these formidable crops so long as the Persian peasant remained on his homestead to sow the dragon's-tooth seed.

¹ *Odyssey*, Books IX–XII.

² Ἐνθεν δὲ προτέρω πλέομεν ἀκαχήμενοι ἥτορ,
ἀσμενοι ἐκ θανάτου, φίλους δόλσαντες ἐταίρους.

(*Odyssey*, IX, ll. 62–3 and 565–6.)

with all speed, lest any man should lose thought of the voyage home by eating of the lotus.¹

Again, when half his ship's company accepted Circe's invitation to come into her parlour,

'she led them in and gave them benches and chairs to sit on and mixed for them cheese and barley and yellow honey in Pramnean wine; and among the food she sprinkled baneful drugs, to make them utterly forget their native land. And then when she had given it to them and they had drunk it up, straightway she smote them with her staff and penned them in pig-styes. And, lo, they had the heads of swine and the voice and the bristles, yea and the body thereof,² albeit their understanding was steadfast as aforetime.³

It needed not only Odysseus's human sword but Hermes' divine herb to rescue the poor fools from Circe's black magic.

Thereafter, Odysseus himself would have gone deliberately to his death, in the Sirens' clutches, when the enchantment of their singing fell upon his ears, had he not beforehand stopped his companions' ears with wax and made them bind him hand and foot to the mast and enjoined upon them only to multiply his bonds if he besought them to release him.⁴

Perhaps the hero is least heroic when, shipwrecked and alone, he is washed up on Calypso's island and is kindly entreated by the Goddess⁵—a fairer than Penelope⁶—who takes him to dwell with her in her earthly paradise⁷ and promises him an immortality of perpetual youth.⁸ He finds salvation when the nymph ceases to please him—when he begins to pass his nights as an unwilling lover in her willing arms and his days sitting on the sea-shore (as he is shown at his first appearance in the poem) with his eyes never dry of tears and his life ebbing away in his longing for home.⁹ This revolt, in the eighth year of a passive captivity,¹⁰ against a state of melancholy ease in which he might have continued for evermore, is the inward release which has its external counterpart in the intercession of Athene before the throne of Zeus and in the liberating mission of Hermes.¹¹ When Calypso pleads with him, at the last moment, to remain, Odysseus answers:

"Lady Goddess, be not wroth with me for this. I, even I, know it all: I know that the prudent Penelope is not to be compared with thee, in

¹ *Od.* IX, ll. 92-102. An historical analogue to this legendary incident is the soporific effect upon the Polynesian navigators of the sweets of repose on the South Sea Islands. (See pp. 13-15, above.)

² Compare Plato's description of 'the City of Swine' in *The Republic*, 369B-372D, which is cited above in Part II. B, vol. i, p. 193, footnote 1.

³ *Od.* X, ll. 233-40.

⁴ *Od.* VII, ll. 255-7.

⁵ See the beautiful description of it, as Hermes saw it, in *Od.* V, ll. 63-74.

⁶ *Od.* V, l. 209, and VII, l. 257.

⁷ *Od.* VII, ll. 259-61.

⁸ *Od.* XII, ll. 39-54 and 153-200.

⁹ *Od.* V, ll. 211-18.

¹⁰ *Od.* V, ll. 151-8.

¹¹ *Od.* V, ll. 1-148.

figure nor in stature, face to face. She is a mortal woman, while thou art deathless and ageless. Yet none the less I long and pray daily to reach my home and to behold the day of my returning. Yea, and if some God shall wreck me in the wine-faced sea, I will endure it. For I have in my breast a spirit well schooled in enduring sorrows. Already have I suffered full many, and have borne the buffetings of wave and war. I care not if this other blow be added unto those."¹

When Odysseus speaks these words, he is his clear-sighted and indomitable self again; and nothing—not even Poseidon's final stroke of malice, which the hero foresees—can prevent him from reaching Ithaca now. Moreover, as he knows already from the mouth of Teiresias' ghost, he will not rest on his oars, even when he has regained his home and slain Penelope's suitors. Another journey awaits him, in which he must bear his oar on his shoulder and exchange the toils and perils of the sea for those of the land.²

The Flesh Pots of Egypt

This *motif* in the Hellenic story of Odysseus' return from Troy to Ithaca appears, in a variant form, in the Syriac story of the Chosen People's exodus from Egypt to the Promised Land. The attraction which undermines the resolution of the Israelites during their wanderings in the wilderness is not the present delight of a Lotus Land or a Calypso's Isle, but a hankering after the flesh pots of Egypt,³ which may perhaps be theirs again to-morrow if only they turn back now. They have no sooner crossed the sea dry-shod, and seen Pharaoh and his host perish in the returning waters, than they begin to murmur in the wilderness against Moses and Aaron:

'Would to God we had died by the hand of the Lord in the Land of Egypt, when we sat by the flesh pots and when we did eat bread to the full; for ye have brought us forth into this wilderness to kill this whole assembly with hunger.'⁴ . . .

'Wherefore is this that thou hast brought us up out of Egypt, to kill us and our children and our cattle with thirst?'⁵ . . .

'Who shall give us flesh to eat? We remember the fish which we did eat in Egypt freely—the cucumbers and the melons and the leeks and the onions and the garlic—but now our soul is dried away: there is nothing at all beside this manna before our eyes.'⁶

Even when they have crossed the wilderness as safely as they had crossed the sea, and stand at last on the threshold of Canaan, their

¹ *Od. V*, ll. 215-24.

² *Od. XI*, ll. 119-34.

³ Egypt seems like an earthly paradise to the Israelites in retrospect, when the memory of their past sojourn there acts as a foil to the current experience of their present ordeal in the wilderness. Yet when they had been living and working in Egypt—making bricks without straw under the task-master's lash—they had realized as clearly as the Egyptian peasants themselves that in Egypt, as in other lands, it is ever in the sweat of his face that Man eats bread.

⁴ Exodus xvi. 3.

⁵ Exodus xvii. 3.

⁶ Numbers xi. 4-6.

thoughts fly back to Egypt as they listen to the evil report of their spies—their sight of the Sons of Anak, the children of the giants, in whose presence the spies had seemed and felt like grasshoppers.

‘And all the congregation lifted up their voice and cried; and the people wept that night. And all the children of Israel murmured against Moses and against Aaron, and the whole congregation said unto them: “Would God that we had died in the land of Egypt! Or would God we had died in this wilderness! And wherefore hath the Lord brought us unto this land, to fall by the sword, that our wives and our children should be a prey? Were it not better for us to return into Egypt?” And they said one to another: “Let us make a captain and let us return into Egypt.”’¹

The Chosen People are unable to enter into their inheritance until this haunting and enervating recollection of the flesh pots has been effaced; and it is not effaced until forty years of purgatory—spent in wandering over the face of the wilderness which they have just put behind them in one straight and rapid trek—have brought the older generation to the grave and the younger generation to manhood.²

The Doasyoulikes

These passages from myth and history surely demonstrate, between them, that when people are translated—whether in ‘real life’ or in imagination—from conditions of pressure into conditions of ease, the effect upon their behaviour is demoralizing. It may perhaps be retorted that this is a truism, and that we might have spared ourselves the trouble of demonstrating the fact and not have overlooked the obvious explanation. The ill effect, it may be argued, is a consequence of the process of transition and not a consequence of the condition in which the transition results. ‘You infer, from the illustrations which you have put before us, that conditions of ease are inimical to civilization in themselves. You might as well argue that a full stomach is inimical to health on the ground that a heavy meal has been known to prove fatal to a starving man. You know very well that the proper treatment for starvation is neither to fill the patient’s empty stomach at one sitting nor to keep him at starvation point in perpetuity, but to re-acustom him to taking a normal amount of nourishment by increasing his ration gradually. The disastrous effect of the heavy meal upon the health of the starving man was due not to any inherent fault in the quantity of the full ration, but solely to the rash abruptness with which it was administered.’ In order to meet this

¹ Numbers xvi. 1-4.

² Numbers xiv. 26-35. On this point, see also II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 334-5, above.

criticism, we must turn to the second of the two situations which we have distinguished above—the situation of people in an easy environment who have never, so far as is known, been exposed to any other environment since their pre-human ancestors became men. In this case, the factor of transition is eliminated and we are enabled to study the effect of easy conditions in the absolute.

Here is an authentic picture of it from Nyasaland, as seen by a Western observer, nearly half a century ago, in the early days of 'the opening-up of Africa':

'Hidden away in these endless forests, like birds' nests in a wood, in terror of one another, and of their common foe, the slaver, are small native villages; and here in his virgin simplicity dwells *Primaeval Man*, without clothes, without civilisation, without learning, without religion—the genuine child of Nature, thoughtless, careless, and contented. This man is apparently quite happy; he has practically no wants. One stick, pointed, makes him a spear; two sticks rubbed together make him a fire; fifty sticks tied together make him a house. The bark he peels from them makes his clothes; the fruits which hang on them form his food. It is perfectly astonishing, when one thinks of it, what Nature can do for the animal-man, to see with what small capital after all a human being can get through the World. I once saw an African buried. According to the custom of his tribe, his entire earthly possessions—and he was an average commoner—were buried with him. Into the grave, after the body, was lowered the dead man's pipe, then a rough knife, then a mud bowl, and last his bow and arrows—the bowstring cut through the middle, a touching symbol that its work was done. That was all. Four items, as an auctioneer would say, were the whole belongings for half a century of this human being. No man knows what a man is till he has seen what a man can be without, and be withal a man. That is to say, no man knows how great Man is till he has seen how small he has been once.

'The African is often blamed for being lazy, but it is a misuse of words. He does not need to work; with so bountiful a Nature round him it would be gratuitous to work. And his indolence, therefore, as it is called, is just as much a part of himself as his flat nose, and as little blameworthy as slowness in a tortoise. The fact is, Africa is a nation of the unemployed.

'This completeness, however, will be a sad drawback to development. Already it is found difficult to create new wants; and when labour is required, and you have already paid your man a yard of calico and a string of beads, you have nothing in your possession to bribe him to another hand's turn. Nothing almost that you have would be the slightest use to him. . . .

'A fine-looking people, quiet and domestic, their life-history from the cradle to the grave is of the utmost simplicity. Too ill armed to hunt, they live all but exclusively on a vegetable diet. A small part of the year they depend, like the monkeys, upon wild fruits and herbs; but the staple food is a small tasteless millet-seed which they grow in gardens,

crush in a mortar, and stir with water into a thick porridge. Twice a day, nearly all the year round, each man stuffs himself with this coarse and tasteless dough, shovelling it into his mouth in handfuls, and consuming at a sitting a pile the size of an ant-heap. His one occupation is to grow this millet, and his gardening is a curiosity. Selecting a spot in the forest, he climbs a tree, and with a small home-made axe lops off the branches one by one. He then wades through the litter to the next tree, and hacks it to pieces also, leaving the trunk standing erect. Upon all the trees within a circle of thirty or forty yards' diameter his axe works similar havoc, till the ground stands breast-high in leaves and branches. Next, the whole is set on fire and burnt to ashes. Then, when the first rains moisten the hard ground and wash the fertile chemical constituents of the ash into the soil, he attacks it with his hoe, drops in a few handfuls of millet, and the year's work is over. But a few weeks off and on are required for these operations, and he may go to sleep till the rains are over, assured of a crop which never fails, which is never poor, and which will last him till the rains return again.

'Between the acts he does nothing but lounge and sleep; his wife, or wives, are the millers and bakers; they work hard to prepare his food, and are rewarded by having to take their own meals apart, for no African would ever demean himself by eating with a woman. I have tried to think of something else that these people habitually do, but their vacuous life leaves nothing more to tell.'¹

This piece of first-hand testimony to the *ethos* and behaviour of Man in an easy environment has been chosen for quotation here because of the remarkable sharpness of vision and depth of insight which the witness displays; but of course his evidence does not stand alone. It could be supported, if that were necessary, by other modern Western evidence, ranging in Time over the four centuries that have elapsed since Western Man first began to take the whole World for his field, and ranging in Space over all parts of the World where he has found primitive societies still surviving.² From the opposite extremity of Tropical Africa, we could cite similar descriptions of the life of the Dinka and the Shilluk—a life which exhibits to-day, like some specimen in 'a living museum', the circumstances in which the fathers of the Egyptian Civilization were living before they responded to the challenge of desiccation and plunged into the jungle-swamp of the Lower Nile Valley.³

¹ Drummond, H.: *Tropical Africa* (London 1888, Hodder and Stoughton), pp. 55-6 and 58-9.

² For a survey and classification of primitive societies that have come under the direct observation of our modern Western explorers and anthropologists, see *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples: an essay in correlation*, by Hobsbouse, L. T., Wheeler, G. C., and Ginsberg, M. (London 1915, Chapman and Hall; reprinted in 1930), which has been cited above in I. C (iii) (a), vol. i, p. 147, footnote 2.

³ See the description of the social institutions of the Dinka and the Shilluk which has been quoted above in II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, on p. 313, from Childe, V. G.: *The Most Ancient East* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), pp. 10-11. For a fuller account, see Seligman, C. G. and B. Z.: *Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan* (London 1932, Routledge).

Again, this Tropical African evidence could be reinforced by records of primitive tropical life in distant longitudes: in Amazonia¹ or in Melanesia.² All this modern Western evidence is readily accessible; and for this reason we will hold it in reserve and will close our review of the effect of easy conditions in the absolute (as distinct from the effect of easy conditions succeeding to difficult conditions, which we have examined already) by citing a description of Hellenic authorship, albeit this description is only given at second hand and has manifestly been enriched by certain legendary touches. Here is Herodotus's account of a people called the Argippaei who were to be found at the farthest extremity, as it stood in his day, of the trade-route leading from the Greek settlements on the north coast of the Black Sea north-eastward into the interior of the great Eurasian Steppe:³

'Up to this point, the whole of the country that I have described is plain-land with a deep soil, but from this point onwards it is broken country and the soil is stony. If you cross this broken country—and there is a great stretch of it—you come to the foothills of lofty mountains; and these foothills are inhabited by people who are all bald from birth, men and women alike. They also have snub noses and bushy beards, and a language of their own, though they wear Scythian clothes; and they live off trees. The tree off which they live is called the *Ponticum*. It is just about the size of a fig-tree, and it bears a fruit the size of a bean, with a stone in it. When the fruit ripens, they bag it in cloths, and then it exudes a thick black substance which is called *aschy*. This they either suck or drink mixed with milk, while from the thick dregs they make cakes and use these for solid food. They have not much livestock because there is not any good pastureland there; but every man lives under his tree. In the winter he covers in the tree with a tent of close white felt; in the summer he lives under the tree in the open. These people are not ill-treated by anybody. They are left in peace because they are regarded as holy, and they possess no arms. Their neighbours bring their disputes to them for arbitration, and anyone who takes asylum with them is safe from injury.'

This Hellenic description of primitive life in Central Asia and the foregoing Western description of primitive life in Central Africa give, between them, a clear picture of how Man does live where he has never been exposed to a challenge either from the

¹ For the absence of response to any stimulus from the environment in the Amazon Basin (except, of course, on its Andean rim), see the allusions in Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilisations of the Andes* (New York 1931, Scribner), p. 25, qualified by Nordenskiöld's observations which have been cited in II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. I, on p. 259, footnote 1, above.

² See Malinowski, B.: *Argonauts of the Pacific* (London 1922, Routledge).

³ The possibility that, a century or so before Herodotus's day, this trade-route may have extended right across the Eurasian Steppe, from the north-eastern extremity of the Hellenic World to the north-western extremity of the Sinic World, is examined by Hudson, G. F., in *Europe and China: A Survey of their Relations from the Earliest Times to 1800* (London 1931, Edward Arnold), ch. 1: 'Beyond the North Wind'.

⁴ Herodotus, Book IV, ch. 23. See also chs. 24 and 25.

physical or from the human environment. He vegetates, quite comfortably and happily, in a state of lethargy; and, to all appearance, he might continue to vegetate in perpetuity, were he not on the point of being exposed to a formidable challenge from the human environment at last.

This imminent challenge is portended in the very fact that his manner of life has come under the observation of one of those energetic societies that are in process of civilization; for his encounter with these importunate strangers will not end in a mere platonic acquaintance. They observe in order to take action; and, when once the explorer has crossed the primitive's threshold, the trader and the missionary and the soldier are sure to follow in quick succession at the explorer's heels. The primitive's isolation is terminated, his peace is broken, his comfort and happiness are replaced by a consciousness of pressure and a feeling of anxiety. In fact, he is confronted by a challenge under which it is impossible for his lethargy to persist. The lethargy may pass into death or it may pass into action, but on either alternative it will pass away.

The possible alternative outcomes of collisions between primitive societies and societies in process of civilization are examined in later parts of this Study.¹ In this place we are concerned solely with the state in which the primitive societies are found existing at the moment when the first contact takes place. This state makes a profound impression upon the intruders because there is an extreme contrast between the two colliding ways of life—between the *ethos* of people who have been sheltered from challenges hitherto by an easy environment and the *ethos* of people who have been challenged and have responded victoriously. This impression works so powerfully upon the intruders' emotions and imagination that it issues in mythology.

The classic Hellenic exposition of the myth is the fable of the Lotus Eaters, which we have quoted already apropos of the effect of the lotus fruit upon Odysseus' companions.² A classic Western exposition is 'The History of the Great and Famous Nation of the Doasyoulikes, who came away from the Country of Hardwork because they wanted to play on the Jews' Harp all day long'. In Charles Kingsley's fable, an improvident people who persist in living a life of primitive ease in an earthly paradise overshadowed by the eruptive crater of Etna, pay the penalty by degenerating into Tropical African gorillas. This is the complement to another Western fable which we have dealt with in an earlier chapter:³

¹ In a general way they are examined in V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 194-337, and in Part VIII; the special case of the collisions between primitive societies and our Western Civilization is further examined in Part XII.

² See pp. 22-3, above.

³ See II. C (ii) (a) i, vol. i, pp. 216-21, above.

'The History of that Virtuous and Provident Creature Nordic Man, who followed the retreating Ice Cap because he wanted to harden his Moral Fibre.' In the Western version of the myth, which these two fables convey between them, the clear vision of the primitive *êthos* in an easy environment, which we find in the verse of Homer and the prose of Herodotus, is obscured by the mists of self-righteousness and self-interest. Yet these blemishes are irrelevant to our present purpose; and, if we consent for the moment to ignore them, we may perceive, underlying them, the philosophic truth which we have studied in the Syriac fable of the Garden of Eden.¹ The same philosophic truth is mirrored in the fable of the Lotus Eaters. In fact, the objective view of the primitive *êthos* in easy circumstances is found, when we abstract it,² to be substantially the same in the minds of the Western and the Hellenic observer. Alike, they see that the primitive environment presents the sharpest contrast to their own; they see that there is a corresponding contrast between the *êthos* which has been induced in the

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, pp. 290-3, above, for a discussion of the fable of the Garden of Eden and for the relevant quotations from Hesiod, Plato, Virgil, Origen, Volney, Huntington, and Myres. It will be noticed that the three passages quoted from the works of Western scholars are simply expurgated versions of the myth which the fable of Nordic Man renders so crudely.

² In all versions of the myth, the objective view—the purely intellectual perception of the facts—has to be disentangled from certain aesthetic and emotional concomitants. The difference between the turns which these concomitants take in the Western and Hellenic versions throws some interesting side-lights upon the difference of outlook which distinguishes the Hellenic from our Western Civilization. In the fable of the Lotus Eaters, the innocence and happiness of the primitive *êthos* in easy circumstances are appreciated at their full aesthetic value—appreciated so keenly that the Hellenic observer feels a lively fear of being captivated by this charming way of life and succumbing to its lethargy and so being beguiled into abandoning those practical ends on the pursuit of which his own civilization depends. The Hellene does not want to remake the Lotus Eater in his own image. Indeed, the idea never occurs to him. He is content to avoid turning into a Lotus Eater himself, and even on this point he is in two minds. As he sails away, he looks back on Lotus Land with a certain wistful regret. 'Perhaps', he thinks, 'I might have been happier as a Lotus Eater after all!' The Western observer's attitude is amusingly different. As a rule, he is blind to the beauty of the life which he is observing. A Malinowski's appreciation of the artistic and ritual and social refinements with which 'the Argonauts of the Pacific' occupy their vast leisure is the exception which proves the rule. The typical Western observer dismisses such primitive occupations as child's-play and triviality and waste of time. He is quite immune from the possibility of being captivated by them himself, and there is no shadow of this fear on his mind. The emotion which he feels is disgust—disgust that the Doasyoulukes should have played truant from the Country of Hardwork; disgust that the Shilluk and the Dinka should have evaded the challenge of desiccation to which the virtuous Egyptian has responded by becoming a fallâh. In the Westerner's view, this weak-minded malingering is so contemptible that it must bring the wretches who indulge in it to a bad end. A Doasyouluke, left to himself, is bound to degenerate into a gorilla. It follows that it is the duty of Nordic Man to intervene, in order to save the Doasyouluke, in spite of himself, from his natural and well-deserved fate. Fortunately, duty and self-interest coincide; for the Doasyouluke can only be saved by being remade in Nordic Man's image, and the first step in this transfiguration is to make him serve an apprenticeship as Nordic Man's hewer of wood and drawer of water. Nordic Man can do with any amount of cheap labour. 'And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to His purpose' (Romans viii. 28). Fortified in his resolution by this oracle from the *Sortes Biblicae*, Nordic Man takes the poor Doasyouluke firmly in hand and—in the various roles of taskmaster, salesman, and evangelist—arouses him from his lethargy, with ultimate consequences which are not yet apparent but which may prove to be surprising.

primitive by his easy circumstances and the *êthos* which has been induced by a strenuous life in themselves; they see that the primitive will not and cannot ever join them in running the race of civilization¹ so long as an easy environment continues to shield him from the necessity; and finally they see that they themselves, if they succumb to this insidious environment, will cease to run with patience the race that is set before them.

II. THE STIMULUS OF HARD COUNTRIES

A Plan of Operations

We have now perhaps established decisively the truth that ease is inimical to civilization. The results of our investigation up to this point appear to warrant the proposition that, the greater the ease of the environment, the weaker the stimulus towards civilization which that environment administers to Man. Can we now proceed one step farther? Are we warranted in formulating, in equally simple and abstract terms, the inverse proposition that the stimulus towards civilization grows stronger in proportion as the environment grows more difficult? Let us put this second proposition to the test by our now well-tried empirical method. Let us review first the evidence in favour of the proposition and then the evidence against it, and see what inference emerges. Evidence indicating that the difficulty and the stimulus of an environment are apt to increase *pari passu* is not hard to lay hands upon. Rather, we are likely to be embarrassed by the wealth of illustrations that leap to the mind. Most of these illustrations present themselves in the form of comparisons. Let us begin by sorting out our illustrations into two groups in which the points of comparison relate to the physical environment and to the human environment respectively; and let us first consider the physical group. It subdivides itself into two categories: comparisons between the respective stimulating effects of physical environments which present different degrees of difficulty; and comparisons between the respective stimulating effects of old ground and new ground, apart from the intrinsic nature of the terrain.

The Yellow River and the Yangtse

Let us compare, for example, the different degrees of difficulty which are presented respectively by the lower valleys of the Yellow River and the Yangtse—starting in either case from the point where the river issues from its last gorge in order to flow the rest of its way through open country to the coast.

The primeval state of the lower section of the Yellow River

¹ For this metaphor, see II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, pp. 233-4, above.

Valley is vividly described in a passage from the work of a distinguished Sinologist which has been quoted in an earlier chapter.¹ When Man first took this watery chaos in hand, the river was not navigable at any season; in the winter it was either frozen or choked with floating ice; the melting of this ice in the spring produced devastating annual floods which repeatedly changed the river's course by carving out new channels, while the old channels turned into jungle-covered swamps. This was the state of the river as Man first found it; and to-day, when some three or four thousand years of human effort have drained the swamps and have confined the main channel of the river between embankments, the devastating action of the floods has not been eliminated. The visitations have merely been reduced in frequency—only to ravage the works of Man with greater violence and over a wider range when they do occur.

The flood-waters of the Yellow River which, in the state of Nature, used to spread themselves annually over the plains, now in normal years travel harmlessly between embankments from the exit of the gorges to the sea; but, like Gods restrained by human impiety from satisfying their lust to destroy, these floods, in passing, prepare for a future revenge. They pile up trouble for Man in the literal sense by depositing the silt which they have brought down from the mountains as they slacken speed and move on sluggishly over the flat river-bed to which, in their lower course, the embankments now confine them. Year by year, as the deposits accumulate, the level of this river-bed rises above the level of the fields on either side; year by year, the people raise the height of the embankments, to prevent the flood-waters from spilling over. Yet at last there comes a point at which the level of the river-bed is so high above the level of the surrounding country that no heightening or thickening of the embankments avails any longer to lend them the requisite resisting power; and then, in some year of high flood, the imprisoned river savagely bursts its banks and engulfs a whole countryside, obliterating the fields and sweeping away the buildings and drowning the live stock and the population. Since the history of the region began to be recorded, these periodic inundations have occurred innumerable times; and on several occasions the river has changed its course completely. At the present moment it debouches into the Gulf of Chihli near the mid-point of its south-western coast, almost opposite the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula; in the prehistoric age it debouched at the north-west corner of the Gulf through the bed in which the Pei-ho River flows to-day;² but during the intervening three or four

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 318-20, above.

² *Op. cit.*, loc. cit.

millennia it has played greater vagaries than this. Less than a century ago it was not debouching into the Gulf of Chihli at all. It was only the inundation of 1852 that diverted the river back into the Gulf from a channel debouching, south of the Shantung Peninsula, direct into the Yellow Sea; and this was not the first time on record that the Yellow River had switched its course from one side of the Shantung Peninsula to the other.

A remarkable contrast to this is presented by the lower valley of the Yangtse. The Lower Yangtse drains a basin where the land is potentially no less fertile than the northern plains and where agriculture has not to labour, as it labours there, under the twofold scourge of flood and drought. The Yangtse sometimes emulates his northern brother in inundating his human neighbours' fields,¹ but he never refuses to bear their craft upon his waters.²

Such are the respective characters of the two great rivers, as they were in the beginning and as they are to-day. And where did the Sinic Civilization come to birth? On the banks of the gracious Yangtse-kiang or on those of the demonic Hwang-ho? We know that it came to birth on the banks of the Hwang-ho, and that the Lower Yangtse Valley was not brought within the ambit of the Sinic Society until after the Sinic Civilization had broken down and had entered upon a Time of Troubles which was the first phase of its decline.

Chimu and Valparaiso

Again, on what section of the Pacific Coast of South America did the Andean Civilization come to birth? Not on that Central

¹ A week after these sentences had been written in the summer of the year 1931, the Yangtse produced, in the region of Hankow, a flood which, in scale and in destructiveness, is perhaps unsurpassed in the annals of the Yellow River itself. Nevertheless, the writer believes that on a long view, extending back to the local beginnings of recorded history in the middle of the last millennium B.C., the contrast here drawn between the characters displayed by the Yangtse and the Yellow River in their respective relations to Man is borne out on the whole by the facts.

² In the year 1926 of the Christian Era, 'the Yangtse was navigable' in 'the summer months, when the discharge of the river was augmented by the summer rainfall and by the melting of the snows in Tibet . . . as far up as Hankow (about 570 miles from its mouth) . . . for large ocean-going steamers'; and this point had been known to be reached by 'a foreign battleship of as much as 12,000 tons displacement. . . . Under the same conditions, steamers of ordinary construction, though not of heavy tonnage, could navigate likewise the next section of 367 nautical miles from Hankow to Ichang. The section of 400 nautical miles above this, between Ichang and Chungking, had been opened since 1919 to steam-navigation by specially constructed river-steamers of light draft and with engines sufficiently powerful to mount the rapids. This achievement had brought steam-navigation into Szechuan—the most populous Chinese province (with an estimated population of 50,000,000). For native junks, the passage of the rapids in the Ichang-Chungking section was a slow, laborious, and dangerous operation. On the other hand, they were able to ascend the river as far as Suifu, which was about 1,548 nautical miles from the mouth, or even as far as Pingshan, about 33 miles further, whereas Chungking, the limit of river-steamer navigation, was about 1,337 miles from the mouth, and Ichang, the limit of navigation for small steamers of ordinary build, about 937.' (Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926 (London 1928, Milford), pp. 302-3.)

Chilean section which enjoys such a generous rainfall that the Spanish explorers saluted an earthly paradise—Valparaiso—in the first of these green valleys which rejoiced their eyes after their long journey down the parched brown coast which they had to traverse farther north. The Andean Civilization came to birth on the North Peruvian section of the coast—described in a passage which has been quoted above¹—where Man has to fight a perpetual battle with the desert and must water his fields, which the sky will not water for him, by his own hard labour: the spade-work of digging and maintaining innumerable irrigation-channels. Chile was not brought within the ambit of the Andean Society until the Andean Civilization had reached an advanced stage in its decline. Chile was one of the last conquests of the Empire of the Incas—the Andean universal state—and even then the Incas were content to leave the greater part of fertile Chile beyond their southern frontier, which they drew along the line of the River Maule. The Incas were at home on the Andean Plateau, to which the coastal civilization had spread at an early date in its growth. And on what section of the plateau did this civilization secure its first foothold? Neither on the section which was nearest to its primary home in the coastal valleys of Chimú, nor yet on the northerly section (in the territory of the modern Latin Republic of Colombia) where the altitudes are comparatively low and the valleys open and the climate genial. The ruins of Tiahuanaco testify that the first foothold of civilization on the plateau was in the upland basin of Lake Titicaca—a region which was hardly nearer to the primary home of the Andean Civilization in one direction than the upper basin of the Magdalena River was in the other, while in soil and climate it was manifestly less inviting.²

Lowlands and Highlands in Guatemala

Again, which face of Central America was it that saw the birth of the Mayan Civilization? Not the Pacific face, where a relatively high altitude co-operates with a relatively low rainfall to liberate a strip of country from the pall of tropical forest which smothers the Atlantic lowlands.³

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 322-3, above.

² See the description of the Titicaca Basin which has been quoted in vol. i, p. 322, above. For the birth-places of the Andean Civilization, and the course of its expansion during its growth, see II. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 120-3, above.

³ For the contrast in climate and vegetation between the Pacific Highlands and the Atlantic Lowlands of Central America, see Huntington, E.: *The Climatic Factor as illustrated in Arid America* (Washington 1914, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 192), chs. xvii and xviii. For the almost exact inversion of the relative degrees of civilization that have been prevalent respectively in the several different geographical zones of Central America in post-Columbian times, as contrasted with the situation in the age in which the Mayan Civilization came to birth and grew to maturity, see op. cit., pp. 218-19. For Dr. Huntington's hypothesis that this shift of social zones is to be accounted for by a shift of climatic zones, see II. D (vii), Annex I, below.

When the Spaniards arrived, they took to these open healthy Central American uplands overlooking the Pacific—an earthly paradise in the Tropics—as decidedly as they took to Chilean Valparaíso at the far extremity of their conquests in the New World. It was here that they planted their Central American settlements, working their way up the Pacific coast from the point where they bestrode the Isthmus of Panama as far as the present frontier between Guatemala and Mexico. On the other hand, they made no serious attempt to occupy the Atlantic coast of Central America between their settlements on the Isthmus and their settlements in Yucatan. The tropical forest in the hinterland deterred them, though this coast lay almost within sight of their island possessions in the Antilles and though the opening up of coast and hinterland would have shortened appreciably the length of the journey between the Spanish settlements on the Pacific face of Central America and the mother country. In spite of that, the Spaniards abandoned this Atlantic coast to indigenous Indians and to English interlopers,¹ and were content to leave the communications between Spain and the Spanish settlements on the Pacific coast to follow the roundabout route across the Isthmus. The situation has not changed substantially since the Spanish Empire in the New World has disappeared. Though five out of the six republics which are its 'successor-states' in Central America possess Atlantic seabords, the best-developed districts and the principal centres of population are still to be found on the uplands overlooking the Pacific where the Spaniards first made themselves at home. In 1933, there were still no more than two lines of railway spanning Central America from coast to coast between the Isthmus of Panama and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; and in 1927 the capital city of at least one republic was still cut off from its Atlantic littoral by a barrier of virgin and virtually impassable jungle.²

The contrast between the eagerness and promptness with which the Spaniards took to the open highlands overlooking the Pacific coast of Central America and the almost complete failure of the colonists and their successors, over a period of more than four

¹ An unsuccessful attempt to found a Puritan colony on the islet of Santa Catalina or Providence, off 'the Mosquito Coast', was made in A.D. 1630 (see Newton, A. P.: *The Colonizing Activities of the English Puritans* (New Haven 1914, Yale University Press)), and the British Government continued to claim a protectorate over the Mosquito Indians till 1855. After the acquisition of Jamaica, the English secured a footing on another section of this coast which has now become the Crown Colony of British Honduras.

² The North American statesman, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, when he was at Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, in 1927, found that 'the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua was distant from us much less than 200 miles as the crow flies, but it takes longer to get there than to go from New York to San Francisco, and the only way of going was by sea through the Panama Canal, unless one was willing to travel on foot through the jungle or to follow down a tropical river in a canoe'. (Stimson, H. L.: *American Policy in Nicaragua* (New York 1927, Scribner), p. 47.)

centuries, to open up the Atlantic coast with its hinterland of tropical forest, gives some measure of the difference in the degree of the difficulty which these two neighbouring but very diverse regions oppose respectively to Man when he attempts to break them in. Where was it, then, that the oldest indigenous civilization of the New World came to birth? On the Central American uplands or in the Central American forests? We know that the Mayan Civilization came to birth in the forests and that, even when it spread, its line of expansion was not southwards into the adjoining uplands but northwards into the Yucatan Peninsula and on to the Mexican Plateau. It was in those quarters, and not on the southern uplands, that the two later civilizations which were related to the Mayan Civilization arose in their turn. Apparently the easily accessible Central American uplands were never occupied by any civilization until the Spaniards came to take possession of them from the other side of the Atlantic. The indigenous civilizations were as persistent in shunning the uplands as the intrusive civilization has been in shunning the forests. Then were the Mayas blind and the Spaniards sharp-sighted? We have only to compare the respective achievements in Central America of the Mayan Civilization on the one hand and of the Spanish version of our Western Civilization on the other in order to realize that the forests in which the Mayan Civilization came to birth surpass in two respects the uplands on which our Western Civilization has been propagated. They not only surpass them in the degree of the difficulty which they oppose to human efforts; they surpass them no less in the degree of the response which they have evoked from human beings who have made the effort to grapple with them.¹

The Aegean Coasts and their Continental Hinterlands

Again, the unusual difficulty presented by the Aegean area, in which the Minoan and the Hellenic Civilization successively came to birth, becomes fully apparent only when the area is viewed in its geographical setting, against the foil provided by the regions round about. I can testify to this from personal experience. On my first visit to the Aegean, I came and went by sea; and, as always, the sea-voyage had the psychological effect of fixing a great mental gulf between its termini. The contrast between the physical features of Greece and those of England was of course obvious; but on both the journey out and the journey back the abrupt transition from the one country to the other made it impossible to

¹ This avoidance of the former theatre of the Mayan Civilization by the Spanish colonists in Central America may be compared with the avoidance of the former theatre of the Indic Civilization in Ceylon by the Scottish and English planters. (See II. D (i), pp. 6-7, above.) In both instances, the latter-day Western intruders chose the softer—and less stimulating—option.

appreciate this obvious matter of fact imaginatively. On my second visit to the Aegean, I again arrived by sea; but this time I broke my stay in Athens by making three reconnaissances into regions just outside the Aegean area. First I went to Smyrna and made expeditions from there by rail up country into the interior of Anatolia; next I went to Constantinople and made other expeditions into Anatolia from that quarter; and then, before coming home, I went to Salonica and made an expedition from there into the interior of Macedonia. Finally, I returned to England by the overland route, travelling in the same railway-carriage, without a change, from Constantinople to Calais. Thus, in the course of this visit, I travelled overland, out of the Aegean area into the regions round about, in four different directions; and each time, in every direction, I found myself travelling out of country that was bare, barren, rocky, mountainous, and broken into fragments by the estranging sea, into country that was greener and richer and softer—country in which mountain-ranges were replaced by rolling hills, and sea-filled gulfs and straits by broad cultivable river-valleys. The cumulative effect of these contrasts upon the observer's imagination was very powerful. On this comparative view, the Aegean area showed itself in its true colours as a region of unusual difficulty, not only by contrast with England or with the other Transalpine countries of Europe, but by contrast with every region adjoining it. In this light, I realized the deep meaning of the words which Herodotus puts into the mouth of the Spartan exile Dâmarâtus in a colloquy with the Great King Xerxes: 'Hellas has a foster-sister Poverty who never leaves her; but she has brought in a guest in the shape of Virtue, the child of Wisdom and Law; and by Virtue's aid Hellas keeps Poverty at bay and Servitude likewise.'¹

Attica and Boeotia

Similar contrasts in the physical environment, capped by corresponding contrasts in the local variety of civilization, may be observed in the interior of the Aegean area itself. For instance, if one travels by train from Athens along the railway which eventually leads, through Salonica, out of the Aegean area into the heart of Europe, one passes, on the first stage of the journey, through a stretch of country which gives to Central or Western European eyes an anticipatory glimpse of familiar scenery. After the train has been climbing slowly for hours round the eastern flanks of Mount Parnes through a typical Aegean landscape of stunted pines and jagged limestone crags, the traveller is astonished to find himself

¹ Herodotus, Book VII, ch. 102. The Greek text is: Τῇ Ἑλλάδι πένη μὲν αἰεὶ κοτε σύντροφός ἐστι, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἑπακτός ἐστι, ἀπὸ τε σοφίης κατεργασμένη καὶ νόμου ἰσχυροῦ· τῇ διαχρεωμένῃ ἢ Ἑλλὰς τήν τε πείνην ἀπαμύνεται καὶ τὴν δεσποσύνην.

being rattled down into a lowland country of gently undulating deep-soiled ploughlands. He might imagine that he had just crossed the Austro-German frontier on the railway between Innsbruck and Munich; the northern aspect of Parnes and Cithaerôn, which he now views at a distance across this lowland foreground, might be the northernmost range of the Tyrolese Alps. Of course this landscape is a 'sport'. He will not see the like again until he has put Nish behind him some thirty-six hours later and is descending the Lower Valley of the Morava towards the Middle Danube; and that makes this anticipatory patch of Bavaria-in-Greece so much the more striking.

What was this odd piece of country called during the lifetime of the Hellenic Civilization? It was called Boeotia; and in Hellenic minds the word 'Boeotian' had a quite distinctive connotation. It stood for an *êthos* which was rustic, stolid, unimaginative, brutal—an *êthos* out of harmony with the prevailing genius of the Hellenic culture. This discord between the Boeotian *êthos* and Hellenism was accentuated by the fact that just behind the range of Cithaerôn, and just round the corner of Parnes where the railway winds its way nowadays, lay Attica 'the Hellas of Hellas': the country whose *êthos* was the quintessence of Hellenism lying cheek by jowl with the country whose *êthos* affected normal Hellenic sensibilities like a jarring note. The contrast was summed up in piquant phrases: 'Boeotian Swine' and 'Attic Salt'.

The point of interest, for the purpose of our present study, is that this cultural contrast, which impressed itself so vividly on the ancient Hellenic consciousness, was geographically coincident with an equally striking contrast in the physical environment which already existed then and which still survives to-day to impress the passing Western railway-traveller. For Attica is 'the Hellas of Hellas' not only in her soul but in her physique. She stands to the other countries of the Aegean as those Aegean countries stand to the regions around. If you approach Greece by sea from the west and enter through the avenue of the Corinthian Gulf, you may flatter yourself that your eye has grown accustomed to the Greek landscape—beautiful and forbidding at once—before the view is shut out by the banks of the Corinth Canal. Yet when your steamer emerges from the cutting through the Isthmus to plough Aegean waters at last, you will still be shocked, in the Saronic Gulf, by an austerity of landscape for which the scenery on the other side of the Isthmus has not fully prepared you; and this austerity attains its climax when you round the corner of Salamis and see the land of Attica spread out before your eyes up to the summits of Pentelicus and Hymettus.

In Attica, with her abnormally light and stony soil, the process called denudation, which Boeotia has escaped down to this day, was already complete in Plato's time, as witness the Attic philosopher's own graphic account of it.

'Contemporary Attica may accurately be described as a mere relic of the original country, as I shall proceed to explain. In configuration, Attica consists entirely of a long peninsula protruding from the mass of the continent into the sea, and the surrounding marine basin is known to shelve steeply round the whole coastline. In consequence of the successive violent deluges which have occurred within the past 9,000 years (the interval which separates our own times from the period with which we are dealing), there has been a constant movement of soil away from the high altitudes; and, owing to the shelving relief of the coast, this soil, instead of laying down alluvium, as it does elsewhere, to any appreciable extent, has been perpetually deposited in the deep sea round the periphery of the country or, in other words, lost; so that Attica has undergone the process observable in small islands, and what remains of her substance is like the skeleton of a body emaciated by disease, as compared with her original relief. All the rich, soft soil has moulted away, leaving a country of skin and bones. At the period, however, with which we are dealing, when Attica was still intact, what are now her mountains were lofty, soil-clad hills; her so-called shingle-plains of the present day were full of rich soil; and her mountains were heavily afforested—a fact of which there are still visible traces. There are mountains in Attica which can now keep nothing but bees, but which were clothed, not so very long ago, with fine trees producing timber suitable for roofing the largest buildings; the roofs hewn from this timber are still in existence. There were also many lofty cultivated trees, while the country produced boundless pasture for cattle. The annual supply of rainfall was not lost, as it is at present, through being allowed to flow over the denuded surface into the sea, but was received by the country, in all its abundance, into her bosom, where she stored it in her impervious potter's earth and so was able to discharge the drainage of the heights into the hollows in the form of springs and rivers with an abundant volume and a wide territorial distribution. The shrines that survive to the present day on the sites of extinct water-supplies are evidence for the correctness of my present hypothesis.'

What did the Athenians do with their poor country when she lost the buxomness of her Boeotian youth? We know that they did the things which made Athens 'the education of Hellas'.² When the pastures of Attica dried up and her ploughlands wasted away, her people turned from the common pursuits of stock-breeding and grain-growing to devices that were all their own: olive-cultivation

¹ Plato, *Critias*, III A-D.

² The Athenian response to the challenge of the Attic environment has been touched upon, by anticipation, in I. B (ii), vol. i, pp. 24-5, above.

and the exploitation of the subsoil. The gracious tree of Athena not only keeps alive but flourishes on the bare rock. Yet Man cannot live by olive-oil alone. To make a living from his olive-groves, the Athenian must exchange Attic oil for Scythian grain. To place his oil on the Scythian market, he must pack it in jars and ship it overseas—necessities which called into existence the Attic potteries and the Attic merchant-marine,¹ and also the Attic silver-mines, since international trade demands a money economy and thus stimulates an exploration of the subsoil for precious metals as well as for potter's earth. Finally, all these things together—exports, industries, merchant ships, and money—required the protection and defrayed the upkeep of a navy. Thus the denudation of their soil in Attica stimulated the Athenians to acquire the command of the sea from one end of the Aegean to the other, and beyond; and therewith the riches which they had lost were recovered a hundredfold. This effect of Athenian sea-power

¹ In the year 1921, the writer of this Study visited a modern Orthodox Christian community in the Aegean area in whose life the olive was then playing the same part as it had once played in Hellenic Attica. This modern Greek city-state of Ayvalyq (a Turkish word meaning 'Quince Orchard') or Kydhoniés (the equivalent in modern Greek) was situated on a little peninsula projecting into the Aegean from the west coast of Anatolia opposite the Greek island of Mitylene (the ancient Lesbos). The soil of this peninsula—which was as thin and stony and rock-ribbed as the soil of Attica itself—made a striking impression of barrenness upon the traveller who came to Ayvalyq overland from the fertile valley of the Caicus and travelled on to Mitylene with its smiling gardens and vineyards just across the water. From the citadel of Pergamum, which commands the Caicus Valley, Macedonian Attalids and Turkish Qara 'Osmanoghlus had sometimes extended their dominions over half Asia Minor. Yet barren Ayvalyq had acquired an empire too: an overseas empire extracted from the olive. The Greek settlers from all parts of the Aegean who had founded Ayvalyq during the last quarter of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era had turned the barren soil, on which their lot was cast, into a goodly heritage by planting it with two million olive trees; and, a century and a half later, these plantations were supporting a community of thirty or forty thousand people in a high degree of civilization. At Ayvalyq, the olive was at the bottom of everything. The community purchased its food supplies and other necessities of life by exporting the produce of the olive in various forms: as fruit, as oil, and as soap (which they manufactured out of the oil in their own factories). The waste product of the oil-presses—skins and stones and dregs—was used as fuel for driving the oil-presses and the soap-factories in Ayvalyq town, and also for driving the steamers (owned by local capitalists and manned by local crews) which carried the produce of the olive-groves from Ayvalyq port as far afield as Russia and America, in order to fetch the community's foreign requirements as return cargoes. This olive-economy enabled Ayvalyq not only to live but to live well. This community of fruit-growers and manufacturers and merchants and shippers did not neglect the things of the spirit. Its chief glory was an academy which was one of the first places in which the literature of ancient Hellas and the science of the modern West had been studied and taught together in the modern Greek tongue.

This remarkable community at Ayvalyq was both brought into existence and wiped out of existence by the process of Westernization, as this remorselessly worked itself out in the Near East. After being twice destroyed and twice refounded in the struggle for the heritage of the old Ottoman Empire—a struggle which the ferment of Westernization set on foot between the Greeks and the Turks and the other Near Eastern peoples—Greek Ayvalyq was finally evacuated, this time presumably for good, in the great Greek exodus from Anatolia after the *débâcle* of the Greek Army in 1922. To-day, modern Greek Ayvalyq belongs to the past no less than ancient Greek Athens. The present writer's glimpse of the place in 1921, on the eve of its extinction, has enabled him to understand by analogy the part played in ancient Attic life by the miraculous tree which was venerated and loved as the gift of Attica's tutelary Goddess.

has been vividly painted by an anonymous Athenian writer of the generation before Plato's:

'Bad harvests due to atmospheric conditions fall with crushing weight upon even the strongest land-powers, while sea-powers surmount them easily. Bad harvests are never of world-wide incidence, and therefore the masters of the sea are always able to draw upon regions in which the harvest has been abundant. If I may venture to descend to minor details, I may add that the command of the sea has enabled the Athenians . . . to discover refinements of luxury through their extensive foreign relations. Every delicacy of Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Black Sea, the Peloponnese or any other country has been accumulated on a single spot in virtue of the command of the sea. . . . Moreover, the Athenians are the only nation, Hellenic or non-Hellenic, that is in a position to accumulate wealth. If a country happens to be rich in ship-timber, what market is there for it, if it fails to conciliate the masters of the sea? Similarly, if a country happens to be rich in iron, copper or flax, what market is there for it, if it fails to find favour in the same quarter? But these are precisely the raw materials out of which I construct my ships—timber coming from one source, iron from a second, copper from a third, hemp from a fourth, flax from a fifth. In addition, they will refuse to licence the export of these commodities to other markets or—those who choose to oppose our wishes shall be excluded from the sea! Thus I, who produce not one of these commodities in my home territory, possess them all by way of the sea, while no other country possesses any two of them simultaneously.'¹

But these riches of the sea—riches beyond the dream of the Boeotian ploughman whose deep-soiled fields had never failed him—were merely the economic foundation for a political and artistic and intellectual culture which made Athens 'the education of Hellas' and 'Attic Salt' the antithesis of Boeotian animality. On the political plane, the Athenian industrial and sea-faring population constituted the electorate of the Athenian democracy, while Attic trade and sea-power provided the framework for that international association of Aegean city-states which took shape in the Delian League under Athenian auspices. On the artistic plane, the prosperity of the Attic potteries gave the Attic vase-painter the opportunity which he used for creating a new form of beauty; and the extinction of the Attic forests compelled Athenian architects to translate their work from the medium of timber into the medium of stone and so led them on to create the Parthenon instead of resting content with the commonplace log-house which Man has always built in every place where tall trees grow.² On the

¹ Pseudo-Xenophon: *Athēnaion Politeia* ('Athenian Institutions'), edited by Kalinka, E. (Leipzig 1913, Teubner), ch. 2.

² The translation of a commonplace architecture in timber into a unprecedentedly and unsurpassedly noble architecture in stone was of course not an exclusively Attic achievement. It was the general consequence of a general exhaustion of timber-supplies

intellectual plane, to quote our anonymous Athenian observer once again,

'their familiarity . . . with every language spoken under the Sun has enabled the Athenians to select this expression from that language and this from the other, with the result that—in contrast to other Hellenes, who, as a general rule, preserve their local dialect, life and costume—the Athenians rejoice in a cosmopolitan civilization for which the entire Hellenic and non-Hellenic worlds have been laid under contribution.¹

This Attic culture did, indeed, gather the whole of the contemporary Hellenic culture into itself, in order to transmit it to posterity seasoned with the 'Attic Salt' and ennobled by the Attic impress.

Chalcidicé and Boeotia

The contrast between Boeotia and Attica is not the only illustration of our theme which the Aegean area has bequeathed from the age when it was the theatre of Hellenic history. Boeotia had another neighbour, Chalcis: a closer neighbour than Athens, though divided from Boeotia by the sea. The city of Chalcis stood on the Euboean shore of the Straits—so narrow that at times they have been spanned by a bridge—which run between the Island of Euboea and the Boeotian mainland. In the Euboean hinterland of Chalcis City, and within the frontiers of the Chalcidian State, lay the Lelantine Plain. And this Chalcidian campagna was not like the 'bad lands' of Latium or Attica. It was as good a ploughland as Boeotia itself; but, unfortunately—or fortunately—for the Chalcidians, the Lelantine Plain was narrow; and hence, while the Boeotian farmers were still finding land for the plough, enough and to spare, without looking beyond their borders, the Chalcidian farmers—brought up short, on their island, by the precipitous flanks of the towering peak of Dirphys—were stimulated to search for fresh ploughlands abroad. The salt waters of the Euripus Straits, which washed the foot of their city walls, offered the Chalcidians a sea-passage for their voyages of exploration. Sailing out into the Aegean and beyond it, they took to the land again wherever they found another Lelantine Plain awaiting the Chalcidian plough with a native population incompetent to hold its own against the Chalcidian colonist. Sailing north and east, they founded a new Chalcidicé on the coasts of Thrace; sailing south and west, they founded another in Sicily.

throughout the Aegean area. It was, however, on Athenian sites and in Athenian hands that the Hellenic architecture produced its masterpieces. We may note in passing that the absence of building timber had a profoundly stimulating effect not only upon the Hellenic architecture but upon the Sumeric. Here, however, the effect was of a different kind. While the Hellenic architect, in translating from timber into stone, was stimulated to create a new beauty, the Sumeric architect, in translating from timber into brick, was stimulated to invent a new technique. He discovered the principles of the arch and the vault.

¹ Op. cit., loc. cit.

Of course, this feat which the Chalcidians performed under the stimulus of land-shortage in Euboea is not to be compared with the feats to which the denudation of Attica stimulated the Athenians. While the Athenians responded to the Attic challenge by a qualitative change in their economy, the Chalcidians' response to the Euboean challenge was quantitative. They merely added field to field, instead of transforming fields into mines and olive-groves. The agricultural life of the Chalcidian colonies, each set in its arable plain—a Thracian Torone or a Sicilian Leontini—was a replica of the life which had been lived in the Lelantine Plain by the colonists' forefathers and which was still being lived there by their cousins whose forefathers had succeeded in staying at home. In other words, the expansion of Chalcis differed from the expansion of Athens in being extensive and not intensive.¹ Nevertheless, Chalcis too, in response to a less formidable challenge, made a mark—albeit a fainter mark than the Athenian—upon Hellenic history. It was through those Chalcidian farmer-settlers overseas that the barbarians of Macedonia and of Latium were drawn into the orbit of the Hellenic Civilization and were given their first tincture of the Hellenic culture.² The Chalcidians reacted, in their degree, to the prick of Necessity's spur, while comfortable Boeotia cared for none of these things.

Byzantium and Calchedon

The enlargement of the area of the Hellenic World *circa* 725-525 B.C., in which the Chalcidians played this prominent part, offers us some further Hellenic illustrations of our theme. Among the barbarians who came within range of the movement and who reacted to it by becoming converts to Hellenism instead of being supplanted by Greek settlers, the difference, in stimulating effect, between a hard and an easy environment is illustrated by the contrast between the careers of the two Italian city-states which arose respectively in the Roman and in the Capuan campaign. This contrast needs no more than a bare mention here, since we have examined it in another connexion already;³ and we may pass on to the celebrated illustration which is afforded by the contrast between the two Greek colonies of Calchedon and Byzantium which were planted respectively on the Asiatic and on the European side of the entrance to the Bosphorus from the Sea of Marmara.

A century or so after the foundation of the two cities, the Persian

¹ This point has been noted, by anticipation, in I. B (ii), vol. i, pp. 24-5, above, and is taken up again in Part III. B, vol. iii, pp. 120-2, below.

² See further III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii.

³ See pp. 18-21, above.

statesman Megabazus, who had been placed in charge of the European hinterland of the Straits by Darius,

'made a *mot* which won him immortal celebrity among the Hellespontine Greeks. At Byzantium he heard that the Calchedonians had planted their city seventeen years earlier than the Byzantines had planted theirs; and he had no sooner heard it than he remarked: "Then the Calchedonians must have been blind men all that time." He meant that they must have been blind to choose the worse site when the better was at their disposal.'¹

Megabazus's famous observation was epigrammatic rather than acute; for it is not so difficult to be wise after the event, and in Megabazus's day the respective destinies of Calchedon and Byzantium were already manifest. Calchedon was still what she had been to begin with: an ordinary Greek transmarine agricultural settlement of the kind which Chalcis and Megara and half a dozen other agricultural communities in Old Greece had planted by the score round the coasts of the Mediterranean and its backwaters. Meanwhile, Byzantium was already growing into one of the busiest ports of the Hellenic World and was fairly launched on the career which was to culminate in her becoming the ultimate capital of a Hellenic universal state in the last phase of Hellenic history. Thus, by Megabazus's time, any comparison between the respective advantages of the sites of Byzantium and Calchedon would naturally turn upon their respective facilities as ports; and on this test the eligibility of Byzantium was no doubt incomparably greater than that of her neighbour over the water. Byzantium not only possessed the natural harbour of the Golden Horn which had no counterpart on the exposed and featureless section of the opposite Asiatic coastline where Calchedon stood. More than that, the set of the current which comes down the Bosphorus from the Black Sea into the Sea of Marmara is in favour of any vessel trying to make the Golden Horn from either direction, while it is adverse to any vessel heading for the open beach of Calchedon.² Thus every ship that plies between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean has a double incentive for passing by on the other side from Calchedon and making Byzantium its port of call. The founders of Calchedon would have been blind men indeed if, in face of this obvious fact, they had deliberately chosen Calchedon in preference to Byzantium as the site for a port.

In reality, of course, the founders of Calchedon made their historic choice on quite a different consideration. As they approached the southern entrance to the Bosphorus on their voyage

¹ Herodotus, Book IV, ch. 144.

² See the detailed account of this which is given by Polybius, Book IV, chs. 43 and 44.

of exploration, they looked at the landscape and chose their site with eyes that were not blind at all, but were simply farmers' eyes and not mariners'; and from the farmer's standpoint their choice was admirable. They planted their city on the Bithynian Riviera: a sheltered strip of fertile coast which seems like an enclave of Mediterranean scenery in a more northerly clime. On this favoured spot, the Greek farmer-prospectors who founded Calchedon settled down to raise the crops and plant the fruit-trees which they had always raised and planted at home. For their purpose, they could not have chosen better; and we may be sure that this was the judgement of the next company of Greek explorers, in search of fresh land for their ploughs, who came this way seventeen years later. We may picture the founders of Byzantium cursing the Calchedonians for their perspicacity and themselves for their tardiness as they turned their ships' prows away from the smiling Bithynian Riviera, now crowned by Calchedon's walls, towards the much less inviting opposite coast of Thrace. Some Hesiodic equivalent of the proverb that 'It is the early bird that gets the first worm' must have often been in the Byzantines' mouths when they tilled the soil of their little Thracian peninsula—only to see their crops carried off systematically, year after year, by the barbarians of the hinterland.

'The Byzantine territory is an enclave in Thrace, which marches with the entire Byzantine land-frontier and comes down to the sea on either side. In consequence, the Byzantines are afflicted with an interminable and insoluble war against the Thracians. Even when they make a military effort and get the better of the Thracians for the moment, they can never get rid of the Thracian war owing to the multitude of the Thracian hordes and Thracian princelings. If they overthrow one princeling, this simply clears the way for three others more formidable than the first. Even if the Byzantines give in and come to terms for paying a stipulated tribute, they find themselves no better off. For any concession which they make to one enemy has the direct effect of bringing five new enemies down upon them. So they are in the toils of this interminable and insoluble war, in which they are exposed to all the danger of being at close quarters with a bad neighbour and all the horror of warfare against a barbarian adversary. These, in a general way, are the evils against which they have to struggle on land; and, besides the ordinary evils attendant on war, they have to endure the legendary punishment of Tantalus. They possess a first-rate soil; they cultivate it intensively; they raise fine big crops—and then the barbarians arrive on the scene to gather in and carry off the crops and destroy what they do not take away! It is not only the loss of labour and money and the spectacle of devastation but the fineness of the crops that makes the business heartbreaking.'

¹ Polybius, Book IV, ch. 45.

Thus Byzantium was subject, as a matter of course, throughout her history, to a recurrent calamity which Athens only experienced during fifteen out of the twenty-eight years of the Peloponnesian War¹ and Miletus only during her eleven years' war with Lydia in the reigns of Kings Sadyattes and Alyattes.² Her agriculture was at the mercy of an invader whom she was not strong enough to meet in the field and who therefore had a free hand to carry off or destroy her crops. After all, then, the Greek farmer-colonists who founded Calchedon were not blind men when, with both shores of the Bosphorus to choose between, they settled on the Bithynian Riviera and shunned the inhospitable Thracian shore; nor were the founders of Byzantium men of vision. They simply followed in the earlier prospectors' wake and took their leaveings. However, a vindication of the Calchedonians' perspicacity is not the true moral of this story. The true moral is that when the Byzantines found themselves perpetually subject, on land, to a prohibitive handicap which the Athenians and the Milesians suffered only for a few critical years in the whole course of their respective histories, the Byzantines were thereby stimulated, even more powerfully than the Athenians and the Milesians were stimulated in their less desperate circumstances, to turn their attention from the land to the sea and to indemnify themselves for their ruinous losses as farmers by making handsome profits as merchants and mariners. Under this powerful stimulus, to which the prudent Calchedonian farmers on the opposite shore were never exposed, the Byzantines made the most of their straits and discovered—no doubt to their own surprise as well as to their neighbours'—that 'the Golden Horn' was a cornucopia. The wealth and influence which Byzantium was taught by Necessity to derive from her command of the Bosphorus are described in the second century B.C. by Polybius in terms which recall the passage already cited³ from an anonymous Athenian writer of the fifth century who is describing the effects of his own country's wider but less durable sea-power.

'The Byzantines occupy a site which, from the twin standpoints of security and prosperity, is the most favourable of all sites in the Hellenic World to seaward and the most unprepossessing of all to landward. To

¹ During the first part of the War, the Peloponnesians invaded Attica in the years 431, 430, 428, 427, and 425 B.C. During the second part, they were in permanent occupation of a fortified position on Attic soil, at Decleia, during the years 413-404 B.C. inclusive.

² See the account of this war in Herodotus, Book I, chs. 17-22. The Lydian invaders of Miletus practised the same form of economic warfare as the Thracian invaders of the Byzantine territory and the Peloponnesian invaders of Attica. They destroyed or carried off the annual crops. On the other hand, the Lydians showed less barbarity—or at any rate more enlightened self-interest—than either the Thracians or the Peloponnesians in leaving the farm-buildings, out in the countryside, intact.

³ On pp. 41-2, above.

seaward, Byzantium commands the mouth of the Black Sea so absolutely that it is impossible for any merchantman to pass either in or out against the Byzantines' will; and thus the Byzantines control all the numerous commodities originating in the Black Sea which are in general demand. These commodities include both necessities—like the cattle and slaves for which the hinterland of the Black Sea is notoriously a prime source of supply, both for quantity and for quality—and luxuries like honey, wax and caviar, which the same region provides in abundance. Moreover, the Black Sea hinterland offers a market for the surplus of our Mediterranean products, such as olive oil and wines of every vintage—grain being the medium of exchange in which the balance of trade is adjusted periodically in either direction. The Hellenic World would necessarily be debarred from all this trade completely, or at any rate would lose all possibility of making a profit on it, if the Byzantines chose to give up "playing the game" and went into partnership with the Celts (or, normally, with the Thracians), or again if Byzantium itself were simply not on the map. The Straits are so narrow and the adjoining hordes of barbarians so formidable that in those circumstances the Black Sea would unquestionably be closed to Hellenic navigation. As a matter of fact, the Byzantines themselves probably draw the greatest economic profit of all from their unique position, which enables them to export all their surplus products, and import all that they need, both easily and profitably, without any exertion or danger. At the same time, many commodities which are in general demand reach their destination through the Byzantines' agency, as has been observed already. To this degree, the Byzantines are benefactors of Society who fairly deserve not only gratitude but positive military assistance, on an international basis, from the Hellenic World against the standing menace of the barbarians.¹

The Byzantines were content to perform their service to Hellenic Society without recompense so long as, on the landward side, they only had to deal with their regular tormentors, the Thracians.² When, however, in the course of the third century B.C., the local Thracians were temporarily subjugated by a migratory horde of Celts, the Byzantines suffered heavily from this change of masters in their hinterland. Where the Thracians had chastised them with whips, the Celts now chastised them with scorpions. They raised the annual ransom for the Byzantine crops to an exorbitant figure; and in this extremity the Byzantines met with hardly any response when they appealed for financial assistance to the rest of the Hellenic World. Accordingly, the Byzantines were driven to raise funds for ransoming their fields from the Celts by levying a toll on all ships passing through the Bosphorus; and their action so upset the Hellenic carrying-trade that the consequence was a war

¹ Polybius, Book IV, ch. 38.

² Polybius, Book IV, ch. 45.

between Byzantium and Rhodes, the leading maritime community in the Hellenic World of the day.¹

Thus the vast divergence between the destinies of Byzantium and Calchedon is not explained by Megabazus's epigram. It was not the blindness of the Calchedonians but the barbarity of the Thracians and the Celts that made Byzantium's fortune. If the actual founders of Byzantium had arrived first on the scene, they would certainly have made the Calchedonians' choice; and if the actual founders of Calchedon had arrived second and had been left no choice but to found Byzantium, they, for their part, would inevitably have been confronted by the challenge of an intolerable situation on land, with the Byzantines' historic choice between starving as landmen or making a fortune out of the sea.

Aegina and Argos

Another illustration of our theme from Hellenic history is the contrast between the careers of two city-states of the Argolid: Argos herself and Aegina. The Argives, being owners of one of the finest arable plains in the Peloponnese, had only one idea when they began to find their Argive plain too small for them. They set out, like the Chalcidians, to take possession of additional arable land beyond their borders; but, unfortunately for themselves, they did not look out to sea but lifted up their eyes unto the hills and coveted what lay beyond them. Taking up the spear before labouring at the oar, they sought their new fields in the quarter where it was hardest to acquire them: in the territory of their Hellenic neighbours, who were spearmen too. The Chalcidians had known better than to try conclusions with the sturdy Boeotians; they had reserved their steel for easy victories over ill-armed and ill-disciplined Thracians and Sicels. The Argives were less prudent. Fighting for the mastery of the Peloponnese, they collided with the Spartans, who had responded to the same challenge in the same way, but had faced the implications of their response by militarizing their life from top to bottom.² For spearmen such as these, the Argives were no match; and this was the end of their city's career. She never extricated herself from the role of being Sparta's discomfited rival until Hellenic history came to an end.

Meanwhile, the little Argolic island of Aegina had been playing an utterly different historical role, in conformity with the vastly poorer physical endowment which she had received from Nature. Aegina, raising her horn—a bare, solitary mountain-peak—above

¹ Polybius, Book IV, chs. 46 and 47.

² For Spartan militarism, see I. B (ii), vol. i, pp. 24-6, above, and III. A, vol. iii, pp. 50-79, below.

the waters of the Saronic Gulf within full view of Athens,¹ was no doubt one of those 'small islands' which were in the Athenian philosopher's mind² as signal examples of denudation at its worst. Aegina was, in fact, an Attica in miniature; and, under a still more severe pressure from the physical environment than that to which the Athenians were exposed, the Aeginetans anticipated, on a small scale, the Athenians' achievements. Aeginetan merchants were taking the lead in the activities of the Hellenic settlement at Naucratis in Egypt at a time when Athenian merchants were still rare visitors there;³ and Aeginetan sculptors were carving statues to stand in the pediments of the temple which Aeginetan architects had built for the local goddess Aphaia, half a century before the Athenian Pheidias carved his masterpieces for the Parthenon.

Israelites, Phoenicians, and Philistines

If we turn now from Hellenic history to Syriac, we shall find that the various elements of population that entered Syria, or held their own there, at the time of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung, distinguished themselves relatively thereafter in close proportion to the relative difficulty of the physical environment in the different districts in which they happened to have made themselves at home. In an earlier passage,⁴ we have taken note of the difficulty which an immigrant population must have found in acquiring the art of irrigating the gardens of Damascus. Yet the Ghūtah—though a hard country compared with the fabulous Garden of Eden—was the choicest prize that offered itself in Syria to the incoming barbarians; and it is therefore remarkable that, in the subsequent progress of the Syriac Civilization, it was not the Aramaean occupants of Damascus that took the lead. Nor was the lead taken by those other Aramaeans who settled down at Hamath to irrigate the fertile banks of the Orontes with their water-wheels; nor again by those tribes of Israel who halted east of Jordan in order to fatten their cattle on the fine pasture-lands of Gilead.⁵ Most remarkable of all, the primacy in the Syriac World was not retained by those refugees

¹ Aegina was execrated to an Athenian audience as *λήμη Περαίων*—'the eye-sore of the Peiraeus'—by the Athenian statesman Pericles when he was exhorting his countrymen to deal the maritime rival of Attica the knock-out blow at the culmination of a long and bitter struggle for the command of a sea which was too narrow to be shared between the barren island and the barren peninsula.

² See the quotation from Plato on p. 39, above.

³ In the time of King Amasis of Egypt (*regnabat circa 569-525 B.C.*) the Aeginetans were one of three Hellenic communities—the other two being the Samians and the Milesians—that possessed separate religious precincts at Naucratis dedicated to their respective tutelary Gods. The other nine Hellenic communities which had a footing at Naucratis were content to share a common precinct: the Hellenion. At this time, Athens not only had no settlement of her own at Naucratis, but was not even one of the nine city-states that shared in the administration of the International Settlement. (Herodotus, Book II, ch. 178.)

⁴ In II. C (ii) (b) 2, on pp. 374-5, above.

⁵ Numbers, ch. xxxii.

from the Aegean who came to Syria not as barbarians but as the heirs of the Minoan Civilization and who took possession of the ports and cities and fields of the Shephelah: the maritime plain that extends from the south-western face of Mount Carmel to the north-eastern frontier of Egypt.

In the connotation which their name has acquired, the Philistines have fared still worse than the Boeotians. In our modern Western vocabulary, with its echoes of Syriac and Hellenic tradition, the word 'Boeotian' signifies nothing worse than a congenital obtuseness of vision, while 'Philistine' signifies a wilful blindness and a militant hostility towards 'the Chosen People' who see the light. Possibly, neither Philistines nor Boeotians fully deserve their bad name. It is probable, on the whole, that they have been misrepresented, considering that their reputation has been at the mercy of hostile neighbours. Yet this consideration in itself tells a tale. Why is it that the picture of these nations which has come down to us is a picture painted by their neighbours' hands and not by their own? It is because these neighbours and contemporaries of theirs were more active, more vocal, and more successful than they were, and hence were better able than they were to impress their own will and their own view upon the future. The Athenians and Chalcidians, who were the Boeotians' neighbours, have occupied our attention already. We have taken note of the feats accomplished by them which the Boeotians never attempted. Let us look now at the neighbours of the Philistines, and compare the Philistines' record with theirs.

The Syriac Civilization has three great feats to its credit.¹ It invented an alphabetic system of writing; it discovered the Atlantic Ocean; and it arrived at a particular conception of God which is common to Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam, but alien alike from the Egyptiac, Sumeric, Indic, and Hellenic veins of religious thought and feeling.² Which were the Syriac communities by whom these achievements were severally contributed? The Philistines may prove to have been the transmitters, if not the inventors, of the elements of the Alphabet, if the conjectured derivation of the Alphabet from some Minoan script³ is substantiated in the future investigations of our Western archaeologists. Pending further archaeological research, the credit for the inven-

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 82 and 102, above.

² And equally alien, it would appear, from the Minoan and Hittite veins, as far as these are known to us. In this catalogue, the exception which proves the rule is the conception of God which was attained by Ikhnaton (see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 145-6, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 695-6, below). The abortive solar monotheism of Ikhnaton has a distinctly Syriac touch; but this flash of illumination in the soul of a single individual, who was repudiated by the society in which he happened to be born, can hardly be placed to the credit of the Egyptiac Civilization.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 102, footnote 3, above, and II. D (vii), p. 386, footnote 2, below.

tion of the Alphabet must at present be left unallocated. When we come, however, to the other two Syriac achievements, the history of which is a matter of common knowledge, we find that the Philistines have no part or lot in them.

Who were those Syriac seafarers who ventured to sail the whole length of the Mediterranean to the Pillars of Hercules and out beyond? Not the Philistines, whose Minoan ancestors had been the pioneers of long-distance seamanship in the Mediterranean.¹ In the Philistine communities of the maritime plain, the ancestral seafaring tradition was buried, with the sowing-corn, in the furrows of the broad ploughlands; and so, when the Philistines came to feel the need to expand, they took the same wrong turning as the Argives took in the Peloponnese. Turning their backs on the sea, the Philistines took up arms to conquer the arid lowlands of Beersheba and the well-watered valleys of Esdraelon and Jezreel; and they met the Argives' fate when, in fighting for the mastery of Palestine, they came into conflict with still better fighters: the tribesmen in the hill-country of Israel and Judah. The discovery of the Atlantic was achieved not by the Philistine Lords of the Shephelah, but by the Phoenician tenants of the rugged middle section of the Syrian coast.

These Phoenicians were a remnant of the Canaanites—the population which had been in occupation of Syria before the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* descended like a human flood upon the country. When the neighbours and kinsmen of the Phoenicians had been overwhelmed by the incoming Philistines and Teucrians from the sea and Israelites and Aramaeans from the desert, the Phoenicians had survived because their homes along the middle section of the Syrian coast were not sufficiently inviting to attract the invaders.

Phoenicia, which the Philistines left alone, presents a remarkable physical contrast to the Shephelah, in which the Philistines settled. On this section of the coast, there is no broad plain and no gradation between plain and hill-country. Instead, the mountain-range of Lebanon rises almost sheer out of the sea—grudging the coast-dwellers any plain of their own and cutting them off from the plains of the interior. Lebanon and Mediterranean lie in such a close embrace that they leave no easy passage between them for road or railway.² The Phoenicians communicated with each other

¹ See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 102, footnote 4, above.

² In the year 1933 there was a continuous line of standard-gauge railway from Haydar Pasha, the Asiatic railway-terminus at Constantinople, all the way to Tarabulus at the northern end of the Phoenician section of the Syrian coast; there was also a continuous line of standard-gauge railway from Haifa, at the southern end of this section of coast, to Cairo; but the gap between Tarabulus and Haifa remained unbridged owing to the expense involved in the difficult engineering feat of building a standard-gauge coastal

and with the outer world by water, coastwise; and of the three leading Phoenician cities—Tyre, Aradus, and Sidon—the two first-mentioned were not even situated on the mainland but were perched, like gulls' nests, on rocky off-shore islands. When the Aramaeans drifted into Syria out of the desert, they silted up against the eastern face of Lebanon without penetrating beyond it; and when the Philistine *Völkerwanderung* passed that way *en route* from Anatolia towards Egypt, we may presume that the ships sailed southward straight past the forbidding Phoenician coast to the farther side of 'the Ladder of Tyre', while the ox-carts took the inland road, to the east of Lebanon, along which the modern railway-traveller from Turkey to Egypt finds himself transported to-day. Even when the Philistines and Teucrians were flung back from the frontier of Egypt,¹ they did not fall upon Phoenicia in their recoil. They fastened upon the Shephelah and made no permanent settlements north of Mount Carmel. Thus, thanks to Lebanon, the Phoenicians survived the Philistines' passage; and, again thanks to Lebanon, they actually took over from their new neighbours that Minoan tradition of long-distance navigation which the Philistines themselves now discarded. While the Philistines were browsing on the Shephelah like sheep in clover and were moving inland, at their peril, in search of pastures new, the Phoenicians, whose maritime horizon had hitherto been restricted to the short range of the coastwise traffic between Byblos and the Delta of the Nile,² now launched out, Minoan-fashion, into the open sea and won a second home for the Syriac Civilization in the western basin of the Mediterranean and on the coasts of the Ocean beyond.

Thus the maritime achievement of the Syriac Civilization was contributed not by the Philistines but by the Phoenicians. The physical discovery of the Atlantic, however, is surpassed, as a feat of human prowess, by the spiritual discovery of Monotheism; and this achievement was contributed by a Syriac community that had been stranded by the *Völkerwanderung* in a physical environment which was still less inviting than the Phoenician coast: namely, the

railway to link Tarabulus and Haifa together. Thus the railway-traveller who, between London and Aleppo, had only been required to change carriages twice—at the Straits of Dover and at the Bosphorus—had to change four times more in order to complete his railway-journey to Cairo. At Homs he had to leave his through-carriage, bound for railhead at Tarabulus, in order to proceed along the branch line leading to the inland junction of Rayāq. At Rayāq he had to change trains from the standard-gauge railway on to a narrow-gauge railway which carried him (by rack-and-pinion over Anti-Lebanon) to Damascus. At Damascus he had to change again on to another narrow-gauge railway. And finally he had to change a fourth time in order to board a train running on the standard-gauge railway between Haifa and Cairo. In A.D. 1941-3 the missing stretch of standard-gauge line between Haifa and Tarabulus was built at last under the un-economic stimulus of military necessity.

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93 and 100-1, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 102, footnote 4, above.

hill-country of Ephraim and Judah. This country was indeed so extremely uninviting that—in spite of its position in the heart of Syria, overlooking the high road between Egypt and Shinar—it appears to have remained (like the rift-valley of the Jordan)¹ a virgin wilderness throughout the thousand years and more during which the rest of Syria had been incorporated successively first in the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, which was the Sumeric universal state, and then in the Hyksos 'successor-state' of that empire, and then in 'the New Empire' of Egypt. Apparently, this patch of thin-soiled, forest-covered hill-country remained literally a no-man's-land until 'the New Empire' began to lose its grip upon Syria and the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung set in; and then, at last, it was populated by the adventurous vanguard of the Hebrew Nomads who had drifted into the fringes of Syria out of the North Arabian Steppe.² These Hebrews were content, for the most part, to halt in the pasture-lands east of Jordan and south of Hebron. The hill-country beyond was the farthest bourne of their migration; and here the Israelite pioneers transformed themselves from Nomadic stock-breeders into sedentary tillers of a stony ground which they laboriously cleared of its forests³ only to see the soil which they had won from the trees washed away by the rains to deepen the Philistine ploughlands on the Shephelah. The hardness of the life which has to be lived by the husbandman whose lot is cast in this hill-country of Ephraim and Judah is conveyed in the following passages from the report of an experienced British investigator who, in the year 1930, observed on the spot the life of the Israelite husbandmen's modern Arab successors.⁴

'The cultivated land in the Hills varies very largely both in depth and quality of the soil. In the valleys there are stretches of fertile land, which will grow sesame as a summer crop. On the hillsides the soil is shallow and infertile, and the extent of land-hunger is evident from the fact that every available plot of soil is cultivated, even when it is so small that the plough cannot be employed. There cultivation is carried on with the mattock and the hoe. The harvest of such plots, even in a favourable year, is exceedingly small—in general it seems doubtful whether such

¹ See the quotation from Eduard Meyer in II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, p. 257, above.

² These statements likewise are made on the authority of Eduard Meyer: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii (i), 2nd edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 96.

³ See Joshua xvii. 14-18, for the mark made upon the Israelites' folk-memory by the labour of deforesting this hill-country in order to find room for an ex-Nomadic people that had been driven off the North Arabian Steppe yet was deterred by its fear of the iron chariots of the Canaanites from descending into the fertile valley of Jezreel.

⁴ The modern Arab peasantry of Palestine, like their Israelite predecessors, are descended partly from Nomadic intruders off the North Arabian Steppe, who in physical race were Afasian 'long-heads', and partly from 'broad-headed' denizens of the highland zone of folded mountains (see vol. i, p. 328, above), who worked their way down to the Palestinian highlands from the Anatolian Plateau. Anthropometric studies of the modern population of Palestine indicate that, in the repeated mixture of two races which has here taken place, the 'Alpine' strain has prevailed over the 'Mediterranean'.

cultivation can pay. On the other hand, even the most rocky hillsides support trees, especially olives; and, if capital were available, many of the cultivators of these exiguous and infertile plots would be able to gain a livelihood by cultivation of fruit trees and of olives. These cultivators have, however, no capital, and cannot afford to forgo even the meagre crops obtained, for the four or five years which are required before fruit-trees render a return. In the case of the olive, the period before a return may be expected is much longer.

"There is little irrigation in the Hill Country. Here and there are springs which afford a supply for the irrigation of a small area; but, taken as a whole, the country is arid and the crops depend on rain. . . .

"In the best case . . . it is impossible that the general character of the cultivation in the Hill Country can be radically changed, except in so far as fruit can be made to replace grain. . . . From the point of view of agriculture, the Hill Country will always remain an unsatisfactory proposition. . . .

"The life of the fallāh is one of great struggle and privation. . . .

"It is a common impression that the fallāh's cultivation is entirely inadequate, and a good deal of ridicule has been and is poured upon the nail-plough which he uses. In the stony country of the Hills, no other plough would be able to do the work at all. With regard to the use of that plough, Dr. Wilkansky [a modern Zionist agricultural expert] writes:—"The Arab plough is like the ancient Hebrew plough. . . . It performs—very slowly, it is true, but very thoroughly—all the functions for which a combination of modern machines is required. . . . The ploughing of the fallāh is above reproach. His field, prepared for sowing, is never inferior to that prepared by the most perfect implements, and sometimes it even surpasses all others." "

In such a country, and under such conditions, the Israelites continued to live in obscurity until the Syriac Civilization had passed its zenith. As late as the fifth century before Christ, at a date when all the great prophets of Israel had already said their say, the name of Israel was still unknown to the great Greek historian Herodotus and the Land of Israel was still masked by the Land of the Philistines in the Herodotean panorama of the Syriac World. When Herodotus wishes to designate the peoples of Syria as a whole, he calls them 'the Phoenicians and the Syrians in the Land of the Philistines';² and 'the Land of the Philistines'—Filastin or Palestine—is the name by which Erez Israel has continued to be known among the Gentiles down to this day.³ Yet in these barren landlocked highlands, which were not of sufficient worldly importance to acquire even a recognized name of their own, there was immanent

¹ Simpson, Sir J. H.: *Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development* (British Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 3686 of 1930: London 1930, H.M. Stationery Office), pp. 14, 65, and 66.

² e.g. in Book II, ch. 104, and in Book VII, ch. 89.

³ Παλαιστίνη is the Ancient Greek and فلسطين the modern Arabic for Philistia.

(to paraphrase Plato's language)¹ a divine inspiration which made this uninviting country a means of grace to those who came to settle there. A Syriac fable tells how this divinity once tested a king of Israel with the most searching test that a God can apply to a mortal.

"The Lord appeared to Solomon in a dream by night; and God said: "Ask what I shall give thee." And Solomon said: "... Give ... thy servant an understanding heart." ... And the speech pleased the Lord, that Solomon had asked this thing. And God said unto him: "Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life; neither hast asked riches for thyself, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies; but hast asked for thyself understanding to discern judgment; behold, I have done according to thy words: lo, I have given thee a wise and an understanding heart, so that there was none like thee before thee, neither after thee shall any arise like unto thee. And I have also given thee that which thou hast not asked, both riches and honour, so that there shall not be any among the kings like unto thee all thy days."²

This fable of Solomon's Choice is a parable of the history of the Chosen People. In the power of their spiritual understanding, the Israelites surpassed the military prowess of the Philistines and the maritime prowess of the Phoenicians. They had not sought after those things which the Gentiles seek, but had sought first the kingdom of God; and therefore all those things were added unto them.³ As for the life of their enemies, the mighty men of the Philistines were delivered into Israel's hands to be smitten with the edge of the sword. As for riches, Jewry entered into the inheritance of Tyre and Carthage to conduct transactions on a scale beyond Phoenician dreams in continents beyond Phoenician knowledge. As for long life, the Jews live on—the same peculiar people—to-day, long ages after the Phoenicians and the Philistines have lost their identity like all the nations. The ancient Syriac neighbours of Israel have fallen into the melting-pot and have been re-minted, in the fullness of time, with new images and superscriptions, while Israel has proved impervious to this alchemy—performed by History in the crucibles of universal states and universal churches and wanderings of the nations—to which we Gentiles all in turn succumb.⁴

Lebanon and Jabal Ansariyah

The contrast between the roles of the Phoenicians and the Philistines in the history of the Syriac Civilization is reproduced, in

¹ See the passage quoted above in II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, on p. 252, in footnote 2.

² 1 Kings iii. 5-13.

³ Matt. vi. 33-3; Luke xii. 29-31.

⁴ From the Gentile standpoint, modern Jewry is the 'fossil' remnant of a society that is extinct. For this phenomenon of 'fossilization', see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35, and I. C (i) (b), pp. 90-2, above; and II. D (vi) and Part IX, below.

the history of the affiliated Arabic Civilization, in a corresponding contrast—which can be studied in the life at the present day—between the enterprise of the Lebanese highlanders, in the hinterland of the former Phoenician ports of Sidon and Tyre and Byblus, and the stagnation of the Nusayrī highlanders who live on the northern side of the Nahr-al-Kabīr in the hinterland of Aradus.

In modern times the highlanders of the Lebanon have emulated the historic exploits of the Phoenician islanders of Tyre and Aradus by seeking their fortunes abroad and making a livelihood as traders and shopkeepers far and wide—in Egypt and in West Africa and in the New World.¹ The Nusayrī highlanders, on the other hand, have been as stay-at-home as the Philistine contemporaries of the Phoenicians.

The extreme degree and long continuance of the Nusayrīs' stagnation in their highland homes is attested by the antique aspect of their religion. The Lebanon, in its own degree, is a museum of religious survivals. The ex-Monothelete² Maronites and the Monophysite Jacobites and the Imāmī Shī'is of the Jabal 'Āmil and the Druses are so many 'fossil' remnants of different phases in the long contact between the Syriac Civilization and the Hellenic.³ The Nusayrīs, too, have acquired some tincture of Syriac religion in its latest phase. They have travestied the Ismā'īlī Shī'ism which forced an entry into their mountain fastness in the age of the Crusades⁴ by deifying the Caliph 'Alī abu Tāfīb; but this worship of 'Alī is only an accretion;⁵ and the core of their religion appears to be some local worship which is more ancient than either Islam or Christianity and is perhaps even prior to that impact of Hellenism on the Syriac World in which both Christianity and Islam have originated. The sharpness of the contrast, in every aspect of social life, between the Nusayrīs and the Lebanese is very striking; and there is also a striking contrast between the two peoples' respective physical environments.

While the native physical environment of the Lebanese is perhaps not quite so stimulating as the rocky islet of Tyre, which cannot be cultivated at all, it presents a severer challenge to the husbandman than the hill-country of Ephraim and Judah. On the stony flanks of Lebanon there is a rigid limit to the harvests that can be wrung out of a scanty soil, and this soil itself can only be

¹ See II. D (vi), p. 238, below.

² Ex-Monothelete, because the Maronites have been in full communion with the Roman Catholic Church since A.D. 1445, though they have retained their own Syriac liturgy and their own ecclesiastical discipline.

³ See II. D (vi), pp. 234-6, and II. D (vii), pp. 285-8, below.

⁴ See II. D (vi), p. 258, below.

⁵ On the strength of it, the French mandatory authorities have dubbed the Nusayrīs (Arabic plural 'Ansariyah') 'Alouites', which is a Gallicism for the Arabic 'Alawiyyin.

conserved and kept under cultivation by laborious terracing.¹ By contrast, the Jabal Ansariyah, though it 'has been described as a barren region', is in reality 'an extremely agreeable and fertile tract. Being lower and less rocky, it is naturally much more fertile than the Lebanon'.² In the light of the local precedents, it looks as though the Lebanese had been stimulated to emulate the Phoenicians by the barrenness of their native mountain, while the agreeableness of the Jabal Ansariyah has inveigled the Nusayris into vegetating in a Philistine sloth.

Brandenburg and the Rhineland

When we turn from the Aegean and from Syria³ to the scenes of our own Western history, similar contrasts strike the eye.

Suppose, for example, that one finds oneself in the capital city of either of the two great Central European Empires of the modern age: the Hohenzollern Empire of Brandenburg-Prussia-Germany and the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy. One has only to board an outgoing train at any railway terminus in either Berlin or Vienna in order to receive the same impression that a traveller receives when he goes by train from the Aegean area into the interior of Anatolia or into the interior of Europe.⁴ In whichever direction you may happen to be travelling outwards from the nucleus of the Hohenzollern or of the Hapsburg Empire into its fringes and outskirts, you find yourself passing out of an unusually difficult physical environment into environments where the difficulties are less formidable.

¹ See II. D (vi), p. 258, below.

² British Admiralty: *A Handbook of Syria* (London 1920, H.M. Stationery Office), p. 339.

³ We cannot take leave of the Syriac World without observing that, in the penultimate phase of Syriac history, the contrast which we have brought out between Phoenicia and Philistia was reproduced, in the Hijāz (a region which is a southward extension of Syria into Arabia), in the similar contrast between the two oases of Mecca and Medina. 'The community which had settled in the valley of Mecca . . . cannot, when they selected this spot, have hoped to live by its produce; for that the soil is incapable of producing anything is attested by all who know it, from the author of the Qur'ān to the present day. . . . Unlike Mecca, Yathrib [Medina] lies in a fruitful plain. "Walled habitations, green fields, running water, every blessing the Eastern mind can desire, are there." And indeed the richness of the soil finds expression in the name Tā'ibah, "the pleasing".' (Margoliouth, D. S.: *Mohammed*, 3rd edition (London 1905, Putnam), pp. 7-8 and 185.) In consequence, we find that the Yathribis, like the Philistines, were content to cultivate their garden without turning their hands or minds to other things or betaking themselves beyond their own borders, whereas the Meccans were stimulated by the challenge of a barren home to take to the Steppe as the Phoenicians, in similar circumstances, had taken to the sea, and to earn their livings as camel-caravaners. It is significant that Mecca, and not Medina, was the oasis in which the Hijāzi Prophet Muhammad was born and brought up. It was the stimulus of his contact with the great world in his caravan expeditions to the Syrian desert-ports of the Roman Empire, circa A.D. 594 seqq., that gave Muhammad the mental stimulus which impelled him to embark upon the career of a religious revolutionary. (For the career of Muhammad, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 276-8, with Annex II, below.)

⁴ For this impression, as experienced by the writer of this Study, see pp. 36-7, above.

Take the nucleus of the Hohenzollern dominions: the territories which Frederick the Great inherited from his father when he came to the Prussian throne: Brandenburg, Pomerania, East Prussia. As you travel through this unprepossessing country between the Havel and the Masurian Lakes, with its starveling pine-plantations and its sandy fields, you might fancy that you were traversing some outlying corner of the Eurasian Steppe, where the aggressive desert was thrusting its dry bones up and out through the skin of the European landscape! Then travel on westward from Brandenburg into the Rhineland or eastward from Prussia into Lithuania or northward from Pomerania into Scandinavia: whichever way you go, you will experience a new sensation. As the pastures and beech-woods of Denmark or the black earth of Lithuania or the vineyards of the Rhineland greet your eyes, you will breathe a sigh of relief at your passage into a normal European landscape out of a landscape which was an offence to your aesthetic sensibilities. 'So this repulsive Ostelbisches Land is, after all, something exceptional in the European physical environment!' True enough; yet it is no less true that the descendants of the medieval Western colonists whose lot was cast in these 'bad lands' have played an exceptional role in the modern history of the Western World. The legendary 'Prussian' may be as unprepossessing as his homeland. (There is always a flicker of flame behind a screen of smoke and always a grain of truth beneath the most hostile caricature.) Be that as it may, he has managed to make his unpromising kingdom 'the education of Europe' in certain matters which no good European can affect to despise. The Prussian has taught his neighbours how to make sand produce cereals by enriching it with artificial manures; and he has taught us how to raise a whole population to an unprecedented standard of social efficiency by a system of universal compulsory state education and to an unprecedented standard of social security by a similar system of health and unemployment insurance. In these responses to his physical environment, the Prussian has performed a greater service to Mankind and has established a more lasting memorial for himself than in his more notorious achievements: the training of the Prussian Army and the building of the German Reich.

Austria and Lombardy

Take, again, the nucleus of the Danubian Hapsburg dominions: those Danubian territories which the Emperor Charles V inherited from the Emperor Maximilian before the Danubian Monarchy took shape in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, and which the Austrian Republic inherited again from the last Austrian

Emperor Charles when the Monarchy broke up in 1918. On the aesthetic scale of values, the heart of Austria and the heart of Prussia are of course at opposite extremes. The Alps in the Tyrol and the Salzkammergut, and the Danube in Upper and Lower Austria, are as beautiful as the sands and pine woods of Brandenburg and Pomerania are ugly. Yet, if the observant traveller is not an artist but an economist, his prosaic eye will register the same impression when he travels outwards from Vienna as when he travels outwards from Berlin. Whether his journey carries him out of the Tyrolese or Styrian mountains into the plains of Bavaria or Lombardy or Croatia or Hungary, or from the banks of the Austrian Danube to the banks of the Bohemian Elbe, the economist, as he observes the changes in the landscape, will ignore the transition from variety to monotony which the artist perceives, and will take note that he has left a lean land, flowing with nothing better than milk and honey, and has entered fat lands where the plains are covered with hop-fields or vineyards or wheat-fields or beet-fields, and where the mountains are loaded with mineral ores. Yet that lean land of Austria bred the dynasty¹ which gathered together the fat lands round about and held them united for four centuries against a host of enemies without and within.

The contrast between the relative poverty of the nucleus of the Hapsburg Monarchy and the relative riches of the appended crown-lands gives the physical explanation of the genesis of the Danubian Monarchy.² A dynasty bred in a difficult environment supplanted the more softly nurtured dynasties round about. The same contrast explains the economic straits to which the City of Vienna has been reduced since the Danubian Monarchy's dissolution. A stranger, visiting Vienna after 1918 without any knowledge of modern Western history and witnessing Vienna's plight to-day, would be at a loss to understand how a magnificent city of some two million souls could ever have come into existence in a poorly endowed country of some six million souls all told. Actually, of course, the present size and magnificence of Vienna are explained by the city's *ci-devant* status as the capital of an empire with fifty million inhabitants and with abundant natural resources, while the location of Vienna is explained by the Danubian Empire's origin. The capital of the Hapsburg Monarchy was never moved from the

¹ As a matter of strict historical accuracy, the Hapsburg Dynasty was bred in the castle of Hapsburg, in the present Swiss Canton of Aargau, before it came to rule over Austria. This, however, only gives additional point to our present argument; for, compared with the Aargau, even Austria is a land of plenty.

² For the human explanation, see II. D (v), pp. 177-90, below. In particular, see p. 181, footnote 1, where a distinction is drawn between the *ethos* of the Tyrolese highlander, which once made Austria an Imperial Power, and the *ethos* of the Viennese bourgeois, which reflects the demoralizing influence of an empire upon the inhabitants of its capital city.

Austrian homeland of the Hapsburg Dynasty—a land which was the most venerable but least valuable jewel in the Hapsburg Crown.

'The Black Country' and 'The Home Counties'

When we turn from Central Europe to Great Britain, the apparent law of correspondence between the difficulty and the stimulus of a physical environment—the law illustrated by the geographical situations of Vienna and Berlin—seems at first sight to be put in question by the geographical situation of London. While the capitals of the *ci-devant* Hapsburg and Hohenzollern Empires lie in the leanest districts of Central Europe, the Thames Valley, in which London lies, is one of the most well-favoured districts of the United Kingdom. This superficial anomaly disappears, however, as soon as we look deeper. For one thing, we shall find that, although the so-called 'home counties' certainly were the choicest portion of the English physical environment in the age when the capital of England came to be established at London, it is also true that London did not win her position without having to respond to any challenge at all. In that very age, she responded victoriously to a challenge from the human environment which we shall examine further on in this Part.¹ This, however, is by the way. For our present purpose, it is more to the point to notice that, in the modern social geography of the United Kingdom, London has not remained the capital of the country in every sense.

While London has retained her status in the Kingdom as the focus of politics and finance, the economic centre of gravity shifted, during the Industrial Revolution, from the south-east towards the north-west, until, on the eve of the General War of 1914-18, it had come to rest on the farther side of a line drawn diagonally across the island from the estuary of the Severn through Coventry and Leicester to the estuary of the Humber. If we now fix our attention upon the region north-west of this line and pick out the districts which shared between them the industrial primacy in 'pre-war' Great Britain, we shall see at once that they conform to our law conspicuously. The midland manufacturing cities—Birmingham and Coventry, Leicester and Northampton—which almost bestride our dividing line are the only group situated in good arable or grazing country; and this is the exception that proves the rule. In each of the other industrial districts of 'pre-war' Great Britain, the physical environment is one which, judged by the average standard of the island, offers unusually difficult conditions to Man. This is true alike of the valleys of South Wales; of Tyneside and Teesside; and of the neck of Scotland where

¹ See II. D (v), p. 199, with the Annex, below.

Clydeside now harbours, in Glasgow, the second largest city of Great Britain after London herself. The most striking illustration of all is the gigantic industrial zone which embraces the southern end of the Pennines in the shape of a magnet with its tips at Preston and Leeds and its curve skirting the upper course of the Trent—a zone which includes the Lancashire cotton-mills and the Staffordshire potteries and collieries and the multiple industries of Nottingham and the steel-works of Sheffield and the wool-mills of the North Riding.

The forbidding character of the physical environment in which this Pennine industrial zone is set was brought home to the writer of this Study once when he had occasion to travel by road from the rural spot in the east of Yorkshire, in which he is writing these lines at this moment, to a place in Shropshire within sight of the Wrekin. After traversing York—a city not less reminiscent than Canterbury of medieval England—we drove on south-westwards across a fertile plain still innocent of other products than crops and cattle, till we reached the frontier of the industrial zone at a village which is celebrated for a legend. The legend is that, a century ago, a certain Anglican prelate whose diocese extended over the West Riding used to appoint the church of this village as his trysting-place with West Riding candidates for confirmation, because, he declared, this was the farthest point west, towards the new *terra incognita* of industrial squalor, to which any gentleman—in orders or out of them—could be expected to ride! And indeed, when we passed that prelate's legendary bourne now that the squalor beyond it, on which he had refused ever to set eyes, had had a hundred years longer to grow, the aesthetic side of our nature protested in sympathy with the prelate's scandalous ultimatum to the lost souls in his industrial cure. Beyond this village, the fertile lowlands came to an end and at the same point the fells and the factories began.

In their outward aspect, the 'dark satanic mills' seemed a fitting match for the bleak grey landscape; and at the same time the *tour de force* of these monstrous works of Man, erected in defiance of the wilderness, had all the moral incongruity of an abomination of desolation standing in the place where it ought not. In this pullulating, throbbing, squalid life in a forbidding landscape, there was something portentously unnatural; and the acme of unnaturalness was reached when we paused on the summit of the Pennine Range itself—a hand's-breadth of fell-country that had been left still inviolate in its state of Nature—and looked down, this way and that, towards Leeds just behind us and Manchester just ahead. When, at nightfall, we found ourselves passing through

Shrewsbury—such another mellow city as York in such another pleasant countryside—our glimpse of the West Riding and South Lancashire already began to fade into the unreality of an evil dream.

Yet this industrial *tour de force* that has been accomplished in the Pennine Zone is of course not just a hideous blemish on the landscape. The portent has also an import which the legendary prelate who deplored its appearance never divined. The Pennine Zone is indeed a magnet, not only in a fanciful geographical conceit, but in sober economic reality. It is a magnet which has drawn to itself the productivity and the population of a great country so potently that it has actually succeeded in shifting that country's economic centre of gravity—shifting it from the fertile basin of the Thames to the barren skirts of the Pennine fells. The uncompromising prelate himself, if he could return to life to-day, would almost be constrained by curiosity to ride on into his *terra incognita* in order to explore the ugly wonderland into which the ugly wilderness has been transformed. And what is the agency which has produced these astonishing effects? When we look into it, we find ourselves, here again, in presence of a now familiar social phenomenon: the stronger stimulus of a more difficult environment prevailing over the weaker stimulus of an environment in which the difficulty is less.

In this psychological aspect, the contrast between the rural south-east and the industrial north-west of modern Britain since the Industrial Revolution reproduces that contrast between Boeotia and Attica, in ancient Greece, which struck the imagination of Hellenic observers after the great Athenian statesmen and economists—a Solon and a Peisistratus and a Cleisthenes and a Themistocles—had done their work. In our so-called Middle Ages, the inhabitants of 'the home counties' of England, south-east of our line, held economic assets comparable to those which the Boeotians held in the first age of Hellenic history. Indeed, they not only possessed the best arable and pasture lands in the Kingdom, but in Surrey and Sussex they also had command of easily workable iron ores, with the woods of the Weald to supply fuel for their forges and with a near and accessible market for their products in London. Blessed with these rich but wasting assets, the Southerners, like the Foolish Virgins in the parable, improvidently burnt up their fuel till it was all consumed away. The iron railings round St. Paul's are said to be the last substantial piece of work that was produced by the Southern iron-masters. By the time when these railings were forged, the Weald was bare, and thereupon the Southern iron industry came to a dead halt. The stagnant reed-choked hammer-ponds upon which the latter-day 'hiker' stumbles in the middle of

the Surrey heaths are no more to-day than this dead industry's funeral monument.¹ Meanwhile, the medieval inhabitants of the Welsh and Scottish and Northern English 'bad lands' had been stimulated by the poverty of their environment to exercise their ingenuity in making the most of it. In South Wales and in Durham, they probed the sub-soil, in the spirit of the ancient inhabitants of Attica, to see whether Nature might prove to be less niggardly below than she was on the surface; and their inquisitiveness was rewarded by the discovery of a new kind of fuel. In the Pennine Zone, they took to supplementing the meagre livelihood obtainable from fell-farms by spinning and weaving; and they turned to human profit fell-sides that were too steep and barren for the plough by harnessing the water-power of the falling beck. And so, under the constant prick of Necessity, they equipped themselves, unwittingly, for exchanging roles with their Southern neighbours as soon as their neighbours' improvidence gave them their opportunity. When the oil in these Foolish Virgins' lamps gave out, the Wise Virgins of the North were ready to step into their places and to astonish the World with the mighty—though sadly vulgar—illumination which they were able to produce. In the Industrial Revolution, the Northern coal-fuel with its unheard-of potency and the Northern mechanical processes with their unheard-of productivity replaced and eclipsed the commonplace wood-fuel and the traditional hand-work of the South.² The modern industrial Britain which arose, like a jinn of the desert, out of the 'bad lands' beyond the Severn-Humber line, surpassed the medieval agrarian Britain of 'the home counties' as Solomon—the king of the hill-country of Ephraim and Judah—surpassed in all his glory the oasis-queen of Sheba.³

¹ For the history of the Southern iron industry, see Straker, E.: *Wealden Iron* (London 1931, Bell).

² It is amusing to notice that the dearth of wood, which stimulated the ancient Greeks into creating the beauties of Hellenic architecture, and the ancient Sumerians into inventing the arch and the vault (see footnote 2 on p. 41, above), has stimulated the modern British into burning coal.

³ The shifting of the economic centre of gravity of Great Britain at the time of the Industrial Revolution is sometimes attributed in large measure to the change in the flow of international trade which followed the discovery of the New World. Since the Western explorers who made this discovery were not natives of the British Isles, the effect of their discovery upon the economic life of Great Britain must be regarded, from the British standpoint, as the accidental effect of an extraneous cause. So far, therefore, as this extraneous cause contributed to the shift in the economic centre of gravity of Britain, it tells against our explanation of the shift as an incident in the internal history of Britain and as a consequence of the different relations between Man and his physical environment which respectively obtained, during the Middle Ages, in the South and in the North of the island. Admittedly, of course, the effect of the discovery of the New World upon the economic geography of Great Britain was considerable. Accentuating, as it did, the effect of the foregoing decay of the Hansa trade, it worked for the benefit of the ports on the west coast and of their economic hinterlands, and to the prejudice of the ports on the east coast. This dividing line between the eastern and the western faces of Great Britain by no means coincides, however, with the line, running diagonally across the country from Severn to Humber, which came eventually—some two or three centuries after the discovery of America had taken place—to divide the agrarian section

In the present 'post-war' age, this glory is perhaps departing. Since about the year 1920 there have been indications that the economic centre of gravity of Great Britain is tending to shift back again, south-eastward, towards its medieval locus,¹ and simultaneous indications that the economic centre of gravity of the World is shifting away from the British Isles, and indeed from Europe, altogether, and is passing over to North America. It may be that, if these symptoms become more sharply pronounced, the *ci-devant* industrial focus of Britain, marooned among the barren Pennine fells, will come to present as melancholy a spectacle as the *ci-devant* political capital of the Danubian Monarchy, imprisoned within the frontiers of the little Alpine Republic of Austria. The drama of Industrial Britain, which opened in a busy squalor and culminated in a grim magnificence, may be transfigured in its third act into an austere tragedy with a cruel end.²

The economic contrast between the two sections into which Great Britain is divided by the Severn-Humber line is not the only illustration of our theme which the island provides. Still more familiar is the cultural contrast between England and Scotland, which has survived the union of the two kingdoms and which still lends reality to a Border which has lost its political and has never possessed any economic significance. The notorious difference of temperament and habit between the legendary Scotchman—solemn, parsimonious, precise, persistent, cautious, conscientious, and thoroughly well educated—and the legendary Englishman—frivolous, extravagant, vague, spasmodic, careless, free-and-easy, and ill-grounded in book-learning—follows the same lines, and corre-

of Great Britain from the industrial. For instance, the discovery of America, as was to be expected, brought prosperity in the sixteenth century to the seamen of Devonshire and to the merchants of Bristol: the western maritime districts which were least distant from 'the home counties' and from London. Yet it has still to be explained why Bristol afterwards lost the primacy in the American trade to Liverpool and Glasgow: west-coast ports which were geographically handicapped, in competition with Bristol, by being separated from the open Atlantic by a longer stretch of narrow dangerous waters. It has also to be explained why, in the Industrial Revolution, the new life showed itself not only in the Lancashire and Lanarkshire hinterlands of Merseyside and Clydeside but equally in Tyneside and Teesside and in the West Riding of Yorkshire, which was served by the port of Hull. Newcastle and Middlesbrough and Hull, like the extinct hearths of medieval English trade and industry in East Anglia, all face away from the Atlantic and from America. If the accessibility of the American market and of the American source of supply was really the determining factor in the shift of the economic centre of gravity of Great Britain at the time of the Industrial Revolution, it would be impossible to explain why at this very time Bristol decayed and Newcastle began to flourish. On the other hand, the phenomena are all explicable if it is conceded that the geographical relation to America was no more than a secondary factor and that the governing factor in the shift was the difference, examined above, in the degree of the respective stimuli which were administered to human activities by the two sections of the island, as demarcated by our diagonal dividing line.

¹ These symptoms are discussed, in another connexion, in III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, p. 207, below.

² These lines were written a few weeks before the 21st September, 1931, which, at the time of revision, seemed likely to be a momentous date in English economic and financial history.

sponds to the same contrast in the local physical environment, as the similar difference, which has likewise been elaborated and caricatured on both sides, between the legendary Prussian and the legendary Bavarian.

The Struggle for North America

The classic illustration of our present theme in our Western history is the outcome of the competition between half a dozen different groups of Western colonists for the mastery of North America. The victors in this contest were the New Englanders; and at an earlier point in this chapter, apropos of the reversion of Town Hill, Connecticut, to its pristine state of Nature, we have taken note of the unusual difficulty of the local American environment which first fell to the lot of the ultimate masters of the whole continent. Let us now compare this New England environment, of which the site of Town Hill is a specimen, with the earliest American environments of the New Englanders' unsuccessful competitors: the Dutch, the French, the Spaniards, and the New Englanders' own kinsmen and neighbours from England who established themselves along the southern section of the Atlantic seaboard.

In the middle of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, when all these settlers had already found their first footing on the fringes of the North American mainland, it would have been quite easy to predict the coming conflict between them for the possession of the interior; but the most acute and far-sighted observer then alive would hardly have been likely to hit the mark if he had been asked, at the time, to designate the ultimate victor. He might conceivably have had the acumen to rule out the Spaniards in spite of their two obvious assets: their ownership, in Mexico, of the only region in or adjoining North America which had been broken-in and developed economically, before the European colonists' arrival, by an indigenous civilization; and the primacy of Spain, in our hypothetical observer's own day, among the Great Powers of the Western World. Our observer might have discounted the high development of Mexico in view of its outlying position—cut off, as it was, from the main body of North America by a broad belt of inhospitable plateau and desert; and have discounted the political strength of Spain by reading the political signs of the times as they were written between the lines of the Treaty of Westphalia.

'The Spanish Empire', he might have pronounced, 'is already a carcass round which the vultures are gathering. France will succeed to the military hegemony of Spain in Europe, Holland and England will succeed to her naval and commercial supremacy on

the seas. The competition for North America lies now between these three countries. Let us estimate their respective chances in the double light of their general positions in the World and of their local holdings in America. On a short view, Holland's chances might appear to be the most promising. She is mistress of the seas (England being no match for her on this element, and France not seriously competing); and in America she holds a splendid water-gate opening into the interior: the valley of the Hudson. On a longer view, however, France seems more likely to be the winner; for the French St. Lawrence offers still better means of access to the interior of North America than the Dutch Hudson, while it is in the power of the French to immobilize and exhaust the Dutch by bringing to bear against them the overwhelming military superiority of France on the Continent of Europe. All the same, as between French and Dutch prospects, I hesitate' (we hear him saying) 'to decide. The one prophecy that I make with confidence is that the English are not in the running. Possibly the more southerly of the English colonies, with their relatively genial soil and climate, will manage to survive—though at best they will find themselves hemmed in between the Dutch along the Hudson in the north and the Spaniards in Florida on the south and the Dutch or the French, whichever it may be that cuts off their hinterland on the west by securing the control of the Mississippi. One thing, however, is certain. The little group of settlements in the bleak and barren country which the colonists have christened "New England" is bound to disappear. They are cut off from the other English settlements by the Dutch in the Hudson Valley, while the French in the St. Lawrence Valley press them close on the opposite flank. The destinies of these New Englanders, at any rate, are not in doubt!

Let us now suppose that our hypothetical observer lives to see the turn of the century. By the year 1701 he will be congratulating himself on his discernment, fifty years earlier, in rating French prospects higher than Dutch; for in the course of these last fifty years the St. Lawrence has vanquished the Hudson. The French explorers have pushed up the St. Lawrence on to the Great Lakes, and over the portage into the Basin of the Mississippi, and down these Western Waters to the delta of the great river, where they have established the new French colony of Louisiana to match the older French colony of Canada at the other end of the trans-continental waterway. As for the Dutch, our observer must admit that he had rated their prospects much too high. They might have made themselves masters of the Great Lakes before the French arrived there. Indeed, for the ocean-going vessels of the century, the head

of navigation was rather less distant up the Hudson than it was up the St. Lawrence from the shores of Lake Ontario. Yet, far from that, the Dutch have tamely allowed the Hudson Valley itself to be taken from them by their weaker maritime rivals the English. Well, the Dutch are out of the running now in North America, and the French and the English are left there *tête à tête*; but the English can hardly be regarded as serious competitors. The events of the last half-century assuredly do not call for any revision of forecasts on this head—notwithstanding the unlooked-for success which the English have gained in the Hudson Valley. Certainly the New Englanders are making the most of this windfall. Already they are colonizing the back-country of the Dutch province and are linking New England up with the rest of the English settlements on the Atlantic coast. Possibly the New Englanders have been saved from extinction—but this only to share the modest prospects of their southern kinsfolk. For the English feat of conquering the Hudson Valley from the facile Dutch has been utterly surpassed by the simultaneous French feat of conquering from the formidable virgin wilderness the whole extent of the magnificent inland waterway between Quebec and New Orleans. While the English colonies have been consolidated, the French colonies have effectively hemmed them in. The future of the Continent is decided! The victors are the French!

Shall we endow our observer with superhuman length of life, in order that he may review the situation once more in the year 1803? If we do preserve him alive till then, he will be forced to confess that his wits have not been worthy of his longevity. By the end of 1803, the French flag has actually disappeared off the political map of North America altogether. For forty years past, Canada has been a possession of the British Crown, while Louisiana, after being ceded by France to Spain and retroceded again, has just been sold on the 20th December, 1803, by Napoleon to the United States—the new Great Power which has emerged out of the thirteen English colonies by a most extraordinary metamorphosis.

'The United States of America!' Who would have prophesied it? Yet the ambitious title is justified by the accomplished facts. In this year 1803, the United States have the continent in their pockets, and the scope for prophecy is reduced. It only remains to forecast which section of these United States is going to pocket the larger share of this vast estate—the breadth of a continent—that has come into their joint possession. And surely this time there can be no mistake? The Southern States are the manifest masters of the Union and residuary legatees in North America of Great Britain and France. Look how the Southerners are leading in this

final round of the competition—in this inter-American race for the Winning of the West. It is the backwoodsmen of Virginia who have founded Kentucky—the first new state to be established west of those mountains which have so long conspired with the French to keep the English-speaking settlers on the Atlantic coast from penetrating into the interior. And take note of the key-position which Kentucky occupies, extending right down the left bank of the Ohio to the confluence of the Mississippi's principal tributary with the Mississippi himself. The West is in the Southerners' grasp, and mark how all things work together for their good. The statesmanship of an English Chatham and a Pennsylvanian Franklin and a Corsican Buonaparte has endowed them with an immeasurable supply of land; and, as fast as they can put this new land under the hoe, the new-fangled mills of distant Lancashire are offering them an ever-expanding market for the cotton-crop which the soil and climate of the South enable them to raise. The Negro provides the labour and the Mississippi the means of transporting the produce to the quays of New Orleans, where the ships from Liverpool are waiting to bear it away. Even the New Englander is a useful auxiliary, as the Southerner superciliously points out.

'Our Yankee cousin', the Southerner observes in 1807, 'has just invented a "steam-boat" which will navigate our Mississippi upstream; and he has made a practical success of a machine for carding and cleaning our cotton-bolls. Those unlovable, unfortunate fellow-citizens of ours in that out-of-the-way corner, down east! Their "Yankee notions" are more profitable to us than they are to the ingenious inventors! For what are New England's prospects? Her prospects are no better in this year 1807 than they were a century since. To-day, when the wide West has been thrown open to Southern enterprise at last, it still remains closed to the New Englander. New England is still barred in on the landward side by the barrier of Canada, which has not ceased to be a foreign country in passing from the French to the British Crown. So there our poor relation still sits in his out-of-the-way corner, cooped up on the "bad lands" of Town Hill; and there, presumably, he will go on sitting till Doomsday! "Sedet, aeternumque sedebit!"'¹

If our unlucky prophet takes Southern prospects on the morrow of the Louisiana Purchase at the Southerner's own valuation, he must indeed be in his dotage; for in the last round of the two-centuries-long contest for the mastery of the North American Continent, the Southerner is destined to meet a swifter and more crushing defeat than those that have been met heretofore by the Spaniard and the Dutchman and the Frenchman. To witness his

¹ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book VI, l. 617.

discomfiture, we shall not have to wait as long as a century. We shall see the relative positions of South and North reversed in less than a lifetime.

In the year 1865, the situation is already transformed, out of all recognition, from what it was in 1807. In the Winning of the West, the Southern pioneer had been outstripped and outflanked by his Northern rival. After almost winning his way to the Great Lakes through Indiana and after getting the best of the bargain in Missouri, the Southerner has been decisively defeated in Kansas, and he has never reached the Pacific. The descendants of the men who mastered the difficulties of Town Hill, Connecticut, have now become masters of the Pacific coast along the whole front from Seattle to Los Angeles. Nor has the Southerner's command of the Mississippi much availed him. He had counted on the network of the Western Waters to draw the whole of the West into a Southern system of economic and political relations; and when the Yankee presented him with steam-boats to ply on the Western Waters, he imagined that the Yankee had delivered the West into his hands. But 'Yankee notions' have not ceased. The inventor of the steamer has gone on to invent the locomotive; and the locomotive has taken away more from the Southerner than the steamer ever gave him; for the potential function of the Hudson Valley in the human geography of North America as the main gateway from the Atlantic to the West—a potentiality which the Dutch had failed to turn to account in competition with the French—has been actualized at last in the railway age. The railway-traffic which now passes up the valley of the Hudson and the valley of the Mohawk and then along the lake-side to link New York with Chicago has superseded the river-traffic on the Mississippi between New Orleans and St. Louis. Therewith, the internal lines of communication of the North American Continent have been turned at right angles from south and north to east and west; and the North-West has been detached from the South, to be welded on to the North-East in interest and in sentiment. Indeed, the Easterner, who once made the South-West a present of the river-steamer, has now won the heart of the North-West with a double gift: he has come to the North-Western farmer with the locomotive in one hand and with the reaper-and-binder in the other, and so has provided him with solutions for both the problems with which the West is confronted. In order to develop its potential economic capacities, the whole West has need of two things: transport and labour; but the South-Western planter—believing that his labour-problem has been solved for ever by the institution of negro slavery—has sought a solution for his transport-problem, and for this only, from the Yankee's

mechanical ingenuity. The North-Western farmer is in a different case. He disposes of no servile man-power, and his free-labour force is recruited by the casual process of immigration from Europe all too slowly to till his fast-expanding fields. So he finds the agricultural machinery which is turned out by the Eastern factories as great a godsend as the Eastern railways. By these two 'Yankee notions', together, the allegiance of the North-West has been decided; and thus the Civil War has been lost by the South before it has been fought. In taking up arms in the hope of redressing her economic reverses by a military counterstroke, the South has merely precipitated and consummated a *débâcle* that was already inevitable.

This ultimate victory of the New Englanders, in a competition for the mastery of North America in which their Spanish, Dutch, French, and Southern competitors were successively discomfited, is illuminating for the study of the question with which we are concerned at the moment: the question of the relative stimulating effects of different degrees of difficulty in the physical environment of human life. For, unusually difficult though the New Englanders' environment was, it is manifest that the rival colonists' environments were none of them easy. To begin with, all alike had undergone the initial ordeal of plucking up their social roots in Europe and crossing the Atlantic and striking fresh roots in the soil of a New World;¹ and, when they had succeeded in re-establishing themselves, it was not only the New Englanders who found permanent difficulties to contend with in their new American home. The French settlers in Canada had to contend with an almost arctic cold; and the French settlers in Louisiana had to break in a great river. The Mississippi was as wayward in changing his course, and as devastating in his inundations, as the Yellow River or the Nile or the Tigris; and the *levées* with which the Creoles protected their hard-won fields and villages cost no less human effort to build and maintain than the earthen bulwarks of the Egyptian and the Sumerian and the Sinic Civilization. In fact, the difficulties presented by the physical environment in Canada and in Louisiana were only less formidable than those which the New Englanders encountered on Town Hill itself. Thus this North American illustration, as far as it goes, tells in favour of the proposition that the difficulty and the stimulus of an environment are apt to increase *pari passu*. It will tell the same tale if we push it even farther.

Can we push it farther? Can we venture, in 1933, to prophesy

¹ The stimulus of transmarine colonization and migration is examined further on pp. 84-100, below.

in whose hands the mastery of North America will lie a century hence? Can we hope to come any nearer to the mark ourselves than our imaginary prophet in 1650 and 1701 and 1803? Can we do more than ring down the curtain on the present scene, in which the offspring of the New Englanders dominates the stage? Difficult though divination may be, there are already certain signs that the drama is not yet played out and the final victory in the struggle not yet decided. One small sign once came to the notice of the author of this Study.

A few days after the occasion, mentioned above,¹ when I passed by the deserted site of Town Hill, Connecticut, I found myself with an hour to spend between trains in one of the small back-country manufacturing towns of New England, on the Massachusetts side of the Connecticut-Massachusetts state-line. Since the General War of 1914-18, the industrial districts of New England have fared as badly as those of the mother country. They have fallen on evil days, and they show it in their aspect. In this town, however, on this day, the atmosphere was not at all forlorn or lifeless. The town was in fête, and the whole population was abroad in the streets. Threading my way through the crowds I noticed that one person out of every two was wearing a special badge, and I inquired what the colours signified. I was told that they were the colours of the local French Canadian club; and I ascertained that my rough impression of their frequency in the streets was borne out by statistics. In that year 1925, in that New England manufacturing town, the French Canadians were by far the strongest contingent in the local labour-force. The indigenous New Englanders had left these factories, as they had left the fields of Town Hill, to find their fortunes in the West; but the town, unlike the village, had not been deserted. As fast as the indigenous population had ebbed out, a tide of French Canadian immigrants had flooded in. Conditions of work and life which had ceased to be attractive to the descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers seemed luxurious to these Norman peasants' children from the sub-arctic hinterland of Quebec. Moreover, I was told, the French Canadian immigrants were spreading from the towns of New England on to the land, where, as peasants, they found themselves truly at home. On their frugal standard of living, American rates of industrial wages left them with a surplus which quickly mounted up to the purchase-price of a derelict New England farm. The immigrants were actually re-populating the deserted countryside. Perhaps, on my next visit, I should find Town Hill itself no longer desolate. Yet if, on that forbidding spot, the works of Man overcame the wilderness for the second time, it could be foreseen

¹ See pp. 15-16, above.

that history would repeat itself with a difference. The fields and orchards and even the houses might wear again in 1950 the aspect which they had worn two centuries before; but this time the blood in the veins of the farmers would be French and not English, and divine worship in the antique wooden church would be conducted no longer by a Presbyterian minister but by a Catholic priest!

Thus it seems possible that the contest between the French Canadian and the New Englander for the mastery of North America may not, after all, have been concluded and disposed of finally by the outcome of the Seven Years' War. For, when the French flag was hauled down, the French peasant did not disappear with the emblem of the French Government's sovereignty. Under the tutelage of the Roman Catholic Church, this peasantry continued, undisturbed, to be fruitful and multiply and replenish the Earth; and now in the fullness of time the French Canadian is making a counter-offensive into the heart of his old rival's homeland. He is conquering New England in the peasant's way—by slower but surer methods than those which Governments have at their command. He is conducting his operations with the plough-share and not with the sword, and he is asserting his ownership by the positive act of colonizing the countryside and not by the cartographical conceit of painting colours and drawing lines on a scrap of paper. Meanwhile, law and religion and environment are combining to assist him. The environment of a harsh countryside keeps him exposed to a stimulus which no longer invigorates his rival in the softer atmosphere of the distant Western cities. His religion forbids him to restrict the size of his family by contraceptive methods of birth-control. And United States legislation, which has restricted immigration from countries overseas but not from countries on the American Continent, has left the French Canadian immigrant in a privileged position which is shared with him by none but the Mexican.¹ Perhaps the present act in the drama of North American history may end, after a century of peaceful penetration, in a triumphal meeting between the two resurgent Latin peasantries in the neighbourhood of the Federal Capital of the United States! Is this the denouement that our great-grandchildren are destined to witness in A.D. 2033? There

¹ This restriction of immigration into the United States has been effected by the Immigration (Restriction) Acts of 1921 and 1924. It should be noted that the wide door left open for immigration into the United States across the land-frontiers is only open for native-born inhabitants of the adjoining American countries. A European or Asiatic who attempts to enter the United States through Canada or Mexico, without having secured a place in the annual quota of immigrants assigned to his own country of origin, finds himself excluded. In this matter, the United States Bureau of Immigration has adopted the British Admiralty's doctrine of 'continuous voyage'.

have been reversals of fortune every bit as strange as this in North American history before.

III. THE STIMULUS OF NEW GROUND

The Testimony of Philosophy, Mythology, and Religion

So much for comparisons between the respective stimulating effects of physical environments which present different degrees of difficulty. Let us now approach the same question from a different angle by comparing the respective stimulating effects of old ground and new ground, apart from the intrinsic nature of the terrain.

Does the effort of breaking new ground act as a stimulus in itself? The question is answered in the affirmative by the critical empiricism of an eighteenth-century Western philosopher as well as by the wider spontaneous human experience which has found a cumulative expression in Mythology. David Hume concludes his essay *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences* with the observation that 'the arts and sciences, like some plants, require a fresh soil; and, however rich the land may be, and however you may recruit it by art or care, it will never, when once exhausted, produce anything that is perfect or finished in the kind'. The same affirmative answer is conveyed in the myth of the Expulsion from Eden and in the myth of the Exodus from Egypt. In their removal out of the magic garden into the workaday world, Adam and Eve transcend the food-gathering economy of Primitive Mankind and give birth to the fathers of an agricultural and a pastoral civilization.¹ In their exodus from Egypt, the Children of Israel—though they hanker in the wilderness after the flesh pots of the house of bondage²—give birth to a generation which helps to lay the foundations of the Syriac Civilization in taking possession of the Promised Land.³ When we turn from myths to records, we find these intuitions confirmed by the evidence of empirical observation.

In the histories of religions, we find that—to the consternation of those who ask the scornful question: 'Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?'⁴—the Messiah of Jewry does come out of that obscure village in 'Galilee of the Gentiles':⁵ an outlying piece of new ground which had been captured for Jewry by the Maccabees rather less than a century before the date of Jesus's birth.⁶ And when the indomitable growth of this Galilaean grain of

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 290, above.

² See pp. 24-5, above.

³ See the passage quoted in II. B, vol. i, p. 198, above.

⁴ John i. 46. Compare John vii. 41 and 52, and Matt. iv. 14-16, which is a reminiscence of Isaiah ix. 1-2.

⁵ Matt. iv. 15.

⁶ *Regnante Alexandro Jannaeo*, 102-76 B.C.

mustard-seed turns the consternation of Orthodox Jewry into active hostility, and this not only in Judaea itself but among the Jewish diaspora, then the propagators of the new faith deliberately 'turn to the Gentiles'¹ and proceed to conquer new worlds for Christianity on ground which had lain wholly beyond the range of the strong right arm of an Alexander Jannaeus. In the history of Buddhism it is the same story, for the decisive victories of this Indic faith are not won on the old ground of the Indic World. The Hinayana first finds an open road in Ceylon, which was a colonial annex of the Indic Civilization. And the Mahayana starts its long and roundabout journey towards its future domain in the Far East by capturing the Syriacized and Hellenized Indic province of the Panjab. It is on the new ground of these alien worlds that the highest expressions of the Indic and the Syriac religious genius eventually bear their fruit—in witness to the truth that 'a prophet is not without honour save in his own country and in his own house'.²

The Testimony of the 'Related' Civilizations

A convenient empirical test of this social 'law' is offered by those civilizations of the 'related' class that have arisen partly on ground already occupied by the respective antecedent civilization and partly on ground which the 'related' civilization has taken over—either from primitive societies or from other civilizations—on its own account, without the antecedent civilization having here preceded it and prepared the way. We can test the respective stimulating effects of old ground and new ground by surveying the career of any one of these 'related' civilizations, marking the point or points within its domain at which its achievements in any line of social activity have been most signal, and then observing whether the ground on which such points are located is new ground or old.

Let us begin with the extreme case of the Babylonian Civilization, whose original home has been found to be wholly coincident with that of the 'apparented' civilization: the Sumeric.³ In which of its three foci—Babylonia, Elam, Assyria⁴—did the Babylonian Civilization most distinguish itself? Undoubtedly in Assyria. Whether we judge by prowess in arms or by constructive ability in politics or by creative genius in art, we must pronounce that the Babylonian Civilization reached a higher level in Assyria than in either of the other two Babylonian countries. And was Assyria old ground or

¹ Acts xiii. 46.

² Matthew xiii. 57. Compare Mark vi. 4; Luke iv. 24; John iv. 44.

³ See the table and the footnote in vol. i, p. 132, above.

⁴ See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 116-17, above.

new? It turns out, on further examination, that Assyria was the one portion of the original home of the antecedent Sumeric Civilization which possibly might be regarded as new ground—at any rate by comparison with Sumer and Akkad and Elam; for when we probe the local history of Assyria as deep as the present state of our archaeological knowledge allows us to penetrate, we find some reason for supposing that Assyria was not one of the original communities into which the Sumeric Society articulated itself after its birth, but was in some sense a colony—albeit a colony that was almost coeval with the mother country. Perhaps it is not altogether fantastic to surmise that the stimulus derived from this breaking of new ground in Assyria at some early stage in the growth of the Sumeric Civilization may account in part for the special vigour which was afterwards displayed by the ‘affiliated’ Babylonian Civilization on this Assyrian ground.¹

Turning next to the Hindu Civilization, let us mark the local sources of the new creative elements in Hindu life—particularly in religion, which has always been the central and supreme activity of the Hindu Society. We find these sources in the South. It was here that all the distinctive features of Hinduism took shape:² the cult of Gods represented by material objects or images and housed in temples; the emotional personal relation between the worshipper and the particular God to whose worship he has devoted himself; the metaphysical sublimation of image-worship and emotionalism in an intellectually sophisticated theology (Śāṅkara, the father of Hindu Theology, was born, *circa* A.D. 788, in Southern Malabar).³ All these features of Hinduism bear a Southern stamp. And was the South of India old ground or new? It was new ground, inasmuch as it had not been incorporated into the domain of the ‘apparented’ Indic Civilization until the time of the Maurya Empire (*circa* 323–185 B.C.),⁴ when the Indic Society, after having first broken down and then passed through a Time of Troubles, at length entered upon that advanced stage in the disintegration of a civilization which we have learnt to recognize as a ‘universal state’.

Let us look now at the two civilizations that are ‘affiliated’ to the Syriac, namely the Arabic and the Iranian.⁵

Where, during the short life of the Arabic Society, did its rather feeble pulse beat least feebly? Assuredly in Egypt, where a ghost of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate (a ghost, that is to say, of the ‘reintegrated’ Syriac universal state) was evoked in the thirteenth century of the

¹ For another explanation of Assyria’s rise as a reaction to the stimulus of pressure from the human environment, see the present volume, pp. 133–7, below.

² See Eliot, Sir Charles: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. i, Introduction, p. xli.

³ See Eliot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 207.

⁴ See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 86–7, above.

⁵ See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 67–72, with Annex I, above.

Christian Era by the Mamlûks.¹ It was in Egypt that the Arabic literature and the Arabic architecture kept themselves alive during the quarter of a millennium that elapsed between the inauguration of the Cairene Caliphate and the Ottoman conquest. And was Egypt old ground or new? It was new ground inasmuch as it had not begun to be incorporated into the domain of the Syriac Civilization, to which the Arabic Civilization was 'affiliated', before the entry of this Syriac Civilization into its universal state; and even then the 'dead trunk' of the indigenous Egyptiac Civilization, which still cumbered the ground in Egypt, was only absorbed into the tissues of the Syriac Civilization slowly and arduously.

The conquest of Egypt by the Achaemenian Empire, which was the original Syriac universal state,² was a mere external annexation. The Egyptians were simply subdued politically by force of arms and even this only intermittently. The Achaemenian régime made no progress whatever towards converting their souls; and, when the Syriac universal state was interrupted by the intrusion of Hellenism, 'Hellenization' seemed a more likely destiny for the residue of the Egyptiac Society than a merger with the Syriac Society which had been submerged, quite as deeply as the Egyptiac Society itself, under the Hellenic flood. It was not until both the Hellenic and the Egyptiac Society were *in extremis* that, in the competition for spiritual dominion over Egypt, the Hellenic Society lost and the Syriac Society gained the upper hand. The ultimate victory of the Syriac Civilization in Egypt was first foreshadowed when Egypt was captivated by Monophysitism—a version of Christianity in which the Syriac reaction against Hellenism expressed itself before the dissolution of the Roman Empire and the re-integration of the Syriac universal state in the 'Abbasid Caliphate'.³ The victory of the Syriac Civilization in Egypt was only consummated when the population of Egypt—after having successively abandoned their ancient Egyptiac religion for Primitive Christianity and Primitive Christianity for Monophysitism—were converted *en masse* from Monophysitism to Islam; and this did not happen until the 'Abbasid Caliphate itself had dissolved into the interregnum (*circa* A.D. 975–1275)⁴ out of which the Arabic Civilization afterwards emerged. Thus, in Egypt, the Arabic Civilization was occupying ground which the 'apparented' Syriac civilization had not completely made its own until the Arabic Civilization was on the point of coming to birth. Yet it was on this new ground in

¹ See vol. i, p. 70, above.

² See vol. i, pp. 75–9, above.

³ The reaction of the Syrian Civilization against the intrusion of Hellenism, of which this Monophysite version of Christianity was one symptom in one phase, is discussed further in II. D (vi), on p. 236, and II. D (vii), on pp. 286–7, as well as in Part IX, below.

⁴ See vol. i, pp. 67–8, above.

Egypt that the Arabic Civilization displayed such vigour as it did display before its career was prematurely closed by incorporation into the body social of its lustier Iranic sister. This is noteworthy, considering that the original home of the Arabic Civilization included not only the new ground of Egypt but also the old ground of Syria—the very region in which the ‘apparented’ Syriac Civilization had taken its rise. Yet, in the history of the ‘affiliated’ Arabic Civilization, Syria always played the subordinate and Egypt the leading part.

Again, in what areas did the Iranic Civilization—the sister of the Syriac—most conspicuously flourish? Almost all the great achievements of the Iranic Civilization in the principal spheres of social activity—not only in war and in politics, but even in architecture and in literature¹—were accomplished at one or other of the two extremities of the Iranic World: either in Hindustan, at one end, or in Anatolia, at the other;² and they culminated respectively, in these two areas, in the Mughal and in the Ottoman Empire. Were these two Iranic empires erected on old ground or on new ground? The ground was new in both cases. The Ottoman Empire was erected on the domain of the Orthodox Christian Civilization; and indeed it occupied this domain so effectively that it actually performed, for the main body of Orthodox Christendom, the function of a universal state.³ Similarly, the Mughal Empire was erected on the domain of the Hindu Civilization and performed the function of a universal state in the Hindu World.⁴ Thus the Iranic Civilization

¹ Persian literature—which in the early age of Iranic history continued to flourish, and this in the heart of the Iranic World, in Iran itself—is a conspicuous apparent exception to the general rule here formulated. This Persian literature, however, is to be regarded as a creation not of the Iranic but of the ‘apparented’ Syriac Civilization (as Latin literature is a creation of the Hellenic Civilization and not of the ‘affiliated’ Western or Latin Christendom). The genesis of Persian literature was an event of the ‘Abbasid age, when the Syriac Civilization was enjoying a kind of ‘Indian Summer’ after the reintegration of its universal state. It is to this age of the Syriac Civilization that Persian literature genetically belongs, although chronologically the lifetime of one of its great masters, Sa’di of Shirāz (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1184–1201), falls within the post-Syriac interregnum, and the lifetimes of two others—Hāfiz of Shirāz and Jāmi of Khurāsān—fall respectively within the fourteenth and the fifteenth century of the Christian Era: that is to say, within a time when the Iranic Civilization had already emerged. Hāfiz and the other Persian poets of his generation flourished under social conditions curiously resembling those which produced both the Scandinavian skalds and the Ionian Homeridae. ‘It would seem that the existence of numerous small courts, rivals to one another, and each striving to outshine the others, was singularly favourable to the encouragement of poets and other men of letters, who, if disappointed or slighted in one city, could generally find in another a more favourable reception.’ (Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 160–1.) Thereafter, however, from the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, Persian literature wilted in Iran under the régime of the Safawis. (For a discussion of this last-mentioned phenomenon, see Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 24–31; and the present Study, I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, above.)

² For the area covered by the original domain of the Iranic Civilization, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 68–9, above.

³ For this role of the Ottoman Empire, see further Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26–7, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 68, below. ⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 97, below.

displayed, at two points which were remote from one another, the identical idiosyncrasy of flourishing best on foreign soil. Moreover, it is to be noted that, in both cases, the acquisition of this foreign soil had not started until after the beginning of the interregnum (*circa* A.D. 975-1275) into which the universal state of the 'apparented' Syriac Civilization dissolved and out of which the 'affiliated' Iranic Civilization itself emerged. The first permanent conquests of Hindu territory in the Kābul Valley and in the Panjab were made (*circa* A.D. 975-1025)¹ by Sebuktegin and his more celebrated successor Mahmūd of Ghaznah; the first permanent conquests of Orthodox Christian territory were made (*circa* A.D. 1070-5) by the Saljūqs.

Accordingly, it was on sites acquired piecemeal from alien civilizations at recent dates that the Iranic Civilization eventually erected its most imposing monuments. On the other hand, the second home which the 'apparented' Syriac Civilization had once found on the Iranian Plateau and in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin² never became the most active focus of the 'affiliated' Iranic Civilization, in spite of the fact that these two regions lay in the heart of the zone in which the Iranic Civilization originally emerged. During the age when, in the new territories conquered from Orthodox Christendom and Hinduism, the Iranic Civilization was going from strength to strength, it succumbed in Iran and in Transoxania to a series of local misdevelopments.³ In the first place, during the post-Syriac interregnum, these regions bore the brunt of the Mongol invasion—the last and most destructive avalanche of the post-Syriac Völkerwanderung. Thereafter, they lay torpid under the dead weight of the two local Mongol 'successor-states' of the 'Abbasid Caliphate—the appanage of the Il-Khans and the appanage of the House of Chaghatāy; and these disorderly and sluggish régimes only disappeared to make way for the devouring militarism of Timur. The final blows, by which the two regions were prostrated simultaneously at the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, were the establishment of the Shī'ī Power in Iran and the conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin by the Uzbeg barbarians off the Eurasian Steppe: two violent political transformations which had the identic effect of fixing a great religious and cultural gulf between the geographical heart of the

¹ Sebuktegin established his suzerainty over the Kābul Valley in A.D. 975; and Mahmūd conquered it and forcibly converted the population to Islam in A.D. 1021. (Vaidya, C. V.: *A History of Mediaeval India* (Poona 1921-4, Oriental Book-Supplying Agency, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 193.) Sebuktegin's raids on the Panjab began in A.D. 986-7; Mahmūd raided Kanauj in A.D. 1019 (Smith, V.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 382). ² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 80-2, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i; II. D (v), pp. 144-8 of the present volume; and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (x), vol. iv, pp. 491-501, below.

Iranic World and either of its extremities. Thus it was in the extremities and not at the heart of the Iranic body social that the blood pulsated most vigorously; or, in terms of our original metaphor, it was on new ground and not on old ground that the seed of the Iranic culture produced its finest harvests.

In what regions has the greatest vigour been displayed by the Orthodox Christian Civilization? A glance at its history shows that its social centre of gravity has lain in different regions at different times. In the first age after its emergence out of the post-Hellenic interregnum, the life of Orthodox Christendom was most vigorous on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles—in the central and north-eastern parts of the Anatolian Plateau or, in the administrative terminology of the day, in the Anatolic and Armeniac army corps districts (*themata*) of the East Roman Empire. Thereafter, in the course of the two centuries which elapsed between the conversion of Bulgaria to Orthodox Christianity in A.D. 865–70 and the occupation of the interior of Anatolia by the Saljūq Turkish converts to Islam in A.D. 1070–5, the centre of gravity of Orthodox Christendom shifted from the Asiatic to the European side of the Straits; and, as far as the main body of Orthodox Christian Society is concerned, it has remained in the Balkan Peninsula ever since. In modern times, however, that portion of Orthodox Christendom which constitutes the main body of the society from an historical standpoint has been far outstripped in growth and overshadowed in importance by the mighty offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia.¹

Are these three areas in which the Orthodox Christian Civilization has successively raised its head to be regarded as old ground or as new? Central and North-Eastern Anatolia was certainly new ground as far as the Orthodox Christian Civilization was concerned. It was the former domain of the Hittite Civilization; and although the Hittite Civilization had died a premature death by violence during the *Völkerwanderung* in which the Hellenic Civilization was brought to birth,² its Anatolian homeland was not penetrated by Hellenism until after the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great. Even then, this region remained unhellenized much longer than many places that were far more distant from the Aegean. The process did not set in vigorously here until after the last of the local 'successor-states' of the Achaemenian Empire had been converted into Roman provinces; and the first positive local contributions to the Hellenic culture

¹ An offshoot which has neither lost its importance nor ceased to be recognizable through being draped twice over—first by Peter the Great and then by Lenin—in an exotic fancy dress of the momentarily fashionable Western cut.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93 and 100–1, above.

were made as late as the fourth century of the Christian Era by the Cappadocian Fathers of the Church. Thus the earliest centre of gravity of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in the interior of Anatolia lay in a region which had not been completely incorporated into the domain of the 'apparented' Hellenic Civilization until Hellenism was *in articulo mortis*.

The second centre of gravity in the interior of the Balkan Peninsula was established on new ground likewise. For the veneer of Hellenic Civilization in a Latin medium, with which this region had been thinly overlaid, in the lifetime of the Roman Empire, during a span of some five centuries, had been destroyed without leaving a trace¹ during the interregnum into which the Empire had eventually dissolved. The destruction was more thoroughgoing here than it was in any of the western provinces with the single exception of Britain. In the Balkan Peninsula, as in Britain, the superficial change of régime was accompanied by a radical change of population and religion. The Christian Roman provincials were not simply conquered but were practically exterminated by the pagan barbarian invaders; and these barbarians eradicated all elements of local culture so effectively that when their descendants repented of the evil which their fathers had done they had to obtain fresh seed from outside in order to start cultivation again. By the time when Orthodox Christianity was re-sown in the Balkan Peninsula in the ninth century of the Christian Era, the soil had been lying fallow for more than three centuries: that is to say, for about twice as long as the soil of Britain had been lying fallow at the time when Augustine was sent on his mission by Gregory the Great. Thus the region in which the Orthodox Christian Civilization established its second centre of gravity was ground which had recently been reclaimed *de novo* from the wilderness.

As for the third centre of gravity in Russia, there is no need to labour the point. The offshoot of Orthodox Christendom which was transplanted to Russia in the tenth century of the Christian Era was propagated there in virgin soil on which no civilization had ever grown before; and this new Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom was separated from the main body by a double barrier of sea and steppe.² Russia was new ground with a

¹ The survival of a Romance language among the mountains of South-Eastern Europe, from the Carpathians to the Pindus, cannot properly be regarded as a trace of the Latin version of the Hellenic Civilization in the Balkan Peninsula; for the survival of the language did not carry with it any survival of the culture of which this language had once been the vehicle. The still Latin-speaking and still nominally Christian Vlachs and Rumans had to be converted, in 'the Middle Ages', to the Orthodox Christian Civilization *de novo*, just like the contemporary Bulgars and Jugoslavs, who were pagan barbarians speaking outlandish tongues.

² At the present time, the domain of Orthodox Christendom in Russia and its domain in the Balkan Peninsula are geographically isolated from one another no longer. The

vengeance; and it is noteworthy that, in Russia, the Orthodox Christian Civilization has flourished with an exuberance which stands out in contrast to its strained and stunted growth elsewhere.

It is still more remarkable to observe that while the centre of gravity of the Orthodox Christian Civilization has shifted twice in the course of Orthodox Christian history, it has never lain in the homeland of the 'apparented' Hellenic Civilization in the Aegean area, although this area has been included in the domain of Orthodox Christendom from first to last. In the early age of the Orthodox Christian Civilization, when its centre of gravity lay on the Anatolian Plateau, the Aegean frontage of Anatolia, which had played a leading role in the early age of the Hellenic Civilization, was perhaps the least important district in the Asiatic peninsula.¹ Again, since the centre of gravity of the main body of Orthodox Christendom has shifted to the European side of the Straits, it has normally lain on the landward and not on the seaward side of Salonica. In fact, peninsular Greece, which was the hub of the Hellenic universe after the primacy had once passed from Ionia, has never played a prominent part in Orthodox Christian history except on two occasions—one in the 'medieval' and the other in the 'modern' age of Western history—when Greece has served as a

Rumanian Orthodox Christians of the Balkan area now march with their Ukrainian co-religionists of the Russian area along a line extending from the Central Carpathians through the Bukovina and Bessarabia to the Black Sea coast. This geographical continuity between the Russian and the Balkan domains of Orthodox Christendom does not, however, date back farther than the eighteenth century. The two domains were separated from one another by an outlying strip of the Eurasian Steppe until after the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74. It was only in the sequel to this war, when the north coast of the Black Sea and its whole hinterland were annexed to the Russian Empire, that this insulating strip of steppe was cleared of the last of its Nomadic pastoral tenants and was colonized with an agricultural population of Orthodox Christian peasants. This was the final stage in a gradual converging encroachment of the Orthodox Christian peasant's ploughland upon the Muslim or pagan herdsman's cattle-range which had been in progress since the Ruman pioneers had descended in the fourteenth century from the Transylvanian highlands into the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia, and since the Zaporogian Cossacks had established themselves—as they did at about the same date—on their island-fortress in the River Dniepr. (See II. D (v), pp. 154-7, below.) In the tenth century, however, this encroachment had not yet begun. At that time, the pagan Turkish Pechenegs were pasturing their flocks on virgin steppe-land from the banks of the Don to the Iron Gates of the Danube without interruption. The Orthodox Christian missionaries who carried the seeds of their civilization to Russia could only reach this new field by facing the perils of sea and steppe in succession. They had first to travel by ship from Constantinople to the Crimea, and thence to pick their way across the open prairie, where they were at the mercy of the Pechenegs until they found safety at last in the southern outskirts of the Russian forests.

¹ When the East Roman Army was concentrated in Anatolia during the military crisis produced by the Persian and Arab invasions in the seventh century of the Christian Era, this district was assigned to the Thracensian Army Corps, which was permanently withdrawn from the European district from which it derived its name and was stationed here in Western Anatolia in order to support the Anatolic Army Corps, which had been withdrawn from Syria on to the Anatolian Plateau. The Anatolici were the front-line troops; the Thracenses were mere reserves. Accordingly, the Thracensian district was little accounted of, whereas the Anatolic district, in conjunction with the Armeniac, swayed the destinies of the East Roman Empire.

watergate through which Western influence has forced an entry into the Orthodox Christian World.¹

Turning now to Hellenic history, let us ask our question apropos of the two regions which (as we have just observed in passing) successively held the primacy in the Hellenic World. When the Hellenic Civilization flowered on the Anatolian coast of the Aegean and afterwards on the European Greek peninsula, was it on new ground or on old ground that this flowering took place? It was on new ground, here again; for neither of these regions had lain within the original home of the antecedent Minoan Civilization, to which the Hellenic Civilization was related. On the European Greek peninsula, the Minoan Civilization, even at its widest extension in its latest age, had held no more than a chain of fortified positions along the southern and eastern coast-lines.² On the Anatolian coast of the Aegean, the failure of our modern Western archaeologists to find traces of the presence, or even influence, of the Minoan Civilization has been so signal that it can hardly be attributed to chance, but seems rather to indicate that for some reason this coast actually did not come within the Minoans' range.³ As far as we know, the first settlers from the Aegean to occupy the west coast of Anatolia effectively were those refugees of Minoan culture and Greek speech who were driven thither, as late as the twelfth century B.C., in the same final convulsion of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung that drove the Philistines on to the coast of Syria.⁴ These were the founders of Aeolis and Ionia; and thus Hellenism flowered first on soil which the antecedent civilization had never seriously cultivated. Moreover, when the seeds were scattered abroad from Ionia into other parts of the Hellenic World, the Ionic soil on which they flowered next was the stony ground of Attica on the opposite side of the Aegean. They did not germinate in the Cyclades: the Ionic islands which stood, like stepping-stones, between the Ionic mainlands in Asia and in Europe. Through the whole course of Hellenic history the Cycladic islanders played a subordinate role as humble servants of the successive masters of the sea. This is remarkable, since the Cyclades had been one of the two foci of the antecedent Minoan Civilization. The other Minoan focus, of course, was Crete; and the role played in Hellenic history by Crete is even more surprising.

¹ The first of these two forcible entries was the military conquest of peninsular Greece by the Latins, during and after the so-called 'Fourth Crusade'. The second was the infiltration of modern Western ideas which began towards the end of the seventeenth century and came to a head politically, some hundred and fifty years later, in the Greek War of Independence which broke out in A.D. 1821.

² See I. C (i) (b), Annex II, vol. i, above.

³ On this point, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 95, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 100-2, above.

Crete might have been expected to retain its social importance not only for historical reasons, as the place in which the Minoan Civilization had attained its culmination, but for geographical reasons as well. Crete was by far the largest island in the Aegean Archipelago, and it lay athwart two of the most important sea-routes in the Hellenic World. Every ship that sailed from the Peiraeus for Sicily had to pass between the western end of Crete and Laconia; every ship that sailed from the Peiraeus for Egypt had to pass between the eastern end of Crete and Rhodes. Yet, whereas Laconia and Rhodes each played a leading part in Hellenic history, Crete remained aloof, obscure and benighted from first to last. While Hellas all around was giving birth to statesmen and poets and artists and philosophers, the island which had once been the home of the Minoan Civilization now bred nothing more reputable than medicine-men and mercenaries and pirates; and though the greatness of Minoan Crete had left its impress upon the Hellenic Mythology in the fables of Minos the thalassocrat and his brother Rhadamanthys, the judge of the dead, this did not save the latter-day Cretan scapegrace from becoming a Hellenic byword. Indeed, he has passed judgement on himself in the song of Hybrias¹ and in a hexameter which has been embedded, like a fly in amber, in the canon of Christian Scripture. 'One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said: "The Cretians are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies."'² Thus even the Apostle of the Gentiles excepted the Hellenes of Crete from the charity which he bestowed upon Hellenes in general.³

Let us ask our question once again—this time in regard to the Far Eastern Civilization which is 'affiliated' to the Sinic Civilization. At what points in its domain has this Far Eastern Civilization shown the greatest vigour? The Japanese and the Cantonese stand out unmistakably as its most vigorous representatives to-day; and both these peoples have sprung from soil which is new ground and not old ground from the standpoint of Far Eastern history. As regards the south-eastern seaboard of China, we have noticed in an earlier chapter⁴ that it was not incorporated into the domain of the

¹ An English translation of the Song of Hybrias, by Gilbert Murray, will be found below in Part III. A, vol. iii, on p. 87, footnote 1.

² The Epistle of Paul to Titus, ch. i, v. 12. The hexameter here quoted runs in Greek:

Κρήτες δὲ ψευδοί, κακὰ θηρία, ὕστεροι ἀνθρώποι.

For the original context of this verse in the poem called 'Minos' which was attributed to the Cretan 'prophet' Epimenides, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 99, footnote 2.

³ The Cretans have not forgiven St. Paul for immortalizing their ill repute, and they have racked their brains to turn the passage of Scripture in which they are pilloried to the Apostle's own discredit. When the present writer was travelling in Crete in the year 1912, a Cretan peasant adjured him in all seriousness to discount Paul's testimony on the ground that Paul was a biased witness. On being asked what had given Paul his anti-Cretan bias, the peasant explained that a Cretan had once got the better of Paul in a business transaction!

⁴ In I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 90, footnote 2.

'apparented' Sinic Society until the last phase of Sinic history, and even then only on the superficial plane of politics, as a frontier province of the Empire of the Han, which was the Sinic universal state. Its inhabitants remained barbarians; and their successors in the four modern Chinese provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, and Chekiang testify, in the nomenclature which they employ, that they claim no part or lot in the chapter of history which the Han Dynasty brought to a close. They resign the glorious name of 'Han people' to their neighbours in the basins of the Yangtse and the Yellow River, and use the name of 'T'ang people' to designate themselves. In this designation they signify that their own history did not begin until the Far Eastern Civilization had already emerged from the post-Sinic interregnum; for the lineaments of the Far Eastern Civilization had taken shape before the close of the fifth century of the Christian Era, whereas the T'ang Dynasty was not founded until A.D. 618. Thus the four provinces of China Proper which are now the most vigorous and progressive are the four in which the Far Eastern Civilization has broken new ground. As for the Japanese Archipelago, the offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization which was transplanted thither, by way of Korea, in the sixth and seventh centuries of the Christian Era was propagated there on ground where there was no trace of any previous culture. The strong growth of this offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization on the virgin soil of Japan is comparable to the growth of the offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Civilization which was transplanted from the Anatolian Plateau to the virgin soil of Russia.¹

The Special Stimulus of Migration Overseas

This survey of the relative fertility of old ground and new ground, as exemplified in the histories of seven 'related' civilizations, has given us a certain empirical support² for the doctrine which is implicit in the myths of the Exodus and the Expulsion: the doctrine that the ordeal of breaking new ground has an intrinsic stimulating effect. Before passing on from the physical to the human environment, let us pause to glance at certain illustrations by which the foregoing empirical evidence may be reinforced. These additional illustrations confirm the view—which is suggested by the unusual vitality of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia and of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan—that the stimulating effect of breaking new ground is greatest of all when the new ground can only be reached by crossing the sea.

The special stimulus inherent in transmarine colonization appears

¹ See pp. 80-1, above.

² For a defence of this empirical evidence against a possible criticism, see II. D (iii), Annex, below.

very clearly in the history of the Mediterranean during the first half of the last millennium B.C., when the Western Basin of the Mediterranean was being colonized competitively by maritime pioneers representing three different civilizations in the Levant. It appears, for instance, in the degree to which the two greatest of these colonial foundations—Syriac Carthage and Hellenic Syracuse—each outstripped its parent-city.¹ Carthage dwarfed Tyre in the volume and value of her commerce, and on this economic basis she built up a political empire to which the parent-city did not and could not aspire. Syracuse likewise dwarfed her parent Corinth in political power, and perhaps even more signally in the contribution which she made to Hellenic culture. Again, the Achaean colonies in Magna Graecia became busy seats of Hellenic commerce and industry, and brilliant centres of Hellenic thought, as early as the sixth century B.C., whereas the parent Achaean communities along the northern coast of the Peloponnese remained in a backwater—outside the main stream of Hellenic history—for three more centuries, and only emerged from this long obscurity after the Hellenic Civilization had passed its zenith. As for the Locrians, who were the Achaeans' neighbours on both sides of the Ionian Sea, it was only the Epizephyrian Locrians, in their transmarine settlement in Italy, who ever distinguished themselves at all. The Locrians of Continental Greece remained obscure from first to last.

The most striking case of all is that of the Etruscans,² who were the third party competing with the Greeks and the Phoenicians for the colonization of the Western Mediterranean. In this competition, the Etruscans effectively held their own. Their colonies on the west coast of Italy were comparable, in size and number, to the Greek colonies in Magna Graecia and Sicily and to the Phoenician colonies in Africa and Spain; and the Etruscan colonists, unlike either the Phoenicians or the Greeks, were not content to remain within sight of the sea across which they had come. They pushed forward from the west coast of Italy into the interior with an *élan* which carried them on across the Appennines and across the Po, until their outposts halted at last at the foot of the Alps. At the same time, these colonial Etruscans remained in close contact with their Greek and Phoenician rivals; and though this contact gradually drew them into the ambit of the Hellenic Society and eventually resulted in their being incorporated into the Hellenic body social, this cultural 'conversion' increased rather than diminished the importance of their position in the Mediterranean World. Thus

¹ As, in the modern European colonization of North America, Boston in Massachusetts has outstripped its parent-town in Lincolnshire, and New York and New Orleans have outstripped the two cities in England and France after which they are respectively named.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 114, footnote 3, with Annex II, above.

the Etruscan colonies in Italy are illuminated by the full light of history; and we are also not without evidence of an abortive Etruscan colonial enterprise in another quarter: a daring but unsuccessful attempt to compete with the Greeks, in Greek home waters, for the mastery of the Dardanelles and for the command of the Black Sea.¹ It is the more remarkable that the Etruscan homeland in the Levant, which sent out overseas the Etruscan colonists of Italy and the Etruscan colonists of Lemnos, should be an historical *terra incognita*. No historical record of its exact location survives; and nothing can be built on the Hellenic legend that the Etruscans came from Lydia.² We have to be content with the knowledge, supplied by the records of 'the New Empire' of Egypt, that the ancestors of the Etruscans, like the ancestors of the Achaeans, took part in the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung; and in the presumption that the ports from which the descendants of those older Etruscan sea-raiders afterwards set sail to make their fortunes in the west lay somewhere on the Asiatic coast of the Levant in the no-man's-land between Greek Sidê and Phoenician Aradus. This surprising gap in the historical record can only mean one thing:³ namely, that the Etruscans who stayed at home never did anything worth recording. The astonishing contrast between the nonentity of the Etruscans at home and their eminence overseas gives the measure of the stimulus which they must have received in the process of transmarine colonization.

The stimulating effect of crossing the sea is perhaps greatest of all in a transmarine migration which occurs in the course of a Völkerwanderung.

Such occurrences seem to be uncommon. The only instances which the writer of this Study can call to mind are the migration of the Teucrians, Aeolians, Ionians, and Dorians across the Aegean to the west coast of Anatolia and the migration of the Teucrians and Philistines round the eastern end of the Mediterranean to the coast of Syria in the course of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung; the migration of the Angles and Jutes across the North Sea to Britain in the course of the post-Hellenic Völkerwanderung; the consequent migration of the Cornavii and other Britons across the Channel to the Armorican Peninsula of Gaul; the contemporary migration of the Irish Scots across the North Channel to the corner of North Britain that is now called Argyll;⁴ and the migrations of the

¹ See I. C (i) (b), Annex II, in vol. i, above.

² This legend may have no better basis than the not very close resemblance between two proper names: Tyrrhenoi and Torreheboi.

³ Pace those modern Western scholars who take this to mean that the Etruscans of Italy were either 'autochthonous' Italians or else immigrants, by an overland route, from the interior of the European Continent.

⁴ See II. D (v), p. 194, and II. D (vii), pp. 323-4, below.

Scandinavians in the course of the *Völkerwanderung* which followed the abortive evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire by the Carolingians.¹ This Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung* took place almost entirely by sea, and this in several directions: from Norway across the North Atlantic to the Shetlands and Orkneys and thence by way of the Hebrides to Ireland and by way of the Faroes to Iceland; from Denmark across the North Sea to England; from either Norway or Denmark down the English Channel to Normandy; and from Sweden across the Baltic to Russia.

The Philistine migration, as we have observed at an earlier point in this chapter,² came to a standstill in an easy environment which produced a soporific effect upon the immigrants after they had settled down; and this sequel would appear to have neutralized any stimulating effect that may have been produced by the previous sea-passage.³ The British migration, likewise, appears to have produced no appreciable stimulating effect—to judge by the rather undistinguished subsequent history of the Bretons—and this in spite of the facts that the new Continental Brittany was decidedly a hard country, and that the new-comers from overseas did not establish their footing there without having to encounter and overcome a considerable resistance, both from the Roman Church and from the Frankish 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire.⁴ In the other four instances, however—that is to say, in the transmarine migrations of the Ionians, the Angles, the Scots, and the Scandinavians—we can discern certain striking phenomena which have an inner connexion with one another and which appear in conjunction, in each instance, with singular uniformity, while they are not to be found in the far more numerous instances of migration overland. Considering that the four migrations in question have occurred quite independently of one another at wide intervals of time and place,⁵ we may venture, perhaps, to generalize from them

¹ For the abortive Scandinavian Civilization, see II. D (vii), pp. 340–60, below. For the Scandinavian Heroic Age, out of which the abortive Scandinavian Civilization failed to come to birth, see Part VIII, below. For the abortive Carolingian ghost of the Roman Empire, see Part X, below.

² See pp. 49–51, above.

³ Moreover, the Philistine migration was only maritime in part. The *flotilla* which skirted the Asiatic coast was accompanied by a train of ox-carts in which the women and children and goods of the migrant horde were transported overland.

⁴ The failure of the Bretons to distinguish themselves is the more remarkable when we consider that their migration across the Channel in the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung* is the exact analogue of the migration of the Aeolians and Ionians across the Aegean in the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*. The Continental Bretons, like the Asiatic Aeolians and Ionians, are the overseas descendants of refugee representatives of the antecedent civilization who have been dislodged by the incoming barbarians. They are not the overseas descendants of the barbarians themselves, like the Angles and the Dorians. In the history of the Aeolians and Ionians, the combination of the stimulus of transmarine migration with the asset of an inherited culture has, of course, shown itself particularly potent.

⁵ With the exception of the English and the Scottish migrations, which were contemporary in date though geographically isolated from one another.

to the extent of regarding those phenomena which are common to all four as being inherent features of a *Völkerwanderung* when this takes place not in the usual fashion overland but in this exceptional fashion over the water.

The distinctiveness of these phenomena and their inner connexion with one another are both explained by one and the same simple fact: In transmarine migration, the social apparatus of the migrants has to be packed on board ship before they can leave the shores of the old country and then unpacked again at the end of the voyage before they can make themselves at home on new ground. All kinds of apparatus—persons and property, techniques and institutions and ideas—are equally subject to this law. Anything that cannot stand the sea voyage at all has simply to be left behind; and many things—and these not only material objects—which the migrants do manage to take with them can only be shipped after they have been taken to pieces—never, perhaps, to be reassembled in their original form.

This law governs all transmarine movements whatsoever. It has governed, for example, the ancient Greek and Phoenician and Etruscan colonization of the Western Basin of the Mediterranean and the modern European colonization of America; and the challenge which, in virtue of this law, is inherent in a sea-passage accounts for the intrinsic stimulus of crossing the sea which we have observed already in these two cases. In these particular cases, however, the colonists happen to have belonged to societies which were already in process of civilization at the time when the sea was crossed. When a transmarine migration occurs in the course of a *Völkerwanderung*, the challenge is much more formidable and the stimulus proportionately more intense because the impact here falls upon a society which is not socially progressive at the time but is overtaken by the challenge while it is still in that static condition which is the last state of Primitive Man.¹ The transition, in the *Völkerwanderung*, from this passivity to a sudden paroxysm of storm and stress produces a dynamic effect upon the life of any community which undergoes the experience;² but this effect is naturally more intense when the migrants take ship than when they keep their feet on solid ground throughout their trek. The driver of an ox-cart has a greater command than the master of a ship over the circumstances of his journey. He can maintain an unbroken

¹ For the Yin-state in which we find Primitive Man as we know him, see I. C (iii) (e), vol. i, pp. 179-80, and II. B, vol. i, pp. 192-5. In essentials, every society which takes part in a *Völkerwanderung* is still in that static condition—even though, *ex hypothesi*, it has been irradiated by certain elements of the civilization into whose ambit it has been attracted and in whose 'external proletariat' it has been enrolled and whose former domain it is now invading. (See Part II. A, vol. i, pp. 187-8, above, and Part VIII, below.)

² See further Part VIII, below.

contact with his base of operations; he can pitch camp and strike camp where and when he chooses; he can set his own pace; and in these circumstances he can carry with him much of the social apparatus which has to be discarded by his seafaring comrade. Thus we can measure the stimulating effect of transmarine migration in the course of a *Völkerwanderung* by comparing the phenomena with the effect of migration overland, and *a fortiori* with the effect of staying at home and letting the paroxysm pass without being moved to follow either the swan-path or the cart-track.

'When the Scandinavians went beyond the sea, their migration meant more than a change of place. At home, the World, large as it was, could be surveyed from the homestead with the eyes of the mind; but, as one horizon burst on the view and another closed in . . . the ancient Middlegarth lost its definiteness and made way for something more akin to our Universe. This change of outlook gave birth to a new conception of gods and men. The local deities whose power was coextensive with the territory of their worshippers were replaced by a corporate body of gods ruling the World. The holy place with its blot-house which had formed the centre of Middlegarth was raised on high and turned into a divine mansion. Time-honoured myths setting forth the doings of mutually independent deities were worked up into a poetical mythology, a divine saga, on the same lines that had been followed by an earlier race of Vikings, the Homeric Greeks. This religion brought a new god to birth: Odin, the leader of men, the lord of the battlefield.'¹

In somewhat similar fashion, the overseas migration of the Scots from Ireland to North Britain prepared the way for the entry of a new religion. It is no accident that the transmarine *Dalriada* became the head-quarters of St. Columba's missionary movement which not only achieved the conversion of the Picts and the Northumbrians but also exercised a profound retroactive influence upon Christianity in Ireland itself through the *Familia Columbae*: a cluster of federated monasteries, mostly situated on Irish soil, which all recognized the supremacy of Iona.²

One distinctive phenomenon of transmarine migration is the intermingling and interbreeding of diverse racial strains; for the first piece of social apparatus that has to be abandoned is the primitive tribe or horde. No ship will hold more than one ship's company, and the primitive ship is small. At the same time, the primitive ship is relatively mobile compared with the ox-cart or other primitive means of transport on land. Moreover, in transmarine migration, no less than in overland migration, there is safety in numbers. For these reasons, a new community founded

¹ Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 parts in 2 vols.), Part II, pp. 306-7.

² For the *Familia Columbae*, see further II. D (vii), p. 325, below.

by migrants across the sea is apt to be established by the concerted efforts of a number of crews which have joined forces from different quarters—in contrast to the ordinary process of migration overland, in which a whole tribe is apt to pack its women and children and seed-corn and household gods and household utensils into its ox-carts and move off *en masse*, at a foot's pace, over the face of the Earth. We catch a glimpse of this phenomenon of maritime race-mixture in the foundation-legends of Hellenic Aeolis and Ionia—whatever these legends may be worth in the form in which they have been transmitted by Herodotus and Pausanias. In almost every Greek city-state along the west coast of Anatolia, the latter-day inhabitants traced their ancestry back to more places than one in the European Greek peninsula—not to speak of the strains introduced by intermarriage with the native women whom the pioneers took captive. We are on surer ground when we turn from the case of Ionia to that of Iceland, where an exact and detailed oral record survived to be perpetuated in the *Landnamabok*.

'Among the peculiarly favourable conditions for mental development in Iceland, the most important was the selection of the human stock that settled the island. It included all those families of petty kings and peasant chieftains from Western Norway who refused to yield to the autocratic rule of Harold Fairhair, preferring to seek a new home on the distant island which had recently been discovered. At the same time it was impossible for the society of Iceland to become a mere repetition of the old Norwegian community; the racial mixture was too pronounced for that. There came Norwegians from various parts of the country, stragglers from Sweden, vikings from the West, including even some semi-Celtic elements.'

This distinctive phenomenon of unusually far-going racial mixture is closely connected with another: the unusually rapid disintegration of the kin-group which is the basis of social organization in a primitive society. The comparative efficacy of transmarine migration and of overland migration as solvents of the kin-group is appraised as follows, at the conclusion of an exhaustive inquiry, by a distinguished modern student of Scandinavian antiquities:

'The analogy of the Icelandic settlers will incline us to accept the idea that a migration involving transport by sea was especially liable to impair the sense of kin-solidarity among those who venture on it, though the organization of those who remained behind might not be appreciably affected. It is extremely unlikely that each group of kindred would build a vessel and man it exclusively, or even mainly, with their own kinsmen; on the contrary, all analogies show us that any individuals wishing to join an expedition would rally to the first ship that was sailing and

¹ Olrik, A.: *Viking Civilisation* (English translation: London 1930, Allen and Unwin), pp. 175-6. Cp. p. 112.

probably remain permanently associated with its crew in the new country. . . .

'A classic example is afforded by the sons of Earl Hrollaug of Norway, one of whom, Gǫngu-Hrólfr, is declared by Snorri to have founded the Duchy of Normandy; one lost his life in the Western Isles of Scotland on an expedition with Harald Hairfair; another became Earl of the Orkneys, while yet another settled in Iceland. It seems more than probable that the peoples of Schleswig-Holstein lived under similar conditions in the 5th century, with viking expeditions, and finally the permanent conquest of England, as the result. The settlers in England might therefore be almost as lacking in full kindreds as the settlers in Iceland a few centuries later. Before we make certain that the invaders must have come over *en masse*, in full kindreds, in order to achieve such a vast result as the conquest of England, we shall do well to remind ourselves that the feat was all but paralleled, in a much shorter time and in the teeth of a resistance at least equally obstinate, by the vikings of a later period; yet that no one thinks it necessary to assume a wholesale emigration of kindreds in this case, or to postulate that the organization of the Vikings, when they arrived in England, was on a basis of kindreds.

'If we are to adopt the Danish theory that the Normans are mainly of Danish and not Norwegian origin, we can point to Normandy also as affording corroborative evidence for the disintegrating influence on the kindred of a settlement by sea. According to this theory the invaders of Normandy came from the highly cohesive kindreds of Denmark. Yet the traces of kinship-solidarity in thirteenth-century Normandy are far fainter than in other districts of Northern France, which the Teutons reached by land.

'So far as it goes, too, the evidence available for the easternmost and westernmost of Teutonic settlements bears out our contention. The laws of the Swedish kingdom in Russia, won by naval expeditions, show but a feeble conception of kinship: the slayer alone pays for his deed, and the right of vengeance is limited to brother, father, son and nephew. On the other hand, West Gothic customs in Spain show division of wergild between kinsmen, definitely organized blood-feuds between kindreds, and oath-helpers of the kindred. . . . The West Goths travelled a long way, but they travelled by land.

'Thus we are driven to the conclusion that the main disintegrating factor in the case of the Teutonic kindreds was migration, and especially migration by sea. Denmark and Schleswig are the strongholds of the kindreds: those of Friesland, the Netherlands and Northern France had vitality enough to withstand centuries of highly adverse influences, whereas the Icelander stood alone from the moment he set foot on Icelandic soil; and it may be questioned whether the Anglo-Saxon settler was in much better case in this respect. Here, too, we should find an explanation of the weakness of the kindreds in Norway, for much of the settlement of that country must have been accomplished by sea, and at a very late period.'

¹ Phillpotts, B. S.: *Kindred and Clan* (Cambridge 1913, University Press), pp. 257-65.

Another distinctive phenomenon of transmarine migration is the atrophy of a primitive institution which is perhaps the supreme expression of undifferentiated social life before this is refracted, by a clarifying social consciousness, on to the separate planes of economics and politics and religion and art: the institution of the *ἐνιαυτὸς δαίμων* and his cycle.¹ On this point we may quote another work by the same authority:

'In Iceland the May Day game, the ritual wedding, and the wooing scene seem hardly to have survived the settlement, partly, no doubt, because the settlers were mainly of a travelled and enlightened class, and partly because these rural observances are connected with agriculture, which could not be an important branch of activity in Iceland.'²

If we wish to see the ritual of the *ἐνιαυτὸς δαίμων* in its glory in the Scandinavian World, we must study its development among Scandinavian peoples who did not leave their homes:

'It seems that at Lejre and Salhaugar in Sjaelland, at Upsala in Sweden, and possibly at the old Skiringssal in South Norway, the fertility-drama was presented in ancient sanctuaries consecrated by the tombs of kings or gods. There is some reason for believing that it was the central rite of a religious confederacy. This drama was apparently performed only once every nine years, by actors of royal birth, and there was a tradition of an actual slaying. Such stately drama as this was bound by immemorial tradition to one locality. The sanctuary, the goddess, the priest-king³ could not migrate with the members of the confederate tribes. There is therefore no trace of what we may call literary drama, or of such highly developed tragic drama, outside Southern Scandinavia, where Teutonic peoples had been settled for several thousand years.'⁴

The thesis of the work from which these two last passages are quoted is that the Scandinavian poems which have been preserved by Icelandic tradition and committed to writing in the Icelandic compilation called the Elder Edda are derived from the spoken words of the primitive Scandinavian fertility-drama—the only element in the traditional ritual which the migrants were able to cut away from its deeply-embedded local roots and to take on board ship with them. According to this theory, the development of a primitive ritual into a Scandinavian drama was arrested among

¹ See Part II. B, vol. i, p. 189. The undifferentiated unity of Art and Religion and Life itself in a primitive human society is pointed out, apropos of the Scandinavian case, by Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 parts in 2 vols.), Part II, pp. 239-41 and 269.

² Phillpotts, B. S.: *The Elder Edda and Ancient Scandinavian Drama* (Cambridge 1920, University Press), p. 204. On the same subject, see further Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 parts in 2 vols.), Part II, ch. xiv: 'The Creative Festival' (pp. 216-45), and ch. xv: 'Essay on Ritual Drama' (pp. 260-340).

³ 'As a matter of fact the priest-king did survive migration among the Franks. But the migrations of the Franks did not last long and affected their customs very little.'

⁴ Phillpotts, op. cit., p. 207.

those Scandinavians who migrated across the sea; and the theory is supported by an analogy from Hellenic history. For it is a well-established fact that, although the Hellenic Civilization came to flower in transmarine Ionia first, the Hellenic drama, which was one of the highest creations of Hellenic culture, sprang from the continental soil of the European Greek peninsula. The counterpart, in Hellas, of the sanctuary at Upsala was the theatre of Dionysus at Athens. Neither Ionia nor Iceland could show the like.

The distinctive phenomena of transmarine migration which we have noticed so far are all negative; but the challenge implicit in these negative phenomena has evoked a remarkable positive response which must now engage our attention.

At an earlier point in this Study we have found reason to believe that race-mixture, by setting up a physical disturbance, administers a stimulus to the psyche which is conducive to the genesis of a civilization—so much so, that the geneses of civilizations may actually prove to require contributions from more races than one.¹ This indirect physical stimulus may be assumed to reinforce the direct psychic stimulus which is administered by 'a sea change'; and the two factors in combination shatter the 'cake of custom' in which primitive societies, as we know them, are fast bound.² Thereupon, in long-imprisoned and suddenly liberated souls there emerges a rudimentary social consciousness which reveals itself in two closely connected forms: an awareness of strong individual personalities and an awareness of momentous public events. The circumstances and spirit of this mental awakening are forcibly conveyed in the following description of it, as it came to pass in Iceland, from the pen of one of the three modern Western scholars whom we have quoted already.

'The largest part of the population came from the districts of Hordaland and Rogaland in Western Norway, [and] it was these regions that had contributed most to the great Viking Age and the period of discoveries. Many families had spent years in the western colonies. They had acquired a wide horizon and an insight into political conditions in near and distant places; for all these scattered habitations were closely connected with each other by family ties and common enterprises. The numerous merchant-ships constantly brought news, which was received, scrutinised and judged. The experiences of contemporaries naturally became transformed into sagas.

'These aristocratic and talented persons settled in Iceland under more severe conditions of life than they had formerly known. Instead of being a petty king, the peasant had at most a very limited chieftain authority as the *godi* (sacrificial priest and *thing* leader) of his district; many a man

¹ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, pp. 239-243, and II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 278, above.

² For this 'cake of custom' see Part II. B, vol. i, p. 192, above.

of noble origin had to settle as a peasant in the *godord* (*godi* district) of another man. Instead of proud rafted halls, they built houses with walls of earth several yards thick, a continuous row or group of such houses constituting the farm buildings. Cattle-breeding, bird-hunting, fishing required an extreme degree of attention if they were to yield foodstuffs for all the housecarls and servants; a man who once had traded in the most precious commodities of foreign countries had now only the home-woven frieze to export. The external circumstances of life were narrowing down. The only earmark of nobility that was still retained from the forefathers was the mental culture, the ability to pass in review a succession of events, to form a judicious estimate of situations.¹

In the strenuous and stimulating mental atmosphere here described, the void resulting from the absence of the primitive social apparatus that has been left behind in crossing the sea is filled by new acts of social creation. The energies released by the breaking of the 'cake of custom' crystallize, in the new transmarine environment, into new activities which are definite in their forms and are limited in their scope, in each case, to some single plane of social life. In the field left clear by the atrophy of the fertility-ritual there arises a narrative form of literary art: the Saga or the Epic. In the field left clear by the disintegration of the kin-group there arises a polity in the likeness of a ship's company on an enlarged scale and on a permanent basis: a commonwealth in which the binding element is not community of blood but that common obedience to a freely chosen leader and common respect for a freely accepted law which has been called 'the social contract' in the figurative language of our modern Western Political Mythology.

The Saga and the Epic both alike arise in response to the same new mental need. In both, the new awareness of strong individual personalities and of momentous public events, which the storm and stress of the *Völkerwanderung* has brought into consciousness, finds an expression through art.²

'The Icelandic Saga . . . grew out of reports of contemporary happenings. A man who had recently returned home would sit at the *Althing*

¹ Olrik, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-7.

² The difference between the Saga and the Epic lies not in the nature of the stimulus by which they are evoked nor in the nature of the interests and feelings and ideas which are expressed in them, but merely in the method and origin of their respective techniques. In the Icelandic Saga, the new interest in personalities and events finds expression in a technique which is new likewise. The form and matter of the dialogues and soliloquies that grew out of the continental Scandinavian fertility-ritual are religiously preserved in the *Elder Edda*; but, having once been torn away from their roots in order to be transported across the sea, they are not put to new uses in the new country nor developed any further. They are preserved, as it were, as fossils; and when the Icelanders fashion 'the Saga, the true Icelandic counterpart of the Epic, out of the stories current in the countryside', they create, to convey it, 'a new prose form' in which they are 'hampered by no fossilised tradition' (Phillipotts: *The Elder Edda*, p. 205). The sagas only indirectly reveal the existence of an older dramatic technique in a certain dramatic sense and dramatic detachment which are characteristic of their style (*op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*). On the other hand the makers of the Epic—in Ionia or in England—solve the same problem of

and tell his story—a connected account—of all that had taken place during the year at well-known scenes of action. . . . Probably many a saga originated in this way. The story was related to an attentively listening circle of hearers by one who had himself been taking part in the events; and while the first scene is being thus reported, Life itself continues the destinies of the acting persons.¹

Thus, one day at the *Althing*, Thormod listens to a saga that is being told by Thorgrim and slays the teller after the tale is done because an incident in the story has been the slaying, by Thorgrim himself, of Thormod's own foster-brother.² Thus, likewise, during the siege of Troy, when Achilles is sulking in his tent, he is there found entertaining himself by singing 'the tales of warriors'³—such tales as 'the wrath of Achilles' itself is destined to become in the mouths of Homeric minstrels. Already, in the tenth year after the fall of Troy, the tales of the siege and of the victors' homeward voyages are ever in the mouths of the minstrel Phemius in Ithaca and the minstrel Demodocus in the land of the Phaeacians.⁴

'That lay is praised of men the most which ringeth newest in their ears.'⁵ Yet there is one thing in an epic lay that is still more highly prized than its novelty by the hearers, and that is the intrinsic human interest of the story. The interest in the present predominates just so long as the storm and stress of the Heroic Age continues; but this social paroxysm is essentially transitory; and,

finding an artistic expression for the new interest in personalities and events by 'making over' both the form and the matter of the continental fertility-ritual to fit the new demand. Thus, in the Greek and English Epic we find the tale of Troy's fall or Achilles' wrath or Odysseus' wanderings or Beowulf's exploits grafted on to myths in which the stuff of primitive ritual has been reshaped and projected into heroic narrative. The amalgamation of these two elements in the Epic is so thorough, and the artistic perfection of the finished product is so complete, that it needs all the paraphernalia of 'the Higher Criticism' to analyse the process which has taken place. Nevertheless, such analysis reveals not only the presence of these two once separate elements in the Epic but also the extreme diversity of their nature and origin. The Epic, unlike the Saga, has a ritual root, and it shares this root with the Drama. The continental Ionic Drama of Attica and the transmarine Ionic Epic of Ionia are two flowers of art which have sprung from a single religious stem. By contrast, the poetry of the Elder Edda and the prose of the Sagas are two flowers that have sprung from different stems out of roots bedded in different soils. The Elder Edda is a flower which has wilted, before it has been able to unfold itself in its full perfection, because its root has been cut in order to transport it across the sea. The Saga is a flower which has blossomed because it has grown up from new roots in the new ground.

¹ Olrik, op. cit., pp. 177-8.

² This illustration is cited at greater length in op. cit., loc. cit., in the passage here omitted in the foregoing quotation.

³ τὸν δ' εὖρον φρένα τερπόμενον φόρμιγγι λυγίῃ. . . .

τῇ δ' ἔγε θυμὸν ἔτερπεν, αἶδε δ' ἄρα κλέα ἀνδρῶν.

(*Iliad*, IX, ll. 186-9.)

⁴ Of the four lays sung by Phemius and Demodocus in the *Odyssey*, no less than three are taken from the Trojan Cycle, while only one is a tale of the Gods. Phemius sings of the homeward voyage of the Achaeans (*Od.* I, ll. 325-7), Demodocus of a quarrel between Odysseus and Achilles (*Od.* VIII, ll. 73-82), and of the Wooden Horse (*Od.* VIII, ll. 499-520).

⁵ τὴν γὰρ αἰοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσι ἄνθρωποι
ἢ τις ἀκούοντεςσι νεωτᾷ ἀμφεπλήγται.

(*Od.* I, ll. 351-2.)

as the storm abates, the lovers of the Epic and the Saga come to feel that life in their time has grown tamer than it was in the time of their heroic predecessors. Therewith, they cease to prefer new lays to old; and the latter-day minstrel or saga-man, responding to his hearers' change of mood, repeats, like Nestor, the tales of the older generation. When the storm abated in Iceland, 'now that the present moment was less eventful and exciting, attention was fixed on the deeds of the past; they were again brought forth and shaped artistically into connected accounts. . . . And only then did the sagas in the proper sense of the term begin to take shape.'¹ When the storm abated in Ionia, the latter-day epic poet still harped upon Phemius's and Demodocus's Trojan theme:

'Tell me, Muse, of a man; a man of many shifts; a man who wandered much when he had sacked Troy's sacred fastness. O, many were the folk whose cities he beheld and knew their thoughts beside; and many were the sorrows that he suffered in his heart; sorrows of the sea, in striving for his life and striving therewithal to bring his comrades homeward.'²

Thus the art of the Homeric Epic and the Icelandic Saga continued to live and flourish when the stimulus which had first evoked it was no longer at work. It ultimately attained its literary zenith in the altered circumstances of a later age. The literary history of the English Epic—as exemplified in *Beowulf*—is the same. Nevertheless, these mighty works of art would never have come into being if that original stimulus had not been exerted; and it was produced, as we have seen, by the ordeal of migration across the sea. This explains why the Hellenic Epic developed in transmarine Ionia and not, like the Hellenic Drama, in the European Greek peninsula; the Teutonic Epic on the island of Britain and not on the European Continent;³ and the Scandinavian Saga on the island of Iceland and not, like the Scandinavian Drama, in Denmark or Sweden. This contrast between the transmarine and the continental artistic phenomena appears with such regularity in such widely different times and places that one of the authorities whom we have cited formulates it as a law. 'Drama . . . develops in the home country, Epic among migrating peoples, whether they migrate to France or England or Germany—or to Ionia, for the analogy with Greek Drama holds good here too.'⁴

¹ Olrik, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

² *Od.* I, ll. 1-5.

³ Of the Teutonic peoples who took part in the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung*, the majority migrated overland on the European Continent and only the Angles and the Jutes overseas from the Continent to Britain. Yet, of the extant epic poetry that has sprung from the Teutonic migrations of that age, all the mature and complete specimens are of English make, while the Continental School is represented by a handful of rather rudimentary original fragments and some Latin versions.

⁴ Phillpotts, B. S.: *The Elder Edda* (Cambridge 1920, University Press), p. 207.

The other positive creation that emerges from the ordeal of transmarine migration in the course of a *Völkerwanderung* is not artistic, like the Epic and the Saga, but political. This new kind of polity is a commonwealth in which the binding element is contract and not kinship. We have noted its nature already by anticipation, and examples of it leap to the mind.

The most famous examples, perhaps, are those city-states which were founded by seafaring Greek migrants in the last convulsion of the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* along the west coast of Anatolia, in the districts which subsequently came to be known as Aeolis and Ionia and Doris. The scanty surviving records of Hellenic constitutional history seem to indicate that the principle of political organization by law and locality instead of by custom and kinship asserted itself first in these Greek settlements overseas and was afterwards adopted in the European Greek peninsula by mimesis. In the act of establishing their foothold on the Anatolian coast in the face of opposition from the previous occupants of the country, the Greek seafarers would proceed upon the new principle spontaneously. A number of ship's companies—each hailing from a different district and recruited from members of many different kin-groups—would join forces to conquer a new home for themselves overseas and to secure their common conquest by building a common citadel. In the city-state thus founded, the 'cells' of the new political organization would be, not kindreds held together by the tie of common descent, but 'tribes'¹ representing ship's companies; and these ship's-companies, in taking to the land, would still be held together by the ties which had held them on ship-board. Having co-operated at sea as men do co-operate when they are 'all in the same boat' in the midst of the perils of the deep, they would continue to feel and act in the same way ashore when they had to hold a strip of hardly-won coast against the menace of a hostile hinterland. On shore, as at sea, comradeship would count for more than kin, and the orders of a chosen and trusted leader would override the promptings of habit and custom. In fact, a bevy of ship's-companies joining forces to conquer a new home for themselves overseas in a strange land would turn spontaneously into a city-state articulated into local 'tribes' and governed by an elective magistracy.

There are no corresponding circumstances to account for the evolution of the Hellenic city-state in European Greece; and indeed our scanty records indicate that the Greeks who had stayed at home in Europe came into line politically with the Greeks who had migrated across the sea to Asia by imitating, artificially and

¹ The conventional English translation of the Greek word *φυλαί*.

belatedly, an act which, in the settlement of Aeolis and Ionia and Doris, had been something immediate and spontaneous. On the coast of Anatolia, the city-state was a new creation evoked by the stimulus of transmarine migration. In European Greece it was the second-hand product of a deliberate 'synoecism'—a revolutionary aggregation of village-communities into city-states, which was accompanied or followed by the substitution of locality for kin as the basis of political organization. There is no reason to suppose that any such 'synoecism' would ever have been carried out or even thought of in 'the old country' if the spontaneous generation of the city-state in 'the new country' overseas had not provided the Hellenic Society with a model polity—a model which was commended not only by its own obvious intrinsic merits but also by the prestige of its creators, the Hellenes of Aeolis and Ionia, who were in the forefront of the Hellenic Civilization in this first age of Hellenic history.¹

When we turn from the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung to the Scandinavian, we can discern the rudiments of a similar political development in certain new Scandinavian communities which arose out of transmarine migrations likewise.² If the abortive Scandinavian Civilization had actually come to birth, the part once played in Hellenic history by the city-states of Aeolis and Ionia might have been played in Scandinavian history by the five city-states of the Ostmen along the Irish coast³ or by the five boroughs which were organized by the Danes to guard the landward border of their conquests in Mercia.⁴ Even as it was, the stimulus of transmarine

¹ The artificial character of the process of 'synoecism' in Continental Greece, as a deliberate imitation of an overseas pattern, is indicated by the fact that the four 'Ionic' *φύλαί*, into which the Athenian body politic was articulated before the Cleisthenic reorganization of 508 B.C., were a selection from a larger number of *φύλαί* into which we know that the body politic was articulated at Miletus. (See Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U. von: *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893, Weidmann, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 138-42.) On this analogy, we may conjecture that the three 'Doric' *φύλαί* likewise originated spontaneously in some city-state of the overseas Doris and were reproduced artificially in some of the 'Dorian' city-states of Continental Greece (there is no evidence for their reproduction in Sparta). So much for the overseas origin of the 'Ionic' and 'Doric' *φύλαί* in the city-states of Continental Greece. We may attribute the same origin to the 'Dorian', 'Ionian', and 'Aeolian' races into which the Greek-speaking World as a whole was conventionally articulated. The Greek transmarine settlements on the Anatolian coast fell into three distinct geographical groups speaking three different dialects of the Greek language. The local names of these groups were Aeolis, Ionia, and Doris; and we may conjecture that the same names were subsequently applied to communities in other parts of the Greek-speaking World on grounds of linguistic affinity or of accidental similarity of name. (See Beloch, K. J.: *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd edition, vol. i (i) (Strassburg 1912, Trübner), pp. 139-42.)

² See Olrik, A.: *Viking Civilisation* (London 1930, Allen and Unwin), pp. 98-9.

³ These city-states were Dublin, Wexford, Waterford, Cork, and Limerick. (For their history, see Kendrick, T. D.: *A History of the Vikings* (London 1930, Methuen), pp. 277 and 299.)

⁴ These five boroughs were Lincoln, Stamford, Leicester, Derby, and Nottingham (see Kendrick, op. cit., p. 236). Compare the four similar boroughs which were established, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Wedmore, at Northampton, Huntingdon, Cambridge, and Bedford, in order to guard the landward borders of Danish East Anglia (Kendrick, op. cit., p. 240).

migration produced several Scandinavian polities that did attain a high degree of development. On the south coast of the Baltic, in Wendland, the short-lived fraternity of the Jomsvikings developed a standard of asceticism, discipline, and prowess which won for Jomsborg, in its day, the same reputation in the Scandinavian World that Sparta had once enjoyed in Hellas.¹ The older Scandinavian settlement of Aldeigjuborg—established by vikings who had crossed the Baltic from west to east and had pushed on up the Gulf of Finland and up the River Neva into Lake Ladoga—made an impression of political efficiency upon the minds of the Northern Slavs which is reflected in the foundation-legend of the Scandinavian empire in Russia. The legend relates that the Slavs who had fallen under the yoke of these intruders from beyond the sea succeeded in driving their new masters out; but that, having once experienced, under duress, the benefits of Scandinavian rule, they found the reversion to their native anarchy so intolerable that they invited the Scandinavians to return and receive their willing obedience. This legendary 'social contract' between a primitive Slavonic population and a Scandinavian ruling class which had acquired its political education in crossing the sea is the traditional explanation of the origin of the Russian State. Yet the creation of Russia was not the greatest political feat that was achieved by Scandinavians who migrated overseas. It was surpassed by the creation of the Republic of Iceland—a Scandinavian polity whose foundation is not veiled in legend but is illuminated by the full light of history. On the apparently unpromising soil of this barren arctic island, which could only be reached from the nearest Scandinavian *point d'appui* in the Faroes by crossing some five hundred miles of open Atlantic, the political as well as the literary genius of the Scandinavian Civilization produced its finest flower.

As for the political consequences of the transmarine migration of the Angles and Jutes to Britain in the course of the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung*, it is perhaps something more than a coincidence that an island which was occupied at the dawn of Western history by immigrants who had shaken off the shackles of the primitive kin-group in crossing the sea should afterwards have been the

¹ 'Jomsborg . . . was inhabited by a . . . viking garrison; and legend tells that this society within the fortress was governed by strict rules. There were no women at all allowed inside, and each one of the men was a warrior of tested valour, not older than fifty years of age nor younger than eighteen. Courage, and courage alone, won admission to their company, and in that company a self-sacrificing loyalty to each and all one's fellows was demanded of the Jomsvikings, slander of any kind was prohibited, and the private retention of booty forbidden. Military efficiency was the sole object of their organization and regulations, and though no single man might be away from the fortress for more than three days without special licence, each summer the Jomsvikings were abroad together fighting, and so widespread did their fame become that soon they were counted as the greatest warriors of the North.' (Kendrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-2.)

country in which our Western Civilization achieved some of the most important steps in its political progress. The Danish and Norman invaders who followed on the heels of the Angles, and who share the credit for subsequent English political achievements, likewise came over the element that has to be traversed by all who set foot on the shores of an island; and the sea-passage had the same liberating effect upon their social organization as upon that of their seafaring predecessors. A people thus fruitfully diversified in its racial composition, and at the same time uniformly freed from the encumbrance of a hampering primitive institution, offered an unusually favourable field for political cultivation. It is not surprising that our Western Civilization should have succeeded, in England, in creating first 'the King's Peace' and thereafter 'Parliamentary Government', while, on the Continent, our Western political development was retarded by the survival of the kin-group among the descendants of Franks and Lombards who had not been relieved of that social incubus at the outset by a liberating transit of the sea.

Finally, we may observe, in this political connexion, the curious fact that one of the two enduring political entities that have eventually emerged out of the struggle for existence between the ephemeral barbarian 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire in Britain has been the Kingdom of Scotland;¹ and that the founders and eponyms of this Scotland in Britain were an overseas offshoot of those original Scots of Ireland who, in their native island, are a byword for their prolonged failure to create an effective united Irish state—even under the pressure of the most formidable foreign aggression from the Scandinavians and thereafter from the English.²

IV. THE STIMULUS OF BLOWS

Having now examined the relative stimulating effects of a less and a more difficult environment in cases in which the environments are physical, we may complete this part of our study by surveying the field of human environments on the same comparative method.

For convenience, we may divide this field into sections. We may distinguish, first, between those human environments that are geographically external to the societies upon which they act, and

¹ For the creation of the Kingdom of Scotland, see further II. D (v), pp. 190-2 and 194-5, below.

² It is one of the curiosities of history that even in these latter days, when the Irish have to some extent retrieved their political reputation by their success in establishing an Irish Free State, this political achievement in Ireland itself has been forestalled by the success of the Irish emigrants across the Atlantic in playing the game of 'machine politics' in the United States!

those that are geographically intermingled with them. The former category will cover the action of societies, peoples, states, cities, and other social organizations that are in exclusive occupation, at any given time, of particular portions of the habitable world, upon neighbouring social organizations of the same kind. From the standpoint of the organizations which play the passive role in such social intercourse, the human environment with which they are confronted here is 'external' or 'foreign'. The second of our two categories will cover the action of one social 'class' upon another, where the two 'classes' are in joint occupation of the same geographical area, and where the term 'class' is employed in its widest meaning. From the standpoint of a 'class' which plays the passive role, the human environment constituted by the other 'classes' that are acting upon it is 'internal' or 'domestic'. Leaving this 'internal human environment' for later examination, and starting with the 'external human environment', we may begin by making a further subdivision between the impact of the 'external human environment' when it takes the form of a sudden blow and its impact in the form of a continuous pressure.

What is the effect of sudden blows from the external human environment? Does our proposition 'The greater the challenge the greater the stimulus' hold good here? Let us seek light, once more, from our well-tried empirical method of inquiry.

The first test cases that naturally occur to our minds are certain sensational instances in which a military and militant Power has first been stimulated by successive contests with its neighbours, and has then suddenly been prostrated in an encounter with some adversary against whom it has never measured its strength before. What usually happens when incipient empire-builders are thus dramatically overthrown in mid-career? Do they usually remain lying, like Sisera, where they have fallen, while their half-built empire collapses like a house of cards? Or, on the contrary, do they rise again from their Mother Earth, like the giant Antaeus of the Hellenic Mythology,¹ with their strength and vigour and moral redoubled? Do they succumb? Or do they react to an unprecedentedly heavy blow by an unprecedented outburst of purposeful energy? The historic examples indicate that the second and not the former alternative reaction is the normal outcome.

What, for example, was the effect of the *Clades Alliensis* upon the fortunes of Rome? The catastrophe overtook her only five years after her victory in her long and arduous duel with Veii had placed her, at last, in a posture to assert her hegemony over Latium. The overthrow of the Roman Army at the Allia and the occupation of

¹ For the myth of Antaeus, see further Part X, below.

Rome herself by barbarians from the back of beyond might have been expected to wipe out, at one stroke, once and for all, the power and prestige which Rome had won, just before, by the overthrow and annexation of her Etruscan neighbour. Instead, Rome recovered from the Gallic disaster so rapidly that, within less than half a century after the Gauls had been ignominiously bought off, the Roman State was able to engage in a longer and more arduous duel with a mightier neighbour than Veii for higher stakes. The Roman State was able to fight the Samnite Confederacy for the prize of a hegemony over all Italy, and eventually to emerge victorious from a fifty-years' war which far surpassed, in scale and severity, any previous war which Rome had ever ventured to wage.¹

What, again, was the effect on the fortunes of the 'Osmanlis when Timur Lenk took Bāyezīd Yilderim captive on the field of Angora? This catastrophe overtook the 'Osmanlis just when they were on the point of completing their conquest of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the Balkan Peninsula. The 'Osmanlis had planted their military colonies in Thrace and Macedonia; they had overthrown the latest masters of the interior—the Serbs—on the field of Kosovo; and they were beleaguering the last remnant of the East Roman Empire in Constantinople. At the moment when they were thus on the verge of consolidating the results of fifty years' labours in Europe, they were prostrated, on the Asiatic side of the Straits, by a thunderbolt from Transoxania. A collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans might have been expected to follow the disaster at Angora—the more so, inasmuch as Timur, being rather more provident if not much more persevering than Brennus, had taken steps to paralyse the Ottoman Power in its Anatolian homeland by liberating and re-establishing the rival Anatolian Turkish principalities. So far from that, however, Mehmed the Conqueror, who succeeded to the Ottoman throne just half a century after his ancestor Bāyezīd had been carried away captive to Samarqand, was able to place the coping-stone on Bāyezīd's building by taking possession of Constantinople and rounding off the Ottoman Empire until, from Trebizond to the gates of Belgrade and from the Crimea to the Morea, it comprised the whole domain of Orthodox Christendom except its transmarine annex in Russia.²

In the third place, we may take notice of the fortunes of the Incas after their passage of arms with the Chancas towards the middle of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era. When the Chancas

¹ The traditional initial and terminal dates of the first three Romano-Samnite Wars are 343–290 B.C.; the traditional date of the Battle of the Allia is 390 B.C.

² Mehmed Fātih *imperabat* A.D. 1451–81; the Battle of Angora had been fought in A.D. 1402.

marched on Cuzco and the reigning Inca Yahuar Huaccac evacuated his capital in a panic, it looked as though the Incas had lost the empire which had been founded a hundred years before when their ancestors had conquered the Collao and Nazca.¹ The battle on the plain of Sacsahuana, in which Prince Hatun Tupac—the future Inca Viracocha—just succeeded in staying the Chancas' onslaught and saving Cuzco from fire and sword, was the hardest battle that the Incas had yet had to fight. Nevertheless, the great work of expanding and elevating the Empire into an Andean universal state was taken up and completed by Viracocha's son and successor the Inca Pachacutec, who came to the throne at Cuzco some fifty years after the Battle of Sacsahuana had been fought.²

Other illustrations of the same 'law'—the stronger stimulus of the heavier blow—will meet our eyes if we reopen the book of Roman history at a later page and study the course of those wars between Rome and the rival Great Powers of the Hellenic World which cleared the ground for the eventual conversion of the Roman Empire into a Hellenic universal state. In this phase of Roman and Hellenic history—which began with the outbreak of the first Romano-Punic War in 264 B.C. and ended with the simultaneous destruction of Carthage and annexation of Macedonia in the year 146—Rome had to fight three rounds with Carthage and four with Macedonia before she was able to deliver two 'knock-out blows' which brought the titanic struggle to a close. No doubt, the poet Virgil had these two series of wars in mind when he bade his countrymen ever remember 'to battle down the stiff-necked': *debellare superbos*.³ Yet the historical facts surely indicate that the method of attrition was not a masterly choice but a costly and dangerous necessity; for, though the Romans managed to beat the Carthaginians and the Macedonians in every war that they fought with either Power, nevertheless, at each successive renewal of the combat, the prowess displayed by the vanquished and the exertions required of the victors were both conspicuously greater than they had been each time before.

The defeat of Carthage in the first Romano-Punic War stimulated Hamilcar Barca to conquer for his country an empire in Spain which far surpassed her lost empire in Sicily, and Hamilcar's son Hannibal to strike at the heart of the Roman Power in Italy. Even after the Hannibalic War had ended in the defeat of Hannibal's

¹ For the foundation of the Inca Empire, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 121-2, above.

² The elevation of the Empire of the Incas into an Andean universal state may be said to have been accomplished through the incorporation of the states along the seaboard of the Pacific, from Ica to Chimú inclusive, which covered, between them, the original home of the Andean Society. The Inca Pachacutec, who achieved this, *imperabat circa A.D. 1400-48*; the Battle of Sacsahuana had been fought *circa A.D. 1347*.

³ *Aeneid*, Book VI, l. 853.

last army at Zama, in the home territory of Carthage, the Carthaginians twice astonished the World during the half century that was still to run before their name was blotted out of the Book of Life. Under the stimulus of this appalling situation, when they lay at the mercy of an implacable enemy, with their impending doom ever present to their minds, they displayed an energy and a fortitude which had not distinguished them in the days of their power and their security. They showed their mettle first in the rapidity with which they paid off their war indemnity to Rome and recovered their commercial prosperity;¹ and they showed it again in the heroism with which the whole population of the doomed city—men, women, and children—fought and died in the last struggle, when the Romans were avowedly bent upon destroying them utterly, and when it was certain that nothing now could save them from their fate.

Again, King Philip V of Macedon had been content during the Hannibalic War, when he might have saved his country by joining forces with Hannibal himself in Italy, to engage in desultory and ineffective 'side-shows' on his own side of the Adriatic. It was the blow of Cynoscephalae, which cost him his hegemony in Greece, that stimulated him to show that 'his last sun had not yet set'² and to transform Macedonia into so formidable a power that, a quarter of a century after Cynoscephalae had been fought, Philip's son Perseus was able to challenge Rome single-handed and almost to defeat her utmost efforts to overcome him. Even when Perseus' stubborn resistance was finally broken at Pydna, the Macedonian people were so far from losing their spirit that, some twenty years later, it only needed the appearance of an adventurer impersonating Perseus' son Philip to make the nation rise in arms again in a last struggle for liberty which was a forlorn hope from the start.

In our own Western history, similar reactions were evoked by Napoleon I's premature and abortive attempt, during the General War of 1792-1815, to establish a Western universal state in the form of a French Empire.³

For example, the Austrians, who in 1792 had scarcely lifted a finger to support their Prussian allies in an invasion of France

¹ As early as 191 B.C., only ten years after the restoration of peace, the Carthaginians offered to pay off the whole outstanding amount of the indemnity forthwith in a single lump sum, in anticipation of the stipulated succession of instalments. This offer was not accepted by the Romans. (Livy, Book XXXVI, ch. 4.)

² See the account given by Livy (Book XXXIX, ch. 26) of an interview in the year 185 B.C. (the eleventh year after Cynoscephalae) between Philip and a Roman commissioner. After stating his case, Philip 'elatus deinde ira adiecit nondum omnium dierum solem occidisse'. The Macedonian king's outburst was a reminiscence of a line of Theocritus: *Ἡδὴ γὰρ φράσθη πάνθ' ἄλιον ἄμμι δεδοκεῖν*; (Theocritus: *Thyrsis*, l. 102).

³ This aspect of the Napoleonic Empire is examined further in V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, vol. v, pp. 619-42, below.

which might have nipped the Revolution in the bud, and had allowed themselves thereafter to be ejected by the French twice over from Italy, were aroused at last by the blow of 1805, when in a single campaign Napoleon captured half the Austrian Army at Ulm and occupied Vienna and destroyed the rest of the Austrian Army at Austerlitz. Austria after Austerlitz prepared for a renewal of the contest with the same grim energy that Macedonia had displayed after Cynoscephalae; and in 1809, when she tried conclusions with the conqueror again, and this time single-handed, without an ally, she made him pay as much more dearly for a second victory as Macedonia made the Romans pay in 171-168 B.C. If Austerlitz was Austria's Cynoscephalae, Wagram was her Pydna. Moreover, the Austrians, like the Macedonians, still had the spirit, after suffering two signal defeats, to take up arms once again; and, more fortunate than the Macedonians, they marched this time to victory. The intervention of Austria on the side of Russia and Prussia in 1813 was the decisive act which made the overthrow of Napoleon inevitable and brought his ephemeral empire to the ground.

Again, the Prussians played the same ineffective part in 1805 as the Macedonians played during the Hannibalic War, and they paid the penalty by meeting their Cynoscephalae at Jena; but the effects of Jena upon Prussia were dynamic. The remnant of the Prussian Army which had marched out so ingloriously in the autumn to an ignominious defeat had the hardihood to fight a winter campaign and to exact a Pyrrhic victory from Napoleon at Eylau and after that to go on fighting still, in the farthest corner of Prussian territory beyond the Memel. In the year after Jena, the Prussians only accepted the French conqueror's terms because they were virtually coerced into surrender by their own Russian allies; and the severity of the terms only added to the stimulus which the shock of Jena had first administered. The energy evoked in Prussia by this stimulus was extraordinary. It not only regenerated the Prussian Army (and this through the instrumentality of the very restrictions which Napoleon had imposed upon the Prussian Army in order to reduce it to impotence); it regenerated, into the bargain, the Prussian Administrative Service and the Prussian Education System. In fact, this new-found energy transformed the Prussian State into a chosen vessel for holding the new wine of German Nationalism; and simultaneously it performed the miracle of conjuring this strong German wine out of a watery cosmopolitanism. The first-fruits of this titanic Prussian response to the challenge of Jena were the acts of faith which decided the issue of the Befreiungskrieg; the final harvest was gathered in by Bismarck in that

calculated combination of diplomacy and war which produced its intended result in the establishment of a new polity: Prussia-Germany.

As for the role of the Russians in the General War of 1792-1815, it is notorious that they fought indifferently so long as they were fighting the French on foreign ground. In 1812 the national energies of the Russian people were evoked, in successively higher degrees, as the French invaders crossed the political frontier and as they passed, at Smolensk, out of the insensitive fringe of alien territories, recently incorporated in the Russian Empire, into the quick of Holy Russia. At last, in the burning of Moscow, Russia found herself; and then she turned upon her invader in a counter-attack that did not come to a standstill until the tide of war had ebbed back right across the Continent from Moscow to Paris.

When we turn to the next chapter of Western history, in which the roles of France and Germany are reversed, exactly the same phenomena present themselves *mutatis mutandis*. In 1870, when the French, in their turn, played the vainglorious and ignominious role of the Prussians in 1806, the Prussian General Staff, who this time had calculated and provided for everything down to the last button, were half-surprised at the ease with which they were able to invade France and destroy the French armies in the field and lay siege to Paris.¹ On the other hand, in 1914 the Prussian General Staff of the day, who were obsessed by the memory of what had happened forty-four years before, were astonished at what happened this time when they repeated the invasion of France with apparently greater odds in their favour than their predecessors had been able to count upon in 1870. In 1914 the Germans encountered a French resistance for which the campaign of 1870 offered no precedent; and their under-estimate of French *moral* in 1914 was one of several psychological miscalculations which, cumulatively, were responsible in large measure for Germany's final defeat in the War of 1914-18. The Germans fell into this particular error of judgement because they neglected to take into account the momentous effect of the stimulus which their own fathers had administered to France in dealing her the blow of 1870. This stimulus had revealed itself already, before the War of 1870 was over, in the contrast between the *débâcles* at Sedan and

¹ It was the glamour of Napoleon I's victories that blinded the French to realities in 1870, just as, in 1806, the Prussians had been blinded to realities by the glamour of the victories of Frederick the Great. Among neutral spectators, the expectation of a French victory in 1870 was widespread when war broke out. The writer of this Study possesses a map, published at that moment by *The Illustrated London News*, in which the section covered by the German Rhineland is printed in red in order to pick it out on the assumption that it is destined to be the war-zone. The French Army itself is said to have been supplied with maps of Germany but not with maps of France.

Metz and the stubborn resistance of the people of Paris in a siege from which they had no hope of being delivered. The same stimulus revealed itself again at a later date and in a sublimated form in the Affaire Dreyfus, when a moral issue stirred millions of French hearts to the depths. For those who had eyes to see, it was evident that this was the turning-point at which the shock of defeat, still working in French souls, had translated itself into the stirrings of regeneration; and so, to properly instructed observers, the extreme difference between the successive French reactions to successive German invasions in 1870 and in 1914 did not come altogether as a surprise.

The tenacity of the French resistance during the War of 1914-18—a tenacity which was symbolized by the defence of Verdun—was one of the principal factors in the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers. Perhaps the most impressive feature in the behaviour of the French during those war-years was the fortitude with which they endured the devastation of some of the wealthiest and most valuable parts of their national territory; and the sequel is still more remarkable. A sympathetic and admiring witness of French national heroism during this war might have imagined, at the time, that he was witnessing the death of a nation on the field of honour. 'France', he might have prophesied, 'may possibly emerge victorious, but her victory will certainly be the death of her. This long-drawn-out devastation of the war-zone must have inflicted a mortal wound upon the French national economy. These terrible casualties must have doomed the population of France to an irretrievable decline. A magnificent euthanasia! Yet death is still death of the body, even when it has been robbed of its spiritual sting.' Such prophets never dreamed that the ghastly wound which was being inflicted on France would actually rejuvenate her. Yet so it has turned out. In the reconstruction of the devastated areas, the whole material apparatus of life has had to be renewed. The debris of the old equipment has naturally been replaced by new equipment of the latest pattern; and, as the work of renovation has proceeded, the French have come to congratulate themselves on the accident—which they lamented so bitterly while the devastation was taking place—that the war-zone happened to include the majority of their industrial districts. Whether the cost of reconstruction actually has been, or ever will be, defrayed by German Reparations payments is a secondary question. In the fifteenth year after the Armistice, it is already evident that it has profited France handsomely to have had her hand forced by devastation, even if the consequent reconstruction has had to be carried out almost entirely at French expense. In this compulsory renovation

of her industrial plant, France has been compelled to make an inestimably valuable capital investment. Moreover, her gain is not to be measured in crude terms of iron and steel and bricks and mortar. A new apparatus involves a new technique; and a new technique involves a new spirit. It is no paradox to say that, in the reconstruction of the devastated areas, France herself has renewed her youth.¹

As for Germany, the miracle which a military devastation has accomplished in one fashion for victorious France has been accomplished in another fashion for the defeated rival of France by a financial inflation. It is already evident that the blows which have been rained upon Germany since the Armistice of 1918 are having the same stimulating effect as the blows inflicted on Prussia a century ago in 1806-7.² In fact, the unfriendly service which the Germans did to the French before the Armistice has been done by the French to the Germans during these post-war years; so that an observer who perceived only the outward actions and their effects, without being aware of the motives behind them or the temper informing them, might almost imagine that France and Germany were two flagellants who had gone into a partnership in asceticism under a mutual vow to wield the lash for one another in turn.

'These are they which came out of great tribulation';³ and certainly, in the autumn of 1931, when the first draft of this chapter was written, both France and Germany seemed to be less far from salvation than Great Britain: the one Great Power in Europe which had succeeded for more than seventeen years after the outbreak of the Great War in turning the blows of Fortune aside and avoiding both the two calamities of invasion and inflation. An Englishman, communing with his own soul in the autumn of the year 1931 after the collapse of the Pound Sterling on the 21st September, might well ask himself whether this British *tour de force* had not really been a perverse evasion of 'things that accompany salvation'⁴—a perversity whereby Great Britain had simply condemned herself to 'work out' her 'own salvation' belatedly 'with

¹ In the autumn of 1931, some thirteen years after the Armistice, on the morrow of the fall of the Pound Sterling from the Gold Standard, France momentarily found herself in a position in the World which, even at the time of the Peace Conference, it had seemed inconceivable that she should ever occupy again. At that moment, she possessed and exercised an effective military supremacy and political hegemony on the European Continent; she was predominant over the whole of Europe in the air; she was second only to the United States in her holding of gold; and she was in a conspicuously better economic position than any other great country in the World in virtue of her relative immunity, for the time being, from the incidence of the world-wide economic depression. It was as if, when Zeus hurled the thunder-bolt which was to annihilate Semele, his defenceless victim had been transfigured, at the stroke, into Athene radiant in her shining armour.

² This passage was written in the summer of 1931, and it still holds good—with a vengeance—at the moment of revision on the 23rd March, 1935.

³ Revelation vii. 14.

⁴ Hebrews vi. 9.

fear and trembling',¹ instead of having salvation thrust upon her betimes. 'For whosoever will save his life shall lose it.'²

The classic example of the stimulating effect of a blow is the reaction of Hellas in general, and Athens in particular, to the onslaught of the Achaemenian Power—the Syriac universal state—in 480-479 B.C.

'The vastness of the forces employed in the expedition of Xerxes King of Persia against Hellas cast the shadow of a terrible danger over the Hellenic Society. The stakes for which the Hellenes were called upon to fight were slavery or freedom, while the fact that the Hellenic communities in Asia had already been enslaved created a presumption in every mind that the communities in Hellas itself would experience the same fate. When, however, the war resulted, contrary to expectation, in its amazing issue, the inhabitants of Hellas found themselves not only relieved from the dangers which had threatened them but possessed, in addition, of honour and glory, while every Hellenic community was filled with such affluence that the whole World was astonished at the completeness with which the situation had been reversed.

'During the half century that followed this epoch, Hellas made vast strides in prosperity. During this period, the effects of the new affluence showed themselves in the progress of the arts; and artists as great as any recorded in history, including the sculptor Pheidias, flourished at the time. There was an equally signal advance in the intellectual field, in which philosophy and public-speaking were singled out for special honour throughout the Hellenic World and particularly at Athens. In philosophy there was the school of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; in public-speaking there were such figures as Pericles, Isocrates and Isocrates' pupils; and these were balanced by men of action with great military reputations like Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Myronides and a long array of other names too numerous to mention.

'In the forefront of all, Athens achieved such triumphs of glory and prowess that her name won almost world-wide renown. She increased her ascendancy to such a point that, with her own resources, unsupported by the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians, she broke the resistance of powerful Persian forces on land and sea and so humbled the pride of the famous Persian Empire that she compelled it to liberate by treaty all the Hellenic communities in Asia.'³

The pre-eminence of Athenian vitality in this outburst of Hellenic life which followed the repulse of Xerxes' onslaught is comparable with the rejuvenation of France after the War of 1914-18; for Athens on that occasion, like France on this, bore the brunt of the stimulating blow. While the fertile fields of Boeotia were saved from devastation by the treachery of their owners to the Hellenic cause, and the fertile fields of Lacedaemon by the presence and the

¹ Philippians ii. 12.

² Matthew xvi. 25.

³ Diodorus of Agyrum: *A Library of Universal History*, Book XII, chs. 1-2¹.

pro prowess of the Athenian fleet at Salamis, the poor land of Attica was devastated systematically by the invaders in two successive seasons. Indeed, Attica suffered more in 480-479 B.C. than France in A.D. 1914-18; for the Germans only succeeded in occupying a fraction, albeit an especially valuable fraction, of the French national territory, whereas the Persians occupied and devastated the whole of Attica, including Athens itself and the Acropolis and the temple of Athene, on the summit of the rock, which was the Attic holy of holies. The whole population of Attica—men, women, and children—had to evacuate the country and cross the sea to the Peloponnese as refugees; and it was in this situation that the Athenian fleet fought and won the Battle of Salamis, within sight of the victors' abandoned fields and ruined homes and altars. It is no wonder that a blow which aroused this indomitable spirit in the Athenian people should have been the prelude to achievements which are perhaps unique in the history of Mankind for their brilliance and multitude and variety. In the material reconstruction of Attica, the new equipment of the farmsteads surpassed the old as conspicuously as the new equipment of the French factories has surpassed the plant destroyed by German shell-fire. Half a century later, this new apparatus of agriculture in Attica was still so far superior to anything that was to be found in other parts of Hellas that when Athens—betrayed into folly by excess of good fortune—at last conjured up against herself an overwhelming counter-coalition of other Powers, the Boeotian contingent in the Allied and Associated Armies found it worth while to carry off the woodwork of the Attic farm-buildings bodily across the mountains.¹ Yet, in the reconstruction of Attica, this imposing re-equipment of the farmsteads was nothing accounted of. The work which was regarded as truly symbolic of the country's glorious resurrection was the rebuilding of the temples; and in this work Periclean Athens displayed a vitality far superior to that of post-war France. When the French recovered the battered shell of Rheims Cathedral, they performed a pious restoration of each shattered stone and splintered statue. When the Athenians found the Heka-

¹ This fact is recorded in the fragment of a history of Hellenic affairs, of unknown authorship, which has come to light on the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus. The relevant passage runs as follows:

'Thebes had enjoyed a great increase in general prosperity as an immediate result of the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War . . . she prospered still more after the joint Thebano-Lacedaemonian occupation of Decelea. While the occupation lasted, the Thebans bought up cheap the slaves and other prize of war; and the fact that they were the Athenians' next-door neighbours enabled them to transport to the Thebaid all the capital equipment of Attica, including the very timber and tiling of the buildings. At that time the Attic countryside was more lavishly equipped than any other in Hellas. It had suffered very little in the previous Lacedaemonian invasions, and an immense amount of skill and labour had been invested in it by the Athenians. . . .' (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Oxford 1909, University Press), xii. 3-4.)

tompedon burnt down to the foundations, they let the foundations lie and proceeded, on a new site, to create the Parthenon.

As for Sparta, she had to wait for the stimulus which she had been spared—or denied—by Destiny in 480-479 B.C. until it was accorded to her some fifteen years later by an act of God. It was the great earthquake of 464 B.C.—a catastrophe which laid the City of Sparta in ruins and raised all the Helots of Laconia in revolt against their stricken masters—that put the Spartans on their mettle again and nerved them first to check the expansion of the Athenian Empire and later to put an end to its existence. As for Thebes, she did not completely recover from the demoralization of her 'Medism' in 480 B.C., nor wholly efface its stigma, until almost a century later when, in the year 382, the Gods at last had mercy on her and inspired the Spartans to seize by fraud and hold by force the Theban citadel, the Cadmea. Under the stimulus of this heaven-sent blow, Thebes achieved, for a season, the miracle of adding a cubit to her stature. The liberation of the Cadmea in 378 B.C. was followed by the victory of Leuctra in 371 and the invasion of Laconia in 370. Thebes had not only fulfilled her ancient ambition of establishing an undisputed authority over the other city-states of Boeotia; she had actually defeated the invincible Spartans and raided their inviolable territory and wrested from them the hegemony of the Hellenic World.

In this series of examples from the military and political histories of sovereign states, the stimulus of blows is manifest. Yet if these examples warrant the inference that 'the heavier the blow the stronger the stimulus' is a genuine social law, we must beware of making the further inference that Militarism in itself is a source of creative energy; for the historic examples of our present law are not confined to the battle-field,¹ and there are other mediums besides those of war and politics in which these stimulating blows are dealt and received.

The classic example, which we have reserved until the end of this chapter, is presented on the field of religion in the Acts of the Apostles. These dynamic acts, which were to win the whole Hellenic World for Christianity as they worked themselves out in the fullness of time, were conceived at the moment when the Apostles were looking steadfastly toward Heaven as their Lord went

¹ One of the notorious deeds of Militarism in recent Western history—the burning of the city of Atlanta, Georgia, by General Sherman in A.D. 1864—has stimulated the stricken city to raise herself to an eminence in the arts of peace which she had never attained in her *ante-bellum* infancy. Sherman challenged Atlanta to show her destroyer that she was not a Persepolis but a phoenix; and he taught her the way by opening her eyes to the indestructible importance of her geographical position as a railway junction. On the morrow of her disaster, Atlanta took for her civic motto the Latin word *Resurgens*, and turned her strategic position to commercial account by making herself into a distributing centre for the whole of the south-eastern United States.

up out of their sight.¹ At the moment, it was a crushing blow for them to lose again the personal presence of a Master who had so lately returned to them from the dead. Yet the very heaviness of the blow evoked, in their souls, a proportionately powerful psychological reaction which is conveyed mythologically in the message of the two men in white apparel² and in the descent of the Pentecostal tongues of fire.³ In the power of the Holy Ghost, they preached the divinity of the crucified and vanished Jesus not only to the Jewish populace but to the Sanhedrin;⁴ and, within three centuries, the Roman Government itself capitulated to the Church which the Apostles had founded at a moment of extreme spiritual prostration.

V. THE STIMULUS OF PRESSURES

'Marches' and 'Interiors'

So much for the stimulus of the human environment when its impact takes the form of a sudden external blow. We have next to examine the cases in which the impact takes the different form of a continuous external pressure.

In terms of political geography, the peoples, states, or cities which are exposed to such pressure fall, for the most part, within the general category of 'marches'; and the best way to study the effects of this particular kind of pressure empirically is to make some survey of the parts played by marches, in the histories of the societies or communities to which they belong, in comparison with the parts played by other territories that belong respectively to the same societies or communities but are situated geographically in their 'interiors'.⁵

In the Egyptiac World

In the history of the Egyptiac Civilization, for example, we have noticed already, in another connexion,⁶ that, on no less than three momentous occasions, the course of Egyptiac history was directed by Powers originating in the south of Upper Egypt. The foundation of the United Kingdom *circa* 3200 B.C., the foundation of the universal state *circa* 2070/2060 B.C., and the restoration of the universal state *circa* 1580 B.C., were all accomplished by Powers that originated within this narrowly circumscribed district. We may observe now, apropos of our present inquiry, that this district is

¹ Acts i. 9-10.

² Acts i. 10-11.

³ Acts ii. 1-4.

⁴ Acts ii-v.

⁵ In IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (x), vol. iv, pp. 501-4, below, we shall have occasion to recur to this survey of the parts played by marches, apropos of the pathological phenomenon of an excessive concentration of energy upon certain particular activities which are the responses to particular challenges. An example of this phenomenon which is conspicuous in the histories of marches is the social malady called Militarism.

⁶ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 140, footnote 2, above, following Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii (i), 2nd edition, pp. 60-1.

coincident with the Southern March of the Egyptiac World which was exposed to pressure from the barbarians of Nubia. And if we look further into Egyptiac history from our present angle of vision, we shall find other marches playing equivalent parts in reaction to pressures from barbarians or from alien civilizations which impinged upon the Egyptiac World from other quarters. In particular, a pressure from North-Western Africa or from South-Western Asia was apt to call into existence, in the Egyptiac World, a paramount Power with its seat in the corresponding marches on this or that fringe of the Delta.¹

The polarization of political power at the two extremities of the Egyptiac domain was an early as well as a persistent phenomenon of Egyptiac history. A consolidation of the twenty or thirty once independent local states of the Lower Nile Valley² into two empires with the Northern and the Southern March as their respective nuclei was the prelude to the foundation of the United Kingdom; and after this dualism had been converted into unity through the triumph of the Southern over the Northern Power, the memory of it was still kept alive in the symbolism of the Double Crown, until at last, after the passage of some two thousand years, the Northern March succeeded in capturing in its turn, and thenceforth retaining, the primacy. In the thirteenth century B.C., new pressures from the Hittite Power on the Asiatic mainland and from the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung in the Levant caused the sceptre to pass from Thebes, the historic metropolis of the Southern March, to the City of Ramses: the new frontier-fortress on the eastern fringe of the Delta which now guarded this exposed extremity of the Egyptiac World as Thebes had guarded the frontier over against Nubia.³ Thereafter, during the sixteen centuries of twilight which elapsed between the decline of 'the New Empire' and the ultimate extinction of the Egyptiac Society in the fifth century of the Christian Era, political power reverted to the Delta as persistently as it had been apt to revert to the Southern March during the preceding two thousand years. After being governed in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. from Deltaic Ramses, the Egyptiac

¹ e.g. at the City of Ramses and at Tanis and at Bubastis on the eastern fringe of the Delta; at Sais on the western fringe (see below).

² The historical 'nomes', i.e. provinces, as they were called after their 'mediatization'.

³ For this transfer of the capital from Thebes to the City of Ramses, see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. II (i), 2nd edition, pp. 453-4, 487-8, and 494-5. The City of Ramses was the first Deltaic capital of an oecumenical Egyptiac State with the exception of Avaris; and Avaris is the exception which proves the rule; for Avaris was the capital of the Hyksos; and the Hyksos were alien interlopers in the Egyptiac World who never felt themselves at home there. For this reason, the Hyksos did not attempt to establish themselves in the interior, but remained encamped at Avaris, on the edge of their Egyptian dominions, in order to keep open their line of retreat to their original settlements in Syria. Thus Avaris, under the Hyksos régime, was not really the capital of an Egyptiac State but rather the head-quarters of an alien military occupation.

World was governed in the eleventh century from Deltaic Tanis and in the tenth and ninth centuries from Deltaic Bubastis; and the classic instance of Deltaic paramountcy is the rise of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty, which originated in the Delta in response to the challenge of the Assyrian occupation in the seventh century B.C. and came, after supplanting the intruders, to rule all Egypt, as far south as Elephantine, from Sais. The Saite Power, thus founded, endured until it failed to respond to another challenge from Asia in failing to save Egypt from political incorporation into the Achaemenian Empire. The subsequent successive attempts—some abortive and others temporarily successful—to throw off the Achaemenian yoke all emanated from the Delta likewise. During these centuries when the Delta was politically in the ascendant, the Thebaid was politically in eclipse. The position of post-Imperial Thebes in the latter-day Egyptiac World resembled that of post-Imperial Rome during the post-Hellenic interregnum and the early age of Western Christendom. The *ci-devant* Imperial City was perfunctorily compensated and consoled for the loss of its political power by the enjoyment of an ecclesiastical primacy which was a legacy from its previous greatness and a tribute to its enduring prestige.¹

Can we discern why it was that, in the competition for political paramountcy between the Thebaid and the Delta, the Thebaid had the upper hand from the foundation of the United Kingdom until the decline of 'the New Empire', while the Delta had the upper hand thereafter? This permanent change in the balance of power is to be explained by certain permanent changes in the incidence of external pressure upon the Egyptiac World. From the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. onwards, the pressures from North-Western Africa and from South-Western Asia decidedly outweighed the pressures from other quarters; and accordingly, during these latter days, the stimulus derived from external pressure was felt in greatest measure by the Northern Marches in the Delta. Concurrently, the pressure from the Upper Nile Valley relaxed; and the classic Southern March, in the section of the valley immediately below the First Cataract, was relegated to the interior of the Egyptiac World by an extension of the Egyptiac domain *ip-river*.

The classic Southern March was only a march so long as the First Cataract marked a sharp line of cultural division between the Egyptiac Civilization and a Nubian barbarism; and this condition

¹ See Meyer, E.: *Gottesstaat, Militärherrschaft und Ständewesen in Aegypten* = *Berichten Berl. Akad.* 1928, pp. 495 seqq.; eundem: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii (ii), 2nd edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1931, Cotta), pp. 6-60.

did not prevail either in the evening or at the dawn of Egyptiac history. In the so-called pre-dynastic age, there had been no substantial difference in culture between the sections of the Nile Valley below the First Cataract and above it. The differentiation of a dynamic civilization in Egypt from a static primitive culture in Nubia declared itself on the eve of the foundation of the United Kingdom; and the stimulus of barbarian pressure upon the Egyptiac frontiersmen at the new dividing line perhaps accounts for the foundation of the United Kingdom by a dynasty whose seat was at Al Kāb. The new difference in cultural level between Egypt and Nubia was accentuated during the régime of the Egyptiac United Kingdom, as the Egyptiac Civilization soared to its zenith; and this cultural gulf remained fixed during the subsequent 'Time of Troubles'—when Nubia appears to have been occupied by Afrasian Nomads from the North-West—and also during the régime of the Egyptiac universal state, which was founded and maintained by the Theban emperors of the Eleventh and Twelfth Dynasties. Though Nubia was annexed to the Egyptiac universal state politically, its incorporation into the Egyptiac World remained superficial, like the incorporation of the southern seaboard of China into the Sinic World under the Han.¹ The Egyptiac Civilization was still exotic in Nubia; and such local interaction between the two cultures as took place in that age resulted in the barbarizing of the Egyptian garrison and not in the civilizing of the Nubian proletariat. On the other hand, Nubia was not only politically annexed but was also culturally assimilated by the restored Egyptiac universal state—'the New Empire'—and after the organization of the new dominion by Thothmes I (*imperabat circa* 1557–1505 B.C.) the southern boundary of the Egyptiac World stood near the foot of the Fourth Cataract, at the new frontier-fortress of Napata, instead of standing at the head of the First Cataract at the old frontier-fortress of Elephantine. In thus definitively incorporating Nubia into the Egyptiac World, the Theban emperors of the Eighteenth Dynasty cut the roots of their own country's greatness. They transferred from the Thebaid to Napata the military burden, and with it the political stimulus, of serving as the Southern March; and on the one occasion, during the last sixteen centuries of Egyptiac history, on which the now prevalent political paramountcy of the Northern Marches was contested by the South, the Southern Power which aspired to oecumenical authority had its roots in the new Southern March of Napata and not in the *ci-devant* Southern March of the Thebaid.

When the break-up of 'the New Empire' into successor-states,

¹ See pp. 83–4, above.

under the rule of local princelings descended from Libyan mercenaries, was followed by a re-polarization of political power at the two extremities of the Egyptian World, the two poles in the new tension were not both coincident with those at which power had been concentrated on the eve of the foundation of the United Kingdom, some two thousand five hundred years earlier. In the post-Imperial age, the capital of the Northern Power was duly planted in the Delta, this time at Bubastis, by the Libyan princes of Heracleopolis; while these latter-day Libyan Heracleopolites' Napatan kinsmen¹ and contemporaries, who established the Southern Power, retained their capital at Napata, which was now the Southern point of pressure and stimulus, and did not transfer it either to the Thebaid or to any other point in the interior. In the fullness of time, this Napatan Power attempted to emulate the thrice-repeated feat of the Thebaid: the political unification of the whole Egyptian World under a single sovereignty. The new Southern March, however, now failed to accomplish what the old Southern March had achieved thrice over. The Napatan attempt to gain oecumenical power, which was initiated by Kashta when he annexed the Thebaid *circa* 750 B.C. and was almost carried to completion by Piankhi when he made his expedition down-Nile into the Delta *circa* 725, was frustrated first by the alien Assyrian invaders and finally by the indigenous Deltaic Power of the Saites, who began as the Assyrians' creatures and ended as their local residuary legatees. *Circa* 661-655 B.C., the frontier between the Saite and the Napatan Power came to rest at Elephantine; and thereafter this obsolete boundary between an Egyptian Civilization and a Nubian barbarism acquired a new function as the internal line of demarcation between the two political units into which the enlarged Egyptian World was thenceforth permanently divided.

Thus, in the post-Imperial age, the old Northern and the new Southern March both failed to attain oecumenical power in the end; and the resultant political dualism persisted during the remainder of Egyptian history. Yet though Napata fell short, in achievement, of Al Kāb and Thebes, she was not altogether unresponsive to the stimulus of external pressure to which, as the latter-day Southern March of the Egyptian World, she had come to be exposed in her turn. The former frontier-fortress of 'the New Empire' on the Upper Nile became the capital of a 'successor-state' which embraced half, albeit the more backward half, of the latter-day expanded Egyptian World; and, unlike the Saites and their successors in the

¹ Reisner's view that these princes of Napata were Libyans is not accepted by Eduard Meyer, who suggests that they were descended from Hrihor, the High Priest of Amon who established the Theban theocracy *circa* 1075 B.C. (*Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii (ii), 2nd edition, p. 52).

Delta, the Napatans did not succumb to alien conquerors. During the long centuries when Egypt north of Elephantine was successively subject to the Achaemenids and the Ptolemies and the Romans, Ethiopia south of Elephantine remained an independent Egyptiac Power. Indeed, during these centuries the domain of the Egyptiac Culture was extended still farther up-river under this Ethiopian régime, until Napata herself, who had started her career as a frontier-fortress, was relegated to the interior as Thebes had been before her. Thereafter, *circa* 300 B.C., Napata was supplanted, as the capital of the Ethiopian state, by Meroë at the foot of the Sixth Cataract, midway between the junctions of the Atbara and the Blue Nile with the main river; and this Meroitic Power lived on, as a politically independent embodiment of the Egyptiac Society, until the third century of the Christian Era, when the Egyptiac Culture suffered a violent death in Ethiopia at the hands of barbarian invaders, some two centuries before it died peacefully in its sleep in Egypt itself.

Thus the political history of the Egyptiac World, from beginning to end, may be read as a tension between two poles of political power which, in every age, were located respectively in the Southern and in the Northern March of the day. One or other of these marches was the cradle of every successful or abortive oecumenical dynasty. On the other hand, there are no examples of oecumenical dynasties which originated at points in the interior of the Egyptiac World. The political creations of the interior were seldom more than parochial; and even when oecumenical dynasties whose roots lay in one of the marches—in the Delta or in the Thebaid—transferred their capitals to places in Middle Egypt for administrative convenience, political power was apt to ebb back to the marches as soon as times once more became critical. For instance, after the foundation of the United Kingdom, the capital was transferred from Al Kāb, in the Southern March, which had been the original seat of the founders, to Memphis on the borderline between the two lands of the Double Crown; yet the new task of founding the Egyptiac universal state after a time of troubles was accomplished by a dynasty from Thebes. Again, after the foundation of the universal state, the capital was transferred once more, this time from Thebes to a new central site just above Memphis;¹ yet the new task of restoring the universal state after the intrusion of the Hyksos was accomplished by a dynasty from Thebes, who thus asserted her political potency for the second

¹ This new central site, to which the capital was transferred by Amenemhat I from Thebes, was called Iz-Taui, which meant 'Conqueror of both Lands' (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (ii), 3rd edition, p. 267).

time. Finally, after the restoration of the universal state, the capital was transferred from Thebes by Ikhnaton to his new imperial city at Tell-el-Amarna, mid-way between Thebes and Memphis; yet this transfer was as ephemeral as the religious and artistic innovations with which it was bound up.¹ Upon the death of the imperial revolutionary, the capital reverted to Thebes and remained there until the Thebaid paid the inevitable penalty for having ceased to be a march by forfeiting, once for all, its ancient and long-enduring political paramountcy. Even then, the political heritage of the Thebaid did not fall to any district in the interior, but was divided, as we have seen, between the old Northern March in the Delta and the new Southern March of Nubian Napata.

In the Sinic World

The part played in the classical period of Egyptiac history by the Thebaid—the march which relieved the interior of the Egyptiac World from the pressure of the barbarians of Nubia—was played in Sinic history by the valleys of the Wei-ho and the Fen-ho, which were the marches of the Sinic World against the barbarian highlanders of Shensi and Shansi. The Chóu Dynasty, which founded the Sinic equivalent of the Egyptiac United Kingdom towards the close of the second millennium B.C., and the Ts'in Dynasty, which founded the Sinic universal state in the year 221 B.C., both originated in the Wei Valley, while the Fen Valley was the seat of the Tsin Dynasty, which was the rival of the Ts'in during the first phase of the Sinic Time of Troubles. In Sinic, as in Egyptiac, history, there was a tendency for Powers which originated in the marches and afterwards attained an oecumenical dominion to transfer their capitals from the periphery to the interior. The site in the Sinic World which corresponded to the Egyptiac Memphis was Loyang (the modern Honan-fu). It lay on the borderline between the western valleys and the eastern plain,² traversed by the Yellow River in its lower course, which was the geographical heart of the Sinic World.³ The capital of the Chóu was transferred to the neighbourhood of Loyang from the Wei Valley after the dynasty

¹ For a discussion of Ikhnaton's role in Egyptiac history, see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 145-6, above.

² The exact location of Loyang was in the valley of the Lo-ho, a minor right-bank tributary of the Yellow River which debouches into the main stream just below the Yellow River's exit from the gorges that intervene between its Lower Basin in the eastern plain and its Upper Basin in the highlands where it receives the waters of the Wei and the Fen.

³ The title of 'Middle Kingdom' (*Chung Kwo*), which was eventually taken over by the Sinic universal state as an alternative to 'All that is under Heaven' (*T'ien-hia*), appears to have been borne originally by the little principality of Chu, in the middle of the eastern plain, on the borderline between the modern provinces of Honan and Shantung. (See Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920-1, Geuthner, 4 vols.), vol. i, p. 214.)

had fallen into decadence; and in a later age the capital of the Sinic universal state, which had been located originally at Ch'ang Ngan in the Wei Valley under the Prior Han, was transferred likewise to Loyang when the Posterior Han gave the Sinic universal state a second lease of life. It is the more significant that, notwithstanding this repeated attraction of the capital of the Sinic World from the periphery into the interior, the two Powers which made Sinic history both originated in the Western March. The only Power that is credited with an original seat in the eastern plain is the semi-legendary Yin or Shang Dynasty, which was traditionally supposed to have been paramount before the Ch'ou united the eastern plain with the Western March under their own sceptre.

In the Far Eastern World

When we turn to the history of the Far Eastern Civilization which is 'affiliated' to the Sinic Civilization, we find that the oscillation between a western capital and an eastern capital, which had been characteristic of the political history of the 'apparented' civilization, is reproduced, with a difference, in a new oscillation between a southern capital and a northern.

In the Sinic World, there had been a tendency for oecumenical Powers to originate in the Western March, under stimulus from the pressure of the surrounding barbarian highlanders, and to transfer their capitals to sites in the interior on the eastern plain. In the Far Eastern World, the heaviest external pressure came from a different source and a different quarter. The barbarian highlanders of Shensi and Shansi had been subdued and assimilated by the growing Powers of Ts'in and Tsin before the close of the Sinic Time of Troubles; but this elimination of the barbarians of the western highlands had merely removed a buffer which had previously intervened between the Sinic World and the far more formidable Nomadic peoples of the Eurasian Steppe; and the simultaneous expansion of the two Sinic principalities of Chao and Yen, at the northern end of the eastern plain, doubled the length of the new front between the Sinic World and Eurasia. This front now extended from the north-western coast of the Gulf of Liaotung to the north-eastern escarpment of the Tibetan Plateau. The lines of defence against Nomad inroads, which had been thrown up piecemeal by the contending states of the Sinic World, with such energies as they could spare from the last round in their own internecine struggle, were consolidated, after the 'knock-out blow' had been delivered and the Sinic universal state founded by Ts'in She Hwang-ti, into the Great Wall of China.¹ It was across the line of

¹ See Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 206-7.

the Wall, from north to south, that, some five centuries later, during the interregnum (*circa* A.D. 175-475) which followed the break-up of the Sinic universal state, the Eurasian Nomads came in, as barbarian invaders, in the post-Sinic Völkerwanderung; and the pressure from the north did not cease when the new Far Eastern Civilization emerged. Hence, in the Far Eastern World, there was a tendency, from the beginning, for oecumenical Powers either to originate in the Northern Marches or to transfer their capitals to the Northern Marches if they had originated in the southern interior.

For instance, the Power which evoked, in the Far Eastern World, a ghost of the Sinic universal state¹ in the first age of Far Eastern history, originated, like the Sinic universal state itself, in the Wei Valley; and in the new orientation of political geography the Wei Valley constituted the western section of those Northern Marches in which the pressure from the Eurasian Nomads was now making itself felt. It was here that the Sui Dynasty, which re-enacted the part of Ts'in She Hwang-ti by uniting the whole of Society under a single rule, established a new oecumenical capital at Si Ngan (the modern Sian-fu) in the neighbourhood of the ancient Ch'ang Ngan.² Si Ngan, under the Sui, drew to itself the power that had previously resided in Nanking, the capital of the South,³ which the Sui had annexed to their dominions; and when the T'ang Dynasty reaped the fruits of the Sui Dynasty's labours, as their prototypes the Han had once entered into the heritage of Ts'in She Hwang-ti, the T'ang kept the seat of oecumenical power at Si Ngan, where they had found it.

Si Ngan, however, did not retain its primacy in perpetuity; for the incidence of the pressure from the Eurasian Nomads tended, in the course of Far Eastern history, to shift from the western sector of the Northern Marches to the east, and the seat of political power in the Far Eastern World shifted eastwards correspondingly. This shift was approximately contemporaneous with the momentary breakdown of the Far Eastern Oecumenical Power during the interval between the extinction of the T'ang Dynasty in A.D. 907 and the foundation of the Sung Dynasty in A.D. 960.

During the Sung Age, Far Eastern history consisted, for the main body of the Far Eastern Society on the Continent,⁴ in a slow and

¹ See further the comparative study, in Part X, below, of the likenesses and differences between the evocation of the ghost of the Sinic universal state in the Far Eastern World and the evocation of ghosts of the Hellenic universal state in the Orthodox Christian and Western worlds.

² For Ch'ang Ngan, the capital of the Sinic universal state under the Prior Han, see p. 119, above.

³ See p. 122, footnote 1, below.

⁴ The different course taken by the history of the offshoot of the Far Eastern Society overseas, in Japan, is examined below in the present section, on pp. 158-9, as well as in V. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 93-4.

stubborn retreat of the Far Eastern Oecumenical Power from north to South under an ever increasing pressure from a succession of Nomad Powers operating from Manchuria. The Khitan had extorted the cession of sixteen districts along the northern border *circa* A.D. 927-37, before the oecumenical authority of the Sung had been established; the Khitans' successors, the Kin, conquered from the Sung, *circa* A.D. 1125-42, the whole of Northern China down to the watershed between the Yellow River and the Yangtse; and, when the Kin had been supplanted in their turn by the Mongols, the Mongol Great Khan Qubilay (*imperabat* A.D. 1259-94) completed the work of his Kin and Khitan predecessors by extinguishing the Sung altogether and reuniting the whole of the main body of the Far Eastern World under a barbarian dominion. The tide of barbarian conquest, however, had no sooner engulfed the last remnant of the Far Eastern Society on the mainland than it began to recede; and the point of interest, for our present purpose, lies in the sequel which followed the eviction of the Mongols from China in A.D. 1368¹ by a new thoroughbred Chinese Power: the Ming.

This new thoroughbred Chinese dynasty arose in the same quarter in which their last thoroughbred predecessors, the Sung, had held out longest, that is to say in the South; and the founder of the Ming, Hung Wu, signalized the expulsion of the barbarians from China and the restoration of a genuine Chinese régime by a solemn transfer of the capital.

When the Kin had conquered Northern China, they had established their capital on the site of the modern Peking ('the Northern Capital'), on the borderline between the barbarian portion of their dominions to the north of the Great Wall and the Chinese portion to the south of it.² The same site commended itself, for the same geographical reason, to Qubilay;³ and in his reign Peking became the capital not merely of a reunited China but of a universal state which extended from the Pacific coasts of Asia right across the continent as far as the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates and the Carpathians and the Baltic and thus embraced the whole circumference of the Eurasian Steppe. This Kin and Mongol capital was naturally obnoxious to the Chinese as a reminder of the barbarian

¹ The insurrection against the Mongols which ended in their eviction began about the year 1351.

² Compare the location of the Hyksos' capital, Tanis, on the borderline between the non-Egyptian portion of their dominions in Syria and the Egyptian portion in the Lower Nile Valley. (See p. 113, footnote 3, above.)

³ Qubilay began to recondition Peking in A.D. 1264 and transferred his capital thither in 1267 from Qaraqorum, which was his ancestral capital in the Basin of the Orkhon, in the heart of Eurasia. At the same time he kept a footing on the Steppe by building himself a subsidiary residence, within easy reach of Peking, at Chung-Tu (Coleridge's Xanadu) just outside the Great Wall.

'In Xanadu did Kubla Khan

A stately pleasure-dome decree. . . .

yoke which they had borne so long and had only just succeeded in throwing off. Accordingly, Hung Wu had no sooner driven the Nomads out again into their native steppes and re-established the frontier of a liberated China along the line of the Great Wall, than he transferred the capital from Qubilai's city to Nanking, which had been the 'Capital of the South' at the dawn of Far Eastern history.¹ Hung Wu laid out his new city at Nanking on a scale commensurate with the size of the greater empire of which it was designed to be the capital henceforward. Yet neither historical sentiment nor cultural *amour propre* nor administrative convenience nor a lavish outlay on public buildings availed to retain the capital of the Ming Empire on this site in the interior. For though the Nomads had been expelled from China for the moment by Hung Wu's prowess, he could not exorcize the danger of their possible return. On the morrow of their expulsion, as they began to recover from their momentary prostration and to rally their forces like Satan and his angels in the exordium of *Paradise Lost*, their pressure became perceptible once more at the point where it had been making itself felt for the past five centuries—that is, in the eastern sector of the Northern March—and, once again, the point which was bearing the brunt of the political pressure drew to itself the primacy in political power. In A.D. 1421, Hung Wu's son and second successor, Yung Lo (*regnabat* A.D. 1403–25), retransferred the capital of China from his own father's chosen city of Nanking to the very city of Peking which had first been raised to honour by the hereditary barbarian enemy.

Yung Lo's reversion from 'the Southern Capital' in the interior to 'the Northern Capital' in the Marches was justified by the event. Indeed, the renewed pressure from the north became so strong that, though the retransference of the capital to the danger-point postponed the day of fresh disaster for China, it could not for ever avert it. In A.D. 1619–44, rather more than two centuries after Yung Lo's statesmanlike move, the Great Wall was broken through and Peking captured and all China overrun by a new Power from the north-eastern no-man's-land in the shape of the Manchus;² and

¹ Nanking had been continuously the capital of the South, under five successive dynasties, from A.D. 317 (the date which saw the end of the ephemeral restoration of the Sinic universal state under the so-called 'United Tsin') down to A.D. 589 (the date which saw the evocation of a ghost of the Sinic universal state by the Sui). In A.D. 589 the Sui annexed the South to their own Northern dominions and thereby united the whole Far Eastern World of the day under a single rule. (See p. 120, above.)

² Unlike the Mongols, the Manchus were not stock-breeding Nomads but primitive hunters who were at home, not on the Eurasian Steppe, but in the highlands—clad in virgin forest—which bound, on the east, the easternmost enclave of the Eurasian Steppe in the common basin of the Rivers Liao and Sungari. The particular Manchu community which conquered China in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era came from the section of this highland-forest country that lies between Kirin and the Pacific coast. These Manchu conquerors of China, being still on the primitive level at

in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era the Manchu sovereign Ch'ien Lung ruled from Peking¹ an empire—uniting all China and half Eurasia under a common dominion—which could bear comparison with the empire that had once been ruled from Peking by the Mongol Great Khan Qubilai himself. From A.D. 1421 down to A.D. 1928, Peking remained the capital of China through all vicissitudes. The attempt of the T'ai-p'ing insurgents, in the middle of the nineteenth century,² to bring back the capital to Nanking collapsed with the failure of their endeavour, of which it was a part, to deal with the Manchus as the Ming had dealt with the Mongols. In 1928, however, the Emperor Yung Lo's historic act was reversed, at last, by President Chiang Kai-shek; and at the time of writing Nanking is the capital of the Chinese Republic, while Peking has been degraded to the rank of a provincial centre under the belittling title of Peping.

Is this change likely to be permanent? And, if it is, will it militate against the validity of our social 'law' that marches are apt to be stimulated, by the external pressure to which they are exposed, into developing a political power which gives them a predominance over the interior? In the writer's belief, the recent transfer of the Chinese capital from Peking to Nanking is likely to be perpetuated, and this just because, so far from invalidating our 'law', it actually illustrates and confirms it.

How are we to account for the success of the Kuomintang in re-transferring the capital of China from Peking to Nanking some three-quarters of a century after the T'ai-p'ing's failure in their attempt to do this very thing? The explanation is to be found in certain far-reaching transformations of China's human environment which have taken place during the interval.

In 'the eighteen-fifties' of the Christian Era, the quarter from which China was subject to the heaviest external pressure was still the north, as it had been since the beginning of Far Eastern history. At that moment, China was under the rule of a dynasty of north-barbarian origin whose founder had forced his entry by breaking through the Great Wall, in its eastern sector, from north to south;

the time of the conquest, were much more readily assimilated to the Far Eastern culture, and absorbed into the Far Eastern body social, than their Mongol predecessors, who had entered China as full-fledged Eurasian Nomads with a tincture of the abortive Far Eastern Christian culture of the Nestorian Diaspora (see II. D (vi), pp. 237-8, below). For the primitive culture of the Manchus, see Lattimore, Owen: *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 44-5. It will be seen that the Manchu conquest of China differed from the Mongol conquest both in nature and in outcome, and bore a greater resemblance to the Chichimec conquest of Mexico.

¹ The Manchu rulers of China followed Qubilai's example by supplementing their capital at Peking, on Chinese soil, with a secondary residence—a glorified hunting lodge and summer retreat—outside the Great Wall. This Manchu counterpart of Qubilai's 'Xanadu' was Jehol in Eastern Inner Mongolia.

² The T'ai-p'ing insurrection lasted from A.D. 1850 to A.D. 1864.

and, according to our 'law', it was to be expected that the capital of China would remain in the zone of pressure—that is to say, at Peking, in the eastern sector of the Northern Marches—so long as this state of affairs continued. By 1928, however, a historic situation which had still been intact in 'the eighteen-fifties' had become entirely obsolete; and the Chinese Political Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Manchu Dynasty and put an end to the Manchu ascendancy in China Proper, was by no means the most revolutionary event in this radical change. The Manchu Dynasty and the Manchu Bannermen who had transferred their residence from Manchuria to China at the time of the conquest had been converted to Chinese culture many generations before they were put down from their seat by Chinese Nationalism.¹ The really momentous change in the situation since the failure of the T'ai'ping has been not political but economic, and has consisted in a counter-offensive of the Chinese cultivator against the Nomad herdsman.² This Chinese colonization of the steppe country, which was well under way before 1911, has been facilitated by the lapse of the Manchu régime's migration-restrictions and has been stimulated by the subsequent ravages of civil war and banditry and famine and flood in the heart of China itself: a fourfold scourge which has been driving the Chinese peasantry of Shantung and Honan and Chihli to emigrate in their hundreds of thousands to the empty and unharassed virgin lands of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Thus, to-day, the Great Wall no longer marks the boundary between Chinese peasant and barbarian Nomad. The line across which the Nomad invader has trespassed so many times during the last two thousand years has been left far behind in the Chinese peasant's peaceful but potent counter-offensive, until now a broad zone of the steppe-land which the Mongol herdsman used to range has

¹ Indeed, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the Manchu Dynasty and Nobility, at any rate, had been Sinitized before they crossed the Great Wall in A.D. 1619. For their previous extra-mural dominions had included not only their own original homeland in the forest-clad highlands east of Kirin but also the relatively well-watered portion of the lowlands in the Liao River basin which had been brought under the plough by Chinese peasant-colonists and had been shielded from Nomad incursions by the construction of the Willow Palisade: a north-eastern prolongation of the Great Wall which takes off from the Wall just above Shanhaikwan and runs down the eastern escarpment of the Central Asian Plateau and then across the South Manchurian plains until it strikes the left bank of the Upper Sungari after traversing the foot-hills of the eastern mountains between Changchun and Kirin. By the time when the Manchus descended from their highlands, these well-watered and colonized and cultivated and protected lowlands had become a Chinese country; and it was at Mukden, in this Chinese milieu, that the Manchus held their court before they crossed the Wall and moved to Peking. This residence at Mukden Sinitized the Manchu princes as effectively as the Scottish kings were Anglicized by transferring their residence from the Highlands to Edinburgh, and the Achaemenidae Babylonized by transferring theirs from Persis to Susa. Half the Bannermen who conquered intra-mural China for the Manchu Dynasty were not Manchus at all, but South-Manchurian Chinese; and the so-called Manchu conquest of China was, in effect, a Chinese civil war. (See Lattimore, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-71.)

² For this, see further Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 16-22, below.

been brought under the Chinese plough. Under the counter-attack of these ever advancing furrows, the Mongols have almost evacuated their former pasturelands south of the Gobi Desert, while the Manchus have become almost extinct in 'the Three Eastern Provinces' of the Chinese Republic which are still popularly known as Manchuria. In other words, the environs of Peking have ceased to be a march and have become assimilated to the interior for the first time in Far Eastern history; and it is in accordance with our law that in these new circumstances Peking itself should forfeit its long-maintained status of being the capital of China.¹

But has Nanking undergone any converse change of circumstances which entitles it to re-acquire the status which Peking has now lost? If our law is to be vindicated completely, we must be able to demonstrate that, concurrently, the environs of Nanking have ceased to be part of the interior, as they have been hitherto since the beginning of Far Eastern history, and have become a march; and, as soon as we state the problem in these terms, we perceive that, in this quarter, there has in fact been a transformation of China's human environment which is not less far-reaching than the change in the north. While, along the northern land-frontiers of China, the old pressure from the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe has gradually been reduced to vanishing point and has latterly given place to a counter-pressure upon the Nomads from the Chinese, China has been exposed contemporaneously to a new pressure, of steadily increasing intensity, along her eastern frontage, where she faces the sea. In earlier ages of Far Eastern history, the coast-line of China was the quarter on which the pressure upon her was least severe. Save for the desultory visits of Arab and Persian Muslim merchant-ships in the T'ang period and the desultory raids of Japanese pirates in the Ming period, the sea remained, from the Chinese standpoint, 'a perfect and absolute blank', until, some four centuries ago, it became the vehicle of the impact of our Western Civilization upon the Far East.

This impact of a human force from the opposite side of the globe was feeble at first; and it is less than a century ago that it began to acquire its present formidable momentum. At the date, for instance, when the T'ai'ping made their unsuccessful attempt to retransfer the capital of China to Nanking, the Western international settlement of Shanghai was still in its puny infancy: an unregarded bunch of 'godowns' planted on a mud-bank up a backwater of the Yangtse estuary. To-day Shanghai is not only the greatest of the treaty-ports that stud the coast of China from Canton at one end

¹ Compare the eclipse of Thebes after it had been relegated to the interior of the Egyptian World through the incorporation of Nubia (see the present chapter, pp. 114-18, above).

to Tientsin at the other. She is also one of the greatest ports and greatest cities in the World, and, to all appearance, she commands a future that will quite eclipse her imposing present. In other words, as China's northern landward marches have fallen into atrophy with the cessation of pressure from the Nomads, a new eastern maritime march has been brought into existence by a new pressure from overseas which is being exerted upon China by the Westerners. This new maritime march has taken the place of the old landward march as the quarter from which the incidence of external pressure upon China is heaviest; and the sector in which it is now heaviest of all is the central sector containing Shanghai. Shanghai is the point of the spear which the West is thrusting into China's side; and accordingly, in the political geography of China, as it has come to be re-orientated during the last three-quarters of a century, the province of Kiangsu, in which Shanghai is embedded, has succeeded to the historic position of the province of Chihli, which used to lie athwart the war-paths of Nomad invaders from Mongolia and Manchuria.¹

Now Nanking occupies in Kiangsu a position corresponding to

¹ The reader of this passage may demur to this implied relegation of Manchuria to a secondary role; for he can point out that Manchuria has never ceased to be a zone in which external pressure is being brought to bear upon China and that, since the 18th-19th September, 1931, the pressure upon China from this quarter has become so intense that it has come to be regarded as a matter of world-wide concern. This is quite true; but it should also be observed that, since the last decade of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the pressure which has been exerted upon China through Manchuria has not been the pressure either of Mongol Nomadism or of Manchu Barbarism. In these latter days, the pressure through Manchuria has been exerted by Russia and Japan; and it has been exerted by these two Powers as a consequence of the process of Westernization which each of them has previously undergone. In fact, Russia and Japan in Manchuria are acting as representatives of the West; and, in virtue of this, 'the importance of Manchuria as a channel conducting towards China the aggression of the West is at least as great' at the present day 'as its importance in bringing the expansive powers of China to bear on the frontier'. (Lattimore, *op. cit.*, p. 259.) Under the shadow of the Sino-Russian conflict in Manchuria in 1929 and the more formidable Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria which came to a head in 1931, an observer might be inclined to judge that, while the personality of the aggressor in Manchuria has changed—the Japanese and the Russian having replaced the Mongol and the Manchu—Manchuria itself has not forfeited its historic role as the quarter from which the heaviest external pressure upon China is exerted. Yet on closer inspection it will be found that, in spite of superficial appearances, the Manchurian frontier, as a zone of entry for the Western impact upon China, is really secondary to the maritime frontier round the estuary of the Yangtse. This truth is borne out by the history of the Sino-Japanese conflict which broke out in Manchuria in 1931; for the conflagration which had first flared up at Mukden spread to Shanghai forthwith.

'There could have been no more conclusive demonstration than this of the truth that the centre of gravity of China had indeed effectively shifted from the Province of Chihli and the Basin of the Peiho River and the port of Tientsin and the former political capital at Peking to the Province of Kiangsu and the basin of the Yangtse River and the port of Shanghai and the new political capital at Nanking. In effect, the new centre of energy with which Western enterprise had endowed—or encumbered—China at Shanghai had become so potent that, by the years 1931-2, it was virtually impossible for anything of major importance to happen to China at large without Shanghai becoming the principal scene of action. In this phase of Chinese history, Shanghai was a dominant magnetic point; and the magnetic power of this Western-made focus of modern Chinese economic life proved stronger than Japanese military dispositions.' (Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs 1931* (London 1932, Milford), p. 461.)

In A.D. 1950 there was no ground for jumping to the conclusion that Shanghai's role was played out.

that of Peking in Chihli. Peking commands the Mongolian war-path down the Nankow defile and the Manchurian war-path through the passage of Shan-hai-kwan, where the Great Wall descends from the mountains to the sea. Similarly, Nanking commands the path by which Western men-o'-war penetrate into the heart of China up the waterway of the Yangtse. A Chinese Government established at Nanking can defend China against the most formidable of the external pressures to which she is subject to-day at the point where the pressure is the most intense; and, in keeping the intruder under surveillance and holding him in check from this post of vantage, the rulers of China can learn his arts as well. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri*;¹ and Nanking is only one short night's railway-journey distant from Shanghai: the den—and school—of thieves which Western enterprise has planted at China's eastern door.

Military defeat from the seaward side, in spite of the history of the nineteenth century, is still novel and terrifying to the consciousness of the [Chinese] people at large. There is no buffer territory between the sea and the heart of China; there are no non-Chinese "reservoir" tribes to graduate the shock; and the tradition of the sea-going population itself is one of exploiting, not of being exploited. The impact of Western nations, the alien standards of the West, treaties dictated by the West, have always aroused a reaction of terror and hate far greater than any defeat in the vague buffer territories of the North. There is no underlying tradition to prescribe a method of dealing with aggression from over the sea. The methods applied in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were, generally speaking, coloured by the traditions applying to the northern land-frontier barbarians. They did not work well; in fact, they tended to bring on disasters. Hence a feeling, which has now penetrated very deep, that the Western nations are incalculable, that they are always likely to spring a fresh surprise, something quite outside of experience and the "rules of the game".²

It was in order to learn the outlandish rules of the new Western game of war and diplomacy and trade and industry and finance that the capital of China was transferred from Peking to Nanking in A.D. 1928. It will be seen that this transfer is a perfect illustration of our law that the external pressure of the human environment upon a march administers a stimulus which gives the march predominance over the interior.

In the Hindu World

If we turn next from Far Eastern history to Hindu, we shall recognize certain corresponding phenomena. We shall notice, for instance, that in India, as in China, to-day the march which is

¹ Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, Book IV, l. 428.

² Lattimore, Owen: *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 297-8.

subject to the heaviest pressure is the seaboard, and that the pressure from overseas is being applied by the same Western force. In Bombay, 'the Gate of India', we shall identify the Indian analogue of Shanghai; and we shall observe that just as the vital elements of the Far Eastern Society in China have been concentrating themselves latterly in the immediate hinterland of Shanghai, so the vital elements of the Hindu Society in India seem to be concentrating themselves now in the immediate hinterland of Bombay. It is the Bombay Presidency, from Poona to Ahmadabad, that is producing the foremost politicians and industrialists and saints and thinkers in India in our generation.

We shall notice, again, that, in India as in China, this concentration of pressure and stimulus and response in the maritime march is of recent date; and indeed in India it is still far from being complete. If we pass, for instance, from the intellectual and economic indices of social vitality to the military, and inquire into the comparative contributions of the various subdivisions of contemporary India to the Indian Army, we shall find that nearly 58 per cent. of the personnel is supplied by the Panjab and by the adjoining North-West Frontier Province, and that, on this criterion, the Bombay Presidency is altogether outmatched by the Panjab in vitality, even though it holds its own in the military field, as in the civil, against all other provinces of British India.¹ Moreover, the capital of the Indian Empire, though it was transferred to a new site in A.D. 1912, as the capital of the Chinese Republic was transferred in 1928, has not been transplanted to the Bombay Presidency. It has been located at Delhi; and Delhi, though not appreciably nearer than the previous capital, Calcutta, to Bombay, is on the fringe of the Panjab. In fact, the special enclave containing the new imperial capital has been carved out of territory which previously belonged to the Panjab as delimited in British Indian administrative geography.

¹ In the year 1930, the total combatant strength of the British Indian Regular Army was 158,200. Of these troops, 91,600 had been recruited from the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Province; some 35,500 from the Himalayan Highlands (Garhwal, Kumaon, Nepal); some 31,100 from the rest of India, including the Bombay Presidency; and 7,000 from the Bombay Presidency itself. (See the *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* = British Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 3568 of 1930 (London 1930, H.M. Stationery Office), vol. i, pp. 96-8. In the figures extracted from this source in the present footnote, the 16,500 troops recruited from the United Provinces have been credited to the Himalayan Highlands on the assumption that the majority of them came from the highland districts of Garhwal and Kumaon.) The above figures include recruitments outside as well as inside the limits of territory under British administration or control. In the year 1930, about one-seventh of the Indian Regular Army was recruited from territories beyond the limits of British administration or control: partly among the highlanders of the North-West Frontier in districts which were not under effective British rule though they were on the Indian side of the Indo-Afghan Frontier; and partly (to the strength of 19,000) among the highlanders of Nepal: an independent state hanging on the southern flanks of the Himalayas. For the tendency of civilizations, when they find themselves confronting barbarians along stationary artificial frontiers, to recruit their frontier defence-forces from among the trans-frontier barbarians themselves, see V. C. (i) (d) 6 (x), vol. v, pp. 459-80, as well as Part VIII, below.

Why has the capital of India moved to Delhi and not to the hinterland of Bombay? And why do the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Province supply, between them, more recruits than all the rest of India together to the Indian Army?

The answer to the second question is, of course, that, in the Panjab and in the North-West Frontier Province, in contrast to the Maritime March and the interior alike, Indian vitality has been stimulated to express itself in military prowess by exposure to external military pressure. This pressure is being applied nowadays by the warlike highlanders who still preserve their independence *de facto* on the extreme edge of the Iranian Plateau, where its south-eastern escarpment descends upon the north-western flank of the Indus Valley. The proximity of these barbarian hill-men has the same stimulating effect upon the frontiersmen of the Hindu World, along the banks of 'the Five Rivers', that the proximity of similar barbarians in the highlands of Shensi and Shansi once had upon the frontiersmen of the Sinic World in the valleys of the Wei and the Fen.¹ And the parallel goes further. On the northern marches of China, the highland zone once occupied by barbarian hill-men eventually became, as we have observed,² a passage through which China was invaded by the more formidable Nomadic peoples from the Eurasian Steppe in the hinterland. Similarly, on the north-western marches of India, the pressure which is being exerted by the local highlanders at the present day was formerly far surpassed in severity by a pressure from the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe, who found a passage into India across the highlands of Afghanistan, as their counterparts found a passage into China across the highlands of Shensi and Shansi and Jehol.

In Hindu history, as in Far Eastern, it is this pressure from Eurasian Nomads across an inland frontier that has been the heaviest external pressure until recently, and this ever since the time when Hindu history began. The Nomads' pressure was felt in full force during the interregnum, following the disintegration of the 'apparented' Indic Civilization, out of which the Hindu Civilization originally emerged. In the post-Indic *Völkerwanderung* after the break-up of the Gupta Empire—the Indic Power that had resumed and fulfilled the social functions of an Indic universal state³—India was invaded, across this north-west frontier, by the

¹ See the present section, pp. 118–19, above, and compare the relations between the Chinese frontiersmen and the Manchu barbarian hill-men in Manchuria, on the eve of their joint conquest of intra-mural China. (See p. 124, footnote 1, above.)

² See p. 119, above.

³ For the role of the Gupta Empire in Indic history, as a resumption of the Indic universal state which had been first embodied in the Maurya Empire and had then been interrupted prematurely by a Hellenic intrusion upon the Indic World, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 85–6, above.

Nomad Gurjaras and Huns. The invaders swamped the Indus Valley, made themselves at home in the Indian Desert beyond it, and swept on through Rājputāna into the Deccan.¹ The historic issue was whether these barbarians should or should not forestall the emergence of a new civilization, 'affiliated' to the defunct Indic Civilization, by engulfing the Ganges Valley as well; and this question was decided in the negative because, along the line of the River Jumna, a stand against their onslaughts was made with success. In the historical geography of the Hindu World, the cross-section of the great plain of Hindustan which contains the course of the Jumna, from the southern foot-hills of the Himalayas to the northern foot-hills of the Central Indian highlands, has had the same strategic importance as the passes from Manchuria and Mongolia into the Chinese province of Chihli in the historical geography of the Far East. Here was the gap through which the Nomad invaders must pass if they were to penetrate farther; and here was the point where they met with serious resistance. To this neighbourhood, accordingly, the capital of India has gravitated hitherto throughout the history of the Hindu Civilization.

Already, during the post-Indic interregnum, when Harsha (*imperabat* A.D. 606-47) momentarily restored the Indic universal state, he fixed his capital in this new north-western march at Sthanesvara, covering the approach from the Panjab to the Jumna, and not at Pataliputra in Magadha—the natural administrative centre of the Ganges Basin, at the junction of the Ganges with the Jumna and with two other tributaries, which had been the capital of both the Guptas and the Mauryas. Again, some two centuries later, when the new Hindu Civilization, which had emerged in the meanwhile, was threatened in its infancy by pressure from the Arabs, who had reached the delta of the Indus from the sea and were pushing their way inland up-river,² the Arabs' advance was arrested by the rise of a Hindu Power, the Prātihāra Rājputs, who ruled from Gujerat to the Jumna-Ganges Duab and fixed their capital in the Duab, on the west bank of the Ganges, at Kanauj.³

¹ In Vincent Smith's opinion, the Chalukyas, who founded a principality in the Deccan circa A.D. 550, were probably Gurjara invaders from Rājputāna. (Smith, Vincent: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 424.)

² For the province of the Arab Caliphate in the Indus Valley, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 105-6, above.

³ The Prātihāras were Gurjara converts to Hinduism who defended the society of their adoption against the aggression of the Syriac universal state (now resumed, after the Hellenic intrusion, in the Arab Caliphate), just as, on the opposite edge of the Syriac World, another nascent society—in this case, Western Christendom—was defended against the same Arab aggressors by the Frankish converts to Christianity. The Eurasian Nomad origin of the Prātihāras is attested by their military technique. They were horse-archers and camel-men, not elephant-riders. (See Vaidya, C. V.: *The History of Mediaeval India* (Poona 1924, Oriental Book Supplying Agency), vol. ii, p. 105.) The Prātihāras made themselves masters of the Jumna-Ganges Duab definitively circa A.D. 810-16. It is remarkable that they fixed their capital at Kanauj, in this

Both Kanauj and Sthanesvara, however, were to be eclipsed by a later foundation in the same region. Delhi was built on the west bank of the Jumna, on a site intermediate between the sites of the two earlier capitals, in A.D. 993-4¹ by Hindu hands; but Delhi, like Peking, was first raised to honour by rulers who were alien intruders.

At this very juncture, the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe broke their bounds again and began to make their way into India by the old route across the north-west frontier; but this time they appeared in a new guise. The Hun and Gurjara invaders of the post-Indic Völkerwanderung (*circa* A.D. 475-775) had come in as undifferentiated barbarians who were not immune from conversion to Hinduism. Their Turkish kinsmen who took the same road two centuries later arrived in India as converts to Islam—the Syriac universal church—and as apostles of a new Iranic Civilization to which the expiring Syriac Civilization was ‘apparented’. By force of arms these latter-day Turkish invaders carried their alien religion and culture into the Ganges Valley, where their Gurjara predecessors had not secured a footing until after they had become Hindus. The Turks broke through the Jumna March, and conquered the Ganges Valley down to the coast of Bengal, in A.D. 1191-1204; they conquered the Deccan in A.D. 1294-1309; and eventually a great Turkish statesman, Akbar the Timurid (*imperabat* A.D. 1556-1605), reunited the Hindu World under an alien rule, as the Mongol Qubilai reunited the main body of the Far Eastern World,² by bringing together its motley fragments—Hindu and Muslim principalities alike—into an all-embracing empire which performed the functions of a Hindu universal state. For the Eurasian invaders of India, Delhi was the natural site for a capital—situated, as it was, on the borderline between the Indus Valley and the Ganges Valley, between the region in which Islamic religion and Iranic culture and Eurasian blood had become predominant and the region where Hinduism was still holding its own under an alien yoke. Accordingly, Delhi was the normal seat of Turkish Muslim rule in India from the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, when the ‘Slave Kings’ fixed their capital there, down to the eighteenth, when the descendants of Akbar, the maker of the Hindu universal state, were maintaining a shadow court at Delhi as protégés and pensioners of the British East India Company.³

newly acquired province at the extremity of their dominions, instead of retaining it at some site in Rājputāna, the country in which they had been at home for several centuries and which was still the geographical centre of their empire. In order to explain their choice, we must suppose that the strategic importance of the Jumna-Ganges Duab was already well recognized.

¹ Smith, V., *op. cit.*, p. 384.

² See p. 121, above.

³ While Delhi was normally the capital of India during the five or six centuries of Muslim Turkish rule, her enjoyment of this status was not uninterrupted. In the

Moreover, Delhi, like Peking, has succeeded in recovering her status after the downfall of the Power by which this status was first conferred upon her. The replacement of the Mughal Rāj in India by the British Rāj, like the expulsion of the Mongols from China by the Ming, was accompanied at the moment by a transfer of the capital from the principal landward march to a new site in the interior where the new rulers felt themselves at home and were sure of their authority. In the nineteenth century, Delhi had to yield her primacy to Calcutta, as, in the fourteenth century, Peking had to yield hers to Nanking. Yet in India, as in China, the old capital in the march eventually won back, from the new capital in the interior, the status which it had temporarily forfeited. In A.D. 1912, fifty-five years after the definitive extinction of the Mughal Rāj and confirmation of the British Rāj in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, the British Government itself retransferred the capital of India to Delhi, as the Ming Emperor Yung Lo retransferred the capital of China to Peking fifty-three years after the expulsion of the Mongols from China by Yung Lo's own father Hung Wu.

It is noteworthy that, while the capital of India has perpetually gravitated to the environs of Delhi since the genesis of the Hindu Civilization, it has never established itself permanently anywhere in the Middle or Lower Ganges Valley, in Bihar or in Bengal. Before the advent of the British, it never established itself thereabouts at all; and no permanent change in the political geography of the Hindu World has been produced by the historical accident that the British rule began in Bengal a century before it was fully confirmed throughout India. This accident gave Bengal a double temporary advantage over other Indian provinces: she became the base of operations and seat of government of the new All-India rāj which was taking the place of the broken-down rāj of the Mughals; and her people were exposed to the process of intensive Westernization several generations earlier than their neighbours. Yet these accidental advantages, considerable though they are, have not availed against the permanent handicap to which Bengal is subject: the lack of stimulus which is the penalty of her situation in the interior. Even under the British Rāj, which has its source in seapower, the capital of India has departed from Calcutta—a port

early days of the empire of the Great Mughals, the capital was at Agra; and Akbar, who unknowingly followed in Ikhnaton's footsteps in attempting to turn his autocratic political authority to account for the artificial creation and imposition of a new universal church (see V. C. (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 699-704, below), likewise followed Ikhnaton in building himself a brand-new capital city. After the founder's death, however, Fātihpur Sikri had the same fate as Tell-el-Amarna; the capital reverted to Agra and thence, under Shah Jahān, to Delhi; and so, in the latter days of the Mughal Empire, the Turkish Muslim rule in India ended at Delhi, where it had begun.

accessible to ocean-going vessels—and has shifted back to Delhi, where the Eurasian horseman is at home and the Western seafarer is a stranger. As for the stimulus of the impact of our Western Civilization from across the sea—an impact which has given Bengal the character of a march for the first time in Hindu history—the Bengali response to this challenge seems to lack vitality and originality. In Bengali souls, the ferment of Westernization is apt to deteriorate into 'the leaven of the Scribes'. 'Where there is no vision, the people perish';¹ and, in the Indian National Movement, which the challenge of the West has evoked, the inspiration and the leadership have been passing, as we have observed already, from Bengal to the Bombay Presidency. We may observe further that this hinterland of Bombay, which has thus become the principal march of India *vis-à-vis* the West, has not now acquired the character of a march for the first time in Hindu history. From the beginning, it has been exposed to external pressure of various kinds from various quarters: military pressure from Gurjaras and Arabs by land; economic pressure from Arabs and Parsees by sea. 'The greater the pressure the greater the stimulus' is a maxim which is borne out by the phenomena of social geography in the Hindu World, as well as in the Far Eastern World and in the Sinic and in the Egyptiac.

In the Sumeric and Babylonian Worlds

In the Sumeric World, we find the same law illustrated in the history of the Sumeric universal state.² The Empire of Sumer and Akkad was founded by a Sumerian dynasty whose capital was at Ur, in the heart of the homeland of the Sumeric Civilization. The Empire was restored, after a temporary breakdown, by an Amorite dynasty whose capital was at Babylon: 'the Gate of the Gods' which was also the gate through which the Amorite Nomads of the North Arabian Steppe had forced an entry into the Land of Shinar. Thus, in the Sumeric universal state, political power passed from the interior to the march on which the heaviest external pressure was being exerted.

The same phenomena reappear in the history of the Babylonian Civilization which was 'affiliated' to the Sumeric. We have seen that, in Babylonian history, Babylonia was surpassed, in arms and arts alike, by Assyria; and we have attributed Assyria's superiority to the fact that, as compared with Babylonia, she was in a certain sense 'new ground'.³ We shall now find a second and possibly more potent cause of Babylonia's failure to hold her own against Assyria

¹ Proverbs xxix. 18.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 103 and 106, above.

³ See pp. 74-5, above.

in the fact that Babylonia occupied a sheltered position in the interior of the Babylonian World, whereas Assyria was a march which bore the brunt of successive external pressures. In the post-Sumerian *Völkerwanderung*, Babylonia had suffered—and succumbed to—an invasion of barbarian Kassites at the time when Assyria was suffering—and repelling—an invasion of barbarian Mitannians; and thereafter the Assyrians experienced—and resisted—further pressures from which the Babylonians were exempt.

After being liberated, in the fourteenth century B.C., from the Mitannian pressure by the vicarious exertions of the Hittite Power,¹ Assyria was involved, throughout the eleventh and tenth centuries, in a new struggle for existence against a more formidable adversary than Mitanni in the shape of Aram. The Aramaeans were Nomads who had issued out of the Arabian Peninsula, in company with the Hebrews, during the *Völkerwanderung* which preceded the birth of the Syriac Civilization; and while the Hebrews had drifted into Southern Syria, the Aramaeans had drifted northwards in the ancient track of the Amorites. One wing of the migrant Aramaean horde had settled in the oases of east-central Syria, from Damascus to Hamah; another wing had lapped over the Middle Euphrates and had occupied the pasture-lands of Northern Mesopotamia; and it was this eastern wing that came into collision with Assyria. The situation, however, was not in all respects the same as when the Aramaeans' Amorite predecessors had forced an entry into the Sumerian World along this very track some twelve hundred years before.

The Amorites when they entered Akkad, like the Huns and Gurjaras when they entered India, had come in as undifferentiated barbarians and, as such, they had been converted easily and rapidly to the culture which they found in occupation of the ground on which they were trespassing. On the other hand, the Aramaeans, when they began to encroach upon the western borders of Assyria, had already come within the ambit of the nascent Syriac Civilization, just as the Turks who invaded India in the footsteps of the Huns had previously come within the ambit of the nascent Iranian Civilization and had been rendered immune to Hinduism by an anticipatory inoculation with Islam. Thus the Aramaean Syriac pressure upon the Babylonian World was as formidable a danger to the existence of the threatened civilization as the Turkish Muslim pressure upon the Hindu World; but, whereas the Rājputs failed to save India from being overrun by the Turks, the Assyrians not only checked the Aramaeans' eastward advance in two centuries of defensive warfare but passed over thereafter, in the ninth century

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 113, above.

B.C., into a counter-offensive which carried the Assyrian arms to the shores of the Mediterranean and ground all Syria under the Assyrian heel. Thus, in this first round of the long and arduous struggle between the Syriac and Babylonian civilizations, Assyria bore the brunt and gained the victory for the Babylonian World. In the meantime Babylonia had the easy task of assimilating the Chaldaeans—a Nomadic people who had issued out of the Arabian Peninsula simultaneously with the Aramaeans and the Hebrews, but whose line of migration lay so far to the south-east that the influence of the nascent Syriac Civilization did not reach them. Thus the Chaldaeans—like the Amorites and unlike the Aramaeans—came in as undifferentiated barbarians who were open to assimilation; and their infiltration into Babylonia, during the centuries when Assyria was fighting the Aramaeans for her life, was a peaceful penetration instead of being a formidable ordeal.

Moreover, the Aramaean front was only one of the fronts on which Assyria had to fight. While she was resisting the pressure from the Syriac Civilization on the south-west, she had to defend her rear against the highlanders of the Iranian and Anatolian plateaux on the east and the north. In this quarter, again, Assyria performed the function of a march covering the interior of the Babylonian World; and, while she eventually gained the upper hand over her Syriac adversaries, the highlanders kept her perpetually on the defensive. Indeed, when, through this warlike intercourse, the highland principality of Urartu, in the basin of Lake Van, eventually became converted to the Babylonian Civilization, the struggle only became the more intense—like the struggle between the East Roman Empire and Bulgaria after the conversion of the Bulgarians to Orthodox Christianity.

Nevertheless Assyria, under this perpetual pressure from every quarter, developed a vitality which Babylonia could not match so long as Assyria's prowess gave her shelter. On the other hand, the positions were reversed when Assyria turned her arms against the interior of the Babylonian World and ceased to defend its frontiers.¹ During the seventh century B.C. she applied to her sister-country Babylonia the grinding pressure which she had applied in the ninth and eighth centuries to alien Syria; and this fearful challenge stimulated the Babylonians as potently as it stimulated the Syrians, though in a different way. In Syrian souls, it evoked the religious inspiration which found expression through the mouths of the Prophets of Israel; in Babylonian souls it evoked a dogged nationalism

¹ This change in the direction of Assyrian energies is examined further in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (x), vol. iv, pp. 468-84, below, apropos of the pathological phenomenon of Militarism as a specific malady of the marches.

which proved more than a match for the *furor Assyriacus*. The Babylonians—fortified by Chaldaean infusions and steeled by Assyrian atrocities—were in at the death when, at the close of the seventh century B.C., the highlanders of the Iranian Plateau overwhelmed Assyria at last; and these Median allies of Babylon in the war of annihilation against Assyria were able now to achieve the destruction of the Power which had successfully resisted the pressure of Urartu and the earlier pressure of Mitanni because Assyria, by the time when she had to deal with the Medes, had ceased to perform her historic function as a march.

In the seventh century B.C., a wave of Eurasian Nomads—the Cimmerians and the Scyths—broke over the north-western extremity of the Iranian Plateau and descended upon the Babylonian and Syriac worlds, as the Huns and Gurjaras broke over the north-eastern extremity of the same plateau and descended upon the Indic World in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era. Therewith, the challenge of Nomadic invasion was presented in South-Western Asia for the first time since the occasion when, more than a thousand years earlier, during the post-Sumeric *Völkerwanderung*, the Hyksos had broken out of the Eurasian Steppe and had swept across the derelict domain of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad to settle in Syria.¹ This time, Assyria was the South-West Asian Power whose proper task it was to take the Eurasian Nomads' challenge up; but, this time, Assyria failed to rise to the occasion for the first time in her history. Whether from impotence or from impolicy, she allowed the Nomads to raid South-Western Asia unchastised; and she even enlisted their services as mercenaries to fight for her in her Median and Babylonian wars. Thereby, she repudiated the function which she had made her own for the last five centuries; and the Medes seized the opportunity thus offered to them. They stepped into the breach; occupied the vacant post of danger and honour; exterminated or subdued or expelled the Scythian intruders; and inherited, as their reward, the hegemony previously exercised by Assyria over South-Western Asia.² For

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104-5, above. In the seventh century B.C., the Scythians penetrated to Syria, like the Hyksos before them and the Turks after them; and the name Scythopolis, by which the Greeks afterwards knew the Biblical city of Bethshean (the modern Baisan) in the Valley of Jezreel, attests that at least one Scythian war-band made a permanent settlement in Palestine.

² Except in the western extremity of the Anatolian Peninsula, beyond the River Halys, where the local task of exterminating or subduing or expelling the intrusive Nomads was taken in hand, not by the Medes, but by the Lydians: a local people who were under the influence of the Hellenic and not the Babylonian or the Syriac Civilization. The local response of Lydia to the challenge from the Nomads won her a double reward. On the landward side, she shared with Media, Babylonia, and Egypt the dominion previously exercised by Assyria over South-Western Asia. On the seaward side, towards the Aegean, she imposed her suzerainty upon the Greek city-states along the seaboard, who had failed to save themselves from the Nomads and therefore forfeited their political independence to the Power in the hinterland which had performed the work of

Assyria was a march or nothing. As soon as she failed to respond to the challenge of external pressure from the human environment, she fell; and Media, who had taken up the Scythian challenge, was the Power that dealt Assyria her death-blow.

In the Syriac World

While the immediate consequence of the presentation of the Scythian challenge was the replacement of Assyria by Media, an ultimate consequence—which was of much greater historical importance—was the eventual victory of the Syriac Civilization in its long duel with the Babylonian—the duel which had begun in the eleventh century B.C. with the collision between Assyria and Aram. After the first round had been decided in favour of the Babylonian Civilization by the victorious Assyrian counter-offensive against Syria in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C., the struggle had shifted from the military to the cultural plane and had resolved itself into a competition between the two rival civilizations for the conversion of the highlanders on the Anatolian and Iranian plateaux. In this competition, the Babylonian Civilization gained an initial success, which has been mentioned above, in the conversion of Urartu; but this cultural 'Babylonization' of one highland country on the north which did not succumb to Assyrian arms was counter-balanced by the 'Syriacization' of another highland country on the east which the Assyrians temporarily succeeded in subjugating; and here, in Media, the Assyrians—in applying their ruthless policy of breaking their victims' spirit by uprooting them from their homes and carrying them away captive—actually served as 'carriers' for the Syriac Civilization which they had trampled under foot.

When the Assyrians finally broke the resistance of the Syriac peoples in the latter half of the eighth century B.C., they deported part of the conquered population to 'the cities of the Medes';¹ but this extreme application of the maxim 'Divide and rule' had an unintended consequence. By the forcible introduction of Syriac deportees, the Medes were inoculated with the germs of the Syriac Civilization before they were stimulated, by the challenge of Scythian pressure, to step into Assyria's place. At the same time, the Scythian challenge, which called out this 'Syriacized' Media's energies, broke the 'Babylonized' Urartu's back; and thus the fivefold interaction between Syria and Assyria and Media and the Scyths and Urartu worked together for the Syriac Civiliza-

salvation for them. The political subjection of the Asiatic Greeks to Lydia naturally expedited the cultural conversion of the Lydians to Hellenism. Indeed, this was perhaps the first of many instances in which 'Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit'. (Horace: *Epistolae*, Book II, Ep. 1, l. 156.)

¹ 2 Kings xvii. 6 and xviii. 11.

tion's good. After the fall of Assyria, the remnant of the Babylonian World—now gathered together into 'the Neo-Babylonian Empire' of Nabopolassar and Nebuchadnezzar—found itself hemmed in and pressed upon by the Syriac World on both flanks: not only from the rival civilization's homeland in Syria itself but from the great new domain which the Syriac Civilization had now acquired for itself in Iran. From this encircling movement, the Babylonian Civilization had no more chance of escape than an antelope has from the toils of a boa-constrictor. The constriction and mastication of the Babylonian Civilization by its victorious rival was only a matter of time; and the process was completed before the beginning of the Christian Era.¹

If we now turn our attention to the subsequent history of the Syriac Civilization, we shall find our law illustrated here again.

The enlarged Syriac World which had been brought into existence by the 'Syriacization' of Iran remained, from the seventh century B.C. onwards, in direct contact with the Eurasian Steppe; and it was from the Eurasian Nomads that it continued to receive the heaviest external pressure. In consonance with this, we find that, thenceforward, the primacy in the Syriac World passed, in succession, to the peoples who successively took over the burden of keeping the Eurasian Nomads at bay, and to the regions which successively served as anti-Nomad marches. The Median hegemony, for example, lasted just so long as the Medes held the front line in the defensive warfare against Nomad aggression. The hegemony was forfeited by the Medes to the Persians because the princes of Persis had succeeded in snatching from their Median neighbours the wardenship of the Eurasian Marches and thereby relegating Media to an unexposed and unstimulating position in the interior of the Syriac World. The Medes had been content to bar the passage of the Nomads at its narrowest point, where the Elbruz Range on one side and the Central Desert of Iran on the other side barely leave open, between them, 'the Caspian Gates'. The Achaemenidae masked this Median front line, and redeemed from Nomad occupation a vast additional zone of Iranian territory, by extending their own dominions north-eastwards from their home territory of Persis right up to the line of the Oxus; and it was their expansion in this direction that made their fortune by putting them in a position to supersede the Medes as the Medes had superseded the Assyrians.²

¹ For the attraction of Iran into the orbit of the Syriac Civilization, and the absorption of the dead body of the Babylonian Civilization into the Syriac Civilization's living tissues, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79-81, above.

² It may be noted that the Lydians as well as the Medes succumbed to the Achaemenidae, and that Lydia, like Media, had previously been 'relegated to the interior' by the Achaemenids' assumption of the wardenship of the Eurasian marches.

This Achaemenian enterprise in the north-east, which was the preliminary to the overthrow of the Median Astyages and to the foundation of a Syriac universal state in the form of an Achaemenian Empire, went almost unmarked among Hellenic observers, whose vision did not yet extend to such distant horizons. Yet the acquisition of Bactria was a more important step in the rise of the Achaemenian Power than the acquisition of Elam; and it was not for nothing that Cyrus met his death in fighting the Nomad Massagetae beyond the Jaxartes.¹ Under Cyrus's successors, the Achaemenian Empire held against the Nomads, with a strong hand, every oasis that could be created by irrigation along the courses of those rivers—Heri Rud and Murghab, Oxus and Jaxartes—which flow out from the northern foot of the Iranian Plateau and from the western foot of the Pamirs to reach the Caspian or the Sea of Aral or else to lose themselves in the desert. We may conjecture that the pressure of the Eurasian Nomads upon this North-Eastern March of the Syriac universal state always weighed more heavily on the minds of Achaemenian statesmen than the pressure of the Hellenes upon the opposite extremity of their dominions—and this even during the Athenian counter-offensive that was kept up intermittently for thirty years after the failure of Xerxes' expedition against Greece. It was assuredly not until Alexander had crossed the Dardanelles, and perhaps not until he had crossed the Euphrates, that the Hellenic peril became a greater anxiety than the Nomad peril to the last Darius.

Moreover, Alexander's own experience in the process of conquering the Achaemenian Empire indicates that, here as elsewhere, the march which was exposed to the heaviest external pressure had been stimulated into a greater vitality than any other region. It took Alexander not more than five years to conquer outright, without parley or compromise, the vast mass of the Achaemenian dominions, from the Dardanelles and the Libyan oases up to 'the Caspian Gates', where the Medes had halted in their pursuit of the routed Scyths and where Alexander overtook the dying Darius. Persis itself—the home territory of the imperial dynasty and the native land of the imperial people—quietly accepted the verdict of the Battle of Arbela, notwithstanding the stimulus which the Persians—having 'elected to live as an imperial people in a rough country rather than to cultivate the lowlands as some other nation's

¹ See the picturesque account of Cyrus's last campaign in Herodotus, Book I, chs. 202-15. Herodotus's accurate knowledge of geography did not extend much farther eastwards than a line drawn from Trebizond to Susa (i.e. a line roughly coincident with the present eastern frontiers of Turkey and 'Irāq); and his 'River Araxes'—on the crossing of which his story turns—appears to be a conflation of the actual river, still bearing that name, which flows from Armenia through Azerbaijan into the Caspian, with the actual Oxus and Jaxartes, into a single mighty and fabulous stream.

slaves'¹—had never ceased to derive from their physical environment. Nevertheless, in this instance, the physical stimulus of a rough country upon the Persians showed itself less potent than the human stimulus of Nomad pressure upon their kinsmen in the north-eastern marches; for, whereas it had taken Alexander no more than five years to conquer the interior of the Achaemenian Empire up to 'the Caspian Gates', it took him two whole years more to complete his task by conquering the marches in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin.

As soon as Alexander passed beyond the Caspian Gates, he experienced an entire change in the nature of the resistance which he encountered. Up to that point, he had secured the submission of vast provinces at the price of a few pitched battles against heterogeneous imperial field armies which showed little enthusiasm for defending territories where they felt themselves hardly more at home than the invader. Upon setting foot, however, in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin after the last of the Achaemenian armies had been scattered to the winds, the Macedonian conqueror met with a spontaneous resistance from a feudal aristocracy with local roots. The border barons of Bactria and Sogdiana defended themselves against the Macedonians as they were accustomed to defend themselves against the Massagetae. Their resistance was not only spontaneous but energetic and protracted. Every castle stood a siege; and even when a baron had been brought to his knees he rose in revolt again the moment the conqueror's back was turned. At the end of two strenuous campaigns, Alexander had to win the allegiance which force could not exact by a policy of conciliation.

Thus, during the two centuries that had elapsed between the day when Cyrus met his death at the hands of the Massagetae on the far side of the Jaxartes and the day when Alexander gave the Nomads a lesson by bombarding them with his catapults without crossing the frontier river, the vitality of the Syriac universal state which was embodied in the Achaemenian Empire had come to be concentrated in these north-eastern marches, where the Syriac World was exposed to the severest external pressure. It is remarkable to find this phenomenon reappearing when the Syriac universal state, which had been prematurely cut short by the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire through Alexander's action, was reintegrated and resumed, after a Hellenic intrusion which had lasted a thousand years, in the 'Abbasid Caliphate'.²

Though the 'Abbasid capital was fixed, on considerations of geo-

¹ See the passage quoted from Herodotus in II. D (i), on p. 21, above.

² For the historical relation between the 'Abbasid Caliphate and the Achaemenian Empire, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 73-8, above.

graphical and administrative convenience, at Baghdad,¹ in the ancient homeland of the Babylonian Civilization which had long since been absorbed into the Syriac World, the political and military movement which completed the re-establishment of the Syriac universal state by setting up the 'Abbasids in the place of the Umayyads originated in Khurāsān: the province lying between 'the Caspian Gates' and the Murghab, which was the north-eastern march of the Syriac World in that age.² The stimulus which nerved Abu Muslim and his Khurāsānīs to overthrow the Umayyads was the selfsame stimulus that, in earlier ages of Syriac history, had nerved Cyrus and his Farsīs to overthrow Astyages and the Medes, and had nerved the dihkans of Balkh and Sughd to measure themselves against the invincible Iskandar Dhu'l-Qarnayn. The challenge of pressure from the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe was as stimulating to the latter-day Syriac frontiersmen who were confronted by the Ephthalites and the Turks and the Türgesh as it had been to their predecessors who had had to deal with the Scyths and the Massagetae; and the Khurāsānīs' historic feat of re-establishing the Syriac universal state in A.D. 751 was led up to, during the years 705-41, by the more arduous, if less momentous, feat of reincorporating the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin into the Syriac World after a separation that had lasted some eight or nine centuries.³

¹ The 'Abbasids fixed their capital at Baghdad on the same considerations that had once led the Achaemenids to hold their court at Babylon for four months in the year (Herodotus, Book I, ch. 192). It lay in the most remunerative province in their dominions and at the mid-point between the Syrian and the Iranian half of the Empire.

² The destruction of the Achaemenian Empire had been followed, within two centuries, by the submergence of the former North-Eastern Marches in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin under a flood of Nomad invasion; for the Seleucid Empire, which was the Hellenic 'successor-state' of the Achaemenian Empire in Asia, was too exactly preoccupied by the task of holding its own against rival Hellenic Powers in the Levant to discharge efficiently those responsibilities on the distant borders of the Eurasian Steppe which it had inherited from its Achaemenian predecessor. (See pp. 143-4, below.) Thus, from the latter part of the second century B.C. to the beginning of the eighth century of the Christian Era, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been lost to the Syriac World and had been living a separate life of its own under the dominion of successive Nomad intruders—Massagetae (= Sakas) and Yuechi and Ephthalites and Turks. Under this dispensation, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had often been in closer relations with India than with Iran; and in these conditions it had developed symptoms of a distinctive social individuality which promised, for a time, to take definite shape in the genesis of a new 'Far Eastern Christian' Civilization. (See II. D (vii), pp. 369-85, below.) During this long secession and estrangement of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin from the Syriac World, the role of anti-Nomad march devolved upon the province of Khurāsān, which was saved for the Syriac World by the Arsacid prince Mithradates the Great (*regnabat* 123-88 B.C.) after a struggle between the Arsacid Power and the invading Sakas or Massagetae which had lasted for nearly half a century.

³ Khurāsān—the frontier province over against the Eurasian Nomads which the Umayyads took over from the Sasanian successors of the Arsacidæ—was the base of operations from which, under the Umayyad régime, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was eventually reincorporated into the Syriac World, by force of arms, in A.D. 705-41. (See Gibb, H. A. R.: *The Arab Conquests in Central Asia* (London 1923, Royal Asiatic Society).) The work was accomplished by the combined efforts of Arab garrisons which had been cantoned in Khurāsān after the Arab conquest of the Sasanian Empire, half a century before, and local levies which were raised, by the Arab authorities, from the

Thereby, the North-Eastern Marches of the Syriac World, over against the Nomads of Eurasia, were restored, on the eve of the reintegration of the Syriac universal state under the 'Abbasids, to the limits up to which they had been carried originally on the eve of the first establishment of the universal state under the Achaemenids. And thereafter history repeated itself yet again; for under the 'Abbasid, as under the Achaemenid, régime the vitality of the Empire concentrated itself in the North-Eastern Marches as it ebbed away from the interior. This became apparent at the break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, as it had become apparent, once before, at the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander; for the most powerful and effective and socially beneficent of the Caliphate's 'successor-states' arose one after another in this region. The Sāmānid régime at Balkh and Bukhārā (A.D. 819-999) fostered Persian literature in its infancy and accomplished something which the Caliphate had never achieved in propagating Islam among the Nomads of the Steppe;¹ and it was only as converts that it suffered them at last to trespass from the desert on to the sown. Thereafter, one horde of these trespassers, the Saljūqs, when they had penetrated to Baghdad in order to rescue the 'Abbasid Caliphs from the tyranny of the sectarian Buwayhids, turned back to supplant their fellow-converts, the Ilék Khans, as wardens of the North-Eastern Marches against their unconverted Nomadic kinsmen who still remained on the Steppe. Under this Saljūq régime at Merv (A.D. 1089-1141) the frontier of Dār-al-Islām was once more guarded as faithfully as it had been guarded by the Sāmānids; and even the Shahs of Khwārizm, who first rose to power by betraying their religion and allegiance when they joined forces (in A.D. 1141) with the pagan Nomad Qara Qitays in order to expel the Saljūq Sultan Sanjar from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, eventually redeemed their honour when (from A.D. 1220 to 1231) they bore the brunt of the Mongol avalanche which finally overwhelmed Dār-al-Islām in the last convulsion of the post-Syriac Völkerwanderung.²

indigenous Iranian Khurāsānis. It is noteworthy that it was here, in the North-Eastern Marches, under the formative influence of a common pressure from beyond the frontier, that the vanquished Iranians and the victorious Arabs first fraternized with one another. And it was this Arab-Iranian frontier-force that completed the re-establishment of the Syriac universal state, by putting down the Umayyads and setting up the 'Abbasids, ten years after it had proved its mettle and acquired its *esprit de corps* by completing the re-conquest of Transoxania on the Syriac Society's account.

¹ The Saljūqs, who at that time were ranging over the steppe-country in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, were converted about A.D. 956; the followers of the Ilék Khans, who were ranging over the steppes adjoining the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin on the north-east, in the gap between the Tien Shan and the Altai Mountains (in the fourteenth-century 'Mughalistan' and the modern 'Zungaria'), were converted about A.D. 960.

² In A.D. 1209/1210, ten years before the Mongol avalanche descended upon them, the Khwārizm Shahs had partially counteracted the effects of their original act of treachery against the Saljūqs by similarly betraying the Qara Qitays. They partitioned the dominions of the Qara Qitays in conjunction with Gushluk the Naiman, another

Thus, over the course of some nineteen centuries of Syriac history, from the seventh century B.C. to the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, we can observe one constant phenomenon. We find the pressure from the Eurasian Nomads normally exceeding in severity the pressures from other neighbours of the Syriac World, and concurrently we find the North-Eastern Marches, upon which the brunt of this pressure fell, normally surpassing in vitality all the other marches as well as the interior.

The exception which proves the rule is the situation which prevailed, for some two centuries out of these nineteen, under the Seleucid Empire, which was the Achaemenian Empire's Hellenic 'successor-state' in Asia.¹ Under the Seleucid régime, as under the Achaemenid and the 'Abbasid, vitality and power tended to pass from the interior of the Empire to the periphery; but whereas they passed under the Achaemenids from Persepolis and Susa and Babylon and Ecbatana to Bactria and Sogdiana, and under the 'Abbasids from Baghdad to Khurāsān and to Transoxania, they flowed out, under the Seleucids, in the diametrically opposite direction: that is, from Seleucia-on-Tigris not to 'Alexandria on the Verge' of the Eurasian Steppe but to Antioch-on-Orontes. This gravitation of the Seleucid capital to a site which lay almost in view of the Mediterranean indicated that the Seleucid statesmen, unlike their Achaemenid predecessors, felt the pressure from the Hellenic World more acutely than the pressure from the Eurasian Nomads. The outcome, however, was to prove that the Seleucids' policy was ill-advised and the site of Antioch eccentric; for, notwithstanding the clever location of Antioch athwart the shortest portage between the Mediterranean and the Euphrates, the transfer of the capital from Seleucia to Antioch cost the Seleucidae their Empire and the Syriac World its North-Eastern Marches. The first consequence was that the Greek garrisons in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, finding themselves left to their own resources, seceded from the Seleucid Empire and constituted themselves into an independent Power: the Hellenic Kingdom of Bactria. The second consequence was that this Hellenic Bactria, which had responded with such spirit to the challenge of desertion by resorting to self-help, found herself unequal in the long run to the task of holding the

pagan Nomad Power, who took the Qara Qitays in the rear. In this unheroic manner, the whole of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was momentarily recovered again for Dār-al-Islām; but retribution quickly overtook the spoilers. The Naiman and the Khwārizm Shah were overwhelmed in turn by the Mongol Chingis Khan; and it was in response to this terrific Mongol challenge that the last of the Khwārizm Shahs, Jalāl-ad-Dīn Mankobirni, redeemed the treacheries of his ancestors by the heroic rear-guard action in which he covered the interior of Dār-al-Islām from Mongol assault and battery for a whole decade after the Mongols had overrun his own home-territories on the banks of the Lower Oxus.

¹ See the second footnote on p. 141, above.

North-Eastern Marches against the Nomads without support from the interior. In the second century B.C., Bactria succumbed to a Nomad invasion;¹ and the ground then lost to the Nomads by the Greeks was only recovered from the Nomads by the Arabs some eight or nine centuries later.²

In the Iranic World over against Eurasia

The North-Eastern Marches over against the Eurasian Nomads, which were thus reincorporated into the Syriac World on the eve of the reintegration of the Syriac universal state, and which played a part of steadily increasing importance under the 'Abbasid régime,³ produced their historic social effect once more in the first age of the Iranic Civilization, 'affiliated' to the Syriac Civilization, which emerged, after the interregnum following the break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, when the waters of the Mongol cataclysm began to subside.

We can discern this effect in the diversity between the respective historical roles of the two Mongol 'successor-states' which were deposited here—one in the borderland and the other in the interior. As between these two appanages of the Mongol Empire in Dār-al-Islām, nothing came of the principality of the House of Hulāgū, the so-called Il-Khans, in Iran and 'Irāq. 'The lines' were 'fallen unto' these barbarians 'in pleasant places; yea', they had 'a goodly heritage'.⁴ And yet, 'as the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away', so the Il-Khans went down to the grave and came up no more.⁵ On the other hand, out of the principality of the House of Chaghatāy, which bestrode the borderline between the desert and the sown, there came forth two Powers which made their mark, for good or evil, on history: the Empire of Timur Lenk ('Tamerlane') in Central Asia and the later Empire of the Timurids in India, where Timur's great-great-grandson Bābur played the part of David and Bābur's grandson Akbar the part of Solomon. A glance at the careers of Timur and Bābur shows that both were frontiersmen who were confronted by a challenge from the Eurasian Nomads of their time, and that both rose to greatness by responding to this challenge successfully—each in his own way.

Timur (*imperabat* A.D. 1369–1405) started life as a feudal baron in the district of Kish in Transoxania: that is to say, in the sedentary as opposed to the Nomad section of the Chaghatāy dominions. The Chaghatāy principality had been compacted of two component

¹ See the second footnote on p. 141, above.

² See the third footnote on p. 141, above.

³ See p. 142, above.

⁴ Psalm xvi. 6.

⁵ Job vii. 9.

parts: the oases of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin,¹ where this pagan Mongol dynasty bore rule over a sedentary Muslim population; and the steppes of Zungaria, adjoining the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin on the north-east, where the Chaghatāy Khans were the leaders of pagan Nomads who were made in their own image. In A.D. 1321, however, a century after the Mongol conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and forty years before the beginning of Timur's career, the two ill-assorted sections of the Chaghatāy principality had been separated from one another politically through the partition of Chaghatāy's appanage between two different branches of the eponym's descendants; and the prelude to Timur's career opened with this event. The political separation enabled the sedentary population in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin to assert itself culturally against the Nomadic element after a century of subjection; and the first consequence was that here, as in contemporary Iran and Hindustan and Anatolia, the nascent Iranic Civilization began to make headway.

The partition was accompanied by, and was perhaps causally connected with, the conversion of the western branch of the Chaghatayids, who obtained the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin for their portion, from their primitive Mongol paganism to the Islamic faith of their subjects; while even the eastern branch of the House, whose portion was the Zungarian Steppe (now styled, *par excellence*, 'Mughalistan'), seem to have been converted likewise a generation later. The next consequence was a reaction of the Nomads against the rising power of the new sedentary civilization on their borders. In A.D. 1360 Tughluq Timur, the newly converted Eastern Chaghatāy Khan of 'Mughalistan', presented himself in the Oxus-Jaxartes country—perhaps at the instigation of the Nomad element there, who felt their old ascendancy slipping out of their hands—and claimed dominion over the western as well as the eastern portion of his ancestral appanage. By this time, the settled population of the oases, having enjoyed for some forty years the benefits of a milder and less barbarous régime, had come to regard the untamed Nomads of 'Mughalistan' as odious marauders² who—whether converted or not—were definitely beyond the pale of

¹ Excluding the oases along the lower course of the Oxus, in Khwārizm, which were included, not in Chaghatāy's appanage, but in his brother Jūjī's. (See further p. 147, below.)

² The mysterious word 'jītah', which the Turki-speaking sedentary population of the Oxus-Jaxartes oases in Timur's day applied to the Nomads of 'Mughalistan' as a term of abuse, is perhaps identical with the Ottoman Turkish word 'cheteh', which means something between a brigand and a guerrilla. Is it perhaps derived from the tribal name of the Getae (Massagetae and Thyssagetae) or Jāts, who were the nearest Nomadic neighbours of the Oxus-Jaxartes oases in the Achaemenian Age, before they erupted out of the Steppe and poured over the Hindu Kush into the Panjab in the second century B.C.?

civilization. Thus, for them, the Eastern Khan's pretension carried with it the menace of a fresh bout of Nomad domination and a relapse into the barbarism from which they were just beginning to emerge. In this crisis, when Nomadism had returned to dispute with the young Iranic Civilization the possession of the borderland between the Iranic World and the Eurasian Steppe, Timur Lenk stood forth as the champion of the Iranic Civilization.

In A.D. 1360, when Timur Lenk's fellow-barons in Transoxania fled before the face of the Eastern Khan towards Khurāsān, Timur alone had the courage to turn back and make terms with the intruder; and two years later, when Tughluq Timur Khan returned to Mughalistan, he rewarded Timur Lenk by appointing him lieutenant, in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, to the Khan's son, who remained behind as his father's viceroy. This gave Timur his opportunity. He first organized a successful insurrection, in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, against the Eastern Khan's authority; and when, under his leadership, the people of the oases had defeated, in six years of defensive warfare (A.D. 1362-7), the efforts of the 'jātah' to subdue them,¹ Timur ventured upon the enterprise which had led Cyrus to his death beyond the Jaxartes and Darius to his discomfiture beyond the Danube. With the forces—military and religious—of the nascent Iranic Civilization at his back, Timur passed over to the offensive and attacked the Nomads on their own ground, in the heart of the Eurasian Steppe; and, as far as is known, he was the first sedentary Power before the Cossacks to attempt this *tour de force* with any success. In five campaigns in 'Mughalistan' (circa A.D. 1369-80), he crushed the local Nomads of Chaghatāy's appanage and broke their spirit; and he finally reduced them to submission after he had performed an even greater feat: the crushing of the Nomads of Jūji's appanage, who ranged over the vast steppes of Qipchāq,² between the Altai Mountains and the Carpathians, and were the overlords of Khwārizm, along the Lower Oxus, on the one side and of Russia on the other.

The collision between Timur and the hordes of Qipchāq was brought on by an act of aggression on Timur's part. Not content with chastising the Chaghatāy Nomads for their attempt to reassert

¹ This war of defence was a popular movement, as was shown by the fact that, when Timur was momentarily routed by the 'jātah' in the open field at the Battle of the Mire in A.D. 1365, the oasis-city of Samarqand was successfully defended against the victorious Nomads by the townspeople under the leadership of their 'ulamā'. Thus Timur's first and greatest achievement—the expulsion of the Nomads from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin—was accomplished by him as the leader of a popular movement and not in his later character of a capricious militarist going forth conquering and to conquer for conquest's sake.

² So called after the name of the Turkish Nomad horde which, at the moment of the Mongol conquest, was in occupation of the region afterwards assigned, as an appanage, to Chingis Khan's eldest son Jūji.

their mastery over the sedentary section of Chaghatāy's appanage, he set himself to liberate the oases of Khwārizm from the dominion of the Nomads of Qipchāq; and by A.D. 1380 he had attained this second objective as well, in a series of campaigns which alternated with his punitive expeditions into 'Mughalistan'. At the time, the Nomads of Qipchāq were impotent because they were a house divided against itself; and in 1378-80, when Timur was completing the liberation of Khwārizm, the Russians, in the opposite hinterland of the Qipchāq Steppe, momentarily succeeded in liberating themselves from these same Nomads' domination likewise. Immediately thereafter, however, the Nomads of Jūji's appanage were all united politically—perhaps for the first and last time in their history¹—by the definitive victory of one of their warring princes, Toqatmysh Khan, over his rivals. In 1382 Toqatmysh re-established the ascendancy of Qipchāq over Russia by taking and sacking Moscow. In 1388 he invaded the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin in order to re-establish the *status quo* which Timur's aggression had overthrown there.

Toqatmysh's attack was formidable, since he made it, not only at the head of the united forces of Qipchāq, but at a moment when Timur, at the head of his own forces, was absent on a campaign in the interior of the Iranic World, in Fars. The hordes of Qipchāq, like the hordes of 'Mughalistan' before them, overran the oases of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin up to the walls of Samarqand; but on Timur's approach they withdrew into their steppes without accepting battle, and left it to him to seek them out at home. Two years later, he did so. In January 1391, in midwinter, Timur plunged into the Qipchāq steppes; and this time it was in vain that the Nomads resorted to the elusive tactics with which they were accustomed to frustrate the punitive expeditions of sedentary Powers. When Darius had invaded these selfsame steppes at their opposite extremity some nineteen centuries earlier, he had been first exasperated and finally intimidated by the perpetual retreat of his mobile adversaries ever farther into the interior of their wilderness. When Timur embarked on the same enterprise, he had the hardihood and the generalship to beat the Nomads at their own game. He did not cease to follow them up until he had traversed, at their heels, the whole breadth of the Eurasian Steppe and had forced them to give battle with their backs to the farther boundary of their vast ranges. Here, at Urtapa, in June 1391, he crushed the

¹ Jūji had died before his father Chingis Khan, and consequently, when Chingis died himself and his dominions were distributed among his heirs, Jūji's appanage was partitioned at the outset among Jūji's sons. Thereafter, one of these sons, Bātū, enormously extended his portion of the appanage as a result of his famous campaigns of 1237-41, in which he subjugated Russia and raided the Central European Marches of Western Christendom. For these reasons, the appanage of Jūji was both the largest and the most loosely knit of all the appanages of Chingis Khan's descendants.

hordes of Qipchāq, as he had once crushed those of 'Mughalistan', and then retraversed the breadth of the Steppe in midwinter to re-enter Samarqand twelve months after he had set out on this extraordinary campaign.

In Timur's military prowess, the stimulating effect of pressure from the external human environment upon the frontiersmen who bear the brunt of it is eminently apparent. When Timur turned his arms against the interior of the Iranic World, he met there no Power that was able to withstand him. Indeed, when he traversed his own world from east to west, as he had traversed the Eurasian Steppe from south to north, he momentarily prostrated even his redoubtable fellow-frontiersmen the 'Osmanlis'.¹ The collapse of the 'Osmanlis' when they came into collision with Timur's Transoxanians may be taken as giving the measure of the difference in strength between the stimuli which these two frontier-communities of the Iranic World had derived respectively from their warfare against the Nomads and their warfare against Orthodox Christendom. It is not, of course, surprising that the challenge of the Nomads should have evoked a supreme military prowess in the frontier-community which nerved itself to take that challenge up. Nor is it surprising that a community which was so violently stimulated in this direction as were the Transoxanians in Timur's day should have lost its social balance under the strain and have been drawn into that pathological pursuit of war for war's sake which constitutes the malady of Militarism. Timur's militarism, which brought to naught almost the whole of his constructive work and has justly given him as sinister a reputation as Sennacherib's, is examined in a later part of this Study in another connexion.² Considering the predominance of this militaristic expression of Transoxanian vitality in Timur's generation, it is the more remarkable to find that, in the century immediately following Timur's death, the North-Eastern Marches, after having demonstrated their superiority to the interior of the Iranic World in arms, proceeded to make their own distinctive contribution to the Iranic intellectual culture.

While Timur's older contemporary Hāfiz, the last but one of the great masters of Persian poetry,³ lived and died in Fars, at Shīrāz, the last great master, Jāmī (*vivebat* A.D. 1414-92), was a Khurāsānī who lived at Herat, at the court of the Timurid Sultan Husayn b. Mansūr b. Bayqarā (*regnabat* A.D. 1468-1506). At the same court

¹ For the reaction of the 'Osmanlis' to the blow which Timur dealt them at Angora in A.D. 1402, see p. 102, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (x), vol. iv, pp. 491-501, below.

³ For the role of Persian Literature in the histories of the Syriac and Iranic civilizations, see p. 77, footnote 1, in II. D (iii), above.

lived Mīr 'Alī Shīr Nawā'ī, a versatile genius who was not only Sultan Husayn's minister of state but was also the centre of a literary circle which gave birth to a new vernacular literature, on the Persian model, in the Turkī language.¹ Timur himself was a patron of men of letters; and personal contributions to the Iranic culture were made by several of his descendants. His grandson, Ulugh Beg (*regnabat* A.D. 1447-9) made his fame before he ascended the throne by building an observatory at Samarqand in A.D. 1421 and organizing the compilation of a set of astronomical tables which were completed in 1437/8.² Timur's great-great-great-grandson Zahir-ad-Dīn Bābur (*vivebat* A.D. 1482-1530)—the Timurid prince of Farghāna who found a new field of action for his House in India—and Bābur's cousin and contemporary Mirzā Haydar Dūghlāt (*vivebat* A.D. 1499/1500-51) each wrote, in Turkī and in Persian respectively, a noteworthy autobiographical history of his own times;³ and the literary gifts which manifested themselves in Bābur's memoirs reappeared, among his descendants, in Gul Badan Begum's *Humāyūn Nāma* and in Jahāngīr's *Tūzūk*.

Still more impressive is the hold which the Iranic culture acquired, after Timur's harrying of the Steppes, over the hearts and minds of the Nomads, as illustrated by the career and personality of Yunus Khan: a common grandfather of Bābur and Haydar who ruled over 'Mughalistan' in the latter part of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era. Yunus had been handed over in his childhood as a hostage to the Timurids; studied for twelve years under Sharaf-ad-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī (the biographer of Timur); travelled in Fars and Azerbaijan; settled in Shīrāz, where he was known as 'ustād' or 'master of arts'; and had finally been reinstated in 'Mughalistan' by the Timurid Sultan Abu Sa'īd.⁴ The following sketch of him is given by his grandson Haydar:⁵

'Yunus Khan was the greatest of all the Chaghatāy Khans, and before him there was, in many respects, no one like him in his family. None of the Chaghatāy Khans who preceded him had passed the age of forty; nay, most of them never reached that age; but this prosperous Khan attained to the age of seventy-four. Towards the end of his life, growing repentant and devout, he became a disciple of that Refuge of the Pious, Nāsir-ad-Dīn Khwāja 'Ubayd-allāh [in this history, wherever the term "His Holiness" is used, it refers to the Khwāja]; and him the Khan followed with piety. He was also acquainted with many other shaykhs,

¹ For Mīr 'Alī Shīr Nawā'ī, see Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 390-1, 422-3, and other passages.

² Browne, op. cit., p. 386.

³ Mirzā Haydar had a musical as well as a literary bent. See Mirzā Haydar Dūghlāt: *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, English translation by Ross, E. D., and Elias, N. (London 1895, Sampson Low and Marston), Introduction, p. 23.

⁴ See op. cit., pp. 83-5.

⁵ In op. cit., ed. cit., pp. 155-7.

and used to associate with them. His nature was adorned with many high qualities and virtues; he possessed also many acquirements, among which may be mentioned the reading of the Qur'an. He was of an even temper, his conversation was charming, and he had a quick perception. He excelled in penmanship, painting, and other accomplishments conformable with a healthy nature, and was well-trained in singing and instrumental music. . . .

'At the beginning of the reign of Yunus Khan, all the Mughals dwelt, according to their custom, in Mughalistan; they avoided all towns and cultivated countries [and regarded them] with great repugnance. They were Musulmans in nothing but the name; in fact, not even in name, for they were carried off into countries round about, and sold as slaves like other infidels. After the Khan had had the happiness to kiss the feet of His Holiness, the latter wrote letters to all the surrounding Musulman rulers, saying: "We have seen Sultan Yunus Khan, and it is not lawful to molest a tribe whose chief is so good a Musulman."

'From that date no more Mughals who had been carried off were ever bought or sold as slaves in a Muhammadan country. The Mughals had always been this kind of Nomadic people. The Khan felt that until they settled down in cultivated countries and towns, they could never become true Musulmans. He therefore exerted himself to the utmost to bring their settlement about.'

Here we are shown the picture of a Khan of Mughalistan who was different indeed from that barbaric Tughluq Timur whose descent upon Transoxania a century earlier had been the starting-point of Timur Lenk's career. The Nomads themselves, who had formerly made the transit from the desert to the sown as conquerors or raiders, now only make it when they are sold into slavery to their sedentary neighbours. As a result of Timur's action, the Nomads and their former victims have exchanged their roles. Even when, a century after the death of the great Transoxanian harrier of the Steppes, his homeland was swamped once again by an influx of Nomad conquerors—this time the uncouth Uzbeks from the far northern ranges of Western Siberia¹—the light of the Iranic culture in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was not quite put out. It communicated itself to the conquerors; and we have a history of the Mongols from the hand of a latter-day Uzbek scholar-prince, Abu'l-Ghāzi Khan of Khiva² (*regnabat* A.D. 1643–63).

In the Iranic World over against Orthodox Christendom

So much for the effect of the pressure from the Eurasian Steppe upon the Iranic World in administering to the North-Eastern Marches a special stimulus which was not received by the interior. If we turn to the North-Western March, where the Iranic Society

¹ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, above.

² i.e. Khwārizm.

was confronted by Orthodox Christendom, we shall find another illustration of the same phenomenon in the remarkable diversity between the fortunes of the 'Osmanlis and the Qaramanlis.

These two Turkish communities were both of them 'successor-states' of the Anatolian Saljūq Sultanate: a Muslim Turkish Power which had been established in the interior of Anatolia in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, during the post-Syriac Völkerwanderung, by Saljūq Turkish adventurers who made provision for themselves in this world and in the next by thus enlarging the borders of Dār-al-Islām at Orthodox Christendom's expense. When this Anatolian Saljūq Sultanate eventually broke up in the course of the thirteenth century, the Qaramanlis appeared to have the finest, and the 'Osmanlis the poorest, prospects of all the Saljūqs' heirs. The Qaramanlis inherited the kernel of the former Saljūq domain, including their predecessors' capital, Qoniyah, while the 'Osmanlis found themselves in possession of a piece of the husk.

In fact, the 'Osmanlis had received the leavings of the Saljūq estate in Anatolia because they were the latest comers of all the Anatolian Saljūq Sultans' Turkish feudatories and had arrived, when they did arrive, in humble circumstances. Their eponym, 'Osmān, was the son of a certain Ertoghrul who had led into Anatolia a nameless band of Turkish refugees: an insignificant fragment of the human wreckage which had been hurled to the farthest extremities of Dār-al-Islām by the tremendous impact of the Mongol wave when it broke upon the North-Eastern Marches out of the heart of the Eurasian Steppe. The last of the Anatolian Saljūqs had assigned to these refugee fathers of the 'Osmanlis a strip of territory on the north-western edge of the Anatolian Plateau, where the Saljūq dominions then marched with the Anatolian territories which were still held by the East Roman Empire along the Asiatic shores of the Sea of Marmara. This outlying and exposed position, where the 'Osmanlis at last found rest for the sole of their foot after a trek which had carried them from the Oxus to the Sangarius, was appropriately called *Sultan Önü*, the Saljūq Sultan's 'battle-front'. The refugees had broken contact with the Mongols, only to be thrown into action against the East Romans; and they must have envied the fortune of the Qaramanlis, whose lot had been cast in the sheltered interior of Anatolia. But beggars could not be choosers. 'Osmān submitted to the decree of Destiny which had condemned him, in a new and strange environment, to be a frontiersman like his fathers before him. He set himself to enlarge the borders at his Orthodox Christian neighbours' expense, and took as his first objective the East Roman city of

Brusa. The capture of Brusa took him nine years (A.D. 1317-26); but the 'Osmanlis have justly called themselves by his name, for 'Osmān was the true founder of the Ottoman Empire. He had determined the direction in which the Ottoman Power was thenceforth to expand without ever being brought to a halt until the day when it laid siege in vain to Vienna.¹

Within thirty years of the fall of Brusa, the 'Osmanlis had gained a footing on the European shore of the Dardanelles; and it was in Europe and not in Asia that they made their fortunes. Through their conquests in the Balkan Peninsula, into which the centre of gravity of the Orthodox Christian World had already shifted from its earliest seat in Anatolia,² the 'Osmanlis acquired a prestige, as 'the Ghāzis of Rum',³ which spread through the Iranic World to India and through the Arabic World to Morocco;⁴ and at the same time these conquests beyond the borders of the Iranic World so increased their power by comparison with that of the other Turkish 'successor-states' of the Anatolian Saljūq Sultanate in the interior that, before Timur Lenk launched his lightning campaign in Anatolia,⁵ they had subdued the Qaramanlis and the other Turkish communities in Anatolia with their left hand while they were subduing the Greeks and Serbs and Bulgars with their right.

Timur sought to give permanence to the effects of the blow which he had dealt the 'Osmanlis at Angora by restoring throughout Anatolia the *status quo ante* the establishment of the Ottoman ascendancy; but Timur's hasty revision of the local political map could not perform the miracle of instilling into the static Qaramanli Turk of the interior the qualities of energy and adaptability which he needed in order to hold his own against the dynamic 'Osmanli Turk of the marches. 'All the King's horses and all the King's men could not set up Caramania again.' The Transoxanians could only have changed the history of Anatolia if they had come to stay; and when, after a single campaign, they departed, never to return, the fate of Qaraman was sealed. She had merely obtained

¹ For the special adaptation of Nomadic institutions by means of which the 'Osmanlis brought Orthodox Christendom into subjection and kept Western Christendom at bay, see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 22-50, below.

² See II. D (iii), pp. 79-80, above.

³ The title by which Bābur refers to the 'Osmanlis in his memoirs (English translation by Mrs. Beveridge: *The Bābur-nāma in English* (London 1922, Luzac, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 564).

⁴ The earliest known first-hand description of the Ottoman community is from the hand of the Moroccan traveller Ibn Battūta, who travelled through Asia Minor in the second quarter of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era. (See Ibn Battūta: *Travels in Asia and Africa 1325-1354*, translated and selected by H. A. R. Gibb (London 1929, Routledge).)

⁵ See II. D (iv), p. 102, and the present chapter, p. 148, above. Timur made his onslaught upon the 'Osmanlis in February 1402, after having wintered in Qarabagh. The Battle of Angora was fought on the 20th July. In December 1402, Timur was at Smyrna. By the summer of 1403 he was far away again, in Georgia.

a reprieve; and, although she showed herself as stubborn as ever in defensive warfare, the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, after rounding off his dominions in the Balkan Peninsula by taking Constantinople in A.D. 1453, was able to round them off in Anatolia also by annexing Qaraman to the Ottoman Empire, once and for all, in 1465.

The Turkish principality of Qaraman, which thus succumbed to the 'Osmanlis after having existed for something less than two centuries from first to last, was almost coincident in area with the District of the Anatolic Army Corps which, in the earliest age of Orthodox Christian history, had held the primacy among all the army corps districts of the East Roman Empire.¹ In its cantonments here on the plateau, the Anatolic Corps had established its precedence over the Thracensian Corps, which was cantoned in the Anatolian hinterland of the Aegean, and over the Imperial Guard ('Obsequium'), which was cantoned in the Anatolian hinterland of the Marmara. On the other hand, the Qaramanlis, when they occupied the site of the Anatolic Army Corps District in a later age, failed to hold their own against the 'Osmanlis, who in this later age were occupying the former cantonments of the East Roman Imperial Guard. It will be seen that, in terms of physical geography, the respective roles of these several regions of Anatolia in the earlier and the later of the two ages in question were precisely inverted. The region which had played the dominant role in the East Roman Empire as the District of the Anatolic Corps played a secondary role in Turkish Anatolia as the principality of Qaraman; and, conversely, the region which had played a secondary role as the District of the East Roman Imperial Guard played a dominant role as the nucleus of the Ottoman Empire. Why was it that these regions thus came to exchange roles within the span of a few centuries? It was because, in terms of human geography, Anatolia had been transferred, in the interval, from the domain of one civilization to that of another—and had been made, in the process, to turn right-about-face—as a result of the Saljūq conquest.

If the political geography of Anatolia is examined again in the light of this historic transformation, it will be seen that, in both

¹ See II. D (iii), p. 81, with footnote 1, above. The only trace of this primacy which survives to-day is the name 'Anatolia' itself, which has come to be extended to the whole peninsula from the district in the centre of the plateau which was once occupied by the Anatolic Army Corps. 'Anatolia' is a corruption of the Turkish 'Anadolu', which is itself a corruption of the Greek *Ἀνατολή*; and *Ἀνατολή* is a translation of the Latin 'Oriens', which, in the official nomenclature of the Roman Empire in the fourth to seventh centuries of the Christian Era, was the name of a *diocesis* which corresponded, not to Anatolia, but to Syria (in the widest extension of the name Syria, from the Taurus Mountains to the North Arabian Steppe, and from the north-east frontier of Egypt to the north-west frontier of 'Irāq). The Anatolic Army Corps retired to the north-west side of Taurus in the seventh century of the Christian Era, when the Roman provinces south-east of Taurus were overrun by the Arabs.

periods alike, the respective rôles of the several regions conform to and illustrate the law that a march enjoys a stimulus which does not reach the interior. During the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era, when the Anatolic Corps was dominating the East Roman Empire, it was at the same time holding the front line on the front on which Orthodox Christendom was then being subjected to the heaviest external pressure—the south-eastern front, over against the Arab Caliphate—while the Thracensian Corps and the Imperial Guard, which were playing secondary parts, were standing relatively at ease, in the rear. On the other hand, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the 'Osmanlis were establishing their ascendancy over the other Turkish successors of the Saljūqs, their domain in the former cantonments of the East Roman Imperial Guard had become the north-western march of the Iranic World against Orthodox Christendom, while the domain of the Qaramanlis, in the former cantonments of the Anatolic Corps, had ceased to be a march and had been relegated to the interior as a consequence of the transfer of this region from the Orthodox Christian World to the Iranic.

In Russian Orthodox Christendom

When we pass on from the main body of Orthodox Christendom to its offshoot in Russia, we find that here, as elsewhere, the vitality of the society has tended to concentrate itself, successively, in one march after another as the relative strengths of the respective external pressures upon the several marches have varied in the course of history.

The Russian region in which the Orthodox Christian Civilization first took root, at the time of its original transplantation across the Black Sea and across the Eurasian Steppe from Constantinople,¹ was the upper basin of the River Dniepr. From there, the centre of gravity of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia was transferred, in the course of the twelfth century, to the upper basin of the Volga by the Russian frontiersmen who were enlarging the borders in this direction at the expense of the primitive pagan Finnish denizens of the north-eastern forests. Thereafter, the seat of vitality shifted again and passed, this time, from the Upper Volga to the lower Dniepr when the light pressure from the forest peoples was outweighed by a crushing pressure from the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe. This pressure, which was suddenly imposed upon the Russians as a result of the Mongol Bātū Khan's famous campaign of A.D. 1237, was indeed extreme and prolonged; and it is interesting to observe that, in this instance as in others, a challenge

¹ See p. 80, footnote 2, above.

of unusual severity evoked a response which was remarkably original and creative.

This response was nothing less than the evolution of a new manner of life, and a new social organization, which enabled a sedentary society, for the first time in the history of civilizations, not merely to hold its own against the Eurasian Nomads (as the Transoxanian frontiersmen had once held their own in certain ages of Syriac history), and not merely to chastise the Nomads (as Timur had chastised them) by transitory punitive expeditions into the Steppes, but actually to make an enduring conquest of Nomad ground and to change the face of the landscape by transforming the Nomads' cattle-ranges into peasants' fields and replacing their mobile camps by permanent villages. The Cossacks, who performed this unprecedented feat, were frontiersmen of Russian Orthodox Christendom, over against the Eurasian Nomads, who were tempered in the furnace and fashioned on the anvil of border-warfare in the course of the two centuries following the first establishment of the Mongol domination.¹ The far-flung Cossack communities which—at the moment of their annihilation in the Russian Communist Revolution of 1917—were echeloned right across Asia from the banks of the Don to the banks of the Ussuri—were all derived from a single mother community, the Cossack Army of the Dniepr; and we find the characteristic Cossack institutions already fully developed here by the time when, in the fifteenth century, the Dniepr Cossacks first make their appearance in recorded history.

These original Cossacks were a semi-monastic military brotherhood, existing for a single purpose, which displays points of resemblance to the Scandinavian brotherhood of the Jomsborg Vikings² and to the Hellenic brotherhood of the Spartans³ as well as to the Cossacks' own Western Christian contemporaries the Crusading Orders of Knighthood. The water-girt fortress of Jomsborg,

¹ The name Cossack describes the Cossacks as they appeared from their Nomad adversaries' point of view. 'Cossack' is simply the Turkish word 'Kazak'; and 'Kazaks', in the political terminology of the Eurasian Nomad World, mean people who live on the Steppe but live there beyond the pale of the organized Nomadic Society: contumacious outlaws who refuse to acknowledge the authority of the legitimate lords of the Steppe, and parasitic marauders who live by lifting the cattle of those productive Nomads who make the Steppe support life by pursuing their skilful and laborious avocation of stock-breeding. (For the nature, genesis, and fate of the Nomadic Civilization, see further Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 7-22, below.)

² See p. 99, footnote 1, above. It may be recalled, in this connexion, that while one of the two constituent elements of the Russian Civilization was Orthodox Christian, the other was Scandinavian (see p. 99, above), and that in the tenth century of the Christian Era the Cataracts of the Dniepr, among which the original Cossacks planted their stronghold before the fifteenth century, had possessed a Scandinavian as well as a Slavonic set of names. (See Constantine Porphyrogenitus: *De Imperio Administrando*, ch. 9.)

³ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 50-79, below.

ensconced between sea and 'haff', is reproduced in 'the Sich': the river-girt fortress of the Cossacks on an island in the Dniepr. The Helot peasantry which tilled the Spartans' fields, in order that their masters might devote their whole time and energy to the practice of arms, is reproduced in the servile peasantry which laboured for the Cossacks in return for their protection. The devotion of the Templars and Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights to a single purpose is reproduced in the similar devotion of the Cossacks, whose avocation it was likewise to live and die as Crusaders against pagans and Muslims. The Cossacks, however, in their method of conducting their truceless warfare against the Eurasian Nomads, displayed a further characteristic in which they did not so much reproduce the past as anticipate the future. For they resembled the Colonial Powers of the modern Western World in their strategic outlook. They realized that, if a civilization is to wage war against barbarians with success, it must fight them with other weapons and other resources than their own.

Just as the modern Western 'empire-builders' have overwhelmed their primitive opponents by bringing to bear against them the superior resources of Industrialism, so the Cossacks overwhelmed the Nomads by availing themselves of the superior resources of agriculture. And as modern Western generalship has reduced the Nomads to military impotence, on the Nomads' own ground, by outmatching their mobility and overtaking their elusiveness through the employment of newfangled and bewildering and invincible technical devices like railways and motor-cars and aeroplanes, so the Cossacks reduced the Nomads to military impotence in their own way by seizing upon the rivers: the one natural feature on the Steppe which was not under the Nomads' control and which told against them instead of telling in their favour. The rivers were formidable as obstacles and useless as means of transport to the Nomad horseman, whereas the Russian peasant and lumberman, with a lingering trace of Scandinavian seamanship in his social tradition, was expert in river navigation. Accordingly the Cossacks, when they ventured out of the Russian forests in order to dispute with the Nomads the mastery of the Nomads' native Steppes, did not neglect, in their new environment, to take advantage of their own hereditary skill. In learning to vie with their Nomad adversaries in the art of horsemanship, they did not forget to be watermen; and it was by boat, and not on horseback, that they eventually won their way to the dominion of Eurasia.

Descending the Dniepr, the Cossacks held the river-line, maintaining their own communications upstream with Russia, and cutting the Nomads' communications from bank to bank, by their

command of the water. Moreover, the tributary streams led the Cossack boatmen, by easy portages, from one river-basin to another; and before the end of the sixteenth century the parent Cossack community along the line of the Dniepr had given birth to two daughter communities: the Cossacks of the Don and the Cossacks of the Yaik.¹ Thereafter, in an unequal alliance with Muscovy which accelerated their expansion but ultimately cost them their independence, the Cossacks extended their range from the rivers which flow into the Black Sea and the Caspian across the Steppes to the rivers which flow into the Arctic Ocean across Siberia. In A.D. 1586 they crossed the watershed between the basins of the Volga and the Ob; by 1638 their exploration of Siberian inland waters had brought them to the shores of the Pacific on the Sea of Okhotsk.²

In the same century in which the Cossacks thus signalized their victorious reaction to the pressure of the Nomads on the south-eastern borders of Russian Orthodox Christendom, another frontier became the principal recipient of external pressure upon Russia and concurrently the principal focus of Russian vitality. In the seventeenth century, Russia experienced, for the first time in her history, a formidable pressure from the Western World. A Polish army penetrated to Moscow and remained in occupation of the Kremlin for over two years (20th September, 1610, to 22nd October, 1612), and soon afterwards Sweden barred out Russia from the Baltic by making herself mistress of the whole eastern coastline of that sea from Finland southwards to the Dvina, where she marched with the United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania.³ The century had barely closed when Peter the Great retorted to this Western pressure by founding Petersburg in A.D. 1703 and displaying the flag of a Russian Navy, in the Western style, on Baltic waters. As the capital of a Russian Empire which did not cease to expand towards the south and the east till it had pushed its frontiers across the Caucasus and on to the Pamirs, Petersburg was even more 'eccentric' in its situation than Antioch had been as the capital of the Seleucidae.⁴ Nevertheless, the capital of the Russian Empire was retained in this fantastic city—founded by a political genius in a frozen swamp on the extreme northern verge of the habitable world—by the exigency of a pressure from the West which ever

¹ i.e. the Ural River—a name under which the Yaik has been given a curious notoriety by the caprice of our modern Western geographers, who have made this artery of the Eurasian Steppe into the conventional boundary between Europe and Asia.

² For a fuller account of the Cossacks, see an article entitled 'Russia, Germany and Asia' in *The Round Table*, issue of June 1918.

³ Sweden conquered Livland from Poland-Lithuania in A.D. 1621-5, after having compelled Russia, in a peace-treaty concluded in A.D. 1617 at Stolbovo, to sign away her precious strip of coastline at the head of the Gulf of Finland.

⁴ See pp. 143-4, above.

continued to rise until the steam was blown off at last in the great explosion of 1914-18. After that catastrophe, which shattered the pre-existent political structure of Europe and interposed a broad barrier of debris—the East-European ‘successor-states’—between Russia and the surviving Great Powers of the Western World, the capital of the Russian Empire, in its latest metamorphosis the U.S.S.R., promptly swung back from the eccentric position on the Western March in which it had remained fixed for more than two centuries to the position of greatest administrative convenience in the interior: that is to say, from Leningrad to Moscow.¹

In Japan

If we now take a comparative view of this history of the offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia and the history of the offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan, we shall observe, in Japanese history, an outflow of vitality and power from the interior into a march which closely corresponds to the first of the three movements in Russian history which we have just been examining. We have seen that the centre of gravity of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia was transferred from the upper basin of the Dniepr—the region in which the offshoot first took root—to the upper basin of the Volga when this latter region was added to the domain of Russian Orthodox Christendom by the prowess of the Russian backwoodsmen. We may now observe that the centre of gravity of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan likewise shifted from the region in which the offshoot first took root in this case—that is, from Yamato—to a region in the backwoods which was subsequently added to the domain of the Japanese Far Eastern Civilization: shifted, that is to say, from Yamato to the Kwanto. In the historical geography of Japan, Nara and Kyoto are the analogues of the Russian Kiev, while Kamakura and Yedo-Tokyo are the analogues, respectively, of the Russian Vladímir and the Russian Moscow. The contrast between ‘the Kiev Period’ and ‘the Moscow Period’ of Russian history reappears, with an accentuated sharpness, in the contrast between ‘the Nara and

¹ By the time when the capital was retransferred from Leningrad to Moscow under the Russian Communist régime, Moscow, which had lain within the north-eastern marches of Russia from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, had long since been relegated to the interior by the eastward and southward expansion of the Russian Empire. In this retransfer, however, there was another force at work besides *vis inertiae*. If, in one aspect, the retransfer of the capital of the U.S.S.R. from Leningrad to Moscow by the Russian Communists was an almost automatic recoil, there was also another aspect in which this transfer, like the contemporary transfer of the capital of the Turkish Republic from Constantinople to Angora by the Turkish Nationalists, was a deliberate move in a systematic campaign of social revolution. This aspect is referred to again in Part III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 200-2, and is dealt with further in Part IX, apropos of contacts in the Space-dimension between different civilizations.

Kyoto Period' of Japanese history (sixth¹ to twelfth century of the Christian Era) on the one hand and 'the Kamakura and Ashikaga Period' (A.D. 1184-1597) on the other. The first precocious and sophisticated bloom of the Far Eastern Civilization on Japanese soil at Nara and Kyoto has that exotic air of a hot-house plant, keeping alive by a *tour de force* in an unfavourable climate, which is also characteristic, though in a less extreme degree, of the first bloom of the Orthodox Christian Civilization on Russian soil at Kiev. And the passing of the sceptre in the twelfth century of the Christian Era from sophisticated Kiev to rude Vladímir—the natural breakdown of an artificial state of affairs—is analogous to the more violent and dramatic revolution in Japan through which, in the course of the same century, the régime of 'the Cloistered Emperors' of Yamato was overthrown and was replaced by that of the feudal nobility of the Kwanto. The new masters of Japan, like those of Russia, were men of war who had acquired land and power and military spirit in the process of enlarging the borders at the expense of the primitive peoples of the north-eastern forests (the Ainu being the counterparts, in the Japanese hinterland, of the Finns in the Russian). Thus in Japan, as in Russia, vitality flowed away from the sheltered interior towards the exposed frontier until eventually power followed suit.²

In the Minoan and Hellenic Worlds

In the Minoan World, which we may consider next, the quarter in which the heaviest pressure was felt was the frontier over against the continental European barbarians; and, in the course of Minoan history, vitality and power duly passed from the maritime interior to the continental European marches. When 'the Thalassocracy of Minos' was in its hey-day, the cultivated inhabitants of the unvalled imperial capitals at Cnossos and Phaestus, on the island of Crete, doubtless looked down upon the wardens of the marches who had to live a ruder life—cribbed, cabined, and confined within the clumsily massive walls of Tiryns and Mycenae—for fear of the barbarians at their gates. How much more elegant and comfortable to be protected, as the Eteocretans were, by the shapely wooden

¹ Strictly, 'the Nara Period' did not begin till the laying out of the first fixed capital of the Japanese Empire at Nara in A.D. 710. From a broader point of view, however, this period may be taken as coeval with the introduction of the Far Eastern Civilization into Japan. In this process the two major events were the importation of Mahayanian Buddhism into the Japanese Archipelago, via Korea, during the second half of the sixth century of the Christian Era, and the reorganization of the Japanese Imperial Government on the Chinese model of the T'ang in A.D. 645.

² The breakdowns of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan and of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia, which accompanied these shifts of the centres of gravity in the course of the twelfth century of the Christian Era, are examined in IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 95-6, below.

walls of an Imperial Navy which was in sole and complete command of the estranging sea! Yet, here again, pressure administered a stimulus which eventually gave Mycenae and Tiryns the mastery over Phaestus and Cnossos. The pioneers who had won for the Minoan Civilization a footing on the European mainland, in defiance of the continental barbarians, by building those gigantic fortifications, found energy and enterprise to spare, from their task of holding their own on land, to compete with their imperial cousins¹ in Crete for the control of the sea. While they kept the continental barbarians at bay with one hand, they launched a battle-fleet with the other; and our archaeologists conjecture that it was a Mycenaean Armada which put a sudden and catastrophic end to the Minoan Thalassocracy by breaking through the boasted wooden walls of Crete and sacking the open city of Cnossos towards the close of the fifteenth century B.C.

When we pass on to the history of the Hellenic Civilization which was 'affiliated' to the Minoan Civilization, we find that in the Hellenic World, likewise, the continental European marches were the zone of greatest external pressure and that the vitality and power of the Hellenic Society tended to concentrate themselves at different points in this zone successively as the incidence of the pressure shifted hither and thither in the course of Hellenic history.

In the Greek Peninsula, the hegemony which was first held by a city-state situated in 'the Island of Pelops' passed from Sparta to Athens, on the continental side of the Isthmus of Corinth, and then from both Athens and Sparta to Thebes, on the continental side of Mounts Cithaeron and Parnes, until it came to rest at the roots of the Peninsula in Macedonia: the frontier state of Greece over against the continental European barbarians.² Similarly, in the

¹ This language is not intended to imply that these Mycenaean pioneers of the Minoan Civilization were Eteocretan colonists, or even that they were akin to the Eteocretans in race or linked with them by the bond of a kindred language. It is possible and even probable that the majority of the exponents of the Minoan Civilization on the mainland of European Greece were not colonists but converts. (On this question, see II. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 101, footnote 1, with Annex II.)

² The writer of this Study vividly remembers how the continental character of Macedonia impressed itself upon him at the first view. He first visited Macedonia in the summer of 1912, at the end of a visit to the Kingdom of Greece within the frontiers as they then stood. Since the standard-gauge railway which now links Athens with Salonica had not been completed at that date, he travelled from the Peiraeus to Salonica by sea. He had been looking forward with interest to observing the political aspect of the passage from territory under Greek to territory under Turkish rule; but, as the steamer entered Salonica harbour, his eye was caught, not by the Turkish flag flying above the custom house, but by Austrian and German railway-wagons standing along the quay, on rails which ran without a break from Salonica to Vienna and from Vienna to Berlin. He then realized in a flash that this economic solidarity with Central Europe was the distinctive and fundamental characteristic of Macedonia, and that the political connexion with Turkey-in-Asia, though picturesque, was accidental and superficial. (For the history of the question whether the Hellenic Great Power in Macedonia was to be a monarchy—as it actually came to be—or a confederacy of city-states of the kind that was built up in Italy by Rome, see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, in vol. iii, below.)

Italian Peninsula, the hegemony which had first been held by Syracuse in the island of Sicily (an island which, in terms of human geography, is only insular in the same degree as the Peloponnese) was afterwards contended for between two Powers which were both situated on the continental side of the Straits of Messina: Samnium and Rome. Moreover, this contest was won, not by Samnium, who had both hands free for fighting her duel with her Italian neighbour, but by Rome, who was constrained to fight Samnium with one hand while she was employing the other in keeping at arm's length the Celtic barbarians who were pressing upon Italy from the heart of Continental Europe. Yet Rome beat Samnium and won the hegemony of Italy, not in spite of, but because of, the fact that she had previously taken over the wardenship of the continental march of Italy when the Etruscans had shown themselves unequal to the task;¹ for the pressure which had thus fallen upon Rome acted as a stimulus and not as a handicap.

From the days of Camillus to the days of Caesar, during the four centuries which it took the Romans to build up their empire, the peril which was their bugbear—more trying to Roman nerves than Carthaginian galley-beaks or Macedonian pike-heads—was the barbarian avalanche: the 'Gallicus Tumultus'; and the genius of Hannibal showed itself in nothing so much as in his decision to attack Rome from the quarter from which, in Roman eyes, an aggressor ever appeared the most formidable. In making the passage of the Alps and bringing the Celtic avalanche down with him in full force in his descent of the Italian slope, Hannibal was seeking to reproduce artificially, for the undoing of the Romans, the natural catastrophe which, some two centuries earlier, had overwhelmed the Etruscans. He was seeking to bring upon the Romans the destruction which, in Mr. Kipling's story, Mowgli brought upon Shere Khan when he sent the herd of buffalo stampeding down from the head of the valley upon the tiger who stood trapped in the valley-bottom. But the strategy which succeeded so brilliantly in the hands of the fictitious Indian changeling failed in the hands of the historic Carthaginian man of genius, because Hannibal's human antagonists reacted, in this desperate situation, quite otherwise than Mowgli's bestial victim. Instead of losing nerve, like Shere Khan, and turning tail, the Romans refused to

¹ Before the collapse of the Etruscan Power, Rome had held the wardenship of the Etruscan marches of Latium and had finally reacted to Etruscan pressure by a victorious counter-attack in which she had conquered and incorporated the Etruscan city-state which had lain closest to the Latin border: that is, Veii. In virtue of this original wardenship of the Etruscan marches, Rome had captured the hegemony of Latium from Alba Longa—another example of the phenomenon of the frontier prevailing over the interior, since Alba, ensconced among the hills that bear her name, was shielded from Etruscan attack by the Roman watch on the Tiber.

'despair of the Republic' and turned at bay; and in defeating Hannibal and his Celtic allies they determined their own destinies. The general result of the victory of Rome in the Hannibalic War was that the Roman Empire grew—and merged—into a Hellenic universal state. One particular result was that Rome won—and lost—the hegemony over the whole Hellenic World by becoming the sole warden of the continental European marches.

This devolution upon Rome of the sole responsibility for the defence of Hellenism against the continental European barbarians was manifest to the World, and was acknowledged even by the Romans themselves, when Augustus organized the Roman frontier along the longest diameter of the Continent from the mouth of the Rhine to the mouth of the Danube; but this vast extension of Rome's commitments, as compared with the local wardenship of the Italian march which she had originally taken over from the Etruscans, had devolved upon the Romans against their will and had still been repudiated by them in theory long after it had become an accomplished fact. The advance of the Roman frontier from the line of the Po, where it had stood at the outbreak of the Hannibalic War, to the distant line of the Rhine was a direct, though long-delayed, consequence of the Hannibalic War itself, in which the western corner of Transalpine Europe had become both the prize of victory and the key to the retention of its fruits.¹ The parallel advance of the frontier from the Po to the Danube was a direct consequence of Rome's victory over Macedonia and therefore an indirect consequence of her victory over Hannibal, since it was the Hannibalic War that precipitated the collision between Rome and Macedonia and also predetermined the outcome.

In this trial of strength between the Power which had become the warden of the continental European marches of the Hellenic Civilization in Italy and the Power which was the warden of the corresponding marches in Greece, Macedonia did not succumb to Rome without a struggle;² for the Macedonians had been trained in the same school of border-warfare as the Romans, and they too were redoubtable frontiersmen and barbarian-fighters in their degree. The Hannibalic War, however, had been an unprecedented ordeal from which the Macedonians had held aloof, while the Romans had been made by their Punic adversaries to pass through the fire like the children offered to Molech;³ and the burning fiery furnace had tempered the Roman steel to a cutting edge which clove the Macedonian buckler at one stroke and mercilessly shore through the living flesh. This figurative manner of speech is

¹ On this point see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 40, above.

² For the increase in the vigour and effectiveness of the Macedonian resistance as the struggle proceeded, see II. D (iv), pp. 103-4, above. ³ Lev. xviii. 21, xx. 2; Jer. xxxii. 35.

literally borne out by the following description¹ of the effect upon the Macedonians' *moral* when they first encountered a weapon which the Romans had just adopted, in the course of the Hannibalic War, from some of the European barbarians in Hannibal's service. The incident was the sequel to a cavalry skirmish in Illyria between the Roman and Macedonian outposts in the opening phase of the campaign of the year 200 B.C.

'Philip reckoned that it would conduce to his popularity with the troops, and would increase their readiness to risk their lives in his service, if he looked after the burial of the men who had fallen in this reconnaissance; so he gave orders for the bodies to be brought to camp and buried in the sight of the whole army with military honours. Nothing, however, is so uncertain and so unpredictable as the psychology of the crowd; for the spectacle which was to have fortified the troops' *moral* actually had the effect of shaking it. In hostilities with their usual Greek and Illyrian adversaries, the Macedonians were only familiar with spear-wounds and arrow-wounds and occasional lance-wounds. They now saw the execution done by the Spanish sword: mutilated trunks with the arms shorn away, heads severed from bodies by strokes that had cleft right through the neck, intestines laid bare, and other horrors; and this ocular demonstration of the type of weapon and type of fighting-man that they now had to face simply threw them into a panic. The King himself was terror-stricken at the thought that he had not yet faced the Romans in a pitched battle; and accordingly he recalled his son, with the garrison that was guarding the Pelagonian Pass, to reinforce his own army, and thus exposed Macedonia to invasion by Pleuratus and by the Dardanians.'

Thus the Macedonian frontiersman, when he came to grips with the Roman, found himself as hopelessly outmatched in armament as Hector when he faced Achilles in his last battle. Yet, in that legendary combat, it was not only Hector who was fey. It was Achilles' doom to meet his death from a Dardanian arrow when he had laid his Trojan rival low; and the drama of Achilles and Hector was re-enacted to the bitter end by Rome and Macedonia. The King of Macedonia, in the shock of his collision with the deadly power of Rome, had thrown up his wardenship of the continental European marches of the Hellenic World in that vital section, covering the Greek Peninsula, which Macedonia had guarded hitherto. By withdrawing the frontier guard, he had exposed not only his own Kingdom but the whole of Greece to invasion by the Dardanian barbarians of the Upper Vardar Valley and the Illyrian barbarians of Scodra. But the responsibility which King Philip had thrown off in his extremity, as he went out to meet defeat at Roman hands, could not be repudiated by Philip's conquerors.

¹ Livy, Book XXXI, ch. 34.

Inexorably, the burden of vanquished Macedonia became the burden of victorious Rome; and it was Philip's abandonment of the old Macedonian border in the Vardar Basin in the year 200 B.C. that compelled Augustus, two centuries later, to advance the Roman border up to the Danube, as well as up to the Rhine, from the Basin of the Po. Thus, in the event, the Illyrian and the Dardanian, as well as the Spaniard and the Gaul, were brought within the frontiers of the Hellenic universal state by Roman force of arms; and so it was that Rome, in winning the hegemony of the Hellenic World from Carthage and Macedon, set up a train of events which inevitably transferred the hegemony to other hands again in the fullness of time.

For Rome had no peculiar magic.

The same arts that did gain
A power, must it maintain—

and Rome was no more capable than her predecessors and victims of maintaining a hegemony which had been gained under the stimulus of barbarian pressure after she had deprived herself of that stimulus in obedience to the very necessities of her new situation. In the last phase of Hellenic history, power and vitality flowed away once more from the interior to the marches; and this time the current left Rome stranded. The stimulus which had once nerved Rome to overcome Syracuse and Samnium and Carthage and Macedon now nerved Illyria and Gaul, in their turn, to dominate Rome herself. Some three centuries after Augustus had organized the Danubian frontier, the dominion which the first Roman Emperor had gathered into his hands for transmission to Roman successors was being exercised by the Illyrian Diocletian¹ and by the Dardanian Constantine;² and the Roman Empire was being governed, not from the banks of the Tiber nor even from Milan beyond the farther bank of the Po, but from two cities in the immediate hinterlands of the two continental frontiers: from Constantinople behind the Lower Danube and from Trier behind the Middle Rhine. In the last agony, when the Empire broke up and the Old Rome opened her gates to the Goths and Vandals, New Rome remained an impregnable city of refuge—never to be swamped by the barbarian waves that broke upon its walls from beyond the old front line. As for the Rhineland, it played the same role in the break-up of the Roman Empire as Transoxania in the

¹ Diocletian came from Doclea, a village in the Basin of the Lake of Scodra which, in 200 B.C., had been the nucleus of the Illyrian principality of King Pleuratus.

² Constantine's father, Constantius Chlorus, came from Naissus (Nish) in the Morava Valley, which lay within the borders of Dardania; and the family traced their origin back to another Dardanian—Claudius Gothicus—who had anticipated Constantius Chlorus, by several generations, in attaining to the purple.

break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. Under the Merovingian régime it became the seat of the least ineffective and least ephemeral of all the defunct empire's 'successor-states'.

In the break-up of the Hellenic universal state, we can observe the stimulus of exposure to external pressure at work, not only in its general social effect upon whole territories and populations, but also in its particular personal effect upon single individuals. On this plane, it produced, 'in real life', the astonishing results which Mr. G. K. Chesterton has imagined in his fantasy 'The Napoleon of Notting Hill'. It transformed pacific men of letters into warlike men of action. In order to perform this miracle, the stimulus had, of course, to be administered with extreme violence. Pausanias the antiquarian, for example, was not made a new man by the momentary appearance, in the Asopus Valley, of a stray band of trans-frontier barbarians. Pausanias was a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, and in that generation, some two centuries after the establishment of the Danubian frontier, such mishaps as this passed off without stirring men's souls to the depths, because they were regarded as curiosities rather than as portents. Even so, the vagaries of the outlandish Costoboci caused at least one citizen of one city in Greece to take up arms and die in battle for hearth and home in the manner of the past which was also to be the manner of the future;¹ while the more formidable upheaval in the hinterland of the Danubian frontier—a wave in a new movement of barbarian unrest in which the Costobocan raid on Greece was a casual ripple—compelled the philosopher-emperor to devote his last years to the uncongenial business of punitive border warfare.

The emergency which gave a Mnêsibûlus or a Marcus the occasion for a noble gesture was felt in grim earnest in the days of Athenian Dexippus, and yet more in the days of Cyrenaean Synesius and Arvernian Sidonius Apollinaris. In those latter days, no man could blind himself to the fact that the barbarian enemy was now within the gates of the Hellenic World; and this challenge to the inner citadel of Hellenism transfigured the last custodians of the Hellenic cultural tradition. The Gothic threat to Athens nerved the historian Dexippus to take up the sword in order to resume the pen when the tyranny was overpast. The Gothic threat to Auvergne, and the Berber threat to Cyrenaica, which did not pass

¹ 'The marauding band of Costoboci which raided Greece in my lifetime appeared, in the course of their raid, before the walls of Elates; whereupon, an Elatean gentleman, Mnêsibûlus, raised an armed force under his own command and succeeded in inflicting heavy casualties on the barbarians, though he himself was killed in action.' (Pausanias: *Descriptio Graeciae*, Book X, ch. 34.)

These Elateans who died for their country in the second century of the Christian Era were worthy of the epitaph in which the self-sacrifice of the Tegyatan had been commemorated in the fifth century B.C. by Simonides.

away, changed the whole course of Synesius's and Sidonius's lives. It turned them from cultivated and lethargic country-gentlemen into energetic barbarian-fighters and devoted shepherds of souls. By the third generation, when the intrusive barbarism had become endemic, the *ci-devant* heirs of the Hellenic culture in a derelict world had adapted themselves so well to the monstrous conditions of their new environment that when the Arvernian nobility answered the summons of their Visigothic overlords to march against the Franks, they acquitted themselves better than their barbarian comrades-in-arms in this contest between two barbarian 'successor-states' for the residuary legateeship of Rome in Gaul. At the decisive Battle of Vouillé (A.D. 507), Sidonius's grandson died gallantly on the battle-field with King Alaric when Alaric's own Visigoths ran away.

In the Western World over against the Continental European Barbarians

When we pass on to the history of our own Western Civilization which is 'affiliated' to the Hellenic Civilization, we find on the one hand that, in the Western World, the heaviest external pressure was felt, at first, in the same quarter in which it had been felt from first to last in the Hellenic World and in the Minoan World—that is to say, on the frontier over against the continental European barbarians. On the other hand we find that the Western, unlike either the Hellenic or the Minoan, reaction to the barbarian pressure was in the end definitively victorious. The barbarian frontier of Western Christendom on the Continent of Europe eventually faded out; and thereafter our Western Society found itself in contact here, no longer with barbarians, but with alien civilizations. The incidence of these new pressures stimulated the vitality of our Western Society to new responses in new forms.

In the first phase of Western history on the European Continent, the stimulating effect of the pressure from the continental barbarians declared itself in the emergence of a fresh social structure for a nascent society out of the debris of one of the 'successor-states' of the defunct Roman Empire: the barbarian principality of the Franks. The Merovingian Frankish régime had been Epimethean: its face had been turned towards the Roman past. The succeeding Carolingian Frankish régime was Promethean; for, although it incidentally evoked a ghost of the Roman Empire, its face was turned towards the Western future, and the ghost was only evoked—in the spirit of the cry 'Debout les morts!'—in order to assist the living in carrying out an almost superhuman task.¹ This

¹ See Part X, below, for the phenomenon of the Evocation of Ghosts in general, and in particular for this Carolingian evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire.

complete transformation of the social functions of the Frankish Power—this transubstantiation of the Frankish body politic—was nothing less than a fresh celebration of the perpetual mystery of Life. 'Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness.'¹ And in what part of the Frankish domain was this fresh act of creation accomplished? Not in the interior but on the continental European March; not in Neustria, on soil fertilized by ancient Roman culture and sheltered from fresh continental barbarian inroads, but in Austrasia,² in a territory which bestrode the ancient Roman frontier and which was still exposed to constant assaults from the Saxons of the North European forest and from the Avars of the Eurasian Steppe. The measure of the stimulus which was administered by this external pressure to the Franks in Austrasia is given by the achievements of Charlemagne. Charlemagne's eighteen Saxon campaigns and his extirpation of the Avars are not incomparable, as sheer military triumphs, to Timur Lenk's steppe campaigns in which he crushed the Nomads of Mughalistan and Qipchak;³ and Charlemagne's military and political achievements were followed by the first faint manifestations of intellectual energy in the Western World—a feeble counterpart to the outburst of intellectual energy in Transoxania and Khurasan under the Timurids.⁴

This Austrasian reaction to the stimulus of pressure from the continental European barbarians—the reaction which came to a head in the career of Charlemagne—was not conclusive. For reasons which are examined at later points in this Study,⁵ it came to a premature standstill and was followed by a relapse. Accordingly, we find the Austrasian reaction reduplicated in our Western history by the Saxon reaction which came to a head, rather less than two centuries later, in the career of Otto I. The enduring (though exhausting) achievement of Charlemagne's career had been the incorporation of the domain of the continental Saxon barbarians into Western Christendom; and by this very success he had prepared the way for a transfer of the kingdom, the power and the glory from

¹ Judges xiv. 14.

² The very nomenclature 'Austria-Neustria', which makes its appearance in the Lombard as well as in the Frankish 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire, tells its own tale. 'Austria' is a new name for a new living commonwealth which has sprung from the soil of the derelict 'successor-state' in its eastern—i.e. continental—marches. 'Neustria' simply means 'Non-Austria': that is to say, the leavings of the debris which still cumber the ground on the rest of the derelict site after the new growth in the marches has manifested itself.

³ See pp. 146-8, above. Charlemagne, like Timur, though in a lesser degree, succumbed to the malady of Militarism and was inveigled by it into misdirecting his military energies from the periphery to the interior of his world; and Charlemagne's error, like Timur's, resulted—though this, again, in a lesser degree—in the collapse of the structure which he had built up. For the malady of Militarism, as illustrated in both Charlemagne's career and Timur's, see further IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (x), vol. iv, pp. 488-501, below.

⁴ For this, see pp. 148-50, above.

⁵ In II. D (vii), pp. 344-5, and in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (x), vol. iv, pp. 488-91, below.

his own victorious Austrasia to the homeland of the vanquished and forcibly converted barbarians by pushing forward the continental European march of Western Christendom from Austrasia into Saxony and thereby exposing Saxony, instead of Austrasia, to the stimulus of continental barbarian pressure from the hinterland. In Otto's day, the same stimulus evoked in Saxony the same reaction that had been evoked by it, in Charlemagne's day, in Austrasia; and this time the counter-offensive of the Western Civilization against the continental barbarians was sustained until it reached its final objective.

Otto smote the Wends as Charlemagne had smitten Otto's own Saxon ancestors; and thereafter the continental frontiers of Western Christendom were pushed steadily eastward, partly through the voluntary conversion of the barbarians to Christianity and partly through their subjection or extirpation by force of arms. The Magyars and the Poles and the Scandinavians were converted at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era by the prestige of Western Christendom under the Ottonid régime, as the Bohemians had been converted, two centuries earlier, by the prestige of Western Christendom under the régime of Charlemagne. The barbarians along the continental coastline of the Baltic were more recalcitrant. On this sector of the frontier, the Saxon frontiersmen had to follow up Otto's counter-stroke against the Wends in a stubborn border warfare that lasted some two centuries before they succeeded in definitively advancing the bounds of Western Christendom from the line of the Elbe to the line of the Oder. This result was achieved by the conversion of the Wends in Mecklenburg in A.D. 1161, and by the contemporary extirpation of their kinsmen in Brandenburg and Meissen.

Thereafter, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the task of 'Westernizing' the last remaining continental barbarians was carried on by the Germans with still greater vigour and effect through the instrumentality of two new Western institutions: the city-state and the militant monastic order. The Hansa Towns and the Teutonic Knights, between them, advanced the bounds of Western Christendom from the line of the Oder to the line of the Dvina, while, farther north, the Scandinavian converts to Western Christianity were winning fresh ground for Western Christendom and for themselves—the Danes in Estonia and the Swedes in Finland. That was the last round in this secular conflict; for, before the close of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, the continental European barbarians, who had been pressing upon the frontiers of three successive civilizations over a total span of some three thousand years, had been wiped off the face of the Earth. By

A.D. 1400, Western Christendom and Orthodox Christendom, which had been entirely isolated from one another on the Continent by intervening barbarians no longer than five hundred years before, had come to march with one another continuously along a line extending across the whole breadth of the Continent from the coast of the Adriatic Sea to the coast of the Arctic Ocean.

It is interesting to observe how, on this frontier between a youthful Western Christendom and a senile continental European barbarism, the reversal in the direction of the pressure, which became constant from the time when Otto I took up Charlemagne's work, was followed by a transference of stimulus as the Western counter-offensive proceeded.

For example, the original Duchy of Saxony, west of the Elbe, suffered the same eclipse as a result of Otto's victories over the Wends that Austrasia had suffered, two centuries earlier, as a result of Charlemagne's victories over the Saxons themselves. Like Austrasia, Saxony owed the hegemony over Western Christendom which she inherited from Austrasia to the *esprit de corps* that was instilled by pressure from barbarians at close quarters; and, again like Austrasia, she lost her *esprit de corps*, and with it her hegemony, when this pressure was removed. Saxony actually lost her hegemony over the Western World in A.D. 1024: that is, as soon as the Wends beyond the Elbe had been thrown upon the defensive. She broke into fragments in A.D. 1182-91: that is, as soon as the frontier of the Western World had been definitively advanced, on this sector, from the line of the Elbe to the line of the Oder. Thereafter, when, in a later age of Western history, a state bearing the name of Saxony once again became a power in the Western World, this latter-day Saxony arose in the March of Meissen: that is, on one portion of the new ground which had been won for Western Christendom at the expense of the Wends during the two centuries of border warfare along the old Saxon frontier which had followed the reign of Otto I.

Again, as the continental frontier of Western Christendom was pushed farther and farther forward into the barbarian hinterland, the seat of 'the Holy Roman Empire' receded deeper and deeper into the interior; and simultaneously, as the vigour of the Western counter-offensive against the continental barbarians increased, the authority of 'the Holy Roman Emperor' diminished. The similitude of the Imperial office, which had been revived at the end of the eighth century of the Christian Era for the benefit of an Austrasian prince and had then passed from Austrasia to Saxony, did not continue thereafter to follow the ever advancing frontier. When the office fell, in due course, from Saxon hands in A.D. 1024, it passed

this time, not to the makers of the new marches of the Western World beyond the Elbe, but to a dynasty whose homeland lay in Rhenish Franconia. Moreover, from the advent of the Salian Dynasty to the Imperial throne in this year 1024 down to the formal extinction of 'the Holy Roman Empire', nearly eight centuries later, in A.D. 1806, each successive dynasty that held the office had its roots in the Rhine Basin—that ancient continental march of the Roman Empire which had been relegated to the innermost interior of the expanding Western World. The Franconians came from the valley of the Main, the Hohenstaufen from the valley of the Neckar, the Luxemburgers from the valley of the Meuse, the Hapsburgs from the valley of the Aar. At each successive transfer, the office passed to a dynasty which sprang from soil more remote from the continental frontiers of the Western World than the native soil of its predecessors; and concurrently, at each successive transfer, the Imperial authority grew weaker. It was less effective in Salian hands than in Saxon and in Hohenstaufen hands than in Salian, until the downfall of the House of Hohenstaufen was followed by 'the Great Interregnum' (A.D. 1254-73).

It is noteworthy that, during this practical break in the continuity of the Imperial succession to Charlemagne and to Otto I, the work of reacting against the pressure of the continental barbarians—a work which Charlemagne had first set on foot and which Otto had taken up again—was being carried on, and this with unprecedented energy and success, by other agencies than the Imperial authority: such agencies as the Hansa towns and the Teutonic Knights and the crowns of Denmark and Sweden. It is also noteworthy that the Hohenstaufen, who were seeking to preserve 'the Holy Roman Empire' *in extremis*, and the Hapsburgs and Luxemburgers, who were seeking to re-establish it after it had fallen into practical abeyance, all alike sought to restore some real function and importance and power to an office which had in fact become superfluous by combining it, once more, as it had been combined in the great days of the Carolingians and the Ottonids, with something in the nature of a wardenship of the marches. The Hohenstaufens sought a new basis for their power in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which was a march of Western Christendom against both the Orthodox Christian World and the Arabic World. The Luxemburgers mounted to the throne of the Empire by way of the throne of Bohemia, and justified their tenure of the highest office in Western Christendom by their service in bringing the full light of Western Civilization into a region which had previously lain in the penumbra. Rudolf of Hapsburg made the fortunes of his family not by his acquisition of the Imperial office but by his

seizure of the opportunity which this gave him for adding the Austrian March of the Empire to his ancestral possessions in Swabia.

It was thanks to this permanent addition to the Hapsburg family inheritance that the Imperial office, which Rudolf had held for his lifetime, was reacquired by his descendants not much less than two centuries later. Yet the office would assuredly not have remained in the hands of the Hapsburgs permanently the second time any more than the first, and would probably not have remained in existence at all now that the ancient pressure from the continental European barbarians had been completely removed by the complete extinction of the barbarians themselves, if the Western World had not suddenly been subjected at this juncture to a new and formidable continental pressure from an alien civilization. The life of 'the Holy Roman Empire' was unexpectedly prolonged for another three centuries, and was permanently vested during the whole of this period in the House of Hapsburg, in consequence of the impact of the Ottoman Power upon the Western World in the Basin of the Danube. 'The Great Interregnum' which virtually began at the death of Frederick II Hohenstaufen and was nominally brought to an end when Rudolf of Hapsburg assumed the Imperial office a quarter of a century later, really continued until A.D. 1526, when, on the morrow of the Battle of Mohacz, Rudolf's descendant Ferdinand added the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia to the wardenship of the Austrian and Styrian marches and thereby founded the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, with which the Imperial office thenceforth remained indissolubly associated until it was finally extinguished in 1806 by a formal merger of the shadow in the reality.¹

Thus the vitality of 'the Holy Roman Empire' varied, during the course of the Empire's existence, in the same degree as the intensity of the external pressure that was being exerted from time to time, by barbarians or by alien civilizations, upon the continental frontiers of Western Christendom. The Empire lost vitality as the pressure from the continental European barbarians relaxed, and then recovered vitality when a new pressure came to be exerted by the 'Osmanlis'. Conversely, we find that the vitality of the barbarians who had remained beyond the pale of the Western Civilization and the *ci-devant* barbarians who had been brought just within the pale by conversion tended to increase as the pressure

¹ In August 1806 the Holy Roman Emperor Francis II Hapsburg formally renounced the style and title of 'Roman Emperor' in order to style himself thenceforward 'Emperor of Austria'—a titular solecism which was at the same time a tardy recognition of long since accomplished historical facts. (See the passage quoted from Lord Bryce in Part I. B (iv), Annex, vol. I, on p. 343, above.)

exerted upon them by the Western counter-offensive came to be intensified.

The Lithuanians, for example, as the last surviving pagans in Europe, drew upon themselves, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the last impetus of the Crusading spirit in the Western World that survived the decisive failure of the Crusading enterprise in Syria. The head-quarters of the Teutonic Knights, which had been established at Acre, on the Syrian coast, until the fall of this sole remaining stronghold of the Crusaders in the Holy Land in A.D. 1291, were transferred, in 1308, to Marienburg on the easternmost arm of the delta of the Vistula; and during the next hundred years the Teutonic Order pressed Lithuania hard. This formidable Western pressure upon the Lithuanians in their homeland had the effect of stimulating the Lithuanians themselves to achieve sweeping conquests at the expense of Russian Orthodox Christendom in the upper basin of the Dniepr, and at the expense of the Eurasian Nomads in the sector of the Qipchāq Steppe that lay between the lower courses of the Dniepr and the Dniestr; and, as their struggle with the Order approached its climax, the stimulus increased to such a pitch that in A.D. 1363, when the Lithuanians were being worsted in their resistance to the Order's strategy of barring them out from their ancestral seaboard on the Baltic, they actually acquired a new seaboard on the remote shores of the Black Sea. The social energy and the military technique in virtue of which the Lithuanians were able to establish this far-reaching ascendancy over their non-Western neighbours had been acquired in the process of reacting to the pressure of their Western adversaries; and eventually this reaction became so powerful that it enabled the Lithuanians to launch a counter-offensive against the Teutonic Knights themselves.

This explanation of Lithuania's temporary political greatness as a reaction to the Teutonic Knights' contemporary Crusade is aptly conveyed in the heraldic emblem of the Lithuanian State: a galloping horseman clad—man and horse—in the elaborate plate-armour which was brought to perfection by the technique of Western armourers in the fifteenth century. This horseman is the last of the barbarians in a new guise. It is the woodland warrior of Lithuania who has taken unto him the whole armour of his Western adversaries that he 'may be able to withstand in the evil day, and, having done all, to stand'.¹ To the astonishment and confusion of the Teutonic Knights, he is bearing down upon them in their own accoutrements in order to trample them under foot on the field of Tannenberg.

This *tour de force*, however, was only achieved by the Lithuanian

¹ Ephesians vi. 13.

barbarian after he had adopted the religion and the culture as well as the military technique of the Western Civilization from which he was under pressure; and this conversion—which was the true turning-point in his struggle with the Teutonic Order—was brought about on the initiative, and through the agency, of a Western Christian neighbour and ally who had likewise become a victim of the Order's aggression and was likewise being stimulated into unprecedented activity by the necessity of fighting for his life. The Lithuanian's ally was the Pole, who had been converted to Western Christianity himself before the close of the tenth century of the Christian Era and had actually called in the Teutonic Order in the thirteenth century in order to assist him in extending the bounds of Western Christendom, on this sector of the frontier, at the pagan Prussian's and Lithuanian's expense. The Polish prince of Cujavia who gave the Teutonic Knights their first footing on the Baltic unwittingly laid the foundations of Poland's subsequent greatness by exposing her to a new German pressure which was far more formidable than the old Prusso-Lithuanian pressure from which he had intended to bring her relief. For the Teutonic Knights treated their neophyte Christian Polish hosts in much the same fashion as they treated the unconverted pagans whom they had been called in to fight; and the Poles, who at this time were still only feebly illuminated by the penumbra of the Western Civilization, were at first little more competent than their pagan neighbours to withstand a militant power which emanated from the heart of the Western World and which had at its command the most highly developed technique and organization that the Western Society had yet evolved. Accordingly, in the thirteenth century, the Teutonic Knights unceremoniously deprived the Poles of their ancestral Baltic seaboard in Pomerania while they were religiously depriving the Lithuanians of theirs in Prussia and Samogitia; and thereafter, in the fourteenth century, this same pressure from the same quarter produced the same reaction in Poland as in Lithuania.

While the Polish principalities of Cujavia and Masovia were being devoured by the Order, the nucleus of a new Polish Kingdom was being formed by Casimir the Great (*regnabat* A.D. 1333-70), whose reign was contemporary with the south-eastward expansion of Lithuania. The ultimate object of Casimir's work was to bring the offensive of the Teutonic Knights to a standstill; but Casimir's successors realized that Poland was no match for the Teutonic Order by herself; and, before trying conclusions with their assailants, they cast about for possible comrades-in-arms. The first combination which was achieved by Polish diplomacy—the personal union of the crowns of Poland and Hungary from A.D. 1370 to A.D.

1382, in the person of the Angevin King of Hungary, Louis the Great—was ephemeral and abortive, since the interests of the two parties did not coincide. Hungary had no quarrel with Poland's enemies nor Poland with Hungary's. The master-stroke of Polish statesmanship was the personal union between the crowns of Poland and Lithuania, which was achieved in A.D. 1386 by the grant of the Polish Queen Jadwiga's hand to the Lithuanian King Jagellon in consideration of Jagellon's conversion from his primitive Lithuanian paganism to Western Christianity.

It was Jagellon who opened the counter-offensive against the Teutonic Order by leading the combined forces of Lithuania and Poland to victory over the Knights at Tannenberg in A.D. 1410; and the work thus begun was completed by Jagellon's second successor on the Polish-Lithuanian throne in A.D. 1466, when he imposed on the Teutonic Order the Second Peace of Thorn. The First Peace of Thorn, in the year following the Battle of Tannenberg, had secured the retrocession of Samogitia to Lithuania. The fruits of the Second Peace were the cession¹ to Poland of Eastern Pomerania and Ermeland and the reduction of the Teutonic Order's domain in Prussia to the position of a geographical enclave in Polish-Lithuanian territory and to the status of a political dependency of the Polish Crown. Thus, in little more than half a century, the situations of the combatants had been completely reversed as a result of the combined Polish-Lithuanian reaction to the Teutonic Order's pressure. Before the year 1410, the dominions of the Order had extended along the continental coastline of the Baltic in an unbroken belt from the eastern frontier of the Holy Roman Empire all the way to the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland; and both Poland and Lithuania had been excluded thereby from access to the Baltic altogether. After 1466, the ancestral seaboard of Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic were once again in the hands of their original owners, while the two remnants of the Teutonic Order's dominions were now both insulated—by the restored 'Lithuanian Corridor' from one another, and by the restored 'Polish Corridor' from the Empire.

In the Western World over against Muscovy

Why did not Poland and Lithuania fall apart again after the pressure from the Teutonic Knights, which had originally brought them together, had thus been effectually counteracted? The ques-

¹ 'Cession', not 'retrocession', since the Polish territories which were recovered from the Teutonic Order in A.D. 1466 had been lost to the Order originally, some two centuries earlier, not by the Kingdom of Poland but by the then independent Polish principalities of Cujavia and Masovia. Before the conclusion of the Second Peace of Thorn in A.D. 1466, the two Polish principalities—or, rather, the remnants of them which had escaped annexation by the Order—had been absorbed into the Polish Kingdom.

tion is suggested by the actual course of events in Scandinavia—a region which had first come within the pale of the Western Civilization, by conversion to Western Christianity, contemporaneously with Poland, and had then been subjected, again contemporaneously with Poland, to pressure from certain more progressive and more efficient members of the Western Society. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, while Poland was under pressure from the Teutonic Order, Scandinavia was under pressure from the Hansa; and in Scandinavia, as in Poland, the backward members of the Western Society succeeded in holding their own against their progressive assailants by resorting to the expedient of political combination. The personal union of the three Scandinavian kingdoms under the Treaty of Calmar in A.D. 1397¹ was a retort to the aggression of the Hanseatic League, just as the personal union of Poland and Lithuania in 1386 was a retort to the aggression of the Teutonic Order. The two unions, however, had very different histories. The Scandinavian Union of Calmar dissolved in A.D. 1520, after the sinews of the Hansa had been cut by the diversion of trade from the Baltic and the North Sea to the Atlantic in consequence of the discovery of America. On the other hand, the crushing of the Teutonic Order in 1466 was not followed by any corresponding dissolution of the parallel union between Poland and Lithuania. On the contrary, the Polish-Lithuanian Union was drawn closer in 1501 and still closer, by the Treaty of Lublin, in 1569, and it only ceased with the complete extinction of the political independence of the united commonwealth in 1795.

Why was the life of the Polish-Lithuanian Union prolonged almost to the close of the eighteenth century? And why was it completely extinguished then? The answer to these two questions is to be found in the imposition and the subsequent remission of a fresh pressure upon Lithuania and Poland from a new quarter. The Poles and Lithuanians had no sooner won relief from the pressure of the Teutonic Knights than they began to feel the pressure of the rising power of Muscovy. The expansion of Lithuania at the expense of the offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia reached its farthest limits about the middle of the fifteenth century. Within the next century, the multitude of mutually independent and hostile states, into which the remnant of the Russian Orthodox Christian World had previously been articulated, was consolidated, by Muscovite conquest, into a single Russian Orthodox Christian universal state;²

¹ The definitive union which was achieved in A.D. 1397 had been preceded by tentative experiments in the direction of an All-Scandinavian union in the course of the fourteenth century.

² This function of the Muscovite Empire as a Russian Orthodox Christian universal state is studied further in IV, C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 88–92, below.

and in 1563—that is, half a dozen years before the Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin—this newly formed Russian universal state impinged upon the Western World by pushing back the eastern frontier of Lithuania, which had once run east of Smolensk, to a line running west of Polotsk on the Dvina. Thus the united commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania acquired a new function—and, therewith, a new vitality—as one of the marches of the Western World against a new pressure from Orthodox Christendom in Russia.

Poland shared this new function with the Kingdom of Sweden, which had broken off from the Scandinavian Union in A.D. 1520;¹ and the reaction of the Western Society to the new Russian pressure took the form of simultaneous Polish and Swedish counter-offensives. The Poles recaptured Smolensk in 1582 and held Moscow itself from 1610 to 1612; while the terms of the peace-treaty which was concluded between Sweden and Muscovy at Stolbovo in 1617 excluded Russia, in her turn, from all access to the Baltic.² In pushing their counter-offensives thus far, however, the Poles and the Swedes were guilty of an excess of zeal which brought its own retribution. The temporary presence of a Polish garrison in Moscow and the permanent presence of Swedish garrisons on the banks of the Narev and the Neva produced a profound psychological effect in Russian souls; and this inward spiritual shock translated itself into an outward practical act of equivalent magnitude: the deliberate 'Westernization' of Russia by Peter the Great.³ Through this portentous revolution, the continental frontier of the Western World was advanced, at one bound, from the eastern borders of Poland and Sweden to the distant lines along which the newly initiated Russian proselytes to the Western Civilization already marched with the Nomad occupants of the Eurasian Steppe and with the Manchu conquerors of China. Therewith, the wardenship of the marches of the Western Society, which Russia's Western neighbours and adversaries had been exercising somewhat too zealously at Russia's expense, was suddenly snatched out of their hands, as a result of Peter's astonishing counter-stroke, by Russia herself. The Poles and Swedes thus found the ground cut from under their feet. Their function in the Western body social was taken from them; and the loss of the stimulus which the exercise of this function had formerly administered was followed by a swift decay. Within little more than a century—reckoning from the beginning of Peter's

¹ See p. 175, above.

² For the effect produced upon the internal economy of Russian Orthodox Christendom by the application of this pressure from the Western Civilization in the seventeenth century through the agencies of Poland and Sweden, see pp. 157-8, above.

³ This 'Westernization' of Russia is examined in greater detail in III. C (ii) (b), vol. ii, pp. 278-84, and in Part IX, below.

effective rule—Sweden had lost to Russia all her possessions east of the Baltic, including her ancient dominion of Finland, while Poland had been erased from the political map altogether.

In the Western World over against the Ottoman Empire

It will be seen that Polish and Swedish history, from the opening of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era until after the close of the eighteenth, is best expressed in terms of the history of a foreign body social: in terms, that is, of the history of Orthodox Christendom in Russia. Poland and Sweden both flourished so long as they fulfilled the functions of anti-Russian marches of the Western Society; they both began to decline towards their fall so soon as Russian Orthodox Christendom had achieved the *tour de force* of filching this function from them. Let us now turn our attention to the history of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, which can be traced back to approximately the same date as the histories of modern Poland and modern Sweden. Sweden upset the Scandinavian union of 1397 by breaking away from Denmark and Norway in 1520; Poland consolidated the Polish-Lithuanian union of 1386 by entering into the closer unions of 1501 and 1569; the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy was brought into existence by the union of the Hungarian and Bohemian crowns with the Austrian patrimony of the Hapsburgs in 1526. Thus the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy was modern Poland's and modern Sweden's contemporary; and we shall find that its history, like their histories, is best expressed in foreign terms. Poland and Sweden had their *raison d'être* in serving as marches of the Western Society against an Orthodox Christian universal state which had been established in Russia by the Muscovites. Similarly, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy existed in order to serve as a march of the Western Society against another universal state into which the main body of Orthodox Christendom, in the Balkan Peninsula, had been welded by the Osmanlis.¹ It was called into existence at a moment when the Ottoman pressure upon the Western World had suddenly become really formidable; it remained in the first rank of the Great Powers of Europe as long as the Ottoman pressure remained at its height; it began to decline as soon as the Ottoman pressure began to relax; and it finally fell to pieces in the same general war—the War of 1914-18—in which the Ottoman Empire received its *coup de grâce*.

The impact of the Ottoman Power upon the Western World began

¹ This function of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy as a carapace evolved by the Western Society, in order to protect it against the Ottoman impact, has been noticed already, by anticipation, in I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, on p. 156, footnote 1, above. The function of the Ottoman Empire as the universal state of the main body of Orthodox Christendom is discussed further below in Part III. A, vol. iii, on pp. 26-7, below.

with the hundred years' war between the 'Osmanlis and Hungary which culminated in the Battle of Mohacz (A.D. 1526). Before the opening of this long duel in A.D. 1433/4, the 'Osmanlis and the Westerners had only crossed one another's paths occasionally—and these occasions had arisen through the desultory interference of this or that Western Power in the distracted affairs of the Orthodox Christian Society with a half-hearted intention of preventing the 'Osmanlis from accomplishing their work of welding the main body of Orthodox Christendom together under Ottoman rule. This work, however, was substantially complete before the end of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era; it was not undone by the blow which Timur dealt the 'Osmanlis at Angora in A.D. 1402;¹ and, after a momentary pause, it was easily rounded off by Mehmed the Conqueror (*imperabat* A.D. 1452–81). It was not the annexation of Constantinople and the Morea and Trebizond and Qaraman, but the offensive against Hungary, that made the greatest demands upon Ottoman military energies in the fifteenth century.

Hungary, standing at bay under the leadership of John Hunyadi and his son Matthias Corvinus (*regnabat* A.D. 1458–90), was the most stubborn opponent whom the 'Osmanlis had yet encountered; and she was stimulated culturally as well as militarily by the tremendous effort involved in withstanding the Ottoman pressure almost single-handed. The disparity, however, between the respective forces of the two combatants was so great that the maintenance of the effort eventually proved to be beyond Hungary's strength; and the ultimate break-down of Hungary and formation of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy—in order to carry on Hungary's work with greater resources—were both portended in a number of preliminary and abortive attempts at political union between Hungary and several of her Western neighbours while the hundred years' war between Hungary and the 'Osmanlis was in progress. For instance, the Hungarian crown was fitfully united with the Bohemian during the years 1436–9 and 1453–7 and 1490–1526; both crowns were united with part of the Austrian patrimony of the Hapsburgs in 1438–9 and again in 1453–7; and Hungary alone was united with Austria from 1485 to 1490. Moreover, the crowns of Hungary and Poland were temporarily united for a second time from 1440 to 1444—this time in the person of a Polish and not a Hungarian sovereign, and with the object, not of bringing Hungarian reinforcements to Poland in her struggle with the Teutonic Order (the purpose of the previous Hungarian-Polish union in A.D. 1370–82),² but of bringing Polish reinforcements to Hungary in her struggle with the 'Osmanlis. These loose and ephemeral

¹ See II. D (iv), p. 102, above.

² See pp. 173–4, above.

unions were not enough to give Hungary the strong permanent reinforcement which she needed. They perhaps postponed but did not ultimately avert the crushing blow which the 'Osmanlis finally dealt Hungary at Mohacz; and it was only a disaster of this magnitude that could produce a sufficient psychological effect to bring the remnant of Hungary together with Bohemia and Austria into a close and enduring union under the Hapsburg Dynasty. This result was immediate. The triple union was accomplished before the end of the calendar year (A.D. 1526) in which the Battle of Mohacz had been fought; and it endured for nearly four hundred years—only to dissolve in the same calendar year (A.D. 1918) that saw the final break-up of the Ottoman Power which had delivered the dynamic blow at Mohacz four centuries back.

Indeed, from the moment of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy's foundation, its fortunes followed those of the hostile Power, whose pressure had called it into existence, in each successive phase. The heroic age of the Danubian Monarchy coincided chronologically with the period during which the Ottoman pressure was felt by the Western World most severely. This heroic age may be taken as beginning with the first abortive Ottoman siege of Vienna in A.D. 1529 and as ending with the second in A.D. 1682-3. In these two supreme ordeals, the Austrian capital played the same role—psychological as well as strategic—in the desperate resistance of the Western World to the Ottoman assault that Verdun played in the French resistance to the German assault in the War of 1914-18.¹ The two sieges were both turning-points in Ottoman military history. The failure of the first brought to a standstill the tide of Ottoman conquest which had been flooding up the Danube Valley for a century past. The failure of the second siege was followed by an ebb which continued thereafter—in a secular movement that persisted through all pauses and fluctuations—until the European frontiers of Turkey, which stood at the outskirts of Vienna from 1529 to 1683, have fallen back in our time to the outskirts of Adrianople. The Ottoman Empire's loss, however, has not been the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy's gain; for the heroic age of the Danubian Monarchy did not survive the beginning of the Ottoman decline. The collapse of the Ottoman Power, which threw open a field in South-Eastern Europe for other forces to occupy, simultaneously released the Danubian Monarchy from the pressure which had been stimulating it into heroic activity hitherto; and the withdrawal of the former stimulus inhibited the Danubian Monarchy from taking advantage of the new opportunity. So far

¹ For the part played by sieges in making the fortunes of cities, see further II. D (v), Annex, pp. 400-1, below.

from entering into the heritage of the Ottoman Empire in South-Eastern Europe, the Danubian Monarchy now followed into decline the Power that had originally called it into existence, and eventually shared the Ottoman Empire's fate.

In the counter-offensive which drove the 'Osmanlis back from the walls of Vienna in 1683, the Hapsburgs found themselves at the head of an anti-Ottoman coalition which included Venice, Poland, and Russia; yet they never avenged the sieges of Vienna by laying siege to Constantinople. The peace-treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 restored to the Hungarian Crown the greater part of the Hungarian territory which had been lost to the 'Osmanlis in 1526; the peace-treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 actually carried the frontier considerably beyond the line along which it had stood on the eve of the campaign of Mohacz, two centuries earlier. The peace-treaty of Belgrade in 1739, however, revised the frontier of 1718 in the 'Osmanlis' favour and to the Hapsburgs' disadvantage. The fortress of Belgrade itself, which Hungary had always held against the 'Osmanlis during the fifteenth century and which Prince Eugene had wrested from Ottoman hands in 1717, was retroceded in 1739 by the Hapsburg Monarchy to the Ottoman Empire; and though Austrian armies momentarily re-occupied Belgrade in the Austro-Turkish War of 1788-91 and again in the General War of 1914-18, Belgrade had another destiny. It finally passed out of Ottoman hands in 1866 to become the capital of the Serbian 'successor-state' of the Ottoman Empire; and it was recovered by the Serbs from the Austrians in 1918 in order to become the capital of Jugoslavia, which is a 'successor-state' of the Hapsburg Power as well as of the Ottoman. As for the south-eastern frontier of the Danubian Monarchy, it remained virtually stationary, at the line fixed in 1739, for the remainder of the Monarchy's existence. During the hundred and eighty years which elapsed between the conclusion of the Peace of Belgrade and the moment when the Hapsburg Monarchy signed its own death-warrant in the Armistice of 1918, the Monarchy made only two further acquisitions of Ottoman or ex-Ottoman territory, and these were of trivial dimensions.¹ Between 1683 and 1739, however, the Hapsburg frontier in this quarter had been advanced sufficiently far to relegate Vienna from the situation of a frontier-fortress to that of an imperial capital in the interior; and this change made itself felt in the city's fortunes and character. The glory which Vienna had gained by keeping the Turks at bay in 1529 and 1682-3 was tarnished by the humiliation

¹ The first of the two was the acquisition of the Bukovina in 1774-7; the second was the acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878 and annexed in 1908.

of French occupations in 1805 and 1809; and the Viennese, who had first made their name as the heroic defenders of Western Christendom, eventually became a by-word for an attractive but decidedly unheroic combination of fecklessness with amiability and softness with elegance.¹

If we look more closely, we shall see that the fate of Austria-Hungary was analogous to that of Poland-Lithuania. Just as the Polish counter-offensive against Russia at the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century precipitated the 'Westernization' of Russian Orthodox Christendom and thereby rendered Poland's previous *raison d'être*, as an anti-Russian march of the Western Society, superfluous, so the Austrian counter-offensive against the 'Osmanlis' in the last two decades of the seventeenth century precipitated the 'Westernization' of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the Balkan Peninsula and thereby deprived the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy of its *raison d'être* likewise.

The parallel extends to details. For example, when the 'Westernization' of Russia was taken in hand by Peter the Great, the Russian imperial revolutionary did not obtain his Western inspiration through the medium of his backward and hostile Western neighbour Poland. He addressed himself, by preference, to Germany and Holland and England: countries which were then leading the van in the progress of the Western Civilization and which were not alienated from Russia by any unneighbourly tradition of hostility. Similarly, in the main body of Orthodox Christendom, when the process of 'Westernization' was initiated—in a less deliberate and systematic way than Peter's—by the 'Osmanlis and their subjects under the stimulus of the Austrian counter-offensive, the 'Westernizers' did not address themselves to the Hapsburgs. The 'Osmanlis turned to France, who was their natural Western ally inasmuch as she was the House of Austria's principal Western rival.² As for the Orthodox Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire, they welcomed the Austrians at first as Christian liberators, only to find that the status of barely tolerated 'heretics' under a

¹ In the long run, this relaxing effect of an abnormal exemption from the pressure of the human environment has counted for more, in the evolution of the Austrian *ethos*, than the stimulating effect of the physical environment in the shape of an abnormally rough country. (For the latter aspect of Austria, see II. D (ii), pp. 58-60, above.) For Vienna, as the capital of the entire Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy over a span of four centuries, has outweighed the rural and highland remainder of Austria. It is the Viennese and not the Tyrolese who has set the tone of Austria in these latter days.

² Francis I of France actually co-operated with Suleymân the Magnificent in naval operations against the Hapsburg Power in the Mediterranean in 1543. France had been rewarded for her friendship already in 1535 by receiving 'capitulations' (i.e. a charter of trading rights) from the Ottoman Government in advance of any other Western Power apart from the Italian republics. These 'capitulations' were confirmed and improved in 1740 as a reward for diplomatic services which the French Government had rendered to the Ottoman Government during the negotiation of the Belgrade peace-treaty between Turkey and Austria in 1739.

Roman Catholic régime was less to their liking than that of explicitly licensed 'unbelievers' under the Islamic dispensation. Tantalized, and at the same time disillusioned, by their brief spells of Austrian and Venetian rule in the early years of the eighteenth century, the Serbs and Greeks turned eagerly towards their Russian co-religionists when these demonstrated the advantages of 'Westernization' by their decisive victory over the 'Osmanlis in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74.¹ Yet the Orthodox Christians of the Balkan Peninsula were not long content to derive their Western inspiration through this circuitous and stagnant Russian channel. They soon learnt to draw the living waters from the fountain-head. They eagerly imbibed the ideas of the American and the French Revolution; and they profited by a personal intercourse with the leading nations of the West when Napoleon burst into the Levant, with his British adversaries in his wake, in the course of the General War of 1792-1815. Before the close of the Napoleonic Wars, the main body of Orthodox Christendom was in ferment with the leaven of Romantic Nationalism which was the Western spirit of the age;² and this was the beginning of the end of the Hapsburg Monarchy.

It was in vain that the Monarchy, under the stimulus of Napoleon's repeated blows, played a decisive part in the overthrow of Napoleon by its military intervention in 1813³ and thereafter dominated the Congress of Vienna. While, to outward appearance, Metternich had skilfully taken advantage of the 'restoration' of the pre-revolutionary régime in Western Europe in order to secure for the Danubian Monarchy a European hegemony which it had never quite succeeded in exercising at any previous stage of its history, the underlying reality was something altogether different. In reality, the Danubian Monarchy, in the 'post-war' period which began in 1815, found itself encircled, for the first time in its history, by a single ubiquitous adversary in front and rear—in Western Europe on the one side and in South-Eastern Europe on the other⁴ - and this adversary was the *Zeitgeist* of that very Western Society

¹ See Khrysanthópoulos, Ph.: *Απομνημονεύματα περί της 'Ελληνικής 'Επανάστασης*, (Athens 1899, Sakellarios, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 16-18.

² See Kolokotronis, Th.: *Διήγησις Συμβάντων της 'Ελληνικής Φυλής, 1770-1836* (Athens 1889, Estia, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 48-9.

³ See II. D (iv), p. 105, above.

⁴ The Janus-like physiognomy of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy is aptly symbolized in the double-headed eagle (a heraldic perversion of the Roman eagle, which the Hapsburg Monarchy shared, as its official emblem, with Prussia and Russia). While one head of the Austrian eagle was keeping watch eastward towards the Ottoman Empire, the other head was ever craning back westward into the interior of the Western World; and the Ottoman pressure had no sooner begun to slacken than the Danubian Monarchy began to divert its attention and energy disastrously from Near Eastern to Western affairs. This tendency, which first declared itself in the Thirty Years' War, is examined further in V. C (i) c, vol. v, pp. 325-7, below.

in which the Monarchy itself inextricably lived and moved and had its being.

Thus the situation of the Monarchy had really changed, in the course of a century, most profoundly to the Monarchy's disadvantage. A hundred years earlier, on the morrow of the Western General War of 1672-1713, the Danubian Monarchy had still been secure in front and rear alike. On its front, *vis-à-vis* the Orthodox Christian World, it was then already more than holding its own against the slackening pressure of the 'Osmanlis, while in its rear, *vis-à-vis* its fellow-members in the Western Society to which the Monarchy itself belonged, it was still performing the service and fulfilling the function which was its *raison d'être*, in its original capacity as the carapace which the Western body social had evolved from its own living substance in order to protect it against Ottoman sabre-strokes. On the other hand, in 1815, though the Danubian Monarchy had once again emerged from a general war even more triumphantly, to outward appearance, than in 1714, its *raison d'être*, and therewith its security, existed no longer. The sabre against whose strokes the West had sought protection under the Austrian carapace had fallen, by this time, out of the 'Osmanli's decrepit hands; and the osseous growth of the Danubian Monarchy, which could not be re-absorbed into the living tissues of the Western body social now that its function had become obsolete, was simply cramping the internal growth of the society whose life it had once preserved against a deadly attack from an external enemy. Since the foundation of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy in A.D. 1526, the cumulative effect of the Dutch, English, American, and French revolutions had called into existence in the Western World a new political order—a comity of nations—in which a dynastic state like the Hapsburg Monarchy was an anachronism and an anomaly. In attempting to restore the pre-revolutionary régime in Europe on the basis of the principle of Dynastic Legitimacy and in defiance of the principle of Nationality, Metternich provocatively transformed the Monarchy from 'King Log' into 'King Stork', from a passive incubus upon the life of the Western Society into an active internal enemy of Western progress—an enemy more harmful, in its own fashion, than the now decrepit external Ottoman enemy which the Hapsburg Monarchy had formerly kept at bay.

The Monarchy spent the last century of its existence in attempts—all doomed to failure before they were made—at hindering the inevitable revision of the political map of Europe on national lines; and in this futile endeavour there are two points of interest for our present purpose. The first point is that, from 1815 onwards, the new Western leaven of Nationalism was fermenting just as

vigorously among the Orthodox Christian peoples within and beyond the south-eastern frontiers of the Danubian Monarchy as it was among the Western peoples within and beyond the frontiers of the Monarchy on the western side. The second point is that when the Monarchy reconciled itself at last, under the discipline of hard experience, to the necessity of making some concessions to the spirit of the age, it duly succeeded in arriving at an accommodation with the national aspirations of the Western peoples. By renouncing the hegemony over Germany and the possession of territory in Italy in 1866, the Hapsburg Monarchy rendered possible its own coexistence with the new German Empire and with the new Italian Kingdom; and by accepting the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867 and its Austrian corollary in Galicia, the Hapsburg Dynasty succeeded in identifying its own interests with the national interests of the Polish and the Magyar as well as the German element in its dominions. The problem which the Hapsburg Monarchy never succeeded in solving was the problem of Nationalism in the Balkans; and it was its inability to arrive at an accommodation in this quarter that eventually brought the Monarchy to destruction. The Western weapons of Nationalism, which had not dealt the Hapsburg Monarchy any mortal blow when they were wielded by the Italian and German and Magyar hands that had forged them, proved deadly in the alien hands of the Serbs. The discarded Danubian carapace of the Western body social, which had withstood so many blows from the Ottoman sabre, was eventually pierced and shattered by Serbian bayonets.

Since 1918, the south-eastern frontier of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy—a frontier which for a hundred and eighty years was one of the abiding landmarks in the political landscape of Europe—has been effaced by the establishment of two new national states—Jugoslavia and Greater Rumania—which are symbolic of the triumph of the new order. Each of these new states is a 'successor-state' both of the *ci-devant* Hapsburg Monarchy and of the *ci-devant* Ottoman Empire; and each of them unites within its newly drawn frontiers not only territories acquired from two different dynastic states, but also—under the sign of the Western principle of nationality—populations that have been nurtured, hitherto, by two different civilizations. This audacious experiment in political chemistry may succeed or fail; these synthetically produced nations may become organic unions or may disintegrate into their constituent elements; but the mere fact that the experiment is being made is conclusive evidence that the Hapsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire are both defunct and that they have been destroyed simultaneously by an identic hostile force.

It is curious in the present 'post-war' age, as one's train crosses the railway-bridge over the Save, between Semlin and Belgrade, to reread the opening passage of Kinglake's *Eothen*. When, less than a century ago, the English traveller was ferried across the frontier-river from the Hapsburg to the Ottoman bank, he felt as though he were passing out of one world into another; and the Austrian hussar who escorted him to the ferry-boat took leave of him as solemnly as though he were Hermes Psychopompus committing a soul to Charon's barque on the River of Hades. To the uninitiated English observer and to the unsophisticated Austrian soldier alike, the gulf there fixed between 'West' and 'East' seemed as great in the post-Napoleonic age as it had ever been; but this was not the view of the anxious-minded Rhenish statesman who at that moment, from his cabinet in Vienna, was pulling the strings of European diplomacy like a human spider spinning a political web. Metternich knew well enough, by that time, that the ancient gulf had been bridged and the ancient barriers thrown down; he knew that the spiritual leaven of Nationalism had already been carried from the 'West' into the 'East' across the obsolete dividing line; and he knew that the political miasma which was arising from the fermentation of this Western leaven in Orthodox Christian souls was more difficult to exclude from the sacrosanct dominions of his Imperial Master than the Plague itself.

Already, Metternich had taken alarm at the outbreak of the Greek insurrection against Ottoman rule in 1821. Clear-sighted as he was according to his own lights, he had divined at once that this repudiation of the Ottoman Pādishāh's authority by a handful of his Orthodox Christian subjects in the remote Morea was a menace to the authority of the Austrian Kaiser because the Greeks were claiming Western sympathy and assistance for their cause in the name of the Western principle of Nationality. Metternich represented to the Holy Alliance insistently, though without success, that if their own principle of Legitimacy was to be maintained intact, the Greek insurgents must be boycotted as outlaws and Sultan Mahmūd be supported, in maintaining his dynastic rights, as one of the Lord's Anointed. From the Legitimist standpoint, Metternich's attitude on this occasion was entirely justified by the event. For the triumphant success of the Greek insurgents—a success which they owed to the friendly intervention of France, Great Britain, and Russia as much as to their own exertions—was an event of far more than local importance. The erection of a sovereign independent national Greek State in 1829-31 made it inevitable that every people in South-Eastern Europe should insist upon attaining its own national independence and national unity sooner

or later; and thus the Greek insurrection of 1821 incidentally preordained the erection of Yugoslavia and Greater Rumania in 1918-20. Truly, Metternich's senses had not deceived him when he heard the death-knell of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy in those reverberations from the clash of arms in the Morea which fell upon his ears in Vienna.

It is curious, too, in this present 'post-war' age, to compare the situation and the *éthos* of Austria with those of contemporary Turkey on the one hand and Bavaria on the other.

Out of the destruction which overtook the Hapsburg and the Ottoman Empire simultaneously in the General War of 1914-18, there have emerged an Austrian and a Turkish Republic; and these two republics bear a superficial resemblance to one another inasmuch as they both conform outwardly to the conventional type of modern parliamentary national state with which the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires remained fundamentally incompatible to the end of their histories. This formal resemblance, however, between the new Austria and the new Turkey is of little significance in the light of their profound present difference in *éthos*. The Austrians are at once the hardest hit and the least recalcitrant of the five peoples that have emerged from the War of 1914-18 on the losing side. They have accepted the new order passively, with supreme resignation as well as with supreme regret. By contrast, the Turks are the only people among the five who have taken up arms again, after the Armistice, against the victorious Powers and have successfully insisted upon negotiating their own peace-treaty freely and on a footing of equality with their late opponents, instead of having the victors' peace-terms imposed upon them. More than that, the Turks have seized upon the catastrophe of the Ottoman Empire as an opportunity for renewing their youth and changing their destiny. So far from accepting the new order passively, they have welcomed it with open arms, and have plunged into the path of Westernization, at the heels of their former subjects the Greeks and Serbs and Rumanians and Bulgars, with the zeal of eleventh-hour converts who are taking the Kingdom of Heaven by storm.

How are we to explain these strangely diverse psychological phenomena? Examination shows that this *éthos* in Turkish souls is something quite new. For more than five centuries—from the close of their dynamic age at the beginning of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era down to A.D. 1919—the Turks, in all the vicissitudes of their history, invariably displayed the psychological reactions of Conservatism. In the days of their prosperity, they waxed fat and kicked, like Jeshurun;¹ and in the days of their ad-

¹ Deuteronomy xxxii. 15.

versity they either stood stock still or behaved like sullen, thick-skinned mules who will not move until they are belaboured, and then not more than one step at a time.

The former ruling minority of Turkish landlords, who found themselves left stranded among alien minorities and under alien rule by the ebb of the Ottoman tide in Europe between 1683 and 1913, used to accept their sudden and extreme reversal of fortune as passively as the Austrians have accepted theirs since 1918. They would either abandon their ancestral lands and migrate *en masse* to squat and flit and squat again within the ever contracting Ottoman frontiers; or if they were too phlegmatic to make even this negative response to the new human challenge confronting them, and were restrained from migrating by sheer inertia, then they would resign themselves to sinking from the top to the bottom of the social ladder in their old homes under the new conditions. As for their fellows who continued to rule the Ottoman Empire, they could only be induced to 'Westernize' their institutions under *force majeure*, and then always piecemeal and to the minimum degree that seemed necessary at the moment in order to keep the Empire just alive. This stricture fairly applies to all the Ottoman 'Westernizers' from Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmūd II down to the Committee of Union and Progress inclusive, with one notable exception to prove the rule in the person of Midhat Pasha.¹ How, then, are we to explain the revolutionary change in the Turkish state of mind, from an ultra-Austrian passivity to an ultra-Jacobin activity, which has come to pass since 1919? And how, for that matter, are we to explain the converse change in the Austrian state of mind from the heroism of the defence of Vienna in 1682-3 to the 'defeatism' of the present day?

The explanation of both changes is to be found in the normal operation of Challenge-and-Response. The Viennese are showing, now, the cumulative psychological effects of having lived for more than two centuries as an 'imperial people' in the interior of the Hapsburg Dominions instead of sustaining their historic role as wardens of the marches of Western Christendom against the 'Osmanlis'. In their unstimulating latter-day environment, they learnt to feed out of the Dynasty's hand; and when the Imperial Government's ultimatum to Serbia had precipitated the General War of 1914-18, they obeyed the mobilization order, like sheep who follow their shepherd to the slaughter-house, with a blind faith in their Emperor Francis Joseph's assurance that, in doing what he had done, he had foreseen, and made provision for, all the eventualities that might befall his

¹ The process of 'Westernization' in the Ottoman Empire is examined in greater detail in IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 76-8, as well as in Part IX, below.

trusty and well-beloved subjects. On the other hand, the Turks have responded, at this eleventh hour, to the challenge from the West—a challenge first presented by the triumphant defenders of Vienna in A.D. 1683—because, in 1919, they were simply unable to evade the issue any longer.

On the morrow of the Armistice of 1918, the Turks found themselves standing with their backs to the wall, in a situation in which they must either conquer or die. In this supreme hour, they were betrayed by the Ottoman Dynasty—a dynasty which had created not only the Ottoman Empire but the 'Osmanli Turks themselves, who were stamped, in the very name which they bore, with their creator's own image and superscription.¹ The Turks were forced by this betrayal to rely upon themselves—and this in a struggle for their existence. For in 1919–22 the Turks were no longer fighting in order to preserve an Ottoman province for their Pādishāh or a fragment of Dār-al-Islām for their Caliph. They were fighting to preserve their own homelands. The battle-field of In Önü, on which the decisive action in the Graeco-Turkish War of 1919–22 was fought, lies in that original patrimony on the north-western edge of the Anatolian Plateau which had been assigned to the fathers of the 'Osmanlis by the last of the Saljūqs more than six centuries back.² On the day of this decisive battle, the tide of Ottoman history, whose mighty flood had once spread from the neighbourhood of In Önü to the neighbourhood of Vienna, at length completed its mighty ebb by returning to its source. In this situation, the Ottoman Turkish people was faced with the momentous choice between two, and only two, alternatives: annihilation or metamorphosis. It will be seen that the final urgency of the challenge to which the Turks have responded has been fully sufficient to account for the potency of their eleventh-hour response. It will also be seen that the reversal in the direction of the pressure between the Western World and the main body of Orthodox Christendom—a reversal which first manifested itself under the walls of Vienna in A.D. 1683—has been followed in due course by a corresponding transfer of stimulus, which has manifested itself, in turn, in the situation and in the *éthos* of the two communities by whom the brunt of the pressure has been given and taken.

So much for the comparison between Austria and Turkey. As for the other comparison of Austria with Bavaria, the interest of this lies in the fact that Bavaria and Austria were originally of one substance. By origin, Austria is simply Bavaria's 'eastern march'—

¹ For the creation of the 'Osmanlis, see further Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 22–44, below.

² See pp. 151–2, above.

or, rather, a cluster of Bavarian marches: Upper Austria, Lower Austria, and Steiermark or Styria—which was first evolved by the Bavarian body politic in order to protect its eastern flank against assaults from the Avars and Slovenes, and which afterwards became differentiated and consolidated, by a series of historical accidents, into a separate political entity. When we formulate the history of Austria in these genetic terms, we find ourselves enabled to measure once again, from a new angle, the extent of the change which has been produced in the Austrian *êthos* by the successive imposition and removal of external pressures.

During the last ten or twelve centuries, the country which began life as the eastern march of Bavaria has passed through a long series of experiences in which the Bavarian interior has had no share. Austria has been first stimulated by recurring waves of attack from Avars and Magyars and 'Osmanlis and then debilitated by the paternal despotism of the Hapsburgs; she has performed in turn the strangely different functions of carapace to a society in jeopardy and metropolitan province to a Great Power; and each phase in this varied and distinguished history has left some mark upon her, until the sum total has effaced her original Bavarian identity and has transformed her character, as well as her name, into something that is now entirely her own. During all this time, while the transfigured eastern march of Bavaria has been playing her great part in the life of our Western Society and in the life of the World, the Bavarian interior has remained one of those small countries which are 'happy in having no history'—as is signified in the fact that it has retained the original Bavarian name which Austria has discarded. During the ten or twelve centuries that have elapsed since Bavaria and Austria first parted company and began to go their different ways, the Bavarian *êthos* has remained parochial and exuberant and sanguine, whereas the Austrian *êthos* has become oecumenical and fastidious and sceptical. The contrast between the temperaments respectively prevalent in these two South German Catholic countries to-day cannot fail to strike the traveller who passes from one into the other at almost any point on their long common frontier; and it is not a contrast that can possibly be explained by any difference of racial endowment. There is no reason to suppose that, in the population of the original Bavaria, there was any difference of race between the Bavarians of the eastern marches and the Bavarians of the interior, nor is there any record of substantial changes in the racial composition of either population since their subsequent segregation into separate communities. The only tenable explanation—and it is a wholly adequate explanation—of the difference between the Bavarian and the

Austrian *êthos* at the present day is to be found in the operation of the psychological force of Challenge-and-Response.

In the Western World over against the Far Western Christendom

Having now surveyed such illustrations of Challenge-and-Response as are offered by the various historic responses to external pressures upon the continental European frontiers of Western Christendom, let us glance at three other frontiers of the same society: its land-frontier *vis-à-vis* the now extinct Far Western Christendom¹ in the *alter orbis* of Britain; its maritime frontier, *vis-à-vis* the abortive Scandinavian Civilization,² along the sea-boards of England and France upon the North Sea and the Channel; and its land-frontier *vis-à-vis* the Syriac Civilization in the Iberian Peninsula.

What has been the genesis of the present British 'United Kingdom'? It is a union of the two kingdoms of England and Scotland in Great Britain, together with the English and Scottish conquests and plantations in Ireland;³ and these two kingdoms, which cover the whole area of Great Britain between them, are the products of a struggle for existence between half a dozen 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire which were established, during the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung*, by Anglian and Jutish barbarians who migrated across the North Sea from the western coast of the continent to the eastern and southern coasts of the Roman island.⁴ An inquiry into the genesis of the United Kingdom thus resolves itself into the prior question: How is it that the struggle for existence between the primitive and ephemeral barbarian principalities of the so-called 'Heptarchy' in Great Britain has resulted in the emergence of these two progressive and enduring states-members of our Western Society? If we now glance at the historical process by which the two kingdoms of England and Scotland have eventually replaced 'the Heptarchy' on the political map, we shall find that the determining factor at every stage has been a response to some challenge which has been presented by the incidence of an external pressure.

The genesis of the Kingdom of Scotland can be traced back to

¹ This abortive Far Western Christian Civilization has been referred to, by anticipation, in I. B (iii), vol. 3, p. 29, above, and is dealt with further in II. D (vii), on pp. 322-40, below.

² See II. D (iii), pp. 86-100, above, and II. D (vii), pp. 340-60, below.

³ At the time of writing, some twelve years after the establishment of the Irish Free State, the United Kingdom still included an enclave of territory in Northern Ireland, where the Scottish plantations of the seventeenth century were most thickly sown, as a memorial of the fact that it once embraced the whole of the British Isles save for the Isle of Man, whose special status was a legacy from its Norwegian past.

⁴ This migration has been touched upon already, on pp. 86-100, above, apropos of the stimulus of migrations across the sea.

a challenge which was presented, some nine or ten centuries ago, to the outlying Anglian kingdom of Northumbria by the Picts and Scots, who were the representatives of the abortive Far Western Christian Civilization in an adjoining section of 'the Celtic Fringe'. The present capital of Scotland, Edinburgh, was founded by the Northumbrian prince whose name it bears¹ as the frontier-fortress of Northumbria over against the Picts; the political and cultural nucleus of medieval and modern Scotland has been the district called Lothian; and Lothian was originally the march of Northumbria against both the Picts beyond the Firth of Forth and the Britons in Strathclyde. The challenge was presented when the Picts and Scots conquered Edinburgh in A.D. 954 and thereafter compelled the principality of Northumbria to cede the whole of Lothian to them round about the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries. This cession raised the following issue: Was this lost march of Northumbria, which had likewise been a march of Western Christendom, to retain its Western Christian culture in spite of the local change of political régime, or was it to succumb to the alien Far Western Christian culture of its Celtic conquerors? So far from succumbing, Lothian responded to the challenge by 'taking its conquerors captive'.

The culture of the conquered territory exercised such an attraction upon the Scottish kings that they made it the seat of their kingdom and came to feel and to behave as though Lothian were their ancestral homeland and as though their native Highlands were an outlying and alien part of their dominions. In consequence, by an historical paradox, the eastern seaboard of Scotland, from the northern shore of the Firth of Forth to the southern shore of the Moray Firth, was colonized, and 'the Highland Line' was pushed back steadily farther towards the north-west, by settlers of Anglian origin from Lothian under the auspices of rulers of Celtic origin and at the expense of a Celtic population who were the Scottish kings' original kinsmen and who had once conquered the Lowlanders under the leadership of these very kings' forefathers. By a consequential and not less paradoxical transference of nomenclature, 'the Scottish language' came to mean the Teutonic dialect spoken in Lothian, the *ci-devant* march of the Anglian principality of Northumbria, instead of meaning the Gaelic dialect spoken by the original Scots who had first brought the Scottish name into Britain in a migration from the north-west corner of Ireland to Argyll during the post-Hellenic Völkerwanderung.

Thus the ultimate result of the conquest of Lothian by the Scots

¹ This traditional etymology is challenged by J. A. Duke in *The Columban Church* (Oxford 1932, University Press), p. 13.

and Picts was not to set back the north-western boundary of Western Christendom from the Forth to the Tweed but to push the boundary forward until it embraced the whole north-western corner of the mainland of Britain. The new Kingdom of Scotland, which was brought into existence by the union of Lothian with the domain of the Scots and Picts in the Highlands, took the impress of the Western Christian culture which Lothian contributed to the common stock of the new Scottish body politic. Scotland became a member of the Western instead of the Far Western Christian Society; so that the conquest of Lothian by the Scots and Picts, which had first had all the appearance of being a redistribution of territory between Western and Far Western Christendom to the advantage of the latter at the former's expense, was actually turned to the advantage of Western Christendom by the triumphant response which Lothian made to the challenge thus presented to her. In virtue of this response, her transfer from Anglian to Scottish rule ultimately caused Western Christendom to increase and Far Western Christendom to decrease on this sector of their frontier in the British Isles.¹

Thus a conquered fragment of one of the principalities of the English 'Heptarchy' actually became the nucleus of one of the two commonwealths which have now come to divide between them the whole of Britain and to constitute by their union the present United Kingdom. This was an extraordinary feat; and it is pertinent to observe, once again, that the fragment of Northumbria

¹ The political union which brought the medieval and modern Kingdom of Scotland into existence towards the beginning of the eleventh century of the Christian Era has several points of symmetry with the union which brought into existence the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy five centuries later. In the Scottish instance, Lothian plays the part that is played in the Danubian instance by Austria. Though it is the smallest of the component members of the union in mere territorial extent, it manages to dominate the rest by its superiority in culture and in political ability. Again, Edinburgh corresponds to Vienna. Either city finds its destiny in being the capital of a union between two states after having started life as the frontier-fortress of one of the two states against the other: Vienna as the frontier-fortress of Austria (or rather Bavaria) against Hungary, Edinburgh as the frontier-fortress of Lothian (or rather Northumbria) against the Picts. The symmetry extends even further; for the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy sprang from the union not of two states but of three, and so did the Kingdom of Scotland likewise. If Lothian is the analogue of Austria and if the country of the Picts and Scots, north of the Forth-Clyde line, is the analogue of Hungary, we find that Bohemia has its counterpart in Strathclyde. By comparison with these substantial correspondences, it is not a material point of difference that the dynasty which brought about the Danubian union originated in Austria, whereas the dynasty which brought about the North British union originated not in Lothian—the analogue of Austria—but in the domain of the Picts and Scots, which is the analogue of Hungary. It was only an accident that the Danubian Monarchy was not brought into existence by the Hungarian conquest of Austria in A.D. 1485. If Matthias Corvinus's anticipation of Ferdinand Hapsburg's achievement had lasted not merely half a dozen years but four centuries—as it well might have lasted—and had so precluded an Austrian ruler from performing the achievement with enduring success forty years later, as it was actually performed by Ferdinand, then the Danubian Monarchy would have come to be known as 'the Hungarian Empire' and not as 'the Austrian Empire'. In that event, the symmetry between the political structures of the Danubian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Scotland would have been complete down to the very nomenclature.

which performed this feat was the march between Forth and Tweed and not the interior between Tweed or Tyne or Tees and Humber.

If some enlightened traveller from Constantinople or Cordova had visited Northumbria in the tenth or eleventh century of the Christian Era, on the eve of the cession of Lothian to the Scots and Picts, he would assuredly have pronounced that Lothian had no future, and that, if any Northumbrian town was to become the capital of a great country, the town marked out for this destiny was not Edinburgh but York. Here was a city situated at the mid-point of the largest and richest arable plain that was to be found in the whole northern half of the island of Britain; a city which had once been a *point d'appui* of the Roman Empire and had now become a *point d'appui* of the Roman Church. Already, for a moment at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries, York had bade fair to become the capital of a great kingdom—not indeed, as a state-member of Western Christendom, but as an important structural element in the rising edifice of the Scandinavian World which was then threatening to drive Western Christendom to the wall and to usurp its place.¹ Yet this Scandinavian Kingdom of York rose and fell as swiftly as some solid-seeming mountain of thick-piled cloud which dissolves into wisps before the eyes of the astonished gazer. By the year A.D. 920, the Danish Kingdom of York, as well as the surviving remnant of English Northumbria north of Tees, had submitted to the suzerainty of the English King of Wessex; and, through all the subsequent vicissitudes of Danish and Norman conquest, Yorkshire came to be welded more and more closely into the fabric of the new Kingdom of England. Nothing but the abnormal size of Yorkshire among the counties of England and Scotland to-day remains to recall the fact that York once aspired to be the capital not of a county but of a kingdom. This aspiration came to naught in the collapse of the abortive Scandinavian Civilization which had momentarily translated it into a reality. In A.D. 920, when King Ragnvald of York acknowledged the suzerainty of King Edward of Wessex, York lost her prospect of becoming the capital of a kingdom thirty-five years before Edinburgh was assured of this prospect through being conquered from her Northumbrian founders by the Picts and Scots in A.D. 955.

The Northumbrian city which came nearest to emulating Edinburgh's political eminence was not York but Durham; and Durham became eminent by inheriting from Lothian the role of northern march against the Scots after the incorporation of Lothian

¹ For the conflict between Western Christendom and the abortive Scandinavian Civilization, see II. D (vii), pp. 340-60, below.

itself into Scotland. As the county palatine of the medieval Kingdom of England *vis-à-vis* the medieval Kingdom of Scotland, Durham acquired something of the status of an independent state and her prince-bishop some of the attributes of a sovereign.

In the Western World over against Scandinavia

In the foregoing analysis of the differentiation between the respective fortunes of several parts of the early English principality of Northumbria, we have just had occasion to notice certain incidents in the Scandinavian impact upon Western Christendom. This Scandinavian impact was the other external pressure, over and above the pressure from the Far Western Christians of 'the Celtic fringe', which went to the making of the Kingdom of Scotland; and it also went to the making of the kingdoms of England and France likewise.

In the making of Scotland, the union between Lothian and the domain of the Picts and Scots was not the first stage. By the time when the Picts and Scots conquered Lothian, they were already united with one another; but this union was not of old standing. Before the *Völkerwanderung* that followed the break-up of the Roman Empire, the Picts had had the northern extremity of Britain to themselves. During the *Völkerwanderung* the Scots had migrated across the sea from Ireland and had settled in Argyll as hostile intruders on Pictish ground.¹ The hostility between the two peoples had only given place to a friendly political union between them in A.D. 843. What was the cause of this remarkable change in their relations? The date speaks for itself. The Picto-Scottish union was effected one year after the first Viking raid on London and two years before the first Viking raid on Paris; and while some of the Scandinavian sea-raiders were sailing down the North Sea into the English Channel, others had been finding their way round the north-west coasts of Britain into Ireland. Thus the date of the Picto-Scottish union seems to tell its own tale; and we may hazard the conjecture that the two peoples who before the advent of the Vikings had been contending with one another for possession of the northern extremity of Britain, now brought themselves to compose their feud and unite their forces in response to the challenge of this formidable new pressure which had suddenly descended upon both alike from Scandinavia.

If this conjecture is right, the genesis of the Kingdom of Scotland may be expressed in terms of the responses to two successive challenges: first, a Picto-Scottish response to a Scandinavian challenge, and, second, a response on the part of the Northumbrian

¹ See II. D (iii), p. 86, above, and II. D (vii), pp. 323-4, below.

frontiersmen in the march of Lothian to a challenge from the united Picts and Scots.

In the genesis of the Kingdom of England we can discern the operation of responses to the same two challenges, but we find that the challenges were delivered here in the inverse chronological order. In this case, the first pressure—corresponding chronologically to the impact of the Scandinavians upon the Picts and Scots—was the pressure of certain sections of 'the Celtic Fringe' upon the English principalities of 'the Heptarchy'; the second pressure—corresponding chronologically to the Picto-Scottish conquest of Lothian—was the impact of the Scandinavians upon the two English principalities which had previously marked themselves out as the two alternative candidates for the hegemony of Southern Britain by their respective responses to the challenge of Celtic pressure upon the western borders of the English settlements in the island.

Just as, in North Britain, it was not Yorkshire in the interior of the principality of Northumbria but Lothian on the local border of 'the Celtic Fringe' that became the nucleus of an enduring kingdom, so, in South Britain, this destiny did not await the principality of Kent, in the corner of the island which lay nearest to the focus of the Western Christian Civilization on the Continent, nor again the principality of Essex, just across the estuary of the Thames. Thanks to its geographical situation, Kent did indeed become the first *point d'appui* of the Roman Church in Britain, as York became the second. Yet the very geographical circumstances which told in favour of Canterbury and York becoming archbishops' sees at the same time militated against their becoming the capitals of kingdoms. On the political plane, Canterbury never rose to be anything more than the capital of the principality of Kent. Political power in South Britain accrued not to Kent and Essex in the interior, at the point of junction between the insular outpost of Western Christendom and its continental main body, but to Mercia and Wessex, the two English principalities which were 'up against' the two southerly sectors of 'the Celtic Fringe' on the main island of the British Archipelago.

Moreover, the relative strength of Mercia and Wessex, in the first phase of their histories, showed itself proportionate to the relative strength of the external pressure from 'the Celtic Fringe' to which these two English principalities were subject. The pressure exerted upon Mercia from Wales was stronger than that exerted upon Wessex from the Welsh communities south of the Bristol Channel. Though the resistance of these 'West Welsh' to the English invaders has left an undying echo in the legend of King

Arthur, this resistance seems nevertheless to have been overcome with comparative ease and rapidity. The Arthurian legend ends on a note of heroic disaster; and the front line of the 'West Welsh' defences, which the legend locates in the neighbourhood of Glastonbury, was driven back by the founders of the English border principality of Wessex, advancing up the Valley of the River Thames, from the western watershed of the Thames to the distant line of the River Tamar which now constitutes the boundary between the counties of Devon and Cornwall. Confined, as they thus were, to a by no means impregnable patch of territory in the extreme south-western corner of the island, the 'West Welsh' ceased to be formidable to the English principality of Wessex, whereas the Welsh of Wales, from their relatively extensive and defensible mountain fastnesses, continued to press upon the western frontier of the adjoining English principality of Mercia.

The severity of this pressure is attested philologically by the name Mercia itself ('The March' *par excellence*) and archaeologically by the vestiges of the great earthwork called 'Offa's Dyke' which once covered the Welsh frontier of Mercia from the estuary of the Severn to the estuary of the Dee; and the military and political energy generated in Mercia, in response to this external pressure, enabled this same Mercian King Offa, when he turned his arms from the frontier towards the interior, to come within an ace of establishing a Mercian hegemony over South Britain. At the time when Mercia was stimulated, by her reaction to the pressure from Wales, into indulging these great ambitions, Wessex was prompted, by the less powerful stimulus from her 'West Welsh' frontier, to achieve, in the interior, the less ambitious feat of absorbing Kent and Essex into her body politic. Thus, in the eighth century of the Christian Era, it looked as though Mercia rather than Wessex were marked out, by the greater energy of her response to the pressure from 'the Celtic Fringe', as the destined nucleus of a future Kingdom of England. In the ninth century, however, when the challenge from 'the Celtic Fringe' was eclipsed by the challenge from Scandinavia, these prospects were falsified. In face of this new challenge, Mercia forfeited her prospects of greatness by failing to respond this time,¹ while Wessex, under the leadership and inspiration of Alfred, responded triumphantly and thereby became the nucleus of the historic Kingdom of England as it exists at the present day.

The Scandinavian pressure upon the Oceanic (as contrasted with the Mediterranean) seaboard of Western Christendom evoked

¹ Before the close of the eighth century, Mercia had sapped her own strength by succumbing to the malady of Militarism (see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 501, below).

responses which resulted not only in the coalescence of the Kingdom of England out of the insular 'Heptarchy', but also in the articulation of the Kingdom of France out of the continental mass of Western Christendom which had once been embraced in Charlemagne's Empire.

We have already observed that, in the tenth century, 'the Holy Roman Empire' passed from the Carolingian Dynasty to the Ottonids; and we have explained¹ this transfer of power by the circumstance that, as a result of Charlemagne's conquest of Saxony, the stimulus of serving as the march of Western Christendom against the continental European barbarians had been inherited by conquered Saxony from her conqueror Austrasia. We may now consider the notorious historical fact that, when the Ottonids succeeded the Carolingians in the Imperial office, they did not enter into the whole of the Carolingian territorial inheritance. Of the three portions into which the Carolingian dominions had been partitioned in A.D. 843,² only the eastern and the central portion were reunited, rather more than a century later, under the rule of Otto I (*imperator* A.D. 962-73).³ In the western portion, the Carolingians were succeeded, not by the Ottonids but by the Capetians (in A.D. 987);⁴ and this change of dynasty was the outward visible sign of an inward psychological change which was the genesis of 'France' in the present meaning of the name. The West Frankish crown became the French crown when it was transferred from the head of the last Carolingian at Laon to Hugh Capet's head at Rheims. Out of the old undifferentiated substance of the Carolingian Empire there had emerged, in the west, a new kingdom which thenceforward was not only recognized juridically as being independent of 'the Holy Roman Empire' but was also felt to be a distinct body politic, within the larger but more rudimentary body social of Western Christendom, in the consciousness of the French people themselves. In fact, the birth of France in the tenth century of the Christian Era was the first—and has ever remained one of the most definite—of those inner geographical articulations of our Western Society which in our day have been carried to extremes in the name of 'the principle of nationality'.

Why was it that, when 'the Holy Roman Empire' was rescued from disintegration by the Ottonids, it failed to reunite the western portion of the Carolingian Empire with the central and the eastern

¹ See pp. 167-8, above.

² See I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 37, above.

³ Otto became German king (i.e. ruler of the easternmost of the three portions into which the heritage of Charlemagne had been partitioned in A.D. 843) in A.D. 936, twenty-six years before he assumed the Imperial title. The claim, implicit in this assumption, to sovereignty over the entire Carolingian heritage was never, of course, made good either by Otto or by his successors.

⁴ The date of Hugh Capet's coronation at Rheims.

portion under its aegis? We have remarked above that the defence and extension of the continental European frontiers of Western Christendom was the original function of 'the Holy Roman Empire' and continued to be its function—in face of diverse pressures from barbarians and from alien civilizations—through all its subsequent metamorphoses. Thus the secession of France from 'the Empire' was not due to any failure, on 'the Empire's' part, to perform its own special duty. The emergence of the Kingdom of France, like that of the Kingdom of England, in the tenth century is rather to be explained as the response to a new external pressure upon a different frontier of Western Christendom: the Scandinavian pressure upon the Atlantic seaboard. From the continental pressures which it was 'the Holy Roman Empire's' task to meet, Britain was exempt by nature and Gaul by circumstance after Charlemagne had carried the continental frontier of Western Christendom forward from the right bank of the Rhine to the left bank of the Elbe. On the other hand, the impact of the Vikings subjected Western Christendom to a maritime pressure from which the central and eastern portions of the Carolingian dominions were exempt, but which fell with its full weight upon the western portion—that is, upon Western Gaul—together with Britain. The line of the original frontier between France and 'the Empire'—a frontier which bisected ancient Gaul longitudinally from the mouth of the Scheldt to the mouth of the Rhône—is explicable as the line along which, in the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era, there was a substantial equilibrium between two simultaneous external pressures. East of this line, the continental pressure from Slavs and Nomads was still felt more severely than any other, while west of the same line this continental pressure was exceeded by the maritime pressure from the Vikings—a pressure which overbore all others in its zone of heaviest incidence within range of the Atlantic coast and up the navigable channels of the rivers which gave the Viking ships an entry from the coast into the interior.

The local responses to the maritime challenge from Scandinavia which were made by the Western Christian Society on the Atlantic slope of the European Continent and in the British Archipelago were literally the making of France and England as we know them to-day.¹ These responses not only brought the two kingdoms into

¹ In the subsequent course of Western history, the making of France and England was completed by the mutual pressure which the two kingdoms exerted in turn upon one another. In particular, the grinding pressure to which France was subjected by England in the last phase of 'the Hundred Years' War' evoked the tremendous French response which was inspired by and incarnated in Joan of Arc. The military energy generated by this French reaction against English aggression was so powerful that, after it had driven the English into the sea, sufficient impetus remained to carry French arms—in the opposite direction—right over the Alps and down the Italian Peninsula before the close of the fifteenth century. The work which the Vikings had begun and the

existence but determined their centres of gravity and assigned them their historic capitals. The Kingdom of England coalesced, not round Mercia, which failed to respond to the Scandinavian challenge, but round Wessex, which rose to the occasion. The old capital of Wessex, however, did not become the capital of the new English Kingdom; for Winchester, which had once lain within range of the frontier of Wessex over against the 'West Welsh', did not lie in the principal danger-zone in the struggle between the English and the Danes. In the Danish ordeal, Winchester enjoyed a comparative security for which it had afterwards to pay by an irreparable loss of prestige and power. When Wessex had mastered the Danes and had grown into England in the process of performing the feat, the capital of the new kingdom soon passed from Winchester, in the inglorious interior, to London, the city which had borne the heat and burden of the day and which had perhaps given the long battle its decisive turn in A.D. 895 by repelling the attempt of a Danish Armada to ascend the Thames. Similarly, the Kingdom of France found its centre of gravity, not in Provence or Languedoc, whose Mediterranean coastline was rarely visited by Viking raiders, but in the *Langue d'Oil*, which felt the full force of the storm from Scandinavia. Again, within the area of the *Langue d'Oil*, the capital passed away from Carolingian Laon—a city set safely on a hill overlooking the sources of the Oise, far above the highest point up to which the river was navigable for Viking craft. The inevitable capital of the new French Kingdom was Paris in the *Île de France*, a city which had stood in the breach and had brought the Vikings to a halt in their ascent of the Seine as London had brought them to a halt in their ascent of the Thames.¹

Thus the response of Western Christendom to the Scandinavian maritime challenge manifested itself in a new Kingdom of France with its capital at Paris, as well as in a new Kingdom of England with its capital at London; and at the same time it is to be observed that these manifestations of new creative power on the face of the political map, imposing though they are, do not reveal the actual vigour and versatility of the response in its full measure. In order to take its measure, we must add that, in the process of gaining the upper hand over their Scandinavian adversaries, the French and English peoples forged the potent military and social instrument of the Feudal System, and that they also gave aesthetic expression to the emotional experience of the ordeal in national epics.

English King Henry V continued was consummated by all the neighbours of France in unison when they fell upon Revolutionary France in 1792, and provoked an eruption of national energy which astonished the World.

¹ For details of the rise of Paris and London through their heroic responses to the Scandinavian challenge, see the Annex to the present chapter, pp. 400-1, below.

The English national Epic is represented by one notable work of art: the *Lay of the Battle of Maldon*. The French Epic, which is represented by the *Chanson de Roland* and the other *Chansons de Geste*, is the stem from which has sprung the mighty tree of our Western vernacular literature: a literature which has branched into an infinite variety of *genres* and which has learnt to operate with as many tongues as there are living languages in Western Christendom.¹

With regard to the origins of the Feudal System, it will suffice to quote the following account of its emergence in England, before the Norman Conquest, from the work of a scholar who is one of the acknowledged masters of the subject:

'It became impossible to perform the ordinary *fyrð* service, in frequent expeditions and in proper equipment, on the basis of a tenement of one hide, without help from outside. The coat of mail and the horse acquired more and more value from a military point of view—one as a means of defence in the hard struggles with the Danes, the other as a means of quick locomotion. Well-forged helmets and swords were scarce and very expensive. Altogether, the difference between a well-armed warrior and a militiaman grew more and more important. This led ultimately to the formation of a professional force of knights and sergeants-at-arms. . . .

'The outfit of 1066 was more elaborate and costly than that of 800. Although horses were employed in Charlemagne's armies, especially in his *scaræ* or picked troops, the decisive turn towards horsemanship was taken in the Danish wars, when the "horsed" Vikings had to be caught up and pursued by riding divisions, and the five-hide unit probably included provision for one or two horses. . . . The social foundation of the old army establishment—the status of the small free householder, provided on the average with a hide—was entirely inadequate to meet the altered requirements of the art of war and of military organisation. A unit five times as large grew up as the natural basis for the man-at-arms in the national array of the tenth and eleventh centuries. One might say—using political expressions with some caution—that the more ancient democratic arrangement had to be replaced by an aristocratic one.'²

¹ The author of the *Lay of Maldon* has derived his technique and style from the tradition of *Beowulf*, but his inspiration has quite a different source and character. The older epic poetry in the English tongue was inspired by the experience of barbarians who were overrunning the Roman Empire in the *Völkerwanderung* which occupied the interregnum between the submergence of the Hellenic Civilization and the emergence of the 'affiliated' Western Civilization. The *Lay of Maldon* is part of a response which was made by this Western Civilization, after its emergence, to one of the first great challenges with which it was confronted. Whereas *Beowulf* is an expression of barbarism on the war-path, the *Lay of Maldon* is the expression of a civilization fighting for its life. Thus, genetically, the true affinity of the *Lay of Maldon* is not with the previous English epic poetry but with the contemporary French epic poetry which was evoked in an adjoining province of Western Christendom by the same ordeal of the impact of the Vikings. The *Lay of Maldon* and the *Chansons de Geste*, between them, are the outcome, in the artistic sphere, of the collision between Western Christendom and the abortive Scandinavian Civilization in one of the two opposing camps. In the other camp, the outcome in the same sphere is the Icelandic Saga. (For the part played in the genesis of the Icelandic Saga by the stimulus of transmarine migration, see II. D (iii), pp. 86–100, above.)

² Vinogradoff, Paul: *English Society in the Eleventh Century* (Oxford 1908, Clarendon Press), pp. 30 and 34.

Thus the Feudal System, like the *Lay of Maldon* and the *Chanson de Roland*, and like the kingdoms of England and France with their new capitals in London and Paris, was an outcome of the reaction of Western Christendom to Scandinavian pressure upon her Atlantic seaboard; and these manifold creations testify to the versatility and the vigour of the Western response which the Scandinavian challenge evoked. The most cogent testimony of all is afforded by the actual outcome of the collision between Western Christendom and its Scandinavian adversaries. Western Christendom successfully defended herself, by force of arms, against the first fury of the Scandinavian onslaught which had threatened to overwhelm her; she then passed over to the offensive by rapidly converting to her religion and culture the invaders who had made a forcible lodgement on her soil in the Danelaw and in Normandy; and she reaped the fruits of this moral victory when she sent forth the converted Normans, as her knights errant, to fight in her service not less valiantly, and at the same time far more effectively, than their pagan ancestors had fought against her.

Little more than a century after Rollo and his companions had made with Charles the Simple the pact which secured them a permanent settlement on the Atlantic seaboard of France as newly initiated members of the Western Christian fraternity, their descendants were extending the bounds of Western Christendom in the Mediterranean at the expense of Orthodox Christendom and Islam, and were spreading the full light of the Western Civilization, as it now shone on the Continent in France, into the insular kingdoms of England and Scotland which still lay in the penumbra. Physiologically, the Norman Conquest of England might perhaps be regarded as the final achievement of an enterprise which adventurers of Scandinavian blood had been perpetually striving to accomplish for more than two centuries. From the cultural standpoint, however, this interpretation of the Norman Conquest makes nonsense; for the Normans came to England in the eleventh century on a mission which was the very contrary of the Danish mission in the ninth century. The Normans repudiated their Scandinavian pagan past by coming, not to destroy the law of Western Christendom in England, but to fulfil it. On the field of Senlac, when the Norman warrior-minstrel Taillefer rode singing into battle in the van of the Norman knights, the language on his lips was not Norse but French, and the matter of which he was inditing was not the tale of Sigurd but the tale of Roland. When the Western Christian Civilization had thus captivated the Scandinavian invaders of its own domain, it is no wonder that it was able to set the seal upon its victory by supplanting the abortive Scandinavian Civilization in

Scandinavia itself and in the uttermost parts of the Earth to which Scandinavian seafarers had penetrated. We shall have occasion to examine this impact of the Western Christian Civilization upon Scandinavia and Iceland and Greenland at a later point in this volume, when we shall be considering the collision between Christendom and the abortive Scandinavian Civilization from the Scandinavian standpoint.¹

In the Western World over against the Syriac World in the Iberian Peninsula

The last frontier of Western Christendom that calls for consideration here is the land-frontier in the Iberian Peninsula *vis-à-vis* the Syriac Society in its latest phase—a phase which began when the Arabs reintegrated the Syriac universal state in the seventh century of the Christian Era. In the history of this frontier there are two outstanding features. In the first place, Western Christendom came under pressure from an alien civilization at a far earlier stage in this quarter than in any other. In the second place, the Powers which came into being, in response to this pressure, on the Iberian marches of Western Christendom eventually came to play a leading role, which was all their own, in the propagation of the Western Civilization.

As regards the first of these two points, we have seen that on the North European continental land-frontier Western Christendom was confronted at the outset solely by barbarians. In that quarter, the Western World did not become subject to pressure from the main body of Orthodox Christendom before the Ottoman impact upon Hungary in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era,² while it was not until the sixteenth century that the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom exerted pressure upon the West in the form of a Muscovite impact upon Lithuania.³ On the other hand, on the Iberian land-frontier, Western Christendom found itself under pressure from the Syriac Civilization at the dawn of Western history. Indeed, this Syriac menace to the existence of Western Christendom in its infancy was still more formidable than the contemporary menace from the North European barbarians;⁴ and our Western Society was awakened to its first glimmer of self-consciousness by the ordeal of wrestling simultaneously with these two deadly foes—like the infant Hēraklēs when he rose in his cradle to wrestle with the two serpents that had been sent by a malevolent

¹ See II. D (vii), pp. 340–60, below.

² See pp. 177–9, above.

³ See pp. 175–6, above.

⁴ See the passage cited in I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 30, footnote 1, above, from Edward Gibbon: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. xlii.

goddess to take his life, and saved himself alive by strangling both monsters, each single-handed.

The Arab onslaught upon the infant civilization of the West was an incident in the final Syriac reaction against the long Hellenic intrusion upon the Syriac domain; for when the Arabs, in the strength of Islam, took up and completed the task which had proved to be beyond the strength of Zoroastrians and Jews and Nestorians and Monophysites, they did not rest until they had recovered for the Syriac Society the whole of its former domain at its widest extension. Not content with reconstituting as an Arab Empire the Syriac universal state which had originally been embodied in the Persian Empire of the Achaemenidae, the Arabs went on to reconquer the ancient Phoenician colonial domain in the Western Mediterranean which, in the Achaemenian age, had been welded into a unity of its own—an overseas counterpart of the Persian Empire—under the hegemony of Carthage. For a moment in the eighth century of the Christian Era an Arab Caliph fulfilled the ambition which a Persian King of Kings had found himself unable to fulfil in the sixth century B.C.¹ The last Umayyad who reigned at Damascus was at least nominally master of the whole compass of the Syriac World, from the farthest limits ever attained by the Achaemenian Empire in the east to the farthest attained by the Carthaginian Empire in the west.² In the latter direction, the Arab commanders had crossed not only the straits of Gibraltar but the Pyrenees in the footsteps of Hannibal in A.D. 713; and thereafter, though they had not emulated their great Carthaginian predecessor's passage of the Rhône and the Alps, they had broken ground which Hannibal never trod when they carried their arms to the Loire in A.D. 732. At the Battle of Tours, the Arabs were attacking Western Christendom in its cradle.

The discomfiture of the Arabs by the Franks on this occasion has assuredly been one of the decisive events in history; for the Western

¹ According to Herodotus, Cambyses, after his conquest of Egypt, aspired to round off the Achaemenian Empire in North Africa by conquering the Napatan Kingdom up the Nile and the oases of the Libyan Desert and the Carthaginian Empire beyond the Syrtes. Operations against Napata and the Oasis of Ammon were actually attempted with disastrous results. Simultaneously, Cambyses 'ordered the fleet to sail against Carthage; but the Phoenicians declined to carry the order out. They explained that they were bound to the Carthaginians by solemn pledges, and that they would be committing an atrocity if they made war upon their own colonists. The Phoenicians' refusal was decisive, since the remainder of the fleet by itself was no match for the Carthaginian forces. Accordingly, the Carthaginians escaped the Persian yoke; for Cambyses shrank from coercing the Phoenicians, who had become members of the Persian Empire of their own free will and were the mainstay of the Persian Navy.' (Herodotus: Book III, ch. 19.)

² On the eastern front, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was definitively incorporated into the Arab Empire in the years A.D. 737-41 (see p. 141, with footnote 3, above) by Nasr, while on the western front Musa had completed the Arab conquest of the Visigothic 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire as early as A.D. 713 by occupying the Transpyrenean province of Septimania along the Gallic coast between the Pyrenees and the Rhône.

reaction to Syriac pressure which declared itself on the battle-field of Tours in A.D. 732 continued in force and increased in momentum on this front until, some eight centuries later, its impetus was carrying the Portuguese vanguard of Western Christendom right out of the Iberian Peninsula and onward overseas round Africa to Goa and Malacca and Macao, and the Castilian vanguard onward across the Atlantic to Mexico and thence across the Pacific to Manila.¹ These Iberian pioneers of Western Christendom performed an unparalleled service for the civilization which they represented. They expanded the horizon, and thereby potentially the domain, of our Western Society from an obscure corner of the Old World until it came to embrace all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the surface of the planet. It is owing to this Iberian energy and enterprise that Western Christendom has grown, like the grain of mustard seed in the parable,² until it has become 'the Great Society': a tree in whose branches all the nations of the Earth have come and lodged. This latter-day Westernized World is the peculiar achievement of Western Christendom's Iberian pioneers; and the Western energy which performed this feat was evoked and sustained and wrought up to its high intensity by the challenge of Syriac pressure on the Iberian front.

The Portuguese and Castilian seafarers who made their presence felt throughout the World in the first century of our modern age (*circa* A.D. 1475-1575) were the heirs of frontiersmen whose spirit had been tempered by thirty generations of strenuous border warfare against the Moors on the Iberian marches. On this frontier, the Franks first turned back the tide of Arab conquest from the heart of Gaul; thereafter, under Charlemagne's leadership, they carried their counter-offensive to the Iberian side of the Pyrenees, where they joined forces with the remnant of the Visigoths in the fastness of Asturia; and eventually, during the post-Syriac interregnum (*circa* A.D. 975-1275), when the Umayyad Caliphate in Andalusia broke up,³ these Christian barbarians of the Pyrenaean hinterland contended victoriously for the possession of the Umayyads' Peninsular heritage with the Muslim Berbers from the opposite hinterlands in Africa: the wild Murābit Nomads from the Sahara and the still wilder Muwāhhid highlanders from the Atlas.

The dependence of Iberian Christian energy upon the stimulus administered by pressure from the Moors is demonstrated by the fact that this energy gave out as soon as the Moorish pressure

¹ The expansion of Frankdom in this direction has been mentioned by anticipation in I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 38, above.

² Matthew xiii. 31-2; Mark iv. 31-2; Luke xiii. 19.

³ When the Umayyad Caliphs who had ruled the whole Syriac World from Damascus were overthrown in A.D. 750 by the 'Abbasids, a branch of the Umayyad House succeeded in establishing itself in Andalusia, where it ruled at Cordova from A.D. 755 to 1028.

ceased to be exerted. In the seventeenth century of the Christian Era the Portuguese and Castilians were supplanted in the new world which they had called into existence overseas by interlopers from the Transpyrenaeen parts of Western Christendom—the Dutch and the English and the French—and this discomfiture overseas coincided in date with the removal of the historic stimulus at home through the extirpation (by massacre, expulsion, or forcible conversion) of the remaining 'Moriscos' in the Peninsula.

Again, if we look farther back, we shall observe that Portugal and Castile were only two out of the three Christian 'successor-states' of the Umayyad Caliphate which had divided the Iberian Peninsula between them. Why did not Aragon take her part, side by side with Castile and Portugal, in the vaster enterprises of discovery and commerce and conquest on which the two sister kingdoms embarked at the turn of the fifteenth and the sixteenth century? In the immediate past, during the later 'Middle Ages', Aragon had played a more brilliant role than either Castile or Portugal in the life of the Western Society. She had shared in the brilliance of the North Italian city-states and had made certain original contributions of her own—in the fields of cartography and of international law—to the North Italian medieval culture. Why was it, then, that, just when Portugal and Castile both entered upon the brilliant phase of their careers, Aragon allowed herself to be dominated and effaced by her Castilian neighbour?¹ The explanation perhaps lies in the fact that the stimulus of Moorish pressure had been lost by Aragon several centuries before it was lost by either of the other two Peninsular kingdoms. In the days of da Gama and Columbus, both Portugal and Castile were still serving as marches of Western Christendom against the Moors. Castile then still marched in the Peninsula with the surviving Moorish kingdom of Granada, while Portugal marched with Morocco in her Tangerine province on the African side of the Straits of Gibraltar; and the Portuguese and Castilian exploits overseas, which began in that age, were simply diversions, to a new and wider field, of energies which had hitherto been employed assiduously against the Moors at home. On the

¹ The Aragonese themselves submitted passively to 'Castilianization'; the Catalans, who had been the active and progressive element in the medieval Kingdom of Aragon, kicked against the pricks. Yet this Catalan resistance to Castilian domination has been feeble and ineffective compared with the Portuguese. The Crown of Portugal was united with the Crown of Castile in A.D. 1581, only 102 years after the Catalans had been yoked with the Castilians by the union of the Crowns of Castile and Aragon which came about in 1479 through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella ten years earlier. The sequels to these two unions were very different. The Portuguese revolted against the Castilian yoke in 1640 and compelled the Government at Madrid to recognize the independence of Portugal in 1663. On the other hand, the Catalans failed in their belated attempt to recover their independence from Madrid during the War of the Spanish Succession, with the result that Catalonia disappeared altogether off the political map from the fall of Barcelona in 1714 down to the Spanish Revolution of 1931.

other hand, Aragon had been relegated to the interior of Western Christendom since A.D. 1235, when the overthrow of the Muwahhid Berbers by the Iberian Christians at the Battle of Las Navas had confined the Moors in the Peninsula to the Granadan enclave. Since that time, Aragon had been insulated from the Moors on land by the intervening Castilian province of Murcia, while in the Mediterranean her Moorish warfare had been brought to an end in A.D. 1229-32 by her conquest of the Balearic Islands.¹ Thus the stimulus which was the common source of Iberian Christian energies had ceased to play upon the Aragonese at least two-and-a-half centuries before it ceased to play upon their Castilian and Portuguese neighbours; and this may partly² explain why it was that Aragon fell out of the running before the great opportunity of overseas expansion offered itself to the Peninsular Powers, while Castile and Portugal did not finally succeed in cutting off the source of their own energies by extirpating the 'Moriscos' in their midst until the stimulus of Moorish pressure at home had carried the Portuguese and Castilian pioneers to the four corners of the World.

It will be seen that the relation of the Iberian marches of Western Christendom to the Moors resembles the relation of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy to the 'Osmanlis'.³ The Peninsular Powers, likewise, had their *raison d'être* in serving as marches of the Western Society against an alien civilization; and their energies were responses to the pressure of this alien force. They were vigorous just so long as this pressure was formidable, and as soon as the pressure slackened they petered out.

In the Andean and Central American Worlds

We may conclude our present survey of the stimulus of pressures by making the historic passage from the Iberian Peninsula to 'the New World'. When the Spaniards broke in upon the Andean and Central American worlds in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, they found the Andean Society already in a universal state and the Mexic Society on the point of falling into one. The Andean universal state had been established by the Incas of Cuzco;

¹ This conquest was not, of course, the end of Aragonese enterprise in the Mediterranean; for the Balearic Islands were stepping-stones to Sardinia and the Two Sicilies, and these to Greece; and, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, Catalan adventurers were harrying both their Latin predecessors and these predecessors' Greek victims on the shores of the Aegean. Yet these latter-day Catalan filibustering expeditions into the Levant were no substitute for the ancient border warfare with the Moors at close quarters. The Catalan victories in the fourteenth century over Greek East Roman Emperors and Burgundian Dukes of Athens were as facile, and therefore as barren of stimulus, as the Castilian victories in the sixteenth century over Aztecs and Incas.

² Some part of the explanation evidently lies in the fact that Aragon, alone of the three fifteenth-century Peninsular kingdoms, possessed no seaboard on the Atlantic, and was thus at the same disadvantage as Columbus's native city of Genoa for participating in the exploitation of a Transatlantic New World.

³ For this relation, see pp. 177-90, above.

the Central American universal state was being established by the Aztecs of Tenochtitlan. To what did Cuzco and Tenochtitlan owe their imperial greatness? Or, to ask the same question, in regard to the Andean World, in other terms: Why was it that the Andean universal state found its nucleus on a previously obscure corner of the Andean Plateau, in the upper valley of the River Urubamba, and not in the Basin of Lake Titicaca, where the earliest and greatest development of civilization on the plateau has left its monument in the ruins of Tiahuanaco? Or, for that matter, why did not the Andean universal state find its nucleus somewhere within the original home of the Andean Civilization among the oases of the Pacific coast-land?

In the light of our foregoing survey, the answer to these questions becomes apparent when we notice the geographical fact that Cuzco in the Andean and Tenochtitlan in the Central American World were situated, like Rome and Macedonia in the Hellenic World,¹ in marches which were exposed to external pressure from formidable barbarians. Cuzco guarded the gate of the Andean World against the wild tribes of the Amazonian tropical forest; Tenochtitlan similarly guarded the gate of the Central American World against the Chichimecs: the vagrant hunting tribes of the North American arid zone, whence the Aztecs themselves were recent immigrants. Tenochtitlan always remained within close range of the northern frontier of the Central American Society over against the Chichimecs, and Cuzco within close range of the north-eastern frontier of the Andean Society over against the Amazonian savages, even when the conquests of the Aztecs in the interior of the Central American World and the conquests of the Incas in the interior of the Andean World had reached their greatest respective extents. This extreme difference in the range of Aztec and Inca expansion towards the outer darkness in the one direction and towards the interior of their own worlds in the other might seem at first sight to call for explanation; but reflexion shows that, on the contrary, this permanent proximity of both the Inca and the Aztec capital to a dangerous barbarian frontier, so far from requiring to be explained, itself explains why it was that the Andean and the Central American universal state actually grew out of precisely these two nuclei. It was the stimulus of perpetual reaction to external pressure that evoked in the Aztecs and in the Incas alike the energy which was required in order to perform a great feat of political construction at home.

Why did not either Tlaxcala or Cholula, rather than Tenochtitlan, become the nucleus of the incipient Central American universal

¹ See pp. 160-1, above.

state? Because these cities of the interior lacked the stimulus of external pressure from the Chichimecs of the outer darkness—a stimulus which never ceased to act upon Tenochtitlan on the frontier. And why did the Collas of the Titicaca Basin go down before the Incas of the Urubamba Valley in that trial of strength between two neighbouring Andean highland confederacies which was the beginning of the Incas' imperial career? The answer to this latter question may be given in terms of physical geography. 'Cuzco, the ancient capital of Ttahu-ntin-suyu, the Land of the Four Sections, otherwise the Inca Empire, lies in the drainage of the Amazon river-system. . . . The small torrential streams that flow through Cuzco pour themselves into the Urubamba, which is a tributary of the Ucayali, which in turn empties into the Marañon, just as that does into the Amazon.'¹ In other words, the physiography of the Inca section of the frontier between the Andean Civilization and an Amazonian barbarism facilitated and even invited barbarian incursions into the Andean domain and therefore kept the Andean wardens of the marches in this sector for ever on the *qui vive*. On the other hand, the Collao, in the Basin of Lake Titicaca, was safely insulated from the Amazonian savages by those 'snow-clad peaks of the Eastern Cordillera—Sorata, Huayna Potosi, and Illampu'—which 'bite into the sky with glittering white teeth'² on the horizon that unfolds itself before the gaze of the visitor to Tiahuanaco. The grimness of the physical environment in this rough country, from which the ancient builders of Tiahuanaco had perhaps derived their stimulus,³ may have been the undoing of their latter-day successors the Collas—not because it presented the Collas, any more than their local predecessors, with a physical challenge beyond their strength, but, on the contrary, because it shielded them from a stimulating human pressure to which their neighbours and contemporaries, the Incas, were exposed. The absence of this potent human stimulus in the Collao may have been the handicap which brought defeat upon the Collas when they had to meet the Incas in battle.

VI. THE STIMULUS OF PENALIZATIONS

The Nature of the Stimulus

We have now concluded our survey of the stimulus of the human environment when it takes the form of continuous external pressure. Let us next examine its effect when it takes the form of social penalization.

¹ Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilisations of the Andes* (New York 1931, Scribner), p. 17.

² Means, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

³ See the fuller quotation from Means, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, in II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i p. 322, above.

The nature of this effect may be indicated by an analogy between social phenomena and physical. It is a well-known fact that when a living organism is penalized, by comparison with other representatives of its species, through losing the use of a particular organ or faculty, it is apt to respond to this challenge by specializing in the use of some other organ or faculty until it has secured an advantage over its fellows in this second field of activity to offset its handicap in the first. The blind, for example, are apt to develop a more delicate sense of touch than is usually possessed by people who have not been deprived of the normal human sense of sight; and this enhancement of one faculty to offset the atrophy of another seems to occur in some degree universally and as it were spontaneously, apart from the special cases in which individuals of eminent character—a Henry Fawcett or a Helen Keller—are stimulated by their personal physical handicap into making some deliberate and sustained effort of will and ingenuity.¹ Somewhat similarly, we find that, in a body social, any section or group or class which is socially penalized—either by accident or by its own act or by the act of other members of the society in which it lives—is apt to respond to the challenge of being handicapped in, or altogether excluded from, certain fields of social activity by concentrating its social energies upon other fields and excelling in these.

We may remind ourselves, once again, of our simile of 'the pollarded willow'.² The more ruthless the execution that is done by the pruner among the shoots that he finds sprouting in spring-time out of the willow's head, the more abundant will be the vitality that the tree will concentrate into the shoots which are spared, and the more vigorous, therefore, will be the growth of these surviving shoots in the course of the season.

We may find an alternative simile, within the social sphere, in a famous incident in the history of the Hellenic Society. When the rising religion of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic World in its universal state was persecuted by the dominant minority, the Roman Imperial authorities were able to suppress the public practice of Christianity, but they failed to suppress Christianity itself: they merely drove it underground. The prohibition of Christian worship on the surface of pagan Rome stimulated the Christians to create for themselves a new Christian Rome in the Catacombs below the surface of the Campagna; and the City of the Catacombs

¹ Such purposive efforts are apt to carry those who make them to greater achievements than are accomplished by ordinary people who are in full possession of all their faculties, and perhaps even to greater achievements than the afflicted persons themselves would actually have accomplished if the challenge of physical penalization had not evoked in them a spiritual response that made the utmost demands upon their moral and intellectual as well as their physical energies.

² See I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 168, above.

eventually triumphed over the City of the Seven Hills. The Church rose again from the bowels of the earth in order to raise in the City of the Vatican a dome which towers at this day above the Capitol;¹ and the early Latin peasant, who responded to the challenge of his physical environment by breaking in the intractable surface of the Campagna with his plough,² was emulated by the latter-day Christian denizen of the Roman slums, who responded to the challenge from his human environment by visiting the Campagna in the secrecy of the night-watches in order to carve a labyrinthine subterranean world of his own out of the solid tufa. The monument of the Latin peasant's feat is the Roman Empire; the monument of the Christian proletarian's feat is the Roman Catholic Church.

In surveying the effects of the stimulus of social penalizations, it may be convenient to start with the simplest case: a situation in which certain physical handicaps inhibit the individuals who are subject to them from following the ordinary avocations of the society in which they live. Let us remind ourselves, for example, of the predicament in which a blind man or a lame man finds himself in a barbarian society when the ordinary male member of society is a warrior—a situation which is apt to arise in 'the external proletariat' on the fringe of a decadent civilization on the eve of a *Völkerwanderung*.³ How does the lame barbarian react? Though his feet cannot carry him into battle in the company of his fellows, his hands can forge weapons and armour for other men to wield and wear; and therefore, since he cannot use all his limbs to good effect in the normal activities of Man in the human environment into which he has been born, he counteracts his handicap by using those limbs in which he is sound to better effect than his fellows know how to use them—in a sleight of hand that is all his own. So he becomes the skilled artificer who is the workaday prototype of lame Hephaestus and lame Weland in the World of Mythology. And how does the blind barbarian react? His predicament is still worse than his lame brother's, for he cannot use his hands in the smithy to any better purpose than on the battle-field; yet he can use them to strike the harp in harmony with a voice that rings as clear and sweet as any other man's, and he can use his mind to make poetry out of the human life in which he cannot take an active part.

¹ Gibbon, sitting among the ruins of Ancient Rome on the Palatine, and listening to the friars singing Vespers among the ruins of Ancient Rome on the Capitol, was inspired to write *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. (See Part XIII, below.)

² See II. D (i), pp. 16-17, above.

³ This predicament has been touched upon in II. B, vol. i, p. 190, above, apropos of the phenomenon of the Division of Labour. For the blind bard as an institution, see the survey of examples that is given by Subotić, D., in *Yugoslav Popular Ballads* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), pp. 22-3.

Nor seeks nor finds he mortal blisses,
But feeds on the ærial kisses
Of shapes that haunt thought's wildernesses.

But from these create he can
Forms more real than living man,
Nurslings of Immortality.¹

The deeds of god-like Achilles and Agamemnon only live on in the verses of 'blind Thamyras and blind Maeonides'. The fame which the barbarian warrior desires above all things, and in quest of which he wanders over the face of the Earth 'like as a lion that is greedy of his prey',² is in the barbarian poet's hand and voice and mind to give or to withhold.

Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona
Multi, sed omnes illacrimabiles
Urgentur ignotique longa
Nocte, carent quia vate sacro.³

In the barbarian's universe, the blind bard, who cannot wield either warrior's sword or blacksmith's hammer, is yet as potent as the Galilaean fisherman who ranks as a proletarian in the Roman census but as Prince of the Apostles in the Christian dispensation. Homer, like Peter, is an arbiter of human destinies.⁴ 'So the last shall be first and the first last.'⁵

So much for the stimulus of social penalizations when these are the automatic consequence of physical disabilities. When we pass on to the penalization which is imposed by poverty, we may observe, for example, in an English 'public school', that the 'commoners', who have been born in well-to-do homes and have come to be where they are, without exertions of their own, by reason of their parents' capacity to pass muster and to pay the school fees, are less apt to do hard work at school than their schoolfellows of the same social class and social—but not personal—background who are 'scholars'. The 'scholars' know that their parents could not have afforded to send them to a school of this kind if the boys themselves had not won 'scholarships' by their own endeavours; and they realize that, as it has been in their childhood, so it will continue to be when they are grown up. They will have to make their way by their own efforts; they will have to set off the handicap of starting life with smaller material means than the average of their class by rising above the average in intelligence and efficiency and application.

¹ Shelley: *Prometheus Unbound*.

² Horace: *Carmine*, Bk. IV, Ode 9, vv. 25-8.

³ Psalm xvii. 12.

⁴ 'And I say unto thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church; and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on Earth shall be bound in Heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on Earth shall be loosed in Heaven.' Matthew xvi. 18-19.

⁵ Matthew xx. 16.

Thus the penalization of poverty gives the 'scholar' a perpetual stimulus which the 'commoner' lacks except in the rare cases in which the soporific effect of 'independent means' is counteracted by personal ambition or by public spirit or by intellectual curiosity—and these are rare gifts of the Gods. Again, in an English university, we may observe that the County Council scholar, who is penalized not only by poverty but by a certain inferiority in social class, is apt to exert himself still more than the scholar from a 'public school', whose social, if not his economic, position is assured. And in general we may observe—not only in contemporary England but in every society in every age—that each class on the social ladder is apt to maintain its numerical strength, not by natural increase, but by recruitment from the classes below it, and that the topmost class, which cannot go up higher, is always making room for its recruits from below by a perpetual process of extinction in the third and fourth generation. In fact, the climber who reaches the topmost rung of the social ladder has arrived at the edge of a social abyss and has condemned his descendants—unintentionally and unwittingly—to 'walk the plank'. This social phenomenon is so manifest and so notorious that it has become proverbial. The Maghribī philosopher Ibn Khaldūn's generalization that the average duration of a dynasty is three generations¹ is an exact equivalent of the North American saying that 'It's three generations from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves.'

Migration

An aptitude for rising in the social scale may also be observed among immigrants who have been impelled by the stimulus of poverty or persecution at home to seek their fortunes in a foreign country. The social handicap of finding himself in a new human environment, where he is unfamiliar with the prevailing manners and customs and language and where he has to contend with the instinctive prejudice of the native-born citizen against the immigrant alien, commonly stimulates the new-comer to put forth his energies and to keep a sharp look-out for opportunities of advancement until he has 'made good' in the country of his adoption. This is the common history of the Scotsman in modern England (and the Scottish engineer all over the World); the Flemish weaver in medieval England; the German miner in medieval Hungary; the French-Canadian factory-hand and farmer² and the Polish market-

¹ Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt* (Prolegomena): translation by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 343-59. Compare the same volume, pp. 286-90, where Ibn Khaldūn suggests that it takes four generations for a family to reach its zenith.

² See II. D (ii), pp. 71-2, above.

gardener¹ in New England; the Huguenot silk-weaver in Spital-fields and his fellow exiles whose descendants have distinguished themselves in every walk and circumstance of life in almost every Protestant country: England, Württemberg, Prussia, South Africa.² In the Arabic World, it is the history of the Hadramī trader in Java.

Slavery

Perhaps the most extraordinary illustration on record of the immigrant's aptitude for social efficiency is the history of the vast concourse of immigrants from all the countries round the Mediterranean who were brought to Italy as slaves during those two terrible centuries between the outbreak of the Hannibalic War and the establishment of the Augustan Peace which were the climax of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles'.

The handicap under which these slave-immigrants began their new life is almost beyond imagination. Some of them were heirs to the cultural heritage of the Hellenic Civilization; and these had seen their whole spiritual and material universe tumble about their ears when their beautiful cities, which Gods had guarded and men respected from of old, had been put to the sack and the citizens sold into slavery against all laws human and divine and all precedents in Hellenic history. The Coronean captives on the Delian slave-market in the year 171 B.C. might have cried out to their Haliartian companions in misfortune³ in the words of the last messenger who brought tidings of evil to Job: 'Behold, there came a great wind from the wilderness and smote the four corners of the house, and it fell upon the young men and they are dead; and I only am escaped alone to tell thee.'⁴ Indeed, the calamity was overwhelming, even for those slave-immigrants to Italy who had been taken, not from the dominant Hellenic minority in the Hellenic

¹ The writer of this Study once drove through a string of villages in the Connecticut Valley in which all the houses were the handiwork of eighteenth-century colonists of English origin, while all the present inhabitants (in A.D. 1925) were immigrant Poles who were making a good living by growing onions on land which had ceased to yield a profit in native-born American hands. The Polish immigrant prospered here because he worked longer hours than his native-born American predecessor and because every member of the Pole's large family laboured in the fields side by side with the head of the household. The children of the original Polish immigrants were already beginning to attend the local American high schools, and it was evident that the third generation would win their way into the universities with the ultimate result that the fourth generation would cease to benefit by the stimulus which had impelled their elders to climb towards the top of the social tree!

² 'One drop of Huguenot blood in the veins is worth a thousand a year' is a saying that is attributed to T. H. Huxley. The observation is acute; but of course the Huguenot's money-making power is not an attribute of his race. In race, the Huguenot is no different from his kinsmen who still remain in France. And, if it is true that the Huguenot shows a greater aptitude for making money than the Catholic or agnostic Frenchman who has stayed at home, his eminent business ability is to be interpreted as a response to the challenge of having been driven into exile without resources—a challenge to which the majority of the French nation has not been exposed.

³ See Livy xlii. 63, and xliii. 4.

⁴ Job i. 19.

World, but from the Oriental 'internal proletariat' which had lost its social heritage already, or from the barbarian 'external proletariat' which had none to lose; for there were other grievous losses of a personal kind that were inherent in enslavement. All these slave-immigrants alike had lost their personal liberty; they had been branded as human chattels instead of human beings with human rights; they had been uprooted from their homes and separated for ever from their families; and they had been subjected to new conditions of life which were almost beyond bearing. Their Roman masters, who had purchased their bodies wholesale as a speculative investment, thought only of wringing the utmost possible profit from their labour. The Roman law treated slaves with a harshness that reflected the apprehensions of a Roman governing class which was ever conscious of the volcanic stirrings of a servile under-world. Some of the recruits to the Roman servile labour-force had to spend their days working in chain-gangs on the plantations and their nights in semi-subterranean prisons; others were condemned to mines and quarries in which no worker's life was worth more than a few years' purchase. The minority whose lot was the relative independence of the slave-herdsman or the relative amenity of domestic service were fortunate; and it might have seemed that even this fortunate minority had no future. There was an ancient Greek saying that 'The day of enslavement deprives Man of half of his Manhood';¹ and this saying was terribly fulfilled in the debasement of the slave-descended urban proletariat of Rome which lived—not by bread alone, but by 'bread and shows'²—from the second century B.C. to the sixth century of the Christian Era until the flesh pots failed and the people perished off the face of the Earth. This long-drawn-out life-in-death was the penalty of failure to respond to the challenge of enslavement; and no doubt that broad path of destruction was trodden by a majority of those human beings of many different origins and antecedents who were enslaved *en masse* in the most evil age of Hellenic history. Yet some there were, nevertheless, who did respond to the challenge and did succeed in 'making good' in one fashion or another.

Some rose in their Roman masters' service until they became the responsible administrators of great estates; and Caesar's estate itself, when it had grown into the universal state of the Hellenic World, continued to be administered by Caesar's freedmen. Others,

¹ The lines are placed in the mouth of the slave-swineherd Eumaeus in the *Odyssey*:

ἡμῶν γὰρ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνονται εὐρύσσεια Ζεὺς
ἀνὴρ, εὖτ' ἂν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἡμᾶρ ἔλθῃσιν. (*Od.* XVII, ll. 322-3.)

² 'Panem et circenses' (Juvenal, *Satire* x, l. 81).

whom their masters established in petty business, succeeded in purchasing their freedom out of savings which they made on the share of the profits that their masters allowed them; and some of these afterwards rose to eminence and affluence in the Roman business-world. Others remained slaves in this world to become philosopher-kings or fathers of churches in another; and of such was the Kingdom of Heaven. The true-born Roman who might justly and sincerely condemn the illegitimate power of a Narcissus or the ostentatious wealth of a Trimalchio would delight to honour the wisdom and serenity of the lame slave Epictetus; and he could not but admire—though he might not approve—the enthusiasm of that nameless multitude of slaves and freedmen whose faith was moving mountains.¹ During the five centuries which intervened between the Hannibalic War and the Conversion of Constantine, the Roman authorities saw this miracle of servile faith being performed under their eyes and being repeated—in defiance of their utmost efforts to arrest it by physical force—until eventually they themselves succumbed to it. For the slave-immigrants who had lost their homes and their families and their property still kept their religion and handed it down to their descendants in Italy. The Greeks brought the Bacchanalia, the Anatolians the worship of Cybele (a goddess who long outlived the Hittite Society in whose womb she had been conceived); the Egyptians brought the worship of Isis, the Babylonians the worship of the Stars, the Iranians the worship of Mithra, the Syrians Christianity. *Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes*;² and the confluence of these waters raised a social issue which revealed the limitations of a slave's subjection to his master.

The issue was whether an immigrant religion of the internal proletariat was to swamp the indigenous religion of the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society. For, when once the waters had met, it was impossible that they should not mingle; and, when once they had mingled, there was little doubt as to which current would prevail if Nature were not counteracted by Art or by Force. The tutelary Gods of the Hellenic World—Attic Athene the Keeper of the City and Spartan Athana of the Brazen House; Tyche of the Antiochenes and Fortuna Praenestina; and even the omnipotent Dea Roma and the Saviour Divus Caesar³—had already withdrawn

¹ Marcus Aurelius was impressed by the readiness of the Christians at any moment to die for their faith, though he disapproved of its psychological basis, which he describes as *παράφαις* (? 'mass suggestion' or 'esprit de corps') in contrast to what seems to the philosopher the right basis: that is to say, rational judgement (Marcus Aurelius: *Meditations*, xi. 3).

² Juvenal: *Satire* iii, l. 62. It was at Antioch-on-Orontes that the followers of Jesus were first called Christians (Acts xi. 26).

³ See I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 443, above.

from the intimate life-giving communion in which they had once lived with their worshippers.

Excessere omnes, adytis arisque relictis,
Di quibus imperium hoc steterat.¹

On the other hand, the Gods of the internal proletariat had proved themselves to be in truth their worshippers' 'refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble'.² If these Gods and those, who now divided the allegiance of Society between them, were left to contend with one another for the allegiance of the whole, the battle would assuredly go as it had gone in Israel when Elijah had challenged the prophets of Baal;³ and in face of this prospect the Roman authorities halted for five centuries between two opinions. Should they take the offensive against these foreign religions which were making their way, by peaceful penetration, into Roman hearts? Should they attempt to stamp them out by pitting against their uncanny other-worldly power the Roman World-State's irresistible concentration of mundane force? Or should they rather welcome these new Gods who were offering to fill a spiritual void—unacknowledged but not unfelt—that had been left in the Roman universe by the old Gods' departure? Every one of the new Gods appealed to some section of the Roman governing class. Mithra appealed to the soldiers, Isis to the women, the Heavenly Bodies to the intellectuals, Dionysus to the Philhellenes, Cybele to the fetish-worshippers. In the year 205 B.C., in the crisis of the Hannibalic War, the Roman Senate anticipated Constantine's reception of Christianity by receiving, with official honours, the magic stone, fallen from Heaven and charged with the divinity of Cybele, which was the talisman of Anatolian Pessinus.⁴ In the year 186 B.C., during the brief breathing-space between the Hannibalic affliction and the Gracchan, they anticipated Diocletian's persecution by suppressing the Bacchanalia.⁵ The long Battle of the Gods, which thus began and ended, was the counterpart of an earthly contest between the slave-immigrants and their Roman masters; and, in this dual conflict, the slaves and the slaves' Gods won.

Caste

The same stimulus of penalization which is administered by poverty and by class-inferiority and by slavery is also administered by racial discrimination in a state of society in which two or more

¹ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Bk. II, ll. 351-2 (already quoted in I. C (i) (a), vol. i, on p. 57, in footnote 2, above).

² Psalm xlv. 1.

³ 1 Kings xviii.

⁴ See the account of the translation of Cybele from Pessinus to Rome which is given by Livy in Book XXIX, chs. 10-14.

⁵ See the account of this persecution which is given by Livy in Book XXXIX, chs. 8-19.

racess live intermingled without merging into one. Such states of society are apt to arise by immigration in two alternative ways. An indigenous population may be conquered by invaders who forbear to exterminate it and disdain to coalesce with it and are therefore constrained to tolerate it in the status of a depressed caste.¹ Alternatively, an indigenous population may admit peaceful immigrants to live on sufferance as perpetual strangers in its midst on more or less disadvantageous and humiliating conditions. In both these varieties of what is ultimately the same situation, the dominant race is apt to reserve certain statuses and certain avocations as its own exclusive preserves, and to impose upon the penalized race the necessity of cultivating other fields of social activity if it is to find a living at all. The 'reserved' occupations usually include all those which have high social prestige—the priesthood, the business of government, the ownership of land, the bearing of arms, and the civilian 'liberal professions'—as well as the fundamental economic activity of Society, which has usually been agriculture in the social economies of societies in process of civilization down to recent times. By a process of exhaustion the penalized race is apt to find itself virtually confined to the field of trade and handicraft; and, just because the field is narrow, the penalized race is stimulated to make this field all its own and to conjure out of it, by a *tour de force* which fills the dominant race with astonishment and resentment, a harvest of wealth and power which this Naboth's vineyard would hardly have yielded to hands not debarred from other handiwork.

The classic example of this effect of racial discrimination is the strongly marked tendency in the Hindu Society for castes to become coincident with occupations; but this tendency in India is not without parallels elsewhere. In Europe, tinkering and fortune-telling have been monopolized by the Gipsies,² and in Arabia metal-working by the Sunnā;³ and other examples are to be found in the New World which has been called into existence, since the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, by the expansion of Western Christendom over all the habitable lands and navigable seas of the planet. Round the shores of the Pacific—an ocean which has been transformed from an insulator into a medium of communication by Western maritime enterprise within the last century—the Chinese immigrant who has been admitted on sufferance

¹ The three possible alternative outcomes of the impact of one society upon another—that is, extermination, assimilation, and caste—are examined further in Parts VIII and IX, below.

² Strictly, perhaps, the occupational specialization of the Gipsies in Europe is not so much a parallel to, as a derivative from, the convergence between caste and occupation in India, since the Gipsies are by origin a vagrant Hindu caste which has happened to spread beyond the boundaries of the Hindu World.

³ For this metal-working caste in Arabia, see The British Admiralty: *Handbook of Arabia*, vol. i (London, no date, H.M. Stationery Office), pp. 92, 94, and 610.

into countries under Western control has succeeded, as coolie and laundryman and shopkeeper, in making his fortune out of those meagre patches of the economic field which have been grudgingly thrown open to him. In British Malaya and Netherlands India to-day, there are Chinese millionaires who emulate Trimachio's wealth without displaying his vulgarity; and if Petronius Arbiter's fictitious portrait of the penalized proletarian immigrant who has 'made good' in this world is reproduced in these authentic Chinese counterparts in 'the real life' of our modern society, we can also detect a counterpart to the historic figure of the ancient slave-philosopher in Harriet Beecher Stowe's fictitious portrait of 'Uncle Tom': a character who emulates the serenity of Epictetus without aspiring to his mental power.

The Negro slave-immigrant into modern North America has been subject to the twofold penalization of legal servitude and racial discrimination; and at this day, some seventy years after the first of these two handicaps has been removed, the second still weighs as heavily as ever upon the coloured freedman. From first to last, the Negro's sufferings at the hands of the English-speaking peoples of the Western World have probably been still greater in the aggregate than those of the Greeks and Orientals and barbarians who were enslaved by the Romans. The horrors of the Delian slave-market in the second century B.C. are hardly to be compared with those of 'the middle passage' on a Transatlantic slave-ship in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era; and even if we allow that, in the next stage of the slave's career, the conditions of servile life and labour on the plantations of modern America may not have been so bad as they were on those of ancient Italy, we must add that the Roman slave who had once landed alive on Italian soil saw his horizon faintly yet distinctly illuminated by a gleam of light which has never been vouchsafed to the Negro survivor of the Transatlantic voyage nor to any of his descendants even in the third or fourth generation.

The harshness of the Roman Law in its treatment of the slave, so long as he remained in servitude, was mitigated by its facility in the procedure of manumission and by its liberality in making the personal act of manumission carry with it automatically the political consequence of enfranchisement; and these legal provisions for the mitigation of the Roman slave's lot were implemented by social custom. The Roman masters who were merciless in exploiting their slaves were generous in granting them their freedom; and when once the legal formality had been accomplished, the social stigma of servile origin was extinguished in a few generations. In the third generation the poet Horace could afford to remind his readers that

he was *libertino patre natus*¹ in order to point the contrast between what he had once been and what he had since become in virtue of his own genius and his intimacy with Maecenas. How different from the agony with which a modern American citizen who knows that there is a tincture of Negro blood in his veins² keeps watch and ward over his secret when he has surreptitiously violated 'the colour bar' by 'passing' from the black to the white side of the caste-line. The Roman freedman was wholly free from the doom of perpetual racial ostracism to which the American Negro freedman has been condemned without any prospect of reprieve even for his remotest posterity; and it is not surprising to observe that the Negro, finding the scales thus permanently and overwhelmingly weighted against him in this world, has turned to another world for consolation.

The Negro appears to be answering our tremendous challenge with a religious response which may prove in the event, when it can be seen in retrospect, to bear comparison with the ancient Oriental's response to the challenge from his Roman masters. The Negro has not indeed brought any ancestral religion of his own from Africa to captivate the hearts of his White fellow citizens on the American Continent. His primitive social heritage was of so frail a texture that every shred of it was scattered to the winds at the first impact of our Western Civilization. Thus he came to America spiritually as well as physically naked; and he has met the emergency by covering his nakedness with his enslaver's cast-off clothes. The Negro has been adapting himself to the rigours of his new social environment by rediscovering, in Christianity, certain original meanings and values which Western Christendom has long ignored. Opening a simple and impressionable mind to the Gospels, he has divined the true nature of Jesus's mission. He has understood that this was a prophet who came into the World not to confirm the mighty in their seat but to exalt the meek and the humble.³ 'At that time Jesus answered and said: "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes."⁴ The Syrian slave-immigrants who once brought Christianity into Roman Italy performed the miracle of establishing a new religion which was alive in the place of an old religion which was already dead. It is possible that the Negro slave-immigrants who have found Christianity in America may perform the greater miracle of raising the dead to life. With their childlike spiritual intuition and their genius for

¹ Horace: *Satires*, Bk. I, Sat. 6; *Epistles*, Bk. I, Ep. 20.

² 'A touch of the tar-brush' is the colloquial phrase.

³ Luke i. 52.

⁴ Matthew xi. 25; cp. Psalm viii. 2.

giving spontaneous aesthetic expression to emotional religious experience, they may perhaps be capable of rekindling the cold grey ashes of Christianity which have been transmitted to them by us, until in their hearts the divine fire glows again. It is thus, perhaps, if at all, that Christianity may conceivably become the living faith of a dying civilization for the second time. If this miracle were indeed to be performed by an American Negro Church, that would be the most dynamic response to the challenge of social penalization that had yet been made by Man.

Religious Discrimination

When we pass from racial to religious discrimination, we find that, *mutatis mutandis*, the phenomena are the same. A religious denomination which is penalized on account of its persuasion by being debarred from engaging in agriculture or in 'the liberal professions', is apt to respond, like a penalized caste, by developing an exceptional proficiency in trade or handicraft. The Hindu Banya has his analogue in the Jew; the Arabian Sunnā' have theirs in the otherwise obscure North American religious fraternity at Oneida, in New York State, whose members have made a name for themselves in the business-world as the manufacturers of 'Community Plate'.

The results of religious discrimination may be studied in three different situations: first, where the adherents of the penalized denomination are members of the same society and heirs of the same civilization as the adherents of the privileged denomination among whom they live; second, where the respective adherents of the penalized and of the privileged denomination belong to two different civilizations which are both still 'going concerns'; third, where the adherents of the privileged denomination belong to a civilization which is still a 'going concern', while the adherents of the penalized denomination represent a civilization which only survives as a 'fossil'.¹

The first of these situations may be illustrated from the history of the English-speaking peoples of the Western World. In England, the re-establishment of the Anglican Church and the galling but not intolerable penalization of other Protestant religious denominations after the Restoration of A.D. 1660—a penalization which did not altogether cease at the Revolution of A.D. 1688—had the effect of stimulating the members of the Society of Friends to distinguish themselves in industry and banking,² and other Protestant Dis-

¹ For a list of the still extant 'fossils' of extinct civilizations, see above, I. B (iii), vol. i, pp. 34-5, and I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2. The psychological phenomena of the contact between 'fossils' and living societies are examined in Part IX, below.

² The Quakers, who appear to have been largely recruited from the agricultural population, found themselves in a more difficult position than the Nonconformists, owing to their conscientious objection to the payment of tithes.

senters and Nonconformists to prosper in various forms of retail trade.¹ *A fortiori*, the positive persecution to which the Puritans were exposed in England in the earlier decades of the seventeenth century, before the English Civil War, and again the Mormons in the United States some two centuries later, stimulated each of these persecuted sects into reacting with proportionate vigour. While the Quakers and the Nonconformists in eighteenth-century England were able to exist and even to prosper in that state of life to which it had pleased the Establishment to confine them, both the Puritans in early seventeenth-century England and the Latter-Day Saints in early nineteenth-century America made up their minds that there was no room in the same country for themselves and for their persecutors; and accordingly they each, in their day, went out into the wilderness in order to found ideal commonwealths, after their own heart, on virgin soil where they had only to contend with Physical Nature and not with stronger human powers.

The achievement of the Pilgrim Fathers in breaking-in the rough country of New England has been reviewed in this Study already.² It was fully equalled, in its own kind, by the achievement of the Latter-Day Saints. In the early nineteenth century, it needed no less courage to venture out in wagons into the unexplored hinterland of the North American Continent than it had needed in the early seventeenth century to set sail from the shores of Europe in the *Mayflower* for an uncharted American coast. Moreover, at the journey's end, the desert basin of Utah, with the Salt Lake at its core, offered an even more forbidding landscape for a Promised Land than the site of Town Hill, Connecticut. Indeed, it may be doubted whether the Mormons would ever have 'made good' in Utah if they had not been governed by the practical genius of Brigham Young. Happily for Joseph Smith's disciples, the first khalifah of the Mormon prophet³ played Joshua's as well as Moses' part in this latter-day American exodus. Brigham Young had the vision to perceive that the salt desert could be fertilized by the sweet waters descending from its mountain rim, and he also had the power of organization and command to carry through a great co-operative scheme of irrigation. These daring and romantic foundations of new commonwealths in the virgin wildernesses of Utah and New England have their place, beside the more passive and prosaic performance of the English Nonconformists in adapting themselves to their disabilities at home, as examples of the response which the

¹ For the movement in which the English Protestant Nonconformists withdrew from public life in the seventeenth century and returned in the nineteenth, see further III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 334, below.

² See II. D (i), pp. 15-16, above.

³ For the analogy between the histories of Mormonism and of Islam, see Meyer, Eduard: *Ursprung und Geschichte der Mormonen* (Halle 1912, Niemeyer).

challenge of religious discrimination is apt to evoke from those who are exposed to it in diverse degrees.¹

The Mormon response in the United States has a parallel in Russia in the history of the Old Believers and other dissenters from the established practice of Russian Orthodox Christendom. These Russian Orthodox Christian sectaries have won freedom to follow the devices of their own hearts by going out, beyond the advancing borders of the Russian Empire, into the wildernesses of Siberia and the Caucasus and the Eurasian Steppe. These sectarian pioneer settlements in no-man's-land have eventually been incorporated into the Russian body politic, as Utah has been incorporated into the United States; but the latter-day Czarism, in its treatment of schismatics, exercised a politic form of discrimination which was already customary in Western monarchies in the seventeenth century. While penalizing its Nonconformists in the interior, it tolerated and even encouraged them in the marches as unorthodox messengers of Holy Russia who could serve to prepare her way before her, just because they were officially beyond her pale.

The Phanariots

The situation arising when the respective adherents of the penalized and the privileged denomination belong to two different civilizations which are both 'going concerns' may be illustrated from the *ancien régime* of the Ottoman Empire as it existed down to the Revolution of A.D. 1908. In the Ottoman Empire, the main body of Orthodox Christendom had been endowed, by intruders of alien faith and culture, with a universal state which the Orthodox Christian Society could not do without yet was unable to establish for itself;² and the Orthodox Christians had paid for their social incompetence by ceasing to be masters in their own house. The Muslim conquerors who established and maintained the *Pax Ottomanica* in the Orthodox Christian World exacted payment, in the form of religious discrimination, for the services which they were rendering to their Christian subjects willy-nilly; and here, as elsewhere, the adherents of the penalized denomination responded to

¹ We may observe that while the sedentary Nonconformists of England learnt the lesson of toleration and eventually imparted it to their Anglican fellow countrymen, the Pilgrim Fathers and the Mormons both justified their persecutors in retrospect by persecuting others as soon as they had the power and the occasion. The ideal commonwealth which they went forth to found in the wilderness was not to be a place where every sect and every individual would be free to worship according to private conscience, but a place in which the pioneers would be able to do unto others what their persecutors had done unto them. The Quakers discovered this to their cost when they came out to Massachusetts at the Pilgrim Fathers' heels. An honourable and remarkable exception to the general spirit and practice of early New England was to be found in the State of Rhode Island, which from the outset granted freedom of conscience to all who settled on its diminutive territory.

² On this point, see further, Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7, below.

the challenge of discrimination by becoming past-masters in those pursuits to which their activities were now confined.

In the old Ottoman Empire, none who were not 'Osmanlis might govern or bear arms; and in large tracts of the Empire even the ownership and cultivation of the land passed out of the hands of the subject Christians into those of their Muslim masters. In these circumstances, the several Orthodox Christian peoples who found themselves forcibly united under a common Ottoman rule now came—for the first and last time in their histories—to a tacit but effective mutual understanding. They were inhibited by the 'Osmanlis' monopoly of sovereign power from carrying on their habitual internecine warfare with one another for the local mastery of cities and provinces. They were stimulated, by the 'Osmanlis' monopoly of 'the liberal professions', into parcelling out among themselves the humbler trades, which remained open for Christian practitioners, and learning each to excel in some special occupation of their own. By this road, the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Pādishāh gradually regained a footing within the walls of the Imperial capital, from which they had been deliberately evicted wholesale by Mehmed the Conqueror. The Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christian Qaramanlis from the interior of Anatolia and the Romance-speaking Orthodox Christian Vlachs from the highlands of the Balkan Peninsula succeeded in establishing themselves in Constantinople as grocers; their Greek-speaking co-religionists from the islands of the Aegean Archipelago set up in business on a more ambitious scale; the Orthodox Christian Albanians came to Constantinople as masons; the Orthodox Christian Montenegrins as hall-porters and commissionaires. Even the bucolic Bulgars, who had managed to keep a firmer grip upon the land than the Greeks, came to find a livelihood in the suburbs of Constantinople as grooms and market-gardeners. In Ottoman Syria, likewise, the Arabic-speaking Orthodox Christians gravitated towards the towns and tended to specialize in trades and handicrafts, while the Arabic-speaking Muslims remained cultivators of the soil in the countryside.

Among the Orthodox Christian re-occupants of Constantinople, there was one coterie—the so-called Phanariots—who were stimulated by the challenge of penalization to such a degree that they actually rose to be the virtual partners and potential supplanters of the 'Osmanlis themselves in the political administration and control of the Ottoman Empire. The Phanar, from which the Phanariots derived their name,¹ was the extreme north-western corner of

¹ The word Phanar itself is the modern Greek for 'lighthouse'—the quarter being called after a lighthouse which stood here in the angle between the land-walls of Constantinople and the south shore of the Golden Horn.

Stamboul, which the Ottoman Government had grudgingly abandoned to its Orthodox Christian subjects as the equivalent of a ghetto. The Oecumenical Patriarchate made its new head-quarters here after the Church of the Holy Wisdom had been converted into the Mosque of Aya Sofia and the Church of the Apostles demolished to make way for the Mosque of the Conqueror. In this apparently unpromising retreat, the Patriarchate became the rallying-point and the preserve of the Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians from the Aegean Archipelago who had found their way to Constantinople and had prospered there in trade; and these 'Phanariots' developed two special accomplishments. As merchants on the grand scale, they entered into commercial relations with the Western World and acquired a first-hand knowledge of Western manners and customs and Western languages. As managers of the Oecumenical Patriarchate's affairs, they acquired a wide practice and close understanding of Ottoman administration, since, under the old Ottoman régime, the Oecumenical Patriarch was the official intermediary between the Pādishāh and his Orthodox Christian subjects throughout the Empire and was invested, in this capacity, by delegation, with many of the functions of sovereignty over his co-religionists. These two accomplishments, together, made the fortunes of the Phanariots when, in the secular conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Western World, the tide definitely turned against the 'Osmanlis after their second unsuccessful siege of Vienna in A.D. 1682-3.¹

The change introduced certain formidable complications into Ottoman affairs of state. Before the reverse of 1683, the 'Osmanlis had always been able to count upon settling their relations with their Western Christian adversaries and with their Orthodox Christian subjects to their own satisfaction by the simple application of force. Their military decline confronted them with two new problems. They had now to negotiate at the conference-table with Western Powers whom they could no longer defeat in the field; and they had to consider the feelings of Orthodox Christian subjects whom they could no longer be sure of holding down. In other words, the Ottoman Empire could no longer dispense with skilled diplomatists and skilled administrators; and the necessary fund of experience, of which the 'Osmanlis found themselves destitute in their hour of need, was opportunely placed at their disposal by the Phanariots. In consequence, the 'Osmanlis were constrained to disregard the precedents and tamper with the principles of their own régime by conferring upon the Phanariots

¹ For this turn of the tide and its eventual effects upon the Turkish and the Austrian *éthos*, see II. D (v), pp. 179-88, above.

the monopoly of four high offices of state which were key-positions in the new political situation of the Ottoman Empire.¹ In the course of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the political power of the Phanariots was steadily enhanced by the specific influence and patronage which these offices carried with them, and still more potently by the general effect of the steady increase in the political pressure from the West—an increase which was inevitably accompanied by a corresponding appreciation in the political value of the one element inside the Ottoman Empire which was capable, at the time, of coping with 'the Western Question'. A hundred years after the turn of the tide under the walls of Vienna in 1683, it looked as though the result of Western pressure might be to endow the old Ottoman Empire with a new governing class by first forcing the 'Osmanlis to take the Phanariots into partnership and then enabling the Phanariots to make themselves, in effect, the senior partners in the Ottoman firm.²

¹ These four offices were the Dragomanship of the Porte, the Dragomanship of the Fleet, and the hospodarships of the autonomous principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The two dragomanships were new creations; the two hospodarships were existing offices which were now placed in Phanariot hands.

The importance of the dragomanships is not to be measured by the literal meaning of the title. The 'Osmanlis sought to 'save their faces' by giving the modest title of 'interpreters' ('dragoman' = *terjümen*) to Phanariot officials who, in effect, discharged the functions of a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and a Secretary of State for the Navy and whose power and patronage, *ex officio*, were not much less extensive than they would have been in any Western monarchy of the day.

As for the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, these had been founded by Orthodox Christian pioneers of Rumanian nationality who had descended from the Transylvanian highlands in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era and had wrested the extreme south-western corner of the great Eurasian Steppe from the Nomads. The two principalities had recognized the suzerainty of a paramount Power from the beginning of their existence, but their original suzerain had been the King of Hungary, from whose dominions their founders had come. The transference of their allegiance to the Ottoman Padişah had been one of the incidents in the long duel between Hungary and the Ottoman Power which ended on the field of Mohacz; and since the political orientation of these principalities was one of the factors on which the issue of the struggle between Hungary and Turkey depended, the Wallachian and Moldavian Rumanians had been able to come to far more favourable terms with the 'Osmanlis than any of their co-religionists on the south side of the Danube. They had secured from the Padişah a pledge that, under his suzerainty, they should always be governed by princes of their own faith, and that no Muslim places of worship and no Turkish military fiefs or colonies should ever be established on their territories. The Ottoman Government faithfully observed these undertakings and implemented the first of them, to begin with, by placing the two Ruman principalities under local Ruman princes. This practice was abandoned after the turn of the tide in A.D. 1683, when the principalities acquired a new strategic and political importance as marches of the Ottoman Empire over against the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy on the one hand and the Russian Empire on the other. When Peter the Great invaded Moldavia in 1711, the reigning prince, Demetrius Cantemir, went over to his side; and this danger-signal moved the Ottoman Government to strengthen its control over the principalities, without violating the letter of its bond, by thenceforth appointing Orthodox Christian princes who were not of Rumanian nationality and who had no hereditary local influence or attachments. Accordingly, from A.D. 1711 to 1821, the incumbencies of the two principalities became a perquisite of the Phanariots—an arrangement which safeguarded Ottoman interests and lined Phanariot pockets at the local Rumanian population's expense.

² It was in this expectation that the Empress Catherine II of Russia played with the idea of re-establishing the East Roman Empire after the great Russian victory over the 'Osmanlis in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74.

In the event, the Phanariots failed to achieve their 'manifest destiny' because, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Western pressure attained a degree of intensity at which its nature underwent a sudden transformation. The purely external pressure, of a military and diplomatic kind, which began to be exerted upon the Ottoman Empire by the great Powers of the Western World after the Second Siege of Vienna, was reinforced, after the American and French revolutions, by a far more penetrating and pervasive and disruptive pressure which was exerted, from within, by the Ottoman peoples themselves through that process of cultural fermentation and social metabolism, for which we have coined the name 'Westernization'. The general operation of this process in the Ottoman Empire has been touched upon already;¹ and in this place we need only recall the two facts that the political gospel of 'Westernization' was Nationalism and that the Greeks, being the first of the Ottoman peoples to enter into intimate relations with the West, were also the first whom the virus of Western Nationalism infected. Between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, the Greeks were under the spell of two incompatible aspirations. They had not given up the Phanariot ambition of entering into the whole heritage of the 'Osmanlis and keeping the Ottoman Empire intact as a 'going concern' under Greek instead of Turkish management; and at the same time they had conceived the new ambition of establishing a sovereign independent national state of their own—a Greece which should be as Greek as France was French—in order that the Greeks 'also' might 'be like all the nations'² of the Western World.

In their quest for this 'pound of flesh' the Greek nationalists eventually overreached themselves; but their miscalculation was not the same as Shylock's. The legendary Jew desired his victim's death, but forgot to stipulate for shedding his blood; the Greeks failed to foresee that the death of the Ottoman Empire must result from the bloodshed which they contemplated, and that therefore the new Greece of their dreams could be nothing but a goblet of the old Empire's dismembered carcass. Their discomfiture was even more ironic than their Shakespearian prototype's; for fate permitted them to draw and use the knife in order to expose their miscalculation by an experiment which could never be undone. The incompatibility of the two Greek aspirations was demonstrated conclusively in 1821 when the Greeks attempted to realize both of them simultaneously.

When the Phanariot Prince Hypsilanti crossed the Pruth, from his 'jumping-off ground' in Russia, in order to make himself master

¹ See II. D (v), pp. 181-6, above.

² I Samuel viii. 20.

of the Ottoman Empire, and the Maniot chieftain Petro Bey Mavromikhális descended from his mountain-fastness in the Morea in order to carve out an independent Greece, the outcome of both enterprises was a foregone conclusion. The resort to arms, in itself, spelt the ruin of Phanariot aspirations, since the Phanariot ascendancy in the Ottoman Empire could only have been consummated by an uninterrupted process of 'peaceful penetration'. Prince Hypsilanti's armed incursion into the Danubian Principalities produced an electric effect upon the 'Osmanlis. The reed on which they had been leaning for more than a century had pierced their hand;¹ and their fury at this betrayal nerved them to break the treacherous staff in pieces and to stand again at all costs on their own feet. In 1821, the 'Osmanlis retorted to Prince Hypsilanti's act of war by destroying at one blow the fabric of power which the Phanariots had been peacefully building up for themselves since 1683; and this was the first step in a process of eradicating all non-Turkish elements from the remnant of the 'Osmanlis' heritage—a process which reached its climax in the eviction of the Orthodox Christian minority from Anatolia in 1922.

Thus the first explosion of Greek nationalism kindled the first spark of Turkish nationalism; but the effect of Prince Hypsilanti's act upon the non-Greek Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire was, if possible, still more untoward, from the Greek standpoint, than its effect upon the Turks. The Greek Prince's appearance in the Danubian Principalities at the head of an armed force of Greek filibusters made the local Rumanian population realize that they were in imminent danger of exchanging 'King Log' for 'King Stork'. If the Muslim 'Osmanlis had chastised their Christian subjects with whips, the Christian Phanariots showed every intention of chastising their co-religionists with scorpions. The Rumans turned Hypsilanti's raid into a fiasco by passively but effectively taking the Turkish side; and not only the Rumans but the Bulgars and the Serbs and all the other Orthodox Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire made up their minds forthwith that it was expedient for them to remain under Turkish rule until they could be sure of exchanging it for their own national independence. Therewith, it was decided that the Ottoman Empire should not have its unity maintained and its life prolonged by a peaceful transference of control from the 'Osmanlis to the Phanariots, but should be broken up by violence into a mosaic of sovereign independent national states on the Western pattern. This procrustean operation, by which an association of occupational castes was cruelly rough-hewn into a congeries of territorial nations, began with the

extermination of the Turkish Muslim landowners in the Morea in 1821 by massacre or eviction at the hands of the local Greek insurgents, and was carried on—by the same ‘methods of barbarism’—to the bitter end, until it reached its term, a hundred years later, in the massacre or eviction of the Greek and other Christian tradesmen and artisans in Anatolia in 1922 at the hands of the Turkish nationalists.

The Qāzānlīs

Thus, after all, the Phanariots just failed to secure that ‘senior partnership’ in the Ottoman Empire which had seemed, in the eighteenth century, to be their ‘manifest destiny’. Yet the fact that they came within an ace of success is sufficient evidence of the vigour with which they had responded to the challenge of penalization. Indeed, the history of their relations with the ‘Osmanlis is an excellent illustration of the general social ‘law’ of Challenge-and-Response; and the antithesis between Greek and Turk, which has attracted so much interest and excited so much animus,¹ is explicable only in these terms and not in the racial and religious terms which have been in fashion on both sides in the popular polemics. Turcophils and Graecophils agree in attributing the historical differences in *êthos* between Greek Christians and Turkish Muslims to some ineradicable quality of race or indelible imprint of religion. They disagree simply in inverting the social values which they assign to these unknown quantities in the two cases. The Graecophil postulates an inherent virtue in Greek blood and in Orthodox Christianity and an inherent vice in Turkish blood and in Islam to make the Greek the angel and the Turk the devil that he alleges them to be. The Turcophil transposes his postulates and thereby proves the Turk an angel and the Greek a devil to his own satisfaction. Actually, the common assumption which underlies both these special pleadings is contradicted by unquestionable matters of fact.

It is unquestionable, for instance, in the matter of physical race, that the blood of Ertoghrol’s Central Asian Turkish followers which flows in the veins of the Ottoman Turkish people to-day is no more than an infinitesimal tincture. The Ottoman Turkish people has grown into a nation out of a handful of refugees, not by natural increase, but by assimilating the Orthodox Christian population² in whose midst the ‘Osmanlis have been living ever since the original settlement in Sultan Özü.³ The process was in full swing in the second generation, under Ertoghrol’s son ‘Osmān,

¹ It is perhaps worth remarking that the animus of the Greeks and Turks against one another has been surpassed by that of their respective partisans in the Western World, who have shown still greater fanaticism than their protégés.

² For the method of assimilation, see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 28–44, below.

³ For the challenge presented to the fathers of the ‘Osmanlis by the geographical location of this settlement, see II. D (v), pp. 151–2, above.

whom the new community adopted as its eponymous hero when it had to coin itself a new name. There is every reason to believe that the blood of the indigenous Greek and other Orthodox Christian recruits had swamped the blood of the immigrant Turkish Muslim nucleus in the racial composition of the 'Osmanlis well before the end of the first century of their existence as a distinctive community with a name of its own. If this sufficiently refutes the *a priori* racial explanation of the Graeco-Turkish antithesis, we may refute the *a priori* religious explanation by citing the following description of one of the other Turkish Muslim peoples that are in existence, side by side with the Ottoman Turks, at the present day:¹

'The Volga Turks are, on the whole, distinguished by their sobriety, honesty, thrift, and industry. By their assiduity they often acquire considerable wealth. They live on the best of terms with their Russian peasant neighbours. The chief occupation of the Qāzān Turk is trade, to which he turns at once when he has acquired a small capital by agriculture. On his commercial journeys he is always a propagandist of Islam. His chief industries are soap-boiling, spinning, and weaving. He is sometimes a worker in gold. He makes a good shoemaker and coachman. . . . These Turks are more cleanly in their houses than the Russian peasantry. . . .

'Till the end of the sixteenth century, no mosques were tolerated in Qāzān, and the Tatars were compelled to live in a separate quarter. But the predominance of the Muslims gradually prevailed, so that in the second half of the eighteenth century there were as many as 250 mosques in the Government of Qāzān. A ukase of tolerance promulgated in 1773² helped the cause of Islam among these Turks. Far from being won by Russian tolerance, the Muslims of the Volga have in modern times become more closely united than ever with the Muhammadan world. . . .

'There has been a rapid increase in the number of mosques and a steady improvement in the status of Muslim schools in the Government of Qāzān. . . . These schools have not been affected in the least by the Russian educational system. . . .

'In consequence of the attention paid to education, the percentage of Qāzān Turks who cannot read and write is extremely low. The production of printed books has also been considerable among these Muslims. . . .

'Thus, during a period of 360 years of Russian rule, the Asiatic conservatism of these Qāzān Muslims has in no way been weakened or influenced by Russian culture. . . . No conversion except among their ruling families takes place, and only the quite uneducated element is liable to be absorbed in the Russian population. . . .'³

¹ At the present day there are approximately twice as many Turkish Muslims within the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. as there are in Turkey.

² In the same year, the Ottoman Government granted its charter to the Greek Orthodox Christian community at Ayvalıq (see II. D (ii), footnote 1 on p. 40, above). The Russian and Ottoman Empires, being engaged at the time in a formidable war with one another, each found it advisable to make concessions to subject minorities which were of the same civilization as the enemy Power.—A. J. T.

³ The British Admiralty: *Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanism* (London, no date, H.M. Stationery Office), ch. vi (iii), 1, pp. 181-4.

It will be seen that, if the proper names in the foregoing passage were left blank, the text might serve, as it stands, to describe the Orthodox Christian Greeks of Constantinople under the old Ottoman régime just as well as the Muslim Turks of Qāzān under the Russian Czarism. This coincidence defies explanation on the hypothesis that Turks and Greeks or Muslims and Christians are what they are by reason of certain absolute racial characteristics or indelible religious hall-marks. On the other hand, it is just what we should expect on the hypothesis of Challenge-and-Response. For what has been the history of the Qāzānli Turks? Qāzān was a Muslim city which was conquered by the Orthodox Christian Muscovites within a century of the conquest of Christian Constantinople by the 'Osmanlis; and under Muscovite rule the Qāzānli Turks have had to adapt themselves, like the Stambouli Greeks under Ottoman rule, to a régime of religious discrimination. So far from being surprising, it is eminently natural that the Greek in Turkey and the Turk in Russia should have met the same challenge of religious discrimination with the same response. Both communities have concentrated their energies with success upon trade and handicraft because both have been debarred from following other walks of life as a penalty for their nonconformity with the religion of the Power under whose ascendancy they have each respectively had to live. In this connexion, the incidental fact that the Greeks in Turkey happen to have been penalized for being Christians and the Turks in Russia for being Muslims has made no difference. The common experience of being penalized on account of religion has been the governing factor in the development of both communities; and in the course of four or five centuries their identical reaction to this common experience has bred them into a 'family likeness' with each other which has quite effaced the diversity between the original imprints of Orthodox Christianity and Islam.

The Levantines

This 'family likeness' is shared by adherents of certain other religious denominations who have likewise been penalized on account of their religious allegiance and who have responded in the same way. Without extending our survey beyond the bounds of the old Ottoman Empire and the old Russian Czarism, we may observe that the distinctive characteristics of the Orthodox Christian Phanariots and the Muslim Qāzānli reappear unmistakably both in the Roman Catholic 'Levantines' and in the Protestant inhabitants of the seventeenth-century suburb of Moscow which was known as 'the Svoboda'.

These Catholics and Protestants were immigrants from Western

Christendom who were permitted to reside in the Ottoman and Russian Empires on sufferance, under certain disabilities, as in our day the Chinese are permitted to reside in countries under Western control round the shores of the Pacific.¹ These Western residents in a bygone Russia and a bygone Turkey were, indeed, in a less unfortunate position than that of the Chinese residents in California or Australia at the present time, since the Chinese are the victims of a racial discrimination from which they cannot escape by any action which it lies with them to take, whereas the Levantines could, and sometimes did, escape from the religious discrimination to which they were subject by becoming 'renegades'—a step which not only raised them from the degradation of being treated as pariahs, but threw open to them the highest positions in the Ottoman State. The same avenue of escape was open to the 'Osmanlis' Orthodox Christian subjects; and the Ottoman governing class was actually recruited, by preference and on principle, from Christian 'renegades', Christian prisoners-of-war and Christian 'tribute children' from the time of 'Osmān himself down to the turn of the tide in A.D. 1682-3.² In this respect, the Levantines were in the same position as the Phanariots; but in both communities religious apostasy, notwithstanding the strength of the inducements to it, remained the exception and did not become the rule; and the Levantine Catholics who were unwilling to renounce their religion were subject to the same disabilities under the old Ottoman régime as the indigenous Orthodox Christians. In Galata on the north shore of the Golden Horn, and in the Frankish quarters in the other 'Échelles du Levant', the Catholic *ra'iyyeh*³ lived a ghetto-life which was not very different from the life of the Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh* in the Phanar or the life of the Jews in the West down to the time of the French Revolution; and the Levantines duly developed the specific virtues and vices which the ghetto demands.⁴ It made no difference that they happened to be descended, in physical race, from some of the most warlike and imperious and high-spirited peoples of Western Christendom: from the medieval Venetians and Genoese and the modern French and Dutch and English. In the stifling atmosphere of their Ottoman ghetto, they must either respond to the challenge of religious penalization in the

¹ See pp. 217-18, above.

² See further Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 28-44, below.

³ *Ra'iyyeh* means literally 'the flock' of which the Ottoman Pādīshāh was the shepherd. The term was not applied exclusively to his non-Muslim subjects. The Muslim peasantry of Anatolia were called *ra'iyyeh* as well as the Christian merchants and ecclesiastics of Constantinople.

⁴ 'Nos négocians dans les diverses échelles . . . renfermés dans leurs *kans* comme dans des prisons, ne s'embarrassent que peu de tout ce qui est étranger à leur commerce.' (Volney, C. F.: *Voyage en Syrie et en Egypte pendant les Années 1783, 1784 et 1785*, 2nd ed. (Paris 1787, Desenne et Volland, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 142.)

same manner as other men, or else succumb. Again, the 'Nordic' physique and Protestant tradition of the Dutch and Scottish and German residents in 'the Svoboda' did not prevent the Christian denizens of this Muscovite ghetto¹ from acquiring a strong 'family likeness' to their Muslim neighbours and contemporaries and equals in status: the Turks of Qāzān.

Moreover, if we let our eyes range farther afield over the world of that day, we shall observe that, in the latter part of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, the life of the ghetto was being lived by traders and handicraftsmen of Catholic or Protestant religion and Western origin, not only under an Ottoman régime in Galata and under a Muscovite régime in 'the Svoboda', but likewise under the Mughal rulers of India on the island of Bombay and under the Manchu rulers of China in the 'factories' at Canton² and under the Shoguns of Japan on the island of Deshima.

The ingenuity and the severity with which the Japanese penalized the Dutch have probably never been exceeded in the whole history of religious and racial discrimination. At Japanese hands, Dutch traders endured, for more than two centuries, humiliations worse than any that have been inflicted by Turk on Greek or by Gentile on

¹ 'Svoboda' means literally 'free-town'; yet, at the accession of Peter the Great, the social atmosphere of 'the Svoboda' was essentially the same as that of Galata or the Phanar in the same age.

² For a description of the conditions under which the Western merchants lived and traded, before their 'emancipation', in the 'factories' at Canton, see Morse, H. B.: *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London 1910, Longmans Green), vol. I, chs. iv and xiv, esp. pp. 67-72:

'In 1757 an Imperial edict was issued making Canton the sole staple, and prohibiting all foreign trade at any other port. . .

'Regulations were made for the control of the foreigner, his ships and his trade. . . The more important among them may be summarised as follows:—

'1°. Ships of war must remain outside the river, and must not enter the Bogue.

'2°. Women must not be brought to the factories; nor could guns, spears, or other arms.

'3°. Hong merchants must not be in debt to foreigners.

'4°. Foreign traders must not engage Chinese servants.

'5°. Foreigners must not use sedan chairs.

'6°. Foreigners must not row for pleasure on the river. Three days in the month (on the 8th, 18th, and 28th) they might take the air at Fati (the flower gardens across the river) in small parties, under the escort of an interpreter, who was held, literally and personally, responsible for all their misdeeds.

'7°. Foreigners must not present petitions; if they have anything to represent, it must be done through the Hong Merchants.

'8°. "In the Hong merchants' factories where foreigners live, let them be under the restraint and control of the Hong merchants. The purchase of goods by them must pass through the hands of a Hong merchant; this was originally designed to guard against traitorous natives misleading them and teaching them. Hereafter the foreign merchants dwelling in the Hong merchants' factories must not be allowed to presume of their own accord to go out and in, lest they should trade and carry on clandestine transactions with traitorous natives."

'9°. Foreigners must not remain at Canton out of season, but, their goods sold and ships laden, must return home or go to Macao. . . .

These factories provided palatial accommodation for the foreign visitors, guests of the Empire, but they constituted in effect a gilded cage. The only ground for exercise available for the greater number was a square in front of the six factories in the middle, measuring about 500 feet by 300 feet.

Jew; and the reader of the story is left at a loss between admiration for the tenacity and disgust at the servility with which these 'Nordic' Protestant Occidentals held their ground and made their money, year in and year out, under conditions which were deliberately intended to make their residence in Japan intolerable. From A.D. 1641 to 1858,¹ the Dutch in Japan were rigorously 'kept in Coventry' on Deshima, a tiny island off the Japanese port of Nagasaki; and the privilege of being allowed to do their business in this insular ghetto, which was accorded to the Dutch alone among the Western nations, had to be purchased at the price of periodic self-abasement. One condition of the Hollanders' tenure of Deshima was that they should trample annually upon the Cross in the presence of a Japanese official: a ceremony which was only allowed to lapse in A.D. 1853 and was only abolished formally in 1856-7.² Another condition was that they should pay an annual visit of respect to the Shogun's capital at Yedo³ and should make themselves objects of public derision by cutting capers for the entertainment of the Court.⁴ This was the only occasion in the year on which the Dutch were permitted to stir outside their island prison-house. Yet the Dutch became so well resigned to these odious conditions of their residence in Japan that they left it to others to take the initiative in bringing the relations between Westerners and Japanese on to a footing of equality; and they showed no haste to follow, even after the Americans had led the way.⁵

The relations in which the Dutch lived with the Japanese, from the date of their confinement on Deshima in A.D. 1641 down to the

¹ On the 18th August, 1858, a Dutch-Japanese Treaty was concluded on the pattern of the American-Japanese Treaty which had been signed on the 31st March, 1854.

² See Murdoch, J.: *A History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), pp. 616-17.

³ The present Tokyo.

⁴ In compelling the Dutch residents in Japan to demean themselves periodically in this public manner, the Japanese authorities were deliberately seeking to make the Western peoples and the Western Civilization ridiculous and contemptible in Japanese eyes. Without knowing it, they were adopting one of the expedients of Spartan statecraft. In ancient Lacedaemon, the Helots were periodically compelled to exhibit themselves to their Spartan masters in a maudlin condition, in order to confirm on both sides the impression that the Helots were an inferior race who were born to be the slaves of the Spartiates.

⁵ Aristotle (I think it is) says that the Overseers (*ἐφόροι*) [the chief executive officers of the Lacedaemonian Government, who were elected annually], when they take office, formally declare war on the Helots, in order to keep a free hand for killing Helots without blood-guiltiness. Altogether, the Spartans' treatment of the Helots was harsh and inhuman. For instance, they used to force them to drink quantities of neat wine and then bring them into the military messes, in order to give the young Spartiates an ocular demonstration of what drunkenness looks like. And they used to give them orders to sing songs and dance dances that were low and ludicrous, and not to sing or dance anything classical. On this account they say that in the sequel, during the Theban invasion of Laconia, when the Helot prisoners were told to sing something of Terpander's or Alcman's or Spendo the Laconian's, they begged to be excused, on the ground that their Spartan masters would not like it.

Plutarch: *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. xxviii. Cf. eundem, *Instituta Laconica*, No. 30. For Spartan institutions, see further Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 50-79, below.

⁵ Murdoch, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 618.

reopening of Japan to Western commercial enterprise on normal conditions in the middle of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, have their analogy in the relations between the ancient Greeks and Egyptians from the time when the Egyptian King Amasis (*regnabat circa 569-525 B.C.*) confined the Greek residents in Egypt to the 'treaty-port' of Naucratis in the middle of the sixth century B.C. down to the time when the Greeks were made masters of Egypt by Alexander the Great. During those two centuries the ancient Greeks in Egypt, like the modern Dutch in Japan, accepted the social humiliations of a pariah status in order to earn its commercial profits, as appears plainly from the following account of the Egyptian ritual of sacrifice in the fifth century B.C. from the hand of a contemporary Greek observer.

'When the Egyptians have slaughtered the sacrificial victim, they cut off its head. Thereupon, they flay the carcase and make a fearful imprecation over the head, which they then proceed to get rid of. Where they have a market with resident Greek traders, they simply get rid of it in the market by sale; but where there are no Greeks on the spot, they get rid of the head by throwing it into the river. The formula of imprecation which is recited over the head runs thus: "If any evil is impending over us who are making this sacrifice or over the whole Land of Egypt, into this head let it go!"'

The situation here depicted is a prosaic version, 'in real life', of the phantasy which Robert Louis Stevenson has played with in 'The Bottle Imp'. The sacrificial victim's head is an object charged with evil which the pious and sensitive Egyptian peasant is as anxious to get rid of as the unsophisticated Polynesian islander is anxious to get rid of the haunted bottle. The Greek trader, who is willing to take the unclean head off his Egyptian neighbour's hands any day for the sake of a pennyworth of profit, is a sordid counterpart of Stevenson's sailor-man, who cheerfully carries off the bottle for the sake of a dram and so disappears from the story. The light which this throws upon the status of the Greeks in Egypt in Herodotus's day is highly illuminating.

The Jews, Parsees, Nestorians, Monophysites, and Monotheletes

We have still to take note of the results of religious discrimination in the third of our three situations: that is, where the adherents of the penalized denomination represent a civilization which only survives as a 'fossil'. This situation need not be surveyed in great detail, since the phenomena are well known in themselves and do not differ in essence from those which we have observed in the two situations which we have examined already.

Let us glance at the various 'fossils' of the Syriac Society which

¹ Herodotus, Bk. II, ch. 39.

have been deposited, in successive social strata, during the much-interrupted and long-drawn-out course of Syriac history.¹ In the oldest stratum there are the Jews and the Parsees, who are relics of the Syriac Society as it was in its universal state, under the Achæmenian régime, before the Hellenic intrusion. In an intermediate stratum there are the Nestorians and the Monophysites, who are relics of two abortive attempts on the part of the Syriac Society to expel the intrusive Hellenism from its body social, and there are the Monotheletes, who are relics of an equally abortive attempt, on the part of the Hellenic Society *in extremis*, to retain its hold over a remnant of the Syriac World. In the most recent stratum there are the Shī'īs, who are the relics of a fissure in the Syriac World which was one of the consequences of the Hellenic intrusion² and which left its scar upon the Syriac body social even after the expulsion of Hellenism and the re-unification of the Syriac World had been successfully achieved, on the whole, in the 'resumption' of the Syriac universal state under the 'Abbasid régime and in the establishment of a 'totalitarian' Syriac universal church in the shape of Islam. The medium in which all these Syriac 'fossils' have been preserved is a religious medium; their religious idiosyncrasies, which have safeguarded their identities and perpetuated their existence in their fossil state, have also exposed them to religious discrimination at the hands of the alien societies in the midst of which they have managed to survive; this penalization has taken the usual form of exclusion from certain walks of life; and it has evoked the usual reaction in its victims. They have learnt to hold their own in any human environment in which they are allowed to exist on sufferance by excelling in those trades and handicrafts to which their activities have been compulsorily confined.³

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2, above, and II. D (vii), pp. 285-8, below.

² For the partition of the Syriac World, over a span of some seven centuries, into an eastern section which had liberated itself and a western section which had failed to liberate itself from the Hellenic domination, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 75-7, above.

³ In general, the reaction evoked by religious penalization among the representatives of a 'fossil' civilization seems to be more thoroughgoing than the reaction which the same challenge evokes among members of a civilization which is still a 'going concern'. The 'fossils' are apt to learn how to hold their own, under penalization, in any number of human environments successively or simultaneously, whereas the range of penalized religious minorities whose civilizations are still 'going concerns' is apt to remain within the ambit of some single society. Yet this broad distinction is by no means absolute. For example, the Levantines and the Greeks and the Gujaratis, who are members of the Western and the Orthodox Christian and the Hindu Society respectively, have shown themselves as versatile as the 'fossil' Jews and Parsees and Armenians and Nestorians and Maronites. Having served their apprenticeship in penalization under an Islamic régime—the Levantines and Greeks under the Ottoman Empire and the Gujaratis under the Muslim rāj in India—they have each extended their range into other environments: the Greeks into Western Europe and America; the Gujaratis into the colonial domains of the Western peoples in East and South Africa; the Levantines into Russia and India and the Far East. Conversely, the 'fossil' Copts have not made themselves at home outside Egypt any more than 'the Old Believers' have made themselves at home outside the Russian Empire or the Quakers outside the English-speaking World.

The Jews, for example, have overcome the social handicap which their religious idiosyncrasy entails by holding their own successfully, as traders and financiers, in a great variety of human environments. They have found a place for themselves first in the Syriac and Hellenic worlds and then in the Arabic and Iranic and Western worlds; and during the last few centuries they have kept pace with the expansion of Western Christendom until nowadays their activities and interests extend, as widely as those of our modern Western Society itself, over all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face of the planet. The Parsees, for their part, have played the same role in the Hindu World as the Jews have played elsewhere; and they have shown the same elasticity and initiative as the Jews in using their special skill and experience to good effect in a variety of circumstances. Having acquired their expertise in trade and finance in a Hindu economic environment, they have managed to turn it to account in the utterly different economic environment which has been created in India by the impact of our Western Civilization; and their response to the challenge of this impact has been so much more effective than the response of the Hindus and Muslims among whom they live that they have profited by the ordeal of 'Westernization' to increase the economic ascendancy over their Indian neighbours which they already possessed before the challenge from the West was presented.

The Armenian Gregorian Monophysites have shown the same ability and adaptability in the same lines of activity as the Parsees and the Jews, until, at the present day, the Armenian merchant, like the Jewish financier, has become ubiquitous. In a narrower field, the Syrian Jacobite Monophysites have reacted like their Armenian co-religionists, while the Coptic Monophysites have held their own by acquiring a virtual monopoly of the local but lucrative business of farming the land-tax in their native Egypt.

The Monophysites started their career by holding out under the religious persecution which they had to suffer at the hands of an Orthodox Christian régime in the Roman Empire.¹ The Nestorians, for whom life in the Roman Empire was made impossible, transferred their head-quarters to 'Irâq and Iran, and held their own there, not only as men of business but as physicians, under the comparatively tolerant Sasanid and Umayyad and 'Abbasid régimes; and they did not perish in the social cataclysm which overwhelmed

¹ The Monophysites called their Orthodox Christian oppressors 'Melchites', that is to say 'Imperialists'—Orthodox Christianity (from which the Catholic Christianity of the West had not yet differentiated itself) being the established religion of the Roman Imperial régime under which the Monophysites had to live from the year 451, when the schism came to an open breach, down to the Arab conquest of the Roman provinces in Syria and Egypt towards the middle of the seventh century.

these regions at the break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, when Baghdad was sacked, and the irrigation-system of 'Irāq put out of action, by the Mongols.

Before this catastrophe overtook their base of operations in the Syriac World, the Nestorians had already learnt to make themselves at home in other human environments at the ends of the Earth. In one direction, they made their way by sea along the west coast of India, beyond the farthest point to which the Parsee sphere of influence extended, and established a sphere of their own at the extremity of the Indian Peninsula, where their descendants or converts survive to this day as 'Saint Thomas's Christians' in Travancore. In another direction, they ventured out overland, beyond the farthest outposts of the Syriac World in Transoxania, into the heart of the great Eurasian Steppe, and made their way, from oasis to oasis, across the whole breadth of the wilderness until they emerged on the other side in China. These continental Nestorian pioneers who once won a footing in Central Asia and in the Far East have left no survivors. Yet, although in this sense they have been less successful than their co-religionists who followed the maritime route to India,¹ they have succeeded in making a greater mark upon the history of Mankind during their briefer day.

In the Far East the Nestorians were an active element in Society in the age of the T'ang (*imperabant* A.D. 618-907); and in the oases of the Eurasian Steppe they succeeded in converting the sedentary Turkish Uighurs and came near to establishing a distinctive Far Eastern Christian Civilization in the midst of the supremely adverse human environment of Nomadism.² It is true that this *tour de force* was abortive. The prospect was compromised in A.D. 737-41, when the oases of Transoxania, which had been the 'jumping-off ground' of the Nestorians in their overland venture, were permanently incorporated into the Arab Empire and were thereby transferred from the sphere of Nestorian Christendom to the sphere of Islam. The *coup de grâce* was delivered in A.D. 1203-6, when the semi-Nestorianized Nomads of the high steppe—the Karāyits³ and the more powerful and progressive Naimans—were successively defeated by the pagan chief of the Mongols, Chingis Khan. The Basin of the Orkhon, over which the Karāyits and the Naimans ranged at the time, was a key-position; and the conquest of its

¹ Even in India, Nestorianism has now lost its heritage; for, in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, the allegiance of Saint Thomas's Christians was usurped, under false pretences, by the Jacobite Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch. (See above, I. B (iii), vol. i, footnote 3 on p. 35.)

² This abortive Far Eastern Christian Civilization is discussed further in II. D (vii), on pp. 369-85, below.

³ Wang Khan, the prince of the Karāyits, was perhaps the historic original of the legendary 'Prester John'.

contemporary occupants was the first decisive step in Chingis' career. It is interesting to speculate what the future of Nestorian Christendom might have been if Wang Khan the Karāyit and not Chingis Khan the Mongol had won the day in A.D. 1203, or again if Tayan Khan the Naiman had won in 1206.

Even as it was, the Nestorian pioneers in the Nomadic World were able, thanks to their local monopoly of the elements of a higher culture, to hold their own after the overthrow of their Karāyit and Naiman patrons; and the Mongol conqueror took them into his service as scribes and accountants and recorders. For the best part of a century, while the centre of gravity of the Mongol Empire still remained on the Steppe and its seat of government in 'Prester John's' country at Qaraqorum, on the head-waters of the Orkhon, the archives of the Great Khan's Court were kept by Nestorian Christian secretaries in a Uighur Turkish dialect conveyed in a Syriac Alphabet. The Nestorians even made some distinguished Mongol converts. Hulāgū Khan, who sacked Baghdad and devastated 'Irāq (the original point of departure of the Nestorian Dispersion) in A.D. 1258, had a Nestorian wife; and Hulāgū's advance-guard, which captured Damascus in A.D. 1260, was commanded by a Nestorian general. It will be seen that the history of these Nestorian Christian Turkish Uighurs bears a certain resemblance to the history of the Orthodox Christian Greek Phanariots. They just missed their 'manifest destiny'; yet, in response to the challenge of penalization, they had developed certain special accomplishments which so enhanced their social value in the human environment in which they lived that they were virtually taken into partnership by the rulers of a great empire.¹

As for the Maronite Monotheletes, they have served an apprenticeship as clerks and traders in the Arabic World—especially in the fat land of Egypt which lies on the threshold of their own lean Lebanese fastness—and they have known, like the Jews and the Parsees and the Armenians, how to profit by the recent economic expansion of the Western Society over the face of the planet. The original field of Maronite commercial enterprise in Egypt now counts for less in the Maronite economy than the larger and more lucrative fields which the Maronites have found for themselves in the United States, in Latin America, and in the French Colonial Empire in West Africa. Similarly, the Ismā'īlī Shī'īs (*alias* Assassins *alias* Khwājas) have served an apprenticeship in India and have profited by 'the opening-up of Africa', where they have found a

¹ For the role played by the Nestorians in the Mongol Empire, see Vladimirtsov, B. Y.: *The Life of Chingis Khan* (English translation: London 1930, Routledge); and Barthold, W.: *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (English translation: London 1928, Luzac), pp. 386-92.

new field of enterprise in the British protectorates and colonies and mandated territories along the East-African seaboard of the Indian Ocean. At the opposite extremity of the Arabic World, the 'Ibādī Kharijites have held their own in a Sunnī environment as a mercantile class in the Maghrib.¹

So much for the reactions to the challenge of religious discrimination which can be observed among the 'fossils' of the Syriac Society. If we turn from these to the 'fossils' of the Indic Society, we can observe at least one reaction of the same nature to the same challenge among the Jains in India, who, together with the Hinayanian Buddhists in Ceylon, are relics of the Indic Society as it was before the Hellenic intrusion and who thus correspond in stratum to the Jews and the Parsees.² In Bengal and Assam at the present day, retail trade is a perquisite of Jain shop-keepers from the State of Marwar in Rājputāna.³

¹ For the 'Ibādīs, see Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 303-4:

'Les Mzabites actuels sont assurément les descendants des ibadites rostémides, mais ils ont beaucoup changé en mille ans. Ils ont subi une transformation qui est fréquente dans la société orientale. Comme les Arméniens, comme les Parsis, comme les Juifs, qui ont l'exemple le plus éclatant, les Mzabites depuis l'écroulement de l'empire sont venus une sorte de tribu, ou plutôt de nation constituée par des siècles d'intermariage et spécialisée dans le maniement de l'argent, où, par développement atavique progressif, ils ont passé maître. Malgré l'éparpillement des individus dans toutes les villes de l'Algérie, partout où il y a un mouvement d'affaires possible, la cohésion de la nation mzabite, qui est incroyablement forte, son patriotisme hargneux et profondément méprisant, sont assurés uniquement par le lien religieux. Cette croûte protectrice religieuse s'est incessamment épaissie de siècle en siècle, elle s'est consolidée d'une armature compliquée de subtilités théologiques et de pratiques culturelles minutieuses.'

² For the 'fossils' of the Indic Society and their stratification, see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35, and I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2, above.

³ The remarkable resemblance, in ethos and occupation, between the Marwaris on the one hand and the Jews, Parsees, Armenians, and Maronites on the other is apparent in the following series of concordant testimonies from a number of independent authorities:

'Of the four well-known castes of India, viz., the *Brahmana*, the *Kshatriya*, the *Vaishya*, and the *Sudra*, the principal caste engaged in banking is the *Vaishya*. Among the *Vaishyas* are included the *Jainas*, *Marwaris* and *Chettis* who are the most important bankers in India. . . . The *Marwaris*, who are either *Jainas* or *Vaishnavites*, come from the Marwar State of Rājputāna and Central India. The majority are settled as permanent residents in Central India, but some of them travel from one place to another in search of business. Quite a number of *Marwari* merchants and bankers have migrated to trade centres like Bombay and Calcutta, whence they return home either when trade is slack or to perform religious ceremonies. . . . Very few of them are educated on Western lines and fewer still are acquainted with English commercial practice, but the way in which they conduct their business is remarkable. Gifted with a natural knack for trade, the *Marwari* boys quickly learn their arithmetic and accounting and start work in their family shops, where they soon pick up the necessary technique. To give an instance of their efficiency, while an English-educated graduate of an Indian university may take five minutes to work out on a piece of paper the compound interest on a given sum, the *Marwari* boy will get an answer correct to the nearest pie mentally, without the aid of pen and paper, in less than half a minute. Of course they are unfamiliar with the modern progress in their craft which is taking place in foreign countries, but, in their own sphere, they are by no means wanting in capacity.' (Jain, L. C.: *Indigenous Banking in India* (London 1929, Macmillan).)

'Almost every province has its peculiar trade-castes. The Marwaris of Rājputāna are, however, found almost everywhere, and in Assam they are of more importance than the natives of the province.' (Anstey, Vera: *The Economic Development of India* (London 1929, Longmans Green), quoting from the *Imperial Gazetteer*.)

'The Marwaris, whose home is in the Marwar State of Rājputāna, have an evil repute as usurers and skinflints. They are found in all the great trading cities, and much of the

The Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Dönme, and Marranos

Having now made some survey of the stimulating effects of religious discrimination over a wide field, we may pause, before proceeding to the next point in our study, in order to test the potency of this stimulus by our usual comparative method. The test can be applied here in two ways. We can compare the *éthos* displayed by members of a religious denomination when they are being penalized on account of their religion with the *éthos* of the same people, or their co-religionists, when the penalization has been partly or wholly remitted. We can also compare their *éthos* with the *éthos* of co-religionists to whom the stimulus of penalization has never been administered.

To start with the first of these two comparative tests, we can observe a series of gradations in the present *éthos* of diverse communities of Jews who are subject to penalization in different degrees of rigour or laxity.

At the present time, the Jews who display most conspicuously the well-known *éthos* which is commonly called 'Jewish', and which in Gentile minds is popularly assumed to be the hall-mark of Judaism always and everywhere, are the Ashkenazi Jews of Eastern Europe who, in Rumania and in the adjoining territories which used to be included in the so-called 'Jewish Pale' of the *ci-devant* Russian Empire, are still being kept morally, if not juridically, in the ghetto by the backward Christian nations among whom their lot is cast. The 'Jewish' *éthos* is already less conspicuous among the 'emancipated' Jews of Holland, France, Great Britain, and the United States; and when we consider how short a time has passed since the legal emancipation of the Jews took place, and how far from being complete their moral emancipation still is, even in the enlightened countries of the West, we shall not underrate the significance of the change of *éthos* which is already apparent here.

We may also observe that, among the emancipated Jews of the West, those of Ashkenazi origin, who have come from 'the Jewish Pale', still appear distinctly more 'Jewish' in *éthos* than the rarer

economic difficulties of the peasantry may be laid to their charge.' (Crooke, D.: *Natives of Northern India* (London 1907, Constable).)

'Marwari, literally a native of Malwa or Marwar. Most of the Marwaris found in Bengal are bankers and traders, usually Jains. The name gives no definite indication of caste. . . . In fact all traders from Rājputāna and the neighbouring districts are commonly called Marwaris.' (Risley, H. H.: *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal* (Calcutta 1891, Secretariat Press).)

'Marvari—a territorial name, meaning a native of Marwar. At times of census, Marwaris have been returned as a caste of Jains, i.e., Marwaris who are Jains by religion. The Marwaris are enterprising traders, who have settled in various parts of Southern India, and are, in the city of Madras, money lenders.' (Thurston, E.: *Castes and Tribes of Southern India* (Madras 1909, Government Press).)

See also the Report of the Calcutta University Commission (London 1917, H.M. Stationery Office, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 25.

Sephardim in our midst, who have come originally from Dār-al-Islām; and we shall account for this difference by reminding ourselves of the diversity in the history of those two Jewish communities.

The Ashkenazim are descended from Jews who took advantage of the opening-up of Europe by the Romans and made a Jewish perquisite of the retail trade in the semi-barbarous Transalpine provinces. Since the conversion and break-up of the Roman Empire, these Ashkenazim have had to suffer doubly from the fanaticism of the Christian Church and from the resentment of the barbarians. A barbarian cannot bear to see a resident alien living a life apart and making a profit by transacting business which the barbarian lacks the skill to transact for himself; and the barbarian neophytes of Western Christendom have been humiliated by the superior ability and filled with envy by the superior prosperity of the indispensable Ashkenazi Jew. Acting on these feelings, they have penalized the Jew as long as he has remained indispensable to them, and have expelled him as soon as they have become capable of doing without him; and accordingly the rise and expansion of the Western Civilization since the days of Charlemagne and Otto I¹ have been accompanied by an eastward drift of the Ashkenazim from the ancient marches of the Roman Empire in the Rhineland to the modern marches of Western Christendom in 'the Pale'. In the expanding interior of Western Christendom, the Jews have been evicted from one country after another as successive Western peoples have attained a certain level of economic efficiency, while, in the advancing continental fringe, these Jewish exiles from the interior have been admitted and even invited into one country after another, in the initial stages of 'Westernization', as commercial pioneers, only to be penalized and eventually evicted once again as soon as they have once again ceased to be indispensable in their latest transitory asylum.

In 'the Pale' and in Rumania, this long trek of the Ashkenazi Jews from west to east across the Continent of Europe has been brought to a halt and their martyrdom has reached its climax; for here, at the meeting-point of Western Christendom with Russian Orthodox Christendom, the Jews have been caught and ground between the upper and the nether millstone. In the fullness of time, the local barbarian converts to Western Christianity on this extreme eastern verge of Western Christendom have acted after their kind. As they have gradually improved their own economic capacities, they have progressively penalized the Jews in their midst and have eventually begun to cast them out. This time,

¹ See II. D (v), pp. 166-74, above.

however, the evicted Ashkenazim have been unable to find a fresh asylum by trekking still farther eastward. Beyond the eastern boundary of 'the Pale', 'Holy Russia' has barred their way.

For the Jews, Russian soil has been forbidden ground from the time when Western and Russian Christendom originally made contact with one another on the Continent in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era right down to the Russian Communist Revolution of A.D. 1917. This barrier did not fall when Russia opened her doors to the Western Civilization in the generation of Peter the Great; and it did not fall thereafter when the eastern marches of Western Christendom were incorporated politically into the Russian Empire. The old frontier between Muscovy and the United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania, which the Partition of Poland obliterated for the Christian subjects of the Czar, remained in force for the Jew as an eastern limit which he was absolutely forbidden to pass. It was fortunate indeed for the Ashkenazim that by this time the leading nations of the West, which had been the first to evict the Jews in the Middle Ages, had risen to a height of economic efficiency at which they were no longer afraid of exposing themselves to Jewish economic competition in a free field with no favour. The emancipation of the Jews in the West came just in time to give the Ashkenazim of 'the Pale' a new western outlet when their old eastward drift was brought up short against the blank wall of 'Holy Russia'. During the past century, the tide of Ashkenazi migration has been ebbing back from east to west: from 'the Pale' and Rumania into England and the United States. It is not to be wondered at that, with these antecedents, the Ashkenazim whom this ebb-tide has deposited among us should display the so-called 'Jewish' *ethos* more conspicuously than their Sephardi co-religionists whose 'lines' have 'fallen'¹ in comparatively pleasant places.

To the author of this Study, the spiritual and political duress under which the Ashkenazim have had to live their life in 'the Pale' was brought home by the following two anecdotes which were recounted to him in 1919, during the Peace Conference of Paris, by Dr. Chaim Weizmann in order to explain why this great statesman and scientist—the most distinguished member of the Ashkenazi community in his generation—had become a convert to Zionism.

The first anecdote was this. In Dr. Weizmann's boyhood, at Vilna, there was a young Jewish sculptor of great promise who was expected to become one of the historic exponents of the Jewish culture. The young man's promise was fulfilled, but Jewry's hope was disappointed; for the *chef d'œuvre* in which this Jewish artist eventually gave expression to his genius was a statue of the Russian

¹ Psalm xvi. 6.

Orthodox Christian Czar Ivan the Terrible! Under the duress of 'the Pale', Jewish genius had been perverted to the glorification of Jewry's oppressors. It was as if the *chef d'œuvre* of Jewish literature in the second century B.C. had not been the Book of Ecclesiastes or the Psalms but some panegyric, in the Isocratean manner, upon Antiochus Epiphanes. Truly, that statue of a Russian Czar by the hand of a Vilna Jew was as great an eyesore for Jewish eyes as the statue of Zeus which the Seleucid once set up in the Temple of Yahweh at Jerusalem: an 'abomination of desolation standing where it ought not'.¹

Dr. Weizmann's second anecdote was an incident which had happened to himself as a grown man before his migration from Vilna to Manchester. A piece of urgent business made it indispensable for him to break the Russian law then in force, under the Czardom, by trespassing beyond the eastern boundary of 'the Pale' in order to have a personal meeting with a friend in Moscow. As a precaution against the vigilance of the Russian police, it was arranged beforehand that Dr. Weizmann should travel from Vilna to Moscow in a train arriving at nightfall, do his business in his friend's house during the night, and return to Vilna by a train leaving Moscow before dawn; but this arrangement fell through. For some reason, the friend whom Dr. Weizmann had come to see was unable to keep the appointment; and Dr. Weizmann found on inquiry that there was no return-train to Vilna earlier than the train which he had been intending to take. How should he pass the night hours? To engage a room in a hotel would be tantamount to delivering himself up to the police. Dr. Weizmann solved the problem by hiring a cab and driving round and round the streets of Moscow until the hour of his train's departure. 'And that', he concluded, 'was how I had to pass my time on my one and only visit to the capital of the Empire of which I was supposed to be a citizen!'

Such anecdotes as these sufficiently explain the *ethos* of the Ashkenazi immigrants from 'the Pale' into the more enlightened countries of the modern Western World; and the less highly accentuated 'Jewishness' of the *ethos* which we observe among the Sephardi immigrants from Spain and Portugal is explained by the antecedents of the Sephardim in Dār-al-Islām.

The representatives of the Jewish Dispersion in the dominions of the Sasanidae and in those provinces of the Roman Empire which ultimately fell to the Arabs and not to the North European barbarians found themselves in a happy position compared with their unfortunate co-religionists in the Rhineland. Their status under the régime of the 'Abbasid Caliphate was certainly not less favourable

¹ Mark xiii. 14; Matthew xxiv. 15; Luke xxi. 20; Daniel ix. 27.

than the status of Jews to-day in those Western countries where the Jews have been 'emancipated'; and it did not become intolerable when the Caliphate broke up and the Syriac Society finally dissolved in the interregnum from which the 'affiliated' Arabic and Iranic societies subsequently emerged. The historic calamity of the Sephardim was the transfer of the Iberian Peninsula from the domain of the Syriac to the domain of the Western Civilization: a transfer which began towards the close of the tenth century of the Christian Era and was consummated, some five centuries later, in the conquest of Granada by Ferdinand and Isabella. The change of régime was effected, from beginning to end, by force of arms;¹ and the local calamity which this violent social change entailed for the Sephardim, in common with the Muslimin among whom they lived, was extreme in its severity. The Muslims and the Jews who came under Christian rule in the Iberian Peninsula were not offered the choice of retaining their old religion and culture under the new régime at the price of penalization, as the Ashkenazim were permitted to live under Western Christian domination on the other side of the Pyrenees or the Orthodox Christians and the Levantines under Muslim domination in the Ottoman Empire. In the Iberian Peninsula, the conquered communities had to choose between the three alternatives of annihilation, expulsion, and conversion. In Spain, the choice was presented to the Jews during the century which began with the great persecution of A.D. 1391 and ended with Ferdinand and Isabella's edict of expulsion in 1492. Let us glance at the latter state of those Peninsular Sephardim who saved their lives in one of the two alternative ways and whose posterity therefore survives down to this day.

Peninsular Sephardim who preferred to go into exile rather than to be received into the Roman Catholic Church—or rather than to remain forced and insincere converts to the Roman Catholic faith—found asylum among the enemies of Catholic Portugal and Spain: the Portuguese Sephardim in Protestant Holland, the Castilian Sephardim in Muslim Turkey, and members of both communities in tolerant Tuscany.² The 'Osmanlis gave asylum to the Jewish refugees from Castile for several reasons. They felt the normal

¹ For the effect of this warfare upon the Iberian Christians, see II. D (v), pp. 203–6, above.

² For the eventual dispersion abroad of the descendants of the Sephardi Jews who were forcibly converted in Castile in A.D. 1391 and in Portugal in A.D. 1497, see Roth, C.: *A History of the Marranos* (London 1932, Routledge), especially chapters viii–xi. The history of the Peninsular Sephardi community which was founded at Leghorn in A.D. 1593 (see op. cit., pp. 214–19) by Spanish and Portuguese crypto-Jewish refugees who were able to return openly to their ancestral faith under the Tuscan Government's protection, may be compared with the history of the autonomous Greek community which was founded in the last quarter of the eighteenth century at Ayvalık under the aegis of the Ottoman Pādīshāh. (See II. D (ii), p. 40, footnote 1, above.)

human sympathy for the victims of their enemies (and the United Kingdom of Castile and Aragon was the principal enemy of the Ottoman Power in the Mediterranean); they inherited the normal Muslim tradition of liberality towards Jews; and they had a special *raison d'état* for welcoming Jewish immigration into their dominions at this juncture.

While the Castilians had been rounding off their conquests and confirming their supremacy in the Iberian Peninsula, the 'Osmanlis had been rounding off their own conquests in the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia and were anxious to confirm their supremacy likewise in their own domain. They were not, however, at liberty to confirm it by cutting the Gordian Knot in the Occidental fashion; for, in the eyes of the Islamic Law, Jews and Christians as well as Muslims had certain fundamental and inalienable rights in virtue of their common belief in the One True God. The recipients of the Torah and the Bible, as well as the recipients of the Qur'ān, were 'People of the Book'; and to non-Muslim 'People of the Book' who had succumbed to Muslim arms the Muslim conqueror was instructed to offer a less cruel choice than the three alternatives which were offered to vanquished Muslims and Jews by the Christian Church Militant in Spain. His Catholic Majesty cut the knot by giving any vanquished miscreants who did not conveniently dispose of themselves by fighting to the death a choice between conversion and expulsion. The Muslim conqueror must give them the choice between conversion and toleration—the condition of toleration being the acceptance of a status of inferiority and the payment of a special super-tax. In other words, the Muslim conqueror was bound by the Islamic Law to face the problem of having permanently under his rule an alien population which was subject to penalization but not devoid of rights. This problem was a severe test of statesmanship in a situation in which the *dhimmis* were the majority and the Muslims the minority; and this was the situation in which the Ottoman Pādishāh found himself after the Ottoman Empire had been rounded off by Ferdinand and Isabella's older contemporary Mehmed the Conqueror. Ottoman statesmanship sought to find a solution for its problem by giving the Castilian Jewish refugees asylum and taking them into partnership.

The 'Osmanlis were confident of their own ability to fill the roles of rulers and soldiers and peasants, in which the immigrant Castilian Jews would have neither the power nor the inclination to compete with them. On the other hand, they knew themselves to be incompetent to supplant the conquered Greek Orthodox and Levantine Catholic Christians in the field of handicraft and trade; and at the same time they were afraid that these tolerated but unreconciled

native subjects might remain too strong for the safety of the Ottoman Commonwealth if even in this limited field they were permitted to retain a monopoly. Accordingly, the Ottoman Government not only gave the Castilian Jews asylum in its dominions but carefully planted them in the chief commercial centres—Salonica, Adrianople, and Constantinople itself—with the intention that these Jews should take the lion's share in the one field of social activity which the 'Osmanlis themselves were unable to occupy. This intention was fulfilled. The Sephardim, whose ancestors had made themselves past-masters in this field some fifteen or twenty centuries before the Christian subjects of the 'Osmanlis were confined to it, were easily able, with the Ottoman Government's political support, to draw the main threads of Near Eastern commerce into their own hands. Under the Ottoman régime, they prospered commercially in the Near East as they had once prospered commercially in the Iberian Peninsula. At the same time—and this is the significant point for our present purpose—they developed under the Ottoman régime a quite different *éthos* from the Jewish *éthos* as we know it in the West, because the treatment which they received at the 'Osmanlis' hands was quite different from the treatment which Jews have customarily received at the hands of Westerners.

The psychological effect of four centuries of the Ottoman régime upon the descendants in the Near East of these Sephardi refugees from Castile was once brought home to the writer of this Study by an incident which came under his personal observation.

One day in August 1921, some eight years and more after Salonica, with its Sephardi population of eighty thousand souls, had passed by conquest out of Ottoman jurisdiction into Greek, I found myself travelling by train from Salonica to Vodena in the same carriage with three Sephardi school-teachers going on a holiday and one Greek officer going to rejoin his regiment. The holiday-makers—two girls and a man—were in high spirits, and they gave vent to their mood by breaking into song. They sang in French: the 'culture language' in which the modern Near Eastern Jew has found the necessary supplement to his hereditary Castilian vernacular. After they had been singing for some time, the Greek lieutenant broke his own silence. 'Won't you sing in Greek for a change?' he said. 'This country is part of Greece now, and you are Greek citizens.' But his intervention had no effect. 'We prefer French' the Jews answered, politely but firmly, and fell to singing lustily in French again, while the Greek lieutenant subsided. There was one person in the carriage, however, who was even more surprised at the Jewish teachers' reply to the Greek officer than the Greek himself, and that was the Frankish spectator. Seldom, he reflected,

would a Jew have shown such spirit in such circumstances in France or England or America. The incident bore witness to the relative humanity with which the Jews in the Ottoman Empire had been treated by the 'Osmanlis; and it also had a wider and more interesting significance. It was evidence that the Jewish *êthos* was not something ineradicably implanted by Race or something indelibly ingrained by Religion but was a psychic variable which was apt to vary in response to variations in Gentile behaviour in different times and places.

This inference is supported by other varieties of Jewish *êthos* within the Sephardi community itself. For instance, there is the *Dönme*:¹ a fraction of the immigrant Castilian Jewish community in the Near East which has been in communion with Islam for some two and a half centuries.² These *ci-devant* Jews have parted company with their former co-religionists without wholly merging themselves in the fraternity of Islam. They have remained in some degree 'a peculiar people', neither fish, flesh, nor fowl. Nevertheless, their *rapprochement*, so far as it has gone, towards the ruling element in the society in which they live has been accompanied by a visible diminution of the distinctively 'Jewish' element in their *êthos*. *A fortiori*, in the Marranos—that is, the descendants of those Peninsular Sephardim who were induced or compelled some four or five centuries ago to be received into the Roman Catholic Church rather than go into exile³—the distinctive Jewish characteristics have been attenuated to vanishing point.

There is reason to believe that in Spain and Portugal to-day there is a strong tincture of the blood of these Jewish converts in Christian veins, especially in the upper and middle class. Yet the most acute psycho-analyst might find it 'difficult, if samples of living upper and middle class Spaniards and Portuguese were presented to him for examination, to distinguish those who had from those who had not a Jewish strain in their physical race. Indeed, in most cases our psycho-analyst would have no psychic data here to go upon in attempting to separate the sheep from the goats; for in most cases he would be unable to detect in his subjects any sense, either conscious or sub-conscious, of their Jewish antecedents, even where

¹ 'Dönme' is a Turkish verbal noun meaning 'conversion'.

² The *Dönme* community consists of the descendants of those ex-Castilian Ottoman Jews who followed Sabbatai Zevi: a Smyrniot Jew who proclaimed himself Messiah in A.D. 1648. In 1666, the year in which the *Smr* not Messiah was to enter into his kingdom, the Ottoman Government, which had left him completely at liberty to propagate his claims for eighteen years, at last took the precaution of internment him; and thereafter Sabbatai obtained his release by making a *volte face* and proclaiming his conversion to Islam, in which his example was followed by his disciples. For Sabbatai Zevi's career, see Kastein, J.: *The Messiah of Smyr: Sabbatai Zevi* (London 1931, Lane).

³ A genuine choice between conversion and expulsion was offered to the Castilian Jews between A.D. 1391 and A.D. 1492. On the other hand, in A.D. 1497, the Portuguese Jews were coerced into apostasy wholesale. (See Roth, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-62.)

the Jewish physical strain was actually present. The forced converts themselves and the first few generations of their descendants may have remained crypto-Jews; the next few generations may have preserved some memory of their ancestors having only been Gentiles and Catholics in outward form; but, when once the traditional social barriers had been broken down by the formal act of conversion, the perpetual intercourse and repeated intermarriage between the posterity of the converts and the hereditary members of the society into which their forefathers' act had initiated them must gradually have produced its full psychological effect among the great majority of the *ci-devant*-Jewish families. With the passage of time, a generation must have arrived in which the Jewish consciousness and the Jewish *éthos* were totally extinct.¹

Thus, in Jewry, we find a graded sequence of types—Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Dönme, crypto-Jew, and *ci-devant*-Jewish Catholic—in which the Jewish *éthos* varies in intensity through all the degrees from maximum to vanishing point; and we observe that these variations in the intensity of the Jewish *éthos* correspond to variations in the severity of the penalization to which Jewry has been subjected by the Gentiles. The distinctive *éthos* of the penalized religious denomination becomes less and less sharply accentuated as the penalization is progressively remitted; and this social law is not valid only for the Jews. Its operation can be illustrated from the history of other penalized sects whose reactions we have examined above.

Nabobs and Sahibs

Examples are afforded by the history of those Western Christian traders who have lived the ghetto-life, under alien régimes, in the

¹ This final extinction of the Jewish consciousness and *éthos* in the Marranos is of surprisingly recent date—to judge by a remarkable passage in chapter xi of George Borrow's *The Bible in Spain*. For the author arrived off the coast of the Peninsula on the 10th November, 1835, and wrote the preface to his book on the 26th November, 1842, so that the incident recorded in chapter xi must have occurred between these two dates—that is to say, if the tale is to be taken literally as the record of an actual experience and is not to be interpreted as a literary artifice for conveying the 'feel' of a crypto-Jew's existence as Borrow had reconstructed this in imagination from a book-study of the history of the Marranos in earlier centuries. Be that as it may, Borrow's description of his alleged encounter and conversation with the mysterious Abarbenel on the road to Talavera is eminently worth reading; and, since the passage is far too long to quote in full, and far too fine a piece of literary art to be quoted at all except *verbatim*, the writer of this Study must be content to refer his readers to it and urge them to re-read it for themselves. The authenticity of Borrow's alleged encounter with a living Marrano in Spain appears by no means incredible in the light of the well-authenticated fact that, in Portugal, a rural population of Marranos has come to notice, and has even begun to return publicly to its ancestral faith, since the overthrow of the Monarchy and establishment of the Republic in A.D. 1910. (See Roth, *op. cit.*, Epilogue.) The survival of crypto-Jewish communities in the Iberian Peninsula over a span of more than four centuries is amazing; and our amazement will be increased when we consider that, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era, this subterranean Jewish community was being weakened all the time by a steady drain of its more active and enterprising members, who lost no opportunity of emigrating in order to return publicly to their ancestral religion in a Dutch or Tuscan or Ottoman asylum.

Ottoman Empire and Russia and India and the Far East. These formerly penalized Western Christian residents in Oriental countries have all been 'emancipated' from their ghettos successively in the course of the last two and a half centuries: the 'Niemci' from the Muscovite 'Svoboda' in the time of Peter the Great; the French and English from their 'factories' on the coasts of India after the death of Awrangzib; the Franks from their segregated quarters in the *Échelles du Levant* after Bonaparte's landing in Egypt in A.D. 1798; the 'South Sea Barbarians' from their 'factories' at Canton after the Anglo-Chinese 'Opium War' of A.D. 1839-42; the Dutch from Deshima after the visit of Admiral Perry's squadron to Yedo Bay in A.D. 1853. The nature and manner and extent of the 'emancipation' have been different in each case; but there is one thing that can be said of all these cases with equal truth. In all the cases, a more or less uniform 'Jewish' *êthos*, which these Western residents under an alien régime had developed in response to a more or less uniform penalization, has faded or vanished altogether as the social conditions conducive to it have been mitigated.

The most astonishing case is that of the servants of the English East India Company in India. In this case, the reversal of fortune was rapid and extreme. Within the span of less than a century, the Company's servants rose from being for the most part clerks and salesmen who were allowed to do their business on sufferance on the fringe of 'the Great Mogul's' dominions until they found themselves the undisputed masters of India and acknowledged heirs of 'the Great Mogul' himself, who only retained a shadow of his hereditary sovereignty as the Company's protégé and pensioner. The change of *êthos* which the English in India underwent in the course of this century was fully commensurate with their change in status. The 'Nabob' of the eighteenth century became the 'Sahib'¹ of the nineteenth. In the character of Jos Sedley, Thackeray has simply given a touch of caricature to a life-like portrait of the 'Anglo-Indian'² as he continued to be until after the turn of the century. Yet already the revolutionary change of circumstances in India had made Thackeray's picture an anachronism. The Battle of Waterloo, which is signalized in fiction by Jos Sedley's headlong flight, was won as a matter of historical fact by a 'sepoxy general'; and in the

¹ This title 'Sahib', which has come to be applied to the Englishman in India, is an Arabic word which, in its classical usage, means 'a companion of the Prophet Muhammad'. The application of a title with this connotation to the infidel son of a shopkeeper shows how completely 'the nation of shopkeepers' was transfigured in the Indian imagination when it succeeded the Mughals in the role of being the ruling race; and this, in turn, shows how profound a change must have taken place in the *êthos* of the English in India themselves, since it is evident that the Indians have always taken us approximately at our own valuation.

² 'Anglo-Indian' in the original sense of English resident in India, and not in the latter-day usage of the name as a euphemism for 'Eurasian'.

decade of the Sikh Wars, when Thackeray was writing *Vanity Fair*,¹ the typical servant of the East India Company was no longer a chicken-livered Jos nor even a ruffianly Clive, but an evangelical soldier or administrator of heroic build: a John Lawrence or a John Nicholson.

Emancipated Nonconformists

Another illustration of our point is offered by the history of the Huguenots. In France down to this day the Huguenots continue to display the distinctive *éthos* of a penalized religious denomination, in spite of the fact that they have been 'emancipated' officially since the time of the Revolution. In their native land, they still tend to hold aloof from public life and to devote themselves with conspicuous success to private business. On the other hand, the descendants of those Huguenots who emigrated at the close of the seventeenth century from France to the Protestant countries have been subject to no such inhibition; and in the annals of modern England and Germany and South Africa the descendants of Huguenot refugees have distinguished themselves in every walk of life, not only in business but in the army and in the civil service and in politics. Lasalle and Ledebour, Joubert and Dufour-Féronce are examples of Huguenot names which have made a mark in German and South African history.

In England, the *éthos* of the non-Anglican Protestant denominations shows signs of a corresponding modification—not, in this case, in response to more favourable conditions which have been secured by migration into an alien environment, but in response to an improvement of conditions at home. 'The Nonconformist Conscience' has lost some of its sharpness since Nonconformity has ceased to be incompatible with membership in the English Governing Class, while on the other hand the Quaker Conscience has led the members of the Society of Friends to pursue their old ideals in a wider field of social action as the religious disqualifications which once circumscribed their activities have been removed. In both these otherwise dissimilar cases, the remission of a previous penalization has had one common effect. It has resulted in both the Quakers and the Nonconformists ceasing to be 'peculiar peoples'. It has led both to come out of their shells in order to live—for good or not for good, as the case may be—the ordinary life of the world around them.²

¹ *Vanity Fair* was written during the years 1846–8.

² This tendency, which was at work all through the nineteenth century, was brought to a head by the General War of 1914–18, in which the Nonconformists on the whole identified themselves with the policy and outlook of the Governing Class while the Quakers found themselves moved to uphold their own unchanged ideals in public action.

Emancipated Ra'iyeh

In the Orthodox Christian World, the same point is illustrated by the diversity of *êthos*, in post-war Greece, between two sections of the population: on the one hand, the indigenous inhabitants of 'the Old Kingdom', within the frontiers as they stood before the wars of 1912-22; and, on the other hand, the new citizens whom the present Greek Republic has acquired partly through the transfer of Macedonia and Western Thrace, with their Greek inhabitants, to Greek from Ottoman sovereignty, and partly through the influx into Greece of Greek refugees from Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia after the failure of the Greek Government to wrest these latter territories from Turkish hands. At the time of writing, some ten years after the Peace Settlement of Lausanne, the contrast between these two elements in the population of Greece is still conspicuous. It is, in fact, the most important feature of diversity in the social and political life of the country.

The old citizens and the new citizens of the Greek Republic are conscious, on both sides, of a certain *mésintelligence* with one another. Yet the differentiation of *êthos* out of which this tendency towards misunderstanding arises cannot be much more than a century old; for, little more than a century ago, before the Greek Revolutionary War of 1821-9, the whole of the present territory of Greece, with the insignificant exception of the Ionian Islands, was still embraced within the Ottoman Empire, so that in that generation the influence of the Ottoman environment was operative upon the ancestors of the present old citizens and new citizens of Greece alike. The present difference of *êthos* is to be explained by the fact that the new citizens have remained under the Ottoman régime down to the present generation, while the old citizens have been exempt from the Ottoman régime for some three or four generations past. Instead of remaining members of a penalized religious denomination under an alien ascendancy, they have been living, during these last three or four generations, as citizens of a Greek national state on the Western pattern. In this new environment, they have lost much of the *êthos* of the old-fashioned Ottoman *ra'iyeh* and have acquired something of the *êthos* of the modern Occidental. Though the time has been short, the psychological change which has been induced by the new conditions of the human environment has been sufficiently great to establish a perceptible psychological barrier between the two sections of the Greek people now that they have been

on a grand scale. The blunting of 'the Nonconformist Conscience' is reflected in the post-war decay of the Liberal Party. The entry of the Quakers into public life is proclaimed by the mighty works of philanthropy which have been performed in every part of the World by the Society of Friends since 1914. In these works, the Inner Light has made itself outwardly manifest. *Si monumentum requiris, circumspecte.*

reunited in a single commonwealth after little more than a century of segregation.

Assimilationists and Zionists

This effect of citizenship in a Greek national state upon the descendants of the Greek *ra'iyeh* of the old Ottoman Empire has a bearing on a modern movement in Jewry: the movement called Zionism.

The ultimate aim of the Zionists is to liberate the Jewish people from the peculiar psychological complex induced by the penalization to which they have been subject for centuries in the Gentile World. In this ultimate aim, the Zionists are at one with the Assimilationist School among the 'emancipated' Jews in the enlightened countries of the West. They agree with the Assimilationists in wishing to cure the Jews of being 'a peculiar people'. They part company with them, however, in their estimate of the Assimilationist prescription, which the Zionists reject as inadequate for coping with the malady.

The ideal of the Assimilationists is that the Jew in Holland, France, England, or America should become a Dutchman, Frenchman, Englishman, or American, as the case may be, 'of Jewish religion'. They argue that there is no reason why a Jewish citizen of any of these enlightened countries should fail to be a completely satisfied and satisfactory member of Society just because he happens to go to synagogue on Saturday instead of going to church on Sunday. To this argument, the Zionists have two replies. In the first place, they point out that, even if the Assimilationist prescription were capable of producing the result which its advocates claim for it, it is only applicable in the enlightened countries in which the Jews have been granted 'emancipation'. It offers no solution for the Jewish problem in Eastern Europe, where the régime of the ghetto still virtually prevails and where bona fide 'emancipation' is not in prospect.¹ In the second place—and this is the more trenchant of the two Zionist attacks upon the Assimilationist position—the Zionists contend that, even in the most enlightened Gentile community in the World, the Jewish problem cannot be solved by a Gentile-Jewish 'social contract' under which the Gentile 'emancipates' the Jew and the Jew 'assimilates' himself to the Gentile. This attempt at a contractual solution is vitiated, in the Zionists' view, by the false

¹ This passage was written before the 'Aryan' outbreak against the Jews in Germany which accompanied the German National-Socialist Revolution of 1933. This appalling recrudescence of militant anti-Semitism in one of the leading countries of the Western World still further strengthens the already strong Zionist case. For the German outbreak of 1933 can only be compared—in its brutality, its hysteria, and its thoroughness—with the Castilian outbreak of A.D. 1391. If this could happen in the present age in a country in which the Jews had long since been emancipated, then where in the World can the Jewish Diaspora feel itself really secure?

premise which vitiates the classical 'social contract' theory of Rousseau. It presupposes that human beings are social atoms and that a human society is an aggregate of these atoms which is held together by a legal nexus between the individuals as, in the physical universe, an aggregation of physical atoms is held together by the laws of Physics according to the 'classical' physical science of the nineteenth century. The Zionist, arguing *ad hominem*, insists that the Jew, at any rate, is not in fact an autonomous individual who can make and unmake his social relations as he pleases. To be a Jew is to be a human being whose social environment is Jewry. It is an essential part of the Jew's individuality that he is a member of the living Jewish community and an heir to the ancient Jewish tradition. He cannot cut off his Jewishness and cast it from him without self-mutilation; and thus, for the Jew, an emancipation-assimilation contract with a Gentile nation has the same kind of consequence as the legal instrument which turns a free man into a slave. It 'deprives him of half of his manhood'.¹ A Jew who, by process of emancipation and assimilation, attempts, in a social contract with his Gentile neighbours, to turn himself into a Dutchman or a Frenchman or an Englishman or an American 'of Jewish religion' is simply mutilating his Jewish personality without having any prospect at all of acquiring the full personality of a Dutchman or whatever the Gentile nationality of his choice may be.

Thus, in the Zionist view, the emancipation and assimilation of the Jew as an individual is a wrong method of pursuing a right aim. Genuine assimilation is indeed the true solution for the Jewish problem and ought therefore to be the ultimate goal of Jewish endeavours; but the Jews can never escape from being 'a peculiar people' by masquerading as Englishmen or Frenchmen. If they are to succeed in becoming 'like all the nations',² they must seek assimilation on a national and not on an individual basis. Instead of trying to assimilate individual Jews to individual Englishmen or Frenchmen, they must try to assimilate Jewry itself to England and France. Jewry must become a nation in effective possession of a national home, and this on the ground from which the historic roots of Judaism have sprung. When a new generation of Jews has grown up in Palestine in a Jewish national environment, then, and not till then, the Jewish problem will be solved by the reappearance in the World of a type of Jew which has been almost non-existent for the past two thousand years: a Jew who has genuinely ceased to be 'not as other men are'.³

Though the Zionist Movement as a practical undertaking is only

¹ See the ancient Greek proverb quoted in the present section on p. 214, above.

² 1 Samuel viii. 5 and 20.

³ Luke xviii. 11.

half a century old, its social philosophy has already been justified by results. In the Jewish agricultural settlements that have been founded in Palestine within the last fifty years, the children of the ghetto have been transformed out of all recognition into a pioneering peasantry which displays many of the characteristics of the Gentile European colonial type in the New World. The Zionists have made no miscalculation in their forecast of the effect which the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine would have upon Jewry itself. The tragic misfortune into which they have fallen, in company with the Mandatory Power, is their inability to arrive at an understanding with the existing Arab population of the country: prior claimants and possessors who have been roused to resistance by the very spirit of Western Nationalism which has been the inspiration of Zionism itself.

Ismā'īlīs and Imāmīs

Lastly, we may take note of the difference between the *Ismā'īlī* *Shī'īs* of India, who display to-day, as strongly as ever, the distinctive characteristics of penalized religious denominations, and the *Imāmī Shī'īs* of Persia, whose *êthos* at the present day is at the opposite extreme of the psychological gamut. In the modern Western World, the antithesis to the characteristic *êthos* of penalized religious denominations is the spirit of Nationalism; and the closest indigenous analogue of Western Nationalism which Western observers have detected in the modern Islamic World is the spirit of the *Imāmī Shī'ī* Persians.¹ Indeed, the modern Persians may be called a nation and modern Persia a national state without any flagrant misapplication of our Western terminology. In other words, the spirit of *Imāmī Shī'ism*, which is the established religion of modern Persia, differs at the present day from the spirit of *Ismā'īlī Shī'ism* about as widely as the spirit of France or England or any of the other territorial nations of the West differs from the spirit of Jewry. Yet, as a matter of historical fact, the present differentiation of the *Imāmī êthos* in Persia from the *Ismā'īlī* in India is of recent date, like the differentiation in *êthos* between the Jewish agricultural colonist in Palestine and the Ghetto-Jew of 'the Pale' or between the Greek citizen of Greece and the Greek *ra'iyyeh* of the Ottoman Empire.

¹ In recent times, of course, the Islamic Society has become infected with the virus of Western Nationalism itself, and this infection has not attacked the Persians as violently as it has attacked certain other Islamic peoples: for instance, the Egyptians and, above all, the 'Osmanlis. This Western type of Nationalism in the Islamic World is, however, something exotic; and if we search for a counterpart of Western Nationalism in the Islamic Society as that society was before the process of 'Westernization' began, then we shall find this counterpart among the Muslims of Persia and not among those of the Ottoman Empire. This point has been touched upon already in I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 393 with footnote 1, above.

Little more than four centuries ago, the Imāmīs, like the other sects of the Shī'ah, were 'dispersed abroad' among a Sunnī majority in Persia, Bahrayn, Hasā, Syria, and elsewhere,¹ and in this situation they duly displayed, like other Shī'īs, those characteristics of a penalized religious denomination with which we have now become familiar. The situation of the Imāmī sect was revolutionized at the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, within the short span of a single generation, by the life-work of one man: Ismā'il Shāh Safawī. This militant apostle of Imāmī Shī'ism changed the destinies of his faith by the victories of his sword. Imāmī Shī'ism, as Shāh Ismā'il found it, was the persuasion of a scattered and persecuted sect; as he left it, it was the established church, and very nearly the exclusive religion, of an empire which embraced the whole of Persia.² In modern Persia, from Shāh Ismā'il's time onwards, the Imāmīs have ceased to be the 'peculiar people' which the Ismā'ilīs have continued to be in India. While these other Shī'īs have remained what they always were, the Imāmīs in Persia have become *the* people of a great country. They have become the Persian nation, which is master in its own house and is free to practise its national religion without being penalized by any man. In the course of four centuries, this profound change of circumstance has produced the profound change of *êthos* to which we have drawn attention above. There were, however, certain Imāmī communities—for example, those in Syria and in Hasā—whose homes were too distant from Shāh Ismā'il's base of operations to be included in the empire which he carved out; and these Imāmī Shī'īs beyond the borders of Persia have never ceased to display the *êthos* which all Imāmīs formerly displayed in common with the Ismā'ilīs.³

Fossils in Fastnesses

So much for the evidence that the *êthos* and aptitudes which are characteristic of penalized religious denominations tend to disappear if, and when, and in proportion as the penalization is remitted.

¹ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 358-65, above.

² For Shāh Ismā'il's work, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 69-70, with Annex I, above.

³ The Imāmī Shī'īs of 'Irāq are a special case; for 'Irāq is a former province of Shāh Ismā'il's empire which was eventually conquered from the Safawīs by the 'Osmanlis after having changed hands several times in a series of wars which lasted more than a century (A.D. 1534-1639). The Imāmī Shī'īs of 'Irāq are in the same situation as their co-religionists in Syria and in Hasā, inasmuch as they have been subject to the political ascendancy of a Sunnī majority. They are in a different situation, inasmuch as their subjection has not been unbroken. For a brief interval, the Imāmī Shī'īs of 'Irāq were masters in their own house, as their more fortunate co-religionists in Iran have continued to be ever since the day when Shāh Ismā'il released the Imāmīs from the house of bondage in Iran and 'Irāq alike. In consonance with this peculiar history, the *êthos* of the Shī'īs in 'Irāq has become something intermediate between their *êthos* in Persia and their *êthos* in those places where they have always been under Sunnī domination. In our Western political terminology, 'Irāq is a Persian *terra irredenta* and the 'Irāqī Shī'īs, though mostly Arabs by language, may be regarded almost as a Persian minority under alien rule.

This evidence seems to indicate that the characteristics in question are not innate and ineradicable qualities, but rather symptoms of a particular response to a particular challenge—symptoms which have no greater permanence than the challenge and the response out of which they arise. We shall find this indication confirmed if we now compare the *ethos* of penalized denominations with that of co-religionists to whom the stimulus of penalization has never been administered. We shall observe that those who have never undergone tribulation resemble those who have come out of tribulation in being free from the distinctive and unmistakable characteristics which those who are actually suffering tribulation almost invariably display.

The 'Osmanlis draw a sharp distinction between the 'fresh-water' French, English, and so on, and their 'salt-water' namesakes. The 'fresh-water' Franks are those who have been born and bred in Turkey in the Levantine atmosphere and have duly responded by developing the Levantine character. The 'salt-water' Franks are those who have been born and bred at home in Frankland and have come out to Turkey as adults at an age when their character has already been formed. The Turks have been intrigued to find that the great psychological gulf which divides them from the 'fresh-water' Franks does not intervene when they have to deal with the Franks from beyond the sea. The Franks who are geographically their compatriots are psychologically aliens; the Franks who come from a far country turn out to be men of like passions with the Turks themselves. This apparent paradox has a simple explanation. The Turk and the 'salt-water' Frank are able to understand one another because there is a broad similarity between their respective social backgrounds. They have each grown up in a social environment in which they have been masters in their own house. On the other hand, they both find difficulty in placing themselves *en rapport* with the 'fresh-water' Frank because the 'fresh-water' Frank has a social background which is equally foreign to both of them. The 'fresh-water' Frank—the Frank brought up in Turkey—is not a son of the house but a child of the ghetto; and this peculiar social environment has induced in him an *ethos* from which the Frank brought up in Frankland and the Turk brought up in Turkey have both remained free.

This Turkish dichotomy between the 'fresh-water' and the 'salt-water' Frank, within the body social of a civilization which is still 'a going concern', has an analogue in the sociology of those remnants of extinct civilizations which survive in the form of 'fossils'; for the 'fossils' of which we have knowledge are preserved in one or other of two alternative situations which are entirely dissimilar. In the present chapter up to this point, we have confined our attention to

'fossils' which have been preserved in the shape of penalized religious denominations 'dispersed abroad among the Gentiles'; and we have seen that 'fossils' in this situation, if they survive at all, succeed in holding their own by learning to excel in the narrow field of social activity to which their Gentile neighbours and masters are apt to confine them. There is, however, another situation in which 'fossils' can and do maintain themselves in existence on easier terms. Instead of working their way through the fabric of some Gentile body social until they find a precarious lodgement in its crevices, like flints in chalk, they may segregate themselves into some fastness where they can be sure of being left in peace by the Gentiles round about; and most of the 'fossils' of which we have hitherto taken account have in fact been preserved partly in such fastnesses and not solely in dispersion. We can substantiate this by a cursory survey.

For example, the Jewish 'Diasporà'¹—in the variant forms of Ashkenazim and Sephardim and Dönme and crypto-Jews—is not the only shape in which the Jewish 'fossil' of the extinct Syriac Civilization survives to-day. Side by side with the conspicuous majority of Jewry which has held its own by learning to endure the life of the ghetto, there are other Jews—less numerous and less notorious but not less interesting to the student of history—who have held their own by withdrawing into mountains and deserts where they have converted the primitive inhabitants to Judaism and have themselves reverted more or less to the primitive way of life. Such are the Jewish peasantry and artisans in the highlands of the Yaman, in the south-western corner of Arabia; the Jewish highlanders called the Falasha in Abyssinia; the Jewish highlanders in the Caucasus; and the Krimchaks of the Crimea—a Turkish-speaking Jewish community that is believed to be descended from the Khazar Nomads who were converted to Judaism in the eighth century of the Christian Era at a time when they were ranging over the Don-and-Volga section of the Eurasian Steppe.²

Similarly, the Nestorian 'fossil' of the Syriac Civilization is not represented solely by craftsmen in the cities of 'Irāq, or by 'Saint Thomas's Christians' in Travancore, who are the Nestorian 'Diasporà'. There is also a Nestorian peasantry in the secluded uplands along the western shore of Lake Urmia, in North-West Persia; and there are (or were till yesterday) Nestorian 'wild highlanders' in the

¹ *Διασπορά* is an ancient Greek word meaning 'dispersion' which was adopted by the Jews as a name for that section of Jewry which came to be dispersed abroad among the Gentiles of the Hellenic World after the intrusion of Hellenism upon the Syriac World through the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire by the action of Alexander the Great.

² For further information about these Jews in fastnesses, see the Annex to the present chapter on pp. 402-12, below.

Hakkari highlands of Kurdistan. It is the same among the Monophysites. The Armenian 'Diasporà' has its foil in the Armenian peasantry which used to cultivate the uplands round the shores of Lake Van and the Armenian 'wild highlanders' who used to live their own life in the fastness of Sasūn, on the watershed between the headwaters of Tigris and Euphrates, and in the fastnesses of Hajjīn and Zeytūn in the Cilician Taurus. The Coptic 'Diasporà' of Cairo and the Delta has its foil in the Coptic peasantry of the Sa'id, and also in the Christian 'wild highlanders' of Abyssinia, who are adherents of the Coptic Monophysite Church and whose local prelate ('Abunā') is an appointee of the Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria. The Jacobite 'Diasporà' in Syria has its foil in the Jacobite highlanders of the Tūr 'Abdīn: a fastness on the watershed between Tigris and Khabur near the meeting-point of the post-war frontiers between Syria, 'Irāq, and Turkey. Among the Monothelite Lebanese emigrant who sets up shop in Egypt or West Africa or America and his brother who stays at home to cultivate the terraced flanks of 'the Mountain'.

In the Shī'ah, we find that the Ismā'īlī 'Diasporà' in India and East Africa likewise has its foil in the Ismā'īlī highlanders of the Jabal Ansariyah in Northern Syria: an untamed Ismā'īlī community which is descended from a garrison once established in this Syrian fastness by 'the Old Man of the Mountain' in the militant phase of the sect, in the age of the Crusades. The Shī'ah has also thrown off the religious community of the Druses: a 'fossil' which now survives in fastnesses only and is no longer to be found in dispersion at all.¹

¹ 'The Druses were the adherents of an esoteric non-proselytizing religion founded in the eleventh century after Christ by the Fatimid Caliph Al-Hākim bi'amrillāh, and they took their name from Al-Hākim's apostle Ad-Darazī. In matters of religion the Druse community was divided into a hierarchy of initiation-classes. There was the "spiritual section" (qism-ar-Rūhānī), subdivided into the chiefs (ar-Ru'asā), the intelligent (al-'uqalā), and the excellent (al-ajāwid); and the "corporeal section", subdivided into the lords (al-umārā) and the ignorant (al-juhāl). Initiation was open to women as well as men. Like many other small and peculiar sects which have managed to survive, the Druses tended to withdraw into mountain fastnesses. At the date when the French and British mandates were introduced there were four main Druse strongholds—one in the Lebanon east of Bayrūt, the second in the extreme south-west of the Lebanon, the third on the western slopes of Mount Hermon, and the fourth in the Jabal-ad-Durūz—an isolated mass of rugged and ill-watered mountains which rose abruptly between the fertile corn-lands of the Hawrān to the west and the Hamād steppe to the east. The central shrine of the Druse religion, Khalwat-al-Biyād, lay in the Mount Hermon district, while the chief political focus of the Druse community had formerly lain in the Lebanon; but during the past two centuries—and especially after the migration which followed the French military intervention in 1860 and the organization of the autonomous sanjāq of the Lebanon in 1861-4—the political centre of gravity had shifted to the most remote and militarily strongest of the Druse fastnesses: the Jabal-ad-Durūz (as it came to be called *par excellence*). During the period under review the mandatory authorities estimated that there were 48,000 Druses in the Jabal (out of a total population of about 60,000), 40,000 in the Lebanon east of Bayrūt, 2,000 in the south-west, 7,000 in the Mount Hermon district, and 7,028 in the British mandated territory.' (Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 406-8.) See, in general, Hitti, P. K.: *The Origins of the Druze People and Religion* (New York 1928, Columbia University Press).

On the other hand, the antithesis between 'fastness' and 'dispersion' presents itself, once again, among the Greek Orthodox Christian ra'iyeh of the old Ottoman Empire, in the striking contrast between the two sections which took up arms simultaneously in A.D. 1821, at opposite extremities of the Ottoman dominions, with incompatible aspirations and diverse fortunes: the merchants and administrators of the Phanar and the 'wild highlanders' of the Mani.¹

This brief survey of the dichotomy between 'fossils in dispersion' and 'fossils in fastnesses' yields a uniform result. The 'fossils' preserved in fastnesses, where they have never been subject to penalization, display no symptoms of the *ethos* which is characteristic of the same 'fossils' where they are found in dispersion in the shape of penalized and specialized minorities. The Jewish peasant in the Yaman has much more in common with his Muslim fellow-worker on the land than with his Jewish co-religionist in the ghetto; the Jewish tribesman in Abyssinia or the Caucasus has much more in common with the Christian or Muslim tribesmen round about who lead the same turbulent and predatory life in the same highlands.

VII. THE GOLDEN MEAN

The Law of Compensations

We have now reached a point at which we can bring our present argument to a head. We have ascertained that civilizations come to birth in environments that are unusually difficult and not unusually easy; and this has led us on to inquire whether or not this is an instance of some social law which may be expressed in the formula: 'the greater the challenge, the greater the stimulus.' We have pursued this inquiry by our customary empirical method. We have made a survey of the responses which are evoked by five types of challenge—the challenges of hard countries, new ground, blows, pressures, and penalization—and in all five fields the upshot of our survey appears to attest the validity of the law which we have formulated above. We have still, however, to determine whether its validity is absolute or limited. If we increase the severity of the challenge *ad infinitum*, do we thereby ensure an infinite intensification of the stimulus and, by the same token, an infinite increase of energy

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 226-7, above, and II. D (vii), p. 262, below. It is one of the curiosities of History that the Mani, which became a fastness of Orthodox Christianity under the Ottoman régime, had previously served as the last fastness of Hellenism. The fact is recorded by the learned East Roman Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*imperabat* A.D. 912-59):

'The inhabitants of the fastness of Mani are not of the same stock as the [Moreot] Slavs but are descended from the ancient Romans; and down to this day they are locally called Hellenes because once upon a time, long ago, they were idolators who bowed down to idols like the ancient Hellenes. These people were baptized in the reign of Basil of glorious memory (*imperabat* A.D. 866-86), and they have been Christians ever since.' (Constantine Porphyrogenitus: *De Imperio Administrando*, ch. 50.)

in the response which the stimulus evokes when the challenge is responded to successfully? Or do we reach a point beyond which an increase in severity brings in diminishing returns? And if we go beyond this point, do we reach a further point at which the challenge becomes so severe that the possibility of responding to it successfully is eliminated altogether? If the former of these two alternatives proves to be the truth, then we shall be able to lay down the law of 'the greater the challenge the greater the stimulus' without qualification. In the other event, we shall have to enter the *caveat* that some challenges may be excessive, and we shall then have to qualify the law of 'the greater the challenge the greater the stimulus' by formulating an overriding law to the effect that 'the most stimulating challenge is to be found in a mean between a deficiency of severity and an excess of it'.

Where does the ultimate truth lie? At first thoughts, we may incline to the view that 'the greater the challenge the greater the stimulus' is a law which knows no limits to its validity. We have not stumbled upon any palpable limits at any point in our empirical survey so far; and there are several celebrated extreme cases of the operation of the law which we have hitherto held in reserve.

We have not yet cited the example of Venice—a city built on piles driven into the barren mud-banks of a salt lagoon which has surpassed in wealth and power and glory all the cities built on terra firma in the fertile plains of the Po and the Adige. Nor have we cited the example of Holland—a country which has actually been salvaged from the sea and which has to be protected in perpetuity by dykes against submergence under the encircling waters that stand high above the level of the land. Yet Holland has distinguished herself in history far above any parcel of ground of equal area in all the rest of the great North European plain which stretches away—safe above sea-level—from the eastern margin of the Polders to the western foot-hills of the Urals.

Holland is assuredly the original, 'in real life', of that imaginary land which Goethe's Faust redeems from the waters of the Baltic when he is working out the redemption of his own soul from the toils of Mephistopheles. In this land, as Faust describes his work,

Eröffn' ich Räume vielen Millionen,
Nicht sicher zwar, doch tätig-frei zu wohnen;
Grün das Gefilde, fruchtbar; Mensch und Herde
Sogleich behaglich auf der neusten Erde,
Gleich angesiedelt an des Hügels Kraft,
Den aufgewälzt kühn-emsige Völkerschaft;
Im inneren hier ein paradiesisch Land—
Da rase draussen Flut bis auf zum Rand,

Und wie sie nascht, gewaltsam einzuschiessen,
 Gemeindrang eilt, die Lücke zu verschliessen.
 Ja! diesem Sinne bin ich ganz ergeben,
 Das ist der Weisheit letzter Schluss:
 Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben,
 Der täglich sie erobern muss.¹

What challenge could be more extreme than the challenge presented by the sea to Holland and to Venice? What more extreme, again, than the challenge presented by the Alps to Switzerland? And what responses could be more magnificent than those which Holland, Venice, and Switzerland have made? The three hardest pieces of country in Western Europe have stimulated their inhabitants to attain the highest levels of social achievement that have yet been attained by any of the peoples of Western Christendom.

A less well-known but not less impressive example of a heroic response to an extreme challenge from Physical Nature is offered by a survey of the places which were the historical nuclei of Modern Greece. One political nucleus was the Phanar: a remote corner of Stamboul which the Ottoman Pādishāh had assigned to the Greeks as a kind of Christian ghetto. The Phanariots responded by becoming adepts in the Western art of diplomacy.² One cultural and economic nucleus was Ayvalyq: a rocky peninsula on the Anatolian coast which seemed so barren that the Ottoman Pādishāh was content to grant his Greek subjects an exclusive right of occupancy. The Greek settlers made the barren rock bear olives and imported Western culture into their commonwealth as the return-cargo for their exports of olive-oil.³ Another economic nucleus was Ambelakia: a village perched high on the flank of Mount Ossa, overlooking the defile of Tempe, which made a livelihood by spinning and dyeing cotton for the Western market.⁴ Another was the Macedonian village of Shátishta which stands marooned among the stony hills that flank the upper valley of the Haliacmon over against Pindus. In the eighteenth century, after the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, in its counter-offensive against the Ottoman Power, had pushed its south-eastern outposts deep into the Balkan Peninsula, the Greeks of Shátishta made a livelihood by organizing an overland caravan-traffic for exchanging the dyed cotton goods of Ambelakia and other products of the Ottoman Empire for the products of the

¹ Goethe: *Faust*, II. 11563-76. The last two lines here quoted have been quoted already in vol. i, p. 277 and in the present volume, p. 17, above.

² See II. D (vi), pp. 222-5, above.

³ See II. D (ii), footnote on p. 40, above.

⁴ See the interesting account of Ambelakia which is given by Clarke, E. D.: *Travels*, Part II, section iii, ch. 9, pp. 285 sqq. (London 1816, Cadell and Davies.) Dr. Clarke visited Ambelakia on the 23rd-24th December, 1801. The red dye used by the Ambelakiots was a local product obtained from the Valona oak.

West. The commercial houses of this out-of-the-way Macedonian village had their branches in Budapest and Vienna and Leipzig and Dresden.¹ As for the maritime nuclei, Hydhra and Petses and Psarà and Kasos are uncultivable limestone islands; Trikeri is a rocky peninsula; Galaxidhi is a tiny harbour on the least inviting stretch of the coastline of the Gulf of Itéa. Yet these six maritime communities, between them, built up a thriving Greek merchant marine; and when their seamen diverted their energies from trading to fighting at the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, their light craft swept the Ottoman Navy off the seas as effectively as the light craft of Elizabethan England dealt with the Spanish Armada. As for the places which distinguished themselves during the War of Independence in the fighting on land, the Mani, whose warriors struck the first blow,² is a peninsula which is almost entirely occupied by a lofty mountain-range and is almost entirely destitute of both soil and water. The soil is so meagre that it will grow neither cereals nor vines nor even olives, but only prickly pears. The water is so scarce that there are only three springs in the whole country, which has to depend for the rest of its supply upon rain-water collected in cisterns.³ Similarly Suli, which played its part in a preliminary duel with 'Alì of Yánnina, is ensconced in the wildest and barrenest highlands of Epirus, while Mesolonghi, which is celebrated for the siege in which Byron died, is a fishing-village on a mud-bank in a lagoon: an embryonic Greek counterpart of Venice.

Venice and Holland and Switzerland, Mesolonghi and Mani and Hydhra: do they not all testify with one accord that our law of 'the greater the challenge the greater the response' holds good absolutely, without limitation? At first thoughts, the answer to this question appears to be plainly in the affirmative; yet certain cautionary second thoughts are suggested by a closer comparative study of these particularly telling illustrations which we have just assembled.

It is quite true that in all these places the challenges to which the inhabitants have responded so magnificently have been severe to an extreme degree; but it is also a fact that these superlative challenges have one feature in common which mitigates their severity considerably. Extreme though they are in degree, they are limited in range to one only out of the two realms which together constitute the total environment of any human society. These challenges are,

¹ When the writer of this Study visited Shátishta in the summer of 1921, he was shown portraits of ancestors—all dressed up in wigs and powder and patches and crinolines—which had been painted during their residence in the commercial centres of the West and had been brought home to Shátishta to be preserved as memorials.

² See II. D (vi), pp. 226-7 and 259, above.

³ The writer tested the rigours of the Mani for himself in the spring of 1912, when he walked down to the tip of the peninsula on his own feet and returned, *hors de combat*, on mule-back.

all alike, challenges in the realm of the physical environment, and in that realm only. Before, therefore, we can properly assess the severity of the total challenge with which the inhabitants of these places have been presented by their environment as a whole, we have to examine the human environment as well, and to ascertain what challenge, if any, has been presented here. As soon, however, as we follow this line of inquiry up, we observe that in all these places the exceptional severity of the challenge from the local physical environment has carried with it an exceptional immunity from certain specific, and possibly not less formidable, challenges from the human environment which have actually been presented to the inhabitants of the regions round about. The very barrenness or inaccessibility, in which the exceptional severity of the physical challenge has consisted, has served as a shield and buckler against those human challenges inasmuch as these physical drawbacks have deterred or frustrated certain potential human aggressors.

This secondary and compensatory effect of the physical challenge is no mere matter of speculation. It is manifest in the histories of all three places in Western Europe and thirteen places in Greece.

For example, the superlative physical challenges from the sea which have been presented to Venice and Holland have not only administered to them a physical stimulus which their neighbours have lacked, but have incidentally served to shield them from a human ordeal to which their neighbours have been exposed. Venice on her mud-banks, insulated from the continent by her lagoons, was exempt from foreign military occupation for little short of a thousand years: from the day when the Franks evacuated her in A.D. 810 to the day when the French took possession of her in A.D. 1797. Holland, likewise, within her girdle of canals, was saved from foreign military occupation for the best part of two centuries—from her armistice with Spain in A.D. 1609 until she was overrun by the French revolutionary armies in 1794-5.¹ As a Dutch statesman once remarked in a famous conversation with a king of Prussia, these Dutch canals were comfortably deeper than the height of a Pomeranian grenadier; and they could be made to flood the country far and wide at a few hours' notice.² What a contrast to the histories of Lombardy and Flanders—the respective neighbours of Venice and Holland on terra firma—which notoriously have been the two habitual battle-fields of Europe. It will be seen that, in Dutch and Venetian history, the sea has played a dual role—the sheltering role

¹ The stimulus derived by the Dutch from their responses to human challenges represented by interludes of Spanish, French, and German domination is, of course, a factor in Dutch history which has to be kept distinct from the divers effects of the physical environment with which we are concerned here.

² When the French invaded Holland in 1794-5, 'General Winter', who was to defeat them in Russia eighteen years later, was fighting on their side. Holland's girdle of protecting waters was frozen hard, and the Dutch fleet itself, fast bound in the ice, was captured by the French cavalry—an incident that is perhaps unique in naval and military history.

of a guardian angel as well as the stimulating role of a Satan or a Mephistopheles—and so it has been in Swiss history with the Alps. The mountains have not only stimulated the Swiss to earn by dairy-farming and watch-making and other ingenuities the livelihood which Alpine agriculture could not afford them. The Alps have also served the Swiss in a simpler and more direct way by helping to drive out and keep out the Hapsburgs and the Burgundians and a whole series of human aggressors.

The thirteen nuclei of Modern Greece which we have passed in review reveal the same phenomenon of compensation in the sphere of the human environment for a challenge in the sphere of Physical Nature. In all these cases, the physical challenges of remoteness and stoniness and waterlessness and mountainousness were unquestionably stimulating in themselves, but they also had a protective value in the human sphere which was of first-rate historical importance.

It is a well-known social law that when and where the Government is incompetent or corrupt or high-handed or malevolent, or is vicious in all these ways, or in several of them, at once, the subject's chance of prosperity depends on his escaping the Government's notice or failing to excite the Government's cupidity. In these adverse social circumstances, the normal values of the physical environment are inverted. When the Government is immoderately rapacious in 'taking up that' which it 'laid not down and reaping that' which it 'did not sow',¹ the fertile field actually yields less sustenance to the cultivator than some patch of stony ground which is beneath the notice of the tax-farmer; and a situation on the brink of a fine harbour or on the route of the king's highway is actually less remunerative to the merchant and the craftsman than a fastness in the hills where he is out of sight and reach of the king's armies and officials and couriers, who make their way by commandeering food and lodging and ships and carts and horses and coolies from the local inhabitants of the harbourside and the roadside. Such circumstances came to prevail in the Ottoman Empire during the two centuries and a half that elapsed between the death of Sultan Süleymān the Magnificent in A.D. 1565 and the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in A.D. 1821; and the sites of the places which have been the historical nuclei of Modern Greece are all in conformity with the social law which we have just formulated.

Why did the Pādīshāh leave the Phanar to the Greek Orthodox Christian inhabitants of Constantinople when he expelled them from all the rest of Stamboul? Why did he grant the Albanian Orthodox Christian colonists of Hydhra the privileges of complete

¹ Luke xix. 22.

local self-government and almost complete immunity from Imperial taxation? Why did he confer on the Greek colonists of Ayvalyq, in addition to the privilege of local self-government, the even more remarkable and precious concession that no Muslim should retain the right of residence within their parochial boundaries? Simply because he regarded the Phanar as an uninhabitable hole in a corner, and Hydhra and Ayvalyq as uncultivable wastes. He was not taking the children's bread and casting it to dogs. He was merely allowing the Christian dogs to eat of the crumbs which had fallen from their Muslim masters' table.¹ Why, again, were the Ambelakiots allowed to spin and dye and make money unmolested? Because Ambelakia was perched on the flank of Ossa at a safe altitude, or, in other words, at such a height that when the village caught the Ottoman extortioner's eye as he rode, far below, through the vale of Tempe, his laziness got the better of his greed, with the consequence that he rode on sullenly to plunder some poorer village within easier reach.² And why were the Christian Greeks of Shâtishta allowed to make fortunes out of their caravan-traffic? Because their Muslim Greek neighbours had done them a double service when they drove them out of the fertile valley-bottom into the barren uplands. They had not only compelled them—at a profitable moment—to turn their attention to commerce instead of agriculture, but they had also jostled them into a cranny in the hills where they could accumulate wealth unnoticed. Why, lastly, did the Maniots and the Suliots retain their autonomy and their arms and their warlike spirit? Because it had not been worth the Pâdishâh's while to follow them up into their barren highland fastnesses, as it was eminently worth his while to take and hold the orange-groves of Sparta and the currant-plantations of Elis and the mastic-villages of Chios and the harbours of Patras and Nauplia and the dome of Aya Sofia and the gardens of the Seraglio. It is evident that the sites of our thirteen nuclei of Modern Greece cannot be

¹ Matthew xv. 26-7.

² 'This Empire, as vast and large as it is, is yet dispeopled, the villages abandoned, and whole provinces as pleasant and fruitfull as Tempe or Thessaly uncultivate and turned into a desert or wilderness—all which desolation and ruine proceeds from the tyranny and rapine of the *Beglerbegs* and *Pashaws*; who either in their journeys to the possession of their Government, or return from thence, expose the poor inhabitants to violence and injury of their attendants, as if they had entred the confines of an enemy or the dominions of a conquered people. In like manner, the insolence of the horse and foot is unsupportable; for, in their marches from one countrey to another, parties of 20 or 30 are permitted to make excursions into divers parts of their own dominions, where they not only live upon free quarter but extort money and cloaths from the poor vassals, taking their children to sell for slaves, . . . so that, rather than be exposed to such misery, and licence of the soldiery, the poor people choose to abandon their dwellings and wander into other cities, or seek for refuge in the mountains or woods of the countrey.' (Rycaut, *Sir Paul: The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey and Brome), p. 170.)

For the break-down of the Ottoman system, to which these evils were due, see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 44-50, below.

accounted for completely until the exceptional local mildness of the human environment as well as the exceptional local rigour of the physical environment is taken into the reckoning.

We have evidently to reckon with the same combination of factors in interpreting the contrast, which we have noticed in a previous passage,¹ between the respective achievements of two modern communities in Syria—the Lebanese and the Nusayrīs—who have been fellow-sufferers with the modern Greeks from the misgovernment of the Ottoman Empire in its period of decline. In seeking to account for the prowess of the Lebanese, we must take into account the political seclusion as well as the physical rigour of their forbidding mountain fastness. And conversely, in seeking to account for the stagnation of their neighbours the Nusayrīs, we must bear in mind the political disadvantages which the relative openness and agreeableness of the Jabal Ansariyah has entailed.

‘Leurs montagnes sont communément moins escarpées que celles du Liban; elles sont en conséquence plus propres à la culture; mais aussi elles sont plus ouvertes aux Turcs; et c’est par cette raison, sans doute, qu’avec une plus grande fécondité en grain, en tabac à fumer, en vignes et en olives, elles sont cependant moins peuplées que celles de leurs voisins les Maronites et les Druzes.’²

Having caught this glimpse of ‘compensations’ in the human environment in the course of surveying certain superlative challenges from the physical environment which we had not examined before, let us now glance once again at some of those other illustrations of Challenge-and-Response which we have passed in review in earlier chapters of the present Part. When we thus extend our horizon, we shall find evidence of a ‘compensatory’ interaction between the physical and the human environments which is operative in both directions. There are not only challenges from the physical environment but also challenges from the human environment which have demonstrably tempered their own severity by producing an incidental compensatory effect in the complementary field. Let us first complete our survey of compensations accruing in the human sphere from challenges encountered in the physical, and then go on to consider the instances in which the compensation is physical and the challenge human.

The severity of a challenge in the physical sphere may be compensated in the human sphere in several alternative ways, as is already apparent from the illustrations which we have just been examining. A site which presents unusual physical difficulties to

¹ In II. D (ii), on pp. 55–7, above.

² Volney, C. F.: *Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte pendant les Années 1783, 1784 et 1785*, 2nd ed. (Paris 1787, Desenne et Volland, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 7–8.

its occupants may secure them at the same time an unusual freedom from human molestation because the site is either unattractive or inaccessible to outsiders or because it is forbidding in both senses at once.

We have seen that, in Orthodox Christendom in the latter days of the Ottoman Empire, the Greek 'squatters' in the Phanar and in Ayvalıq were compensated for an 'ineligible location' and for a stony soil by the very fact that these physical blemishes made both sites unattractive to the 'Osmanlis. Similarly, in Ancient Greece, at the dawn of Hellenic history, the stoniness of Attica not only stimulated the Athenians by its challenge¹ but also brought them compensation by proving unattractive to the immigrant 'Dorians'. In Ancient Syria, likewise, at the dawn of Syriac history, the Israelite 'squatters' were compensated as well as stimulated by the stoniness of the Hill Country of Ephraim—a physical blemish thanks to which these highlands overlooking the highway between Egypt and Shinar had been preserved as an untenanted no-man's-land from time immemorial until the Israelitish infiltration.² Thus, too, in the Hindu World, when it was being visited by the calamity of Muslim invasion, the deserts and forests of Rājputāna not only stimulated those Hindus who responded to their physical challenge, but also brought them compensation by offering little or no attraction to the Muslim invaders. The Muslims, descending upon India from the Iranian Plateau, did not rest till they had conquered the whole of the Indus Valley down to the coast of the Indian Ocean and the whole of the Ganges Valley down to the coast of the Bay of Bengal; but they were content to leave the Rājputs their independence in the 'bad lands' that occupied the angle between the two river-systems, notwithstanding the fact that Rājputāna skirts the banks of the Sutlej and the Jumna as closely as the Hill Country of Ephraim overhangs the lowlands of Philistia and the Vale of Esdrael. If we extend our survey to the Andean World, we may also conjecture that the builders of Tiahuanaco were compensated for the bleakness of the upland basin of Lake Titicaca³ by immunity from molestation on the part of their powerful neighbours in the maritime plain.

In a later age, after the Titicaca Basin had been broken in by the efforts of the ancient pioneers, its latter-day inhabitants, the Collas, were compensated for the lesser effort of keeping the bleak uplands under cultivation by being shielded against molestation from another quarter. The domineering snow-peaks, which sent down chilly winds and raging blizzards to blight their crops, also served the

¹ See II. D (ii), pp. 37-42, above.

² See II. D (ii), pp. 52-5, above.

³ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. I, p. 322, and II. D (v), in the present volume, p. 208, above.

Collas as a rampart against the warlike savages of the tropical Amazonian forest, who were effectively kept at a distance by their inability to cross the snow-line.¹ These Amazonian savages would have found the Collao attractive enough if the mountains had not rendered it inaccessible to them; and thus, from the Collas' standpoint, the mountains had a twofold aspect. Though physically oppressive they were humanly protective. In fact, the Andean snows have played here the same dual role as the high altitudes of Shátishta and Ambelakia or the depression of Hölland below the level of the sea. In each of these instances, a physical blemish has not only acted as a stimulus but has also brought its own compensation with it in the human sphere by conferring the boon of inaccessibility.

We may observe that a similar compensation is apt to be conferred by the physical ordeal of transmarine migration. The emigrants from the zone of post-glacial desiccation in North Africa who became the fathers of the Minoan Civilization in Crete by responding to the challenge of the sea² were compensated in the human sphere for the physical perils of navigation. We may read the same tale in the history of England. In the *Völkerwanderung* which accompanied the break-up of the Roman Empire, those continental North-European barbarians who took to the sea in order to invade the Roman island of Britain chose a harder path than their comrades who drifted into the Roman provinces on the mainland. On the other hand, throughout the whole course of Western history, from the first emergence of our Western Civilization until the recent inventions of the submarine and the aeroplane, the descendants of the seafaring Jutes and Angles have been enjoying the compensation that has accrued from their forefathers' ordeal. They have been reaping the profits of an insularity which has been the perpetual envy of their continental neighbours—the descendants of the land-loping Saxons and Franks and Sueves and Lombards.

In the modern age of Western history, the same ordeal of migration across the sea has brought a similar compensation to all those victims of religious persecution in Europe who have found freedom of worship in the New World.

Where the remote Bermudas ride
In the ocean's bosom unespied,
From a small boat that row'd along,
The listening winds received this song:
 'What should we do but sing His praise
That led us through the watery maze
Unto an isle so long unknown
And yet far kinder than our own?

¹ See II. D (v), p. 208, above.

² See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 323-30, above.

Where He the huge sea-monsters wracks,
That lift the deep upon their backs,
He lands us on a grassy stage,
Safe from the storm's and prelate's rage;

And in these rocks for us did frame
A temple where to sound His name.
Oh! Let our voice His praise exalt
Till it arrive at Heaven's vault,
Which thence (perhaps) rebounding may
Echo beyond the Mexique bay!

Thus sung they in the English boat
A holy and a cheerful note;
And all the way, to guide their chime,
With falling oars they kept the time.

The English seafarers in whose mouth this song of thanksgiving has been placed by a seventeenth-century poet were Presbyterian emigrants who had been rewarded for braving the perils of the Atlantic by being led to an earthly paradise in the Antilles. Their compensation was, indeed, in both kinds; and the physical delights of a tropical island—which are depicted by Andrew Marvell in the loveliest lines of his poem¹—had the same enervating effect upon these English navigators that we have seen them have upon Polynesian navigators on the other side of the planet.² To-day the song sounds only faintly off the coast of the Bermudas; yet the singers' pious hope has been fulfilled; for their voice has indeed rebounded from 'Heaven's vault' till it echoes now 'beyond the Mexique bay' in stentorian reverberations. The song of these English Presbyterian seafarers who found freedom of worship in an earthly paradise in the Bermudas has become the song of their kinsmen and co-religionists who have likewise crossed the Atlantic to find the same religious freedom in a prosaic eldorado on the North American Continent. And voices from every quarter of the overseas world are singing in chorus: the voice of French Huguenots who have found freedom of worship in South Africa, and the voice of Irish Catholics who have found it in Australia and in Spanish America as well as in the United States.

We still have to glance at certain instances in which a site that presents unusual physical difficulties to its occupants is not only inaccessible to outsiders but is unattractive to them as well. Where the physical features of a site thus make it doubly forbidding, the compensation in the human sphere accrues in double measure.

This has been the good fortune of Venice and of Hydhra: a

¹ These lines have been omitted in the quotation above.

² See II. D (i), pp. 13-15, above.

mud-bank and a rock-reef which have both been protected from molestation by the twin safeguards of insularity and barrenness. The same double compensation has accrued to the inhabitants of other barren islands in the histories of other societies besides Western and Orthodox Christendom: to the Icelanders, for example, in Scandinavian history¹ and to the Tyrians and Aradians in Syriac history² and to the Aeginetans in Hellenic history³ and to the first human occupants of the Cyclades, who share with the Eteocretans the honour of being the fathers of the Minoan Civilization.⁴

The fathers of all the other 'unrelated' civilizations may likewise have enjoyed this double protection against their neighbours in compensation for the severity of the physical challenges to which they have courageously responded. At least, we may conjecture that when the fathers of the Egyptiac and Sumeric and Sinic civilizations had plunged into those jungle-swamps which they transformed in course of time into fields and cities, they did not find themselves compelled, like the Jews when they were rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem, to do their work with one hand while they held a weapon in the other.⁵ It seems more probable that these primeval Egyptiac and Sumeric and Sinic pioneers, unlike Nehemiah's Jewish contemporaries, were left in peace by their fellow men to wage and win their titanic war against Physical Nature. They may have had to suffer from human molestation at an earlier stage, when they were still living in the open. Some such human pressure—accentuated, in the Egyptiac and the Sumeric case, by the gradual desiccation of the Afrasian Steppe in the post-glacial age—may even have been the proximate cause of their taking their momentous plunge into a howling wilderness which no human being had ever attempted to penetrate before them. When once, however, they had descended into their terrestrial hell, we may suppose that their former neighbours were both unable and unwilling to follow in pursuit of them. The fathers of the Mayan Civilization may have secured a similar immunity from molestation by plunging into the tropical forest, and the fathers of the Andean Civilization by settling on the arid coastal plain and mounting on to the bleak plateau in its hinterland.

Again, those 'fossil' remnants of extinct civilizations that have survived in fastnesses⁶ all owe their preservation to the same double safeguard. A combination of unattractiveness with inaccessibility is the common characteristic of the Jewish fastnesses in the Caucasus and in the Yaman, the Jewish and Monophysite fastnesses in Abyssinia, the Nestorian fastness in Hakkari, and the Monothelete fastness in

¹ See II. D (iii), pp. 86-100, above.

² See II. D (ii), pp. 51-2, above.

³ See II. D (ii), pp. 48-9, above.

⁴ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. 1, pp. 328-30, above.

⁵ See the Book of Nehemiah, ch. iv.

⁶ See II. D (vi), pp. 256-9, above, with the Annex.

the Lebanon. We have already taken note of two instances of this type in glancing at the Greek Orthodox fastnesses of the Mani and Suli in the old Ottoman Empire. It was a combination of unattractiveness with inaccessibility that saved both Suli and the Mani from ever feeling the full weight of the Ottoman oppression which crushed the life out of the Greek *ra'iyeh* in the neighbouring vales of Yánina and Sparta. Hence the Suliots and the Maniots—protected as well as stimulated by the physical hardness of their highland strongholds—were able to play active and decisive parts in the creation of Modern Greece. The same twofold compensation in the human sphere has accrued to the New Englanders from the physical hardness of Town Hill, Connecticut, and to the Mormons from the diverse but not less formidable physical hardness of Utah. It is not only because these new-found fastnesses in the North American wilderness have been stimulating to their occupants, but also because they have been at the same time unattractive and inaccessible to outsiders, that they have served their occupants so well and have assisted them to make the marks which they have succeeded in making on our Western history.

Let us now examine the inverse case in which the challenge is delivered in the human sphere while the compensation accrues in the physical.

The experience of the 'fossils in fastnesses', which we have been examining just above, is precisely inverted in the experience of the 'fossils in dispersion'. The Jews, for example, who survive in the fastnesses of the Caucasus and Abyssinia have responded successfully to a challenge from the physical environment and have been compensated by immunity from penalization at Gentile hands. These Jewish 'wild highlanders' are as free, and as upstanding, as their Monophysite and Muslim counterparts. Inversely, the Jews of the 'Diaspora' have successfully responded to the human challenge of religious penalization and have been compensated for their Babylonish captivity among the Gentiles by the presence of those flesh pots to which their ancestors used to look back with such regret after Moses had led them forth into the wilderness out of the fat land of Egypt.¹ The exercise of holding their own in a hostile human environment has not only stimulated the Jews of the Dispersion to activity. It has also enabled them, in diverse Gentile societies in successive ages, to keep their footing in the market-place and their seat in the counting-house and to take their tribute from the golden stream of commerce and finance, instead of having to put up with the poverty-stricken life of the wilderness that has been led by their Abyssinian and Caucasian co-religionists.

¹ See II. D (i), pp. 24-5, above.

There is a somewhat similar relation between the diverse experiences through which the fathers of the 'unrelated' and the 'related' civilizations have passed. The fathers of the 'unrelated' civilizations, like the 'fossils in fastnesses', have responded to a physical challenge and have been compensated by immunity from human molestation. Inversely, the fathers of the 'related' civilizations, like the 'fossils in dispersion', have been compensated in physical values for responding to a human challenge. The dynamic act by which a 'related' civilization is generated is the secession of a proletariat from a dominant minority; and this is a human, not a physical, ordeal. The insurgent proletariat which initiates a new civilization by passing through this ordeal successfully is compensated by inheriting a physical habitat, ready made, from its predecessors instead of finding itself compelled to create a new physical habitat for itself out of the virgin wilderness; and this compensation is not in human currency but in physical. It takes the form of a reprieve from physical hardship in place of that reprieve from human molestation which is granted to the pioneer who initiates a new civilization by wrestling with Physical Nature in the virgin wilderness.

This same phenomenon of physical compensation for successful response to a human challenge may be illustrated by other examples. We have just observed that the 'fossils in dispersion' are compensated for their endurance in holding their ground in a hostile religious environment by the golden opportunities for economic gain which this ground, so hardly held, affords them. There is an analogy to this in the experience of those emigrants from lean countries to fat countries who find their ordeal, not in holding their ground in spite of persecution, but in changing their ground under pressure of poverty.¹ The resulting situation is substantially the same. The Hadrami in Java, the Scotsman in England, and the French-Canadian in the United States are all responding, like the Jew in the Gentile World, to the challenge of an alien human environment; and, like the Jewish 'Diaspora' again, they are being compensated for their endurance of this human ordeal by 'reaping where' they have 'not sown', inasmuch as they are participating in the material prosperity which has been built up by the work of other men's hands in a country which is not the immigrants' home.

We can see our 'law of compensation' likewise at work in certain otherwise very diverse historical situations.

For example, the militant pioneers who extended the bounds of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan by carrying on a frontier-warfare against the indigenous barbarian inhabitants of the Kwanto,²

¹ See II. D (vi), pp. 212-13, above.

² See II. D (v), pp. 158-9, above.

were compensated in the economic field for their military exertions. Their strenuous life in the marches not only gave them a stimulus which was conspicuously lacking in the interior at the court of 'the Cloistered Emperors' in Yamato; it also brought them a direct material reward; for the soil of the Kwanto, where they were carving out new fiefs for themselves at the barbarians' expense, was considerably more productive than the soil of Yamato: the region which was the original home of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan and in which the Japanese Imperial patrimony was situate. In weighing the causes of the momentous revolution in which the preponderance passed from Yamato to the Kwanto in the course of the twelfth century of the Christian Era, we must give due weight to this economic factor. We must recognize that the wardens of the marches did not owe their triumph solely to the superiority in *moral* which their military training had given them over their unwarlike peers at the Court. They also owed it in part to the superiority in wealth which had accrued to them incidentally as their compensation in the economic field for their exertions in the military field.

The 'law of compensation' has also to be reckoned with in accounting for the rise of the cities of Paris and London in and after the ninth century of the Christian Era. In an earlier passage of this Part,¹ we have noticed the stimulus which was administered to these two cities of Western Christendom by pressure from Scandinavia. We have now to observe that the rivers which Paris and London respectively commanded had a twofold social function. They served as waterways not only for Viking raids but for international commerce; and the commanding situations of the two cities, athwart the courses of the Seine and the Thames, had more than one effect upon their civic fortunes. Standing where they stood, London and Paris were marked out, as we have already observed, to bear the brunt of the sea-raiders' attacks upon England and France; but, by the same token, they were also marked out to draw to themselves the lion's share of the two kingdoms' waterborne commerce. In other words, the ordeals of ninth-century London and Paris carried with them their own prospective compensation; and in this respect the history of the Londoners and the Parisians is not incomparable to the history of the Jews dispersed abroad among the Gentiles. In both cases, we have the spectacle of a community holding its ground tenaciously against intense hostile pressure; and in both cases, again, we find that it is rewarded doubly for its tenacity. It not only gains a moral stimulus from its act of resistance, but it also obtains a material compensation for its moral ordeal in virtue of the fact that the position from which it

¹ See II. D (v), pp. 198-9, above, and also the Annex to that chapter on pp. 400-1, below.

refuses to be driven out—by persecution or by force of arms, as the case may be—is a position of unique commercial profitability.

The existence of this 'law of compensation' and the wide range of its operation, of which we have now perhaps satisfied ourselves, may give us warning not to press to extremes our other law of 'the greater the challenge the greater the stimulus'. Before we allow ourselves to be convinced, on evidence, that this other law holds good without limitations, we must make sure that our evidence will stand the test of the supplementary 'law of compensation' which has now come to light. When we are confronted with a triumphant response to some challenge from the environment which is apparently superlative in its severity, we must not accept this evidence at its face value until we have made sure that the total environment has been taken into consideration. We must always bear in mind that the environment is twofold—a physical environment and a human—and that a challenge which is delivered in either one of these two realms and which appears superlatively severe at first sight, may prove on closer inspection to be tempered and attenuated by some compensation which it carries with it in the complementary realm, whichever of the two that may be. This is what we actually found when we examined the most extreme examples of Challenge-and-Response in the physical realm which we could call to mind: the examples of Venice and Holland and Switzerland and the thirteen historical nuclei of Modern Greece. Thereafter, when we extended our horizon, we again found our 'law of compensation' at work in the most extreme example of Challenge-and-Response in the human realm that can well be imagined: the example of the Jewish 'Diaspora'. We have not, however, come across any example of a triumphant response to a challenge which has presented itself with uniformly superlative severity in the physical and in the human realm simultaneously. This *argumentum ex silentio* does not, of course, go very far; but it goes far enough to suggest a doubt as to whether our law of 'the greater the challenge the greater the response' does retain its validity when the challenge is at once extreme in degree and relentless in presenting itself over the whole range of the total environment, instead of unobtrusively offering compensation in one of the two realms for the conspicuous severity of its incidence in the other.

How is a challenge proved excessive?

Are we, then, to conclude that the validity of this law is not absolute but limited? We can hardly draw that conclusion from the negative fact that no instance of a triumphant response to an unmitigatedly superlative challenge has actually come to our notice.

If we are to establish a convincing proof, it must be founded on positive evidence. We must be able to present unequivocal instances in which a challenge has proved to be excessive; and the excessiveness of a challenge will not be conclusively demonstrated by the mere fact that a particular party has failed to respond to the challenge in question on a particular occasion.

This will prove nothing in itself, because almost every challenge that has eventually evoked a victorious response turns out, on inquiry, to have baffled or broken one respondent after another before the moment when, at the hundredth or perhaps the thousandth summons, the victor has entered the lists at last. This is the notorious 'prodigality of Nature'; and, in the field of the histories of civilizations, a host of examples spring to mind.

For instance, the physical challenge of the North European forest effectually baffled Primitive Man. Unequipped, as he was, with implements for felling the forest trees, and ignorant of how to turn the rich underlying soil to account by cultivation, even if he had been capable of clearing it of its sylvan encumbrance, Primitive Man in Northern Europe simply avoided the forest and squatted on sand-dunes and chalk-downs which his successors afterwards scornfully rejected as 'bad lands' when the forest was falling at last under the blows of their axes. For Primitive Man, the challenge of the temperate forest was actually more formidable than the challenge of the frozen Tundras; and in North America his line of least resistance eventually led him Pole-ward beyond the forest's northern fringe to find his destiny in creating the Eskimo Civilization¹ in response to the challenge of the Arctic Circle. Yet Primitive Man's experience does not prove that the challenge of the North European forest was excessive in the sense of being altogether beyond human power of effective response; for where Primitive Man was baffled, the barbarians who followed at his heels were able to make some impression with the aid of tools and technique acquired from the rising civilizations with which they were in touch, until, in the fullness of time, the pioneers of two latter-day civilizations came and saw and conquered. Before the close of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, the Northern forest had been effectively taken in hand and mastered—by Western Christian pioneers in Europe and by Orthodox Christian pioneers in Russia—all the way from the coast of the Atlantic to the foot-hills of the Urals.

Some fifteen centuries before that, in the second century B.C., the southern vanguard of the North European forest in the Basin of the Po had been subdued by the Roman pioneers of the Hellenic Civilization after having baffled the Romans' barbarous and primitive

¹ For the arrested civilization of the Esquimaux, see III. A, vol. iii, pp. 4-7, below.

predecessors from time immemorial. The Greek historian Polybius, who visited this country immediately after it had been opened up and been turned to account by Roman enterprise, has put on record his personal observations. He draws a striking contrast between the inefficient and poverty-stricken life of the Romans' Gallic predecessors, whose last survivors were still living this life in the backwoods at the foot of the Alps,¹ and the cheapness and plenty that prevailed in the adjoining districts which the Roman colonists had taken in hand.² It could never have occurred to Polybius, with this contrast before his eyes, to imagine that the Padane forest was invincible simply because the miserable remnant of the Gauls survived as a specimen of one community which had failed to respond to the forest's challenge. In Polybius's day, the testimony of the forest-bound Gallic kraals was given the lie by the opposing testimony of a thriving Roman country-side which now held the field, a stone's throw off, on ground which the forest had still been holding victoriously against Mankind a few years before. But suppose that an earlier Greek historian—let us say, a Herodotus—had been able to anticipate Polybius's visit to the Po Basin by some three centuries. He would have arrived on the scene at a moment when the Gallic avalanche had just descended from the Alps and was overwhelming the Etruscan prospectors who had ventured out north of the Apennines. After watching the discouraging spectacle of barbarism evicting the forerunners of civilization from a country which the barbarian was patently incapable of turning to account for himself, our Herodotus might well have returned to Hellas to report that the Padane forest was invincible and that the Etruscans, who had lightly taken up its challenge, had paid the inevitable penalty for their presumption by incurring the Envy of the Gods. The moral of this imaginary story may be expressed in the words of Solon's warning to Croesus: 'Respite finem.'³ The suggested inevitability of the Etruscans' failure was disproved within three centuries by the Romans' success. It is evident that a challenge is not proved unanswerable by the fact that some attempts to answer it have failed. It has first to be shown that the series of failures has been unbroken from beginning to end of the story.

Polybius's sketch of the Basin of the Po in the latter part of the second century B.C. bears a curious resemblance to the picture of the Basin of the Mississippi at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era which has been drawn for us in detail by a host of modern Western travellers. The contrast

¹ Polybius, Bk. II, ch. 17.

² Polybius, Bk. II, ch. 15.

³ The Greek original of the Latin proverb is placed in Solon's mouth by Herodotus (Bk. I, ch. 32).

between the last of the Gauls still starving within reach of plenty and the Roman pioneers who have compelled the primeval forest to yield up its hidden wealth at the summons of their axe and spade has been reproduced on another continent, at an interval of some two thousand years, in the modern contrast between the last of the Redskins and the American pioneers in the primeval forest of Kentucky or Ohio.

The Americans have responded victoriously to a sylvan challenge by which their Red Indian predecessors were baffled.¹ Indeed, they have increased the productivity of the soil and subsoil which they have conquered from the trees to such a degree that to-day, when the territory of the United States is occupied by 120 million people of European origin with a conspicuously higher standard of living than is enjoyed by their kinsmen and contemporaries who have not left their European homes, it is calculated that the present Red Indian population of the United States is not less numerous and possibly more numerous than the Red Indian population of the same territory some three centuries ago, before the first progenitor of the 120 million European intruders ever set foot on this American soil.² In other words, practically the whole of the present national income of the United States is derived from wealth that has been extracted direct from Physical Nature by the in-comers, and little or none of it is derived from wealth which has been robbed from the indigenous occupants (as the Inca's gold and silver was robbed from him by the Spanish conquistadores of Peru). On this showing, the present national wealth of the United States gives a fair economic measure of the difference between the ineffectual Red Indian response and the triumphant American response to the physical challenge of the North American forest. The monument

¹ By the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, when the English and French colonists of North America appeared on the scene, the Red Indian occupants of the vast area which is now covered by Canada and the United States had not begun to master the North American forest, though they did not lack an incentive for mastering it since they had already acquired the art of maize cultivation from the adjoining Mexic World. (See II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, p. 265, above.) For the question whether an indigenous civilization, 'affiliated' to the Mexic, would or would not have emerged eventually in North America if the European Civilization of Western Christendom had not intervened, see the footnote on pp. 265-6 in II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, above.

² If this calculation is correct, it bears eloquent testimony to the extent of the difference in degree between American and Red Indian economic efficiency, but it does not, of course, justify any retrospective condonation of the treatment which the Red Indians have received at American hands. (See II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, pp. 211-14, above.) A statistical result, however interesting and remarkable, is impotent to undo crimes that have been committed and cruelties that have been suffered in real life. Though the present Red Indian population of the United States may be neither less numerous nor less well off than the Red Indian population of the same territory three centuries ago, the present representatives of the indigenous race are confined to an insignificant fraction of the area over which their predecessors once ranged, and they are descended from only a minority of the tribes which the European intruders found in existence on their arrival. The suffering and the wrong involved in the extermination of the majority of the Red Indian tribes and the alienation of the greater part of the territory over which they used to roam are hard facts which no figures can explain away.

of the American pioneer's victory over the forest is the present aspect of the United States; and, in face of the forest's ultimate defeat by Man, which this aspect now proclaims to the World, it is patent that the different aspect which the same territory wore three centuries ago, in an age when the North American forest was still dominant over the local representatives of the Human Race, afforded no valid evidence at all of the forest's invincibility. An Aztec explorer, visiting the Far North before A.D. 1600, would have been in grievous error if he had returned home to report that the Northern forest was invincible after observing the ineffectual efforts of the Algonquin and the Iroquois to plant their maize between the serried tree-stems. For, by A.D. 1600, the formidable conquerors of the North European forest were already girding up their loins to cross the North Atlantic and repeat their exploit in a New World.

The story of Man and the Forest is reproduced in the stories of Man and Mineral Oil and Man and the Air.

Like the forests of Europe and North America, the oil-fields of Azerbaijan have challenged one human society after another to master them for human ends before the challenge has eventually been answered. The Nomads, who are the earliest recorded tenants of the Azerbaijani Steppe, appear to have made no use whatever of the mineral wealth which was oozing out and welling up from below the surface of their cattle-pastures. The Syriac Society, which supplanted the Nomads in Azerbaijan in the early part of the sixth century B.C., when the Medes overcame the Scyths,¹ was not unaware of the peculiar natural phenomenon which was native to this remote border province on the outer edge of the Syriac World; yet, under the Syriac dispensation, the oil of Azerbaijan was harnessed solely for a religious purpose, without ever being turned to economic account. A few conspicuous natural gushers were imprisoned in towers in order that the rising jet might minister to the Zoroastrian cult of Fire by feeding a perpetual flame at the summit; and even this ritual use of the mineral only lasted as long as the local prevalence of the Zoroastrian religion. When Zoroastrianism gave way to Islam and the Syriac Civilization was superseded, in due course, by the 'affiliated' Iranic Civilization, these perpetual flames ceased to burn and the sole use which Man had so far made of Mineral Oil became obsolete. Yet the Azerbaijani oil-field was not destined to elude economic exploitation to the end of Time. The economic potentialities of this unexploited mineral resource did not escape the attention of Peter the Great when he passed that way in A.D. 1723 *en route* for the conquest of the Caspian provinces of Persia;²

¹ See II. D (v), pp. 136-8, above.

² See Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 480 and 518.

and although in this, as in other things, the intuitive genius of this Russian changeling anticipated the laborious discoveries of *Homo Economicus* in the West by the best part of two centuries, Peter's economic reconnaissance of the Azerbaijani oil-field was a true portent of things to come. At the beginning of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, Baku was conquered again, and this time permanently, by a Russia which still retained the impetus towards economic Westernization that Peter had communicated to her; and, in the course of the same century, Baku Oil became one of the staple commodities of a Western economic system which had come to embrace the whole World and all Mankind. Indeed, at the present day, the mastery of Man over Oil has become so complete that it looks as though he might substitute oil for coal—as he has already once substituted coal for wood—to be his ordinary fuel and standard generator of light and heat and mechanical power. Thus the successive failures of the Nomadic and Syriac and Iranic civilizations to respond to the challenge of the Azerbaijani oil-field were not, after all, good evidence that this challenge was inherently insuperable.

As for the challenge of the Air, the myths of human Icarus and human Phaethon, who fell to destruction when they presumed to imitate the flights of their superhuman sires, convey a profound conviction that the Air—unlike the Forest or the Jungle-Swamp or the Desert or the Sea—is for ever destined to defeat the utmost efforts of human daring and ingenuity. Nor has this conviction of the Air's invincibility been limited to those Hellenic minds which have given it its classic expression in Mythology. It has been taken for granted by all men in all ages; and even in our own Western Society, which has triumphantly conquered the Air in our day, the older generation now alive in this year 1935 has grown up in the old assumption. The writer of this Study well remembers how, when he was a schoolboy, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the possibility of effective flight by aircraft heavier than air was still a theme for tales of mystery and imagination in the vein of Jules Verne or Edgar Allan Poe.

When we turn from the physical to the human environment, we find the same. A challenge which has defeated one respondent is afterwards proved by a victorious response on the part of some later competitor to be not insuperable.

Let us reconsider, for example, the relation between the Hellenic Society and the North European barbarians. In a previous passage of this Part, we have already examined the effect of the pressure from the barbarians upon the Hellenic World;¹ but the pressure

¹ See II. D (v), pp. 160-6, above.

was reciprocal, and there was a counter-effect of Hellenic pressure upon the barbarians which has a bearing upon our present subject of inquiry. As the Hellenic Civilization radiated deeper and deeper into the continental European hinterland of the Mediterranean, one layer of barbarians after another was confronted with a question of life and death. Was it going to succumb to the impact of this potent alien social force and suffer a disintegration of its own social fabric in order to become raw material for assimilation into the tissues of the Hellenic body social? Or was it going to hold its own and resist assimilation and be enrolled, in virtue of its resistance, in the recalcitrant external proletariat of the Hellenic Society instead of merging its identity in that of the Hellenic Society itself? This challenge was presented by the Hellenic Civilization successively to the Celts and to the Teutons. In the earlier of these two ordeals, the Celts eventually broke down; but in the second ordeal the Teutons proved that the Hellenic challenge was not insuperable by responding to it victoriously now that their turn had come.

The break-down of the Celts was impressive, because the Celts had had a good start and had taken spectacular advantage of it to begin with. The Celts were given their opportunity by an error of tactics on the part of the Etruscan settlers along the west coast of Italy. These overseas converts to Hellenism were not content with securing their foothold on the Italian coastline nor even with expanding inland up to the foot of the Apennines. The Etruscan pioneers rashly crossed the Apennine watershed and scattered far and wide over the Basin of the Po right up to the foot of the Alps.¹ In expanding on this scale, they were vastly overtaxing their strength; and the consequence was as auspicious for the Celts—who happened to be the layer of barbarians immediately affected—as it was disastrous for the Etruscans themselves. The sudden initial access of Etruscan pressure had stimulated the Celts to react against the aggressors;² and now an equally sudden relaxation of the pressure tempted the barbarians to pass over to the offensive. The result was a *furor Celticus* which was sustained for some two centuries.

Before the end of the fifth century B.C., a Celtic avalanche, descending from the Alps, overwhelmed the weak Etruscan outposts in the Po Basin. In the early decades of the fourth century, the invigorated barbarians were sweeping across the Apennines and sacking the walled cities of Italy, including Rome itself,³ and were

¹ See II. D (iii), pp. 85-6, and the present chapter, p. 276, above.

² The length of the time during which the Celts had been in contact with the Etruscans before their reaction took a violent form in the fifth century B.C. is emphasized by H. Hubert in *Les Celtes et l'Expansion Celtique jusqu'à l'Époque de la Tène* (Paris 1932, Renaissance du Livre), p. 331.

³ For Rome's recovery from the *Clades Alliensis* of 390 B.C., see II. D (iv), pp. 101-2, above.

sending out flying columns of raiders right to the extremity of the Italian Peninsula. A century later, they were playing the same havoc in Peninsular Greece. In 279 B.C. they burst through the northern bounds of Macedonia and remained masters for four years (279-276 B.C.) of a country which had just imposed its hegemony on all the other states of Greece and overthrown the Achaemenian Empire.¹ Their range of action was immense. One wing of the horde which had descended the Danube to fall upon the heart of the Hellenic World swerved eastward and crossed the Dardanelles instead of heading for Pella and Delphi; and these Celts made a permanent settlement—an Asiatic 'Galatia'—on the Anatolian Plateau. Other Celtic hordes, bursting out in the opposite direction, descended the Rhine and the Seine and the Loire to the shores of the Ocean and swept on—taking seas and mountains in their stride—some across the Channel into the British Isles and some across the Bay of Biscay or the Pyrenees into the Iberian Peninsula. Nor were these Celtic migrants mere marauders. Inept though they were in material technique—as they showed in their inability to master the forest²—the Celts nevertheless succeeded, under the stimulus which came to them from Etruria and Macedon and Marseilles, in developing a style of their own³ which is sufficiently distinctive to enable our modern Western archaeologists to plot out the course and extent of these Celtic migrations on the basis of the remains of the Celtic culture which have come to light.

During those two centuries of Celtic exuberance (*circa* 425-225 B.C.), it looked as though the Celts might actually overwhelm the Hellenic World by breaking into its citadels in Italy and Greece and enveloping its flanks in Spain and Anatolia simultaneously; and then, when this Celtic terror was at its height, the barbarians missed their chance. They were driven out and kept out of the Italian Peninsula by the Romans and out of the Greek Peninsula by the Antigonids. In Anatolia, the scourge of their marauding expeditions stimulated the local 'successor-states' of the Achaemenian Empire to co-operate to the extent of confining the obnoxious Celtic

¹ In the fourth century B.C., the Macedonians had committed the same error of tactics on their own continental European frontier that the Etruscans had committed on theirs a century earlier. King Philip Amyntou, the Macedonian counterpart of Peter the Great, had stimulated the Celts by extending his rule into the interior of the Balkan Peninsula; and thereafter Philip's son and successor Alexander the Great, and Alexander's general and local successor Lysimachus, had both diverted the energies of Macedonia from Europe to Asia, leaving the continental European frontier invitingly open for barbarian reprisals.

² See pp. 275-6, above.

³ The type of culture which, in the technical terminology of our archaeologists, is known as 'La Tène', after the site, at the outflow from the Lake of Neuchâtel, on which the first striking examples of this culture were unearthed. The five phases into which the La Tène culture is analysed by the archaeologists on the strength of its material remains are believed to cover, in all, a span of five centuries, from the fifth century to the last century B.C. See Hubert, *op. cit.*, and the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. vii, ch. ii.

intruders within narrow bounds in the least desirable part of the country. In the Balkan Peninsula, in the basins of the Maritsa and the Danube, the Celts were exterminated by the indigenous representatives of European barbarism—Thracians and Illyrians and the like—as soon as these had recovered from the first shock of the Celtic onslaught. In the Iberian Peninsula, they were rolled back by the North African barbarians who gave the Peninsula its Iberian name. The last hope for the Celts lay in Hannibal's brilliant attempt, in his passage of the Alps, to set the Celtic avalanche in motion again at its original starting-point;¹ and this hope was forlorn, since the hour of Hannibal's intervention was not the eleventh but the thirteenth. The definitive defeat of Hannibal by Rome in the last year of the third century B.C. spelled the doom of Hannibal's Celtic allies. It was thenceforth inevitable that the encounter between the Celtic barbarism and the Hellenic Civilization should end in a Celtic defeat, and that this defeat should be inflicted by Roman hands. Within little more than two centuries after the close of the Hannibalic War, the Celts had been absorbed into the Hellenic body social through being incorporated into the Roman Empire from the banks of the Po to the banks of the Rhine and the Danube and from Celtiberia to Gallograecia. They had been followed up by Roman Imperialism from the Continent on to the island of Britain and from the British mainland on to their last sanctuary on the Isle of Mona. Their discomfiture was complete.²

This disintegration of the Celtic layer of European barbarism by the radiation of Hellenism exposed the Teutonic layer, which lay next behind the Celtic, to the action of the same formidable disintegrating force. How must the prospects of the Teutons have appeared to a Hellenic historian—a Diodorus of Agyrium or a Strabo of Amaseia—who had lived to see Caesar conquer Gaul³ or to hear Caesar's successors debating whether it were worth their while to conquer Britain?⁴ With the Celtic *débâcle* in his mind, our

¹ See II. D (v), pp. 161-2, above.

² Hubert, in *op. cit.*, on pp. 155-6, writes the epitaph of the Celts in the following terms:

'La Civilisation de la Tène commence avec l'âge d'or de la civilisation grecque. Ce sont les innovations de celle-ci qui ont provoqué les innovations qui caractérisent celle-là. Les surfaces de contact se sont depuis lors régulièrement accrues et, malgré quelques apparences contraires, l'influence des Méditerranéens et la masse des importations—jusqu'à l'assimilation de la civilisation de la Tène par la civilisation romaine. . . .

'Mais ce que les hommes de la Tène ont emprunté, ils l'ont généralement adapté et transformé de la façon la plus originale. Jamais encore, dans la série des emprunts faits par les civilisations de l'Europe Centrale aux civilisations plus avancées du Midi, pareille originalité ne s'était révélée.'

³ The narrative of Diodorus's *A Library of Universal History* stops at Caesar's invasion of Gaul in the year 58 B.C.; but certain later events are mentioned by Diodorus incidentally: e.g. Caesar's crossing of the Rhine and invasion of Britain, as well as his death and apotheosis.

⁴ 'Caesar the God [i.e. Divus Julius] landed on the island [of Britain] on two occasions, but each time he withdrew again in a hurry without accomplishing anything much or

historian—quite rationally forecasting the future in the light of the past—would assuredly have been inclined to pronounce that, for the barbarians of Europe, the challenge of Hellenism was insuperable and that, however lustily the Teutons might storm and rage, as the Celts had once stormed and raged, at the first encounter with the pioneers of the conquering civilization, the Teutons, like the Celts, were bound to be discomfited in the long run.

An observer who had watched Caesar throw Teutonic Ariovistus, neck and crop, out of Gaul or Augustus push the Roman frontier forward from the Rhine to the Elbe, right into the Teutonic domain, would hardly have guessed that the boundaries of the Roman Empire on the European Continent were destined to relapse to the line of the Rhine and remain at the line of the Danube instead of continuing to advance, at the Teutonic barbarians' expense, until they reached a 'natural frontier' at the neck of the European Peninsula, along the lines of the Vistula and the Dniestr. Yet, in despite of the historical precedents, this was what actually happened. The Teutonic resistance to Roman expansion succeeded in compelling Roman statesmanship to accept the Rhine-Danube line—the longest line that it is possible to draw across the face of Europe—as the permanent European frontier of the Roman Empire; and, when once this was decided, the game was in the Teutons' hands and their ultimate victory was only a matter of time.

On a stationary military frontier between a civilization and a barbarism, time always works in the barbarians' favour;¹ and, besides this, the barbarians' advantage increases (to borrow Malthus's famous mathematical metaphor) in geometrical progression at each arithmetical addition to the length of the line which the defenders of the civilization have to hold. The unsubdued Teutonic tribesmen pressed ever harder upon the fine-drawn line of the Roman frontier along the Rhine and the Danube; and they were so far from being threatened by the fate of the Celts that they soon began to assume a threatening aspect themselves in Roman minds as the most for-

penetrating far into the interior. . . . Lately, however, some of the local chiefs have entered into friendly relations with the Government of Caesar Augustus by sending embassies and paying other attentions; and they have gone so far as to dedicate monuments on the Capitol and to place the whole island virtually at the Romans' disposal. There would be no advantage, however, in a military occupation of the island in view of the heaviness of the duties which the Britons are compelled, as it is, to pay to the Imperial Treasury on all imports from Britain into Gaul and exports from Gaul into Britain. (These exports consist of ivory bracelets and necklaces and amber beads and glass-ware and other rubbish.) A military occupation would not pay, because it would require at least one legion, with some cavalry, to extract revenue from the islanders by direct taxation, and the cost of this force would swallow up the net increase in receipts (allowing for the fact that direct taxation could not be imposed without a simultaneous reduction in the customs tariff). Nor could force be employed without a certain amount of risk.' (Strabo: *Geographica*, Bk. IV, ch. v. 3, pp. 200-1.)

¹ This law of the barbarian frontiers of civilizations is examined further in Part VIII, below.

midable contingent in the recalcitrant external proletariat by which the now stationary frontiers of the Empire had come to be encircled. The Teutons, unlike the Celts, were proof against the assaults of Hellenic culture, whether these were delivered by soldiers or by traders or by missionaries. Even when they succumbed, on the eve of their final military triumph, to the spiritual assault of the Syriac religion which had just conquered the Hellenic Society itself, they made their Christianity their own by opting for Arianism instead of adopting the Catholicism which became prevalent on the Roman side of the now fast-crumbling military front. And when the Roman Empire finally collapsed, and the Hellenic Society went into dissolution with it, the Teutons were in at the death. It was these representatives of continental European barbarism, rather than the Sarmatians and the Huns of the Eurasian Steppe or the Arabs and the Berbers of Afrasia, who delivered the *coup de grâce*. A Greek historian of the fifth century of the Christian Era—a Priscus or a Zosimus—would have been in no danger of making that mistake which might so easily have been made by a Diodorus or a Strabo some four centuries earlier. In an age when Visigoths and Vandals were harrying the Peloponnese and holding Rome to ransom and occupying Gaul and Spain and Africa and seizing the command of the Mediterranean, it had long ceased to be possible to argue that the challenge of Hellenic culture and Roman arms was insuperable for the barbarians of Europe, just because this challenge had once defeated the Celts. The Teutonic victory robbed the Celtic defeat, in retrospect, of the apparent historical significance which it had seemed to possess at the time when it had been consummated.

There are other obvious illustrations of the same theme in the realm of the human environment which we may cite more briefly.

For example, the spiritual poverty of the indigenous Roman religion presented a standing challenge to foreign religions when once Rome's military career had brought her into cultural contact with foreign communities. Was some alien religion to respond to this challenge victoriously by filling the awful void in Roman souls which had yawned open during the seismic convulsions of the Hannibalic War? The Roman *numina* knew no magic formula for closing this spiritual breach.¹ Would some foreign divinity close it by leaping in, as the mythical Curtius once upon a time had closed a physical abyss in the Roman forum? The Hellenic Dionysus leapt into the breach straightway and was straightway swallowed up without constraining the gulf to close over his head. Yet the sum-

¹ On this point, see Warde-Fowler, W.: *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London 1911, Macmillan), Lectures xiv and xv.

mary suppression of the Dionysiac propaganda in Roman Italy by the Roman authorities in the second century B.C. was after all no proof that this challenge of the Roman spiritual void was insuperable; for, where the Hellenic Dionysus suffered defeat, the Syriac Christ descended into hell and re-ascended as a victor. Five centuries after the suppression of the Bacchanalia by the Roman Senate in the year 186 B.C.,¹ the Roman Government itself acknowledged the victory of Christianity in the conversion of the Emperor Constantine the Great.

Again, the intrusion of Hellenism upon the Syriac World in the train of Alexander the Great presented a standing challenge to the Syriac Society. Was it, or was it not, to rise up against the intrusive civilization and cast it out? Confronted with this challenge, the Syriac Society made a number of attempts to respond; and all these attempts had one common feature. In every instance, the anti-Hellenic reaction took a religious movement for its vehicle.² Nevertheless, there was a fundamental difference between the first four of these reactions and the last one. The Zoroastrian and Jewish reactions were failures; the Nestorian and Monophysite reactions were failures; the Islamic reaction was a success.

The Zoroastrian and Jewish reactions were attempts to combat the ascendancy of Hellenism by bringing into action two religions which had both been rife already in the Syriac World before the calamity of the Hellenic intrusion befell it. In the strength of Zoroastrianism, the Iranians, who had been the political masters of the Syriac World before Alexander overthrew the Achaemenian Empire, rose up against Hellenism and expelled it, within two centuries of the conqueror's death, from all the region east of the Euphrates. At the line of the Euphrates, however, the Zoroastrian reaction reached its limit. The remnant of Alexander's conquests was salvaged for Hellenism by the intervention of Rome; and in A.D. 628, after the Arsacids and the Sasanids had been beating upon this Roman frontier for nearly 700 years, it actually stood perceptibly farther east than the line along which Pompey had first drawn it in 64 B.C.³ Thus the Zoroastrian reaction never succeeded in dislodging the intrusive alien civilization from the Syriac *terra irredenta*. Nor did the Jewish reaction succeed in its more audacious attempt to liberate the homeland of the Syriac Civilization from the Hellenic incubus by an uprising from within. The Jewish people was too weak in arms and numbers and Syria lay too near to the reservoirs of Hellenic energy for the Jewish reaction to be able to achieve even that measure of

¹ See II. D (vi), pp. 215-16, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2, and II. D (vi), pp. 234-6, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 75-6, above.

success which was achieved by the Zoroastrian reaction; and the momentary triumph of the Maccabees over the Seleucids was effaced by an overwhelming disaster when the Romans intervened. In the great Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70, the Jewish community in Palestine was ground to powder; and the Abomination of Desolation, which the Maccabees had once cast out from the Holy of Holies, came back to stay when Hadrian planted on the site of Jerusalem the Roman colony of Aelia Capitolina. The debris of this devoted Syriac people which took up the Hellenic challenge so gallantly and was shattered so remorselessly by the impact of Rome is drifting about in the World down to this day, as the ash-dust once floated in the atmosphere, and tinged the colours of the sunset on the other side of the planet, for weeks after the great eruption of Krakatoa. This pulverized social ash is familiar to us as the Jewish 'Diaspora'. The scattered survivors of Jewry are left with the cold consolation of remembering that their forefathers volunteered on a forlorn hope and went down to destruction in a splendid failure.

As for the Nestorian and Monophysite reactions, they were two alternative attempts at turning against Hellenism a weapon which the intrusive civilization had forged for itself from a blend of Hellenic and Syriac metal. In the syncretistic religion of Primitive Christianity, the essence of the Syriac religious spirit had been Hellenized to a degree that rendered it congenial to Hellenic souls;¹ and, for the Syriac underworld, this was perhaps the bitterest fruit of the Hellenic ascendancy. The Hellenic dominant minority had discovered the pearl of great price that lay buried in the field of Syriac culture, and now the hated intruder was actually carrying this precious Syriac heirloom away. The Nestorian and Monophysite reactions were attempts to snatch Christianity out of those sacrilegious Hellenic hands and to save it for the Syriac heirs of the Heavenly Kingdom. They were attempts to de-Hellenize Christianity and thereby to restore it to a pristine Syriac purity. Yet the Nestorian and Monophysite reactions failed in their turn; and they both really failed in the same way, in spite of the diversity of their theological tenets and their political fortunes. It made little difference that their theological divergences from the middle path of the Catholic Faith were in diametrically opposite directions to one another. It made little difference that Nestorianism was ignominiously driven out beyond the bounds of the Roman Empire to consort with Zoroastrianism in the limbo east of Euphrates, whereas Monophysitism held its ground in Syria and Egypt and Armenia, and defied the Melchite hierarchy, without being blasted—as Judaism had

¹ Mithraism, which was Christianity's contemporary and its most formidable rival in the competition for the spiritual conquest of the Roman Empire, was of a corresponding alloy. It was a Hellenized version, not of Judaism, but of Zoroastrianism.

been blasted in an earlier encounter—by the Roman thunderbolt. The fundamental reason why Nestorians and Monophysites both alike failed was that both were attempting an impossible feat of spiritual alchemy. The Hellenic alloy which both were seeking to eliminate from Christianity was really indispensable. Christianity was a syncretism or nothing; and although either one of the two blended elements might be reduced to a minimum by the alchemist's art, it could never be reduced to zero. By reducing the Hellenic element in Christianity as far as they could, the Nestorians and Monophysites were merely impoverishing Christianity without being able to rid it completely of the foreign alloy which, on a Syriac valuation, was so much intractable dross. The Nestorians and Monophysites were not so much defeated by the resistance of the Melchites as they were paralysed by an irreconcilable contradiction in their own souls. A religion which contained an irreducible residuum of Hellenism in itself could never inspire a whole-hearted anti-Hellenic crusade.

A Greek contemporary of the Emperor Heraclius, who had witnessed the ultimate victory of the Roman Empire in its last trial of strength with the Sasanidae and the ultimate victory of the Melchite hierarchy in its last trial of strength with the Nestorian and Monophysite heretics, might have been betrayed, about the year 630 of the Christian Era, into giving thanks to God for having made the Earthly Trinity of Rome and Catholicism and Hellenism invincible. First Zoroastrianism and Judaism, and then Nestorianism and Monophysitism, had taken up the Hellenic challenge, and now all these Syriac reactions had failed to achieve their common aim. Surely these four failures were conclusive proof that the challenge presented by the ever dominant Hellenism to the ever prostrate Syriac Society was insuperable?

In the year 630, this conclusion would have forced itself upon the reason of almost any intelligent citizen of the Catholic Graeco-Roman Commonwealth, to whichever side his personal sympathies might happen to incline. And yet, at that very moment, the fifth Syriac reaction against Hellenism was impending; and this fifth reaction was to give the lie to the apparent significance of the other four by succeeding triumphantly where they had all failed alike. The Emperor Heraclius himself, who had spent his life in vindicating the work of Alexander and Pompey, was condemned by a malicious Destiny not to taste of death until he had seen 'Umar the Successor of Muhammad the Prophet coming into his kingdom to undo Alexander's work and Pompey's work and Heraclius's own work—and this utterly and for ever. For Islam accomplished everything which Judaism and Zoroastrianism and Nestorianism and

Monophysitism had severally and successively attempted in vain. It completed the eviction of Hellenism from the Syriac World. It reintegrated, in the shape of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the Syriac universal state which Alexander had ruthlessly cut short, before its term had run out or its mission been fulfilled, when he overthrew the Achaemenidae. Finally, Islam endowed the Syriac Society, at last, with an indigenous universal church and thereby enabled it, after centuries of suspended animation, to give up the ghost in the assurance that it would not now pass away without leaving offspring. When the 'Abbasid Caliphate broke up and the Syriac Society went into a tardy dissolution, the Islamic Church became the chrysalis out of which the new Arabic and Iranic civilizations, 'affiliated' to the Syriac Civilization, were to emerge in due course at the end of a post-Syriac interregnum.¹

We may also reconsider, from our present standpoint, the challenge which was presented to Western Christendom by the impact of the Ottoman Power. During the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, the 'Osmanlis had succeeded in imposing the Pax Ottomanica upon the warring communities of Orthodox Christendom in the Balkan Peninsula. By the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the issue between Orthodox Christendom and the 'Osmanlis was closed, and a new issue was presented. Were the warring communities of Western Christendom to have peace imposed on them now, as it had been imposed on the warring communities of Orthodox Christendom already, by the drastic discipline of an Ottoman conquest? Or would the Western Society succeed in effectually countering this danger by evolving from its own body social some kind of carapace which would be sufficiently broad and thick and tough to be impervious to Ottoman blows?

In the fifteenth century this protective function was assumed by the Kingdom of Hungary and, after a century-long ordeal, it proved to be beyond Hungary's permanent capacity. Hungary's failure was dramatically proclaimed in her crushing defeat at the hands of Sultan Suleymān in the Battle of Mohacz; and we may imagine some Venetian observer who had escaped from the battle-field alive reporting home that the 'Osmanlis were invincible and advising the Government of the Republic to agree with their Ottoman adversary quickly while they were in the way with him, before his cavalry had time to cross the Julian Alps and descend upon the Venetian possessions on the Italian mainland. On the morrow of the Battle of Mohacz, it might indeed have appeared to the shrewdest judge of public affairs that the Ottoman challenge to Western Christendom was unanswerable. Yet this judgement was invalidated, before

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 72-7, above.

the calendar year was out, by the establishment of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy.

This 'ramshackle empire' must indeed have appeared, at the moment of its improvisation, to be a house built on the sands, which was bound to fall as soon as ever 'the rain descended and the floods came and the winds blew and beat upon' it.¹ How could this jerry-built structure be expected to stand when the house of Hungary had fallen? Hungary had been a historic kingdom with a tradition and an *esprit de corps*. The Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy was a pile of rubble thrown together out of the nearest materials that came to hand: an incongruous amalgam of Hungarian debris, salvaged from Ottoman clutches, with a miscellaneous backing of half a dozen contiguous kingdoms and lands: the marches of Styria and Austria, the duchies of Carinthia and Tyrol, the Kingdom of Bohemia. Surely this new Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy could not succeed where the old Kingdom of Hungary had failed? Surely it must fall, with a greater fall than that of Hungary, when the Ottoman conqueror resumed his offensive? Such expectations, which assuredly were prevalent in rational minds in A.D. 1526, were nevertheless destined to be falsified in 1529 and refuted for ever in 1683. In the first siege of Vienna, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy survived the impact of the force to which Hungary had succumbed on the field of Mohacz. In the second siege of Vienna, the Ottoman Power was thrown into a recoil from which it never rallied. Thus the outcome of the Battle of Mohacz was not, after all, a proof that the Ottoman challenge was unanswerable for the Western World. So far from that, the shattering of the first anti-Ottoman carapace of Western Christendom actually stimulated the threatened society to provide itself with a new carapace of sufficient massiveness to withstand the blows under which the original carapace had given way.

The foregoing examples indicate that we have not yet found the right method for dealing with the problem now before us. We are concerned at the moment to lay hands on unequivocal instances—if such are to be found—in which a challenge has proved to be excessive, and we have now ascertained empirically that we cannot reach our goal by the process of demonstrating that some challenge has been too much for a particular respondent on a particular occasion or even for a succession of respondents on a series of occasions. However long the catalogue, the demonstration is bound to be incomplete because we cannot here apply the method of exhaustion. The inference suggested by a thousand successive failures may be invalidated, at the thousand-and-first encounter,

¹ Matthew vii. 25.

by a single anomalous and quite unpredictable success. This method of inquiry, therefore, is a false route, and we must make for our goal along some other line of approach.

Comparisons in Three Terms.

Can we see some alternative method of research that promises better results? Let us try the effect of starting our inquiry from the opposite end. We have made no progress when we have started from instances in which a challenge has defeated a respondent. Let us now start from instances in which a challenge has administered an effective stimulus and has evoked a successful response. In previous chapters of the present Part, we have had occasion to examine many instances of this kind, and in many of these cases we have conducted our examination comparatively. We have compared the example of a successful response to a challenge with some other historical situation in which the same party (or a comparable party) has responded with less success to the same challenge (or to a comparable challenge) when the challenge has been less severe. Let us now reconsider some of these comparisons between two terms and see whether we cannot increase our two terms of comparison to three.

Let us look in each case for some third historical situation in which the challenge has been not less severe but more severe than in the situation from which we have started. If we succeed in finding a third term of this kind, then the situation from which we have started—a situation in which it is already established, by empirical observation, that our challenge does evoke a successful response—becomes a middle term between two extremes. At these two extremes, the severity of the challenge is respectively less and greater than it is at the mean. And what about the success of the response? In the situation in which the severity of the challenge is less than the mean degree, we know that the success of the response is likewise apt to be less than it is in the middle term. We have still to ascertain what kind of response is evoked in our third situation: the situation in which the severity of the challenge is above the mean and not below it. Here, where the severity of the challenge is at its highest, shall we find that the success of the response is at its highest also? Suppose that we find, on examination, that an enhancement of the severity of the challenge above the mean degree is not accompanied by any corresponding increase in the success of the response but that, on the contrary, the response actually falls off, just as it falls off when the severity of the challenge is not enhanced but diminished? If this proves to be the outcome of our inquiry, we shall have discovered that the interaction of Chal-

allenge-and-Response is subject to the well-known 'law of diminishing returns'. We shall conclude that there is a mean range of severity at which the stimulus of a challenge is at its highest; and—assuming that the height of the stimulus is our criterion of value—we shall call this degree of severity the optimum. On this standard, we shall pronounce certain presentations of a given challenge to be 'defective', and certain other presentations of the same challenge to be 'excessive', on the common ground that both alike are apt to evoke less successful responses than those which are evoked by the challenge at the optimum degree at which its effect upon respondents is the most stimulating. Having sketched this new line of inquiry, let us follow it out in order to discover experimentally whether it does lead us to the goal for which we are making.

Norway—Iceland—Greenland

For example, let us reconsider the stimulating effect which was produced upon the Norsemen by their transmarine migration from Scandinavia to Iceland. The effect is indisputable. It was in Iceland and not in Norway or in Sweden or in Denmark that the abortive Scandinavian Civilization achieved its greatest triumphs both in literature and in politics.¹ And what were the conditions of the stimulus that evoked this supremely brilliant response? There are two conditions which are conspicuous: the transmarine migration across arctic seas and the exchange of a bleak and barren country-side in Norway for an Icelandic country-side which was bleaker and barrenner. As far as we can judge, these two conditions together constituted the Icelandic challenge which stimulated the Scandinavian Society to surpass itself. Now, suppose that the same challenge had been repeated with redoubled severity; suppose that the Norsemen had been challenged by their physical environment to traverse twice the width of arctic waters that separates Iceland from Scandinavia, and to settle on the farther shore in a country-side which was as much bleaker and barrenner than Iceland as Iceland itself is bleaker and barrenner than Norway. Would this repetition of the same challenge with twice its Icelandic severity have resulted in a repetition of the Scandinavian response with twice its Icelandic brilliance? Would this Thule beyond Thule have bred a Scandinavian community whose literature had twice the literary merit of the Icelandic Saga and their polity twice the political genius of the Icelandic Commonwealth? This question is not hypothetical; for the conditions which we have postulated were actually fulfilled when the Scandinavian seafarers pushed on from Iceland to Greenland. And the answer to the question is not uncertain; for the

¹ See II. D (iii), pp. 86-100, above.

brilliance which the Scandinavian culture had attained in Iceland was nowhere and never surpassed. Though Greenland supplanted Iceland as the Ultima Thule of the Scandinavian World, it did not supplant it as the focus of Scandinavian culture. The height to which that culture had risen in Iceland remained its zenith.

As it turned out, the conditions of enhanced severity, which had evoked so brilliant a response from the Norsemen who migrated from Norway to Iceland, brought in diminishing returns when they were imposed upon the emigrants to Greenland in double measure. The Greenlanders made hardly any contribution to Norse literature;¹ they did not distinguish themselves in politics; and they betrayed a most un-Scandinavian-like lack of drive in failing to follow up and clinch the great geographical discovery—the discovery of America—which was within their grasp.

By the time when they had reached Greenland, the Scandinavian explorers had attained the threshold of the New World. They had already put behind them the longest and most formidable stage of the journey. The relatively clement south-west coast of Greenland, which they had chosen for the site of their settlements, faces the north-east coast of Labrador across waters that are scarcely wider than the North Sea; and this side of Greenland is not more distant from the Gulf of St. Lawrence than it is from Iceland. Within the forty years immediately following the Norse colonization of Greenland in A.D. 985–6, there were no less than five separate occasions on which Norse voyagers, sailing for Greenland or from Greenland, accidentally or deliberately made the North American coast.² It is remarkable that these Scandinavian voyages to America all occurred during the first four decades of an occupation of the adjacent coast of Greenland which lasted altogether for more than four centuries; and the failure to follow these reconnaissances up appears all the more extraordinary when we bear in mind the usually high standard of adventurousness and hardihood which prevailed among the Scandinavian seafarers in general in the Viking Age. Moreover, in this instance, the Scandinavian settlers in Greenland had a special incentive for indulging in the traditional Viking diversion and exercising the traditional Viking virtue. Over a span of little less than half a millennium, the Greenlanders were being slowly worsted in a tragic losing battle against a physical environment which was too severe for even the Scandinavian spirit to endure permanently the ordeal of keeping alive in it. During all this time, there was knowledge in Greenland of a temperate country to the south—a land of vines—which had been proved to be within sailing distance

¹ They are credited with the so-called 'Greenlandic Atli Lay' in the Poetic Edda.

² See Gathorne-Hardy, G. M.: *The Norse Discoverers of America* (Oxford 1921, Milford); and Kendrick, T. D.: *A History of the Vikings* (London 1930, Methuen), ch. xv.

of Greenland by the voyages of the Greenlanders' own ancestors. Yet the descendants of the Scandinavian heroes who had made their way across the Arctic Ocean to Greenland as a work of super-erogation, almost for the sport of braving the elements, were not spurred on by the imminent danger of extinction in their Greenlandic settlements to save their souls alive by making the easier transit to Vinland. They did not follow in the wake of their inquisitive ancestors in order to find new homes in a temperate clime where they and their descendants could look forward to living in perpetuity a life of reasonable ease.¹

What are we to make of this strange and melancholy story? Its meaning surely is that the challenge of Greenland was excessive, and that the reason why the abortive Scandinavian Civilization actually attained its zenith neither in Greenland nor in Norway but in Iceland was that in Iceland the challenge to which the Scandinavian Civilization was the response happened to be presented in the optimum degree of severity—a degree which was a mean between the lesser and the greater degree of severity in which the same challenge was presented in Norway and in Greenland respectively.

Dixie—Massachusetts—Maine

The Vinland on which the Scandinavian seafarers had failed to secure a foothold at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era was successfully colonized, rather more than six centuries later, by English maritime pioneers of Western Christendom who boldly steered straight across the open Atlantic instead of skirting the great Oceanic void and following the Scandinavian route through arctic waters where Iceland and Greenland offer themselves as stepping-stones. This bold Western seamanship had its reward; for New England—as Vinland was christened by English colonists who made themselves at home there in the seventeenth century—presented a physical challenge which had a potent stimulating effect. We have studied this physical challenge on the site of Town Hill, Connecticut;² and we have traced the steps by which the New Englanders were led on to the mastery of the whole North American Continent through their successful response to the severe conditions of the New England environment.³ We have seen how, in the last round of the struggle between the diverse communities which had been established by European colonists along the Atlantic seaboard of North America, the New Englanders 'knocked out' their Southern kinsmen whose ancestors had likewise braved the perils of the passage from England across the open

¹ For traces of abortive attempts at later dates, see Gathorne-Hardy, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-97. ² See II. D (i), pp. 15-16, above. ³ See II. D (ii), pp. 65-70, above.

Atlantic in the seventeenth century, but had settled in the treacherously genial clime of Virginia and the Carolinas. After two and a half centuries of exposure, in their respective settlements overseas, to the relaxing climate of the South and to the stimulating climate of New England, these two offsprings of a single English stock had been differentiated to a degree of which the measure is given by the outcome of the American Civil War. Evidently the challenge of the physical environment, which has evoked such a triumphant response at the degree of severity in which it is presented in New England, remains stimulating at the somewhat milder degree in which it is presented in New York State and New Jersey and Pennsylvania, but becomes distinctly relaxing at the lower degrees to which it falls on the southern side of the Mason and Dixon Line. In geographical terms, we may say that, along the North American Atlantic seaboard, the Mason and Dixon Line marks the southward limit of the optimum climatic area—in the sense of the area in which the challenge of the physical environment evokes the most effective human response. We have now to ask ourselves whether this area of highest climatic stimulus has another limit on the northern side; and, as soon as we have framed this question, we are aware that the answer is in the affirmative.

The northern limit of the optimum climatic area actually partitions New England; for New England, small as it is compared to the whole range of the North American seaboard from Florida to Labrador, is by no means homogeneous within itself. When we speak of New England and the part which it has played in North American history, we are really thinking of three New England States out of the five: of Massachusetts and Connecticut and Rhode Island rather than New Hampshire or Maine; though the two latter states have just as good a title to the family name of New England as their three more distinguished sisters.¹ Historically, Maine is a mere offshoot of Massachusetts; and she only acquired her separate statehood in the year 1820, at a date when the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with Maine as its annex, had already been in existence for the best part of two centuries. Thus the tie between Maine and Massachusetts is perhaps as close as that between any two other states in the Union.² The combined influences of geographical propinquity and common racial stock and common tradition and long-maintained common government have been at work to hold these two New England States together. And yet the

¹ This cannot be said for the state of Vermont, which falls into the same group as New Hampshire and Maine sociologically, but is historically an offshoot of New York State and therefore not strictly a part of New England by origin.

² It is certainly closer than the tie between Virginia and West Virginia or between North and South Carolina.

diversity of their history up to date and of their character at the present time is extreme.

Massachusetts has always been one of the leading English-speaking communities on the North American Continent. She has succeeded in maintaining this position in spite of the immense political and economic changes which, in the course of the last hundred and fifty years, have accompanied and followed the establishment of the Union and the expansion of the United States across the continent from Atlantic to Pacific. On the other hand, Maine has always been unimportant and obscure, not only before but since her erection into a separate State. Massachusetts to-day is still one of the principal seats of North American industrial and intellectual activity, while Maine survives as a kind of 'museum piece'—a relic of seventeenth-century New England, a land of woods and lakes which is still inhabited by woodmen and watermen and hunters. These children of a hard country now eke out their scanty livelihood by serving as 'guides' for the pleasure-seekers who come from far and wide out of the North American cities to spend their holidays in this Arcadian State, just because Maine is still what she was at a time when many of these great cities had not yet begun to arise out of the virgin wilderness. Maine to-day is at once one of the longest-settled regions within the frontiers of the Union and one of the least urbanized and least sophisticated.

How is this contrast between Maine and Massachusetts to be explained? It would appear that the hardness of the New England environment, which stands at its optimum in Massachusetts, is accentuated in Maine to a degree at which it brings in diminishing returns of human response to its challenge. In other words, the optimum climatic area along the North American Atlantic seaboard has a northern limit at the northern boundary of Massachusetts which corresponds to its southern limit at the more celebrated Mason and Dixon Line. If it is a fact that, beyond the southern boundary of Pennsylvania, the challenge of the physical environment becomes deficient in severity and therefore positively relaxing in its effect upon human energies, it is also a fact that, beyond the northern boundary of Massachusetts, the same challenge becomes excessive in severity and therefore repressive. And, in terms of the human response, the effects of repression and of relaxation are identical. In areas in which either of these two conditions prevails, the human respondent to the challenge is not stimulated to respond with as great effect as in the optimum area in which the highest physical stimulus is administered by a challenge of mean severity between the relaxing and the repressive extreme.

The operation of 'the law of diminishing returns', which begins

to reveal itself in the contrast between Maine and Massachusetts comes out much more clearly if we extend our survey farther northwards to the rest of the English-speaking communities along the Atlantic seaboard of North America. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, which occupy the mainland between Maine and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, are the least prosperous or progressive provinces of the Dominion of Canada with the exception of their north-eastern neighbour, Prince Edward Island. On the northern side of Cabot Strait, the Island of Newfoundland is the least reputable of all the self-governing communities of the British Commonwealth of Nations.¹ On the northern side of the Strait of Belle Isle, the English-speaking fisherfolk along the bleak and barren north-east coast of Labrador are fighting, at this day, the same tragic losing battle against overwhelming physical odds that was once fought out to the death, on the opposite side of Davis Strait, along the south-west coast of Greenland, by those forlorn Scandinavian pioneers whose last survivors perished some five centuries ago.

Brazil—la Plata—Patagonia

If we turn our attention to the Atlantic seaboard of South America, we shall observe the same phenomena there *mutatis mutandis*. In Brazil, for example, the greater part of the national wealth and equipment and population and energy is concentrated in the region lying south of the 20th degree of southern latitude and east of the River Paraná. This region is only a small fraction of the vast territories of the Republic, yet in social importance it far outweighs the much larger fraction that extends along the Atlantic coast from the 20th parallel up to the point where this coast strikes the Equator at the mouth of the Amazon (not to speak of the vast hinterland, which includes almost the whole of the Amazon Basin). Moreover, Southern Brazil itself is inferior in civilization to the adjoining regions that lie still farther south: the Republic of Uruguay and the Argentinian State of Buenos Aires. It is evident that, along the South American Atlantic seaboard, the equatorial sector is not stimulating but positively relaxing, and that the optimum climatic area—in the sense of the area in which the challenge of the physical environment evokes the most effective human response—begins south of the 20th parallel (south) and is nearer to its best in the neighbourhood of the Rio de la Plata than in the neighbourhood of the Tropic of Capricorn.

Where, then, is 'the high light' of this optimum area to be found?

¹ This passage was written before the suspension of the constitution of Newfoundland, and the re-assumption of a certain measure of local financial and administrative responsibility and control on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom, at the end of A.D. 1933.

The city of Buenos Aires has the advantage over the city of Rio de Janeiro by some dozen degrees of latitude. If we follow the coast farther southward through another dozen degrees of latitude beyond Buenos Aires, shall we find ourselves in a region which is as much superior in civilization to Central Argentina as Central Argentina is to Southern Brazil? The answer is in the negative. We shall actually find the vigour and effectiveness of the human response to the physical environment beginning to fall off before we have rounded the bight of Bahia Blanca and reached Parallel Forty. Farther south than that, we shall find ourselves traversing the bleak plateau of Patagonia which is still tenanted by a stalwart but sparse and primitive population of vagrant hunters. If we push on still farther south again and cross the Strait of Magellan, we shall find ourselves among the numbed and starved savages who just manage to keep alive among the frosts and snows of Tierra del Fuego. Thus in the Southern, as in the Northern, Hemisphere the Atlantic seaboard of America contains an optimum climatic area which has limits in both directions. In either hemisphere, this area in which the physical environment evokes the most effective human response passes over on the one side into an area in which the challenge is not of sufficiently stimulating severity and on the other side into another area in which the challenge is so severe that its excessive stimulus brings in diminishing returns.

The Pacific Seaboard of South America

Let us next re-examine the Pacific seaboard of South America, which has engaged our attention before. We have observed¹ that the original home of the Andean Civilization on this seaboard lay, not in Valparaiso or in any of the other green valleys which open out upon the Central Chilean sector of the coast south of the 30th parallel, but among the oases which hold their own against the coastal desert along the North Peruvian coast, from the Tumbes Valley on the north to the Nazca Valley on the south inclusive. We have also observed that, in Valparaiso, the physical environment does not present that challenge which is presented in the valleys of Tumbes and Chimú and Rimac and Nazca: a challenge which once evoked the Andean Civilization as the human response to it. The North Peruvian Coast has given birth to an indigenous civilization because of its relative severity, and the Central Chilean coast has failed to do the like because of its relative geniality. Are we to infer that other sectors of the South American Pacific coast would have evoked still more vigorous and effective human responses than the North Peruvian coast, supposing that the physical challenges which

¹ See II. C ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 322-3, above.

they presented to Man had only been still more severe? The answer is in the negative; for any such fancy is ruled out by the fact that two coasts of this very character are actually to be found in immediate proximity to the North Peruvian coast, on either side of it, and that neither of these still more forbidding stretches of coast has been any more successful than the less forbidding coast of Central Chile in emulating the unique cultural achievement which the North Peruvian coast has to its credit. Certainly the Andean Civilization did not emerge in the Earthly Paradise of Central Chile; but neither did it emerge in the unmitigated desert which dominates the seaboard of Northern Chile and Southern Peru between the 30th parallel and the 15th; nor again did it emerge in the tropical forest which smothers the seaboard of Ecuador.

On these two latter stretches of coast, the challenge of the physical environment was presented with an excess of severity which is well brought out in the following descriptions by an expert hand:

'Along the Ecuadorian coast, conditions prevail which accord with the usual conception of the tropical environment; for in that part of the Andean area there exist tangled forests crowded with unkempt trees draped in trailing mosses: forests wherein Man must combat warm, humid, and enervating air and a too-luxuriant vegetation, not to mention vast stretches of marsh or of spongy, unwholesome soil. . . . The island of Puna, at the mouth of the Guayas River, presents a delightful park-like aspect, embellished by sightly trees that raise graceful heads above the general expanse of grass and low shrubs. But even this comparatively charming part of the coast is replete with swamps, formerly the abode of yellow-fever mosquitoes. . . . Coastland Ecuador . . . varies . . . within itself to a marked degree, some of it being, seemingly, almost incapable of supporting human society, the rest of it being, apparently, not unpropitious to Mankind. Yet in no part of it, so far as we now know, was any well-balanced culture produced and set upon a rational career. True, manifestations of advanced material culture—stone-carving, pottery-making, &c.—have been discovered there by archaeologists; but . . . they are almost certainly the product, in every case, of cultural influences from outside the region. Thus, as a whole, the Ecuadorian coast is one of those habitats wherein Man was unable to progress without help from outside—or at any rate did not—but wherein, once advanced culture was introduced, it could be carried on.'¹

As for the Peruvian coastal desert, it

'is not uniform throughout its length; for in the northern half of the Peruvian coast it is low—some three or four hundred feet, at most, above the valley floors—and it slopes perceptibly towards the sea. . . . In the southern part of the coast, on the other hand, the desert plain lies at an altitude of two or three thousand feet above the sea, and the river itself,

¹ Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilisations of the Andes* (New York 1931, Scribner), pp. 6-7.

at a distance of only twenty miles from its mouth, is, as in the case of the Majes River, at an altitude of a thousand feet or more and is hemmed in inexorably by the adjacent but even higher desert plains. It is little to be wondered at, therefore, that in valleys of this type—let us say, from that of Lomas southwards into Northern Chile—no great cultural advances were ever made save as the result of outside influences.¹

Thus the stimulating desert of the North Peruvian coast is succeeded, farther south, by a repressive desert which reaches its acme of oppressiveness in the Nitrate Coast: a howling wilderness which has only become a bone of contention between three Latin-American Republics in these latter days when its chemical deposits have acquired a commercial value.

'There is in Northern Chile none of the scenic beauty that marks the change from bleak mountains to the warm, green valleys of the coastal desert of Peru. In the latter case, the streams reach the sea, and the valley walls enclose cultivated fields that fill the valley floor. In Peru the picture is generally touched with color—a yellow, haze-covered horizon on the bare desert above, brown lava-flows on the brink of the valley, grey-brown cliffs, and greens ranging from the dull shade of *algarrobo*, olive and fig trees to the brightness of freshly irrigated alfalfa meadows. In Northern Chile there is no hint of water until one reaches the foothills of the Andes far beyond the Coast Range and across the intervening desert. Where water occurs it is so small in volume that its effects are almost completely hidden in the depths of steep-walled ravines, so that in many places one may look for miles along the Andes without seeing a single trace of vegetation or human life.'²

It will be seen that, in point of severity, the Pacific seaboard of South America from the 5th to the 15th parallel (south) presents a challenge which is a mean between two extremes, like the Atlantic seaboard of the same continent from the 20th to the 40th parallel or the Atlantic seaboard of North America from the 39th to the 43rd parallel (north), or again like Iceland. In Iceland, the challenge of the physical environment is a mean between extremes in Norway and in Greenland; in Massachusetts it is a mean between extremes in South Carolina and in Labrador; in Uruguay it is a mean between extremes in Amazonia and in Tierra del Fuego. Similarly, on the North Peruvian seaboard of South America, which has given birth to the Andean Civilization, the challenge of the physical environment is a mean of optimum severity between the excessive geniality of Central Chile and the excessive severity which is displayed, in diverse ways, by both the Nitrate Coast and the seaboard of Ecuador.

This Andean illustration is perhaps more illuminating than the

¹ Op. cit., pp. 12-13.

² Bowman, I.: *Desert Trails of Atacama* = American Geographical Society Special Publication No. 5 (New York 1924, American Geographical Society), pp. 11-12.

others, just because its geographical and climatic expression works out less simply than theirs. In all the other instances above cited, the mean or optimum challenge is presented in an area which happens to be situated geographically in between the two areas in which the challenge is respectively insufficient and excessive. In the two other American instances, again, the mean challenge coincides with a climatic mean of relative temperateness between two climatic extremes which verge respectively towards tropical and towards arctic conditions. In the Andean instance, on the other hand, the excessive challenge is presented alike by two areas which are situated on opposite sides of the optimum area and which have nothing in common with one another in their climates—one being a humid region smothered under a tropical forest and the other an arid region where inorganic chemical deposits coat an otherwise naked desert. The insufficient challenge, again, is here presented in an area which is not sub-tropical but temperate in climate, and which is separated geographically from the area of optimum challenge by one of the two areas in which the challenge is excessive. In this Andean instance, therefore, the 'mean' which we are studying cannot be mistaken for anything but what it really is. Here, clearly, it has nothing to do with a geographical 'mean' in the sense of a central location, or again with a climatic mean in the sense of a climate that is relatively temperate. It reveals itself unmistakably as a 'mean' between a greater and a lesser degree of severity in a challenge presented to Man by his Environment—a 'mean' which is also an 'optimum' because, at this mean degree of severity, the challenge evokes a more vigorous and more effective human response than is evoked by it either when its severity is greater (for whatever reason) and therefore 'excessive' or again when it is less and therefore 'insufficient' from the standpoint of the human respondent.

In the light of this Andean illustration, we can now pursue our survey with clearer insight.

Votyaks—Magyars—Lapps

Another illustration of the working of this law is offered by the migrations of the Finnish-speaking peoples. From their original habitat at the east end of the North European forest, astride the Urals, where some of these peoples have never ceased to live their old life in its old environment, other peoples of the same family have migrated into one or other of the two regions of entirely different physique which adjoin the forest-belt on the north and on the south. The ancestors of the Lapps, migrating northwards, have exposed themselves to the challenge of the Tundras, while the ancestors of the Magyars, migrating southwards, have exposed

themselves to the challenge of the Eurasian Steppe. The social consequence of the change in physical environment has been very different in these two cases.

‘The consanguineity of the Hungarians and Laplanders would display the powerful energy of climate on the children of a common parent; the lively contrast between the bold adventurers who are intoxicated with the wines of the Danube and the wretched fugitives who are immersed beneath the snows of the polar circle. Arms and freedom have ever been the ruling, though too often the unsuccessful, passion of the Hungarians, who are endowed by Nature with a vigorous constitution of soul and body. Extreme cold has diminished the stature and congealed the faculties of the Laplanders; and the Arctic tribes, alone among the sons of men, are ignorant of war and unconscious of human blood: an happy ignorance, if reason and virtue were the guardians of their peace!’¹

The Lapps on their Tundras have sunk considerably below the level of their sylvan ancestors; the Magyars on the Hungarian Alföld have risen far above it. It is evident that the ordeal of exchanging the life of the forests for the life of the Steppes is sufficiently severe to be stimulating, whereas the change from forest to Tundra is so inordinately severe that its effect on those who have endured it has been, not stimulating at all, but positively repressive.

Reactions to Changes of Climate

Let us next consider the effect of migration from countries with a damp, cloudy, foggy, heavy climate—the climate which prevails in England and along the adjoining continental coasts of the North Sea from Flanders to Jutland—to countries with climates that are drier, sunnier, clearer, and lighter. In the course of our Western history, a change of climate in this direction has been made by the medieval emigrants from the original Duchy of Saxony to the new marches wrested from the Slavs beyond the Elbe.² In modern times, a similar change has been made by the Dutch emigrants to the Transvaal and by the English emigrants to New England. In each of these three cases the change of climate has produced on those who have made it a stimulating effect which can be measured at the present day in the difference of *ethos* between the Brandenburger and the Hanoverian or between the Afrikaner and the Hollander or between the Yankee and the Englishman. In regard to this stimulus, however, a distinguished American climatologist strikes a warning note:

‘The people of the Eastern and Central United States are more nervous and active than those of Europe—but not necessarily more efficient. . . . They are alternately stimulated and relaxed by frequent

¹ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. lv.

² See II. D (v), pp. 168–9, above.

changes from day to day, and in this are like horses that are well driven. In the spring and autumn, however, the combined effect of ideal temperature and highly invigorating daily changes spurs them to an astonishing degree of effort. Then comes the hot summer or the cold winter, either of which is debilitating. People do not diminish their activity at once, especially in the winter. They draw on their nervous energy, and thus exhaust themselves. They are like horses which pull on the bit and, when urged a little, break into a run, straining themselves by their extreme speed. Then they are pulled up so suddenly that they are thrown back on their haunches and injured. In Germany somewhat the same conditions prevail, although not to so great an extent. England apparently comes nearer to the ideal than almost any other place. The climate is stimulating at all times, both by reason of abundant storms and because of a moderate seasonal range. It never, however, reaches such extremes as to induce the nervous tension which prevails so largely in the United States.¹

Is this warning justified? When we are comparing the climatic influences of England and Holland and Hanover with those of New England and the Transvaal and Brandenburg, the question cannot be answered off-hand. The points on either side are so evenly matched that, when we try to strike a balance, it seems equally reasonable to pronounce, with Dr. Ellsworth Huntington, that England, after all, 'apparently comes nearer to the climatic ideal than any other place', or to make out that, on the whole, the more violent stimulus of New England is apt to evoke a more effective response. But suppose that we raise the violence of the stimulus to a still higher degree. Suppose that we substitute California on the Pacific coast of North America for New England on the Atlantic coast, and the African highlands of Kenya Colony on the Equator for the African highlands of the Transvaal on the Tropic of Capricorn, and the Polish or the Russian section of the North European plain for the Prussian section. Suppose that we make these substitutions, which all have the effect of heightening the violence of the stimulus, and then repeat our previous question in these alternative terms. On the whole and in the long run, does the climate evoke the more effective response in England or in California? In Holland or in Kenya Colony? In Berlin or in Warsaw or Moscow? When the question is framed in these alternative and sharper terms, the answer is not in doubt; for it is evident in every case that when the violence of the climatic stimulus is increased to that degree it brings in diminishing returns of human response.

As for California, Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's verdict in this case will be accepted without hesitation.

¹ Huntington, Ellsworth: *Civilisation and Climate*, 3rd ed. (New Haven 1924, Yale University Press), pp. 225-6. Compare pp. 403-4.

"The chief defect of the climate of the California coast is that it is too uniformly stimulating. Perhaps the constant activity which it incites may be a factor in causing nervous disorders. . . . The people of California may perhaps be likened to horses which are urged to the limit so that some of them become unduly tired and break down."¹

As for the Kenya highlands, we may take note of the widely different estimates that are current to-day among competent observers in regard to the prospects of the White Race in Kenya Colony and in the Transvaal respectively. To-day, no serious person doubts that the White Race has already proved its ability to make itself at home in the Transvaal and even to increase and multiply there. On the other hand, no serious person to-day is yet convinced that the White settlers in Kenya Colony will prove able to bring up their children in the country, or that a native-bred generation of Whites, even if it is actually reared in the Kenya highlands by a *tour de force*, will display the physical and psychic stamina of its European-bred parents.

As for the climatic stimulus of the North European plain, which rises in violence at each farther remove from the moderating influence of the Atlantic, it may be an open question whether it attains its optimum degree on this side or on that side of the Elbe. At any rate, that is a burning question of modern German politics—a perpetual source of friction between the Rhinelander or the Westphalian and the true-blue *ost-elbisch* Prussian; and, in this German family quarrel, a foreigner will be chary of taking sides. He will not readily commit himself on the question whether the *ost-elbisch* Prussian dominion over the western half of North Germany and the Prussian hegemony over Germany as a whole is or is not an inevitable political outcome of Prussian pre-eminence in vigour and efficiency. He will be content to agree that the optimum climatic area on the North European plain is to be found in the neighbourhood of the Elbe, on whichever side of the Elbe it may be. On the other hand, he will hardly hesitate to pronounce that this optimum climatic area, which begins at least as far west as the Elbe, does not extend as far east as the Vistula; for, whatever may be the respective merits of Hanoverian phlegm and Prussian alertness, 'the law of diminishing returns' quite manifestly comes into play where Prussian alertness froths over into Polish effervescence and Polish effervescence evaporates into Russian exaltation.

The successive rise and fall in the curve of the human response to a steadily rising climatic stimulus reveals itself to the eye of any traveller who passes by train through Hanover and Berlin and Posen and Warsaw *en route* for Moscow. From Berlin eastwards, the

¹ Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

curve unmistakably declines, and at each stage farther eastwards the decline becomes progressively steeper. If the traveller varies his route, and proceeds from Berlin east-north-eastward through Königsberg to Kovno, the same impression of a cultural fall succeeding a cultural rise in the course of his journey will be borne in upon him more forcibly; for, on this route, instead of feeling himself descending a cultural slope all the way, he will have at a certain point the sensation of falling headlong over a cultural precipice. At the frontier between East Prussia and Lithuania, as he is transported over the few yards of permanent way that link the German railway station of Eydtkühnen with the Lithuanian station of Wirballen, he will experience instantaneously as great a cultural transition as he would experience in the course of travelling the whole distance from Frankfurt-on-Oder to Brest-Litovsk. In the experience of the writer of this Study, this is the most precipitous cultural frontier that he has ever crossed—not excepting the passage of the Save between Semlin and Belgrade or the passage of the Ohio between Cincinnati and Kentucky.

Up to this point in our examination of the comparative effects of challenges from the physical environment which differ in the degree of their severity, we have been considering situations in which a challenge is presented in different degrees simultaneously in two or more separate geographical areas. Let us next consider the case in which the challenge rises or falls from one degree to another, through some process of climatic or other environmental change, in one identic area successively.

Let us examine, for example, the tropical sylvan environment—occupying the northern part of Guatemala and the western part of Honduras—in which the Mayan Civilization once emerged. We have noticed that this low-lying tropical forest presents a much severer challenge than the adjacent highlands overlooking the Pacific Coast; and we have concluded that the Mayan Civilization emerged, as it did, in the forest and not on the highlands just because the greater severity of the sylvan challenge evoked a more vigorous and effective human response.¹ But suppose that, some time after the Mayas had responded to the challenge of the forest by transforming the forest into fields, the climate of Central America had undergone some change which accentuated the challenge presented by the local physical environment to Man. Suppose that there had been a considerable increase in humidity. Might not this have rendered the challenge of the tropical forest prohibitively severe, and at the same time have rendered the challenge of the highlands adequately stimulating? As a matter of fact, at the present day, the sites of the

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, p. 321, above.

Mayan cities lie derelict, untenanted by Man and overwhelmed by the resurgent forest,¹ while the highlands are the seat of the local variety—such as it is—of the Latin-American version of our own Civilization.² Is it not possible that this undoubted interchange of social roles between forest and highlands may be due to some climatic change in the sense which we have suggested? One of the foremost living climatologists has advocated this hypothesis persuasively.

'The most surprising thing about the Mayas is that they developed their high civilisation in what are now the hot, damp, malarial lowlands where agriculture is practically impossible. A hundred miles away, on the coasts of Yucatan or in the Guatemalan highlands, far more favourable conditions now prevail. There, agriculture is comparatively easy; the climate, while not bracing, is at least good for the torrid zone; and malarial fevers are rare. To-day, the main cities lie in these more favourable regions; the energetic part of the population is there, and the interior lowlands are hated and shunned by all except a degraded handful. In the past, the more favourable localities were occupied by people close akin to the Mayas, yet civilisation never rose to any great height. Ruins are found there, but they are as far behind those of the lowlands as the cities of Yucatan are to-day behind those of the United States.'³

In explanation of these peculiar conditions, several possibilities suggest themselves. First, we may suppose that the Mayas were the most remarkable people who ever lived. . . . A second possibility is that, in the time of the Mayas, tropical diseases were less harmful than at present. . . . It may be . . . that a fairly satisfactory explanation will be found if the two preceding possibilities are joined with a third, namely, a climatic change such that the dry conditions which prevail a little farther north prevailed in the Maya region when these people attained eminence. Such a shifting of zones would increase the length of the dry season which now comes in February and March. This would diminish the amount of vegetation and cause scrub to take the place of dense forest. Under such conditions, agriculture would become comparatively easy. Fevers would also greatly diminish, for in the drier parts of Yucatan they are to-day relatively mild; and the lowland plain would be the natural site of the chief development of civilisation, just as is the case in other countries.'⁴

The hypothesis expounded in the foregoing passage might be accepted in principle without our necessarily following Dr. Huntington in his estimate of the degree of the climatic change involved. If the climate of Mayaland at the time of the genesis of the Mayan Civilization really differed from the climate of the same area at the present day to the same extent and in the same sense as the present climate of Yucatan, then the fathers of the Mayan Civilization were

¹ See II. D (i), pp. 3-4, above.

² See II. D (ii), p. 35, above.

³ On this point, see the present Study, Part II. D (ii), p. 34, above, with the references there made to Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's works.—A.J.T.

⁴ Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-2.

not confronted with the sylvan challenge at all, and we should have to regard their achievement as a response to some other challenge which is now beyond our knowledge. It is not necessary, however, to press Dr. Huntington's hypothesis thus far. It seems more reasonable to suppose that the Mayan Civilization was actually evoked by the challenge of the tropical forest, as we have already seen reason to believe, and that this particular interplay of Challenge-and-Response does explain why the civilization emerged where it did instead of emerging either on the Yucatan Peninsula or in the highlands. At the same time, we may follow Dr. Huntington so far as to conjecture that, at the time when the challenge of the forest evoked the Mayan response, the challenge was presented in a degree of severity which was stimulating, and that the subsequent abandonment of the Mayan cities to the resurgent forest may have been due, at least in part, to some climatic change which accentuated the sylvan challenge to a degree of severity that was prohibitive.¹

Dr. Huntington's hypothesis may also have a bearing on the genesis of other 'unrelated' civilizations besides the Mayan. We have found reason for thinking that the Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations, for example, were generated in response to a climatic change which is supposed to have overtaken Afrasia after the passing of the 'Pluvial Age' (the Afrasian variant of the European 'Ice Age'). We have suggested that the fathers of these two civilizations performed their feat of mastering the valleys of the Lower Nile and the Lower Tigris and Euphrates in response to the challenge presented by the desiccation of the Afrasian Steppe. They took their plunge into the forbidding jungle-swamps because their former habitat in the neighbourhood was beginning to turn from a genial savannah into an inhospitable desert. The ordeal of transition to the difficult environment of the un-reclaimed river-valleys from the easy environment which the savannah had provided before desiccation set in was the dynamic event by which, in our view, the fluvial civilizations were brought to birth.² We may now observe that the wilderness of the river-valleys, formidable though it was at the time when the fathers of the fluvial civilizations came to grips with it, was nevertheless not quite so formidable then as it must have been in the preceding period.

If we are right in conjecturing that the desiccation of Afrasia in the 'post-pluvial' age was the challenge which impelled the fathers of

¹ For the extent to which it is possible to accept Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's explanation of the rise and fall of the Mayan Civilization in Northern Guatemala—and likewise his complementary explanation of the vicissitudes of the Syriac Civilization at Palmyra—see II. D (vii), Annex I, below. For alternative explanations of the abandonment of the Mayan cities of 'the Old Empire', see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, footnote 2 on p. 126, above.

² See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 304-6, above.

the fluvial civilizations to descend into the river-valleys out of their former habitat on the surrounding savannah, then, *ex hypothesi*, the new environment which they were entering must have been tending to become easier at the same moment, and for the same reason, that the old environment which they were abandoning was becoming more difficult. For the process of desiccation which Afrasia was undergoing in this 'post-pluvial' age was part and parcel of a widespread climatic change which was simultaneously melting the ice-cap in Europe, and therefore, *a fortiori*, it must have been at work ubiquitously throughout Afrasia itself—on the savannah and in the river-valleys alike. At the same time, this uniform physical change would evidently produce diverse and even contrary social consequences in these two different Afrasian environments. A process of desiccation which was actually making the Afrasian savannah less easily habitable than it had been during the preceding 'pluvial' age by reducing the local quantum of humidity from the optimum quantity to an insufficiency, must have been making it less difficult for Man to cope with the Nilotic and Euphratean jungle-swamps, which had previously been kept uninhabited by an excess of humidity. We know, from the sequel, that the ordeal to which the fathers of the Egyptian and the Sumeric Civilization exposed themselves, when they eventually plunged into the jungle-swamps under these changing conditions, administered a stimulus which evoked, in both instances, a brilliantly successful response. Must we not suppose that if, for some reason, they had been moved to attempt the conquest of these same jungle-swamps at an earlier time, before the pluvial conditions had begun to abate, the ordeal would have proved so inordinately severe that its effect, instead of being stimulating, would have been repressive? In that event, the Nilotic and Euphratean pioneers, instead of being rewarded for their hardihood by becoming the fathers of two great civilizations, might have been punished for their audacity by becoming the slaves of their new environment and not its masters: the fate which has actually overtaken the miserable 'Web-Foot' in a subsequently deposited section of the Tigris-Euphrates delta.¹

If the foregoing argument is sound, we have reached the conclusion that the physical challenge by which the Egyptian and Sumeric civilizations were evoked was a mean between two extremes. On the one hand, the conditions of life on the Afrasian savannah in the pluvial age were not sufficiently severe to bring any civilizations to birth; on the other hand, the severity of the conditions in the lower valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates in the pluvial age was excessive. The necessary conditions of 'mean' or

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 316-18, above.

'optimum' severity were realized in the Afrasian region for the first time when the post-pluvial climatic change from exuberant humidity towards desiccation came to mitigate the previously excessive challenge of the river valleys to a degree at which it ceased to be impossible for Man to respond with success. It was in these circumstances that the Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations were born.

The same conclusion applies to the physical challenge by which our own Western Civilization and the Russian offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Civilization have been evoked in a different environment at a later date. The physical environment in which these two civilizations have eventually come to birth is Northern Europe; and during the pluvial-glacial age, when the Nilotic and Euphratean jungle-swamps were prohibitively water-logged, the birth of any civilizations in Northern Europe was prohibited, just as decisively, by the incubus of the ice-cap. The ice-cap then still covered with its dead weight the whole region which in this present post-glacial age has been conquered successively from the ice by the forest and from the forest by Mankind. Let us now ask ourselves what would have happened if the fathers of our Western Civilization and the fathers of the Russian Orthodox Christian Civilization had been moved for some reason to attempt the conquest of Northern Europe before the ice-cap had receded. The answer undoubtedly is that in that event, instead of becoming the fathers of two great civilizations, they would have suffered the same kind of fate as we have imagined the fathers of the Egyptian and the Sumerian Civilization suffering in punishment for a premature attempt to conquer the Nilotic and Euphratean jungle-swamps. If importunate pluvial pioneers would have been punished by being depressed to the social level of the modern 'Web-Foot' in the Basra-'Amārah-Nāsiriyyah triangle, importunate glacial pioneers would probably have been punished in a corresponding way by being depressed to the social level of the modern Lapps on the frozen tundras.¹

If this analogy holds, then the physical challenge which has helped to evoke the Western Civilization in Northern Europe and the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia is likewise to be viewed as a fruitful mean between two extremes which have both been sterile. In Northern Europe and Russia, as in the lower valleys of the Euphrates and the Nile, the severity of the conditions was excessive in the glacial-pluvial age, in common contrast to its insufficiency in the same age on the Afrasian savannah. In Northern Europe and Russia, the necessary conditions of 'mean' or 'optimum'

¹ See the quotation from Gibbon on p. 301, above.

severity were realized for the first time when the post-glacial climatic change melted the ice-cap and conjured up the North European forest in its place. It is under these new conditions of 'mean' severity that a region which was formerly inimical to Life has given hospitality to two great civilizations in the fullness of Time.

Scotland—Ulster—Appalachia

Let us next consider an instance in which the challenge has been not exclusively physical but partly physical and partly human.

At the present day, there is a notorious contrast between Ulster and the rest of Ireland. While Southern Ireland is a rather old-fashioned agricultural country, Ulster is one of the busiest workshops in the modern Western World. The city of Belfast ranks in the same company as Glasgow or Newcastle or Hamburg or Detroit; and the modern Ulsterman has as great a reputation for being efficient as he has for being unaccommodating.

In response to what challenge has the Ulsterman made himself what he now is? He has responded to the dual challenge of migrating to Ulster across the sea from Scotland and contending, after his arrival in Ulster, with the native Irish inhabitants whom he found in possession and proceeded to dispossess. This twofold ordeal has had a stimulating effect which may be measured by comparing the power and wealth of Ulster at the present day with the relatively modest circumstances of those districts on the Scottish side of the border between Scotland and England and along the Lowland fringe of 'the Highland Line' from which the original Scottish settlers in Ulster were recruited some three centuries ago by King James I/VI. The comparison reveals that, in the course of the intervening centuries, the dual challenge presented by Ulster has administered a noteworthy stimulus to those descendants of the original Scottish settlers who have remained on the Irish soil on which King James once planted their ancestors.

The modern Ulstermen, however, are not the only living representatives of this stock; for the migratory habit, once acquired, is apt to persist; and the Scottish pioneers who migrated to Ulster in the seventeenth century begot 'Scotch-Irish' children and grandchildren who re-emigrated in the eighteenth century from Ulster to North America. At the present day, the twice-transplanted offspring of these 'Scotch-Irish' emigrants to the New World survive, far away from their kinsmen in Ireland and their kinsmen in Scotland, in the fastnesses of the Appalachian Mountains: a highland zone which runs through half a dozen states of the North American Union from Pennsylvania to Georgia.

What has been the effect of this second transplantation upon the

Scotch-Irish stock? In the seventeenth century King James's colonists crossed the sea from Scotland to Ulster and took to fighting 'the Wild Irish' instead of 'the Wild Highlanders'. In the eighteenth century, their grandchildren crossed the sea again to become 'Indian fighters' in the North American backwoods. Obviously this American challenge has been more formidable than the Irish challenge, and this in both its aspects. In the human sphere, the 'Red Indian' heathen was of course a more savage adversary than the 'Wild Irish' Catholic (however wilfully the difference may have been ignored by the Scotch-Irish frontiersman in his Protestant fanaticism).¹ In the physical sphere, the Appalachian Mountains are wilder in scenery and vaster in scale than any landscape in Scotland or in Ulster, with the consequence that the Scotch-Irish immigrants who have forced their way into these natural fastnesses have come to be isolated and segregated here from the rest of the World to a much greater extent than their ancestors ever were, or than their cousins ever have been, in their Irish and Scottish habitats. In terms of the total environment, the severity of the challenge has been enhanced in the transition from Ulster to Appalachia to such a degree that 'the law of diminishing returns' has come into operation with unmistakable force.

If the modern citizen of industrial Belfast has in some respects outstripped his Scottish cousin who has never migrated from the rural neighbourhoods of 'the Highland Line' and the English Border, he has certainly not been outstripped in his turn by his American cousin who has migrated for the second time from Ulster to the Appalachian fastnesses. On the contrary, the stimulus which was once administered by the migration from Scotland to Ireland, so far from being reinforced by the subsequent migration from Ireland to America, has been more than counteracted—as we shall find if we now compare the Ulsterman and the Appalachian as they each are to-day, some two centuries since the date when they parted company.

Let us compare them, for example, on the point of their respective proneness to bloodshed: a point on which Ulster has by no means a good record. The old war to the knife between intrusive Protestants and indigenous Catholics is still carried on by gunmen from the windows of Belfast; and at this day the toll of political murders is heavier in the capital of Ulster than in any other great city of Western Europe.² Yet even in Ulster, where this political bloodshed still persists, there is no longer any survival of the family

¹ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, Annex, vol. i, pp. 465-7, above.

² These lines were written before the National-Socialist Revolution in Germany at the beginning of the year 1933.

blood-feud which has remained one of the regular social institutions of 'the Mountain People' of Appalachia. The Ulsterman, again, is unlikely to forget the sea, considering that one of his principal industries is shipbuilding, whereas the Appalachian, whose ancestors actually crossed the Atlantic five or six generations ago, has lost touch with the sea so completely that he no longer attaches any clear meaning to the word itself—which is preserved in his vocabulary solely through its occurrence in his folk-songs. In the third place, the Ulsterman has retained the traditional Protestant standard of education, whereas the Appalachian has relapsed into illiteracy and into all the superstitions for which illiteracy opens the door. His agricultural calendar is governed by the phases of the Moon; his personal life is darkened by the fear, and by the practice, of witchcraft. He lives in poverty and squalor and ill-health. In particular, he is a victim of Hook-Worm: a scourge which lowers the general level of vitality in Appalachia just as it does in India and for just the same reason. (The children persist in going about bare-foot, and their parents either cannot afford to give them shoes, or will not take the trouble to insist upon their wearing them, or are too ignorant to be aware that Hook-Worm gains entry into human bodies through sores in naked soles.)

In fact, the Appalachian 'Mountain People' at this day are no better than barbarians. They are the American counterparts of the latter-day White barbarians of the Old World: the Rifis and Kabyles and Tuareg, the Albanians and Caucasians, the Kurds and the Pathans and the Hairy Ainu.¹ These White barbarians of America, however, differ in one respect from those of Europe and Asia. The latter are simply the rare and belated survivals of an ancient barbarism which has now passed away all around them; and it is evident that their days, too, are numbered. Through one or other of several alternative processes—extermination or subjection or assimilation²—these last lingering survivals will assuredly disappear within the next few generations, as other survivals of White barbarism have disappeared in other parts of the Old World at earlier dates: in the Scottish Highlands in the eighteenth century³ and in Lithuania in the fourteenth.⁴ It is possible, of course, that barbarism will disappear in Appalachia likewise. Indeed, the process of assimilation is already at work among a considerable number of Appalachians who have descended from their mountains and changed their way of life in order to earn wages in the North Carolinian cotton-mills. In this case, however, there is no

¹ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, p. 236, above.

² For these processes, see further V. C (i) (c) 2 and 3, *passim*, in vol. v, as well as Part VIII, below.

³ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, p. 237, above. ⁴ See II. D (v), pp. 172-4, above.

corresponding assurance; for the White barbarism of the New World differs from that of the Old World in being not a survival but a reversion.

The 'Mountain People' of Appalachia are *ci-devant* heirs of the Western Civilization who have relapsed into barbarism under the depressing effect of a challenge which has been inordinately severe; and their neo-barbarism is derived from two sources. In part, they have taken the impress of the local Red Indians whom they have exterminated.¹ Indeed, this impress of Red Indian savagery upon the White victors in this grim frontier-warfare is the only social trace that has been left behind by these vanquished and vanished Redskins. For the rest, the neo-barbarism of Appalachia may be traced back to a ruthless tradition of frontier-warfare along the border between Western Christendom and 'the Celtic Fringe' which had never died out among their ancestors in the British Isles and which has been revived, among these Scotch-Irish settlers in North America, by the barbarizing severity of their Appalachian environment.² On the whole, the nearest social analogues of the Appalachian 'Mountain People' of the present day are certain 'fossils' of extinct civilizations which have survived in fastnesses and have likewise relapsed into barbarism there: such 'fossils' as the Jewish 'wild highlanders' of Abyssinia and the Caucasus or the Nestorian 'wild highlanders' of Hakkari.³

It will be seen that industrial Ulster is a social 'optimum' between rural Scotland on the one hand and barbarian Appalachia on the other; and that this 'optimum' is the product of a response to a challenge which, in point of severity, presents itself as a 'mean' between two extremes. The challenge to which King James's colonists were exposed in Ulster was distinctly more severe than the challenge that had been faced by their ancestors along the English Border or 'the Highland Line'. On the other hand, it was very much less severe than the challenge which afterwards presented itself to their Scotch-Irish descendants when these migrated from Ulster to North America in order to become 'Indian-fighters' in the Appalachian hills. The contrast between rural Scotland and industrial Ulster bears out, as far as it goes, the law of 'the greater the

¹ 'The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war-cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man.' (Turner, F. J.: *The Frontier in American History* (New York 1921, Holt), p. 4.)

² See II. C (ii) (a) 1, Annex, vol. i, on pp. 465-7, above.

³ See II. D (vi), pp. 256-9, above, and the Annex dealing with Jews in fastnesses, on pp. 402-12, below.

challenge the greater the response'; but in the sharper contrast between industrial Ulster and barbarian Appalachia we see this particular law overridden by the general 'law of diminishing returns': a law which, in any situation, infallibly comes into operation at some point or other when things are pushed to extremes.

In this sequence 'Scotland—Ulster—Appalachia', the challenge is on the borderline between the physical sphere and the human; but the operation of 'the law of diminishing returns' appears quite as clearly in other instances in which the challenge is presented in the human sphere exclusively.

Reactions to the Ravages of War

Let us reconsider, for example, the effects of the challenge of devastation. We have observed above¹ how the Athenians responded to the devastation of Attica at Persian hands in 480–479 B.C. and the French to the devastation of France at German hands in A.D. 1914–18. We have seen that, in both these instances, a great calamity has acted as a potent stimulus; and we have also seen that, in one instance at least, this stimulus has been worth the price, when we have compared the achievements of the Athenians in the post-war period with those of the Thebans. Thebes escaped devastation—and thereby missed the stimulus of devastation—in the Persian War; and in the sequel Thebes was outstripped by her neighbour who had come out of great tribulation. Thus the contrast between the fortunes of Athens and Thebes in this historic case bears out the law of 'the greater the challenge the greater the response'; but again it only bears it out so far as it goes. Let us now add a third term to this series and compare the sequels to the devastation of Attica in 480–479 B.C. and of France in A.D. 1914–18 with the sequel to the devastation of Italy by Hannibal in 218–201 B.C. Hannibal succeeded in inflicting deeper wounds on Italy than the Persians inflicted on Attica or the Germans on France. Did this greater calamity act as a stimulus likewise? And, if it did, was the potency of the stimulus proportionately higher? The answer to both parts of this question is decidedly in the negative. The devastation of Italy, unlike that of France or Attica, did not turn out to have been a blessing in disguise. On the contrary, the devastated area in the South became the seat of a social cancer which ate into the vitals of the Roman Commonwealth until the whole fabric of Roman economic and political life was destroyed. In post-war Roman Italy, there was no genuine parallel to the renovation of agriculture in post-war Attica and of industry in post-war France. In Italy the devastation administered an economic stimulus which proved transitory and

¹ See II. D (iv), pp. 107–11, above.

evoked a social response which proved all too difficult to revoke after its ill effects had become apparent.

What happened is well known. The devastated arable lands of Southern Italy were transformed partly into pasture-lands and partly into vineyards and olive orchards, according to the local degree of the devastation and the local nature of the terrain; and the new rural economy, planting and stock-breeding alike, was worked by slave-labour, in place of the free peasantry which had once tilled this soil before Hannibal's soldiery burnt the peasant's cottage and before the weeds and briars invaded his deserted fields. This revolutionary change from 'subsistence-farming' to 'cash-crop-farming' and from husbandry to the application of a servile 'man-power' undoubtedly increased for a time the monetary value of the produce of the land; but the social value of this temporary increase in the aggregate amount of the national income was offset by a concurrent increase in the inequality of its distribution and was more than counteracted by the attendant social evils: the depopulation of the country-side and the congregation of a pauper proletariat of *ci-devant* peasants in the towns. The attempt to arrest these evils through legislation, which was made by the Gracchi in the third generation after Hannibal's evacuation of Italy, only aggravated the distemper of the Roman Commonwealth by precipitating a political revolution without bringing the economic revolution to a halt; political strife became inflamed into civil war; and, a century after the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus, the Romans acquiesced in the establishment of a permanent dictatorship by Augustus as a drastic remedy for a desperate state of affairs. Thus the devastation of Italy by Hannibal, so far from stimulating the Roman people as Xerxes' devastation of Attica had once stimulated the Athenians, actually gave them a shock from which they never recovered: a shock which revealed its demoralizing and debilitating effects in the political collapse of the Roman Republic and in the economic decay of Roman Italy and ultimately in the decline and fall of the Roman Empire.

In this sequence, again, we see the law of 'the greater the challenge the greater the response' first of all borne out and then overridden. It is borne out in the contrast between the fortunes of Athens and the fortunes of Thebes in and after the War of 480-479 B.C. It is overridden by 'the law of diminishing returns' in the contrast between the fortunes of Athens in and after that war, when Xerxes had chastised her with whips, and the fortunes of Rome in and after the War of 218-201 B.C., when Hannibal had chastised Rome with scorpions. The chastisement of devastation, which is stimulating when it is administered with Persian vigour, becomes deadly when it is inflicted with Punic intensity.

Chinese Reactions to the Challenge of Emigration

Let us reconsider, again, the effects of the challenge of emigration upon the modern Chinese. We have seen above¹ that when the Chinese coolie emigrates to Malaya or Indonesia, he is apt to reap a reward for his enterprise. By facing the social ordeal of leaving his familiar home and entering an alien social environment, he exchanges an economic environment which is congested and poverty-stricken for one in which he has a chance of bettering himself, and not infrequently he profits by this chance to the extent of making his fortune. Suppose, however, that we intensify the social ordeal which is the price of economic opportunity. Suppose that, instead of sending our Chinese emigrant to Malaya or Indonesia we send him to Australia or California. In these 'White Man's countries' our enterprising coolie, if he gains admission at all, will undergo an ordeal of vastly greater severity. Instead of merely finding himself a stranger in a strange land, he will have to endure deliberate and sometimes malignant penalization, in which the Law itself will discriminate against him instead of coming to his aid as it aids him in British Malaya, where an official 'Protector of Chinese' is appointed by a benevolent Colonial Administration. Does this severer social ordeal evoke an economic response of proportionately greater vigour? This question is answered in the negative when we compare the levels of prosperity which are in fact attained by the Chinese 'Diaspora' in California and Australia with the levels attained in the Philippines and Malaya. The comparison shows conclusively that the social ordeal to which the Chinese are everywhere subject abroad brings in diminishing returns when it is intensified from the Malayan to the Australian or from the Philippine to the Californian degree.

Slavs—Achaean—Teutons—Celts

Let us next reconsider the challenge which a civilization presents to a barbarism: a challenge that has been presented in Europe to successive layers of barbarians, in successive ages, by the radiation of various civilizations into the interior of this once dark continent.

When we study this drama in its European setting, our attention is caught by one instance in which the challenge has evoked a response of extraordinary brilliance. The Hellenic Civilization is perhaps the finest flower of the species that has ever yet come to bloom; and this Hellenic Civilization was generated, in response to a challenge from the Minoan Civilization, by the European Barbarism. When the maritime Minoan Civilization which had arisen in the Aegean Archipelago established a footing on the European

¹ In II. D (vi), on pp. 217-18.

continent, along the seaboard of the Greek Peninsula, the Achæan barbarians of the European hinterland were neither exterminated nor subjected nor assimilated. Instead, they managed to retain their identity as an 'external proletariat' of the Minoan 'thalassocracy' without failing to learn the arts of the civilization which they were holding at bay. In due course, these *ci-devant* continental barbarians took to the sea. Eventually they overcame the Cretan 'thalassocrats' on their own element.¹ And the Achæans were the true fathers of the Hellenic Civilization which emerged, in its turn, in the Aegean area after the Minoan Civilization had been swamped by the Achæan *Völkerwanderung*.

The Achæan claim to the paternity of Hellenism is vindicated, as we have seen, by a religious test; for the Gods of the Olympian Pantheon, who were the paramount and universal objects of Hellenic worship, display manifestly in their lineaments their derivation from these Achæan barbarians who had constituted the 'external proletariat' of the Minoan World,² while any vestiges of a universal church derived from the Minoan 'internal proletariat' are only to be found, if at all, in the side-chapels and the crypts of the temple of Hellenic religion: in certain local cults and subterranean mysteries and esoteric creeds.³ This reaction of the Hellenic Society to the religious test is strikingly different from the reaction of our own Western Society, in which a universal church derived from the 'internal proletariat' of an antecedent civilization has served as the chrysalis of the new civilization and has never ceased to be its most important institution. On the other hand, in the religious history of Western Christendom, the religion of the antecedent civilization's European 'external proletariat'—the primitive Teutonic heathenism and the Arianism by which this heathenism was superseded on the eve of the Teutonic *Völkerwanderung*—has left even less trace than has been left by the religion of the Minoan 'internal proletariat' in the religious history of Hellenism. These diverse results of the religious test plainly give us warrant for ascribing the paternity of the Hellenic Civilization to the Achæans, and for seeing in this great feat of creation the response of these European barbarians to a challenge which the radiation of the Minoan Civilization had presented to them.

The measure of the stimulus in this instance is given by the brilliance of Hellenism, which still outshines every other civilization that has ever come into existence up to the present. And we can also measure the stimulus which was received from the Minoan Civilization by the Achæans in another way. We can make a direct

¹ See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 92-3, and II. D (v), p. 160, above.

² See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 95-7, above.

³ See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 97-100, above.

comparison between the fortunes of this Achaean layer of European barbarians and the fortunes of another layer which happened to be so remote and so effectively sheltered that it remained virtually immune from the radiation of any civilization whatsoever for some two thousand years after the Achaeans had received the Minoan challenge and had made their brilliant response. These inviolate barbarians were the Slavs, who had ensconced themselves in the Pripet Marshes when these dregs of the Continent had been yielded up to Man by the retreating ice-cap. In this fenny fastness, which offered little temptation to trespassers, the Slavs went on living the primitive life of the European Barbarism for century after century, while the history of the Hellenic Civilization, which had been begotten by their Achaean kinsmen, played itself out from start to finish. When the wheel of Hellenic destiny came round full circle, and the Teutonic *Völkerwanderung* ended the long drama which the Achaean *Völkerwanderung* had begun, the sluggish Slavs were still where they had been and what they had been some two thousand years earlier.

It was only when the Teutonic *Völkerwanderung* itself was approaching the end of its course that the Slavs were at last routed out of their ancient fastness by the Avar Nomads, who had been tempted to stray beyond the limits of their native Eurasian Steppe in order to take a hand in the Teutons' game of pillaging the wreckage of the Roman Empire. In the strange environment of an agricultural world, these lost children of the Steppe sought to adapt their old manner of life to their new circumstances. On the Steppe, the Avars had made their living as herdsmen of cattle; in the cultivated lands on to which they had now trespassed, these herdsmen found that the appropriate local live-stock was a human peasantry, and they therefore set themselves, rationally enough, to become herdsmen of human beings.¹ Just as they would have raided their Nomadic neighbours' cattle in order to stock some newly conquered pasture-land, so they now looked round for human cattle to re-stock the depopulated and derelict provinces of the Roman Empire which had fallen into their hands. Ranging the interior of the European Continent on this quest, the Avars found

¹ In sedentary societies, it is often cast up as a reproach against Nomads who have strayed off the Steppe *in partes agrorum* that they tend to treat their sedentary subjects as 'human cattle'. Yet a sedentary and not a Nomadic society created the religion which conceives of its Lord as 'the Good Shepherd', and which represents him as enlisting fishermen in his service with the invitation 'Follow me, and I will make you fishers of men' (Matt. iv. 19). The metaphor of the shepherd (*ra'i*) and his flock (*ra'iyyah*) was no doubt derived by the Christian Church, at second or third remove, from the Nomads of the Afrikan Steppe, and it ill becomes us to foul our own nest by blaspheming against the source of one of the most pregnant similes in the imagery of the Christian Religion. For a critique of Nomadism, on and off the Steppes, as one of the 'arrested' civilizations, see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 7-22, below.

what they wanted in the Slavs. They forced their way into the Slavonic fastness; they herded off its helpless denizens in droves; and they stationed these captive droves of Slavonic human cattle in a vast circle round about the outlying enclave of the Eurasian Steppe in the Hungarian Alföld where the Avars had pitched their own camp. This, it appears, was the process by which the Slavs made their belated and humiliating début in History;¹ and the last of the Hellenic historians has been moved by a faint stirring of the old Herodotean curiosity to record the impression which was made on the senile Hellenic mind, towards the latter end of the sixth century of the Christian Era, by the first appearance of these Slavonic innocents abroad, when they came wandering all unarmed, out of the back of beyond, across the stricken field of the secular conflict between Teutons and Romans. Here is the passage in the annals of A.D. 591:²

'Three men of Slav race without weapons or military equipment were captured by the Imperial Body-Guard. Their only baggage consisted of harps, and they carried nothing else with them. The Emperor cross-examined them regarding their nationality, their habitat, and their reasons for trespassing upon Roman territory. They explained that they were Slavs by nationality and that their homes were on the boundary of the Western Ocean. The Khaqan [of the Avars] had sent emissaries to their countrymen with a view to raising military forces and had lavished generous presents upon their chieftains. The latter had accepted the gifts but rejected the proposed alliance, on the plea of being disheartened by the length of the journey, but they had followed this up by dispatching the individuals just captured to the Khaqan on a mission of apology. It had taken them fifteen months to accomplish this journey. Forgetful of the privileges of ambassadors, the Khaqan had determined to prevent their departure; whereupon the three emissaries, who had heard of the really extraordinary reputation of the Roman People for wealth and hospitality, had procured an opportunity to withdraw to Thrace. They carried harps because they were not trained to bear arms. Their country was ignorant of iron, and this accounted for their peaceful and harmonious life. They strummed on stringed instruments because they did not know how to speak with the voice of trumpets. They were people among whom war was unheard-of; and it was only natural that there should be a bucolic note in their musical technique.

'This story inspired the Emperor with such respect for the tribe that he determined to offer hospitality to these visitors from the back of beyond, whose gigantic build and huge limbs extorted his admiration. He sent them under escort to Heraclea.'

These amiable but unpractical representatives of the European

¹ See Peisker, J.: *Die älteren Beziehungen der Slawen zu Turko-Tataren und Germanen* (Berlin 1905, Kohlhammer); and *The Expansion of the Slavs* = *Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. II (Cambridge 1913, University Press), ch. xiv.

² Theophylactus Simocatta: *A Universal History*, Bk. VI, section II, §§ 10-16.

Barbarism in its most secluded fastness were obviously the worse for the age-long immunity from human stimulus which they and their ancestors had enjoyed. It was assuredly better for them when, a few years later, the Khaqan of the Avars—losing patience with their lack of spirit—turned from blandishments to violence and dragged the Slavs out of their seclusion by main force. The shock administered by this Avar *coup de main* was the making of the Slavs and the beginning of Slavonic history. It would have been better still for these victims of Avar ruthlessness if they had been aroused by some less brutal human stimulus at an earlier date, as once, some two thousand years before, the radiation of the Minoan Civilization had awakened a response in the Achaeans. The Achaeans did not lack skill with the harp. Indeed, there is no Slavonic minstrel, historic or legendary, who has won the fame of a Phemius or a Demodocus or a Homer. But Achaean hands had not neglected other arts. In their intercourse with the Minoans, the Achaeans had made themselves masters not only of the harp but of the sword and of the oar, and thereby masters of their environment and their fate. This contrast between the Achaeans and the Slavs shows two things. It shows that, for a primitive society, complete immunity from the challenge of encounters with civilizations is a very serious handicap. It also shows that this challenge has a stimulating effect when its severity is of a certain degree. There is a third point, however, which we still have to determine. Suppose that we accentuate the challenge; suppose that we raise the degree of the energy with which the Minoan Civilization irradiated the Achaean Barbarism to higher and higher potencies: shall we thereby elicit a more and more brilliant response on the barbarians' part? Or shall we reach a degree at which 'the law of diminishing returns' comes into play and the potency of the action ceases to be stimulating and becomes destructive? Let us make the experiment by applying our empirical method of inquiry. Between the Achaeans and the Slavs, there have lain several other layers of European barbarians who have been exposed to the radiation of various civilizations in diverse degrees. What experiences have these other barbarians had?

One instance in which European barbarians have succumbed to a radiation of destructive intensity has come to our notice already. We have seen how the Celts were eventually exterminated or subjected or assimilated by an overpowering radiation of Hellenism in a Roman medium, after a transitory outburst of Celtic energy in response to an earlier stimulus which the Celts had received from Hellenism through the medium of the Etruscans.¹ We have

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 279-82, above.

contrasted the ultimate failure of the Celts with the relative success of the Teutons in holding their own against the Hellenic impact. We have noted that the Teutonic layer of European barbarians, unlike the Celtic layer, resisted the disintegrating action of Hellenism to such effect that the Teutons were able to take their place in the 'external proletariat' of the Hellenic World and to dispatch the Hellenic Society in its death-agonies with a *coup de grâce*. By comparison with the Celtic *débâcle*, this Teutonic reaction to Hellenism was a success; but as soon as we compare the Teutonic achievement with the Achaean, we are reminded that the Teutons gained nothing better than a Pyrrhic victory.¹

The Teutons came in at the death of the Hellenic Civilization only to receive their own death-blow, on the spot, from the rival proletarian heirs of the defunct society. The victor on this field was not the Teutonic war-band but the Roman Catholic Church into which the 'internal proletariat' of the Hellenic Society had incorporated itself; and this victory of the Church over the barbarians was complete before the end of the social interregnum which the break-up of the Roman Empire had brought with it. Before the close of the seventh century of the Christian Era, every one of those Arian or heathen Teutonic war-bands that had ventured to trespass on Roman ground had been either converted to Catholicism or wiped out of existence; and, as converts to Catholicism, the surviving barbarian intruders renounced the pretension to bequeath to the future any positive contribution of their own except a racial strain of uncertain social value. The new civilization, 'affiliated' to the Hellenic Civilization, which emerged in the West when the post-Hellenic interregnum came to an end, was related to the antecedent civilization through the 'internal proletariat' and not through the 'external proletariat'. Western Christendom was essentially the creation of the Catholic Church—in contrast to Hellenism, which was essentially the creation of the Achaean barbarians. Thus the Teutons showed themselves unequal to the situation at the crucial point at which their Achaean counterparts had consummated their own brilliant achievement. The Teutons made the great refusal which Esau made when he sold his birthright to Jacob.² They had

¹ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 58-62, above.

² For the replacement of pagan by Christian themes in the English version of the Teutonic Epic, see I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 449, footnote 2, above. This compromise, however, did not save the Teutonic Epic from a premature death; for the abandonment of the pagan poetic themes was soon followed by an abandonment of the pagan poetic forms as well. For a striking account of the Teutons' repudiation of their own heritage in the domain of literature, see Ker, W. P.: *Epic and Romance* (London 1922, Macmillan), pp. 45-7. 'In mediaeval literature, whatever there is of the Homeric kind has an utterly different relation to popular standards of appreciation from that of the Homeric poems in Greece. . . . English epic is not first, but one of the least, among the intellectual and literary interests of King Alfred.'

not the spirit to compete with the Catholic Church for the paternity of a new civilization.

Let us now arrange our series of the challenges delivered by various civilizations to successive layers of the European Barbarism in the order of an ascending scale of severity. The Slavs were long immune from the challenge altogether and were patently the worse for being without the stimulus. The Achaeans were presented with the challenge of the Minoan Civilization and made the brilliant response of becoming the fathers of Hellenism. The Teutons held their own against the challenge of the Hellenic Civilization but were discomfited thereafter by the challenge of Catholicism: a universal church which first took shape as an embodiment of the Hellenic 'internal proletariat' and which eventually made itself into the chrysalis of a new civilization—the Western Christendom into which the progeny of the Teutonic war-bands was incorporated. The Celts were discomfited by the antecedent challenge of the Hellenic Civilization, against which the Teutons managed to hold their own. It is evident that the radiation from the Minoan Civilization to which the Achaeans were exposed was of the 'optimum' degree, and that this degree represents a mean between the insipid immunity of the Slavs and the overwhelming bombardment of Hellenic radiation to which the Celts succumbed. It is further evident that 'the law of diminishing returns' comes into operation, in this particular field of Challenge-and-Response, when the severity of the challenge is raised to some point between the degree at which the challenge of the Minoan Civilization stimulated the Achaeans and the higher degree at which the challenge of the Catholic Church proved too much for the Teutons.

Does our empirical method enable us to define more closely this point at which 'the law of diminishing returns' is here brought into play? Yes, it does; for the encounter in which the Teutonic trespassers on Roman ground succumbed to the Catholic Church was not the only conflict in which the Church was compelled to engage with European barbarians. Before it succeeded in bringing our Western Civilization to birth and ensuring that the child should live, the Church had to fight for her own life against two separate rear-guards of the 'external proletariat' of the Hellenic World which had not been drawn into the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung* when the Teutonic advance-guard swept over the derelict provinces of the Roman Empire *circa* A.D. 375–675. These two rear-guards were the Celts of 'the Celtic Fringe' that had remained beyond the range of effective Roman rule in the British Isles, and the Teutons of Scandinavia: a region which had lain beyond the zone of Roman border warfare on the European Continent. It was these Far Western Celts

and Far Northern Teutons who proved themselves the Church's most formidable adversaries. The reckless Teutonic advance-guard, exposing itself all unprepared to the Church's counter-attack on a battle-field ill suited to barbarian weapons and barbarian tactics, was defeated by the Church without much difficulty. The prudent Celtic and Teutonic rear-guards of the European Barbarism held themselves in reserve and sought to beget new civilizations of their own in place of Hellenism, as Hellenism itself had once been begotten, in place of the antecedent Minoan Civilization, by the barbarian Achaeans. These high ambitions brought first the Far Western Celts and then the Far Northern Teutons into conflict with the Catholic Church, since in Western Europe there was not room for several separate civilizations—all related to Hellenism in different fashions and degrees—to grow up side by side simultaneously. In both these conflicts the Church eventually won the day and the ambitious barbarians were forced, after a hard struggle, to accept defeat. Yet these Celts and these Teutons of the rear-guard, unlike their Teutonic kinsmen who perished before them in the van, came very near to achieving the same success as their Achaean predecessors. They both did succeed in begetting new civilizations before they severally succumbed; and though these two embryonic civilizations were abortive, they did not pass into limbo before they had each taken a recognizable shape which can be given a name. We may call them the abortive Far Western Christian Civilization and the abortive Scandinavian Civilization. Let us take a glance at each of them.

The Abortive Far Western Christian Civilization

The distinctive feature of the Far Western Christian Civilization of 'the Celtic Fringe' was its attitude towards Christianity. Unlike the Gothic converts to Arianism or the English converts to Catholicism, the Celtic barbarians who survived to accept Christianity did not take the alien religion as they happened to find it. They moulded it to fit their own barbarian social heritage, instead of allowing it to break up their native tradition and instal itself uncompromisingly in the vacuum. In modern scientific terms, the Christianization of the Celtic rear-guard was not revolutionary but evolutionary.

'No other race showed such originality in its way of taking Christianity. . . . The Church felt no obligation to be severe towards the caprices of the [Celtic] religious imagination; it gave free play to popular instinct; and the outcome was a cult which was perhaps the most thoroughly steeped in Mythology and the most closely analogous to the Mysteries of Hellenic Antiquity of any cult recorded in the annals of Christianity.'¹

¹ Renan, E.: *Essais de Morale et de Critique* (Paris 1859, Lévy), pp. 437-8 and 442, quoted by Gougoud, L., in *Les Chrétientés Celtiques* (Paris 1911, Gabalda), p. 58. In the

This originality showed itself even among the Celts of Britain, whose native genius had been subjected, under the Roman régime, to the standardizing impress of a latter-day cosmopolitan Hellenism. The relatively short span of perhaps not more than two centuries that intervened between the spread of Christianity through the Roman Island and the invasion of the English barbarians sufficed to produce, in Pelagius, a British 'heresiarch' who caused a stir throughout the Christian World of his day. The nascent Far Western Christendom, however, was to find its focus not in Roman Britain but in barbarian Ireland. Pelagius himself was possibly of Irish origin; but while Pelagius's work was ephemeral, both in Britain and on the Continent, the work of his British contemporary Patrick, who evangelized Ireland, was of enduring importance. If certain scholars are right in supposing that the historical home of this triumphant British apostle of Ireland lay in a neighbourhood that is the traditional home of the British hero King Arthur,¹ whose name is associated in legend with the leadership of a forlorn hope, the coincidence may be taken as symbolic. For virtue was going out of Britain into Ireland at the very time when the spear-head of the English Völkerwanderung was piercing Britain's opposite flank. In the course of the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era, Ireland increased and Britain decreased until the centre of gravity of the insular Celtic World passed over decisively from the 'Roman' to the 'barbarian' island.

The English transmarine Völkerwanderung, which dealt the British Celts a crushing blow, made the Irish Celts' fortune. While the Britons bore the brunt of the English invasion, the Irish were not only immune from English attack themselves but actually emulated the English in harrying their unhappy British kinsmen. When the Roman defences of Britain broke down, the Irish raided the west coast of the derelict Roman insular dominion as the English were raiding the east coast; and it was as a captive, carried away on one of these Irish raids, that Patrick first set foot in Ireland. These

English translation of the last-mentioned work, which has been published by Dom L. Gougaud after an interval of twenty-one years under the title *Christianity in Celtic Lands* (London 1931, Sheed and Ward), the author criticizes, as overdrawn, the picture of Celtic idealism which is given by Renan in the essay entitled 'La Poésie des Races Celtiques', in which the above-quoted passage occurs. (See Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 19.)

¹ On this location of the obscure Bannaventa, see Bury, J. B.: *The Life of Saint Patrick* (London 1905, Macmillan), pp. 17 and 322-5. The most convincing alternative location is Dumbarton on the Clyde; and this is preferred by Gougaud (see *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 32) and by J. A. Duke (in *The Columban Church* (Oxford 1932, University Press), Appendix IV, pp. 145-50). But the thoroughly Roman touches in Patrick's own description of his family background make it difficult, *a priori*, to suppose that he can have been born and brought up in a district of North Britain which had only just been included within the frontiers of the Roman Empire, even at the time of the Empire's farthest extension in this quarter, and which had almost certainly been abandoned to barbarism again thereafter some time before the date of Patrick's birth.

fifth-century Irish raiders likewise emulated the English in making permanent settlements on British soil; and though these were not comparable with the English settlements in scale, one of them—planted by raiders from Dalriada, in the north-east corner of Ireland, on the opposite British coast, at the point where the intervening seas are narrowest—was destined to become the nucleus of one of the two enduring kingdoms into which the petty and ephemeral successor-states of the Roman Empire in Britain were eventually consolidated.¹ The most valuable boon, however, which the Irish obtained from the English *Völkerwanderung* into Britain was not this opportunity of taking a modest share of the British spoils. The main effect of the English *Völkerwanderung* upon Irish fortunes was to segregate Ireland—immediately after the seeds of Christianity had been sown there—from those *ci-devant* Roman territories in the western part of the European Continent in which a new Christian Civilization, oriented towards Rome, began to emerge during the post-Hellenic interregnum. It was this segregation, at the most formative stage of early growth, that made it possible for the embryo of a separate and distinctive 'Far Western Christian Civilization', with its nucleus in Ireland, to emerge simultaneously with the emergence of the nascent Continental Western Christendom.

'The Irish culture differed considerably from the general European-Roman Civilisation. . . . It is true, Christianity had penetrated to this westernmost land of Europe; but in countless other respects Ireland had remained outside the spread of civilisation, so that the peculiarly Celtic culture had had time to develop in its richest and most unique form. . . . Christianity had taken root very early and had produced small hermit-like monastic settlements which were the leading force in the Irish Church. They were in a sense the heirs of the struggle waged by the ancient Druids on evil spirits with the aid of conjuring, and were at the same time consecrated to an inner religious life and an external missionary activity. A curious adventurous asceticism drove hermit societies—twelve monks and an abbot, corresponding in number to the Redeemer and His disciples—to the outermost islands, in one case even to distant Iceland, before any other human foot had stepped upon the island.'²

The originality of the Far Western Christian Civilization, as it emerged in Ireland, is manifest alike in its ecclesiastical organization, in its ritual and hagiography, and in its literature and art.

In Ireland conspicuously, and to some extent also in Wales and in

¹ For the origin of this new Dalriada on British soil, see II. D (iii), p. 86, and II. D (v), p. 194, above. It is one of the well-known curiosities of history that the Scottish name, which originally belonged to the Irish Celts and was carried from the old to the new Dalriada by Irish settlers, should have lost its association with Ireland and have become exclusively associated with a kingdom that is situated in Britain and with a language that is not Celtic but Teutonic.

² Olrik, A.: *Viking Civilisation* (English translation: London 1930, Allen and Unwin), pp. 107-8.

Brittany, the life of the Celtic Church was 'cellular'—in the literal as well as the metaphorical sense. It resided in the monasteries, which were sometimes federated in clusters (*familiae*) round some mother-foundation—the most famous example being the *Familia Columbae* which clustered round Iona.¹ A monastic cell or cluster of this kind was apt to be established, as a nucleus of the embryonic civilization, in each of the cantons into which barbarian Ireland was politically articulated. The initiative seems usually to have been taken by the local chieftain; and the cells and clusters thus established were governed by abbots—sometimes spiritual, sometimes temporal—who in many places were required to be of the founder's kin. The Irish called their monasteries in Latin *civitates*—the Latin name for the city-states of the Hellenic World which had become bishops' sees after the advent of Christianity. The Irish *civitates* resembled their continental European namesakes in being the seats of bishops; but here the resemblance ceased; for the Irish *civitates* were monasteries and not towns;² the episcopal office in an Irish monastic *civitas* was sometimes held by the hereditary abbot himself³ and sometimes by a tame bishop living in the monastery under the abbot's control;⁴ and these Irish cloistral bishops had no mutually exclusive territorial jurisdictions. There were even bishops who had no connexion with a monastery and therefore no fixed point of residence or zone of jurisdiction at all. Conversely, there were non-episcopal monasteries which were independent, *de facto*, of episcopal control.⁵

This monastic organization of the Celtic Church was an extreme development of a tendency which had declared itself to some extent in Early Christian Egypt;⁶ but, on the whole, it is less reminiscent of Christian than of Buddhist or Manichaean ecclesiastical institu-

¹ See Duke, J. A.: *The Columban Church* (Oxford 1932, University Press).

² Perhaps the closest parallel to this Irish Society with its monastic nuclei is the outpost of the Orthodox Christian Society which was established in Calabria by means of Basilian monastic foundations in the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era. These monastic foundations in Calabria provided rallying-points for the settlement of Orthodox Christian refugees from Sicily. (See Gay, Jules: *L'Italie Méridionale et l'Empire Byzantin: A.D. 867-1071* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing.)

³ The titles "bishop" and "abbot" are used almost indiscriminately for the rulers of Armagh during the 6th and 7th centuries, justification for this usage being that every ruler held in fact the two (almost equally distinguished) offices. (Ryan, J.: *Irish Monasticism: Origins and Early Development* (London 1931, Longmans, Green and Co.), p. 171.) At Armagh the two offices were divorced between A.D. 750 and A.D. 790 (*op. cit.*, p. 172).

⁴ In this event, the abbot monopolized the administration, while the bishop devoted himself to sanctity and learning (Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 172)—so much so that in Ireland the word abbot became synonymous with executive authority of any kind, spiritual or secular (Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 83). For examples of tame bishops, see Ryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 180 and 301-2.

⁵ Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 178. The most famous case of the kind is the constitution of the *Familia Columbae*, of which the Abbot of Iona was the head. For the Abbot of Iona was always only a presbyter, though the abbots of the affiliated monasteries were often bishops. (Duke, *op. cit.*, p. 120; Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 136.)

⁶ For the ancestry of Irish monasticism, see Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

tions. As for the Irish itinerant bishops, there are parallels in the history of the Nestorian Church after its dispersion abroad among the oases of the Eurasian Steppe;¹ but the very notion of a bishop without a diocese was repugnant to the Orthodox and Roman churches, whose conceptions of ecclesiastical organization were thoroughly territorial owing to the fact that these churches had grown up within the framework of the Roman Empire and had taken for granted its systematic territorial articulation into municipalities and provinces.²

As for ritual, the Celtic Church became doubly differentiated from the Roman Church by its conservative attitude towards Roman innovations and its proneness to innovations of its own. It did not adopt the innovations which were made by the Roman Church during the period of segregation (*circa* A.D. 450-600) in the method of reckoning the date of Easter.³ On the other hand, it did adopt—possibly from the Druids—a peculiar form of tonsure;⁴ and it developed a hagiography of its own in which the Celtic Saints eclipsed, or at any rate attained an equal eminence with, the most exalted figures in the Old and the New Testament. Saint Patrick, for instance, was equated with Moses and Saint Bridget with the Virgin Mary herself.⁵

The literary studies which Christian liturgical requirements kept alive everywhere during the post-Hellenic interregnum bore fruit in Ireland in a greater mastery of the Latin Classics than was retained by the Christian Church in the *ci-devant* Roman provinces on the Continent where Latin remained the vernacular language. More remarkable still, the Irish ecclesiastical scholars contrived to

¹ See II. D (vi), pp. 237-38, above.

² For Irish monasteries and bishops, see Bury, J. B.: *The Life of Saint Patrick* (London 1905, Macmillan), pp. 174-84 and 375-9; Gougaud: *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, pp. 215-19 and 232-4; Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, pp. 66-75; Ryan, S. J., the Rev. J.: *Irish Monasticism: Origins and Early Development* (London 1931, Longmans, Green and Co.). According to Ryan, Saint Patrick's organization was clerical rather than monastic, though Patrick approved of monasticism (pp. 92-3). The ecclesiastical centres (*civitates*) established by Patrick resembled monasteries (pp. 94 and 88-9). 'The place of monasticism in the church founded by Saint Patrick was important but secondary' (p. 96). However, 'the clerical community at Armagh was reorganized and reconstituted on a formally monastic basis' before the end of the fifth century (p. 101). In the early sixth century, Irish monasticism received an impulsion from Britain (pp. 114-16). And about the middle of the sixth century, under the British influence of Gildas, the Irish sees were transformed into monasteries (pp. 165-6). The influence of three Britons—St. David, St. Cadoc, and Gildas—upon Irish monasticism is also emphasized by Duke in *op. cit.*, on p. 50.

³ According to Bury (*in op. cit.*, pp. 371-4), the method of reckoning which prevailed in Ireland in the sixth and seventh centuries was a method which had been discarded by the Roman Church as early as A.D. 343. In other words, the Irish method was pre-Patrician; and Bury conjectures that it had been introduced into Ireland before Patrick's arrival—probably from Britain.

⁴ Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-4 and 183 and 239-43; Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 204.

⁵ Gougaud: *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, pp. 260-6; *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, pp. 271-2.

recapture a command of the Greek language and literature, at a time when the knowledge of Greek was extinct in Latin Christian countries that were much less remote geographically than Ireland was from the living reservoir of Greek that survived in the East Roman Empire.¹ At the same time, the ardour of the Irish in studying the culture of the Hellenic Society from which their own embryonic culture had received its impetus did not prevent them from developing a vernacular literature of their own in the line of their pagan Celtic tradition.² And they showed their independence in the technical domain by working out a specifically Irish adaptation of the Latin Alphabet.³

The new style of art which emerged, during the post-Hellenic interregnum, in the nascent Far Western Christian World 'drew its inspiration from many seemingly incongruous sources . . . and welded their several elements together into a singularly harmonious unity'.⁴ There were elements from the Early Central European Iron

¹ The channel through which the Irish acquired their knowledge of Greek remains a mystery. Gougaud suggests Theodore of Tarsus, who taught Greek to a number of English pupils on the testimony of Bede (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, iv. 2, and v. 20 and 23). But this seems hardly likely, considering that Theodore arrived in England just after the conflict between the Roman and the Celtic Church had come to a head at the Synod of Whitby, and considering further that this Greek Archbishop of Canterbury took a strongly anti-Celtic line himself (*Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 423). Gougaud points out (in *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, pp. 247-9) that the Irish mastery of Greek is non-proven for the period of Irish scholarship anterior to the ninth century of the Christian Era. On the other hand, the genuineness of the ninth-century Irish Hellenists (e.g. Johannes Scotus Erigena) is beyond question. (For details of John Scotus's proficiency in Greek, see Gougaud, *op. cit.*, loc. cit., and Sandys, J. E.: *A History of Classical Scholarship* (Cambridge 1903, University Press), pp. 473-8. In *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, on p. 309, Gougaud cites the warm testimony which is given to John Scotus by his contemporary, the papal librarian Anastasius, for his feat in making a Latin translation of the Greek Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita.) In *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, on p. 308, Gougaud comes to the conclusion that 'in the second half of [the ninth] century a limited number of Irish emigrants on the Continent gave proof of some acquaintance with the [Greek] language'. But he finds no proof of Greek studies in the Irish schools in Ireland (*op. cit.*, p. 248). It was on the Continent that the Irish acquired their unusual learning, the evidence for which is all to be found in Continental manuscripts (*op. cit.*, pp. 250 and 309).

² Noteworthy . . . is the apparently matter-of-fact way in which zeal for studies, the higher as well as the lower, is worked into the Irish system. . . . Its explanation in Ireland is probably to be sought in the native schools of druids, fáthi, filid, bards, which preceded Christianity. The monks were felt to be the successors of the two orders first mentioned of these, and thus were expected to apply themselves not only to religion, but also to the cultivation of the intellect. When they likewise took up the study of the native language and literature, their extraordinary position in the life of the country was assured. (Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 408.) The pre-Christian bardic schools, instead of being abolished when the monastic schools were instituted, were simply reorganized (apparently in A.D. 573, under the inspiration of Saint Columba, who had received a bardic education himself). Thereafter, the two systems of education flourished in Ireland side by side, performing complementary functions and mutually influencing one another (Graham, H.: *The Early Irish Monastic Schools* (Dublin 1923, Talbot Press), pp. 71-8). 'The union of the two cultures in the monastic schools probably began about A.D. 600' (Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 377). The Latin orthography of the Irish language was definitely fixed before the end of the seventh century (Ryan, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.).

³ On this Irish script, see Gougaud: *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, pp. 333-5; *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 368; Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

⁴ Macalister, R. A. S.: *The Archaeology of Ireland* (London 1928, Methuen), p. 264. *Vide* ch. vi, 'The Principles of Irish Christian Art', and ch. vii, 'The Expression of Decorative Christian Art in Ireland', *passim*.

Age culture of La Tène—the culture of the pagan Celts at the time of their impact upon the Hellenic World in the fifth to third centuries B.C.¹ There were elements from the art of the Eurasian Steppe, which had been brought into Western Europe by the Sarmatian Nomads who broke through the Roman frontier, in company with the vanguard of the Teutonic trans-frontier barbarians, in the post-Hellenic Völkerwanderung.² There were elements from Hellenic art, and from the Syriac art which had eventually dominated and permeated and transformed Hellenic art from end to end of the Roman Empire. This new art was not confined to Ireland or even to 'the Celtic Fringe' as a whole. It was a common possession of the whole North European external proletariat of the Roman Empire.³ It was in Ireland, however, that it attained its zenith—particularly in the illumination of parchment manuscripts and in the carving of stone crosses—and the influence of this Irish art radiated into England and Scandinavia,⁴ and impressed itself upon the kindred art there, besides making itself felt in Continental Western Christendom.

Within a century of Saint Patrick's mission in Ireland (*Patricius in Hibernia Fidem propagabat circa* A.D. 432–61), the embryonic Far Western Christian Civilization, derived from the germs which he had planted, had not only developed on its own distinctive lines but had actually shot ahead of the nascent Western Christian Civilization on the Continent. This initial superiority of the Insular over the Continental culture was due in part to the positive cause which we have considered already—the creative reaction of an indigenous Celtic Barbarism to an intrusive Christianity during a century and a half of segregation—and partly perhaps to the negative advantage which Ireland enjoyed during the post-Hellenic interregnum in being immune from the Frankish and Lombard invasions which devastated Gaul and Italy only less cruelly than the English invasion devastated Britain.⁵ But, however the superiority is to be explained, the fact is manifest. It was doubly proved, when the period of segregation came to an end towards the close of the sixth century of the Christian Era, by the warmth of the welcome which Irish missionary monks and scholars received in Britain and on the Continent, and by the eagerness with which English and Continental students sought out the Irish monastic schools, where foreigners were generously furnished with food and lodging and books and

¹ For this impact and its repulse, see pp. 279–82 and 319, above.

² The distinctive contributions of this Eurasian art were 'the Animal Style' and 'Polychromy' (see Rostovtzeff, M.: *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford 1922, Clarendon Press)).

³ Macalister, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

⁴ For the influence of Irish on Scandinavian art, see Olrik, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–18, and Macalister, *op. cit.*, pp. 340–3.

⁵ For the heaviness of the yoke which the Lombards imposed upon Italy, see II. D (iii), Annex, pp. 395–9, below.

teaching gratis.¹ The period of Irish cultural superiority over the Continent and over Britain may be conventionally dated from the foundation of the monastic university of Clonmacnois in Ireland in A.D. 548² to the foundation of the Irish monastery of St. James at Ratisbon *circa* A.D. 1090. Throughout those five and a half centuries, it was the Irish who imparted culture and the English and the Continentals who received it. But this transmission of culture was not the only social consequence of the renewal of contact between the Insular and the Continental Christendom of the West. Another consequence was a contest for power. In this conflict, the issue at stake was whether the future civilization which was to emerge in Western Europe should derive from an Irish or from a Roman embryo; and the Irish were defeated in this trial of strength long before they lost their cultural ascendancy.

The issue was raised by the great movement of missionary expansion to which the Irish monks were inspired, by their peculiar spirit of 'adventurous asceticism',³ in the latter part of the sixth century of the Christian Era. In this manifestation of youthful energy, monastic Ireland anticipated papal Rome. While Pope Gregory the Great's emissary Augustine did not cross the sea from the Continent to Britain, on his mission of converting the pagan English, until A.D. 597, St. Columba had already crossed the sea from Ireland to Britain *circa* 563 to found a Christian cell on the Island of Iona among the Scots whose forefathers had migrated thither from Ireland a century or so before;⁴ while, *circa* 590, St. Columbanus had crossed from Ireland to Britain and from Britain to the Continent itself. Columbanus reached the Lake of Constance in 610 and crossed the Alps in 613; and the simultaneous settlement, in the latter year, of Columbanus himself at Bobbio and of his companion Gallus at the spot where his name was afterwards commemorated in the monastery of St. Gall,⁵ anticipated

¹ Bede: *Historia Ecclesiastica*, iii. 47. For a list of distinguished foreign students who studied in the Irish monastic schools, see Graham, H.: *The Early Irish Monastic Schools* (Dublin 1923, Talbot Press), pp. 84-90. The list includes Welsh, English, and Frankish names—among them, the name of Willibrord, the apostle of the Frisians (Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, pp. 257-8). The Northumbrian English refugees who studied in Ireland learnt to speak Gaelic and even to write in it (op. cit., p. 248). There are Irish verses which are attributed to the Northumbrian King Aldfrid (*regnabat* A.D. 686-705), the son of the King Oswiu who presided, with such momentous results, at the Synod of Whitby (see pp. 334-6, below). On the question of English and Continental students in Ireland in the seventh and subsequent centuries, see also Gougaud: *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, pp. 251-2.

² The earliest of all the Irish monasteries seems to have been Cell Enda, on the largest of the Arran Islands, whose eponymous founder died in A.D. 530. (Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 67.)

³ See the quotation from Öliuk on p. 324, above.

⁴ Duke points out (in op. cit., on p. 12) that Columba died in the year of Augustine's arrival.

⁵ Gougaud points out (in *Christianity in Celtic Lands* on pp. 143 and 158) that a regularly organized monastery was not established at St. Gall till nearly a century after the eponym's death on that spot.

by twelve years the arrival of the Roman missionary Paulinus in York.

Pressing boldly into the interior of the Continent, Columbanus founded his first Continental cluster of cells in the heart of the Frankish dominions, on the borders of Burgundy, Swabia, and Austrasia, at Annegray, Luxeuil, and Fontaines; and the choice of these sites testifies to the founder's strategic intuition. It is no accident that Luxeuil lies within a hundred miles of Metz—the point of intersection of the two co-ordinate lines in the eventual structure of Western Christendom¹—and within less than a hundred miles of La Tène, which lies in the heart of the region from which the Celtic barbarians had expanded a thousand years earlier in their counter-attack upon the Hellenic World in the fifth to third centuries B.C.² At Luxeuil the pioneer Celtic monk Columbanus and his companions, like their prototypes the pioneer Celtic barbarians at La Tène, commanded an ideal base for operations in all quarters of the Continent. While La Tène lies at the outlet of the Lake of Neuchâtel in the upper basin of the Aar, in the gap between the Jura and the Alps, Luxeuil stands by the head-waters of the Saône, in the gap between the Jura and the Vosges. From either base, it is equally easy to descend upon the basin of the Rhône and the basin of the Rhine and hardly less easy to reach the basins of the Seine and the Danube. The Celtic war-band at La Tène and the Celtic fraternity at Luxeuil each, in their day, took full advantage of the commanding strategic position in which they found themselves. Their expansions over the face of the Continent from these two neighbouring starting-points followed identic routes and were pursued with an equal energy.

The likenesses and the differences between the first and the last of the Celtic expansions cannot fail to exercise a historian's imagination. The very closeness of the physical points of resemblance brings into relief the sharpness of the spiritual contrast. The first Celtic expansion was a warlike *Völkerwanderung*, the last an ascetic pilgrimage; and while the legendary barbarian war-lord Bellovesus came to destroy the Hellenic culture, the historical Christian missionary Columbanus trod in Bellovesus's footsteps in order to re-sow the seeds of culture in lands where Bellovesus's Teutonic barbarian successors had trampled the harvest of Hellenism into the mire. At Luxeuil, Celtic monks reoccupied a derelict Roman watering-place,³ as a Celtic war-band had once occupied a derelict Etruscan

¹ See I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 37-9, above.

² See pp. 279-82 and 319, above, for this Celtic counter-attack upon the Hellenic World and its failure.

³ Gougaud points out (in *Christianity in Celtic Lands* on p. 83) that Celtic monasteries were in the nature of pioneer settlements, and that deserted sites were favourite locations for them.

city at Milan; but the difference in the circumstances was all-important; for Etruscan Milan had been laid desolate by the Celtic invaders themselves, whereas the Irish reoccupants of Luxeuil re-inhabited a Roman site which had been desolated by others, and dedicated it to a nobler service than its original use. At Bobbio, Columbanus founded a Celtic monastery in an Apennine valley which the Celtic invaders of Italy in the fifth century B.C. had never reached;¹ and this latter-day Celtic stronghold in Liguria, commanding a passage across the Apennines from Northern Europe to Rome, was not an outpost of barbarism but a light of freshly kindled civilization shining in the darkness of a barbarized Italy. The sister foundation of St. Gall—a still more famous daughter of Luxeuil—occupied an equally commanding position on the high road leading out of Western Europe into the Danube valley, where it radiated a light of equal brilliance upon the darkness of a still pagan Bavaria.

There is, however, one point of likeness between the two Celtic expansions on the Continent which is of the highest historical importance. In the seventh century of the Christian Era, as in the fourth century B.C., the expanding Celts came into collision with Rome; and in the second of these encounters they were defeated as decisively as they had been defeated a thousand years earlier.

The conflict between the Irish and the Roman Church in the seventh century was perhaps the inevitable result of a profound difference of *ethos* which had arisen during the century and a half of segregation, and which declared itself as soon as the Irish missionary expansion brought the two parties into contact again. Under the stress of the breakdown of the Hellenic Society and the break-up of the Roman Empire, the Roman Church had sought to save the situation by salvaging, and making its own, those traditions of discipline and unity for which the defunct secular Roman order had formerly stood, whereas the Irish Church, in its peculiar isolation and security, had indulged, if not cultivated, a libertarian genius. When these two thus sharply differentiated churches met, it was the Irish Church that bridged the physical gulf and the Roman Church that took the human offensive.

The temporary segregation of the Irish Church had been involuntary and not deliberate;² and when the Irish pioneer-missionaries eventually landed on the Continent and thereby re-established contact with Continental Christendom, they were evidently unconscious of having drifted away from Roman practice themselves and unaware that Roman practice had parted company with theirs.

¹ There is, however, some shadow of evidence for Celtic settlements in the north-western Apennines as early as the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. (See Hubert, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-32.)

² On this point, see Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-15.

They simply continued on their own course, on the assumption that their native Irish Christianity was the Christianity of the Catholic Church;¹ and in their intercourse with their Continental co-religionists, including the Pope himself, they exhibited the freedom and the self-confidence to which they were accustomed in their dealings among themselves.

Columbanus, for example, appears to have established his cluster of monasteries in Burgundy without consulting the local Burgundian ecclesiastical authorities; he certainly introduced his own Irish monastic rule;² and he celebrated Easter according to a method of reckoning, still employed in Ireland, which had been discarded on the Continent since A.D. 343.³ When he was taken to task on this last account by the representatives of the Gallican Church, he counter-attacked by upbraiding the Pope himself, in an open letter, for adhering to the newfangled Continental system. The particular Pope whom Columbanus thus roundly threatened in A.D. 600 with the penalty of being 'looked upon as a heretic and rejected with scorn by the Churches of the West' was none other than Gregory the Great himself: the very incarnation of the new Roman ecclesiastical imperialism! Columbanus wrote with equal frankness to the Gallican synod at Châlon-sur-Saône before which he was arraigned in A.D. 603; and he addressed a third letter on the Paschal Controversy to one of Gregory's successors on the Papal throne.⁴ His independent attitude towards the authorities of the Continental Western Church on this question of ecclesiastical practice, and his equal independence in denouncing the political and personal crimes of the Frankish Queen Brynhild,⁵ eventually led to his being evicted from Gaul in A.D. 610—whereupon the Irish saint followed the example of Saint Paul and turned his back upon his co-religionists in order to preach to the Gentiles. He travelled on from Christian Burgundy into pagan Bavaria, and it was thus that he reached Lake Constance;⁶ but this was not the end of his pilgrimage. For in A.D. 612 he left the shores of Lake Constance and descended, from

¹ This assumption seems to underlie the concluding passage in St. Columbanus's letter to the synod at Châlon-sur-Saône before which he was arraigned in A.D. 603. (See below.)

² The attractiveness of the Irish Christian culture to the Continental Christians of the day is illustrated by the fact that 'the rule of Saint Columbanus soon became the object of such veneration that, towards the middle of the seventh century, many Gallic cloisters adopted it simultaneously with the rule of St. Benedict'. (Gougaud, *Les Chrétiens Celtiques*, p. 146; cp. *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 141.)

³ See p. 326, above.

⁴ For Columbanus's three letters on the Paschal Controversy, see Gougaud: *Les Chrétiens Celtiques*, pp. 180-3; and Kerr, W. S.: *The Independence of the Celtic Church in Ireland* (London 1931, S.P.C.K.), ch. v. An attempt to explain away the conflict between Columbanus and the Papacy in particular, and between the Irish Church and the Roman Church in general, is made by Ryan in op. cit., on pp. 302-5; but this exposition is not convincing. Duke points out (in op. cit., on p. 131) that, in Adamnan's *Life of St. Columba*, the Papacy is never mentioned.

⁵ For details, see Ryan, op. cit., pp. 308-12.

⁶ See p. 329, above.

this unexpected quarter, upon Italy; and his spirit was so far from being broken by his experiences in the Paschal Controversy that, between his settlement at Bobbio in 613 and his death two years later, he found time to engage in another controversy with another pontiff!¹

This independent spirit of Irish Christendom, which Columbanus displayed in the seventh century, was still alive in the ninth.

On the moral plane, the spirit reveals itself in a gloss written by an Irish hand and in the Irish language on the margin of a ninth-century manuscript of the Epistles of St. Paul:²

'To go to Rome is great labour and little profit. Thou wilt not find the King that thou goest to seek there unless thou bring Him with thee. It is folly, frenzy, insanity, unreason—since thou goest out to meet certain death—that thou shouldest call down upon thee the wrath of the Son of Mary.'

With the moral insight of this ninth-century Irish gloss, which conveys in two sentences the theme of Tolstoy's fable of the Two Pilgrims, we may equate the intellectual vigour and originality of the ninth-century Irish Hellenist, philosopher, and theologian, Johannes Scotus Erigena: the giant of the Carolingian Renaissance, whose like was not seen again in Western Christendom until the Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century. In his magnum opus *De Divisione Naturae* (*scriptum circa* A.D. 867), Erigena dared to present Philosophy as an independent discipline on an equal footing with Theology, and to declare that where philosophic reason and theological authority conflict, reason and not authority must prevail.³

The struggle for power which was perhaps rendered inevitable by this striking difference in ethos between the libertarianism of Ireland and the authoritarianism of Rome was brought to a head by a competition for the conversion of the still pagan barbarians of

¹ For Columbanus's letter to Pope Boniface IV on the Controversy of 'the Three Chapters', see Kerr, *op. cit.*, ch. xii.

² The Codex Boernerianus in the Royal Library at Dresden. Translations of the gloss are given in Gougaud: *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, pp. 158-9; and in Zimmer, H.: *The Irish Element in Mediaeval Culture* (English translation: New York 1891, Putnam), p. 126. For a critical examination of this gloss, see Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 169.

³ For Johannes Scotus see Gougaud: *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, ch. viii, especially pp. 280-1; *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, pp. 288-9; Zimmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-60; Sandys, J. E.: *A History of Classical Scholarship* (Cambridge 1903, University Press), pp. 473-8. Erigena's independence of mind showed itself not only in the domain of Philosophy but also in that of Physical Science. For example, he believed in the existence of the Antipodes. In this belief he had perhaps been anticipated by an eighth-century Irish missionary scholar, Virgil, bishop of Salzburg (*episcopabatur* A.D. 767-84), who was denounced on this account to Pope Zacharias by the English missionary Boniface. The pope gave orders that if Virgil really did believe in the Antipodes, he was to be excommunicated and unfrocked. In this controversy, the Irishman appears to have got the better of the Englishman; for, after holding the see of Salzburg against Boniface since A.D. 745 as a mere presbyter, Virgil became a bishop after Boniface had become a martyr. (For this Irish Virgil, see Gougaud: *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, pp. 242-3; *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 151; Sandys, *op. cit.*, p. 448; Hodgkin, T.: *Italy and her Invaders*, vol. vii (Oxford 1899, Clarendon Press), pp. 122-3. Some scepticism in regard to Virgil's supposed views is exhibited by Gougaud in *Christianity in Celtic Lands* on p. 256.)

Northern Europe on the Continent and in Britain. It was manifest that—in a region where there was no room for two separate civilizations to come to birth and grow up side by side—the unitary Western Christendom of the future would spring from whichever of the two embryonic societies that were now emerging at opposite extremities of this region should succeed in capturing the barbarian hinterland. The battle between the Irish and the Roman competitors for the privilege of becoming the creators of our Western Civilization was fought out, between the years 625 and 664, in the northernmost English successor-state of the Roman Empire, Northumbria, and was decided in the latter year at the Synod of Whitby.

The race between the Roman and the Irish Church for the prize of Northumbria was closely run. The Roman missionary Paulinus reached York in A.D. 625, and in 627 he converted the Northumbrian prince Edwin—the founder of Edinburgh¹—who had asserted a political hegemony over the larger part of Britain. In 633, however, Edwin lost both his dominion and his life in battle with the pagan Penda of Mercia; and Christianity was reintroduced into Northumbria by Edwin's successor Oswald: the representative of a rival dynasty who had repaired in exile to Iona and had been converted to Christianity there. The new ruler of Northumbria naturally sought missionaries for his subjects in the sanctuary where he had found his own faith. He addressed himself to Iona and not to Rome; and the monks of Iona, who had already converted the Picts, in the northern extremity of Britain, from their islet-cell off the west coast, now established a new cell off the east coast of Britain on the islet of Lindisfarne (Holy Island) as a base of operations for evangelizing Oswald's Northumbrians in the first instance and the rest of the English in due course.

In the middle of the seventh century, when Northumbria was under this Irish ecclesiastical ascendancy, the prospects of the Far Western Christendom in Britain seemed promising. The Irish Christians were not alienated from the English by the implacable hatred that animated the British Christians of Wales and West Wales and Strathclyde; for, during the recent *Völkerwanderung*, the Irish and the English had never crossed one another's path, since their common victims, the Britons, whom they had assailed simultaneously from opposite sides, had always interposed a human 'buffer' between them. The English barbarians, on their part, were even more susceptible to the attractions of the superior Irish culture which was offered to them by the Ionan missionary Aidan than the somewhat less barbarous peoples who had recently welcomed the advent of Columbanus on the Continent. Moreover, the North-

¹ See II. D (v), p. 191, above.

umbrian principality, which was Aidan's immediate field of work, recovered momentarily in 655, under Oswald's brother and successor Oswiu, the hegemony which it had already won and lost under Oswald's predecessor Edwin. Thus a number of social and political factors were working together for the cultural union of the Teutonic with the Celtic peoples of the British Isles under the aegis of a common Far Western Christendom. In these circumstances, Northumbria was unexpectedly recaptured for the Roman Church by the influence of Eanfled, Oswiu's queen, who had been brought up in the Roman practice, and by the energy of Wilfrid, a native Northumbrian cleric who had become an ardent Romanizer. At the Synod of Whitby, where the issue was decided in A.D. 664, the rival claims of Rome and Iona were nominally debated on the merits of the Paschal Controversy; but this trivial point of ritual was merely the test question in a trial of strength between two ecclesiastical powers, and King Oswiu gave his allegiance to Rome because he came to the conclusion that Peter was stronger than Columba.¹

The consequences of Oswiu's decision were momentous. The immediate external effect was the restoration of a uniformity of practice in the Western Church. The Picts, the Irish, the Welsh, and the Bretons successively accepted the Roman Easter and the Roman tonsure in the course of the eighth century; and Iona itself submitted as early as the year 716. Yet even this half-century's delay deprived the Ionan missionaries of all the ground which they had won by a century of effort in Britain. They had to evacuate Northumbria on the morrow of Oswiu's decision in 664,² and all Pictland east of the Grampians on the morrow of an identic decision which was taken by the Pictish King Nectan in 710. Moreover, in making this formal act of submission to Rome, Celtic Christendom publicly renounced its independence without obtaining any counter-vailing material benefits; for the questions of Easter and the tonsure, which had been taken as the test questions in the struggle for power, were by no means the only points on which the Celtic Churches had become peculiar. The residue of the Celtic peculiari-

¹ Wilfrid convinced Oswiu by quoting the text: 'Thou art Peter; and upon this rock I will build my Church; and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on Earth shall be bound in Heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on Earth shall be loosed in Heaven.' Turning to Colman, the Ionan Abbot of Lindisfarne, who was the spokesman of the Ionan party at the synod, Oswiu asked him (i) whether the text quoted by Wilfrid was genuine, and (ii) whether Colman could quote any text showing that equivalent powers had been granted to Columba. When Colman answered the first of these two questions in the affirmative and the second in the negative, Oswiu closed the debate by opting for allegiance to Rome, 'lest, when I come to the gates of the Kingdom of Heaven, there should be none to open them, he being my adversary who is proved to have the keys'.

² They still held out in the Northumbrian monasteries—particularly at Lindisfarne, which appears to have clung to the Ionan practice for another half-century (Duke, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-6).

ties was still sufficient to incline the rest of Western Christendom to regard the Celtic Christians as remaining in some sense beyond the Catholic Pale; and these Celtic ecclesiastical peculiarities did not entirely disappear—either in Wales or in Brittany or in Scotland or in Ireland—until the close of the twelfth century.

Thus, from the date of the Synod of Whitby onwards, the embryonic Christendom of the Far West was thrust back again into the state of isolation from which it had been released for a moment by the missionary efforts of a Columba and a Columbanus. But the last state of this abortive Far Western Christendom was worse than the first. For the iron which had entered into the soul of the Welsh with the agonies which they had suffered during the English *Völkerwanderung* now entered into the soul of the Irish likewise with the humiliation of their rebuff from Northumbria. The whole of the Celtic Fringe was thus now alienated from England; and at the same time the English had become much more formidable than before to the surviving insular Celts as an aggressive hostile force. Instead of being a swarm of pagan barbarians who were as abhorrent to the Continental Christians as to the British Christians themselves, the English had now become the obedient humble servants of the new ecclesiastical empire of Rome—fighting the Papacy's battles and receiving in return the Papacy's support.

From the latter part of the seventh century onwards the pressure of England upon the Celtic fringe had the whole weight of Continental Western Christendom behind it; and this weight gave the subsequent English drives against the Irish an irresistible impetus. The first of these new drives was made, not in the British Isles but on the Continent, where, in the early decades of the eighth century, the outer fringe of the Continental Teutonic countries under Frankish political suzerainty—Frisia, Hesse, Thuringia, Bavaria—was won for the Roman Church by the English missionary Boniface (*baptizatus* Wynfrith) not so much from a primitive paganism as from the Far Western Christianity of the pioneer Irish missionaries whom Boniface found already at work in this field. The English champion of Rome deliberately ousted these Irish pioneers who had blazed the trail for him, in order that on the Continent, as in Britain itself, the Roman Church might enter into the Celtic Church's missionary labours.¹ In the British Isles, more than four centuries

¹ For Boniface's devotion to the Papacy and warfare against his own Irish predecessors in the Central European mission field, see Gougaud, *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, pp. 153-5, and Hodgkin, T.: *Italy and her Invaders*, vol. vii (Oxford 1899, Clarendon Press), pp. 81-4. Zimmer points out (in *op. cit.*, p. 32) that Boniface's immediate forerunner, Willibrord, the apostle of Frisia, was Irish-trained. (See p. 329, footnote 1, above.) For the measures taken by the Continental ecclesiastical authorities to restrain the Insular *vagantes*, from the second quarter of the eighth century onwards, see Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, pp. 165-7.

later, the Anglo-Roman alliance against the Celts was still in operation. King Henry II's raid in A.D. 1171, which completed the first step in the long-drawn-out English conquest of Ireland itself, was made on the authority of a Papal Bull.¹

Henry II's expedition to Ireland opened the third act of a tragedy in which the first act had been closed by the Synod of Whitby. The intervening second act was the Irish reaction to the ordeal of the Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung*. In contrast to the foregoing Teutonic *Völkerwanderung* which had accompanied the break-up of the Roman Empire, the Scandinavian outbreak did not spare Ireland; and the Far Western island which had been immune from the storms of the fifth to seventh centuries was harried in the ninth to eleventh centuries as cruelly as Britain or the Continent. The Vikings first completed the eradication of Irish influence from Britain by sacking Lindisfarne in A.D. 793 and Iona in A.D. 802;² and thereafter they dealt such heavy blows to the nascent Far Western Christian culture in Ireland itself that not a single Irish monastery escaped,³ and, as far as is known, not a single work in Latin was written in Ireland during the ninth century of the Christian Era (the century in which the scholarship of the Irish refugees on the Continent stood at its zenith).⁴ The Irish did not yield any more tamely to their Scandinavian assailants than the English or the French; and in the end the physical progress of Scandinavian conquest in Ireland was arrested definitively by the Irish victory in which Brian Boru met his death at Clontarf. Yet the same Scandinavian challenge that was literally the making of England and France, because it stimulated the French and English peoples to the optimum degree,⁵ presented itself to Ireland, in her renewed isolation, with such excessive severity that she could win no more than a Pyrrhic victory.

The repulse of the physical assaults of Scandinavian raiders on France and England was followed by a spiritual counter-offensive on the part of Continental Western Christendom; and the outcome was a rapid and thorough-going cultural conquest of the Scandi-

¹ The Bull *Laudabiliter*, addressed to King Henry II of England by Pope Hadrian IV in A.D. 1155, was the response to a request which the King had made for Papal approval of his projected enterprise. The Pope acceded to the King's request on the ground that an English conquest of Ireland would enlarge the bounds of the Church and bring knowledge of the Truth to ignorant and barbarous peoples. The authenticity of this Bull has been disputed without, apparently, being effectively impugned. (See Gougaud: *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, p. 367; *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 408; and Kerr, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-2.) The history of the three-cornered relation between Rome, England, and Ireland is discussed further in Annex II, below.

² Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 391. At Iona, the monks were massacred in the subsequent visitations of A.D. 806 and 825.

³ Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 392.

⁴ Gougaud: *Les Chrétientés Celtiques*, p. 358.

⁵ For the victorious response of the French and English to the challenge from the Scandinavians, see II. D (v), pp. 198-202, above.

navian intruders who had secured a physical lodgement on French and English soil. In three or four generations the descendants of the Norse assailants of Western Christendom became her Norman champions;¹ and a filibustering band of freelance Norman knights, which crossed St. George's Channel in A.D. 1169, was the advance-guard of King Henry II's expedition to Ireland. On the other hand, the victory of Clontarf, which was 'the crowning mercy' in the long Irish struggle against the same Norsemen, was not followed by any corresponding conversion of the Scandinavian intruders who still managed to keep their footing on the coasts of Ireland to the culture of the Irish hinterland. Notwithstanding the manifest attractiveness and assimilative power of the Irish culture, and the profound cultural interactions which did in fact take place between Ireland and Scandinavia, the 'Ostmen', in their five surviving city-states on Irish soil,² remained a people apart; and on a minor scale they played the same role towards Ireland as the English. In the first phase of the Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung*, before the conversion of the intruders to Christianity, the Viking masters of the Irish coasts and seas isolated the Irish people from the main body of Western Christendom as effectively as they had been isolated by the lodgement of the pagan English in Britain during the first phase of the Teutonic *Völkerwanderung* of the fifth and sixth centuries. In the second phase, the converted Ostmen, like the converted English, stole a march upon the Irish by entering into more intimate relations than the Irish themselves had established with Continental Western Christendom. In the twelfth century, when Ireland succumbed successively to the ecclesiastical authority of Rome and the political authority of England, the Ostmen lent themselves readily (though ultimately to their own undoing) as instruments in both these deadly assaults upon Ireland's independence.

Thus the embryo of a Far Western Christian Civilization, which showed such promise of life towards the close of the post-Hellenic interregnum, was ultimately rendered abortive by the strain of having to respond to a series of challenges which were excessive in their severity. It was a forlorn hope for the Celtic abbot Colman, in his islet off the coasts of Ultima Thule, to emulate the prowess of the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople by trying conclusions with the successor of the Apostle at Rome; and it was a forlorn hope for the Irish to emulate the prowess of the English and the French in resisting the onslaught of the Norsemen. The gallantry of the Irish in facing these fearful odds did not enable them to survive in a human environment which was insuperably

¹ On this point see II. D (v), p. 201, above.

² For these five Scandinavian city-states on the coasts of Ireland, see II. D (iii), p. 98, above.

adverse; and instead of creating a new civilization of their own it was their fate to be laid under contribution by the very competitors who were robbing them of their birthright of independent creation. Irish scholarship was made to minister to the progress of the Continental Western Christian Civilization when Irish scholars, fleeing from Ireland as refugees from Scandinavian onslaughts, were enlisted in the service of the Carolingian Renaissance;¹ and Irish art and literature served to inspire the art and literature of the Scandinavian aggressors themselves² and thus likewise helped to enrich the culture of Continental Western Christendom indirectly, through a side channel, when the abortive Scandinavian Civilization succumbed in its turn to a rival which proved more than a match for the Teutonic as well as the Celtic rear-guard of the North European Barbarism.³

These Irish contributions to the life of a Western Civilization of non-Irish origin were not even the most conspicuous contributions which medieval Western Christendom levied from the vanquished and discarded peoples of 'the Celtic Fringe'. In spite—or possibly just because—of the predominant part which the Irish had played among the Celtic Christian peoples in inspiring the embryonic Far Western Christian Civilization with its abortive vitality, the Latin (unlike the Scandinavian) genius was not attracted by the exuberant Irish imagination. In the twelfth century, when the possibilities of the French Epic had been exhausted and when French poets were on the look-out for some exotic inspiration, they found what they wanted not in Ireland—the Celtic island which had almost wrested from the Latin Continent the role of creating the new Western Civilization—but in Britain: a Celtic island which had fallen out of the running before the race between the Irish and the Latins had begun. It was no 'matter of Ireland' but 'the matter of Britain' that appealed to a Chrétien de Troyes; and if the Celtic imagination is a living force in the World to-day, it lives in the legend of the heroic failure of Arthur, and not in the history of Columba's or Columbanus's heroic success.

The measure of the difference in *éthos* between the Irish vein of the Celtic imagination, which left the Latin mind cold, and the Welsh vein, which took the Latin mind by storm, is given by a significant dissimilarity in the treatment of a mythical Celtic theme which the Welsh and the Irish had each cultivated in their respective manners. The peoples of 'the Celtic Fringe', with the Atlantic at their backs and a host of formidable aggressors ever bearing down upon them from the Continent, were naturally inspired to seek imaginative relief from the pressure of an adverse human

¹ Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, p. 311.

² See p. 328, above.

³ See pp. 340-60, below.

environment by dreaming of an Elysium hidden in the bosom of the Ocean: a magic island which a Celtic hero might reach under the guidance of superhuman powers who would never give right of way to the hero's alien adversaries. This Elysium is the common dream of the Far Western Celtic peoples; it is the bourne alike of King Arthur and of Saint Brendan; but, in the British and the Irish heroic cycles, the hero's magic westward voyage is made in utterly different circumstances. The vanquished British warrior is wafted away to Avalon in order to find an asylum where he may depart this weary life in peace; the adventurous Irish Saint bends his sails towards the island of his dreams in order to lead a new life on this Earth in a land of hope. The fantasy of Avalon consoled the grief of the Britons when the waters of the English conquest were going over their souls; the fantasy of Saint Brendan's Isle inspired—or reflected—the feat of the Irish when they were anticipating the Norsemen in the discovery of the Faroes and of Iceland.¹

The Abortive Scandinavian Civilization

It will be seen that, in the hard-fought contest between Rome and Ireland for the privilege of becoming the creator of a new Western Civilization, Rome only just succeeded in gaining the upper hand. And when the nascent Western Christendom which was thus enabled to develop from a Roman embryo was still in its infancy, it had to engage, after the briefest breathing-space, in a second struggle for the same prize—this time in conflict with the Teutonic rear-guard of the North European Barbarism which had been holding itself in reserve in Scandinavia.

In this conflict between the Scandinavians and Western Christendom, the issue was as doubtful as it had been in the foregoing conflict between the Irish and the Roman Church, while the circumstances were more formidable. On this occasion, the trial of strength was made on the military as well as on the cultural plane; the contest was on a far larger material scale; and the two contending parties were severally stronger, and also more alien from one another, at the time of decision in the ninth century, than the rival Irish and Roman embryos of Western Christendom had been at the decisive moment in their antecedent contest, some two centuries earlier. On the one hand, the superiority in strength of ninth-century Western Christendom over its seventh-century Roman embryo is conspicuous. The measure of the difference is given by the political and cultural vitality of the eighth-century Western Christian Civilization as this was manifested in the lives and works of its great protagonists: a Bede and a Boniface, a Liutprand and a

¹ For the Irish monks who preceded the Norsemen in Iceland, see Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, pp. 131-2.

Charles Martel, and, above all, a Charlemagne. On the other hand, the Scandinavian adversaries of the Carolingians surpassed the Irish rivals of Pope Gregory the Great or Bishop Wilfrid in weight of numbers and power of action at least as conspicuously as ninth-century Western Christendom surpassed seventh-century Western Christendom in the same respects.

The history of the Scandinavians in and after the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung* of the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries of the Christian Era was in some ways like the contemporary history of the Irish and in some ways different from it.

To consider the points of likeness first: the Scandinavians, as well as the Irish, had been drawn within the ambit of the Hellenic external proletariat before the break-up of the Roman Empire; and in Scandinavia, as in Ireland, the effect of the ensuing *Völkerwanderung* was to insulate this portion of the barbarian hinterland, rather abruptly, from the cultural radiation, proceeding out of the body social of the moribund Hellenic World, to which it had latterly been exposed.

Just as Ireland was isolated from Roman Christendom before the end of the fifth century by the interposition of the pagan English invaders who had crossed the North Sea and made a lodgement in the Roman island of Britain, so Scandinavia was isolated from Roman Christendom before the end of the sixth century by the interposition of the pagan Slavs, who drifted overland along the southern shores of the Baltic, from the line of the Niemen or the Vistula to the line of the Elbe and the Saale, into the vacuum left by the emigration of the Goths, Vandals, Heruli, Warni, Lombards, and other Teutonic barbarians who had evacuated this region because they had been implicated in the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung* and had been lured away by its spell to inflict and suffer destruction in the derelict provinces of the Roman Empire, while the Scandinavians, in 'the back of beyond', had stayed at home. Thus, before the close of the post-Hellenic interregnum, the Scandinavians found themselves isolated from their fellow Teutons, as the Irish were isolated from their fellow Christians, by a wedge of more barbarous interlopers.¹

¹ 'The conditions for a separate Scandinavian development were not created until the Migration of Nations, which definitely broke the bonds uniting the northern Teutonic tribes with their southern neighbours. The Angles and Saxons travelled to England; the Svevi and Goths moved southward. The lands along the Baltic were for a time deserted, but were slowly filled with a new population. Slavic tribes trickled in from the east, settling the shores of the Baltic as far west as Holstein. . . .

'Thus sharp boundaries of language had been drawn around the North, and at the same time the unrest in Central Europe had cut off the ancient connexions with the South. There had once been physical contact with the Romano-Germanic Civilization; now the bridge had been broken, and the North was thrown on its own resources.' (Olrik, op. cit., p. 8.)

There was, however, one difference between the Scandinavian and the Irish situation which was of fundamental importance and lasting effect. While the previous cultural radiation out of the Roman Empire into Ireland had just succeeded in kindling a spark of Christianity in Ireland before the interposition of the English, the feeble incidence of the same radiation upon Scandinavia had failed to produce the same effect there before the interposition of the Slavs. While the Irish barbarians were converted in the fifth century and the vanguard of the Teutonic barbarians who overran the Continental provinces of the Roman Empire were converted as early as the fourth century,¹ the rear-guard of the Teutons in Scandinavia were still pagans in the sixth century when segregation overtook them; and they therefore remained pagans so long as the segregation lasted and emerged as pagans when it came to an end. Thus the cultural histories of Ireland and of Scandinavia during their respective segregation-periods were markedly different. In Ireland, in this age, there was a mingling of the old wine of North European Barbarism with the new wine of Christianity; and this mingling had produced a creative fermentation—the potential genesis of a new civilization—before the segregation-period had reached its close.² In Scandinavia, during the corresponding age, the indigenous North European Barbarism ‘stewed in its own juice’; and though the old wine did notably improve by keeping (as it had improved under the same treatment in the same region on other occasions before),³ it was not, as in Ireland, miraculously changed, by a fresh infusion, into a new vintage.

¹ With the exception of the Franks, who were not converted until A.D. 496. This retardation in the conversion of the Franks is noteworthy, but its effect was mitigated by the fact that the Franks had already settled on Roman ground, where they were exposed to all the influences of the Roman Christian culture. Moreover, the Franks were converted to Catholic Christianity direct, instead of passing from paganism to Catholicism through an intermediate stage of Arianism, like the Goths, Vandals, and Lombards.

² For a sketch of this embryonic Far Western Christian Civilization which emerged in Ireland during the segregation period, see pp. 324–8, above.

³ Before the abortive attempt at creating a Scandinavian Civilization, and the consequent absorption of Scandinavia into Western Christendom, between the eighth and the eleventh century of the Christian Era, the North European Barbarism had had a long history in Scandinavia; and there is one feature in its history here which is distinctive and recurrent because it arises from the permanent geographical relation of Scandinavia to the Continent. On a sociological view, Scandinavia has always been virtually an island, since the cultural radiation to which it has been subject has always travelled to Scandinavia across Continental Europe and thence, in the last stage of the journey, over the Baltic or the North Sea; and this sociological insularity has made Scandinavia particularly prone to segregation. Accordingly, during the long age of Barbarism, during which the Primitive Savagery of Northern Europe was being irradiated by the several contemporary or successive influences of the Egyptian and Minoan and Sumeric and Hittite and Hellenic and Syriac civilizations, it frequently happened that some particular element or aspect or phase or emanation of one or other of these incoming cultures remained in being, within the secluded area of Scandinavia, and underwent new local developments there, long after it had become obsolete, not only in the focus of the civilization which had originally created it, but even in the intermediate zones of barbarism across which the cultural radiation had passed *en route* to Scandinavia from its point of origin. This peculiarity of Scandinavian cultural history in the age of barbarism becomes apparent at

'The Northman, cut off from association with the outside world, turned his attention inward. . . . In certain respects he became a barbarian again. The stately chieftain in his Romanized garb was transformed back into a long-bearded viking; his Damascene blade was replaced by a heavy sword of iron or a 'troll' of a battle-axe; he wished not to be buried in a coffin in the Southern fashion, but again piled up a mound of earth over the dead, as did his ancient forefathers. He was like the legendary hero Sinfjötli, who when ten years old was sent out into the forest to live as a wolf in order that he might be hardened for the great deed that awaited him. In the same manner the Northman was thrown back upon his own rude nature. He tried his strength against the sea, hunted seals and whales, caught small fish and large fish, went up on the mountain heights after reindeer or after Lapp tribute, or cleared his forest—and dreamed his long heavy winter dream.'¹

There was a deep difference here, in life and in outlook, between Scandinavia and Ireland in the segregation-period; and this difference, at this stage, produced a further differentiation between the courses of Scandinavian and of Irish history in the following stage, when the Irish and the Scandinavians successively re-entered into contact with Continental Roman Christendom. This subsequent and consequent differentiation was threefold. In the first place, the Scandinavians did not begin to develop a positive civilization of their own until after they had re-established contact with Roman Christendom, whereas the emergence of an embryonic Far Western Christian Civilization in Ireland had preceded the re-establishment of contact between the Irish and the Roman Church. In the second place, the re-establishment of contact between the Scandinavians and Roman Christendom was made on Frankish and not on Scandinavian initiative. Charlemagne's thirty years' war of attrition against the Continental Saxons (A.D. 772-804), in which the Continental frontier of Roman Christendom against the North European Barbarism was carried forward overland from the Ruhr to the Eider, both anticipated² and precipitated³ the Scandinavian sea-raids upon

a glance to any one who visits the Museum of National Antiquities in Stockholm. The visitor cannot fail to observe that the Swedish relics, here displayed, of the North European 'Stone Age' and 'Bronze Age' and 'Iron Age' are the finest local relics of these successive phases of the North European Barbarism that are anywhere to be seen. At first thoughts, it seems paradoxical that the finest products of a culture should have been produced on the outermost fringe of the culture's geographical range; but second thoughts discern that the geographical remoteness of Scandinavia is precisely the explanation of its technological pre-eminence, when the factors of segregation and 'time-lag' are taken into account. The barbarians of Scandinavia eventually carried the techniques of 'the Stone Age' and 'the Bronze Age' to higher degrees of excellence than were ever achieved in either technique by the barbarians of the Continent for the simple reason that the Scandinavians, segregated in their *alter orbis*, were continuing to work in stone for many centuries after the Continentals had abandoned stone for bronze and thereafter to work in bronze (when once they had adopted it) after the Continentals had taken to iron.

¹ Olrik, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

² The earliest recorded Scandinavian sea-raids upon Western Christendom took place some time between the years 786 and 793. (Kendrick, T. D.: *A History of the Vikings* (London 1930, Methuen), pp. 3-4.)

³ See II. D (iii), pp. 86-7, above.

the coasts of Gaul and the British Isles. On the other hand, in the re-establishment of contact, two centuries earlier, between the Irish and the Roman Church, Roman Augustine's landing in Britain had at least been forestalled, even if it cannot be shown to have been inspired, by Irish Columbanus's landing on the Continent. The third line of differentiation between Scandinavian and Irish history, which is inherent in the other two, is perhaps the most important. The collision between the Irish and the Roman Church was pacific; the collision between the Scandinavians and Western Christendom was a clash of arms.

The Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung*, like other *Völkerwanderungen*, was the reaction of a barbarian society to the impact of a civilization.¹ The post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung*, which had drawn the Scandinavians' Continental Teutonic kinsmen into its vortex and had left the Scandinavian rear-guard stranded, had been a long-term reaction to the Transalpine expansion of the Roman Empire. The Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung* which followed in course of time, some four centuries later, was a short-term reaction to the abortive evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire by Charlemagne and the Carolingian epigoni.² The Carolingian Empire was a fiasco because it was both grandiose and premature. It was an ambitious political super-structure piled up recklessly upon rudimentary social and economic foundations;³ and the arch-instance of its unsoundness was the *tour de force* of Charlemagne's conquest of Saxony, which brought the Carolingian Empire and Scandinavia into direct contact with one another.

During the two preceding centuries, when Scandinavia had been segregated from Roman Christendom, Continental Saxony had acted as a kind of buffer or middle term between the Scandinavian peoples and the Frankish 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire. The people of Saxony, during this period, had certain affinities with the peoples both north and south of them. They were related equally to Franks and to Scandinavians inasmuch as all three peoples were Teutons. At the same time, the people of Saxony were especially akin to the Scandinavians inasmuch as the ruling elements among them had originally come from the North during the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung*, when they had turned their faces towards the Continent and had conquered their fellow barbarians between the Eider and the Ruhr, instead of turning their faces towards the sea like their kinsmen and namesakes who conquered Britain. Like the Scandinavians, again, these Continental

¹ The nature and geneses of *Völkerwanderungen* are examined further in Part VIII, below.

² See II. D (iii), pp. 86-7, above.

³ The weakness of the Carolingian Empire is examined further in Part X, below.

Saxon conquerors and their indigenous Teutonic subjects had remained faithful to their primitive Teutonic paganism when both the Franks and the transmarine Saxons had become converts to Roman Christianity. On the other hand, the subject element in Saxony was partly Frankish in origin and spoke a kindred Teutonic dialect which the Saxon conquerors themselves adopted. Thus Saxony, before Charlemagne's war, was a potential bridge between Roman Christendom and Scandinavia: a bridge over which some successor of Boniface might have led the Scandinavians into the fold of Roman Christendom by the great missionary's pacific methods. Charlemagne's militancy ruled out this possibility.

When Charlemagne set out in A.D. 772 to bring Saxony within the fold of Roman Christendom by force of arms, he was making a disastrous breach with the policy of peaceful penetration—conducted by Irish and English missionaries on the Continent for a century past—which had effectively extended the borders of Continental Christendom at the expense of the Continental Barbarism by achieving the conversion of the Bavarians and Thuringians and Hessians and Frisians.¹ And this change of policy was not only morally retrograde; it was even militarily disastrous; for though the *tour de force* of a Frankish conquest of Saxony was eventually achieved, it was a Pyrrhic victory. The ordeal of the Franco-Saxon Thirty Years' War overtaxed the limited resources of the Carolingian Empire and overstrained the weak tissues of the nascent Western Society which had been burdened with this ponderous unitary political régime. By the time when the Carolingian offensive had been carried to the line of the Eider, its force was spent; the rash advance stopped dead; and it was inevitably and immediately followed by a counter-attack in which the Scandinavians—awaking, full of vigour, from their 'heavy winter dream'—avenged upon the exhausted Franks the wrongs of the prostrated Saxons. In fact, the convulsive expansion of the Frankish Power over the basins of the Weser and the Elbe, which came to this abrupt halt at the neck of the Danish Peninsula, aroused in the souls of the Scandinavians the same demoniac *furor barbaricus*—the notorious Berserker² rage—that had once been awakened in the souls of the Celts when the ambitious expansion of the Etruscan Power over the Basin of the Po had come to a halt at the foot of the Alps.³

¹ See p. 336, above.

² Berserkers, i.e. warriors who went into battle without defensive armour, were an institution of the North European Barbarism which was not confined to the Scandinavian Barbarism of the Viking Age. There were Celtic Berserkers in Transalpine Gaul in the third century B.C. The Transalpine Celtic mercenaries (Gaesatae) whom the Cisalpine Celts enlisted when they made their supreme effort to break the power of Rome, fought naked at the Battle of Telamon in 225 B.C. (See Polybius, Bk. II, chs. 22, 28, and 30.)

³ For the relation between the Etruscan expansion and the Celtic avalanche, see pp. 276 and 280, above.

'In its origin and driving force, the' Scandinavian, like the Celtic, 'movement was a tremendous expansion of the life-force of the race';¹ and the Scandinavian expansion in the eighth to eleventh centuries of the Christian Era surpassed the Celtic expansion of the fifth to third centuries B.C. both in extension and in intensity: in the impetus of its attack; in the sweep of its geographical range; in the narrowness of the margin by which it just failed to overwhelm the civilization against which it was directed; and in the brilliance of the embryonic civilization which it created on its own account. The abortive envelopment of the Hellenic World by the Celts, which had carried the right wing of the North European barbarian assailants of Hellenism into the heart of Spain and their left into the heart of Asia Minor,² was dwarfed in geographical scale by the operations of the Vikings, who threatened to envelop Orthodox as well as Western Christendom by extending their left wing into Russia and their right into North America. Again, the two Christian civilizations which were assaulted by the Scandinavians were in greater jeopardy when the Vikings were attempting to force the passages of the Seine and the Thames and the Bosphorus past Paris and London³ and Constantinople, than the jeopardy in which the Hellenic Civilization found itself at the moments when the Celtic war-bands were actually masters of Rome and of Macedonia.⁴ In a still higher degree, the abortive Scandinavian Civilization which began to unfold itself in Iceland before its chill beauty melted into formlessness under the warm breath of Christianity, surpassed in both achievement and in promise the rudimentary Celtic culture of La Tène.⁵

We have already observed that the short bloom of the Scandinavian Civilization in Iceland was evoked by the same stimulus as the long bloom of the Hellenic Civilization in Ionia: the peculiar stimulus which is given to barbarians by a *Völkerwanderung* which carries them overseas. We have taken a comparative view of the Icelandic and the Ionian achievements in the two fields of political organization and literary art;⁶ and it would be superfluous at this point to enlarge upon the character of the abortive Scandinavian Civilization, and its resemblance to the successful Hellenic Civilization, any farther.⁷ We may likewise absolve ourselves from recapitulating the account which we have already given of the Scandinavian assault upon Western Christendom and its ultimate failure.⁸

¹ Olrik, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

² See II. D (v), pp. 198-9, above.

³ See pp. 280-1, above.

⁴ For the La Tène culture, see p. 281, above.

⁵ See II. D (iii), pp. 86-100, above.

⁷ On this question, see further pp. 356-7, as well as Annex V, below.

⁸ For these events, see II. D (v), pp. 196-202, above.

² See pp. 280-1, above.

We may pass on at once to consider the successive consequences of this failure as far as they concern Scandinavia.

The first of these consequences was that the Scandinavian invaders who had made a forcible lodgement on the soil of Western Christendom, in the Danelaw and in Normandy, were at once lost to the Scandinavian Society, as irrevocably as if they had been annihilated, through their rapid conversion to the religion and culture of their invincible Western Christian adversaries. The enlistment of the converted Normans as knights errant in Western Christendom's service was the first signal piece of evidence which showed that, in this encounter, Western Christendom and not Scandinavia was the victor. We have noticed this metamorphosis of the Normans already;¹ but this was only the first stage in the Christian counter-attack. In the second and final stage, both the Western and the Orthodox Christian Society carried the war, which they had already won on their own ground, into the enemy's country, and rendered the nascent Scandinavian Civilization abortive by conquering the whole vast extent of the New World in the North which Scandinavian enterprise had called into existence.²

It is noteworthy that these successive triumphs of Western Christendom over Scandinavia were obtained by a reversion to the tactics which Charlemagne had discarded. The self-defence of Western Christendom against the Vikings' assaults had been conducted, perforce, on the militant lines on which Charlemagne had rashly embarked and on which the Scandinavians had followed Charlemagne's lead with a vengeance. But as soon as a militant Western defensive had brought the militant Scandinavian offensive to a halt, the Westerners resumed the peaceful tactics of Augustine, and Boniface, which Charlemagne had abandoned with such disastrous consequences. One hundred and seven years after the end of Charlemagne's Great Saxon War, a Charles who was nicknamed 'the Simple' was able at last to set bounds to the mischief which had been done by Charles 'the Great' by making another new departure in policy—this time in exactly the opposite direction from that which had been taken by his more famous namesake and ancestor. In the treaty concluded in A.D. 911 between the Carolingian Charles the Simple and the Viking Rollo, the barbarian intruder was permitted to retain in peace his conquests on Frankish soil—from which the lawful Frankish sovereign would scarcely have been able to eject him by force—on condition that he enrolled himself as a citizen of the Western *Respublica Christiana*; and the sequel proved that the Carolingian statesman who made this compact had been right in believing that he was getting the best of the

¹ In II. D (v), on p. 201, above.

² See II. D (v), pp. 201-2, above.

bargain. This resumption of the policy of peaceful penetration in place of the policy of force in dealing with the Northern barbarians was accountable for all the subsequent successes of Western Christendom in the encounter between the two societies. By peaceful penetration, Western Christendom converted not only the impulsive Normans, who had forced an entry and made a lodgement as formidable strangers within her gates, but also the warier Northmen who had remained ensconced on their own ground in the North European hinterland beyond the pale at which the frontier of the Carolingian Empire had been fixed by Charlemagne's Saxon campaigns.

The tactics of peaceful penetration proved particularly effective in dealing with the Scandinavians because the Scandinavians were peculiarly receptive. The Scandinavians had already shown themselves susceptible to the influence of the embryonic Far Western Christian Civilization of Ireland¹ at a time when their relations with Roman Christendom and with the Carolingian Empire were still exclusively hostile. This Irish influence enriched and did not sterilize the native vein of the Scandinavian genius, because the embryonic Irish and Scandinavian civilizations had an identic source in the common reservoir of the traditional North European Barbarism, while the new Christian element, of which the nascent Scandinavian Civilization received its first infusion through this Irish channel, had already been blended harmoniously with a North European tincture in the course of its percolation through Irish soil.² Thus, when the Vikings overwhelmed Ireland, they plundered the spiritual as well as the material riches of their Irish victims with impunity.³ On the other hand, when they descended upon Roman Christendom and eventually succumbed to the spell of a civilization which had succeeded in holding them at bay, they ate the bread and drank the cup of the Christian mysteries without that saving self-examination which Paul had recommended to the Corinthians and which the Delphic Apollo, long before Paul's day, had enjoined upon all Hellenes who presumed to approach a shrine

¹ For Irish influence on the Scandinavian Civilization see Olrik, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-20; and Macalister, R. A. S.: *The Archaeology of Ireland* (London 1928, Methuen), pp. 340-3.

² For this harmonious adaptation of Christianity in Ireland to the temper of the pre-existing local culture, see pp. 322 and 324-8, above.

³ The effect of the Irish influence upon Scandinavian culture is summed up by Olrik (in *op. cit.*, p. 120) as follows:

'Considered as a whole, this Irish element in Scandinavian culture is a phenomenon in itself, which does not coincide with the principal current of the Christian movement as it passes over Europe. It appears more as an enrichment and expansion of the native North European stage of Civilization than as a part of the new trend accompanying the introduction of Christianity. In so far as it swept away a portion of the ancient heritage, this tendency might have made a breach for the entrance of the new main current; and furthermore certain Christian impulses did emanate from Ireland. But in at least equal measure this Irish influence contributed to the production of a special civilization which somewhat impeded the rapid absorption of the North into Christian Europe.'

once consecrated to older Minoan divinities whom the intrusive Olympian had supplanted. In thus swallowing Roman Christianity whole, the Scandinavians were eating and drinking damnation to themselves.¹ The strong wine of the South tainted and sterilized the elixir of Scandinavian culture and burst the bottles of the North European Barbarism within which this elixir was being gradually distilled.

The encounter between the Scandinavians and Orthodox Christendom followed a parallel course; for, although Orthodox Christendom had borne no share in the responsibility for evoking the Scandinavian outbreak, it suffered incidentally from the consequences of the militant Western Christian offensive against the North European Barbarism in the generation of Charlemagne. The Scandinavian movement of expansion threatened to overwhelm both the Roman and the Orthodox Christian World simultaneously. While the Vikings who had taken to the North Sea sailed up the Thames to sack London in A.D. 842 and up the Seine to sack Paris in 845, other Vikings, who had taken to the Baltic and had threaded their way, by river and portage, across the whole breadth of Russia until they emerged on the Black Sea, sailed down the Bosphorus in A.D. 860 to sack Constantinople and only just failed to take the Imperial City by surprise. Thereafter, Constantinople, like Paris and London, endured and survived the ordeal of successive Scandinavian assaults;² and in the great war of A.D. 967-72 the East Roman Government first incited the Scandinavian prince of Russia, Svyatoslav, to invade the rival Orthodox Christian Empire of Bulgaria overland, and finally drove the formidable barbarian intruder out again, without being forced to concede to him, on Orthodox Christian soil, the equivalent of a Danelaw or a Normandy. The sequel to the treaty which Svyatoslav found himself compelled to conclude with the East Roman Emperor John Zimisces at Drstra in A.D. 972 was the same as the sequel to Guthrum's treaty with Alfred in A.D. 878 and to Rollo's with Charles in A.D. 911, except that the discomfiture of the Scandinavian aggressor was more signal on the Orthodox Christian front and his subsequent conversion more rapid.

Thus, when the Vikings made their pacts with the Christian Powers—a Wessex and a France and an East Roman Empire—after having been flung back from the walls of Constantinople and Paris and London, the nascent Scandinavian Civilization was doomed; for nothing but the ferocity of the Northmen could save them from the fate to which their receptivity exposed them. In the collision

¹ 1 Corinthians xii. 29.

For the ordeal of Paris and London, see II. D (v), Annex, on pp. 400-1, below.

between the Scandinavian Völkerwanderung and Christendom, there were only two possible alternative outcomes: either Christendom must be annihilated or the nascent Scandinavian Civilization must be rendered abortive by the conversion of its makers. When the former alternative was renounced, the second inevitably came to pass. The frail fabric of the native Scandinavian culture was now disintegrated by a foreign radiation which penetrated it, layer by layer, first on the economic plane and then on the political and finally on the cultural. On the political plane, Charlemagne the heir of Augustus ultimately exercised a more profound effect upon Scandinavian minds than Charlemagne the slayer of the Saxons. On the cultural plane, the process of peaceful penetration was completed when the Northmen accepted the very religion of the Southerners.

'It was the wealth of the South that lured the Viking. . . . But the Northman was an apt pupil; he not only stole; he also imitated. He learnt to build fortresses and form a *testudo*, to imitate the high-prowed warships, the galleys of the South, in his own dragon ships; he learned to plan cities and order a state. A new goal for the ruler's power arose . . . the figure of Charlemagne: "Carolus Magnus". Even during his lifetime, in the families of Northern kings in the West, men began to call their sons Karlus or Magnus; whenever a Magnus subsequently succeeds to one of the Northern royal seats, this is a victory of the Carolus Magnus ideal. A kingship with external power, internal peace and order, and moral elevation, stands as the highest goal of princely ambition.

'As the viking king moves in the direction of the Carolus Magnus ideal, the viking ships are transformed into merchant ships. At the beginning of the Viking Age, they set forth on bloody expeditions; at the end of the Viking Age, Scandinavian merchant towns have arisen along all the coasts of Northern Europe from Novgorod to Bristol, Limerick, and Dublin. The Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea, formerly bare of ships, have now been absorbed into the realm of world trade. . . . Consciously or unconsciously, the Scandinavians acquire the handicrafts and art of foreign peoples. They adopt a metal currency. . . .

'The acceptance of Christianity was for many persons rather an assimilation of European life than an expression of religious enthusiasm.'¹

The receptivity of the Northmen was indeed as sensitive on the cultural plane as on the economic or political; and here it was not merely imitative but also creative.

'The old idea of the Vikings as sweeping like a storm across the lands they touched, destroying the wealth they found and leaving themselves as poor as ever, has in our time had to give way to a breathless wonder at their craving for enrichment. The gold they found has disappeared. But we have learnt now that there was gathered together in the

¹ Olrik, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-7.

North a treasury of knowledge and thought, poetry and dreams, that must have been brought home from abroad, despite the fact that such spiritual values are far more difficult to find and steal and carry safely home than precious stones or precious metals. The Northmen seem to have been insatiable in the matter of such spiritual treasures. . . . [And] they had not only a passionate craving to convert the elements of foreign culture to their own enrichment, but they had also a mysterious power of stirring up culture and forcing it to yield what lay beneath its surface. Even this thirst for knowledge, however, is not the most surprising thing about them. That they did learn and copy to a great extent is plain to see; but . . . there exists no magic formula whereby the culture of Viking times, as a whole, can be resolved into its original component parts. So thoroughly have they refashioned what they took, until its thought and spirit are their own.¹

The audacious attempt to re-cast the Christian culture in a Scandinavian mould was manifestly a forlorn hope. Yet a society which could summon up the spirit and exercise the imagination to essay this *tour de force* would not readily confess itself outmatched. And, although this spiritual encounter could have no other outcome than the assimilation of the weaker spiritual force by the stronger, the nascent Scandinavian Civilization did not reconcile itself to this spiritual discomfiture without a struggle. The spell of quiescence which had given free play to the Scandinavian faculty of receptivity at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries was broken, before the latter century closed, by a fresh outburst of the *furor barbaricus*; this new fit of Berserker rage was provoked by a recognition of the strange and monstrous fact that the meek were fast inheriting the Scandinavian Earth; and the spirit of militant reaction was embodied, by the Northern poetic imagination of the day, in the heroic figure of Starkad the Old:² a mighty man of valour who, with a fervour worthy of a Syriac prophet, inspires the king his lord to cleanse his household from foreign abominations. In creating the image of this pagan zealot, the Scandinavian Society of the Viking Age was painting a portrait of itself. As he first appears upon the scene, Starkad victoriously repels the formidable oncoming tide of Christian influence; but as the poetic cycle of which Starkad is the hero develops, a tragic *motif* creeps in. In the latest version of the plot, the zealot himself is corrupted by the foreign abominations which he has denounced. For lust of foreign gold, Starkad betrays his master; and when we translate this poetry into prose, the upshot is that the tenth-century reaction was foredoomed to failure, and that the victory of the Christian over the

¹ Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 parts in 2 vols.), Part I, pp. 11-12.

² For an analysis and interpretation of the Starkad Cycle, see Olrik, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-7.

Scandinavian Civilization was really assured before the tenth century was over.

In the Scandinavian kingdoms of Russia, Denmark, and Norway, the formal outward act of conversion was imposed upon the people wholesale by the arbitrary will of three contemporary princes: Vladimir the Great (*regnabat* A.D. 980-1015), Harald Gormsson (*regnabat circa* A.D. 940-86), and Olaf Tryggvason (*regnabat* A.D. 995-1000). In Norway, strenuous resistance was offered to a royal command which was ostensibly actuated by nothing more reasonable than the determination of a masterful ruler to gratify a personal whim; and in Denmark and in Russia, where the royal commands were passively accepted by the princes' subjects, the princes themselves appeared to be acting on immediate considerations of political expediency. Harald imposed Christianity on Denmark in A.D. 974 as part of the purchase-price of peace from the Saxon emperor Otto II, who had invaded Denmark in force in reprisal for Danish raids on Saxony.¹ Vladimir imposed Christianity on Russia in A.D. 989 in order to win the hand of a Christian princess, the sister of the East Roman Emperor Basil II, and to obtain as her dowry a diplomatic ratification of his seizure of the East Roman fortress of Cherson in the Crimea.²

'At his despotic command, Peroun, the god of thunder, whom he had so long adored, was dragged through the streets of Kiow; and twelve sturdy barbarians battered with clubs the misshapen image, which was indignantly cast into the waters of the Borysthenes. The edict of Wologdomir had proclaimed that all who should refuse the rites of baptism would be treated as the enemies of God and their prince; and the rivers were instantly filled with many thousands of obedient Russians, who acquiesced in the truth and excellence of a doctrine which had been embraced by the great duke and his boyars.'³

Vladimir's fiat may conceivably account for the mass-conversion of the docile Slavs on whom the Scandinavian pioneers in Russia had imposed their dominion. Yet the personal opportunism or caprice of a ruler seldom or never avails to bring about a wholesale and permanent revolution in the religion of his subjects unless the religious change which the ruler enjoins is in accord with the prevalent social tendencies of the place and the time.⁴ This truth is eminently true in a turbulent and individualistic society such as the

¹ Kendrick, T. D.: *A History of the Vikings* (London 1930, Methuen), p. 103.

² Kendrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-5.

³ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. lv.

⁴ The history of civilizations up to date furnishes a number of instances of signal failures in cases where rulers have attempted to use their political power for the purpose of enforcing religious changes against the spirit of the place and time. Examples of such failures (e.g., in the cases of Ikhnaton, Ptolemy Soter, Açoka, Julian, Leo Syrus, and Akbar) are examined in V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, in vol. v, below.

Scandinavian Society was in the Viking Age. The phenomenon that requires to be explained is not the conversion of Vladimir's pagan Slav subjects but rather the conversion of 'his boyars': that is to say, his pagan Swedish war-band; and the readiness of the head-strong Vikings to abandon their primitive paganism for alien religions towards the end of the tenth century of the Christian Era, after kicking, Starkad-wise, against the pricks, was evidently the outcome of a deep and gradual psychological mass-movement with a long rhythm: a movement which statecraft might bring to a head, but which it could not have initiated and could not arrest. The ripeness of the Russian Vikings for conversion in Vladimir's day was not only apparent to Vladimir himself but was also the main-spring of his religious policy, if there is any truth in the story that, before he finally opted for Orthodox Christianity, he investigated and compared the respective merits of Orthodoxy, Romanism, Judaism, and Islam.¹ And the Russian prince's ultimate choice of Orthodox Christianity can probably be accounted for by the fact that, when once the Russian Vikings had failed to take Orthodox Christendom by storm, and when this failure had been followed by a substitution of peaceful for warlike relations between the discomfited barbarians and the civilization which had successfully repelled their assaults, then the attractiveness and prestige of Orthodox Christendom prevailed, in Russian imaginations, over the fainter impressions made upon them by the Roman Christian West or by the Islamic 'Abbasid Caliphate or by Jewish Khazaria.²

'The ambassadors or merchants of Russia compared the idolatry of the woods with the elegant superstition of Constantinople. They had gazed with admiration on the dome of St. Sophia: the lively pictures of saints and martyrs, the riches of the altar, the number and vestments of the priests, the pomp and order of the ceremonies; they were edified by the alternate succession of devout silence and harmonious song; nor was it difficult to persuade them that a choir of angels descended each day from heaven to join in the devotion of the Christians.'³

In general,

'the conversion of the North was accomplished by voluntary means. Of course, we must not assume that compulsion was never used against any individual; the conditions of the times would forbid any such assumption. But no Scandinavian tribe was forced as a body to assume the new law. What happened was that leading men of the tribe appeared in considerable numbers as its advocates, drawing the stragglers in their wake. Behind the many decisions of the *thing* meetings in which the acceptance of Christianity was voted, we cannot always assume the

¹ Kendrick, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

² For the Judaism of the Khazars see II. D (vi), Annex, p. 410, below.

³ Gibbon, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

presence of a majority, but surely [always] that of a very important minority. And, once the choice had been made, it was never rescinded; we do not encounter any pagan reaction of real moment.¹

The most illuminating instance of all was the conversion of Iceland, and this for several reasons. In the first place, the Scandinavian community in Iceland was particularly remote from Christendom geographically. In the second place, its political constitution and political tradition were both peculiarly individualistic, so that in Iceland it was even less easy than in other Scandinavian countries to impose conversion upon the body-politic by the arbitrary fiat of an individual or even of a strong minority. In the third place, the Icelanders had been so powerfully stimulated by the challenge of migration overseas to a country still harder than their Norwegian homeland that they had raised the Scandinavian culture which they brought with them to higher degrees of aesthetic and intellectual intensity than were ever attained in any other part of the Scandinavian World,² so that, in abandoning paganism for Christianity, they were sacrificing a more precious and more highly appreciated social heritage than any of the other Scandinavian converts (Russians or Swedes or Danes or other Norwegians) were called upon to give up. Yet, in spite of these special obstacles which the Christian propaganda had to overcome in Iceland, the Icelanders' own records of their conversion show plainly that the process was voluntary here as well as in other Scandinavian lands—if the word 'voluntary' may fairly be used to describe a realistic recognition and unenthusiastic acceptance of a social and psychological necessity. The history of the momentous decision which was taken at the *Althing* in the June of A.D. 1000 is recounted as follows in the *Njals Saga*:³

'Both sides went to the Hill of Laws, and each, the Christian men as well as the heathen, took witness, and declared themselves out of the other's laws, and then there was such an uproar on the Hill of Laws that no man could hear the other's voice.

'After that men went away, and all thought things looked like the greatest entanglement. The Christian men chose as their Speaker Hall of the Side, but Hall went to Thorgeir, the priest of Lightwater, who was the old Speaker of the law, and gave him three marks of silver to utter what the law should be, but still that was most hazardous counsel, since he was an heathen.

'Thorgeir lay all that day on the ground, and spread a cloak over his head, so that no man spoke with him; but the day after men went to the

¹ Olrik, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

² On this point, see II. D (iii), pp. 86-100, above.

³ *The Story of Burnt Njal*, translated from the Icelandic of the *Njals Saga* by Dasent, G. W. (Edinburgh 1861, Edmonton and Douglas), vol. ii, pp. 78-80. See further Kendrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 346-53.

Hill of Laws, and then Thorgeir bade them be silent and listen, and spoke thus—

"It seems to me as though our matters were come to a deadlock if we are not all to have one and the same law; for if there be a sundering of the laws, then there will be a sundering of the peace, and we shall never be able to live in the land. Now, I will ask both Christian man and heathen whether they will hold to those laws which I utter?"

"They all said they would.

"He said he wished to take an oath of them, and pledges that they would hold to them, and they all said "yea" to that, and so he took pledges from them.

"This is the beginning of our laws", he said, "that all men shall be Christian here in the land, and believe in one God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, but leave off all idol-worship, not expose children to perish and not eat horseflesh. It shall be outlawry if such things are proved openly against any man; but if these things are done by stealth, then it shall be blameless."

"But all this heathendom was all done away with within a few years' space, so that those things were not allowed to be done either by stealth or openly.

"Thorgeir then uttered the law as to keeping the Lord's day and fast days, Yuletide and Easter, and all the greatest highdays and holidays.

"The heathen men thought they had been greatly cheated; but still the True Faith was brought into the law, and so all men became Christian here in the land."

It was here in Iceland, where the act of conversion was influenced by external pressure to a lesser extent than anywhere else in the Scandinavian World, that the cultural consequences of conversion were most manifestly devastating. This spiritual devastation is conspicuous in this case for the reason, mentioned above, that the Icelanders, before their conversion, had raised the abortive Scandinavian Civilization to its highest level of achievement, and for the further reason that the Scandinavian culture, as maintained in Iceland at this high pitch, differed markedly in many respects, and in most of these respects to its own advantage, from the contemporary culture of Roman Christendom.

While the Roman, like the Orthodox Christian, Civilization was affiliated through the Christian Church to an antecedent civilization, and was only less potently dominated by the Hellenic past than was Orthodox Christendom itself, the relation of the abortive Scandinavian Civilization to the defunct and contemporary civilizations of the South resembled rather the less intimate relation that had once subsisted between the Hellenic Civilization and the Minoan. The barbarian Vikings, like the barbarian Achaeans, were at first stimulated by their contact with the Southern cultures to create an original culture of their own rather than to bow down and worship

the established civilizations which they encountered; and this similarity between the Scandinavian and the Achaean reaction to alien societies goes far towards accounting for the similarity in *êthos* between the abortive Scandinavian and the successful Hellenic Civilization: a family likeness which is recognized on all hands and is indeed unmistakable.¹

The Scandinavian *êthos* of the Viking and the post-Viking Age, as it is reflected in the Eddic and Skaldic poetry and in the Sagas, resembles the Hellenic *êthos* of the Heroic and the Early Classical Age, as it is reflected in the Homeric Epic and in the prose of Herodotus. Both these young civilizations are distinguished by a freedom from the incubus of tradition, which gives them a precocious freshness and originality, and by a freedom from the incubus of superstition, which gives them a precocious clarity and rationalism. Their members are fully aware both of the extent of their human powers and of these powers' limitations; and this ever-present dual consciousness results in a combination of self-confidence with pessimism and of exaltation with melancholy, which is often puzzling, and always intriguing, to observers who have grown up in other spiritual environments.

In the Viking Movement, as in the Achaean *Völkerwanderung*, the

'presupposition was a people not only acquainted with maritime affairs, but possessing courage to venture forth, ability to make far-reaching plans, and a gift for keen observation, always ready to find the adversary's weak points. These powers seemed to grow with the increase of their tasks and the broadening of their horizon. Taken together, they produced a feeling of superiority and invincibility. The compass of the World was multiplied many times. The shut-in valley-dweller had felt the world of trolls and monsters, whom Man might not tempt, to be close at hand. The boundaries of this world now widened immensely, and the viking pursued his horizon, directing his course over the sea though the keel of his boat might break the back of a mermaid, or ascending to the Cave of the Giants in the farthest north to see whether this adventure was really so dangerous. It is true, the ancient terror remained in his soul, imparting the proper tension for the audacious venture; but at the same time his inborn self-assurance and matter-of-factness grew into a conscious emphasis on the tangible and reasonable, into that "faith in their own power and strength" which the vikings professed—in spite of all gods and trolls and mighty realms.'²

This *êthos* which was tempered in adventurous action found expression in literary art.

'The Sagas are partly indebted to a spirit of negative criticism and

¹ See Annex V, below, for the resemblance in the field of religion.

² Olrik, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-8.

restraint: a tendency not purely literary—corresponding, at any rate, to a similar tendency in practical life. The energy, the passion, the lamentation of the Northern poetry, the love of all the wonders of Mythology, went along with practical and intellectual clearness of vision in matters that required cool judgement. The ironical correction of sentiment, the tone of the *advocatus diaboli*, is habitual with many of the Icelandic writers, and many of their heroes. "To see things as they really are", so that no incantation could transform them, was one of the gifts of an Icelandic hero, and appears to have been shared by his countrymen when they set themselves to compose the Sagas. The tone of the Sagas is generally kept as near as may be to that of the recital of true history. Nothing is allowed any preponderance over the story and the speeches in it. It is the kind of story furthest removed from the common pathetic fallacies of the Middle Ages. The rationalist mind has cleared away all the sentimental and most of the superstitious encumbrances and hindrances of strong narrative.¹

This original Scandinavian *êthos*, which attained its highest tension and finest harmony in Iceland, was relaxed and confused and eventually annihilated in consequence of the conversion of the Icelanders to Christianity.

It is true that the abortive Scandinavian Civilization did not perish without a struggle on this remote island which had been the theatre of its greatest achievements. Indeed, the Icelandic scholars who committed the Sagas to writing and collected the Eddic poems and made the classic digests of Scandinavian Mythology and Genealogy and Law, were all possessed of a Christian as well as a Northern cultural background and education; and the century during which they flourished (*circa* A.D. 1150–1250) was some hundred and fifty to two hundred and fifty years posterior to the date of the conversion.² Yet this backward-looking scholarship was the last achievement of the Icelandic genius; and it is significant that, although the Sagas acquired their final literary form in 'the age of peace' (which intervened between the act of conversion and the age of faction and scholarship), nevertheless 'the age of the Sagas', in the sense of the age from which the historical plots and historical characters of the Sagas were exclusively drawn, did not extend beyond about A.D. 1030: that is to say, beyond the deaths of the generation which was already in its prime by the time when the conversion to Christianity took place. Lives that had come to their maturity in the pre-Christian social environment and atmosphere were apparently the only stuff out of which Icelandic sagas

¹ Ker, W. P.: *Epic and Romance* (London 1922, Macmillan), p. 212.

² On the political plane, this last century of Icelandic intellectual activity was also the last century of the free Icelandic Commonwealth. Snorri Sturlason, the prince of Icelandic scholars, who lived from A.D. 1178 to A.D. 1241, was also a politician who met a violent death in the last political convulsions of the Commonwealth, which ended in the submission of the Icelanders to the Norwegian Crown in A.D. 1262.

could be made. Icelanders who had sucked in the Christian tradition with their mothers' milk might be the collectors or even the composers, but they could never be the heroes, of these essentially pagan works of art. For the heroic Northern self-confidence could not dwell harmoniously in the same heart with the Christian conviction of sin, nor the stoical Northern rationalism in the same mind with Christian sentiment and Christian superstition.

As the alien civilization to which the Icelanders had capitulated in A.D. 1000 gradually establishes its dominion over their hearts and minds,

'a mysterious fantasy, pregnant with disaster, comes into being and carries off the victory over the ancient worldly wisdom and the poet's sense of proportion. In the bitter years of the Sturlung conflicts, about the middle of the thirteenth century, the fear in people's souls expresses itself constantly in visions and dreams. Elements that had once been subject to poetic domination now gradually gain the upper hand. The downfall of the Icelandic Free State brings about also a cessation of the national Saga literature. Preference is shown for the romantic saga, to which the cultivated aesthetic sense is now turned; its fantastic elements become stronger and stronger and digress farther and farther from reality. The nation that once had so sharp an eye for the world of reality falls into slumber—politically, aesthetically, economically—and sleeps its sleep of centuries, full of disturbing dreams, while the elves shriek their shrill laughter from all the cliffs and the giants from all the rocky caves, while the Earth quakes, and the fire-mountains shine, and souls fly about the crater of Hekla like black birds.'¹

By the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, the Icelandic *Kulturkampf* is over and the paralysis of the Icelandic genius is complete. The clear light of the pale Northern sunshine has now been refracted through the exotic medium of a stained-glass window; and the Icelandic mental landscape, thus weirdly illuminated, has become stupefyingly outlandish.

'Hauk Erlendsson, an Icelander of distinction in the fourteenth century, made a collection of treatises in one volume for his own amusement and behoof. It contains the *Volosþá*, the most famous of all the Northern mythical poems, the Sibyl's song of the doom of the gods; it contains also the *Landnámabók*, the history of the colonization of Iceland; *Kristni Saga*, the history of the conversion to Christianity; the history of *Eric the Red*, and *Fóstbræðra Saga*, the story of the two sworn brethren, Thorgeir and Thormod the poet. Besides these records of the history and the family traditions of Iceland and Greenland there are some mythical stories of later date, dealing with old mythical themes, such as the life of Ragnar Lodbrok. In one of them, the *Heidreks Saga*, are embedded some of the most memorable verses, after *Volosþá*, in the

¹ Olrik, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

old style of Northern poetry—the poem of the *Waking of Angantyr*. The other contents of the book are as follows: geographical, physical, and theological pieces; extracts from St. Augustine; the *History of the Cross*; the *Description of Jerusalem*; the *Debate of Body and Soul*; *Algorismus* (by Hauk himself, who was an arithmetician); a version of the *Brut* and of *Merlin's Prophecy*; *Lucidarium*, the most popular medieval handbook of popular science. This is the collection, to which all the ends of the Earth have contributed, and it is in strange and far-fetched company like this that the Northern documents are found. In Greece, whatever early transactions there may have been with the wisdom of Egypt or Phoenicia, there is no such medley as this.¹

The century in which Hauk Erlendsson's mental vision was confounded, and his mental abilities paralysed, by this criss-cross of broken intellectual lights was the tenth century since the Scandinavian rear-guard of the Teutonic line (in the embattled army of the North European Barbarism) had struck out on an independent course of its own by parting company with the Teutonic van-guard at a moment when Goths and Vandals and Angles and Lombards had allowed themselves to be drawn, to their own eventual undoing, into the social vacuum produced by the break-up of the Roman Empire. During this millennium, the whole drama of an abortive Scandinavian Civilization had been played out from the first act to the last. After cultivating their native barbarism in their native fastness for some four centuries after their kinsmen and former neighbours had struck their tents and moved off westward and southward, the Scandinavians had been stimulated at last, by Charlemagne's challenge, to break out in their turn; and then, in their Viking Age, they had made a supreme effort to overwhelm the civilizations of the South which they encountered on their war-path, and to establish in their stead a new Scandinavian Civilization erected on barbarian foundations and unencumbered by reminiscences of a traditional style or by traces of a traditional ground-plan. By the fourteenth century of the Christian Era—the century in which Hauk Erlendsson lived—this ambitious Scandinavian enterprise had lamentably miscarried. That century saw the extirpation of the North European Barbarism finally consummated by the establishment of continuous contact between the Western Christian and the Orthodox Christian Civilization along a line stretching across the whole breadth of the European Continent from the coast of the Adriatic Sea to the coast of the Arctic Ocean;² and this new line of demarcation cut sheer across the domain which the abortive Scandinavian Civilization had once staked out for itself. By the fourteenth century, the *ci-devant* Scandinavian dominion in

¹ Ker, W. P.: *Epic and Romance* (London 1922, Macmillan), pp. 47–8.

² See II. D (v), pp. 168–9, above.

Russia had become incorporated into Orthodox Christendom, while Western Christendom had annexed Scandinavia itself with its overseas outposts in the Orkneys and Shetlands and Hebrides and Faroes and Ireland and Iceland and Greenland. The partition of the Scandinavian World between two alien civilizations was thus complete.

We are now in a position to arrange the encounters between the North European Barbarism and the Southern Civilizations in a series, and to embrace them all in a single comparative survey.

In the Achaean achievement, the North European Barbarism successfully performed the feat of begetting a new civilization on the site of a pre-existent civilization which had incorporated a layer of the barbarians into its 'external proletariat'. In the Scandinavian and the Irish endeavours, the same barbarism just fell short of repeating the same performance because the challenge from Roman Christendom was just too severe. The excessive severity of the challenge which defeated the Scandinavian and Irish endeavours—and the earlier endeavours of the Teutonic and Celtic van-guards *a fortiori*—proved inimical to success, no less than the deficiency of stimulus which handicapped the secluded Slavs. Thus our sequence of encounters between the North European Barbarism and the several Southern civilizations does display the operation of 'the law of diminishing returns' in the movement of Challenge-and-Response in an instance in which the challenge is presented in the human sphere and not in the physical sphere. Moreover, our examination of the abortive Scandinavian and Far Western Christian civilizations has enabled us to define within quite narrow limits the locus of the point at which 'the law of diminishing returns' comes into play in this sequence of comparable encounters. The point has been located in the narrow interval between the severity of the challenge presented by the Minoan Civilization to the Achaeans—a challenge which is proved, by the resulting genesis of Hellenism, to have been of the optimum degree—and the slightly enhanced severity of the challenge presented by Roman Christendom to the Irish and the Scandinavians: a challenge which is proved to have been excessive by the consequent abortion in which the embryonic Far Western Christian and Scandinavian civilizations both met their fate.

The Impact of Islam upon the Christendoms

Another sequence of challenges in the human sphere in which we can locate with some precision the point at which 'the law of diminishing returns' comes into play is offered by a series of encounters between the Islamic wave of Syriac religion and the pre-

ceding Christian wave, which had been emitted some six hundred years earlier from approximately the same geographical point of departure. Each of these two successive waves travelled outwards in all directions in a circle with an ever expanding circumference but with a constant and identic centre;¹ and the younger Islamic wave, travelling at a six hundred years' time-interval in the older Christian wave's wake, caught up and collided with different portions of the Christian wave in different sectors of the circumference of their common circular field at different moments and with different degrees of violence and with different results.

If we take a comparative view of the several collisions between these two waves in the several sectors of their circular line of contact, we shall at once observe one instance in which a portion of the older Christian wave responded to the challenge of the younger Islamic wave's impact with conspicuous success. When the Islamic wave impinged upon the Roman portion of the Christian wave in the western sector of their common circumference, it was Western Christendom and not Islam that ultimately profited by the encounter.²

The Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors, who burst the bounds of Arabia in A.D. 632, took just a century to push their conquests, round the southern and western shores of the Mediterranean, from the former Arabian frontier of the Roman Empire to the southern bank of the Loire. As early as A.D. 647 they made the first movement to recapture for the Syriac Civilization (whose unconscious and unintentional champions they were) the colonial area in North-West Africa and in the Iberian Peninsula which had been first won from barbarism by Phoenician enterprise and then annexed by Hellenism as the spoils of Rome's victory over Carthage. By A.D. 713, the year which saw the completion of the Arab conquest of the Visigothic 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire in the Peninsula and in Septimania, the Arabs had not only recovered the whole of the former colonial domain of the Syriac Society in the Western Mediterranean but were penetrating into territory which had been originally won from barbarism not by Syriac Tyre and Carthage but by Hellenic Marseilles and Rome; and when 'Abd-ar-Rahmān marched from the Pyrenees to the Loire in A.D. 732, he was breaking ground which Hannibal himself had never trodden.³

¹ For this refraction of Syriac religion, through the impact of Hellenism, into a series of waves emanating successively from an identic geographical centre, see II. D (vi), pp. 234-6, and II. D (vii), pp. 285-8, above, and II. D (vi), Annex, pp. 402-3, below, as well as Part IX.

² For the reaction of Western Christendom to the pressure of the Syriac Civilization, represented by the Primitive Arab Muslim conquerors and the subsequent Arab Caliphs and their 'successor-states', see II. D (v), pp. 202-6, above.

³ See II. D (v), p. 203, above.

The only Syriac conqueror that had preceded the Muslim soldier in his invasion of Gaul was the Christian Church; and in this sector of the expanding circumference of the wave-field of Syriac religion, by the time when the Christian wave was here overtaken by the Islamic, the Christian wave, as we have observed above, had already differentiated itself locally into a specifically Roman Christendom which was struggling to become the chrysalis of a new Western Civilization 'affiliated' to the Hellenic Civilization. The Arab invasion of Gaul in A.D. 732 struck this nascent Roman Christendom at a critical moment, when it had just emerged victorious from its struggle with the Far Western Christendom of 'the Celtic Fringe'¹ and was on the verge of a still more formidable struggle with the Teutonic rear-guard of the North European Barbarism in Scandinavia.² The challenge presented to Roman Christendom by the impact of Islam at this juncture was more severe than any challenge from the North European barbarians that it had to face either before or after.³ Yet, severe though this Islamic challenge to Roman Christendom was, the sequel showed that it was not excessive; for the actual effect of this collision of the Islamic wave with the western portion of the Christian wave was to stimulate Western Christendom over a long period and to a high degree.

The strength of this stimulus is displayed in a whole series of responses. In this year A.D. 732 itself, 'Abd-ar-Rahmān's attack upon the Continental European homeland of Western Christendom was repelled once and for all by Charles Martel. By the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era, the Continental European border between Western Christendom and Dār-al-Islām had been pushed back from the northern to the southern foot of the Pyrenees.⁴ At the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Western Christians assumed the offensive against Dār-al-Islām along the whole Mediterranean front, from the Iberian Peninsula to Syria, in the great movement of political and economic expansion which is known as 'the Crusades':⁵ a movement which eventually engulfed Orthodox Christendom as well as Dār-al-Islām. At its furthest extent, this movement carried Western Christian arms down the whole length of the Peninsula and across the Straits of

¹ See pp. 329-40, above.

² See II. D (v), p. 202, above.

⁴ Pepin conquered Septimania from the Arabs in A.D. 755. Charlemagne crossed the Pyrenees in A.D. 778 and succeeded, before his death, in enlarging his Empire by the addition of a Spanish march which included both Barcelona and Pampelona. Thereby a direct contact was established, south of the Pyrenees, between the Carolingian Empire and the remnant of the Visigothic Power which had survived in isolation, for the best part of a century, in the mountain-fastness of Asturia. For the probable fate of the Asturians if the Franks had not delivered their counter-attack against the Arabs, see Annex VIII, p. 447, footnote 4, below.

⁵ In the Western Mediterranean, this movement began a century before the date of 'the First Crusade' in the technical sense of the term.

³ See pp. 344-60, above.

Gibraltar to Ceuta,¹ and from Italy over the stepping-stone of Sicily to the coasts of Tunisia and Tripoli,² and from Europe *outré mer* to Syria, and from Syria across the Euphrates to Edessa and across the Jordan to Kerak and even to the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah—not to speak of 'the Latin Empire' of Constantinople and the cluster of petty principalities which a host of French and Venetian and Genoese and Catalan adventurers carved out for themselves in the Aegean as a sequel to 'the Fourth Crusade'. On its economic side, the same movement carried Western trade much farther: from the Levant across Egypt to India and from the Black Sea across the Eurasian Steppe to the Far East.³ It is true that most of these deliberate economic and political conquests were ephemeral; but even this ephemeral contact with Dār-al-Islām and with Orthodox Christendom on the economic and political planes was sufficiently intimate to produce cultural effects upon Western life which were not only fruitful but enduring.⁴

Moreover, a portion of the political as well as the cultural conquests was permanent. While the medieval Western principalities and colonies in the Levant were all eventually wrested away out of Western hands and gathered up into the Ottoman Empire, Calabria and Sicily and the Iberian Peninsula were permanently incorporated into Western Christendom; and the incorporation of the Iberian Peninsula had momentous consequences, which we have reviewed already, in the histories of the West and of the World. The Atlantic sea-front of the Peninsula from Lisbon to Cadiz, which the Western Christians conquered from Dār-al-Islām between the middle of the twelfth and the middle of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, became 'the jumping-off ground' from which the Portuguese and Castilian pioneers of Western overseas expansion launched the Western Civilization upon the open Atlantic and thereby extended its potential domain, at one stroke, from the narrow bounds of Western Europe to all the navigable seas and habitable lands on the face of the globe. It was the spirit aroused in these Western Christian frontiersmen by their triumphant response to Muslim pressure that nerved them to hazard their lives on the apparently illimitable ocean; and it was the impetus acquired in their victorious counter-attack that carried them not only out into the great deep but right across it into new worlds beyond.⁵

Thus the challenge presented to Western Christendom by the

¹ Conquered by the Portuguese in A.D. 1471.

² A number of places on these North African coasts, from Bona to Tripoli inclusive, were held by the Norman Kings of Sicily for a few years in the middle of the twelfth century.

³ See I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 38, above.

⁴ The cultural effects of the contact of Western Christendom with Orthodox Christendom and with Dār-al-Islām in 'the Crusades' are examined in Part IX, below.

⁵ See II. D (v), p. 204, above.

impact of Islam is manifestly proved, by the outcome of the encounter, to have been highly stimulating, which is as much as to say that in this local encounter the challenge was presented in the optimum degree of severity. The west, however, was only one of several sectors of the concentric Christian and Islamic circles in which a collision between the two waves occurred. While Islam was colliding with Roman Christendom on the west, it was also colliding with Orthodox Christendom on the north and with Monophysite Christendom on the south and with Nestorian Christendom on the east. These several portions of Christendom, which were already alienated from one another spiritually before the Islamic wave welled up in the midst of them, were thenceforth also isolated from one another geographically as the Islamic wave, expanding in their wakes, drove them all outwards and asunder. In consequence, each of these fragmentary Christendoms responded to the Islamic challenge separately and independently on its own account, and these several responses to different presentations of an identic challenge can be compared with one another.

If Western Christendom responded to the challenge of Islam with success, that is the only instance of a successful response which this series of encounters will discover to us. In each of the three other encounters between Islam and a local Christendom, the Christian response was a failure; and when we investigate these failures we shall find that they were not all due to one and the same cause. The encounter between Islam and Monophysitism offers an example of a response which failed because the local presentation of the challenge was not sufficiently severe. In the encounters between Islam and Orthodoxy and between Islam and Nestorianism, the responses were failures because the severity of the challenge was excessive.

The Monophysite failure is Abyssinia: a Monophysite Christian community which has survived in its African fastness, on the southern periphery of the *ci-devant* Syriac World,¹ to become one of the social curiosities of a latter-day Great Society. This Abyssinian Monophysite Christendom is a curiosity nowadays on two accounts: in the first place on account of its sheer survival here, in almost complete isolation from other Christian communities, during the thirteen centuries that have elapsed since the Primitive Muslim Arabs conquered Egypt in A.D. 639-41;² in the second place on account of its extraordinarily low cultural level. 'The common

¹ For this Abyssinian fastness, see II. D (vi), p. 258, above, and II. D (vi), Annex, pp. 403-7, below.

² The antecedent conversion of Abyssinia to a still undifferentiated Christianity had taken place in the fourth century of the Christian Era; the conversion to the Monophysite differentiation of Christianity dates from the latter part of the fifth and early part of the sixth century.

Christianity' of Abyssinia and the West, in a world which the radiation of our Western Christian Civilization has now unified upon a Western basis, is a theme for satire to which only a Voltaire or a Gibbon could do justice. Though Christian Abyssinia has been admitted, with some heart-searching and hesitation, to membership in the League of Nations,¹ she is a byword for disorder and barbarity: the disorder of feudal and tribal anarchy and the barbarity of the slave-trade. In fact, the spectacle presented by the one indigenous African state that has succeeded in retaining its complete independence is perhaps the best justification that can be found for the partition of the rest of Africa among the European Powers.²

Consideration shows that the peculiarities of modern Abyssinia—the survival of her political independence in the midst of an Africa under European dominion, the survival of her Monophysite Christianity in the borderland between Islam and paganism, the survival of her Semitic language between the Hamitic and Nilotic language-areas, and the stagnation of her culture at a level which is really not much higher than the level of the adjacent Tropical African Barbarism—are all peculiarities which derive from the same cause: that is, from the virtual impregnability of the highland-fastness in which this Monophysite fossil is ensconced.

This is the explanation of Abyssinian survival-power. Each casual piece of jetsam that has been left stranded on this rock by the passage of successive waves of civilization has remained high and dry beyond the reach of the waves that have followed.³ A Semitic language has mounted the plateau without succeeding in extinguishing the Hamitic languages which preceded it; a Monophysite Christianity has mounted without succeeding in extinguishing the antecedent Judaism.⁴ The wave of Islam, and the mightier wave of our modern Western Civilization, have washed round the foot of the escarpment without submerging the summit.

The occasions on which these later waves have swept up on to the highlands have been few and brief; and they are the exceptions which prove the prevailing rule of Abyssinian immunity. Abyssinia was in danger of Muslim conquest during the first half of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era when the Muslim inhabitants of the adjoining lowlands along the coasts of the Red Sea and the

¹ For the circumstances of her admission, see Toynbee, A. J.: *A Survey of International Affairs in 1920-3* (London 1925, Milford), pp. 393-6.

² The only other completely sovereign and independent state in Africa besides Abyssinia in the year 1933 was Liberia: a republic in which a helpless aboriginal Negro majority was being mishandled by a repatriated American Negro minority with an almost Abyssinian brutality.

³ See II. D (vi), Annex, pp. 403-7, below.

⁴ For the Jewish fossil (the Falasha) which is ensconced, in the heart of the Monophysite fossil, among the recesses of Semyen, see II. D (vi), p. 257, above, and Annex, pp. 406-7, below.

Gulf of Aden forestalled the Abyssinians in the acquisition of fire-arms; but the newfangled weapons which the Somalis had acquired from the 'Osmanlis' were acquired by the Abyssinians from the Portuguese a quarter of a century later, just in time to save Abyssinia from destruction.¹ Thereafter, when the Portuguese had served their turn and had begun to make themselves a nuisance by attempting to convert Abyssinian Christendom from Monophysitism to Roman Catholicism, the Western version of Christianity was suppressed and all Westerners—priests and laymen alike—were expelled in the 'thirties' of the seventeenth century, at the moment when the same policy was being carried out against the same intrusive forces in Japan.²

Like contemporary Japan, Abyssinia then retired into a deliberate isolation, which lasted until it was eventually broken by the British military expedition to Magdala in 1868. This was a portent of recurring danger from abroad which corresponded in Abyssinian history to the appearance of Commodore Perry's squadron in Yedo Bay in 1853. For the subsequent 'opening-up of Africa' by European Powers whose weapons had just achieved another sudden advance in deadliness—this time in consequence of the Industrial Revolution—exposed Abyssinia once more, towards the close of the nineteenth century, to the menace of foreign conquest which she had had to face in the sixteenth century. This time the formidably armed invaders were not the local Muslims from the Somali coast but a European nation from overseas, the Italians; but once again Abyssinia was saved from destruction by receiving in the nick of time, from friendly hands, a consignment of the deadly weapons that were being used against her. In 'the eighteen-nineties', the Negus Menelik was supplied with breech-loading rifles by the French, as in 'the sixteen-forties' his predecessor Claudius had been supplied by the Portuguese with matchlocks; and in consequence the Italians suffered as signal and decisive a defeat at Abyssinian hands at Adowa in 1896 as the Muslims had suffered at Woina Dega in 1543.

Thus the only two serious foreign attacks which Abyssinia has had to face during the fifteen or sixteen centuries that have elapsed since her conversion were both repelled too quickly and too decisively to serve as stimulating ordeals. The conversion itself has been both the first and the last stirring event in Abyssinian history;

¹ See Alvarez, Father Fr.: *Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to Abyssinia, A.D. 1520-7*: English translation = Hakluyt Society Publication, 1st series, No. 64 (London 1881, Hakluyt Society); Castanhoso, M. de, and Bermudez, J.: *The Portuguese Expedition to Abyssinia in 1541*: English translation = Hakluyt Society Publication, 2nd series, No. 10 (London 1902, Hakluyt Society).

² The expulsion of the Portuguese and Spaniards and the suppression of Roman Catholicism were accomplished in Japan between A.D. 1614 and A.D. 1638.

both before and after, uneventfulness has been the rule; and there is a remarkable contrast between the profound and enduring effect that was made on Japanese minds by the naval demonstration of Commodore Perry and the apparent indifference of the Abyssinians to the military operations of Lord Napier of Magdala. If the Abyssinians have reacted so much less vigorously than the Japanese to our modern Western pressure, that is because the stimulus of the human environment is robbed of half its effect on Abyssinian minds by a knowledge, born of long experience, that the physical environment can be relied upon to relieve the inhabitants of the Abyssinian highlands from most of the onus of self-preservation.

This persistent lack of stimulus fully accounts for the lowness of the cultural level at which Abyssinian Christendom stands to-day. This sheltered Christian society could afford to let the salt of Christianity lose its savour—to relapse almost to the pre-Christian level and to remain at that low level in perpetuity—because its survival was almost automatically secured by the impregnability of the physical fastness in which it had barricaded itself. In fact, the backwardness of Monophysite Christendom on the Abyssinian Plateau is due to precisely the same cause as the failure of Primitive Man to create any indigenous civilization in the adjacent forests and savannahs of Tropical Africa.¹

Thus the response of Abyssinian Monophysitism to the challenge of Islam was a failure because this challenge, like all the challenges with which the Abyssinians have ever been confronted, was mitigated, to a point far below the optimum degree of severity, by the impregnability of the local physical environment. On the other hand, the responses of Anatolian Orthodoxy and Transoxanian Nestorianism to the Islamic challenge were failures for just the opposite reason.

While the wave of Islamic expansion impinged upon Western Christendom in Gaul with stimulating vigour and washed ineffectively round the impregnable fastness of Monophysitism in Abyssinia, it broke upon Orthodox Christendom in Anatolia with almost overwhelming force. Whereas Transpyrenaean Europe was almost out of range of the Muslim Arab Power with its capital at Damascus and its reservoir of soldiers in Arabia,² Transtauric Asia Minor was within easy striking distance; and for some three centuries, from the launching of the original Arab offensive in A.D. 632 until the break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in the tenth century of the Christian Era, the Arab military efforts which were concentrated

¹ For the non-emergence, up to date, of any indigenous civilization in Tropical Africa, see II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, pp. 233-8, and II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 312-15, above.

² See Annex IV, below.

upon this Anatolian front were considerably greater than the contemporary efforts which resulted in more spectacular conquests on other fronts. In the first phase, the Arabs sought to put 'Rûm' out of action and to overwhelm Orthodox Christendom altogether by striking, right across Anatolia, at the Imperial City itself; and they came within an ace of attaining this ambitious objective when they besieged Constantinople in A.D. 673-7 and again in A.D. 717-18. Even after the failure of the second siege, when the frontier between Rûm and Dâr-al-Islâm settled down along a more or less stable line coinciding with the physical barrier of the Taurus Range, the surviving Anatolian domain of Orthodox Christendom was regularly raided by the Muslims twice a year, in spring and in autumn, from their *place d'armes* in the Cilician plain at Tarsus.¹

Thus Orthodox Christendom had to resist a pressure from Islam which was distinctly more severe than the pressure from the same force to which Western Christendom was exposed, and infinitely more severe than any Islamic pressure upon Monophysite Abyssinia. The Orthodox Christians responded to this pressure by a political expedient; and this response was successful inasmuch as it availed to keep the Arabs at bay. On the other hand, it was unsuccessful inasmuch as the expedient adopted for this specific purpose had far-reaching effects, which were almost wholly pernicious, upon the inward life and growth of the Orthodox Christian Society: effects which caused the Orthodox Christian Civilization, after a brief spell of illusory power and prosperity, to break down and go into disintegration in the latter part of the tenth century of the Christian Era, just at the time when the sister civilization of Western Christendom was surmounting its early difficulties and entering upon that course of almost uninterrupted progress which has carried it to the pinnacle on which it stands to-day.

The political expedient which Arab Muslim pressure impelled Orthodox Christendom to adopt was the evocation of a 'ghost' of the Roman Empire: a feat which was achieved effectively, and therefore disastrously, in the Orthodox Christian World by Leo the Syrian about two generations before it was attempted unsuccessfully, and therefore innocuously, in Western Christendom by Charlemagne. The disastrous effects of this Orthodox Christian *tour de force* have been mentioned in passing already² and are examined in greater detail below.³ In this place it is sufficient to take note of two of these effects, one general and the other particular.

¹ For these periodic raids, see Le Strange, G.: *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge 1905, University Press), pp. 132-9; Brooks, E. W.: 'The Struggle with the Saracens (717-867)', in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1923, University Press), ch. v.

² See Part I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 65 and 67, above.

³ In IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 320-405, below.

The general effect was a premature and excessive aggrandizement of the State in Orthodox Christian social life at the expense of all other institutions. The particular effect was the special consequence of the aggrandizement of the Orthodox Christian State at the expense of the Orthodox Christian Church. In Orthodox Christendom in the eighth century the Church suffered a fate which it escaped in Western Christendom until the sixteenth century, and which it only suffered then, immediately and completely, in those Western Christian countries that turned Protestant. In the eighth century, the Orthodox Christian Church was relegated to the position of a department of state; and thus, instead of serving as an institutional embodiment of the unity of Society, as the Roman Church served during the Western 'middle ages', the Orthodox Church served from the outset, like the 'established' churches of Protestant states in the modern age of Western history, to accentuate and aggravate the division and the strife which were produced in the bosom of Society by its articulation into sovereign independent states. The ultimate consequence was an internecine hundred years' war between an East Roman Empire and Patriarchate on the one side and a Bulgarian Empire and Patriarchate on the other which ended in a 'knock-out blow'; and this self-inflicted wound was the death of the Orthodox Christian Society.¹

It will be seen that the premature breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization was the penalty of malformation due to overstrain, and that this overstrain was imposed upon the Orthodox Christian social fabric by the necessity of resisting the Islamic impact. In other words, the severity of the challenge which this Islamic impact presented to Orthodox Christendom was excessive.

The Abortive Far Eastern Christian Civilization

If we now turn our attention, in conclusion, to the eastern sector of the circular line of contact between the Christendoms and Islam, and examine the effects of the Islamic impact upon Nestorian Christendom, we shall find that the severity of the challenge here was greater still. An ordeal which condemned the Orthodox Christian Civilization to die a premature death actually prevented a 'Far Eastern Christian Civilization' from being born.

This embryonic Far Eastern Christian Civilization in a Nestorian chrysalis, which the Islamic impact rendered abortive, was germinating in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin; and the blow that robbed it of its chance of coming to life was the permanent annexation of the

¹ For the Ottoman sequel to this 'time of troubles' in Orthodox Christendom, see Part III. A. vol. iii, pp. 26-7, below.

Oxus-Jaxartes Basin to the Arab Empire in A.D. 737-41.¹ The Arab Empire was a resumption or reintegration of the Syriac universal state which had originally been embodied in the Achaemenian Empire before the premature overthrow of the Achaemenidae by Alexander; and the Arab conquest of Transoxania re-extended the limits of the Syriac universal state, over against the Eurasian Steppe, to the line at which these limits had stood during the Achaemenian régime.² This restoration, however, was by no means a foregone conclusion; for, by the time when it was at last achieved by the Arab commanders Asad and Nasr, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been politically divorced from the rest of the Syriac World for the best part of nine centuries;³ and this political divorce had been followed by a cultural estrangement.

The frontier drawn across the ancient Syriac domain from the highlands of Afghanistan down the basin of the Murghab and out on to the Transcaspian Steppe, which the Arab conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin obliterated in A.D. 737-41, was as old, and as deeply scored, as the more famous frontier—running from the Armenian highlands down the Euphrates Basin and out on to the North Arabian Steppe—which the Arabs had obliterated in A.D. 632-41, when they had conquered the Sasanian Empire with one hand and the Syriac provinces of the Roman Empire with the other. Moreover, the conquest of Transoxania, which was relatively remote from the Arabs' base of operations, instead of lying at the threshold of Arabia like Syria and 'Irāq, was only undertaken after a long delay and was only carried through to a successful conclusion after strenuous exertions. The Arabs had completed the conquest of the Sasanian dominions, up to the line of the Murghab, by A.D. 651; they did not seriously attempt the conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin till more than fifty years later, in A.D. 705; and their successive attempts, which began in that year, all failed to achieve more than a transitory success until in A.D. 736 the Arab commander Asad, like the Macedonian Alexander before him,⁴ supplemented an ineffective policy of force by a masterly policy of conciliation.⁵ Even so, the definitive Arab conquest of Transoxania, which followed in A.D. 737-41, was not confirmed until the Chinese, who had been supporting the Transoxanians in their resistance, were defeated by the Arabs on the banks of the River Talas in A.D. 751, just a century after the Arabs had reached the banks of the Murghab.

¹ See II. D (v), p. 141, with footnotes 2 and 3; and II. D (vi), p. 237, above.

² See II. D (v), p. 142, above.

³ See p. 141, footnote 2, above.

⁴ See II. D (v), p. 140, above.

⁵ For Asad's policy see Gibb, H. A. R.: *The Arab Conquests in Central Asia* (London 1923, The Royal Asiatic Society), pp. 80-1.

The embryonic civilization which was germinating in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin at the time of the Arab conquest, and which resisted the annihilating impact so obstinately, though ultimately in vain, was the product of Central Asian history during those eight or nine preceding centuries during which the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been living a life of its own with special functions and special experiences.

The intrusion of Hellenism into the Syriac World at the heels of Alexander the Great affected the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin as profoundly as any other part of the Syriac domain, notwithstanding the fact that Transoxania lay at the opposite extremity of the Syriac World to the point at which Hellenism had made its entry. In spite of this geographical remoteness, the Bactrian and Sogdian oases received a greater infusion of Greek colonists—and therewith a stronger tincture of Hellenic culture—than many regions which lay nearer to the Aegean: the reason, no doubt, being the intrinsic importance of Transoxania as the march over against the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe.¹ The process of Hellenization was even intensified, for a time, when the Greek settlers in Central Asia severed their political connexion with the Seleucid Macedonian 'successor-state' of the Achaemenian Empire in the middle of the third century B.C. and set up a Bactrian Greek Empire of their own; but there were other sequels to this Central Asian Greek secession which were of greater historical moment.

In the first place, the hostility between the Bactrian Greek Power and the Seleucid Power set up a barrier between the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and the rest of the Syriac World—a barrier that was quickly broadened when, in the adjoining province of Khurāsān, a community of Nomad origin followed the Bactrian Greeks' example and founded a principality which began as a buffer state between the Bactrian Greek and the Seleucid Greek Power and ended as the so-called Parthian Empire.² In the second place, the Bactrian Greeks turned their arms against India and thereby opened the way for the intrusion of Hellenism upon the Indic World: an intrusion which is to be dated from the passage of the Hindu Kush by the Bactrian Greek prince Demetrius about 190 B.C., and not from Alexander's brilliant but ephemeral Indian campaign of 326—

¹ For this function of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, see II. D (v), pp. 138-50, above.

² The founders of 'the Parthian Empire' were Parni; and the Parni were one of the three semi-Nomadic hordes of the Dahae, who had been deposited in Transcaspiā by the same eruption out of the Steppes that had carried their neighbours and kinsmen, the Massagetae, to the Jaxartes, and the Cimmerians and Scythians as far west as the shores of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The particular war-band of Parni who founded 'the Parthian Empire' appear to have drifted out of Transcaspiā on to the northern rim of the Iranian Plateau *circa* 250 B.C.; and since their new home lay in the old Achaemenian province of Parthia, the Parthian name came to be applied both to the new arrivals themselves and to the empire which they eventually built up round this territorial nucleus.

325 B.C.¹ In the third place, the Greek Power in Bactria, alienated as it was from the Seleucidae and cut off from the main body of the Hellenic World by the rise of the Parthians in Khurāsān, proved unequal to the task of holding the Eurasian border of the Hellenized Syriac World against Nomad pressure.

In the last quarter of the second century B.C., the Nomads broke through the Bactrian frontier defences in two successive waves—Sakas² and 'Indo-Parthians' in the van, Yuechi or Kushans in the rear—submerged the oases of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and flooded on round, or over, the Hindu Kush into India in the footsteps of the antecedent Bactrian Greek conquerors. This barbarian Völkerwanderung put an end to Greek rule in Central Asia and in India. It did not, however, extinguish Hellenic culture in the regions on either side of the Hindu Kush which the Bactrian Greek princes had united under their sceptre. These Eurasian barbarians were Philhellenes;³ and under their aegis Hellenism survived to be an effective cultural force in the Kushan Empire, which was brought into existence in the first century of the Christian Era by the reunion of all the *ci-devant* Bactrian Greek dominions under the rule of an ex-Nomad dynasty. The effect of the Nomad influx was unfavourable not to Hellenism but rather to the Syriac Civilization in Central Asia. The cumulative effect of all the events that have just been recited was temporarily to disconnect the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin from the Syriac World and to connect it up with the Indic World instead. The north-eastern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau became a cultural and political barrier, whereas the statesmanship of local Greek and Kushan empire-builders temporarily 'abolished the Hindu Kush' as Louis XIV boasted himself to have 'abolished the Pyrenees'.

During the four hundred years or so—from the second century B.C. to the third century of the Christian Era—during which Central Asia and North-Western India were clamped together first under Greek and then under Kushan rule, this temporary political union had a momentous and enduring cultural result which was parallel, *mutatis mutandis*, to the cultural result that followed from the clamping together of Syria and the Hellenic World for an approximately equal length of time under the Roman Empire. In either case, the

¹ On this point, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86, above.

² These Sakas appear to have been identical with the (Massa-)getae who had ranged the Steppes immediately adjoining the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin in the Achaemenian Age. They are probably represented by the modern Jāts of the Panjab (compare Annex V, below), and their companions or pursuers the Tochari by the Doghras.

³ Hellenism had previously proved attractive to the Scyths: a Nomadic people who had been carried out of the interior of Eurasia on to the steppes adjoining the north coast of the Black Sea in the preceding period of disturbance in Eurasia (*circa* 825–525 B.C.), and who had thus come into contact with the Greek movement of maritime expansion. (See the story of Scyles in Herodotus, Book IV, chs. 78–80.)

political union of heterogeneous cultural elements generated a great syncretistic religion: in the one case the Syro-Hellenic religion of Catholic Christianity, in the other case the Indo-Hellenic religion of Mahayanian Buddhism. The Mahayana grew up within the framework of the Kushan Empire as the Catholic Church grew up within the framework of the Roman Empire; but in Central Asia the situation was complicated by further factors.

One new factor was that, under the Kushan régime, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin ceased to be a march between a civilization and a barbarism and became, instead, a corridor along which three different civilizations entered into communication with one another. In the last quarter of the second century B.C., immediately after the exodus of the Sakas and the Yuechi from the Central Asian Steppe, the Sinic Society, which at that time was living, under the Han Dynasty, through its universal state, expanded its spheres of exploration and influence westward, beyond the western extremity of the Great Wall, along the line of oases in the Tarim Basin, and thereby established contact with the Hellenic and the Indic Civilization which were then beginning, under the auspices of the Bactrian Greek Empire, to blend with one another in the Basin of the Jaxartes and the Oxus. The resultant commerce of cultures along this Central Asian corridor became more active at the turn of the first and second centuries of the Christian Era, when the dust of the Nomad Völkerwanderung was subsiding. The Han Empire and the Kushan Empire marched with one another in Central Asia for at least a century (*circa* A.D. 75-175); in the wars between them, the oases of the Tarim Basin were bandied to and fro between the one Power and the other; and thus the seeds of the Mahayana which were sown in the Tarim Basin during the periods when it was under Kushan rule were able to propagate themselves in the Far East during the periods when the Tarim Basin was united politically with China. In consequence, the Mahayana did not remain confined to the Kushan Empire in which it had originated. After issuing out of India across the North-West Frontier, it passed on in a curving orbit—skirting Tibet on three sides—through the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and the Tarim Basin into the Far East;¹ and, like Catholic Christianity, it was destined to receive more honour in a new world than in its own birthplace. At the present day, the Mahayana is a mighty power in China and Korea and Japan while it is extinct in both India and Central Asia.

The extinction of Mahayanian Buddhism in India through the rise of a 'totalitarian' Indic religion in the shape of Hinduism does

¹ On the route by which the Mahayana reached the Far East, see II. D (vi), Annex, p. 405, footnote 1, below.

not here concern us.¹ Its extinction in Central Asia—where, as in India, this was a gradual process—was due to a resurgence of the Syriac Civilization which made itself felt in all parts of the buried, but not dead, Syriac body social. From the third century of the Christian Era onwards, this Syriac risorgimento manifested itself, as we have noticed in another connexion,² in the waves of religion which were periodically emitted by the Syriac internal proletariat. While Judaism had only defied Hellenism as a forlorn hope and Catholic Christianity had not defied Hellenism at all but had found its field of action in the Hellenic World as a Syro-Hellenic syncretism, most of the subsequent Syriac religious movements were deliberate and successful anti-Hellenic reactions.³ In the third century of the Christian Era, a Zoroastrian Church Militant constituted itself the established church of a Sasanian state whose mission was to fight Hellenism with temporal weapons by wresting back all ex-Achaemenian territories from the Roman Empire. In the fifth century, the Nestorian and Monophysite movements sought to wrest back Christianity itself from the Hellenizers by recovering the Syriac gold in the Christian syncretism from its Hellenic alloy; and both these anti-Hellenic Christian movements managed to survive: Nestorianism outside and Monophysitism actually inside the Roman frontiers.

The frontier between the Roman and Sasanian Empires was the line along which these battles were fought; but the forces there brought into action soon began to make themselves felt, as well, on the opposite frontier of the Sasanian Empire, where it marched with other ex-Achaemenian territories in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin. The Kushan Empire broke up about the time when the Sasanian Empire came into existence; but the Sasanidae were no more successful on the north-east than they were on the west in their long efforts to restore the lost unity of the Syriac World by force of arms. The political heirs of the Kushans were not the Sasanidae but two fresh hordes of Nomad invaders who were carried out of the Steppes in this direction in the ensuing period of disturbance in Eurasia (*circa* A.D. 375-675). The Huns overran the *ci-devant* Kushan dominions in both Central Asia and India in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era; and the White Huns or Ephthalites, who had fastened upon the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, were supplanted

¹ On this matter, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 85 and 87, above, and II D (vi), Annex, in the present volume, p. 405, footnote 1, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 136-9, as well as Part IX, below.

² On pp. 234-6, and 285-8, above.

³ Manichaeism may be regarded as a partial exception. At any rate, it took pains, like Catholic Christianity before it, to propagate itself in the Hellenic World. Both Manichaeism and Mazdakism were directed, in the first instance, not against Hellenism so much as against the Zoroastrian established church of the Sasanian Empire. (See further V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex I, vol. v, pp. 575-80, below.)

there by the Turks in A.D. 563-8. Thus the political divorce of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin from the rest of the Syriac World was still maintained. On the other hand, the Syriac Civilization began to recapture its lost Central Asian provinces not by force of arms but by the peaceful penetration of religious propaganda.

In this north-eastward expansion of Syriac religion, Zoroastrianism might have been expected to play the leading part in virtue of the geographical proximity of its base of operations on the Iranian Plateau; but it actually failed to play this part because it was handicapped by its status as the established religion of the Sasanian Empire, with which the rulers of Central Asia were at enmity. The Syriac religions which did successfully penetrate the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin under the Ephthalite and the Turkish régime were those which had been subjected to persecution in the empires in which they had first raised their heads; for their adherents were driven by *force majeure* to seek asylum abroad and were readily received by the Powers which were at enmity with the persecuting Governments, since the persecuted refugees could fall under no suspicion of intending to act as the secret agents of Governments before whose face they had fled. Thus Manichaeism, which was proscribed and persecuted in the Sasanian Empire in the third century of the Christian Era, and Mazdakism, which had the same experience in the Sasanian Empire in the fifth century, and Nestorianism, which was proscribed and persecuted in the fifth century in the Roman Empire and was therefore granted free passage into and across the Sasanian dominions, all in turn passed on into the Central Asian corridor and made their way through it into the Far East.¹ This new north-eastward radiation of Syriac culture in the form of religious waves was so vigorous that the Nestorian Christian wave, which was the latest in the series, had already reached the capital of the T'ang Empire, Si Ngan, in A.D. 636,² only just over two hundred years after the outcome of the Council of Ephesus had made life impossible for the Nestorians within the frontiers of the Roman Empire in A.D. 431. Contemporaneously, the Mahayana appears to have decreased in Central Asia as the Syriac religions increased. In the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, it was evidently in decline by the time when the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang) traversed the Central Asian corridor from east to west *circa* A.D. 629, *en route* from China to India.³

This was the situation in Central Asia at the moment when the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of the Sasanian Empire com-

¹ See Barthold, W.: *Zur Geschichte des Christentums in Mittel-Asien bis zur mongolischen Eroberung* (Tübingen and Leipzig, 1901, Mohr), pp. 10-16.

² See II. D (vi), p. 237, above. The date is established by the famous Christian inscription of Si Ngan.

³ Barthold, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

pleted their conquest by reaching the Sasanids' north-east frontier along the River Murghab in A.D. 651.¹ Their advent raised a momentous issue. Would the new Islamic wave of Syriac religion roll on in the wake of the preceding Nestorian and Mazdakite and Manichaean waves until it broke, in its turn, upon the western borders of the Far Eastern World?² Or would the Nestorian Christendom which had forestalled Islam in Central Asia succeed in resisting and repelling the Islamic impact? In other terms, was the embryo of a new 'Far Eastern Christian Civilization' in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin to succeed or to fail in coming to birth?

In the middle of the seventh century of the Christian Era, all the local conditions in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin appear to have been in favour of the genesis of a new civilization there. There had been a long and thorough local intermingling of cultures: Syriac and Hellenic and Indic. There had been an equally long and thorough local intermingling of races: an indigenous Iranian peasantry overlaid by a deposit of Iranian-speaking Nomads in the second century B.C. and by a further layer of Turkish-speaking Nomads (Ephthalites and Turks) in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era. And this fruitful diversity of the human element was preserved and accentuated by the character of the physical environment. The concentration of the sedentary inhabitants into a number of separate fortified oases (working together, it may be, with a lingering memory of the Hellenic social tradition which had been imported by Alexander and his successors) had resulted in the social articulation of the country into a number of politically independent but economically and culturally inter-connected city-states; and the princes and merchants of these city-states were on good terms with their Ephthalite and Turkish Nomad overlords, who were enlightened enough to understand that their own true advantage lay in fostering the prosperity of their sedentary vassals and not in killing the goose that laid the golden egg.

'The golden egg' of seventh-century Central Asia was the transit-trade along the corridor between the still surviving Roman Empire and the 'ghost' of the Sinic universal state which had just been revived in the Far East under the dynasties of the Sui and the T'ang.³ Under the aegis of the Ephthalite and Turkish khans, this trans-steppe commerce (which resembled maritime rather than overland trade) was being conducted, with profit to all parties concerned, by the merchants of the Transoxanian cities; and this

¹ See the masterly description in Gibb, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-11.

² This, of course, has been the actual outcome. The Syriac religion which has a footing in North-Western China at the present day is neither Manichaeism nor Nestorianism but Islam.

³ For the role of the T'ang Empire as a 'ghost' of the Han Empire, see Part X, below.

commerce was opening up, for the embryonic new civilization of the communities that were conducting it, the vast hinterland of the Eurasian Steppe. Transoxania possesses greater natural advantages as a 'jumping-off ground' for the conquest of the Steppe by a sedentary society than any of the other settled regions by which the coasts of the great Eurasian Steppe are bounded; and we have observed already¹ that even in the actual event, when Nestorianism had been robbed of its Central Asian base of operations through the Muslim conquest of Transoxania in A.D. 737-41, it very nearly succeeded in permanently converting the whole of the Eurasian Nomadic Society.

Thus, in the middle of the seventh century of the Christian Era, the new embryonic civilization in Central Asia had fair prospects in every quarter except the south-west, where the wave of Islam was welling up and menacingly raising its crest. If that menacing tide had been successfully stemmed, we must suppose that the embryo would have come to birth, and we can even conjecture to some extent the physiognomy which this civilization would have assumed if it had not been abortive.

The 'Far Eastern Christian Civilization' of Central Asia would probably have displayed a certain resemblance to the 'Far Western Christian Civilization' of Ireland.² The introduction of the germ of Christianity into Central Asia by Nestorian missionaries, just before Central Asia was isolated from the other Christendoms by the welling up of the Islamic wave in the midst of them, was analogous to the introduction of the germ of Christianity into Ireland by Saint Patrick just before Ireland was isolated from the other Christendoms by the settlement of the pagan English barbarians in Britain. In these circumstances, we have observed how, in Ireland, Christianity blended harmoniously with the indigenous culture of the island to create a new civilization with a high vitality and a distinctive character. If Nestorian Christianity in Central Asia had been able to repel the Islamic assault, or had been screened from its incidence as Ireland was screened from the incidence of the English assault by a Welsh buffer, we may conjecture that in those circumstances Nestorian Christianity would have followed the same course in the Far East that Patrician Christianity actually followed in the Far West. We can imagine Central Asian Nestorianism coming to some permanent local understanding with the Mahayana—and perhaps even with the remnants of Zoroastrianism as well; for the Zoroastrians, who maintained their independence in a fastness between the Elbruz Mountains and the Caspian for two or three hundred years after the Arab conquest of the rest of the Sasanian

¹ In II. D (vi), on pp. 237-8, above.

² See pp. 322-8, above.

Empire, had been chastened by adversity. In their new predicament they would assuredly have abandoned their traditional exclusiveness and intolerance (which had lost their *raison d'être* after the overthrow of the empire in which Zoroastrianism had been the established church); and we can imagine them making common cause with any forces in Central Asia which could offer them a *point d'appui* for that resistance to Islam which had become their absorbing occupation. We have, then, to conceive of the unrealized 'Far Eastern Christian Civilization' as based upon an entente between Nestorianism on the one hand and Buddhism and Zoroastrianism on the other: an entente which might have taken the alternative forms of coalescence (like the coalescence between Christianity and the Celtic Paganism in Ireland) or of eclecticism (like the abortive Neoplatonic Church of the Emperor Julian or the successful eclectic religion of Hinduism)¹ or of 'tri-religionism' (like the simultaneous practice of the Mahayana with Confucianism and Taoism by Buddhists in latter-day China, and with Confucianism and Shintoism by Buddhists in latter-day Japan).² On any of these alternative bases, we can imagine the rise of a great creative 'Far Eastern Christian Civilization' and picture it spreading from the oases of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin over the Eurasian Steppe, and from Eurasia into the other regions round about.

Why did this potential 'Far Eastern Christian Civilization' fail to materialize? Or, in concrete terms, why did the Nestorian Christendom of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin fail to resist the impact of the Arab Muslim conquerors during the critical century A.D. 651-751? The problem can be stated in this way: In (let us say) A.D. 721, the strategic position of the Arabs *vis-à-vis* the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was not unlike their position at the same moment *vis-à-vis* Gaul. On both their Central Asian and their European front, at that moment, the Arabs were standing just on the farther side of a well-defined physical boundary at the threshold of a new world which they might or might not proceed to conquer. As early as A.D. 713, Musa had quietly occupied Septimania,³ while Qutaybah's more ambitious Central Asian campaigns of A.D. 705-15 had evoked a more vigorous riposte, with the result that, by the year 721, the

¹ For the nature of Hinduism and Neoplatonism, see further V. C (i) (c), 2 vol. v, pp. 136-9; V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, pp. 565-7; V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 680-3; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 222-3, below.

² In the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, in Uiguria, Nestorianism and Buddhism were actually living cheek by jowl on a *modus vivendi* of mutual toleration. This relation between these two religions at that time and place has been put on record by the Western travellers who passed that way *en route* for the Court of the Mongol Great Khan. These Western travellers were naturally impressed by finding two would-be universal churches at peace with one another, in contrast to the perpetual state of 'Holy War' which was the contemporary relation between Western Christendom and Islam. (See Barthold, W.: *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (2nd ed. *Anglice*, translated and edited by Gibb, H. A. R.: Oxford 1928, University Press), pp. 389-90.)

³ See p. 361, above.

Arabs' holdings in Tukharistan and Transoxania, beyond the north-eastern foot of the Iranian Plateau, were no larger than their contemporary holdings in Gaul, beyond the northern foot of the Pyrenees.¹ By the year 732, after another dozen years of campaigning on either front, the respective positions were still apparently the same. By the beginning of the year 732, in consequence of the disastrous Battle of the Pass in 731, the Arabs had lost all but three posts beyond the Oxus, and all but one or two in Tukharistan; while at the same date, owing to the (less serious) reverse at Tours, they had retreated again to the Septimanian extremity of Gaul. Ultimate success was not in either case out of the question, but experience seemed to show that in both areas it could only be purchased at the price of great and sustained military efforts. In both areas, however, the sequel failed to bear out the natural expectations. The Battle of Tours was accepted as final, and from that time onwards the Arabs often lost, but practically never gained, ground on their north-western frontier. On the other hand, the seemingly not less serious situation on the north-east was so dramatically reversed during the next nine years that by A.D. 741 the whole of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been incorporated definitively into the Arab Empire at a relatively small cost in the shape of fresh military operations.

How are we to account for the remarkable difference between Arab military fortunes in these two war-zones? Why did the Arabs fail to conquer Gaul and succeed in conquering Transoxania? One obvious explanation is to be found in the very much greater distance of the European war-zone from the Arab base of operations. We have already had occasion² to remark upon the inordinate length of 'Abd-ar-Rahmān's line of communications in A.D. 732 by the time when he had reached the Loire. The distance overland³ (and the Arabs did not command the Mediterranean) from the Umayyads' capital at Damascus to Narbonne, their advanced base on the threshold of Gaul, is approximately twice as great as the distance from Damascus to Merv, their advanced base on the threshold of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin. This difference in distance explains much; yet the whole explanation of the difference between the outcomes of the two encounters can hardly lie here; for, while sheer distance told in favour of Western Christendom in its resistance to the Islamic impact, there were other factors—including certain geo-

¹ Qutaybah had penetrated far beyond the bounds of Khurāsān into Khwārizm and Farghana. It has been shown, however, by Mr. H. A. R. Gibb (in *op. cit.*, pp. 29-87) that Qutaybah's campaigns in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, though brilliant and extensive, were superficial, and that the results were almost entirely lost, within six years of his death (*op. cit.*, p. 55), by a Central Asian counterstroke.

² On pp. 203 and 361, above. On this point see further II. D (vii), Annex IV, pp. 428-9, below.

³ Via North Africa and the Straits of Gibraltar.

graphical factors—in which Far Eastern Christendom had the advantage.

For example, the Pyrenees were not nearly so formidable a political and cultural barrier in the first half of the eighth century of the Christian Era as the north-eastern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau. By that date the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been divorced politically, and to a large extent also culturally, from Iran for close upon nine hundred years; and there was a profound cleavage in tradition and *éthos* between the two regions. On the other hand, eighth-century Aquitaine had a stronger sense of affinity with the Iberian Peninsula—a country with which Aquitaine had been united politically not only under the Roman Empire but also for a time thereafter under the Visigothic 'successor-state'—than she had with Northern Gaul: an ex-Roman territory that had been barbarized by the immigration of the Franks.¹ Although, by the year 732, Aquitaine had been subject to Frankish political domination for more than two centuries—ever since Frankish Clovis had won his victory over Gothic Alaric at Vouillé in A.D. 507²—the Aquitanians had never become reconciled to Frankish rule; and if 'Abd-ar-Rahmān had won a victory over Charles Martel in A.D. 732, or had even subsequently retrieved his defeat, the Aquitanians would assuredly have been well content to exchange a Frankish for an Arab master. In this important matter of local political sentiment, the conditions were certainly less unfavourable to the Arabs in Gaul than they were in Transoxania.

As compared with Gaul, again, Transoxania possessed other assets as well. From the military point of view the Empire of the T'ang may have proved a broken reed, but the diplomatic support against the Arabs which the independent states of Transoxania and Tukharistan were constantly receiving from the Court of Si Ngan was at any rate an effective moral weapon, especially since, to the Arabs, its value long remained imponderable and therefore subject to over-estimation. The Aquitanians, Neustrians, and Austrasians, in the crisis of A.D. 713–32, do not appear to have received either naval assistance in the Mediterranean or diplomatic support at Damascus from the Court of Constantinople, so that both the fighting and the bluffing had all to be their own. In matters of topography and climate, moreover, Transoxania was a more difficult country than Gaul for the invader. The cultivated areas were not continuous, but were separated by stretches of steppe and desert; the rivers, being mightier streams than the Garonne, the Loire, or the Seine, offered correspondingly greater obstacles; and

¹ See II. D (vii), Annex IV, p. 428, below.

² For the Battle of Vouillé, see II. D (v), p. 166, above.

between the crossing of the Oxus at Tirmidh and the Transoxanian metropolis of Samarqand there were formidable mountains to be traversed which had not their like at any point on the road from Narbonne to Tours. As for political unity, it was still hardly more than nominal in the Frankish dominions at this period and was of little account for the practical purpose of military co-operation, so that, even from this point of view, the Transoxanians and Tukharistanis were scarcely at a disadvantage as compared with the peoples of Gaul, while such disadvantage as there may have been was no doubt more than compensated by the greater vitality of local political life in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and the distinctly higher level of general civilization.

These further considerations have to be set off against the simple explanation of the difference between the Arabs' military success in Central Asia and their military failure in Europe in terms of the relative distance of the two theatres of war from Arabia. In fact, they diminish the force of this explanation to such a degree that we can hardly regard the problem as solved unless some supplementary explanation is forthcoming. Perhaps the higher level of general civilization that prevailed in Transoxania at the time supplies the clue.

In what, after all, did the superiority, in this respect, of Transoxania over contemporary Gaul consist? Undoubtedly in an immeasurably greater development of international trade, as might be expected in a region which had long been, and still was, a corridor of communication between surrounding societies, whereas the Gaul of that day was a semi-civilized region penned up in a blind alley at the ends of the Earth. That difference has an important bearing on our problem, for it means that the eighth-century population of Gaul possessed no vital commercial interests which would be damaged or promoted by possible alternative relations between them and the Arab Empire. At that date they were an agricultural society, and little more besides—such commerce as existed between Gaul and the rest of the World being then largely carried on by Italians, Syrians, and other outsiders. Transoxania, on the other hand, was a commercial community first and foremost.¹ Her numerous and well-peopled cities could not subsist upon the local oasis-cultivation, the extent of which was limited by a restricted water-supply, however scientific the methods of irrigation. For such a society, international trade was not a mere optional source of surplus profit but a necessity of existence; and each new development of the struggle with the Arabs struck a fresh blow at this staple of Transoxania's economic life.

¹ On this, see Gibb, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 2, 5, and 88.

During the first phase of the struggle, which may be dated from Qutaybah's opening campaign in A.D. 705 down to A.D. 719 (by which year the greater part of his work had been undone through the unaided efforts of the Transoxanians and Tukharistanis themselves), the damage to trade was evidently not intolerable. The commercial classes in the Oxus-Jaxartes principalities were not yet faced by an unprecedented situation, for the Arab Empire in this quarter had simply stepped into the shoes of the Sasanian Empire, with which the Transoxanian Powers had frequently been at war. During these earlier hostilities, the Government at Ctesiphon appears, on more than one occasion, to have placed embargoes upon Transoxanian trade along routes that traversed the Sasanian dominions; but they had never succeeded in dealing that trade a mortal blow, and the Sughdi merchants had shown enterprise and ingenuity in opening up alternative lines of communication with their Mediterranean customers.¹ Even, moreover, if their trade with the Roman Empire were temporarily cut off, they still remained the monopolists of the overland route between the Far East and India, and the volume of this branch of commerce was no doubt sufficient to secure them against anything like an economic catastrophe. This was the situation down to A.D. 719; but it was altered—and, as it turned out, very much for the worse from the point of view of Transoxanian trade—when, in A.D. 720–1, the Türgesh Nomads from the heart of the Eurasian Steppe began to take a hand in the struggle between the Transoxanian city-states and the Arab Empire.

The Türgesh intervened as mandatories of the Government of Si Ngan and as auxiliaries of the Transoxanians in their war of liberation; and, as far as fighting the Arabs was concerned, they performed their task efficiently. For seventeen years they kept the Arab forces on the defensive, inflicted upon them several military disasters, and gradually forced them out of their fortresses beyond the River. The nominal beneficiaries discovered, however, that the remedy was worse than the disease. Officially, the Türgesh were the subjects and agents of China; but the Chinese authorities exercised no supervision, and the Türgesh evidently behaved as irresponsible Nomads do behave when they find themselves in military control of sedentary populations. The eastern trade-routes were cut; and, when the Türgesh actually crossed the Upper Oxus and began to push the Arabs out of Tukharistan, that must have

¹ e.g. the embassy which arrived in A.D. 568 at the Court of Constantinople from the Khaqan of the Nomad empire of the Turks included a Transoxanian prince, whose object was to open up a trade-route north of the Caspian and therefore beyond the reach of interference by the Persians. It seems probable that this embassy was sent on the initiative of the Transoxanian merchants, though it was headed by a representative of their suzerain, the Turkish Khaqan.

made matters still worse from the economic point of view, for the insecurity was thereby extended to the routes between Transoxania and Hindustan. Meanwhile, the Chinese suzerains of the Türgesh had already become so incensed against their unmanageable vassals that they took the opportunity of a victory which was gained at last (in A.D. 737) by the Arab governor Asad over the Türgesh Khaqan in Juzjān and Khurāsān to destroy the Türgesh Confederacy and to disperse the horde. It is safe to conjecture that the Transoxanian commercial classes, on whom the direct losses had fallen, felt even more bitterly against the Türgesh than did the Government of the T'ang, and this explains the immediate and general success which attended the conciliatory policy that had already been initiated by Asad and was being followed out by his successor Nasr.

In 736 Asad appears to have come to an understanding with the Iranian notables of Tukharistan. The national capital of Balkh, ruined in the previous wars, was rebuilt, under Asad's auspices, by the Tukharistanis themselves, in order to replace Merv as the seat of the Arab provincial administration. This step was taken by Asad the year before his victory over the Türgesh, and the succeeding year (A.D. 738) was signalized by Nasr's declaration of amnesty and guarantee of rights to the peoples of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin. The tolerance of non-Arab nationalities and non-Islamic religions, upon strict but not unbearable conditions of inferiority, was a permanent feature in the policy of the Arab Empire—a feature without which that Empire could never have achieved its astonishing triumphs. Nasr's charter, however, appears to have been exceptionally favourable; and, by granting it, he offered the Transoxanians an honourable escape from the terrible choice between political servitude and commercial ruin. On condition of accepting Arab sovereignty on not intolerable terms, they were given the prospect, not merely of commercial recovery, but of perhaps unprecedented prosperity.

If once the political objections to incorporation into the Arab Empire were surmounted, there could be no doubt of its advantages from the economic point of view; for, in place of a permanent military front upon their south-western border, it opened up to Transoxanian merchants a hinterland stretching from Khurāsān to the Mediterranean and from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Moreover, Arab statesmanship set itself promptly to reopen the trade-routes leading along the Central Asian corridor to the Far East. 'Shortly after his recapture of Samarqand' (probably in A.D. 739), Nasr 'sent an embassy to China. This was followed up in 744 by a much more elaborate embassy, obviously intended to regulate commercial relations in the most complete manner possible,

in which the Arabs were accompanied by ambassadors not only from the Sogdian cities and Tukharistan, but even from Zabulistan' (south-east of the Hindu Kush), 'Shash, and the Türgesh. Two other Arab embassies are also recorded in 745 and 747.'¹ The inclusion of representatives from Zabulistan suggests that steps had already been taken to reopen the overland trade-route to India.

These facts² satisfactorily explain the ease and the permanence with which the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was incorporated into the Arab Empire between A.D. 737 and A.D. 741. Do they not also suggest a reason for the failure of the Arabs, during the same period, in Gaul? The non-commercial Aquitanians and Neustrians were not confronted with the same dilemma as the Transoxanians in dealing with the Arabs. They had little or no foreign commerce to lose by war with the great neighbouring Power; in defending their political independence, they were at the same time defending their fields, which were the source of their prosperity as a primitive agricultural population; and by summoning their over-lords, the Austrasians, to the rescue, they were not exposing themselves to any such economic calamities as those which the Transoxanians incurred when they called in the Türgesh.

If this line of argument is correct, the superior civilization of eighth-century Transoxania—in other words, her higher commercial development—as compared with eighth-century Gaul was the principal reason why she succumbed to Arab imperialism and lost this opportunity of founding a distinctive civilization of her own, whereas Gaul preserved her liberty of self-determination and so eventually gave birth to that Western Civilization in which we ourselves still live and move and have our being.

Whatever the true explanation of the actual course of history on this occasion may be, it is evident that, in the capitulation of A.D. 737-41, the unborn Far Eastern Christendom renounced its birth-right.

We can now arrange our series of collisions between Islam and the several Christendoms in a sequence. The impact of the Islamic wave upon the Monophysite Christendom of Abyssinia was so feeble that it hardly administered any perceptible stimulus. The more vigorous impact upon Western Christendom was highly stimulating, as is demonstrated by the vigour of the response. The considerably more forcible impact upon Orthodox Christendom was so severe that the social structure of Orthodox Christendom was permanently warped and its social fabric fatally overstrained by the *tour de force* of holding its ground. The impact upon Nestorian Christendom

¹ Gibb, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

² Established and interpreted by Professor Gibb in *op. cit.*

caught this Christendom while it was still in embryo and dealt it a blow that rendered it abortive. It is evident that the severity of the Islamic challenge to Western Christendom was of the optimum degree; that the challenges to Abyssinian Monophysite Christendom and to Central Asian Nestorian Christendom were both equally remote in degree from the ideal mean, though this in opposite directions; and that the challenge to Orthodox Christendom, while less remote from the mean than either of these other two challenges, was still decidedly beyond the limits of the optimum, and this in the direction of excessive severity.

Miscarriages and Births of Civilizations in Syria

One further example of Challenge-and-Response in which the challenge has been presented in the human sphere may suffice to conclude this survey of serial encounters in which an identic challenge is delivered on different occasions with different degrees of severity and with resultant responses that differ by comparison with one another in the respective degrees of their failure or success.

This final instance of our present object of study is the human challenge presented to the inhabitants of Syria, on successive occasions when they have been moved to create an independent local Syriac Civilization, by the geographical proximity of the Egyptiac Civilization on one flank, and the Sumeric (followed by the Babylonian) Civilization on the other flank, as 'going concerns'. This human challenge became potential from the time when, under pressure of the desiccation of the Afrasian Savannah into the Afrasian Steppe, the fathers of the Egyptiac and Sumeric civilizations braved and mastered the physical challenge of the Nilotic and Euphratean jungle-swamps, whereas in Syria—the section of Afrasia that lies in between the Land of Egypt and the Land of Shinar—the corresponding challenge which was there presented by the Jordan Valley was left unanswered by Afrasian Man.¹ Thenceforward, any movement to create an independent civilization in Syria was exposed to a challenge from the presence of the civilizations that were now already established in close proximity on either side; and this challenge continued to be presented in some degree until the extinction without issue of the Babylonian Civilization in the Lower Tigris-Euphrates Valley in the last century B.C. was followed, in the fifth century of the Christian Era, by the extinction without issue of the Egyptiac Civilization in the Lower Nile Valley.

Within this long period of some four thousand years during which the challenge now under consideration was operative, there

¹ See II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, pp. 256-7, above, especially the quotation from Eduard Meyer on p. 257.

is one conspicuous occasion on which it was taken up successfully. The Syriac Civilization which came to birth towards the end of the second millennium B.C. is perhaps the most brilliant and most original representative of the species, next to the contemporary Hellenic Civilization, that has appeared up to date within the period of some six thousand years during which this species of societies has so far been in existence. This Syriac Civilization, as we have remarked at other points in this Study, has three great feats to its credit.¹ It invented an alphabetic system of writing; it discovered the Atlantic Ocean; and it arrived at a particular conception of God as a personal and moral and unique and omnipotent being. And it performed these great works of creation independently of the two imposing civilizations which overlooked its tiny original domain from either side.

The Syriac Civilization; arising in an interstice between the Egyptiac Society and the Babylonian, was neither beholden to, nor impeded by, either of them;² and, so far as it was related to any antecedent civilization at all, its affinity was not with a society whose roots were in the soil of Egypt or Shinar but with the relatively distant Minoan Civilization of the Aegean. In virtue of this affinity, the Syriac Civilization was not only the contemporary of the Hellenic Civilization but its sister; and it revealed its common descent from the Minoan Civilization in a common taste for long-distance deep-sea navigation: a taste which made the Phoenicians and the Greeks, between them, the masters of the entire basin of the Mediterranean by the middle of the last millennium B.C. Even, however, in its relation to the sister Hellenic Civilization and to the antecedent Minoan Civilization, the Syriac Civilization maintained its

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 82 and 102; and II. D (ii), p. 50, above.

² It used to be assumed—on rather slender evidence—that the Phoenicians were beholden to the Egyptiac Society for the Alphabet. The subsequent discovery of the several Minoan scripts has evoked the counter-conjecture that the Alphabet may be of Minoan origin. (See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 102, footnote 3, above.) Pending a settlement of this controversy, we may say at once that, even if the earlier view of the Egyptiac origin of the letters of the Alphabet were eventually to be confirmed, this would not deprive the Phoenicians of the credit of having invented the Alphabet; for the essence of the invention lies not in the equation of particular signs with particular sounds, but in the analysis of the sounds of human speech into a minimum number of simple elements. Both the Egyptiac and the Sumerian script, in so far as they were phonetic at all and not ideographic, were content to represent whole syllables, without pushing the analysis further. The further analysis of syllables into their consonantal elements was the new Syriac invention which gave birth to the Alphabet; and the invention is just as great an invention if the inventors happen to have used Egyptiac or Babylonian syllable-signs to represent the consonants as if they had coined brand-new signs to represent the new elements of sound which they had succeeded in isolating by analysis. As a matter of fact, the post-war researches of Western archaeologists in Syria have brought to light, in the north, an alphabetic script employing signs which are quite different from those of the historic Alphabet and which seem to be borrowed from the signs of the Babylonian Syllabary. This discovery indicates that the Syriac inventors of the Alphabet were experimenting simultaneously with different traditional materials. (The question of the origin of the Alphabet has been touched upon already above in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 102, footnote 2, and in II. D (ii), pp. 50-1.)

independence. For the greatest creative achievement of the Syriac Society was neither its discovery of the Atlantic nor its discovery of the Alphabet but its discovery of God; and the particular conception of God at which the Syriac Society arrived—a conception which is common to Judaism and Zoroastrianism and Christianity and Islam—is alien (as we have seen) not only from Babylonian religious thought and Egyptian religious thought (apart from the flash of illumination in the single soul of Ikhnaton) but also from Hellenic religion and from Minoan (as far as the *ethos* of Minoan religion is known to us).

Thus the historical Syriac Civilization proclaims, in its magnificent creative originality, the triumphant success of its response to the challenge which the proximity of the Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations presented to it. Yet, without disparaging the Syriac achievement, we may notice that this successful Syriac Civilization came to birth at a juncture when the social pressure exerted upon Syria from Egypt on the one side and from Shinar on the other was at less than its average strength.¹ The post-Minoan interregnum, during which the Philistine wave of Minoan refugees broke upon Syria from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Hebrew wave of Afrasian Nomads from the North Arabian Steppe, may be dated, in round figures, between 1425 and 1125 B.C.; and during these three centuries, in which the Syriac Civilization actually emerged, both the Egyptian and the Babylonian Society were in a low state of vitality. The Egyptian World was then wholly on the defensive. Its energies were being absorbed in the effort of self-preservation amid the formidable social convulsions which the dissolution of the Minoan Civilization was producing in the Levant; and so long as 'the New Empire' succeeded in saving the homelands of the Egyptian Civilization in the Nile Valley from being overwhelmed, it was content to leave Syria to take care of itself. On the other flank of Syria, in the same age, the Babylonian Civilization, which had recently taken the place of the Sumerian Civilization, was equally passive; for Babylonia was still torpid under the feeble rule of the last epigoni of her Kassite barbarian conquerors, while Assyria had not yet started upon her career of militarism.² As for the sister civilization which the Hittites had created in Anatolia, this had been shattered, in the course of the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*, by the impact of the great migration at the beginning of the twelfth century B.C.: an impact which the Egyptian Civilization

¹ This point is noticed by Eduard Meyer in his 'Zur Theorie und Methodik der Geschichte' (*Kleine Schriften* (Halle 1910, Niemeyer), p. 56).

² The Third (Kassite) Dynasty of Babylon 'petered out' circa 1173 B.C.; Tiglath-Pileser I of Assyria, who made the first tentative essay in Assyrian militarism, reigned circa 1115-1089 B.C.

just managed to resist by the expenditure of its last remaining reserves of vitality.¹

Thus, in observing that the historical Syriac Civilization responded to the challenge of Egyptiac and Babylonian proximity with conspicuous success, we have also to observe that it made this successful response at a time when the challenge was presented in less than its normal degree of severity; and in order to appraise this success we must compare it with a previous failure. For the creation of a Syriac Civilization was not achieved at the first attempt. The successful attempt which resulted in the historical Syriac Civilization had been preceded on the same Syrian soil, some four or five centuries earlier, by a similar attempt which was abortive.

We have come across this earlier Abortive Syriac Civilization already in other connexions.² We have seen that when 'the Empire of Sumer and Akkad', which was the Sumeric universal state, broke up, and the Sumeric Civilization itself went into dissolution, after the death of Hammurabi at the end of the twentieth century B.C., the former domain of the Empire was overrun by Aryan Nomadic invaders from the Eurasian Steppe; and that one horde of these invaders—the people who afterwards became known in the Egyptiac World as the Hyksos—migrated right across the breadth of the Sumeric World from north-east to south-west and came to a halt at the furthest extremity of that world, in Syria.

At that time Syria was a kind of debatable border or no-man's-land or limbo between the Sumeric World and the Egyptiac World. The rift-valley of the Jordan—having failed to evoke from Man the response which had given birth to civilizations in the valleys of Euphrates and Nile—remained desolate and uninhabited; and the Hill Country of Ephraim was still uninhabited likewise.³ On either side of these physical barriers, the Sumeric and Egyptiac civilizations had respectively acquired footholds on Syrian soil and had staked out spheres of interest. The Egyptiac Civilization had radiated up the coast of Syria as far as Byblos soon after, or possibly some time before, the foundation of the Egyptiac United Kingdom *circa* 3200 B.C.; and Byblos, which was its farthest bourne, was also its firmest *point d'appui* in this quarter. From the other side, the interior of Northern Syria was raided as far as the Jabal Ansariyah and the Lebanon, and even occasionally as far as the Mediterranean coast, by the Sumerian militarist Lugalzaggisi of Uruk (Erech) and Umma (*regnabat circa* 2677–2653 B.C.) and his

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93 and 101, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 105–7; and I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 139, footnote 1, and p. 144, above.

³ See the present Study, II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, p. 257, and II. D (ii), in the present volume, p. 53, above, as well as Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii (i), and ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 96.

Akkadian supplanters and emulators Sargon (*regnabat circa 2652-2597*) and Naramsin (*regnabat circa 2572-2517*);¹ and the seeds of Sumeric culture which were scattered in the west by these passing whirlwinds of military conquest took permanent root among the Amorites: a Semitic-speaking Nomadic people who appear to have drifted off the North Arabian Steppe and silted up against the eastern flank of Lebanon about the middle of the third millenium B.C.,² as their fellow-Semites and fellow-Nomads, the Aramaeans, drifted from the same starting-point to the same resting-place some twelve centuries later.³

The Amorite settlers in the interior of Syria became incorporated into the Sumeric body social, worked their way towards the heart of the Sumeric World, and eventually founded the First Dynasty of Babylon, which was also the last dynasty to rule and maintain the Empire of Sumer and Akkad. Thus, by the time when the Empire finally broke up after the death of Hammurabi, the greatest of the latter-day Amorite emperors, the interior of Syria had long formed an integral part of the Sumeric World; and when, in the ensuing *Völkerwanderung*, Syria was overrun by a horde of barbarians who had broken into the Sumeric World from the Eurasian Steppe, it might have been expected that the local outcome would have been similar to the outcome in Babylonia and in Cappadocia. In both these other *ci-devant* provinces of the defunct Sumeric universal state, the interregnum occupied by the post-Sumeric *Völkerwanderung* was followed by the emergence of new civilizations, closely related to the Sumeric, which were built up by the joint efforts of the ex-provincials and the immigrant barbarians.⁴ In Babylonia, the new Babylonian Civilization emerged after the irruption and settlement of the Kassites; in Cappadocia, the new Hittite Civilization emerged after the irruption and settlement of the 'Kanisians' and the 'Luvians'.⁵ Why was it that, in contemporary Syria, a new Syriac Civilization did not emerge simultaneously after the irruption and settlement of the Hyksos? In other words, why was it that the potential Syriac Civilization of this age miscarried and never came to birth?

The explanation of this miscarriage seems to be that the Aryan Nomadic invaders of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad who settled in its Syrian province overshot the boundaries of the Sumeric

¹ For these militarists and their role in Sumeric history, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, above.

² For the Amorites see Meyer, E.: *op. cit.*, vol. ii (i), 2nd ed., pp. 18 and 100.

³ For the Aramaeans, see II. D (v), pp. 134-5, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 110-12, above.

⁵ For these barbarians, who spoke Indo-European languages of 'the Centum-group' and who had presumably descended upon the Sumeric World from South-Eastern Europe, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 113, footnote 3, above.

World, impinged upon the Egyptian World, and became implicated, to their own undoing, in the course of Egyptian history. The settlement of the Hyksos in Syria, which may be dated between the death of Hammurabi *circa* 1905 B.C. and the foundation of the Kassite 'successor-state' of Hammurabi's Empire in Babylonia *circa* 1749 B.C.,¹ would normally have been followed by a long period of local stagnation and quiescence; but in Syria, unlike Babylonia and Cappadocia, this normal sequel to a *Völkerwanderung* did not follow, and therefore, on this occasion, the promise of a new Syriac Civilization did not come to fruition; for, without a spell of quiescence and recuperation after the tumult in which it has been conceived, an embryonic civilization can never be brought to birth.

The reason why the Hyksos were unable to settle down after their arrival in Syria was because the province of the defunct Empire of Sumer and Akkad into which Fate had carried them happened to be in immediate proximity to the Egyptian World.

The site at the southern extremity of the Syrian coast, which the Hyksos selected for the capital of their 'successor-state',² actually lay within the Egyptian and not within the Sumeric sphere; and soon after the beginning of the seventeenth century B.C., perhaps not more than a century after the Hyksos had made their headquarters here, an event occurred in the Egyptian World which could not leave the Hyksos indifferent. The Egyptian universal state (the so-called 'Middle Kingdom', which lasted from *circa* 2075 to *circa* 1675 B.C.) broke down;³ an interregnum ensued in the Egyptian World which was comparable to the Sumeric interregnum that had set in after the death of Hammurabi some two centuries earlier; and, once again, the Hyksos were drawn into the vacuum. Instead of settling down to collaborate with the Canaanites in the gradual building up of a local Syriac Civilization, they struck the tents which they had so lately pitched and marched on into Egypt, as they had once marched across Shinar into Syria, in their old role of barbarian invaders.

The consequences of this diversion of the Hyksos' energies from Syria to Egypt were disastrous to all parties; but they were disastrous first and foremost to the Hyksos themselves; for the tincture of Sumeric culture which the Hyksos had acquired *en route* made them unassimilable by, and therefore abominable to, their Egyptian subjects.⁴ Thus the first effect of the Hyksos' conquest of the Egyptian World was to evoke a militant Egyptian reaction; and this

¹ See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 111, footnote 1, above.

² For the archaeological excavations on this site, in 1931, see a letter from Sir Flinders Petrie in *The Times*, 31st May, 1931.

³ See I. C. (ii), vol. i, p. 137, above.

⁴ See I. C. (ii), vol. i, pp. 139, footnote 1, and 144, above.

reaction was victorious. The Hyksos were driven out of Egypt again, within a century of their original entry, by a restored Egyptian universal state;¹ and 'the New Empire' was not content to bring its successful counter-offensive to a halt at the Syrian border. It followed up the discomfited Hyksos in their retreat and annexed the Syrian territories which the Hyksos had previously taken over from the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, right up to the Euphrates. The Aryan personal names of certain Syrian princes which are preserved in 'the New Empire's' official records testify that the Hyksos survived in Syria for some centuries longer as a people;² but they only survived under Egyptian dominion; their political power was at an end; and, more than that, their chance of creating a Syriac Civilization had vanished.³ In yielding to the temptation of invading a prostrate Egypt, the Hyksos had thrown away their Syrian birthright. The distracting proximity of Egypt to Syria thus explains why, in the first half of the second millennium B.C., the promise of a Syriac Civilization, related to the Sumeric Civilization, came to nothing, while a Hittite and a Babylonian Civilization were successfully brought to birth. In Syria, this miscarriage was followed by a period of frustration which lasted until 'the New Empire' of Egypt had run its course and until the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung supervened to offer a new opportunity for creation: an opportunity which was seized this time, as we have seen, with brilliant success.

Thus the challenge to which the historical Syriac Civilization responded triumphantly had proved excessive when it had been presented on an earlier occasion with greater severity; but there was another occasion on which a civilization that had been conceived and duly born on Syrian soil was manifestly starved of stimulus because this very challenge of Egyptian and Babylonian proximity had ceased to operate.

By the time when the Arabic Civilization emerged in Syria after the post-Syriac interregnum (*circa* A.D. 975-1275), both the Egyptian and the Babylonian Civilization had long been extinct. Their extinction had been accomplished by the society to which the nascent Arabic Civilization was 'apparented': that is to say, by the historical Syriac Civilization itself. For the Syriac Civilization—acting as though it were conscious of the Egyptian and Babylonian menace—had set itself, from the moment of its own birth, to devour its two venerable neighbours and to absorb their tissues into its own body social. The process began with the peaceful penetration of Egypt

¹ See I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 138 and 144; and II. D (v), p. 112, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 105, footnotes 4, 5, and 6 above.

³ For the lack of originality in the local culture of Syria in that age, see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (ii), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 682.

and Assyria by Phoenician and Aramaean traders; it was completed by the successive conversions of the Egyptian and Babylonian worlds to a series of Syriac missionary religions: Primitive Christianity and Nestorianism and Monophysitism and Islam. By the time when the Syriac Civilization died at last—after a life that had been unnaturally interrupted but also unnaturally prolonged by a Hellenic intrusion—the work of assimilation had been performed so thoroughly that Egypt on the one side and 'Irāq on the other were now just as Syriac as Syria herself.

Thus, when the Arabic Civilization was in embryo, it was not confronted with the challenge which had proved so stimulating to the historical Syriac Civilization and so upsetting to its abortive predecessor. While the Syriacized land of 'Irāq lay derelict on the morrow of the Mongol devastation, the Syriacized land of Egypt offered the embryonic Arabic Civilization a safe citadel in which its birth could be accomplished. The ancient challenge of Egyptian and Babylonian proximity to Syria had entirely ceased to operate. Yet, if we are justified in concluding that, in the first half of the second millennium B.C., the severity of that challenge was excessive, we are also bound to conclude that the entire cessation of the challenge by the time when the Arabic Civilization was in gestation, at the turn of the first and second millennia of the Christian Era, was an untoward circumstance. For the Arabic Civilization which had this easy birth did not have a distinguished career.¹ Its possession of a citadel in Egypt gave it no substantial security; for its independence was prematurely brought to an end by the masterful intervention of a sister society—the Iranian—which had been nurtured in a harder environment. Yet, before this misfortune overtook it in the early decades of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, the Arabic Society had been granted two centuries' grace in which to prove its mettle; and the time was long enough to show that no great creative forces were gathering in its bosom. If the Arabic Civilization had not had such an easy start but had been confronted at the beginning by the challenge which Egyptian and Babylonian proximity had presented to its Syriac predecessor, it would assuredly have acquitted itself with greater distinction than it actually achieved.

It will be seen that this Syrian series of encounters has presented us with a sequence once again. The brilliantly successful response of the historical Syriac Civilization to the challenge of Egyptian and Babylonian proximity proves to be a middle term between two extremes. On the one hand, the greater severity with which the same

¹ For the career of the Arabic Civilization, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 70-2, with Annex I, above.

challenge was presented in the first half of the second millennium B.C. rendered a first attempt at creating a Syriac Civilization abortive. On the other hand, the complete absence of this challenge in the history of the subsequent Arabic Civilization—a younger local civilization which was 'affiliated' to the Syriac—had an untoward effect upon this latter-day civilization's career. In this sequence, the historical Syriac Civilization, to which the identic challenge was presented in a mean degree of severity, stands out as the conspicuous instance of success against a double background of failure: failure from an excess of stimulus and failure from a lack of it.

Perhaps we are now in a position to answer the question which originally drew us into our present inquiry. After finding, by our empirical methods of study, that, in diverse instances and variations of the movement of Challenge-and-Response, 'the greater the challenge the greater the response' appeared to be a working 'law', we then set out to discover whether this 'law' which we had traced inductively were valid absolutely, or whether it were subject, like so many other particular laws, to the general 'law of diminishing returns'. The inquiry which we have just concluded indicates that 'the law of diminishing returns' does hold good in this connexion. In the language of Mythology, the encounter between two super-human personalities, which is the dynamic force in human affairs and the key to the plots of the great tragic works of art, does not result *semper et ubique et omnibus* in the denouement which is given to the play in the Book of Job and in Goethe's *Faust*. A wager between God and the Devil in which the Devil cannot be the winner nor God the loser is not, after all, the course which the action of this universal drama invariably follows. It turns out that this is only one possible rendering of the plot—a rendering which depends upon the terms in which the bet is offered and taken; and there is another alternative rendering in which the denouement is that of Euripides' *Hippolytus*. There are challenges of a salutary severity that stimulates the human subject of the ordeal to a creative response; but there are also challenges of an overwhelming severity to which the human victim succumbs. In scientific terminology, 'the most stimulating challenge is to be found in a mean between a deficiency of severity and an excess of it.'¹

The meaning of this proposition has gradually unfolded itself in the long empirical process of proof. There is, however, at least one word in the formula that remains ambiguous, and this is the word 'stimulating'; for a stimulus evokes a reaction, and a reaction implies a movement in some definite direction after the stimulus has been received. What, then, is the movement towards which a

¹ For this formula see p. 260, above.

nascent civilization is stimulated by the challenge that brings it to birth? Presumably the nascent civilization is stimulated to fulfil its nature. And what is it in the nature of a new-born babe to do? When the babe has come to birth, it is in its nature to grow in wisdom and stature. Growth is what birth implies; and if our study of the geneses of civilizations has now at last reached its term, the study of the growths of civilizations still lies before us.

ANNEX TO II. D (iii)

IS 'OLD GROUND' LESS FERTILE THAN 'NEW GROUND' INTRINSICALLY OR BY ACCIDENT?

In one passage of a foregoing chapter¹ we have examined the histories of seven civilizations of the 'related' class, each of which has comprised some 'old ground' and some 'new ground' in its domain. The upshot of this survey is that 'old ground' is apt to make a less fertile field than 'new ground' for human culture; and we have interpreted this result of empirical observation as a confirmation of the doctrine—implicit in the myths of the Exodus and the Expulsion—that the ordeal of breaking 'new ground' has an intrinsic stimulating effect. This interpretation of our empirical evidence rests on the assumption that the reason why 'old ground' is relatively sterile is because it presents a less formidable challenge to its occupants than the challenge presented by 'new ground', and therefore exerts a proportionately less powerful stimulus.² Some readers, however, may contest this explanation of the facts and may discount accordingly the value which we have placed upon this empirical evidence in our argument. Even assuming that the facts, as we have set them out in our survey, are correctly stated, our critics may submit that these facts are to be explained in another way. The explanation, they may represent, lies not in any subtle influence of the physical environment upon the behaviour of its human occupants, but in certain obvious external misfortunes which happen to have afflicted the inhabitants of certain regions in certain ages. In terms of our metaphor, the poorness of the crop in these particular fields is accounted for (according to our critics' contention) by the ravages of blight and mildew, and is therefore no evidence of any intrinsic lack of fertility in the soil. This

¹ On pp. 74-84, above.

² This assumption is borne out by two instances that have already come to our attention—one in Ceylon and the other in Central America—which stand out as exceptions to our law; for they both turn out to be exceptions that prove the underlying rule. In both Ceylon and Central America, the modern Western planters or colonists have occupied 'new ground' which had been left virgin by the pioneers of the foregoing indigenous civilizations; yet in both cases the new-comers on the 'new ground' have achieved nothing that can compare with the respective achievements of the Sinhalese and the Mayas. (For the Ceylonese case see II. D (i), pp. 6-7, above; for the Central American case see II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, p. 267; and II. D (ii), pp. 35-6, above.) When we look closer, however, we observe that, in both cases, the mere 'newness' of the 'new ground' was not such a formidable—and therefore presumably not such a stimulating—factor as the inherent and perpetual challenge of Physical Nature which the 'old ground' presented. In Central America, it was less difficult for the Spanish colonists to open up the relatively dry highlands than for the Mayas to keep the jungle at bay in the rain-sodden lowlands. And in Ceylon it has been less difficult for the Scottish and English planters to clear the rain-smitten highlands than for the Sinhalese to keep the parched plains supplied with water by irrigation.

criticism deserves consideration. Let us see what our critics have to say, and what we have to say to them in reply.

Our critics are likely to open their attack by pointing out that, in several of the instances which we have brought forward, the 'old ground' which has proved sterile is ground which happens to have been overlaid by a peculiarly barbarous deposit of barbarians in the *Völkerwanderung* antecedent to the birth of the particular 'related' civilization in question. For example, at the birth of the Babylonian Civilization, Babylonia was overrun by the barbarous Kassites, while Assyria was surrounded but never quite engulfed by the Mitannians. At the birth of the Arabic Civilization, Syria was harried by the incurably barbarous Crusaders and Mongols, while the Kurdish and Turkish and Caucasian barbarians who fell upon Egypt were human wolves who proved capable of transforming themselves into human watch-dogs: the Mamlûks. At the birth of the Iranic Civilization, Transoxania and Iran were blighted by the Mongols, while the 'new ground' occupied by the Iranic Civilization in Anatolia and Hindustan was as relatively fortunate as Egypt in respect of the barbarians which fell to its lot. In Anatolia and in Hindustan, the Iranic Civilization was not only first propagated by Turkish barbarians who had been converted to Islam but was afterwards protected by them—as Egypt was protected by the Mamlûks—against the ravages of the more barbarous Mongols who followed at the Turkish barbarians' heels. Again, at the birth of the Hellenic Civilization, Crete was saddled with the 'Dorians'—barbarians whose yoke weighed so heavily upon the local descendants of the Minoans that the very name 'Minōs', which had once denoted the ruler of the seas, became the hall-mark of serfdom in the derivative 'Mnoîtēs'.¹ Naturally, it may be represented, the nascent Hellenic Civilization did not ever come to flower in this wilderness of uncivilized masters and barbarized slaves. Naturally, likewise, it did first come to flower among the descendants of those Minoan refugees who had saved themselves from enslavement by finding asylum along the Anatolian coast.

This array of facts is impressive, but it is not impregnable. To take, for instance, the contrast between the roles of Doric Crete and *ci-devant* Minoan Ionia in Hellenic history: we may retort to our critics by pointing out to them that the Cyclades, which were as free as Ionia herself from the 'Dorian' incubus, played as poor a part in Hellenic history as Doric Crete, whereas one of the first points at which Hellenism flowered in Continental European Greece was Doric Corinth. Moreover, Doric Laconia and Doric Rhodes, which flanked Doric Crete on either side, each came to play an

¹ See I. C (i) (b), Annex II, vol. i, above.

eminent part as the movement of Hellenic history developed. The case of Laconia is particularly striking, inasmuch as the likeness between Dorian institutions in Laconia and in Crete was notorious.¹ The same yoke weighed with the same weight upon the Laconian Helots as upon the Cretan Mnoitae. Yet the descendants of the Dorian conquerors of Sparta rose to a greatness which was never emulated by their kinsmen in Crete. On the hypothesis that Dorian brutality accounts for the benightedness of Hellenic Crete, these further facts are inexplicable. On the other hand, they are all intelligible on our hypothesis that the occupation of 'old ground' fails to provide a stimulus which the breaking of 'new ground' does provide. This hypothesis explains the common obscurity, in Hellenic history, of Crete and the Cyclades—the two foci of the antecedent Minoan Civilization—notwithstanding the presence in Hellenic Crete and the absence in the Hellenic Cyclades of the Dorian incubus. It also explains the common eminence, in Hellenic history, of Ionic Ionia and Attica and Doric Corinth, Laconia and Rhodes; for both Ionia and Corinth appear to have lain beyond the range of the thalassocracy of Minos, while Attica, Laconia, and Rhodes came only just within its pale.

Moreover, we may suggest that, in any *Völkerwanderung*, each invaded district is apt to get the barbarians whom it deserves, and, having got them, to bear their yoke until it earns its liberation. For instance, was it a mere external accident that, in the post-Sumeric *Völkerwanderung*, Assyria kept her head above the Mitannian flood when the waters of a Kassite domination went over Babylon's soul? Is it not more credible that Assyria managed to keep her local barbarians at bay because she offered a stouter resistance than her Babylonian neighbour; and that she offered a stouter resistance because the Assyrians had responded to some stimulus in their local environment which was not offered to the Babylonians by theirs? Again, the failure of the Mnoitae in Crete—and, for that matter, of the Helots in Laconia—to liberate themselves from the yoke of their Dorian masters was by no means a matter of course. It was only one of two possible alternative outcomes of the Dorian conquest of Crete, as is shown by the historical parallel of the Lombard conquest of Italy.

The Lombards, at the time when they overran Italy in the last convulsion of the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung*, were more barbarous than any other barbarian conquerors of Roman provinces in the West except the English conquerors of Britain; and their treatment of the conquered population was proportionately harsh. Though the Lombards did not go to the length of exterminating

¹ On this point, see further Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 55 below.

the native Italians, they did impose upon them a much heavier yoke than had been imposed by the Lombards' predecessors in Italy, the Ostrogoths, or by the Franks in Gaul, or even by the Vandals in Africa. Thus, at the dawn of our Western history, the situation in Italy was closely comparable to the situation that existed at the dawn of Hellenic history in Crete. An extreme reversal of fortune had placed a once imperial people under the heel of a particularly brutal barbarian master. Yet, though the situation was comparable, the outcome was completely different; for, while the Cretan Mnoïtai never recovered from the shock of their abasement and continued to bear the Dorian yoke to the end of Hellenic history, the Italian Aldi boldly and victoriously took their savage Lombard conquerors captive.¹ They converted the Lombards from their Arian heresy to the Catholic Faith; they taught them to discard their Teutonic vernacular for the Italian language; and by such means they succeeded, within four or five centuries of the Lombard conquest, in transforming an unsocial aggregation of serfs and masters into a single people, abounding in energy and morally fit to take the leading part in the next act of the drama of Western history. This evidence proves that a calamity like the Lombard conquest of Italy or the Dorian conquest of Crete is by no means bound to blight for ever the prospects of the region upon which it descends. While the history of Dorian Crete shows that this may be the effect, the history of Lombard Italy shows not less clearly that the effect may equally well be just the opposite.

Finally we can refute our critics by joining issue with them on the field of Orthodox Christian history; for here it is impossible to adduce any evidence for a special extraneous calamity, exclusively afflicting the 'old ground' in the Orthodox Christian domain, which might be held to account for this 'old ground's' relative sterility. It is true that, in the domain of Orthodox Christendom, the 'old ground'—that is, the Aegean area—was visited by the twin calamity of Slav invasions overland and Arab raids by sea; but the same visitations fell much more severely upon the two pieces of 'new ground' in which Orthodox Christendom successively found its centre of gravity. The brunt of the Arab offensive was borne by Eastern and Central Anatolia, from the Taurus to Amorium; the brunt of the Slav invasions was borne by the interior of the Balkan Peninsula from the Danube to Salonica. The bands of Slavonic invaders that penetrated beyond Salonica into Peninsular Greece were forlorn hopes; the Arab sea-raids were 'side shows' compared to the Arab land operations. Thus it will be seen that, in Orthodox Christendom, the 'old ground' was afflicted not more but less

¹ Horace: *Epistolae*, II, Ep. i, l. 156.

grievously than the 'new ground' by these barbarian blights; yet in Orthodox Christian history—just as in Babylonian and Hindu and Arabic and Iranian and Hellenic and Sinic history—the 'old ground' has proved less fertile than the new.

Perhaps our thesis that 'old ground' is less fertile than 'new ground' intrinsically and not by accident has now been sufficiently vindicated against the criticism to which it might seem, at first sight, to be exposed.

ANNEX TO II. D (v)

HISTORIC SIEGES AND THEIR AFTER-EFFECTS

CITIES, like ships, are readily personified by the human imagination; and their greatness depends, not merely upon immediate practical values which can be expressed statistically, but also always to some extent, and often to a far greater extent, upon an imponderable prestige which is created and sustained by an emotional consciousness of their historic trials and triumphs. In many cases it is possible to trace the origin of this prestige to certain particular outstanding ordeals; and the prestige of Vienna is a case in point. It is manifestly founded upon the successful resistance of Vienna to the Ottoman assaults of A.D. 1529 and A.D. 1682-3.

A city's resistance, however, need not be successful in order to win the reverence and affection of later generations. For example, the prestige of Moscow is founded upon the passive endurance of the city on two occasions when she has fallen, without serious military resistance, under the heel of a Western invader: a Polish invader in 1610-12 and a French in 1812. On the other hand, the prestige of Constantinople in Orthodox Christendom, like that of Vienna in the Western World, is founded on a series of successful resistances: to the Persians and Avars in A.D. 626 (a supreme crisis which is commemorated, down to this day, in the Liturgy of the Orthodox Church, in the *'Ακάθιστος Ύμνος*); to the Arabs in A.D. 673-7; and to the Arabs again in A.D. 717-18. The prestige of Constantinople, like that of Vienna and unlike that of Moscow, is bound up with the concept of inviolability; and it has suffered from the Latin conquest of A.D. 1204 and the Ottoman conquest of 1453, as the prestige of Vienna has suffered from the French occupations of 1805 and 1809. In contrast to Constantinople and Vienna, Rome and Paris and London, all three, owe their present eminence, as the respective capitals of Italy, France, and England, to prestige gained by them in ordeals in which they have made an heroic resistance but have not remained inviolate.

How was it that Rome achieved the *tour de force* of becoming the capital of the new Kingdom of Italy in preference to Turin, a city which enjoyed the practical advantage of being the capital of the particular Italian State that was the instrument of national unification, and likewise in preference to Milan, a city which enjoyed the practical advantage of being the industrial centre of the Italian Peninsula? These practical considerations telling in favour of Milan or Turin would hardly have been overridden, in favour of

Rome, on the strength of historical sentiment pure and simple, if Rome had not identified herself, in the hearts and minds of the Italian people, with the Risorgimento of Italy by standing siege from the French in 1849. So far from Rome suffering any loss of prestige through the fact that her resistance to her besiegers on this occasion was unsuccessful, she gained her prestige in 1849 in virtue of the very fact that her resistance was a forlorn hope. She rejected the summons to capitulate with the clear foreknowledge that her fall was inevitable; for by that time the Italian national uprising of 1848 had already suffered defeat in almost every other quarter; the reaction was in the ascendant all over the European Continent; and the reactionary forces which were being concentrated upon Rome were overwhelming. Rome's heroic gesture in making this last and hopeless stand against overwhelming odds in 1849 was just what appealed to the Italian national imagination.

As for the prestige of Paris and London, which was won a thousand years earlier than the prestige of modern Rome in the utterly different ordeal of the Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung*, inviolability was not of its essence either. In fact, at the first encounter with the Vikings, both London and Paris were ignominiously taken by assault and pillaged: London in A.D. 842; Paris in 845. London was actually ceded to the invaders by Alfred under the Treaty of Wedmore in A.D. 878 and remained for seven years in their hands. The two cities emerged from their ordeal with a new and enduring prestige not because they never fell but because they fell only to rise again and oppose a firmer resistance to the invader. As the ordeal continued, this resistance became indefatigable. The Vikings never succeeded in forcing their way above Paris up the Seine or above London up the Thames; and either city crowned its long endurance with a final feat of arms which made a permanent impress upon the national imagination: Paris with her successful resistance to the great siege of A.D. 885-6; London with her successful barrage of the Thames in A.D. 895.

ANNEX TO II. D (vi)

JEWS IN FASTNESSES

IN the relevant chapter,¹ we have drawn attention to the fact that the fossils of extinct civilizations are found in two distinct situations—in 'dispersion' and in 'fastnesses'—and we have observed that these situations are not only different but are in sharp contrast with one another. The most familiar example of a fossil in dispersion is the Jewish 'Diasporà'. On the other hand, it is perhaps not so well known that there are other Jewish communities that have survived in fastnesses down to the present day. The contrast between the *ethos* of these Jews in fastnesses and the *ethos* of the Jewish 'Diasporà' is extreme; and some description, in greater detail, of extant 'Jews in fastnesses' may therefore be of interest.

In this connexion it may be recalled that Judaism is a fossil of the extinct Syriac Civilization, and that the successive religions which the Syriac Civilization begot in the course of its history all arose, in turn, in the heart of the Syriac World, and all radiated out from the centre, in every direction, towards the circumference. The result has been not unlike what happens when a child throws one stone after another into the middle of a pond. When several stones have been thrown in succession, the surface of the pond displays a pattern of several concentric circular waves which are all travelling outwards from the centre towards the circumference simultaneously. The outermost of these expanding circles is the product of the first stone thrown in; the wave raised by the second stone forms the second circle which is expanding in the first circle's wake; and so on—each wave that has travelled a shorter distance from the centre being the product of a stone which has been thrown into the pond at a later moment of time. On this pattern, the religions successively begotten by the Syriac Civilization have expanded in concentric circles from the heart of the Syriac World: Jewry and Christianity and Islam from Syria and the Hijāz; Zoroastrianism and Shi'ism from Iran. The Jewish-Zoroastrian wave, being the earliest, is the outermost; the Christian wave has followed in its wake; the Islamic wave is the innermost and the latest.²

Of course, at the present day, some thirteen centuries after the date when even the youngest of these waves was originally launched,

¹ See II. D (vi), pp. 256-9, above.

² This refraction of Syriac religion into a series of successive waves is a consequence of the impact of Hellenism upon the Syriac World. (See II. D (vi), pp. 234-5, and II. D (vii), pp. 285-8, above, and Part IX, below.) The boy who threw the first stone of Hellenism into the Syriac pond was Alexander of Macedon.

the pattern of concentric circles has lost its regularity. The Jewish-Zoroastrian wave has mostly dissolved into spray which has scattered itself all over the World in the form of a diaspora. As for the Christian wave, certain sectors of its circle—e.g. the Orthodox sector and the Western (now broken up into a Catholic fraction and a Protestant)—have swollen to unexpected dimensions, while other sectors—e.g. the Nestorian and the Monophysite—have shared the fate of the Jewish-Zoroastrian wave ahead of them. Only the Islamic wave still clearly retains its original formation. It needs the discerning eye of a historical geographer to reconstruct the original pattern of the whole series of waves from the present state of the map; and the materials for reconstruction would have been altogether insufficient but for the existence of certain rocks and reefs on which the waves, in breaking, have thrown up fragments of jetsam which have provided a permanent record of their passage. These rocks are the fastnesses in which fossils have been preserved in a state of fixity thanks to their isolation from the moving and changing world outside.

On the periphery of the Syriac World, there are two notable fastnesses of the kind: on the south, Abyssinia with its outwork the Yaman; on the north, the Caucasus with its annex the Crimea.¹ If we examine the present human fauna of either of these fastnesses, we shall find in either place a Jewish fossil still preserved in the inmost recesses and a more recently deposited Christian fossil surrounding the Jewish fossil and embedding it. In either place, again, we shall see the Islamic wave—the youngest and innermost wave of the three—washing round the foot of the rock, occasionally beating tempestuously against its flanks, and ever seeking to submerge it from base to pinnacle.

In Abyssinia, the local Jewish fossil—the Jewish community known as the Falasha—occupies the central district of Semyen: the highest highlands of the Abyssinian Plateau. The Jewish highlanders of Semyen are entirely surrounded by Abyssinian Monophysite Christians, who occupy all the rest of the plateau from the bounds of Semyen to the edge of the escarpment. The lowlands adjoining the plateau on the north and on the east are inhabited by Muslims—the foot of the Abyssinian escarpment constituting the limit of the Islamic domain in this direction.²

Similarly, in the Caucasus, the habitat of the local Jewish fossil—the so-called 'Mountain Jews'—is Daghestan (i.e. 'the Highlands'

¹ For a former Jewish fastness on the west, in the Maghrib, which held out till A.D. 1492, see Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), p. 200. Cf. op. cit., 415-16.

² See the map on p. 111 of *A Handbook of Abyssinia*, vol. 1: General (London 1917, H.M. Stationery Office).

par excellence), a district which may be regarded as the innermost recess of all Caucasia. The local Christian fossils—Georgian Orthodox Christians in the basins of the Rion and the Kur, and Armenian Monophysites on the plateau south of Georgia—occupy more exposed positions. As for the Muslims, they have penetrated into the Caucasus more deeply than they have succeeded in penetrating into Abyssinia up to the present, so that the Mountain Jews of the Caucasus find themselves embedded to-day in a non-Jewish population which is not Christian but Muslim.

As regards the outwork of Abyssinia in the Yaman and the annex of the Caucasus in the Crimea, it is noteworthy that in both places Jewish fossils have survived, while the more recently deposited Christian fossils, which were once to be found there, are now no longer extant. The Nestorian Christendom of the Yaman did not survive the first impact of Islam; and the indigenous Orthodox Christendom of the Crimea¹ is extinct to-day, though it was extant no longer ago than the sixteenth century of the Christian Era.² On

¹ As distinct from the Russian Orthodox Christendom which has been introduced into the Crimea, by Russian colonization, since the annexation of the Crimea to the Russian Empire in A.D. 1783.

² The indigenous Orthodox Christendom of the Crimea was originally represented by two communities: the Greeks of Cherson, on the site now occupied by the modern Russian foundation of Sebastopol near the southern corner of the peninsula; and the Crimean and Tetraxite Goths, who occupied respectively the eastern end of the Crimean mountains and the western end of the Caucasus Range, on opposite sides of the Straits of Kertch. These Goths were jetsam from the *Völkerwanderung* which had carried the main body of their kinsmen not only from the shores of the Baltic to the shores of the Black Sea, but on and beyond from the shores of the Black Sea to the shores of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The Crimean and Tetraxite Goths had been left behind at the first halting-place on the long trek which the Visigoths and the Ostrogoths continued to the bitter end. When the main body went west and was straightway consumed in the holocaust of the Roman Empire like a moth that flies into a candle-flame, the lost Gothic rear-guard in the Crimea lived on in obscurity in this fastness for another millennium. The last descendants of these Crimean Goths were found surviving by the Flemish scholar and traveller Busbecq in the middle of the sixteenth century, when he was the Ambassador of the Hapsburg Monarchy at the Sublime Porte. In the fourth and last of his famous Turkish Letters, he describes an interview with two envoys from these Crimean Goths who had come on official business to the Ottoman Imperial Government at Constantinople, and he gives a short vocabulary of their language, which he recognizes to be Teutonic. As for Cherson, it was not only a representative of Orthodox Christendom but a fossil of the Hellenic Society in its pristine state. Cherson was the last survivor of the hundreds of sovereign independent city-states into which the Hellenic World had been articulated before it was unified politically in the Roman Empire. Cherson, alone, had become an ally of Rome without ever losing its autonomy, and it also survived the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung* in which the Roman Empire broke up. In fact, Cherson lived on as a sovereign city-state on the old Hellenic pattern until the East Roman Empire—a resuscitation of the Roman Empire in the Orthodox Christian World—annexed Cherson outright in the ninth century of the Christian Era. Thus the mountainous southern portion of the Crimea has provided fastnesses not only for Orthodox Christendom and Jewry but for the North European external proletariat of the Hellenic Society as represented by the rear-guard of the Goths, and the Hellenic city-state as represented by Cherson. At the same time, the flat and lowlying northern portion of the Crimea has repeatedly provided an asylum for Nomadic peoples who have been driven off the Great Eurasian Steppe by more powerful hordes of their own kind, but have managed to hold their own on the miniature Crimean Steppe to the south of the Isthmus of Perekop. The Thracian-speaking Taurians, the Iranian-speaking Scythians, and the Turkish-speaking Khazars and Tatars are examples of *ci-devant* masters of the Eurasian Steppe who managed to survive in the Crimea for some centuries after they had been trampled out of

the other hand, the Yamanī Jews have managed—under great and apparently increasing pressure from the local Muslims who have occupied the place of the former local Christians and pagans since the seventh century—to maintain themselves in existence down to the present day, when the remnant is gradually being evacuated from the Yaman to Palestine by Zionist enterprise. As for the Jewish fossil in the Crimea, it is represented—and this likewise down to the present day—by two separate Jewish communities: the Krimchaks, who are Talmudists, and the anti-Talmudist Qara'im.

Thus the original pattern of concentric Jewish and Christian and Islamic waves is preserved by the Jewish and Christian jetsam that has remained stranded in the fastnesses of Abyssinia and the Yaman and the Caucasus and the Crimea, while the tide of Islam has filled the vast intervening area and has flooded round the bases and up into the gateways of the fastnesses themselves.¹

existence everywhere else. The Khazars who survived in the Crimea after the destruction of the Khazar Empire on the Eurasian Steppe in the eleventh century of the Christian Era are believed to be the ancestors of the Krimchak Jews.

¹ This pattern of concentric waves, representing the expansion, from a common centre, of successive religious movements, is not a unique and peculiar product of the Syriac Civilization. We have observed already (on pp. 234-5 and 285-8, above) that the refraction of Syriac religion into separate and successive and sometimes conflicting waves is an outcome of the collision between the Syriac Civilization and the Hellenic Civilization. We have also observed (vol. i, on pp. 85-6 and 91-2, in I. C (i) (b), above) that the Syriac Civilization was not the only civilization which the impact of the Hellenic Society deflected from its natural course. This experience of the Syriac Civilization was shared by the Indic Civilization; and if we now glance at the historical geography of the religious movements that have emanated from the ancient Indic World, we shall find analogous traces of an identical pattern of successive concentric waves.

In this Indic pattern, the oldest and outermost wave—corresponding to the Jewish-Zoroastrian wave in the Syriac pattern—is represented by the Primitive or Hinayanian Buddhism which survives down to the present day on what used to be the southern sector of the periphery of the ancient Indic World in Ceylon and Burma and Siam, and which was once to be found likewise on the northern sector of the same periphery, in the Tarim Basin. This first wave is likewise represented by Jainism, which still survives in dispersion nearer the heart of the ancient Indic World, in continental India. This Jainism and Hinayanian Buddhism are fossils of Indic religion as it was before the Hellenic impact, just as Zoroastrianism and Judaism are fossils of Syriac religion as it was before the Hellenic impact. The next wave in the Indic pattern—corresponding to the Christian wave in the Syriac pattern—is represented by the Later or Mahayanian Buddhism, which, like Christianity, is a syncretism between the indigenous culture and the intrusive Hellenism; and this Mahayanian wave, like the Christian wave, again, has developed a marked irregularity of form. What was originally its north-western sector has completely disappeared in Afghanistan and in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, which were the first stages on its course of expansion; and it has also disappeared in the Tarim Basin, where it followed and effaced the Primitive Buddhism of the Hinayana. On the other hand, this north-western sector of the Mahayanian Buddhist wave has swollen to unexpected proportions in its final resting-place in the Far East, which it has reached at the end of a journey that has carried it, in a sharply curving track, round the southern and western and northern foot of the Tibetan Plateau. As for the north-eastern sector of the Mahayanian wave, which is constituted by the Tantric or Lamaistic variety of Mahayanian Buddhism, this has spread from Bengal to Tibet and thence to Mongolia—Tibet and Mongolia being the places where it survives to-day. It will be seen that the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism corresponds to the Monophysite-Nestorian sector of the Christian wave, and the Far Eastern Mahayanian Buddhism to the Western sector. Finally, while the Mahayanian Buddhism, in its two extant varieties, constitutes the middle wave in the Indic pattern, the latest and innermost wave is represented here by Hinduism, which—like Islam in the Syriac pattern—now occupies the central position and still clearly retains its original formation. It will be seen that Hinduism also resembles Islam in

If we now concentrate our attention upon the Jews in fastnesses, who have been deposited there by the expansion of the oldest and outermost of the three concentric waves, we shall find that in physique and language and culture these Jews have far more in common with the pagans and Christians and Muslims with whom they share their asylum than they have in common with Jews elsewhere. It is to be inferred that Judaism, like its successors Christianity and Islam, has propagated itself by the process of conversion as well as by the process of migration. At any rate among the Jews in fastnesses, the predominant element in the life and in the blood of the community seems to be the contribution of the indigenous proselytes.

In Abyssinia, for instance, 'the Falasha are Hamites by race and Jews only by religion'.¹ They 'are in general darker and more corpulent than the Amharas, among whom they live. Their hair is shorter and often curly; their eyes are smaller and their faces not so long'.² They 'have no language of their own, but speak various Agau dialects'.³ 'They are ignorant of Hebrew, but possess in Ge'ez the canonical and apocryphal books of the Old Testament' and various other religious works.⁴ 'They know nothing of the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmud, composed during and after the Captivity respectively, and do not observe the feast of Purim, i.e. the dedication of the post-Exilic Temple'.⁵ 'Their Judaism does not exclude a very strong tincture of paganism. . . . Especially curious is their worship of Sanbat, the Goddess of Sabbath'.⁶

From its origins down to the end of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, this Falasha Jewish community seems to have lived a life of warlike independence in its highland fastness of Semyen. This community 'consolidated itself into an independent Kingdom in Semyen at the time of the conversion of Abyssinia [to Monophysite Christianity]. In [A.D.] 937 Judith, queen of Semyen in her own right, murdered the whole [Christian] royal family of Axum, with the exception of one child who was conveyed to Shoa, and usurped the throne. In 977 she was succeeded by her daughter, who was deposed a few months later by a prince of the house of

standing for the ultimate victorious reaction by which the indigenous culture eventually drove the intrusive Hellenism out. If we may venture to pursue our parallel still farther, we may also perceive Indic analogues of the Syriac fastnesses. The Plateau of Tibet, which gives asylum to the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism, plays the part of the Caucasus; the highlands of Ceylon, which give asylum to the Hinayanian Buddhism, play the part of Abyssinia. (The historical geography of the Indic and the Syriac religions is examined at greater length in Part IX, below, apropos of the contacts between civilizations in Space.)

¹ *British Admiralty Handbook of Abyssinia* (cited on p. 403, above), p. 107.

² *The Jewish Encyclopaedia* (New York and London 1901-6, Funk and Wagnall), s.v. 'Falasha'.

³ *British Admiralty Handbook of Abyssinia*, p. 109.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pag. cit.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 120-1.

Zagwe. The dynasty founded by this prince was at first perhaps Jewish but later Christian.¹ Thereafter, in Semyen, the Falasha maintained their independence in periodic warfare with the surrounding Christians; but 'their line of kings became extinct about 1800, when the Falasha became subject to Tigre'.²

During the last century and a half, under the new conditions of subjection of Christian rule, the Falasha seem to have entered on a process of transformation from a fossil in a fastness into a fossil in dispersion. They still 'live mostly in Semyen in villages of their own',³ and 'agriculture is' still 'their chief occupation'.⁴ At the same time, members of the Falasha community are now dispersed abroad in other parts of Abyssinia, and in this situation they are already displaying the characteristic traits of a penalized religious minority. 'If resident in a Christian or Muhammadan town', they 'occupy a separate quarter. They do not mix with the Abyssinians; indeed, they are forbidden to enter the house of a Christian and never marry the women of other religions. Polygamy is unknown; early marriages are rare; and the moral standard is superior to that of the Abyssinians'.⁵ 'They are fanatical in observing the Sabbath, the circumcision of both sexes, certain fasts, and several festivals, annual and monthly. They are scrupulous in following the laws of purification by means of baths and ablutions'.⁶ Moreover, 'they excel in all trades. In their eyes work is not, as it is, for example, in the eyes of the Shoans, the attribute of serfs and slaves. They are cultivators, smiths, masons, architects, ebony-workers, weavers, potters, and so on. We have seen them, in the course of this history [of Abyssinia], forming regular centres of almost constant rebellion. For more than a century past, however, they have no longer made themselves notorious. Their skill in manual work leads to their being exploited by the chiefs and even maltreated—treated, in fact, as an inferior race'.⁷ Evidently the Falasha who are now dispersed abroad in Abyssinia beyond the confines of their native fastness in Semyen are rapidly approximating towards the well-known type of the Jewish 'Diaspora'. As yet, however, the approximation is imperfect; for although they 'ply the trades' and 'make the articles necessary for the home or the field', they still 'reject commerce'.⁸

The modern history of the neighbouring Jewish community in the Yaman has run a parallel course. 'At the beginning of the 19th century, the condition of the Jews of Yaman was miserable. . . . They were prohibited . . . from engaging in money transactions and

¹ Op. cit., p. 218.

² Op. cit., p. 122.

³ Op. cit., pag. cit.

⁴ *The Jewish Encyclopaedia*, s.v. 'Falasha'. ⁵ *British Admiralty Handbook*, p. 122.

⁶ Colbeaux, J.-B.: *Histoire Politique et Religieuse d'Abyssinie* (Paris 1929, Geuthner), vol. ii, pp. 399-401.

⁷ Op. cit., loc. cit.

⁸ *The Jewish Encyclopaedia*, s.v. 'Falasha'.

were all mechanics, being employed chiefly as carpenters, masons, and smiths. . . . The chief industry of the Jews of Yaman is the making of pottery, which is found in all their settlements and which has rendered them famous throughout the East.¹

If we turn now to the Caucasus, we shall find the same phenomena as in Abyssinia. In physical race, the 'Mountain Jews' of Daghestan, like the Falasha of Semyen, are of one blood with the non-Jewish peoples round about them. Socially, they are an agricultural community which is just beginning to migrate into the towns and to take up some of the occupations which are characteristic, elsewhere, of the Jewish 'Diaspora'—though in the Caucasus this tendency does not seem to have gone so far as in Abyssinia up to the present.

The racial character of the Caucasian Jews is clearly described by a Jewish authority in the following passage:²

'The Jews of the Caucasus are very interesting. Historically it has been proven that they have been there for more than two thousand years. They claim that they are the descendants of those ubiquitous Ten Lost Tribes, and many missionaries are inclined to believe them. The most curious, both from an anthropological and ethnological standpoint, are the Mountain Jews of Daghestan. They have diverged completely from the ethnic type of the Jews in every other country. According to the measurements obtained recently by Kurdoff, they are tall, averaging 166.0 cm. in height, and 57 per cent. of them were above the average height. Very few blonds are met with among them, 87 per cent. have both dark hair and eyes. Their head-form is hyperbrachycephalic, the average cephalic index being 86.35, and not one dolichocephalic individual was found among 160 measured by Kurdoff. Their face is broad, the forehead straight, the aperture of the eye horizontal; the cheek-bone being somewhat protruding, the nose straight and of medium size; only thirty per cent. have "Semitic" noses. The mouth is broad, the lips thick, and the ears large. That author concludes that the Daghestan mountain Jews are physically far removed from all other Jews, and have nothing in common with them. They are a product of mixture of the mountain tribes of Daghestan on the one hand, and some other races, especially the Kirghiz Mongolians, on the other.³ Their language, dress, and manners are the same as those of the other mountaineers among whom they live. All who have observed these Jews agree that they are of a totally different type from the one generally known as "Jewish". It is impossible to distinguish them from the Tats, Lesghians, and Circassians, among whom they live, says one who has studied the races of the Caucasus,⁴ and most other ethnologists agree with this view.'

¹ Op. cit., s.v. 'Yemen'.

² Fishberg, M.: *The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment* (New York and Melbourne 1911, The Walter Scott Publishing Company), pp. 130-1.

³ E. Kurdoff, 'Gorskije Yevrei Dagestana' (*Russian Anthropological Journal*, 1905, Nos. 3-4, pp. 57-87).

⁴ Hahn, C.: *Aus dem Kaukasus* (Leipzig 1892, Duncker and Humblot), pp. 161 and 232.

As for the social life of the Caucasian Jews—their occupations and institutions and *éthos*—it will be sufficient to quote a passage from one of the leading modern Western authorities on the Caucasian peoples:¹

'One principal reason for the incompleteness of earlier works about the Mountain Jews of the Caucasus is to be found in the fanaticism and exclusiveness which these Jews display towards other Jews. They have a mass of religious usages and articles of faith which to European Jews are entirely unknown; above all, they are zealous adherents of the Talmud. Their hatred of other Jews was still further accentuated by the fact that, after the conquest of the Caucasus, the Jewish soldiers from Russia, who were hospitably received by the Mountain Jews as co-religionists, chose to nickname their hosts "oxen"—a nickname which persists down to this day—on account of the roughness and grossness of their manners. The extent of the enmity between the two is best shown by a saying current among the Mountain Jews: "Don't kill an Ashkenazi by cutting his throat; stab him in the neck to prolong the agony." There have been a number of bloody encounters between these two Jewish races. . . .

'The Mountain Jews are mostly dispersed up and down Daghestan and the Terek District; and, in consonance with their principal occupations, their settlements are located on the alps or in the gorges or on the slopes of the mountains. Their auls are in some cases dispersed among the auls of other tribes, in some cases segregated from them, while there are places where they live cheek by jowl with the natives. In general, with few exceptions, they live in a good understanding with the natives. It is not uncommon for a Jew to contract a close friendship with a Musulman and to become, after the exchange of the kiss of friendship, his life-long *kardash* [brother]. In this rite the parties exchange weapons and contract a solemn mutual obligation to stand by one another, in time of stress, till they have shed their last drop of blood in their comrade's defence. . . .

'A considerable section of the Mountain Jews live in the towns and devote themselves to trade and business. Those who live in the auls are predominantly agriculturists. They cultivate wheat, barley, rice, tobacco, fruit, and vines, as well as vegetables. A small section are artisans and make morocco leather. . . .

'The attitude of the Mountain Jews towards European education is very hostile; and so it is no wonder that in the auls one often finds hardly two or three people who can read and write. The reason for this is fanaticism. There is a fear that those who acquire some learning may become apostates. It is only lately that the children are being sent to school, and the number of illiterates has already come down to something like 85 per cent. On the other hand, the number of those who attend the higher schools in order to acquire a rabbi's diploma amounts to only 1 per cent. The Mountain Jew mostly lives by the work of his

¹ Hahn, C.: *op. cit.*, ch. vi: 'Die Juden in den Kaukasischen Bergen'.

own hands, and he needs his children's help, so that the children have no time for school. . . .

'When we come to the physiognomy of the Mountain Jews, we have to observe that the Semitic type has been substantially modified by mixture with the native peoples of the Caucasus. . . . The Mountain Jew resembles the Lesghian, Chechen, and Circassian, and even the Armenian, much more than he resembles the European Jew. . . .

'The character and occupation of the Mountain Jew is profoundly influenced by his physical environment. Here we see him, armed *cap-à-pie*, riding past us on a handsome charger; there we see him, in old ragged clothes, clambering up the mountain-track in order to hew stumps or dig up the roots of trees and bushes to be carried home on bended back; here again we see him digging the ground, ploughing, making wine, gathering in his fruit crop or perhaps standing in a tub by the spring and stamping out raw hides. . . .

The two Jewish communities in the Crimea differ from one another in their theology and also, apparently, in their racial origin. The 'Krimchaks', who are Talmudists, are believed to be descended from the Khazars: a Turkish-speaking Nomadic people who erupted from the depths of the Eurasian Steppe in the latter part of the sixth century of the Christian Era; found themselves new pastures between the Lower Volga and the Lower Don; made themselves the dominant power between the Caucasus and the Urals and the Russian forest and the Black Sea; and eventually became converts to Judaism—probably in the eighth century of the Christian Era, more than two hundred years before the White Bulgars on the Middle Volga were converted to Islam or the Russians on the Upper Dniepr to Orthodox Christianity. The Krimchaks are believed to be descendants of a remnant of the Khazars who found asylum in the Crimea¹ after they had been driven off the main steppe in the eleventh century, partly by the Russians and partly by a fresh eruption of kindred Turkish-speaking Nomadic tribes (Ghuzz and Cuman or Qipchāq) from the heart of Eurasia.²

'Krimchaks: the so-called "Turkish Jews", inhabitants of the Crimea, whose centre of population is Qara-Su-Bazar, one of the most densely populated districts of Taurida. They differ from the other Jews of Russia in that the Semitic and Tatar elements are in them intimately blended. In their mode of life, they greatly resemble their Tatar neighbours, but in religion they adhere strictly to the Jewish faith, even to Talmudic Judaism. Their dress is identical with that of the Tatars. . . . The men are almost all of tall stature and slenderly built, and are marked by the reddish-golden colour of their hair, a tint which is uncommon among Semitic tribes. The women have retained more tenaciously the

¹ 'Many intermingled in the Crimea with the local Jews; the Krimchaki are probably their descendants' (*The Jewish Encyclopaedia*, s.v. 'Khazars').

² See the second footnote on p. 404, above.

characteristically Jewish type. . . . The houses of the Krimchaks are built in the usual Tatar style. . . . The Krimchaks employ a pure Tatar language, but use the Hebrew Alphabet in writing.¹

The other Jewish community in the Crimea are the anti-Talmudist Karaites (Qara'im: i.e. readers of the Law and the Prophets as opposed to the commentaries upon them). The Karaite Sect appears to have arisen somewhere near the centre of the Syriac World—perhaps in Northern Persia—in the eighth century of the Christian Era, after the reintegration and resumption of the Syriac universal state in the Arab Caliphate.² In its Syriac homelands, the Karaite Movement attained its zenith in the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era. Thereafter, in the Syriac World, and in the new Arabic and Iranic worlds which arose on its ruins, Talmudic orthodoxy began to regain its ascendancy among the local Jewry, and the Karaites went out in search of new worlds to conquer. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they were able to offset their losses among the Jews of Dār-al-Islām by gaining ground among the Jews in the main body of the Orthodox Christian World and the Jews in the Crimea and on the adjoining stretches of the main body of the Eurasian Steppe. Of the Karaites who established themselves on the north side of the Black Sea, some were transplanted to Troki in Lithuania by the Lithuanian conqueror Witold the Great (*regnabat* A.D. 1392–1430).³ Others remained in their Crimean fastness, which is described in the following passage from the work of one of the earliest travellers with a Western scientific outlook that visited the Crimea on the morrow of the modern Russian conquest of the peninsula:⁴

'At three versts' distance, as the crow flies, from the upper part of Baghcheserai, at the entry of the gorge where the Juruk-su⁵ rises, one reaches the fastness of the Jews: Jufut-Qal'eh. It is situated at the junction of the gorge with another valley, on a high limestone mountain which juts out between the two ravines. . . . One climbs up to the fortress by a path used for carrying water on donkey-back (in little barrels, slung pannier-wise, at a charge of ten kopeks). Outside the town, at the entry of the valley, one sees the cemetery of the Jews, shaded by magnificent trees and covered with rows of tombs. . . . The Jews have such veneration for this Valley of Jehoshaphat that at one time, whenever the Khans wanted to make a levy on the Jews, they were sure of obtaining from them whatever sum they demanded by the threat of felling the trees surrounding

¹ *The Jewish Encyclopaedia*, s.v. 'Krimchaks'.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 76–7, above.

³ For the expansion of the Lithuanians to the shores of the Black Sea under the stimulus exerted by the pressure of the Teutonic Knights from the Baltic, see II. D (v), p. 172, above.

⁴ Pallas, Professor: *Voyages entrepris dans les Gouvernemens Méridionaux de l'Empire de Russie dans les Années 1793 et 1794* (French translation from the German: Paris 1805), vol. ii, pp. 34–6.

⁵ Choraq-su?

the Jewish cemetery, on the pretext that they needed the timber. The Jewish town is situated on the narrowest part of the salient of the mountain and is fenced in by walls and by houses. It has two outer gates, which are shut every evening: one at the peak of the crag; the other at the point where the ridge spreads out into a plateau. The streets are narrow and tortuous but very clean. The rock itself serves for paving, but the principal streets have side-walks for the convenience of the inhabitants. In the centre of the town one sees a third gate which indicates the limit of the town's original area and gives a measure of the extent to which it has grown. One observes in the vicinity the mausoleum of a daughter of Toqatmysh Khan. . . . The Synagogue, which is a fine piece of architecture, possesses a little garden which serves for the Feast of Tabernacles. All the courtyards are surrounded, in the Tatar fashion, with high walls built of undressed limestone and clay. The houses, which are built in continuous blocks, number about two hundred and are inhabited by twelve hundred persons of both sexes, who are all Karaïtes. These Jews still use the name Qara'im among themselves, and do not admit the orthodoxy of any other Jews except the Polish Karaïtes who agree with them in rejecting the Talmud. They also import their bibles from Poland; but they have almost entirely adopted the ancient costume and language of the Tatars, because they have been living under the domination of that people from time immemorial, from the produce of their commerce, manufactures and trades.'

This brief survey may give some notion of the great gulf in race, occupation, and *ethos* which divides the little-known Jews in fastnesses from the well-known Jews in dispersion.

ANNEX I TO II. D (vii)

DR. ELLSWORTH HUNTINGTON'S APPLICATION OF HIS CLIMATE-AND-CIVILIZATION THEORY TO THE HISTORIES OF THE MAYAN AND YUCATEC CIVILIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND TO THE HISTORY OF THE SYRIAC CIVILIZATION IN THE OASES OF THE NORTH ARABIAN STEPPE

It will be evident to any reader of this Study that the writer of it has the greatest admiration for Dr. Ellsworth Huntington and his work; and it is with considerable diffidence that the writer now ventures upon a criticism of Dr. Huntington's views on one particular point. He therefore wishes to preface this criticism by noting that the point in question does not touch the substance of Dr. Huntington's theory: the theory, that is to say, that the fluctuations in the fortunes of civilizations are in some cases and to some extent connected with variations in climate arising from a periodic shifting of climatic zones. The criticism refers to two only out of a very large number of applications of this theory which Dr. Huntington has made; and the present critic will seek to show that, in these two particular applications, Dr. Huntington is (no doubt, unintentionally) departing from his own theory in effect, instead of supporting it.

With Dr. Huntington's main positions, as he understands them, the writer of this Study profoundly agrees.

He recognizes that Dr. Huntington—with the just sense of proportion which is characteristic of big minds—avoids the mental pitfall of ascribing exclusive or even paramount efficacy to the particular factors which happen to have been the object of the scholar's own researches. Dr. Huntington perceives and declares that, in human affairs, the efficacy of spiritual factors is primary and the efficacy of climatic and other physical factors secondary.¹ And, in the sphere of application which he assigns to the climatic factor, he generally portrays this factor as acting upon human life, not in a mechanical, *a priori*, necessitarian way, but in the form of a stimulus. Indeed, a sentence in which Dr. Huntington sums up this view of the relation between climate and civilization has been quoted in an earlier passage of this Study as one in a series of illustrations of the action of Challenge-and-Response. 'A relatively high degree of storminess and a relatively long duration of the season of cyclonic

¹ See, for example, his *The Climatic Factor as illustrated in Arid America* (Washington 1914, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 192), p. 226.

storms have apparently been characteristic of the places where civilization has risen to high levels both in the past and at present.¹

Moreover, in the present Study, Dr. Huntington's special climatic theory of the periodic shifting of climatic zones has been accepted as supplying the key to the geneses of three civilizations—the Nomadic, Egyptian, and Sumeric—on the assumption that a desiccation of the former Afrasian Savannah into the present Afrasian Steppe has presented the human inhabitants of this region with a common challenge that has evoked several alternative responses.²

Dr. Huntington goes on, however, to apply this same special theory of the shifting of climatic zones to explain the rises and falls of the Mayan and Yucatec civilizations in Central America and the Syriac Civilization in the oases of the North Arabian Steppe; and it is in regard to these two applications that the writer of this Study finds himself unable to see eye to eye with Dr. Huntington altogether.

Stated briefly, the theory of the shifting of climatic zones supposes that two things are constant from age to age—in the first place, the amount of water existing on the surface of the planet, and in the second place the nature and relative position of the successive zones of climate that encircle the globe latitudinally—while one thing varies periodically, this variable being the absolute positions of the boundaries between the same three successive zones as measured by their respective distances, at different times, from the Equator on the one hand and from the Pole on the other. This periodic variation in the absolute positions of the zones is ascribed to a periodic shifting of the track of the cyclonic storms, these storms being the climatic agency (as distinct from the astronomical factors involved) to which the differentiation of the face of the planet into this series of climatic zones is ultimately due.

In order to grasp the application of this meteorological theory to human affairs, we must remind ourselves of the respective characteristics of the successive climatic zones which always retain their relative positions but periodically change their absolute positions on this view. Proceeding from the Equator towards the Pole, the first zone is a tropical zone of drenching rain and rank vegetation; the second is a sub-tropical zone of drought and barrenness; the third is a temperate zone of moderate humidity and moderate fertility (the succeeding sub-arctic and arctic zones do not concern us here). From the human standpoint, the temperate zone offers Mankind the climatic and vegetational golden mean; the sub-

¹ Huntington, E.: *Civilization and Climate*, 3rd ed. (New Haven 1924, Yale University Press), p. 12, quoted above in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, on p. 278.

² See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 304-6, above.

tropical zone challenges Man by offering him less moisture and less vegetation than he requires; and the tropical zone challenges him equally severely by offering him an *embarras de richesse* in both these commodities.

Assuming the truth of the hypothesis that the absolute positions of these three zones periodically shift, it is obvious that there are two sets of regions—one along the borderline between the tropical and the sub-tropical zone, and the other along the borderline between the sub-tropical and the temperate zone—which must be periodically changing their climate in an alternation between one of two different climates and the other. And this periodic alternation of climates in any given area will obviously affect the character of this area as a physical environment for human life. Confining our attention, for present purposes, to the Northern Hemisphere, we shall observe that, when the whole series of latitudinally parallel zones shifts southward, certain areas on the borderline between the temperate and the sub-tropical zone will now become easier for human beings to live in because they will now be turning temperate instead of sub-tropical and will thereby be making good their previous deficiency in moisture and vegetation; and concurrently certain areas on the borderline between the sub-tropical and the tropical zone will also now become easier for human beings to live in because they will now be turning sub-tropical instead of tropical and will thereby be getting rid of their previous excess of moisture and vegetation. Conversely, when the whole series of latitudinally parallel zones shifts northwards, the same two sets of areas in the Northern Hemisphere will both now simultaneously become harder for human beings to live in: on the margin between the tropical and the sub-tropical zone owing to the northward advance of the zone of excessive moisture and vegetation, and on the margin between the sub-tropical and the temperate zone owing to the simultaneous northward advance of the zone of insufficient moisture and vegetation.

Now, on the assumption that civilizations arise as responses to challenges, and that their birth-places are therefore regions in which life is relatively hard, and not regions in which life is relatively easy, we have found no difficulty in explaining the geneses of the Nomadic, Egyptian, and Sumeric civilizations as responses to the challenge of a particular northward shift on the margin of oscillation between the sub-tropical zone and the temperate zone. On the same showing, the rise of the Syriac Civilization on the same margin—for example, in the oasis of Palmyra¹—ought to be the result (in so far as it is due to the climatic factor at all) of a similar

¹ For Palmyra, see II. D (i), pp. 9-12, above.

northward shift presenting a similar challenge of increasing aridity and barrenness. *Mutatis mutandis*, on the margin of oscillation between the sub-tropical zone and the tropical zone, the rise of the Mayan Civilization in Guatemala¹ ought also to be the result of a northward shift: a shift which, on this other margin, presents the antithetical but equally severe challenge of an increasingly excessive rainfall and an increasingly rank growth of vegetation.

It is here that Dr. Ellsworth Huntington appears to abandon, in detail, the view—which he shares with the writer of this Study in general and in principle—that civilizations arise as responses to challenges, whether these challenges be human or physical. For, in a passage already quoted in this Study,² Dr. Huntington suggests that the Mayan Civilization arose in Guatemala when the local climate was relatively dry and therefore relatively easy, and that its eventual decline was due to a local increase in moisture and vegetation which made the homeland of the Mayan Civilization a relatively difficult place to live in. Similarly, in another place,³ he suggests that the age in which Palmyra rose to eminence was an age in which the North Arabian Desert was relatively moist and fertile, and that the decline of Palmyra was the consequence of desiccation. In putting forward these two suggestions, Dr. Huntington appears to depart from his own general view that civilizations flourish on challenges and decay in their absence, and to range himself, for the moment, with the vulgar view that civilizations flourish on ease and wilt under difficulties.

With regard to Palmyra, the climatological evidence is scanty; and we shall simply observe that Dr. Huntington, in assuming a deterioration of the local climate in the age of Palmyra's decline, has to resort to the argument by exhaustion and that in arguing, on this line, that we must assume a climatic cause for lack of a social cause, he gravely underestimates the strength of the social factors by which the decline of Palmyra can actually be accounted for.⁴

With regard to Central America, Dr. Huntington has at his disposal the far more precise and detailed evidence that is afforded by a study of the growth-rings on cross-sections of the trunks of specimens of the Californian giant pine (*Sequoia*).⁵ On the basis of this evidence, he has compiled a remarkable table of dates⁶ purporting to show a chronological correspondence between 'inferred

¹ For the Mayan Civilization, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 125-7; II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, pp. 260-1; II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, p. 321; II. D (i), pp. 3-4; II. D (vii), pp. 304-6.

² Huntington, E.: *Civilization and Climate*, 3rd ed., pp. 330-2, quoted in II. D (vii) on p. 305, above.

³ Huntington, E.: *Palestine and its Transformation* (London 1911, Constable), ch. xv.

⁴ See, in particular, his *Palestine and its Transformation*, p. 335.

⁵ See *The Climatic Factor as illustrated in Arid America*, especially ch. xiv.

⁶ Huntington, op. cit., Table 12 on p. 231.

climatic conditions in Mayaland' and 'historical conditions in Mayaland'. And, on the strength of the correspondence which he believes that he has established, he proceeds to argue¹ that, in the ages in which the Mayas created and maintained their civilization in the lowlands of Guatemala, this homeland of the Mayan Civilization was not covered by a rain-sodden tropical forest, as it is to-day, but then enjoyed the drier climate and less overwhelmingly luxuriant vegetation that are to be found to-day on the Pacific Highlands of Central America on the one hand and in the Mexican Province of Yucatan in the tip of the Yucatan Peninsula on the other hand—these being the regions which are comparatively populous and prosperous at the present time, when the rain-sodden forest that covers the former homeland of the Mayan Civilization is almost uninhabited.

In other words, Dr. Huntington suggests that, while the climatic zones have shifted to and fro in the course of the last two or three thousand years, the relation between Man and his Physical Environment has remained constant. As none of the present inhabitants of Central America are masters of the tropical forest, so, he suggests, it must always have been with their predecessors. The fathers of the Mayan Civilization must have made themselves at home in Guatemala in an age when the boundary between the climatic zones ran relatively far south and when accordingly, in Guatemala, the tropical forest was not in possession. Their descendants must have been evicted from Guatemala by the irresistible might of Physical Nature when the climatic zones shifted northward again and in consequence the tropical forest returned upon Guatemala to reclaim the country for its own. Indeed, Dr. Huntington goes so far as to maintain that the true tropical forest (as distinct from the jungle through which it tails off into the sub-tropical bush) has never yet been mastered by any human society at any time or in any place.²

In putting forward this view, Dr. Huntington believes that he is elucidating both the rise and the fall of the Mayan Civilization; but, to leave its fall out of the question for the moment, its rise, on this showing, surely becomes more difficult, and not more easy, to account for. Dr. Huntington asks us to believe that the Mayas have never faced the challenge of the tropical forest at all, but have lived, throughout the successive histories of the Mayan and Yucatec civilizations, in no other physical environment but that of the sub-tropical bush in which their descendants in north-western Yucatan

¹ In op. cit., ch. xvii: 'Guatemala and the Highest Native American Civilization', and ch. xviii: 'Climatic Changes and Maya History'.

² See op. cit., pp. 180, 186, and 187.

are living to-day. If that supposition is accepted as the truth, we are left without an answer to the question of what the challenge was that did evoke the Mayan Civilization. It was not, on Dr. Huntington's hypothesis, the challenge of the tropical forest; and at the same time we can cite the testimony of Dr. Huntington himself to show that no equivalent challenge, and indeed no challenge of any sort, is presented by the sub-tropical bush in which, according to Dr. Huntington, the Maya have lived and moved and had their physical being at all times in the history of the race and in all parts of Central America in which the race has ever at any time established itself. In describing the life and *ethos* of the present-day Maya in the bush of north-western Yucatan, Dr. Huntington draws a picture that bears an amazing resemblance to a description of primitive life in Tropical Africa which we have quoted already in another connexion.¹

'The pure Indian is a quiet, slow being, inoffensive and retiring unless abused. He seems never to work unless compelled. As for storing up anything for the future, the thought seems scarcely to enter his head. If he has enough to eat, he simply sits still and enjoys life until hunger again arouses him to activity. His wants are few and easily supplied. His agriculture begins by cutting the small growths of the bush, or jungle, girdling the larger trees, leaving the bush to dry during the season of little rain, and finally burning it off. Then he goes around with a pointed stick, making holes into which he drops corn, pumpkin seed, beans, and the seeds of one or two other vegetables. The corn is his chief reliance. When the corn is ripe, he has no thought of gathering it all at once and storing it away safely, perhaps in the form of flour or at least shelled. His method is to go out to the field in the early part of the dry season after the corn is well ripe, and half break each stalk in the middle so that it is bent over and the ears point downward. Little by little, he picks what ears he needs for daily use, caring nothing that insects, birds, and beasts are also eating what they need. He knows that a quarter or a third of the ears may be spoiled; but, so long as there are some for him, he cares little. The only thing that ultimately stirs him up to gather the remainder of the crop is the end of the dry season. Before the rains come he knows that he must harvest his crop and plant more seed or else he will starve. Therefore he arouses himself for the one period of effort during the year. He is hardly to be blamed for his apparent laziness. He certainly is lazy according to our standards; but he has little to stimulate him, and it is easy to get a living without much work.'²

One has only to compare this passage with the description, referred to above, of primitive life in Nyasaland in order to realize

¹ Drummond, H.: *Tropical Africa* (London 1888, Hodder and Stoughton), pp. 58-9, quoted in II. D (i) on pp. 26-7, above.

² Huntington, Ellsworth: *The Climatic Factor as illustrated in Arid America* (Washington 1914, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 192), p. 180.

that, in the un-exacting, and therefore un-stimulating, environment of the sub-tropical bush, the descendants of the people who created and maintained the Mayan and Yucatec civilizations have relapsed right back to the primitive level. And, in the light of this fact, it is surely more difficult to imagine how, once upon a time, this self-same environment can have stimulated earlier representatives of the self-same race to build Copan and Uxmal or to think out the Mayan calendar than it is to suppose that these immense achievements were evoked by the tremendous challenge that is presented—not by the sub-tropical bush, but by the tropical forest.

So much for the attempt to ascribe the birth of the Mayan Civilization in Northern Guatemala or the blossoming of the Syriac Civilization at Palmyra to a state of physical ease arising from a shift in the absolute position of the tropical and sub-tropical and temperate climatic zones. At the same time, there is no objection to supposing that, not only in these two cases but also in several others which have been cited in this Study,¹ a physical alleviation, produced in this way, may have played a secondary 'permissive' or 'enabling' part in the genesis of a civilization, not by introducing a condition of physical ease, but by tempering a physical challenge of previously prohibitive severity to a lesser degree at which the severity has ceased to be prohibitive and has become, instead, a potent stimulus. And, conversely, we may legitimately suppose that, in a case where a civilization is already in decline through other causes, an accentuation in the severity of the climatic challenge may have the effect of making the decline irretrievable and hurrying it towards a final fall.

We may also suppose that, in a case where a civilization is in an exact, and therefore static, equilibrium with its environment,² a change in the physical environment, arising from a shift of the climatic zones, may act upon the society in question in a mechanical way instead of through the vital give-and-take of Challenge-and-Response. This is to be expected, because a society that is 'arrested' in static equilibrium is inhibited, *ex hypothesi*, from exercising the vital mobility and free will and initiative which the movement of 'Challenge-and-Response' involves. In this condition, a society must either remain unaffected by the impact of an external force or else react to this impact in a merely mechanical fashion. A case in point is the reaction of the 'arrested' Nomadic Civilization of the Afrasian and Eurasian steppes to climatic changes arising from the periodic shifting of the climatic zones in this area. In periods of increasing humidity, the Nomads are apt to yield ground to the

¹ See II. D (vii), pp. 306-9, above.

For such 'arrested' civilizations see Part III. A, below.

encroachments of their agricultural neighbours in the borderland between the Desert and the Sown. Conversely, in periods of increasing aridity, the Nomads are apt to burst the bounds of the Steppe and to pour out, in eruptions of volcanic violence, over the domains of their sedentary neighbours. The connexion between these eruptions of the Nomads and the pulsatory variations in the climate of the Steppes is examined further in Part III. A, Appendix II, in Volume III, below.

ANNEX II TO II. D (vii)

THE THREE-CORNERED RELATION BETWEEN THE ROMAN CHURCH, ENGLAND, AND IRELAND

SINCE the first encounter between the English and Irish peoples and the Roman Church, the relations between the three parties have passed through almost every possible permutation and combination. From the seventh century to the twelfth, the English were apt to be the faithful servants of the Roman See, while the Irish were disinclined from the Roman practice and recalcitrant towards the Roman authority. Since the sixteenth century, on the other hand, the Irish have been devoted adherents of Rome, while the English have been Protestants. It is noteworthy, however, that, although the changes which the three-cornered relation has undergone in the course of nearly thirteen centuries have been kaleidoscopic, the English have always contrived, in each successive situation, to retain the superior position which they secured in the seventh century and to keep the Irish at a disadvantage.

It might have been supposed, for example, that the English would have forfeited their advantage in the twelfth century when, nearly five hundred years after the Synod of Whitby, the Irish at length followed the English into the Papal fold. The incorporation of the Irish Christendom into the Roman Church was formally completed in A.D. 1152, when Cardinal Paparo, the first Papal Legate in Ireland, convened the Synod of Kells and reorganized the Irish dioceses. Yet it was only three years after this that a successor of the Pope who had dispatched the legate addressed to a King of England the Bull *Laudabiliter*,¹ which gave approval to the project of an English conquest of Ireland on the ground that this would have the effect of enlarging the bounds of the Church (just as though the Irish had not already come within the Roman fold of their own accord). Thereafter, the English conquerors arrogated to themselves—again, apparently, with Papal approval—a virtual monopoly of all high ecclesiastical offices in Ireland, from which the Irish came to be excluded generically. Thus their tardy reconciliation with Rome in the twelfth century profited the Irish nothing.

Again, it might have been supposed that the Irish would at least have profited by their loyalty to Rome in and after the sixteenth century, when the English turned Protestant; for now, at least, the Roman Church was bound to treat Ireland as her child when her former spoilt child, England, had shown herself so unfilial. Would

¹ See p. 337, footnote 1, above.

not Ireland be strengthened now, as England had been strengthened during the past nine centuries, by having the weight of the Continental Roman Church behind her in her everlasting struggle with her insular enemy? Unfortunately for Ireland, England has always had sufficient command of the sea since the sixteenth century to isolate Ireland from the Catholic countries of the Continent and to deal with her *tête-à-tête*.

But was not this situation, in which Ireland was isolated from the Continent by an English barrier, precisely the situation in which the abortive Far Western Christian Civilization had flourished so remarkably in the fifth and sixth centuries?¹ Unfortunately, again, for Ireland, the situation since the sixteenth century has differed from the situation in the fifth and sixth centuries in two important respects. In the first place, the English in the modern age, instead of being isolated and backward pagans, have been converts to Protestantism: a revised version of Western Christianity which has been adopted, not by the English alone, but by half the nations of the Western World, including some of the most energetic and progressive and successful members of the Western Society. The second difference in the situation is that, in the fifth and sixth centuries, the English had not yet attempted to invade and conquer Ireland and would not have been strong enough to succeed in the attempt even if they had made it. By the sixteenth century, on the other hand, the English conquest of Ireland was already half completed; and the new religious gulf which opened between the English and the Irish peoples, when the former turned against Rome and the latter remained loyal to her, inclined the English more than ever to treat the Irish as 'Natives' who were 'beyond the Pale' (an expression which is actually derived from conditions which prevailed in Ireland during the first phase of the English conquest). In the seventeenth century, the English 'planted' Catholic Ireland with Protestant settlers as ruthlessly as they were 'planting' pagan North America.² In consequence, after the Reformation, as before it, the Irish had to suffer from an English ecclesiastical tyranny which remained identical in substance in spite of its change in form. From the twelfth century to the sixteenth, when there was nominally one single church in Ireland to which Irish and English alike belonged, the English (as has been mentioned) assumed in this Church a monopoly of high ecclesiastical offices. Since the sixteenth century there have been two Churches in Ire-

¹ In those centuries, no doubt, Ireland had still maintained some communication, round the corner, with the coasts of Gaul and Spain. The ship on board which St. Patrick, in his youth, made good his escape from his slavery in Ireland was bound for a Gallic port.

² On this point see II. C (ii) (a) 1, Annex, vol. i, pp. 465-7, above.

land, and the Catholic Church has been in the hands of the Irish themselves. But from the moment when the Catholic Church in Ireland was thus thrown back into Irish hands as an incidental consequence of the English secession from Rome, this local native Irish Roman Church became a penalized institution with an alien Protestant Church in a dominant position over it. Thus the effect of the English Reformation upon the ecclesiastical position of the Irish was simply to confirm and accentuate the inferiority of their ecclesiastical status—an injustice which was only remedied by the combined effect of two nineteenth-century acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom at Westminster: the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 and the Episcopalian Church of Ireland Disestablishment and Disendowment Act of 1869.

It will be seen that the history of the three-cornered relation between Ireland, England, and the Roman See from A.D. 664 to A.D. 1869 aptly illustrates the aphorism that *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

ANNEX III TO II. D (vii)

THE EXTINCTION OF THE FAR WESTERN CHRISTIAN CULTURE IN IRELAND

THE discomfiture of the Far Western Church by the Roman Church at the Synod of Whitby in A.D. 664 was the beginning of the end of the distinctive Far Western Christian culture in 'the Celtic Fringe' as a whole and in Ireland in particular, but the process of extinction was long-drawn-out.

In Ireland, this process was completed at different dates in different spheres of social life. In the ecclesiastical sphere, it was completed in the twelfth century, with the thoroughgoing incorporation of the Irish Christendom into the Roman Church.¹ In the political and literary spheres, it was completed in the seventeenth century, when Ireland was systematically 'planted' and subjected by the successive efforts of James I/VI and Cromwell and William III, and when the traditional art of the vernacular Irish literature fell into decay. This tradition, which went back without a break to the pre-Christian age, and which had been quickened into new life by the conversion of Ireland to Christianity and the development of a peculiar Far Western Christian Civilization, was not broken by the subjection of the Irish Christendom to Rome and of Ireland herself to England in the twelfth century; but the tribulations of the seventeenth century were fatal to it. Finally, in the linguistic sphere, the Irish Celtic vernacular language itself died out (except in a few remote and secluded districts in the west) in the course of the nineteenth century, partly owing to the spread of elementary education imparted in the English language, and partly through the retro-action upon Ireland of the Irish community in America, who became English-speaking instead of Irish-speaking as a result of crossing the Atlantic and settling in a New World where English was the *lingua franca*.

The fact that, by the twentieth century, English had become the real national language of Ireland was brought out in an amusing incident that occurred during the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1921. During these negotiations, the Irish representatives had been making a point, in the presence of the British representatives, of talking Irish with one another and signing their names in Irish characters; and it had become evident that they did not speak and write this Irish without a certain difficulty. Thereafter, there came a moment when the

¹ See II. D (vii), Annex II, above.

principal British negotiator, who was none other than the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. David Lloyd George, had occasion to hold a confidential conversation with his private secretary, Mr. Thomas Jones. Instead of taking the trouble to withdraw from the room where the negotiations were taking place, the two British representatives simply ceased talking English and began to talk to one another in Welsh, which was the native language of both of them. It then became evident to the Irish representatives in the room that, whereas their own real native language was English, there were at least two British representatives negotiating with them whose real native language was Welsh: a Celtic language to which these champions of England resorted for the sake of privacy because they could be certain that it would not be understood by any representative of Celtic Ireland!

The last stage in the long-drawn-out process of the obliteration of a distinctive Far Western Christian culture in Ireland has been the establishment of the Irish Free State, in which the negotiations of 1921 have happily resulted. Among the Irish themselves, this happy event has been widely regarded as a great act of restoration—a liberation of the Irish genius from the shackles placed upon it by the successive acts of foreign aggression which have followed one another since the seventh century. This is surely an amiable illusion; for, when the nature of modern Irish nationalism is analysed, it proves, like Zionism, to be really a radical form of 'Assimilationism'.¹ Nationalism (whatever nation's nationalism it may happen to be) is the characteristic and fundamental political creed of our modern Western Society; and 'to go nationalist' is the most infallible of all the symptoms of 'Westernization'. The captivation of the Irish by Nationalism, like the captivation of the Jews by Zionism, signifies the final renunciation of a great but tragic past in the hope of securing in exchange a more modest but perhaps less uncomfortable future. If Jewish Zionism and Irish Nationalism succeed in achieving their aims, then Jewry and Irishry will each fit into its own tiny niche in the colossal structure of the modern Western World as one among sixty or seventy national communities all organized on the standard Western pattern. In this posture, the Irish and the Jews may find life in a Western environment somewhat easier than they have found it under the previous conditions when each of them still represented, not just a commonplace national articulation of an overgrown Western body social, but the relic of an independent society of the same species and order as the whole of Western Christendom.

Thus the establishment of the Irish Free State is a prosaic rather

¹ See the critique of Zionism in II. D (vi), on pp. 252-4, above.

than a romantic event. In fact, it signifies that the romance of Ancient Ireland has at last come to an end, and that Modern Ireland has made up her mind, in our generation, to find her level as a willing inmate in our workaday Western World. The romantic trappings of the Free State, which catch (and are no doubt intended to catch) the English eye, are superficial and perfunctory. While the new Irish Parliament and political parties, and the Free State itself, have been decked out with arresting Irish styles and titles, Irish civil servants and school-teachers are rebelling against the demand that the qualifications required of them shall be made to include an effective knowledge of the Irish language (a non-utilitarian accomplishment, inasmuch as Irish is no longer a living language except among the peasantry of a few districts in the west of the island). It is also significant that there has been no movement in Ireland for changing the seat of government: a costly and inconvenient proceeding which is almost common form at the foundation of 'successor-states'. Tara, the deserted capital of the Ancient Irish High Kings, has been left at the disposal of the archaeologists, while the Government of the Irish Free State has installed itself in Dublin: a city originally founded by Scandinavian interlopers and afterwards taken over from them by the English conquerors to become the head-quarters of the foreign garrison by which Ireland has been dominated for more than seven centuries. Yet, in spite of this historic association with an alien ascendancy, Dublin has been accepted as the inevitable capital of a new Irish national state for the substantial reason that Dublin is the geographical point of contact between little Ireland and the great circumambient modern Western World in which Ireland has now resolved to merge herself.

ANNEX IV TO II. D (vii)

THE FORFEITED BIRTHRIGHT OF THE ABORTIVE FAR WESTERN CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION

Now that the issue between Iona and Rome has been settled conclusively and irrevocably, it needs a vigorous effort of the historical imagination to conceive that, in the seventh century of the Christian Era, the embryonic Celtic and the embryonic Roman Church contended with one another for the prize of becoming the chrysalis of the new society which was to emerge in the West. The actual emergence of our modern Western Civilization from a Roman ecclesiastical chrysalis is such a prominent and important fact in our Western history as it has happened to take shape, that it is difficult to persuade oneself that this historic outcome was not inevitable but was merely one of two possible alternatives. Yet this now barely credible proposition is the manifest truth. During the post-Hellenic interregnum there was a real possibility of an Irish victory and a Roman defeat; and this alternative outcome—which would have given the whole of our Western history quite a different turn from that which it has actually taken—might have been realized in the seventh century, or even in the eighth, if, in certain stubbornly contested battles between certain well-matched forces, the victory had remained with the side which actually accepted defeat.

It may be suggested, without extravagance, that our modern Western Civilization would probably have been derived from an Irish instead of a Roman embryo *either* if Colman instead of Wilfrid had won the Synod of Whitby in A.D. 664 *or* again if 'Abd-ar-Rahmān instead of Charles Martel had won the Battle of Tours in A.D. 732. And we may confidently promote this probability into a certainty if we allow ourselves the historical licence of imagining that in *both* these 'decisive battles of the World' the Fortune of War had fallen out otherwise than it did.

The course which European history seemed likely to take, at the moment when 'Abd-ar-Rahmān, carrying all before him, was bearing down upon Charles Martel, has been imagined by Gibbon in a famous *tour de force* of historical speculation:

'A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles from the Rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland: the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the

interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.¹

We should rather be inclined to speculate that 'Abd-ar-Rahmān's victory—had he overthrown Charles Martel in A.D. 732—would have proved of less advantage to the Arabs and Islam than to the Celts and Far Western Christendom.

An Arab victory at Tours might conceivably have had the effect of adding the Gallic territories south of the Loire and west of the Alps to the permanent dominions of the Arab Caliphate. The *ci-devant* Roman citizens of Aquitaine and Provence had already been linked once before with their fellow-Latins in the Iberian Peninsula under the rule of the Visigoths: the Teutonic barbarians who had set up the first 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire in this quarter. The Visigoths had been driven back from the Loire to the Pyrenees by their Frankish kinsmen and rivals in A.D. 507-8;² yet, until the Arabs superseded them in the possession of their remaining dominions, the Goths had always retained a foothold on the Gallic side of the Pyrenees in Septimania; and, though more than two centuries had passed between Clovis' march to the Pyrenees and 'Abd-ar-Rahmān's march to the Loire, the Aquitanians had never become reconciled to the rule of the Franks, whose little finger was thicker than the Visigoths' loins.³ No doubt the Latins of Aquitaine would have been at least as well content as the Latins of the Iberian Peninsula were to exchange a Teutonic for an Arab master. And we can therefore readily imagine an Arab victory at Tours being followed by a permanent annexation of Aquitaine and Provence, as well as Spain and Septimania, to the Arab Caliphate.

On the other hand, it is not so easy to follow Gibbon's flight of imagination in fancying that the troops of 'Abd-ar-Rahmān might have doubled their thousand-mile march from Gibraltar to the Loire by marching on from the line of the Loire to the line of the Caledonian Canal or the line of the Oder. For even if 'Abd-ar-Rahmān had scattered the Franks to the winds and had found himself, on the morrow of a decisive victory at Tours, left master of the situation, with no organized military power any longer in existence anywhere in Northern Europe to contest his advance, it seems probable that the further advance which Gibbon imagines, and which no human obstacle would then have hindered, would have been prohibited—as inexorably as Alexander's ruefully abandoned

¹ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. lli. The passage has been cited in this Study already, by anticipation, in I. B (iii), vol. i, on p. 30, footnote 1, above.

² For Clovis' victory at Vouillé in A.D. 507 see II. D (v), p. 166, *abōve*.

³ 2 Chronicles x. 10.

advance beyond the Ganges—by the physical impossibility of lengthening any further an already stupendously long line of communications. From their capital at Damascus and their reservoir of soldiers in the Arabian hinterland, the Umayyad Caliphs were unable to send reinforcements and supplies by sea from the Mediterranean ports of Syria and Egypt to those of Spain and Gaul, because the naval command of the Mediterranean had been retained by the East Roman Empire.¹ They thus had no short and easy alternative to the land-route across the whole breadth of North Africa from the Isthmus of Suez to the Straits of Gibraltar; and this route was not only long and round-about but was also beset with obstacles, both physical and human: the difficulty of crossing the desert and the danger of being set upon by the Berbers. Accordingly it seems wise, on this point, to differ (with great deference) from Gibbon; and to imagine that an Arab victory at Tours in A.D. 732 would have carried the North-West frontier of the Arab Caliphate up to the Loire and the Alps but (in all probability) not beyond them.

What would have been the probable effect of an expansion of the Caliphate, up to but not beyond these limits, upon the history of Europe?

The first effect would have been once again to isolate the Far Western Christendom of the British Isles from the Roman Church—as it had been isolated once before, three centuries earlier—by the interposition of an alien society. In this respect, the Muslim Arabs in Southern Gaul would have performed the same function as the pagan English in Eastern Britain; only, this time, the barrier would have been drawn along a line which would have given a much greater geographical advantage to the Far Western embryo of a nascent Western Civilization than to its Roman competitor. In the first place, the Far Western Church would assuredly have retrieved the defeat which it had suffered at Whitby half a century earlier, and would have drawn the English, as well as the Irish and the Welsh and the Bretons, into its fold. In the second place, the Far Western Church would then almost certainly have captured from the Roman Church the whole existing and surviving extent of Continental North European Christendom. The country between the Loire and the Rhine was already honeycombed with Irish monastic cells;² and in A.D. 732 the Irish missionaries in the Continental pagan marches of the day—Frisia and Hesse and Thuringia and Bavaria—had not yet been suppressed by the English Romanizing

¹ See J. B. Bury's *editio minor* of Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. vi, Appendix 5: 'The Byzantine Navy.'

² See the map illustrating 'Les Expansions Irlandaises' in Gougau, *Les Chrétientés Celtiques* (Paris 1911, Gabalda), ad fin.

interloper Boniface. We may even conjecture that Boniface himself would have found it impossible thereafter to carry on his own missionary work in Central Europe without transferring his ecclesiastical allegiance from Rome to Iona. In our mind's eye we begin to perceive the outlines of a picture—never committed to canvas by the Artist of human destiny—in which a Far Western Church, with its centre and source of energy in Ireland and its southern frontier along the Loire, consolidates its dominion over the British Isles and the adjacent portions of the European Continent and then gradually extends its domain north-eastwards—by converting the Saxons and the Scandinavians—until its advance in this direction is eventually barred by a collision with the Orthodox Christian Church, as the actual advance of the Roman Church in the same direction was eventually barred by the same barrier in the fourteenth century.

In studying this actual historical process we have had occasion to notice that when Roman and Orthodox Christendom did collide in Northern Europe, after the elimination of the last of the pagan North European barbarians, the eventual line along which the two Christian civilizations established their contact ran south and north from the shores of the Adriatic to the shores of the Arctic Ocean.¹ Where are we to draw our imaginary boundary between the Orthodox and the Celtic Christendom in our hypothetical reconstruction of our Western history? We may assume, to begin with, that if 'Abd-ar-Rahmān had won the Battle of Tours in A.D. 732 and had carried the permanent frontier of the Caliphate to the foot of the Alps as well as to the banks of the Loire, the whole of Italy, including Rome itself, would then have clung to the skirts of Orthodox Christendom as the only valid protection against this Arab menace.

The moment when the Arabs and the Franks were fighting their decisive battle at Tours was also a turning-point in the relations of the Roman See with Orthodox Christendom and of Italy with the East Roman Empire. At this moment, the iconoclastic policy of the Imperial Government at Constantinople—a policy which the Emperor Leo the Syrian had promulgated in A.D. 726²—was driving a wedge between these two portions of a hitherto undivided Catholic Christendom.³ The Pope was refusing to accept the proscription of image-worship by Imperial decree; the enclaves of Imperial territory in Central Italy which had hitherto held out against the

¹ See II. D (v), pp. 168-9, above.

² This policy of Iconoclasm was launched by Leo as soon as he had succeeded in restoring the East Roman Empire (a ghost of the Roman Empire) in the homelands of Orthodox Christendom. (For Leo's role in Orthodox Christian history see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 64, footnote 3, above, and Part X, below. For Leo's personal history see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 274-6, below.)

³ For the progressive alienation of the Roman from the Orthodox branch of Catholic Christendom see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 66-7, above.

Lombard barbarian intruders were renouncing their allegiance to the Empire; and the Lombards themselves were preparing to round off their uncompleted conquest of the peninsula by attacking and conquering piecemeal these long-recalcitrant enclaves which had now at last rendered themselves defenceless by deliberately repudiating the East Roman Government's support. At the news of an Arab victory over the Franks at Tours we may conjecture that all these incipient movements in Italy would have been arrested forthwith and reversed.

The Pope and the Romagnols would have hastened to make their peace with the Emperor at Constantinople in order to make sure of Imperial protection against an agile Arab aggressor who had shown himself far more formidable than the heavy-footed Lombard. The Franks—defeated at Tours and now cut off from Italy by the new dominion of the Arab Caliphate in Southern Gaul—would never have suggested themselves to the minds of Papal statesmen as possible alternative protectors of the Roman See, in lieu of the East Roman Emperors. The Lombards would have ceased to cast covetous eyes upon the surviving East Roman possessions in Italy, and would rather have offered their own allegiance to the East Roman Empire in order to save themselves from suffering, at Arab hands, the fate which had already overtaken their own Teutonic kinsmen the Visigoths and the Franks. Thus Justinian's 'great idea' of reuniting the Italian with the Balkan and the Anatolian Peninsula in a reconstituted Roman Empire—a feat which had actually been accomplished in the sixth century, only to be undone forthwith by the Lombard invasion—would have been realized definitively in the eighth century of the Christian Era, thanks to the masterful intervention of the Arabs in Gaul.

In that event we may conjecture that, a century later, the Orthodox Christian missionaries Cyril and Methodius would have been successful in winning the field of their labours—Moravia and Bohemia—for an Orthodox Christendom which would have embraced both the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Patriarchate of Rome.¹ In these circumstances it is probable that, in the partition of barbarian Europe between the Orthodox and the Celtic Christendom, the Orthodox Church would have gathered into its fold the whole vast family of the Slavs, and that the ecclesiastical boundary between the two Christian societies would have run through Central Europe, south and north, from the Alps to the Baltic, along the line of the contemporary linguistic boundary

¹ The geographical conditions resulting from the historical schism between the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Rome in the eighth century actually rendered Cyril and Methodius's work for Orthodox Christendom in Central Europe abortive. (See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 65, above.)

between the Slavonic and the Teutonic vernaculars. The new Western Society derived from an Irish embryo would then have been confined on the European Continent to a modest enclave between the Loire and the Alps and the Böhmer Wald and the Elbe, and its centre of gravity would have rested overseas: in the British Isles or perhaps eventually in Scandinavia. As for the rival Roman embryo, its attempt to arrogate to itself the function of becoming the chrysalis of a new Western Civilization would have been written off by latter-day historians as an effort which was not uninteresting in spite of its having been abortive, just as the Irish attempt is written off now.

On this showing we may perhaps partly attenuate and partly embroider Gibbon's fantasy. We have already represented the Celtic pioneer Columbanus to ourselves as a second Bellovesus.¹ Let us think of the Syriac conqueror 'Abd-ar-Rahmān as a second Hannibal;² and let us imagine him—after a decisive victory over the Franks at Tours—taking up again the brilliant policy, which the Carthaginian statesman and strategist had conceived a thousand years before, of an anti-Roman coalition, on West European ground, between the Syriac Society and the Celts.³ Let us further suppose that the Arab—rendered more prudent than the Carthaginian by the greater distance at which, in Gaul, he finds himself from his base—is content to clip the wings of Rome by excluding her from Transalpine Europe, and that he does not follow the path of his Carthaginian predecessor in the hazardous enterprise of crossing the mountains and seeking out his enemy in Italy itself. In that event, the picture which we have already drawn will materialize. While Italy and the Slavias gravitate towards Orthodox Christendom, the Arab victor at Tours, who is too prudent to attempt the passage of the Alps, is equally firm in declining to march on, another thousand miles, into the heart of an unknown and barbarous continent until he arrives at the western confines of Slavdom or at the northern extremity of Britain. Instead of embarking on any such crack-brained military adventure, he insures the exclusion of Roman and East Roman influence from North-Western Europe by making friends, beyond the Loire, with the Bretons and the other Far Western Christians who follow the Celtic Rite, and who are just as ready as the Far Eastern Christian Nestorians and Monophysites to escape the yoke of a Catholic-Orthodox Christendom by placing themselves under the aegis of Islam.

On this reckoning we need not push our flight of fancy so far as to imagine the interpretation of the Qur'ān being taught in the

¹ See II. D (vii), pp. 330-1, above.

² This analogy had already been suggested in II. D (v), on p. 203, above.

³ For Hannibal's policy see II. D (v), pp. 161-2, above.

schools of modern Oxford. We may paint, instead, the rather less sensational picture of a Celtic Easter being celebrated in the University Church by monks exhibiting the Celtic tonsure and belonging to the Ionan Order of Saint Columba. And we may imagine Irish scholars, with their lively intellectual curiosity and their restless *Wanderlust*, resorting to the seats of Arabic learning—not merely to Cordova but to distant Baghdad and Samarkand—and bringing back a knowledge of Aristotle, not to Oxford or to Paris but to Clonmacnois: the metropolitan university of a Western World which looks for intellectual light to Ireland.¹ Assuredly these active and brilliant Irishmen would have acquired this precious knowledge from the Arabs at least three centuries earlier than the date at which it was actually conveyed from Toledo to Paris by the stolid descendants of Charles Martel's Franks who have deflected the course of our Western history for ever, but perhaps not for good, by refusing to accept defeat at Tours at the hands of 'Abd-ar-Rahmān's Arabs!

So near did the Celtic rear-guard of the North European Barbarism come to wresting from the Roman Church the privilege of creating a new Western Civilization. In this conflict, Rome only just succeeded in gaining the upper hand over Ireland.

¹ A certain affinity between the Irish and the Saracenic genius appears to reveal itself in the realm of art; for the Irish art of the now extinct Far Western Christendom is on a par with the Saracenic art in its love for, and mastery of, geometrical design, while its weakness lies in the delineation of living creatures, which, for Muslim artists, is *tabu*. (For these characteristics of Irish art, see Gougaud: *Christianity in Celtic Lands*, pp. 371 and 374.)

ANNEX V TO II. D (vii)

THE RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN THE ABORTIVE SCANDINAVIAN CIVILIZATION AND THE HELLENIC CIVILIZATION

THE resemblance of the abortive Scandinavian Civilization to the successful Hellenic Civilization is not of course confined to the fields of literary art and political organization;¹ it reveals itself likewise in the fields of religion and of *êthos*. The resemblance in *êthos*, which consists in the combination of a precocious originality with a precocious rationalism, is touched upon on pp. 355-7, above. The resemblance in religion is twofold. In the first place, the Pantheon of Asgard resembles the Pantheon of Olympus in being a society of divinities conceived in the likeness of human beings, and this not only in their physical form but in their heart and mind and experience and fortune. In the second place the mythology of which this pantheon is the subject is strangely divorced from worship. The Gods and Goddesses who are most prominent in the myths are not invariably the objects of the most popular or the most hallowed cults; and, conversely, some of the *numina* which are the objects of these outstanding cults play quite an obscure part, or no part at all, in the mythological drama. This divorce between myth and cult is brought out in the case of the Hellenic religion by Miss J. E. Harrison in her *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*,² and in the case of the Scandinavian religion by Professor H. M. Chadwick in *The Cult of Oðin*.³

These resemblances in religion and in *êthos* between the Scandinavian and the Hellenic Civilization cannot be explained, like the political and artistic resemblances, as outcomes of the identic experience of transmarine migration which was common to the Greek settlers in Ionia and to the Norse settlers in Iceland. On the other hand, they seem too close to be fortuitous. Can we then account for them otherwise?

A generation or so ago scholars would have confidently attributed all these resemblances alike to 'the common Indo-European origin' of the Teutonic-speaking and Greek-speaking layers of North European barbarians by whom the Scandinavian Civilization and the Hellenic Civilization were respectively created, but this explanation no longer satisfies us; for we have now realized that a genetic relationship between two languages is no evidence for the existence of any racial relationship between peoples speaking

¹ For the resemblance in these two fields, see II. D (iii), pp. 86-100, above.

² 2nd ed., Cambridge 1908, University Press.

³ London 1899, Clays.

those languages, and also that a racial relationship, even if effectively demonstrated by direct anthropometric measurements, is no evidence for any community of *êthos* or tradition between peoples that prove to be racially akin to one another. In fact the old hypotheses of 'an Indo-European race', 'an Indo-European *êthos*', and 'an Indo-European religion' have been exploded; and explanations of actual resemblances between different peoples of Indo-European speech have therefore to be sought elsewhere.

The resemblances in certain religious phenomena between the Scandinavian rear-guard of the Teutons and the post-Minoan Greeks do extend to at least one other people speaking an Indo-European language: namely, the Aryan-speaking Nomads from Eurasia who created the Indic Civilization on the site of the fore-going 'Indus Culture'. On the other hand there are other Indo-European-speaking peoples—for example, the Italic—who display no trace of these particular religious phenomena. The Italic do not appear to have conceived their divinities in human likeness; they had little or no mythology; and their cults were crude magic. Yet the Italic were 'Indo-European' in just the same sense (whatever the sense may be) as the Teutons and the Greeks and the Aryas. Thus these particular religious phenomena are palpably something less than the universal heritage of 'an Indo-European family' of peoples. Yet, even if the old concept of 'an Indo-European family' is abandoned, this does not exclude the possibility of a common origin for certain particular Indo-European tribes which are geographically far removed from one another at the time when they first emerge into the light of History. It may not be fantastic to conjecture that the Teutonic-speaking Goths and Gauts of Scandinavia may have been descended from a fragment of the same Indo-European-speaking tribe as the homonymous Getae and Thyssagetae and Massagetae of the Eurasian Steppe who are represented to-day by the Jâts of the Panjab.¹ A similar connexion may be postulated between the Aryan-speaking Bhrigus of India and their Thraco-Phrygian-speaking homonyms the Brigoi of the Balkan

¹ If the European Getae in the Lower Danube Basin were a fragment of the same Nomad horde as the Thyssagetae between the Volga and Emba and the Massagetae on the Lower Jaxartes, then it is natural to postulate the same relation between the Davi or Daci, who were the historical neighbours of the European Getae in Transylvania, and the Dahae, who were the historical neighbours of the Thyssagetae and Massagetae in Transcaspiæ. Since the Dacians, at any rate, were regarded as a Thracian people by the time when they emerged into the full light of history in consequence of their collision with Rome, it might seem at first sight as though the tribal names Getae and Davi were both common to the Iranian-speaking and the Thracian-speaking branches of the Indo-European linguistic family. It is, however, perhaps more likely that the European Getae and Davi, like their homonyms east of the Volga, were a pair of originally Iranian-speaking hordes who gradually became assimilated to the sedentary Thracian-speaking populations whom they had conquered. Since the founders of 'the Parthian Empire' appear to have been Dahae (see p. 371, footnote 2, above), it would follow that the Roman Emperor Trajan's Transeuphratean and Transdanubian adversaries were blood brothers.

Peninsula and the Bebryces and Phryges of Anatolia; and again between the Kaşyapas who were the historical neighbours of the Bhrigus and the Cassiopaei who were the historical neighbours of the Brigoi. The same postulate may be extended to another series of tribal homonyms: the Illyrian-speaking Veneti (Enetoi) of Venetia, the presumably Thracio-Phrygian-speaking Enetoi on the Black Sea coast of Anatolia, the Slavonic-speaking Venedi (Wends) in the Pripet Marshes, and the Celtic-speaking Veneti on the Atlantic coast of Gaul, whose tribal name has survived as Vannes. Is there any evidence of the same kind for a common origin of the Teutonic-speaking and Greek-speaking tribes who respectively created the Scandinavian and the Hellenic Pantheon? In a recent study of the Greek language¹ it is pointed out that 'there was a Germanic tribe called Ingaev-ones, a name that apart from the suffix corresponds exactly phonetically to the name Akhaiw-oi'. And when we ask which particular Teutonic peoples these Ingaevones were, we find that 'by native tradition—assuredly the most trustworthy class of evidence which we possess in such matters—the name Ingaevones is connected with the peoples of the Baltic and with them alone'.²

Then can we explain the common features of the Scandinavian and Hellenic religions as the common heritage of a single Indo-European-speaking tribe, the Ingaevones-Akhaiwoi, which had broken into fragments and come to be dispersed, in the course of history, from the Baltic to the Aegean? We may go on, if we choose, to fortify—or weaken—this equation between the Teutonic Ingaevones and the Greek Akhaiwoi by adding an equation of our own between the Teutonic Istaevones and the Greek Histiaioi; and at first sight this modified version of the 'common Indo-European origin' hypothesis looks attractive. Yet, before accepting it, we may pause to take account of two considerations: first, that it is notoriously hazardous to build historical hypotheses upon resemblances in nomenclature which may be accidental; and second that, in this particular case, the 'tribal identity' hypothesis which explains the resemblance between early Scandinavian religion and early Hellenic religion does not explain their common resemblance to early Indic religion as it is conveyed in the Vedas.

A more convincing explanation will be found in a common experience and achievement of the Norsemen and the Achaeans and the Aryas which has nothing whatever to do with the 'Indo-European' family-relationship between their respective languages. All three peoples alike were barbarians who happened—each in their

¹ Atkinson, B. F. C.: *The Greek Language* (London 1932, Faber & Faber), p. 14, footnote 1.

² Chadwick, H. M.: *The Origin of the English Nation* (reprint: Cambridge 1924, University Press), ch. ix: 'The Classification of the Germani', p. 219.

own time and place—to become ‘external proletariats’ of declining civilizations, and who each succeeded, or very nearly succeeded, thereafter, in becoming the creators of new civilizations on the sites of the antecedent civilizations whose domains they overran in their *Völkerwanderungen*. At previous points in this Study¹ we have already attributed the idiosyncrasy of the Hellenic religion to the barbarian origin of the Hellenic Society. We have derived the Olympian Pantheon from the barbarian war-band, and have explained the divorce between Hellenic mythology and Hellenic worship as a vestige of the unbridged cultural gulf between barbarian intruders who fashioned a new civilization out of their own social heritage and the heirs of an antecedent civilization who had failed to assimilate the intrusive barbarians. If this explanation of the Hellenic religion is right, then we can account in the same way for the features which the Hellenic religion shares with the Indic and the Scandinavian; since these are precisely the features that derive from the barbarian origin which the successful Hellenic and Indic and the abortive Scandinavian Civilization have in common.

¹ e.g. in I. C (i) (a), vol. i, on pp. 95–100, and in II. D (vii) on p. 316.

ANNEX VI TO II. D (vii)

THE FORFEITED BIRTHRIGHT OF THE ABORTIVE SCANDINAVIAN CIVILIZATION

HAVING observed the narrowness of the margin by which the abortive Scandinavian Civilization failed to achieve its manifest destiny, let us now imagine to ourselves that the historic encounter between the Vikings and the Civilizations of the South had ended, not as it actually did, but in the other of the two possible alternative outcomes. Let us imagine, that is to say, that the Teutonic rear-guard, instead of being eventually discomfited like the Teutonic van-guard, had eventually triumphed over Roman and Orthodox Christendom, as the Achaean barbarians had once actually triumphed over the Minoan Civilization and the Hittite Civilization. Owing to the accident that, in the Scandinavian case, history has happened to take the other of the two equally possible alternative courses, the unfulfilled consequences of the unachieved victory of the Scandinavian barbarians are as difficult to apprehend in our latter-day imaginations as the unfulfilled consequences of the unachieved victory of the Far Western Christians of Ireland.¹ Yet, if we glance again at the critical events in the history of the Viking Age, we shall recognize that the Scandinavian Vikings, like the Irish missionaries, came within an ace of succeeding in their gigantic enterprise.

Let us suppose that they had just succeeded, instead of just failing, to capture Constantinople in A.D. 860² and Paris in A.D. 885-6 and London in A.D. 895;³ let us suppose that Rollo had not been converted by Charles the Simple in A.D. 911⁴ nor Svyatoslav defeated by John Zimisces in A.D. 972;⁵ let us suppose that, at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era, the Scandinavian settlers in Greenland had just managed, instead of just failing, to gain a footing on the North American Continent;⁶ and let us suppose that the Scandinavian settlers in Russia, having actually made themselves masters of the Dniepr and the Volga waterways, had proceeded to make use of these key-positions not merely for occasional raids upon the Caspian provinces of the 'Abbasid Caliphate'⁷ but for the exploration and mastery of the whole network of waterways that gives access to the Far East across the face of Eurasia. None of these seven suppositions are at all far-fetched or fantastic; and if we allow ourselves to postulate all

¹ See Annex IV, above.

² See p. 349, above.

³ See II. D (v), p. 199, II. D (v) Annex, pp. 400-1, and II. D (vii), p. 349, above.

⁴ See pp. 347-8, above.

⁵ See p. 349, above.

⁶ See pp. 291-3, above.

⁷ For these occasional Viking raids in the Caspian, see Kendrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-63.

of them, or even a majority of them, in imagination, we shall obtain a reconstruction of the course of history which will perhaps surprise us.

We shall see the Vikings trampling the nascent civilizations of Roman and Orthodox Christendom out of existence as thoroughly as the Achaeans actually crushed the decadent Minoan and the rising Hittite Society: so thoroughly, in fact, that the two annihilated civilizations do not leave any spiritual children, affiliated to them through a universal church, behind, but vanish, bag and baggage, from the face of the Earth to leave the field free for a new Scandinavian structure on barbarian foundations.¹ We shall then see this new Scandinavian Civilization reigning supreme in Europe in Christendom's stead and marching with the Arabic Civilization across the Mediterranean, and with the Iranic Civilization across the Caspian, as the Hellenic Civilization, once created on new barbarian foundations by the Achaeans, actually marched with the Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations in the place of the Minoan and Hittite civilizations, when these had been so utterly overthrown that their place did not know them any more.² And, after this, we shall watch the Scandinavians turning their energies to the extension of their domain into the barbarian hinterlands on either flank.

The Scandinavians, in their day, were assuredly as efficient in the art of exploration and commerce and conquest and colonization along the channel of inland waterways as the latter-day Cossack pioneers of the Old World or the latter-day French and English pioneers of the New World. The Cossacks, who made themselves masters of the waterway of the Lower Dniepr some five or six hundred years later than the Vikings, conducted their north-eastward operations from this base with such effect that, within two or three centuries, they had threaded their way across the vast expanse of river-shot continent that stretches away from the left bank of the Dniepr to the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk.³ Is it credible that the Dniepr-Vikings and the Volga-Vikings would have failed to anticipate the achievement of the Cossacks if they had applied their thoughts and energies seriously to this task?⁴ Again, the French

¹ For this unfulfilled possibility, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 99, above.

² Job vii. 10.

³ For the achievement of the Cossacks, and the stimulus of alien pressure to which this achievement was a reaction, see II. D (v), pp. 154-7, above.

⁴ The Vikings were actually better placed than the Cossacks for penetrating and mastering the Great North-East, since they were already masters of the Volga—a waterway of unique importance over which the Cossacks never obtained control (the Cossacks were anticipated by the Muscovites on the Lower Volga and therefore had to make the leap from the Don to the Yaik). The Vikings reached the Volga partly direct from the Baltic (the portage to the Volga Basin from the Volkhov Basin is shorter, though less level, than the portage to the Dniepr Basin from the Volkhov Basin) and partly by a roundabout route down the Dniepr into the Black Sea and out of the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov and up the River Don and across the portage between the Don and the Volga at the point where the courses of the two rivers approach nearest to one another. (See Kendrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-63.)

and English mariners who eventually made themselves masters of the St. Lawrence and the Hudson, some six centuries after the Greenland Vikings had just failed to master these two North American waterways, pushed westward, inland, up-stream, and on into the Basin of the Mississippi with such effect that, within two centuries, the victorious Western pioneers had reached the coast of the Pacific. Is it credible that the Vinland-Vikings (if Vinland had actually become, as it so nearly became, a Scandinavian colony) would have failed to anticipate the achievement of the French *coureurs* and the English backwoodsmen? The estuary of the St. Lawrence, which offers itself invitingly to any seafarer approaching North America from the direction of Greenland, induces the explorer, through the chain of the Great Lakes, into the heart of the Continent; and here, at the head of the Lakes, lie vast tracts of country with a soil and a climate in which the Viking pioneer would have found a larger and more genial reproduction of his native Scandinavia.

The peculiar suitability of this region for Scandinavian agricultural settlement is demonstrated by the strength of the modern Scandinavian contribution to the population of the present States of Wisconsin and Iowa and Minnesota; but the Swedish and Norwegian farmers who have been attracted to the American North-West and have 'made good' in these new surroundings within the last half-century have not been pioneers themselves. They have waited for French and English pioneers to lead the way into an American land of promise which these modern Scandinavian settlers' Viking forefathers were on the verge of discovering for themselves at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era. If a few more Viking ships had made the passage from Greenland to Vinland in that age, or if the ship's companies that did make the passage had not shown something less than the usual Viking determination and enterprise in failing to push on beyond the fringe of the great new world upon which they had stumbled, we must surely suppose that, by Hauk Erlendsson's time, some three centuries later, the Scandinavian World would have extended to the Pacific coast of North America¹ as well as to the Pacific coast of Northern Asia. Perhaps the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, which actually saw the completion of the partition of the *ci-devant* Scandinavian domain between Western and Orthodox Christendom, would have seen, instead, a Scandinavian encirclement of the globe, when

¹ There is one alleged piece of material evidence—a Runic inscription, bearing the date A.D. 1362, which came to light at Kensington, Minnesota, in 1898—which opens up the possibility that, in Hauk Erlendsson's age, one band of Norse explorers from Greenland may have penetrated thus deep, at any rate, into the interior of the North American Continent. (See Holand, H. R.: *The Kensington Stone* (privately printed: Wisconsin 1932, Ephraim).)

Viking pioneers who had made their way across the breadth of the North Atlantic Ocean and the breadth of the North American Continent to Alaska¹ joined hands at last, across the Behring Straits, with other Vikings who, in starting out from Scandinavia, had turned their faces in the opposite direction and had crossed the Baltic in order to make their way across the breadth of Eurasia to Kamchatka.²

What would have been Iceland's rank and role in Hauk Erlendsson's day in a world in which Western Christendom and Orthodox Christendom were both extinct, and in which a triumphant Scandinavian Civilization, that had overrun Europe and encircled the globe, now found itself marching with the Arabic Civilization across the Mediterranean and with the Iranic across the Caspian and with the Far Eastern along the Amur and perhaps even with the Mexic Civilization along the Rio Grande? In this unrealized and therefore unfamiliar but by no means impossible world, it is evident that Iceland would long since have ceased to be a Scandinavian Ultima Thule and would have become, instead, the centre-point of the Scandinavian World: the inevitable stepping-stone, in mid-ocean, between the European and the American half of the gigantically expanded domain of a living and growing Scandinavian Society. And what would then have been the state of Icelandic culture? Would this brilliant culture, which actually wilted away under the transforming touch of Christianity before it had attained its prime, have been able to fulfil its early promise by going on steadily from strength to strength if a successful Viking conquest of Europe had extirpated Roman Christianity on its native soil before ever the alien religion had acquired an opportunity of exerting its corrosive influence upon Icelandic life? And if the Icelandic culture really had continued to develop, what special colour would it have taken and what special lines would it have followed?

From its actual development, before its life was cut short, we can surmise with some confidence that its aesthetic sensibility and intellectual penetration would have been of a rare quality and that its religious temperature would have been sub-normal.³ The

¹ This Arctic route from Europe to North America, which the Scandinavian mariners just failed to open up in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, is perhaps destined to be opened in the twentieth century by Western airmen. 'On the British Arctic Air Expedition [of 1930-1] we spent a year in Greenland investigating the possibilities of an air route between Europe and America. The advantages of the Arctic route are many. There are no long sea-crossings; the weather in most parts of the Arctic is more stable than in Europe; and, lastly, owing to the shape of the World, the Arctic route is the shortest between England and Central North America.' Mr. H. G. Watkins in *The Times*, 30th June, 1932.

² See Annex VII, below, for a comparison of the lost opportunities of the Scandinavians with those of the Osmanlis.

³ For an imaginary reconstruction of the religious history of medieval and modern Europe on the supposition that Christendom had succumbed to Viking assaults instead of beating them back, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 99, above.

two tendencies are interdependent, for both spring equally from the specific *êthos* of the Scandinavian Civilization which we have attempted to appraise above.¹ This *êthos*, as we have observed, bears an unmistakable resemblance to the Hellenic; and if we wish to conjecture what the Scandinavian genius might have achieved by the fourteenth century of the Christian Era—supposing that it had enjoyed the Hellenic immunity from a sterilizing contamination—we cannot do better than to remind ourselves of what had actually been achieved by the more fortunate Hellenic genius in its most brilliant early focus at a corresponding date.

What is the corresponding century in Hellenic history to Hauk Erlendsson's in Scandinavian? Hauk Erlendsson actually lived, and was no doubt highly conscious of living, in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era; but if Scandinavian history had taken the alternative course that we have allowed ourselves to imagine, Christianity would have been virtually extinct and the Christian Era therefore presumably obsolete by Hauk's time. In that case Hauk might have been conscious rather of living in the tenth century since the moment when his Scandinavian forefathers had struck out that independent course of their own which had eventually led their descendants to unforeseen heights of achievement. He might have reckoned his chronology from the beginning of the post-Hellenic *Völkerwanderung* (*circa* A.D. 375), when the Teutonic van-guard went off to the wars and the Teutonic rear-guard made its momentous choice of staying four centuries longer at home. And if we take the corresponding starting-point for Hellenic history, and measure off the centuries from the beginning of the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*, when the Achaeans made a Vandal choice and won Scandinavian laurels, what is the tenth century of the Hellenic Era on this computation? Simple arithmetic informs us that the Hellenic century which corresponds to Hauk Erlendsson's century in Scandinavian chronology is the fifth century B.C. (*circa* 525–425 B.C.). And if we contemplate the historic cultural achievement, in that famous century, of Ionia, the Hellenic Iceland, we may begin to imagine what might have been achieved, at an equivalent date, by Iceland, the Scandinavian Ionia, if Fortune had permitted the Icelanders, as she graciously permitted the Ionians, to work out their own high destinies undisturbed. In that contingency the Icelandic culture in Hauk Erlendsson's day might have reached and even passed its zenith, and Iceland might then have been in the act of handing the torch of Scandinavian Civilization to Norway and to Vinland, as Ionia, in the fifth century B.C., did

¹ See pp. 355–7, as well as Annex V, above.

hand the torch of Hellenic Civilization to Athens and to Magna Graecia.

So near did the Scandinavians come, when they responded to the challenge of Roman Christendom, to achieving the same success as the Achaeans achieved when they responded to the challenge of the Minoan Civilization.

ANNEX VII TO II. D (vii)

THE LOST OPPORTUNITIES OF THE SCANDINAVIANS AND THE 'OSMANLIS

IN the narrowness of the margin by which the achievement of success was missed on a number of crucial occasions, and in the vastness of the difference in the course that would have been taken by History if some or all of these enterprises had succeeded, the history of the Vikings bears a curious resemblance to the history of the 'Osmanlis.

For example, the fate of Western Christendom was at stake in the Ottoman siege of Vienna in A.D. 1529, as it was at stake in the Norse sieges of Paris in A.D. 885-6 and of London in A.D. 895. Again, the 'Osmanlis, like the Vikings, just missed a number of opportunities for expansion which other peoples took.

The 'Osmanlis' acquisition of Algeria in A.D. 1512-19 came just too late, and fell just too far short, to enable them to cut off, at its base, the Oceanic enterprise of the Castilians and the Portuguese. If Ottoman sea-power had been able to make itself felt at the western end of the Mediterranean some thirty years earlier, it might have come to the rescue of the last Moorish enclave in the Iberian Peninsula and have compelled the Castilians to fight for the retention of Andalusia at the moment when Ferdinand and Isabella were actually rounding off their Peninsular dominions by the conquest of Granada. In that event, the Spanish sovereigns might have lacked the leisure and the means for patronizing Christopher Columbus; and Columbus himself might have found it impossible, in A.D. 1492, to set sail across the Atlantic from Palos. (The 'Osmanlis did take sufficient interest in the discovery of the New World to execute a careful copy of a very early map of the Americas which they found on board a Spanish prize that was captured by an Ottoman squadron in the Western Mediterranean.)¹ Again, if the 'Osmanlis had followed up their acquisition of Algeria by making themselves also masters of Morocco, they might have brought Henry the Navigator's work to naught by closing the Portuguese route round Africa to India and the Far East. The Portuguese circumnavigators of Africa who were scarcely hampered in their enterprise by the activities of the Moorish pirates of Salee might have found themselves paralysed if the Atlantic coast of Morocco

¹ See Kähle, P.: *Die verschollene Columbus-Karte von 1498 in einer türkischen Weltkarte von 1513* (Berlin and Leipzig 1933, de Gruyter).

had given harbour to Ottoman fleets with the whole power of the Ottoman Empire behind them.

Similarly, the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in A.D. 1517 and of 'Irāq in A.D. 1534 came just too late to forestall the arrival of the Portuguese mariners in the Indian Ocean; and although the acquisition of seaboard on the Red Sea and on the Persian Gulf, in addition to their seaboard on the Mediterranean, gave the 'Osmanlis the great strategic advantage of holding the interior lines, this geographical asset did not make up for lost time. When an Ottoman naval squadron attacked the Portuguese at Diu in A.D. 1538, and Ottoman matchlockmen fought Portuguese matchlockmen in Abyssinia in A.D. 1542-3, these Ottoman operations were unsuccessful and they were never followed up.

Again, after the Ottoman victory over the Türkmen prince Uzun Hasan at Baiburt in A.D. 1473, there was nothing at the moment to stop the expansion of the Ottoman Empire overland into the central and eastern sections of the domain of the Iranic Civilization; and the 'Osmanlis would assuredly have been called in to the rescue by the Transoxanians and the Khurāsānīs at the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, when the Eurasian frontier of the Iranic World was attacked by a new Nomadic invader in the shape of the Uzbegs, if this avenue for Ottoman expansion had not been closed, at that very moment, by the meteoric rise of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī.¹

Finally, we may note that the Grand Vizir Mehmed Sököllü's project of cutting a canal from the Don to the Volga, and so securing for the Ottoman Empire the command of the great Eurasian network of waterways, miscarried when it was actually attempted, in A.D. 1568-70, because the Muscovites had just anticipated the 'Osmanlis in securing command of the Volga by taking Qāzān in A.D. 1552 and Āstrakhān in A.D. 1554. This Ottoman project might well have succeeded if it had been put in hand in or immediately after A.D. 1475: the year in which the necessary base of operations had actually been secured by the conquest of Caffa and Tana and by the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty over the Crimean Tatars. In A.D. 1475 Muscovy had not yet doubled her power by the annexation of Novgovod, nor the Cossacks strengthened their hold on the Steppes by advancing from the line of the Dniepr to the lines of the Don and the Yaik.

These Ottoman lost opportunities are a remarkable analogue of the Scandinavian lost opportunities which we have reviewed in Annex VI.

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 69-70, with Annex I, above.

ANNEX VIII TO II. D (vii)

THE FORFEITED BIRTHRIGHT OF THE ABORTIVE FAR EASTERN CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION

We have found reason for believing that the capitulation of the embryonic Far Eastern Christendom to Islam in A.D. 737-41 was an event of historic importance. We may measure its importance by allowing ourselves to conjecture what might have happened if the Umayyads had left unretrieved their great defeat of A.D. 731 in the Pass between Kish and Samarqand, as they were content to leave the defeat which they suffered the year after at Tours. In that event, it is scarcely credible that the situation on the north-eastern front of the Arab Empire would have stabilized itself on the *status quo*. If the Arab frontier had not been carried forward, after A.D. 731, from the Murghab to the Jaxartes, it is improbable that the Arabs would have retained their hold upon Khurāsān. Within the next half-century, the independent principalities in Sughd and Tukharistan (reinforced by Türgesh and other adventurous Nomads off the Steppe) might have driven the Arabs back south-westward through Damaghan and the Caspian Gates, and have made the Dasht-i-Lūt the boundary between Far Eastern Christendom and Dār-al-Islām for the time being. But if the frontier had once moved back to that point, a comparison with the actual course of events on the north-western front of the Arab Empire, where the frontier actually did recede after the failure to retrieve the Battle of Tours, indicates plainly that the ebb of the Islamic wave in this quarter would eventually have gone very much farther than the Caspian Gates.

The strategic circumstances of the European and Central Asian fronts were curiously similar to one another. While the ultimate base of the Umayyad Power lay in Syria, it possessed two secondary bases, nearer to the respective fronts, in two rich lowlands—Andalusia in the one case and 'Irāq in the other—from which armies could draw abundant supplies. Beyond these friendly lowlands the Arab lines of communication had to traverse two comparatively arid and inhospitable plateaux—the Plateau of Castile in Europe, and the Plateau of Iran in Asia—and, on either plateau, the Arab lines were dangerously flanked to the left by a long, narrow strip of unconquered territory. The previous Western Christian masters of the Iberian Peninsula were still holding out in the narrow zone between the crest-line of the Asturian Mountains and the southern coast-line of the Bay of Biscay. The previous Zoroastrian masters

of Iran were likewise still holding out in the almost equally narrow (though much longer and altogether more extensive) zone between the crest-line of the Elbruz Mountains and the southern coast-line of the Caspian Sea.¹ In both cases these unconquered enclaves of hostile territory were dangerous—partly because they threatened a long and exposed flank; partly because they were natural fastnesses which it would be extremely difficult to occupy and subdue effectively in the teeth of a hostile population; but, most of all, because both enclaves were hemmed in by the Arab dominions on the landward side only, and were saved from the moral and material handicap of geographical isolation by the fact that they were in contact, by sea,² with more powerful opponents of the Arabs in still unconquered hinterlands.

The actual course of history in the north-west indicates what might have happened in the north-east had Qutaybah's work not been performed over again—and, this time, conclusively—by Asad and Nasr. Because, in A.D. 732, the Arabs lacked the will-power to complete the conquest of Aquitaine, the Austrasian Franks were able to join hands with the Asturians and to ensure that Asturia should be an advanced base for future Western counter-offensives against the Muslims. This was one of the objectives of Charlemagne's campaign which ended in A.D. 778 at Roncesvalles; and, in spite of that discomfiture, the objective had been achieved by A.D. 801, when Charlemagne's Spanish march was pushed forward beyond Barcelona.³ From that date onwards, the local Asturian front became part of a united front of Western Christendom; the ascendancy on the Iberian border had definitely passed from the Muslims to the Westerners; and there is nothing surprising in the developments of the next four centuries, which were consummated in A.D. 1235 by the conquest of Cordova and which resulted in the extinction of Muslim rule in every part of the Peninsula except the enclave of Granada.⁴

¹ In climate and vegetation the Elbruz range may be considered as being a detached and remote enclave of Northern Europe, and the sub-tropical coastal belt between the Elbruz and the Caspian as a similar enclave of India. We may compare with this the equally curious enclave of the Mediterranean climate along the eastern part of the south coast of the Black Sea, which also, of course, faces northward.

² At that time the main stream of the Oxus may possibly have flowed into the Caspian, and this would have afforded water transport all the way from Daylam to Sughd via Khwārizm. But, in any case, there was always a caravan-route between Khwārizm and the eastern coast of the Caspian. (For the variations in the course of the River Oxus, see Huntington, Ellsworth: *The Pulse of Asia* (London 1907, Constable), ch. xvii. The only period for which a discharge of part of the waters of the Oxus into the Caspian instead of into the Sea of Aral is satisfactorily attested is the period A.D. 1221–circa A.D. 1550 (op. cit., p. 350).)

³ See p. 362, above.

⁴ Conversely, what actually happened in the north-east enables us to reconstruct, with some confidence and even in some detail, the first stages of what would presumably have happened in the north-west had the fate of Aquitaine, like that of Transoxania, been decided between A.D. 732 and 741. With the Arab Empire permanently established in

On this showing, it is surely clear that, if the Far Eastern Christendom of Central Asia had survived the Islamic impact, the boundary between Dār-al-Islām and the new Central Asian World which would then have taken substance would not have stood permanently at the Caspian Gates. For while that narrow passage between desert and mountain is admirably protected by the nomad's-land of the Dasht-i-Lūt on the south, it is outflanked on the north by the fastnesses of Tabaristan and Daylam; and we have suggested already¹ that the Zoroastrians who were holding out in these fastnesses against the Arabs would have made common cause with the Nestorians and Manichaeans and Buddhists of Central Asia if the Central Asians had succeeded in turning back the tide of Arab conquest in the eighth century of the Christian Era. Even as it was, the Tabaris and Daylamis resisted conversion to Islam until the ninth and tenth centuries, and even then they only accepted their Arab enemies' religion in the unorthodox version of the Shi'ah. Had a previous turn of the tide encouraged them to hold out only a few years longer than they actually did, then, upon the break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the Buwayhids would duly have descended upon the Iranian Plateau from Daylam, but as Zoroastrians and not as Muslims and as conquerors of fresh territory for the nascent Central Asian Civilization at the expense of Islam, instead of their passage being a mere domestic incident in the last phase of Syriac history.

The progress of Central Asia at the expense of Dār-al-Islām would, no doubt, have gone steadily forward. Even if the Sunnis had made more effective efforts to save 'Irāq, or, at least, Baghdad itself, from the hand of a Buwayhid unbeliever than they actually made when the Caliph fell into the power of a Buwayhid sectarian, the Buwayhid's work would have been finished by a Zoroastrian or a Nestorian Saljūq; for, in the meantime, the Far Eastern Christen-

their rear, as well as in front of them, and with their co-religionists in Aquitaine apostasizing in increasing numbers to Islam, the Christians of the Asturian enclave could no more have resisted assimilation than the Zoroastrians of the Caspian Provinces found themselves able to resist it after the Arab conquest of Transoxania. The Asturians, like the Daylamites, Tabaris, and Jurjanis, would almost inevitably have been converted to Islam in the course of the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era. It is true that such conversion, had it taken place, would not have prevented the Asturian mountaineers, in the course of the tenth century and thereafter, from issuing out of their fastnesses and beginning to push down across the Castilian Plateau towards the lowlands of Andalusia, as they actually did. That historical movement was a consequence of the growing social and political weakness, at that time, of the Arab Empire through its whole extent, both under Umayyad sovereignty in the Peninsula and under 'Abbasid sovereignty elsewhere. It was not affected by the religious factor, and the converted Daylamites therefore took the offensive in Iran simultaneously with the unconverted Asturians in the Peninsula. In the sequel, however, the religious factor made a world of difference. The Buwayhids, descending as Muslims (though as Muslims of the Shi'i persuasion), were not, by their conquests, diminishing the territories of Dār-al-Islām. For this reason, these conquests were not so fiercely opposed as those of the Christian Asturians, and were therefore not only more rapid in their extension, but also more superficial and transitory in their effects.

¹ On pp. 377-8, above.

dom would have become solidly established in between Dār-al-Islām and the Eurasian Steppe, and the Nomadic peoples who broke upon the Transoxanian coasts of the Steppe in the eruption of A.D. 975-1275 would therefore have been converted to Nestorianism and would have come, not as reinforcements, but as alien and destructive enemies to Islam. As it was, the Saljūqs, meeting Islam and succumbing to it in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, travelled on westward as Muslims and discharged their thunder upon Orthodox Christendom in Anatolia. If we may imagine them converted, in Transoxania, to Nestorianism instead, and meting out to a Muslim 'Irāq and Syria the treatment which they actually meted out to an Orthodox Christian Anatolia, we can estimate how disastrous the effect would have been for the destinies of Islam.

This, again, is not a fantastic conjecture, for, in the last phase of the post-Syriac Völkerwanderung, a catastrophe of this very kind actually did bring Islam to within an ace of destruction. The post-Syriac Völkerwanderung was contemporaneous with a period of effervescence on the Steppes; and on the Eurasian Steppe, in this period, the convulsions reached their maximum degree of intensity immediately before the disturbance died down altogether.¹ As the disorder worked up towards its climax, successive hordes of Eurasian Nomads were upheaved and discharged outwards from deeper and deeper recesses of Eurasia. The first elements discharged upon Dār-al-Islām were the occupants of the peripheral or 'in-shore' zone of the Steppe, of whom the Saljūqs may be taken as the leading example. Since, for a considerable period before their upheaval, these peripheral Nomads had been in contact with, and under the influence of, the religion then prevalent in Transoxania, and since, furthermore, that religion happened, owing to the decision of A.D. 741, to be not an unconquered Nestorian Christianity but the conquering religion of Islam, the Saljūqs had themselves become Muslims before the Völkerwanderung hurled them upon Muslim lands, and it has just been remarked how this previous assimilation rendered their invasion comparatively harmless to the invaded society. In the final and most convulsive phase of the eruption, however, the circumstances were not equally favourable from the Islamic point of view; for, in this phase, Dār-al-Islām was assailed by Nomadic invaders from the innermost depths of the Steppe—depths to which Islam, in spite of having conquered Transoxania, had not had time to penetrate during the five centuries which had since elapsed.

These depths, however (which lay in what are now Mongolia and Zungaria), had not been left unevangelized. In conquering the

¹ On this point, see further Part III. A, Annex II, below.

Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, Islam had, indeed, effectively prevented that region from becoming the centre of a new Far Eastern Christian Civilization based on an entente between all Islam's local rivals—Nestorianism and Buddhism and Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism—but she could not prevent these rival religions, whose future in Central Asia she had destroyed for any effective purpose of social construction, from drifting eastwards along the Central Asian corridor and establishing a curious, transitory, and abortive ascendancy over the minds of Uighurs and Naimans.¹ Indeed, it is possible that Muslim aggression against Sughd and Farghana hastened the conversion of the Far North-East to Manichaeism and Nestorianism² by causing a dispersion of Transoxanian refugees abroad among Nomad Gentiles.³ If so, the unborn civilization of Central Asia at any rate left a ghost in the shape of 'Prester John', and that ghost very nearly succeeded in taking its revenge upon the remote successors of those Muslim conquerors who, five centuries before, had cheated it of life in the flesh. It is doubtful whether there were any Buddhist or Nestorian elements in the original nucleus of Chingis Khan's Nomadic confederacy; and, even among the tribes on the pasture-lands immediately to the west of his, these elements were probably very small in numbers. They possessed, however, something like a local monopoly of technique and knowledge; the communities among whom they were found were incorporated into the Mongol community on terms more nearly approaching equality than any terms granted to remoter and more alien populations that were subsequently conquered; moreover, their incorporation occurred at a moment when Chingis' empire was assuming proportions which made the introduction of some kind of civil order a necessity—and thus it was that these few and scattered survivors of an abortive civilization were paradoxically raised to places of honour and influence round a throne which bade fair to dominate two continents.

Had this suddenly evoked spectre of the abortive Far Eastern Christendom succeeded in grasping the hand of the Western Christendom which (owing to the faint-heartedness of Arab empire-builders after A.D. 732) was by this time a creature of flesh and blood in all the aggressive lustiness of early manhood, it is hardly

¹ See II. D (vi), pp. 237-8, above.

² Buddhism, which travelled eastward and south-eastward to the Far Eastern World along the corridor of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and the Tarim Basin, does not appear to have penetrated the steppe-country to the north.

³ The ruling house of the Uighurs was converted to Manichaeism in A.D. 762-3: that is to say, twenty-one years after the definitive incorporation of the whole of Transoxania into the Arab Empire. In this case, however, the immediate source of radiation seems to have been the Manichaean Church which by this time had been established for a century in the Far East, and not the Manichaean Church in Transoxania. (See Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920-1, Geuthner, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 500.)

possible to believe that Islam could have survived; and it is sometimes forgotten how very near to accomplishment this dramatic reunion of co-religionists, long sundered by the barrier of Islam, was several times brought, through overtures from both sides, in the course of the thirteenth century after Christ. The overthrow of the Khwārizm Shah in A.D. 1220 seemed at first sight to have cancelled, at one stroke, five centuries of Islamic effort in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin; and the sack of Baghdad and the irreparable devastation of 'Irāq in A.D. 1258 by Hulāgū Khan were like mortal blows at the political and economic heart of the Islamic commonwealth. Now the project of Hulāgū's expedition appears to have been suggested to the mind of Hulāgū's overlord, the Khaqan Mangu, by the Uniate-Catholic King Hayton of Little Armenia; and it may have been Hulāgū's Nestorian wife who inspired him, in turn, to send his advance-guard across the Euphrates, in order to attack the Muslims in their last citadel of Egypt, under the command of the Nestorian general, Kit-Bugha.¹ In A.D. 1260, when Kit-Bugha captured Damascus and momentarily gave the local Monophysite and Orthodox Christians the dominion over their Muslim neighbours, the Western Crusaders were still clinging to Acre and a few other strongholds on the Syrian coast, and they were not blind to the possibilities which 'Prester John's' miraculous intervention might offer. Already Friar Giovanni di Piano Carpini had been sent to the Khaqan's court at Qaraqorum by Pope Innocent IV in A.D. 1246 and Friar William of Rubruck by St. Louis in A.D. 1253. Between 1260 and 1269 Marco Polo's father and uncle made their way to the same destination as private merchants, and returned as bearers of a letter to the Pope from the Khaqan. In 1271 they set out, this time from Acre, to make the journey to Qaraqorum again, bearing an answer from the Pope, and accompanied by Marco, and it was not till 1295 that they returned to Venice via the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, a letter (still preserved) had been sent in 1295 by the Il-Khan Arghun to the Court of France, to be followed by another in 1305 from his son Uljaytu. Thus, during the latter half of the thirteenth century, the two deadly enemies of Islam came within measurable distance of co-operation. It was not till after the fall of Acre in 1291 and the successive failure of the second and third Mongol invasions of Syria in 1281 and 1303 that this possibility disappeared.


Such were the straits to which Islam was reduced in the last phase of the Nomad eruption and post-Syriac Völkerwanderung of A.D. 975-1275, and this although, as recently as A.D. 1220, Islam had been the dominant cultural and political force as far north-eastward

¹ See II. D (vi), p. 238, above.

as the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin. Supposing, however, that, five centuries earlier, that region had resisted assimilation and had developed an independent and aggressive civilization in the meantime on the lines suggested above, the eventuality which, in actual fact, only passed in a flash across the page of History as a picturesque possibility, would almost certainly have taken shape as a historical event of permanent importance. Supposing that, by A.D. 1220, Islam had already been driven west of the Euphrates, and that a new Far Eastern Christian Civilization had already extended its domain from that river on the south-west to the border of Chingis Khan's homelands in the opposite quarter, it is probable that the Buddhist-Nestorian culture, which exercised so marked an influence upon the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Mongols even in its dim and shadowy residue, would have captured them heart and soul, and that they would have made themselves its apostles as they went forth, conquering and to conquer, to the ends of the Earth. In that case the western bank of the Euphrates would have been Islam's first and last line of defence, and it is hardly conceivable that a single line would not have been broken. Had that breach occurred, Islam in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era would have suffered the fate of Orthodox Christendom in the eleventh. The Eastern and the Western Christian enemy would have united to storm her Egyptian citadel.¹ She would have become a submerged society, and by the twentieth century of the Christian Era she might only have been represented by such 'fossils' as now actually survive of the Gregorian and Jacobite Monophysites or of the Nestorians themselves.

¹ Just as in the eleventh century the Saljūqs and the Normans broke simultaneously upon the Orthodox Christian World from opposite quarters of the compass.





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A STUDY OF
HISTORY

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A STUDY OF HISTORY

BY

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(both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)

'Work . . . while it is day . . .'

JOHN IX. 4

'Nox ruit, Aenea . . .'

AENEID VI. 539

'Thought shall be the harder,
Heart the keener,
Mood shall be the more,
As our might lessens.'

THE LAY OF THE BATTLE OF MALDON

901
Toy



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III

THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS

A. THE PROBLEM OF THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS

The Arrested Civilizations

IN giving this chapter its title, are we not begging a question? And, if the question is raised, can we really maintain that the growths of civilizations present a problem at all? The problem of the geneses of civilizations is another matter. That problem is genuine beyond all doubt; and our attempts to solve it have exercised our minds severely. But if we may venture to suppose that these efforts have had any substantial measure of success, do we need to seek further? For does not any solution of the problem of birth dispose of the problem of growth *a priori*? When birth is once achieved, does not growth follow of itself? This is a question which has to be answered if our title is to stand. Let us turn, for an answer, to the empirical method of inquiry which has often stood us in good stead.

If we take a survey of civilizations that have duly come to birth—in contrast to those embryonic civilizations that have miscarried—do we find, as a matter of fact, that they have invariably grown thereafter in wisdom and in stature? Frequently—perhaps usually—they have gone on growing, no doubt. Our twenty-one specimens of this species of societies are cases in point. For although, in our day, all but seven of the twenty-one are extinct, and although the majority of these seven are now unmistakably in decay, it is evident, on the other hand, that even the shortest-lived and least successful of these twenty-one societies did achieve at least some measure of growth after it had come to birth. But the twenty-one developed civilizations¹ and the four abortive civilizations² are not the only examples of civilizations that an empirical survey reveals to us. If we now look further, we shall come across specimens of yet a third class. We shall find examples of civilizations which have not been abortive yet have not developed either, but have been arrested after birth. It is the existence of these arrested civilizations that justifies the title of the present chapter by presenting the problem which we have now set ourselves to solve. The first step

¹ See the list in vol. i, on p. 133, above.

² The Abortive Far Western Christian, Abortive Far Eastern Christian, Abortive Scandinavian, and Abortive Syriac. (See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-94, above.)

2 THE PROBLEM OF THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS
towards solving it will be to collect as many specimens of arrested civilizations as we can.

We can readily lay hands on half a dozen specimens of the kind. Among the civilizations that have come to birth in response to physical challenges, there are the Polynesians and the Esquimaux and the Nomads. And, among the civilizations that have come to birth in response to human challenges, there are certain peculiar communities, like the 'Osmanlis in the Orthodox Christian World or the Spartans in the Hellenic World, which have been called into existence by local accentuations of the prevalent human challenges when these have been keyed up, through peculiar circumstances, to pitches of unusual severity. These are all of them examples of arrested civilizations; and we can see at once that they all present a picture of the same general predicament.

All these arrested civilizations alike have been immobilized in consequence of having attempted, and achieved, a *tour de force*. They are responses to challenges of an order of severity on the very borderline between a degree that still affords some stimulus and a degree that brings into operation the law of diminishing returns.¹

In the imagery of our fable of the climbers' pitch,² the representatives of the arrested civilizations are like climbers who happen to have started to scale the precipice in places where they are brought up short, at an early stage, against beetling projections on the face of the cliff. In these circumstances, a timid or a clumsy climber might have lost his hold and fallen, while a more prudent or a less obstinate climber might have redescended to the ledge from which he had just taken off, in order to try his fortune again at another point, or else to rest, unambitiously, from his labours. These actual climbers, however, have been neither defeated, nor daunted, nor inspired with that wisdom which is the better part of valour, by the unexpected and formidable obstacles that they have encountered. They have accepted their challenge as they have found it, grasped the projecting rock, and levered themselves over it, outwards and upwards, with a movement of magnificent audacity and vigour and skill. But though the gesture is magnificent, it is not good climbing; for it entails a consequence which the expert climber is ever on the look out to foresee and to avoid. The expert climber is on his guard against making any move that will preclude him from moving on; and our over-audacious climbers cannot break this rule with impunity. They grapple with the jutting crag, only to find them-

¹ In concrete terms, they are responses to challenges of an intermediate degree of severity between the challenge that stimulated the Achaeans to create the Hellenic Civilization and the challenges which were just too severe to allow the Irish and the Norsemen to bring the Abortive Far Western Christian and the Abortive Scandinavian Civilization to birth.

² See II. B, vol. i, pp. 192-5, above.

selves, the next moment, clinging to the crag's projecting face in a rigid posture from which they dare not budge. Their superabundant skill and vigour and boldness is now all absorbed in a supreme effort to save themselves from falling, and they have no purchase, and no margin of energy, for climbing on until they have rounded the formidable projection and reached a normal surface again. Their motto—and eventual epitaph—is 'J'y suis, j'y reste'. They are performing an astonishing acrobatic feat, but a feat in the realm of Statics and not in the realm of Dynamics. In fact, these arrested civilizations, unlike the primitive societies, are real instances of 'peoples that have no history'.¹ Immobility is their unalterable posture, so long as they are what they are. They become what they are by grappling with the projecting crag; they remain what they are by gripping the crag so close that their once free and supple bodies mould themselves stiffly into all the contours of the rock; and they cease to be what they are when they either turn to stone and merge into the crag to which they have clung, or else drop, like a stone, from exhaustion.

This common posture of perilous immobility at high tension may be observed, in the several examples that we have cited, under the widest variety of conditions.

The Polynesians, for instance, ventured upon the *tour de force* of Oceanic voyaging. Their skill was to perform these stupendous voyages in frail open canoes. Their penalty has been to remain in an exact equilibrium with the Pacific—just able to cross its vast empty spaces, but never able to cross them with any margin of security or ease—until the intolerable tension has found its own relief by going slack, with the consequence that these former peers of the Minoans and the Vikings have degenerated into incarnations of the Lotus-Eaters² and the Doasyoulikes:³ losing their grip upon the Ocean and resigning themselves to be marooned, each in his own insular paradise, until the Western mariner comes at last from the ends of the Earth to exterminate them as he exterminates the Arctic hunters' seals or the prairie hunters' bison.⁴ We need not dwell here upon the Polynesians' latter end, since we have touched upon it already apropos of Easter Island.⁵

¹ For the unrecorded, but not unacted, history of the primitive societies, in the Yang-activity which must have preceded their present Yin-state, see I. C (iii) (e), vol. i, pp. 179-80, above.

² See II. D (i), vol. ii, pp. 22-3, above.

³ See II. D (i), vol. ii, pp. 25-31, above.

⁴ The decimation of the Polynesians by the Western 'beach-combers' has not, of course, been deliberate; yet the bullet and the harpoon which have done such execution among the non-human fauna of North America are not so deadly to Primitive Man as the germs of contagious diseases which the Westerner involuntarily brings—not to speak of the profound devitalizing influence which the Westerner's very spiritual presence exerts upon the Primitive who suddenly comes into social contact with him.

⁵ See II. D (i), vol. ii, pp. 12-15, above.

4 THE PROBLEM OF THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS *The Esquimaux*

As for the Esquimaux, 'the Palaeeskimo Culture was an original North Indian form of culture, the winter side of which had become specially and strongly developed by adaptation to the winter ice of the Arctic Ocean.¹ . . . The essential impulse to the development of the Eskimo Culture did not come until the Eskimo accustomed themselves to stay at or on the sea ice in the winter and hunt seals.² This was the Esquimaux's *tour de force*; and the stimulus which excited them to achieve it seems, on the whole, more likely to have been the attraction of economic advantage than the pressure of human aggressors.

'It might be asked whether the pre-Eskimo advance towards the north, to the Tundra and the Archipelago, took place voluntarily or was due to pressure from southern neighbours. One will probably never be able to decide the question. But . . . it is to be strongly emphasized that life at the Arctic sea-coast, far from indicating a step backwards, in reality indicated a step forwards as regards economy, inasmuch as, in addition to the hunting of terrestrial mammals and summer fishing in the fresh waters, which was already known, the practice of hunting aquatic mammals was acquired as compensation for the ice fishing on lakes and streams. The contrast between this fishing on the ice of lakes, which was only resorted to in times of need, and the sea ice hunting of seals, gives a kind of standard of progress. One can then very well imagine that no pressure has been necessary, but that the pre-Eskimo have been tempted on to the coasts of the Arctic Ocean by natural conditions.'³

Whatever the historical incentive may have been, it is evident that, at some point in their history, the forefathers of the Esquimaux grappled audaciously with the Arctic environment and adapted their life to its exigencies with consummate skill.

'It is [the] natural conditions in the [Arctic] Archipelago, or, to put it more exactly, in the coast and sea regions between the mainland and the islands, which have been able to force a slow hunting people such as the ancient Eskimo must have been to undertake so thorough a cultural change as that which the modification of the Eskimo Culture must necessarily have required.'⁴

The skill evoked in the Esquimaux by this formidable problem of adaptation is justly celebrated. 'As regards certain dexterities, they really furnish an example of the utmost effort of human ability';⁵ and, to prove the point, it is only necessary to recite the catalogue

¹ Steensby, H. P.: *An Anthropological Study of the Origin of the Eskimo Culture* = *Saertryk af Meddelelser om Grønland LIII* (Copenhagen 1916, Lunos), p. 186.

² Steensby, op. cit., p. 205.

³ Steensby, op. cit., p. 206.

⁴ Steensby, op. cit., p. 168. For the evolution of the Esquimaux's most characteristic piece of technical apparatus, the kayak or sealskin canoe, from the North American Indian birch-bark canoe, see auct. cit., op. cit., p. 162.

⁵ Steensby, op. cit., p. 41.

of the material appliances which the Esquimaux have elaborated or invented: 'kayak, umiak (women's boat), harpoon, and bird-dart with throwing board, the three-pronged salmon spear, the compound bow, strengthened by a backing of sinews, the dog sledge, the snow shoe, the winter house and snow house with the lamps for burning blubber oil, and the platform, the summer tent, and lastly the skin garments.'¹

These are the outward and visible signs of an amazing feat of wit and will; yet

'in certain directions, for instance as regards social organization, the Eskimo display somewhat inferior development. But it is a question whether this inferior social differentiation is due to primitiveness, or whether it is not rather a result of the natural conditions under which the Eskimo have lived from time immemorial. No deep knowledge of the Eskimo Culture is needed to see that it is a culture which has been obliged to employ an immensely large part of its force simply to develop the means wherewith to gain a livelihood.'²

The penalty which the Esquimaux have had to pay for their audacity in grappling with the Arctic environment and compelling it to yield up its latent economic riches, has been the rigid conformation of their life to the annual cycle of the Arctic climate. 'All the bread-winners of the tribe are obliged to carry on different occupations at the different seasons of the year';³ and the tyranny of Arctic Nature imposes almost as exacting a time-table upon the Arctic hunter as is imposed on any factory worker of the temperate zone by the human tyranny of 'scientific management'.⁴ A distinguished student of the Eskimo Culture has made out this time-table, in two local variants, as follows:⁵

Arctic Eskimo Culture.

<i>Season.</i>	<i>Place of Abode.</i>	<i>Occupation.</i>	<i>Principal Implements.</i>	<i>Dwelling.</i>
Winter	In the beginning of winter, the coast land; later in the winter, the sea ice.	Hunting on the sea ice.	Dog sledge, Harpoon.	In the beginning of winter, earth house; later in the winter, snow house.
Summer	Inland.	Hunting on land and fishing in rivers.	Kayak, Lance, Bow and Arrow, Salmon Spear.	Tent.

¹ Steensby, *op. cit.*, p. 43. For a systematic and detailed survey of the ingenuities by which the Esquimaux have adapted their life to their physical environment, see Weyer Jr., E. M.: *The Eskimos: Their Environment and Folkways* (New Haven 1932, Yale University Press), ch. iv.

² Steensby, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

³ Steensby, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

⁴ 'There is hardly another people in the world whose self-maintenance *mores* are so strictly regulated by the changes in the seasons.' Weyer, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁵ Steensby, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-8. Compare the more elaborate chart in Weyer, *op. cit.*, on pp. 80-2 (fig. 11), which illustrates the author's account of the 'Seasonal Life-Cycle of Eskimos' in ch. v, § 1.

Sub-Arctic Eskimo Culture.

<i>Season.</i>	<i>Place of Abode.</i>	<i>Occupation.</i>	<i>Principal Implements.</i>	<i>Dwelling.</i>
Winter	The coast.	Hunting in Kayaks.	Kayak, Harpoon, Umiak.	Earth house.
Summer	Inland (otherwise the coast).	Inland hunting, fishing in rivers.	Kayak, Lance, Salmon Spear, Bow and Arrow.	Tent.

Another Western anthropologist, who has lived through this Arctic annual cycle himself by sharing the life of the Esquimaux of Coronation Gulf, has described the sharp transition from one seasonal rhythm to another as he encountered it in his own personal experience.

'A fortnight's fishing exhausted the bay and compelled us to make another move. It mattered little which way we turned, for every ridge bounded a lake that contained both trout and salmon. But since the total catch would be greater if we scattered our forces and settled on different lakes, the families separated. . . .

'This dispersal of the individual families completed one-half of the strange cycle through which the Eskimos passed year after year. They reacted to the seasons, to their constantly changing environment, more than most of the inhabitants of our globe. The problem of obtaining life's basic needs—food, clothing, and shelter—left little time for other thoughts; and the seals and caribou, that furnished them with food, furnished also the materials for clothing and tents. In winter, when the land lay bare and silent beneath the snow, when the caribou had migrated south, when the twilight hours were brief and the nights long, the natives had banded together into tribes, and tribe combined with tribe to wrest a precarious livelihood from the frozen sea by united effort. Food had been common to all, and their snow-houses had adjoined each other so closely that the families seemed absorbed in the group. With the returning sun and lengthening days, Nature had recalled its life;¹ the seals had appeared on top of the ice, the caribou had come northward again, and the tribes of Eskimos had broken up into little bands. For a time they had lingered on the ice to hunt more seals; then, turning landward, they had pursued the caribou over the snow-covered hills and plains. Now the snow was vanishing, the caribou had scattered, and fish alone provided a sure livelihood until midsummer. So my party, like many another throughout the country, was dividing into its constituent households, each of which now toiled for itself alone. The tribe no longer existed; Society had dissolved into its first element, the family.²

As we ponder over the scene which is here so vividly depicted,

¹ Weyer points out, in *op. cit.*, on pp. 20 and 28-9, that in the Esquimaux's habitat the transition from winter to summer is abrupt, while the transition from summer to winter is relatively gradual.—A.J.T.

² Jenness, D.: *The People of the Twilight* (New York 1928, Macmillan Company), pp. 136-7.

we may be inclined to ask ourselves whether the Esquimaux are the Masters of Arctic Nature or her slaves. We shall meet with an equivalent question, and find it equally difficult to answer, when we come to examine the lives of the Spartans and the 'Osmanlis. Meanwhile, we have still to consider the fate of another arrested civilization which has been evoked by a physical challenge, before we pass on to examine those which human challenges have brought to birth.

The Nomads

The *tour de force* of the Esquimaux has been to take up the challenge of the Ice and the *tour de force* of the Polynesians to take up the challenge of the Ocean. The Nomad, who has taken up the challenge of the Steppe, has had the audacity to grapple with an equally intractable element; and indeed, from the social (as distinct from the physiographical) point of view, the Steppe, with its surface of grass and gravel, actually bears a greater resemblance to 'the unharvested sea'¹ than it bears to terra firma that is amenable to hoe or plough. Steppe-surface and water-surface have this in common, that they are both accessible to Man only as a pilgrim and a sojourner. Neither offers him anywhere on its broad expanse (apart from the islands and oases) a place where he can rest the sole of his foot and settle down to a sedentary existence. Both provide strikingly greater facilities for travel and transport than those parts of the Earth's surface upon which human communities are accustomed to live in permanence;² but both exact (as the penalty for trespassing upon them) the necessity of constantly 'moving on', or else 'moving off' their surface altogether and finding some standing ground upon terra firma somewhere beyond the coasts which respectively surround them. Thus there is a real similarity between the Nomadic horde which annually follows the same orbit of summer and winter pasture-ranges, and the fishing-fleet which cruises from bank to bank according to the season; between the convoy of merchantmen which exchanges the products of the opposite shores of the sea, and the camel-caravan by which the opposite shores of the Steppe are linked with one another; between the water pirate and the desert raider; and between those explosive movements of population which impel Norsemen or Minoans or Crusaders to take to their ships and to break like tidal waves upon the coasts of Europe or the Levant, and those other movements which impel Imoshagh or Arabs or Scythians or Turks or Mongols to

¹ 'Unharvested' (*ἀρπύγρος*) is one of the stock epithets of the sea in the Homeric Epics.

² For the light thrown upon this question of relative 'conductivity' by a study of the geographical distribution of languages, see III. A, Annex I, below.

8 THE PROBLEM OF THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS
swinging out of their annual orbit on the Steppe and to break, with equal violence and equal suddenness, upon the settled lands of Egypt or 'Irāq or Russia or India or China.

It will be seen that the Nomads', like the Polynesians' and the Esquimaux's, response to the challenge of Physical Nature is a *tour de force*; and in the case of the Nomads the historical incentive to this *tour de force* is not, as in the case of the Esquimaux, altogether a matter of conjecture. We are entitled to infer that Nomadism was evoked by the same challenge that evoked the Egyptian and the Sumeric civilizations and that drove the forefathers of the Shilluk and the Dinka into Equatoria and the forefathers of the Norsemen into Scandinavia. Nomadism, likewise, may be conceived as having arisen in response to the searching challenge of desiccation; and we have touched upon its possible origins already incidentally, in inquiring into the origins of the fluvial cultures.¹ The origins of the Nomadic Civilization, as well as those of the sedentary civilizations which have arisen in the same arid zone, are illuminated by the discoveries of modern Western Archaeology;² and the clearest light which we have upon Nomadism, up to date, has been thrown by the researches of the Pumpelly Expedition in the Transcaspian oasis of Anau:³ a site in the extreme south-western corner of the Eurasian Steppe, at the foot of the north-eastern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau.

In the Transcaspian oases, as in the river-valleys of the Lower Tigris and Euphrates and the Lower Nile,⁴ we find the challenge of desiccation, in its first incidence, stimulating certain communities which had formerly lived entirely by hunting to eke out their livelihood under less favourable conditions by taking to a rudimentary form of agriculture.

'With the gradual shrinking in dimensions of habitable areas and the disappearance of herds of wild animals, Man, concentrating on the oases and forced to conquer new means of support, began to utilize the native plants; and from among these he learned to use seeds of different grasses growing on the dry land and in marshes at the mouths of larger streams

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 304-5, above.

² On this point, a cautionary note has been communicated to the writer of this Study by Mr. G. F. Hudson: 'Nomadism has to be carefully distinguished from the keeping of domestic animals by sedentary folk, and the archaeological evidence only refers to the latter. I think it is very probable that both intensive agriculture and animal-domestication began in oases as a result of a process of desiccation, namely the drying-up of North Africa, Arabia, and Iran when the climatic belts shifted north at the end of the Ice Age—though even this is rather conjectural. Nomadism, on the other hand, was a development about which we have not, and cannot have, satisfactory archaeological evidence.'

³ Pumpelly, R.: *Explorations in Turkestan: Expedition of 1903* = Carnegie Institution Publication No. 26 (Washington, D.C., 1905, Carnegie Institution); auctor idem: *Explorations in Turkestan: Expedition of 1904: Prehistoric Civilizations of Anau* = Carnegie Institution Publication No. 73 (Washington, D.C., 1908, Carnegie Institution, 2 vols.).

⁴ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 305-18, above.

on the desert. With the increase of population and its necessities, he learned to plant the seeds, thus making, by conscious or unconscious selection, the first step in the evolution of the whole series of cereals.¹

Whether agriculture in Transcaspia was an independent invention or a loan from the Indus Valley or from Sumeria is not apparent. Archaeology simply reveals that, at Anau North Kurgan, 'they cultivated cereals from the beginning'² and that agriculture was already the mainstay of the earliest inhabitants that have left their mark on the local archaeological record,³ though 'at first, besides cultivating the soil, they' still 'hunted wild animals'.⁴

Thus, in Transcaspia, agriculture supervened directly upon hunting, and thereafter these two methods of obtaining a subsistence were practised there simultaneously side by side. The most significant fact, however, which archaeological research at Anau had brought to light is the fact that 'the agricultural stage preceded domestication and [thus preceded] the Nomadic shepherd stage of civilization'.⁵

'At the time when the lowest layers of the North Kurgan at Anau were formed, Man lived in this region entirely without domestic animals. The mighty wild ox (*Bos namadicus* Falconer and Cautley) and the small wild horse—possibly in the form that Wilckens thought he discovered among the finds of Maragha in Persia, or in that of *Equus przewalskii*—roamed on the steppes and the oases of the Kara Kum desert and sought shelter in the forest which probably then occupied the valleys and slopes of the Kopet Dag. There lived, too, the large-horned wild sheep (*Ovis vignei arkal* Lyddeker) and the gazelle (*Gazella subgutturosa* Gueldenstedt). From the absence of all stone weapons in the oldest period, we may conclude that Man lived on a friendly footing with these animals and that he could gain possession of them only by depriving the wolves of their prey or by the use of fire-hardened wooden weapons. . . . It would be guess-work to attempt to picture the method of domestication and to assume . . . that the wild horse, the wild sheep, and the wild ox voluntarily (or compelled by the necessity of food from outside the oasis) approached human dwellings in order to graze on the weeds and other plants, and so were gradually brought into companionship with Man, who then assumed the care of their nourishment. We know only that after the accumulation of the lowest ten feet of the strata in the North Kurgan this same ox occurs in an almost equally large, but certainly a domesticated form, becoming more and more frequent in the higher

¹ Pumpelly, op. cit., *Expedition of 1904*, vol. i, pp. 65-6.

² Pumpelly, op. cit., *Expedition of 1904*, vol. i, p. 38; cp. p. 67.

³ Pumpelly, op. cit., *Expedition of 1904*, vol. i, p. 39.

⁴ 'While the bones of these, as well as those of the animals which they domesticated later, show that they ate the flesh of these, including the pig and probably also the fox and the wolf, these bones are not sufficiently abundant to prove that meat formed by any means the chief part of their diet.' (Op. cit., loc. cit.)

⁵ Pumpelly, op. cit., *Expedition of 1904*, vol. i, p. xxviii.

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strata, when the horse and the sheep also pass over into the domesticated condition.¹

Thus the first turn of the climatic screw in Eurasia not only stimulated a society which had formerly lived by hunting to take to agriculture. It also had another—indirect but not less important—effect upon the social history of these *ci-devant* hunters who had made this first successful response to its challenge. By stimulating them to turn to agriculture instead of hunting as their staple source of food-supply, it gave them the opportunity to enter into a wholly new relation towards wild animals. For the art of domesticating wild animals, which the hunter, by the very nature of his occupation, is unable to develop beyond narrow limits, has vastly greater potentialities in the hands of the agriculturist. The hunter may conceivably domesticate the wolf or jackal with whom he disputes or shares his prey by turning the wild beast into a partner in the hunter's own human predatory activities. But it is virtually inconceivable that the hunter should succeed in domesticating the game which is his quarry and his victim. It is not the hunter with his hound but the *ci-devant* hunter, transformed into an agriculturist with his watch-dog, who has it in his power to accomplish the further transformation which brings into existence the shepherd with his sheep-dog. The agriculturist enjoys a double advantage for this purpose. Unlike the hunter, he is not preying upon the wild animals and therefore is not inspiring them with a deadly fear of his presence; and, unlike the hunter again, he possesses food-supplies which are attractive to ruminants like the ox and the sheep, which 'would not, like dogs, be attracted by meat or other products of a hunting or fishing life'.²

Archaeological research at Anau indicates that this further step in social evolution had been accomplished in Transcaspia by the time when Physical Nature gave her screw its second turn. The first spasm of desiccation had found Eurasian Man a hunter and nothing else; the second spasm found him a sedentary cultivator and stock-breeder, with his hunting reduced to a subsidiary means of livelihood. In these circumstances, the challenge of desiccation, when it was now redelivered with greater insistence than before, evoked two new and diverse human reactions. By achieving the domestication of ruminants, Eurasian Man had potentially recovered the mobility which he had forfeited in his previous metamorphosis from a hunter into a cultivator; and, in response to the fresh incidence of the old challenge, he made use of his new-found mobility in two quite different ways.

¹ Duerst, J. U., in Pumpelly, *op. cit.*, *Expedition of 1904*, vol. ii, p. 435.

² Duerst in Pumpelly, *op. cit.*, *Expedition of 1904*, vol. ii, p. 437.

Some of the Transcasian oasis-cultivators simply used their mobility in order to emigrate progressively—moving ever further on as the climatic trend towards desiccation increased in severity at the heart of the Steppe and in range on the periphery—so as always to keep abreast of a physical environment in which they could continue to practise their existing way of life without being constrained to revolutionize it once again.

'The establishment of the first domestic breeds of pigs, long-horned cattle, large sheep, and horses was followed by a deteriorating climate which changed these to smaller breeds. The climatic deterioration, by diminishing the productivity of the fully-peopled oases, caused unrest and migrations of agriculturists. . . . Dr. Duerst identifies the second breed of sheep [at Anau] with the turbary sheep (Torfschaf) and the pig with the turbary pig (Torfschwein), which appear towards the end of the Neolithic period in the Swiss lake-dwellings and other Neolithic stations of Europe, already as domestic animals and unaccompanied by any transitional forms that might indicate local origins. These animals must therefore have been descendants of those domesticated on the oases of the Anau district. The turbary breed was established not later than towards the end of the oldest settlement of the North Kurgan. . . . It was formed during the part of the climatic cycle in which prevailed those conditions, unfavourable to nutrition, to which the breed owed its stunted character. Its characteristic features became firmly fixed during the subsequent existence of many generations after transference to a Nomadic life on the arid plains during the dry extreme of the cycle. And the firm establishment of the characteristics of the breed is proved by the persistence down to the present time; for it still exists at one point in the high Alps of the Grisons in Switzerland, and in Wales.'¹

This was one reaction to the recurring challenge of desiccation in Eurasia. But these cultivators and stock-breeders who trekked away across the withering Steppes with their seed-corn and their cattle, in order to find new homes where they could sow and reap and breed and pasture under the old conditions, had brethren who parted company with them at this point in order to respond to the same challenge in a more audacious fashion. These other Eurasians likewise abandoned the now untenable oases and launched them-

¹ Pumpelly, *op. cit.*, *Expedition of 1904*, vol. i, pp. 67-8. Mr. G. F. Hudson comments as follows: 'In this passage it seems to be suggested that the pig of Neolithic stations in Europe (turbary pig) was brought by emigrants from the Anau district via the desiccated Steppe. But swine-breeding is absolutely unknown to Steppe-Nomadism, for pigs cannot be kept on the Steppe at all unless they are specially fed. Swine-breeding has in historical times been characteristic of forest regions at both ends of the Eurasian Steppe (in Europe and in China and Manchuria), but not at all of the Steppe itself. Thus if, as Duerst holds, the Anau pig is the turbary pig, it must have come from the Anau district by way of Northern Iran and Asia Minor—which is otherwise probable in view of the southern affinities of the early "Danubian" culture.' [For this highland route of migration, see II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 324-7, above.—A.J.T.] 'Or it may be that both the Anau and the Swiss breed were derived originally from a culture-centre west of Anau; so very little of Asia Minor and Transcaucasia has as yet been explored archaeologically. Anyway, I protest against the pig being brought across the Steppes!'

selves and their families and their flocks and their herds upon the inhospitable surface of the Steppe. But these other men did not embark upon the Steppe as timid fugitives seeking to reach and pass its boundaries and so escape from its clutches. They abandoned their former staple occupation of agriculture, as their agricultural forefathers had once abandoned their former staple occupation of hunting, and staked their existence upon their latest-acquired economic art, which, this time, was the art of stock-breeding. They flung themselves upon the Steppe not in order to escape beyond its bounds, but to make themselves at home upon it *en permanence* and to wrest a livelihood from it under physical conditions which were more inimical to life than any which had yet prevailed on the Steppe since Man had first set foot on it. 'Through the accomplished domestication of ruminants, men obtained freedom of motion for travelling with cattle after good pasture, and commenced a Nomadic life. This must be the real explanation of the origin of the wandering peoples.'¹

It will be seen that the Nomad's response to the challenge of recurring and increasing desiccation is a *tour de force* indeed. At the first onset of desiccation, the Nomad's pre-agricultural forefathers had abandoned their hunting-grounds on the Steppe and had retreated to the oases, where they took to agriculture as their staple source of food supply and looked to their former hunting grounds for no more than a subsidiary supply from that time onwards. And now, when the rhythmic process of desiccation, in its next onset, has made life still more difficult in the oases, and more difficult on the Steppe *a fortiori*, the patriarchs of the Nomadic Civilization audaciously return to the Steppe in order to wring out of it, now, no mere subsidiary supply but their entire livelihood—and this under climatic conditions under which the hunter and the

¹ Duerst, in Pumpelly, *op. cit.*, *Expedition of 1904*, vol. ii, p. 437. Duerst also notes, in *loc. cit.*, that 'among the Turkomans of to-day occur also cultivators of soil and breeders of cattle designated as Chomru and Chorva who intermarry and whose children choose either the life of Nomads or of farmers'. In a communication to the writer of this Study, Mr. G. F. Hudson questions whether the hypothesis of a second turn of the climatic screw (see p. 10, above) is necessary to account for the transformation of the sedentary stock-breeders who had come into existence in the oases into the Nomadic stock-breeders on the Steppes. 'We have no date, even approximate, established for the beginning of Nomadism, and we do not know of any period of desiccation which would be adequate thus to displace the oasis-dwellers after the winding-up of the Ice Age—unless it be the so-called Sub-Boreal period; and this is too late, as the Steppe seems already to be full of Nomads at this time. The facts can surely be explained just as well by supposing an analogy with the case of the Esquimaux, which you have put convincingly. The Esquimaux launched themselves on the Arctic ice, not because there was a spread of the ice (which would correspond to the desiccation hypothesis for Nomadism), but because they found a way of living off the ice which had previously been uninhabitable. In the same way, when animals had once been domesticated (the original domestication having been probably due to the desiccation, as you suggest), the herdsmen would sooner or later have found that by migrating so as to use seasonal pasture they could live off the Steppe, which had previously been either uninhabited or thinly peopled by roaming hunters. Thus no second desiccation is necessary for the theory.'

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cultivator alike would find life on the Steppe quite impossible. The Nomad grapples with the arid Steppe in the strength of his new-found pastoral art; but, in order to practise this art successfully under these exceedingly exacting conditions, he has to develop a special skill; and, in order to exercise this skill, he has also to develop special moral and intellectual powers.

When we compare the civilization of the Nomad who has abandoned agriculture and has held his ground on the Steppes with the civilizations of his brethren who have preserved their agricultural heritage by changing their habitat, we shall observe that Nomadism displays a superiority over Agriculture in several ways.

In the first place, the domestication of animals is manifestly a higher art than the domestication of plants, inasmuch as it is a triumph of human wit and will over a less tractable material. The power of physical locomotion and the direction of this power by volition are the two main points in which Fauna differs from Flora; and these two characteristics, which Man's fellow-animals share with Man himself, evidently make the Animal Kingdom a less easy realm than the Vegetable Kingdom for Man to conquer. In other words, the shepherd is a greater virtuoso than the husbandman, and this truth has been expressed in a famous passage of Syriac mythology.

'Adam knew Eve his wife; and she conceived, and bare Cain. . . . And she again bare his brother Abel. And Abel was a keeper of sheep, but Cain was a tiller of the ground. And in process of time it came to pass that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering unto the Lord. And Abel, he also brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. And the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering; but unto Cain and to his offering he had not respect.'¹


In fact, the art practised by Abel, the afterborn, is not only posterior in the time of its invention to the art of Cain, the elder brother; and it is not only an art of greater skill and greater difficulty. Nomadism is also superior to Agriculture economically; and from this technical standpoint it is comparable not so much with Agriculture itself as with Industrialism: another newfangled economic system which, like Nomadism, has differentiated itself out of a rudimentary agricultural economy in course of time and in response to a novel challenge. Whereas the cultivator produces raw materials which he can consume directly, the Nomad, like the Industrialist, makes his living out of raw materials which are of no utility to Man until they have been deliberately transformed. The cultivator lives off artificial grasses which he eats himself. The Nomad manages to live off natural grasses which he cannot eat himself—the coarse

¹ Gen. iv. 1-5.

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and scanty herbage of the Steppe—by causing these non-human foodstuffs to be eaten by his tame animals and then feeding himself on these animals' milk and flesh, and clothing himself in their wool and hides.

And this indirect utilization of the vegetation of the Steppe through an animal medium makes demands on human wit and will which go far beyond the bare knowledge of the domesticator's art. If a shepherd or herdsman who had grown up in a sedentary society were suddenly put in charge of the Nomad's flocks and herds in the Nomad's environment, he would find himself almost as helpless as a vine-dresser or a ploughman; for the shepherd of the Steppes has no meadows to yield him hay for winter fodder, and no brother-husbandman to provide him with cattle-food by artificial cultivation, and no brother-industrialist to transform an unwieldy truss of soya-beans into handily portable oil-cake. In season and out of season, the Nomad must find subsistence for his cattle from the natural vegetation of the barren and parsimonious Steppe; and he can only find it by adapting his life and his movements meticulously to the vagaries of a severe and unfriendly physical environment. He must manœuvre himself and his family and his flocks and his herds over the vast spaces of the Steppe from winter-pasture to summer-pasture and from summer-pasture back to winter-pasture again in conformity with the climatic and vegetational year-cycle; and the Nomad patriarch cannot wrest victory out of this annual economic campaign without exercising—and exacting from the human beings and animals under his patriarchal authority—those virtues of forethought and self-control and physical and moral endurance which a military commander exercises, and exacts from his troops, when Man is at war with Man and not with Physical Nature.

Thus the material *tour de force* of Nomadism demands, from those who take the responsibility on their shoulders, a rigorously high standard of character and behaviour. They must combine the pastoral with the military virtues. They must know, by sure intuition, when to be benevolent and when to be severe; when to be prudent and when to be prompt in action. It is no wonder that the Christian Church has found in the everyday life of the Nomadic Civilization a symbol for the highest Christian ideal: the image of 'the Good Shepherd'.¹ It is also no wonder that the very achievement of so great a *tour de force* should have doomed the society that

¹ For the Nomadic origin of this image, see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 317, footnote 1, above. It is found alike in the Semitic languages of the Afrasian Nomads (e.g. the Arabic ) and in the Indo-European languages of the Eurasian Nomads (e.g. the Greek ποιμένα λαών).

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has accomplished it to atone for its audacity by paying a penalty of equivalent magnitude.

The Nomads' penalty is in essence the same as the Esquimaux's. The formidable physical environment which they have succeeded in conquering has insidiously enslaved them in ostensibly accepting them as its masters. The Nomads, like the Esquimaux, have become the perpetual prisoners of an annual climatic and vegetational cycle;¹ and in acquiring the initiative on the Steppe they have forfeited the initiative in the World at large. The Nomads have not indeed passed across the stage of the histories of civilizations without making their mark. From time to time they have broken out of their own domain into the domains of neighbouring sedentary civilizations, and on some of these occasions they have momentarily carried all before them and have turned their sedentary neighbours' lives upside down; but these outbreaks have never been spontaneous. When the Nomad has issued out of his Steppes and has trespassed upon the cultivator's garden, he has not been moved by a deliberate intention to depart from his customary cyclic annual manœuvres. The violence of his occasional aberrations is not the expression of a demonic will-power, but the effect of powerful external forces which the Nomad is obeying mechanically. There are two such external forces to which he is subject: one force which pushes, and another force which pulls. The Nomad is occasionally pushed off the Steppe by a fresh turn of the climatic screw which intensifies the pressure to a degree which even the trained and hardened steppe-dweller cannot endure; and again he is occasionally pulled out of the Steppe by the suction of a social vacuum which has arisen in the domain of some adjacent sedentary society through the operation of historic processes, such as the breakdown and disintegration of a sedentary civilization, which are quite extraneous to the Nomad's own experiences. A survey of the great historic interventions of the Nomads in the histories of the sedentary civilizations seems to show that these interventions can all be traced to one or other of these two mechanical causes, and that they are not attributable to any active and positive responses, on the Nomads' part, to challenges arising out of any inner evolution in their own Nomadic life.²

Thus, in spite of these occasional eruptions out of the Steppe and

¹ In one sense, the Nomads are freer than the Esquimaux; for, 'unlike pastoral peoples, who lead their domesticated animals in quest of grazing grounds and water, the Eskimos are themselves led hither and thither by the animals, which follow their natural instincts'. (Weyer, *op. cit.*, p. 99.) 'It cannot be maintained, however, simply from the failure of the Eskimo to domesticate the caribou, for instance, that he is culturally inferior to all pastoral peoples. His indirect mastery over the animals in their wild condition displays a more highly developed cultural adaptation than do the simple adjustments of some herding peoples.'

² A survey of this kind is attempted below in Part III. A, Annex II.

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incursions into the field of historical events, Nomadism is essentially a society without a history. Once launched on its annual orbit, the Nomadic horde revolves thereafter round the same identic track and might continue to revolve in *saecula saeculorum* if an external force against which Nomadism is ultimately defenceless did not eventually bring the horde's movement to a standstill and its life to an end. This force is the pressure of the sedentary civilizations round about; for although the Lord may have respect for Abel and his offering and not for Cain and his, no power can save Abel from being slain by Cain in revenge.¹

There is, indeed, a primordial antipathy and misunderstanding between the cultivator and the Nomad which has been observed in the life by a recent Western investigator in Manchuria:

'Within Manchuria, . . . while the Manchus have amalgamated themselves with the Chinese, there persists a profound cleavage between the Manchu-Chinese amalgamation and the still practically intact Mongol mass. What emerges from this is a realization of the profound power of culture—the way of life—in comparison with the factors of Race and Environment. . . . There is little difference, in physical racial type, between the majority of Northern Chinese and the majority of Mongols. . . . It is often possible to mistake a Chinese in Mongol costume for a Mongol, or a Mongol in Chinese costume for a Chinese. On the other hand, when it is possible to tell them apart, . . . it is only possible because of differences in stance, movement, expression, manner, which are intangible in the material sense but unmistakable. They are not differences of the physique itself, but of the life within the physical structure. Yet these intangibles, which belong to outlook, culture, feeling, and the way of life, establish a cleavage.'²

The causes of this social and moral cleavage can be laid bare by analysis, which makes it apparent that the relation between the cultivator and the Nomad is not unlike the relation between the landsman and the seaman.

'The Nomad moves in an annual orbit, and drives his herds each season over the ground on which he has pastured them at the same season the year before. His perpetual motion is not a symptom of waywardness and perversity. It is as scientific as the agriculturist's rotation of crops or performance of different operations in different fields at different times of year. Both are perpetually shifting the scene of their activities in order not to exhaust a particular parcel of ground. There is only a quantitative difference in the range of their oscillation, conditioned by the difference between their media of productivity. The Nomad, ranging widely in order to convert grasses into human food through chemical transformations in the bodies of tame animals, regards

¹ Gen. iv. 6–8.

² Lattimore, O.: *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 70–1 and 299–300.

the agriculturist as a stick-in-the-mud. The agriculturist, raising edible seeds and roots in sufficient quantities out of a much smaller area of land, regards the Nomad as a vagabond.

There would be nothing more in this than the commonplace mutual contempt of different trades, if the frontiers between Nomad's land and Peasant's land were stable. On his own ground, each of them is following that mode of life which the experience of generations has shown to be economically the most productive. He is in equilibrium with his environment and therefore more or less harmless and amiable. In fact, the Nomad who visits the Peasant or the Peasant who visits the Nomad at home is generally agreeably surprised at the courtesy of his reception.¹ . . . The traditional bitterness between Peasant and Nomad arises from a physical cause for which neither is to blame. Their respective environments and the frontiers between them are subject to periodic change.

Recent meteorological research indicates that there is a rhythmic alternation, possibly of world-wide incidence, between periods of relative desiccation and humidity,² which causes alternate intrusions of Peasants and Nomads into one another's spheres. When desiccation reaches a degree at which the Steppe can no longer provide pasture for the quantity of cattle with which the Nomads have stocked it, the herdsmen swerve from their beaten track of annual migration and invade the surrounding cultivated countries in search of food for their animals and themselves. On the other hand, when the climatic pendulum swings back and the next phase of humidity attains a point at which the Steppe becomes capable of bearing cultivated roots and cereals, the Peasant makes his

¹ The sedentary observer usually paints the Nomad in dark colours because he usually comes across him in a hostile relation: either as an aggressor to be anathematized or else as a victim of aggression who has to be given a bad name in order that the wrong which is being committed against him may be justified. (On this, see further the footnote on p. 18, below.) There are, however, a number of descriptions of the Nomad at home which, although they come from the hands of sedentary observers, are nevertheless surprisingly different from the usual picture of the 'Tartarean' Tartar or the hideous Hun; and since the authors of these descriptions are not only describing the Nomad in his native environment, but are themselves the children of several different sedentary civilizations and have written their accounts quite independently of one another, at wide intervals of space and time, there is a strong presumption that, in so far as these pictures of the Nomad agree with one another, they are likely to be more faithful portraits than the usual caricature.

The following references are offered as samples: Homer, *Iliad*, xiii, ll. 5-6: 'Those splendid horse-dairy-farmers the Abioi, who live on a milk diet and are the justest of Mankind'; Hippocrates: *De Aeribus, Aquis, et Locis*, ch. xviii; Herodotus, Bk. IV, ch. xlvi; de Rubruquis, Frater Willielmus: *Itinerarium Anno Gratiae 1253 ad Partes Orientales*, ch. iii; Marco Polo, ch. lii; Huc, l'Abbé: *Souvenirs d'un Voyage dans la Tartarie, le Thibet et la Chine pendant les années 1844, 1845, et 1846* (Paris 1850, Le Clere, 2 vols.); Atkinson, T. W.: *Oriental and Western Siberia: A Narrative of Seven Years' Explorations and Adventures in Siberia, Mongolia, the Kirgiz Steppes, Chinese Tartary and Part of Central Asia* (London 1858, Hurst and Blackett). The aforementioned works are all descriptive of the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe. For their Afrikan fellow Nomads who range the North Arabian Steppe, see the Pentateuch, *passim*, and, among modern Western observers, above all Doughty, C. M.: *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2nd ed. (London 1931, Cape, 2 vols.) and the abridgement entitled *Wanderings in Arabia* (London 1908, Duckworth, 2 vols.). For the Afrikan Nomads who range the Sahara, see Rodd, F. R.: *The People of the Veil: The Wandering Tuareg Tribes* (London 1926, Macmillan).

² See Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's works, *passim*, but especially *The Pulse of Asia* (Boston and New York 1907, Houghton Mifflin) and *The Climatic Factor as illustrated in Arid America* (Washington, D.C., 1914, Carnegie Institution). In this 'Study of History', the phenomenon of climatic periodicity is discussed further in Part III. A, Annex II, below.

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counter-offensive upon the pastures of the Nomad. Their respective methods of aggression are very dissimilar. The Nomad's outbreak is as sudden as a cavalry charge, and shatters sedentary societies like the bursting of some high explosive. The Peasant's is an infantry advance. At each step he digs himself in with mattock or steam plough, and secures his communications by building roads or railways. The most striking recorded examples of Nomad explosion are the intrusions of the Turks and Mongols, which occurred in what was probably the last dry period but one. An imposing instance of Peasant encroachment is the subsequent eastward expansion of Russia. Both types of movement are abnormal, and each is extremely unpleasant for the party at whose expense it is made. But they are alike in being due to a single uncontrollable physical cause.¹

"The relentless pressure of the Cultivator is probably more painful in the long run, if one happens to be the victim of it, than the Nomad's savage onslaught. The Mongol raids were over in two or three generations; but the Russian colonization, which has been the reprisal for them, has been going on for more than four hundred years—first behind the Cossack lines, which encircled and narrowed down the pasture-lands from the north, and then along the Transcaspian Railway, which stretched its tentacles round their southern border. From the Nomad's point of view, a Peasant Power like Russia resembles those rolling and crushing machines with which Western Industrialism shapes hot steel according to its pleasure. In its grip, the Nomad is either crushed out of existence or racked into the sedentary mould, and the process of penetration is not always peaceful. The path was cleared for the Transcaspian Railway by the slaughter of Türkmens at Göktepé.² But the Nomad's death-cry is seldom heard. During the European War, while people in England were raking up the Ottoman Turks' Nomadic ancestry in order to account for their murder of 600,000 Armenians, 500,000 Turkish-speaking Central Asian Nomads of the Kirghiz Qāzāq Confederacy were being exterminated—also under superior orders—by that "justest of mankind" the Russian muzhik. Men, women, and children were shot down, or were put to death in a more horrible way by being robbed of their animals and equipment and then being driven forth in

¹ 'It is as erroneous to attribute [the] workings [of this physical cause] to human wickedness in the one case as in the other. Yet while the intrusive Nomad has been stigmatized as an ogre, the intrusive Peasant has either escaped observation or has been commended as an apostle of civilization. The reasons for this partiality are clear. One is that the Nomad's tactics are more dramatic than the Peasant's and make a correspondingly greater impression on the imagination. The other is that history is written for and by the sedentary populations, which are much the most numerous and sophisticated portion of Mankind, while the Nomad usually suffers and pines away and disappears without telling his tale. Yet, if he did put it on record, he might paint us as monsters.' One of the oldest and most famous of the extant literary presentations of this secular conflict is, in fact, written from the Nomad's standpoint; and here, in the fourth chapter of the Book of Genesis, our own prototype Cain—the first tiller of the ground and the first builder of a city—is branded for all time with the mark of his blood-guiltiness for the slaying of his pastoral brother. But if Abel's advocate has had the first word, Cain's advocates have held the floor ever after. In the Iranian epic of the struggle between Iran and Turan, the sympathy has already been transferred to Cain's side. This revised version of the story has prevailed down to this day. And it is usually the last word that carries weight in the minds of the jury.

² In 1881,

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winter-time to perish in mountain or desert. A lucky few escaped across the Chinese frontier.¹ These atrocities were courageously exposed and denounced by Mr. Kerensky in the Duma before the first Russian Revolution; but who listened or cared? Not the Czar's Government, nor the great public in the West.²

The epitaph of Nomadism has been written, in a famous work of literature, by a son of the sedentary civilization which has given the Nomad the *coup de grâce*.³ In Eurasia, Nomadism was doomed from that moment in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era when two sedentary empires, the Muscovite and the Manchu, stretched their tentacles round the Eurasian Steppe from opposite quarters until they interlaced with one another. From that moment onwards, it was merely a question of how long it would take for this living noose to strangle the Eurasian Nomad who was caught fast in its toils. In the Manchu Empire, a horde of non-Nomadic barbarian conquerors were serving the purposes of the Far Eastern Society, whose domain they had overrun and whose culture they had adopted, by helping to extirpate, on the adjoining steppe-land, the alien Nomadic way of life.⁴ In the Muscovite Empire, a first infusion of Western Civilization was inspiring an Orthodox-Christian body politic with fresh energy and arming it with newfangled weapons. In our own 'post-war' generation, our Western Civilization, which has now spread its tentacles over the entire surface of the planet, is completing the extirpation of Nomadism not only in Eurasia, but in all its other ancient domains.

In the Eurasian domain, the powerful solvent of Russian Communism is now being applied to disintegrate the Nomadic way of life over a vast range of territories stretching from Transcaspia to Outer Mongolia, while in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria the last of the Nomad conquerors of China have been almost extinguished on their own ancestral pasture lands by the peaceful penetration of the conquered Chinese peasantry.⁵ In Kenya, the pasture-lands of

¹ For details see Czaplicka, M. A.: *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day* (Oxford 1918, Clarendon Press), p. 17. The respective estimates of the total numbers of murdered Qazāqs and Armenians are both conjectural.

² Toynbee, A. J.: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London 1923, Constable), pp. 339-42.

³ de Quincey, Thomas: *Revolt of the Tartars: Or, Flight of the Kalmuck Khan and his People from the Russian Territories to the Frontiers of China* [in A.D. 1771], reprinted in *The Collected Writings of Thomas de Quincey*, ed. by Masson, D.: vol. vii (London 1897, Black), pp. 368-426.

⁴ See Courant, M.: *L'Asie Centrale aux xvii^e et xviii^e siècles: Empire Kalmouk ou Empire Mantchou?* (Paris 1912, Picard).

⁵ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs: 1920-3*, p. 433; 1925, vol. ii, pp. 350-1; 1928, pp. 434-5. See further an article by Young, C. W., in *Current History*, New York, July 1928. In *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), on pp. 125-32, Mr. Owen Lattimore describes in detail the process by which the Mongol Nomad is being replaced by the Chinese peasant in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. For the contrast between the antipathy of the Mongol and the sympathy of the Manchu towards the Far Eastern culture, see further op. cit., pp. 73-4 and 131-2.

the Masai have been cut up and cut down to make room for intrusive European farmers who aspire to sow and reap on the Equator. In the Sahara, the Imoshagh are seeing their hitherto impenetrable desert fastnesses invaded by the aeroplane and by the eight-wheeled automobile. In Libya, where the Afrasian Nomadism has been organized to resist the European onset by the Islamic religious order of the Sanūsiyah, the resistance collapsed when, in January 1931, a column of Italian troops occupied the Sanūsī fastness in the reputedly impregnable oasis of Kufarā. Even in Arabia—the classic home of the Afrasian Nomadism and the most impervious of all the continents to penetration by Western pioneers—the Badu are being forcibly converted, in this age, into fallāhīn, and this by no alien Power, but by the deliberate policy of an Arab of Arabs, ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz Āl-Sa‘ūd, the King of the Najd and the Hijāz, and the temporal head of the Wāhhābī community of puritanical Muslim zealots.¹ When a Wāhhābī potentate in the heart of Arabia is fortifying his political authority with the weapon of armoured cars and solving his economic problems by means of petrol pumps and artesian wells, it is evident that the spirit of the Western Civilization is prevailing in the Nomadic Civilization’s innermost citadel, and that the last hour of Nomadism has struck.

Thus Abel has been slain by Cain; and, of all the sedentary civilizations which the Nomadic Civilization has encountered in the course of some five thousand years of contact between these two varieties of the same social species, it is our own Western Civilization that has consummated the fratricidal act. This Western Civilization has swept Nomadism off the face of the Earth, almost without noticing what it has been doing, as one incident in the titanic social revolution by which, within the last hundred and fifty years, all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face of the planet, and the entire living generation of Mankind, have been linked together, by a Western-made mechanism, into a single world-wide economic order. Western enterprise has built up this new world order by burying its own fields under mushroom cities and putting the virgin grasslands of all the continents under the plough in order to feed these mushroom cities’ pullulating industrial populations. In this oecumenical society, with its dynamic economy, there is no place for the arrested civilization and the static economy of the Nomadic

¹ For Ibn Sa‘ūd’s policy of converting the tribesmen of Central Arabia from Nomadism to agriculture on a large scale by planting them in organized settlements, and for his triumph over the recalcitrants, see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs: 1925*, vol. i, p. 281; 1928, p. 290; 1930, pp. 177–82. For details of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s agricultural settlements (*hijrahs*), see Philby, H. St. J. B.: *The Heart of Arabia* (London 1922, Constable), vol. i, pp. 299–300; Amīn-ar-Rihānī: *Tarikh Najd al-Hadīth* (Cairo 1928), pp. 412–14, and *Ibn Sa‘ūd of Arabia* (London 1928, Constable), pp. 191–9; Philby, H. St. J. B.: *Arabia* (London 1930, Benn), pp. 225 seqq.

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horde revolving perpetually round its closed annual cycle.¹ Abel is indubitably dead, and we are left to inquire whether the curse of Cain is duly descending upon his slayer.

'And now art thou cursed from the Earth, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand; when thou tillest the ground, it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength; a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the Earth.'²

This first clause of Cain's curse has manifestly proved ineffective; for though the oasis-cultivator has certainly found himself unable to raise crops from the desiccated steppe-land, his migrations have carried him, several thousand years ago, into regions round about in which the climatic conditions have not proved insuperably adverse; and thence, in the fullness of time, he has returned, as we have seen, with the new driving force of Industrialism behind him, to claim the grasslands for the plough and to make the desert blossom³ by the latter-day arts of artesian-boring and dry-farming. It is rather in building the city from which these new arts and this new driving-power derive that Cain has given hostages to Fortune. The emergence of Industrialism and the extinction of Nomadism are two outstanding events in the history of the last 150 years; and, as we have seen, these two events are not merely contemporary but

¹ The impossibility of finding a place for Nomadism in the economy of an industrialized world is proved not only by the recent revolution on the grasslands of the Old World, from which an old-established Nomadism has been evicted by the Russian and the Chinese peasant's plough. It is demonstrated still more cogently by what has happened on the grasslands of South and North America, where the pioneers of European colonization found only hunting peoples in previous occupation. (See II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, p. 255, above.) The immediate effect of the European pioneers' advent was to turn these former hunting-grounds not into fields and cities but into cattle-ranches; but the 'cow-boys' have been more ephemeral than the 'Indians' whom they have exterminated. They have been merely the foam frothing on the crest of the oncoming wave; and, within less than two generations, they have been supplanted in their turn by the ploughman and the mechanic, who all the time were following hard at their heels in irresistible force. To-day, the Middle Western prairies are being covered by a network of fields and cities, no less than the Central Asian Steppes. Yet our urban imaginations have been rightly captivated (see II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, p. 255, above) by the 'cow-boy's' wild ride across our prosaic social stage. For his brief appearance has been a repetition—performed in the full light of history—of the evolution (sketched above) through which the Nomads of the Old World were begotten by earlier sedentary societies. The latter-day Nomadism which has been begotten in the New World by our Western Society has, it is true, been abortive. But let us imagine, for a moment, that, after the occupation of the prairies by the 'cow-boys' in the middle of the nineteenth century, these grasslands had been rendered unfit for the production of cereals (even by 'dry farming') through an access of aridity; or let us imagine that plantation-slavery or civil war or some other social disaster had blighted, in North America, the growth of the sedentary civilization from whose bosom the 'cow-boys' had emerged: then, in either of these eventualities, we can readily picture the 'cow-boys' making the prairies their own not merely for two brief generations, but perhaps for centuries or even for thousands of years. In that event, the history of Nomadism in the Old World would have repeated itself in the New. For this abortive Nomadism of the North American Prairies, see French, the Hon. W.: *Some Recollections of a Western Ranchman, New Mexico, 1883-1899* (London 1927, Macmillan); James, W.: *Lone Cowboy: My Life Story* (London 1930, Scribners); Love, C. M.: 'The History of the Cattle Industry in the South West' (in *The South-Western Quarterly*, vol. xix); Paxson, F. L.: 'The Cow Country' (in *The American Historical Review*, vol. xxii); Rollins, P. A.: *The Cowboy* (New York and London 1922, Scribners).

² Gen. iv. 11-12.

³ Isaiah xxxv. 1-2.

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are also interconnected. In this year 1935, when the new economic world order is threatened with break-down and dissolution, it seems not impossible that Abel may be avenged, after all, upon his fratricide brother; and that *Homo Nomas*, *in articulo mortis*, may yet linger on to see his slayer, *Homo Faber*, go down, distraught, to Sheol.

The 'Osmanlis

So much for the civilizations that have suffered arrest as a penalty for a *tour de force* in response to some physical challenge. In order to complete our survey, we must now consider the two parallel cases—the predicament of the 'Osmanlis and the predicament of the Spartans—in which the superlative challenge that has evoked the *tour de force* has been not physical but human.

The superlative challenge to which the Ottoman system was a response was the geographical transference of a Nomadic community from its native environment on the Steppe, where it had been at grips with Physical Nature, to an alien environment in which it found itself free from the physical pressure of desiccation but was confronted, in exchange, with the novel problem of exercising dominion over alien communities of human beings. We have already taken note¹ of these occasional aberrations of Nomad hordes out of their regular annual orbits on the Steppe into the domains of neighbouring sedentary civilizations in mechanical obedience to physical pushes or to human pulls. We have also had occasion to observe incidentally, apropos of a particular instance of this phenomenon, the first reaction which this new challenge is apt to evoke. We have seen how the Avar Nomads, when they found themselves expatriated from their cattle-ranges on the Steppe and stranded, *in partibus agricolarum*, in the derelict provinces of the Roman Empire in the sixth century of the Christian Era, sought to deal with the sedentary population which they had conquered as though it were a human flock, and attempted to transform themselves from shepherds of sheep into shepherds of men.²

This Avar experiment has been tried by other *ci-devant* Nomads who have found themselves from time to time in similar situations, and it is indeed a logical application of an obvious analogy. In their native environment on the Steppe, the Nomads live off the local vegetation at second hand by subjecting it to a preliminary transformation through the agency of certain fellow members of the Animal Kingdom whom the Nomads have at their command. In the alien environment of fields and cities, an intrusive horde of *ci-devant* Nomads almost inevitably expects to make its living in an

¹ On p. 15, above.

² II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 317-19, above.

analogous way. Instead of living off the wild herbage of the Steppe through the transforming medium of tame animals, the *émigrés* now propose to live off the cultivated crops of the ploughland and the manufactured goods of the workshop and the profits of the counting-house through the transforming medium of subject human beings: a servile peasantry and a servile bourgeoisie. The analogy is tempting to apply, and it works out in practice up to a point; but the empirical test discovers in it one almost fatal flaw.

On the Steppe, the composite society constituted by the Nomads and their non-human cattle is the most effective social instrument of economic utilization which can be devised for dealing with that kind of physical environment at that degree of aridity. While the Nomad would not, of course, be able to keep alive on the Steppe at all without his flocks and herds, he is not a parasite upon his non-human partners in the pastoral business, since it would be just as impossible for these sheep and cattle and dogs and horses and camels to keep alive on the Steppe, in anything like their actual numbers, under the actual climatic conditions, without the assistance of their human overseers. At this degree of aridity, neither the human nor the non-human denizens of the Steppe could continue to live there in any considerable numbers except in association with one another,¹ and *a fortiori* they could not survive there in the anti-social relation of hunter and hunted, in which their predecessors once stood to one another in the Pluvial Age, before the challenge of desiccation was presented to both alike. On the other hand, in an environment of fields and cities, a composite society constituted of expatriated Nomads and indigenous 'human cattle' is economically unsound; since in these alien circumstances the 'shepherds of men' are always economically—though not always politically—superfluous and therefore parasitic. From the economic

¹ In this connexion it is significant that the one-humped Camel of the Afrasian Steppe is one of the rare species of animals that are now represented only by domesticated breeds, without any wild specimens having survived. Mr. G. F. Hudson points out, however, that wild specimens of the Eurasian two-humped camel (i.e. the Mongolian Wild Camel) are still to be found in Tsaidam and round the Lob Nor; and that specimens of the Afrasian one-humped camel which had reverted to a wild state were to be found—at any rate until the close of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era—in the arid fens of the Guadalquivir in Spain. (These were the descendants of camels which had been brought in from Africa, after the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, by the Arabs and Moors.) Moreover, there are not only wild camels but wild horses and wild asses still extant in Mongolia and in the Tarim Basin. An account of these rare animals will be found (as Mr. Hudson has brought to the attention of the writer of this Study) in Sir Henry Howorth: *A History of the Mongols*, vol. iv (London 1928, Longmans), pp. 19-23. Apropos of Mongolia, Howorth observes that 'the most interesting district in many ways in regard to its fauna is the most barren and unattractive wild part, where the absence of water and fodder make it practically uninhabitable by Man. . . . This kind of country is chiefly found in Alashan and the Steppes of the Ordus and in the land about Lob Nor and parts of Dzungaria.' This is evidently the limiting case; but for the major part of the Steppe, which lies climatically between the extreme of aridity and the degree of humidity that is required for cultivation, the thesis put forward here in this Study probably holds good.

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standpoint they have ceased to be shepherds keeping their flocks and have turned into drones exploiting the worker-bees. They have become a non-productive ruling-class maintained by the labour of a productive subject-population which receives from them no economic contribution in exchange for an uneconomic tax, and which could therefore utilize its fields and cities to much better economic effect if this human incubus were absent.

For this reason, the empires established by Nomad conquerors of sedentary populations have usually suffered the fate of the seeds in the parable which 'fell upon stony places where they had not much earth; and forthwith they sprung up, because they had no deepness of earth; and when the Sun was up they were scorched; and because they had no root they withered away'.¹ The usual career of such empires is to begin with an imposing display of power, but to belie their first promise by a rapid decadence and a premature extinction. The great Maghribī historian Ibn Khaldūn (*vivebat* A.D. 1332-1406) was thinking in terms of Nomad empires—the prevalent type of empires in Ibn Khaldūn's time and place—when he assessed the average duration of empires in general at not more than three generations or 120 years.² Nomad empires are apt to be powerful at the outset because the moral virtues of self-control and endurance and the intellectual aptitudes for forethought and organization, which are developed in the Nomad by his proper profession of pasturing his flocks and herds on the Steppe, are also potent for the military conquest of sedentary human populations. At the same time, these Nomad empires are apt to be ephemeral because the special qualities of the Nomad, being the outcome of his response to the challenge of his native environment, inevitably tend to atrophy in a new environment which fails to provide the requisite stimulus. Thus Nomad empire-builders usually degenerate, while on the other hand their sedentary subjects, after having been first stunned by the shock of the conquest (which is often a brutal business) and having then been hypnotized into acquiescing in the unnatural status of 'human cattle', usually begin to recover their *moral* at about the time when their *ci-devant* Nomad masters begin to lose theirs—and this for the inverse reason. If the ex-Nomad 'shepherd of men' degenerates because he has passed out of his own element and has become economically superfluous, his 'human cattle' recuperate because they have remained on their own

¹ Matt. xiii. 5-6.

² Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*: French translation by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 342-59, especially p. 347. Compare the passage in the same volume, p. 286, in which the author lays down that nobility lasts for four generations on the average and that corruption is of the essence of the Universe. (These passages from Ibn Khaldūn have been cited already in the present Study in vol. ii, on p. 212, above.)

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ground and have not ceased to be economically productive—even under the adverse social conditions of political subjection.

In these circumstances, the false social analogy breaks down, and the 'human cattle' reassert their manhood by either expelling their shepherd-kings or assimilating them. The dominion of the Avars over the Slavs lasted, in all probability, for less than fifty years;¹ and while the transitory Avar ascendancy was the making of the Slavs, the enslavement of the Slavs proved to be the undoing of the Avars. While the Slavs proceeded to make their mark on both Orthodox Christian and Western history, the Avars simply lingered on, in the outlying Hungarian enclave of the Eurasian Steppe, until they were exterminated, after the lapse of two centuries, by Charlemagne. Some Nomad empires have had still shorter lives than this. For example, the empire of the Western Huns, who passed out of Eurasia into the Hungarian Alföld about a century and a half before the Avars, lasted no longer than the life-span of a single individual: Attila.² The empire of the Mongol Il-Khans over Iran and 'Irāq lasted less than eighty years (*circa* A.D. 1258–1335),³ and the empire of the Great Khans themselves over Southern China had an equally short duration (*circa* A.D. 1280–1354).⁴ The empires of the Chaghatāy Mongols over Transoxania⁵ and of the Hyksos over Egypt⁶ each lasted a bare century. The Magyars, who were the next Nomad occupants of the Hungarian Alföld after the Avars, were absorbed, by conversion, into the body social of Western Christendom within little more than a hundred years after their arrival. The span of more than two centuries (*circa* A.D. 1142–1368) during which the Mongols and their immediate local predecessors the Kin ruled continuously over Northern China,⁷ and the longer span of over three centuries and a half (*circa* 140 B.C.–A.D. 226/232) during which the Parthians were masters of 'Irāq as well as Iran, were distinctly exceptional.⁸

¹ See Peisker, T.: *The Expansion of the Slavs* (= *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1912, University Press), ch. xiv), cited already in II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 318, above.

² Similarly, the dominion of the Eastern Huns (the White Huns or Ephthalites) was limited to the life-span of a single individual, Mihiragula, in India. In the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, on the other hand, the Ephthalites succeeded in maintaining their ascendancy for a period—extending from the early part of the fifth century of the Christian Era to A.D. 567—which approximated to Ibn Khaldūn's figure of 120 years.

³ See vol. ii, p. 144, above.

⁴ See vol. ii, p. 121, above.

⁵ See vol. ii, pp. 144–6, above.

⁶ See vol. i, pp. 104–5, 137–9, and 144, and vol. ii, pp. 113, footnote 3, and 388–91, above.

⁷ See vol. ii, p. 121, above.

⁸ The average period of the ascendancies which have been exercised from time to time over a sedentary population in the Russian forest-belt by Nomads in occupation of the western arm of the Eurasian Steppe, which skirts the north coast of the Black Sea, appears to have been decidedly longer than Ibn Khaldūn's average of 120 years. The Scythians held their 'human cattle' in subjection (Herodotus, Bk. IV, ch. 3), and extracted from them a surplus of cereals for export to the Aegean, throughout the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The Khazars drew tribute from the Russian Slavs from the

By these standards of comparison, the duration of the Ottoman Empire over the Orthodox Christian World was unique. If we date its definitive establishment from the Ottoman conquest of Macedonia in A.D. 1371-2, and the beginning of its end from the peace-treaty of Küchük Qaynarjy, which terminated the most disastrous of the Russo-Turkish Wars in A.D. 1774, we shall be assigning to the zenith of the Ottoman régime a period of fully four centuries without reckoning in the time which it took, before that, to rise and, after that, to fall. What is the explanation of this relative durability of the Ottoman Nomad empire-builders' work?

A partial explanation is, no doubt, to be found in the course of Orthodox Christian history, in which the Ottoman régime was an episode. For although on the economic plane the 'Osmanlis were not less parasitic than any other *ci-devant* Nomads who had been carried by conquest on to a sedentary society's ground, they were fortunate in finding on the political plane an unusually positive and constructive function to fulfil. Ejected from the Eurasian Steppe by the explosion of the Mongols (a social convulsion produced by one of the periodical turns of the Eurasian climatic screw), the fathers of the 'Osmanlis were driven deep into the Orthodox Christian World, and were lodged there by chance in a position of exceptional strategic advantage,¹ at a turning-point in Orthodox Christian history. This little band of Eurasian Nomad refugees happened to arrive at the north-western edge of the Anatolian Plateau, overlooking the Sea of Marmara, just after the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles' had reached and passed its nadir. The break-down of the Orthodox Christian Civilization may be dated by its most prominent outward symptom: the Great Bulgaro-Roman War of A.D. 977-1019.² The landmarks in the subsequent disintegration of Orthodox Christendom were the military *débâcle* of the East Roman Power at Manzikert in A.D. 1071, which left the interior of Anatolia at the mercy of the Saljûqs; the successful insurrection of the Bulgars against the East Roman domination in A.D. 1186; and—crowning catastrophe—the capture and sack of

latter part of the sixth century of the Christian Era until the Norsemen filched their Slav tributaries from them in the ninth century. The Mongols of Qipchâq exercised dominion over Russia, off and on, from the first half of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era until the latter half of the fifteenth. This longer Russian average, however, may be regarded as the exception which proves Ibn Khaldûn's rule, for the relations between the sedentary peoples in Russia and their Nomad overlords on the Black Sea Steppe were not quite of the usual kind. The Nomads did not here transfer their own habitat from the Steppe to the forest. They remained on the Steppe—on their own ground—and exercised their suzerainty over the forest-dwellers from a distance.

¹ For the settlement of Ertoghrlu and his fellow refugees in Sultan Özü in the latter part of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 150-3, above.

² For the cause of this destructive internecine warfare in the Orthodox Christian World, see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 368-9, above, and Part IV, below.

the East Roman capital, Constantinople, itself in A.D. 1204 by the Western military and commercial adventurers who were seeking their fortunes on the so-called Fourth Crusade. The tide turned when an Anatolian Greek successor-state of the East Roman Empire, the Principality of Nicaea—starting from a base of operations at the foot of that very section of the plateau-rim on which the fathers of the 'Osmanlis were in the act of pitching their tents—actually anticipated, and conceivably inspired, the subsequent exploits of the 'Osmanlis themselves by crossing the Dardanelles, conquering Adrianople, and enveloping Constantinople on the landward side in A.D. 1235, annexing Macedonia in A.D. 1246, and finally recapturing the Imperial City from the Western usurpers in A.D. 1261. To play the historic role of being the empire-builders of an Orthodox Christian universal state was not the Nicene Greeks' destiny. Yet their passage of the Dardanelles in A.D. 1235 marked a transition, in the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles', from the process of disintegration to a process of reconstruction; and the work of consolidation and pacification, which these Nicene Greeks had initiated and which was the crying need of the Orthodox Christian Society in that age, was duly accomplished in the fullness of time by the 'Osmanlis. Treading on their Nicene forerunners' heels, the 'Osmanlis made their passage of the Dardanelles in A.D. 1355 and their conquest of Adrianople in 1360 and their conquest of Macedonia in 1371-2; and they crowned their construction of a universal state, embracing the whole of the main body of Orthodox Christendom, by their capture of Constantinople in A.D. 1453.

It will be seen that the *Pax Ottomanica* fulfilled a long-unsatisfied and urgent requirement of the Orthodox Christian Society; and this partly explains the duration of an empire which was able to perform for its subjects this vitally important service. Yet this explanation is incomplete; for, from the Orthodox Christian standpoint, the Ottoman Empire was always an alien and an odious Power whose heavy yoke was only worn under sheer compulsion and whose genuine social services were recognized grudgingly, if at all. Moreover, this Ottoman Power was not exempt from the economic weakness, analysed above,¹ which is inherent in all Nomad dominions over sedentary populations. The relative durability of the Ottoman Empire, by comparison with other Nomad dominions of the same general type, only becomes fully intelligible when we view it in the light of the special Ottoman adaptation of the common Nomad institutions in response to an extraordinary challenge.²

¹ See pp. 23-5, above.

² For the stimulus which was administered to the 'Osmanlis by the challenge of Orthodox Christendom, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 150-4, above, where the history of the 'Osmanlis is contrasted with that of the Qaramanlis.

We have seen that the Avars and their like, when they have trespassed from the Desert on to the Sown, have attempted—and failed—to deal with their new situation by turning themselves from shepherds of sheep into shepherds of men. Their failure seems the less surprising when we consider that these unsuccessful Nomad empire-builders in *partibus agrorum* have not attempted to find any sedentary human equivalent for one of the essential partners in the composite society of the Steppe. For this Steppe Society does not consist simply of the human shepherd and his flock. In addition to the domesticated animals which he keeps alive in order to live off their products, the Nomad keeps other animals—the dog, the camel, the horse—whose function is not to provide him, as his sheep and cattle provide him, with food and clothing, but to assist him, as non-human auxiliaries, in his pastoral task.¹ These auxiliary animals are the *chef d'œuvre* of the Nomadic Civilization and the key to its success. Without their aid, the Nomad's *tour de force* would pass the bounds of human capacity; yet this aid can only be enlisted by a miracle of human ingenuity. The sheep or the cow has merely to be tamed (though that is difficult enough) in order to be of service to Man. The dog and camel and horse cannot perform their more sophisticated services until they have been tamed and trained into the bargain. The training of his non-human auxiliaries is the Nomad's crowning achievement; and it is the adaptation of this higher Nomad art to sedentary conditions, over and above the adaptation of the comparatively commonplace art of taming sheep and cattle, that distinguishes the Ottoman Empire from the Avar Empire and accounts for its vastly greater strength and durability. The Ottoman Pādishāhs maintained their empire by training slaves as human auxiliaries to assist them in keeping order among their 'human cattle'.

This remarkable institution of making soldiers and administrators out of slaves—an idea which is so congenial to the Nomad genius and so alien from ours—was not an Ottoman invention. We find it in other Nomad empires over sedentary peoples—and this precisely in those which have had the longest duration next to the Ottoman Empire itself.

We catch glimpses of military slavery in the Parthian Empire in the last century B.C. One of the Parthian armies that frustrated

¹ The division between these two categories of animals is not, of course, completely clear-cut. The horse, for example, belongs to both classes, since it provides its Nomad master with milk and meat, besides providing him with a mount of greater mobility than the cattle which the Nomad herdsman has to round up. The primary animal in the auxiliary class appears to be the dog, who was also perhaps the first animal ever to be domesticated by Man. The transformation of the hound into the sheep-dog must have been accomplished through the middle term of the watch-dog; and this must have happened during the agricultural stage which intervened between hunting and Nomadism. (See p. 10, above.)

Mark Antony's ambition to emulate Alexander the Great was reported to have borne only 400 free men on its strength out of a total of 50,000 effectives;¹ and the Surēn who commanded the earlier Parthian army which annihilated the Roman army of Crassus was reported to have brought into the field no less than 10,000 slaves and clients of his own.² In the same region a thousand years later, the 'Abbasid Caliphs maintained—and forfeited—their authority in the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era by purchasing Turkish slaves off the Eurasian Steppe and training them at Baghdad for the calling of soldiers and administrators.³ This 'Abbasid institution was adopted, and perhaps elaborated, in the principality of the Sāmānidae (*regnabant* A.D. 819–999),⁴ which was the successor-state of the 'Abbasid Caliphate on its north-eastern marches, over against the Eurasian Steppe. These Sāmānid princes, who ruled at Balkh and Bokhārā, were closer than the Caliphs at Baghdad to the source from which the raw material for a Turkish slave-staff was derived, and at the same time they had a proportionately stronger incentive to train a pack of 'human watch-dogs' in order to protect their perilously exposed dominions from the depredations of their domesticated Turks' wild kinsmen. The Sāmānids' Turkish slaves were put through a long and minutely graduated probation which, for individuals who showed merit, became a *cursus honorum* culminating in an appointment to some responsible administrative office at, but not before, the age of thirty-five.⁵ This Turkish slave household was a factor both in the long preservation of the Sāmānid régime and in its ultimate extinction; for, while the greater part of the Sāmānid dominions was eventually overrun by the wild Turkish Nomads from the Steppe—the Saljūq Khān's horde on the left bank of the Oxus and the Ilék Khān's horde on the right bank—the House of Sāmān itself actually

¹ Mommsen, Th.: *A History of Rome: the Provinces from Caesar to Diocletian*: English translation (London 1886, Bentley, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 7.

² Plutarch: *Life of Crassus*, ch. xxi.

³ The 'Abbasids' Turkish bodyguard at Baghdad had its counterpart, at the court of the 'Abbasids' Umayyad contemporaries and rivals at Cordova, in a bodyguard of European barbarians who were purchased by the Spanish Caliphs from their Frankish neighbours. The Franks supplied the Cordovan slave-markets by making slave-raids across the opposite frontier of the Frankish dominions. The barbarians who were thus captured by the Franks in order to be sold to the Spanish Umayyads happened to be Slavs; and this is the origin of the word 'slave' in the English language.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 142, above.

⁵ The Sāmānids' slave-system is sketched by the Nizām-al-Mulk Abu 'Alī Hasan in the 'Siasset Namēh' = Siyāset-Nāmeḥ (French translation by Schéfer, Ch. (Paris 1893, Leroux), p. 139, cited by Lybyer, A. H.: *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass. 1913, Harvard University Press), pp. 22–3. Sāmānid institutions are a subject on which the Nizām-al-Mulk may be accepted as an authority, since he was himself an administrator in the service of the Saljūqs: the Turkish intruders from the Eurasian Steppe who were the Sāmānids' successors in Khurāsān. Moreover, the Nizām-al-Mulk and the House of Sāmān had a common cultural background as fellow Iranians and as joint heirs of the Syriac Civilization.

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received its *coup de grâce* from one of its own slave administrators:
Sebuktegin.¹

In the interregnum which followed the extinction of the successor-states of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, we find slave-soldiers and slave-administrators not only repeating Sebuktegin's individual exploit of supplanting the dynasties in whose service they had been trained, but actually replacing these by slave-dynasties, in which the dominion passed from slave to slave instead of passing from father to son. In the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, the new domain in Hindustan which had been conquered for the nascent Iranic Civilization by a series of Turkish soldiers of fortune, beginning with Sebuktegin, was ruled from Delhi by a sequence of 'Slave-Kings' (*regnabant* A.D. 1206-87). A more celebrated instance of the same remarkable phenomenon was the Mamlūk régime in Egypt. These Egyptian Mamlūks, as their name implies,² were originally the slaves of others. Their makers and masters were Saladin and the heirs of his body, the dynasty of the Ayyūbidae; but in A.D. 1250, at a critical moment in the life-and-death struggle of the nascent Arabic Civilization against the Crusaders, the Ayyūbids' Mamlūks brushed the Ayyūbids themselves aside and took the Ayyūbid slave-system over on their own account as their own slaves and own masters—perpetuating themselves, as before, by the purchase of fresh relays of slaves from abroad,³ without resuming the normal human method of procreation.

Behind the façade of a puppet Caliphate—invested in a line of latter-day 'Abbasids, to whom the Mamlūks gave asylum in Cairo after the Mongol sack of Baghdad, on the understanding that these august refugees should reign but should not govern⁴—the self-owned slave-household of the extinct Ayyūbids ruled Egypt and Syria, and held the redoubtable Mongols in check at the line of the Euphrates, from A.D. 1250 to A.D. 1516-17, when they met more than their match in the slave-household of the 'Osmanlis. Yet the Ottoman conquest was not the end of the Mamlūks; for although the strong slave armed had been overcome by a stronger than he, and had been constrained to submit to a division of his spoils,⁵ the

¹ For details see Barthold, W.: *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, 2nd ed., translated into English and revised by the author with the assistance of H. A. R. Gibb (London 1928, Luzac), pp. 261-4.

² Mamlūk is the past participle passive of the Arabic verb *malaka*, which denotes the ownership of property.

³ The Egyptian Mamlūks made sure of their source of supply by maintaining a political entente with the Mongol khanate of Qipchāq and with the maritime power of Venice. The Khans of Qipchāq made slave raids upon the Caucasian highlanders and the Russian forest-dwellers and the Eurasian Nomads beyond the pale of the Khan's own horde. The Venetians were the middlemen who conveyed the newly captured slaves from Tana to Damietta. This slave-trade was one of the most lucrative lines of Venetian business.

⁴ For these Cairene 'Abbasidae, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 67, footnote 2, and pp. 70-1, above, and Part X, below.

⁵ Luke xi. 21-2.

'Osmanli forbore to take from the Mamlūk the armour wherein he trusted. Under the Ottoman régime in Egypt, the Mamlūk corps was permitted to perpetuate itself, as before, by the same method of training and from the same sources of recruitment; and, as the Ottoman power declined, the Mamlūk power reasserted itself. In the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the Ottoman Pasha of Egypt came to be virtually a state prisoner of the Mamlūks; and he reigned as the Pādishāh's viceroy without having much more share in the government of Egypt than the Cairene 'Abbasids had been allowed in their day. At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it seemed an open question whether the Ottoman heritage in Egypt would revert to the Mamlūks or fall to some Western Power; and although both these alternatives were overruled, in the event, by the genius of Mehmed 'Alī, this great Ottoman statesman had more ado to settle accounts with the Mamlūks than to keep the British at arm's length or to step into the shoes of the French. It needed all Mehmed 'Alī's ability and energy and ruthlessness to exterminate this self-perpetuating slave-corps after it had kept itself alive on the alien soil of Egypt, by constant drafts of Eurasian and Caucasian man-power, for more than five hundred years; and even then the Mamlūks died hard. The last stand which was made, after the massacre of A.D. 1811, by a handful of survivors in the unexplored African hinterland of Egypt on the Upper Nile, was not the least impressive demonstration of the singular vitality which this extraordinary institution displayed from the beginning to the end.

In discipline and organization, however, the Mamlūk slave-household which had supplanted the Ayyūbid Dynasty in the dominion over Egypt, was far surpassed by the somewhat younger slave-household which the Ottoman Dynasty created as an instrument for the establishment and maintenance of its dominion over the Orthodox Christian World. To exercise dominion over the entire body social of an alien civilization was evidently the hardest task which a Nomad conqueror could set himself; and this audacious enterprise called out, in 'Osmān and his successors down to Suleymān the Magnificent, a supreme display of the Nomad's social capacities. The Ottoman slave-household is the finest recorded specimen of the species and on that account the most illuminating example for our purpose.¹

¹ The universal state which was imposed upon the Orthodox Christian World by the 'Osmanlis has, of course, its historical counterpart in the universal state which was imposed upon the Hindu World, some two centuries later, by the Timurid 'Mughals' who, like the 'Osmanlis, were Turks of Nomadic antecedents with a veneer of Iranic culture; but here an equivalent challenge evoked no more than the rudiments of an equivalent response. We have seen that the Egyptian Mamlūks had their counterparts, in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, in the Delhi 'Slave-Kings'; and in the following century certain contemporaries, in Hindustan, of the early Ottoman empire-builders

Its general character is conveyed in the following passage from a brilliant study by an American scholar:¹

'The Ottoman Ruling Institution included the Sultan and his family, the officers of his household, the executive officers of the Government, the standing army of cavalry and infantry, and a large body of young men who were being educated for service in the standing army, the court, and the Government. These men wielded the sword, the pen, and the sceptre. They conducted the whole of the government except the mere rendering of justice in matters that were controlled by the Sacred Law, and those limited functions that were left in the hands of subject and foreign groups of non-Muslims. The most vital and characteristic features of this institution were, first, that its personnel consisted, with few exceptions, of men born of Christian parents² or of the sons of such; and, second, that almost every member of the Institution came into it as the Sultan's slave, and remained the Sultan's slave throughout life—no matter to what height of wealth, power, and greatness he might attain. . . .

appear to have laid the foundations of something like the Ottoman system. For example 'Alā-ad-Dīn (reign 1296–1316) is recorded to have possessed 50,000 slaves, and Firūz (reign 1351–88) 180,000; and these Turkish slave-households in Hindustan were elaborately trained and organized (see Lane-Poole, S.: *Mediaeval India* (London 1903, Fisher Unwin), pp. 147–8). Thereafter, however, in Hindustan, the slave-system receded into the background; and in the institutions of the Timurid 'Mughals', who actually established the universal state of Hindu history, the slave-household was not at all prominent. Indeed, the principal evidence for the existence of this institution at the Mughal Court is indirect. It is an unverified inference from the established fact that, in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, an ex-feudatory of the Mughals, the Nawwāb of Farrukhābād, Muḥammad Khān Bangash, is known to have 'maintained what was practically a replica in miniature of the Ottoman system. Hindu boys between the ages of seven and thirteen, some of them sons of Rājputs and Brahmans, were seized, bought, or accepted as *chelas* or slaves to the number of one or two hundred a year. They were taught to read and write, and were specially rewarded when the task was completed. Five hundred *chelas* from eighteen to twenty years of age were trained as a regiment of musketeers. From among the older *chelas* were chosen the officers of the household, generals of the army, and deputy governors of provinces'. (Lybyer, A. H.: *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass. 1913, Harvard University Press), p. 282, following Irvine, W.: 'The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhābād', in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1878, pp. 340 seqq.)

We seem to catch a glimpse of the same institution in the universal state which, in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, was imposed upon the main body of the Far Eastern Society by the Manchus: a barbarian people who (it is true) were not Nomads themselves, but who were in geographical contact with the easternmost hordes of the Mongol Nomads and were certainly responsive to Mongol cultural influences, as is shown by the Manchu adoption and adaptation of the Mongol version of the Syriac Alphabet. At the Manchu Court in Peking, 'it is curious and interesting that the Chinese officials referred to themselves, when received by the Emperor, as *ch'ien* (an official); it was the Manchu officials who used the term *nu* (a slave)—thus emphasizing that they were regarded as the Emperor's personal or "party" followers'. (Lattimore, O.: *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), p. 72.)

¹ Lybyer, A. H.: *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass. 1913, Harvard University Press). See also Miller, B.: *Beyond the Sublime Porte: The Grand Seraglio of Stambul* (New Haven 1931, Yale University Press), ch. iii, and an article by the same author on 'The Curriculum of the Palace School of the Turkish Sultan' in *Macdonald Presentation Volume* (Princeton 1933, University Press), chap. xxi.

² The Egyptian Mamlūks, in their latter days, were likewise recruited mainly from the children of Christian parents who were sold into slavery or were carried away captive in their childhood. The Orthodox Christian peasantry of Transcaucasia, which was the principal source of supply for the latter-day Egyptian Mamlūks, was also one of the recruiting grounds of the Ottoman slave-household.—A.J.T.

'The royal family . . . may rightly be included in the slave-family [because] the mothers of the Sultan's children were slaves; the Sultan himself was the son of a slave; and his daughters were married to men who, though they might be called vizier and pasha, wore these titles at the Sultan's pleasure, whereas they bore indelibly the title of *qūl* or slave. The Sultan's sons, though they might sit upon the throne, would be the consorts of none but slaves. Long before Süleymān's time, the Sultans had practically ceased either to obtain brides of royal rank or to give the title of wife to the mothers of their children. . . .¹

'Perhaps no more daring experiment has been tried on a large scale upon the face of the Earth than that embodied in the Ottoman Ruling Institution. Its nearest ideal analogue is found in the Republic of Plato,² its nearest actual parallel in the Mamlūk system of Egypt; but it was not restrained within the aristocratic Hellenic limitations of the first, and it subdued and outlived the second. In the United States of America men have risen from the rude work of the backwoods to the Presidential chair, but they have done so by their own effort and not through the gradations of a system carefully organized to push them forward. The Roman Catholic Church can still train a peasant to become a pope, but it has never begun by choosing its candidates almost exclusively from families which profess a hostile religion. The Ottoman system deliberately took slaves and made them ministers of state. It took boys from the sheep-run and the plough-tail and made them courtiers and the husbands of princesses; it took young men whose ancestors had borne the Christian name for centuries, and made them rulers in the greatest of

¹ In fact, the Ottoman Pādīshāhs bred their children from picked and chosen female slaves as their Nomad forbears on the Steppe had bred pedigree cattle from selected stock, and their attitude towards their own human progeny resembled their attitude towards the younglings of their flocks and herds. Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror obtained a *fatvā* from the 'ulemā of his day in which it was declared lawful—in order to secure the peace of the World—for the Sultan's successors on the Ottoman throne to have all their brothers put to death. Sultan Mehmed issued an Imperial *qānūn* in which he made this precept jussive instead of merely permissive, and his successors duly carried out his instructions. Sultan Mehmed's condemnation of the majority of his own male descendants to a premature death by violence for the sole crime of being superfluous has become famous in our Western World as a hyperbole of inhuman barbarity; but we must suppose that the great Ottoman statesman felt no more compunction in condemning his own superfluous offspring to be strangled than a twentieth-century Western bourgeoisie feels when she condemns her pet cat's superfluous kittens to be drowned.—A.J.T.

² 'Plato would have been delighted with the training of the Sultan's great family, though his nature would have revolted from its lowliness of birth. He would have approved of the life-long education, the equally careful training of body and mind, the separation into soldiers and rulers (even though it was not complete), the relative freedom from family ties, the system's rigid control of the individual, and, above all, of the government by the wise. Whether the founders of the Ottoman system were acquainted with Plato will probably never be known, but they seem to have come as near to his plan as it is possible to come in a workable scheme. In some practical ways they even improved upon Plato—as by avoiding the uncertainties of heredity, by supplying a personal directing power, by insuring permanence through a balance of forces, and by making their system capable of vast imperial rule.' (Lybyer, *op. cit.*, p. 71.)

The Ottoman system was also Platonic in picking out and training women as well as men. 'The Imperial harem partook of the characteristics of the schools of pages' (Lybyer, *op. cit.*, p. 78); but, while the male and female departments of the household were trained, *mutatis mutandis*, on parallel lines, they were kept rigidly separate. 'Before the middle of the reign of Süleymān, no woman resided in the entire vast palace where the Sultan spent most of his time' (Lybyer, *op. cit.*, p. 121).—A.J.T.

Muhammadian states, and soldiers and generals in invincible armies whose chief joy was to beat down the Cross and elevate the Crescent. It never asked its novices "Who was your father?" or "What do you know?" or even "Can you speak our tongue?"; but it studied their faces and their frames and said: "You shall be a soldier and, if you show yourself worthy, a general", or "You shall be a scholar and a gentleman and, if the ability lies in you, a governor and a prime minister". Grandly disregarding that fabric of fundamental customs which is called "human nature", and those religious and social prejudices which are thought to be almost as deep as life itself, the Ottoman system took children for ever from parents, discouraged family cares among its members through their most active years, allowed them no certain hold on property, gave them no definite promise that their sons and daughters would profit by their success and sacrifice, raised and lowered them with no regard for ancestry or previous distinction, taught them a strange law, ethics, and religion, and ever kept them conscious of a sword raised above their heads which might put an end at any moment to a brilliant career along a matchless path of human glory.¹

It will be seen that the essence of the Ottoman system was the picking and training of 'human watch-dogs' to keep the Pādishāh's 'human cattle' in order and his human neighbours at bay. To become an Ottoman public slave of the highest order was the most arduous and dangerous and important and magnificent profession that could be followed by any subject of the Ottoman Pādishāh. Yet an essential, as well as an astonishing, rule of Ottoman statecraft was that this profession should be reserved almost exclusively for persons who were infidel-born²—without its mattering whether their infidel parents happened to be the Pādishāh's subjects or not—whereas the Pādishāh's own Muslim co-religionists were ineligible *ex officio religionis*, even if they happened to be the sons of the Ottoman feudal landed gentry who were the Pādishāh's equals in the sight of God and his companions in arms and even in some sense his social peers. This provision is astonishing because it is an extreme denial of natural expectations to disqualify the members of a conquering community from bearing rule;³ but, given the ability to enforce this disqualification, as it actually was enforced during at least two centuries of Ottoman history (*circa* A.D. 1365–

¹ Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 57–8, and 45–6.

² The only regular exceptions were the sons of members of the slave-household who had risen to one of the two highest classes—the class of administrative officials or the class of troopers in the household cavalry. These young men were Muslims, Muslim-born, in spite of the fact that their fathers must have been infidel-born *ex hypothesi*, since conversion to Islam, as well as infidel birth, was required of a slave as one of the necessary conditions for enrolment in the regular army or for appointment to an administrative office. Nevertheless, the sons of public slaves of either of the two highest classes were allowed, by special privilege, to follow in their fathers' footsteps. This privilege, however, did not extend to the next generation. The grandsons of pashas and sipāhis, and the sons of public slaves of lower rank, were disqualified for admission into the Pādishāh's slave household by being enfeoffed among the free Muslim landed gentry.

³ The point is put forcibly by Lybyer in *op. cit.*, p. 117.

1565), its utility is manifest. The Ottoman system of training a 'human watch-dog' made such severe demands upon human nature that only an individual who had been torn out of his own hereditary social environment, and had been introduced into the system as an isolated human atom, could be expected to submit to it. Now of all the human materials at the Ottoman Pādishāh's disposal, the least tractable were the children of his free Muslim feudatories with their pride of race and religion, their local connexions, and their family solidarity. The Ottoman Pādishāhs realized that, if once they were to admit this free-born and free-minded element into their household, an acute conflict would arise between the personnel and the system and that, in this trial of strength, it would not be the system that would prevail. Hence the ban upon the admission of free Muslims; and this drastic policy was justified by the sequel; for, when the free Muslims did at last force an entry into the household, the system did break down.

Until the time of that revolutionary and disastrous innovation, which began in the last years of Suleymān's reign,¹ the Sultan's slave-household was recruited—with the exceptions already mentioned—from infidel sources of supply. Recruits from beyond the Ottoman frontiers were obtained either by capture in war² or by purchase in the slave-market³ or by gift of previous owners⁴ or by voluntary enlistment.⁵ Recruits within the frontiers were obtained by the periodical levy of children by conscription. Through which-

¹ Lybyer, *op. cit.*, p. 69, note 3.

² We have works from the pens of two Western prisoners of war who were passed through the Ottoman system and who afterwards escaped to put their experiences on record. One of these is the German, Johann Schiltberger, who was taken prisoner in A.D. 1396 at the Battle of Nicopolis at the age of sixteen, spent six years as a slave in the service of Sultan Bāyezid I, was taken prisoner a second time, together with his Ottoman royal master, by Timur Lenk at Angora in A.D. 1402, spent twenty-five years more as a slave in the service of Timur, and finally succeeded in making his escape and finding his way back to Western Christendom. (German text of Schiltberger's narrative: Tübingen 1885, Literarischer Verein in Stuttgart; English translation by Telfer, J. B.: London 1879, Hakluyt Society). The second Western prisoner who has left a record of his experiences is Giovanni Antonio Menavino, a Genoese who was captured by the Barbary Corsairs at the age of twelve, about the year 1505. He was presented by his captors to Bāyezid II, was placed in the school of pages, and made his escape in 1514 during Selim I's expedition against Ismā'il Shāh Safawī. (Menavino, G. A.: *Trattato de' Costumi e Vita de' Turchi* (Florence 1548).)

³ The Ottoman slave-market was kept supplied by two sets of professional slave-raiders: the Barbary Corsairs (Ottoman colonists in Tunis and Algiers), who raided the sea-coasts of Western Europe by ship; and the Krim Tatars (a remnant of the Mongol horde of Qipchāq, which had survived under an Ottoman protectorate), who raided the steppe-coasts of Muscovy and Poland on horseback. Rycaut (*in op. cit. infra*, p. 81) estimates the average annual import of slaves from Krim Tatars to Constantinople at 20,000 head. The Tatars and the Algerines ought to be classed by our anthropologists among 'the higher hunters'.

⁴ e.g. by gift of the Barbary Corsairs (Rycaut, *op. cit. infra*, p. 25). This was how Menavino was acquired by Bāyezid II. (See footnote 2, above.)

⁵ The fourth of the four regiments of Ottoman household cavalry, i.e. the Ghurebā ('the Westerners'), was recruited entirely from non-Ottomans, both Muslim and Christian. The career of a renegade in the Ottoman service remained attractive to Western Christians until as late as the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era.

ever of these channels the recruit made his entry into the Pādishāh's slave-household, and whatever the age at which he was received, he was put through a long and elaborate and strenuous course of training before he was gazetted to a post in the Ottoman public service.¹ The leading features of this Ottoman public educational system were a minute and constant supervision by the responsible officers;² a perpetual selection and specialization at every stage;³ and a stimulation of the candidates by the administration of the strongest possible incentives, both negative and positive. The discipline was meticulous and the punishments, though not unregulated, were savage,⁴ while on the other hand there was a deliberate and unceasing appeal to ambition. Every boy who entered the Ottoman Pādishāh's slave-household was—and was no doubt aware that he was—a potential Grand Vizier; and his prospects depended on his prowess, in competition with his contemporaries, in the course of his training.⁵ At each stage, he had the possibility of qualifying for a higher category of service; and success meant an immediate increase of pay (for these Ottoman slave-apprentices were paid from the outset),⁶ as well as a greater chance, in the future, of climbing to the top of the tree.

The method and spirit of the Ottoman educational system in its heyday are vividly portrayed in the following appreciation by a first-hand observer, the Flemish scholar and diplomat Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, who was resident in the Ottoman Empire, as ambassador to Süleymān the Magnificent from the Hapsburg Court at Vienna, during the years 1555–1562:⁷

'Every year the Turkish sovereign sends commissioners into different

¹ The usual age for passing out of the educational system and being appointed to a military or administrative post seems to have been 25 in all grades.

² Rycout, op. cit. *infra*, p. 25; Lybyer, op. cit., pp. 71–2. ³ Lybyer, op. cit., p. 83.

⁴ See the quotations from original authorities in Lybyer, op. cit., pp. 108–9, as well as the references on pp. 77–8. See also Rycout, op. cit. *infra*, pp. 2 and 26, and d'Ohsson, op. cit. *infra*, p. 205.

⁵ Lybyer, op. cit., p. 83.

⁶ Lybyer, op. cit., pp. 76–7 and 82–3. See further the table of 'Differential Allowances of Pages of Palace School' in Miller, 'The Curriculum of the Palace School', opposite p. 310.

⁷ Busbecq's observations on Ottoman affairs are contained in four letters written home, during his diplomatic mission in the Near East, to a friend in Western Christendom, Nicholas Michault, and in a subsequent pamphlet entitled *Exclamatio, sive de Re Militari contra Turcam instituenda Consilium*. These five papers are all printed in *A. Giselii Busbecqii Omnia quae Extant* (Leyden 1633, Elzevir). Busbecq observed the Ottoman System just before it passed its zenith. A century later, when the system was still outwardly intact but was verging towards its fall, it was observed again by another Western diplomatist of equal acumen, the Englishman Sir Paul Rycout, who served in the Levant first as English Consul at Smyrna and afterwards as Secretary of the English Embassy at Constantinople. His observations are recorded in *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey and Brome). He states (p. 42) that his information has been taken 'from the mouth of one who had spent nineteen years in the schools of the Seraglio', and in another passage (p. 132) he cites 'one Albertus Bobovius, a Polonian by nation, but educated in the Seraglio and instructed in all the learning of the Turkish literature (from whom I freely confess to have received many of my observations)'. Thus Rycout had good informants, apart from what he saw himself. Finally, the Ottoman system was observed, when it lay in ruins, but before the rubble had been removed to

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provinces who levy one in every three or four of the boys of Christian parentage.¹

'These boys are brought in droves to Constantinople; and there those of more gentlemanly appearance, and those who show signs of greater innate ability, are allocated to the domestic service of the sovereign himself or the pashas or other high officials.'²

'The rest are taken to a place where a great crowd of men of every condition, especially countryfolk, is gathered in waiting; and these apply to the official in charge for any boys who strike their fancy. The official hands over the boy to the applicant on payment of a gold piece, after entering in the public records the boy's name, birthplace, social status, and age, as well as any permanent physical marks of identity. Upon fulfilment of these formalities, the recipient of the boy—be he countryman or townsman—is at liberty to take the boy away with him across the sea to Asia or wherever he likes, according to his place of domicile, in order to break him in there as a slave by steady hard labour. The boy receives rations of bread and water, with an occasional seasoning of porridge or fruit or vegetables, and he is supplied with sufficient clothing to protect him against the inclemency of the weather. He is also instructed in the practice and the tenets of the Muhammadan religion. Thus the boy grows up a stranger to luxury, and with no parents to spoil him, until he becomes a strong man capable of standing any exertion.'³

'Then, when the Government requires the young man's services, it demands him back from the private master who has had him on deposit, and transfers him to the military service; and this is the seminary from

clear the ground for a new social structure, by Ignatius Mouradgèa d'Ohsson, a Levantine born and brought up in Turkey. His survey of the civil institutions of the Ottoman Empire in his day will be found in the seventh volume of his *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1788-1824, 7 vols.). See further the admirable descriptive bibliography in Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-30. The text of a treatise on the Seraglio School from the hand of Bobovius himself has been discovered by Miss Miller (see Miller, *The Grand Seraglio*, p. 48).

¹ Actually, this levy (called *devrîshmè* or 'rotation') was made once in every four or five years (or at shorter intervals when the Pādîshāh's slave-household was depleted by heavy military casualties). Out of a total determined on each occasion by the Central Government, a quota was levied on each district. The commissioners who picked the children reviewed the boys of between 12 and 20 years of age, as shown on the parish priests' baptismal registers (Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-2). Contemporary Christian evidence shows that parents were not always unwilling to see their children taken; and there were instances of Muslim parents evading the disqualification to which their own children were subject by bribing their Christian neighbours to exchange children surreptitiously (*op. cit.*, pp. 53-5). The use of violence was rare; and the forcible conversion of the Christian conscript children, though it did occur, was not countenanced by the Ottoman authorities (d'Ohsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-7). Forcible conversion was, indeed, usually superfluous, for the combined effect of segregation, education, and ambition would lead almost all Christian boys who entered the system to embrace Islam voluntarily before their time arrived for passing out and entering the public service. (See Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-8.)—A.J.T.

² The further education of this *crème de la crème*, which was thus skimmed off and set apart at the outset, is described below (see the present quotation, seventh paragraph on pp. 39-40).—A.J.T.

³ The common run of conscript children, who were put out to be brought up by foster-masters in this way, were called '*Ajem-oghians*' ('alien boys'). For their training see further Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-82, and Rycaut, *op. cit.*, Bk. I, ch. x. The rural foster-fathers seem to have been usually members of the free Muslim feudal landed gentry and not simple peasants (as Busbecq's description seems rather to imply that they were).—A.J.T.

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which drafts are taken to make good the wastage in the ranks of the Janissaries.¹

Upon enrolment in the Janissaries, the cadet's pay starts at about a ducat and a half *per mensem*—a remuneration which is considered quite enough for a soldier who has yet to learn his trade. But, to insure that he is properly fed, he receives rations *gratis* from the mess of the platoon to which he is posted, on condition that he re-pays the platoon in scullion's-work and other fatigue duty. In return, the best master of arms in the platoon gives the cadet military instruction and teaches him, by daily practice, the science of handling his weapons. Thus the cadet acquires physical strength and endurance and professional skill; but he is still his messmates' inferior in rank and pay; and his sole hope of attaining equality with them lies in his own prowess: that is to say, if, in his first experience of active service, he gives a sufficiently good account of himself to be discharged from his probation and to be put on a par with the full-blown Janissaries in rank and pay. The hope of this reward stimulates many cadets to perform numerous feats of distinguished valour and to vie with the veterans in giving proof of their courage; and so they win the higher pay, which rises, for Janissaries, to a maximum of eight ducats *per mensem*.² If, however, a Janissary qualifies, through

¹ Busbecq here skips over an intermediate stage which is recorded in Rycaut, *op. cit.*, ch. x, and in Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-82. The drafting of the '*Ajem-oghians*' into the Janissary Corps did not follow immediately upon their recall to Constantinople. The cream of them were thereupon selected for service, *en permanence*, in the Pādishāh's household as gardeners and in other menial non-military capacities (with a possibility of rising thereafter, by merit, to the lesser administrative posts in the Palace). The remainder were either drafted temporarily into the Navy or were hired out by the Government to private contractors to perform hard urban labour (as described by Busbecq in his next paragraph). It was from these two latter sub-categories of '*Ajem-oghians*' that the recruits for the Janissaries were eventually taken. In this last probationary stage, the '*Ajem-oghians*' were organized in companies (*odalar* or 'chambers'); and in each company facilities were provided for teaching any member, who wished to learn, to read and write (d'Ohsson, *op. cit.*, p. 327).—A.J.T.

² The Janissaries were a professional paid standing corps of 12,000 regular infantry—disciplined, drilled, uniformed (in uniforms of blue cloth, without armour), and equipped with muskets. In other words, they resembled the infantry of Western Christendom as it came to be in the eighteenth century; but they were so different from, and in every way so superior to, the Western infantry of the sixteenth century that they moved an intelligent Western observer of that age, such as Busbecq was, to astonishment and envy. The whole purpose of Busbecq's *Exclamatio*, from which the passage here quoted is taken, was to induce the sovereigns of Western Christendom to save themselves and their peoples from the Ottoman peril by raising troops of their own on this Ottoman model. The unfamiliarity of uniformed troops to sixteenth-century Western eyes comes out in Busbecq's description of Suleymān defiling through the streets of Constantinople at the head of his troops in A.D. 1559 (in Letter III: Elzevir edition, p. 246): 'The cavalry were followed by a long column of Janissaries, few of whom carried any weapons except muskets, which are their regular arm. They were dressed in uniforms of practically identical cut and colour, which marked them out as the slave-force, or slave-household, of a single master. There was no extravagance or exaggeration in their dress, no slashings or perforations. They say their clothes wear out quite fast enough, even without deliberately tearing them!'

As in the Roman standing army of the Imperial period, marriage was discountenanced, though in the case of the Janissaries it was not actually disallowed (Lybyer, *op. cit.*, p. 70). The unmarried Janissaries lived in barracks. They were organized in messes of ten members each ('For their living expenses each contributes so much a day; and they have a steward and a cook, who provide their necessary living': Ramberti, B.: *The Second Book of the Affairs of the Turks*, written in A.D. 1534, and translated from the Italian by Lybyer, in *op. cit.*, p. 249). Ten messes constituted an *orta* or company. A school-master was attached to each *orta* to teach any Janissary, who wished for instruction, to read and write (d'Ohsson, *op. cit.*, p. 327).

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good conduct and distinguished service, for promotion, he is either given an officer's commission in his own corps or is enrolled in the household cavalry called *Sipāhīs*.¹

'The residue of the boys above-mentioned are kept in Constantinople and are employed in labour of various kinds. For instance, you may often see a couple of hundred or three hundred of them clearing a site, removing rubble, and transporting stones or timber or other heavy weights. None is allowed to live in idleness, and none receives his subsistence *gratis*. These likewise, upon reaching maturity, are transferred into the land or naval forces.'²

'As for those who are selected³ for the personal service of the sovereign at court, these generally end up as men of mark, and are appointed to the highest posts of public responsibility, according to their individual fortunes or characters.'⁴ From these are chosen the senior officers of

The corps was privileged in many ways. The *Pādīshāh* himself, from *Suleymān's* time onwards, was enrolled in a Janissary *orta* and drew Janissary's pay (*d'Ohsson*, op. cit., p. 354. Compare the similar practice of modern Western sovereigns, who likewise flatter their troops by wearing their own uniforms and holding honorary rank in their own service). If a Janissary were condemned to suffer capital punishment, the sentence could not be executed until the culprit had been expelled from the corps, and this could not be done without the corps' consent. (Compare the similar privilege of the Macedonian citizen army in the time of Alexander the Great.) When a Colonel-in-Chief of the Janissaries (*Yenicheri Aghasy*) died, his property escheated, not (like the property of all other high officials) to the Crown, but to the regimental chest (*Rycaut*, op. cit., p. 193). By *Rycaut's* time, the Corps had acquired corporate estates in Anatolia; and *'Ajem-oghlan*s destined for enrolment in the Janissaries were sent to these estates for the first stage of their training (*Rycaut*, op. cit., p. 192), instead of being put out to service with private foster-masters, as they were in *Busbecq's* day.—A.J.T.

¹ These '*Sipāhīs of the Porte*' (as distinct from the ordinary *Sipāhīs*, who were a territorial mounted militia of free feudal land-holders) were the *Pādīshāh's* professional paid household cavalry. Of the four regiments of which this regular cavalry force was composed, the fourth, called the *Ghurebā* or 'Westerners' (see footnote 5 on p. 35, above), was a foreign legion. The rest were recruited partly from Janissaries who had earned promotion and partly from Imperial Pages (see below). Troopers recruited from the latter source were men of literary education (*Rycaut*, op. cit., p. 184).—A.J.T.

² As noted above (in footnote 1, on p. 38), this was a stage which all *'Ajem-oghlan*s—including those eventually drafted into the Janissaries—had to pass through upon their recall to Constantinople from the Interior of Anatolia, with the sole exception of those who were appointed at this stage to menial non-military posts in the Palace service.—A. J. T.

³ i.e. selected at the outset, upon the first arrival of the conscript children at Constantinople, when the remainder were put out into private service with foster-masters in the Anatolian countryside to be brought up as *'Ajem-oghlan*s.—A.J.T.

⁴ These boys, who were selected from the outset to be Imperial Pages, were called *Ich-oghlan*s ('Interior Boys', i.e. boys admitted to the *Pādīshāh's* privy service) in distinction from the *'Ajem-oghlan*s ('Alien Boys'). They were an *élite*—numbering not more than 2,000 in all at any given moment, while there were perhaps as many as 20,000 *'Ajem-oghlan*s. It was on the quality of the *Ich-oghlan*s that the performance of the Ottoman *tour de force* ultimately depended, and these Imperial Pages were given a special education throughout. When the *'Ajem-oghlan*s were drafted off to their foster-masters in Anatolia, the *Ich-oghlan*s were placed in one or other of three residential schools (one in *Stamboul*, one in *Galata*, and one in *Adrianople*), which were the first rung in an educational ladder of four grades. The three higher grades were represented by six halls, culminating in the Hall of the Imperial Bedchamber (*Khāṣ Oda*), which were all situate within the precincts of the *Seraglio*; and here the *Ich-oghlan*s received an education which was both liberal and professional and both intensive and many-sided. They were first educated in Arabic and Persian literature, and afterwards in athletic and military accomplishments. They also had to learn some handicraft—an element in all Ottoman higher education, including that of the *Pādīshāh* himself (*Suleymān the Magnificent*, anticipating the precepts of Mr. Gandhi, is reported to have devoted a certain time every day to working at his handicraft: *Lybyer*, op. cit., p. 76; cp. *Withers*, R.: *Description of the Grand Signor's Court* (London 1650, Martin and Ridley), p. 78; and *Miller*, *The Grand Seraglio*, pp. 68–9, and 'The Curriculum of the Palace School', pp. 307–8). The Arabic

the Janissaries, the admirals of the fleet, the beylerbeys and—at the top of the tree—the Vizier Pashas.¹ To these, again, the sovereign's own daughters are given in marriage.

'I think I have now sufficiently elucidated the origin, selection, discipline and education of this Turkish soldiery which has made itself so greatly feared the whole World over. At the same time, I will not deny that there are other avenues of entry into the Turkish military service, though the system which I have described is the most usual way. For the Turks do occasionally also make recruits of the boys or young men whom they take prisoners in raids or in regular warfare against Western Christendom.

and Persian literary education corresponded to the contemporary Western education in the Greek and Latin humanities.

Rycaut, however, notes (in *op. cit.*, p. 32) that the *Ich-oghlan*'s curriculum included no mathematics or physical science or geography. Moreover, printing was still rigorously forbidden in Turkey in Rycaut's day—an ominous symptom of mental rigidity.

Geography was certainly a science of which the statesmen and admirals of the Ottoman Empire remained abysmally ignorant. There is a legend of an Ottoman admiral who was sent out with orders to capture Malta and who returned to Constantinople, after cruising round the Mediterranean for many weeks, to report '*Malta yoo!*' ('There is no Malta'). Again, in the great Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74, when the Ottoman Government received intelligence from friendly Powers in Western Europe that the Russians were fitting out a fleet in the Baltic for service in the Mediterranean, they are said to have ignored the warning in the belief that the Baltic and the Mediterranean were not connected with each other by any through-waterway!—A. J. T.

¹ Instances of *Ich-oghlan*s who eventually distinguished themselves by rising to the highest offices of state are noted in Jorga, N.: *Geschichte der Türkei* (Gotha 1908-13, Perthes, 5 vols.), especially in volume ii, pp. 199 seqq. For example, Mahmūd Pasha, who was Grand Vizier in A.D. 1453-67, and again in 1472-3, was the son of a Greek father and a Serbian mother. He had been captured by Osmanli raiders in childhood (Jorga, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 200). Mawla Khosrev, who rose to the highest Ottoman posts in the Islamic legal career as qādi of Constantinople and Grand Mufti in the reign of Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror, was of Greek parentage (*op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 202). Khurrem (called by Franks '*La Rossa*' and by Frankish pedants '*Roxalana*'), who was Suleymān's favourite slave-concubine and who so won the Pādishāh's heart that he broke the long-established rule of the dynasty by making her his legally wedded wife, was a Russian girl who had been captured on a slave-raid by the Tatars of Krim, sold to the Porte, and educated in the female section of the Pādishāh's slave-household (*op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 345). İbrāhīm of Parga, who was Grand Vizier in A.D. 1523-36, was the son of an Albanian peasant (on whom he afterwards conferred a *sanjāq* or provincial governorship). İbrāhīm had been enslaved at the capture of Santa Maura, selected for an *Ich-oghlan*, and brought up at Mānysa with Suleymān before the latter came to the throne (*op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 347-9). Mustafā of Cattaro, who was second vizier under İbrāhīm and who was also Sultan Suleymān's brother-in-law, was a Serb who had been born a Venetian subject (*op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 249-50). Ayas of Khimarra, who was third vizier under İbrāhīm, was the son of a Christian peasant-woman. While he had become a vizier at Constantinople, his mother had become a nun at Avlona, and Ayas used to remit an annuity to her there (*op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 350). Rustem, who was İbrāhīm's successor in the Grand Vizierate and who received in marriage Mihrmah, Suleymān's daughter by Khurrem, was a Serb (*op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 350); and Mehmed Sököllü (Sokolovic), who was Grand Vizier at the close of Suleymān's reign and the opening of Selim II's reign for fifteen years without a break, had started life as an acolyte in a Serbian church. One of Mehmed's acts as Grand Vizier was to restore the 'autocephaly' of the Serbian Orthodox Church and to instal one of his own relatives called Makarios, who had remained an Orthodox ecclesiastic, in the resuscitated Serbian Patriarchate of Ipek (Peć) (*op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 167; and Temperley, H. W. V.: *History of Serbia* (London 1917, Bell), pp. 123-4. The date of Sököllü's restoration of the 'autocephalous' Serbian Patriarchate at Ipek was A.D. 1557). Counting in Mehmed Pasha Sököllü, who was still in office when Suleymān died, and Mehmed Pasha Piri, whom Suleymān had found in office at his accession, the Grand Vizierate was occupied by nine different persons in Suleymān's reign, with terms of office which amounted in the aggregate to sixty-two years. All nine, with the sole exception of Mehmed Piri, were men of infidel birth who had passed through the slave-household (Lybyer, *op. cit.*, p. 167). For the Dalmatian Slav 'Ali, who was Grand Vizier in A.D. 1561-5, between the Grand Vizierates of his fellow-Serbs Rustem and Mehmed Sököllü, see Busbecq's *Turkish Letters*, *passim*.—A. J. T.

‘These prisoners are immured for years on end in the cloister-like palaces which they call *serays*. When, in this confinement, they are judged to have lost all memory of, and all feeling for, their Western homeland and civilization, and to have made sufficient progress in the practice of Arabic letters and Turkish arms under eunuch instructors, they are eventually let out of their prison-house by their Ottoman masters, and are appointed to the branches of the military service for which they appear best fitted. Recruits are also taken from among the slaves acquired—in war or otherwise—by the Pashas and other Imperial Grandees. At the same time, no prospective recruit from any of these categories is ever accepted without definite scrutiny and consideration. In every single case there is a preliminary investigation into the candidate’s physique and character, to make sure of his being equal to the position assigned to him.

‘In this connexion, I have found myself again and again struck with wonder at the sheer power of the Turkish system of discipline and education, when I have seen men who in our world had been despised and rejected making such progress in a few years in the Turkish environment that they were not only able to acquit themselves uncommonly well as common soldiers but were considered worthy, in the unanimous opinion of the Turks, of being entrusted with the duty of serving as military instructors to others.

‘It has sometimes happened that, when I have been sitting, for recreation, at my window and looking out upon the public thoroughfare, Turks, sitting at my elbow, have pointed out to me passers-by who (they have told me) have been put in charge of the training of recruits on account of their own expertness in arms. I have then asked what these men’s nationality was—imagining to myself that champions who enjoyed such a reputation as masters of arms among the ‘Osmanlis must be Khurāsānis or Balkhis or Uzbeks or something of the kind (*nescio quos Parthos aut Bactrianos aut Massagetas*). Then I have been told that this one was a Hungarian, that one a Croat, the third a German. At this I have been much surprised; but I have imagined to myself that this outstanding proficiency in arms must have been the consequence of previous practice in the use of Western arms at home, and that these men must have been of noble birth and have received a liberal education and have seen military service [before their capture]. So I have proceeded to inquire from my Turkish informants whether they knew what station in life these men had occupied at home and what career they had followed. My Turkish friends have then searched their memories and told me that now they remembered: this one (they have said) would tell you that he had been, may be, a cook’s son, the second a novice in a monastery, the third a publican’s bar-tender. They had been captured in war-time or in time of truce, had been brought to Constantinople with other prize of war, and had thus entered the household of this or that Pasha.

‘At this point, I have become more surprised than ever, and have asked how on earth it could happen that they should turn into such doughty warriors. Then my Turkish friends have explained that the

masters into whose possession these prisoners had passed retained in their palaces distinguished men who were masters of arms and who were equipped with a profound experience and knowledge of the military art. To these masters the prisoners were handed over for instruction (if the masters judged, by their intuition of the prisoners' physique and character, that they were worth the trouble); and, under this tutelage, the men had made such rapid progress that they had outstripped all their contemporaries and had given good earnest of their own future prowess. There had followed campaigns in which they had done yeoman service and had brought back a reputation for distinguished valour on the unanimous testimony of their comrades in arms. Hence the positions of high authority to which they had attained.

'When I have heard this explanation, I have been cut to the heart by the thought of the great gulf that lies between this Turkish practice and our Western way of doing things. And I have envied the Turks this system of theirs. It is always the way of the Turks, whenever they come into possession of a man of uncommonly good parts, to rejoice and be exceeding glad, as though they had found a pearl of great price. And, in bringing out all that there is in him, they leave nothing undone that labour and thought can do—especially where they recognize military aptitude. Our Western way is different indeed! In the West, if we come into possession of a good dog or hawk or horse, we are delighted, and we spare nothing in our efforts to bring the creature to the highest perfection of which its kind is capable. In the case of a man, however—supposing that we happen to come upon a man of signal endowments—we do not take anything like the same pains, and we do not consider that his education is particularly our business. So we Westerners obtain many sorts of pleasure and service from a well-broken-in horse, dog and hawk, while the Turks obtain from a man whose character has been cultivated by education (*ex homine bonis moribus informato*) the vastly greater return that is afforded by the vast superiority and pre-eminence of Human Nature over the rest of the Animal Kingdom.'

The fine fruits which were the product of this wonderful system of human cultivation are depicted by Busbecq himself in a passage in the first of his four Turkish Letters, in which he is describing his visit to Sultan Süleymān's camp at Amasiyeh in A.D. 1555:

'The Sultan's head-quarters were crowded by numerous attendants, including many high officials. All the Cavalry of the Guard were there—the Sipāhīs, the Ghurebā, the Ulufajīs—and a large number of Janisaries. In all that great assembly, no single man owed his dignity to anything but his personal merits and bravery; no one is distinguished from the rest by his birth; and honour is paid to each man according to the nature of the duty and offices which he discharges. Thus there is no struggle for precedence, every man having his place assigned to him in virtue of the function which he performs. The Sultan himself assigns

¹ Busbecq, O. G.: 'Exclamatio, sive de Re Militari contra Turcam instituenda Consilium', in *A. Gisleii Busbequii Omnia quae Extant* (Leyden 1633, Elzevir), pp. 432-9.

to all their duties and offices, and in doing so pays no attention to wealth or the empty claims of rank, and takes no account of any influence or popularity which a candidate may possess; he only considers merit, and scrutinizes the character, natural ability, and disposition of each. Thus each man is rewarded according to his deserts, and offices are filled by men capable of performing them. In Turkey every man has it in his power to make what he will of the position into which he is born and of his fortune in life. Those who hold the highest posts under the Sultan are very often the sons of shepherds and herdsmen, and, so far from being ashamed of their birth, they make it a subject of boasting, and the less they owe to their forefathers and to the accident of birth the greater is the pride which they feel. They do not consider that good qualities can be conferred by birth or handed down by inheritance, but regard them partly as the gift of Heaven and partly as the product of good training and constant toil and zeal. Just as they consider that an aptitude for the arts, such as music or mathematics or geometry, is not transmitted to a son and heir, so they hold that character is not hereditary, and that a son does not necessarily resemble his father, but [that] his qualities are divinely infused into his bodily frame. Thus, among the Turks, dignities, offices, and administrative posts are the rewards of ability and merit; those who are dishonest, lazy and slothful never attain to distinction, but remain in obscurity and contempt. This is why the Turks succeed in all that they attempt and are a dominating race and daily extend the bounds of their rule. Our method is very different; there is no room for merit, but everything depends on birth, considerations of which alone open the way to high official position. On this subject I shall perhaps say more in another place, and you must regard these remarks as intended for your ears only.

'Now come with me and cast your eye over the immense crowd of turbaned heads. . . . What struck me as particularly praiseworthy in that great multitude was the silence and good discipline. There were none of the cries and murmurs which usually proceed from a motley concourse, and there was no crowding. Each man kept his appointed place in the quietest manner possible. The officers . . . were seated; the common soldiers stood up. The most remarkable body of men were several thousand Janissaries, who stood in a long line apart from the rest and so motionless that, as they were at some distance from me, I was for a while doubtful whether they were living men or statues, until, being advised to follow the usual custom of saluting them, I saw them all bow their heads in answer to my salutation.'¹

Such were the 'human watch-dogs' that were bred by the Ottoman 'shepherds of men' in order to perform the *tour de force* of keeping the whole of Orthodox Christendom in subjection and holding the whole of Western Christendom at bay. The twentieth-century Western student of history, who can no longer see the

¹ Original Latin text in *A. Gisleii Busbequii Omnia quae Extant* (Leyden 1633, Elzevir), pp. 99-102; English translation, here quoted, by Forster, E. S.: *The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq* (Oxford 1927, Clarendon Press), pp. 59-62.

Ottoman slave-household with a Busbecq's, or even with a Rycaut's, living eye, can still conjure up a vivid image of this long since defunct institution's former power by paying a visit to a building on the outskirts of the Seraglio grounds in Stamboul which was once the Orthodox Christian church of St. Irene before it became the Ottoman military museum. As the visitor's eye falls upon the apse, piled high with 'breasts' and 'backs', gorgets and cuisses, helmets and morions, and all the elaborate apparatus of sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century Western armour, lying in profusion, disregarded, just where the pieces happened to be thrown down when they were first brought in as spoils of war, perhaps three centuries or four centuries ago,¹ it is borne in upon the visitor's mind how easily the 'Osmanlis performed their stupendous *tour de force* so long as they kept themselves in training. 'The weapons of war' are 'perished'; but, by the same token, 'How are the mighty fallen'.²

The Ottoman system fell because of its 'grand disregard for human nature';³ but it was not the inhuman—or superhuman—severity of the training and discipline that brought this extraordinary institution to the ground. The Pādishāh's slave-household did not perish for lack of man-power, through failure to compel flesh and blood to continue to undergo its rigours. It perished by suffering the violence of the violent who took it by force, because every man pressed in to share its privileges.⁴ The evil that ruined it was not depletion but dilution. The 'fundamental customs' which the Pādishāh's will-power proved unable permanently to set at naught were the pretensions of birth and heredity; and the first breach was made by men who, having known what it was to be the Pādishāh's slaves themselves, were determined to secure the same boon for their sons. A concession had always been made to the principle of heredity in the privilege of enrolling their sons (though not their grandsons) among the Pādishāh's slave-boys which was already accorded to the Sipāhis of the Porte.⁵ On this analogy, Suleymān, towards the close of his reign, began to tolerate the enrolment of Janissaries' sons among the '*Ajem-oghlan*s; and his successor Selim II celebrated his advent to the throne by formally extending to the Janissaries the Sipāhis' privilege.⁶ This concession

¹ The 'Osmanlis themselves despised armour—perhaps on account of their own proficiency in the use of long-range missile weapons. (They inherited an aptitude for archery from their Nomad ancestors, and they took kindly to fire-arms.) The Janissaries wore no armour at all, and the Sipāhis seldom bothered to take any with them when they started on a campaign, since they counted upon being able to capture all that they wanted from the enemy. When they did wear armour acquired in this way, the Sipāhis made a point of choosing pieces that did not fit, in order to show that they were hermit-crabs.

² 2 Samuel i. 27.

³ See the passage quoted from Lybyer on pp. 33-4, above.

⁴ Matt. xi. 12; Luke xvi. 16.

⁵ See p. 34, footnote 2, above.

⁶ Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 120 and 69.

THE PROBLEM OF THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS 45 opened the floodgates; for, when once the Janissaries had thus pressed in, it became a psychological impossibility to keep the free Muslim feudal gentry out any longer.

In fact, between 1574 and 1595, admission to the Janissary Corps was made open to all free Muslims except Negroes;¹ and the sequel shows that inflation produces the same results, with the same rapidity, in a human as in a monetary currency. Down to Suleymān's death, the strength of the Janissary Corps was little more than 12,000, and the total strength of the whole slave-household, on the widest reckoning, was only about 80,000.² By A.D. 1598 there were 101,600 Janissaries, alone, on the pay-rolls—not to speak of 150,000 'supernumeraries' who were enrolled though unpaid, and an unknown quantity of honorary 'aspirants'.³ The 'supernumeraries' earned their living by engaging in trade, and there was a tendency for each *orta* to specialize in a particular craft.⁴ The consequence was a collapse of Ottoman military discipline and efficiency.

In psychological 'compensation' for the severity of their upbringing and the sobriety of their normal régime, the Janissaries, even in their best days, had always been prone, in peace-time, to

¹ d'Ohsson, op. cit., p. 328. There appears to have been some attempt, even at this stage, to reserve the higher posts in the civil administration for infidel-born graduates from the Schools of Pages. In A.D. 1582 a free Muslim-born 'Osmanli was refused the Grand Viziership on the ground of his birth. (Finlay, George: *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time* (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.), vol. v, p. 40, footnote 2.)

² Before inflation, the Ottoman Pādishāh's slave-household appears to have been constituted approximately as follows:

1. Boys in process of education:				
<i>Ich-oghlan</i>	.	.	.	2,000
<i>'Ajem-oghlan</i>	.	.	.	20,000
				<hr/> 22,000
2. <i>Ex-'ajem-oghlan</i> s in non-military service:				
Palace Gardeners	.	.	.	2,000
Other Palace menials	.	.	.	500
On hire to private employers	.	.	.	5,500
				<hr/> 8,000
3. <i>Ex-'ajem-oghlan</i> s in temporary naval service				2,000
4. Regular Army:				
Sipāhīs of the Porte	.	.	.	12,000—
Janissaries	.	.	.	12,000+
				<hr/> 24,000
5. Slave troopers maintained by the Sipāhīs of the three senior regiments of household cavalry at their own charges				30,000

On this showing, the Sultan's slave-household mustered 56,000 head excluding, and 86,000 head including, the slaves of slaves, while that part of the household which constituted the Regular Army mustered only 26,000 on the former reckoning and 56,000 on the latter. (Figures in Lybyer, op. cit., pp. 49, 80, 98, and 130.) The feudal cavalry, including the men-at-arms whom the fief-holders brought into the field with them, totalled something between 80,000 and 100,000 (Lybyer, op. cit., p. 104); but considerations of distance and expense made it impossible for the whole feudal force ever to be mobilized *in toto* for any given campaign. Thus the largest army which the Ottoman Power, at its zenith, was able to put into the field can hardly have reached six figures.

³ d'Ohsson, op. cit., pp. 330-2. In Rycaut's time there were 100,000 Janissaries on the rolls, of whom only 20,000 were effectives. (Rycaut, op. cit., pp. 171 and 191.)

⁴ d'Ohsson, op. cit., p. 332.

sudden outbreaks of temper and turbulence which contrasted oddly with their customary good behaviour; and on active service their contumacy compelled Selīm I to halt at Tabriz¹ and Süleymān to halt before Vienna,² as Alexander had been brought to a halt by his Macedonians on the west bank of the Ganges. Yet, in Busbecq's day, the discipline of the Janissaries was still so exemplary on the whole that they were employed as a military police to protect the Pādishāh's non-Muslim 'human cattle' against molestation from the free Muslim population of the Empire.³ By Rycaut's time, hardly more than a century later, these 'human watch-dogs' had 'returned to Nature' by reverting into wolves, who harried the Pādishāh's 'human cattle' instead of looking after them and keeping them in order. The Orthodox Christian subject population was now cheated of the *Pax Ottomanica* which had originally reconciled it to bearing the Ottoman yoke. The Pādishāh's *ra'iyeh* were being plundered and enslaved by the Pādishāh's own troops as though they were the inhabitants of enemy countries;⁴ and in A.D. 1683, when the Anatolian feudal cavalry were marching to join the Ottoman Army for the second—and last—Ottoman siege of Vienna, the villagers in the Rumelian provinces on the line of march burnt their houses and fled to the mountains rather than await their oppressors' passage.⁵ In Rycaut's time, the pristine Ottoman discipline still survived on active service, as Rycaut himself testifies from his own personal observation of the Ottoman Army which was operating against the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy in A.D. 1665.⁶ But in the great war of A.D. 1682–99 between the Ottoman Empire

¹ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 386, above.

² Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–3.

³ The Janissaries 'are scattered through almost every part of the Empire, either to garrison the fortifications against the enemy, or to protect the Christians and Jews from the violence of the mob. There is no district which is at all populous, and no city or town, that has not a detachment of Janissaries to protect the Christians and Jews and other helpless people from criminal assault'.—Busbecq, Letter I, Elzevir edition, p. 24.

⁴ Rycaut, *op. cit.*, pp. 170–1. See the passage quoted above in II. D (vii), vol. ii, on p. 265 in footnote 2.

⁵ Finlay, George: *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time* (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.), vol. v, p. 159.

⁶ 'In the Turkish camp, no brawls, quarrels, nor clamours are heard; no abuses are committed on the people by the march of their Army, all is bought and paid with money, as by travellers that are guests at an inn; there are no complaints by mothers of the rape of their virgin-daughters, no violences or robberies offered on the inhabitants' (Rycaut, *op. cit.*, p. 203). In the seventeenth-century English observer's opinion, 'this regulation . . . proceeds from nothing more than the strict prohibition of wine upon pain of death'. A twentieth-century observer, the writer of this Study, was equally struck by the exemplary behaviour of a Turkish force which reoccupied the Anatolian town of Ismid, in provocative circumstances, after its evacuation by the Greek Army in A.D. 1921. Though the Greek troops, before their departure, had massacred the Turkish civilian population, plundered their property, burnt their houses, and slaughtered pigs in their mosques, the victorious incoming Turkish troops refrained from making any reprisals upon the persons or property or churches of the Greek civilian population, which had been left at their mercy by the withdrawal of the Greek Army. In A.D. 1921, as in A.D. 1665, the penalty in the Turkish Army for drinking alcohol on active service was death.

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and the Powers of Western Christendom—a war which began with the second Ottoman siege of Vienna and ended with the first of a series of Ottoman territorial losses that continued thereafter until A.D. 1922—the superiority in discipline and efficiency passed definitively from the Ottoman to the Western camp; and in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, when Western armies rose to the level at which the Ottoman Army had stood two centuries earlier, the Ottoman Army itself degenerated into the kind of rabble that had done duty for a Western army in Busbecq's day.

The sequel to this decay of the Ottoman slave-household has brought to light the insuperable rigidity which was the fatal defect of its otherwise extraordinary qualities. For the 'Osmanlis have not found it possible to respond to the tremendous challenge from the West, to which the failure of their own indigenous institutions has exposed them, by reconditioning the peculiar social system which they had invented to meet their own special needs and which had served them so well, for a season, by carrying them to a dizzy height of military and political greatness. Once thrown out of gear, the Ottoman system has proved wholly incapable of being either repaired or remodelled; and since the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, at latest, its wreckage has been nothing but an incubus. Ever since they were first thrown on the defensive, the 'Osmanlis have been forced to seek salvation in a wholly different quarter and through wholly different measures. They have been compelled to take *Fas est et ab hoste doceri* for their motto, and to borrow for their own defence the alien arms and armour with which they have latterly been worsted by the once despised and long thereafter hated peoples of the West. This has been the inevitable path which all Ottoman reformers, for the past two and a half centuries, have had to follow, whether they have trodden the road of Westernization with personal repugnance or with personal enthusiasm.¹

As soon as the turn in the tide of war, which came in the latter part of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, had rendered the art of diplomacy at least as important as the art of war itself for the welfare of the Ottoman Empire in its intercourse with the West, the Pādishāh found himself constrained to create new official posts of great responsibility and power to be occupied by Orthodox

¹ The psychological history of Ottoman 'Westernization', which has been touched upon in II. D (v), vol. II, pp. 186–8, above, is a classic illustration of a famous Stoic text:

Ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ', ἡ πεπωμένη,
ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος,
ὡς ἔφομαι γ' ἄοκνος· ἦν δέ γε μὴ θέλω,
κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἔφομαι.

(Cleanthes in J. von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. I (Berlin and Leipzig 1905, Teubner), p. 118.)

Christian subjects of his who had not been transformed from 'human cattle' into 'human watch-dogs' through being conscripted and educated as pages in the Pādishāh's own palace. The imperious reason which dictated this revolutionary inversion of the established practice was that the traditional curriculum of the Ottoman schools for pages would leave a Greek boy-conscript destitute of the now precious knowledge of Western languages and Western ways, while this same knowledge would be acquired almost as a matter of course by the conscript-boy's rejected brother who had been allowed to be brought up at home and to follow a commercial career in his Greek father's footsteps.¹

The 'Osmanlis experienced their next great humiliation in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, when they suffered a signal defeat at the hands of the Muscovites—'poor relations' of the 'Osmanlis' own Orthodox Christian *ra'īyeh* who had stolen a march upon the 'Osmanlis themselves by their greater promptitude in borrowing the new Western military technique. The shock administered to the Pādishāh's self-esteem and sense of security by the peace-terms to which his Government was compelled to subscribe in A.D. 1774 at Kūchūk Qaynarjy, stimulated Sultan Selim III (*imperabat* A.D. 1789-1807) to drill a contingent of the free Muslim citizens of his Empire into the nucleus of a new model army on Western lines;² and this first essay in the 'Westernization' of the Ottoman military establishment was the thin end of a wedge which has since penetrated to the heart of Ottoman life until the process has been completed, on every plane and in every sphere, by President Mustafā Kemāl in our day.

The metamorphosis of the Ottoman body-social which Selīm began and which Mustafā Kemāl has carried to its logical conclusion is as wonderful a *tour de force*, in its way, as the creation of the Pādishāh's slave-household by an earlier line of great Ottoman statesmen. Yet a comparison of the respective results of these two performances brings out the relative triviality of the second. The makers of the Ottoman slave-household forged an instrument which enabled a tiny band of Nomads, who had been ejected from their native Steppe and cast away in an alien environment, not merely to survive and hold their own in this strange world, but to impose

¹ For the success with which the Phanariots qualified themselves, under the stimulus of penalization, for making the most of this opportunity, see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 223-5, above. The social adaptability of these Ottoman *ra'īyeh* throws the social rigidity of the 'Osmanlis themselves into strong relief. In A.D. 1793, Sultan Selim III, as part of his 'Westernization' programme (see below), established Ottoman diplomatic missions in Paris, Vienna, London, and Berlin and appointed Turks as ambassadors; but his Turks proved so incompetent in this unfamiliar environment that they had to be replaced by Greek *chargés d'affaires* (d'Ohsson, *op. cit.*, p. 573).

² Selim's bombardier corps was organized for him by Western renegades (d'Ohsson, *op. cit.*, p. 369).

peace and order upon a great Christian society which had gone into disintegration, and to threaten the life of a yet greater Christian society which has since cast its shadow over the whole of the rest of Mankind. Our latter-day Turkish statesmen have simply filled part of the vacuum which has been left in the Near East through the disappearance of the incomparable structure of the old Ottoman Empire by erecting on the desolate site a ready-made 'go-down' of a standard Western pattern in the shape of a Turkish national state. And in this commonplace 'villa-residence' the Turkish legatees of the arrested Ottoman Civilization are to-day content—like the Zionist legatees of a fossilized Syriac Civilization¹ next door and the Irish legatees of an abortive Far Western Christian Civilization² across the street—to live henceforth in comfortable nonentity as a welcome escape from the no longer tolerable status of being 'a peculiar people'.

The grateful acquiescence in this *pis aller*, which is the prevalent state of mind among Ottoman Turks of the present generation, gives some measure of the failure to which the old Ottoman institutions have been condemned in the long run by their intractable rigidity, in spite of their amazing efficacy to fulfil the precise functions for which they were originally designed. The denouement is almost ridiculous, yet it has only been achieved through long and painful travail. Selīm III's pioneer effort to supplant the long since useless Janissaries cost the bold reformer his throne and his life; and his cousin Mahmūd II, who shared Selīm's outlook and cherished his policy, had to keep his own counsel³ and watch for his opportunity for eighteen long years⁴ before he was able to emulate the

¹ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 252-4, above.

² See II. D (vii), Annex III, vol. ii, pp. 425-6, above.

³ Mahmūd ascended the throne at the age of 25 in succession to his brother Mustafā IV, who had been deposed and murdered after a reign of only a few months when he had served the Janissaries' turn as a pretext for deposing and murdering Selim.

⁴ In girding himself for the task of clearing away the debris of the slave-household, Sultan Mahmūd II did not have to start *ab initio*; for some of the dead wood had already been cut out by his predecessors. According to Finlay (in op. cit., vol. v, pp. 35-7), the *devrîshme* or rotational conscription of Ottoman Christian children fell into disuse during the reign of Sultan Mehmed IV (*imperabat* A.D. 1649-87); and Rycout (in op. cit., first published in A.D. 1668) speaks of this institution as obsolete in several passages (on pp. 80, 191, and 197). In another passage, however (on pp. 40-1), Rycout states that about 2,000 boy-conscripts for the *Ajemi-oghlan* were still being recruited annually, chiefly from the Morea and Albania. Possibly he is here following some informant in the Seraglio who was describing things as they had been one or two decades back. That the *devrîshme* had actually been abandoned before the end of Mehmed IV's reign is indicated—though this is only presumptive evidence—by the fact that two out of the three extramural preparatory schools for *Ich-oghlan* were closed by İbrâhîm I and the two lowest of the six halls inside the Seraglio by Mehmed IV thereafter. In d'Ohsson's day, none but the Galata Seray remained; and the Sultans, who had once spent their lives in their pages' company, now only visited the school once in every two or three years. Vestiges of the original discipline and curriculum survived; and the school still provided pages for the Pâdishâh's personal domestic service; but the promotion of pages to be high officials, or even lifeguardsmen, had long since been abandoned (d'Ohsson, op. cit., pp. 47-53). Thus Sultan Mahmūd II found part of his work already done for him; and even the idea of deliberately destroying the Janissaries was not new. Rycout declares his

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greatest of his subjects by extirpating the Janissaries in 1826 as the Mamlûks had been extirpated in 1811 by Mehmed 'Ali.¹

The Spartans

If it is possible that the Ottoman slave-household, at its zenith, came as near as might be to realizing the social ideal of Plato²—and this on the Hellenic philosopher's own native soil—it is certain that Plato himself, when he conceived his Utopia, was inspired by the actual institutions of the Spartan city-state: a Hellenic community which was the greatest among the Great Powers of the Hellenic World in Plato's day. A direct comparison between the Spartan and the Ottoman system reveals a striking similarity; and this is assuredly attributable, not to any mimesis of the society which happened to be prior by the society which happened to be posterior in the accidental sequence of chronology, but rather to a natural conformity between the responses which were made to a virtually identic challenge by two different communities acting independently of, and unbeknown to, one another.³ On the point of similarity, there is, of course, a superficial contrast between the Spartan and the Ottoman achievement in mere material scale. The Spartans succeeded, by means of their 'peculiar institution', in making themselves masters of about two-fifths of the Peloponnese, whereas the entire Morea constituted no more than a fraction of the single Ottoman province of Rumili. Yet, when all the relevant factors, human as well as physical, are taken into account, the Spartan achievement would appear to have been at least as great a *tour de force* as the Ottoman. At any rate, the Spartans were hated quite as intensely as the 'Osmanlis were by their 'human cattle', while

belief that, in his time, the Janissaries were being 'studiously destroyed, . . . so as to be able to lay a foundation of a new discipline', by the policy of the Viziers of the House of Köprülü; and that the War of Candia (A.D. 1645-69) had been prolonged, and the Austrian War of A.D. 1663-4 precipitated, with this purpose in view (Rycaut, op. cit., Bk. III, ch. viii, pp. 197-9).

¹ For Mehmed 'Ali's massacre of the Mamlûks, see p. 31, above. Mehmed 'Ali enticed his victims into the Citadel of Cairo and had them shot down there. Mahmûd's destruction of the sole Ottoman regular forces, such as they were, in 1826, when the Greek Revolutionary War was at its height and a new Russo-Turkish War was in the offing, was a courageous act which was justified by results. For the Ottoman Empire managed to survive the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-9; and thereafter, with the incubus of the old slave-household removed at last, Sultan Mahmûd was able with impunity to call in a Prussian military mission (in which Hellmuth von Moltke won his spurs; see his *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei* (Berlin 1841, Mittler)). By 1843, the Turkish Army had been reorganized on nineteenth-century Western lines. The bombardment of the Janissaries and the shooting-down of the Mamlûks were as brutal as Peter the Great's suppression of the Streltzy. Yet it would be false sentiment to waste pity on these military victims of 'Westernization'. If a watch-dog who is clearly past his work goes mad into the bargain, there is no doubt that he has to be shot, however faithful and efficient he may have been in his day.

² See the passage quoted from Lybyer on p. 33, above.

³ The nature of the Spartan response has been indicated, by anticipation, in vol. i, on p. 24, and vol. ii, p. 48, above.

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the numerical ratio of 'human cattle' to 'human watch-dogs' appears to have been as high in Laconia as it was in the Ottoman Empire.¹

When we look into the origins of the Spartan system, we find that the Spartans, like the 'Osmanlis, were confronted with the necessity of performing their *tour de force*, and equipping themselves for the task with their 'peculiar institution', because, at an earlier stage in the course of their history, they had taken a peculiar turning. We have seen that the 'Osmanlis were derived from a band of Nomads which had parted company from the common run of Nomad hordes on the Steppe and had been cast up into the exotic environment of a sedentary society. In a similar fashion, the Spartans parted company, at a certain point in their history, from the common run of Hellenic city-state communities.

The Spartans made a peculiar response to the common challenge which was presented to all Hellenic communities in the eighth century B.C., when, in consequence of the immediately antecedent course of Hellenic social development,² the extension of the area under cultivation in the homelands of the Hellenic Society in Peninsular Greece and in the Archipelago had begun to bring in diminishing returns while the population of Hellas was rapidly increasing in numbers. The 'normal' solution which was found for this common problem of eighth-century Hellenic life was the further extension of the total arable area in Hellenic hands by the discovery and conquest of new territories overseas; and this solution proved satisfactory for two reasons. In the first place, the new lands could be conquered—and held—without an excessive military effort from barbarian 'Natives' who were less efficient than the Hellenic intruders in the art of war; and, in the second place, the lands thus conquered could be made to yield a higher economic return to Hellenic cultivators than they had yielded to their previous occupants because the superiority of the colonists over the 'Natives' in arms was only one manifestation of a superiority all round which extended to other branches of social activity, including agriculture. Even where the 'Natives' were not exterminated by the Hellenic conquerors but were assimilated—partly by force and partly by the attraction of a higher civilization—into the new-comers' body social, there would be room in these new Hellenic colonies overseas, under Hellenic husbandry, for an aggregate increase of population without any lowering of the existing standards of living of the diverse elements from which the population was recruited. This

¹ For an estimate of this ratio in the Ottoman Empire and in Laconia, see Annex III, below.

² The chain of cause and effect which can be detected here is examined further in III. B, on pp. 120-1, below.

was how the borders of the Hellenic World were gradually enlarged, from the eighth to the sixth century B.C., by the creation of new Chalcidian countrysides overseas in the territories of Chalcidian colonies like Leontini or Tauromenium in Sicily or like Methone or Torone in Thrace,¹ or a new Corinthian countryside in the territory of Syracuse, or a new Megarian countryside in the territory of Calchedon.² In the galaxy of new Hellenic city-states that came into existence as a result of this general movement of overseas expansion, there was one foundation, Tarentum, which claimed a Spartan origin; but even if this claim was in accordance with historical fact, the case of Tarentum was unique. Tarentum was the only Hellenic city overseas which even purported to be a Spartan colony; and this Tarentine tradition merely points the truth that, in the main, the Spartans sought to solve the common eighth-century Hellenic population-problem, not along the common lines of overseas colonization, but in their own peculiar way.

When the Spartans found even their broad and fertile ploughlands in the vale of the Eurotas³ too narrow for a growing population, they did not turn their eyes to the sea, like the Chalcidians or Corinthians or Megarians. The sea is not visible either from Sparta city or from any point on the Spartan plain or even from the heights that immediately surround it.⁴ The natural feature which dominates the Spartan landscape is the towering mountain-range of Taygetus, which rises so sheer from the western edge of the plain that its face seems almost perpendicular, while its line is so straight and so continuous that it gives the impression of a wall. This wall-like aspect of Taygetus attracts the eye to the Langádha: a gorge which cleaves the range at right angles as though the titanic architect of plain and mountain had expressly designed this one apparent break in an otherwise uniformly impassable barrier in order to provide his people with a sally-port. When the Spartans began,

¹ For the agricultural colonization overseas which was carried out by the people of Chalcis, and which was typical of a movement in which many other city-states of the Hellenic homeland took part, see I. B (ii), vol. i, p. 24, and II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 42-3, above.

² For the relative agricultural value of the Calchedonian and Byzantine territories and the consequent diversity of Calchedonian and Byzantine fortunes, see II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 43-8, above.

³ Sparta, which means etymologically 'the sown land', was perhaps the name of the plain which is dominated from the west by the heights of Frankish and Ottoman Mistrà, and from the east by the heights of Minoan Therapne, before the term was confined to denoting the unwallled Hellenic city-state in the midst of the plain which made the name of Sparta famous after Therapne was forgotten and before Mistrà was heard of. (See Toynbee, A. J., in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. xxxiii (London 1913, Macmillan), p. 246.) Similarly, Argos meant the arable land dominated by the Minoan fortresses of Mycenae and Midea and Tiryns before it became the name of a Hellenic city-state.

⁴ Between the plain of Sparta and the sea-coast, the River Eurotas has to wind its way through a tangle of hills; and in the panorama of the plain, as seen from the crown of the citadel of Mistrà, it is impossible to detect either the point where the river enters the plain or the point where it leaves it. The plain is shut in by hills in every quarter, as far as the eye can see.

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in the eighth century B.C., to feel the pinch of population-pressure, they lifted up their eyes unto the hills¹ and beheld the Langádhā and sought their help in the pass through the mountains, as their neighbours, under the same spur of Necessity, were seeking theirs in the passage over the sea. At this first parting of the ways, help did come to the Spartans from the lord² Apollo of Amyclae and the lady Athana of the Brazen House. The first Messeno-Spartan War (*circa* 736-720 B.C.), which was contemporary with the first Hellenic settlements on the Thracian and Sicilian coasts, left the Spartan victors in possession of broader conquered lands in Hellas than the Chalcidian colonists won overseas at Leontini or the Spartans' own reputed colonists at Tarentum. But the Presiding Genius of Sparta, who led her and who did 'not suffer' her 'foot to be moved'³ when once she had reached her Messenian goal, did not thereby 'preserve' her 'from all evil'.⁴ On the contrary, the superhuman—or inhuman—fixity of Sparta's subsequent posture, like the mythical doom of Lot's wife, was manifestly a curse and not a blessing.

The Spartans' peculiar troubles began as soon as the First Messeno-Spartan War had ended in a Spartan victory; for to conquer the Messenians in war was a less difficult task for the Spartans than to hold them down in peace-time. These conquered Messenians were no barbarous Thracians or Sikels, but Hellenes of like culture, and like passions, with the Spartans themselves: all but their equals in war and perhaps more than their equals in numbers. The First Messeno-Spartan War (*circa* 736-720 B.C.) was child's-play compared to the Second (*circa* 650-620 B.C.), in which the subject Messenians—tempered by adversity and filled with shame and rage at having submitted to a fate by which no other Hellenes had allowed themselves to be overtaken—now rose in arms against their Spartan rulers and fought far harder and longer, in this second bout, to recover their freedom than they had fought in the first bout to preserve it. Their tardy heroism failed, in the end, to avert a second Spartan victory; and, after this unprecedentedly stubborn and exhausting war, the victors treated the vanquished with unprecedented severity. Yet, in the long view of the Gods, the Messenian insurgents had secured their revenge on Sparta, in the sense in which Hannibal was to have his revenge on Rome. The Second Messeno-Spartan War changed the whole rhythm of Spartan life and deflected the whole course of Spartan history. It was one of those wars in which the iron enters into the survivors' souls. It was so terrible an experience that it left Spartan life fast bound in misery and iron, and it 'side-tracked' Spartan evolution into a

¹ Psalm lxxi. 1.

³ Psalm lxxi. 3.

² Psalm lxxi. 2.

⁴ Psalm lxxi. 7.

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blind alley. And since the Spartans were never able to forget what they had gone through, they were never able to relax, and therefore never able to extricate themselves from the impasse of their post-war reaction.

The relations of the Spartans with their human environment in Messenia passed through the same ironic vicissitudes as the relations of the Esquimaux with their physical environment in the Arctic Zone. In either case we have the spectacle of a community which ventures to grapple with an environment that daunts this community's neighbours, in order to wring from this excessively formidable enterprise an exceptionally rich reward. In the first phase, this act of audacity seems to be justified by results. The Esquimaux find better hunting on the Arctic ice than their less adventurous Indian cousins can find on the North American prairies;¹ the Spartans, in the First Messeno-Spartan War, win richer lands from their fellow-Hellenes across the mountains than the contemporary Chalcidian colonists can win from barbarians across the sea. But in the next phase the original—and irrevocable—act of audacity brings its ineluctable penalty. The conquered environment now takes its audacious conqueror captive. The Esquimaux become prisoners of the Arctic climate and have to shape their lives according to its exacting dictates down to the smallest detail.² The Spartans, having conquered Messenia in the First War in order to live unto themselves, are constrained, in the Second War and ever after, to give up their lives to the task of keeping Messenia. They live as the obedient humble servants of their own dominion over Messenia from this time forth for evermore; and this servitude of the Spartiate 'Peers' (*ῥῆμιοι*) is as rigorous a bondage as that of the Ottoman Pādishāh's slave-household (*qullar*).

The Spartans equipped themselves for performing their *tour de force* by the same method as the 'Osmanlis'. They adapted existing institutions to fulfil new needs. But whereas the 'Osmanlis' were able to draw upon the rich social heritage of Nomadism, 'the [latter-day] Spartan institutions are actually built up upon primeval and altogether primitive foundations, which have been adapted with amazing dexterity to the [peculiar] requirements of the Spartan conqueror-state.'³

The Spartans were descended from Greek-speaking barbarians belonging to the so-called 'Dorian' stratum of the external proletariat of the vanished Minoan World: a stratum which had descended upon the shores of the Aegean, out of the European hinterland, in

¹ See the passage quoted from Steensby on p. 4, above.

² See pp. 5-7, above.

³ Nilsson, M. P.: 'Die Grundlagen des spartanischen Lebens', in *Klio* vol. xii (Leipzig 1912, Dieterich), p. 308.

a kind of human avalanche, at the climax of the post-Minoan and pre-Hellenic Völkerwanderung, about the turn of the thirteenth and the twelfth centuries B.C.¹ The primeval institutions which the forefathers of the Spartans had brought with them were the common social heritage of all these 'Dorian' interlopers from the back of beyond; and there were other Hellenic communities of 'Dorian' origin besides the Spartans—e.g. the 'Dorian' conquerors of the heart of the Minoan World in Crete—who retained these primitive institutions down to a late date in Hellenic history. The Cretan 'Dorians', however, seem to have remained socially primitive mainly out of inertia, and to have done little to adapt their inherited social tradition to the conditions of the new social environment in which their conquest of the Minoans had placed them.² On the other hand, the primitive 'Dorian' heritage was sloughed off altogether at an early date by those 'Dorians' who had established themselves on the Isthmus of Corinth and in the Argolid and on the islands and peninsulas off the south-west corner of Anatolia and in other regions which, instead of remaining, like Crete, untouched by the main currents of Hellenic history, became focuses for the development of the new Hellenic Civilization.³ When 'Dorian' Corinth or Sicyon or Rhodes first come into the light of Hellenic history, they display no more trace of primitiveness than contemporary 'Ionic' communities like Athens or Miletus. 'Dorian' Sparta, however, dealt with her primitive heritage in a different manner from either 'Dorian' Crete or 'Dorian' Rhodes.⁴

'The way . . . in which those primitive institutions, which otherwise vanished in all Greek communities before the face of the rising [Hellenic] culture, were made to serve as the corner-stones of the Spartan organism, is something which exacts from us the deepest admiration.'⁵

'In this adaptation, one cannot refuse to discern something which is more than the mere result of an automatic development. The methodical and purposeful way in which everything has been made to lead towards one single goal forces us to see here the intervention of a consciously shaping hand. . . . The existence of one man, or of several men working in the same direction, who have remodelled the primitive institutions into the *Agôgê* and the *Kosmos*, is a necessary hypothesis.'⁶

¹ See I. C (ii) (b), vol. i, pp. 92-3 and 100-1, above.

² For some account of the primitive 'Dorian' institutions as they lingered on in Crete, see Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. II, ch. vii, 1271 B-1272 B, and Strabo (following Ephorus) Bk. X, pp. 480-4. Compare the survival of Nomadic institutions among the Egyptian Mamlûks. (See pp. 30-1, above.)

³ Compare the disappearance of the original Nomadic institutions of the Magyars after their settlement in Hungary and their subsequent absorption into the body social of Western Christendom.

⁴ For the differentiation in the fortunes of the various Hellenic city-states of 'Dorian' origin in the course of Hellenic history, see II. D (iii), Annex, vol. ii, pp. 395-9, above.

⁵ Nilsson, op. cit., p. 340.

⁶ Nilsson, op. cit., loc. cit.

Hellenic tradition attributed not only the reconstruction of the Lacedaemonian Society after the Second Messeno-Spartan War—a reconstruction which made Sparta what she was and what she remained ever after until she collapsed—but also all the antecedent and less abnormal events in Spartan social and political history to 'Lycurgus'. But 'Lycurgus' was a god;¹ and modern Western scholars, in search for a human author of the 'Lycurgeoan' system, have been inclined to find their man in Chilon, a Spartan Overseer (*ἐφορος*) who left a reputation as a sage and who appears to have held office about 550 B.C.² Perhaps we shall not go far wrong if we regard the 'Lycurgeoan' system as the cumulative work of a series of Spartan statesmen during something like a century, dating from the outbreak of the Second Messeno-Spartan War, on the analogy of the genesis of the Ottoman system, which we know to have been the work of a series of statesmen that began, perhaps, with Sultan 'Osmān himself and ended with Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror.

In the Spartan system, as in the Ottoman, the outstanding feature—the feature which accounts alike for the system's astonishing efficiency and for its fatal rigidity and for its consequent breakdown—was its 'grand disregard for human nature';³ and, when we compare the two systems from this standpoint, we find that while in some respects the 'Lycurgeoan' *agōgē* set human nature at defiance rather less truculently than the Ottoman slave-household, in other ways it challenged it still more provocatively.

The *agōgē* did not go so far as the slave-household in ignoring the customary claims of birth and heredity; and the free citizen landholders of Sparta were in exactly the opposite situation from the free Muslim landed gentry of the Ottoman Empire. Whereas the Ottoman Muslims were excluded from any share in the government of the Empire by rule, and the descendants of the Pādishāh's slaves were debarred from inheriting their fathers' or grandfathers' positions by the practice of conferring upon them the doubtful

¹ 'The famous name of Lycurgus has attracted to itself the whole series of developments that make up Spartan history: *συνουκισμός*, ephorate, rhetra, *γῆς ἀναδασμός*. The Greeks always imagined Athene springing adult out of the head of Zeus: the idea of growth they had not grasped. Accordingly, we find the [Spartan] *νομοθέτης* ascribed to the most varied epochs (which was easy, since he never lived in any generation of men). The ninth century B.C. was the favourite estimate, for this put him well at the back of Spartan history, and it is easier to antedate than to postdate political inventions. But each author connects him with the development that loomed largest in his own mind; and Aristotle, at least (*Politics*, 1270 A, 1-5), dates him after the close of the Messenian Wars.' All the time, 'Lycurgus was a god, or at least the epithet of one. We are surely bound to follow the opinion of the Pythia, even though cautiously expressed (Herodotus, Bk. I, ch. 65). The fact that in Sparta he had a *ναός*, not a *ἱεῖον*, clinches the matter: *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καὶ Λυκούργῳ τῷ θεμένῳ τοὺς νόμους οἷα δὴ θεῷ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοὺς ἱερὸν*. (Pausanias, *Descriptio Graeciae*, Bk. III, ch. 16, § 6).' Toynbee, *op. cit.*, footnotes on pp. 259 and 256.

² For Chilon, see Guy Dickins in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. xxxii (London 1912, Macmillan).

³ See pp. 34 and 44, above.

honour of manumission and enfeoffment, virtually the whole burden of maintaining the Spartan dominion over Messenia was imposed on the free-born children of free-born Spartiates. At the same time, within the Spartiate citizen-body itself, the principle of equality was not only well-established but was carried to great lengths.

Though there was not an equalization of wealth, every Spartiate 'Peer' held from the State one of the fiefs or allotments (κληροί) of equal magnitude—or equal productivity—into which the arable land of Messenia had been divided up after the Second Messeno-Spartan War; and each of these allotments, which was cultivated by the labour of Messenians bound to the soil as serfs (εἰλωτες), was calculated to support a Spartiate 'Peer' and his family, on a 'spartanly' frugal standard of living, without their having to labour with their own hands.¹ Accordingly, every Spartiate 'Peer', however poor, was economically in a position to devote his whole time and energy to the art of war; and since permanent and perpetual military training and service were also incumbent upon every Spartiate 'Peer', however rich he might be, the residual inequality of wealth² was not, at Sparta, reflected in any substantial difference between the rich man's and the poor man's way of life.

In the matter of hereditary rank, the Spartan nobility appear to have retained no political privilege denied to commoners except eligibility to the Council of State (γερονσία). For the rest, they were absorbed into the rank and file of the 'Peers'; and, in particular, the three hundred knights (ἵππεις) of Sparta were no longer, under the 'Lycurgeoan' system, either a club of nobles or a mounted force. They had become a *corps d'élite* of heavy infantrymen which was recruited by merit from all the 'Peers', who competed eagerly for admission.³ The most striking manifestation of the equalitarian spirit of the 'Lycurgeoan' system was the status to which it reduced the Kings.⁴ Though the Kings continued to succeed to the throne by hereditary right, the one substantial power which they retained

¹ The average number of Helot families per Spartiate allotment seems to have been seven (see Herodotus, Bk. IX, ch. 28, § 2). For the amount of the annual rent in kind (that is, in barley, wine, and oil) which a Spartiate 'Peer' was supposed to draw from his allotment, see Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. viii.

² There was a residual inequality of wealth, as between one Spartiate 'Peer' and another, in spite of the equality of the public allotments, because there was private property in land in the older territories of Sparta which had belonged to her before her acquisition of Messenia; and the distribution of this freehold land among Spartan citizens naturally was and remained unequal—in spite of a customary prejudice against the buying and selling even of freehold land, which seems to have grown up by analogy with the non-negotiability of the public allotments (see Heraclides Ponticus, ii. 7, in Müller's *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, vol. ii, p. 211).

³ See Xenophon, *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*, ch. iv, and the passage from Plutarch's *Apophthegmata Laconica* which is quoted on p. 65, in footnote 2, below.

⁴ There was a double kingship at Sparta, which was hereditary in two separate dynasties, each of which had to be represented in the person of one of the two kings reigning simultaneously at any given moment.

was the military command on active service. Otherwise, apart from certain ceremonial duties and privileges which were less important than picturesque, the reigning Kings, as well as all other members of the two royal families, had to submit to the same exacting and life-long discipline as ordinary 'Peers'. As heirs apparent, they received the same education; and their succession to the throne brought them no exemption.

Thus, within the fraternity of the Spartiate 'Peers', differences of birth and of hereditary privilege counted, under the 'Lycurgeoan' system, for little or nothing; and, although one normal qualification for admission into this fraternity was free Spartiate birth, no candidates for admission would ever have dreamt of saying—even within themselves, let alone in public—the Spartan equivalent of 'We have Abraham to our father';¹ for Spartiate birth was no guarantee of promotion to the coveted though onerous status of a 'Peer'. Indeed, Spartiate birth, though normally required, was not a *sine qua non*. Spartiate birth simply condemned a child (if it were not reprieved by being rejected as a weakling after birth and put out to die of exposure)² to undergo the ordeal of a Spartan education; and this ordeal merely entitled a boy to compete for a place in the fraternity of the 'Peers' when he came of age. A child's response to this ordeal of education counted for more than his birth in the last resort. There were Spartiates born who failed to give satisfaction under the educational test and who were therefore eventually refused admission to the fraternity of 'Peers' and were left to weep and gnash their teeth in outer darkness in the unenviable status of 'Inferiors'. Conversely, there were cases—though these were evidently rare—in which non-Spartiate boys were allowed to undergo the Spartan education; and if these 'Alien Boys' (μόθακες) acquitted themselves well, they appear to have been no less eligible for enrolment among the 'Peers' than their Spartiate class-mates.³

To this extent the Spartan system, like the Ottoman, ignored the claims of birth and heredity; and there were also points, as has been mentioned by anticipation, in which the God Lycurgus went still farther than the Sultan 'Osmān in defiance of 'human nature'. Whereas, for example, the Ottoman social reformer was content to conscript children who had been born in wedlock in the ordinary way, the Spartan ventured to interfere with marriage itself in the

¹ Matt. iii. 9.

² The new-born child's fate was decided not by its father, as in most Hellenic communities, but by the public authorities (Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. xvi).

³ For these so-called μόθακες, see Phylarchus apud Athenaeum, vi. 271, 2; Plutarch, *Instituta Laconica*, 22; Aelian, *Variae Historiae*, xii. 43. The μόθακες were apparently recruited both from non-Spartan Lacedaemonians (Helots or Perioeci) and from non-Lacedaemonian foreigners. It will be seen that they corresponded in nature as well as in name to the Ottoman 'Ajem-oghians.

interests of eugenics, and sought—with greater audacity but also with greater logic—to do what he could to obtain the kind of human material that he wanted, by breeding, before the time came for selection. In the second place, the Spartan conscription, for the class that was subject to it (that is to say, for all free-born Spartiates who had not been exposed after birth), was universal, whereas the 'Osmanlis only conscripted a portion of the offspring of their 'human cattle' to be trained as 'human watch-dogs', and this every fourth year and in different provinces in rotation. In the third place, the Spartans took the children from their homes and put them into the educational mill at the age of seven; the 'Osmanlis not until the age of twelve and upwards. Finally, the Spartans not only anticipated the 'Osmanlis in conscripting and training girls as well as boys, but they went far farther towards an identical treatment of both sexes. For Spartan girls, as well as for Spartan boys, conscription was universal; and the Spartan girls were not trained in special female accomplishments, nor kept in seclusion from the men, like the girls in the female section of the Ottoman Pādishāh's slave-household. Spartan girls, like Spartan boys, were trained on a competitive system in athletics; and girls, like boys, competed naked in public before a male audience.¹

In the matter of breeding human stock, the Spartan system² pursued two distinct aims simultaneously. It aimed both at quantity and at quality. It secured quantity (proportionately to the miniature scale on which the Spartan Society was built) by addressing itself to the individual male adult Spartiate and seeking to influence his behaviour through inducements and through penalties. The deliberate and confirmed bachelor was penalized by the State and was insulted by his juniors for his shameful lack of public spirit. On the other hand, the father of three sons was exempt from mobilization, and the father of four from all obligations towards the State.³ At the same time, quality was secured by keeping alive, with

¹ This spectacle, which would have routed the most redoubtable Janissary and have given him a lasting moral shock, was really, of course, a demonstration of the remarkable degree of sexual self-control to which, under the 'Lycurgeoan' system, it was possible for the Spartan Society to attain. In this matter, our twentieth-century Western Society is still far from having reached the Spartan level; but that level has been attained, and perhaps surpassed, by the Japanese.

² See Xenophon, *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*, ch. i; Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. xv; Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 325-35.

³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1270 B, 1-5. Aristotle points out, in *loc. cit.*, that where, as in Lacedaemon, the number of allotments is limited, large families entail a surplus of pauper male population; but this, of course, was just what the Spartan State required. To meet the incalculable losses of war, Sparta needed a standing reserve of military unemployed. In the Spartiate citizen-body the superfluous souls which, in other Hellenic states, would have been absorbed into industry or commerce, or would have been drawn off by emigration, were first unfitted for either agriculture or any other gainful occupation by being compelled to go through the Spartan military education, and were then retained at home to starve. On the Spartan system, the maintenance of the 'Peers' (*δμοιοι*) entailed the existence of 'Inferiors' (*ὑπομεικτορες*). The Ottoman system showed

a conscious and definite eugenic purpose, certain primitive social customs governing sexual intercourse which appear to have been relics of a sex-group system of social organization antecedent to the system represented by marriage and the family. A Spartiate husband won popular approval, instead of exposing himself to public condemnation, if he took pains to improve the quality of his wife's progeny by arranging that her children should be gotten upon her by a sire who was a better man—or human animal—than her husband himself. And it even appears that a Spartiate wife could arrange this on her own account with impunity if her husband would not take the initiative in providing her with a substitute for himself when he was manifestly below par. The spirit in which the Spartans practised their eugenics is conveyed by Plutarch in a passage¹ which finds its echo in Busbecq's observations, quoted above,² on the social philosophy of the 'Osmanlis. According to Plutarch, the Spartan social reformer

'saw nothing but vulgarity and vanity in the sexual conventions of the rest of Mankind, who take care to serve their bitches and their mares with the best sires that they can manage to borrow or hire, yet lock their women up and keep them under watch and ward in order to make sure that they shall bear children exclusively to their husbands—as though this were a husband's sacred right even if he happens to be feeble-minded or senile or diseased. This convention ignores the two obvious truths that bad parents produce bad children and good parents good children, and that the first people to feel the difference will be those who possess the children and who have to bring them up.'

In the matter of educating³ the Spartiate children which had been bred in this way, with the ultimate object of selecting the best of them for enrolment among the 'Peers' and endowment with public allotments, the Spartan system again availed itself of the relics of a pre-familial system of social organization in which the child who no longer needed his mother's personal care was educated, not by learning his father's business in a patriarchal household, but by successive membership in a series of 'human packs', in which he consorted, at each stage, with the other children of the tribe who were of his own age and sex. The 'Lycurgean' reform adopted this

itself more statesmanlike, as well as more humane, in taking care that every child which passed through it should learn a trade besides receiving the literary and athletic education required for making administrators and soldiers, and further in arranging thereafter that the adult *'Ajem-oghians*, who were on the waiting-list for admission to the Janissary Corps and who had to be kept in waiting in order to maintain the necessary military reserve, should be enabled meanwhile to earn their livings in some public or private employment.

¹ Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. xv.

² See p. 42 above.

³ For the Spartan education, see Xenophon, *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*, chs. ii and iv; Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*, chs. xvi and xvii; Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-25 ('Altersklassen und Syskenien'); Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-2.

'age-class' system and at the same time adapted it to its own educational purpose by introducing a cross-division in which children of all ages were brought together in one group, so that the elder children might assist in training the younger.¹ These juvenile 'droves' (*ἀγέλαι*) were reproductions of, and preparations for, the adult 'messes' (*φιδίτια*), which were associations of 'Peers' belonging to different 'age-classes', from the highest to the lowest, among the forty 'year-classes' (from the twenty-first to the sixtieth year inclusive) that were subject to military service.² The climax of a Spartan boy's thirteen years of education in a 'drove' was his candidature, at the end of his twentieth year, for entry into one of the 'messes', which was the sole avenue of admission into the fraternity of the 'Peers'. Entry into a 'mess' could only be secured by co-option; and a single 'black ball' entailed the rejection of the candidate.³ A successful candidate, once co-opted, remained an active member of his 'mess' for forty years unless he either failed to make his prescribed contribution, in victuals and money, towards the

¹ For this cross-division (a Spartan innovation upon the primitive 'Dorian' institutions, as is indicated by the fact that there is no trace of it in 'Dorian' Crete), see Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 323-4. The 'age-classes' at Sparta were called 'herds' (*βοῦαι*), the cross-divisions 'droves' (*ἀγέλαι*) and 'hordes' (*ἵλας*). These vertical cross-divisions, which included boys of all ages, evidently played a more important part than the 'age-classes' in the life and education of a Spartiate boy. In the 'drove' the junior boys were under the authority of one of the senior boys who was appointed 'horde-leader' (*ἡδραρχος*) and who had much the same duties of exercising discipline and rights of exacting 'fagging' from his juniors as a 'prefect' in an English 'public school'. (The 'prefect system' also existed in the Ottoman chambers of *Ajem-Oghlans*: see Withers, R.: *Description of the Grand Signor's Court* (London 1650, Martin and Ridley), pp. 65-7.) To supervise the education of the 'fags' by the 'prefects' in the 'droves' and 'hordes' was the informal business of every Spartiate 'Peer' and the official business of the Director of Public Education (*παιδονόμος*)—an office which, at Sparta, was a step to the highest political career (Xenophon, *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*, ch. ii). Though Spartan boys, like Ottoman *Ajem-oghans*, were taught to read and write (Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. xvi), their education was otherwise almost exclusively moral and physical. There was no counterpart, in the Spartan system, to the literary education that was given to the Ottoman *Ich-oghans*, in spite of the fact that Sparta lay in the midst of a Hellenic World whose posthumous fame rests to-day upon the higher intellectual education which it evolved. In this most un-Hellenic trait, Sparta showed that, in accepting the 'Lycurean' system, she had sold her birthright. Thenceforward, Sparta was in Hellas but not of it.

² For this institution, see Xenophon, *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*, ch. v. The Spartan name for a 'mess' was *φιδίτιον* and for mess-mates *σώκηνος* ('occupants of the same tent'). In popular Greek parlance, the Spartiate mess was called a *συσσίτιον*; a word which bears its meaning on its face. The 'mess' was the basis, but not the unit, of the military formation. The smallest Spartan military unit, which was called the 'company' of sworn comrades (*ἐνομορία* = *Eidgenossenschaft*), was apparently a body of 40 men representing the 40 'year-classes' subject to service; and each of these 'companies' seems to have been made up of 2 'messes'. After the reorganization of the Lacedaemonian Army in the fifth century B.C. (see Annex III, below), when the proportion of Spartiates to Perioeci was reduced from 5:5 to 4:6, the 2 Spartiate 'messes' in each Spartiate 'company' appear to have contained no more than 16 men each, the complement of 8 additional men, which was needed to bring the 'company' up to its full strength of 40, being now provided by the Perioeci. Under this organization, the 40 adult 'year-classes' were presumably consolidated into 8 blocks of 5 'year-classes' each, so that, in every 5 years, each of the 2 'messes' in a 'company' would liberate 2 time-expired men and replace them by 2 recruits, while there would be 1 replacement among the supplementary Perioeci. (See Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 261, 264, and 267.)

³ Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. xii.

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upkeep of the common table or were convicted of the unpardonable offence of cowardice in war.¹

The leading features in the Spartan system were the same as in the Ottoman²—namely: supervision, selection, and specialization; a competitive spirit;³ and the simultaneous use of the negative stimulus of punishment and the positive stimulus of reward. And in the Spartiate fraternity of 'Peers', as in the Ottoman slave-household, these features were not confined to the educational stage. They continued to dominate the Spartiate's adult life as they had dominated his boyhood; and from the moment when he was taken away from his mother upon the completion of his seventh year he was continuously subject to discipline until the completion of his sixtieth year brought him his release from military service. The outward and visible sign of this discipline was the regulation which prescribed fifty-three years 'service with the colours'; for the Spartiate who had been transferred as a child from his parents' home to a juvenile 'drove' did not find himself at liberty to live in a home of his own when he had been co-opted into a 'mess' and had been endowed with a public allotment and had performed his social duty of taking a wife in marriage. Whereas the Janissaries, who were discouraged from marrying, were allowed to live in married quarters if they did marry nevertheless, the Spartiate 'Peers' were both compelled to marry and forbidden to lead a 'home life'.⁴ The Spartiate bridegroom was required to spend even his wedding-night in barracks; and though the ban upon sleeping at home was gradually relaxed as he advanced in years, the ban upon dining at home was absolute and permanent.

Lycurgus took care that the Spartiates should not be at liberty to take a preliminary dinner at home and so come to mess on full stomachs. If a Spartiate showed no appetite at mess, he was "told off" by his messmates as a glutton who was too soft to stand the common fare; and if he was actually convicted he was fined. There was a famous occasion when King Agis had returned from the wars after a long absence (at the end of his victorious war of attrition against Athens). The King wanted to dine, just once, with his wife, and sent to the mess for his portion; but the Army Council (οἱ πολέμαρχοι) would not allow it to be

¹ See Herodotus, Bk. VII, ch. 231; Xenophon, *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*, ch. ix. There is a similarity in organization and in atmosphere between a Spartan 'mess' and a Janissary 'mess' (as described above in the passage quoted from Busbecq on pp. 38-9). The Janissaries, like the Spartiates, were even famous—or notorious—for their soup; and the senior member of a Janissary 'mess' was called the *chorbaji* ('soup-maker'). The recognized method by which the Janissaries expressed dissatisfaction was to upset their soup-kettles—a gesture which was taken as a danger-signal by any wise Pādīshāh. At Sparta, though the soup was no more palatable, such insubordination was unheard of!

² See p. 36, above.

³ See Xenophon, *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*, chs. iv and x.

⁴ Compare the attitude of Oxford colleges, with their monastic tradition, towards married 'fellows'.

sent, and when the incident came to the notice of the Board of Overseers (*τοῖς ἐφόροις*) next day, they made the King pay a fine.¹

Manifestly, a system which set 'human nature' at defiance so truculently as this could not have been enforced without some overwhelming external sanction; and at Sparta this sanction was applied by public opinion, which knew how to chastise an offender against the Spartan social code with scorpions that stung far more cruelly than the Overseers' whips. The point is brought out by an Athenian observer² who studied the Spartan system in its eleventh hour, on the eve of its collapse.

'One of the remarkable achievements of Lycurgus is that he has made it preferable, in Sparta, to die a noble death rather than remain alive in disgrace. As a matter of fact, investigation reveals that there are actually fewer deaths in battle among the Spartans than in armies which give way to their fear and prefer to leave the field; so that in reality courage turns out to be a more effective survival-factor than cowardice. The path of courage is easier and more agreeable and smoother and more secure. . . . And I ought not to omit to explain how Lycurgus made sure that this path should be followed by his Spartans. He made sure of that by ensuring inevitable happiness for the brave and inevitable unhappiness for the cowardly. In other communities, a coward's only penalty is to be branded with the epithet. For the rest, he is free to work and play cheek by jowl with men of valour if he chooses. In Sparta, on the other hand, everybody would be ashamed to take a coward for his messmate or to take him for his partner in athletics. And it will often happen that when they are picking up ball-teams the coward finds himself left out, and that in choirs he is pushed out into the least honourable positions, and that he has to yield precedence to everybody in the street and at table and to make way for his juniors and to keep his womenfolk indoors and to bear their reproaches for his lack of manhood and to resign himself to having no housewife in his house and to pay a fine on that account into the bargain, and never to show himself out of doors with his skin oiled, and in fact to do nothing whatsoever that is done by Spartans who have no stain on their reputations—under pain of receiving bodily chastisement from his betters. For my part, I am not at all surprised that, in a community in which cowardice is visited with this terrific penalization, death is preferable to a life of such reproach and such dishonour.'³

¹ Plutarch: *Apophthegmata Laconica*; *Lycurgus*, No. 6.

² Xenophon, *Respublica Lacadaemoniorum*, ch. ix.

³ These penetrating general observations on the potency of public opinion in keeping the Spartan system in force are borne out by a particular case in point which is recorded by Herodotus (Bk. VII, chs. 229-31 and Bk. IX, ch. 71) as a foil to the story of Leonidas and his Three Hundred at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. Two of the Three Hundred, Eurystus and Aristodamus, were in hospital with acute ophthalmia at a village a few miles behind the front, when they received the news that Leonidas' flank had been turned and that their comrades' duty of holding the pass had become a forlorn hope. At this news, Eurystus groped his way back to the front and fell in action with the two hundred and ninety eight, whereas Aristodamus went home.

'The fact . . . that one of them had actually met his death, while the other, who had

Yet penalization alone, however merciless, could never have created the Spartan *êthos* or have inspired the superhuman heroism which that *êthos* made possible. The sanction which made the Spartans what they were was internal as well as external; for these implacable souls, whose corporate public opinion made life intolerable for any one of their number who had failed to live up to their common standard of behaviour, were merciless in such cases just because they were single-hearted in exacting the same standard individually from themselves. This 'categorical imperative', in the soul of every true Spartiate 'Peer', was the ultimate driving force which made the 'Lycurgeoan' system work—in sheer defiance of 'human nature'—for more than two hundred years. And its essence is laid bare in the no doubt imaginary but none the less illuminating conversation which Herodotus¹ puts into the mouths of the Achaemenian Pādishāh Xerxes and the exiled Spartan King Dāmarātus, who was serving on Xerxes' staff, when Xerxes' army was marching upon Thermopylae from the Dardanelles. Xerxes has asked Dāmarātus whether he is to expect any resistance; and Dāmarātus has answered him that, whatever the other Hellenes may do, he can guarantee in regard to his own Spartan countrymen (though he personally has no cause to love them) that they will turn out to

the same excuse (neither better nor worse) to cling to, had not made up his mind to lose his life, compelled the Spartans to be implacable in visiting their resentment upon Aristodāmus. . . . After returning to Lacedaemon, Aristodāmus was received with insult and contumely. The contumely took the practical form that no Spartan would give him a light for his fire or speak to him, while he was insulted with the nickname of "Runaway Aristodāmus" (*Ἀριστοδάμῳς ὁ τρέσας*). At the Battle of Plataea, however, he made good all the imputations upon his character. . . . At the Battle of Plataea, Aristodāmus . . . was the Spartan who showed by far the greatest gallantry in my judgement. Next to him, the Spartans Poseidonius, Philocyon, and Amompharētōs distinguished themselves most conspicuously. On the other hand, in a discussion as to which of them had shown the greatest gallantry, the Spartans present came to the conclusion that the prodigies of valour performed by Aristodāmus, who behaved like a man possessed and would not keep his place in the ranks, were inspired by his unconcealed wish to die on account of the imputation under which he laboured, while Poseidonius had fought like a hero without any desire to lose his life—a factor which, in their judgement, gave the measure of his superiority. This pronouncement might conceivably have been dictated by envy; but the fact remains that all the individuals whom I have mentioned who fell in this battle, with the exception of Aristodāmus, were awarded honours, while Aristodāmus, who wished to die on account of the imputation aforementioned, received none.'

Herodotus also mentions (in Bk. VII, ch. 232) another case which, if true, was even more inhuman than the treatment of Aristodāmus:

'There is also said to have been another survivor of the Three Hundred named Pantitās, who had been sent with dispatches to Thessaly and who returned to Sparta, was treated with contumely and committed suicide.'

This militant and merciless pressure of Spartiate public opinion, to which the individual Spartiate was subject, was perhaps the most odious feature of Spartan life in Athenian eyes, and it is tacitly stigmatized, by implication, in the following passage from the funeral oration delivered by Pericles on the Athenians who fell in the first campaign of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C., as reported by Thucydides (Bk. II, chs. 34-46):

'We [Athenians] lead a life of freedom not only in our politics but in our mutual tolerance of private conduct. We do not resent our neighbour doing what he pleases, nor subject him to those marks of disapproval which poison pleasure though they may inflict no formal injury.'

¹ Herodotus, Bk. VII, chs. 101-5.

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fight without taking any account of the disparity of numbers. When Xerxes refuses to entertain the idea that troops who are free agents, as the Spartans are *ex hypothesi*, would voluntarily face an ordeal into which Xerxes' own troops could only be driven by dread of their commander and by compulsion of the lash, Dāmarātus replies that,

'free though the Spartans are, they are not free altogether. They too serve a master in the shape of Law, whom they dread far more intensely than your servants dread you. They show this by doing whatever their master orders, and his orders are always the same: "In action it is forbidden to retire in the face of enemy forces of whatever strength. Troops are to keep their formation and to conquer or die."'

This was the spirit that inspired the Spartans' achievements; and those achievements have stamped the Spartan name with the meaning which it still bears in every living language to-day. The deeds are so famous that there is no need in this place to retell familiar tales. The story of Leonidas and the Three Hundred at Thermopylae: is it not written in the Seventh Book of Herodotus? And the story of the Boy and the Fox: is it not written in Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus*?¹ And do not these two stories, between them, convey the whole *tour de force* of Spartan boyhood and Spartan manhood?² And if we cannot take our eyes off the Spartans—as, in candour, we cannot—without first looking also at the other side of the Spartan shield, we have simply to remind ourselves that the last two years of a Spartan boy's education before his coming of age—the crucial years upon which, more than any others, his prospects of co-option on to a 'mess' depended—were probably spent in the Secret Service (*κρυπτεία*), and that this was nothing else than an official 'murder gang' which patrolled the Laconian countryside surreptitiously—taking cover by day and stalking abroad, like a veritable *negotium perambulans in tenebris*,³ by night—for the purpose of making away with any Helots who had shown symptoms of restiveness or perhaps

¹ It was part of the education of Spartan boys that they were ordered to steal and were punished if caught. 'And to show what earnestness the boys put into their stealing I will cite the story of the boy who, once upon a time, had stolen a fox and was hiding it under his shirt; and although the creature was tearing the boy's belly with its teeth and claws the boy bore the torture, rather than be found out, until he fell down dead.' (Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. xviii).

² If one other touch is still needed in order to complete this bright side of the picture, it will be given by the following rather less well-known anecdote, which illustrates the triumph of public spirit over personal ambition (though ambition was deliberately fostered by the competitive spirit of the 'Lycurgean' system):

The Spartiate Paedarātus went off in high spirits, with a smile on his face, after having been passed over as a candidate for enrolment in the Three Hundred (the highest distinction attainable at Sparta). The Overseers (*οἱ ἑπόροι*) called him back and asked him why he was laughing. "I am laughing", he said, "because I am so delighted at Sparta's good fortune in having three hundred citizens who are better men than I am." (Plutarch: *Apophthegmata Laconica*, Paedarātus, No. 3 (cf. *Lycurgi Vitam*, ch. xxv).)

³ Psalm xci. 6.

merely vestiges of character and ability.¹ While Sparta demanded, and duly evoked, the manly heroism of a Leonidas and his Three Hundred in order to cover the Spartan name with incomparable military glory, she equally demanded—and did not fail to evoke—the juvenile criminality of her Secret Service in order that the tiny minority of Spartiate ‘Peers’ might keep their feet on the necks of a numerically overwhelming majority of ‘Inferiors’ and ‘Dependants’ and ‘New Members’ and ‘Serfs’ who would have been delighted, if ever they had the chance, ‘to eat’ their handful of masters ‘alive’.² If, under the ‘Lycurgeoan’ system, the Spartans rose to some of the sublimest heights of human conduct, they also sounded some of the darkest depths.

Every feature in the ‘Lycurgeoan’ system—material or spiritual, evil or good—was directed towards one single aim; and this definite aim was exactly achieved. Under the ‘Lycurgeoan’ system, the Lacedaemonian heavy infantry were the best heavy infantry in the Hellenic World. They were as far superior to any other Hellenic troops of the same arm as the Janissaries were superior to the infantry of Western Christendom in Busbecq’s day. For nearly two centuries the armies of other Hellenic Powers dreaded to meet the Lacedaemonian Army in pitched battle. In drill and in *moral* alike, the Lacedaemonians were inimitable. But, just because of this, there was no room, in ‘Lycurgeoan’ Sparta, for more than one kind of professionalism.

The ‘single-track’ genius of the ‘Lycurgeoan’ *agôgê* leaps to the eye of any visitor to the present-day Sparta Museum. For this museum is totally unlike any other modern collection of extant Hellenic

¹ This Spartan Secret Service may be compared with the patrols which used to terrorize the Negro population in the Southern States of the North American Union before the abolition of slavery. The *chef d’œuvre* among the recorded villainies of the Spartan Secret Service was the assassination of the Helots who had responded to a call for volunteers which the Spartan Government had made in the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431–404 B.C. The story is recorded by a witness of enemy nationality; but since this witness happens to be Thucydides, we can accept the anecdote, nevertheless, without a very heavy discount.

“The whole policy of the Spartans towards the Helots is governed by considerations of security; and one of the acts into which they were led by their fear of the rising generation’s spirit and numbers was the following. They proclaimed that all Helots who could show a distinguished war record should present themselves for selection to receive their freedom. This was simply a trap—the calculation being that those Helots who considered that they had the best claim to liberation would be just the Helots who would have the spirit to take the initiative in falling upon their masters. So they selected two thousand of them; and these two thousand gave thanksgiving for their manumission by crowning themselves with garlands and visiting the shrines of the Gods in procession. But the Spartans were not long in making away with them—and this with such secrecy that nobody ever knew how each of the victims had met his end.” (Thucydides, Bk. IV, ch. 80.)

The extermination of the 2,000 does not seem to have been complete (see Toynbee, op. cit., footnote on p. 266); but, even so, the story is black enough. For the general treatment of the Helots, see Plutarch’s *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. xxviii. For the policy of compelling the Helots to make buffoons of themselves, see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 233, footnote 4, above.

² See Annex III, below.

works of art, either in Greece or elsewhere. In other such collections the visitor's eye seeks out and finds and dwells upon the works of 'the Classical Age', which approximately coincides with the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. In the Sparta Museum, however, this 'Classical' Hellenic art is conspicuous by its absence. The visitor's eye is here caught first, and fascinated, by the 'pre-classical' exhibits: delicate ivory-carving and striking polychrome pottery painted by artists who had a gift for line as well as colour. Fragmentary though they are, these relics of early Spartan art bear unmistakable marks of originality and individuality; and the visitor who has made the discovery of them here for the first time looks expectantly to find the sequel—only to look in vain, since this early blossoming of Spartan art remains a promise without a fulfilment. In the place which should contain the monuments of a Spartan version of 'Classical' art there is a great hiatus; and the Sparta Museum contains little more except a superfluity of uninspired and standardized works of minor sculpture dating from the late Hellenistic and early Imperial period. Between the two sets of exhibits in the Sparta Museum a great chronological gulf is fixed; and this gulf is explained by the dates. The date at which the early Spartan art breaks off is approximately that of the Overseership of Chilon in the middle of the sixth century B.C. The almost equally abrupt resumption of 'artistic production' in the age of decadence is posterior to 189–8 B.C.: the date at which the 'Lycurgeoan' system is known to have been abolished at Sparta by the deliberate policy of a foreign conqueror after Sparta had been forcibly incorporated into the Achaean League.¹ Art was impossible at Sparta so long as Spartan life was confined, by this cast-iron system, to the single track of militarism.

The paralysis which descended, with the *agôgê*, upon Spartan pictorial and glyptic art was equally fatal to the art of music,² in which the Spartans had likewise shown early promise. The Spartan authorities even discouraged their nationals from cultivating an art which is so near akin to the soldier's that, in our modern Western World, it is regarded as the best preparation for a military training. The Spartans were prohibited from competing in the

¹ For the conquest and incorporation of Sparta into the Achaean League in 189 B.C. and the deliberate eradication of the 'Lycurgeoan' system by the Achaean authorities, see Polybius, Bk. XXII, ch. 11, 5–12, *fin.*; and Livy, Bk. XXXVIII, ch. 34.

² 'At Sparta, any departure from the primitive canons of music was censored. Terpander himself, who was a primitive of primitives and the best harpist of his day and a eulogist of heroism, was fined, all the same, by the Overseers (*ἐφόροι*), and had his harp permanently confiscated by them, because he had added just one extra string in order to increase the instrument's range. The Overseers only approved of simple melodies. Again, when Timotheus was competing at the festival of the Carneia, one of the Overseers snatched up a knife and asked the performer on which side of his instrument he (the Overseer) was to cut the necessary number of strings in order to bring the total down to the permitted number of seven.' (Plutarch: *Instituta Laconica*, No. 17.)

great Pan-Hellenic athletic sports,¹ on the ground that professionalism in running and jumping and putting the weight was one thing and professionalism in wielding the spear and the shield and performing the evolutions of the parade-ground was something quite different, from which the Spartiate's heart and mind must not be distracted on any account.²

Thus Sparta paid the penalty for having taken her own headstrong and hazardous course at the parting of the ways in the eighth century B.C. by condemning herself, in the sixth century, to standing still—with arms presented like a soldier on parade—at a moment when other Hellenes were just moving forward once again on one of the most signal moves in the whole course of Hellenic history.

It requires an effort of imagination to remind ourselves that the fraternity of Spartiate 'Peers' was the earliest Hellenic democracy, and that the redivision of the arable land of Messenia among the members of this Spartiate *dêmos* in equal allotments became the watchword—*γῆς ἀναδασμός*—of the revolution that convulsed Athens in the next generation. In Sparta the new movement which had declared itself precociously in the 'Lycurgeoan' reform was doomed to be arrested prematurely at a rudimentary stage because the 'Lycurgeoan' system changed the face of Spartan life, only to petrify it for ever after. It was not in Sparta, and not in response to the peculiar challenge that had been presented to the Spartans in the Second Messeno-Spartan War, that these new tendencies in Hellenic life were destined to work themselves out in fresh acts of creation. The creative act of the sixth century B.C. was evoked by a challenge of a different kind; and this challenge was presented in the first instance to those Hellenic communities which had responded to the previous challenge of the eighth century, not on the Spartan lines of conquering a next-door neighbour in Hellas, but on the Chalcidian and Megarian lines of overseas colonization.

After the Malthusian problem had been solved—or shelved—in Hellas at large by this method for a period of some two centuries, it was raised again, and this time more acutely than before, by the simultaneous stoppage of the territorial expansion of the Hellenic World in every quarter.³ Eastward, Hellenic expansion was checked in the sixth century B.C. by the rise of new Great Powers—the Saite Power in Egypt and the Lydian in Anatolia and the far

¹ This prohibition did not apply to Spartan women—if they were wealthy enough to compete vicariously by entering a chariot for the chariot-races.

² Compare the official discouragement, and even prohibition, of golf and tennis, in the supposed interests of cricket, in certain English 'public schools' at the present day; and contrast the *mot*, attributed to the Duke of Wellington, that 'the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing-fields of Eton'.

³ For this stoppage, see further III. B, pp. 121-2; III. C (i) (a), pp. 139-40; and III. C (i) (d), pp. 197-8, below.

mightier Achaemenian Empire that first overshadowed and then absorbed them both. During the same century, Hellenic expansion was brought to a halt in the Western Mediterranean by a rally among the rival Levantine colonial peoples—Phoenicians and Etruscans—who now discovered in political co-operation a make-weight for their inferiority to the Greeks in vitality and in numbers. At the same time the indigenous barbarians of the West were beginning to learn how to hold their own against all the Levantine intruders alike by fighting them with their own weapons. In these various ways the expansion of Hellas was cut short all round; and this challenge stimulated the Hellenes to solve their recurrent social problem by substituting, for the mere extensive growth which was no longer open to them, an intensive growth, of a higher social order, which was still within their capacity. They passed from 'subsistence farming' to 'cash-crop farming' and manufactures; from a régime of local self-sufficiency to a régime of international trade; from a natural economy to a money economy; and from a polity based on birth to a polity based on property. And the lead in making this victorious response was taken by Athens: a 'dark horse' who had not taken part in the earlier movement of overseas colonization, but who at the same time had not followed Sparta into her Messenian blind-alley.

The nature of the Athenian response has been examined already in this Study elsewhere in another connexion.¹ In this place it has only to be mentioned in order to point the contrast between Hellenic progress under Athenian leadership and Sparta's un-Hellenic immobility; and this contrast is aptly symbolized in the difference between the Attic and the Spartan money-coinage. The new invention of coined money had found its way into Sparta before the 'Lycurgeoan' system set hard; and even thereafter it continued to play a not unimportant part in the internal life of the fraternity of Spartiate 'Peers', since a 'Peer's' contribution to his 'mess', which he had to keep up under pain of forfeiting his membership, was payable partly in money as well as in kind. Yet although the sixth-century Spartan reformers could not, or would not, banish coin from Laconia altogether, they succeeded in adapting this institution to their purpose like all the other institutions which they found in the field. They allowed their countrymen to retain a token-currency of iron which was too heavy and bulky for ordinary convenience and was chemically treated in such a way as to make it too poor in quality to have any intrinsic commercial value even in bulk.² Thus

¹ See I. B (ii), vol. i, pp. 24-5, and II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 39-42, above.

² Plutarch, *Life of Lysander*, ch. xvii. Plutarch goes on to point out that the Spartan Government was merely preserving, at Sparta, the primitive type of coinage that had once been prevalent everywhere.

Laconia was excluded from the international continuum of financial relations, just as effectively as if she had possessed no coinage at all, by being given a coinage which could have no currency beyond the Laconian frontiers. Meanwhile 'the owls of Athene' became the current coin of the entire Mediterranean World, and the occasional arrival of a flock of these migratory birds in Sparta itself created still greater consternation among the Spartan authorities than the importation of a musical instrument with more than seven strings.¹ The Spartiate Gylippus himself, who had done perhaps as much as any other single man to bring Athens to the ground in the Great War of 431-404 B.C. by foiling the Athenian attempt to conquer Sicily, was forced to go into exile on the morrow of the peace when his servant laid information that there was 'a bevy of owls in the tiliary'.²

Thus the 'Lycurgeoan' system, which the Spartans established in order to defend their dominion over the Helots at home, had the effect of throwing them on the defensive against the whole Hellenic World into the bargain. And the greatest irony in Sparta's situation was the fact that, when she had sacrificed everything that made life worth living to the single object of forging an irresistible military instrument, she found that she dared not make use of her dearly bought power because her social equilibrium under the 'Lycurgeoan' system was so exact, and her social tension so high, that the slightest disturbance of the *status quo* might have disastrous repercussions; and this disaster might be brought on by a victory which would increase the permanent demands on Sparta's manpower almost as readily as by a defeat which would open the way for an invasion of Sparta's home-territories. In the event, the fatal victory of 404 B.C. and the consequent fatal defeat of the year 371 duly brought upon the Spartans the disaster which they had never ceased to dread since they had succeeded in making themselves into the most formidable military power in their world. Yet Spartan statesmanship managed to postpone the evil day for nearly two centuries, dating from the completion of the 'Lycurgeoan' reforms, by declining to accept for Sparta the greatness which circumstances incessantly sought to thrust upon her.

In this frame of mind the Spartans evaded, time and again, the challenge to assume the leadership of Hellas which the Achaemenian peril presented to them. They forbore to send help to the Anatolian Greek insurgents in 499 B.C.; they arrived too late to fight at Marathon in 490; and after covering themselves with glory, under protest, at Thermopylae and Plataea, they abdicated from

¹ See the passage quoted from Plutarch on p. 67, footnote 2, above.

² Plutarch, *Life of Lysander*, ch. xvi.

the high command of the forces of liberation in 479-478. Rather than incur the risks which greatness involved for Sparta, they deliberately left their own repudiated greatness lying derelict for Athens to appropriate; and yet, even at this bitter price, they were ultimately unable to elude their tragic destiny. For the Spartans' great refusal to accept the challenge of 499-479 B.C. did not, and could not, purchase for Sparta more than a brief immunity from her peculiar dilemma. In preferring, to the risks of acceptance, the lesser immediate evil of giving the Athenians their opportunity, the Spartans were opening the door for the menace to Hellenic liberties to recur in the shape of an Athenian peril; and this time the Spartans found themselves confronted with a challenge which it was impossible for them to ignore. In the opinion of Thucydides, 'the fundamental . . . cause of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War was the fear inspired in the Lacedaemonians by the rise of Athens to greatness; and this fear compelled them to take up arms'¹—under threat of seeing the 'sanitary cordon' of their Peloponnesian alliance dissolve and their Athenian enemy from beyond the Isthmus join hands, to their undoing, with their Messenian enemy within their gates.

In 431 B.C. Corinthian diplomacy succeeded in compelling Spartan statesmanship to assume the leadership of Hellas at last; and, in the Great War of 431-404, the Spartan military machine—now tested for the first time to the uttermost—performed all that its makers had intended, and all that Sparta's neighbours hoped or feared. The Spartan nightmare of an *union sacrée* between Athens and the Helots did not come true—not even when the Athenian strategist Demosthenes made his brilliant stroke of establishing a fortified post at Pylos, on the Messenian coast of Laconia, in 425 B.C. On the other hand, the overland expedition of the Spartan commander Brasidas to the Thracian seaboard, and the exhaustion of Athenian strength in Nicias' naval expedition to Sicily, did bring to pass the Athenian nightmare that the Peloponnesians might succeed in joining hands with the Hellenic subjects of Athens on the other side of the Aegean, and might overpower Athens on her own element with a fleet manned by Ionian seamen and financed by Achaemenian gold. When this first stage in the self-inflicted attrition of the Hellenic Society came to an end in the year 404 B.C., it was Athens and not Sparta that lay prostrate. Yet the Spartan King Agis' prophecy—uttered at the moment when the die was cast—that 'this day' would prove to 'be the beginning of great evils for Hellas'² came true in respect of the victors no less than the vanquished; for the greatness which Sparta now tardily and

¹ Thucydides, Bk. I, ch. 23.

² Ibid., Bk. II, ch. 13.

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involuntarily retrieved from her prostrated rival proved to be a veritable Shirt of Nessus.

The Spartans were placed in the same predicament by their victorious war of 431-404 B.C. as the 'Osmanlis by their disastrous war of A.D. 1682-99. A people trained consummately but exclusively for warlike contact with its neighbours found itself suddenly compelled, by the outcome of one particular war, to enter into non-military relations for which they were not only unprepared but were positively unfitted by their own peculiar institutions and habits and *éthos*. These peculiarities which the Spartans, like the 'Osmanlis, had developed in order to grapple with a previous problem, and which had given them superhuman strength within the limits of the narrow environment within which their lines had previously been cast, now took their revenge upon this peculiar people by making them inhumanly or infra-humanly incompetent to live in the wider world into which the fortunes of war had eventually carried them. The very exactness of their adaptation to their previous environment made any readaptation to a new environment so difficult for them as to be virtually impossible; and the very qualities which had been the secret of their success in the one situation became their worst enemies when they found themselves in the other. For these selfsame reasons the 'Osmanlis came to grief when, in consequence of a military defeat, they had to negotiate diplomatically with the Powers of Western Christendom instead of simply imposing their will upon them;¹ and the Spartans came to grief when, in consequence of a military victory, they had to take upon their own shoulders the imperial responsibilities of Athens instead of merely holding the naval and military power of Athens at bay.

The contrast between the Spartan at home and the Spartan abroad was a by-word in Hellas; for whereas, on his own ground, the Spartan admittedly rose above the ordinary Hellenic standards of personal discipline and disinterestedness, he fell below those same standards in at least equal measure as soon as he found himself out of his own element.² The spectacular demoralization of

¹ In A.D. 1793, under the stimulus of the shock which had been administered by the disastrous outcome of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74, the Westernizing Sultan Selim III took the new departure of establishing permanent Ottoman diplomatic missions in Paris, Vienna, London, and Berlin. It proved impossible, however, to find competent 'Osmanlis to play the Western-style ambassadorial role, and the original appointees, who were naturally Turkish Muslims recruited from the Ottoman dominant minority, had to be replaced by Greek Christian *chargés d'affaires* recruited from the *ra'iyyeh* (d'Ohsson, I. M.: *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. vii (Paris 1824), p. 573, cited on p. 48, footnote 1, above).

² Similarly, Weyer (in *op. cit.*, on p. 7) dwells upon 'the utter inability of the Eskimo culture to fit life-conditions outside of the arctic and sub-arctic regions'. In this connexion, it is to be noticed that, while 'the Eskimos are among the most widely distributed of primitive peoples' (*op. cit.*, p. 3), the physical features of their thirty-four-hundred-mile-long habitat are singularly uniform (at least in so far as they are of concern to Man),

the Spartan Regent Pausanias, when circumstances placed him in command of a Pan-Hellenic force on Achaemenian territory, had been an awful warning which had counted for much in the Spartan Government's decision to abdicate from the leadership of Hellas in 479-478 B.C. And this decision was almost justified in retrospect when, in and after the second and conclusive round of the Great War of 431-404 B.C., Sparta was forced to send abroad Pausaniases by the dozen. 'We have done those things which we ought not to have done and we have left undone those things which we ought to have done, and there is no health in us' must have been the reflection that forced itself, on the morrow of Leuctra, upon the mind of a Spartan statesman like King Agesilaus who was old enough to remember the *ancien régime*.

In that year 371 B.C. the majority of the Spartiate 'Peers' were serving, outside the frontiers of Laconia, on garrison duty in other Hellenic states which had once been Sparta's voluntary allies, but which could no longer be held to their allegiance except by naked military force; and the pick of them had been seconded from their military duties in order to occupy political and administrative posts in which they were making themselves as notorious, on a petty scale, as Pausanias himself, for their Spartan tactlessness and tyranny and corruption, until the respectable title of 'moderators' (*ἀρμοσται*), by which these Spartan martinets abroad were called, had come to sound odious in Hellenic ears. These very Spartiate 'Peers', who were making the Spartan name stink as fish out of water, would no doubt have manifested the traditional Spartan virtues if Fate had allowed them to fulfil the expectations in which they had grown up by leaving them to live their camp-life on the banks of the Eurotas until the Lacedaemonian Army was mobilized for the Leuctra campaign. Unfortunately for their own reputation and their country's, all these men were absent at that grave hour, and, in the Lacedaemonian contingent of the army under King Cleombrotus's command which was so signally defeated by the Thebans at Leuctra in 371 B.C., there were only 400 Spartiates in action apart from the 300 'knights' who always formed a Spartan King's personal body-guard on active service. This figure seems to mean that, in the Lacedaemonian infantry of the line, on this critical occasion, only one man was a Spartiate in every ten, instead of the four Spartiates in every ten Lacedaemonians which was the regulation quota.¹

and that this uniformity of the Esquimaux' physical environment is reflected in the cultural uniformity (op. cit., pp. 3-4) of their social life.

¹ The regulation quota (see Annex III, below) appears to have been four Spartiates in every ten Lacedaemonians, the other six being citizens of the autonomous Laconian cities (*περίοικοι*). At Leuctra, it may be conjectured that the places of the three Spartiates out of the four in every ten Lacedaemonians, who were now missing, were filled by Helots who had been enfranchised, in consideration of volunteering for heavy

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If the Spartiate quota had not been thus cut down, at Leuctra, to a quarter of its normal strength, we may doubt whether even the valour of the Theban infantryman and the tactical genius of the Theban commander Epaminondas, who knew how to turn his troops' fighting-power to the best account, would have been able to achieve their historic success of breaking that record of Lacedaemonian invincibility which had remained unbroken, down to that date, for at least two centuries and a half.

Moreover, the Spartan victory over Athens in the Great War of 431-404 B.C. ruined Sparta in other and subtler ways, besides the compulsion which it put upon her to second her 'Peers' from military service, from which they could not safely be spared, to non-military duties with which they could not safely be entrusted. It ruined her, for example, by exposing her belatedly, and therefore disastrously, to the subversive social effects of a money economy from which her people had so long been artificially sheltered. 'The date at which Lacedaemon was first attacked by social disease and corruption practically coincides with the moment at which she overthrew the Athenian Empire and gorged herself with the precious metals.'¹ And the introduction of a money economy brought in its train an equally subversive revolution in the Spartan attitude towards personal property. Spartan conservatism could not, indeed, bring itself to go the length of allowing real estate to be bought and sold in the market; but at some date unknown in the fourth century B.C. the Spartan Assembly passed into law 'a bill making it legal for the holder of a family property or an allotment to give it away during his lifetime, or to bequeath it by will, to anybody whom he chose'.² The effect of this piece of legislation in reducing the numbers of the Spartiate 'Peers' must have been much greater than the effect of the relatively light Spartiate casualties at Leuctra, and possibly as great as the effect of the loss of Messenia, which was the political penalty of Sparta's military defeat. When Aristotle was writing his *Politics*, this unfortunate law was already producing noticeably untoward results.³ By the time of King Agis the Martyr, who came to the throne early in the latter half of the third century B.C., 'not more than 700 Spartiates survived, and of these perhaps 100 may have owned land and an allotment, while the remainder were a destitute and disfranchised mob'.⁴

infantry service, under the name of 'New Members' (*νέοι μέλη*). For these figures see Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-2.

¹ Plutarch's *Life of Agis*, ch. v, *ad init.* The whole account of the state of Sparta in the middle of the third century B.C., which is given in chs. v-ix, deserves study.

² Plutarch, *op. cit.*, loc. cit. The dates *post quem* and *ante quem* of the 'rhetra' of Epitadeus are the termination of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 404 B.C. and the publication, circa 325 B.C., of Aristotle's *Politics*. (Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 272, footnote.)

³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1270 A 15-39.

⁴ Plutarch, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

Another conspicuous social phenomenon in the Spartan, as well as in the Ottoman, decadence was 'the monstrous regiment of women' (*γυναικοκρατία*). Like the maldistribution of property, this maldistribution of influence and authority as between the two sexes was already noticeable at Sparta in Aristotle's time;¹ and in the legend of the Saviour Kings, Agis and Cleomenes, who reigned at Sparta a century later, the part assigned to the noble women who inspire and encourage and console and mourn the heroes is as prominent as it is in the New Testament.² This legend suggests that, notwithstanding Aristotle's strictures on the behaviour of the Spartan women during Epaminondas' invasion of the Eurotas Valley in the winter of 370-369 B.C.,³ it was really through their virtues that, in the age of Spartan decadence, the Spartan women established their moral ascendancy over their husbands and their sons; and, if this is the truth, it throws some light upon the failure of the 'Lycurgeoan' system. For although the system had been applied to women as well as to men, the Spartan girls and Spartan married women had not been subjected to its pressure in the same degree as their brothers and their husbands; and if we are right in our belief that the moral breakdown of Spartan manhood was the penalty of a moral rigidity which had been produced by the excessive severity of the 'Lycurgeoan' temper, then we may conjecture that it was the relative immunity of the women from this unnatural strain that left them with the moral elasticity to bend and rebound in reaction to an ordeal which broke the spirit of the Spartan men outright.⁴

¹ For the ascendancy of the Spartan women over the Spartan men in Aristotle's time, see his *Politics*, 1269 B 12-1270 A 31. No doubt the women had certain unfair advantages. For example, the habit of transferring landed property from one Spartiate family to another in the form of large dowries worked together with the effect of the heavy casualties among male Spartiates in war to create and maintain a class of Spartan heiresses, who doubtless understood how to turn their money-power to account. Aristotle also suggests that the Spartan women were excessively spoilt in psychological 'compensation' (to use our modern Western terminology) for the excessive severity of the discipline that was imposed upon the men. These fortuitous advantages may have given some Spartan women a social 'pull', but this does not really explain the ascendancy of the women at Sparta in the age of decadence, since this ascendancy was manifestly moral and not material in its essence.

² The literary relation between the legend of the Spartan Royal Martyrs and the story of the New Testament is discussed in Part V, below.

³ Aristotle, *Politics*, loc. cit.

⁴ In general terms we may say that the women of Sparta were less highly specialized than the men, and were therefore not so much at a loss to adapt themselves when the particular circumstances for which the 'Lycurgeoan' system had been expressly designed were replaced by new circumstances which called for a readjustment of the Spartan outlook and the Spartan attitude. What was true of 'Lycurgeoan' Sparta has probably been true in some measure of most societies in most ages. Whatever form of specialism a society may cultivate, the women are apt to go less far in specialization than the men; and whenever a society suffers a breakdown or disaster or reverse, the women, again, are apt to show greater elasticity and greater adaptability than the men in face of the new situation that arises. We may observe that the great Hellenic disaster of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War—a shock which caused the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization—was accompanied by a rise in the prestige of women not only at Sparta but at Athens, as is attested by the war-plays of Aristophanes and by the role assigned to women in the

The epitaph of the 'Lycurgeoan' system has been written by Aristotle¹ in the form of a general proposition:

'Peoples ought not to train themselves in the art of war with an eye to subjugating neighbours who do not deserve to be subjugated. . . . The paramount aim of any social system should be to frame military institutions, like all its other institutions, with an eye to the circumstances of peace-time, when the soldier is off duty; and this proposition is borne out by the facts of experience. For militaristic states are apt to survive only so long as they remain at war, while they go to ruin as soon as they have finished making their conquests. Peace causes their metal to lose its temper; and the fault lies with a social system which does not teach its soldiers what to make of their lives when they are off duty.'

Thus the 'Lycurgeoan' system ultimately and inevitably destroyed itself; yet, even in committing suicide, the system died hard. Although it had been brought into existence for the precise purpose of enabling Sparta to maintain possession of Messenia, the 'Lycurgeoan' *agôgê* actually continued to be practised at Sparta, out of sheer conservatism, for nearly two centuries after Messenia had been irrevocably lost.² And although King Cleomenes the Martyr tardily replaced the 4,000 lost Spartiate allotments in Messenia by redividing the territory that remained to Sparta east of Taygetus, in the Eurotas Valley, into new allotments of an equal number,³ the royal revolutionary did not take this opportunity to liberate his country from the ancient curse of helotage. Since the 700 surviving Spartiates, all told, could not take up as much as 20 per cent. of the 4,000 allotments into which the estates of the 100 surviving Spartiate 'Peers' were now broken up, Cleomenes presumably gave the Spartan franchise to more than 3,000 Helots and Perioeci in order to fill up the numbers of his new Spartan citizen-body; but these were only a minority of the surviving Helots; for Cleomenes freed 6,000 more of them, at so much a head in ready money, and enrolled 2,000 of these freedmen in his army, on the eve of the Battle of Sellasia, when his Macedonian adversary Antigonos Dôson had reached Tegea.⁴ And when the Romans invaded Laconia in

Ecclesiastusae, in anticipation of the *Republic* of Plato. The writer of this Study has noticed, from personal observation, the superiority of the women's moral over the men's among the *ci-devant* aristocracy in the Southern States of the North American Union under the abiding shock of the Southern defeat in the Civil War, and the same phenomenon among the intelligentsia in China under the long strain of Westernization. The qualities which this ordeal of Westernization has called out among the women of Russia are a matter of common knowledge.

¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1333 B-1334 A.

² Messenia was liberated from Sparta by Epaminondas in 370/369 B.C.; the 'Lycurgeoan' *agôgê* was abolished at Sparta by Philopoemen in 189 B.C.

³ See Plutarch's *Life of Cleomenes*, ch. xi, and *Life of Agis*, ch. viii. The territory which Cleomenes redivided into his 4,000 new Spartiate allotments was only the territory of the Spartan city-state, and did not include the territories of the dependent but autonomous Laconian city-states which were inhabited by the *περίοικοι*. Cleomenes' forerunner Agis had intended to redivide this perioecic territory into 15,000 allotments and the Spartiate territory into 4,500.

⁴ Plutarch, *Life of Cleomenes*, ch. xxiii.

195 B.C., they found Helots still living on there in their traditional status.¹

The most remarkable feat of Spartan 'Diehardism' was the attempt of the Royal Martyrs, Agis and Cleomenes, to reclothe the dry bones of the 'Lycurgeoan' system in flesh, and to breathe the breath of new life into the corpse, a full century and a half after the great Spartan victory over Athens had sealed the 'Lycurgeoan' system's fate. In this last desperate *tour de force* the derelict wheel of Spartan life was turned, by a supreme conservative effort, so very far back that it actually made a revolution; and this violent movement finally wrecked the long-dislocated mechanism. Cleomenes' surgery effectively killed a body social which it could not possibly cure. The bruised reed was broken by the hand that sought to straighten it; and the smoking flax was quenched for ever by the breath which was intended to rekindle a flame.²

Thereafter Sparta lived wholly in her dreams of the past and distinguished herself—if it be a distinction—in nothing but the peculiar zest with which she threw herself into the academic game of archaism that was in fashion throughout the Hellenic World during the first two centuries of the Roman Empire.³ The Spartans of the Imperial age delighted, like all their contemporaries, in composing honorary inscriptions in a caricature of their obsolete local dialect; but at Sparta these harmless archaistic pedantries were accompanied by at least one archaistic morbidity of a gruesome nature. A primitive fertility-rite of scourging boys at the altar of Artemis Orthia, which had been converted by the 'Lycurgeoan' system, for its own grim but still utilitarian purposes, into a competition in the endurance of pain, was exaggerated, in Plutarch's day, into a sadistic atrocity, in which boys were keyed up to a pitch of hysteria at which they submitted to be flogged to death. 'This would not be incredible of the Spartan youth of the present day', Plutarch writes in recounting the famous legendary story of the Spartan boy and the stolen fox,⁴ 'since I myself have seen numbers of them die under the flogging at Orthia's altar.'⁵ The essence of this scene, in which a superhuman—or inhuman—feat of endurance is performed without flinching, yet to no effect, is characteristic of the Spartan ethos and emblematic of Sparta's fate. For if any Spartiate ever prayed, for the peace of his soul, that *tantus labor non sit cassus*, that prayer was assuredly breathed by Spartan lips in vain.

¹ Livy, Bk. XXXIV, ch. 27.

² Isaiah xliii. 3.

³ For Spartan archaism in the Imperial age, see Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Zweite Reihe [R-Z], Dritter Band (Stuttgart 1929, Metzler), s.v. 'Sparta', pp. 1450-2.

⁴ For this story see p. 65, above.

⁵ Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus*, ch. xviii, *ad init.*

The vanity of Spartan wishes is exposed in the outcome of an otherwise unimportant arbitral transaction which the Roman historian Tacitus records—apparently without realizing its historic significance—in his annals of the Roman Empire in the year 25 of the Christian Era:

'A hearing was given to delegations from the Lacedaemonian and Messenian Governments in the matter of the juridical status of the temple of Diana [i.e. Artemis] Limnâtis. The Lacedaemonians maintained that the temple had been founded by their own Lacedaemonian forefathers on Lacedaemonian territory, and they supported their claim by an appeal to literary evidence, both historical and poetic. They declared that the temple had been taken from them forcibly, in war, by Philip of Macedon, and had afterwards been restored to them on the strength of a legal opinion which had been rendered by Gaius Caesar and Marcus Antonius. The Messenians, on their side, brought up the ancient division of the Peloponnese among the descendants of Hercules [i.e. Héraklēs], and maintained that the territory of Dentheliâtis, in which the temple was situated, had been part of the portion assigned to their king. They declared that there were actual records of the transaction still extant, engraved on stone and on archaic bronze; and they added that, if there was to be an appeal to literary evidence, they could also beat the Lacedaemonians in the amount and in the fullness of the testimony of this kind which they were in a position to cite. As for King Philip's decision, they argued that it had not been an act of arbitrary power, but had been based upon the facts and had been confirmed by identic judgements of the Macedonian king Antigonos and the Roman general Mummîus; by an arbitral decision of the Milesian Government; and most recently by the decision of Atidius Geminus, the Governor of the Roman Province of Achaea. On this showing, judgement was now given in the Messenian Government's favour.'

Thus, in the first century of the Christian Era, the Spartans were still contending—and this last time without success—over the debatable territory in the mountainous borderland between the Eurotas Valley and Messenia which their forefathers had originally contended for, and conquered, in the eighth century B.C. A dispute over the Dentheliâtis was the traditional cause of the First Messeno-Spartan War; and now, after the passage of at least eight centuries, the same dispute between the same two parties over the same insignificant piece of territory was at issue before the arbitral tribunal of the Roman Emperor Tiberius. Assuredly no further proof is needed that the Spartans were veritably a people without a history. And if the reader of this passage from Tacitus happens, like the writer of this Study, to have traversed the Dentheliâtis in person, *en route* through the Langádha defile from Sparta to Kala-

¹ Tacitus: *Annals*, Bk. IV, ch. 43 (*imperante Tiberio Caesare, Anno Christi 25*).

máta, he must have marvelled to think that such a stupendous *tour de force* as the 'Lycurgean' *agógē* should have been evoked by a desire to possess this patch of highland, with its bare scree and scraggy pine-woods and rare flecks of jejune upland pasture. As the traveller wends his weary way over one rocky ridge after another, he will find himself repeating Oxenstierna's aphorism¹ before he arrives at his Messenian journey's end.

The Reversion to Animalism.

The Spartan body social is the last of the arrested civilizations that we have set ourselves to review; and, now that we have concluded our survey, we may perhaps find ourselves able to lay our finger upon certain common characteristics of this particular class of the species of society which is the object of our study. The two characteristics, common to all these arrested civilizations, that stand out prominently are caste and specialization; and both these phenomena can be embraced in a single formula: The individual living creatures which each of these societies embraces are not all of one single homogeneous type, but are distributed among two or three different categories which differ from one another markedly.

It is of the essence of these arrested civilizations that they are socially composite or polymorphous. In the Eskimo Society, for example, there are two castes: the human hunters and their canine auxiliaries who assist them in two capacities: partly as hunting-dogs and partly as sledge-dogs. In the sub-arctic branch of the Nomadic Society, on the Eurasian Tundra, there are three castes: the human herdsmen; the reindeer used as mounts and beasts of burden; and the same reindeer in their other capacity as cattle tended for the sake of their milk and flesh. In the other branches of the Nomadic Society, on the Eurasian and Afrasian Steppes, there are likewise three castes, but with a greater range of variety in the types. Among these Nomads, there are first the herdsmen or shepherds; second, their animal auxiliaries (dogs, horses, and camels); and, third, their cattle (kine, sheep, and goats). In the Ottoman body social we find the equivalents of the three castes of the Nomadic Society with the substitution of human beings for animals. Whereas the polymorphic body social of Nomadism is constituted by the assemblage, into a single society, of human beings and animals who would none of them be capable of making a livelihood on the Steppes in dissociation from their partners, the polymorphic Ottoman body social is constituted by the exactly opposite process of artificially differentiating a naturally homogeneous Humanity into human castes which are treated, by an

¹ See Part I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 463, footnote 2, above.

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inhuman social fiction, as though they differed from one another in nature as widely as human beings actually differ from domesticated animals and as domesticated animals differ among themselves.

This point of unlikeness in the constitutions of those arrested civilizations which are at grips respectively with a physical and with a human environment has been touched upon above;¹ but for our present purpose we may ignore it, since it is a difference of genesis and not a difference of ultimate form. For our present purpose we have simply to take note of the Ottoman castes and of their correspondence to the Nomadic castes. The Ottoman Pādishāh himself is a shepherd of men; his trained human slaves (*qūllar*) correspond to his Nomadic forefathers' auxiliary animals; while the function of the rest of the Pādishāh's subjects in the Ottoman social system is plainly indicated by their official designation as human cattle (*ra'iyeh*). In the 'Lycurgean' system at Sparta we rediscover the same three castes again (though the Spartan community was not of Nomadic origin). In Laconia the Helots are the human cattle, the Spartiate 'Peers' are the human equivalents of the Nomad's trained animal auxiliaries, while the place of the shepherd of sheep or the shepherd of men is occupied at Sparta by an impersonal but not less mighty power: the Law 'whose service is' the 'perfect freedom'² of the Spartiate 'Peers', although—or perhaps because—they stand in just as much awe of it as the slaves of a Xerxes or a Suleymān stand in awe of the Pādishāh.³

This caste system tends to produce some kind of metamorphosis in the various living creatures that become parties to it. The Eskimo's dog and the Nomad's horse and camel are half humanized by their partnership with Man in hunting or tending other animals. On the other hand, the Ottoman *ra'iyeh* and the Laconian Helots are half dehumanized through being treated as human cattle. Other human partners in these associations are transformed into super-human or inhuman monsters and *Mischwesen*. The perfect Spartiate is a Martian, the perfect Janissary a monk, the perfect Nomad a centaur, the perfect Eskimo a merman.

The Spartiate stands self-convicted of being the perfect Martian in the following anecdote:

'Hearing on one occasion that the allies of Sparta were chafing at the perpetual campaigns in which they had to follow the Lacedaemonians' lead when the Lacedaemonians were so inferior to them in numbers, Agesilaus determined to put this question of numbers to the test. So

¹ See pp. 22-3, above.

² The Second Collect, for Peace, in the Order for Morning Prayer of the Book of Common Prayer of the Church of England.

³ For the formula 'Spartan Law: Spartiate Peer = Xerxes: Persian Immortal' see the apocryphal conversation between Xerxes and Dāmarātus which has been cited on pp. 64-5, above.

he ordered all the allies to parade together in one company and the Lacedaemonians to parade separately by themselves. Then he ordered all potters, first, to step out of the ranks; and, when these had stepped out, he next gave the same order to the smiths, and then, in succession, to the carpenters and to the builders until he had run through all the trades. By the end, practically every man of the allies had stepped out, but not a single Lacedaemonian,¹ since the Lacedaemonians were debarred from learning or following any vulgar trade by their constitution. Then Agesilaus laughed and said: "You see, gentlemen, how many more *soldiers* Sparta sends on active service than *you* send."²

The intention of this anecdote is, of course, to glorify the Spartiates at the other Peloponnesians' expense; but, on a more penetrating view, the missile hurled by Agesilaus at his allies' heads looks very like a boomerang. The military superiority of the Spartiates over the non-Spartiates, which is impressive so long as we do not look beyond their respective performances on the battlefield, loses half its glamour as soon as it is brought home to us that the Spartiates are whole-time professionals while their non-Spartiate comrades-in-arms are part-time amateurs. When we give due weight to this crucial point of difference between them, we become inclined to consider the Spartiates' actual superiority less remarkable, in the circumstances, than the fact that the non-Spartiate Peloponnesian amateurs have been able, in their spare time, to turn themselves into good enough soldiers to be able to serve in the same ranks at all with professionals who have had such a vastly greater opportunity of making themselves masters of the military craft. Though the non-Spartiate Peloponnesians naturally cannot emulate the Spartiates in the profession to which the Spartiates have devoted their lives, it is open to them, in compensation, to apply to themselves, in a modest degree, the Athenian boast in which the Athenians took especial pleasure just because it conveyed an implicit criticism of their Spartan rivals' way of life:

'We . . . differ in our military institutions from our opponents. . . . We leave it to them to cultivate manliness by a laborious training from their tender years upwards, while we, with our undisciplined life, are as ready as they to face every reasonable danger. . . . The fact that we preserve a military spirit by a life of ease instead of deliberate hardship and by a natural rather than an artificial courage gives us a double advantage. We are not compelled to anticipate the rigours of war; yet we face them,

¹ This is not strictly accurate, since the citizens of the autonomous cities of Laconia, who served shoulder to shoulder with the Spartiates in the Lacedaemonian Army, were not full-time professional soldiers, but a militia of citizens who normally practised some civilian trade, just like the troops furnished by Sparta's non-Laconian allies. To give the story its proper point, the word 'Spartiate' should be substituted for the word 'Lacedaemonian' throughout the passage.—A. J. T.

² Plutarch: *Apophthegmata Laconica*, *Agesilaus*, No. 72, and *Life of Agesilaus*, ch. xxvi.

when they come, as courageously as those who are in perpetual training. . . . Besides all this, we cultivate the arts without extravagance and the intellect without effeminacy. . . . Our politicians do not neglect their private affairs, and the rest of us devote ourselves to business without losing touch with politics. . . . In short, I maintain that the Commonwealth of Athens is the School of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian will never meet his equal for self-reliance, versatility, and gallantry, in whatever situation he may find himself.¹

Thus the Athenian glorified his own Attic humanism by pointing the contrast with the Martian inhumanity in which the Spartiate took pride. And, if the Spartiate struck his neighbours, and fancied himself, as a Martian 'robot', the Janissary, who was the Ottoman equivalent of a Spartiate 'Peer', made a monkish impression, on first view, upon the mind of the Flemish observer Busbecq:

'In the citadel of Buda there is a permanent garrison of Janissaries . . . and a pair of these Janissaries used generally to wait upon me. When they were shown into the dining-room, they would salute me with bowed heads; and then they would approach me—at a pace which was almost a run—and touch my coat or my hand, as though they were going to kiss it; offer me a bunch of hyacinths or narcissi; and forthwith retire almost as rapidly as they had advanced—this time walking backwards, in order to avoid turning their backs on me (which would be a breach of courtesy in their code of manners). At the door they would stand in silence and with the utmost decorum—their hands folded on their breasts and their eyes downcast—so that they reminded one of our Western monks rather than of our Western soldiers. . . . In fact, if I had not been told beforehand that these were Janissaries, I might easily have mistaken them for some order of Turkish monks, or for the fellows of some kind of college. Yet these are the notorious Janissaries who spread terror wherever they go.'²

As for the Nomad centaur, his portrait is painted in the following passage from the pen of one of the most gifted Western observers of Nomadic life on the Eurasian Steppe:

¹ From the funeral oration delivered by Pericles over the Athenians who had fallen in the first campaign of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C., as reported by Thucydides, Bk. II, chs. 34-46. Compare the passage already quoted from the same speech on p. 64, above.

² *A. Gisleii Busbecqii Omnia quae Extant* (Leyden 1633, Elzevir), pp. 24-5. The same comparison suggested itself to the mind of an English observer more than a century later: 'He who hath run through the several schools, orders, and degrees of the Seraglio must needs be an extraordinary mortified man, patient of all labours, services, and injunctions, which are imposed on him with a strictness beyond the discipline that religious novices are acquainted with in monasteries, or the severity of Capuchins or holy votaries.' (Rycaut, *op. cit.*, Bk. I, ch. v.)

We may take note, in passing, of another important characteristic, besides the virtues of modesty and austerity and self-control, which the Janissaries of Busbecq's day possessed in common with the monastic orders of Western Christendom. The Janissaries resembled the monks, and differed from the Spartiates, in their admirable rule of tempering their professionalism by learning and practising manual trades. For the prominence given to handicrafts in the education of the Ottoman Pādishāh's slave-household, see p. 39, footnote 4, and p. 59, footnote 3, above.

'L'éducation des jeunes Mongols . . . consiste à s'exercer dès l'enfance au maniement de l'arc et du fusil à mèche; l'équitation surtout les absorbe presque entièrement. Aussitôt qu'un enfant est sevré, et que ses forces se sont suffisamment développées, on l'exerce à aller à cheval: on le fait monter en croupe, puis on commence une course au galop, pendant laquelle le jeune cavalier se cramponne de ses deux mains à la robe de son maître. Les Tartares s'accoutument ainsi de bonne heure au mouvement du cheval; et bientôt, à force d'habitude, ils finissent par s'identifier, en quelque sorte, avec leur monture. . . .

'Le Mongol est tellement accoutumé à aller à cheval, qu'il se trouve tout-à-fait désorienté et comme jeté hors de sa sphère, aussitôt qu'il a mis pied à terre. Sa démarche est pesante et lourde; la forme arquée de ses jambes, son buste toujours penché en avant, ses regards qu'il promène incessamment autour de lui, tout annonce un cavalier, un homme qui passe la plus grande partie de ses jours sur un cheval ou sur un chameau.

'Quand les Tartares se trouvent en route pendant la nuit, il arrive souvent qu'ils ne se donnent pas même la peine de descendre de leurs animaux pour prendre leur sommeil. Si on demande aux voyageurs qu'on rencontre où ils ont passé la nuit. . . . *Temen dero* (sur le chameau) répondent-ils, d'une voix mélancolique. C'est un singulier spectacle, que de voir les caravanes faire halte en plein midi, lors qu'elles ont trouvé un gras pâturage. Les chameaux se dispersent de côté et d'autre, broutant les grandes herbes de la prairie, tandis que les Tartares, à califourchon entre les deux bosses de l'animal, dorment d'un sommeil aussi profond que s'ils étaient étendus dans un bon lit.'

Here we are shown the picture of a rider who is so completely at home astride his mount that the twain—man and beast—have virtually become one flesh. And one of our foremost modern Western anthropologists has gone so far as to suggest, in a brilliant imaginative reconstruction of a lost chapter of pre-Nomadic history, that the intimate association of Man and Horse on the Steppe has actually produced far-reaching and permanent modifications in the physical type of the human participants in the partnership.

'It is not necessary to suppose that within the great plateaux of Central Asia there was perennial snow, or a wholly uninhabitable region [during the Ice Age]. Rather the vast accumulations of loess, the deposit of countless dust storms, suggest a "continental" climate with wide variations, and the possibility of at least seasonal occupation by fleet grazing-animals, such as the horse. It is indeed to an intimate parasitic connexion with such an animal "host", in some such circumstances, that we have probably to ascribe the highly specialized type of Man characteristic of this region now. The yellow skin-colour of Mongoloid Man gives him protective camouflage in sandy desert and dry-grass steppe; the structure of his straight wiry hair, and its rarity except on the scalp, suggest adaptation to a continental climate; while its extreme length in

¹ Huc, l'Abbé: *Souvenirs d'un Voyage dans la Tartarie, le Thibet et la Chine pendant les années 1844, 1845, et 1846* (Paris 1850, Le Clere, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 93-5.

both sexes serves to disguise the characteristic profile of the human head and neck, and approximate it to that of a quadruped seen from behind. From the rather prominent jaw combined with globular brain-case may be inferred long habituation to some food which minimized the pull of the jaw-muscles on the side-walls of the skull; and the only food which fulfils this condition is milk and its products, on which Nomad Tartars still live almost exclusively: the absence of face-hair, the short concave nose with spread nostrils, the peculiar infantile lips, the wide flat face and obliquely set eyes, are adaptations we should expect if for ages this milk was absorbed direct from the udder; and the short legs of some Mongoloids, and poor development of the calf-muscles in all, suggest that, like Tartar infants nowadays, the parasitic proto-Mongol sat tight upon his host between meals, and shared its wanderings. On the Steppes of glacial Europe, Man hunted and ate the horse; if we suppose that in Central Asia, during the same and perhaps in long earlier periods, he made friends with him and lived upon his friendship, we seem to have a clue to the paradox of the emergence of a highly specialized breed of Man from a region which had been for a very long time so little suited, except on these terms, to sustain him at all.¹

This Mongol centaur of the Eurasian Steppe has his counterpart in the Eskimo merman of the American arctic waters. While the Nomad has become of one flesh with his domesticated animal mount, the Eskimo—reacting to an equally severe physical environment by performing an equally exacting, and exact, *tour de force*—has become, so to speak, of one skin with his man-made inanimate water-craft. The Eskimo kayak is an adaptation, for sea-faring, of the canoe in which the Esquimaux's North American Indian cousins navigate their inland waters. In kayak and canoe the structural element is identical. Both types of craft are built round a wooden framework. But whereas the Indian canoe is an open boat with a hull of birch bark, the Eskimo kayak, which has to face heavier weather, is covered with seal-skin and is decked over, as well, with the same material.

'As a rule, each hunter makes his kayak for himself, and it is fitted to the man's size just like a garment. . . .

'In the middle of the kayak's deck there is a hole just large enough to enable a man to get his legs through it and to sit down; his thighs almost entirely fill the aperture. Thus it takes a good deal of practice before one can slip into or out of the kayak with any sort of ease. The hole is surrounded by the kayak-ring, which consists of a hoop of wood. It stands a little more than an inch (3 or 3½ centimetres) above the kayak's deck, and the waterproof jacket . . . is drawn over it.

¹ Myres, J. L.: 'Primitive Man in Geological Time', in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. i, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1924, University Press), p. 22. These fascinating speculations are an admirable mythological expression of the truth about the Nomad's relation to his environment, even though they may be beyond the range of scientific verification.

'In fair weather the kayak-man uses the so-called half-jacket (*akui-lisak*). This is made of water-tight skin with the hair removed, and is sewn with sinews. Round its lower margin runs a draw-string, or rather a draw-thong, by means of which the edge of the jacket can be made to fit so closely to the kayak-ring that it can only be pressed and drawn down over it with some little trouble. This done, the half-jacket forms, as it were, a water-tight extension of the kayak. The upper margin of the jacket comes close up to the armpits of the kayak-man, and is supported by braces or straps, which pass over the shoulders and can be lengthened or shortened by means of handy runners or buckles of bone, so simple and yet so ingenious that we, with all our metal buckles and so forth, cannot equal them. . . . This half-jacket is enough to keep out the smaller waves which wash over the kayak. In a heavier sea, on the other hand, the whole-jacket (*tuilik*) is used. This is made in the same way as the half-jacket and, like it, fits close to the kayak-ring, but is longer above, has sleeves attached to it, and a hood which comes right over the head. It is laced right round the face and wrists, so that, with it on, the kayak-man can go right through the breakers and can capsize and right himself again, without getting wet and without letting a drop of water into the kayak.

'It will readily be understood that it is not easy to sit in a vessel like the kayak without capsizing, and that it needs a good deal of practice to master its peculiarities. . . . But when one has acquired by practice a mastery of the kayak and of the two-bladed paddle, one can get through the water in all sorts of weather at an astonishing speed. The kayak is beyond comparison the best boat for a single oarsman ever invented.

'In order to become an accomplished kayak-man, one ought to begin early. The Greenland boys often begin to practise in their father's kayak at from six to eight years old, and when they are ten or twelve the provident Greenlander gives his sons kayaks of their own. . . . From this age onwards, the young Greenlander remains a toiler of the sea. . . .

'You cannot rank as an expert kayak-man until you have mastered the art of righting yourself after capsizing. . . . An Eskimo told me of another who was so extraordinarily skilful at righting himself that he could do it in every possible way: with or without an oar, with or without a throwing-stick, or with his clenched hand. The only thing he could not right himself with was—his tongue! . . .

'A kayak-man who has entirely mastered the art of righting himself can defy almost any weather. If he is capsized, he is on even keel again in a moment, and can play like a sea-bird with the waves, and cut right through them. . . . The prettiest feat of seamanship I have ever heard of is that to which some fishers, I am told, have recourse among overwhelming rollers. As the sea curls down over them they voluntarily capsize, receive it on the bottom of the kayak, and when it has passed right themselves again.'

This perfect unison between the Eskimo and his kayak or be-

* Nansen, F.: *Eskimo Life* (London 1893, Longmans, Green & Co.), pp. 46-54. The whole relevant passage, from p. 44 to p. 77 inclusive, is worth studying.

tween the Nomad and his mount is a marvellous *tour de force*; and, when we contemplate it, our first impression is that we are viewing one of the highest flights of human achievement. This impression is not false so far as it goes; but there is another aspect of the picture which comes to light after further consideration. In either case, the essence of the achievement is the mastery, by a human being, of some non-human animal's prowess.¹ The Nomad centaur acquires the prowess of a horse, the Eskimo merman the prowess of a seal; and for human beings these accomplishments are extraordinarily difficult. The difficulty, however, lies just in this, that an animal is enabled to perform its specific prodigies thanks to the organic—and therefore one-sided and rigid and unalterable—adaptation of its physique to just these particular functions and to these functions only. The animal solves its problem by developing a special permanent organ or a special permanent instinct for the purpose, whereas the man who seeks to emulate the animal's feat has been endowed by Nature with no physical equipment except the human eye and human hand, and with the mental equipment of an errant amateur reason in place of an infallible professional instinct.² The *tour de force* is manifestly so very difficult indeed that we ask ourselves how it is possible for human beings to perform it at all; and then, upon further examination, we observe that they actually perform it by a device which is so obvious that we ought to have detected it *a priori*.³

¹ 'An ingenious hunting device can take the place of fleetness of foot or sharpness of tooth or talon.' (Weyer, *op. cit.*, p. 65.)

² 'La vie est un certain effort pour obtenir certaines choses de la matière brute, et . . . instinct et intelligence, pris à l'état achevé, sont deux moyens d'utiliser à cet effet un outil: dans le premier cas, l'outil fait parti de l'être vivant; dans l'autre, c'est un instrument inorganique, qu'il a fallu inventer, fabriquer, apprendre à manier.' Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 122. The same point is put very clearly by Ibn Khaldūn: 'To every animal, God has given an organ specially designed for repelling its enemies. But to Man He has given, instead, the human intelligence and the human hand. The hand, under the control of the intelligence, is always ready to work at the arts; and the arts furnish Man with the instruments that replace, for him, the organs that have been assigned to the other animals for their defence. Thus lances take the place of horns, swords the place of claws, shields the place of tough thick hides.' (*Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 87.)

³ The extremeness of the *tour de force* which is performed by the Eskimo is forcibly represented by Weyer in *op. cit.* on p. 65. Weyer points out that 'physically the Eskimo is in all essential characteristics like other men. Strip him of his clothing, deprive him of his tools and implements, his dwellings, and his ability to create these things essential to life, and he would be scarcely more fit to survive in his northern environment than a savage from the tropical jungle'. *A fortiori*, the Eskimo is at a physical disadvantage, in the struggle for existence in this environment, by comparison with the non-human fauna which he has found in the field and at whose expense he makes his livelihood. Weyer points out that 'what' the Eskimo 'lacks as a physical organism he acquires through ingenuity and invention', and that 'in this manner Man's culture takes the place of physical adaptations among the lower animals'. Weyer, however, does not go on to point out in this connexion that, while 'the Eskimo cannot compete with the animals as an animal' and 'is not compelled to', it is also true that he has assimilated himself to the non-human fauna of his physical environment in a subtler way by sacrificing the adaptability, which is the distinctive quality of his distinctive mental powers, and forcing his mobile human spirit, as far as it can be forced, into the rigid posture of animal automatism—as is suggested in the present Study in the paragraphs that here follow.

These Esquimaux and Nomads and 'Osmanlis and Spartiates achieve what they achieve by putting off their human nature as far as possible, and assuming an animal nature instead. If, being human, they cannot really live and act by instinct, they can still train reason to simulate instinct by imprisoning their thought within the confines of a 'single-track mind'. And if they cannot grow the flippers and tails and waterproof skins of seals to make them at home in the sea, or the legs of horses to make them at home on the Steppe, or the fangs of wolves to give them dominion over human cattle, they can at least extend the limited capacities of their human limbs by devising instruments—animate or inanimate—with which they teach their own arms and legs to enter into such an exquisitely harmonious co-operation that the effect is almost as though they had succeeded in adding a cubit to their stature. The Eskimo acquires an artificial seal's body in the shape of his kayak and an artificial pair of flippers in the shape of his double-bladed paddle. The Nomad acquires an artificial horse's or camel's body in the shape of his mount. The Spartiate acquires an artificial fang in the shape of his spear-head and an artificial carapace in the shape of his shield.¹

These are, indeed, miracles of human will-power and human ingenuity; but the faculty of working miracles has to be bought at a price, and in this case the price turns out to be so high that those human beings who have consented to pay it might have done better to reject it as prohibitive. The price paid has been nothing less than the determined and systematic repudiation of those very qualities of the human hand and the human eye and the human reason which are distinctive of human nature. The distinctive quality of the human mind is its adaptability. With its manifold analytic and synthetic and mimetic mental faculties, and its versatile physical informants and executants the human eye and the human hand, the mind of Man is capable of unlimited achievement on the one condition that it faithfully follows the bent of its own genius.²

¹ In the song of Hybrias (the uncouth Cretan cousin of Spartan Brasidas and Leonidas and Agesilaus), the spear and shield and sword are recognized, with conscious cynicism, as being the artificial organs through which a human parasite contrives to live upon the labours of an unwilling human 'host':

I have great riches, spear and sword
And raw-hide fluttering at my breast;
My land is ploughed, my harvest stored,
My sweet wine from the vintage pressed,
The Mnoan trash hath learnt its Lord,
By spear and sword.

And all who dare not walk with spear
And sword and raw-hide fluttering,
They needs must kiss my knees, and cling,
And hail me, cowering in their fear,
Lord and Great King!

(Translation by Gilbert Murray.)

² As Weyer expresses it (in op. cit., on p. 66), 'men can modify their culture, whereas

In forcing their human minds into the similitude of animal psychology, and their human legs and arms into the similitude of animal morphology, the Esquimaux and the Nomads and the 'Osmanlis and the Spartans have betrayed their own humanity. They have set their feet on the path of retrogression from humanity towards the animalism out of which Humanity evolved itself once upon a time by one of the greatest creative acts that have yet been achieved in the life-history of the Universe. They have committed the unpardonable sin of Lot's Wife, and in committing it they have duly brought upon themselves the Biblical penalty. Like pillars of salt, they stand bewitched and arrested for ever at the very outset of their life's journey, as an awful warning to other civilizations that are in the act of making their own transition from genesis to exodus.

'The necessity for effort—the "struggle for existence" in the most general sense—has from age to age raised the average level of independence, the measure of individuality's perfection in living beings. In spite of this general rise of level, there has been in every age a falling away, a decline in perfection of individuality in certain species. This decreased independence reveals itself not only as structural degeneration but also in degeneration's opposite, structural specialization. There is, however, a common cause beneath these opposed effects, and that is over-close adaptation, adaptation to very narrow conditions.

'It is self-evident that all organisms must be more or less adapted to their surroundings; in other words they must be more or less dependent upon their environment. Failure to exist in any but a very limited environment is obviously a weakness, a lack of independence, and it seems to be a fact that adaptation to any such limited environment makes it impossible or very difficult for an animal to exist in any other environment. The very success of the adaptation decreases the creature's adaptability.'¹

Insect Societies and Human Utopias

If we wish for corroborative evidence in support of our conclusion that the turn taken, at the outset, by the Spartan and the 'Osmanli and the Eskimo and the Nomadic Civilization was a blind alley, we shall find what we seek by comparing the social structure of these four actual arrested human societies with that of the imaginary human societies called Utopias, or again with that of the

animals cannot modify their bodily organisms appreciably'. And he goes on to maintain that the application of 'this interpretation of cultural evolution' to the Esquimaux 'is uncommonly striking'. This is, of course, manifestly true if we confine our attention to the first chapter in the Esquimaux's cultural history—the chapter, that is to say, which covers their original feat of adapting their life to the Arctic physical environment. On the other hand, in the ensuing chapter the Esquimaux have hardened into a cultural immobility which is the very antithesis of the characteristic human habitus and which is, *pace* Weyer, very strongly reminiscent of the comparative fixity of the animals.

¹ Huxley, J. S.: *The Individual in the Animal Kingdom* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 131-2.

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social insects. If we enter into the comparison, we shall discern in an ant-heap and in a bee-hive, as well as in Plato's *Republic* or in Mr. Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* or in Mr. H. G. Wells's fantasy of a lunar society, the same outstanding features that we have now learnt to recognize in all the arrested civilizations which we have been studying. The two phenomena of caste and specialization, and the fatally perfect adaptation of the society to its particular environment which these two phenomena bring about between them, are just as characteristic of the Utopian and the Insect World as they are of the four actual human societies, just examined, which have suffered arrest. And these resemblances are significant, since the insect societies and the Utopias are both patently in a state of arrested development likewise.

The social insects rose to their present social heights, and came to a permanent standstill at those altitudes, many millions of years before *Homo Sapiens* began to emerge above the mean level of the rank and file of the Vertebrate Order.¹ And as for the Utopias, they are static not only as a matter of fact but *ex hypothesi*. For these fictitious descriptions of imaginary human societies that have never existed are really programmes of action masquerading in the disguise of descriptive sociology; and the action which they are intended to evoke is the 'pegging', at a certain social level, of an actual society which has broken down and has entered upon a decline that must end in a fall unless the downward movement can be artificially arrested. To arrest a downward movement is the utmost to which a Utopia can aspire, since Utopias seldom begin to be written in any society until after its members have lost the expectation and ambition of making further progress and have been cowed by adversity into being content if they can succeed in holding the ground which has been won for them by their fathers. Hence, in almost all Utopias—with the noteworthy exception of that work of English genius which has given this whole genre of literature its modern Western name²—an invincibly stable equilibrium is the

¹ Wheeler, W. M.: *Social Life among the Insects* (London, no date, Constable), pp. 6-9.

² In More's *Utopia* there are indeed traces of those elements, copied or caricatured from the living reality of the 'Lycurgeoan' system of Sparta, which we shall have occasion to notice below in glancing at the Athenian Utopias of the age immediately posterior to the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization in the Great War of 431-404 B.C. For example, More's Utopians entertain and display a supreme contempt for the precious metals (ch. vi), and in the communal messes the menial domestic service is performed by bondsmen. Yet, considering More's great knowledge of, and deep regard for, the Greek and Latin classics, and the high prestige of Hellenic Antiquity in the Western World of More's day, it is really surprising that the traces of Plato's and Aristotle's influence in More's *Utopia* are not more prominent than they are. And it is still more remarkable to find More parting company with his Hellenic ensamples in matters which are clearly of fundamental importance. For example, the contempt for the precious metals is offset by the importance which is assigned, in the same chapter, to overseas trade (ch. vi). Again, the employment of bondsmen in menial domestic service is reduced

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supreme social aim to which all other social values are subordinated and, if need be, sacrificed.

This is true of the Hellenic Utopias which were conceived at Athens in the schools of philosophy that arose there, or established themselves there, in the age immediately following the catastrophe of 431-404 B.C., in which the Hellenic Civilization had broken down.¹ It is also true of certain modern Western Utopias which have been conceived in England either shortly after or shortly before the catastrophe of A.D. 1914-18: a great war which may or may not prove to have been the undoing of our own Western Civilization.²

The Utopias which were published in Athens in the fourth century B.C. bear the marks of their time and their place. Their negative inspiration is a profound hostility to Athenian democracy. For, after the death of Pericles, Athenian democracy had dissolved its brilliant partnership with Athenian culture under the stress of the Great War; it had developed a crazy and virulent militarism that brought devastation upon the world in which Athenian culture

to its true proportions when we find (in ch. viii, *ad init.*) that the institution of bondage is maintained in Utopia not—as in 'Lycurgeoan' Sparta or in the imaginary commonwealths of Plato and Aristotle—for the purpose of liberating a privileged caste of citizens from ordinary economic employments and preoccupations, but simply as a humane substitute for the death penalty. There is no question of the free citizens of Utopia being a parasitic dominant class; for they all do an honest day's work with their own hands (ch. vi). Nor is More obsessed, as Plato and Aristotle are, by Malthusian anxieties. In Utopia, there is no artificial postponement of marriage. The marriageable age is 18 for women and 22 for men (ch. viii), and an occasional surplus of population is looked upon as a normal phenomenon which is all in the day's work. When the problem of over-population arises in Utopia, it is solved by colonization overseas in under-populated territories where Utopian settlers can find new homes for themselves without having to evict the previous inhabitants (ch. v, *ad init.*).

It will be seen that More's Utopia differs from its Hellenic predecessors and from its modern Western successors alike in being almost wholly free from those elements of caste and specialization and static social rigidity which are the outstanding characteristics of Utopias as a class. This is really extraordinary when we bear in mind that while Sir Thomas More welcomed the renaissance of Hellenic culture in the Western Society of his age, he deplored the simultaneous transition of the Western Society out of its 'medieval' into its 'modern' phase. A social metamorphosis which, in our perspective, can be seen to have been no more than the passage from one chapter to the next chapter in the same Western story, must have seemed to More, living in the midst of it, very like an irreparable breakdown of the Western Civilization itself in the form in which he knew it and loved it. In these circumstances, we should have expected More to write a *Utopia* of a thoroughly Platonic and Aristotelian flavour; and the fact that he actually makes his own the opposite ideal of elasticity and growth is an enigma which has to be explained. Perhaps the true explanation may be that More was sub-consciously aware of being a member of a lustily growing society all the time, notwithstanding his conscious conviction that the world in which he had grown up was falling to pieces.

¹ Bergson finds the same bent in the metaphysical as well as in the social speculations of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. See the critique in *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 257-61. The 'post-war' French philosopher arraigns the 'post-war' Athenian philosophers for trying to 'peg' the flux of the Universe, as mirrored in human experience, upon the rigid scheme of the human thinking-apparatus.

² The generation now alive will not live to know whether the wound dealt to our Western Society in 1914-18 has been mortal or not, though the truth—whatever it may be—will doubtless be manifest, several centuries hence, to our descendants. On this question, see further Part XII, below.

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had found its air and light and nourishment; and it had capped its great sin of omission—the failure to win the War—with a sin of commission—the judicial murder of Socrates—which was certainly more wanton and was naturally more heinous in the philosophers' eyes.

The first concern of the Athenian post-war philosophers was to repudiate everything that, for two centuries past, had made Athens economically and politically great. This comes out almost startlingly in a passage in Plato's *Laws*, in which the fictitious 'Athenian Stranger' makes his first observations upon an imaginary project for the establishment of a new city-state on a depopulated area in Crete.

ATHENIAN STRANGER. 'If the city were going to be built at the seaside and were going to find itself well-supplied with natural harbours but ill-supplied with many of the necessities of life instead of being endowed with a soil that produced something of everything, then it would have needed a mighty saviour and divinely inspired legislators if it was to escape the moral heterogeneity and the moral corruption which are the penalty of this type of physical environment. . . . For the sea is an insidious neighbour which makes itself agreeable to a country in the daily intercourse of the two elements but is intrinsically salt and bitter, in as much as it fills the country with tradesmen's business and the souls of the country's inhabitants with tortuousness and deceit and the body politic itself with distrust and disaffection both in its internal life and in its foreign relations. These social evils are to some extent counteracted if the soil produces something of everything; and, if it is also a rough highland country, it is evident that it will not produce this something of everything, that it does produce, in lavish quantities. If it did do that, it would provide a large export surplus and would attract to itself an equivalent import of gold and silver currency—and that is the greatest conceivable disaster, from the moral standpoint, by which a community can be overtaken. . . .¹

[As for sea power], 'it would have profited the Athenians to lose seventy times seven children a year [by having to send them as tribute to the legendary Cretan sea-lord Minos] before turning themselves [in self-defence] into seamen instead of heavy infantry and so losing the habit of standing fast, and acquiring in its place the habit of perpetually jumping ashore and then retreating to their ships again at a run, hardly a moment after they have made their landing. This method of warfare extinguishes any sense of shame at being too cowardly to risk one's life by standing one's ground and receiving the enemy's attack and suggests facile and plausible excuses for leaving one's arms in the enemy's hands and taking to one's heels—never, of course, "in disorder" but invariably "according to plan". . . . There is nothing so demoralizing for infantry in action as a hospitable fleet riding at anchor in their rear. Why, even

¹ Compare with the foregoing paragraph Aristotle, *Politics*, 1326 B-1327 A.—A. J. T.

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lions, if they took to tactics of that sort, would take to running away from deer.¹

'Moreover, sea power practises a kind of inverse selection upon the manhood of a country by awarding political office as well as immunity from being killed in action to the least desirable elements. Sea power depends upon the warrant officers and petty officers and able bodied seamen; these naval ratings are a miscellaneous and not a very reputable body of men; and in such circumstances it is impossible for office to be conferred upon those who are worthy of it. Now, when once it ceases to be possible in politics to put the right man in the right place, how can a country's political life possibly remain healthy?'

CLINIAS OF CRETE. 'How indeed? Yet, all the same, Sir—Well, what about the battle of Salamis? That, after all, was a naval battle in which the Hellenes beat the barbarians; and it is our belief in Crete that this naval victory was the salvation of Hellas.'

ATHENIAN STRANGER. 'I know that is the general view both in Hellas and in the Orient. But in our belief, Sir—and by "us" I mean myself and my Lacedaemonian friend, here, Megillus—it was the land-battles at Marathon and Plataea that were the day-spring of the salvation of Hellas and the crowning mercy. And we also believe that these land victories left the Hellenes better men than they found them, but that the effect of the naval victories was in the contrary sense.'²

The unavowed but unmistakable thesis of the Platonic and Aristotelian Utopia is that Hellas could, and should, be saved by a fraternization between the discredited Athenian democracy's two arch-enemies: Athenian philosophy and the 'Lycurgeoan' system of social life which was the secret of the greatness of Sparta. If Athenian democracy had broken faith with Athenian culture, Athenian culture might still avenge its own wrongs, and save the Hellenic Civilization into the bargain, by contracting a new alliance with the rival social system which (to all appearance) had just proved its superiority over the Athenian democracy in the ordeal of battle. The Platonic and Aristotelian programme is to 'peg' the Hellenic Society at the social level of a 'Lycurgeoan' system which is to be improved in two ways: first, through being worked out to logical extremes, and, secondly, through being supplemented by the imposition of a sovereign intellectual caste, in the likeness of the

¹ Contrast the following passage in Pericles' Funeral Speech as reported by Thucydides in Book II, chs. 35-46:

'The Lacedaemonians never invade our country alone, but with the combined forces of their confederacy, whereas, when we attack our neighbours, we seldom find difficulty in defeating them, though we are the invaders and they are defending their homes. Again, our united forces have never yet been faced by any opponent, because we are continually dispersing them on expeditions by land, in addition to the requirements of our fleet. Yet, whenever they encounter a fraction of our forces and defeat them, they boast that they have been victorious against our total strength, while, if they are worsted, they maintain that it has taken our total strength to secure the victory.'

² Plato, *Leges*, Bk. IV, *ad imit.*, 704 A-707 C. The whole passage reads almost like a deliberate rejoinder, point for point, to the eulogy of Athens in Pericles' Funeral Speech as reported by Thucydides in Bk. II, chs. 35-46.

Athenian philosophers themselves, upon a military caste which is to be created in the image of the Spartiate 'Peers', but is to be taught, in the Utopian orchestra, to play second fiddle.¹

In Plato's mind, the enthronement of the philosophers in the seats of the mighty is the great thing.

'Unless . . . either the philosophers receive royal authority in the states of Hellas or the present so-called kings and sovereigns take to philosophy, and take to it genuinely and thoroughly; and unless there is a personal union between these two things, political power and philosophy; and unless the majority of the personalities which at present enter upon the one career and upon the other are forcibly excluded from entry: unless these conditions are fulfilled there cannot possibly be any cessation of evils . . . for the states of Hellas, nor indeed, in my opinion, any for the Human Race.'²

Yet even in Plato's *Republic*, and *a fortiori* in Plato's *Laws* and in the last two books of Aristotle's *Politics*, the dry bones of 'Lycurgian' Sparta stick out gauntly through the tender Athenian philosophic skin. In their condonation of caste, in their penchant towards specialization, and in their passion for establishing an invincible equilibrium at any price, the Athenian philosophers of the fourth century B.C. show themselves docile pupils of the Spartan statesmen of the sixth.

In the matter of caste, the thought of Plato and Aristotle is tainted with that Racism³ which has been one of the besetting sins of our own Western Society in its modern age, but which is something alien from the Hellenic genius. Plato's conceit of 'the Noble Lie'⁴ is a delicate device for suggesting the notion that, between one human being and another, there may be physical and psychic differences of such degree and such importance as to constitute a diversity of morphological type of the same order as the diversity between human beings and animals or between different animals of diverse species. This notion is worked out in more prosaic and therefore more brutal terms in Aristotle's discussion of the moral basis of the institution of Slavery.

'When any human beings . . . differ in nature from their fellows by as wide a remove as bodies from souls and animals from humanity (and this is the case with human beings whose utility lies in bodily labour exclusively, and that is the best that can be got out of them), then such individuals may be identified as natural-born slaves (*φύσει δοῦλοι*). . . .

¹ The second of these two improvements was first worked out 'in real life' by the 'Osmanlis, who certainly knew nothing at all about the social institutions of Sparta and probably very little about the social theories of Plato. (See pp. 33 and 50, above.)

² Plato, *Republic*, Bk. V, 473 C-D.

³ For Racism see Part II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, above.

⁴ Plato, *Republic*, Bk. III, 414 B-D. The passage will be found in translation in II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, on pp. 247-8, above.

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The natural-born slave is . . . a human being who participates in the rational faculty to the extent of being responsive to it without being capable of exercising it. The other animals are not even responsive to reason but are governed by their sensations. However, this makes little difference from the utilitarian standpoint. For bodily contributions towards the performance of elementary social service are what we obtain from both alike—from human slaves and from domestic animals. It is the intention of Nature to establish a morphological difference between the bodily types of freemen and slaves, corresponding to the differentiation between their functions. . . . But in actual fact the opposite frequently occurs, and one finds slaves with freemen's bodies and even slaves with freemen's souls. [These exceptions to the rule obscure the truth]; for it is manifest that if even the merely bodily diversity were of the same order as the diversity between the statues of the Gods and the physique of mortals, then the enslavement of the physically inferior type to the physically superior type would be universally approved by public opinion. And if this is true in the case of bodily diversity, the same distinction could be drawn with far more justice if the diversity were spiritual. But of course it is not so easy to discern spiritual as it is to discern physical beauty. . . .¹

Aristotle goes on to expound the arguments of the anti-slavery party in the Hellenic World of his day, and notes their refusal to admit that any human beings should be called slaves except barbarians. But, in recording this exception, he not unfairly comments that it is tantamount to accepting the hypothesis of 'the natural-born slave' which Aristotle himself has put forward.

On the strength of this social theory, the Athenian social reformers prescribe a caste-system which reproduces or caricatures almost all the 'Lycurgeoan' idiosyncrasies. Plato's 'human watch-dogs'² are reproductions of the Spartiate 'Peers' and anticipations of the Ottoman Pādishāh's slave-household, while Aristotle's prescription is indistinguishable from the Laconian reality.

'Tillers of the soil and artisans and all the other elements of a labour force are indispensable necessities in commonwealths, but the only true members of the body politic are the military and the statesmen. The division between these three castes is absolute as between the labour force and the other two, but not impassable as between these other two *vis-à-vis* one another.'³

In the philosophers' precepts on specialization, their 'Lycurgeoan' inspiration obtrudes itself, if possible, still more clearly. 'Human

¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. I, 1254 B.

² For a sketch of these 'human watch-dogs', see *Republic*, Bk. II, 375 A-376 B; and Bk. III, 416 A-C.

³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1329 A 35-9. Aristotle rejects Plato's prescription of an intellectual governing caste which is to be segregated from the military caste *ab initio* and to exercise authority over it at all times (an idea which Plato rightly believed to be the most important contribution in the *Republic* to Hellenic social philosophy). Aristotle is content to recruit his senate from time-expired soldiers.

watch-dogs' are to be bred by compulsory selective mating, just like literal dogs and horses and poultry and other domestic animals;¹ and in the *Republic* Plato goes so far as to abolish outright the institutions of marriage and the family,² which 'Lycurgus' had been content to leave in existence at Sparta when once he had ensured that they should not interfere with the efficient working of his system. Children, both male and female, are to be kept in communal crèches from the outset—even before they are weaned—³ instead of being allowed to grow up at home as Spartan boys were allowed until the end of their seventh year and Spartan girls more or less until they were given in marriage.⁴ Private property is to be abolished:⁵ a great leap in the dark beyond the rudimentary collectivism of 'Lycurgeoan' Sparta, where, as we have seen, private property was jealously preserved and was distributed ever more unequally in spite of the socialistic endowment of every Spartiate 'Peer' with a state-owned allotment of real property, and in spite of the custom by which the 'Peers' made free with one another's hounds and horses, as well as with the stores in their hunting-lodges out in the country (in the same spirit in which English 'public-school' boys 'borrow' one another's bicycles and cricket-bats).⁶ The soldier who is to be the finished product of this social system is to be as professional in his soldiering as an artisan is in his trade.⁷ The 'human watch-dog' cannot and will not be happy; but his personal happiness is of no account; for the individual human being exists, not for his own sake, but in order to promote the welfare of the commonwealth of which he is a member.⁸ His function is to be a part of a corporate social whole; and the metaphor of the 'body politic' is to be translated, as far as may be, into a reality. The human cells of Leviathan are to be subordinated, on theory, to the social pseudo-organism as the protoplasmic cells of a human body are subordinated in fact to the genuine organism in which they cohere. 'A commonwealth approaches constitutional

¹ Plato, *Republic*, Bk. V, 459 A-460 B; cp. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1334 B-1336 A.

² Plato, *Republic*, Bk. V, 457 C-D.

³ Plato, *Republic*, Bk. V, 460 B-D. For Aristotle's precepts on the rearing of children, see *Politics*, 1336 A-1337 A.

⁴ It is, of course, only logical that, in the *Republic*, the upbringing of girls is to be socialized as thoroughly as that of boys; for (as we have noted already by anticipation) women are to be just as eligible for becoming 'watch-dogs' as men; and since they are to have the same duties, they must obviously have the same education to prepare them for this. For this complete abolition of the social inequality between the sexes, which of course goes far beyond the status accorded to women at Sparta, see Plato, *Republic*, Bk. V, 451 D-457 B, and the burlesque anticipation of this Platonic theme in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*.

⁵ Plato, *Republic*, Bk. III, 416 D-417 B.

⁶ For this custom among the Spartiate 'Peers', see Xenophon, *Lacedaemoniorum Respublica*, ch. vi, and Aristotle, *Politics*, 1263 A, 35-7.

⁷ Plato, *Republic*, Bk. II, 374 B-D.

⁸ Plato, *Republic*, Bk. IV, 419 A-421 C.

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perfection in so far as it approximates to the constitution of a single human being.¹

Not happiness and not progress, but stability, is the Alpha and Omega of the Athenian philosopher's social creed. Aristotle, in his matter-of-fact way, envisages this much-desired social stability statistically. There is an optimum size both for the population of a commonwealth² and for its territory;³ and, in his anxiety to keep his population stable at the optimum figure, Aristotle allows his train of thought to carry him so far out of range of practical possibilities that he actually prescribes a difference of nearly twenty years between the respective statutory marriageable ages for women and for men. His women are to marry at 18 and his men at about 37, in order that the son (who is presumably to be an only son in every case) may not approach the statutory marriageable age in his turn until his father is conveniently ready to die off and make room for an heir to step into possession of the family allotment!⁴

In this fantastic prescription, Aristotle is consciously departing from the practice of 'Lycurgus'; for in 'Lycurgeoan' Sparta there was no regulation of the Spartiate population on economic considerations. When Spartiate male infants were destroyed, they were destroyed solely on eugenic grounds; and, as we have seen,⁵ the 'Lycurgeoan' State—like the Fascist State in our own society—deliberately encouraged Spartiate fathers to rear as many sons as they could, so long as the boys were physically fit. In commenting on the 'Lycurgeoan' social policy, Aristotle points out⁶ that the breeding of the largest attainable number of adult Spartiate males in a commonwealth which only disposed of a rigidly limited number of land-allotments for the endowment of Spartiate 'Peers' was bound to produce a pauper surplus of Spartiate male population. This residue of disinherited citizens, who had been disappointed of their natural expectations, and had been condemned to live in poverty and idleness through no personal fault of their own, would evidently be prone to revolution; and, as a grave and standing menace to the stability of the 'Lycurgeoan' constitution, their existence at Sparta strikes Aristotle as a palpable flaw in the 'Lycurgeoan' system. Accordingly, when he comes to offer his own prescription for a stable society, he makes a heroic effort to prevent this particular flaw from arising. He does not realize that, even if his scheme for keeping his population at one absolutely constant figure were feasible, his very success in carrying the pursuit of stability to this

¹ Plato, *Republic*, Bk. V, 462 c. For a critique of this conception of the relation between individual human beings and human societies, see III. C (ii) (a), below.

² Aristotle, *Politics*, 1325 B-1326 B; cp. Plato, *Republic*, 423 B.

³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1326 B-1327 A.

⁵ On p. 59, above.

⁴ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1334 B-1335 A.

⁶ Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. II, 1270 B.

extreme would remorselessly defeat its own object by extinguishing the last spark of his imaginary commonwealth's vitality. The Spartan statesmen who had created the 'Lycurgeoan' system some two centuries earlier had been wiser in their generation. They can scarcely have been unaware of the gravity of the menace to which the 'Lycurgeoan' constitution was, and always would be, exposed on account of the Spartiate 'Inferiors' inevitable revolutionary proclivities; but we may conjecture that they called this disinherited caste into existence with their eyes open. They realized that, if Sparta was to live at all, she must have a reservoir of man-power; that if this was an absolute social necessity, it could not be purchased at too high a social price; and that an element of pressure and elasticity might be not merely a necessary evil, but even perhaps an indispensable good in a social system that was otherwise altogether rigid and static.

So much for Aristotle's pursuit of social stability through statistical ingenuities. And as for Plato, who follows his own bent by pursuing this same Utopian aim on the plane of intellect and imagination, he involves himself in proclaiming a ban upon poets which might have issued from the mouth of a Spartan Overseer, and in establishing a general censorship over 'dangerous thought' which has its analogues, in the Westernized World of to-day, in the obscurantist regulations of Communist Russia and National-Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy and Militarist Japan.¹

The Utopian programme of the fourth-century Athenian philosophers was a forlorn hope, for the 'Lycurgeoan' system, in which they put their trust, was visibly crumbling at the very time when they were seeking to arrest the incipient decline of the Hellenic Civilization by 'pegging' it to the Spartan rock. The philosophers' failure was proved in a general way retrospectively by the continuance of the decline, which persisted, with alternate rallies and relapses, until, some eight centuries after 'the beginning of evils' in 431 B.C., it ended in an irretrievable fall.² But the inadequacy of this kind of Utopia for the salvation of Hellas was also demon-

¹ For the Platonic censorship of Literature, see *Republic*, Bk. III, 306 A-398 B; and Bk. X, 595 A-608 B; *Laws*, 663 D-664 D. The touches of whimsical Platonic humour with which the heaviness of the passages in the *Republic* is skilfully relieved should not be interpreted as implying that the policy here set forth is not intended by Plato to be taken seriously by his readers. For the Platonic censorship on the expression of private opinion in matters of morality and theology, see *Laws* 662 B-663 A and 907 A-910 E. In the last of the passages here cited, the atheist who preaches his atheism without malice aforethought is condemned to confinement in a reformatory for a minimum period of five years, with death as the penalty for invincible ignorance. The wilful propagandist of atheism is condemned to solitary confinement for life. For the restriction upon travel and migration, see *Laws* 949 E-953 E. On the whole subject of Plato's authoritarianism and obscurantism, see Livingstone, R. W.: *The Greek Genius and its Meaning to Us* (Oxford 1912, Clarendon Press), pp. 186-90.

² For the rhythm of declines and falls, see Parts V and XI, below.

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strated experimentally, before Hellenic history had run its course, by the mass-production of artificially manufactured commonwealths in which the main Utopian precepts were duly translated into practice. The single commonwealth laid out on a patch of waste land in Crete, which is postulated in Plato's *Laws*, was actually magnified tenfold and multiplied a thousandfold in the city-states which were founded by Alexander and the Seleucidae in *partibus Orientalium* and by the Romans in *partibus Barbarorum* during the next three or four centuries. In these 'Utopias in real life', which were systematically planted, by Hellenically enlightened rulers, over a zone extending from Transoxania and the Panjab at one end to Gaul and the Maghrib at the other, the social order was founded on the dogma, first ventilated by Aristotle, that all non-Hellenes were 'natural-born slaves'. Accordingly, the little bands of Greeks and Macedonians and Italici who were fortunate enough to be enrolled as colonists were liberated for their high cultural task of making the light of Hellenism shine in the outer darkness by having assigned to them an ample labour-force of 'Native' fallāhīn to do the dirty work of providing their new Hellenic masters with the necessary means of material livelihood. In accordance with the Aristotelian precept,¹ these hewers of wood and drawers of water were 'in' but not 'of' the commonwealths to which they were high-handedly 'attributed' and whose existence their labours rendered possible. The 'attributions' were sometimes made on what was—from the standpoint of the privileged citizen-body—a princely scale. A Roman colony in Gaul might be endowed with the entire territory and population of a barbarian tribe or canton; a Seleucid colony in Anatolia with a score of villages which had previously supported the priesthood of a temple-state.²

¹ There is no evidence to show how far the Hellenic colonization policy of the Alexandrine and post-Alexandrine age was consciously influenced by the precepts of the fourth-century Athenian philosophers. The Seleucid and the Roman foundations had precedents, in the enserfment of the Sikels and the Mariandyni to the older Hellenic colonies of Syracuse and Heraclea Pontica, which are likely to have been more prominent in the minds of the Roman and Seleucid statesmen, when they were working out their policy, than either 'Lycurgeoan' Sparta or the Athenian Utopias.

² For example, the city-state of Nemausus (Nîmes), which was organized by the Roman authorities in the territory of the Volcae Arecomici in the Roman Province of Gallia Narbonensis, received 'the Latin franchise' (an intermediate status between subjection and the Roman citizenship) and at the same time had twenty-four native Arecomican villages 'attributed' to it. (Strabo, Bk. IV, pp. 186-7.) Again, 'Antioch-towards-Pisidia . . . was probably carved out of the once vast estate of [the Anatolian divinity] Mén Askainos' by the Seleucidae (Tarn, W. W.: *Hellenistic Civilisation* (London 1927, Arnold), p. 116). In general, see Tarn, op. cit., ch. 4, *passim*; Beloch, K. J.: *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd ed., vol. iv, part (i) (Berlin and Leipzig 1925, de Gruyter), ch. 7: 'Die Hellenisierung des Ostens'; Reid, J. S.: *The Municipalities of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge 1913, University Press). Interesting light is thrown upon the relations between 'attributed' tribes and Roman municipalities by the accident which has preserved for us the text of an edict, promulgated in A.D. 46 by the Emperor Claudius, *De Civitate Anaunorum* (translation and commentary in Hardy, E. G.: *Roman Laws and Charters* (Oxford 1912, Clarendon Press)). Compare the present relation between European immigrants and native Africans in the British territory of Kenya Colony.

A broad servile foundation was certainly needed; for the Hellenic city-state of the decadence, with its fine public buildings and its handsome public 'dole' in kind (free bread and free entertainments), was a costly affair—especially when it was arbitrarily and suddenly imposed as a superstructure upon an alien system of society which was already complete in itself. The calculation was that this costly Hellenic superstructure would ultimately pay its way by raising the whole standard of life—economic, as well as political and cultural—of the entire population throughout the vast area over which these seeds of Hellenism were being sown. But this calculation left out of account the blighting effect of the parasitism which was inherent in the Roman and Seleucid performance, as it was in the Platonic and Aristotelian programme. This fatal vice prevented the great experiment from producing the results which its authors had expected of it.¹ The weight of the parasitic Hellenic superstructure merely depressed the level of 'Native' life without penetrating beneath the surface and loosing the great deeps; and there was therefore no release of new social forces that was in any way comparable to the emergence of the titanic forces of Democracy and Industrialism from the depths of our own modern Western Society towards the close of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era.

In the second century of the same era—when the Hellenic World was enjoying an Indian Summer which contemporaries, and even posterity, long mistook for a Golden Age—it looked superficially as though Plato's most audacious hopes had at last been fulfilled and transcended. From the accession of Nerva in A.D. 96 to the death of Marcus Aurelius in A.D. 180, a series of philosopher-kings sat, in unbroken succession, upon a throne which dominated not merely this or that single Hellenic city-state but the entire Hellenic World of that age. A thousand city-states were living side by side, in peace and concord, under this philosophic Imperial aegis; yet the cessation of evils was only a pause, for all was not well beneath the surface. An impalpable censorship—inspired by the atmosphere of the social environment more effectively than it could ever have been imposed by Imperial fiat—was now eliminating intellectual and artistic originality with a vengeance which would have devastated Plato if he could have returned to see his whimsical precepts so literally realized. And the uninspired respectable prosperity of the second century was followed by the chaotic passionate misery of the third, when the fallāhīn turned and rent their masters.² By the

¹ Contrast the social effect of the previous Greek maritime colonization in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (eighth to sixth centuries B.C.), which has been touched upon on pp. 51-2, above.

² See Rostovtzeff, M.: *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1926, Clarendon Press), *passim*.

fourth century the tables had been completely turned; for the once privileged ruling class of the Roman municipalities, so far as it survived at all, was now everywhere in chains. Chained to their kennels, and with their tails between their legs, the municipal decurions of the Roman Empire *in extremis* could hardly be recognized as the ideological descendants of Plato's magnificent 'human watch-dogs!'

The same pursuit of stability and the same achievement of sterility reappear in the *Brave New World* which has been conceived, in a satirical vein, by Mr. Aldous Huxley.¹

Like the Hellenic Utopias which we have just been surveying, this modern Western Anti-Utopia bears the marks of its place and its time. Written in England and published in the fourteenth year after the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918, it carries the scars of the Great War of 1914-18 and the Great Economic Depression which had begun in 1929. The author portrays an imaginary future generation of our Western Society which is content to sacrifice originality and progress if it can save itself from being destroyed by the terrific new forces of Industrialism and Democracy from which the War and the Depression have emanated.

'The Nine Years' War, the great Economic Collapse. There was a choice between World Control and destruction; between stability and . . .²

"Stability," said the Controller, "stability. No civilisation without social stability. No social stability without individual stability." His voice was a trumpet. Listening, they felt larger, warmer.

'The machine turns, turns and must keep on turning—for ever. It is death if it stands still. A thousand millions scabbled the dust of the Earth. The wheels began to turn. In a hundred and fifty years there were two thousand millions. Stop all the wheels. In a hundred and fifty weeks there are once more only a thousand millions; a thousand thousand thousand men and women have starved to death.

'Wheels must turn steadily, but cannot turn untended. There must be men to tend them, men as steady as the wheels upon their axles, sane men, obedient men, stable in contentment.

'Crying: My baby, my mother, my only, only love; groaning: My sin, my terrible God; screaming with pain, muttering with fever, bemoaning old age and poverty—how can they tend the wheels? And if they cannot tend the wheels. . . The corpses of a thousand thousand thousand men and women would be hard to bury or burn.'³

The programme of *Brave New World* (a programme which is displayed by the author in order to repel and not in order to attract) is to 'peg' our 'post-war' Western Society at the level of the Industrial System, which is to be improved, like the 'Lycurgeoan'

¹ Huxley, Aldous: *Brave New World* (London 1932, Chatto and Windus).

² Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

³ Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

system in the Athenian Utopias, and this again in two ways. In *Brave New World*, the application of our Western Physical Science to practical life is to be carried to extremes; and at the same time the vast increase in the material 'drive' behind all our actions is to be counteracted and rendered innocuous by converting the spiritual voltage of Human Nature from high to low tension. In the imaginary extensions of Applied Science—'Ectogenesis'¹ and 'Hypnopædia'²—we are given the same sensation of superhuman skill and ingenuity that we experience in real life when we contemplate the *tours de force* of the Esquimaux and the Nomads and the Spartans and the 'Osmanlis. In the relaxation of the nervous system of *Homo Industrialis* from the *furor Americanus* to the lotus-eaters' tempo,³ we are reminded of the latter end of the Polynesians.

The difficult scientific enterprise of obtaining and maintaining a low degree of spiritual tension is executed in *Brave New World* by an ingenious variety of means. In the synthetic drug called 'soma', which has the same opiate effect as the legendary lotus fruit, the aid of Applied Physical Science is enlisted;⁴ but for the most part the desired psychic effect is induced by psychological methods. The pre-Utopian social heritage of our Western Civilization is consigned to oblivion by a Burning of the Books.⁵ The possibility of fresh spiritual creation is ruled out by the elimination of challenges⁶ and of all the higher forms of spiritual activity and experience.⁷ The personality of the individual is subordinated to the corporate life of the body social to a degree that would satisfy Plato himself.⁸ And the majority of individuals are so cultivated⁹ that they perform the function for which they have been designed without any discomfort or any repining or even any consciousness that human life has other potentialities than those which they find within their own reach.

¹ Huxley, *op. cit.*, ch. i.

² Huxley, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-32.

³ For the fable of the lotus-eaters, see II. D (i), vol. ii, pp. 22-3, above.

⁴ For 'soma', see Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁵ This idea is taken, of course, from the legendary act of the Emperor Ts'in She Hwangti, the founder of the Sinic universal state; but it may be noted that, in the author's own generation, a similar act of vandalism had been performed for a similar purpose by a living dictator. The desire to make a breach with the Ottoman cultural past was one of the motives in the mind of President Mustafa Kemal when he substituted the Latin for the Arabic Alphabet in Turkey in A.D. 1928. Since the publication of Mr. Huxley's fantasia, there has been an actual Burning of the Books in Germany, to celebrate Herr Hitler's advent to power.

⁶ "Consider your own lives", said Mustafa Mond: "Has any of you ever encountered an insurmountable obstacle?" The question was answered by a negative silence.' (Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 51.)

⁷ 'You can't make tragedies without social instability' (*op. cit.*, pp. 259-60). The price of happiness is the renunciation of Art and Science and Religion (p. 271).

⁸ The official motto of the World State is 'Community, Identity, Stability' (*op. cit.*, p. 1). Its slogans are 'Everyone belongs to everyone else' (p. 45) and 'When the individual feels, the community reels' (p. 109).

⁹ 'Cultivated' is the right word; for when life is reproduced by 'Ectogenesis' and birth is replaced by 'decanting', the distinction between the two successive processes of breeding and rearing fades out.

The method of operation by which the inhabitants of the Brave New World are brought into perfect equilibrium with their environment is the deliberate differentiation of Society into a number of separate castes with different social functions; and this is triumphantly achieved by the application of Physical and Psychological Science.

'Of course they did not content themselves with merely hatching out embryos: any cow could do that. "We also predestine and condition. We decant our babies as socialised human beings, as Alphas or Epsilons, as future sewage workers or future. . . ."

"I suppose Epsilons don't really mind being Epsilons." . . .

"Of course they don't. How can they? They don't know what it's like being anything else. We'd mind, of course. But then we've been differently conditioned. Besides, we start with a different heredity."

"I'm glad I'm not an Epsilon," said Lenina, with conviction.

"And if you were an Epsilon," said Henry, "your conditioning would have made you no less thankful that you weren't a Beta or an Alpha." . . .

"I was wondering", said the Savage, "why you had them at all—seeing that you can get whatever you want out of those bottles. Why don't you make everybody an Alpha Double Plus while you're about it?"

'Mustafa Mond laughed. "Because we have no wish to have our throats cut," he answered. "We believe in happiness and stability. A society of Alphas couldn't fail to be unstable and miserable. Imagine a factory staffed by Alphas—that is to say by separate and unrelated individuals of good heredity and conditioned so as to be capable (within limits) of making a free choice and assuming responsibilities. Imagine it!" he repeated.

'The Savage tried to imagine it, not very successfully.

"It's an absurdity. An Alpha-decanted, Alpha-conditioned man would go mad if he had to do Epsilon Semi-Moron work—go mad, or start smashing things up.² Alphas can be completely socialised—but only on condition that you make them do Alpha work.³ Only an Epsilon

¹ Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

² This, of course, was the state of mind of the Spartiate 'Inferiors' (*ὑπομέλως*). The Directors of the World State in *Brave New World* are saved from this Spartan problem by their superior command of Physical Science; for there is no need to maintain a reserve-force when any number of individuals required in any given caste can be cultivated artificially according to plan, and when no provision has to be made against unforeseen casualties through either war or disease.—A. J. T.

³ The spiritual 'make-up' of Alphas is the crux of the social system. 'Alphas are so conditioned that they do not *have* to be infantile in their emotional behaviour, but that is all the more reason for their making a special effort to conform. It is their duty to be infantile, even against their inclination' (p. 114). On one occasion a very high official, who is an Alpha *ex hypothesi*, confesses in an unguarded moment that 'Happiness is a hard master—particularly other people's happiness. A much harder master, if one isn't conditioned to accept it unquestioningly, than truth' (p. 268). In this Alpha mentality we detect the inevitable residual element of instability which defies elimination in *Brave New World* as in every other Utopia. The Alphas are as indispensable to Mr. Huxley's imaginary commonwealth as the servile labour force is to Aristotle's. And it can be foreseen that, sooner or later, they too will turn and rend the system that is exploiting them.—A. J. T.

can be expected to make Epsilon sacrifices, for the good reason that for him they aren't sacrifices; they're the line of least resistance. His conditioning has laid down rails along which he's got to run. He can't help himself; he's foredoomed. Even after decanting, he's still inside a bottle—an invisible bottle of infantile and embryonic fixations. . . ."

"The Savage sighed profoundly.

"The optimum population," said Mustafa Mond, "is modelled on the iceberg—eight-ninths below the water line, one-ninth above."

"And they're happy below the water line?"

"Happier than above it. . . ."

"In spite of that awful work?"

"Awful? They don't find it so. On the contrary, they like it. It's light, it's childishly simple. No strain on the mind or the muscles. Seven and a half hours of mild, unexhausting labour, and then the soma ration and games and unrestricted copulation and the feelies. What more can they ask for?"

What more indeed? And the ingeniously contrived result is an imaginary Western universal state in the likeness of the historic Roman Empire in the age of the Philosopher-Kings after the Augustan failure of nerve, or in the likeness of the Sinic Empire under the Prior Han after Ts'in She Hwangti had delivered 'the knock-out blow' in the internecine warfare of the Contending States. In *Brave New World*, likewise, an unnerved society is bidding for stability by consenting to the sacrifice of everything that makes stability worth having. It has accepted the verdict that 'Civilisation is sterilisation';² but the historical parallels indicate that no amount of self-mutilation will avail to placate the Envy of the Gods who hold the keys of immortality. 'For whosoever will save his life shall lose it.'³

While Mr. Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* is a satirical exercise of wisdom after the event, the genius of Mr. H. G. Wells has contrived, in *The First Men in the Moon*,⁴ to write a 'post-war' Utopia thirteen years before the outbreak of the War of 1914-18. Without waiting to be enlightened by this portentous catastrophe, Mr. Wells appears to have divined by intuition that our Western Civilization was rushing down a steep place into the sea. He perceives that the social climate of Industrialism is threatening to become as inimical to Life as the physical climate of the Moon; and he presents a programme for 'pegging' our terrestrial society at a habitable level in the adverse environment of a thoroughly industrialized world in the guise of an imaginary description of actual lunar conditions.

¹ Huxley, *op. cit.*, pp. 87, 262, 264.

² Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

³ Matt. xvi. 25. The illusion of immortality, which is one of the regular psychological idiosyncrasies of universal states, is examined further in Part VI, below.

⁴ Wells, H. G.: *The First Men in the Moon* (1st ed.: London 1901, George Newnes).

The physical climate of the Moon has become so adverse to Life that the star's surface has ceased to be habitable except intermittently. Mr. Wells portrays his Selenites as being content if they can 'peg' their Selenite Society a point or two above the death-line. And, in the genuine Utopian vein, he imagines them seeking survival through stability, stability through differentiation of social functions, and differentiation through physical and psychic polymorphy.

'In the Moon, every citizen knows his place. He is born to that place, and the elaborate discipline of training and education and surgery he undergoes fits him at last so completely to it that he has neither ideas nor organs for any purpose beyond it. . . . If, for example, a Selenite is destined to be a mathematician, his teachers and trainers set out at once to that end. They check any incipient disposition to other pursuits, they encourage his mathematical bias with a perfect psychological skill. His brain grows, or at least the mathematical faculties of his brain grow, and the rest of him only so much as is necessary to sustain this essential part of him. At last, save for rest and food, his one delight lies in the exercise and display of his faculty, his one interest in its application, his sole society with other specialists in his own line. His brain grows continually larger, at least so far as the portions engaging in mathematics are concerned; they bulge ever larger and seem to suck all life and vigour from the rest of his frame. His limbs shrivel, his heart and digestive organs diminish, his insect face is hidden under its bulging contours. His voice becomes a mere stridulation for the stating of formulae; he seems deaf to all but properly enunciated problems. The faculty of laughter, save for the sudden discovery of some paradox, is lost to him; his deepest emotion is the evolution of a novel computation. And so he attains his end.

'Or, again, a Selenite appointed to be a minder of mooncalves is from his earliest years induced to think and live mooncalf, to find his pleasure in mooncalf lore, his exercise in their tending and pursuit. He is trained to become wiry and active; his eye is indurated to the tight wrappings, the angular contours, that constitute a "smart mooncalfishness". He takes at last no interest in the deeper part of the Moon; he regards all Selenites not equally versed in mooncalves with indifference, derision or hostility. His thoughts are of mooncalf pastures, and his dialect an accomplished mooncalf technique. So also he loves his work, and discharges in perfect happiness the duty that justifies his being. And so it is with all sorts and conditions of Selenites—each is a perfect unit in a world machine. . . .'¹

The imaginary human investigator of Selenite affairs draws an eerie picture of what the Selenites have come to look like as a result of their adaptation to this lunar social régime:

'"It was an incredible crowd. Suddenly and violently there was

¹ Wells, *op. cit.*, ch. xxiv: 'The Natural History of the Selenites.'

forced upon my attention the vast amount of difference there is amongst these beings of the Moon.

"Indeed, there seemed not two alike in all that jostling multitude. They differed in shape, they differed in size, they rang all the horrible changes on the theme of Selenite form! Some bulged and overhung, some ran about among the feet of their fellows. All of them had a grotesque and disquieting suggestion of an insect that has somehow contrived to mock humanity; but all seemed to present an incredible exaggeration of some particular feature: one had a vast right fore-limb, an enormous antennal arm, as it were; one seemed all leg, poised, as it were, on stilts; another protruded the edge of his face-mask into a nose-like organ that made him startlingly human until one saw his expressionless gaping mouth. The strange and (except for the want of mandibles and palps) most insect-like head of the mooncalf-minders underwent, indeed, the most incredible transformations: here it was broad and low, here its leathery brow was drawn out into horns and strange features; here it was whiskered and divided, and there with a grotesquely human profile. One distortion was particularly conspicuous. There were several brain-cases distended like bladders to a huge size, with the face-mask reduced to quite small proportions. . . ."

'He does not mention the ant, but throughout his allusions the ant is continually being brought before my mind, in its sleepless activity, in its intelligence and social organization, in its structure, and more particularly in the fact that it displays, in addition to the two forms—the male and female form—that almost all other animals possess, a number of other, sexless, creatures—workers, soldiers and the like—differing from one another in structure, character, power and use, and yet all members of the same species. For these Selenites, also, have a great variety of forms . . . differing in size, differing in the relative size of part to part, differing in power and appearance, and yet not different species of creatures, but only different forms of one species, and retaining through all their variations a certain common likeness that marks their specific unity. The Moon is, indeed, a sort of vast ant-hill; only, instead of there being only four or five sorts of ant, there are many hundred different sorts of Selenite, and almost every gradation between one sort and another.'¹

In this brilliant fantasy, Mr. Wells brings his gift of concrete imagination into play in order to conjure up before our mental vision a society which has actually achieved that morphological differentiation between different social castes which Aristotle—for once allowing his wish to be father to his thought—would have us believe that Nature herself has intended to establish.² It is significant that, in staging this fantasy, Mr. Wells finds it convenient to picture the creatures of which his imaginary Selenite Society is composed as belonging to a fabulous race which is a

¹ Wells, *op. cit.*, ch. xxiv: 'The Natural History of the Selenites'.

² See the passage quoted on pp. 93-4, above.

kind of 'missing link' between human beings and insects. By this artifice he diminishes the demand upon the imaginative faculty of his readers; for the conception of a definite and rigid correlation between social function and physical or mental structure is familiar to human minds apropos of the World of Insects; and therefore, if once the readers of Mr. Wells's *Utopia* can be induced to accept his suggestion of kinship between insects and human beings, they may be led on through this association of ideas to entertain, as possibly not inapplicable to their own human kind, a conception which would be not merely unfamiliar but violently repugnant if it were crudely suggested in an uncompromisingly human context.

In the life of the social insects, the morphological diversity of the social castes is, of course, the outstanding fact that strikes the mind of human observers, inasmuch as in the Human Race, Nature—*pace Aristotelis*¹—has not attempted to go further in morphological differentiation than to diversify the two sexes. In the Insect Kingdom, Nature has given freer play to her plastic faculty. In the social honey bee (*Apis*), she has taken one step beyond mere sexual dualism by differentiating the female sex into workers and queens with different forms corresponding to their different functions.² In the ants (*Formicidae*) she has gone further still; for in these insects the three primary morphological castes—workers, queens, and males—not only differ from one another in form more radically than the corresponding castes among the bees, but are further differentiated, in some genera of ants, into sub-castes which each have their own precise social functions.³ In the Carebara ant, 'the queen is several thousand times as large as the worker'.⁴ Finally, in the termites, the number of morphologically diverse castes, which in the ants is four at the highest—males, queens, workers, and soldiers—is normally five and rises in some genera of termites to as many as eight, each of which is represented by both males and females.⁵

In all these social insects, this physical phenomenon of morpho-

¹ Aristotle's thesis of a psychic dimorphism in the Human Race between a breed of natural-born masters and another breed of natural-born slaves has received a certain measure of support from a great Western philosopher in our own 'post-war' age:

'Dirons-nous . . . que dans les sociétés humaines il y a "dimorphisme", non plus physique et psychique à la fois, comme chez l'insecte, mais psychique seulement? Nous le croyons, à condition toutefois qu'il soit entendu que ce dimorphisme ne sépare pas les hommes en deux catégories irréductibles, les uns naissant chefs et les autres sujets. . . . La vérité est que le dimorphisme fait le plus souvent de chacun de nous, en même temps, un chef qui a l'instinct de commander et un sujet qui est prêt à obéir.' (Bergson, Henri: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 300.)

² See Wheeler, W. M.: *Social Life among the Insects* (London, no date, Constable), p. 132.

³ Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 152 and 158-9.

⁴ Wheeler, op. cit., loc. cit.

⁵ Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 248-58.

logical diversity between different social castes is associated with a psychic vein of ruthlessness which is strongly reminiscent of the *êthos* of some of our arrested human societies: for example, the Nomads (who have instituted a polymorphic society by domesticating animals and taking them into partnership) or again the 'Osmanlis and the Spartans (who have done their best to introduce the equivalent of polymorphy into a society composed throughout of human beings by the Aristotelian device of treating some human beings as though they were 'human watch-dogs' and others as though they were 'human cattle'). Classic illustrations of the insects' ruthlessness are the annual massacre of the drones, in cold blood, by the worker-bees, as soon as the drones have fulfilled their social function of fertilizing the queen; the self-mutilation of the ants of both sexes, when they deliberately break off their own wings, after a solitary nuptial flight, in order to lead, for the rest of their lives, a terrene existence of laborious social service; and the self-sacrifice of the soldier-ants, who rise, on occasion, to the same heights of selflessness as Spartan Leonidas and his Three Hundred human warriors.

The ants' discarding of their wings is a symbolic act which typifies the genius of these arrested societies, both insect and human: the miracles which they are capable of achieving, and their still more astonishing limitations.

In the matter of achievement, the ants have risen socially, like human societies, from the economic phase of hunting to the higher economic levels of agriculture and pastoralism.¹ The ants have even acquired an inkling of the technique of Industrialism; for 'there are species of ants that use their larvae as shuttles in weaving the silken walls of their nests'.² In the bees, we admire the elegance with which they have solved the geometrical problems involved in the structure of the honeycomb. In the termites, we are impressed by the titanic scale of an architecture which, in its largest known buildings, surpasses, scale for scale, the Empire State Building at New York in height and the Great Pyramid at Gîzah in massiveness.³

Therewithal, some social insects also resemble our arrested human civilizations in the further point of preserving a certain measure of adaptability. The ants are decidedly adaptable in their nesting and feeding habits;⁴ the bees in their feeding habits and in their power of accommodating themselves to a wide range of

¹ See Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-7, 177-9, and 181-94. For the practice of agriculture by the termites, see *op. cit.*, pp. 267-71.

² Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³ For the termites' 'sky-scrapers', see Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-5.

⁴ Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-4.

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variety in climate.¹ On the other hand, the termites have allowed themselves to be lulled into physical inefficiency by their very success in mastering the technique of architecture.

'With greater elaboration and solidity of nest architecture the termite colonies shut themselves off more and more from the outside world, and all the castes, except the winged males and females, lost their eyes and the tough consistency of their integument. They thus came to resemble the molluscs, crustaceans, and certain fishes and reptiles which have withdrawn within a heavy protective armour and have given up participating in the free competitive and co-operative life of their environment.'²

The distinguished student of social life among insects who wrote these lines goes on³ to compare the termites with the human inhabitants of China and Korea, in the age when these shut themselves off from the rest of Mankind and lived as 'hermit kingdoms'.⁴

Moreover, when we turn our attention from the physical to the psychic plane, we find evidence of a rigidity—induced, apparently, by a too exquisitely exact mental equilibrium—not only in the termites, but in the ants and bees as well.

The amazingly precise and delicate mental tool of instinct, with which the insects perform their wonderful feats, is believed, by at least one close observer of insect behaviour, to be a product of reason in a state of arrest. He suggests

'that instinct began in a reasoned act. That this act, through being continually repeated, tended to lose the reasoning element and to become more and more unconscious. As this process continued through generations, the mental machinery through which it worked got more indelibly engraven in the mind. And in the end it became automatic—in other words, it became instinctive.'⁵

The same observer finds, in insect instinct, the qualities of perfection and wisdom combined with the characteristic of inflexibility.

'Speaking in a broad and general sense, instinct is a force of amazing perfection. It performs acts of such precision that they sometimes seem to surpass intelligence. What can be more perfect than the spider's net with its equal angles, its uniform spirals, its nicely parallel threads? Or see the perfection in the comb of the hive-bee. Why, these creatures have solved a recondite problem. It is only a student of the higher mathematics who could determine after detailed calculations that this

¹ Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

² Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

³ Wheeler, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.
⁴ For this social phenomenon of 'petrification' see further Part I. C (ii), vol. i, above, and Parts V, VI, and X, below.

⁵ Hingston, R. W. G.: *Problems of Instinct and Intelligence* (London 1928, Arnold), p. 268. This question has been touched upon already in the present Study in II. C (i), vol. i, on pp. 205-7, above.

exquisite system of waxen chambers, with their pyramids and rhombs and particular angles, was the one and only system possible to effect the greatest economy of wax. . . .

'Then, again, instinct is wise in its purpose. We [see] this particularly in the hunting-wasps. How amazingly wise it seems that a wasp can get the end of its sting into the one anatomical point that will bring about a paralysis of its prey.'¹

At the same time,

'we have seen that instinct is inflexible. It battles against every obstacle in order to fulfil its particular end. We saw how locusts marched out upon a river and allowed themselves to be drowned in millions rather than change their instinctive course. We saw butterflies lost on the Himalayan snow-line in obedience to that unswerving instinct which impelled them across the range. We saw spiders allowing themselves to be cut to pieces rather than change their instinctive device of sitting absolutely still.'²

From such inflexibility it is a short step to folly.

'Instinct, when it operates in the normal course, when it fulfils the particular purpose for which that particular instinct exists, acts with admirable wisdom and perfection. But divert that instinct from its normal course; try to turn it in some other channel; endeavour to make it do something which it was not originally intended to do, and the result is a course of action which astonishes us by its utter folly. . . .

'An insect may select the wrong species to mate with, another may lay on the wrong kind of food-plant, another may construct the wrong type of cocoon. These are errors that run through the perfection, and their result is disaster and death. . . .

'What folly, we exclaim, in all these actions! Why can't the creatures just think a little and not fall into these stupid traps? They can't do so, for the instinct that impels their actions demands fulfilment, whatever the cost. . . . Their instincts, so amazingly exact and deliberate, have been given them only for one definite end. When applied to that end they are astonishingly perfect. They act with foresight, with unerring logic, with results which seem even to surpass our reason. The wasp must keep parasites out of her cell. What does she do? Smear the cell outside with glue. The caterpillars have to keep in a procession. What do they do? Cling to a thread. The trap-door spider wants to hide its door. What does it do? Cover it with moss. How foreseeing, how logical, how wise it is! Our reason could do no better. Perhaps it could not do as well. But divert the same instinct. Alter its course. Try to make it do something else. Give the wasp an enemy other than a parasite; make the caterpillar's thread into an endless circle; take away the mossy environment of the spider. We have seen the result. Instinct goes on oblivious of such changes. Darkness takes the place of light.'³

¹ Hingston, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-1.

² Hingston, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

³ Hingston, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

What is the bearing of these phenomena of insect life upon the history of Man? The observer here quoted expresses the opinion that 'we are not justified in making barriers between insect and human mentality' and that 'the minds of these humble creatures operate in the same way as the mind of Man in their main essential characteristics'.¹

'Every animal, Man included, possesses two sets of mental activity: the one instinctive, automatic, innate; the other intelligent, plastic, and acquired. These two activities are always blended. They may differ immensely in degrees of development, but they never completely separate from each other.

'The insect mind and the human mind differ mainly in the development of these two factors. Instinct predominates in the insect mind: intelligence in the mind of Man. Nevertheless, in both the Insect and Man these two factors definitely exist. But their minds have evolved along different channels. They have marched, so to speak, along diverging paths, the one developing the force of instinct, the other the force of reason. And each has brought its own type of development to an amazingly perfect degree.

'Yet the Insect, though predominantly instinctive, possesses also glimmerings of reason. Exactly the same is true of Man. Though his life is so filled with rational judgement, yet underneath are those primitive instincts. . . .'²

If our observer is right in this view of insect and human mentality and of the relation between the two, then his analysis projects a ray of light upon the problem of our arrested human civilizations. The cause of their strange and tragic arrest, at a moment when they have already issued, quick-born, from the womb of Time and are standing, alive with youthful energy, on the threshold of their life-course, may be explained, on this showing, in psychological terms as a mental reversion from the human towards the insect type of mental rhythm: from the blundering but progressive mobility of reason to the infallible but inflexible rigidity of instinct. In the life of these arrested human civilizations one prominent feature is, as we have seen, the degree to which their human members have become the slaves of habit; and the well-known process by which human habits are formed through some originally deliberate and conscious action becoming automatic as a result of repetition is manifestly analogous to the hypothetical process by which insect instincts may have arisen out of automatized acts of intelligence.³

¹ Hingston, op. cit., p. 285.

² Hingston, op. cit., pp. 287-8. Cp. Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 122-3. For the conventional view, which represents human societies as being founded on reason and insect societies as being founded on instinct, see Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. I, p. 84.

³ This analogy is suggested, in this context, by Hingston, op. cit., pp. 266-8.

The existence of the five arrested human civilizations shows that the problem of the growth of civilizations is a genuine problem. The analogy between the human and the insect soul gives us an inkling of the nature of this growth as it is manifested in the histories of our twenty-one civilizations which have not suffered arrest but have duly gone on growing after birth.

B. THE NATURE OF THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS

HAVING satisfied ourselves that the growths of civilizations present a problem, and having set ourselves the task of solving this problem by inquiring what the nature of these growths may be, let us start our inquiry by invoking a power which has already proved itself a very present help at another critical point in this Study. Let us call in once again the aid of Mythology.

The myth of the Book of Job and of Goethe's *Faust* has given us an insight into the nature of the geneses of civilizations.¹ We may find that equal light is thrown upon the nature of their growths by the myth of Aeschylus's Promethean Trilogy.

This line of approach to our new problem seems promising because the general structure of the two myths is the same. In both, the theme is a conflict between two superhuman powers: a conflict between Zeus and Prometheus in this case, and a conflict between God and Satan or Mephistopheles in the other. In both myths, again, the field of this superhuman conflict is a human being or human society which is also the stake for which the superhuman combatants are contending. The role of Faust or Job is played in the Aeschylean myth by the Hellenic Society, which expands, in the poet's transcendent imagination, into Mankind at large. And, lastly, in both myths, the relative importance of the human and superhuman actors, as it appears in the mythological fantasy, has to be reversed when we come to the psychological interpretation. From this introverted angle of vision, the human field of conflict or prize of victory takes substance as the sole figure on the stage, while the superhuman combatants resolve themselves into conflicting impulses in this human actor's soul.

To this extent the two myths are analogous. The difference between them lies in the relation of the two superhuman combatants—or two conflicting human impulses—with one another. In the myth of Faust and Job, it is God—the receiver of the challenge—who wins the victory through finding an opportunity, in the challenge presented by Satan or by Mephistopheles, for performing a new creative act from which God would otherwise have been inhibited by his own perfection. In this myth, the challenger—Mephistopheles or Satan—is permitted by God to persecute a human victim, in order that the persecutor may suffer discomfiture and defeat. On the other hand, in the Aeschylean myth, the re-

¹ For an analysis of this myth, see II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, above.

ceiver of the challenge, who in this myth is Zeus, is the loser of the battle. For Zeus, so far from yearning to perform a creative act, is anxious to stay as he is and to keep the Universe around him at a standstill; the challenge presented to Zeus by Prometheus, which calls the temper and policy of Zeus in question, moves Zeus to inflict a vindictive persecution upon his challenger; and in this act, which overthrows his cherished equilibrium, Zeus brings about his own defeat, while Prometheus, through suffering, wins his way to victory.

When the superhuman and universal imagery of the Aeschylean drama is translated into terms of human time and place, the issue presents itself as the question whether or not the infant Hellenic Civilization is to grow. The crisis is specifically a crisis of social infancy.

'We have before us something pre-classical. We have the daring of an age that has not yet been frightened. If Euripides had said of Zeus the things that Aeschylus says there would probably have been trouble. By his time people were afraid of the solvent and destructive effects of free speculation; in the time of Aeschylus they were still looking to the powers of the human intellect, to reason and free inquiry, as the great emancipators.'¹

Aeschylus sees Zeus as he is, and therefore he sees that Zeus has to be saved, in spite of himself, by the Promethean challenge.

This Aeschylean Zeus is the primeval Zeus: a superhuman counterpart of the Achaean barbarian war-lord, with the Olympian Pantheon for his turbulent war-band.² The historical feat of the Achaeans in overrunning the domain of the outworn Minoan Civilization and making themselves masters of its debris has its mythical reflection in the legendary feat of Zeus in overthrowing his divine predecessor Cronos.³ Having accomplished this *tour de force* and mounted the throne of Olympus, Zeus has no other idea except to keep himself enthroned there, in solitary, motionless, tyrannical state, with his foot on the neck of a prostrate Universe, as the human barbarians, deposited in Crete by the 'Dorian' Völkerwanderung, actually sat upon the enserfed Minoans,⁴ and as the Nomadic invaders from the Steppes have sat upon the sedentary populations whom they have conquered in various times and places. Zeus, however, has not conquered Cronos by his own unaided

¹ Murray, Gilbert: *Prometheus Bound translated into English Rhyming Verse* (London 1931, Allen & Unwin), Introduction, pp. 8-9.

² For this aspect of Zeus, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 96, above.

³ The overthrow of Cronos by Zeus is duplicated, in the Hellenic Mythology, in the previous overthrow of Uranus by Cronos. Both Cronos and Uranus are conceived in the image of Zeus, and not in that of the Minoan godhead. (See vol. i, p. 96, above.)

⁴ See the Song of Hybrias the Cretan, quoted in Part III. A on p. 87 in footnote 1, above.

powers. He has conquered him with the help of Prometheus; and, after their joint victory, he has to reckon with his Titanic ally. But Prometheus works—and works indefatigably—for everything in life that Zeus now wishes to rule out. For Prometheus is an insatiable creator, a kindler of fire, a probing progressive mind. Prometheus is a mythical personification of the continuity of the growth-process, the Bergsonian *élan vital*. He knows that, unless Zeus keeps on the move, the new ruler of Olympus will inevitably be overthrown in his turn, like Cronos before him; and therefore he gives Zeus no peace.

In every situation, Prometheus always ranges himself on the side of thought against force, of progress against arrest.

When the Titans stand for force and Zeus for thought, Prometheus takes sides with Zeus against his fellow-Titans.

When first the immortals learned the taste of wrath,
And strife arose and between them wound its path,
Many would cast out Cronos from his throne,
That Zeus forsooth might reign, but many an one
Swore that no Zeus should e'er be lord of heaven.
Wise was I, but no force to me was given
To move the brood Titanic, born of Earth
And Sky. All crooked plans they turned to mirth
In their great hearts, and thought full easily
By strength to master all. But much to me
And oft-times had my mystic mother told—
Themis and Gaia, titles manifold
Of one eternal form—what end must fall:
That in this warfare not by strength at all,
Only by thought, the conquerors should prevail.
I spoke, I showed my brethren all the tale,
But they nor heard my words nor looked at me.
Best then I deemed it, if such things must be,
That I with Zeus, led by my mother's light,
Should stand, will linked with will, in armed fight;
And by my counsels now the deep and cold
Abyss of darkness covereth Cronos old. . . .¹

Thereafter, when Zeus seeks to make his newly won dominion secure by turning the universe into a desert and calling it peace, Prometheus remains true to his own role and thereby falls out with his late ally.

When first he mounted on his father's throne
Straightway he called the Gods, and gave each one
His place and honours. So he wrought his plan
Of empire. But of Man, unhappy Man,

¹ Aeschylus: *Prometheus Vincit*, ll. 201-22, Gilbert Murray's translation.

He had no care: he counselled the whole race
 To uproot, and plant a strange brood in its place.
 And none took stand against that evil mind
 Save me. I rose. I would not see Mankind
 By him stamped out and cast to nothingness. . . .¹

In this fresh crisis in the cosmic drama, Prometheus fails to convince Zeus by sheer reason, as he had previously failed to convince the Titans.

In every tyrant's heart there springs in the end
 This poison, that he cannot trust a friend.²

Thereupon, Prometheus sets the will of Zeus at defiance, and leads Mankind onward and upward out of the darkness of the post-Minoan interregnum into the light of the Hellenic Civilization as it had come to shine at Athens in Aeschylus's own day.

All that of art Man has, Prometheus gave.³

And he gave it by inspiring his human protégé and pupil with his own Promethean spirit:

A thing of no avail
 He was, until a living mind I wrought
 Within him, and new mastery of thought.⁴

For this thwarting of his will, Zeus takes his revenge upon Prometheus by turning against him the whole battery of his super-human force.

Mercy I had for Man; and therefore I
 Must meet no mercy, but hang crucified
 In witness of God's cruelty and pride.⁵

Therewith, Zeus reveals himself as a tyrant and a blight; and the cosmic forces—Io and Oceanus and the Chorus of the Oceanides—which had been in sympathy with Zeus in his struggle with the Titans now turn against him. But these sympathies, which are inhibited by timidity from issuing in action, are of little avail to Prometheus in his contest of wills with his Olympian antagonist.

In this contest, Prometheus is physically at Zeus' mercy. Yet the victory is in Prometheus' hands; for no torture that Zeus can inflict is able to overcome Prometheus' will-power; and this will-power guards a secret that Zeus fain would know.⁶ The secret is that, if Zeus persists in his static, tyrannical posture, he is dooming himself to be overthrown, like his predecessors, by the brute force

¹ Op. cit., ll. 230-8.

² Op. cit., ll. 226-7.

³ Op. cit., l. 506. See the whole passage, ll. 436-506, in which Prometheus reviews his labour of love for Man in retrospect.

⁴ Op. cit., ll. 443-4.

⁵ Op. cit., ll. 241-3.

⁶ Op. cit., ll. 511-25 and 907-40.

which he has deliberately enthroned in place of thought.¹ This secret is the key of Zeus' own destiny, and in the *Prometheus Vincitus*—the first, and the sole surviving, play of the Aeschylean Trilogy—we are shown Zeus trying, and failing, to wrest Prometheus' secret from him—first by the mental pressure of a threatening message delivered by Hermes and finally, at the end of the play, by the brute force of the thunderbolt.

'The other two plays of the Trilogy, *Prometheus Released* and *Prometheus the Torchbearer*, are no longer extant, but there is enough evidence to show that the end was reconciliation. Prometheus endured for the sake of Man and the oppressed Elder Gods all the pains that Zeus could inflict; also Zeus himself "learnt by suffering"² the lesson of forgiveness. He set free his old enemies, the Titans; he spared Mankind; he invented the right of the suppliant. These two elements are enough in themselves to make possible a reconciliation, but it seems certain that Aeschylus also brought in a third element. From the very beginning, Zeus was not quite what he seemed. . . .³

How was Prometheus' moral victory over Zeus attained? Was it that he stole a march on Zeus by bringing down the divine fire to Man concealed in a fire-stick or in a hollow reed? Or was it that he placed Zeus in the tactical dilemma of having to see his policy of immobility flouted or else depart from it himself in the act of taking up arms to defend it? But moral victories are not won by mental chicane; and the cause of Zeus' surrender to Prometheus assuredly lies deeper. Zeus was 'not quite what he seemed' because there was an element of his ally-adversary's spirit in him—a glimmer of Promethean light in the soul of Zeus which Zeus himself was unable wholly to extinguish. It was this that gave Zeus his inkling that Prometheus possessed a secret which was big with the tyrant's own fate, even though he could not divine what this secret was and could think of no better way of learning it than to extort it by force—until he found by trial that, for this purpose, force was unavailing. The reconciliation between Zeus and Prometheus was achieved because their conflict kindled into a flame the Promethean spark which was latent all the time in Zeus' soul.

This is perhaps another way of expressing an aspect of the relation between these two powers which we have noticed, by anticipation, above.⁴ Zeus and Prometheus, who on the plane of Mythology appear as separate superhuman personalities, are seen, in a psychological analysis, to be two impulses in a single human

¹ Murray, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 13-14.

² For this Aeschylean doctrine of *πάθει μάθος* see *Agamemnon*, ll. 177-8, quoted in I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 169, footnote 1, above.

³ Murray, op. cit., Introduction, p. 11.

⁴ See p. 112, above.

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soul which interpenetrate one another, however vehement their conflict, because it is the same soul that feels them both.

If we apply this analysis to the souls of the men and women who were the constituents of the Hellenic Society in the days of its infancy, we may give the Aeschylean myth the following historical interpretation. Supposing that, in Hellas at large, the lethargy of the Achaean or 'Dorian' barbarians, who had squatted among the debris of the derelict Minoan World, had never been stirred by a current of Promethean mental energy, then all Hellas would have vegetated in perpetuity like 'Dorian' Crete. Or let us suppose that the Promethean challenge had been duly presented to the infant Hellenic soul, but had been answered everywhere as it was answered at Sparta. Then the Hellenic Civilization would have been arrested on the threshold of growth, in static high tension, in the Spartan vein; and Sparta, not Athens, would have been *Hellados Hellas*. If the Hellenic Society at large actually avoided both the Cretan and the Spartan fate, this was because, in a majority of Hellenic souls, during the centuries that intervened between the post-Minoan interregnum and the generation of Aeschylus (*vivebat circa* 525-456 B.C.), the humane progressive civilizing *êthos* of the mythical Prometheus prevailed over the violent 'die-hard' barbarian *êthos* of the mythical Zeus. 'Zeus was not quite what he seemed.' He seemed a mere barbarian interloper; yet he must have been something more than that; or the historical fact that the Hellenic Civilization actually grew out of an Achaean barbarian root would be an inexplicable miracle.¹

The Promethean *êlan* in the infant Hellenic Society carried it forward from genesis into growth and did not allow it to stand motionless, like a creature turned to stone, on the threshold of life until its place on the open road should be taken by another. In the Hellenic Mythology the son who is greater than his father is born by Thetis not to Zeus (the power who, when reconciled to Prometheus, stands, like God in Goethe's *Faust*, for the divine whole). Achilles is born to Peleus (who, like Faust or Job, is no more than the human part).² And thus Hellenic destiny works itself out as a process of growth within the bosom of the Hellenic Society, and not as a catastrophe in which the forces immobilized in the bosom of an arrested civilization are eventually released by the destruction of the social fabric within which they have been imprisoned, in order to clear the ground for a new attempt at construction from the foundations upwards.

¹ For the relation of the Hellenic Civilization to the Minoan Civilization through the Achaean 'external proletariat' of the Minoan Civilization, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 95-100, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 315-16, above.

² Murray, *op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. 13-14.

The Promethean *élan* of the human intellect, which has been portrayed in mythological imagery by the Athenian poet, has been described in the corresponding terms of his own language by a modern French philosopher.

'Although we have to act only upon the objects around us, and although this was the original function of the intellect, the fact that the mechanical structure of the whole Universe is present in each of its parts has made it inevitable that Man should be born with an intellect virtually capable of embracing the whole material world. It is the same with the intellect as with the sense of sight. The eye, likewise, has been made only for the purpose of revealing to us the objects upon which we are in a position to act; but, just as Nature has not been able to obtain the desired degree of visual power except by constructing an apparatus with an efficiency in excess of its object (in as much as we see the stars, although we are incapable of exerting action on them), in the same way she has given us, of necessity, along with the faculty of understanding the matter which we manipulate, a virtual knowledge of the rest and a power—likewise virtual—to make practical use of it.'¹

The same Western philosopher has retold the Aeschylean tale of the conflict between Prometheus and Zeus.

'Man, as he issued from the hands of Nature, was a being who was both intelligent and social, with a sociality which was calculated to reach its term in diminutive societies and with an intellect which was destined to serve both the individual life and the group life. But the intellect, dilating by its own efforts, has entered upon an unexpected development. It has liberated human beings from servitudes to which they had been condemned by the limitations of their nature. Under these conditions it has proved not impossible for certain human beings, with particularly rich [psychic] endowments, to re-open that which had been closed, and to perform, at least for themselves, that which it would have been impossible for Nature to perform for Humanity at large. Their example has eventually carried away the rest of Mankind, at least in imagination. The will has its genius, as well as the intellect, and genius defies all prognostication. Through the medium of these wills inspired by genius, the *élan* of Life that traverses Matter obtains from Matter, for the future of the Human Species, promises of which there could not even have been any question at the time when the species first took shape. . . . One might say—to employ Spinoza's terms in a

¹ Bergson, Henri: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 180-1. The prologue to the Bergsonian epic of the human intellect is given in the following passage from the work of a contemporary English biologist:

'Throughout life, effort always seems to bring in its train advantages unforeseen and unconnected with the effort's immediate object. To give an extreme example, the eyes and ears and other sense-organs of animals were developed chiefly for the capture of prey and the avoidance of enemies; but, once formed, they were the starting-point for the life of consciousness that has culminated in ourselves.' (Huxley, J. S.: *The Individual in the Animal Kingdom* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 130-1.)

Compare the fable of Solomon's Choice in the First Book of Kings, iii. 5-13 (already cited in this Study in II. D (ii), vol. ii, on p. 55, above), and the histories of Venice and Holland (cited in II. D (vii), vol. ii, on pp. 260-1, above).

In Bergson's philosophy, as in the poetry of Aeschylus, the personality of Prometheus—the genius of the Human Intellect—is drawn for us with a masterly touch. Can we translate this Promethean image into terms of our own concept of Challenge-and-Response? We have found, by empirical observation, that the most stimulating challenge is a challenge of mean degree between an excess of severity and a deficiency of it.² Perhaps we can now gain deeper insight into this apparent 'law' by applying the myth of Prometheus to it. The characteristic of Prometheus is his *élan*, which carries him past the dead point at which Zeus would have stuck if Prometheus had not been there to carry Zeus away with him. And, in terms of Challenge-and-Response, the Promethean *élan* suggests a consideration which has not engaged our attention in this context so far. So far, we have simply noted the truths, or truisms, that a deficient challenge may fail to stimulate the challenged party at all, while an excessive challenge may break his spirit. But what about the challenge with which he is just capable of coping? On a short view, this is the most stimulating challenge imaginable; and, in the concrete instances of the Polynesians and the Esquimaux and the Nomads and the 'Osmanlis and the Spartans, we have observed empirically that such challenges are in fact apt to evoke *tours de force*. We have also observed, however, that in the next chapter of the story these *tours de force* exact, from those who have performed them, a fatal penalty in the shape of an arrest in their development. And, therefore, on a longer view, we must pronounce that the evocation of the greatest immediate response is not the ultimate test of whether any given challenge is the optimum from the standpoint of evoking the greatest response on the whole and in the end. The real optimum challenge is rather one which not only stimulates the challenged party to achieve a single successful response but also stimulates him to acquire a momentum that carries him on a step farther: from achievement to a fresh struggle, from the solution of one problem to the presentation of another, from momentary rest to reiterated movement, from Yin to Yang again. The single, finite movement from a disturbance to a restoration of equilibrium is not enough; if genesis is to be followed by growth. And, to convert the movement into a repetitive, recurrent rhythm, there must be an *élan* which carries the challenged party through equilibrium into an overbalance which exposes him to a fresh challenge and thereby inspires him to make a fresh response in the form of a further equilibrium ending in a further overbalance

¹ Bergson, op. cit., p. 55.

See Part II. D in vol. ii, above.

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—and so on in a progression which is potentially infinite. In earthly language:

So tauml' ich von Begierde zu Genuss
Und im Genuss verschmacht' ich nach Begierde.¹

In heavenly language:

Komm! Hebe dich zu höheren Sphären!
Wenn er dich ahnet, folgt er nach.²

This *élan*, working through a series of overbalances, can be detected in the course of Hellenic history from the genesis of the Hellenic Civilization down to Aeschylus's day.³

The first challenge presented to the new-born Hellenic Civilization was the challenge of chaos and ancient night. The disintegration of the 'apparented' Minoan Society had left a welter of social debris—marooned Minoans and stranded Achaeans and 'Dorians'—in the defunct society's derelict domain; and the first question was whether a new order would assert itself in this void and formless world. Would the sediment of an old civilization be buried under the shingle which the new torrent of barbarism had brought down in spate? Would the rare patches of lowland in the Aegean landscape be dominated by the wilderness of highlands which ringed them round? Would the peaceful cultivators of the plains be at the mercy of the shepherds and the brigands of the mountains?

This first challenge to the life of the infant Hellenic Civilization was victoriously met. As Hēraklēs, in his cradle, strangled the two serpents that had been sent to take his life, so the people of the lowlands of Hellas solved their problem of self-defence by establishing their mastery over their aggressive highlander neighbours; and their victory decided that Hellas should be a world of cities and not of villages, of agriculture and not of pasturage, of order and not of anarchy. Yet the very success of their response to this first challenge exposed the victors to a second. For a victory which ensured the peaceful pursuit of agriculture in the lowlands gave a momentum to the growth of population; and this momentum did not come to a standstill when the population reached the maximum density which agriculture in the Hellenic homeland could support. This limit was inelastic; for, in the Aegean World, the arable lowlands amount to only a small fraction of the total area of the country; and the line at which the bare limestone skeleton of the land breaks out, as a barren mountain-side, above the level sediment of soil in

¹ *Faust*, ll. 3249–50.

² *Mater Gloriosa* (Mary) to *Una Poenitentium* (Gretchen), speaking of Doctor Marianus (Faust), in *Faust*, ll. 12094–5.

³ These chapters of Hellenic history have been dealt with, by anticipation, in I. B (i), vol. i, on pp. 24–6 and in II. D (ii), vol. ii, on pp. 36–49, above, and are examined further in III. C (i) (a) on pp. 139–40 and in III. C (i) (d) on pp. 197–8, below.

the valley bottoms is so sharp that the wayfarer passes from loam to rock, from field to wilderness, at a single step.¹ Thus the very success of the response which the Hellenic Society had made to the first challenge exposed it to a second; and it responded to this Malthusian challenge as successfully as it had responded to the Herculean.

The Hellenic response to the challenge of over-population took the form of a series of alternative experiments. The easiest and most obvious method of solving the problem was adopted first and was applied until it began to bring in diminishing returns. Thereupon, a less obvious and more difficult alternative method was adopted and applied, in place of the first, until, this time, a solution of the problem was achieved.

The first method was to employ the techniques and institutions which the lowlanders of Hellas had created in the process of imposing their wills upon their highlander neighbours at home in order to conquer new domains for Hellenism overseas. With the military instrument of the hoplite phalanx and the political instrument of the city-state, a swarm of Hellenic pioneers established a Magna Graecia in the toe of Italy at the expense of barbarian Itali and Chônes, and a new Peloponnese in Sicily at the expense of barbarian Sikels, and a Hellenic pentapolis in the Cyrenaica at the expense of barbarian Libyans, and a Chalcidicê on the north coast of the Aegean at the expense of barbarian Thracians.² Yet, once again, the very success of the response brought down a new challenge upon the victors. For the expansion of Hellas from the coasts of the Aegean far and wide around the coasts of the Mediterranean was itself a challenge to the other Mediterranean peoples—the barbarian victims and the Phoenician and Etruscan rivals of the Hellenic pioneers—whose vital interests were being jeopardized by these Hellenic successes; and eventually the non-Hellenes were stimulated by the Hellenic pressure upon them to bring the expansion of Hellas to a standstill: partly by resisting Hellenic aggression with borrowed Hellenic arts and arms, and partly by co-ordinating their own forces on a greater scale than the Hellenes themselves were able to achieve.³ Through the increasingly effective resistance of

¹ A modern Western observer cannot fail to be struck by the resemblance between the physiography of Greece and that of Japan; and the situation of the agricultural population of the Hellenic homeland in the first half of the eighth century B.C. must have been not unlike that of the agricultural population of Japan in the first half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era.

² See I. B (ii), vol. i, p. 24, and II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 42-3, above. For the wrong turning taken on this occasion by the Spartans, when they tried to solve the Malthusian problem by conquering their own Hellenic neighbours and peers in Messenia, see I. B (ii), vol. i, p. 24, and III. A, pp. 52-3, above.

³ It is one of the laws of the Balance of Power that it is more difficult to achieve political consolidation in the heart and centre of an expanding society than on the periphery. This law is analysed in III. C (ii) (b), on pp. 301-6, below.

these opposing forces, the Hellenic expansion over the Mediterranean, which had begun in the course of the eighth century B.C., was brought to a standstill in the course of the sixth century after having lasted for some two hundred years. Meanwhile, the Hellenic Society was still confronted by the challenge of over-population, by which its expansion had originally been set in motion; and now that one method of solving the problem had been followed out to the point of diminishing returns, some alternative method had to be discovered.

In this new crisis in Hellenic history, the required discovery was made by Athens, who became 'the education of Hellas' through learning, and teaching, how to transmute the expansion of the Hellenic Society from an extensive into an intensive process.¹ This Athenian response to the Malthusian challenge has been described already in this Study,² and the description need not be repeated here. It need only be pointed out that this Athenian response was demanded because the pre-Athenian response to the same challenge had carried the balance of forces between the Greeks and their Mediterranean neighbours beyond the dead point of equilibrium until it had eventually overbalanced into a situation in which the non-Hellenic resistance to Hellenic expansion made it necessary for the Hellenic Society to pursue the solution of the Malthusian problem by other means.

It was in the full *élan* of the Athenian response³ that the Athenian poet Aeschylus wrote his Promethean Trilogy, in which the rhythm of overbalance is captured and immortalized in a myth.

This rhythm, which thus appears in the poetry of Aeschylus as well as in the pre-Aeschylean chapters of Hellenic history, has been apprehended, in a far distant time and place, by a modern North American poet.

¹ The phenomenon of 'etherialization', of which this transmutation is an example, is examined in III. C (i) (c), below.

² In vol. i, pp. 24-5, and vol. ii, pp. 39-42, above. Compare the similar policy for solving the same Malthusian problem which was pursued by the Japanese Government from the time of the Washington Conference of A.D. 1921-2 down to the 18th-19th September, 1931. (See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1931* (London 1932, Milford), pp. 400-3.)

³ This time, again, the success of the response to one challenge exposed the successful society to a new challenge. The Athenians had discovered how to solve the Hellenic problem of over-population by an intensification of economic productivity through specialized production for export; and through this Athenian discovery an economic problem received a complete economic solution. But this economic solution of an economic problem at once created a political problem which could only be solved on political lines. For the economic change from a system of local autonomy to a system of intercourse and interdependence demanded a corresponding change on the political plane. An inter-city-state economy could not be carried on effectively without the provision of some kind of political framework in the shape of an inter-city-state régime of law and order. The Athenians failed to respond successfully to this political challenge which arose out of their successful response to the foregoing economic challenge, and this failure resulted in the breakdown and disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization. (See further IV. C (iii) (b) 10, vol. iv, pp. 206-14, below.)

'It is provided in the essence of things that from any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth something to make a greater struggle necessary.'¹

This intuition of an American man of letters of the nineteenth century has been taken as a text by a twentieth-century English biologist.

'Life can never be in equilibrium. Given the two well-established facts that living substance can vary and that living things, if left to themselves, would multiply in rapid geometrical ratio, then change in the *status quo* is inevitable. A state of equilibrium may for a time exist, but every balanced organism is as it were pressing against every other, and a change in one means a rearrangement of them all. . . .

'If one species happens to vary in the direction of greater independence, the inter-related equilibrium is upset and cannot be restored until a number of competing species have either given way to the increased pressure and become extinct, or else have answered pressure with pressure and kept the first species in its place by themselves too discovering means of adding to their independence. While the balance of power lasts, variation no doubt takes place, but there is no strong necessity to guide it. Once let a large favourable variation take place in a species, however, so giving it a handicap, and then for its competitors natural selection is at once made more active—they must perish or else adjust themselves by a variation, generally in a similar direction. So it comes to pass that the continuous change which is passing through the organic world appears as a succession of phases of equilibrium, each one on a higher average plane of independence than the one before, and each inevitably calling up and giving place to one still higher. . . .'²

The same rhythm has been detected, in both the organic and the inorganic realm of the material world, by a South African statesman (often quoted in this Study) who is at the same time a philosopher and a student of Physical Science.

'A . . . peculiar feature about the change in equilibrium in a physico-chemical structure is that it is never such as to produce a perfect new equilibrium; the new is merely approximate, just as the old equilibrium was. We may say that the change is from too little to too much. A structure remains unchanged in spite of a small change in its inner equilibrium; hence the inner instability must pass certain limits before the readjustment in equilibrium takes place. The instance of a super-saturated solution is a case in point, where the solidification or crystallization lags behind the conditions which bring it about. When the change does come, it again proceeds too far; it swings beyond the necessities of the case; it passes the limits of perfect equilibrium on to the other side, so to say. From too little adjustment it passes to too much adjustment, and again there is a condition of instability which has to be

¹ Walt Whitman, quoted by Huxley, J. S., in *The Individual in the Animal Kingdom* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), p. 114.

² Huxley, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-16.

righted by a swing back in due course.¹ Thence arises the rhythmic character of natural change, which links it on to the rhythm of the life-processes, and shows that they spring from the same source in the inner nature of things. Hence probably arise also the definite quantitative increments of change which the New Physics reveals. . . .

'We may represent an organism as a moving developing equilibrium, which is never perfectly adjusted because it has a persistent slight over-balance in the direction of development. Complete equilibrium is never attained and would be fatal if it were attained, as it would mean stagnation, atrophy, and death.'²

This philosophic and scientific intuition of the rhythm of progress is confirmed by the keen eye of the horse-breeder, which finds the same points in the build of a thoroughbred.

'The more unstable, in a forward direction, is the equilibrium of a horse's body during each step at any particular pace, the greater will be the speed that can be developed at that pace; because, the more unstable the equilibrium, the more easily can the centre of gravity be brought forward. This fact needs no mathematical investigation, for we all know that, if a person is bending forward, it is much easier to push him to the front than if he was leaning back. . . . It is evident that the chief advantage which is gained from the "crouching jockey's seat", as regards speed, is due to the fact that the forward position of the rider increases the instability of the equilibrium of the horse. . . . During continued movement, any addition to speed obtained by increased instability of equilibrium necessitates increased muscular effort in maintaining the centre of gravity of the body at a suitable height.'³

This homely illustration from the lore of horseflesh raises a question of general interest and of profound importance; for the horse, who is constrained by the instability of his equilibrium to repeat, and to go on repeating, an identic movement of his legs, is carried by this repetitive physical rhythm in a certain direction—a 'forward direction'—which is constant.⁴ Whatever the directive may be—whether it be the horse's own impulse to outstrip his competitors or the external stimulus of rein and whip and spur—its effect is to make the horse run, from start to finish, the race that is set before him.⁵ Is this element of direction an essential feature in the process of growth?

In encountering this question we shall be wise to remind ourselves that the idea of 'direction' can have no literal application

¹ Compare the *loi de double frénésie* which is enunciated, as one of the characteristic phenomena of human social progress, by Monsieur Bergson in op. cit., pp. 318-22.—A. J. T.

² Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd ed. (London 1927, Macmillan), pp. 181 and 223.

³ Hayes, Captain M. H.: *Points of the Horse*, 5th ed. (London 1930, Hurst and Blackett), pp. 53-4.

⁴ For an analysis of the repetitive and the non-repetitive factors in the phenomenon of Rhythm, see IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 34-8, below.

⁵ Hebrews xii. 1.

except in the physical world, and that we must be on our guard against going astray when we apply the same idea metaphorically in the psychic field. The movement of the *Psychê* is not 'directed', either by a deterministic push or by a teleological pull; and in the Promethean rhythm of challenge and response and recurrent challenge—or differentiation passing over through integration into differentiation again—the thread of continuity which the repetitive character of the process reveals requires a different metaphor to describe it.

'The essential [notion in] the idea of an *élan vital* [is] the impossibility of foreseeing the forms that Life creates—complete in every detail—by discontinuous leaps along the course of her evolution. If one takes his stand on the doctrine of pure mechanism or on that of pure teleology, on both hypotheses alike the creations of Life are pre-determined, since on the one hypothesis the future can be deduced from the present by a calculation, while on the other it is delineated in the present in the form of an idea—with the consequence, in either case, that Time is of no effect. Pure experience suggests nothing of the kind. "Neither impulsion nor attraction," it seems to say. . . .

'[The goal of human endeavours], which, at long intervals, has been the dream of the elect, realizes something of itself each time in acts of creation—each of which makes it possible, by a more or less profound transformation of Human Nature, to surmount difficulties that have been insurmountable up to that point. . . . Are these steps in progress all taken in one single direction? It goes without saying that the direction is the same as soon as we have agreed upon calling these movements steps in progress. Each movement will in fact then have to be defined as a step forward. But this is merely a metaphor; and if there were really a pre-existing direction along which Mankind had been content to advance, moral revivals would be predictable: the need of a creative effort for each of them would not be there. The truth is that one can always take the latest of them, define it by a concept, and say that the others contained a greater or lesser quantity of what the concept includes, and that consequently all of them were stations on the road to this. But things only take this form in retrospect. In reality, the changes were qualitative and not quantitative, and they therefore defied prediction. There was, however, one side on which they presented in themselves, and not merely in their conceptual transcripts, a factor common to them all. They were all of them attempts to open what was closed. . . . To push our analysis farther, we must add that these successive efforts were not exactly the progressive realization of an ideal, because no idea that had been forged in anticipation would be able to represent a sum of acquisitions each of which, in creating itself, would be creating a special idea of its own. Yet, all the same, this diversity of efforts might well sum itself up in something unique: an *élan*.¹

¹ Bergson, Henri: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 119-20 and 288-9.

The continuity here is not spatial but summative. As far as direction goes, the line of movement plotted out by the succession of responses may be exceedingly erratic; and, whatever shape this line may take, it has little or no symbolic significance, because the continuous progress that is achieved by the Promethean *élan*, as its response to one challenge exposes it to another challenge *und so weiter*, cannot be registered at all in the form of a curve. This progress has rather to be conceived in terms of control and organization, as a progressive and cumulative increase both in outward mastery over the environment and in inward self-determination or self-articulation on the part of the individual or the society that is in process of growth. A teleological formula may be adequate to express any single term in the progression; but it may become misleading when it is applied to the summation of the whole series; and in attempting to express this whole—in which the essence of growth consists—we shall find the concepts of mastery and articulation more illuminating than any others.

A teleological formulation of the transit from one integration to the next differentiation into which it overbalances is given in the following passages from a 'post-war' English *Anti-Utopia* from which several quotations have been made in this Study already.

"Don't you wish you were free, Lenina?"

"I don't know what you mean. I am free. Free to have the most wonderful time. Everybody's happy nowadays."

He laughed. "Yes, *Everybody's happy nowadays*. We begin giving the children that at five. But wouldn't you like to be free to be happy in some other way, Lenina? In your own way, for example; not in everybody else's way."

"I don't know what you mean", she repeated. . . .

"Once you began admitting explanations in terms of purpose—well, you didn't know what the result might be. It was the sort of idea that might easily de-condition the more unsettled minds among the higher castes—make them lose their faith in happiness as the Sovereign Good and take to believing, instead, that the goal was somewhere beyond, somewhere outside the present human sphere; that the purpose of life was not the maintenance of well-being, but some intensification and refining of consciousness, some enlargement of knowledge."¹

When 'purpose' is interpreted in this somewhat esoteric sense of an *élan* which transcends not only the individual situation and the individual act but also the individual personality or social group, then it becomes virtually identical in meaning with the concepts of progressive mastery of the environment and progressive self-determination; and this identification is explicitly made in the following

¹ Huxley, Aldous: *Brave New World* (London 1932, Chatto and Windus), pp. 106 and 209.

passage from the pen of the South African philosopher-statesman whom we have so often quoted.

'Evolution is a fact of observation and experience, and it shows a persistent trend: from Matter to Life; from Life to more Life and to higher Life; from higher Life to Mind; from Mind to more and higher Mind and to Spirit [*sic*] in its highest creative manifestations. . . . The trend of slight overbalance is towards . . . a structural character which will ever more approximate towards wholeness. . . . The nature of the Universe points to something deeper, to something beyond itself. The persistent direction on the whole shows that it is not self-sufficing. It has a trend; it has a list. It has an immanent Telos. It belongs to or is making for some greater whole. And the pull of this greater whole is enregistered in its inmost structures.'¹

Perhaps this is as far as we can penetrate into the nature of the growths of civilizations. The process by which they grow makes the next demand upon our attention.

¹ Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd ed. (London 1927, Macmillan), pp. 185-7.

C. THE PROCESS OF THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS

I. THE CRITERION OF GROWTH

(a) INCREASING COMMAND OVER THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

WE have seen that the growths of civilizations are in their nature progressive movements. Civilizations grow through an *élan* that carries them from challenge through response to further challenge and from differentiation through integration to differentiation again. We have also seen that this kind of progress cannot properly be described in the spatial metaphor of 'direction'. For the progress which we call growth is a cumulative progress, and its cumulative character is apparent in both its outward and its inward aspect. In the Macrocosm, growth reveals itself as a progressive and cumulative mastery over an external environment; in the Microcosm, as a progressive and cumulative inward self-determination or self-articulation. In either of these two manifestations of growth—the external or the internal—we have a possible criterion of the progress of the *élan* itself. Let us examine each manifestation in turn from this standpoint. In considering, first, the progressive conquest of the external environment, we shall find it convenient to subdivide the external environment into the physical environment, constituted by non-human Nature, and the human environment—which, for any given human society at any given moment, consists of all the other human societies with which it finds itself in contact. Let us begin our examination with the human environment, interpreted in this sense.

The progress made by any growing civilization in the conquest of its human environment may be measured, for practical purposes, in terms of geographical expansion. For, seeing that the greater part of the habitable world may be presumed to have been occupied already, in some fashion and to some degree, by primitive human societies before ever any human society entered on the path of civilization, the geographical expansion of any society in process of civilization can seldom or never have taken place except at some other society's expense.¹ On this showing, the geographical expansion of a civilization can be taken as a fair index of its progress in conquering its human environment; and this index is not only fair

¹ The society that is the victim of an alien society's expansion in any given case may, of course, either be still on the primitive level or else have entered on the path of civilization on its own account. The respective effects of the impact of an expanding civilization in these two different cases are dealt with in Parts VIII and IX, below.

but convenient, since expansion is a process which is easy to observe and measure. We have now to ask ourselves whether expansion is an equally good criterion of a civilization's growth—in the comprehensive sense which includes growth in wisdom as well as in stature. If we are to answer our question in the affirmative, we cannot be content with merely showing that geographical expansion is a possible and occasional concomitant of growth in its wider and deeper sense. We must demonstrate that it invariably accompanies growth and that it also invariably comes to a standstill if a civilization suffers abortion or arrest or breakdown and disintegration. More than that, we must demonstrate that the correlation of geographical expansion with growth is as definite as its correlation with the conquest of the human environment: that such expansion keeps pace, in its rapidity and its extent, with the *élan* of the growth of which it is assumed to be the criterion; and that, conversely, it not only comes to a halt when growth is arrested, but gives place to contraction when a civilization disintegrates and is finally reduced to vanishing point when disintegration ends in extinction. If we amplify our original question in these terms and seek to answer it by applying our well-tried empirical method, we find that on every count the answer proves to be in the negative.

In the matter of sheer geographical range, an empirical survey reveals the widest diversity in the actual expansion of different civilizations whose respective achievements in this field are fairly comparable, without revealing any corresponding difference in the degrees of growth attained by the several civilizations which are in question in each instance.

For example, there was an age-long competition between the Egyptian, Sumeric, and Minoan civilizations for expansion into the no-man's-land of Syria which lay between them; and in this competition the Egyptian Civilization was decidedly less successful than either of its rivals. At an early date in the history of this generation of civilizations, the Egyptian culture pushed up the coast of Syria as far as Byblos at the northern end of the Lebanon. Yet although it was the first in the field, and notwithstanding its success in making its way along the forbidding Phoenician section of the coast (where the Lebanon range falls steeply into the sea, with no coastal plain between),¹ the Egyptian culture failed to penetrate into the interior of Syria before the far more distant Sumeric Society had succeeded in annexing this part of Syria to its own domain.² Finally, the original field of Egyptian expansion

¹ For the geographical character of Phoenicia, see II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 51-2, above.

² For the line of demarcation between the Sumeric and the Egyptian sphere in Syria in the pre-Hyksos age, see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 388-9, above.

along the Syrian coast was captured from the Egyptian Society, after the Egyptian cultural ascendancy here had prevailed for some two thousand years, by the Minoan Society, which, in the *Völkerwanderungen* of the fourteenth to twelfth centuries B.C., succeeded in establishing itself not only in Cyprus (a natural field of expansion for a maritime power from the Aegean), but even on the Syrian mainland, and this on the southernmost section of the Syrian coast on the very threshold of Egypt itself.¹ In other directions, likewise, the Egyptian Society shows to equal disadvantage, in terms of geographical expansion, by comparison with its two neighbours. The percolation of the Egyptian Civilization up the Nile exhibits neither the range nor the drive of the maritime expansion of the Minoan Civilization into the Mediterranean or the overland expansion of the Sumeric Civilization over South-Western Asia and out beyond into Europe and into India. Yet manifestly this marked inferiority of the Egyptian Civilization in expansive power cannot be taken as a token of any corresponding deficiency in the *élan* of its growth; for an intuitive view of the histories of the three civilizations here in question gives the impression that the Egyptian Civilization grew at least as fast and as far as either of the two others.

Or let us compare the expansion of the Hellenic and Syriac civilizations with that of their seniors in their own generation—the Indic and the Sinic. The two Mediterranean civilizations display the same expansive power as the older Minoan Civilization, to which they are both related. They not only expand overseas, from the Levant and the Aegean down the whole length of the Mediterranean and out through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Atlantic. They show an equal capacity to expand thereafter overland, in the opposite direction, into the interior of Asia; and here they reach and impinge upon the Indic and the Sinic worlds before ever the Indic and the Sinic societies have crossed their own thresholds in order to go out to encounter them. Just as the Minoan Civilization had once deposited its Philistine pioneers—or refugees—on the threshold of Egypt, so the two Mediterranean civilizations deposit on the thresholds of India and China their exotic styles of art and their exotic scripts.

In India, the Kharoshti script is certainly derived from the Aramaic alphabet and the Brahmi script possibly derived from the Phoenician;² while in the Far East the scripts employed in modern times by the Manchus and the Mongols to convey their own

¹ For the establishment of the Philistines in the Shephelah, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 100-2, above. For the affiliation of the subsequent Syriac Civilization to the Minoan Civilization, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 102-3, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 386-7, above.

² See Jensen, H.: *Geschichte der Schrift* (Hanover 1925, Lefaire), especially pp. 116-17, 146-7, and 199-216.

languages are likewise derived from the Syriac Alphabet and not from the Sinic characters—an extraordinary testimony to the superiority of the Syriac over the Sinic Civilization in expansive power, considering that Manchuria and Mongolia lie close up against the Great Wall, in immediate proximity to the homeland of the Sinic culture, whereas both countries are separated by the whole breadth of Asia from the Syrian birthplace of the scripts which they have actually adopted.¹

As for styles of art, the modification of the Hellenic Style which was worked out in North-Western India, after the intrusion of Hellenism upon the Indic World, between the second century B.C. and the second century of the Christian Era, was afterwards carried, by Mahayanian Buddhist missionary enterprise, through the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and the Tarim Basin into North-Western China, to become the germ of the Far Eastern art which has superseded the pre-Helleno-Buddhist style of the ancient Sinic Society.

Thus the expansive power of the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations has been vastly greater than that of the Indic or the Sinic. Yet, who will venture to affirm dogmatically that the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations have surpassed the other two in their general and genuine growth?

The inadequacy of the geographical criterion in the case in point is exposed by the fact that the Indic Civilization, which had waited on its own ground for Hellenism to bring a new style of art to its door, thereafter assumed the expansive role on its own account and became the carrier by which the Hellenic style was conveyed, over the last long stage of its immense journey, from the Indus to the Tarim and from the Tarim to the Yellow River. For (as has just been mentioned) Hellenic art reached the Far East as the instrument of Mahayanian Buddhist propaganda, and the Mahayana, of course, was a creation of Indic souls. This extraordinary difference in the degree of the expansive power which the Indic Civilization has put forth in this or that geographical direction has struck, and baffled, the mind of a great modern Western authority on Indic religion, who finds himself reduced to an arbitrary explanation which is really no explanation at all.

'Ideas, like empires and races, have their natural frontiers. Thus Europe may be said to be non-Muhammadan. . . . Similarly, in the

¹ The existence of the Mongol Alphabet may have inspired the invention of the Korean Alphabet; for the invention was made at a time (*regnante Hsien Wang, A.D. 1419-50*) when the Koreans had recently been in contact with the Mongols during the Mongol political domination which had extended over Korea and China alike. On the other hand, the forms of the new Korean alphabetic characters seem to have been borrowed from some Indic script in which the Koreans had received the original texts of the Buddhist Scriptures. (See Jensen, *op. cit.*, p. 152; Carter, T. F.: *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward*, revised ed. (New York 1931, Columbia University Press), pp. 174-5.)

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regions west of India,¹ Indian religion is sporadic and exotic. . . . But in Eastern Asia the influence of India has been notable in extent, strength, and duration.²

If we glance next at the pair of civilizations 'affiliated' to the Syriac Civilization, we find no difficulty in deciding that the Iranic Civilization, which swallowed up the Arabic in the third century after the simultaneous birth of both,³ has grown further than the sister-civilization which has been its victim. Yet, if geographical expansion be the index of growth, it can only be said that, in this instance, the index is singularly uninformative; for, in terms of expansion, the discomfited Arabic Civilization makes just as good a showing as the triumphant Iranic. The expansion achieved by the Iranic Civilization in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era is impressive enough, whether we follow its course into South-Eastern Europe or into the Deccan or on to the Eurasian Steppe; but it is no more impressive than the contemporary and subsequent expansion of the Arabic Civilization up the Nile and across the Sahara into Tropical Africa and over the Indian Ocean into Indonesia. In this instance, at any rate, the attempt to use geographical expansion as a criterion of growth is a conspicuous failure.

Or let us compare the growths of the two sister-civilizations—the Babylonian and the Hittite—which are both related to the Sumeric. On an intuitive view, the Hittite Civilization, in the course of a shorter life, would appear to have gone farther in its growth than its Babylonian sister. Yet the geographical expansion which the Hittite Civilization achieved in the sixteenth to thirteenth centuries B.C. through the militarism of the Khatti Power was not so wide as the expansion of the Babylonian Civilization in the ninth to seventh centuries B.C. through the militarism of the Assyrians.

We find the same absence of correlation between geographical expansion and genuine growth if we extend our survey from the Old World to the New. In the first generation of indigenous American civilizations, the Mayan culture appears to have shown greater expansive power than the Andean. At any rate, at the dawn of Andean history there is some shadow of archaeological evidence for Mayan influence along the stretch of South-American coastline on which the Andean Civilization then emerged,⁴ while there appears to be no trace of any counterflow of Andean cultural influence from South America into Central America until the time

¹ 'The frontier seems to be about long. 65° E.'

² Eliot, Sir Charles: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. xii-xiii.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 69-70, with Annex I.

⁴ See Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilizations of the Andes* (New York 1931, Scribner), pp. 40-1 and 71-2.

of the interregnum between the disappearance of the Mayan Civilization and the emergence of the related Yucatec and Mexic civilizations¹—an epoch which, in Central America, marks the transition from the first generation of civilizations to the second. Yet it would be arbitrary to assert that the Mayan Civilization went farther than the Andean in its growth. And when we come to make a comparison between the two American civilizations of a younger generation—the Mexic and the Yucatec—which are both ‘affiliated’ to the Mayan Civilization, we find not merely an absence of correlation between expansion and growth, but an actual contrariety. While the Yucatec culture kept within the bounds of its own Central American peninsula, its Mexic neighbour not only occupied the Mexican Plateau but radiated northwards into North America as far as the Great Lakes.² Yet there can be little doubt that the Yucatec Civilization had achieved a greater measure of growth than the Mexic by the time when it suffered at Mexic hands the same fate that, in the Old World, was to be suffered by the Arabic Civilization at the hands of the Iranic.

In our own World in our own day we have the most imposing spectacle of expansion of any that are on record. For the first time in human history, so far as we know, one single human society has now succeeded in expanding until it has come to embrace within its system all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face of the planet. There could hardly be a greater difference in degree of expansive power than the difference which has appeared in recent times between the world-wide expansion of our own Western Civilization and the relative immobility of the other surviving civilizations. Every one of these other civilizations has been content to remain within its own bounds while the ever expanding Civilization of the West has washed round its coasts, encircled its frontiers, knocked at its gates, broken through its defences, and forced an entrance into its inmost citadel. Yet at this very moment, when the ‘Westernization’ of the non-Western civilizations is making headway at an unprecedented rate and is being carried to unforeseen lengths, *Homo Occidentalis* has been overtaken by a mistrust of his own *élan* and an uncertainty about his own future which (to judge by the precedents) are ominous symptoms.³

These Western misgivings in the heyday of our Western ex-

¹ For the introduction of the technique of metallurgy into Central America during the post-Mayan interregnum—in all probability from the Andean World—see pp. 161–2, below. In other departments of material culture besides the metallurgical, Andean influence is discernible in the Zapotec province of the Mexic culture, in the district of Oaxaca (see Joyce, T. A.: *Mexican Archaeology* (London 1914, Lee Warner), pp. 192 and 369–70).

² See II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, pp. 264–5, above.

³ For a survey and analysis of the psychological symptoms of social disintegration, see Part V, below. For a diagnosis, from this standpoint, of the Western *éthos* in our own day, see the present chapter, section (d), pp. 210–12, and Part XII, below.

pansion will not appear fantastic in the light that is thrown upon the present situation of our Western Society by the histories of the abortive and the arrested civilizations. For three out of the four abortive civilizations¹ and four out of the five arrested civilizations² went uncommonly far in their geographical expansion; yet in all these cases any correlation between expansion and growth is ruled out *a priori*, since the abortive civilizations ceased to grow before coming to birth and the arrested civilizations in their infancy.

Thus the empirical test plainly shows that, while the progressive and cumulative conquest of the human environment may perhaps be measured fairly in terms of geographical expansion, this geographical index is not a criterion of growth. And indeed the only social 'law', apropos of geographical expansion, which it is possible to discern appears to operate in a contrary sense; for the correlation which this law suggests is not between geographical expansion and social growth, but between geographical expansion and social retardation.

There seems to be some warrant for the formula that, as a rule, the social effect of geographical expansion in an outward direction from the geographical centre of a civilization towards the periphery is equivalent to a retardation of social progress in the Time-dimension: a retardation which, in acute cases, may pass over into an arrest and in extreme cases into an actual retrogression.

A good example of this phenomenon is the history of our modern Western 'Renaissance'.³ In Northern and Central Italy, where this intellectual movement originally came to birth, it emerged as early as the fourteenth century of the Christian Era and attained its highest point of intensity in the fifteenth. On the other hand, in England the equivalent centuries were the sixteenth and seventeenth, in France the seventeenth and eighteenth, in Germany the eighteenth and nineteenth; so that the German *Aufklärung* of the age of Goethe corresponded in character to the phase through which the Renaissance had been passing in Italy some four centuries earlier. In fact, this modern Western Renaissance was a kind of social wave, first generated in Italy, which took an appreciable time to travel outwards from its centre of dispersion to other parts of the original homeland of the Western Civilization in Western Europe.

The operation of our law becomes more strikingly apparent when

¹ The Far Eastern Christian, the Far Western Christian, and the Scandinavian, by contrast with the abortive Syriac. (For a comparison between the Scandinavian and the Ottoman expansion, see II. D (vii), Annex VII, vol. ii, above.)

² The Polynesian, the Eskimo, the Nomadic, and the Ottoman, by contrast with the Spartan. (For the failure of the 'Osmanlis, in their expansion, to occupy just those key points which it would have been really profitable for them to occupy, see II. D (vii), Annex VII, vol. ii, above.)

³ For renaissances in general as outcomes of the contacts between civilizations in the Time-dimension, see Part X, below.

we examine the social effects of the propagation of our Western Civilization from its homeland in Western Europe into the new domains which it has acquired by colonization overseas. For the popular notion that the overseas *êthos* is essentially radical, if not progressive, turns out to be illusory on a closer view. It is true that, in the technological field, the challenge of having to wrestle, short-handed, with an untamed Physical Nature has sometimes stimulated the Western overseas pioneers who have been exposed to this ordeal to make remarkable mechanical inventions; and it is also true, as we have seen in another connexion,¹ that the very process of transmarine migration has a disintegrating effect upon the migrants' social heritage which offers an opportunity for new social creation. This opportunity was taken, with brilliant results, by the Scandinavian settlers in Iceland and the Hellenic settlers in Ionia; but it is an opportunity and no more, which the overseas settler is at liberty to take or leave as he chooses. It is equally in his power to justify the proverb that *caelum, non animus, mutant qui trans mare currunt*.² Transmarine migration is merely a possible stimulus and not an automatic and infallible forcing-process of mental growth; and, if this stimulus evokes no response, there is little virtue in the stimulus to mechanical invention which overseas settlement in an undeveloped country likewise administers; for the field of mechanical invention—however great the pioneer's progress in this field may be—lies, after all, on an extremely superficial plane of social life. So that, in neglect of manifest opportunities and in spite of superficial appearances, the colonial *êthos* may prove, in any given historical instance, to be mentally old-fashioned. And such old-fashionedness is undoubtedly the hall-mark of our modern Western Overseas World.

At an earlier point in this Study,³ we had occasion to glance at the living museum of the Egyptiac Society in the predynastic age which is provided, down to this day, by the Dinka and the Shilluk barbarians on the upper reaches of the White Nile. Within the compass of a far shorter Time-span, we can observe, in modern America and Antipodea, a number of living exhibits of Western social conditions which are no longer extant in Europe. In our twentieth-century Quebec and Appalachia and Charleston and Transvaal and Peru and Macao, we have living museums of a seventeenth-century or sixteenth-century Normandy and Ulster and England and Holland and Castile and Portugal.⁴ And, even in the

¹ In II. D (iii), vol. ii, on pp. 84-100.

² Horace, *Epistles*, Bk. I, ep. xi, l. 27.

³ In Part II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 312-15.

⁴ Compare the living museum of a Hellenic city-state which survived down to the ninth century of the Christian Era at Cherson in the Crimea, at the uttermost extremity of the colonial domain of the defunct Hellenic Society. (See II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 404, footnote 2, above.)

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technological field, the overseas settler is not invariably an innovator. As an offset to those 'Yankee Notions' which we are inclined to regard as characteristic of the modern Western Overseas World as a whole, we may remind ourselves that, down to the first half of the nineteenth century, the descendants of the Spanish settlers in New Mexico and Texas still rode forth to war equipped with lance and shield—an equipment which, in Spain itself, was already ludicrously obsolete by the time when Cervantes was writing *Don Quixote*! The quaintness of these latter-day Don Quixotes of the New World made a vivid impression upon the minds of the English-descended American pioneers who encountered and discomfited the Spanish-descended Texans and New Mexicans in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Yet our transmarine Don Quixote, if he had 'had his eyes skinned', might have turned the laugh against Uncle Sam; for while the Spaniard of New Spain had clung to the European military equipment of the early seventeenth century,¹ the New Englander, on his side, had preserved a vestige of the civilian costume of the same period in the shape of the steeple-crowned hat.² And Don Quixote might also have noted that the wave of the Italian Renaissance, which had swept over Spain in the

¹ For a description of the shields which were still part of the regular equipment of the Spanish cavalry in New Spain in the first decade of the nineteenth century, see Pike, Z. M.: 'Observations on New Spain', in *The Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike*, edited by Coues, E. (New York 1895, Harper, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 794. See further Gregg, J.: *Commerce of the Prairies, or The Journal of a Santa Fé Trader* (New York 1844, Langley, 2 vols.), vol. i, ch. xi, p. 221:

'A great portion of the military are obliged to use the clumsy old-fashioned *escopeta* or firelock of the sixteenth century; while others have nothing but the bow and arrow, and sometimes the lance, which is in fact a weapon very much in use throughout the country.'

Scopetus is actually the word used for 'firelock' in the sixteenth-century Latinity of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq.

For the old-fashioned life of New Spain in the early nineteenth century, see Pike and Gregg, *op. cit.*, *passim*: e.g. Gregg's description of the riding-dress of the contemporary New Mexican Caballero in *Commerce of the Prairies*, vol. i, pp. 211-14.

² This antique style of headgear re-emerged from its Transatlantic 'living museum' on the heads of the envoys from the ex-English colonies in North America who came to Paris during and after the American Revolutionary War. The unexpected resurrection of the *chapeau Henri Quatre* caught the French eye and tickled the French fancy and inspired French hands to fashion the embryo of the nineteenth-century top hat! 'The top hat (Zylinderhut) was . . . known already in the eighteenth century. It originated in England as the Puritan and Quaker hat and migrated to America in order to find its way back thence to Europe. It was the European enthusiasm for North America when she was in the throes of her war of liberation that brought this headgear into fashion on the Continent—where it had attracted no attention until then—in Liberal circles. The sympathies . . . which this struggle evoked in the steadily growing Liberal camp were extended to the American hat as well as to the American cause; and thus our top hat—which was the form into which the Quaker hat had blossomed out—came to Europe as a symbol of Liberal ideas.' (Timidiör, O.: *Der Hut und Seine Geschichte* (Vienna and Leipzig 1914, Hartleben), p. 58.) For the political significance of the top hat when it made its appearance—or rather its reappearance—in Europe, see further *op. cit.*, pp. 80-1, and Rosenberg, A.: *Geschichte des Kostums* (Berlin 1906, Wasmuth), vol. iii, p. 267). It is amusing that this revolutionary cachet should have been associated with a type of hat which was actually more antique than the discomfited *tricorne* of the *Ancien Régime*. It is also amusing to find that, between 1797 and 1848, the new bourgeois headgear ran through the whole gamut of symbolism from ultra-revolutionariness to ultra-respectability. (See Timidiör, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-1.)

generation of Cervantes and over Germany in the generation of Goethe, only irrigated New England in the generation in which Texas was conquered from its Spanish-descended occupants by Sam Houston and his fellow-filibusters. Moreover, the intellectual renaissance of Houston's respectable fellow-citizens and contemporaries in New England—an Emerson and a Longfellow and a Thoreau and a Hawthorne—passed over as swiftly and as abruptly as an Indian Summer.¹

When the landscape of the Catskill Mountains inspired Washington Irving to conceive the myth of Rip van Winkle, an overseas genius was really expressing in mythological imagery the essence of the overseas experience; and, at bottom, this experience is common to the whole Overseas World. It has overtaken the hustling New Yorker and the sharp-witted New Englander, as well as the citizen of Charleston or Cuzco, or the Appalachian mountaineer, or the Afrikaner farmer, in whose outward bearing its effects are more manifestly apparent.

The phenomenon is conspicuously manifest in the field of religion. The most old-fashioned form of Protestantism that is a living faith to-day is the 'Fundamentalism' of the Mississippi Basin; the most old-fashioned living Catholicism is the Catholicism of Quebec, or the faith of Mexican Guadalajara with its militant 'Cristeros', who wage a chronic guerrilla war against the modernism of the Mexican Revolution with all the zeal that used to animate their Crusading forefathers when they fought against Islam in medieval Spain. In Russian Orthodox Christendom, again, we find 'the Old Believers' surviving on the periphery of the Russian Empire, in Siberia and the Caucasus and on the Eurasian Steppe.² And on the peripheries of the *ci-devant* Syriac and Indic worlds we find the most primitive extant survivals of Syriac and Indic religion. The most primitive forms of Judaism survive, as we have seen, in the peripheral fastnesses of the Caucasus and the Crimea and Abyssinia and the Yaman; and Abyssinia is also the home of a Monophysitism which is the most primitive living specimen of any form of Christianity.³ In a similar pattern, we find the Hinayana surviving on the southern periphery of the ancient Indic World in Ceylon and Burma and Siam, and the Tantric form of the Mahayana on the northern periphery in the fastness of Tibet.⁴

Our law that geographical expansion produces social retardation may also be illustrated from the philological field. In Appalachia, forms of English speech are still alive that have become extinct in

¹ See Mumford, L.: *The Golden Day* (Oxford 1927, University Press).

² See II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 222, above.

³ See II. D (vi), Annex: 'Jews in Fastnesses', in vol. ii.

⁴ See II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1.

the British Isles, and folk-songs are still sung that have been forgotten in their European homeland. Again, the most old-fashioned living dialect of the Castilian language is to be found to-day, not in the Peninsula, but among the Castilian-speaking Jews in the Near East who are descended from Jews expelled from the Peninsula in the fifteenth century.¹ We find the same phenomena in the Far East. The most old-fashioned living dialects of Chinese are those which are spoken in the provinces of the Southern Seaboard from Kiangsu to Kwangsi inclusive; and these provinces were colonized by Chinese settlers from the North as lately as the time of the T'ang Dynasty.² Similarly, in the ancient Syriac World, we find the Canaanite language surviving as a living language in the colonial domain of the Syriac Society in North-West Africa at least six centuries after it had been superseded in its Phoenician and Palestinian homelands by the intrusive Aramaic.³

The evidence of Archaeology accords with that of Philology. We have noticed already⁴ how in 'pre-historic' Scandinavia, on the periphery of the Old World, the successive techniques that had arisen in the central regions and had gradually radiated outwards each continued to be practised by Scandinavian craftsmen for many centuries after they had been superseded by technical innovations in Sumer and Egypt and Crete.⁵ Similarly, we find that the Minoan style of technique and art survived in Sicily⁶ and Cyprus, at the western and eastern extremities of the Minoan World, after it had become extinct in the Cretan homeland of the Minoan culture;⁷

¹ For this expulsion, see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 243-4, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 90, and II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 83-4, above.

³ Aramaic began to become the lingua franca of all the Semitic-speaking peoples in the Babylonian and Syriac worlds during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. The process was assisted by the violent redistribution of populations under the impact of Assyrian militarism, and it was completed by 'peaceful penetration' under the Achaemenian and Seleucid Empires (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 80-1, above). By the second century B.C., the Canaanite language had probably been replaced almost completely as a spoken language in Phoenicia and Palestine by either Aramaic or Greek. On the other hand, in North-West Africa, the old Canaanite speech of the original Phoenician colonists continued to be spoken right down to the time of St. Augustine (*decessit* A.D. 430) as the vernacular of the peasantry, who then still talked of themselves as 'Canaanites'; and there are even indications that the language lingered on in this region, here and there, until after the Arab conquest in the seventh century of the Christian Era. (See Mommsen, Th.: *The History of Rome: The Provinces from Caesar to Diocletian*, Part II, English translation (London 1886, Bentley), pp. 326-9; see further Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), Part II, ch. i: 'La Survivance de Carthage.') As a dead language, Canaanite has, of course, survived down to this day in the Hebrew scriptures and liturgy of the Jews; and, by an unprecedented *tour de force*, this dead Hebrew has been brought to life again during the nineteenth century, in 'the Pale', as a literary vehicle for the conveyance of modern Western ideas, and in the twentieth century, in Palestine itself, as the mother-tongue of the Palestinian-born children in the Zionist colonies.

⁴ In II. D (vii), vol. ii, on p. 342, footnote 3, above.

⁵ In this connexion, we may also notice that in modern times the conceit of writing Latin verses, which had been initiated by the Italian Renaissance, continued to be practised in Sweden, as in England, after it had fallen out of fashion in Italy.

⁶ See Glotz, G.: *La Civilisation Egéenne* (Paris 1923, Renaissance du Livre), p. 258.

⁷ In Cyprus, a version of the Minoan script also survived down to the fifth century B.C., in the form of a syllabary which was used for conveying the Cypriot dialect of Greek.

while the Hittite style and technique and pictographic script likewise survived in Northern Syria, at the south-eastern extremity of the Hittite World, after their extinction in the homeland of the Hittite culture on the Anatolian Plateau.

So much for the direct effects of geographical expansion upon social growth. Returning now to our inquest, we may next observe that, on an empirical test, a good case can be made out for a correlation of geographical expansion, not with social growth, but, on the contrary, with social disintegration.

Let us take, for example, the history of the Hellenic Civilization. We have noticed, above,¹ that, at one stage of its history, the Hellenic Society met the challenge of over-population by geographical expansion on the grand scale; that, after some two centuries, this expansion was brought to a halt by the successful resistance of certain non-Hellenic forces; and that Hellenism responded to this new challenge by changing over from the extensive to the intensive method of economic development as a new way of dealing with the persistent problem of over-population under the new conditions which the stoppage of expansion had imposed. To Hellenic observers, looking back at short range upon this particular crisis of Hellenic history, the period of readaptation, when the Hellenic Society was transforming the *élan* of its growth from an extensive to an intensive rhythm, had all the appearance of a time of tribulation. As Thucydides saw it, from the age of Cyrus and Darius 'Hellas was repressed from all sides over a long period of time, with the consequence that, in this period, she neither performed any great co-operative achievement nor showed any enterprise in the parochial life of the individual city-state communities'.² As Herodotus saw it, 'the three successive generations covered by the reigns of Darius Hystaspes-son and Xerxes Darius-son and Artaxerxes Xerxes-son saw Hellas overwhelmed by more troubles than she had had to suffer from first to last during the twenty generations preceding Darius's accession'.³ The modern reader finds it difficult to realize that, in these melancholy sentences, the two greatest of all Greek historians are describing the age which, in the sight of posterity, stands out in retrospect as the acme of the Hellenic Civilization: the age in which the Hellenic genius performed those great acts of creation, in every field of social life, which have made Hellenism immortal. Herodotus and Thucydides felt as they did about this creative age because it was an age in which, in contrast to the age before it, the geographical expansion of the Hellenic World was being held in check by the pressure of more potent external forces.

¹ See I. B (i), vol. i, pp. 24-5; II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 39-49; and Part III. B, pp. 120-2, above.

² Thucydides, Bk. I, ch. 17.

³ Herodotus, Bk. VI, ch. 98.

Yet there can be no question but that, during this century between the accession of Darius and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the *élan* of the growth of the Hellenic Civilization was greater than it had been during the two immediately preceding centuries, when the maritime expansion of Hellenism over the Mediterranean was in flood-tide. And if a Herodotus or a Thucydides could have been endowed with superhuman longevity to enable him to observe the sequel, he would have marvelled to find that the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization in the Peloponnesian War (a catastrophe which Thucydides lived to record) was followed by a fresh outburst of geographical expansion—the expansion of Hellenism overland, inaugurated by Alexander—which not only equalled but far surpassed the earlier maritime expansion of Hellas in material scale. During the two centuries that followed Alexander's passage of the Hellespont, Hellenism expanded in Asia at the expense of all the other civilizations—the Syriac and the Egyptian and the Babylonian and the Indic—which it encountered on its path. And, for some two centuries after that, it continued to expand, under the Roman aegis, in the barbarian hinterlands of the Hellenic World in Europe. Yet these were centuries during which the Hellenic Civilization was palpably in process of disintegration!

Thus, in Hellenic history, we observe that the *élan* of growth was at its maximum in an age when geographical expansion was at a standstill; that this age of geographical stagnation, which was the great age of spiritual activity, was a relatively short interval which was followed, as well as preceded, by a considerably longer period in which geographical expansion was going forward vigorously; and that in the second of these two periods, when the Hellenic Civilization was already in process of disintegration, the drive of the geographical expansion was even more vigorous than it had been in the earlier period when the Hellenic Civilization had been still in process of growth. This Hellenic illustration suggests that, if expansion has any correlation with growth at all, the ratio is inverse; or, in other words, that geographical expansion is a symptom not of social growth but of social disintegration.

This inference from the Hellenic case is fortified by a similar survey of the histories of other civilizations.

An inspection of Syriac history, for example, reveals a pattern comparable to that which we have just detected in Hellenic history. The great creative period of Syriac history—the age of the Prophets of Israel—was a period in which a previous Syriac expansion from the Levant into the Western Mediterranean had been brought to a standstill and even driven into retreat by the competitive maritime expansion of the rival Hellenic Civilization in the eighth to sixth

centuries B.C. Simultaneously, the Syriac Society was being harried from the opposite quarter by a violently aggressive movement on the part of the Babylonian Society in the guise of Assyrian militarism. In the latter part of the sixth century B.C., the Syriac World secured relief from these external pressures. In the maritime zone of conflict, the transmarine Syriac communities of Phoenician origin succeeded in checking the Hellenic advance by allowing one of their own number, the city-state of Carthage, to unite and organize their forces under her hegemony. In the continental zone, the Aramaeans and Israelites who had been transplanted, by the ruthless policy of Assyrian militarism, from their homes in the interior of Syria to the western rim of the Iranian Plateau, succeeded in turning the tables against their Babylonian oppressors by imparting their own Syriac culture to their Median and Persian fellow-victims,¹ with the eventual result that the Empire of the Medes and Persians, which entered into the Assyrians' heritage, came to perform the functions of a Syriac universal state. Thus, from the latter part of the sixth century B.C. onwards, the Syriac Civilization was holding its own again in the Western Mediterranean and was entering upon a new career of expansion on the Asiatic mainland. Yet this time of regained mastery over the human environment and of renewed material prosperity, as measured by geographical expansion, was not a period of spiritual growth. In the spiritual history of the Syriac Society, the interval between the sixth century B.C. and the second presents itself as a time of relative stagnation. After the turn of the political tide in the generation of Cyrus, Syriac souls were not again stimulated to fresh spiritual endeavours until the time when Hellenism renewed its attack on the Syriac World by attempting, under the leadership of Alexander and his successors, to capture its entire continental Asiatic domain and by succeeding, under the leadership of the Romans, in overthrowing the Carthaginian Power in the Western Mediterranean. These latter days, in which the Syriac World was no longer expanding territorially but was standing once again on the defensive, were the days in which the Syriac genius created the Psalms and the New Testament and the Confessions of Saint Augustine. It will be seen that, in Syriac as in Hellenic history, geographical expansion and spiritual growth appear to vary inversely to one another.

As for the Babylonian Society, it displayed singularly little expansive power at any stage of its history. After its emergence from the post-Sumerian interregnum (*circa* 1875-1575 B.C.), it never expanded at all until the rise of Assyrian militarism, which was itself a symptom of Babylonian disintegration; and this militant Assyrian

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79-82, and II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 137-8, above.

form of Babylonian expansion was more apt to evoke cultural antipathy than to prepare the way for cultural conquests. The exception which proves the rule is the case of Urartu (Ararat): a barbarian principality in the highlands of Armenia which bore the full brunt of Assyrian aggression, and at the same time adopted the Babylonian culture, in the course of the ninth and eighth centuries B.C.¹—apparently on the principle of keeping an enemy at bay by fighting him with his own weapons.

In Egyptian history it is much the same story. The incorporation of the Upper Nile Valley into the domain of the Egyptian culture—the only substantial and permanent enlargement of this domain that was ever achieved after the close of the pre-dynastic age—was not accomplished until after the Egyptian Civilization had broken down and had passed through its 'Time of Troubles' and had entered into its universal state. Nubia was annexed to Egypt politically under 'the Middle Empire'; but it was not until after this original Egyptian universal state had broken down and had then been restored in the shape of 'the New Empire' that Nubia was assimilated culturally to the homeland of Egyptian culture down-stream from the First Cataract.² In Syria, again, it was not until the time of 'the New Empire' that the ancient Egyptian sphere of influence in this quarter was extended from the coast to the interior: from Byblos to Naharayn.

In Sumerian history, similarly, the first known intrusion of the Sumerian culture into Syria from its homeland in Shinar was the raid of the Sumerian militarist Lugalzaggizi, who carried his arms from the basin of the Tigris and Euphrates to the shores of the Mediterranean; and Lugalzaggizi's career of military conquest was one of the outward symptoms of the breakdown of the Sumerian Civilization.³ The ensuing Sumerian 'Time of Troubles' saw the expansion of the Sumerian Civilization in another direction: across Anti-Taurus and Taurus on to the Anatolian Plateau.⁴ And the radius of Sumerian influence had never before been so wide as it finally came to be in the time of the Sumerian universal state: the Empire of Sumer and Akkad and its continuation in the Amorite Empire of Hammurabi.

Again, the Minoan culture attained its widest range of radiation in the phase which our modern Western archaeologists have labelled 'Late Minoan III'; and this phase did not begin until after the sack of Cnossos *circa* 1425 B.C.: that is to say, not until after the

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 135, above.

² For the connexion between these relations of Nubia with Egypt and the role played in Egyptian history by the Thebaid, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 114-15.

³ For the place of Lugalzaggizi in Sumerian history, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 110-11, above.

catastrophe in which the Minoan universal state—'the Thalassocracy of Minos'—had broken up and given place to the interregnum in which the Minoan Society went into liquidation. The hall-mark of decadence is stamped upon all the material products of Minoan culture dating from this third phase of the 'Late Minoan' period which our archaeological discoveries have brought to light. The handiwork of 'Late Minoan III' falls below that of the preceding phases of Minoan culture in standard of workmanship and in artistic power as conspicuously as it outranges all previous Minoan handiwork in its geographical distribution. In this Minoan instance, it looks almost as if a deterioration in the quality of craftsmanship was the price which had to be paid for an expansion of 'output'; and the moment at which this apparent sacrifice of quality to quantity was made seems to be coincident with the beginning of the end of the Minoan Civilization.

In Sinic history it is much the same again. During the age of growth, the domain of the Sinic Civilization does not extend beyond the Basin of the Yellow River. It is during the Sinic 'Time of Troubles'—'the Period of Contending States'—that the Sinic World incorporates into itself the Yangtse Basin on the south and the plains beyond the Pei-ho, in what is now the province of Chihli, on the opposite quarter. Ts'in She Hwangti, the founder of the Sinic universal state, carries the political frontiers of the Sinic World up to a line which is still delimited by the Great Wall; the Han Dynasty, which enters into the Ts'in Emperor's labours, pushes forward the Sinic frontiers still farther until they come to embrace the whole of the southern seaboard of China and the whole of the Tarim Basin. Thus, in Sinic history, the periods of geographical expansion and of social disintegration are contemporaneous.

So they are, likewise, in the history of the younger Far Eastern Society to which the Sinic Society is 'apparented'. In the main body of the Far Eastern World, on the Asiatic mainland, it is again the 'Time of Troubles' that is the period of expansion. The intrusion of the Eurasian Nomad barbarians, Khitan and Kin, on to the Far Eastern Society's domain in the role of conquerors—a trespass which convicted the invaded society of decadence on the political plane—provided a social channel along which the Far Eastern culture radiated out into the homelands of the barbarian invaders. The Mongol invaders, who brought the Far Eastern 'Time of Troubles' to a close by establishing a Far Eastern universal state, served the Far Eastern culture as carriers through whom it propagated itself round the western as well as the eastern coasts of the Eurasian Steppe and out beyond into the domains of remote and alien civilizations. Through the instrumentality of the Mongol empire-builders

—short-lived though the Mongol Empire was—the art of the disintegrating civilization of the Far East gave an inspiration to the art of the infant civilization of Iran; and it is possible and even probable, though still non-proven, that the Far Eastern invention of printing was introduced through the same agency into Western Europe.¹ This role of the Mongols was afterwards taken over by the last of the barbarian invaders, the Manchus, who reconstituted the Far Eastern universal state which the Mongols had founded, but which the Mongol Power had been unable to maintain against the indigenous reaction led by the Ming.² The Manchu Empire has been the vehicle through which the Far Eastern Society—‘taking its savage conquerors captive’ once again—has expanded in these latter days by incorporating Manchuria: a territory approximately equal in area to the combined areas of France and Germany as delimited in the peace-settlement of 1919-20.

This correlation between expansion and disintegration is characteristic of Far Eastern history not only in the main body of the Far Eastern World on the Continent, but also in the offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in the Japanese Archipelago. In the Japanese variant of Far Eastern history, as we have already had occasion to notice at an earlier point in this Study,³ geographical expansion and social disintegration stand to one another in a manifest relation of cause and effect. In Japan, the Far Eastern Civilization broke down and entered on its ‘Time of Troubles’ in the last quarter of the twelfth century of the Christian Era, when the barbarized—or re-barbarized—Japanese feudal nobility in the Kwanto asserted themselves at the expense of the unmilitary Imperial Court in Yamato: the Japanese province in which the exotic Far Eastern culture had found a second home after its first introduction into the Japanese Archipelago from Korea. This transfer of power from the cultivated men of peace to the uncouth and unruly men of war dealt the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan a blow from which it never recovered. And when we inquire who these usurping Japanese war-lords were and what was the basis of their ascendancy, we find that they were the backwoodsmen who, for several centuries past, had been extending the bounds of the Far Eastern Civilization on the Main Island of Japan at the expense of the barbarian Ainu. Through this long-continuing and ever-victorious border warfare, the backwoodsmen had developed the prowess in arms and acquired the

¹ On the question whether the art of printing in the Western World is a derivative from the more anciently established and certainly indigenous practice of the same art in the Far East, or whether our Western printing has been a separate and independent invention, see Carter, T. F.: *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward*, revised ed. (New York 1931, Columbia University Press).

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 121-5, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 158-9, above.

wealth in land which eventually gave them their ascendancy over the Imperial Court; but, in the self-same process, the backwoodsmen had been losing their own grip over the culture which it was their mission to propagate; and accordingly, when these Japanese backwoodsmen supplanted the Japanese courtiers, who had performed the *tour de force* of conserving the exotic Far Eastern culture in an alien social climate, the political revolution brought with it a cultural set-back, since the re-barbarization of the backwoodsmen now began to react upon the entire Japanese body social. In this instance, again, quality was sacrificed to quantity. A geographical expansion was purchased at the price of a social relapse.

The offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Society in Russia had much the same history, in this respect, as the offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in Japan. In this case—as we have also noticed already in another connexion¹—there was a transfer of power from the second home which the exotic Orthodox Christian culture had made for itself in the Upper Dniepr Basin at Kiev to the new domain which was conquered by the Russian backwoodsmen from the barbarian Finns in the Upper Volga Basin; and this shift of the social centre of gravity of Orthodox Christian Russia from the Dniepr to the Volga—from Kiev to Vladímir—was duly followed by a social breakdown for the same reasons that account for the parallel course of events in the history of Japan. Social relapse was the price of geographical expansion here again; and this expansion did not cease during the ensuing 'Time of Troubles' (*circa* A.D. 1075–1475), when the Russian city-state of Novgorod succeeded in spreading the Russian version of the Orthodox Christian culture from the Baltic to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Thereafter, when the Muscovite Power brought this 'Time of Troubles' to a close by uniting all the Russian principalities under its own dominion in a Russian universal state,² the expansion of the Russian Orthodox Christendom proceeded at an unprecedented rate and on an unprecedented scale. It took the Muscovites less than a century to spread their dominion and their culture across the whole breadth of Northern Asia. In A.D. 1552, the eastern frontier of the Russian World still stood at a point on the River Volga west of Qāzān. By A.D. 1638, the frontier had been carried forward to the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk. In this case, again, geographical expansion was a concomitant, not of social growth, but of social decadence.

This correlation still holds good when we extend our survey from the Old World to the New. In Andean history, for example, Chile was brought within the ambit of the Andean culture for the

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 154, above.

² A convenient conventional date for the establishment of this Russian Universal State is A.D. 1478: the year in which Muscovy absorbed Novgorod.

first time by the military conquests of the later Incas; and the Inca Power was the Andean universal state: the penultimate stage in the decline and fall of the Andean Civilization. In Mayan history, the expansion of the Mayan culture on to the Mexican Plateau and into the peninsula of Yucatan seems to have occurred at a time when the Mayan Civilization was approaching its mysterious end.¹ In Mexic history, the radiation of the Mexic culture over North America as far as the Great Lakes was contemporary with the Mexic 'Time of Troubles', when the Aztecs were warring down the other states-members of the Mexic World and were thrusting their way forward towards the establishment of a Mexic universal state.²

There remains a certain residue of doubtful or exceptional cases. The Yucatec Civilization, for example, appears—in sharp contrast to its sister-civilization, the Mexic—to have never expanded at all beyond its original homeland in the Yucatan Peninsula down to the time when its absorption into the Mexic body social cut its history short. The Hittite Civilization, which likewise came to a sudden violent end through the impact of an alien body, did previously expand in one direction—from the Anatolian Plateau into Northern Syria—and it may be questioned whether this expansion occurred in a time of growth or in a time of decadence. The question cannot be answered with any assurance, since the premature ending of Hittite history makes its life-line difficult to read. Yet we may reasonably conjecture that the collapse of the Hittite Society under the impact of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung, in the early years of the twelfth century B.C., was the nemesis of the militarism in which the Khatti Power had been indulging for some two centuries past. In other words, we may interpret Khatti militarism as a symptom of Hittite social disintegration; and since the propagation of the Hittite culture in Northern Syria was a direct result of the conquest of that region by Khatti arms, it seems to follow, on this line of reasoning, that the correlation of geographical expansion with social disintegration is borne out by the course of Hittite history as far as we can make it out.

We have also to consider certain cases in which a civilization appears to have had an outburst of geographical expansion in its infancy without suffering any immediate arrest in its growth. Cases in point are the maritime expansion of the Hindu Civilization into Indonesia and Indo-China in the latter part of the first millennium of the Christian Era; the expansion of the Arabic Civilization from the Lower into the Upper Nile Basin in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era; and the contemporaneous expansion of the

¹ Spinden, H. J.: *The Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America* (New York 1922, American Museum of Natural History), p. 137.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 124, and II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 206–8.

Iranic Civilization in three different directions: into South-Eastern Europe and on to the Eurasian Steppe and into the Deccan. On closer inspection, however, we observe that all these three civilizations belong to the 'related' class; and that their infantile expansions are explicable as a 'carry-over' from previous movements of expansion, in the same directions, in which the antecedent civilizations had been engaged in the last days of their senile decay. Thus the expansion of the Iranic Civilization into South-Eastern Europe through the agency of the 'Osmanlis continues the previous expansion of the antecedent Syriac Civilization into Anatolia which had taken place through the agency of the Saljūqs during the post-Syriac and pre-Iranic interregnum. The expansion of Islam into the Deccan similarly follows on from its previous expansion into Hindustan. And on the Eurasian Steppe Timur Lenk treads in the footprints that had been left on the sand by the Ilék Khans and the Khwārizm Shāhs.¹ In the same way, the early Arabic expansion into Tropical Africa and the early Hindu expansion into Indonesia are simply the continuations of movements which had already been under way during the interregna in which the senile Syriac and Indic civilizations had disappeared and from which their infant successors had emerged. In all the cases here in question, the movement of expansion is traceable, not to some new impulse, but merely to the vestige of an old momentum.

So far, then, our survey appears to have revealed to us only two clear cases—namely, the maritime expansions of the Syriac and the Hellenic Civilization into the Western Mediterranean in the earlier half of the last millennium B.C.—in which a geographical expansion has been the concomitant, not of social disintegration, but of social growth. We may add to these examples the overland expansion of the main body of Orthodox Christendom into the Caucasus on the one hand and into South-Eastern Europe on the other;² for this expansion took place before the outbreak of the great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977–1019, in which the Orthodox Christian Civilization suffered its breakdown. Finally, we may enlarge this list of clear exceptions to our apparent law of the correlation between expansion and disintegration by citing certain obvious cases from our own Western history: for example, the expansion which the Western World achieved in its infancy when it absorbed into its own body social the abortive Far Western Christian and the abortive Scandinavian Civilization on its Atlantic fringes;³ its contemporary expansion on the European Continent from the Rhine to the Vistula at the expense of the North European barbarism, and from the Alps

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 142 and 144–8, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 64–5, above.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322–60, above.

to the Carpathians at the expense of the Hungarian advance-guard of Eurasian Nomadism;¹ and its subsequent maritime expansion into every corner of the Mediterranean Basin, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the mouths of the Nile and the Don, in the widespread though ephemeral movement of conquest and commerce for which the most convenient short title is 'the Crusades'.²

In these three instances in our Western history, we have clear cases of geographical expansion being neither accompanied nor followed by any arrest in the expanding civilization's growth. But we cannot cite these incidents from our own past experience without evoking in our minds a question concerning our present situation and our future prospects—a question which is of the deepest interest to us in our generation, though, just because we stand *in mediis rebus*, we are reduced to mere guesswork in seeking for the answer. The question arises out of the fact that the whole geographical expansion of our Western Society in all the earlier chapters of its history has been utterly dwarfed in scale by the modern Western tide of world-wide 'Westernization' which set in towards the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era and is flowing in full flood in our day. As we contemplate this titanic movement—a movement which is sweeping over all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face of the planet and which is undoubtedly the most important social phenomenon of recent times—we find ourselves speculating whether this is a concomitant of growth, like the three earlier bouts of Western expansion which we have already cited, or a symptom of disintegration, like the majority of the examples from the histories of other civilizations which we have encountered in the course of the foregoing survey.

Our only clue to the solution of this riddle of the future, in which our own destinies are involved, is the dim and perhaps deceptive light which may be obtained by analogy from the history of some other civilization which has already run its course from start to finish, so that the whole story is known.

If we seek such light from the history of the Hellenic Civilization which is 'apparented' to ours, we perceive first that the earlier instances of expansion in our own history—those Western expansions which unquestionably occurred in an age when our civilization was still in process of growth—are the analogues of the early expansion of Hellas over the Mediterranean. Indeed, this early maritime expansion of the Hellenic Society, which was in progress from about 725 to 525 B.C. and which thus occupied approximately the fifth and sixth centuries of Hellenic history (dating from the

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 166–71, above.

² See I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 38, above.

emergence of the Hellenic Civilization out of the post-Minoan interregnum), corresponds chronologically as well as morphologically with the early maritime expansion of our own civilization in the same quarter which is covered by the name of the Crusades; for the 200 years between A.D. 1095 and A.D. 1291, which are the two conventional termini of the Crusading period, are approximately equivalent, in our Western horoscope, to the fifth and sixth centuries of Western history (dating from the emergence of our Western Civilization out of the interregnum which followed the dissolution of the 'apparented' Hellenic Society). Pursuing our analogy, we perceive in the next place that, between the end of the Crusades and the beginning of our modern Western expansion, there is an interval during which the tendency of our Western Society to expand is held in check by the pressure of external forces. This period of geographical constriction, which runs from about A.D. 1275 to A.D. 1475, may be taken as the analogue of the period of similar geographical constriction which runs in Hellenic history from the rise of the Carthaginian and Achaemenian Empires to the generation of Alexander the Great. We have observed already that these two centuries of Hellenic history saw the Hellenic genius come to its finest flower. We may now observe that the two analogous centuries of our Western history witnessed the Italian Renaissance.

Up to this point, then, the analogy works out effectively; and we have now to consider whether we are to carry it through to its bitter end. Are we to find a Hellenic analogy to our modern Western expansion in the latter-day dissemination of Hellenism, along furrows ploughed by Macedonian and Roman arms, as far as India in one direction and Britain in the other? This analogy, likewise, works out, if we choose to apply it, both in the matter of date and in the matter of scale; and if we do apply it, we shall be giving an answer—and a melancholy answer—to the question of the significance of our modern Western expansion in the horoscope of our Western Civilization. In Hellenic history, the denouement of the plot makes it clear that this latter-day expansion, which began with Alexander's passage of the Hellespont and closed with Agricola's conclusion of the Roman conquest of Britain, was not merely a concomitant of social disintegration but was actually a symptom of the malady. Shall we follow the argument whither it is leading us, and nerve ourselves to pass the same judgement upon the modern expansion of our Western Society which began with the triumphant voyages of da Gama and Columbus and which now seems to be carrying us, their successors, into seas that run so high that Leviathan himself can scarcely breast the waves? Or shall we refuse to believe, on the strength of mere analogy, in a prospect

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which cannot be confirmed by observation, and insist, since this prospect happens to be unpleasant, upon giving ourselves the benefit of the doubt?

In whichever of these alternative mental directions our personal temperaments may incline us to turn, our mental reaction to this Western case in point is likely to be highly subjective; but, for our present purpose in this Study, we can afford to leave the interpretation of our modern Western expansion in suspense; for our survey has really demonstrated already that the correlation between geographical expansion and social disintegration holds good at any rate on the whole.

How are we to account for this apparent social law? One obvious explanation is offered by the phenomenon of Militarism; for Militarism—as we shall see at a later point in this Study¹—has been by far the commonest cause of the breakdowns of civilizations during the four or five millennia which have witnessed the score or so of breakdowns that are on record up to the present date. Militarism breaks a civilization down by causing the local states into which the society is articulated to collide with one another in destructive internecine conflicts. In this suicidal process, the entire social fabric becomes fuel to feed the devouring flame in the brazen bosom of Molech.² The single art of war makes progress at the expense of all the arts of peace;³ and, before this deadly ritual has completed the destruction of its votaries, they may have become so expert in the use of their implements of slaughter that, if they happen for a moment to pause in their orgy of mutual destruction and to turn their weapons for a season against the breasts of strangers, they are apt to carry all before them.

A case in point is the latter-day expansion of Hellenism to India and to Britain between the fourth century B.C. and the first century of the Christian Era; for the roads which this expansion followed had been opened by Macedonian and by Roman arms, and those arms had been wrought up to an irresistible efficiency in the long-drawn-out internecine warfare between the Great Powers of the Hellenic World in which Athens failed to establish her hegemony and Rome succeeded in delivering 'the knock-out blow'.

Thus, in Hellenic history, Militarism was at least partly responsible for the latter-day expansion of the Hellenic World as well as for the disintegration of the Hellenic Society with which this expansion was contemporaneous. Yet this military explanation of the correlation between expansion and disintegration does not go very deep. For mere military conquest does not in itself ensure the acceptance

¹ In IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), vol. iv, pp. 465-564, below.

² Lev. xviii. 21, xx. 2; Jer. xxxii. 35.

³ For a symbolic illustration of this, see pp. 167-8, below.

of the victors' culture by the vanquished. And although the propagation of Hellenism through the Macedonian conquests in Syriac Asia and the Roman conquests in barbarian Europe is proof that this consequence may sometimes follow, this Hellenic example appears to be an exceptional case. It more frequently happens that the vanquished make the military victors their cultural captives—as the Romans themselves were captivated by the Greeks. And if a subject people fails to win this cultural compensation for its military and political discomfiture, it is likely to acquire a positive animus against the culture of its alien masters. For example, the cultural effect of Assyrian militarism was to make the Assyrians' Aramaean and Israelite victims impervious to the influence of the Babylonian culture of which the Assyrians were representatives—notwithstanding the fact that this Babylonian culture had the advantage over the Syriac culture in both antiquity and prestige. Moreover, when the Median barbarians, who had likewise been scarified by the Assyrian harrow, had to make their choice of a civilization among the existing civilizations that came within their horizon, they found the Babylonian culture of their Assyrian oppressors less attractive than the Syriac culture of their Aramaean and Israelite fellow sufferers.¹ Thus, in this Babylonian instance, the process of military conquest, so far from promoting the spread of the conquerors' culture, was a serious handicap to it. And this Babylonian experience has perhaps been commoner than the Hellenic.

The deeper explanation of our law that the geographical expansion of a society is facilitated by its disintegration is to be found in the nature of the social process by which such expansion is brought about. For, as we have seen, geographical expansion is an index of the encroachment of one society upon the domain of another; such social encroachment is accomplished by social assimilation; and this social assimilation is the outcome of 'social radiation'. This is not the place for any detailed consideration of this phenomenon, which is examined in other parts of this Study.² For our present purpose, we may confine ourselves to noting the fact that in social, as in physical, radiation a ray is a composite affair which requires to be diffracted into its elements in order to penetrate a foreign body. A composite ray of white light makes its way through a prism by disintegrating into the spectrum, in which the elementary components of white light are separated out instead of remaining fused together. The social rays in which the psychic energies of societies are radiated are similarly compounded of different elements—economic, political, and cultural—and a social ray has likewise to be

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79-82, and II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 137-8, above.

² See Part II. A, vol. i, p. 187, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 196-203, as well as Parts VIII and IX, below.

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diffracted into its elementary components in order to penetrate an alien body social readily.

In successful cases of social penetration it is usually the material economic apparatus of the radiating society that works its way into the alien body social first. An Afghan or an Eskimo ventures to adopt some attractive Western 'gadget' like a rifle or a sewing-machine or a gramophone because this 'gadget' appears to be detachable from the main structure of the Western Civilization. In being offered an alien tool or toy, the stranger is not ostensibly being asked to adopt, along with it, the alien institutions and ideas and *ethos* in which this alien product has originated. If the Afghan were told that he could only obtain a rifle made in Britain on condition that he introduced the British Constitution into Afghanistan and became a convert to the Anglican Church and emancipated his womenfolk, then even his craving for the Western weapon would probably not suffice to overcome his consternation at the prospect of having to turn his whole life upside down. He would forgo the coveted rifle and content himself with his ancestral weapons rather than cease to walk in his ancestral ways. In other words, an expansive civilization does not easily penetrate an alien civilization so long as its rays remain undiffracted and therefore only play upon the alien body social in their composite form—the form in which their economic and political and cultural elements are fused together. Now this is the form in which the rays of social radiation are emitted from a civilization so long as that civilization is in process of growth. For the texture of a ray is determined by the fabric of the radiating body; and it is one of the characteristics of civilizations in process of growth that all the aspects and activities of their social life are co-ordinated into a single social whole, in which the economic, political, and cultural elements are kept in a nice adjustment with one another by an inner harmony of the growing body social. On the other hand, when a society breaks down and goes into disintegration, it is one of the symptoms of this social malady that the previous harmony between the economic, political, and cultural elements in the body social gives way to a discord; this discord in the fabric of the radiating body is reproduced, in the form of diffraction, in the rays which the body now emits; and these diffracted rays of the disintegrating civilization have greater power to penetrate the tissues of alien social bodies than the undiffracted rays which the same civilization used to emit in the time before the breakdown, when it was still in the growth stage.

This is perhaps the underlying explanation of the law, which we have inferred from empirical observation, that social disintegration

is a more favourable condition than social growth for geographical expansion.

On this showing, we are almost warranted in regarding geographical expansion as a social disease: an elephantiasis or fatty growth; a running to stalk or a running to seed; the malady of the Reptiles, who turned huge on the eve of being surpassed by the Mammals;¹ or the malady of Goliath who grew to gigantic stature in order to succumb to David; or the malady of the ponderous Spanish galleons which were routed by the English mosquito-fleet. And we may compare this disease of expansion with the mania for big buildings, which is a well-known symptom of declines and falls. In the realm of the social insects, this is the significance of the titanic scale and massive structure of the sky-scrapers built by the termites,² which make ants' nests look careless and shapeless by comparison. Yet

'In termites the amount of degeneration accompanying social evolution is . . . much greater than in the ants, and this degeneration seems to have been brought about very largely by an increasing need for protection. With greater elaboration and solidity of nest architecture the termite colonies shut themselves off more and more from the outside world; and all the castes, except the winged males and females, lost their eyes and the tough consistency of their integument. They thus came to resemble the molluscs, crustaceans and certain fishes and reptiles which have withdrawn within a heavy protective armour and have given up participating in the free competitive and co-operative life of their environment. The ants, with the exception of certain subterranean species, have not been inveigled into adopting this passive and timorous mode of life.'³

This illustration from the history of an insect society has its parallels in the histories of human civilizations. In Egyptian history, for example, the building of the Pyramids not only celebrates the triumph of the Egyptian Civilization, but registers its apogee and heralds its breakdown; and at the latter end of the story, when the breakdown has been followed by a 'Time of Troubles' and this 'Time of Troubles' by a universal state, and when 'the New Empire' has trodden for a second time the round which 'the Middle Empire' had trodden before, we find the same mania breaking out once more in the colossal temples and colossal statues of the Ramsids.⁴ In Hellenic history, again, there is no excess of bulk in the incom-

¹ See Wells, H. G.: *The Outline of History* (London 1920, Cassell), pp. 22-4, quoted in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv, pp. 425-6, below.

² See Part III. A, p. 107, above.

³ Wheeler, W. M.: *Social Life among the Insects* (London, no date, Constable), p. 282. A portion of this passage has been quoted already on p. 108, above.

⁴ For this Ramsid mania, see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (i), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 429.

parable works of art which a Pheidias and an Ictinus created for Periclean Athens; and, a century after the breakdown, Alexander can still deprecate, as a misdirection of effort and a lapse of taste, the flattering suggestion that Mount Athos shall be carved into a colossal bust in Alexander's own image.¹ In the decline of Hellenic art, the craving for colossality does not become prevalent until the Roman age. But in that penultimate age of Hellenic history the Colosseum and the Baths of Caracalla and the Baths of Diocletian and the Basilica of Constantine are colossal symptoms of the same social disease which is also manifest in the colossal dimensions of the Roman Empire itself.

Constantine, whose pile of bricks and mortar still insolently dominates the Forum, has had to steal from the monuments of his predecessors the little bas-reliefs which he requires for the ornamentation of his triumphal arch, because in Constantine's day the master of the Roman World can no longer find any living sculptor who has either the technical skill or the creative originality to carve new bas-reliefs for him. Is the excessive bulk of the basilica the monument to an 'inferiority complex' in the mind of the prince who has ordered the building and decreed its scale? Does Constantine pile concrete on concrete and rubble on rubble in order to assert his power to command material resources and to produce material effects, even if his sculptors cannot emulate the frieze of Trajan's Column or the bas-reliefs of Augustus's Altar, not to speak of the metopes of the Parthenon? And if we are right in this interpretation of Constantine's work and in this analysis of his state of mind, how are we to interpret the colossal works on which our own Western Society is expending its energies in our day: the 'skyscrapers' which we pile up on land, and the 'liners' which we launch on the ocean? By another route, we have arrived at the same question concerning our own Western destiny which has already confronted us in contemplating the spectacle of the colossal expansion of our own Western Civilization over the face of the Earth.

On this interpretation, a declining society is apt to hasten the day of its dissolution by squandering its diminishing store of vital energy in material performances on an excessive scale, not so much out of a wanton megalomania as in a vain effort to give the lie to its own unacknowledged but agonizing consciousness of incompetence and failure and doom.

(b) INCREASING COMMAND OVER THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Perhaps we may now take it as proved that the criterion of the growth of a civilization is not to be found in the progressive and

¹ Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*, ch. lxxii.

cumulative conquest of the human environment, as measured on the index of geographical expansion. We have next to see whether the conquest of the physical environment will provide us with the criterion for which we are in search; and in this field the obvious index of progress is an improvement in technique. Between an improvement in technique and a progress in the conquest of the physical environment, a definite correlation may fairly be assumed to exist. Is there evidence of an equally definite correlation between an improvement in technique and a progress in social growth?

This latter correlation is taken for granted in a classification—invented by our modern Western sociologists and readily accepted by the popular Western mind—in which a supposed series of stages in the improvement of material technique is taken as indicative of a corresponding succession of chapters in 'the progress of Civilization'. In this scheme of thought, human progress is represented as a sequence of 'ages' which are distinguished by technological labels: the Palaeolithic Age, the Neolithic Age, the Chalcolithic Age, the Copper Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age, with a grand culmination—or climacteric—in the Machine Age in which our latter-day *Homo Occidentalis* has been privileged to live. In spite of the wide currency which this classification enjoys in our day, it will be wise to examine it critically; for, without prejudice to the empirical test, we can point out several grounds on which it is suspect even *a priori*.

It is suspect, in the first place, by reason of its very popularity; for the hold which this classification has obtained over the popular mind is not due to any reasoned intellectual conviction of its theoretical merits. The technological classification has been accepted widely and uncritically because it has appealed to the emotions of a society which has been fascinated by its own recent technical triumphs. In inventing this scheme of thought, our sociologists have caught the popular fancy; but in their own mental process they themselves have succumbed to the subtle and insidious influence which a historian's local and temporary environment always and everywhere exerts upon the trend of his historical studies. This is a phenomenon which we have examined in general terms already;¹ and we may therefore absolve ourselves from re-examining it here *ad hoc*, and may pass on to our next point forthwith.

A second reason for regarding the technological classification of social progress as suspect *a priori* is because it is a manifest instance of another phenomenon which we have also examined above:² the tendency for a student to become the slave of the particular materials

¹ See Part I. A, above, vol. i.

² See the present Study, loc. cit.

for study which have come into his hands by chance. From the scientific standpoint, it is a mere accident of no scientific significance that the material tools which Man has made for himself should have a greater capacity to survive, after they have been thrown on the scrap-heap, than Man's psychic artifacts: his institutions and feelings and ideas. Actually, while this mental apparatus is in use, it plays a vastly more important part than any material apparatus can ever play in human lives; yet because of the accident that a discarded material apparatus leaves, and a discarded psychic apparatus does not leave, a tangible detritus, and because it is the *métier* of the archaeologist to deal with human detritus in the hope of extracting from it a knowledge of human history, the archaeological mind tends to picture *Homo Sapiens* as *Homo Faber par excellence*.

"The spoken word does not fall to the ground, like the spent missile or the broken vessel, to be its own memorial of human achievement: it vanishes in air, so that the philologist deals not with originals, but at best with the reminiscence of an echo. To recover, therefore, what men were doing, or making, still more what they were thinking or desiring, before the dawn of History, the sole available method is that of the archaeologist, merging as it does in that of the geologist: since these alone handle and interpret original creations of men's thought and will, and contemporary elements of the physical surroundings of those men. Where the tree falls, there shall it lie, and where the lost implement or shattered potsherd or worn-out man fell, there have they lain, for all that any one cared then or knows now."¹

In this eloquent passage we discern the archaeologist's natural bias, against which it behoves the historian to be on his guard.

A third *a priori* ground for treating the technological classification of progress as suspect is because this is a flagrant example of the fallacy of thinking of Growth, with a big 'G', as a single movement in a straight line, and of Civilization, with a big 'C', as a unitary and unique process. This, again, is a phenomenon which we have examined before in a general way;² and in this place we need only observe, *ad hoc*, that even if we were to accept the technological classification as valid, we should still find it quite impossible to construct a single framework within which all the relevant facts could be brought into order.

To begin with, the framework could not be made world-wide; for, in every age of which a record survives, each stage in the technological series that has ever been passed through by any human society up to that date has always continued to be represented, side

¹ Myres, J. L., in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. i, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1924, University Press), pp. 1-2.

² In Part I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, above.

by side with each subsequent stage so far attained, by some living society in some locality. Scandinavia, for example, may remain in the Stone Age for thousands of years after Egypt or Shinar, or even the less distant Aegean, has taken to bronze; and then, when Scandinavia has followed the example of her neighbours by discarding stone for bronze in her own good time, she may cling to bronze for centuries after her neighbours have discarded this metal for iron.¹ Even at the present day, when the expansion of our own Western Civilization and the concomitant 'Westernization' of the other living societies has gone so far as it has towards bringing about a social unification of the whole World on a Western basis, we can still find living representatives of every stage of technique, from the recent machine-age technique, which has given our modern Western Society its unprecedented material 'drive', back to the stone-age technique which is still practised by the Esquimaux and by the Australian Blackfellows.

In fact, there is not, and never has been, any such thing as *the* Machine Age or *the* Palaeolithic Age with a capital letter. For all that we know, the older techniques, from flint-chipping to iron-smelting inclusive, may each have been invented a number of times over by different societies in different times and places. At least, this remains a possible hypothesis in the absence of any historical record of their origins. Yet even if we make the assumption that each of the earlier techniques has anticipated the history of the machine-technique in being invented at some single time and place,² we still cannot revert to the diagram of a unitary movement in a straight line. For if the invention of each technique has been a unique event, the new knowledge cannot have spread instantaneously, by some kind of miraculous intuition, from the minds of its inventors, at one particular place, into the minds of all the rest of Mankind in all other parts of the World. An invention does not make 'a clean cut' between two epochs of World History. It rather sets in motion a wave of mimesis; and this psychic wave behaves like other waves in other media. It travels outward in different directions from its point of origin; it takes time to travel; and it takes a different length of time in different sectors, according to the size and disposition of the local obstacles which it encounters, and the degree of the local resistance which it has to overcome. The farther a wave spreads, the more it tends to lose the original regularity of its formation; and in fact we find that the successive waves of human technique have reached different parts of the World in

¹ This technological 'time-lag' in Ancient Scandinavia has been noticed in II. D (vii), vol. ii, on p. 342, footnote 3, above.

² For the controversy between the advocates of the Uniformity Theory and the advocates of the Diffusion Theory, see I. C (iii) (b), Annex, vol. i, above.

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different orders, and that certain societies have never been reached by certain waves at all. For example, the Egyptian Society never transcended the Bronze Age nor the Mayan Society the Stone Age from beginning to end of their respective growths; and no known society except our own Western Society has ever converted the Iron Age into the Machine Age. Yet we shall scarcely have the audacity to measure off the growths of civilizations on this index, and to place our own civilization at the top and the Mayan at the bottom of the scale on this account.¹

And even if we were rashly to accept the assumption that improvement in technique is the criterion of progress in growth, we should still have to define what we mean by the word 'improvement' in this context. Are we to think of improvement in the utilitarian sense, in terms of the material results accomplished, or are we to think of it in the spiritual sense, in terms of the challenge and the difficulty surmounted and the energy exerted and the creative power put forth? If we think in these latter terms—and they are the only terms tolerable to the human spirit—then we shall incline to the opinion that, in the development of technique, *c'est le premier pas qui coûte*. The transmission of the human voice by telephone or wireless is not so miraculous as the origin of articulate language (without which the technique of transmitting sounds would be of no value). The application of fire to drive steam-engines or to shoot guns is not so daring as the original mastery of fire: the discovery of how to handle it with impunity and how to keep it alight and how to rekindle it when it has gone out. The invention of fire-arms, again, has been intellectually easier than the invention of the first missile weapons: The bow-and-arrow represents a greater intellectual triumph than 'Big Bertha'. On the same showing, the solid wheel of the primitive ox-cart is more wonderful than the locomotive or the motor-car, the dug-out canoe than the liner, the flint implement than the steam-hammer. And it has been a harder task to domesticate animals and plants than to dominate

¹ It is in its application to the Mayan Civilization and the other civilizations of the New World that the modern Western technological index of the growths of civilizations finds its *reductio ad absurdum*.

'Not only in Peru, but also in Central America and in Mexico, the Indians lived in a high state of culture during the stone age. The copper and bronze ages are not synonyms of an essentially higher civilization in America. It only means that in certain regions the Indians had achieved a considerable measure of progress. The bronze age does not mark the adoption of a new civilization but only an amplification of the copper culture in Peru, and the transition from the stone age to the copper age means nothing more than a further step in development, and not the accession of a new people with a new culture. The earliest Maya inscriptions on immovable objects date from the first centuries A.D., and at that time the wonderful calendar of the Mayas had already been perfected. Then, as very much later, the Mayas were a stone-age people. At Paracas in Peru, Tello has discovered the remains of a civilization in which especially the art of weaving was on a marvellously high level, although no other metal than gold was known.' (Nordenskiöld, E.: *Origin of the Indian Civilizations in South America* (Göteborg 1931, Elander), p. 40.)

Inanimate Nature—to harness the horse than to harness the tide. Inanimate Nature obeys regular laws which Man has merely to work out in order to apply them mechanically for his own practical purposes. It is infinitely harder to cope with the waywardness and complexity of Life; and the peasant and the Nomad, who have discovered the art of governing the Vegetable and the Animal Kingdoms, may smile sardonically at the boastful industrialist who glories in his facile conquest of the material universe and has not paused to remind himself that 'the proper study of Mankind is Man'.¹

"Though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing."²

The industrialist has concentrated all his effort and attention upon the relations of Man with Physical Nature to the neglect of the relations between Man and Man; and he has thus heightened the effect—for good or for evil—of every human action by putting at its disposal a terrific driving-power, without having taken thought to improve the wisdom or the virtue of the human beings whom he has been endowing so recklessly with these improved technical facilities. In the light of the event, we can see at this eleventh hour that Daedalus would have done better to follow the lead of Cain and Abel by seeking to crown their conquests of the Vegetable and Animal kingdoms with the conquest of the highest kingdom in the world of Life: the Kingdom of Man. And, in this realm of human relations, charity is of more account than clock-work.

These *a priori* objections to the technological diagram of human progress are almost sufficient in themselves to rule out the idea of taking an improvement in technique as the criterion of social growth. If we now apply our well-tried empirical test, we shall find that it will give this popular hypothetical correlation its *coup de grâce*. A survey of some of the relevant facts will show us cases of technique improving while civilizations remain static or go into decline,³ as well as examples of the converse situation, in which technique remains static while civilizations are in movement—either forward or backward as the case may be.

For instance, a high technique has been developed by every one of the arrested civilizations. The Polynesians have excelled as navigators, the Esquimaux as fishermen, the Spartans as soldiers, the Nomads as tamers of horses, the 'Osmanlis as tamers of men.

¹ Pope: *Essay on Man*, Epistle ii, l. 2.

² 1 Corinthians xiii. 2.

³ This point is noticed by Turgot in his *Second Discours sur les Progrès Successifs de l'Esprit Humain* (*Œuvres de Turgot*, Nouvelle Edition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 608).

These are all instances in which civilizations have remained static while technique has improved.

An example of technique improving while a civilization declines is afforded by the contrast between the Upper Palaeolithic Age in Europe and the Lower Neolithic, which is its immediate successor in the technological series. The Upper Palaeolithic Society remained content with implements of rough workmanship, but it developed a fine aesthetic sense, and it did not neglect to discover certain simple means of giving its sense a pictorial expression. The deft and vivid charcoal sketches of animals, which survive on the walls of Palaeolithic Man's cave-dwellings, where they have been discovered by our modern archaeologists, excite our astonishment and admiration. The Lower Neolithic Society took infinite pains to equip itself with finely ground tools, and possibly turned these tools to account by using them as weapons in a struggle for existence with Palaeolithic Man in which *Homo Pictor* went down and left *Homo Faber* master of the field. In any case, the Palaeolithic Society vanished away and the Neolithic Society reigned in its stead; and this change, which inaugurates a striking improvement in terms of technique, is distinctly a set-back in terms of civilization. For the art of Upper Palaeolithic Man died out with him; and if Lower Neolithic Man had any glimmering of aesthetic sense at all, at any rate he has given no material expression to it.¹

Another example of an improvement in technique being coincident with a set-back in civilization is to be found in the interregnum in which the Minoan Civilization went into dissolution. The Minoan Society had remained in the Bronze Age from beginning to end of its history. The latest and most barbarous swarm of Continental European barbarians who descended upon the derelict domain of the Minoan Society in the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* came armed with weapons of iron instead of bronze; and in their victorious onslaught upon the epigoni of the Minoan Civilization they doubtless profited from their acquaintance with the more potent metal. Yet this victory of the iron-sworded 'Dorians' over the bronze-sworded Minoans was a victory of Barbarism over Civilization. For an iron sword—or, for that matter, a steel tank or submarine or bombing-plane or any other killing-machine of our latter-day Machine Age—may be a talisman of victory without being a talisman of culture. When the 'Dorians' adopted weapons of iron instead of weapons of bronze, they did not cease to be barbarians. And there is no reason for crediting these barbarians even

¹ There is a suggestive passage on the cultural contrast between Lower Neolithic Man and Upper Palaeolithic Man in Wells, H. G.: *The Outline of History* (London 1920, Cassell), pp. 64-7.

with the technical achievement of discovering a new and better material for metallurgy. The 'Dorian' iron was probably no 'Dorian' original discovery, but simply a 'Dorian' loan which a geographical accident had put these barbarians in the way of making by mimesis from the skilled artificers of a neighbouring region.¹ In this encounter between the 'Dorians' and the Minoans, the technological criterion of progress in civilization is confuted by a *reductio ad absurdum*; for by the technological criterion we are constrained to declare that the nadir of the post-Minoan interregnum witnessed an advance in the culture of the Aegean area; that this advance was more significant than any which had been achieved in the whole history of the Minoan Civilization; and that the advance was brought about by the invading bands of iron-sworded 'Dorians' at the moment when they were using their iron weapons to deal the bronze-sworded Minoan culture its death-blow.

This example from the history of the Old World has a parallel in the history of the New World which is remarkably exact.

The establishment of Mayan and Toltec chronology fixes, within relatively narrow limits, the beginning of the metal age in Central America and Mexico. No specimen of metal, not even a copper stain, was observed during excavations at Copan, Quirigua and other Mayan cities of the First Empire. Las Quebradas in Guatemala was actually built upon a placer mine; yet, in the sluicing operations which have almost destroyed the site, no specimen of worked gold has been found. Nor are any ornaments of metal, such as gorgets and bells, pictured on the early monuments. We therefore conclude that the metal age did not begin till after 600 A.D.; yet by 1200 A.D. metal-work was highly developed in gold, silver, copper and various alloys. Many specimens found at Chichen Itza in Northern Yucatan are of Costa Rican and Colombian origin, and the technique of metal-working is the same from

¹ According to the Hellenic tradition, the inventors of iron-working were the Chalybes: a people whose habitat in the fifth century B.C., when this tradition was current, was the Black Sea coast of Anatolia in the neighbourhood of Trebizond. If the technique of iron-working really came to the Aegean from this quarter, it might have reached the 'Dorians', via the Black Sea and the Danube, before it reached the Minoans at Cnossos or Mycenae; for the 'Dorians', on the eve of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung, were presumably living somewhere in the Continental European hinterland of the Aegean area. The Chalybes of the Hellenic tradition, like the Tubal-Cain of the Syriac tradition who was 'an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron' (Gen. iv. 22), may be presumed to represent the Hittite culture. (The Tubal and Meshech of Gen. x. 2 stand for the Tibareni and Moschi: two swarms of barbarians from the Caucasian hinterland of the Hittite World who drifted into the former Hittite domain in Eastern Anatolia after the overthrow of the Khatti Power in the twelfth century B.C.) The historical Chalybes, as the Greeks found them when the Hellenic Society expanded into the Black Sea from the seventh century B.C. onwards, were apparently in a low state of culture. We may account for this by supposing that they were a primitive people who had simply served to transmit the art of iron-working from its Hittite homeland in East-Central Anatolia to the Balkan Peninsula via the Black Sea. Or else we may suppose that the historical Chalybes were a remnant of the Hittite Society which had been saved, by its sheltered situation, from being involved in a catastrophe which had overwhelmed the rest of the Hittite World at the beginning of the twelfth century B.C. In that case, the Chalybes must have relapsed into barbarism—in everything except their metallurgical technique—in consequence of their isolation.

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Southern Colombia to Central Mexico. The art was apparently introduced from South America about A.D. 1000 and underwent a rapid growth in the five hundred years before the Spanish conquest.¹

It will be seen that this illustration of our thesis from Central America and the preceding illustration from the Aegean throw some light upon one another. Just as in the Old World the Minoan Society performed its achievements and lived out its life without ever transcending the Bronze Age, so in the New World the Mayan Society rose and fell without ever passing out of the Stone Age into an age of metal. In Central America, the introduction of the metallurgical technique was reserved for two civilizations, both related to the Mayan, which can neither of them compare with the antecedent civilization in respect of the general level of their cultural attainments. And, here again, the technological advance was synchronous with a cultural interregnum.

If it be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the technological criterion to claim that the second-rate civilizations which were affiliated to the Mayan Civilization or the barbarian invaders of the Aegean World in the post-Minoan and pre-Hellenic interregnum were apostles of civilization in virtue of their prowess in technique, it is amusing to find an equally extravagant claim being submitted in all solemnity by the last of the great Hellenic historians on behalf of the post-Hellenic interregnum on a similar technological ground.

Procopius of Caesarea wrote a history of the wars of the Roman Emperor Justinian (*imperabat* A.D. 527-65); and these wars were actually the death of the ancient Hellenic Society. In obstinately striving to realize his misguided ambition of restoring the territorial integrity of the Empire, Justinian brought financial ruin upon the Oriental provinces, depopulation upon the Balkan provinces, and devastation upon Italy; and even at that price he failed to achieve his 'single-track' aim; for in extirpating the Vandals in Africa he was clearing the way for the Moors to take their place, and in extirpating the Ostrogoths in Italy he was creating a vacuum which was to be filled, within three years of his own death, by the far more barbarous Lombards. The century which followed the wars of Justinian was actually the nadir of the post-Hellenic interregnum. This was the tragedy of the generation of Procopius, as posterity can see it in retrospect; and indeed it was painfully apparent at the time, and was widely recognized by Procopius's own contemporaries, that—however far or near the end of Hellenism might be—Hellenic history had long passed its zenith. Yet in writing the preface to his narrative of the fatal events which had

¹ *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*: Supplementary Volumes constituting the Thirteenth Edition (London and New York 1926), vol. i, p. 195, s.v. 'Archaeology'.

just dealt Hellenism its death-blow before he took up his pen, the eminent historian goes out of his way to break a lance in a battle of his own seeking between the Moderns and the Ancients; and he awards the palm to the Moderns on the score of their technical superiority in the art of war.

"To an unprejudiced mind it will be evident that the events of these wars are at least as striking and imposing as any in history. They have been responsible for occurrences of a more extraordinary character than any of which a record survives, except (possibly) from the point of view of a reader who insists upon giving the palm to Antiquity and refuses to be impressed by anything in the contemporary world. The first example that occurs to my mind is the affectation of alluding to modern troops as "archers" and reserving such appellations as "hand-to-hand combatants" or "men-at-arms" for the warriors of Antiquity, in the confident assumption that in our day these military qualities are extinct. Such assumptions merely betray a superficiality and an utter lack of experience in those who make them. It has never crossed their minds that the archers in Homer, whose arm is cast up against them as an opprobrious epithet, had no horse-flesh between their knees, no lance in hand, and no shield or body-armour to cover them. They went into action on foot and were compelled to take cover, either by posting themselves behind the shield of a comrade or by "leaning against a tombstone"—a position which precluded them equally from extricating themselves in defeat and from pursuing a retreating enemy, and, above all, from fighting in the open. Hence their reputation for playing an underhand part in the game of war; while, apart from that, they took so little pains with their technique that, in shooting, they only drew the bow-string to the breast, with the natural result that the missile was spent and ineffective by the time when it reached its target. This was undoubtedly the level at which archery stood in earlier times. By contrast, modern archers go into action equipped with cuirasses and knee-boots and with their quiver on their right side and their sword on the other, while some troopers have a lance slung over their shoulders and a small handleless shield of just sufficient diameter to cover the face and neck. Being admirable horsemen, they are trained to bend their bow without effort to either flank when going at full gallop, and to hit a pursuing enemy in their rear as well as a retreating enemy to their front. They draw the bow-string to the face, to the level (approximately) of the right ear, which imparts such force to the missile that its impact is invariably fatal and that neither shield nor cuirass can resist its momentum. Some people, however, who choose to ignore the existence of these troops, persist in an open-mouthed adulation of Antiquity and refuse to admit the superiority of modern inventions. Misconceptions of this kind are, of course, powerless to rob the late wars of their superlative interest and importance."¹

Procopius's argument is an extravaganza which refutes itself; and the only comment that it seems necessary to make is that the

¹ Procopius of Caesarea: *A History of the Wars of Justinian*, Bk. I, ch. 1.

cataphract, whom Procopius presents to his readers as the *chef d'œuvre* of Greek and Roman military technique—the most efficient type of fighting-man that had ever been thrown up in the Hellenic World during the long span of time between the Homeric Age and the author's own day—was actually no more an original creation of the Greek or the Roman military genius than iron was a discovery of the 'Dorians'. This horse-archer—armed cap-à-pie and formidable by reason of his personal prowess in riding and shooting—was utterly alien from the genuine Greek and Roman military tradition, which had relegated its cavalry to a subordinate role and had put its trust in an infantry whose strength lay in the corporate cohesion and discipline of the regiment far more than in the equipment or *expertise* of the individual soldier. In the Roman Army, the cataphract was a recent innovation—an arm which had not been adopted more than a couple of centuries before Procopius's own day—and if this arm had come to be the mainstay of Roman military power within that relatively short period of time, this revolution in military technique bears witness to the historic Roman infantry's rapid and lamentable decay. In fact, in the Roman Army of Procopius's day the cataphract filled a vacuum which had been of the cataphract's own making; for the previously invincible Roman infantryman had first met his match, and finally acknowledged his superior, in the cataphract whom he encountered on the Mesopotamian plains in the armies of the Arsacidae and the Sasanidae, and on the Danubian plains in the war-bands of the Sarmatians and the Goths. The military lessons of a long trial of strength between the legionary and the cataphract, which had begun with Crassus's disaster at Carrhae in 53 B.C. and had culminated in Valens' disaster at Adrianople in A.D. 378, had ultimately led the Roman authorities to discard the historic Roman infantryman—through whose sword and trenching-tool Dea Roma had originally won her Empire—and to adopt the exotic but triumphant Oriental cataphract in the legionary's stead.

In his eulogy of the cataphract,¹ Procopius is thus really doing just the opposite of what he supposes and intends. Instead of celebrating an improvement of the Greek and Roman military tech-

¹ In the detailed description of the cataphract's equipment which this eulogy contains in the passage quoted above, Procopius has forgotten to mention one detail which would have been germane to his purpose and which is actually mentioned in a handbook of military technique which dates from the next generation: the *Strategikon* of the Emperor Maurice (*imperabat* A.D. 582–602). From Maurice's *Strategikon* we learn that the cataphract was equipped with 'stirrups: an invention which had cropped up since the fifth century without our being able to say from whom it had its origin'. (Oman, Sir Charles: *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century* (London 1898, Methuen), p. 185.) The first reference to stirrups in Chinese literature is said to date from A.D. 477 (Münsterberg, O.: *Chinesische Kunstgeschichte*, vol. i (Esslingen 1910 Neff), p. 162).

nique, he is pronouncing its funeral oration. Yet, although Procopius has chosen an unfortunate illustration of the point that he is seeking to make, his general contention that there has been a progressive improvement in Hellenic technique remains broadly true within the field of military technique to which he confines his argument. In surveying this field of Greek and Roman social history, let us rule out of account the spurious epilogue represented by the cataphract and confine our survey to the thousand years which began with the invention¹ of the Spartan phalanx in the second Messeno-Spartan War in the latter part of the seventh century B.C.² and which ended with the final discomfiture and discrediting of the Roman legion at the Battle of Adrianople in A.D. 378. The development of the genuinely Hellenic military technique can be traced, without any break in continuity, throughout these thousand years; and in tracing it we shall find that an arrest or a set-back in the Hellenic Civilization invariably accompanied an improvement in the Hellenic art of war.

To begin with, as we have seen already, the invention of the Spartan phalanx, which is the first signal improvement of which we have a record, was an outcome of the same events that brought the growth of the Spartan version of the Hellenic Civilization to a premature halt.³

The next signal improvement was the differentiation of the Hellenic infantryman into two extreme types: the Macedonian phalangite and the Athenian peltast. The Macedonian phalanx, armed with long two-handed pikes in place of short one-handed stabbing-spears, was more formidable in its impact than its Spartan precursor; but it was also more unwieldy in its manœuvres and more at the enemy's mercy if once it lost its formation; and therefore it could not safely go into action unless its flanks were guarded by peltasts: a new type of light infantry who were taken out of the

¹ 'Adoption', rather than 'invention', is perhaps the right word in this case, since the phalanx formation and tactics, as we have seen above (in I. C. (iii) (b), Annex, vol. i, p. 428, footnote 2), appear to have originated in the Sumeric World and to have spread thence to the Hellenic World. In the *Iliad*, the phalanx-technique makes its appearance side by side with older and cruder kinds of armament and tactics. In *Iliad* xiii, ll. 126-35 (cp. l. 680), there is a detailed description of phalanx-fighting; and in *Iliad* xvi, ll. 211-17 (cp. l. 248), the Myrmidons go into battle in phalanx-order. On the other hand, in *Iliad* xiii, ll. 712-18, the Locrians are described as bowmen who are destitute of the phalangite's panoply. This panoply—the metal helmet and corselet, and the comparatively small round metal shield—appears to have been introduced into the Aegean from Assyria in the fourteenth century B.C. This material equipment, and the formation and tactics that it rendered possible, were technically as much superior to the indigenous Minoan equipment and tactics as the cataphract, in his turn, was superior to the hoplite. It is noteworthy that each of these great technical advances in the art of war was introduced during a cultural interregnum: the hoplite during the post-Minoan interregnum and the cataphract during the post-Hellenic interregnum. (See Glotz, G.: *La Civilisation Égée* (Paris 1923, Renaissance de Livres), pp. 100-1 and 103.)

² For the general social effects of this war in arresting the growth of the Spartan Society, see the present Part, Section A, pp. 53-68, above.

³ See the preceding footnote.

ranks and trained to fight as skirmishers. In collaboration, the Macedonian phalangite and the Athenian peltast were a far more effective type of infantry than the old undifferentiated phalangite on the Spartan model;¹ and this second improvement in the Hellenic military technique was the outcome of a century of internecine warfare in the Hellenic World—the century running from the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. to the Macedonian victory at Chaeronea in 338—which saw the Hellenic Civilization break down and go into disintegration.

The next signal improvement in the Hellenic military technique was made by the Romans, when they succeeded in combining the advantages and avoiding the defects of both peltast and phalangite in the tactics and equipment of the legionary. The legionary was armed with a couple of throwing-spears and a stabbing-sword, and the legion went into action in open order in two waves, with a third wave—armed and ordered in the old-fashioned phalanx-style—in reserve. This third improvement in the Hellenic military technique was the outcome of a fresh bout of internecine warfare—beginning with the outbreak of the Hannibalic War in 218 B.C. and closing with the end of the Third Romano-Macedonian War in 168—in which the Romans delivered a ‘knock-out blow’ to every other Great Power in the Hellenic World of that age.

The fourth and last improvement was the perfection of the legion: a process, begun by Marius and completed by Caesar, which was the outcome of a century of Roman revolutions and civil wars.² The Roman legionary was probably at his best in the army which fought for Caesar at Pharsalus in 48 B.C.—five years after the legions which had fought for Crassus at Carrhae in 53 B.C. had met their match in the Parthian cataphracts. Thus the generation of Caesar and Crassus saw the Greek and Roman military technique both attain and pass its zenith. And the same generation saw the Hellenic Civilization enter upon the penultimate stage in its decline and fall. For that century of Roman revolutions and civil wars which had begun in 133 B.C. with the tribunate of Tiberius

¹ The inability of the old-fashioned Spartan hoplite phalanx to cope with enemy peltasts unaided was demonstrated in the action fought at Lechaem in 390 B.C., when the Athenian commander Iphicrates, with his peltasts, cut up a *mora* (division) of Lacedaemonian infantry which was on the march unescorted by friendly cavalry. (See Xenophon: *Hellenica*, Bk. IV, ch. v, 11–17.)

² In terms of our modern Western military history, the homogeneous but versatile Roman infantry of the last century B.C. may be compared with our nineteenth-century infantry, with its uniform equipment of rifle and bayonet. The slightly differentiated Roman infantry of the second century B.C. may be compared with our eighteenth-century infantry, in which the light company and the grenadier company of a battalion were armed and trained somewhat differently from the ordinary troops of the line. The sharply differentiated Macedonian infantry of the third century B.C. may be compared with our seventeenth-century infantry, which was likewise sharply differentiated into pikemen and musketeers and targeteers.

Gracchus had been the climax of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles'; and it was Caesar's mission to bring that 'Time of Troubles' to a close by inaugurating the universal state which Augustus eventually established after the Battle of Actium.

In this history of the successive improvements in the Hellenic art of war, we have a clear case in which it is not the growth of a civilization, but its arrest and breakdown and disintegration, that goes hand in hand with the improvements in its military technique; and the histories of the Babylonian and Sinic civilizations offer us equally good illustrations of the same phenomenon. Both in the Babylonian 'Time of Troubles', when the Babylonian Society was tearing itself to pieces in the frenzy of Assyrian militarism, and likewise in the Sinic 'Time of Troubles', when the military Power of Ts'in was delivering knock-out blows to the other contending states of the Sinic World, conspicuous improvements in military technique were accomplished. In both cases, for example, the old-fashioned use of the war-horse as a draught-animal to draw a chariot was discarded in favour of its more effective use as a mount for a cavalryman.¹ Perhaps we may infer from the foregoing survey that an improvement in military technique is usually, if not invariably, the symptom of a decline in civilization.

An Englishman of the generation that has lived through the General War of 1914-18 may remind himself, in this connexion, of an incident which struck him, at the time, as painfully symbolic. As the War, in its ever-increasing intensity, made wider and wider demands upon the lives of the belligerent nations—like some great river that has burst its bounds in flood and is engulfing field after field and sweeping away village after village—a moment came in England when the offices of the Board of Education in Whitehall were commandeered for the use of a new department of the War Office which had been improvised in order to make an intensive study of trench warfare. The ejected Board of Education found asylum in the Victoria and Albert Museum, where it survived on sufferance as though it had been some curious relic of a vanished past. And thus, for several years before the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918, an education for slaughter was being promoted,

¹ In Sinic military history, the substitution of cavalry for chariots is known not to have been an original invention of the Sinic Society, but to have been borrowed by the Sinic World from the Nomads of Eurasia, with whom the Sinic World, in the course of its expansion, had come into contact about the fourth-century B.C. The innovation is attributed to Wu-ling (*regnabat* 329-299 B.C.), the prince of the north-eastern frontier-state of Chao. (See Hirth, F.: *The Ancient History of China* (reprint: New York 1923, Columbia University Press), pp. 272-3; and Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), p. 385.) May we conjecture, on this analogy, that the introduction of the cavalry arm into the Assyrian Army at about the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. was likewise an outcome of contact with the Eurasian Nomads? This was just the time when the Cimmerian and Scythian Nomads were breaking out of the south-western corner of the Eurasian Steppe and over running Asia Minor.

in the heart of our Western World, within the walls of a public building which had been erected in order to assist in promoting an education for life. As the writer of this Study was walking down Whitehall one day in the spring of that year 1918, he found himself repeating a passage from the Gospel according to Saint Matthew:

'When ye therefore shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the Prophet, stand in the holy place, (whoso readeth, let him understand), . . . then shall be great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the World to this time. . . . And, except those days should be shortened, there should no flesh be saved. . . .'¹

No reader can fail to understand that when the Ministry of Education of a great Western country is given over to the study of the art of war, the improvement in our Western military technique which is purchased at such a price is synonymous with the destruction of our Western Civilization.

Nor is the art of war the only kind of technique that is apt to make its progress in inverse ratio to the general progress of the body social. War is so manifestly an anti-social activity that an antinomy between military progress and social progress is not surprising. And we shall notice in retrospect that, in all the examples of the correlation between technical improvement and social arrest or setback which we have passed in review up to this point, the technique that has achieved improvement at Society's expense has been more or less military in each instance. Let us now take the case of a technique which stands at the furthest remove from the art of war: the technique of agriculture, which is generally regarded as *par excellence* the sovereign art of peace. If we revert to the history of the Hellenic Civilization, and trace out the course of the successive improvements in the Hellenic technique of agriculture against the general background of Hellenic history, we shall find here another instance in which an improvement in a technique has been the accompaniment of a decline in a civilization.

At the outset, perhaps, we seem to be entering here upon a different story. Whereas the first historic improvement in the Hellenic art of war was purchased at the price of an arrest in the growth of the particular Hellenic community by which this improvement had been invented, the first comparable improvement in Hellenic agriculture had a happier sequel. In the domain of agricultural technique, the first Hellenic innovators were not the Spartans but the Athenians; and when Attica, on Solon's initiative, led the way in Hellas from a régime of mixed farming for subsistence

¹ Matt. xxiv. 15 and 21-2.

to a régime of specialized agricultural production for export,¹ this technical advance, so far from being followed by an arrest or decline of civilization in the locality where the advance had been made, was actually followed by an outburst of energy and growth in every sphere of Attic life—an outburst which had so powerful an *élan* that its influence was not confined to Attic soil but went coursing, in a great current of new vitality, through the veins of the whole Hellenic body social.

In the next chapter, however, the story of the successive improvements in the Hellenic agricultural technique takes a different, and this time a sinister, turn. The next stage of technical advance was an increase of scale in the operations of the new specialized agriculture through the organization of mass-production. This step appears to have been taken in the colonial Hellenic communities which had been planted overseas in Sicily; for the Sicilian Greeks found an expanding market for their wine and oil among the barbarians of the Western Mediterranean who had acquired a taste for the fruits of the vine and the olive without having yet learnt to plant vineyards and oliveyards for themselves. Our first glimpse of the newfangled Attic agriculture on the new colonial scale is in the territory of the Sicilian Greek city-state of Agrigentum towards the close of the first quarter of the fifth century B.C.; and the description which we have of it from the pen of a later Sicilian Greek historian shows that this second advance in Hellenic agricultural technique was vitiated socially from the start by being bound up with the employment of slave-labour.

'After the victory [of the allied Greek city-states of Sicily over the Carthaginians at the Battle of Himera in 480 B.C.], Gelo . . . divided the bulk of the spoils,² including the prisoners of war, among the Greek allies in proportion to the strengths of the forces which they had respectively put into the field. The Governments put the prisoners allotted to them into fetters, and employed them on public works. The Agrigentines received the largest number, and were able to improve their countryside as well as their city. The number of captives in their hands was so great that many private people there possessed as many as 500—the number being due not only to the large size of the force which they had sent on the campaign but also to the accident that, when the Carthaginian rout began, many of the fugitives retreated inland, and this mostly into Agrigentine territory. These stragglers were all caught by the Agrigentines, so that the city was positively packed with captives. Most of them were nationalized, and these were put to quarrying stone for public works [which the author goes on to enumerate and describe]. . . .

¹ For the causes of this Attic agrarian revolution of the sixth century B.C., see Part II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 37–42, above.

² After disposing of some of them as rewards for distinguished valour, and reserving others for dedication in the temples of Himera and Syracuse. A. J. T.

Besides this, they planted the whole of their territory, which had a good soil, with vineyards and with orchards of all kinds of fruit trees, which brought them in a great income from the land.¹

The great technical advance which was achieved in this agrarian revolution was offset by at least as great a social lapse; for the new plantation-slavery, with which the new plantation-agriculture was bound up, was a far more serious social evil than the old domestic slavery which was the only form of the institution that had existed in Hellas before. The plantation-slavery was worse, both morally and statistically. It was impersonal and inhuman, and it was on the grand scale.

This system of agricultural mass-production by slave-labour for a barbarian market spread from the Greek communities in Sicily to adjoining regions in the Western Mediterranean Basin which came within the ambit of the Hellenic Civilization: first to the Carthaginian dominions in North-West Africa and then, on a larger scale, to the great area in Southern Italy which was left derelict and devastated by the Hannibalic War.² Wherever this slave-plantation system of agriculture established itself, it notably increased the productivity of the land in the purely economic terms of the profits accruing to the entrepreneurs who bought or leased or squatted on the land and planted it with vines and olives and stocked it with slaves; but, by the same token, the system made the land socially sterile; for, wherever the slave-plantations spread, they displaced and pauperized the peasant and the yeoman farmer as inexorably as bad money drives out good.

The social consequence was the depopulation of the countryside and the creation of a parasitic urban proletariat in the cities;³ and this fatal path of social development was a 'one-way street'. Not all the efforts of successive generations of Roman social reformers—not the revolutionary political measures of the hot-blooded

¹ Diodorus of Agyrium, *A Library of Universal History*, Book xi, chap. 25.

² It must be confessed that the malignant social effects which followed upon the second signal advance in the technique of Hellenic agriculture cannot, after all, be kept altogether distinct from the malignant effects of Greek and Roman militarism, since the invention of the new agricultural technique in Sicily was connected with the Sicilian War of 480 B.C. and its introduction into Italy with the Italian War of 218–203 B.C. When the Romans finally annihilated Carthage in 146 B.C. they gave away all the libraries of Punic literature which fell into their hands to the local African princelings who had taken sides politically with Rome against Carthage without abandoning their taste for the Punic culture. To the Roman victors, this culture meant nothing; but there was one Carthaginian book of which they made an exception for practical reasons; and this was Mago's treatise on plantation-farming. Though the work ran to twenty-eight volumes, the Roman senate ordered its translation into Latin (Pliny, *Natural History*, xviii. 22).

³ The dispossessed peasantry of Italy tended to drift into Rome; and those who remained in the countryside sank to the status of a rural proletariat, who eked out a miserable existence by serving as casual labourers (*politores*) on the plantations at harvest time and at other busy seasons. For the depopulation of the Campagna by the time of the establishment of the Empire, see the passage from Livy which is quoted in Part II. D (i), vol. ii, on p. 17, footnote 1, above.

Gracchi, and not the private munificence of the soberly public-spirited conservatives who endowed the Italian *Alimenta* in the second century after Christ¹—could avail to rid the Roman World of this social blight which the last advance in agricultural technique had brought upon it. In spite of such efforts at reform, the plantation slave-gang continued to usurp the yeoman farmer's place until the slave-plantation system collapsed spontaneously in consequence of the breakdown of the money economy on which this system of agricultural mass-production for a world-market was dependent for making its profits. This financial breakdown was part of the general social *débâcle* of the third century of the Christian Era; and this *débâcle* was doubtless the outcome, in part, of the agrarian malady which had been eating away the tissues of the Roman body social for the previous four centuries. Thus the social cancer of Roman plantation-slavery eventually extinguished itself by causing the death of the society upon which it had fastened.²

The plantation-slavery of Roman Italy has a modern Western analogy, which has often been pointed out, in the plantation-slavery which was rampant in the cotton-belt of the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century after Christ.³ In this latter case, again, a new virulence was instilled into the ancient social disease of slavery by an improvement in economic technique. If the close of the eighteenth century had not witnessed the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom, it is probable that the nineteenth century would have seen slavery die of inanition in the Southern States of the American Union, as it had already died on the northern side of the Mason and Dixon Line. It was the Industrial Revolution that gave slavery in the Southern States a new lease of life by creating a vast new market for raw cotton in Lancashire and by inventing the machinery for carding and spinning and weaving cotton at a financial profit. In these new circumstances, which a sudden great improvement in the Western technique of manufacture had brought about, the Slave Power became a menace not only to the political integrity of the United States, but to the social welfare of the whole Western World. Happily, the Western World has responded more effectively than the Hellenic World ever succeeded in responding to this formidable challenge. We have realized that slavery becomes too terrible an evil to be tolerated when the terrific driving-power of Industrialism has once been applied to it; and, realizing this, we have paid the

¹ For the *Alimenta*, see Hirschfeld, O.: *Die Kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1905, Weidmann), pp. 212-24.

² For the spiritual reaction of the Roman plantation-slaves to the penalization to which they were subjected, see Part II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213-16, above.

³ For the spiritual reaction of the Negro plantation-slaves in the Southern United States, see Part II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 218-20, above.

price that has had to be paid—the price of the American Civil War—in order to stamp our modern slavery out. We have still, however, to overcome a host of other social evils which the technical improvements of the Industrial Revolution have brought in their train; and one of these still unconquered evils is the malignant growth of a parasitic urban proletariat: an evil which seems to be sapping the strength of our own society in our time as it once sapped the strength of the Roman body social in its latter days.

The lack of correlation between progress in technique and progress in civilization is apparent in all these cases in which techniques have improved while civilizations have remained stationary or have suffered set-backs. The same thing is apparent in the cases, which we have next to consider, in which techniques have remained stationary while civilizations have been moving either forward or backward.

For example, an immense step forward in human progress was made in Europe between the Lower and the Upper Palaeolithic Age.

‘The Upper Palaeolithic Culture is associated with the end of the fourth glacial epoch. In place of the remains of Neanderthal Man we find the remains of several types, none of which show any affinity to Neanderthal Man. On the contrary, they all approximate more or less closely to Modern Man. At one bound we seem, when looking at the fossil remains from this epoch in Europe, to have passed into the modern period as far as human bodily form is concerned.’¹

This transfiguration of the human type in the middle of the Palaeolithic Age is possibly the most epoch-making event that has ever yet occurred in the course of human history up to date; for at that moment Sub-Man succeeded in turning himself into Man, while Man, in all the time that has elapsed since Sub-Man’s achievement made Man human, has never yet succeeded in attaining the superhuman level which is the goal of our human endeavours.² This comparison gives us the measure of the psychic advance which was achieved when *Homo Neanderthalensis* was transcended and when *Homo Sapiens* emerged. Yet this immense psychic revolution was not accompanied by any corresponding revolution in technique; so that, on the technological classification, the sensitive artists who drew the pictures that we still admire in the Upper Palaeolithic cave-dwellings have to be confounded with ‘the Missing Link’, while in reality—as measured by wisdom and stature alike, and by every trait that is distinctive of Humanity—this *Homo*

¹ Carr-Saunders, A. M.: *The Population Problem* (Oxford 1922, Clarendon Press), pp. 116–17.

² For the rare exceptions that prove this rule, see III. C (ii) (a), below.

Palaeolithicus Superior is divided from *Homo Palaeolithicus Inferior* by just as great a gulf as is our latter-day *Homo Mechanicus*.

This instance in which a technique has remained stationary while a civilization has advanced finds its converse in other cases in which techniques have remained stationary while civilizations have receded.

For example, the technique of iron-working, which had been originally introduced into the Aegean at the moment of the great social relapse when the Minoan Civilization went into dissolution, remained stationary—neither improving nor declining—at the time of the next great social relapse, when the Hellenic Civilization went the way of its Minoan predecessor. Our Western World inherited the technique of iron-working from the Roman World unimpaired; and it likewise inherited the technique of writing, embodied in the Latin Alphabet,¹ as well as the Greek science of mathematics.² Socially, there had been a cataclysm. The Hellenic Civilization had gone to pieces and a social interregnum had ensued, out of which the new Western Civilization eventually emerged. But there was no corresponding break of continuity in the realm of technique—at least, not in the histories of the three important techniques just mentioned.

Another example of a technique remaining stationary while a civilization has receded is noticed by Ibn Khaldūn³ in his contemporary observation of his own ancestral country. He remarks that, in the fragment of the Iberian Peninsula that still remained under the Islamic dispensation in his own day, the ancient arts had survived though the ancient order of society had fallen into a lamentable decay.

Our empirical survey has made it abundantly clear that there is

¹ We might add that the Orthodox Christian World inherited the Greek Alphabet from the Hellenic Civilization, the Islamic World the Arabic Alphabet from the Syriac Civilization, the Far Eastern World the Sinic characters from the Sinic Civilization, and the Babylonian World the Sumerian cuneiform script from the Sumerian Civilization. In bringing up these further examples, however, we might be convicted of arguing in a circle; for, in all these cases, we have left it an open question whether the posterior civilization in each pair of civilizations is really an independent civilization or merely the petrified or mummified corpse of the antecedent civilization. And the continuity of script (with all the continuity of mental tradition which that implies) is of course one of the strong arguments against admitting the claims of these posterior civilizations to be allowed the status of independent civilizations in their own right. (This problem has been discussed in Part I. C (ii), vol. i, on pp. 133-46, above.)

² 'The Mathematics are distinguished by a peculiar privilege that, in the course of ages, they may always advance and can never recede. But the ancient geometry, if I am not misinformed, was resumed by the Italians in the same state in the fifteenth century' (Gibbon, E.: *A History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. lii). This is perhaps a reminiscence of a passage in Turgot's *Second Discours sur les Progrès Successifs de l'Esprit Humain* which was delivered at the Sorbonne on the 11th December, 1750 (*Œuvres de Turgot*, Nouvelle Edition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin), 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 600. The topic also appears in Turgot's *Plan de Deux Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* (op. cit., p. 666).

³ Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 360-2.

no correlation between progress in technique and progress in civilization;¹ yet, although the history of technique proves not to be, in itself, the criterion for which we are seeking, it may still provide us with a clue for finding the object of our search.

(c) 'ETHERIALIZATION'

The history of technique, which has not yet revealed to us any law of social progress, does reveal the principle by which technical progress is governed; and this principle may be described as a law of progressive simplification.

For example, in the history of our modern Western system of transportation, the technical advance which was achieved in the substitution of mechanical for muscular traction required, in its first stage, a great elaboration of material apparatus. When the horse was replaced by the locomotive, the simple carriage-road had to be turned into an elaborate 'permanent way', with cuttings and tunnels and embankments and viaducts to eliminate the gradients of the natural landscape, and with a pair of metal rails to smooth the passage of the wheels of the steam-driven train. On the other hand, in the next stage of technical advance, when the ponderous and bulky steam-engine, with its heavy consumption of water and coal, is replaced by the light and handy internal-combustion-engine, driven by a mixture of petrol vapour and air, the improvement in technique is accompanied by a notable simplification of apparatus this time. The technical advantage of mechanical traction is not only preserved but enhanced (inasmuch as the internal-combustion-engine is an improvement on the steam-engine from the mechanical standpoint); and at the same time the disadvantage of the elaborate material apparatus is partly transcended. For the motor-car liberates itself from the rails to which the locomotive is bound, and takes to the road again, with all the speed and power of a railway-train and almost all the freedom of action of a pedestrian or a horse.

The same law of progressive simplification is apparent in the history of our modern Western technique for the instantaneous long-distance conveyance of words. When electric telegraphy and telephony is first invented, the electric currents by which the Morse Code is signalled or the human voice is conveyed have to be transmitted through an artificially installed medium of metal wires. Then comes the invention of wireless telegraphy and telephony—a further technical advance which makes it possible to dispense with the artificial medium of transmission and to radiate the human voice through the natural medium of the 'aether' to the distance of

¹ The same opinion is expressed by Eduard Meyer in his *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1921, Cotta), pp. 164-5.

hundreds of miles in as short a time as it takes the human organs of speech to transmit the same voice a few feet through the natural medium of the air.

Or let us consider the history of writing: an older device for transmitting the sense, without the sound, of human speech across vast intervals of Space and Time. In the history of writing, there is not merely a correlation between progress in technique and simplification in form, but the two tendencies are actually identical, since the whole of the technical problem which a script has to solve, in transposing human speech into a visual medium, is the distinct representation of the widest possible range of language with the greatest economy of visual symbols.

Perhaps the most elaborate script that has ever been invented is the Sinic, in which the characters are pictograms which have been conventionalized without being simplified, and in which each pictogram represents, not a sound nor even a word, but an idea. Since there is an infinite diversity of nuance among the ideas that arise in the human mind, the number of characters in the Sinic script runs into five figures, and a single one of these characters may contain more strokes than there are letters in our Alphabet. This Sinic script is certainly the most incompetent in technique, as well as the most elaborate in form, of any system of writing that is now in use.

This still current Sinic script is technically inferior to two extinct scripts—the Egyptiac hieroglyphic and the Sumeric cuneiform—which have each independently taken the step of using conventional pictures to represent sounds as well as ideas, or, in technical terms, to serve as phonograms as well as ideograms. The technical advantage of this step lies precisely in the economy of visual symbols which it renders possible; for while there is no limit to the number of distinct ideas in the human mind which may demand distinct representation in a system of ideograms, there is only a limited range of sounds in any given human language. Accordingly, a script that is based on phonograms instead of ideograms can provide for all its requirements out of a relatively small stock of visual symbols. If the Egyptiac and Sumeric scribes had only had the courage of their invention, and had discarded the use of ideograms altogether when once they had hit upon the use of phonograms to take their place, their scripts might perhaps now be holding the field which our own Alphabet actually occupies at the present day. As it was, they deprived themselves of the advantage of their invention by persisting in the use of phonograms and ideograms side by side (a perverse practice which made the invention of phonograms a source of confusion instead of a step towards

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greater clarity). All the same, both scripts are technically superior to the Sinic in almost all respects. Their pictograms are both fewer in number and simpler in form. The Egyptiac scribes, in particular, carried simplification of form very far in the cursive versions of their script, while, in their analysis of the sounds of human speech, they went the length of making phonograms for syllables containing only one consonant: an advance which brought them to the verge of inventing a consonantal alphabet.

In the historic Alphabet, which was invented by some Syriac scribe after the Egyptiac scribes had just failed to hit upon it, the simplification of writing, which is the same thing as its technical improvement, has been carried almost as far as it can go. The essence of the Alphabet is the analysis of the sounds of human speech into their primary elements, and the representation of each of these elements by a separate visual symbol which combines distinctiveness with simplicity of form. The Phoenician inventors of the Alphabet analysed out, and gave representation to, the consonants. The Greeks borrowed this Phoenician invention and then improved upon it by analysing and representing the vowels as well. And the Latin Alphabet, which is the script of our own Western Society, is simply a variant of the Greek Alphabet without any change, for better or worse, in technical principle. In a vowelised alphabet of the Greek and Latin type, it is possible to give visual representation—with sufficient accuracy and distinctiveness for practical purposes, if not for the scientific requirements of the phonetician—to almost any sound that is used in almost any language that has ever been spoken.

In the history of writing, with its culmination in the Alphabet, the law of correlation between improvement in technique and simplification in apparatus is admirably illustrated. And its operation can be discerned again in the history of language: a technique of articulate and significant sounds which is both logically and chronologically prior to the invention of writing and indeed is perhaps coeval with Humanity itself.

In the history of language, as in the history of writing, simplification is the path of technical progress. The tendency of language, when it is in course of improvement, is to abandon the elaborate apparatus of inflexion, in which the parts of speech that express relations are welded on to the parts that express meanings, and to resort, instead, to the use of prepositions and auxiliary verbs and particles, in which the same relations are expressed in the form of separate words which can be attached to, or detached from, any of the other separate words that express meaning, without the necessity of altering the internal form of either word in either class.

It will be seen that this tendency in the technique of language has the same effect as the tendency in the technique of writing to progress from ideographic pictograms to conventional symbols representing the elementary sounds. The effect in both cases is to render possible an economy of forms: visual forms in the case of writing and sound forms in the case of speech. It will also be seen that the relation-word sits as loosely to the meaning-word as the tool to the human hand, which can pick up or put down any tool at will or exchange one tool for another, while the nexus between the inflexion and the root on to which it is welded is like the nexus between a sword-fish's sword and the sword-fish, in contrast to the casual relation of a man's sword to the man.¹ In an inflective language, the root can no more let go of its inflexion than the sword-fish can let go of his sword; and therefore, if the meaning has to be put into a different relation to other meanings than the particular relation which any one given inflexion happens to express, a separate form has to be coined for the combination of the old root with the new inflexion, with which it has now to enter into another indissoluble partnership, just as, when Nature wishes to use the snout as a prehensile implement instead of using it as a piercing instrument, she cannot just unship the sword-fish's sword and fit a trunk to the creature's snout instead, but can only provide herself with a trunk by creating quite another creature—an elephant—to wear this other implement as an integral part of his elephantine bodily organism.

The tendency of language to simplify itself by abandoning inflexions in favour of auxiliary words may be illustrated by a comparative view of the histories of certain representatives of the Indo-European family of languages. As the two extreme poles in this series we may take Classical Sanskrit and Modern English. Sanskrit happens, by an historical accident, to have been stabilized in a standard literary form before it had deviated very far from the now extinct *Indo-europäische Ursprache*: the primitive mother tongue from which all the members of the Indo-European family are descended. Accordingly we find in Sanskrit what, to an English-speaking student, seems an amazing wealth of inflexions side by side with a surprising poverty in particles, while, at the other end of the scale, Modern English has retained only a few miserable vestiges of the wealth of inflexions bequeathed by the *Ursprache*, but has recouped itself by developing a wealth of prepositions and particles and, above all, auxiliary verbs. In this linguistic gamut in which English and Sanskrit represent the extremes, Attic Greek

¹ For this contrast between animal fixity and human adaptability, see in general Part III. A, pp. 79-88, above.

lies somewhere near the middle. An English student of Attic Greek is struck by its conformity with Sanskrit in having retained an abundance of inflexions; but closer inspection shows that the Greek and the Sanskrit wealth in inflexions is differently distributed between the different parts of speech. Greek is poorer than Sanskrit in the inflexions of the noun, but on the other hand it is richer in the inflexions of the verb; and this difference is significant, because the verb, unlike the noun, has relation as well as meaning in its essence. But a Hindu Sanskrit scholar who turned his attention to Greek would probably not be struck by the Greek inflexions at all—neither by the verbal inflexions nor by the nominal. The feature in the Attic Greek language that would impress the Sanskrit scholar would be its wealth in particles; and on the strength of this feature he might be inclined to think of Attic Greek and Modern English as representing an identic tendency, in common contrast to Sanskrit. If the three languages are to be judged by their relative powers of expression, we shall probably come to the conclusion that our hypothetical Indian has come nearer to hitting the mark in classing Greek with English than our hypothetical Englishman in classing it with Sanskrit. For the English composite verb has at least as wide a range and as subtle a nuance as the Greek inflective verb for expressing relations, while the Sanskrit verb is equally inferior to them both.

Again, the Arabic verb impresses the English student at first sight by its wealth of 'aspects' expressed through internal inflexions; but he soon discovers that the English verb, with the aid of its auxiliaries, can express all the nuances of these 'aspects' as well as all the distinctions of Time, whereas the Arabic verb with its single pair of tenses—a perfect and an imperfect—is virtually incapable of expressing the elementary Time-distinction between past, present, and future.

The Ottoman Turkish language, again, manages to express as wide a range and as subtle a nuance of relations by means of an inflective verb as Attic Greek itself; but its inferiority to Greek is revealed by its poverty in particles. Such particles as it possesses are mostly loans from Persian and Arabic. But the greatest weakness of Turkish is its lack of relative pronouns; and it is in vain that it calls all its gerunds and gerundives into action to do duty for them. The result is a complication of syntax which makes the most ponderous Ciceronian or Miltonian period seem simple by comparison. The Turkish language would be better off if it could drop half its verbal inflexions and acquire a handful of relatives in exchange.

The line of progress in the technical improvement of language

which the foregoing survey reveals seems to suggest that a technically perfect language would dispense with inflexions altogether in favour of auxiliary words, and perhaps eventually dispense with these auxiliaries as well, and express itself entirely in uninflected words of meaning whose relations with one another would be indicated simply by their relative order. Modern English has travelled this path a very long way; and the Classical Chinese language—which seems to have been as progressive as the Classical Chinese script is backward—has possibly travelled the whole path to its logical end.

Our law of correlation between improvement in technique and simplification in apparatus, which we have now illustrated by examples taken from the diverse fields of transportation and telegraphy and telephony and writing and language, can be illustrated equally well from the histories of astronomy or philosophy or fashions in dress.

If we turn the pages of some illustrated history of fashion in our own Western World, we shall be struck by the steadiness of the trend which is apparent, in the course of the last four centuries, from elaborateness towards simplicity and from diversity towards uniformity. In the costume of a Queen Elizabeth or a King Louis XIV there is a profusion and extravagance of ornament, and an exaggeration and distortion of the natural lines of the human figure, which smells strongly of the savage.¹ Elizabeth, with her enormous ruff and her tight-laced waist, has essentially the same conception of finery as the primitive African or Melanesian who files his teeth to a point and distends his lips and ear-lobes by inserting wooden plugs into the living flesh. And Louis, when he caricatures the beauties of the natural human head of hair in the fantastically dense tresses and crimped curls of his enormous bagwig, is really aiming at the same effect as the Abyssinian chieftain who envelops his head in a lion's mane. The excruciating effect which is made upon our modern sensibilities by Louis' and Elizabeth's taste is enhanced when we notice the contrast between the costliness of the dress of the fashionable world in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the scantiness and raggedness of the clothing of the common people, who have to go unshod and unprotected against cold and rain. As we turn over the pages, we are conscious of a growing sense of relief as we approach the fashion-plate of our own 'post-war' generation.² For in our generation the

¹ For an interpretation of the latter-day savage's penchant towards puerility and monstrosity as a kind of pathological 'compensation' for the absence of progress in his social life, see Bergson, Henri: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 142-4.

² Peter the Great, whose tastes (both for good and for evil) were some two centuries ahead of his age (even if we reckon his age on the Western and not on the, by then,

old invidious class-distinctions are no longer flaunted so flagrantly in the field of dress: a field in which they have no rhyme or reason, whatever there may be to be said for them or against them in other spheres. In dress, there has been a remarkable and salutary approximation towards uniformity between class and class within living memory; and the main factor in this approximation has not been the cheap imitation of the finery of the rich which has been brought within the means of the poor by the mass-production of the Machine Age. A more striking and significant tendency has been the voluntary simplification in the dress of the minority which disposes of the means to set the fashion. There has been a tendency towards the use of plainer materials, and—even more markedly—towards a simpler cut, which aims at following and setting off the natural lines of the human body instead of contradicting or caricaturing them.¹

It is interesting to rediscover the same trend in the history of Hellenic fashion as in the history of our own. Thucydides, writing on the morrow of the Great War of 431-404 B.C., describes the finery which had been worn by well-to-do male Athenians not so very long before the historian's own day, in contrast to the simple modern style of dress which had been introduced by the Spartans and had spread from Lacedaemon to the rest of Hellas. In the same passage Thucydides also mentions a modern tendency—which unfortunately has no counterpart as yet in our modern Western World—for the well-to-do minority to accept equality with the masses, not only in the matter of dress, but in their whole material standard of living.² This tendency towards simplification which is manifest,

relatively belated Byzantine Time-scale), already experienced this sense of relief in England when he visited that country at the close of the seventeenth century. When King William III asked his eccentric Russian guest: 'What has pleased you most in London?' Peter replied: 'That the richest people go about in clothes that are plain but clean' (Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 224. Cp. p. 515).

¹ In the modern Western male costume, this tendency set in with the invention of the coat and waistcoat towards the close of the seventeenth century, and was confirmed in the opening decades of the nineteenth century when bright colours and showy materials were abandoned and breeches were superseded by trousers. In the Western female costume, the corresponding revolution has been later but more rapid. While much the same kind of taste is expressed, *mutatis mutandis*, in the feminine as in the masculine dress of our 'post-war' age (in which the two costumes both incline equally towards simplicity, as in the Elizabethan age they both inclined towards a certain style of extravagance), there is a violent contrast between the male and female costume of the mid-nineteenth century, when the Empress Eugénie revives the worst extravagances of Queen Elizabeth, while the Emperor Napoleon III already anticipates the sober and almost sombre garb of a President Mustafâ Kemal or a President Calvin Coolidge.

² 'The Athenians were among the first to lay aside their arms and change to a more comfortable and refined way of living. The older men of the well-to-do class have only recently abandoned the luxuries of wearing linen shirts and fastening their hair in a bunch with gold grasshopper clasps. Among the kindred population of Ionia, these fashions long retained their hold over the older generation. The simple dress which we wear to-day was first introduced by the Lacedaemonians, who reduced the whole outward standard of living to approximately the same level for rich and poor. They were also the first to take exercise naked, and to strip in public and oil themselves for this purpose. Originally, even at the Olympic Games, the athletes used to cover their nakedness with a

for all who have eyes to see, in the histories of fashions in dress, appears to reveal itself to instructed eyes in the progress of Physical Science, and it has also been acclaimed as the royal road of philosophic intuition by one of our greatest living Western philosophers.

In the history of Physical Science, the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, which was the first attempt to give a coherent explanation of all the observed movements of all the known heavenly bodies, had to postulate an elaborate geometrical apparatus of epicycles. The Copernican system, by which the Ptolemaic has latterly been replaced, presents us, in far simpler geometrical terms, with an equally coherent explanation of the vastly wider range of movement of the innumerable host of heaven that has now been revealed by the invention of the telescope. And to-day Einstein's system—for those who comprehend it—appears to be introducing a still further simplification into the hypothetical structure of the physical universe by bringing the dimensions of Time and Space, and the laws of Gravity and Radiation and Magnetism, into a single synthesis.

In the domain of Philosophy, a corresponding tendency towards simplification has been taken as an index of progress in intuition by Monsieur Henri Bergson.

'Something which, when viewed from without, is susceptible of being decomposed into an infinite number of inter-coordinated parts might perhaps appear, if viewed from inside, as one single act. For instance, a movement of the hand, which feels to us indivisible, will be perceived externally as a curve which can be defined by an equation: that is, as a juxtaposition of points which are infinite in number and which at the same time all satisfy a single law. In the place where our analysis, remaining outside its object, discovers positive elements in greater and ever greater numbers and in more and ever more astonishing coordination with one another (in virtue of the very fact that their numbers increase), an intuition which succeeded in planting itself in the interior would be aware no longer of means combined but rather of obstacles surmounted. An invisible hand passing brusquely through a heap of iron filings would be simply brushing aside resistance; but the sheer simplicity of this act would appear, when viewed from the side of resistance, in the guise of a juxtaposition of the filings in a positively determined order.'¹

The simile of the movement of the hand in its outward and its inward aspects is applied by the same philosopher, in another

loin-cloth while competing, and it is not many years since this practice has been given up. Among the non-Hellenic peoples of the present day, especially in Asia, when there are boxing and wrestling competitions, they still wear loin-cloths for the occasion; and it would be possible to point out many other similarities between ancient Hellenic and modern non-Hellenic life.' (Thucydides: 'Prolegomena' (Bk. I, chs. 1-5).)

¹ Bergson, Henri: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 118-19.

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passage of the same work, to the relation between Man and the material universe.

'When one speaks of the smallness of Man and the vastness of the Universe, one is thinking of the complexity of the Universe at least as much as of its dimensions. A personality makes an effect of simplicity, whereas the material world is of a complexity that baffles the imagination: the most minute particle of matter that is visible to the human eye is already a world in itself. How persuade oneself that Personality can be the sole *raison d'être* of Matter? But we will not allow ourselves to be intimidated. When we find ourselves in the presence of parts which can be enumerated *ad infinitum*, it is possible that the whole may be simple, and that we are just looking at it from the wrong end. Carry your hand from one position to another: for you, who perceive the movement from within, it is something that is indivisible. But I perceive it from outside and fix my attention on the line that has been traversed; and so I say to myself that the first half of the space has first had to be traversed, and then half the second half, and then half of what remains, and so on and on: I might continue for milliards of centuries, and still I should never have exhausted the enumeration of the acts into which my eyes decompose the movement that feels indivisible to you. Similarly the gesture which evokes the Human Species—or, in general terms, evokes objects of love for the Creator—might very well demand conditions which demand other conditions which lead on step by step into an infinite regress. The mere thought of this multiplicity turns the thinker giddy; yet it is nothing but the reverse side of an indivisible something. It is true that the infinitely numerous acts into which we decompose a movement of the hand are purely virtual, and that they are absolutely determined in their virtuality by the actuality of the movement itself, whereas the constituent parts of the Universe, and the parts of these parts, are realities—and realities which, when they are living creatures, enjoy a spontaneity which can reach the point of free activity. So we will not claim that the relation of the complex to the simple is precisely the same in the two cases. The purpose of the parallel that we have drawn has merely been to show that sheer complexity—even when it is a boundless complexity—is not a sign of importance; and that an existence which is simple in itself may demand conditions that stretch away in an endless chain.'

Thus a modern Western philosopher applies the historic *solvitur ambulando* to the ancient sophism of the Eleatics in order to equate complexity with Matter and simplicity with Life, and this not merely with Life at its lowest levels, but with the Life of Man and the Life of a Creative Godhead.

The foregoing illustrations seem to indicate that our law of the correlation between simplification in apparatus and improvement in technique has no limits to its field of operation. We have discovered

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-9.

this same tendency towards simplification at work in the most diverse spheres. But perhaps 'simplification' is not quite an accurate, or at least not altogether an adequate, term for describing the tendency which we have just been investigating. 'Simplification' is a negative word. It connotes omission and elimination; whereas, in the concrete examples of the phenomenon from which we have inferred the validity of our law, the ultimate effect which the law produces by its operation is not a diminution, but an enhancement, of practical efficiency or of aesthetic satisfaction or of intellectual understanding or of godlike love. In fact, the result is not a loss but a gain; and this gain is the outcome of a process of simplification because this process liberates forces that have been imprisoned in a more material medium and thereby sets them free to work in a more etherial medium with a greater potency. We are witnessing here the release of

'A fiery soul which, working out its way,
Fretted the pigmy-body to decay
And o'er-informed the tenement of clay.'

In other words, the process which we are examining involves not merely a simplification of apparatus but a consequent transfer of energy, or shift of emphasis, from some lower sphere of being or sphere of action to a higher sphere. Perhaps we shall be describing the process in a more illuminating way if we call it, not 'simplification', but 'etherialization'.

This phenomenon of 'etherialization' may be observed in many different spheres.

In the sphere of human control over Physical Nature it may take the form of a transfer of the field of operation from a grosser to a subtler mesh in the texture of the material universe: from coal-fuel to oil-fuel (as in the illustration which we have drawn from the history of our modern Western methods of transportation); or from water-power to steam-power and from steam-power to electric-power; or from the transmission of electric waves through metallic wires to their transmission through the 'aether'. This trend in the development of our modern Western application of Physical Science is indicated, with a finely imaginative touch, in the following passage from the pen of an anthropologist of the present generation:

'We are leaving the ground, we are getting out of touch, our tracks grow fainter. Flint lasts for ever, copper for civilizations, iron for generations, steel for a lifetime. Who will be able to map the route of the London-Peking air express when the age of movement is over or to-day

¹ Dryden: *Absalom and Achitophel*.

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to say what is the path through the "aether" of the messages which are radiated and received? But the frontiers of the petty vanished kingdom of the Iceni still sweep defensively across the southern frontier of East Anglia, from drained marsh to obliterated forest."¹

The consummation towards which this historic tendency may conceivably be advancing (on the assumption that it persists) has been anticipated in imagination by a nineteenth-century English novelist in a phantasia in which he pictures the then prevalent methods of controlling Physical Nature—the methods of the early Industrial Revolution—as having been rendered obsolete by the discovery, and superseded by the application, of an incomparably subtle and powerful physical force.

'I went with my host and his daughter Zee over the great public museum, which occupies a wing in the College of Sages, and in which are hoarded, as curious specimens of the ignorant and blundering experiments of ancient times, many contrivances on which we pride ourselves as recent achievements. In one department, carelessly thrown aside as obsolete lumber, are tubes for destroying life by metallic balls and an inflammable powder, on the principle of our cannons and catapults, and even still more murderous than our latest improvements. My host spoke of these with a smile of contempt, such as an artillery officer might bestow on the bows and arrows of the Chinese. In another department there were models of vehicles and vessels worked by steam, and of a balloon which might have been constructed by Montgolfier. "Such," said Zee, with an air of meditative wisdom—"such were the feeble triflings with Nature of our savage forefathers, ere they had even a glimmering of perception of the properties of Vril."'²

This imaginary 'Vril'-force, with which Bulwer Lytton endows 'the Coming Race', performs the magic which our more sanguine physicists look forward to exercising in our own day if they succeed in discovering a method for 'breaking up the atom'. In both the nineteenth-century and the twentieth-century conceptions, the ultimate form of human control over Physical Nature—the form which is to give Man boundless material power—is conceived as being incomparably etherial in its mode of operation.

The phenomenon of 'etherialization' which thus asserts itself in the domain of Applied Science may also be observed in the domains of Theology and Mathematics and Art and Philosophy.

The etherialization of Theology is compared with the corresponding development in the history of Mathematics by Monsieur Bergson:

'The gradual ascent of Religion towards Gods whose personality is more and more plainly marked and who enter into more and more

¹ Heard, Gerald: *The Ascent of Humanity* (London 1929, Cape), pp. 277-8.

² Bulwer Lytton: *The Coming Race*, ch. xvi.

clearly defined relations with one another or tend to become absorbed into one single divinity . . . has gone forward until a moment has come at which the religious spirit has turned away from the Outward towards the Inward, from the Static to the Dynamic, by a process of conversion analogous to that accomplished by the Pure Intellect when it passed from the consideration of finite magnitudes to that of the Differential Calculus.¹

An etherialization of our modern Western Art which took place in the course of the eighteenth century, when the sceptre passed from the art of Architecture to the art of Music and when the *élan* of the Western artistic impulse was thus, as it were, translated from the grosser medium of stone into the subtler medium of sound, has been traced out by Oswald Spengler in one of the most interesting passages of his *magnum opus*.

'About the year 1740, when Euler was beginning to establish the definitive formulation of Functional Analysis, there arose the Sonata, which is the maturest and the highest form of the instrumental style. . . . Therewith begins the reign of Music over all the other arts. In the field of the plastic arts Music banishes statuary and tolerates nothing but the completely musical and finikinly un-Hellenic and counter-Renaissance *Kleinkunst* of porcelain, which was invented at a time when chamber music was winning its way to a position of decisive importance. Whereas the plastic art of the Gothic age is architectonic ornament—rows of human figures—through and through, the plastic art of the Rococo period is a significant example of an art which is only plastic superficially, while in reality it is under the domination of Music—which is its opposite in the circle of the arts—and is speaking in the language of musical form. This reveals the degree to which it is possible for the technique that governs the foreground of artistic life to be in contradiction with the spirit of the world of forms which this technique creates (*pace* the usual aesthetic theory which assumes that spirit and technique stand to each other in the relation of a cause and an effect). Compare the crouching Venus of Coyzevox (A.D. 1686) in the Louvre with her Hellenic forerunner in the Vatican, and you will see the difference between plastic art treated as music and plastic art working in its own right. In Coyzevox's work, the sense of movement, the flow of the lines, and the fluidity that has been imparted to the very essence of the stone—which, like porcelain, has somehow lost its solidity and mass—can be described most aptly in musical terms: staccato, accelerando, andante, allegro. Hence the feeling that somehow the close-grained marble is here out of place. Hence, too, the altogether un-Hellenic reliance on effects of light and shade: a device which corresponds to what has been the leading principle of oil-painting since Titian. The quality which the Eighteenth Century called colour—whether in an engraving or in a drawing or in a group of statuary—really means music. This quality governs the painting of Watteau and Fragonard and the art of the Gobelins and

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

Pastelle. Do we not talk, from that day to this, of "colour-tones" and "tone-colours"? And is this not a recognition of an equivalence finally attained between two arts that are superficially so different? And are not all such designations meaningless in reference to all Hellenic Art? Music even succeeded in recasting, in its own spirit, the Baroque architecture of Bernini. It re-cast it into Rococo; and the transcendental Rococo ornamentation is "played" over by lights which are virtually musical tones, and which perform the function of resolving roofs, walls, arches and everything that is constructive and concrete into polyphony and harmony: an architectural music whose trills, cadences and passaggios carry to the point of identity the assimilation of the architectural semantic of these halls and galleries to the music which was conceived for them. Dresden and Vienna are the homes of this late and shortlived wonderland of chamber music and billowy furniture and mirror-rooms and pastoral poetry and porcelain-groups. This is the last expression of the Western soul: an expression of autumnal ripeness with a touch of autumn sunshine. The Vienna of the Vienna Congress saw it die and disappear.¹

While Spengler's brilliant historical analysis lays bare the process of 'etherialization' in the domain of Art, an illustration of the corresponding process in the domain of Philosophy may be found in a famous passage in which Plato represents Socrates as recounting the history of his own personal intellectual development.

"In my own early days", said Socrates, "I had an extraordinary passion for this branch of study which they call Physical Science. It seemed to me a sublime science to know the causes of all phenomena and to understand the reasons for the genesis and disintegration and existence of each of them. And often I used to rack my brains with such preliminary speculations as whether there is any truth in the theory that living organisms arise out of a kind of fermentation of Heat and Cold; or whether the material instrument of our thought is blood or air or fire; or whether, perhaps, this is a wrong approach to the problem, and we must rather think of the brain as providing the senses of hearing and sight and smell, and think of memory and supposition as arising from the senses, and then think of knowledge as arising at the end of the chain, from memory and supposition when these are brought into a steady focus. And then again I used to speculate on the ways in which all these phenomena pass out of existence, and about the natural history of the stellar universe and of our own planet, until, at the end of it all, I came to the conclusion that I had less gift for conducting this kind of research than any creature in the World. I will give you a conclusive piece of evidence about my state of mind. I was blinded by this kind of research to such an extreme degree that I actually unlearned the things which it had seemed to me—and to others as well—that I had known

¹ Spengler, Oswald: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 318-20. Compare the passage quoted in III. C (iii), below, on pp. 388-9. The same theme is developed by Heard, G., in *The Ascent of Humanity* (London 1928, Cape), pp. 226-8.

quite clearly before. . . . But one day", he went on, "I happened to hear Anaxagoras giving a recitation from a book in which he said that it is Mind which is the directive force in the Universe and the cause of all phenomena; and here I found at last an explanation that delighted me. It seemed to me somehow right that the cause of all phenomena should be Mind; and I thought that, if this were the truth, a directive force like Mind in the Universe must be directing the whole thing and arranging each detail of it to the best possible purpose." "

In the experience here described, which was evidently a turning-point in Socrates' mental history, the Athenian philosopher transferred his interest and attention from the physical to the psychic sphere, from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm, and discovered in the hypothesis of a spiritual cause that clue to an explanation of the mystery of existence which had eluded him so long as he had been working on the hypothesis that the cause was material. Thus Socrates found intellectual salvation; and, in finding that, he found moral salvation as well; for this change in the field of his research involved a simultaneous change in the goal. In the act of transferring his quest from the physical to the psychic sphere, Socrates transcended Metaphysics and made his entry into the realm of Ethics. As appears in the last sentence in the passage just quoted, the scope of his inquiry now broadened out to include the Good as well as the True; and when the problems of Physical Science had thus ceased to trouble him, he became receptive to the promptings of his *δαμόνιον*.

This *δαμόνιον* that spoke to Socrates after he had grown in wisdom² and had put away childish things³ was no other than the still small voice in which Elijah heard at last the Godhead whom he had not seen in the fire and not encountered in the earthquake and not felt in the great and strong wind which had rent the mountains and broken in pieces the rocks.⁴ And this experience, which came alike to the Syriac prophet and to the Hellenic philosopher, was also attained by the Sinic sage Lao-tse,⁵ when he made the same spiritual transit to the Microcosm from the Macrocosm. This Socratic path led Lao-tse to his intuition of Wu Wei: the ultimate principle whose nature cannot be indicated in the language of the discursive reason except by way of verbal paradox. Wu Wei is that utter emptiness which is the acme of plenitude, and that utter immobility which is the acme of motion, and that utter relaxation which is the acme of intensity, and that utter tranquillity which is the ecstasy of creation.

¹ Plato: *Phaedo*, 96-7.

² 1 Sam. ii. 26, and Luke ii. 52.

³ 1 Cor. xiii. 11.

⁴ 1 Kings xix. 11-12.

⁵ Or (perhaps it is more accurate to say) by the anonymous originators of the school of Sinic philosophy that passes under the name of Lao-tse.

These paradoxical lights on the nature of Wu Wei may perhaps be further illuminated by a parable. For Wu Wei was assuredly the unconscious philosophy of the hero in the story of the Chinese pilot and the English crew: a story which, *se non è vero, è ben trovato*.

Some time about the middle of the nineteenth century, there was an English sailing-ship which used to make the voyage to China, year by year, with the same English crew and used to finish the voyage, each time, by going up the Yangtse, three days' sail up stream, with the same Chinese pilot. Now these were the years when, in England, the Industrial Revolution was making rapid headway; and one year the owners scrapped the old sailing-ship and sent their men out on the China voyage this time in a new-fangled steamer instead. The English crew were as pleased as the English owners with their new mechanical toy; and all the way out they speculated about the impression which the steamer would make upon their old friend the Chinese pilot. To navigate a steamer was quite a sensation even for these seamen from Liverpool, where the wheels had been whirring and the steam had been whizzing all around them since their childhood. How, then, would a steam-propelled vessel strike John Chinaman, when he was suddenly confronted with this miracle of mechanical ingenuity which had no parallel or precedent in his own Chinese social background? Would he react like the Queen of Sheba when she had seen all Solomon's wisdom and there was no more spirit in her? Would wonder or terror be his dominant emotion when he was asked to take the wheel of a ship which, with no visible means of propulsion, was able to travel at a greater velocity than any junk or sampan that had ever been rowed by oars or wafted by sails of bamboo matting? As the Englishmen entertained themselves with these speculations at their Chinese friend's expense on the long voyage out (for the China voyage was still long enough, even when it was made under steam), their curiosity was titivated; and as they approached the point off the China coast where the pilot always came on board they had quite a tense feeling of expectancy. When they saw their old friend mounting the ladder from the pilot-boat, they could hardly restrain themselves from calling his attention to the marvellous difference between the new and the old; but they just managed to hold their tongues, for they had decided beforehand that it would be more amusing to let John Chinaman's comments burst out of his mouth spontaneously.

The pilot stepped on to the steamer's deck, made his customary salutation to the Captain, walked to the wheel, and prepared to steer the vessel when she got under way again. 'Now he will have his surprise', thought the Englishmen, 'when he finds the ship moving forward with not a sail bent on the yards. Now he will

realize that there is something about this ship that he has never come across in any ship before.' But it was the Englishmen's fate to have the surprise on this occasion; for, when the engines started, they were astonished to see that not a muscle moved on the Chinese pilot's face, and that he kept his place at the wheel without uttering a word. 'Well, John Chinaman is a cautious fellow', they said as they talked the pilot's conduct over. 'His mind works slowly. He will ruminate all day and tell us his thoughts this evening.' But the day passed, and the evening, and the night, and the pilot still said nothing, but kept his place at the wheel and quietly did his business as he had always done it before. The second day and night passed likewise, and the pilot had still said nothing when the third and last day arrived—the day on which he was to take his leave after having piloted the steamer up river to her destination. At this point the Englishmen were unable to contain themselves any longer. They forgot their resolution to leave it to the pilot to break the silence first; and they asked him outright what impression their magic ship had made on him. 'Oh! This ship?' said the Chinese (and his face remained as expressionless when he spoke as it had been since he had come on board). 'This ship? Why, once upon a time we used to make ships like this in China too; but we gave them up again some time ago. It must be about two thousand years since we used them last!' And, with his customary salutation the pilot stepped down the ladder into the little boat that was waiting to take him off, and rowed away without so much as one glance back at the masterpiece of Western industry which he had treated so cavalierly. In the game of making an impression, which the English seamen had started in a patronizing vein, the Chinese pilot had won a crushing victory.

The point of this legendary Chinese pilot's retort to the English seamen's curiosity is, of course, not the same as the point of the passage from the pen of an authentic English novelist of the same period which has been quoted above. When the imperturbable Chinese conveyed his contempt for a steamship, or for any other piece of clockwork, by affecting to believe that his own people had invented and discarded that sort of thing a long time ago, he did not mean to say that in China they had replaced steam-power by electric-power and electric-power by 'Vril-power' or by some other imaginary device of incomparable potency for harnessing the material forces of Physical Nature in the service of human purposes. In dismissing his English contemporaries' new mechanical toy as a childish thing—one of 'the feeble triflings with Nature' which his own forefathers had perpetrated and afterwards outgrown—he was making a criticism of the Western Industrial Revolution that cuts

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much deeper than the 'meditative wisdom' of Bulwer Lytton's equally fictitious heroine. He meant to say that his own people had anticipated 'the South Sea Barbarians'—and this perhaps by many centuries—in trying their hand at the exploitation of Physical Nature, but that they had been convinced by their experience that this material world was not the place where human beings should lay up their treasure, and had acted upon this conviction by transferring their interest and energy, not from a less efficient to a more efficient industrial technique, but right away from Industrialism to some wholly different sphere.

This mythical transfer of the treasure of the Sinic Civilization in ancient times has a historic parallel, in the present-day Hindu World, in the preaching of the Mahatma Gandhi to his co-religionists and fellow countrymen. In wrestling with the problem of the penetration of India by the Western system of Industrialism and by the Western spirit with which this system goes hand in hand, the Mahatma has come to the conclusion that India must repudiate not only the present-day apparatus of Western technique, but the whole system and spirit for which this apparatus stands, if she is to find her own salvation. This is the doctrine for which he has found a concrete symbol, understood of the people, in the *khaddar*, or hand-woven cloth of hand-spun home-grown cotton-thread, which he urges all Indian men and women to make for their own wear. The return, which he commends, from the elaborateness of the Western technique of spinning and weaving by power-driven machinery to the simplicity of handwork, is not commended in the belief that there is any intrinsically superior virtue in the simpler, as against the more elaborate, method of providing for one of the primary material necessities of human life. The Mahatma's advocacy of hand-spinning is really an advocacy, in symbolic terms, of a transfer—or reversion—of Indian interest and Indian energy from a material to a spiritual plane of action.

The doctrine and the policy for which the genius of Mr. Gandhi has found this particular form of expression are not, of course, peculiar to this Mahatma of this 'post-war' generation. The spirit of Gandhism is such a strong and persistent and prominent element in the *ethos* of Hinduism that even a Western observer of Hindu life who is so incorrigibly Western-minded as Mr. Rudyard Kipling has seized and expressed this trait in the beautiful story of Purun Dass:¹ the competent, sophisticated, and ostensibly Westernized prime minister of an Indian autonomous state under the British Raj who suddenly renounces his whole worldly position at the height of his worldly success, and deliberately adopts the life of a

¹ 'The Miracle of Purun Baghat', in *The Second Jungle Book*.

hermit. The career of this Hindu hero of a Western work of fiction, which was conceived and written before Mr. Gandhi was heard of, actually foreshadows the historic career of the Gujerati Banya, educated in London and established in business in South Africa, who renounced a successful legal practice in order to follow Religion. The path of Purun Bhagat and of Mahatma Gandhi is a path that is familiar in the history of Hinduism and its antecedents. It is the path which the Emperor Açoka trod in his youth when he renounced the use of war as an instrument of his Imperial policy, and again in middle life when he virtually renounced the Imperial throne itself in order to lead the life of a Buddhist monk. And the same path had been trodden by the Emperor's master the prince Gautama, when he renounced throne and wife and child in order to become the Buddha.

Thus the way of life which is being preached in our generation by the Hindu Mahatma Gandhi has a host of precedents and inspirations in the Hindu tradition. Yet, since the Mahatma himself has freely acknowledged his spiritual indebtedness to Christianity as well as to Hinduism, we may perhaps conjecture that his preaching reflects in part the influence of a passage in the New Testament in which the principle of 'etherialization' has received its supreme expression.

'Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?

'Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly father feedeth them. Are ye not much more than they? . . .

'And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin:

'And yet I say unto you that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. . . .

'Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek). . . .

'But seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and His righteousness.'¹

This passage from the Gospel according to Saint Matthew may conclude our chain of quotations to illustrate the wide range and extreme diversity of the spheres in which the phenomenon of 'etherialization' manifests itself. In each sphere, the same fundamental tendency can be discerned under some different aspect. In morphological terms, 'etherialization' appears as a progressive change in organization from complexity towards simplicity; in

¹ Matt. vi. 25-6, 28-9, and 31-3.

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 biological terms, it appears as a *saltus Naturae*¹ from Inanimate Matter to Life; in philosophical terms, as a re-orientation of the mind's eye from the Macrocosm towards the Microcosm; in religious terms, as a conversion of the soul from the World, the Flesh, and the Devil to the Kingdom of Heaven. If we chose to extend our survey further, no doubt we should find different manifestations of 'etherialization' in other spheres again; but the illustrations which we have gathered in already are sufficient for our purpose; for they point the way unmistakably towards the object of our present inquiry.

(d) THE TRANSFERENCE OF THE FIELD OF ACTION

Etherialization has come to our notice as a concomitant of growth; and our illustrations of the phenomenon make it clear that the criterion of growth, for which we are in search, and which we have failed to discover in the progressive and cumulative conquest of the external environment, either human or physical, lies rather in a progressive change of emphasis and transfer of energy and shifting of the scene of action out of this field into another field in which—as we have noted already in passing²—the action of Challenge-and-Response may find an alternative arena. In this other field, challenges do not impinge from outside but arise from within, and victorious responses to challenges do not take the form of surmounting an external obstacle or overcoming an external adversary but manifest themselves, instead, in an inward self-articulation or self-determination. When we watch an individual human being or a human society making successive responses to a succession of challenges, and when we ask ourselves the question whether this particular series of responses to challenges is to be interpreted as a manifestation of growth, we shall arrive at the answer to our question through observing whether, as the series proceeds, the action does or does not tend to shift from the first to the second of the two fields aforesaid. The presence or absence of this tendency gives us our criterion for the presence or absence of growth; and we may add that it is always a tendency that is in question; for, if we look narrowly, we shall find it impossible to cite a case of Challenge-and-Response in which the entire action takes place on either the one or the other of our two fields exclusively. Even in those responses which look like sheer conquests of an external environment at first sight, an element of inward self-determination can always be detected as well and, conversely, there is always some

¹ Pace the dictum that *Natura non facit saltum*: a view which cannot be reconciled with our present insight into the inwardness of natural phenomena.

² See III. B, p. 126, and III. C (i) (a), p. 128, above.

residue of action in the external area, even when the shifting of the scene of action to the internal arena has been carried as far as it will go. The action is never fought solely on one single field in any of those successive bouts of Challenge-and-Response in which the victorious responses accumulate into growths. At the same time, if growth is being achieved, this implies that, in each successive bout, the action on the external field is counting for less, and the action on the internal field for more, in deciding the issue between victory and defeat.

This truth comes out very clearly in those presentations of history in which the attempt is made to describe processes of growth exclusively in terms of the external field from start to finish. Let us take as examples two outstanding presentations in these terms which are each the work of a man of genius: Monsieur Edmond Demolins' *Comment la Route Crée le Type Social*,¹ and *The Outline of History* which has been written by Mr. H. G. Wells.²

The environmentalist thesis is set out by Monsieur Demolins in his preface³ with uncompromising terseness:

'Il existe à la surface du globe terrestre une infinie variété de populations; quelle est la cause qui a créé cette variété? . . . La cause première et décisive de la diversité des races, c'est la route que les peuples ont suivie. C'est la route qui crée la race et qui crée le type social.'

When this provocative manifesto fulfils its purpose by stimulating us to read the substance of the book in which the author's thesis is worked out, we find that he manages quite well so long as he is drawing his illustrations from the life of societies which have remained on the primitive level. In such cases, the state of society can be explained with approximate accuracy and completeness in terms of responses to challenges from the external environment exclusively; but this, of course, is not an explanation of growth, since these primitive societies are now static. Monsieur Demolins is equally successful in explaining the state of the arrested civilizations. He has done a brilliant piece of work in his chapter on the Eurasian Nomads. But conditions are static here again; and this chapter, which comes first in the book, is also an acme, with all the rest of the book for its anti-climax. When the author applies his formula to patriarchal village communities, the reader begins to be uneasy. The explanation seems too plausible, the course too much plain sailing. In the chapters on Carthage and Venice, one feels sure that he has left something out, without being able quite to say

¹ Demolins, E.: *Comment la Route Crée le Type Social*. (Paris, no date, Firmin-Didot, 2 vols.)

² Wells, H. G.: *The Outline of History* (London 1920, Cassell).

³ Demolins, op. cit., vol. i, p. vii.

what this omission may be. When he seeks to explain the Pythagorean philosophy in terms of a portage-trade across the Toe of Italy, one feels tempted to smile, but checks oneself in deference to Monsieur Demolins' impressive ability and disarming enthusiasm. But the chapter entitled 'La Route des Plateaux—Les Types Albanais et Hellène' pulls one up short. Albanian Barbarism and Hellenic Civilization to be unhesitatingly bracketed together, just because their respective exponents happen to have arrived once upon a time at their respective geographical destinations by way of the same *terrain*! And the great human adventure and human experience which we know as Hellenism to be reduced to a kind of epiphenomenal by-product of the Balkan plateaux! In this unlucky chapter, the argument of *Comment la Route Crée le Type Social* confutes itself by a palpable *reductio ad absurdum*. When a civilization goes so far in its growth as the Hellenic Civilization went before it suffered breakdown, an attempt to describe its growth exclusively in terms of responses to challenges from the external environment becomes positively ridiculous.

Mr. Wells, again, seems to lose his sureness of touch when he handles something mature instead of handling something primitive. He is in his element when he is exercising his imaginative powers in order to reconstruct some dramatic episode in some remote æon of Geological Time. His story of how 'these little theriomorphs, these ancestral mammals', survived when the overgrown reptiles went under is almost worthy to rank with the Biblical saga of David and Goliath, and in its own vein it is inimitable. As we read the passage,¹ we look forward eagerly to coming chapters, in which this brilliant mind is to play upon the famous events of human history; but we are destined to experience a certain disappointment. When the little theriomorphs turn into Palaeolithic Hunters or Eurasian Nomads, Mr. Wells, like Monsieur Demolins, still comes up to our expectations; and he does passably well when some individual theriomorph, here and there, develops the personality of a Ts'in She Hwangti, or even the personality of a Nabonidus. But he comes to grief in the recent annals of our own Western history when he has to size up that singularly etherialized theriomorph William Ewart Gladstone. In appreciating—or failing to appreciate—Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Wells has allowed his judgement to be perverted by conscious prejudice and—still graver intellectual crime—by involuntary obtuseness. No doubt, in Mr. Wells's own mind, his passing references to Mr. Gladstone, whether felicitous or not, are only a niggling detail in the great sweep of his historical panorama; and yet, in a sense, they are a touchstone for trying the quality of the

¹ Wells, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-4. The passage is quoted textually in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv. pp. 426-7, below.

whole monumental work. For, in handling Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Wells is handling a great man of his own culture and his own country and his own century; and, to an author with Mr. Wells's imaginative gift, such a subject offers an opportunity of apprehending human character, not by a mere description and classification and docketing of the outer man, but by an intuitive sympathy of one soul with another. Mr. Wells has failed to rise to the occasion here because he has failed to transfer his spiritual treasure, as his narrative proceeds, from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm; and this failure reveals the limitations of the magnificent intellectual achievement which *The Outline of History* represents.¹

Mr. Wells's failure may be measured by Shakespeare's success in solving the same problem. If we arrange the outstanding characters of the great Shakespearian gallery in an ascending order of etherialization, and if we bear in mind the fact that the playwright's technique is to reveal characters by displaying personalities in action, we shall observe that, as Shakespeare moves upward from the lower to the higher levels in our character-scale, he constantly shifts the field of action in which he makes the hero of each drama play his part, and shifts it always in the same direction—giving the Microcosm an ever larger share of the stage and pushing the Macrocosm ever farther into the background. We can verify this fact if we follow our series of Shakespearian heroes from Henry V through Macbeth to Hamlet. The relatively primitive character of Henry V is revealed almost entirely in his responses to challenges from the human environment around him: in his relations with his boon-companions and his relations with his father and in his communication of his own high courage to his comrades-in-arms on the morning of Agincourt, and in his impetuous wooing of Queen Kate. When we pass to Macbeth, we find the scene of action shifting; for Macbeth's relations with Malcolm or Macduff, and even his relations with Lady Macbeth, are equalled in importance, in the action of the play, by the hero's own relations with himself. Finally, when we come to Shakespeare's revelation of Hamlet, we see him allowing the Macrocosm almost to fade away, until the hero's relations with his father's murderers, and with his spent flame Ophelia, and with his outgrown mentor Horatio, become absorbed into the internal conflict which is working itself out in the hero's own soul. In Hamlet, the field of action has been transferred from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm almost completely; and in this masterpiece of Shakespeare's art, as in Aeschylus's Prometheus or in Browning's *Dramatic*

¹ This criticism of *The Outline of History* is made with all respect, in the belief that frankness in criticism is the best evidence of sincerity in appreciation. For a positive appreciation of Mr. Wells's achievement as an historian, see Part I. A, vol. i, pp. 4-5, above.

Monologues, a single actor virtually monopolizes the outward stage, in order to leave the greater scope for action to the surging spiritual forces which this one personality holds within him.

This transference of the field of action, which we discern in Shakespeare's presentation of his heroes when we arrange these fictitious personalities in an ascending order of spiritual growth, can also be discerned in the histories of civilizations. Here too, when a series of responses to challenges accumulates into a growth, we shall find, as this growth proceeds, that the field of action is shifting, all the time, from the external environment of the growing society into the interior of the society's own body social.

For example, we have noticed above, in another connexion, that, when our Western forefathers in France and England succeeded in repelling the onslaught which the Scandinavians made upon Western Christendom in the earliest age of our Western history, one of the means by which they achieved this signal victory over their human environment was by forging the potent military and social instrument of the Feudal System.¹ The creation of the Feudal System was of the essence of the Western response to the Scandinavian challenge; and we may now go on to observe that Feudalism was also the element in this response that caused its momentary equilibrium to overbalance and thus opened the way for the Promethean *élan* of our Western life to pass the dead point that is reached whenever a challenge is successfully met, and to make the transit from one dynamic bout of Challenge-and-Response to another. The social and economic and political differentiation between different classes of society, which Feudalism entailed, set up certain stresses and strains in the structure of the Western Society; and these strains produced the next challenge with which the growing society was confronted. Western Christendom had hardly rested from its labours in beating back the Vikings before it found its next task in the problem of replacing the Feudal System of relations between classes by a new system of relations between sovereign states and their individual citizens.² In this example of two successive challenges in the history of our Western Civilization, the shift of the scene of action from the exterior to the interior field is plainly apparent.

We can observe the same tendency in other passages of history which we have likewise examined already in different contexts.

In Hellenic history, for example,³ we have seen that the earlier challenges in the series of challenges and responses of which Hel-

¹ See Part II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 199-200, above, with the quotations there given from Paul Vinogradoff's *English Society in the Eleventh Century* (Oxford 1908, Clarendon Press). See further *op. cit.*, pp. 88-9.

² For the role of this challenge in Western history, see further III. C(ii)(b), p. 343, below.

³ See Part III. B, pp. 120-2, and the present chapter, section (a), pp. 139-40, above.

lenic history consists all emanated from the external environment. The earliest challenge of all was the human challenge of the highlanders to the lowlanders in Hellas itself. The victorious lowlanders were then exposed to the physical challenge of the Malthusian problem; and they met it by an expansion overseas which exposed them to a new human challenge from the rival Phoenician and Etruscan colonists of the Western Mediterranean and from the indigenous barbarians. This challenge was actually presented when the expansion of the Greeks was checked for some two centuries (*circa* 525-325 B.C.) by the counter-pressure of their non-Greek neighbours¹—a counter-pressure which became so strong that Hellas was thrown on to the defensive and was compelled, in the critical year 480 B.C., to fight for her existence on two fronts simultaneously: against the Carthaginians in Sicily and against Xerxes in Continental European Greece itself. Thereafter, this formidable challenge from the human environment was triumphantly surmounted in the course of the four centuries beginning with Alexander's passage of the Hellespont. Alexander overthrew the Achaemenian Empire, and thereby opened the way for Hellenism to dominate the main body of the Syriac World, and the Egyptian and Babylonian and Indic worlds into the bargain. The Romans overthrew the Carthaginian Empire and gained the upper hand over the European barbarians—thus opening the way for a fresh expansion of Hellenism towards the west on a scale commensurate with the eastward expansion that had been inaugurated by Alexander. Thanks to these triumphs of Macedonian and Roman arms, the Hellenic Society now enjoyed a respite of some five or six centuries—from the latter part of the fourth century B.C. to the early decades of the third century of the Christian Era—during which no serious challenge from the external environment was presented to it. During those centuries, the Hellenic Society was dominant over all other societies—civilizations and barbarisms alike—that came within its range, and dominant over Physical Nature likewise. It was not until the third century of the Christian Era that the external environment obtruded itself upon the Hellenic World once again by presenting simultaneously the economic challenge of diminishing returns from the social institution of the city-state² and a military challenge from the Sasanian Power on the Euphrates and from barbarian war-bands on other frontiers of the Roman Empire. During the five or six preceding centuries, the Hellenic World was practically exempt from challenges emanating from the external environment, either physical

¹ See the quotations from Herodotus and Thucydides on p. 139, above.

² See Rostovtzeff, M.: *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1926, Clarendon Press), *passim*.

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or human, for the first time in Hellenic history. But this did not mean that, during those centuries, the Hellenic Society was exempt from challenges altogether. On the contrary, as we have noted already, these centuries were a period of decline: that is to say, a period in which Hellenism was being confronted by challenges to which it was failing to respond with success. We have seen what these challenges were; and, if we now look into them again, we shall observe that they were all of them new versions of old challenges which had been met victoriously in the external field but had been translated, in that very act, from the environment of the Hellenic Society into the society's own internal life.

For example, the external challenge of Achaemenian and Carthaginian military pressure had stimulated the Hellenic Society in self-defence to forge two potent social and military instruments—the Athenian Navy and the Syracusan Tyrannis—and these two instruments had performed their immediate function by giving Hellas the strength to fling back her external assailants. But the same instruments also produced certain stresses and strains in the internal structure of the Hellenic body social—a competition for hegemony between Athens and Sparta, a degeneration of the Athenians' hegemony over their maritime allies into a tyranny, and a reaction against Syracuse on the part of both her Sicilian barbarian subjects and her Sicilian Greek allies—and these new internal stresses and strains presented the Hellenic Society with a fresh challenge which it failed to meet: a failure which resulted in social breakdown. Thus a challenge which had originally presented itself, in 480 B.C., as an impact of external political forces reappeared in 431 B.C. as a conflict of political forces which were all internal to the Hellenic body social.

In the next chapter of Hellenic history, corresponding effects followed from the expansion of Hellenism, east and west, in the tracks of the Macedonian and the Roman armies. The military victories of Hellenic arms, which exempted Hellenism from any further external challenges for some five or six hundred years, could only achieve this result by transferring the field of Challenge-and-Response from outside to inside the ambit of the Hellenic World. The long military struggles of Hellenism with its external enemies—the Achaemenidae and the Carthaginians and the Barbarians—were brought to a victorious close by Alexander and the Scipios, only to be translated forthwith into the civil wars of rival Macedonian diadochi and rival Roman dictators. The economic competition between the Hellenic and Syriac societies for the mastery of the Western Mediterranean reappeared within the bosom of the Hellenic Society, after the Syriac competitor had succumbed, in the still more devastating domestic warfare between the gangs of

Oriental plantation-slaves and their Siceliot or Roman masters—a warfare which was carried on in the former arena of the Carthagino-Syracusan and Carthagino-Roman Wars.¹ The cultural conflict between Hellenism and the Oriental civilizations—Syriac and Egyptian and Babylonian and Indic—likewise reappeared within the bosom of the Hellenic Society, after the Hellenic culture had successfully asserted its supremacy over the others, as an internal crisis in Hellenic, or Hellenized, souls: the crisis that declared itself in the emergence of Isis-worship and Astrology and the Mahayana and Mithraism and Christianity and a host of other syncretistic religions.

They cease not fighting, East and West,
On the marches of my breast.²

In our own Western history, so far as it has gone up to date, we can detect a corresponding trend. In earlier ages, the most conspicuous of the challenges with which Western Christendom had to contend were presented by the human environment. In its infancy, Western Christendom had to hold its own against the Arab empire-builders of a new Syriac universal state in the Iberian Peninsula and against the abortive Far Western Christian and Scandinavian civilizations along its Atlantic seaboard and against the Continental European barbarians. In the age of the Crusades, when the Western Christians expanded temporarily over the Mediterranean and permanently over the Baltic, they were expanding at the expense of other societies: the Muslims and the Orthodox Christians and the surviving Continental European barbarians. Thereafter, their expansion was temporarily checked by the successful resistance of their victims, and they were subjected in their turn to counter-pressure from formidable alien powers: on one front from the Muscovites and on others from the 'Osmanlis. And after that, again, the West broke out into its latter-day expansion: a movement which is comparable, scale for scale, with the feats performed in Hellenic history by the Macedonians and the Romans, and which has brought the West into collision with the whole of the non-Western World.

Our modern Western expansion has been literally world-wide; and for the time being, at any rate, it has relieved us completely from our old pre-occupation with challenges from alien human societies. The last challenge of the kind in our modern history was presented some two-and-a-half centuries ago, when the 'Osmanlis

¹ For this Hellenic plantation-slavery, see Part II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213-16, and the present chapter, section (b), pp. 169-71, above.

² Housman, A. E.: *A Shropshire Lad*, xxviii. The lines are equally applicable to the religious war in France which was waged in the sixteenth century between Catholicism and Protestantism and which reappeared in the seventeenth century—within the bosom of a victorious Catholic Church which had driven the Huguenots off the field—as the controversy between the Jesuits and the Jansenists.

200 THE PROCESS OF THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS made their second attempt to capture Vienna; and, since the failure of that last great Ottoman offensive in A.D. 1683, *Homo Occidentalis* has forgotten how it feels to face a serious menace from an external human force. Since that day he has constantly inspired this feeling in others, without ever again experiencing it himself, until, in these latter days, he has attained a position of world-wide dominance which is absolute on the economic plane and preponderant on the political plane, while even on the cultural plane it is at any rate unrivalled.

The only semblance of an effective external challenge which has been presented to *Homo Occidentalis* since the 'Osmanlis raised their siege of Vienna in 1683 has been the challenge of Bolshevism, which has confronted the Western World since Lenin and his companions made themselves masters of the *ci-devant* Russian Empire in the second Russian revolution of 1917. Yet Bolshevism, for all its breathings of fire and slaughter, has not yet seriously threatened the ascendancy of our Western Civilization, as we know it, outside the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.; and even if one day the Communist dispensation were to fulfil the Russian Communists' hopes by spreading from Russia over the whole face of the planet, a world-wide triumph of Communism over Capitalism would not mean the overthrow of the present world-wide supremacy of the Western Civilization by an alien culture, since Communism, unlike Islam, is itself derived from a Western source. In its origin, the Communist doctrine is a nineteenth-century Western criticism of the nineteenth-century Western social order; and the adoption of this exotic Western doctrine as the revolutionary creed of twentieth-century Russia, so far from signifying that the ascendancy of Western culture is in jeopardy, really shows how potent this ascendancy has come to be.¹

There is a profound ambiguity in the nature of Bolshevism which is manifested in Lenin's career. Did Lenin come to fulfil or to destroy the work of Peter the Great? And does the substitution of Lenin's for Peter's name in the translation of Petersburg into Lenin-grad signify that Lenin has made or marred the fortune of the city which Peter founded? In re-transferring the capital of Russia from an eccentric position on the western threshold of the country to a

¹ The truth that the Russians could not succeed in establishing an ascendancy over the Western World except in so far as they had previously succeeded in Westernizing their own way of life, was already apparent to Gibbon, as may be seen from a passage in the 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West' at the end of chapter xxxviii of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*:

'Europe is secure from any future irruption of barbarians; since, before they can conquer, they must cease to be barbarous. Their gradual advances in the science of war would always be accompanied, as we may learn from the example of Russia, with a proportionable improvement in the arts of peace and civil policy; and they themselves must deserve a place among the polished nations whom they subdue.'

central position in the interior,¹ Lenin seems to be proclaiming himself the successor of the Arch-Priest Avvakum² and the Old Believers and the Slavophiles. Here, we feel, is a prophet of Holy Russia who has been great enough to gather up into his own career and personality the whole reaction of the Russian soul against the Western Civilization—a reaction which had been gathering momentum during the two centuries that had passed since the ordeal of Westernization was first forced upon Russia by Peter. And yet, when Lenin casts about for a creed to express this spiritual revolt, he does not find an anti-Western creed of Russian origin. There is a significant touch of irony in the fact that he is constrained to arm Russia for her fight against the West with a borrowed Western weapon, and to take his indictment of the Western Civilization at second-hand from a Western critic: the German Jew Karl Marx.

It is true that the Marxian creed comes nearer to a total repudiation of the Western order of society than any other creed of Western origin which a twentieth-century Russian prophet could have adopted. And this explains the paradox that a Utopia which was conceived in a Western environment, as a protest against the industrialization of Western life, should have been erected for the first time into an officially established social régime in a non-Western country in which the process of Westernization had hardly gone skin-deep, and in which the solvent of Industrialism had not yet begun to disintegrate the primitive agrarian economy which was the traditional economic basis of the Russian Society. It was the negative and not the positive element in the Marxian creed—its denials and not its affirmations—that made it congenial to a Russian revolutionary mind; and this explains why in Russia, in 1917, the exotic Western apparatus of capitalism was successfully overthrown by the equally exotic Western doctrine of Communism. This explanation is borne out by the metamorphosis which the Marxian philosophy appears to be undergoing in the Russian atmosphere. For in Russia, since 1917, we seem to see Marxism turning, before our eyes, into an emotional and intellectual substitute for Orthodox Christianity, with Marx for its Moses and Lenin for its Messiah and their collected works for the Scriptures of this new atheistic Russian Church Militant. In this apparent metamorphosis of Marxism, it looks, at first glance, as though, in Russia, the spirit of the intrusive Western Civilization had been overcome at last, and the indigenous spirit of the Orthodox Christian Civilization had reasserted itself. But the phenomena take on a different aspect when we turn our

¹ For this oscillation of the capital of modern Russia between Moscow and Petersburg, see Part II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 157-8, above, and Part IX, below.

² See *The Life of the Archpriest Avvakum, by himself*, translated by J. E. Harrison and Hope Mirrlees (London 1924, Woolf).

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attention from faith to works, and examine what Lenin and his successors have actually been doing to the Russian people.

When we ask ourselves what is the significance of the Five Years' Plan, we are constrained to answer that, whether the Plan be destined, in the long run, to succeed or to fail, there can be no mistake about its intention. This is an attempt to mechanize agriculture as well as industry and transportation, to change a nation of peasants into a nation of mechanics, to transform the old Russia into a new America. In other words, it is a latter-day attempt at Westernization which is so ambitious and so radical and so ruthless that it puts Peter the Great's work into the shade. If Peter could have had foreknowledge of this Bolshevik Five Years' Plan, he would have gasped. 'I only chastised these miserable Russians with whips', he would have exclaimed, 'but my audacious successors are chastising them with scorpions! I only scratched the surface of Russian life, but these giants, with their mighty engines, are ploughing up the Russian soil and pulling up the tree of indigenous Russian culture by the roots!' Thus, willy-nilly, the prophet Lenin and his successors are playing Balaam's and not Jonah's part. They are working—and this with demoniac energy—to ensure the triumph in Russia of the very civilization which they are denouncing in the World at large. No doubt they dream of creating a new society which will be American in equipment but Russian in soul. Yet this is a strange dream to be dreamed by statesmen for whom a materialistic and deterministic interpretation of History is an article of faith! On Marxian principles, we must expect that, if a Russian peasant is taught to do the work and live the life of an American mechanic, the peasant will also learn to think as the mechanic thinks and to feel as he feels and to desire what he desires. And in this tug-of-war which we are witnessing in Russia between the ideals of Lenin and the methods of Ford we may look forward to seeing the modern ascendancy of the Western over the Russian Civilization paradoxically confirmed.

The ambiguity in Lenin's career, which we have just analysed, is likewise apparent in the career of the Russian prophet's Hindu contemporary and compeer Gandhi, whose involuntary furtherance of the same ubiquitous process of Westernization is still more ironical. The Hindu prophet sets out to sever the threads of cotton which have entangled India in the activities of the Western World. 'Spin and weave our Indian cotton', he preaches, 'with your Indian hands. Do not any longer clothe yourselves in the products of Western power-looms; and do not, I conjure you, seek to drive those alien products out of the Indian market by setting up on Indian soil new Indian power-looms on the Western pattern!' This

message, which is Gandhi's real message,¹ is not accepted by Gandhi's countrymen. They revere the spirit of the saint, but they only follow his guidance in so far as he resigns himself to leading them along the path of Westernization. And thus we see Gandhi to-day promoting a political movement with a Western programme—the transformation of India into a sovereign independent parliamentary state—and with a Western procedure (the whole Western political apparatus of conferences, resolutions, votes, platforms, newspapers, and publicity). In this political campaign, the prophet's most effective—though not his most obtrusive—supporters are those very Indian industrialists who have done the most to defeat the prophet's real mission—the men who have acclimatized the technique of Western industrialism in India itself. Their factory chimneys, which the prophet, in his heart of hearts, must regard with dismay, rise almost within view of his retreat at Sabarmati.² Stranger still, Western thoughts colour and inform the prophet's own mind. He seeks inspiration in Western works of philosophy and devotion at least as much as in the Hindu Scriptures³.

In this spiritual travail of a Gandhi and a Lenin in our generation, we can watch the impact of the Western Civilization upon Hinduism and upon Russian Orthodox Christendom in the act of transformation from an external encounter between the Western Society and its neighbours into an inner experience of a Westernized World. Strive as they will to win a decisive victory for an anti-Western reaction, the Hindu and the Russian zealot of these latter days can only succeed in giving an impetus to the very process of Westernization against which they are up in arms. The life and energy with which they inspire their anti-Western 'holy wars' is actually drawn—and this is the secret of its vigour—from a Western source; and thus, in the crucible of these ardent souls, an anti-Western movement is transmuted into a new manifestation of the spiritual force against which it is directed. A Gandhi and a Lenin find it impossible to take spiritual action without being moved by the spirit of the Western Civilization; and, conversely, the Western-born heirs of this Western Civilization find it impossible to be indifferent to the thoughts and feelings and acts of a Gandhi and a Lenin. We are aware that, in the titanic careers of these two Janus-faced figures, our own Western destinies are involved, as they were never involved in the careers of a Sivaji or an Ivan the Terrible or a

¹ For Gandhi's role as a preacher of simplification and etherialization, see pp. 190-1, above.

² For the discord between Ancient and Modern in the architecture of the City of Ahmadabad, see Toynbee, A. J.: *A Journey to China* (London 1931, Constable), ch. xxi, pp. 140-4.

³ For the Christian element in the Mahatma Gandhi's inspiration, see p. 191, above.

Saladin or a Suleymān or any other champion of an alien civilization who has taken up the challenge of our Western power without being touched, in his own soul, by the influence of the Western spirit. It is as though this Western spirit were a kind of psychic electricity which had now electrified the whole of Mankind with such effect that there could no longer be any exertion of human psychic force which was not either a positive or a negative charge of this all-pervasive Western current.

This change which is signalized in the careers of Gandhi and Lenin is not confined to the relations of the West with the two once alien societies that have now given those two great personalities to a Westernized World. The transformation of an external conflict between two separate societies into an internal conflict in the bosom of one of the two, when this one has succeeded in absorbing the other into its own body social, is a phenomenon which might be illustrated alternatively from the history of the relations between the modern West and any of the other societies with which the West has come into contact in the course of its world-wide expansion in these latter days. In fact, the virtual elimination of external challenges emanating from the human environment, which has been one of the remarkable features of our Western history during the last two hundred and fifty years, has been followed by the presentation of equivalent challenges in the internal life of a Western Society which has expanded into an oecumenical system. On the economic plane, one of these transmuted challenges is the new problem arising from the differences in standards of living which continue to divide different fractions of Mankind after they have been brought into economic relations with one another by the world-wide nexus of our modern Western commerce and industry and finance. On the political plane, the challenge of 'holy wars' waged by alien civilizations against Western Christendom has been transmuted, since the triumph of the West over these external adversaries, into a Western problem of 'imperialism' and 'colonial administration'. On the cultural plane, the conflict between Western culture and alien cultures has been transmuted into a conflict, within the bosom of a Western-made 'Great Society', between different classes and different races.

Corresponding transmutations of external into internal challenges have followed the triumph of the Western Civilization over its material environment—a victory which it has won with its left hand while its right hand has been occupied in mastering its human neighbours. In this material sphere, the process of transference comes out very clearly in the recent economic history of Great Britain: the country in which the modern Western Industrialism

first emerged a century-and-a-half ago in order to spread thereafter far and wide over the World, as molten lava flows abroad over the landscape from the crater through which it has welled up out of the depths of the Earth.

In England, the first round of the stubborn contest between Man and Physical Nature out of which the new force of Industrialism arose was fought under the same conditions as the first bout in the mythical wrestling-match at Peniel between Jacob and the angel,¹ when Jacob's superhuman adversary immobilized the human combatant by putting out of joint the hollow of his thigh. On the eve of the triumph of Man over Physical Nature which inaugurated the Industrial Revolution, the pioneers of Industrialism in England found themselves caught and held by the geographical location of the raw materials and the potential sources of mechanical power which they were striving to make subject to their own human wills. The potters were constrained to establish their potteries where they happened to find the beds of potter's clay, and the iron smelters their furnaces at some half-way house between the deposits of the ore from which their metal was to be extracted and the seams of the coal by which the operation was to be performed. Even the textile manufacturers were constrained to aline their mills along the foot of the Pennines, in order to tap the streams descending from the fells for water-power to drive their machinery.² At this stage, Physical Nature was able to dictate to Man the place where he should try conclusions with her; and the industrial map of England was governed by the geological and physiographical map *a priori*.

In the next stage, Man triumphed over Nature as Jacob overcame the angel at the breaking of the day, when he refused to let him go unless he would give him his blessing. In this second round of the contest, the fathers of Industrialism solved the problem of transportation and thereby liberated their industrial operations from their previous bondage to the vagaries of Geology and Physiography.

'Where does that there clay come from?' asked Edwin. For not merely was he honestly struck by a sudden new curiosity, but it was meet for him to behave like a man now, and to ask manly questions.

'Runcorn,' said 'the Sunday' scornfully. 'Can't you see it painted all over the boat?'

'Why do they bring clay all the way from Runcorn?'

'They don't bring it from Runcorn. They bring it from Cornwall. It comes round by sea—see?' He laughed.

'Who told you?' Edwin roughly demanded.

¹ Genesis xxxiii. 24-32.

² For the original location of the industrial districts in England, see Part II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 60-4, above.

'Anybody knows that!' said 'the Sunday' grandly, but always maintaining his gay smile.

'Seems devilish funny to me,' Edwin murmured, after reflection, 'that they should bring clay all that round-about way just to make crocks of it here. Why should they choose just *this* place to make crocks in? I always understood . . .'

'Oh! Come on!' 'the Sunday' cut him short. 'It's blessed well one o'clock and after!' . . .

'The Sunday' was satisfied with his bit of accidental knowledge. Edwin was not. Edwin wanted to know why, if the clay for making earthenware was not got in the Five Towns, the Five Towns had become the great seat of the manufacture. Why were not pots made in the South, where the clay came from?¹

We know, of course, the answer to this question which an English novelist, born and bred in the Staffordshire potteries in the latter part of the nineteenth century, has placed in the mouth of one of his characters whom he presents to his readers as his own fellow-townsmen and contemporary. Long before the end of the nineteenth century, the invention of the steamship and the railroad had made it possible for the potter to fetch his clay, and the iron-master his ore, and the textile-manufacturer his raw wool and cotton, not only from the other end of England but from the very ends of the Earth, and to carry the stuff so cheaply that the cost of transportation did not wipe out or even perceptibly diminish the manufacturer's profits. And why—as Edwin Clayhanger went on to ask—did Muhammad prefer to perform the *tour de force* of making the mountain come to him instead of taking the line of lesser resistance and migrating, himself, to the mountain? 'Why were not pots made in the South, where the clay came from?' Why had the Five Towns in Staffordshire not only become, but remained, the great seat of manufacture? The answer was that, in the course of a century, as industrial technique had gone from strength to strength, the relative importance of the two fundamental factors in industry had gradually shifted. In the eighteenth century, the dominant factor in pot-making had been the clay, which dictated to the potter the place where he should set up shop. A century later, the dominion had passed from Physical Nature to Man, until the site of the Potteries had come to be determined no longer by the location of the raw material, but rather by the local presence or absence of the human skill that fashioned the clay into pots. In the geographical nexus between the clay and the potter, the original relations were thus actually inverted. In the eighteenth century, the potter had gone to Staffordshire to find his clay; in the nineteenth

¹ Arnold Bennett: *Clayhanger*, Bk. I, chs. (i) and (ii).

century, when the Staffordshire clay-beds had become utterly inadequate to supply the needs of an industry which had increased the scale of its operations in the meantime by a hundred or a thousand fold, the clay was coming to Staffordshire from Cornwall to find its potter. And thus the Five Towns remained the great seat of the manufacture for a different reason from that which had caused them to become the seat of the manufacture originally. In the beginning, the lode-stone had been the clay; in the next chapter of the story, the magnetic power had come to be transferred from the inanimate clay to the human skill which the clay had originally attracted to itself.

If we now turn our attention from the industry of clay to the industries of metal and of fibre, a further chapter in the history of Industrialism unfolds itself. For when once human skill has established its ascendancy over raw materials and over mechanical driving force as the dominant factor in industrial production, it is only a matter of time for the volatile human spirit to break loose from its obsolete material moorings and to blow where it lists.

In the metal industry in England, this tendency has been perceptible since the close of the General War of 1914-18, as the corollary of a technical change: the transfer of plant and capital from the production of the old-fashioned staple heavy-work to that of newfangled implements—such as motor-cars—in which the sheer bulk of mineral consumed in the productive process counts for very much less in proportion to the amount of the human skill which is brought into play. In 1931, it was remarked by a sharp-sighted French observer of English social life that

'One can already perceive a spontaneous movement of population from the north of England towards the south, from the mining areas towards London and the Thames Valley. This tentative migration may be considered as the first visible after-effect of the attack on the coal monopoly. In the nineteenth century the centre of gravity of the British economic structure was irresistibly attracted towards the coal basins of the north; the twentieth century may produce a new equilibrium, less strictly dependent on the Black Country.'

In the cotton industry—which operates with a raw material that is vastly lighter than that employed in even the most finikin lines of our 'post-war' metallurgy—the liberation of human skill from the bondage of gross matter has become virtually complete. In this industry, the skill once mobilized by water-power in Lancashire and New England has been able to attract to itself, from the ends of the Earth, a raw material which cannot be produced at all by the local soil and climate of New England or Lancashire themselves;

¹ Siegfried, A.: *England's Crisis* (London 1931, Cape), pp. 125-6.

and, in the next chapter of this story, the diffusion of the skill which used to be concentrated in the classic seats of the industry has been equally wide in its range. At the present time, the raw cotton is produced in almost every part of the tropical and sub-tropical belt in which the soil and water required for cotton cultivation can be found; and at the same time the World's cotton-crop is spun into cotton-thread and woven into cotton cloth in mills that are no longer confined to the purlieus of Manchester or Lowell, but have sprung up like mushrooms—east and west and north and south—round Kobe and Shanghai and Ahmadabad and on the Polish plains and on the piedmont of North Carolina.

In this thoroughgoing diffusion of the cotton industry, we have a classic instance of a challenge from the Physical Environment being met and mastered triumphantly by *Homo Faber*. And the result which has been attained in textiles to-day (and this in every stage of the economic process, from the production of the raw material to the marketing of the finished product) seems likely to be attained in other industries to-morrow. In fact, we may look forward to a time when Industry of all kinds will have shaken itself free from the ties of locality and will have solved the technical problem of performing its operations at any point on the surface of the Earth at which it may elect to instal itself. But the plight of the cotton industry in the very hour of its technical victory plainly shows that the old contest between Man and Physical Nature has not really been transcended, but has rather been transmuted into a new conflict between Man and Man.

The pioneers of the cotton industry wrestled with, and eventually triumphed over, the technical difficulties of cultivating the cotton plant, and of transporting the cotton crop from field to mill, and of carding and spinning and weaving the cotton fibre by mechanical power; but these very triumphs in the technical sphere have created new problems in the realm of human relations. The extension of the area of cotton-cultivation has produced a competition between the cotton-growers of America and Asia and Africa to supply the mills; the diffusion of the technique of cotton-manufacture has produced another competition between the manufacturers of Great Britain and New England and North Carolina and Japan and China and India and Poland to supply the world-market; and, over and above these local rivalries, a conflict of interests has arisen between Capital and Labour, and between Producers and Consumers. These human problems have been bequeathed to the latter-day heirs of the cotton industry by their predecessors, from whose victories over Physical Nature they have also inherited the solutions of those technical problems which used to obsess the industry in its infancy.

In this history of our modern Western cotton industry we can detect, once again, as we follow out a sequence of challenges and responses, the tendency for the scene of action to shift from the external environment to the internal life of the society or the individual that is the subject of the experience.

The self-same tendency appears in the history of the technique of communications, which has latterly played so important a role in our modern Western industrial development.

The invention of sailing-ships overcomes the barrier of the estranging sea; the invention of twin-screw steamships liberates the navigator from his bondage to the winds, even as an auxiliary or emergency source of driving-power. Again, the invention of the wheel enables Man to transport overland a load of greater bulk and weight than the maximum that he is capable of carrying on his own shoulders, while the invention of railways enables him to increase the load almost *ad infinitum* and to whirl it across the breadth of a continent almost as easily as a ship could waft it across the breadth of an ocean. Tunnels pierce the barriers interposed by mountains; six-wheeled motor-cars and caterpillar-tractors skim over quaking bogs and yielding sands; and finally aeroplanes make transportation wholly independent of sea and land and mountain and swamp and desert and all the other physical obstacles by which the movement of goods and persons was impeded so long as it was tied down to the aquatic and terrestrial surface of the globe. More wonderful still, we have now discovered means of communication between human intelligences which render the transportation of human bodies superfluous. For the arts of writing and telegraphy and telephony and television, and the organization of the newspaper press and the broadcasting radio, have lengthened the range of the human eye and ear and voice from a few miles or a few yards to the great circle of the Earth's circumference. The age-long human ambition to 'annihilate distance' has been realized at last in our day; but here again, in the act of overcoming a challenge presented by the external environment, we have evoked a new challenge in the internal field of our own social life. We have 'annihilated distance' by equipping our physical movements and our physical senses with a vastly enhanced material 'drive'; and this technical triumph—which has been achieved substantially within the last hundred and fifty years—has given 'the traffic problem' a wholly new meaning.

Let us call up in our minds the now fast-fading picture of the pre-mechanical road. This antique road is thronged with all kinds of primitive wheeled vehicles: wheel-barrows, and rickshaws, and ox-carts, and dog-carts, with the stage-coach as the *chef-d'œuvre* of muscular traction, and with a foot-propelled bicycle here and there

as a portent of things to come. Since this road is already rather crowded, there are a certain number of collisions; but nobody minds, because nobody is hurt and the traffic is scarcely interrupted. For the fact is that these collisions are not serious. They cannot be serious, because the traffic is so slow, and the muscle-power—human, bovine, equine—by which the vehicles are propelled is so feeble, that these vehicles can collide and rebound without mishap. 'The traffic problem' on this road is not the problem of avoiding collisions, but the problem of hauling the loads and covering the distances. Accordingly, there is no sort of traffic-regulation: no policeman on point duty, and no system of signal-lights.

And now let us turn our eyes to the familiar road of to-day on which a mechanized traffic hums and roars. On this road, the problems of speed and of haulage have been solved, as is testified by this motor-lorry with its train of trucks that comes lumbering along with the momentum of a charging elephant, and by this sports-car that goes whizzing past with the swiftness of a bee or a bullet. But, by the same token, the problem of collisions has become 'the traffic problem' *par excellence*. For while the chauffeur commands a traction-power which puts the teamster out of the running so long as the chauffeur is competent and sober, a fool or a knave at the driving-wheel of a motor-vehicle is far more dangerous both to the public and to himself than a fool or a knave on the driver's seat of a hay-wagon. Hence, on this latter-day road, the crucial challenge is no longer technological but psychological. Instead of being concerned to transport larger and heavier loads at higher speeds, we are rather concerned nowadays to avoid collisions by regulating the traffic: by introducing a lighting-system, by teaching the drivers what the signals mean, and by having the road patrolled by police in order to see that these signals are obeyed. The old challenge of physical distance has been transmuted into a new challenge of human relations between drivers who have learned how to 'annihilate distance' and have thereby put themselves in constant danger of annihilating one another.

This change in the nature of the traffic problem on our roads has, of course, a symbolic as well as a literal significance. It typifies the general change that has occurred over the whole range of our modern Western social life since the emergence of the two dominant social forces of the age: the economic force of Industrialism and the political force of Democracy.¹ Owing to the extraordinary progress which our latter-day inventors have made in harnessing the energies of Physical Nature and in organizing the concerted action of millions

¹ For the rise of these two forces to their present position of supremacy, see Part I. A, *init.*

of human beings, everything that is now done, for good or evil, in our society is inevitably done with a stupendous 'drive'; and this has made the material consequences of individual acts far greater and the moral responsibility of the agents far heavier than these used to be under our previous social régime.¹ It may be that in every age of every society some moral issue is always the challenge that is fateful for the society's future; but, however that may be, there is no doubt, in the case in point, that it is a moral challenge and no longer a technical challenge that confronts our own society in our own day.

'In the present-day thinker's attitude towards what is called mechanical progress, we are conscious of a changed spirit. Admiration is tempered by criticism; complacency has given way to doubt; doubt is passing into alarm. There is a sense of perplexity and frustration, as in one who has gone a long way and finds he has taken the wrong turning. To go back is impossible: how shall he proceed? Where will he find himself if he follows this path or that? An old exponent of applied mechanics may be forgiven if he expresses something of the disillusion with which, now standing aside, he watches the sweeping pageant of discovery and invention in which he used to take unbounded delight. It is impossible not to ask: Whither does this tremendous procession tend? What, after all, is its goal? What its probable influence upon the future of the Human Race?

'The pageant itself is a modern affair. A century ago it had barely taken form, and had acquired none of the momentum which rather awes us to-day. The Industrial Revolution, as everybody knows, was of British origin; for a time our island remained the Factory of the World. But soon, as was inevitable, the change of habit spread; and now every country, even China, is become more or less mechanized. The cornucopia of the engineer has been shaken over all the Earth, scattering everywhere an endowment of previously unpossessed and unimagined capacities and powers.

'Beyond question many of these gifts are benefits to Man, making Life fuller, wider, healthier, richer in comforts and interests, and in such happiness as material things can promote. But we are acutely aware that the engineer's gifts have been and may be grievously abused. In some there is potential tragedy as well as present burden. Man was ethically unprepared for so great a bounty. In the slow evolution of morals he is still unfit for the tremendous responsibility it entails. The command of Nature has been put into his hands before he knows how to command himself.'

These moving words propound a question which has been struggling to find expression in all our hearts; and they are words spoken with authority, for they were uttered by the President of

¹ On this point see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs: 1928* (London 1929, Milford), pp. 7-8.

the British Association for the Advancement of Science in his opening address at the hundred-and-first annual meeting of that historic body.¹ Is the new social driving-power of Industrialism and Democracy to be employed in the great constructive task of organizing a Westernized World into an oecumenical society in which the new forces may find free play to work on a world-wide scale for the benefit of all Mankind? Or are we going to turn our new power to our own destruction by putting its unprecedentedly powerful 'drive' into a number of ancient anti-social institutions—into War and Tribalism and Slavery and Property—at the risk of turning these once not wholly lethal vehicles of evil into veritable Juggernaut cars? This is the latter-day traffic-problem of our Western Civilization in its inward spiritual essence.²

The foregoing analysis of the latest chapter in our Western history incidentally throws light on a phenomenon in Egyptian history which we have already noted for a fact without having hit upon the explanation: the ambiguous significance of the Pyramids as monuments of the breakdown as well as the triumph of the Egyptian Civilization.³ This ironic ambiguity is due, as we can perceive now by analogy, to a shift which occurred, in the Pyramid-Builders' age, in both the theatre and the nature of the challenge in which the Egyptian Society's destiny was at stake.

When we inquired into the genesis of the Egyptian Civilization,⁴ we found that it had been brought to birth by the audacity and

¹ The full text of Sir Alfred Ewing's address on this occasion, which was delivered in York on the 31st August, 1932, will be found in *The Times* of the 1st September, 1932.

² The same simile of the traffic on the road has been drawn, with the same application, by Professor Gilbert Murray in a speech delivered in 1932 at the Annual General Meeting of the English National Federation of Women's Institutes:

'This is a time of rapid change. The ends of the Earth are being brought closer together. News travels all round the World in a few moments. People travel ever so much more and ever so much faster than they did in our grandmothers' time. The consequence is that all the civilized nations are crowded close together and constantly treading on each other's toes and, as always happens in a crowd, everyone has to be careful and considerate or else there will be trouble.

'Think of any of our big towns—Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, or London itself: think of the great stretches of country round them which used to be open fields or moors and which are now streets full of traffic. They used to be open fields and moors. Our fathers and grandfathers could gallop over those moors on horseback, could tear about wherever they liked, without any danger of running into other people or knocking them down. They need hardly ever think of anyone but themselves. The horse only went about twelve miles an hour and there was plenty of room in every direction. But now those moors have become crowded streets. People are driving about them in motors which go at thirty or forty miles an hour and there is no spare room at all. They have to be very careful indeed and always thinking about other people. They have to have red signs and green signs and policemen at point duty to direct them. They have to be very obedient. And even so they kill some four thousand people a year!

'That is exactly the change that has taken place in the World. The World has become crowded: people are moving about faster and faster and the engines that carry them are terribly powerful. There are all sorts of disastrous accidents waiting for us, unless we move with great care and particularly care for others. And when I say care for others I mean people other than ourselves, classes other than our own class and nations other than our own nation.'

³ See the present chapter, section (a), p. 153, above, as well as I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 141-3.

⁴ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 302-15, above.

determination of pioneers who had met the challenge of desiccation on the Afrasian Steppe by plunging into the forbidding and apparently impenetrable jungle-swamp of the Lower Nile Valley and turning the formless wilderness into a pattern of ditches and embankments and fruitful fields. This heroic victory of human wills over the wantonness of Physical Nature demanded not only a sustained individual courage, but also a continuous co-operative effort; such co-operation demanded discipline; and the discipline through which the fathers of the Egyptian Civilization won the day in their battle with the jungle-swamp was purchased at the price of subordinating the wills of the rank and file to the wills of a few outstanding leaders. Thus the physical ordeal out of which the Egyptian Civilization emerged, like the human ordeal which Western Christendom underwent in the Scandinavian onslaught, left a mark on the internal articulation of the growing society in addition to the change which it produced in the society's relations with its external environment.¹ By the time when this Egyptian ordeal came to an end, the water and soil and vegetation of the Lower Nile Valley were subject to the wills of human beings; and at the same time the great majority of these human victors, in the very act of subduing Physical Nature, had themselves fallen into subjection to a small minority of their own human kind who happened to be endowed with exceptional power of command or with exceptional intellectual ability.

This differentiation in authority and knowledge and wealth and prestige between the ruling minority and the subject majority in the Egyptian Society of 'the Old Kingdom' went to far greater lengths than the corresponding differentiation between the social positions of different classes in medieval Western Christendom under the feudal régime. The command which the King of the Two Lands, and his hierarchy of administrators and technicians and priests, had acquired over the wills and imaginations and actions and lives of the Egyptian peasantry was indeed as absolute as the control which he had established, through this command of 'man-power', over the soil and water of the Land of Egypt itself. In other words, the challenge originally presented to Man in the encounter between Man and Nature in the Lower Nile Valley had been transmuted into a challenge which found its arena—and demanded its response—in the internal articulation of the new-born Egyptian Society.

The destinies of the Egyptian Civilization now turned upon the

¹ For the internal effect of the Western Christian response to the Scandinavian challenge upon the structure of the Western Christian Society, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 199-200, and the present chapter, p. 196, above.

question of how the royal lord and master of Egypt and the Egyptians would use his enormous power. Would he respond to this new challenge, which was a moral challenge, in the spirit of Prometheus or in the spirit of Zeus?¹ Would he employ the material power and the 'man-power' at his command in order to improve the lot of the peasantry who had made him master of the material wealth of Egypt when they had placed at his disposal their own human wills? Would he lead them onward and upward to the level of the well-being that had been attained already by the King himself and by his handful of peers? Or would the dizzy height of his pinnacle upset the King of Egypt's moral and intellectual balance? As he surveyed his Land of Egypt and saw that it was very good, would he yield to the illusion that he, and he only, was its creator? Would he forget that, without the disciplined co-operation of a docile peasantry, the King alone could have created nothing? And would he treat the wealth and power which was the co-operative product of an entire society as though it were his private property, to be devoted to his own gratification and glorification in this life and to his immortalization in the life to come? Would he act like Zeus, whose plan of empire, when first he mounted on his father's throne, was to call the Gods—his superhuman companions in arms in his victorious struggle with the Titans—and to give each one of these elect his place and honours, but to have no care of unhappy Man?²

Under the first and the second of the dynasties that ruled the Egyptiac World after the union of the two crowns, this fateful question remained open; but under Snefru, the last king of the Third Dynasty, and his successors of the Fourth Dynasty, it received its answer; and in this answer it was the voice of Zeus and not the voice of Prometheus that made itself heard; for those kings were the Pyramid-Builders;³ and the pyramids have immortalized these autocrats, not as ever-living gods, but as never-to-be-forgotten grinders of the faces of the poor. In the long run, the Egyptian peasantry has had its revenge upon King Cheops and King Chephren; for it handed down their evil reputation through the centuries, until these Egyptiac folk-tales found their way at last into Hellenic literature in the immortal work of Herodotus. In our own age, when the society that produced the Pyramids has long been extinct, their indestructible piles commemorate still the endurance of the peasants who built them and the tyranny of the sovereigns who caused them to be set up.

¹ For the myth of Prometheus and an essay in the interpretation of it, see Part III. B, above.

² Aeschylus: *Prometheus Vincit*, ll. 230-4, quoted above in Part III. B, on pp. 114-15.

³ The builders of the three classic Pyramids at Gizah were King Khufu (Cheops), King Khafre (Chephren), and King Menkaure (Mycerinus).

The spirit that inspired—or, rather, exacted—the building of the Pyramids possessed the Egyptiac Society ever after, and this with fatal consequences. For the power and knowledge which the creation of Egypt out of the wilderness had placed in a minority's hands could only have fructified if its benefits had been shared by this minority with the majority in the next chapter of Egyptiac history. When this new challenge evoked the response of Zeus, and not the response of Prometheus, from the epigoni of the pioneers, the penalty was paid in the first instance by the mass of the people, and in consequence by the society as a whole, and therefore ultimately also by the ruling minority itself. The building of the Pyramids seems to have broken the spirit of the Egyptian peasantry; and the cruel experience of that generation left its impress upon the *éthos* of their descendants, as though the weight of the piles which the fathers had been compelled to raise were weighing, *in saecula saeculorum*, upon the children's souls.¹ This peasantry degenerated into a sullen agrarian proletariat; and the ruling element in the Egyptiac Society degenerated, on its side, into a 'dominant minority' which ruled by repression because it had lost the art of ruling by leadership.² In losing the art of leadership, the Egyptiac 'Heirs of the Kingdom'³ lost, into the bargain, their initiative and their originality in all their activities. The *éthos* of the Egyptiac Society during its long-drawn-out decline displays a rigidity and a conventionality and a barrenness of all inspiration⁴ which present the sharpest contrast to the creative energy displayed in this self-same society's epic birth and growth.⁵

In Egyptiac history, Death laid his icy hand on the life of a growing civilization at the moment when the challenge that was the stimulus of its growth was transferred from the external to the internal field, because, in this new situation, the shepherds of the people betrayed their trust. In the somewhat similar situation of our world in our day, when the challenge of Industrialism is being transferred from the sphere of technique to the sphere of morals, the outcome is still unknown, since our reaction to the new situation is still undecided. On the other hand, in that earlier chapter

¹ For the religious consequences of the tyrannical egotism of the Pyramid-Builders, see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 142-3, above.

² For the schism of societies into 'proletariats' and 'dominant minorities', which is one of the symptoms of social breakdown and disintegration, see Part I, vol. i, pp. 41-2 and 53-62, above, and Part V, below. For the sharpness of this schism in the life of the Egyptiac Society, see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, 3rd ed., vol. i, part (ii) (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 68.

³ James ii. 5.
⁴ For the role of Ikhnaton, as one of those exceptions which prove a rule, see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 145-6, above.

⁵ The vices of the Egyptiac *éthos* during the long ages of decline are so conspicuous that they are often mistakenly attributed to the Egyptiac *éthos tel quel*—a mistake which ignores the almost antithetical virtues which are equally conspicuous during the relatively short age of this society's genesis and growth.

in our history when the challenge of the Scandinavian onslaught upon Western Christendom was met by the creation of a new Western military technique, with a consequent modification of the Western social system, there was a transfer of the challenge which manifestly stimulated the challenged civilization to achieve a further degree of growth. In this instance, as we have seen,¹ the challenge was transferred from the battle-field between Western Christendom and the Vikings to the field of conflict between the different classes into which the Western body social had been impelled to articulate itself in the process of resisting the Scandinavian pressure; and in this new situation our Western Civilization responded as successfully to the challenge of an internal problem as it had previously responded to an external attack, with the result that it continued to grow in wisdom and stature and went forward from strength to strength.

On this showing, we may perhaps persist in the view that a given series of successful responses to successive challenges is to be interpreted as a manifestation of growth if, as the series proceeds, the action tends to shift from the field of the external environment—whether physical or human—to the *for intérieur* of the growing personality or the growing civilization. In so far as this grows and continues to grow, it has to reckon less and less with challenges delivered by alien adversaries and demanding responses on an outer battle-field, and more and more with challenges that are presented by itself to itself in an inner arena. Growth means that the growing personality or civilization tends to become its own environment and its own challenger and its own field of action. In other words, the criterion of growth is progress towards self-determination; and progress towards self-determination is a prosaic formula for describing the miracle by which Life enters into its Kingdom.

This miracle is described by the Hellenic mythology in the parable of Pygmalion's statue, and portrayed by our Western art in Watts's picture of Chaos. In the Hellenic myth, a piece of marble turns to human flesh and blood in response to the prayer of a sculptor who has fallen in love with the creature of his own creative hands. In Watts's *Chaos*, huge figures of titans are pictured in the act of shaking themselves free from the frame of their Mother Earth. They are still clay of her clay—glowing-red forms of one earthy substance and one fiery heat with the glowing-red landscape. Some of them are drowsily stirring in a flux of volcanic flames; others, wholly liberated and fully come alive, are leaning, stupefied, upon the Earth-Mother's breast. But we know that in a moment—the moment after this which the artist has caught in his vision—these

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 199–200, and the present chapter, p. 196, above.

giants will surely rise to their feet and then stride forward over land and sea. We know it because already, on the peaks of the mountains, the grim chthonic glow is turning miraculously into the ethereal flush of dawn; and because, down here in the shadow, unhurried but unhindered, there floats or dances through Space and Time a living chain of Goddesses, hand linked in hand: the endless procession of the Hours.

II. AN ANALYSIS OF GROWTH

(a) THE RELATION BETWEEN GROWING CIVILIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

The argument of the preceding chapter has led us to the conclusion that the criterion of growth is to be found in progress towards self-determination. If this conclusion is right, it may offer us a clue for analysing the process of the growths of civilizations, which is the next problem that lies before us.

If self-determination is the criterion of growth, and if self-determination means self-articulation, we shall be analysing the process by which growing civilizations actually grow if we investigate the way in which they progressively articulate themselves. In a general way, it is evident that a society in process of civilization articulates itself through the individual human beings who 'belong' to the society, or to whom the society 'belongs'. We can express the relation between Society and Individual indifferently by either of these two mutually inverse formulae; and this ambiguity seems to show that either formula is inadequate and that, before setting out on our new inquiry, we shall have to consider what is the relation in which societies and individuals stand to one another.

This is, of course, one of the stock questions of sociology, and there are two stock answers to it. One answer is that the individual human being is a reality which is capable of existing, and of being apprehended, by itself, while the society is nothing but a sum or aggregate of atomic and autonomous individuals who bring societies into existence by coming together and dissolve them by parting company again. The other stock answer is just the opposite. According to this second view, the reality is the society and not the individual: the society is a perfect and intelligible whole, while the individual is simply a part of this whole, who can neither exist nor be conceived as existing in any other capacity or in any other setting. If we examine each of these two antithetical views in turn, we shall find that neither of them will bear examination; and we may also find incidentally what the true answer to our question is.

The classic picture of an imaginary atomic individual is the

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celebrated Homeric description of the Cyclops Polyphemus and his kind, which is quoted by Plato in his *Laws*:¹

Mootless are they and lawless. On the peaks
Of mountains high they dwell, in hollow caves,
Where each his own law deals to wife and child
In sovereign disregard of all his peers.²

It is perhaps significant that, in this fantasy of Hellenic mythology, the atomic way of life is ascribed to no race of ordinary human beings, but to fabulous monsters who are represented as living at the ends of the Earth. The truth is that no human beings have ever actually lived in this mythical Cyclops-fashion; for Man, as we have seen already, is essentially a social animal, in the sense that social life is a condition which the evolution of Man out of Sub-Man pre-supposes, and without which that evolution could not conceivably have taken place.³

'The purely individualist Self or mere individual is a figment of abstraction. For the Self only comes to realization and consciousness of itself, not alone and in individual isolation and separateness, but in Society, among other selves with whom it interacts in social intercourse. I would never come to know myself and be conscious of my separate individual identity were it not that I become aware of others like me: consciousness of other selves is necessary for consciousness of self or self-consciousness. The individual has therefore a social origin in experience. Nay, more, it is through the use of the purely social instrument of language⁴ that I rise above the mere immediacy of experience and immersion in the current of my experience. Language gives names to the items of my experience, and thus through language they are first isolated and abstracted from the continuous body of my experience. Through the naming power of language, again, several items of experience can be grouped together under one name, which becomes distinctive of their general resemblances, in disregard of their minor differences. In other words, the power of forming general concepts becomes possible only through the social instrument of language. Thus the entire developed apparatus of thought with which I measure the Universe and garner an untold wealth of personal experience is not my individual equipment and possession, but a socially developed instrument which I share with the rest of my fellows. The individual Self or Personality rests not on its individual foundations but on the whole Universe.'⁵

¹ *Odyssey*, ix, ll. 112-15, quoted in Plato, *Laws*, Bk. II, 640 B.

² Τοῖσιν δ' οὐτ' ἀγοραὶ βουλευφόροι οὔτε θέμις, ἀλλ' οἷγ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναῖουσι κάρηνα ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσι.

³ See I. C (iii) (c), vol. i, pp. 173-4, above, and the passages there quoted from Aristotle and from Eduard Meyer.

⁴ For the social origin of language, see the passage quoted from Eduard Meyer in vol. i, p. 174, above.—A. J. T.

⁵ Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd ed. (London 1927, Macmillan), pp. 253-4. See also Webb, C. C. J.: 'Our Knowledge of One Another,' in *The Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. xvi (London 1930, Milford), especially pp. 8-9.

So much for the imaginary Cyclopean human being who is pictured as being free to live and die unto himself or alternatively to enter into a 'social contract' with others of his kind, according as he chooses. The human social animal's relation to his society is evidently not that of an arithmetical integer to an arithmetical sum; and we have next to ask ourselves whether the truth is to be found in the antithetical view. Is the individual's relation to his society the relation of a part to a whole?

'There are communities, such as those of bees and ants, where, though no continuity of substance exists between the members, yet all work for the whole and not for themselves and each is doomed to death if separated from the society of the rest.

'There are colonies, such as those of corals or of Hydroid polyps, where a number of animals, each of which by itself would unhesitatingly be called an individual, are found to be organically connected, so that the living substance of one is continuous with that of all the rest. Sometimes these apparent individuals differ among themselves and their energies are directed not to their own particular needs but to the good of the colony as a whole. Which is the individual now?

'Histology then takes up the tale and shows that the majority of animals, including Man, our primal type of individuality, are built up of a number of units, the so-called cells. Some of these have considerable independence; and it soon is forced upon us that they stand in much the same general relation to the whole man as do the individuals of a colony of coral polyps, or better of Siphonophora, to the whole colony. This conclusion becomes strengthened when we find that there exist a great number of free-living animals, the Protozoa, including all the simplest forms known, which correspond in all essentials, save their separate and independent existence, with the units building up the body of Man: both, in fact, are cells; but while the one seems to have an obvious individuality, what are we to say of the other? . . .

'In a sense . . . the whole organic world constitutes a single great individual, vague and badly co-ordinated, it is true, but none the less a continuing whole with interdependent parts: if some accident were to remove all the green plants, or all the bacteria, the rest of Life would be unable to exist.'¹

Do these observations of Organic Nature hold good for Mankind? Is the individual human being so far from possessing a Cyclopean independence that he is actually no more than a cell in the body social of the society to which he belongs, or, on a wider view, a cellule in the vaster body of 'a single great individual' which is constituted by 'the whole organic world'? The well-known original frontispiece to Hobbes's *Leviathan* pictures the human body social as an organism built up out of a host of Anaxagorean *homoeo-*

¹ Huxley, J. S.: *The Individual in the Animal Kingdom* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 36-8 and 125.

meriae which are individual human beings—as though the ‘social contract’ could have the magical effect of degrading a Cyclops into a cell. The same picture of the individual human being as an only partially emancipated part of a social whole which has acquired for itself some elements of individuality is presented, rather more tentatively, by the twentieth-century English biologist whom we have just been quoting:

‘One interesting property gained by brains and sense-organs:—organisms possessing them can easily enter into more than one individuality. . . . A man can very well be at one time a member of a family, a race, a club, a nation, a literary society, a church and an empire. “Yes, but surely *these* are not individuals”—I seem to hear my readers’ universal murmur. . . . Here we can but express a pious opinion:—that they *are* individuals, that here once more the tendency towards the formation of *closed systems* has manifested itself, though again in very varying degrees, so that some of the systems show but a glimmer of individuality, others begin to let it shine more strongly through. That their individuality is no mere phantasm I think we must own when we find men like Dicey and Maitland admitting that the cold eye of the Law, for centuries resolutely turned away, is at last being forced to see and to recognize the real existence, as single beings that are neither aggregates nor trusts, of corporate personalities.’²

A state of human life in which the corporate personality of a society has completely overshadowed and dominated and subordinated to itself the individual personalities of the human beings belonging to it is pictured, in an eschatological phantasy, by a twentieth-century English biochemist.³

‘After the immense efforts of the first colonisers [of the Planet Venus], we have settled down as members of a super-organism with no limits to its possible progress. The evolution of the individual has been brought under complete social control, and besides enormously enhanced intellectual powers we possess two new senses. The one enables us to apprehend radiation of wave-lengths between 100 and 1,200 metres, and thus places every individual at all moments of life, both asleep and awake, under the influence of the voice of the community. It is difficult to see how else we could have achieved as complete a solidarity as has been possible. We can never close our consciousness to those wave-lengths on which we are told of our nature as components of a super-organism or deity, possibly the only one in Space-Time, and of its past, present and future. It appears that on Earth the psychological equivalent of what is transmitted on these wave-lengths included the higher forms

¹ See Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, Bk. I, ll. 830 seqq.

² Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

³ See the sketch entitled ‘The Last Judgement’ in Haldane, J. B. S.: *Possible Worlds* (London 1928, Chatto and Windus), especially pp. 302–5 and 308–9. The author works out very ingeniously the implications of ‘a life completely dedicated to membership of a super-organism’ (*op. cit.*, p. 303).

of art, music and literature, the individual moral consciousness, and, in the early days of Mankind, religion and patriotism. The other wavelengths inform us of matters which are not the concern of all at all times, and we can shut them out if we so desire. Their function is not essentially different from that of instrumental radio-communication on Earth. The new magnetic sense is of less importance. . . .¹

This conception of a human society as a super-organism is presented in a fantasia by the twentieth-century English biochemist because he does not regard it as anything more than a speculative curiosity. But a nineteenth-century English social philosopher once argued that human societies were super-organisms in sober earnest;² and a twentieth-century German social philosopher has ventured to reaffirm dogmatically that the historic societies that we call civilizations are actual examples of super-organisms—and this, apparently, in the literal sense, with all its implications.

'Civilizations (*Kulturen*)³ are organisms. The History of Civilization (*Kulturgeschichte*) is the biography of these organisms. The history (*Geschichte*) of the Chinese [i.e. the Sinic] or the Antique [i.e. the Hellenic] Civilization, which presents itself to us, before our mind's eye, as "History" in the conventional sense (*in historischer Erscheinung*), is the exact counterpart of the history (*Geschichte*) of the individual human being, or of an animal or of a tree or of a flower. If we wish to gain insight into its structure, the proper method has been worked out long ago in the science of the comparative morphology of plants and animals. . . .

'A civilization is born at the moment when, out of the primitive psychic conditions of a perpetually infantile [raw] Humanity, a mighty soul awakes and extricates itself: a form out of the formless, a bounded and transitory existence out of the boundless and persistent. This soul comes to flower on the soil of a country with precise boundaries, to which it remains attached like a plant. Conversely, a civilization dies if once this soul has realized the complete sum of its possibilities in the shape of peoples, languages, creeds, arts, states, and sciences, and thereupon goes back into the primitive psyche from which it originally emerged.'⁴

In this remarkable passage, the conception of a society as a super-

¹ Haldane, J. B. S.: *Possible Worlds* (London 1928, Chatto and Windus), pp. 304-5.

² This was, of course, Herbert Spencer in his *Principles of Sociology*, vol. i (London 1876, Williams and Norgate). The thesis that societies are organisms is worked out systematically, in detail, in part (ii). See, for example, pp. 514-15, in which 'the classes engaged in manual occupations' are equated with 'the components of the alimentary surfaces'; the trading class with the vascular system; and the 'controlling' class with the brain.

³ In Spengler's terminology, a *Kultur* means what, in this Study of History, is called a civilization, so long as the civilization is in process of growth. *Zivilisation*, which for Spengler is the antithesis of *Kultur*, means the condition into which a civilization (in our sense) falls when it breaks down and goes into disintegration.—A. J. T.

⁴ Spengler, Oswald: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i, 15th-22nd ed. (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 150 and 153.

organism is formulated in such uncompromising terms that it virtually refutes itself; but we may cite a formal condemnation of it from the work of an English publicist which happened to appear in the same year as Spengler's book.

'Again and again, social theorists, instead of finding and steadily employing a method and a terminology proper to their subject, have attempted to express the facts and values of Society in terms of some other theory or science. On the analogy of the physical sciences they have striven to analyse and explain Society as *mechanism*, on the analogy of biology they have insisted on regarding it as an *organism*, on the analogy of mental science or philosophy they have persisted in treating it as a *person*, sometimes on the religious analogy they have come near to confusing it with a God.

'These various analogies have very different degrees of value and disvalue. The mechanical analogy and the organic analogy have been alike definitely harmful and have led theory seriously astray; for they both invoke a material analogy in what is essentially a mental or spiritual study.¹ The analogies drawn from psychology and mental philosophy are far less harmful and may be even extremely suggestive if they are not pushed too far; for though neither Society nor the various associations which it includes are "persons", they approach far more nearly to being persons than to being either mechanical or organic.'²

The biological and psychological analogies are perhaps least harmful and least misleading when they are applied to primitive societies in their present static condition or to those exceptional and unsuccessful civilizations that have fallen into a state of arrest.³ But they are manifestly unsuited to express the relation in which the growing civilizations stand to the individual human beings who 'belong' to them—or to whom such societies 'belong'. The inclination to introduce these particular analogies in this context seems to be a peculiar infirmity of our own Western social philosophers; and we may trace this infirmity to the special penchant—noted in an earlier passage of this Study⁴—which we in our Western Society seem to have for personifying groups or classes or associations of human beings, or human social institutions, by the device of labelling them with mythological proper names: 'Britain', 'France', 'Czechoslovakia'; 'His Majesty's Government' and 'The London County Council'; 'the Church', 'the Bar', 'the Press', 'the Turf', 'the Trade'. The distorting effect of these fictitious personifications upon historical thought and historical narrative has been discussed

¹ 'We may, if we will, speak of the "organs of the body social" or of the "machinery of society", but we must beware of regarding such phrases as more than metaphors or of basing any conclusions at all upon them.' (Ibid., p. 21.)

² Cole, G. D. H.: *Social Theory* (London 1920, Methuen), pp. 13-14.

³ For the arrested civilizations, see the present Part III. A, above.

⁴ See I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, pp. 442-5, above.

in this Study already¹ and need not be re-emphasized here. It is sufficiently evident that the representation of a society as a personality or as an organism does not offer us an adequate or accurate expression of the society's relation to its individual human 'members'. A human society is not a whole of which the individual human beings are parts, any more than it is an aggregate of individual human atoms that are free to associate or dissociate at will.

What, then, is the true relation between human societies and individuals? The truth seems to be that a human society is, in itself, a relation: a particular kind of relation between human beings who are not only individuals but are also social animals in the sense that they could not exist at all—or at any rate not humanly—without being in this social relation with one another. The species of human relation of which our human societies are one sample is known to us already. At an earlier point in this Study,² we have noticed that 'the social relations of human beings extend beyond the furthest possible range of personal contacts, and' that 'these impersonal relations are maintained through social mechanisms called institutions. Without institutions, societies could not exist. Indeed, societies themselves are simply institutions of the highest order—institutions, that is, which comprehend without being comprehended by others. The study of societies and the study of institutional relations are one and the same thing.'

The nature of these social or institutional relations between individual human beings is thus the ultimate object of our present inquiry into the relations between individuals and societies. But, before we can go further, we shall have to remind ourselves of the nature of these human individuals, or social animals, whose relations with one another we are trying to study; and we shall have to consider incidentally the nature of 'relations' in general.

The very concept of 'relations' between 'things' or 'beings' involves the logical contradiction that something which is *ex hypothesi* separate and self-contained and individual and exclusive has also to be conceived as somehow overlapping with other entities of the same order. How is this contradiction to be transcended? Only, perhaps, by substituting 'actions' for 'things' and 'agents' for 'beings' and 'interaction' for 'overlapping' as our formulae for describing 'the nature'—or, rather, 'the working'—of the Universe. Let us follow, along this path, the South African philosopher-statesman whose guidance we have sought on many occasions.

'Action does not come to a stop in its structures; it remains Action, it remains in action. In other words, there is more in bodies, things and events than is contained in their structures or material forms. All

¹ In loc. cit.

² In I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, pp. 454-5, above.

things overflow their own structural limits, the inner Action transcends the outer structure, and there is thus a trend in things beyond themselves. This inner trend in things springs from their very essence as localised, imprisoned Action. From this follow[s] . . . the concept of things as more than their apparent structures, and their "fields" as complementary to their full operation and understanding. A thing does not come to a stop at its boundaries or bounding surfaces. It is overflowing Action, it passes beyond its bounds, and its surrounding "field" is therefore essential not only to its correct appreciation as a thing, but also to a correct understanding of things in general, and especially of the ways in which they affect each other.¹

This suggestive concept of 'fields' is applied by the philosopher to Action of diverse kinds on different planes.

'Round every luminous point in experience there is a penumbra, a gradual shading off into haziness and obscurity. A "concept" is not merely its clear luminous centre but embraces a surrounding sphere of meaning or influence of smaller or larger dimensions, in which the luminosity tails off and grows fainter until it disappears. Similarly a "thing" is not merely that which presents itself as such in clearest definite outline, but this central area is surrounded by a zone of vague sense-data and influences which shades off into the region of the indefinite. The hard and abrupt contours of our ordinary conceptual system do not apply to reality and they make reality inexplicable, not only in the case of causation, but in all cases of relations between things, qualities and ideas. Conceive of a cause as a centre with a zone of activity or influence surrounding it and shading gradually off into indefiniteness. Next conceive of an effect as similarly surrounded. It is easy in that way to understand their interaction, and to see that cause and effect are not at arm's length but interlocked, and embrace and influence each other through the interpenetration of their two fields. In fact, the conception of fields of force which has become customary in Electro-magnetism is only a special case of a phenomenon which is quite universal in the realms of thought and reality alike. Every "thing" has its field, like itself, only more attenuated; every concept has likewise its field. It is in these fields and these fields only that things really happen. It is the intermingling of fields which is creative or causal in Nature as well as in Life. The hard secluded thing is barren because abstract, and but for its field it could never come into real contact or into active or creative relations with any other thing or concept. Things, ideas, animals, plants, persons: all these, like physical forces, have their fields, and but for their fields they would be unintelligible, their activities would be impossible, and their relations barren and sterile.'²

If we realize the existence of fields and recognize their importance, our thought runs on to explore their ranges; and our philosopher-statesman cites a contemporary philosopher-mathematician

¹ Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd ed. (London 1927, Macmillan), p. 336.

² Smuts, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

for the view that the field of any given 'thing' or 'event' extends to the totality of the Universe. Professor Whitehead, General Smuts observes,

'arrives at the result that a thing or event is not confined to its own simple Space-Time location, and is thus not itself alone, but that it reflects the aspects of all other things and events from its particular standpoint, and thus in a sense involves their locations also. In the larger context of Nature the thing or event is therefore a synthesis of itself with the aspects or perspectives of everything else as mirrored from its standpoint. Whitehead's searching analysis leads to results which closely resemble those of Leibniz's *Monadology*.¹

On the plane of physical phenomena, this doctrine means that each single atom or proton or electron, and each single ray of radiation, embraces the entire Physical Universe, inasmuch as its field of action has no narrower range than that. And a modern French philosopher, Monsieur Henri Bergson, argues, on the same principle, that the entire material universe is virtually included in the material body of each single human being.

'People never tire of repeating that Man is an insignificant speck on the Earth, and the Earth in the Universe. Yet, even in respect of his body, Man is far from occupying merely the tiny place which is usually assigned to him, and with which Pascal himself was content when he reduced "the thinking reed" to no more than a reed materially. For if

¹ Smuts, *op. cit.*, p. 22, referring to Whitehead, A. N.: *Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge 1927, University Press). See also Smuts's note, in *Holism and Evolution*, pp. 121-4, on 'Whitehead's doctrine of Organic Mechanism'. This doctrine, which is Whitehead's central theme in *Science and the Modern World*, is enunciated there, in precise terms, on pp. 99 and 134, while on p. 193, *ibidem*, Whitehead touches upon the relation of his own philosophy to that of Leibniz. In Leibniz's philosophy, the ultimate substances or entities or realities—for which Leibniz has coined the term 'monads'—are individual centres of perception, each of which mirrors the Universe:

'Chaque monade est un miroir vivant de l'univers suivant son point de vue.' (*Leibnitii Opera Philosophica*, edited by Erdmann, J. E. (Berlin 1840, Eichler), p. 725.) 'Et comme une même ville regardée de différens côtés paroît tout autre et est comme multipliée perspectivement, il arrive de même que par la multitude infinie des substances simples, il y a comme autant de différens univers, qui ne sont pourtant que les perspectives d'un seul selon les différens points de vue de chaque monade' (*op. cit.*, p. 709).

From this faculty of reflecting or perceiving the Universe, which Leibniz ascribes to his monads, he argues that each monad enjoys self-determination:

'Les monades qui sont les véritables et uniques substances, ne sauroient être empêchées naturellement dans leurs déterminations intérieures, puisqu'elles enveloppent la représentation de tout externe' (*op. cit.*, p. 722). 'Elles ont en elles une certaine perfection; il y a une suffisance qui les rend sources de leurs actions internes et pour ainsi dire des automates incorporels' (*op. cit.*, p. 706).

But this very self-determination implies that one monad cannot be acted upon by—and therefore, conversely, cannot itself act upon—any other monad:

'Il n'y a pas moyen . . . d'expliquer comment une monade puisse être altérée ou changée dans son intérieur par quelque autre créature, puisqu'on n'y sauroit rien transposer ni concevoir en elle aucun mouvement interne qui puisse être excité, dirigé, augmenté ou diminué là-dedans. . . . Les monades n'ont point de fenêtres, par lesquelles quelque chose y puisse entrer ou sortir' (*op. cit.*, p. 705. Cf. pp. 680 and 709 and 728).

Thus, while the Leibnizian monads have the whole Universe for their field of perception, they apparently have no fields of action at all.

For further light, see Russell, Bertrand: *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (Cambridge 1900, University Press).

our body is the matter to which our consciousness attaches itself, then it is coextensive with our consciousness, it comprehends all that we perceive, it stretches to the stars. But this immense body changes every instant—and sometimes radically—through the slightest displacement of one particular part of itself which occupies its centre and which keeps within a tiny space. This interior and central body, which is relatively invariable, is always present. And it is not only present; it is active: it is through it, and through it alone, that we are able to move other parts of the great body. Since it is action that counts, and since it is taken for granted that we are in the place where we act, it is customary to confine the consciousness within the tiny body and to ignore the immense body . . . [yet], if the surface of our very small organized body (which is organized precisely with a view to immediate action) is the locus of our actual movements, our very large inorganic body is the locus of our eventual and our theoretically possible movements. No doubt, everything happens *as though* our external perceptions were constructed by our brain and projected by it into space; but this is merely because the perceptive centres of the brain perform the necessary explorations and preparations for these eventual actions and sketch the design of them within. The truth is quite different; and we *are* really *in* everything that we perceive, though we happen to be represented there by parts of ourselves which vary without ceasing and which are occupied by actions that are only virtual.¹

In this passage, the modern Western philosopher contents himself with equating the individual human body, by virtue of its 'field', with as much of the material universe as happens at any given moment to come within the individual human being's range of action and perception and thought. An old school of Western thinkers went the length of equating the individual human soul with the entire Universe, on all its planes and in all its aspects, when they made their dichotomy between Microcosm and Macrocosm: a dichotomy which applies alike to the Soul and to the Universe itself. In the Microcosm, the Universe is mirrored or concentrated in the Soul; in the Macrocosm, the Soul ranges over a 'field' that is coextensive with the Universe; and the sum of things—the ultimate Whole which remains undivided and indivisible in reality, notwithstanding the logical dichotomy that has been practised upon it by human thought—is Soul and Universe in one.

In this now old-fashioned anticipation (or implementation) of a modern idea, we have found one answer to the question before us. It seems that individual human beings are related with one another through having individual fields of action that are each coextensive with the Universe and therefore all coextensive *inter se*. But, like so many of the intuitions of the medieval scholastic genius, this answer

¹ Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 276-7.

to a practical question is no answer for practical purposes. For to say that people are related with each other through fields that have no limits short of the Universe is virtually to say that they enter into their mutual relations at Infinity; and this leaves as obscure as ever the nature of their empirically observed relations in those mundane human societies, with their unique locations in Space-Time, that are the actual objects of this Study. Empirical observation has informed us, in objective terms, that these societies are institutions which, for our practical purposes, are of the highest order, in the sense that they comprehend other institutions without being comprehended by others in their turn.¹ In subjective terms we have found, by the same empirical test, that, for the same practical purposes, these same societies are also 'intelligible fields of study'.² In practice, therefore, our question will not have received a satisfactory answer until we have grasped the nature of the empirically observed relations between human individuals in these social fields which are neither universal in their range nor infinitely remote.³ Does the philosophically true but practically unsatisfying answer which we have obtained from the oracle of Scholasticism furnish any clue for discovering an answer in our own practical terms? Perhaps we can make the transit from the theoretical to the practical answer to our question by way of a mathematical simile.

Let us represent our human individuals, whose social relations we are trying to grasp, by any number of points on a plane; and from each one of these points, as an apex, let us produce a cone to represent each individual's field of action. Some of these cones may expand rapidly, at an obtuse angle; others may expand gradually, at angles that are more acute; and the central spine or axis of each cone may take off at any angle from the common plane on which all the apices lie. Our only postulate is that the cones shall all be produced into the third dimension on one and the same side of our original plane (which offers, of course, two alternative sides on which our three-dimensional figures may be constructed). Let us now decree that every one of these cones shall be produced,

¹ See Part I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 455, above.

² See Part I. A and also I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 443, above.

³ The problem that confronts us here has been formulated as follows, in 'holistic' terms, by General Smuts:

'What limits are there to the field of an inorganic body or an organism or a personality? Leibniz represented each monad as containing or mirroring the whole Universe in its own way and from its own particular angle; lower monads, of course, more imperfectly than higher monads; but each in its own degree is a sort of Microcosm or miniature Universe. In other words, each tiniest least monad is in a sense cosmic and universal. This description would not apply to a "field". As we have seen, a "field" is of the same character as the inner area of the whole, only more attenuated in its force and influence, and the farther it recedes from that area the greater the attenuation; so that the field, though theoretically indefinite in extent, is in effect quite limited in practical operation.' (Smuts, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-8.)

on the (conventionally determined) productive side of our plane, from its apex on and on into Infinity. This decree ensures mathematically that, notwithstanding the diversity of the respective angles at which our cones take off from our plane, the ultimate cross-section of every cone will coincide in area with the ultimate cross-section of every other cone; for, on a plane that lies at an infinite distance from our original plane of departure, all our cones alike will project themselves in cross-sections with infinite and therefore coextensive areas. At the same time, we shall find that the sections of a certain number—though only a certain number—of our cones do coincide in area at each and every distance, short of infinity, from the productive face of our original plane, at which we choose to describe another plane parallel to it. For, as our cones which we are producing from our original plane traverse any one of these other planes, at some finite distance from the first, on their way towards Infinity, they will each leave their mark on the second plane in the shape of a conic section; and while these conic sections will naturally differ from one another in location and size and form according to the point on the original plane from which each particular cone has taken off, and according to the angles that govern its production, it will be found, as a matter of fact, that the conic sections imprinted on the second plane by a certain number of different cones that have taken off from the first plane at different points and at different angles will actually coincide with one another—coinciding, in this case, at a finite and not at an infinite distance from their respective apices, and in a finite and not in an infinite area.

Before we proceed to the interpretation of this simile, it may be well to make the mathematical construction clearer by translating it into concrete terms. For our original plane let us take the surface of the Earth; let our points on this surface be represented by search-light projectors; and let these projectors be without those prisms of crystal or glass by means of which the beams of light that are projected from ordinary search-lights are diverted, at the outset, from their natural paths and are made to travel parallel to one another in the form of a shaft instead of following their natural bent and diverging cone-wise. These natural cones of radiating light will thus take off from the surface of the Earth at different points and at different axial angles and at different degrees of obtuseness or acuteness according to the particular structures and locations and bearings of the particular projectors from which they respectively emanate; and—just as in the case of our abstract mathematical cones—their cross-sections will all be coextensive with one another at Infinity. In the concrete illustration, however, we are confronted at once with the gulf between theory and practice; for it is

evident that, in practice, this theoretical coincidence of all the cross-sections of all our light-cones will never be realized. It will not be realized because the light-cone—which is the 'field' of radiation of the projector—becomes more and 'more attenuated in its force and influence the farther it recedes from' the lamp that is the source from which the radiation is emitted, 'so that the field, though theoretically indefinite in extent, is in effect quite limited in practical operation'.¹ Moreover, in the particular concrete case that we are imagining, the field of our search-light's cone-shaped radiation is limited in a double way: not only by the attenuation of the light as it travels, but also by the interposition of opaque bodies that prevent its further progress—even before it has petered out—towards the Infinity which it would never actually reach in any event. These obstructive bodies are the layers of cloud that float in the atmosphere on planes that are roughly parallel to the Earth's solid and liquid surface; and the under-surface of one of these cloud-layers will receive the imprint of a conic section from each one of the light-cones, emanating from our projectors, whose further progress this particular cloud-layer happens to bar. With this cloud-surface to play upon, the expert human manipulators of the projectors will be able so to adjust their angles of projection that the conic sections of the light-cones that are projected on to the cloud-surface from different points and at different angles will overlap with one another so closely as virtually to coincide. Indeed, this power of making the sections of the beams of search-lights coincide, for practical purposes, at distances but little removed from the solid or liquid surface of the Earth is the power that gives the invention of the search-light its practical value for Man. As *Homo Belligerans*, he focuses his convergent beams upon a single point on an aerial plane that is determined by the momentary presence of a hostile piece of aircraft; as *Homo Coponans*, he focuses upon a point on a plane that is embodied materially in the under-surface of a cloud in order to advertise his wares by 'sky-writing'.

The concrete version of our simile has probably made an interpretation superfluous; but, for the reader's possible convenience, we will give the key nevertheless. The points on the surface of a mathematical plane, or the search-light projectors on the surface of the Earth, represent individual human beings; the mathematical cones, or light-cones, represent these individuals' respective fields of action; the second plane, or the under-surface of the cloud-layer, upon which the cones impinge at some finite range in the course of their production towards Infinity, represents the social animal's

¹ See the passage quoted from Smuts, op. cit., on p. 227, footnote 3, above.

sociality; and the coincidence of a certain number of the conic sections imprinted on this surface represents the coincidence of the fields of action of a certain number of individual human beings—a coincidence which constitutes a society.

If this simile has any substance in it, it may now yield us a definition of what a human society is. A society, we may say, is a relation between individuals; and this relation of theirs consists in the coincidence of their individual fields of action; and this coincidence combines the individual fields into a common ground; and this common ground is what we call a society. Inasmuch as an individual's field of action is a part or aspect of the individual himself, each single individual is in a sense coextensive and indeed identical with the whole of the society in which he is a shareholder or in which he has a vested interest—to apply a metaphor from the business practice of the modern Western World. On the other hand, inasmuch as the Microcosm is distinct and distinguishable from the Macrocosm—and it is only in the field of the Macrocosm, and not in the fastness of the Microcosm, that the different individuals interact—it cannot be said that every individual is identical with every other, in spite of their being each identical with the society through which they are related. In this 'political arithmetic' or 'social geometry', the Euclidean axiom that 'things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another' apparently does not hold.

The foregoing investigation into the nature, or the working, of human societies has incidentally brought out a point which is of great importance for the next stage of our inquiry. Our analysis of phenomena into agents and their fields of action implies not only that 'the stuff or material of the Universe' is 'activity instead of matter',¹ but also that this activity originates in one, and one only, of its two poles and can only flow in the one direction. The mathematical cones in our simile were produced from their apices; the light-cones were radiated from the search-light projectors; the Macrocosm is apprehended and acted upon by the Microcosm; and the action which is the theme of human history is the action of individual human beings on that common ground of their respective fields of action which we call a society.

A field of action—and, *a fortiori*, an intersection of a number of fields of action—cannot be a source of action. The source of action is other than the field of action *ex hypothesi*. And—to apply this truism to the case in point—the source of social action cannot be the society, but can only be each or some or one of the individuals whose fields of action constitute a society on the ground where they coincide. A 'field' or a 'relation' is condemned, by its very nature,

¹ Smuts, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

to the impotence which is ascribed to the abstract human intellect in the Aristotelian aphorism.¹ It 'moves nothing'. A 'field' merely provides a locus for the action of an agent who operates in the field but who is not the field itself; a 'relation' merely provides a common ground for the interaction of two or more agents with one another. Just as mathematical Space takes no action itself, but merely lends itself to the action of particular electrons or atoms or vibrations, each of which occupies the whole of Space for its field, so a human society is inherently incapable of playing an active, creative role in human affairs. The society is not, and cannot be, anything more than a medium of communication through which the individual human beings interact with one another. It is human individuals and not human societies that 'make' human history.²

This truth is stated forcibly and insistently by Bergson in the work which we have been quoting repeatedly in this part of our Study.

'We do not believe in the "unconscious" [factor] in History: the "great subterranean currents of thought", of which there has been so much talk, only flow in consequence of the fact that masses of men have been carried away by one or more of their own number. . . . It is useless to maintain that [social progress] takes place of itself, bit by bit, in virtue of the spiritual condition of the society at a certain period of its history. It is really a leap forward which is only taken when the society has made up its mind to try an experiment; this means that the society must have allowed itself to be convinced, or at any rate allowed itself to be shaken; and the shake is always given by *somebody*. It is useless to allege that this leap forward does not imply any creative effort at the back of it, and to argue that there is not here any invention comparable to the artist's. This is to ignore the fact that the majority of the great successful reforms have appeared at first unrealizable and have been so in fact. They could only be realized in a society whose spiritual condition was already that which these reforms were to induce through their realization; and there was a vicious circle here from which no issue would have been found if the circle had not been broken by one or more privileged souls which had dilated the social soul in themselves and which then drew the society after them [through the breach which they had made]. Now, this is just what we mean by the miracle of artistic creation.'³

¹ Διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνεκά του καὶ πρακτικῆς αὐτὴ γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει. (Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, Z 2 (pp. 1139 A-B).)

² 'Aller Fortschritt geht von einzelnen Persönlichkeiten aus'—Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 145-6. Compare Schweitzer, A.: *The Decay and Restoration of Civilisation* (London 1923, Black), p. 73; Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th ed. (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 30-8 and 87-97.

³ Bergson, op. cit., pp. 333 and 73-4. Compare p. 102. In another passage (in op. cit., p. 124) Bergson suggests that 'it is only in Humanity that the effort of invention, which

The individuals who perform this miracle of creation, and who thereby bring about the growth of the societies in which they arise, are more than mere men. They can work what to men seem miracles because they themselves are superhuman in a literal and no mere metaphorical sense.

'In giving to Man the moral conformation which he required in order to be a social animal, Nature has probably done all that she was able to do for the Human Species. But, just as men of genius have been found to push back the bounds of the human intelligence (which means that, at long intervals, individuals have been granted far more than it was originally possible to give, all at once, to the species), so there have arisen privileged souls who have felt themselves related (*apparentés*) to all souls, and who, instead of remaining within the limits of their group and keeping to the [restricted] solidarity that has been established by Nature, have addressed themselves to Humanity in general in an *élan* of love. The apparition of each of these souls has been like the creation of a new species composed of one unique individual—the thrust of Life arriving, at long intervals, in the person of a particular human being, at a result which could not have been attained all at once for the aggregate of Mankind. Thus each of these souls has marked the attainment of a certain point by the evolution of Life; and each of them has manifested in an original form a love which seems to be the very essence of the creative effort.'

For Bergson, it is the mystics who are the superhuman creators *par excellence*, and he finds the essence of the creative act in the supreme moment of the mystical experience.

'Shaken to her depths by the current that is to carry her away, the Soul ceases to turn upon herself and escapes for one instant from the law which requires the species and the individual to condition one another in a vicious circle. The Soul stops still, as though she heard a voice calling her. Then she lets herself go—straight forward.'

What is the new specific character of these rare and superhuman

manifests itself in the whole domain of Life through the creation of new species, has discovered the means of carrying on through individuals who are endowed with intelligence and who are therewith made the repositories of the faculties of initiative, independence and liberty.'

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–7. Compare pp. 228 and 289. It is interesting to find the same conception appearing a few years earlier in the work of a contemporary English writer whose mental background would appear to be very different from our French philosopher's.

'Jesus . . . was a new kind of man, literally, scientifically; a new species of the *Genus Homo*. . . A new species of the *Genus Homo*, for the ordinary biologist, would mean a man with an extra eye, or a rudimentary fin where his tail should be. . . But . . . the coherence which we discern in the life of Jesus . . . is organic on a higher level than the pure biological. . . The differentiating characteristic of this new man, as we regard him, lies first in his apprehension in immediate experience of an all-pervading Unity, and second, and more importantly, in the perfection of his obedience to it. . . Jesus is not the unique example of the new man. One very clear and relatively modern example is the English poet, John Keats. . . I find very evident traces of the same kind of development in Spinoza, in Goethe, in Shakespeare, in Blake, and in some of the great Christian mystics.' (Murry, John Middleton: *God* (London 1929, Cape), pp. 111–18.)

² Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–6. Compare p. 84.

souls that break the vicious circle of primitive human social life and resume the work of creation? The new factor may be described as 'Personality'.

'Personality is still a growing factor in the Universe, and is merely in its infancy. Its history is marked by the thousands of years, whereas that of Organic Nature is marked by millions. Personality is as yet but an inchoate activity of the whole, but nevertheless its character is already distinct and well marked; and its future evolution is the largest ray of hope in human, if not terrestrial, destiny. . . . The level of its power and activity is gradually rising; more and more it is gathering the unorganized centrifugal tendencies of the individual into an effective central control, and often it wins even in the most discouraging circumstances those moral victories which form the great landmarks of personal and human progress.'

It is through the inward development of Personality that individual human beings are able to perform those creative acts, in their outward fields of action, that cause the growths of human societies; and so we find that this enhancement of the individual's mastery over the Macrocosm is the consequence of a corresponding achievement in the Microcosm—of a progress in self-articulation or self-determination within. The outward and the inward advance in organization and increase in power are so intimately connected that either can be described in terms of the other.

'The nature of Personality is distinguished by its departure from the processes of Organic Nature and an approximation to the forms of action which are characteristic of Society. Just as in a well-organized society or state there is a central legislative and executive authority which is for certain purposes supreme over all individuals composing that society or state, and controls their activities in certain definite directions deemed necessary for the welfare of the state, so the human personality is distinguished by an even more rigorous inner control and direction of the personal actions to certain defined or definable ends. . . . The ideal personality is he in whom this inner control is sufficiently powerful, whether exercised by conscious will or some unconscious activity, to harmonize all the discordant elements and tendencies of the personal character into one harmonious whole, and to restrain all wayward, random activities which are in conflict with that harmony.'

In the South African philosopher's analysis of Personality and

¹ Smuts, *op. cit.*, pp. 306 and 308.

² Smuts, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-6. On p. 107 the author draws the following contrast between the soul which has achieved Personality and the soul which has not succeeded in achieving it:

'Consider for a moment what distinguishes the formed and developed personality from the unformed and incomplete personality; the strong character from the weak; the master of his fate from him who is blown about by every wave of impulse or opinion. In the latter case—the case of the weak, or flabby, or irresolute person—you have usually the same elements of character as in that of the strong man. But the difference is that while in the case of the strong man or personality all these elements are unified into one central whole which shapes and directs their separate activities, in the case of the weak

in the French philosopher's account of the mystical experience¹ we are given a glimpse of the process by which, in the souls of certain individual human beings, a new spiritual species—a veritable Superman—emerges. The mystically illumined Personality evidently stands to ordinary Human Nature as civilizations stand to primitive human societies. In both cases, the new species is evolved from the old through a passage from a temporary state of quiescence into a bout of dynamic activity. In both cases, likewise, the new chapter of history implies, and in fact demands, a sequel; for 'all things overflow their own structural limits . . . and there is thus a trend in things beyond themselves'.² Civilizations that have succeeded in coming to birth not only tend to grow, but also tend to impinge upon other societies in the pluralistic social universe which has been the field of human history up to date.³ Similarly, personalities that have succeeded in attaining self-determination through self-mastery find, in the act, that they cannot live and cannot die unto themselves;⁴ that, having been lifted up, they cannot rest until they have drawn all men unto them;⁵ because it is for this that they are come into the World.⁶

'The soul of the great mystic does not come to a halt at the [mystical] ecstasy as though that were the goal of a journey. The ecstasy may indeed be called a state of repose, but it is the repose of a locomotive standing in a station under steam pressure, with its movement continuing as a stationary throbbing while it waits for the moment to make a new leap forward. . . . Henceforward, the soul has a superabundance of life; it has an immense *élan*; it has an irresistible thrust which hurls it into vast enterprises. . . . The great mystic has felt the truth flow into him from its source like a force in action. He could no more stop himself from spreading it than the Sun could stop himself from pouring out his light. . . . His desire is with God's help to complete the creation of the Human Species and to make of Humanity what it would have been from the beginning if it had been capable of constituting itself definitively without the help of Man himself. Or, to use words which . . . say

man these elements of thought, emotion, will, and passion have never been harmonized or fused into one whole; the sovereign legislative and executive authority in the personality has never been properly constituted or exerted, or is so weak as to be regularly disobeyed and defied; the unorganized and uncoordinated factions in the character fight for their own hand and keep up a constant state of inner warfare in the personality, with the result that the stronger passions or impulses carry the day and ruin the character, which depends on a harmonious subordination of all the various elements of character under one supreme ethical authority. The inner discord may even proceed the length of apparent dissociation of the personality and lead to the singular phenomenon of multiple personality in the same individual.'

The spiritual struggle in which the emergent personality brings psychic order out of psychic anarchy in the Microcosm, and social growth out of social stagnation in the Macrocosm, is delineated with the poetic imagination and the emotional intensity of genius in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 243-9.

² Smuts, *op. cit.*, p. 336, quoted on pp. 223-4, above.

³ The phenomena arising from the contacts between civilizations are discussed in Parts IX and X, below. For the contacts between civilizations and barbarians, see Part VIII, below.

⁴ Romans xiv. 7.

⁵ John xii. 32.

⁶ John xvi. 28.

the same thing in different language, the mystic's direction is the very direction of the *élan* of Life. It is that *élan* itself, communicated in its entirety to privileged human beings whose desire it is thereafter to set the imprint of it upon the whole of Mankind and—by a contradiction of which they are aware—to convert a species, which is essentially a created thing, into creative effort; to make a movement out of something which, by definition, is a halt.¹

This contradiction is the crux of the dynamic social relation which arises between human beings upon the emergence of mystically inspired personalities and which resolves itself—if it achieves a resolution of its forces—in the growths of civilizations.² The necessity which impels a creative personality to transfigure his fellow men into fellow creatures by re-creating them in his own image is both internal and external. The internal necessity lies in the identity of Life and Action. No being can be what he is unless he is putting his essence into action in his field. But a human being's field of action lies in a society which is common ground between his field and the fields of a host of other people; and it is here that the necessity translates itself into external pressure when the individual agent happens to be a genius who represents 'a new species composed of one unique individual'.³ The creative mutation in the Microcosm requires an adaptative modification in the Macrocosm before it can become either complete or secure; but, *ex hypothesi*, the Macrocosm of the transfigured personality is also the Macrocosm of his untransfigured fellow men; and accordingly his effort to transform the Macrocosm in consonance with the change in himself will be resisted by their inertia, which will tend to keep the Macrocosm in harmony with their unaltered selves by keeping it just as it is.

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-51.

² The crux does not present itself in situations where the social relations between human beings are not dynamic but static: e.g. in civilizations that have suffered arrest, or in stagnant or quiescent primitive societies that have not entered upon the path of civilization at all. In primitive societies in their latter-day 'Yin-state' of integration—which happens to be the only condition in which we have direct knowledge of them—social activity is crystallized or solidified in a 'cake of custom' (see the quotation from Bagehot in II. B, vol. i, p. 192, above); and the social relations established between each individual and every other on the common ground of their respective fields are repetitive and uniform and invariable or, in other words, stable. The crux only presents itself when 'the cake of custom' breaks. Presumably it did present itself in the 'Yang-activity' of differentiation to which the latter-day 'Yin-state' of Primitive Humanity is the sequel. In that phase of evolution, Humanity was achieved through a mutation of Sub-Man into Man (see I. C (iii) (e), vol. i, pp. 179-80, and II. B, vol. i, pp. 192-5, above); and since it appears that our pre-human ancestors who accomplished this mutation were already social or at any rate gregarious animals (see I. C (iii) (c), vol. i, pp. 173-4, above), it is conceivable that this pre-human mutation worked, like the post-human mutation that is struggling to achieve itself in the growths of civilizations, through a social conflict between individuals: in this case between incipient human beings and their recalcitrant sub-human kin and kind. But we have no record of this momentous chapter of history; and Bergson (*op. cit.*, p. 124) may be right in his view that it is only in our own post-human phase of evolution that the instrument and agent of creation has come to be the individual.

³ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-7, quoted on p. 232, above.

This social situation presents a dilemma. If the creative genius fails to bring about in his milieu the mutation which he has achieved in himself, his creativeness will be fatal to him. He will have put himself out of gear with his field of action; and in losing the power of action he will lose the will to live—even if his former fellows do not harry him to death, as abnormal members of the swarm or hive or herd or pack are harried to death by the rank and file in the static social life of gregarious animals or insects. This is the penalty of the genius whose failure to transform his social milieu convicts him of having been 'before his time'. On the other hand, if our genius does succeed in overcoming the passive inertia or active hostility of his former fellows and does triumphantly transform the social milieu which has hitherto been common ground between him and them into a new order in harmony with his transfigured self, he thereby makes life impossible for men and women of common clay unless they can succeed in adapting their own selves, in turn, to the new social milieu that has now been imposed upon them by the triumphant genius's masterfully creative will.

This is the meaning of a saying attributed to Jesus in the Gospels:

'Think not that I am come to send peace on Earth: I came not to send peace but a sword.

'For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law.

'And a man's foes shall be they of his own household.'¹

The emergence of a superman or a great mystic or a genius or a superior personality inevitably precipitates a social conflict. The conflict will be more or less acute, according to the degree in which the creative individual happens to rise above the average level of his former kin and kind. But some conflict is inevitable, since the social equilibrium which the genius has upset by the mere fact of his personal emergence has eventually to be restored either by his social triumph or by his social defeat.

'A work of genius, which begins by being disconcerting, may by its mere presence create, bit by bit, a conception of art and an artistic atmosphere which will permit of its being understood. It will then receive the hall-mark of genius retrospectively. Failing that, it would have remained what it was at the beginning: that is, simply disconcerting. In a financial speculation, it is success that decides that the idea has been a good one. There is something of the same sort in the case of artistic creation, with this difference that here the success, if it eventually comes to the work which has shocked people at first, is the

¹ Matthew x. 34-6. Compare Luke xii. 51-3.

effect of a transformation in public taste which has been produced by the work itself. On this showing, the work has been a force as well as a material object. It has communicated the impress of an *élan* which the artist has imparted to it, or, rather, which is the artist's own *élan*, invisibly present in it. . . . It is only the thrust of genius that has ever forced the inertia of Humanity to yield.¹

How is it possible for social equilibrium to be restored when once the discordant, disturbing thrust of genius has made itself felt?

The simplest solution would be that uniform thrusts—uniform in vigour and uniform in direction—should be made by each and every individual member of Society simultaneously. In that event, no strain or tension or disturbance of equilibrium would be felt on the common ground of the individuals' respective fields of action, because all the individuals, in seeking to adapt their respective fields to the uniform mutations that had occurred simultaneously in their inner selves, would be feeling their way towards uniform adaptations. This easy solution, however, is only a fanciful conceit; for, *ex hypothesi*, a creative mutation of Human Nature is the act of an individual soul which is acting independently; and a simultaneous uniform mutation in every one of a number of individual human beings would be a sheer miracle.

There are not, of course, any authentic instances of this convenient miracle in human history. The most that we find is that the same—or more or less the same—creative thought or plan occurs, at approximately the same time and place, to two or three individuals instead of occurring exclusively to one.

In the history of our modern Western mechanical inventions, for example, the steam-engine and the locomotive and the aeroplane and the tank were invented at almost the same moment by several people. Indeed, the highly involved and long-drawn-out dispute between the several claimants of the reward which was offered for the invention of the tank by His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom illustrates the difficulty of tracing an invention indisputably to a single author even when the invention in question is only a few years old, and when the society in which it has been made is in the habit of keeping exact and voluminous records of its transactions. And whatever the upshot of this British controversy may be—whether the invention of tanks in Great Britain was really singular or plural—it seems to be admitted that 'the ideas which had been thought out by the British originators in 1914 were reinvented separately and independently by the French

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 74 and 181.

in 1915'.¹ Similarly, in the history of modern Western mountaineering and exploration, there was actually a race between different parties to scale the Matterhorn² and to reach the North and South Poles;³ and in the history of modern Western Physical Science it was for a time an open question whether the concept of Evolution would receive its classical expression—'the struggle for existence' and 'the survival of the fittest'—from the mind of Charles Darwin or from the mind of Alfred Russel Wallace, while the abstruse calculations which led to the discovery of the planet Neptune—on the slender clue of certain unexplained irregularities in the motion of the planet Uranus—were actually worked out independently and simultaneously by Adams and Leverrier. This phenomenon of simultaneous pluralistic creation is particularly conspicuous in the histories of religions. The feat of providing the Arabian external proletariat of the Roman Empire with a vernacular version of the monotheism which had come to prevail in the Roman World was being attempted by Muhammad's contemporary Maslamah in the Najd at the very time when it was being accomplished, in the Hijāz, by Muhammad himself;⁴ and this simultaneous appearance of Muhammad and Maslamah in Arabia has parallels in the contemporaneity of Jesus and John the Baptist in Jewry, and in the encounter between Paul and Apollōs in the Hellenic mission-field of Primitive Christianity,⁵ and in the simultaneous appearance, in different parts of Western Christendom, of the Protestant Reformers: a Wyclif and a Huss in one generation and a Calvin and a Zwingli and a Luther in another.

The phenomenon of which these are a few familiar examples is described in the popular phrase that this or that new thing 'is in the air'; and there is nothing surprising about it. When we consider that a number of human beings who are in social relations with one another share more or less the same social background and social heritage and are exposed to more or less the same social challenges, it would rather be surprising if more or less the same response were never hit upon by several people at once. And the really surprising point in the actual operation of social dynamics is that a new thing 'in the air' should not be breathed in as a matter of course by

¹ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 13th ed., supplementary volume iii, p. 726. See further

Swinton, Major-General Sir E. D.: *Eyewitness* (London 1932, Hodder and Stoughton).

² In the year 1865, the summit of the Matterhorn was reached for the first time by a party ascending from the Swiss side and by a party ascending from the Italian side within three days of one another—the two parties working quite independently.

³ The South Pole was reached independently by Amundsen on the 14th December, 1911, and by Scott on the 18th January, 1912. Peary's claim to have been the first human being to reach the North Pole—a feat which he achieved on the 6th–7th April, 1909—was disputed (though not convincingly) by Cook.

⁴ For Muhammad's career, see further III. C (ii) (b), pp. 276–8, with Annex II, below.

⁵ Acts xviii. 24–8, and xix. 1–7; 1 Corinthians i. 10–16, and iii, *passim*.

everybody. This, however, is not what happens in fact; for while it is true that a new creative thought or plan does often occur to more than one member of a society simultaneously, it is also true that it never occurs simultaneously to more than a minority.

The importance of such creative minorities in human history has struck the imagination of Mr. H. G. Wells:

'I am building my expectation of a new phase in human affairs upon the belief that there is a profoundly serious minority in the mass of our generally indifferent species. I cannot understand the existence of any of the great religions, I cannot explain any fine and grave constructive process in history, unless there is such a serious minority amidst our confusions. They are the Salt of the Earth, these people capable of devotion and of living lives for remote and mighty ends.'¹

In this passage, the fact on which emphasis is laid is not that these creative personalities are more than one in number, but that they are fewer—and far fewer—than the total membership of the societies in which they succeed in producing such dynamic social effects. And indeed this is the aspect of the situation which will make the strongest impression on us if we survey those contemporary instances of the phenomenon in the political sphere which the English writer of this passage had in mind: the Japanese Samurai, the Russian Communists, the Italian Fascisti.

The truth seems to be that the intrinsic uniqueness and individuality of any act of creation is never counteracted to more than a trifling extent by the tendency towards uniformity which arises from the fact that every individual member of Society is a potential creator and that all these individuals are living in the same social atmosphere; so that the creator, when he arises, always finds himself overwhelmingly outnumbered by the inert uncreative mass of his kin and kind, even when he has the good fortune to enjoy the companionship of a few kindred spirits. In all acts of social creation the creators are either creative individuals or, at most, creative minorities; and, at each successive advance which these pioneers of growing civilizations achieve, the great majority of the members of the society are left behind.

If we take, for example, the growth of the Hellenic Civilization between its infancy, as portrayed in the Homeric Epic, and its acme, which was attained in Athens during the half-century immediately preceding the catastrophe of 431 B.C., we notice at once that almost all the women have been left behind and almost all the slaves. The Homeric Odysseus has blossomed into the Attic Themistocles; but as for the Homeric Penelope and the Homeric Eumaeus, where, in fifth-century Athens, are they? We shall not rediscover Penelope

¹ Wells, H. G.: *Democracy under Revision* (London 1927, Hogarth Press), p. 42.

in the virtuous but colourless housewife of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*,¹ nor Eumaeus in the Aristophanic slave who culminates in the sharp and shady Carion of the *Phutus*.² The creative minority in Periclean Athens is exclusively free-born and exclusively male; and, even so, it is only a small fraction of the free male population of Attica that has any part or lot in it.

We shall find the same situation if we take a glance at any or all of the five civilizations—the Western and the Orthodox Christian and the Islamic and the Hindu and the Far Eastern—that happen to be alive in our own day. The differentiation is perhaps most conspicuous in Hinduism, where the whole gamut of known human standards, from the lowest to the highest, is represented in the gradations that extend from the Ghonds and Bhils and Criminal Castes and 'Untouchables' and 'Depressed Classes' at one end of the scale to a Tagore or a Bhowe or a Gandhi at the other. On Western tongues, it is a common reproach to Hinduism to point out that it may stand for anything, from the loftiest moral and intellectual level to the most degraded; and the abandonment of the Hindu masses to their degradation is the central point in Miss Katherine Mayo's indictment of the Hindu *élite*.³ It is interesting to observe that the Hindu apologia has followed both of two mutually contradictory lines. Some of the Hindu apologists prefer to glory in their infirmities⁴ and claim for Hinduism, as its peculiar merit, that it translates into action, in everyday life, the Latin tag *Homo sum, humanum nihil a me alienum puto*.⁵ At the same time, other Hindu apologists pass over into a counter-offensive on the

¹ Milesian Aspasia is, of course, the exception which proves the Attic rule that is exemplified by the housewife in the *Oeconomicus* (an early fourth-century portrait which is equally true to life in the fifth century).

² In Carion, the lineaments of the typical slave of the Attic 'New Comedy' are already manifest.

³ Mayo, K.: *Mother India* (London 1927, Cape). Between the moment when the writer of this Study wrote these lines and the day when he first re-read them, a conference between the leaders of the Caste Hindus and the leaders of the 'Untouchables' had issued in the Poona Agreement of the 24th September, 1932. On the morrow of this agreement, in which the Caste Hindus undertook to give the 'Untouchables' a fair share in the political power which was on the point of devolving upon the Hindu community as a whole through the transfer of political authority in India from British to Indian hands, it looked as if this enfranchisement of the 'Untouchables' on the political plane might lead on to the removal, or at any rate the alleviation, of their social disabilities, to which they had been subject from time immemorial. If that sequel did follow, it would stamp the Poona Agreement of the 24th September, 1932, as the most signal event that had occurred in the history of Hinduism for many centuries. It is noteworthy that the achievement of the Poona Agreement was directly due to the personality of the Mahatma Gandhi, who had announced his intention of fasting to death unless the Caste Hindus and the 'Untouchables' were able to agree upon some alternative to the British Government's scheme for the political enfranchisement of the 'Untouchables'—a scheme which, in Mr. Gandhi's opinion, would have had the effect of stereotyping the ancient unhappy cleavage within the bosom of the Hindu community. The Poona Agreement—which may perhaps take rank, in retrospect, as the greatest triumph in Mr. Gandhi's career—may prove to be one recent example of a saint's power of transforming his social milieu into conformity with the creative evolution in himself.

⁴ 2 Corinthians xi. 30, and xii. 9.

⁵ Terence: *Hauton Timorumenus*, i, 1, l. 25.

lines of the Parable of the Mote and Beam. Instead of directly defending themselves, they seek to confound their Western critics by pointing out, in their turn, that the differentiation of cultural levels between one class and another, which shocks a Western observer when he contemplates the structure of the Hindu Society, stares us Westerners in the face in the present aspect of our own Western World.

Our Western scientific knowledge of which we boast, and even our Western technique for turning this knowledge to practical account—a technique on which we depend for the maintenance of our wealth and strength—is perilously esoteric. The great new social forces of Democracy and Industrialism, which our Western Civilization has thrown up in the course of its growth, have been evoked from the depths by a tiny creative minority. Even this minority is wondering to-day whether it will be able to control and guide much longer these forces that it has let loose—as witness Sir Alfred Ewing's presidential address to the British Association in 1932.¹ And the main reason why this would-be Western Salt of the Earth is in fear, to-day, of losing its savour is because the great mass of the Western body social has remained unsalted.

To-day this great mass of humanity still remains on substantially the same intellectual and moral level on which it lay—a century ago, or a century and a half—before the titanic new social forces began to emerge. The measure of this intellectual and moral retardation or stagnation or degradation of the mass is given with remorseless accuracy by the character of 'the Yellow Press'. In the latter-day perversion of our Western Press, we see the 'drive' of Western Industrialism and Democracy being employed to keep the mass of Western Humanity culturally depressed at, or perhaps even below, its pre-industrial and pre-democratic spiritual level; and the same new 'drive' has been put, with similar evil consequences, into the old institutions of War and Tribalism and Slavery and Property.² The creative minority in the modern Western World is in danger of seeing its advance brought to a standstill and the ground that it has conquered filched away by an act of betrayal that has prostituted the new-won powers and the new-made apparatus of this handful of pioneers to the anti-social function of debauching the rest of Society. This betrayal is a dastardly crime; and yet, in exposing it, we have not really probed to the bottom of the mischief. For the life of the many could never have been debauched so effectively by adroitly misapplying the inventions of the few if the many had not remained morally and intellectually stationary all

¹ See the passages quoted from this address in III. C (i) (d), p. 211, above.

² See III. C (i) (d), p. 212, above, and IV. C (iii) (b) 2-7, vol. iv, pp. 137-98, below.

the time while the few were making their tremendous moral and intellectual advance. This stagnation of the masses is the fundamental cause of the crisis with which our Western Civilization is confronted in our day. And the intensity of this crisis seems to bear out the Hindu controversialist's contention that the blemish which the Western observer perceives in the social structure of Hinduism is not peculiar to the Hindu Society, but is likewise discernible in the contemporary Western World.¹ This common predicament of two living societies may be regarded as a regular phenomenon in the life of all civilizations that are, or at any time have been, in process of growth.

The very fact that the growths of civilizations are the work of creative individuals or creative minorities carries the implication that the uncreative majority will be left behind unless the pioneers can contrive some means of carrying this sluggish rear-guard along with them in their eager advance. And this consideration requires us to qualify the definition of the difference between civilizations and primitive societies on which we have hitherto worked. At an earlier point in this Study,² we found that the primitive societies, as we know them, are in a static condition, whereas the civilizations—or, at any rate, the growing civilizations—are in dynamic movement. We should now rather say that growing civilizations differ from static primitive societies in virtue of the dynamic movement, in their bodies social, of creative individual personalities; and we should add that these creative personalities, at their greatest numerical strength, never amount to more than a small minority in the society which their action pervades and animates. In every growing civilization, even at the times when it is growing the most

¹ In estimating our Western Society's prospects of surmounting this crisis, we may perhaps venture to encourage ourselves by recalling certain instances in our own past history in which a gulf that had opened between an advancing minority and a lagging majority was after all successfully closed by bringing the majority into line. A noteworthy instance presents itself in the history of Parliamentary government in England. The successful establishment of responsible parliamentary government as a result of 'the Glorious Revolution' of A.D. 1688 was followed by a *de facto* limitation of the exercise of political power through this new constitutional channel to an oligarchy which represented a much smaller fraction of the total population of the country than the class which had effectively enjoyed the franchise in previous chapters of parliamentary history, when the control of Parliament over the Government had been imperfect or negligible. Moreover, this oligarchy succeeded in maintaining its virtual monopoly for nearly a century and a half—from A.D. 1688 to A.D. 1832—with the result that the mass of the population was practically disfranchised and the new system of government threatened to lose its vitality. Yet, even thus late in the day, it proved not impossible to bring the rear-guard into line with the van-guard; and in the course of the century beginning in A.D. 1832 successive extensions of the franchise have enabled almost the whole adult population to participate in the political life which the Whig oligarchs won for themselves in A.D. 1688. Similarly, the social gulf which opened, in an earlier chapter of English history, between the thegns, who had played the leading part in beating off the Vikings, and the militarily subordinate rank and file of the freemen, was successfully closed again without the permanent establishment of a rigid caste-system. (See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 200, and III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 196 and 215-16, above.) These historical precedents may serve to put us in better heart to-day.

² In Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 192-5.

lustily, the great majority of the participant individuals are in the same stagnant quiescent condition as the members of a primitive society which is in a state of rest. More than that, the great majority of the participants in any civilization in any phase are men of like passions—of identical human nature—with Primitive Mankind.

'The truth is that, if Civilization has profoundly modified Man, it has done so by making the social milieu into a kind of reservoir for accumulating habits and skills which are poured into the individual by Society in each successive generation. Scratch the surface and efface what we receive from an education which never ceases, and we shall rediscover something very like primitive humanity in the depths of our nature. . . . Human Nature is the same to-day as it always has been.'¹

It will be seen that, although the difference between static primitive societies and growing civilizations is traceable to a difference in nature between two types of individual which are respectively characteristic of the two species of society, the individual participants in societies of the higher species do not conform exclusively, or indeed predominantly, to the type of individual which is characteristic of this species of society. The characteristic type of individual whose action turns a primitive society into a civilization and causes a growing civilization to grow is the 'superior personality' or 'genius' or 'great mystic' or 'superman'; but in any growing society at any given moment the individuals of this type are always in a minority. They are no more than a leaven in a lump of ordinary humanity; and this ordinary humanity is no different in nature from the human type which is typical of primitive societies.

Thus the line of spiritual demarcation between superior personalities and ordinary human beings does not coincide with the line of social demarcation between civilizations and primitive societies. There is an overwhelming majority of ordinary people in the membership of even the most advanced and progressive civilization; and the humanity of all these people is virtually primitive humanity.

'Those beliefs and customs of Savage Man are "primitive" which are the product of that "primitive" type of mind, or of non-primitive mind

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 133 and 169. See further pp. 106-7 and 150-70 for the author's whole argument against the thesis that primitive Human Nature in primitive societies differs in kind from ordinary Human Nature in the societies that are in process of civilization. The great French philosopher's opinion on this question is shared by a great English anthropologist: 'The truth seems to be that to this day the peasant remains a pagan and savage at heart; his civilization is merely a thin veneer which the hard knocks of Life soon abrade, exposing the solid core of paganism and savagery below.' (Frazer, Sir J. G.: *The Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., Part VII: 'Balder the Beautiful' (London 1913, Macmillan), Preface, pp. viii-ix. Cp. Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i (i), 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 145.)

which from some cause or other keeps the co-ordinative reasoning controlling power in abeyance. That man is "primitive", whether he is a Veddah of Ceylon or a European peasant, whose ideas and practices are of that character.¹

Conversely, we have no warrant for assuming that the Arcadian village or the Ethiopian kraal or even the most backward and stagnant primitive society is destitute of superior personalities *in posse*²—individuals who have lived and died obscure because they have failed to break 'the cake of custom' and have therefore failed to win for their potential genius the field which it needs in order to realize and manifest itself in action.

Along the cool sequester'd Vale of Life
They kept the noiseless tenour of their way.

We are still left at grips with the problem of how those dynamic personalities who do succeed in breaking 'the cake of custom' in their own *for intérieur* are actually able to consolidate their individual victory, and save it from being converted into a social defeat, by going on to break 'the cake of custom' in their social milieu and so drawing all men unto them. In order to solve this problem,

'a double effort is demanded: an effort on the part of some people to make a new invention, and an effort on the part of all the rest to adopt it and adapt themselves to it. A society can be called a civilization as soon as these acts of initiative and this attitude of docility are both found in it together. As a matter of fact, the second condition is more difficult to secure than the first. The indispensable factor which has not been at the command of the uncivilized societies is, in all probability, not the superior personality (there seems no reason why Nature should not have had a certain number of these felicitous vagaries at all times and places). The missing factor is more likely to have been the opportunity for individuals of this stamp to display their superiority and the disposition in other individuals to follow their lead.'³

This problem of securing that the uncreative majority shall in

¹ Murphy, J.: *Primitive Man: His Essential Quest* (London 1927, Milford), p. 10.

² 'Le génie est répandu sur le genre humain à peu près comme l'or dans une mine. Plus vous prenez de minéral, plus vous recueillez de métal. Plus il y aura d'hommes et plus vous aurez de grands hommes ou d'hommes propres à devenir grands. Les hasards de l'éducation et ceux des événements les développent ou les laissent enfouis dans l'obscurité. . . . On est forcé d'avouer que si Corneille, élevé dans un village, eût mené la charrue toute sa vie, que si Racine fût né au Canada chez les Hurons . . . ils n'eussent jamais déployé leur génie.'—Plan de Deux Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle' in *Œuvres de Turgot*, nouvelle édition (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 645-6.

³ Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 181. Compare the following passage of Plato (in *Laws*, 951 B-C): 'Among the mass of Mankind there is always a certain number—though a very small number—of godlike individuals whose inspiration is of priceless social value. These rare individuals are no more apt to emerge in socially progressive societies than in others; so the members of the socially progressive societies ought to be constantly on their tracks, scouring sea and land in order to discover sterling representatives of the species [and to derive from them inspiration for] revising the existing body of social institutions.'

fact follow the creative minority's lead appears to have two solutions, the one practical and the other ideal.

'How is one to get purchase upon the will [of another person]? There are two ways open to the educator. The one way is by drill (*dressage*) . . . the other is by mysticism. . . . The first method inculcates a morality consisting of impersonal habits; the second induces the imitation of another personality, and even a spiritual union, a more or less complete identification, with it.'¹

The classic description of this second, mystical method is given in Plato's indignant refusal of Dionysius's request for a short and simple exposition of the Platonic philosophy in writing.

'I have one thing to say about all writers, past or future, who claim to understand my philosophy either as a result of oral communications received from me or from others or by the unaided light of their own genius. All such claimants stand convicted of charlatanism on my showing. At any rate there is no written work of my own on my philosophy, and there never will be. For this philosophy cannot possibly be put into words as other sciences can. The sole way of acquiring it is by strenuous intellectual communion and intimate personal intercourse, which kindle it in the soul instantaneously like a light caught from a leaping flame; and, once alight, it feeds its own flame thenceforward. Of course I know very well that the best presentation of it, oral or written, would be my own. I also know that I should be the first to be pained by a written presentation which failed to do it justice. And if I believed that an adequate popular presentation, either written or verbal, were possible, what finer life-work could I have set myself than to write something of real benefit for Mankind; something which would bring the nature of the Universe into the light of day for all eyes to see? Unhappily, I do not consider that the study of my philosophy is good for people, with the exception of a few who are capable of discovering it for themselves with the aid of a minimum of demonstration. As for the rest, I fancy that some would be filled perversely with a misguided contempt and others with a soaring, windy expectation—in the belief that they had learnt something tremendous.'²

The direct kindling of creative energy from soul to soul, which Plato here enjoins, is no doubt the ideal way. Yet to enjoin this way exclusively is a counsel of perfection. The problem of bringing the uncreative rank and file of a growing society into line with the creative pioneers, in order to save the pioneers' own advance from being brought to a halt, cannot be solved in practice, on the social scale, without also bringing into play the faculty of sheer mimesis—one of the less exalted faculties of Human Nature which has more in it of drill than of inspiration.

To bring mimesis into play is indispensable for the purpose in

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-9.

² Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341 B-E.

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hand because mimesis, at any rate, is one of the regular faculties of ordinary Primitive Man.

'The original drill, the drill that has been intended by Nature, consists in the adoption of the habits of the group; it is automatic; and it is performed spontaneously in situations where the individual feels himself half merged in the collective life.'

Thus, when the Promethean *élan* summons mimesis to its aid in order to express itself in the growths of civilizations through the action of creative individuals or creative minorities, it is not called upon to perform the *tour de force* of evoking, in the other individuals who constitute the uncreative majority, some new faculty which has hitherto been alien from their nature. Creative Evolution has set herself here the easier task of utilizing an existing faculty for the performance of a new function by merely giving the faculty a new orientation; and this historic reorientation of an intrinsically unaltered faculty of mimesis has engaged our attention already in our first inquiry into the specific difference between primitive societies and civilizations. We have noticed already that mimesis is a generic feature of social life and that its operation can be observed in societies of both species. But we have also noticed in the same context that while, in primitive societies, mimesis is directed towards the older generation of the living members and towards the dead ancestors, in whom 'the cake of custom' is incarnated, the mimetic faculty is reoriented, in societies in process of civilization, towards creative personalities who have broken new ground.² The 'elements' of the old faculty 'persist; but they have been magnetized and have been turned by this magnetization in a new direction'.³

Can this revised version of a primitive social drill—this perfunctory and almost automatic right or left incline—really serve as an effective substitute for the 'strenuous intellectual communion and intimate personal intercourse' which Plato declares to be the sole way in which the spark of creative energy can be genuinely transmitted?⁴ It can only be replied that the inertia of Mankind

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 99. This metaphor of 'drill' is also employed by Bagehot, W., in *Physics and Politics*, 10th ed. (London 1894, Kegan Paul), p. 27.

² See Part II, B, vol. i, pp. 191-2, above.

³ Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 230. 'This is the principal mode in which the greatest minds of an age produce their effect. They set the tone which others take, and the fashion which others use. There is an odd idea that those who take what is called a "scientific view" of history need rate lightly the influence of individual character. It would be as reasonable to say that those who take a scientific view of Nature need think little of the influence of the Sun. On the scientific view a great man is a great new cause.' (Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th ed. (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 96-7.)

⁴ This question is raised by de Gobineau: 'L'imitation n'indique pas nécessairement une rupture sérieuse avec les tendances héréditaires, et l'on n'est vraiment entré dans le sein d'une civilisation que lorsqu'on se trouve en état d'y progresser soi-même, par soi-même et sans guide.' (*Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (Paris 1853-5, Firmin-Didot, 4 vols.), vol. i, p. 122.)

in the mass has never in fact been overcome by the exclusive use of the Platonic method; and that, in order to draw the inert majority along in the active minority's train, the ideal method of direct individual inspiration has always had to be reinforced by the practical method of wholesale social drill—a habitual exercise of Primitive Mankind which can be made to serve the cause of social progress when new leaders take command and issue new marching orders.

The creative personality who makes play with the primitive habit of mimesis in order to move a mass of ordinary people on whom he has no hope of getting purchase in any other way is in much the same quandary as a chauffeur who turns and turns his crank on the chance that the engine may start up in the end if only he persists. The chauffeur resorts to this primitive donkey-work because experience has taught him that these apparently 'vain repetitions'¹ are actually capable of striking the essential spark which he has failed to conjure up with his 'self-starter'. A similar capacity is latent in the apparently perfunctory and automatic spiritual motions of mimesis.

'Formulae that are almost void of meaning have a way of evoking here and there, like veritable magic phrases, the spirit that can fulfil them. A mediocre teacher, giving mechanical instruction in a science that has been created by men of genius, may awake in some one of his pupils the vocation which he has never felt in himself, and may convert him all unconsciously into an emulator of those great men whose personalities are invisibly present in the message which our teacher transmits.'²

It is this mysterious possibility of kindling fire by rubbing dry sticks that invites, and justifies, the play which is made with mimesis in those relations between creative minorities and inert majorities that bring about the growths of civilizations. Mimesis, as we have seen,³ may lead to the acquisition of social 'assets'—aptitudes or emotions or ideas—which the acquirers had not originated for themselves and which they might never have possessed if they had not encountered and imitated other people in whose possession these assets were already to be found. This, of course, is as much as to say that mimesis is a 'short cut'; and, at a later point in this Study,⁴ we shall find that this 'short cut', though it may be an inevitable path

¹ Matt. vi. 7.

² Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-30. Compare p. 47, *ad init.* An historic social illustration of Bergson's point is offered, in the sphere of Art, by the extraordinary yet well-established fact that the sublime and vital and creative art of Mahayanian Buddhism was actually kindled into flame by the spark of divine fire which was invisibly present in the mediocre works on Hellenic art—produced mechanically on standardized patterns for commercial profit—which were current in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and North-Eastern Iran and the Panjab round about the beginning of the Christian Era.

³ In Part II. B, vol. i, p. 191, above.

⁴ In IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 123-31, below.

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towards a necessary goal, is also a dubious expedient which no less inevitably exposes a growing civilization to the peril of breakdown. It would be premature, however, to discuss that peril in this place. For, now that we have come to the end of our inquiry into the relation between growing civilizations and individuals, we have next to inquire into the interaction between individuals in growing civilizations.

(b) THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS IN GROWING
CIVILIZATIONS

The Movement of Withdrawal-and-Return

In the last chapter we have studied the course which is followed by creative personalities when they are taking the mystic path which is their highest spiritual level. We have watched the mystic's soul passing first out of action into ecstasy and then out of ecstasy into action again.¹ In this language, we have been describing the creative movement in terms of the personality's inward psychic experience. In terms of his external relations with other individual human beings in the social life which is the common ground of his and their respective individual fields of action, we shall be describing the same movement if we call it a disengagement and temporary withdrawal of the creative personality from his social milieu, and his subsequent return to the same milieu transfigured: in a new capacity and with new powers. The disengagement and withdrawal make it possible for the personality to realize individual potentialities which might have remained in abeyance if the individual in whom they were immanent had not been released for a moment from his social toils and trammels. The withdrawal is an opportunity, and perhaps a necessary condition, for the anchorite's transfiguration; but, by the same token, this transfiguration can have no purpose, and perhaps even no meaning,² except as a prelude to the return of the transfigured personality into the social milieu out of which he has originally come: a native environment from which the human social animal cannot permanently estrange himself without repudiating his humanity and becoming 'either a beast or a god'.³ The return is the essence of the whole movement, as well as its final cause.

¹ See the passage quoted from Bergson on pp. 234-5, above.

² The transfiguration of a creative personality is a change in his aspect which, *ex hypothesi*, is perceived in him by fellow human beings; and it can only be perceived by men and women who have associated with him after, as well as before, he has enjoyed the personal spiritual experience of which his transfigured countenance is the outward and visible sign. (See Exodus xxxiv. 29-35, for a description of such transfiguration in mythological imagery.)

³ Aristotle, *Politics*, i. 1, 9-12 (p. 1253 A), quoted in I. C (iii) (c), vol. i, on p. 173, above.

This is apparent in the Syriac myth of Moses' solitary ascent of Mount Sinai. Moses ascends the mountain in order to commune with Yahweh at Yahweh's call; and the call is to Moses alone, while the rest of the Children of Israel are charged to keep their distance and not to touch the mount, under pain of being blasted by a force which only Moses can confront unscathed. Yet Yahweh's whole purpose in calling Moses up is to send him down again as the bearer of a new law which Moses is to communicate to the rest of the people because they are incapable of coming up to receive the communication themselves.

'And Moses went up unto God; and the Lord called unto him out of the mountain, saying: "Thus shalt thou say to the house of Jacob and tell the Children of Israel. . . ."

'And he gave unto Moses, when he had made an end of communing with him upon Mount Sinai, two tables of testimony . . . written with the finger of God.'¹

The emphasis upon the return is equally strong in the account of the prophetic experience and the prophetic mission which is given by the Arabic philosopher Ibn Khaldūn.

'The human soul has an innate disposition to divest itself of its human nature in order to clothe itself in the nature of the angels and to become an angel in reality for a single instant of time—a moment which comes and goes as swiftly as the flicker of an eye-lid. Thereupon, the soul resumes its human nature, after having received, in the world of angels, a message which it has to carry to its own human kind. This is the meaning of the terms Revelation and Discourse of Angels.'²

In this philosophic interpretation of the Islamic doctrine of prophecy we seem to catch an echo of a famous passage of Hellenic philosophy: the Platonic simile of the Cave.³

"And now," he said . . . , "Picture to yourself people in a kind of cave-like underground dwelling. The place has its entrance open to the light, and this entrance stretches along the whole length of the cave. Picture these people living in this place from their infancy with their limbs fettered and likewise their necks, so that they cannot change their position and can only see in front of them, because the fetters make it impossible for them to turn their heads. And then imagine fire-light coming to them, from behind their backs, from a fire which is burning at a higher level and at a long distance off, with a raised road running between this fire and the prisoners. And now picture a parapet built along the side of the road, like the screens in front of the performers in a Punch and Judy show—the screens over the top of which they display their puppets."

¹ Exodus xix. 3, and xxxi. 18. See chapter xix, *passim*.

² Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, French translation by Baron M. de Slane (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 437.

³ Plato, *Republic*, 514 A-521 C.

"I see the picture," he said.

"Well, now imagine people carrying past this parapet all kinds of material objects which show up over the top of it—particularly models of living creatures: figures of human beings and figures of animals made of stone and of wood and of all kinds of materials. And imagine that some of the people will be talking—as they naturally will—and others keeping silence as they carry the objects by."

"A strange simile," he said, "and strange prisoners!"¹

"The prisoners are ourselves," said I.

The prisoners, of course, take it for granted that the moving shadows cast by the fire-light upon the back wall of the cave are the ultimate realities, since these are the only realities that they have ever been able to see. They cannot guess that these are mere shadows of solid objects that are in motion, outside the cave, behind the prisoners' backs; or that these objects themselves are only inanimate models of living beings—models whose motions are imparted to them by genuine living agents whose very shadows are intercepted by the parapet and therefore never appear on the cave-wall screen. When the voices of the passengers on the road actually penetrate the cave and echo from the wall on which the moving shadows of their burdens are cast, the prisoners imagine—inevitably—that the voices are being emitted by the shadows of the objects that are being carried by the speakers, and never suspect the existence of the speakers themselves. This fantasy is presented by Plato as an apt simile for the ordinary state of ordinary people in the ordinary world.

Plato then imagines a prisoner being suddenly released from his fetters and compelled to stand up and turn his head and walk and face the light and finally come out into the open. The first result of this sudden compulsory reorientation of vision is that the liberated prisoner is dazzled and confused. He finds himself in an agonizing and incomprehensible blaze of light, and wishes himself back in the comfortable and familiar underground environment in which he has been brought up. But this is only the first effect of his translation from the fire-lit cave into the sun-lit upper world. The faculty of vision is already in him, and it only needs this drastic reorientation of direction and change of medium in order to accustom his eyes gradually to take in the real world, until at last he is able to look the Sun himself in the face. And when the

¹ The simile is more strange to a reader of Plato's generation in Plato's world than to one of our generation in ours; for Plato is really picturing, by a brilliant effort of imagination, the situation of an audience in a cinematograph theatre with its eyes glued to the screen on which a lantern at their backs projects the lights and shadows of a moving film. Plato even anticipates the distinction between silent films and 'talkies'. If Plato had happened to live in this Western World in this twentieth century, he would assuredly have taken the simile which he requires at this point in *The Republic* from real life, instead of resorting to an elaborate and inevitably somewhat bizarre fantasy.

liberated prisoner has thus adapted himself to living in sunlight and freedom completely, his previous condition is exactly inverted. If he is now suddenly compelled to turn his back on the light of day and go down into the cave again, he is just as much dazzled and confused by the twilight now as he was by the sunlight before. He experiences all the agonies and uncertainties of translation once again; and again he regrets, and now if possible still more poignantly, the environment which he is being compelled to leave. Moreover, this time his regrets are fully justified; for this time he is being compelled to leave a better world for a worse (as he knows now, for certain, through having had some experience of either); and, in returning to his old companions in the cave who have never yet seen the sunlight, he will be exposed to the risk of a hostile reception.

"There will assuredly be laughter at his expense, and it will be said of him that the only result of his escapade up there is that he has come back with his eye-sight ruined. Moral: it is a fool's game even to make the attempt to go up aloft; "and as for the busybody who goes in for all this liberating and translating to higher spheres, if ever we have a chance to catch him and kill him, we will certainly take it".

When Plato has painted the ordeal of the return in these unattractive colours, it is almost startling to find him imposing this ordeal remorselessly upon his elect philosophers. If it is essential to the Platonic system that the elect should acquire philosophy, it is equally essential that they should not remain philosophers only. The purpose and the meaning of their philosophic enlightenment is that they should ultimately become philosopher-kings.

"Our business," I said, "is to compel the most highly gifted individuals in our society to address themselves to the study which we have called the greatest study of all. We have to make them see the Good by ascending the ascent which we have pictured in our simile. But when they have duly ascended and seen their fill, then it becomes our business not to give them the licence which is actually given them nowadays."

"What licence?"

"The licence," I said, "of remaining up there and refusing to come down again to the prisoners who have remained in bondage—refusing to share, for better or for worse, in the trials and triumphs of that underworld. . . . We must say to them . . . : *You have each of you to come down again in your turn to the common dwelling-place of your kin and kind; and you have to accustom yourselves again to using your eyes in the dark. When you have recovered the habit, you will find yourselves infinitely sharper-sighted than the denizens of the underworld. You will know exactly what each of the shadows is, and what it is a shadow of, thanks to the vision which you have had of Reality in the several realms of Beauty and Justice and Goodness. And so our society—which is also*

your society—will be taught to live its life in the clear light of consciousness instead of having to live it in the nightmare in which most societies have been kept hitherto by people who have been fighting over shadows—struggling for power, as though power were a prize worth winning—while the actual truth is, and must be, that social life is happiest and most harmonious where those who have to rule are the last people who would choose to be rulers, and is least happy and least harmonious where the rulers are of the opposite disposition.”

The path which Plato here lays down for his philosopher-kings is unmistakably identical with the path that has been trodden by the Christian mystics.¹ The pain and bewilderment which the Platonic prisoner suffers for a time after he has been forced to come up out of the cave into the sunlight correspond to the raptures and hallucinations which are the prelude to the Christian mystic's transfiguration through his ecstatic union with God.² The still sharper pain and still deeper bewilderment which the liberated prisoner suffers when he is forced to re-descend into the chthonic 'prison-house' and feels its 'shades' beginning 'to close around' him³ correspond, in turn, to 'the dark night' through which the soul of the Christian mystic has to pass when it is returning from ecstasy into action. Yet, while the path is identical, the spirit in which it is traversed by the Hellenic and the Christian soul is not the same.

In the Simile of the Cave, it is taken for granted that the personal interest, as well as the personal desire, of the liberated and enlightened philosopher must be in opposition to the interest of the mass of his fellow men who still 'sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, . . . fast bound in misery and iron'.⁴ For these unliberated prisoners of the underworld, the crying need—though they themselves may be blind to it—is that the philosopher should return, 'trailing clouds of glory', 'from God who is' his 'home',⁵ like 'a day-spring from on high' to give them light: 'to give knowledge of salvation', and 'to guide' their 'feet into the way of peace'.⁶ On the other hand, the philosopher, on Plato's showing, cannot minister to these needs of Mankind without sacrificing his own happiness and his own perfection. For, when once he has attained enlightenment, the best thing for the philosopher himself, in Plato's own view, is to remain in the light and live happily there ever after.

¹ For a penetrating analysis and description, in small compass, of the Christian mystic experience, see Bergson, *Il.: Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 243-9. Portions of this passage have been quoted already in the present Study on pp. 234-5, above.

² For these raptures and hallucinations, see Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

³ William Wordsworth: *Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood*.

⁴ Psalm cviii. 10.

⁵ Wordsworth, *op. cit.*

⁶ Luke i. 77-9.

It was indeed a fundamental tenet of Hellenic Philosophy that the best state of life is the state of 'contemplation' (*θεωρία*): a philosophic term with a religious association¹ which pitches its meaning somewhere between 'intellectual speculation' and 'mystical ecstasy'. The life of contemplation is placed by Pythagoras above the life of action, as well as above the life of pleasure;² and this doctrine runs through the whole Hellenic philosophical tradition from Pythagoras to the Neoplatonists. It is accepted, explicitly or implicitly, by Plato himself in many places besides the passage here quoted; and in this passage, as we have seen, Plato assumes that nothing but compulsion will bring the philosopher down again to the underworld and back again to Mankind to perform the social task which his fellow men require of him. The compulsion which the Platonic philosophers obey when they become philosopher-kings may not be really external; but even if they are driven into action by a Spartan sense of duty rather than by a Median lash, they are being driven all the same; and, however admirably they may behave, they are handicapped by a fatal lack of zest which checks the impetus of their *élan*. This negative, weary, melancholy temper is manifest in the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius, the historic philosopher-king who dutifully carried on his shoulders the burden of governing the whole *Orbis Romanus*.

'Human life! Its duration is momentary, its substance in perpetual flux, its senses dim, its physical organism perishable, its consciousness a vortex, its destiny dark, its repute uncertain—in fact, the material element is a rolling stream, the spiritual element dreams and vapour, life a war and a sojourning in a far country, fame oblivion. What can see us through? One thing and one only—Philosophy; and that means keeping the spirit within us unspoiled and undishonoured . . . and taking what comes contentedly as all part of the process to which we owe our own being.'³

The state of mind of the historic philosopher-king which is revealed in this passage reflects upon the pious hope which is expressed by Plato at the close of his allegory. Plato affects to believe that his enlightened philosophers, when they receive their orders to return, will duly obey and duly consent to take a hand in the work of the World (on the understanding that they are to take it turn and turn about, so that they can spend the greater part of their time apart, in exclusive communion with one another, in a

¹ A *θεωρός* means, in the technical terminology of Hellenic public life, an ambassador from a city-state to the holy place of some Pan-Hellenic divinity: e.g. to the oracle of Apollo at Delphi.

² Burnet, J.: *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato* (London 1914, Macmillan), p. 42.

³ Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *To Himself*, Bk. II, *ad fin.*

pure moral atmosphere and a clear intellectual daylight).¹ But while this Platonic Wisdom might be justified of her children² in the rare personality of a Marcus, who carried his heavy burden of social responsibility in the spirit of a conscientious sentry who would not desert his post,³ this was not the characteristic spirit of Hellenic philosophers and not their common practice; and the example of Marcus in the second century of the Roman Empire was not followed by Plotinus in the next century, when the breakdown of the Hellenic universal state was making the duty of returning to the World less attractive to Hellenic philosophers than ever. In Plotinus, both Hellenic Philosophy and Hellenic Mysticism reached their term; and Plotinus's repudiation of the Platonic injunction to return is taken by Bergson as a sign that the Hellenic form of Mysticism was incomplete.

'In our eyes, the culmination of Mysticism is an entry into contact, and in consequence a partial coincidence, with the creative effort that is manifested by Life. This effort comes from God, if it is not identical with God himself. The great mystic would be an individual who transcended the limits assigned to the Human Species by its materiality, and who thus continued and prolonged God's action. . . . To Plotinus . . . it was given to see the Promised Land, but not to set foot upon its soil. He went as far as Ecstasy: a state in which the Soul feels itself, or thinks that it feels itself, in the presence of God, with God's light illuminating it. But Plotinus did not transcend this last stage and so arrive at the point where contemplation plunges into action and the human will becomes merged in the divine will. Plotinus believed himself to be at the summit: to go further would have been, for him, to go downwards. And this is what he has expressed in language which is admirable in itself but which is not the language of Mysticism in its plenitude. "Action," he says, "is a weakened form of contemplation."⁴ Herein Plotinus remains faithful to the intellectualism of the Hellenic genius. In fact, he sums it up in a striking formula. . . . In a word, Mysticism, in the absolute sense in which we have decided to take the term, was never attained by Hellenic thought. No doubt Mysticism was seeking here for realization; and, as an unrealized possibility, it knocked several times on the door. The door actually opened to it wider and wider, but never wide enough to allow it to enter complete.'⁵

This ultimate refusal of the Hellenic philosophers to return from the world of contemplation into the world of action out of which they had originally come may explain why it was that the breakdown which the Hellenic Civilization had suffered in the generation

¹ Plato, *Republic*, 520 D.

² Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 35.

³ For this simile of the sentry see Plato, *Phaedo*, 62 B, where it is placed in Socrates' mouth.

⁴ 'Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν ἀσθενήσωσιν εἰς τὸ θεωρεῖν, σκίαν θεωρίας καὶ λόγου τὴν πρᾶξιν ποιοῦνται. (Ennead III, viii, 4).

⁵ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-6.

preceding Plato's generation was never retrieved. For here we see the same 'great refusal' that the creators of the Egyptiac Civilization made in the age of the Pyramid-Builders,¹ and that Zeus would have made at the dawn of Hellenic history if he had not been saved from it, in spite of himself, by Prometheus.² The reason why 'the great refusal' was made by the Hellenic philosophers is also clear. Their moral limitation was the consequence of an error in belief. Believing that the ecstasy and not the return was the be-all and end-all of the spiritual Odyssey on which they had embarked, they saw nothing but a sacrifice on the altar of duty in the painful passage from ecstasy to return which was really the purpose and meaning and culmination of the movement in which they were engaged. The supreme importance of this passage, which the Hellenic philosophers just failed to divine, is brought out in Bergson's penetrating account of the experience of the Christian mystics.

'If [in the mystic ecstasy] the Soul is absorbed into God in its thought and in its feeling, there is still some part of it that remains outside, and that is the will. Its action, if it acted, would still proceed simply from itself. Its life, therefore, is not yet divine. Of this it is aware; the knowledge causes it a vague disquietude; and this agitation in repose is characteristic of what we call complete Mysticism. It indicates that the *élan* has been acquired for the sake of going further; that, while the ecstasy certainly engages the perceptive and emotional faculties, there is also the will; and that the will, likewise, has to be restored to God. When this feeling has grown to the point of occupying the whole field of consciousness, the ecstasy has fallen away, the Soul finds itself alone again, and sometimes it is desolated by the experience. Accustomed as it has been for a time to dazzling light, it can no longer distinguish anything in the shade. It does not take account of the profound travail that is being accomplished in obscurity within. It feels that it has lost much; it does not yet know that it has suffered that loss in order to gain all. This is the "dark night" of which the great mystics speak, and it is perhaps the most significant, and in any case the most instructive, feature that the Christian Mysticism has to show. The definitive phase—the phase that is characteristic of the Great Mysticism—is at hand. . . . The soul has already felt God's presence; it has already believed itself to have perceived Him in symbolic visions; it has already even attained to union with Him in the ecstasy; but none of this has been lasting because it has all been nothing but contemplation: action has [always hitherto] recalled the Soul to itself and has thus detached it from God. [But] now it is God who is acting in the Soul and through it: the union is entire, and consequently definitive. . . . Now the visions are things of the past; for how could the Godhead manifest itself from outside to a Soul which is now and henceforward filled with the Godhead? There

¹ See III. C (i) (d), pp. 212-15, above.

² See III. B, above.

is nothing more now in the appearance of such a human being to indicate that there is any essential distinction between him and the other human beings among whom he moves. He alone is aware of a change which raises him to the rank of the *adjutores Dei* who are passive in their relation to God but active in their relation to Mankind."¹

This movement of Withdrawal-and-Return, which culminates in 'the dark night of the Soul' in the Christian mystical experience, is not a peculiarity of human life which is only to be observed in the relations of human beings with their fellows. It is something that is characteristic of Life in general; and it becomes manifest to Man in the life of the plants as soon as Man has made this plant-life his own concern by taking to agriculture. In the World of Vegetation the withdrawal and the return are enacted in the annual procession of the seasons. The corn withdraws in the autumn when the stubble wilts and the seed is sown in the bosom of the Earth; the buried seed undergoes its mystic unseen transfiguration in the winter; and the corn returns in the spring when the green blade rises out of the ground in order to ripen for a fresh harvest in the summer. This movement of Withdrawal-and-Return in the Vegetable Kingdom, which has entered into the economic life of Mankind in consequence of the invention of agriculture, pulsates through our human economic activity in all its post-agricultural transformations. Withdrawal-and-Return is the rhythm of the Nomad's annual trek on a recurrent orbit with his flocks and herds; and we bear testimony to the operation of the same *motif* in the rhythm of our own modern Western Industrialism when we talk of 'sinking' capital or of making 'a reproductive investment'.

The manifest parallelism between the life of plants and the life of men has led the human imagination to express its thoughts and feelings and hopes and fears about each of these two realms of life in terms of the other.

The Withdrawal-and-Return of the corn has been translated into anthropomorphic terms in ritual and mythology, as witness the rape and restoration of a Korê or Persephonê,² and the death and resurrection of a Dionysus or Adonis or Osiris or whatever may be the local name for the universal corn-spirit or *ἐνιαυτός δαίμων* whose ritual and myth are as ubiquitous as the art of agriculture itself. It is a frequent feature of the agrarian myth that the

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-8.

² If the mythical adventure of Persephonê represents the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return when it is carried to completion (as we have seen it carried in the experience of the Christian mystics), we may perhaps take the myth of Eurydicê as an allegory of the movement when it comes to a halt just short of the triumphant return (as we have seen it come to a halt in the experience of the Hellenic philosophers).

transfiguration which is accomplished during the period of withdrawal should likewise be translated into human terms by introducing a difference of personality and a diversity of sex. The springing corn is thus pictured as a male child who is born from the womb of the Earth Mother.

Conversely, the human imagination has found an allegory of human life in the phenomena of Withdrawal-and-Return which are apparent in the life of plants and trees and flowers; and in terms of this allegory it has wrestled with the problem of Death: a problem which begins to torment human minds from the moment when, in growing civilizations, the higher personalities, whose value and significance lie in their unique originality and therefore appear to be annihilated by their death, begin to disengage themselves from the mass of Mankind.

There is a passage in the Homeric Epic in which the poet's apprehension of the common lot of leaves and men casts a shadow over the husbandman's glad confidence in the return of spring—the shadow of the thought of the transitoriness of the lives of men:

Mark ye the leaves, for men are like thereto.
When leaves by winds into the dust are whirled
Soon the green forest buddeth millions new,
And lo, the beauty of Spring is on the World.
So come, so pass, all that are born of Man.¹

In the dirge for the Sicilian Greek poet Bion—an anonymous Greek poem of the third century B.C.—the annual reappearance of the plants and flowers is represented, in the antique vein of the agrarian ritual, as a happy resurrection, and not in the Homeric vein as a ruthless replacement of old life by new; but this is only to point a pathetic contrast between the resurrection of the flower and the last sleep of a man from which there is no waking.

Alas, when mallow in the garden dies,
Or parsley green, or crinkled anise dear,
They rise again, they bloom another year;
But we, great men, so powerful and so wise,
Once dead, beneath the hollow earth must keep
A long, dumb, changeless, unawakening sleep.²

In this passage from a poem of the Hellenic decline, the return of a human being to the society of his fellows, when once he has been withdrawn from the material world of men by the stroke of Death, is ruled out of the bounds of possibility. But there was a subterranean stream of Hellenic feeling and thought in which

¹ *Iliad*, vi, ll. 146-9, translated by Gilbert Murray.

² *Anonymi Epitaphios Bionis*, ll. 99-104, translated by Gilbert Murray.

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the annual resurrection of the vegetation—represented anthropomorphically as the *ἐνταυτός δαίμων*—was taken as an earnest of immortality for individual human beings; and this underground spiritual current, which was the spirit of the Eleusinian and the Orphic mysteries, welled up to the surface of thought and belief in the allegorical imagery of Primitive Christianity.

‘Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit.’¹

The allegory suggested in this passage from the Gospel according to Saint John is introduced and followed out in an older document of the collection that constitutes the New Testament:

‘Some man will say: “How are the dead raised up? And with what body do they come?”

‘Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die;

‘And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat or of some other grain;

‘But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body . . .

‘So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption;

‘It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power;

‘It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body . . .

‘And so it is written: “The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit.” . . .

‘The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from Heaven.’²

In this passage from the First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, four ideas are presented in a succession which is also a crescendo. The first idea is that we are witnessing a resurrection when we behold the return of the corn in the spring after its withdrawal in the autumn. The passage thus begins by reaffirming the ancient faith in the resurrection of plants and flowers which had been enacted in the agrarian ritual and expressed in the agrarian myth, but which had been shaken in the soul of the Homeric poet by his dismay at the appalling human experience of Death. The second idea is that the resurrection of the corn is an earnest of the resurrection of dead human beings: a reaffirmation of a doctrine which the Hellenic Mysteries had taught and which a third-century Greek poet had sorrowfully abandoned. The third idea is that the resurrection of human beings is possible and conceivable in virtue of some kind of transfiguration which their natures undergo through the act of God during the time of waiting that has to intervene

¹ John xii. 24.

² 1 Corinthians xv. 35-8 and 42-5 and 47.

between their death and their return to life. The earnest of this hypothetical transfiguration of dead human beings—a hypothesis which has to be taken on faith—is the manifest transfiguration of seeds into flowers and fruits: a miracle which repeats itself year by year for every human eye to see. This parallel also foreshadows the quality of the transfiguration which human beings are to undergo. This change in human nature is to be a change in the direction of greater endurance, greater beauty, greater power, and greater spirituality; and this last term in the poetic imagery in which Paul describes the change reveals it as identical with the tendency which we have taken as our criterion of growth and which we have called 'etherialization'.¹ The fourth idea in the passage is the last and the most sublime. In the concept of the First and Second Man, the problem of Death is forgotten and the concern for the resurrection of the individual human being is momentarily transcended. In this climax of Paul's thought, the transfiguration of the seed into the fruit, which is apparent in the life of plants and flowers, is taken as an earnest and an allegory of a transfiguration of human nature which is of even greater moment than the destiny of any individual human soul. In the advent of 'the second man who is the Lord from Heaven', Paul hails 'the creation of a new species composed of one unique individual': the *adjutor Dei* whose mission it is to raise the rest of Mankind to a superhuman level by inspiring his fellow-men with his own inspiration from God.²

Thus the same *motif* of withdrawal and transfiguration leading up to a return in glory and power can be discerned in the spiritual experience of Mysticism and in the physical life of the Vegetable Kingdom and in the speculations of the human mind on human death and human immortality and in the creation of a higher out of a lower species. This is evidently a *motif* of cosmic range; and it is therefore not surprising to find that it has furnished one of the 'primordial images' of Mythology, which is an intuitive form of apprehending and expressing universal truths.³

One mythical variant of the *motif* is the story of the foundling. A babe born to a royal heritage is cast away in infancy—sometimes (as in the stories of Oedipus and Perseus) by his own father or grandfather who is warned by a dream or an oracle that his child is destined to supplant him; sometimes (as in the story of Romulus)

¹ See III. C (i) (c), above.

² See the passages from Bergson which are quoted on pp. 232 and 234-5 and 255-6, above.

³ For the nature of Mythology, see I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 442, above. It was a discovery of Plato's that the mythopoeic activity of the human spirit was 'primary' not only in the sense of being 'primitive', but also in the sense of being 'profound', so that even the philosopher, in his highly sophisticated quest, might succeed in penetrating beyond the furthest limits to which reason and logic could carry him by bringing his mythopoeic faculty into play.

by a usurper, who has killed the babe's father or driven him out and fears lest the babe should grow up to avenge him; and sometimes (as in the stories of Jason and Orestes and Zeus and Horus and Moses and Cyrus) by friendly hands that are concerned to save the babe's life from the villain's murderous design.¹ The next chapter in the story is that the infant castaway is miraculously saved alive. Romulus is suckled by a she-wolf and Cyrus by a bitch² and Zeus by the goat—or nymph—Amalthea.³ Jason is reared by the Centaur Cheiron. Oedipus and Cyrus and Romulus are retrieved by shepherds.⁴ Moses floating in his ark of bulrushes among the flags is adopted by Pharaoh's daughter.⁵ Perseus and his mother, cast out to sea from Argos in a crazy chest, come safe to shore on Seriphos. In the third and last chapter the child of destiny—now grown to manhood and wrought to a heroic temper by the hardship through which he has passed—returns in power and glory to enter into his kingdom. Oedipus unwittingly slays and then succeeds his father Laius; Perseus unintentionally slays and then succeeds his grandfather Acrisius; Cyrus deliberately deposes and succeeds his grandfather Astyages; Jason compasses the death of his father's brother and supplanter Pelias; Orestes slays his father's cousin and slayer and supplanter Aegisthus; Romulus takes his revenge upon his father's brother and supplanter Amulius by founding a new city which eclipses Alba Longa; Horus overthrows his father's brother and slayer and supplanter Set and recalls Osiris to life and to power; Moses discomfits Pharaoh by delivering the Children of Israel from out of his hand; Zeus overthrows his own father Cronos. This is the story of the foundling; and in the Hellenic imagination this story loomed so large that it came to be a literary commonplace: a regular ingredient in the

¹ In the stories of Jason and Orestes and Horus the villain is a usurper who is the hero's uncle or cousin (a Pelias and an Aegisthus and a Set; compare Hamlet's usurping uncle who not only deposes but also murders his royal brother who is the father of the hero—as Set slays and dismembers Osiris). In the story of Moses the villain is a legitimate but tyrannical sovereign (Pharaoh; compare Herod in the story of Jesus). In the story of Cyrus the villain is a grandfather (Astyages; compare Acrisius in the story of Perseus). In the story of Zeus, the villain is the hero's father.

² In the Herodotean version of the Cyrus-myth, *Κυνώ* or *Σπακώ* is the name of the child's foster-mother (Herodotus, i. 110). In the Hellenic Mythology, the child who is suckled by a bitch is Neleus.

³ It is pointed out by M. P. Nilsson (in *Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion* (London 1927, Milford), p. 501) that, in the Greek Mythology, the divine child who is reared by some one who is not his mother appears in Hyacinthus, Plutus, Erichthonius, and the Phrygian Dionysus, as well as in the Cretan Zeus. For this Cretan Zeus, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 98, above.

⁴ The Roman twins Romulus and Remus who are retrieved by a shepherd have their Hellenic prototypes in the twins Neleus and Pelias. Neleus (though not, apparently, Pelias) is suckled by a bitch, in consonance with the suckling of Romulus and Remus by a she-wolf.

⁵ Compare the story of Attis, who is hidden as a child among the reeds of the River Gallos and is afterwards taken up by the Goddess Cybele. (See Evans, Sir Arthur: *The Earlier Religion of Greece in the Light of Cretan Discoveries* (London 1931, Macmillan), p. 35.)

plots of the Attic 'New Comedy' and of the Hellenistic Novel. In our own Western folk-lore we find the same story in the fairy-tale of Hop-o'-my-Thumb.

In another mythical variant of the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif*, the hero is not cast out to perish of exposure as an infant, but is sent out as a youth to meet his death on some perilous quest. Perseus is sent by King Polydectes to bring the Gorgon's head; Jason is sent by King Pelias to bring the Golden Fleece; Bellerophon is sent by King Proetus to meet his death in Lycia from the Chimaera or the Solymi or the Amazons; Hêrâklês is sent by King Eurystheus to perform his Twelve Labours. In this variant of the story, the final chapter is the same. The hero defeats the villain's design by triumphantly performing his perilous task and returning from his ordeal in power and glory.¹

In the story of Jesus, the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* perpetually recurs. Jesus is the babe born to a royal heritage—a scion of David or a son of God Himself²—who is cast away in infancy. He comes down from Heaven to be born on Earth; he is born in David's own city of Bethlehem yet finds no room in the inn and has to be laid in a manger, like Moses in his ark or Perseus in his chest. In the stable, he is watched over by friendly animals, as Romulus is watched over by the wolf and Cyrus by the hound, and as Bellerophon is befriended by Pegasus; and he also receives the ministrations of shepherds, and is reared by a foster-father of humble birth, like Romulus and Cyrus and Oedipus. Thereafter he is saved from King Herod's murderous design by being taken away privily to Egypt, as Moses is saved from Pharaoh's murderous design by being hidden in the bulrushes, and as Jason is placed beyond King Pelias' reach by being hidden in the fastness of Mount Pelion, and Cyrus beyond King Astyages' reach by being banished to the highland marches of Media.³ And then, at the end of the story, Jesus returns, as the other heroes return, to enter into His Kingdom. He enters into the Kingdom of Judah when, riding into Jerusalem, He is hailed by the multitudes as the Son of David. He enters into the Kingdom of Heaven in the Ascension.

In all this, the story of Jesus conforms to the common pattern of the story of the foundling babe; but in the Gospels the under-

¹ With this variant of the *motif* we must perhaps class Moses' flight in early manhood from Egypt to Midian, where he receives Yahweh's commission and then returns to Egypt with Yahweh's power working for and through him. Perhaps we should also regard as another variant of the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* the curious masquerade of the youthful Achilles on Scyros and of the toil-worn Hêrâklês in the house of Omphalê. In masquerading as a woman, the mighty man of valour seems, at first sight, to have repudiated his own nature; but the masquerade is temporary, and the hero resumes his proper role in order to perform thereafter the mightiest deeds in his career.

² Compare the lineage of Perseus, who is both a grandson of Acrisius and a son of Zeus.

³ Herodotus, loc. cit.

lying *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return presents itself in other shapes as well. It is present in each one of the successive spiritual experiences in which the divinity of Jesus is progressively revealed. When Jesus becomes conscious of His mission upon His baptism by John, He withdraws into the wilderness for forty days and returns from His Temptation there in the power of the spirit;¹ 'and they were astonished at his doctrine, for his word was with power',² 'for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes'.³ Thereafter, when Jesus realizes that His mission is to lead to His death, He withdraws again into the 'high mountain apart'⁴ which is the scene of His Transfiguration and returns from this experience resigned and resolved to die. Thereafter, again, when He duly suffers the death of mortal man in the Crucifixion, He descends into the tomb in order to rise immortal in the Resurrection. And, last of all, in the Ascension, He withdraws from Earth to Heaven in order to 'come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead: whose kingdom shall have no end'.⁵

These crucial recurrences of the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* in the story of Jesus likewise have their parallels. The withdrawal into the wilderness reproduces Moses' flight into Midian;⁶ the Transfiguration on the 'high mountain apart' reproduces Moses' transfiguration on Mount Sinai;⁷ the death and resurrection of a divine being is anticipated in the Hellenic Mysteries and is derived by the Mysteries themselves from the world-wide agrarian ritual and myth; the tremendous figure who is to appear, and dominate the scene, at the catastrophe which is to bring to an end the present mundane order, is anticipated in the Zoroastrian Mythology in the figure of the Saviour (*Saosyant*) and in the Jewish Mythology in the figures of the Messiah and 'the Son of Man'.⁸ There is, however, one feature in the Christian Mythology which seems to have no precedent; and that is the interpretation of the future coming of the Saviour or Messiah or 'Son of Man' as the future return to Earth of an historical figure who has already lived on Earth the life of a human being. In this flash of intuition, the timeless past of the Foundling Myth and the timeless present of the Agrarian Ritual are translated into the historical striving of Mankind to reach the goal of human endeavours, or, on a wider than human

¹ Luke iv. 14.² Luke iv. 32.³ Matt. vii. 29.⁴ Matt. xvii. 1.⁵ The Nicene Creed.⁶ There is, however, a significant difference in the nature of the spiritual experience in the wilderness by which the hero's soul is fortified. Moses in the wilderness encounters a benevolent numen, and receives an assurance of the kind of supernatural aid that Odysseus obtains from Athena. On the other hand, Jesus in the wilderness is fortified through being tempted by the Devil, like Job or Faust.⁷ The parallel here is an intentional feature in the story; for the three apostles who witness the Transfiguration see Moses as well as Elijah communing with Christ.⁸ See Gall, A. von: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter).

range, into the unceasing travail of creation.¹ In the concept of the Second Coming, the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return attains its deepest spiritual meaning.²

After this attempt to grasp what Withdrawal-and-Return really means, we are perhaps in a better position to take an empirical survey of its working in human history through the interaction of creative personalities and creative minorities with their fellow human beings. There are famous historical examples of the movement in many different walks of life. We shall encounter it in the lives of mystics and saints and statesmen and soldiers and historians and philosophers and poets, as well as in the histories of nations and states and churches.³ In each instance, we shall see the creative personality or creative minority taking the path of Withdrawal-and-Return in order to rise to some occasion of social crisis: in order, that is to say, to cope with some challenge that is confronting the society to which the individual or the minority belongs.

Saint Paul

Among the mystics and the saints—to begin our survey with these—we see Paul of Tarsus being born into Jewry in a generation when the impact of Hellenism upon the Syriac Society was presenting a challenge which no living Jew could evade. How was the Syriac genius to react? In the spirit of the Jewish Zealots, who sought to meet the Hellenic challenge by putting on the whole armour of the Jewish Law and violently repudiating Hellenism and all its works—both material and spiritual? This was in fact the original reaction of Paul:⁴ a born propagandist who had received the conventional education of a Pharisee in the Jewish 'Diasporà'.⁵ And the first chapter in Paul's career was devoted to persecuting the Jewish followers of Jesus, who were guilty, in Jewish Zealot eyes, of making a breach in the Jewish community's ranks. In the last chapter of his career, Paul employed his gifts of propaganda in responding to the challenge of Hellenism in a totally different way. He sought to solve the problem of Helleno-Syriac relations by peace instead of war. He preached a new dispensation 'Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free'⁶—and he preached this in the name

¹ Romans viii. 22.

² For this concept of the Second Coming, see further the first Annex to this chapter on pp. 462–5, below.

³ 'All the great nations have been prepared in privacy and in secret. They have been composed far away from all distraction.' Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th ed. (London 1894, Kegan Paul), p. 214.

⁴ Paul's own account of his career will be found in his Epistle to the Galatians, ch. i, vv. 13–24.

⁵ For the Jewish Diasporà, see II. D (vi), vol. ii, above.

⁶ Colossians iii. 11.

of Jesus, whose Gospel of non-violence and universal brotherhood and divine love he carried to its logical conclusion in his mission to the Gentiles. Paul's *volte-face* not only scandalized the Zealots whose camp he had abandoned; it even caused some searchings of heart among the leaders of the Jewish Christian Church. Yet this last chapter was the creative chapter in Paul's career; the first chapter was a false start; and between the two chapters a great gulf was fixed. After his vision on the road to Damascus, in which he was suddenly enlightened, Paul withdrew into the wilderness, as Jesus himself had withdrawn after his sudden enlightenment at the moment of his baptism by John.

'When it pleased God,' Paul writes, 'to reveal his Son to me, that I might preach him among the heathen, immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood, neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were apostles before me, but I went into Arabia and returned again unto Damascus. Then after three years I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter.'¹

In the Arabian wilderness, Paul thought out—or felt out—a new philosophic and emotional interpretation of Christianity; and from this creative withdrawal he returned, with all the native powers of his genius heightened and focused upon his life-work, in order to preach this Pauline Christianity to the *Orbis Romanus*.

A Pair of Saviours

The challenge presented by the final bankruptcy of the Hellenic culture to the stricken and stunned population of the derelict Roman provinces in the West was taken up by two saints—one a born educator and the other a born administrator—who lived through the blackest years of the sixth century of our era in Italy. Benedict of Nursia (*vivebat circa* A.D. 480–543)² was born just after the first barbarian 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire was set up by Odovacer in Italy, and he died in the throes of the long-drawn-out and devastating war between the Ostrogothic 'successor-state' and the Imperial Government of Constantinople—a war which was the worst that Italy had undergone since the War of Hannibal, and which completed the destruction of the ancient order of society in the peninsula. Gregory the Great (*vivebat circa* A.D. 540–604) was born in the middle of the Great Romano-Gothic War, a few years before Benedict's death, and he lived to see the brief Imperial Restoration in Italy, which followed the overthrow of the barbarian Goths, undone by the irruption and permanent lodgement of the far more

¹ Galatians i. 15–18.

² Dom John Chapman interprets the evidence as showing that Benedict lived on into the sixth decade of the sixth century (*Saint Benedict and the Sixth Century* (London 1929, Sheed and Ward), ch. viii).

barbarous Lombards. Both saints were launched by their parents on the conventional career of their society and class and generation; both showed their creative genius in rebelling against the outworn convention and breaking away; and both brought their genius to fruition by withdrawing for a time from the World and disentangling themselves from the trammels of Society in order to return in due course with a new moral power and a new practical policy for dealing with a new state of affairs to which the old conventional order had no application. In these two returning anchorites, the lost sheep of Western Christendom found shepherds to convert their soul and to comfort them with pastoral rod and staff as they walked through the valley of the shadow of death.¹

Saint Benedict. Benedict,² sent as a child from his Umbrian birthplace to Rome in order to receive the traditional upper-class education in the humanities, revolted at the life in the capital and withdrew into the wilderness at this early age. In a cave—the *Sacro Speco*—in the Valley of Subiaco he lived for three years of his youth the life of a complete anchorite in utter solitude; but the turning-point in his career—an event of still greater importance than his original break-away—was his return to social life upon reaching manhood when he consented to become the head of a monastic community: first in the valley of Subiaco and eventually on Monte Cassino. In this last creative chapter of his career, the saint improvised in the wilderness a new education to take the place of the obsolete system which, years before, in Rome, the child had rejected. And Benedict's Senatorial contemporaries, who had never departed in their own careers from the traditional rut, now sent their sons out into the wilderness to be brought up there in a new discipline by a Christian Cheiron. Moreover, the Benedictine community on Monte Cassino became the mother of monasteries which increased and multiplied until they had spread the Benedictine Rule into the uttermost parts of the West; and this Rule was one of the main foundations of the new social structure which was eventually raised in Western Christendom on the ruins of the ancient Hellenic order.

'This Rule, extending to only seventy-three short chapters . . . and not probably designed by its author for use much beyond the bounds of the communities under his own immediate supervision, proved to be the thing which the world of religious and thoughtful men was then longing for: a complete code of monastic duty. Thus, by a strange parallelism, almost in the very year when the . . . Emperor Justinian was codifying the results of seven centuries of Roman secular legislation

¹ Psalm xxiii.

² For Benedict's career see Hodgkin, T.: *Italy and her Invaders*, vol. iv, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1896, Clarendon Press), ch. xvi.

—[a Herculean task which was virtually labour lost]—Saint Benedict on his lonely mountain-top was unconsciously composing *his* code for the regulation of the daily life of the great civilizers of Europe for seven centuries to come.¹

One of the most important features in Benedict's rule was the prescription of manual labour; for this meant, first and foremost, agricultural labour in the fields.² The Benedictine movement was, in fact, on the economic plane, an agricultural revival: the first successful revival of agriculture in Italy, after innumerable abortive attempts, since the destruction of the ancient Italian peasant-economy in the Hannibalic War seven-and-a-half centuries earlier. The Benedictine Rule achieved what had never been achieved by Gracchan agrarian laws or by Imperial *alimenta* because it did not work, as state action works, from above downwards upon individuals who would not and could not have taken the initiative for themselves if the authorities had not taken it on their behalf, but worked, on the contrary, from below upwards, by evoking the individual's initiative through enlisting his religious enthusiasm.³ By virtue of this spiritual *élan*, the Benedictine Order not only turned the tide of economic life in Italy at the moment when it was at its lowest ebb. It also performed in medieval Transalpine Europe that strenuous pioneer work of clearing forests, draining marshes, creating fields and pastures, and starting manufactures which were performed in modern North America by the French and English backwoodsmen.

¹ Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, p. 440. At the point in this passage where the writer of this Study has inserted his own parenthesis, Dr. Hodgkin describes Justinian as working 'for the benefit of the judges and the statesmen of the new Europe'. It is true that, after the interregnum and the Dark Age, the Justinianean *Corpus Juris* was, so to speak, rediscovered—in Orthodox Christendom in the tenth century and in Western Christendom in the eleventh—and this discovery undoubtedly produced a profound effect thereafter upon legal thought and practice in both these societies. This, however, was in the nature of a legal 'renaissance'; and, in making a comparison between Justinian's and Benedict's legislative work, it is perhaps more pertinent to bear in mind that, whereas Benedict's Rule was a new kind of legislation which broke new ground and, in breaking it, fulfilled an urgent need, Justinian was codifying a law which was not merely old, but was on the verge of becoming an anachronism owing to the disappearance of the social conditions which the Roman Law had been designed to meet. For fully three centuries after the Justinianean codification was completed, this code was altogether inapplicable to the new social conditions that supervened upon the final bankruptcy of the Hellenic culture. And, in view of this, Justinian's work may fairly be called 'labour lost'.—A. J. T.

² *Benedicti Regula Monachorum*, ch. xlviii, 'De Opera Manuum Cotidianarum': 'Otiositas inimica est animae, et ideo certis temporibus occupari debent fratres in labore manuum, certis iterum horis in lectione divina. . . Si autem necessitas loci aut paupertas exegerit ut ad fruges recolligendas per se occupentur, non contristentur, quia tunc vere monachi sunt si labore manuum suarum vivunt sicut patres nostri et apostoli. Omnia tamen mensurate fiant propter pusillanimes.'

³ Unlike either the recipients of the Gracchan land-allotments or the farmers who received the loans in which the capital applied to the *Alimenta Italiae* was invested, the Benedictine workers on the land were not free men but slaves. Their master, however, was no human slave-owner but God; and the ex-slaves of human masters found themselves on a footing of perfect equality with ex-freemen when they entered the Benedictine Order. 'Non convertenti ex servitio praeponatur ingenuus, nisi alia rationabilis causa existat. . . quia, sive servus sive liber, omnes in Christo unum sumus et sub uno Domino aequalem servitutis militiam baiulamus' (*Regula*, ch. ii).

The Benedictine pioneers, however, were no mere hewers of wood and drawers of water for the civilization which they served; for their manual labour included the work of the pen as well as the work of the spade. Wherever they founded a new cell, they introduced a mental as well as a material culture; and one of the incidental results of their industry was the preservation of the Classical Latin literature—the vehicle of that traditional Roman education which Benedict himself had rejected at the outset of his career.

Saint Gregory the Great. In the career of Gregory the Great,¹ the break-away was not achieved at so early an age. Born and bred in Rome itself, Gregory appears to have acquiesced not only in the conventional education, but also in the conventional bureaucratic career until he found himself occupying the post of *Praefectus Urbi*²—civil governor of the Imperial City—in or about the year 573; and it seems to have been his experience in this office that led him, at this stage, to make an abrupt change in his course.

The fact was that, in A.D. 573, the *Praefectus Urbi* was faced with an impossible task; for in 573 the City of Rome was in much the same predicament as the City of Vienna in 1920. A great city which had become what it was—in its government and its livelihood and its population—in virtue of having been the capital of a great empire for a number of centuries, now suddenly found itself cut off from its former provinces, deposed from its traditional rank, deprived of its historic functions, and thrown back, all unprepared, upon its own resources. In most of these respects, the reversal of fortune which Rome suffered in the sixth century of the Christian Era was even more extreme than the similar experience of Vienna in the twentieth century. At her zenith, Rome had been the political capital of the entire Basin of the Mediterranean and the social and economic capital, likewise, of the western half of it—including a Transalpine annex that extended to the Rhine and the Tyne.³ By A.D. 573, the political capital of the Roman World had been transferred from Rome to Constantinople, while in the West the Roman dominions had been cut short until the frontiers had fallen back to the outskirts of Rome itself. The brief Imperial Restoration in Italy that had followed the devastating Romano-Gothic War had been brought to an end by the avalanche of the Lombard invasion which had overwhelmed Northern Italy in A.D. 568 and had spread

¹ For Gregory's career see Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, vol. v (Oxford 1895, Clarendon Press), ch. vii; Dudden, F. H.: *Gregory the Great: His Place in History and Thought* (London 1905, Longmans, Green and Co., 2 vols.). Little is added to these two studies by Batiffol, P.: *Saint Gregory the Great* (London 1929, Burns, Oates, and Washbourne).

² The better attested reading in the manuscripts is 'praetoram'; but since the urban praetorship was extinct in Gregory's time, whereas the urban praefecture was a still surviving office, the less well attested reading 'praefecturam' is to be preferred. (See Dudden, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 101.)

³ For this annex, see I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 39 and 40, above.

to the Centre and the South in 570-2, when roving Lombard war-bands had established themselves in Spoleto and Benevento. In the year of Gregory's prefecture, the *Ager Romanus* in the environs of Rome itself was restricted approximately to the area which it had occupied, some nine centuries back, before the Romans had embarked on their struggle with the Samnites for the hegemony over Italy.¹ The territory which had supported the tiny rural market-town of that age had now to support a vast parasitic ex-capital city; and the Imperial bureaucracy, of which the *Praefectura Urbis* was a part, was impotent to cope with a problem that had never been envisaged by the Imperial statesmen who had installed the bureaucratic machine.

This impotence of the old order to deal with the new state of affairs must have been borne in upon the mind of a Roman magnate who held the *Praefectura Urbis* in or about A.D. 573; and that painful experience would fully account for Gregory's break-away, which occurred two years later, about A.D. 575. Gregory now withdrew entirely from the secular world. He applied his estates in Sicily² to the foundation and endowment of six Benedictine monasteries and distributed the rest of his property to the poor—except for his ancestral palace in Rome, which he turned into another monastery in order to enter it himself, not as the abbot but as an ordinary monk. Gregory's withdrawal—like Benedict's and Paul's—was of three years' duration; and at the end of that period he was in the act of withdrawing still farther—to Ultima Thule—on the enterprise of converting the heathen English; but at that moment—and this was the true turning point in Gregory's career—he was recalled to Rome by the Pope, in deference to an urgent popular demand, and was constrained to bring his administrative gifts into play once more in the service of the afflicted City. He served Rome henceforth in capacities in which he could use those gifts effectively.

Gregory's life-work, which began with his return and never ceased until his death in harness, was performed in the role of an ecclesiastical administrator and diplomatist and statesman. He performed it first as Seventh Deacon of the Roman See (the officer responsible for the social welfare work of the Church in the City); then, from about 579 to 585, as Apocrisiarius (the Papal representative at the Imperial Court of Constantinople); and finally as Pope, from 590 to his death in 604. Gregory was elected to the Papacy by *force majeure* in a year of war and pestilence and famine,³ and he

¹ For details see Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

² We may conjecture that these Sicilian estates were the only part of Gregory's property in agricultural land, outside the walls of Rome, that had not been lost in consequence of the Lombard invasion.

³ After his return from his diplomatic mission in Constantinople he had withdrawn again to his monastery in Rome—this time as its abbot.

bore heroically the burden which he had shrunk from accepting.¹ On the Papal throne, he accomplished three great achievements. In the first place, he reorganized the administration of the *Patrimonia Petri*—the estates of the Roman Church in Italy and overseas—with such efficiency that the condition of the serfs was improved while at the same time revenues were raised for relieving, on the grand scale, the distress of the destitute population of the derelict Imperial City.² Gregory's second achievement—a labour of ten years—was to negotiate a *modus vivendi* in Italy between the Imperial authorities and the Lombards on a basis of *uti possidetis*.³ His third achievement was to lay the foundations of a new empire for Rome in the place of her old empire which now lay in ruins. This new Roman Empire, established by religious propaganda and not by military force, was eventually to conquer new worlds whose soil the legions had never trodden and whose very existence had never been suspected by the Scipios and Caesars. And the first step towards this re-establishment of the Roman Empire in a new and more ethereal form was the recovery of a Roman foothold in Britain through the mission of Augustine: the Abbot of Gregory's own monastery in Rome, whom Gregory the Pope dispatched in A.D. 596 to carry out an enterprise which Gregory the anchorite had aspired to undertake in person nearly twenty years earlier. Thus, at Rome's darkest hour, when the Lombards were at her gates, her sacerdotal shepherd and captain audaciously out-maneuvred the Continental Barbarians by sending his lieutenant overseas to acquire new allies for Rome, and to win her a new sphere of influence, in the enemy's rear. The spirit of the Roman Pontiff in A.D. 596 is worthy of comparison with that which had been shown, eight centuries back, by the Roman Senate in 211 B.C. when, with Hannibal at the Gates, they had shipped troops out of Rome down the Tiber to reinforce their armies in Spain.⁴

¹ For Gregory's distress at leaving the life of contemplation, once for all, for the life of action see his letter to Theoctista, the sister of the Emperor Maurice, in which he analyses his feelings about his appointment (*Letters*, Bk. I, letter 5). See further Hodgkin's observations in *op. cit.*, pp. 304-6.

² For Gregory's administration of the *Patrimonia* of the Roman Church, see Dudden, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 296-320. For his organization of relief work in the City, see vol. i, pp. 247-51.

³ See Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 418-21.

⁴ 'Cum ipse [Hannibal] ad moenia urbis Romae armatus sederet, milites sub vexillis in supplementum Hispaniae profectos audiit' (Livy xxvi. 11). Another parallel in Roman history to Gregory's dispatch of Augustine to Britain—a parallel, in this case, from the history of Gregory's own age—is the Emperor Heraclius's audacious and successful strategy of sailing with the flower of his troops from Constantinople in the spring of A.D. 622, when a Persian army lay encamped at Calchedon, just across the Golden Horn, in order to take the enemy in the rear by disembarking his expeditionary force at Alexandretta. The preceding winter had been spent by Heraclius in retirement (see Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Later Roman Empire* (London 1889, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 224-5).

Saint Ignatius Loyola

Another saint whose life-work had its overture in a withdrawal and a return is Ignatius Loyola. Loyola was born into Catholic Christendom in an age when the medieval standing of the Roman Church as the master-institution of the Western World had been challenged, and when its very existence as well as its supremacy had been placed in jeopardy, by the renaissance of Paganism in Italy and the eruption of Protestantism in Transalpine Europe. In this religious and social crisis Loyola, born a Spanish nobleman, was brought up in the Spanish nobility's conventional atmosphere and served in the Spanish Army till his twenty-seventh year,¹ when he was badly wounded in a siege of Pamplona by the French. The wound necessitated an operation from which the patient almost died; but he was just able to recover; and during his convalescence he underwent a religious conversion. In the year following these events, which had all taken place in A.D. 1521, Loyola dedicated himself to fight thenceforward as a soldier for God; but he did not rush straight into action in this new form of warfare. He spent the next twelve years in retreat: on pilgrimage, in asceticism, in study, and in meditation. It was only after this long withdrawal that he returned to the World at last in order to establish the Society of Jesus. The Society did not begin to take shape till the year 1534; it did not receive recognition from the Pope until 1540; and Loyola himself was not elected to be its first General until 1541. In Loyola's career, the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return is conspicuously manifest.

The Buddha

The *motif* is almost equally conspicuous in the career of a genius who was born into a wholly different time and place and whose temperament was at the opposite extreme of the human gamut: Siddhārtha Gautama the Buddha. Gautama was born into the Indic World in its 'Time of Troubles'.² In the devastating internecine warfare between contending states, he lived to see his native city-state Kapilavastu sacked, and his Sakyan kinsmen massacred. The small aristocratic republics of the early Indic World, of which the Sakya community was one, appear, in fact, to have been succumbing in Gautama's generation to rising monarchies which were autocratically governed and were built on a larger scale. Thus

¹ We have Loyola's own authority for the statement that he was twenty-six years old at the time of his conversion; and since the conversion evidently took place immediately after he received his wound at the siege of Pamplona—i.e. in A.D. 1521—it follows that he was born in A.D. 1495. (See Sedgwick, H. D.: *Ignatius Loyola* (London 1923, Macmillan), pp. 392-3.)

² For the symptoms, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 86-7, above.

Siddhārtha Gautama was born a Sakya aristocrat at a moment when the older Indic social order, in which this aristocracy had its recognized place, was being challenged by new social forces. Gautama's personal retort to this challenge was to renounce a world which was becoming inhospitable to aristocrats of his ancestral kind. According to the tradition, it was at the age of twenty-nine that he abandoned his wife and son and wealth and rank and inheritance—he was the son of a 'king'¹—and 'went out from the household life into the homeless state',² in order to seek enlightenment through asceticism. This quest continued without result for seven years during which Gautama constantly increased the severity of his physical self-mortification until he had carried it to the furthest extremity consistent with remaining alive. It was not until he had taken the first step towards returning to the World by breaking his fast that the light broke in upon him. And then, after he had attained the light for himself, he spent the rest of his life in imparting it to his fellow human beings.³ In order to impart it effectively, he allowed a company of disciples to gather round him and thus became the centre and head of a fraternity.

The return of the ascetic Gautama to Society as the enlightened Tathāgata is remarkable when we consider what the mental content of the Buddha's enlightenment was. In his philosophy, the highest aim and happiest state of the human soul was something still more remote from action than the contemplative *θεωρία* which was the Hellenic ideal of Pythagoras and Plato and Plotinus. It was nothing short of spiritual self-annihilation. And while Plato paid lip-service to the duty of return, the Buddha proclaimed the philosopher's right to escape into the freedom of Nirvana if only he could win his own way thither. Nevertheless, the Buddha did return to the World more sincerely, and therefore more effectively, than Plato. The foundation of the Sangha was a greater social achievement than the foundation of the Academy; and in the record of the Buddha's relations with princes there is none of the pedantry which appears in Plato's relations with Dionysius. The subsequent histories of Buddhism and Platonism point and accentuate this contrast. We have seen already⁴ that Plato's injunction to return was repudiated, both in doctrine and in practice, by the first of the Neo-Platonists. On the other hand, the actual return of the Buddha—which was in logical contradiction with his doctrine, besides being

¹ The 'kingship' of Gautama's father seems to have been no more than a primacy *inter pares*. The constitution of the Sakya Commonwealth was oligarchical rather than monarchical. (See Eliot, Sir Charles: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 131.)

² Eliot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 135.

³ Eliot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 138-40.

⁴ On p. 254, above.

against his personal inclination¹—became the central feature of the Neo-Buddhism which took shape in the Mahayana or Great Vehicle. One of the new and distinguishing features of the Mahayana is 'a code of altruistic ethics which teaches that everyone must do good in the interest of the whole World and make over to others any merit he may acquire by his virtues. The aim of the religious life is to become a Bodhisattva, not to become an Arhat.'² The Arhat is an adept who has attained the Buddhist goal of self-annihilation for himself; and according to the Mahayana 'the Arhat, engrossed in his own salvation, is excused only by his humility and is open to the charge of selfish desire, since the passion for Nirvana is an ambition like any other'.³ The Bodhisattva is a potential Arhat or aspirant Buddha who voluntarily postpones his own entry into Nirvana when he has reached the threshold and stands before the open door, and thus sacrifices his own happiness by prolonging his own existence as a sentient being among sentient beings, in order to help his fellow-creatures to reach the point which he himself has reached already on their common path.⁴ It would seem that the impulse to consummate a movement of withdrawal by a counter-movement of return must be deeply grounded in the nature of the human soul, and perhaps in the nature of the Universe itself, if it has asserted itself so insistently in Buddhist practice, in despite of Buddhist teaching and Buddhist belief.

David

When we pass from the lives of mystics and saints to those of statesmen and soldiers, the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* reveals itself in this field again.

In the Syriac saga, for example, David begins his career as a mighty man of valour in Saul's war-band. In other words, the

¹ See Eliot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 140. This inclination to remain aloof, which the enlightened Buddha overcame in his own soul, was a vestige of the ordinary attitude of the unregenerate Indic anchorites of Gautama's generation; and, according to the legend, the conventional opinion of these anchorites had been scandalized by Gautama's very first step towards his return, when he broke his fast. 'There were five monks living near him, hoping that when he found the Truth he would tell it to them. But when they saw that he had begun to take food, their faith failed and they went away' (Eliot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 139). The Buddhist legend goes on to relate that the Buddha succeeded—though not without difficulty—in converting these five monks to a recognition of his Buddhahood, in spite of the scandal of his return to 'a life of ease' (Eliot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 140-1). In the story of Jesus, this incident has its parallel in the scandal caused among the Pharisees by the formal breach of the Sabbath when the disciples of Jesus satisfied their hunger, with their master's approval, by plucking and eating ears of corn on the Sabbath day (Matt. xii. 1-8). For the Pharisees, the return of Jesus to ordinary social intercourse after his forty days of ascetic withdrawal in the wilderness was an insuperable stumbling-block.

'The Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say: "Behold a man gluttonous and a wine bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners".' (Matt. xi. 19.)

² Eliot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 6.

³ Eliot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 8.

⁴ See Eliot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 7-11.

future hero first appears on the scene as just an outstanding representative of what is, in itself, a common type in the society into which he has been born. It is not until Saul's jealousy has driven David into the wilderness, to lead the precarious life of an outlaw in the no-man's-land between Israel and Philistia, that David begins to acquire the statesmanship which eventually marks him out to be Saul's successor. And it is this statesmanship, thus acquired, that enables David, after his return from the wilderness, to solve for Israel the urgent problem of the age which Saul has failed to solve effectually: the problem of endowing the people of the hill-country with a political organization that will enable them to hold their own against the people of the coast.

Solon

Solon, again, was born into a rustic Attica in an age when Attica, in common with the whole Hellenic World, was confronted with the problem of continuing to provide for a population which was not ceasing to increase, yet which could not any longer be provided for by the old method of geographical expansion.¹ Solon's personal reaction to this social challenge was to withdraw from the agrarian life amid which he had been brought up and to take to the life of a merchant: a life which was something exotic in Attica at the turn of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. While the majority of Solon's countrymen were still engrossed in the desperate business of obtaining diminishing returns from sowing and reaping increasing quantities of the traditional crops, Solon took to buying and selling and exporting and importing and travelling overseas and acquainting himself with the newfangled technique of a money economy. But he only withdrew for a season from the common round of Attic rural life in order to return to the land with a practicable scheme of economic salvation. By applying the new mercantile technique to the old industry of agriculture, Solon discovered the secret of substituting intensive development for extensive expansion; and he returned to teach his countrymen how to enhance the economic productivity of their land and labour by giving up 'subsistence farming' in favour of 'cash-crop farming' in specialized crops produced for export. Thus Solon's withdrawal from Attic agriculture to overseas trade was a prelude to his return to Attic agriculture in a new capacity. The first change in Solon's career—the change from farmer to merchant—led up to the second, and vital, change from merchant to statesman. And it was in his return to the land as a statesman that Solon accomplished his life-work.

¹ See vol. i, pp. 24-5, and vol. ii, pp. 39-42, as well as the present volume, pp. 122 and 139-40 and 168-9, above.

In the history of Philopoemen of Megalopolis, we find a Hellenic analogue of the Syriac saga of David. Born in the heart of the Peloponnese in an age when the city-states of Greece were being dwarfed by the new Powers of vastly greater calibre that had sprung up all around them on the periphery of an expanding Hellenic World, Philopoemen started his career as a spirited young soldier in the Macedono-Lacedaemonian War of 224-221 B.C.; and he covered himself with distinction at Sellasia. When the overthrow of Cleomenes in that decisive battle had restored peace to Continental Greece for the time being, Philopoemen withdrew for ten years (*circa* 220-210 B.C.) to Crete in order to train himself in the arts of generalship and statesmanship in that miniature island-world apart within the great and growing oecumenical society of Philopoemen's day. From this Cretan apprenticeship, into which he had entered as a mere soldier, Philopoemen returned to the Peloponnese at the end of ten years as an experienced man of affairs; and it was only after that, upon his first election to the annual generalship of the Achaean Confederacy in 208 B.C., that he began his life-work—the work of piloting the frail and puny Achaean ship of state through perilous seas over which new storm-clouds were gathering from beyond the western horizon.¹

Caesar

The same *motif* reveals itself in a far more famous political career. When Caesar withdrew from Rome to Gaul in 58 B.C., he was still to outward appearance nothing more than a virtuoso in the regular role of the Roman politician of the day: a player of the conventional game for the sake of the conventional prizes. During the nine years that passed before he re-emerged from Gaul in 49 B.C. and crossed the Rubicon, he grew in political and moral stature till even his bitterest opponents were compelled to recognize him, in their heart of hearts, as the one possible Saviour of Society—if Society would consent to allow itself to be saved.

Leo Syrus

The *motif* reappears in the career of Leo Syrus² (*imperabat* A.D.

¹ For the metaphor of 'the clouds from the west', which was first employed, apropos of Rome and Carthage, by Agelaus of Naupactus in the peace-pourparlers of 217 B.C. between the Aetolian Confederacy and the Macedonian Alliance, see Polybius, Bk. V, chs. 103-5.

² The grounds for regarding Leo as a 'Syrian' (i.e. as a native of the administrative area which was known in the political geography of the Later Roman Empire as *Oriens* or *Ἀνατολή*) are given by Bury in his edition of Gibbon (Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, edited by Bury, J. B.: *Editio Minor* (London 1900-2, Methuen, 7 vols.), vol. v, p. 185, footnote 17). Leo's family appear to have been natives of the city of Germanicea, in Commagene, among the south-eastern foot-

717-40): the great statesman who saved the infant civilization of Orthodox Christendom from meeting its death before it was out of the cradle.

In the history of Leo, there are some features that recall the Syriac saga of David, and others that recall the Hellenic myths of Jason and Bellerophon.¹ Like David, Leo first appears upon the scene as a mighty man of valour in a prince's war-band. He comes to the notice of the Emperor Justinian Rhinotmetus, as David comes to the notice of King Saul, by presenting himself in the prince's camp as a shepherd-boy bringing rustic gifts from the produce of his father's flocks; and in the prince's service he displays a prowess which only serves to draw down upon him his royal master's deadly jealousy. The historical Emperor Justinian II was in fact, throughout his history, a by-word for that demoniac vein of passion and implacability that is attributed in the Syriac saga to Saul. But, in the saga of Leo, the hero's master, when he seeks to compass the hero's death, does not adopt the direct methods of a Saul but resorts to the guile of a Pelias or a Proetus. Leo is sent by Justinian, as Jason is sent by Pelias, on a perilous quest to the Caucasus; and Justinian takes treacherous measures to ensure that his victim shall meet his death which are quite in the manner of Proetus's treacherous dealing with Bellerophon. Leo, however, like his mythical and historical prototypes, achieves the impossible and not only escapes alive but triumphantly fulfils his mission, so that when he returns—leading home from the Caucasus a marooned Roman army in a Xenophontic catabasis that duly ends at Trebizond—he is greeted as the heaven-sent saviour of the Roman People and eventually takes the place of his long since discomfited and discredited and evicted master on the Imperial throne.

Whatever may be the respective ingredients of fact and fable in the story of Leo up to this point, it is certain that Leo returned to Romania from the Caucasus in A.D. 713 as a seasoned statesman who was ripe to enter upon his life-work; and it was in the last chapter of his career, which opened now, that he performed his three historic achievements. In A.D. 716-18, he defeated the second and supreme effort of the Arabs to overwhelm Orthodox Christendom by force of arms and to make themselves masters of Con-

hills of the Taurus Range. The family left their Asiatic home as refugees, and found a new home in Thrace, when Commagene was conquered from the Romans by the Arabs some time during the first reign of Justinian II (A.D. 685-95).

¹ Leo's personal history (which has been touched upon in this Study, by anticipation, in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, on p. 64, footnote 3, above) is recounted in the *Chronographia* of Theophanes retrospectively, *sub Anno Mundi* 6209, which was the year of Leo's accession to the Imperial throne of Constantinople. The story reads like a genuine record of fact which has become suffused with traditional or legendary motifs—a well-known tendency in the stories of historical personalities that have made a deep impression upon the popular imagination.

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stantinople. Thereafter, he provided for the future security of the infant civilization whose life he had saved from out of the jaws of destruction by evoking, in Orthodox Christendom, a ghost of the Roman Empire¹—and this with a thoroughgoing efficiency and an enduring effect that stand out in impressive contrast to the superficial and ephemeral re-establishment of the same great institution in the West by Charlemagne half a century later. Leo not only consolidated his East Roman Empire territorially, with Anatolia—now salvaged from the Arabs—as its centre of gravity and Constantinople as its European bridge-head. He gave his new state such solid administrative and military and financial and legal and economic foundations that it remained ‘a going concern’ for little short of five centuries after his reign, whereas ‘the Holy Roman Empire’ of the West faded away into the nullity of ‘a ghost of a ghost’ almost immediately after the death of the founder and was never successfully resuscitated—not even by the energy of an Otto I or by the genius of a Frederick II. Leo’s third historic achievement was the impress which he set upon the history of the Orthodox Church: a permanent impress in the supremacy over the Church which he vindicated for his re-animated State, and a temporary yet nevertheless profoundly important impress in his initiation of the Iconoclastic Movement. In both the successful and the abortive part of his ecclesiastical policy, Leo, in the eighth century of the Christian Era, brought about developments in Orthodox Christendom which did not take place in Western Christendom until the time of the Protestant Reformation, some seven centuries later. It will be seen that in Leo’s career the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return, represented by the Caucasian episode, was the prelude to a titanic output of creative activity after the hero’s restoration to the society of which he became the saviour.

Muhammad

A still more effective statesman in whose career the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* is strongly marked is the Prophet Muhammad, who was born into the Arabian external proletariat of the Roman Empire in an age when the relations between the Empire and Arabia were coming to a crisis. At the turn of the sixth and seventh

¹ This ghost of the Roman Empire was evoked by Leo to serve as a ‘carapace’ for Orthodox Christendom against the assaults of the Syriac universal state, which had been reintegrated in the shape of the Arab Caliphate. Thus the East Roman Empire, during the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries of the Christian Era, performed for Orthodox Christendom the service which was performed for Western Christendom during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries by the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, when it was serving as a ‘carapace’ against the assaults of the Ottoman Empire (which, it may be recalled in passing, was the universal state of the Orthodox Christian Society). For the simile of the ‘carapace’ see I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 156, footnote 1, and II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 177, footnote 1.

centuries of the Christian Era, the saturation-point had been reached in the impregnation of Arabia with cultural influences from the Empire through the cumulative effect of a long-continuing process of social radiation.¹ Some reaction from Arabia upon the Empire, in the form of a counter-discharge of energy, was bound to ensue; and the destinies of both parties to the Arabo-Roman interaction were deeply involved in the open question of what direction this imminent Arabian recoil would take and what plane of social activity it would choose for its principal field of action. It was the career of Muhammad (*vivebat circa* A.D. 570-632) that gave these questions their historic answers; and a movement of Withdrawal-and-Return was the prelude to each of the two crucial new departures upon which Muhammad's life-history hinges.

There were two features in the social life of the Roman Empire in Muhammad's day that would make a particularly deep impression upon the mind of an Arabian observer because, in Arabia, they were both conspicuous by their absence. The first of these features was monotheism in religion.² The second was law and order in government. Muhammad's life-work consisted in translating each of these elements in the social fabric of 'Rūm' into an Arabian vernacular version and incorporating both his Arabianized monotheism and his Arabianized imperium into a single master-institution—the all-embracing institution of Islam—to which he succeeded in imparting such titanic driving-force that the new dispensation, which had been designed by its author to meet the needs of the barbarians of Arabia, burst the bounds of the Peninsula and captivated the entire Syriac World from the shores of the Atlantic to the coasts of the Eurasian Steppe.

This life-work, upon which Muhammad seems to have embarked in about his fortieth year (*circa* A.D. 609), was achieved in two stages. In the first of these stages, Muhammad was concerned exclusively with his religious mission; in the second stage, the religious mission was overlaid, and almost overwhelmed, by the political enterprise. Muhammad's original entry upon a purely religious mission was a sequel to his return to the parochial life of Arabia after a partial withdrawal (*circa* A.D. 594 seqq.)³ into the exotic life of a caravan-

¹ For this phenomenon of social radiation, see Part II. A, vol. i, p. 187, and III. C (i) (a), pp. 151-3, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 196-203, as well as Parts VIII and IX, below.

² See III. C (ii) (a), p. 238, above.

³ The dates of Muhammad's caravan-expeditions are instructive. They fall within the short interval of peace (A.D. 591-603) between the two long-drawn-out and devastating Romano-Persian Wars of A.D. 572-91 and A.D. 603-28. We do not know the exact year in which Muhammad's expeditions between Mecca and Syria ceased, but we may conjecture that they were brought to an end by the general paralysis of economic life in the Asiatic provinces of the Roman Empire that must have resulted from the Persian invasions. The expeditions had evidently ceased before Muhammad's entry upon his prophetic mission, and, if that is to be dated about A.D. 609, we may bring this date into relation with the Persian invasion of Syria in A.D. 606 and with the occupation of Calche-

trader between the Arabian oases and the Syrian desert-ports of the Roman Empire along the fringes of the North Arabian Steppe. The second or politico-religious stage in Muhammad's career was inaugurated by the Prophet's withdrawal (*Hijrah*) from his native oasis of Mecca to the rival oasis of Yathrib (thenceforward known *par excellence* as Medina: 'The City' [of the Prophet]). In the *Hijrah*—which has been recognized by Muslims as such a crucial event in the Prophet's career that it has been taken as the inaugural date for the Islamic Era—Muhammad left Mecca as a hunted fugitive. After a seven years' absence (A.D. 622–9), he returned to Mecca, not as an amnestied exile, but as lord and master, not only of Mecca itself, but of half Arabia. It will be seen that the first stage in Muhammad's career is comparable with the career of Solon¹ and the second stage with the career of Caesar.²

Peter the Great.

The drastic and effective statesmanship of Muhammad, which changed the face of the Arabian Barbarism, has its analogue in the work of Peter the Great and Lenin, who, in two successive chapters

don by a Persian expeditionary force in A.D. 608. May we conjecture that Muhammad's commercial activities were abruptly and unexpectedly cut short by these catastrophic events and that it was an enforced resumption of a sedentary life of economic inactivity in Mecca that diverted the ex-merchant's spiritual energies from the economic into the religious channel? This would explain—in so far as there can be any external explanation of a psychic event—why Muhammad's creative religious experience came to him at just this point in his life.

¹ In Part III. A, pp. 7–8, above, the Steppe has been compared to the Sea, and the life of the camel-caravanner, who conveys merchandise across the Steppe on board 'the ship of the desert', to the life of the merchant-seaman. Thus, from the technical or professional standpoint, there is an affinity between the early commercial phases of Muhammad's and Solon's careers. There is also this further point of resemblance that, in Muhammad's Arabia, this commercial life—which brought the individual or the minority that took to it into social intercourse with the Great World—was just as exotic as it was in Solon's Hellas. In Arabia *circa* A.D. 600, as in Hellas *circa* 600 B.C., commerce was the pursuit of a small minority, whose adoption of this profession was tantamount to a withdrawal from the common run of life in the surrounding society. In one respect, however, the situations of the two statesmen were different; for, while Solon the Athenian belonged to a relatively backward local community in which the merchant was a much rarer type than he was in contemporary Corinth or Miletus, Muhammad the Meccan belonged to a local community in which commerce was the prevailing economic activity—in contrast to the more primitive conditions of the rest of the Hijāz in Muhammad's day. Perhaps this difference explains why the first stage of Muhammad's career, which corresponds to Solon's career, was a failure, in contrast to Solon's success. In rustic Attica, Solon's profession had a rarity-value which must have enhanced Solon's personal prestige in the eyes of his countrymen and have thereby facilitated the accomplishment of Solon's mission. On the other hand, Muhammad the merchant had no peculiar honour in his own commercially-minded city. It is significant that Muhammad, when he had been despised and rejected at Mecca, found a welcome at Yathrib: a rustic oasis (see Margoliouth, D.S.: *Mohammed*, 3rd ed. (London 1905, Putnam), pp. 185 and 191, and the present Study, II. D (ii), vol. ii, p. 57, footnote 3, above) where an immigrant with Muhammad's Meccan commercial experience was a valued and an honoured guest. In fact, Muhammad proved himself valuable to the Yathribis not only by introducing them to political law and order, but also by teaching them to take advantage of their geographical situation in order to supplant Mecca as the half-way-house on the caravan-route between Syria and the Yaman.

² For the significance of Muhammad's political success, see further the second Annex to this chapter, on pp. 466–72, below.

of a single social revolution, have succeeded in changing the face of Russian Orthodox Christendom.

By a freakish stroke of Fortune, there was born into the purple of the Russian Orthodox Christian universal state at Moscow, on the 30th May, 1672, a genius endowed with a completely Western *êthos*—and this not even the *êthos* of his own Western contemporaries, but the *êthos* of their descendants in the sixth or seventh generation, whose time was not to come till some two centuries had gone by! Peter the Great¹ was an incomprehensible and therefore disagreeable *lusus Naturae* in the eyes of an English Bishop Burnet or a Dutch King William III, as well as in the eyes of a Russian Arch-Priest Avvakum. When Burnet met Peter in A.D. 1698, he pronounced him sordid-minded, and saw nothing more in him than a young barbarian potentate who happened to be a good ship's carpenter. When William met him, he complained that he had no aesthetic sense, and no knowledge of the Dutch language apart from a jargon of nautical technicalities. These worthy representatives of the modern culture of the West did not, and could not, guess that, in their encounter with this repulsive mechanically-minded barbarian they were being given a glimpse into their own society's future and were being shown a prototype of the typical *Homo Occidentalis* who was to adorn an age two centuries beyond their own! For us, their descendants, who have the fortune to live in these latter days, the figure of Peter has ceased to be enigmatic. We have no hesitation in placing Peter the Great in the same portrait-gallery as Edison and Ford and Rhodes and Northcliffe and Mark Twain's Yankee at the Court of King Arthur and Mr. Shaw's Straker in *Man and Superman*.

The leading traits of *Homo Occidentalis Mechanicus Neobarbarus* appear in Peter's character unmistakably, both for good and for evil. He displays an American vitality, an American impatience of pomp, an American delight in manual skill, and also an American ruthlessness.

When Peter wanted anything done, he always took the initiative by setting the example of doing the hard work himself. He worked with his own hands as a ship-wright; and, in his new Western-model Russian Army and Navy, he worked his way up the ladder of promotion from the bottom, as though he were a self-made man instead of being, as he actually was, the creator as well as the master of these two new Russian public services.² Moreover, he

¹ The account of Peter which is given here is taken for the most part from Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote).

² In the triumphal procession through the streets of Moscow in A.D. 1696 with which Peter celebrated the capture of Azov—his first signal success—Peter himself marched among his comrades in the uniform of a naval captain. Compare his admiration for

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chose a genuine self-made man in the person of Menshikov to be his Russian right-hand man (his other principal coadjutors were imported Westerners). He threw off the Byzantine ceremonial of the Muscovite Court¹ and preferred to live at ease: not only among the relatively cultivated Western merchants and professional men in the German suburb of Moscow,² but also among his Western craftsmen at Preobrazhensk. (At Zaandam in Holland, which he visited on his Western tour, he stayed in the house of an artisan whose acquaintance he had made in Russia.) His method of visiting the West was to send his Swiss adviser Lefort on a diplomatic mission to the Western Courts and then to travel incognito in his own ambassador's suite as one of a party of naval apprentices. As for his mechanical bent, he had already learnt the use of all manner of tools and mechanical apparatus by his twelfth year, before ever he had stirred abroad. In 1697 the Kurfürstin Sophie Charlotte of Brandenburg found him master of no less than fourteen trades; he took the opportunity of his visit to the West to add dentistry and etching to his accomplishments and to make some study of anatomy; and he astonished the Saxon Court by his technical knowledge of artillery. The most 'American' of all Peter's traits was the combination of this manual ability with the lynx eye of the prospector and the entrepreneur. When he temporarily occupied the Caspian Provinces of Persia in 1722-3 his first step was to organize a systematic inquiry into their natural resources; and he himself divined the commercial future of coal in an age when coal was as yet of no account at Newcastle. More remarkable still, a passing visit to Baku in the course of a military campaign revealed to Peter's uncannily perspicuous vision the future of mineral oil!³
It will be seen that Peter was a *lusus Naturae* in two degrees. He was a Westerner born into Russian Orthodox Christendom; and he was a Westerner born into the World two centuries before the West itself succeeded in producing human beings of Peter's type. When we have added that Nature endowed Peter with genius and that Fortune placed in his hands the autocratic government of a great state, we shall find that we have left ourselves only one historical figure with whom Peter can be treated as comparable, and that is Ikhnaton.

Ikhnaton, inheriting despotic power in a society in which he was a spiritual stranger, attempted to remake Society in his own image and ended in utter failure. Peter, attempting the same *tour* English simplicity in dress, which comes out in the anecdote cited in III. C (i) (c) on p. 179, footnote 2, above.

¹ Throughout his reign, Peter restricted himself to a modest personal income.

² This suburb was known in Russian as 'the Svoboda' or 'free town'. The proportion of self-made men among its bourgeoisie was high. For its *éthos*, see vol. ii, p. 232, above.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 278-9, above.

de force in the same circumstances, achieved a resounding success. What accounts for this extreme difference between the fortunes of these two historic human 'sports'? Partly, no doubt, the difference in temperament (for in temperament, as opposed to circumstances, Peter and Ikhnaton were poles apart). There is, however, another factor which was manifestly of the utmost importance in Peter's career and which was lacking in Ikhnaton's career; and this factor is the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return. Ikhnaton did indeed withdraw from the Egyptiac Society into the enchanted palace which he conjured up for himself at Tell-el-Amarna. But, once within the precincts of this asylum, he could never bring himself to face the return to reality. Peter likewise withdrew from the alien Orthodoxy of Russia into the Western World towards which he was drawn by spiritual affinity; but his whole absence in the West, on the momentous tour of A.D. 1697-8, only lasted eighteen months; and the absentee autocrat cut his travels short, upon the news of the outbreak of the Streltzy, in order to return to Russia post-haste and crush the mutineers. Moreover, the Peter who returned to Russia in the autumn of 1698 was a different man from the Peter who had left Russia less than two years before.

The change in Peter which actually took place is symbolically described in a Russian fairy-tale. On the Western tour, as the tale is told, the real Peter disappeared;¹ and the man who came back to Russia in 1698 was neither Peter nor indeed a real man at all, for he was none other than Antichrist in Peter's shape! There is more in this fairy-tale than the naïve peasants who tell it comprehend; for Peter really did return with a life-work to carry out which is aptly described as the work of Antichrist from the standpoint of Russian Orthodox Christendom. When he left Russia for the West, Peter was still just a boy who had found his hobby in carpentry and had applied this hobby, when Fortune gave him the power, to building himself a navy and building it on Western lines because those lines happened to be technically the best. If this gifted boy had simply stayed at home, immersing himself in his hobby and making himself an *enfant terrible* to the conservative Byzantine Court which was his native social milieu, he might well have met the same untimely and violent end as Scyles the Scythian;² and his vagaries would certainly have had no greater effect

¹ He is said to have disappeared in Sweden—a country which he did not actually visit—but the Sweden of the fairy-story is a mythical German Kingdom which is ruled by a virgin—a wraith, perhaps, of the famous Queen Christina (*regnabat* A.D. 1633-54).

² Scyles (*florebat circa* 450 B.C.) was the prince of a Scythian Nomad horde which ranged the steppes in the hinterland of the north coast of the Black Sea. Through the Greek colonies planted on this coast, Scyles made the acquaintance of the Hellenic Civilization, and he fell in love with it. For a time he led a double life—living part of the year, unknown to his fellow-Nomads, in the Greek city of Borysthene in Greek clothes and in the Greek manner, with a Greek wife. (Compare Peter's visits to 'the

than those of Ikhnaton upon the subsequent course of history. The very different course which Peter's life-history actually took was the outcome of his brief Western tour of A.D. 1697-8—as far as it can be ascribed to any external event. At any rate, Peter returned to Russia from this tour with his mental horizon immensely widened and with his mind made up to carry out a design which might seem to be beyond the compass of any one man's powers but which, nevertheless, was the one possible way of safeguarding 'the changeling's' own personal fortunes. Peter returned with the resolve to make life possible for Russia in the contemporary World—and, incidentally, to make life possible for Peter himself in Russia—by bringing this derelict remnant of Byzantinism into the comity of Western nations as one of the Great Powers of the Western political system.

This broadening of Peter's aim can be discerned in those records of his Western tour that have come down to us. The interests that took him abroad in 1697 were not social and political but technical. Out of his eighteen months in Western Europe, he spent nine on improving his knowledge of the technique of ship-building. He worked for five months and a half on a frigate that was under construction in the Dutch Admiralty dockyard at Amsterdam; and he went on from Holland to England because the Dutch naval designers were not sufficiently scientific in their methods to satisfy him! The impression which he made, in England, upon King William and Bishop Burnet has been described already. Yet a broadening of outlook is indicated by the fact that, in England, Peter sometimes turned aside from his technical pursuits in order to attend Anglican church services and Quaker meetings; and such indications are confirmed by his action after his return, when he launched his campaign of Westernization along the whole front of the battle-ground between his own subversive personality and the traditional social life of Russian Orthodox Christendom. On every sector of this front, he took the offensive and won a victory. He overcame the Streltzy,¹ he overcame the Boyars,² he overcame the

Svoboda', and his ten-years-long liaison with Anna Mons.) When the Nomads discovered their prince's secret Hellenism, they did him to death. The story is told by Herodotus in Bk. IV, chs. 78-80.

¹ The Streltzy were destroyed by Peter in A.D. 1698-9. In non-Western communities that have entered upon the path of Westernization, the destruction of a turbulent and inefficient 'Old Guard', in order to make room for a new-model army on the Western pattern, has been a common first step in the campaigns of political Westernizers. Compare the destruction of the Mamlûks in Egypt by Mehmed 'Ali in A.D. 1811 and the destruction of the Janissaries in Turkey by Sultan Mahmûd II in A.D. 1826. The exception which proves the rule is the voluntary renunciation of traditional privileges in Japan by the Daimyos and their Samurai in A.D. 1868-9. For these phenomena, see further Part IX, below.

² The noble cadets attached to Lefort's suite (of whom Peter himself was one!) were given exacting instructions to master certain particular Western techniques. If they did not bring home satisfactory evidence that they had done what had been laid upon them,

Byzantine social tradition,¹ he overcame the Orthodox Church,² and he overcame the Swedes.³ This astonishing list of victories is a summary of Peter's life-work; and this life-work was a sequel to his withdrawal-and-return in A.D. 1697-8.

Lenin

Withdrawal-and-Return is likewise the key to the career of

they were to forfeit their estates! Peter even went so far as to prohibit any nobleman from marrying until he had passed an examination in geometry, arithmetic, and navigation! Moreover, all hereditary boyars were conscripted by Peter for a lifelong term of compulsory public service—and this without even the compensation of being given a monopoly of the field. For at the same time the public service was thrown open to all classes; and self-made men were automatically ennobled upon the attainment of quite modest ranks in the new political hierarchy. More than that, the Russians of all classes in Peter's service were subordinated to the imported Westerners, of whom more than a thousand were engaged on long-term contracts during the Western tour of A.D. 1697-8. It will be seen that Peter passed his boyars under the harrow, without mercy.

¹ Peter's declaration of war upon the Byzantine social tradition was delivered in his celebrated gesture of shaving, with his own hand, the beards of the grandees who came to congratulate him on his return from the West in A.D. 1698. A ukase of the 4th January, 1700, made the wearing of Western dress compulsory by a certain date 'for the glory and beauty of the State and the improvement of the Army'. This was confirmed in a second ukase of the 20th March, and detailed instructions were issued in 1701. Compare Mehmed 'Ali's imposition of Western uniforms upon his troops, and Mustafâ Kemâl's imposition of Western dress upon the entire male civil population. (The compulsory change of dress which was carried through by Peter in Russia was confined to the upper class, and the obligation to shave might be bought off by the payment of a beard-tax.) Peter, however, was not content with imposing Western dress. He arranged for the compilation of elaborate manuals of Western fine manners; and in the houses of the nobility in the new capital, Petersburg, 'receptions' *à la française* were organized by the Police.

² Peter re-converted the Orthodox Church in Russia into the docile instrument of state which had been the church's function in the minds of Peter's Byzantine precursors Constantine the Great and Justinian the Caesaro-papist and Leo the Iconoclast; but Peter's model in this matter was probably the contemporary practice in the Protestant countries of the Western World rather than the original practice in Orthodox Christendom itself. In A.D. 1690 (just on the morrow of his effective accession to power) Peter failed to secure the election of his own well-educated and progressive candidate, the Metropolitan Marcellus of Pskov, to the Patriarchate of Moscow. But when the Patriarchate fell vacant next time, which happened in 1700, Peter deliberately left it vacant for 20 years, until 1721, when he substituted for the Patriarchate, as the supreme authority over the Russian Orthodox Church, a Holy Synod which was simply a secular department of the Petrine State. The measure of Peter's victory over the Orthodox Church is given by the fact that he attended Protestant and Catholic church services, not only abroad, but in 'the Svoboda' under the very walls of Moscow. In a prospectus, issued in 1702, inviting foreign experts to come to Russia—a document which was printed in German and was circulated in the West—Peter gave an express and explicit guarantee of religious toleration. (Text of the relevant passage in Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 204.)

³ Having realized Russia's need to acquire a seaboard, Peter began, in A.D. 1695-6, with the relatively easy conquest of Azov from the Turks. It is significant that, after his return from the Western tour of A.D. 1697-8, he addressed himself to the far more formidable task of conquering the Baltic Provinces from the Swedes, and persevered in this arduous enterprise for twenty years (A.D. 1700-21) until he finally achieved his aim. He had come to the conclusion that a seaboard on the Baltic was worth acquiring at any price because it would open the door for direct intercourse between Russia and the West. (For the significance of the new capital which Peter founded on the Neva, see II. D (v), vol. II, pp. 157-8, above.) On the other hand, the conquest of Azov was not worth following up, because the further passage from this port to the open sea was blocked by the Ottoman Government's control of the Straits of Kertch and of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles. And even if the Russian ships had been able to run the gauntlet of these three successive 'Symplegades', they would have merely found themselves at large in the Eastern Mediterranean—a sea which, in Peter's day, before the opening of the short-cut from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, was a sluggish backwater, remote from the principal ocean-highways of the World.

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 Lenin:¹ the second Russian 'Antichrist' whose intention it was to undo, and whose achievement it has been to consummate, the work of Westernization which was originally initiated by Peter.² Born in 1870, Lenin entered, in 1893, upon the conventional revolutionary career of the Russian intellectual of his generation: an abortive agitation which ended in 1897 in banishment to Siberia. It was after his withdrawal from Russia to Switzerland in 1900, after his Siberian sentence had been served out, that Lenin came to know his own mind and began to impose his will upon the minds of his fellow revolutionaries. He came to the front in 1903, when a conference of Russian Marxian Socialists in exile, which was held that year in Brussels and London, resulted, by reason of Lenin's masterful intransigence, in the historic split of the Russian Marxian Socialist Party into the two sects of Minoritarians (*Mensheviki*) and Majoritarians (*Bolsheviki*). From that time onwards Lenin, as leader of the 'majoritarian' Bolshevik faction in the Russian Marxian Socialist camp, continued to gain in authority and prestige through the long course of an absence from Russia which extended, from first to last, from 1900 to 1917. And though this potent exile's first return missed fire in the failure of the abortive Russian Revolution of 1905-7,³ his second return, when he appeared again in Russia from the West on the 4th April, 1917, will assuredly rank as one of the decisive events in the history of our Western Civilization and perhaps in the history of Mankind, as well as in the history of Russia. After twenty-four years of revolutionary work, of which some eighteen years had been spent at work in exile in Siberia and Europe, Lenin now returned, with seven more years of life before him, to carry out his tremendous life-work. Before he died in 1924 he had made himself master of the territory and population and resources of the *ci-devant* Russian Empire; and he had turned this mastery to account in order to put in hand—with a ruthlessness equal to Peter's—the great experiment of translating the Marxian Utopia into real life on the grand scale.

Garibaldi

Before we pass on from the 'practical men' to the 'intellectuals', we may observe the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* appearing again in the careers of two famous Western heroes of the modern age: Giuseppe Garibaldi (*vivebat* 1807-82) and Paul von Hindenburg (*vivebat* 1847-1934).

¹ See Mirsky, D. S.: *Lenin* (London 1932, Holme Press).

² For the function of Bolshevism as an instrument of Westernization, see III. C (i) (d), pp. 200-2, above.

³ On this occasion, Lenin returned to Russia in November 1905 and withdrew again in December 1907.

The first chapter in Garibaldi's career is not unlike the first chapter in Lenin's. Born in 1807, Garibaldi entered, in 1833, upon the conventional revolutionary career of the post-Napoleonic Western Liberal: an abortive conspiracy against the régime of the Restoration, which ended in the conspirator's ignominious flight from the territory of the Sardinian Government instead of ending in the Government's overthrow. The next stage in Garibaldi's life-history recalls a stage which has come to our notice in the life-history of Philopoemen. As the young Philopoemen withdrew for ten years from his native Peloponnese in order to practise the arts of war and statesmanship overseas in the training-school of Crete, so the young Garibaldi now withdrew for twelve years (1836-48) from his native Italy in order to learn the same perennial arts in the New World of Latin America. It was in a Latin-American war between the Republic of Rio Grande do Sul and the Empire of Brazil that Garibaldi won his spurs as a guerilla leader; and it was in another Latin-American war—this time between Monte Video and Buenos Ayres—that he recruited the nucleus of his Italian 'Red-Shirts'.

'[The] Italian Legion of Monte Video was the origin of the Garibaldians proper. It was the first considerable body of his countrymen whom he ever commanded on land; most of the men were political exiles; it was they who first wore the famous "red shirt"; and those of them who came back with him to Europe in 1848 imported the Garibaldian dress, tradition, and methods in war and politics. The idea with which they enlisted was to fight for the liberties of Monte Video in return for the shelter it had given them, refusing all rich rewards; but the idea behind was to prepare for another struggle, which, as Garibaldi said, he had never forgotten even "in the depths of the American forests".'¹

Thus, when the news of the European Revolution of 1848 reached the opposite shores of the Atlantic, Garibaldi in Monte Video was ready for the call to enter upon his life-work. As they sailed homewards across the ocean in order to turn their prowess to account in fighting for the liberation of Italy, the returning hero and his companions 'knew that they were going "towards the attainment of the passion and desire of their lives"'.² And the People of Italy, on their part, were already aware of what Garibaldi's life-work was to be,³ before ever he re-entered the country which he had left, twelve years before, as an obscure and defeated fugitive. Garibaldi's fame had outstripped Garibaldi himself and

¹ Trevelyan, G. M.: *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic, 1848-9* (second impression: London 1928, Longmans, Green and Co.), p. 35.

² Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

³ Read the anecdote recounted by Trevelyan in *op. cit.*, on pp. 39-40.

come home to Italy before him. 'Already the names of Garibaldi and his Italian Legion were household words'¹ as far afield as Rome. In the chapter of his life-history which began when he once more set foot on Italian soil in 1848, Garibaldi stepped straight into that place in the hearts of his countrymen and in the history of his age which he was to occupy from that time onward.²

Hindenburg

As for Hindenburg, in the summer of 1914 he was already some four years older, at the age of 67, than Garibaldi had been at the time when the task which had been Garibaldi's life-work was carried to completion by the entry of the Italian troops into Rome in the autumn of 1870. And yet, at the outbreak of the General War, the life-work of Hindenburg had not really begun. Born in 1847, and born the son of a Prussian officer, he had almost automatically embraced his father's profession and had passed in his turn through the conventional career of a Prussian officer from start to finish. Nor had his career been particularly eventful; for, while he had come to manhood just in time to serve in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870-1, the whole of the rest of his time of service had elapsed in a period of unbroken peace, until he had been placed on the retired list in his sixty-fourth year as a worthy but undistinguished General Officer. Yet this retirement, which seemed to write 'finis' upon his record, was destined to last for no longer than three years. On the 22nd August, 1914, less than a month after the outbreak of the General War, von Hindenburg re-emerged from his retirement at Hanover, and entered upon his life-work, when he rescued East Prussia from her Russian invaders. For this was the first step in a new career which culminated in the command of the whole German Army on all fronts; and the veteran Generalissimo justified the trust which had been placed in him by his countrymen in the stress of national danger when he stood by his troops at the moment of débacle instead of running to earth on neutral soil at the heels of his sovereign and his chief-of-staff. Thereafter, when the fighting had ceased and the armies had been demobilized, von Hindenburg retired to Hanover for the second time in July 1919, and remained in retirement this time for twice as many years as before, until his countrymen summoned him out of retirement once again by electing him President of the German Reich in April 1925. Thereupon, at the age of seventy-seven, the veteran entered

¹ Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

² Compare the life-history of Hereward the Wake, who left England before the Norman Conquest as a young sprig seeking his fortune on the Continent, and returned to England after the Norman Conquest to step at once into the position of being the one Englishman who knew how to defy the Conqueror.

upon a third career in which he was required to bear the highest responsibility in an unfamiliar field of action. In this remarkable life, the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return has asserted itself at the eleventh hour in order to transform the retired Prussian officer of 1911 into the Pater Patriae of 1925 by miraculously adding a cubit to an old man's stature.

A Pleiad of Historians

If we pass on now, in our survey, from the lives of soldiers and statesmen to the lives of historians and poets and philosophers, our attention will first be attracted by a Pleiad of historians—Thucydides and Xenophon and Polybius; Josephus and Ibn Khaldūn; Machiavelli and Clarendon and Ollivier—who have started life as soldiers or statesmen and have made the transit from one field of action to another in their own life-histories by returning as historians to a world from which they have previously been expelled as prisoners-of-war or deportees or exiles.

Born into their social milieux in generations whose fortune it has been to encounter tremendous challenges and to live through momentous experiences, these eventual observers and recorders of the histories of their own times have all begun their careers by taking a hand in 'practical affairs': participating, that is to say, in the direct interactions between individual human wills in which current history works itself out. This original orientation of their energies towards 'practical' action may have been determined by different causes—by inward inclination or by external accident—but in every case the effect upon their activities has been the same. So long as they have been swept along in the stream of 'practical' action into which they have stumbled or plunged, they have found no occasion for exercising their latent historical abilities. In each of these lives, the occasion has been offered by some accidental breach in the future historian's career as a 'practical man'; and, here again, the effect of this compulsory abandonment of their original role in Society has been the same, whether the reversal of fortune has been greeted by the victim of it as a welcome relief from an onerous public duty or has been endured as a painful banishment from a field of action for which the exile's heart has never ceased to ache. As it happens, these opposite personal reactions to the break are illustrated in the respective attitudes of those two members of our historical Pleiad who have attained the highest distinction in the 'practical' sphere—the only two, in fact, who would undoubtedly have made their mark in history as statesmen if Fortune had allowed them to hold their ground in the political field from beginning to end and had never compelled them to

withdraw in order to make their mark otherwise by turning their historical talents to account. Yet in Clarendon's and in Machiavelli's life alike, the break in the career has actually been the making of it; and this apparent paradox applies *a fortiori* to the life of Thucydides, who lives on in living minds to-day as a greater historian than either of these, although there is no indication that he would ever have emerged from obscurity if his service as a soldier in the 'Twenty-Seven Years' War had continued to the bitter end. Without exception, every member of our Pleiad has made a greater mark and achieved a greater distinction in the last chapter of his career, which has opened with his return as an historian, than he would ever have achieved if the first chapter had not been cut short by his withdrawal as a defeated general or a fallen minister of state.

In these eight broken lives we have a conspicuous example of that process of 'etherialization' which we have taken as our criterion of growth. In the 'practical' first chapter of their careers, these future historians have all set themselves to produce an effect upon their fellow men by the obvious and crude and finite 'direct method' of bringing their wills to bear upon the wills of their neighbours. The compulsory withdrawal, which has inhibited the exercise of their activities on this 'practical' plane, has compelled them to find a new vent by transferring their action to another plane and transmuting their energies into a new medium. In prison or internment or exile, the energies that can now no longer discharge themselves in the impact of will upon will have been transmuted from will-power into a heightened intensity of perception and thought and imagination and feeling; and, in virtue of this transfiguration, the same energies have been able, in the fullness of time, to return to action by evoking an answering note of heightened perception and thought and imagination and feeling in the souls of other human beings. On this higher plane, and through this more etherial medium, action duly begets action in the end, as it does when will strikes will; for the heightening of perception and thought and imagination and feeling cannot take place without producing some tension in the will of the personality that enjoys the experience. In this subtler form of interaction, however, the second will responds to the first by a spontaneous movement that arises from within, and not under a duress that has been imposed upon it *more mechanico* or *manu militari*.

This new form of action on a new plane has been made possible by the employment of a new method of expression and approach. The *ci-devant* soldiers and statesmen who once produced an effect on their fellow men by the direct exertion of will-power, have been

taught by Necessity to invent the alternative method of creating works of art; and, just because it is more etherial, this alternative method is also more effective. It is more effective in the double sense of being wider in its range and of going deeper in its penetration. For the influence of soul on soul that is transmitted through the medium of will-power is as narrow and as superficial as it is sensational. In every kind of action, the agent's scope is limited by the nature of his field; and the scope of the 'practical' man of action is bounded by the confines of the personal and institutional relations through which he is operating. It is only when human action is transmuted—by the purging out of all its human passion and its human *animus*¹—from the gross medium of will into the etherial media of perception and thought and feeling and imagination, that it is able to transcend all limits of Time and Space and to win its way into a field that extends to Infinity.

Let us search, in our own time and place, for vestiges of the living presence of Thucydides and Xenophon the Athenian soldiers, or Polybius the Megalopolitan statesman, or Josephus the defender of Jotapata, or Ibn Khaldun the vizir and the *qādi*, or Machiavelli the Secretary to the Signoria of Florence, or Clarendon the mentor and minister of Charles the First and Charles the Second, or Ollivier the minister of Napoleon III. Search as we may, we shall not find one vestige of life to-day in any of these souls in their original 'practical' capacities. In these capacities, their only monument is Shirley's remorseless stanza:

Some men with swords may reap the field
And plant fresh laurels where they kill;
But their strong nerves at last must yield:
They tame but one another still.
Early or late
They stoop to Fate
And must give up their murmuring breath
When they, pale captives, creep to death.

It is the break in their careers that has saved these abortive soldiers and statesmen from a Caesar's or Napoleon's fate by compelling them to withdraw from the field of 'practical affairs' in order to return to action on the plane on which they have achieved their immortality.

Ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra
Processit longe flammantia moenia mundi
Atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque.²

¹ For purgation (*κάθαρσις*) as the function of the Hellenic art of tragic drama, see Aristotle's famous definition of Tragedy in the *Poetics*, vi. 2 (1449 B).

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Bk. I, ll. 72-4, quoted already in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, on p. 299, above.

If we search now for Thucydides and Xenophon and Polybius and Josephus and Ibn Khaldūn and Machiavelli and Clarendon the historians, we shall find each one of them just as much alive and just as effectively in action in his etherial communion with posterity as ever he was in his 'short and narrow-verged' life in the flesh. As creative artists, these *ci-devant* soldiers and statesmen are proof against Shirley's taunt:

The garlands wither on your brow;
Then boast no more your mighty deeds.

They can answer in the language of Wren's epitaph *Si monumentum requiris circumspice*¹ or in the language of Horace's ode *Non omnis moriar*.² For, in withdrawing on one plane to return on another, they have found life in losing it;³ and their action sweeps on, immortal and infinite.

O love, they die in yon rich sky,
They faint on hill or field or river:
Our echoes roll from soul to soul
And grow for ever and for ever.

This is the spiritual significance of the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return as it manifests itself in the lives of our Pleiad of historians. At a later point in this Study, when we come to consider the inspirations of historians,⁴ we shall have to examine this particular type of Withdrawal-and-Return once again for the sake of the light which it may be found to throw upon the nature of the historian's art. For the purpose of our present inquiry, we have merely to review the circumstances in which each of these eight withdrawals and returns took place.

On a comparative view, these eight lives fall into three groups. In five of them—the lives of Thucydides and Xenophon and Josephus and Ollivier and Machiavelli—the *motif* appears in its simple form. The break which cuts short the chapter of 'practical' action concludes it once and for all, and the chapter of literary activity fills the rest of the life to the end. In two other lives—the lives of Polybius and Clarendon—the pattern is more complicated. Instead of there being only one break, there are two or three; and the periods of 'practical' and literary activity are interwoven in a series of alternate chapters. Finally, there is the life of Ibn Khaldūn, in which a single short period of literary activity is followed, as well as preceded, by a long period of immersion in 'practical' affairs—the posterior period of 'practical' activity lasting, in this case, right down to the philosophic qādi's death.

¹ Inscribed in St. Paul's Cathedral on a tablet over the architect's tombstone.

² Horace: *Carmina*, iii. 30.

³ Matt. x. 39.

⁴ This is the subject of Part XIII, below.

Thucydides

Thucydides (*vivebat circa* 454-399 B.C.) was a citizen of Athens who lived through the Twenty-Seven Years' War of 431-404 B.C., and who was overtaken by the outbreak of the war in his early manhood. He thus belonged to a generation which was just old enough to have known the pre-war Hellenic World as an adult member of the pre-war society; and at the same time he lived long enough to see the denouement of the great catastrophe that brought the growth of the Hellenic Civilization to an end and set in motion the long and tragic movement of decline and fall. The definite breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization was, in fact, the challenge which the generation of Thucydides had to encounter and the experience through which they had to live; and Thucydides was fully alive to the significance of the catastrophe. 'This war', he says in the preface to the first part of his work,¹ 'was . . . the greatest upheaval ever experienced by Hellas and by a part of the non-Hellenic World (it would hardly be an exaggeration to say: by the Human Race)'; and he informs his readers in the same passage that, 'in the belief that this war would eclipse all its predecessors in importance, he began to write as soon as war broke out'. In the Athens, however, of Thucydides' day an able-bodied adult male citizen was constrained in peace-time, and *a fortiori* in war-time, to devote the best part of his time and energy to public service if the State made the demand; and we may suppose that, as soon as war broke out, this 'practical' demand upon Thucydides became exacting. At any rate, in the eighth year of the war, we find Thucydides serving as one of the ten Athenian Generals: a board of public officers, elected annually for a twelve months' term, who exercised the chief executive authority in the civil government in addition to their command over military operations.

It was in this position of 'practical' responsibility, which Thucydides held in 424-423 B.C., that he suffered the break in his career which was the turning-point in his life-history. In the winter of 424-423 B.C., when Thucydides was in command of an Athenian naval squadron stationed at Thasos, he failed to prevent a Lacedaemonian expeditionary force commanded by Brasidas from capturing Amphipolis. The lost fortress was a key-position, since it commanded the passage across the River Strymon on the land-route leading from Continental Greece towards the Dardanelles:

¹ Thucydides' *History of the Twenty-Seven Years' War* is in two parts, each introduced by a preface. The preface to Part I = Bk. I, chs. 1-23; the preface to Part II = Bk. V, chs. 25-6. Part II is unfinished. (The work was apparently interrupted by the author's death.) The narrative breaks off abruptly in the middle of the record of the twenty-first year of the war (411 B.C.) out of the total of twenty-seven years (431-404 B.C.) which the author intended to cover.

the only route along which it was possible for the Peloponnesians to strike, with their superior land-power, at a vital point in the Athenian Empire, so long as Athens retained her command of the sea. The Athenian People sought relief for their feelings of chagrin and alarm at the news of this reverse by cashiering Thucydides and sentencing him to exile. And it was thanks to this personal mishap to Thucydides the soldier that Thucydides the historian at last obtained the opportunity to accomplish his life-work.

'I lived', he writes in the preface to the second part of his work, 'through the whole of [the Twenty-Seven Years' War], and I was not only of an age of discretion, but I took special pains to acquire accurate information. It was my fate to be exiled from my country for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis; and in this situation I was enabled to see something of both sides—the Peloponnesian as well as the Athenian—and to make a special study of the War at my leisure.'

Thanks to this fortunate misfortune, Thucydides was able to complete rather more than two-thirds of his projected work,¹ though he seems to have died a premature death before he was out of his fifties. What is more, he has triumphantly achieved his ambition, declared in the preface to the first part of the work, to produce 'an everlasting possession'—a permanent contribution to knowledge—'rather than an ephemeral *tour de force*'. In his own austere intellectual way, this cashiered Athenian officer has anticipated the injunction

'Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon Earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal;

'But lay up for yourselves treasures in Heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal;

'For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.'²

The passing agony of one unhappy generation of Hellenes who dealt their own Hellas a mortal blow and knew that her blood was on them and on their children³ has been transmuted by Thucydides, in a great work of art, into an ageless and deathless human experience.

Xenophon

Xenophon was the continuator of Thucydides' work; and he carried on the tale of ruin, from the point at which Thucydides' narrative broke off, for another fifty years,⁴ until he, too, dropped his pen

¹ The title of Part II, as given by the author himself in the preface to this part, is: 'The History of the Second Phase of the War down to the Overthrow of the Athenian Empire by the Lacedaemonians and their Allies and the Occupation of the Long Walls and the Peiraeus.'

² Matt. vi. 19-21.

⁴ Xenophon's *Hellenica* covers the years 411-362 B.C.

³ Matt. xxvii. 25.

from a hand which was arrested, not by the accident of death, but by the inward inhibition of despair.¹ Born an Athenian citizen in a generation which did not come to manhood until the Twenty-Seven Years' War was in full swing, and which therefore was inclined to take the state of war for granted, Xenophon can scarcely have seen his first military service until some time after Thucydides had seen his last;² and his experience of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War did not sate Xenophon's appetite for the military career. After the restoration of peace in Hellas he went off to seek his fortune in the service of Cyrus the Lesser: a young pretender to the Achaemenian throne; and this gratuitous military adventure—on which Xenophon embarked against the advice of his mentor Socrates³—resulted, as Socrates had feared, in Xenophon's being penalized at Athens by a sentence of banishment;⁴ but this political mishap simply impelled the incorrigible soldier of fortune to find a new opening for military adventure by irrevocably throwing in his lot with the Spartans. He attached himself to the staff of King Agesilaus, and was actually present, in the Spartan king's suite, at an important engagement in which his own Athenian countrymen were on the opposing side.⁵

It was after this, when Xenophon was perhaps some ten years older than his predecessor Thucydides had been when he retired, after his banishment, to his Thracian asylum at Scaptê Hylê, that at last the change took place in Xenophon's life which transformed Xenophon the soldier into Xenophon the author. The Lacedaemonian Government now showed its appreciation of Xenophon's services by endowing him with an estate at Scillus, a quiet, rural neighbourhood in the Peloponnese;⁶ and at Scillus Xenophon lived in peace and wrote at leisure for some twenty years, until eventually

¹ After recounting the Battle of Mantinea which was fought in 362 B.C., and in which Xenophon's own son met his death as well as the great Theban statesman Epaminondas (the one man of his generation who might conceivably have saved Hellas, if his life had been spared), Xenophon winds up his history with the following sentence: "There was more unsettlement and disorder in Hellas after the battle than before it—but I do not propose to carry my narrative further, and will leave the sequel to any other historian who cares to record it" (Xenophon: *Hellenica*, Bk. VII, *ad fin.*). The bitterness of this sentence comes with peculiar pungency from the pen of a writer with Xenophon's placid temperament.

² Xenophon is said to have been in action, in the summer of 424, at the Battle of Delium, and to have had his life saved on this occasion by Socrates. This story, however, is probably apocryphal; and Xenophon was perhaps some ten years younger than the story assumes.

³ See Xenophon's own account of this incident in his *Cyri Anabasis*, III. i. 4-8.

⁴ The decree of banishment appears to have been issued against Xenophon in 399 B.C., the same year in which Socrates was put to death. His final offence, in the eyes of his own Athenian countrymen, seems to have been his action in inducing the remnant of his ten thousand fellow-Greek mercenaries, after their catabasis from Babylonia to the Aegean, to take service with the Spartan commander Thibron in his operations against the Achaemenian Power in western Asia Minor.

⁵ The Battle of Coronea, fought in 394 B.C.

⁶ See Xenophon's own charming description of his estate at Scillus in *Anabasis*, v. iii. 7-13.

he was expelled by the Eleans after the downfall of his Lacedaemonian patrons.¹ It was those twenty years in Scillus that ensured the achievement of Xenophon's life-work.

Josephus

Josephus was a Jew who lived through the Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70, and who was overtaken by the outbreak of the war in his late twenties.² Born into a distinguished family of the hereditary Jewish priesthood, and brought up at Jerusalem in the traditional Jewish culture,³ Josephus was old enough to have known the pre-war Jewish life in Palestine as an adult member of the pre-war society; and at the same time he lived to witness the great catastrophe which ended in the destruction of the Palestinian Jewish community root and branch, and which thereby reduced Jewry to a mere diaspora.⁴ The Great Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70 was the last and the decisive bout in a long-drawn-out combat which had opened with the armed insurrection of the Maccabees against the Seleucid Power in 168 B.C. This Jewish attempt to resist the impact of Hellenism by force of arms had been a forlorn hope from the outset; and the tragedy of the inevitable outcome was only heightened by the accidental prolongation of the unequal struggle over a period of little less than two and a half centuries.⁵ The annihilation of the Palestinian Jewish community through the knock-out blow which was delivered, in the end, by the military power of Rome, was the experience which had to be endured by Jewry in the generation of Josephus; and Josephus writes of this great Jewish catastrophe in terms that recall Thucydides' description of the great Hellenic catastrophe of 431 B.C. 'The Judaeo-Roman War', he says in the opening sentence of the preface to his history of it, 'is the greatest war of our own times, and it would hardly be an exaggeration to add that it is the greatest of any wars on record between either city-states or nations.'⁶

In the early part of the war, Josephus, like Thucydides, participated as a combatant; and, like Thucydides again, he was com-

¹ The Eleans were former allies of the Lacedaemonians who had shown themselves recalcitrant and had therefore been chastised by the Lacedaemonian Government in 398-397 B.C. as soon as the downfall of Athens had set Spartan hands free to attend to minor matters. Scillus was a former possession of the Eleans which had been taken from them by the Lacedaemonians on this occasion. The Eleans promptly resumed possession after the Lacedaemonian *débâcle* at Leuctra in 371 B.C.

² See Josephus's *Autobiography*, chs. 3 and 4 and 15.

³ See Josephus, *op. cit.*, chs. 1 and 2. He records that, between the ages of sixteen and nineteen, he spent three years in self-mortification in the Wilderness, as the disciple of an ascetic anchorite, as a prelude to becoming a Pharisee.

⁴ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 236, and II D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285-6, above.

⁵ The militant anti-Hellenic reaction of Jewry in Palestine was respite by a series of accidents: the overthrow of the Seleucidae by Rome; the rise of the Arsacid Power east of Euphrates; and the adroit temporizing policy of the Herods.

⁶ Josephus: *The Romano-Jewish War*: Preface = Bk. I, chs. 1-16.

pelled to change his role by the fortune of war, which broke his military career and thrust him into the position of an observer who was penalized in one sense and privileged in another. Josephus was penalized in the sense that the circumstances in which his change of fortune came about were such as to produce a moral breach between the prisoner-of-war and his own people, in whose eyes he was a traitor to the Jewish cause.¹ He was privileged inasmuch as he won the confidence and esteem and patronage of Vespasian—the Roman commander in Palestine who rose, while the war in Palestine was still in progress, to be the lord and master of the Roman World. When the war was over and the last embers of the great conflagration had been stamped out, Josephus left Palestine for Rome in the same ship as Vespasian's son and lieutenant and successor Titus; and in Rome he settled down in comfort² to his life-work of writing *The History of the Romano-Jewish War* and *The Ancient History of the Jews* and the other historical and controversial works through which he lives to this day. Josephus's own account of the stroke of Fortune which turned Josephus the soldier into Josephus the historian is given in the following terms:

'By descent I am a Hebrew from Jerusalem, by profession a priest. I saw service against the Romans in the initial phase of the War, and was a compulsory spectator of its latter stages.³ . . . My own record of the War as a whole and of the incidental details is correct, since I was a first-hand witness of all the events. I was in command of our Galileans so long as resistance was possible, while after my capture I was a prisoner with the Romans. Vespasian and Titus compelled me to remain in constant attendance upon them under guard, at first in chains, though afterwards I was released and was sent from Alexandria, on the staff of Titus, to the siege of Jerusalem. During this period nothing was transacted that escaped my observation. The events in the Roman camp I sedulously recorded at first hand, while I was the only person present who could understand the reports of the deserters from the

¹ Josephus became a prisoner-of-war in the campaign of A.D. 67 upon the capture of the Galilaean fortress of Jotapata, of which he had been the commandant. During the siege of Jotapata and in the earlier operations in which he had taken part, Josephus had shown himself an energetic and able soldier; but his record down to this point did not subsequently count to him for righteousness in Jewish eyes. The Jewish people could not forgive Josephus for having been the only survivor of the garrison of Jotapata to give himself up alive, instead of falling in action or committing suicide; nor could they forgive him for having made favour thereafter with Vespasian and for having attempted, in the final campaign, to persuade the fanatical defenders of Jerusalem to capitulate before it was too late. No doubt Josephus had been in the black books of the Zealots from the outset as an original opponent of the war, who had only taken up arms against his better judgement after he and his party had lost control of the political situation. (For Josephus's part in the war down to the siege of Jotapata, see his *Autobiography*, chs. 4-74. For the siege of Jotapata and the circumstances in which Josephus not only escaped with his life but promptly established himself in the good graces of Vespasian, see *The Romano-Jewish War*, Bk. III, chs. 127-408.)

² See Josephus's own rather self-complacent account of his life after becoming the protégé of Vespasian in his *Autobiography*, chs. 75-6.

³ *The Romano-Jewish War*, Bk. I, ch. 3.

Jewish side. When all my material was in the proper state of preparation, I took advantage of a period of leisure at Rome to employ the services of collaborators to help me with the Greek language, and I thus wrote out my narrative.¹

It will be seen that, in their external aspect, the career of Josephus and the career of Thucydides ran an almost identical course, but that there is a profound difference in the spiritual response which the same challenge evoked from the two personalities. The response of Thucydides is a noble example of the tragic *catharsis*; and, in 'the everlasting possession' into which the Athenian exile has transmuted his transitory experience, the dross of egotism and animus has all been refined away. As we read Thucydides' history, we are conscious that the author's personal misfortune is genuinely of no account in the author's own eyes by comparison with the public catastrophe which has overtaken Athens and Hellas; and even the deep emotion which the consciousness of this catastrophe awakens in Thucydides' soul is so rigorously held in control that we are only made aware of its intensity now and again by the quivering tension which reveals itself, here and there, through the texture of the historian's calm and measured words. In the soul of Josephus, on the other hand, the *catharsis* has been imperfect; and the note which his writing strikes has a tart and polemical tone. While one element in his soul is seeking to transmute the agonizing experience of a war of annihilation into an everlasting memorial of the people and the culture that have been blotted out of the book of life,² there is all the time another Josephus who is seeking a personal relief for a private spiritual malaise. This other Josephus is attempting to heal his personal breach with Jewry by making himself the classic interpreter of Jewry to Hellenism; and he is trying to assuage the stings of his conscience—which will not leave him in peace, in his pampered life of exile in Rome, while Jerusalem lies in ruins—by conducting a perpetual polemic against Hellenism with his pen, as an amends for his having once bought personal immunity and advancement from the lords of the Hellenic World by giving up his sword. In other words, Josephus, in his latter-day literary work, is in some sense pursuing his previous 'practical' activities in a new medium. And this fault is still more conspicuously apparent in the literary work of the French member of our Pleiad: Émile Ollivier.

Ollivier

Ollivier is not without excuse for his frailty, for his personal identification with the disaster that overtook his country in his day

¹ *A Reply to Apion*, Bk. I, chs. 47-50.

² Exod. xxxii. 32; Rev. iii. 5.

was much more intimate, and much more serious, than Thucydides' identification with the fall of Athens or Josephus's with the fall of Jewry. Ollivier was a Frenchman who lived through the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1. For France, this war, which brought to an end a French political and military hegemony of two centuries' standing on the European Continent, was not only a supreme national catastrophe; it was also a supreme national humiliation, since the war was lost by no honourable defeat but by a lamentable *débâcle*. And for Ollivier this tragic experience of France was a personal tragedy of equal magnitude; for, at the moment when the disaster occurred, Ollivier occupied in France the principal position of political responsibility next to the Emperor Napoleon III himself. While the Emperor was saved from the fury of the French people by falling into the enemy's hands, his minister had to fly the country. Ollivier took refuge in Italy, and when he ventured to return to France in 1873 his life was in ruins. Born in 1825, engaged in politics from 1848 to 1870, and virtually Prime Minister in the Imperial Government during the fatal days between the end of 1869 and the 9th August, 1870, Ollivier now found himself, at the age of forty-eight, a scapegoat in the wilderness, with all the transgressions of the Second Empire heaped upon his devoted head.¹

Ollivier's retort to the outrageous Fortune which had felled his country and himself by the same terrific blow was to write, on the grand scale, a history of the whole unhappy chapter in French history in which he had played his own unhappy part. The prologue to the drama, as he presents it in *L'Empire Libéral*,² begins with the morrow of the peace-settlement of 1815; the curtain descends upon the *débâcle* of 1870 after Ollivier's fall from office on the 9th August of that year and his subsequent abortive private mission to Italy. The first volume was published in 1895, a quarter of a century after the catastrophe, when the author himself was already seventy years old;³ and thereafter volume followed volume

¹ Ollivier applies the simile of the scapegoat to himself in *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. i, p. 30.

² *L'Empire Libéral: Études, Récits, Souvenirs*, par Émile Ollivier (Paris 1895-1912, Garnier Frères, 16 volumes).

³ The final and effective decision to write seems to have been taken by Ollivier as a consequence of Bismarck's outright avowal that he had deliberately precipitated the war by tampering with the text of the famous 'Ems Telegram'. This outright avowal was not made until 1892, after Bismarck's dismissal from the Chancellorship of the German Reich by the Emperor William II. Ollivier appears to have been stirred by this revelation in two ways. He was elated to see the responsibility for the outbreak of the war transferred from the shoulders of France to the shoulders of Germany by so conclusive an authority as Bismarck himself; and he was outraged to find that Bismarck's confession was not being taken by public opinion as an exoneration of Ollivier for his own part in those transactions. *L'Empire Libéral* seems to have been committed to writing under this twofold stimulus. The context in which Ollivier gives his account of Bismarck's avowal is illuminating. (See *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. i, pp. 24-31.)

year by year until the sixteenth and last volume was published in 1912, when the author was eighty-seven and when the greater war of 1914-18, which was to reverse the result of the war of 1870-1, was only two years ahead in the future.¹ In thus transferring to historiography the energies that had been expelled from the field of politics twenty-five years earlier, Ollivier was not achieving a spiritual *catharsis* and was not pursuing the path of 'etherialization'. To parody a notorious maxim of his Prussian enemies,² he was rather taking up the historian's pen in order to pursue the politician's aims by the best alternative means that still remained at his disposal. The driving force that impels him to write and write from his seventy-first to his eighty-eighth year is a burning desire to vindicate France and to vindicate Ollivier.

The first of these two motives is proclaimed at the beginning of the book:

'À la veille de disparaître de ce monde, je veux donner une dernière preuve de dévouement à la patrie bien aimée à laquelle j'ai consacré toutes mes pensées. Je veux la laver devant la postérité de la tache d'avoir déchaîné parmi les hommes la misère, la défiance, la haine, la barbarie. Je veux démontrer qu'en 1870 elle n'a pas été plus agressive qu'elle ne l'avait été en 1792 et en 1806; qu'alors comme autrefois elle a défendu son indépendance, non attenté à celle d'autrui. Laissant aux contempteurs de son droit les gémissements dont depuis tant d'années ils affaiblissent son courage, je lui tends la coupe où l'on boit le cordial qui rend la foi, la force, l'espérance. Si elle l'accepte, tant mieux pour elle!'³

The patriotic motive, here confessed, is plain to read; but the personal motive, which Ollivier is at pains to deny, is equally unmistakable. It is revealed in the author's chagrin that Bismarck's avowal of his responsibility for precipitating the war has not served to vindicate his own—Ollivier's—reputation.⁴ It is revealed in the ostentation with which he abstains from vindicating himself (for 'on s'excuse même en renonçant aux excuses'). Above all, it is revealed in his grand finale, which is not the *débâcle* at Sedan and is not the fall of Metz and is not the fall of Paris and is not the signature of the Peace of Frankfurt, but is—at the end of sixteen volumes—the fall of the Ministère Ollivier!

¹ The writer of this Study, who was an undergraduate at Oxford at the time when the last volumes of *L'Empire Libéral* were appearing, can well remember the interest which their publication aroused.

² 'War is only a continuation of State policy by other means' (Clausewitz, General Karl von: *On War*. Translated by Colonel J. J. Graham from the third German edition (London 1893, Trübner), p. vii).

³ Ollivier, E. O.: *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. i, pp. 32-3.

⁴ Ollivier, op. cit., vol. i, p. 30.

Machiavelli

If Émile Ollivier is the dimmest member of our Pleiad, Niccolò Machiavelli is as bright a star as Thucydides himself.

Machiavelli (*vivebat* A.D. 1469–1527) was a citizen of Florence who was twenty-five years old when King Charles VIII of France crossed the Alps and overran Italy with a French army in A.D. 1494. He thus belonged to a generation which was just old enough to have known Italy as she had been during her age of immunity from 'barbarian invasions'; and he lived long enough to see the peninsula become the international arena for trials of strength between sundry Transalpine or Transmarine Powers, which found the prize and the symbol of their alternating victories in snatching from one another's grasp an oppressive hegemony over the once independent Italian city-states. This impact upon Italy of non-Italian Powers was the challenge which the generation of Machiavelli had to encounter and the experience through which they had to live; and the challenge was the more difficult for the Italians of this generation to meet inasmuch as the experience had not been tasted, either by these Italians or by their forefathers, for the best part of two and a half centuries.

The immunity which was broken (for nearly four centuries to come) by the French invasion of A.D. 1494 had been enjoyed down to that date, with little or no interruption, since the death of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II in A.D. 1250. Between those two dates, the Italian city-states had not only lived their own parochial lives in political freedom and security from external attack behind the 'natural frontiers' of the Alps and the sea, but on the economic plane their merchants and manufacturers had dominated the business-life of three worlds: the Arabic World and the main body of Orthodox Christendom, as well as the whole of Western Christendom. The coasts of the Levant and the Black Sea had been bespangled with Italian trading-ports and naval stations and colonies. The Republic of Venice had made herself mistress of Crete; Florentine dukes had ruled in Athens; the Greek Emperor in Constantinople had been browbeaten by his Genoese neighbours across the Golden Horn at Galata; and the Genoese flag had flown as far afield as Caffa in the Crimea and Tana at the mouth of the Don, in the far corner of the Sea of Azov. Moreover, Italian explorers had pushed their way beyond the farthest limits of Italian empire and commerce. Some twenty-five years after Frederick II's death three Venetian explorers, the Polos, had made their way to China across the whole breadth of the Eurasian Steppe; and, just two years before Charles VIII's passage of the

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Alps, a Genoese explorer, Columbus, had made his way across the whole breadth of the Atlantic to the West Indies.

But the greatest achievements of the Italian genius during those two and a half centuries of immunity had not been extensive but intensive, not material but spiritual. In architecture, in sculpture, in painting, in literature, and in almost every other province in the realm of aesthetic and intellectual culture, the Italians, during those centuries, had been performing works of creation that bear comparison with the creative achievements of the Greeks during an equal period of time in the sixth and fifth and fourth centuries B.C.¹ In fine, the Italians had used their long-sought, hard-won immunity from alien military and political domination in order to create, within their sheltered peninsula, a miniature Italian World apart within the wider world of Western Christendom—an Italian World in which the level of the Western Civilization had been raised precociously to such a high degree that the difference of degree became tantamount to a difference in kind. By the close of the fifteenth century the Italians were, and felt themselves to be, so far superior in civilization to all other Westerners (with the possible exception of the Flemings) that—half in conceit and half in earnest—they revived the term ‘barbarians’ to describe the Western peoples on the farther side of the Alps and beyond the Tyrrhene Sea. And then, in this very generation, the latter-day ‘barbarians’ began to act in character by showing themselves militarily and politically wiser than the Italian children of light.²

As the new Italian culture radiated out of the peninsula in all directions, it had quickened the cultural growth of the peoples round about, and quickened it first in the grosser elements of culture—such elements as political organization and military technique—in which the effect of radiation is always most prompt to make itself felt.³ In consequence, the ‘barbarian’ peoples of Western Christendom, while remaining little less barbarous than before in everything else, had begun to overtake their Italian teachers in the mastery of the military and political arts; and when once they had mastered them they were able to apply them on a vastly larger scale than the scale of the Italian city-states. Their ability to surpass the Italians in this material way was not, of course, a symptom of any greater inborn genius. On the contrary, the ‘barbarians’ were manifestly inferior in political and military

¹ The Italians, of course, sought inspiration from this ancient Greek genius by evoking the ghost of the extinct Hellenic culture, first in its latter-day second-hand Latin version and eventually in its original Greek form. (For this Italian Renaissance of Hellenic Culture, see further IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (x), vol. iv. p. 275, footnotes 1 and 2, as well as Part X, below.) ² Luke xvi. 8.

³ For this phenomenon of social radiation, see Part II. A, vol. i, p. 187, and Part III. C (i) (a), pp. 151-3, above, and Parts VIII and IX, below.

as well as in artistic and literary genius to the Italians of Machiavelli's age. The explanation of the 'barbarians' relative success in achieving a scale of social organization which the Italians had found to be beyond their own powers lies in the fact that the 'barbarians' were applying the political lessons which the Italians had taught them in far easier circumstances than those with which statesmanship had to contend in contemporary Italy.

In Machiavelli's generation, Italian statesmanship was being handicapped, and 'barbarian' statesmanship was being facilitated, by the operation of one of the regular laws of 'the Balance of Power'.¹

The Balance of Power is a system of political dynamics that comes into play whenever a society articulates itself into a number of mutually independent local states; and the Italian Society that had differentiated itself externally from the rest of Western Christendom during the second chapter in the history of our Western Civilization (*circa* A.D. 1075-1475) had at the same time articulated itself internally in this very way. The political movement to extricate Italy from the Holy Roman Empire had been initiated and carried through by a host of 'communes' or city-states which were striving, each for itself, to assert a right to local self-determination; so that the creation of an Italian World apart and the articulation of this world into a multiplicity of local states were coeval events in Italian history. Thus the Balance of Power had been introduced from the outset into the political structure of this new Italian version of the Western Civilization; and indeed the Italian city-states were already contending fiercely with one another in order to maintain or modify or restore this balance among themselves long before they had completed their common task of shaking themselves free from the old Imperial trammels. At this stage of Italian history, however, the loss of energy and the destruction of wealth and life and happiness which were caused by this internal political strife were not yet so serious as to check the new Italian Society's growth in civilization. This growth made headway in all those fields of activity that have been cited above; and, as Italy grew in spiritual stature, she radiated her culture, as has been described, into the regions round about her. The effect of this continuing radiation of culture from an Italian source of social energy was to bring an ever widening circle of surrounding countries and peoples within the ambit of the Italian Civilization in this or that sphere of social activity and in this or that degree. It has been mentioned already that (as always happens) the first

¹ The various laws of interaction between mutually independent states that follow from 'the Balance of Power' are examined in greater detail in Part XI, below.

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sphere of activity in which the 'barbarians' made substantial progress in learning from their Italian teachers was the sphere of military and political technique. And at this point one of the laws of the Balance of Power comes into play.

The Balance of Power operates in a general way to keep the average calibre of states low in terms of every criterion for the measurement of political power: in extent of territory and in head of population and in aggregate of wealth. It operates in this way through a system of pressures; a state which threatens to increase its calibre above the prevailing average becomes subject, almost automatically, to pressure from all the other states that are members of the same political constellation; and it is one of the laws of the Balance of Power that, in any given constellation of states in which the political units are in this dynamic relation with one another, the pressure is greatest at the heart of the constellation and relaxes progressively towards the periphery.

At the centre, every move that any one state makes with a view to its own aggrandizement is jealously watched and adroitly countered by all its neighbours, and the sovereignty over a few square feet of territory and a few hundred 'souls' becomes a subject for the bitterest and stubbornest contention. For this reason, it commonly happens that, at the centre of the constellation, no appreciable political result is produced by the application of even the highest genius or by the mobilization of the utmost energy. The severity of the mechanical pressure under which the statesman has to operate here effectively counteracts the statesman's ablest efforts; while, on the other hand, on the periphery, a second-rate statesman is capable—thanks to the relatively slight degree of pressure under which he has to work—of producing results that arouse the astonishment and envy of the first-rate statesman at the centre. In the easy circumstances of the periphery quite a mediocre political talent is often able to work wonders. In this field, the second-rate statesman can carry out his naïve moves without their being frustrated or even being suspected by his local rivals; and he can annex a province or a kingdom or even a whole continent without arousing as much opposition as his brilliant contemporary in the central region has to face when he seeks to annex a single fortress or a single village. The domain of the United States can be expanded unobtrusively right across North America from Atlantic to Pacific, the domain of Russia right across Asia from Baltic to Pacific, in an age when the best statesmanship of France or Germany cannot avail to obtain unchallenged possession of an Alsace or a Posen.

This extreme unevenness in the distribution of political pressure

prescribes a law of the Balance of Power which can be formulated as follows: If a given society is articulated politically into a multiplicity of mutually independent local states, with the result that the Balance of Power has been introduced into the dynamics of this society's political structure; and if this society proceeds to grow in civilization, with the result that it radiates its culture out abroad and thereby enlarges its own geographical ambit:¹ then the states that occupy the heart and homeland of this civilization will sooner or later be dwarfed and overshadowed and dominated by the rise, around the periphery of the expanding constellation, of a whole new order of Great Powers with an overwhelmingly greater average calibre.

There are many historical examples of this phenomenon; and, to look no farther than our own present predicament,² we can see that the multiplicity and the discord of the national states of Europe is being challenged collectively in our generation by the rise, in Asia and overseas, of a new order of Great Powers of a vastly greater average magnitude. The United States, which has been the first of these giants to grow to full stature, is to-day a match, not merely for this or that European state or group of states, but for all Europe put together (if Europe ever can be put together by the genius of any European statesman). And to-morrow we Europeans must look forward to seeing our little European World encircled by a dozen giants of the American calibre when Canada and Argentina and Australia have peopled their empty spaces, and when Russia and India and China and Brazil have acquired the knack of efficiency, and when the Union of South Africa has expanded its domain from the Tropic of Capricorn to the Equator.

¹ In the case of an expanding civilization, the unevenness in the distribution of the political pressure as between the centre and the periphery is accentuated by a psychological factor which the process of geographical expansion brings into play. Two common forms which expansion takes are the cultural assimilation of outer barbarians and the physical occupation of outlying regions by colonists from the homelands of the expanding society. The effect of both these forms of expansion is to create 'new countries'; and in 'new countries' of both kinds there is a high degree of psychological plasticity which works powerfully in favour of political consolidation. The political value of this psychological factor is illustrated by the relative ease with which the statesmanship of the Roman Republic was able to incorporate the semi-barbarous mountaineers of the Sabina and Picenum into the Roman body politic, by contrast with the strength of the resistance that was offered by a Veii or a Capua. Another illustration is the relative ease with which British statesmanship has succeeded in creating new self-governing nations out of the bi-national White populations of Canada and South Africa, by contrast with that fissiparous tendency in European multi-national states which disrupted the pre-war Austria and which is threatening to disrupt the post-war Belgium. (For the plasticity of colonial populations and the way in which this factor has worked in favour of the construction of the British Commonwealth of Nations, see further Toynbee, A. J.: *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement* (London 1928, Milford), pp. 37-8.)

² Other examples are to be found in the history of the Sinic World *post Confucium*, during 'the period of contending states', and in the history of the Hellenic World *post Alexandrum*. This latter example is dealt with on pp. 310-12, below, apropos of the career of Polybius.

When that day comes, the pygmy countries of Europe, instead of being confronted by a single giant, will be encircled by half a dozen; and these encompassing giants, who already overtop us as they grow in stature, all owe their gigantic strength to the currents of vitality that have been flowing into their frames, through one medium or another, from Europe itself. These gigantic countries of the extra-European World have either been colonized by European immigrants or they have been overrun by European conquerors or they have been opened up by European traders or else they have been spiritually irradiated by European techniques or institutions or ideas without any physical inoculation with European flesh and blood; but, whatever the process may have been, they have all been brought to life by being brought within the ambit of that Western Civilization of which Europe has been the fountain-head. And thus it would appear that—to invert a famous phrase¹—we Europeans have called a new world into being not to *redress* but to *upset* the balance of the old.²

In the light of the political laws which we have analysed above, we can see objectively that this 'dwarfing' of Europe is the natural and indeed the inevitable result of the expansion of our Western Civilization when it has expanded out of a continent that is partitioned politically into a multiplicity of states and when its inter-state relations are governed by the principle of the Balance of Power. At the same time, the result is, subjectively, a strange sensation for us Europeans who, in our generation, are living through this experience. It is strange to find Europe being dwarfed and put out of countenance by the outer world which she has succeeded in bringing within her ambit through the radiation of her higher culture. It is strange to realize that she may emerge from her last four centuries of triumphal progress as the servant, and not as the mistress, of the other continents round about her. An uncomfortable blend of bewilderment and misgiving and pique and irony is the characteristic state of mind of a European in our generation when he gazes out at the 'Brave New World' which he sees arising all around him. And this was likewise the state of mind of an Italian in Machiavelli's generation, when he looked abroad and saw the 'barbarians' looming up from outer darkness into the penumbra of the light that was shining out from Italy into the rest of Western Christendom.

¹ The phrase was uttered by the British statesman Canning in a debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th December, 1826, in allusion to the part which British statesmanship had played in the liberation of a score of new nations that had come to life in South and Central America within the chrysalis of the Spanish Empire.

² 'The dwarfing of Europe' in our generation is examined further in Part XII, below, *apropos* of the prospects of our Western Civilization.

It was just this Italian light that had given the 'barbarians' their new and formidable vitality. A France politically Italianized by Louis XI and a Spain politically Italianized by Ferdinand and Isabella and an England politically Italianized by Henry VII were the new 'barbarian' Powers which, in Machiavelli's day, were dwarfing an Italian Florence or Venice or Milan and were putting the whole of Italy out of countenance.¹ It is curious to reflect that these raw 'barbarian' Powers which were overshadowing the city-states of Italy at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are the self-same nation-states of Transalpine Europe which, in their turn, are being overshadowed now, four centuries after, by the rising continent-states of an extra-European World. By A.D. 1527, the year of Machiavelli's death, his Florence and Venice and Milan had come to stand to France and Spain and England as our England and France and Spain were standing in A.D. 1927 to Canada and Russia and the United States.

This situation is a challenge to statesmanship. If the pygmy states at the centre take no preventive action, it is obvious that the giant states on the periphery are bound to overwhelm them by sheer weight of metal; and this means that, on the political plane, the creators and sustainers of the common civilization will lose their power of initiative and perhaps their independence, and that the sceptre will pass to the outer 'barbarians' who are not yet fit to wield it. This will not only be a political calamity for the pygmy central states; it will also be a cultural calamity for Society as a whole. From every point of view, it is in the public interest that this calamity should be averted; and the duty of averting it devolves upon the statesmen of the central states whose political existence is threatened. It is for them to act, but how are they to perform their task? The solution manifestly lies in somehow transmuting political pluralism and political strife into political concord and political solidarity; but how is this miracle to be achieved? For, as we have observed, it is precisely here, in the centre of the international constellation, that the forces working for political disunity

¹ There were also two other Great Powers which began to press heavily upon Italy in Machiavelli's lifetime, but which had not been brought to life by the radiation of Italian influence. One of these other two Powers was the Ottoman Empire, which engulfed the Italian enclaves in the Levant as soon as it had finished its conquest of the Orthodox Christians. (The 'Osmanlis made themselves masters of Genoese Galata in A.D. 1453 and of Florentine Athens in 1456; and in 1470 they conquered Venetian Negrepont in the course of a great Venetio-Ottoman War which lasted from 1463 to 1479, and which did not end until the Ottoman cavalry had appeared in Friuli (in 1477-8). In 1475 they annexed Genoese Caffa and Tana, and in 1480 an Ottoman expeditionary force momentarily occupied Otranto.) The other Great Power which arose on Italy's eastern flank was the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, which took shape in A.D. 1526—a few months before Machiavelli's death—as a carapace to protect the eastern borders of Western Christendom against Ottoman onslaughts. (For this function of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 177-90, above.)

and discord exert their strongest pressure. It will be seen that the task which confronted Italian statesmanship in Machiavelli's generation, and which likewise confronts European statesmanship in ours, is a task of peculiar difficulty; if the problem can be solved at all, it can only be solved by some stroke of genius; and, in the Italy of Machiavelli's generation, Niccolò Machiavelli himself had many of the qualities for serving as the man of the hour.

Machiavelli was endowed by Nature with consummate political ability; he had an insatiable zest for exercising his talents; and Fortune conspired with merit to give him his opportunity. Fortune made him a citizen of Florence, one of the leading city-states of the peninsula; and merit won him, at the age of twenty-nine, the post of secretary to the Government of the Republic. Appointed to this important office at Florence in A.D. 1498, four years after the passage of the 'barbarian' Charles VIII, Machiavelli acquired a first-hand knowledge of the new 'barbarian' Powers in the course of his official duties; for the Florentine Government sent their Secretary abroad on frequent diplomatic missions, and these not only to other Italian Governments but also to the Courts of the formidable potentates beyond the Alps. In the course of the fourteen years during which he held his Secretaryship, Machiavelli was sent on one mission to the Emperor and on no less than four missions to the Court of France; and his writings show how ably he turned these occasions to account.¹ With his genius for political observation, he studied and apprehended and recorded exactly those features in the political structure of the new Transalpine nation-states which were of practical interest and importance for contemporary Italian statesmanship. After fourteen years of this experience, Machiavelli had become perhaps better qualified than any other living Italian for taking in hand the urgent task of helping Italy to work out her political salvation, when a turn in the wheel of Florentine domestic politics suddenly expelled him from his whole field of 'practical' activity. On the 7th November, 1512, Machiavelli was deprived of his Secretaryship of State; in the February and March of the following year he suffered imprisonment and torture; and, although he was lucky enough to emerge again alive, the price which he had to pay for his release from prison was a perpetual rustication on his farm in the Florentine countryside at San Casciano, where he found himself wholly cut off from all those affairs of state in which he had hitherto lived

¹ See the instructions, dispatches, and reports, relating to these five diplomatic missions, which are printed in Machiavelli's collected works, as well as his four special studies on France and Germany (*Ritratti delle Cose della Francia, Ritratti delle Cose dell'Alamagna, Rapporto delle Cose della Magna, Discorso sopra le Cose di Alamagna e sopra l'Imperatore*).

and moved and had his being. The break in his career was complete; yet, in putting him to the proof of this tremendous personal challenge, Fortune did not find Machiavelli wanting in the power to make an effective response.

The fallen and imprisoned statesman had already decided on his response before he had obtained his release, as is apparent from the following passage in a letter of the 9th April, 1513, which he wrote to a friend and former colleague from his place of confinement:

'Fortune has decided that, as I do not know how to talk about the *Arte della Seta* or the *Arte della Lana*,¹ or about profits and losses, my cue must be to talk about the State. I have to talk about that or else resign myself to keeping quiet.'²

Already, the *ci-devant* Secretary of State was preparing to return as a political philosopher to a world which had cast him out as a practical politician; and the circumstances in which this change of role was actually achieved are described by the philosopher himself in another letter addressed to the same correspondent and written before the close of the same calendar year:

'Here I am on the farm; and, since those last experiences of mine, the number of days that I have spent in Florence does not amount to twenty, all told. I have spent my time since then in fowling—thrushes—with my own hand, rising before daylight. I have been setting bird-lime and going along with a bundle of cages on my back, for all the world like Geta when he came from the harbour with Amphitryon's books. I have been catching at least two thrushes a day, and sometimes as many as seven. In this way I occupied myself for the whole of September. After that, this sport came to an end (to my regret, in spite of its being odd and not worth caring about); and I will now tell you what my life has been since then.

'I rise with the Sun, and go my ways to my wood, which I am having cut. I stay there two hours inspecting the previous day's work and passing the time with the wood-cutters, who always have some trouble on hand, with their neighbours if not among themselves. About that wood I have a thousand tales to tell of the things that have happened to me. . . .

'After leaving the wood, I go off to a spring, and from there to a fowling-place of mine, with a book stowed away: a Dante or a Petrarch or one of these minor poets: say, Tibullus or Ovid or the like. I read those tales of lovers' passions and call to mind my own and indulge myself a little in such reminiscences. Then I transfer my quarters to

¹ In Florentine parlance, these two terms might mean either 'the Woollen Industry' and 'the Silk Industry' or else 'the Wool Guild' and 'the Silk Guild' which were two of the six 'Greater Corporations' (*Arti Maggiori*) that constituted the ruling oligarchy of the Florentine city-state.—A. J. T.

² From a letter of the 9th April, 1513, to Francesco Vettori (Machiavelli: *Lettere Familiari*, No. xiii).

the roadside inn, talk with the passers-by, ask them the news of their villages, hear all kinds of things and note the various tastes and diverse fantasies of Mankind. Then comes the hour for dinner, when I eat, with my household, of such viands as this poor farm of mine and this tiny property can afford me. So soon as I have eaten, I return to the inn; and, here, most days, I find the inn-keeper, a butcher, a miller, and two kiln-tenders. With this company I amuse myself to day's end playing cards—source of a thousand disputes and a thousand bouts of mutual abuse. Most times the stakes are a farthing; and, for all that, our shouts can be heard from San Casciano. Thus, amid these trifles in which I am enveloped, I drag my brain out of the mildew in which it moulders and purge out the malignity of my fortune—content to let Fate trample on me in this way, if only to see whether she won't become ashamed of herself.

'When the evening comes, I return to the house and go into my study; and at the door I take off my country clothes, all caked with mud and slime, and put on court dress; and, when I am thus decently re-clad, I enter into the ancient mansions of the men of ancient days. And there I am received by my hosts with all lovingkindness, and I feast myself on that food which alone is my true nourishment, and which I was born for. And here I am not abashed to speak with these Ancients and to question them on the reasons for their actions. And they, in their humanity, deign to answer me. And so, for four hours long, I feel no gêne, I forget every worry, I have no fear of poverty, I am not appalled by the thought of death: I sink my identity in that of my Ancient mentors. And since Dante says that there can be no science without some retention of that which Thought has once comprehended, I have made notes of the mental capital that I have acquired from their conversation, and have composed an essay *De Principatibus*, in which I try to penetrate as deep as I can into the theory of the subject—discussing what Sovereignty is, what varieties of it there are, how these are acquired, and how they are maintained, and through what causes they are lost. And if ever any conceit of mine has pleased you, you should not be displeased by this, while a sovereign—and especially one newly installed—should find it acceptable. Accordingly, I am dedicating it to His Magnificence Giuliano [de' Medici]. Filippo Casavecchia has seen it and will be able to regale you with the substance of the thing and with the arguments I have had with him—though all the time I am enriching it and re-polishing it.'¹

This was the origin of *The Prince*; and the concluding chapter of the famous treatise, which is an 'Exhortation to liberate Italy from the Barbarians', reveals the intention that Machiavelli had in mind when he took up his pen to write. He was addressing himself once more to the one vital problem of contemporary Italian statesmanship in the hope that perhaps, even now, he might help to

¹ Machiavelli, Niccolò: Letter of the 10th December, 1513, to Francesco Vettori (*Lettere Familiari*, No. xxvi).

bring that problem to solution by transmuting into creative thought the energies which had been deprived of their practical outlet. If *The Prince* had happened to inspire some living Italian princeling—if a Medici or Este or Sforza or Gonzaga had employed the author's methods to attain the author's ends—it is not inconceivable that Machiavelli might have lived to see the political union of Italy accomplished; and, had this Italian political problem been solved in that age, the consequences would assuredly have been far-reaching. In the *Cinquecento*, a politically united Italy would have easily driven the Transalpine 'barbarians' beyond her borders, and she might even have established over her discomfited invaders as decisive an ascendancy in the cruder commerce of politics and war as the politically disunited Italy of the *Quattrocento* had established already over the rest of Western Christendom on the ethereal planes of Literature and Art.

In fact, of course, the political hope that animates *The Prince* was utterly disappointed. The problem of Italy's political disunity was not solved by Italian statesmanship in Machiavelli's lifetime; and therefore it was Italy's fate to serve for centuries as the battle-field of 'barbarian' armies and the prize of 'barbarian' victories—a prize that fast depreciated in value as it was bandied to and fro between alternate 'barbarian' victors. Spanish and Austrian and French hegemonies came and went and monotonously came again. It was only in the nineteenth century, when more than four hundred years had passed since Machiavelli's birth, that the political union of Italy was belatedly accomplished; and, *au fin du compte*, the Italian people had to pay a heavy price for the long incompetence of Italian statesmanship. While an Italy united in the sixteenth century might have made herself mistress of Europe and have contended with the 'Osmanlis on equal terms for the dominion of the Levant, the Italy who completed her union on the 20th September, 1870, was content to take her place in the rank and file of European states as the last and least of the latter-day Great Powers.

Thus *The Prince* failed to achieve its author's immediate aim, as this aim is presented in the final chapter; but this is not to say that *The Prince* was a failure; for 'the pursuit of practical politics by literary means' was not the essence of the business which Machiavelli was going about when, evening after evening in his remote farm-house, he entered into the mansions of the men of ancient days and ate of the ambrosia which he had been born to eat. In these rare hours of mental retreat, the fallen politician was freer from the burden of practical politics than at any other times in his life; yet, in virtue of this complete withdrawal from the plane of

activity on which he had made his first effect upon the World, Machiavelli was able to return to the World on a more ethereal plane on which his effectiveness has been vastly greater. Even if he had retained his Secretaryship to the end of his days, and even if the political union of Italy had been accomplished in his lifetime through his instrumentality, Machiavelli the practical politician would never have influenced the course of history as it has actually been influenced by Machiavelli the political philosopher. For, in finding his 'true nourishment' in his communion with the Ancients, Machiavelli was really finding his opportunity to perform his life-work. In those magic hours of *catharsis* when he rose above his vexation of spirit, Machiavelli succeeded in transmuting his 'practical' energies into a series of mighty intellectual works—*The Prince* and the *Discourses on Livy* and *The Art of War* and *The History of Florence*—and these fruits of a Florentine politician's broken career have been the seeds of our modern Western political philosophy. The thought which these famous books put out into the World is still living and working in our thought to-day.

Polybius

Polybius of Megalopolis (*vivebat circa 206-128 B.C.*) was born a citizen of a Hellenic city-state in the heart of Continental Greece in an age when Greece was in the same general predicament as Europe in our time or Italy in the age of Machiavelli.¹ In the Hellenic World of the second century B.C., as in our Great Society of the twentieth century of the Christian Era and in the Western Christendom of the *Cinquecento*, the little states in the centre of the World, at the fountain-head of Civilization, were ringed round by a circle of gigantic Powers which the quickening outflow of the living waters had called into life on the periphery. Eastward, the Greek core of the Hellenic World was overshadowed by the Greek 'successor-states' of the Achaemenian Empire: the political progeny of the military conquests of Alexander. Westward it was overshadowed by the even greater Powers of Carthage and Rome: two non-Greek city-states which had been stimulated into empire-building in the process of resisting the impact of Hellenic arms and succumbing to the influence of Hellenic culture. The general situation was one with which we are familiar; but in the Hellenic World of Polybius's day this situation worked itself up to a climax—and out to a catastrophe—which our Western World has hitherto escaped.

¹ The following sketch was written before the writer of this Study had read the sympathetic and penetrating appreciation of Polybius and his work by Mr. T. R. Glover in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. viii (Cambridge 1930, University Press), ch. i.

In the Western World of to-day, the encirclement of Europe by the giant Powers of the penumbra is recent and still incomplete. And the Western World of yesterday, which did see Machiavelli's Italy both encircled and overrun by the Transalpine 'barbarians', was at least spared the spectacle of seeing the giants collide on Italian soil in a war of annihilation. Though Northern Italy had to suffer the damage and humiliation of serving as 'the battle-field of Europe' from A.D. 1494 to A.D. 1866, this evil was mitigated by the fact that, in all the European warfare of this age, 'the European forces' were 'exercised by temperate and undecisive contests'. And the great European historian who wrote these words in 1781 was able to declare his confident belief that 'the Balance of Power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be alternately exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts and laws and manners, which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of Mankind, the Europeans and their colonists'.¹ The confidence here proclaimed was based on the experience of three centuries of European history, and it was to be justified by the subsequent course of events for another century to come.

In all the warfare between French and Spanish armies, and French and Austrian armies, that met in battle on Italian soil in the course of nearly four centuries of European contests from the days of Charles VIII to the days of Napoleon III, no combatant, from first to last, ever dealt his adversary a mortal blow; and the Balance of Power between the great Transalpine states continued to fluctuate without being overthrown until the day when Italian statesmanship at length succeeded in abating the nuisance of this high-handed usage of Italy as an arena for Transalpine military exercises by fulfilling Machiavelli's dream and consolidating Italy herself into a single united nation-state of the Transalpine calibre—a state strong enough to guard its own frontiers and to warn off, for the future, the habitual Transalpine trespassers. This has been the relatively fortunate history of the relations between Europe and Italy during the epoch of Western history that began in Machiavelli's lifetime and came to a close in 'the eighteen-seventies'. Let

¹ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. xxxviii, *ad finem*: 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West.' The passage here quoted appears to have been written some time during the first quarter of the year 1781, at a moment when the author's own country happened to be engaged in fighting a losing battle. At that moment, the American Revolutionary War was approaching its crisis. His Britannic Majesty was at war with France and Spain and Holland, as well as with the Thirteen American Colonies; the Northern Powers of Europe were maintaining an unfriendly 'armed neutrality'; and the decisive campaign of the war, which was to end at Yorktown so disastrously for British arms, was about to open! And yet Gibbon's confidence was justified in the event by the peace settlement of A.D. 1783.

us hope that the history of the comparable relations between a latter-day Great Society and Europe may be no more unhappy than this during the centuries to come. For the history of the relations between the Hellenic Great Society and Greece in the lifetime of Polybius shows that a general situation of this kind is fraught with potential dangers which may work out to a disastrous outcome.

In the Hellenic World of Polybius's age, the new Great Powers of the periphery duly found their battlefields on Greek soil, but they did not 'exercise' their forces there 'in temperate and undecisive contests'. In their Greek arena, they fought one another to the death; and Greece was devastated and the Hellenic Civilization destroyed before these gladiatorial combats between Rome and Carthage and Rome and Macedon were brought to an end by a series of 'knock-out blows', which wiped the defeated Powers off the face of the Earth and left Rome, the victor, as the sole surviving Power in the whole circuit of the Mediterranean.

In this deadly warfare on Greek battle-fields between 'barbarian' Powers, a helpless and defenceless Greece suffered only less severely than the vanquished titans. The wars between Rome and Carthage were fought out mainly on Greek soil in Sicily and Magna Graecia; and the Hannibalic War entailed the sack of the two chief Greek cities of the West: Syracuse in 212 B.C. and Tarentum in 209. A larger number of smaller Greek cities suffered the same fate in the wars between Rome and Macedon, which were fought out on the soil of Continental Greece. In the first Romano-Macedonian War, the victims were Aegina and Anticyra (sacked in 211-210) and Oreus (sacked in 208); in the Third Macedonian War they were Haliartus and Coronea (sacked in 171)¹ and seventy cities in Epirus (sacked in 168). And the overthrow of Macedon at Pydna by Roman arms did not spell the end of Greek disasters. A desperate revolt of Macedon against her Roman conquerors in 150-148 B.C. excited the Achaean Confederacy in the Peloponnese to make a declaration of war on Rome next year: a suicidal gesture which resulted in the annihilation of Corinth in 146 B.C., a few months after the annihilation of Carthage. The annihilation of Corinth and the dissolution of the Achaean Confederacy in 146 B.C. dealt the final blow to Greek prosperity and Greek independence.

This was the overwhelming experience through which Polybius lived and of which he eventually became the historian.

'The events which he has chosen as his subject are sufficiently extraordinary in themselves to arouse and stimulate the interest of every reader, young or old. What mind, however commonplace or indifferent,

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 213, above.

could feel no curiosity to learn the process by which almost the whole World fell under the undisputed ascendancy of Rome within a period of less than fifty-three years,¹ or to acquaint itself with the political organization to which this triumph—a phenomenon unprecedented in the annals of Mankind—was due? What mind, however infatuated with other spectacles and other studies, could find a field of knowledge more profitable than this?

That is how Polybius apostrophizes his readers in the preface to his *Oecumenical History*;² but although this panoramic history of his own times was Polybius's life-work, it was not as a historian that he started his career; for all the circumstances of his birth and upbringing drew him in his youth towards the life of a practical politician.

Polybius's native city, Megalopolis, was an Arcadian community which was one of the leading states-members of the Achaean Confederacy. Its accession to the Confederacy, some thirty years before the date of Polybius's birth, had been an historic event, which had given the Achaean Confederacy a prospect of achieving the political unification of all the Peloponnese, and perhaps of all Continental Greece. The accession of Megalopolis, which had opened this prospect up, had been the work of a high-minded and clear-sighted Megalopolitan statesman, Lydiadas, who had found himself despot of his native city and had voluntarily abdicated from this post of personal power in order to serve the public interest both of Megalopolis and of Greece. In making this generous gesture, Lydiadas of Megalopolis was taking up the policy of his contemporary Aratus of Sicyon—the Greek statesman who had started the movement for turning the ancient parochial Achaean Confederacy into the nucleus of a wider Greek political union by persuading his own city Sicyon to enter the Confederacy, as its first non-Achaean state-member, after he had liberated Sicyon from Macedonian occupation.

It will be seen that Aratus and Lydiadas dreamed the same dream for Greece that Machiavelli dreamed for Italy.³ They

¹ 220–168 B.C.

² Polybius: *Historiae*, Bk. I, chs. 1–4.

³ In the history of the Sinic World, in which the process of geographical expansion produced its usual result of encircling the little states at the centre with an outer ring of younger states of larger calibre (see p. 303, footnote 2, above), the central states sought to protect themselves in the same way as in ancient Greece and in modern Italy: that is to say, by forming a confederacy; and this confederacy 'remained one of the fundamental elements in Sinic politics' for two-and-a-half centuries (Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), p. 299). Ultimately, however, the Sinic Central Confederacy failed, and this for the same reason as the Achaean League. Though its history bore out the rule that 'union is strength', it never succeeded in making itself quite strong enough to shake itself free from the toils of the surrounding Powers; and thus the Confederacy sank in the end into the position from which its constituent members had hoped to extricate themselves once for all when they joined forces. It became a pawn on the Great Powers' chess-board.

realized that the age-long disunion and strife of the Greek city-states could not continue with impunity in an age when Greece was encompassed about by gigantic Powers of a vastly superior calibre. 'They should be profoundly thankful if they succeeded, by maintaining absolute unanimity and by linking hands like people crossing rivers, in flinging back the onslaughts of the barbarians¹ for the common salvation of their countries and themselves.'² This policy was originally propagated in the Peloponnese by Aratus and Lydiadas; and while it was Aratus of Sicyon who had initiated the idea, it was in Megalopolis, the city of Lydiadas, that the word became flesh in an hereditary school of statesmen. The work of Lydiadas was carried on in the next generation by two other distinguished Megalopolitans, Philopoemen and Lycortas; and Lycortas was the father of Polybius.

Thus Polybius was brought up in a social milieu in which there was a long tradition of public service; and he went into politics as a matter of course. Indeed, his first political appointment was given him by special favour before he had attained the legal minimum age. In 181 B.C. he was appointed member of a diplomatic mission which was to represent the Achaean Confederacy at the Court of Alexandria. Polybius's fellow envoys were his own father Lycortas and Aratus, the son of Aratus the Great; and it was in virtue of his family connexions that the statutory age-qualification was waived on this occasion in the young man's favour.³ After this favourable start in politics, Polybius doubtless looked forward to living the life of 'a practical politician' for the rest of his days; but political events which were beyond the Achaean Government's control were to give quite a different turn to Polybius's career. The young Megalopolitan had happened to come of age during a momentary lull in the great political tornado that was sweeping across his world. Continental Greece had enjoyed a respite from serving as the battle-field of the Powers since 189 B.C., when the Aetolian Confederacy had laid down its arms after a vain attempt to wage war against Rome in alliance with the Seleucid Monarchy. But the respite was brief; for the Third Romano-Macedonian War broke out in 171 B.C.;

¹ The word 'barbarians' is used here as a half-jesting half-serious nickname for the non-Greek Great Powers on the periphery of the Hellenic World and in the penumbra of the Hellenic Civilization. Compare the similar usage, cited above, in fifteenth-century and sixteenth-century Italy.

² This statement of the problem to be solved by Greek statesmanship might well have been made by either Aratus of Sicyon or Lydiadas of Megalopolis, though it was actually made by Agelaus of Naupactus: a statesman of the rival Aetolian Confederacy which was attempting in the same age to achieve the same aim of unifying Greece politically, though round a different nucleus. Agelaus's speech on this theme, which was delivered at a peace conference which was held at Naupactus in 217 B.C., is reported by Polybius in Bk. V, chs. 103-5.

³ See Polybius's own notice of this transaction in Bk. XXIV, ch. 6. The mission never actually sailed for Egypt, after all!

and one of the sequels to the overthrow of Macedon by Rome in 168 was the precautionary deportation to Italy, *en masse*, of leading politicians from the states of Greece. The deportees included a thousand Achaeans; Polybius was one of the number; and this sudden break in his political career was the turning-point in his life.

From that point onwards, Polybius's life was an alternation between periods of compulsory withdrawal from practical politics and other periods of painful return to public affairs. His internment in Italy lasted for more than sixteen years (166-150 B.C.); and during this first compulsory withdrawal he accepted the challenge of Fortune by taking advantage of the break in his political career at home in order to enlarge, in his Italian exile, both the range of his political horizon and the circle of his personal acquaintance.¹ At Rome he learnt to know the Roman Commonwealth from within;² at Rome, likewise, he became the friend and mentor of the most promising young Roman of the next generation: Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus;³ and these two experiences governed the course of Polybius's life thereafter.

Released from internment in 150 B.C., Polybius was drawn back into public affairs by the catastrophic international events of the next five years. In 147 Scipio was elected consul in order to take command in Africa and break the desperate resistance which the Carthaginians were offering to the now overwhelmingly superior force of Rome in the Third Romano-Carthaginian War;⁴ and Poly-

¹ The challenge presented to Polybius and his fellow deportees was severe; for the uncertainty in which they were kept by the deliberate policy of the Roman Senate must have imposed a heavy nervous strain upon their spirits. The nominal reason for which they had been brought to Rome was in order to give them an opportunity of vindicating themselves in person from the charge of having adopted a hostile attitude towards the Roman cause during the Third Romano-Macedonian War. Upon their arrival in Rome, the Senate professed astonishment that it should be asked to pass judgement on citizens of foreign states on whom judgement had already been passed at home. Thereupon, the Achaean Government sent an embassy to Rome to point out that the Achaean deportees had not, as a matter of fact, had any sentence passed upon them in Achaëa, and to ask the Senate either to try the deportees itself or to send them home for trial forthwith. Thereupon the Senate—being determined to prevent the deportees from returning to political life in their own countries, and at the same time desiring to avoid the juridical irregularity of passing judgement itself on individuals who in theory were not under Roman jurisdiction—replied, in writing, to the Achaean embassy that: 'In the opinion of the Senate, it is not in the interests either of the Roman Government or of your Governments that these individuals should return home.' Polybius, who narrates this diplomatic transaction himself (in Bk. XXX, on. 32), has recorded that 'when this reply came out, it not only threw the deportees themselves into a state of utter despair and mental paralysis, but it excited public grief throughout Greece, where the reply was taken as depriving the unfortunates of all hope of salvation. When the terms of the reply became generally known, the feelings of the Greek public were devastated, and people were overcome by a wave of hopelessness.'

² Compare the knowledge of France and Germany which Machiavelli acquired on his more transient Transalpine missions.

³ The origin and history of this friendship between Polybius and Scipio Aemilianus is recorded by Polybius himself in Bk. XXXI, chs. 22-30. It was through Scipio's intercession that Polybius was permitted by the Roman authorities, as a special favour, to continue to reside in the capital when his fellow deportees were distributed for internment among the country towns of Italy.

⁴ Scipio, on this occasion, like Polybius some thirty-four years earlier, had the honour

bios accompanied his Roman friend to the African front. Polybius was thus an eyewitness of the last act of the long tragedy that ended now in the literal annihilation of a commonwealth which had been one of the greatest of the Great Powers in the World at the time of Polybius's birth.¹ And then, from Scipio's camp by the smouldering ruins of Carthage, Polybius was called post-haste to Greece by the news of the outbreak of war between Rome and the Achaean Confederacy; and he arrived in his own country to find Corinth already overtaken by the same awful fate which Carthage had just suffered under his eyes.

Thereupon, Polybius was required, after a twenty years' absence, to resume his political career at home in circumstances which were at once more honourable and more painful for him than any which he could have foreseen or imagined. The Board of Ten Commissioners which the Roman Government, according to its usual practice, had sent out after the termination of hostilities to wind up the affairs of the conquered enemy country now courteously invited Polybius to serve as their expert adviser; and after they had performed their own major task—which was to dissolve the Achaean Confederacy and to confiscate the property of communities and individuals convicted of war-guilt—they left it to Polybius to regulate the affairs of the ex-member-states on the new footing on which they were thenceforth to live.² In this transaction, Polybius deserved as well of his country as in anything that he had ever been able to do for her; and his countrymen were not ungrateful for his services; but it was a transaction which was final by its very nature; and after Polybius had followed the Commissioners to Rome to make his report, he found himself again—and now irrevocably—cut off from practical politics. His second retirement, which now followed, was to last until the end of his long life (he lived to be eighty-two), with one interval when his faithful friendship for Scipio conspired with his insatiable desire for knowledge to draw him out of his retreat and lure him into the heart of Spain

of receiving his appointment in advance of the legal minimum age. Scipio had, in fact, been the only Roman officer to distinguish himself in the first two campaigns of the Third Romano-Carthaginian War—a war which had been forced upon Carthage by the Roman Government with the deliberate intention of destroying Carthage root and branch.

¹ In a passage which has only been preserved at second-hand (in Appian's *Punica*, 132), Polybius himself has recorded how, at the final scene of destruction, Scipio broke down; and how he afterwards quoted two foreboding lines of Homer (*Iliad* vi, ll. 448-9); and how, when Polybius asked him point-blank what he meant by his quotation, Scipio confessed that he was thinking that Rome would suffer one day what Carthage was suffering then.

² Though the Achaean Confederacy was dissolved, the individual states-members (with the exception of Corinth, which forfeited its juridical existence, besides being physically destroyed) retained their juridical sovereignty and *de facto* autonomy as isolated *civitates liberae* under the supervision of the Roman Governor of Macedonia (which, unlike Achaia, was now annexed by Rome and converted into a Roman province).

in order to witness the last phase of the war between Rome and Numantia.¹

In this strange alternation between periods of enforced leisure and other periods of strenuous participation in public affairs, Polybius continued, through his personal merit, to gain experience and achieve distinction while all the World around him, including Rome herself,² was going to wrack and ruin; and as he 'watched the workings of Fortune' and learnt to 'know her genius for envious dealing with Mankind',³ he answered her challenge by transmuting his unemployed ability and frustrated zeal for practical politics into the literary activity of 'depicting the operation of the laws of Fortune upon the grand scale' in an oecumenical history of his own times.⁴ In this work, Polybius the historian has performed an act of creation which could never have been emulated by Polybius the politician; and though the *Oecumenical History* may not be a pearl of as great a price as the work of Polybius's predecessor Thucydides, it is nevertheless, in its own way, 'an everlasting possession' likewise; for Polybius, like Thucydides, had the genius to divine the character of his time and to catch its reflexion in a work of art;⁵ and, like Thucydides again, he also had the strength of mind to bring his genius into play by seizing the unique opportunity that was offered to the historian by the politician's adversity. Expelled from the political life of their respective countries at an age when they were at the height of their personal powers, both men returned after an absence of twenty years to find their countries politically prostrate. But this physical return in the flesh to a home in ruins was not the true return of Polybius and Thucydides; 'for here' they had 'no

¹ Scipio had been appointed to the Spanish command in 134 B.C., as he had been appointed to the African command in 147 B.C., in order to break the resistance of an enemy who was outmatched by Rome in every element of military strength except the vital elements of generalship and *moral*.

² In Bk. XXXI, ch. 25, Polybius describes the general demoralization of the rising generation of the Roman governing class after the destruction in 168 B.C. of Macedon—the last surviving Great Power that had been capable of disputing Rome's ascendancy; and he lived to see the outbreak, in 133 B.C., of the Hundred Years' Revolution which was the nemesis of the devastation of Southern Italy in the Hannibalic War and which was to end in autocracy.

³ Polybius, Bk. XXXIX, ch. 8.

⁴ The work consists of forty volumes (only the first six survive intact), of which thirty contain the main body of the work, two the prologue, and eight the epilogue. The main body (Bks. III–XXXII) records the history of the conquest of the whole Hellenic World by Rome between 220 B.C. and 168 B.C. The epilogue (Bks. XXXIII–XL) carries the story down to the annihilation of Carthage and Corinth in 146 B.C. The prologue (Bks. I–II) carries the story back to the outbreak of the First Romano-Carthaginian War in 264 B.C.

⁵ 'The coincidence by which all the transactions of the World have been oriented in a single direction and guided towards a single goal is the extraordinary characteristic of the present age, to which the special feature of the present work is a corollary. The unity of events imposes upon the historian a similar unity of composition in depicting for his readers the operation of the laws of Fortune upon the grand scale; and this has been my own principal inducement and stimulus in the work which I have undertaken' (Polybius: *Oecumenical History*, Preface = Bk. I, chs. 1–4).

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continuing city'.¹ Megalopolis and Athens were in truth the cities
from which they withdrew; but the city to which they have both
returned, to abide in it for ever, is not the City of Cecrops but the
City of Zeus.²

Clarendon

The English statesman and historian Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon (*vivebat* A.D. 1609-1674), saw his life rudely shattered and still more strangely remade by a social convulsion which was scarcely less violent in its way than the terrible experience that fell to the lot of Polybius. In Clarendon's generation, the modern Western World was shaken to its spiritual depths; and out of those depths there emerged a titanic new force—the political force which, under the name of Democracy, is still in the ascendant in our world in our generation, three centuries later.³ This tremendous political movement which is still in motion to-day—expanding in a wave which has latterly submerged the greater part of the Habitable Earth—welled up three centuries ago in a huge eruption of molten lava from the mouth of a single crater. England was the place in Western Christendom where this crater opened in order to discharge to the ends of the Earth a stream of energy that rose, with terrific impetus, from the vast subterranean reservoirs of Western social experience; and Clarendon's generation was the time in which the volcano erupted. Born in 1609, Edward Hyde had reached the age of thirty-three in the year in which the English Civil War between Crown and Parliament broke out, and the outbreak of that war broke up Hyde's life into periods of alternate storm and calm on the pattern which we have detected in the life of Polybius.⁴ The Englishman's lifework, like the Greek's, was the outcome of his inward response to these external vicissitudes; and this truth became manifest to Clarendon himself when, in the haven of his final exile, he reviewed his life-history and saw it in retrospect as a whole. The noble passage in which Clarendon describes his own experience of Withdrawal-and-Return must be given in his own words, which cannot be paraphrased, though they must perforce be abbreviated.

'He was wont to say that, of the infinite blessings which God had vouchsafed to confer upon him almost from his cradle, amongst which he delighted in the reckoning up many signal instances, he esteemed himself so happy in none as in his three acquiescences, which he called

¹ Heb. xiii. 14.

² Marcus Aurelius: *Meditations*, iv. 23.

³ See the present Study, Part I, *ad init.*, vol. i, above, and the present chapter, pp. 359-63, below.

⁴ If the parallel between the lives of Clarendon and Polybius is to be worked out in detail, we shall have to confess that Polybius was more fortunate in his friendship with Scipio than Clarendon in his service to Charles II.

his three vacations and retreats he had in his life enjoyed from business of trouble and vexation; and in every of which God had given him grace and opportunity to make full reflections upon his actions, and his observations upon what he had done himself, and what he had seen others do and suffer; to repair the breaches in his own mind and to fortify himself with new resolutions against future encounters, in an entire resignation of all his thoughts and purposes into the disposal of God Almighty, and in a firm confidence of his protection and deliverance in all the difficulties he should be obliged to contend with; towards the obtaining whereof, he renewed those vows and promises of integrity and hearty endeavour to perform his duty, which are the only means to procure the continuance of that protection and deliverance.

The first of these recesses or acquiescences was his remaining and residing in Jersey, when the Prince of Wales, his now Majesty, first went into France upon the command of the Queen his Mother . . . ; and his stay there, during that time that his Highness first remained at Paris and St. Germain's, until his expedition afterwards to the fleet and in the Downs.¹ His second was when he was sent by his Majesty as his ambassador, together with the Lord Cottington, into Spain; in which two full years were spent before he waited upon the King again.² And the third was his last recess, by the disgrace he underwent and by the act of banishment.³ In which three acquiescences he had learnt more, knew himself and other men much better, and served God and his country with more devotion, and he hoped more effectually, than in all the other more active part of his life.

He used to say that he spent too much of his younger years in company and conversation, and too little with books. . . . He accused himself of entering too soon out of a life of ease and pleasure and too much idleness into a life of too much business, that required more labour and experience and knowledge than he was supplied for; for he put on his gown as soon as he was called to the Bar;⁴ and, by the countenance of persons in place and authority, as soon engaged himself in the business of the profession as he put on his gown, and to that degree in practice that gave him little time for study, that he had too much neglected before; besides that he still indulged to his beloved conversation. Few years passed before the troubles in Scotland appeared, and the Little Parliament was convened; which being dissolved and presently a new one called, he was a member in both, and wholly gave himself up to the public affairs agitated there. . . . And in the beginning of the rebellion he was sworn of the Privy Council and made Chancellor of the Exchequer: and from this time the pains he took, and the great fatigue he underwent, were notorious to all men; insomuch as, the refreshment of dinner

¹ Clarendon's residence in Jersey lasted from the 17th April, 1646, to the 26th June, 1648.—A. J. T.

² Clarendon was actually in Madrid from the 26th November, 1649, until the December of 1650.—A. J. T.

³ Clarendon was required to deliver up the Great Seal on the 30th August, 1667; he had to leave England as a fugitive on the 29th November; and he reached France on the 2nd and December of the same year. He died abroad on the 9th December, 1674.—A. J. T.

⁴ Clarendon was called to the Bar in 1633 at the age of 24.—A. J. T.

excepted, for he never supped, he had very little of the day, and not much of the night, vacant from the most important business. . . .

[His] 'first retreat gave him opportunity and leisure to call himself to a strict account for whatsoever he had done, upon revolving of all his particular actions and the behaviour of other men; and to compose those affections and allay those passions which, in the warmth of perpetual actions and chafed by continual contradictions, had need of rest and cool and deliberate cogitations. He had now time to mend his understanding, and to correct the defects and infirmities of his nature, by the observation of and reflection upon the grounds and successes of those counsels he had been privy to, upon the several tempers and distempers of men employed both in the martial and civil affairs of the greatest importance, and upon the experience he had and the observation he had made in the three or four last years, where the part he had acted himself differed so much from all the former transactions and commerce of his life. . . .

'These unavoidable reflections first made him discern how weak and foolish all his former imaginations had been, and how blind a surveyor he had been of the inclinations and affections of the heart of Man; and it made him likewise conclude from thence how uncomfortable and vain the dependence must be upon any thing in this World, where whatsoever is good and desirable suddenly perisheth, and nothing is lasting but the folly and wickedness of the inhabitants thereof. In this first vacation, he had leisure to read many learned and pious books; and here he began to compose his Meditations upon the Psalms, by applying those devotions to the present afflictions and calamities of his King and country. He began now by the especial encouragement of the King,¹ who was then a prisoner in the Army, to write The History of the late Rebellion and Civil Wars, and finished the first four books thereof; and made an entry upon some exercises of devotion which he lived to enlarge afterwards.

'When he had enjoyed, in that pleasant island of Jersey, full two years, in as great serenity of mind as the separation from country, wife and children can be imagined to admit, he received . . . an express order from the King . . . that he should forthwith attend the person of the Prince of Wales . . . and then without any delay he used all possible diligence to find the Prince. . . .

[In] 'his second retreat and recess' [when he was sent as ambassador into Spain], though he underwent in this employment many mortifications of several kinds, yet he still acknowledged that he learned much during the time of his being in Spain, from whence he returned a little before the Battle of Worcester; and after the King's² miraculous escape into France he quickly waited upon his Majesty, and was never separated from his person till sixteen or seventeen years after by his banishment.

'This he called his third and most blessed recess, in which God vouchsafed to exercise many of his mercies towards him. And though

¹ i.e. Charles the First, not Charles the Second!—A. J. T.

² i.e. Charles the Second.—A. J. T.

he entered into it with many very disconsolate circumstances; yet in a short time, upon the recovery of a better state of health, and being remitted into a posture of ease and quietness, and secure from the power of his enemies, he recovered likewise a marvellous tranquillity and serenity of mind, by making a strict review and recollection into all the actions, all the faults and follies, committed by himself and others in his last continued fatigue of seventeen or eighteen years. . . .

'In all this retirement he was very seldom vacant, and then only when he was under some sharp visitation of the gout, from reading excellent books or writing some animadversions and exertations of his own, as appears by the papers and notes which he left. He learned the Italian and French languages, in which he read many of the choicest books. Now he finished the work which his heart was most set upon, *The History of the late Civil Wars and Transactions to the Time of the King's Return in the Year 1660*; of which he gave the King advertisement. He finished his *Reflections and Devotions upon the Psalms of David*, which he dedicated to his children; which was ended at Montpellier before the death of the Duchess. He wrote and finished his *Answer to Mr. Hobbes's Leviathan*, to which he prefixed an epistle dedicatory to the King, if his Majesty would permit it. He wrote a good volume of *Essays, Divine, Moral and Political*, to which he was always adding. He prepared a *Discourse Historical of the Pretence and Practice of the successive Popes from the Beginning of that Jurisdiction they assume*; in which he thought he had fully vindicated the power and authority of kings from that odious usurpation. He entered upon the forming a *Method for the better disposing the History of England*, that it may be more profitably and exactly communicated than it hath yet been. He left so many papers of several kinds, and cut out so many pieces of work, that a man may conclude that he never intended to be idle."

Ibn Khaldūn

The last member of our Pleiad of historians is 'Abd-ar-Rahmān ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldūn al-Hadramī of Tunis (*vivebat* A.D. 1332-1406)—an Arabic genius who achieved in a single 'acquiescence' of less than four years' length, out of a fifty-four years' span of adult working life, a life-work in the shape of a piece of literature which can bear comparison with the work of a Thucydides or the work of a Machiavelli for both breadth and profundity of vision as well as for sheer intellectual power. Ibn Khaldūn's star shines the more brightly by contrast with the foil of darkness against which it flashes out; for while Thucydides and Machiavelli and Clarendon are all brilliant representatives of brilliant times and places, Ibn Khaldūn is the sole point of light in his quarter of the firmament. He is indeed the one outstanding personality in the

¹ *The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon, written by himself, ad fin.* (Oxford 1817, Clarendon Press), vol. ii, pp. 549-67.

history of a civilization whose social life on the whole was 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'.¹ In his chosen field of intellectual activity he appears to have been inspired by no predecessors² and to have found no kindred souls among his contemporaries and to have kindled no answering spark of inspiration in any successors; and yet, in the Prolegomena (*Muqaddamāt*) to his *Universal History* he has conceived and formulated a philosophy of history which is undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place. It was his single brief 'acquiescence' from a life of practical activity that gave Ibn Khaldūn his opportunity to cast his creative thought into literary shape.

Ibn Khaldūn was born into the Arabic World in an age when the infant Arabic Civilization was struggling (as it proved, in vain) to bring order out of the chaos which was its legacy from a recent social interregnum. This interregnum (*circa* A.D. 975-1275) had been the sequel to the break-up of the Umayyad and 'Abbasid Caliphates, which had been the final embodiments of the Syriac universal state; and at the western extremity of the derelict Syriac World—in North-West Africa and in the Iberian Peninsula—the last vestiges of the old order had been swept away by a conflux of barbarians from three continents: European Asturians and Franks from the Pyrenees; African Nomads from the Sahara³ and highlanders from the Atlas⁴ who made themselves a name as the 'Berbers' *par excellence*;⁵ and Asiatic Arab Badu from the North Arabian Steppe who were perhaps the most barbarous and destructive of them all.

The destruction which these barbarians had worked was brought home to Ibn Khaldūn by his family history as well as by his personal experience. The Khaldūns were a prominent house of the aristocracy of Seville⁶ who had emigrated from Andalusia to Africa, about a century before 'Abd-ar-Rahmān ibn Khaldūn's birth, in anticipation of the conquest of Seville by the Castilians;⁷ and in the

¹ The famous description of the life of Primitive Man in the State of Nature which is given by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan*, part i, ch. 13. For the history of the Arabic Civilization into which Ibn Khaldūn happened to be born, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 70-2, with Annex I, above.

² The education which he received from his masters—of whom he gives an account in his *Autobiography*—seems to have been exceedingly thorough but entirely scholastic. (See the relevant passage, in French translation, in Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, Introduction, pp. xix-xxvi.)

³ The Murābits.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 204, above.

⁵ By origin, the family were Yamanis from the Hadramawt who had migrated to Andalusia, after the Umayyad conquest, in one of the military colonies which were then drafted out to the Iberian Peninsula from the five garrisons of Arab troops in Syria (de Slane, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. ix-x).

⁷ Ibn Khaldūn, in his *Autobiography* (translation in de Slane, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. xv), mentions that his ancestors migrated from Seville to Ceuta some twenty years before the fall of Cordova (A.D. 1236), Carmona (A.D. 1243), Seville (A.D. 1244), and Jaen (A.D. 1246).

⁴ The Muwāhids.

family's new home in Ifriqiyah 'Abd-ar-Rahmān, comparing the local conditions in his own generation, as he saw them, with the descriptions of Ifriqiyah in earlier ages which he read in historical works, was evidently impressed by the greatness of the contrast between present and past and was convinced that the immense change for the worse which had taken place within the last three centuries was the handiwork of the Arab Badawī tribes—the Banu Hilāl and the Banu Sulaym—who had been unleashed in A.D. 1051 upon a rebellious Maghrib by the Fātimid rulers of Syria and Egypt.

'Ifriqiyah and the Maghrib',¹ he writes, 'are suffering still from their devastation by the Arabs. The Banu Hilāl and the Sulaym broke their way in during the fifth century of the Hijrah [the 11th century of the Christian Era]; and they have continued to wreak their fury on these countries for three centuries and a half. Hence devastation and solitude still reign there. Before this invasion, the whole region extending from the [Western] Sudan to the Mediterranean was thickly populated: the traces of an ancient civilization, the débris of monuments and buildings, the ruins of towns and villages, are there to testify to the fact.'²

Ibn Khaldūn was conscious of the difference between this purely destructive Arab invasion during the post-Syriac interregnum and the movement which, some three or four centuries earlier, had brought his own ancestors westward from the Hadramawt to Andalusia. For these Arab emissaries of the Umayyads had come to the Maghrib not to destroy but to fulfil. They had come to step into the shoes of the previous Roman garrisons and Roman officials and to retrieve for the ancient Syriac Society, in its latter days, the former colonial domain of which it had been deprived during eight or nine centuries of alien rule.³

'After the preaching of Islam,' Ibn Khaldūn observes, 'the Arab armies penetrated into the Maghrib and captured all the cities of the country; but they did not establish themselves there as tent-dwellers or as Nomads, since their need to make sure of their dominion in the

¹ In the language of Arabic political geography, the Maghrib (i.e., 'the West') means in a general way the whole of the Arabic World west of Egypt, though the term is apt to be confined to the Arabic domain in North-West Africa to the exclusion of the Arabic domain in the Iberian Peninsula (Andalus). Maghrib al-Aqṣā (i.e., 'the Far West') means Morocco. Ifriqiyah (an Arabization of the Latin name 'Africa') means a region of rather wider extent than the modern Tunisia in which urban and agricultural life had the ascendancy over Nomadism. The successive capitals of Ifriqiyah have been Carthage, Qayrawān, Mahdiyyah, and Tunis.

² Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translation by de Slane, vol. i, p. 312. Cp. pp. 66-7.

³ The Syriac culture had been planted on the coasts of North-West Africa and Spain by Phoenician colonists from about the ninth century B.C. onwards. The interval of alien rule between the end of the Carthaginian régime and the beginning of the Umayyad régime had lasted in Spain from the close of the third century B.C. to the beginning of the eighth century of the Christian Era, and in Africa from the middle of the second century B.C. to the middle of the seventh century of the Christian Era.

Maghrib compelled them to keep to the towns. So in the Maghrib at this stage the Arabs did not occupy the open country. It was not until the fifth century of the Hijrah that they came to take up their abode there and to spread tribe-wise in order to camp all over this immense region.¹

The first of the two passages here quoted from the *Universal History* of Ibn Khaldūn occurs in a chapter² which is perhaps the most crushing indictment of Nomad rule over sedentary populations that has ever been delivered from the mouth of a first-hand witness.³ But the thought which had been set in motion in Ibn Khaldūn's mind by his apprehension of the ruin which the Nomads had brought upon the Maghrib did not come to a standstill here. It moved on, with a gathering momentum, to contemplate the contrast between the Nomadic and the sedentary way of life and to analyse the nature of each; to ponder over the group-feeling or sense of social solidarity or *esprit de corps* ('*asabiyyah*') which is the Nomad's psychological response to the challenge of life in the desert; to trace out a connexion of cause and effect between *esprit de corps* and empire-building and between empire-building and religious propaganda; and thence to broaden out until at last it embraced, in a panoramic vision, the rises and falls of empires and the geneses and growths and breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations.⁴

This mighty tree of thought, with its towering stem and symmetrically branching boughs and delicate tracery of twigs was the eventual outcome of the seedling that germinated in the young 'Abd-ar-Rahmān's mind under the early impression of the contrast between present and past in his native Ifriqiyyah. But Ibn Khaldūn did not begin his career by sitting down to put these burgeoning thoughts into order. It seemed a more pressing task to be putting some rudiments of order into the struggling, chaotic social life of

¹ Ibn Khaldūn: *A History of the Berbers = A Universal History*, vols. vi and vii, French translation by de Slane (Algiers 1852-6, 4 vols.), vol. i, p. 28. The passage here quoted is taken for the text of his tenth chapter by Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot). See further Marçais, G.: *Les Arabes en Berberie du XI^e au XIV^e Siècle* (Paris 1913, Leroux).

² Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, Bk. I, section ii, *ad fin.* The chapter-headings speak for themselves: 'Every country that is conquered by Arabs rapidly goes to ruin'; 'In general, Arabs are incapable of founding an empire unless they have received a tincture of religion of a certain strength from some prophet or saint'; 'Of all peoples, Arabs are the least capable of governing an empire.'

³ The indictment is the more remarkable when we consider that the particular Nomads at whose expense Ibn Khaldūn makes his *argumentum ad hominem* shared the name of Arab with the author himself; but perhaps it is actually this ostensible kinship which inspires Ibn Khaldūn with his animus against the Banu Hilāl; for the House of Khaldūn had not only been bourgeois for centuries; there was no Nomadic chapter at all in their past; for the peasantry of the Hadramawt is just as sedentary as the bourgeoisie of Mecca or Medina or San'ā. The very accent and argot of the Banu Hilāl set Ibn Khaldūn's teeth on edge. (For this, see the passages quoted by Gautier in *op. cit.*, p. 387.)

⁴ See, further, Annex III, below.

contemporary Ifriqiyah; and this was the task to which the young man found himself called both by family tradition and by personal need of a livelihood. The Macrocosm called him; the Microcosm could wait. And so, at the age of twenty, 'Abd-ar-Rahmān ibn Khaldūn followed in his forbears' footsteps by plunging into local politics as a courtier and a minister of state.

The Arabic adventurer's own account, in his *Autobiography*, of his life during the next twenty-two years reminds a modern Western student of history, who re-reads the story in A.D. 1935, of nothing so much as the life of some latter-day Western-style Chinese politician during the equal span of time which has elapsed since the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution. It was, indeed, a life of 'meeting at night and parting at morning'; for, within this span of twenty-two years, Ibn Khaldūn saw service with no less than seven different princelings; and from almost every one of these successive royal masters his parting was abrupt and violent. In his native principality of Tunis, where he made his début, he remained no longer than a few weeks; and thereafter we find him making a series of brief appearances now in Fez and now in Granada (whence his momentary employer sends him, in A.D. 1363, on an embassy to the court of Peter the Cruel in Seville)¹ and now again in this or that city of Ifriqiyah. In all these peregrinations, his only tranquil 'getaway' was the last; and this, too, was effected *more sinico*.

In the spring of A.D. 1375 Ibn Khaldūn had just settled down at Tilimsān (Tlemçen), under the patronage of the local prince, to give public instruction as a change from practical politics, when it pleased the prince to send his accomplished guest on a political mission to a Nomad Arab tribe in the interior.

'As I had renounced public affairs,' Ibn Khaldūn proceeds, 'in order to live in retreat, the prospect of this mission filled me with repugnance; but I affected to accept it with pleasure. [On my road], I fell in with the 'Awlād 'Arif [who appear to have been a branch of the Duwāwidah tribe which Ibn Khaldūn had been instructed to visit]; and they welcomed me with gifts and honours. I took up my abode with them; and they sent to Tilimsān to fetch my family and my children. They promised at the same time to represent to the Sultan that it was positively impossible for me to fulfil the mission with which he had charged me; and in fact they induced him to accept my excuses. Thereupon I established myself with my family at Qal'at ibn Salāmah, a castle situated in the country of the Banu Tujīn which was held from the Sultan by

¹ This was how 'Abd-ar-Rahmān ibn Khaldūn visited, for the first and last time, the home of his ancestors. 'When I arrived at Seville', he writes, 'I remarked a number of monuments of my ancestors' greatness'. Peter received 'Abd-ar-Rahmān with honour, and actually offered to reinstate him in his ancestral property if he would consent to enter his service—an offer which 'Abd-ar-Rahmān politely declined. (See the relevant passage from the *Autobiography* in de Slane's translation of the *Muqaddamāt*, vol. i, p. xliv.)

the Duwāwidah in feudal tenure. I remained there for four years, entirely free from worries and from the turmoil of public affairs; and it was there that I began the composition of my work [on universal history]. It was in this retreat that I completed the *Muqaddamāt*:¹ a work which was entirely original in its plan and which I made out of the cream of an enormous mass of research. When I settled at Qal'at ibn Salāmah, I installed myself in a large and solid suite of rooms that had been built there by Abu Bakr ibn 'Arif. During the prolonged stay which I made in this castle, I completely forgot the kingdoms of the Maghrib and of Tilimsān and thought of nothing but the present work.²

This light-hearted 'acquiescence', secured by chicane, was obtained in strangely different circumstances, and was accepted in a profoundly different spirit, from the three 'acquiescences' in the life of Clarendon. Yet the volatile Maghribī's single sojourn in Qal'at ibn Salāmah evoked a greater work of genius than anything that came of the sober Englishman's successive sojourns in Jersey and Madrid and Montpellier—and this notwithstanding the fact that Ibn Khaldūn's quadrennium in the wilderness was the solitary incident of the kind in the whole of his long career. For, when once he quitted the friendly walls of Qal'at ibn Salāmah, Ibn Khaldūn was sucked back into the turmoil of affairs; and he never extricated himself again.

From the author's own account, it is not clear whether scholarship or boredom was the magnet that drew him back into the World. It is only certain that he was not responding, like Clarendon, to the call of public duty.

'When I had finished the *Muqaddamāt* and passed on to the history of the Arabs and Berbers and *Zenāta*, I had a keen desire to consult a number of books and collections that are only to be found in great cities; and I had to correct and to make a fair copy of a work that had been dictated almost entirely from memory. . . . Impelled by the desire to visit the Sultan Abu'l-'Abbās and to set eyes again on Tunis, the home of my fathers, . . . I set to work to obtain from this prince his permission to re-enter the dominions of the Hafsid Government. Shortly after, I received letters of amnesty, with an invitation to join the prince forthwith; so I hastened on the preparations for my departure and took my leave of the 'Awlād 'Arif.'³

From that autumn of A.D. 1378 till his death in the spring of 1406, nearly twenty-eight years after, Ibn Khaldūn never found

¹ It is amusing to reflect that the great work on the philosophy of history which had been originally inspired in Ibn Khaldūn's mind by the portent of Arab barbarism in the Maghrib was actually composed under the aegis of the very barbarians who were the author's *bêtes noires*. We may conjecture that Ibn Khaldūn found means of excusing himself from reading aloud to his ingenuous hosts the biting satire on their ancestral way of life which he had been composing under their hospitable roof!

² Ibn Khaldūn: *Autobiography*, in op. cit., vol. i, pp. lxvii-lxviii.

³ Op. cit., vol. i, p. lxviii.

another haven where his mind could be 'entirely free from worries'. His experiment of returning to public life in his home country was not a success; and four years later he sailed from Tunis for Alexandria—never again to return to his native Maghrib. But this was one of the cases in which *caelum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt*;¹ and, even in the stabler society of Egypt, Ibn Khaldūn contrived to enliven his old age with as many chances and changes as had given zest to his youth in the chaotic West. The high personal distinction which he had now attained only gave him so much the greater scope for making enemies; and in the twenty years ending with his death in A.D. 1406 he was no less than six times appointed to one of the four highest judicial posts of Cairo² and five times deposed—to die at last triumphantly in office, within ten days of his fifth reinstatement. In each successive tenure, he put his colleagues and rivals out of countenance by exposing with equal ruthlessness their venality in administering the law and their ignorance in interpreting it—a double humiliation for which they were unable to forgive him. Nor were these legal feuds the only sensational incidents in the Egyptian chapter of the Maghribī philosopher's life. On the eve of his first deposition, his whole family, with all his worldly goods, were lost at sea on their way from Ifriqiyah to join him in his new Egyptian home; and, in the interval between his second and his third tenure of his judicial office at Cairo, he had an encounter at Damascus with Timur the Lame³ which was a vastly more hazardous adventure than his youthful encounter, thirty-seven years before, with Peter the Cruel.

These were the turbulent circumstances in which 'Abd-ar-Rahmān ibn Khaldūn completed the life-work upon which he had embarked when he started to dictate his incomparable *Muqaddamāt*

¹ Horace: *Epistles*, I. xi. 27.

² The post of Qādi'l-Qudāt of the Mālikī School of Islamic jurisprudence.

³ Ibn Khaldūn's encounter with Timur was involuntary; for he seems to have been included more or less by *force majeure* in the suite of the Mamlūk Sultan Nāsir Nāsir-ad-Dīn Faraj when the Sultan marched out, towards the close of A.D. 1400, to dispute Timur's passage through Syria. The philosopher was deposited in Damascus while the Sultan went to meet his redoubtable adversary on the battle-field; but a brief engagement with the Transoxanian invaders was sufficient to damp the martial ardour of the Mamlūks; and their retreat was so precipitate that Ibn Khaldūn found himself, without warning, marooned in Damascus, with Timur's victorious army beleaguering the city. In this predicament, the resourceful philosopher headed a deputation from the citizens of Damascus to the conqueror's camp. (Since the enterprise was vetoed by the Mamlūk military governor of Damascus, Ibn Khaldūn and his fellow ambassadors made their exit from the city by having themselves let down over the city-wall with cords: a traditional Damascene expedient which had once saved the life of Saint Paul!) When the deputation found themselves in Timur's presence, Ibn Khaldūn contrived to engage Timur in conversation and then won the Emperor's heart by reciting to him the section of his *Universal History* in which he had recorded Timur's career up to date, with the request that Timur would deign to correct any errors of fact in the narrative! Timur treated Damascus with little less than his customary harshness, but he let Ibn Khaldūn depart to Cairo in peace. (For this encounter between Ibn Khaldūn and Timur, see the passages quoted from the original authorities by de Slane in op. cit., vol. i, pp. lxxxvi-xcii.)

328 THE PROCESS OF THE GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS during his creative 'acquiescence' at Qal'at ibn Salāmāh. The task of committing to writing the *Universal History* which was in his mind was not at an end until the Prolegomena had been followed by six further volumes; and we may conjecture that these last six-sevenths of the work might never have seen the light if the successful composition of the prelude, during those four exceptional years of tranquillity, had not inspired the philosopher with an impetus to write which persisted through the subsequent years of recurrent turmoil. We must add that the relative value of the different parts of the work as 'everlasting possessions' is not to be measured by any quantitative standard; and that if Posterity were confronted with the cruel choice between losing the first volume alone of Ibn Khaldūn's *Universal History* or saving the *Muqaddamāt* at the price of losing all the other six, we should unhesitatingly sacrifice the six volumes which the author contrived to compose after his re-emergence from Qal'at ibn Salāmāh in order to preserve the single volume which came to birth in that tranquil retreat. In fact, Ibn Khaldūn's life-work is the work which he accomplished in the four years devoted to creation out of half a century spent in a whirl of public activity. And the great philosopher's true return from his brief withdrawal was not the second chapter of practical life in which he emulated the vagaries of the first. In one aspect, the Ibn Khaldūn who bade farewell to Qal'at ibn Salāmāh in the autumn of A.D. 1378 reassumed, at Tunis and in Cairo, the role of the restless politician who had whimsically taken his congé from the Court of Tilimsān in the spring of A.D. 1375. In another aspect, the ephemeral man of affairs re-emerged from his retreat transfigured, once for all, into the immortal philosopher whose thought still lives in the mind of every reader of the *Muqaddamāt*.

Confucius

The same *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return appears in the life of the Sinic social philosopher Confucius (*vivebat circa* 551-479 B.C.)—a life which was outwardly not unlike the life of Ibn Khaldūn.

Born into the Sinic World within a century of the breakdown of the Sinic Civilization,¹ at a time when the destructive internecine warfare between a plurality of sovereign states was rapidly gathering momentum, the young Confucius aspired to enter politics in order to arrest the disintegration of the Sinic Society by systematizing and enforcing the observance of its traditional ceremonies and customs and institutions. Unlike Ibn Khaldūn, who evidently took

¹ If this breakdown is to be dated by any external event, a convenient date is the outbreak of war, in 634 B.C., between the peripheral states of Tsin and Ch'u for the hegemony over the cluster of smaller states at the centre of the Sinic World. (See Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), p. 323.)

his politics lightly as a profitable and diverting outlet for his practical energies, Confucius placed his whole treasure in the life of practical action, and found little consolation in imparting to a band of admiring disciples the precepts which he yearned to put into practice as a minister of state. Hence Confucius's life was a life of personal disappointment;¹ for the local princes of the contending states had little use for the services of a pedant in their cynical and perilous struggle for existence. Accordingly, Confucius had difficulty in obtaining an official appointment at all; and when at last he did attain a minor administrative post in his native state of Lu (one of the smaller states of the centre), he did not succeed in retaining it. His resignation was followed by his withdrawal from his native country; and he spent the next fourteen years in a peripatetic way of life—presenting himself in the capital of one state after another in the hope that some foreign prince might offer employment to a prophet who had found too little honour at home. This hope was never fulfilled; and Confucius's wanderings abroad were only brought to an end by an invitation to return to Lu which was extended to him as an act of grace without any accompanying offer of reinstatement in office. By then Confucius was sixty-eight years old; and when death overtook him five years later he was still in a private station. But this disappointing return to his little native state of Lu at the close of his life in the flesh was not the final way in which Confucius returned to the public life which he had quitted *à contre-cœur* fourteen years earlier. For the energies which the unsuccessful administrator was no longer able to apply to practical affairs found their outlet thereafter through literary and educational channels.

Confucius in exile collected and edited the literary monuments of the traditional lore which Confucius in office had sought to put into practice; the disciples who gathered round the philosopher's person and accompanied him in his wanderings from place to place followed suit by collecting and editing their master's oral precepts; and some three and a half centuries after Confucius's death, when the long crescendo of internecine warfare between the contending states had ended in the 'knock-out blow' of 221 B.C., and when bitter experience had taught the Sinic World to appreciate the stabilizing power of the pedantic Confucian ethos, the *Corpus Confucianum* was actually adopted by the Government of a Sinic universal state as its official canon of statesmanship.² The final

¹ For a critical sifting of the attested facts in Confucius's life-history, see Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 454-9. For the traditional biography, see Hirth, F.: *The Ancient History of China to the End of the Chou Dynasty* (New York (reprint of) 1923, Columbia University Press), pp. 241-8.

² See Hu Shih: 'The Establishment of Confucianism as a State Religion during the Han Dynasty' (in the *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*,

step was taken in 125 B.C.,¹ when a competitive public examination in the Confucian Classics was instituted as the avenue of entry into the Imperial Civil Service; and the official reign of Confucius, which dates from that year, may be said to have lasted until the abolition of the examination system in A.D. 1905.

During these two thousand years, the posthumous ascendancy of Confucius survived the interregnum (*circa* A.D. 175-475) which followed the break-up of the Empire of the Han; it survived the influx of the barbarians, and the far more revolutionary influx of the Mahayana, into the new Far Eastern World; and it survived the latter-day barbarian invasions of Khitan and Kin and Mongol and Manchu. The one power that has ever seriously disputed the hold of Confucius over Chinese minds since the sage's ethereal reign began is the Civilization of the West, which is making its forcible impact upon the traditional life of China in the present generation. For the moment, maybe, the Western impact has driven Confucius from his millennial throne; yet, even if he has been officially deposed, the unconquerable sage is still contriving to govern where he no longer reigns by ruling incognito. For the essence of the Confucian social system, as it was instituted two thousand years ago, is government by students under the auspices of a sage whose personality and precepts are regarded with all the more veneration since the man of flesh and blood has departed this life and has received his apotheosis; and the lineaments of this system can still be detected in the life of a revolutionary China beneath all the scum and froth that have gathered on its agitated surface. In this twenty-eighth year after the abolition of the Confucian examinations, China is still being governed by students in a dead philosopher's name. The veneration long paid to Confucius has been transferred provisionally to Sun Yat-sen; and the borrowed prestige of the founder of the Kuomintang has secured the long-suffering acquiescence of the Chinese People in the conduct of public affairs by Dr. Sun's political legatees, who (to China's undoing) have received their education abroad in the social and physical sciences of the West, instead of being educated in the Confucian Classics like their predecessors for sixty generations. The moral and political bankruptcy of these Western-educated student-politicians of the Kuomintang may conceivably bring King Confucius back into his own again; and thus, even now, we cannot foresee the end of the mighty kingdom which this Sinic sage unwittingly acquired when he lost his official post in the petty principality of Lu.

vol. ix, 1929, pp. 26-7). See also Shryock, J. K.: *The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius* (London 1932, Century Company).

¹ This is Hu Shih's date in *op. cit.*, p. 27. The date is given as 124 B.C. by Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 301.

Kant

The *motif* reappears in the life of a modern Western philosopher who was more academic than Confucius himself. Immanuel Kant of Königsberg (*vivebat* A.D. 1724-1804) withdrew from the World deliberately. Though he had to wait fifteen years to obtain a professorial chair in his native city, he steadfastly refused all calls to other universities. In all his life, he never travelled more than forty miles from his birthplace or took a voyage upon the waters of the Baltic on whose shores he lived; and the daily round of his activities was so monotonously regular that the townspeople learnt to set their watches by his punctual passage past their windows on his daily 'constitutional' walk. Yet within his own lifetime the retiring philosopher lived to draw a host of students to the outlying Prussian city from which he refused to move; and the insignificant-looking man who never transported his body more than forty miles has radiated his thought from Königsberg to the ends of the Earth.

Dante

When we turn our attention from the philosophers to the poets, we find the same *motif* in the life-history of Dante (*vivebat* A.D. 1265-1321). For this greatest of all Florentines did not accomplish his life-work till he had been driven to withdraw from his native city. In Florence, Dante fell in love with Beatrice, only to see her die before him after marrying another man. In Florence he went into politics, only to be sentenced to exile.¹ And from this banishment the Florentine *exul immeritus*² never returned in the flesh. Yet, in losing his birthright in Florence, Dante was to win the citizenship of the World; for, in exile, the genius which had been crossed in politics after being crossed in love found its life-work to achieve in creating the *Divina Commedia*.³ To judge by an allusion in the first ode of Paragraph Nineteen of *La Vita Nuova*,⁴ the first

¹ Dante was a philosophic Ghibelline, who broke away from the prevailing Guelf tradition of Florence because he divined—two centuries before Machiavelli—that the supreme political need of the Italian Society was for some supreme authority to bring peace and order into the relations between the contending city-states. While Machiavelli looks for an Italian dictator to be his saviour of Italian Society, Dante, in his less sophisticated generation, feels no repugnance against calling in a 'barbarian' to perform the same service for Italy in the traditional role of a Holy Roman Emperor.

² 'Dantes Aligherius Florentinus et Exul Immeritus' is the superscription over four out of ten extant letters written by Dante in exile.

³ Dante was condemned to exile *in absentia* (under pain of death if he returned) on the 10th March, 1302. He is believed to have composed the *Divina Commedia* in exile during the last seven years of his life (A.D. 1314-21). The date in which the action of the poem is placed in the poem itself is A.D. 1300, when the poet was still living in Florence; but this date, which represents the middle-point of Dante's life on the conventional lifespan of three-score years and ten, is evidently fictitious.

⁴ Dante: *La Vita Nuova*, § 19, Canzone Prima, ll. 45-7:

Là, ov' è alcun che perder lei s'attende,
E che dirà nell' Inferno a' malnati:
'Io vidi la speranza de' beati.'

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conception of the *Commedia* must already have arisen in Dante's mind before the death of Beatrice in A.D. 1290. Yet it was not until a quarter of a century later, when Beatrice had been twenty-four years in her grave and Dante himself twelve years in exile, that the extinction of the Florentine statesman's last political hopes, by the death of the Emperor Henry VII in A.D. 1314, at last set the poet free to escape from the trammels of Time and Space into the writing of his ageless and deathless masterpiece.

Hamlet

We may conclude our survey of the working of Withdrawal-and-Return in the lives of individuals by reverting from the realm of fact to the realm of myth from which we started, and contemplating the hero of a Scandinavian myth who has been transfigured by the genius of Shakespeare into the archetype of 'the intellectual'. In Shakespeare's tragedy of *Hamlet*, the dreamstudent of Wittenberg is suddenly confronted, by the revelation of his mother's guilt, with the prospect of having to do the deed of Orestes. In face of this dreadful challenge, which finds him unfitted by temperament and unprepared by experience for making the response that his conscience demands, Hamlet does not resort to a physical withdrawal from the tragic scene in the fashion of his Hellenic counterpart. Orestes is conveyed away secretly, as a child, from the clutches of his mother and her lover and is brought up in distant Phocis in order to return to Argos in his manhood as his father's avenger. Since his earliest memory, Orestes has grown up with the knowledge that this is the deed which it has been laid upon him to do. Hamlet learns his fate by a sudden intimation at an age when he has already passed the threshold of maturity; and the manner in which he withdraws in order to return is characteristically different. Understanding, from the first, that his spiritual agony cannot be escaped by physical flight, he deliberately assents to his mother's request that he stay in Denmark instead of returning to Wittenberg; and thereupon he withdraws—on a far longer spiritual voyage—into the innermost depths of the Microcosm, in order to return to the Macrocosm, in the fullness of time, transformed, for the Orestian deed, into a demonic 'man of action'.

Puberty

Having now completed our survey of Withdrawal-and-Return in the lives of individuals, we may trace the same *motif* in the histories of minorities.

The *motif* presents itself conspicuously in the case of one minority of a natural order which always exists of necessity in every society: the minority consisting of those male members of any given society

who, at any given moment, are in course of passing out of boyhood into manhood through the metamorphosis of puberty. The withdrawal of the boys from the common life of Society on the eve of puberty in order that they may return as men when they are ripe for marriage is a social movement which is not only common in the life of primitive societies, but is also traceable in the lives of societies that are in process of civilization—sometimes as a theme of Mythology and sometimes as a custom that lingers on in practice in some by-way of practical life. The temporary segregation of the boys of a primitive society during their years of puberty is a commonplace of Anthropology.¹ The reflexion of this custom in Mythology is illustrated by the Hellenic myth of the Centaur Cheiron's school of heroes in the wilderness of Mount Pelion. Its survival, as 'a going concern', into the history of a civilization is illustrated by the Spartan institution of the so-called 'Lycurgeoan Agôgê' and by the English institution of the so-called 'Public Schools'.²

Penalized Minorities

Other illustrations of the same *motif* are to be found in the experiences of some among those 'penalized minorities' whose histories we have already surveyed in another connexion.³

In the history of Jewry, for example, in face of the challenge presented by the impact of Hellenism, the Pharisees withdrew⁴ in the second century B.C. not only from the cultural movement of Hellenization which had been unsuccessfully promoted by the High Priest Joshua-Jason but also from the triumphant military and political reaction against the Hellenic Seleucid Power which was captained by the Maccabees. And then, in the first century of the Christian Era, the greatest Pharisee that ever lived returned from this two-centuries-long segregation, with a mighty spiritual impetus, to sweep away all cultural barriers between Jew and Greek⁵ by preaching the transfigured Judaism of Jesus as a means of salvation for the whole of Humanity.⁶

¹ For a survey of the prevalence of this institution in the lives of extant primitive societies, see Schurz, H.: *Altersklassen und Männerbünde* (Berlin 1902, Reimer).

² For an examination of the Lycurgeoan Agôgê and its analogies in the English 'Public Schools', see Part III. A, above. It is to be noted that while the English boy who is segregated from his family on the eve of puberty by being sent to a 'public school' does return to ordinary life upon reaching manhood, the Spartiate never returns, after his entry into the Agôgê at the age of seven, until he is superannuated from military service at the age of sixty.

³ In II. D (vi), vol. ii, above.

⁴ The name 'Pharisees' literally means 'those who separate themselves'.

⁵ Col. iii. 11.

⁶ For the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return in the personal life-history of Paul, see the present chapter, pp. 263-4, above. It is to be noted that the particular Pharisee who accomplished this Christian return from the Pharisaic withdrawal was an exceptional individual. The rank-and-file of the Pharisaic minority of Jewry marched into the same blind alley as the rank-and-file of the Spartiate soldiers and the Hellenic philosophers. They duly withdrew, but they never made their withdrawal fructify by returning in new capacities to create new worlds.

In a similar movement, the Nestorians withdrew, under pressure from the following wave of Islam, right out of the domain of their native Syriac Society into the remote interior of the Eurasian Steppe; and thence in due course they returned as conquerors on the crest of the wave of the Mongol invasion.¹ The Constantinopolitan Greeks, driven out of public life by the Ottoman conquest, withdrew into the realm of private business in order to emerge again into public life, some two centuries later, as the Phanariots—the efficient secretaries of state whose business training made their political services indispensable to the Ottoman Government in its hour of adversity.² The English Nonconformists,³ who had made their stormy entrance on to the stage of English history in the Civil War and the Commonwealth, thereafter withdrew and returned in somewhat similar circumstances to those that evoked the corresponding movement among the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Christians. Dropping out of public life from the morrow of the Restoration until the eve of the passage of the Reform Bill,⁴ they likewise reacted by withdrawing into the realm of private business in order to return omnipotent, a century and a half later, as the authors of the Industrial Revolution.⁵

¹ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 236–8, above.

² Ibid., pp. 222–8, above.

³ Ibid., pp. 220–1 and 250, above.

⁴ The exclusion of the Nonconformists from public life may be dated from the passage of the Corporation Act in A.D. 1661 and the Test Act in A.D. 1673. Their readmission may be dated from the repeal of these two Acts in A.D. 1828.

⁵ In the examples of Withdrawal-and-Return here cited from the histories of certain 'penalized minorities', the two beats of the movement make a sequence in Time—the withdrawal coming first and the return following after a perceptible Time-interval. But there is also a sense in which the very response of a penalized minority to the challenge of penalization is in itself an example of Withdrawal-and-Return, even when the two beats of the movement are virtually simultaneous. Some of the most conspicuous representatives of the 'penalized minorities'—e.g. the Jewish Diaspora—have never returned at all in the literal sense; but in the ethereal sense they undoubtedly have returned to the World in a new capacity and with enhanced power in the act of concentrating their social energies on other fields, and excelling in these fields, in response to the challenge of being handicapped in, or altogether excluded from, the most highly regarded fields of social activity. (See II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 209, above.)

This 'timeless' exhibition of the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* is characteristic of what may be called the 'institutional penalized minorities': e.g. the Buddhist and Christian monastic orders or the Roman Catholic celibate clergy. It is indeed a common practice in primitive societies to penalize, by the imposition of tabus, those minorities or individuals who serve as institutions incarnate. The notion underlying this practice seems to be that, the more drastically such incarnate institutions are compelled to withdraw from the ordinary activities of social life, the more vigorously they will return to Society on the plane of magical or religious activity which has been assigned to them as their special field. In fact, their fellows deal with them as the man with the pollarding-axe deals with the willow (See I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 168, above) or the pruner with the vine or the mower with the meadow. A classic example of such compulsory withdrawal being imposed upon an incarnate institution by tabu is the treatment of the Toda 'palol', or sacred dairyman, by the pastoral Toda Society of the Nilgiri Hills in Southern India. (See Rivers, W. H. R.: *The Todas* (London 1906, Macmillan), pp. 98–105.) The 'palol', who is solely charged with the management of the sacred dairy, is not allowed to visit his home or any ordinary village. He has to do all his business with ordinary people through an intermediary. He may not cross a bridge. He must be celibate (except in the celebration of his eighteenth year of office). He may not attend a funeral under pain of having to resign his office. He may not be approached at all by ordinary Todas on two days

Barbarian Rear-guards

The *motif* reappears in the histories of other minorities which we have already had occasion to examine in the course of this Study.

We have seen, for example, how the Celtic and Teutonic rear-guards of the European Barbarism parted company with the van-guard and held themselves in reserve when the van-guard threw itself upon the derelict provinces of the Roman Empire in the *Völkerwanderung* of *circa* A.D. 375-675; and we have noted the historic difference in the outcome of these two alternative barbarian strategies. The barbarian van-guard, recklessly rushing in, was easily and rapidly overcome by the internal proletariat of the defunct Hellenic Society, which was able, through the institution of the Catholic Church, to deliver an irresistible counter-attack on its own ground.¹ On the other hand, the Celtic and Teutonic rear-guards, which held aloof and concentrated their efforts in the first instance upon begetting embryonic civilizations of their own, were able to contend with Catholic Christendom on equal terms when they emerged from their withdrawal at last in their own good time. In the embryonic Far Western Christian Civilization of the Irish and the embryonic Scandinavian Civilization of the Vikings, the Catholic Church found adversaries of a very different metal from the temper of the Goths and the Franks, which had been as flexible as the iron of a Galatian sword-blade. And there were moments in the seventh century of the Christian Era, and again in the ninth, when it was really an open question which of two contending Powers would win for itself the privilege of giving birth to the future civilization of the West.² In the narrowness of the margin by which the abortive Far Western Civilization and the abortive Scandinavian Civilization were defeated in their struggle with the Catholic Church we have the measure of their superiority over the Gothic Barbarism from which they had parted company; and this

in the week. Neither he nor his dairy must be touched by any ordinary person. He may not cut his hair or nails. Compare the tabus imposed upon the Grand Lama in Tibet. And compare likewise the role of 'the prisoner in the Vatican' which, in modern Western Christendom, has been played by the Pope for more than half a century, from A.D. 1870 to A.D. 1929. As 'the prisoner in the Vatican', the Pope has been able to move the feelings and imaginations of Roman Catholics all over the World more powerfully than he had ever moved them when he was the temporal sovereign of an Italian principality extending from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic and from the Po to the Garigliano. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen what will be the ultimate psychological consequences of the Lateran Agreements of 1929 between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Italy, under which 'the prisoner in the Vatican' has emerged from his masterly captivity to resume the role of a territorial sovereign over the miniature territory of the Vatican City. (For the Lateran Agreements, see further Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs for 1929*, Part V (i).)

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 320-1, above.

² For the successive combats in which the Roman Church had to engage with the embryonic Far Western Christian Civilization and the embryonic Scandinavian Civilization for the privilege of becoming the embryo of our modern Western Civilization, see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-60, above.

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superiority can be traced to the special impetus which the two barbarian rear-guards acquired, before coming into action, from their previous movement of Withdrawal-and-Return.

Athens in the Second Chapter of the Growth of the Hellenic Society

A still more conspicuous example of Withdrawal-and-Return, which has come to our attention repeatedly,¹ is the behaviour of the Athenians in the crisis into which the Hellenic Society was thrown by the presentation of the Malthusian challenge in the eighth century B.C.

We have noticed that the first reaction of Athens to this problem of over-population was ostensibly negative. She did not react to the pressure of over-population, as her neighbours Eretria and Chalcis and Corinth and Megara reacted to it, by seizing and colonizing new agricultural land overseas; and she did not react, as the Spartans reacted, by conquering the territories of adjoining Greek city-states and turning the Greek inhabitants into serfs.² In this age, so long as her neighbours were content to leave Athens alone, Athens was content to play an apparently passive role on a Hellenic stage on which the action was all the time becoming more intense all around her. The first glimpse of her demonic latent energy that she gave to the rest of Hellas was in her violent and victorious reaction against King Cleomenes' attempt, towards the close of the sixth century B.C., to bring her under the Lacedaemonian hegemony, as his predecessors had brought the Isthmian states.³ And

¹ See vol. i, pp. 24-5; vol. ii, pp. 37-42; and vol. iii, pp. 122, 139-40, 197, above.

² The definitive boundaries of Attica as they had been established by Solon's time, at the turn of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., certainly embraced an area which was exceptionally large for a Continental Greek city-state (the territorial scale of the Greek colonies in Magna Graecia and Sicily was distinctly larger than that of the mother-states in Continental Greece). In fact, Attica was by far the largest city-state territory in Continental Greece with the one exception of the territory of Sparta. Yet there is no indication, either in tradition or from presumptive evidence, that Attica was a product of conquest. It is probable, though unattested, that Eleusis was originally an independent city-state; but, if so, the unrecorded act of union between Eleusis and Athens must have been an agreed measure, on a footing of equality, like the union of A.D. 1707 between Scotland and England. The sole apparent exception to the pacific process by which Attica grew is the acquisition of the Island of Salamis from Megara by force of arms; but this did not become a precedent. When Athens next extended her territorial sphere on the Continent by the attachment of Plataea, she attached her, not as a conquered and recalcitrant enemy, but as an enthusiastic and devoted ally.

³ The Lacedaemonian Government attempted to establish its ascendancy in Athens, as it had established it in Corinth and Sicyon and Epidaurus and Megara, by overthrowing a local despotic régime and setting up in its place a more or less reactionary oligarchy which could only make itself secure against a restoration of the radical despotism by continuing to lean upon Lacedaemonian support. When King Cleomenes applied this policy to Athens, he was successful in the first step. In 511 B.C., a Lacedaemonian expeditionary force duly expelled the despots of Athens and set up an oligarchy in their stead. But at Athens this was not the end of the story. The local restoration of the oligarchy was followed here by a struggle for power between the moderates and the extremists; in 508 B.C. the leader of the moderates, Cleisthenes, gained the upper hand by 'taking the Dêmos into his party' (Herodotus, Bk. V, ch. 66); the extremists appealed to Sparta; and Cleomenes led a new Lacedaemonian military expedition to Attica with surprising consequences. When he put the Athenian extremists back into power and drove

thus, by her passive non-participation in the general movements of the age, and by her active resistance to any attempt to coerce her into conformity, Athens more or less deliberately segregated herself from the main body of the Hellenic World for upwards of two centuries. Yet these two centuries of Athenian withdrawal were not centuries of Athenian inactivity. On the contrary, we have seen how Athens took advantage of this long seclusion, which left her free from foreign entanglements, to concentrate her energies upon solving the general Hellenic problem of over-population by an original solution of her own—an Athenian solution which proved its superiority by continuing to work when the Spartan solution and the Chalcidian solution were bringing in diminishing returns. It was only in her own good time, when she had remodelled her traditional institutions to suit her newfangled way of life, that Athens at last returned to the arena from which she had so long absented herself. But when she returned in these circumstances, she returned with an impetus that was unprecedented in Hellenic history.

Athens proclaimed her return by the sensational gesture of throwing down the gauntlet to the Achaemenian Power. It was Athens who responded—when Sparta hung back—to the appeal of the Asiatic Greek insurgents in 499 B.C.; and from that day onwards Athens stood out as the protagonist in the Fifty Years' War (*gerebatur* 499–449 B.C.) between Hellas and the Syriac universal state. For upwards of two centuries from the beginning of the fifth century B.C., the role of Athens in Hellenic history was the absolute antithesis of the role which she had been playing for an equal period of time before.¹ From the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt in

the moderates into exile, he was answered by a general rising of the population of Attica; he found himself blockaded, with his little expeditionary force, in the citadel of Athens; and he was compelled to capitulate on condition of evacuating Attica unconditionally. Thereupon, Cleisthenes returned and immediately introduced his famous democratic constitution. In 507 B.C., Cleomenes sought to avenge this humiliation by unleashing against Athens her three strongest neighbours: Thebes, Chalcis, and Aegina. But, in face of this fresh attack, the Athenians displayed their latent energy once again. On land, they decisively defeated the combined Theban and Chalcidian forces in a single campaign (after which they dealt with Chalcis as Sparta had dealt with Messene). At sea, they successfully carried on a desultory naval warfare against the Aeginetan seapower for some twenty years, until the imminence of Xerxes' great offensive against European Greece put a temporary stop to local inter-state hostilities.

¹ In the earlier period of Athenian history, the prevalent Athenian policy was only departed from by the despot Peisistratus, who anticipated, in the third quarter of the sixth century B.C., the Athenian imperialism of the fifth century by attempting to secure strategic and political and economic control over the two key-points in the Aegean area: the Black Sea Straits and the mouth of the River Strymon together with the mineral deposits of Mount Pangaeus. Peisistratus found his opportunity at Athens because his predecessor Solon had insisted upon implementing the Solonian economic policy by non-revolutionary methods which worked too slowly for the stress of the times. On the whole, Peisistratus came to fulfil the Solonian programme and not to destroy it; but he used his despotic power in order to 'speed up' the agrarian reconstruction of Attica by revolutionary methods. After his final triumph, he appears to have taken a leaf out of the Spartans' book and to have carried out in Attica an internal redistribution of landed property at the expense of the defeated and exiled aristocrats.

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499 B.C. down to the end of the Chremonidean War in 262, Athens was always in the thick of the mêlée of Hellenic international politics; and it was not until she found herself hopelessly out-classed by the new titans of the periphery that she reluctantly renounced the status and the burdens of a Hellenic Great Power. Nor was her would-be withdrawal from the arena of international politics after her final overthrow by Macedon in 262 B.C. the end of her active participation in the general life of the Hellenic World. For, long before she fell behind in the military and political race, she had made herself 'the education of Hellas' in every other field. She had given the Hellenic culture a permanent Attic impress which it still retains in the sight of Posterity.

Ionia in the First Chapter of the Growth of the Hellenic Society

In the history of Athens, we have discerned our *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return in the creative activity of a minority which taught the Hellenic Society how to continue its growth by teaching it how to solve one of its crucial problems. Athens made herself 'the education of Hellas' in the literal sense by discovering how to solve the general Hellenic problem of over-population by a special Athenian method of intensive economic development. We have seen, however, at an earlier point,¹ that this Malthusian challenge which received an Athenian response was not the first crucial challenge with which the Hellenic Society had been confronted in the course of its history. The Malthusian challenge was actually evoked by the previous success of the Hellenic Society in replying to the prior challenge of Chaos. And it is natural to inquire whether, in this first chapter of Hellenic history, we can detect the same *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return that is apparent in the second. We have seen that this primary challenge of Chaos was victoriously met in Hellenic history by the invention of the city-state: an institution which enabled the relatively orderly and progressive population of the rare and narrow plains to establish their ascendancy over the wild highlanders. Was the Hellenic city-state, like the later Hellenic economic system of specialized production for export, the invention of some creative minority which temporarily withdrew from the rest of the Hellenic Society, like Athens in a later age, in order to return in its own good time with a solution of a common problem which it had worked out for itself in its period of retreat?

We are here in the realm of conjecture; for we have no contemporary records of this first chapter of Hellenic history; but in

¹ In Part III. B, on pp. 120-1, above.

an earlier passage of this Study¹ we have found some reason for believing that the Hellenic city-state was originally invented, at the end of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung, by those refugees from the 'Dorian' avalanche who parted company from their neighbours in Continental Greece by taking to their ships and finding new homes overseas on the coast of Anatolia. The transmarine migration which brought into existence the historic city-states of Aeolis and Ionia and Doris may fairly be regarded as a 'withdrawal' in our present usage of the term; and there are indications, as we have seen, that the historic city-states of Continental Greece were later foundations which were established on the overseas pattern artificially by mimesis. If we have interpreted these indications aright, then the eventual 'return' of the transmarine settlers into full communion with the rest of the Hellenic Society may be traced in the spread of the new institution of the city-state over the greater part of the Hellenic World. And, whether or not the Hellenic city-state can properly be regarded as a specifically Ionian invention, it is beyond dispute that there was an Ionian 'return' in the cultural if not in the political sphere. The monument of this return is the historic conquest of Continental Greece by the Ionian Epic,² which became 'an everlasting possession' of all Hellas. In fact, the Hellenic culture had received a definitely Ionian impress before Athens withdrew and returned to give it the Attic impress which it subsequently bore. Nor, even then, did the second impress wholly efface the first; for, although the Attic *êthos* and the Ionian *êthos* were notably different,³ the Athenians did not begin to perform original acts of creation on their own account until they had saturated themselves with the Ionian spirit. The Athenian poet Aeschylus himself, in whom the Attic Promethean *élan* is incarnate, is content to describe his plays as 'slices from Homer's banquets';⁴ and it was the Athenian 'reception' of the Ionian Epic that secured for the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* an unchallenged supremacy in the realm of Greek literature as 'the Hellenic Bible'—a supremacy from which the Ionian 'Homer' was never to be ousted by any of his Attic successors.

The Achaean Confederacy in the First Chapter of the Disintegration of the Hellenic Society

Thus it would appear that, in each of two successive chapters in the history of the growth of the Hellenic Civilization, a challenge

¹ In II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 97-8, above.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 94-6, above.

³ See the illuminating analysis of the difference, as it comes out in a comparison of the Aeschylean with the Homeric treatment of an originally identical theme, in Murray, Gilbert: *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1911, Clarendon Press), pp. 289-95.

⁴ Athenaeus 347 E, quoted in this Study already in vol. i, p. 449, footnote 1, above.

was met by the withdrawal and return of a creative minority which withdrew temporarily from the rest of Society in order to discover an original solution for the common problem and then returned in the fullness of time in order to communicate to the rest of Society the solution which it had duly discovered during its temporary retreat. In the growth-phase of the Hellenic Society, there are no more chapters than these two, since the growth of the Hellenic Civilization was brought to an end by a failure to meet the next challenge—the challenge of international anarchy—which the Athenian response to the Malthusian challenge evoked in its turn.¹ The consequence was the breakdown of 431 B.C. and the long disintegration which followed; but this disintegration was not a constant process. It consisted in an alternation of lapses and rallies and relapses;² and in the first rally the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return appears again.

One of the features of this first Hellenic rally was an attempt to solve a problem which had been presented to the central states of the Hellenic World by the renewal of the process of geographical expansion—the problem of saving the central states from being not only dwarfed but overwhelmed by the rise of new Great Powers of titanic calibre on the expanding periphery. Athens; as we have seen, had confessed herself worsted by this problem when she sought to retire from active participation in international politics after her last disastrous experience in the Chremonidean War of 266–262 B.C. In her foregoing attempt to pose among the titans as the Great Power which in their presence she had ceased to be, Athens had not succeeded in adding a cubit to her stature. She had merely exposed herself to being treated—and sacrificed—as a pawn in the war-game between giant Antigonos and giant Ptolemy. When she shook herself free at last from Macedonian military occupation in 228 B.C., her impulse, upon which she acted, was to repeat the gesture of withdrawal which had turned out so fortunately for her when she had made it for the first time some five centuries earlier. By this time, however, there were other statesmen in Greece who perceived that, in the new Hellenic World which had been called into existence by Alexander the Great, the little city-states at the centre were so utterly at the mercy of the titans round about that they were not even free to withdraw from

¹ The Athenian response to the Malthusian challenge of over-population was to obtain an enhancement of local productivity by specializing in production for exchange; but this economic solution of an economic problem confronted the Hellenic Society with the new political problem of establishing some international system of political peace and order as a framework for an international system of economic interdependence. This was the problem which the Hellenic World failed to solve. (See Part III. B, p. 122, footnote 3, above, and IV. C (iii) (b) 10, vol. iv. pp. 206–14, below.)

² For the movement of Lapse-and-Rally-and-Relapse in the disintegrations of civilizations, see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi. pp. 278–321, below.

the field at their pleasure. They were no longer actors on a stage; they were pawns on a board; and the all-powerful players of the diplomatic and military game would replace them on the board, and sacrifice them once again, whenever this might happen to suit their convenience. If the city-states of Greece were to recover their freedom even to withdraw, they could only hope to succeed by joining forces in order to establish in the heart of Greece a confederacy of city-states which would be sufficiently strong to compel a Macedon or an Egypt to respect its neutrality. This was the policy of the statesmen who attempted to turn the ancient parochial Achaean Confederacy into a wider union.¹ We need not enlarge upon this policy here, for we have noticed it already in our inquiry into the social milieu of Polybius.² We need only mention that in this instance the movement of withdrawal was followed by no movement of return because the policy of Aratus failed and the first rally of the Hellenic Civilization broke down into a relapse.³ Yet in the policy which Aratus pursued with persistence and success for a quarter of a century, from 251 B.C. to 225, the first beat of the familiar rhythm is unmistakably recognizable.

Italy in the Second Chapter of the Growth of the Western Society

We have seen that Aratus in Greece was at grips with a problem of the Balance of Power which likewise exercised Machiavelli in Italy;⁴ and we have also seen that both statesmen's efforts ended in failure. But in one important respect the two situations were different. While Aratus, in the third quarter of the third century B.C., was attempting to extricate the city-states of Greece from an entanglement with the Great Powers of the periphery from which they had been suffering for the best part of a century without ever having succeeded in shaking themselves free, Machiavelli, at the

¹ For the failure of both Athens and Sparta, the *ci-devant* leaders of Greece, to take the lead in this later chapter of Hellenic history in a movement which was manifestly the sole chance of salvation that Greece still had open to her, see, further, IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (x), vol. iv, pp. 265-6, below. In the critical year 228 B.C., Athens refused to join the Achaean Confederacy and Sparta went to war with it!

² See the present chapter, pp. 310-14, above.

³ The policy of Aratus came to grief in 228 B.C., when the Achaean federal movement came into collision with the Spartan revolutionary movement. There was not room for both movements in the Peloponnese; and when Aratus found himself being worsted by Cleomenes, he undid his own life-work by purchasing the military assistance of Macedon in 225-224 B.C. at the price of allowing the Achaean Confederacy to become a Macedonian pawn. The joint Achaean and Macedonian war against Sparta (224-222 or 223-221 B.C.) was immediately followed by a joint Achaean and Macedonian war against the Aetolian Confederacy—the rival of the Achaean Confederacy which had been attempting to carry out the Aratean policy round a different nucleus for a whole generation before Aratus himself had appeared in the field. The last hope of extricating Greece from the internecine warfare between the titanic Powers of the periphery disappeared in 212 B.C. when the Aetolians involved Greece in the Hannibalic War by entering into an alliance against Macedon with the Romans.

⁴ For a general exposition of this problem, see the present chapter, pp. 301-6, above.

turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, was attempting to preserve for the city-states of Italy an immunity from molestation on the part of Transalpine Europe which they had actually enjoyed, without any serious break, for more than two centuries before the apparition of Charles VIII in A.D. 1494. In other words, the withdrawal of Italy from the international politics of Transalpine Western Christendom, unlike the attempted withdrawal of third-century Greece from the international politics of the Macedonian 'successor-states', was not a pathetically abortive gesture but a successfully accomplished fact. In this respect it is comparable, not to the Achaean movement in the third century B.C., but rather to the withdrawal of Athens in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B.C. which we have been studying in this chapter already.

On a comparative view, we can see that the Athenian withdrawal of the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B.C. and the Italian withdrawal of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era display a strong resemblance to one another. In both cases, the withdrawal—on the political plane—was complete and persistent. In both cases, the self-segregating minority devoted the energies that were liberated by its release from foreign political entanglements to the task of finding an original solution of its own for a problem that confronted the whole of Society. And in both cases the creative minority returned to the Society which it had temporarily abandoned in the fullness of time, when its work of creation was accomplished, in order to set its impress upon the whole body social. We have already noticed how the Hellenic Society took an Attic impress after the return of Athens at the beginning of the fifth century B.C. We may now remind ourselves that our own Western Society took just as strong an Italian impress when Italy returned—not voluntarily, but under protest—at the beginning of the *Cinquecento*.

Moreover, the actual problems which Athens and Italy solved, in retreat, on their respective societies' behalf were much the same. Like Attica in Hellas, Lombardy and Tuscany in Western Christendom served, after withdrawal, as a segregated social laboratory in which the experiment of transforming a locally self-sufficient agricultural society into an internationally interdependent commercial and industrial society was successfully carried out. And in the Italian, as in the Athenian, case there was a radical remodelling of traditional institutions in order to bring them into conformity with the newfangled way of life. A commercialized and industrialized Athens changed over, on the political plane, from an aristocratic constitution based on birth to a bourgeois con-

stitution based on property.¹ A commercialized and industrialized Milan or Bologna or Florence or Siena changed over from the prevalent Feudalism of medieval Western Christendom to a new system of direct relations between individual citizens and locally sovereign governments whose sovereignty resided in the citizens themselves. These concrete economic and political inventions, as well as the impalpable and imponderable cultural creations of the Italian genius, were communicated by Italy to Transalpine Europe from the close of the *Quattrocento* onwards.

At this stage, however, the respective courses of Western and Hellenic history diverge in consequence of one essential point of dissimilarity between the position of the Italian city-states in Western Christendom and the position of Athens in Hellas. Athens was a city-state which had withdrawn from a society of city-states in order to return to a society that had not ceased to consist of city-state units. And accordingly, when Athens became 'the education of Hellas', the process of education was facilitated by the fact that the creative minority and the imitative majority had one important feature in common. They were both alike organized on the city-state pattern; and thus, while the non-Athenian majority of Hellas had to change over from agriculture and aristocracy to industry and democracy in order to catch up with the progress that the creative Athenian minority had made, the majority was not required to make any change in the nature or the scale of the local communities into which it was articulated. It was merely a question of changing a number of agricultural aristocratic city-states into the same number of industrial democratic city-states. There was no question of altering the city-state basis which was the common social heritage of Athens and her Hellenic neighbours.

In the relations between the creative Italian minority and the non-Italian majority of Western Christendom, the problem of assimilation was more difficult because in this case there was no corresponding common ground between the two parts of Society. For the city-state pattern, on which the Italian minority was organized, was not the original basis of articulation in Western Christendom. The original basis—the basis on which Western Christendom, in the first chapter of its history, had met the challenge of Chaos and had triumphed over the rival Scandinavian

¹ This change, which was made in principle, and indeed in substance, by Solon himself at the beginning of the sixth century B.C., was the really radical change in the constitution of Athens. Compared with this, the transition from oligarchy to democracy which followed in the course of the next century-and-a-half was secondary. When once the change of basis from the birth-qualification to the property-qualification had been made, Athens was a potential democracy already. It was merely a question of lowering to zero the amount of the property-qualification for the exercise of political power without any further change in its essential nature.

Civilization—was not the city-state but Feudalism.¹ The city-state, in fact, was not one of the original institutions of the Western Society. In Western history, the city-state only emerged in the second chapter; and then it emerged as a newfangled institution of the minority which withdrew and returned in this age. The withdrawal of the Italian minority from political entanglements with Transalpine Christendom was accompanied by a change-over, on the part of the self-segregating Italian communities, from a feudal to a city-state basis. This change in the basis of social articulation was one of the most conspicuous ways in which the Italians differentiated themselves from the majority of Western Christendom in their temporary retreat.² There was no simultaneous change in the same sense in the social structure of the Western Society at large; and when the creative Italian minority returned in due course to become 'the education of Western Christendom', the greater part of the Western World was still organized on the original feudal basis, and not on the new city-state basis on which the Italians had built their new model for a progressive Western Society.

This situation presented a problem to Western Christendom for which, *a priori*, there were two conceivable alternative solutions. In order to place itself in a position to adopt the new social inventions which Italy had to offer, Transalpine Europe might either break with its feudal past and rearticulate itself throughout on the Italian city-state basis; or else it might modify the Italian inventions in such a way as to make them workable on the feudal basis and on the kingdom-state scale of the old-fashioned Transalpine World. Theoretically, the problem might be solved along either of these lines. The only thing that was not practically possible was for the Italian inventions, as they stood, to be applied in the Transalpine kingdoms, as they stood, without some far-reaching measure of adaptation on the one side or on the other. In the event, the city-state articulation of the Italian minority was rejected and the Italian inventions were only adopted in Transalpine Europe in so far as they could be applied on the kingdom-state scale. But the alternative solution of rearticulating Transalpine Europe into an Italianized society of city-states was not left untried; and although the experiment eventually proved abortive, it was carried a considerable distance and came within sight of success before it irrevocably failed.

Northern Italy, in fact, was not the only place in Western

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 199-200, and III. C (i) (d), p. 196, above.

² For the emergence of the institution of the city-state in the Italian part of medieval Western Christendom as a 'throw-back' to the 'apparented' Hellenic Society on the part of the 'affiliated' Western Society, see Part X, below.

Christendom in which, during the second chapter of Western history, a creative minority extricated itself from the general political life of the Western Society by building city walls and learning to live a new life of its own behind them. While Italy was the region in which this movement declared itself the most conspicuously, and where it achieved its greatest works of creation, the movement was not exclusively Italian in origin. It was a general movement of the Western Society, which came to the surface wherever it was favoured by the presence of certain social conditions. These conditions were presented in some measure in other parts of Western Christendom besides Italy; and wherever they were to be found, the movement asserted itself.

The main conditions were two: the one economic and the other political. The economic condition was that the emergent city-states should command a sufficient field of commercial and industrial activity—a sufficiency of markets and of sources of supply—to enable them to live by commerce and industry instead of continuing to depend upon agriculture. The political condition was that there should be a sufficiently exact equilibrium—or sufficiently prolonged stalemate—in the local Balance of Power between the large-scale Powers of Western Christendom—the Papacy and the Empire and the peripheral kingdoms—to enable new Powers on the small scale of city-states to take possession of the no-man's-land between the evenly-matched and therefore temporarily immobilized titans.¹ These conditions were fulfilled in the case of Northern Italy; for Northern Italy was the pier-head² from which medieval Western Christendom was bound to conduct its overseas trade with the Syriac World and with Orthodox Christendom—two neighbouring worlds which in that age were both larger and richer than Western Christendom itself;³ and Northern Italy was also the no-man's-land in the long and stubborn contest for the headship over Western Christendom which was waged between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. These were the conditions under which Northern Italy disengaged herself (*circa* A.D.

¹ It is one of the laws of the Balance of Power that, when and where it falls into an exactly stable equilibrium, this situation gives an opportunity for the emergence of new Powers, of lesser calibre, in the interstices between the existing Powers who are temporarily immobilized by the exactness of their balance with one another. This law is examined further in Part XI, below.

² For this function of Northern Italy in the primitive geographical structure of Western Christendom, see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 38, above.

³ Italy was the physical bridge between Western Christendom and these two alien worlds; for when Western and Orthodox Christendom emerged simultaneously from the interregnum that followed the break-up of the Roman Empire, the Italian Peninsula was partitioned between them; and, thereafter, the possession of the Orthodox Christian part of Italy—that is, the 'heel' and the 'toe' and the Island of Sicily—was disputed between Orthodox Christendom and the re-emergent colonial Syriac Society of North-West Africa.

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1158-1250) from the mass of Western Christendom as a constellation of virtually sovereign city-states. But the same conditions offered themselves in certain other places with similar results.

In Germany, for example, the rise of city-states was promoted economically by the debouchure, on German soil, of the overland trade-routes from Italy to Transalpine Europe through the Alpine passes and also by the northward and eastward expansion of Western Christendom—an expansion which gave Germany a seaboard on the Baltic and brought Scandinavia and Poland and Hungary within the radius of the German pioneers of Western trade.¹ At the same time, on the political plane, the rise of city-states in Germany was promoted indirectly by the struggle between the Empire and the Papacy in Italy—a struggle which sapped the strength of the Imperial Power in its German homeland and thus gave an opportunity for the Emperor's German feudatories to erect themselves into virtually independent princes. The resulting Balance of Power between the princes and the Emperor enabled rising city-states to shake themselves free in Germany as their elder sisters in Italy had been enabled to win their freedom through the Balance of Power between the Empire and the Papacy. In Flanders, again, the rise of city-states was promoted economically by the junction on Flemish soil of the overland trade-route from the Mediterranean (over Northern Italy and Southern and Western Germany) with the maritime trade-routes along the Atlantic and North Sea coasts and across the Straits between the Continent and the British Isles. Thereafter, the Flemish city-states were enabled to complete the achievement of their *de facto* political independence from the authority of the Count of Flanders, who was a feudatory of the Crown of France, by taking sides with the Crown of England in the Hundred Years' War (*inceptit* A.D. 1337).

Thus, by the middle of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, the feudal darkness of the Western World was thickly sown with constellations of city-states; and these constellations were disposed in a commanding formation. At each of two points on opposite fringes of the Western firmament, in Italy and in Flanders, there was a star-cluster of such density that, within its own circumference, it wholly occupied the field of vision with a continuum of stellar light which left no rifts of darkness visible. Between the Italian and the Flemish cluster, across Swabia and the Rhineland, there stretched a star-riband of looser mesh and lesser luminosity, in the likeness of the Milky Way; and from the north-eastern flank of this terrestrial galaxy, in the neighbourhood of Cologne, the star-stream of the Hansa Towns shone out across Westphalia from the

¹ For this expansion, see II. D (v), vol. II, pp. 167-70, above.

banks of the Rhine to the shores of the Baltic. It will be seen that the new cosmos of city-states, which was taking shape in Western Christendom within the framework of the old cosmos of feudal tenures, had increased and multiplied with remarkable vitality during the three centuries or so that had elapsed since the beginning of its creation. The light was shining in the darkness from which it had been divided by the creative act; but the darkness comprehended it not. Would the light prevail over the darkness or the darkness reabsorb the light?¹ The moment had come when the Western Society must choose which world, of these two alternative and incompatible worlds, it was henceforth to be: the old feudal world or a new world of city-states.²

Before the end of the fourteenth century this issue had been

¹ In the ephemeral overseas world (*terre d'outre mer*) which medieval Western Christendom won for itself in 'the Crusades' at the expense of the moribund Syriac Society and the prematurely decadent Orthodox Christendom, the feudal cosmos which the Crusaders created in this new colonial domain in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era actually was swallowed up, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, by the new city-state cosmos which had latterly come into being in Italy.

At the time of the original conquests, which were mainly achieved in the First Crusade and in the Fourth, the lion's share of the conquered territories was parcelled out into feudal principalities, while the Italian maritime city-states, whose sea-power had contributed so much to the success of these joint Italian and Transalpine enterprises, had to content themselves with the acquisition of a number of comparatively small (though commercially and navally important) enclaves. By the end of the story, on the eve of the total extinction of Latin dominion in the Levant at the hands of the 'Osmanlis, the relative extent of the Italian and the Transalpine holdings of Latin territory in the Levant had been completely reversed. In so far as the *ci-devant* Frankish feudal principalities had not been reconquered by the Orthodox Christians and the Muslims, the remnants had been mostly preserved in virtue of their transfer from incompetent Transalpine to competent Italian hands. The change of régime which this transfer involved was striking; for, in the Frankish principalities overseas, the principles of feudalism had been carried to greater logical extremes, under artificial cultivation, than they had ever attained in their spontaneous growth on their native European soil, whereas the Italian colonial régimes which eventually took their place were anticipations of the modern Western methods of colonial exploitation.

The outstanding example of this process is the history of the Latin Kingdom of Cyprus, which was founded in A.D. 1191-2. As a result of a local conflict which broke out in A.D. 1372 between the Genoese and Venetian colonies in Cyprus, the reigning French dynasty of the House of Lusignan fell foul of the Genoese and was compelled to cede to the Genoese Republic the sovereignty over the port of Famagusta, with a monopoly of the foreign trade of the island. Famagusta was reconquered from the Genoese by the Cypriot Crown in A.D. 1464, but the enfeebled feudal power could only maintain itself by inviting a Venetian protectorate in A.D. 1466; and this protectorate duly led on, in the usual manner of protectorates, to annexation. In the last chapter of its history, from A.D. 1489 until the Ottoman Conquest in 1571, Latin Cyprus was a Venetian colony.

Another example is the Levantine career of the Acciajuoli—a family of Brescian steel-manufacturers who had settled in Florence and taken to banking. In A.D. 1334, Niccolò Acciajuoli, who was the confidential banker of the Angevin Court of Naples, took advantage of his financial and political transactions on behalf of his royal clients in order to acquire estates for himself in the Frankish feudal principality of Achaia. In 1358, Niccolò obtained from the ruling Angevin prince of Achaia the hereditary governorship of Corinth. Niccolò's sons mortgaged Corinth to their second cousin Nerio Acciajuoli; and in 1385-8 Nerio conquered the Frankish Duchy of Athens (which included Boeotia as well as Attica) from the Catalans, who had conquered it themselves from the French in 1311. The Florentine dominion in Central Greece which was thus established in 1388 lasted until the Turkish annexation of Athens in 1456 and of Thebes in 1460.

² For a comparison between the situations in fourteenth-century Western Christendom and in fifth-century Hellas, see further III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, below.

decided, and decided against the new dispensation. A twentieth-century historian, looking back over the intervening span of Western history to the year 1400, can see plainly in retrospect that, by that date, the brilliant new world of city-states was already doomed to be abortive. But perhaps this decision would have been less readily apparent to a contemporary observer than it is to us to-day; for, although its historical consequences have been momentous, its actual execution was not sensational. The medieval Western cosmos of city-states was not blotted out in any single overwhelming cosmic catastrophe. Its fate was decided by the outcome of a number of local conflicts, no one of which was of oecumenical importance in itself. Their importance was the consequence of their aggregate effect; and this was largely hid from the eyes of the generation that took part in them.

In Italy, the light was dimmed by the destructive War of Chioggia (*gerebatur* A.D. 1378-81) between the two principal Italian maritime commonwealths, Genoa and Venice: an equivalent of the Atheno-Lacedaemonian War of 431-404 B.C. which left both protagonists permanently enfeebled. The year A.D. 1378 may also be taken as the beginning of an era of chronic and ubiquitous warfare between the Italian city-states on more scientific and professional and therefore more exhausting and ruinous lines than the earlier Italian fashion of conducting hostilities. The hundred and sixteen years between the outbreak of the War of Chioggia and the apparition of Charles VIII (A.D. 1378-1494) were the heyday of the Italian Condottieri. Thus, in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, the Italian city-states were setting themselves seriously to break one another's strength; and in the same decades the South and West German city-states allowed their strength to be broken by the local feudal princes.¹

The policy of these German city-states was ambitious. The example of the Swiss Confederation, which had found in its union the strength to contend against the Hapsburg Power since the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, inspired the formation of a Swabian League of Cities in 1376 and a Rhenish League of Cities in 1381. These two leagues entered into an alliance with one another shortly afterwards; and in 1385 this alliance was extended to include some of the leading members of the Swiss Confederation. At the end of the year 1385, the efficacy of this new federal movement among the Central European city-states was put to the test by the outbreak of war between the Swiss Confederation and Leopold Hapsburg; and the Swabian and Rhenish allies of

¹ For this crisis in the fate of the city-states of Southern and Western Germany, see Clarke, M. V.: *The Mediaeval City State* (London 1926, Methuen), pp. 175-8.

the Swiss proclaimed as their war aim: 'Between the Forests of the Vosges, Thuringia, Bohemia, and the Lower Alps shall be a great union of free cities.'¹ If this large aim had been achieved, the fourteenth century of the Christian Era might have seen the ancient feudal body social of Western Christendom riven asunder by a solid wedge of confederated city-states extending right across the middle of Continental Europe from the Mediterranean and the Adriatic to the Channel and the North Sea and the Baltic.² In that event, the forces of Feudalism, divided by the enemy in their midst and unable to render one another mutual aid, might eventually have been driven off the field, to leave a new society of city-states in possession. But this prospect was barely opened up before it was decisively blotted out. At the critical moment, the Rhenish and Swabian cities hung back; the Swiss defeated Leopold Hapsburg at Sempach (in A.D. 1386) and 'set the seal on their independence' unaided; and two years later, when the Rhenish and the Swabian League found themselves at war, in their turn, with their own local feudal enemies, no Swiss help came to save them from defeat. Both these German Leagues were defeated decisively by the local German princes in A.D. 1388; and thereafter, in 1389, they were formally dissolved—'as contrary to God, the King, the Empire and the Law'—by the Holy Roman Emperor Wenceslas.

At about the same time, misfortunes of equal gravity befell the older and larger and stronger North German League of the Hansa, and also the Flemish cluster of city-states.

Flanders—which, as a stronghold of the new city-state régime in Western Christendom, was only second in importance to Italy itself—became subject in A.D. 1384 to a new line of Counts of the House of Burgundy; and in these Burgundian princes the Flemish burghers found their masters. It had been one thing to assert their civic liberties against the feudal lordship of a Count of Flanders who had no external resources beyond the fitful support of his usually embarrassed suzerain the King of France. It was quite another thing for them to contend with a Power which commanded the resources of territories outside Flanders itself³ and which was learning to make the most of these resources by applying the new-fangled Italian military and fiscal and administrative methods to

¹ This watchword was an adaptation of the Swiss watchword: 'Between the four forest cantons shall be a great Switzerland' (Clarke, *op. cit.*, p. 177).

² It will be noticed that the fourteenth-century zone of city-states (Northern Italy-Rhineland-Netherlands) approximately coincided in area (apart from the replacement of a Burgundian by a Swabian corridor) with the central slice of the Carolingian Empire which was assigned to Charlemagne's eldest grandson Lothaire in A.D. 843. (For the historical importance of Lothaire's portion, see I. B (iv), vol. 1, pp. 37-9, above.)

³ In the same year, 1384, in which the House of Burgundy acquired the County of Flanders, it enlarged its home territory—the French Duchy of Burgundy—by acquiring both the French County of Nevers and the Imperial County of Burgundy.

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an old-fashioned Transalpine feudal principality.¹ From the establishment of Burgundian rule in Flanders in A.D. 1384 down to the incorporation of Flanders into Revolutionary France in A.D. 1795, the Flemish city-states remained subject to the House of Burgundy and its successive heirs, the Spanish and the Austrian Hapsburgs.

As for the Hansa League, it was overtaken before the end of the fourteenth century by the nemesis of the political pressure which, in furtherance of its commercial interests, it had brought to bear upon the converted barbarians on the northern and eastern periphery of an expanding Western Christendom. The *ci-devant* barbarians, finding themselves outmatched in efficiency by the Hansa and its partners the Teutonic Order, brought their quantitative superiority into play to compensate for their qualitative inferiority, and thereby succeeded in redressing the unequal balance.² The political union of Lithuania with Poland in A.D. 1386 was as great a blow to the Hansa Towns as it was to the Teutonic Knights; and the subsequent union of the three Scandinavian Kingdoms in A.D. 1397 completed the Hansa's discomfiture.³ For the next five centuries, the history of the Hansa Towns is the history of their successive absorption into other bodies politic of different structure and larger build. And the long process was completed in A.D. 1866 when the last three survivors—Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen—decided to merge themselves in the North German Confederation.⁴ Indeed, that merger may be regarded as the extinction of the last three stars of the innumerable host of city-states which had covered the face of Western Christendom five centuries earlier.

England in the Third Chapter of the Growth of the Western Society

Thus it was decided that Western Christendom should not be rearticulated into a society of city-states in order to facilitate the transmission of the new Italian version of the Western culture from Italy to Transalpine Europe. And since there was no room in Western Christendom for a kingdom-state cosmos and a city-state cosmos to exist side by side in perpetuity, this decision spelled the doom of the city-state régime even in its Italian and Flemish

¹ The House of Burgundy was a pioneer among the Transalpine dynasties which set themselves, in the fifteenth century, to transform their feudal principalities into autocracies by devices borrowed from Italy. ² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 172-5, above.

³ The arrest of the expansion of the German city-states into the Baltic which was brought about by the political unification of the Scandinavians and of the Polono-Lithuanians in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era may be compared with the similar arrest of the expansion of the Greek city-states into the Western Mediterranean which was brought to a standstill in the sixth century B.C. by the political unification of the Etruscans and of the Transmarine Phoenicians.

⁴ The final completion of the process ought possibly to be dated in this year 1933, when Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, together with all the other *Länder* of the German Reich, have lost the last vestige of their political individuality in the course of the German National-Socialist Revolution.

strongholds. Accordingly, if the new Italian culture was to be transmitted to the Western World at large or even to be preserved in its place of origin, it was thenceforth necessary that it should be adapted to the prevailing kingdom-state scale. It was only in so far as this adaptation could be accomplished that the Italian culture had a prospect of becoming 'the education of the Western World' under the actual conditions which had been set for its propagation before the end of the fourteenth century. In these circumstances, the Western Society was confronted with a new problem which may be formulated as follows. In the preceding chapter of Western history, a change-over from an agricultural aristocratic way of life to an industrial democratic way of life had been achieved by the Italians and the Flemings in two localities in Western Christendom at the price of reducing the unit-size of the local communities from the traditional and generally prevalent kingdom-state scale to a new city-state scale which had failed to acquire a general currency. In the next chapter of Western history, the problem was to discover how the new Italian and Flemish way of life could be lived, on the kingdom-state scale, by the Western World as a whole. This challenge was taken up in Switzerland and Holland and England, and it eventually received an English response.¹

In another connexion, we have noticed already² that all these three countries have been sheltered to an unusual degree by the inaccessibility of the local physical environment from challenges presented by the surrounding human environment. In other words, the inhabitants of all these three countries are well placed for withdrawing, if they choose, from the trammels of a regional society of which they find themselves members; and in the third chapter of the history of our Western Society the Swiss and the Dutch and the English have all in fact made efforts to shake themselves free from the entanglements of Western international politics in order to concentrate their energies upon the task of finding original solutions for the general Western problem of the age.

The Swiss, who had successfully surmounted the crisis of the city-state cosmos in the latter part of the fourteenth century, when

¹ A student of social geography will observe that in this new chapter of Western history the general pattern of the social map of Western Christendom is still the same as in the last chapter. The creative minorities that temporarily withdraw in order to find a response to the challenge of the day arise in the same two neighbourhoods on either flank of the Western World. England and Holland represent the same geographical 'node' as Flanders; Switzerland represents the same 'node' as Northern Italy. It will be noticed, however, that there is a general shift towards the North-West—from Italy to Switzerland across the Alps and from Flanders to England across the Straits—and also that the relative importance of the two 'nodes' is reversed. In the Italian-Flemish chapter, the South-Eastern Node is more important than the North-Western; in the English-Dutch-Swiss chapter, the North-Western Node is the principal focus of action. In the modern period, Holland and England count for more than Switzerland, whereas in the medieval period Italy counts for more than Flanders.

² In II. D (vii), vol. ii, on pp. 262-4 and 268, above.

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the German and Flemish city-states had succumbed, succeeded in maintaining their political freedom, in the Swiss-Burgundian War of A.D. 1474-7, against the nearest of the new Italianized Transalpine Powers. *Vis-à-vis* the Holy Roman Empire, the Swiss Confederation secured *de facto* independence in A.D. 1499 and *de jure* independence in the Westphalian Peace Settlement of 1648.

The Dutch succeeded in winning their political freedom from the Spanish Hapsburg Power in the Dutch-Spanish War of A.D. 1572-1609; and, like the Swiss, they obtained the recognition of their *de jure* independence from the Holy Roman Empire in 1648, as part of the Westphalian Settlement.

The English, after having squandered their energies in the Hundred Years' War (A.D. 1337-1453) in order to win a Continental European empire, had found themselves at the end of the struggle in possession of less Continental territory than they had held at the moment when they embarked on this Continental adventure. In 1337 they had held Aquitaine; in 1453 they were left with nothing but Calais; and Calais went the way of all the other English possessions on the Continent in 1558. This experience cured the English of Continental ambitions; and then, in the next generation, they encountered the Continent in a still more disagreeable guise: not, this time, as a hazardous field for English military adventures in which England might burn her fingers, but as a formidable breeding-ground for aggressive Great Powers of supra-insular calibre which might use the Continent as a base of operations for bringing the island into political subjection. From the moment of Queen Mary's marriage to King Philip of Spain in A.D. 1554 the English were confronted by this new Continental danger; and the danger was only banned, after a generation of warfare against heavy odds, by the destruction of the Spanish Armada in 1588. The triumph of that year confirmed the outlook which had been first induced in English minds by the humiliations of 1429-53 and 1558. From that time onwards until the General War of A.D. 1914-18, the avoidance, as far as possible, of Continental European political entanglements was accepted, without further question, as one of the fundamental and perpetual aims of English foreign policy.¹

Thus the same policy of withdrawal was adopted, in their different circumstances, by the English, the Dutch, and the Swiss; but these three local minorities in the modern Western body social were not equally well placed for carrying this policy out, though they were all better placed for this purpose than any of their neigh-

¹ This statement requires some qualification in regard to British foreign policy during the period A.D. 1689-1815.

bours. In an age before the field of warfare had been extended to the air, the Swiss mountains were less effectually protective than the Dutch and English waters; and in an age before the invention of the steamship but after the invention of artillery, there was all the difference in the world between the breadth of a Dutch dyke, which was already too narrow to insulate Holland from the Continent, and the breadth of the English Channel, which was still broad enough to make the British Isles an *alter orbis*. The Dutch were found out by their Continental situation when they emerged incurably exhausted from their forty years' struggle (A.D. 1672-1713) against Louis XIV;¹ and thereafter, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both Holland and Switzerland were temporarily engulfed in the Napoleonic Empire.² On the other hand, England remained an *alter orbis* for three whole centuries until, in our own generation, she has been re-welded on to the military and political system of the Continent—and this time more closely than ever before in her history—by the ever-accelerating progress of those recent mechanical inventions which are largely the fruits of English ingenuity.³ In this post-war age, the English Channel is no broader—in the subjective human terms of measurement which have to be applied in this context—than a Dutch dyke in the age of Alva and William the Silent; and the Atlantic itself is no broader than the Channel at the time when Napoleon's army of invasion was encamped at Boulogne. It now seems not improbable that the fate of Holland in the eighteenth century may be the fate of England in the twentieth; but this possible coming change in England's position belongs to a new chapter in Western history which is only just beginning. The chapter that concerns us here is the last; and in that chapter the prolongation of England's period of privileged insulation for some two centuries beyond the term of Holland's enjoyment of the same privilege has been an historical fact of capital importance. Her prolonged immunity has enabled England to surpass and supplant Holland, in this chapter, in the role of the creative minority that withdraws from communion with Society in order to return in the fullness of time with an original solution for a general social problem.

¹ The experience of Holland in the General War of A.D. 1672-1713 was not unlike the experience of Athens in the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. 'The Old Oligarch' (Pseudo-Xenophon: *Respublica Atheniensium*, ch. ii. 14-16) observes that the one defect of Athenian sea-power is that Attica itself is not an island. The observation is equally applicable to Holland, *mutatis mutandis*.

² Switzerland was as much in Napoleon's power *de facto* as Holland, though only the fringe of Switzerland was formally incorporated into France.

³ For this, see further Toynbee, A. J.: *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement* (London 1928, Milford), pp. 7-8, and the passages there quoted from an address on 'The Dominions and Foreign Policy' which was broadcast on the 14th November, 1924, by Lord Grey of Fallodon.

In the competition for this role between the three minorities in question the English also had the advantage over the Dutch and the Swiss in another way. The Kingdom of England—and *a fortiori* the subsequent United Kingdom of Great Britain—was a state of large calibre on the traditional Transalpine scale. Indeed, in the eighteenth century, after the Union between England and Scotland in A.D. 1707, Great Britain, while by no means the largest state in the Western World in point of sheer territorial magnitude, was by far the largest single area that had been consolidated into a really effective political and economic unity. And her political and economic unification on this large scale made Great Britain an admirable laboratory for solving the crucial Western problem of the day: the problem of finding ways and means of adapting to the original kingdom-state scale of the Western Society the latter-day city-state achievements. In this matter, both Holland and Switzerland were at a disadvantage because both these states were really survivals of the abortive city-state cosmos—a régime which had been preserved in these two localities behind the shelter of dykes and mountains when it had perished in other parts of Western Christendom. The Swiss Confederation and the United Netherlands were virtually two local combines of city-states;¹ and, from the institutional standpoint, they were anachronisms in the modern Western World—in the same category as the two surviving Italian city-states of Venice and Genoa. They were incapable, *a priori*, of solving the problem of the age, because they themselves were constructed on the city-state basis and therefore on the city-state pattern. For these several reasons, it was not in Switzerland or in Holland but in England that the problem was eventually solved.

The problem, as we have seen, was to emulate the social achievements of the city-state régime in kingdom-states with a feudal heritage; and these achievements had been three in number: the substitution of a democratic for an aristocratic form of government; the substitution of a commercial and industrial for a purely agricultural economy; and the introduction of a new standard of business-like efficiency into the conduct of both economics and politics. All these achievements had now to be emulated on the supra-city-state scale of the feudal kingdom; and the accomplishment which was actually translated on to the larger scale most rapidly and easily was efficiency on the political plane.

The first attempt to translate the accomplished political efficiency of the city-state on to a supra-city-state scale was made within the

¹ Juridically, the Swiss Confederation was a union of cantons and the United Netherlands a union of provinces; but in both commonwealths the principal constituent states were city-states *de facto*.

city-state cosmos itself. It declared itself in a widespread movement to weld local clusters of city-states together into larger commonwealths which should be as solid and as enduring as their individual city-state constituents. This movement was particularly active in Italy. At the opening of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, the North and Central Italian regions of Lombardy, Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and the Marches were partitioned between seventy or eighty city-states; or, in other words, there was a larger number of fully-self-governing states in one-half of Italy in A.D. 1300 than can be counted in 1935 in the whole World. On the other hand, by the time of Machiavelli's death, in A.D. 1527, the number of sovereign states in the same Italian area had been reduced from seventy or eighty to ten, including the Papal Principality. Switzerland and Holland are monuments of the spread of the same movement of consolidation, at a later date, to those portions of the city-state cosmos that lay beyond the Alps. But the Swiss and the Dutch were more successful than the Italians in one respect. Swiss and Dutch statesmanship succeeded in welding a number of city-states together into larger commonwealths without abandoning the democratic kind of government that was the soul of political life under the city-state régime; and though their city-state federal structure debarred the Swiss and the Dutch from going on to make those new experiments in democratic government that were eventually made by the English, the Swiss and the Dutch did avoid the loss of their hereditary form of political liberty. In Italy, on the other hand, the benefits of territorial consolidation were purchased at the price of a forfeiture of political liberty in a twofold sense.

In the first place, when the seventy or eighty Italian city-states were welded together into ten agglomerations of seven or eight city-state units each on the average, the unification was not brought about here through the voluntary federation of the component states on an equal footing, but through the conquest and subjugation, in each case, of half a dozen weaker city-states by some powerful and domineering neighbour. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany was the outcome of the conquest of Fiesole and Volterra and Arezzo and Pistoia and Pisa and Siena¹ by Florence. The Venetian dominions on the Continent were built up by the imposition of

¹ The territory of Siena was only annexed by Florence or, rather, partitioned between Florence and Spain, in A.D. 1557, thirty years after Machiavelli's death. It was after this, again, that the Florentine Commonwealth was officially transformed into the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. (The title was conferred on the ruling Medici Duke of Florence by the Pope in A.D. 1567 and was recognized by the Holy Roman Emperor in A.D. 1576.) The foregoing siege and capture of Siena, in 1555, by a combined Florentine-Spanish expeditionary force was as brutal an act of conquest as any of the preceding steps in the formation of the Florentine empire.

Venetian rule upon Treviso and Padua and Vicenza and Verona and Brescia and Bergamo. The Papal State was rounded off—or, in theory, reconstituted—by the political degradation of the former city-states of Bologna and Ferrara to the status and style of 'the Legations'. There was, of course, a considerable variety in the imperial policy of these different empire-building Italian Powers. The city-states that fell under the Venetian hegemony were comparatively well treated, whereas Pisa was deliberately and malignantly ruined by her Florentine conquerors in the fifteenth century. As for the vigorous and turbulent Bolognesi, they could never reconcile themselves to being governed as a satrapy of the Holy See by Papal Legates. The local conditions and reactions varied; but the forfeiture of political liberty was the general rule, and downright oppression at the hands of the conquering Power was not infrequent. This was one sense in which the territorial consolidation of Italy entailed the loss of political freedom; and in the second place the empire-building city-states—with the notable exception of Venice¹—all paid for their dominion over their neighbours by the loss of their own domestic liberties before the process of empire-building was completed. The formation of these miniature Italian empires was contemporary with the rise of the Italian despots who were the miniature predecessors of a Transalpine Louis XI or Henry VII; and these two Italian political developments were not only contemporary but were inter-connected. A city-state which had set its heart upon conquering its neighbours could not accomplish this formidable ambition with the amateur instruments of a civic militia and a republican constitution. Imperialism required a professional army of mercenaries; and a mercenary force required in its turn a despotic government with the twofold function of keeping the mercenaries in order and organizing the city's resources to maintain them. Venice was the only Italian city-state that succeeded in building up an Italian empire without finding itself driven to place the lives and fortunes of its own citizens in the hands of an autocrat.

This price which was paid in Italy for the reduction of the number of Italian states from seventy or eighty to ten was actually paid in vain from the Italian standpoint; for the new Italian principalities, large as they were by comparison with the former Italian city-states, were still not large enough to serve the purpose of enabling them to hold their own against the Transalpine Powers. They might, perhaps, have held their own if the Transalpine Powers

¹ Genoa, of course, besides Venice, retained her republican institutions, as well as her independence, until she was engulfed in the Napoleonic Empire; but Genoa can hardly be reckoned among the empire-building Italian city-states, for none of the communities on the Riviera which she brought under her rule were of anything like her own calibre.

had remained enveloped in their ancient feudal darkness without receiving any irradiation of Italian light; and there was possibly a period in the fourteenth century when the Duchy of Milan or the Commonwealth of Venice was capable of holding its own against the House of Anjou or the House of Luxemburg. This theoretical equilibrium, however, was of short duration, if it ever really existed; for Italian political efficiency in the shape of Italian despotism proved to be the easiest of all Italian accomplishments to acclimatize in Transalpine Europe and to accommodate to the Transalpine scale; and before the end of the fifteenth century every one of the latter-day Italian principalities had been decisively outclassed in political strength by the new Italianized autocracies of Louis XI in France and Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain and Henry VII in England.¹

This propagation of Italian autocracy beyond the Alps was

¹ In Hellenic history, the analogue of the relation between political despotism and territorial consolidation in the history of modern Italy is to be found, not in the Hellenic World at large and not in Continental Greece or in the Aegean, but in the colonial domain of Hellas in Sicily and Magna Graecia.

In Continental Greece, despotism and consolidation did not go together. On the contrary, the city-states round about the Isthmus of Corinth were associated in an interstate union for the first time in their histories at the moment when they were liberated from the despots who had ruled them during the seventh and the sixth centuries B.C. The overthrow of the Isthmian despots and the formation of the Peloponnesian League were both the work of the Spartan Government; and these two Spartan acts were not only simultaneous but were actually two complementary parts of a single policy.

In Sicily and Magna Graecia, on the other hand, Hellenic history developed on lines which are parallel to the modern Italian developments which we have just been examining. In this western region of the Hellenic World, the movement towards consolidation in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. was more radical and more persistent than any corresponding movement in Continental Greece until the Aetolian and Achaean movements of the third century. And whereas these Achaean and Aetolian movements, when they came, resembled the modern Swiss and Dutch movements in seeking to reconcile solidarity with liberty and equality, the earlier movement in Sicily and Magna Graecia resembled the modern Italian movement in both its leading characteristics. In Hellenic Sicily and Magna Graecia, as in modern Italy, the process of consolidation did not take place voluntarily on a footing of equality, but was accomplished through the subjugation of the weaker city-states by the stronger (a subjugation which went much further than the 'hegemonies' that were being imposed in the same age upon the weaker city-states of Continental Greece and the Aegean by Athens and Sparta and Thebes). A Catana and a Leontini were dealt with by a Syracuse as ruthlessly as Florence dealt with Arezzo or with Pisa, while the dominion which was established by Tarentum over Metapontum and Heraclea and Messapia was as positive as the Venetian dominion over Treviso and Padua and Friuli. Again, the persistent republicanism of empire-building Tarentum was as much of an exception in Magna Graecia and Sicily as the persistent republicanism of Venice in Italy. The typical story was the story of Syracuse, in whose history empire-building went hand in hand with despotism at home, as it went in Milan or Florence. The Milanese Visconti and the Florentine Medici of our modern Western history have their Hellenic analogues in the successive dynasties of Syracusan despots: the Deinomenidae (circa 485-466 B.C.), the Dionysii (405-344 B.C.), Agathocles (316-289 B.C.), and Hiero with his grandson Hieronymus (266-214 B.C.).

Finally we may observe that the consolidation of the Greek city-states of Sicily and Magna Graecia under the empires of Syracuse and Tarentum in the fifth and fourth and third centuries B.C. was as ineffectual as the consolidation of the Italian city-states under the empires of Milan and Venice and Florence in the fourteenth and fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era for the purpose of enabling these little principalities to hold their own against the surrounding 'barbarians'. The Greeks of Sicily and Magna Graecia suffered the same fate at the hands of the Carthaginians and the Oscans and the Romans that the Italians suffered at the hands of the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons.

It will be seen that the parallel works out with remarkable exactitude.

Italy's undoing; but it brought the Transalpine countries no equivalent gain because this Italian political efficiency was only one of the Italian accomplishments which Transalpine Europe had to assimilate. Transalpine Europe would not be laying hands upon the greatest political gift that Italy had to give her until she found for herself some equivalent of the Italian political democracy which Italy herself had already lost; and without the achievement of some kind of political democracy it was difficult for the Transalpine countries to emulate the Italian economic accomplishment of advancing from agriculture to commerce and industry.

The difficulty lay in the very nature of Society; for every social system is a coherent whole; and it is therefore inherently difficult to acquire any one part of an alien social system without acquiring the rest. In the natural evolution of the medieval Italian city-state, the growth of democracy and the growth of industry and commerce had been complementary to one another. They had been synonymous with the political and the economic rise of the bourgeoisie; and no class can rise beyond a certain point in any one sphere of social life without rising simultaneously and proportionately in the others.¹ In Italy, the old bourgeoisie began to decline in economic prosperity as soon as its political liberty had been taken from it by the new autocracy. On this showing, it was hardly likely that, when this Italian autocratic form of government was transplanted to the Transalpine kingdoms, a vigorous new Transalpine bourgeoisie would grow up under its shadow in communities that had remained till then predominantly agrarian and feudal. And, in the event, there was no such miraculous departure in the Transalpine countries from the regular order of Nature.

In Spain, the autocracy of Ferdinand and Isabella grew in stature until it became the grander autocracy of Philip II; and in France, in similar fashion, the autocracy of Louis XI rankled into that of Louis XIV; but two centuries passed without any creative political advance from autocracy towards democracy in either of these two Transalpine countries.² In both Spain and France, the introduction

¹ This is the limitation of our law (which we have traced out in II. D (vi), above) that specialization is the response to the challenge of penalization. It is quite true that a penalized minority which responds to its challenge does find compensation for being excluded from certain spheres of social activity by winning for itself a supremacy or monopoly in other spheres. But it is also true that the responsive penalized minority cannot succeed beyond a certain point, even in the restricted sphere which it has made peculiarly its own, unless it ultimately returns to communion with the general life of the society from which it has been ostracized. A pertinent case in point is the history of the English Nonconformists (see the present chapter, p. 334, above). The English Nonconformists responded to the challenge of their partial exclusion from public life for a century and a half (circa A.D. 1673-1828) by starting the Industrial Revolution; but they could hardly have carried the Industrial Revolution through if they had not returned to public life (without forfeiting their supremacy in private business) in the nineteenth century. It was after this that Industrialism in England attained its apogee.

² The transformation of the indigenous Transalpine feudal monarchy into an Italianized

of the new Italian institution of despotic government caused the traditional feudal institutions to atrophy, without evoking any new institutions to take their place. The result was political stagnation; and in this dead-alive political atmosphere it is not surprising to observe that the wealth of the New World did not save Spanish commerce and industry from decadence and that the governmental patronage of French commerce and industry under the administration of Colbert did not enable France to compete successfully on the economic plane with Holland and England.¹ It was in England that the problem of translating democracy from the city-state scale to the kingdom-state scale was successfully solved; and it was therefore in England thereafter that Western commerce and industry first entered upon a new phase of activity on a scale that dwarfs the medieval commerce and industry of Italy or Flanders or the Hansa Towns in the measure of the difference in calibre between a United Kingdom of Great Britain and an isolated city-state like thirteenth-century Florence or Venice.

For some reason, the introduction of the new despotism, which had a deadening political effect in Spain and France, had the opposite effect in England. In England it was taken as a challenge which demanded a response; and the English response was to breathe new life and import new functions into the traditional constitution of the Transalpine body politic which was an English as well as a French and a Spanish heritage from the common past of Western Christendom.

One of the traditional Transalpine institutions² was the periodical holding of a parliament or conference between the Crown and the Estates of the Realm for the double purpose of ventilating grievances and obtaining a vote of supply for the Crown from the Estates as a *quid pro quo* for an honourable undertaking on the Crown's part that well-founded grievances should be redressed. In the gradual evolution of this institution of Parliament, the Transalpine king-

autocracy had in general much the same effect as the transformation of the indigenous Macedonian 'Homeric' monarchy into an Atticized autocracy. (For the modernization and revival of the institution of monarchy in Hellenic history, see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, below.) Both expedients failed because both were 'short cuts'. (For the peril of 'short cuts', see IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 123-31, below.)

¹ There were, of course, movements in both Spain and France to anticipate or emulate the commercial and industrial achievements of the Dutch and the English. But it is significant that in both countries these movements were made by penalized minorities who were ultimately driven out to find an asylum among their step-mother countries' economic rivals. It was Holland and England, and not Spain and France, that ultimately benefited by the business ability of the Spanish Jews and the French Huguenots.

² The institution of Parliament was not, of course, exclusively Transalpine in origin; for assemblies of states were not unknown in medieval Italy; and the congressional method of dealing with public business may have been part of the common social heritage of Western Christendom from the Church (see p. 360, footnote 2). In Northern and Central Italy, however, the growth of the institution was cut short by the rise of city-states, so that it became, in effect, a Transalpine institution as it developed.

doms had discovered how to overcome their regional problem of material scale—the problem of unmanageable numbers and impracticable distances—by inventing, or rediscovering, the legal fiction of ‘representation’. The duty or right of every person concerned in the business of Parliament to take a personal part in the proceedings—a duty or right which is self-evident in a polity on the scale of a city-state—was attenuated in these unwieldy Transalpine feudal kingdoms¹ into a right to be represented by proxy, and a duty, on the proxy’s part, to shoulder the burden of travelling, even from the extremity of the Kingdom, to the place where the Parliament was being held.²

This feudal institution of a periodical representative and consultative assembly was well fitted for its original purpose of serving as a liaison between the Crown and its subjects in a feudal monarchy. In particular, it enabled the Crown to raise larger revenues by consent, in exchange for concessions on matters of policy, than it could raise by mere insistence upon exacting its customary feudal dues. On the other hand, the medieval Transalpine Parliament was originally not at all well fitted for the task—to which it was success-

¹ It is only since the invention of railways and telegraphy and other mechanical means of communication that modern England and France have become smaller—in terms of human geography—than Attica or Laconia were in the Hellenic World.

² Where and when the institution of Parliament came to be of sufficient political importance for membership to become a contested privilege instead of a detested duty, the practice arose of choosing between rival candidates by the method of election (in the modern sense of selection by majority vote, as opposed to the original sense of the Latin word *eligere* = simply ‘to pick out’, without connoting that the act of selection is performed by the majority of an electorate rather than by the individual will of a personal sovereign or his representative). Among students of parliamentary history, it appears to be a still unsettled question whether the application of the electoral system, in its modern sense, in the parliamentary field was an original invention or whether it was suggested to the minds of its inventors by analogy from the ecclesiastical field, in which the idea of election was familiar to the medieval Western Society as a traditional device for appointing, not the members of consultative bodies, but individual executive officers. The election of executive officers was a part of the constitutional machinery of the Hellenic city-state, which had been borrowed by the Christian Church as a method of appointing abbots, bishops, patriarchs, and other ecclesiastical dignitaries. When the Christian Church was taken into partnership by the Roman Empire in the fourth century of the Christian Era, autocracy tended to encroach upon self-government in the ecclesiastical field, as it had already superseded it in the secular field. But this process was arrested by the break-up of the Empire; and since in Western Christendom, unlike Orthodox Christendom, the Imperial Power was not effectively revived, the system of electing executive officers survived in the Western Church as ‘a going concern’ to a sufficient extent to make the notion of election familiar to the minds of medieval Western constitution-builders. The new Western constitutional invention (which may or may not have been inspired by ecclesiastical precedents) was to apply the device of election to secular feudal consultative bodies as a means of making them ‘representative’. The idea of ‘representation’, as well as the device of election, had made its appearance in Hellenic constitutional history; but in Hellenic history the two things had never been combined. The device of election had been reserved for the appointment of executive officers, while the ‘representativeness’ of consultative bodies had been secured, logically enough, by employing the device of the lot. At Athens, for example, the Council of Five Hundred, which was instituted by Cleisthenes in 508–507 B.C., was appointed annually by lot on a fixed allocation of seats. (Fifty seats were allocated to each of the ten Cleisthenic ‘tribes’ (Aristotle: *The Constitution of Athens*, xliii. 2), and within each ‘tribe’ these fifty seats were distributed among the ‘demes’ (parishes) in proportion to their populations.)

fully adapted in England in the seventeenth century—of undertaking the Crown's work instead of merely consulting with and bargaining with the Crown as to the manner in which the royal prerogatives should be exercised.

Between deliberation and diplomacy on the one hand and executive action on the other there is a great gulf fixed. The two lines of political activity demand, and evoke, quite different outlooks and habits and capacities; and although the institution of Parliament had become well established in Transalpine Europe in general, and in the Kingdom of England in particular, in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, there was still no indication at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that this Transalpine institution was capable of becoming the germ of a new form of self-government for bodies politic on the kingdom-state scale. In that generation, these things were hidden from the wise and prudent.¹ There is no inkling of the future course of Transalpine constitutional development in Machiavelli's otherwise penetrating studies of France and Germany;² and if the lynx-eyed Florentine publicist had happened, in the course of his official career, to have been sent on a diplomatic mission to England, we may doubt whether he would have divined the future even on the spot. Indeed, an Italian observer visiting England a hundred years after Machiavelli's day, in the early decades of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, would probably have pronounced that the old-fashioned local institution of Parliament was destined to succumb to the newfangled Italian institution of autocracy in England as surely as in the other Transalpine countries. He would hardly have guessed that, before the century ran out, the English would have brought the triumphal Transalpine progress of autocracy to a halt by achieving the constitutional *tour de force* of turning the medieval Transalpine institution of Parliament into a still more effective engine of executive political action than the personal government of a Matteo Visconti or a Henry Tudor or a Louis Valois.

¹ Matthew xi. 25.

² In the dispatches relating to his embassies to the French Court, and in the *Ritratti delle Cose della Francia*, there appears to be no allusion at all to the French Estates. (The five Parlements are mentioned in the *Ritratti*; but these, of course, were courts of law and not parliamentary bodies in the English sense.) In the dispatches relating to his embassy to the Emperor, and again in the *Ritratti delle Cose dell'Alamagna* and the *Rapporto di Cose della Magna*, there are a few references to certain sessions of the Imperial Diet and to one session of the local Diet of the Tyrol; and here Machiavelli does show a clear realization of the power of the purse which was exercised by these parliamentary bodies in the Holy Roman Empire. Perhaps the most interesting reference to a Transalpine parliamentary body in Machiavelli's works is the notice of the Swiss Federal Diet in the second dispatch (dated Botzen, the 17th January, 1507) relating to his mission to the Emperor. Machiavelli here reports that 'il corpo principale de' Svizzeri sono dodici comunanze collegate insieme, le quali chiamano cantoni. . . . Costoro sono in modo collegati insieme, che quello che nelle loro Diete è deliberato, è sempre osservato da tutti, nè alcun cantone vi si opporrebbe'.

Why was it that England took up, and met successfully, a challenge with which no other contemporary Transalpine kingdom proved able to cope? Why did the Transalpine feudal monarchy grow into a constitutional monarchy in England when it gave way to an absolute monarchy in France?

'It was because the English monarchy became national before it ceased to be feudal, at a time when the French monarchy still remained feudal only. When then the feudal element disappeared, as it ultimately did in both kingdoms, in England its place was taken by a government in which the Estates had already begun to share; in France there was no power in existence to replace the feudal monarchy but the uncontrolled power of an absolute king. The difference is owing to the regular participation of the Estates in England before the feudal monarchy disappeared—a participation which existed in that period of French history, with one exception, only on the rare occasions of popular unrest. On the decline of Feudalism in France, there was no authority, and no body of men, politically prepared permanently to take over or even to share with the king in the centralized government that was replacing feudal decentralization. That place could be taken only by an authority that was at once centralized and national, and the only one then in existence to do it was a strong, national, but practically absolute monarch. To put it otherwise, in England there was participation and there was representation while feudal conditions still remained, and therefore when these conditions disappeared the strong centralized national power which emerged was one which retained the participation of the Estates. In France, since this participation had not begun during the period when feudal conditions flourished, so it could not continue when they began to decline, and the feudal monarchy was replaced by one practically, even if not theoretically, absolute. . . . The decisive factor in determining [the] results for England was the *early* centralization of administration—a centralization which came far sooner there than elsewhere. It was this that made England the only Western country with a common law little influenced by Rome, and this too ultimately made her a constitutional instead of an absolute monarchy.'¹

These were the predisposing conditions that stimulated the English body politic to take up and meet successfully a challenge which the other Transalpine bodies politic scarcely attempted to face. Yet, even when full allowance for these favourable conditions has been made, the English achievement of pouring the new wine of Renaissance Italian administrative efficiency into the old bottles of medieval Transalpine parliamentarism, without allowing these old bottles to burst, is a constitutional triumph that can only be regarded as an astonishing *tour de force*. And this English constitutional *tour de force* of carrying Parliament across the gulf that

¹ Professor C. H. McIlwaine in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. vii (Cambridge 1932, University Press), pp. 709–10.

divides the conduct from the criticism of government was the political act of creation which was performed for the Western Society by the English creative minority during its period of withdrawal. This political invention provided a propitious social setting for the subsequent English economic invention of Industrialism.¹ 'Democracy' in the sense of a system of government in which the executive is responsible to a parliament which is representative of the people, and 'Industrialism' in the sense of a system of machine-production by 'hands' concentrated in factories to tend the machinery, are the two master-institutions that still dominate the life of the Western World in our age;² they have come to prevail because they offer the best solutions which the Western Society has been able to find for the problem of transposing the achievements of the Italian city-state culture from the city-state scale to the kingdom-state scale; and both these solutions have been worked out for the Western Society in England in an age when England has been temporarily aloof from the general life of the Western World.

What is to be Russia's Role in our Western History?

In the contemporary history of the Great Society into which our Western Christendom has grown, can we again discern symptoms of that tendency to overbalance which is a symptom that the process of growth is still continuing? Now that the problems set to us by Italian solutions of earlier problems have received their English solutions, are these English solutions giving rise to new problems in their turn? We are already alive, in our generation, to two new challenges to which we have been exposed by the triumph of Democracy and Industrialism in the current meaning of these terms. In particular, the economic system of Industrialism, which means local specialization in skilled and costly production for a world-market, demands the establishment of some kind of political world-order as a framework for the operation of Industrialism on its indispensable world-wide scale. And, in general, both Industrialism and Democracy demand from Human Nature a greater individual self-control and mutual tolerance and public-spirited co-operation than the human 'social animal' has been apt to practise, because these new institutions have put an unprecedentedly powerful material 'drive' into all human social actions. We shall have to consider these two challenges more closely when we come to estimate the future prospects of our Western Civilization.³ In this

¹ It is noteworthy that the English, in making their political invention of parliamentary government in the seventeenth century, took advantage of a previous industrial invention, namely, the art of printing. The printing press greatly facilitated the circulation and publication of documents.

² See I. A, *init.*, in vol. i, above.

³ In Part XII, below.

place, we will merely suggest, in this connexion, that these challenges which confront us here and now are not altogether different in kind from those which have confronted our own society and other societies in other times.¹ Our purpose at the moment in reminding ourselves of our current challenges is not to investigate them for their own sakes but simply to observe whether they have yet evoked any fresh examples of the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return.

This observation is difficult to make, for the practical reason that these challenges themselves are very recent, so that any responses to them that may be on foot must *ex hypothesi* still be in a very rudimentary stage. We can, therefore, look for nothing more definite than inklings which may turn out to be false scents. Subject to this *caveat*, we may perhaps venture to speculate whether we have not here found an explanation of the present posture of Russian Orthodox Christendom, which has baffled us by its apparent self-contradiction when we have attempted, at an earlier point in this Study, to analyse it in a different context.²

In the Russian Communist Movement, we have detected, under a Westernizing masquerade, a 'Zealot' attempt to break away from the policy of Westernization which had been imposed upon Russia, two centuries before Lenin's day, by Peter the Great; and at the same time we have seen this masquerade passing over, willy nilly, into earnest. We have concluded that a Western revolutionary

¹ For example, the challenge of being called upon to create a political world-order the framework for an economic world-order is bound to confront any society that has accomplished the economic change from a locally self-subsistent and 'extensive' economy to an 'intensive' and oecumenically interdependent economy. The Hellenic Society was confronted by this challenge after it had adopted the new economy of Solonian Athens (see Part III. B, p. 122, footnote 3, and the present chapter, p. 340, footnote 1, above, and IV. C (iii) (b) 10, vol. iv, pp. 206-14, below); and the same challenge confronted the medieval Western city-state cosmos, which practised an economy of the intensive interdependent type from the outset. (We may note in passing that this challenge, which now confronts our modern Western society, was never successfully met either in the medieval Western city-state cosmos or in the Hellenic World and that their failure to meet this challenge caused both these societies to break down.) Again, the challenge of the increase in material 'drive' which Industrialism and Democracy entail was not unknown to either of these two other societies, though it perhaps confronts our own society in our day in an unprecedentedly high degree. The increase in material 'drive' which Hellas acquired in the course of the half-century between the repulse of Xerxes' invasion and the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War is reflected in the Thucydidean usage of the word *παράθυρος*. (For the significance of the subsequent change in the meaning of this Greek word, see Part VII, below.) As for the medieval Western city-states, they too were defeated by the challenge of the increase in 'drive', as well as by the challenge of the demand for a world-order. Indeed, it is the internal failure of the medieval Western city-state cosmos to respond successfully to these two challenges that accounts for its subsequent external failure to refashion the rest of Western Christendom in its own image. This latter failure, as we have seen, had the consequence that the problem of changing over from the city-state scale to the kingdom-state scale became, for the time, the major problem of the Western Society as a whole; and the two problems of 'world-order' and 'material drive' were in abeyance so long as the problem of 'change of scale' was in the forefront. This latter problem was substantially solved in the latter part of the nineteenth century; and now, in the twentieth century, the problems of 'world-order' and 'material drive', which found no solution in the medieval city-state cosmos, have presented themselves again—and this time more insistently than ever—on the newly-achieved scale of the Great Society.

² See III. C (i) (d), pp. 200-2, above.

movement which has been taken up by an unwillingly Westernized Russia as an anti-Western gesture has turned out, unintentionally and unexpectedly, to be a more potent agency of Westernization in Russia than any application of the conventional Western social creed; and we have tried to express this outcome of the latest phase of the social intercourse between Russia and the West in the formula that a relation which was once an external contact between two separate societies has been transformed into an internal experience of the Great Society into which Russia has been incorporated. Can we now go on to discern more clearly and define more closely what form this experience is taking? Can we explain the apparent contradiction of Communist Russia's simultaneous centrifugal and centripetal movement *vis-à-vis* the Western Society in the formula that Russia, while resigning herself to her incorporation into the Great Society, is at the same time attempting to make a temporary withdrawal from the general life of the society in which she has been enrolled by *force majeure*; and that she is making this attempt to withdraw in order to play the part of a creative minority which will strive to work out some solution for the Great Society's current problems? If this is really the explanation of Russia's present course, it is not difficult to understand why it is that Russian minds are drawn in this direction; for a withdrawal in these circumstances and with this aim promises to give some satisfaction to two strong Russian desires. It satisfies the impulse, which the Russians have inherited from their own non-Western past, to escape from the Western toils; and it also holds out the prospect that if, after all, it proves impossible for Russia to break away permanently from her Western entanglements, she may at least make her return to the bosom of the Western Society in a creative role which will enable her to re-cast the general shape of Western life on a more or less Russian pattern.

The Working of Withdrawal-and-Return in the Histories of Civilizations

Having now completed our survey of the withdrawals and returns of creative minorities, we may find ourselves able to establish what the general features of these movements are when a creative minority and not a creative individual is the protagonist.¹

¹ There are, of course, creative individuals at the back of all creative minorities, on the hypothesis that some individual human being is the ultimate author of every creative human act. (For this hypothesis, see III. C (ii) (a), above.) In the case of several of the creative minorities that we have passed under review, the originating individuals can be identified. Behind sixth-century and fifth-century Athens we can discern the personality of Solon, and behind the third-century Achaean Confederacy the personality of Aratus. But who was the architect of the Aetolian Confederacy in the preceding generation? Or the nameless Ionian or Aeolian refugee who invented the Hellenic city-state in the Dark

The first step in any group-movement of Withdrawal-and-Return is the extrication of the potentially creative minority from the general life of the society to which it belongs. This step may be accomplished in any one of several different alternative ways. The minority may be relieved of its entanglements against its own will, by *force majeure*, as the English were relieved of theirs on the Continent of Europe between A.D. 1429 and A.D. 1558. Or it may deliberately seek to shake off entanglements and fight with might and main to win its liberty, as the Dutch fought against the Spanish Hapsburg Power from A.D. 1572 to 1609 or the Lombards against the Hohenstaufen Power from A.D. 1158 to 1250 or the Athenians against the Spartan Power in 508-507 B.C. Or, having originally been extricated against its own will, it may come to realize that this dénouement has been a blessing in disguise, and may thereafter fight as vigorously to save itself from being involved in entanglements as it once fought to debar itself from being relieved of them. This has been the history of the English, who have resisted the successive attempts of a Philip II of Spain and a Louis XIV of France and a Napoleon to incorporate England into a Continental European empire as doggedly as they resisted the victorious efforts of a Joan of Arc to relieve England of the English empire which she had established on the Continent in the earlier chapters of the Hundred Years' War. Or, again, the withdrawal may take the negative form of a persistent abstention, on the part of the minority, from commitments which are being entered into by the majority of its neighbours—as when Athens, in the eighth and seventh and sixth centuries B.C., abstained from taking any part in the contemporary movement of territorial expansion either along the Spartan line of conquering the territory of neighbouring Greek city-states or along the Chalcidian and Eretrian and Megarian and Corinthian line of conquering the territory of barbarians overseas. The alternative forms of withdrawal are diverse, but in each case the result is the same. In each case the minority that undergoes the experience finds its energies set free from the pre-occupation of dealing with its neighbours in order to concentrate these energies upon creative work.

The second stage in the movement is the stage of relative isolation in which this creative work is performed; and this stage is apt to fall into two distinct phases which may be called the originaive phase and the constructive phase respectively. The first, or origina-

Age? And can we put our finger on the individual Italians or the individual Englishmen who have been ultimately responsible for the contributions that have been made by a creative Italian minority and by a creative English minority to the growth of our Western Civilization? In these cases we may infer the unseen presence of a creative individual from the visible existence and activity of a creative group; but since we cannot identify the creative individual in fact, we are constrained to deal with such cases either in terms of a group or not at all.

tive, phase is a youthful age of poetry and romance and emotional upheaval and intellectual ferment; the second, or constructive, phase is a comparatively sedate and 'grown-up' age of prose and matter-of-fact and common sense and systematization; and the psychological transition between the two phases is sometimes abrupt.

In Italian history this transition is apparent in the contrast in *êthos* between Dante (*vivebat* A.D. 1265-1321) and Boccaccio (*vivebat* A.D. 1313-75); in English history in the comparable contrast between Milton (*vivebat* A.D. 1608-74) and Dryden (*vivebat* A.D. 1631-1700); in Attic history in the contrast between the radical spirit of Athens before, and her conservative spirit after, the great Athenian disaster of 404 B.C. In the Athens of that generation, the transition from poetry to prose is registered in the change that comes over the style of the Athenian playwright Aristophanes. His latest extant play, the *Plutus* (produced in 388 B.C.), is already more akin to 'the New Comedy', which reaches its zenith a century later, than it is to Aristophanes' own earlier work, which belongs unmistakably to the same world of thought and feeling as the art of Aeschylus.¹

Approximately, we may say that in Attic history the originative phase lasts from the generation of Solon to the Atheno-Peloponnesian War and the constructive phase from that decisive catastrophe down to the generation of Alexander, by whose time the Attic 'education of Hellas' has been put into an Isocratean shape in which it is ready for export to the ends of the Earth. In Italian history, the originative phase is represented in the field of politics by the democratic movement and in the field of art by the Tuscan School of painting, while the constructive phase is represented by the Venetian School and by the mastery of the despots, with their autocratic methods of administrative efficiency. In English history, the originative phase may be regarded as beginning with the accession of Queen Elizabeth and as being divided by the Restoration from the constructive phase, which lasts from 'the sixteen-sixties' to 'the eighteen-sixties' and has to its credit such solid achievements as the foundation of the Royal Society and 'the Glorious Revolution of 1688' and the peopling of the North American Continent with an English-speaking population and *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* and the invention of the steam-engine and the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 and the establishment of the Indian Empire and *The Origin of Species* (which was

¹ For an appreciation of the change in the outlook and *êthos* of Aristophanes in the course of his life, as mirrored in his literary work, see Murray, Gilbert: *Aristophanes: A Study* (Oxford 1933, Clarendon Press).

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published in 1859) and the invention of the British Commonwealth of self-governing nations (an invention which dates from the creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867).

The third stage in the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return is the return of the creative minority into communion with the general life of the society from which it has temporarily withdrawn in order to perform its work of creation. And the way for this return is prepared, as we have seen, by the transition, during the preceding stage of isolation, to a constructive from an originaive phase of creative activity; for in this constructive phase the creator is really anticipating his return by giving his work a shape in which it will be possible for him to transmit it eventually to the non-creative majority when he enters into full social intercourse with them again.

The return, when it comes, is sometimes deliberate, as when Athens threw herself in 499 B.C. into the oecumenical conflict between Hellas and the Syriac universal state. In other cases it is involuntary, as when the Achaean Confederacy was forced in 228 B.C., by its collision with Sparta, to allow itself once more to be used as a pawn in the game between the Great Powers of the periphery, or when Holland was drawn back into Continental European entanglements by the General War of A.D. 1672-1713, or England by the General War of A.D. 1914-18. Yet in whatever fashion and whatever mood the return is made—whether the returning minority makes a virtue of necessity or whether it kicks against the pricks—this experience of return is apt to be as painful and as humiliating, in its own way, as the foregoing experience of withdrawal. The returning minority has to suffer the disillusionment of the child in Wordsworth's ode who comes from Heaven to Earth 'trailing clouds of glory' to find 'the shades of the prison house' closing around him; and it has to expect from the uncreative majority the hostile reception that awaits the Platonic philosopher when he re-descends into the cave.¹

The encounter between the minority and the majority when they meet again does in fact take the form of a challenge which is reciprocal. The returning minority challenges the uncreative majority to accept its own original solution of their common problem or else to take the consequences of continuing to confront the problem helplessly without finding any solution for it at all. Reciprocally, the majority challenges the minority to convert it to the new way of life which the minority has worked out for itself in isolation, or else to stand convicted, by 'the acid test' of experiment, of having

¹ For the relevant passages from Wordsworth and Plato, see the present chapter, pp. 249-52, above.

failed, after all, to discover a solution for the common problem that will actually work in the workaday world. If the minority does fail, upon its return, to convert the majority, then the whole of its movement of Withdrawal-and-Return is exposed in retrospect, in the last act, as ineffective and abortive. On the other hand, if the minority, going out into the highways and hedges like the servant in the parable at the bidding of his lord, does compel the multitudes to come in,¹ then the readjustment in the life of the majority which is required for the performance of this act of mimesis is sometimes so drastic that it can only take the form of revolution.² In any event, the reciprocal challenge is apt to produce all manner of friction and conflict and storm and stress; and in the most signal triumphs of creative minorities and creative individuals there is often a note of tragic irony.

Sometimes the creator only wins his converts posthumously, after he has testified to the worth of his revelation by sacrificing his life for its sake.

'Ye build the sepulchres of the prophets, and your fathers killed them.

'Truly ye bear witness that ye allow the deeds of your fathers; for they indeed killed them, and ye build their sepulchres.'³

In other cases, the creator only wins his converts indirectly, through the intervention of an intermediary. When Moses has led the Children of Israel out of the land of Egypt and out of the house of bondage,⁴ and has shepherded them through the Wilderness, it falls not to Moses but to Joshua to lead them on into the Promised Land. When David has won the Kingdom of Israel and Judah for the House of Jesse, and has conquered Jerusalem from the Jebusites, and has prepared abundantly for the building of the Temple, it falls not to David but to Solomon to build it.⁵ The poetry of 'Homer' reaches the listener's ear through the voice and hand of the rhapsodist, and the music of the composer of a symphony through the fingers or the lips of the executants. The Gospel of Jesus of Nazareth makes its grand conquest of the Hellenic World through its interpretation by Paul of Tarsus. And the successive contributions which an Italian and an English creative minority have made to the growth of the Western Civilization have not passed into general currency until they have been filtered through a French medium. It was in a French version that the new culture of the Italian Renaissance made its triumphal progress beyond the Alps until, in the eighteenth century, it reigned supreme throughout

¹ Luke xiv. 23.

² For revolutions as incidents in the mimesis of a creative minority by an uncreative majority, see further Part IV, below.

³ Luke xi. 47-8. Cp. Matthew xxiii. 29-31.

⁴ Exodus xiii. 3, and xx. 2.

⁵ 1 Chronicles xxii.

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the Western World; and it is in a French version, again, that the English invention of responsible representative parliamentary government has been spreading, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, over the Old World and the New.

It is indeed ironical that the prophet should be venerated by the children of his slayers and that the creator should depend on the propagandist for giving currency to creative work which the propagandist himself could never have originated. Yet the irony is only a cross light which falls upon the creative personality's experience when it is regarded subjectively from the individual's point of view; and as soon as we contemplate this experience in another aspect as one incident in that interaction between individual actors out of which the act of creation springs, we perceive that the sacrifice or effacement of the creator himself does conduce, in the nature of things, to the furtherance of the creator's work.

The canonization of the prophet by the children of his slayers, which is so ironical an outcome of the prophet's return from the prophet's personal standpoint, seems almost a matter of course when we view it in the light of the normal psychology of the uncreative majority of Mankind. For familiarity breeds acquiescence as well as contempt; and the sheer passage of time may work potently to win acceptance for the martyr's gospel by fructifying the outpoured blood which is 'the seed of the Church'.

Again, the effacement of the creator by the interpreter is a tribute, on the imitator's part, to the greatness of the creator's work. 'The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life';¹ yet, just because this is true, it is also true that the miracle of creation which the spirit performs is ineffable and inimitable, whereas the deadening letter of the scribes stands out stiff and steady to be copied, however clumsily, by the novice's hand.

A very prosaic illustration of the convenience of the letter as a medium of transmission is offered by the history of the spread of the institution of responsible representative parliamentary government in the modern Western World. We have seen that this institution is an English invention which has spread for the most part in a non-English form. If we take a survey of the constitutions of the sixty or seventy fully-self-governing states which exist in our 'post-war' World, we shall find that the great majority of them have acquired at least a tincture of parliamentarism, but that the particular form of parliamentarism which is practised in the United Kingdom—the country in which the institution was originally invented—is hardly current elsewhere except in half a dozen communities which have been brought into existence by British colonization and

¹ 2 Corinthians iii. 6.

which have continued to retain their political association with Great Britain as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Outside this British Commonwealth, hardly any of the present parliamentary constitutions of parliamentarily governed states are directly inspired by the British Constitution, which is the mother of the whole parliamentary system; the majority are copies of either the United States or the French or the Belgian or some other non-British constitution in which the principles of British parliamentarism have been embodied.

Why have the great majority of the countries of the World preferred to take their parliamentarism at second-hand, instead of drawing it from the fountain-head? When we put the question, the answer is obvious. The American and French and Belgian constitutions have been the popular models because these are written constitutions set down in black and white on paper, so that any constituent assembly in any part of the World can imitate them—if only likewise on paper—by the simple procedure of purchasing a copy from a stationer and adopting the text as it stands with the mere substitution of 'the Portuguese Republic' for 'the French Republic' or 'the United States of Brazil' for 'the United States of North America'. This cannot be done with the British Constitution, because this is an unwritten constitution which can only be mastered by making a long and close study on the spot of how it actually works. But why is the British Constitution left elusively unwritten, while the French and Belgian and American constitutions are set down plainly in black and white? When we ask ourselves this second question, we see that the British Constitution is unwritten just because it is the living, growing, original, while the American and Belgian and French constitutions are written, and rigid, because they are themselves copies of this British model; and the rest of the World has found it easier to make copies of copies than to make fresh attempts at copying the original itself. This illustration goes far to explain the interpreter's role because it shows that the very creativeness of the creator may in itself be an impediment to the direct imitation of his work.¹

So much for the third stage in our movement of Withdrawal-and-Return; but if the return of the creative individual or minority is duly consummated by the conversion of the uncreative majority, then this third stage has a sequel in which storm gives place to calm, conflict to peace, and a sense of malaise to a sense of well-being.

'In the development of single communities and groups of communities there occurs now and again a moment of equilibrium, when

¹ The same illustration of the same point is touched upon further in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 414-18, below.

institutions are stable and adapted to the needs of those who live under them; when the minds of men are filled with ideas which they find completely satisfying; when the statesman, the artist, and the poet feel that they are best fulfilling their several missions if they express in deed and work and language the aspirations common to the whole society. Then for a while Man appears to be the master of his fate; and then the prevailing temper is one of reasoned optimism, of noble exaltation, of content allied with hope. The spectator feels that he is face to face with the maturity of a social system and creed. These moments are rare indeed; but it is for the sake of understanding them that we read history. All the rest of human fortunes is in the nature of an introduction or an epilogue. Now by a period of history we mean the tract of years in which this balance of harmonious activities, this reconciliation of the real with the ideal, is in course of preparing, is actually subsisting, and is vanishing away.¹

The particular moment of equilibrium that was in the historian's mind when he wrote this eloquent and imaginative passage was the moment in the second period of our Western history at which the two institutions of the Papal Church and Feudalism were found satisfying by men and women in Western Christendom. We may perhaps equate this moment with those five years in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era when Saint Dominic and Saint Francis of Assisi and the Emperor Frederick II and Saint Louis King of France were all in the World together. And in the third period of our Western history we may possibly discern an equivalent moment in the eighteenth century between the end of the Wars of Religion and the beginning of the Wars of Democracy and Industrialism, when the Western World as a whole was finding satisfaction in the culture that had been broadcast through a French medium by the Italian Renaissance. If these two illustrations are apt, they both confirm the author's judgement that the moments of which he writes in this passage are not only rare but are also transitory. The Emperor Frederick II himself, who is one of the most brilliant representatives of the medieval Western Civilization at its zenith, is a witness whose life-history proclaims that the equilibrium of his age was ephemeral; and the Papal *Respublica Christiana*, which was the master-institution of the age, and which Frederick assailed in vain, was to be disrupted by the new culture of the Italian city-states which in Frederick II's day were fighting as the allies of the Holy See against the House of Hohenstaufen.

In truth, this moment of reconciliation between the real and the ideal, which is the sequel to a successful movement of Withdrawal-and-Return in the history of a society in process of civilization, is bound to be ephemeral *a priori*. The sense of well-being and the

¹ Davis, H. W. C.: *Mediaeval Europe* (London, no date, Williams & Norgate), p. 6.

sense of mastery which pervade Society at a moment such as this give an inkling of the happiness which Mankind would enjoy if it were ever to attain the goal of human endeavours. But that goal will only be attained when the whole of Society has come to consist of individuals of the new species which is represented by the Saints alone in human history up to date. In a society of Saints, well-being might endure because the crux of social relations might be overcome. But the Saints who have appeared in the World so far have only been able to transfigure Human Nature in their own personalities and in those of the rare kindred souls who have risen to Sainthood through communion with the Saints by catching the divine fire. The Saints have not been able to evoke the creative change from Primitive Humanity to Sainthood in Mankind at large; and they have made their effect upon the uncreative majority, not by the direct kindling of creative energy from soul to soul, but by a resort to the primitive social drill which we have called mimesis.¹ This social expedient of mimesis is a 'short cut'; and the resort to it is proof in itself that the goal of human endeavours has not yet been attained. The climber has not yet reached the ledge above him where he may hope to find rest. He is still in jeopardy on the face of the cliff; and here there is no rest for him; for unless he continues to climb on upward until he reaches the next ledge, he is doomed to fall to his death, either through a sudden false step² or through an arrest at high tension which entails the same fall in the end when the arrested climber's energies have been exhausted by the effort of keeping his position³.

'For every form which has improved, dozens have degenerated. Probably all the birds are derived from one ancestral species which took to the air, but very many have independently lost the power of flight. The ostriches and their allies, the dodo, the kiwi, the flightless parrots and rails of New Zealand, have all lost their flying power and gained nothing in exchange. Only the penguins have transformed their wings into fairly effective fins. Very numerous groups whose ancestors were motile have taken to sessile habits or internal parasitism. Degeneration is a far commoner phenomenon than progress. It is less striking because a progressive type, such as the first bird, has left many different species as progeny, while degeneration often leads to extinction, and rarely to a widespread production of new forms. Just the same is true with plants. Many primitive forms have not progressed. A few have done so, but relapses of various kinds are equally common. Certainly the study of evolution does not point to any general tendency of a species to progress. The animal and plant community as a whole does show such a tendency, but this is because every now and then an evolutionary

¹ See III. C (ii) (a), above, *ad fin.*

² For the breakdowns of civilizations, see Part IV, below.

³ For the arrested civilizations, see Part III. A, above.

advance is rewarded by a very large increase in numbers, rather than because such advances are common. But if we consider any given evolutionary level, we generally find one or two lines leading up to it and dozens leading down.¹

Haud igitur leti praechusa est ianua;² for what is true of the evolution of the Plants and the Birds is also true of the growths of civilizations.

If a growing society is tempted to cling to some momentary equilibrium for fear of losing the happiness which the moment has brought, it will lose its life and its happiness into the bargain because the moment cannot really be prolonged. And the moment is inexorably transient because the gesture of mimesis that has conjured it up is only an improvisation which the remorseless test of Time exposes as something superficial and insincere. In the gesture of mimesis, the uncreative majority is making an outward movement of conformity and not an inward adaptation. Spiritually, the gulf between the majority and the minority remains unbridged. And if, in this situation, the creative minority and the imitative majority remain immobile face to face, it is not the imitative majority that will be 'levelled up' but the creative minority that will be 'levelled down'. The salt will have lost its savour; and Faust, in bowing down and worshipping the moment with his 'Verweile doch! Du bist so schön!'³ will have delivered himself over into the power of Mephistopheles.

We can now perceive that the reciprocal challenge which is the relation between minority and majority in the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return resembles the movement of a walker's legs when he is taking a step. The withdrawal of the minority is like the walker's action in lifting one leg while he keeps the other leg on the ground to give him his purchase for carrying the lifted leg forward. The period of isolation corresponds to the time when the advancing leg is in the air; and the return corresponds to the moment when this leg returns to the ground. In the act of mimesis, the rear leg is trailing forward in its turn to catch up with the front leg, whose turn it now is to stay planted on the earth; and the sense of well-being is experienced in the moment when both legs are side by side and the muscular effort demanded of the walker is at its minimum. Yet if the walker seeks to prolong that easy moment by stopping his advance and coming to attention, he will not only fail to reach his goal and so stultify all the steps which he has taken already; he will also soon find that the stationary posture is more

¹ Haldane, J. B. S.: *The Causes of Evolution* (London 1932, Longmans, Green & Co.), pp. 152-3.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, V, 373.

³ Faust, l. 1700, quoted in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, on p. 281, above.

irksome and more fatiguing than a steady continuation of his advance towards his objective. For a single step—and *a fortiori* a half-step—is not a complete or satisfactory movement in itself. A step is an incident in a journey; and each single step presupposes and demands another, until the walker has traversed the whole distance between his starting-point and his goal.

The growth of a civilization is a succession of steps; and the gait of social progress is really not a walk but a run, for there are moments when both feet¹ are off the ground simultaneously. There are moments, that is to say, when a new creative minority has separated itself out from the rest of the body social and has begun to execute a new movement of Withdrawal-and-Return in response to a new challenge, before the body social which is thus being rearticulated and reinvigorated has yet completed the process of adopting by mimesis the response to a previous challenge which has been worked out by an older creative minority in an earlier movement of Withdrawal-and-Return. In our own Western history, for example, there was a time during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when the now problem of transforming a locally self-sufficient agricultural society into an internationally interdependent commercial and industrial society was being worked out in the city-states of Northern Italy and Flanders while in Western Christendom at large the agricultural economic conditions and the corresponding feudal and ecclesiastical institutions, from which the rising city-states were already breaking away, were still in process of gaining ground and winning acceptance. And in the next chapter there was another time during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the new problem of translating the Italian inventions of Democracy and Industrialism from the city-state scale on to the kingdom-state scale was already being worked out in England while the Western World at large was still engaged in assimilating those other elements in the Italian city-state culture which were capable of being translated as they stood on to the larger scale without being remodelled.²

¹ To say 'both feet' may seem to imply that the creative minority and the uncreative majority are two permanent articulations of the growing body social; but of course our simile, like all similes, only works out imperfectly. For a society, being not an organism itself, but merely a relation between organisms, is able to articulate and rearticulate itself much more freely than either a human body or a human soul; and accordingly, in order to make sure of 'putting its best foot forward' every time, a growing society is apt to articulate out of its members a new leg to take each new step, or, in other words, a new creative minority to find an original response for each new challenge. It is exceedingly rare for any community or other group of individuals which has played the part of creative minority in one chapter of a growing society's growth to play the same part in the next chapter. (This last point is dealt with further in IV. C (iii) (c), *passim*, in vol. iv, below.)

² This overlap between successive bouts of Challenge-and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return confronts the historian with the minor technical problem of choosing between alternative systems of naming his periods. Assuming that the successive periods in the

It will be seen that this periodic movement of growth, in which the solution of one problem gives rise to a new problem even before it has secured a general acceptance for itself, is a plain instance of that alternating rhythm of Yin and Yang which we have studied already in another connexion.¹ We have first put our finger on the pulse of this rhythm in observing the contrast between the static condition of extant human societies of the primitive species and the dynamic movement of those societies of another species that are in process of civilization. In the particular sequence of Challenge-and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return in which the two known species of human societies have their place, we are only in a position to observe a single pulsation: the impulse that has launched a small number of human societies out of the Yin-state attained by Primitive Humanity into the Yang-activity in quest of a goal which the Saints themselves only dimly and fitfully apprehend. In going on to study the process by which civilizations grow, we have now re-discovered in this process the alternating rhythm of Yin and Yang; but this time the rhythm is tuned to a shorter 'wave-length', and we are able to observe it in a number of examples which extend over two or three successive pulsations each.

Perhaps this is as far as we can hope to carry our analysis of the interaction between individuals in growing civilizations. In the next chapter, which is the last section of this Part, we have

growth of any given civilization will be labelled most distinctively and most characteristically if they are named after the successive creative minorities that have risen to meet successive challenges by discovering original responses through withdrawals and returns, we have still to decide whether we are to name any given period after the old minority which has not yet completed the act of return or after the new minority which has entered already upon the process of withdrawal. To take, for example, the second chapter of our own Western history—the 'medieval' chapter which runs, in conventional dates, from about A.D. 1075 to A.D. 1475—are we to call this chapter 'the Romanistic-Feudalistic period of Western history' after the *Respublica Christiana* and the Feudal System which were the master-institutions of the age? It was these institutions that presided over the moment of equilibrium and harmony which Mr. H. W. C. Davis has described in the passage quoted above. Yet it would seem equally appropriate to call this same chapter 'the Italian period of Western history' after the Italian city-states which were engaged, at that very moment, in working out a new way of life in order to solve new problems which the medieval harmony had left unsolved. Or again, to take the last chapter of Western history before the chapter in which we are living now—the chapter, that is to say, which runs, in conventional dates, from about A.D. 1475 to A.D. 1875—are we to call this chapter 'the Italic period of Western history' after the Italian minority whose culture was being progressively adopted during these centuries by the non-Italian majority of the Western Society; or are we to call it 'the English period of Western history' after the English minority which was engaged during the same centuries in working out in relative isolation those new versions of Democracy and Industrialism on the kingdom-state scale which in this latest age are apparently conquering the World? And how will future historians conceive of the present chapter of our Western history which began about half a century ago? Will they think of it as 'the Britannic period', in deference to the British origin of the two master-institutions and prevailing forces of the age; or will they rather associate it with the name of the new creative minority, whatever it may be, that will find—or attempt to find—a solution for the new problems to which Industrialism and Democracy are already giving rise? It will be seen that there are two alternative systems, which we may call the Promethean and the Epimethean, for giving our historical periods their names.

¹ In Part II. B, vol. i, on pp. 195-204, above.

to take a glance at the differentiation in character between one growing civilization and another which the process of growth brings with it.

III. DIFFERENTIATION THROUGH GROWTH

We have now completed our investigation of the process by which civilizations grow, and, in the several instances which we have examined, the process appears to be one and the same. Growth is achieved when an individual or a minority or a whole society replies to a challenge by a response which not only answers the particular challenge that has evoked it but also exposes the respondent to a fresh challenge which demands a fresh response on his part. And the process of growth continues, in any given case, so long as this recurrent movement of disturbance and restoration and overbalance and renewed disturbance of equilibrium is maintained. This is the process of growth as we have observed it in a comparative study of a number of cases; but, although the process may be uniform, the experiences of the various parties that undergo the process are not the same.

The variety of experience in confronting a single sequence of common challenges is manifest when we compare the experiences of the several different communities into which any single society is articulated at any given moment. For under the test of a common challenge a certain number of the communities that are exposed to it are apt to succumb, whereas others strike out a successful response through a creative movement of Withdrawal-and-Return, while others, again, neither succeed in responding along original lines nor fail to respond altogether, but manage to survive the crisis by waiting until some creative individual or creative minority has shown the way through, and then following tamely in the footsteps of the pioneers.¹ Each successive challenge that any growing civilization undergoes is apt to differentiate the experiences of its constituent individuals and communities in this way; and it is evident that the differentiation is cumulative. The longer the series of recurrent Challenge-and-Response-and-Challenge, the greater the progressive differentiation in the experiences of the parties concerned. And if the process of growth thus gives rise to differentiation within the body social of a single growing society, where the successive challenges to which the parties are subjected are common to all these parties, then, *a fortiori*, the same process must differentiate one growing society from another, since the series of Challenge-and-Response-and-Challenge through which the growths of different societies are achieved are not identical but separate and

¹ See I. B (ii), vol. i, pp. 22-6, above.

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diverse. Thus the growths of civilizations entail a progressive differentiation between the experiences of one growing society and another; and we have now to consider what the implications of this differentiation of experiences may be. Does a variety of experience produce, in its turn, a variety of outlook and aptitude and *ethos*?

In the matter of outlook, one signal example of a variety that is traceable to a variety of experience has engaged our attention already. Our first step in entering upon this Study of History was to take account of the relativity of historical thought;¹ and, in studying this characteristic of historical thought empirically in the work of our own contemporary Western historians, we came to the conclusion that the outlook of Western historians in our time has been governed by the modern Western versions of 'Industrialism' and 'Democracy'—the two master-institutions which the Western World has thrown up in the most recent chapter of its history in the process of working out its responses to the dominant challenges of the age.² In this connexion, we observed that the historians of this particular society in this particular age have been apt to view the histories of all societies in all ages from the Industrial and Democratic angles of vision; and we came to the conclusion that this local and temporary standpoint has given our historians a false perspective, not only for studying the histories of all other societies beside our own,³ but even for studying the history of our own society in its earlier chapters, before the modern Western versions of 'Industrialism' and 'Democracy' were worked out. Here, then, in the domain of historical thought, we have one clear case in which the variety in the experience of different civilizations is reflected in a variety of outlook. Are there other cases of the kind?

A conspicuous case presents itself in the domain of Art. For while the concept of the relativity of historical thought is an unfamiliar idea which has to be explained and justified, the concept of unique artistic styles that can be apprehended by direct aesthetic intuition is an accepted commonplace. There is nothing new or startling or paradoxical in the proposition that every civilization

¹ In Part I. A, vol. i, above.

² For this aspect of modern Western 'Industrialism' and 'Democracy', see III. C(ii) (b), pp. 358–63, above.

³ On this point see also Spengler, Oswald: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 183–4. In this passage, as so often, Spengler does injury to his own thesis by pressing it too far. 'It is altogether impossible', he writes, 'to penetrate completely, with the forces of one's own soul, into the historical *Weltaspekt* of alien civilizations (*Kulturen*)—the picture of the process of growth as it has taken shape in souls that have quite a different "lay-out" from ours'. This sentence sounds the characteristic note of over-emphasis and hyper-dogmatism which is the serious blemish in Spengler's remarkable work.

creates an individual artistic style of its own; and, if we are attempting to ascertain the limits of any given civilization in any dimension, either spatial or temporal, we find, as a matter of fact, that the aesthetic test is the surest as well as the subtlest.

For example, a survey of the successive artistic styles that have prevailed in Egypt brings out the fact that the art of the 'pre-dynastic age' is not yet characteristically Egyptian, whereas the Coptic art has discarded the characteristically Egyptian traits; and on this showing we are able to establish the Time-span of Egyptian history, from the birth to the dissolution of the Egyptian Society, more accurately than we can establish it by any other method of measurement. By the same aesthetic test, we can establish the respective dates at which the Hellenic Civilization emerged from beneath the crust of the Minoan Society and at which it disintegrated in its turn in order to make way for the Orthodox Christian Civilization to rise to the surface. Here, too, Art speaks in clearer accents than either Politics or Economics. The aesthetic test, again, enables us to establish, with some assurance, the distinction between an 'apparented' Sinic Society, with an art that was indigenous, and an 'affiliated' Far Eastern Society with an art that owed its individual style to an Indo-Hellenistic inspiration. By the same test, we can distinguish the chapters of Indic history that precede from those that follow the Hellenic intrusion upon the Indic World. In the spatial dimension, likewise, the style of the Minoan artifacts which our modern Western archaeologists have brought to light enables us to ascertain the geographical extension of the Minoan culture at different epochs with approximate accuracy, though the history of this Minoan Civilization is known to us exclusively through the archaeological record without any reinforcement in the shape of written documents or oral tradition—so true it is that 'if these should hold their peace, the stones would immediately cry out'.¹

The individuality of artistic style is indeed so profound that it sets its imprint upon the simplest and crudest works of craftsmanship. The chiselling of a stone or the moulding of a brick or the texture and varnish of a potsherd is capable of bearing testimony to the existence of the culture that fashioned it with as clear a voice as the masterpiece of a great poet or the life of a great saint or the career of a great statesman.

'The phenomenon of Style springs from the nature of the Macrocosm. It expresses the fundamental symbolism (*Ursymbol*) of a civilization (*Kultur*). . . . [And] in the historical panorama of any given civilization there is only room for one single style, which is the style of that

¹ Luke xix. 40.

civilization itself. . . . A masterpiece of the purest Renaissance, like the courtyard of the Palazzo Farnese, is actually nearer—immeasurably nearer—to the vestibule of St. Patroclus at Soest or to the interior of Magdeburg Cathedral or to the propylaea of eighteenth-century South German mansions than it is to the temple at Paestum or to the Erechtheum. There is the same relation between Doric and Ionic; and that is why Ionic columns can enter into a combination with Doric architectural forms which is just as complete as the combination of late Gothic and early Baroque in St. Lawrence at Nuremberg or the combination of late Romanesque and late Baroque in the beautiful upper portion of the West Choir at Mainz. And this is also why our eye is still only just beginning to distinguish, in the Egyptian Style, the respective contributions of "the Old Kingdom" and "the Middle Kingdom": contributions which correspond respectively to the Doric-Gothic youth of a style and to its Ionic-Baroque age, and which, in Egyptian history, interpenetrate one another with complete harmony in the semantic of all works of art of any greatness from the time of the Twelfth Dynasty onwards."¹

In the light of the evidence which we have marshalled for ourselves, we may be disposed to agree with Spengler when he maintains in this passage that every society in process of civilization creates a unique and unmistakable artistic style of its own. But if we accept the view that every civilization has its individual outlook and aptitude and *ethos* in the domain of Art, this conclusion raises a further question; for civilizations—as we shall find when we come to study their contacts with one another in Space and in Time²—are wholes whose parts all cohere with one another and all affect one another reciprocally. If, therefore, it is accepted that every civilization has a style of its own in the domain of Art, we have to inquire whether the qualitative uniqueness which is the essence of style can appear in one single domain of social life without pervading all the parts and organs and institutions and functions and activities of the whole body social.

Spengler answers this question with an emphatic negative; for he maintains that the relativity which we have recognized in the domains of Art and of Historical Thought is also recognizable in the domains of Mathematics and of Physical Science; and he even imports his dogma of relativity into the Kantian Categories of Thought in general, and into the realm of Ethics into the bargain.

"There is not and cannot be any such thing as Number-in-Itself. There is a plurality of worlds of numbers because there is a plurality

¹ Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 275 and 284-5. In the passages here omitted, the author gives interesting characterizations of the Egyptian Style and the Hellenic Style. For Spengler's conception of the *Ursymbol*, which he equates with the Platonic *Idea*, see further *op. cit.*, p. 243.

² For the contacts of civilizations in these different dimensions, see Parts IX and X, below.

of civilizations. We find an Indic, Arabic, Hellenic, and Western type of numbers; and each type is something individual and unique from the foundations upwards; each is the expression of a different sensation of the Universe; each is the symbol of a validity which, even in the scientific sense, is strictly limited; each is the principle of an arrangement of the statically existent (*des Gewordenen*) which reflects the innermost essence of a unique soul and of no other soul but this: the soul, that is to say, which is the centre of just this civilization and no other. It follows that mathematics are not singular but plural. . . . Number as conceived in and through the spirit . . . bears witness not to a universal but in each case to a quite specific Humanity. Accordingly, when a new system of mathematics arises, its style depends entirely upon the particular civilization in which it has its roots and upon the particular kind of human beings in whose minds it is thought out. . . .¹

'There is no Physical Science without unconscious pre-suppositions which it is beyond the scientific researcher's power to control. Moreover, these pre-suppositions can be traced back to the earliest days of the civilization—the days in which it first awakened to consciousness. The existence of a physical science implies the previous existence of a religion. In this matter there is no distinction between the Catholic and the Materialistic view of Physical Nature: they are both statements of the same creed in different words. Even the atheistic presentation of Science has religion in it: modern mechanics are a reproduction of Christian dogmas, point for point. No science is *mere* system, law, number or arrangement; every science is also an historical phenomenon, and as such it is a living organism which realizes itself in the thoughts of human beings and is governed by the destiny of a particular civilization. In the science of modern Physics there is an historical as well as a logical necessity. It is not only a matter of intellect; it is also a matter of race. . . . The notion of a universally valid Science which is true for all civilizations is an illusion. . . .'²

'In the [concept of the *a priori*], Kant assumes not only that the form of all mental activity is unalterable, but also that it is identical for all human beings. In consequence, he has entirely overlooked a circumstance of inestimable importance (the main reason for this lapse being his failure to test his thought by reference to any mental resources or any intellectual standpoint except those of his own time). The point in question is the variation in the degree of this "universal validity". While there are certain factors in Thought which are no doubt valid over a wide range and which are at least ostensibly independent of the civilization or the century to which the thinker belongs, there is also, underlying all Thought, another necessity, in respect of the forms of Thought, which is of quite a different kind: the necessity to which a human being is subject in his capacity as a member of one particular civilization and no other. . . .'³ The categories of Thought, Life, and Consciousness of the Universe are as various as the physiognomies of

¹ Spengler, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 85–6. See further the whole of this chapter: 'Vom Sinn der Zahlen' (pp. 75–131).

² Spengler, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 531–2.

³ Spengler, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 87–8.

individual human beings. There are intellectual as well as physical "races" and "peoples": communities constituted by the possession of some particular mental form or idea; and they have as little knowledge of their own intellectual idiosyncrasies as they have of other people's perceptions of "redness" or "yellowness". The common system of symbols which is especially characteristic of Human Speech fosters the illusion that there is an identity of inner life and an identical picture of the Universe. [In reality], the great thinkers of the individual civilizations are comparable in this respect to victims of colour-blindness who do not realize their own condition and who therefore each make merry over their neighbours' mistakes. . . .¹

'There are exactly as many systems of morality as there are civilizations. In this matter no one has a free choice. In the activity of every painter and musician there is assuredly some factor, of which the artist himself is never conscious, which nevertheless governs from the outset the semantic of his works and distinguishes them from the artistic performances of all other civilizations; and it can be stated with equal assurance that every manifestation of life by any human being who belongs to any civilization is stamped from the outset—a *priori*, in the strictest Kantian sense—with an idiosyncrasy which goes far deeper than any conscious judgement or endeavour and which is recognizable, by its style, as belonging to a particular civilization. The individual may behave morally or immorally, "well" or "badly", in terms of the primordial moral sense of his own civilization; but the form of his behaviour is not a matter of personal choice. Every civilization has its own ethical standard; and the validity of this standard begins and ends with that civilization itself. There is no such thing as a universal human ethic.'²

In the foregoing series of passages, in which Spengler carries his dogma of relativity from the domain of Art into almost every other domain of social life, there is a magnificent logic; and an English empiricist might find this German transcendentalist a formidable antagonist if he were rash enough to challenge him to a tournament with his own German weapons. If we admit that there are qualitative differences between the styles of different civilizations in the domain of Art, and also admit that every civilization is an indivisible whole consisting of parts which are interdependent with one another, then it is certainly difficult to refute Oswald Spengler's logic by counter-syllogisms. But an empiricist will be inclined to reply by approaching the same problem from a different angle. He will begin by submitting that the attribute of absolute and all-pervasive qualitative individuality, which Spengler ascribes to each and every society of the species Civilizations, carries with it the implication that a civilization is something qualitatively constant and therefore static; and this would mean, in Spengler's own

¹ Spengler, op. cit., vol. i, p. 251.

² Spengler, op. cit., vol. i, p. 471.

metaphysical terms, that civilizations belong to the realm of *das Gewordnes*, and not to the realm of *das Werden*: a consequence which is in contradiction with Spengler's own doctrine¹ and with the empiricist's own observation.

The empiricist will go on to point out that a civilization, as he observes it 'in real life', is not a static thing but a dynamic process or movement or *élan*: an endeavour to create something Super-human out of primitive Human Nature. He may be prepared to contemplate the possibility of a specific difference of character between the raw material and the eventual work of art which the demiurge is striving to fashion out of it; for experience reveals what is tantamount to a specific difference between primitive or ordinary Human Nature and the nature of the Saints who are Superman's heralds and forerunners;² and from this experience we may infer, *a fortiori*, that 'the first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit', and that 'the first man is of the earth earthy, the second man is the Lord from Heaven'.³ But how can we accept the conclusions of logic when it ascribes this specific individuality—this absolute qualitative difference, not only from all primitive societies but also from one another—not to saints or to supermen but to civilizations, when these civilizations are nothing but alternative and parallel and philosophically contemporary efforts to move on from *das Gewordnes*—from the accomplished fact of Human Nature—to another nature, superhuman or divine, which is the unattained goal of human endeavours: the goal towards which 'the whole creation groaneth and travaileth'?⁴ If a civilization is a movement from one kind of being to another, and is not a thing in itself, then surely it cannot be absolutely constant and self-consistent; and if it is a representative of a species, then surely, again, it cannot be absolutely unique. Logic or no logic, we cannot follow Spengler as far as this.

On the other hand, we shall probably feel that he is opening up an interesting line of inquiry on firmer ground when he interprets the variety of social style as arising not from a difference of essence but rather from a difference of emphasis.

'We talk of the *habitus* of a plant—by which we mean the specific outward appearance that belongs to this plant alone, and the character and the style in which it presents itself in the realm of static existence and spatial extension (*in den Bereich des Gewordnen und Ausgedehnten*),

¹ See Spengler, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 243, *ad init.*

² For this conception of the Saints as precocious representatives of a new species in process of creation, see the passages quoted from Bergson and from Middleton Murry in III. C (ii) (a), on p. 232, above.

³ 1 Corinthians xv. 45 and 47.

⁴ Romans viii. 22.

whereby every plant is distinguished, in every one of its parts and at every single stage of its life, from the representatives of all other species. This notion is so important for the study of physiognomy that I propose to apply it to the great organisms of History and to speak of the *habitus* of the Indic, the Egyptian or the Hellenic Civilization or History or Mentality. A vague sense of the conception is already to be found underlying the notion of Style, and we are merely clarifying this notion and giving it greater depth if we talk of the religious, mental, political, social, and economic style of a civilization, or, in general terms, of the style of a soul. This *habitus* of conscious being, which covers sentiments and thoughts and bearing and behaviour in the life of an individual human creature, has a wider scope in the life of entire civilizations. In this sphere it embraces the total expression of Life in its higher manifestations: for example, the choice of particular branches of Fine Art (the choice of sculpture in the round and fresco-painting by the Hellenes, and the choice of counter-point and oil-painting in the West) and the decisive rejection of other branches (the rejection of sculpture by the Arabs). The style of a civilization reveals itself again in a penchant towards esotericism (Indic) in contrast to a penchant towards publicity (Hellenic); or a penchant towards the spoken word (Hellenic) in contrast to a penchant towards the written word (in the Sinic World and the West).¹

This interpretation of the variety of social style as the outcome of a differentiation in penchant or bent or trend or emphasis will carry conviction to the empirical student of history, because he will find it borne out by actual examples 'in real life'.

The Hellenic Civilization, for instance, displays a manifest tendency towards a predominantly aesthetic *habitus* (to borrow Spengler's terminology). This Hellenic tendency to view life as a whole in distinctively aesthetic terms is illustrated by the well-known fact that the Ancient Greek adjective *καλός*, which properly denotes what is aesthetically beautiful, is employed indiscriminately to stand in addition for what is morally good. In other words, in the Hellenic Society the emphasis upon the aesthetic outlook has become so strong that the moral outlook has been confounded with it on the showing of the Ancient Greek vocabulary.

The Indic Civilization, again, as well as the 'affiliated' Hindu Civilization, displays an equally manifest tendency towards a *habitus* which is predominantly religious.

'One general observation about India may be made at the outset. Here more than in any other country the national mind finds its favourite occupation and full expression in religion. This quality is geographical rather than racial, for it is possessed by Dravidians as much as by Aryans. From the raja to the peasant most Hindus have

¹ Spengler, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 156.

an interest in theology and often a passion for it. Few works of art or literature are purely secular: the intellectual and aesthetic efforts of India, long, continuous and distinguished as they are, are monotonous inasmuch as they are almost all the expression of some religious phase.¹

When we come to our own Western Civilization, we find no difficulty in detecting our own bent or bias. It is, of course, a penchant towards machinery: a concentration of interest and effort and ability upon applying the discoveries of Natural Science to material purposes through the ingenious construction of material and social clockwork (material engines such as steamships and motor-cars and sewing-machines and wrist-watches and fire-arms and bombs; and social engines such as parliamentary constitutions and military mobilization systems). We are acutely—and, to-day, no longer complacently²—aware that this is our Western bent; but we are possibly apt to under-estimate the length of the time during which our Western energies have been flowing in this direction.

We sometimes talk as though our Western 'Machine Age' were no older than the modern Western Industrial Revolution which began little more than a century and a half ago; and it is true, as we have seen in another connexion,³ that less than two centuries and a half ago the polite society of Holland and England (which were the two most commercially-minded Western countries of the day) was disgusted at the base mechanic *ethos* of Russian Peter. Peter the Great, however, was manifestly a *lusus Naturae*; and the disgusting impression which he made upon the sensibilities of a Bishop Burnet and a King William III as a barbarian whose barbarism was accentuated and not redeemed by his amazing but unedifying mechanical talent is precisely the impression which *Homo Occidentalis* himself has usually made upon the children of other civilizations since very early days. This is how *Homo Occidentalis* was regarded in China and Japan in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era; and he was regarded in just the same way in the Orthodox Christian World eight centuries earlier when he burst upon the East Roman Empire in the First Crusade. Anna Comnena's description of the cross-bow—'a barbarian weapon which is entirely unknown to the Hellenes'—might serve, *mutatis mutandis*, for a description of a modern Western rifle from the pen of a nineteenth-century Confucian *litteratus*. The Byzantine authoress brings out the ingenuity of construction and length of range and power of penetration and deadliness of effect of this Western lethal weapon, and sums it up

¹ Eliot, Sir Charles: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. xiii-xiv.

² For our recent awakening from complacency, see 'II. C (i) (d)', pp. 210-12, above.

³ See p. 279, above.

as 'a really devilish contrivance'.¹ There are a number of other symptoms that indicate how early this mechanical trend declared itself in Western history. Clock-work, for example, in the literal sense, appears to have been invented in the West in the same century as the cross-bow;² and in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era Roger Bacon, within the bosom of the Western Society, was as notable a forerunner of the latter-day *Homo Occidentalis Mechanicus* as the alien Peter Alexeyevich four centuries later.

It is even possible that the first stirrings of our Western mechanical activity may be discerned at a much earlier date, when the 'apparented' Hellenic Society was still in being and the 'affiliated' Western Society was only in gestation, awaiting the hour of its birth. It is at any rate one of the curiosities of history that the sole instance of the application of mechanical invention to practical economic life which appears to be recorded in Hellenic annals had its locus in Gaul: a region which was not incorporated into the Hellenic World until its latter days, and which always remained on its fringe, but which has been the homeland and heart of the Western World in every age of the Western Civilization. This Gallic apparatus—the existence of which is attested in the first century of the Christian Era, and again in the fourth³—seems 'rudimentary' and 'clumsy' to the modern Western scholar⁴ when he studies the original accounts of it at second-hand with the masterpieces of modern Western mechanical ingenuity in his mind as a standard of comparison. Yet if we consider this labour-saving appliance in its Hellenic environment and appraise it on a Hellenic standard from a Hellenic standpoint, we shall be inclined to regard it as being almost as great a portent in the Roman Empire as the genius of Peter Alexeyevich was in Holy Russia. We feel ourselves here in the presence of something profoundly alien from the Hellenic genius.⁵ Is it fanciful to see in this 'rudimentary' and 'clumsy' Gallic reaping-machine a precocious pre-natal manifestation of the Western mechanical bent?

At any rate, however far it may or may not be possible to trace our Western mechanical trend back towards the origins of our Western history, there is no doubt that a mechanical penchant is as characteristic of the Western Civilization as an aesthetic penchant

¹ Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς τλάγγας πρᾶγμα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὡς ὄντως δαιμόνιον. (Anna Comnena: *Alexias*, Bk. X, ch. 8.)

² Spengler, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 18-19.

³ See Pliny, *Historia Naturalis*, xviii. 296, and Palladius, *Opus Agriculturae*, vii. 2, cited by Heitland, W. E.: *Agricola* (Cambridge 1921, University Press), p. 398.

⁴ Heitland, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

⁵ For a conspectus of the mechanical equipment of the Hellenic World in the latest age of Hellenic history, see Usher, A. P., *A History of Mechanical Inventions* (New York, 1929, McGraw-Hill Book Company), chaps. 4 and 5. The water-wheel seems to have been more widely diffused than the Gallic reaping-machine, but there is no evidence that it, too, was of Gallic origin.

is of the Hellenic Civilization or a religious penchant of the Indic and the Hindu. And in our comparative study of the progressive differentiation between growing civilizations we are possibly warranted in going on one step farther than this. With all circumspection, we may possibly venture to suggest in certain instances that this or that interest or aptitude or activity which manifestly plays an important part in the history of some one particular civilization is in some sense the counterpart of some other interest or aptitude or activity which appears to play a corresponding role in the history of another particular civilization.

It may be suggested, for example, that our modern Western sensitiveness to ugliness in moral action when it takes the form of cruelty, coupled with our obtuseness to ugliness in visual form when it takes the shape of a modern Western industrial area, is not only inverse to, but is also in some sense equivalent to, or compensatory for, the obtuseness to cruelty which was coupled, both in medieval Italy and in ancient Greece, with an acute sensitiveness to ugliness in the field of vision.

'It is often said that the modern man has entirely lost the Greek love of beauty. This is, I think, untrue, and unjust to our present civilization, unlovely as it undoubtedly is in many ways. It is curious that modern critics of the Greeks have not called attention to the *aesthetic* obtuseness which showed itself in the defective reaction of the ancients against cruelty. It was not that they excluded beautiful actions from the sphere of aesthetics; they never thought of separating the beautiful from the good in this way. But they were not disgusted at the torture of slaves, the exposure of new-born children, or the massacre of the population of a revolted city. The same callousness appears in the Italian cities at the Renaissance; Ezzelino was a contemporary of the great architects and painters. I cannot avoid the conclusion that it is connected in some obscure way with the artistic creativeness of these two closely similar epochs. The extreme sensibility to physical suffering which characterizes modern civilization arose together with Industrialism, and is most marked in the most highly industrialized countries. It has synchronized with the complete eclipse of spontaneous and unconscious artistic production, which we deplore in our time. . . . The explanation of this extreme susceptibleness must be left to psychologists; but I am convinced that we have here a case of transferred aesthetic susceptibility. We can walk unmoved down the streets of Plaistow, but we cannot bear to see a horse beaten. The Athenians set up no Albert Memorials, but they tortured slave-girls in their law-courts and sent their prisoners to work in the horrible galleries of the Laureion silver-mines.'¹

On the same line of thought, it may be suggested that the

¹ Inge, W. R., in *The Legacy of Greece* (Oxford 1921, Clarendon Press), pp. 39-40.

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luxuriance of Religion in India corresponds in some sense to the luxuriance of Politics in Europe.

'Hinduism has often and justly been compared to a jungle. As in the jungle every particle of soil seems to put forth its spirit in vegetable life and plants grow on plants, creepers and parasites on their more stalwart brethren, so in India art, commerce, warfare, and crime, every human interest and aspiration seek for a manifestation in religion, and since men and women of all classes and occupations, all stages of education and civilization, have contributed to Hinduism, much of it seems low, foolish and even immoral. The jungle is not a park or garden. Whatever can grow in it, does grow. The Brahmans are not gardeners but forest officers. To attempt a history or description of Indian creeds seems an enterprise as vast, hopeless and pathless as a general account of European politics. As for many centuries the life of Europe has expressed itself in politics, so for even longer ages the life of India, which has more inhabitants than Western Europe,¹ has found expression in religion, speculation, and philosophy, and has left of all this thought a voluminous record, mighty in bulk if wanting in dates and events. And why should it chronicle them? The truly religious mind does not care for the history of religion, just as among us the scientific mind does not dwell on the history of science.'²

Or, again, we may follow Spengler when he suggests that the art of sculpture in the round, with the human figure as its theme, corresponds, as the master-art of the Hellenic Civilization, to the art of music in the West, where it is music and not sculpture that has played the leading role.

Spengler distinguishes an 'Apollinean' and a 'Faustian' group of arts which he regards as being characteristic of the Hellenic and the Western Civilization respectively.

'In the Apollinean group, which includes vase-painting, fresco-painting, bas-relief sculpture, an architecture based on ranks of columns, the Attic Drama and the dance, the central point is the sculpture of the naked statue. The Faustian group, on the other hand, gravitates round the ideal of pure spatial Infinity; and its central point is to be found in counter-point music. From this central point outwards, fine-spun threads extend into all fields of mental life and weave themselves into the infinitesimal system of mathematics, the dynamic system of physics, the Catholicism of the Society of Jesus and the Protestantism of the Enlightenment, the modern machine-technique, the credit system and the dynastic-social organization of the State—a stupendous sum of spiritual self-expression. . . .

'The nearer the [two] civilizations have approached towards their complete self-realization, the more decided has been their leaning towards an art of inexorable symbolic clarity. . . . From [the generation

¹ The population of India (about 315 millions) is larger than that of Europe without Russia.

² Eliot, Sir Charles: *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 166.

of Bach and Handel] onwards, music—and this a pure instrumental and not a vocal music—becomes the Faustian art *par excellence*. The corresponding artistic crisis occurs in Hellenic history about the year 470 B.C., when the last of the great fresco-painters, Polygnotus, yields the primacy, once and for all, to his pupil Polycleitus—yields it, that is to say, to the art of statuary.

‘With this music and this sculpture the goal is attained. A pure symbolism of a mathematical stringency has now become possible. That is the meaning of the *Canon* (Polycleitus’s work on the proportions of the human body); and Polycleitus’s *Canon* has its analogue in the canon of counter-point which was established by Polycleitus’s Western “contemporary” Bach. In clarity and intensity of pure form, these arts attain the acme and the final term of achievement. We may test this by comparing the tone-body (*den Tonkörper*) of the Faustian instrumental music, and within this again the stroke-body (*den Streichkörper*), and in Bach’s music the body of the wind-instruments (which operates as a unity) as well, with the body of Attic statues. We may likewise compare the two things that are called “figures” by Haydn and by Praxiteles respectively: that is to say, the figure of a musical theme and the figure of an athlete. The use of the word “figure” itself is borrowed from mathematics and it reveals the fact that this goal, which has now been attained at last, has been found in a union of the artistic with the mathematical spirit. In music and in sculpture, the analysis of Infinity and the Euclidean geometry have each apprehended its own respective task, its specific problem of numbers, with complete clarity. The greatest masters of these mathematical systems are contemporaries of the great masters of these thoroughly mathematical arts. It will be recollected that, at an earlier point in this work, mathematics has been described as an art and the great mathematician as an artist and a visionary. The explanation now lies before us. The mathematics of Beauty and the beauty of Mathematics can no longer be distinguished from each other. The Infinite Space of musical tones and the Pure Body of marble or bronze are a direct interpretation of that which has spatial extension and static existence (*des Ausgedehnten und Gewordnen*). They belong respectively to Number conceived as Relation and to Number conceived as Mass. Both in fresco-painting and in oil-painting, the relevant laws of proportion and perspective yield no more than a bare intimation of mathematical system. On the other hand, the two latest and strictest arts [i.e. statuary and music] are mathematics. Counter-point and the statue-canon alike are absolute worlds of numbers. In these worlds, laws and formulas are enthroned. At this height of attainment, the Faustian and the Apollinean art are both manifested in their completeness.”¹

This is perhaps as far as we can follow out the differentiation which accompanies the growth of civilizations without losing our way in a maze of fantasy. We have explored far enough to have

¹ Spengler, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 380-3. See further the whole of the chapter entitled ‘Musik und Plastik’ (pp. 297-402).

established the fact that a differentiation of some kind does take place; and thus we have returned, at the close of this third part of our Study, to the point from which we started at the beginning of the first part, when we dwelt upon the fact that in any age of any society all social activities, including the study of history itself, are governed by the dominant tendencies of the time and the place. Yet if we were merely to dwell on this point once again, we should be ending this part of our Study on a false note; for, as we have observed in our critique of the concept of Race,¹ the variety that is manifested in Human Nature and in human life and institutions is a superficial phenomenon which masks, without impairing, an underlying unity.

We have compared our civilizations to rock-climbers;² and on the showing of this simile the several climbers, though they are certainly separate individuals, are also all representatives of a single species and are all engaged upon an identical enterprise. They are all attempting to scale the face of the same cliff from the same starting-place on a ledge below towards the same goal on a ledge above. The underlying unity is apparent here; and it appears again if we vary our simile and think of the growths of civilizations in terms of the Parable of the Sower. The seeds which the sower sows are separate seeds; and every grain has its own different destiny. Some fall by the wayside and some fall upon stony places and some fall among thorns (the breakdowns and disintegrations of the unsuccessful civilizations will engage our attention in the parts of this Study that follow next). It is only a residue that falls into good ground and brings forth fruit. Yet the seeds are all of one kind, and they are all sown by one sower in the hope of obtaining one harvest. And even the seeds that are devoured by the fowls or scorched by the sun or choked by the thorns are serving the sower's purpose, as well as the seeds which bring forth fruit an hundredfold. The differentiating Yang-movement of growth is leading towards a goal which is a Yin-state of integration. For 'ilayhi marji'ukum jami'an':³ 'to Him return ye every one'.

¹ In II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, above.

² In Part II. B, vol. i, on pp. 192-5, above.

³ Qur'an, x. 4. Literally: 'To Him is your return, universally.'

ANNEX I TO III. A

THE 'CONDUCTIVITY' OF NOMADISM AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE DIFFUSION OF LANGUAGES

THE high social 'conductivity' of both the Steppe and the Sea is particularly well brought out by some of the phenomena of the geographical distribution of languages.

It is a well-recognized fact that a seafaring people is apt to spread its own language round all the coasts of any sea or ocean in which it has made itself at home. Ancient Greek navigators once put the Greek language into currency round the whole circumference of the Mediterranean, and their Modern Greek successors still keep Greek alive round the narrower compass of the Aegean. The prowess of Malayan seamanship has propagated the Malay family of languages as far as Madagascar on the one hand and the Philippines on the other. And, in the Pacific, the Polynesian language is still spoken with extraordinary uniformity throughout an archipelago that extends from Fiji to Easter Island and from New Zealand to Hawaii, though many generations have now elapsed since the vast spaces of 'estranging sea' which separate these Pacific islands from one another were regularly traversed by Polynesian canoes. Again, it is because 'Britannia rules the waves'—or did rule them for a century or so—with a world-wide thalassocracy that English has latterly become a world-language with a currency from China to Peru. This 'conductive' effect of maritime navigation in propagating languages over wide areas with rapidity and ease is notorious; but it is perhaps not so commonly recognized that the same 'conductivity' is also one of the properties of the Nomadism of the Steppes.

This property of Nomadism can be verified by examining the geographical distribution of four living languages, or families of languages, which are all very widely disseminated in the world of our day: namely Berber, Arabic, Turkish, and Indo-European.

The Berber languages are spoken to-day by the Nomads of the Sahara (i.e. the African section of the Afrasian Steppe) and also by the sedentary peoples along the northern and southern 'coasts' of the Sahara, in the Maghrib and in the northern fringe of the Nigerian and Senegalese Sudan. It is natural to infer that the northernmost and the southernmost branches of this family of languages were propagated into their present domains by Saharan Nomads, speaking Berber as their mother-tongue, who trespassed, in times past, out of the Desert into the Sown.

Again, Arabic is spoken to-day not only in the Arabian section of the Afrasian Steppe but on its northern coasts, in Syria and 'Irāq, and on its southern coasts, in the Hadramawt and the Yaman, and on its western coasts, in the Basin of the Nile, from the Delta up to the Sudanese Jazīrah. More than that, the Arabic language has spread still farther westward—trespassing here upon the Berber family's domain—until it has reached the North-African coast of the Atlantic and the northern shore of Lake Chad; and in this instance we happen to have an historical record of how the propagation of Arabic across the whole breadth of Northern Africa was accomplished. We know that this was the work of Arabic-speaking Nomads—the Banu Hilāl and the Banu Sulaym—who, by the deliberate policy of the Fātimid Caliphate, were first transplanted from the North Arabian Steppe to Upper Egypt and were then let loose upon North-West Africa about the middle of the eleventh century of the Christian Era.¹

If we look next at the present distribution of the Turkish languages, we can infer with assurance from the linguistic map that their original centre of distribution must have been the Eurasian Steppe. Turkish dialects are spoken to-day throughout a solid block of Central Asian territory extending from the east coast of the Caspian to the Lob Nor and from the Northern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau to the western face of the Altai, with a fringe of outlying enclaves in the regions round about: in Azerbaijan and Anatolia; in the Crimea and the Dobruja; in Western Siberia and Bashkiristan; and, far away to the north-east, in the Basin of the Lena, where the Yakut dialect of Turkish survives to show that Turkish-speaking peoples must once have occupied not only, as now, the western but also the eastern half of the Eurasian Steppe which now constitutes Zungaria and Mongolia and Manchuria. The inference is that the Turkish family of languages was propagated over its present domain by Turkish-speaking Eurasian Nomads; and this inference from the linguistic map is of course proved correct by our historical records.

This explanation of the present distribution of the Turkish family of languages gives the key to the present distribution of the Indo-European family, which (as its name implies) is now so strangely sundered into two isolated geographical groups: one domiciled in Europe and the other in India and Iran. The present Indo-European linguistic map becomes intelligible if we assume that the languages of this family were originally propagated by Nomads who were tenants of the Eurasian Steppe before the pro-

¹ See Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 385-90; Marçais, G.: *Les Arabes en Berberie du xi^e au xiv^e siècle* (Paris 1913, Leroux).

pagators of the Turkish languages made themselves at home there. Europe and Iran both have 'seaboards' on the Eurasian Steppe, and this great waterless ocean is the natural medium of communication between them. This explanation of the present Indo-European linguistic map is confirmed by the researches of our modern Western archaeologists, who have recently discovered the records of now extinct Indo-European languages which were once current on another 'seaboard' of the Eurasian Steppe, in the Tarim Basin.

We can fortify the foregoing evidence for the 'conductivity' of Nomadism by an instance in Tropical Africa and another instance in North America.

It is one of the well-known curiosities of Tropical African sociology that, among the African Negro peoples, there is a violent contrast between the extreme linguistic uniformity which is characteristic of one part of their habitat and the equally extreme linguistic diversity which is characteristic of another part. From Uganda and Kikuyu to Basutoland and Kaffraria, over a span of more than thirty degrees of latitude, the African Negroes all speak dialects of the one great Bantu family of languages.¹ On the other hand, in the Sudan (in the widest sense of the term, in which it covers a belt of territory stretching right across Africa from the western foot of the Abyssinian Plateau to the Guinea Coast), a different language, with no discernible affinity to the neighbouring languages, is spoken in every district and, in some districts, in almost every village.² In the Sudan, the rare *lingue franche*, e.g. Hausa and Fulani, are apt to be of at least partly alien origin.³ This contrast which the linguistic diversity of the Sudan presents both to the uniform Bantu area on the south and to the uniform Berber and Arabic area on the north is a phenomenon which demands explanation; and the most obvious explanation is to be found in the fact that the Bantu-speaking and Fulani-speaking peoples, like the Imoshagh and like the Badawī Arabs, are by origin stock-breeding Nomads, whereas the Sudanese Negroes are sedentary agriculturists.

A parallel case in North America is the contrast between the

¹ 'To the south of a zigzag boundary which stretches from Fernando Pô on the west to Mombasa on the east, lies the sphere of the Bantu speech.... There is but one indigenous language-family over the whole of Central and South Africa, the only exceptions to this universality of type being a few patches of Sudanian tongues on the Northern Congo, Nilotic dialects in East Africa, a click language south of the Victoria Nyanza, and the nearly extinct Hottentot and Bushman languages of South-West Africa' (Johnston, Sir H. H.: *The Opening Up of Africa* (London, no date, Williams & Norgate), pp. 131-2).

² 'West Africa and the south-western part of the Egyptian Sudan are perhaps the most bewildering in their innumerable language types. A few hundred or few thousand people will speak a language in one group of villages totally distinct in vocabulary and in grammar from the equally isolated language of the next group of villages, and so on' (Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 131).

³ See Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 130 and pp. 117-18.

narrowness of the geographical domain of the Mayan language and the vast extent of the Nahuan-Shoshonean group of languages (the group to which the Aztec language belongs). The Nahuan-Shoshonean family ranges from Idaho to Costa Rica;¹ and we know that these languages were propagated, not indeed by stock-breeding Nomads, but by equally mobile tribes who made their livelihood on the North American prairies by hunting.

Thus the 'conductivity' of Nomadism and of Seafaring accounts for a number of the most conspicuous examples of the wide geographical diffusion of languages.² Indeed, the examples are so conspicuous that, although the number of instances is not really large, we have mistakenly come to regard wide distribution as the normal state of affairs which can be taken for granted, and narrow distribution as something exceptional which requires explanation.³

¹ Spinden, H. J.: *The Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America* (New York 1922, American Museum of Natural History), p. 32.

² Nomadism and Seafaring are not, of course, the exclusive agencies of wide diffusion. Another manifest cause of wide diffusion is military conquest—the cause which accounts for the present diffusion in Europe of the Romance languages. The diffusion of the Russian language from the Basin of the Dniepr to the shores of the Pacific has been achieved, as we have seen (in II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 154–7, above), by Cossack pioneers who had mastered the arts of the Nomad as well as those of the waterman.

³ 'The current notion about languages is much too much dominated by the impression that is produced by the diffusion of a few families of languages over areas of immense extent: a phenomenon which has really been, in all cases, a gradual outcome of the course of history. This is true of the Indo-Germanic and the Semitic languages, as well as of the Turkish, Melanesian, and Bantu languages; and it also holds good for the diffusion of the Hamitic languages over North Africa. This creates a deceptive appearance of there being something anomalous when a number of languages which are fundamentally different from one another are crowded together within the limits of one small area—a phenomenon which is to be found in overwhelming abundance among the native Indians of all parts of America, and which, in the Old World, has survived in the Caucasus. . . . This is a state of affairs which is almost universal in primitive regions that have been left nearly or completely untouched by the main current of history' (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (i), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), pp. 7–8).

ANNEX II TO III. A

THE CAUSES OF THE OCCASIONAL ERUPTIONS OF THE NOMADS OUT OF THEIR OWN DOMAIN ON THE STEPPES INTO THE ADJOINING DOMAINS OF THE SEDENTARY SOCIETIES ROUND ABOUT THEM

IN our inquiry into the life of the Nomadic Civilization, we have seen that Nomadism involves two kinds of movement which are quite distinct, and are in fact in sharp contrast to one another, though they are frequently confused in the popular notion of what Nomadism is.

The normal movement of a Nomadic community or horde is a regular movement of a cyclic kind in which the horde never trespasses beyond the limits of a definite range but keeps moving perpetually within these limits—coming round again and again to each particular station on this range periodically. Since the economic incentive which keeps the Nomad on the move is the necessity of extracting out of his range the utmost pasturage obtainable for his flocks and herds by taking advantage of the local seasonal variations in the vegetation of the Steppe, it follows that the period of the Nomad's cyclic movement is the year-period; that the geographical direction of the movement is alternately south to north in spring and north to south in autumn; and that the geographical extent of the Nomad's range runs from hundreds into thousands of miles in its north-and-south extension—the area required by any given horde being determined by the ratio between its head of cattle and the pastoral resources of its range, both in their totality and in their local distribution between the different seasonal stations.¹ This regular cyclic annual movement of a Nomadic horde differs in degree only, and not in kind, from the regular cyclic daily movement of the factory workers and the clerical workers in a modern Western industrial community between the factories and offices where they work and the residential districts where they sleep.

This yearly periodic movement within a limited range is what 'Nomadism' (the Greek word for 'cattle-driving') literally and properly means. But the Nomads are also subject to another movement which differs from their normal movement in every way. This other movement occurs at intervals, not of twelve months, but of decades or centuries; it is at first sight difficult to discern any regular periodicity in it; its direction is as often as not from east to west or from west to east, in contrast to the normal northward

¹ See Part III. A, pp. 7, 14 and 16, above.

movement in spring and southward movement in autumn; and the distances traversed by the Nomads in this occasional movement are out of all comparison with the range of the normal seasonal movement. In the occasional movements of this second kind, a Nomad horde is apt not only to trespass out of its own recognized range on to the ranges of its Nomadic neighbours, but actually to burst out of the Steppes altogether and to flood over the fields and cities of the sedentary societies on the further side of the border between the Desert and the Sown.

These occasional migrations or eruptions of the Nomads, right out of the Steppes, have of course affected the lives and fortunes and histories of the sedentary societies round about much more profoundly and sensationally than these have been affected by the Nomads' regular annual movements within their own domain; and, since the history of the Nomads has been written almost entirely by observers belonging to one or other of the sedentary societies with which the Nomads have happened to collide, these violent eruptions have come to be regarded as the characteristic manifestations of Nomadism, though really they are exceptional interludes in a round of annual movements which are regular in time, limited in geographical range, and intrinsically peaceful in character.

The impact of these Nomad eruptions upon the lives of the sedentary victims is so catastrophic that the sedentary observers have been inclined to postulate a demonic force of will and strength of purpose in the Nomads to account for such vast effects upon the sedentary societies' fortunes. In opposition to this popular view, we have suggested, in passing,¹ that these eruptions are not, as a matter of fact, the spontaneous expressions of the Nomads' human initiative, but are all produced mechanically by the action upon the Nomads of either one or other of two alternative external forces: either a pull exerted by one of the sedentary societies in the neighbourhood of the Steppes, or else a push exerted by the climate of the Steppes themselves.

Evidently this proposition requires proof; and the first step towards putting it to the test is to tabulate as many of the historic eruptions as we can ascertain from the surviving records.

In setting out to compile this table, there are several obvious considerations which we must keep in mind.

In the first place, the eruptions which we shall be entering on our list are not all precisely comparable with one another from the sociological standpoint. At one end of the social scale there are migrant hordes, like the [pseudo-] Avars who burst out of the heart of the Eurasian Steppe into the Hungarian Alföld in the second

¹ See Part III. A, p. 15, above.

half of the sixth century of the Christian Era, who have been so utterly uprooted before the moment when they break into the historical record that the whereabouts of their previous ranges is quite unknown. Then there are others, like the Magyars, who burst into the same Alföld at the close of the ninth century of the Christian Era, whose previous ranges may be conjectured¹ but cannot be ascertained with certainty. There are others again, like the Banu Hilāl and the Banu Sulaym, who migrated out of Arabia into Africa in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, or like the various hordes of Calmucks who migrated out of the western parts of the Mongolian Plateau in all directions—to the Obi, to the Volga and to the Kuku Nor—during the first half of the seventeenth century, whose previous ranges are on record but who lost touch with their former homes when once their migration was under way. The migrations of the Calmucks and the Banu Hilāl, like those of the Magyars and the Avars, were mass-movements in which the migrants brought their flocks and their herds and their women and their children with them. On the other hand, the eruption of the Calmucks' kinsmen the Mongols or Tatars in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era was only secondarily a displacement of population and was primarily a military operation carried out by a horde which extended its domain principally by means of imposing its political dominion upon other peoples.² The Mongols had a fixed capital in Mongolia at Qaraqorum (besides the subsidiary capitals which they established in, or on the fringes of, the conquered countries); and they depended upon the secretarial and administrative abilities of the Nestorian and Manichaean and Buddhist Uighurs in the Central Asian oases, as well as upon the strength of their own right arms.³ Among the Primitive Muslim Arabs who burst upon the Roman and Sasanian Empires out of the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century of the Christian Era, there was likewise an association between Nomads and oasis-dwellers, but in this case the merchants of the city of Mecca and the husbandmen of the oasis of Medina were the dominant partners, and the Badu went into action under their command. Finally, in the Palmyrene eruption of the third century of the Christian Era, which was an abortive anticipation of the Muslim Arab eruption of the seventh century,⁴ the patricians of the Palmyrene city-state, whose

¹ See Macartney, C. A.: *The Magyars in the Ninth Century* (Cambridge 1930, University Press).

² This contrast between the Mongol eruption and the subsequent Calmuck eruption is pointed out by Courant, M.: *L'Asie Centrale aux xiii^e et xiv^e siècles: Empire Kalmouk ou Empire Mantchou?* (Lyon 1912, Rey), p. 35.

³ For the relations between the Mongols and the Uighurs, see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 237-8, above.

⁴ On this point, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 74, footnote 4, above.

magnificent public buildings represent the antithesis of the Nomadic life, so completely eclipsed their Nomad satellites that it is perhaps doubtful whether this particular eruption ought to find a place in our table at all.

Another pertinent consideration is that the dates which we assign to these eruptions are bound to be more or less arbitrary on several accounts.

For one thing, the border between the Desert and the Sown is not a fixed line which can be crossed at a single step at a precise moment which can be timed with a stop-watch. It is not a boundary line but a transitional zone; and both the location of this zone and its breadth are perpetually changing in accordance with changes in the local social or the local climatic conditions. Then, again, the sensational eruptions will often be found to have been preceded and prepared for by long continuing and hardly perceptible seepages. For example, the Arabs who flooded over the interior of the Roman and Sasanian Empires in the seventh century of the Christian Era had been heralded during the preceding two hundred years by the Arabs whose seepage into the Arabian borderlands of the Roman and Sasanian Empires had given rise already, before Muhammad's birth, to the Ghassanid Arab and the Lahmid Arab Principality on ground that had been under direct Roman and direct Sasanian administration at an earlier date. Again, the Saljūqs, who flooded over the 'Abbasid Caliphate and burst into the East Roman Empire in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, had been heralded by the Turkish slaves and freedmen who, since the ninth century, had been making themselves the masters in Baghdad and in Samarra and in the provinces. At the same time, there have been a certain number of Nomad outbreaks which have taken their victims as completely unawares as the most malign of the eruptions of Vesuvius, and the catalogue of these bolts from the blue includes not only the impacts of the Avars, Magyars, and Mongols upon Europe, but also the outbreak of the Muslim Arabs from Arabia—in spite of the seepage which had been giving warning of its imminence during the preceding two centuries. These sudden explosive discharges of Nomad invaders out of the Desert into the Sown seem to be peculiar to those Nomads who have succeeded in acquiring a certain amount of sedentary technique and organization from the oasis-dwellers in their midst, and whose outbreaks are in the nature of military operations rather than migrations *en masse*. At least, this conclusion seems to emerge from a comparison of the thirteenth-century eruption of the Mongols with the seventeenth-century eruption of the less sophisticated Calmucks, or a comparison of the seventh-century eruption of the Primitive Muslim

Arabs either with the pre-Muslim seepage or with the subsequent eruption of the Banu Hilāl. The tide of Nomad invasion also seems to acquire its greatest impetus when it is flooding up one of those gulfs of the steppe-ocean that penetrate into the interior of the sedentary world around, just as the physical tides of the sea attain their greatest velocity and mount to their greatest heights within the confines of the estuaries of tidal rivers. In the physiography of the Steppe, the most notable estuary of the kind is, of course, the bay which opens between the northern coast of the Caspian and the southern limit of the 'forest-fleece' of the Urals; for this bay runs due westward from that point, along the north shore of the Black Sea and the north bank of the Danube, through more than thirty degrees of longitude, till it comes to an end at last at the Iron Gates.

In the reckoning of dates, we have also to take account of the fact, referred to already, that our extant records of Nomad eruptions are almost all derived from the sedentary peoples into whose domains the Nomads have burst, so that we have usually to be content with ascertaining the date at which this or that horde crossed this or that sedentary society's threshold, without our being able to discover precisely where and when the movement which has burst across this threshold in full swing originally took its start and gathered its momentum in the depth of the Steppe—in the absence of any sedentary observer on the spot who might have noticed and recorded this first phase. For practical purposes, we have to date these eruptions by the moments at which they burst across one or other of the different sectors into which we may conveniently divide the vastly long border between the Steppes and the surrounding sedentary territories. And, in many cases that are extremely pertinent and important, our records only begin at stages in the Nomads' penetration of the sedentary world which are two or three degrees removed from the original line at which the invaders began to trespass upon alien ground and left their native haunts behind them. In other words, we have not only to dissect the border between the Desert and the Sown into a number of distinct sectors, but on some of the most frequently and most energetically violated frontiers we have to distinguish between a series of thresholds or *limina*, in *échelon* one behind the other, which the Nomad trespassers are apt to cross successively before the cumulative effect of the resistance which they encounter ultimately counteracts their momentum and brings their invasion to a halt.

Tentatively, we may divide the frontiers of the Eurasian Steppe into six sectors and the frontiers of the Afrasian Steppe into nine.

The first sector of the Eurasian frontiers extends between the mountainous base of the Korean Peninsula on the east and the

Khingan Range on the west; and the eruption of Nomads on this sector out of the Steppe into China may be dated by their successive passages of three thresholds or limina: first, the Pale covering the Liaotung Peninsula; second, Shanhaikwan (the Chinese Thermopylae); and, third, the watershed between the Hwangho Basin and the Yangtse Basin.

The second sector extends from the western slopes of the Khingan Range to the Pamir Plateau via the Tien Shan; and here the first threshold is marked by the line of the Great Wall of China, while the second threshold falls into three sub-sectors, according to whether the invaders who have passed the Wall then fall upon the eastern plain of North China, or upon Tibet, or upon the Tarim Basin.¹ On the sub-sector where the second threshold is marked by the western edge of the North-China Plain, there is a third threshold (identical with Threshold (iii) of Sector I) at the watershed between the Hwangho and the Yangtse, and a fourth at the watershed between the basins of the Yangtse and the West River on the one side and the river-systems of Indo-China on the other. This fourth threshold was actually crossed by the Mongols about seventy years after their passage of the Great Wall.

The third sector extends from the Pamir: to the east coast of the Caspian Sea; and here the first threshold is the border between the Dasht-i-Qipchāq and the oases of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, while the second threshold is the northern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau. Eurasian Nomad invaders of South-Western Asia who succeed in mounting the Iranian Plateau and then crossing it may either turn south-eastward and descend upon the plains of the Panjab, or turn south-westward and descend upon the plains of 'Irāq, or turn north-westward and reach the Plateau of Anatolia. Thus, on this sector, the third threshold is divided into three sub-sectors which are geographically remote from one another; and a still greater distance divides the several sub-sectors of the fourth threshold of this Pamir-Caspian sector *a fortiori*. The third threshold in the Panjab leads to a fourth threshold at the line of the Ganges and to another fourth threshold at the north-western foot of the Plateau of Maharashtra; and the third threshold in 'Irāq leads to a fourth threshold on the verge of Syria and Egypt. Both Egypt and Maharashtra may seem, at first sight, inordinately remote, not only from one another, but from their common first threshold along the line between the Caspian and the Pamirs. Yet Nomad invaders who have once crossed this original line have

¹ The Tarim Basin, of course, is left uncovered by the western terminus of the Wall; but, at various times in history, the frontier of China over against the Nomads has extended beyond this point, north-westward, to Hami and Urumchi.

penetrated simultaneously, on more than one occasion, to Egypt in the one direction and to Maharashtra in the other. The Aryas in the first half of the second millennium B.C. (who broke upon Egypt as the Hyksos) and the Turks in the first half of the second millennium of the Christian Era (who reached Egypt as the Mamlûks and India as the Slave Kings) are two cases in point.¹

The fourth sector, which extends from the north coast of the Caspian to the southern end of the forest-clad Urals, is comparatively short; but the shortness of the front is compensated for by the depth of the steppe-gulf, beyond this front, which assists any horde that crosses the first threshold on this sector to push on readily and rapidly to a second, third, and fourth threshold. On this sector, the first threshold is marked by the line of the River Emba and the second by the line of the River Volga. A horde which succeeds in crossing the Volga has the choice between three lines of advance. Either it may push straight on across the Don and occupy the steppe between the west bank of the Don and the eastern face of the Carpathians; or, without crossing the Don, it may turn southward and occupy the Ciscaucasian Steppe—to be pushed, perhaps, eventually, right round the eastern end of the Caucasus Range into the steppes of Azerbaijan;² or, in the third place, it may ascend the course of the Volga and lodge itself in the northern bay of the Steppe where the Volga is joined by the Kama. Thus the second threshold on this front splays out into three sub-sectors: the Don-to-Carpathians sub-sector, the Caucasian sub-sector, and the Volga-Kama sub-sector. The Don-to-Carpathians sub-sector of the second threshold leads on, in its turn, to three choices of a third threshold. A horde which is in occupation of the Don-to-Carpathians Steppe may either turn south and enter the Crimea, or it may turn south-west and occupy Wallachia, or it may make its way across the Carpathians and ensconce itself in the basin which contains the Hungarian Alföld. Finally, a horde which has occupied Wallachia may cross the Danube and occupy the Basin of the River Maritza or even the Basin of Thessaly.

The fifth sector of the frontiers of the Eurasian Steppe extends from the Urals to the Altai and has a single threshold which approximately coincides with the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway between Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg) and Novo-Nikolayevsk.

The sixth and last sector extends from the Altai to the Kningan, and approximately coincides with the present frontier between the Soviet Republic of Outer Mongolia and the U.S.S.R.

¹ For the identity of the tracks of the Aryas and the Turks on the Pamirs-Caspian front and beyond it, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104-7, above.

² This seems to have happened to the Albanian Sarmatians and to a section of the Sevodik Magyars.

Before passing on from the Eurasian to the Afrasian Steppe, we may observe that the Eurasian Steppe is engirdled by a ring of detached and more or less outlying enclaves of steppe-country, which have sometimes played an important part in the history of Nomad eruptions out of the main body of the Eurasian Steppe because, in these enclaves, the Nomads have found new homes after their own hearts, in which they have been able to go on leading the Nomadic life under favourable conditions in the very midst of an alien sedentary world. The most famous of these enclaves is the Alföld or Puszta of Hungary. Others are the Dobruja or Scythia Minor between the right bank of the Danube, in the penultimate reach in which it flows south-and-north, and the coast of the Black Sea; the Basin of the Maritza and the Basin of Thessaly; the Axylon or treeless high steppe at the centre of the Anatolian Plateau; the Steppe of Azerbaijan, in the lower basin of the Rivers Aras and Kur; the Dasht-i-Lüt or salt desert at the centre of the Iranian Plateau; the Basin of Seistan; the Thar or Indian Desert (which is sociologically an enclave of the Eurasian Steppe, though it belongs to the Afrasian Steppe physiographically); the Kuku Nor Basin in North-Eastern Tibet; and finally the so-called 'Eastern Gobi', on the eastern side of the Khingan Range, which has been the mustering place for the Nomads who have invaded China on the sector between the Khingan Range and Korea.

Turning now to the frontiers of the Afrasian Steppe, and numbering our sectors continuously—since, in the study of Nomad eruptions, the two great steppes have to be treated as one whole—we may take, as the seventh sector in our series, the Lower Euphrates front of the Arabian portion of the Afrasian Steppe. On this Lower Euphrates front, the first threshold is the line of the Euphrates itself; the second is the south-western escarpment of the Iranian Plateau; and the third is the northern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau. (All these three thresholds were passed, in succession, by the Primitive Muslim Arabs.)

The eighth sector is the Upper Euphrates front, which has one threshold—marked by the line of the river between Hit and Jarābis—leading over into an outlying enclave of the North Arabian Steppe in the Jazīrah.

The ninth sector is the Syrian front of the Arabian portion of the Afrasian Steppe, with its first threshold along the border between the North Arabian Steppe and Syria, from Jarābis on the Euphrates to 'Aqabah on the Red Sea. The second threshold on this Syrian front splays out into two sub-sectors, one leading out of Syria into Anatolia and the other out of Syria into Egypt. The Egyptian sub-sector of the second threshold leads on, in its turn, to two further

thresholds: one leading across the Nile into the Maghrib and the other up the Nile into the Nilotic or Eastern Sudan. Finally, the third threshold towards the Maghrib leads on into the Iberian Peninsula across a fourth threshold which is marked by the Straits of Gibraltar. (The Primitive Muslim Arabs passed all these four thresholds likewise.)

Turning, now, to the African portion of the Afrasian Steppe, we may take as our tenth sector the Nile front of the Libyan Desert, over against Egypt and Nubia. This sector has a first threshold, marked by the west bank of the River Nile itself, and a second, marked by the border between Egypt and Syria. (This second threshold was passed by the Katāma Berber followers of the Fāti-mids when, after occupying Egypt in A.D. 969, they invaded Syria in or about A.D. 970.)

The eleventh sector is the border between the Libyan Desert and the cultivable plateau of the Cyrenaica.

The twelfth sector is the border between the Sahara and the Maghrib. The first threshold here is the southern escarpment of the mountains and plateaux that stretch continuously from Cape Nun on the Atlantic to Cape Bon on the Mediterranean. The second threshold is marked by the Straits of Gibraltar, across which the Saharan invaders of the Maghrib have sometimes passed over into the Iberian Peninsula.

The thirteenth sector is the opposite border of the Sahara over against the Sudan.¹

The fourteenth sector is the frontier of the South Arabian Desert over against the highlands of the Yaman. The first threshold here is the borderline between the relatively low and arid interior and the high-lying parts of the Yaman that are watered by the monsoons. There is a second threshold at the Straits of Bāb-al-Mandab, across which the Nomad invaders of the Yaman have made their way, on one occasion at least, on to the Plateau of Abyssinia.

The fifteenth sector is the frontier between the detached enclave of the Afrasian Steppe in Somaliland and Tropical Africa.

If we take an historical survey of the eruptions of Nomads out of the Steppes on all these fifteen sectors of the immensely long frontier along which the Desert marches with the Sown, and if we watch for the passage of the Nomad invaders at the fourth or third or second of the successive thresholds, as the case may be, as well as at the first, we shall make reasonably certain of including in our table all the important eruptions of which a record survives. The

¹ The Sudan is here used in the proper sense of the term which includes the whole northern fringe of Tropical Africa that is inhabited by a sedentary Negro population, from the coast of the Atlantic to the western escarpment of the Abyssinian Plateau.

Hyksos eruption, for example, will come within our ken as it crosses its fourth threshold and bursts upon Syria and Egypt, some two thousand miles beyond the line at which these Hyksos originally broke out of the Eurasian Steppe when they crossed the Jaxartes. Again, the eruption of the Cimmerians and the Scythians will come within our ken, some fifteen hundred miles from the same starting-line, as it crosses its third threshold and bursts simultaneously upon Assyria and upon Cappadocia. Conversely, there are sectors on which our earliest records, at any threshold, are of relatively recent date. On the Thirteenth or Sudanese Sector, for instance, we have no record of any Nomad eruption earlier than the eleventh century of the Christian Era. And there is one sector, the Fifteenth or Somali Sector, where we are entirely destitute of dated records, though the vast extension of Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Bantu-speaking Negroid peoples over the central and southern parts of Africa is a monument of the vigour of at least one Nomad eruption in this quarter at some unknown date in the past.

In compiling our table, we shall naturally carry it down to the present day; but, in choosing the *terminus post quem* we are to start, we shall scarcely find it worth while to make any systematic survey of any period anterior to the beginning of the second millennium B.C., considering the extreme scantiness of the record in these earlier chapters of the story. In another connexion, we have found reason for believing that the genesis of Nomadism was coeval with the geneses of the Egyptian and Sumeric civilizations;¹ and there is no reason to imagine that the occasional eruptions of the Nomads into the domains of their sedentary neighbours—a phenomenon which presents itself as far back in history as our continuous record extends—would not present itself equally in the earlier chapters if our record of these were fuller than it actually is. As a matter of fact, we are not without some evidence for Nomad eruptions in the third millennium B.C. and even in the fourth. The Asiatic invaders of Egypt who were met and repulsed by the Government of 'the Old Kingdom' in the age of the Sixth Dynasty, about the middle of the third millennium B.C., were perhaps the front line of the Amorite horde which is found already established in Syria and in process of drifting into Shinar in the latter part of that millennium; and these Amorites were not the earliest wave of Semitic-speaking Nomads to break out of the Arabian Steppe into the regions round about. The forefathers of the Semitic-speaking Akkadians, who are found established in Northern Shinar, as next-door neighbours to the Sumerians, when the curtain rises upon the history of the Tigris- and-Euphrates Basin, must have been the descendants of a Nomad

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 304-5, above.

horde which broke out of the Arabian Steppe into the Jazīrah, on the Upper Euphrates front, at some date in the fourth millennium B.C.—and this, perhaps, nearer to the beginning of that millennium than to the end of it.¹ Again, we must suppose that the first, or 'Centum-speaking', wave of Indo-European-speaking Nomads must have broken out of the Eurasian Steppe upon both Europe on the one side and the Tarim Basin on the other² at some date in the third millennium B.C., since the second, or 'Satem-speaking', wave, which subsequently followed in the first wave's wake, undoubtedly broke upon the sector of the Eurasian front between the Pamirs and the Caspian, and washed across this front as far afield as Egypt in one direction and the Panjab in the other, in the early centuries of the second millennium B.C. These fragments of evidence indicate that it may ultimately be possible to fill in our table, upwards, at least as far as the beginning of the fourth millennium if our knowledge of this age continues to be enlarged by the progress of archaeological discovery. Meanwhile, we may be content to take the beginning of the second millennium as our present starting-point for practical purposes.

In using the table that here follows, the reader is advised to keep the key-plan, on p. 420, of the fifteen 'fronts' or 'sectors', and their successive 'thresholds' or 'limina', folded out, so that he may have it under his eye all the time together with each of the pages on which the passages of particular hordes across particular 'thresholds' are set out under their dates—since, on these pages, the various 'thresholds' and 'fronts' are indicated by reference numbers only and not by name.

In order to give the reader a visual impression of the constant oscillation between the boundaries of the Nomadic and the sedentary worlds, the writer has supplemented the entries in roman type, which record the eruptions of the Nomads out of the Desert into the Sown, with a complementary series of entries in italics, which record the encroachments of the sedentary peoples upon the Steppe.

¹ The respective locations of the Akkadians and Sumerians in the third millennium, after the Land of Shinar had come to be partly in Akkadian hands, show that the Upper Euphrates front and not the Lower Euphrates front must have been the sector on which the Nomad ancestors of the Akkadians broke out of Arabia in the fourth millennium B.C. This was also the track of the Shammari and 'Anazah in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era. On the other hand, the Lower Euphrates front was the sector on which the Chaldeans broke through at the turn of the second and the last millennium B.C. and the Primitive Muslim Arabs in the seventh century of the Christian Era.

² The spread of this 'Centum-speaking' wave in an easterly as well as in a westerly direction is proved by the recent discovery, in the Tarim Basin, of written records in a Centum-language that has been labelled 'Tocharian'.

ANNEX II TO III. A

<i>Vent</i>	<i>Threshold I</i>	<i>Threshold II</i>	<i>Threshold III</i>	<i>Threshold IV</i>
2025-1725 B.C.				
<i>Vent</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>
1	Aryas + Iranians ?Thracians + Slavs		Aryas + Iranians 1. ?Thracians + Slavs	
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
			$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1. \text{ Aryas} \\ 2. \text{ Hyksos + Mi-} \\ \quad \text{tanni} \end{array} \right\}$	<p>prae 1750</p> <p>3. Hyksos</p> <p>prae 1680</p>

<i>Vent</i>	<i>Threshold I</i>		<i>Threshold II</i>		<i>Threshold III</i>		<i>Threshold IV</i>	
	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>
	1725-1425 B.C.							
<i>Vent</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>
1							3. <i>New Empire</i>	post 1580
2							v. Hyksos	
3								
4								
5								
6								
7								
8								
9								
10								
11								
12								
13								
14								
15								

<i>Vent</i>	<i>Threshold I</i>	<i>Threshold II</i>	<i>Threshold III</i>	<i>Threshold IV</i>
1125-825 B.C.				
<i>Vent</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7	Chaldaeans	continue		
8	<i>Tiglath-Pileser I</i> v. Aramaeans	prae 1100		
9	Libyans	continue		
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				

ANNEX II TO III. A

Vent	Threshold I	Threshold II	Threshold III	Threshold IV
825-525 B.C.				
1				
2				
3	{ Cimmerians } + Scythians { (? = Pactyes) }	{ Cimmerians + Scythians { Medes v. Scythians	{ 1. ? Pactyes 2. Scythians 3. Cimmerians 3. Lydians v. Cimmerians	post 700 prae 700 post 650
4	Cimmerians + Scythians + Sarmatians	{ Cimmerians + Scythians thidus 1. Greek colonists 2. Sarmatians 3. Budini	{ Tauri (Thracians) 2. Getae 3. Agathyrsi	3. Scythians Odryae
5	Scythians			
6	? Arabs			
7	Arabs			
8	Nabataeans			
9				
10				
11	Greeks colonize Cyrene			
12	Phoenicians colonize the Maghrib	? Iberians from Africa		
13				
14				
15				

ANNEX II TO III. A

<i>Yeni</i>	<i>Threshold I</i>	<i>Threshold II</i>	<i>Threshold III</i>	<i>Threshold IV</i>	
	225 B.C.—A.D. 75				
<i>Unit</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	
1	{ Hiongnu Han v. Hiongnu in Kansu Sakas { (= Missa- getae (= Jats)Yuechi (= Tochari (= Doghras)	c. 225 B.C. post 135 B.C.	{ 1. Sakas { 1. Kushans (Yuechi) { 1. Scythians 3. Sarmatians (Iazyges)	{ 1. Sakas { 2. Sakas c. 50 B.C. c. 100 A.D.	
2					
3		c. 135 B.C.			130 B.C. post 123 B.C.
4	{ 1. Sarmatians into Azerbaijan { 2. Sarmatians (Albani) into Azerbaidjan	c. 225 B.C. prae 66 B.C.		c. 200 B.C. prae 30 B.C.	
5					
6					
7					
8					
9	Arabs	127 B.C. post 100 B.C.			
10	Arabs				
11	Numidians	post 200 B.C.			
12					
13					
14					
15					

<i>Vent</i>	<i>Threshold I</i>	<i>Threshold II</i>	<i>Threshold III</i>	<i>Threshold IV</i>
	A.D. 75-375			
<i>Vent</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>
1	Sien Pi ('Pe Yen')	c. 300		
2	{ <i>Interior Horde</i> expand north-west <i>Fungu</i> ('Pe Han') + <i>To Pa</i> ('Wei') <i>Wei</i> expand north-west	post 73 c. 300 c. 370		
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8	{ <i>Christianity</i> converts <i>Osrhoene</i> <i>Palmyrenes</i> <i>Romans</i> annex <i>Nabataea</i>	prae 200 264 106		
9	{ <i>Palmyrenes</i> <i>Blennynes</i> <i>Nubians</i>	post 260 c. 270 post 284		
10				
11	{ <i>Romans</i> advance v. <i>Berbers</i> <i>Berbers</i>	1st & 2nd cents. 258		
12				
13				
14				
15				

Event	Threshold I	Threshold II	Threshold III	Threshold IV
	A.D. 675-975			
1	Horde { Khitan occupy 16 frontier districts { Khitan v. N. Turks revolt v. Tang { W. Turks + N. Turks 750 + 744	Date 696 post 927 681 + 699	Horde	Date
2	Horde { Ilak Khan v. W. Turks + Uighurs { v. N. Turks 762 893 956 + 960	Date 750 + 744 762 893 956 + 960	Horde	Date
3	Horde { Khans { Judarim converts Khazars { Chuz { Rusians v. Khazars	Date c. 750 c. 889 966	Horde { 1. Sevardik Magyars { 1. Rusians on Black Sea { 1. Pechenegs { 3. Islam converts White Bulgars	Date 791 post 800 c. 895 c. 895
4	Horde { Carmathians { Banu Hamdan { Carmathians { Banu Hamdan { Katima Berbers { Katima Berbers Ghdna dominate Tuareg	Date 914 prae 900 923 944 969 c. 860 prae 975	Horde { 3. Charlemagne v. Avars { 3. Slavaks { 3. Magyars { 2. Pechenegs	Date 755 788

ANNEX II TO III. A

Vent	Threshold I		Threshold II		Threshold III		Threshold IV	
	Horde	Date	Horde	Date	Horde	Date	Horde	Date
1	Kin	post 1114	Kin	post 1125	Mongols	post 1258	Mongols	post 1277
2	Mongols	post 1207	Mongols	post 1213	{ 1. Ghaznawia	986	{ 1. Ghaznawia	1191
3	{ Ilekh Khans	992	{ Saljūqs	1026	{ 2. Saljūqs	1041	{ 2. Saljūqs (Syria)	1071
	{ Mongols	1219	{ Ghuzz	1157	{ 3. Saljūqs	1037	{ 3. Atabeks (Egypt)	- 1164-9
4	{ Qipchāq = Cumans	c. 1050	{ Ghuzz + Cumans	c. 1055	{ 2. Ghuzz	1258	{ 3. Mongols (Syria)	1260
5	{ Mongols	1238	{ 1. Mongols	1238	{ 3. Pechenegs + Cumans	prae 1065	{ Pechenegs	1026
6	{ ? Bulgars	post 1221	{ 3. Mongols	1237	{ 3. Cumans + Mongols	1067	{ Gagauz	1065
7	{ { Carnathians	post 1200						
8	{ Banu Maryād	1012						
9	{ Banu Uqayl	986						
10	{ { Carnathians	prae 975						
11	{ { Miridāids	1011	2. Banu Hilāl	prae 1046	{ 1. Banu Hilāl	1052		
	{ { Katāma Berbers	969			{ 2. Juhaynah	post 1319		
12	{ Murābits	post 1068	{ Murābits	1086				
	{ { Normans v. Murābits	post 1134	{ { Frank v. Murābits	prae 1144				
	{ { Muwāhhids	post 1140	{ { Muwāhhids	1144				
13	{ Sanhāja (on Niger)	c. 1000	{ { Frank v. Muwāhhids	1212				
14	{ Murābits (on Niger)	post 1054						
15	{ { 'Sayfī' Arabs (on Chad)	prae 1100						

A.D. 975-1275

Vent	Threshold I	Threshold II	Threshold III	Threshold IV
A.D. 1275-1575				
Vent	Horde	Date	Horde	Date
1				
2	{ Chinese v. Mongols Mongol backwash Islam converts Chag- hatays Timur v. Nomads Uzbeks	post 1368 c. 1525 c. 1321 1362 1500	{ 1. Chinese v. Mongols 2. Lamotim converts Mongols Islam converts Il-Khans Uzbeks	c. 1355 post 1366 1295 1507
3				
4	{ Islam converts Golden Horde Muscovy conquers Saray	post 1313 1502	{ 1. Moldavians v. Lithuanians 2. Goussaks on Dnieper 3. Muscovy conquers Qazan	{ post 1350 post 1350 post 1350 1552
5				
6	{ Islam converts Sibir Cosacks v. Sibir	post 1570 1586		
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13	{ Empire of Malle Tuareg take Timbuktu Songhay v. Tuareg Moroccans cross Sahara	post 1313 1434 1469 1590	1. Genoese at Caffa 2. Wallachians v. No- gay Horde	c. 1275 post 1300
14				
15	Muhammad Gran	c. 1525	2. Fung v. Arabs	c. 1500

Veni	Threshold I		Threshold II		Threshold III		Threshold IV	
	Horde	Date	Horde	Date	Horde	Date	Horde	Date
A.D. 1575-1875								
1	Manchus { Manchus v. Inner Mongols Manchus v. Outer Mongols Manchus v. Zungaria Zungar Calmucks Russians v. Turkmens post 1870	1618 1634 1691 1758 1668 post 1870	Manchus { 2. Calmucks invade Tibet 3. Zungar Calmucks	1629 1642 1678	Manchus	1645		
3								
4	Torgut Calmucks { Russians v. Torguts	1616 1771	{ 1. Don Cossacks on Black Sea 1. Russians v. Nogay Tatars 2. Russians conquer Ciscaucasia 2. Torgut Calmucks 2. Russians v. Torguts 2. Russians conquer Azerbaijan	post 1637 post 1768 post 1552 1616 1771 post 1800	1. Russian annexation	1783		
5	Zungar Calmucks Russians v. Qazaqs Manchus v. Qazaqs	c. 1621 post 1730 post 1754						
6								
7	Shammar + Anarah Wahhabis	post 1650 1801						
8	Northern Shammar	prae 1800						
9	Wahhabis	1805	2. Mehmed 'Ali v. Wahhabis	1810	{ 2. Islam converts Wadai 2. Wadai v. Tujiyar Arabs	1612 1612		
10	Sandaliyah	post 1850						
11								
12	Tuareg (Niger) Fulbe (Niger) Awlad Sulayman (Chad) Sandaliyah (Wadai)	post 1770 post 1862 post 1750 post 1850						
13								
14	Galla (v. Abyssinia)	post 1575						
15								

<i>Vent</i>	<i>Threshold I</i>	<i>Threshold II</i>	<i>Threshold III</i>	<i>Threshold IV</i>
A.D. 1875-2175				
	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Horde</i>	<i>Date</i>
1	Chinese colonization	post 1911		
2	Chinese colonization	post 1911		
3				
4				
5				
6	Wahhabis	1922		
7	Refugee Shammar	1921		
8	Wahhabis	1924		
9	Wahhabis	1883		
10	Baggara Arabs (Mahdists)	1898		
11	British conquer E. Sudan	1930		
12	Italians v. Santuhyah	post 1900		
13	French conquer Sahara	1901		
14	French conquer Wadai	post 1926		
15	Wahhabis			

<i>The Vents from the Steppes</i>	<i>Successive Thresholds</i>			
	I	II	III	IV
<i>A. Eurasian Steppe</i>				
1. Between Korea and Khingan	Liaotung Pale	Shanhaikwan { 1. Eastern Plain 2. Tibet 3. Tarim Basin }	Hwangho-Yangtse Watershed	Tongking + Burma
2. Between Khingan and Tien Shan	Great Wall	Iran { 1. Volga and Don 2. Lower Volga 3. Kama }	Hwangho-Yangtse Watershed { 1. Panjab + Thar 2. 'Irāq 3. Anatolia 1. Crimea 2. Lower Danube 3. Hungary }	{ 1. Ganges Basin 2. Maharashtra 3. Syria + Egypt }
3. Between Pamirs and Caspian	Jaxartes			Thrace + Thessaly
4. Between Caspian and Urals	Emba			
5. Between Urals and Altai	West-Siberian Steppe			
6. Between Altai and Khingan	Baikāl Basin			
<i>B. Afrikan Steppe</i>				
7. Lower Euphrates Front	'Irāq	Iran	Oxus-Jaxartes Basin	Andalusia
8. Upper Euphrates Front	Jazirah	{ 1. Anatolia 2. Egypt 3. Syria }	{ 1. Magrib 2. Eastern Sudan }	
9. Syrian Front	Syria	Andalusia		
10. Nile Front (from the Libyan side)	Egypt + Nubia	Abyssinia		
11. Cyrenaica Front	Cyrenaica			
12. Maghrib Front	Maghrib			
13. Sudan Front	Western Sudan			
14. Yaman Front	Yaman			
15. East Africa Front	Somaliland			

This table is an attempt to display the eruptions of the Nomads and the encroachments of the sedentary peoples on a synoptic view; and, though the presentation is imperfect, it enables us to make certain general observations which may throw some light upon the causes to which these movements are to be ascribed.

One easy observation is that the Nomadic way of life is not the monopoly, nor even the special perquisite, of particular 'races' or particular linguistic groups. On the Afrasian Steppe, there have been both Semitic-speaking and Hamitic-speaking Nomads ranging side by side throughout the ages that are covered by our records; and in spite of the encroachments of the Arab Badu upon the Berber Nomads' domain from the eleventh century of the Christian Era onwards, both these linguistic families are still represented among the Afrasian Nomads at the present day. The Eurasian Steppe has witnessed more drastic vicissitudes in racial and linguistic fortunes.

At the present day, for example, the Indo-European-speaking peoples are no longer represented among the Eurasian Nomads apart from a few surviving Powindah Pathans in Afghanistan and Ossete Sarmatians who have been driven right out of the Ciscaucasian Steppe on to the northern slopes of the Caucasus Range and have been transformed, in effect, from Nomads into mountaineers. Yet, as far as we can see, the Indo-European-speaking Nomads had the Eurasian Steppe to themselves from the third millennium B.C. to the third century B.C. The earliest Eurasian Nomad neighbours of the Sinic and Sumeric worlds alike appear to have been Indo-European-speakers; it is not until the third century B.C. that the Turkish-speaking Hiongnu Nomads become prominent; and, even then, their predominance is limited at first to the hinterland of the second sector of the Eurasian frontiers, between the Khingan Range and the Tien Shan. Thereafter, in successive eruptions, these Turkish-speaking Nomads gain more and more ground in Eurasia at the Indo-European-speaking Nomads' expense, until at last, at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era, the Huns, who are the Turkish-speaking Nomads' westward advance guard, drive the Sarmatian rear-guard of their Indo-European-speaking predecessors right out of their last asylum in the great western bay of steppe-country between the Emba and the Carpathians—to lose their identity as they tumble pell-mell upon the western provinces of the Roman Empire in the company of the Goths and the Vandals.¹ From the fifth century of the Christian

¹ The absorption of a few scattered drops of this Sarmatian flood into the soil of Gaul is commemorated in the place-name *Sermaises* or *Sermaizes*, which survives down to this day here and there in France.

Era to the twelfth, the Turkish-speaking peoples had the Eurasian Steppe almost as much to themselves as their Indo-European-speaking predecessors had had it before the rise of the Hiongnu in the third century B.C. But in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era the tremendous eruption of the Mongol-speaking Tatars—in the very region which had witnessed the emergence of the Turkish-speaking Hiongnu some fourteen or fifteen centuries earlier—marked the first stage in the eviction of the Turkish-speaking peoples from the Steppes in their turn, as the Turkish-speaking peoples had formerly evicted their Indo-European-speaking predecessors. The process which was begun by the Mongol-speaking Tatars in the thirteenth century was carried farther by the Mongol-speaking Calmucks in the seventeenth century. For while the Tatars had been content, for the most part, to conquer their Turkish-speaking neighbours without displacing them, the Calmucks, who migrated *en masse*,¹ were in process of absorbing the western as well as the eastern half of the Eurasian Steppe into a Mongol-speaking domain extending from the Eastern Gobi to the Don and from the Kuku Nor to the Obi, when the process was cut short in the third quarter of the eighteenth century by the simultaneous intervention of two sedentary Powers: the Muscovite and the Manchu Empires. But for the crushing blows which were dealt, at that stage, to the expanding Calmuck Power on the Steppe

* by these two great external forces, the Calmuck expansion would doubtless have continued; and then the Turkish-speaking Qāzāqs, who still range to-day over the Dasht-i-Qipchāq from the Altai to the Caspian, would have suffered, in the eighteenth century, the fate which was inflicted upon the Iranian-speaking Sarmatians in the fourth century by the Qāzāqs' Hunnish predecessors and kinsmen.

Thus, within the centuries covered by our record, the supremacy on the Eurasian Steppe has passed successively from Indo-European-speaking to Turkish-speaking and from Turkish-speaking to Mongol-speaking hordes; and these are not the only linguistic families whose representatives have successfully taken up the Eurasian Nomad way of life. On several occasions in history, the Tungus-speaking reindeer-Nomads from the sub-arctic Tundras or Tungus-speaking hunters from the Siberian and Manchurian forests have acquired the art of horse-and-cattle Nomadism on the Eastern Gobi, between the Khingan Range and Korea, and have made their mark in history by erupting—under the successive names of Sien Pi and Khitan and Kin—across the Liao Pale and

¹ For this contrast between the Mongol movement in the thirteenth century and the Calmuck movement in the seventeenth century, see p. 397, above.

through the Shanhaikwan into China.¹ Even the Ugrian-speaking peoples, who are hunters and forest-dwellers *par excellence*, have been represented in the history of the Eurasian Nomadism by the famous horde of the Magyars, as is testified by the close affinity between the present national language of Hungary and the dialects of the West-Siberian Voguls and Ostyaks.

More important, for our present purpose, than the linguistic and racial variety of the Nomads are the synchronisms, which our table brings to light, between their eruptions out of the Desert into the Sown on different fronts.

The most striking of these synchronisms are those which cover both the Eurasian and the Afrasian Steppe at once. For example, *circa* 700 B.C., when the Cimmerians and the Scythians had arrived at the third successive 'threshold' in the course of their eruption through the passage between the Pamirs and the Caspian, the Arabs, erupting out of the Arabian portion of the Afrasian Steppe, were likewise pressing upon the Upper Euphrates from the opposite direction. Again, at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era, when the Juan Juan were breaking upon China between the Khingán and the Tien Shan and the Huns were erupting simultaneously between the Pamirs and the Caspian and between the Caspian and the Urals, the Arabs were once again pressing upon the Euphrates and upon Syria and the Berbers were invading the Roman dominions in Cyrenaica and North-West Africa. Similarly, in the middle of the eleventh century of the Christian Era, when the Saljūqs were erupting between the Pamirs and the Caspian, and the Cumans between the Caspian and the Urals, the Banu Hilāl were breaking out of Arabia across Syria and Egypt into the Maghrib, and the Murābits were breaking out of the Western Sahara into the Sudan in one direction and into Morocco and Andalusia in the other. Finally, round about the middle of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, when the Calmucks were flooding over their Mongol kinsmen's ranges towards the east and over the alien Qāzāqs' ranges towards the west, the Shammar and the 'Anazah were breaking out of Arabia and were crossing the Upper Euphrates into the Jazīrah.

There are other synchronisms which also catch the eye, though the movements here concerned are confined to the one or the other of the two great areas.

For example, on the Afrasian Steppe, the fourteenth, thirteenth, and twelfth centuries B.C. saw the Libyans pressing upon the west

¹ The most famous Tungus-speaking invaders of China hitherto have been, of course, the Manchus; but the Imperial Manchus passed straight out of a primitive hunting economy into the influence of the Far Eastern Civilization—leaving the Nomadic way of life to be adopted by their poor relations, the Solons, from their neighbours the Mongols.

bank of the Nile out of the Libyan Desert and the Aramaeans breaking out of the North Arabian Steppe into Syria. Again, at the beginning of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, when the Wāhhābīs were attempting to break out of the North Arabian Steppe into Syria and 'Irāq, the Fulbe were breaking over the Western Sudan out of the Western Sahara.

On the Eurasian Steppe, at the turn of the third and second centuries B.C., when, at one extremity, the Hiongnu were pressing upon China between the Khingan and the Tien Shan, at the other extremity the Sarmatians (Roxalani and Iazyges) were crossing the Don and occupying the western bay of the Steppe up to the eastern foot of the Carpathians. Again, about the middle of the sixth century of the Christian Era, when the [pseudo-] Avars—with the Khazars at their heels—were sweeping out of the heart of the Steppe across the Emba and the Volga and the Don and the Carpathians into the Hungarian Alföld, the Khitan were pressing upon China between the Khingan Range and Korea. Finally, in the first half of the thirteenth century, the Tatars or Mongols erupted out of the Eurasian Steppe on almost every front simultaneously: between Khingan and Tien Shan, between Pamirs and Caspian, between Caspian and Urals, between Urals and Altai. Conversely, round about the middle of the fourteenth century, there were simultaneous encroachments upon the epigoni of Chingis Khan on the part of almost all the sedentary peoples round about. In the Far East, the founder of the Ming Dynasty overthrew the Yuen Dynasty and expelled its Mongol henchmen out of China into the Steppes, on the northern side of the Great Wall, out of which they had issued a century and a half before.¹ In the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, Timur Lenk simultaneously established the ascendancy of the oasis-dwellers over the hordes of Chaghatāy and Jūjī.² And, in the great western bay of the Steppe, the Nomads' cattle-ranges were simultaneously reclaimed for the plough by the Rumanian highlanders who descended out of Transylvania into the plains at the foot of the Carpathians which they converted into Wallachia and Moldavia; and by the Lithuanians who broke out of the North European forest between the Bug and the Dniepr and pushed their way right down to the Black Sea coast;³ and by the Cossacks who ensconced themselves on an island in the River Dniepr itself.⁴ There was a corresponding synchronism in the middle of the eighth century of the Christian Era when the Nomadism of the Khazar Power on the Volga and the Nomadism of the Uighur

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 121-2, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 144-50, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 172, above.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 154-7, above.

Power in Zungaria were conquered simultaneously—not by alien ploughs but by alien faiths.¹

Having observed these synchronisms both in the eruptions of the Nomads out of the Desert into the Sown and in the encroachments of their sedentary neighbours from the Sown upon the Desert, we are now in a position to observe that the eruptions and the encroachments are apt to alternate with one another.

This observation is easiest to make in the outlying enclaves of the Steppe and in its tapering gulfs.

For example, in the Hungarian Alföld, when the curtain rises upon its history at the moment of Darius's expedition against the Scythians towards the close of the sixth century B.C., we find in occupation a Nomad horde: the Agathyrsi.² About the fourth century B.C., the Agathyrsi are superseded on the Alföld by Celts who have pushed their way down the valley of the Danube out of the Central European forests. Before the end of the last century B.C., however, the *Βολών ἐρημία*³ is once more occupied by Nomads—this time by the Sarmatian Iazyges, who have made their way, since Darius's day, from the east bank of the Don to the western side of the Carpathians. Thereafter, the Romans succeed in cooping the Iazyges up into the quadrilateral between the Danube and the Theiss, until, about A.D. 400, the Alföld is recovered for Nomadism by the horde of Huns that produces Attila. After the evaporation of Attila's power, the Alföld is occupied for a century by a fresh band of sedentary North European barbarians: the Gepidae. In A.D. 567 the Gepidae are destroyed and replaced by the Nomad [pseudo-]Avars. In A.D. 791 the Avars, in their turn, are crushed by Charlemagne, and the Alföld is again occupied by sedentary North European barbarians: the Slovaks. In A.D. 895 it

¹ The Khazars were converted at this time to Judaism and the Uighurs to Manichaeism.

² It is assumed here that the Agathyrsi were Nomads, and that they were a fraction of the same horde as the Odrysae who were the contemporary masters of the Maritsa Basin. (The names are very close to one another if we may suppose that the δ in 'Odrysae' is the Macedonian δ for θ and that the Ag- in 'Agathyrsi' is a distinguishing prefix.) On the strength of Herodotus iv. 48, where the River Maros is said to rise among the Agathyrsi, it is sometimes suggested that the Agathyrsi were a sedentary people inhabiting Transylvania; but this does not necessarily follow, since Transylvania has often been under the rule of Nomads whose own home has been on the Alföld. For example, at any time during the last 1,000 years, it would have been a natural thing to say that the Maros rises 'in the country of the Magyars'. In their European settlements, the Agathyrsi in the Alföld and the Odrysae in the Maritsa Basin were separated from one another by the Getae, who ranged over the plains of the Lower Danube Basin between the Carpathians and the Haemus (i.e. the European Balkan). Further eastward, in the mouth of the great western bay of the Eurasian Steppe, between the Volga and the Emba, there was a contemporary horde called the Thyssagetae, whose name may possibly record a coalescence of one branch of the Getae with one branch of the Athyrsi or Odrysae into a single people.

³ Strabo, p. 292. The country was desolate in Strabo's time because the Boii had been exterminated by Boerebistas, the Dacian prince of Transylvania (Strabo, pp. 213, 304, 313). In creating this vacuum on the Alföld, the Dacians were unintentionally preparing the ground for the Iazyges, as, some six centuries later, the Lombards exterminated the Gepidae for the benefit of the Avars.

is won back for Nomadism, once more, by the irruption of the Magyars. At the beginning of the eleventh century, the Magyars are converted to Western Christianity and are incorporated into the body social of the Western Society; but in A.D. 1241 this work of conversion and civilization is almost undone when the Alföld is half swamped by the pagan Nomad Cumans who burst in from the east, on the track of the Magyars, with the Mongols at their heels. It is only after the sudden ebb of the Mongol tide in the same year that the Cuman refugees on the Alföld are gradually converted and assimilated, like the Magyars before them. Therewith, the sedentary civilization of the West prevails in the Alföld over the Eurasian Nomadism. Yet, in this year 1241, it would be rash to assert too confidently that the Hungarian Alföld will never be the home of a Nomad horde again.

We can observe a still longer series of alternations in the adjacent bay of the Eurasian Steppe between the eastern foot of the Carpathians and the west bank of the Don.

In this field, when the curtain rises in the sixth century B.C., we find the Nomad Scythians in possession; but their domain is already being nibbled away simultaneously by interlopers from two sides: from the sea side by the Greek commercial establishments that have been planted along the north coast of the Black Sea, and from the interior by 'the agricultural Scythians' whose presence and activity on the Black Earth Belt has been tolerated by their Nomad masters, 'the Royal Scythians', in order that they may pay in exports of grain for imports of Hellenic luxuries. Soon after the turn of the fourth and third centuries B.C., the Nomad Scythians are supplanted altogether in their westernmost ranges by a band of North European barbarians the (German?) Bastarnae, as the Scythians' neighbours and fellow Nomads, the Agathyrsi in the Alföld, had been supplanted in the fourth century by the Celts. Before the end of the third century, however, the north-to-south movement of the Bastarnae down the valley of the Dniestr is countered by a fresh east-to-west movement of Nomads: this time, the Sarmatians from the east bank of the Don. In the third century of the Christian Era, the westernmost of these Sarmatians, the Roxalani, are effaced in their turn by another band of North European barbarians, the Goths, who migrate, down the valley of the Dniepr, from the seaboard of the Baltic to the seaboard of the Black Sea. About A.D. 375, the Goths are blown right off the Steppes into the heart of Europe by the explosive irruption of the Huns from the far side of the Volga; but the Huns recede, and in the sixth century of the Christian Era the western end of the Don-to-Carpathians Steppe is occupied by fresh North Euro-

pean barbarians, the Slavs, who drift southward on the track of the Bastarnae and the Goths. This drift is so strong that it silts up into Wallachia, passes the Danube, and fills the depopulated interior of the Balkan Peninsula with a Slavonic population right down to the Morea.¹ But in the middle of the sixth century this Slav drift is cut short by the irruption of the Nomad [pseudo-] Avars; and at the close of the seventh century the Nomad Bulgars, whom the Avars have cut through and left still in being in their wake, cross over from the north to the south bank of the Danube and impose their rule upon the Slav vanguard in the Balkan Peninsula. In the middle of the ninth century a fresh band of North European barbarians, the Scandinavian Varangians or Russians, make their way down the Dniepr, in the track of the Goths, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Between A.D. 889 and A.D. 895, the Russians' track is crossed by the Magyar Nomads, who are driven westward, by the Pechenegs at their back, first across the Dniepr and then across the Carpathians into the Alföld. In the tenth century, the Russians return again. About A.D. 966, they exterminate the Khazars at the mouths of the Don and the Volga; and Svyatoslav's ensuing invasion of the Bulgarian and East Roman dominions, on the south side of the Danube, in A.D. 967-72, has its counterpart in the contemporary maritime raids against the Caspian provinces of the 'Abbasid Caliphate.² But in the middle of the eleventh century the Russians are cut off, once more, from the Caspian and the Black Sea and the Balkans by the irruption, from the far side of the Volga, of the Nomad Ghuzz followed up by the Nomad Cumans or Qipchāq; and in the middle of the thirteenth century this Nomad counterstroke is repeated, with vastly greater force, by the irruption of the Mongols, who establish their suzerainty over Russia itself. But the Mongol flood-tide ebbs almost as swiftly as it has flowed. Before the thirteenth century is over, the Venetian and Genoese mariners are establishing their

¹ If Morea is not the Greek word for mulberry-leaf but is really a Slavonic word meaning 'sea-country' (like the names of the present German province of *Po-merania* on the Baltic and the present Russian province of *Po-morskaya* on the Sea of Japan), then the word Morea is a living record of the Slavonic occupation of the peninsula which is more famous under its previous name of the Peloponnese. Some of the Moreot Slav communities retained their identity down to the French conquest of the Morea in the thirteenth century; and the present place-names testify to their former ubiquity. At the present day, the language introduced into the Balkan Peninsula by these Slav immigrants via Moldavia and Wallachia in the sixth century survives as the Slavonic language which is now called Bulgarian (though the original Bulgars were Turkish-speaking Nomads from the Steppe by whom the Balkan Slavs were conquered at the close of the seventh century). The other living Slavonic language in South-Eastern Europe, which is known as Serbo-Croat, was introduced by a different swarm of Slavs—the Serbs (or Sorabians) and the Croats (or Chrobatians)—whose right wings replaced the previous German occupants of Galicia and Silesia and Lusatia, while the left wings of the same two Slav peoples made their way through the Moravian Gap and pushed across the Alföld, or worked their way round the western rim of the Alföld, till they reached the Adriatic.

² See II. D (vii), Annex VI, vol. ii, p. 438, above.

trading-posts along the same coast on which the Ancient Greek mariners had established themselves some eighteen or nineteen centuries back, in the age when the same steppe was occupied by the Scythians. And, in the middle of the fourteenth century, the pasture-lands of the Nomads in this quarter are nibbled away, along their inland border, by the encroachments of the Wallachians and Moldavians and Lithuanians and Cossacks. In the sixteenth century the Muscovites deal the Nomads a still heavier blow by conquering from the epigoni of the Mongols those points of vantage on the Volga which had been conquered by the Varangian Russians, six hundred years before, from the epigoni of the Khazars. In the seventeenth century, the Don Cossacks emulate the Varangians of the ninth century and the Goths of the third century by launching their piratical craft upon the waters of the Black Sea. But at this moment history makes a motion to repeat itself yet again; for in the seventeenth century the newly established Muscovite frontier along the Lower Volga is broken by the irruption of a fresh horde of Nomads from the east, the Torgut Calmucks. It is only in A.D. 1771, when the Calmuck tide ebbs back across the Volga and right back across the Kazak Steppes,¹ that the ascendancy of the sedentary life over Nomadism in the western gulf of the Eurasian Steppe is asserted decisively; and even to-day it would be rash to declare that the last chapter in this chequered story had now unfolded itself.²

Thus, in the Hungarian enclave and in the Ukrainian gulf of the great Eurasian Steppe, we have two recorded series of alternate advances and retreats in a secular conflict between the Eurasian Nomads on the one hand and the sedentary peoples of Central and Northern Europe on the other. In the Ukrainian series, the alternations are: Scythians, *Bastarnae*, Sarmatians, *Goths*, Huns, *Slavs*, Bulgars, *Russians*, Pechenegs, *Russians*, Cumans+Mongols, *Wallachians+Moldavians+Lithuanians+Cossacks+Muscovites*, Calmucks, *Muscovites*. In the Hungarian series, the alternations are: Agathyrsi, *Celts*, Iazyges, *Romans*, Huns, *Gepidae*, Avars, *Franks+Slovaks*, Magyars, *Conversion of the Magyars*, Cumans+Mongols, *Recession of the Mongols and Conversion of the Cumans*.

If we take a comparative view of the histories of the Scythians and the Khazars and the Golden Horde of the Mongols on the western bay of the Eurasian Steppe, we can draw something like a typical pic-

¹ See Thomas de Quincey's *Revolt of the Tartars: or, Flight of the Calmuck Khan and his People from the Russian Territories to the Frontiers of China* (reprinted in the *Collected Writings of Thomas de Quincey*, edited by David Masson, vol. vii (London 1897, Black), pp. 368-421).

² Even after the Calmuck recession of A.D. 1771, the Calmuck flood of the seventeenth century has left its mark in the isolated pool of Calmuck Nomads that still lies between the lower courses of the Volga and the Don.

ture of the history of a Nomad horde which happens to be carried away in one of the eruptive movements that we are now studying.

In the first chapter of the story, the horde erupts out of the heart of the Steppe into the debatable borderland, in the bay, from which these incoming Nomads evict a previously-settled sedentary population. In this chapter, the Nomadism of the Desert gains ground at the expense of the sedentary culture of the Sown; but in the second chapter a reaction declares itself; for, as the Steppe simmers down from effervescence into quiescence, the new Nomad occupants, who have arrived as unmitigated Nomads from the far interior of Eurasia, become more and more affected and diluted by sedentary influences. The Royal Scythians allow the Greek maritime traders, and the Golden Horde allows the Italian maritime traders, to establish themselves on the north coast of the Black Sea; and, simultaneously, the agricultural peoples of Central and Northern Europe, who have been driven temporarily right off the field by the first impact of the Nomad new-comers in the first chapter of the story, begin to recover their ground either as tolerated and exploited subjects of the Nomad lords of the Steppe (the relation of 'the Agricultural Scythians' to 'the Royal Scythians' in the fifth century B.C. and of the Slav peoples in the Dniepr Basin to the Khazars in the ninth century of the Christian Era) or else as their conquerors (the relation of the Wallachians and Moldavians and Lithuanians and Dniepr Cossacks to the western outposts of the Golden Horde). In either situation, the economic outcome is the same. The grain of the Black Earth Belt and the furs of the northern forests come to be exchanged for the sea-borne luxuries of the Levant, and in this trade the Nomad masters of the Steppe sink into the position of parasites who take their toll, as far as their force avails, without contributing any positive economic service. In the third and last chapter, the parasitism of the Nomads eliminates itself. The Nomads succumb to the charms of the civilizations of the South. The Scythian prince Scyles 'goes Helene';¹ the Khaqan of the Khazars is converted to Judaism, and the Khan of the Golden Horde to Islam. This penchant towards the sedentary life and culture, which declares itself first among the

¹ For the Philhellenism of Scyles, see Herodotus, Bk. IV, chs. 78-80; and compare the attraction which was exerted upon the Calmucks, in the same region, by the Russian variety of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, as described by Courant in op. cit., on pp. 132-3. Compare, in particular, the foundation, in A.D. 1737, of the town of Stavropol for the Calmuck converts from Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism to Orthodox Christianity. The privilege of residence within the urban precincts of Stavropol was confined to the notables, while the rank-and-file continued to live in the surrounding open country. This is a precise parallel to the relation between Scyles and his tribesmen when Scyles was leading his double life as a Scythian chieftain and a citizen of the Hellenic city-state of Borysthenes—except that Scyles had to apostatize *sub rosa* because, in the fifth century B.C., Nomadism was politically dominant in the western bay of the Steppe and Urbanism was only there on sufferance.

notables, is violently, though unsuccessfully, resisted by the rank and file; and, in the event, the antipathy of the irreconcilables is justified; for the converted Nomad fails to hold the ground which his unconverted forbears had won for him in their original eruption. In the grand finale of the third and last chapter of the story, the epigoni of the Nomad intruders, having been demoralized by the cultural influences of the sedentary South, are overwhelmed by a fresh descent of the sedentary Northern barbarians. The Scythians are partially disinherited by the Bastarnae, the Khazars are annihilated by the Varangians; the Golden Horde are annihilated by the Muscovites. And, therewith, the debatable territory passes back out of Nomad hands into sedentary hands, until a fresh irruption of another Nomad horde out of the heart of the Steppe starts a repetition of this social cycle.

If we now view these alternations in connexion with the synchronisms which we have noticed above, we shall perceive that our table of Nomad eruptions is beginning to reveal a regular pattern of movements which are periodical in Time and uniform in Space over the whole extent of the Steppes from the Atlantic coast of the Sahara to the Great Wall of China. In order to make this pattern clearer to the reader's eye, the eruptions recorded in the table have been grouped in periods of three hundred years each; and the reader will see at a glance that the alternating movement which we have brought to his attention above in two local fields reappears in the picture of the entire field when the eruptions are grouped in these three-hundred-year periods. The overwhelming majority of the recorded eruptions fall within the periods 2025-1725 B.C., 1425-1125 B.C., 825-525 B.C., 225 B.C.-A.D. 75, A.D. 375-675, A.D. 975-1275, and A.D. 1575-1875. Conversely, the overwhelming majority of the entries in the alternate periods—1725-1425 B.C., 1125-825 B.C., 525-225 B.C., A.D. 75-375, A.D. 675-975, and A.D. 1275-1575—are records of movements in the contrary direction: that is to say, records of encroachments on the Nomads' domain on the part of the surrounding sedentary peoples and cultures and religions.

If we concentrate our attention in the first place upon the alternate three-hundred-year periods of effervescence, and look into the dates more closely, we shall see that, within each of these spans of three centuries, it is the first century of the three that is the most vigorously eruptive. The century A.D. 1575-1675 contains the eruptions of the Zungar and the Torgut Calmucks and the Shammar and the 'Anazah Arabs; the century A.D. 975-1075 contains the eruptions of the Saljūq and the Cuman Turks and the Banu Hilāl Arabs and the Murābit Berbers; the century A.D. 375-

475 contains the eruptions of the Juan Juan and the Huns; the century 225-125 B.C. contains the eruptions of the Hiongnu and the Yuechi and the Sarmatians; the century 825-725 B.C. contains, in all probability, the eruption of the Cimmerians and the Scythians (though our earliest news of the eruption dates from not much earlier than 700 B.C., with the arrival of the stream of invaders at the third of the successive 'thresholds' beyond the line of their original exit from the Eurasian Steppe on the sector between the Pamirs and the Caspian);¹ the century 1425-1325 B.C. contains the eruption of the Aramaeans and probably also the eruption of the Libyans; the century 2025-1925 B.C. contains, in all probability, the eruption of the Aryas who break upon Egypt subsequently, *circa* 1680 B.C., as the Hyksos. This list does not include all the principal eruptions that are on record. For example, the eruption of the Primitive Muslim Arabs occurred in the last and not in the first century of the effervescent period A.D. 375-675; the eruption of the Mongols in the last and not in the first century of the effervescent period A.D. 975-1275; the eruption of the Turks and [pseudo-]Avars in the second and not in the first century of the effervescent period A.D. 375-675. And these are some of the most celebrated Nomad eruptions in history. At the same time, from the statistical standpoint, the concentration of Nomad eruptions into the particular centuries which we have enumerated is clearly marked; and the reader will have perceived that these centuries of maximum effervescence occur at regular intervals of six hundred years. On this showing, it looks as though the phenomenon of occasional Nomad eruptions out of the Desert into the Sown has a rhythm of its own which is as regular, on its own scale, as the Nomad's annual trek in search of seasonal pasture. While the movement in search of pasture has a year period, the eruptive movement appears to have a six-hundred-year period.

¹ Herodotus (Bk. IV, ch. 12) says that the Cimmerians who invaded Anatolia and the Scythians who invaded Iran both came via the Caspian Sea—*the Cimmerians down the east coast of the Black Sea, the Scythians round the south-eastern end of the Caucasus Range*. If these tracks were proven, they would be unique; for *all other known Eurasian Nomad invaders of South-Western Asia have erupted out of the Steppe through the gap between the Caspian and the Pamirs; and though some Nomads (Albanians, Alans, Huns, Sevordik) have occasionally forced the passage of the Caspian Derbend, their raids have been ephemeral and their settlements no further afield than Azerbaijan*. As a matter of fact, Herodotus's statement is not valid evidence that the Cimmerians and Scythians who burst upon Assyria *circa* 700 B.C. did not take the usual route south of the Caspian and across the Iranian Plateau; for the context shows that the statement rests not upon testimony but upon inference. Herodotus finds that in his own day there are real live Scythians on the western bay of the Steppe, north of the Black Sea, and that the former presence of Cimmerians in the same region is attested by the local place-names. He infers that the Cimmerians and Scythians who had harried South-Western Asia two or three hundred years earlier must have come from this region. This inference, however, is discredited by the historical analogies, which make it far more likely that the Cimmerians and Scythians on the Black Sea Steppe and the Cimmerian and Scythian invaders of South-Western Asia were two parallel streams which had separated already before their respective passages of the Emba and the Jaxartes.

If the reality of this six-hundred-year cycle of eruption is a fair inference from the facts and dates that are assembled synoptically in our table, it is immediately evident that this cycle cannot be explained as an effect of the pull which is exerted upon the Nomads by their sedentary neighbours; for this would mean that, every six hundred years, a vacuum, inviting a Nomad irruption, simultaneously arises in the social structure of every sedentary society that marches with every sector of the frontiers of the Afrasian and Eurasian steppes, from the Sudan to Western Siberia and from Hungary to Manchuria; and it is manifest that the histories of the sedentary societies display no trace whatever of any such symmetrical periodicity. On the other hand, if we think of explaining our six-hundred-year cycle of Nomad eruption as the effect of a climatic push and not of a human pull, we shall find that our hypothesis is reconcilable with the climatic theories of at least one modern school of climatologists.

This school, whose most eminent representative is Dr. Ellsworth Huntington, believes that there is a periodic shift in the location of the successive climatic zones that encircle the globe latitudinally, so that, in the Northern Hemisphere (with which we are exclusively concerned for present purposes), the arid sub-tropical zone, which lies between the humid tropical zone and the temperate zone, is oscillating all the time, with a regular periodicity, between two extreme geographical positions, in one of which it is nearer to the Equator, while in the other it is nearer to the North Pole. This theory of a periodic shift in the geographical location of the climatic zones has engaged our attention in this Study already, apropos of the geneses of the Mayan and Yucatec civilizations and the floruit of the Syriac Civilization in the oases of the North Arabian Steppe.¹ Let us now consider the bearings of the theory upon our present problem of periodic Nomad eruptions out of the Desert into the Sown.

From our present standpoint, we shall observe that, if and when the arid zone shifts northwards, there will then be an accentuation of its aridity (and, therewith, a diminution in its capacity for supporting life, even on the Nomadic economy) in the parts adjoining the temperate zone. The former southern fringe of the temperate zone will turn into the northern fringe of the Steppe, while the former northern fringe of the Steppe, in which the aridity has previously been at its minimum, will become the region of maximum desiccation. (Simultaneously, of course, the former southern fringe of the Steppe will turn into the northern fringe of the Tropics, while the region in which the aridity has been previously at its

¹ See II. D (vii), Annex I, vol. ii, above.

maximum will now be moistened by the northernmost precipitation of the monsoons.) Conversely, if and when the arid zone shifts southwards, there will be a mitigation of its aridity (and, therewith, an increase in its capacity for supporting life, even by means of agriculture in substitution for Nomadism) in the parts adjoining the temperate zone. The recent northern fringe of the Steppe will once more become the southern fringe of the temperate zone, while the northern fringe of the Steppe will fall back southwards into the area which has recently been the region of maximum aridity. (And simultaneously, on the southern border of the arid zone, the Steppe will compensate itself for its losses to the temperate zone in the north by recovering ground at the expense of the tropical forest.)

Now, if the frontiers between the several climatic zones were ideally straight lines, all running precisely parallel to the Equator and to one another, and if the geneses and growths of sedentary societies were just as rife in the tropical zone as they are in the temperate zone, then the social effect of a periodic oscillation in the positions of the climatic zones would be that, during the northward swing of the climatic pendulum, the Nomads would erupt out of the Steppes northwards into the domains of the temperate-zone sedentary societies, while during the southward swing of the pendulum they would erupt into the domains of the tropical-zone sedentary societies, southwards. In other words, the alternating rhythm of the climate would duly translate itself into an alternating rhythm of Nomad eruptions, but this latter rhythm would not be the actual rhythm which we have detected by empirical observation. The direction of the eruptions would alternate, whereas the alternating rhythm of eruption would be unintermittent, whereas the alternating rhythm of eruption which we have actually observed is not an alternation in direction between northward and southward outbreaks but an alternation in intensity between bouts of relative effervescence and bouts of relative quiescence.

At first sight, it may look as though these empirically observed social facts could not be explained by the theory of oscillating climatic zones after all. But the social facts and the climatic theory fall into harmony with each other as soon as we take account of the disposition of the climatic zones *de facto*. *De facto*, the ideal *a priori* disposition of the climatic zones in precisely parallel bands, all running due east and west, is thrown out entirely, on the real map, by a number of potent disturbing factors, such as the distribution of the land and water surfaces of the globe and the articulation of the land-surface into highlands and lowlands. In the outcome, the arid zone is deflected, on the African and Asiatic

land-surfaces of the Northern Hemisphere, from a west-and-east to a south-westerly-to-north-easterly direction; and, in consequence of this deflexion, the arid zone, instead of running evenly between the temperate zone and the tropical zone from side to side of these two continents, breaks contact altogether with the tropical zone and burrows its way into the heart of the temperate zone before it reaches its eastern extremity in Asia.

In the terminology which we are employing in this Study, this means that the Steppes march with the temperate zone on no less than twelve, and with the tropical zone on only three, out of the fifteen sectors into which we have divided the total length of the frontiers between the Desert and the Sown on the African and Asiatic land-surfaces of the Northern Hemisphere. The Eurasian Steppe actually marches with the temperate zone on every front, and the Afrasian Steppe marches with it on six fronts out of nine. The three fronts on which the Afrasian Steppe marches with the tropical zone are the Sudan Front and the Yaman Front and the East Africa Front, and it is only on rare occasions that, on the two African fronts in this group of three, the Afrasian Nomadism has been in contact with a sedentary civilization. Except on the Yaman front, the Afrasian as well as the Eurasian Nomadism has been in contact with sedentary civilizations almost exclusively on the fronts that march with the temperate zone.

The upshot of all these facts taken together is that, if the climatic zones did really shift to and fro periodically on the 'lay-out' of the *de facto* climatic map, then the eruptions of the Nomads out of their own domain into the domains of the adjoining sedentary civilizations would occur almost exclusively in times when the shift of climates was taking place from south to north, and only to a negligible extent during the contrary shifts from north to south. In other words, the north-to-south phase of the cycle would translate itself, in the life of the Nomad occupants of the Steppes, *vis-à-vis* the sedentary civilizations, into a phase of relative social quiescence, and the south-to-north phase of the climatic cycle into a phase of relative social effervescence. Now these are precisely the alternating phases which we have detected in the life of the Nomads by empirical observation; and this means that these results of our empirical social observation do admit of an explanation in terms of the climatological theory of a periodic oscillation of climatic zones which Dr. Ellsworth Huntington has built up out of his study of lake-strands and river-beds and tree-rings.

The way in which the Eurasian and Afrasian Nomad is affected by the accentuation of the aridity of his physical environment during a northward shift in the periodic oscillation of the

climatic zones is depicted by Dr. Ellsworth Huntington himself as follows:

'Under the influence of climatic pulsations, the change from prosperity to adversity is usually much more abrupt than from adversity to prosperity. . . . In the deserts, the Nomads increase in number, and their flocks attain great proportions. The crest of a climatic wave is reached. The settled nations, dwelling in the best agricultural lands, feel no distress. The change is too slight to trouble them. They proceed with their plans for expansion and growth. The Nomad, on the contrary, feels the difference at once. At first it does not disturb him greatly unless the population has attained an uncommon degree of density. Soon, however, he comes into conflict with his fellow Nomads, for all move to the best pasturage and most permanent waters. Conditions become similar to those under which the herdsmen of Isaac strove with those of Abimelech in Gerar after a time of famine. The weaker party is driven out, and begins to wander in search of new pastures and springs. Conflict follows conflict. At length the tribes which have often been driven forth grow desperate. Impelled by despair, they pour forth in wild hordes upon the nations round about.'¹

The same tension, resulting in the same resolution of forces, is expressed in mathematical terms in a communication which the writer has been so fortunate as to receive from an eminent physicist:

[If we isolate the climatic factor from other factors,] 'the different effects of a change of climate on an agricultural and on a pastoral community may be realized at a glance.

'Suppose, for instance, that we are considering an agricultural community of n families spread over an area of s square kilometres. Each family will have an average holding of s/n square kilometres which in a steady state will be sufficient to support it. Presumably they will take all steps by irrigation and intensive cultivation to get as much as possible out of the land, and the families will be regulated, by infanticide or otherwise, to maintain a steady maximum population per unit area. Near the periphery, of course, the families will tend to be greater, and new families will be founded and new land gradually brought under cultivation. In the interior, however, the population must be kept constant. Now suppose the rainfall increases. The same yield can be obtained from the land with less work. The course of those families which live near the edge of the community is simple; they find that they can cultivate more land with the same effort, so they increase their holding and expand and multiply. The number of these families whose farms are bounded by unoccupied territory will be of the order $\pi\sqrt{n}$. On the other hand, there is no room for the families in the interior to found fresh farms; so that they must keep their numbers practically

¹ Huntington, Ellsworth: *Palestine and its Transformation* (London 1911, Constable), pp. 400-1.

constant, whatever the climate. Hence an improvement in the climate will only cause an increase of the order $\pi\sqrt{n}$, i.e. a fraction $\pi\sqrt{n}$ of the normal n families.

'The results are very different when we consider the effect of an increased rainfall upon the population in a pastoral community. Here no efforts are made to cultivate the soil, and we have numerous families or tribes dotted about at a considerable distance from one another. Presumably here also the number of members of each tribe will be regulated so that they can just be supported by the produce of the maximum head of cattle which can be grazed on the land available. But there would seem to be an economic limit beyond which it would not pay to go on increasing the size of the flock or—what is proportional to this—the number of any one pastoral family. When the flocks become too large they are cumbrous to handle, a considerable organization becomes necessary, and in a primitive community the tribe will tend to break up into two smaller units.

'It is easy to predict what will happen in a community such as this if the climate changes, e.g. the rainfall increases. The ground will become more fertile and a larger number of animals, and consequently men, can be supported per unit area. Hence each flock will increase—not only those at the periphery, as in the agricultural community—and all the n families will increase. As pointed out above, this will probably result in an increase in the number of families rather than in the numbers of each tribe; but the important point is that a considerable increase will occur in the total number of human occupants of the unit area.

'If we contrast the two instances, we see that the essential difference lies in the rate of change in the population following a change in climate. In the agricultural community of n families, $\pi\sqrt{n}$ families will increase and multiply abnormally fast. In the pastoral community, all the n families or tribes will be augmented. Only the periphery will be affected in the agricultural community; the whole country will be affected in the pastoral community. Hence, if the climate improves, the population of the agricultural region is only increased very slowly, whereas the population of the Steppe increases with scarcely any lag.

'We can easily foresee what will happen if the climate becomes worse and the country less fertile. The agricultural peoples will experience times of famine and die off. They could not help themselves by enlarging their farms, even if there were room; for only those at the periphery can expand without infringing on their neighbours, and anyhow one family can only cultivate a given amount of land. The pastoral people, however, will not be in the same case. Each tribe will realize that it could exist quite well if only the grazing-ground were not in the possession of neighbouring tribes. It will try to oust the neighbouring tribes; and, since the whole Steppe is affected, there will be a simultaneous tendency to overflow into the surrounding territories.'¹

¹ Communication to the writer from Professor F. A. Lindemann, Dr. Lee's Professor of Experimental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. The following observations, apropos of the hypothetical community of cultivators, are made by Mr. G. F. Hudson:

The ubiquitous effect of the climatic factor upon the whole of the Steppe and upon the whole muster-roll of the Nomad hordes that are in occupation of it is not only postulated *a priori* by the mathematical considerations which are set out in the passage just quoted, but is also demonstrated empirically by the frequency of the phenomenon of eruptions in successive waves, in which the first horde that breaks out of the fringe of the Desert into the fringe of the Sown turns out to be propelled from behind by a second horde, erupting out of the deeper interior of the Steppe and following in rapid succession at the first horde's heels. Thus, in all probability, the Aryas are propelled out of the Steppe by the Iranians, and certainly the Cimmerians by the Scythians, the Sakas by the Yuechi (and the Yuechi themselves by the Hiongnu), the Avars by the Khazars, the Magyars by the Pechenegs, the Ghuzz by the Cumans, the Shammar by the 'Anazah.¹ This phenomenon of a double wave is usually, though not invariably,² an indication that the force by which the particular eruption has been set in motion has been at work in the interior of the Steppe and not merely on the periphery; and this in turn points to the force in question being the climatic push of desiccation on the Steppe itself, and not the social pull of a vacuum in the sedentary region into which the particular eruption happens to discharge itself, since this latter force would only affect the Nomad hordes along the border.

Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's theory of a periodic oscillation of climatic zones implies, of course, that the resulting climatic pulsation is not only common to the whole area of the Steppe but is actually world-wide; and in his long-continued and widely extended investigation he has established some remarkable correlations between the findings of his physiological researches in Asia

'In the marginal belt between arid and high-rainfall country, it surely makes all the difference whether the rainfall is ample or insufficient to raise crops. Thus, in the Middle Volga Black Earth Belt, which is extremely fertile but is liable to famine every now and then owing to the failure of rainfall (e.g. the famine of 1921, which caused peasants to emigrate wherever they could), a few inches more or less makes all the difference between dense population and complete uninhabitability; for, whereas an increase of aridity on the Steppe means that fewer Nomads can live on it, a decline of rainfall below the minimum necessary for dry cultivation means that no peasants can stay in the area affected (at least, none without relief, bank credits and what not). Professor Lindemann is apparently assuming that the settled land is universally made to give the maximum yield of which it is in any circumstances capable, so that no change of climate except a period of extreme drought can make any difference to it; but this is to make the problem highly abstract and hypothetical. I think he is right in saying that the same climatic change would make a greater increase of Nomads on the Steppe than of peasants in what would normally be a high-rainfall area; but in the marginal belt of fluctuation I think the fluctuations of population are likely to be the most violent of all.'

¹ The phenomenon of the double wave, as illustrated in the propulsion of the Cimmerians by the Scythians in the eruption of 825-725 B.C., made such an impression upon the first Hellenic student of Nomadism, Aristaeus of Proconnesus, that he came to regard a chain of pressures as the normal relation between neighbouring Nomad hordes, whereas in reality this is only normal in the abnormal circumstances of an eruption. (For Aristaeus' theory, see Herodotus, Bk. IV, ch. 13.)

² e.g. not in the case of the Magyars and the Pechenegs (see pp. 441-3, below).

and in North America. The result of this work is summed up graphically in a pair of curves—one derived from measurements of Californian tree-rings and the other from observations of the levels of Western and Central Asiatic lakes and inland seas—which register the respective fluctuations in the climates of these two widely separated regions (on the criterion of relative humidity or aridity) from 1300 B.C. to A.D. 1900.¹ The two curves manifestly correspond in a general way with one another. We have still to see whether they show any correspondence with the six-hundred-year cycle of Nomad explosions which we have surmised from the historical evidence as set out above in our table.

Dr. Huntington himself remarks² that his two curves 'have a length of centuries but do not show any regular periodicity'. We may add that the tree-ring curve, which is the better substantiated, is also the more highly irregular of the two. At the same time, Dr. Huntington's pair of physiographical curves do bear out, at a considerable number of points, our own historical six-hundred-year cycle with its alternation of three-hundred-year phases of relative effervescence and relative quiescence and with its maximum of effervescence in the first century of each effervescent tri-centennium. The first low level (denoting an access of aridity) that comes within Dr. Huntington's record falls in the thirteenth century B.C.: that is, a century later than our hypothetical century of maximum effervescence between 1425 and 1325.³ At the same time, there are climatic low levels at 800 B.C., 200 B.C., and A.D. 400 (on the better substantiated tree-ring curve), which correspond to our ultra-effervescent centuries 825-725 B.C., 225-125 B.C., and A.D. 375-475. On the other hand, A.D. 1000, which falls within our next ultra-effervescent century running from A.D. 975 to A.D. 1075, is marked in both of Dr. Huntington's curves by a humid peak and not by an arid trough; and there is no trough, again, to correspond with our latest ultra-effervescent century, running from A.D. 1575 to A.D. 1675, which saw the simultaneous eruptions of the Zungar and Torgut Calmucks and the Shammar and 'Anazah Arabs. Of the three great eruptions which, on our pattern, are irregular, the Primitive Muslim Arab outbreak in the seventh century of the Christian Era and the Mongol outbreak in the thir-

¹ This graph will be found in Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's *The Climatic Factor as illustrated in Arid America* (Washington, D.C. 1914, Carnegie Institution of Washington), p. 172, and also in his *Civilisation and Climate*, 3rd ed. (New Haven 1924, Yale University Press), p. 319.

² *The Climatic Factor*, p. 173.

³ It may be noted that, while the Aramaean eruption certainly, and the Libyan eruption probably, dates from the early part of the fourteenth century B.C., the Libyan eruption, at any rate, was still active in the thirteenth century. The Libyan Nomads invaded Egypt from the west circa 1221 B.C. and again, on perhaps two occasions, in the early years of the twelfth century.

teenth century of the Christian Era are both duly signalized, in Dr. Huntington's pair of curves, by strongly pronounced troughs, while on the other hand the outbreak of the [pseudo-]Avars and the Turks in the middle of the sixth century of the Christian Era is contradicted, in Dr. Huntington's pair of curves, by an Asiatic maximum of humidity at A.D. 550 and a Californian maximum at A.D. 610. Conversely, Dr. Huntington's curves show an arid trough at or before A.D. 1500; and this offers a climatic explanation for the Uzbeg irruption of that date into Transoxania and the backwash of the Mongols from Outer into Inner Mongolia about a quarter of a century later—two events which, on our chart, look like exceptional disturbances in the middle of a phase of quiescence.

One of the most interesting facts in Dr. Huntington's physiological evidence is the rapid and exuberant, though transitory, access of humidity in the early decades of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, following upon the extreme access of aridity by which the early decades of the thirteenth century had been marked. This unusually violent swing of the climatic pendulum is apparently well attested. For example, the Caspian rises rapidly to a maximum in A.D. 1306 which is 37 feet higher than its level at the present day; and the town of Aboskun, at the south-eastern corner of the Caspian, is under water in A.D. 1325.¹ And, almost simultaneously, between the years 1308 and 1311, the Lob Nor, which receives the waters of the River Tarim, overflows its banks and overwhelms 'the Dragon Town' (Lungshong).² We have noticed already that the foregoing paroxysm of aridity coincides in date with the demoniac eruption of the Mongols. And it will now be seen that the physiographical recoil towards humidity likewise corresponds in date with the rapid ebb of the Mongols on almost every coast of the Eurasian Steppe in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era—an ebb which is signalized by the encroachments of the Wallachians and Moldavians and Lithuanians and Dniepr Cossacks upon the ranges of the Golden Horde, and by the conversion of the Khans of the Golden Horde and the Il-Khans in Iran and the Chaghatayid Khans in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and Zungaria to Islam, and by Timur's chastisement of the Chaghatayids and the Jujids, and by the expulsion of the Great Khans from China.

If we may fairly regard the increase of humidity at this time as having been at least one of the causes of these social changes, we can see two distinct ways in which this climatic cause would operate. On the one hand, it would strengthen the inclination of

¹ Huntington, E.: *The Pulse of Asia* (London 1907, Constable), p. 344.

² Huntington, op. cit., pp. 287-8.

the neighbouring sedentary peoples to encroach upon the fringe of the Steppe at the Nomads' expense if the increase of humidity went so far towards correcting the previous excess of aridity on this fringe as to make the country suitable not only for Nomadic stock-breeding but also for sedentary agriculture. On the other hand, the same climatic change would weaken the resistance offered by the Nomads to their sedentary neighbours' pressure, because it would render the interior of the Steppe capable of supporting a larger stock of cattle, and therefore a larger population of Nomads, than before. The physiographical facts would thus go far towards answering the otherwise mysterious question why the Mongols erupted on all fronts with an unprecedented vehemence in the thirteenth century in order to recede with a bewildering tameness a century later. At the time when they went forth conquering and to conquer as far as Hungary in one direction and as Burma in another, the demons of drought and starvation were spurring the Mongols on. At the time when they abandoned the Ukraine and the Transoxanian oases and China, they knew that their native steppes could offer them an asylum because these steppes were now luxuriant once again with a heaven-sent vegetation.

In the present state of our knowledge, this is perhaps as far as we can carry our study of the part played by the climatic factor in the historically attested human fluctuations along the borders between the Desert and the Sown. We have seen that this climatic factor, in so far as its operation can be discerned, is apparently world-wide in its geographical range and is possibly also rhythmical in the Time-dimension. We have now to consider the human factor in the shape of the sedentary societies living round about the Nomad's domain; and it is evident *a priori* that the local operation of this human factor on one sector of the borderline will be quite independent of its local operation on other sectors, in consequence of the perpetual plurality of the sedentary societies by whose domains the Steppes have been encircled ever since the beginning of recorded history. It is also evident *a priori* that there will be no regular rhythm in the operation of this human factor in the Time-dimension, since we are confronted here with all the individuality and all the complexity of the histories of the sedentary civilizations, in place of the relatively simple and regular physical phenomenon of a periodic oscillation of climatic zones.

Indeed, in the operation of the human factor, any appearance of simultaneity or universality will prove, on inspection, to be the effect of a fortuitous coincidence. A case in point is the impressive synchronism of half a dozen far-flung movements of Nomad eruption round about the year A.D. 900. About A.D. 890, the Katāma

Berbers overrun the dominions of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Ifriqiyyah. In, or just before, A.D. 889, the Ghuzz break in from the east upon the ranges of the Pechenegs between the Emba and the Volga, with the result that the Pechenegs cross the Volga and the Don and propel the Magyars—whom they find in occupation of the steppes west of the Don—right across the Carpathians into the Hungarian Alföld. Again, some time before A.D. 900, the Banu Hamdān Arabs make themselves masters of the 'Abbasid Caliphate's dominions in the Jazīrah. In 914, the Carmathians make a raid, out of eastern Arabia, upon the home province of the Caliphate in 'Irāq. And far away, between the Khingan and Korea, the Khitan trespass across the Pale and the Wall and occupy the north-eastern fringes of intra-mural China in or after A.D. 927. At first sight we seem here to be in the presence of a ubiquitous movement which must be explained by some universally operative cause—presumably of the climatic order. Dr. Huntington's pair of climatic curves, however, show a humid peak and not an arid trough at this date; and, if we now look for explanations in the human sphere, we shall find all that we need in the respective political histories of the 'Abbasid, the Khazar, the Carolingian, and the T'ang Empires.

The irruptions of the Katāma and the Banu Hamdān and the Carmathians can all be traced to the attraction exerted by the social vacuum which was already being created by the decline of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in the ninth century of the Christian Era—in anticipation of the Caliphate's final break-up during the post-Syriac interregnum of A.D. 975–1275. (Incidentally, the Katāma were not Nomads of the Steppe, but highlanders,¹ and they were led on their war-path by the Fātimids, who were—or claimed to be—the 'Abbasids' hereditary rivals; the Banu Hamdān had been long domiciled in the Jazīrah before they made themselves the political masters there; and the Carmathians were a militant sect which had first raised its horn in 'Irāq itself, with its head-quarters at Wāsit, and had only retreated to Arabia and recruited a following among the Badu after it had been momentarily suppressed in the sedentary region which was its earliest field of action.)²

As for the successive impacts of the Ghuzz upon the Pechenegs and the Pechenegs upon the Magyars, this local disturbance of equilibrium was started by a deliberate but only partially success-

¹ See Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 314–17.

² The unsuccessful insurrections of the Carmathians in 'Irāq and Syria took place between A.D. 890 and A.D. 906. The East Arabian Province of Hasā, which was the Carmathians' base of operations in the second and more notorious chapter of their history, was acquired in A.D. 899 thanks to the conversion of a local Badu horde, the 'Abd-al-Qays, by a Carmathian missionary who had been sent thither from the original head-quarters of the movement in 'Irāq.

ful stroke of policy on the part of the Khaqan of the Khazars (an ex-Nomad horde which had long since become a sedentary commercial power). The Khazar, wishing to rid himself of his troublesome neighbours the unreclaimed Nomad Pechenegs, who occupied the steppe within sight of his own capital on the Lower Volga, made a compact with the still wilder Nomad Ghuzz, who were ranging at that time on the Pechenegs' opposite (i.e. eastern) flank, for a simultaneous assault upon the Pechenegs which would wipe these nuisances out of existence. The Ghuzz fulfilled their part of the compact. About A.D. 889, they duly assailed the Pechenegs and successfully occupied the Pechenegs' ranges right up to the east bank of the Volga. But the Pechenegs, instead of passively allowing themselves to be annihilated, made their way across the Volga, broke right through the Khazar lines, and seized the ranges of the Magyars on the farther side of the Don. Driven westward, the Magyars first responded to an invitation from the East Roman Government to invade Bulgaria, with which the East Roman Empire was then at war; but this first quest for a new home turned out unfortunately for the Magyars, since the Bulgars retorted by calling in their turn upon the Pechenegs. The Magyars were punished for their attack upon Bulgaria by a combined attack from the Bulgars and the Pechenegs which resulted in a severe defeat for the Magyars; and this second disaster, which seems to have occurred in A.D. 895, might have been the end of the Magyar horde, if the misfortunes which the Khazar Khaqan's high policy had incidentally brought upon them had not been retrieved by an incidental consequence of the policy of the long-defunct Austrasian Emperor Charlemagne. In A.D. 791, Charlemagne had crushed the Avar Nomads, who had been masters of the Hungarian Alföld since the middle of the sixth century, and the subsequent rapid decline of the Carolingian Empire had left the Alföld a no-man's-land which was now in process of occupation by the sedentary barbarian Slovaks. For the Magyars, expelled from the western bay of the Steppe and repulsed from Bulgaria, the line of least resistance now was to cross the Carpathians and fill the opportune vacuum in the derelict Alföld. For a horde which had been waging war with the Pechenegs and the Bulgars, the eviction of the Slovaks from the Alföld was child's-play; and the Magyar conquest of the Alföld followed hard upon the Magyar defeat at the hands of the Pechenegs and the Bulgars.¹ Thus the historic disturbance

¹ In the foregoing account of the movements of the Ghuzz, the Pechenegs and the Magyars in the ninth century of the Christian Era, the writer follows Mr. C. A. Macartney, whose reconstruction of this chapter of history, in the light of an acute analysis of the evidence, will be found in his *The Magyars in the Ninth Century* (Cambridge 1930, University Press).

of equilibrium on the western bay of the Eurasian Steppe at the close of the ninth century of the Christian Era—a disturbance which produced a lasting effect upon the history of Western Christendom by giving birth to the Hungarian Kingdom and the Hungarian nation—can be accounted for as the combined effect of two local acts of statesmanship: an act of the Khazar Khaqan at the time, and an act of the Emperor Charlemagne about a hundred years earlier. There is no need here to postulate the operation of any ubiquitous or universal cause.

As for the intrusion of the Khitan into intra-mural China in or after A.D. 927, this can be accounted for likewise as the effect of a local event in the political history of the Far Eastern World: that is to say, the extinction of the T'ang Dynasty in A.D. 907 and the lapse of China into anarchy pending the foundation of the Sung Dynasty in A.D. 960.¹

It will be seen that it is a sheer fortuitous coincidence, and not the operation of any universal cause, that accounts for the appearance, at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries, of a general Nomad eruption extending from the Maghrib front to the Manchuria front and from the Lower Euphrates front to the Alföld.

It remains for us to survey, quite briefly, the outstanding instances in which a Nomad eruption out of the Steppe can be traced, at least in part, to the attraction exerted by some kind of social vacuum in the domain of some sedentary society adjacent to the Steppes on one or other of our fifteen sectors of frontier. It may be convenient to cite, separately, first, the instances in which the vacuum coincides in date, either wholly or partly, with one of those alternate 'effervescent' phases in the life of the Steppe which have come to light in our table, and, secondly, the instances in which the vacuum occurs during one of our 'quiescent' phases. On the hypothesis that the series of Nomad eruptions is to be explained in part as the result of a climatic pulsation with a six-hundred-year cycle, we shall be able to explain the first set of instances as combined effects of two convergent causes, the one climatic and the other social, while the second set of instances will suggest possible human causes for a number of eruptions which, *ex hypothesi*, the climatic factor does not account for.

We may begin our catalogue of instances in which the social vacuum partly or wholly coincides with a phase of effervescence on the Steppes by citing the partial overlap of the post-Sumeric social interregnum *circa* 1875–1575 B.C. with the effervescent phase on the Steppes *circa* 2025–1725 B.C. We may suppose that the two causes combined to bring the Aryas down upon South-Western

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 120–1, above.

Asia in a spate which carried their van-guard from the Northern bank of the Lower Jaxartes to the Mediterranean coast of Syria.¹ We may next observe that, after the arrival of these Aryan Hyksos at the Syrian extremity of the Sumeric World, they were drawn on into the Egyptiac World by the social vacuum resulting from the break-down of the Egyptiac universal state ('the Middle Empire') at the turn of the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries B.C.² Again, the post-Minoan interregnum *circa* 1425-1125 B.C. wholly coincides with the effervescent phase on the Steppes which we have defined by the same conventional pair of dates; and this coincidence partially explains how the Achaean sedentary barbarians from the European hinterland of the Minoan World, who had been drawn into the vacuum arising from the collapse of the Minoan 'thalassocracy', came to join forces with the Nomad Libyans in the Delta of the Nile and to compete with the Nomad Aramaeans for the inheritance of the Egyptian dominion in Syria. To complete the explanation, we have to bear in mind that the social vacuum in the Minoan World overlapped chronologically from about 1375 B.C. onwards, with a fresh social vacuum in the Egyptiac World arising from the political decay of 'the New Empire' of Egypt. When all these factors are taken together, it will be seen that, in the convergent attacks of the Libyans, Aramaeans, and Achaeans upon 'the New Empire' at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C., each of the three assailants was acting under the combined influence of two distinct forces. The Achaeans were being drawn off their native continent on to the sea and across the sea by the attractive force of two successive social vacua: the first in Crete and the second in Egypt. The Libyans and Aramaeans were being pulled from in front by the attraction of the same social vacuum in Egypt, and at the same time they were both being pushed from behind by the physical force of an access of aridity on the Afrasian Steppe.

Again, we may observe that the Babylonian 'Time of Troubles' (ended 610/609) and the Syriac 'Time of Troubles' (*circa* 925-525 B.C.) both overlap in time with the phase of effervescence on the Steppes *circa* 825-525 B.C., so that we have a social as well as a climatic cause to account for the simultaneous irruption of the Cimmerians and Scythians out of the Eurasian Steppe and the Arabs out of the Afrasian Steppe upon Iran and the Jazīrah. In the same region, the decay of the Seleucid successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire overlaps with the beginning of the effervescent phase on the Steppes *circa* 225 B.C.-A.D. 75. If the Sakas

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104-7, above.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 388-91, above.

and the Yuechi had been confronted by a united Achaemenian or even by a united Seleucid Empire in 135 B.C., when the pressure of desiccation on the Eurasian Steppe impelled them to try their fortunes across the Jaxartes and the Oxus, they might either have preferred to remain on the Steppe and face the prospect of starvation rather than court certain destruction in a military forlorn hope; or else this certain destruction would have overtaken them if they had embarked upon that desperate venture. It was an auspicious political event in the Nomads' Promised Land—the disruption of the former Achaemenian dominions into the three mutually hostile powers of the Seleucidae, the Arsacidae, and the Greek princes of Bactria—that gave the Eurasian Nomads their opening between the Pamirs and the Caspian in the second century B.C. Still more clearly, it was the death-agonies of the Seleucid Monarchy that gave the Arabs their opening in the Jazīrah and in Syria round about the beginning of the last century B.C.

Similarly, the post-Hellenic interregnum *circa* A.D. 375–675 substantially coincides in date with the phase of effervescence on the Steppes *circa* A.D. 375–675; and thus the attraction of the vacuum arising from the break-up of the Roman Empire combines with the pressure of desiccation on the Steppes to account for the irruption of the Huns into the Alföld at the beginning of the fifth century of the Christian Era; for the irruption of the Avars into the same enclave of steppe-land, commanding the derelict European provinces of the Empire, a hundred and fifty years later; for the infiltration of the Berbers into the African provinces of the Empire and of the Arabs into Syria from the fifth century onwards; and for the tremendous explosion of the Primitive Muslim Arabs in the seventh century. This last shattering explosion struck the Roman and the Sasanian Empire at a moment when these two Powers were both prostrated by the devastating social effects of their two internecine wars of A.D. 572–91 and A.D. 603–28.

Finally, the post-Syriac interregnum *circa* A.D. 975–1275 substantially coincides in date with the phase of effervescence on the Steppes *circa* A.D. 975–1275; and thus the attraction of the vacuum arising from the break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate and the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate combines with the pressure of desiccation on the Steppes to account for the successive irruptions of the Murābits and the Muwāhhids into the Maghrib and Andalusia; for the irruption of the Katāma (as followers of the Fātimids) into Egypt and Syriā; for the infiltration of Badu from the North Arabian Steppe (Banu 'Uqayl and Banu Mazyad and Mirdasids and the like) into the fringes of the Jazīrah and 'Irāq and Syria; for the more violent outbreak of other Arabian Badu (the Banu Hilāl and

the Banu Sulaym) across Syria and Egypt into the Maghrib; and for the successive eruptions of the Saljūqs in the eleventh century of the Christian Era and the Ghuzz in the twelfth and the Mongols in the thirteenth century out of the Eurasian Steppe into the adjoining dominions of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in South-Western Asia.

An isolated, but particularly conspicuous, case in which there is not only a hypothetical climatic push but an incontestible political pull to account for an eruption of Nomads out of the Desert into the Sown is the aggression of the Berber people who were known in the Hellenic World as 'the Nomads' *par excellence*¹ against the continental dominions of the Carthaginian Republic in the second century B.C. We may observe that this century falls within a phase of effervescence on the Steppe, *circa* 225 B.C.—A.D. 75, which also saw the infiltration of the Sarmatians into the Hungarian Alföld and the irruption of the Sakas into India. But it is a more pertinent observation that the second century B.C. opened immediately after the close of the Hannibalic War, in which Rome had dealt Carthage a knock-out blow, and that a little more than half-way through the century the destruction of the vanquished party was consummated in a war of annihilation, in which the Carthaginian Republic and the city of Carthage itself were literally blotted out. In seeking to account for the aggression of the Numidians against the Carthaginian dominions in these circumstances, we may allow the climatic factor whatever credit we will; but it is manifest that the governing factor here was not climatic but political. The governing factor was the persistent and undisguised incitement and encouragement and support which the Numidian aggressors received from the Romans, who had found in these African Nomads a convenient instrument for breaking the spirit and wearing down the strength of Carthage in preparation for the Roman *coup de grâce*.

Turning now to those eruptions of Nomads which cannot be traced *ex hypothesi* to the pressure of a climatic push, we need not revert to the half-dozen instances, dating from round about the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era, which we have examined already and have succeeded in explaining in political terms.² We have merely to complete the list. We may observe, for example, that the continuing decadence of the Egyptian Society accounts for the continuing infiltration of Libyans into Egypt after the close of the phase of effervescence on the Steppes which began about 1425 and ended about 1125 B.C. Similarly, we

¹ The Berber *Nomādes* (Latinized as 'Numidae') in the Saharan hinterland of Ifriqiyyah.

² See pp. 440-3, above.

may observe that the decadence in which Babylonia languished after the petering out of the Kassite régime accounts for the infiltration of the Chaldaeans—a process which seems to have begun later and lasted longer than the irruption of the Chaldaeans' kinsmen and contemporaries the Aramaeans into the Jazīrah and Syria. Again, the incursions of the Blemmyes and Nubians into Egypt and of the Berbers into the Roman provinces in North-West Africa, and the conquest of all the eastern provinces of the Empire by the Palmyrenes at the head of their Badawī clients—a set of irruptions out of the Desert into the Sown which all occurred more or less simultaneously round about the year A.D. 270—can all be accounted for satisfactorily as consequences of the bout of anarchy from which the Roman Empire was suffering at the time. There is no need to postulate a climatic cause for these inroads of Nomads from the Steppe, any more than for the contemporary inroads of the Franks from the North European forest (where an access of aridity, if it had actually occurred at the time, would certainly not have impelled these sedentary barbarians to invade the Roman Empire but would rather have made life more comfortable for them in their sylvan homes). Similarly, the invasion of intra-mural China, round about the year 300 of the Christian Era, by the Eurasian Nomad hordes who founded the barbarian principalities of Pe Yen and Pe Han and Wei on Sinic ground, can be accounted for satisfactorily as a consequence of the anarchy into which the Sinic Society fell in its last agonies, upon the failure of the indigenous successor-state of the 'second' or 'united' Tsin to restore the structure of the Sinic universal state of Ts'in and Han. As for the conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin by the Uzbeks in and after A.D. 1500, it may possibly be explained in part by the access of aridity, about this date, which appears in Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's pair of curves. But the principal cause of the catastrophe was manifestly not climatic but political. The Uzbeks found their opportunity in the weakness of the Timurids. And the Timurids were weak because Timur Lenk himself had prematurely exhausted the energies of the Iranic World by his fratricidal militarism.¹ Finally, in the Western Sudan in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, we can explain the occupation of Timbuktu by the Tuareg Nomads from the Sahara between 1434 and 1469 as a consequence of the political anarchy which intervened in the Sudan between the fall of the sedentary Empire of Malle and the rise of the sedentary Empire of Songhay.

If we now re-examine our table of Nomad eruptions from the Steppes, we shall see that we have found satisfactory human

¹ For the militarism of Timur Lenk, see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (x), vol. iv, pp. 491-501, below.

explanations, in the political or social conditions of the sedentary regions round about, for almost every one of the eruptions that obtrude themselves exceptionally in the course of the alternate phases of relative quiescence on the Steppes. This fact perhaps increases the probability that these alternations of social 'quiescence' and social 'effervescence', which emerge from a tabulation of the recorded historical facts, may correspond to, and proceed from, a climatic cycle of alternate bouts of humidity and aridity. At any rate, if we eliminate all entries for which a satisfactory human explanation can be found, the regularity of the alternation and the sharpness of the contrast between our alternate three-hundred-year periods is considerably enhanced.

In any case, our survey of the evidence appears to confirm the view that all the recorded eruptions of the Nomads out of the Desert into the Sown can be traced to the operation of some external force, which may be either a climatic push or a social pull or a combination of the two.

Before we conclude our examination of the effects which the social and political conditions in the regions round about the Steppes may have upon the eruptions of the Nomads, we must take note of the fact that these effects are sometimes negative as well as positive. We have reviewed a number of instances in which the domain of some sedentary society adjoining the Steppes has invited an irruption of Nomads by offering the attraction of a social vacuum. But there are other instances in which a Nomad invasion that has been evoked by a social pull or been impelled by a climatic push had been brought to a halt and even, perhaps, been driven back pell mell by the opposition of some sedentary military power. In another connexion,¹ we have noticed how many times the hegemony or dominion over South-Western Asia has fallen to some power which has constituted itself an effective warden of the north-eastern marches of South-Western Asia, between the Pamirs and the Caspian, over against the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe. This is only one signal instance of a play of political forces which, in all places and at all times, has profoundly affected the fortunes of those Nomad hordes that have ventured to trespass upon the preserves of their sedentary neighbours.

The Lydian Monarchy made its fortune by annihilating the Cimmerian marauders in Anatolia about the middle of the seventh century B.C.; and, before the end of the same century, the Medes justified their title to be the principal heirs of the Assyrians by annihilating the Scythian marauders in Iran. In the sixth century B.C. the Achaemenidae justified their universal empire by chastising

¹ In II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 136-50, above.

the Massagetae. In the latter part of the second century B.C. the Arsacidae won their spurs, and laid the foundations of their empire, by preventing the Sakas and the Yuechi, who had just overwhelmed the Greek principality in Bactria, from overrunning Western Iran—with the result that the course of this Nomad irruption was deflected south-eastward into Seistan and Sind and ultimately into Maharashtra. In the fifth century of the Christian Era, the Sasanidae emulated the feat of their Arsacid predecessors by checking the irruption of the Huns at the line of the Oxus and deflecting its course into the Panjab and the Ganges Basin. This success of the Sasanidae in keeping their north-eastern frontier almost inviolate against the Huns is thrown into relief by the contemporary failure of the Roman Power in Europe and the Gupta Power in India to keep the same horde of Nomad invaders at bay. The reason why the Huns failed to occupy Western Iran, when they succeeded in overrunning the plains of Hindustan and forcing their way into Gaul and Italy, is manifestly political and not climatic. At the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, the Uzbeks had the same experience as the Sakas. Having easily overwhelmed the Timurid Powers in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, as the Sakas overwhelmed the Greek Power in the same region, the Uzbeks were beaten back from Western Iran by Ismā'il Shāh Safawī as valiantly as the Sakas were beaten back by Mithradates the Arsacid. On the same front the Mongols, with their demoniac drive, succeeded in overwhelming not only the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin but Iran and 'Irāq and the Jazīrah into the bargain; yet at the line of the Euphrates their advance was brought to a halt—belatedly but for ever—from A.D. 1261 onwards by the resistance of the Egyptian Mamlūks.

On another front of the Eurasian Steppe, between the Khingan Range and the Tien Shan, the Nomad confederacy of the Hiongnu met more than its match in the Sinic universal state of the Han; and in the seventh century of the Christian Era the Empire of the T'ang, which was a reincarnation of the Empire of the Han, not only repulsed and crushed, but momentarily even subjugated the Nomad confederacy which had been organized in the sixth century by the Turks. On the same front, in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the Zungar Calmuck successors of these Central Asian Nomad Turks met their match in the Manchu successors of the T'ang and the Han; and simultaneously, in the gap between the Caspian and the Urals—through which horde after horde of Sarmatians and Huns and Avars and Magyars and Mongols had poured irresistibly time and again—the Torgut kinsmen of the Zungars met their match in the Empire of Muscovy.

Similar experiences have befallen the Nomads who have erupted out of the Afrasian Steppe. The Aramaean invaders of the Jazīrah were brought to a halt by the indomitable resistance of Assyria. The Primitive Muslim Arabs, who conquered the Sasanian Empire—lock, stock, and barrel—almost at one blow, were successfully brought to a halt by the Roman Empire at the line of the Taurus, while the Franks drove them back from the Loire in A.D. 732 and expelled them from Septimania in 755 and dislodged them from the southern foothills of the Pyrenees in 788. Finally, in the nineteenth and the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the Sanūsīs of the Libyan Desert and the Wāhhābīs of the Arabian Desert have found, each time when they have attempted to break their bounds, that even the disciplined enthusiasm that can be infused into the spirit of the Afrasian Nomad by the inspiration of a religious faith is no match for the weapons of the modern Western World, whether these weapons are wielded by the French or English or Italian hands that made them or by the Egyptian peasant-conscript of a Mehmed 'Alī.

There is one more form of interaction between the Nomads and the sedentary societies round about them which calls for consideration, and that is the effect upon the Nomads of conversion to the sedentary societies' religions. In glancing at the histories of the Khazars and of the three westernmost appanages of the Mongol Empire, we have seen the conversion of the Khazars to Judaism and the conversion of the Golden Horde and the Il-Khans and the Chaghatayids to Islam acting as a social solvent which apparently relaxes the moral fibre of the converts and precipitates their political downfall.¹ In these instances, however, we are dealing with a religious conversion which overtook a horde *after* it had erupted out of the interior of the Steppe and had settled down either on the outermost edge of the region in which Nomadism is at home or else actually on the farther side of the border, on positively alien ground. There are other instances in which the Nomad is converted or influenced by an alien religion while he is still leading his natural life in his native haunts; and in such instances the alien religious influence appears—on the showing of the historical evidence—to produce just the opposite moral effect. So far from acting as a laxative, it acts as a stimulant, and it is apt to precipitate an eruption instead of heralding a *débâcle*.

This stimulating effect of an alien religious influence is a conspicuous feature in the life of the Afrasian Nomads. The preaching of Islam by Muhammad, and the prodigious outbreak of the Primitive Muslim Arabs, were preceded by successive infiltrations

¹ See pp. 429-30, above.

of Judaism and Nestorianism and Monophysitism into Arabia. It was a Carmathian missionary who set the Badu of the Hasā in motion in the tenth century of the Christian Era; and the preaching of Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhāb in the eighteenth century set the Badu of the Najd in motion, to the same effect, in the nineteenth century and in the twentieth. In the African portion of the Afrasian Steppe there are also celebrated examples of the same phenomenon. It was under the leadership of a Shi'ite propagandist that the Katāma Berbers overran Ifriqiyyah in A.D. 890 and Egypt and Syria in A.D. 969-70. As for the Murābits and the Muwahhids, their very titles testify that the Berbers who made their conquests under these names in the eleventh and in the twelfth century of the Christian Era respectively were stimulated by a religious enthusiasm and drawn on by a religious purpose. The Fulbe Nomads, who emulated in the nineteenth century those conquests in the Western Sudan that had been made in the eleventh century by the Murābits, were likewise inspired by a religious faith which in their case was the Wahhābī faith of their Arab contemporaries in the Najd. We have already touched upon the Sanūsī movement, which stimulated the Nomads of the Libyan Desert to establish an empire that extended, at one moment in the nineteenth century, from the Cyrenaica to Wadai.

These religious landmarks in the life of the Afrasian Nomads are well known, but it is worth noticing that there are certain Eurasian parallels. For example, the irruption of the Saljūqs into the Asiatic dominions of the 'Abbasid Caliphate and of the East Roman Empire alike, in the course of the eleventh century of the Christian Era, had been preceded by the conversion of the Saljūqs to Islam in A.D. 956; and the contemporary domination of the Ilék Khans over Transoxania and the Tarim Basin had been preceded by the conversion of their forefathers to Islam in A.D. 960. The prodigious outbreak of the Mongols in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era was preceded by a gradual infiltration of Mahayanian Buddhism and Manichaeism and Nestorianism into the north-eastern parts of Eurasia. The outbreak of the Calmucks in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era followed hard upon their conversion, at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to the religion of the Yellow Sect of Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism which had taken shape in Tibet.¹

This series of examples, taken together, seems to indicate that the religions of the sedentary societies are apt to stimulate the

¹ On the other hand, it must be recorded that the Mongols, who were converted to exactly the same form of Buddhism about one generation earlier than the Calmucks, remained quiescent in the seventeenth century when the Calmucks erupted.


Nomads into erupting out of the Desert into the Sown when these religious influences play upon the Nomad while he is still living his natural life upon his native ground. And the case of the Primitive Muslim Arabs seems to indicate further that this stimulus is strongest when the Nomads transmute these alien religious influences into some new religious creation of their own, instead of accepting them passively in the form in which they happen to come from their places of origin. Have we here stumbled at last upon one cause of Nomad eruptions which does not work externally and mechanically through the exertion of a climatic push or a social pull, but rather takes the spiritual form of Challenge-and-Response? If this is the fact, then we shall have to concede that, after all, the Nomads are not to be numbered without reserve among 'the peoples that have no history'. But second thoughts remind us that, in so far as the spiritual movement of Challenge-and-Response is discernible here, the souls that experience it are not the souls of the Nomads themselves but the souls of the oasis-dwellers who live in, but not of, the Steppe as outposts of the sedentary civilizations. Muhammad was not a Nomad herdsman but a commercial traveller; his Meccan kinsmen were business men; his Medinese helpers were tillers of the ground; and it was under the inspiration and leadership of these semi-aliens in their midst that the Arabian Nomads went forth conquering and to conquer in the seventh century of the Christian Era. The Carmathian Power in the Hasā and the Wāhhābī Power in the Najd and the Sanūsī Power in the Libyan Desert have all been founded upon the oases, like the Primitive Muslim Power in the Hijāz which they have all consciously taken as their ensample. On the Eurasian Steppe, likewise, the religious influences which touched, and perhaps exhilarated, the Mongols in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era all emanated from the oases which were inhabited by the once Nomadic but long since domesticated Uighurs. And the Yellow Lamaism which converted the Calmucks and the Mongols some three, or three and a half, centuries ago has retained its hold upon these elusive converts by planting artificial oases among their grazing-grounds in the shape of Buddhist monasteries.

It seems, then, that the Nomads, in so far as they remain pure Nomads, are really 'a people without a history' after all. Their eruptions out of the Desert into the Sown, like the eruptions of a Vesuvius or an Etna, are the mechanical resolutions of vast but inanimate physical forces. They are not the agonies of an imprisoned Titan who is frantically struggling for liberty and light.

NOTE BY MR. G. F. HUDSON

With regard to the climatic theory in general, there are two difficulties which have to be overcome:

(1) As pointed out by Peisker in his criticisms of Huntington, the effect of an arid period on the Eurasian Steppe would be not only to increase the amount of desert but also to extend the grassland northward at the expense of the Russo-Siberian forest belt; the summer would also be hotter, so that the main result would be simply that the Nomads' domain would shift northwards (that is, the portions of this domain which lie to the north of the Caspian-Gobi belt of deserts). The peasants, if there were any, on the fringe of the Steppe would be driven away by the increasing drought, quite apart from the Nomads' aggression. Of course, the shifting of the belts might not be exactly compensatory; but as regards the Eurasian Nomads dwelling between the desert belt and the Russo-Siberian forest belt, it does not seem clear why a period of aridity or south-to-north shift of climatic belts should actually have deprived the Nomads of any considerable amount of territory. The diagram below will show what I mean:



Here we have in the arid phase less forest and more desert, but about the same quantity of steppe, which represents the degrees of humidity sufficient for grass but not enough for trees.

This objection does not apply in the same way to the Afrasian Steppe, but it does lie, I think, against the climatic theory for the Eurasian Nomads: Scythians, Huns, Avars, &c.

(2) I must admit that you have made out a very strong case for the six-hundred-year cycle, and the synchronizations between the Eurasian and Afrasian eruptions are most interesting. Nevertheless, as you point out, the eleventh and seventeenth centuries, for which you have shown such good evidence of general effervescence,

do not correspond to arid troughs in Huntington's curves. The Huntington curves, in so far as they can be relied on at all (and I am very doubtful about the lake-level curve, except where it can be verified, as it can be for the fourteenth-century levels of the Caspian and the Lob Nor), appear to give climatic changes that are quite irregular and have no fixed periodicity. I had a talk on the matter with [a distinguished expert], who is very sceptical about alleged periodicities; he pointed out to me that the great difficulty in explaining climatic changes or arriving at a general theory of them is the very delicate balance of forces which exists, so that a very insignificant cause may have effects on a vast scale. Again, the cycle should affect the Afrasian and Eurasian steppes equally; but, although you have given some remarkable synchronizations, there are other cases where they are lacking. There is no violent outbreak on the Afrasian Steppe corresponding to the Hun, Turk-Avar, or Mongol eruptions, while, conversely, the Eurasian Steppe is singularly quiescent in the seventh century of the Christian Era when the Primitive Muslim Arabs break out in the south.

There can be no doubt that there have been oscillations of climate in the last 4,000 years (the best attested is the humid peak in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era), and that they have been factors in the eruptions of Nomads; I would not, however, explain everything by the climatic push and the pull of sedentary breakdowns, because I think there is a measure of real development in Nomadic societies from their mixture with sedentaries, the growth of commerce, &c., and this factor gives them something of real history. It is true that the Nomad *qua* Nomad is unchanging, but so is the peasant *qua* peasant (until quite recently); it is in both cases a question of what sort of edifice can be built on these foundations, and clearly the peasant foundation gives more scope. As for the pull by the sedentary societies' vacua, I think this principle could be extended to all conquests of any kind: e.g., on this showing, the British conquest of India would be an automatic consequence of the break-up of the Mughal Empire, and so forth. The Nomad could not be 'pulled' off the Steppe but for his war-like and predatory disposition, which is a by-product of his mode of life, and which gives him always the will to raid his sedentary neighbour—a will which only the effective power of the latter restrains.

ANNEX III TO III. A

THE NUMERICAL RATIO BETWEEN SUBJECTS AND MASTERS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND IN LACONIA

We have seen that, including the slaves of slaves, the Pādishāh's slave-household mustered about 86,000 head all told; that some 56,000 of these were soldiers; and that, besides these 56,000 regular professional troops, the Ottoman Government disposed of a feudal cavalry, which aggregated 80,000 to 100,000 troopers all told; so that, in an extreme emergency, the Ottoman Power could mobilize perhaps as many as 100,000 men for a foreign campaign and rather more than 150,000 for the police-duty of keeping order among the 'human cattle' within the frontiers.¹ Reckoning in the women and children, the Pādishāh's household may have accounted for something like 200,000, and the feudal gentry for something like 400,000 souls out of the total population of the Ottoman Empire; and if we may hazard the conjecture that, even at the widest extension of the Empire in its most flourishing period, the total population can hardly have exceeded thirty millions, we may guess that the ratio of the Pādishāh's household to the total population was not lower than 1 in 150, while the ratio of the whole ruling element—including the feudal gentry, but excluding the Muslim 'human cattle' (e.g. the Muslim peasantry of the Arabic provinces) as well as the Christian 'human cattle'—would work out, on the same reckoning, at not lower than 1 in 50.

On the other hand, the Spartiate 'Peers', who were the ruling element in Laconia, evidently reckoned the ratio of their own numbers to the total population of Laconia as 1 in 100. This appears from the following account of an abortive conspiracy for the extermination of the Spartiate 'Peers' which was hatched by one Cinadon, who was a Spartiate 'Inferior', in the year 399 B.C.; that is, at a time when the territorial dominion of the Spartan city-state in the Peloponnesus still stood at its widest extent, and when Sparta and her allies had just won a great victory over Athens which had left Sparta the paramount Power in the whole Hellenic World. The account here quoted is given by Xenophon, an Athenian historian who knew Sparta, and the internal conditions of Laconia, from the inside. (The technical terms which occur in this passage have been explained in the relevant chapter, above.)

¹ See the second footnote on p. 45, above.

The conspiracy was betrayed to the Spartan Government by an informer; and

'the Overseers (οἱ ἐφόροι) asked the informer how he had thought that the movement would take place, whereupon he told them that Cinadon had taken him to the edge of the *piazza* (ἀγορά) and had asked him to count how many Spartiates were to be found there. "And so," said the informer, "I counted the King and the Overseers (τοὺς ἐφόρους) and the Privy Councillors (τοὺς γέροντας) and others, up to about forty, and then asked: 'Why ever did you tell me to count them, Cinadon?'—'Because,' said Cinadon, 'you are to regard these as enemies and all the rest as allies'—amounting to more than 4000 persons who were in the *piazza* at the moment." He added that Cinadon pointed out to him in the streets one "enemy" here and two there as they passed them, while all the rest were "allies". When the Overseers (οἱ ἐφόροι) asked him what he believed the number of conspirators to be, the informer said that Cinadon had spoken with him on this point, too, and had told him that only a restricted number of trustworthy persons were in the confidence of the ring-leaders, but that the latter regarded themselves as being in virtual conspiracy with all the Serfs (ἐἰλωτες) and New Members (νεοδαμώδεις) and Inferiors (ὑπομείλους) and Dependents (περίλοικοι); for wherever, among these classes, there was any mention of the Spartiates, there was not a man of them who could conceal the fact that he would be delighted to eat them alive.'

The state of mind here described as prevailing among the subjects of the Spartiates, on the eve of Cinadon's abortive conspiracy to exterminate the Spartiates in 399 B.C., is remarkably reminiscent of the similar state of mind which our first-hand records of the Greek Revolutionary War of A.D. 1821-9 show to have prevailed, on the same spot, among the Christian ra'iyeh of the 'Osmanlis, who did succeed, when they rose in 1821, in wiping out the local representatives of the Ottoman ruling class—men, women, and children—in their Laconian citadel of Mistrà and throughout the Morea. The ruins of Mistrà, which remain down to this day as they were left on the morrow of the sack of the city in 1821, bear grim witness, for any visitor who seeks ocular testimony, to the virulence with which the 'Osmanlis were hated by their ra'iyeh—and the Spartans, before them, by their Helots.

The traditional ratio, assumed in the passage just quoted from Xenophon, of one Spartiate 'Peer' to every hundred inhabitants of Laconia is impossible to check, since we have no means of calculating the absolute figure of the total population. Even the absolute number of the Spartans themselves is a matter of conjecture. Such evidence as we possess seems to indicate that, after the enserfment of the inhabitants of the plain of Stenyclarus, in Messenia,

† Xenophon: *Hellenica*, Bk. III, ch. 3, paragraphs 4-11.

at the close of the second Messeno-Spartan War, and the redivision of these 'Helots' lands into allotments (κληροί) for maintaining Spartiate 'Peers', the maximum force of Spartiate heavy infantry (ὀπλίται) that could be mobilized, when all the forty year-classes liable to active service were called out from the twenty-first to the sixtieth inclusive, was 3,200 men. In this period, the Spartan Government appears to have required the dependent but autonomous city-state communities in Laconia, the so-called Perioeci, to put one heavy infantryman into the field for every Spartiate, so that at this time the maximum total force of heavy infantry which Sparta could raise was 6,400. This (rather than Herodotus's round figure of 10,000) was probably the strength of the Lacedaemonian contingent of heavy infantry at the Battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. But at some date between 479 B.C. and 418 the Lacedaemonian military establishment appears to have been reorganized so as to put 6 Perioeci into the field for every 4 Spartiates, instead of 5 for 5. Under this new organization, the maximum strength of the Lacedaemonian heavy-infantry force seems to have been raised from 6,400 to 7,680, while the maximum strength of the Spartiate contingent was lowered from 3,200 to 3,072.¹

¹ For these figures, see A. J. Toynbee: 'The Growth of Sparta', in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. xxxiii (London 1913, Macmillan).

ANNEX TO III. C (i) (a)

SOME MAKE-WEIGHTS AGAINST SOCIAL RETARDATION IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION OF THE WESTERN WORLD

IN the relevant chapter we have reviewed certain pieces of evidence which apparently point to the conclusion that the social effect of geographical expansion in an outward direction from the geographical centre of a civilization towards the periphery is equivalent to a retardation of social progress in the Time-dimension; and a considerable part of this evidence has been drawn from the history of the geographical expansion of our own Western World.¹ In this connexion, it is interesting to observe that our Western Society has counteracted the operation of this social 'law' in its own case to a certain extent by perpetually discharging fresh currents of its social life-blood from the heart of the Western body social towards its ever-expanding extremities.

This enhancement and enrichment of the relatively low social vitality of Western Christendom in its fringes by replenishment and reinforcement from the centre has sometimes taken the direct form of a centrifugal migratory movement of population and sometimes the indirect form of a temporary political association of some country or community at the focus of our Western life with some other country or community in the penumbra. In this indirect or political form of cultural reinforcement the physical migration of persons has usually been on an infinitesimal scale. For the most part, it has been limited to a change—and this perhaps merely a seasonal change—of residence on the part of a sovereign or a dynasty or a court or an aristocracy or an army. In such cases, the reinforcement of the culture of the periphery by replenishment from the centre has chiefly consisted in a propagation of techniques and institutions and ideas: a propagation which is capable of being accomplished on the grand scale, both extensively and intensively, by a very small number of migrant individual *Kulturträger*, and this with cultural effects that could hardly have been outdone by a physical emigration *en masse*.

To consider the direct or physical form of cultural reinforcement first, we may take, as illustrations, the introduction of Lombard settlers into Sicily after this island had been incorporated into Western Christendom as a result of the Norman conquest in the

¹ See III. C (i) (a), pp. 134-9, above.

eleventh century of the Christian Era;¹ the introduction of Flemish settlers into England after the Norman conquest of this other island on the opposite fringe of the Western World of the day; the introduction of Low Dutch settlers into the territories along the southern shore of the Baltic, from the right bank of the Elbe to the left bank of the Niemen, which were added to Western Christendom by conquest, at the expense of Slavs and Prussians, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; the introduction of German miners into Slovakia, and of German peasants and burghers into Transylvania, by the deliberate policy of the Hungarian Crown after the conversion of Hungary to Western Christianity;² and the introduction of other German settlers—for the most part from Swabia—into the territories conquered, in the eighteenth century, by the Hapsburg and Romanov Empires from the Ottoman Empire and from the Eurasian Nomads (the descendants of these latter-day German pioneers of Western Civilization along its south-eastern land frontiers are scattered over a zone which stretches from the Hungarian Alföld and Slavonia and the Banat of Temesvar through the Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia and the *ci-devant* Nogay Steppe to the great compact German settlement on the lower Volga, just below Saratov).³ In the same connexion we may also mention two important waves of refugees: the French Huguenots, who were dispersed abroad into England, South Africa, and the Protestant states of Germany (particularly Prussia and Württemberg) after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1683;⁴ and the German Liberals who found asylum in the United States after the failure of the Revolution of 1848 (these German political

¹ It was this Lombard immigration into Sicily that converted the Sicilians to the Romance language which they speak at the present day, in place of the Greek which was the native language of the Sicilians over a period of some fifteen or sixteen centuries beginning at least as early as the fifth century B.C., when the language introduced by the Greek colonists extinguished the languages previously spoken by the earlier inhabitants, even where these pre-Greek layers of population survived physically in the interior. It is remarkable that the Greek language in Sicily should have succumbed to the intrusive Romance language of Lombardy under the Norman and Hohenstaufen régimes after having survived the impact of Latin under the Roman Empire and the impact of Arabic under the Aghlabid régime. The first Lombard colony in Sicily of which there is a record dates from A.D. 1145. An examination of the Romance dialects of Sicily shows that the colonists must have been drawn from Liguria and the Po Basin, as well as from Apulia (Chalandon, F.: *Histoire de la Domination Normande en Italie et en Sicile* (Paris 1907, Picard, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 349).

² The so-called Saxons whose descendants still survive in Transylvania down to this day appear to have come, in reality, not from Saxony but from Luxembourg and the Rhineland.

³ For details of these German settlements see Grothe, H.: *Kleines Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslands-Deutschtums* (Munich and Berlin 1932, Oldenbourg). On the administrative map of the Soviet Union, the territory of the Volga Germans constitutes an autonomous community within the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, which is itself one of the seven constituent members of the Union. According to Grothe, *op. cit.*, p. 305, the Volga German district had 663,996 inhabitants in 1920, of whom 442,362 were Germans.

⁴ For this Huguenot diasporà, see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 213, above.

refugees were the van-guard of the great nineteenth-century German immigration into the United States which has done so much to counteract the deterioration of European culture under the adverse cultural conditions in 'the Middle West').

The indirect form of cultural reinforcement through a political link may be illustrated by the following table:

<i>Point of the Compass</i>	<i>Countries politically associated</i>		<i>Dates of association</i>
	<i>Country in the focus of civilization</i>	<i>Country in the penumbra of civilization</i>	
NW.	Normandy	England	1066-1204
NW.	Anjou	England	1154-1203
N.	Holstein	Denmark	1460-1864
NE.	Hohenzollern	Brandenburg	1415-
NE.	Cleves	Brandenburg	1614-
NE.	Brandenburg	Prussia	1618-
NE.	Meissen ('Saxony')	Poland	1697-1763
E.	Swabian Hapsburg dominions	Austria	1282-1801
E.	Luxemburg	Bohemia	1308-1437
E.	Anjou	Hungary	1310-82
E.	Luxemburg	Hungary	1387-1437
E.	Luxemburg + Flanders + Holland + Franche Comté	Austria	1482-1521
E.	Luxemburg + Flanders	Austria	1713-95
E.	Milan	Austria	1713-1859
E.	Austria	Hungary	1438-9 1453-7 1485-90 1526-1918
S.	Swabia	The Two Sicilies	1194-1266
S.	Anjou	Insular Sicily	1266-82
S.	Anjou	Continental Sicily	1266-1435
SW.	Franche Comté	Spain	1530-1674
SW.	Holland	Spain	1516-1609
SW.	Luxemburg + Flanders	Spain	1516-1713
SW.	Milan	Spain	1535-1713

Finally, we may remind ourselves of those signal cultural triumphs in which Western Christendom has succeeded in converting into propagandists of the Western Civilization those militant barbarians from beyond the pale who had previously threatened to cut the domain of the Western Christian Society short or even to extinguish Western Christendom altogether.

The English converts became instruments for propagating the Roman form of Christianity at the expense of Far Western Christendom in the Celtic fringe and of paganism in Central Germany.² The Scandinavian settlers in France who were converted into 'Normans' propagated the Western Christian culture at the expense of Orthodox Christendom and the Syriac World in Southern Italy and Sicily and Ifriqiyah and Syria.³ The Scandinavians who were converted in their own homes propagated the

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 178-9, above.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 336, with Annex II, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 201, above.

same culture across the Baltic—the Danes into Wendland and Estland, and the Swedes into Finland.¹ The Magyars, who were converted from Nomadism to the sedentary civilization of Western Christendom after their settlement, at the gates of the Western World, in the Hungarian enclave of the Eurasian Steppe, served as a buffer to absorb the shock of their fellow Nomads—Pechenegs and Ghuzz and Cumans—who burst out of the Steppe during the next period of effervescence and broke into Hungary at the Magyars' heels. And the outpost which the Magyars—in their right-about-face as wardens of the Eurasian marches of Western Christendom against their own Nomadic kin and kind—once planted in Transylvania, in the extreme south-eastern angle of the Carpathians, survives down to this day in the isolated Magyar community who are known as the Széklers.

In these various ways, we see the 'law' that expansion in Space means retardation in social progress being counteracted perpetually, with some success, in the history of our Western Civilization.

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 168, above.

ANNEX I TO III. C (ii) (b)

THE CONCEPT OF THE SECOND COMING IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL SETTING

THE flash of intuition in which the concept of the Second Coming was first conceived must evidently have been a response to the particular challenge of the time and the place; and the critic who has not yet extricated himself from the modern error of supposing that things have nothing more in them than is to be found in their origins may make the mistake of depreciating the Christian doctrine of the Second Coming on the ground that it originated in a disappointment: the disappointment of the Primitive Christian community in the first generation when they realized that their Master had actually come and gone once without the looked-for effect. Here was a prophet in Israel who had boldly broken away from the Jewish Messianic tradition by adopting the unfamiliar and paradoxical principle of non-violence. He had been faithful to His principle, and the principle itself had apparently been confuted by the outcome; for He had allowed Himself to be put to death; and, as far as could be seen, His death had left His followers without prospects. If they were to find the heart to carry on their Master's mission, they must draw the sting of failure from their Master's career by projecting this career from the past into the future. If they were to preach Christ crucified—which was 'unto the Jews a stumblingblock and unto the Greeks foolishness'¹—they must believe and proclaim that the career which had ended in the Crucifixion was only the First Coming of their Master, and that He was to come again in power and glory in order to prove that 'God hath chosen the foolish things of the World to confound the wise and God hath chosen the weak things of the World to confound the things which are mighty'.²

It is certainly true that the doctrine of the Second Coming was conceived in the Primitive Christian Church at a time when the Church was oppressed by a sense of weakness and failure, and when even its keenest minds had as yet no inkling of the tremendous victories which Christianity was to win in the fullness of time on the strength of the First Coming alone. It is also true that this doctrine of the Second Coming has since been adopted with the greatest enthusiasm by societies and sects and peoples that have been in this same disappointed or frustrated state of mind.

¹ 1 Corinthians i. 23.

² 1 Corinthians i. 27.

In the myth of the Second Coming of Arthur, for example, the vanquished Britons have consoled themselves for the splendid failure of the historic Arthur to avert the ultimate victory of the English barbarian invaders.¹ In the myth of the Second Coming of Barbarossa, again, the Germans of the later Middle Ages have consoled themselves for their failure to maintain the hegemony over Western Christendom which their forefathers had held from the *Völkerwanderung* down to the age of the Hohenstaufen.

'To the south-west of the green plain that girdles in the rock of Salzburg, the gigantic mass of the Untersberg frowns over the road which winds up a long defile to the glen and lake of Berchtesgaden. There, far up among its limestone crags, in a spot scarcely accessible to human foot, the peasants of the valley point out to the traveller the black mouth of a cavern, and tell him that within Barbarossa lies amid his knights in an enchanted sleep, waiting the hour when the ravens shall cease to hover round the peak, and the pear-tree [shall] blossom in the valley, to descend with his Crusaders and bring back to Germany the golden age of peace and strength and unity. Often in the evil days that followed the fall of Frederick's house, often when tyranny seemed unendurable and anarchy endless, men thought on that cavern and sighed for the day when the long sleep of the just Emperor should be broken and his shield be hung aloft again as of old in the camp's midst—a sign of help to the poor and the oppressed.'²

Barbarossa and his knights in their cave are re-sleeping the sleep of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, whose awaking is a sign that the persecution of the Christian Church by the Roman Empire is overpast.

The most striking of all the derivative versions of the Second Coming is that which reflects the disappointment of the Shi'ah.

'The Shi'ite Movement began in the first century of Islam as political propaganda against the Umayyad dynasty of Caliphs in favour of the house of 'Alī, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet. It was then hand in glove with the orthodox, and succeeded both in impressing its historical point of view on orthodox sentiment and in overthrowing the hated dynasty, only to be cheated of its political hopes by the establishment of the rival 'Abbāsīd line, and to fall instead under a more methodical persecution than hitherto. Shi'ism now took to the catacombs, and soon became a separate heretical sect, distinguished by the doctrine of allegiance to a divinely appointed, sinless, and infallible spiritual leader, the Imām, instead of an elective lay head or Caliph. The Imāmate they held to be hereditary in the house of 'Alī, but the various sub-groups differed on the point at which the succession of Imāms was interrupted. The belief of the principal group, or "Twelvers", to which the Shi'ites of Persia and 'Irāq still belong, was

¹ See Part II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 339-40, above.

² Bryce, James: *The Holy Roman Empire*, ch. xi, *ad fin.*

that the twelfth Imām of the line disappeared about the year 873 [of the Christian Era] into a cave at Hillah, but that he continues, through the heads of the religious organisation, to provide spiritual and temporal guidance for his people, and will reappear as the promised Mahdī to bring the long reign of tyranny to an end. This strange doctrine of a "Hidden Imām" or "Expected Imām", often referred to as "the Master of the Age", is recalled by the ceremony at Hillah of which Ibn Battūta gives a graphic description.¹

"The inhabitants of Hillah are all Shi'ites of the "Twelvers" Sect. . . . Near the principal market of this town there is a mosque, the door of which is covered with a silk curtain. They call this the Sanctuary of the Master of the Age. Every evening before sunset, a hundred of the townsmen, following their custom, go with arms and drawn swords to the governor of the city and receive from him a saddled and bridled horse or mule. With this they go in procession . . . to the Sanctuary of the Master of the Age. They halt at the door and call out: "In the name of God, O Master of the Age, in the name of God, come forth! Corruption is abroad and injustice is rife! This is the hour for thy advent, that by thee God may discover the true from the false." They continue to call out thus, sounding their drums and bugles and trumpets, until the hour of sunset prayer; for they hold that Muhammad the son of Al-Hasan al-'Askari entered this mosque and disappeared from sight in it, and that he will emerge from it; for he, in their view, is "the Expected Imām".²

If we now turn our attention again to the doctrine of the Second Coming in its classic Christian exposition, we shall see that it is really an example of 'etherealization'. For the angel's promise to the Apostles, on Olivet, after the Ascension, that 'this same Jesus, which is taken up from you into Heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into Heaven',³ is manifestly a mythological projection into the future, in physical imagery, of the spiritual return in which the Apostles' vanished Master reasserts His presence in the Apostles' hearts when the Apostles take heart of grace to execute, in spite of the Master's physical departure, that audacious mission which the Master, when he was actually present in the flesh, had once laid upon them. This creative revival of the Apostles' courage and faith, after a moment of disillusionment and despair, is described in the Acts—again in mythological language—in the image of the descent of the Holy Ghost upon them on the Day of Pentecost.⁴ In this connexion it is noteworthy that, in the account which is given, in the same book, of the last colloquy between the Apostles and Jesus, the Master makes and

¹ Gibb, H. A. R.: *Ibn Battūta: Travels in Asia and Africa, A.D. 1325-54, translated and selected* (London 1929, Routledge), Introduction, pp. 38-9. Compare Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. i (London 1908, Fisher Unwin), chs. ix and xiii.

² Ibn Battūta, Gibb's translation, pp. 98-9.

³ Acts i. 11.

⁴ Acts ii. 1-4.

reaffirms the explicit promise that they 'shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence'¹ and that, in the power with which this baptism will endue them, they 'shall be witnesses unto' Jesus 'both in Jerusalem and in all Judaea and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the Earth'.² At the same time, Jesus implicitly answers in the negative the naive question: 'Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the Kingdom to Israel?'³ in the answer: 'It is not for you to know the times or the seasons.'⁴ And in this context the prophecy of His literal Second Coming in the flesh, which is put into the mouth of the angel after the Ascension has taken place, is not attributed to Jesus Himself.

¹ Acts i. 5.² Acts i. 8.³ Acts i. 6.⁴ Acts i. 7.

THE POLITICAL CAREER OF MUHAMMAD

THE Empire which Muhammad founded on his return from Medina to Mecca can bear comparison with the empire which Caesar founded on his return from Gaul to Rome; for although, at Muhammad's death in A.D. 632, his political heritage was still no more than a barbarian principality in the no-man's-land beyond the Arabian frontier of the Roman Empire, the founder's companion and second successor 'Umar (*imperabat* A.D. 634-44), who survived Muhammad by a dozen years, lived to expand the Caliphate into a framework for a reintegrated Syriac universal state by conquering the Roman dominions in Syria and Egypt with one hand and the entire domain of the Sasanian Empire with the other.¹ Under the successive régimes of the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids, this great empire remained 'a going concern' for some three hundred years; and this immense political achievement was the outcome of Muhammad's political success during the second or politico-religious stage of his career.

Thus Muhammad's political activity is noteworthy as a factor of first-rate historical importance in the histories of civilizations; and it is also noteworthy as a phenomenon in Muhammad's own personal career, because it makes this particular career an exception to a rule which appears to hold good in the case of every other career that we have reviewed in our survey of the Withdrawal-and-Return *motif* in the lives of individuals.

This rule is the law of 'etherealization' which we have taken as our criterion of growth² and which is in fact obeyed in the growths of the other personalities whose careers we have cited as illustrations of the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return. In each of these other cases, the capacity in which the growing personality has returned to Society after his temporary withdrawal has been more ethereal than the same personality's social capacity in the first chapter of his career, before his withdrawal has taken place. David and Philopoemen withdraw as soldiers and return as statesmen; Solon withdraws as a merchant and returns as a statesman; Caesar withdraws as a politician and returns as a statesman; Loyola withdraws as a soldier and returns as a saint; and all these changes of capacity are in the direction of 'etherealization'. On the other hand,

¹ For the function of the Caliphate as a 'reintegration' or 'resumption' of the Syriac universal state which had originally been embodied in the Achaemenian Empire before the Hellenic intrusion upon the Syriac World, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 73-7, above.

² See III. C (i) (c), above.

Muhammad's career, taken as a whole, appears to have been a movement in the opposite sense. For though in the first stage of his career he withdraws as a merchant and returns as a prophet, in the second stage he withdraws as a prophet and returns as a conqueror. In other words, the second stage of Muhammad's career, which is the conspicuously successful stage, is apparently the exact inverse of the career of Loyola; and if Loyola's career is a striking example of spiritual transfiguration, Muhammad's, by the same token, is an equally striking example of spiritual bathos. This exceptional feature in Muhammad's career calls for further examination.

Muhammad's overwhelming political success has undoubtedly made a deep impress upon Islam—the great institution of which Muhammad is the founder. This impress has lasted down to our own day; and it comes out clearly in the contrast between Islam and Christianity; for, broadly speaking, each of the two religions has tended, in its attitude towards politics, to follow the course which its founder indicated either by precept or by example. The Christian Churches have been guided, on the whole, by the injunction to 'render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's';¹ and though the Orthodox and Protestant 'Established Churches' are important exceptions to this rule, the incorporation of these 'Established Churches' into the bodies politic of the secular states that have enslaved them has always remained imperfect and continued to appear unnatural. In Islam, on the other hand, the relation between the religious and the political elements of the institution is not that of a belated and artificial union. In Islam, the two elements cohere in an original and organic unity; so that, in Islamic sociology, such dichotomies as 'religious and secular', 'ecclesiastical and civil', 'clerical and lay' have no application. In the Islamic Society, Church and State are actually identical; and, in this undifferentiated social entity, the secular interest and the secular spirit have hitherto predominated over the religious in a fashion which makes even the most thoroughly enslaved of the Christian 'Established Churches' appear comparatively 'un-political' and 'other-worldly' by this Islamic standard of comparison.²

¹ Matt. xxii. 21.

² In the history of Christianity, perhaps the nearest approach to this identity of Church and State in Islam has been the ideal of the *Respublica Christiana* which, in Western Christendom, was entertained by the more ambitious of the Roman Pontiffs in the Middle Ages. The goal of this ideal was to eliminate the dichotomy between Church and State by incorporating the ramshackle and parochial states of medieval Western Christendom into the body social of an all-embracing Roman Church. But this ideal never came near to being realized; and, even if the goal had actually been achieved, the resulting Christian Commonwealth of the West would not have been altogether homologous with Islam; for, if Church and State had been fused together in Western Christendom in this fashion, the dominant interest and spirit in the resulting union would have been the religious and not the secular.

Thus the political, secular, mundane element has been exceptionally prominent not only in Muhammad's personal career, but in the subsequent history of the institution which is the monument of Muhammad's life-work. In quarters hostile to Islam and to its founder, this 'worldliness' has always been a popular object of denunciation; and, on impartial consideration, there is evidently much to be said for the view that Islam, as an institution, has suffered throughout its history from the note of secularity which has been characteristic of it hitherto. In so far as this note of secularity has been a social blemish in the history of Islam, it must also be regarded as having been a personal misfortune in the career of Muhammad. The monument of Muhammad's life-work might have been something more ethereal than Islam as Islam has been and is, if only the Prophet's career had not taken this decisively political turn in its last chapter. The hostile critics, however, go farther than this. They denounce Muhammad's unfortunate metamorphosis, after his *Hijrah*, from a prophet into a conqueror as a mark of moral turpitude. And this judgement cannot, in equity, be allowed to pass without taking into consideration the circumstances in which the metamorphosis occurred.

Was Muhammad a vulgar impostor, who posed as a prophet with his eye upon a throne from the outset? This calumny is conclusively refuted by the record of Muhammad's life during the thirteen years, or thereabouts, that intervened between his first announcement of his prophetic mission in Mecca *circa* A.D. 609 and his flight in A.D. 622 from Mecca to Medina. The announcement was first made secretly to an intimate circle which did not extend beyond his wife and family and a handful of personal friends; and this secrecy was justified by the sequel; for, when the propaganda came to public notice after the secret had been preserved for three years, the Meccan Prophet and his followers at once found themselves exposed to the vehement and active hostility of the ruling oligarchy, in whose belief the new doctrine was calculated to place the vital interests of Mecca in jeopardy.¹ Muhammad's life was only saved from death by violence because his uncle Abu Tālib, who was the head of his clan, would not consent to his being outlawed, so that it was impossible for the dominant conservative party to take Muhammad's life without precipitating a blood-feud; yet, in the fifth year of the mission, the persecution became so

¹ The point in Muhammad's message which incensed the Quraysh was the denunciation of idolatry, which was the corollary of the proclamation of the unity of God. The Quraysh feared that this impiety, if it prevailed, would not only bring down upon Mecca the wrath of the divinities whose existence was being denied by the blasphemer, but would also ruin the pilgrimage traffic, which was attracted to Mecca by the presence there of the shrines and cults of a number of other divinities, besides Allah, who enjoyed a Pan-Arabian prestige.

severe that a number of the Faithful had to take refuge overseas in the Christian Kingdom of Abyssinia; and the persecutors then retaliated by boycotting Muhammad and his clansmen and blockading them in their own quarter of Mecca, with the intention of starving them into recantation in lieu of putting them to the sword at the cost of civil war. Down to the thirteenth year of the mission, when Muhammad finally withdrew from Mecca to Medina and abandoned the purely prophetic for the politico-religious career, Muhammad's preaching was manifestly, from the worldly point of view, an utter failure. As the result of thirteen years of propaganda, he had won no more than a handful of converts—most of whom had been compelled to fly the country—and he had drawn upon himself the implacable and apparently invincible hostility of the dominant powers in his native community. A prophet who persisted in his mission in these circumstances for this number of years can only have been animated by a deep and genuine religious conviction; and he can only have supposed that he was sacrificing his worldly prospects. He cannot have suspected that he was on the road to making his worldly fortune.

Muhammad, therefore, must be acquitted of the charge of having entertained ulterior political designs during the Meccan period of his prophetic mission. But we have still to explain how it was that he eventually took, nevertheless, to the political career in which he was afterwards so triumphantly successful.

Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the nature of the social milieu into which Muhammad happened to be born. If it is asked why he did not 'render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's' the obvious answer is that, unlike Jesus, Muhammad did not happen to live under Caesar's jurisdiction. Whereas Jesus was a member of the internal proletariat of the Roman Empire, and, as such, was at the Roman Government's mercy, Muhammad was a member of the external proletariat whose home was in the no-man's-land outside the Roman frontiers and beyond the reach of Caesar's arm. This extreme difference of milieu explains, at least in part, the extreme difference between the earthly fortunes of these two prophets who, in addressing themselves to their fellow men, each claimed to be the messenger of their God, bringing them a strange message, wholly subversive of their former beliefs and practices: claiming, in short, to be their dictator, though dictating not his own words, but God's.¹

'There is no example in history of such a claim being at first favourably received, unless by any chance it is made by one already sovereign.'²

¹ Margoliouth, D. S.: *Mohammedanism* (Home University Library Series: London, no date, Williams and Norgate), p. 51.

² For this rather rare situation and its usual outcome, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ) Annex, in vol. v, below.—A. J. T.

In most communities it has meant death, or at best condign punishment, for the person who makes it. The better the order of the community, the less chance has a prophet. The execution of Socrates took place after a legal trial, in the most highly civilized and most tolerant state of Antiquity.¹

We may add that Jesus, in spite of His rendering unto Caesar the things that were Caesar's, and in spite of His refusal to allow His followers to resort to violence in order to save Him from arrest,² was nevertheless put to death by the Roman authorities. His mortal offence in Roman eyes was that 'he taught . . . as one having authority'³—an attitude which no Sovereign Power is willing, in the last resort, to tolerate in any of its subjects.

Muhammad's attitude, in proclaiming his prophetic message, was the same; and assuredly he would have met the same fate at the same early stage if he had been conducting his prophetic mission inside, instead of outside, the Roman frontiers, either in Jesus's day or in his own. In this situation, it would have made no difference to Muhammad's immediate personal fortunes whether, when the Roman authorities had sought his life, he had chosen the path of non-resistance or had turned at bay; for Jesus was not the only Jewish prophet of his age who met his death at Roman hands. The same fate overtook the Theudas and Judases who desperately resorted, within the ambit of the Roman imperium, to the militant tactics which the historical Muhammad was able to execute with brilliant success in the no-man's-land of Arabia. If Muhammad had been living under Roman rule, his mission would have resulted in his losing his life, whatever line he had taken in dealing with the Roman authorities; and we can only conjecture, on the historic analogy of Jesus and the Christian Church, that if Muhammad had lived in these circumstances and had died, as Jesus died, without offering resistance, then Islam might have become something different from, and spiritually higher than, what it has become in fact. The historic development of Islam is a consequence of the fact that Muhammad's career, in Muhammad's actual circumstances, developed quite differently. Instead of sealing his prophetic message with his blood by becoming Caesar's victim, it was Muhammad's ironic destiny to compromise and debase his prophetic message by becoming an Arabian Caesar himself.

'The problem . . . is . . . : How was it that he escaped death when once his mission had been proclaimed? And the reply is: Because there was no orderly government. . . . Justice, it would seem, could only be executed within the tribe, and . . . it was impossible to assail the Pro-

¹ Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-2.

² Matt. xxvi. 51-4; John xviii. 11 and 36.

³ Matt. vii. 29.

phet . . . for such an assault would have led to civil war between the Meccan tribes: a consequence which it was their common interest to avert.¹

We have seen how this political situation was brought about by Abu Tālib's refusal to withdraw his patriarchal protection from his nephew. The result was a political stalemate, which was not unlike the stalemate that followed the introduction of Christianity, some four centuries later, into the similarly constituted Scandinavian Society in Iceland.² The operation of the primitive social system of kin-group-solidarity and blood-feud in a political vacuum made it impossible for the new religion to be stamped out by violence and likewise impossible for it to prevail by peaceful propaganda; and there were only two possible issues from this impasse: either the negotiation of a *modus vivendi* between the pagans and the religious revolutionaries or the creation, by the one or the other party, of a body politic to fill the political vacuum and thus to pave the way for a solution by force. In this predicament, the Icelanders adopted the former alternative and Muhammad the latter. The Icelanders negotiated a *modus vivendi* which averted civil war and obviated the necessity for establishing an effective government in Iceland, at the price of a voluntary general acceptance of the new faith. Muhammad, on the other hand, embraced the opportunity, when it came his way, of arming himself in the panoply of political power and using this power as an instrument for imposing Islam upon Mecca by force.

No doubt, when he accepted the fateful invitation to organize a government in Medina, Muhammad assured his own conscience that he was acting as single-heartedly as ever in the cause of God. Had not God laid upon him the duty of conveying the revelation of God's truth to his fellow men? And would he not be executing this duty if he embraced this heaven-sent opportunity of providing the new religion, whose path had been obstructed for ten years by human *force majeure*, with a human political vehicle without which, as ten years' personal experience showed, Islam could make no further practical progress? No doubt, Muhammad reasoned with his conscience thus; and no doubt he was deceiving himself in yielding to his own arguments; for, in the event, the temporal power with which the Arabian Prophet endowed—or encumbered—his Islam at this crucial point in his career has proved to be not a vehicle but a prison-house, which has cribbed and cabined and confined the spirit of Islam ever since.

The truth, then, seems to be that, in the invitation to Medina,

¹ Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-3.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 354-5, above.

Muhammad was confronted with a challenge to which his spirit failed to rise. In accepting the invitation, he was renouncing the sublime role of the nobly un-honoured prophet and contenting himself with the commonplace role of the magnificently successful statesman. The prospect of effective practical action which the call to Medina opened up for the Prophet's long repressed and thwarted practical genius blinded the Prophet's vision and warped his judgement. For even on the eve of the worldly call, in the second phase of his thirteen-years-long worldly failure in Mecca, Muhammad had been content with the faithful performance of a prophet's duty, as is shown by his apostrophe to the idolaters: 'Is aught else laid upon God's messengers but a plain delivery of the message?'¹ This simple understanding and acceptance of his prophetic mission were thrown to the winds by the Prophet when a new career was offered him in the alien political sphere; and, in the language of worldly wisdom, this *volte-face* was amply 'justified by success'. The Prophet's latent political genius was so transcendent that the modest office of 'honest broker' in an anarchy-ridden Arabian oasis² was transformed in his hands into the sovereignty of a state which was destined to eclipse the Empire of Rome and emulate the Empire of the Achaemenidae. This tragic worldly success of the founder of Islam—a success which was pernicious for the institution which he had founded—points the truth that, for a prophet, to be *felix opportunitate mortis*³ is the highest good and to be *capax imperii*⁴ the unkindest gift that the Gods can bestow upon him. The chance to prove his political mettle in action, which Fortune brought, was just as fatal to the prophet *manqué*, Muhammad, as it was to the Caesar *manqué*, Galba.

¹ Qur'ān, Surah xvi, verse 35: فَهَلْ عَلَى الرَّسُولِ إِلَّا الْبَلَاغُ الْمُبِينُ

² The arbitral function which Muhammad was invited to perform at Medina in mediating between the local clans and factions who could not make peace unaided, was not unlike the function of an *aesymnētēs* in a Hellenic city-state or a *podestà* in a medieval Italian commune.

³ Tacitus: *Agricola*, ch. 45.

⁴ Tacitus: *Histories*, i. 49.

ANNEX III TO III. C (ii) (b)

THE RELATIVITY OF IBN KHALDŪN'S HISTORICAL THOUGHT

A MODERN Western reader of Ibn Khaldūn will possibly be surprised to find *'asabiyyah*—the *esprit de corps* which expresses itself in effective social action—regarded by the Arabic social philosopher as a rare phenomenon which is hardly to be found except among the members of Nomad hordes. To a modern Western sociologist, the *êthos* of a modern Western national state, or the *êthos* of a Hellenic or a medieval Western city-state, will seem to afford at least as good an illustration of *'asabiyyah* as the *êthos* of a Nomad horde. In order to follow the course of Ibn Khaldūn's thought, we have to keep in mind the nature of his historical background and his personal experience; and it is evident that, in Ibn Khaldūn's mental picture of world-history, there were two great events of outstanding importance and significance. The first of these events was the reintegration of the Syriac universal state, in the form of the Caliphate, through the conquests of the Primitive Muslim Arabs; the second was the eventual devastation of the derelict domain of the Caliphate in the Maghrib by the Banu Hilāl after the Caliphate had broken up.

In both these historic transactions, there was a collision between an aggressive minority of Nomads and a passive majority of sedentary peasants and bourgeois; in both cases the majority allowed the minority to work its will upon them; and in both cases this happened because the majority lacked the dynamic social quality of *'asabiyyah* which the minority possessed. In the mental picture which Ibn Khaldūn constructs out of this historical evidence, the lack of *'asabiyyah* or deficiency in social vitality is taken to be the normal *êthos* of sedentary populations in all times and places (see the *Muqaddamāt*, Book I, section 2, in the chapters entitled: 'The inhabitants of the open country are less corrupt than the bourgeoisie'; 'The inhabitants of the open country are more courageous than the bourgeoisie'; 'The submission of the bourgeoisie to constituted authorities impairs their bravery and makes them strangers to the notion of self-help').¹ Conversely, in Ibn Khaldūn's mental picture, the possession of *'asabiyyah* is taken to be virtually a mono-

¹ For Ibn Khaldūn's own first-hand observation of this contrast as between the Arabs of Andalusia who have lost their *'asabiyyah* and the Berbers of the Maghrib who have retained theirs, see the *Muqaddamāt*, Introduction (de Slane's translation, vol. i, pp. 63 and 319 and 338-40).

poly of the Nomads ('The faculty of living in the desert is confined to communities that are animated by a strong *esprit de corps*'). Since Ibn Khaldūn also takes it as an axiom that this *esprit de corps* is the psychic protoplasm out of which all bodies politic and bodies social are built up, he infers that 'semi-savage tribes are more capable than other peoples of making conquests', and that 'the extent of conquests is in inverse ratio to the degree of civilization exhibited by the conquerors'.

This conclusion leaves him with one obvious unsolved conundrum. For, if the conquests of the Primitive Muslim Arabs in the first century of the Hijrah and the conquests of the Banu Hilāl in the fifth century of the Hijrah are both alike to be ascribed to the potency of Nomadic '*asabiyyah*', what is the differentiating factor which accounts for the extreme difference in the outcome of the two historic transactions? He supplies an answer to his riddle by introducing (in the last chapters of section 2 and the first chapters of section 3 of Book I) the suggestion that '*asabiyyah* is not the only kind of social protoplasm after all; an alternative—and superior—kind exists in the shape of religion. ('In general, the Arabs are incapable of founding an empire *unless* they have received a tincture of religion of a certain strength from some prophet or saint'; 'The religious teaching of a prophet or a preacher of the truth is the only basis on which a great and powerful empire can be founded'; and 'A dynasty which starts its career by placing itself on a religious basis will thereby double the effectiveness of the *esprit de corps* which is the means of its establishment'; though, at the same time, 'It is impossible to establish a domain or to found a dynasty without possessing the support of a people animated by *esprit de corps*'; and 'An enterprise which aims at securing the triumph of the religious principle can only succeed if it finds a strong party to support it'.) Thus Ibn Khaldūn explains the success of the Primitive Muslim Arabs in their empire-building by the fact that, in this case, the two dynamic forces of religion and '*asabiyyah* were working together; and he explains the failure of the Banu Hilāl to accomplish anything but destruction by the fact that, in this other case, the force of '*asabiyyah* had no religious reinforcement. Again, he perceives that the eventual decay of the Umayyad and 'Abbāsid Caliphates has been due to the atrophy of the socially constructive *ethos* of the conquering minority and the re-emergence of the socially unconstructive *ethos* of the conquered majority; and he infers that this is the general explanation of the eventual decay which overtakes all empires. ('When an empire has acquired its natural form through the establishment of autocracy and the introduction of luxury, it tends to decay'; 'Empires, like individual human beings, have their

specific life-span'; 'In empires, the habits of the Nomadic life are gradually replaced by those of the sedentary life.')

Every reader of Ibn Khaldūn's work will be filled with admiration for the vigour and the brilliance of the thought which has succeeded in making so much out of the amount of evidence that the thinker has had at his disposal; but a modern Western critic may feel that Ibn Khaldūn's empirical foundation is rather too narrow to bear the weight or to justify the range of his masterly generalizations. In the terms that we are employing in this Study of History, Ibn Khaldūn is ascribing to sedentary societies *sans phrase* a certain *êthos* (i.e. a deficiency in '*asabiyyah*') which is really only characteristic of sedentary social life in the particular circumstances in which Ibn Khaldūn happens to be familiar with it: that is to say, in the circumstances exhibited by the internal proletariat of a declining civilization in the penultimate phase of its decline when it is passing through its universal state. Conversely, Ibn Khaldūn is ascribing to Nomadic societies *sans phrase* another *êthos* (i.e. the possession of '*asabiyyah*'), which is really no monopoly of Nomadism, but is equally characteristic of the non-Nomadic members of any external proletariat (i.e. the sedentary North-European as well as the Nomadic Arab and Berber and Eurasian members of the external proletariat of the Roman Empire). Thus, in our perspective, Ibn Khaldūn's equation of '*asabiyyah*' with the *êthos* of Nomadism and *lā 'asabiyyah* with the *êthos* of sedentary life seems much too sweeping. In our eyes, the equation only seems to hold good in the particular case in which the Nomadic horde happens to belong to the external proletariat and the sedentary population to the internal proletariat of a declining civilization. And we can think of other historic cases in which a sedentary population has displayed at least as vigorous an '*asabiyyah*' as any community of Nomads. Again, Ibn Khaldūn's explanation of the decay of empires is only applicable, in our eyes, to the particular case of an empire founded by Nomads (see the examination of this case in Part III. A, above¹), which is, of course, the only case of empire-building that Ibn Khaldūn takes into account. This explanation will not seem adequate to a student of history for whom the classic instance of a universal state happens to be the Roman Empire or the Empire of Ts'ing and Han, and not the Arab Caliphate.

In offering these criticisms, however, we must not forget that our ability to make them does not arise from any inherent superiority of our intellectual powers, but simply from the external accident that we happen to have at our disposal a wider field of historical evidence to work upon. If any political philosopher capable of

¹ In the present volume, on pp. 22-6.

comprehending Ibn Khaldūn's ideas had ever arisen in Western Christendom at any time during the first four centuries of our Western history, this imaginary genius would assuredly have found in Ibn Khaldūn's propositions a satisfactory philosophical explanation of all the historical evidence that was actually at the disposal of Western minds in that epoch. He would have found in the barbarians' apparent monopoly of *'asabiyyah*, and in the absence of this quality among the derelict provincials of the defunct Roman Empire, the explanation of the later empires that were successively built, on Roman ruins, by the Merovingians and the Carolingians and the Ottos; and he would have explained the eventual decay of each of these barbarian empires by the Khaldunian generalization that the *êthos* of the conquering minority is inevitably diluted and contaminated and obliterated in process of time by contact with the *êthos* of the conquered majority.

In this context, we may remind ourselves of the axiom which we have taken as the starting-point of our present Study of History: the axiom that all historical thought is inevitably relative to the particular circumstances of the thinker's own time and place. This is a law of Human Nature from which no human genius can be exempt. Ibn Khaldūn points out the application of the law to the ideas of his predecessor Tartūshī;¹ and his critical mind would assuredly have been ready to admit that its own workings were subject to the same limitation.

¹ Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, de Slane's translation, vol. i, p. 322.

ANNEX IV TO III. C (ii) (b)

THE VICTORY OF THE CITY-STATE RÉGIME OVER THE KINGDOM-STATE RÉGIME IN THE HELLENIC WORLD

THE partition of Western Christendom in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era into two incompatible worlds¹ has a parallel in the situation of the Hellenic Society in the fifth century B.C., when Hellas was likewise partitioned between a world of city-states and a world of cantons and kingdoms which were survivals of a pre-city-state phase of the Hellenic Civilization. But this superficial similarity between the two situations turns out, on inspection, to overlie two important differences. In the first place, the city-state was a much older institution in fifth-century Hellas than it was in the fourteenth-century Western World. It was as old an institution in Hellas as Feudalism was in Western Christendom; and it had been called into existence in Hellas to serve the primary purpose, which Feudalism served in the West, of preserving Society from Chaos in the first chapter of its history on the morrow of its birth. In the second place, the city-state régime had made relatively much greater progress in Hellas by the fifth century than it had made in Western Christendom by the fourteenth.

In fourteenth-century Western Christendom, as we have seen, the feudal régime was still the rule and the city-state régime the exception almost everywhere outside Northern Italy and Flanders. On the other hand, in fifth-century Hellas, the 'Classical' city-state régime had already become the rule, and the 'Homeric' kingdom-state régime the exception, throughout the Hellenic World of the age. In the Peloponnese, a fifth-century movement towards synoecism in Argos and Mantinea and Elis² left only one patch of Peloponnesian territory, in the south-western corner of Arcadia, still living under the pre-city-state dispensation.³ The whole of insular

¹ See the present volume, pp. 341-50, above.

² This movement seems to have taken place in the decade following the repulse of Xerxes' invasion of European Greece in 480-479 B.C. (For the original authorities, see Hill, G. F.: *Sources for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars* (Oxford 1907, Clarendon Press), pp. 291-6.) In Argos and Mantinea, at any rate, the movement seems to have been an imitation of Athens, who was at the height of her prestige owing to the leading part which she had played in the victorious Hellenic resistance to Xerxes. Compare the imitation of British political institutions abroad at the time when Great Britain was at the height of her prestige after the Napoleonic Wars.

³ It is possible that the formation of city-states in this district was artificially prevented by the deliberate policy of the Lacedaemonian Government, which was interested in preventing the rise of any strong power in the neighbourhood of the most vulnerable section of its land-frontier. It is significant that the military débacle of the Spartans in 371 B.C. was immediately followed by the synoecism of the South-West Arcadian cantons into the new city-state of Megalopolis under the auspices of the victorious Thebans.

and transmarine Hellas was at this time already on a city-state basis; and indeed the Greek colonies in the Black Sea and the Cyrenaica and the West had never lived on any other basis, since they had been founded as city-states by communities in the homeland which had previously organized their own lives on the city-state pattern. Thus, by the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C., the only part of the Hellenic World, apart from one small district in the Peloponnese, which had not yet adopted the city-state régime was the culturally backward northern half of Continental European Greece outside an imaginary line running approximately from Naupactus at the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth to Thermopylae at the head of the Gulf of Malis. The Continental Greek peoples beyond this line were backwoodsmen who, in the fifth century, were regarded by the city-state Greeks as 'barbarians'.¹ Their very cultural backwardness made them impotent to resist the impact of the energetic and progressive city-state form of Hellenic culture; and this culture was being radiated into the interior of Northern Continental Greece at close quarters from the colonial city-states which had been planted by Chalcis and Eretria and Andros on the east coast and by Corinth on both coasts of the Greek Peninsula.²

On the west coast, the process of penetration was gradual and on the whole pacific. The two nations on the seaboard, the Thesproti and the Chaones, had already made the change from a monarchical to a republican constitution by the time of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War.³ Thereafter, monarchy reasserted itself in this quarter when a growing local consciousness of pressure from the maritime city-states stimulated the several nations in Epirus to enter into a federation; for this federation was formed under the leadership of the Molossi, an inland people who were then still untouched by the anti-monarchical movement. In Epirus, however, this recrudescence of monarchy was accidental and temporary; and the monarchical régime did not long survive the career of King Pyrrhus (*regnabat circa 307-272 B.C.*), whose reckless expenditure of his people's blood and treasure for his own gratification was 'too much of a good thing' for Epirot public opinion to accept at royal hands with equanimity.⁴ The Epirot monarchy did not outlast the reign

¹ e.g., by Thucydides in his account of military operations on the west side of Northern Greece in the years 430-429 B.C. (See Book II, chs. 68, 80, and 81.)

² For the reason why these colonies were planted on the outer edge of the Hellenic World, and not at points nearer home from the standpoint of the mother-cities, see I. C (i) (b), Annex II, vol. i, pp. 405-6, above.

³ Thucydides, ii. 80.

⁴ Compare the effect of the career of Pyrrhus's modern Western analogue Charles XII of Sweden, 'the Hero of the North', upon the subsequent course of Swedish constitutional history.

of Pyrrhus's grandson, and Epirus became a federal republic by a peaceful revolution about the year 230 B.C.

On the east coast, the victory of the city-state over the canton and the monarchy was not won so quickly or so easily; for, while Thessaly made a pacific change-over from the canton régime to the city-state régime in the fourth century B.C., Macedonia was the theatre of a struggle between the traditional monarchical régime and the intrusive city-state régime in which the city-state régime was worsted. And although this decision was not definitive, it gave the Macedonian Monarchy a two-centuries-longer lease of life (379-168 B.C.) with momentous historical consequences.

As the Hellenic World expanded and the power began to pass from the small states at the centre to new states of larger calibre on the periphery,¹ it became evident that one of the new Hellenic Great Powers would arise in the neighbourhood of the Thermaic Gulf (the Gulf of Salonica) and the lower valley of the River Axios (Vardar).² The open question was whether the nucleus of this new Power would be the Macedonian Kingdom which had been established on the coastal plain west of the Gulf by Macedonian Greek conquerors who had descended from the highlands of the interior; or whether alternatively the new Power would spring from the Chalcidian city-states which had been established on the peninsula east of the Gulf by Euboean Greek colonists who had come in from overseas as apostles of the new city-state dispensation on this outlying fringe of the Hellenic World. From about the time of Xerxes' invasion of Continental European Greece (480-479 B.C.), both these possible aspirants for the future role of Northern Great Power began to qualify themselves for eventually assuming that position by acquiring those qualifications which they did not yet possess. The qualifications which either party already possessed and which either had still to acquire were inverse to one another. In 480 B.C., the Kingdom of Macedon already possessed the supra-city-state scale of territory and population but lacked the city-state culture, while at the same date the colonial city-states in Chalcidicê were abreast of the general Hellenic city-state culture of their day but lacked the supra-city-state scale. It was to be a race between the two com-

¹ For an analysis of this law of the Balance of Power, see III. C (ii) (b), pp. 301-6, above, and also Part XI, below.

² A study of the Athenian tribute-lists shows that, in the fifth century B.C., the north coast of the Aegean was increasing, and the east coast decreasing, in wealth and importance. The Greek city-states along the Anatolian seaboard suffered from being the battle-field of the fifty years' war (499-449 B.C.) between Hellas and the Achaemenian Power; and the peace-settlement which definitively liberated them from the Achaemenian yoke cut them off from their economic hinterland in Anatolia in order to fasten upon them the heavier yoke of Athens. Meanwhile, the north coast of the Aegean was going up in the world, partly owing to the exploitation of its mineral resources and naval stores, and partly owing to the rise in civilization of the peoples in the interior.

petitors for power, to see which would be the first to make good its own particular defect and in consequence be the first to seize the coming political opportunity.

King Alexander I of Macedon, who was on the throne at the time of Xerxes' expedition, seems to have been the earliest Macedonian King to conceive the policy of increasing the efficiency of his kingdom by introducing the city-state culture without changing the traditional monarchical constitution; and in the sphere of military equipment and organization the Kingdom was brought up to the city-state standard of the time by Alexander's second successor Archelaus (*regnabat circa* 413-399 B.C.).¹ But between the death of King Archelaus in 399 B.C. and the beginning of the decisive reign of King Philip II in 359 B.C., the Kingdom of Macedon went through a bout of recurrent disorder and inefficiency, and this Macedonian relapse gave the Chalcidians an opening which they proceeded to take with an energy which carried them to the verge of success.

The descendants of the Euboean colonists who had founded the city-states of Chalcidicê displayed two political inclinations which were rare virtues in citizens of Greek city-states. They were inclined to combine politically with each other, and they were not averse from taking into partnership the more backward peoples of the hinterland. These two virtues told in favour of their adding to their territory and increasing their power. The Chalcidians' first territorial acquisition was the city of Olynthus,² which was handed over to them in 479 B.C. by a retreating Achaemenian general who had paused to take the city from its previous Bottiaean occupants as a punishment for their defection from the losing cause.³ Thereafter, about 432 B.C., on the eve of the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, the reigning King of Macedon, Perdiccas II, who was anxious to weaken the power of Athens in his neighbourhood, raised up a formidable future rival to his own country at closer quarters by persuading the Chalcidians to evacuate and dismantle their original settlements on the coasts of the Peninsula, in which they had been living till that time; to migrate inland to Olynthus; and to establish in Olynthus a single strong Chalcidian city-state. In exchange for the agricultural land which they would be abandoning on the seaboard, Perdiccas offered the Chalcidians the usufruct of land in the interior, in the neighbourhood of Lake Bolbê (Beshik Göl) in Macedonian territory.⁴ The Chalcidians accepted the offer and revolted against Athens. Their revolt, which

¹ For the military reforms of Archelaus, which included the building of forts and the cutting of roads, see Thucydides, ii. 100.

² See Gude, M.: *A History of Olynthus* (Baltimore 1933, Johns Hopkins University Press).

³ Herodotus, viii. 127.

⁴ Thucydides, i. 58.

was successful, was one of the strokes that eventually brought the Athenian Empire to the ground; and therewith the Chalcidians started on a new career as a unitary power.

The political unification which these Chalcidian communities achieved on this occasion was not just a 'synoecism' of the well-known Continental Greek type in which a number of small communities surrendered their separate political individuality altogether in order to merge themselves in a new body politic. The Chalcidian communities which united to establish a 'Greater Olynthus' *circa* 432 B.C. were no mere villages or groups of villages like the Arcadian communities which were brought together *circa* 370 B.C. to make Megalopolis. They were city-states—albeit small city-states—with about three centuries of independent political existence behind them since the time of their foundation in the eighth century B.C. Such communities could hardly have been persuaded to renounce their corporate identity completely. Even among the more backward and rudimentary communities of South-West Arcadia, the surrender of identity which was involved in the synoecism of Megalopolis, some sixty years later, aroused opposition which had to be overcome partly by force and partly by compromise.¹ The Chalcidians resolved this political crux by anticipating the Romans in the invention of 'dual citizenship': a constitutional device which offered a practical solution for the problem of creating a commonwealth that would combine the city-state structure with the supra-city-state scale.² The Chalcidian communities which united to establish 'Greater Olynthus' did not surrender their own respective identities. They continued to exist as city-states of which their members remained citizens. But every citizen of every participating state now became simultaneously a citizen of Greater Olynthus, and his Olynthian citizenship was henceforth of very much greater importance than his local citizenship, because the more important powers and functions of government were now invested in the comprehensive Olynthian body politic while the constituent city-states were reduced to the status of municipalities.

¹ See the illuminating account of the synoecism of Megalopolis in Pausanias: *Graeciae Descriptio*, Bk. VIII, ch. 27.

² In Hellenic constitutional history, this invention of 'dual citizenship' (*συμπολιτεία*) is the analogue of the invention of 'representative government' in the constitutional history of our Western World. The Western feudal kingdom started life endowed with the political asset of magnitude; and the crucial political problem for Western statesmanship was to organize some method of self-government for a state on this large scale. On the other hand, the Hellenic city-state started life endowed with the asset of self-government; and the crucial political problem for Hellenic statesmanship was to devise some method of creating a state of supra-city-state scale out of a congeries of self-governing and self-conscious city-states. The solution of the Western problem has been to apply to the constitution of deliberative bodies the principle of election, on the analogy of the use of election as a method of appointing executive officials. The solution of the Hellenic problem was 'dual citizenship'.

This new political organization gave the Chalcidians such strength that within forty years, in about the year 392 B.C., they were able to take advantage of a change of rulers in Macedonia and an Illyrian invasion of the Kingdom from the interior in order to extract from a new occupant of the Macedonian throne, King Amyntas III, a treaty which gave the Chalcidian Commonwealth important commercial advantages in Macedonia as the price of a defensive alliance;¹ and this transaction was followed by a transfer of possession—whether in freehold or on lease or on loan—of a large slice of Macedonian territory.² A few years later, about 385 B.C., when Amyntas had established himself on his throne and—justifiably or unjustifiably—demanded the transferred territory back, the Chalcidians evidently decided that their hour had struck. They started a military and political offensive on all fronts, with the deliberate object of incorporating into their commonwealth, by persuasion or by coercion, not only the Kingdom of Macedonia but also the still independent non-Chalcidian colonial city-states along the coast. Their forward policy in these years (*circa* 385–383 B.C.) is vividly described in a speech which Xenophon puts into the mouth of the envoys from two of the threatened states—Acanthus³ and Apollonia—who came to Sparta to ask for military assistance.⁴

'Gentlemen, we have come to tell you of a portentous political movement in Hellas which has, we fancy, escaped your attention. It is a matter of common knowledge that Olynthus is the most powerful state on the North Aegean Coast. It is a state which has induced other states to unite with it on the basis of a common law and a common citizenship; and on this basis the Olynthians have eventually obtained the adhesion of some states of larger calibre. They have now embarked on a policy of liberating the cities of Macedonia from their lawful sovereign King Amyntas; the nearest of the Macedonian cities have acquiesced, and they have forthwith turned their batteries upon the larger Macedonian cities at a greater distance. By the time when we left home, a large number of Macedonian cities were in the Chalcidians' hands; and the list included Pella, which is the biggest city of which Macedonia can boast. We stayed long enough to see Amyntas evacuating the cities and on the verge of being driven out of Macedonia altogether. The Olynthians have also sent a warning to the Governments of Acanthus and Apollonia that, unless we agree to supply them with a contingent of troops, we must expect them to take military measures against us. Now our own desire, gentlemen, is to go on living under our ancestral laws as citizens of our own city-states; but nevertheless

¹ A considerable part of the text of this treaty, including the commercial provisions, has been recovered by our modern Western archaeologists (text in Dittenberger, W.: *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 3rd ed., No. 135).

² For this transfer of territory, see Diodorus of Agyrium: *A Library of Universal History*, xiv. 92 and xv. 19.

³ Acanthus was an Andrian colony.

⁴ Xenophon: *Hellenica*, V. ii. 11–19.

we shall find ourselves compelled to join the Olynthians unless some one comes to our rescue. . . . They already hold Potidaea¹ on the Isthmus of Pallênê; and you must reckon that the cities on the Pallênê Peninsula² are likely to share Potidaea's fate. In fact, we can give you a striking piece of evidence of the terror in which those states already live; and this is that they have not ventured to join us in our present embassy to you although their hatred of Olynthus is extreme. . . .

How can you be indifferent to the formation of this new Great Power—a Power which will be equally strong on land and on sea? They possess all the elements of sea-power in their abundant local supplies of timber and in their ample revenues from harbour-dues and trading-stations and in the great man-power for which they command the necessary food-supply. Moreover, they have as their neighbours the republican Thracians³ who are already the Olynthians' satellites as it is; and if they actually become their subjects, then Olynthus will gain another important accession of strength from this quarter. Moreover, if these Thracians accept Olynthian supremacy, the gold mines on Mount Pangaeus will be positively inviting the Olynthians to come and take them. In all that we have been saying to you, there is nothing that is not being said openly, ten thousand times over, in the Public Assembly of the Olynthian Commonwealth. Their self-confidence is beyond description—and possibly it is one of the innate dispositions of Human Nature that self-confidence should increase in the same ratio as power.

'Well, gentlemen, this is our report on the situation in the North; and it is now for you to make up your minds whether such a situation requires intervention on your part. We may perhaps add just this, that, while we have represented the power of Olynthus as a great power, it is not yet a power that it would be very difficult to overthrow. The states that are unwilling partners in the Olynthian Commonwealth will quickly secede if they see that Olynthus has met her match. But when once they have been welded together by the mutual grant of reciprocal civil rights⁴ which they have already voted, and when once they have realized the advantage of throwing in their lot with the paramount Power, we fear that what the Olynthians have done may prove less easy to undo.'

This speech would serve, *mutatis mutandis*, for the discourse of some envoy from one of the Greek city-states in Campania whom we might imagine arriving at Tarentum, perhaps half a century later than this, in order to warn the Government of Sparta's Italian daughter-city about the portentous political movement in Italy which was gathering momentum in the victorious progress of

¹ A Corinthian colony.—A. J. T.

² The principal cities on the Pallênê Peninsula were Eretrian colonies.—A. J. T.

³ These 'republican Thracians' (Θράκες οἱ ἀβασίλευτοι) are probably the Thracian and Paeonian communities in the Lower Basin of the River Strymon (Struma), who were more civilized than the Thracians of the interior and who, for a century past, had felt their independence to be threatened by the eastward expansion of Macedonia.—A. J. T.

⁴ Literally, 'by arrangements for contracting marriages and holding property across the frontiers'.—A. J. T.

Rome. For Olynthus, in the years 385–383 B.C., had embarked on a course of political aggrandisement which might conceivably have carried her to the height of power which Rome actually attained in the momentous half-century which opened with her first intervention in Campania in 343 B.C. Had the historic appeal of Acanthus and Apollonia to Sparta fallen on deaf ears, we can imagine, on this Roman analogy, the successive stages by which Olynthus might have risen to greatness in the next forty or fifty years. If the Macedonian Plain was her Campania and Pella her Capua in 383 B.C., then Upper Macedonia might have become her Samnium¹ and 'the republican Thracians' her Sabines² and the wild Thracians her Gauls. By one means and another—here using naked force and there exerting the attraction of a superior culture—she might have brought within the ambit of her expanding commonwealth the whole of Northern Greece, with its rough and backward but vigorous and receptive population.

Like Rome in Italy, Olynthus in Greece was a city-state which found itself standing in the fourth century B.C. on the geographical border-line between the modern cosmos of city-states and the old-fashioned pre-city-state penumbra of the Hellenic World at a moment when the peoples of the penumbra were being impelled by the stimulus of their long irradiation with the intrusive city-state culture to adopt the city-state régime and to participate in the life of the city-state society. This was evidently a favourable moment for some strong and far-sighted and ambitious city-state on the borderline to expand its own commonwealth to a supra-city-state scale by incorporating the territory and man-power of an awakening barbarian world which was still politically malleable because it was still free from any unforgettable political memories or unalterable political habits.³ And if Olynthian statesmanship had

¹ The Kingdom of Macedon in the Salonican Campania, whose capital city of Pella was momentarily incorporated into the Olynthian Commonwealth *circa* 385–383 B.C., had been founded by Macedonian Greek conquerors from the highlands of the interior, just as Capua and the other Oscan city-states of the Italian Campania had been founded—or occupied—by Oscan conquerors from the highlands of Samnium (the Abruzzi). In the early fourth century B.C., the three cantons of Upper Macedonia (Elimeia, Orestis and Lynceus) were in much the same stage of civilization as the cantons of Samnium (Caraceni, Pentri, Caudini, Hirpini) half a century later. No doubt they would have fought as hard to expel the Olynthians from the territory of their Macedonian kinsmen in the lowlands as the Samnites actually fought to expel the Romans from Capua; and no doubt, like the Samnites, they would have eventually succumbed to the superior organization and superior culture of their city-state antagonist.

² Linguistically, these 'republican Thracians' may have had as close an affinity with the Olynthians as the Sabines had with the Romans. At any rate, two of these particular 'Thracian' communities, namely the Odomanti and the Tynteni (the latter are known only from their coins), were presumably kinsmen of their homonyms the Athamanes and Atintanes in Epirus; and these two Epirot peoples were presumably Greek-speaking. (The Odomanti appear to be identical with Herodotus's Siropaeones or Paeonians of Siris (the modern Serrhes). Compare Herodotus, v. 15 and 115, with Livy, xlv. 4.)

³ For the psychological plasticity of the inhabitants of 'new countries' see p. 303, footnote 1, above.

been allowed the same free hand in Northern Greece as Roman statesmanship was actually allowed in Central Italy, we can carry our hypothetical analogy farther. We can imagine that when Olynthus had consolidated in the North a commonwealth on an overwhelmingly larger scale than any of the historic city-states of Central Greece and the Peloponnese, she might have completed her political mission by eventually incorporating into her commonwealth the southern half of the Greek Peninsula, as Rome eventually incorporated Magna Graecia and Sicily into hers. In Thessaly Olynthus might have found her Apulia, in Aetolia her Lucania, in Athens and Sparta her Tarentum and her Syracuse; and the Achaemenian Power might have met at Olynthian hands the fate which Roman hands inflicted upon Carthage.

In the actual event, the fortunes of Olynthus and of Rome turned out quite differently; for whereas Tarentum neglected to oppose the aggrandisement of Rome till it was just too late to undo the constructive work of Roman statesmanship,¹ the Spartan Government exerted itself at once to nip the political development of Olynthus in the bud. A Lacedaemonian expeditionary force was sent to the North in 382 B.C.; and within three years the ambitions of Olynthus had been frustrated once and for all. In 379 B.C. Olynthus had to capitulate to her Lacedaemonian besiegers; and the principal point in the Lacedaemonian peace-terms was that the Chalcidian Commonwealth should be dissolved into its original constituents. In thus overthrowing Olynthus, Sparta was unwittingly working not for herself and not for Hellas but for the Crown of Macedon. For it was Sparta's intervention between Olynthus and Macedon in 382-379 B.C. that gave King Philip his opportunity to make himself master of all Continental Greece between 359 B.C. and 338. Thirty years after the time when Sparta saved Macedon from Olynthus, another call for help against a rising Power was heard from the North; and this time the roles were reversed. In 349 B.C., it was the city-state of Olynthus that was the Northern victim and the Kingdom of Macedon that was the Northern aggressor. The danger was just as real and just as urgent as it had been on the earlier occasion. But in Southern Greece times had changed; and not all the eloquence of a Demosthenes could move the Athenians to intervene now in the effective manner of Sparta in 382. Accordingly, in 349-348 B.C., the dissevered cities of Chalcidicê fell one after another until the Macedonian triumph was consummated by the fall of the *ci-devant* Chalcidian metropolis

¹ The Tarentines did their best by enlisting the services of the most destructive of the Epigoni. Yet even Pyrrhus's sword, which worked such political havoc in Continental Greece, was incapable of hewing in pieces the sinewy body politic which Roman statesmanship had created in Italy.

Olynthus itself. And this time the Chalcidians received no mercy. Their lands were confiscated and their persons were either sold into slavery or deported into the interior. Therewith, the commonwealth that had aspired, a generation earlier, to become the new Northern Power was utterly blotted out. There had been no such act of barbarism in Hellenic history since the notorious destruction of Sybaris; and unhappily the fate of Olynthus in 348 B.C. was to become a precedent. In 335 B.C. the same fate was to overtake Thebes at the hands of Philip's son, and thereafter it was to overtake Syracuse and Tarentum and Corinth at the hands of the Romans.¹

Thus, in the event, the new Northern Power that was to unify European Greece was established, not by the Olynthian Commonwealth, but by the Kingdom of Macedon; and in 338 B.C., when King Philip crowned his extraordinary achievement by routing the Athenians at Chaeronea and invading Laconia,² the Athenians assuredly regretted their lukewarmness and the Spartans their hostility towards Olynthus twelve years and forty years earlier. Between them, the two leading city-states of Southern Continental Greece had allowed the primitive institution of monarchy, which had been on the verge of extinction in the Hellenic World, to rise almost from the grave and to reassert its ascendancy over the cosmos of city-states, not only in Northern Greece, but in the whole Hellenic World to the east of the Ionian Sea.

In the long run, no doubt, this anachronistic recrudescence of monarchy in the Hellenic World did not avail to deflect the course on which Hellenic history was already set. By the fourth century B.C., the city-state régime had become so thoroughly bred into the bone of the Hellenic Society that it could not be bred out again by anything short of the final dissolution of the Society itself; and, on a long view, the sensational triumph of monarchy in the careers of Philip and Alexander was ineffective and ephemeral. Though Hellenic monarchy in the person of Alexander accomplished one tremendous deed of destruction in the break-up of the Achaemenian Empire, the only constructive achievement of Alexander and his successors in Asia that had any enduring effect was the calling into existence, *in partibus Orientalium*, of a vast new world of Hellenic city-states. Moreover, in the Hellenic West, the aping of

¹ For the destruction of Greek communities by the Romans in the age of Polybius, see p. 312, above.

² For the transfer of the territory of Dentheliâtis from Spartan to Messenian sovereignty on this occasion, see the passage quoted from Tacitus in Part III. A, on p. 78, above. On the same occasion, Philip cut Laconia short in other directions as well by putting Tegea and Megalopolis in possession of the debatable territories on the northern frontier, and Argos in possession of the Thyreâtis and Cynuria. (For details see Beloch, K. J.: *Griechische Geschichte*, iii (i), 2nd ed. (Berlin and Leipzig 1922, de Gruyter), pp. 574-5.)

Macedonian royalty by the latter-day despots of Syracuse was not imitated by the new non-Greek Great Powers that were rising on the periphery of the Hellenic World in this quarter. Both the Roman Commonwealth and the Carthaginian Empire were built up on a city-state basis; and this triumph of the city-state in the West secured the ultimate victory to the city-state throughout the Hellenic World, since it was the Roman Commonwealth that delivered 'the knock-out blow' in the internecine warfare between the new Hellenic Great Powers of the supra-city-state calibre. The last round of this struggle was fought between the Roman Commonwealth and the Macedonian Kingdom; and when Macedonia suffered her final disaster in 168 B.C. the Macedonian Monarchy which had been reprieved by Spartan arms in 382-379 was deliberately abolished by Roman policy. In the peace settlement that followed the overthrow of King Perseus after the Battle of Pydna, the territory of his *ci-devant* kingdom was rearticulated by Roman commissioners into four confederacies of city-states, and therewith the political transformation of Macedonia, which Olynthian statesmanship had attempted two centuries earlier, was accomplished at last.

Thereafter, in the penultimate phase of Hellenic history, the Hellenic universal state that was established within the framework of the Roman Empire took the form of an immense confederacy of city-states encircling the Mediterranean. And thus the city-state asserted itself decisively, as the master-institution of the Hellenic Society, at the end of the story as well as at the beginning. Yet, even so, the historical consequences of the monarchical interlude were important enough.

One consequence was the forfeiture by Continental Greece of its political supremacy in the Hellenic World and the transfer of the sceptre into the hands of a non-Greek city-state in Italy. In an earlier passage in this Study,¹ we have observed that, in the deadly competition for an exclusive and permanent dominion over the Hellenic World, the two Powers that survived to encounter one another in the last round were the two Powers that were guarding the continental marches of the Hellenic World, against the European Barbarism, at the root of the Greek Peninsula and at the root of the Italian Peninsula respectively. As things turned out, it was the Greek Power that succumbed and the Italian Power that was victorious; but we may fairly speculate whether the outcome would have been the same if the warden of the Continental Greek marches in the second century B.C. had been not the Macedonian Kingdom but an Olynthian Commonwealth.

¹ In II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 160-3, above.

The fatal weakness of the Macedonian Kingdom at the time when it had to measure its strength against Rome lay in its failure to weld the whole of Continental Greece together into a single commonwealth as the Roman city-state had welded the whole of Italy. This critical time found Continental Greece once more divided against herself and therefore impotent to put forth the political and military strength which would have been at her command if only she could have united her forces. And the apple of discord was the principle of monarchy; for the city-states of Southern Greece had never been able to reconcile themselves to the Pan-Hellenic union under the presidency of the Macedonian Crown which had been imposed upon them by King Philip II in 338 B.C. Philip's Pan-Hellenic Confederacy did not survive the scramble for power among the successors of Alexander. From the morrow of Alexander's death in 323 B.C. until the outbreak of the last Romano-Macedonian War in 171, Continental Greece was wasting her strength in an inconclusive and interminable domestic conflict between Northern Monarchy and Southern Republicanism.¹ And it was this domestic conflict that rendered Continental Greece impotent to intervene effectively in the Hannibalic War, when the destinies of the Hellenic World were being finally decided. After the Battle of Cannae, King Philip V of Macedon did indeed enter the arena on the side of the momentarily victorious but fundamentally weaker of the two antagonists. His action, however, was almost paralysed by a fear—which was to be justified by the event—that Aetolia might take the opportunity to attack him on the flank; and for this reason his intervention had no decisive effect upon the issue of the struggle between Rome and Carthage and simply served to implant in the Roman Government's minds a determination to make themselves secure in Greece as soon as their hands were free in Italy.

If the North-Greek Great Power had been established in the fourth century B.C. by the Chalcidian Commonwealth instead of by the Macedonian Crown, the course of Greek history during the next two hundred years might have been very different; for if a commonwealth of city-states had succeeded in welding together

¹ We have touched upon some aspects of this conflict already in examining the social milieu of Polybius. In the first stage, the city-states of Southern Greece won a partial and fitful independence from the Crown of Macedon by allowing themselves to become the pawns of the Crown of Egypt in the diplomatic game between the Great Powers of the periphery. The policy of the Aetolian and Achaean Confederacies was to weld the shrunken city-state cosmos of Southern Greece into a Central Power strong enough to insist upon holding aloof from the combats between the surrounding monarchies. (Compare the project, which was mooted in Germany between A.D. 1815 and 1866, for a Confederation of German States from which Prussia as well as Austria was to be excluded.) We have seen how the Aetolian and Achaean policy broke down in the last three decades of the third century B.C.

all the territories and peoples that were actually united under the Macedonian Crown by King Philip II, this Power would have possessed a combination of qualities which was never possessed by either Macedon or Thebes or Sparta or Athens. A Chalcidian Commonwealth would have enjoyed the material advantage of the supra-city-state scale which was enjoyed by Macedonia, but was lacking to the three city-states that had tried and failed before her to achieve the political union of Greece, and at the same time a Chalcidian Commonwealth would have possessed a spiritual asset which was lacking to Macedonia. As a commonwealth of city-states, it would have been recognized to be a polity of the same species as the historic city-states of the South; and therefore Thebes and Athens and Sparta, when they bowed to the new Great Power's overwhelmingly superior strength, would not have been inwardly humiliated and alienated, as they actually were in 338 B.C., by a feeling that they were submitting themselves, under sheer *force majeure*, to a barbarous and reactionary régime which was the very negation of everything that the city-state had stood for since its first emergence.

The Roman historian Livy, in a celebrated passage,¹ has speculated upon what would have happened if, in the fourth century B.C., Alexander the Great had turned his arms against the Roman Commonwealth. On this distinguished precedent we may venture to put an imaginary question of our own. What would have been the course of history if the career of Alexander the Great and the career of his father Philip had been ruled out *a priori* by the previous incorporation of Macedonia into a vast Chalcidian Commonwealth of city-states? In that event might not Hannibal, on the morrow of Cannae, have found himself able to summon to his aid a politically united Greece which would have been a Power of the same calibre as Roman Italy? And in the face of such overwhelming odds as these, could Rome have avoided the fate which actually overtook Olynthus in 348 and Macedon in 168 and Carthage in 146 B.C?

¹ Titi Livi, *ab Urbe Condita*, Liber IX, caps. xvii-xix.

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
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A STUDY OF HISTORY

BY

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'Except the Lord build the house,
their labour is but lost that build it.
'Except the Lord keep the city,
the watchman waketh but in vain.'

Ps. cxxvii. 1-2



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del

PREFACE

THESE three volumes contain Parts IV and V of the thirteen parts which are set out in the plan of the book on p. v above. The writer hopes to publish the remaining eight parts in one more batch of volumes, as he believes that the five parts contained in the first six volumes will prove to amount, in aggregate length, to rather more than two-thirds of the whole work. Part V, as now published, includes much that, in the first sketch, was left over for treatment in Parts VI–VIII; on the other hand, nothing of what was originally intended to be treated in the first five parts has been omitted from the final version of these.

The index to the volumes now published, like the index to the preceding volumes, has been made by the writer's friend and colleague and co-author of the *Annual Survey of International Affairs*, Miss V. M. Boulter. While the writer cannot let pass this opportunity of expressing his now double gratitude to her on this head, it seems hardly necessary this time to draw attention to the excellence of her contribution, or to its indispensability to the reader, because every reader of volumes i–iii will have found out these facts for himself, and will know, in advance, on learning that the index to vols. iv–vi comes from the same expert hand, that, once again, he will have the same admirable guidance in finding his way through the labyrinth of the text. The writer need only point out that the greater length of the present batch of volumes has made the indexer's task even more difficult—and unfortunately also even more laborious—this time than it was before. Gratitude to colleagues and affection for friends are feelings that mount up with the years; and a lustrum which in retrospect seems as long as a lifetime has now passed since the previous index was compiled.

During the same five years Miss Reddin has typed, with the same patience and accuracy as always, many thousands more sheets of complicated manuscript, not only for the present volumes of this work, but also for the heavily laden current volumes of the *Survey of International Affairs*; and, in again having her aid throughout, both the writer and the printer have been as fortunate as before.

The writer also wishes to thank another colleague, Miss P. F. Beard, for her resourcefulness and good nature in helping him, when the present volumes were being sent to press, to settle a number of outstanding queries.

He is also again deeply indebted to other friends of his who have found time—or made time—to read parts of these volumes in the typescript. And again these kind critics, through the trouble that

they have taken for the writer's benefit, have put it in his power to diminish a number of weaknesses in his original draft—though this, of course, without any one beyond the writer himself being in any way responsible for the final result. For this invaluable help the writer wishes to express his most sincere gratitude to Professor Gilbert Murray, Mr. and Mrs. J. L. Hammond, the Librarian of Ampleforth Abbey, Lord Samuel, Professor N. H. Baynes, Dr. W. W. Tarn, Father H. Thurston, S.J., Mr. Geoffrey Barraclough, Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, Mr. R. N. Carew Hunt, Dr. Edwyn Bevan, Professor A. L. Sadler, Sir George Sansom, Mr. M. P. Charlesworth, Dr. Martin Braun, the writer's sister, Miss J. M. C. Toynbee, and other scholars to whom acknowledgements are made in footnotes to the text.

In addition to these debts to individual scholars the writer is also once again indebted to several learned institutions. The Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs have continued to make, out of a grant which they have been receiving from the Rockefeller Foundation for research in the field of international studies, an allocation for the purpose of releasing the writer's time and energy for writing the present work, and for the same purpose the trustees of the Leverhulme Fellowship Fund have given him aid for which he takes this opportunity to express in public a gratitude of which the trustees themselves are, he feels sure, long since aware. As for his indebtedness to Chatham House—on the staff of which he has by now had the honour and happiness of serving for more than fifteen years—this would not be fully accounted for even in a complete catalogue of all the acts of help and kindness that have been done him, during these years, by the Council and his colleagues. He also owes more than he can tell, or can repay, to the spirit of Chatham House itself; for he knows that—while he owes his interest in history to his Mother, who died while the present volumes were in the press—he could never have produced this book without also having received a stimulus that is by now perhaps familiar to all scholars who have done any work under the auspices of this great institution.

Though the original sketch of Parts IV and V was worked out, like that of all the parts that precede and follow, in the summers of 1927 and 1928, the actual writing of Part IV was not begun before the summer of 1933, and the last proofs were sent to press, at a moment of public anxiety and private grief, in March 1939. It will be seen from the dates that the contemporary atmosphere in which the present three volumes were produced was painfully appropriate to the themes of 'breakdown' and 'disintegration' which these volumes have for their subjects. There were moments when it

almost seemed like tempting Fate and wasting effort to go on writing a book that must be the work of many years, when a catastrophe might overtake the writer's world within the next few weeks or days. At such moments the writer has often fortified his will by calling to mind the dates of writing of another book with which this book is comparable only on the single point of length. Saint Augustine did not begin writing *De Civitate Dei* before the sack of Rome by Alaric in A.D. 410; yet he finished the work within the next twenty years, and, although, at the moment of his death in A.D. 430 in his episcopal see of Hippo, a Vandal war-band was beleaguering the city-walls, the book survived to inform the minds and inspire the souls of Christians from that day to this, in times and places that were far beyond the fifth-century African Father's mundane horizon. Of course the author of this tale of two cities had a supra-mundane range of vision in comparison with which no appreciable difference is made by a few thousand terrestrial miles or years more or less; and a glimpse of this vision is the boon for which the present writer is the most deeply grateful to the writer of *De Civitate Dei*.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

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IV

THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS

A. THE PROBLEM OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS

THE problem of the breakdowns of civilizations is more obvious than the problem of their growths. Indeed, it is almost as obvious as the problem of their geneses. The geneses of civilizations call for explanation in view of the mere fact that this species of societies has come into existence and that we are able to enumerate twenty-six representatives of the species (counting in the five arrested civilizations)¹ that have come to birth up to date, as against four civilizations that have been abortive.² We may now go on to observe that while only four civilizations, to our knowledge, have miscarried, as against twenty-six that have been born alive, no less than sixteen out of these twenty-six are by now dead and buried.

These sixteen dead civilizations include all the six representatives of the 'unrelated' class:³ the Egyptian, the Andean, the Sinic, the Minoan, the Sumeric, and the Mayan civilizations. Of the fifteen 'related' civilizations, six—namely the Indic, the Hittite, the Syriac, the Hellenic, the Babylonian, and the Mexic—are now dead likewise; and two more of them—the Arabic and the Yucatec—have been swallowed alive by sister civilizations: the Arabic by the Iranian Civilization,⁴ and the Yucatec by the Mexic.⁵ Of the five arrested civilizations, two—the Spartan and the Ottoman—are also now extinct. We are thus left with no more than ten civilizations out of twenty-six (including three arrested civilizations out of five) that are actually alive to-day. These ten are our own Western Society, the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the Near East, the offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia, the Islamic Society, the Hindu Society, the main body of the Far Eastern Society in China, and the offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in Japan, together with the three arrested civilizations of the Poly-

¹ For the arrested Polynesian, Eskimo, Nomadic, Ottoman, and Spartan civilizations see Part III. A, in vol. iii, above.

² For the abortive Far Western Christian, Scandinavian, Far Eastern Christian, and Syriac civilizations see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-91, above.

³ For the distinction between 'related' and 'unrelated' civilizations see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 129-30, above. In the same chapter there is a catalogue of the civilizations of both classes that have been identified by an empirical inquiry in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 63-129, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 70-2, with I. C (i) (b), Annex I, above.

⁵ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 123-4, above.

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nesians and the Esquimaux and the Nomads. If we look more closely at these ten survivors, we observe that the Polynesian and the Nomadic civilizations are now in their last agonies, and that seven out of the eight others are all, in different degrees, under threat of either annihilation or assimilation by our own Civilization of the West. Moreover, no less than six out of these seven civilizations whose existence is now threatened (that is, all except the Eskimo Civilization, whose growth was arrested in infancy), bear marks of having already broken down and gone into disintegration.

One of the most conspicuous of the marks of disintegration, which we have already noticed in this Study at an earlier point,¹ is a phenomenon of the last stage but one in a decline and fall, when a disintegrating civilization purchases a reprieve by submitting to a forcible political unification within the framework of a 'universal state'. For a Western student of history the classical example of a universal state in this special sense of the term is the Roman Empire, into which the Hellenic Society was forcibly gathered up in the penultimate chapter of its history, immediately before the interregnum in which the Hellenic Society passed out of existence and our own Western Society came to birth. With this clue in our hands, we have succeeded, at the outset of this Study, in identifying a number of other now extinct civilizations by working backwards from their respective universal states, whose memories still stand out as conspicuous features in our mental landscape of the Past.² We did not employ the same clue for dealing with any of the living civilizations, because we were able to identify these at once by a direct observation of their existence in the world of to-day. We have noticed incidentally, however, that one of these still living civilizations, namely the main body of Orthodox Christendom, has already been through a universal state in the shape of the Ottoman Empire.³ We have also noticed that the offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia entered into a universal state towards the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era after the political unification, in A.D. 1478, of Muscovy and Novgorod, which were the two principal parochial states in the Russian Orthodox Christian World of the time.⁴ We may now observe that at least three more of the civilizations in question have had their universal states likewise: the Hindu Civilization in the shape of the Timurid Mughal Empire and its successor the British Rāj; the

¹ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52-5, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), *passim*, in vol. i, pp. 63-129, above.

³ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 374; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 175; and III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 145, above.

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main body of the Far Eastern Civilization in the shape of the Mongol Empire and in the resuscitation of the Mongol Empire—in a less colossal but also less ephemeral form—at the hands of the Manchus; and the Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization in the shape of the Tokugawa Shogunate. And when we pass to the Islamic Civilization, we may perhaps discern at least an 'ideological' premonition of a universal state, here too, in the shape of the Pan-Islamic Movement.

If we accept this phenomenon of a universal state as a token of decline, we shall conclude that all the six non-Western civilizations that are alive to-day (leaving the arrested civilization of the Esquimaux out of account) had broken down internally before they were broken in upon by the impact of our Western Civilization from outside. At a later stage of this Study,¹ when we come to investigate the contacts of civilizations with one another, we shall find reason for believing that we have stumbled here upon an example of a general 'law'; and that, whenever we see one civilization intruding upon another successfully, we may infer that the civilization which is suffering the intrusion has already broken down and is no longer in its growth. For our present purpose we have merely to take note of the fact that, among the civilizations which are alive at the present day, every one, apparently, has already broken down and is now in process of disintegration, with the possible exception of our own.

And what of our Western Civilization? In contrast to all its living contemporaries, the Western Civilization has manifestly not yet reached its universal state; and, to outward appearance at least, it is not yet within sight of that historical landmark. The paroxysm of Nationalism by which the Western World was being racked in the year 1938 rather suggested—unless, perhaps, this frenzy was a last desperate bout of kicking against the pricks—that the political unification of our Western World might have to be bought at a heavy price, and that our parochial national states might have to pass through further bouts of internecine fratricidal warfare before they would either bring themselves to enter into an effective social contract or else submit to the terrible alternative of being unified by force.² Yet a universal state is not the first stage in the disintegration of a civilization, any more than it is the last. While it is followed by an interregnum, a universal state is preceded, as we have seen,³ by a 'Time of Troubles' that seems usually to occupy several centuries; and if we in our generation were to permit ourselves to judge by the purely subjective criterion of our own feeling

¹ In Part IX below.

² See V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 318-21, below.

³ In I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 53, above.

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about our own age, the best judges among us would probably declare unanimously that our 'Time of Troubles' has undoubtedly descended upon us in our Western World of to-day—*tanta stat praedita culpa*.¹

Nor would this subjective judgement be entirely without the support of objective evidence. For, on an empirical test, we have found strong grounds for believing that one of the symptoms of social disintegration is a geographical expansion on the grand scale;² and we have already asked ourselves, in this connexion, whether the latter-day expansion of our own Western Civilization over the face of the Earth may not be, perhaps, an intimation of mortality. In our generation, no doubt, we must be content to leave this question unanswered.³ Yet, if there is happily still no proof that our Western Civilization has already broken down and gone into decline, we are equally without assurance that our year is still in the spring.

Meanwhile, we children of the West are in the posture of the Ancient Mariner after Life-in-Death had won him for her own while Death had gained dominion over his shipmates.

The many men, so beautiful!
And they all dead did lie:
And a thousand thousand slimy things
Lived on; and so did I.

As we cast our eyes around a world in which the majority of the civilizations known to us are already dead, while the rest of the survivors are all either in decline or *in extremis*, and as we remind ourselves that we have not any means of divining what our own society's expectation of life may be, we may be inclined to read into the panorama of history the same grim *motif* that the poet divined in the stones of Westminster Abbey.

Mortality, behold and fear!
What a change of flesh is here!

In truth, the problem of the breakdowns of civilizations stares us in the face.

Haud igitur leti praeclusa est ianua caelo
nec soli terraeque neque altis aequoris undis,
sed patet immane et vasto respectat hiatu.⁴

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, l. 199.

² See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 139-54, above.

³ See I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 36-7, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 313-4, below.

⁴ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 373-5. (The passage has been quoted already in vol. ii, p. 9, and in vol. iii, p. 374, above.)

B. THE NATURE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS

HAVING recognized that the breakdowns of civilizations present a problem, and having set ourselves to search for a solution, we shall be wise to make certain that we are agreed upon the nature of the phenomenon with which we are concerned, before we attempt to investigate its cause.

As it happens, we have defined the nature of the breakdowns of civilizations already. These breakdowns are failures in an audacious attempt to ascend from the level of a Primitive Humanity, living the life of a social animal, to the height of some superhuman kind of being in a Communion of Saints; and we have described the casualties of this great enterprise in various similes. We have compared them to the drivers of motor-cars whose cars backslide before they have succeeded in passing out through the exit from a one-way street;¹ and we have compared them to climbers who fall to their death, or to an ignominious state of life-in-death, upon the ledge from which they have last started, before they succeed in completing the 'pitch' and reaching a new resting-place on the ledge above.²

We have also described the nature of these breakdowns in non-material terms as a loss of creative power in the souls of the creative individuals, or the creative minorities, who have been the leaders of any given civilization at any given stage in the history of its growth;³ and we have seen that this failure of vitality on the leaders' side divests them of their magic power to influence and attract the uncreative masses. Where there is no creation, there is also no mimesis. The piper who has lost his cunning can no longer conjure the feet of the multitude into a dance; and if, in rage and panic, he now attempts to turn himself into a drill-sergeant or a slave-driver, and to coerce by physical force a people whom he feels that he can no longer lead by his old magnetic charm, then, all the more surely and more swiftly, he defeats his own intention; for the followers who had merely flagged and fallen behind as the heavenly music died away will be stung by a touch of the whip into active rebellion.

We have seen, in fact,⁴ that when, in the history of any society, a Creative Minority degenerates into a mere Dominant Minority which

¹ See I. C (iii) (d), vol. i, pp. 176-7, above.

² See Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 192-5, above.

³ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-7, and Part II. A, vol. i, pp. 187-8, above.

⁴ Ibid. See further IV. C (iii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 119-33, and V. C (i) (a)-(c), *passim*, in vol. v, pp. 35-337, below.

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attempts to retain by force a position which it has ceased to merit, this fatal change in the character of the ruling element provokes, on the other side, the secession of a Proletariat which no longer spontaneously admires, or freely imitates, the ruling element, and which revolts against being reduced to the status of an unwilling 'under-dog'. We have also seen that this Proletariat, when it asserts itself, is divided from the outset into two distinct parts. There is an 'Internal Proletariat', prostrate yet recalcitrant, under the Dominant Minority's heel within the disintegrating society's borders, and an 'External Proletariat' of barbarians beyond the pale who now violently resist incorporation. And thus the breakdown of a civilization gives rise to a class-war within the body social of a society which was neither divided against itself by hard-and-fast divisions nor sundered from its neighbours by unbridgeable gulfs so long as it was in growth.

On this showing, the nature of the breakdowns of civilizations can be summed up in three points: a failure of creative power in the minority, an answering withdrawal of mimesis on the part of the majority, and a consequent loss of social unity in the society as a whole. With this picture of the nature of these breakdowns in our minds, we may now proceed to inquire into their cause.

C. THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS

I. SAEVA NECESSITAS?

ONE of the perennial infirmities of human beings is to ascribe their own failure to the operation of forces which are entirely beyond their control and immeasurably wider in range than the compass of human action. This mental manœuvre, which promises to convert an importunate sense of humiliation into a new assurance of self-importance—by setting the great engine of the Universe in motion in order to break one human career—is among the most insidious of ‘the Consolations of Philosophy’. It is particularly attractive to sensitive minds in periods of decline and fall; and in the decline and fall of the Hellenic Civilization it was a commonplace of different schools of philosophers to explain the social decay which they deplored but could not arrest as the incidental and inevitable effect of an all-pervasive onset of ‘cosmic senescence’.

This was the philosophy of an Epicurean poet in the last generation of the Hellenic ‘Time of Troubles’ before the Hellenic Society obtained the temporary reprieve of the *Pax Augusta*:

Sic igitur magni quoque circum moenia mundi
expugnata dabunt labem putrisque ruinas.
iamque adeo fracta est aetas, effetaque tellus
vix animalia parva creat quae cuncta creavit
saecula deditque ferarum ingentia corpora partu.
haud, ut opinor, enim mortalia saecula superne
aurea de caelo demisit funis in arva
nec mare nec fluctus plangentes saxa crearunt,
sed genuit tellus eadem quae nunc alit ex se.
praeterea nitidas fruges vinetaque laeta
sponte sua primum mortalibus ipsa creavit,
ipsa dedit dulces fetus et pabula laeta;
quae nunc vix nostro grandescunt aucta labore,
conterimusque boves et vires agricularum,
conficimus ferrum vix arvis suppeditati:
usque adeo parcunt fetus augentque laborem.
iamque caput quassans grandis suspirat arator
crebrius, incassum manuum cecidisse labores,
et cum tempora temporibus praesentia confert
praeteritis, laudat fortunas saepe parentis
et crepat, antiquum genus ut pietate repletum
perfacile angustis tolerarit finibus aevum,
cum minor esset agri multo modus ante viritim.

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tristis: item vetulae vitis sator atque vietae
temporis incusat momen caelumque fatigat
nec tenet omnia paulatim tabescere et ire
ad capulum spatio aetatis defessa vetusto.¹

The theme recurs in a work of controversy which was written by one of the Fathers of the Western Christian Church some three hundred years later, under the impression of the stricken Hellenic Society's next relapse into a time of tribulation which had found Thascius Cyprianus a pagan scholar and which saw him become a Christian martyr before the crisis passed:²

'You ought to be aware that the age is now senile (*senuisse iam saeculum*). It has not now the stamina that used to make it upstanding, nor the vigour and robustness that used to make it strong. This truth is proclaimed, even if we keep silence . . . , by the World itself, which testifies to its own decline by giving manifold concrete evidences of the process of decay. There is a diminution in the winter rains that give nourishment to the seeds in the earth, and in the summer heats that ripen the harvests. The springs have less freshness and the autumns less fecundity. The mountains, disembowelled and worn out, yield a lower output of marble; the mines, exhausted, furnish a smaller stock of the precious metals: the veins are impoverished, and they shrink daily. There is a decrease and deficiency of farmers in the fields, of sailors on the sea, of soldiers in the barracks, of honesty in the marketplace, of justice in court, of concord in friendship, of skill in technique, of strictness in morals. When a thing is growing old, do you suppose that it can still retain, unimpaired, the exuberance of its fresh and lusty youth? Anything that is near its end and is verging towards its decline and fall is bound to dwindle. The Sun, for instance, radiates his beams with a less brilliant and less fiery splendour when he is setting, and the Moon grows thin, with her horns all eaten away, when she is on the wane. The tree which was once so green and so luxuriant turns sterile later on, as its branches wither up, and grows ugly with old age; and old age likewise stops the flow of the spring, until the bounteous outpouring of its welling sources dwindles into a bare trickle. This is the sentence that has been passed upon the World; this is the law of God: that what has been born must die, and what has grown up must grow old, and what has been strong must lose its strength, and what has been great must be diminished; and that this loss of strength and loss of stature must end, at last, in annihilation.'³

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book II, *ad fin.*, ll. 1144-5 and 1150-74.

² The terrible social relapse which swept away the *Pax Augusta* in the third century of the Christian Era may be said to have begun (or at least to have become glaringly manifest) with the murder of Alexander Severus, at the instigation of Maximin, in A.D. 235, and to have been surmounted (or perhaps rather to have been hidden under a veil) after Diocletian had struck down Arrius Aper in A.D. 284. Cyprian was converted to Christianity in the twelfth year of this time of tribulation (i.e. in A.D. 246); he wrote the tract *In Demetrianum* in the eighteenth year (i.e. in A.D. 252); and he suffered martyrdom in the twenty-fourth year (i.e. in A.D. 258).

³ Thascius Caecilius Cyprianus: *Ad Demetrianum*, chap. 3. Cf. Saint Augustine: *Sermo lxxxix*, chap. 8 (apropos of Psalm ciii, 5).

This implication of death, as the inevitable consummation of an unmistakable senescence, was the argument in the mind of Lucretius when he wrote the lines above quoted as the tail-piece to a canto which is devoted to a demonstration that the Universe is doomed to destruction; and in another passage the pagan poet pronounces his Epicurean sentence upon the World in almost Christian tones of mingled horror and exultation:

Principio maria ac terras caelumque tuere;
quorum naturam triplicem, tria corpora, Memmi,
tris species tam dissimiles, tria talia texta,
una dies dabit exitio, multosque per annos
sustentata ruet moles et machina mundi.¹

This cosmic sentence of death is not unfamiliar to us, since we are accustomed to hearing it pronounced by our own physical scientists in our own generation when they talk of 'matter' being transformed into 'radiation':

'The capacity of Space for radiation is practically infinite when judged by any amount of radiation which can ever be poured into it. It follows that the transformation of matter into radiation is a "one-way" or, as it is technically called, an "irreversible" process. Matter can change into radiation, but under present conditions radiation can never change back into matter. Ultimately a time must come when every atom which is capable of dissolving into radiation will have done so. The Universe is like a clock which is running down: a clock which, so far as Science knows, no one ever winds up, which cannot wind itself up, and so must stop in time. . . . [A state in which] there [will] be neither sunlight nor starlight but only a cool glow of radiation uniformly diffused through Space . . . is indeed, so far as present-day Science can see, the final end towards which all creation moves, and at which it must, at long last, arrive.'²

For the latter-day Westerner, who has deliberately reinvested his treasure in This World after taking the most up-to-date professional advice, this sentence upon the Material Cosmos bears with it none of that promise of spiritual liberation—through the extinction of our consciousness or else through its etherialization—which it bore for a Lucretius and a Cyprian. And if we were bidden to believe, as well, that the destiny of our Western Civilization is bound up with the destiny of our Physical Universe, and that the symptoms of social breakdown, which in our day we seem to see on every side, are signs that the final cosmic catastrophe is now upon us, then our neo-pagan spirits would be damped indeed!

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 92-6.

² Jeans, Sir James: *Eos, or the Wider Aspects of Cosmogony* (London 1930, Kegan Paul), pp. 52 and 56.

As it happens, however, our Western cosmologists part company from their Hellenic confrères at this point; for they present us with a Time-chart in which human history and cosmic history are plotted on such utterly different scales that, from the practical standpoint, they can be regarded as being quite out of relation with one another.

'Taking a very gloomy view of the future of the Human Race, let us suppose that it can only expect to survive for two thousand million years longer, a period about equal to the past age of the Earth. Then, regarded as a being destined to live for three-score years and ten, Humanity, although it has been born in a house seventy years old, is itself only three days old. . . . Utterly inexperienced beings, we are standing at the first flush of the dawn of Civilization. . . . In time, the glory of the morning must fade into the light of common day; and this, in some far distant age, will give place to evening twilight, presaging the final eternal night. But we children of the dawn need give but little thought to the far-off sunset.'¹

Indeed, if the expectation-of-life of the *Genus Homo* is (as Sir James Jeans here computes) something in the order of 8517 times the length of its actual life up to date, the expectation-of-life of the species of human societies called civilizations dwarfs the actual span of the existence of this species hitherto by a vastly greater measure. At an earlier point in this Study² we have satisfied ourselves that if we accept our cosmologists' time-chart, and if we make the unverifiable but not intrinsically unreasonable assumption that the average life-span of the twenty-one known civilizations which have come to birth and have proceeded to grow gives the general average for all future as well as for all past representatives of the species, then, 'on a conservative estimate', there is time ahead of us for at least 1,743,000,000 civilizations to come into existence and to pass away.³ On this showing, it is obvious that no light whatever can be thrown upon the problem of the historic breakdowns of civilizations by the alleged inevitability of an ultimate breakdown of the Physical Universe.

Accordingly, our latter-day Western advocates of a predestinarian or deterministic explanation of the breakdowns of civilizations do not attempt to link the destinies of these human institutions up with the ultimate destiny of the Physical Universe as a whole. They appeal, instead, to a law of senescence and death with a shorter wave-length, for which they claim jurisdiction over the whole Kingdom of Life on this planet. Here are the terms in

¹ Jeans, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13 and 83-4.

² See I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. I, pp. 462-4, above.

³ This is on the computation that the Human Race has at least 500,000 million years of existence still to look forward to.

which, on this ground, the death-sentence is demanded by our most celebrated post-war exponent of a philosophy of history:

'Every civilization (*Kultur*) passes through the same succession of ages as an individual human being. Every one of them has its childhood, its youth, its manhood and its old age. A young, timid, anxious soul reveals itself in the early dawn of Romanesque and Gothic. . . . One feels here the breath of the breezes of spring. . . . Childhood proclaims itself likewise, and this in kindred accents, in the early Homeric Doric. . . . The nearer a civilization approaches to the midday zenith of its existence, the greater become the manliness, the severity, the discipline and the self-fulfilment of its self-expression (*Formensprache*), which is now at last assured; and there is a corresponding increase of certainty in its feeling of its own strength, and increase of clarity in its features. (In the archaic age, all this is still blurred and confused and tentative—still inspired by childish longing and at the same time by childish fear.) . . . Now, in the full consciousness of a mature formative power, . . . every detail of expression gives evidence of a fastidiousness, a precision, a sense of proportion and an amazing facility and naturalness. This age is all shot through with flashes of a dazzling perfection. . . . Later still, we encounter a tenderness, a brittleness that is near to breaking-point, a painful sweetness like the feel of the last October days, in the Cnidian Aphrodite and in the Caryatid-portico of the Erechtheum, in the arabesques of Saracenic horse-shoe arches, in the Schloss at Dresden, and in the work of Watteau and Mozart. Last of all, in the time of old age . . . , the soul's fire goes out. The society's ebbing strength ventures just once again, and this time with only partial success, to attempt a great act of creation in the shape of the Classicism which is characteristic of every expiring civilization; and then, in a Romantic Movement, the soul casts back its thoughts once more, sorrowfully, to its childhood. Finally the soul turns weary, listless and cold; she loses the appetite for existence; and all her longing is to leave the light in which she has lived for a thousand years and to sink back into the darkness of primitive mysticism, into the womb, into the grave.'¹

In this passage we may acknowledge a fine appreciation of the successive changes in *êthos* that can be observed in the course of the histories of certain civilizations which, at some point in their growth, have in fact had the misfortune to break down and to lapse into a decline. But Herr Spengler is here demanding from us much more than a recognition of empirically verifiable facts. He is asking us to induce from this handful of facts a universal and inexorable law; and, with (no doubt, unconscious) jugglery, he is attempting to mask the inadequacy of the evidential basis on which his tremendous induction has to stand, behind the simile in which

¹ Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 154-5. Compare Frobenius, L.: *Paideuma* (Frankfort 1928, Frankfurter Societäts-Druckerei), p. 40.

he likens the career of a civilization to the life-history of a human being or other living organism. As an effective artifice of literary expression, this simile might have been allowed to pass; but, when we detect its author in the act of misusing it for the purpose of glozing over a weakness in his chain of argument, we are bound to point out that this simile has no basis in fact.

At an earlier stage in this Study¹ we have noted that societies are not, in fact, living organisms in any sense; and we may be sure that our apparent glimpses of a living and breathing Leviathan will always resolve themselves, under cold scrutiny, into the prosaically inanimate realities of a bunch of gasometers or a pall of smoke on the horizon. In subjective terms, societies are the intelligible fields of historical study.² In objective terms, they are the common ground between the respective fields of activity of a number of individual human beings³ who are themselves living organisms but who cannot conjure up a giant in their own image out of the intersection of their own shadows and then breathe into this unsubstantial body the breath of their own life. The individual energies of all the human beings who constitute the so-called 'members' of a society are the vital forces whose operation works out the history of that society, including its Time-span. And who can decree or forecast what the characters and the interactions of all these actors are to be, or how many of them are to appear upon this particular stage from first to last? To declare dogmatically that every society has a predestined Time-span is as foolish as it would be to declare that every play that is written and produced is bound to consist of just so many acts, or that every film that is photographed and thrown upon the screen is bound to measure just so many yards or metres.

Nor does our historical determinist strengthen his case when he abandons the simile of an individual organism for the simile of a species of organisms or a genus:

'The *habitus* of any group of organisms includes, among other things, a definite life-span and a definite *tempo* of development; and no morphology of history can dispense with these concepts. The musical time of Hellenic life was different from that of Egyptian or Arabic life. One may legitimately speak of the Graeco-Roman *andante* and of the Faustian⁴ *allegro con brio*. The concept of the life-span of a human being, an eagle, a tortoise, an oak or a palm is bound up with a definite numerical value which is quite independent of all the accidental elements in the fate of the individual. In the life of all human beings a decade of years is a Time-section of approximately equal significance, and the metamorphosis of insects is in some cases bound up with a particular number

¹ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 219-23, above.

² See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 223-48, above.

³ See Part I. B, in vol. i, above.

⁴ i.e. Western.—A.J.T.

of days which is accurately known in advance. The Romans defined their concepts of *pueritia*, *adulescentia*, *iuventus*, *virilitas*, *senectus* with an absolutely mathematical exactitude. The Biology of the future will undoubtedly find the point of departure for an entirely new formulation of its problems in the concept of the pre-ordained life-span of the genera and species. . . . The span of a generation—whatever creature may be in question—is a numerical value of almost mystical significance. And these relations are also valid for all¹ civilizations—and this in a way that has never before been dreamt of. Every civilization, every archaic age, every rise and every downfall, and every inevitable phase of each of these movements, has a definite Time-span which is always the same and which always recurs with symbolic emphasis. What is the significance of the fifty-year period in the rhythm of political, intellectual and artistic life which is prevalent in all civilizations? (The basis of this particular period is the spiritual relation between the grandfather and the grand-child.) What is the significance of the three-hundred-year periods of Gothic, Baroque, Doric, Ionic, of the great mathematical systems, of Attic sculpture, of mosaic, of counterpoint, and of Galileo's system of mechanics? What is the significance of the millennium which is the ideal life-span of all civilizations, considered in proportion to the individual human being's "three-score years and ten"?²

The conclusive answer to these questionings is that a society is not a species or a genus,³ any more than it is an organism. It is itself an individual representative of some species of the genus 'societies', and the individual human beings who are the 'members' of a society are representatives of a species or a genus likewise. But the genus of which we human beings are the individuals is neither the Western Society (or the Hellenic Society or any other society) in particular nor the genus of societies in general, but the *Genus Homo*; and this simple truth absolves us from any obligation to examine here Herr Spengler's dogma that genera and species have pre-ordained life-spans on the analogy of the individual organisms in which the biological genera and species are represented.

Let us assume, for the moment, without prejudice, that the *Genus Homo* has a mandate of limited duration for reproducing itself on the face of this planet, and that it cannot look forward to

¹ In this word 'all' the watchful reader will observe a sudden alteration in the major premise of Herr Spengler's argument. The 'group of organisms' with which Herr Spengler sets out to deal at the beginning of this passage is a *single* civilization—Hellenic, Egyptian, or Arabic—in which the organisms are presumably the human beings who are the 'members' of the civilization. From the present point onwards, however, the group becomes the species 'civilizations' of the genus 'societies', and the organisms become the several civilizations in which the species is represented. This change of premise has implicated the philosopher in an unresolved contradiction. At the beginning of the passage he tells us that 'the musical time' of each civilization is unique; at the close he tells us that the rhythm, as well as the Time-span, of all civilizations is uniform.—A.J.T.

² Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 157–8.

³ For Herr Spengler's own inconsistency in regard to this premise of his argument see the last footnote but one.

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remaining in being as a matter of course until the progress of cosmic radiation eventually makes the Material Universe too chilly a place for human life to continue here. Even on this assumption, a brief consideration of the actual historical duration of biological genera and species on the surface of this planet up to date shows at once that it is just as impossible to link up the breakdown and disintegration of any given civilization with this hypothetical expiry of the mandate of the *Genus Homo* as it is to link it up with the dissolution of the Material Universe into radiation. The *Genus Homo* is supposed to have been in existence, in a recognizably human form, for some 300,000 years already, as against the 6,000 years or less that have elapsed since the first emergence of the species of societies called civilizations.¹ What warrant is there for assuming that the mandate of this genus (if it is really subject to any mandate) is not good for another 300,000 years at least? And, to come to grips again with our immediate problem of the breakdowns of civilizations, what ground is there for suggesting that these breakdowns are accompanied by any symptoms of physical or psychic degeneration in the individual human beings who happen to be the living 'members' of the particular society in question at the moment when the breakdown occurs? Were the Athenians of the generation of Socrates and Euripides and Thucydides and Pheidias and Pericles, who were overtaken by the catastrophe of 431 B.C., intrinsically poorer creatures, in either soul or body, than the generation of the *Μαραθωνομάχαι*, who shone in retrospect in the illusively intensified light of an age which appeared more glorious than it had been in truth by contrast with the tragedy of the age which followed?

An explanation of the breakdowns of civilizations in terms of a supposed science of eugenics does, perhaps, appear to be suggested by Plato in a famous passage of *The Republic*:

'A society with the ideal constitution is not easily thrown out of equilibrium; but, after all, everything that has a genesis is foredoomed to eventual disintegration, and even the ideal constitution will not endure in perpetuity but will break down in the end. The breakdown is connected with the periodic rhythm (with a short wave-length for short-lived creatures and a long wave-length for those at the other end of the scale) which is the rhythm of Life in the Animal as well as in the Vegetable Kingdom, and which is the determinant of both physical and psychic fecundity. The specific laws of human eugenics will baffle both the reason and the intuition of our trained ruling minority, in spite of all their intellectual power. These laws will elude them; and one day they will beget children inopportunately. For superhuman beings that have had a genesis in Time, the numerical value of their wave-length is an

¹ See I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 462, above.

integer; but for human beings it is the number which is expressed in the following formula:

[A fantastically intricate formula follows.]

'This number is the governing factor in the laws of human eugenics; and when our trustees—acting in ignorance of these laws—happen to mate brides with bridegrooms unseasonably, then the children born of these unions will be neither fine nor fortunate. The best individuals of this generation will be duly installed in office by their elders; but, being below standard, they will misuse the powers bequeathed to them by their fathers and will begin to neglect their trusteeship *vis-à-vis* their fellows, undervaluing first mental and secondly physical culture, with the result that there will be a falling off in the culture of the rising generation. In this next generation, rulers will be installed who will be quite lacking in the trustee's essential faculty of distinguishing between the several 'races'—of gold and silver and bronze and iron—whose existence we have postulated on the venerable authority of Hesiod. And when silver is alloyed with iron, and gold with bronze, this introduces those factors of incongruity and disharmony which invariably generate war and enmity wherever they are introduced. Wherever this happens at any time, one must pronounce that this generation has fallen into social discord.'

When we look into this passage more closely, we see that Plato does not represent the racial degeneration, to which he attributes the social breakdown, as being an automatic or a predetermined event. He traces the degeneration back, in its turn, to a false step of some sort on the part of his ruling minority, and does not ascribe this false step, vice versa, to an antecedent degeneration. The false step, as he describes it half whimsically in terms of a philosophy which interprets moral aberrations as intellectual mistakes, is a failure of technique: in fact, an error in mathematics! But whether it be intellectual or moral, the failure to which the social breakdown of Plato's ideal society is ultimately traced back is not a deterioration in the 'make-up' of the human psyche or the human physique, but a lapse in the sphere of human action: a failure to meet a challenge with the appropriate response.

Nor is there any warrant for following Plato in accepting racial degeneration as even a secondary link in the chain of causation through which a social breakdown leads on to a decline. For although, in times of social decline, the members of the declining society may seem to dwindle into pygmies, or to stiffen into cripples or bedridden invalids, by contrast with the kingly stature and the magnificent activity of their forebears in the age of social growth, to ascribe this malady to degeneration is a false diagnosis. The biological heritage of the epigoni is the same as that of the pioneers,

¹ Plato: *Respublica*, 546 A-547 A.

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and all the pioneers' endeavours and achievements are potentially within their descendants' reach. The malady which holds the children of the decadence fast bound in misery and iron¹ for generation after generation is no paralysis of their natural faculties as human beings but a breakdown and disintegration of their social heritage, which debars them from finding scope for their unimpaired faculties in effective and creative social action. The wreck of the social structure cribs and cabins and confines their natures like those hideous strait-waistcoats in which, in Ancient Egypt, well-framed and healthy children were deliberately deformed into artificial dwarfs. The dwarfing of the epigoni is the effect of the social breakdown and not its cause.²

This untenable hypothesis that a racial degeneration is the cause of a social breakdown and decline is sometimes supported by the observation that, during the interregnum which intervenes between the final dissolution of a decadent society and the first emergence of a new-born society related to it by 'affiliation', there is frequently a *Völkerwanderung* in which the population of the identical home of the two successive societies is treated to 'an infusion of new blood'. On the logic of *post hoc propter hoc* it is assumed that the fresh access of creative power which the new-born civilization displays in the course of its growth is the gift of this 'new blood' from 'the pure source' of 'a primitive barbarian race'; and it is then inferred that, conversely, the loss of creative power in the life of the antecedent civilization must have been due to some kind of racial anaemia or pyaemia which nothing but a fresh infusion of healthy blood could cure.

In support of this view an alleged case in point is cited from the history of Italy. It is pointed out that the inhabitants of Italy exhibited a pre-eminent energy and creative power during a period of some four centuries running from about the fourth to the last century B.C.,³ and again during a period of some six centuries running from the eleventh to the sixteenth century of the Christian Era. During the first of these periods the Italians dealt the Hellenic Civilization its *coup de grâce* and then endowed the prostrate society

¹ Psalm cvii. 10.

² This dwarfing effect of unfavourable social conditions upon human souls is noticed by Longinus: *On the Sublime*, chap. 44. Longinus has in mind the conditions in a Hellenic universal state in which, as he saw it, people were now engrossed in the sordid business of making and spending money because they were debarred from the political activities that had stimulated and ennobled the souls of their forebears in the Hellenic Society's age of growth. A modern Western student of history who visited South Wales or North Bohemia in A.D. 1938 might conclude that the same dwarfing effect could be produced by a withdrawal of opportunities for making and spending money in a society in which the traditional idea of the good life was a régime, not of subsidized public service, but of remunerated private labour.

³ In this computation the achievements of the Greek and Etruscan colonists are, of course, ignored, and only those of the native Italians are taken into account.

with its universal state in the shape of the Roman Empire. During the second period the Italians insulated themselves from the rest of Western Christendom and then worked out a new and higher form of Western culture which inaugurated a fresh chapter in Western history when it was imparted to the Transalpine 'barbarians' in due course.¹ In both of these two great ages of their history the Italians performed feats which have not been outdone by any other people in any other place or time. On the other hand the two ages are separated from one another by a thousand years of decadence, prostration, and convalescence, in which it seemed for a time as though the virtue had gone out of the Italians altogether. This fantastically chequered history would be inexplicable, argue the racialists, if the key were not supplied by Clio herself, who has preserved for our instruction a record of the infusion into Italian veins of the new blood which was brought in, during the post-Hellenic Völkerwanderung, by the advent of the Goths and the Lombards. This fresh barbarian blood was the elixir of life which produced, in the fullness of time, the Italian Renaissance. It was for lack of this fresh blood that Italy languished, during the Imperial Age, after the demonic output of Italian energy in the Age of the Roman Republic. And this energy which burst into action in the last four centuries B.C. was itself, perhaps, the product of an earlier infusion of fresh barbarian blood which Italy had received during the post-Minoan interregnum, when the Oscans and Sabellians were descending upon the peninsula out of Central Europe in the same Völkerwanderung that carried their Achæan and 'Dorian' cousins into Greece.

This racial explanation of Italian history from the fourth century B.C. to the sixteenth century of the Christian Era has a certain plausibility so long as we are careful to cut short our survey of Italian history at this point. But if we allow our thoughts to travel on from the sixteenth century to the present day, we shall see that Italian history has repeated itself in circumstances that rule the racial explanation out.

From the close of the sixteenth century to the close of the eighteenth, Italy suffered a fresh eclipse; and in the nineteenth century this has been followed by a fresh recovery. The Italian *Risorgimento* is, as its name implies, at least as notable a feat of rejuvenation as the Italian Renaissance; and if we are to accept the racialists as our ciceroni, we may fairly ask them to specify the new infusion of blood, at some date between the years 1600 and 1800, which, on their theory, must have been received by Italy in order to make the *Risorgimento* possible. The answer is, of course, that

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 299-300 and 341-50, above.

the racial composition of the Italian people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when they have been displaying this fresh manifestation of creative power, has been precisely what it was in the immediately preceding period of eclipse and precisely what it was, before that, in the great age of the Renaissance. In fact, there has been no substantial change in the racial 'make-up' of the inhabitants of Italy since the peninsula was partially overrun by numerically weak war-bands of Lombards in the sixth century.¹ Since then, the only considerable 'infusions of new blood' have been in Calabria and Sicily; and their role in medieval and modern Italian history has been secondary to the parts that have been played by the Centre and the North.²

Accordingly, if we are to account for the decline of Italy after the Renaissance and for her recent recovery after her decline, we must find some explanation which does not depend upon a race-theory; and such an explanation is not really very far to seek. In an earlier passage³ we have traced the decline of Italy, in and after the sixteenth century, to the failure of Italian statesmanship to achieve that concord and co-operation between the Italian states of the age which had to be achieved in order to counteract the mechanical operation of the Balance of Power to the detriment of the small Italian Powers at the centre of the Italian World and to the advantage of the large 'barbarian' Powers on the periphery. This failure of Italian statesmanship caused Italy to become the battle-field of the Transalpine Powers from 1494 to 1859; and

¹ The Italian territories which escaped being occupied and settled by the Lombards included Venice, the Romagna, the Pentapolis (i.e. a considerable portion of the Marche), Perugia, the Agro Romano, Naples, Amalfi, Calabria, and Sicily. This mere catalogue is enough to show that there is no geographical correspondence between the districts which received an infusion of Lombard blood and the districts which have been pre-eminent in energy and creative power in the history of medieval and modern Italy. Amalfi contests with Venice the honour of having been the pioneer in starting the medieval commerce of Italy with the Levant; and as for the Romagnols, they have the reputation of being the most lively and the most domineering people in Italy. In the Middle Ages Bologna was more pugnacious than any of the city-states of Lombardy; and in the sequel the Romagnols have distinguished themselves repeatedly: first in the Napoleonic period and then in the *Risorgimento* and latterly in the 'post-war' chapter of Italian history, in which the Romagna has provided the Fascist movement with its founder and leader. Has anything comparable come out of Pavia, which was the capital of the Lombard Kingdom, or out of Spoleto and Benevento, which were the seats of the two autonomous Lombard duchies? If any racial conclusions are to be drawn from this geographico-historical evidence, we shall have to pronounce that the best Italian blood has been the blood which has remained free from a Lombard taint!

² In Sicily there was an infusion of Arab and Berber blood in the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era, when the island was conquered from the East Roman Empire by the Muslims of Ifriqiyah; and there was an infusion of Apulian and North Italian blood in the twelfth century, after the conquest of Sicily by the Normans. (This last infusion has left a lasting trace of itself in the Romance dialect which has entirely supplanted the previously prevalent Greek, except for one or two places where Greek has been re-introduced by modern Greek immigrants (see III. C (i) (a), Annex, vol. iii, pp. 458-9, above).) In Calabria, in the ninth and tenth centuries, there was an infusion of Sicilian blood, introduced by settlements of Sicilian refugees, which temporarily turned the former Magna Graecia into a Greek-speaking country again (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 356-7, below).

³ In III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 299-309, above.

during this age of Italian impotence and adversity the Italians fell behind their Transalpine neighbours not only in military power but also in those arts of peace which the French and the Spaniards and the Austrians had originally learnt from Italian masters. This explains the Italian decadence; and the *Risorgimento* is explained, in its turn, by the stimulus which Italy received, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from her temporary incorporation into the Napoleonic Empire: a passing political association that effectively carried Italy back into the main current of Western life and gave her a baptism of new ideas and new experiences which was a far more potent influence than any infusion of new blood could ever be.¹

It is not more difficult to find non-racial explanations for the previous rise of Italy at the beginning of the second millennium of the Christian Era and for her foregoing decline which declared itself in the course of the last two centuries B.C. This last-mentioned decline was manifestly the nemesis of the Roman militarism, which brought upon Roman Italy the scourge of Hannibal and all the appalling social evils that followed in the train of the Hannibalic War.² The beginnings of social recovery in Italy, during the post-Hellenic interregnum, can be traced with equal certainty to the work of creative personalities of the old Italian race—a Benedict and a Gregory—who are the fathers, not only of the rejuvenated Italy of the Middle Ages, but of the new Western Civilization of which the medieval Italians were members.³

We can even drive the racialists out of their one remaining Italian stronghold by finding an alternative explanation for the rise of the Roman Republic which will dispense us from having to recognize any special virtue in the new blood which had been infused into Italy out of Central Europe during the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*. The rise of the Romans, and of the other pre-Greek and pre-Etruscan inhabitants of Italy, in the course of the last millennium B.C. can be explained as a response to the challenge of Greek and Etruscan colonization. Were the native peoples of the Italian Peninsula to resign themselves to that choice between the alternatives of extermination, subjugation, and assimilation which had been forced upon their cousins in Sicily and in those Umbrian territories that had been transformed into an Etruria?

¹ The significance of the Napoleonic Empire in the histories of Italy, Flanders, and Western Germany is discussed further in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (a), pp. 283-9, and in V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), Annex I, vol. v, pp. 619-42, below.

² See I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-1; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213-16; and III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 166-7 and 170-1, above, and IV. C (iii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 48-9, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (b), pp. 505-10, below.

³ For the work of SS. Benedict and Gregory see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 264-9, above.

Or were they to hold their own against the formidable intruders by adopting the Hellenic Civilization of their own accord and on their own terms, and thereby raising themselves to the Greek and Etruscan level of cultivation and efficiency? The Romans decided to make this latter response, and in taking this decision they became the authors of their own subsequent greatness.¹

The Italian vicissitudes of renaissance and eclipse and *risorgimento* in the Modern Age of our Western history have an almost exact parallel, in Hellenic history, in the vicissitudes that were experienced by the Greek city-states along the western coast of Anatolia and on the inshore islands.

We have seen that, in the first age of Hellenic history, the Ionians and Aeolians were the creators and the pioneers;² but in the sixth century B.C. they fell on evil days. They forfeited their political independence first to the Lydian Empire and afterwards to the greater empire of the Achaemenidae; the mismanaged revolt of 499-494 ended in the disaster of the fall and sack of Miletus; and their 'liberation' from the Achaemenidae by the Athenians in or after 479 B.C. only added to the Ionians' troubles. For the next hundred and fifty years they were bandied about between the Achaemenian Empire and whichever of the Powers of European Greece was momentarily mistress of the Aegean; and as often as not they were bullied and fleeced by their fellow Greeks and by their fellow Asiatics simultaneously. In fact, all through the great age of Athens, Ionia was in eclipse; but she achieved a remarkable revival in the new chapter of Hellenic history which opened with Alexander's passage of the Hellespont. In the third century B.C., when Athens fell out of the ranks of the Great Powers of the Hellenic World after her bitter experience in the Chremonidean War,³

'the old Greek cities of Asia, . . . with their ancient traditions, large populations, compact and busy life, growing wealth, magnificent public buildings, and vast walls,'⁴ scarcely felt themselves inferior to a kingdom. . . . Magnesia on the Maeander could stretch her arms from Ithaca to the Oxus; she helped to defend Delphi against the Gauls, she gave to Bactrian Hellenism its most powerful dynasty and thereby invaded

¹ For this barbarian reaction to Greek and Etruscan pressure in Italy see further V. C (i) (c), I, vol. v, p. 55, with footnote 4, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 211-2, below. ² III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 338-9, above. ³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 338 and 340, above.

⁴ At the time of the Peloponnesian War, when Ionia was at her political nadir, we have explicit testimony that a number of the continental and insular Asiatic Greek cities were unfortified. Perhaps this was one of the unrecorded stipulations of the peace-settlement between Athens and the Achaemenian Empire which had been negotiated by Callias in 446 B.C. The evidence is as follows: for the Ionian cities in general, Thucydides III. 33; for Chios, Erythrae, and Clazomenae, VIII. 14; for Clazomenae again, VIII. 31; for Chios previously, IV. 51; for Cnidus, VIII. 35; for Cos, VIII. 41 and 108; for Camirus, VIII. 44; for Samos, VIII. 51; for Cyzicus VIII. 107; for Lampsacus, VIII. 62, and Xenophon *Hellenica*, I. 2, § 15; for Phocaea, Xenophon, op. cit., I. 5, § 11. Teos had been re-fortified, for reasons unrecorded, not by the Teians themselves but by the Athenians (Thucydides VIII. 16).—A.J.T.

India, and she helped the Seleucid to create Antioch-towards-Pisidia, Antioch-in-Persis, and doubtless, if we knew, other cities; there was not much infanticide in third-century Magnesia.¹

As for Ephesus, she succeeded, between the generation of Lysimachus and the generation of Augustus, in extending her commercial hinterland so far eastwards into the interior of Asia Minor that by the beginning of the Christian Era the products of Cappadocia were diverted from Sinope and shipped through Ephesus,² though Ephesus was at least twice as far as Sinope was from Mazaca. This second bloom of Ionia lasted throughout the Imperial Age and only wilted with Hellenism itself; and when the Emperor Justinian resolved to build, in Constantinople, a fane which should embody the spirit of the nascent Orthodox Christian Civilization, he sent for the Ionian architects Anthemius of Tralles and Isidorus of Miletus.³ The last feat of the Ionian genius was to create the never-to-be-transcended masterpiece of a new-fangled architecture which was the very antithesis of the classic style that was enshrined in the Ionian fanes of Apollo at Didyma and of Artemis at Ephesus.

What is the explanation of Ionia's deep eclipse and brilliant re-emergence? In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. the Ionians were a by-word for softness in the mouths of Athenians and Spartans and Thebans and Persians. Had the cancer of racial degeneration sapped the *moral* and ruined the physique of the descendants of those 'brazen men'⁴ who had risen out of the sea in the seventh century to sell their swords to an Egyptian Psammetichus? This explanation will only work if we can point to some fresh infusion of new blood which nerved a Magnesians Euthydemus in the third century B.C. to emulate the hardihood of his sixth-century ancestors—who had carved their names on the colossus at Abu Simbel⁵—by carving out a kingdom for himself in Bactria and handing it on to a son who doubled it by his conquests in India. Can our racialists point to any infusion of the kind between 494 and 334 B.C.? If the Ionian cities did receive any fresh blood during this dark period in their history, it must have been

¹ Tarn, W. W.: *Hellenistic Civilization* (London 1927, Arnold), pp. 138-9. Cf. eundem: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 6.

² 'Cappadocia produces the so-called "Sinopic" red lead, which is the finest in the World. . . . It is called "Sinopic" because the dealers used to bring it to Sinope for shipment before the commercial hinterland of Ephesus expanded into these parts.'—Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XII, chap. 10, p. 540.

³ Procopius: *De Aedificiis*, Book I, chap. 1, § 24.

⁴ Herodotus, Book II, chap. 152.

⁵ The oldest extant Greek inscriptions are those carved upon the two southern colossi of the Great Temple at Abu Simbel by Ionian mercenaries in the service of the Egyptian King Psammetichus II (reigned 593-588 B.C.)—a successor of the original Psammetichus who had founded the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty and given Egypt a new lease of political independence with the aid of earlier Ionian 'brazen men'.

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supplied by the Asiatic subjects of the Great King in their Continental hinterland—a strain which would be condemned with equal conviction by a contemporary Spartan or Athenian Hellenomaniac and by a latter-day Western racialist. We are driven to conclude that the blood which coursed in a Euthydemus's veins was certainly no racier than that which had throbbed in the pulses of his forebears four centuries back. Ionian history, like Italian history, is impossible to explain on racial lines; and the satisfactory non-racial explanation which we have found for the chequered course of Italian history offers a clue which it is not difficult to follow out.

Ionian fell on evil days because, at the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., her statesmen failed as signally as Italian statesmanship failed at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era to respond to the challenge of a growing pressure from surrounding Powers by solving the problem of the house divided against itself.¹ Her plight in the fifth and fourth centuries, as a pawn in the political game of the Athenians and Spartans and Thebans and Achaemenidae, is remarkably like the plight of Italy in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, when Lombardy was the battle-field of the French and Spaniards and Austrians, while the Levantine outposts of Genoa and of Venice were being captured by the 'Osmanlis. Ionian, again, was impoverished in the fifth century B.C. by the attraction of the maritime trade of the Aegean to the Peiraeus while simultaneously her overland trade with her Asiatic hinterland was being cut off by the new political frontier between the Athenian and Achaemenian Empires—just as Italy was impoverished in the sixteenth century by the double blow of the Ottoman conquest of the Levant and the diversion of sea-borne commerce from the Mediterranean to the Oceanic routes. If we pursue the analogy, we can discern that the discomfiture of Thebes and Athens and Sparta by Philip of Macedon and the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander had substantially the same effect, *mutatis mutandis*, as the overthrow of the *ancien régime* in Europe and the reopening of the Levant to European enterprise by Napoleon. Like Italy *post Napoleonem*, Ionian *post Alexandrum* was drawn back into the main current of the

¹ 'The keener minds of Ionian, at this crisis in Ionian's fate, were evidently aware that their only hope of salvation lay in achieving the *tour de force* of political consolidation. This is apparent in a legend which is recorded by Herodotus: 'Before Ionian was ruined [by the Achaemenian conquest], an admirable policy was suggested to the Ionians by Thales of Miletus. . . . Thales proposed that the Ionians should have one single Government, and that the seat of this Government should be at Teos (Teos being the geographical centre-point of Ionian). The other Ionian cities were to go on being inhabited just as before, but were to be reduced politically to the status of parishes' (Herodotus, Book I, chap. 170). *Mutatis mutandis*, this is the policy which is advocated in the last chapter of Machiavelli's *Prince*.

life of the society to which she belonged. Politically the Asiatic Greek city-states received a far more gracious and considerate treatment from Alexander and his successors than they had been accustomed to receive either from Athenian tax-collectors or from Spartan residents or from Persian satraps. Economically they benefited by the reopening of the overland route from the east coast of the Aegean to the interior of Asia still more appreciably than Italy has gained by the reopening of the Levantine maritime route to India and China which was heralded by Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and was consummated by the cutting of the Suez Canal.¹

The histories of the Ionian and Italian *risorgimenti* discredit the hypothesis of racial degeneration by demonstrating that a people which has fallen into social decadence after a period of brilliant achievements is capable of recovering its social health again without any change whatever in its racial composition from first to last.

We have now disposed of three predestinarian explanations of the breakdowns of civilizations: the theory that they are the incidental consequence of a running-down of the clockwork of the Physical Universe; the theory that a civilization, like a living organism, has its own inherent life-span and life-curve which compel it to pass, within a definite number of centuries, from birth through growth and senescence to death; and the theory that the breakdown of any given civilization at any given date is due to the racial degeneration of the particular portion of the Human Race from which this particular civilization happens to have drawn its 'members'. We have still to consider one further predestinarian hypothesis which follows out to its logical conclusion the hypothetical analogy between the lives of civilizations and the lives of the Physical Universe and of the Human Race and of individual human beings. This hypothesis assumes that civilizations succeed one another, by a law of their nature which is the common law of the Cosmos, in a perpetually recurrent cycle of alternating birth and death.

The application of this theory of cycles to the history of Mankind was a natural corollary to the sensational astronomical discovery, which appears to have been made in the Babylonian World some time between the eighth and the sixth centuries B.C., that the three conspicuous and familiar astronomical cycles—the terrestrial cycle of day-and-night and the lunar cycle of the month and the solar cycle of the year—were not the only instances of periodic recurrence in the movements of the heavenly bodies; that there

¹ For the vast and rapid increase of wealth in the Ionian cities *post Alexandrum* see Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*, pp. 96-7.

was also a larger co-ordination of stellar movements which embraced all the planets as well as the Earth and the Moon and the Sun; and that 'the music of the spheres', which was made by the harmony of this heavenly chorus, came round full circle, chord for chord, in a cycle of great cosmic months and years which dwarfed the solar year into insignificance. The inference was that the annual birth and death of the terrestrial vegetation, which was manifestly governed by the solar year cycle, had its counterpart in a recurrent birth and death of all things on the Time-scale of the cosmic year cycle; and minds which came under the spell of this idea were apt to project this pattern of periodicity into every object of their thought.¹ The interpretation of Human history in these cyclic terms evidently fascinated Plato.

ATHENIAN STRANGER. Do you feel that the ancient legends have any truth in them?

CLEINIAS OF CRÈTE. Which legends?

STRANGER. The legends of repeated destructions of the Human Race by floods and plagues and many other catastrophes, in which only a tiny remnant of Mankind survived.

CLEINIAS. Why, certainly, the whole of that body of legend carries conviction with everybody.²

This brief exposition of the cyclic hypothesis in the *Laws* has its counterpart in the *Timaeus* in a myth which is placed in the mouth of an old Egyptian priest to justify his exclamation to Solon that 'the Hellenes are perpetual children' and that 'such a thing as an old Hellene does not exist'.

'All of you,' proceeds Plato's Egyptian priest in reply to the Platonic Solon's expostulation: 'All of you Hellenes are young in mind. Your minds contain no thoughts handed down from Antiquity by ancient tradition and no knowledge hoary with age. There is a reason for this, which I will explain. A series of catastrophes in a variety of forms has befallen, and will continue to befall, the Human Race—the greatest being the work of fire or water, while the others, which are of less violence, are produced by an infinity of different causes. In Hellas you have a tradition that Phaethon, the child of the Sun, once harnessed his father's chariot but proved incompetent to drive it along his father's course, with the result that he burnt up everything on the face of the

¹ For the consequent invention of the pseudo-science of Astrology see V. C (i) (c) 1, vol. v, pp. 56-7, below.

² Plato: *Leges*, 677 A; compare *Critias*, 109 D. This Hellenic concept of repetition *ad infinitum* in the Time-dimension was matched, in one school of Hellenic thought, by a corresponding concept of repetition *ad infinitum* in the Space-dimension as well. On this view there was not only an infinite number of successive worlds, but also an infinite number of worlds existing simultaneously at any given moment. Logically the two doctrines hang together; but Plato appears to have adopted the hypothesis of an infinite repetition in Time without admitting that the same hypothesis was applicable to Space on the same showing. (See Cornford, F. M.: 'The Invention of Space' in *Essays in Honour of Gilbert Murray* (London 1936, Allen & Unwin).)

Earth before his own career was cut short for ever by the thunderbolt. Although this tradition has been dressed in a legendary form, it preserves the scientific fact that, at immense intervals of time, there is a declination in the orbit of the heavenly bodies revolving round the Earth and a catastrophe which overtakes life on this planet in the shape of a vast conflagration. At this juncture the inhabitants of regions with a mountainous relief, a high altitude, or an arid climate pay a heavier toll than those of riverain or maritime neighbourhoods; and on these occasions we in Egypt are rescued by the Nile, our unfailing saviour, from a quandary from which he is immune himself. There are other occasions on which the Gods cleanse the Earth with a deluge of water, and in these circumstances the shepherds and herdsmen on the mountains survive, while the inhabitants of your towns in Hellas are swept away by the rivers. In Egypt, however, water never descends upon the fields from above—not even in these pluvial epochs—but rises from below by a law of Nature which never varies. Thus, for the above reasons, the traditions preserved in Egypt are the most ancient in the World. . . . And glorious or important or in any way remarkable events in the history of Hellas or of Egypt itself or of any other region within our field of knowledge are recorded and preserved in our shrines here in Egypt since a remote antiquity. On the other hand, human society in Hellas, or elsewhere has always just arrived at the point of equipping itself with written records and the other requisites of Civilization when, after the regular interval, the waters that are above the firmament descend upon you like a recurrent malady and only permit the illiterate and uncultivated members of your society to survive, with the result that you become as little children and start again from the beginning with no knowledge whatever of Ancient History either in Egypt or in your own world. . . . You have only preserved the memory of one deluge which is the most recent in a long series.”¹

¹ Plato: *Timaeus*, 21 E-23 C. It will be seen that Plato deliberately emphasizes the periodic recurrence of the floods and other natural catastrophes which he represents as perpetually destroying successive human attempts at Civilization in every part of the *Oikoumenē* except Egypt. On the other hand the version of the Sumeric flood-myth which the Jews brought back to Syria from their Babylonish captivity is equally emphatic in recording God's promise that the visitation should never be repeated (Gen. viii. 21-2, and ix. 11-17). It is interesting to find the notion of a periodic destruction of the World by natural catastrophes reappearing in the mythology of the Mexic Society. According to an Aztec myth, there were four successive world-ages, each ending in a destruction of the World by jaguars, by hurricane, by a volcanic rain of fire, and by water, respectively (Spinden, H. J.: *Ancient Civilisations of Mexico and Central America* (New York 1922, American Museum of Natural History), p. 191; Joyce, T. A.: *Mexican Archaeology* (London 1914, Lee Warner), pp. 50-1; Spence, L.: *The Civilization of Ancient Mexico* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), p. 84). This notion of cycles of civilization punctuated by catastrophes may have been inherited by the Mexic Civilization from the antecedent Mayan Civilization (Spinden, op. cit., p. 205; Joyce, op. cit., p. 239). In any case we may safely assume that it arose in the New World independently of the similar notions, once current in the Old World, which we have just been surveying. On the other hand we may postulate an Indic or Babylonian origin for the system of recurrent cycles of 129,600 years—each cycle ending in a catastrophe—which is expounded by the Far Eastern philosopher Chu Hsi (*vivebat* A.D. 1131-1200), though no doubt the ground for the reception of this idea in the Far Eastern World had been prepared by the familiarity of Far Eastern thought with the Sinic conception of the perpetual alternation of Yin and Yang. (For Chu Hsi's theory of cycles see Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Rheinhardt), pp. 337-8.)

The same conception of recurrent alternating catastrophe and rehabilitation is applied to the Cosmos as a whole, instead of just to a portion of the *Οἰκουμένη*, and is at the same time translated into theological terms, in another Platonic myth:

'This Universe is sometime conducted on its path and guided in its orbit by God, while at other times, when the cycles of its appointed time have arrived at their term, it is released from control by God and proceeds to revolve in the opposite direction by itself (which it can do, because it is a living creature endowed with intelligence by the being who originally constructed it). The tendency towards this reverse motion is inevitably innate in the Universe . . . in virtue of the principle that perpetual self-consistency and self-identity are properties confined to a supremely divine order of existence, to which Matter, by its nature, does not belong. That which we call Space and the Cosmos has been endowed with many blessings by its Begetter, but these blessings do not include freedom from a material ingredient. For this reason it is impossible for the Cosmos to be permanently exempt from change, though up to the limits of its capacity it does its utmost to move with a constant and unvarying rhythm in the same locus, and has therefore been allowed (when it changes) to revolve in the reverse direction as involving the slightest possible deviation from its proper motion. Perpetual self-rotation, however, is beyond the capacity of almost every being except that by which all things that move are conducted, and this being is precluded from moving them sometimes in one direction and sometimes in the opposite. From these various premises it follows that the Cosmos, in alternating between the two contrary revolutions to which it is subject, neither rotates itself perpetually nor is entirely and perpetually rotated by God, and again that there are not two gods rotating it with contradictory purposes, but that (as has just been stated and is the only remaining alternative) it is sometimes conducted by a divine cause outside itself, in which phase it receives an access of vitality and a renewal of immortality from its Creator, while at other times it is released from control and moves by itself. . . .

'In the previous period the whole circular motion itself, in the first place, was controlled and superintended by God, and the same superintendence was provided locally by the assignment of all the parts of the Cosmos to other controlling deities. Living creatures too, according to their kinds, were taken in charge, in flocks, by divine spirits, and each of these good shepherds was efficient in every respect to care for the creatures under his particular charge, so that there was no savagery, no preying upon one another, and no war or discord among them at all. . . .

'When, however, the period of this dispensation had been completed and a change was due . . . , at that point the Helmsman of the Universe abandoned control of His rudder and retired to His observation-post, and the Cosmos was set rotating in the reverse direction by Destiny and Innate Desire. Forthwith, all the local gods who shared the authority of the Great Spirit realized what was happening and successively

abandoned control of those parts of the Cosmos which were under their immediate charge. Then the Cosmos, as it reversed its motion, experienced the shock of two contrary momenta, which were simultaneously beginning and coming to an end. It quaked to its depths with a terrible convulsion, which worked corresponding havoc among every race of living creatures. Afterwards, with the lapse of time, the Cosmos began to emerge from this tumult and disorder, to obtain relief from the seismic storms, and to settle down into its own habitual rhythm, in which it exercised control and authority over itself and all that was therein, and followed the instructions of its Creator and Father to the best of its recollection.

'At the beginning it performed its functions with comparative precision, and then with growing clumsiness as it approached the final phase. The cause of this degeneration was the material element in its composition, which was one of the original ingredients in its nature and which had been in an utterly chaotic state before the present cosmic order was imposed upon it. By its Constructor the Cosmos has been endowed with all good qualities. On the other hand, from its previous condition it has inherited in itself and reproduces in its living creatures all the evil and unrighteousness that arises in the World of Space. So long as the Cosmos enjoyed the co-operation of the Helmsman in breeding its living creatures, it implanted in them only trifling defects with a predominance of good; and, when it parts company with Him, it always performs its functions best during the phase least far removed from its release. As time goes on, however, and forgetfulness invades it, the malady of its original disharmony begins to gain the upper hand, until in the final phase it breaks out openly. Then the Cosmos recruits its composition with such minute doses of good elements and with so predominant an admixture of the opposite that it comes to be in danger of involving itself and all things in it in a common destruction.

'At this point God, who had originally set it in order, perceives the straits into which the Cosmos has fallen, and—anxious lest it may break up under the tempestuous blows of confusion and may founder in the fathomless gulf where all things are incommensurable—He again assumes control of its rudder, reverses the tendencies towards sickness and dissolution which had asserted themselves in the previous period when the Cosmos had been left to itself, sets it in order, corrects that which was amiss, and thus endows the Cosmos with immortality and eternal youth. . . .'¹

The same cyclic doctrine, with the same religious imprint, reappears in the second most famous of the poems of Virgil:

Ultima Cumaei venit iam carminis aetas;
magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo.
iam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,
iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto.² . . .

¹ Plato: *Politicus*, 269 C 4-270 A; 271 D 2-E 2; 272 D 6-273 E 4. See further the Annex to the present chapter on pp. 585-8 below.

² This line reads like a deliberate contradiction of Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book II, ll. 1153-4, which has been quoted on p. 7, above.—A.J.T.

alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quae vehat Argo
delectos heroas; erunt etiam altera bella,
atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles.¹

This philosophy of sheer recurrence, which intrigued, without ever quite captivating, the Hellenic genius,² came to dominate contemporary Indic minds, including Siddhārtha Gautama's,³ and it has exercised the same domination over the mental outlook of Hinduism.

'For Hindus the World is endless repetition, not a progress towards

¹ Virgil: *Eclogue* IV, ll. 4-7 and 34-6.

² The allusions to this philosophy in Hellenic literature are far too numerous for us to survey in this place; but we may note one characteristic reference in the surviving works of the Roman historian Tacitus, and a group of references in the *Meditations* of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius.

The passage of Tacitus (*Annals*, Book II, chap. 55) occurs, as an incidental reflexion, at the close of a parenthetical note on the variations in the manners and customs of the Roman aristocracy during the first century of the Principate:

'Unless perchance there is, inherent in all things, a kind of cycle which generates a periodicity of manners and customs to match that of times and seasons. This would imply that our predecessors are not, after all, our superiors in everything, but that our age, too, has produced many monuments of an admirable ingenuity for Posterity to copy.'

A doctrine that seems comforting to Tacitus seems desolating, however, to Marcus. 'There is a deadly monotony about the cyclic motion of the Cosmos—up and down, world without end. . . . Soon we shall be buried under the Earth, and next the Earth herself will be transformed, and then whatever has arisen out of her transmutation will undergo the same process again and again to infinity' (Marcus: *Meditations*, Book IX, chap. 28; cf. Book V, chap. 13, and Book VII, chap. 1).

The emperor-philosopher relentlessly pursues this theory of the objective nature of the Universe into its subjective consequences for the Soul:

'He who has once seen the Present has for ever seen all things—all that will be in an infinite Future, as well as all that has been in a Past that is without beginning. All things are homogeneous and uniform' (Marcus: *Meditations*, Book VI, chap. 37).

The logical conclusion is that a man of forty, if he is not positively deficient in intelligence, must know as much about human life as if he had been studying it for 10,000 years (Book VII, chap. 49)—must, in fact, have beheld all things, past and future (Book XI, chap. 1, quoted in this Study in V. C (i) (d) 10, vol. vi, p. 137, below).

This philosophy of disenchantment and *ennui* had, of course, been inherited by Marcus from a long line of Hellenic predecessors (compare, for example, Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 944-9); and from these it had already been transmitted to the children of alien civilizations upon which a post-Alexandrine Hellenism had impinged. This radiation of a Hellenic *Weltanschauung* is no doubt the explanation of a remarkable assonance between the passages just quoted from Marcus's *Meditations* and a passage in a Jewish philosophical treatise which was written before the beginning of the Christian Era.

'The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the Sun. Is there anything whereof it may be said: "See, this is new"? It hath been already of old time, which was before us' (Ecclesiastes i. 9-10).

A place for this Hellenic philosophy of recurrence was found in the Jewish *Weltanschauung* by the ingenuity of Philo of Alexandria.

'The divine plan (*λογος*) which is commonly called Chance (*τύχη*) makes its rhythmic movement in a cyclic course (*καταία ἐν κύκλῳ*)' (Philo: *Quod Deus Immutabilis*, § 176).

But, notwithstanding this Philonic *tour de force*, the whole conception was too profoundly alien from the Syriac outlook and temperament to allow of any effective reconciliation or even compromise. In Saint Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* (Book XII, chaps. 14, 18, 20, and 21) the philosophy of recurrence is mentioned only to be combated. Yet the Christian theologian is hard put to it when he tries to rebut the suggestion that our passage of Ecclesiastes is an exposition of the cyclic theory of the Hellenic philosophers.

³ One of the surest marks of the Buddha's greatness is his heroic struggle with this dominating and paralyzing idea, until at length he conquered it by finding a way of escape out of the Wheel of Existence into *Nirvāna*. The courage required for this spiritual feat of reconnaissance deserves the paean, written by Lucretius in honour of Democritus, which has been quoted above in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 299.

an end. Creation has rarely the sense which it bears for Europeans. An infinite number of times the Universe has collapsed in flaming or watery ruin, aeons of quiescence follow the collapse, and then the Deity (he has done it an infinite number of times) emits again from himself worlds and souls of the same old kind. . . .

'Hindu chronology revels in periods, whose enormous length, though expressed in figures, leaves no real impression on the mind: days and nights of Brahma, Kalpas, Manvantaras, and Yugas, in which gods and worlds are absorbed into the supreme essence and born again. But there is no finality about these catastrophes: the destruction of the whole Universe is as certain as the death of a mouse, and to the philosopher not more important. Everything is periodic: Buddhas, Jinas, and incarnations of all sorts are all members of a series. They all deserve great respect and are of great importance in their own day, but they are none of them final, still less are they able to create a new Heaven and Earth or to rise above the perpetual flux of Samsāra'¹

The exuberant Hindu fancy has even expressed itself in figures which come amusingly close to the laborious calculations of our Western astronomers.

'Time, like soul and matter, is a phase of the Supreme Spirit. As Brahmā wakes or sleeps, the Universe wakes or sleeps also. Each day and each night of Brahmā is an "aeon" (*kalpa*) and is equivalent to a thousand "great ages" (*mahāyuga*): that is to say, $1,000 \times 4,320,000$ mortal years. During an "aeon" fourteen Manus or "Fathers of Mankind" appear, each presiding over a period of seventy-one "great ages" with a surplus. Each "great age" is further divided into four "ages" (*yuga*) of progressive deterioration like the golden, silver, brazen and iron ages of Greek and Roman mythology.'²

Under the influence of Hinduism or of Neoplatonism³ or of both, the philosophy of recurrence has actually succeeded in insinuating itself, in the mind of at least one Muslim mystic, into the Syriac myth of the First and Last Things: a myth which insists, in the original, upon the uniqueness of the series of divine events which it purports to reveal. According to Ibn Khaldūn,⁴ the Sūfi Ibn Abī Watīl taught that history consists of a recurring cycle of three phases—the first phase being the appearance of a prophet or a saint, the second phase a caliphate, and the third phase the temporary rule of 'the Lie' (*Dajal*) under the reign of Antichrist (*Dajjāl*), pending the appearance of the next deliverer of Mankind. According to

¹ Eliot, Sir Charles: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. lxviii and 46-7. Compare the same work, vol. ii, pp. 298-9, apropos of the Sāṅkhya philosophy.

² Rapson, E. J., in *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. i (Cambridge 1922, University Press), p. 303, apropos of the chronological scheme of the Puranas.

³ The doctrine of the world-periods is mentioned in passing by Plotinus in *Ennead* V. 7. 2, *ad fin.*

⁴ Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translation by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 192.

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this Sūfī scheme of history, the expected Mahdī was to play the part, in the next age to come, that had been played in the current age by the Prophet Muhammad.

Are these 'vain repetitions of the Gentiles'¹ really the law of the Universe and therefore, incidentally, the law of the histories of civilizations? This question is of immeasurable importance—

temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae
ambigitur status²

—and if we find that the answer is in the affirmative we can hardly escape the conclusion that we are the perpetual victims of an everlasting cosmic practical joke, which condemns us to endure our sufferings and to overcome our difficulties and to purify ourselves of our sins—only to know in advance that the automatic and inevitable lapse of a certain meaningless measure of Time cannot fail to stultify all our human exertions by reproducing the same situation again and again *ad infinitum*, just as though we had never exerted ourselves at all. In an eternally repetitive universe all human endurance becomes the torment of a Tityos or an Ixion, and all human action becomes the ineffective gesture of a Tantalus or else the lost labour of a Sisyphus or a Danaid.³

This conclusion may be tolerable to an unusually robust intellect in an unusually sanguine mood. Aristotle, for example, shows no sign of distress when he pricks the bubble of his own philosophy by making the casual observation, in the middle of a treatise on meteorology, that

'In human history the recurrence of identical scientific views does not happen just once or twice or a small number of times; it happens *ad infinitum*.'⁴

In another passage, again, Aristotle deals with the problem of periodicity in human affairs, through the concrete example of the implications of a recurrence of the Trojan War, as though these implications were nothing more than an intellectual conundrum.

'How are the concepts of priority and posteriority to be taken? Are we to take it that the generation of the Trojan War is prior to ours, and that their predecessors are prior to them, and that those who are previous

¹ Matt. vi. 7.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 1073-4, quoted in I. C (i) (a), vol. i, on p. 56, footnote, above.

³ It is possible (see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 522-3, below) that the repetition in *aeternum* of the actions and sufferings of these figures of Hellenic mythology, which is of the essence of their myths in the forms in which these have come down to us, was not an original trait but was an adventitious idea that was read into them, in and after the sixth century B.C., under the influence of Orphism.

⁴ οὐ γὰρ διὰ χρόνον ἀπὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἀπὸς τὰς αὐτὰς δόξας ἀνακυκλεῖν γινόμενα ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ αὐτὰς—Aristotle: *Meteorologica*, Book I, chap. 3, apropos of Anaxagoras' anticipation of Aristotle's own theory of the ether. A similar illustration of the cyclic theory is used by Saint Augustine in *De Civitate Dei*, Book XII, chap. 14.

are prior *ad infinitum*? Or, if the Universe has a beginning and a middle and an end, and if, when anybody is brought by old age to the terminus, he comes round right back again to the starting-point, then what stands in the way of our being nearer to the starting-point than the generation of the Trojan War were?¹ And if, in virtue of this, we might possess priority, what stands in the way of a correspondence between the process of the genesis and disintegration of things subject to decay and the circular motion that is characteristic of all the heavenly bodies? Why should not their genesis and decay be repetitive, in the sense of the proverb that "Human life is a vicious circle"? It would be silly, of course, to suppose that the same state of human society was reproduced statistically, but a morphological reproduction would not be so difficult to demonstrate. On this showing, we might actually possess priority, and one might conceive the structure of the series as a continuous and uniform process of coming round again full circle to the starting-point. According to Alcmaeon, human beings are subject to death because they do not possess the art of joining their beginning to their end; and it is a brilliant observation if one takes the aphorism symbolically without attempting a literal application. Well, if human history is a circle, and if a circle has no starting-point and no terminus, it follows that the priority which consists in being nearer to the starting-point cannot be possessed either by us over the generation of the Trojan War or by that generation over us.²

Thus Aristotle propounds the problem and feels no pang; but when Virgil plays with the doctrine of recurrence in his Fourth Eclogue, and applies it in his turn to the Trojan War in a passage quoted above, his sensitive imagination apprehends the nightmare vision of human affairs which it is on the point of conjuring up, and his literary dexterity promptly contrives a deft retreat. Virgil grasps at the Platonic conceit of an alternation between two movements in contrary directions, and professes to have caught his glimpse of a recurring Trojan War in a magic rewinding of the film of Hellenic history from the year of Pollio's consulship right back to the blissful reign of Cronos.³ This reverse-movement is so

¹ In this abstract speculation Aristotle happens to have hit the mark in respect of the particular pair of historical moments which he has taken as his illustrations; for 'the generation of the Trojan War' actually lived at the very terminus of the history of the Minoan Civilization, whereas Aristotle's own generation, which lived more than eight hundred years later on the single-track scale of Astronomical Time, was born into the history of the Hellenic Civilization more than a thousand years before its terminal date. Thus, as a matter of fact, Aristotle was prior to Agamemnon (in the sense in which Aristotle uses the term 'priority' in this passage) by more than 800 years if we find the Hellenic counterpart and 'contemporary' of the Minoan Agamemnon in a Theodoric, and by more than 900 if we find him in a Dagobert. But of course this historical fact is no sufficient ground for a theory of cycles that are all predestined and are each of the same invariable length.—A.J.T.

² Aristotle: *Problemata*, xviii. 3.

³ Here Virgil's ultimate source may well be the passage in Plato's *Politicus* from which quotations have been made in this chapter on pp. 26-7, above; for the notion of a reverse movement, which is applied to the life of the Cosmos as a whole in the portions of the passage that have been quoted, is worked out in the context with particular application to the life of Man and the other animals, and is explicitly made to lead back in this domain to the *ἐν τῇ Κρονίου δυνάμει βίος* (Plato: *Politicus*, 270 D-272 D).

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miraculously speeded up that the historic events which it has taken twelve centuries to evolve are re-wound, in the poet's fancy, between the birth and the coming of age of the Child of Promise. In this setting the recurrent Trojan War is lightly dismissed by Virgil as a slight and momentary recrudescence of the Old Adam, which simply serves as a foil to the swiftly and securely re-dawning Golden Age, like a patch which brings out the colour of an eighteenth-century beauty's cheek.

Pauca tamen suberunt priscae vestigia fraudis,
quae temptare Thetim ratibus, quae cingere muris
oppida, quae iubeant telluri infindere sulcos.¹

Yet the poet has not really succeeded, by this *leger de main*, in exorcising the spectre which he has evoked; for in his heart he knows all the time that Life and Action cannot ever really run backwards, and that the Trojan War, whose recurrence he has foreseen, cannot be just an interlude after which the Golden Age will set in again untarnished. When Virgil returns from his day-dream of an Earthly Paradise Regained to resume the spiritual burden of his own tormented generation, he confesses that the heroic warfare of the Achaeans in the pre-Hellenic interregnum has led on, through a continuous chain of *karma*, to the internecine warfare of the Roman war-lords.

Satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
Laomedontea luimus periuria Troiae . . .
quippe ubi fas verum atque nefas; tot bella per orbem.
tam multae scelerum facies, non ullus aratro
dignus honos, squalent abductis arva colonis,
et curvae rigidum falces conflantur in ensem. . . .
vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes
arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe;
ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae,
addunt in spatio, et frustra retinacula tendens
fertur equis auriga neque audit currus habenas.²

Is the Trojan War to recur innumerable times over, when it is fated each time to precipitate an age-long avalanche of wickedness and woe? This question, which Virgil dares not face, is answered by Shelley in a chorus which begins as a Virgilian reminiscence and ends on a note which is altogether Shelley's own:—

The World's great age begins anew,
The golden years return,
The Earth doth like a snake renew
Her winter weeds outworn:
Heaven smiles, and faiths and empires gleam
Like wrecks of a dissolving dream . . .

¹ Virgil: *Eclogue* IV, ll. 31-3.

² Virgil: *Georgic* I, ll. 501-2, 505-8, 510-4.

A loftier Argo cleaves the main,
 Fraught with a later prize;
 Another Orpheus sings again,
 And loves, and weeps, and dies;
 A new Ulysses leaves once more
 Calypso for his native shore.

Oh! write no more the Tale of Troy,
 If Earth Death's scroll must be!
 Nor mix with Laian rage the joy
 Which dawns upon the free,
 Although a subtler Sphinx renew
 Riddles of death Thebes never knew. . . .

Oh cease! Must Hate and Death return?
 Cease! Must men kill and die?
 Cease! Drain not to its dregs the urn
 Of bitter prophecy.
 The World is weary of the Past:
 Oh might it die or rest at last!

If the law of the Universe is really the sardonic law *Plus ça change plus c'est la même chose*,¹ no wonder that the poet cries for the Buddhist release from a Wheel of Existence which may be a thing of beauty so long as it is merely guiding the stars in their courses, but which is an intolerable tread-mill for our human feet.

Does reason constrain us to believe that the cyclic movement of the stars is also the movement of human history? A skilful advocate of the cyclic doctrine might concede that, on the showing of our Western cosmologists, the wave-length of the hypothetical social cycles can have no direct relation to the vastly longer wave-length of the hypothetical cycles of alternate unwinding and re-winding in the clockwork of the material Universe.² But, having made this concession, he might then go on to suggest that the occurrence of symptoms of periodicity in the social history of Mankind and in the astronomical history of the Cosmos alike is a coincidence which can hardly be dismissed as just fortuitous. Does it not rather indicate that this periodicity is the very rhythm of Existence; and, in the course of this Study of History, have we not stumbled upon examples of the same rhythm time and again—in fact, whenever we have had any measure of apparent success in digging down to the roots of the Tree of Life and in laying our finger on the springs of human action? What, 'in the last analysis', are those movements of Yin-and-Yang and Challenge-and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return and Apparentation-and-Affiliation

¹ Karr, Alphonse: *Les Guêpes*, January 1849.

² For this consideration see p. 10, above.

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which we have taken some intellectual pleasure in discerning and bringing to light? Are not these all just different variations on the periodic rhythm?

Our reply to this dialectical manoeuvre will be to concede, in turn, our opponent's point but to contest the inference that he seeks to draw from it.

Certainly, in all these movements of the forces that weave the web of human history, an element of sheer recurrence can be detected. Indeed, it stares us in the face. Yet the shuttle which shoots backwards and forwards across the loom of Time¹ in a perpetual to-and-fro is all this time bringing into existence a tapestry in which there is manifestly 'a progress towards an end' and not just an 'endless repetition' in the likeness of the shuttle's own action. This we know from our empirical study of the outcome of Yin-and-Yang and Challenge-and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return in the histories of civilizations.

The transition from Yin to Yang, in any given case, is no doubt one repetition of a repetitive action; yet this repetition is neither vain nor stale, since it is the necessary condition for an act of creation which is new and spontaneous and unique.² Similarly, the response to a challenge which provokes a further challenge and thereby evokes a further response which is likewise provocative in its turn, no doubt sets up a cyclic movement like the endless repetition of a particular group of figures that follows the appearance of the first recurrent cypher in a recurring decimal. Yet we have seen that it is precisely this kind of response—the response which inaugurates a cyclic movement by providing for its own successor—that releases the Promethean *élan* of social growth.³ Again, the withdrawal and return of individual personalities, or of minorities, who first leave and afterwards re-enter the common life of the society to which they belong, may look like a monotonous process when the historical examples are set out in a catalogue. Yet we have seen that these are the creative individuals and minorities to whose experiences and actions a growing society owes its growth; and they are able to exercise this creative power upon their return because they have acquired it during their withdrawal. At each repetition the familiar cycle of Withdrawal-and-Return brings about a unique transformation of a personality and enhancement of its powers and ennoblement of its functions.

The simple truth is that, in any analysis of rhythm, we have to distinguish between the movements of the part and of the whole

¹ See Goethe: *Faust*, ll. 501-9, quoted in Part II. B, vol. i, p. 204, above, and again in V. C (iii), vol. vi, p. 324, below.

² See II. C (ii) (b) 1, *passim*, in vol. i, above.

³ See Part III. B, *passim*, in vol. iii, above.

and between the natures of the means and of the end. There is no law of pre-established harmony which decrees that the end must have the same nature as the means or the whole the same movement as the part; and this is immediately obvious in the case of the wheel, which is the original simile and the permanent symbol of the whole cyclic philosophy. The movement of the wheel is admittedly repetitive in relation to the wheel's own axle; but the wheel has only been manufactured and fitted to its axle in order to become a part of a vehicle; and the fact that the vehicle can only move in virtue of the wheel's circular movement round the axle does not compel the vehicle itself to travel like a merry-go-round in a circular track. It is true that, without the repetitive circular movement of the wheel, the vehicle could not move on any track at all; but while the wheel is indispensable to the vehicle as a means of locomotion, it is incapable of dictating the course on which the vehicle is to move when once the wheel is working and the vehicle's powers of locomotion are thereby assured. The course depends upon the manipulation of the reins or the steering-gear by the driver. It would be fantastic to suggest that, just because the wheel possesses the power to bring the vehicle to a halt by refusing to go on turning round, it must therefore possess the further power of compelling the vehicle to travel in a circular orbit, in the likeness of the wheel's own orbit round its axle, by some occult art of sympathetic magic!¹

¹ The following comments on this passage have been communicated to the writer by Lord Samuel, who very kindly read the present chapter before it went to press:

'The illustration of the wheel and the wagon is ingenious and illuminating; but does it do more than remove the difficulty from the long range to the short range—or rather the relatively shorter range? For the short range is long enough to include, not only every individual life, but successions of many generations. If we are to distinguish between wheel and wagon, individuals are particles of the wheel, since they are subject to the short range alternation. Although in a thousand years the hub of the wheel, with the rest of the wagon, may be further forward, the individuals, on this theory, must find themselves inexorably moved round the circle. And is not the movement of the wagon itself the consequence of the movement of the wheels? If not, of what is it the consequence? I believe the truth to be that each person, and each society, is indeed the product of causes, and that Necessity prevails, if by Necessity you mean the total sum of all those causes. But the causes in every case are innumerable. If they are traced back even some little way towards their origins, they will soon run into millions, most of them indefinable by us. And their interactions are of infinite complexity. It is impossible, therefore, to predict what will be the outcome of any actual combination of causes, whether in the case of a person or of a society. We may be able to disentangle a few causes here and there, and say that experience shows that such and such effects will follow from them. And we do this in our systems of education and of politics. But we cannot carry this process far enough, or accurately enough, to be able to predict what will happen in each particular case, and that is why life is an art rather than a science—and so, I believe, is politics. An individual acts according to his character, and a society similarly; and, starting as from that character, as it is at any moment, the individual or the society has freedom to act. But the character itself is the product of causes, and therefore is, at that level, the outcome of Necessity.'

In Lord Samuel's argument (which will also be found set out less summarily in his since published book *Belief and Action* (London 1937, Cassell), pp. 194-205) it will be seen that he does not disagree with the present writer's primary proposition that in human affairs there is a net of Necessity as well as a breath of Freedom. Lord Samuel's criticism is directed against the secondary proposition that the texture of cause-and-

Indeed, if the relations between wheel and vehicle or part and whole or means and end are governed by any law at all, it is not a law of identity but a law of diversity, under which a repetitive movement of the wheel or the part or the means brings about a non-repetitive movement of the vehicle or the whole or the end, while conversely the end attains its unique realization and the whole its unique individuality and the vehicle its unique goal through the repetitive employment of similar means and the repetitive juxtaposition of standard parts and the repetitive revolution of a wheel round its axle.

In the mechanism of any mechanical tractor this is true not only of the road-wheels but of every wheel in the engine, including the fly-wheel. To the novice in mechanics the giant fly-wheel, which is the most prominent part of a traction-engine in motion, seems to be spinning round quite aimlessly in the air and using up power which might be better employed; but the mechanic knows that, if the fly-wheel were un-mounted, then the road-wheels of the traction-engine might catch and stick at their dead-points, with the result that the traction-engine itself, with all its train of trucks, would be brought to an abrupt halt instead of moving steadily forward towards its journey's end. Thus, contrary to all appearance, the sheer cyclic movement of the fly-wheel is helping to carry the whole train forward continuously in a straight line, and the train is accomplishing its 'one-way' journey through the agency of wheels that are turning round and round.

This harmony of two diverse movements—a major irreversible movement which is borne on the wings of a minor repetitive movement—is perhaps the essence of what we mean by rhythm; and we can discern this play of forces not only in the mechanized rhythm of our man-made machinery but likewise in the organic rhythm of life. The annual procession of the seasons, which brings with it the annual withdrawal and return of vegetation, has made possible the secular evolution of the Vegetable Kingdom. The sombre cycle of birth and reproduction and death has made possible the evolution of all the higher animals up to Man

effect is woven on a pattern that can be discerned by human minds. This proposition is no doubt speculative and disputable. The empirical method by which we have tried to test it can establish, at best, only a presumption and not a proof. If, however, for the sake of the argument, this presumption may be assumed for the moment to have been established, that conclusion does not, so far as the present writer can see, circumscribe the bounds of human freedom more narrowly than they have been drawn by Lord Samuel. If once it is admitted that there is an element of Necessity—coexisting side by side with an element of Freedom—in human affairs, the scope of this Freedom is surely not affected by our answer to the question whether *Sæva Necessitas*, in her own acknowledged sphere, dances to a perceptible rhythm or obeys no intelligible law. At any rate the writer heartily agrees with Lord Samuel (*Belief and Action*, p. 205) that for human beings 'everything depends upon their own individual decisions and actions', and that 'there can be no division between State morality and personal morality'.

himself.¹ The goose-step of a pair of legs enables a walker to 'cover the ground'; the pumping-action of the lungs and the heart enables the human being to live out his life; the bars of music and the feet, lines, stanzas and cantos of poetry enable the composer and the poet to expound their themes; the scenes and acts of plays permit the presentation of the plots; the cyclic rotation of the praying-wheel carries the Buddhist towards the goal of *Nirvāna* in the alternative vehicles of the *Hīnayāna* and the *Mahāyāna*; and even the Wheel of Existence, from which the Buddhist discipline promises release, produces the abiding and cumulative burden of *karma* which is handed on from one incarnation-cycle to the next and thereby transforms a trivial round into a tragic history. The planetary 'Great Year'² itself, which is perhaps the origin of the whole cyclic philosophy, can no longer be mistaken for the ultimate and all-embracing movement of a stellar cosmos in which our local solar system has dwindled into a speck of dust under the mighty magnifying lens of our latter-day Western Astronomy. The repetitive 'music of the spheres' dies down to an undertone in an expanding physical universe of nebulae and star-clusters which are apparently receding from one another with incredible velocity, while the relativity of the Space-Time framework gives to each successive position of the vast astral array the irrevocable historic uniqueness of a dramatic 'situation' in some play in which the actors are living personalities.

Thus the detection of periodic repetitive movements in our analysis of the process of Civilization does not by any means imply that the process itself, to which these contributory movements minister, is of the same cyclic order as they are. On the contrary, if any inference at all can be drawn legitimately from the periodicity of these minor movements, we may rather infer that the major movement which they bear along upon their monotonously rising and falling wings is of the diverse order, or, in other words, that it is not recurrent but is progressive. This tentative conclusion³ is

¹ For the annual cycle of the corn and the life-cycle of Mankind and for the analogies between the two see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 248-63, above.

² For the Babylonian discovery of the 'Great Year' see the present chapter, pp. 23-4, above, and V. C (i) (c) 1, vol. v, pp. 56-7, below.

³ In the view that has been put forward above, a Spenglerian belief in an element of recurrence in human affairs has been combined with an Einsteinian belief in an element of uniqueness and irreversibility in the movement of the stars. An eighteenth-century philosopher who combined a belief in human progress with a Newtonian conception of physics saw the Physical Universe as the wheel and Mankind as the vehicle for which this wheel's vain repetitions provide a means of locomotion along a 'one-way' road.

Les phénomènes de la nature, soumis à des lois constantes, sont renfermés dans un cercle de révolutions toujours les mêmes. Tout renaît, tout périt; et dans ces générations successives, par lesquelles les végétaux et les animaux se reproduisent, le temps ne fait que ramener à chaque instant l'image de ce qu'il a fait disparaître. La succession des hommes, au contraire, offre de siècle en siècle un spectacle toujours varié. La raison, les passions, la liberté, produisent sans cesse de nouveaux événements. Tous les âges

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sufficient for our purpose at the moment, since it effectively breaks the spell that was threatening to keep Ixion bound for ever to his wheel and Sisyphus for ever rolling his stone towards the summit of the mountain. We are not condemned to believe in the cyclic version of predestinarianism as the supreme law of our human history; and this was the last form of the necessitarian doctrine with which we had to contend.

This is a message of encouragement for us children of the Western Civilization as we drift to-day alone, on the 'wide wide sea' of human history, with none but dead or stricken civilizations around us. Manifestly 'the door of death is not closed'.¹ *Si monumentum requiris circumspice*. The dead civilizations strew the deck of the ship of human fortunes; and we, and we only, are left.² By the Law of Chance the odds are certainly sixteen to ten, and possibly twenty-five to one, that Death the Leveller will lay his icy hand on us likewise; and, as we contemplate these disconcerting figures, we may still be inclined to repine in the elegiac mood of William Dunbar's Lament:

I that in heill was and gladness
Am trublit now with great sickness
And feeblit with infirmity:

Timor Mortis conturbat me . . .

That strong unmerciful tyrand
Takis, on the motheris breast sowkand,
The babe full of benigntie:

Timor Mortis conturbat me . . .

He spairis no lord for his piscence,
Na clerk for his intelligence;
His awful straik may no man flee:

Timor Mortis conturbat me . . .

He has done petuously devour
The noble Chaucer, of makaris flour,
The Monk of Bury, and Gower, all three:

Timor Mortis conturbat me . . .

He has tane Rowll of Aberdene,
And gentill Rowll of Corstophine;
Two better fallowis did no man see:

Timor Mortis conturbat me . . .

sont enchaînés . . . et le genre humain, considéré depuis son origine, paraît aux yeux d'un philosophe un tout immense, qui lui-même a, comme chaque individu, son enfance et ses progrès."—Turgot, A. R. J.: 'Second Discours, sur les Progrès Successifs de l'Esprit Humain, prononcé le 11 Décembre, 1750', in *Œuvres de Turgot* (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 597-8.

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, l. 373, quoted in Part IV. A, on p. 4, above.

² 1 Kings xviii. 22, and xix. 10 and 14.

Sen he has all my brothers tane,
 He will nocht let me live alane;
 Of force I mon his next prey be:
Timor Mortis conturbat me . . .

Yet, even in our forlorn and melancholy plight, our deliverance from the incubus of the predestinarian creed should put us in better heart; for, if this creed is non-proven, then even in Life-in-Death there is still Hope-against-Hope. The Goddess with whom we have to do battle is not Saeva Necessitas¹ with her lethal armoury, but only Probability, whom mortal valour wielding mortal weapons may one day drive ignominiously off the field, as Diomedes, with Athena's blessing, once routed Aphrodite.² The Mariner's proper watchword, as he keeps his lonely vigil in this haunted ship upon enchanted seas, is not the Scots poet's elegy but the Greek sailor's epitaph:

*Ναυηγού τάφος εἰμί· σὺ δὲ πλέε· καὶ γὰρ ὅθ' ἡμεῖς
 ὠλόμεθ', αἱ λοιπαὶ νῆες ἐποντοπόρουν.*³

The dead civilizations are not 'dead by fate'; and therefore a living civilization is not doomed inexorably in advance *migrare ad plures*: to join the majority of its kind that have suffered shipwreck. Though sixteen civilizations may have perished already to our knowledge, and nine others may be now at the point of death, and though Nature, in her wanton prodigality, may be wont to slay the representatives of a species, not by tens or scores, but by thousands and tens of thousands,⁴ before she rouses herself to create a new specific mutation, we need fear no evil from the encompassing shadow of Death;⁵ for we are not compelled to submit our fate to the blind arbitrament of statistics. The divine spark of creative power is instinct in ourselves; and if we have the grace to kindle it into flame, then the stars in their courses⁶ cannot defeat our efforts to attain the goal of human endeavours.

II. LOSS OF COMMAND OVER THE ENVIRONMENT?

(a) THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

If we have proved to our satisfaction that the breakdowns of civilizations are not brought about by the operation, either recurrent or progressive, of cosmic forces which are outside human control, we have still to find the true cause of these human catastrophes; and, in pursuing our search, we shall look now for some fatal miscarriage in the action of the human beings whose overlapping fields

¹ Horace: *Carmina*, Book I, Ode 35, l. 17.

² Theodorides in *Anthologia Palatina*, No. 282.

³ Psalm xxiii. 4.

⁴ *Iliad*, Book V, ll. 330-54.

⁵ 1 Samuel xviii. 7.

⁶ Judges v. 20.

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of activity conjure a civilization into existence on their common ground.¹ Are the breakdowns of civilizations due to some loss of command over the environment on the part of their human 'members'? In attempting to answer this question, it will be convenient to abide by our usual distinction between two kinds of environment: the physical and the human.

Do civilizations break down owing to a loss of command over the physical environment? As a measure of the degree of command over the physical environment that is possessed by any given society at any given stage in its history, we may take, as before, the state of its technique; and we have already ascertained, in the course of a previous inquiry into the process by which civilizations grow, that, if we set ourselves to plot out two sets of curves—one set representing the vicissitudes in the histories of civilizations and the other set the contemporary vicissitudes in the state of technique—the two sets not only fail to correspond but display wide and frequent discrepancies.² We find cases of technique improving while civilizations remain static or go into decline, as well as examples of the converse situation in which technique remains static while civilizations are in movement—either forward or backward³ as the case may be.⁴ It will be seen that, in the act of proving that an increase of command over the physical environment is not the criterion of the growths of civilizations, we have gone a long way towards proving incidentally that a loss of command over the physical environment is not the criterion of their breakdowns. In order to complete this latter demonstration in this place, we have still to show that, in certain cases in which the breakdown and disintegration of a civilization have been accompanied by a decline in technique, so that the two curves here exceptionally coincide, the coincidence does not mean that the downward movement of technique and the downward movement of the civilization are related to one another as cause and as effect respectively.

An investigation of these cases will make it clear that, in so far as any causal relation at all can be established, it is always the decline of the civilization that is the cause and the decline of technique the consequence or symptom. When a civilization is in

¹ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 223-48, above.

² See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 154-74, above.

³ 'Pour la vapeur et toutes les découvertes industrielles, je dirai aussi, comme de l'imprimerie, que ce sont de grands moyens; j'ajouterai que l'on a vu quelquefois des procédés nés de découvertes scientifiques se perpétuer à l'état de routine, quand le mouvement intellectuel qui les avait fait naître s'était arrêté pour toujours, et avait laissé perdre le secret théorique d'où ces procédés émanaient. Enfin, je rappellerai que le bien-être matériel n'a jamais été qu'une annexe extérieure de la civilisation, et qu'on n'a jamais entendu dire d'une société qu'elle avait vécu uniquement parce qu'elle connaissait les moyens d'aller vite et de se bien vêtir.'—de Gobineau, le Comte J. A.: *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (Paris 1853-5, Firmin Didot, 4 vols.), vol. i, pp. 200-1.

⁴ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 159, above.

decline in all its aspects and activities, it sometimes happens that a particular technique which has been both feasible for and profitable to this civilization in the growth-stage now begins to encounter increasing social obstacles and to yield diminishing economic returns; and if, in the end, the technique in question becomes positively and patently unremunerative, it is sometimes deliberately abandoned even before it has become socially impossible to practise. It would obviously be a complete inversion of the true order of cause and effect in such a case to suggest that the abandonment of the technique was neither an act of economic policy nor a confession of social bankruptcy, but was a consequence of a loss of technical command, and that this hypothetical loss of command, in its turn, was the cause of the long antecedent breakdown of the civilization. The cause of this breakdown is not to be found in a retrogression in technique, when this retrogression is no more than a symptom of the decline by which the breakdown is followed.

An obvious case in point is the abandonment of the Roman roads in Western Europe, which was manifestly not the cause but the consequence of the break-up of the Roman Empire and the previous breakdown of a Hellenic Society which was embodied in the Roman Empire in the last stage but one of the Hellenic decline. This social malady was the cause of the abandonment of the roads, and not any loss of the technique of road-building and road-maintenance. These Roman roads became derelict, not through a failure of technical skill, but because in Western Europe, between the fifth century of the Christian Era and the eighteenth, the general state of society was such that a road-system of the Roman standard would not have paid its way and would therefore have been a social incubus instead of a social asset. Since the recent revival of road-building in the Western World, there have been similar examples of the deliberate abandonment, for the same reason, of roads that have been built in non-Western countries which have been under temporary Western occupation. For instance, the roads built by the British authorities in the Ionian Islands during the British protectorate of 1815-64 have been partly abandoned, or at least they have considerably deteriorated, since the termination of the British connexion and the incorporation of the islands into the Kingdom of Greece. And the same fate has overtaken the roads that were built by the Allied Armies in Greek Macedonia in 1916-18, and by a British force in Eastern Persia (to the Persian city of Mashhad from the British-Indian rail-head in Baluchistan) during the same years.

Nor can the decline and fall of the Hellenic Civilization be traced back to a decline in technique simply by extending our vision from

the single technique of road-building to embrace the whole technical apparatus of economic life. 'The economic explanation of the decay of the Ancient World must be rejected completely. . . . The economic simplification of ancient life was not the cause of what we call the decline of the Ancient World, but one of the aspects of the more general phenomenon.'¹ This more general phenomenon, to which Professor Rostovtzeff alludes in this passage, is 'the failure of administration and the ruin of the middle class, as revealed by the Theodosian Code', which is described in detail by Professor Dill.² This general social breakdown accounts for the abandonment not only of the Roman roads but also of other parts of the technical apparatus of the Roman World which were abandoned at the same time: for instance, the shipping services which had ensured the food-supply of the population of the City of Rome by providing for the maritime transport of corn that had been grown on the African side of the Mediterranean. Without recourse to the unsubstantiated hypothesis of a loss of technical skill, the technical decline is easily deducible from social causes; but, by the same token, this technical decline affords no explanation of the social decline which is the object of our present investigation.

The abandonment of the Roman roads has a contemporary parallel in the partial abandonment of the far older irrigation-system in the alluvial delta of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin.³ In the seventh century of the Christian Era the reconditioning of these hydro-engineering works was left in default in a large section of South-Western 'Irāq after the works had been put out of action by a flood which had probably done no more serious damage than many floods that had come and gone in the course of the preceding four thousand years. Thereafter, in the thirteenth century, the entire irrigation-system of 'Irāq was allowed to go to ruin. Why, on these occasions, did the inhabitants of 'Irāq abandon the conservation of a system which their predecessors had successfully maintained for some thousands of years without a break—a system, moreover, on which the agricultural productivity of the country depended and, therewith, its capacity for supporting the existing population at its existing standard of living? At first sight, this

¹ Rostovtzeff, M.: *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1926, Clarendon Press), pp. 302-5 and 482-5.

² Dill, Samuel: *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, 2nd edition (London 1905, Macmillan), Book III.

³ See Lestrang, Guy: *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge 1905, University Press), pp. 25-9. The great catastrophe, which resulted in a diversion of the main stream of the Tigris in its lower course from a channel approximately coincident with its present bed into the channel now known as the Shatt-al-Hayy, appears to have taken place in the reign of the Sasanian Emperor Khusrū Parwiz (*imperabat* A.D. 590-628). There had been an anticipatory disaster in the reign of Kawādh [Qubādh] I (*imperabat* A.D. 488-531), but this had been partially, though only partially, retrieved in the reign of Khusrū Anūshirwān (*imperabat* A.D. 531-79).

manifestly suicidal neglect looks so perverse that a sheer inability to perform the work, owing to a loss of technique, might appear to be the only plausible explanation. Yet no historical evidence of this hypothetical loss of engineering technique appears to be forthcoming; and the true explanation seems to be that the abandonment of the works was not the cause but was rather the consequence of a decline in population and in prosperity which was itself the result of social causes. The ancient irrigation-system of the Land of Shinar was allowed to fall locally derelict in the seventh century of the Christian Era and to go to ruin altogether in the thirteenth century because, in each of those two ages, the Syriac Civilization was at so low an ebb in 'Irāq, and the consequent general state of insecurity was so extreme, that nobody at the time had either the means of investing capital, or the motive for employing energy, in river-conservancy and irrigation work. So far from it being a loss of technique that wrecked the irrigation-system of 'Irāq and thereby contributed to the decline and fall of the Syriac Civilization, it was this social decline and fall that caused the progressive abandonment of the 'Irāqī irrigation-system by overwhelming the people of 'Irāq under a succession of social catastrophes: the great Romano-Persian War of A.D. 603-28; the consequent, and immediately subsequent, overrunning of 'Irāq by the Primitive Muslim Arabs; and the Mongol invasion of A.D. 1258 which dealt the moribund Syriac Civilization its *coup de grâce*.¹ By the same token, our examination of the technical factor leaves the decline and fall of the Syriac Civilization still unexplained.

The conclusion that the decline and fall of the Syriac Civilization is to be regarded not as an effect but rather as the cause of the progressive ruin of the irrigation-system of 'Irāq in the sixth, seventh, and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era is supported by an historical precedent; for the Syriac Society was not, of course, the first civilization that had installed itself in the Land of Shinar. In this portion of its eventual domain the Syriac Society was the residuary legatee of the Babylonian (which was itself the successor of a Sumerian Society which had been the original creator of the fields and cities of Sumer and Akkad out of an inhospitable and untenanted jungle-swamp²); and the unrepaired ruin of the irrigation-system of the whole of the Land of Shinar in the course of the

¹ In a similar way the anticipatory physical disaster in the reign of Kawādh [Qubādh] I can be explained as the reflexion of an earlier bout of social catastrophes: e.g. the destruction of the Emperor Pīrūz and his army by the Ephthalite Eurasian Nomads in A.D. 484 (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 279, footnote 1, and V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, vol. v, p. 600, below); the Romano-Persian wars of A.D. 502-5 and 528-32; and the social upheaval, fattered by the Prophet Mazdak, which came to a head *circa* A.D. 528-9 (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 129, below).

² See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 315-18, above.

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last eight centuries of Syriac history has an analogue in the unretrieved destruction of the local network of drainage- and irrigation-canals in the territory of the ancient city-state of Ur in an earlier age when the Babylonian Civilization was *in extremis*.

At other points in this Study¹ the disintegration of the Babylonian Civilization is traced through a 'Time of Troubles', which was precipitated by the social disease of Assyrian militarism, into a universal state which was inaugurated by the Neo-Babylonian Empire and was continued in the form of the Achaemenian and Seleucid régimes; and it was under these last two political dispensations that the moribund Babylonian Society was progressively absorbed into the tissues of an encircling Syriac Society until the last vestiges of a distinctive Babylonian culture were obliterated in the last century B.C. It was also in this age that, in the territory of Ur, the local irrigation and agriculture which had been maintained there over a previous period of at least 3,000 years were permanently put out of action by a shift in the course of the Euphrates which worked havoc that was never repaired.² Thus, here again, we find a decline of civilization and a decay of irrigation proceeding *pari passu*; but, here again likewise, there is no suggestion that the failure to retrieve the physical disaster was either the consequence of a loss of technique or the cause of the accompanying dissolution of an ancient society. According to the greatest living authority on the subject, it is rather the decrepitude into which the Babylonian Civilization had already sunk, by the time when the physical disaster occurred, that accounts for the failure to bring the waters under human control again.

"To make good the disaster required a co-ordinated effort which the country then was too poor or too ill-organized to attempt. . . . [For] everything depended on hard work and upon system. The boast of a Sumerian king was that he had honoured the gods, had overcome his enemies, had secured equal justice for his people, and had built canals. The last was not the least important function of the Government; but the task did not stop with the building. The cleaning of the channels,

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79-81, and II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 137-8, above, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, in the present volume, pp. 100-103, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), pp. 468-84, below.

² The fatal economic effects of this unretrieved physical disaster are forcefully described in the following passage from the pen of Sir Leonard Woolley, the modern Western archaeologist who has rescued Ur from an oblivion under which the famous city lay for more than two thousand years:

"The river Euphrates burst its banks and, flowing across the open plain, made a new bed for itself more or less where it runs now, eleven miles to the east; and with that change the entire system of water-supply was broken up. The old irrigation-canals that had tapped the river further up were left high and dry; the new river-course, not yet confined within artificial banks, was a wide lake whose waters, level with the plain, blocked the ends of the drainage-channels so that these became stagnant back-waters. The surface of the plain was scorched by the tropic sun, the sub-soil was saturated, and the constant process of evaporation left in the earth such quantities of salt that to-day irrigation brings to the surface a white crust like heavy hoar-frost which blights all vegetation at birth' (Woolley, C. L.: *Abraham* (London 1936, Faber), p. 69).

the upkeep of the banks, the fair allotment of water as between different villages and different landowners—all this entailed constant work and constant supervision; and whilst the peasant's industry was amply rewarded so long as a strong hand kept control, the collapse of the Government might well mean, and in the end did involve, the utter ruin of the country.¹

This explanation of the failure to repair the havoc that the Euphrates had made of the irrigation-system in the territory of Ur gains point when we consider the date to which the disaster is assigned by the authority just quoted. 'We do not know exactly when the change came, but it was not so very long after [Herodotus's] visit, perhaps about the end of the reign of Alexander the Great, towards 300 B.C.'² If so, this unretrieved physical disaster descended upon South-Western Babylonia at a moment when a long train of social calamities had just mounted up to its climax. As far back as the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. the spirit and prosperity of the Babylonian people had been broken by the quelling of the insurrection against Darius I and by the more drastic repression of the insurrection against Xerxes. Then the *Pax Achaemenia*, which had at any rate been something to set against the loss of Babylonian independence, had been brought to a violent end by the impact of Alexander the Great.³ And finally the premature death of the Macedonian conqueror had condemned the whole of the derelict Achaemenian domain to be turned into an arena for the wars of succession between the Diadochi.⁴ It is manifest that in the fourth century B.C., as in the sixth and seventh and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the physical failure of Man to maintain over Nature the command which Man had once imposed upon her was the consequence and not the cause of Man's social failure to manage his relations with his human neighbour.

We arrive at a similar conclusion when we follow out a train of investigation which is suggested by a remarkable finding of empirical observation in Ceylon. In Ceylon at the present day the area which contains the ruined monuments of the Indic Civilization on the island has been found to be coincident, not only with the area that is permanently afflicted by drought (in contrast to that

¹ Woolley, *op. cit.*, pp. 69 and 73-4.

² Woolley, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

³ The presumption that the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire was economically disadvantageous to the Babylonians is not, of course, incompatible with the fact that it was politically agreeable to them (for the welcome which the Babylonians gave to Alexander, see IV. C (ii) (b) 2, p. 100, footnote 4; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 94 and 123, with footnote 2; V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 347-8; and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 442, below).

⁴ The conquest of South-Western Asia from the Achaemenidae by the Macedonians, and the subsequent civil wars among the victors over the division of their spoils, were as devastating as the corresponding social convulsions in the same region in the seventh century of the Christian Era, when the Arabs first overthrew the Roman and Sasanian Powers and then turned their arms against each other.

part of the island that is annually drenched by the monsoon), but also with the area that is infested nowadays with malaria.¹ This latter-day perversity of a water-supply which is amply sufficient nowadays for breeding the Anopheles Mosquito, while it is wholly inadequate for raising crops, is at first sight a strange environmental setting for the social life of the civilization whose former establishment in precisely this area is attested beyond all question by the archaeological evidence. The geographical coextensiveness of the domain of the Indic Civilization in Ceylon with the domain of the drought has occupied our attention already;² and we have found a satisfactory explanation for this in terms of Challenge-and-Response. In Ceylon the immigrant Indic Civilization was stimulated to its highest achievements in an area where it could not maintain itself at all without creating and keeping up a vast and elaborate system of water-storage and irrigation. We have still to explain why the area which, in virtue of these mighty works, was once covered by irrigated fields, has now become a hot-bed of malaria besides going out of cultivation.

It is extremely unlikely, *a priori*, that the malaria should have been prevalent already at the time when the mental and physical energy that went into these gigantic waterworks was being put forth by the human occupants of the country; and, as a matter of fact, it can be demonstrated that the malaria is a consequence of the ruin of the irrigation-system and is therefore posterior to the age in which the Indic Civilization in Ceylon was in its flower. This part of Ceylon became malarious because the breakdown of the irrigation-system transformed flowing watercourses into chains of stagnant pools and destroyed the fish which had lived in those flowing waters and had kept them clear of mosquito-grubs.³ Thus, in tracing the cause of the decline and fall of the Indic Civilization in Ceylon, we have come upon a technical factor, the ruin of the irrigation-system—a factor which operated both directly, by disastrously reducing the possibilities of cultivation, and indirectly by turning the lees of the once life-giving waters into breeding-places for an insidious disease. We have still, however, to trace the cause of this technical catastrophe. What was it that choked the irrigation-channels and breached the bunds of the tanks? When we put this question, we find that the cause was not any decline in engineering technique but the social decline which is the very phenomenon for which we are seeking to account.

Those bunds were breached and those channels were choked in the course of an incessant and devastating warfare. The works

¹ See Still, J.: *The Jungle Tide* (Edinburgh 1930, Blackwood), pp. 75-6.

² In II. D (i), vol. ii, pp. 5-7, above.

³ Still, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-1.

were deliberately sabotaged by invaders as a short cut to the military objective of bringing their victims to their knees; and a war-worn people had not the heart to go on repairing a damage that had been inflicted so many times over and that was virtually certain to be inflicted many times again.¹ On this showing, the ultimate explanation of the decline and fall of the Indic Civilization in Ceylon has to be sought in a social cause—the social malady of warfare—and this social malady, which is the key to the problem, proves to have been itself the cause and not the consequence of the loss of command over the physical environment which is implied in the ruin of the irrigation-system. Thus, upon investigation, the technical factor dwindles, in this case again, into an incidental and subordinate link in a chain of social cause and effect which has still to be traced back to its social origins.

This chapter in the history of the Indic Civilization in Ceylon has a close parallel in the history of the Hellenic Civilization in the Mediterranean Basin.

Here, too, we find that some of the regions where this now vanished civilization once lived its most brilliant life and put forth its most vital energies have since become malarial swamps that have been reclaimed only within living memory. The Copaic marshes, which have been drained by the enterprise of a British company since 1887, after having been a pestilential wilderness for at least two thousand years, were once the fields that fed the citizens of Orchomenos the Wealthy; and the Pomptine marshes, which have been drained and repopulated and re-cultivated under Signor Mussolini's régime, after as long a period of desolation, once harboured a swarm of Volscian cities and Latin colonies. The high cultivation and dense population of this region filled Molossian Pyrrhus with astonishment and admiration when he penetrated thus far at the farthest point of his vain offensive against the Roman Commonwealth.² In Boeotia and in Latium, as in Ceylon, there is reason to believe that the reign of malaria did not begin until, in each of these regions, the Hellenic Civilization had passed its zenith. A modern Western scholar who has examined the extant fragments of the contemporary evidence on the subject has come to the conclusion that in Greece malaria did not become endemic until after the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431—

¹ Still, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–90.

² For the impression which the Pomptine region made upon Pyrrhus's mind, see Dio Cassius: *Ἐκ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ λς*, fragment 40, § 23, ed. Melber (Leipzig 1890, Teubner). In a passage of words with his Italian and Italian allies Pyrrhus 'said to them that their inferiority to the Romans leapt to the eye in the very aspect of the countryside. In the territory under Roman sovereignty there were fruit-trees of all kinds and vineyards and arable lands and agricultural improvements of immense capital value, whereas his own friends' territories had been devastated to a degree at which it was impossible to tell even whether they had ever been inhabited'.

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404 B.C.;¹ and in Latium the disease does not seem to have gained the upper hand over human physique until after the Hannibalic War of 218-201 B.C.² It also seems to be established that in the Mediterranean Basin, as in Ceylon, the malaria-carrying mosquito was enabled to breed because the once healthy and productive fields had been turned into stagnant swamps by the ruin of the engineering works which had formerly regulated the flow of the waters. Are we, then, to pronounce that the Hellenic Civilization was laid low by malaria, and that this malaria was let loose by a failure of engineering technique?

In this case the absurdity of that reconstruction of historical cause and effect is palpable; for the age in which the Pomptine country was passing out of the dominion of Man into the dominion of the Anopheles Mosquito was actually the age in which the Romans were constructing their most imposing public works. To say nothing of the roads which were being made to radiate from Rome to the extremities of the Empire, and the aqueducts which were being made to supply Rome with water from the Alban and the Sabine hills, we may remind ourselves of a notable hydro-engineering work which was carried out, in the neighbourhood of the Pomptine region, by the Emperor Claudius. In A.D. 52 Claudius opened a tunnel through the Marsic Mountains which drained the waters of the Fucine Lake away into the bed of the River Liris and thereby captured the lake-bottom for cultivation.³ Is it arguable that a government which was able to drain the Fucine Lake in this way was technically incompetent to carry out, if it had chosen, the simpler engineering enterprise of draining the Pomptine marshes, which were separated by no mountain barrier from their natural outlet to the sea?

The real reason, of course, why the Pomptine country was allowed to become derelict, and to remain so, was not technical but social. The social breakdown which had been brought upon the heart of the Hellenic World by the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. had been extended by the Hannibalic War to Italy. The Hannibalic War, and the Roman predatory wars and civil wars which followed in its train during the next two centuries, had a profoundly disintegrating effect upon Italian social life. The peasant culture and economy, which had been the basis of Italy's social well-being in the Pre-Hannibalic Age, was first undermined and finally swept away by the cumulative effect of a number of inimical forces: the devastation of Southern Italy by Hannibal himself; the perpetual

¹ Jones, W. H. S.: *Malaria and Greek History* (Manchester 1909, University Press).

² Greenidge, A. H. J.: *A History of Rome from the Tribune of Tiberius Gracchus to the End of the Jugurthine War, 133-104 B.C.* (London 1904, Methuen), p. 70.

³ See Tacitus: *Annals*, Book XII, chaps. 56-7.

mobilization of the Italian peasantry for campaigns which carried them ever farther afield for ever longer periods of continuous military service; the agrarian revolution (first accomplished in the devastated areas) which substituted large-scale cash-crop farming and stock breeding with a slave labour-force for small-scale subsistence farming by a free citizen-peasantry;¹ the mass-migration from a no longer self-sufficient countryside into the more and more parasitic cities; and an arbitrary and unequal redistribution of wealth which aroused a revolutionary temper in the masses—a temper for which the state dole of free rations was a sedative but not a cure. This combination of social evils amply accounts for the husbandman's retreat and the Anopheles Mosquito's advance in Italy during the seven centuries that intervened between the generation of Hannibal and the generation of Benedict.²

As for Greece, a similar combination of evils, going back not merely to the Hannibalic Age but to the disaster of 431 B.C., some two centuries earlier, had resulted, by the time of Polybius (*vivebat circa 206–128 B.C.*), in a degree of depopulation which was still more extreme than the contemporary depopulation of Italy. In a famous passage Polybius lays his finger upon the practice of restricting the size of families (by abortion or infanticide) as the principal cause of the social and political downfall of Greece in his day;³ and in another passage, which occurs in his account of the post-Hannibalic war between Rome and the Seleucid Power (192–188 B.C.), he happens to mention that the social disintegration which was apparent in Greece as a whole was particularly flagrant in Boeotia. The special Boeotian symptoms were a twenty-five years' moratorium upon legal proceedings; a public dole distributed to paupers; and a custom, among the well-to-do minority, of bequeathing their property to their clubs—a custom which was not confined to people who died without issue.⁴ It will be seen that no hypothesis of retrogression in engineering technique is necessary in order to explain why the Copaic, like the Pomptine, plain was allowed to transform itself from a granary into a nest of mosquitoes.

Our diagnosis of these past chapters in the histories of 'Iraq and Ceylon and Italy and Greece is borne out by an observation of what has been taking place in China, under our eyes, in our own

¹ 'Innumerabilem multitudinem liberorum capitum in eis fuisse locis quae nunc vix seminario exiguo militum relicto servitia Romana ab solitudine vindicant' is one of Livy's alternative answers to his conundrum 'unde totiens victis Volscis et Aequis suffecerint milites' (Book VI, chap. 12).

² For the social evils that followed in the train of the Hannibalic War, see I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40–2; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213–6; and III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 170–1, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), in the present volume, pp. 505–10, below. For the turn in the tide of Italian agrarian history which was brought about by Saint Benedict, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 266, above.

³ Polybius, Book XXXVI, chap. 17.

⁴ Polybius, Book XX, chap. 6, §§ 1–6.

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generation. In China, during the second and third decades of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the railways throughout the country, as well as the river-conservancy works in the basins of the Yellow River and the Hwai River and the Yangtse, were going to rack and ruin; and in this case it is patent that a decline in technical skill cannot have been the cause; for in this generation there have undoubtedly been a far larger number of civil engineers in China, with a far higher standard of technical efficiency, than ever before. Under the impact of our Western Civilization upon the Far Eastern Society, thousands of able young Chinese who, in any other generation during the previous two thousand years, would have studied the Confucian Classics and followed a literary and administrative career, have actually been taking up, instead, the Applied Physical Science of the West: partly on the rational consideration that the Chinese people must make themselves masters of this Western technique if they mean to hold their own in a Westernized World, and partly from a blind and vulgar desire to be 'in the fashion' of the alien civilization which is obviously paramount, in wealth and in power, in the world of the day. If these young Chinese engineers had had a free field for the exercise of their skill, it is evident that they could have begun to equip China with a system of river-conservancy works and irrigation-canals and roads and railways the like of which had never been seen on the face of this land during all the centuries that had elapsed since the Sinic Civilization first arose there. But it was part of the paradox and the tragedy of China in these years that the majority of these young Chinese engineers who had received this expensive technical education in America or in Europe remained unemployed, while under their eyes the existing engineering-works in China—works which, even in repair, were quite inadequate to the country's needs and which these young men might have improved out of recognition¹—were rapidly going to pieces.

What is the explanation? In this latter-day Chinese case, where we are not driven back upon conjecture but can use our own eyes, we can see at once that the general condition of society in China in our day is the key to the puzzle. The public works that were the

¹ An indication of what the living generation of Chinese Western-trained engineers was capable of achieving, if their technical abilities were freed from prohibitive political and social handicaps, was afforded by the extraordinary rapidity and thoroughness with which the river-conservancy works were restored along the middle course of the Yangtse after the disastrous floods of the summer of 1931. In this great operation not only the labour-force but the engineering staff was Chinese, and the function of the International Flood Relief Commission, under whose auspices the work was carried out, was not technical (as might have been expected *a priori*) so much as diplomatic. The participation of the International Commission made the work possible by giving it a neutral complexion and thereby taking it out of the arena of Chinese civil war and party politics. It was this exceptional release from the political handicap that gave the Chinese engineers a rare opportunity for showing what they could do.

fruits of technical skill were deteriorating in China, at a time when technical skill was actually on the increase there, because the encounter between the Far Eastern Civilization and the West, which had led to this increase of technical skill among the Chinese people in the domain of civil engineering, had also turned the whole life of the Far Eastern Society in China upside down and had produced the political anarchy and the social ferment and the individual spiritual convulsions with which the Chinese people were being tormented ever since the Westernizing Revolution had broken through the traditional crust of Far Eastern life in China in A.D. 1911. The recent dilapidation of public works in China was not the cause but an incidental and paradoxical consequence of the dissolution of the ancient Far Eastern body social; and in order to find the cause of this social dissolution we must study the action of another social force, the corroding Western solvent. In this Chinese case the investigation of the factor of technique is demonstrably a false scent if the dissolution of the old Far Eastern order of society in China is the phenomenon which we are seeking to account for.

We shall arrive at corresponding conclusions if we pass from the practical technique of engineering to the artistic techniques of architecture and sculpture and painting and calligraphy and literature.

Why, for example, did the cuneiform script, which the Babylonian Society had inherited from the Sumerian Society, go out of use in the last century B.C. after having served as a vehicle of culture for more than three thousand years? And why did the Egyptian hieroglyphic and demotic scripts, and with them the Egyptian styles of architecture and sculpture, go out of use between the third and the fifth century of the Christian Era after at least as long a span of uninterrupted currency? Why, again, did the Hellenic style of architecture go out of use between the fourth century of the Christian Era and the seventh? We may feel our way towards the answers to these questions by asking why the Ottoman Turks abandoned the Arabic Alphabet in A.D. 1928;¹ why the Japanese and even the Chinese are now meditating the abandonment of the Sinitic characters; and why almost every non-Western society in the World is discarding to-day its own traditional dress and architecture and art. And we may bring the problem home to ourselves by asking finally why our own traditional Western styles of music and dancing and painting and sculpture are being abandoned by our own rising generation.

In our own case, is the explanation a loss of artistic technique? Have we forgotten the rules of rhythm and counterpoint and per-

¹ See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1928, III. A (viii), and the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 112-13, below.

spective and light and proportion which were discovered, or invented, by that Italian and Flemish creative minority which carried our Western Society out of the second chapter in its history into the third chapter some four or five centuries ago?¹ In this case, in which we happen to be first-hand witnesses, the answer to our question is palpably in the negative. In these days of mass-education our Western World is more amply supplied than ever before with *virtuosi* who are masters of these techniques and who could put them into operation again any day if they felt the impulse in themselves and received the demand from their public. The prevailing tendency to abandon our Western artistic traditions is no involuntary capitulation to a paralytic stroke of technical incompetence; it is the deliberate abandonment of a style of art which is losing its appeal to the rising generation because this generation is ceasing to cultivate its aesthetic sensibilities on the traditional Western lines. We have wilfully cast out of our souls the great masters who have been the familiar spirits of our forefathers; and, while we have been wrapt in self-complacent admiration of the spiritual vacuum which we have discovered how to make, a Tropical African spirit of music and dancing and statuary has made an unholy alliance with a pseudo-Byzantine spirit of painting and bas-relief, and has entered in to dwell in a house that it has found empty and swept and garnished.² The decline which betrays itself in this revolutionary change in aesthetic taste is not technical but is spiritual. In repudiating our own native Western tradition of art and thereby reducing our aesthetic faculties to a state of inanition and sterility in which they seize upon the exotic and primitive art of Dahomey and Benin as though this were manna in the wilderness, we are confessing before all men that we have forfeited our spiritual birthright. Our abandonment of our traditional artistic technique is manifestly the consequence of some kind of spiritual breakdown in our Western Civilization; and the cause of this breakdown evidently cannot be found in a phenomenon which is one of the subsequent symptoms.

The recent abandonment of the Arabic Alphabet by the Turks in favour of the Latin Alphabet is to be explained on the same lines, *mutatis mutandis*. The notion that this change has been made because the adult generation of Turks has been finding the Arabic Alphabet hard to read and write and the Latin Alphabet easy cannot possibly be entertained by any alien observer who has had occasion, since 1928, to watch Turks who have been brought up on the Arabic Alphabet attempting to do their business with the Latin

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 299-300 and 341-50, above.

² Matt. xii. 43-5; Luke xi. 24-6.

substitute. It is patent that they find the Latin Alphabet not only ugly but clumsy by comparison with their own (and, indeed, the Arabic cursive, in the hands of a master, is so far superior to our Latin cursive in brevity and fluency that a community which employs the Arabic Alphabet finds no need for the use of short-hand).

It has, of course, been one of the official arguments of President Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk that a new generation of Turkish children, starting with a clean slate, will be able to make itself literate in the non-cursive Latin Alphabet with considerably less expenditure of time and energy than is required for the mastering of the Arabic Alphabet with its Protean letters which change their form in accordance with their positions and their ligatures;¹ and the older generation has been exhorted to sacrifice its own convenience for the sake of smoothing the way in Turkey for the advent of universal education. Yet the assumption, underlying this argument, that the key to literacy is the character of the script, and that when the script is simplified there will be a corresponding rise in the percentage of literates in the population, is not borne out by an empirical survey. In Japan, for example, the percentage of illiterates in the population in A.D. 1923 was as low as 0.94, notwithstanding the fact that the script in use was the incomparably complicated Sinic legion of characters—and this in a specially confusing Japanese usage, in which some characters are employed as syllabic phonograms while others are employed concurrently as ideograms in the original Sinic manner. On the other hand, in Portugal the percentage of illiterates in A.D. 1911 was as high as 68.9, and in Mexico in A.D. 1925 as high as 62.0, in spite of the fact that the relatively simple Latin Alphabet was the script in use in both these countries.² These facts militate against the argument which was officially put forward in Turkey in A.D. 1928. Yet, in a sense, this is beside the point; for the positive consideration of practical utility for the education of the rising generation of Turkish children was not, perhaps, the strongest motive in the mind of the statesman at whose fiat the change of alphabet was carried out.

The strongest motive for this change in Turkey would appear to have been the negative consideration that the historical Ottoman Turkish literature, and the classical Persian and Arabic literature which was a part of the Ottoman cultural heritage from the latest phase of the 'apparented' Syriac Civilization, were no longer worth

¹ The Arabic Alphabet, of course, differs from the Latin Alphabet in being a cursive script exclusively. If there were a form of the Arabic Alphabet in which the letters were separate, never varied in shape, and represented vowels besides consonants, then the Arabic Alphabet would be no more difficult than the Latin; and, conversely, if the sole form of the Latin Alphabet were the cursive in which the present writer is at this moment writing this note on the margin of his sheet, the Latin Alphabet would be just as difficult as the Arabic.

² See Toynbee and Boulter, *op. cit.*, p. 219, footnote 3.

54 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS preserving, and that it was therefore useless for the Turkish people in these latter days to retain their mastery of the Arabic Alphabet, which was chiefly valuable as a key to this ancient cultural treasure-house.¹ In other words, the old Ottoman Civilization had declined, by the year A.D. 1928, to a point at which, in the eyes of the Turks themselves—or, at any rate, of their active leaders—it had ceased to be worth while to master the script in which the literary heritage of this decadent civilization was preserved. Thus it was the decline in the Ottoman Civilization that led to a deliberate abandonment of its traditional script, and not the loss of skill to read and write the Arabic Alphabet that sped the Ottoman Civilization on its downward course.

This account of the causal relation between the decline of the Ottoman Civilization and the abandonment of the Arabic Alphabet by the Ottoman Turks in A.D. 1928 applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the contemporary moves in favour of abandoning the Sinic script in Japan and China, and likewise to the historic abandonment of the cuneiform script by the Babylonians in the last century B.C., and of the hieroglyphic and demotic scripts by the Egyptians between the third and the fifth century of the Christian Era.² We may take it that there was no loss of technical command over the traditional scripts in the Babylonian or in the Egyptian World at these respective dates; that the abandonment of those scripts was not involuntary but was deliberate; and that this was a consequence and not a cause of the decline of the civilization in question in either case.

A particularly interesting example of a similar substitution of one technique for another in a different subdivision of the artistic field is the abandonment of the traditional Hellenic style of architecture in favour of the new-fangled Byzantine style in the Hellenic World between the fourth and the seventh century of the Christian Era. For in this case the architects of a society which was by this time *in articulo mortis* were abandoning the unusually simple architectural schema of architrave on column in order to experiment in the unusually difficult problem of crowning a cruciform building with a circular dome. Is it credible that the Ionian architects who triumphantly solved this problem for the Emperor Justinian³ would have been technically incompetent to build a

¹ For this motive see further V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 112-13, below.

² The latest known example of the use of the demotic script dates from A.D. 476; but the Coptic script—which was an adaptation of the Greek Alphabet for the purpose of conveying the vernacular language of the age—was already prevalent in the third century of the Christian Era, and in the fourth century the hieroglyphic script was already out of use—if we may make this inference from the fanciful interpretations given to hieroglyphic characters by a fourth-century Egyptian adept in occultism, Hōrapollōn (see Jensen, H.: *Geschichte der Schrift* (Hanover 1925, Lafaire), pp. 48-9).

³ For Anthemius of Tralles and Isidorus of Miletus see IV. C (i), p. 21, above.

replica of the Parthenon, if that had been the autocrat's will—and theirs?

In this case it is clear that the old architecture was abandoned for a new architecture because the old civilization, of which the old architecture was part and parcel, had declined by this time to so low a degree that it seemed no longer possible, within its traditional framework, to perform any fresh act of creation in any field of activity. In the field of architecture the attractiveness of the new Byzantine style in the eyes of a Justinian and an Anthemius was probably due to the very fact that this Byzantine style presented the greatest contrast to the Hellenic style that was well conceivable. The Hellenic architecture was a structure of straight lines and flat surfaces meeting at right-angles; the Byzantine architecture was a structure of curves and cupolas. The Hellenic temple looked outwards towards an assembly in the open air; the Byzantine church looked inwards towards a congregation in the interior. The Haghia Sophia was the monumental protest of a generation which could no longer find inspiration in the Parthenon or in any of those things for which the Parthenon stood.¹ In building an Haghia Sophia instead of a Parthenon, Anthemius was doing, in essence, what a Synesius or a Sidonius Apollinaris was doing when he became a bishop instead of remaining just a cultivated country gentleman, or an Augustine when he became a bishop instead of remaining just a professor of rhetoric, or an Ambrose or a Gregory the Great when he became a bishop instead of remaining just an Imperial official. In each of these cases a creative personality was breaking his way out of his hereditary social framework, in which his creative powers had been baulked, and was setting himself into a new framework in which these powers were offered an outlet.²

No doubt this is also the story of those Egyptian scribes of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries who gave up copying the Book of the Dead in the Egyptiac script and in a traditional form of the Egyptian language, in which their predecessors had been copying the same ritual *vade mecum* for the past two thousand years,³ in order to copy a vernacular Coptic version of the Christian

¹ The substitution of the Haghia Sophia for the Parthenon was the architectural counterpart of the substitution of the cataphract for the legionary. (For this see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 162-4, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), in the present volume, pp. 439-45, below.)

² For the lives of Synesius and Sidonius see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 165-6; for the life of Saint Gregory the Great see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 267-9, above.

³ The elements out of which the Book of the Dead was put together were current as early as the sixteenth century B.C., though there was no canonical redaction before the fourth century B.C. (Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), p. 293). The Classical Egyptian that was a legacy of the Old Kingdom was ousted by New Egyptian, as a vehicle of polite literature, in the fourteenth century B.C., in and after the reign of Ikhnaton (*imperabat circa 1370-1352 B.C.*) (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), vol. v, p. 496, and V. C (i) (d), § (y), vol. vi, p. 62, footnote 1, below).

Scriptures in an adaptation of the Greek Alphabet. Certainly this is the story of the Chinese student of our generation who abandons the study of the Confucian Classics among the litterati of Peking or Loyang in order to study the Western technique of civil engineering or the Western theory of economics and politics in Chicago or in London. Is it also the story of this Chinese student's Western contemporary who abandons the rhythms and tones of Bach and Beethoven and the lines and colours of Botticelli and Leonardo for the music of Darkest Africa and for a pseudo-Byzantine depiction of 'Anglo-Saxon attitudes'?

The upshot of our present investigation seems to be that the abandonment of a traditional artistic style, so far from being a possible cause of the breakdown of the particular civilization to which this style belongs, is actually an indication that the breakdown of this civilization has long since passed into a decline and is now culminating in a dissolution.¹ When we see a creative spirit abandoning the traditional style of his society in any field of artistic activity and seizing upon some exotic style instead, we may suspect that the world on which he is turning his back is 'a city of destruction' which is about to suffer the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah or, in Platonic language, to 'founder in the fathomless gulf where all things are incommensurable'.² As the foundering ship quivers before her final plunge, the intrepid seaman who has the will to live refuses to stay cowering on board in order to be sucked under with the sinking vessel. Before it is too late, he dives into the water and swims away with all his might from the fast settling gunwale in the hope of finding some drifting spar or cruising catamaran that will bring him—strange passenger on untried craft—alive to his journey's end.

(b) THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

1. 'The Triumph of Barbarism and Religion'?

If loss of command over the physical environment, as measured by the history of technique, proves not to be a cause of the breakdowns of civilizations, we have still to consider whether a loss of command over the human environment may be the cause of which we are in search.

The significance of a command over the human environment has also engaged our attention when we have been studying the growths of civilizations at an earlier point in this work. We have

¹ In III. C (iii), vol. iii, pp. 378-80, above, we have already come to the conclusion that the test afforded by artistic style is the surest as well as the subtlest index of the temporal as well as the spatial extension of a civilization.

² See the passage from the *Politicus* which is quoted in IV. C (i), on pp. 26-7, above.

seen that the degree of command over the human environment which is possessed by any given society at any given stage in its history can be measured, for practical purposes, in terms of geographical expansion; and we have found, on an empirical test, that a good case can be made out for a correlation of geographical expansion, not with social growth, but on the contrary with social disintegration.¹ This inductive conclusion is supported by two *a priori* considerations. In the first place, one of the commonest forms in which the breakdown of a civilization declares itself is an outbreak of fratricidal warfare between the states members of the society; and if ever the children of the household pause for a moment from their self-imposed task of self-destruction in order to turn their arms against outsiders, it is likely enough that the improvements in the art of war which they have been making at the price of their own blood will purchase them a wide dominion over their neighbours.² The second and more fundamental consideration which makes it probable, *a priori*, that a widely and rapidly expanding society will prove to be also a disintegrating society arises from the fact that the social radiation of a society into the life of alien bodies social attains its greatest penetrative power when the different elements in the radiating society are being radiated separately: the economic elements penetrating in the van, the political elements following in the next wave of attack, and the cultural elements—which are the essence of a civilization—bringing up the rear in order to occupy and organize the captured ground. The diffraction of a civilization's social rays into these separate beams of different quality and different wave-lengths is one of the consequences of a civilization's social breakdown and disintegration. So long as a civilization is in the growth stage, all its elements cohere to constitute an indivisible whole, and the civilization radiates abroad either in its totality or not at all. Since the radiation of a civilization in its totality is hard and rare, any manifestation of violent radiative activity is an indication *prima facie*—though not, of course, a proof—that the civilization in question has broken down and begun to disintegrate already.³

If this concordance of *a priori* considerations with empirical evidence gives good ground for the belief that an increase in command over the human environment, as measured in terms of geographical expansion, is a consequence and symptom of breakdown and decline, then it seems extremely improbable that the cause of this self-same breakdown and decline is to be found in the precisely

¹ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, especially pp. 139-53, above.

² For this consideration see III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 150-1, above.

³ For this consideration see III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 151-2, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 199-201, below.

inverse tendency—a tendency, that is to say, towards a decrease in command over the human environment, as measured by a successful encroachment of alien human forces. Nevertheless the view has been widely held that civilizations, like primitive societies, commonly lose their lives by violence, as the result of successful assaults upon them on the part of external human powers.¹ And a classic exposition of this view, worked out empirically in a particularly celebrated example, is given by Edward Gibbon in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. The theme is declared in the single sentence in which Gibbon sums up his story in retrospect: 'I have described the triumph of Barbarism and Religion'.² The Hellenic Society, embodied in a Roman Empire which was at its zenith in the Age of the Antonines, is represented as having been overthrown by a simultaneous assault from two alien enemies attacking on two different fronts: the North European barbarians issuing out of the no-man's-land beyond the Imperial frontiers along the Rhine and the Danube, and the Christian Church emerging from the subjugated but never assimilated Oriental provinces.

The key to this interpretation of the Decline and Fall is given in the famous opening passage of Gibbon's work in which he enunciates the plot of his drama by painting a magnificent picture of the Empire in the Antonine Age and then presaging its fall—without yet disclosing the identities of the villains of the piece:

'In the second century of the Christian Aera the empire of Rome comprehended the fairest part of the Earth and the most civilised portion of Mankind. The frontiers of that extensive monarchy were guarded by ancient renown and disciplined valour. The gentle, but powerful, influence of laws and manners had gradually cemented the union of the provinces. Their peaceful inhabitants enjoyed and abused the advantages of wealth and luxury. The image of a free constitution was preserved with decent reverence. The Roman senate appeared to possess the sovereign authority, and devolved on the emperors all the executive powers of government. During a happy period of more than fourscore years the public administration was conducted by the virtue and abilities of Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian and the two Antonines. It is the design of this and of the two succeeding chapters to describe the prosperous condition of their empire; and afterwards, from the death of Marcus Antoninus, to deduce the most important circumstances of its decline and fall: a revolution which will ever be remembered, and is still felt by the nations of the Earth.'³

¹ This is, no doubt, the most common way in which primitive societies, in contrast to civilizations, do lose their lives. (On this point see I. C (iii) (a), vol. i, pp. 148-9, above.)

² Gibbon, op. cit., chap. lxxi (already quoted in this Study in I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 42, above).

³ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. i, *init.*

Whenever the writer of this Study reads this masterpiece of Edward Gibbon's art, there rises up before his mind's eye a vision of the Connecticut Valley as he once saw it, late in the Fall, on a visit to Amherst. As he drove through the woods in the valley bottom, every leaf was still intact in its place, and every leaf had turned pure crimson or pure gold. Nor did the course of his journey prevent him from seeing the wood for the trees; for, as the car began to climb the hills by which the valley is bounded, the widening horizon showed that the beauty of detail was trivial compared with the beauty of the whole. As we paused at the highest point, we looked back over miles and miles of golden and crimson woodland spread out below us. The sky was clear blue, without a cloud; the sun was in power and glory; the air was bathed in golden light; and it seemed to be passing on this gift to the leaves, though these hardly needed any enhancement of their natural brilliance. The whole landscape made an overwhelming impression of tranquil splendour. Here, surely, was 'a thing of beauty' which could not pass but was destined to remain to be 'a joy for ever'.

I do not know whether my New Englander companion had read my thoughts and was breaking in upon them purposely when, at this moment, abruptly, he began to tell me which roads would be left derelict for the winter, and which would be kept open by a service of motor snow-ploughs when the ground would be snow-covered and the boughs all bare some two months hence. To me, who was seeing for the first time what I was seeing that day, and who had never lived in New England through the whole round of the seasons, this prosaic announcement of the imminence of winter was incredible. But my companion's native eyes were not deceived by the beauty that had dazzled mine. He knew that this was not the summer, and not the spring *a fortiori*. It was 'the Indian Summer', whose brief splendour celebrates, not the Promethean *élan* of Life, but the inexorable onset of Mortality. *Morituri te salutamus* was the silent declaration of the leaves which now wore those brilliant colours in place of the living green. Under sentence of death they hung on their boughs but hung by a thread. One breath of wind, one touch of frost, and they would drop, blackened and crumpled, to the ground. With my inexperienced eye I had not understood the true meaning of the spectacle which had taken my breath away and captivated my imagination.

Was not Gibbon the victim of some such illusion as this on that notable evening of the 15th October, 1764, when his magnificent vision of the Age of the Antonines rose up in his mind and inspired him to write as he 'sat musing amidst the ruins of the Capitol while the barefooted fryars were singing Vespers in the Temple of

Jupiter'?¹ For was not the Age of the Antonines 'the Indian Summer' of Hellenic history? To a Western historian who finds himself musing and writing in the fourth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era amidst the ruins of the Western World of Gibbon's day,² the colour and atmosphere of the Antonine Age, as Gibbon has painted it in his incomparable opening passage, is poignantly suggestive of a long-drawn-out decay and a fast approaching dissolution—like that autumn gold and crimson of the New England woods or like the rainbow hues of spilt petrol or disinterred Roman glass. Thanks to a wider knowledge and a deeper insight that do not spring from any merits of his own, but have been conferred on him by the historical accident of the date of his birth, the twentieth-century Western historian can perhaps read more clearly than the greatest of his eighteenth-century predecessors the signs of the times on the impressive face of that magnificent Antonine landscape. As the New Englander, when confronted once more in due season with the autumn colours of the Connecticut Valley, was insensible to the impressions of an English stranger because his native eyes well knew these intimations of Mortality for what they were, so the twentieth-century Western observer of a second-century Hellenic landscape will not allow himself to be captivated by the hallucination of an eighteenth-century man-of-letters. So far from acquiescing in the judgement of Gibbon, he will be readier to view the World of the Antonines through the penetrating eyes of contemporaries who saw below the surface and staked their lives on their confidence in the truth of their vision. And this true contemporary vision is conjured up in a sermon preached in commemoration of two Christian heroes of that ostensibly golden age by the spiritual pastor of a Rome which, in the meantime, had passed out of a second-century 'Indian Summer' into a sixth-century winter.

'To-day,' Saint Gregory the Great³ once declared to his flock, 'there is on every side death, on every side grief, on every side desolation; on every side we are being smitten, on every side our cup is being filled with draughts of bitterness. . . . [On the other hand] those saints at

¹ *The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon*, edited by Murray, J. (London 1896, Murray), p. 302. For Gibbon's inspiration see further Part XIII, below.

² Gibbon himself just lived to see the beginning of a chapter of Western history which is perhaps coming to its tragic climax in our day. He had barely completed the last volume of his *magnum opus* when the tranquillity of his retreat at Lausanne was rudely disturbed by the first reverberations of a thunderstorm which broke over France. The outbreak of the French Revolution evidently shook Gibbon to the core. With the intuition of a great historian he seems to have divined the magnitude of the disturbance. What would he have felt if he had lived to see the sequel? For this latter-day relapse of the Western World, after an eighteenth-century lull, into a violence which had been the note of its seventeenth-century and sixteenth-century courses, see IV. C (iii) (b) 3 and 4, pp. 141-85, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 315-9, below.

³ For the life-work of Saint Gregory the Great see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 267-9, above.

whose tomb we are now standing lived in a world that was flourishing, yet they trampled upon its material prosperity with their spiritual contempt. In that world life was long, well-being was continuous, there was material wealth, there was a high birth-rate, and there was the tranquillity of a lasting peace; and yet, when that world was still so flourishing in itself, it had already withered (*aruerat*) in the hearts of those saints.¹

To the mind of a latter-day Western historian who is living, like Gregory, in a wintry age, the severe verdict of the sixth-century Roman saint on the Age of the Antonines will probably carry greater weight than the indulgent appraisal of the eighteenth-century English philosopher. For the hearts in which the World of the Antonines had withered underneath its brilliant surface were not only those of a Christian minority who had laid up their treasure elsewhere. It had also withered in the hearts of a pagan majority, from a Marcus encumbered by his purple to a Lucius hide-bound in his ass's skin; and these hearts knew a deeper bitterness because they held the key to no other treasure-house than a Hellenism which had wrinkled into a hollow shell.

The degree of Gibbon's hallucination is betrayed by the very title of his great work. *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire!* The author of a history that bears this name is surely beginning his narrative at a point which is very near the end of the actual story; for the Roman Empire itself was a monumental symptom of the far-advanced decline of a Hellenic Society of which this empire was the universal state. When the whole story is taken into account, the rapid downfall of the Empire after the Antonine Age is seen to be not at all surprising. On the contrary, it would have been surprising if the Empire had endured; for this empire was already doomed before it was established. It was doomed because its establishment was nothing but a rally² which could delay, but not permanently arrest, the already irretrievable ruin of a Hellenic Society which the Roman Empire temporarily embodied.³

The breakdown and disintegration of the Hellenic Society itself is the story in which Gibbon would have found a subject altogether

¹ Saint Gregory the Great: *Homiliae Quadraginta in Evangelia*, No. xxviii (Migne, J. P.: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. lxxvi, col. 1212).

² For the movement of Rally-and-Relapse which punctuates the disintegrations of civilizations, see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 278-321, below.

³ In defence of Gibbon (if it is not sheer impertinence to offer any defence at all for a historian who is so great a master of his art) it may be mentioned that Gibbon's interpretation of the Age of the Antonines was anticipated by at least one distinguished observer who lived and wrote in that age itself. The passage from Gibbon's pen which has been quoted above may be compared with the Introduction to the *Studies in Roman History* of Appian of Alexandria (*vixit circa* A.D. 90-160). Yet Gibbon—had his eyes been opened by the spectacle of a Western World in its Post-Gibbonian Age—might have taken another cue from an Apuleius or a Lucian. On the pages of these two Antonine writers the brilliant colours of 'the Indian Summer' unmistakably reveal themselves—for those who have eyes to see—as the hectic flush on the cheeks of a patient who is dying of a galloping consumption.

worthy of his genius; and if he had set himself to tell this longer tale from the beginning, he would have found that 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion' was not the plot of the play, but only an epilogue—not a cause of the breakdown, but only an inevitable accompaniment of the dissolution in which the long process of disintegration was bound to end. More than that, he would have found that the triumphant Church and Barbarians were not, after all, external powers, but were really children of the Hellenic household who had been morally alienated from the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society in the course of a 'Time of Troubles' which had intervened between a Periclean breakdown and an Augustan rally.¹ In fact, if Gibbon had carried his inquest back to the true beginning of the tragedy, he would have had to return a different verdict. He would have had to report that the Hellenic Society was a suicide who had attempted to undo the fatal results of his own self-immolation when his life was already past saving, and who eventually received a *coup de grâce* from his own mis-handled and alienated children at a time when the Augustan rally had already given way to a third-century relapse and the patient was manifestly dying from the after-effects of his old self-inflicted wounds.²

In these circumstances the historian-coroner would certainly not concentrate his attention upon the epilogue, but would employ all his mental energy and acumen in attempting to determine exactly when and how and why the suicide had first laid violent hands upon himself. In prospecting for the date, he would probably lay his finger upon the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C.—a social catastrophe which was anathematized at the time, by one of the actors in the exordium of the tragedy, as 'a beginning of great evils for Hellas'.³ In reporting upon how the members of the Hellenic Society perpetrated their monstrous crime—a crime against the cause for which they, and their civilization with them, had come into the World⁴—the coroner would probably lay equal emphasis upon the twin abominations of interstate war and inter-class war which, doubtless unintentionally but none the less effectively, set up a process of 'inverse selection': 'die Ausrottung der Besten', in the terrible but unanswerable and unforgettable phrase of one of Gibbon's successors who has

¹ For the roles of the Church and the Barbarians as 'the internal proletariat' and 'the external proletariat' of the disintegrating society see I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-1, and I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-62, above, as well as V. C (i) (c) 2 and 3, *passim*, in vol. v, pp. 58-337, below.

² On this point see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53 and 62, above.

³ Melesippus, Diacritus's son, the Spartan, as reported by Thucydides in Book II, chap. 12.

⁴ John xviii. 37.

ventured to re-open the case and to probe more deeply into its origins.¹

Though the twenty-seven years' war of 431-404 B.C. was only the first chapter in a 'Time of Troubles' which lasted for four hundred years before it was brought to a close by the establishment of a two-hundred-years-long *Pax Augusta*, the two terrible social evils that were let loose in this social breakdown were already out of hand, and already producing their fatal fruits, before this first chapter was over. The new spirit of atrocity which was inspiring inter-state warfare is exemplified in the treatment of the Melians by the Athenians in 416 B.C. and in the treatment of the survivors of the Athenian expeditionary force by the Syracusans in 413 B.C. and in the cold-blooded massacre of the Athenian prisoners-of-war after the Battle of Aegospotami in 404 B.C. The advent of the same evil spirit in the relations between social classes is exemplified in the murderous faction-fights by which the Corcyraeans disgraced themselves in 427-425 B.C.² On this showing, there is really no need to pursue the argument that the Hellenic Society did not receive its mortal blow in the Post-Antoine Age at the hands of the Christians and the Barbarians. The mortal blow was delivered at least six hundred years earlier, and the hand that dealt it was the victim's own.³ We are still confronted with the question why the victim was overtaken by a suicidal mania of this kind at this time; and the positive answer still eludes us; but we have at least arrived at the negative conclusion that the verdict must be one of suicide and not one of murder.

If we now extend our inquest from the case of the Hellenic Society to the cases of the other undoubtedly dead or apparently moribund civilizations, we shall find that the same verdict has manifestly to be returned in a number of other instances.

For example, in the decline and fall of the Sumeric Society, 'the Golden Age of Hammurabi'⁴ represents an even later phase of 'the Indian Summer' than we see in the Age of the Antonines; for

¹ 'Die Ausrottung der Besten' is the title of Part II, chap. 2, in vol. i of Otto Seeck's *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt* (4th edition, Stuttgart 1921, Metzler, 6 vols. with supplements).

² See Thucydides, Book III, chaps. 70-85, and Book IV, chaps. 46-8.

³ The long-drawn-out self-destruction of the Hellenic Society during the four centuries that intervened between the year 431 B.C. and the year 31 B.C. might well be described in the language of Herodotus's gruesome account of the suicide of the first King Cleomenes of Sparta, a man of genius who went out of his mind. Having obtained possession of a knife, 'Cleomenes began to mutilate himself from the calves of his legs upwards. He slit up his flesh lengthwise; and, beginning with his calves, he went on to his thighs, and then from his thighs to his hips and flanks, until finally he reached his stomach and found his death in slashing his stomach into ribbons' (Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 75). There is no redeeming feature in this protracted form of *hara-kiri*.

⁴ This is the title of chapter xiv of volume i of *The Cambridge Ancient History*. It may be conjectured that the title of the chapter was chosen, and that the exposition of the subject was determined, under the influence of Gibbon's presentation of the Age of the Antonines.

Hammurabi is not the Trajan nor even the Marcus Aurelius of Sumeric history, but its Diocletian or its Constantine; and in this age the decadent society is like the New England forest after the first of the winter storms has come and gone without shaking down all the brilliant leaves at one fell swoop or leaving yet a permanent pall of snow upon the ground. Accordingly we shall not identify the slayers of the Sumeric Civilization with the trans-frontier barbarians who descended upon 'the Kingdom of the Four Quarters' in the eighteenth century B.C.: the Aryas who swept across the Land of Shinar into Syria, or the Hittites who sacked Babylon in a transitory raid,¹ or the Kassites who crawled upon the carrion. We shall detect the fatal strokes in certain events that had occurred some nine hundred years earlier: the class-war between Urukagina of Lagash and the local priesthood, and the militarism of Urukagina's destroyer Lugalzaggisi of Erech (Uruk) and Umma; for these far-off catastrophes were the authentic beginning of the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles'.²

Similarly, in the decline and fall of the Minoan Society, we seem to detect the material evidence of an Antonine 'Indian Summer' in 'the Palace Style' of the age which our archaeologists have labelled 'Late Minoan II';³ and we shall not lay the destruction of the Minoan Civilization to the charge of the Central European barbarians who swept over the Aegean in the immediately subsequent age which bears the archaeological label 'Late Minoan III'.⁴ In attempting to reconstruct the history of the Minoan Civilization out of our archaeological materials, we shall conjecture that 'the thalassocracy of Minos', which was the Minoan universal state, corresponds to the archaeological strata called 'Middle Minoan III' and 'Late Minoan I' and 'Late Minoan II'; that this universal state, like others, was the outward and visible sign of a social rally after a 'Time of Troubles'; and that the culmination of this 'Time of Troubles' is marked by the archaeologically attested destruction of the first palaces at Cnossos and Phaestus at the end of 'Middle Minoan II', a catastrophe which we may tentatively ascribe to the

¹ In I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 111, above, the Hittite war-lord Mursil I's raid on Babylon has been dated circa 1750 B.C. on the strength of Meyer, E.: *Die Aeltere Chronologie Babyloniens, Assyriens und Aegyptens* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1925, Cotta), pp. 5 and 25. On the other hand Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, Renaissance du Livre), p. 64, dates the raid circa 1800 B.C.

² See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, above.

³ This suggestion may perhaps offer a means of reconciling the at first sight incompatible interpretations of the archaeological evidence of L.M. II which are given by G. Glotz in *La Civilisation Egéenne* (Paris 1923, Renaissance du Livre), p. 53, and by M. P. Nilsson in *Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion* (London 1927, Milford), p. 27. For this discrepancy of interpretation see I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 93, footnote 4, above.

⁴ In the chronology on pp. 28-31 of Glotz, op. cit., L.M. II is dated 1450-1400 B.C. and L.M. III 1400-1200 B.C.

evil spirit of a fratricidal inter-state warfare.¹ It will be seen that the breakdown of the Minoan Civilization must be dated at least 500 years, and probably a longer span of years than that, before the Achaeans and the 'Dorians' appeared upon the scene.

In the decline and fall of the Sinic Society 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion' is represented by the foundation of Eurasian Nomad barbarian 'successor-states'² of the Sinic universal state³ in the basin of the Yellow River at the turn of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era, and by the simultaneous invasion of the interior of the Sinic World by the Mahayanian form of Buddhism, which was one of the religions of the internal proletariat of the Sinic Society in the outlying western provinces which it had conquered from the Indic World in the Tarim Basin.⁴ But these victories, like those of the North European barbarians and the Christian Church at the Hellenic Society's expense, were only the victories of the moribund society's own external and internal proletariats. There was no conquest of the Sinic World by any wholly alien forces at any stage in the Sinic decline and fall; and the victories of the Sinic proletariat over the dominant minority by whom the universal state had been founded and preserved were the last chapter in the whole story. The Sinic universal state itself was the institutional embodiment of a social rally after a 'Time of Troubles' in which the Sinic body social had been torn in pieces by an internecine fratricidal warfare between the parochial states into which the society had once been articulated; and 'the Period of the Contending States' (*Chan Kuo*), which ended with Ts'in She Hwang-ti's knock-out blow in 221 B.C., unquestionably began long before 479 B.C., which has been taken as the conventional opening date for this period of Sinic history simply because it is the traditional date of the death of Confucius. This fratricidal warfare must already have inflicted cruel wounds upon the Sinic body social by

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 92, footnote 3, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 236, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 312, below.

² See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 272-3, V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, p. 356, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (a), vol. v, p. 465, below.

³ The Sinic universal state was the empire which was founded in 221 B.C. by Ts'in She Hwang-ti, which was carried on by the Prior and Posterior Han, and which was ephemerally restored by the Western or United Ts'in (*imperabant* A.D. 280-317), after having fallen apart into the indigenous 'successor-states' called 'the Three Kingdoms'.

⁴ The Mahāyāna is said to have made its first lodgement in the Sinic World in the seventh decade of the first century of the Christian Era—the traditional date of the foundation of the first Buddhist monastery at Loyang—but it did not begin to gain a hold upon the people until the third century. In this connexion it may be observed that the Sinic reconquest of the Tarim Basin was begun by Pan Chao, the general of the Posterior Han, in A.D. 73, almost simultaneously with the conquest of NW. India by the Kushan Power from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin. Thereafter there was constant intercourse, sometimes hostile but also sometimes friendly, between the Empire of the Han and the Empire of the Kushan for about a hundred years; and this helps to explain the subsequent religious development in the Far East; for the Kushan Empire seems to have been the political crucible in which the Mahayanian form of Buddhism was precipitated. The rise and spread of the Mahāyāna are examined further in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 133-46, below.

the time when fourteen states held a disarmament conference in 546 B.C. and sought to ensure the maintenance of peace by arranging for a joint hegemony of the two Great Powers of Tsin and Ch'u over the league of the central *Kleinstaaten* which was the heart of the Sinic World.¹ Perhaps the beginning of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' may be dated from the outbreak of the first great war for hegemony between Tsin and Ch'u in 634 B.C.²—and this was more than 900 years before 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion' was consummated.

In the decline and fall of the Indic Society 'the Indian Summer' was manifestly 'the Golden Age of the Guptas' (*imperabant circa* A.D. 375–475),³ which was followed immediately by the devastating triumph of the Eurasian Nomad barbarian Hun and Gurjara invaders. But in this case the religion of the Indic internal proletariat, which shared the barbarians' triumph, was not an alien power at all, but was the wholly indigenous religion of Hinduism,⁴ while the Hun invasion of India in the fifth century of the Christian Era was separated in time from the original breakdown of the Indic Civilization not only by the whole duration of the Indic universal state and of the foregoing 'Time of Troubles', but also by the Timespan of the Hellenic intrusion upon the Indic World—an intrusion which intervened between the establishment of the Gupta Empire *circa* A.D. 375 and the fall of the Maurya Empire (which had been the first avatar of the Indic universal state) in 185 B.C.⁵ The fratricidal warfare between parochial states which preceded the foundation of the Maurya Empire was already in full swing by the time at which we catch our first rare glimpses of Indic history in the seventh century B.C.⁶ The event which marks the original break-

¹ See Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920–1, Geuthner, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 135; Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), pp. 347–8; and Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 170–2. The covenant of 546 B.C. was broken by Ch'u in 538 B.C. (For the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' see further V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 291–5, below).

² In this round of the struggle for hegemony between these two Powers, Tsin inflicted a heavy defeat on Ch'u in 632 B.C. For this catastrophe see Hirth, F.: *The Ancient History of China* (New York 1908, Columbia University Press), pp. 210 and 216; Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 165. This war lasted from 634 to 628 B.C. In the next round Ch'u took its revenge for the reverse of 632 B.C. by inflicting a comparable defeat on Tsin in 597 B.C.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 85, above.

⁴ See Part IX below for the social 'law' that the universal church which is created by the internal proletariat of a disintegrating society is apt to draw its inspiration exclusively from sources that are indigenous to that society if the normal process of decline and fall has been interrupted, during the universal state phase, by the intrusion of an alien society (as the decline and fall of the Indic Society was in fact interrupted by the intrusion of the Hellenic Society).

⁵ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86, above. The Hellenic intrusion upon the Indic World is to be dated, not from Alexander's raid in 326–325 B.C., but from Demetrius's invasion *circa* 190 B.C. (more precisely, *circa* 183–182 B.C., according to Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 133).

⁶ See Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 28–30.

down of the Indic Civilization may prove, if ever we identify it, to date from before the year 700 B.C.—that is to say, from a time more than 1,100 years earlier than the advent of the Huns.

As for the Syriac Society, which enjoyed its 'Indian Summer' under the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, and which saw 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion' in the invasions of the Eurasian Nomad barbarian Turks and Mongols and in the captivity of these savage conquerors by the indigenous religion of Islam—we may observe that the Syriac, like the Indic, decline and fall was drawn out to an exceptional length by a Hellenic intrusion which lasted, in this case, little short of a thousand years (if we reckon up the span of time that intervened between the conquests of Alexander the Great and the counter-conquests of the Caliph 'Umar).¹ To arrive at the date of the breakdown of the Syriac Civilization, we have to cast our thoughts back, behind the first incarnation of the Syriac universal state in the Achaemenian Empire, into a Syriac 'Time of Troubles' that preceded the establishment of a *Pax Achaemenia* by Cyrus.

What caused the breakdown of a civilization which, during its brief foregoing age of growth, had proved its genius and displayed its vitality in the three immense discoveries of Monotheism and the Alphabet and the Atlantic? At first glance it may seem as though we have stumbled here, at last, upon an authentic instance of a civilization being struck down by the impact of an external human force. Did not the Syriac Civilization break down under the hail of blows with which it was belaboured by an Assyrian militarism in the ninth and eighth and seventh centuries B.C.? This is, no doubt, the first obvious diagnosis; but closer inspection proves it to be mistaken; for, by the time when 'the Assyrian came down like a wolf on the fold', Syria was no longer 'one fold' with 'one shepherd'.² The tenth-century attempt to unite politically, under an Israelite hegemony, the galaxy of Hebrew and Phoenician and Aramaean and Hittite cantons and city-states which lay in the fairway between the Babylonian and the Egyptian World had lamentably failed, and it was the resulting outbreak of Syriac fratricidal warfare that offered the Assyrians their opportunity and tempted them to take it. The ignominious defeat of King Shalmaneser III by a partial and ephemeral combination of Syriac forces at the Battle of Qarqar in 853 B.C.³ shows that the Syriac World could have kept this Assyrian militarism at arm's length if the Syriac statesmanship of the age had taken to heart 'how good and pleasant

¹ For the structure of Syriac history see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 72-84, above.

² John x. 16.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), pp. 468, 473, and 475, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 303, below.

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 a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity'.¹ The breakdown of the Syriac Civilization, like the breakdown of its Hellenic sister, turns out, after all, to have been a case of suicide and not a case of murder. The Syriac peoples had begun their deadly gladiatorial contest among themselves before the Assyrian giant strode into their arena. The breakdown of the Syriac Civilization is to be dated, not from the first crossing of the Euphrates by Asshur-nazirpal II in 876 B.C., but from the evaporation of Solomon's hegemony after that Syriac prince's death *circa* 937 B.C.

If we turn to the history of the decline and fall of Orthodox Christendom, and accept the view that in Orthodox Christian history the role of universal state has been played by the Ottoman Empire,² we shall find rudiments of a post-Ottoman 'triumph of Barbarism' in the abortive attempts of Albanian and Serb and Maniot and Kurdish and Arab tribesmen from the fringes of the Empire to carve out 'successor-states' in the heart of the Empire during the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era. Perceptible, though even slighter, rudiments of a corresponding 'triumph of Religion' are discernible in certain abortive attempts to supplant both the Sunnī Islam of the Ottoman founders of the Empire and the Orthodox Christianity of their subject *ra'iyyeh* by revised or resuscitated versions of Islam which might purport to achieve a synthesis between the two faiths and so to offer a basis of reconciliation on which the deep religious cleavage between Orthodoxy and the Sunnah might perhaps be transcended. The first of these abortive attempts was the militant movement of Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn of Simān, which came to a head in A.D. 1416.³ The second was the propagation of a resuscitated Imāmī Shi'ism by the Safawīs at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era.⁴ The third was the propagation of various alternative revised versions of Islam which were ostensibly Sunnī but esoterically heterodox. The most successful of these was the doctrine and discipline of the Bektāshī Order of Dervishes, which had become so prevalent among the Janissaries by the latter part of the seven-

¹ Psalm cxxxiii. 1. (This poem was written, of course, at least seven hundred years after the time in the ninth century B.C. when the Syriac World, for want of unity, had fallen a prey to the Assyrians.)

² For an exposition of this view see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 298-300, below.

³ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, p. 364, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 111, below. A deeper examination of Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn's movement and its affiliations has been made by Babinger, Fr., in *Der Islam*, vols. xi and xii. A reconciliation and fraternization between Muslims and Christians was one of the principal planks in the Sheykh's platform according to the contemporary Orthodox Christian historian Michael Ducas, chap. 21 (pp. 111-15 in I. Bekker's edition (Bonn 1834, Weber)).

⁴ For the history of this propaganda, and for an explanation of its failure, see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, above.

teenth century of the Christian Era that it seems at this time to have been regarded almost as the established regimental religion, while the attraction which it once exerted upon the impressionable barbarians on the fringes of the Empire is attested by its survival in the present Albanian 'successor-state' of the Ottoman Empire as a relatively large and well-organized sect.¹

In the case in point, of course, nobody will think of suggesting that the propaganda of Hājī Bektāsh and his spiritual successors between the fourteenth and the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, or the Völkerwanderung in which the Albanians overran the Morea during the great Russo-Turkish war of A.D. 1768-74, are to be regarded as the causes of the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization! And this fantastic hypothetical diagnosis of the Orthodox Christian decline and fall may be taken as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole Gibbonian schema of 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion', since the stirrings of Bektāshi faith and of Albanian barbarism in the Ottoman body politic are morphologically true

See Rycaut, Sir Paul: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (first edition; London 1668), Book H, chaps. 12-20, for the religious ferment in the Ottoman Empire in Rycaut's time. The Bektāshi Movement is described in chaps. 12 and 19. These abortive universal churches which attempted to establish themselves within, and on the margin of, the framework of the Ottoman Empire are examined further in V. C. (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 110-11, and V. C. (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 295-6, below. See also Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, H.: *Islamic Society and the West* (Oxford 1939, University Press), vol. i, chaps. 13 and 14:—

'The heterodox Sufism professed by the Bātīni propagandists of earlier centuries had appealed to the Turkish tribesmen, as they first immigrated into the lands of Islam, on account of its latitudinarianism. But the Janissary corps was manned by men in a similar case of more or less compulsory conversion; so the same doctrine, preached now by the Bektāshis, was admirably framed to appeal to them. The Janissaries, as long as they remained a slave corps, were, almost to a man, of Christian origin. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Bektashism has several features of a quasi-Christian character, such as the belief in a Trinity—Allah, Muhammad, and 'Alī—and a belief in the efficacy of confession and absolution. It was a tenet of the whole ultra-Bātīni-Sūfī movement that all religions are equally valid, so that the adoption of such beliefs and practices did not involve any compromise of its original character. Indeed, some of the Christian-like features that Bektashism displayed were common to other branches of the movement. And in the later centuries of Ottoman rule over what had formerly been the Orthodox Christian World, the prevalence of a more or less disguised heterodoxy of this type—outside the actual sphere of Bektashism—among all the lower classes of the Muslim population led to a curious development. The veneration of saints and a belief in the magical efficacy of sites and objects connected with them was perhaps the most marked feature both of Orthodox Christianity and [of] this heterodox Muhammadanism in their more popular forms. It came to pass, consequently, that throughout the Balkans and Asia Minor many saints and shrines were venerated and visited in common by the adherents of both religions. . . .

'It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the relations subsisting between Muslims and Christians during the early centuries of Ottoman rule were much more cordial than they had been under earlier orthodox [Muslim] dynasties, or were to be later, after the Sultans had turned to [Islamic] orthodoxy. Thus in the Ottomans' earliest campaigns they were supported by many Christian allies; and several of the earlier Sultans took Christian princesses to wife. During the invasion of the Balkans, moreover, large numbers of Christians turned Muslim; and though this may not seem to be evidence of good Muslim-Christian relations, it is to some extent so in fact, since it shows that the transition—if we are to judge by the frequency with which it was performed—was less painful at this period than it became later, when Muslim orthodoxy forbade any compromise in belief. Indeed, if this return to, or adoption of, [Islamic] orthodoxy had never occurred, it seems possible that the veneration of shrines in common by the adherents of the two religions might have ended in their sinking their differences and evolving a syncretic faith—a Sufistic Christianity.'

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equivalents of the triumphant conquest of the Roman body politic by the North European barbarians and by the Christian Church.

In the Orthodox Christian case those inquirers who are not prevented by religious or cultural prejudice from perceiving that the Ottoman Empire is the Orthodox Christian universal state will justifiably take it for granted that the Orthodox Christian Civilization must not only have broken down but have also travelled very far along the path of disintegration before it became so weak as to succumb to an Ottoman domination and so sick as to derive social benefit from the bitter medicine of a *Pax Ottomanica*. The unprejudiced student of Orthodox Christian history will recognize, nevertheless, that the *Pax Ottomanica* did perform for Orthodox Christendom the same positive and indispensable social service that was performed for the Hellenic Society by the *Pax Romana* and has been performed for the Hindu Society by the *Pax Britannica*. But this, of course, is not the popular view among the Orthodox Christian peoples and their sentimental Western patrons at the present day. The popular view is that all the historic misfortunes of Orthodox Christendom derive from the Turkish conquest; and this diagnosis has been implicitly accepted by our latter-day Ottoman Turks of the school of President Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk, who have made it their doctrine that the old Ottoman Empire—bound up, as it was, with the old Ottoman Slave-Household—has been an even greater curse to the 'Osmanlis themselves than it has been to their *ci-devant* subjects!¹ As for the descendants of the Ottoman *ra'iyyeh*, however violently they may differ on almost every other question of current politics or past history, our latter-day Greeks and Bulgars (echoed by their attendant Philhellenes and Bulgarophiles) will protest with one voice that their common Orthodox Christian Civilization, in which they each claim the leading role for their own respective forebears, was going from strength to strength,² on a flood tide of life and growth, until the moment when it fell a victim to the brutally aggressive force of Turkish militarism, which is represented as having burst without warning upon the Orthodox Christian World out of some Islamic inferno below the Asiatic horizon.³

¹ For President Mustafâ Kemâl's Atatürk's revolutionary breach with the old Ottoman order see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 48-9, above, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 102 and 112-13, below.

² Psalm lxxxiv. 7.

³ The view that Orthodox Christendom suffered injury from a Turkish militarism in one chapter of its history is not, of course, irreconcilable with the view that, in the next chapter, the stricken society received benefit from a *Pax Ottomanica*. In the Hellenic case, for example, nobody disputes that the Hellenic Society received benefit from the *Pax Romana* during the span of 200 years extending from the principate of Augustus to the principate of Marcus Aurelius inclusive. At the same time, nobody can deny that during the preceding two hundred years, between the outbreak of the Hannibalic War and the Battle of Actium, the role of the Romans in Hellenic history was as destruc-

The modern Greek national historian will probably ascribe the ruin of the Orthodox Christian Civilization to an earlier wave of Turkish aggression than will come within the ken of his Bulgar contemporary and confrère. The Greek will find 'the beginning of evils' for Orthodox Christendom in the invasion of the Anatolian territories of the East Roman Empire by the Saljūq Turks in the third quarter of the eleventh century of the Christian Era. More than that, if our imaginary Greek savant happens to be still inspired by a reminiscence of the old-fashioned Orthodox sentiment that the Pope's tiara is at least as objectionable as the Prophet's turban,¹ and if he has not altogether succumbed to the latter-day Greek vanity of self-identification with 'the enlightened West', he may decide to place the Latins as well as the Turks in the dock. And it is unquestionably true that the first Norman raid upon the East Roman Empire's dominions in Italy in A.D. 1017 preceded the first Saljūq raid upon the Empire's dominions in Anatolia in A.D. 1037 by twenty years, and that the Latin conquest of Constantinople in A.D. 1204 was a greater disaster for the Orthodox Christian Civilization than the Turkish conquest in A.D. 1453. If it were to be taken for granted that the Orthodox Christian Civilization met its death at foreign hands, and that it is merely a question of determining the respective responsibilities of the Turkish and the Latin prisoner at the bar, then a candid Western inquirer might be constrained to admit that his own Latin forebears not only delivered the first blow but were also ahead of their Turkish competitors in striking at their victim's heart. But when we have made the fullest allowance for the Latin share, as well as for the Turkish share, in the murderous assaults of which Orthodox Christendom was the victim from the eleventh century of the Christian Era onwards, are we sure that we have ascertained the true cause of the victim's death? If we pursue our post-mortem examination farther, we shall find unmistakable evidence that the Orthodox Christian Society, like the Syriac Society in a different time and place, had laid violent hands upon itself before either of its reputed assassins appeared upon the scene. The criminal intent of both the Latins and the Turks may have been fully as heinous as is commonly alleged; but there is reason to doubt the effectiveness of their criminal action; for there is reason to believe that the alien body social into which they plunged and replunged their swords was the body of a suicide whose life-blood was already ebbing away through a self-inflicted wound.

tive as that of the Turks in Orthodox Christian history at their worst. It is not only possible, but common, to find the same people or the same individual playing contrary roles in successive acts of the same play.

¹ For the prevalence of this sentiment among the Orthodox in Constantinople on the eve of the capture of the city by the Osmanlis in A.D. 1453 see Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lxviii.

The true date of the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization is marked by a domestic event in Orthodox Christian history which occurred before either the Normans or the Saljūqs had come within range of Orthodox Christendom. The beginning of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles' dates from the outbreak, in A.D. 977, of the great Bulgaro-Roman War of A.D. 977-1019.¹ This internecine struggle between the two Great Powers of the Orthodox Christian World did not come to an end until one of the two belligerents had not only suffered defeat but had been deprived of its political existence. From A.D. 1019 onwards for more than a century and a half, until A.D. 1186, Bulgaria was effaced from the political map by being incorporated completely into the body politic of the East Roman Empire. This enormous political disaster in the life of the second most important state in the Orthodox Christian World was bound to administer a profound shock to the whole Orthodox Christian body social; and the Bulgarian Empire's total loss was not counterbalanced by any gain on the credit side of the East Roman Empire's account; for, in a war so long drawn out between belligerents who were so closely matched, the ostensible victor emerged from the struggle in little better condition than his prostrated opponent.

On the political map the East Roman Empire vastly increased its territorial possessions as a result of the 'knock-out blow' of A.D. 1019. From that year until the successful Bulgarian revolt of A.D. 1186 the domain of the East Roman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula was as extensive as the Roman Empire's domain in the same quarter in the reign of Justinian; but an eye which knew how to read the social and economic map below the ostentatious political surface could have discerned that the military triumph in the Balkans had been purchased by the East Roman Power at the price of a prohibitive sacrifice in Anatolia. The strain of the great Bulgaro-Roman War of A.D. 977-1019 exacerbated a social malady in Central and Eastern Anatolia² which had first become noticeable (to judge by the testimony of East Roman agrarian legislation) during the preceding Bulgaro-Roman War of A.D. 913-27. In this Anatolian region an increasing inequality in the distribution of the ownership and the product of the land was keeping pace with an increasing impoverishment of the whole country-side, with the result that the peasantry and the big landowners were becoming increasingly alienated both from one another and from the East Roman Government at Constantinople, at whose door they not unfairly laid the responsibility for their local distress. The military

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 26, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, pp. 388-93, below.

² For this see further IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 395-9, below.

glory which the Emperor Basil the Bulgar-killer (*ὁ Βουλγαροκτόνος*) was winning by his successful war of attrition against the Empire's formidable sister and adversary in Europe was marred by a succession of insurrections headed by representatives of the East Roman landed aristocracy in Asia.

These outbreaks occurred too frequently, and lasted too long, to be dismissed as the work of unruly or ambitious individuals. They were expressions of the Anatolians' profound economic distress and political discontent, and this exhaustion and disaffection of Eastern and Central Anatolia was a loss which could not be made good by the most extensive conquests in Europe; for the military strength of the Eastern and Central Anatolian army-corps districts was the rock on which the East Roman Empire had been founded by Leo the Syrian three hundred years earlier.¹ In A.D. 1019, at the close of the great Bulgaro-Roman War, the whole of this region in the interior of Anatolia, which had once been the Empire's solid core, was so rotten with social decay that it was ready to fall away at a touch, while the newly acquired provinces in the interior of the Balkan Peninsula, which were socially sound in so far as they had not been devastated by the recent warfare, were being held down only by sheer force.² Thus in A.D. 1019, when the East Roman Empire stretched to the Euphrates in one direction and to the Danube in the other, it was inwardly weaker than it had been in A.D. 716, when its European domain was almost confined to the bridge-head of Constantinople and the enclave of Salonica and when the Arabs were marching across Anatolia to put Constantinople under siege. For in A.D. 716 Leo the Syrian had achieved the master-stroke of East Roman statesmanship which Basil the Bulgar-killer was never able to emulate. Leo had united under his leadership the forces of the Anatolic and Armeniac army-corps; and, with the military strength of Anatolia intact, he could await with equanimity the Arabs' assault upon the Empire's European capital.

This estimate of the difference in the East Roman Empire's inward strength at these respective dates is borne out by the respective sequels to the Arab assault at the one date and the Saljūq assault at the other. When the Arabs were repulsed from the walls of Constantinople in A.D. 717, they ebbed right back from the Bosphorus to the south-eastern foot of the Taurus; and although, for two more centuries, they continued to harry the Anatolian

¹ For Leo's life-work see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 64, footnote 3, and III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 274-6, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, pp. 341-2, below.

² For the eventual transference of the social centre of gravity of the main body of Orthodox Christendom from the Anatolian Peninsula to the Balkan Peninsula see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 65, footnote 2; II. D (iii), vol. ii, p. 79; and Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 27, above.

marches of the Empire in annual raids, they never secured a permanent foot-hold upon the Anatolian Plateau. On the other hand, when the Saljūqs were driven out of their advanced post at Nicaea in A.D. 1097 by the combined forces of the East Romans and the Latin Crusaders, they retired no farther than to Qōnīyah; and they continued to hold their ground in Central Anatolia for a full hundred years during which their principality of Rūm was almost completely encircled by Orthodox or Latin Christian Powers: a temporarily reinvigorated East Roman Empire on the west and north; an Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia; and the Latin Crusader principalities in Syria. In fact, the Turks successfully stood on the defensive in Central Anatolia until, at the close of the twelfth century of the Christian Era, the next relapse in the decline of Orthodox Christendom opened the way for the 'successor-states' of the Anatolian Saljūq Sultanate to make themselves masters of almost all the rest of the Anatolian Peninsula at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the Greeks and Latins had exhausted themselves in a long and bitter struggle for the more spectacular prizes of Constantinople and Salonica. And thus the feat of statesmanship by which one of these 'successor-states'—the Ottoman Turkish principality of Sultān Önū—transformed itself, in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, into the universal state of the Orthodox Christian World, was made possible by the feat of endurance through which, in the twelfth century, the Saljūq Turks had held their ground at Qōnīyah.¹

How was it that the Saljūqs were able to hold out in Central Anatolia when they were so easily driven out of Nicaea and Smyrna? An explanation is suggested by the fact that the area which the East Roman Power failed to recapture from the Saljūqs in the twelfth century substantially coincides with the area which had been afflicted with the malady of economic distress and social discontent during the tenth and eleventh centuries, before the Saljūqs arrived on the scene. Though the social history of this region from the twelfth to the fifteenth century is exceedingly obscure, and has to be reconstructed—in the almost total absence of contemporary evidence—by a comparison of the previous with the subsequent conditions, we may conjecture, with some assurance, that the strength of the Saljūqs in Central Anatolia lay in the support, or at least the passive acquiescence, of the local peasantry. In this region the social effect of the Saljūq conquest had been to release the peasantry from the grievous service of the local landlords and the heavy yoke of the Government at Constantinople as repre-

¹ For the direct action of Challenge-and-Response in the history of the rise of the 'Osmanlis see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 150-4, above.

sented by the recruiting-sergeant and the tax-collector. How could they pray for the restoration of an Orthodox Emperor whose little finger would be thicker than the loins of the Turkish unbeliever?¹ And why, now that they were relieved of the incubus of the landlords and the officials and the bishops, should they continue to practise the Orthodox rite or to cultivate the Greek language? From the twelfth century of the Christian Era onwards the Orthodox Christian peasantry of Central Anatolia turned Muslim *en masse*; and even the minority that remained true to their hereditary faith turned Turk in language.

The descendants of these Central Anatolian Orthodox Christians who survived in their native region, under the name of Qāramānli, until the wholesale compulsory exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey that followed the Anatolian War of 1919-22, had not only come to speak the Turkish of their Muslim neighbours as their own mother tongue; they had so utterly forgotten their ancestral Greek that they had even found it necessary to translate the Liturgy of the Orthodox Church into Turkish,² though liturgies are notoriously the last refuges of dead languages. On the eve of the Anatolian War of 1919-22, which gave the last lingering survival of Orthodox Christendom in Anatolia its *coup de grâce*, the Greek language, which had enjoyed exclusive currency throughout Anatolia from the extinction of the last of the pre-Greek vernaculars in the sixth century of the Christian Era down to the advent of the Turkish language in the eleventh century, was only alive in half a dozen remote villages in the fastnesses of Anti-Taurus and on the extreme southern and south-eastern edges of the Plateau at a distance from the main lines of communication.³ At the opening of the twentieth century these fast dwindling islets of Greek in the heart of a *ci-devant* Greek-speaking region were a happy hunting-ground for the philologist and phonetician, who was able here to catch in the act, and study in the life, the metamorphosis of one living language into another.⁴

We have now perhaps convincingly demonstrated that the original breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization was caused by

¹ 1 Kings xii. 10.

² The Turkish version of the Orthodox Liturgy which was used by the Qāramānli, and the Turkish version of the Gregorian Liturgy which was used by the Armenian 'Diaspora' in Anatolia, were conveyed respectively in the Greek and the Armenian Alphabet and not in the Arabic Alphabet which was employed by the Turkish-speaking Muslims.

³ There was, of course, a much more numerous Greek-speaking Orthodox Christian population at Smyrna and Aydyn and Ayvalık and Bergama and other places on or near the west coast of Anatolia; but these communities appear to have been the recent products of immigration from the Aegean islands and from the Morea.

⁴ See Dawkins, R. M.: *Modern Greek in Asia Minor* (Cambridge 1916, University Press), and the present Study, IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, pp. 398-9, below.

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 a domestic conflict in the tenth century of the Christian Era and not by Latin and Turkish assaults which only began in the course of the eleventh century. *A fortiori* we may dismiss the idea that the breakdown could have been caused by the rudimentary and abortive religious propaganda and barbarian *Völkerwanderung* which we have detected, where we should expect *a priori* to find them, in the last agonies of an Ottoman Empire which was the Orthodox Christian universal state.

2. *The Triumph of an Alien Civilization?*

We may next ask ourselves why these movements were abortive in the Ottoman Empire, in contrast to the historic 'triumph of Barbarism and Religion' in the Roman Empire and in the Empire of Sumer and Akkad and in the Minoan Thalassocracy and in the Sinic universal state. The answer to this question is not far to seek.

If the Orthodox Christian World had been breaking up *in vacuo*, out of touch with any other living civilization of superior vitality, there can be little doubt that, in the course of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the former territories of the Ottoman Empire would all have been parcelled out into 'successor-states' established by war-bands of barbarian intruders from the fringes. In the first stages of the break-up of the Roman Empire, at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era, there were incidents which are exactly analogous to the occupation of the Morea, from A.D. 1769 to A.D. 1779, by Albanian *foederati* who had been called in by the Ottoman Government to drive out the Russians, and to the embarrassing eagerness of the Muslim Slavs of Old Serbia and the Geghs of the North Albanian highlands to serve in Khurshid Pasha's expedition against 'Ali of Yánnina in A.D. 1821 and to take direct action against the Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh* within their reach in reprisal for the insurrection of the Maniots against the Pādishāh in the same year.¹ If we pursue the analogy, we may discern in the Kurds the counterparts of the Isaurians and in the Wahnābīs the counterparts of the Primitive Muslims; and we may see in an 'Ali of Yánnina and in a Mehmed 'Ali of Kavala a Clovis and a Theodoric manqué.

Why was it that war-lords such as these did not make the Alba-

¹ For these incidents in the break-up of the Ottoman Empire see Vlachogiannis, G: *Κλέφτες του Μοριά* (Athens 1935, no imprint of publisher's name), pp. 85-109; Finlay, George: *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time* (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.), vol. v, pp. 255-64; vol. vi, pp. 89 and 205. With the former we may compare Alaric's occupation of the Morea in A.D. 395-6; with the latter, Atawulf's ready acceptance, in A.D. 412, of Honorius's invitation to him to employ the Visigothic war-band which he had inherited in Italy from Alaric on the lucrative task of extirpating the nascent 'successor-states'—indigenous as well as barbarian—that were in process of supplanting the Roman Imperial Government in the Transalpine provinces.

nians masters of Rumili and Egypt and the Kurds masters of Anatolia and the Wāhhābīs masters of Syria and 'Irāq? The answer is that the mighty march of an irresistibly expanding Western Civilization was treading hard upon these ephemeral barbarians' heels. 'The triumph of Westernization',¹ and not 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion', was the process to which the break-up of the Ottoman Empire actually ministered. Instead of taking their natural form of barbarian principalities of 'the Heroic Age', the 'successor-states' of the Ottoman Empire were moulded, by Western pressure, as fast as they emerged, into the exotic shape of national states members of a comity of Western states which was in the act of reorganizing itself on a basis of nationalism at this time.

In some cases an incipient barbarian 'successor-state' transformed itself directly (though not without painful and dangerous convulsions) into one of these new-fangled national states on a Western model. For example, the national state of Serbia was the final product of the insurrection of the barbarian Serb backwoodsmen of the Shumadiya in A.D. 1804, and the national state of Greece arose likewise out of the insurrection of the barbarian Greek highlanders of the Mani in A.D. 1821.² On the other hand the barbarians who were still so little affected at this time by the radiation of the Western Civilization that they were incapable of turning their political activities into a Western nationalistic channel paid the penalty of missing their opportunity. The Albanians forfeited the Ottoman heritage in the Balkan Peninsula to the Greeks and Serbs and Bulgars in the nineteenth century in order to enter the Western comity of nations in the twentieth century with a patrimony so grievously diminished that it now constitutes the smallest and least populous and weakest, as well as the most backward, of the national states of Europe.³ As for the Kurds and the Wāhhābīs, the Kurds were reduced to order by Sultan Mahmūd II, and the Wāhhābīs were temporarily subjected and were permanently confined to their deserts by Mahmūd's viceroy in Egypt, Mehmed 'Alī,⁴ through

¹ For the 'Westernization of the 'Osmanlis' Christian *ra'īyeh* see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 181-6, and II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 226-7, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 299-302, below. For the Westernization of the 'Osmanlis themselves see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 227-8, and Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 48-50, above, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 102 and 112-13, below.

² For the contrast between the Moreot and the Phanariot currents in the Greek *Epanastasis* see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 226-8, above.

³ Even the miniature Albanian national state that made its belated appearance on the political map in 1913 was not the product of native Albanian initiative. The whole of the territory inhabited by Albanians would undoubtedly have been partitioned between Serbia and Greece after their joint victory in the First Balkan War of 1912, if the Hapsburg Monarchy and Italy had not then insisted, in their own interests, upon the establishment of a sovereign independent Albania which the Albanians could never have established for themselves.

⁴ See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 233, with footnote 5, below.

the timely employment of a new-fangled military equipment and organization and method which these two great Ottoman 'Westernizers' had borrowed at the eleventh hour from Napoleonic France and from post-Napoleonic Prussia. To-day, when a hundred years have passed since Mahmūd and Mehmed 'Alī completed their work of 'pacification', there is once more a Wāhhābī Empire in the Arabian Peninsula;¹ but the Wāhhābī King of the Najd and the Hijāz has no apparent prospect of acquiring the crowns of 'Irāq and Syria. In the meantime the Kurds have fared still worse than the Albanians; for to-day the whole of Kurdistan is partitioned between the three national states of Turkey and 'Irāq and Persia; and the barbarians who were potential successors of the 'Osmanlis in the mastery of Asia Minor a century ago are now not even the masters in their own house.²

Thus, in the history of the Orthodox Christian Civilization, in which the *Pax Ottomanica* was the last act but one, the last act of all has been, not 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion,' but the triumph of an alien civilization which has been swallowing the moribund society whole and has been incorporating its fabric into its own social tissue.

We have stumbled, here, upon an alternative way in which a moribund civilization may finally lose its identity. 'The triumph of Barbarism and Religion' means that the moribund civilization has been thrown upon the scrap-heap by an iconoclastic revolt on the part of its own external and internal proletariat, in order that one or other of these insurgents may obtain a free field for bringing a new civilization to birth. In this event, the older society duly passes away—

cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas
semper³—

yet in a sense it still lives on vicariously, in the younger civilization's life, through the relation which we have learnt to call 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation'. In the alternative event, when the moribund civilization is not thrown upon the scrap-heap to make way for a new representative of the species that stands in a special relation to it, but is swallowed and assimilated by some living civilization which is one of its own contemporaries,⁴ the loss of identity is manifestly more complete in one sense though less complete in another. The communities into which the moribund society is

¹ For the policy and achievements of King 'Abd-al-'Azīz Āl Sa'ūd see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 333-4, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 234, below.

² See IV. C (iii) (b) 5, pp. 189-90, below.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 964-5

⁴ This contact between civilizations in the Space-dimension is examined further in Part IX, below.

articulated may be spared the extreme agonies of social dissolution; they may be extricated from the body social of the one society and incorporated into that of the other without any absolute break of historic continuity (as the Greek people, for example, has refashioned itself into one of the nations of a Westernized World after having lived for four centuries the life of an Ottoman *millet*). From another point of view, however, the loss of identity in this event will be more complete and not less; for the society that passes away through incorporation into another society, and not through appresentation and dissolution, preserves—if it does succeed in preserving—some continuity in its material fabric at the price of forfeiting altogether the power of creation which, in the alternative event, it may still exercise vicariously. And creation, after all, is a civilization's *raison d'être*.

The instance in which this process of extinction through assimilation has come to our attention is the last chapter in the history of the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society, which has been incorporated into the body social of our own Western Civilization since the beginning of the break-up of the old Ottoman Empire in the last quarter of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, after a preliminary exposure, since about the last quarter of the seventeenth century, to the radiation of the Western culture. We can see at once that, at the present moment, all the other extant civilizations are in course of travelling along the same road. This is the current history of the offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia;¹ of the Islamic and Hindu societies; and of the far Eastern Society, both in its main body in China and in its offshoot in Korea and Japan. It is also the history of the three extant arrested societies of the Esquimaux and the Nomads and the Polynesians, which are all apparently in process of being incorporated into the Western body social in so far as the social radiation of the Western Civilization is not destroying them outright.

We can see, too, that a number of the civilizations that are now extinct have lost their identity, in the last chapter of their history, in the same way. The process of 'Westernization', which began to overtake Orthodox Christendom in the last quarter of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, and the other living non-Western civilizations about a hundred years later, was brought to bear upon the Central American Civilization and the Andean Civilization in the first and second quarters of the sixteenth century; and in both these cases the process now appears to be virtually

¹ For a discussion of the possible alternative interpretations of the Russian Communist Movement as a development in the relations between Russian Orthodox Christendom and the Western World see III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 200-2, and III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 363-5, above.

complete.¹ The peoples which were once the creators and propagators of these two civilizations have not been exterminated or evicted, like the barbarians and the savages who once occupied the present domains of the United States and Canada. But the physical survival of the descendants of the Mayas and the Toltecs and the Collas and the Incas attests the fact that they have lost the cultural birthright which was bequeathed to them by their forebears in order to become members of an intrusive alien society in whose history they have not so far succeeded in playing any creative part.

In the present Latin-American republics of Peru and Bolivia and Ecuador, which are the 'successor-states' of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru and are therefore, at one remove, the 'successor-states' of the Empire of the Incas, the 'Indians', whatever may be their status in constitutional theory, have been so far in fact a submerged social stratum—an inferior caste which has played only a passive part in the social life of its own Andean homeland since this land has been annexed to the domain of Western Christendom. In Mexico the 'Indians' have been more self-assertive. Since the severance of the political connexion between Mexico and Spain in A.D. 1821, individual Mexican 'Indians' have repeatedly risen to the highest positions of political power in the turbulent republican 'successor-state' of New Spain, as the Spanish Viceroyalty in Mexico was officially styled; and since the Revolution of A.D. 1910 there has been a general ferment and upheaval among the Mexican 'Indian' masses. In Mexico, however, still more than in China (where the contemporary revolution displays the same general character), the movement of revolt has been not a reaction against the Civilization of the West but an offensive movement towards it. The Mexicans have not been seeking to extricate themselves from the Western toils in which the civilization of their forebears was caught and bound, four hundred years ago, by Cortes and his fellow *conquistadores*. On the contrary, the Mexicans have been seeking in our generation to take a fabulous Western Kingdom of Heaven by storm. In their campaigns against the latifundia and

¹ The latest perceptible expression of an Andean social consciousness was the rebellion of Tupac Amaru against the Spanish régime in Peru in A.D. 1780-3 (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 120, footnote 1, above). As for the Mexican social consciousness, it is reported to be alive down to this day among certain of the 'Indians' of New Mexico, a state of the North American Union which was once the northernmost outpost of the Mexic World. 'I was told not long ago,' writes Mr. Edwyn Bevan (in *The Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge 1923, University Press), p. 103) 'by some one who knew intimately the native peoples of New Mexico, that they cherished still, by a secret tradition, the unconquerable belief that Montezuma was not really dead, that one day he would come back and drive out the White Man and restore the world as it was before. In some villages it was the custom for a man to climb every day before daybreak to the top of a neighbouring hill and all alone watch the dawn, because that might be the day on which Montezuma might return.' This is a remarkable parallel to the daily visit of the Imāmi Shi'is of Hillah to the sanctuary of the Master of the Age (see III. C (ii) (b), Annex I, in vol. iii, p. 464, above).

against the oil-interests and against the Catholic Church the Mexican revolutionaries have been attacking the privileges or monopolies of native Mexicans of Spanish descent, and of foreign prelates and capitalists, with the object of securing for the 'Indian'-descended masses of the Mexican people that mastery in their own national house which has been proclaimed as the inherent right of every people in our latter-day Western political gospel of Democracy.

On this showing, we may pronounce that the *ci-devant* Central American Civilization, as well as the *ci-devant* Andean Civilization, has now been completely incorporated into our Western body social; and we can point to other *ci-devant* civilizations which have been incorporated into other bodies social with comparable completeness in other times and places. The Babylonian Society, for example, merged its identity in the Syriac body social in the last century B.C., after its hold upon its own cultural tradition had been weakened by the attraction of Hellenism; and the disintegrating effect of the radiation of the Hellenic culture likewise prepared the way for the absorption of the Egyptian Society into the same Syriac body social in the course of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries of the Christian Era. This Syriac assimilation of the Egyptian Society—the longest lived and most firmly compacted and most organically unified and most individually accentuated civilization that has ever yet been seen—is perhaps the most extraordinary feat of social assimilation that has been achieved to our knowledge so far.

If we now glance again at the group of living civilizations that are in process of being assimilated by our own Western Civilization at the present time, we shall observe that the process is proceeding at different paces on different planes.

On the economic plane every one of these societies has been caught in the network of relations which our modern Western Industrialism has cast over all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face of the planet.¹ On the political plane, again, the children of all these apparently moribund civilizations have been seeking admission to membership in the Western comity of states through various doors. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom the 'successor-states' of the Ottoman Empire have been transforming themselves, as we have seen, into national states on our latter-day Western pattern; and the peoples of the Islamic World seem now to be inclined likewise to part company with one another on their way towards the Western political fold, and to pursue their identical objective, in the prevalent Western manner, along separate national paths. The Pan-Islamic dream of a restoration of the

¹ On this point see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 30, above.

pristine political unity of the Islamic World¹ has been shattered by the conversion of the Arabic-speaking Muslim peoples to Nationalism²—a conversion which was proclaimed in a sensational manner in A.D. 1916 when the Hāshimī Sharif of Mecca rose in insurrection against the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph and joined forces with Christian states against whom the Caliph was then engaged in a life-and-death struggle for the preservation of the empire which was the basis of his temporal power.³ Thus both the Islamic World and the main body of Orthodox Christendom are entering the Western fold with politically divided forces. On the other hand the offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia and the offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan have each succeeded in gaining admittance into the Western comity of nations—Russia before the close of the seventeenth century and Japan before the close of the nineteenth—without losing the political unity of which

¹ See Part IV. A in the present volume, p. 3, above.

² For the Arabic 'successor-states' of the Ottoman Empire which have entered, or are on their way to entering, the comity of national states which is the political structure of a Westernized 'Great Society', see the present chapter, p. 107, below. For the relation of the *ci-devant* Arabic Society to an Islamic Society which was constituted by the Ottoman conquest of the Arabic World in the first quarter of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, see the present chapter, pp. 112-14, below.

³ The apparent triumph of our Western Political Nationalism in the Islamic World since the beginning of the twentieth century of our era—and, conspicuously, since the outbreak of the general war of A.D. 1914-18—is a remarkable testimony to the assimilative power of our Western Civilization and to the inability of the Islamic Civilization to hold its own against it. For the Pan-Islamic Movement, which was set in motion under the patronage of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph 'Abd-al-Hamid (*imperabat* A.D. 1876-1909) as an attempt to enable the Islamic World to repel the Western offensive, was not only good strategy on its merits (on the principle that 'union is strength'); it was also in the true line of the Islamic tradition; for, from the time of the Hijrah, which was the crucial event in the career of Muhammad and in the history of the institution that he founded, Islam had been a unitary society which embraced both the two Western social fields of Church and State; and, after the founder's death, the unity of Islam in its political aspect had been incarnated in the Arab Caliphate (see III. C (ii) (b), Annex II, in vol. iii, above). Thus the Pan-Islamic attempt to restore the political unity of Islam, under the historic aegis of a Caliphate, in face of a formidable external menace to the Islamic Society's very existence, might have seemed a promising stroke of statesmanship; and the rapid rout of Pan-Islamism by an irresistible outbreak of Nationalism in the Muslim ranks is a surprising denouement.

On the other hand there is nothing to be wondered at in the triumph of Nationalism in Orthodox Christendom; for, in the main body of the Orthodox Christian World, the course of events which, in the West, has culminated in Nationalism, was anticipated by some eight hundred years. In the Western World as a whole it was not until the sixteenth century of the Christian Era that the parochial national states gained the upper hand over an oecumenical church, whereas this happened as early as the eighth century in Orthodox Christendom. (This chapter of Orthodox Christian history is examined further in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (b), pp. 320-408, with Annex II, pp. 592-623, below.) In fitting the 'successor-states' which they have carved out of the Ottoman Empire into the framework of our modern Western Nationalism, the Orthodox Christian peoples have merely been reverting, upon their extrication from the Ottoman Empire, to an indigenous tradition of their own. It is one of the ironies of history that this precocious Orthodox Christian Nationalism of the Middle Ages, to which these peoples have reverted now that the *Pax Ottomanica* has broken down, was the principal cause of the medieval decline and fall that led to the Ottoman conquest. This eager revival of a pernicious tradition is a bad omen for the Orthodox Christian peoples' new start in life as naturalized members of our Society of the West. And, conversely, the history of Orthodox Christian Nationalism in the Middle Ages, of which we know the whole story, is a bad omen for the prospects of our Western Society in its own belated Nationalistic Era, from which it has not yet emerged.

they were each in possession (Russia under the Muscovite Tsardom and Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate) at the time when they each first began to feel the impact of the West. Finally, the Hindu Society, which now enjoys a precarious political unity under the British Rāj, and the main body of the Far Eastern Society, which is clinging to a vestige of political unity under the flag of the Chinese Republic, are both trying to emulate the feat, which Japan and Russia have accomplished under more favourable conditions, of becoming full-fledged members of the Western comity of states without paying the price of political disruption.

It will be seen that, while there is perhaps a greater diversity in the process of Westernization on the political plane than on the economic plane, the political as well as the economic Westernization of all the living non-Western civilizations is now in full swing. On the cultural plane, on the other hand, there is no uniform corresponding tendency. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom the former *ra'iyeh* of the Ottoman Empire—Greeks, Serbs, Rumans, and Bulgars—appear to have welcomed the prospect of cultural as well as political and economic Westernization with open arms; and the epigoni of their former lords and masters the Ottoman Turks have latterly followed their example. But these cases seem to be exceptional. The Arabs and Persians and Hindus and Chinese, and even the Japanese, are accepting our Western culture with conscious mental and moral reservations as far as they are accepting it at all; and they are all manifestly on the look-out for some form of social compromise which will allow them to participate in the economic and political systems of the West without ceasing to possess their own non-Western souls.¹ As for the Russians, they have passed right out of the phase of cultural Westernization, through which the Balkan peoples are passing to-day, and have now moved on into a cultural reaction against the West, of which an early symptom can be detected in one aspect of the Slavophil Movement and a later manifestation in one aspect of Communism.²

On this showing, the present tendency towards the Westernization of the World may prove to be neither so far advanced nor so well assured of ultimate success as it would appear to be at first sight. On the other hand the four cases of the Central American and Andean and Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations are sufficient to show that the loss of identity through assimilation can be just as complete and just as definitive as the alternative process of Apparentation-and-Dissolution in which the Hellenic and Indic and Sinic and Minoan and Sumerian societies have met their ends.

¹ This point has been touched upon already in I. B (iii), vol. i, pp. 35-6, above.

² See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 200-2, and III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 363-5, above.

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We have next to observe that when we find the last chapter in the decline and fall of a broken-down civilization taking the form of the triumph of an alien civilization, we are no nearer to having discovered the cause of the original breakdown than in the alternative case, which we have examined already, where the last chapter takes the form of 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion'. In this case, as in that, the loss of identity is the final outcome of a long decline; and this decline has to be traced back to its distant beginning in order to arrive at the original breakdown which it is our object to explain.

We have seen, for example, that the main body of Orthodox Christendom did not lose its identity through absorption into the body social of the Western Civilization until the Orthodox Christian universal state had run out into an interregnum. The peoples of the Ottoman Empire did not succumb completely to Westernization until after they had experienced the rudiments of a barbarian *Völkerwanderung*; and even the beginnings of the Westernization of the Greeks and Serbs only date from the last quarter of the seventeenth century, while the Westernization of the Ottoman Turks did not begin until about a hundred years later. These dates are very late in the history of a decline which goes back, as we have observed, to the great Bulgaro-Roman War of A.D. 977-1019.

There are still longer intervals between the original breakdowns of the Egyptiac Civilization, and of the main body of the Far Eastern Civilization in China, and the respective dates at which the Egyptiac Society lost its identity through conversion to Christianity and at which the Far Eastern Society began to be penetrated by our Western social radiation. For both these civilizations not only broke down and passed through a 'Time of Troubles' and entered into a universal state before the alien influence began to work upon them; in both cases, the universal state phase was drawn out to unusual lengths.

The breakdown of the Egyptiac Civilization may be equated approximately with the transition from the Fifth Dynasty to the Sixth Dynasty, *circa* 2424 B.C.,¹ when the sins of the Pyramid-Builders were visited upon their successors and the top-heavy political structure of 'the Old Kingdom' collapsed.² The Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles' may be equated with the following 'Feudal Age', when the Egyptiac World broke up into a multiplicity of decadent local principalities which reproduced (with the melancholy difference between autumn and spring) the situation that had existed in

¹ For this date see further V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 267, footnote 2, below.

² For an account of the breakdown of the Egyptiac Civilization see III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 213-16, above, and IV. C (ii) (b) 3, pp. 116-17, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 408-14, below.

the Egyptiac World a thousand years earlier, before the establishment of the United Kingdom. The Egyptiac universal state was founded *circa* 2070/2060 B.C. under that sovereign of the Eleventh Dynasty who commemorated his achievement by styling himself 'the Uniter of the Two Lands';¹ and this 'Middle Empire', after giving the Egyptiac Society the 'Indian Summer' of the Twelfth Dynasty, eventually passed out into an interregnum in which 'the triumph of Barbarism' was celebrated by the invasion of the Hyksos. At this stage, however, Egyptiac history took a peculiar turn; for, instead of going into dissolution and thereby making way for a new society to come to birth, the Egyptiac Society obstinately refused to give up the ghost. It was the Hyksos who had to make way for a resurrection of the defunct Egyptiac Society in the mummy-case of a restored universal state, the so-called 'New Empire'.² And even then, when 'the New Empire' had run its course like 'the Middle Empire' before it, the dried and withered mummy of the Egyptiac body social still grimly held together. 'The New Empire' expended its last ounce of strength on the *tour de force* of frustrating 'the triumph of Barbarism' for a second time when the Egyptiac World was in danger of being overwhelmed by the back-wash of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C.³ Thereafter the Egyptiac Society lingered on for some fifteen centuries longer in a state of low but tenacious vitality. Successive alien conquerors—Assyrians and Achaemenidae—were evicted in turn, like the Hyksos before them, by the sudden uncanny uprising of a prostrate body which the intruders had taken for a corpse; and the same ignominious fate would unquestionably have overtaken the Ptolemies⁴ if the Roman Emperors had not stepped into their shoes and held Egypt down with an iron hand until the powerful solvent of Hellenism had had time to do its disintegrating work. It was only after this that the Egyptiac Society lost its identity through the mass-conversion of the Egyptian people, in the course of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries of the Christian Era, to the Hellenic-Syriac syncretistic religion of Christianity⁵—from which, in Egypt, the Hellenic

¹ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 137 and p. 140, footnote 2, and II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 112, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 267, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 190, below.

² For these chapters of Egyptiac history see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 136-46, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93 and 101, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, p. 422, V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 269, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below.

⁴ For the series of Egyptian insurrections against the Ptolemaic régime which began before the close of the third century B.C., see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 68, below.

⁵ It will be seen that the conversion of Egypt to Christianity, which marks the disappearance of the distinctive tradition of the Egyptiac culture, did not take place until some two thousand years after the date at which 'the Middle Empire', which was the Egyptiac universal state, passed over into the abortive interregnum which was marked by the ephemeral triumph of the Hyksos. Thus the Egyptiac Civilization cheated Destiny, in the manner of King Mycerinus in the fairy-story, by contriving to double

alloy was progressively purged away by the reconversion of the Egyptians, first from Primitive Christianity to Monophysitism, and eventually from Monophysitism to Islam (save for a residual Coptic minority). This last stage in the purge was only completed in the course of the post-Syriac interregnum *circa* A.D. 975-1275; and thus the final absorption of the Egyptiac Society into the Syriac body social was separated in time from the original breakdown of the Egyptiac Civilization by an interval of more than three thousand years.

The interval between the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in China and the beginning of the present intensive process of Westernization is not of the same order of magnitude; but the intervening course of Far Eastern history in China is not unlike the period of Egyptiac history which we have just surveyed. The breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in China may be equated with the decay of the T'ang Dynasty in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era; and the subsequent 'Time of Troubles'—which was occupied, but not caused, by the progressive encroachments of the Khitan Nomad and the Kin highlander Power upon Chinese soil¹—was brought to an end in A.D. 1280.

its proper term of life—and this on the scale of two millennia. Moreover, even *in articulo mortis*, the indomitable mummy of a long-dead society took a sardonic revenge upon its audacious destroyers; for, if it was the forcible incorporation of Egypt into the Roman Empire that enabled the solvent of Hellenism to corrode the tough Egyptiac social fabric at last into a featureless mass of debris, it was also the influence of the Egyptiac tradition—imposing even in the final state of its decay—that set the characteristic Egyptiac stamp of 'the servile state' upon a reconstructed Roman Empire—the Empire of Aurelian and Diocletian and Constantine—which was the Hellenic Civilization's last avatar. 'The tradition of the Great State maintained itself in Egypt through all the . . . periods of dissolution and foreign invasion down to the Christian Era, and, as Professor Rostovtzeff has shown' (see Rostovtzeff, M.: *Studien zur Geschichte des Römischen Kolonates* (Leipzig and Berlin 1910, Teubner), *passim*; and Rostovtzeff, M.: *A History of the Ancient World* (Oxford 1926, University Press, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 325-33—A.J.T.), 'it exercised a formative influence on the tradition of European state administration through its inheritance by the Hellenistic monarchies and the Roman Empire. The Empire of the fourth century, above all, with its régime of fixed hereditary occupations and forced services, its official hierarchy centring in the Sacred Palace, and its vast organization of state ownership and fiscal exploitation, may be regarded as nothing less than an adaptation to the Mediterranean World in general of a system that had been inherited by the Caesars in Egypt as the successors of the Ptolemies and the Pharaohs. . . . It is remarkable that in the Roman Empire also, from the reign of Aurelian to that of Constantine, a solar monotheism' [the worship of Sol Invictus: see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 82, footnote 4, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 649-50 and 691-4, below—A.J.T.] 'was becoming the official religion' (Dawson, Christopher: *The Age of the Gods* (reissue: London 1933, Sheed & Ward), pp. 161-2). In Professor Rostovtzeff's own words, 'the main business of every social and economic centre in the realm was now to serve the state and work for the state. This conception was no novelty to the Ancient World: the public life of Egypt in the Hellenistic Age was largely based upon it; and now Diocletian introduced it throughout the Empire. . . . The state was entirely organized on the principles of an Eastern despotism: an autocratic ruler controlled an omnipotent bureaucracy, which suppressed every trace of self-government while professing to retain it, and a population of serfs, living and working principally for the purposes of the Government. What a departure from the Graeco-Roman ideals of freedom and self-government!' (Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 327 and 331; see also the present Study, IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (8), in the present volume, p. 414, below).

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 308, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 307, below.

when the Mongol supplanters and successors of the Kin completed the barbarian conquest of China and thereby brought her some tardy alleviation of the sufferings which the Mongols' predecessors had inflicted and which the Mongols themselves had aggravated in bringing them to a climax.¹ The *Pax Mongolica* which was effectively imposed upon China by Qubilay Khan promised to endow China with her universal state; but the Chinese were unwilling to receive even this benefit at barbarian hands. Within less than a hundred years the Mongols were evicted by the Ming² as, in a comparable chapter of Egyptiac history, the Hyksos were evicted by the founders of 'the New Empire'. The Ming in China, like the Eighteenth Dynasty in Egypt, stood for a purist reaction against the indignity of barbarian domination and the taint of barbarian manners; but their strength was insufficient for their task; and the *Pax Mongolica*, which the Ming had managed to destroy but never quite effectively to replace, was eventually restored by the Mongols' fellow barbarians the Manchus, who conquered the whole of China in the course of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, as the Mongols had conquered it four hundred years earlier. This was the long history, in China, of the Far Eastern decline and fall. On the other hand it was only in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, in the later days of the Ming, that the contact of China with the modern Western World began;³ and it was only in the nineteenth century, in the later days of the Manchus, that the present Western pressure upon China began to be seriously felt. The Sino-British 'Opium War' of A.D. 1840-2, in which 'the South Sea Barbarians' brutally battered down the Middle Kingdom's long-closed gates, was separated by a span of 962 years from the sack of the great port of Khānfū⁴—by Chinese hands—in A.D. 878;

¹ It will be seen that the local succession of Eurasian Nomads—Khitan and Mongols—played the same part in the decline and fall of the Far Eastern Civilization in China as was played in the decline and fall of Orthodox Christendom by the Saljūqs and the 'Osmanlis. In both cases the first wave of the Nomad invaders was purely destructive, while the last wave eventually performed the constructive work of compulsorily endowing the disintegrating society with a universal state. It is to be emphasized that the Nomads were not the authors of the breakdown in either case. They appeared on the scene after the breakdown had taken place; and then they merely rode through a breach which their victims had already blown in their own defences in the course of a fratricidal struggle which had gone to extremes before the Nomads' arrival.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121, above, and Part V. A, vol. v, pp. 3-4, V. C (i) (c) 1, vol. v, p. 54, V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 309, V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, p. 348, V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 193, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 305, below.

³ The contact of China with the medieval Western Christendom during the brief period when the Mongol universal state extended continuously from the coasts of China to the coasts of the Black Sea and the Baltic was a curiosity of history which, like Alexander's raid on India, had no lasting effect.

⁴ There is some disagreement among scholars as to whether the port which is called by this name in the Arabic records was Canton or Kanpu—the latter being the port of Hangchow. Khānfū would be the closest possible Arabic transliteration of Kanpu, since there is no letter 'P' in the original version of the Arabic Alphabet which is used for conveying the Arabic language. The letter has only been added in the version used for conveying Persian and Turkish.

and that great disaster, which put an end to the China trade of the Arab and Persian subjects of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, had been one of the outstanding events in the suicidal Chinese civil war which had accompanied the collapse of the T'ang Dynasty and had inaugurated the decline and fall, in China, of the Far Eastern Civilization.¹

In the histories of the decline of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan and the decline of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia the current of Westernization gained the mastery at an earlier stage; for the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Romanov Tsardom, which the Japanese authors of the Meiji Revolution and the Russian Tsar Peter the Great set themselves, respectively, to transform into national states members of the Western comity of nations, were both of them universal states which had not yet passed over into interregna and had not been drawn out to unusual lengths, but were still well within the normal term. The foundation of the universal state in Japan, which was the cumulative achievement of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi and Ieyasu, may be dated at about the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era. The foundation of the universal state in Russia may be equated with the union between Muscovy and Novgorod—the two principal members of the previous plurality of parochial Russian states—in A.D. 1478. It will be seen that the Japanese universal state had been in existence for rather less than 300, and the Russian for rather more than 200, years by the respective dates at which the great Japanese and the great Russian 'Westernizers' performed their *tours de force*.

In these two cases there will perhaps be little inclination to suggest that the incorporation of Russia and of Japan into the Society of the West, which was achieved by Peter and by his Japanese counterparts, is to be regarded as the cause of the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia and of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan. So far from that, these achievements of Russian and Japanese statesmanship were so remarkably successful—at least on a short view—that many observers may be inclined rather to take them as evidence that the societies which deliberately put themselves through this radical metamorphosis, and which came through it—at any rate, for the moment—without mishap, must still have been in the full *élan* of life and growth. The Russian reaction in the seventeenth century and the Japanese reaction in the nineteenth century to the impact of the West cer-

¹ An English translation of an account of this sack of Kanpu or Canton from the pen of Abu Zayd al-Hasan of Siraf will be found in Renaudot, E.: *Ancient Accounts of India and China by two Mohammedan Travellers* (London 1733, Harding), pp. 40-5. The passage also gives a graphic description of the whole political and social breakdown in which the sack of Khānfū was an incident.

tainly appear to display a command of the situation and a mastery over events which stand out in contrast to the ineffectiveness of the 'Osmanlis and the Hindus and the Chinese and the Aztecs and the Incas in dealing with an identical challenge.

Instead of waiting heedlessly and passively for an expanding and aggressive West to breach their walls and stave in their doors and take possession of their house and refurnish it throughout according to a Western taste without consulting the native owners and occupiers, the Russians and the Japanese not only divined, at an early stage, the seriousness of the Western challenge and the severity of the penalties which they would incur if they failed to respond to it; they also took action in good time in order to meet the trouble half-way; and this combination of prescience with resoluteness won conspicuous rewards. Instead of undergoing a process of compulsory 'Westernization' at the hands of Swedish or German or Spanish or American intruders, the Russians and the Japanese were able to carry their social metamorphosis through with their own hands because they submitted themselves to it voluntarily and deliberately; and, instead of being socially submerged like the Central American and Andean peoples, or being politically subjected to the rule of a Western Power like the Hindus and Muslims in India, or being forced to pay for their political 'Westernization' by the sacrifice of their political unity like the Muslim and Orthodox peoples of the Ottoman Empire, they succeeded in preserving their existing unitary commonwealth. Without any break of political continuity they respectively transformed the Romanov Tsardom and the Tokugawa Shogunate from 'hermit kingdoms' which each embraced the whole of its 'short and narrow-verged' universe into members of a Western comity of states with the calibre and the standing of Great Powers which were able at once to play an active part in the international life of the Great Society of the day.

No doubt the later history of Russia, who entered upon the path of 'Westernization' some two hundred years earlier than Japan and who has therefore had that much time longer to experience the consequence, will make cautious observers chary of pronouncing prematurely that the Russian experiment of 'Westernization' has justified Peter's policy in the long run; and in Japan, likewise, the turn of events in our generation suggests that the second phase in the history of the Japanese experiment may pass less smoothly than the first. The Solonian maxim *respice finem*¹ is eminently applicable to both the Russian and the Japanese enterprises; and, if these enterprises do come to grief unmistakably in the end, there will assuredly be some apologists who will maintain that all was well with Japan

¹ Herodotus, Book I, chap. 33.

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and with Russia until our Western Society crossed their paths, and that, in spite of their gallant first attempts to hold their own against the formidable Western intruder by borrowing his weapons and paying him in his own coin, the encounter has been fatal to both these non-Western societies after all.

This hypothetical future apologia, however, can be refuted in advance, here and now, by an examination of Russian and Japanese history in the periods preceding the voluntary 'self-Westernization' of Russia and of Japan respectively.

At this earlier stage, again, we shall admire the handling of 'the Western Question' by Russian and Japanese statesmanship; for, before either the Russians or the Japanese were able to secure leisure and elbow-room for 'Westernizing' their life on their own initiative, they each had to meet and repulse a Western attempt to bring them under Western domination—as the Central Americans and Andeans and Hindus and Chinese have actually been dominated by divers Western aggressors in divers degrees. For the first establishment of relations with the modern Western World, which occurred in Russian and in Japanese history almost contemporaneously, about the middle of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, was followed in both cases—again almost contemporaneously, in the early years of the seventeenth century—by a serious threat of Western conquest.

In the Russian case the impact of the West took the crude form of a regular military invasion of Russia, and a temporary occupation of Moscow, which was at that time the capital of the Russian universal state, by the forces of Russia's Western next-door neighbour, the United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania, on the pretext of supporting a pretender to the Russian Imperial throne, the notorious 'False Dmitri'.¹ In the Japanese case the impact took the more ethereal form of the conversion of several hundreds of thousands of Japanese souls to Catholicism by Portuguese and Spanish missionaries. Yet this peaceful conquest of Japanese hearts and minds by a Western religious propaganda was fraught with potential dangers for the Japanese body social and even for the Japanese body politic; for although these converts were numerically an inconsiderable minority of the total population of Japan, they were strong in enthusiasm and in organization and in the social vitality of the alien way of life which they had adopted; and it would not have been a forlorn hope if this minority had attempted to make itself master of Japan with the military backing of the temporarily united kingdoms of Spain and Portugal.² Thus Japan as well as

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 157 and 176, above.

² The union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns lasted *de facto* from A.D. 1581 to A.D. 1640.

Russia was seriously threatened with being overtaken in the seventeenth century by the fate which had actually overtaken Mexico and Peru at Spanish hands in the sixteenth century and which was subsequently to overtake India in the nineteenth century at the hands of the English. But both Japanese and Russian history was given a different turn by the effective action of the Russians and the Japanese themselves. The Russians drove out the Poles by a spontaneous national uprising,¹ while the Japanese exorcized 'the White Peril' by expelling all resident Western missionaries and merchants, forbidding Westerners to set foot on Japanese soil in future under pain of death,² and exterminating the native Japanese Catholic community by a ruthless persecution. Having thus rid themselves momentarily of 'the Western Question', both the Japanese and the Russians imagined at first that they had merely to retire into their own shells in order to 'live happily ever after'. Time showed, however, that, after all, they had not finally disposed of 'the Western Question' by these tactics of self-isolation; and it was this subsequent discovery that eventually led the Russians and the Japanese in turn to continue the pursuit of their perpetual aim by a complete reversal of their policy, and to hold their own still, against a renewed and redoubled pressure from the West, by transforming their politics deliberately from archaistic 'hermit kingdoms' into 'Westernized' Great Powers.

Thus the Russians and the Japanese prove to have handled 'the Western Question' as ably in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries of our Era as they have handled it since, under altered conditions, down to the beginning of the chapter which is now in progress. And yet there are unmistakable indications that, before ever the first Portuguese ship sailed into Nagasaki, or the first English ship into Archangel, both the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan and the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia had already broken down.

In Russian history the true 'Time of Troubles', in the sense in which that term is used in this Study, is not the bout of anarchy in the early years of the seventeenth century for which the term has been coined by the Russians themselves. The so-called Russian 'Time of Troubles' in the early seventeenth century was an interlude between the first and the second phase of the Russian universal state, corresponding to the bout of anarchy in the Hellenic World, in the middle of the third century, which intervened

¹ See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below.

² The sole exception was the licensed establishment of Dutch traders who were allowed to reside, as pariahs, on the islet of Deshima (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 232-3, above).

between the *Pax Augusta* and the *Pax Diocletiana*.¹ The chapter of Russian history which corresponds to the chapter of Hellenic history between the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War and the Battle of Actium, and which therefore represents the Russian 'Time of Troubles' in our sense, is the time of adversity which preceded the foundation of the Russian universal state through the union of Novgorod with Muscovy in A.D. 1478.² On the same showing, the true 'Time of Troubles' in Japanese history is represented by the so-called Kamakura and Ashikaga periods of feudal anarchy and civil war which preceded the disciplinary and unificatory and pacificatory work of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi and Ieyasu; and the combined span of these two periods extends, according to the conventional dates, from A.D. 1184 to A.D. 1597.³

If these identifications of the true Japanese and the true Russian 'Time of Troubles' are accepted, we have to lay our fingers on their respective origins and to trace each of them to some pre-Western cause; and a Russian apologist for the decline and fall of the Russian Orthodox Christian Civilization will have his explanation on the tip of his tongue. He will remind us that, in our 'philosophy of history', the foundation of a universal state represents a social rally, in which the process of social disintegration is temporarily arrested, and then he will point out that the union of Novgorod with Muscovy in A.D. 1478, which we have taken as the foundation of the Russian universal state, was accompanied by the final liberation of Russia from the alien yoke of the Eurasian Nomad horde whose head-quarters were at the Saray on the Lower Volga. Is not the Russian rally in the last quarter of the fifteenth century to be attributed to the liberation of the Russian Orthodox Christendom from 'the Tatars' rather than to the mere union of Russian forces which made this liberation possible? And, if so, then is not the breakdown of the Russian Orthodox Christendom, which precipitated the 'Time of Troubles', to be identified with the devastating invasion of Russia by Chingis Khan's grandson Batu in A.D. 1238—the catastrophe which originally fastened the 'Tatar' yoke upon Russia's neck? Have we not found the cause of the breakdown here, and found it in a blow which was delivered by an external human force?

This is certainly a commonly accepted explanation of the breakdown of the Russian Orthodox Christian Civilization in 'the Middle Ages'; but before we concur in condemning the Mongols

¹ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 53, footnote 2, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 311, below.

² For the structure of the Russian 'Time of Troubles' see further V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 308-10, below.

³ For the structure of the Japanese 'Time of Troubles' see further V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 303-5, below.

to be the villains of the piece in a Russian historical melodrama, we must be sure that we are not assigning them a more important as well as a more criminal role than they deserve. These Mongols, after all, were the brothers of the Mongols whom we have already encountered in the history of the Far Eastern Civilization in China; and they were the cousins of the Khitan and Kin who were the Mongols' forerunners on Chinese soil, and of the Saljūqs and 'Osmanlis who played corresponding parts in the history of the main body of Orthodox Christendom. In each of these other cases we have had to deal with determined attempts to turn the Eurasian Nomad invaders into scapegoats, and in each case we have come to the conclusion that these attempts are unjustified. Our verdict has been that the Orthodox Christian Society in Anatolia and the Balkans dealt itself a suicidal blow in the great Bulgaro-Roman War of A.D. 977-1019, before ever the Saljūqs made their first raid across the Asiatic frontiers of the East Roman Empire, and that the Far Eastern Society in China did itself an equally mortal injury in the great anarchy of A.D. 875-960, before ever the Khitan crossed the Great Wall.¹ Is it not possible that in Russia, likewise, the Orthodox Christian Society may have already brought about its own breakdown by its own act, before ever the Mongols crossed the Volga in A.D. 1238?

To put this last question aside for a moment, we can pronounce at once that the eruption of the Mongols was not the cause of the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan; for the great Mongol invasion of Japan in A.D. 1281² was such an ignominious failure that it was never repeated; and the Japanese feat of driving into the sea the hitherto invincible conquerors of the Continent must have been as stimulating a triumph as the Athenians' victory over the Persians at Marathon.

To what are we to attribute this Japanese triumph over a Power which shattered every other adversary that it encountered, with the single exception of the Egyptian Mamlūks? No doubt the Japanese benefited by their insularity; for the Mongols were as much out of their element on the sea as they were at home on the Steppe; and they cannot have been at their best in a fiercely contested landing operation in which their wonderful light cavalry had to fight as an awkward squad of horse-marines. In this amphibious warfare the Japanese long-bowmen were at a still greater advantage over their opponents than the English bowmen were at Crécy or Poitiers.

¹ See the preceding chapter, pp. 72-6, and the present chapter, pp. 87-8, above.

² In this invasion Japan was attacked by a converging movement of Mongol armadas from Korea and from China, and the Mongols were able to throw into the enterprise the forces which had been liberated by the completion of their conquest of South China in the preceding year. Hence the Mongol invasion of Japan in A.D. 1281 was a more formidable affair than the previous reconnaissance in A.D. 1274.

Yet when we have allowed for these points of military technique, we shall have to admit that they must have been of less importance than the psychological forces. For the Mongol horsemen who had penetrated the Russian forests and had stormed the strongholds of 'the Old Man of the Mountain' in the fastnesses of the Elbrūz might have subdued the Japanese Archipelago by the sheer terror of their name if they had not met their military match in their Japanese opponents.

The fundamental reason why the Japanese beat the Mongols in A.D. 1281 was that, in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, the Japanese were as fine soldiers as the Mongols themselves; and the school in which these Japanese warriors had been trained was the school of fratricidal warfare. It was in the course of a hundred years of suicidal struggles with one another on their native soil that the Japanese had acquired the prowess to which the Mongol invaders now succumbed; and it follows that even if, in A.D. 1281, the fortune of war had inclined the other way and if Japan had then been added to the tale of Mongol conquests, the breakdown of the Far Eastern Society in Japan would still have to be traced back to some earlier event of a domestic order. As a matter of fact, we have already had occasion to notice, in another connexion,¹ what was the origin of this Japanese fratricidal warfare which had been rife for the best part of a century before the Mongols challenged the Japanese to combat, and which was to continue for more than three centuries longer after that, until it attained its culmination in the time of Hideyoshi and its close in the time of Ieyasu. The fratricidal warfare which marked the Japanese 'Time of Troubles' began towards the end of the twelfth century of the Christian Era when the Japanese feudal nobility which had come into existence in the backwoods, in the slow and arduous process of enlarging the borders of the Far Eastern Society in Japan at the expense of the barbarian Ainu, eventually faced about towards the home front and asserted the ascendancy of this new military Japanese Society in the Kwanto over the old civil Japanese Society in Yamato. The disaster which accounts for the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan is the protracted military revolution which overthrew the régime of 'the Cloistered Emperors' and inaugurated the beginning of the feudal anarchy between A.D. 1156 and A.D. 1185;² and these fatal strokes were not the work of any foreign hand.

¹ In II. D (v), vol. ii, on pp. 158-9, above.

² This revolution worked itself out in three successive bouts, of which the respective dates were A.D. 1156, A.D. 1160, and A.D. 1183-5. But this rapid succession of explosions was fired by a train of gunpowder which had been smouldering and spluttering for a long time before it blew the Far Eastern Society in Japan into fragments. The militarization of the marches in the North-East had begun as early as A.D. 940 (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. i (London 1910, Kegan Paul), pp. 252 and 257). The first known

This reading of Japanese history suggests an answer to our question concerning the cause and the date of the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia; for in this chapter, as in others, the histories of Russia and Japan are analogous, as we have noticed in the earlier passage of this Study which has just been referred to.¹ It is true that the thirteenth-century Russians, unlike the contemporary Japanese, were no match for the Mongol invaders. They went down before them in as lamentable a débâcle as the Khwarizmians or the Hungarians. Yet, notwithstanding this difference of outcome, the antecedent history of Russia had been following a Japanese course. For more than a hundred years before the Mongols' advent the Orthodox Christendom in Russia had been partitioned politically into a plurality of contending states; and the militarism which the parochial Russian princes had learnt to exercise against each other had been acquired in the backwoods of the north-east, where the frontier warfare in which the Russian pioneers were gradually enlarging the borders of the Russian World at the expense of the forest Finns effaced the social effects of the exotic Orthodox Christian culture from Constantinople which had been transplanted, at the close of the tenth century, to the original centre of the Russian Power at Kiev. In this chapter of Russian history Kiev in the Dniepr Basin corresponds, as we have seen, to Kyoto in Yamato, while Vladímir and the other new outposts of the Russian Society in the basins of the Volga and the Arctic Dvina correspond to the new frontier fiefs of the Japanese Empire in the Kwanto. In Russian history, as in Japanese, a time came at which the political supremacy passed to the warlike and barbaric marches from the relatively urban and pacific interior; and in Russian history, again, this shift of the centre of gravity was

case of a Mahayanian Buddhist monastery in Japan taking to arms dates from A.D. 961 (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. i, p. 266; compare the present Study, V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 304, footnote 4, below). The minting of coins in Japan ceased in A.D. 958 and was not resumed until A.D. 1587 (Murdoch, op. cit., pp. 191 and 496). One result of the military revolution at Kyoto in A.D. 1156 was the infliction of the death penalty at the Imperial Court for the first time in 346 years (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. i, p. 299). The first recorded case of the practice of hara-kiri dates from A.D. 1170 (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. i, p. 312). In fact, the overt breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in the twelfth century A.C. was heralded by a relapse into barbarism which began as early as the ninth century (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. i, p. 265). The modern Western student of Japanese history whom we are here following sums up this relapse in the formula that in the ninth century Japan reverted to the condition in which she had been before the establishment of a political constitution of the Far Eastern pattern, *à la T'ang*, in A.D. 645 (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. i, p. 263). In terms of a later chapter of the present Part of this Study (IV. C (iii) (b) 1, pp. 133-7, below) we might describe the Japanese *coup d'état* of A.D. 645 as a revolutionary effect of the impact of the new forces of the Far Eastern Civilization on the old institutions of a Japanese barbarism; and on the same showing the *coups* of A.D. 1156 and 1160 and 1183-5 might be described as a counter-revolutionary reaction of this barbarism against a civilization which had not, in the event, proved strong enough to overcome it in its new domain in the north-eastern marches. For the religious consequences of the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan in the latter part of the twelfth century of the Christian Era see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 96-103, below.

¹ See loc. cit. on p. 94, footnote 1, above.

accompanied by a breakdown of the transplanted civilization, which was unable to stand the aggravation of an alien social climate that was distinctly adverse even at its mildest. In the Russian case there is no definite event, like the Japanese revolutions of A.D. 1156-85, to mark the breakdown; but the change in the Russian situation which brought the breakdown with it was taking place approximately at, or towards, the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian Era,¹ and its completion was openly recognized in A.D. 1157, when Vladímir, in the Volga Basin, supplanted Kiev as the seat of the (now no more than titular) prince-suzerain of All the Russias.² The Russian 'Time of 'Troubles', in our sense of the term, was thus in full swing by the time when Batu appeared on the scene to take advantage of it; and 'the beginning of evils' in Russia was the work, not of Mongol, but of Russian hands.

In the histories of the declines and falls of the Hindu and Andean and Babylonian civilizations the process of assimilation into the tissues of an alien body social supervened, as in the cases of Japan and Russia, when the declining societies were in their universal states and before these universal states had reached the normal term of their existence. In these other three cases, however, the process took a more catastrophic turn; for the statesmen of the declining societies did not remain masters of the situation even to the extent of being able to accomplish their own social metamorphosis on their own initiative; and they did not succeed in preserving their universal states, as the Russians preserved the Romanov Empire and the Japanese preserved the Tokugawa Shogunate, by transforming them into states members of an alien political comity. In all three cases the declining society suffered an alien military conquest, and the universal state in which it had previously been embodied was superseded by a new polity which was imposed by the conquerors.

In Hindu history one such alien polity, imposed by conquest, has been the British Rāj; and the brief century of this British Rāj may still shine in retrospect with the serene beauty of an 'Indian Summer'—and this perhaps even in Indian eyes. For the British

¹ This is the date suggested by Kliutschewski, W. [Kluhevski, V.]: *Geschichte Russlands*, vol. i (Berlin 1925, Obelisk-Verlag), p. 166, and by Mirsky, Prince D. S., in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. vii (Cambridge 1932, University Press), p. 609. In the words of the latter of these two authorities,

'The decisive turning-point in the history of Kiev is the last third of the eleventh century, when the Cumans, favoured by the feuds of the princes, some of whom led them as allies into Russia, secured their control over the Steppe. It was then that the Lower Dniepr ceased to be an avenue to Greece. . . . The sack of Kiev [in A.D. 1169] and the refusal of Andrei to fix his residence there is only a dramatic moment in a long process of degradation.'

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 154 and 158-9, above.

Rāj was only founded after the antecedent universal state of the Hindu World had broken down into an anarchy which has made the eighteenth century of the Christian Era as evil a memory in Hindu history as the third century was in the history of the Roman Empire. It was this post-Mughal anarchy, and not the *Pax Mogulica* which preceded it, that the British conquest of India swept away by force. The *Pax Britannica*, which the British conquerors then imposed, has been more effective, more pervasive, and, in Western eyes at any rate, more beneficent than the peace which had been imposed, two centuries earlier, by Akbar (*imperabat* A.D. 1556-1605); and if the British and the Mughal régimes in India are to be compared, it cannot be argued that, even if the British régime is superior in practical achievement, the Mughal régime is morally more admirable in virtue of being a native product; for the founders of the Mughal Rāj were as utterly alien as the founders of the British Rāj were from the native social order of Hinduism; and a Bābur, cast away in Hindustan through the fortunes of war in Central Asia, was just as homesick for the temperate clime of his native Farghānā as any English sojourner in India has ever been for Kentish hop-fields or for Yorkshire moors.¹ On this point the Mughal Rāj can have no greater sentimental appeal than the British Rāj to an unprejudiced Hindu mind; and although, nevertheless, a favourable verdict upon the British Rāj may be almost impossible for a Hindu of our generation to accept—particularly when it proceeds from a Western observer's mouth—the British Rāj, as it passes, may be content to await the verdict of History; for the future consensus of enlightened and disinterested opinion seems unlikely to convict the British Rāj of responsibility for the breakdown of the Hindu Civilization. The future historian seems more likely to pronounce that, at a time when the Hindu Society was already far advanced in its decline, and when the Mughal attempt to provide the Hindu World with a universal state had miscarried, the British Rāj gave India a political unity and efficiency and stability which neither Mughal nor Hindu had ever succeeded in giving her; and that, when the assimilation of the Hindu Society into the body social of the West was already inevitable, and when the only question left open was the way in which the metamorphosis was to take place, the existence of the British Rāj gave India an opportunity of entering the Great Society on the relatively favourable terms which had been secured—by

¹ In the Indian chapters of Bābur's memoirs there are repeated expressions of the author's dislike for the Hindu World upon which he had forcibly inflicted himself; and, if these querulous passages were quoted anonymously, in isolation from their context, they might easily be taken for the indiscretions of some disgruntled twentieth-century English lieutenant-governor of an Indian province.

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native and not by alien initiative—for Russia and Japan, instead of having to undergo the tribulation which the Greeks and the Turks and the Chinese had undergone on their thorny paths towards the goal of Westernization.

The acquittal of the British Rāj, however, would not necessarily imply that the responsibility for the breakdown of the Hindu Civilization lies on the Hindus' own heads; for if the overseas British invader of India cannot be made to serve as the scapegoat, it may still be possible to conscript the overland Turkish invader and to cast him, in the Englishman's place, for the scapegoat's part. Turkish Akbar, who has perhaps deserved well of Hinduism in endowing the Hindu World with a first attempt at a universal state, was after all the grandson of Turkish Bābur; and Bābur was the last of a long line of Turkish invaders from Central Asia who had made havoc in India from the last quarter of the tenth to the first quarter of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era.¹ Is this series of Turkish invasions the cause to which the breakdown of the Hindu Civilization is to be ascribed? There can be little doubt that, if the English had never made their appearance on the Indian stage or were not playing a prominent part on it to-day, the twentieth-century Hindu apologist for the decline and fall of Hinduism would be as vociferous as the twentieth-century Greek apologist for the decline and fall of Orthodox Christendom in denouncing 'the unspeakable Turk' as the guilty party.

Manifestly the series of Turkish intruders upon India which begins with Mahmūd the destroyer and culminates in Akbar the preserver does correspond historically to the series of Turkish intruders upon Orthodox Christendom which begins with the Saljūq raiders in Anatolia and culminates in the Ottoman founders of an Orthodox Christian universal state; and both series correspond to the succession of Khitan and Kin and Mongols in the history of the decline and fall of the Far Eastern Civilization in China. But, in the light of our previous findings in regard to these other cases, the very admission of the legitimacy of the historical parallel establishes an *a priori* presumption against the legitimacy of the indictment of the Turks as the assassins of the Hindu Civilization. We have ascertained that the Far Eastern Civilization in China and the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Anatolia and in the Balkan Peninsula were the victims, not of their respective Eurasian Nomad invaders, but of their own fratricidal violence; and we have been able to bring forward good evidence of the fatal blows which they

¹ Sebukteġin, the Turkish predecessor of the great Turkish raider Mahmūd of Ghaznah, conquered Kābul in A.D. 975 and began to raid the Panjab in A.D. 986-7 (see II. D (iii), vol. ii, p. 78, above). Bābur descended upon Hindustan from Afghanistan in A.D. 1519 (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 149, above).

had each inflicted upon themselves with their own hands before the invaders arrived. If we now turn back to Hindu history with these analogies in our minds, we shall find that the plot of the Hindu tragedy has followed the same pattern.

The effective conquest of the heart of the Hindu World by the Turks did not take place until the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era (A.D. 1191-1204), when the Turkish aggressors broke through the Hindu marches along the line of the Jumna and swept right down the Ganges Valley to the coast of Bengal.¹ It is this far-reaching and long-enduring Turkish occupation of Hindustan that corresponds to the Hellenic conquest of the same region by the Greek princes of Bactria during the first half of the second century B.C. The raids of Sebukteġin and Mahmūd of Ghaznah and their successors during the two centuries preceding the great Turkish 'break through' cut no deeper into the flesh of the contemporary Indian body social, and had no greater effect upon the course of contemporary Indian history, than Alexander's raid in 326-325 B.C. In the Turkish intrusion upon Hindu soil the great 'break through' of A.D. 1191 was the decisive event; and when we examine the immediate antecedents of this Hindu disaster on the Hindu side of the previous borderline between the Hindu and the Syriac World, we observe that, about the middle of the twelfth century of the Christian Era, the Hindu Powers in the marches (that is to say, in the territories now comprised in the United Provinces of the British Indian Empire) had fallen into an internecine warfare with one another.²

It was this fatal division of the House of Hinduism against itself that made it possible for the Turkish highwaymen to force an entry. The earlier onslaught of an alien aggressor in the shape of the Primitive Muslim Arabs, who had assailed the Hindu World in the eighth century of the Christian Era, had been effectively repulsed in the ninth century by a union of Hindu forces, from Gujerat to Oude, under the leadership of the Prātihāra Rājputs;³ and this successful self-defence of the Hindu Society at this earlier date

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 131, above. In strict accuracy it must be observed that the leaders of this victorious Turkish offensive against the Hindu World were not Turks but Ghūris: i.e. Iranian mountaineers from the highlands between Ghaznah and Herāt and Qandahār. These Ghūris, however, were followed as well as preceded by Turkish war-lords (e.g. the Turkish 'Slave-Kings' at Delhi: see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 30 and p. 31, footnote 1, above); and from first to last it was the impetus of the Turkish eruption out of the Eurasian Steppe that gave the whole movement its driving power.

² See Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 384-7. If we wish to identify the breakdown of the Hindu Civilization with some particular event, we may perhaps equate it with the abduction, circa A.D. 1175, of the daughter of Rāja Jaichand, the King of Kanauj and Benares, by the King of Ajmīr and Delhi, Rāja Prithirāj. If we do not choose to see in this lady a Hindu Helen of Troy, an alternative date would be A.D. 1182—a year which was signalized by Prithirāj's victory over Rāja Chandel, the King of Bundelcund.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 130-1, above.

100 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS stands out in instructive contrast to the débâcle in which the descendants of the Rājputs went down before the Turkish successors of the Arabs some four hundred years later; for the latent strength of the Hindu Society cannot have been so great in A.D. 800, when this society was still in its infancy, as it must have been in A.D. 1200, when the society was in the spring of its youth, while on the other side the religious enthusiasm of Primitive Islam and the material resources of the Umayyad Caliphate made the Arab invaders who were baffled in the ninth century a far more formidable military power in themselves than the Turks who were able, in the twelfth century, to carry all before them. Even as late as A.D. 991, when the first warning trickle of the imminent Turkish flood had just begun to spill over the watershed of the Hindu Kush and to run down into the Kābul Valley, a coalition of Rājput princes was able, in the strength of its united forces, to push its way up the Kurram Valley against the current of the descending Turkish stream.¹ These historical facts may be taken as presumptive evidence that if in the twelfth century the Rājputs had not turned their swords suicidally upon themselves, the Hindu World might have continued, without any undue drain upon its energies, to keep the Turks at bay and to work out its own destinies under its own control. And thus the verdict proves, on appeal, to be suicide instead of assassination in this case also.

In Babylonian history the indigenous universal state was 'the Neo-Babylonian Empire' of Nabopolassar and Nebuchadnezzar and Nabonidus, which united in a single body politic all that remained of the Babylonian Society after the downfall of the Assyrian Power at the close of the seventh century B.C.² In this case the alien polity imposed by conquest was the Achaemenian Empire, which engulfed the Neo-Babylonian Empire when Cyrus took Babylon in 539 B.C. Under the Achaemenian régime and under the régime of the Seleucidae, who were the Achaemenids' Hellenic successors in Asia, the Babylonian Society was gradually absorbed into the tissues of the Syriac body social; for the Achaemenian Empire served as an instrument for the propagation of the Syriac and not of the Babylonian culture;³ and the solvent of Hellenism, which was introduced into a decaying Babylonian World by the instrumentality of Alexander and his successors, worked, contrary to Hellenic intention,⁴ for the profit of the Syriac culture by accelera-

¹ See, Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 382.

² For this Neo-Babylonian Empire see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 138, above.

³ This perhaps explains why it was that the Babylonians never became reconciled to the Achaemenian régime (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 94 and p. 123, with footnote 2; V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 347-8; and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 442, below).

⁴ Alexander appears to have presented himself to the Babylonians, and to have been

ting the process of Babylonian disintegration. In consequence the Babylonian culture became almost entirely extinct in the last century B.C., and thereafter the Syriac culture occupied all but one patch of the ground that had once borne a Babylonian crop.¹ On this showing, the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus in 539 B.C. started a train of historical events which ended in the Babylonian Society's finally losing its identity some five hundred years later. Yet no historian will be tempted to equate this last chapter in the decline and fall of the Babylonian Civilization with its original breakdown, or to ascribe to the comparatively mild and conservative—albeit alien and unpopular—Achaemenian régime the destruction which was manifestly brought upon the Babylonian World, at a time when the Achaemenidae had not yet been heard of, by the native militarism of the Assyrians.

The manifest cause of the breakdown of the Babylonian Civilization was the secular conflict between Babylonia and Assyria, which were the two principal Powers of the Babylonian World; and the perennial sources of this fatal domestic strife were the perpetual aggressiveness of the militarily superior Assyrian Power and the perpetual recalcitrance of the culturally superior Babylonia against the forcible imposition of an Assyrian yoke.² This domestic

accepted by them, in the guise of a liberator from the Achaemenian yoke; and thereafter there was a genuine fraternization—mainly on scientific and religious grounds—between the Hellenic and the Babylonian societies (see V.C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 94 and p. 123, footnote 2; V.C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 347–8; and V.C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 442, below).

¹ As a curiosity of history, we may notice that, for nearly a thousand years after the extinction of the Babylonian Civilization elsewhere, a fossilized remnant of it survived in the outlying but ancient Babylonian city of Harran in North-Western Mesopotamia on the River Balikh, a Sumerian foundation whose patron divinity was the Moon-God Sin. At Harran the worship of the pantheon which the Babylonian Society had inherited from its Sumerian predecessors (see I.C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 115, above) was kept up, without a break, until the Age of the 'Abbasid Caliphate; and the 'Abbasid Caliphs were captivated by the mathematical and philosophical learning which these strange survivors of a vanished culture had partly inherited from their own forebears and partly acquired from their prolonged contact with Hellenism. In consequence these undisguised 'idolaters' were treated by the Commanders of the Faithful with an indulgence which they were not always so ready to show to the officially tolerated Jewish and Christian 'People of the Book'. It is remarkable that this fossil of the Babylonian culture should have been preserved at a point which had been perilously exposed to the impact of the Syriac Civilization from first to last. The neighbourhood of Harran lay right in the track of the Aramaean assaults upon Assyria in the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C. (see II.D (v), vol. ii, pp. 134–5, above), while the next city above Harran on the bank of the River Balikh was Edessa, the cradle of Syriac Christianity and the base of operations from which the Nestorian branch of this Syriac Christendom propagated itself to the Yaman in one direction and to China in the other. It is extraordinary that this Edessan missionary movement should have been still kept at bay by the walls of Harran after it had succeeded in making a lodgement within the walls of Najrân and of Si Ngan, and that the Babylonian culture should have lingered on by the waters of the Balikh for nearly a thousand years after it had died out by the waters of Babylon. Yet Harran is doubly distinguished in Babylonian history as the last stronghold both of the Assyrian Army and of the Babylonian Civilization.

² Psychologically the feud between Babylonia and Assyria, which tore the Babylonian World in two from the ninth to the seventh century B.C., may be compared with the feud between the East Roman Empire and the Bulgarian Empire which devastated Orthodox Christendom in the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era (see IV.C (iii) (c) 2 (b), pp. 382–93, below).

struggle in the Babylonian World became serious about the middle of the eighth century B.C., when the Assyrians seem deliberately to have set themselves the superhuman military task of conquering Babylonia with one hand and Syria simultaneously with the other.¹ The Assyro-Babylonian feud became suicidally destructive when the Chaldaean tribesmen who had drifted into Babylonia out of the North Arabian Steppe took up the cudgels on their adopted country's behalf. When the Chaldaean chieftain Merodach-Baladan made himself master of Babylon in 721 B.C. and set Assyria at defiance, he started a hundred years' war which only ended with the destruction of the Assyrian state and the extermination of the Assyrian people.²

Thus the Assyrian militarism brought ruin upon the whole Babylonian World before it annihilated Assyria herself; and there was no compensation for the Babylonian Civilization in the military conquests that Assyria made incidentally at the Syriac Society's expense; for we have noticed already that the Syriac Civilization actually gained in the long run by the treatment which it suffered at the Assyrians' hands.³ The Assyrians' policy of securing their conquests by uprooting the conquered peoples and deporting them to the opposite extremities of the Assyrian *Machtgebiet* had the unintended effect of inoculating the Medes and Persians with germs of Syriac culture; and these Medes and Persians were to be the lords and masters of South-Western Asia. In the last round of the Assyro-Babylonian fratricidal conflict the Babylonians were constrained to take the Medes for their allies and to leave the lion's share of the Assyrian spoils in Median hands; and the Persian neighbours and cousins and supplanters of the Medes rounded off the Median Empire by adding the Neo-Babylonian Empire to it. This rise of the Medes and Persians to political supremacy in South-Western Asia naturally made the fortune of the Syriac Civilization to which these Iranian barbarians had been converted by the Assyrian militarists' deportees; and in these circumstances the capture of Babylon by Cyrus in 539 B.C. spelled not only the immediate disappearance of the Babylonian universal state but also the ultimate extinction of the Babylonian Civilization itself.

This crowning misfortune, however, had been brought upon the Babylonian Society by no other hands than its own; and the enormities of the Assyrian militarism were the suicidal acts.⁴ If the

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), p. 476, below.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 135-6, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), in the present volume, pp. 477-84, below.

³ On this point see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79-82; II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 137-8; and III. C (i) (α), vol. iii, p. 141, above.

⁴ It is true that these suicidal acts were manifestations and consequences of the militaristic spirit that inspired them, and that we have not found the ultimate explanation of the

Assyrians had not outraged the Babylonians and carried the Syrians away captive in the eighth century B.C., it is improbable that Cyrus would have entered Babylon as a conqueror in 539 B.C., and it is certain that, even if history had followed its actual course to that extent, the cultural consequences of Cyrus's military triumph would have been utterly different from what they actually were. For if no Syrian deportees had ever been planted by Assyrian militarists on the Iranian Plateau, then the Iranian barbarians would eventually have descended upon Babylon, if at all, as converts not to the Syriac but to the Babylonian Civilization, and in the metropolis of their adopted culture they would have made it their mission not to destroy but to fulfil.

In Andean history the indigenous universal state was the Empire of the Incas, under which the whole domain of the Andean Society both on the Coast and on the Plateau (save for the country of the Chibchas in the territory of the present Latin-American republic of Colombia) had been united in a single body politic before the advent of the Spanish *conquistadores*. The sudden, violent, and complete overthrow of the Inca Empire by the Spaniards is often cited as an undoubted instance—and, in fact, as the classic example—of the destruction of a civilization through the impact of an external human force.

It is, of course, manifestly true that the Inca Empire was destroyed by the impact of the Spaniards; and it is probable that, if the peoples of our Western World had never found their way across the Atlantic, the Inca Empire would have lasted several centuries longer; for at the moment in the second quarter of the sixteenth century of our era when the Spaniards destroyed it the Inca Empire was at the maximum of its territorial extent; it was only just beginning to show signs of having passed the zenith of its power; and it had only been fulfilling its political mission as an Andean universal state for about a century, if we equate the establishment of the Andean universal state with the Inca conquest of Chimú in the reign of the Inca Pachacutec (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1400-48).¹ The destruction of this majestic and efficient and beneficent Andean political institution does undoubtedly lie at the Spaniards' door; but the crime of having destroyed the Andean universal

breakdown of the Babylonian Civilization until we have traced this Assyrian militarism back to its origins. In an earlier passage of this Study (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 134-5, above) we have found the genesis of Assyrian militarism in the long struggle of Assyria against her Aramaean invaders in the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C.; and these Aramaeans were, of course, the north-eastern vanguard of the then nascent Syriac Civilization; but it would not be admissible to argue from these premises that the ultimate responsibility for the breakdown of the Babylonian Civilization lies at the Syriac Civilization's door; for the Aramaeans merely presented the Assyrians with a challenge, and the Assyrians themselves must bear the responsibility for their own response.

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 121-2, above.

state is not the same crime as the destruction of the Andean Civilization itself. This second and more heinous crime is attributed to the Spaniards by a confusion of thought; and this confusion is an uncritically repeated commonplace which dates from the period, before the days of archaeological research in the Andean area, when the Empire of the Incas was the only phase in which the Andean Civilization was known to the scholars of our Western World.

This error is less excusable to-day, when our knowledge of Andean history has been vastly extended and illuminated by the progress of archaeological discovery. For we know now that the military and political rise of the Incas, so far from being identical with the cultural rise of the Andean Civilization, was actually a late incident in that civilization's decline and fall. Even on the Plateau the work of the Incas was merely an imperfect revival, after centuries of decadence, of an earlier highland culture which has left its unsurpassed monument in Tiahuanaco; and this earlier highland culture, which was never rivalled by any later achievements in the same region, was itself no original manifestation of creative power, but was derived from a still earlier culture on the Coast. The creative responses to challenges, which brought the Andean Civilization to birth in its two coastal cradles of Chimu and Nasca, date at least from the beginning of the Christian Era, some fifteen hundred years before the Spaniards' arrival.¹ In this historical perspective, which the enterprise of our latest Western archaeologists has recently opened up before our eyes, it becomes evident that the century of the Incas' undisputed supremacy in the Andean World was not the 'Golden Age' which it appeared to be in the eyes of the Spanish chroniclers who followed the Spanish *conquistadores*.

The chroniclers salved their private consciences and flattered their national pride by building a magnificent sepulchre for the mighty empire which the *conquistadores* had killed; but to the eye of a Western historian of our later generation, who can view the century of Inca supremacy, from a farther distance, with less sentiment and with more knowledge, the *Pax Incaica* reveals the unmistakable tokens of an 'Indian Summer' in which the landscape is already wintry and the sunlight pale. We can be certain that the true summer of Andean history had turned to autumn in the earlier age, some five hundred years back, when our archaeological evidence tells us that the highland culture of Tiahuanaco and the contemporary culture on the Coast went into simultaneous decline. It is true that Archaeology, which in some matters tells us so much, is apt to be tantalizingly silent on the questions which happen to be

¹ For an outline of the lineaments of Andean history, as these have been brought to light by our archaeologists, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 119-23, above.

of capital importance for an understanding of history; and the positive acts which caused the breakdown of the Andean Civilization in that age still remain beyond our knowledge. Yet Archaeology does afford us the important negative information that, before the arrival of the Spaniards, the Andean World was a social universe in itself which had no direct intercourse with other civilizations and knew no neighbours beyond its own external proletariat of Amazonian and Araucanian barbarians. We may fairly infer that the Andean Civilization, like so many of its sisters, received its mortal wound from its own hands; and we may go so far as to conjecture that the 'beginning of evils' here was a fratricidal conflict between the People of the Mountain and the People of the Shore.

When we turn to the histories of the Central American and the Islamic Civilization, we observe that the process of assimilation by an alien civilization has overtaken both these societies while they have still been in their 'Time of Troubles', before they have entered upon a universal state at all.

In the history of the Central American decline and fall Cortez found the Central American 'Time of Troubles' in its final paroxysm and an indigenous universal state on the point of being established by the Aztec Power which had already completed the society's ruin through a worse-than-Assyrian Aztec militarism.¹ At the moment of Cortez' arrival Tlaxcala was the only important Central American Power that was left for the Aztecs to subdue. Yet Cortez was in time to overthrow the Aztecs by joining forces with the Tlaxcaltecs; and he forestalled the establishment of an indigenous Central American universal state by turning the domain of the Central American Civilization, at one all-conquering stroke, into the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain.² In the history of the Islamic decline and fall the intrusive Western Civilization gained the upper hand, and forestalled the natural course of Islamic events by giving it a Western turn, at a rather earlier stage in the declining society's 'Time of Troubles'. If we equate the date of the breakdown of both the Mexic and the Yucatec Society with the establishment of the Toltec mercenaries' domination over Yucatan—and the consequent unification of the Yucatec with the Mexic World into a single Central American Society—at the close of the twelfth century of the Christian Era,³ we must reckon that the

¹ This Aztec militarism seems to have become rampant circa A.D. 1376 (Spinden, H. J.: *The Ancient Civilisations of Mexico and Central America* (New York 1922, American Museum of Natural History), p. 183). The Aztec military ascendancy over the Mexican Lakes Basin had been established by A.D. 1428 (Spence, L.: *The Civilisation of Ancient Mexico* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), p. 38) or A.D. 1430 (Joyce, T. A.: *Mexican Archaeology* (London 1914, Lee Warner), p. 21).

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 120, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 123-4, above.

Central American 'Time of Troubles' had already entered upon its fourth century before it was cut short by the Spanish conquest, while the last quarter of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, which was the epoch at which the pressure of the West became the governing factor in Islamic history, was separated by a span of less than three centuries from the schism in the Iranic World and the establishment of the Ottoman domination over the Arabic countries at the beginning of the sixteenth century: the two historic events which we have taken as the tokens of the Iranic breakdown.¹

This difference in the stage at which the decisive Western intrusion took place may partly account for the difference in the subsequent histories of the Central American and the Islamic Society. In the Central American World the abortive—but only just abortive—indigenous Aztec universal state was not simply ruled out by the Spanish conquest but was given an alien substitute in the shape of the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain which the conquerors established on the ruins of Montezuma's imperial ambitions; and, thanks to this consummation and consolidation, by Spanish hands, of the work of political unification which had been carried so far towards completion, before the Spaniards arrived, by the force of Aztec arms, the Central American World was enabled to enter the political comity of Western states as a single political unit when, just three centuries after Cortez' conquest of Tenochtitlan, the Spanish Empire in this quarter was replaced by its present 'successor-state', the Mexican Republic.² On the other hand in the Islamic World, where the process of 'Westernization' gained the upper hand before the establishment of any indigenous Islamic universal state was even within sight, there has been no Western substitute for an indigenous universal state, and no practical possibility of the Islamic Society entering the political comity of Western states as a single body politic. The political Pan-Islamism which was mooted at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth

¹ For the schism in the Iranic World at this epoch, and for the simultaneous incorporation of the Arabic Society into the Iranic Society, see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, above.

² The Mexican Republic has always included within its frontiers the former domain of the Yucatec Civilization in the Peninsula of Yucatan, as well as the former domain of the Mexic Civilization on the Mexican Plateau. The territories of the British colony of Honduras and of the six Latin-American republics that now occupy the rest of the isthmus between Mexico and Colombia all lie outside the borders of the *ci-devant* Yucatec and Mexic worlds, though the domain of the Mayan Civilization, to which both the Yucatec and the Mexic Society were 'affiliated', is now comprised in the territories of Guatemala and the two Hondurases. It is noteworthy that although the Mexic and Yucatec societies coalesced into a single Central American Society more than seven hundred years ago, and though Mexico and Yucatan have been also politically united now for some 400 years, first under Spanish and latterly under Mexican rule, they still remain geographically two worlds apart, with no practicable lines of communication between them except by sea across the Mexican Gulf.

centuries of the Christian Era has been a shortlived dream;¹ and the Islamic countries have pushed their way into the ranks of the Great Society each for themselves, in a scramble in which the Devil of Western or Russian Imperialism has successfully overtaken the hindermost in the Maghrib and the Caucasus and Transcaspia and Transoxania. The Arabic 'successor-states' of the Ottoman Empire, which have evaded or shaken off the political toils of the protectorates or mandates which British or French policy has sought to impose upon them, have emerged as the parochial kingdoms of Egypt and 'Irāq and Sa'ūdī Arabia and San'ā;² and the Persian Empire, which has been the parochial outcome of Shah Ismā'il's abortive attempt to found an oecumenical Shi'i Power, has succeeded in these latter days in making its own entry into the Great Society almost intact³ as a Persian national state.⁴

Thus, in both Islamic and Central American history, the process of assimilation has supervened—under rather different conditions and with rather different results in the two cases—at a distinctly earlier stage of the decline and fall than in the histories of any of the other civilizations whose ultimate fate it has likewise been to lose their identity in that of our omnivorous Civilization of the West. Yet in these two histories also it is manifest that the process of 'Westernization' has been the end of the decline and not its beginning. In both cases we can trace the beginning of the 'Time of Troubles' to internal catastrophes which occurred—at the close of the twelfth century in Central America and at the opening of the sixteenth century in the Islamic World—several centuries before the pressure of the West became overwhelming. In the Iranic and Arabic worlds in the generation of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī and the Ottoman Pādishāh Selīm I the Western factor was a negligible quantity; while in the Mexic and Yucatec worlds at the close of the twelfth century the very existence of another world beyond the Atlantic was quite unknown. On this showing, the Mexic and Iranic societies are to be added to our already long list of suicides; and it is clear that the Yucatec Society falls within the same category; for it was the outbreak of a fratricidal conflict between the

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 81-2, above.

² By the time when this chapter was being revised for the press in A.D. 1938 the number of Arabic parochial states-members of a Great Society on a Western basis was in prospect of being increased by the addition of a Syrian and a Lebanese Republic and a Palestinian State in which the major part of Cisjordanian Palestine was to be united with the existing Principality of Transjordan.

³ The most serious territorial diminution which the Persian Empire has suffered since the definitive Ottoman conquest of 'Irāq has been the loss of the Transcaucasian territory which was conquered by Russia in the early nineteenth century and which now constitutes a Republic of Azerbaijan which is one of the constituent states-members of the U.S.S.R.

⁴ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 254-5, above, for the predisposition of the Persians towards our modern Western Nationalism as a result of their own history since the time of Shah Ismā'il.

108 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS
Yucatec city-states that opened the way for the Toltec domination in Yucatan.¹

We have now dealt with seventeen cases, and we are left with thirteen still to consider: the five arrested civilizations; the four abortive civilizations; the Arabic, Hittite, and Mayan civilizations; and our own Civilization of the West.

The Western Civilization may fairly be left out of account; for we cannot tell, in our generation, whether this civilization has already broken down or whether it is still in growth;² and in these circumstances it would be premature to discuss the cause of a breakdown that is still an unproven possibility and not an established fact.

As for the Mayan Civilization, we do not know the cause of the break-up of 'the First Empire' of the Mayas in Guatemala, which was the Mayan universal state. *A fortiori* we are ignorant of the cause of the foregoing breakdown of the Mayan Civilization.³ We do know, however, that the broken-down Mayan Civilization did not eventually lose its identity through assimilation into the social tissues of an alien society. It found its end in the alternative way by becoming 'apparented' to two new societies, the Yucatec Society and the Mexic. In this last chapter of Mayan history, in so far as Archaeology has revealed it to us, we can perceive no trace of any alien society's intervention; and indeed the whole history of the Mayan Civilization, in so far as it is known to us at all, is markedly pacific. It is only on the north-western fringes of the Mayan World that there is any archaeological evidence for the practice of the art of war; and here it seems merely to have been a border warfare against outer barbarians. There is no evidence either of fratricidal warfare between the Mayan city-states themselves or of military collisions with any alien society of the Mayan Society's own calibre. And thus, while we have to confess that the cause of the breakdown of the Mayan Civilization is still unknown to us, we may guess with some confidence that this cause will not prove, if it one day comes to light, to have been the impact of an alien human force.

On the other hand, violent collisions with alien human forces play as prominent a part in the last chapter of Hittite history as in the latter ends of the Central American and Andean civilizations. The Empire of Khatti, which exercised not merely a hegemony but at least a suzerainty and perhaps even an outright sovereignty

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 124, above.

² We do know that our Western Civilization has not yet entered into a universal state, but we do not know whether it is or is not already in a 'Time of Troubles'. On this question see further I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 36-7, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 313-5, as well as Part XII, below.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 125-6, and II. D (vii), Annex I, in vol. ii, above.

over the greater part of the Hittite World throughout the fifteenth, fourteenth, and thirteenth centuries B.C., was violently and suddenly overthrown, in the early years of the twelfth century B.C., by a back-wash of the last and greatest wave of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung in the Levant;¹ and the fate of the Hittite Society itself was involved in this overthrow of the Khatti State. From the twelfth century onwards this society only survived in a few refugee communities in Cilicia and Northern Syria; and even this local survival only prolonged the Hittite Society's existence for about five hundred years; for the Hittite fossils on the Asiatic Continent were absorbed into the Syriac body social during or after the age of the Assyrian militarism, while their overseas colonies in Italy—if we are right in attributing this Hittite origin to the Etruscans²—were drawn into the current of the Hellenic Civilization at about the same date.

Thus the Hittite Society undoubtedly received its *coup de grâce* from an alien sword; and if we now trace Hittite history backwards from the time of the crushing blow which felled the Empire of Khatti *circa* 1200/1190 B.C., we shall find a convincing explanation for the utter collapse of the Khatti Power under the impact of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung in the intense exhaustion of the Hittite body social after a long-drawn-out conflict with another,

¹ See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93, 101, and 113-14, above. In the opinion of Monsieur Eugène Cavaignac (*Le Problème Hittite* (Paris 1936, Leroux), pp. 128-9) the war-bands which sacked and devastated the Khatti capital Khattusas (Boghazköi) and overthrew the Khatti State were not identical with those that travelled, partly by ship and partly by ox-waggon, along the Levantine coasts from the south-east corner of the Aegean to the north-east frontier of Egypt. Cavaignac points out (in op. cit., p. 2) that Khattusas lay, not at the heart of the Hittite World, but at its north-western extremity, where it served as a shield and buckler for the interior against the barbarians beyond the pale; and on this showing the Khatti capital ought to have been cited, in an earlier passage of this Study (II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 112-208), as an illustration of the stimulus of pressures, side by side with Thebes, Peking, Babylon, Samarkand, Mycenae, Constantinople, Vienna, London, Paris, Tenochtitlan, and Cuzco. Cavaignac suggests (op. cit., p. 130) that Khattusas was eventually overwhelmed by the Anatolian barbarians whom the fortress-capital had so long and so strenuously held at bay, when these local barbarians were reinforced, from the farther side of the Straits, by European recruits. 'Ce qu'il est permis de supposer, c'est que derrière les deux invasions—invasion maritime, invasion continentale—il y a eu un mouvement plus ou moins ample venu des profondeurs de la péninsule balkanique. L'analogie de l'invasion gauloise du iii^e siècle, inondant d'un côté la Grèce, de l'autre l'Asie-Mineure, se présente d'elle-même à l'esprit.' An acceptance of Cavaignac's view does not imply an abandonment of the supposition that the overthrow of Khatti was an incidental consequence of the dissolution of the Minoan World; for the continental no less than the maritime stream of invasion is to be explained as a part of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung.

² On the question of the origin of the Etruscans see I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 114-15, with Annex II, 2, above. See also the very interesting discussion of the problem by Mr. Christopher Dawson in *The Age of the Gods* (reissue: London 1933, Sheed & Ward), pp. 365-84. Mr. Dawson suggests that not only the Etruscans but the Veneti and the Liburni may have been of Anatolian origin, and that the Central Italian Iron-Age culture of Villanova and Novilara may have been introduced by these peoples. On this theory the Etruscans would have arrived in Italy not in the eighth century B.C., as contemporaries and rivals of the Phoenician and Greek colonists in the Western Mediterranean, but in the twelfth century, as contemporaries and companions in misfortune of the North Syrian Hittite refugees from the wreck of the Khatti Empire.

and a far more formidable, alien force. The Khatti Power had courted the destruction which duly overtook it at the north-western barbarians' hands at the beginning of the twelfth century B.C. by fighting a hundred years' war with 'the New Empire' of Egypt for the possession of Syria. This military struggle, which ended inconclusively in the partition of Syria between the two belligerents in the peace settlement of 1278 B.C.,¹ was evidently more exhausting for the young and immature Hittite Society than it was for the veteran Egyptiac Society with its greater reserves of economic strength; and the difference between the respective conditions in which the Hittite and the Egyptiac Great Power emerged from their protracted conflict was demonstrated in a sensational way by the difference in their fortunes, three-quarters of a century later, when they both had to face the same ordeal of a human deluge from the north-west; for while the Empire of Khatti went down to destruction with a facility which was strangely out of keeping with its military tradition, 'the New Empire' of Egypt just succeeded in stemming the barbarian tide by mobilizing² and expending the last dregs of its social resources.³ Thus the Hittite Society ultimately paid with its very existence for its trial of strength with its Egyptiac neighbour; and this trial was not forced upon the Hittite Society but was wantonly incurred by it through its own temerity; for the hundred years' war was set in train by the aggression of the Khatti King Subbiluluma against the Egyptian dominions in Asia.

Subbiluluma reigned between about 1380 and 1346 B.C.; and this was only about two hundred years after the first emergence of the nascent Hittite Civilization out of the post-Sumeric social interregnum.⁴ If we are to regard Subbiluluma's reckless act of aggression against an older and tougher alien Power as 'the beginning of evils' in Hittite history, then this history seems to confront us with one instance in which a collision with the human environment, in the shape of an alien society, has been the cause of the original breakdown of a civilization and not merely the occasion of its ultimate extinction at the end of the last chapter in its decline and fall; for the hundred years' war between Khatti and Egypt,

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 114, above. Circa 1278 is Eduard Meyer's date for the treaty (see *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (1), second edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 479). On the other hand *The Cambridge Ancient History* (vol. ii, p. 149) dates the treaty 1272 B.C.

² For the fighting Pharaohs under whose leadership the Egyptiac Society stood at bay in this crisis, see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below.

³ Compare the respective fortunes of the Roman Empire and the Sasanian Empire when these two Powers were smitten simultaneously, by the impact of the Primitive Muslim Arab eruption, on the morrow of the great Romano-Persian Wars of A.D. 572-91 and A.D. 603-28. In this ordeal the Sasanian Empire collapsed completely, while the Roman Empire preserved its existence at the price of losing half its provinces and all its vitality.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 110-13, above.

which Subbilulyuma precipitated when the Hittite Society was just entering upon the third century of its history, led on, through the chain of cause-and-effect which has been traced above, to the annihilation of the Hittite Society at the beginning of the fifth century of its history by the Sea-Raiders.

At first sight this interpretation of Hittite history may appear to hold the field, since it may seem improbable *a priori* that the breakdown of the Hittite Civilization can have been brought about by some earlier event, before Subbilulyuma's time, when the civilization itself was less than two hundred years old. Yet this possibility cannot be ruled out of account in our present state of almost complete ignorance in regard to the history of the Hittite World in its earliest age; and, in the fragmentary information which we do possess, two facts stand out which suggest, when read together, that the disastrous collision of the Hittite World with the Egyptiac World in Subbilulyuma's reign may actually have been preceded by an even more disastrous domestic conflict within the bosom of the Hittite Society. The first of these two outstanding facts is the extreme local diversity of the nascent Hittite World: the wealth of local languages and the multiplicity of local states. In this respect the Hittite World stands at the opposite pole to the Egyptiac World, while it bears a striking resemblance to our own Western World at all stages of our Western history. The second outstanding fact in the first chapter of Hittite history is the precocious political unification of this polyglot and polycratic society under the sceptre of a single predominant military power, the Empire of Khatti.

This political predominance of Khatti in the Hittite World is already an accomplished fact by the time when the veil which shrouds the beginnings of Hittite history is lifted by the masterful hand of the Egyptian militarist Thothmes III (*imperabat solus circa 1480-1450 B.C.*);¹ and we do not know how Khatti's greatness was achieved. Yet, considering the manifest inclination of the Hittite Society towards local diversity and parochial autonomy, it seems unlikely that the political supremacy of Khatti can have been accepted by the other parochial Hittite states without a struggle; and, if we pursue our parallel between the Hittite World and Western Christendom, we shall find a suggestive counterpart of the precocious Empire of Khatti in the precocious empire which was established by Charlemagne. Charlemagne, as we know for a fact, met with resistance from the Lombards, and with still more strenuous resistance from the Saxons, in carrying out his policy of unification by force; and the effort of overcoming this resistance

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 111, above.

subjected the nascent Western Society to so severe a strain that the whole Carolingian structure quickly collapsed. Let us imagine for a moment that, in the ninth century of the Christian Era, Western Christendom had not been thus happily relieved of the Carolingian incubus by the collapse of the top-heavy building under its own weight. Let us imagine that the Carolingian Empire had lasted on as 'a going concern', and that a dynastic appetite for military conquest, which had been whetted by Charlemagne's own relatively easy victory over the Lombards, had tempted Charlemagne's successors to take advantage of the recrudescence of the Iconoclastic Conflict at Constantinople in order to lay their covetous Frankish hands upon the outlying provinces of the East Roman Empire in Calabria and Sicily and Sardinia. Supposing that this hypothetical act of Carolingian aggression had unexpectedly precipitated a Franco-Roman hundred years' war: in this imaginary reconstruction of our Western history in the ninth century of our Era we may conceivably have found a parallel to the unknown events in Hittite history which preceded the establishment of the Empire of Khatti and led on to the hundred years' war between Khatti and Egypt.

At any rate we cannot be sure that the Hittite Society had not already ruined itself in its infancy, during this obscure first phase of its history, before ever it ran its head against the massive masonry of 'the New Empire' of Egypt, and consequently fell a victim to the onslaught of the north-western barbarians. On the other hand, when we turn to the corresponding chapter in Arabic history, between the emergence of the Arabic Society out of the post-Syriac interregnum and its cataclysmic submergence under the wave of Ottoman conquest, we cannot so readily give the reputed alien assassins the benefit of a corresponding doubt; for the course of events in the Arabic World from the last quarter of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era to the first quarter of the sixteenth century is adequately recorded; and there is nothing in the record to suggest that, within this span of some 250 years, the Arabic peoples had prepared the way for the Ottoman aggressor by doing themselves any fatal injury with their own hands. It is true that this Arabic Society had not shown any marked signs of promise before the time when it was submerged by the Ottoman flood; for the loneliness of Ibn Khaldūn's star is as striking as its brilliance. Yet the apparently aimless turbulence of Ifriqiyah under the Hafsids, as well as the apparently lifeless torpidity of Egypt under the Mamlūks, may have masked the vigorous and purposeful progress of a healthily growing society from infancy through childhood towards adolescence; and we have no valid

warrant, in the Arabic history of that age, for pronouncing dogmatically that the Arabic Society would never in any event have burst into flower if the Ottoman conquest had not blighted it.

Thus in Arabic history we might seem to have one case in which the breakdown of a civilization can be traced to the destructive effects of an alien society's impact; and the most that can be said is that the Iranic Society, as represented by the 'Osmanlis, simply submerged the Arabic Society without assimilating it. It is certainly true that in Ifriqīyah the Ottoman ascendancy never extended far beyond the outworks of a few strongholds along the coast, and that in Egypt the state of society was not essentially altered by the Ottoman conquest. In Egypt the conquest simply added a new alien military caste, in the shape of the Janissaries, to the old alien military caste with which Egypt had been saddled ever since the Mamlūks had been introduced by the Ayyubids.¹ And, underneath this exotic military crust, the indigenous Arabic Society of Egypt still continued to lead its separate and self-sufficient life, in which the peasantry and the 'ulamā and the urban guilds of merchants and artisans each played their interdependent parts, and all recognized one another's respective functions in the corporate life of their common body social.² Indeed, the forcible unification of the Arabic Society with the Sunnī fraction of the sister Iranic Society through the external act of the Ottoman conquest did not ever pass over into an inward social fusion; and the unitary Islamic Society which has confronted the modern Western World, and which has made such an imposing impression of unity on our Western minds, has always been something of an illusion. At heart the Arabs and the 'Osmanlis have remained strangers to one another; and, in so far as there has been any genuine cultural give-and-take, it has been the conquered Arab that has taken the Ottoman conqueror captive.³

Thus, within the last hundred and fifty years, as the old Ottoman superstructure has gradually crumbled into dust, and this dust has been blown away by the wild West Wind that has been sweeping over the World, the Arabic peoples have re-emerged⁴—as Jonah

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), pp. 452-3, below.

² The ethos of this self-sufficient Arabic Society which went on living its own life, under the Ottoman surface, throughout the four centuries of the Ottoman régime, is mirrored in Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-Jabartī's *Ajā'ib-al-Āthār fī-t-Tarājīm wa'l-Ahbār* (French translation: Paris 1888-96, Leroux, 9 vols.), which carries the history of the Arabic Society in Egypt in the author's own times down to the eve of the author's own death in A.D. 1821. See further Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, H.: *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. i (Oxford 1939, University Press), chaps. 4-7.

³ For the cultural consequences of the Ottoman conquest of the Arabic countries see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, pp. 395-6, above, and Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, vol. i.

⁴ For this re-emergence of the Arabic peoples in the guise of nations in the Western sense of the term see the present chapter, pp. 82 and 107, above.

once emerged, in the legend, from the belly of the whale, or as, in prosaic 'real life', a string of toads sometimes crawls, half-dazed, out of the stiffening jaws of a newly killed snake which has swallowed the toads alive and has not succeeded in digesting them before its own life has been cut short by Fate. This re-emergence of the Arabic Society is still so recent that it seems scarcely possible for an observer in this generation to make a clear diagnosis of the society's condition. Is the Arabic Society in our day really in disintegration, as the outward symptoms suggest? Or is it simply displaying the effects of a temporary shock on the morrow of a harrowing experience which, after all, has not proved fatal? For the present it seems so hazardous to choose between these alternative explanations that it may be wiser in this case, too, to return a provisional verdict of non-proven, and to leave the Arabic Civilization—as we have decided to leave the Hittite Civilization—in suspense.

We have now reviewed the declines and falls of all the broken-down civilizations that have enjoyed a period—however short a period—of growth before their breakdowns; and we need not linger long over the cases of the four abortive civilizations that have failed to come to birth¹ and the five arrested civilizations that have failed to pass beyond the threshold of life.² The arrested civilizations have experienced neither growth nor breakdown; and, when once they have fallen into the impasse of their irretrievably exact and intolerably exacting equilibrium with their environment, it is of little interest or importance if they eventually collapse at the touch of an alien hand, since, even if they are left to themselves, their ultimate collapse from sheer exhaustion is only a matter of time. As for the abortive civilizations, the question of whether they are to be or not to be has turned, in each case, upon their response to a challenge which has proved to be of prohibitive severity; and it is true that, in each of the four cases that have come within our view, this intractable challenge has been delivered by some human neighbour or rival or adversary. Yet the detection of this human agency, in the qualifying test which these abortive civilizations have tried and failed to pass, does not entitle us to pronounce that the abortive civilizations have been deprived of their prospect of life by an external act of violence. The truth may be that these miscarriages have been due to some inherent weakness in the embryos, and that the pre-natal shocks by which the miscarriages have been precipitated have simply brought this existing weakness out.

¹ For these see II. D (vii), in vol. ii, above.

² For these see Part III. A, in vol. iii, above.

3. *A Negative Verdict*

We can now sum up the results at which we have arrived in the two preceding chapters.

Leaving the abortive and the arrested civilizations out of account for the reasons that have just been given, and suspending judgement on the Western and on the Mayan Civilization for the reasons that have been suggested above, we find that, out of the nineteen remaining civilizations, no less than sixteen prove to have broken down through their own acts, before ever any alien human force succeeded in dealing them a potentially mortal blow. In all these cases the most that the alien enemy has achieved has been to give the expiring suicide his *coup de grâce* or to devour his carcass after it has already become carrion. The breakdown of the Minoan Civilization seems likewise to have been self-inflicted, so far as we can tell from the archaeological evidence, which is all that we have to go upon. The histories of the Arabic and the Hittite Civilization are the only two cases out of the nineteen in which the original breakdown, as well as the last act in the decline and fall, wears the appearance of being the work of an alien hand; and even in these two cases this finding is only tentative and not conclusive; for in the Hittite case the stricken society may have already laid violent hands upon itself in an antecedent chapter of its history of which no record survives, while in the Arabic case it is not yet certain that the successive shocks of 'Ottomanization' and 'Westernization' have deprived the victim of all chance of living out his life, and have thereby saved him from all possibility of committing suicide.

On this showing, we may fairly conclude that the cause of the breakdowns of civilizations is not to be found in a loss of command over the human environment, as measured by the successful encroachment of alien human forces upon the life of any given society whose breakdown we may be attempting to investigate. Indeed, where the encroachment takes the radical form of a violent attack, the normal effect upon the life of the assaulted party would appear, on an empirical survey of the evidence, to be not destructive but positively stimulating.

For example, the Hellenic Society in Continental Greece was stimulated by Xerxes' attack in 480 B.C. to the highest manifestations of its literary and artistic, as well as its military, capacity;¹ and

¹ See II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 109, above. For the stresses and strains in the internal structure of the Hellenic body social which arose incidentally out of the victorious Hellenic response to the Achaemenian challenge of 480 B.C., and for the failure of the Hellenic Society to respond successfully to the new challenge which these internal stresses and strains eventually presented, see III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 198-9, above, and IV. C (iii) (b) 10, in the present volume, p. 210, as well as Part IX, below.

Western Christendom was stimulated by the Norse and Magyar attacks in the ninth century of the Christian Era into performing those feats of valour and statesmanship which resulted in the foundation of the kingdoms of England and France and in the reconstruction of the Holy Roman Empire by the Saxons.¹ At a later stage of our Western history the city-state worlds-within-a-world, which differentiated themselves in Northern Italy and in Flanders out of the body social of Western Christendom, were stimulated into a triumphant vindication of their *de facto* independence by the respective attempts of the Hohenstaufen Emperors and the French Crown to reassert their *de jure* authority by force of arms. In a still later chapter of Western history the Dutch and the English were stimulated, by the Spanish Crown's attempts to suppress these insurgents and interlopers, into breaking the Spanish and Portuguese monopoly of the New World and building up out of the spoils a more efficient commercial system and a more durable colonial empire than the Spaniards had been able to build when they had the field to themselves; and these Dutch and English feats of military prowess and business enterprise were accompanied by a flowering of art and letters which showed that the stimulus of the Spanish attack had fructified the whole of the assaulted peoples' social life. The infant Hindu Society, likewise, was stimulated by the Primitive Muslim Arab onslaught in the eighth century of the Christian Era;² and the Assyrian frontiersmen of the Babylonian World were stimulated by the Aramaean pressure in the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C.³

The foregoing examples are all cases in which the assaulted party was still in growth at the time when the alien assault upon it was made; but we can cite at least as many cases in which an alien assault has given a temporary stimulus to a society after this society has already broken down through its own mishandling of itself; and in this second set of cases the intrinsically stimulating effect of external blows and pressures is demonstrated with still greater force.⁴

The classic instance is the repeated reaction of the Egyptian

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 168 and 196-202, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 130, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 134-5, above. For the malady of Militarism to which the Assyrians succumbed, under the strain which their successful resistance to the Aramaean onslaught had imposed upon them, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 135-6, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, in the present volume, pp. 101-2, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), pp. 468-84, below.

⁴ The outcome of the assaulted society's reaction to the stimulus of the assault is no doubt different in the two different situations. When the assaulted society is still in growth, it is stimulated to perform some fresh act of creation. On the other hand, when it is already in decline, it is stimulated into an archaistic reaction towards some phase of its own past. (For Archaism as one of the psychological symptoms of social disintegration see V. C (i) (d) 8, vol. vi, pp. 49-97, below.) Yet, though the outcome may be different, the stimulus itself is the same, and it is this fact that concerns us here.

Society to this stimulus; for this Egyptiac reaction was evoked and re-evoked over a span of some two thousand years; and this long epilogue to Egyptiac history was inaugurated at a moment when the Egyptiac Society had already passed out of its universal state ('the Middle Empire') and had entered upon a subsequent interregnum in which it might have been expected finally to pass out of existence. At this moment the apparently defunct society was recalled to life and action by an overwhelming impulse to chastise the Hyksos trespassers who had ventured to desecrate a swept and garnished house by their unclean presence. The stimulus was so powerful that it raised the Egyptiac Society not just from its death-bed but actually from the bier on which it was being carried to the grave;¹ and in this demonic xenophobia the society seemed to have discovered, at the thirteenth hour, the long-sought elixir of immortality; for the same stimulus worked the same miracle time and again. The *tour de force* of the expulsion of the Hyksos was repeated in the repulse of the Sea-Raiders² and in the eviction of the Assyrians³ and in the series of insurrections in which the Egyptian people shook off the yoke of the Achaemenidae⁴ and stubbornly resisted the process of Hellenization to which they were afterwards subjected under the régime of the Ptolemies.⁵

There has been an analogous series of reactions to external blows and pressures in the history of the decline and fall of the Far Eastern Civilization in China. The expulsion of the Mongols by the Ming⁶ is reminiscent, both in temper and in circumstance, of the expulsion of the Hyksos by the Theban founders of 'the New Empire'. The Manchu yoke has been shaken off through the same indomitable resurgence of an implacable xenophobia that likewise proved too strong for Achaemenian imperialism in Egypt. And the militant resistance of the Egyptiac Society to the process of Hellenization under the Ptolemies has its analogue in a Chinese anti-Western movement which attempted, in A.D. 1925-7, to fight out its losing battle to the bitter end by borrowing the exotic weapons of Russian Communism⁷ after its native weapons had

¹ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 139, footnote 1, and pp. 144-5, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, in the present volume, p. 85, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, p. 412; Part V. A, vol. v, pp. 2-3; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 152; and V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 351-2, below.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93 and 101, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, in the present volume, pp. 85 and 110, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 269, below.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 114, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), in the present volume, p. 476, below.

⁴ See V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 302, below.

⁵ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, in the present volume, p. 85, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 68, below.

⁶ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 121-2, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 348-51, below.

⁷ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1926* (Oxford 1928, University Press), pp. 283-5 and 333-41.

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been discredited by the failure of the Boxer Rising of A.D. 1900. Logically, no doubt, this forlorn attempt to repel one alien influence by surrendering to another is the *reductio ad absurdum* of Chinese xenophobia, and it is true that the desperate expedient soon ended in an acrimonious quarrel between such ill-assorted allies;¹ but, psychologically, the willingness of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang to place itself in Borodin's hands in order to combat Western Imperialism gives the measure of the violence of the Chinese reaction to Western pressure; and, by the same token, it reveals the strength of the stimulus which this Western pressure has administered.

In a similar way the strength of the stimulus which the intrusion of Hellenism administered to the decadent Syriac and Indic civilizations is revealed in the respective series of religious reactions which, in both cases, were eventually successful in driving the intrusive culture out: the Nestorian and Monophysite reactions which culminated in the triumph of Islam, and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist reaction which was followed by the triumph of Hinduism. In the history of the Hellenic Society itself the overrunning of the western provinces of the Roman Empire by the North European barbarians in the fifth century of the Christian Era evoked the Justinianean *revanche*, in the sixth century, against the Vandals and the Ostrogoths.² In the history of Orthodox Christendom the Latin and Turkish assaults upon the East Roman Empire in the eleventh century of the Christian Era evoked the ephemeral yet unmistakable Comnenian revival in the century following.³

We can see, finally, that an alien assault has sometimes administered part of the stimulus in the strength of which a disintegrating society has pulled itself together so far as to rally its forces for a moment in the formation of a universal state. The overrunning of the Egyptiac World by Asiatic barbarians during 'the Feudal Age' that followed the collapse of 'the Old Kingdom' was evidently one of the stimuli that evoked 'the Middle Empire';⁴ the overrunning of the Sumeric World by the Gutaeans more patently evoked the Empire of Sumer and Akkad;⁵ and the desire to throw off the yoke of the Mongols was probably the master-motive which reconciled Novgorod and the other parochial states of Russia to their incorporation into the Empire of Muscovy.⁶ On

¹ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927 (Oxford 1929, University Press), pp. 331-65.

² For the recoil of this *revanche* see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 326-8; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 209, footnote 2, and p. 223, below.

³ For this revival see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 298, below.

⁴ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 137, above.

⁵ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, above.

⁶ See the present chapter, pp. 92-3, above. On this showing, the popular conception of the causal relation between the breaking of the Tatar yoke and the contemporary rally

these analogies we may conjecture that the way was smoothed for Chandragupta's political venture by the sensational raid of Alexander the Great, which must have revealed in a flash to Indian minds the imminence of the Hellenic menace and have reconciled them to accepting the Maurya Empire as a safeguard.¹ On the same showing, the work of Augustus may have been facilitated by the anxiety of the Hellenic Society to preserve itself from being overwhelmed by the North European barbarians and the Orientals;² and the anxiety of the Sinic Society to keep at bay the rising power of the Eurasian Nomad Hiongnu may have played into the hands of Ts'in She Hwang-ti.³

These illustrations perhaps sufficiently support our thesis that the normal effect of blows or pressures from outside is stimulating and not destructive; and, if this thesis is accepted, it confirms our conclusion that a loss of command over the human environment is not the cause of the breakdowns of civilizations.

III. FAILURE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

(a) THE MECHANICALNESS OF MIMESIS

Our inquiry into the cause of the breakdowns of civilizations has led us, so far, to a succession of negative conclusions. We have found that these breakdowns are not acts of God. They are neither the inexorable operations of a *Saeva Necessitas* nor the sadistic sport of a Kali snatching another bead for her necklace of skulls. Nor are they the vain repetitions of senseless laws of Nature, like the monotonous revolutions of the Earth round its own axis and of the Planets round the Sun, or like the mechanical churning of the arms of the windmill which lifted Don Quixote out of his saddle and hoisted him sky-high and threatened to dash out his brains because the amiable knight had mistaken this inanimate monster for a creature 'of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting'. We have found, again, that we cannot legitimately attribute these breakdowns to a loss of command over the environment, either physical or human. The breakdowns of civilizations are not catastrophes of the same order as famines and floods and tornadoes and

of the Russian Orthodox Christendom is the exact inverse of the truth. So far from the rally having been the result of the liberation, it was the liberation that was the result of the rally.

¹ If this was really one of the considerations which induced the Indic Society to acquiesce in Chandragupta's tyranny, it was justified by the event; for the Hellenic intrusion upon the Indic World, which had been presaged in Alexander's raid, did not come to pass until after the Maurya Empire had fallen.

² 'Hinc movet Euphrates, illinc Germania bellum'.—Virgil, *Georgic* I, l. 509.

³ At any rate, Ts'in She Hwang-ti's work in completing and consolidating the Great Wall is the only one of his works for which this tyrant is remembered for good and not for evil in the Sinic tradition; and it seems not unreasonable to assume that this tradition reflects the light in which Ts'in She Hwang-ti was regarded by his contemporaries.

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fires and shipwrecks and railway-accidents; and they are not the equivalent, in the experiences of bodies social, of mortal injuries inflicted in homicidal assaults.

In successively rejecting all these untenable explanations we have not arrived at the object of our search; but the last of the fallacies that we have just cited has incidentally given us a clue. In demonstrating that the broken-down civilizations have not met their death from an assassin's hand, we have found no reason to dispute the allegation that they have been the victims of violence, and in almost every instance we have been led, by the logical process of exhaustion, to return a verdict of suicide. Our best hope of making some positive progress in our inquiry is to follow this single clue up; and there is one hopeful feature of our verdict which we can observe at once. There is no originality about it!

The conclusion at which we have arrived at the end of a rather laborious search has been divined with a sure intuition by a modern Western poet.

In tragic life, God wot,
No villain need be! Passions spin the plot:
We are betrayed by what is false within.¹

And Meredith's flash of insight is not a new discovery of nineteenth-century Western wisdom, like the Origin of Species or the Law of the Conservation of Energy. A century earlier the genius of Volney had casually exploded the eighteenth-century doctrine of the natural goodness and automatic improvement of Human Nature by testifying that 'la source de ses calamités . . . réside dans l'homme même; il la porte dans son cœur'.² And the same truth is declared in a fragment of Menander, which almost anticipates the English poet's words,³ and in a passage of the Gospel according to Saint Matthew:

'Whatsoever entereth in at the mouth goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the draught. But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile the man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies. These are the things which defile a man.'⁴

This truth about the lives of human beings is equally true of the lives of societies. A Hellenic philosopher, Dicaearchus, is reported to have maintained—in a lost work called *How Men go to Destruction*—

¹ George Meredith: *Modern Love*, stanza 43.

² Volney, C. F.: 'Les Ruines' in *Œuvres Complètes* (Paris 1876, Didot), pp. 12-13.

³ Menander, fragment 540:

ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἑκάστα κακίας σήπεται,
καὶ πᾶν τὸ λυμαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἐνδοθεν.

Things rot through evils native to their selves,
And all that injures issues from within.

⁴ Matt. xv. 18-20.

tion¹—that the greatest danger to Man is Man. And Volney offers this explanation of the destruction of bodies politic in lieu of the untenable hypothesis that the lives of communities, like those of individuals, have a limited life-span and a formulated life-curve.²

'On s'aperçoit qu'il existe dans la marche, et, si j'ose dire, dans la vie des corps politiques, un mécanisme qui indique l'existence de lois plus générales et plus constantes qu'on ne le croit vulgairement. Ce n'est pas que cette pensée n'ait déjà été exprimée par la comparaison que l'on a faite de cette vie des corps politiques à la vie des individus, en prétendant trouver les phases de la jeunesse, de la maturité et de la vieillesse dans les périodes d'accroissement, de splendeur et de décadence des empires; mais cette comparaison, vicieuse à tous égards, a jeté dans une erreur d'autant plus fâcheuse, qu'elle a fait considérer comme une nécessité naturelle la destruction des corps politiques, de quelque manière qu'ils fussent organisés; tandis que cette destruction n'est que l'effet d'un vice radical des législations.'³

This application to politics of Volney's intuition that 'la source de ses calamités réside dans l'homme même' is anticipated in a passage of Saint Cyprian, in which the African Father applies the same truth to the entire field of social life.⁴

'You complain of the aggression of foreign enemies; yet, if the foreign enemy were to cease from troubling, would Roman really be able to live at peace with Roman (*esse pax inter ipsas togas possit*)? If the external danger of invasion by armed barbarians were to be stamped out, should we not be exposed to a fiercer and a heavier civil bombardment, on the home front, in the shape of calumnies and injuries inflicted by the powerful upon their weaker fellow citizens? You complain of crop-failures and famine; yet the greatest famines are made not by drought but by rapacity, and the most flagrant distress springs from profiteering and price-raising in the corn-trade. You complain that the clouds do not disgorge their rain in the sky, and you ignore the barns that fail to disgorge their grain on terra firma. You complain of the fall in production, and ignore the failure to distribute what is actually produced to those who are in need of it. You denounce plague and pestilence, while really the effect of these scourges is to bring to light, or bring to a head, the crimes of

¹ Dicaearchus: *Περὶ Φθορᾶς Ἀνθρώπων*.

² For an examination of this doctrine see IV. C (i), pp. 10-13, above.

³ Volney, C. F.: 'Leçons d'Histoire' in *Œuvres Complètes* (Paris 1876, Didot), p. 587.

⁴ The two passages are also analogous inasmuch as they both fly in the face of the prevailing philosophy of the day. Volney's intuition, as we have observed, gives the lie to the fundamental doctrine of eighteenth-century Western philosophy, while the passage here quoted from Cyprian contradicts another passage from Cyprian's own pen which occurs in the same tract *Ad Demetrianum*. In this other passage (which has been quoted above in IV. C (i) on p. 8) Cyprian advocates the view that the Hellenic Society of the age is suffering from an automatic process of senile decay. A judicious admirer of Cyprian will not attempt to explain this manifest contradiction away. He will be content to observe that in chapter 3 of the tract the author is simply reproducing one of the commonplaces of Hellenic philosophy, while in chapter 10 he is expounding a Christian doctrine which has become a living part of Cyprian's own thought.

human beings: the callousness that shows no pity for the sick, and the covetousness and rapine that are in full cry after the property of the dead.¹

In this passage a man of penetrating insight and deep feeling, who was an heir to the tradition of the Hellenic culture before he became a convert to Christianity, has given the true explanation of the breakdown which had cut the growth of the Hellenic Civilization short some six or seven hundred years before, and which had brought the broken-down society to all but the last stage of its decline and fall in Cyprian's own day. The Hellenic Civilization had broken down because, in the internal economy of this society in its growth stage, at some point something had gone wrong with that interaction between individuals through which the growth of every growing civilization is achieved.

What is the weakness that exposes a growing civilization to this risk of stumbling and falling in mid-career and losing its Promethean élan? The weakness must be radical; for, although the catastrophe of breakdown is a risk and not a certainty, the risk is evidently high. To leave the abortive and the arrested civilizations out of account, and to consider only those twenty-one civilizations that have been born alive and have proceeded to grow, we are faced with the fact that thirteen out of the twenty-one are dead and buried already; that seven out of the eight living civilizations are apparently in decline; and that the eighth, which is our own Civilization of the West, may also have passed its zenith for all that we know. On an empirical test the career of a growing civilization would appear to be a dangerous activity; and, if we now recall our analysis of Growth in a previous part of this Study,² we shall realize that, on our own showing, the danger is constant and acute because it lies in the very nature of the course which a growing civilization is constrained to take.

This course is not the narrow way 'which leadeth unto life—and few there be that find it';³ for, although the few that do find this way are precisely those creative personalities who set a civilization in motion and carry it forward, they cannot simply lay aside every weight and run the race that is set before them⁴ on that infallible road to the goal of human endeavours which is visible to eyes that have seen salvation.⁵ They cannot take this simple course, because, being 'social animals', they cannot go on moving forward themselves unless they can contrive to carry their fellows with them in their advance; and the uncreative rank-and-file of Mankind, which in every known society hitherto has always been in an overwhelm-

¹ Thascius Caecilius Cyprianus: *Ad Demetrium*, chap. 10.

² See III. C (ii), in vol. iii, above.

⁴ Hebrews xii. 1.

³ Matt. vii. 14.

⁵ Luke ii. 30.

ing majority, cannot be transfigured *en masse* in the twinkling of an eye. In these conditions, which are inherent in the very nature of social life, the higher personalities, who arise here and there and now and then by a mutation of ordinary Human Nature, are challenged to attempt a *tour de force*: 'to convert a species, which is essentially a created thing, into creative effort; to make a movement out of something which, by definition, is a halt.'¹

This *tour de force* is not impossible to achieve; and indeed there is a perfect way: the 'strenuous . . . communion and intimate . . . intercourse' that impart the divine fire from one soul to another 'like light caught from a leaping flame'.² This is the perfect way because the receptive soul, 'once alight, feeds its own flame thenceforward'.³ Yet it is an unpractical counsel of perfection to enjoin this way, as Plato enjoins it, to the exclusion of all others; for the inward spiritual grace through which an unilluminated soul is fired by communion with a saint is almost as rare as the miracle that has brought the saint himself into the World. The world in which the creative personality finds himself, and in which he has to work, is a society in which his fellows are ordinary human beings. His task (Plato concedes)⁴ is to make his fellows into his followers; and Mankind in the mass can only be set in motion towards a goal beyond itself by enlisting the primitive and universal faculty of mimesis.⁵ For this mimesis is a kind of social drill;⁶ and the dull ears that are deaf to the unearthly music of Orpheus' lyre are well attuned to the drill-sergeant's raucous word of command.⁷ When

¹ Bergson, Henri: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 231 (quoted in III. C (ii) (a), in vol. iii, on p. 235, above).

² Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341 B-E, quoted in III. C (ii) (a), in vol. iii, p. 245, above.

³ Plato, op. cit., loc. cit. The same counsel was given by Confucius in political terms in his maxim that a ruler ought to obtain his results by eliciting co-operation and not by issuing commands (Forke, A.: *Die Gedankenwelt des Chinesischen Kulturkreises* (Munich and Berlin 1927, Oldenbourg), p. 187).

⁴ Plato's attitude on this point is examined by Archer-Hind, R. D., in *The Phaedo of Plato*, second edition (London 1894, Macmillan), Appendix I: *Δημοτική και Πολιτική Αρετή*.

⁵ While all *δημοτική ἀρετή* is radically distinguished from philosophical morality by the fact that it is *ἀνευ φρονήσεως*, we may . . . discern two well-marked varieties of it, represented by [*Republica* 554 c] and [*Republica* 500 b]. . . The first is an ethical code formed (1) by the multitude for themselves, (2) on utilitarian principles, (3) without knowledge of the good; the second is (1) formed by the philosopher for the multitude, (2) not on utilitarian principles, (3) with knowledge of the good, but (4) accepted by the multitude on utilitarian principles, and without knowledge of the good. The first Plato regards with unmixed contempt; the second he recognizes as the best which the great majority of Mankind can attain, and by it he hopes to supersede the other: nay, so much importance does he attach to this that his philosophers must take it in turns to desist from their own meditations and give their minds to instructing their fellow citizens' (op. cit., p. 154).

⁶ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 245, above.

⁷ See the quotation, in loc. cit., from Bergson, op. cit., p. 99; and compare Frobenius, L.: *Paideuma* (Frankfurt 1928, Frankfurter Societäts-Druckerei), p. 234.

⁸ Compare Bacon, Francis: *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Humane*, Book I, chap. 8, § 3.

⁹ We see the dignity of the commandment is according to the dignity of the commanded: to have commandment over beasts, as herdmen have, is a thing contemptible: to have

the Piper of Hamelin assumes King Frederick William's Prussian voice, the rank-and-file, who have stood stolid hitherto, mechanically break into movement in obedience to the martinet's orders, and the evolution which he causes them to execute brings them duly to heel; but they can only catch him up by taking a short cut,¹ and they can only find room to march in formation by deploying into the broad way that leadeth to destruction.² When the road to destruction has perforce to be trodden on the quest of Life, it is perhaps no wonder that the quest should sometimes end in disaster.

Moreover there is a weakness in the actual exercise of mimesis, quite apart from the way in which the faculty may be exploited. For, if it is true that mimesis is a kind of drill, it is also true that drill is a kind of mechanization of human movement and life; and our concept of a 'machine' has an ambiguous connotation.

When we talk of 'a delicate mechanism' or 'an ingenious mechanism' or 'mechanical ingenuity' or 'a skilled mechanic', the words call up the general idea of a triumph of Life over Matter and the particular idea of the triumph of human will and thought over the physical environment of a human society. And the same ideas are suggested by concrete examples of machinery when we come across them—from a twentieth-century Western gramophone or wireless-set or aeroplane-engine back to the first wheel and the first earthenware crock and the first dug-out canoe and the first flaked flint instrument, which are the most wonderful inventions in the whole series.³ The sight of these machines which human hands have made gives us a thrill of pride and self-confidence; and this feeling has its justification; for the invention of machinery immensely extends Man's power over Man's environment by so manipulating inanimate objects that they are made to carry out human purposes, as the drill-sergeant's commands are executed by his platoon of mechanized human beings. In drilling his platoon the drill-sergeant expands himself into a giant Briaricus whose hundred adventitious legs and arms obey his will almost as promptly and exactly as though

commandment over children, as schoolmasters have, is a matter of small honour: to have commandment over galley-slaves is a disparagement rather than an honour. Neither is the commandment of tyrants much better, over people which have put off the generosity of their minds: and therefore it was ever holden that honours in free monarchies and commonwealths had a sweetness more than in tyrannies, because the commandment extendeth more over the wills of men, and not only over their deeds and services. And therefore, when Virgil putteth himself forth to attribute to Augustus Caesar the best of human honours, he doth it in these words:

Victorque volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.

¹ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 247-8, above.

² Matt. vii. 13.

³ For the superiority of the human ingenuity which went to the making of these primary machines over the ingenuity that has gone to the making of their myriad derivatives, see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 158-9, above.

they had been originally his own. And similarly the telescope is an extension and enhancement of the human eye, and the trumpet of the human voice, and the stilt of the human leg, and the sword of the human hand.

Nature herself has implicitly complimented Man upon his mechanical ingenuity by anticipating him in the use of mechanical devices. She has made an audaciously extensive use of them in the piece of natural mechanism with which we are most familiar: her *chef d'œuvre*, the human body. In the heart and the lungs she has constructed two self-regulating machines which are models of their kind; and we, her creatures, owe her gratitude for this beneficent triumph of mechanization in the medium of our flesh and blood. By adjusting our heart and our lungs to the performance of their appointed tasks with such perfection that they 'work automatically', Nature has released a margin of our muscular and nervous and psychic energies from the monotonously repetitive Danaids' task of making breath follow breath and heart-beat follow heart-beat, and has set these marginal energies free to do the 'original work' of locomotion and sensation and thought. This is the trick by which, in the evolution of organic life, she has succeeded in building up ever more and more elaborate organisms. At every stage in this advance she has acted as Orpheus acts when he resorts to the methods of the drill-sergeant. In each successive organism in her ascending series she has introduced the maximum possible amount of drill or, in other words, of mechanization. Her aim has been to arrange that, say, ninety per cent. of the functions which any given organism has to perform shall be performed automatically and therefore with a minimum expenditure of energy, in order that a maximum amount of energy may be concentrated upon the remaining ten per cent. of this organism's activities, in which Nature is feeling her way towards a fresh advance in organization. In fact, a natural organism is made up, like a human society, of a creative minority and an uncreative majority of 'members'; and in a growing organism, as in a growing society, the majority is drilled into following the minority's lead mechanically.

When we have lost ourselves in admiration of these natural and human mechanical triumphs, it is disconcerting to be reminded that there are other phrases—'machine-made goods', 'machine-like movements', 'mechanical behaviour', 'the party machine'—in which the connotation of the word 'machine' is exactly the reverse. Yet there is no doubt about it: in each of the phrases in this second group the idea that is suggested is not the triumph of Life over Matter but the mastery of Matter over Life; and, instead of the thrill of self-confidence and pride, we feel a shock of humiliation

and misgiving as we realize that the master-tool of Life and Mind, which promises to give them a boundless dominion over the Material Universe, may actually turn in their hands into an instrument for their own subjugation to the Kingdom of Ancient Night. 'Cette matière est instrument et elle est aussi obstacle.'¹ 'Le corps est bien pour nous un moyen d'agir, mais c'est aussi un empêchement de percevoir.'² 'La mécanique, en se développant, pourra se retourner contre la mystique.'³ The powers which, one moment ago, seemed to have discovered the secret of setting the Universe on fire, now suddenly turn out to have quenched their own flame and put out their own light by rashly smothering the spark under its potential fuel.

This Janus-like quality in the nature of Machinery is disconcerting because at first sight it seems like a betrayal; but on second thoughts it becomes apparent that it is 'all in the game'. For the mechanic to denounce his machine because it has 'caught him out' is as irrational as it would be for the losing team in a tug-of-war to blame the rope for their defeat when they have gone out of their way to challenge the other team to a trial of strength and have woven the rope with their own hands in order to make the match playable. Or we may compare the losing party to a wrestler who has slyly challenged a lay-figure and has congratulated himself, in closing with this adversary of his choice, upon getting the better grip—only to find, to his amazement and horror, that his own muscles go slack at the touch of the dummy's flabby frame. The discomfited competitor's error has lain in taking it for granted that when once the battle was joined he could not fail to win. Yet the tug-of-war team's rope or the wrestler's grip do not, of course, in themselves guarantee a victory to either side. They are merely neutral ways and means for a trial of strength in which the issue is not a fore-gone conclusion. And, in the cosmic tug-of-war between Life and Matter, this neutral function is fulfilled by everything that comes under the category of Machinery. Machines are ambiguous in their essence, and to call this ambiguity a betrayal is to convict oneself of being the bad workman who complains of his tools. *Homo Faber* has apprenticed himself to a dangerous trade; and any one who sets out to act on the principle of 'Nothing venture nothing win' is manifestly exposing himself to the risk of losses as the price of putting himself in the running for the victor's crown.

If this risk is involved in Man's use of machinery for dealing with his physical environment, it must be incurred, *a fortiori*, when he resorts to the device of mechanization in his relations with

¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, p. 340.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

himself and his fellow men.¹ For an expedient which is dangerous to Life when it is employed, as Nature has intended it to be employed, in the struggle between Life and Matter, becomes a sheer *tour de force* when Life attempts to exploit it against Life itself. In the realm of Thought we have put ourselves on our guard, at an early stage of this Study,² against 'the apathetic fallacy' of treating living creatures as though they were inanimate. The mechanization of Life, either in the inner workings of a soul or in the external relations between a number of human beings in a society, is a translation of this 'apathetic fallacy' into practical action; and if the human 'social animal' is constrained to act on so false a premiss as this, the action may be expected to have catastrophic consequences.

Thus a risk of catastrophe proves to be inherent in the use of the faculty of mimesis, which is the vehicle of mechanization in the medium of Human Nature; and it is evident that this inherent risk will be greater in degree when the faculty of mimesis is called into play in a society which is in dynamic movement than when the same faculty is given rein in a society which is in a state of rest. The weakness of mimesis lies in its being a mechanical response to a suggestion from some alien source, so that the action that is performed through mimesis is, *ex hypothesi*, an action that would never have been performed by its performer upon his own initiative. Thus all action that proceeds from mimesis is essentially precarious because it is not self-determined; and the best practical safeguard against the danger of its breaking down is for the exercise of the faculty of mimesis to become crystallized in the form of habit or custom³—as it actually is in primitive societies in the Yin-state, which is the only stage of their history in which we know them.⁴ In 'the cake of custom' the double-edged blade of mimesis is comfortably padded. But the breaking of 'the cake of custom' is of the essence of the change through which the state of rest that is the

¹ Two pertinent examples of the practice—one taken from the sophisticated life of societies in process of civilization, and the other from the life of primitive societies in their latter-day static condition (see I. C (iii) (e), vol. i, pp. 179–80, and Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 192–4, above)—are given in Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 177–8:

'L'acteur qui étudie son rôle se donne pour tout de bon l'émotion qu'il doit exprimer; il note les gestes et les intonations qui sortent d'elle: plus tard, devant le public, il ne reproduira que l'intonation et le geste, il pourra faire l'économie de l'émotion. Ainsi pour la magie. Les "lois" qu'on lui a trouvées ne nous disent rien de l'élan naturel d'où elle est sortie. Elles ne sont que la formule des procédés que la paresse a suggérés à cette magie originelle pour s'imiter elle-même.'

² See Part I. A, vol. i, pp. 7–8, above.

³ This consideration was presumably in Plato's mind when he suggested (*Phaedo* 82 B) that the life of a bee or an ant would be the appropriate next incarnation for a soul which, in a life as a human being, had behaved as a good social animal 'from habit and practice, without philosophy or conscious intelligence (*ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης ἀνεφύλακτος*)'.

⁴ See Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 191–5, above.

last phase in the history of a primitive society gives place to the fresh dynamic movement that we call a civilization.¹ The mimesis which has been directed towards the older generation of the living members of the society, as incarnations of an accumulated social heritage, is now reoriented towards creative personalities whose eyes have seen on the horizon a further goal of human endeavours, and whose wills have become bent upon leading their fellows with them towards this promised land. In this new movement the edged tool of mimesis is not discarded, but is employed with enhanced effect now that the breaking of 'the cake of custom' has laid its cutting edges bare. This baring of a blade means the removal of a safeguard; and the necessity of using the tool of mimesis without the protection of a customary régime—a necessity which is the price of growth—condemns a growing civilization to live dangerously. More than that, the danger is perpetually imminent, since the condition which is required for the maintenance of the Promethean *élan* of growth is a condition of unstable equilibrium in which 'the cake of custom' is never allowed to set hard before it is broken up again.² The *tour de force* of the exploit of Civilization lies in this necessity of resorting to mimesis without a possibility of taking precautions at any stage. In this hazardous pursuit of the goal of human endeavours there can never be such a thing as a provisional insurance against the perils which mimesis entails. There can only be an ultimate and radical solution of the problem through the complete elimination of mimesis in a society which has transformed itself into a communion of saints; and this consummation, which is nothing less than the attainment of the goal, has never been even distantly approached by any known civilization hitherto.

In the meantime—and, on the scale of human lives, the time is long-drawn-out—the mechanized column of route is perpetually in danger of coming to a halt or of falling out of formation on the march if ever the rank-and-file are left to act without a lead in some situation without a precedent. A classic example of this mischance is the history of the mutineers of *The Bounty*, who relapsed from the level of our Western Civilization in the Modern Age to the level of Primitive Humanity after they had marooned themselves on Pitcairn Island. The abyss which always yawns open before the feet of human beings who are taking the broad road towards Civilization is continually revealed in abnormal accidents like shipwrecks or fires, which usually evoke exhibitions of astonishing demoralization as well as astonishing heroism; and the depth of this moral abyss is still deeper where the abnormal ordeal is not a natural accident but a social malady like a war or a revolution. In the his-

¹ See Part II. B, loc. cit., above.

² See Part III. B, in vol. iii, above.

tory of Man's attempt at Civilization hitherto there has never been any society whose progress in Civilization has gone so far that, in times of revolution or war, its members could be relied upon not to commit atrocities. To confine ourselves to the history of our own society in our own generation, we can cite the behaviour of the German Army in Belgium in 1914 and the British 'Black-and-Tans' in Ireland in 1920 and the French Army in Syria in 1925-6 and the German National-Socialist 'Storm Troops' at home in 1933 and the Italian Blackshirts at Addis Ababa in February 1937 as proof positive that, in certain conditions of abnormality and under a certain degree of strain, atrocities will be committed by most members of the least uncivilized societies that have yet existed—

quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periculis
convenit adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit;
nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo
eliciuntur et eripitur persona, manet res.¹

In times of stress the mask of Civilization is torn away from the primitive countenance of raw Humanity in the rank-and-file; but the moral responsibility for the breakdowns of civilizations lies upon the heads of the leaders.

'Woe unto the World because of offences! For it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!'²

The creative personalities in the vanguard of a civilization who have had recourse to the mechanism of mimesis are exposing themselves to the risk of failure in two degrees, one negative and the other positive.

The possible negative failure is that, undesignedly and perhaps unconsciously, these leaders may infect themselves with the hypnotism which they have deliberately induced in their followers; and in that event the docility of the rank-and-file will have been purchased at the disastrous price of a loss of initiative in the officers. 'If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch';³ and 'if the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be salted?'⁴ There is an equivalent failure which may be the nemesis of Nature's device of resorting to mechanization in her construction of bodily organisms. The ingenuity of mechanizing 90 per cent. of the functions of an organism in order to concentrate the maximum amount of energy upon a creative evolution or the rest is an ingenuity which will have utterly defeated its own ends if the energy which has thus been released for a creative activity is converted, by force of

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 55-8.

² Matt. xviii. 7.

³ Matt. xv. 14.

⁴ Matt. v. 13.

suggestion, into the mechanical rhythm of its surroundings. In the former of these two states, in which the mechanization is subservient to a creative purpose, the organism is 'a marvel of mechanical ingenuity' in the appreciative sense; but the extension of the mechanical rhythm from 90 per cent. of the organism's activity to the whole degrades the organism into the monstrosity of 'a machine-like automaton'. The difference between 90 per cent. and 100 per cent. of mechanization is all the difference in the world; and there is just this kind of difference between a civilization that is in growth and a civilization that has become arrested.

We have seen what is wrong with the arrested civilizations in the empirical survey of five civilizations of this class which we have made in an earlier part of this Study.¹ The arrested civilizations have achieved so close an adaptation to their environment that they have taken its shape and colour and rhythm instead of impressing the environment with a stamp which is their own. The equilibrium of forces in their life is so exact that all their energies are absorbed in the effort of maintaining the position which they have attained already, and there is no margin of energy left over for reconnoitring the course of the road ahead, or the face of the cliff above them, with a view to a further advance. The effort by which they barely succeed in holding their own is so strenuous that it compels our admiration; yet when we view the life of the Esquimaux or the Nomads or the 'Osmanlis or the Spartans dispassionately and comprehensively, we feel the same contradictory combination of respect and contempt that is aroused in us by the contemplation of machinery. The apparently superhuman qualities which the Spartiate 'Peer' can be counted upon to display so long as he is on active service under the Lyncurgen *agôgê* have to be discounted in the lurid light of the demoralization and inefficiency which invariably come over the self-same Spartiate if ever he finds himself out of his own element. And a discipline which looks at first sight like a transcending of Human Nature looks, on closer inspection, like a reversion to animality.² In the arrested civilizations we have a classic illustration of the negative failure in which the leaders them-

¹ In Part III. A, in vol. iii, above.

² See Part III. A, in vol. iii, above, especially pp. 79-81. Tolstoy has a story of a little boy who, on being taken for the first time in his life to see a military review, was drawn by curiosity to venture close up to the troops and then came running back to his mother crying, 'Mummy! Mummy! What do you think I have found out? These soldiers were once men.' Such robots wear the same appearance in Hindu as in Russian eyes. 'In the West the national machinery of commerce and politics turns out neatly compressed bales of humanity which have their use and high market value; but they are bound in iron hoops, labelled and separated off with scientific care and precision. Obviously God made Men to be human; but this modern product has such marvellous square-cut finish, savouring of gigantic manufacture, that the Creator will find it difficult to recognise it as a thing of spirit and a creature made in His own divine image.'—Tagore, Sir R.: *Nationalism* (London 1917, Macmillan), p. 6.

selves become hypnotized by the drill which they have inculcated into the rank-and-file. In this predicament the column comes to a dead halt, at whatever point on its route it may happen to find itself at the moment, simply because there is nobody left at the head of the column to give fresh orders. The ten thousand Greek troops whose moral paralysis on the night after the loss of their senior officers has been so graphically depicted by Xenophon's pencil were the same ten thousand who, only a few weeks before, had gladdened the heart of Cyrus and had given the queen of Cilicia the fright of her life by the precision of their discipline on the parade-ground.¹

This negative failure, however, is seldom the end of the story; for the salt that has lost his savour 'is thenceforth good for nothing but to be cast out and to be trodden under foot of men'.² In abandoning Orpheus' music for the drill-sergeant's word of command, the leaders have played upon the faculty of mimesis in the rank-and-file by an exertion of power—as a substitute for the radiation of the magic charm of genius that is only attractive to kindred spirits. In the interaction between leaders and led, mimesis and power are correlatives; and power is a force which is perhaps rarely brought into play without being abused.³ In any event the tenure of power is an abuse in itself if those who hold the power have lost the faculty of leadership; and this abuse is flagrant. Accordingly the halt of the column of route, which we have pictured in our military simile, is apt to be followed by mutiny on the part of the rank-and-file and by 'frightfulness' on the part of the officers—who make a desperate attempt to retain by brute force, against overwhelming numerical odds, an authority which they have ceased to merit by any signal contribution to the common weal. An Orpheus who has cast away his lyre now lays about him with Xerxes' whip; and the result is a hideous pandemonium, in which the military formation breaks up into an Ishmaelitish anarchy. This is the positive failure which is the nemesis of the resort to mimesis in the life of a growing civilization;

¹ Compare Xenophon: *Anabasis*, Book III, chap. 1, §§ 1-12, with the same work, Book I, chap. 2, §§ 14-18. The story of the practical joke which Clearchus played upon the august spectators of the military review at Tarsus has been put into modern dress—with the British Viceroy of India playing Cyrus's part and the Amir of Afghanistan Queen Epyaxa's—by Rudyard Kipling in *The Jungle Book* ('Her Majesty's Servants'). In similar circumstances in a different time and place a queen of Abyssinia was likewise impressed by the drill, *dala suisse*, of the Portuguese matchlockmen of Christovão da Gama's expeditionary force (Castanhoso, M. de, and Bermudez, J.: *The Portuguese Expedition to Abyssinia in 1541*, English translation (= Hakluyt Society, second series, vol. x, 1902), pp. 20-1).

² Matt. v. 13.

³ The sinister importance of the abuse of power as a factor in social life has been appreciated by Ibn Khaldūn. See the chapter entitled 'Dans un empire, le souverain est naturellement porté à réserver toute l'autorité; on s'y abandonne au luxe, à l'indolence et au repos' (*Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 340-3. Compare vol. ii, pp. 114-16.). See also the present Study, V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 178-213, below: 'The Saviour with the Sword.'

and in the language of another simile this failure is familiar to us already. It is that 'disintegration' of a broken-down civilization which declares itself in 'the Secession of the Proletariat' from a *ci-devant* band of leaders which has degenerated into a 'Dominant Minority'.¹ The successive transformations of the prophet into the drill-sergeant and of this martinet into a terrorist explain the declines and falls of civilizations in terms of leadership.

In terms of relation or interaction the failure of the Promethean *élan* declares itself in a loss of harmony.

The significance of this symptom is perhaps most obvious in the concrete case of the bodily organism of a galloping horse:

'During continued movement any addition to speed obtained by increased instability of equilibrium necessitates increased muscular effort in maintaining the centre of gravity of the body at a suitable height. . . . The faster the pace, the greater will be the muscular expenditure of the fore limbs, as compared to the speed. Consequently, when a horse gallops fast, the muscles of his fore-hand tire much more quickly than those of his hind limbs. . . . When a horse begins to tire in a long-distance race . . . , his ordinary "level" style of "going" generally becomes changed more or less into an up-and-down motion, which is caused by the muscles of his fore-hand being too fatigued to work in unison with those of his hind-quarters.'²

A corresponding loss of harmony attends the flagging of the Promethean *élan* in a personality, which is a whole whose parts are spiritual faculties, and in a society, which is a whole whose parts are institutions. In the movement of Life a change in any one part of a whole ought to be accompanied by sympathetic adjustments of the other parts if all is to go well; but when Life is mechanized one part may be altered while others are left as they have been, and a loss of harmony is the result.

In any whole of parts a loss of harmony between the parts is paid for by the whole in a corresponding loss of self-determination; and the fate of a declining civilization is described in Jesus's prophecy to Peter:

'When thou wast young, thou girdedst thyself, and walkedst whither thou wouldest; but when thou shalt be old . . . another shall gird thee and carry thee whither thou wouldest not.'³

A loss of self-determination is the ultimate criterion of breakdown; and this conclusion is what we should expect, since it is the inverse of the conclusion, which we have reached in an earlier

¹ For an explanation of these terms see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 41, and I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-62, above.

² Hayes, Captain M. H.: *Points of the Horse*, 5th edition (London 1930, Hurst and Blackett), pp. 53-4.

³ John xxi. 18.

part of this Study, that a progress towards self-determination is the criterion of growth.¹ In the rest of this Part we shall examine some of the forms in which this loss of self-determination through loss of harmony is manifested.

(b) THE INTRACTABILITY OF INSTITUTIONS

1. *New Wine in Old Bottles*

In the last chapter we came to the conclusion that a society breaks down through a loss of harmony between its parts which is paid for by the society as a whole in a loss of self-determination. One source of disharmony between the institutions of which a society is composed is the introduction into the life of the society of new social forces—aptitudes or emotions or ideas²—which the existing set of institutions was not originally designed to carry.

The destructive effect of this incongruous juxtaposition of 'things new and old'³ has been pointed out in one of the most famous of the sayings that are attributed to Jesus:

'No man putteth a piece of new cloth unto an old garment, for that which is put in to fill it up taketh from the garment, and the rent is made worse. Neither do men put new wine into old bottles—else the bottles break and the wine runneth out and the bottles perish; but they put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved.'⁴

In the domestic economy from which this simile is taken the precept can, of course, be carried out to the letter, because the cloth and the garment and the wine and the bottles are material chattels over which the householder has an absolute power of disposal. But in the economy of social life men's power to order their affairs at will on a rational plan is narrowly restricted, since a society is not the chattel of any owner, but is the common ground of many men's fields of action; and for this reason a precept which is common sense in the economy of the household and practical wisdom in the life of the spirit is a counsel of perfection in social affairs.

Ideally, no doubt, the introduction of any new dynamic forces or creative movements into the life of a society ought to be accompanied by a reconstruction of the whole existing set of institutions if a healthy social harmony is to be preserved; and, in the actual history of any growing civilization, there is in fact a constant re-modelling or readjustment of the most flagrantly anachronistic institutions *ex hypothesi*, at least to the minimum extent that is necessary in order to save the civilization from breaking down. At

¹ See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, p. 216, above.

² Matt. xiii. 52.

³ See Part II. B, vol. i, p. 191, above.

⁴ Matt. ix. 16-17.

the same time, sheer *vis inertiae* tends at all times to keep most parts of the social structure as they are, in spite of their frequent incongruity with the new social forces that are constantly being brought into action by the creative energies of the growing society as its growth proceeds;¹ and in this situation the new forces are apt to operate in two diametrically opposite ways simultaneously. On the one hand they perform the creative work which it is their business to perform by finding vent either in new institutions which they have established for themselves or in old institutions which they have successfully adapted to serve their purposes; and, in pouring themselves into these harmonious channels, they promote the welfare of the civilization by giving fresh impetus to its *élan*. At the same time they also enter, indiscriminately, into any institutions which happen to lie in their path—as some immensely powerful head of steam which had forced its way into an engine-house might rush into the works of any old engine that happened to be installed there.

In such an event one or other of two alternative disasters is apt to occur. Either the pressure of the new head of steam is so very much higher than the maximum pressure which the old-fashioned engine was originally built to bear that the works simply explode and are blown to pieces when the steam has entered into them; or else the antique plates and castings do 'stand the racket', and then the disaster takes an even more destructive and a far more monstrous turn. The unprecedentedly powerful 'drive' of the new motive-force then sets the old machinery to work in a way which was never contemplated by its makers. If it was a rather unsatisfactory machine, the tolerably bad results which it originally produced are now magnified to an intolerable degree; and even if it was a fairly satisfactory machine, the tolerably good performance that was originally obtained from it may have amazing and appalling effects now that the machine has been so powerfully 'keyed up'. The dentist's implement which delicately files away the decayed tip of a tooth when it is operated with the proper power may perhaps pierce the palate to the brain, and cause the patient's death instead of giving him a salutary relief, if the strength of the electric

¹ It was in this aspect, as obstacles to progress, that institutions were envisaged by the eighteenth-century French Encyclopaedists, and in particular by Condorcet (Bury, J. B.: *The Idea of Progress* (London 1924, Macmillan), pp. 210-11). The same point is made by Walter Bagehot in his *Physics and Politics*, 10th edition (London 1894, Kegan Paul), p. 149: 'The very institutions which most aid at step number one are precisely those which most impede at step number two.' Bagehot illustrates this thesis by the case of the institution of Caste. After pointing out (op. cit., p. 148) that Caste is of value to primitive societies in helping them to reconcile the two desiderata of social rigidity and social variety, he goes on (op. cit., p. 149) to point out that 'several non-caste nations have continued to progress, but all caste nations have stopped early, though some have lasted long'. In fact, 'progress would not have been the rarity it is if the early food had not been the late poison' (op. cit., p. 74).

current is suddenly increased out of all measure. Similarly, a drug which acts as a potent stimulant when it is taken in a minute quantity may work with equal potency as a poison if the dose is largely increased.

To translate these parables into terms of social life, the explosions of the old engines which cannot stand the new steam-pressure—or the burstings of the old bottles which cannot stand the fermentation of the new wine—are the revolutions which sometimes overtake institutions that have become anachronisms.¹ On the other hand the baneful performances of the old engines which have successfully stood the strain of being 'keyed up' are the social enormities which a 'die-hard' institutional anachronism sometimes engenders.

Revolutions may be defined as retarded, and proportionately violent, acts of mimesis. The mimetic element is of their essence; for every revolution always has reference to something that has happened already elsewhere—at an earlier moment and on a different spot from the place and the time at which the revolutionary outbreak of violence occurs—and it is always manifest, when the revolution is studied in its historical setting, that this outbreak would never have occurred of itself if it had not been thus evoked by a previous play of external forces.² The element of retardation is likewise of the essence of revolutions; and it is this that accounts for the violence which is their most prominent feature. Revolutions are violent because they are the belated triumphs of powerful new social forces over tenacious old institutions which have been temporarily thwarting and cramping these new expressions of life. The longer the obstruction holds out, the greater becomes the pressure of the force whose outlet is being obstructed;

¹ For this theory of the nature of revolutions see Teggart, F. J.: *The Processes of History* (New Haven 1918, Yale University Press), p. 130, following Walter Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*.

² This external factor in the genesis of revolutions is impossible to ignore in those cases where a revolution in the social structure of one society is evoked by the impact of social forces that emanate from a different society (this class of cases is dealt with in Parts IX and X below). But the operation of the external factor can always be detected, on close inspection, in the history of any revolution, even when the whole movement works itself out within one single society's bosom. For instance, 'the confluence of French theory with American example caused the [French] Revolution to break out' when it did (Lord Acton, quoted by Bury, J. B.: *The Idea of Progress* (London 1924, Macmillan), p. 203). In both these varieties of a substantially identical experience the social structure of the passive party to the encounter is apt to oppose so obstinate a resistance to the impinging force that, when this force does eventually break through, the resolution of forces takes a revolutionary form. 'The great events of history that strike the eye are generally the sequel to a long process of preparation, and most of them constitute the conclusion and climax of some process that is less conspicuous than they are. It is only when the Hellenic idea has quietly and silently permeated the East that Alexander—following the direction thereby given to him—goes on the war-path and founds his empire. It is only when the French idea has pushed its way right across Germany and on beyond into Russia that Napoleon goes on the war-path and seeks to extend the realm of French glory by force of arms' (Frobenius, L.: *Paideuma* (Frankfurt 1928, Frankfurter Societäts-Druckerei), p. 276).

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and the greater this pressure, the more violent the explosion in which the imprisoned force ultimately breaks through.¹

As for the social enormities that are the alternatives to revolutions, these may be defined as the penalties that a society has to pay when the act of mimesis which ought to have brought an old institution into harmony with a new social force has been, not simply retarded, but frustrated altogether.

It will be seen that, whenever some new aptitude or emotion or idea arises in the life of any society, this new force is likely, in proportion to its strength and its range and its importance, to come into collision with a greater or a lesser number of the society's existing institutions, and each of these collisions may have any one of three alternative outcomes. The obstructive institution may either be brought into harmony with the new force promptly and peaceably through some constructive social adjustment; or it may be eliminated tardily and violently through a revolution; or it may succeed in defying both adjustment and elimination, and in this last event some social enormity will result from the unnatural 'drive' which will now be put into the intractable institution automatically by the new force that has failed to master it. It is evident that, whenever the existing institutional structure of a society is challenged by the impact of a new social force, each and all of these three possible alternative outcomes of the collision may actually be realized simultaneously in respect of different parts of the structure; and it is further evident that the ratio in which the three outcomes are represented in the total result of this particular round of Challenge-and-Response will be a matter of momentous importance in the working out of the society's destiny.

If the adjustments predominate over the revolutions and the enormities, then the well-being of the society will be maintained and the continuation of its growth will be assured during the current chapter of its history. If the predominant outcomes are revolutionary, then the fortunes of the society in this chapter will be 'on the razor's edge'. It is possible that the revolutions may save the society's life by blasting away a number of anachronistic institutions which have not proved amenable to pacific adjustment and which would have rankled into enormities if they had proved altogether intractable; it is equally possible that the havoc made

¹ This explains, for example, the violence of the revolution through which a Catholic France caught up with a Protestant England at the close of the eighteenth century. The reason why there was no explosion of that violence in England at that time was that in England, in contrast to France, the medieval institutional obstructions to the modern social forces had already been partially broken down by stages in previous centuries—in a sixteenth-century religious reformation and in a seventeenth-century political upheaval. On this point see Masaryk, T. G.: *The Spirit of Russia*, English translation (London 1919, Allen & Unwin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 495 and 517-23.

by the revolutionary outbreaks may be so great (and, in every revolution, there is always a heavy bill of social damages to pay) that no amount of social liberation can compensate for it, and then the society may suffer almost as severely as if the predominant outcomes in this instance had been not revolutions but enormities. Finally, if the perversion of anachronistic institutions into enormities predominates over the elimination of them through violent revolutions or the conversion of them, through pacific and constructive adjustments, into satisfactory vents for the new social forces, then the dislocation of the whole social structure may be so serious that a breakdown may be virtually impossible to avoid.¹

In the historic breakdowns of civilizations this working out of the principle of Challenge-and-Response in the medium of institutions has indeed played an important part; and now that we have formulated it *a priori* in the imagery of a parable, we shall perhaps do well to study it in the life by resorting once more to our well-tried method of an empirical survey.

2. *The Impact of Industrialism upon Slavery*

Let us begin our survey with a familiar instance from the modern history of our own Western World which happens to be a particularly clear illustration of the possible diversity in the outcome when new social forces collide with an old institution.

In the recent chapter of our Western history in which the protagonists were an English creative minority²—a chapter that came to its close towards the end of the nineteenth century³—the two great new dynamic social forces which were conjured up and set in motion were Industrialism and Democracy,⁴ and one of the old institutions upon which these new forces impinged was Slavery.

Since the institution of Slavery has been recognized to be intrinsically evil by a consensus of all men in all times and places who have been in a position to study it at first hand objectively, it must be regarded as one of the merits, or at least as one of the

¹ 'Catastrophes are necessary to free the World from the monstrosities that periodically torment it. Powerful as he is, Man is an imperfect and unbalanced creature, and he always ends by exaggerating the principles, aspirations and needs most in keeping with his nature to such a monstrous pitch that they become unbearable afflictions. The most splendid civilisations have perished either directly through the action of these insufferable miscreations or indirectly through Man's desperate efforts to get rid of them' (Ferrero, G.: *Peace and War*, English translation (London 1933, Macmillan), pp. 92-3). This tendency in human nature is discussed further in this Study in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), Annex, pp. 635-9, below.

² For the role of England in the third chapter of the growth of our Western Society see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63, above.

³ See Part I. A, vol. i, p. 1, footnote 2, above.

⁴ See Part I. A, vol. i, *init.* The impact of these two new forces in our Western life upon a number of old Western institutions, which is the main subject of the present chapter, has been touched upon already, by anticipation, in III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, p. 212, and III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 241, above.

advantages, of the Western Civilization that, in its history down to the advent of the democratic and industrial régime, this pernicious institution had never played at all a dominant part. Fortunately for the Western Society the system of plantation-slavery, which had contributed so largely to the decline and fall of the 'apparented' Hellenic Society, had broken down in the breakdown of the Hellenic Society itself¹ and had therefore not entered into the 'affiliated' Western Society's original social heritage; and although this social evil had afterwards established itself in the Western body social likewise at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, when Western Christendom had expanded out of Europe overseas, this modern Western recrudescence of plantation-slavery had not at first shown itself very formidable. At the moment when, some three hundred years later, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the new forces of Democracy and Industrialism began to radiate out of Great Britain into the rest of the Western World, the institution of Slavery was still practically confined to the colonial fringes of Western Christendom; it had made no serious lodgements in the European homelands;² and, even overseas, the geographical range of the institution was contracting. For example, in the course of the eighteenth century Slavery died a natural death in the English colonies along the Atlantic seaboard of North America to the north of the Mason and Dixon Line; and if the Industrial Revolution had not broken out, or had only broken out a hundred years later than the actual date of its outbreak, it is possible that Slavery would have disappeared successively in one after another of the overseas communities of English, Dutch, French, Spanish, and Portuguese origin until it might have become completely extinct throughout the Western World without any social upheaval or even any realization that an important advance had been made in the progress of our Western Civilization. This possibility, however, was ruled out by the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, since the market for the produce of the overseas plantations was immensely stimulated by the demand for raw materials to feed the new industries which were called into existence by the new European technique, and for food-stuffs to feed the new urban populations which were called into existence by the new industries. The impact of Industrialism thus gave the languishing institution of Slavery a new lease of life; and there could not any longer be any question of the evil institution gradually

¹ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 169-71, above.

² The exception which proves the rule in this case is Portugal; for the spread of the institution of Negro plantation-slavery from Brazil into the European dominions of the Portuguese Crown was contemporaneous with the eclipse of Portugal as a Great Power (see Phillips, U. B.: *American Negro Slavery* (New York 1918, Appleton), p. 13).

dying out of itself. The Western Society was now faced with a choice between taking active steps to put an end to Slavery immediately, or else seeing this ancient social evil converted, by the driving-force of the new power of Industrialism, into a mortal danger to the society's very life.

In this situation an anti-slavery movement came into action, and this movement achieved some very great pacific successes. It succeeded pacifically in abolishing the international slave-trade altogether, and also in abolishing the institution of Slavery itself over vast areas: in most of the Latin-American countries whose White inhabitants liberated themselves in the early decades of the nineteenth century from the dominion of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns; and then again in the British and French colonial empires, where Slavery was finally extinguished in A.D. 1833 and in A.D. 1848. To this extent the new social problem arising from the impact of Industrialism upon Slavery was solved by a timely and a pacific adjustment; but there was one great region in which the anti-slavery movement failed to make peaceful headway, and this was 'the cotton-belt' in the Southern States of the North American Union.

'The cotton-belt' was the crux; for the greatest technical and financial triumph of the Industrial System in the first phase of its development was the set of brilliant inventions which made it profitable now to clean and spin and weave cotton on the grand scale; and this gave an immense impetus to the production of cotton in the Southern States of the North American Union, south of the Mason and Dixon line, where Slavery was still a going concern and where cotton was cultivated by slave labour. Accordingly, in the Southern States of the Union, Slavery remained in force for one generation longer; and in this short interval of thirty years between A.D. 1833 (the date at which Slavery was abolished in the British Empire) and A.D. 1863 (the date at which it was abolished in the United States) the 'Peculiar Institution' of the Southern States, with the whole driving-force of Industrialism now behind it, swelled into a monstrous growth which threatened to overshadow the North American Continent.¹ After that, the monster was brought

¹ An apologist for the obstinacy which was shown by the slave-owners in 'the cotton-belt' of the United States in clinging to Slavery after it had admittedly become their 'Peculiar Institution' can fairly point out that, at the very time when the profitability of cotton-cultivation was being vastly increased by the rise of the new cotton textile industry in Lancashire and New England, the profitability of sugar-cultivation in the British and French possessions in the West Indies was being diminished by the new invention of extracting sugar from beet-root—a discovery which promised to render Europe independent of the West Indian sugar crop. No doubt these economic facts do partly account for the relative ease, and the relatively early date, of the abolition of Slavery in the West Indian 'sugar-belt'; but this consideration does not affect our present argument; for it is not our purpose here to pass a comparative ethical judgement upon the difference in the handling of the Slavery problem in the British Empire and in the

to bay and was destroyed; but this belated eradication of Slavery in the United States had to be paid for at the price of a shattering revolution which began with the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5 and continued to work itself out in the sordid tragedy of the post-bellum years, when the defeated South went through the agonies of an economic and social collapse, while the victorious North tarnished its victory by countenancing the scandals of 'Reconstruction'.¹ Indeed, the devastating effects of this revolution are still visible in American life at the present day; for the manner in which the *ci-devant* slaves were liberated and enfranchised has done lasting mischief to the social relations between the White and Black races in the United States. So heavy has been the penalty for a thirty years' delay.

Still, our Western Society may congratulate itself that, even at this price, the social evil of Slavery has eventually been destroyed root and branch in its last Western stronghold, and has not anywhere survived to become the intolerable enormity which it was bound to become if it had continued to exist in an industrialized world. For this mercy we have to thank the new force of Democracy, which came into our Western World a little in advance of Industrialism. Since Democracy is the political expression of Humanitarianism, and since Humanitarianism and Slavery are obviously mortal foes, the new democratic spirit put 'drive' into the anti-slavery movement at the very time when Industrialism was putting 'drive' into 'the Peculiar Institution'.² It was this inspiration that enabled the anti-slavery movement to achieve so large a measure of success in driving Slavery off the map pacifically in time to avoid a revolution; and it is safe to say that if, in the struggle over Slavery, the working of the force of Industrialism had not been neutralized to a large extent by the counter-operation of the force of Democracy, our Western World would not have rid itself of Slavery at the cheap price of a single revolutionary catastrophe.

This judgement is supported by two pertinent considerations. On the one hand we have taken note already³ of the devastating

United States. We are concerned with this difference here because it is a signal illustration of the contrast between an adjustment and a revolution; and in this aspect the difference is simply a matter of historical fact.

¹ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 171-2, above.

² The anti-slavery movement received its original initiative and its main permanent impetus from a school of humanitarians in Great Britain, which was the place where the new force of Democracy had first emerged in the modern Western World. In this connexion it may be noted that Great Britain was also the cradle of the Industrialism which was threatening to put fresh 'drive' into Slavery. Is it possible that the conscious humanitarian motive of the English originators of the anti-slavery movement was reinforced by an unconscious intuitive apprehension of the enormity into which the old institution of Slavery would grow if the new force of Industrialism, which was emerging in England under their eyes, were allowed to put its 'drive' into it?

³ In III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 169-71, above.

effect, in Hellenic history, of the system of plantation-slavery which came into operation in the Hellenic World in the fifth century B.C. and which was not neutralized by the fifth-century Hellenic movement towards Democracy. On the other hand we are well aware that, in these latter days of our own Western history, the success of our efforts to eradicate Slavery has not yet been matched by any corresponding success in our efforts to eradicate War; and if we take a comparative view of these two modern Western problems we shall notice at once that one outstanding difference between the two situations is this: in the struggle against Slavery the two new master-forces of Industrialism and Democracy were ranged on opposite sides, whereas the movement to banish War has had to contend with both forces simultaneously. For the 'drive' of Democracy, as well as the 'drive' of Industrialism, has entered into the institution of War; and this double reinforcement has intensified the evil of War enormously.

3. *The Impact of Democracy and Industrialism upon War*

The point may be illustrated from the American Civil War of A.D. 1861-5, which has just engaged our attention apropos of Slavery. In fact, though not in theory, this was a war to end Slavery, and this aim was substantially achieved by it. But the American Civil War was not a war to end War; and its significance in the history of modern Western Warfare was as ominous for the future of our Western Civilization as its role in the history of Slavery was decisive and beneficent. In putting an end to Slavery, the victory of the North in the American Civil War rid the Western World, as we have seen, of an ancient evil into which the new force of Industrialism had been breathing fresh vigour. But when we examine the means by which the North won this military victory, of which the final abolition of Slavery was the first-fruits, we observe that the North not only brought into action against Slavery the very force of Industrialism which had given Slavery itself new power; the North mobilized Democracy against Slavery as well, and it won the Civil War by employing, in combination, a number of potent new weapons which Industrialism and Democracy, between them, had placed in a belligerent's hands by the beginning of the seventh decade of the nineteenth century. The Northerners fought the Slave Power with railways and with heavy artillery; but these weapons forged by Industrialism would not have decided the issue by themselves if they had not been combined with the weapon of conscription; and conscription is a weapon that has been placed in a belligerent Government's hands by Democracy. The compulsory recruitment of man-power for 'cannon-fodder', which autocracies

do not lightly attempt, becomes practicable in a democratic community when it is fighting a national war in a popular cause. The American Civil War of A.D. 1861-5 marks an epoch in the history of War because it saw the application of both the two new driving-forces—Democracy as well as Industrialism—to an ancient social evil.¹ In consequence of the introduction of the formidable new weapons which Democracy and Industrialism had forged, War had become a more terrible thing by the year 1865, when the American Civil War stopped, than it had been in 1861, when the Civil War began.² And so, while it is true that the abolition of Slavery was the first-fruits of the American Civil War and that this result was good, it is also true that the American Civil War had an effect in the military sphere which was profoundly evil. It carried our Western Society a long step forward in the process of 'keying up' War and thus making War a more terrible scourge than it had been in the past.

If we now cast our minds back to the state of our Western World on the eve of the emergence of Industrialism and Democracy, we shall notice that at this time, about the middle of the eighteenth century, War was in much the same condition as Slavery: it was an ancient social evil which was manifestly on the wane.

Our forebears in the eighteenth century looked back with distaste to a recent past in which War had been keyed up to an atrocious intensity by the 'drive' of sectarian Religious Fanaticism; but they also looked back with a self-complacent relief to the divorce between War and Religion which had been achieved before the end of the seventeenth century by the fathers of the Enlightenment.³ The 'drive' of sectarian Religious Fanaticism had first entered into Western Warfare upon the break-up of the religious unity of Western Christendom in the early part of the sixteenth century;⁴ and from the outbreak of the Reformation down to the end of the Thirty

¹ On the same grounds the Austro-Prussian War of A.D. 1866 is taken as a turning-point in the history of modern Western warfare in Europe by Woodward, E. L.: *War and Peace in Europe, 1815-1870* (London 1931, Constable), p. 19.

² One reason why the American Civil War was so perversely fruitful in the improvement of military technique was because it was mainly a war of amateurs, who were fairly representative of all the talent that the community could muster, and who were not inhibited from applying their wits to military affairs by the cramping effect of a hide-bound military tradition. The majority of our great Western wars in the Modern Age have been fought under the command of professional officers; and some instinct of self-preservation has inspired our modern Western Society to recruit its military officers from among its less able members, and then to cripple the abilities which they possess by a rigid routine. The exception which proves this rule is the school of professional officers in Prussia who won the European wars of 1864-71.

³ For the spirit of this modern Western Enlightenment see IV. C (iii) (b) 12, pp. 227-8; V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 669-71; and V. C (ii) (8), vol. vi, pp. 316-18, below.

⁴ For the remarkable similarity in ethos between the Protestant Reformation in Western Christendom and the nearly contemporary revival of Shi'ism in the Iranic World see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 393-4, above.

Years' War in A.D. 1648 on the Continent—and in England down to the Restoration of the Monarchy in A.D. 1660—this demonic force had inspired most of the wars in Western Christendom and had magnified the evil of War into an unprecedented enormity. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, however, the devil of sectarian Religious Fanaticism was successfully cast out; and, although it was exorcized in a spirit of cynical disillusionment and not through the grace of a deeper religious insight, the immediate effect was to reduce the evil of War in the eighteenth century to a minimum which has never been approached in any other chapter of our Western history, either before or after, up to date.

This age of relatively 'civilized' warfare, which began when the institution of War was disconnected from the driving-force of sectarian Religious Fanaticism at the close of the seventeenth century, came to an end at the close of the eighteenth century when War began to be keyed up to an atrocious intensity once again by the new driving forces of Industrialism and Democracy which we have seen at work, two generations later, in the American Civil War. If we ask ourselves which of these two new forces has played the greater part in the intensification of War during the last hundred and fifty years, we may be inclined to attribute the more important role to Industrialism; for the mechanization of Warfare during our so-called 'machine age' has been spectacular, and the 'progress' in the Art of War since the close of the eighteenth century is popularly estimated in terms of rifles and steamships and railways and armour-plate and mammoth guns and submarines and bombing-planes and tanks. But our second thoughts remind us that the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries came very near to wrecking our Western Civilization without any of these mechanical aids, and that a number of other civilizations—the Babylonian, the Hellenic, the Central American—have been completely successful in committing suicide through indulgence in a destructive militarism, though their technical equipment for the purpose would have seemed rudimentary even to a sixteenth-century Portuguese matchlockman. In all these cases the force which put the lethal 'drive' into War was not material but was spiritual; and in our own modern case in the Western World, where the material force of Industrialism and the spiritual force of Democracy have both been engaged in keying up our modern Western Warfare, we shall see that Democracy has been the dominant factor.

The fundamental reason why, in our world, War was less atrocious in the eighteenth century than it has been in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is that, in the eighteenth century, when War was no longer being used as an instrument of ecclesiastical

policy and had not yet begun to be used as an instrument of national policy, there was an interval during which War was merely 'the sport of kings'.

'Restricted by small numbers, poverty and the laws of honour, war became a kind of game between sovereigns. A war was a game with its rules and its stakes—a territory, an inheritance, a throne, a treaty. The loser paid,¹ but a just proportion was always kept between the value of the stake and the risks to be taken, and the parties were always on guard against the kind of obstinacy which makes a player lose his head. They tried to keep the game in hand and to know when to stop. It was for this reason that the great eighteenth-century theorists of warfare urged that neither justice, nor right, nor any of the great passions that move a people should ever be mixed up with war.'²

Morally, of course, the waging of War from this motive and in this spirit is profoundly shocking; for the intrinsic and inevitable waste and wickedness and misery of War, in any circumstances, are so terrible that human consciences can only condone a resort to War either in sheer self-defence or else in pursuit of some aim which is recognized to be of transcendent moral worth and social value. In most times and places this common view of the ethics of War has received lip-service, at any rate, from the statesmen by whom the wars have been made; and they have not gone to war without taking the trouble to find specious pretexts of necessity or altruism under which they could mask their underlying war-aims. Our eighteenth-century princes in the West were exceptional in the frankness with which they waged their wars as a private sport; yet it was no more possible for them than for other war-makers to ride rough-shod over the consciences of their fellow human beings; and just because, in this age, the ancient crime was openly being perpetrated as the recreation of a small number of highly privileged individuals, the players of this eighteenth-century war-game found themselves constrained to be as moderate in the conduct of their wars as they were cynical about the motives for which they made them. So long as people are persuaded that a war is being fought for the sake of religious truth or for the sake of national survival, they will throw themselves into the struggle in deadly earnest, and then there is almost no sacrifice that they will not make and almost no atrocity that they will not commit. But when War is not the absorbing business of whole churches or whole nations, but a form

¹ 'I have lost a battle; I will pay with a province' said the Emperor Francis Joseph (an eighteenth-century sovereign born out of due time) on the day after the Battle of Solferino in 1859 (cited by Ferrero in the work here quoted, p. 59).—A.J.T.

² Ferrero, G.: *Peace and War*, English translation (London 1933, Macmillan), 'War: then and now', p. 7.

of recreation—and this for the entertainment of the few and not of the many—then there are fairly definite limits beyond which the privileged sportsmen cannot push their war-game with impunity. The royal players know quite well the degree of licence that their subjects will readily allow them—how much treasure they can safely squander and how much blood they can safely spill—and since they do not intend to lose their crowns for the sake of a royal pastime, they are usually careful not to exceed their measure. Hence the saving graces of eighteenth-century warfare; and though these were merely negative virtues which were based on no more solid or enduring psychological foundations than an 'enlightened self-interest' and a studied imperviousness to 'enthusiasm' (a twentieth-century virtue which was an eighteenth-century vice),¹ they did produce considerable practical benefits while they lasted.

A list of the most obvious of these saving graces makes an imposing catalogue. For example, eighteenth-century armies were not recruited by conscription; eighteenth-century armies did not live off the country like their predecessors in the Wars of Religion,² nor did they wipe the country out of existence like the armies in the War of A.D. 1914-18; eighteenth-century commanders observed the rules of the military game;³ eighteenth-century Governments set themselves moderate objectives and did not impose crushing peace terms upon defeated opponents.

On the capital question of conscription it will be sufficient to cite the opinion of the most eminent of the royal players of the eighteenth-century war-game, Frederick the Great. In describing the

¹ The monarchs and aristocracies who ruled the states of the Western World before the outbreak of the French Revolution 'could fight each other without excessive animosity. . . . A nation at war must . . . hate the enemy, which means that it must be convinced that it is defending the most righteous of causes against the most infamous aggression.' After the Revolution, 'in the non-professional soldier, passion replaced professional training; myths became weapons as necessary as cannon and muskets' (Ferrero, G.: *Peace and War*, English translation (London 1933, Macmillan), 'War: then and now', pp. 57-8 and p. 9).

² On this point see Ferrero, G.: op. cit., p. 5. The author points out (p. 4) that in the Thirty Years' War, when the armies were still living off the peasantry in the German theatre of operations, they were already living on a commissariat in Flanders and Catalonia.

³ The 'complicated and cunning rules' of eighteenth-century warfare, 'which it is so hard for us to understand to-day, form one of those peaks of human evolution which Man painfully attains from time to time, and on which he stays but for a moment, to slide back once more into imperfection' (Ferrero, op. cit., p. 54). The Italian historian's point is borne out by the following words of a contemporary French soldier who was the greatest authority of his own age on the Art of War: 'La vieille escrime, les méthodes surannées, pour nous, à cette époque-ci de l'histoire, au milieu de l'Europe qui nous entoure, c'est cette guerre sans solution décisive, à but restreint, guerre de manœuvres sans combat' (Foch, Marshal F.: *Des Principes de la Guerre*, fourth edition (Paris-Nancy 1917, Berger-Levrault), p. 26). Marshal Foch proceeds (op. cit., p. 27) to quote the Maréchal de Saxe: 'Je ne suis point pour les batailles, surtout au début d'une guerre. Je suis persuadé même qu'un habile général pourra la faire toute sa vie sans s'y voir obligé.' It will be noticed that the British Museum copy of Marshal Foch's book, from which these quotations were taken was printed under fire of German guns.

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reign of his own father and predecessor, King Frederick William I of Prussia, Frederick the Great remarks that

'This régime was wholly military. The size of the Army was increased; and, in the ardour of the first enrolments, some artisans were taken for soldiers. This spread terror among the rest, and a number of them ran away, and this unforeseen accident did considerable damage to our manufactures. The King stepped in to remedy this abuse, and he devoted himself with particular care to the re-establishment and the progress of Industry.'¹

It will be seen that even such notorious eighteenth-century militarists as Frederick William I and Frederick the Great regarded the conscription of artisans as an abuse which no monarch in his senses would countenance.²

The eighteenth-century punctiliousness over fine points of the military game may be illustrated by the famous legend of the encounter between the English Guards and the French Guards at the Battle of Fontenoy in the War of the Austrian Succession. When the Red Line and the White Line had approached one another to within point-blank range, an English officer is said to have stepped forward from the ranks, made his bow to the enemy, and cried: 'Gentlemen of the French Guards, fire first!' Obviously the Guards could not have afforded to indulge in these courtesies if a precocious Industrial Revolution had enabled King George and King Louis to equip their toy-soldiers with Bren guns instead of muzzle-loading smooth-bore muskets; but it is equally obvious that, even if the French and English troops had been armed, in A.D. 1745, with weapons that were no more formidable than those of Cortez's Aztec adversaries, and could thus have exchanged their courtesies with almost complete material impunity, they would not have exchanged them, even so, if they had not been acting as 'living chess-men' but had been fighting in deadly earnest for causes which they personally had at heart.

¹ Frederick the Great: *Des Mœurs, des Coutumes, de l'Industrie, des Progrès de l'Esprit Humain dans les Arts et dans les Sciences sous la Dynastie des Hohenzollern*.

² Like so many of the eighteenth-century virtues, this self-restraint that was practised by an eighteenth-century Prussian militarism was inspired, not by goodness, but by common sense. The reason why the Prussian artisan was exempted from a conscription to which the Prussian serf was subject was because the King of Prussia wanted to play the militarist efficiently and had the intelligence to realize that, for the waging of war in semi-civilized societies, man-power is of no avail without money-power to back it. This hard fact had set a problem to Prussian statesmanship in an age when Prussia was still poor while warfare was already expensive; and the predecessors of Frederick William I had sought to solve this problem on lines which, in the Hellenic World of the sixth century B.C., had been followed by the Athenian statesman Solon with a view to remedying the natural poverty of Attica. Like Solon, the Prussian Government had encouraged the immigration of skilled artisans from abroad, on the calculation that their labours would increase the income of the community and that there would be a proportionate increase in the yield of taxation (see Bruford, W. H.: *Germany in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge 1935, University Press), pp. 157, 173, and 174).

The punctiliousness of these eighteenth-century soldiers towards one another was matched by the consideration which they usually displayed towards the civilian population, and by the care which they usually took to avoid inflicting serious injury upon the permanent capital equipment of social life in the war-zone. In this they were animated by that blend of discretion and good feeling and sheer delight in *expertise* which moves the sportsman riding to hounds to enjoy the pleasure of a cross-country gallop at the least possible cost in damage to the farmers' gates and fences. The attitude of eighteenth-century war-makers on this point comes to light in the almost unanimous and unmistakably genuine indignation to which they were moved by the few flagrant breaches of the rule: for example, by the devastation of the Palatinate by Louis XIV in A.D. 1674 and 1689 and the devastation of the Neumark and burning of Cüstrin by the Russian Army in A.D. 1758. The latter of these atrocities was written off as a not incomprehensible lapse in the manners of barbarians who had only recently been admitted into the polite society of the West. The misconduct of the *Roi Soleil*, who had more or less established his pretension to be the luminary of the Western social universe, gave the lesser lights a greater moral shock.¹

The moderateness of the objects for which the eighteenth-

¹ It is interesting to find evidence of a similar considerateness towards the civilian population in the conduct of War in the Hellenic World in a period of Hellenic history when War was for a time 'the sport of kings' instead of being the serious business of the citizens of city-states. This evidence is furnished, retrospectively and incidentally, by Polybius in a passage (Book XVIII, ch. 3) describing a conference—held in Malis before the decisive campaign in the Second Romano-Macedonian War (200–197 B.C.)—which was attended by King Philip V of Macedon on the one side and the Roman commander T. Quinctius Flamininus, accompanied by representatives of the Greek allies of Rome, on the other:

'When Phaenias, the General of the Aetolian Confederacy, had finished speaking, he was followed by Alexander surnamed Isius, who enjoyed a reputation as an able speaker and man of affairs. Alexander complained that Philip was neither making peace sincerely now nor in the habit of making war honourably when war was the order of the day. Just as his method in conferences and conversations was to lay ambushes and watch for opportunities and behave exactly like a belligerent, so in war itself he followed an immoral and extremely dishonourable line of conduct. He abandoned any attempt to face his opponents in the field, but signalised his flight by burning and plundering the towns—a policy of avenging defeat by ruining the prizes of the victors. What an utter contrast to the standards observed by his predecessors on the throne of Macedon! These sovereigns had fought one another continuously in the open country but had rarely destroyed and wrecked the towns. This was a fact of general knowledge, established by the war which Alexander the Great waged against Darius for the empire of Asia and again by the struggle of Alexander's successors over his inheritance, when they fought Antigonos in coalition for the possession of Asia. Moreover, the policy of the successors in the second generation, down to Pyrrhus, had been the same. They were ready enough to stake their fortunes in battle in the open country and they left nothing undone in their efforts to overcome one another by force of arms, but they used to spare the towns in order that the victors might enjoy the dominion over them and might receive due honours at the hands of their subjects. On the other hand, to destroy the objects of contention in the war while leaving the war itself in existence was the act of a madman and of one far gone in the malady; yet that was precisely what Philip was doing now. In the course of his forced march from the pass in Epirus Philip had wrecked in Thessaly more towns whose friend and ally he professed to be than had ever been wrecked by any Power with whom the Thessalians were at war.'

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century wars were waged may be illustrated by an incidental remark of a great eighteenth-century historian, Edward Gibbon.

'In War', Gibbon observes in a famous passage of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*,¹ 'the European forces are exercised by temperate and undecisive contests. The Balance of Power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be alternately exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts and laws and manners, which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of Mankind, the Europeans and their colonies.'

In quoting this passage at an earlier point in this Study² we have noticed already that Gibbon appears to have passed these words for publication some time during the first quarter of the year 1781,³

¹ Chap. xxxviii, *ad finem*: 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West.'

² In III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 311, above. It is quoted again in IV. C. (iii) (b) 5, in the present volume, p. 189, in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (a), p. 283, and in V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, vol. v, p. 625, footnote 1, below.

³ In this other context it has been suggested that the passage was not merely passed for publication some time during the first quarter of the year 1781, but was actually written at that date. That the passage was passed for publication in the first quarter of 1781 would seem to be a legitimate inference from the preface to volumes ii and iii of *The Decline and Fall*, since this is dated Bentinck Street, the 1st March, 1781. On the other hand the assumption that the 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West' were written later than the rest of volumes ii and iii, and only just before the writing of the preface, rested on the supposition that the different parts of *The Decline and Fall* were originally drafted in the order in which they were eventually published; and this supposition is not only unproven; it is definitely in conflict with such evidence as there is for the original date of composition of the 'Observations', at any rate.

In the opinion of one of the chief living authorities on the subject, Mr. G. M. Young, 'the conclusion of the third volume was in draft before the first volume was written' (Young, G. M.: *Gibbon* (London 1932, Davies), p. 93); and Mr. Young has been kind enough to communicate to the writer of this Study, in a letter of the 13th July, 1937, the evidence on which his opinion is based.

'(i) Gibbon began *The Decline and Fall* in the winter of 1772-3 (Gibbon, E.: *The Memoirs of the Life of Edward Gibbon, with Various Observations and Excursions by Himself*, edited by Hill, G. B. (London 1900, Methuen), p. 187); (ii) he made very slow progress at first (op. cit., p. 189); (iii) Louis XVI acceded to the French throne on the 10th May, 1774; (iv) the first volume of *The Decline and Fall* was finished in the winter of 1775-6 and was published in February 1776 (op. cit., p. 195); therefore the first volume was not written by the 10th May, 1774; but (v) the Arcadius and Honorius passage in the "Observations", which Louis XVI was supposed to have resented, was "written before his accession to the throne" (Gibbon's Memoir of the 2nd March, 1791); (vi) this passage is really integral to the whole reasoning of the "General Observations" (the federation of modern Europe and the variety within the fabric); ergo: the concluding observations were drafted before the first volume was written. For a closer date, what do you say to the partition of Poland in 1772 between Julian and Semiramis?

In the inquiry to which this letter was a reply, the writer of the present Study had called attention to one passage in the 'Observations' which wears the appearance of having been written after the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War:

'Whatever may be the changes of their political situation, they [i.e. the European settlers in America] must preserve the manners of Europe; and we may reflect with some pleasure that the English language will probably be diffused over an immense and populous continent.'

On this Mr. Young comments, in the letter above quoted:

'Enough had happened [by the year 1772] to make a thoughtful man wonder what the future of the American colonies might be—though of course Gibbon may well have put in that caveat as an afterthought when he revised his draft observations in 1782 [sic: ? for 1781]. This seems the more likely as it occurs in a footnote. Gibbon always

when the author's own country happened to be engaged in fighting a losing battle. At that moment the American Revolutionary War was approaching its crisis. His Britannic Majesty was at war with France and Spain and Holland, as well as with the thirteen insurgent American colonies; the Northern Powers of Europe were maintaining an unfriendly 'armed neutrality'; and the decisive campaign of the war, which was to end at Yorktown so disastrously for British arms, was about to open! And yet Gibbon's confidence was justified in the event by the peace settlement of A.D. 1783. In the American Revolutionary War Great Britain was eventually defeated by an overwhelming coalition of opposing forces; but her opponents did not think of crushing her. They had been fighting for the limited and precise objective of establishing the insurgent colonies' independence of the British Crown—the colonists because, for them, this independence was an end in itself, and the colonists' French allies because, in the estimation of a refined French statesmanship, the secession of the thirteen American colonies from the British Empire would just suffice to restore a Balance of Power which had been unduly inclined in Great Britain's favour by the cumulative effect of successive British victories in three previous wars. In A.D. 1783, when the victory was once more with the French for the first time in nearly a hundred years, French statesmanship was content to attain a minimum objective with a maximum economy of means. No rancorous memory of previous reverses tempted the French Government to seize this opportunity for paying off old scores. They were not even tempted to fight on for the dis-annexation of Canada, the principal American dominion of the French Crown, which had been conquered by the British Crown during the Seven Years' War and had been officially ceded by King Louis to King George in the peace settlement of A.D. 1763, only twenty years back. In the peace settlement of A.D. 1783 Canada was left in the British Crown's possession by a victorious France; and Great Britain, let off with the loss of her thirteen colonies, could congratulate herself, in Gibbonian language, upon having survived, without shipwreck, a fluctuation in the Balance of Power in which her turn had come to see her prosperity depressed, but in which no essential injury had been done to the general state of happiness of a polite society which was the common spiritual home of the subjects of King George and the subjects of King Louis.

thought in paragraphs and used the footnote as a sort of tool-shed for odds and ends which would have spoiled their shape.'

For the reminiscence, in this particular footnote, of an observation in a private letter which Gibbon had received in 1767 from Hume, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex II, in vol. v, p. 644, below.

These illustrations may suffice to display the saving graces of eighteenth-century warfare;¹ and at the same time they reveal the precariousness of this temporary alleviation of an ancient social evil.² The unenthusiastically enlightened soul of *Homo Tricornifer* remained smugly content with having bowed the unclean spirit of Ecclesiastical Fanaticism out of the house; and so, when the new-born spirits of Democracy and Industrialism presented themselves at the door a hundred years later, they found the house empty, swept, and garnished, and it was the easiest thing in the world for them to enter in and dwell there. The society which had sought to minimize the evil of War by the cynical expedient of treating it as 'the sport of kings' was incapable of preserving it from the intrusion of two new social forces which re-imported into War the deadly earnestness of an earlier age. And so the last state of this society has been worse than the first.³ In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era the new double 'drive' of Democracy and Industrialism has been keying up the scourge of War towards the pitch of enormity which it attained in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through the impetus of Ecclesiastical Fanaticism.

In A.D. 1790 the French National Assembly was warned by the prophetic voice of Mirabeau that a representative parliamentary body was likely to prove more bellicose than a monarch.⁴ In A.D.

¹ 'Une humanité nouvelle qu'on a introduite dans le fléau de la guerre, et qui en adoucit les horreurs, a contribué . . . à sauver les peuples de la destruction qui semble les menacer à chaque instant. C'est un mal, à la vérité, très-déplorable, que cette multitude de soldats entretenus continuellement par tous les princes; mais aussi . . . ce mal produit un bien: les peuples ne se mêlent point de la guerre que font leurs maîtres; les citoyens des villes assiégées passent souvent d'une domination à une autre, sans qu'il en ait coûté la vie à un seul habitant; ils sont seulement le prix de celui qui a eu le plus de soldats, de canons et d'argent' (Voltaire: *Essai sur les Mœurs*, ad fin.).

² 'Happy eighteenth century, which had only humane weapons, small forces and limited funds at its command in warfare. . . . Restricted warfare was one of the loftiest achievements of the eighteenth century. It belongs to the class of hot-house plants which can only thrive in an aristocratic and qualitative civilization. We are no longer capable of it. It is one of the fine things which we have lost as a result of the French Revolution' (Ferrero, op. cit., pp. 63-4).

³ Matt. xii. 43-5.

⁴ 'Je vous demande à vous-mêmes: sera-t-on mieux assuré de n'avoir que des guerres justes, équitables, si l'on délègue exclusivement à une assemblée de 700 personnes l'exercice du droit de faire la guerre? Avez-vous prévu jusqu'où les mouvements passionnés, jusqu'où l'exaltation du courage et d'une fausse dignité pourroient porter et justifier l'imprudence. . . ? Pendant qu'un des membres proposera de délibérer, on demandera la guerre à grands cris; vous verrez autour de vous une armée de citoyens. Vous ne serez pas trompés par des ministres; ne le serez-vous jamais par vous-mêmes? . . . Voyez les peuples libres; c'est par des guerres plus ambitieuses, plus barbares qu'ils se sont toujours distingués. Voyez les assemblées politiques; c'est toujours sous le charme de la passion qu'elles ont décrété la guerre' (Mirabeau in the French National Assembly on the 20th May, 1790).

In this matter the statesman Mirabeau showed a clearer vision than the philosopher Volney, whose eighteenth-century complacency on the subject of War was apparently still unshaken in 1791, to judge by the following passage of *Les Ruines*, which was published in that year:

'Si les guerres sont devenues plus vastes dans leurs masses, elles ont été moins meurtrières dans leurs détails; si les peuples y ont porté moins de personnalité, moins

1792, less than ten years after the statesmanlike peace settlement of 1783, the menacing accents of a Democracy conscripted for War were heard by Goethe's sensitive ears in the cannonade at Valmy;¹ and the *levée en masse* of a Revolutionary France² swept away the eighteenth-century régime in Germany, to clear the arena for the German riposte of the *Befreiungskrieg*.³ By the seventh decade of the nineteenth century,⁴ which saw the new note of the Revolu-

d'énergie, leur lutte a été moins sanguinaire, moins acharnée. Ils ont été moins libres, mais moins turbulents; plus amollis, mais plus pacifiques.'

Considering the time and place of publication, we must pronounce the writer singularly blind to the signs of the times. For evidence of Volney's subsequent awakening see IV. C (iii) (b) 4, p. 161, footnote 2, below.

¹ 'So war der Tag hingegangen; unbeweglich standen die Franzosen, Kellermann hatte auch einen bequemen Platz genommen; unsere Leute zog man aus dem Feuer zurück, und es war eben als wenn nichts gewesen wäre. Die grösste Bestürzung verbreitete sich über die Armee. Noch am Morgen hatte man nicht anders gedacht als die sämtlichen Franzosen anzuspiesen und aufzuspeisen, ja mich selbst hatte das unbedingte Vertrauen auf ein solches Heer, auf den Herzog von Braunschweig, zu Theilnahme an dieser gefährlichen Expedition gelockt; nun aber ging jeder vor sich hin, man sah sich nicht an, oder wenn es geschah, so war es um zu fluchen oder zu verwünschen. Wir hatten, eben als es Nacht werden wollte, zufällig einen Kreis geschlossen, in dessen Mitte nicht einmal wie gewöhnlich ein Feuer konnte angezündet werden; die meisten schwiegen, einige sprachen, und es fehlte doch eigentlich einem jeden Besinnung und Urtheil. Endlich rief man mich auf was ich dazu denke — denn ich hatte die Schaar gewöhnlich mit kurzen Sprüchen erheitert und erquickt. Diessmal sagte ich: "Von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der Weltgeschichte aus, und ihr könnt sagen ihr seyd dabei gewesen"' (Goethe: *Campagne in Frankreich*, Doh 19 bis 22 September 1792).

² In this French *levée en masse* we can perceive the emergence of the 'totalitarian' conception of the modern Western state.

'Que voulez-vous?' asks Barère in his *Rapport fait au nom du Comité de Salut Public sur la réquisition civique de tous les Français pour la défense de la Patrie* (Séance du 23 août 1793): 'Un contingent...? Le contingent de la France pour sa liberté comprend toute sa population, toute son industrie, tous ses travaux, tout son génie... Publiions une grande vérité: la liberté est devenue créancière de tous les citoyens; les uns lui doivent leur industrie, les autres leur fortune, ceux-ci leurs conseils, ceux-là leurs bras; tous lui doivent le sang qui coule dans leurs veines.'

Thus, at one stroke of baleful magic, the French state is transformed from a public utility into a goddess. The first article of the draft law which was introduced by Barrère's report runs as follows:

'Dès ce moment jusqu'à celui où les ennemis auront été chassés du territoire de la République, tous les Français sont en réquisition permanente pour le service des armées. Les jeunes gens iront au combat; les hommes mariés forgeront les armes et transporteront les subsistances; les femmes feront des tentes, des habits, et serviront dans les hôpitaux; les enfans mettront le vieux linge en charpie; les vieillards se feront porter sur les places publiques pour exciter le courage des guerriers, prêcher la haine des rois et l'unité de la République.'

This article so deeply thrilled the deputies that they begged the rapporteur to recite it twice over; and each time it was cheered to the echo by men who sincerely believed that they were liberating themselves from Tyranny! For the fallacy of the view that a state is a 'whole' of which the parts are human beings see III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 219-23, above. A twentieth-century French master of the Art of War remarks that the French Revolution 'osa... opposer victorieusement aux armées minutieusement et rigideusement instruites de la vieille Europe, les bandes inexpérimentées de la levée en masse qu'animait par contre de violentes passions' (Foch, Marshal F.: *Des Principes de la Guerre*, 4th edition (Paris-Nancy 1917, Berger-Levrault), p. 25).

³ In the nineteenth century it was the Prussian and not the French General Staff that took to heart and systematically applied the lesson of the French *levée en masse* which had been improvised in A.D. 1793 by the Committee of Public Safety (see footnote 4, below).

⁴ Ferrero points out (op. cit., p. 12) that, except in Prussia, the 'totalitarian' system of warfare which had been substituted for the restricted eighteenth-century system in the French *levée en masse* was not applied completely in any country—not even in its mother-country France—during the years 1815-70. During that period all the

tionary and Napoleonic Wars raised to a still higher pitch in the American Civil War and in Bismarck's three Prussian wars of aggrandizement, the terrible consequences that were latent in the application to War of the new driving-power which Industrialism and Democracy had imported into human affairs might already have been discerned by an acute observer. As we can see now in retrospect, the issue which stares our own generation in the face was actually confronting our grandfathers. They could not afford to rest content any longer with the negative eighteenth-century policy of leaving War to die gradually of inanition after turning it into a triviality; for by A.D. 1871 War was not 'the sport of kings' any longer. It had become the serious business of peoples who were inspired with all the enthusiasm that Democracy could excite and were armed with all the weapons that Industrialism could forge; and in these circumstances there was a choice between taking active steps to put an end to War altogether, or else seeing it rankle into an enormity without precedent in our Western history.

If the experience of the wars of 1861-71 had evoked an anti-war movement of anything like the same intensity and persistence as

Continental European countries except Prussia applied a system, devised in France, which was a compromise between the Revolutionary innovation and the eighteenth-century tradition. Under this transitional system the obligation to perform compulsory military service was universal, but less than one-fifth of the total annual contingent of potential conscripts was actually levied; this fraction was taken by lot; any one on whom the lot fell was allowed to contract out of his obligation if he could afford to pay for a satisfactory substitute; and the men who were finally enrolled were kept with the colours for seven years—a term of service which was long enough to allow them to be formed into semi-professional soldiers. On the other hand, Prussia (op. cit., p. 13) was already applying a system of universal compulsory military service on a three years' term during this post-Waterloo period—thus anticipating by half a century the adoption of an unmitigatedly 'totalitarian' system in other states.

¹ Marshal Foch (op. cit., pp. 29-30) formulates 'l'antithèse des deux époques' in the following terms:

'D'un côté, exploitation à l'extrême des masses humaines, animées de passions ardentes, absorbant toutes les activités de la société. . . . De l'autre côté, au contraire (XVIII^e siècle), exploitation régulière et méthodique de ces parties matérielles qui deviennent les bases de systèmes différents . . . tendant toujours . . . à régir l'emploi des troupes, en vue de ménager l'armée, capital du souverain, indifférente d'ailleurs à la cause pour laquelle elle se bat, mais non dépourvue de vertus professionnelles, d'esprit et d'honneur militaires en particulier.'

The French soldier's antithesis between eighteenth-century and twentieth-century warfare has been translated into general terms by a French philosopher:

'On peut . . . voir des exercices préparatoires ou des jeux dans la plupart des guerres enregistrées par l'histoire. . . . En revanche, si l'on place à côté des querelles accidentelles les guerres décisives, qui aboutirent à l'anéantissement d'un peuple, on comprend que celles-ci furent la raison d'être de celles-là. . . . De ce nombre sont les guerres d'aujourd'hui. . . . Plus de délégation à un nombre restreint de soldats chargés de représenter la nation. Plus rien qui ressemble à un duel. Il faut que tous se battent contre tous, comme firent les hordes des premiers temps. Seulement on se bat avec les armes forgées par notre civilisation' (Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 307-8 and 309-10).

The Italian historian whom we have quoted above points out that, after the change inaugurated by the French Revolution, the Art of War in the West discarded both its two characteristic eighteenth-century elegances: 'The aim of manœuvres was no longer to avoid battles, but to provoke them so as to hasten the decisive result. . . . Once again, as in the sixteenth century, armies lived by pillage or requisition' (Ferrero, op. cit., p. 9).

the anti-slavery movement which had been set on foot before the end of the eighteenth century, then our position to-day might perhaps have been more favourable than it actually is. It happened, however, that the crop of wars in the seventh decade of the nineteenth century was followed, like the General War of 1792-1815, by half a century of general peace, which was only broken by a few local wars of a semi-colonial character: the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8; the Spanish-American War of 1898; the South African War of 1899-1902; the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. These latter wars at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not afford much new insight into the general tendency of warfare in the Western World in this age, because they were fought between not more than two belligerents in each case, and not in any instance in regions lying near the heart of the Western World. Hence the terrible transformation in the character of War which had been brought about by the introduction of the new driving-power of Industrialism and Democracy took our generation by surprise in 1914. This time the shock has been so profound that an eager and active movement for the abolition of War has followed the Armistice of 1918. But this movement is gravely handicapped by its belated birth on the morrow of the World War, when it should have been born in 1871 or, better still, in 1815.¹

Our contemporary effort to abolish War by the organization of an international system of 'collective security' will be so familiar to readers of this Study that it would be superfluous to give any account of it here. It need only be pointed out that the aim of the system—an aim which inspires both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (or Multilateral Treaty of Paris for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy)—is the pacific, even though belated, abolition of War through a free agreement and voluntary co-operation between all the fully self-governing states in the contemporary world. Whether this movement will succeed in its purpose is a question which lies to-day on the knees of the Gods. At this stage we can only be sure that, in our Western World, War will now be abolished sooner or later by one means or another. If it is not abolished in the near future by the method of pacific adjustment, then it is certain to be abolished—and this in a future which may not be much more remote—by the alternative method of 'the knock-out blow', in which a war—or a series of wars—of attrition will end in the decisive and

¹ Our twentieth-century movement for the abolition of War is an outgrowth of one of the two antithetical reactions against the eighteenth-century conception of War as 'the sport of kings' (see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), Annex, pp. 643-7, below); but it has been markedly slower in coming to maturity than the rival movement, which has set itself, not to abolish war, but to salvage it by re-converting it into the serious business of peoples.

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definitive victory of one single Power through the annihilation of all the rest.

The picture of this war of attrition as it will be fought—if it should be fought—to-morrow is so vividly present in all living minds that there is no need in this place to dwell on the hideous details of mechanical warfare and chemical warfare and submarine warfare and aerial warfare and their probable combined result: that is to say, the wholesale annihilation, by starvation and by high explosives and poison gas, of the civilian populations which the eighteenth-century militarists took pains to spare. To indicate the consummation which the Art of War is rapidly approaching in our time, it is sufficient to remind ourselves of a piece of legislation which has been passed in France; for the French, with characteristic clear-sightedness, have envisaged the character of future warfare and have taken what steps they can in order to be prepared for it. They have realized that another war, if it comes, will engulf everything and everybody; and so they have passed legislation for the general organization of French national resources and French national life in war-time.

On the 7th March, 1927, a drastic bill for this purpose, which was sponsored by the Socialist statesman Monsieur Paul-Boncour, was voted by the Chamber of Deputies unanimously, with the sole exception of the Communist members. At this stage the bill provided for the conscription of wealth and the conscription of intellect as well as the conscription of man-power; and though some of these provisions were pruned away before the bill passed the Senate on the 17th February, 1928, the essence of the bill survived and duly passed into law, while the pre-suppositions on which it was based were elucidated and endorsed by the Senate's rapporteur on the bill, Monsieur Klotz, in the report in which he recommended his colleagues to accept the bill in the modified form in which it was eventually enacted.

'The conception of *la guerre totale*, which is the formula that we have to envisage in the future and the formula to which the organization that we contemplate must respond (and on this point your Army Commission is in complete agreement with the authors of the bill)—this conception condemns the peoples who to-morrow may find themselves engaged in a fresh conflict to find that their efforts can no longer be limited to the action of armed masses, but that they must be ready to throw into the battle, in order to snatch victory out of it, the totality of their forces and their resources. Their duty is to attain superiority in means of warfare up to the maximum degree; and, in pursuing this aim, they will never be able to allow themselves to relax, since none can feel sure that he is strong enough so long as he has the possibility of being still stronger than he is already.'

This is the enormity into which the not altogether intolerable evil of eighteenth-century warfare has been fatally transformed by the combined impact of Democracy and Industrialism. Democracy has turned 'the sport of kings' into the deadly earnest of peoples who now throw themselves into the wars of Nationality as passionately as their sixteenth- and seventeenth-century forebears once threw themselves into the wars of Religion.¹ Industrialism has converted the entire material wealth of a belligerent community into *matériel de guerre*, and has at the same time enabled and compelled a belligerent Government to mobilize the entire working population of the belligerent country. The men and women who produce the supplies and munitions in the interior are as indispensable for the waging of the war, and as strongly imbued with the spirit of it, as the soldiers at the front. Both technically and morally, they have ceased to be non-combatants and have therefore become fair targets for enemy attack. And at the moment when the carefully guarded eighteenth-century distinction between civilians and *militaires* has thus broken down, the economic unification of the World and the practical application of Physical Science to the Art of War have placed in an enemy's hands two potent weapons—the economic blockade and the aerial bombing raid—for developing the old-fashioned 'war of fronts', in which belligerency was a limited liability, into a new-fangled 'war of areas', in which the whole territory, equipment, and population of an enemy country becomes a direct object of hostile operations.

This 'totalitarian' kind of warfare, which is the antithesis of the eighteenth-century 'sport of kings' both in its spirit and in its social consequences,² is the only kind of warfare that it is open to us any longer to wage now that the ancient institution of War has received a fresh and unprecedentedly powerful impetus from the impact of the new social forces of Democracy and Industrialism. In this situation we have the single choice between abolishing War through peaceful agreement or allowing War to abolish itself through a 'knock-out blow'; and the destiny of our Western Civilization depends upon which of these two alternatives we in our generation choose.

¹ 'Une ère nouvelle s'était ouverte, celle des guerres nationales aux allures déchaînées, parce qu'elles allaient consacrer à la lutte toutes les ressources de la nation . . . parce qu'elles allaient ainsi mettre en jeu l'intérêt et les moyens de chacun des soldats, par suite, des sentiments, des passions, c'est-à-dire des éléments de force, jusqu'alors inexploités. . . . La nouvelle guerre est partie; on va désormais se battre avec les cœurs des soldats' (Foch, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-9). In a footnote to this passage the author recalls that 'dans le passé déjà, c'étaient les guerres de religion, guerres pour les idées, qui avaient amené les luttes les plus violentes'.

² 'When it took on its new pace and pressure, War increased the effectiveness of the means at its disposal, but at the same time lost the power to achieve its proper purpose, which is peace' (Ferrero, *op. cit.*, p. 126).

4. *The Impact of Democracy and Industrialism upon Parochial Sovereignty*

We have now looked at the effects of the impact of the two dominant social forces of the last age of Western history upon two ancient institutions—War and Slavery—and our inquiry has brought to light the fact that, while the effect of Industrialism upon both these institutions has been the same, the effect of Democracy has been apparently inconsistent—and indeed contradictory—in the two cases. Whereas the advent of Industrialism has intensified the evil of War and the evil of Slavery alike, Democracy appears to have worked as a mitigating influence upon Slavery and as an aggravating influence upon War. What is the explanation of this apparent inconsistency? And how is it possible, *a priori*, for Democracy to act as an anti-social force? For Democracy ‘breathes the spirit of the Gospels . . . and its motive-force is Love’.¹

One possible explanation might be found in the well-known faculty of the human spirit for ‘departmentalizing’ its field of action and for acting, thinking, and feeling quite inconsistently in regard to different parts of this arbitrarily and artificially divided whole. In the case of Slavery and Democracy, for example, an extreme inconsistency was exhibited, in entire good faith, by the Virginian slave-owners who were moved to a genuine democratic indignation at the tyranny of a George III or an Abraham Lincoln,² and by the Attic slave-owners who gave their lives to vindicate the liberty of all free Hellenes against the tyrannous ambitions of the Achaemenidae.³ It did not occur to the Virginian patriots—‘Bible

¹ Bergson, Henri: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 304–5, quoted in this Study already in Part I. A, vol. i, p. 9, above.

² *Sic Semper Tyrannis* was the official motto of the State of Virginia; and the words were declaimed by Lincoln’s Southern murderer from the stage of the theatre at Washington on to which the criminal leapt after having inflicted a mortal wound upon the liberator of the Southern slaves.

³ In fairness to the Athenians it must be noted that at Athens, in the great age of the Athenian democracy in the fifth century B.C., the domestic slaves who were in direct personal relations with their masters, and with their masters’ fellow freemen, were very much more humanely treated than the Helots in contemporary Laconia (for the treatment of the Helots by their Spartan masters see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 233, footnote 4, and III. A, vol. iii, pp. 65–6, above). For this contrast between the two treatments we have the convincing testimony of a contemporary Athenian witness—the anonymous author of the pseudo-Xenophontic *Institutions of Athens* (chap. i, quoted in V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), vol. v, pp. 451–2, below)—who was no admirer of the Athenian democracy either in this respect or in any other.

‘Slaves . . . and permanently domiciled aliens enjoy an extreme degree of licence at Athens, where it is illegal to assault them and where the slave will not make way for you. The reason why this is the local custom shall be explained. If it were legal for the slave—or the alien or the freedman—to be struck by the free citizen, your Athenian citizen himself would always have been getting hit through being mistaken for a slave. The free proletariat at Athens are no better dressed than the slaves and aliens, and no more respectable in appearance. If any reader is surprised at the further fact that at Athens they allow the slaves to live in luxury and in some instances to keep up an imposing establishment, it would not be difficult to demonstrate the good sense of their policy in this point as well. The fact is that, in any country that maintains a naval establishment

Christians' though they might be—to take to heart the Parable of the Unmerciful Servant; and it is unlikely that any Athenian patriot who gave his life for freedom at Marathon or Salamis ever saw himself, *vis-à-vis* his own slaves, in the light of a petty-Darius or petty-Xerxes.¹ A similar psychological 'departmentalism' might possibly explain how the spirit of Democracy could come into our modern Western World without ranging itself against War as it has actually ranged itself against Slavery. Yet this negative explanation cannot account for the fact that, in our case, as we have noticed above, Democracy has not merely failed to work against War, but has positively put its 'drive' into War and has done still more than the sister force of Industrialism has done to key our Western warfare up from the low tension of the eighteenth-century 'sport of kings' to the enormity of 'la guerre totale'. In thus aggravating the evils of War, Democracy has been working in direct opposition to its own spirit, and it is hardly conceivable that it would have thus reversed its natural action if it had collided with War, as it collided

[and where the rich are therefore heavily taxed to foot the bill—A.J.T.], it is essential for slaves to bring in money by their services, in order that I [the master] may receive at least the royalties on the profits of my slave's labour; and this involves [eventual] manumission. In a country, however, in which wealthy slaves exist, it is no longer desirable that my slave should be afraid of you—as he is, for example, in Lacedaemon. If your slave is afraid of me, that fact will keep him under a perpetual threat of having to stand and deliver his own money [to me as blackmail]. This is the reason why we have put our slaves on a social equality with our freemen.'

Here we see in embryo the pert and pampered domestic slaves of fourth-century and third-century Athens whose Roman successors learnt to manage an Emperor's household, and thereby to rule the Hellenic *Orbis Terrarum*, in the names of a Claudius and a Nero. This unseemly practical reversal of the juridical relations between slave and master was the nemesis of a democratic humanitarianism when this right attitude towards human relations, having failed to sweep Slavery away, was imported into a traditional institution which was essentially wrong in itself. A more healthy outcome of Athenian equalitarianism was the parity in the wages paid to slaves and freemen who were employed on the same work (a parity which is strikingly apparent in the inscribed monetary accounts for certain Athenian public works which our modern Western archaeologists have brought to light). It is true that the freeman's wage which was earned by the Athenian slave-artisan went into the pocket of the slave's master and not into the pocket of the slave-worker himself. But this inequitable economic discrimination against skilled slave-labour must have counted psychologically for less than the fact that, in Athenian public works, slaves and freemen of equal skill worked side by side and were reckoned as being of equal value. On the other hand, in the Attic silver-mines at Laurium, which were worked with unskilled slave-labour that was hired out by contractors in the mass, as though it were a material commodity, there is no reason to suppose that the inhumanity of the treatment was any less than was customary in mines and quarries in other parts of the Hellenic World; and, in general, the conditions in the Hellenic mining industry in all ages seem to have rivalled the horrors which our own eighteenth-century Western forebears tolerated in 'the Middle Passage'. The conditions in the Attic silver-mines at Laurium, after the discovery of the rich vein of ore in 483 B.C., are described, with citations from the original authorities, by A. E. Zimmern in *The Greek Commonwealth* (Oxford 1911, Clarendon Press), chapter 16. These fifth-century conditions of life and work in the mines of Attica were bad enough; but they appear to have been surpassed in later ages of Hellenic history in more outlying parts of the Hellenic World. See, for example, the description given by Strabo (Book XII, chap. 40, p. 562) of the mortality in some mines in the Pontic district of Pimoliseae which were worked with convict-labour.

¹ The Cretan slave-owner does, however, compare himself, with brutal self-complacency, to 'the Great King' in the Song of Hybrias which has been quoted in III. A, vol. iii, p. 87, footnote 1, above.

with Slavery, in a direct encounter, face to face. As it has happened, however, the history of the impact of Democracy upon War in our Western World has been less simple than this. Before colliding with the institution of War, our modern Western Democracy has collided with the institution of Parochial Sovereignty in a society that has been broken up politically into a plurality of parochial states; and the importation of the new driving-forces of Democracy and Industrialism into the old machine of the Parochial State has generated the twin enormities of Political and Economic Nationalism. It is in this gross derivative form, in which the etherial spirit of Democracy has emerged from its passage through an alien medium, that Democracy has put its 'drive' into War instead of working against it.¹

Here, again, our Western Society was in a happier posture in the pre-nationalistic and post-sectarian eighteenth century than in either the previous age or this subsequent age into which our own generation has been born. In the eighteenth century, when War was 'the sport of kings' and not the serious business of peoples, the parochial sovereign states of our modern Western World were not, as a rule, the instruments of the 'general wills' of 'citizen bodies', but were virtually the private estates of dynasties: dynastic properties which might pass from one royal owner to another by being hazarded as the stakes in the royal war-game when they did not pass by the more respectable and more normal processes of inheritance or marriage-settlement. It is true that there were certain states on the eighteenth-century political map whose rulers, at any rate *de facto*, were not monarchs but oligarchies which professed to shape their policies in the interests of the people and which effectively consulted their own narrower interests at all events. Eighteenth-century Venice and Hamburg, for example, were relics of the abortive cosmos of city-states which had failed to replace the feudal monarchies of medieval Western Christendom,² while eighteenth-century Holland and Great Britain were precocious examples of the national states into which almost the whole of our latter-day Great Society is partitioned at the present moment.³ The Dynastic State, however, was the typical state of the eighteenth century; and royal marriages and royal wars were the two main

¹ This sinister perversion of a noble spiritual force has been noticed, by anticipation, in Part I, A, vol. i, p. 9, above.

² See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 343-50, above.

³ A third type of oligarchically governed eighteenth-century state is represented by eighteenth-century Poland and Hungary; but these East European oligarchies were of relatively small importance, partly because of the general social backwardness of the countries in which they were established and partly because of certain special political circumstances. In Poland the oligarchy had paralysed itself by exaggerating the liberties of parliamentary government into the licence of the *Liberum Veto*. In Hungary, where the local oligarchy was much more efficient in itself, it was held in check during the eighteenth century by the monarchical power of the Hapsburg Dynasty.

agencies through which the changes in the eighteenth-century political map of the Western World were brought about.

This transfer of sovereignty as though it were private property to be traded or gambled away is as shocking intrinsically as the waging of war for the recreation of crowned heads; and to twentieth-century consciences which reconcile themselves to acts of conquest by taking posthumous plebiscites, it seems peculiarly outrageous that, in the eighteenth century, provinces should have been conveyanced like fields and their human inhabitants transferred from one royal owner to another, like so much live stock, on a profit-and-loss account which was reckoned in millions of souls. Yet in this matter, again, it would be rash for us, in our generation, to adopt a pharisaical attitude towards our forebears without ascertaining how a comparison between our ways and their ways works out.

Eighteenth-century statesmanship has at least this to be said in its favour, that, in finding its ways and means for changing the political map, it always preferred royal marriages to royal wars, if the matrimonial method could be managed. It considered, very rightly, that the matrimonial method was the cheaper and the more elegant way; and this point of view is summed up in a famous Latin epigram on the fortunes of the House of Austria, which built up and retained a great empire through a series of successful dynastic marriages, though it was notoriously apt to come out on the losing side in any wars in which it took part.

'Bella gerant alii; tu, felix Austria, nube.'¹ The very names of eighteenth-century wars tell the same tale: 'the War of the Spanish Succession'; 'the War of the Polish Succession'; 'the War of the Austrian Succession'. The understanding was that, as a rule, these conveyances of royal estates would be peacefully arranged between the diplomatic match-makers, with due consideration for the interests of third parties. They only gave occasion for 'the sport of kings' in exceptional cases, when the royal chaffers found themselves totally unable to agree.

This tendency, which was prevalent in the eighteenth century, to treat international politics as the private family affairs of dynasties, and not as the public business of peoples, undoubtedly turned international politics into something rather petty and rather sordid; but at least it performed one socially beneficial negative service. It 'took the shine out of' patriotism; and, with 'the shine', it took the sting.²

¹ The epigram is applicable to eighteenth-century Austria, though its authorship is attributed to a fifteenth-century king of Hungary, Matthias Corvinus (*regnabat* A.D. 1458-90).

² 'Dans ces derniers temps la générosité, les vertus, les affections douces s'étendant toujours, du moins en Europe, diminuent l'empire de la vengeance et des haines nationales' (Turgot, A. R. J.: *Plan de Deux Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* in *Œuvres de Turgot* (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 632-3).

In damping down patriotic enthusiasm the eighteenth-century system of international politics dissipated the mists of patriotic prejudice in some degree. It lifted, for a moment, the veil which usually prevents 'the man in the street' from perceiving that all other human beings—foreigners and compatriots alike—are 'men of like passions with' himself.¹ Aristotle has nicknamed Man 'the political animal'; and the nickname is well deserved. Ordinarily this primitive political parochialism dominates the outlook and the action of the rank-and-file of Mankind in civilizations as well as in primitive societies. In the eighteenth century an abnormal and temporary system of politics which was not admirable in itself did nevertheless have the socially beneficial effect of making it rather less difficult than usual for men and women to shake themselves free from their political animality.

There is a classic expression of this negatively oecumenical eighteenth-century ethos in a well-known passage of Laurence Sterne's *Sentimental Journey through France and Italy*. Sterne has got as far as Paris, and has been in Paris some days, when, on coming back one evening to his hotel, he is told that he has been inquired after by the police.

"The deuce take it!" said I: "I know the reason." . . . I had left London with so much precipitation that it never enter'd my mind that we were at war with France; and had reached Dover, and looked through my glass at the hills beyond Boulogne, before the idea presented itself; and, with this in train, that there was no getting there without a passport. . . . So, hearing the Count de ——— had hired the packet, I begged he would take me in his suite. The Count had some little knowledge of me, so made little or no difficulty—only said, his inclination to serve me could reach no farther than Calais, as he was to return by way of Brussels to Paris; however, when I had once pass'd there, I might get to Paris without interruption; but that in Paris I must make friends and shift for myself—"Let me get to Paris, Monsieur le Count", said I, "and I shall do very well." So I embark'd, and never thought more of the matter.'

According to Sterne's own story—which may not be true in the letter but is none the less true in the spirit—this eighteenth-century traveller in an 'enemy country' did in fact shift for himself quite successfully. After the visit from the French police in Paris, he took a cab to Versailles, called on an unknown French nobleman there on the strength of being a compatriot of Shakespeare, found no difficulty in inducing the nobleman to procure him a passport from the French authorities, and continued his journey across France without further inconvenience. To us, in our generation, this eighteenth-century anecdote reads like a fairy-story. England

¹ Acts xiv. 15.

and France are at war; yet a private nobleman can hire the packet-boat to convey him from Dover to Boulogne; he can take any other private person whom he chooses in his suite; all that is required, in order to travel in an enemy country in war-time, is a passport; our traveller does not even comply with that requirement; yet he is able to reach Paris and stay there some days before the police begin to bother him; whereupon an unknown French nobleman, out of sheer politeness, procures the necessary passport for him! And, with this formality accomplished, our eighteenth-century 'enemy alien's' troubles are over!

In this matter our forebears in the eighteenth century lived up to a standard of civilization from which their descendants in the twentieth century have fallen away far indeed. A state of war exists, but it only affects the fighting forces. Civilians are immune, because War is simply 'the sport of kings' and international politics are no concern—for weal or for woe—of these kings' subjects. The author of the *Sentimental Journey* is still living in a pre-nationalistic as well as pre-industrial age. But very soon after Sterne's unmolested passage through France at the tail-end of the Seven Years' War the spirit of international relations begins to change.¹ Warfare now is no longer just a *jeu de paume* among a party of kings; it is a serious conflict between peoples. The peoples themselves are once more at enmity, as they were in the age of sectarian Religious Fanaticism;² and every civilian, every non-combatant, has to bear the consequences.

This great evil has come to pass, yet the humane eighteenth-century spirit has died hard. Even after the French Revolution, even after the advent of Napoleon, it was regarded as an outrage

¹ Sterne's exploit was, however, emulated, half a century later, by a distinguished British traveller who visited the United States in peace and comfort during the Anglo-American War of A.D. 1812-15. In 1813 the Scottish law lord, Lord Jeffrey, sailed from Liverpool for the United States; and he walked and talked, unmolested, on 'enemy' soil from the 4th October, 1813, to the 2nd January, 1814. During those three months the 'enemy' visitor not only achieved his private object—which was to persuade a fellow countrywoman, who was at that time living as an 'enemy alien' in the United States, to marry him; the successful suitor also spent two days in discussing the perennial question of Neutral Rights with the Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, and on the second day he went over the same ground again with President Madison, who had invited him to dinner. Jeffrey's business with the Secretary of State was the same as Sterne's with the unknown French nobleman. He wanted a passport ('cartel'); and this was granted to him so promptly that he was able to thank the President for it when he dined with him the day after his first application (see Cockburn, Lord: *Life of Lord Jeffrey* (Edinburgh 1852, Black, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 214-30).

² Volney, who was still living in his eighteenth-century fool's paradise in A.D. 1791 (see IV. C (iii) (b) 3, p. 150, footnote 4, above), was writing in a very different strain a few years later:

'Après nous être affranchis du fanatisme juif, repoussons ce fanatisme vandale ou romain, qui, sous des dénominations politiques, nous retrace les fureurs du monde religieux; repoussons cette doctrine sauvage, qui, par la résurrection des haines nationales, ramène dans l'Europe policée les mœurs des hordes barbares.'

This passage of Volney's *Leçons d'Histoire* was written by a philosopher who had witnessed the *levée en masse* and the Terror.

when, upon the breakdown of the Peace of Amiens and the consequent resumption of war between England and France, Napoleon decreed, on the 22nd May, 1803, that all British civilians between the ages of eighteen and sixty who happened to be travelling in France should be interned. Napoleon defended his action not, as any Government would defend the same action at the present day, on the simple ground that war had broken out. He admitted that the internment of enemy citizens in war-time was a breach of the rules of the game; and he defended his action as reprisals for the alleged seizure of two French merchantmen by the British Navy before war had been declared. Yet Napoleon did not 'get away with it'. His action was condemned not only by contemporary public opinion but also by posterity. It is still described as 'his unheard-of action, which condemned some 10,000 Britons to detention', in a book published as recently as A.D. 1904¹—only ten years before 'enemy aliens' were being interned wholesale, as a matter of course, by all belligerent Governments, upon the outbreak of the Great War of our generation in 1914.

During the century and a half that separates the year 1914 from the date of the *Sentimental Journey*, it is evident that the eighteenth-century standard for the treatment of civilians in war-time has been attacked and undermined with increasing energy by some potent new moral—or immoral—force until at last the old standard has been completely overthrown and swept away. This triumphant antinomian force is, of course, Political Nationalism; and, if we analyse our modern Western Political Nationalism into its constituent elements, we shall find that it is the monstrous outcome of the impact of our modern Western Democracy upon the Parochial State. In origin and essence, Democracy is not parochial but universal, not militant but humanitarian. Its essence is a spirit of fraternity which knows no bounds but those of Life itself; and, in virtue of this quality, Democracy exercises a compelling power over human souls—a power of evoking loyalty and devotion and enthusiasm—which the dynastic political dispensation of the eighteenth-century Western World could not ever have expected, and perhaps did not even desire, to possess. Our eighteenth-century dynasties were content, as we have seen, to employ their feeble spiritual energies in operating the modern Western political system of parochial states at low tension. But this field of activity, in which the application of the dynastic principle was comparatively innocuous, was invaded before the close of the eighteenth century by the new force of Democracy, which was as pervasive socially as it was spiritually

¹ Rose, John Holland: *The Life of Napoleon I* (London 1904, Bell, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 426.

dynamic; and, in this diversion from its natural outlet into an alien channel, the new force was perverted. The natural field of action for Democracy is a field that embraces all Mankind; and it is on this range that its spiritual potency is beneficent. But when this potent spiritual driving-force is diverted into the mechanism of a parochial state, it not only ceases to be beneficent but becomes malignantly subversive. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. Democracy imprisoned in parochial states degenerates into Nationalism.

If we pursue our empirical method of study, we can watch this disastrous corruption poisoning the political life of our modern Western Society.

In examining the impact of Democracy upon War in our modern Western history, we have seen that Gibbon's characterization of the American Revolutionary War as a 'temperate contest' was vindicated by the moderation of the subsequent peace settlement; and that one of the most striking exhibitions of this moderation was the victorious French Crown's willingness to leave the former French dominion of Canada under the sovereignty of the discomfited British Crown, instead of fighting on to recover a possession which had been ceded to King George by King Louis only twenty years before, at the end of a previous 'temperate contest' in which the fortunes of war had happened to go the other way. If the French Crown had insisted upon the recovery of Canada in 1783, the American Revolutionary War might have been inflamed from a 'temperate contest' into a war *à outrance*; but the credit for the moderation which saved the Western World from that disaster does not belong to the French Government alone. The honours are divided between French and British statesmanship; for if, in 1783, the French Government felt no temptation to fight on for the recovery of Canada, this was largely because the Canadians were substantially contented with their experience of British rule, and they were contented because the British Crown had been as good as its word in giving the Canadians, in the Quebec Act of 1774, the liberal treatment to which it had pledged itself in the peace-settlement of 1763,¹ when the sovereignty over Canada had been transferred. In 1783 the Canadians were duly living under their customary French laws and enjoying liberty of worship according to their hereditary Roman Catholic religion; and the British Government's proof of good faith made it morally possible for the French Government to show moderation. Conversely, if the Canadians

¹ 'His Britannic Majesty . . . agrees to grant the liberty of the Catholic religion to the inhabitants of Canada; he will consequently give the most precise and most effectual orders that his new Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion according to the rites of the Romish Church, as far as the laws of Great Britain permit.'—Peace Treaty of the 10th February, 1763, between the Crowns of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal, Article 4.

under British rule had been oppressed, or if they had been evicted from their homes to make way for British colonists, then, in 1783, it would have been morally almost impossible for the French Government not to continue the war until Canada, as well as the Thirteen Colonies, had been liberated from British rule.

The British Crown had not been tempted to break its word to the French Government over the treatment of the Canadians because, in this eighteenth-century interlude of common sense between the two frenzies of Sectarian and National Fanaticism, the parochial Governments of the Western World were both secular and cosmopolitan in their outlook and therefore did not feel it their duty to coerce their subjects into either a uniformity of faith or a uniformity of law and language. So far from that, eighteenth-century statesmanship was rather sensitively scrupulous in such matters because it had unpleasant memories—dating from a recent past—of barbarities which we have been witnessing again in our World in our day: the penalization or oppression or eviction or massacre of alien minorities and other subject populations. All these barbarities had been inflicted and suffered by our eighteenth-century forebears' immediate predecessors during an age of sectarian Religious Fanaticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The last case of the kind had been the expulsion of the Protestants from the Catholic Bishopric of Salzburg by the Prince-Bishop in 1731-2; but this Salzburg barbarity had raised an outcry; for by that time religious persecution had ceased to be countenanced by Western public opinion. The last serious cases before that had been Claverhouse's campaigns against the Covenanters and Louis XIV's persecution of the Huguenots: the dragonnades and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

The exception which proves the rule of eighteenth-century conduct in this matter is the case of the Acadians, the original French settlers in the North American province which has since become Nova Scotia. After having been transferred from French to British sovereignty by the Peace Treaty of Utrecht in A.D. 1713, the Acadians were eventually deported from their homes by the British authorities in A.D. 1755. The British Government were moved to take this action because Acadia was a border-province between the British and French dominions in North America as they then were; the French authorities in Canada were inciting the French settlers under British rule in Acadia to rise against the British Government; and the Seven Years' War was on the point of breaking out. In these circumstances the British authorities reluctantly deported the Acadians as a last resort; and not more than 8,000 persons were involved. Yet the British Government were apologetic over their

action, and it was decidedly condemned by the public opinion of the contemporary Western World. If the eviction of the Protestant Salzburger in A.D. 1731-2 has an historic interest as a last belated case of religious persecution, the deportation of the Acadians in A.D. 1755 has also an historic interest of its own as a harbinger of the latter-day persecutions which were to be inflicted upon alien minorities and other subject populations in our modern Western World—this time in the name, not of Religion, but of Nationality. Less than thirty years later there was a fresh and more flagrant case of this new social evil on the same continent.

While the peace settlement of A.D. 1783 was moderate indeed from the standpoint of the British Crown—which was allowed to retain Canada and was only mulcted of the Thirteen Colonies as the price of its defeat—there was one set of people involved in the American Revolutionary War to whom the settlement appeared in a very different light, and these were the so-called United Empire Loyalists: the people in the Thirteen Colonies who had taken the side of the Crown against the insurgents. Unlike the French colonists in Canada after the previous war, these partisans of the British Crown in the Thirteen Colonies had to leave their homes, bag and baggage, after the American Revolutionary War, when their country came under the new flag. Under the Stars and Stripes the Loyalists found life impossible, and the Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and Ontario are peopled with their descendants down to this day; whereas only twenty years earlier the Canadians, who had shown an equal loyalty to the French Crown during the Seven Years' War, had found it not impossible, after the transfer of sovereignty in Canada, to lead a tolerable life under the Union Jack, with the result that they have remained at home, as contented subjects of the British Crown, from that day to this.

In the new rancour and new harshness with which the Loyalists were treated by the North American victors in the war of A.D. 1775-83, we see the Nationalism that we know by bitter experience to-day already showing its familiar face and bringing forth its familiar fruits. And the dragon's-tooth seed was sown all over Europe in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. We see a national consciousness—and, with it, a national passion and fanaticism and ruthlessness—flaring up first in France and then in Spain and Germany and Russia and then in Belgium and Italy: in the French Revolutionary *levée en masse*; in the Spanish guerrilla war; in the burning of Moscow; in the German *Befreiungskrieg*; in the Belgian Revolution of 1830; in the Italian *Risorgimento*. And, as international politics became infected with these mutually hostile national enthusiasms, the moderation which had been the virtue of

eighteenth-century statesmanship ceased to govern the conduct of international affairs. The last moderate peace terms in our modern Western history were those which Bismarck imposed on the Hapsburg Monarchy in 1866. In 1871, when he had to make peace with a defeated France, Bismarck was confronted with a German Nationalism that had gained such strength under his fostering hand that it had become his master instead of his servant; and, against his better judgement, he was compelled by this masterfully recalcitrant anti-social force to inflict a rankling wound on the French national consciousness by tearing away Alsace-Lorraine from the French body politic. In our generation we have reaped the cruel harvest of this nineteenth-century sowing, in the legion of internecine national conflicts that have been devastating the World since 1914.

If we ask ourselves how this disastrous change for the worse in the spirit of international relations has come about, the fate of the Loyalists in the American Revolutionary War will give us our answer. For the people who made the Loyalists' lives impossible to live any longer in their old homes were the victorious insurgents in the Thirteen Colonies; and that reminds us that, although this war was still on the whole a 'temperate contest' in Gibbon's sense, it was not entirely fought as 'the sport of kings'. In this American war, King George and King Louis, with their moderate war-aims and their lukewarm feelings, were not the only belligerents. The protagonist, this time, was no crowned head but a new-born nation—the American nation—and this American nation was fighting for its national aim of political independence in deadly earnest. The measure of its earnestness was the harshness of the treatment which it meted out, in the hour of its own victory, to the defeated Loyalists; for, in the eyes of American patriots, these adherents of the British Crown were traitors who had committed the unforgivable sin of striving to prevent the new nation from coming to birth. The democratic movement which had welled up in A.D. 1775 out of a North American spring had lost none of its pristine dynamic force in A.D. 1783; but in the short intervening span of eight years the welling waters which had promised to bring fresh life to all Mankind had been transformed from a life-giving fountain into a devastating torrent by being forced into the ancient channel of political parochialism. The movement which had begun with a proclamation of the Rights of Man in the Declaration of Independence¹ simply resulted in the establishment of one more parochial state; and the fixation, upon this idol, of a new democratic enthusiasm which ought to have been bestowed upon Humanity at large en-

¹ 'We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.'

gendered a ruthless Nationalism which demanded the sacrifice of the Loyalists upon its altar.

This Political Nationalism which confronts us at the birth of the United States, and which has since taken possession of most other parochial states throughout the World,¹ is the outcome of the impact of Democracy upon a society in which a plurality of states has been the reigning political dispensation; and it is in this perverted form that our modern Western Democracy has put fresh driving-force into modern Western Warfare. The Economic Nationalism which has grown into as great a social evil as our Political Nationalism in our day has been engendered by a corresponding perversion of Industrialism under the same social conditions.

Economic motives and ambitions and rivalries were not, of course, unknown in the international politics of the Western World in the Pre-Industrial Age. Far from that, the intellectual and moral outlook which is expressed in the Economic Nationalism of our day received its classical expression in the 'Mercantilism' of the eighteenth century; and the prizes of eighteenth-century diplomacy and war included markets, like the market for African negro slaves in Spanish America, and sources of supply, like the sugar islands of the Antilles, as well as provinces, like Canada or Silesia, and the 'souls' that were transferred from sovereignty to sovereignty, with the provinces in which they lived, as though they were so much live stock. Moreover, in so far as the eighteenth-century Western Governments contended with one another for economic prizes, their contests tended to become more serious; for merchants are a less frivolous class than kings; and, when they exert themselves, it is for profit and not for sport. In eighteenth-century Great Britain, where the agrarian land-owning oligarchy, which was the real governing power, was in political alliance with the merchants of London and Bristol and Glasgow, the motive of mercantile profit quite overshadowed the motive of royal or aristocratic sport in the conduct of foreign policy; and the steadiness of aim and persistence of effort by which the conduct of British foreign policy was consequently distinguished go far to account for the successes which were continually being gained in the international arena by eighteenth-century Great Britain at the expense of eighteenth-century France. The predominance of the economic factor which can be observed in eighteenth-century British foreign policy was not, however, characteristic of Western international politics in that age. It was a notable exception; and even in eighteenth-century British policy

¹ For the idolization of the institution of the Sovereign National State in our latter-day Western, or Westernized, World see further IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 317-20 and 405-8, below.

it would be easy to exaggerate the importance of the part which was played by economic considerations. For one thing, the merchants in whose interests foreign policy was largely conducted were a small minority of the population of the country—even though they might seem numerous by comparison with their aristocratic compatriots and confederates or with the French and Spanish monarchs who were their adversaries. And, for another thing, these eighteenth-century economic rivalries, though they were something rather less frivolous than a royal sport, were also something vastly less serious than a matter of national life or death. The economic prizes of eighteenth-century diplomacy and war were not the staple food-stuffs without which whole peoples would starve, and they were not the staple markets and sources of supply without which whole trades and industries would be unable to earn their livelihood. They were lucrative superfluities in which the fortunes of individual merchants might be made or lost but which hardly touched the daily lives of the people at large;¹ and in this respect the stakes of the merchants resembled the stakes of the kings in the eighteenth-century game of international politics. They were not of such values as to introduce any element of overstrain or ruthlessness into the 'temperate and undecisive' eighteenth-century contests.

Indeed, these economic competitions were still more remote from ordinary private life in the eighteenth-century Western World than the contests for territorial sovereignty; for even in the eighteenth century it did make a certain difference to the lives of the inhabitants of Canada whether they were subjects of King Louis or of King George, and to the lives of the inhabitants of Silesia whether they were subjects of the Hapsburg or of the Hohenzollern. On the other hand, the Canadian or Silesian peasant, and the English yeoman or farmer or agricultural labourer, delved and span and ate and drank and clothed and housed themselves in the same traditional fashion, whatever ring of merchants was monopolizing the international trade in slaves or sugar or tea. For the agricultural population of the eighteenth-century Western World the economic horizon seldom or never extended beyond the political frontiers; and it generally fell far short of these, since, in an age when land-transport was only beginning to shift from the backs of pack-animals on to wheeled vehicles, the range of profitable transport for agricultural produce was extremely short. Considering that,

¹ For the contrary assumption that the livelihood of the people at large was dependent upon foreign trade it might be difficult to find chapter and verse that was older than the nineteenth century. An early instance is cited by J. L. and Barbara Hammond in *The Rise of Modern Industry*, 5th edition (London 1937, Methuen), p. 203: 'When Fox destroyed the [slave] trade in 1806 even Sir Robert Peel complained that we were philosophizing when our looms were idle, and George Rose, that Americans would take up the trade, and that Manchester, Stockport, and Paisley would starve.'

in this age, the agricultural population accounted for an overwhelmingly large proportion of the whole, it may be said, with little exaggeration, that the normal field of self-contained and autonomous economic activity in the eighteenth-century Western World was the Lilliputian area of the village community. For the majority of Mankind at that time the bounds of the social universe were as narrow, for practical purposes, as those which are sketched in the picture of rural life in Gray's *Elegy*.

This general state of economic equilibrium at low tension on a minute scale was violently disturbed by the advent of Industrialism; for this new economic force, like the sister political force of Democracy, is intrinsically universal in its operation. We have seen that the essence of Democracy is a spirit of fraternity which embraces all Mankind; and if we now ask ourselves what is the essence of Industrialism, we shall find that the answer runs on parallel lines. Industrialism is a co-operative system of work which demands the unification of all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face of the planet as a common home for the entire living generation of Mankind. Industrialism will not work freely or effectively or beneficently except in so far as the World is organized into one single field of economic activity—a single world-field in which everybody is at liberty to live and work and produce and consume and collect and distribute and sell and buy and travel and transact business without let or hindrance. The social dispensation which Industrialism demands was truly declared by the eighteenth-century pioneers of the new economic technique in their famous watchword 'Laissez faire! Laissez passer!'

This ideal condition of economic world unity, which Industrialism postulates, was far indeed from being realized in the state of our Western Society when Industrialism first impinged upon it. This eighteenth-century Western World was divided up, as we have just seen, into hundreds of petty economic units, and each of these petty units was isolated from all the others by economic barriers which were very difficult to pass. That was the state of the World in which Industrialism had to make its way. Yet one of the presuppositions of Industrialism is the eventual attainment of economic world unity. This is the necessary condition for a permanent organization of the economic life of the World on our modern industrial lines; and if Industrialism cannot secure this necessary condition of world unity—or, at least, come within a measurable distance of securing it—it seems doomed to die of asphyxiation. At this very moment we are watching how Industrialism, caught in the trammels of the Parochial State, is struggling desperately to save itself from ruin by striving to achieve its oecu-

menical destiny instead of being perverted into Economic Nationalism. And this struggle has really been going on all the time (though not, of course, always at its present pitch of desperation) ever since our modern Industrialism made its first appearance. Finding the World divided into small economic units fenced off from one another by high economic barriers, Industrialism has been working, for the last hundred and fifty years, to re-shape the economic structure of the World in two ways, both leading in the direction of world unity. It has been trying to make the local economic units fewer and bigger; and at the same time it has been trying to lower the barriers between them.

If we glance now at the history of these efforts that Industrialism has been making along these two lines, we shall find that this history has a turning point round about the 'sixties' and the 'seventies' of the nineteenth century.¹ Down to the 'eighteen-sixties' and the 'eighteen-seventies' Industrialism was supported and assisted by Democracy in its efforts to diminish the number of the local economic units in the World and to increase their average size and to lower the barriers dividing them; and during the century or so, ending in those decades, during which Democracy was working together with Industrialism in this direction, some substantial progress towards economic world unity was achieved. On the other hand, for the last sixty years or more—reckoning down to the year 1938—the whole rhythm of the world movement has been in the opposite sense. During the last half-century the driving-force of Industrialism, like the driving-force of Democracy, has been diverted from building a world order into fortifying the political parochialism of our Western Society. And, by thus giving this parochialism an immense accession of strength, the two great new forces in the World have actually been raising up, by their own action, the most formidable obstacles to that unification of the World which it is their nature to bring about. This will be apparent if we take these two chapters of modern Western economic history in their chronological order, looking first at the century which ended in the 'eighteen-seventies' and then at the couple of generations which brings us down to 1938.

The intimacy of the connexion between industrialization and unification is illustrated by the modern history of Great Britain; for in the eighteenth century, after the union of England and Scotland in A.D. 1707, Great Britain was the largest single free-trade area in the World; and undoubtedly this was one of the principal reasons why Great Britain forged ahead of all her neighbours in her economic development before the eighteenth century was over.

¹ This has been noticed, by anticipation, in Part I. A, vol. i, p. 14, above.

Great Britain was the birth-place of modern Industrialism; and she was also the birth-place of modern Democracy. And, as Democracy and Industrialism spread simultaneously out of Great Britain over the rest of the World from the last quarter of the eighteenth century onwards, we can watch these two forces working together, for the next hundred years, to increase the size of economic units and to reduce the barriers between them.

In this connexion we may recur to the effects of the American Revolutionary War of 1775-83. American independence was the result of British Democracy. The Thirteen Colonies in North America wanted to enjoy the same measure of self-government that was enjoyed by Great Britain herself. In the Revolutionary War the colonists got their way; and it looked at first sight as if this outcome of the war, which was the first victory gained, beyond the shores of Britain, by the new political force of Democracy, was at the same time a set-back for the other new force, the economic force of Industrialism. Industrialism demands big units; and in the peace settlement of 1783 the unity of the eighteenth-century British Empire was broken up. But in the immediate sequel the disruptive effects of this political schism were more than out-balanced by new tendencies towards consolidation. The Thirteen Colonies had no sooner secured their political and economic independence from Great Britain than they followed the example of England and Scotland by forming among themselves a North American Union which was not only a political union but an economic union likewise. Moreover the United States had no sooner come into existence than it began to expand; and this expansion was so rapid and on so vast a scale that, within sixty-four years¹ of the establishment of the Union, the Continental United States had grown to its present gigantic size. A string of thirteen states along the Atlantic sea-board of North America had expanded into a country stretching right across the continent from Atlantic to Pacific. And in this, its final, extent the United States supplanted and entirely dwarfed the United Kingdom in the role of being the largest free-trade area in the Western World.²

Thus, in the early history of the United States, we see an example of an unprecedentedly large economic unit being built up by the agency of Democracy in co-operation with Industrialism. We see

¹ Reckoning from the coming into force of the Federal Constitution in 1789 to the date of the Gadsden Purchase, which was transacted in 1853.

² The United States is not, of course, the largest free-trade area in the Great Society into which our Western Society has latterly expanded, for it is far surpassed in extent by the free-trade area of the Russian Empire and its successor the U.S.S.R.—the *ci-devant* universal state of the Russian Orthodox Christendom which has obtained admission into the comity of Western states without forfeiting its own unity. (See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, pp. 88-9, above.)

another example of the same co-operation towards the same end in the French Revolution. The French, like the preceding American, Revolution was primarily a political movement inspired by the idea of Democracy. But one of the first acts of the revolutionaries was to convert the territory of France into one single economic unit by sweeping away all the internal customs-barriers which had formerly divided one French province or group of provinces from another.

Two still more striking examples of the same tendency are offered by the unification of Germany and the unification of Italy—unions which were both achieved between 1815 and 1871. On their political side these German and Italian movements were both nationalistic. They were assertions of German and Italian nationhood against French and Austrian imperialism, as the establishment of the United States of America had been an assertion of American nationhood against British imperialism. At the same time, both the German and the Italian national movement resulted in the substitution of one large territorial unit for a number of small units. The German and Italian petty states of the eighteenth century had been at the mercy of France and Austria as the Thirteen Colonies had been at the mercy of Great Britain, and for the same reason. Their weakness had lain in their disunity; and, when they found the remedy for this former weakness by achieving national unification, the union which they established included economic as well as political unity. In Germany a customs union—the German Zollverein—actually anticipated, and prepared the ground for, the establishment of a political union, the German Reich. In Italy economic union went hand in hand with political union as a matter of course.

Thus, during the century ending in A.D. 1871, we see the number of large-scale units in the Western World notably increasing. In 1771 the only economically unified area on a large scale had been Great Britain. By 1871 the British economic unit was equalled in scale by the three new units of France, Germany, and Italy, and was altogether dwarfed by the gigantic new unit of the United States.

Moreover, while the average size of the local economic units was increasing, the barriers dividing them were tending to diminish. After the former American colonies of Great Britain had become an independent country, the trade between the United States and Britain, instead of falling off, became greater than it had ever been when the two countries were under one sovereignty. Thereafter, in the early years of the nineteenth century, the political separation of the former Spanish colonies in Central and South America from Spain led to the removal of the economic barriers by which

the Spanish Government had formerly preserved a monopoly of the Spanish colonial trade for Spain herself. With the achievement of political independence the new republics of Latin America all came into the field of international trade. In the fifth decade of the nineteenth century the United Kingdom abolished its own economic barriers against the rest of the World altogether; and it looked as though this adoption of a system of Free Trade by the country which was the fountain-head of Industrialism might inaugurate an entirely new epoch in the history of international economic relations. The middle decades of the nineteenth century did, in fact, see a great extension of the network of economic treaties. The German Zollverein, again, pursued a policy of keeping tariffs low during the first chapter of its history; and this chapter did not come to an end until after the foundation of the German Reich in 1871. The French Government, too, pursued a low-tariff policy during the reign of Napoleon III, which lasted from the *coup d'état* of A.D. 1852 until after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. As for American tariff policy, it went through many fluctuations in its early stages; but the United States did not commit itself definitely to high tariffs until the time of the Civil War of 1861-5.

It will be seen that the British Free Trade movement of the 'eighteen-forties' was in accordance with the general spirit of the times. The United Kingdom did, no doubt, take the lead in the Free Trade movement and put the principle of Free Trade into practice more thoroughly than any other country; and at a later stage she also clung to Free Trade more tenaciously than most other countries—right down, in fact, to the year 1932. At the same time it will be seen that, during the twenty years or so ending about 1870, the British example was followed to a large extent by a number of economically important countries which at this time made great reductions in their tariffs, short of abolishing them completely. Moreover, tariff barriers were not the only economic barriers that were tending to diminish during the century which began with the American Revolutionary War and ended with the Franco-Prussian War. Those hundred years saw the removal of impediments not only to the free flow of goods, but also to the free flow of capital and the free flow of population. The era of British investment all over the World—in Continental Europe, in the United States and in Latin America—began after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in A.D. 1815. The era of mass-immigration into the United States began in the 'eighteen-forties' with the Irish Famine and the Continental European Revolutions of 1848.

This, in outline, is the economic picture of the hundred years ending in the 'eighteen-seventies', and it presents a striking contrast

to the picture of the last half-century; for since the 'eighteen-seventies' the main tendencies of the previous hundred years have been exactly reversed. Down to A.D. 1871 the number of economic units in the World was becoming fewer, the average size of these units was becoming greater, and the barriers between them were diminishing in height. Since 1871, on the contrary, the barriers have been growing higher while the average size of the units has been diminishing and their number has been increasing. This change of trend is only what was to be expected as a result of the sinister success of the old institution of the Parochial State in dominating the new forces that had made their appearance in the field of Western life; for, *a priori*, it would be paradoxical if a unification of Mankind and of the Habitable World were ultimately brought nearer by the imprisonment of the oecumenical forces of Democracy and Industrialism within the strait-waistcoats of parochial states.

As regards the absolute number and the average size of economic units, the course of events since A.D. 1871 makes it clear, in retrospect, that the aggregative movement which is exemplified in the unification of the United States and the French Republic and the Kingdom of Italy and the German Reich has been temporary and exceptional, and that the normal secular movement is represented by the disruption of the eighteenth-century British Empire to which the establishment of the United States was the sequel. It is true that, since the 'sixties' and 'seventies' of the nineteenth century, the aggregative movement has not altogether ceased. In the 'sixties', for example, the unity of the United States was preserved and re-established by the victory of the North in the American Civil War; and in the same decade it was emulated by the federation of all but one of the British provinces in North America into the Dominion of Canada. Even since the turn of the century the same process of aggregation has been exemplified in the federation of the British colonies in Australia into the Commonwealth and the federation of the British territories and the *ci-devant* independent republics in South Africa into the Union. On the whole, however, it is not aggregation but disruption that has been the prevalent tendency in these latter days—above all in Central and Eastern Europe and in South-Western Asia, where the same decade which saw the union of Italy and the union of Germany completed in 1871 saw the disruption of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, Romanov, and Hohenzollern Empires inaugurated by the partition of Turkey-in-Europe into the nuclei of new national 'successor-states' in 1878. In this great region the disruptive process has worked itself out to its conclusion in the series of catastrophes which began with the outbreak of the Italo-

Turkish War in Tripoli in the autumn of 1911 and which ended with the termination of the Graeco-Turkish War-after-the-War in Anatolia in the autumn of 1922. In these eleven years the zone of 'Balkanization' has been extended from the Balkan Peninsula itself to the eastern frontiers of Italy and Germany on one side and to the western frontiers of Persia and the U.S.S.R. on the other. This considerable portion of the surface of the Earth which, little more than half a century ago, was almost all comprehended in the dominions of four great empires,¹ is now divided among a bevy of not less than twenty 'successor-states' ranging from Finland to Egypt and from Czechoslovakia to 'Irāq. And these states are now not only politically independent of one another. They have made use of their new parochial sovereign independence in order to isolate themselves economically as well by setting up round their fresh-cut frontiers a zariba of economic *chevaux de frise*: tariffs and quotas and migration-restrictions and embargoes on the movement of capital. In fact, almost every one of these 'successor-states' is now in a mood of violent Economic Nationalism; and this temper has greatly aggravated the economic dislocation which an increase in the absolute number and a decrease in the average size of the economic units was bound, in any case, to inflict upon an industrialized world. In the violence of their post-war Economic Nationalism, however, the new-born 'successor-states' are simply displaying 'the zeal of the convert'. For Economic Nationalism did not make its first appearance in our Western World after the War of 1914-18 in post-war Poland or Czechoslovakia; it was born in the United States during the Civil War of 1861-5 and in Germany after the foundation of the Reich in 1871.

Economic Nationalism may be defined as an exploitation of the apparatus of a parochial state for the purpose of promoting the economic interests of the population of that state at the expense of the rest of Mankind. On the moral plane such a policy is indefensible in any circumstances; and in an industrialized world it is also economically disastrous for all parties, since it is attempting the impossible in trying to harness the intrinsically oecumenical force of Industrialism to a parochial aim. At the same time it is manifest in retrospect that an epidemic of Economic Nationalism was the inevitable nemesis of letting this new oecumenical force of Industrialism loose in a world in which parochial states were the

¹ The only completely independent *Kleinstaaten* in this area between the years 1871 and 1878 were Greece and Montenegro, and the Greece of that date was very far from including the whole national home of the Greek people, while Montenegro was no more than a minute fraction of the national home of the Serbs—and *a fortiori* of the Yugoslavs (a nationality which, as a matter of fact, had not, at that date, yet been invented (see Part I. A, vol. i, p. 13, above)).

176 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS reigning political institution. For a community which keys up its economic life to the tension and the rhythm of Industrialism is consciously or unconsciously setting itself the ambition of making its country into a 'Workshop of the World'; and as one local community after another undergoes the Industrial Revolution there is bound to be a competition between a number of local industrial Powers for the same world-market. Owing to the frailty of human nature, such competition usually provokes conflict before it promotes co-operation; the conflict tempts the combatants to resort to whatever weapons may come to hand; and a whole armoury of weapons for an economic conflict between local industrial Powers is offered, ready made, in the apparatus for economic warfare which the parochial states of our latter-day Western World have inherited from the age of 'Mercantilism',¹ when privileged commercial oligarchies were joining in 'the sport of kings' by using states as instruments for capturing from one another the international trade in superfluities.

This pernicious outcome of the impact of Industrialism upon the Parochial State was not foreseen by the British pioneers of Industrialism who were the first people to entertain the industrial ambition of taking the whole World for the field of their economic activities. For the very reason that they happened to be the first in this field, British industrialists were able for the most part—at least down to the 'seventies' of the nineteenth century—to secure free play for British industrial ability and enterprise by a 'peaceful penetration' which was private and haphazard, without need of intervention by the British Government on British Industry's behalf.² Indeed, the whole tendency of British social development in that age was for the Government to renounce whatever intervention in the course of private business it had previously been accustomed to undertake. The great landmark in the rise of the new industrial Great Britain in the nineteenth century was, of course, the establishment of Free Trade in the 'eighteen-forties'; and this meant the withdrawal of the Government from the field of economic action altogether. 'The Manchester School' of British statesmanship looked forward, at the time, to seeing this British lead towards Free Trade followed by the rest of the World; and we have observed³

¹ See pp. 167-8, above.

² This statement requires the qualification—'for the most part'—with which it is put forward here; for while it holds good in respect of the expansion of British trade during this period in the Western World—and this not only in Europe but also overseas—it does not apply to the contemporary British conquests of Oriental markets and sources of supply. These conquests were not metaphorical but literal. It was the armed forces of the East India Company and the Crown that opened up the sub-continent of India to British trade through the wars of 1799-1849, and it was the Royal Navy that opened up the sub-continent of China to British trade through the War of 1840-2.

³ On pp. 172-3, above.

that this expectation was in fact realized to some extent. In both French and German economic history, for instance, the 'fifties' and 'sixties' of the nineteenth century were, as we have seen, a period of low tariffs. We have also noticed, however, that, outside Britain itself, this mid-nineteenth-century tendency towards Free Trade was neither very far-reaching nor very long-lived. The United States, for example, adopted, during the Civil War of 1861-5, a high tariff policy from which it has never again departed. And both Germany and France turned their faces in the same direction in the 'seventies' and 'eighties'.

In this connexion it must be borne in mind that both Germany and the United States went through the Industrial Revolution a full generation or even half a century later than Great Britain; so that in the 'sixties' and 'seventies' and 'eighties', when first the Americans and then the Germans turned decidedly protectionist, the United States and Germany were more or less in the same phase of Industrialism in which Great Britain had been in the 'forties'. The 'forties', as we have seen, were just the time when the British people turned away from Protection to Free Trade; and this comparison of relative dates raises a question and at the same time suggests the answer to it. Why was it that the same process of industrialization, at the same stage, inspired one fiscal policy in Great Britain and exactly the opposite policy in these other countries? The answer to this question is given by the mere fact of the difference in the dates. The Americans and the Germans, when they went through the Industrial Revolution, conceived just the same economic ambition that the British had conceived when they had been going through the same experience at an earlier date. The Americans and the Germans each aspired, just like the British, to make their country into a 'Workshop of the World'. In fact, they actually caught this idea from the British, who had been the first people to think of it and to put it into practice. But evidently the problem of making one's country into a 'Workshop of the World' is one thing if one is in the position of the British people in the 'eighteen-forties', making the attempt with no predecessors and no rivals; it is quite another thing if one is in the position of the American people or the German people, embarking on the same enterprise a generation or half a century later, with the British not only already in the field but established there in a predominant position of advantage. The problem is the same; the goal is the same; but the circumstances are so different that the late comers are led into seeking their solution of the common problem along just the opposite lines from those which were followed by the first comer. The late comers approach the identical goal from an

entirely different angle. The British people, seeking to make Britain into a 'Workshop of the World' at a time when Britain has no rival to fear, proceed to throw Britain open to free trade. The American and the German peoples, seeking to follow the British people into a world-market in which the British are already dominant, proceed to protect their infant industries against the high blast of British competition behind the shelter of an artificial tariff-wall.

Thus, in the course of the nineteenth century, two mutually incompatible prescriptions for turning one's country into a 'Workshop of the World' came into the field one after the other. In the 'eighteen-forties' British statesmen and economists prescribed Free Trade; in the 'sixties' and 'seventies' and 'eighties' American and German statesmen and economists prescribed high protection. And, ever since then, there has been a vigorous controversy over the respective merits of these two fiscal policies which are both in the field and which are wholly irreconcilable with each other. The argument has gone on, and is going on still to-day; and so far neither party—neither the Protectionists nor the Free Traders—have been reduced to admitting that their opponents are right and that they themselves are in error. The argument has remained open; but the balance of power has not remained stationary. Looking back from the year 1938 over the last sixty or seventy years, one can see that in the realm of fact, as distinct from the realm of thought, Free Trade has decidedly been losing and Protection gaining ground. The British practice of Free Trade has remained the exception; the American and German practice of high protection has become the rule. Of the sixty or seventy fully self-governing states that exist in the World to-day, the vast majority have modelled their fiscal policy on the German-American pattern rather than on the British pattern; and this majority includes all the self-governing Dominions of the British Crown outside the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom itself the traditional British policy of Free Trade has been challenged more and more energetically since the turn of the century until at last, in the year 1932, we have seen the British people abandon their own distinctive traditional practice and fall into line with the German-American practice which has become the rule in the contemporary world. This abandonment, by the British pioneers of Industrialism, of a Free Trade policy which had been adopted by British statesmanship a hundred years back, and which had become one of the most cherished institutions of the United Kingdom, is an unmistakable token that the policy and temper of Economic Nationalism have won the day.

Our survey of the impacts of Democracy and Industrialism upon the institution of Parochial Sovereignty in the Western World

during the last hundred and fifty years of our Western history seems to show that we are confronted, in our generation, with an unescapable choice between overhauling the old institution or allowing it to wreck our civilization through the enhanced and misdirected 'drive' which it has acquired from the new forces. The triumph of Political and Economic Nationalism means that the inactive innocuous parochial state of the eighteenth century has disappeared for ever from the Western social landscape; and we can already perceive the enormity which Nationalism is enthroning in its place.

If, in the new world which Democracy and Industrialism have called into existence, the Parochial State survives without any abatement of its traditional claim to exercise an absolute Parochial Sovereignty, it will no longer be a state which leaves the greater part of the lives of the majority of its subjects unaffected by its existence for good or for evil. It will be the new-fangled 'Totalitarian State', which has shown its face, since the War of 1914-18, in a Communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in a Fascist Italy and in a National-Socialist Germany. This Totalitarian Parochial State is an enormity because it is an attempt to confine new social forces which are intrinsically oecumenical in their spirit and operation within the prison-house of a parochial institution which was originally established under quite different social conditions in order to meet quite different human needs. The social friction that is produced by this institutional enormity is so violent that it can hardly fail to make life intolerable for any human beings on whom it is imposed; and, though the violence of the friction can also hardly fail to bring the monstrous institution itself to grief, this prospect offers little consolation to its victims. A plurality of parochial totalitarian states will assuredly give place, sooner or later, to a single oecumenical totalitarian state in which the forces of Democracy and Industrialism will at any rate secure, at last, their natural world-wide field of operation, even if they are still condemned to put their 'drive' into a political mechanism;¹ but, if once our society succumbs to a totalitarian political dispensation, it is virtually inconceivable that the ultimately inevitable change from plural to singular—from a multiplicity of local states to one state embracing all the World—can still be achieved by peaceful means. Under these conditions the change will come, when it does come, through the delivery of a 'knock-out blow' in a 'totalitarian war', or series of 'totalitarian wars', of the kind envisaged in the French Law of A.D. 1928.² And even if those days are shortened

¹ For this prospect see further Part V. A, vol. v, pp. 9-10, below.

² See IV. C (iii) (b) 3, p. 154, above.

so far as to relieve Mankind from the doom of physical extermination, the tribulation will be so great that our present Western Civilization will have little hope of recovering from the shock.¹

The truth seems to be that in both Democracy and Industrialism the impetus towards universality is so strong that these forces are bound to work their way through to a world-wide field of operation sooner or later, in one way or another. If their titanic energies are caught in the toils of Parochial Sovereignty, they will eventually burst their bonds by destroying the institution that is cramping them; and if we are to escape this catastrophic revolutionary denouement, we must take active and timely steps to adjust the old institution to the working of the new forces in such a way as to give these a peaceful entry into the world-wide field of operation which they demand, before they take their oecumenical kingdom by storm. Now that Democracy and Industrialism are at large in our Western World, we cannot afford simply to leave the sixty or seventy fully self-governing states on the 'post-war' political map to exercise, unmodified, their traditional prerogative of absolute sovereign independence. We have to modify the theory and practice of Parochial Sovereignty to whatever extent this may be necessary in order to build our parochial states into some kind of world order. For a world order is the necessary institutional framework for the new oecumenical forces.

In our generation, in the light of the World War of 1914-18, it is manifest that a world order cannot come into existence without some considerable modification of Parochial Sovereignty and that this cannot be expected to happen automatically. Our world order must be brought into existence by a deliberate effort of statesmanship; and it must not be limited to any single plane of social life, but must prevail on all planes alike. Unfortunately we have learnt these lessons late in the day, when the Nationalism that has been generated by a perversion of Democracy and Industrialism has already made great headway. The prospect of solving the problem by peaceful adjustment would have been more promising if the task with which we are grappling now had been taken in hand a hundred years earlier.

It is true that, within the last hundred years, a rudimentary economic world order has grown up, mainly through the work of British hands, with the London money-market as its centre. The intricacy of this *de facto* oecumenical economic system, and the importance of the role which British bankers and shippers and merchants and manufacturers have played in it, have become apparent since the system—now patently threatened with destruction—has

¹ Matt. xxiv. 21-2.

ceased to be taken for granted. This nineteenth-century British economic world order, however, has grown up without any corresponding political framework and indeed without any design at all. For there was no conscious philosophy behind the activities of the British men of business who played the leading part in building it up. The bankers who lent money for the opening-up of the United States and Latin America and the British Dominions overseas, the engineers who built gas-works in Berlin and railways in Argentina and China and Turkey and cotton-mills in Russia, and the industrialists who provided raw materials like coal or manufactured articles like iron girders, never thought of themselves as building up an economic world order, and *a fortiori* they never reflected that this economic order which they were nevertheless undesignedly constructing could not be developed or maintained unless certain political conditions were realized in the new world which had been called into being by the economic enterprise of a new industrial age.

This truth was not interesting or indeed apparent to the majority of the 'practical' men of affairs who built the new system up by 'a fortuitous concourse of efforts', as coral reefs are built by marine animalculae. And although there was one school of thought in Early Victorian England--'the Manchester School' of philosophic statesmen and statesmanlike philosophers—who did realize that the advent of Democracy and Industrialism was a turning point in history and that a world order was a necessity in this new world, these English thinkers almost made a virtue of the thoughtlessness of the contemporary English men of action through a mistakenly thorough application of their own Liberal principle of *laissez faire*.

Cobden and his companions looked forward to seeing the peoples and the states of the World drawn into a social unity by the new and unprecedentedly close-knit web of world-wide economic relations which was being woven blindly, from a British node, by the youthful energies of Industrialism; and they exerted themselves to help this process on its way by converting their own countrymen, and any foreigners who would give ear, to the policy of Free Trade. It would be an injustice both to the Cobdenites themselves and to their contemporaries who carried out their precepts to dismiss the Victorian British Free Trade movement as nothing more than a masterpiece of 'enlightened self-interest'. The movement was also the expression of a moral idea and of a constructive international policy. At a time when the British were the leading commercial and industrial people in the World, they threw open their empire to the commerce of all other peoples; and by this step they hoped to achieve something more than their self-interested economic aim

182 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS of making Great Britain 'the Workshop of the World' and the mistress of the world market. They also hoped to promote the gradual evolution of a political world order in which the new economic world order could thrive: to create a political atmosphere in which a world-wide exchange of goods and services could be carried on in peace and security—ever increasing in activity and bringing with it, at each stage, a rise in the standard of living for the whole of Mankind.

Cobden's policy failed because he failed to reckon with the effect of the impact of Industrialism and Democracy upon a bevy of parochial states. The Cobdenites assumed that these giants could be trusted to go on lying torpid in the nineteenth century, as they had lain in the eighteenth century, until the human spiders who were spinning the new world-wide industrial web had had time to enmesh all the states of the World in their gossamer bonds, as the Lilliputians tied down Gulliver while he slept. They did not realize that, so far from rendering Gulliver incapable of ever again doing any mischief, the new forces were actually galvanizing him into fresh activity and stimulating him to run amok. And so the Cobdenites complacently encouraged their countrymen to give hostages to Fortune. They believed in such good faith that the World was destined to become a social unity, with Great Britain serving as this unified World's workshop, that they actually carried through the transformation of their country into a workshop for the World when the world unity, upon which they confidently counted, was still utterly precarious. They looked on while the population of their island increased to a size at which little more than one-fifth of the inhabitants could be maintained out of the island's own insular resources, while the remaining four-fifths had become dependent for their livelihood upon importing foreign food-stuffs and raw materials in exchange for exports of British manufactures. This new British method of earning a living required the uninterrupted maintenance of a world trade in staple commodities, and this economic requisite required, in its turn, the uninterrupted maintenance of World Peace. It is no exaggeration to say that the early nineteenth-century British pioneers of Industrialism staked their daily bread, and the daily bread of future generations in Great Britain, upon the quite unwarrantable expectation of a world order which was to be equally secure on the economic plane and on the political. That the 'practical' men of business should have taken this risk without realizing what they were doing is not so surprising; but it is less easy to understand the apparent blindness of the statesmen and the philosophers. Perhaps they were at fault in an interpretation of human nature and of Western history which overlooked

some significant qualities of the first and some significant truths of the second.

In their reading of history 'the Manchester School' appear to have assumed that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which had come to an end in 1815 were destined to be the last bout of general warfare in the annals of the Western Civilization. If they had not implicitly made this assumption, they would presumably have dreaded, instead of welcoming, the new economic régime which had made the livelihood of the British people dependent on international trade, since it was evident from the history of the Napoleonic Wars that international trade might be dislocated and even destroyed by warfare on the grand scale. In making this assumption the Cobdenites were presumably counting upon the unifying and pacifying and constructive effects which it was manifestly in the nature of Democracy and Industrialism to produce. They did not reckon with the possibility that these self-same forces, at the very same time, might be producing disruptive and subversive and destructive effects by putting new 'drive' into old institutions like the Parochial State. They did not pause to consider that 'the shot heard round the World', which had been fired at Concord by 'the embattled farmers' in 1775, had been a signal, not for peace on Earth among men of goodwill,¹ but for nation to rise against nation and kingdom against kingdom.² Nor did they reflect that the good tidings of fraternity which had been proclaimed to all peoples by the prophets of Revolutionary France had been followed immediately by the Napoleonic conquest of Europe.

Still stranger was 'the Manchester School's' assumption that, in a world which remained politically divided against itself, the triumph of Peace would infallibly be assured by the advent of Industrialism. This fundamental tenet of the Cobdenite faith finds a characteristic expression in the following sentences:

'The past history of our race proclaims the supremacy of force, the selfishness of empire, and the subjugation of Mankind, as the prevailing aspect of Society. But the rise and progress of the industrial arts, and the extension of beneficent commerce, indicate, in terms too plain to be misunderstood, the real destiny of Society and the existence of a new epoch which shall substitute the ploughshare for the sword and the loom for the battery. The cause of Industry is the cause of Humanity.'³

To a twentieth-century reader of these lines, in his wisdom after the event, it will seem obvious that if the parochial states of the

¹ Luke ii. 14.

² Matt. xxiv. 7.

³ These sentences occur in an introduction (pp. viii-ix) prefixed by an anonymous member of the Manchester Athenaeum to his translation into English of a French observer's work—Faucher, L.: *Manchester in 1844* (London 1844, Simpkin, Marshall). The passage is quoted by J. L. and Barbara Hammond in *The Age of the Chartist* (London 1930, Longmans, Green), p. 39, footnote 4.

pre-industrial eighteenth-century Western World waged wars for the sake of snatching from one another the profits of an international commerce in superfluities, then *a fortiori* the same parochial states would fight one another *à outrance* for economic objects in an age when the Industrial Revolution had transformed the function of international commerce from an exchange of luxuries into an exchange of the necessities of life.

This consideration brings to light the mistake which 'the Manchester School' made in their interpretation of human nature. They did not apprehend that even a merely economic world order cannot be built upon merely economic foundations, and that such were not the foundations of their own belief or the mainspring of their own action. The Cobdenites themselves, as we have seen, were inspired, not by an 'enlightened self-interest', but by a moral idealism; and this idealism was religious in character and in origin. The nineteenth-century English Free Trade movement was a secularized moral and emotional substitute for eighteenth-century and seventeenth-century Methodist and Puritan religious enthusiasm. The prophets of Free Trade had still before their eyes 'the vision splendid' of an Other World, and they would not have succeeded in converting their countrymen if they had not come 'trailing clouds of glory' from a spiritual home which was not that of *Homo Economicus*. They were doing less than justice to themselves when they omitted from their official creed their own personal and traditional belief that 'Man shall not live by bread alone';¹ and at the same time they were dooming their cause to defeat; for to offer bread alone is almost as uninviting as to offer stones for bread.²

This fatal mistake had not been made by Gregory the Great and the other founders of Western Christendom from whom the religious inspiration of Victorian England was ultimately derived. These men, who were whole-heartedly dedicated to a supra-mundane cause, had not consciously attempted to found a world order. Their worldly aim had been limited to the more modest material ambition of keeping the survivors of a shipwrecked society alive; and in acquitting themselves of this burdensome and thankless task they were forced, against the grain, to undertake economic responsibilities. Gregory himself had to spend the best years of his life in 'serving tables' in order to save the urban proletariat of a derelict imperial city from starvation.³ The economic edifice that was raised by Gregory and his peers was avowedly extempore and makeshift; yet, in raising it, they took care to build upon a religious rock and not upon economic sands; and, thanks to their labours,

¹ Matt. iv. 4.

² Matt. vii. 9.

³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 267-9, above.

the structure of our Western Christendom rested on solid religious foundations in the early days when it was still only a tiny society in an out-of-the-way corner of the World. On this religious soil our Western Civilization has grown like the grain of mustard seed until it has become a tree in whose branches all the other living societies have come to lodge.¹ In less than fourteen centuries the narrow-verged Western Christendom of Gregory's generation has grown into the ubiquitous Great Society of our day. If a religious basis was required for Gregory's unpretentious economic building, and if it is this basis that has enabled our civilization to grow on the material plane until it has overshadowed the Earth, it seems unlikely, on this showing, that the vaster structure of a world order, which it is our task to build in our day, can ever be securely based upon the rubble foundation of sordid economic interests.

Perhaps these considerations may explain why the attempt of 'the Manchester School' to endow our Great Society with a world order has failed; and, if our explanation is right, it may perhaps also serve as a warning to us who, in our generation, are challenged to repeat the attempt at the eleventh hour.

5. *The Impact of Nationalism upon the Historic Political Map*

We have seen that the Nationalism which is making such havoc of our world is the outcome of a perversion of Industrialism and Democracy through the impact of these new forces upon the old institution of Parochial Sovereignty; but this does not mean that each particular national movement always sets itself in the framework of some particular parochial sovereign state which it finds waiting ready for it on the political map. If national movements did all duly conform to the pre-existent pattern of state territories and inter-state frontiers, then the havoc wrought by Nationalism would be much less extensive than it has actually been.

There are, of course, cases in which this harmony is achieved. A conspicuous example is the case of France, where the national consciousness which flared up in the French Revolution was acquired by all the inhabitants of all the territories which, in the course of previous centuries, had been brought together under the sovereignty of the French Crown, whether their mother-tongue happened to be French or Flemish or Breton or Basque or German, while the French-speaking inhabitants of Geneva and Savoy and the Swiss Confederation and the Austrian Netherlands, who happened not to be embraced within the fortuitous boundaries of France as these stood in A.D. 1789, did not come to feel themselves Frenchmen in virtue of their community of speech with their

¹ Matt. xiii. 31-2.

neighbours on the French side of the frontiers. In this case the geographical limits of a national consciousness were manifestly determined by the boundaries of a particular parochial state which was 'a going concern' before the new national consciousness was awakened within its borders. The case of France, however, is the exception rather than the rule in the history of our Western Nationalism during the last hundred and fifty years. More frequently, a national movement that has been generated by the encounter between the spirit of Democracy and the institution of Parochial Sovereignty has striven to secure for itself a new political framework of its own, either by making a schism in the body politic of some pre-existent state or by merging the identities of a number of pre-existent states in a body politic embracing them all. Both these methods of manufacturing a body politic *ad hoc* in order to incorporate a nascent nationality are exemplified in the history of the foundation of the United States, which began with the secession of the Thirteen Colonies from the British Empire and was completed by their permanent federation with one another into a new political union. There has been a similar combination of a centripetal with a centrifugal movement in the foundation of the United States of Brazil and in the creation of the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia and the Union of South Africa. The formation of a new national state through the purely centripetal process of a unification of a bevy of *Kleinstaaten* is exemplified in the foundations of the Kingdom of Italy and of the German Reich. The purely centrifugal process of schism is exemplified in the emergence of eighteen 'successor-states' out of the carcase of the former Spanish Empire in the New World, and twenty 'successor-states' out of the carcasses of the former Ottoman, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov empires in Central and Eastern Europe and South-Western Asia.

Thus, on the whole, our modern Western Nationalism has been inclined to demand a drastic revision of the political map instead of being content to leave the map as it stands and to seek self-expression within an existing political framework; and this revisionary tendency in the development of national movements has confronted statesmen with a choice between two alternatives. They may either make a voluntary adjustment of the political map to a sufficient extent, and at a sufficiently early stage, to satisfy the particular national movement with which they have to settle accounts in any particular case, or else they may bend all their efforts to keeping the map as it is and defying the waves of Nationalism that are beating upon their frontiers, from outside or from within, to do their worst. In this latter event there are again two possible

outcomes. Either the recalcitrant state will be shattered, sooner or later, by the national movements 'to which it has refused to adjust itself; and then the old map will be re-drawn on new national lines in a revolutionary way; or else the old political order may prevail and the new Nationalism may kick against the pricks in vain. In the last hundred and fifty years of Western history the revolutionary development has been the most frequent, while there have been comparatively few cases in which a national movement has been either successfully repressed or voluntarily granted a right of way.

The voluntary grant of an outright political divorce in satisfaction of a national aspiration has been rare indeed; but there are at least two examples that can be cited from our modern Western history. In A.D. 1864 the British Empire renounced its protectorate over the Ionian Islands and allowed the islanders to unite themselves with their fellow Greeks in the Kingdom of Greece.¹ In 1905 the Kingdom of Sweden waived whatever juridical right it might have claimed for insisting upon the maintenance of the existing political union between Sweden and Norway,² and allowed the Norwegians to assume complete sovereign independence.³

A less uncommon method of voluntary adjustment between national aspirations and the existing political régime has been the method of devolution in some degree short of an absolute separation of sovereignties. The classic example of this method at one end of the scale is the British device of Dominion Status, through which the people of this or that portion of the British Empire are enabled to find political expression for a local national consciousness, as it arises, by securing full self-government for themselves within the framework of a new-built parochial state which is released from all formal political ties with the rest of the British Empire except the bond of a common citizenship under a single crown.⁴ At the other end of the scale we may cite the post-war treaties for the protection of alien minorities in certain of the national 'successor-states' of the old dynastic empires of Central and Eastern Europe and South-Western Asia; for the intention of these treaties is to secure to such alien minorities the minimum charter of special political rights that will just suffice to make life not intolerable for them within the frontiers of a national state which is not their own.

If we take the status granted to alien minorities under these minorities-protection treaties and the status of the fully self-govern-

¹ See Cruttwell, C. R. M. F.: *A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World* (London 1937, Milford), pp. 52-5.

² This union was a legacy of the peace settlement of A.D. 1814-15.

³ See Cruttwell, op. cit., pp. 91-5.

⁴ The grant of complete national self-government to Iceland by Denmark in 1918 without breaking the link of a common crown is an example of the application of this British device outside the British Empire (see Cruttwell, op. cit., p. 95).

ing Dominions of the British Crown as the two extreme poles in the field of adjustment through devolution, we can see that the gulf between these two poles, broad though it is in itself, is spanned to-day by a gradation of statuses that lie betwixt and between the two extremes. In Switzerland, for instance, the German-speaking, French-speaking, Italian-speaking, and Ladin-speaking citizens of the Confederation have adjusted their common citizenship to their several desires for self-expression in their respective mother-tongues on a footing of perfect equality with one another. In the U.S.S.R. the British experiment of adjusting the common citizenship of a great empire to the aspirations of a hydra-headed Nationalism through the device of progressive devolution has been emulated in a complex system of autonomies within autonomies; and, although the Soviet Union has withheld, even from the constituent states of the highest category, that exercise of self-government in economic and social affairs which has always been the first instalment of autonomy to be granted to the self-governing states-members of the British Commonwealth, in other departments of administration the Soviet Union has gone farther than the British Commonwealth in almost thrusting national autonomy upon backward peoples before they have begun to demand it for themselves.

The reward which statesmanship may hope to reap from these concessions to Nationalism in these various degrees is the avoidance of a catastrophic denouement through some violent process of revolution—which is, as we have observed, the method by which, in our modern Western World, a national movement most frequently succeeds in incorporating itself into a national state. The American nation thus incorporated itself into the United States at the expense of the British Empire in the Revolutionary War of A.D. 1775–83 and at the expense of 'States' Rights' in the Civil War of A.D. 1861–5. The Italian and German nations incorporated themselves respectively into the Kingdom of Italy and into the German Reich, at the expense of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy on the one hand and of the Italian and German *Kleinstaaten* on the other, in the crop of European revolutions and wars which was reaped between A.D. 1848 and A.D. 1871. The Belgian nation incorporated itself into the Kingdom of Belgium at the expense of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the revolution of A.D. 1830 and sixteen out of the eighteen Spanish-speaking nations of the New World established their separate republics at the expense of the Spanish Empire in the revolutionary struggles of the early nineteenth century.¹ Most of the European nationalities that were

¹ The seventeenth Spanish-American republic—the Republic of Cuba—had to wait for its establishment until the War of A.D. 1898 between Spain and the United States. The eighteenth—Panamá—seceded from Colombia in 1903.

formerly subject to the Romanov, Hapsburg, and Hohenzollern Empires achieved statehood in the General War of A.D. 1914-18; and the same war carried to completion a corresponding process in the Ottoman Empire which had begun more than a hundred years back.

When these instances of a revolutionary satisfaction of national aspirations in a modern Western, or Westernized, World are ranged in their chronological sequence, they offer a particularly striking illustration of the social 'law', which we have formulated in the first section of this chapter,¹ that, if old institutions obstruct the action of new social forces without ultimate success, the degree of violence of the eventual revolution is proportionate to the Timespan of its retardation. The American Revolutionary War, which is the earliest of the nationalistic upheavals in our series, was still justly reckoned, by the sagacious contemporary judgement of Gibbon, among those 'temperate and undecisive contests' of the eighteenth century which could inflict no essential injury upon the general state of happiness.² The nineteenth-century wars which were the price of satisfying national aspirations in Latin America, Belgium, Italy, and Germany took a toll from the spiritual and material well-being of our Western Society which was possibly not an excessive price to pay for such considerable results. On the other hand, those national aspirations in Eastern Europe and South-Western Asia which still remained unsatisfied at the opening of the twentieth century have only been able to secure their tardy satisfaction in our day at the cost of a war which has shattered two great empires into fragments; mutilated, prostrated, and inwardly distracted two others; and carried the whole of our society, without distinction between the nominal victors and their officially vanquished adversaries, to the verge of breakdown or, for all that we yet know, beyond it.

While certain national aspirations have thus found vent at a cost which has risen as time has passed, there are several national movements in the World to-day whose efforts to secure political expression have been more or less frustrated. The political map of the year 1938 displayed a Catalonia still fighting for statehood;³ a Basqueland whose momentarily re-asserted statehood had been at least momentarily suppressed once again in favour of Castilian imperialism; and no sovereign independent state at all of the Ukraine or Armenia or Assyria or Kurdistan. It is true that, inside the Soviet

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 1, pp. 135-6, above.

² See the passage quoted in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 311, and in IV. C (iii) (b) 3, in the present volume, p. 148, above, and in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (a), p. 283, and in V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), Annex I, vol. v, p. 625, footnote 1, below.

³ For the previous history of Catalan nationalism see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 205, footnote 1, above.

Union, there were an Ukrainian and an Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic among the eleven then existing constituent states of the U.S.S.R. But the autonomy of these states within the framework of the Union was imperfect, and, even on these terms, the political unification of both the Armenians and the Ukrainians was incomplete. The large Ukrainian populations in Galicia and Volhynia were living an unhappy life under Polish rule with little comfort from a minorities-protection treaty that had been signed in A.D. 1919 and repudiated in A.D. 1934 by the Polish Government; the survivors of the pre-war Armenian community in Turkey were living as refugees under a French mandate in Syria. As for the Kurds, they were politically partitioned in 1938 between the four sovereignties of Syria, Turkey, Persia, and 'Irāq; and the measure of cultural and administrative autonomy which had been guaranteed to the Kurdish population under 'Irāqī rule was more than counter-balanced by the policy of systematic and forcible denationalization which was being pursued against their brethren in Turkey.¹ Finally, the Assyrian Nestorian Christians of Hakkīyārī and Ūrumīyah,² who had been evicted from their ancestral homes during the War of 1914-18, and who had since found life impossible to live in their post-war asylum in 'Irāq, were a tragic instance of a nationality which had 'found no rest for the sole of her foot'.³ The same might be said of those Macedonians (and they appeared to be a large majority) who were Bulgarian in their national sentiment; for the Yugoslav Government had refused to recognize them as an alien minority which was entitled to benefit by the minorities-protection treaty which Yugoslavia had signed; and, in consequence, the Macedonians could only find freedom for their Bulgarian national self-expression at the price of leaving their ancestral homes, which were now under Yugoslav rule, and seeking asylum as refugees within the narrowly circumscribed post-war frontiers of the Kingdom of Bulgaria. These are all cases in which the impact of Nationalism upon the political map has resulted neither in an adjustment nor in a revolution but in an enormity—if it is to be regarded as a greater enormity that a national movement should be denied the self-expression which Nationalism claims as its 'sacred right' than that it should succeed in fulfilling its own sectional ambitions at the cost of an oecumenical catastrophe like the Great War of 1914-18.

¹ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, p. 78, above.

² Spelt 'Hakkīārī' and 'Ūrmīa' in vol. II, pp. 257-8.

³ Gen. viii. 9. For the respective histories of the Assyrians and the Kurds in 'Irāq, during and since the emancipation of the kingdom of 'Irāq from the mandatory régime, see Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (Oxford 1935, University Press), pp. 109-74.

6. *The Impact of Industrialism upon Private Property*

Private Property is an institution which is apt to establish itself in societies in which the single family or household is the normal unit of economic activity—whether the family business be agriculture or stock-breeding or shop-keeping or handicraft. In societies whose economic life is organized on this family basis, Private Property is probably the least unsatisfactory system of governing the distribution of material wealth; and, if the Family is to be regarded as a social institution which is of absolute and permanent value in itself, it may be desirable to maintain the corresponding system of ownership on this account and to constrain the economic life of Society to remain in conformity with it. This question, however, has become rather academic in the Western Society of our day, when the Industrial System of economic operations has not only asserted itself but has successfully pushed its way to the acquisition of an ascendancy over our Western economic life; for, as we have seen,¹ the natural unit of activity in an industrialized society is neither the single family nor the single village community or national state, but the entire living generation of Mankind. Since the advent of Industrialism our modern Western economy has transcended the family unit *de facto* and has therefore logically transcended the family institution of Private Property. Yet in practice the old institution has remained in force; and in these circumstances Industrialism has put its formidable social 'drive' into Private Property and has gone far towards making nonsense of it by enhancing the man-of-property's social power while at the same time diminishing his social responsibility, until an institution which may have been socially beneficent in the Pre-Industrial Age has been half transformed into a social evil.

In these circumstances our society to-day is confronted with the task of adjusting the old institution of Private Property to the workings of the new force of Industrialism—under penalty, in case of failure, of seeing the old institution either swept away altogether by revolution or else swollen into an enormity which may become a deadly danger to the social health of our civilization. The method of pacific adjustment is to counteract the maldistribution of Private Property which the impact of Industrialism automatically brings about by arranging for a deliberate, rational, and equitable redistribution through the agency of the State. The State can mitigate the ill effects of extreme individual poverty by providing public social services, and it can find ways and means for making this provision by a high taxation of extreme individual wealth. At the

¹ In IV. C (iii) (b) 4, pp. 169-70, above.

present time it is impossible to predict whether our current attempts to achieve an adjustment on these lines will succeed or fail; but at least it can be said that there is no inherent reason why they should not be successful—and they have the incidental social advantage that they tend to promote the transformation of the State from the killing-machine which it has been in the past into an agency for social welfare. In any case we may be fairly sure that, if we do fail in our attempt, the revolutionary alternative will overtake us in the shape of a system of State Communism which will either abolish Private Property outright or at least reduce it to vanishing-point. This seems to be the only practical alternative to an adjustment, because the maldistribution of Private Property through the operation of Industrialism would be too great a social evil to be borne if it were not effectively mitigated by some form of state intervention. Yet, as the Russian experiment indicates, the revolutionary remedy of state intervention in the form of Communism might prove to be little less deadly than the disease itself; for, in every society that exists in the World to-day, the institution of Private Property, which the impact of Industrialism is threatening to make intolerable, is at the same time so intimately bound up with what is best in a pre-industrial social heritage that its complete and abrupt abolition could hardly fail to produce a disastrous break in the social tradition.

7. *The Impact of Democracy upon Education*

One of the greatest social changes that has been brought about by the advent of Democracy in our modern Western World has been the spread of Education. In the progressive countries a system of universal compulsory gratuitous public instruction has made Education the birthright of every child in the community—in contrast to the role of Education in the Pre-Democratic Age, when it was the monopoly of a privileged minority. And this new educational system which the progressive states of the Western World have already put into effective practice has become one of the principal social ideals and aims of every state that aspires to hold an honourable place in the comity of our latter-day Great Society. When Universal Education was first inaugurated under the inspiration of Democracy, it was greeted by the Liberal opinion of the day as one of those things which many prophets and righteous men had desired to see, and had not seen,¹ through all the ages: a triumph of justice and enlightenment which might be expected to usher in a new era of happiness and well-being for our Western Society, and perhaps for the whole of Mankind. In retrospect

¹ Matt. xiii. 17.

these expectations can be seen to have left out of account the presence of several stumbling-blocks on this broad road towards the Millennium; and in this matter, as so often happens in human affairs, it has been the unforeseen factors that have proved to be of paramount importance.

One unforeseen stumbling-block has been the inevitable impoverishment in the intellectual results of Education when the process is reduced to its elements and is divorced from its traditional social and cultural background in order to make it 'available' for 'the masses'. The good intentions of Democracy have no magic power to perform the miracle of the Loaves and Fishes; and the draught which, in its benevolent ministrations, it may succeed in bringing to the lips of every child in the community will be at best a weak dilution of the elixir of intellectual life. A second stumbling-block has been the utilitarian spirit in which the fruits of Education are apt to be turned to account when they are placed within everybody's reach. Under a social régime in which Education is confined to a few members of the community who have either inherited the right to receive it as a social privilege or have earned the right by an industrious cultivation of natural intellectual gifts, Education is either a pearl cast before swine which is trampled under foot,¹ or else it is a pearl of great price which the finder buys at the cost of all that he has.² In neither case is it a means to an end: an instrument of worldly ambition or of frivolous amusement. The possibility of turning Education to account as a means of amusement for the masses—and of profit for the *entrepreneurs* by whom the amusement is purveyed—has only arisen since the introduction of Universal Education of an elementary kind; and this new possibility has conjured up a third stumbling-block which is the greatest of all; for it is this that has cheated our educationists, when they have cast their bread upon the waters, of their expectation of finding it after many days.³ The bread of Universal Education is no sooner cast upon the waters of social life than a shoal of sharks rises from the depths and devours the children's bread⁴ under the philanthropists' eyes. In the educational history of England, for example, the dates speak for themselves. Universal compulsory gratuitous public instruction was inaugurated in this country in A.D. 1870;⁵ the Yellow Press was invented some twenty years later—as soon as the first generation of children from the national schools had come into the labour market and acquired some purchasing power—by a stroke of irresponsible genius which had divined that the

¹ Matt. vii. 6.

² Ecclesiastes xi. 1.

³ Matt. xiii. 45-6.

⁴ Matt. xv. 26.

⁵ The system of universal direct compulsion was not made complete until 1880, and the practical establishment of free education not until 1891.

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educational philanthropist's labour of love could be made to yield the newspaper-king a royal profit.¹

A genius of a very different order, who was one of the intellectual lights of our Western World in the eighteenth century, apprehended the social 'law' that learning is apt to be sterilized by diffusion from a study of the educational history of the Hellenic World under the Roman Empire; and he predicted by analogy the truth, which we have now learnt by experience, that in our own society a like development would produce a like effect.

'All the sciences and liberal arts have been imported to us from the South; and it is easy to imagine that, in the first order of application, when excited by emulation and by glory, the few who were addicted to them would carry them to the greatest height and stretch every nerve and every faculty to reach the pinnacle of perfection. Such illustrious examples spread knowledge everywhere and beget an universal esteem for the sciences: after which, it is no wonder that industry relaxes while men meet not with suitable encouragements nor arrive at such distinction by their attainments. The universal diffusion of learning among a people and the entire banishment of gross ignorance and rusticity is therefore seldom attended with any remarkable perfection in particular persons. It seems to be taken for granted in the dialogue *De Oratoribus* that knowledge was much more common in Vespasian's age than in that of Cicero and Augustus. Quintilian also complains of the profanation of learning by its becoming too common. "Formerly", says Juvenal, "science was confined to Greece and Italy. Now the whole World emulates Athens and Rome. Eloquent Gaul has taught Britain, knowing in the laws. Even Thule entertains thoughts of hiring rhetoricians for its instruction."² This state of learning is remarkable because Juvenal is himself the last of the Roman writers that possessed any degree of genius. Those who succeeded are valued for nothing but the matter of fact of which they give us information. I hope the late conversion of

¹ This point has been touched upon already, by anticipation, in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 241, above. There is a brilliant thumb-nail sketch of Lord Northcliffe's career in the first volume of Mr. H. G. Wells' *Experiment in Autobiography* (London, 1934, Gollancz), pp. 325-33. 'The Harmsworth brothers . . . sailed into this business of producing saleable letterpress for the coppers of the new public, with an entire disregard for good taste, good value, educational influence, social consequences or political responsibility. They were as blind as young kittens to all those aspects of life. That is the most remarkable fact about them from my present point of view, and I think Posterity will find it even more astonishing. In pristine innocence, naked of any sense of responsibility, with immense native energy, they set about pouring millions of printed sheets, of any sort of trash that sold, into the awakening mind of the British masses.' Mr. Wells also brings out the still stranger fact that the business instinct which prompted these irresponsible activities was equally blind, notwithstanding the unerringness with which it aimed at, and hit, its mark. 'Neither Newnes nor Harmsworth, when they launched these ventures, had the slightest idea of the scale of the new forces they were tapping. They thought they were going to sell to a public of at most a few score thousands, and they found they were publishing for the million. They did not so much climb to success; they were rather caught by success and blown sky-high,' without having 'had the faintest suspicion of' this 'preposterous thrust of opportunity'.

² Juvenal: *Satires*, No. xv, ll. 110-12.

Muscovy to the study of the sciences will not prove a like prognostic to the present period of learning.¹

Hume's belief that there was a progressive diffusion of learning under the Roman Imperial régime has been borne out by the discoveries of our latter-day archaeologists—from among whom we will cite, as a witness, a particularly distinguished living scholar who happens to be one of Hume's 'converted Muscovites'.

'The third century represents the climax in the spread of primary education all over the Empire. To the schools in the small villages of Egypt, which were probably connected with the temples, we owe most of the recently discovered literary papyri, which served as text-books for the pupils; and it is in the third century, in the time of Alexander Severus, that we first hear of village elementary schoolmasters as a class. In the third book of his *Opiniones* Ulpian speaks of these schoolmasters and emphasizes the fact that they were to be found both in the cities and in the villages.'²

In Hellenic history this climax in the spread of primary education portended, as we know from the event, not merely the extinction of an intellectual life which had maintained its vitality for a thousand years, but the downfall of a civilization; for the enlightened and benevolent Emperor Alexander Severus was the Roman counterpart of Louis XVI: the innocent victim of a deluge which had been eluded by his less reputable predecessors. The assassination of Alexander Severus in A.D. 235 was the signal, as we have seen,³ for the overthrow of the *Pax Augusta* and for 'the Triumph of Barbarism and Religion' in the fifty years' anarchy that followed. And if we had a more intimate knowledge of the spiritual history of those times of tribulation, we might conceivably find that the educationists of the Antonine and Severan Age had been tragically defeating their own ends by placing the masses at the mercy of a propaganda which was discharged in the fullness of time, with subversive social effects, by the abler of 'the Thirty Tyrants'.

In our own world in our own generation we have had a taste of the enormity which the impact of Democracy upon Education can produce. We have suffered under the tyranny which was exercised by the press-lords in the democratic belligerent countries during the General War of A.D. 1914-18. It is perhaps true that this tyranny was partly dependent for its effectiveness upon the distraction of men's minds through the agony of an ordeal for which they had not been prepared either intellectually or morally; and it is certain that with the restoration of peace the press-lords' power

¹ Hume, David: *Essay Of National Characters*.

² Rostovtzeff, M.: *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926, Clarendon Press), p. 375.

³ In IV. C (i), on p. 8, footnote 2, above.

over public affairs waned as noticeably as the profits of the other war-profiteers. Yet our experience of this temporary press-tyranny in a time of exceptional stress has given us an inkling of a social enormity which might become a permanent feature of our social life if a social stress which was exceptional in 1914-18 were to become the normal condition of life in later decades of the twentieth century, or if the minds of the masses were to become so thoroughly debauched by the corrupting influences to which their imperfect education exposes them that they learnt to respond docilely to the press-lord's suggestion even in times when the corrupter did not have a public calamity to assist him in his devil's work. Indeed, even in the relatively tranquil post-war years the enormity of the Yellow Press—and of the other instruments, like the Cinema, that have since been invented for the same lucrative business of making a profit out of the entertainment of the masses—has been still so gross that it has provoked attempts to sweep it away through revolution.

These revolutionary reactions to the impact of Democracy upon Education, like the revolutionary reactions to the impact of Industrialism upon Private Property, have found their weapon in 'the totalitarian state'; and in Communist Russia and Fascist Italy and National-Socialist Germany the press-lord and the cinema-lord have been the first members of the Capitalist tribe to be deprived of their ill-gotten and ill-used power by revolutionary violence. Yet, here again, the revolutionary remedy may prove still worse than the monstrous disease; for, in all these 'totalitarian' states, the means by which the masses have been delivered from the curse of mental exploitation for private profit has been the confiscation and manipulation of the Press and the Cinema by the Government. The elaborate and ingenious machinery for the mass-enslavement of elementarily educated minds, which was invented in the nineteenth century for the sake of private commercial profit under a régime of *laissez faire*, has here simply been taken over *in toto* by the rulers of states who have decided to employ these mental appliances for their own factious political purposes; and, though their intellectual tyranny may be less sordid in its aims, it is more crushing and more pervasive in its incidence than the tyranny of the private *entrepreneurs* into whose shoes the propaganda departments of the 'totalitarian' Governments have stepped.

Thus, in countries where the system of Universal Education has been introduced, the people are in danger of falling under an intellectual tyranny of one kind or the other, whether it be exercised by private capitalists or by public authorities; and, if they are to be saved from both of these two almost equally lamentable fates,

the only third alternative is to raise the standard of mass-cultivation to a degree at which the minds of the children who are put through the educational mill are rendered immune against at least the grosser forms of either private or public propaganda. This is no easy task; for the corrupting intellectual influences to which these minds become exposed when they have been educated in an elementary way all militate against the achievement of any further intellectual advance in any mind which has been caught in the toils. In fact, the play of propaganda upon elementarily educated minds is apt to establish a vicious circle which it is hard to break; and, if it is not broken, we cannot hope even to maintain the intellectual cultivation of the masses at its present miserable level, but must face the prospect of an intellectual retrogression which will be a moral retrogression as well, and which will leave these masses of latter-day Western men and women at a considerably lower spiritual level than that at which their ancestors stood at the moment when the new social engine of Universal Elementary Education was first applied to them.¹ Happily, there are certain disinterested and effective educational agencies in the Western World of our day—such agencies as the Workers' Educational Association and the British Broadcasting Corporation in the United Kingdom and the High Schools for agricultural labourers in Denmark and the extra-

¹ If it is true, as has been argued in a previous Part of this Study (in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 239-44), that in the most progressive civilizations at the height of their achievement, as well as in the primitive societies, the vast majority of the members have so far always remained at the primitive level, then the introduction of a system of compulsory Universal Education may be described not inaptly as an intellectual offensive against the barbarism which persists—in a 'solid core of paganism and savagery'—below the surface of even the most highly polished civilization hitherto known. If this simile is legitimate, then we may remind ourselves of the fact that, when a civilization launches a military offensive against a barbarian society which is external to its own body social, it cannot allow its advance to stop short of complete victory without provoking a violent counter-offensive and courting a signal disaster. We have seen that the Celtic *Völkerwanderung* is attributable to the failure of the Etruscans to press home their ambitious offensive in the Po Basin (II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 276 and 280), and the Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung* to the similar failure of Charlemagne in his onslaught upon his barbarian neighbours in Northern Europe (II D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 344-6). On these analogies we cannot afford, in our age and in our world, to halt at the present inconclusive position in our educational campaign against the barbarism of our nascent Western proletariat.

The reality of the present danger of retrogression may be illustrated, *ad hominem*, by the present writer from his personal acquaintance in a village in Yorkshire. In this village, in A.D. 1935, there was still living an old agricultural labourer who had not only never been to school but had never learnt to read or write, yet was unquestionably a cultivated man in virtue of knowing a large part of the Bible by heart, constantly turning it over in his mind, savouring its beauty of language, and feeling its spiritual power. In the same village, in the same year, there was a boy who was the clever child in his family (to the point of having prospects of being selected for promotion from the primary to the secondary school), and who showed his cleverness chiefly by being an omnivorous reader. A well-meant word of congratulation to his mother drew the unexpected reply: 'Yes, he does read anything he can lay hands on, but I am going to take good care that he gets no more of that!' In this countrywoman's mind (and she was a person of character) the printed word meant mental garbage in the style of the Yellow Press, and a facility in reading, in a child, spelt exposure to moral corruption. This woman's view was a tragic commentary upon the social effects of our present half-baked system of Universal Education.

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mural extensions of many universities in many countries—which are actually grappling with this problem of giving elementary education an additional impetus of sufficient force to carry the minds of the masses beyond the intellectual danger-zone where they are at the mercy of propaganda from whatever source. If these attempts to adjust the system of Education to the impact of Democracy achieve some degree of success within some measurable time, then our Western Society may still succeed in steering its hazardous educational course through the narrow fairway between a North-cliffian Scylla and a Hitlerian Charybdis; but at the present moment the fortunes of our perilous voyage are still in doubt.

8. *The Impact of Italian Efficiency upon Transalpine Government*

We have now examined six formidable disharmonies that have been produced in the institutional structure of our Western Society, directly or indirectly, by the impact of the two new forces of Democracy and Industrialism within the last hundred and fifty years. We may glance next at one or two similar events in earlier chapters of our Western history and in the histories of certain other civilizations, and we may close the inquiry upon which we are here engaged by observing the same play of forces in several situations which are apt to arise in the histories of all civilizations alike.

One example from an earlier chapter of our own Western history is the disharmony that was produced, in the transition between our 'Medieval' and our 'Modern' Age, by the impact of Italian Efficiency upon Transalpine Government.

We have observed already, at an earlier point in this Study, that in the medieval Italian cosmos of city-states Efficiency impinged upon Government, and was perverted into Autocracy, from the opening of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era onwards;¹ and that, when the medieval Italian culture radiated out into the Transalpine parts of Western Christendom, one of the effects, in the political sphere, was to transform the medieval Transalpine feudal monarchies into autocracies on a supra-Italian scale but on the efficient Italian pattern—with the result that, in every Transalpine country except England, the indigenous Transalpine parliamentary institutions wilted away. This introduction, into the Transalpine World, of an Italian political absolutism which was alien to the Transalpine genius threatened to produce a political enormity which might provoke, in turn, a revolutionary reaction. The response

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 354-7, above.

which was demanded by this challenge to the political abilities of the Transalpine peoples was manifestly an avoidance of the autocratic short cut through some adjustment of the old indigenous parliamentary institutions to the new standard of administrative efficiency; and in England this response was duly made because in England, by the time of the Italian impact, the parliamentary system had already been developed to a higher degree of efficiency than in France or in Aragon or in Castile.¹ In England the attempt of the Crown in the sixteenth century to impose the Italian standard of administrative efficiency upon the country at the price of Autocracy was victoriously resisted in the seventeenth century by the Parliament, which demonstrated its ability to govern at least as efficiently as the Crown without the sacrifice of the country's traditional institutions. In its victory over the English Crown the English Parliament found a path for the peoples of other Transalpine countries to follow; but this path was not easy.

Even in England itself the parliamentary solution of the problem did not prevail over the autocratic solution without a certain delay and therefore not altogether without a revolutionary struggle. From the accession of King Henry VII to the accession of King Charles I it looked—at any rate on a superficial view—as though in England, as in other Transalpine countries, Autocracy on the Italian pattern was to sweep the medieval system of government away; and this English trend towards Autocracy persisted for about a hundred and fifty years before it was violently reversed during the momentous half-century that began with the outbreak of the Civil War in A.D. 1642 and ended with 'the Glorious Revolution' of A.D. 1688. Indeed, if the abortive revival of Autocracy in the early years of King George III is taken into the reckoning, it may even be argued that it required the American Revolutionary War in the New World to make English parliamentary government finally secure at home.

A fortiori it required revolutions to overthrow an Autocracy which had secured a tighter grip, over a longer period, upon the political life of the Continental Transalpine countries and of the British colonies in North America—towards which the Parliament at Westminster showed the countenance of a Strafford and not of a Hampden. Accordingly, in the Thirteen Colonies, the overthrow of Autocracy exacted the price of the Revolutionary War of A.D. 1775–83, and, in France, the price of the series of political eruptions which began in 1789 and continued until 1871. The French in the nineteenth century and the Americans in the eighteenth century had to pay a heavier price than the British in the seventeenth

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 357–62, above.

200 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS century in order to purchase the same political benefits;¹ but the nemesis of delay is demonstrated still more forcibly by the case of Germany. Alone among the leading peoples of the Western World, the Germans retained an element of Autocracy in their government after A.D. 1871; and, although there was a large infusion of Parliamentarism in the constitution of the Bismarckian Reich, the survival into the twentieth century of even a remnant of a sixteenth-century autocratic régime in the government of one of the Great Powers of the Western World was sufficient to involve not only Germany herself, but all the other countries that were members of the Great Society of the day, in the catastrophe of A.D. 1914.

9. *The Impact of the Solonian Economic Revolution upon the Domestic Politics of the Hellenic City-States*

The Italian political efficiency which made its impact upon the government of the Transalpine countries of the Western World at the time of transition from the second to the third chapter of our Western history has a counterpart, in Hellenic history, in the economic efficiency which was achieved, under the pressure of the Malthusian problem, in certain city-states of the Hellenic World in the course of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. For this new economic efficiency did not remain confined to the communities in which it had originated, but radiated out over Hellas and, in

¹ This retardation in the replacement of Autocracy by Parliamentarism in the Governments of the United States and France—a delay which condemned these two countries to purchase their constitutional transformation at the cost of a more destructive political and social upheaval than England had to undergo in passing through the same process at an earlier date—had the posthumous effect of making the derivative forms which this Parliamentarism took, in its belated acclimatization on French and American soil, more convenient models for mimesis by the rest of the World than the English original. In general the latter-day parliamentary institutions of the Central and East European countries have been inspired less by English Parliamentarism than by French, and those of the Latin-American countries, again, less by the English model than by the Constitution of the United States. This fact, and the explanation of it, have already been noticed above (in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 370-1). The explanation is that the English original has been virtually impossible to transplant because it is a spontaneous and peculiar outcrop from the English soil, whereas the American and French derivatives, being the successful products of a deliberate and artificial transplantation, lend themselves much more readily to a repetition of the same process. The unwritten constitution of the Kingdom of England, and of the United Kingdom into which it incorporated itself in A.D. 1707, has evolved, in and since the seventeenth century, quite empirically, as a direct embodiment of political practice, without either a prelude or an aftermath of political theory. On the other hand, in the history of both the American and the French Parliamentarism, the effect of the retardation in achievement has been to make theory (based on a study of English practice and not on first-hand American and French experience) come first, so that in these two cases theory, instead of being anticipated and elbowed out by practice, has had time to establish itself in its own right as a recognized political authority to which subsequent political experience must bow. It is this course of historical events that has given the French and American Parliamentarism that doctrinaire or academic touch which distinguishes them both from our British Parliamentarism; and it is precisely this academic quality—the mellow fruit of a belated development—that has made the French and American constitutions more convenient than the British to imitate.

radiating, made impacts upon both the domestic and the international politics of the whole Hellenic city-state cosmos.

In other parts of this book¹ we have come across this Hellenic achievement of economic efficiency in response to a Malthusian challenge in the classic instance of the Solonian economic revolution at Athens,² and we have noticed the nature of the economic change in which the achievement consisted. It was a change from 'subsistence farming' to 'cash-crop farming' accompanied by a development of commerce and industry; and this specialization in production with a view to exchange did duly secure, for a community which carried it through, an effective increase in productivity. This solution of an old economic problem, however, called two new political problems into existence; for, in changing the character of their economic activity, the peasantry of Attica—or any other country which went through this Hellenic economic revolution—inevitably implicated itself in new social relations: on one side with a new-born class of urban commercial and industrial workers whom the economic revolution had conjured into existence in the home country; and, on another side, with the peoples of neighbouring city-states, with whom the community which had now undergone the economic revolution had previously been living side by side for generations without being drawn into social intercourse with them. This customary isolation of one city-state from another was bound to give way to an interdependence on the economic plane as soon as the new economic system of production for exchange came to transcend the narrow boundaries of a single city-state territory; and when once two or more city-states had become economically interdependent, it was thenceforth impossible that they should remain, without disaster, in their pristine state of isolation on the plane of politics.

The impact of the Solonian economic revolution upon Hellenic political life will be easier to observe if we examine the effect on domestic politics and the effect on international politics separately.

In the domestic political life of the Hellenic city-states the economic revolution brought with it the problem of enfranchising the new urban class; and this new class could not be taken into the

¹ In II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 37-42, anticipated in I. B (i), vol. i, pp. 24-5, above.

² This Attic example is the classic case in two senses: on the one hand, we happen to have much more information about the Solonian economic revolution in Attica than about the corresponding revolutions in Miletus or Chalcis or Corinth or Aegina; and, on the other hand, the Solonian revolution was actually of much greater historical importance than the others, because in Attica the problem was solved with such outstanding success that a post-Solonian Athens became 'the Education of Hellas': that is to say, the triumphant pioneer in whose footsteps the rank-and-file of Hellenic city-states now deliberately set themselves to follow. In point of date, however, the Athenians were possibly the latest, besides being certainly the most successful, of the several pioneers in this Hellenic social venture.

bosom of the body politic without a radical change in the basis of political association. The traditional kinship-basis, which had served well enough in an old-fashioned agrarian society, had to be replaced, in order to enfranchise the new artisanry and bourgeoisie, by a new-fangled franchise based on property;¹ and, here again, if the tension arising from the encounter between the old political institution and the new economic force were not relieved by a timely adjustment, it was likely to produce either a revolution or an enormity.

The salutary method of adjustment was a change-over from the birth-franchise to the property-franchise at an early date, by free consent and in a moderate measure; and all these three conditions were more or less effectively fulfilled in the domestic political history of Athens within a period extending from the generation of Solon to the generation of Pericles. At Athens the adjustment was unquestionably made in good time, since it was inaugurated by the same statesman as the economic revolution of which it was the political corollary. It was made by free consent, since Solon, in so far as he exercised dictatorial powers, was invested with these powers through an agreement between the contending parties, and not through the forcible self-assertion of any single class or party over the rest. In the third place the political adjustment in Attica was distinguished by its moderation in almost all its stages. The Solonian constitutional reconstruction itself, while radical in principle, was conservative in its application, since the new-fangled property-franchise which it introduced was limited in scope by being graded in four degrees; and although, within the next century and a half, the property-qualification for the exercise of the highest political rights was reduced to zero² by the successive reforms of Cleisthenes and Ephialtes,³ this eventual translation of political radicalism from principle into practice was not a mere indulgence of doctrinaire 'extremism', but was rather a statesman-like recognition of the social fact that, since the prosperity and power of Athens had come to depend upon her industry and commerce and shipping, the industrial population of the City and the seafaring population of the Peiraeus had become at least as important politically as the agrarian interests in the countryside.

The form of political revolution which was the penalty for undue delay in making this political adjustment on the Athenian pattern

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 342-3, with footnote 1 on p. 343, above.

² See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 343, footnote 1, above.

³ Ephialtes appears to have been the initiator of the Attic political reform movement in the fourth decade of the fifth century B.C. which was eventually carried to completion by the younger statesman Pericles after Ephialtes' career had been cut short by assassination.

was a temporary political dictatorship (*tyrannis*), in which some individual man of action was allowed to seize despotic political power by force in order to accomplish, by the same rough and ready method, those social changes which had to be made somehow, but which the contending classes and parties were failing to accomplish by voluntary agreement. The preferable method of voluntary and timely adjustment seems to have been found so difficult in the Hellenic Society of that age that even the Athenians—who practised adjustment with greater success than any of their neighbours—proved unable to dispense with the dictatorial ‘short cut’ altogether. The Solonian adjustment so far failed to do its work that, in the next generation, the Athenians had to submit to the dictatorship of Peisistratus, and to allow the dictator to achieve the necessary redistribution of wealth and power within the citizen-body through the revolutionary method of confiscation which Solon had striven to avoid. At Athens, however, the Peisistratean tyranny was only an interlude between the Solonian and the Cleisthenean reform. Peisistratus himself did not effectively consolidate his power at Athens until the third attempt, and his sons did not succeed in retaining their father’s political legacy for more than a few years after his death. The classic field of the seventh-century and sixth-century Hellenic *tyrannis* was not in Athens but in Miletus and Samos and Corinth and Sicyon. In these other city-states the dictatorship was not only of considerably longer duration; it was also the chief, if not the sole, instrument by which, in these communities, social changes corresponding to the contemporary changes in Attica were carried through.

At the price of a prolonged dictatorship Corinth eventually secured a stable ‘oligarchic’ constitution, on a conservative property-franchise, which did not differ in principle from the ‘democratic’ constitution of Periclean Athens. But Athens and Corinth had neighbours who did not succeed in carrying through, either by voluntary adjustment or by dictatorial revolution, the domestic political changes which the economic revolution demanded, and these communities condemned themselves, by their double political failure, to be victims of the political enormity of chronic internal strife: the dreaded, and dreadful, Hellenic political malady of *stasis*.

For example, in Corinth’s daughter-city Syracuse the overthrow of the dictatorship of the Deinomenidae *circa* 466 B.C. was followed by alternate bouts of *stasis* and recurrences of dictatorship in a fatal chain which proved stronger than the idealism of a Dion or the statesmanship of a Timoleon. This chain was only broken after more than two and a half centuries had passed, and then only by

the Roman sack of the city in 212 B.C., which was the end of Syracusan political history.¹ In another Corinthian foundation, Corcyra, the evil of *stasis*, inflamed by the heat of war, attained a pitch of atrocity, till then unknown in Hellenic history, in the massacres of 427-425 B.C. which have been immortalized by Thucydides.² At Argos, which seems to have fallen into a state of internal political torpor after the precocious dictatorship of King Pheidon, a belated attempt to catch up, at one bound, with the long political development of Athens was made in the third decade of the fifth century B.C., when the prestige of Athenian political institutions was at a premium in Hellas owing to the brilliance of the part which Athens had played in the winning of the recent Pan-Hellenic victory over Xerxes.³ In the tardiness of this Argive attempt at adjustment we may perhaps detect one of the causes of a subsequent internal discord which signalized itself, a hundred years later, in the notorious 'clubbing incident' (*ρόπαλισμός*) of 371 B.C. At Sparta, where the process of reform was arrested, the remedy of dictatorship rejected, and an endeavour made to cheat Destiny by falling out of the general Hellenic line of march in order to follow a lone Laconian trail, the natural penalty of *stasis* was only averted by being transformed into the grimmer penance of a repression which bore as heavily upon the agents of it as upon their victims, and which fatally blighted the Spartan community's growth.⁴ And, even at this price, the enormity of *stasis* was not completely exorcised from Spartan life; for the agitated 'post-war' years of Hellenic history which followed the discomfiture of Xerxes witnessed, in the Peloponnese, not only the democratic revolution at Argos, but also the great insurrection of the Messenian Helots and Perioeci against their Spartan masters.

Finally, we may cite the case of Rome, a non-Greek community which was not an original member of the Hellenic Society but was a convert brought into the fold as a result of the geographical expansion of the Hellenic Civilization *circa* 725-525 B.C.⁵ It was not till after this conversion that Rome entered upon the course of economic and political development which was the normal career of a Hellenic or Hellenized city-state in this second chapter of Hellenic history;

¹ The Syracusan dictatorship of the Deinomenidae (*circa* 485-466 B.C.) was followed at intervals by those of the Dionysii (405-344 B.C.), Agathocles (316-289 B.C.), and Hiero with his grandson Hieronymus (266-214 B.C.). For the function of the Sicilian despotisms in the field of international affairs see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 357, footnote 1, above.

² Thucydides, Book III, chaps. 70-85, and Book IV, chaps. 46-8, cited in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, on p. 63, above, and quoted in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 58-60, below.

³ On this point see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, p. 477, footnote 2, above.

⁴ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 50-79, above.

⁵ For this expansion see II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 42-5; Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 51; Part III. B, vol. iii, pp. 121-2; III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 148-9, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 210-12, below.

and the consequence was that in this chapter Rome passed through every stage with a Time-lag of some 140 or 150 years behind the date when the corresponding stage was traversed by Athens.¹ It is noteworthy that, for this extreme political retardation, Rome paid an extreme penalty in the shape of a long and bitter *stasis* (following upon an abortive *tyrannis* set up by sophisticated Etruscan intruders) between the Patrician monopolists of power by right of birth and the Plebeian claimants to power by right of wealth and numbers. This Roman *stasis*, which seems to have broken out early in the fifth century B.C. and which lasted on into the third, went to such lengths that the Plebs, on several occasions, seceded from the *Populus* by a physical act of geographical withdrawal, while it permanently established a Plebeian anti-state—complete with its own institutions, assemblies, and officers—within the bosom of the legitimate commonwealth. It was only thanks to a temporary external pressure and a subsequent domestic relief arising from a series of hard-fought wars of conquest that Roman statesmanship found it possible, in 287 B.C., to cope with this constitutional enormity by bringing state and anti-state into a working political unity; and when, in the second century B.C., the imperialism which had temporarily simplified the domestic problem revenged itself upon Rome, in due course, by exposing her to a new internal political strain, the makeshift character of the settlement of 287 B.C. was rapidly revealed. The unannealed amalgam of Patrician and Plebeian institutions, which the Romans had been content to accept as the ultimate constitution of their ramshackle republic, proved so inept a political instrument for attempting to achieve a new social adjustment that, after a respite of little more than a hundred and fifty years' duration, Rome fell into a second bout of *stasis* (*flagrabat* 133–31 B.C.); and this bout was far more terrible than the first because of the formidable increase, in the interval, in the scale of Roman life and in the driving-power of Roman social forces. This time, after a century of self-laceration, the Roman body politic submitted itself to a permanent dictatorship; and since, by this date, Roman arms had completed their conquest of the Hellenic World, the Roman *tyrannis* of Augustus and his successors incidentally provided the Hellenic Society with its universal state.²

This stupendous persistent ineptitude of the Romans in fumbling with their domestic political problems presents an extreme, and at first sight extraordinary, contrast to their unfailing and unrivalled ability in making, retaining, and organizing their foreign

¹ For this Time-lag in Roman social evolution in this chapter of Hellenic history see further V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 288, and Part XI, below.

² For the Roman Empire's historical role as a Hellenic universal state see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52–3, above.

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10. *The Impact of the Solonian Economic Revolution upon the International Politics of the Hellenic World*

The contrast, which we have just touched upon, between the political histories of Athens and Rome has brought out the fact that the comparative success of Athens in her domestic politics was offset by a signal Athenian political failure in the field of international affairs; and this may serve to remind us that we have still

¹ This 'Golden Age' of Athenian democracy, which began *circa* 507 B.C. with the Cleisthenean reforms, is comparable to the 'Golden Age' of British parliamentarism, which began in A.D. 1688 with 'the Glorious Revolution'. In the terms used in a previous part of this Study (in III, C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 366–8, above) these two comparable Athenian and British 'Golden Ages' were each of them a 'constructive phase'—distinguished by substantial achievements in many spheres of activity—in a movement of Withdrawal-and-Return. Moreover the combination of timeliness with moderation, which was the note of Athenian constitutional development during these 189 years, is equally characteristic of British constitutional history during the corresponding period. The contrast between the timely and moderate English Revolution of A.D. 1688 and the violent course taken by the French Revolution, the outbreak of which was delayed until 1789, is analogous to the contrast between the Cleisthenean Reform of 507 B.C. and the Argive and Laconian political upheavals in the third and fourth decades of the fifth century B.C. At a later stage again the British Reform of A.D. 1832 was more moderate (in spite of being delayed for 40 years owing to the General War of A.D. 1792–1815), than the French upheavals of 1830 and 1848 and 1870–1.

to examine the effect, in this field, of the impact of the Solonian economic revolution upon Hellenic political life.

In a previous age, when exceptionally favourable opportunities for sheer extensive geographical expansion had made it possible for the Hellenic Society to provide for a growing population without departing from the old-fashioned economic system of subsistence farming, the self-sufficiency (*αὐτάρκεια*) of each single Hellenic city-state, on every plane of social activity, was a simple matter of fact. The Solonian economic revolution was needed in order to solve the new economic problem of continuing to provide for a population which had not ceased to grow, yet finding this provision within the limits of a Hellenic World whose expansion had been cut short by the successfully organized resistance of its Syriac and barbarian neighbours. The solution lay, as we have seen,¹ in changing over from subsistence farming to a specialized production—industrial as well as agrarian—with a view to exchange; but this solution involved the abandonment of economic self-sufficiency, since the new economic system of specialization and exchange could not be made to yield the enhanced productivity which was its object, so long as its field of action was confined within the narrow limits of the standard-size city-state domain.

In order to produce its fruits, the new economy must burst the bounds of the single city-state and operate freely over a vastly larger area, embracing not only the entire Hellenic World but also Egypt in one direction and Scythia in another and the African and European hinterlands of the West Mediterranean Basin in a third. In fact, the Solonian economic revolution could not be carried out without enlarging the ordinary working unit of Hellenic economic life from a city-state scale to an oecumenical scale; and the historical fact that this economic revolution did take place means that this great enlargement of the field of economic operations was actually achieved. By the beginning of the fifth century B.C. the immense area whose range has just been indicated had actually come to be the normal field of economic activity for the wine-growers and olive-oil producers and potters and merchants and sailors of economically progressive Hellenic city-states like Miletus and Corinth and Aegina and Athens. But this expansion of the range of economic activity from a parochial to an oecumenical scale solved an economic problem only to create a political problem; and the solution of the economic problem remained precarious so long as the consequent political problem had not been solved with equal success along its own lines.

The Milesians and Aeginetans could never count, for certain,

¹ In IV. C (iii) (b) 9, p. 201, above.

on the livelihood which they had learnt to gain through an oecumenical economic activity, unless their freedom of economic action in this oecumenical field were guaranteed by the establishment of some kind of political order on the same oecumenical scale. So long as the ordinary working unit of Hellenic political life continued to be the city-state whose limits had now been so far transcended on the economic plane, it was possible that a political conflict between city-states, in the shape of war or privateering or piracy, might at any moment arbitrarily cut short those oecumenical economic activities which had now become indispensable for the maintenance of the increased and increasing population of Aegina or Miletus individually and of Hellas as a whole. In short, in the international field the Solonian economic revolution confronted the Hellenic Society with the necessity for establishing a political world order. The accomplished fact of the abolition of city-state self-sufficiency on the economic plane now called for its abolition on the political plane as well; and when the transition from a parochial to an oecumenical range had just been successfully achieved on the one plane, there was no apparent reason, *a priori*, why it should not be achieved on the other plane in due course.

The obstacle in the way was the inherited political institution of City-State Sovereignty; and the removal of this obstacle to political solidarity was the task which was set by Fate to Hellas when the fifth century B.C. opened. The obstacle, however, became more formidable in the act of being grappled with; for this City-State Sovereignty which had previously been taken for granted began to draw attention and inspire affection as soon as it became evident that its existence was threatened. From the opening of the fifth century B.C. onwards the whole of the rest of Hellenic political history can be formulated in terms of an endeavour to transcend City-State Sovereignty and of the resistance which this endeavour evoked.¹ Before the fifth century closed, the obstinacy of the resistance to the accomplishment of this urgent political task had brought the Hellenic Civilization to its breakdown; and though the problem which had baffled an Athenian first attempt to solve it was eventually solved in a fashion by Rome, it was not solved in time to prevent the disintegration of the Hellenic Society from running its course to its final dissolution.² In this outcome of the impact of the Solonian economic revolution upon the international

¹ For the idolization, in the Hellenic World, of the institution of the Sovereign City-State see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 303-20, below.

² This explanation of the breakdown and disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization has been touched upon, by anticipation, in Part III. B, vol. iii, p. 122, footnote 3, and in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 340, footnote 1, above. See also V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 287-91, below.

politics of the Hellenic World the alternatives of adjustment, revolution, and enormity present themselves once again.

In this case the solution of the problem through adjustment lay in a permanent limitation of City-State Sovereignty by voluntary agreement between the city-states themselves for the sake of providing the necessary political security for a now indispensable economic intercourse.

A treaty apparently dating from about the middle of the fifth century B.C., and embodying an agreement to such effect between two city-states on the western shore of the Crisaean Gulf, has come into the hands of the modern Western historian through the accident of archaeological discovery;¹ and since the two high contracting parties were, both of them, small and obscure communities, while the district in which they were situated—the Ozolian or ‘colonial’ Locris—is included by Thucydides in a region of North-Western Continental Greece which he takes as a ‘living museum’ of the elsewhere obsolete Hellenic Society of the Dark Age,² we may reasonably conjecture that a practice which had spread to this backward part of Hellas by about the year 440 B.C. had become general throughout the Hellenic World in the course of the first half of the fifth century. The type of treaty of which this surviving treaty between Oeanthea and Chaleum may be taken as a late and unimportant example, is a bilateral agreement between two city-states for the enactment between them, *ad hoc*, of a rudimentary code of international law to govern their economic relations with each other; and no doubt this expedient for dealing with the new problem of international politics was useful as far as it went. At the same time it is manifest that the results must have fallen far short of what was needed. For instance, the treaty between Oeanthea and Chaleum, by itself, can hardly have contributed appreciably to the security of international trade and seafaring even in the waters of the Crisaean Gulf; for there were several other equally small and obscure, but also equally sovereign, city-states which were likewise ‘riverain Powers’; and all the ‘riverain Powers’, between them,

¹ The bronze tablet on which the text is inscribed was found at Galaxidhi (the latter-day equivalent of the Hellenic Oeanthea) and is now in the British Museum. The text is printed, with a translation and commentary, by E. L. Hicks and G. F. Hill in *A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2nd edition (Oxford 1901, Clarendon Press), pp. 73–6. The treaty provides that ‘no Oeanthean, if he make a seizure, shall carry off a foreign merchant from Chalean soil, nor a Chalean a merchant from Oeanthean soil; nor shall either Oeanthean or Chalean seize a merchant’s cargo within the territory of the other city. If any one breaks this rule, it shall be lawful to seize him with impunity. . . .’ On the same tablet there is also inscribed, in a different hand, the text of regulations made in one of the two contracting states (presumably in Oeanthea, where the tablet was found) for assuring to resident aliens the enjoyment of their treaty-made legal rights.

² Thucydides, Book I, chap. 5. For this social backwardness of North-Western and Northern Greece in the second chapter of the history of the growth of the Hellenic Civilization see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, pp. 478–9 above.

would only have accounted for a small fraction of the shipping which plied within sight of their shores; for this waterway was one of the main approaches to the Pan-Hellenic shrine at Delphi, and in the fifth century B.C. Delphi was in communication with almost every community in the Hellenic World, as far afield as Cyrene and Trebizond and Marseilles. In order to provide effectively, by means of bilateral treaties, for the security of all ships and merchandise that had occasion to traverse the Crisaean Gulf, the single bilateral treaty between Oeanthea and Chaleum would have to be supplemented by a vast network of such treaties, not only binding the local riverain Powers among themselves, but also binding each of them to almost every other state-member of the Hellenic Society.¹ When we consider further that the Crisaean Gulf, though an important sea-route in itself, was only a minute fraction of the total surface of the Mediterranean and its annexes, and that almost the whole of this area was embraced, at this date, in the field of Hellenic maritime trade,² we can see at once that the creation of anything like a comprehensive and uniform system of oecumenical law-and-order in the Hellenic World on a basis of voluntary bilateral treaties was a Psyche's task.

As a matter of historical fact, we find that, in those attempts at establishing a Hellenic world order which came the nearest to success, a network of voluntary bilateral treaties was only one of several bases on which the structure was reared. In these relatively successful experiments a local enterprise in treaty-making was reinforced by the stimulus of a general emergency and by the leadership of a single predominant Power. The Delian League (*vivebat* 478-454 B.C.) was established under the stimulus of the Pan-Hellenic war of defence and liberation (*gerebatur* 480-478 B.C.) against the Achaemenian Power, and under the leadership of Athens, whose naval strength had made her the saviour of Hellas and left her the mistress of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Roman Empire was established under the stimulus of a paroxysm of war and revolution which threatened the Hellenic Society with imminent dissolution in the last century B.C., and under the leadership of Rome, who had already (between 220 and 168 B.C.) delivered 'the knock-out blow'

¹ It is significant that the bilateral Chaleo-Oeanthean treaty, above quoted, goes on to say that 'the property of a foreigner [i.e. a citizen of any third state] may be seized on the sea without incurring the penalty, except in the actual harbour of the city'.

² The only Mediterranean waters that were a *mare clausum* to the Hellenes at this time were those bounded by the north coast of North Africa west of a point just north by west of Carthage, by the south-east coast of Spain as far as a point at some unknown distance north-east of (the future site of) Cartagena, and by the Carthaginian insular possessions in the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, and the western tip of Sicily. For the light thrown upon the limits of this Carthaginian preserve by the terms of successive commercial treaties between Carthage and Rome see Strachan-Davidson, J. L.: *Selections from Polybius* (Oxford 1888, Clarendon Press), pp. 65-70.

to all other Great Powers in the Hellenic World of that age.¹ The circumstances show that, in Hellenic history, the establishment of a political world order by process of adjustment was never even approached without a potent admixture of the untoward elements of revolution and enormity. The revolutionary way of constructing an oecumenical political framework for an oecumenical field of economic activity was to abrogate the institution of City-State Sovereignty altogether, by *force majeure*, and to bring the whole of the ground, when it had been cleared of previous obstructions by this high-handed method, under the common roof of a single universal state. The enormity which was the penalty of failure to achieve a world order by either adjustment or revolution was an agglomeration of city-states in which a certain measure of city-state autonomy was preserved, but in which the association between the participating communities was neither on a voluntary basis nor on an equal footing, but was maintained by a forcible and selfish domination of some single city-state over all the rest. This inequitable system of association was evidently the line of least resistance for arriving at a compromise between an old parochial tradition and the new necessity of transcending it; but it was none the less an enormity inasmuch as it only transcended the old parochialism in a material sense, while morally it capitulated to it by allowing one strong parochial community to indulge its egotism to an unprecedented degree at its weaker neighbours' expense. The moral condemnation which this enormity evoked in Hellenic consciences was not averted by the euphemistic title of 'hegemony' (*das Führerprinzip*), by which a 'tyrant-city' preferred to describe its twofold exploitation of its own superiority in military power and of the World's need for political unity.

If we let our minds run over the course of Hellenic history, we shall observe that this enormity of 'hegemony', as well as the revolutionary alternative of the *Gleichschaltung* of City-State Sovereignty by a merger into a universal state, was already a familiar phenomenon in the Hellenic World before the foundation of the Delian League; and we shall also observe that in the Roman Empire—which belatedly and partially succeeded, where the Delian League had failed, in establishing a Hellenic world order through an association of city-states—the vicious element of 'hegemony' far outweighed the salutary element of freedom, and was only eliminated, in the course of the Empire's history, by a gradual process of *Gleichschaltung* which destroyed the autonomy of all Rome's subject cities *pari passu* with the ascendancy of Rome herself.

If we examine rather more in detail the circumstances in which

¹ See the quotation from Polybius in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 312-13, above.

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the Delian League was founded in 478 B.C., we shall find, as we might expect, that its organizer, the Athenian statesman Aristides, was working, not in a political vacuum, but in an atmosphere of political precedents of which his work distinctly bears the marks.

It would have been strange if Aristides had borrowed nothing from the institution of 'hegemony', when Athens herself had been living under the 'hegemony' of Sparta, off and on and in varying degrees, ever since the Spartan King Cleomenes had expelled the Peisistratidae from Athens in 511 B.C.¹ Indeed, the very occasion which had called for the establishment of the Delian League was the renunciation of this Spartan hegemony in 478 B.C. in respect of Athens and those Asiatic Greek communities which had just been liberated from Achaemenian rule; and if the Lacedaemonian Government had not made this deliberate withdrawal² it is safe to say that the Delian League would never have been called into existence at all. In the circumstances it was natural that the Athenians should step into the Spartans' shoes and should include an element of Athenian 'hegemony' in the structure of an Athenian-made experiment in a Hellenic world order.

It was equally natural that, in framing a new international régime for a constellation of Hellenic city-states which had been incorporated, for some sixty or seventy years past, in the Achaemenian Empire, Aristides should borrow certain convenient institutions to which these communities had grown accustomed under the Achaemenian régime from which they had just been liberated. The Achaemenian precedent is unmistakably accountable for an arrangement so alien from the indigenous Hellenic tradition of city-state sovereignty as the imposition of a money-contribution to a federal war-chest at Delos upon states-members of the League which were unable, or disinclined, to contribute an effective contingent of war-ships to the federal navy;³ and the same alien tendency towards *Gleichschaltung*, in the characteristic vein of the Achaemenian Empire and of every other universal state,⁴ may perhaps be discerned

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 336, footnote 3, above.

² For the motives which inspired this Spartan policy see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 70-1, above.

³ The majority of the city-states which acquiesced in the payment of a money-tribute as their contribution to the League, and which accepted the assessment that was made by Aristides, were 'liberated' communities which had previously belonged to the Achaemenian Empire; and for these the tribute was something to which they had long since been broken in. It made little difference to them that the money previously payable to a treasury at Sardis or Dascylium should now be made payable, instead, to a treasury at Delos. It is perhaps significant that Scyros and Carystus, which were the only two city-states that were brought into the Delian League at the beginning by coercion instead of by consent, had neither of them ever lost their independence to the Achaemenian Empire; and it may also be noted that Naxos and Thasos, which were the first two members of the League that endeavoured to secede, had neither of them had more than a brief taste of Achaemenian domination—Thasos for only thirteen years, and Naxos for only eleven years, ending in 479 B.C.

⁴ For the character and genius of universal states see further Part VI, below.

likewise in the progressive centralization, in the courts at Athens, of private litigation in suits to which citizens of the 'allied' cities were parties: an infringement of local sovereignty which was perhaps more bitterly resented than the exaction of the monetary tribute. This Athenian attempt to establish a Pan-Hellenic common law and a Pan-Hellenic jurisdiction on an Athenian basis would have been impossible if the Athenians had not possessed, and employed, the means of coercion; this coercion was only thinly veiled by the network of treaties, between Athens and her associates in the Delian League, on which the process of judicial centralization was formally grounded; and this expedient of conjuring into existence an oecumenical system of law-and-order by compelling the city-states to enter into a network of treaties, wholesale, was demonstrably borrowed by the Athenians from their Achaemenian predecessors in the dominion over the Asiatic Greeks. It is recorded that, after the Achaemenian Government had succeeded in suppressing the great Asiatic Greek revolt of 499-494 B.C., Darius's brother 'Artaphernes, the Statthalter at Sardis, summoned delegates from the [re-subjugated] city-states to his presence, and compelled the Asiatic Greeks to enter into treaties with one another for the regulation, by judicial procedure, of disputes [between their respective *ressortissants*], in substitution for their [traditional] practice of seeking satisfaction, in such cases, by [methods of barbarism like] piracy and brigandage'.¹

It will be seen that if the Delian League was, in one aspect, an endeavour to provide the Hellenic Society with a political world order by a process of voluntary adjustment, it was also partly inspired by the precedents of a Spartan 'hegemony' and an Achaemenian *Gleichschaltung*; and in this light the disastrous failure of this endeavour, and of all its successors, no longer appears surprising. Every one of these successive Hellenic attempts at a world order was morally a hybrid product; and the healthy ingredient in the social compound was always eventually overcome by the poisonous ingredients with which it had been contaminated from the outset. Within the brief Time-span of the 'Pentecontaetia' (478-431 B.C.) the Delian League degenerated into the international tyranny of the Athenian Empire; the chastisement with whips, which this Athenian imperialism inflicted upon the Hellenic World during the half-century ending in 404 B.C., was renewed and outdone by the chastisement with scorpions which a Roman imperialism inflicted, in its turn, during the two centuries that followed the outbreak of the Hannibalic War; and even when, at last, the long Roman oppression was transmuted into a belated Hellenic world

¹ Herodotus: Book VI, chap. 42.

order by the genius of Caesar and the remorse of Augustus, this magnified reflexion—or travesty—of the Delian League did not escape in the long run the untoward metamorphosis which had so swiftly overtaken its original. The ultimate fate of the Hellenic cosmos of city-states under the aegis of the Caesars was a *Gleichschaltung* of the kind to which the Asiatic Greek communities had been subjected already both after the foundation of the Delian League, under the aegis of Athens, and before the foundation of the Delian League, under the aegis of the Achaemenidae. In short, the history of Hellenic endeavours to create a political world order is a tragedy whose gloom is hardly relieved by one brief gleam of sunshine in a Periclean spring and another in an Antonine 'Indian Summer'.¹

II. *The Impact of Parochialism upon the Western Christian Church*

While the Hellenic Society broke down and went into disintegration through a failure to transcend a traditional Parochialism, our Western Society has failed—with consequences that are still hidden in the future—to maintain a social solidarity which was perhaps the most precious part of its original endowment.

In the time of transition from the so-called 'medieval' second chapter of our Western history to the so-called 'modern' third chapter, one of the most prominent symptoms and significant expressions of the current social change was the rise of a new Parochialism in contrast and opposition to the Oecumenicalism of the outgoing age. In our generation it is not altogether easy for us to regard this Parochialism dispassionately and objectively, even in studying its origins, on account of the vast evils which it has since brought, and is still bringing, upon our World owing to its anachronistic and incongruous survival in the radically altered circumstances of our day. Yet we can still perceive that there was much to be said in favour of the change from a medieval Oecumenicalism to this modern Parochialism at the time when this change took place some four or five centuries ago. Our medieval Western Oecumenicalism, for all its moral grandeur, was a ghost from the past—a cherished legacy from the last chapter in the history of the antecedent Hellenic Society²—and on the medieval stage of Western social life there was always an unseemly discrepancy between the theoretical supremacy and ubiquity of this inherited oecumenical idea and the *de facto* anarchy which played so large a part in actual

¹ For the Age of the Antonines as 'the Indian Summer' of the Hellenic decline and fall see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, pp. 58–61, above.

² On this point see further Part X, below.

medieval practice. By comparison the new Parochialism which boldly usurped the stage at the dawn of the Modern Age was more honest in its account of itself, and more effective in enforcing its pretensions, though at the same time it might be more cynical intellectually and on a lower level morally. In any case the new force won the day; and its victory affected every aspect and every institution of our Western life, since this modern Parochialism had just as many facets as there were activities in the society which gave it birth. In politics it displayed itself in the form of a plurality of new parochial sovereign states, in letters in the form of a plurality of new vernacular literatures, and in the field of religion it collided violently with the medieval Western Church.

The violence of this collision was due partly to the fundamental fact that the Church, now elaborately and powerfully organized under the Papal 'hierocracy', was the master institution of the medieval oecumenical régime,¹ and partly to the incidental fact that Italy, which happened for historical reasons to contain the local seat of the Papacy, was also the place where the new Parochialism first worked itself out experimentally in the seed-bed of the North and Central Italian constellation of medieval city-states.² Through the combined effect of these two facts the rise of the modern Parochialism confronted the Papal Church with a grave and urgent problem.

This problem was probably open to a solution by adjustment along lines which the Papacy had already reconnoitred while it was still at the height of its power. For example, in encountering the parochial impulse to make use of local vernacular languages as vehicles for cultural expression side by side with, or even in substitution for, Latin, the Roman Church had already made at least one notable concession—namely, the permission to have the Roman Liturgy translated into the Croatian language and conveyed in Glagolitic characters—in a frontier zone where it found itself in direct competition with a rival, the Orthodox Church, whose policy in

¹ This position of unrivalled dominance in Western Christendom, to which the Papacy finally attained through its victory in its war to the knife with the Hohenstaufen Dynasty, of course placed on the Papacy's shoulders a unique responsibility for worthily and successfully upholding the oecumenical principle of which it had deliberately made itself the exclusive exponent when it insisted upon delivering a 'knock-out blow' to its already discomfited adversary, the Holy Roman Empire. In so far as it failed to live up to this self-imposed responsibility, the Papacy was in part the cause of the subsequent outbreak of Parochialism, of which it was also the most eminent victim; and its share in the disastrous work of bringing the new spirit of Parochialism to a head was undoubtedly very large. The *ὕβρις* with which the Papacy exploited its victory over the Empire—in first trampling on a prostrate foe and then attempting to exercise on its own account the oecumenical despotism which it had refused to tolerate in the hands of a Barbarossa or a Frederick II—quickly turned the public opinion of Western Christendom, not only against the Papacy itself, but against the whole principle of oecumenicalism which was now embodied in the Papacy alone. On this see further IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512–84, below.

² See I. B (i), vol. i, p. 19, and III. C (ii) (δ), vol. iii, pp. 341–6, above.

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regard to the ecclesiastical use of vernacular languages was much more liberal than the ordinary Roman practice.¹ At more recent dates the Papacy had gone still farther in the terms on which it accepted the allegiance of renegades from the Orthodox Church and from the Monothelites, Monophysites, and Nestorians. So long as these Uniates were willing to acknowledge the Roman supremacy and to subscribe to the Roman doctrine, they were granted a wide licence to persist in the liturgical use not only of their vernacular languages but even of their traditional rites.

Again, in dealing with the medieval precursors of the modern parochial sovereign states, the Popes who had been intransigent in maintaining their 'hierocratic' claims against the secular pretensions of the Holy Roman Emperors had been more accommodating in their policy towards temporal rulers in England and Castile and other kingdoms on the fringes of the medieval Western World, whose pretensions to local sovereignty had no bearing on the status of the Pope in his own Roman See, while their goodwill and loyalty to the Roman Church seemed worth purchasing at a certain price owing to the importance of the services which it was in the power of these outlying local sovereigns to render or withhold for the propagation of the Catholic Faith and the Roman connexion *in partibus infidelium et schismaticorum*.

Thus the Holy See was not altogether unschooled in rendering unto Caesar² the things that are Caesar's by the time when a full-fledged neo-Caesarism asserted itself—first in the persons of the despots who made themselves masters of a majority of the Italian city-states, and later in the persons of their Transalpine emulators: a Spanish Ferdinand and Isabella, a French Louis XI, and an English Henry VII. In this political field a possible line of adjustment to the new situation had already revealed itself; and, in the event, the Vatican learnt to follow this line to considerable lengths in the various concordats which it ultimately made with a number of parochial sovereign Powers whose assertion of their sovereignty

¹ For the use of a Slavonic version of the Liturgy in certain Roman Catholic dioceses of Croatia, Istria, and Dalmatia see *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1923, University Press), p. 229. For the survival of the original Slavonic Alphabet, i.e. the so-called Glagolitic Alphabet, here, after it had been superseded by the so-called Cyrillic Alphabet among the Slavonic adherents of the Orthodox Christian Church, see Jensen, H.: *Geschichte der Schrift* (Hanover 1925, Lafaire), pp. 189-90; Bury, J. B., in his edition of Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (editio minor, London 1900-2, Methuen, 7 vols.), vol. vi, p. 550; and Runciman, S.: *A History of the First Bulgarian Empire* (London 1930, Bell), Appendix IX. For the part played by the Slavonic Liturgy in the relations between the Western and the Orthodox Church in South-Eastern Europe in the latter part of the ninth century see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 375-7 and 381-2, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 608-10, below.

² Caesar, that is, in the metaphorical sense; for the Holy Roman Emperors, who laid claim to the title of Caesar *de jure*, were notably less successful in coaxing or wringing concessions from the Holy See than were the medieval kings of England and Castile.

in the teeth of the Roman 'hierocracy' had not gone the length of a repudiation of their ecclesiastical allegiance. The lengths to which the Vatican—schooled, at the thirteenth hour, by overwhelming adversity—has eventually learnt to go, on its own part, in deferring to parochial secular Powers, are exemplified in the terms of the concordats which it has concluded respectively in A.D. 1929 and in A.D. 1933 with two 'post-modern' apostles of a 'totalitarian' Parochial Sovereignty, Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler. These two latest instances, however, in which the policy of concession has been carried to extremes, perhaps indicate that the form of compromise which is represented by the conclusion of a concordat between the Papacy and the sovereign government of a parochial state may be not so much a genuine adjustment as a 'face-saving' method of acquiescence in a revolutionary *fait accompli*.

The modern system of concordats between the Holy See and the parochial secular sovereigns of Catholic populations is the Dead Sea Fruit of abortive oecumenical councils; and it is arguable that the Papacy missed the opportunity of making a genuine adjustment between the oecumenical tradition of Western Christendom and the new spirit of Parochialism when it set itself in opposition to the Conciliar Movement which was mooted at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and was brought into action in the successive councils of Pisa (*sedebat* A.D. 1409), Constance (*sedebat* A.D. 1414-18), and Basel (*sedebat* A.D. 1431-49).

The Conciliar Movement was a constructive effort, on lines of constitutional development which were well known and well tried in Western Christendom by that date, to provide a remedy for the unchecked and unbalanced power which the Papacy had acquired through the overthrow, in the thirteenth century, of the Imperial authority. So long as the Holy Roman Empire had been something more than a shadow, the autocratic oecumenical power of the Papacy had been at least partially balanced by the salutary counterweight of a second oecumenical power of the same autocratic order. The downfall and demoralization of the Papacy, which had swiftly followed the ruin of the Hohenstaufen, and which had been shamefully exposed in 'the Babylonish Captivity' (A.D. 1305-77) and in the Great Schism (A.D. 1378-1417),¹ had made it abundantly clear that an uncontrolled Papal autocracy in the Western *Respublica Christiana* was even more disastrous for the Papacy itself than it was pernicious for the society in which the Papacy was the leading institution. The Conciliar Movement offered a golden opportunity for Papal statesmanship because it aimed at remedying flagrant

¹ For the history of the medieval Papacy as an example of the tragedy of *κόπος-ὑβρις-ἀπῆ* see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512-84, below.

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abuses by moderate measures. Though it was in one aspect an expression of the new Parochialism, it was ready to be content with a measure of devolution within the framework of an undismembered *Respublica Christiana*, and it repudiated the Hussite anticipation of those radical forms of Parochialism which triumphed eventually, a hundred years later. Again, though the stimulus by which the Conciliar Movement was evoked was the scandal of persistent Papal misconduct, the moderate majority of its supporters were ready to see the Christian Republic endowed with a parliamentary constitution without demanding that the Pope should cease to be its executive head.

The settlement which was here proffered to, and refused by, the one surviving oecumenical authority in Western Christendom was in essence the same as that which, in the parochial kingdom of England, had already been accepted by the Crown after a few discouraging experiments in kicking against the pricks. In the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the English Crown had come to realize that, on a long view, it would be strengthening and not weakening its own position by taking Parliament into partnership; and by the opening of the fifteenth century the Papacy—which had lately been experiencing as great disasters and humiliations as an English King Richard II—might have learnt the same lesson as the English Crown through the wisdom that is born of suffering.¹ Instead, the popes who encountered the Conciliar Movement chose, one after another, to harden their hearts; and this Papal intransigence was disastrously successful. It succeeded in its purpose of bringing the Conciliar Movement to naught; and for this barren success it paid the disastrous price of throwing away a last opportunity for adjustment² and thereby condemning Western Christendom to be rent by a violent internal discord between its ancient oecumenical heritage and its new parochial proclivities.

This discord has had issue in a melancholy crop of revolutions and enormities.

The revolutionary solution of the conflict between Parochialism and an Oecumenical Church is not only to be seen in that overt revolution by which, in the Protestant parts of the Western Chris-

¹ Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 177–8, quoted in I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 169, footnote 1, and II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 298, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), in the present volume, p. 584, V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 78, V. C (i) (d) 4, vol. v, p. 416, footnote 3, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 275, below.

² If the Papacy had sincerely welcomed the Conciliar Movement and had loyally co-operated with it, then Western Christendom in the Modern Age might perhaps have succeeded in reconciling a traditional unity with a new parochial consciousness by transforming the Papal imperium, without any revolutionary break, into something like that historic 'amphictyony' which succeeded in some degree in holding together the parochially minded city-states of Hellas by keeping alive their common feeling of attachment to the two oecumenical religious centres at Delphi and Thermopylae.

tian World, the authority of the Papacy has been officially replaced by that of the individual conscience privately interpreting the Scriptures. The power which has been taken from the Papacy in Protestant countries, in order to be transferred in theory to this new authority, has in practice passed in large measure into the hands of the Parochial State, and, in passing, has helped to create the modern Western institution of Parochial Sovereignty. In the modern Western World, however, Parochial Sovereignty has never been a monopoly of the Protestant countries. One source of it, as we have seen,¹ has been the constellation of Italian city-states which arose, before Protestantism was heard of, in a part of Western Christendom in which Protestantism has never gained a footing. And, in the Transalpine World at the beginning of the Modern Age, Parochial Sovereignty raised its head in the Protestant and the Catholic countries simultaneously. This fact points to the truth that the revolutionary solution of the conflict between Parochialism and an Oecumenical Church is not only to be seen in the drastic revolution of Protestantism, but is also to be detected in the less sensational changes which have come over the relations between Church and State in countries that have remained within the Catholic fold. In the modern Catholic World these changes have been carried through sometimes amicably, under the mask of concordats, and sometimes acrimoniously, as in France and Italy between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the outbreak of the General War of 1914-18, or (belatedly) in Mexico since the outbreak of the revolution of 1910; but in some form and in some degree they have taken place in a majority of the leading Catholic countries. 'Libera Chiesa in Libero Stato'² and 'État Laique' are the characteristic formulae of the neo-pagan nationalists in *partibus Catholicorum* who have taken the offensive in carrying this revolution out; and some of the most high-handedly revolutionary apostles of 'the totalitarian state'—from a Hapsburg Joseph II and a Corsican Napoleon I to a Romagnol Mussolini and an Upper Austrian Hitler—are the nurslings of purely Catholic environments.

The enormities which have arisen out of the conflict, in so far as it has not been resolved either violently through revolution or

¹ See p. 215, footnote 2, with references, above.

² This formula was employed by Cavour in his speech on the Roman Question before the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the 27th March, 1861, but it was not invented on this occasion nor, apparently, by Cavour himself. It already occurs in a letter of the 20th November, 1860, which was written to Cavour from Rome by Pantaleoni enclosing a list of conditions to be offered as the basis for an arrangement between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Italy. The first point on this list is: 'Si proclamerà il principio di Libera Chiesa in Libero Stato.' Against this point Cavour wrote 'Approvo' before returning the draft to Pantaleoni on the 28th November. These texts are to be found in *La Questione Romana negli Anni 1860-1866: Carteggio del Conte di Cavour con D. Pantaleoni, C. Passaglia, O. Vimercati* (Bologna 1929, a cura della Commissione Reale Editrice).

peacefully through adjustment, have been of two kinds. On the one hand, in a number of countries which broke away altogether from the Roman ecclesiastical connexion by turning Protestant, the modern Parochial Sovereign Power was not content with emancipating itself from the Papal domination in the political sphere, but attempted, at the same time, to substitute itself for the Papacy in the ecclesiastical sphere by usurping, within its own narrow frontiers, the 'hierocratic' authority which the medieval Papacy had claimed—and had more or less effectively exercised—on an oecumenical range which had extended over the whole of Western Christendom. On the other hand the Roman See itself, as well as a number of bishoprics within the Transalpine domain of the Holy Roman Empire—e.g. Mainz and Trier and Köln and Liège and Salzburg and Münster—stooped to the level of their secular adversaries by entering the political arena and assuming the prerogatives of the modern Parochial Sovereign State on a petty scale.

The incongruity of these petty ecclesiastical principalities with the oecumenical imperium of the Roman Catholic Church, and the incompatibility of their mundane preoccupations with the Church's 'other-worldly' mission, are so flagrant that, in the eyes of a non-Catholic observer, this temporal power wears the appearance of a grievous incubus; and, whatever may be the official view of the Roman Church herself, the non-Catholic will be inclined to regard it as a signal gain for her that the Transalpine prince-bishoprics have been extinguished once for all through being sacrificed to the territorial greed of the secular Powers in the transactions that took place between the secular states of the Holy Roman Empire and the envoys of the French Republic during the Congress of Rastadt between A.D. 1797 and A.D. 1799, and that the Papal State in Central Italy temporarily suffered the same fate, first when it was partitioned between the Napoleonic French Empire and the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, and secondly when it was annexed to the present Kingdom of Italy in successive stages between A.D. 1860 and A.D. 1870. On the same showing, the rehabilitation of the parochial secular sovereignty of the Pope, within the minute domain of the State of the Vatican City, in virtue of the Lateran Treaty of A.D. 1929,¹ can only be regarded as having been, in itself and in principle, an error of Papal statesmanship, however sincerely the non-Catholic observer may admire the courage and perseverance and ingenuity which were displayed by Pope Pius XI and by Signor Mussolini alike in carrying their negotiations through to a successful conclusion, and however heartily

¹ See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1929* (Oxford 1930, University Press), pp. 422-78.

he may rejoice at the consequent suspension of a feud between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Italy which, for three generations, had tormented the consciences of millions of Italians who happened to be both devout Catholics and patriotic citizens. Nevertheless the non-Catholic must regret that, at a time when, to all appearance, the Parochial Sovereign State has become the chief obstacle to human welfare and indeed the arch-enemy of the Human Race, the Pope should have ranged himself, even if only formally,¹ on the side of this pernicious institutional anachronism by successfully reasserting his own title to Parochial Sovereignty, instead of being content to remain on the side of the angels in virtue of the fortunate misfortune which had deprived him of an invidious earthly kingdom and had thrust upon him, instead, the *beau rôle* of 'the prisoner of the Vatican'.

As for the usurpation of the medieval Papacy's 'hierocratic' authority by Protestant parochial sovereigns, it has produced the fantastic doctrine of 'the Divine Right of Kings' which is still working havoc in the Western World in the grim shape of the pagan worship of sovereign national states. This doctrine found its corollary in the field of international affairs in the monstrosity cynical formula '*Cujus Regio Ejus Religio*', upon which the first truce in the long-drawn-out and ever more inclusive Western Wars of Religion was based in A.D. 1555.² The practical outcome of the doctrine and the corollary, taken together, in the Protestant countries has been the replacement of the repudiated oecumenical Catholic Church, one and indivisible, by a plurality of parochial 'Churches', each of which is borne upon the establishment of some particular parochial sovereign state, is subject *de facto*, in matters spiritual as well as temporal, to the sovereign power in the state to which it belongs, and is confined in its membership to such Christians as happen to live within this particular state's frontiers. In

¹ Pope Pius XI's own point of view in regard to the reassertion of the Pope's territorial sovereignty is set forth in an address which he delivered to the parish priests of Rome on the 11th February, 1929, at the moment when the Lateran agreements were being signed:

'A true and proper and real territorial sovereignty (there being no such thing in the World, at least down to the present, as a true and proper sovereignty which is not embodied in a definitely territorial form) [is] a status which is self-evidently necessary and due to One who, in virtue of the divine mandate and the divine representation with which He is invested, is unable to be the subject of any sovereignty on Earth. . . . We must have that quantum of territory that just suffices as a support for the attribute of sovereignty itself, that quantum of territory without which sovereignty could not exist because it would not have a place where to rest the sole of its foot.'

This view of the indispensability of territorial sovereignty for the Papacy seems to have been derived by Pope Pius XI from a passage in the memoirs of Talleyrand which is quoted in Toynbee and Boulter, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

² This formula, which was adopted in A.D. 1555 at Augsburg, was already implicit in the Recess of the Diet of Speier which had laid down in A.D. 1526 that in matters of faith each Prince should so conduct himself as he could answer for his behaviour to God and the Emperor.

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 the freest flight of imagination it would be difficult to conceive of a sharper contradiction of the essence of Christianity—and the essence of all the other historic 'higher religions' as well¹—than is embodied in this monstrous product of the impact of Parochialism upon the Western Christian Church in the Modern Age of our Western history.²

12. *The Impact of the Sense of Unity upon Religion*

The 'higher religions' with a mission to all Mankind are relatively recent arrivals on the mundane scene of human history. They are not only unknown in primitive societies; they have not arisen even among societies in process of civilization until after certain civilizations have broken down and have travelled far along the path of disintegration. It is in response to the challenge presented by the disintegrations of civilizations that these 'higher religions' have made their appearance on Earth.³ The religious institutions of civilizations of the unrelated class,⁴ like those of primitive socie-

¹ For the 'higher religions' and their embodiment in would-be universal churches see V. C (i) (c) 2, *passim*, vol. v, and Part VII, below.

² It may be noted that this Protestant enormity of 'established' parochial churches has, in most Protestant countries, been mitigated by a subsequent revolution whereby part, or even the whole, of the local Protestant community has shaken itself free from the local state's control. In the United States—which did not acquire its sovereign independence until a hundred years after the beginning of the modern Western Age of Toleration in matters of religious allegiance, practice, and belief—there has never been an established church; and a complete separation of Church and State has been the régime under which both Protestant and Catholic American citizens have lived from the beginning. In older Protestant states, like England and Scotland, the original established Protestant Church has been maintained, but its membership has been depleted by the foundation of a number of local free Protestant Churches side by side with it; and at the time of revising this chapter for the press in A.D. 1938 it looked as though similar effects were likely to be produced by similar causes in Germany as a result of the pressure to which the German Protestants were being subjected by the rulers of the Third Reich. In regaining their freedom from the control of a parochial secular government, these Protestant Nonconformists have recaptured one of the two great advantages which the Catholics have never lost. Yet these free Protestant Churches still remain at a disadvantage on the whole, for, while they have escaped from the political servitude which is part of the enormity of the 'established' Protestant Churches, they have bought this liberation at the price of carrying Parochialism to a still farther extreme. The classic example of the fissiparous tendency which has been the bane of the free Protestant churches is afforded by the history of Methodism during the sixty-six years immediately following the death of the originator of the movement, John Wesley, in A.D. 1791. It is noteworthy, however, that, during the eighty-two years ending in 1938, the history of Methodism was made happier by a persistent tendency towards reunion which presents a striking and encouraging contrast to the prevalence of the opposite tendency during the preceding chapter. Among the Methodists of Great Britain the reunion was achieved by stages in 1857, 1907, and 1932; among those of the United States it was achieved in 1938-9; among those of Canada it was achieved in 1883. More significant still was the merger, in 1925, of the Canadian Methodists with the Canadian Presbyterians and Congregationalists in a new 'United Church of Canada'. (For all these events see Piette, M.: *John Wesley in the Evolution of Protestantism* (English translation, London 1937, Sheed & Ward), pp. 393-408.) If in the twentieth century the free Protestant churches were truly on the road towards reconciling freedom with unity, their prospects were bright.

³ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-7, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, *passim*, vol. v, pp. 58-194, together with Part VII, below.

⁴ For the classification of civilizations into an 'unrelated' and a 'related' class see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 129-33, above.

ties, resemble the 'established churches' of our modern Western Protestant countries (which are, in fact, reversions to a primitive type) in being bound up with the secular institutions of parochial communities. Through these parochial associations Primitive Religion is bounded by the narrow vision, and implicated in the tribal feuds, which are characteristic of parochial communities in all times and places. But these positive limitations and blemishes of Primitive Religion have one important offsetting negative advantage: they foster a spirit of 'Live and let live' in the relations between one primitive tribal worship and another. Under primitive social conditions the plurality of mutually independent parochial communities is taken for granted as a permanent state of affairs; the possibility of their consolidation into a universal state by one or other of the two alternative methods of voluntary pacific co-operation or violent conquest remains undreamt-of; and since the gods of each and every primitive parochial community are regarded as members of its social circle on much the same footing as its human and animal members, the moral acceptance of a social situation in which a number of separate parochial communities are living together side by side carries with it the moral acceptance of a plurality of parochial gods—each independent of his or her neighbour and locally master or mistress of his or her own domain in perpetuity.

In this social condition human souls are blind to the unity and ubiquity and omnipotence of the Godhead; but, precisely on that account, they are immune from the temptation of succumbing to the sin of intolerance in their relations with other human beings who happen to worship this Godhead under different forms and titles. It is one of the keenest ironies of human history that the very illumination of human souls which has brought into Religion a perception of the Unity of God and of the consequent brotherhood of Mankind¹ should at the same time have made these souls prone to fall into the deadly sins of intolerance and persecution for Religion's sake. The explanation is, of course, that the idea of Unity in its application to Religion impresses the spiritual pioneers who first stumble upon it in this context with so overwhelming a conviction of its transcendent importance that they are apt to plunge into any short cut which promises to hasten the translation of their idea into reality by enabling them to impose it upon their fellow men.²

¹ For the sense of unity which is one of the fruits of the harrowing experience of living in a disintegrating society, see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 1-49, below.

² The imperious impulse which commands the pioneers to lead their fellow men along the trail that they have blazed by their individual enterprise, and the expedients to which they are apt to resort in their attempts to obey this 'categorical imperative', have been discussed in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 234-48, above.

This enormity of intolerance and persecution in the cause of Unity has shown its hideous countenance, almost without fail, wherever and whenever a 'higher religion' has been discovered and formulated and preached; and the manifestation of this spirit in the souls of religious innovators arouses it, by a sure contagion, in the souls of their opponents. The lists are set for conflict by the tension which arises, in the nature of the relation, between a creative personality and the uncreative mass of Mankind;¹ and the conflict is most bitter when it is fought on the field of Religion, because this is the most important field of any in the whole range of human life.²

This fanatical temper flared up in the abortive attempt of the Emperor Ikhnaton (*imperabat circa* 1370-1352 B.C.) to impose his vision of Monotheism upon the Egyptiac World.³ The high-handedness of the Imperial prophet and the rancour of the organized priesthood of the old school which successfully frustrated his efforts are both apparent even in the fragmentary record of the encounter that has been recovered by our modern Western archaeologists; and the venom of this conflict has proved so potent that, since the record was unearthed the other day, after having been totally forgotten for at least 1,500 years,⁴ the taint that clings to it has infected the souls of a generation which has no personal stake in the issue. Through this virulent infection dry-minded Western Egyptologists of the twentieth century of the Christian Era have been transfigured into passionate champions or critics of a controversial Egyptiac personality of the fourteenth century B.C.

An equally ardent fanaticism casts its lurid light over the rise and development of Judaism. A savage denunciation of any participation in the worships of the kindred Syriac communities round about is the reverse side of that 'etherialization' of the local worship of Yahweh into a monotheistic religion which was the positive, and immense, spiritual achievement of the Prophets of

¹ See loc. cit.

² The sound of this conflict can be heard echoing even in some of the sayings that are attributed in the Gospels to Jesus: e.g. Matt. x. 34-7 and Luke xii. 49-53; but this militant tone and temper is not, of course, characteristic of the founders of the 'higher religions' and the philosophies. The political career of Muhammad (see III. C (ii) (b), Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 466-72, above) is the exception which proves a rule that the Kingdom of the Prophets is not of This World (John xviii. 36). The contrast which a religious Transfiguration and a philosophic Detachment both alike present to a mundane Futurism and Archaism is examined in V. C (i) (d) 8-11, vol. vi, pp. 49-168, below. The corresponding contrast between different conceptions of the Saviour is examined in V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 175-278, below.

³ For Ikhnaton's enterprise and its failure see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 145-6, above, and V. C (i) (d) (6) (b), Annex, vol. v, pp. 695-6, below.

⁴ Reckoning from the extinction of the Egyptiac cultural tradition, which fell into oblivion between the third and the fifth century of the Christian Era. The question whether Ikhnaton and Alexander may not both have derived their vision of Unity—Alexander independently of Ikhnaton—from the teaching of the priesthood of Amon-Re is raised in V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 246, footnote 5, below.

Israel and Judah; and this violent spirit passed over from speech into action in the militant *émeute* of the Maccabees against the Seleucidae and in the war to the knife between Judaism and Hellenism which was carried on thereafter intermittently—perpetually breaking out again in ever more violent bouts—for the next three centuries, until finally Judaism received ‘the knock-out blow’ from the Roman military arm of a Hellenic universal state under the auspices of Vespasian and Hadrian.¹ So persistently did Judaism turn this forbidding face of its Janus-head towards its Hellenic neighbours that it was possible for a Roman satirist who was a child of the last generation of this secular conflict (Decimus Junius Iuvenalis *scribebat circa* A.D. 100–27) to cite the Jew as a sheer embodiment of anti-sociality and superstition²—in an apparently genuine ignorance of the moral and intellectual sublimity of the religion which had betrayed its Jewish champions into their notorious militancy. In the history of Christianity likewise—both in its internal schisms and in its encounters with alien faiths—we observe the same evil spirit of fanaticism breaking out again and again.

On this showing, the impact of the Sense of Unity upon Religion is apt to beget a spiritual enormity, in the shape of religious intolerance and religious persecution, which may provoke revolution if it is not exorcized by adjustment.

The moral adjustment which meets the case is the recognition and practice of the virtue of Toleration. The right motive for Toleration³ is an intuition that all religions alike, from the highest to the lowest, are quests in search of a single common spiritual goal, so that they do not differ in their aim but merely in the extent of the progress which they are able respectively to make with the aid of their varying lights. This intuition makes it apparent that the propagation of one religion at the expense of other religions through the employment of methods of barbarism, on the ground that the religion in whose name the persecution is carried on is a religion of a higher order, is a moral contradiction in terms, since oppression and injustice and cruelty are negations of the very essence of spiritual sublimity.

In at least one noteworthy historical case such tolerance has been

¹ For the lapse of Judaism into militancy see further V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 68–9; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 657–9; and V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 120–3, below.

² See Juvenal: *Satires*, No. xiv, ll. 96–104. Cf. Horace: *Satires*, Book I, Satire v, ll. 100–1.

³ For the other and less worthy motives which have inspired, in our modern Western World, a toleration which asserted itself before the end of the seventeenth century and has been losing ground since the beginning of the nineteenth, see the present chapter, pp. 227–8, as well as IV. C (iii) (b) 3, pp. 142–3 and 150, and IV. C (iii) (b) 4, pp. 184–5, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 669–72, and V. C (ii) (δ), vol. vi, pp. 316–18, below.

enjoined by a prophet upon his followers on this highest ground. The Prophet Muhammad prescribed the religious toleration of Jews and Christians who had made their political submission to the secular arm of Islam, and he gave this ruling expressly on the ground that these two non-Muslim religious communities, like the Muslims themselves, were 'People of the Book'. It is significant of the relatively tolerant spirit which animated a Primitive Islam that, when the Arab conquests brought the Zoroastrians of Iran, as well as the Christians of Syria and Egypt and Mesopotamia and 'Irāq, under Islamic domination, the privilege originally reserved for the Jews and Christians was tacitly extended to the Zoroastrians—though these were not 'People of the Book' in the strict technical sense of believers in the inspiration of the Jewish or Judaistic Scriptures.¹ In tolerating the religion of their Zoroastrian subjects the Primitive Muslim conquerors stretched a point of theological exegesis because they recognized that in fact Zoroastrianism was a 'higher religion' of the same order as Judaism and Christianity and Islam itself, and that therefore any attempt on their part to stamp Zoroastrianism out by force would result, in proportion to the extent of its material success, in debasing and defaming the Islam in whose name the persecution would be conducted.

Less worthy motives than Muhammad's—though perhaps not less worthy than those of his Umayyad successors²—appear to have been mainly responsible for the interludes of toleration which punctuate the annals of intolerance in the history of Christianity.

The temporary toleration of the surviving non-Christian religions of the Hellenic World within the boundaries of the Roman Empire, side by side with Christianity, under the rule of Christian Emperors between A.D. 311/13 and A.D. 382/92, and the corresponding toleration of Christianity, side by side with an abortively reorganized Paganism, from A.D. 361 to A.D. 363, under the rule of the Emperor Julian,³ was manifestly not so much inspired by conviction as dictated by policy. This mutual forbearance was, indeed, little more than a political recognition of the social fact that, during those years, the material strength of the Christians and the non-Christians in the Roman Empire was approximately equal, so that, for the time being, neither party could attempt to suppress the other with any hope of success. The Christians abandoned the policy of

¹ The solitary reference to the Zoroastrians in the Qur'ān is quoted in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 674, footnote 2, below.

² For the fiscal motive that seems to have moved Muhammad's sceptical-minded Umayyad successors to abide, in the matter of tolerating the non-Muslim 'People of the Book', by the precept of a prophet in whose divine inspiration they perhaps had little or no belief in their heart of hearts, see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, p. 630, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 674-7, below.

³ For Julian's abortive Neoplatonic Church see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 681-3, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 222-3, below.

toleration with alacrity as soon as they became conscious that, in material strength, they had acquired a decisive superiority¹—just as, in the preceding bout of the struggle, the anti-Christians, on their part, had persisted in a policy of persecution until it had become plain, even to the headstrong and obstinate soul of a Galerius, that the Christian Church was now powerful enough to hold its own against any degree of material pressure which the Imperial Government could apply.²

The intolerance to which the Christians abandoned themselves before the end of the fourth century of the Christian Era persisted in Western Christendom for thirteen hundred years; and it did not loose its grip upon Western souls until the iniquity of the fathers had been visited upon the children. The atrocities which were inflicted in the name of the Western Church, during the long centuries of its unity and omnipotence, upon Cathars in Languedoc³ and Jews and Muslims in Castile⁴ and Pagans in the Balticum,⁵ were more than avenged within the span of 150 years which followed the first collision between the Western Christian Church and the modern Western spirit of Parochialism.⁶ Overtaken by this disruptive movement within its own bosom, with the old spirit of intolerance still reigning in its heart, Western Christendom proceeded to inflict upon its own body social the treatment which it had been wont to mete out to non-Christian minorities. Internecine Wars of Religion between Catholic and Protestant Christians ravaged the Western World from the outbreak of the Reformation until the latter part of the seventeenth century; and these wars were conducted with the ferocity that is peculiar to fratricidal conflicts.⁷ This great blot upon our Western Civilization in the early Modern Age presents (like our latter-day Wars of Democracy and Industrialism) an extraordinary contrast to the rapid yet sure-footed contemporary progress of the same society in other directions; and the fact that religious intolerance, in this time and place, was not merely an absolute evil in itself but was also a glaring anachronism no doubt accounts in part for the unprecedented excesses to which it ran in this latest chapter of its history in the West.

The period of religious toleration upon which our modern Western Christendom entered about the third quarter of the seven-

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 8 (8), vol. vi, p. 89, below.

² See V. C (i) (d) 3, vol. v, pp. 407-9, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, p. 650, below.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (8), p. 369, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (8), Annex, pp. 652-6, below.

⁴ For the treatment of the Jews under Christian rule in the Iberian Peninsula see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 243-8, above.

⁵ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 172-4, above.

⁶ See IV. C (iii) (b) 11, pp. 218-22, above.

⁷ See IV. C (iii) (b) 3, pp. 142-3, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 668-71, and V. C (ii) (8), vol. vi, pp. 315 and 318-19, below.

teenth century of the Christian Era came unpardonably late, and, when it did come at last, it seems to have been inaugurated in a still more cynical mood¹ than the religious toleration in the fourth-century Roman Empire. In that quarter of the seventeenth century the Catholic and Protestant factions in the Western Church, which had been carrying on an embittered religious warfare all over the face of the Western World for the past century and a half, rather suddenly abandoned the struggle (and this almost simultaneously in every province of Western Christendom)—not, apparently, because they had become convicted of sin and convinced that the propagation of a religion by force of arms was a crime against the spiritual cause which they were seeking thus perversely to serve, but rather on the impulse of an overwhelming fit of disillusionment. The warring religious factions seem to have realized at last, at this date, that their forces were so evenly matched, and that the prospect of any substantial change in their balance of power was so slight, that neither of them had the remotest prospect of gaining a decisive victory over the other even if the conflict were to be prolonged in *saecula saeculorum*; and at the same time they seem to have become aware that they no longer cared sufficiently for the questions of theological doctrine and ecclesiastical government which were at issue to be willing to contemplate any further sacrifices of their own personal comfort for the sake of making their own particular views on these subjects prevail. The régime of religious toleration which our immediate forebears enjoyed for some two centuries and a half, and which we begin to see slipping away from us to-day², was originally established upon no more solid a moral basis than an enlightened repudiation of 'enthusiasm' (a seventeenth-century and twentieth-century virtue which was an eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century vice).³

Nevertheless Toleration, from whatever motive it may derive, is the sovereign and essential antidote to a fanaticism which the impact of the Sense of Unity upon Religion is apt to breed; and, when this prosaic safeguard is lacking or is lost, the nemesis is a choice between a revolutionary revulsion against Religion itself and a hideous triumph of the fanatical spirit. The revolutionary alternative is exemplified in Lucretius's '*Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*',⁴ in Voltaire's '*Écrasez l'infâme*',⁵ and in Gambetta's '*Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi*'.⁶ The triumph of fanaticism is exemplified in the exploits of the Jewish Sicarii—the 'gangsters'

¹ For this mood see also the other passages cited on p. 225, footnote 3, above.

² See V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 316-21, below.

³ See IV. C (iii) (b) 3, p. 145, above.

⁴ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book I, l. 101.

⁵ A frequent colophon in Voltaire's letters.

⁶ Speech in the Chamber of Deputies at Paris on the 4th May, 1877.

of the Zealot persuasion who bear the principal responsibility for the horrors of the great Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70—and in the history of the Spanish Inquisition.

13. *The Impact of Religiosity upon Caste*

The Lucretian and Voltairean view that Religion in itself is an evil—and perhaps the fundamental evil in human life—might be supported by citing, from the annals of Indic and Hindu history, the sinister influence which Religion has ascertainably and uncontestedly exercised, in the lives of two civilizations, upon the institution of Caste.

This institution, which consists in the social segregation of two or more geographically intermingled groups of human beings or social insects, is apt to establish itself wherever and whenever one community makes itself master of another community without being able or willing either on the one hand to exterminate the subject community or on the other hand to assimilate it into the tissues of its own body social.¹ In the recent history of our own Western World a caste-division has arisen in the United States between the dominant element of White race and European origin and the subject Negro element (whom, *ex hypothesi*, their masters had no desire to exterminate, since they deliberately imported them from Africa as slaves). A similar caste-division has arisen between the two corresponding elements in the population of the Union of South Africa (where the White intruders would find it impossible to exterminate the native African Negroes even if they wished to commit the crime, since, even within the narrow borders of the Union, the Negroes now outnumber the Whites in the proportion of more than three to one, with the whole of Black Africa ranged behind them from the Kalahari Desert to the Sahara and from the Limpopo to the White Nile). In the sub-continent of India the institution of Caste seems to have arisen out of the irruption of the Eurasian Nomad Aryas into the former domain of the so-called 'Indus Culture' in the course of the first half of the second millennium B.C.;² and in this Indian case the resulting situation has been still more unhappy than it is in the two cases just cited; for in India there was not only an original diversity of race between the dominant caste and the subject caste—a diversity which has continued to produce its estranging effect socially and morally, long after it has been physically obliterated—but the relative material power of

¹ For an examination of this institution of Caste see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 216-20, and Part III A, vol. iii, pp. 22-107, above.

² For the Aryas and the part which they played in the post-Sumeric Völkerwanderung, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104-6, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 388-91, above. For the Indus Culture and its relation to the Sumeric Civilization see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 107-8, with Annex III, above.

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the two castes was in inverse ratio to their relative civilization. The Aryan conquerors of the Indus Basin in the second millennium B.C. were barbarians, like the 'Dorian' conquerors of Crete and the Lombard conquerors of Italy,¹ while their victims, like the Minoans and the Romans, were the heirs of a once great civilization.

It will be seen that this institution of Caste has no essential connexion with Religion. In the United States and the Union of South Africa, where the Negroes have abandoned their ancestral religions and have adopted the Christianity of the culturally superior Whites, the divisions between churches cut right across the divisions between races (though it is true that the Black and White members of each church are segregated from each other in their public worship as in all their other social activities). In the Indian case, on the other hand, we may conjecture that from the beginning the castes were distinguished by certain differences of religious practice, since the Aryan intruders who constituted the dominant caste were presumably still in the primitive social stage at which the religious and the secular side of life are not yet distinguished from one another, and at which the possession of a distinct and separate life as a community consequently implies the practice of a distinct and separate religion as well. It is evident, however, that this hypothetical religious ingredient in the original form of the local Indian version of the institution of Caste must have been accentuated when the Indic Civilization developed the religious bent which it has bequeathed to a Hindu Society that is related to it by 'affiliation'.² It is further evident that this impact of Religiosity upon the institution of Caste in India must have aggravated the banefulness of the institution very seriously. Caste is always on the verge of being a social enormity; but when Caste is 'keyed up' by receiving a religious interpretation and a religious sanction in a society which is hag-ridden by Religiosity, then the latent enormity of the institution is bound to rankle into a morbid social growth of poisonous tissue and monstrous proportions.

In the actual event the impact of Religiosity upon Caste in India has begotten the unparalleled social abuse of 'Untouchability'; and since there has never been any effective move to abolish or even mitigate 'Untouchability' on the part of the Brahmans—the hieratic caste which has become master of the ceremonies of the whole caste-system and has assigned to itself the highest place in it—the enormity survives, except in so far as it has been assailed by revolution.

¹ For the social effect of the 'Dorian' conquest of Crete and the Lombard conquest of Italy see II. D (iii), Annex, vol. ii, pp. 396-8, above.

² For the religious bent of the Indic and Hindu civilizations see III. C (iii), vol. iii, pp. 384-5 and 388, above.

The earliest known revolts against Caste are those of Mahavira the founder of Jainism (*occubuit prae* 500 B.C.) and Siddhārtha Gautama, the founder of Buddhism (*vivebat circa* 567-487 B.C.): two creative personalities who were non-Brahmans themselves and who ignored the established barriers of Caste in recruiting the bands of disciples whom they gathered round them to wrestle with the moral problems of the Indic 'Time of Troubles'.¹ If either Buddhism or Jainism had succeeded in captivating the Indic World, then conceivably the institution of Caste might have been sloughed off with the rest of the social debris of a disintegrating Indic Society, and an affiliated Hindu Civilization might have started life free from this incubus. As it turned out, however, the role of universal church in the last chapter of the Indic decline and fall was played not by Buddhism but by Hinduism—a parvenu archaistic syncretism of things new and old;² and one of the old things which Hinduism resuscitated was Caste. Not content with resuscitating this old abuse, it embroidered upon it. The Hindu Civilization has been handicapped from the outset by a considerably heavier burden of Caste (a veritable load of *karma*) than the burden that once weighed upon its predecessor; and accordingly the series of revolts against Caste has run over from Indic into Hindu history.

In the Hindu Age these revolts have no longer taken the form of creative philosophical movements of indigenous origin like Buddhism or Jainism, but have expressed themselves in definite secessions from Hinduism under the attraction of some alien religious system. Some of these secessions have been led by Hindu reformers who have founded new churches in order to combine an expurgated version of Hinduism with certain elements borrowed from alien sources. Thus, for example, Kabīr (*vivebat saeculo quinto decimo aevi Christiani*) and the founder of Sikhism, Nanak (*vivebat* A.D. 1469-1538), created their syncretisms out of a combination between Hinduism and Islam, while Ram Mohan Roy (*vivebat* A.D. 1772-1833) created the Brahmo Samāj out of a combination between Hinduism and Christianity.³ It is noteworthy that, in all these three syncretisms alike, the institution of Caste is one of the features of Hinduism that have been rejected. In other cases the secessionists have not stopped at any half-way house but have shaken the dust of Hinduism off their feet altogether and have entered outright into the Islamic or the Christian fold; and such conversions have taken place on the largest scale in districts in which

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 87, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 131, below.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 84-7, above, and V. (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 137-8, below.

³ For these syncretisms between Hinduism and certain non-Hindu religions which have impinged upon the Hindu World, see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 106, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 537, below.

there had previously been a high proportion of members of low castes or depressed classes in the local Hindu population. The classic instance is the latter-day religious history of Eastern Bengal, where the descendants of former barbarians who had been admitted just within the pale of Hinduism on sufferance, with an extremely low status, have become converts to Islam *en masse*.

This is the revolutionary retort to the enormity of 'Untouchability' which has been evoked by the impact of Religiosity upon Caste; and, as the masses of the population of India are progressively stirred by the economic and intellectual and moral ferment of Westernization, the trickle of conversions among the outcasts seems likely to swell into a flood, unless the abolition of the stigma of 'Untouchability' is achieved at the eleventh hour by the non-Brahman majority of the Caste-Hindus themselves, in the teeth of Brahman opposition, under the leadership of the *Banya Mahatma Gandhi*.

14. *The Impact of Civilization upon the Division of Labour*

We have observed¹ that the institution of the Division of Labour, like the faculty of mimesis, is a common feature of all human societies, so that its presence or absence is not one of the distinguishing marks between primitive societies and civilizations. At the same time the mutation of a primitive society into a civilization must tend to alter the social effect of the Division of Labour in this society's life, because, as we have also observed already,² this mutation consists very largely in a reorientation of the faculty of mimesis away from the elders who embody the society's traditional social heritage towards creative personalities whose mission is not to conserve but to innovate. It will be seen that in a primitive society in the Yin-state, in which mimesis acts as a standardizing agency, mimesis and the Division of Labour serve as correctives to one another, whereas in a society which has embarked upon the enterprise of Civilization this same faculty of mimesis, which is now reoriented towards the social pioneers, becomes in its turn a differentiating agency which reinforces the differentiating effect of the Division of Labour instead of mitigating it.

Thus the impact of Civilization upon the Division of Labour tends in a general way to accentuate the division to a degree at which it threatens not merely to bring in diminishing social returns but actually to become anti-social in its working; and this effect is produced in the lives of the creative minority and the uncreative majority alike.³ The creators are tempted into esotericism, while

¹ In Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 189-91, above.

² See Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 191-2, and IV. C (iii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 127-8, above.

³ For this classification of the members of a growing civilization see III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 234-48, above.

the rank-and-file are pushed into lop-sidedness; and both these misdevelopments lead to the cultural impoverishment—and, at extreme lengths, to the cultural atrophy—of the society as a whole.¹

Esotericism is a symptom of failure in the careers of creative individuals or creative minorities which we have encountered a number of times already in the course of this Study. It is an accentuation and perversion and perpetuation of the preliminary movement of withdrawal in the creative rhythm of Withdrawal-and-Return. The effect of this is to check the flow of the rhythm before it has entered upon the final movement which is its whole purpose and its only true fulfilment; and this stultification of a would-be creative act revenges itself both upon the withdrawing individual or minority that fails to return and upon the majority that never reaps the harvest of a return to compensate for the cost of a withdrawal. The penalty which overtakes the truant individual or minority that fails to re-enter into communion with the mass is the forfeiture of the field of action which is an indispensable condition for activity and therefore for life itself,² so that esotericism is equivalent to a self-imposed sentence of Life-in-Death; and this penalty is equally inexorable whether the esotericism be conscious and deliberate, in the spirit of the Egyptiac Pyramid-Builders³ and the Hindu Brahmins,⁴ or unconscious and unintentional, in the spirit of the free male citizens of the city-states of the Hellenic World in the fifth century B.C.,⁵ or conscious but unintentional, in the spirit of the pioneers of Democracy and Industrialism in our modern Western World;⁶ or conscious but contrary to intention, in the spirit of Peter the Great.⁷ As for the penalty which is imposed upon the mass when a minority succumbs to esotericism, it is a permanent depression of status and standards⁸ under the incubus of an aloof minority which weighs upon the rest of Society without giving it any active return for its passive support. This is the condition of the Egyptiac peasantry in and after the Age of the Pyramid-Builders;⁹ the condition of the Orthodox Christian peasantry in Eastern and

¹ On this point see Schweitzer, A.: *The Decay and Restoration of Civilization* (London 1923, Black), p. 20.

² For the conception of 'fields' see III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 223-30, above.

³ See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 212-15, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, pp. 408-9, below.

⁴ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 240, and IV. C (iii) (b) 13, in the present volume, pp. 230-2, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 421, footnote 3, below.

⁵ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 239-40, above.

⁶ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 241-2, above.

⁷ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 278-83, above.

⁸ 'The Nation has thriven long upon mutilated humanity. Men, the fairest creations of God, came out of the National manufactory in huge numbers as war-making and money-making puppets' (Tagore, Sir R.: *Nationalism* (London 1917, Macmillan), p. 44).

⁹ See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 213-15, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, pp. 408-10 and 418-23, below.

Central Anatolia after the successful evocation of an 'East Roman' ghost of the Roman Empire in Orthodox Christendom in the eighth century of the Christian Era;¹ the condition of the Orthodox Christian peasantry in Russia after the imposition of a Westernized superstructure upon Russian Orthodox Christendom by Peter the Great;² the condition of the slaves and the women in the Hellenic Society of the fifth century B.C.;³ the condition of the low castes and the outcasts in the Hindu World;⁴ and the partial condition (at the least unfavourable estimate) of the rank-and-file of our own Western Society to-day.⁵ This situation is a social danger-signal; for it has only to persist and to deteriorate in order to turn the esoteric minority into a dominant minority and the depressed majority into a morally alienated proletariat in a mood to secede; and we have seen that the secession of a proletariat from a dominant minority is the surest symptom of social disintegration.⁶

These are the penalties which esotericism entails; but there is also a risk that the creative individual or minority, in an anxious determination to steer clear of Scylla, may fall unawares into Charybdis; for, in their efforts to bring the uncreative rank-and-file into line with them by resorting to the primitive social drill of mimesis,⁷ they may succeed in regimenting their fellow men, yet produce this effect upon them only at the cost of distorting their natural harmonious development and deforming them into lop-sidedness.

The social problem that awaits the creator when he duly returns from his temporary withdrawal into a renewed communion with the mass of his fellows is the problem of raising a number of ordinary human souls to the higher level that has been attained by the creator himself; and, as soon as he grapples with this task, he is confronted with the apparent fact that many, and perhaps most, of the rank-and-file of his own society in his own generation are individually incapable of living on this higher level with all their heart and with all their soul and with all their strength. In this situation he may be tempted to try a short cut and to resort to the device of raising some single faculty in these ordinary souls to the higher level, without bothering about the whole personality. This means, *ex hypothesi*, the forcing of a human being into a lop-sided development;

¹ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, pp. 72-3, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 395-9, and Part X, below.

² See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 200-2, and III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 278-83, above.

³ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 239-40, above.

⁴ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 240, and IV. C (iii) (b) 13, in the present volume, pp. 229-32, above.

⁵ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 241-2, above.

⁶ On this point see I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-2; I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-62; and IV. C (iii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 119-33, above; and Part V. B, vol. v, pp. 11-14, below.

⁷ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 245-8, and IV. C (iii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 119-33, above.

and in practice the lop-sidedness is apt to be extreme because, unhappily, the more trivial the faculty selected for hypertrophy, the less difficult it is to produce a superficially impressive material result.

Such results are most readily obtainable on the plane of mechanical technique, since, of all the elements in any given culture, its mechanical aptitudes are the easiest to isolate and to detach and to communicate.¹ On this plane it is not so difficult to train human beings whose souls are on the primitive level to perform activities—or to contribute their mite to a mechanical co-ordination of activities—by the trick of mimesis, even though they could never have created these techniques out of their own unaided resources. In this fashion a primitive Negro, taken out of a Tropical African forest, can be made into an effective engine-driver or machine-gunner, though he and his fellows would never have invented a gun or a locomotive, or even have dreamt of the possibility of such machines, if their life had not been turned upside down by White intruders with a mastery of the modern apparatus of the Western Civilization. And if this is true of the outsiders who have been swept into the meshes of the expanding network of our Western economic system, it is also true of the vast majority of the indigenous workers of the Western World; for in the present 'fool-proof' stage of our Machine Age our workers are being reduced in ever-increasing numbers to the role of mere mechanical executives²—when they are lucky enough to escape being replaced altogether by some totally inanimate machine and being thrown out upon the human scrap-heap of unemployment. More than that, we must recognize, on a candid view, that this type of a deformedly lop-sided primitive human creature who is the victim of a summary and superficial method of bringing the rank-and-file into line is not specially characteristic of the masses; it is also to be found far up the social hierarchy of our modern Western Society in classes which are conventionally regarded, and which unquestioningly regard themselves, not at all as victims of the rhythm of social growth but rather as its presiding geniuses and its deserving beneficiaries. Not a few of the prophets of our modern Western Democracy and the inventors of our modern Western Industrialism, and certainly a large number of the politicians and the business men who have appropriated and exploited the genuine pioneers' achievements, have been actually eminent in letters or in science

¹ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 151-3, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 199-201, below.

² 'The West has been systematically petrifying her moral nature in order to lay a solid foundation for her gigantic abstractions of efficiency. She has all along been starving the life of the personal man into that of the professional' (Tagore, Sir R.: *Nationalism* (London 1917, Macmillan), p. 33).

or in politics or in business alone, while they have shown themselves vulgarly puny in their faculty for faith and love and the other spiritual expressions of Human Nature at its highest.

We have come across this kind of lop-sidedness in this Study already at an earlier point, in our examination of the response to the challenge of penalization which is made by penalized minorities.¹ We have observed that the tyrannical and malignant exclusion of these minorities, by *force majeure*, from certain walks of life is apt to stimulate them—in mockery of the intentions of their oppressors—to prosper and excel in other fields which have still been left open to them out of contempt or oversight; and we have marvelled at and admired a whole gallery of heroic *tours de force* in which these minorities stand out as very incarnations of the invincibility of Human Nature. At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that some of the most conspicuous of these minorities—for example, the Levantines and the Phanariots and the Armenians and, above all, the Jews—have a reputation for being ‘not as other men are’ for worse as well as for better; and this ill repute, which clings to them in a strange unresolved contradiction with their notorious virtues and accomplishments, is too persistent and too widely spread to be dismissed altogether as a libellous expression of their discomfited oppressors’ chagrin. In the unhappy relation between Jews and Gentiles, which is the classic case, the Gentile who is disgusted and ashamed at the behaviour of his Anti-Semite fellow Goyyim is also embarrassed at finding himself constrained to admit that there is some grain of truth in the caricature of the Jewish character which the Jew-baiter draws as a justification for his own bestiality. The heart of the tragedy lies in the fact that a penalization which truly stimulates the penalized minority to a heroic response is as truly apt to warp their human nature as well. They rise to superhuman heights in one dimension at the risk of shrivelling to a sub-human level in another dimension. And what is true of these socially penalized minorities is evidently likewise true of those technologically specialized majorities with which we are now concerned.

The point may be illustrated by the English tale of a legendary Irishman and his blanket. A poor Irishman found that his blanket was not long enough to cover his shoulders when he went to bed, so he cut off a strip from the bottom end of the blanket and sewed it on to the top end—only to find, to his bewilderment, that the bedevilled blanket had now become too short to cover his feet. In truth, of course, the blanket had been shortened instead of lengthened by being cut to pieces and sewn together again—at

least, if we may assume that our Irishman knew enough about neediework to turn over the edges in making his suture. Our poor friend has actually made things worse for himself by his naïve attempt to make them better; and so has the anthropoid ape who has naïvely replied to the challenge 'Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?'¹ by incontinently rising on his hind legs. In this case the riddle is actually solved in the immediate and the literal sense; but the challenge, of course, implies that the addition to the stature is to be permanent and that the creature that achieves it is not to do this at a sacrifice of the health and harmony of its whole bodily organism. It is on this point that the guilelessly presumptuous monkey is eventually caught out; for the physical strain of the unnatural two-legged posture that has enabled him to hold his head so high makes itself felt progressively throughout his system. First the change of posture upsets his digestion by displacing his internal organs; and then his two hind legs—thus unreasonably starved of nourishment when they are being compelled to do the work of four—succumb to rickets and finally double up under him. In this ignominious fashion the ape relapses on to all fours again; but he is not now the ape that he was before he started to play his monkey-trick. The healthy quadruped of yore has been transformed, as a result of his disastrous prank, into a rickety quadruped whose constitution has been permanently undermined.²

These fables are applicable to an ordinary uncreative human being who has had one of his human faculties—and this perhaps one of rather trivial value—abnormally and disproportionately developed in the hope of thereby bringing the crown of his head to a level with the height of a creative genius who is a cubit taller by nature than the ordinary run of his fellow men. Such a partial increase in spiritual stature is usually paid for by a general decrease in spiritual stamina. A primitive soul which has been unnaturally developed to a higher capacity in some single line of growth is apt, in all other lines, to shrivel to a lower capacity than that of the natural primitive soul which has not had any liberties taken with its spiritual health.

This malady of spiritual deformation, which is the nemesis of a perverse method of attempting to bring the uncreative rank-and-

¹ Matt. vi. 27.

² A more picturesque version of the same fable will be found in Sir Rabindranath Tagore's *Nationalism* (London 1917, Macmillan), pp. 35-6:

'Man, with his mental and material power far outgrowing his moral strength, is like an exaggerated giraffe whose head has suddenly shot up miles away from the rest of him, making normal communication difficult to establish. This greedy head, with its huge dental organisation, has been munching all the topmost foliage of the World, but the nourishment is too late in reaching his digestive organs, and his heart is suffering from want of blood.'

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file into line with the creative minority, is as great a social enormity as the antithetical malady of esotericism which is the nemesis that lies in wait for a creator when he ignores the truth that 'none of us liveth to himself and no man dieth to himself'¹ and seeks to repudiate his ineluctable obligation to be his brother's keeper.² And these are the two alternative possible enormities that may be produced by the impact of Civilization upon the Division of Labour.

The crime of Procrustes is castigated by Jesus in his denunciation of the Scribes and the Pharisees who

'bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders; but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers'.³

And it is the same enormity that is in the mind of the Arabic philosopher Ibn Khaldūn when he argues that 'too much severity in a sovereign usually does harm to his realm'.⁴

'Benevolent government is rarely associated with a ruler whose mind is over-alert and intelligence over-developed. Benevolence is most commonly found in rulers who are easy-going or who behave as if they were. The worst defect in the alert-minded ruler is that he lays burdens upon his subjects which are greater than they can bear; and he does this because his mental vision outranges theirs and because his insight penetrates to the ends of things at the beginnings—with disastrous consequences for them. The Prophet says: "Go the pace of the weakest among you"; and in this context the exponent of the Divine Law prescribes in the case of rulers that excess of intelligence should be avoided . . . because it produces oppression and bad government and makes demands upon the people which are contrary to their nature. . . . It is evident from this that intellectuality and intelligence is a fault in an administrator, because this is an excess of mental activity—just as dull-wittedness is an excess of mental torpidity. The two extremes are to be deprecated in every attribute of human nature. The ideal is the Golden Mean . . . and for this reason a man who is over-intellectual has Satanic attributes attributed to him and is called "Satan", "possessed by Satan", and so on.'

In an extreme case the pioneer who racks the laggards' limbs in order to key them up to his own pace may be as great a monster as the fiend who tortures a bird by over-nourishing its liver in order to make *pâté de foie gras*.

The social havoc that is wrought on the one hand by esotericism on the part of a creative minority and on the other hand by a spiritual deformation of the souls of the rank-and-file of the un-

¹ Romans xiv. 7.

² Gen. iv. 9.

³ Matt. xxiii. 4; cf. Luke xi. 46.

⁴ Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 383-4.

creative mass is so manifestly serious that, where and when it shows itself, there is apt to be a powerful counter-movement to check it by adjustment or, failing that, by revolution. And the more vigorous and vital the growth of a growing civilization, the greater, as a rule, will be its members' sensitiveness to this particular social danger.

Such sensitiveness is a characteristic mark of the Hellenic Civilization at the time when it was rising towards its highest achievements in the fifth century B.C.; and the feeling declared itself in Hellenic language in an uncompromising condemnation of the *ἰδιώτης* at the one extreme and of the *βάνανος* at the other.

The *ἰδιώτης*, in the fifth-century Greek usage of the word, was a superior personality who committed the social offence of 'living to himself' instead of putting his personal gifts at the service of the common weal; and the light in which such behaviour was regarded in the classical Hellenic World is illustrated by the fact that, in our modern Western vernacular languages, a derivative of this Greek word *ἰδιώτης* has acquired the meaning of 'mental imbecile'. This far-fetched meaning has been imported into the word 'idiot' on the strength of its moral connotation in Hellenic minds. The connotation has been so strong that the meaning has been changed by it out of all recognition. It is amusing to reflect that, if we had managed to forget the original connotation and to carry the original meaning over into the un-Hellenic moral environment of our own code of social ethics, then the English word 'idiot' would presumably be used to-day as a laudatory term; for it would then still signify a man of parts who has devoted his abilities to the acquisition of a personal fortune through private business enterprise; and this classical Hellenic *bête noire* is our latter-day Western hero.

In the Hellenic Society of the fifth century B.C. the free male citizens, who alone lived to the full the intense social life of the city-state, were virtually behaving as *ἰδιῶται* towards the women and the slaves, who had been left behind in the advance of the Hellenic Civilization from the Homeric to the Attic stage. The women and the slaves found themselves virtually outside the social pale of the master institution in which the results of the free male citizens' advance had been embodied.¹ From this point of view it is significant that one of the promptest constructive reactions to the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization in 431 B.C. was a movement to bring the women and the slaves back into social partnership with the free male citizens as recognized and active members of the commonwealth. This movement declared itself in Athens,

¹ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 239-40, above.

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 'the Education of Hellas',¹ while the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, which was the beginning of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles', was still being fought—as witness the war-plays of Aristophanes; and the emancipation of these two great classes in the Hellenic body social may be judged to have reached its apogee during the first century of the third chapter of Hellenic history: a century that began with Alexander's passage of the Dardanelles in 334 B.C. and closed with the outbreak of the Hannibalic War in 218 B.C.²

At the opposite extreme to the *ἰδιώτης* stood the *βάρβαρος*, who was the other bugbear of fifth-century Hellas. The *βάρβαρος* meant a person whose activity was specialized, through a concentration of his energies upon some particular technique, at the expense of his all-round development as a 'social animal'. The kind of technique which was usually in people's minds when they used this term of abuse was some manual or mechanical trade which was practised for private profit. Making money out of industry was as ill looked upon in fifth-century Hellas as it has been well looked upon in the English-speaking communities of a nineteenth-century Western Society; and in the old-fashioned aristocratic Boeotian community of Thebes the social stigma was so severe that it carried a political disqualification with it.³ The Hellenic horror of *βάρβαρία*, however, went farther than this. It implanted in Hellenic minds a deep distrust of all professionalism, even when the medium was something finer than stone or iron or wood or leather and the motive something nobler than money-making.

For example, under the Lycurgean *αγωγή*⁴ or 'way of life' at Sparta, the Spartiate 'Peers' were forbidden not only to master and practise any lucrative manual trade,⁵ but even to train for and take part in any of the international athletic competitions which were

¹ The phrase put into the mouth of the Athenian statesman Pericles by the Athenian historian Thucydides (in Book II, chap. 41).

² Though Athens was the scene of the first move in Hellas towards the re-enfranchisement of both the women and the slaves, it was only the emancipation of the slaves that was a native Attic movement (see IV. C (iii) (b) 4, p. 156, footnote 3, above). The credit for the emancipation of the women of Hellas belongs not to Athens but to Sparta and to Macedon; for in both these two other Hellenic communities the position of women in the so-called 'Classical Age' of Hellenic history was more favourable than it was at Athens—at Sparta as an undesigned consequence of the depressing effect of the Lycurgean *αγωγή* upon the men (see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 75, above) and in Macedon because she was still in the Homeric stage of development (see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, pp. 278-9, above)—and in the course of the century beginning in the year 431 B.C. the institutions of Sparta and Macedon successively gained prestige in Hellas through the victories of Sparta and Macedonian over Athenian arms (see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 90-3, above). In Aristophanes' feminist comedy *Lysistrata*, which was played in 411 B.C., one of the principal characters is Lampito, who is the leader of a delegation of Spartan women.

³ According to Aristotle, *Politics*, Book III, chap. 5, p. 1278A (cf. op. cit., Book VI, chap. 7, p. 1321A), 'there was a law at Thebes that any one who had not been out of business for ten years should be ineligible for public office.'

⁴ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 54-68, above.

⁵ See the story quoted above in Part III. A, vol. iii, on pp. 80-1.

held periodically in the Hellenic World—notwithstanding the two facts that, at the four great Pan-Hellenic festivals, the prizes were not objects of material value but were simple wreaths of green-stuff, and that, in all other Hellenic communities, the winning of one of these wreaths was regarded as the highest honour which a man could possibly gain for himself and for his country.¹ The Spartans, of course, defeated their own ends—and discredited their parochial policy of diverging from the main channel of Hellenic Civilization into a peculiar backwater—by specializing professionally in the Art of War, with disastrous social, and in the end even disastrous military, consequences. It was the paradox and the irony of Spartan history that Spartan militarism, at its height, became *βαναυσία* incarnate. On the other hand the subtler Athenians did not allow themselves to fall into this insidious pitfall. They were on their guard against *βαναυσία* even in the cultivation of those abilities and activities and arts which they were most prone to admire; and they did not hesitate to criticize the professionalism of a countryman of their own who was the most brilliant political genius that Attica had produced and who had used his specialized ability, with dazzling success, to save his country from destruction and to make her great.

'In refined and cultivated society Themistocles used to be girded at by people of so-called liberal education [for his lack of accomplishments] and used to be driven into making the rather cheap defence that he certainly could do nothing with a musical instrument, but that, if you were to put into his hands a country that was small and obscure, he knew how to turn it into a great country and a famous one.'²

This sensitiveness to the dangers of *βαναυσία*, which comes out so strongly in Hellenic social life, can also be observed in the institutions of other societies. For example, the social function of the Jewish Sabbath—and of the sabbatarian Sunday of Scotland, England, and the Transmarine English-speaking countries of our modern Western World—is to insure that, for one whole day out of every seven, a creature who has been specializing for six successive days in the week in sordid business for private gain shall

¹ These two facts were, of course, connected by a reciprocal relation of cause and effect. The materially valuable prizes which had been offered originally could not have been abolished if these four once merely local festivals had not already attained to so well-established an oecumenical prestige in the Hellenic World that their stewards could feel confident of being able to book an abundance of entries for the sake of the honour and glory which the victories at these particular festivals had come to carry with them. (At other local athletic festivals in Hellas which failed to acquire oecumenical prestige it never proved possible to dispense with the lure of prizes of material value.) Conversely, the prestige of the four Pan-Hellenic festivals was immensely enhanced by the fact that the competitors now competed for the sake of the honour and glory alone, without any vestige of a profit-making motive.

² Plutarch: *Life of Themistocles*, chap. 2.

remember his Creator and shall live, for a recurrent twenty-four hours, the life of an integral human soul instead of quite uninterruptedly performing the vain repetitions of a money-making machine. Again, it is no accident that in England mountaineering and 'organized games' and other sports should have come into fashion simultaneously with the rise of Industrialism at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and that this new passion for Sport should since have spread, *pari passu* with Industrialism, from England over the World. For Sport, in this latter-day sense of the term, is a conscious attempt at 'recreation' from the soul-destroying exaggeration of the Division of Labour which the Industrial System of economy entails.

In our latter-day Western World, however, this attempt to adjust Life to Industrialism through Sport has been partially defeated because the spirit and the rhythm of Industrialism have become so insistent and so pervasive that they have invaded and infected Sport itself—just as the *βασιλεία* which the Spartans sought so earnestly to keep at bay eluded their vigilance after all by capturing their own peculiar profession of arms. In the Western World of to-day professional athletes—more narrowly specialized and more extravagantly paid than the most consummate industrial technicians—now vie with the professional entertainers in providing us with horrifying examples of *βασιλεία* at its acme.

In the mind of the writer of this Study this disconcerting industrialization of Sport is summed up in the pictures of three football-fields that are all printed sharply upon his visual memory. One was an English field at Sheffield which he happened once to see out of the railway-carriage window *en route* from York to Oxford. At the parched latter end of summer, when the football season was about to reopen, the grass on this plot of ground was being kept artificially green by hydrants which tapped the municipal water-supply and so made the local groundsman independent of the rain from heaven. And all around this manufactured greensward rose tiers upon tiers of seats, on which thousands of human beings would presently 'take their recreation' in an even closer congestion—with still more pounds of human flesh to the cubic yard of urban space—than during their working hours in shop or office or factory. The other two football-grounds in the writer's mental picture-gallery are to be found on the campuses of two colleges in the United States. One of them was floodlighted, by an ingenious lighting-system which was said to reproduce the exact effect of sunshine, in order that football-players might be manufactured there by night as well as by day, in continuous shifts,

as motor-cars or gramophones are produced in factories which run without a break throughout the twenty-four hours. The other American football-ground was roofed over in order that practice might go on whatever the weather. The roof was supported on four immense girders which sprang from the four corners and met above the centre without any interior support. It was said to be the largest span of roof in existence at that moment in the World, and its erection had cost a fabulous sum. Round the sides were ranged beds for the reception of exhausted or wounded warriors. On both these American grounds I found on inquiry that the actual players in any given year were never more in number than an infinitesimal fraction of the total student body; and I was also told that these boys looked forward to the ordeal of playing a match with much the same grim apprehension as their elder brothers had felt when they went into the trenches in 1918. In truth this Anglo-Saxon football was not a game at all. It was the Industrial System celebrating a triumph over its vanquished antidote, Sport, by masquerading in its guise.

A corresponding development can be discerned in the history of the Hellenic World, where the aristocratic amateurs whose victories are immortalized in Pindar's odes were eventually replaced by the professional boxers of the amphitheatre and professional charioteers of the circus, while the shows that were purveyed, *post Alexandrum*, from Parthia to Spain by the *Διονύσου Τεχνῖται* ('United Artists, Ltd.') were as different from the fifth-century celebrations in Dionysus's own theatre, in its hallowed precinct under the shadow of the Acropolis at Athens, as a music-hall revue in Chicago or Shanghai or Buenos Aires is different from a mediæval mystery play.¹

It is no wonder that, when social enormities defy adjustment in this baffling fashion, philosophers should dream of revolutionary plans for sweeping the enormities away. Plato seeks to cut the root of *βαναυσία*, as he sees it rising rankly all around him in the Athens of his day, by planting his Utopia in an inland region with no facilities for maritime trade and with little inducement towards any economic activity beyond 'subsistence farming'.² Samuel Butler imagines his Utopians deliberately and systematically destroying all machines and placing a rigid ban upon their construction and operation for the future, for fear that Mankind might cease to be the masters of machines through becoming, instead,

¹ This difference is one of the effects of the phenomenon of social diffraction, which has been touched upon in I. B (iii), vol. i, pp. 26-33, above, and is examined further in V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 199-203, as well as in Parts VIII and IX, below.

² See the passage quoted from Plato, *Leges*, 704-5, in Part III. A, vol. iii, on p. 91, above.

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 their domesticated animals.¹ Since a machine is nothing but an artificial extension of the range or 'drive' of some human organ or faculty,² the fantasy of a reversal in the relations between machines and human beings is an apt parable of what happens readily enough 'in real life' when the harmony of some commonplace human soul is upset, and its nature is warped and deformed, by the hypertrophe of some single faculty, at the expense of all the rest, in a vain attempt to raise this ordinary creature to an equality with the rarer representative of its kind that has been endowed by their common Creator with a larger spiritual stature.

15. *The Impact of Civilization upon Mimesis.*

A reorientation of the faculty of mimesis away from the elders and towards the pioneers is, as we have seen,³ the change in the direction of this faculty that accompanies the mutation of a primitive society into a civilization; and the aim in view is the raising of the uncreative mass to a new level that has been reached by a new creative minority. But, because this resort to mimesis is a short cut,⁴ the attainment of the goal along this road is apt to be illusory.

Where a genuine transmission of the divine fire from soul to soul would have transformed the inner man and have admitted him, in transforming him, into the Communion of Saints, the glib response of mimesis is apt to do no more than transmogrify the Natural Man, *Homo Integer Antiquae Virtutis*, into the shoddy 'Man in the Street': a *Homo Vulgaris Northcliffii* or a *Homo Demoticus Cleonis*. In that event the impact of Civilization upon mimesis begets the enormity of a pseudo-sophisticated urban crowd, living for its *panem et circenses*,⁵ which, on any spiritual criterion, is as signally inferior to the Natural Man in a primitive society as are 'the beasts that perish'.⁶ This vulgar social enormity is not so inevitable that it cannot be avoided by an adjustment. In fifth-century Athens, for example, the Dêmos which was exposed to the corrupting influence of the demagogue Cleon's travesty of 'the Education of Hellas' was at the same time being offered pure draughts of the milk of the word⁷ in the celebrations at the Dionysiac theatre.

¹ See Butler, Samuel: *Erewhon* (London 1872, Trübner), chap. 20 *ad fin.* and chaps. 21, 22, 23. Compare the chapter entitled 'Der Mensch als Sklave der Maschine' in Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. ii: 'Welthistorische Perspektiven', 1st-15th edition (Munich 1922, Beck), pp. 624-35.

² For the perilously ambiguous nature of machinery see IV. C (iii) (a), pp. 124-7, above.

³ In Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 191-5, and IV. C (iii) (a), in the present volume, p. 128, above.

⁴ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 245-8; and IV. C (iii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 119-33, above.

⁵ Juvenal, *Satires*, No. x, l. 81, quoted already in II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 214, above.

⁶ 'Man that is in honour and understandeth not is like the beasts that perish' (Psalm xlix. 20).

⁷ 1 Peter ii. 2.

Here was a traditional institution which was part of the common people's birthright and in which they remained thoroughly at home while the most daring aesthetic and moral and intellectual pioneers of the age were now using the folk-drama, without ever breaking its traditional mould, as a vehicle for the expression of their own creative ideas. In the fifth-century Attic drama the happy accident that had converted a primitive institution into a mouthpiece for men of genius gave men of goodwill a fleeting opportunity of competing for the guidance of the souls of the *Dêmos* against men of Cleon's stamp. But a survey of History seems to show that such opportunities are few and far between; and, even in this Attic case, the opportunity was not successfully taken. Cleon won; and the social enormity which he evoked by stamping the *Dêmos* with his own image had to be exorcised in the end, not by adjustment, but by revolution. The Cleonian 'Man in the Street', whose entry upon the stage of Hellenic history before the close of the fifth century B.C. is one of the unmistakable symptoms of social decline, eventually redeemed his soul by repudiating, outright, a culture which had failed to satisfy his spiritual hunger because he had only succeeded in filling his belly with the husks.¹ As the spiritually awakened child of a dissident proletariat, he worked out his own salvation through the discovery of a higher religion.²

Perhaps these examples may suffice to illustrate the part that is played in the breakdowns of civilizations by the intractability of old institutions to the touch of new social forces.

(c) THE NEMESIS OF CREATIVITY

1. *The Problem of Περίπνευρα*

We have now made some study of two aspects of that failure of self-determination to which the breakdowns of civilizations appear to be due. We have considered the mechanicalness of mimesis and the intractability of institutions. We may conclude this part of our inquiry with a consideration of the apparent nemesis of creativity.

It looks as though it were uncommon for the creative responses to two or more successive challenges in the history of a given society to be achieved by one and the same minority or individual. So far from this being the rule, the party that has distinguished itself in dealing with one challenge is apt to fail conspicuously in attempting to deal with the next. This ironical and disconcerting

¹ Luke xv. 16.

² For the secession of the internal proletariat from the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society see I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-2, and I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-62, above, and Part V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 58-82, below.

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yet apparently normal inconstancy of human fortunes is one of the dominant *motifs* of the Attic drama, and it is noticed and discussed by Aristotle, in his critique of Hellenic poetry, under the name of *περιπέτεια* or 'the reversal of roles'.¹ This is also one of the principal themes of the New Testament.²

In the drama of the New Testament a Christ whose epiphany on Earth in the person of Jesus is, in Christian belief, the true fulfilment of Jewry's long cherished Messianic Hope, is nevertheless rejected by a school of Scribes and Pharisees which, only a few generations back, has come to the front by taking the lead in a heroic Jewish revolt against the triumphal progress of Hellenization.³ The insight and the uprightness that have brought the Scribes and Pharisees to the fore in that previous crisis of Jewish history desert them now in a crisis of greater import for the destinies of Jewry and of Mankind, and the Jews that comprehend and accept the authentic Jewish Messiah's message are the publicans and harlots.⁴ The Messiah himself comes from 'Galilee of the Gentiles';⁵ and the greatest of his executors is a Hellenized Jew from Tarsus, a city beyond the traditional horizon of the Promised Land, who carries the preaching of his Galilaean master into the heart of a Hellenized World.

In this Christian rendering of the theme of *περιπέτεια* the roles that are reversed are sometimes played by the Pharisaic *élite* of Jewry and by the outcasts from the Jewish fold:

'I say unto you that the publicans and the harlots go into the Kingdom of God before you.'⁶

Sometimes, again, the Pharisees' role is assigned to Jewry as a whole, and the publicans' role to the Gentiles—as in the sermon

¹ See Aristotle: *Poetics*, chap. 11, § 1, *et alibi*. See further the interesting note on the word in Butcher, S. H.: *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, 3rd edition (London 1902, Macmillan), pp. 329–30. According to Butcher, the word *περιπέτεια*, as used by Aristotle, has a subjective connotation. Unlike the word *μετάβασις*, *περιπέτεια* means not merely a 'change of fortune' but a change in the form of a 'reversal of intention', when an act or a policy produces the opposite result from that which the agent has expected and desired. ² See V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 380–1, below.

³ For this collision between Judaism and Hellenism in the second century B.C. see further V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 103–5, below.

⁴ Luke iii. 12–13, and vii. 29–30; Matt. xxi. 31–2.

⁵ Isaiah ix. 1; Matt. iv. 15. For the stimulus that was derived by a Christian outgrowth of Judaism from its new ground in Galilee and in the great Gentile World beyond, see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 73–4, above. For the contributions to Christian doctrine and legend which may have been made by a submerged Gentile culture in Galilee and by a dominant Gentile culture in Tarsus, see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 465, 477–8, and 499–500, below. In this context it may be noted that Galilee was not the only submerged Gentile annex to Judaea that presented Jewry with a saviour in the post-Maccabaeon age. While Galilee gave birth, in Jesus, to a Messiah whose message of salvation was that His kingdom was not of This World (see V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 130–2, below), Idumaea gave birth, in Herod, to a mundane saviour whose humbler mission was to teach the Jews, not how to transcend This World, but how to live in it, and not how to convert a Hellenized *Οικουμενη*, but how to come to terms with it. In the event the Jews rejected their Idumaeon as well as their Galilaean saviour's message; and this twofold rejection provoked a crushing nemesis. ⁶ Matt. xxi. 31.

in the synagogue at Nazareth in which Jesus reminds his fellow countrymen that the widow to whose aid Elijah was sent in time of famine was not an Israelite but a Sidonian, and that the leper whom Elisha was sent to heal was not an Israelite but a Damascene.¹

'I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham.'²—'The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation and shall condemn it, because they repented at the preaching of Jonas, and, behold, a greater than Jonas is here. The Queen of the South shall rise up in the judgment with this generation and shall condemn it; for she came from the uttermost parts of the Earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and, behold, a greater than Solomon is here.'³—'I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel. And I say unto you that many shall come from the east and west and shall sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the Kingdom of Heaven. But the children of the Kingdom shall be cast out into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.'⁴—'I say unto you, the Kingdom of God shall be taken from you and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof.'⁵—'It was necessary that the word of God should first have been spoken to you; but seeing ye put it from you and judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles.'⁶

The moral that is pointed in the parables of the Labourers in the Vineyard⁷ and the Wicked Husbandmen⁸ is likewise the moral of the parables of the Prodigal Son⁹ and Dives and Lazarus¹⁰ and the Pharisee and the Publican¹¹ and the Good Samaritan¹² and the guests who rebuff or evade the invitation to the feast and whose places are filled with the poor and the maimed and the halt and the blind from the streets and lanes and highways and hedges.¹³ The encounter of Jesus with the Roman centurion¹⁴ has its parallels in his encounter with the Syrophenician woman beyond the borders of Jewry¹⁵ and with the Greeks at Jerusalem.¹⁶ In the Gospel according to Saint John, in which the last-mentioned incident is narrated, this overture to the Jewish Messiah on the Gentiles' part is made the occasion for Jesus's prophecy of the fructification of his work on Earth.¹⁷

In the historical setting in which these sayings and parables and incidents in the New Testament are placed, the Christian

¹ Luke iv. 16-32.

² Matt. iii. 9.

³ Matt. xii. 41-2.

⁴ Matt. viii. 10-12; cf. Luke vii. 9, and xiii. 27-9.

⁵ Matt. xxi. 43.

⁶ Acts xiii. 46.

⁷ Matt. xx. 1-16.

⁸ Matt. xxi. 33-44 = Mark xii. 1-11 = Luke xx. 9-18.

⁹ Luke xv. 11-32.

¹⁰ Luke xvi. 19-31.

¹¹ Luke xviii. 9-14.

¹² Luke x. 25-37.

¹³ Luke xiv. 15-24 = Matt. xxii. 1-14.

¹⁴ Matt. viii. 5-13 = Luke vii. 1-10. This encounter between Jesus and the anonymous Roman centurion at Capernaum has a pendant in the subsequent encounter (Acts x-xi) between Peter and the Roman centurion Cornelius at Joppa (see V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 393, below).

¹⁵ Matt. xv. 21-8 = Mark vii. 24-30.

¹⁶ John xii. 20-2.

¹⁷ John xii. 23-4.

rendering of the theme of *περιπέτεια* is a variation on an ancient rendering in the Jewish Scriptures. The New Testament and the Old Testament are, both alike, regarded as instruments through which God has bequeathed a supernatural heritage to human beneficiaries; and the common plot of a twice-played tragedy is a reversal of roles through a transfer of God's priceless gift from human hands that might have had it for the taking to other human hands that, at the opening of the play, do not appear to have any prospect of attaining the prize. In the original performance of the play it is Esau, the first-born, who sells his birthright to his younger brother Jacob. In the second performance the same two players appear on the stage again; but in making their reappearance they exchange their parts; for this time it is Jacob who forfeits his heirloom to Esau. Thus the action of the Christian version of the plot presents a double *περιπέτεια*—a reversal of a reversal—when the scenes in which this action works itself out in the drama of the New Testament are taken literally in their historical sense. This literal meaning, however, is not the only meaning and not the deepest; for 'Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichniß',¹ and an historical tragedy which is momentous in itself has at the same time a deeper significance as an allegory of a mystery which is illustrated in the passage of History because it lies at the heart of Life. On this plane the operation of the principle of *περιπέτεια* is proclaimed in the New Testament in terms that transcend the historical limits of a particular time and place:

'If any man desire to be first, the same shall be last of all and servant of all.'²—'And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted.'³—'The last shall be first, and the first last.'⁴—'He that is least among you all, the same shall be great.'⁵—'The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner.'⁶

In this timeless and placeless presentation of the play the characters between whom the reversal of roles is transacted are neither Pharisees-and-Publicans nor Jews-and-Gentiles, but are Adults-and-Children.

'I say unto you: Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Whosoever, therefore, shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the King-

¹ Goethe: *Faust*, II, 12104-5.

² Mark ix. 35 = Matt. xxiii. 11 (cf. Mark. x. 43-4 = Matt. xx. 26-7).

³ Matt. xxiii. 12 = Luke xiv. 11, and xviii. 14.

⁴ Matt. xx. 16, as the moral of the Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard. Compare Matt. xix. 30 = Mark x. 31, and Luke xiii. 30.

⁵ Luke ix. 48.

⁶ Matt. xxi. 42 (quoting Psalm cxviii. 22), as the moral of the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen. Cf. Mark xii. 10; Luke xx. 17; Acts iv. 11; Eph. ii. 20; 1 Peter ii. 7.

dom of Heaven. And whoso receiveth one such little child in my name, receiveth me."—'Of such is the Kingdom of Heaven.'²

Why did Jesus take the children up in his arms and put his hands upon them and bless them?³ In another context he is said to have answered this question by quoting a passage of the Jewish Scriptures:

'Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings thou hast perfected praise.'⁴

And the paradox of a *περιπέτεια* between Sophistication and Simplicity, which is thus revealed as the mystery symbolized in the reversal of roles between Children and Adults in the Gospels, flashes out of its sheath of allegory in the exultant phrases of Saint Paul:

'God hath chosen the foolish things of the World to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the World to confound the things which are mighty; and base things of the World, and things which are despised, hath God chosen—yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are: that no flesh should glory in his presence.'⁵

What is the explanation of a principle which plays so prominent a part both in the New Testament and in the Attic drama? This question has received a cynical answer from primitive minds; but this primitive cynicism has not been left unchallenged by a Posterity which has gained deeper insight through sharper suffering.

Primitive human minds are fain to explain the downfalls of pre-eminent human beings as acts of external powers that are human in *êthos* but superhuman in potency. The overthrowers of great men must be gods; and the motive which primitive minds presuppose, to account for these hypothetical divine interventions, is commonly envy. 'The Envy of the Gods' as an agency in human affairs is one of the *Leitmotive*s of primitive Mythology and one of the principal concerns of primitive superstition in all times and places; and the same subject has both fascinated and exercised Hellenic thought, which, in the religious and the moral sphere, is

¹ Math. xviii. 3-5 (Matt. xviii. 3 is reminiscent of Mark x. 15 = Luke xviii. 17; Matt. xviii. 5 = Matt. x. 40 (where the saying refers, not to children, but to the Twelve Disciples) = Mark ix. 37 = Luke ix. 48).

² Matt. xix. 14 = Mark x. 14 = Luke xviii. 16.

³ Mark x. 16.

⁴ Matt. xxi. 16, quoting Psalm viii. 2.

⁵ 1 Cor. i. 27-9. Verse 27 is quoted again below, in association with verses 22-3, in V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, p. 150. The theme is enlarged upon in 1 Cor. ii; and in 1 Cor. iii. 18-21 the *περιπέτεια* between 'Wisdom' and 'Foolishness', which is the first of the four antitheses in i. 27-8, is taken up again and carried farther. Compare Col. ii. 8. Some of the changes that have been rung upon this Pauline theme by Saints Ambrose and Augustine are quoted in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 564, footnote 4, below, with reference to the historic *περιπέτεια* that, in the disintegration of civilizations, is apt to come over the relations between the philosophy of the Dominant Minority and the religion of the Internal Proletariat (see cap. cit., vol. cit., pp. 552-68, and the passage of Eduard Meyer that is quoted in V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 114-5, below).

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remarkable for its conservatism in clinging to primitive conceptions as well as for its ingenuity in refining upon them.¹

A Hellenic view of 'the Envy of the Gods' which is inimitable in its blend of *naïveté* with sophistication is given in the following passage of Herodotus:

'You observe how God blasts with His thunderbolt the animals that overtop their fellows, and how He cannot bear them to show off, while the little animals never irritate Him (οὐδέν μιν κνίζει);² and you also observe how He invariably directs these shafts of His upon the highest houses and the tallest trees. God loves to cut short everything that overtops its kind. In this way a great army is destroyed by a small army in certain circumstances—as, for instance, when God in His envy sends down panic upon them, or thunder. Then they perish, and their last state is unworthy of their first. God suffers no one to be proud except Himself.'³

The thesis here enunciated with a studied affectation of simplicity that heightens a desired effect of blasphemy is the overture to the Herodotean tragedy of the greatness and fall of the Achaemenian emperor Xerxes. The passage occurs in a fictitious speech from the mouth of Xerxes' uncle Artabanus at a meeting of the Achaemenian Privy Council in which Xerxes has announced his project of conquering Hellas, and has commended it on the ground that its accomplishment will 'make the Persian Empire conterminous with the stratosphere (Διὸς αἰθέρι ὁμοπέουσιν), since there will be no *pays limitrophe* to ours for the Sun to set eyes on when I, with your aid, have turned all countries into one country as a result of my triumphal progress through Europe'.⁴ In the course of the same speech Herodotus makes Xerxes incur the envy of no fewer than three great gods: Poseidon, through his announcement of his intention to bridge the Hellespont; Zeus, through his boast that he will divide with him the lordship of the Universe; and Helios, through his declared intention of extending the range of his own dominions from sunrise to sunset.⁵ In this Herodotean tragedy of Xerxes' greatness and fall the protagonist irrevocably seals his own doom when, on the eve of his passage of the Hellespont, on the road to defeat, the spectacle of his grand army and armada tempts him to declare himself divinely happy (ἐαυτὸν ἐμακάρισε). The moment after uttering this blasphemy, Xerxes

¹ For a study of the history of this idea in Hellenic thought and life see Ranulf, S.: *The Jealousy of the Gods and Criminal Law of Athens: a Contribution to the Sociology of Moral Indignation* (London 1933, Williams & Norgate, 2 vols.).

² For some examples of the working of the principle of *μετμέτεια* in the natural history of the non-human fauna of the planet see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), pp. 423-8, below.—A.J.T.

³ Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 10.

⁴ Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 8.

⁵ Compare the latter-day British boast of possessing an empire 'on which the Sun never sets'.

recollects himself and bursts into tears at the poignant thought that not one man of this host will be alive a hundred years hence; but it is too late now for repentance; and this incident only leads to a further colloquy between the Emperor and Artabanus, in which Xerxes hardens his heart and finally sends Artabanus home to Susa in disgrace. This colloquy is opened by Artabanus with the observation that the inevitability of Death is less poignant than the sufferings of Life.

'Human Life is so wretched that Death becomes a blessed escape from it. The tantalizing taste of sweetness, which is all that God gives in the three score years and ten, is proof of the enviousness of God's nature.'¹

In a more serious vein the same thesis is propounded by Herodotus in the parables of Croesus and Polycrates.²

Croesus airs his prosperity, like a peacock's tail, before the eyes of Solon in the hope that the Athenian sage will pronounce him the happiest of Mankind; but a leading question fails to elicit the expected answer; and when the king loses his temper and confesses what is in his mind, he merely gives Solon an opportunity to pass from the particular to the general in his exposition of his philosophy.

'I know for a fact that the Godhead is invariably envious and destructive; and then, Sire, you question me regarding Human Life! . . . Out of all the days which go to make up the seventy years . . . , not one day brings forth anything remotely resembling the offspring of another; and therefore, Sire, Man is nothing but Misfortune. I imagine that you personally are immensely rich and that you have a vast number of subjects; but I cannot yet give you the title which is the object of your question, before I hear that you have been fortunate in your end. . . . Until I see [a man's] end, I must suspend judgement and call him not "happy" but "fortunate." . . . In order to appraise any phenomenon, the attention must be directed upon the circumstances in which it meets its end. To many people God has given a glimpse of happiness in order to destroy them root and branch.'³

Herodotus relates⁴ that 'these observations of Solon's did not at all commend themselves to Croesus, who dismissed the philosopher with contempt, as a man of no intelligence whatever, for his principle of discounting present values and appraising every phenomenon by its end. After the departure of Solon, however,

¹ Herodotus, Book VII, chaps. 44-53.

² In the Herodotean schema each of the exalted victims of 'the Envy of the Gods' is warned in advance, but in vain, by a human mentor—Artabanus's role towards Xerxes being played by Solon towards Croesus and by Amasis towards Polycrates. Croesus wins a reprieve from the extremity of Fate by calling upon Solon's name, in order to become, in his turn, the mentor of his conqueror Cyrus, whom he leads, in the end, to destruction by giving him bad advice in good faith (for this Herodotean ending of the story of Croesus and Cyrus see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 187-8, below).

³ Herodotus, Book I, chap. 32.

⁴ Book I, chap. 33.

Croesus was overtaken by a heavy retribution from God—presumably because he had ventured to regard himself as the happiest of all Mankind.¹ First, Croesus loses his son through the twofold error of failing to see the catch in an oracle and of placing the boy in the care of a man who has been proved desperately unlucky;² and then he loses his kingdom through failing to see the catch in an oracle once again, and leaning on the broken reed of an alliance with Sparta.³ In the end Croesus finds himself standing, shackled, on a lighted pyre, on the point of being burnt alive. It is only in this extremity that he appeases 'the Envy of the Gods' at last by remembering the wisdom of Solon and calling, in contrition, upon the sage's name. The immediate consequence of this religious conversion is to produce a change of heart in Croesus's conqueror Cyrus, who has condemned his vanquished enemy to the flames and is waiting to enjoy the spectacle; and, when the penitent Cyrus orders the fire to be put out and finds that it has caught beyond human power to control it, the God Apollo himself condescends to save Croesus's life by a miracle.³

In the parable of Croesus, who is as wantonly presumptuous as Xerxes, yet manages to save his soul alive by a repentance at the eleventh hour, the Herodotean Godhead shows a touch of human kindness. The divine attributes of malignity and implacability reveal themselves, naked and unashamed, in the parable of Polycrates, who seeks, on the advice of his wise ally Amasis, to anticipate the wrecking of his fortunes through 'the Envy of the Gods'⁴ by marring his own prosperity through his own act, but is frustrated when his favourite gold-mounted emerald signet-ring, which he has cast ceremoniously into the deep sea, is miraculously restored to him by the implacable Divinities.

'The occurrence struck Polycrates as supernatural, so he wrote all that he had done and all that had come of it in a letter, which he addressed to Egypt. When Amasis read the letter from Polycrates, he realized that it is impossible for one human being to extricate another from the destiny awaiting him, and that no good could be awaiting Polycrates, whose success was so unbroken that he recovered even what he had thrown away. In view of this, he sent a note to Samos denouncing the *entente*. His object in making this *démarche* was to save his own feelings from being harrowed, as they would be for a friend and ally, when Polycrates was overtaken by such a crushing disaster.'

¹ See the story in Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 34-45.

² See the story in Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 46-56 and 69-85.

³ Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 86-7. This legendary *auto da fé* has a better claim to the euphemistic title than the historic holocausts of the Spanish Inquisition.

⁴ 'Your vast successes do not please me', Herodotus makes Amasis write to Polycrates, 'because I know for a fact that the Deity has an envious disposition' (Herodotus, Book III, chap. 40).

And, sure enough, Amasis was right; for 'Polycrates met with a shocking fate, which was quite unworthy of his character and ambitions'. The satrap of Lydia entices Polycrates into his power, tortures him to death, and crucifies his corpse.¹

This Herodotean note is recaptured by one of the most accomplished Latinizers of Greek verse and Hellenic *êthos* in the Augustan Age, in a piquant application to Man's greatest material discoveries and inventions:

Ne quicquam deus abscedit
 prudens Oceano dissociabili
 terras, si tamen impiae
 non tangenda rates transiliunt vada.
 audax omnia perpeti
 gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas.
 audax Iapeti genus
 ignem fraude mala gentibus intulit.
 post ignem aetheria domo
 subductum macies et nova febrium
 terris incubuit cohors,
 semotique prius tarda necessitas
 leti corripuit gradum.
 expertus vacuum Daedalus aëra
 pennis non homini datis;
 perrupit Acheronta Herculeus labor.
 nil mortalibus ardui est;
 caelum ipsum petimus stultitia neque
 per nostrum patimur scelus
 iracunda Iovem ponere fulmina.²

The prevalence of this notion of 'the Envy of the Gods' in a disintegrating Hellenic Society is attested perhaps even more impressively by the witness of a Latin philosopher-poet of the last generation of the 'Time of Troubles' who had made it his life-work to preach, with a religious fervour, the illusoriness of the belief that there is any supernatural intervention in human affairs:

Cui non animus formidine divom
 contrahitur, cui non correpunt membra pavore,
 fulminis horribili cum plaga torrida tellus
 contremittit et magnum percurrunt murmura caelum?
 non populi gentesque tremunt, regesque superbi
 corripiunt divom percussi membra timore,
 nequid ob admissum foede dictumve superbe
 poenarum grave sit solvendi tempus adultum?

¹ Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 39-43 and 122-5. The crucifixion of Polycrates is touched upon further in V. C (ii) (b), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 403, footnote 1, below.

² Horace: *Carm.* I, 3, ll. 21-40. In a different context the first four lines of the present quotation have been quoted already in II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, p. 327. The same note is sounded by Horace's contemporary and friend Virgil in his Fourth Eclogue, ll. 31-3.

summa etiam cum vis violenti per mare venti
induperatorem classis super aequora verrit
cum validis pariter legionibus atque elephantis,
non divom pacem votis adit et prece quaesit
ventorum pavidus paces animasque secundas—
nequiquam, quoniam violento turbine saepe
corruptus nilo fertur minus ad vada leti?
usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam
obterit et pulchros fascis saevasque securis
proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.¹

Hellenism is not the only civilization that has inherited this notion of 'the Envy of the Gods' from a primitive past. The same cynical explanation of the working of the Universe is to be found in a book of wisdom which is one of the spiritual fruits of the second and severer bout of a Sinic 'Time of Troubles':²

Stretch a bow to the very full,
And you will wish you had stopped in time;
Temper a sword-edge to its very sharpest,
And you will find it soon grows dull.
When bronze and jade fill your hall
It can no longer be guarded.
Wealth and place breed insolence
That brings ruin in its train.

'He who stands on tip-toe, does not stand firm;
He who takes the longest strides, does not walk the fastest.'
He who does his own looking sees little,
He who defines himself is not therefore distinct.
He who boasts of what he will do succeeds in nothing;
He who is proud of his work, achieves nothing that endures.³

If we turn from the Sinic World to one which was more remote from the Hellenic World in *êthos* in spite of its geographical proximity, we shall find in the book of an Israelitish prophet of the eighth century B.C., who was born into the second bout of a Syriac 'Time of Troubles',⁴ a curiously close anticipation of the words which Herodotus—writing some three hundred years later than Isaiah—has put into the mouth of Xerxes' mentor Artabanus:⁵

'The day of the Lord of hosts shall be upon every one that is proud and lofty, and upon every one that is lifted up; and he shall be brought low;

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 1218-35.

² For the two bouts of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 291-5, below.

³ The *Tao-te King*, chaps. 9 and 24 (translation by Waley, A., in *The Way and its Power* (London 1934, Allen & Unwin)).

⁴ For the two bouts of the Syriac 'Time of Troubles' see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 302-3, below.

⁵ See the present chapter, p. 250, above.

'And upon all the cedars of Lebanon that are high and lifted up, and upon all the oaks of Bashan,

'And upon all the high mountains, and upon all the hills that are lifted up,

'And upon every high tower, and upon every fenced wall,

'And upon all the ships of Tarshish, and upon all pleasant pictures.

'And the loftiness of Man shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of men shall be made low; and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day.'¹

The same philosophy is expounded by a Jewish writer of the second century B.C. who may have been influenced not only by the Prophets of Judah and Israel but also by the Hellenic thought of a post-Herodotean generation that had substituted an impersonal Chance for gods made in human image without having outgrown the naively cynical belief in a Divine Envy working havoc with human life.

'I returned and saw under the Sun that the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong neither yet bread to the wise nor yet riches to men of understanding nor yet favour to men of skill; but Time and Chance happeneth to them all. For Man also knoweth not his time. As the fishes that are taken in an evil net and as the birds that are caught in the snare, so are the sons of men snared in an evil time, when it falleth suddenly upon them.'²

Even some two centuries later, when a prolonged experience of suffering was bringing a tardy enlightenment to Jew and Greek alike, we find, in a passage of lyric poetry in the Gospel according to Saint Luke, that the intervention of God in human affairs is attributed in the first place to a desire to exercise power, and only in the second place to a concern for justice and mercy.

'He hath shewed strength with his arm; he hath scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts.

'He hath put down the mighty from their seats, and exalted them of low degree. He hath filled the hungry with good things; and the rich He hath sent empty away.'³

It was a Greek and not a Jew—and this a Greek older than Herodotus—who first proclaimed the truth that the cause of *περιπέτεια* is not to be found in the intervention of any external power but is an aberration in the soul of the sufferer himself, and that the name of this fatal moral evil is not Envy but Sin.⁴

¹ Isaiah ii. 12-17.

² Ecclesiastes ix. 11-12.

³ The *Magnificat*, in Luke i. 51-3.

⁴ The spiritual insight of Aeschylus seems to have come to him neither as a congenital endowment nor as a sudden intuition, but as a reward of spiritual travail. At any rate we have evidence, in his surviving literary remains, of a stage in his spiritual history at which he had not yet seen the light. As Ranulf points out in *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 69-70, the discomfiture of Xerxes is ascribed to the Envy of the Gods by Aeschylus in *The*

A grey word liveth, from the morn
 Of old time among mortals spoken,
 That Man's wealth waxen full shall fall
 Not childless, but get sons withal;
 And ever of great bliss is born
 A tear unstaunched and a heart broken.

But I hold my thought alone and by others unbeguiled;
 'Tis the deed that is unholy shall have issue, child on child,
 Sin on sin, like his begetters; and they shall be as they were.
 But the man who walketh straight, and the house thereof, tho' Fate
 Exalt him, the children shall be fair.

For Old Sin loves, when comes the hour again,
 To bring forth New,
 Which laugheth lusty amid the tears of men;
 Yea, and Unruth, his comrade, wherewith none
 May plead nor strive, which dareth on and on,
 Knowing not fear nor any holy thing;
 Two fires of darkness in a house, born true,
 Like to their ancient spring.

But Justice shineth in a house low-wrought
 With smoke-stained wall,
 And honoureth him who filleth his own lot;
 But the unclean hand upon the golden stair
 With eyes averse she fleeth, seeking where
 Things innocent are; and, recking not the power
 Of wealth by men misgloried, guideth all
 To her own destined hour.¹

The sinner is brought to destruction not by God's act but by his own. His offence lies not in rivalling his Creator—for that is just the opposite of what the sinner does—but in deliberately making himself utterly unlike Him; and God's part in this human tragedy is not active but passive. The sinner's bane is not a Divine Envy; for Man's attribution of this base passion to the Godhead

Persae as positively as it is explained in the same way by Herodotus. Ranulf not only quotes the reference, in terms, to the Envy of the Gods in *The Persae*, l. 362, but also acutely draws attention to the significance of the particle γὰρ in line 12. In the history of Hebrew thought we seem to find a counterpart to this Aeschylean evolution in Exodus xx. 3-6, where the jealousy of Yahweh is first mentioned as a deterrent against possible proclivities, on his worshippers' part, to divide their worship between him and other gods, but is then immediately interpreted as an implacability towards them that hate him, which is offset by mercy for them that love him and keep his commandments. This interpretation is a manifest attempt to transfigure the immoral, or at any rate non-moral, quality of envy into a discriminatory treatment of friends and enemies which, in the relation between God and Man, may be taken at a stretch as a manifestation of divine righteousness. This attempt to reconcile old and new conceptions of the divine nature is so strained that it actually emphasizes the breadth of the gulf which divides them, and thereby gives a measure of the spiritual distance which the progress of human thought has traversed. In Exodus xxxiv, where the divine qualities of jealousy and mercy are likewise both mentioned, there is no attempt to relate them to each other.

¹ Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 750-81, translated by Gilbert Murray.

is as false as it is blasphemous. The sinner's bane is a divine inability to continue to use as an instrument of creation a creature that has insisted upon alienating itself from the life of its Creator.¹ The sinful soul comes to grief because, so long as it wills to sin, God's grace is unable to inspire and inform it. But if *περιπέτεια*—‘the reversal of roles’—is thus produced by the inward spiritual working of a moral law, and not by the impact of some external agency's immoral envy or unmoral exercise of power, how are we to interpret the plot of this psychological tragedy? If we examine the action of the play, we shall discern two variations on it which are distinguishable in a logical analysis though they are usually blended ‘in real life’. In one version the subject errs through an untimely passivity, while in the other he rushes actively to seek his doom.

The passive aberration to which a creative human being is prone on the morrow of an achievement is to ‘rest on his oars’ in a fool's paradise where he dreams that, by having exerted himself once upon a time, he has won a title to ‘live happily ever after’—as though one day's fairly earned wages could be converted, ‘in real life’, into an interminable and inexhaustible banker's draft upon the Future. Short of this degree of folly, the victor in yesterday's battle is apt to dream that if Time does refuse to stand still—if his successful response to the last challenge does, after all, overbalance into the evocation of a new challenge, and so toss him back into the open sea out of the haven where he has been fain to linger—then the seafarer *malgré lui* has merely to repeat mechanically the motions that served him so well last time in order to be sure of riding any storm which Fate may send down upon him. It is plain that the creative individual who yields to this passive mood is falling into the posture of the arrested individual or the arrested society² which has achieved so exact an equilibrium with its environment that it becomes the environment's slave instead of its master. In the case of the arrested civilizations we have seen that this posture is only tenable so long as the environment happens to remain constant, and that it spells disaster so soon as the environment begins to change. The same fate awaits a creative minority which has become infatuated with its own works. According to the Syriac legend of the creation of the Physical Universe, when ‘God saw everything that He had made, and, behold, it was very good; and the evening and the morning were the sixth day; . . . and on the seventh day God ended His work which He had made; and He rested on the seventh day from all the work

¹ Ephesians iv. 18.

² For a survey of arrested civilizations see Part III. A in vol. iii, above.

258 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS which He had made; and God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because that in it He had rested from all His work which God had created and made'¹—the immediate result was a static paradise, and it needed the Serpent's undesignedly beneficent intervention to liberate God's energies for performing a fresh act of creation in spite of Himself.² The triumphant creator is carried by his triumph into mortal danger of settling, like Zeus, on to a tyrant's throne³ or sinking, as Faust feared to sink, on to a slug-gard's *Faulbett*.⁴ 'Otium et reges prius et beatas perdidit urbes.'⁵ In terms of our modern Western Physical Science the nemesis of creativity, when the *ci-devant* creator's aberration takes this passive form, is described by a living biologist in the following language:

'Specialisation—while it leads to temporary prosperity—exposes a species to extinction or at least to very unfavourable conditions when its environment alters. A small change of climate will lead to the disappearance of forests over a wide area, and with them of most of the animals highly adapted to life in them, such as squirrels, woodpeckers, wood-eating beetles, and so forth. A few, like our own ancestors, adapted themselves to a new environment; but the majority, and all the more highly specialised, died out, the new population of the area being recruited from among the less well adapted forms.'⁶

If the moral of this passive aberration that overtakes some creative spirits is 'let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall',⁷ we shall find that 'pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall'⁸ is the epitaph of those others who rush to seek their doom.

This second version of the plot is a tragedy in three acts which are familiar in Greek literature under the titles *κόπος*, *ὑβρις*, *ἄρνη*; and in this context these three Greek words all have a subjective as well as an objective connotation. Objectively *κόπος* means 'surfeit', *ὑβρις* 'outrageous behaviour', and *ἄρνη* 'disaster'. Subjectively *κόπος* means the psychological condition of being 'spoilt' by success; *ὑβρις* means the consequent loss of mental and moral balance; and *ἄρνη* means the blind headstrong ungovernable impulse that sweeps an unbalanced soul into attempting the impos-

¹ Gen. i. 31 and ii. 2-3.

² For the role of the Serpent and Satan and Mephistopheles see II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, pp. 271-99, above.

³ See Part III. B, in vol. iii, above.

⁴ See II. C (ii) (b) 1, in vol. i, above.

⁵ Catullus: *Carmina*, li. II. 15-16.

⁶ Haldane, J. B. S.: *Possible Worlds* (London 1927, Chatto & Windus), pp. 42-3.

⁷ 1 Corinthians x. 12.

⁸ Proverbs xvi. 18. The same truth is expressed in a different idiom by a latter-day Russian Orthodox Christian philosopher:

'Man's self-affirmation leads to his perdition; the free play of human forces unconsciously with any higher aim brings about the exhaustion of Man's creative powers. . . . The will to power and "life" destroys the personality' (Berdyaev, N.: *The Meaning of History* (London 1936, Bles), pp. 142 and 215. Cf. pp. 154-5).

sible.¹ This active psychological catastrophe in three acts was the commonest theme—if we may judge by the handful of extant masterpieces—in the fifth-century Athenian tragic drama. It is the story of Agamemnon in Aeschylus's play of that name, and of Xerxes in his *Persae*; the story of Ajax in Sophocles' play of that name, of Oedipus in his *Oedipus Tyrannus*, and of Creon in his *Antigone*; and it is the story of Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae*.

'I have said: Ye are gods, and all of you are children of the Most High. But ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes.'²

In Platonic language,

'If one sins against the laws of proportion and gives something too big to something too small to carry it—too big sails to too small a ship, too big meals to too small a body, too big powers to too small a soul—the result is bound to be a complete upset. In an outburst of *ὑβρις* the over-fed body will rush into sickness, while the jack-in-office will rush into the unrighteousness that *ὑβρις* always breeds.'³

In these two variant versions of a single plot⁴ we can discern and comprehend the nemesis of creativity; and if, 'in real life', this tragedy is really common form—if it is true that the successful creator of one chapter is severely handicapped, by his very success, in endeavouring to resume the creative role in the next chapter, so that the chances are always actually against 'the favourite' and in favour of 'the dark horse'⁵—then it is plain that we have here run

¹ 'Un élan qui peut aller jusqu'à l'emportement à mesure que tombent les obstacles; elle a quelque chose de frénétique.'—Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 320.

² Psalm lxxxii. 6–7.

³ Plato: *Leges*, 691 c.

⁴ Plato (*Respublica* 491 B) lays stress on the active kind of moral aberration as a cause of social breakdown:

'Must we not suppose . . . that the souls which have the finest natural endowment are precisely those that tend to go sensationally to the bad under the influence of a bad education? When one looks into the great crimes and the examples of unmitigated wickedness, does one find that these are the fruits of a second-rate character? Are they not apt rather to be the fruits of a vitality that has been corrupted by a wrong upbringing? Is it not the fact that a weak character is never the author of anything great—either for good or for evil?'

⁵ The apparently paradoxical, and at the same time fundamentally right and natural, victory of 'the dark horse' is the theme—if this may be said without irreverence—of the Beatitudes in the Sermon on the Mount. 'Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven; . . . blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the Earth' (Matt. v. 3 and 5). The same paradox is the *Leitmotiv* in the 'folk-tale' of the Ugly Duckling which turns into a swan, in the fairy-story of the Cinderella who turns into a princess, and in the romance of the boor who turns into a mighty man of valour like Sir Kay in fiction and Muzio Attendolo 'Sforza' in 'real life'. And, if Sir Leonard Woolley's theory is right, we can see the same principle at work in the first gleam of a revelation of the nature of the One True God which has eventually shone out in Christianity. According to Woolley in his *Abraham* (London 1936, Faber), God revealed himself to the Hebrew patriarch in the shape of the familiar humble tutelary genius of the household, whose worship Abraham carried with him out of Ur into the Wilderness, and not in any of the great deities of a Sumeric Pantheon whose temples the emigrant perforce left behind him in a city of destruction from which he was extricating himself just in time. For the historical relation between the religious enlightenment of Abraham and the disintegration of the Sumeric Civilization see Part VII, below.

to earth a very potent cause of the breakdowns of civilizations. We can see that in the drama of social life this nemesis of creativity would bring on social breakdowns directly in two distinct ways. On the one hand it would seriously diminish the number of possible candidates for playing the creator's role in the face of any given challenge, since it would tend to rule out those who had responded successfully to the last challenge, and these, *ex hypothesi*, were potential creators before their very success in turning promise into achievement threatened to sterilize their creativity in the act of demonstrating it. In the second place this frequent sterilization of the *ci-devant* creators would handicap the society in its next ordeal out of all proportion to the mere numerical ratio between a handful of lost leaders and a host of creative spirits; for, *ex hypothesi* again, the very past achievement which has fatally disqualified these lost souls from achieving anything further has also brought them to the front and has lodged them in key positions where their senile impotence to create is aggravated by their lasting potency *ex officio* to thwart and hinder.¹ When these considerations are taken together, it will be seen that the handicapping or disqualifying or sterilizing of *ci-devant* creators through an inward psychological aberration to which their very achievement makes them prone is the most potent cause of breakdown of any that our survey has revealed.

Can this nemesis of creativity be averted? Clearly it can; for otherwise every civilization that ever came to birth would be arrested inexorably at the threshold of life, whereas we have actually found no more than four instances of civilizations that have succumbed to this fate, as against no less than twenty-one that have succeeded in going on from strength to strength. Yet, though a way of salvation exists, it is a narrow way and it is difficult to find it.² The question is, 'How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born?'³ And the answer is that, 'except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven'.⁴

How often do the creative minorities which have discovered a successful response to one challenge then qualify themselves, through a spiritual rebirth, to take up the next challenge and the next? And how often do they disqualify themselves by fatuously

¹ This almost malignantly perverse operation of the rhythm of Life is particularly apparent in the disastrous transformation of creative into dominant minorities and the equally disastrous usurpation of the office of peace-makers by statesmen who have risen to power as leaders in war and procurers of military victory. These two illustrations are examined in greater detail in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (a), pp. 297-8 and 298-300, below.

² Matt. vii. 14.

³ John iii. 4.

⁴ Matt. xviii. 3, quoted on p. 248, above.

'resting on their oars' or by wilfully rushing down the steep place that leads from *κόρος* through *ὑβρις* into *ἄτη*? Our best hope of finding an answer to this question lies in resorting once more to our trusty and well-beloved method of making an empirical survey.

2. 'Resting on One's Oars'

(α) *The Idolization of an Ephemeral Self.*

A Definition of Idolatry.

While the attitude of 'resting on one's oars' may be described as the passive way of succumbing to the nemesis of creativity, the negativeness of this mental posture does not certify an absence of moral fault. A fatuous passivity towards the Present springs from an infatuation with the Past; and this infatuation is the sin of idolatry which, in the primitive Hebrew scheme of religion, is the sin most apt to evoke the vengeance of 'a jealous god'. Idolatry may be defined as an intellectually and morally purblind worship of the part instead of the whole, of the creature instead of the Creator, of Time instead of Eternity;¹ and this abuse of the highest faculties of the human spirit, and misdirection of its most potent energies, has a fatal effect upon the object of idolization. It accomplishes the perverse and disastrous miracle of transforming one of 'thè ineffably sublime works'² of God into an 'abomination of desolation, standing where it ought not'.³ In practical life this moral aberration may take the comprehensive form of an idolization of the idolator's own personality, or own society, in some ephemeral phase of the never-ceasing movement from challenge through response to further challenge which is the essence of being alive;⁴ or, again, it may take the limited form of an idolization of some particular institution, or particular technique, which has once stood the idolator in good stead. It may be convenient to examine these different forms of idolatry separately, and we may start with the idolization of the self, because this will offer us the clearest illustrations of the nature of the sin that we are now setting out to study. If it is indeed the truth

That men may rise on stepping-stones
Of their dead selves to higher things,⁵

then the idolator who commits the error of treating one dead self, not as a stepping-stone, but as a pedestal, will be alienating him-

¹ See Part I. A, vol. i, p. 9, with footnote 3, and IV. C (iii) (b) 4 and 5, in the present volume, pp. 141-85, above, for the nature of idolatry as exemplified in our modern Western political aberration of Nationalism.

² Goethe: *Faust*, I. 249, quoted in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, pp. 276 and 279, above.

³ Mark xiii. 14 = Matt. xxiv. 15; cf. Luke xxi. 20. These passages in the New Testament are reminiscences of Daniel ix. 27 and xii. 11.

⁴ See Part III. B, vol. iii, above.

⁵ Tennyson: *In Memoriam*.

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self from the life of God¹ as conspicuously as the stylite devotee
who maroons himself on the summit of a lonely column dissevers
himself from the world of men.

Jewry.

The most notorious historical example of this idolization of an ephemeral self is the error of the Jews which is exposed in the New Testament in a series of passages that we have already quoted² as incomparable expressions of the *motif* of *περιπέτεια*. In a period of their history which began in the infancy of the Syriac Civilization and which culminated in the Age of the Prophets of Israel, the people of Israel and Judah raised themselves head and shoulders above the Syriac peoples round about in responding to the challenge of a 'Time of Troubles' by rising to a higher conception of Religion.³ Keenly conscious, and rightly proud, of the spiritual treasure which they had thus wrested from an ordeal that had broken the spirit of their Aramaean and Phoenician and Philistine neighbours, the Jews allowed themselves to be 'betrayed, by what' was 'false within',⁴ into an idolization of this notable, yet transitory, phase of their own spiritual growth. It was, indeed, a mighty feat of spiritual intuition to perceive in the lineaments of a primitive volcano-demon of the Arabian Wilderness the epiphany of a God who was omnipresent and omnipotent. What the Israelites had come to see in their hereditary tribal divinity Yahweh was never apprehended in Chemosh by the Moabites or in Rimmon by the Damascenes or in Melkart by the Tyrians⁵ or in Dagon by the Philistines. In this chapter of their history the Children of Israel had been gifted with an unparalleled spiritual insight. And then, after having divined a truth which was absolute and eternal, they allowed themselves to be captivated by a temporary and relative half-truth. They persuaded themselves that Israel's discovery of the One True God had revealed Israel itself to be God's Chosen People; and this half-truth inveigled them into the fatal error of looking upon a momentary spiritual eminence, which they had attained by labour and travail, as a privilege conferred upon them by God in a covenant which was everlasting.⁶ In this delusion—which was a moral as well as an intellectual fault—the Jews 'rested on their oars' when they were called upon to respond to a new challenge which was

¹ Ephesians iv. 18.

² In IV. C (iii) (c) 1, on p. 247, above.

³ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 140-1, above.

⁴ Meredith: *Love's Grave*, quoted in IV. C (iii) (a), on p. 120, above.

⁵ The identification of the Tyrian Melkart with the Hellenic Hēraklēs, and the possible influence of this act of religious syncretism upon the mythology and theology of Christianity, are discussed in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 465-76, below.

⁶ See the passages quoted from the Old Testament in II. C (ii)-(a) 1, vol. i, p. 246, above.

presented to the Syriac Society *post Alexandrum* by the impact of Hellenism;¹ and, through persisting in this posture, they 'put themselves out of the running' for serving once more as pioneers in the next advance of the Syriac spirit. Brooding over a talent which they had perversely sterilized by hiding it in the earth,² they rejected the still greater treasure which God was now offering them. 'A son of man the Son of God? Was a generation in Jewry that was heir to the whole of God's revelation to Abraham and Moses and the Prophets now called upon to betray this magnificent Jewish spiritual heritage by accepting one of those childish shocking Hellenic *contes* of the amours of Zeus which the wisdom of the Greeks themselves had long ago rejected as being neither intellectually nor morally credible of the Godhead?'³ The question had only to be framed in order to answer itself in the negative in the mind of an orthodox Jew of the generation of Jesus. And so it came to pass that the Gospel of a Jewish Messiah who was God Himself incarnate was preached by Galilaeans and taken to heart by Gentiles.

Athens.

If Israel succumbed to the nemesis of creativity by idolizing itself in its transitory role of being 'the Chosen People', Athens condemned herself to the same fate by becoming infatuated with her own no less transitory role of being 'the Education of Hellas'.

We have seen how Athens earned a temporary claim to this magnificent title by finding a solution for the Malthusian problem which beset the Hellenic Society in the second chapter of its history,⁴ and by going on to solve, with even greater brilliance, the further problems which the very success of the Solonian economic revolution had raised in the two fields of domestic politics⁵ and artistic culture. These gifts of Athens to Hellas were indeed immense; yet the Enneacruni were not, any more than Jacob's Well at Samaria, 'a well of water springing up into everlasting life'.⁶ This Attic water might momentarily slake the drinker's thirst, but it could not procure him a miraculous release from ever thirsting again;⁷ and, indeed, the imperfectness of what Athens had achieved was proclaimed by the very occasion on which her self-conferred title of 'the Education of Hellas' was coined for her by her own son

¹ For this challenge see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 263-4, above, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 103-5, below.

² Matt. xxv. 25.

³ For the points of likeness and difference between the story of the conception and birth of Jesus in the Matthaean and Lucan prologues to the Gospel and the similar stories that are told of certain pagan heroes of Hellenic history see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 267-75, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 450-1, below.

⁴ See I. B (i), vol. i, pp. 24-5, and II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 37-42, above.

⁵ See IV. C (iii) (b) 9, pp. 200-6, above.

⁶ John iv. 14.

⁷ John iv. 13-14.

Pericles. He coined it in a funeral oration¹ which he delivered in praise of the Athenian dead in the first year of an Atheno-Peloponnesian War which was an outward visible sign of an inward spiritual breakdown in the life of the Hellenic Society. And this fatal war had broken out because one of the problems set by the success of the Solonian economic revolution—the problem of creating a Hellenic political world order—had proved to be beyond the compass of the fifth-century Athenians' moral stature.² In the circumstances of the year 431–430 B.C. the orator's proclamation of Athens as 'the Education of Hellas' should therefore not have moved his audience to a thrill of self-adulation, but rather have moved them to 'abhor' themselves 'and repent in dust and ashes'.³ The military overthrow of Athens in 404 B.C., and the greater moral defeat which the restored Athenian democracy inflicted upon itself in 399 B.C. by the judicial murder of Socrates, did indeed provoke one contemporary Athenian man of genius to repudiate Periclean Athens and almost all her works.⁴ Yet Plato's partly petulant and partly affected gesture of fouling his own Attic nest neither profited Plato himself nor impressed his fellow citizens; and the epigoni of those Athenian pioneers who had made their city 'the Education of Hellas' sought to vindicate their claim to a forfeited title by the perverse method of proving themselves unteachable.

Like the French *émigrés* at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the restorers of the Athenian democracy at the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. convicted themselves of having 'forgotten nothing and learnt nothing';⁵ and the tone which they set was maintained by their successors to the bitter end of Athenian history. They idolized the dead self of Athens as she had been, for a fleeting moment, in the Periclean Age; and they thereby debarred a post-Periclean Athens from having any part or lot in later Hellenic acts of creation.

On the political plane no cumulation of disasters ever availed to shake Athens out of the 'sacred egoism' which Pericles had taught her to regard as a duty to herself that her past services to Hellas entitled her to cultivate in perpetuity.

In transforming the Delian League into an Athenian Empire, this Attic egoism had not only brought upon Athens the loss of her political primacy in Hellas, but had incidentally brought upon

¹ The phrase, as we have it, occurs in the rendering of Pericles' funeral oration by Thucydides in Book II, chap. 41.

² See IV. C (iii) (b) 10, p. 213, above.

³ Job xlii. 6.

⁴ For Plato's attitude towards his Attic social heritage see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 90–3, above.

⁵ 'Personne n'a su ni rien oublier ni rien apprendre.'—Chevalier de Panat in a letter dated London, January 1796, in *Mémoires et Correspondance de Mallet du Pan* (Paris 1851, Amyot & Cherbuliez, 2 vols.), vol. ii, chap. 9, p. 197.

Hellas as a whole the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization. Yet a post-war Athens learnt so little from the political errors of her pre-war self that the history of the First Athenian Empire was virtually repeated in that of the Second. The disruption of this Second Athenian Empire, owing to Athens' inveterately egoistic proclivities, opened the way for a Philip of Macedon, on the fringes of the fourth-century Hellenic World, to build up a Power of an overwhelmingly superior material calibre.¹ The measure of this superiority was given by the completeness of Athens' defeat at Chaeronea; and, in the next generation, Philip's political achievement in Continental European Greece was emulated by the Romans in Italy and dwarfed by Alexander in Asia. Therewith the whole scale of political life in the Hellenic World was enlarged, and this so vastly and so abruptly that the change opened a new chapter in Hellenic history.² Yet it took Athens 76 years—from her overthrow by Philip in 338 B.C. to her overthrow by Antigonos Gonatas in 262—to learn that, in this new world of titans, she could no longer affect with impunity to play her classic role of a Hellenic Great Power.³

Even then, the Athenian reading of a Macedonian lesson was fatally negative; for when, in 229–228 B.C., Athens shook herself free again from Macedonian military occupation, she rebuffed an invitation to enter the Achaean League, and withdrew into a selfish isolation⁴—as though she were blind to the patent political truth that, in the international situation of that age of Hellenic history, a policy of solidarity between the little central states was, for each and all of them, the only possible means of salvation from the fate of being overwhelmed by the new Great Powers of titanic calibre on the Hellenic World's expanding periphery.⁵ In this posture of an egoism that was bound to defeat itself, Athens looked on passively while Rome delivered 'knock-out blows' to her fellow titans on the periphery and to Athens' neighbours in the centre who had been attempting—without Athenian help—to avert this catastrophe by the expedient of federation; and by this time Athens' egoism had so far stifled both her Hellenic public spirit and her Attic self-respect that she actually stooped to play the part of Greek jackal to the Roman lion. She basely begged for a dole out of Roman spoils and Greek losses—the derelict territory of the neighbouring Boeotian city of Haliartus, which had fallen a victim to Roman

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, pp. 485–6, above.

² See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 140 and 150–1, and III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, p. 197, above; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (b), in the present volume, pp. 305–6; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 214; and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 289–90, below.

³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 338, above.

⁴ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 340–1, above.

⁵ See loc. cit.

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'frightfulness',¹ together with the two islands of Lemnos and Delos—and the insular items in her shameless demand were contemptuously tossed to her.²

Yet neither a mercenary gratitude for the lucrative gift of the Delian slave-market, nor a prudent fear of suffering Haliartus's fate, restrained Athens from eventually turning against her Roman patrons and masters. With a supreme inconsequence Athens waited until Rome's world power had been placed on an impregnable basis by the overthrow of all serious competitors, and then she abandoned her latter-day policy of isolation, plunged once again into the maelstrom of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' in its final paroxysm, and this time pushed her way into the *mêlée* on the anti-Roman side. In 88 B.C., when King Mithradates of Pontic Cappadocia offered the city-states of Greece a 'liberation' from Roman whips which would merely have exposed them to chastisement with the scorpions of a despotism in the Achaemenian tradition, Athens light-heartedly enlisted under the Oriental war-lord's banner, and paid for her folly two years later when the city was taken by storm by Mithradates' Roman conqueror Sulla. If the price which she paid on this occasion was something less than annihilation, it was because—as Sulla himself explained, in excuse for his unwonted touch of mercy—'he forgave a minority for the sake of a majority: the living for the sake of the dead'.³ A historian might comment that this posthumous service, which the Athenians of the Solonian and the Periclean Age thus rendered to their degenerate descendants, was, after all, no more than a bare act of justice, considering that the latter-day Athenians' infatuation with their ancestors' withered glory had been so largely instrumental in bringing them to their eventual pass. The extent of the service which Sulla ironically credited to the account of the Athenians of the past must not, however, be overestimated; for, though Athens survived the Sullan sack as a *chef d'œuvre* of architecture and a seat of intellectual life, this last excursion into the arena of international politics was the inglorious end of Athenian political history.

Was it intellectual stupidity or moral aberration that prevented the Athenians from ever learning a lesson which was perpetually being inculcated into them from the days of Lysander to the days of Sulla? Since it can hardly be maintained that the average level, either of native wit or of intellectual cultivation, was lower in Athens than in other parts of the Hellenic World during the last four centuries B.C., the Athenians stand convicted of having brought

¹ For the sack of Haliartus and Coronea by the Romans in 171 B.C. see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 213, and III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 312, above.

² Polybius, Book XXX, chap. 20 (*olim* 18), and Book XXXII, chap. 7 (*olim* 17).

³ Plutarch's *Life of Sulla*, chap. 14.

their political misfortunes upon themselves through the moral fault of infatuation with their own past; and it is here that we must look for the psychological cause of their inveterate self-stultifying egoism. This explanation will be confirmed if we take a comparative view of the contemporary creative achievements of certain other Hellenic communities which conspicuously lacked the Attic intellectual endowment, but which were also, by the same token, exempt from the incubus of a Periclean halo.

At the moment when, at the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., the exiled Athenian democrats were preparing for their barren restoration of an Attic *ancien régime*, an Athenian soldier of fortune, who was then seeing service in the Achaemenian pretender Cyrus's famous corps of ten thousand Greek mercenaries, was observing the differences in *êthos* between the several contingents of troops that composed this variegated force. The Ten Thousand were the human flotsam and jetsam of all the city-states that had been battered by the recent storm of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War; and, since the greater part of the Hellenic World had been involved in the catastrophe,¹ this post-war camp of Greek mercenaries on Achaemenian ground was a fair epitome of the contemporary Hellenic Society. In this miniature Hellas-under-arms the Athenian Xenophon noticed, with a contempt which was half irritable and half condescending, that his Achaean and Arcadian comrades were markedly more wayward, impulsive, improvident, refractory to discipline, and in fact in every way more crude and barbaric, than the representatives of the more sophisticated and progressive Hellenic communities of the day, like his own Athenian self, or his Spartan and Boeotian friends.² Xenophon's observation was correct. At the date when he made it, Athens stood on an altogether higher level of culture than Arcadia and Achaia; yet after Xenophon's day the roles were so rapidly reversed that an Arcadian historian of the second century B.C., who was also an Achaean statesman, could pronounce a condemnation which is as convincing as it is severe upon the statesmanship of a fourth-century Athenian politician who was Xenophon's junior by only one generation; and he could drive his verdict home by pointing the contrast between Demosthenes and the author's own forebears who had been Demosthenes' Arcadian contemporaries.

'For Demosthenes the measure of everything was the parochial interest of his Attic fatherland. In his view the whole of Hellas ought to take its cue from Athens as a matter of duty, and any Hellenes who failed

¹ Thucydides, Book I, chap. 1.

² For the difference in *êthos*, and consequent divergence in action, between the Achaeans and Arcadians on the one side and the rest of the Ten Thousand on the other see Xenophon's *Cyri Anabasis*, *passim*, especially Book VI, chaps. 1-3.

to comply were stigmatized by him as traitors. In this, Demosthenes' policy was, in my opinion, singularly wide of the mark and out of touch with reality; and, as a matter of fact, my opinion is borne out by the verdict of the history of the age, which testified to the political wisdom and foresight, not of Demosthenes, but of [his Arcadian and Messenian contemporaries] Eucampidas and Hieronymus and Cercidas and the sons of Philiadras.¹

If this comparative judgement was valid already for the age which saw Athenian statesmanship fail to prevent the new Power of Macedon from imposing its hegemony upon Hellas, it was still more conspicuously valid for the ensuing period which intervened between the Battle of Chaeronea and the date at which Polybius was writing. In the third century B.C. it was unquestionably the wisdom and foresight of Achaean and Arcadian statesmen that liberated the heart of Hellas from Macedonian shackles, and then worked out a constitutional device for safeguarding this recaptured political freedom by making it less difficult for the little states at the centre of a rapidly and widely expanding Hellenic World to hold their own against the Great Powers which were growing up on the periphery. The device was a new system of federating city-states: a form of federation which did not attempt to deprive the individual state-member of its traditional city-state autonomy, yet at the same time took care to confer effective powers upon the common Government of the federal union. The Achaean and Arcadian architects of this new type of Hellenic polity perceived that these were the only terms on which the city-states in the heart of Greece could survive politically at all in a world in which the average unit-size of a sovereign state had already increased, in every other region, to a measure which dwarfed even an Attica or a Lacedaemon, not to speak of the smaller domain of a Sicyon or Megalopolis or Dyme. This truth, of course, was staring all third-century Greek statesmen in the face; but an Aratus and a Lydiadas distinguished themselves by summoning up the strength of mind to act upon their insight,² whereas, in this new crisis in Hellenic history, Athens' sole distinction lay in the singular negativity of her role. Her despised Boeotian neighbours might perhaps find some ground for claiming that the work of Aratus was inspired by Boeotian federal experiments in the past³—in so far as it was not a direct reaction to the exigencies of Aratus's own age. Even the Spartans, who incurred a more positive responsibility than the Athenians for the ultimate failure of Aratus's political enterprise,⁴ did at least react

¹ Polybius, Book XVIII, chap. 14 (*olim* XVII. 14).

² For their work see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 313-14 and 339-41, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (B), pp. 307-8, below.

⁴ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 341, footnote 1, above.

to the Hellenic crisis of the third century B.C. by suddenly and surprisingly shaking off a social catalepsy in which they had lain fast bound for three hundred years;¹ and they did not relapse into lethargy until they had offered two new and notable contributions to the Hellenic commonweal—an experiment in social revolution² and a legend of martyr-kings³—both of which were harvested in the fullness of time by the Hellenic proletariat, although, at the moment, they brought confusion and not salvation to the dominant minority. At this critical moment when Hellas, in her extremity, was throwing her oldest veterans, as well as her youngest recruits, into her battle with Fate, in a last desperate effort to break through the iron ring, Athens was almost alone in holding coldly aloof.

This negativeness of Athens in her latter days, which we have so far been observing on the political plane, comes out still more strikingly when we turn our attention from politics to culture; for culture, even more than politics, was the sphere of activity in which Athens excelled in the springtime of her history which had opened with her success in solving the Malthusian challenge; and in this field her *floruit* came later and lasted longer. In the souls of a Euripides and a Thucydides and a Socrates and a Plato the very onset of the political adversity that was heralded by the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War had the effect of a challenge which evoked the highest moral and intellectual flights of the Attic spirit; and the fourth century B.C., which saw the beginning of the political autumn of Athenian history, marked the height of its cultural summer. Even after the turn of the fourth and third centuries, when the flow of native Attic genius threatened to dwindle, the cultural pre-eminence of Athens seemed to be assured for ever by an established cultural prestige which attracted to her precincts the men of light and learning from ever more distant regions of a continually expanding Hellenic World—an Aristotle of Stageirus and a Zeno of Citium and an Epicurus of Samos—and these eminent Athenians by spiritual adoption left permanent legacies to the city where they had made their home. They reinforced the Platonic Academy with a Peripatus and a Stoa and a Garden. Yet by the time when Polybius of Megalopolis was writing his oecumenical history, Athens could no longer claim to possess a monopoly of the higher Hellenic culture;⁴ and even in the field of philosophy,

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 53-77, above.

² See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 76-7, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 78; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 388-9; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 219-20, below.

³ See V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, *passim*, vol. vi, below.

⁴ Polybius himself records (in Book IV, chaps. 20-1) the deliberate and strenuous and successful efforts which the Arcadians had made, presumably between Xenophon's day and his own, to counteract the barbaric boorish vein which Xenophon had observed in his Arcadian companions-in-arms. Some time before Polybius's day the Arcadians

which she appeared to have made peculiarly and inalienably her own, the conceit of being 'the Education of Hellas' led her into betraying herself when she was visited by a greater than Zeno from a city which was not more outlandish than Citium.

The rejection of Paul by the Athenians¹ is the analogue of his Master's rejection by the Jews. Though Paul disputed—according to the custom of philosophers at Athens—'in the market daily with them that met with him', and though he gave a seasoning of Attic salt to his Areopagitic oration by taking an Attic votive inscription for his text, his preaching of the Resurrection proved an insuperable stumbling-block to an Athenian generation which was infatuated with a Stoic and Epicurean past. Paul's first impression of a 'city wholly given to idolatry' was indeed a true intuition of Athens as she had come to be in the Apostle's day.

'Their idols are silver and gold, the work of men's hands.

'They have mouths, but they speak not; eyes have they, but they see not;

'They have ears, but they hear not; noses have they, but they smell not. . . .

'They that make them are like unto them; so is every one that trusteth in them.'²

'So Paul departed from among them . . . and came to Corinth',³ where his message that God 'now commandeth all men everywhere to repent' found more sensitive ears among the grandchildren of the commercial-minded Roman freedmen who had been settled by Caesar on the derelict site of Athens' annihilated Greek rival.⁴ Athens had refused to be charged with a spiritual mission which she might have taken as the crown of her long philosophic preparation; and the function of serving as a seed-bed in which the germs

had subjected themselves to the cultural discipline of a compulsory universal education in community singing; and the effectiveness of this Arcadian institution was demonstrated, towards the close of the third century B.C., by one of those exceptions that prove a rule. At this date the Hellenic World was shocked, and the rest of Arcadia put to shame, by a startling relapse into barbarism in the single Arcadian community of Cynaetha, where the national Arcadian institution of an intensive cultivation of music had been allowed to fall into local neglect.

¹ See the account in Acts xvii. 16-34.

² Psalm cxv. 4-6 and 8.

³ Acts xvii. 33 and xviii. 1.

⁴ For the commercial-mindedness of Caesar's freedmen-colonists at Corinth see Strabo, *Geographica*, Book VIII, pp. 381-2. After her annihilation in 146 B.C. by the Roman General Mummius, 'Corinth remained derelict for an age, until eventually the eligibility of the site procured the restoration of the city at the hands of Caesar the God. Caesar repopulated Corinth with a large colony of Romans of the freedman class; and these colonists, when they were shifting the ruins and incidentally digging up the graves, came across quantities of *objets de vertu*, both in porcelain and in bronze. This funeral furniture made such an impression on them that they did not leave a single grave unripped—with the result that they acquired a large stock, disposed of it at a handsome profit, and filled Rome with *necrocorinthia*, as they called the yield of the graves, especially the porcelain. This Corinthian porcelain was highly prized to begin with—quite as highly as the Corinthian bronzes—but afterwards the craze for it subsided (the supply gave out, and, of the pieces already placed on the market, the majority were not a success).'

of Hellenic philosophy and Syriac religion would mingle and blend was fulfilled, not by Attica, but by Asia Minor. The seeds which the Apostle managed to sow among the turbulent Ephesians¹ and the 'foolish' Galatians were ripening, three centuries later, to an Asiatic harvest as far afield as rustic Cappadocia, and were beginning to take root among European barbarians beyond the farthest outposts of the Roman *Orbis Terrarum*, while Athens remained as 'wholly given to idolatry' as ever.

In the fourth century of the Christian Era, when the Cappadocian Fathers of the Church were laying the ecclesiastical foundations of a new social order, Athens was inspiring their Dardanian contemporary Julian with his tragically academic dream of a Paganism re-minted in a Christian image and resuscitated by artificial respiration.² The very connotation which the word 'academic' has acquired in our modern Western vernaculars, and the aptness of the word, in its eventual meaning, for describing and explaining the failure of Julian's life-work, bear witness to the fate to which Athens succumbed in the cultural sphere. It was not for nothing that the city which so frivolously rejected the Apostle's religious revelation should have entered with an equal light-heartedness upon the political escapade of the Mithradatic alliance at the instigation of the university professor Aristion.³ In clinging to her outworn role of being 'the Education of Hellas' in a particular mental groove, Athens fulfilled her ideal of herself in an unfortunately literal way by turning herself into a university town.

In the fifth century of the Christian Era, when she was standing out as a last barren reef of unsubmerged Paganism above the still rising waters of an oecumenical Christian flood, Athens was the scene of a strange cultural alliance between a scholastic intellectualism and an archaistic revival of primitive superstitions⁴ which the live genius of Hellenic philosophy had apparently strangled with ease, a thousand years before, in its Ionian infancy.⁵ The Athenian

¹ For the re-emergence of Ephesus in particular, and of Ionia and Aeolis in general, from the eclipse under which they had lain from the sixth century B.C. to the fourth, see IV. C (i), pp. 20-3, above.

² For Julian's abortive Neoplatonic Church see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 680-3, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 222-3, below.

³ The question whether Aristion was the only professor-dictator who had his day at Athens in this crisis, or whether he had a predecessor of the same profession called Athenion, is discussed in Ferguson, W. S.: *Hellenistic Athens* (London 1911, Macmillan), pp. 446-7, and in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. ix, p. 244, footnote 4.

⁴ This infection of the philosophy of the Dominant Minority by the superstition of the Internal Proletariat is examined further in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 553-68, below.

⁵ As early as the sixth century B.C. Superstition had been so effectively sterilized by Rationalism in the more progressive states of Hellas that the native supply of medicine-men and diviners gave out—if we may legitimately draw this inference from a number of cases, recorded by Herodotus, in which the Government of one or other of these states in the heart of the Hellenic World of that age employed the services of a diviner who had been born and bred in one of the backward cantons in the North-West. For example, the Athenian despot Peisistratus employed the Acarnanian Amphilytus (Book I,

professors in the generation of Saint John Chrysostom would pass—with no apparent sense of incongruity—from learnedly commenting on Aristotle in the lecture-room to piously swinging the bull-roarer over Attic fields in the half-affected but also half-serious belief that they were stimulating the crops by the practice of this magic ritual.¹ In this age, when Hellenism was at bay in an Attic fastness, the first and last things in the Hellenic tradition—its lowest and its highest elements—thus entered, at Athens, into a desperate defensive *union sacrée*. Even then the Athenians were being saved, as well as infatuated, by their ancestors; for at Athens this pedantic prolongation of 'the times of ignorance', in defiance of an official veto upon Paganism,² was indulgently 'winked at'³ by the fifth-century Imperial authorities. Yet a mild official indulgence could not save a senile Attic pedantry from being a forlorn hope; and when these latter-day Athenian professorial activities were eventually snuffed out by the Imperial Government's long delayed enforcement of the law in A.D. 529, there was little loss to learning, and none at all to the genius of creative Hellenic thought, whose soul had long since departed from this body academic.

The only practical effect of the Emperor Justinian's vexatiously legal act of closing the University of Athens was to advertise His Christian Majesty's intolerance and to provide a *beau rôle* for His Zoroastrian Majesty Chosroes. The ejected Athenian professors, cut to the heart by this wanton breaking of a nine-centuries-long Platonic 'Golden Chain', and debarred from all activities that gave their own lives any meaning, sought asylum in the East, where, in the springtime of Hellenic philosophy, the Seven Sages had once sought wisdom. The asylum was graciously granted, but the refugees were inevitably disillusioned; for while it was an easy matter for the Sasanian Pādīshāh to thwart the purpose, and blacken the face, of his Rūmī rival—the Caesar—by affording protection to the victims of Justinian's tyranny, it was entirely beyond Chosroes' power—and perhaps beyond the range of his imagination—to provide these academic exiles with the cultural atmosphere which they were now no longer allowed to breathe in Attica. Wise men who follow a king's star are unlikely to find their king—be he new-

chap. 62); the Samian despot Polycrates employed an Elean (Book III, chap. 132); the Spartan King Leonidas employed the Acarnanian Megistias (Book VII, chaps. 219, 221, and 228); the Phocians employed the Elean Tellias (Book VIII, chap. 27); the Spartans employed the Elean Tisamenus (Book IX, chaps. 33-6); Mardonius employed the Elean Hegesistratus (Book IX, chap. 37); Mardonius's Greek allies employed the Leucadian Hippomachus (Book IX, chap. 38).

¹ See the passage quoted from Marinus's *Life of Proclus*, chap. 28, in Bidez, J.: *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris 1930, Les Belles Lettres), p. 74. The whole of chap. 12 of Bidez's work is worth studying in this connexion.

² For the Imperial legislation of A.D. 382-90 for the suppression of Paganism see IV. C (iii) (b) 12, pp. 226-7, above, and V. C (i) (d) 8 (8), vol. vi, p. 89, below.

³ Acts xvii. 30.

born saviour or wizened metaphysician—if they choose to make their pilgrimage widdershins; and the last of the Athenian professors were not vouchsafed, for their own benefit 'in real life', that miraculous reversal of the cosmic rhythm with which they were familiar in a Hellenic legend of Pelops¹ and in a Syriac legend of Joshua.² So the stars in their courses duly fought against them;³ and indeed, in migrating eastward, from Athens to Ctesiphon, they were actually travelling towards the very source of the aggressive Syriac culture whose far-projected radiation had just completed the disintegration of Hellenism in its homeland. If the Syriac spirit was strong enough, even in a Helleno-Syriac syncretism such as Christianity, to make it impossible any longer to lead the life of a Hellenic philosopher at Athens, how could that life conceivably be lived in Ctesiphon under the aegis of a Zoroastrianism which was an undiluted and militantly anti-Hellenic expression of the Syriac genius?⁴ It is not surprising to learn that the Athenian refugees in a hospitable 'Irāq soon found themselves painfully and incurably homesick for the inhospitable world of Rūm whose dust they had shaken from off their feet with so antique a gesture; but it is certainly remarkable that their host Khusrū Anūshirwān, so far from taking offence at their apparent ingratitude, showed himself not only sensitive but sympathetic to his odd guests' pitiful despair. He was kind enough to make the professors' interest his royal concern; and, in the peace terms which he negotiated with the Roman Imperial Government in A.D. 533, he insisted upon the inclusion of a special clause which not only secured the readmission of his protégés into Roman territory, but also guaranteed them their liberty to live in the Christian Empire as pagans for the rest of their lives without being molested by the Imperial police.⁵

Thanks to such considerateness on the part of a Persian autocrat, this Athenian tragi-comedy received a happy ending; but the Attic aberration of idolatry did not die with its last professional adepts. In its literal sense of that adoration of graven images which had shocked Saint Paul, this Athenian infatuation with Athens' dead self lived on under the Christian dispensation and even survived the interregnum which intervened between the final disappearance of Hellenism and the incipient emergence of Orthodox

¹ See Euripides: *Electra*, ll. 726-44; *Orestes*, ll. 1001-6; *Iph. Taur.*, l. 816; Plato: *Politicus*, 268 B-269 A.

² Joshua x. 12-14.

³ Judges v. 20.

⁴ For Zoroastrianism as a reaction against the intrusion of Hellenism into the Syriac World see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-1; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 203; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 234-6; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285-6 and p. 374, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 125-6, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 657-61, below.

⁵ For the story of King Khusrū Anūshirwān and the Seven Athenian Professors see Agathias of Myrrhina: *A History of His Own Times*, Book II, chap. 30, and Edward Gibbon: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xl.

Christendom. It was assuredly no accident that the East Roman Empress Irene (*imperabat* A.D. 780-802), who restored the images to honour in the Orthodox Christian World after the first outbreak of Iconoclasm,¹ was not Anatolian but Athenian born.

We have now glanced at the part played by Athens in the political history of the Hellenic World after the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, and in its cultural history after the establishment of the four schools of philosophy in their Attic head-quarters; and our cursory survey has brought to light a paradoxical fact. Here is a period of Hellenic history which might aptly be labelled 'the Atticistic Age',² in acknowledgement of the truth that in this age the most strongly marked features of Hellenism are the traces of a lasting impress which has been left upon the face of the whole Hellenic Society by the creative work of Athens in the age immediately preceding;³ and yet, in an age which bears this conspicuous stamp of Attic achievements in the past, Athens makes herself conspicuous—once again, but this time in exactly the opposite way—through the absence of any contemporary Attic contributions to the solution of current Hellenic problems.

Venice

The Attic paradox, for which we have found an explanation in Athens' fatal aberration of idolizing her own dead self, has a parallel, in our Western World, in the similar contrast between the respective roles that Italy has played in the second and in the third chapter of our Western history.

If the Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. could fairly claim the title of 'the Education of Hellas', the Italy of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era might have called herself 'the Education of Western Christendom' with equal justice. If we scrutinize the countenance of our Western Society in that 'modern' chapter of its history which runs from the latter part of the fifteenth century to the latter part of the nineteenth, we shall find that its 'modern' economic and political efficiency, as well as its 'modern' aesthetic and intellectual culture, is of a distinctively Italian origin. In this chapter of its history our

¹ For the iconoclastic movement in the early life of Orthodox Christendom see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 352 and 364, below.

² Instead of 'the Hellenistic Age', which is the label commonly used. The word 'Hellenistic' is manifestly out of place in the description of a particular period of Hellenic history. If it is to be used, it ought to be applied, not to any chapter in the history of the civilization which we have called the Hellenic, but to the whole life and activity of the two societies—the Western and the Orthodox Christian—which stand to the Hellenic Society in the relation which we have called 'Affiliation'. The problem of nomenclature in the labelling of periods of history has been touched upon in III. C (ii) (β), vol. iii, p. 375, footnote 2, above.

³ On this point see II. D (ii), vol. ii, p. 42, above.

Western Civilization was launched on a new course by an Italian impetus; and this impetus came from the radiation, into Transalpine Europe, of a special Italian version of the general Western culture of the preceding age.¹ This local Italian culture made its conquests in Transalpine Europe, and thereby opened a new chapter in the history of the Western World as a whole, because it was brilliantly superior, in a number of vital points, to anything that Transalpine Europe had yet succeeded in achieving.² The unrivalled creativity of Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries³ was thus the original driving-force behind the movement of Western Civilization during a span of four ensuing centuries which, on this account, might aptly be called our 'Italist Age';⁴ and here we find ourselves confronted, once again, by our Attic paradox; for, throughout a period of our common Western history which bore the image and superscription of Italian acts of creation in the past, the contemporary Italian contributions to the general life of the age were conspicuously inferior to those of medieval Italy's modern Transalpine converts.

The comparative cultural sterility of Italy during the four-hundred-years' span of Western history which began *circa* A.D. 1475 was manifest in all the medieval homes of Italian culture—in Florence, in Venice, in Milan, in Siena, in Bologna, in Padua—and a connoisseur of Italian life in this period of eclipse would be able to drive the point home by presenting an eclectic picture com-

¹ For this Italian radiation into Transalpine Europe at the turn of the second ('medieval') and the third ('modern') chapter of our Western history see I. B (i), vol. i, p. 19; III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63; and IV. C (iii) (b) 8, in the present volume, p. 198, above; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), Annex I, vol. v, p. 635, footnote 1, and p. 638, below. The effect of the radiation is sometimes popularly described as 'the Renaissance'; but, in application to Transalpine Europe, the expression is misleading. For it was a mimesis of contemporary Italian culture, and not a recapture of some temporarily lost or submerged element in its own Transalpine social heritage, that was the real secret of the sudden advance in civilization that was accomplished by Transalpine Europe at this date. The authentic Renaissance was a re-birth of the defunct Hellenic culture in a new cultural environment through a successful recultivation of Latin and Greek letters; and this was not a Transalpine but an Italian achievement which was a part—though perhaps not the most vital part—of the *Kulturgut* that was transmitted from Italy to the Transalpine provinces of the Western World at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era.

² The superiority of Italian over Transalpine culture, which was so striking towards the end of the fifteenth century, is sometimes placed to the credit of the foregoing renaissance in Italy of Latin and Greek letters; but the Italian achievement which is correctly called by that name (see the preceding footnote) was in truth not the cause, but was rather partly an instrument or medium, and partly an incidental consequence, of the special local advance in civilization which Italy made in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The true cause of the advance was not an Italian mimesis of the culture of the 'apparented' Hellenic Society (whether in its local Latin version or in its Greek original), but a series of creative Italian responses to contemporary challenges. For the phenomenon of 'renaissances' in general, and for the Italian example in particular, see further Part X below.

³ For the phases, and some of the manifestations, of this Italian outburst of creativity see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 367, above.

⁴ For this term, as one of two alternative labels for describing the third chapter of our Western history (*currebat circa* A.D. 1475-1875), see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 375, footnote 2, above.

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posed of features drawn from the life of each and all of these cities.¹ An amateur may content himself with citing the single case of Venice as a particularly poignant illustration of a malady that afflicted every one of these historic Italian communities in this Modern Age.

In a profound change of circumstances which was cruelly adverse to the welfare of the whole Italian city-state cosmos, Venice was superficially more successful than most of her neighbours in holding her own. She did not lose her independence to a Transalpine conqueror (as Milan lost hers after having come within an ace of making herself mistress of all Northern Italy); and she did not lose it to an Italian empire-builder (as Siena lost hers to Florence, and Bologna hers to the Papacy, and Padua hers to Venice herself). Having always previously avoided political commitments on the Italian mainland and concentrated her political energies on acquiring an empire overseas, Venice deliberately reversed her policy in the course of the fourteenth century, and replied to the continental imperialism of the Visconti by embarking on an offensive-defensive movement in the same field which produced more lasting political results than those Milanese conquests which had drawn Venice into the continental arena. When the Visconti had disappeared from the Italian scene, and when Milan herself had become the prize of contending Transalpine Powers—to be bandied about from French hands to Spanish, and from Spanish to Austrian—Venice remained in possession of the largest of the new consolidated dominions which had now replaced the medieval mosaic of North and Central Italian city-states.² This latter-day Venetian empire on Italian soil was both more extensive and more dangerously exposed to attack by Transalpine aggressors than the latter-day Florentine empire which became the Grand Duchy of Tuscany;³ yet, in contrast to Florence, Venice managed both to acquire and to retain her empire without being driven to renounce the luxury of continuing to live under her ancestral republican constitution. This preservation of her medieval domestic liberties was a unique distinction which Venice shared with her maritime rival Genoa; and Genoa—absolved from the necessity of defensive empire-building by her good fortune in enjoying the protection of the

¹ For the general state of Italy in this age see Collison-Morley, L.: *Italy after the Renaissance* (London 1930, Routledge); Belloni, A.: *Il Seicento*, second edition (Milan 1929, Vallardi); Natali, G.: *Il Settecento* (Milan 1930, Vallardi, 2 vols.); eundem: *Cultura e Poesia in Italia nell' Età Napoleonica* (Turin 1932, Società Tipografica); Lee, V.: *Studies of the Eighteenth Century in Italy*, second edition (London 1907, Fisher Unwin).

² For this process of territorial consolidation in Italy, and for its ineffectiveness as a means of enabling the Italians to hold their own politically against the rising Transalpine Great Powers, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 355-7, above.

³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 355, footnote 1, above.

natural rampart of the Maritime Alps—was never called upon to face the fateful question whether an empire can be governed by a republic.¹

This relative successfulness of Venice in an age of general Italian discomfiture was not a windfall of happy accidents, but was the reward of a clear-headed and unslumbering statesmanship; and the quality of this Venetian statesmanship can be tested by comparing it with Athenian behaviour in corresponding situations. If Venice succeeded in gaining and holding an empire without having to submit herself to a despotism at home, this was because she avoided the strain which Imperialism generally imposes upon communities that indulge in it; and she achieved this negative yet by no means negligible success by making her yoke so easy, and her burden so light,² that her Paduan and Brescian subjects were free from any temptation to exchange their present status for that of their Bolognese or Milanese or Pisan contemporaries. In corresponding circumstances Athens made her tyranny so odious to her subject-allies that they soon yearned for a Spartan, or even for an Achaemenian, yoke as a more tolerable alternative servitude. And the inferiority of Athenian to Venetian statesmanship comes out as clearly in its handling of the problem of how a small state at the geographical centre of an international system should keep its footing after it has been dwarfed by the rise of new titans on an expanding periphery. We have seen³ how Athens was invariably worsted by this problem: how sometimes she recklessly threw down the gauntlet to Powers for whom she was no match, and thereby brought upon herself the disasters of 338 and 262 and 86 B.C., while at other times—as, for instance, in the critical year 228 B.C.—she showed an equal lack of judgement in the unseasonable pursuit of an un-aspiring policy of isolation. This persistent ineptitude, which is the main thread of continuity in Athenian foreign policy from the days of Demosthenes to the days of Aristion, affords a remarkable contrast to the masterliness of a Venetian diplomacy which managed to stave off for nearly three hundred years that partition of the Republic's Italian dominions among the Transalpine Powers which was the grand design of the League of Cambrai.

The secret of Venice's success, in certain situations in which Athens failed, was an ability to rise above the vice of self-worship in which those Athenian failures seem to find their explanation. But the success of modern Venice has been only relative and negative; on the whole and in the end, Venice failed to make any fresh creative contribution to the life of a society in which she managed

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 356, footnote 1, above.

² Matt. xi. 30.

³ On pp. 264-9, above.

to survive; and this Venetian failure can be explained by the fact that Venice, too, did succumb, in her own way, to the nemesis of creativity.

In the field of domestic politics the infatuation with a dead self which had nerved Venice to maintain her own medieval republican constitution at the same time inhibited her from anticipating or emulating the modern constitutional achievements of Switzerland or the Northern Netherlands by transforming her latter-day Italian empire into a federal state on a republican basis. While Venice was never so wrong-headed as to oppress her subject cities, she was also never so broad-minded as to take them into partnership; and so, in A.D. 1797, the political régime in the Venetian dominions in Italy was still just what it had been in A.D. 1339: that is to say, a mild hegemony under which a number of subject communities had to take their orders from a single privileged sovereign city-state.

Again, in the field of foreign policy, the extraordinary skill with which modern Venetian statesmanship succeeded in maintaining the integrity of the latter-day Venetian dominions in Italy, without involving Venice in efforts beyond her strength, did not find its counterpart in the contemporary policy of Venice in the Levant. In her dealings with the Great Powers of the modern Western World Venice took care not to exhaust herself as Florence exhausted herself in the age of Charles VIII or Holland in the age of Louis XIV. On the other hand Venice devoted herself to the forlorn hope of defending her ancient empire in the Levant against the rising power of the 'Osmanlis with an obstinacy which equalled the Dutch courage of a William of Orange and with a recklessness in facing overwhelming odds which reminds the historian of the spirit in which Athens confronted a Macedonian Philip and Antigonous and a Roman Sulla. In the War of Candia (*gerebatur* A.D. 1645-69) the Venetian Commonwealth—undeterred by the uniformly disastrous outcome of the series of losing battles which it had been fighting against the 'Osmanlis since the time of the War of Negrepont (*gerebatur* A.D. 1463-74)—threw the last ounce of its military strength into the prolongation of a struggle which, however long it might last, could have no other ending than the loss of Crete. Through this unseasonable intransigence Venice permanently weakened her stamina without any result beyond the unprofitable satisfaction of knowing that she had compelled the Ottoman Power to pay the same exorbitant price for a Pyrrhic victory.¹

¹ For the part played by the War of Candia in the disintegration of an Ottoman Slave-Household which had been the secret of the 'Osmanlis' rise to greatness, see III. A, vol. iii, p. 49, footnote 4, above.

The modern Venetian idolization of the medieval Venetian empire in the Levant, which inspired the Venetians to this vain act of self-immolation, drove them on to renew the unequal struggle at the first opportunity. When the tide turned against the 'Osmanlis in a war with the Danubian Hapsburg Power which began with the second Ottoman siege of Vienna in A.D. 1682 and ended in 1699 in the peace of Carlowitz, the Venetians hastened to intervene on the anti-Ottoman side and set out to compensate themselves for the loss of Crete by conquering the Morea. The vehemence with which they prosecuted their revenge was momentarily rewarded by the acquisition of Ottoman territories on the mainland which were greater in area than the aggregate of all the islands which Venice had lost to the Pādishāh between 1463 and 1669. Yet the only enduring effect of this War of the Morea upon Venetian life was to rule out the last faint hope of recovery from the exhausting effects of the War of Candia. The conquest of the Morea itself was ephemeral; for all that Venice had won from the 'Osmanlis on the mainland in 1684-99 she lost to them again in 1715, with the island of Tenos—her last foothold in the Archipelago—into the bargain. In this ill-judged final bid for dominion in the Levant Venice was simply creating a diversion for the benefit of the Hapsburgs and the Romanovs, who duly profited by making permanent acquisitions at the Ottoman Empire's expense in the Danubian Basin and on the Black Sea Steppes.

To serve as the cat's-paw for plucking other people's chestnuts out of the fire was the last role which Venetian statesmanship would have chosen to play; and it was a role which Venice never did fall into playing on the political chessboards of medieval Italy and modern Western Europe. Such political ineptitude ran altogether counter to the Venetian tradition and the Venetian *éthos*; yet the Venetians succumbed to this folly, and persisted in it to their own undoing, in a sphere where the policy was ruinous from every material standpoint. The cost, in 'blood and treasure', of postponing the loss of Candia for twenty-five years, or obtaining possession of the Morea for twenty-eight, could not be recouped by any commercial profits that were to be drawn from these Levantine dominions; for the territorial possessions which had been effective *points d'appui* for Venetian trade in the Levant in the Pre-Ottoman Age had been rendered, long since, commercially valueless through the mere fact of their being reduced to the position of tiny enclaves in the vast domain of an Ottoman Empire which had engulfed the whole of the hinterland; and this hinterland itself had been impoverished by the diversion of the main stream of international trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Thus the Levantine

stake for which Venice played her ruinous game against Turkey in the Modern Age was nothing more substantial than a passion to 'save' her 'face' by retaining the cumbersome territorial tokens of a past political greatness. The fact that this passion should have mastered the habitually cool and calculating Venetian mind is a striking testimony to the deadliness of the malady of self-idolization.

The spirit in which Venice surrendered herself to this malady is enshrined for Posterity in the material relics of her Levantine empire. The massive fortifications of her original Levantine *places d'armes*—a Negrepont and a Modon and a Coron and a Candia—speak, more eloquently than any words, of the limpet-like tenacity with which, through two hundred years of strenuous defensive warfare, the Venetian Commonwealth clung to every disputed foothold, and incidentally turned these Levantine reefs and crags and islands and peninsulas into a veritable museum of military architecture in which the twentieth-century traveller may watch the transition from medieval tower-and-curtain-wall to modern bastion-and-glacis. The vanity of the ephemeral revenge which Venice took upon the Ottoman victor in her final feat of conquering the Morea is likewise mutely proclaimed in the present state of Monemvasia—'the Little Gibraltar'¹—where the traveller who cares to scale the rock can still enter the citadel in the footsteps of the Janissaries who made their entry on the 10th September, 1715,² and can pick his way over the summit among the carcasses of the dismantled Venetian cannon, whose bronze bodies lie where they fell when their splintered wooden carriages rotted away.

The nemesis of medieval Venetian creativity took a stern material shape in the frowning military works which modern Venice has left as her cenotaph in the Levant; but the same writing on the wall is no less plainly manifest in the melancholy works of art which were being created at home by those latter-day Venetian painters and musicians who were contemporaries of the last of the great Venetian captains, Francesco Morosini, the conqueror of the Morea. At first sight it may seem incredible that the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Venetians who were living that elegantly frivolous carnival life which the music and the pictures commemorate were the same flesh and blood that fought and died in

¹ Like Gibraltar, Monemvasia is a rock connected with the continent by a low-lying spit of land. The name, in Greek, means 'One Way In'; in English it survives as the label of the 'Malmsey' wine which was exported from the medieval French principality of the Morea to the countries of the West. The missing link between the English Malmsey and the Greek Monemvasia is the French Malvoisie.

² For the capitulation of the Venetian garrison of Monemvasia to the Ottoman forces in September 1715 see Brue, B.: *Journal de la Campagne que le Grand Vezir Ali Pacha a faite en 1715 pour la Conquête de la Morée* (Paris 1870, Thorin), pp. 51-7.

the breach at Candia; but second thoughts tell us that the very sharpness of the contrast in *ethos* proves the two moods complementary. The intolerable strain which modern Venice was incurring in the Levant, in her infatuation with the dead self of her medieval Levantine glory, demanded, and received, in psychological 'compensation', an Epicurean relaxation of Venetian life at home; and this latter-day Venetian cultivation of the pleasures of the passing hour resembled its Hellenic original in being the refined expression of a low vitality. In Canaletto's meticulous portraits of a Venice from whose atmosphere the sunlight has faded away we seem to see the ashes of a holocaust in which the Venetians had burned their energies out since the days when they had savoured the full-blooded colours of a Titian and a Tintoretto; and the same note of 'dust and ashes' struck a nineteenth-century English poet's ear in *A Toccata of Galuppi's*.

Here you come with your old music, and here's all the good it brings.
What, they lived once thus at Venice, where the merchants were the
kings,
Where Saint Mark's is, where the Doges used to wed the Sea with
rings?

What? Those lesser thirds so plaintive, sixths diminished, sigh on
sigh,
Told them something? Those suspensions, those solutions—'Must we
die?'

Those commiserating sevenths—'Life might last! we can but try!'

Yes, you, like a ghostly cricket, creaking where a house was burned—
'Dust and ashes, dead and done with, Venice spent what Venice earned!
'The soul, doubtless, is immortal—where a soul can be discerned.'

'Dust and ashes!' So you creak it, and I want the heart to scold.
Dear dead women, with such hair, too—what's become of all the gold
Used to hang and brush their bosoms? I feel chilly and grown old.

The writer of this Study is familiar with a picture of Canaletto's, now hanging in an English house, in which the only patch of colour is the Union Jack which floats from the poop of an English ship riding at anchor among baroque palaces and churches. This blare of English red and blue, which catches and holds the gazer's eye among the muffled Venetian browns and greens and greys, proclaims, in the visual language of Canaletto's brush, that the dominion of the sea has passed into other than Venetian hands.

The truth that Venice is 'dead and done with', and the moral that others, besides 'Venice and its people', may be 'merely born to bloom and drop', have also been impressed upon the present writer's imagination by another visual image which remains as

sharply printed on his mind to-day as at the instant when he received it more than twenty-five years ago. Turning the corner of a mountain in a lonely district at the eastern end of Crete, he once suddenly stumbled upon the ruins of a baroque villa which must have been built for the pleasure of a Venetian grandee in the last days of Venetian rule in the island before the 'Osmanlis came to reign there in the Venetians' stead. It was a house which might have been built for a contemporary nobleman in England, and have been lived in—had it stood on English ground—by its builder's descendants down to the tenth generation in the writer's own day; but, having been built, as it happened, by Venetian hands in Crete, this piece of modern Western architecture was as utterly 'dead and done with'—as veritably 'a museum piece'—in A.D. 1912 as the Minoan palaces at Cnossos and Phaestus which the traveller had been looking at a few days before. In the common mortality which had overtaken each of them in turn, at moments more than three thousand years apart, these desolate habitations of vanished thalassocrats bore witness, against their makers, that

in due time, one by one,

Some with lives that came to nothing, some with deeds as well undone,
Death' came tacitly and took them where they never see the sun.

As the English traveller recalled the English poet's lines, he reflected that the four and a half centuries for which Venice had been mistress of Crete were a longer span of time than the present age of his own country's rule over the earliest acquired of her overseas dominions; and his ears seemed to catch an echo of Galuppi's music among the Cretan crags.

In you come with your cold music, till I creep in every nerve.

That baroque ruin in Crete, as it stood in A.D. 1912, was a *memento mori* for an England that was then still alive, as well as for a Venice that was then already dead.

This Epimethean chapter of Venetian history, for which Galuppi has written the dirge and Canaletto painted the hatchment, has not turned out, in the event, to be the last phase of Venice's participation in the life of the Western World. For Venice, together with the rest of Italy, has been reprieved from an eighteenth-century life-in-death by undergoing a nineteenth-century *Risorgimento*.¹ At first sight this recent Italian social miracle might seem to testify that, unlike Athens and Sparta, Venice and Florence have eventually triumphed over the nemesis of their previous creativity

¹ The nature of this modern Italian *Risorgimento* has been discussed already in this Study in certain of its aspects (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 311-12, and IV. C (i), in the present volume, pp. 17-19, above, and also V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), Annex I, vol. v, pp. 635-42, below).

by facing it out and living it down; and if this were the truth, it would indicate that the gift of creativity is rather less formidable for its recipient than we have so far taken it to be. On closer inspection, however, we shall find that the modern Italian *Risorgimento* does not bear these implications; for when we look for the creative forces by which the *Risorgimento* was actually achieved, we shall observe that they almost all arose outside the bounds of those historic city-states which were the seed-beds of Italian creativity in the Middle Ages.

In the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, when Italy was confronted with the challenge of Transalpine pressure, these historic Italian communities did not make any attempt at self-redemption that is worthy to be compared with the magnificent failure of the rally in Greece in the third century B.C. For all his intellectual acumen, Machiavelli never achieved the practical effectiveness of an Aratus; and there was no Italian equivalent of the self-sacrifice of a Lydiadas or the martyrdom of an Agis and a Cleomenes. If modern Italy eventually rose again, while third-century Greece fell once for all, this was because, in both these cases, the stage was so set that the outcome did not depend upon the actors' own merits, but was decided by the play of irresistible external forces. The third-century rally in Greece¹ was rendered abortive by the swift destruction of the Balance of Power between the titans on the periphery through a series of 'knock-out blows' that were dealt by Rome to all her rivals; for these blows 'knocked out' Greece as well as all the rest of the contemporary Hellenic World. On the other hand the inveterate inertia of sixteenth- and seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Italy was indulged in with eventual impunity thanks to the moderation of the contemporary Transalpine Powers in exercising their forces 'by temperate and undecisive contests'² which neither overthrew the general Balance of Power nor utterly devastated the Italian arena in which so many of these Transalpine contests were fought. And so, by merits not their own, these Italian communities were preserved from destruction until, in the fullness of time, they received an unearned reward for the merits of their ancestors.

Towards the close of the modern chapter of our Western history the Transalpine nations were ready to repay the debt which they owed to medieval Italy. At the beginning of the chapter, in the fifteenth century, Italy had quickened the Transalpine 'barbarians'

¹ For this rally see the present chapter, pp. 268-9, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 287-9, below.

² This felicitous Gibbonian phrase has been quoted already in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 311, in IV. C (iii) (b) 3, in the present volume, p. 148, and in IV. C (iii) (b) 5, p. 189, above. See also V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, vol. v, p. 625, below.

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 into new life by radiating across the Alps her medieval creative achievements. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the *ci-devant* 'barbarians' had laid out their Italian talents to such good effect that they had gained new talents of their own—a modern Transalpine Democracy and a modern Transalpine Industrialism. It thus now lay in the Transalpine peoples' power to make, at last, some return for the benefit which a medieval Italy had freely conferred upon them four hundred years before; and they duly acquitted themselves of this historical obligation by sharing their own new gains with a modern Italy whose turn it had been to play the passive part, and who in consequence had made no modern Italian contribution to this latest enrichment of a common Western culture. The turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the beginning of a new cultural radiation across the Alps in a reverse direction; and this inflow of Transalpine influences into Italy was the first cause of the Italian *Risorgimento*.

The first strong political stimulus was the temporary incorporation of Italy into the Napoleonic Empire,¹ which brought her into association with modern France. The first strong economic stimulus was the reopening of the trade-route through the Mediterranean between Western Europe and India—an eighteenth-century English fancy which was transformed into a reality by the after-effects of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt²—since this troubling of Mediterranean waters by the wash of French and English hulls broke in vivifying waves upon Italian shores. These Transalpine stimuli did not, of course, produce their full effect in Italy until they had communicated themselves to Italian agents; but the Italian creative forces by which the *Risorgimento* was brought to harvest did not arise on any Italian ground that had already borne the harvest of a medieval Italian culture.

In the economic field, for example, the first Italian port to win a share for itself in modern Western maritime trade was neither Venice nor Genoa nor Pisa, but Leghorn; and Leghorn was the modern creation of a Tuscan Grand Duke who was concerned to fill the vacuum that had been left by the overthrow of medieval Pisa at the hands of medieval Florence, and who achieved his purpose by planting a settlement of Spanish and Portuguese crypto-Jewish refugees on this promising site in the Tuscan maremma.³ It was these Hispanic immigrants, and not any

¹ On this point see IV. C (i), p. 19, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), Annex I, vol. v, pp. 633-42, below.

² See V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), Annex I, vol. v, p. 623, below.

³ For the settlement of this Marrano community at Leghorn in A.D. 1593 see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 244, footnote 2, above.

descendants of the medieval Pisans or Genoese, who made the commercial fortunes of Leghorn in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹

In the political field the unification of Italy was the achievement of an originally Transalpine principality which had no foothold on the Italian side of the Alps before the eleventh century beyond the French-speaking Val d'Aosta, and which did not lose the last of its Transalpine possessions until 1860. The effective assertion, in Piedmont, of the authority of the House of Savoy was not made good till about four hundred years after the original acquisition of a legal title to the lordship over this sub-Alpine Italian province; and the firm establishment of the Savoyard power on the Italian side of the Alps was thus contemporaneous with the creation of a Venetian empire on the Italian mainland and with the formation of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany; yet this Cisalpine expansion of Savoy was not really part of the general process of political consolidation by which the diminutive domains of some seventy or eighty Italian city-states were welded into ten larger agglomerations of territory at the transition from the Medieval to the Modern Age;² for Piedmont was a fringe of Northern Italy into which the city-state dispensation had never effectively spread,³ and the Savoyard rulers who established themselves in this never wholly conquered fastness of North Italian feudalism were not the despotic heirs of republican liberties, like the Visconti or the Medici. They were legitimate princes of the Holy Roman Empire—genuine peers of the Dukes of Lorraine and the Princes of Orange—who drew their title from a good and ancient feudal source.⁴ In fact, this Savoyard principality continued to be a Transalpine state in tradition and in spirit, even after its geographical centre of gravity had shifted to

¹ Compare the role, in the modern commercial life of the Levant, of those other Hispanic Jewish refugees who were planted in the sixteenth century at Constantinople and Smyrna and, above all, Salonica by the Ottoman Government. Like their compatriots and contemporaries who settled at Leghorn, these modern Hispanic Jewish settlers in the Levant stepped into the shoes of medieval Italian men of business. (See II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 246, above.)

² For this process see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 355–6, above.

³ Piedmont was defended from the rising tide of North Italian civic institutions by the Marquessate of Montferrat—another fastness of feudalism, in the mountainous country between the River Po and the River Tanaro, which held out obstinately against the city-state of Asti on the one side and the city-state of Vercelli on the other. In spite of this obstacle the civic movement did succeed in spreading into Piedmont and making itself felt in such Piedmontese towns as Turin and Ivrea; yet on Piedmontese soil it was always exotic and half-hearted.

⁴ Historically the County of Savoy, which was the nucleus of the dominions of the dynasty to which it gave its name, was a district of Boso's *Regnum Provinciae*; and this was one of the four fragments (*Regnum Lotharii*, *Regnum Jurense*, *Regnum Provinciae*, *Regnum Italicum*) into which Lothaire's portion of the Carolingian heritage had split up in the interval between the tripartite division of the Carolingian dominions in A.D. 843 (see I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 37–40, above) and the reunion of the whole of Lothaire's portion with Ludwig's in the tenth century by the Emperor Otto I (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 197, above).

the Italian side of the mountains. No historic Italian city-state was included in the Savoyard dominions till the acquisition of Vercelli in 1427;¹ and it was not till 1748 that the Ticino became the eastern frontier of the Kingdom of Sardinia—as the Savoyard dominions had now come to be styled—along the whole course of the river between its exit from the Lago Maggiore and its confluence with the Po.² The House of Savoy did not, in fact, encroach flagrantly upon the patrimony of the medieval Italian city-state cosmos until it swallowed the Genoese Republic in the peace-settlement of 1814-15; and its *éthos* was at that time still so alien from the city-state tradition that the Genoese chafed under the rule of His Sardinian Majesty until 1848, when the Dynasty won adherents in all parts of the Italian Peninsula by laying aside its parochial dynastic ambitions and putting itself at the head of a national movement for the unification of all Italy.

In 1848 the Austrian régime in Lombardy and Venetia was threatened simultaneously by a Piedmontese invasion and by risings in Venice and Milan and the other Italian cities which were at that time subject to the rule of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy; and it is interesting to reflect upon the difference in the historical significance of these two anti-Austrian movements which were both taking place at one and the same moment on Italian soil, and which both figure officially as blows struck in a common cause for the liberation of Italy.

The risings in Venice and Milan were strokes struck for liberty, no doubt; but the vision of liberty which inspired them was the recollection of a medieval past. As the memories of childhood rise up suddenly, unbidden, in old age, and come sharply into focus through a momentary rift in the mental fog of dotage, so, in A.D. 1848, the Lombard insurgents against the Hapsburgs were resuming their twelfth-century and thirteenth-century struggles

¹ Vercelli, which had previously been under the hegemony of Milan, had become a virtual protectorate of the House of Savoy in 1407, twenty years before the formal act of cession. The acquisition of Asti did not follow till more than a hundred years later, in 1531.

² Earlier in the eighteenth century the House of Savoy had extended its rule over three more minor Lombard city-states: over Alessandria in the peace settlement of 1712-13 (in execution of a treaty of the 8th November, 1703, with the Emperor), and over Tortona and Novara in the peace settlement of 1735-9. But the chief continental Italian acquisition that was made by the House of Savoy in the eighteenth century was Montferrat (which was acquired, with Alessandria, in 1713); and Montferrat, as we have seen, was feudal soil like Piedmont itself. No historic Lombard city-state was comprised either in the Lomellino and Val di Sesia (which the House of Savoy acquired simultaneously with Montferrat and Alessandria) or in the Vigevanasco, the Transticinane and Traspadane portions of the Pavese, and the sub-Alpine county of Anghiera (which the House of Savoy acquired in 1748, in execution of a treaty of the 13th September, 1743, with the Empress). The details of the House of Savoy's acquisitions in Lombardy in the eighteenth century can be found in the state papers published in vols. ii and iii of *Traité Public de la Royale Maison de Savoie avec les Puissances Étrangères depuis la Paix de Châteaue-Cambresis jusqu'à Nos Jours* (Turin 1836-44, Imprimerie Royale, 6 vols.).

against the Hohenstaufen, while the Venetians who expelled the Austrian garrison from their city in the same year were repeating their ancestors' feat of expelling a Frankish garrison in A.D. 810. In the heroic failure of 1848 Milan atoned for the tameness with which she had worn a 'barbarian' yoke for more than three centuries, and Venice for the poltroonery with which she had allowed her independence, as well as her empire, to be snuffed out by Napoleon in 1797. The passionate obstinacy with which the Venetians held out to the last against their Austrian besiegers in 1848-9 was worthy of their forebears' conduct in the War of Candia or the War of Chioggia.

Compared with this final feat of Venetian arms, the Piedmontese military performance in 1848-9 was not very creditable; yet the Italian *Risorgimento* was eventually brought to harvest by the Power whose easy march on Milan was followed by an inglorious retreat, and whose irresponsible breach of a prudent armistice was deservedly punished by a shameful defeat at Novara. This Piedmontese disgrace proved more fruitful for Italy than those Milanese and Venetian glories; for the Piedmontese Army lived to take its revenge for Novara, ten years later, at Magenta; and the English-like parliamentary constitution which King Carlo Alberto had granted to his subjects in 1848 survived his abdication to become the basis of the constitution of a United Kingdom of Italy. On the other hand, the glorious feats of Milan and Venice in 1848 were not repeated; and when Milan was liberated from Hapsburg rule once for all in 1859, and Venice in 1866, both of these historic cities played, this time, a passive part and waited for the work of liberation to be performed on their behalf by the Piedmontese Army with the potent assistance of a Transalpine ally.¹

The explanation is that the Venetian and Milanese exploits in 1848 were virtually foredoomed to failure, however magnificent they might be in their intrinsic worth, because the spiritual driving-force behind them was still that idolization of their own dead selves, as historic medieval city-states, which had been defeating the finest efforts of Italian heroism and Italian statesmanship since the time of Machiavelli. The nineteenth-century Venetians who responded to Manin's call in 1848 were fighting for Venice alone, and not for Piedmont or Milan or even for Padua; they were striving to restore an obsolete Venetian Republic and not to create a new Italian national state; and for this reason their enterprise was a forlorn hope, whereas Piedmont could survive a more shame-

¹ The Transalpine ally of Piedmont was, of course, France in 1859 and Prussia in 1866; and in each case it was this Transalpine adversary of Austria that played the principal part in forcing her to relinquish an Italian province which would probably never have been wrested from her by the unaided force of Piedmontese arms.

ful disaster because the nineteenth-century Piedmontese were not fast bound in the misery and iron of an unforgettable historic past. The Piedmontese were psychologically free to throw themselves into the novel enterprise of creating an Italian national state on the Transalpine pattern; and, in giving them this opportunity, Fortune was placing in their hands a winning card; for this modern Transalpine ideal of Nationalism was the momentarily invincible offspring of the dominant social forces of the age;¹ and the Piedmontese were specially qualified, by the predominance of Transalpine elements in their own social heritage, for serving as the agents who were to translate this Transalpine ideal into an Italian fact.²

The difference in *ethos* between nineteenth-century Piedmont and nineteenth-century Venice is summed up in the contrast between the personalities of Manin and Cavour. Manin was an unmistakable Venetian who would have felt himself quite at home in the Italian city-state cosmos of the fourteenth century if it had been his fate to defend Venice against Genoese instead of Austrian besiegers. Cavour, with his French mother-tongue and his Victorian spirit, would have been as utterly out of his element as his Transalpine contemporaries Bright or Thiers if Fate had happened to make him a citizen of fourteenth-century Alessandria or Tortona, while he could have turned his gifts for international diplomacy and parliamentary politics, and his interest in scientific agriculture and railway-building, to even better use than he did make of them if Fate had chosen to translate him into the seat of some landowner or member of parliament in nineteenth-century England.

On this showing, the role, in the Italian *Risorgimento*, of the outbreak in the year 1848 was essentially negative, and its immediate failure was a precious and, indeed, indispensable factor in the success which crowned the later struggles in the years 1859-70. In 1848 the old idols of a medieval Milan and a medieval Venice were so cruelly battered and defaced that at last they lost their fatal hold upon the idolators' souls; and it was this belated effacement of a medieval Italian past in the seats of its former greatness that cleared the ground for a successful Italian *Risorgimento* under the leadership of the one modern Italian state that

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 4 and 5, above.

² Now that the Piedmontese labours for the creation of an Italian national state on the Transalpine model have been crowned with success, the people of those Italian provinces which were once the patrimony of a medieval Italian city-state cosmos have quickly learnt to play their full part in the new national life and to make their own characteristic contributions to it. We have seen the Piedmontese parliamentarian Giolitti (a caricature of Cavour) brushed aside to make way for the Romagnol dictator Mussolini (in whose countenance we seem to catch a glimpse of a Baldassare Cossa or a Muzio Attendolo 'Sforza'). The nineteenth-century difference in *ethos* between the Romagnols and the Piedmontese was manifestly a matter of mutable states of mind, and not the reflection of any immutable difference of Race. For the decisive refutation, in Italian history, of the racial theory of social breakdowns see IV. C (i), pp. 16-20, above.

was free from the spiritual incubus of overpoweringly poignant medieval memories.

South Carolina.

If we extend our survey from the Old World to the New, without stepping outside the bounds of our Western Society in the nineteenth century, we shall find a parallel illustration of the nemesis of creativity in the history of the United States; and for our purpose this is an even more noteworthy case, for in twentieth-century North America the dead selves that are still being idolized—with the same blind passion and the same unhappy consequences as in modern Italy down to 1848—do not date from the Middle Ages, but are only two or three centuries old.

If we make a comparative study of the *post-bellum* histories of the several states in 'the Old South' which were members of the Confederacy in the Civil War of 1861-5 and were involved in the Confederacy's defeat, we shall notice a marked difference between them in the extent to which they have since recovered respectively from that common disaster; and we shall also notice that this difference is the exact inverse of an equally well marked difference which had distinguished the same states from one another in the *ante-bellum* period.

A foreign observer who visited 'the Old South' in the seventy-third year after General Lee's capitulation at Appomattox Court House would assuredly pick out Virginia and South Carolina as the two Southern States in which there was least sign, or even promise, of recovery; and he would be astonished to find the effects of even so great a social catastrophe persisting so starkly over so long a period. In these states the memory of the catastrophe of 1861-5 is as green in our generation as if the blow had fallen only yesterday; and 'the War' still means the Civil War on many Virginian and South Carolinian lips, though the United States has twice been at war again in the interval, and one of these two later American wars has been the World War of 1914-18. Again, if there is talk of local politics or family affairs, the stranger will often discover, to his surprise, that the persons and events which are the topics of the conversation are a century or a century and a half old. In fact, twentieth-century Virginia or South Carolina makes the painful and uncanny impression of a country living under a spell, in which Time has been made to stand still. And this impression will be heightened by the contrast of which our traveller will become instantly and acutely aware if he breaks his journey, *en route* from Richmond to Charleston, in the intervening state of North Carolina. In North Carolina he will find new cotton-

mills, equipped with the most up-to-date patterns of machinery; mushroom universities; substantial efforts to improve elementary education and local roads; and a 'hustling', 'boosting' spirit which he would rather have expected to find in Oklahoma. He will also find something in North Carolina which Oklahoma cannot match—nor latter-day South Carolina either—and that is a crop of distinguished personalities, of the stamp of Charles D. McIver, Edwin A. Alderman, and Walter Hines Page.

What explains this springlike burgeoning of North Carolina's life while the life of her neighbours still droops in 'the sear, the yellow leaf'?¹ If we turn for enlightenment to the past, we shall find our perplexity momentarily increased when we observe that the present situation is the antithesis of the conditions in the *Ante-Bellum* Age, when North Carolina was socially barren while Virginia and South Carolina were then bursting with social vitality.

During the Time-span of about a hundred years that separates Robert Lee's generation from George Washington's, Virginia and South Carolina were the Southern counterparts of a Northern Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. They were the leading states in their half of the Union in wealth and in intellect and in character; and their fertility in character—the crop of eminent personalities which they continually bred—gave them almost a dominant voice in Federal politics. During these same hundred years North Carolina was seldom heard of; and the cause of her obscurity was not itself obscure. North Carolina was a country with a poor soil and with no ports; and she was therefore settled from the landward side by squatters from Virginia or South Carolina who had failed—perhaps through dullness or poverty or lateness of arrival on the scene—to 'make good' in the first state of their choice. These settlers in North Carolina were not 'bad material' in themselves; the strongest strain among them was a Presbyterian 'Scotch-Irish' element from Ulster whose staying-power has been demonstrated and rewarded in the sequel.² But, in the first chapter of their history in their new North-Carolinian home, this population of small farmers—living a hard life in a blind alley—could not vie with the Virginian squires or with the South Carolinian planters.

It will be seen that the *ante-bellum* contrast between North Carolina and her two neighbours was the natural outcome of historical and geographical circumstance. It is the *post-bellum* inversion of this natural situation that has to be explained; and, here again, the explanation is not to be found in any inborn merits

¹ Shakespeare: *Macbeth*, v. iii. 23.

² For the more sensational fate of the North Carolinian lowlanders' 'Scotch-Irish' kinsmen who drifted into the highlands of Appalachia and stayed 'marooned' there, see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 309-13, above.

of the community which has achieved an eventual eminence, but rather in its freedom from the incubus that has weighed its fallen neighbours down. The former exaltation of Virginia and South Carolina is the veritable cause of their abasement now. They have failed to rise again from their prostration in the Civil War because they have never succeeded in forgetting the height from which that fearful catastrophe once hurled them, whereas North Carolina, who lost so much less because she had so little to lose, has found it relatively easy to recover from a slighter shock. 'For whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted.'¹

Eire.

This hypnotization of a living self by a dead self, which has been the effect of *ante-bellum* upon *post-bellum* Virginia and South Carolina, is also to be seen at work—and this over a far longer span of Time—in the history of Ireland ever since that brilliant flash-in-the-pan which we have glanced at, in an earlier part of this Study, under the name of the Abortive Far Western Christian Civilization.²

'One of the most remarkable traits of Gaelic literature is that it deals, so to speak, with a continuous historic present. The same life, the same mode of thought, appear in the eighteenth century as in the eighth. . . . In effect the Gael found a way of life long ago, and a religious faith, that satisfied him then and forever, and seemed to offer all that a man can wring from the World. His literature, therefore, contrasts in a remarkable way with that of such a country as England, where the writings of every generation mirror some philosophic change. Gaelic literature intellectually is a literature of rest, not of change; of intensive cultivation, not of experiment.'³

The point that is made in this passage from the pen of an Irish student of Irish literature has also been made independently, with a political application, by a contemporary Welsh statesman who has been in a position to speak from personal experience. During the negotiation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1921 Mr. David Lloyd George is reported to have made the remark that 'in Ireland there is no past; it is all present'.⁴ And an English friend of the writer of this Study, who was constantly travelling to and fro between England and Ireland on a private mission of reconciliation during the foregoing months when the warfare between the British

¹ Luke xiv. 11 = xviii. 14 = Matt. xxiii. 12, quoted in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, p. 248, above.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-40, above.

³ De Blacam, A.: *Gaelic Literature Surveyed*, 2nd edition (Dublin 1933, Talbot Press), pp. xiii-xiv.

⁴ See Toynbee, A. J.: *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement* (London 1928, Milford), p. 38.

Government and Sinn Fein was at its height, was once harrowed by receiving from Irish informants the report of a particularly ghastly atrocity which had been committed upon so-and-so, at such-and-such a place, by English hands—only to find that the act had not been done the week before by 'the Black-and-Tans', but in the seventeenth century by the soldiers of Cromwell's army. When the Englishman's Irish interlocutors perceived and corrected his misapprehension, they were benevolently pleased to have relieved his distress, but intellectually at a loss to understand either his peculiar dismay when he supposed that the atrocity had been committed since his last visit to the country, or his intense satisfaction at learning that this particular English disgrace had been staining the honour of England for nearly three centuries and not just for three weeks or three days. In Irish minds, what Cromwell's soldiers had done was an integral part of the current Irish case against England, of precisely the same cogency as the things which were being done at that moment by 'the Black-and-Tans'. When 'the vine of the earth' was once 'cast into the great wine-press of the wrath of God',¹ the English notion that the vintage might perhaps lose its potency with the passage of Time was a hard saying for an Irish logician, who would naturally take it for granted that wine improved by keeping. On the other hand, for the English sympathizer with Ireland's sufferings at England's hands it was quite incomprehensible that an atrocity, however sensational, which had been committed not much less than three hundred years ago, should be retailed to-day with the same lively horror and the same indignant zest as if the victim's shrieks were still echoing in the outraged air and his blood still oozing over the desecrated ground of the Ireland of 1921.

This Irish obsession with the Past, which has been the despair of English statesmanship, presents a piquant antithesis to the psychological plasticity which is the characteristic *ethos* of those 'new countries' in which the same British statesmanship has achieved its signal triumphs.² The problem of creating one united community out of a conquered autochthonous population and a 'garrison' of new settlers who have been planted on the conquered soil by the high hand of the conquering Power has confronted British statesmanship in Canada and in South Africa as well as in Ireland; and in these overseas dominions of the British Crown the problem has been handled with a far greater measure of success.

¹ Rev. xiv. 19.

² For the way in which this psychological plasticity has worked in favour of the construction of the British Commonwealth of Nations see Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-8. The point has also been noticed already in this Study, in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 303, footnote 1, and in III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, p. 484, above.

While in Ireland the Catholic descendants of the Gael and the Protestant descendants of King James I's and Cromwell's military colonists have behaved towards one another like oil and vinegar in a salad or like Orthodox Christian natives and Turkish Muslim colonists in Rumelia, the original French *habitants* in Canada, and even the original Dutch *boers* in South Africa, have brought themselves to co-operate with the interloping English colonists—whose presence in the country is a living memorial of an English conquest—in the common task of working the political machinery of a fully self-governing Union of South Africa and Dominion of Canada.¹ On the other hand, in the European homeland of our Western Civilization Switzerland is the unique example of a successful multi-national state of the latter-day Canadian and South African type. The Belgian imitation of Switzerland has never achieved the harmony and solidity of its Swiss ensample, while in the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy the efforts of Austrian statesmanship to make 'a going concern' out of a state composed of diverse national elements have ended in a still greater failure than the corresponding efforts of British statesmanship in Ireland.²

If we turn from the domestic to the foreign aspects of the Hapsburg Monarchy's political problem, we shall be no less forcibly struck by the observation that the desperate remedy of cutting

¹ The difference of the psychological atmosphere in Canada and in Ireland has had a doubly potent effect, because in either case the local atmosphere had exercised its influence upon the conquerors as well as the conquered. If the British Government has found the French *habitants* in Canada much easier to deal with as British subjects than the native inhabitants of Ireland, it is also true that the French Canadians have had a much less unpleasant experience than the Irish have had of the English as a ruling power. 'The overseas atmosphere, was the more potent for good inasmuch as it produced its effect, not only upon the overseas communities themselves, but upon those statesmen in Great Britain upon whose outlook and action the evolution of relations between the Dominions and the Mother Country in its earlier stages chiefly depended for good or evil. The importance, for the evolution of Dominion Status in its original overseas environment, of this influence of the overseas spirit upon statesmanship in Whitehall can be gauged by the extraordinary contrast between the large-minded generosity of the Quebec Act of 1774—an act which laid the foundations of a friendship between the conquered French settlers in North America and the victorious Empire which was the hereditary enemy of their mother country in Europe—and the ferocity of the anti-Catholic laws which the same British Government kept on the statute book in Ireland until 1829' (Toynbee, A. J.: *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement* (London 1928, Milford), pp. 37-8).

² The difference in degree between these two kindred failures of modern Western statesmanship must not be exaggerated; for, although the whole of Ireland has been kept together provisionally under the British Crown in outward constitutional form, the virtual partition of the island between the Free State and the Northern Irish bridge-head of the United Kingdom is in reality as grave a social disaster, and as great a confession of political bankruptcy, as the undisguised partition of the Danubian Monarchy among its 'successor-states'. Moreover it is noteworthy that, if British statesmanship is to be regarded as having scored a point in the avoidance of an outright secession of an Irish Republic from the British Empire, it owes this modest success in its dealings with Ireland to its magnificent success in dealing with the Dominions of the British Crown overseas. The common ground on which the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1921 is based lies in the acceptance, on both sides, of an analogy between Southern Ireland and Canada. If the principles of 'Dominion Status' had not been worked out in Canada between 1838 and 1921, the Anglo-Irish settlement of the latter year would probably have been impossible to achieve.

the Gordian Knot with the sword, to which Austrian statesmanship, in its dealings with Serbia and Montenegro, resorted with such fatal results in 1914, had been resorted to with impunity by British statesmanship only fifteen years before, in its dealings with the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State.

In an age when the political creed of Nationalism was gaining ascendancy throughout the Western World, an identical problem of unusual difficulty presented itself to British imperialism in South Africa and to Austrian imperialism in South-Eastern Europe. In both regions the awakening of the local populations to national consciousness—and to consequent political aspirations towards national unity and independence—found one local nationality partitioned between a great multi-national empire and two small and fragmentary and backward but at the same time independent national states; and in both cases these states came to regard it as their mission to achieve the unity and independence of the whole of their own nation under their own flag, without being deterred by the consideration that the fulfilment of this national ambition on these lines would involve the disruption of the great multi-national empire which now held half their nationals as its more or less unwilling subjects. In both cases the threatened empire made a series of clumsy, but on the whole well-meaning, efforts to safeguard its own integrity against its puny neighbours' preposterous designs without a breach of the peace or a change in the territorial *status quo*; but in both cases the imperial statesmen rather reluctantly came to the conclusion, after a time, that the existing partition of the recalcitrant nationality was not, after all, a possible basis for a permanent settlement, and that therefore their only practical prospect of obtaining a solution that would be satisfactory to themselves lay in taking advantage of their overwhelming superiority in military strength in order to unite the recalcitrant nationality under the imperial flag by putting a forcible end to their puny but aggressive neighbours' independence.

When the Hapsburg Government acted on this policy in 1914 it brought about the exact opposite of the result at which it was aiming; for the ultimatum which it addressed to Serbia precipitated a general war which did not come to an end until the Hapsburg Monarchy itself had been broken in pieces. On the other hand, when the British Government applied the self-same policy in dealing with the Transvaal Republic in 1899, it did successfully achieve its aim by making war. The threat of an anti-British coalition of Continental European Powers never materialized; there was no intervention; the South African War was not enlarged, like the American Revolutionary War of 1775-83 or the Austro-Serbian War of

1914-18, to the dimensions of a general engagement; and so there was no question of its ending disastrously for Great Britain. The two Dutch Republics in South Africa were duly conquered by British arms and annexed by the British Crown; and the problem with which the British Empire had been faced by the rise of the Afrikaner Dutch national movement was eventually solved by the creation, within a British political framework, of a Union of South Africa in which the whole of the Afrikaner Dutch nation was enabled to enjoy its national self-government in a partnership with the English settlers in its midst. This result of cutting the Gordian Knot in the loosely woven social fabric of South Africa stands out in extreme contrast to the result in South-Eastern Europe, where the indurated texture of historic memories turned the edge of the Austrian sword with such disastrous consequences for the Power that had ventured to draw it. While Dutch nationalism in South Africa has eventually been given satisfaction, at the cost of a minor local war, through a moderate and constructive process of political consolidation, Yugoslav nationalism in South-Eastern Europe has only been satisfied at the cost of a world war which has brought in its train the violent disruption of the whole previous political régime in that quarter of Europe.

The inferiority of the Old World to the New World in psychological plasticity can also be illustrated from the histories of certain modern international frontiers. From the close of the seventeenth century until the end of the Anglo-American War of 1812-15¹ the North American frontier between Canada and the British colonies that subsequently became the United States was the theatre of quite as incessant and at least as rancorous a warfare as the European frontier between France and the German Powers during the same period; yet the subsequent histories of these two frontiers have been remarkably different. Since the close of the particular Franco-German war which had come to an end a few months before the British and American Governments made peace on the 24th December, 1814, there have been three further fierce and bitter Franco-German conflicts,² and in the year 1938 the tension on the Franco-German frontier was perhaps as great as it had ever been. On the other hand, after the conclusion of the Peace of Ghent the North American belligerents decided, Red Indian fashion, to 'bury the hatchet'. By common consent the frontier between Canada and the United States was then deliberately demilitarized, and the

¹ The Battle of New Orleans was fought on the 8th January, 1815, though peace had been signed at Ghent on the 24th December, 1814.

² Reckoning the Waterloo campaign as a separate affair from the foregoing conflict, which had lasted, off and on, from 1792 to 1814, but not counting in the Franco-Austrian War of 1859, which was fought in an Italian and not in a Transalpine arena.

moral, as well as physical, disarmament which was thus achieved between the two new nations that were dividing the ownership of the North American Continent was not disturbed thereafter either by the growing length of the frontier or by the increasing disparity in strength between the Powers on either side of it. To-day, when this unfortified frontier stretches over a length of 3,898 miles from Atlantic to Pacific and divides a nation of 122¹ millions from one of ten millions² which is physically at its gigantic neighbour's mercy, the achievement is so familiar a fact in North American life that it is simply taken for granted. At the opposite extremity of the Americas the unfortified frontier between Canada and the United States has its counterpart in the pacifically delimited frontier between Chile and Argentina, a Latin-American achievement which is commemorated in the statue of the Christ of the Andes. It is true that certain parallels to these two American frontiers can be found in Europe. For example, the frontier between France and Belgium, which probably saw more fighting than any other frontier in Western Christendom from the beginning of the Modern Age down to the Battle of Waterloo, is now traversed twice a day by thousands of workmen who have their home on one side of the line and earn their living on the other, and who ride across on their bicycles without being asked to show a passport. This present state of the Franco-Belgian frontier in the neighbourhood of Tourcoing and Roubaix will bear comparison satisfactorily with the present state of the Canadian-United States frontier in the neighbourhood of Buffalo or Detroit. Unhappily, however, the Franco-Belgian frontier is less characteristic than the Franco-German frontier is of the prevailing condition of frontiers in twentieth-century Europe.

The Self-Hypnotization of Narcissus.

We have now examined five illustrations of the nemesis of creativity in the particular form of an idolization of some ephemeral self, and, if we pause to take a synoptic retrospective view of our field in this survey, we shall perhaps see in a rather new light a social phenomenon which has occupied our attention in an earlier part of this Study: that is, the tendency for 'new ground' to surpass 'old ground' in social fertility.³ This phenomenon regularly reappears in our comparative glances at the Jews and Galilaeans and Gentiles in the time of Christ, at Athens and Achaia in the third century B.C., at the *ci-devant* city-state cosmos and Piedmont

¹ The population of the United States came out at 122,775,046 in the census of 1930.

² The population of Canada came out at 10,376,786 in the census of 1931.

³ See II. D (iii), with Annex, in vol. ii, above.

in the Italian *Risorgimento*, at South Carolina and North Carolina after the American Civil War, and finally at Ireland and the Overseas Dominions of the British Crown during the hundred years ending in the year 1938. In every one of these instances the 'new ground'—be it Galilee or the lands of the Goyyim, Achaia or Piedmont, North Carolina or Canada—duly succeeds in making up for the 'old ground's' obstinate sterility by bearing a timely harvest; but we can now see that this superior fertility of the 'new ground' is not invariably or entirely to be accounted for by the stimulus that is inherent in the ordeal of breaking virgin soil. There is a negative as well as a positive reason why 'new ground' is apt to be fruitful; and this negative reason is its intrinsic freedom from the incubus of ineradicable memories with which 'old ground' is, not indeed certain, but at any rate extremely likely, to be burdened. In fact, we have stumbled upon a psychological application of our 'law of compensations'.¹ The law proves to hold good in the Microcosm as well as in the Macrocosm. It not only applies in so far as a challenge is delivered by the physical or by the human environment; it continues to apply when the field of action is transferred from an outer to an inner world, and it can be seen in operation where the challenged individual or community or society receives the challenge from its own self. In this psychological situation the challenge of 'new ground' is presented by the novice's own lack of experience and *expertise*, and this challenge carries with it a compensation in the shape of an immunity from the sinister spell that 'cramps the style' of 'the old hand'. The nemesis of the hero who has performed some creative achievement in the past is to gaze with Narcissus's spell-bound eyes at a reflexion of his own self which would reveal to any seer in his senses the repellent countenance of a wrinkled Tithonus.² The privilege of the novice is to stumble upon a hidden treasure because his feet are not bound to a beaten track.

We can also now see the reason for another social phenomenon—the tendency for a creative to degenerate into a merely dominant minority—which we have singled out, at an early stage in this Study, as a prominent symptom of social breakdown and disintegration.³ While a creative individual or minority is certainly not predestined to undergo this disastrous change for the worse, the creator is at least decidedly pre-disposed in this direction *ex*

¹ For the operation of this law in the action of Challenge-and-Response see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 259-74, above.

² This myth of Tithonus is taken in Part VI below as an allegory of a challenge that is apt to present itself to a universal state.

³ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-5, above.

officio creativitatis. The gift of creativity, which is in origin the reward of a successful response to a challenge, becomes in its turn, in the act of being conferred, a new and uniquely formidable challenge for its devoted recipient.

The War Cabinet.

A flagrant example of the metamorphosis of a creative into a dominant minority is the moral and intellectual blindness which so frequently smites the statesmen of victorious belligerent Powers when they come to impose a peace settlement upon their defeated adversaries. The war-minister who is an 'organizer of victory' is a creative genius of a kind. There are creative gifts of a peculiar sort which his task demands; and he will not win his way to office in war-time, or find himself in the saddle when the armistice is signed, unless he happens to possess these peculiar gifts in a high degree: the intellectual gift of focussing all his attention upon the smallest possible number of clear-cut objectives and obstacles and cynosures and bugbears, and the moral gift of an aptitude for bold experimentation, rapid improvisation, and living from hand to mouth in a landscape of short horizons. Just because these qualities are barbarous, they are invaluable in war; and accordingly those statesmen that possess them will come to the top when war breaks out and will develop them further by strenuous exercise before the war comes to an end. But, again just because they are barbarous, these self-same qualities are fatal disqualifications for the task of making peace; for the war-maker's virtues are the peace-maker's vices, and *vice versa*. The task of peace-making demands the intellectual gift of seeing all round a problem, leaving no element out of account, and estimating all the elements in their relative proportions, and the moral gift of an aptitude for cautious conservatism, ripe deliberation, taking long views, and working for distant ends. When the armistice is signed, statesmen endowed with these gifts will no doubt still be in existence; but they will certainly not be appointed to be the plenipotentiaries at the peace conference; for even if they were in office at the moment when war broke out, they will certainly have been deposed and discredited, long before peace has returned, on account of their unwarlike virtues. It is the statesmen who have won the war that will inevitably be entrusted by their grateful and admiring constituents with the task of making the peace settlement; and since they have been chosen for this task by a particularly efficient process of inverse selection, they are almost certain to cancel—and much more than cancel—the benefit which they have conferred upon their constituents in leading them to victory by capping this victory with

a peace settlement that will hang like a mill-stone round the victor's necks unto the third and fourth generation.

The perversity of peace settlements is proverbial;¹ and, in the light of the sequel, it is apt to appear so extreme that it becomes difficult to believe that it has not been malignantly deliberate. Yet as a matter of fact we know, from direct contemporary evidence, that the makers of peace settlements are usually well-intentioned. The evil that they do, which so persistently lives after them, is a product, not of a brilliant malignity, but of a deadly blindness; and this blindness has overtaken them because the sounding of 'cease fire' has thrown them, in a trice, entirely out of their element. The good which they have done as the 'organizers of victory' is buried in the grave of the war which they have succeeded in bringing to a victorious conclusion; and the state of mind in which their war-time achievement has left them is the worst possible state for grappling with the utterly different task which is immediately thrust upon their eager hands *ex officio*.

¹ The examples are so notorious that it is hardly necessary to quote them, and a reference to two modern Western peace settlements may suffice.

The makers of the peace settlement of 1814-15, after the General War of 1792-1815, showed their perversity in selecting the dead-and-gone principle of Dynastic Legitimacy as the ideal political foundation for their attempted reconstruction of Society, while they ignored or flouted the rising principle of National Self-Determination, to which the future actually belonged. Similarly, in setting themselves to restore and safeguard the European Balance of Power, they made all their arrangements on the assumption that in the future, as during the past 150 years, the country that would threaten to upset the Balance and subjugate its neighbours would be France, whereas the role which France had been playing in Europe till then was actually to be played thereafter by Prussia. In retrospect it seems extraordinary that this anxiety to build up a barrier against hypothetical future outbreaks of French aggression should have induced so acute a statesman as Metternich to undermine the foundations of his Hapsburg master's re-established hegemony in Germany and Italy by allowing the Hohenzollerns to acquire the Rhineland and the House of Savoy to acquire Genoa. In the event the enlarged Kingdoms of Prussia and Sardinia were never called upon to save Europe from another French attempt at universal dominion; but their gains in territory and strength, through the peace settlement of 1814-15, did enable them, within the next half-century, to establish a new German Reich and a United Kingdom of Italy at the Hapsburg Monarchy's expense. The settlement of 1814-15 contained in itself the warrant of Austria's discomfiture in 1866 for those that had eyes to read the real signs of the times; but even a Metternich was so thoroughly obsessed by the dead facts of the past that he was blind to the vital interests of the Power which he was seeking to serve.

As for the makers of the peace settlement of 1919-20, their blindness, too, has become a by-word in respect of certain of their acts—for example, their handling of the problem of Reparations, and their extortion, from their defeated and momentarily prostrate adversary, of a verbal admission of exclusive guilt for the common sin and calamity of the War. It remains to be seen how the peace settlement of 1919-20 will look after the lapse of half a century! This time the peace-makers have taken, as the ideal political foundation for their attempted reconstruction of Society, the principle of National Self-Determination which their predecessors set at defiance a hundred years before with such disastrous consequences. It is true enough that the obstinate idolization of the anachronistic principle of Dynastic Legitimacy has inflicted incalculable disaster upon Europe between the time of its reaffirmation in 1814-15 and the *coup de grâce* which it received at last in 1918 through the simultaneous downfall of the Hapsburg, Romanov, and Hohenzollern Empires. But the peace-makers have transferred their allegiance from Dynasticism to Nationalism a full century too late; and we may almost take their belated conversion to the younger principle as presumptive evidence that this principle of National Self-Determination has by now become an anachronism in its turn. The consequences of the peace settlement of 1919-20 are touched upon further in V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, vol. v, p. 640, footnote 1, below.

This swift metamorphosis of deft winners of victory into clumsy makers of peace is a tragedy for all concerned: for the statesmen themselves, for their compatriots, for their adversaries, and for the whole of the self-lacerated society to which the victors and the vanquished alike belong. And thus the spiritual and material ravages which a war inflicts are far from being confined to the period of belligerency. The original calamity of a barbarous outbreak of violence in a society's life entails the further calamity that the vast issues which the war has opened up have all to be disposed of summarily and simultaneously in a peace settlement, instead of being grappled with one by one and settled in the fullness of Time. *Ex hypothesi* a peace settlement is an almost superhumanly difficult task; the chances of success are slight, even if the business is placed in the ablest hands that can be found; and the penalties of failure are heavy. In such a pass as this the chances of success are diminished almost to vanishing-point and the penalties of failure are increased almost to infinity when this business of making the peace settlement is actually placed in hands peculiarly unfitted for it by being entrusted to the statesmen who have won the foregoing war. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the peace-making of the war-winners is the worst of all the calamities that War inflicts on those who perpetrate it.

The Religion of Humanity.

In all the instances of idolization which we have examined in this chapter so far, the idol on to which the adulation of an ephemeral self has been projected has been fashioned out of some fraction of Mankind: a camarilla or a community or a race. We have still to consider the case in which the self is idolized in the shape of Humanity at large with a capital 'H'.

This idolatrous worship of Leviathan has been advocated in all seriousness by one of our modern Western philosophers,¹ Auguste Comte (*vivebat* A.D. 1798-1857).

'The whole of Positive conceptions [is condensed in] the one single idea of an immense and eternal Being, Humanity. . . . Around this real Great Being, the prime mover of each existence, individual or collective, our affections centre by as spontaneous an impulse as do our thoughts and our actions. . . . The growing struggle of Humanity against the sum of the necessities under which it exists² offers the heart no less than the

¹ The Hellenic philosopher-king Alexander's gospel of 'the Brotherhood of Man' (*διδύμοια*) appears to have been grounded on a worship, not of Humanity, but of a God who is the common father of all men (see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 8-10, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 246, footnote 5, below).

² In this passage, as in many others, Comte frankly admits that his corporate human object of worship is not an absolute or omnipotent godhead (see Caird, E.: *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte* (Glasgow 1885, MacLehose), p. 31). Comte maintained

intellect a better object of contemplation than the necessarily capricious omnipotence of its theological predecessor¹. . . . Humanity definitely substitutes Herself for God, without ever forgetting his provisional services². . . . We adore Her not as the older god, to compliment Her, but in order to serve Her better by bettering ourselves.³

Comte dreamed of embodying his 'Religion of Humanity' in the institution of a universal church; but this dream has not yet come true 'in real life'. Though the atheist French philosopher did his best to animate a lay-figure by dressing it out in garments—at once venerable and familiar—which he ostentatiously plucked from the living body of the Catholic Church, he has not gained the advantage that he expected from his cold-bloodedly pedantic resort to the strategy of Archaism;⁴ and in our day, when nearly a hundred years have passed since the *floruit* of the Positivist Prophet, Positivism nowhere survives as a church with a corporate life and a regular order of public worship, except in England, where it has merely added one more to an already long muster-roll of insular sects, and in Brazil.⁵ It is true that a far wider, as well as more rapid, success has been achieved in our time by a younger and grimmer worship of Humanity which is part and parcel of the creed of Communism.⁶ The Communist dogmatically and fanatically rules out a belief in the existence of God which the Positivist merely discards as superfluous. Yet while there is no doubt at all about the sincerity of the

that the new science of Sociology had made it plain that this limited object of worship was a satisfactory one (Caird, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-9). But he might not have found it easy to meet his Scottish critic's objection that 'a relative religion is not a religion at all' (Caird, *op. cit.*, p. 165).—A.J.T.

¹ Comte, A.: *The Catechism of Positive Religion*, English translation, second edition (London 1883, Trübner), pp. 45-6.

² Comte, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

³ Comte, *op. cit.*, p. 61. See further eundem: *Système de Politique*, vol. i (Paris 1851 Matties, Carilian, Goeury et Delmont), *Discours Préliminaire, Conclusion Générale: 'Religion de l'Humanité'*; vol. ii (1852), chap. 1: 'Théorie Générale de la Religion, ou Théorie Positive de l'Unité Humaine'; vol. iv (1854), 'Conclusion Générale du Tome iv^{me}', p. 524, on the emancipation of the Vrai Grand Être from a fictitious God.

⁴ For the deliberately imported vein of Archaism in Comte's 'Religion of Humanity' see V. C (i) (d) 8 (δ), vol. vi, p. 83, footnote 2, below.

⁵ After Comte's death his followers in England parted company with those in France over the question whether the apostles of the Positivist Church should, or should not, wait till they had convinced the intellect before they appealed to the emotions. The English Positivists were in favour of going out into the highways and hedges and seeking to convert the women and the proletarians *en masse*; and, in support of this policy of giving the claims of the heart a priority over those of the head, they cited the precedent of the Primitive Christian Church as well as the authority of their own Master, Comte, himself. An account of this controversy in the bosom of the Positivist Church in its Apostolic Age will be found in Caird, E.: *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte* (Glasgow 1885, MacLehose), pp. 171-6.

⁶ On the vexed question whether Communism is to be reckoned as a religion or as a philosophy or merely as a political programme, it will be sufficient—for our present purpose—to point out that Communism at any rate answers to the definition of what constitutes a religion according to Comte. In Comte's view a religion is a comprehensive coherent conception of the Universe which gives us an object upon which we can fix all our affections and an aim to which we can devote all our energies (Caird, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-7; *cf.* p. 159). The nature and tendency of Communism are examined further in this Study in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 177-88, below.

Communist's rejection of the worship of anything superhuman or divine, there is a distinct and increasing doubt about the constancy of his allegiance to an all-embracing Humanity. At any rate in the Soviet Union, where Communism is to-day the established *idéologie d'état*, there has been showing itself, under the Stalinian régime, a strongly pronounced tendency to withdraw allegiance from Humanity at large in order to concentrate it upon that fraction of the living generation of Mankind that is at present penned within the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.¹ In other words, Soviet Communism seems at this moment to be changing under our eyes from a worship of Humanity into the worship of a tribal divinity of the type of Athene Polias or the Lion of Saint Mark or Kathleen na Hoolihan or Britannia.² And this change suggests that Russian Communism, like British Positivism, may be destined to contract to the dimensions of a parochial sect instead of realizing the dream of its founder by growing into a universal church.

Do these apparently unpromising prospects of both Russian Communism and British Positivism portend in their turn a setback to the worship of the Self in the shape of Humanity at large? This does not necessarily follow; for, while Comte's dream may not yet have been translated into reality, it is nevertheless still in the air.

'Il existe, par-dessus les classes et les nations, une volonté de l'espèce de se rendre maîtresse des choses et, quand un être humain s'envole en quelques heures d'un bout de la terre à l'autre, c'est toute la race humaine qui frémit d'orgueil et s'adore comme distincte parmi la création. . . . On peut penser parfois qu'un tel mouvement s'affirmera de plus en plus et que c'est de cette voie que s'éteindront les guerres interhumaines; on arrivera ainsi à une "fraternité universelle", mais qui, loin d'être l'abolition de l'esprit de nation avec ses appétits et ses orgueils, en sera au contraire la forme suprême, la nation s'appelant l'Homme et l'ennemi s'appelant Dieu.'³

When a worship of the Self is thus projected on to a human hive or columbarium that has room in it for every human being—dead, living, and unborn—and leaves none but God out in the cold, does the Self cease to be ephemeral and the worship cease to be idolatrous? This question will be answered in the affirmative not only by Communists and Positivists but also by the more numerous adherents of a vaguer, yet perhaps just on that account more representative, school of humanist thinkers and humanitarian men

¹ This change which seems to be coming over the Communism of the Soviet Union is examined further in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 183-6, below.

² For the personified political communities that are the idols of a modern Western World, see I. C (iii) (c), Annex, vol. i, pp. 442-3, above.

³ Benda, J.: *La Trahison des Clercs* (Paris 1927, Grasset), pp. 246-7.

of action whose outlook has become the dominant *Weltanschauung* of our Western Society in its Modern Age.¹

Is this answer the last word? The self-worshipper who has given expression to his heart's desire by substituting an image of Humanity for the presence of a Living God in his panorama of the Universe, can no doubt proclaim

I am monarch of all I survey;
My right there is none to dispute.

But is there no bitterness in the boast which Cowper has placed in the mouth of Alexander Selkirk? Is not this monarch a castaway? And must he not pay for his undisputed dominion by living in a spiritual solitude which is an abomination of desolation?

'Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible Man . . . because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.'²

(β) *The Idolization of an Ephemeral Institution.*

The Hellenic City-State.

The nemesis of creativity which we have just been studying in the form of an idolization of an ephemeral self may also take the form of an idolatrous worship of some ephemeral institution or technique. Manifestly these idols are of different orders of magnitude in the human hierarchy; for institutions and techniques are no more than the debris of acts of which some human self has been the author. Yet there is also a divine economy in which these human selves and techniques and institutions are, all alike, created things and are therefore, all alike, unworthy and unfit to be made recipients of a worship that is due to none but their Creator; and a moral and intellectual aberration which thus remains in essence the same is not made any less deadly by being indulged in on a narrower human range.³ The extreme deadli-

¹ At the moment when he was putting these words on paper, the writer of this Study had before him on his desk a letter from an English scholar-statesman who was a humanist and a humanitarian in one; and this letter contained an observation on another passage of the present work (V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 160-1, below) which is perhaps even more pertinent to the present passage:

"Self-worship of the Tribe": very good phrase—yet isn't it only wrong because the "self" is so limited? Once get "humanitarian" and make all Humanity your object—or, better still, if, like the Stoic, you make the Great City of Gods and Man [see V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, vol. vi, pp. 332-8, below—A.J.T.] your object—the self-worship gets pretty right and becomes a "higher religion".

² Romans i. 22-3 and 21.

³ 'Whoever detaches Race or the Nation or the State or the Form of State or the Government from the temporal scale of values and raises them to be the supreme model and deifies them with idolatrous worship, falsifies the divinely created order of things.'—Papal Encyclical of the 14th March, 1937, addressed primarily to the German Episcopate.

ness of an infatuation with some past institutional or technical achievement has come under our observation, at an earlier point in this Study, in our survey of the arrested civilizations.¹ The effect of idolizing an institution is exemplified in the arrests of the Ottoman Society's growth under the incubus of the Pādishāh's Slave-Household and of the Spartan Society's under the incubus of the Lycurgian *agôgê*; the effect of idolizing a technique is exemplified in the fates of the Nomads and the Esquimaux and the Polynesians. These extreme examples seem to indicate that an idolatry of institutions and an idolatry of techniques are the besetting sins of societies that are confronted with formidable challenges from the human and from the physical environment respectively. With this key in our hands we may now pursue our study of these two varieties of idolatry along our usual lines of an empirical survey. Let us take the idolatry of institutions first, and let us begin with a classic case: the idolization, in the Hellenic World, of the institution of the Sovereign City-State.

In examining the part played by this particular act of idolatry in the breakdown and disintegration of the Hellenic Society, we have to distinguish between two different situations in which the idol of the Sovereign City-State stood as a stumbling-block in the way of the solution of a social problem.

The earlier, and graver, of the two problems was the challenge of being called upon to establish some kind of political world order as a framework for an oecumenical economic system which had become one of the necessities of Hellenic life. This challenge was presented by the impact on Hellenic international politics of the Solonian economic revolution; for Solon at Athens, and the statesmen who were his contemporaries and counterparts at Aegina and Miletus and elsewhere, had solved the Malthusian problem, by which the Hellenic Society had previously been beset, at the price of abandoning the ancient city-state self-sufficiency in economic activities; and in a society whose life had thus become oecumenical—perforce and once for all—on the economic plane, the ancient political luxury of City-State Sovereignty could no longer be indulged in with impunity. We have seen already how the new necessity of transcending this City-State Sovereignty became urgent in the Hellenic World in the fifth century before Christ; and how an Athenian failure to make satisfactory provision for it involved the whole Hellenic Society in the breakdown of 431 B.C.² This problem of establishing a world order was the crucial challenge in Hellenic history;³ and it inexorably persisted in confronting

¹ See Part III. A, in vol. iii, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (b) 10, pp. 211-3, above.

³ See V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 287 and 287-91, below.

Hellenic statesmen down to the end of the story; but, while this inescapable and fundamental problem still remained unsolved, a secondary problem, which was of the Hellenic dominant minority's own seeking, came treading upon its heels when Hellenic history passed over from its second chapter into a third towards the turn of the fourth and third centuries B.C.

The chief outward and visible sign of this transition, as we have already observed,¹ was a sudden great increase in the material scale of Hellenic life. A hitherto maritime world which had been confined to the coasts of the Mediterranean Basin from Cyrene and Trebizond to Marseilles, now expanded overland in Asia from the Dardanelles to India and in Europe from Olympus and the Appennines to the Danube and the Rhine. In a society which had swollen to these material dimensions without having solved the spiritual problem of creating law and order between the states into which it was articulated, the Sovereign City-State was so utterly dwarfed that it was no longer a practicable unit of political life. And this incidental political consequence of an increase in material scale was in itself by no means a misfortune for Hellenism in an age in which the always doubtful blessing of City-State Sovereignty had turned into an unmistakable curse. So far from that, the passing of this traditional Hellenic form of Parochial Sovereignty might have been taken as a heaven-sent opportunity for shaking off the incubus of Parochial Sovereignty altogether. And this chance of responding successfully at the eleventh hour to a challenge which was big with the Hellenic Society's fate might perhaps not have been missed if Alexander had lived to join forces with Zeno and Epicurus. Under those joint auspices the Hellenes might have succeeded in stepping straight out of the City-State into the *Cosmopolis*²; and in that event the Hellenic Civilization might have been able to take on a new lease of creative life. But Alexander's premature death left the Hellenic World at the mercy of his successors; and these adventurers saw their interest, not in abolishing Parochial Sovereignty, but in preserving it for their own benefit. The personal ambition of each of them was to acquire for himself some portion of their dead master's heritage; and the only purpose for which they knew how to co-operate was to prevent any one of their number from monopolizing the whole of it. Accordingly the abilities of the contending Macedonian war-lords and the wealth of the ransacked Achaemenian Empire were perversely expended on endeavours to

¹ In III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 140 and 150-1; III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, p. 197; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (a), in the present volume, p. 265, above. See further V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 214, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 289-90, below.

² For the Hellenic conception of the *Cosmopolis* see V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, vol. vi, pp. 332-8, below.

keep up the institution of Parochial Sovereignty as a going concern in the new era of Hellenic history which Alexander had lived to inaugurate. But on the new material scale of Hellenic life *post Alexandrum* Parochial Sovereignty could only be salvaged on one condition. The traditional sovereignty of the single city-state must be transcended in order to make way—not, after all, for the establishment of an oecumenical world order, but for the forging of new-fangled parochial states of a supra-city-state calibre. This was the secondary problem which the fourth-century expansion of the Hellenic World brought in its train; and it is one of the ironies of Hellenic history that a problem which would have been better left alone should have been successfully solved by statesmen who had wantonly rejected a chance of responding to an unanswered challenge which could not be ignored without inviting disaster. This untoward success of a perverse feat of statesmanship is attested by an historical fact which we have already had occasion to notice in other contexts.¹ In the third century B.C. the new Great Powers of supra-city-state calibre which had been built up, since Alexander's death, on the periphery of an expanding Hellenic World were showing their mettle by exerting a formidable pressure upon the small states at the centre.

These were the two separate and successive problems with which a disintegrating Hellenic Society came to grips in the field of international politics, and, in the event, both problems were disposed of simultaneously by receiving a single solution which was at the same time a supreme calamity. As the result of a series of 'knock-out blows' which Rome delivered, between 220 and 168 B.C., to all the other brand-new Great Powers of the day,² the number of sovereign states in the Hellenic World was abruptly reduced from the plural to the singular. The sole surviving Roman Power then embraced the entire Hellenic World in its own dominions; and the establishment of this oecumenical Roman Empire solved the problem of establishing a world order—the crucial challenge that Hellenic statesmanship had hitherto left unanswered—by abolishing Parochial Sovereignty altogether and thereby putting an end to any such thing as international relations in the interior of the Hellenic World. This Roman response to a challenge that had defeated Periclean Athens was as crude as it was drastic, and as drastic as it was belated. Yet, belated and drastic and crude though it might be, it was still a response of a sort; and the point of interest for our present purpose is that both this ultimate Roman response

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 310-13 and 339-41; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), in the present volume, pp. 265-6 and 268-9, above.

² See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 312-13, and IV. C (iii) (b) 10, in the present volume, pp. 210-11, above.

and all the preliminary contributions towards the making of it were the work of members of the Hellenic Society who were not completely infatuated with the idol of City-State Sovereignty.

The very structural principle of the Roman State—the constitutional device which alone made it possible for Rome to grow from a city-state into an oecumenical commonwealth—was something which was quite incompatible with an idolization of City-State Sovereignty *à outrance*; for this cardinal constitutional principle was a 'dual citizenship'; and the psychological basis of this 'dual citizenship' was a harmonious division of the citizen's allegiance between the local city-state into which he was born like his ancestors before him and a wider polity which embraced a number of local city-states within its ambit without grudging them their distinct existence in the capacity of municipalities.¹ This creative compromise was psychologically possible only in those communities in which the idolatrous worship of City-State Sovereignty had not acquired a stranglehold over the citizens' hearts and minds; and the importance of this psychological condition becomes apparent as soon as we remind ourselves of the actual circumstances in which this political invention was gradually evolved in a long historical process which the Roman political genius eventually carried to completion.

The first recorded experiment in constructing a Hellenic commonwealth on a supra-city-state scale through the device of 'dual citizenship' is the establishment of the Boeotian Federation after the liberation of Boeotia from Athenian domination in 447 B.C. In the Boeotian constitution of this date, which has been brought to our knowledge by the enterprise of two modern Western archaeologists,² the division of powers between the Federation and its constituent city-states is nicely balanced; yet, though Boeotia was the pioneer in this process of constitutional evolution, she soon fell by the way; for the crux of the problem in Boeotia was the disproportionate size and strength of Thebes by comparison with any other Boeotian city-state; and Boeotian federalism was defeated by Theban egoism. The federal constitution of 447 B.C. had been framed at a moment when Thebes was temporarily humbled by the double disgrace of her 'Medism' in 480 B.C. and her defeat by Athens in 457; and this favourable situation did not recur when the work had to be done all over again after the dissolution of the original Boeotian Federation through a Spartan act of tyranny

¹ For the invention of dual citizenship see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, p. 481, above.

² An account of the Boeotian constitution of 447 B.C. will be found in *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, ed. by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt (Oxford 1909, Clarendon Press), chap. 11.

which the Lacedaemonian Government committed on the strength of the peace-settlement of 383 B.C. ('the Peace of Antalcidas'). This time, when Boeotia's former Lacedaemonian allies were playing the part of her oppressors, Thebes resumed her normal role in Boeotian affairs. In this fourth-century Boeotian struggle against Spartan domination Thebes stood out as the Boeotian protagonist. The critical events of the struggle were the Spartans' seizure of the citadel of Thebes in 382 B.C. and their ejection from it in 378 and their crushing defeat at Leuctra in 371 by the generalship of the Theban commander Epaminondas and the fighting-power of the Theban contingent in the Boeotian army. This liberation of Boeotia by Theban military prowess put the reconstruction of the Boeotian Federation into the hands of Theban statesmen; and Theban statesmanship at once succumbed to the temptation of attempting to swallow the Federation up into a unitary Theban state, in which Thebes would become in Boeotia what Athens was in Attica, while Thespieae and Tanagra and Orchomenos would be reduced to the political nonentity of an Eleusis or a Marathon. This fourth-century Theban policy of *Gleichschaltung* was inimical to the progress of federalism in Boeotia; and though the Boeotian Federation—profiting, perhaps, by the blows which Thebes received at Macedonian hands in 338 and 334 B.C.—protracted its existence until it was finally dissolved by the Romans in 146 B.C.,¹ it missed its 'manifest destiny' of becoming 'the Education of Hellas' in the art of 'dual citizenship'.

This destiny, which was brought within the Boeotians' grasp by the intervention of Sparta—the first time as a friend and the second time as a foe—on the two occasions above mentioned, was snatched out of the Chalcidians' hands by another act of intervention on the part of the same Power.² The short political life of half a century (*circa* 432–378 B.C.) which the Chalcidian Federal Commonwealth enjoyed before the Spartans dissolved it in 378 B.C. is of historical interest, not because of any positive effects which it can be seen to have had upon the subsequent course of Hellenic history, but because the Chalcidian constitution was a close anticipation of the Roman. The new feature in both the Chalcidian and the Roman Commonwealth was that the comprehensive body politic, as well as each of its constituent parts, was a

¹ The final and formal dissolution of the Boeotian League by the Romans seems to have taken place in 146 B.C., after Mummius's campaign in Greece, and as the punishment for the Boeotians' folly in throwing in their lot with the Achaeans in their desperate military defiance of the Roman Power. *De facto*, however, the Boeotian League seems to have been broken up by Roman diplomacy as early as 172 B.C., on the eve of the outbreak of the Third Romano-Macedonian War.

² For the dissolution of the Chalcidian Commonwealth by Spartan arms in 379 B.C. and for the antecedents and consequences of this high-handed and short-sighted Spartan act, see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, in vol. iii, above.

city-state. In the third century B.C., when there was a fresh outburst of experimentation in supra-city-state political construction all over the Hellenic World, the experiments at the centre, in Greece, were reversions to the older Boeotian type, in which the constituent parts were city-states but the comprehensive body politic was a national community. This was the essential structure of both the Aetolian and the Achaean Confederacy—though they both took an important step in advance of the Boeotian Federation in incorporating a number of city-states which were outside the pale of the original Aetolian or Achaean national patrimony.¹ These third-century experiments at the centre of the Hellenic World were evoked, however, as we have seen,² by pressure from a ring of titanic Powers which had already arisen on the periphery; and while some of these, like Ptolemaic Egypt and, in a looser way, Antigonid Macedonia, were unitary monarchies, the majority were akin to the two new commonwealths in Greece in being constructed on the federal principle out of an agglomeration of constituent city-states. In these third-century Hellenic federal states of the outer circle there were several variations from the Boeotian archetype.

The Carthaginian Power was based on the sheer dominion of a single sovereign city-state over a number of subject communities—an empire of the same kind as that which fifth-century Athens tried, and failed, to make out of the Delian League, and that which modern Venice succeeded in establishing for herself on the Italian mainland. The Roman constitution was a system of 'dual citizenship', on the Chalcidian pattern already described, in which the comprehensive body politic was a city-state as well as each of the constituent parts. The far-flung Seleucid Empire stretched across South-Western Asia, from the Dardanelles to the Iranian Plateau, like a rope of pearls in which each pearl was a city-state, while the thread on which all the pearls were strung was a divine kingship vested in the Seleucid Dynasty.³ With the single exception of the Roman Commonwealth itself, all the third-century experiments

¹ This capacity for expanding their federal state beyond their own original national limits was an exceedingly important element in the rise of both these confederacies. The Aetolian Confederacy became a Power in the Hellenic World through the incorporation of Phocian Delphi and Trachinian Heraclea, the Achaean Confederacy through the incorporation of Argolic Sicyon and Arcadian Megalopolis; and a Sicyonian Aratus and a Megalopolitan Lydiadas were the two most distinguished statesmen who were ever entrusted with responsibility for Achaean interests. Boeotia followed these examples by incorporating Megara from 224 to 192 B.C. (This was done at the instance of the Achaean Confederacy, to which Megara had previously belonged, when the Megarid was cut off from the rest of the Achaean domain through the Achaean Confederacy's retrocession of Corinth to Macedon.)

² In III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 313-14 and 339-41, and in IV. C. (iii) (c) 2 (a), in the present volume, pp. 265 and 268-9, above.

³ For the structure and function of the Seleucid Empire see Part I. A, vol. i, pp. 5-6, above.

in political construction on a supra-city-state scale were brought to an abrupt and violent end by Roman 'knock-out blows'; but the statesmanship of the victors made use of the political inventions of the Powers annihilated by Roman arms in order to transform the Roman Commonwealth into a Hellenic universal state. In the political architecture of the Augustan Empire the original Roman—and Chalcidian—device of city-states within a city-state was still the main principle of construction; but in so vast a material extension of the building the architect found it wise to supplement the liberal principle of 'dual citizenship' with an effectively tyrannical imperialism of the Carthaginian order, and to brace the whole edifice together with the Seleucid bond of a divine kingship.¹

If we now glance back at the successive theatres of the cumulative political experiment which reached its term in this Roman culmination, we shall observe one common feature. They were all places in which the subordination of City-State Sovereignty to the requirements of a political structure on a larger scale was psychologically possible, because they were all places in which the idolization of City-State Sovereignty had not won a complete ascendancy. Every one of the supra-city-state commonwealths in which the experiment was tried in each of its successive stages will be found to have lain on the outer edge of the Hellenic city-state cosmos of the day, and most of them actually bestrode the border-line between this city-state cosmos, which was the brilliant heart of the Hellenic World, and its pre-city-state penumbra.²

Boeotia, close to the heart though it lay, was still, in the fifth century B.C., sufficiently near to the edge (being next door to the old-fashioned countries of Phocis and Locris) to have retained a certain sense of its ancient national unity; and this remnant of Boeotian solidarity was a counterweight to the particularism of the self-conscious city-states—a large self-conscious Thebes or a small self-conscious Plataea—into which the country had come to be articulated. Fourth-century Olynthus and Rome both stood at points on the border-line between the city-state cosmos and its penumbra where the transition was more abrupt and the contrast sharper; and in the third century B.C. the Roman Commonwealth in Italy, the Seleucid Empire in Asia, and the Aetolian and Achaean Confederacies in Greece all alike displayed the common structural feature of uniting city-states with pre-civic communities in a single polity. Aetolia contained ancient city-states like Pleuron and Calydon, as well as 'un-synoeicized' cantons like Eurytania, within its

¹ It was characteristic of Roman solidity that the Seleucid thread in a string of pearls was transformed, in Roman hands, into a steel lath in a block of reinforced concrete.

² On this point see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, pp. 484-5, above, apropos of Olynthus and Rome.

own original national limits; and, in expanding, the Aetolian Confederacy incorporated foreign cantons like Aeniania, as well as foreign city-states like Naupactus. Achaia, where the balance of feeling between national solidarity and city-state particularism was perhaps about the same in the third century as it had been in Boeotia in the fifth, now reinforced the pre-civic element in her body politic by incorporating the foreign territory of South-West Arcadia, an exceptional patch of Peloponnesian ground which had gone on living under a pre-civic dispensation until the foundation of Megalopolis in 370 B.C.¹ Rome had incorporated the foreign cantons of the Sabina as well as the foreign city-states in Campania. The Seleucid Monarchy had united a number of ancient Greek city-states on the sea-board of Anatolia with a number of *ci-devant* provinces of the defunct Achaemenian Empire.

If we now look closer, we shall observe that in each of these composite commonwealths the territories in which some kind of pre-civic dispensation was still a living fact, or at any rate a recent memory, were the main scenes of creative political activity. In the Achaean Confederacy, for instance, it was a school of Megalopolitan statesmen that were the best inspired exponents of the Achaean idea;² and, when we examine Roman Italy and Seleucid Asia, we find that a majority of the constituent city-states were not merely recent foundations, like Megalopolis in the Peloponnese, but were actually younger than the comprehensive body politic in which they were embraced.

The characteristic means by which the Roman Commonwealth and the Seleucid Monarchy acquired the constituent city-states out of which they fashioned their political fabric was not by the incorporation of existing city-states which had once been sovereign and would therefore still be self-conscious; it was rather by the creation of new city-states on politically virgin soil which had previously lain outside the borders of the Hellenic city-state cosmos. In both Roman Italy and Seleucid Asia these new city-states were generated in a variety of ways. In some cases, as in the *coloniae Latinae* and the *coloniae civium Romanorum*, or in the Asiatic colonies of Greek military veterans which were planted by the Seleucidae,³ the nucleus of the new civic foundation was created by the physical introduction of new settlers who brought the city-

¹ For the constitutional history of South-West Arcadia see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, pp. 477 and 481, above.

² See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 313-14, above.

³ 'The basis of the Seleucid settlement was the military colony and not the Greek city, the *polis*. The first two kings did not . . . fill Asia with Greek cities directly; at the same time 'the aim of every military colony was to become a full *polis* . . . ; there was a steady upward growth of the colony into the *polis*, and it was this which, before the end of the second century B.C., had filled Asia with "Greek" cities.'—Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 6 and 9.

state tradition with them from their previous homes as part of their social heritage. In other cases the new foundation was called into existence by the 'synoecism' and 'civilization' (in the literal sense) of the indigenous population, as when the Seleucidae created a new city-state out of the domain of some Anatolian or Syrian divinity,¹ or when the Romans organized a Sabine canton into a *praefectura*, or a Picentine village into a *forum* or *conciliabulum*. The most usual method, perhaps, was some combination of conversion with colonization. But, in whichever of these ways any given Roman or Seleucid foundation was started on its career, its citizens could scarcely help taking for granted the supremacy of the Power by whose fiat, and on whose territory, their city had been founded. Often, indeed, they were reminded of the parent Power's *patria potestas* by the very mintage of their city's name, when this recorded the creative act of some Seleucid sovereign, like Seleucia or Apamea,² or of some Roman magistrate, like Forum Sempronii or Forum Appii.

Any citizen of an eponymously named city who might be tempted, out of affectation or snobbery, to idolize his Antioch or his Forum Livii as an Athenian idolized Athens or a Praenestine Praeneste, would necessarily be reminded, in the act, that 'it is he that hath made us and not we ourselves',³ and would probably be pulled up short, by an inward sense of incongruity, before going the length of making any outward gesture of insubordination that would demand the intervention of Roman praetor or Seleucid prince.⁴ The normal psychological attitude of the citizens of such city-states towards their sovereign the God Antiochus or the Dea Roma would be the feeling that they were this sovereign's 'people and the sheep of his pasture'.⁵ Manifestly, a local community which

¹ For the temple-states in Anatolia and Syria which were part of the social legacy of the Achaemenian Empire, and for the Seleucids' policy towards them, see Tarn, *W. W.: Hellenistic Civilization* (London 1927, Arnold), pp. 114-17. For the genesis of these temple-states see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), p. 471, below. The Seleucid city-state of Antioch-towards-Pisidia was founded on territory carved out of a temple-state of the god Mên. For the signal failure of Antiochus IV Epiphanes' attempt to apply the regular Seleucid policy to the temple-state of Yahweh at Jerusalem see V. C (i) (d) 9 (B), vol. vi, pp. 103-5, below. There is no record of any military colony or *polis* ever having been founded on land taken from the estate of an Iranian feudal baron (Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, p. 32).

² 'The only places which were founded directly as *poleis* from the start were some, probably the majority, of those which bore the four Seleucid dynastic names: Antioch, Seleucia, Apamea, Laodicea.'—Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

³ Psalm c. 3.

⁴ In the Seleucid Empire the obverse of the eponymous cities' (and other royal foundations') loyalty to the Crown was the Crown's tact in dealing with the cities. 'Though in theory the Seleucids were autocrats, they could not afford to ride roughshod over the Greeks, and the popularity of the dynasty shows that they did not do so' (Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 26). 'The new cities were not, of course, sovereign states. . . . But neither were they municipalities of the Empire, as they were to be of the Roman Empire; they were a sort of half-way house' (Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 24).

⁵ Psalm c, loc. cit.

felt like this would be socially plastic and politically malleable; and the triumphs of Roman and Seleucid political construction were achieved with materials of this kind, just as the triumphs of British political construction have been achieved with dominions of the Crown in 'new countries'.¹

Any candid Englishman will confess that the British Commonwealth of Nations could never have been built up by English statesmanship if the materials with which it had to work had been all Irelands, with no Canadas or Australias. On this analogy we may reasonably say—without any slighting reflexion upon the Roman or the Seleucid political genius—that Roman Italy could never have been built out of constituent city-states that were all Capuas, with no Aesernias or Venusias, nor Seleucid Asia out of city-states that were all Smyrnas and Lampsacuses, with no Laodiceas or Antiochs. Even as it was, Capua nearly brought the Roman Commonwealth to grief, when the structure of this Roman building was subjected to the supreme test of the Hannibalic War, by seceding on her own account and thereby setting an example which was afterwards followed by Tarentum and other *ci-devant* sovereign city-states which had latterly been incorporated into the Roman body politic. And the demoralization spread so far that a moment came when twelve Latin colonies actually declined to continue their support of the Roman Government in the prosecution of the war by making any further contributions of men or money.² As for the Seleucid Empire, its collision with Rome in the war of 192–188 B.C. caused the immediate loss of the Seleucid possessions north-west of Taurus and was the beginning of the end of the Seleucid Power. And the occasion, if not the cause, of this disastrous encounter was an appeal which was addressed to the Roman Government in 193 B.C. by Lampsacus, Smyrna, and other historic Greek city-states on the western seaboard of Asia Minor³ whose citizens could not forget the City-State Sovereignty which their forebears had lost some four hundred years before, nor reconcile themselves to a suzerainty which the modern Seleucids had inherited from the ancient Mermnad Kings of Lydia through the long chain of a successive Achaemenian and Athenian and Spartan and restored Achaemenian overlordship. These *ci-devant* sovereign Asiatic city-states in the Seleucid Empire had no sooner heard the news that the Romans had restored their sovereignty to the European Greek city-states which had previously been subject to the Kingdom of

¹ On this point see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), in the present volume, pp. 292–6, as well as III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 303, footnote 1, above.

² For the lapse of these twelve Latin colonies from active into passive belligerency in 209 B.C. see Livy, Book XXVII, chap. 9.

³ For this appeal and its diplomatic consequences see Livy, Book XXXIV, chaps. 57–9, and Book XXXV, chap. 16.

Macedon¹ than they set their hearts upon obtaining the same boon for themselves from the same puissant Roman hands.² They did not pause to consider that there could be little guarantee of genuineness or permanency for a sovereignty that was recaptured by a bevy of city-states at the price of overthrowing the general Balance of Power through the humiliation of two Great Powers and the aggrandizement of one. The idolization of a long-lost status obsessed their minds and determined their policy; and so they played into the Romans' hands. For the destruction of the Seleucid Power carried Rome a long stage farther towards that universal dominion over the Hellenic World in which all other sovereignties but hers were ultimately swallowed up.

Thus, in the fatally long-drawn-out effort to transcend the institution of Parochial City-State Sovereignty—an effort which began with a tragically swift Athenian failure in the fifth century B.C. and ended no less than four hundred years later with a tragically belated Roman success—the historic sovereign city-states of Hellas played, from first to last, a role which was either negatively unconstructive or else positively mischievous. The appeal of Lampsacus and Smyrna to Rome in 193 B.C., which brought the Seleucid Empire to the ground, was inspired by the same perverse spirit that had once led the allies of Athens in the Delian League to rebel against their treaty obligations, and led Athens herself to transform the League into an Athenian tyranny; and the aberration of inward thought and feeling which was responsible for this perversity in outward behaviour was a stiff-necked persistence in idolizing the institution of City-State Sovereignty in an age when this institution had become inimical instead of serviceable to the life of the Hellenic Society. When this idolatry captivated and paralysed the ancient and famous communities which were the original sources of Hellenic light and leadership, the work of political construction, which had to be performed by somebody, was carried out crudely and painfully and slowly by communities which had been lying in obscurity, in the penumbra, in the age when an Athens and a Corinth and a Chalcis and a Miletus had been the brilliant luminaries of the Hellenic firmament. And at the culmination and close of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles', when this long labour and travail was on the eve of bearing a tardy and savourless fruit, a sudden view of four once magnificent Greek cities lying derelict

¹ In 196 B.C., on the occasion of the Isthmian Games, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, the Roman commander in Greece, proclaimed, in the name of the Roman Government, the liberation of the communities over which the Macedonian Government had been compelled to cede its title to sovereignty after the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C. See the accounts of this striking transaction in Livy, Book XXXIII, chaps. 32-3, and in Plutarch's *Life of Titus Quinctius Flamininus*, chap. 10.

² On this point see Livy, Book XXXIII, chap. 33, *ad finem*.

within sight of each other, with their brilliance quite extinct, made an overwhelming impression on an experienced Roman statesman of the day.

'On the voyage home from Asia, when my ship was making for Megara from Aegina, I began to take my bearings of the regions round about. Behind me was Aegina, ahead of me Megara, to the right of me Peiraeus, to the left of me Corinth; and all these cities have had their *floruit*—only to lie now prostrate and ruinous for all eyes to see. I began to think to myself: "How monstrous it is for little creatures like ourselves, whose natural term of life is of the shortest, to grow indignant if any of us passes away or has his life taken from him, when the dead bodies of all these cities lie cast out here on this one spot. Servius, pull yourself together and remember that you have been born a son of man."¹

In our own Western World in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era a similar train of thought might have arisen in the mind of any philosophic French or English traveller on 'the grand tour' when he had his first sight of the spires of Bruges and Ghent or the towers of Sienna or the domes of Florence and Venice; for these cenotaphs of departed glories testified in that age, like the monuments of Corinth and Athens eighteen centuries earlier, to the deadliness of the idolatrous worship of the sovereignty of a city-state. In our Western World, it is true, the failure of the historic medieval city-states of Italy and Flanders to rise to the occasion, when they were called upon to face the extreme ordeal of transcending themselves, did not bring about the breakdown and disintegration of the whole society of which those city-states were members. As we have noticed in an earlier part of this Study,² the Italian and Flemish failure was retrieved, and the situation provisionally saved, by a 'clean cut' with the political tradition of the medieval Western city-state cosmos. The modern school of Western political architecture dispensed with the institution of the city-state altogether, adopted the Transalpine kingdom-state as the standard basis for a new political structure, and managed to combine the old Transalpine scale with the new Italian efficiency by a creative adaptation of the Transalpine feudal institution of Parliament. This English solution of the political problem of the age was the main line of Western political development in the third chapter of our Western history; but, side by side with this new-fangled English work of political creation, there was a simultaneous attempt to solve the same problem of creating an efficient body politic on the supracivic scale without renouncing the use of city-states as elements in

¹ Letter written by Servius Sulpicius Rufus to Marcus Tullius Cicero from Athens in 45 B.C. (*Ad Familiares*, iv. 5), upon receipt of the news of the death of Cicero's daughter.

² In III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63, above.

the new structure. This was the experiment which was tried in Switzerland and in the Northern Netherlands; and although it has been of less practical importance than the contemporary constitutional developments in England, this Swiss and Dutch experiment is of equal interest to the student of history. Its interest lies in the fact that here, in a secondary line of our modern Western political development, we have a precise parallel to the main line of development in the corresponding chapter of Hellenic history.¹ The Swiss Confederation and the United Netherlands are counterparts of the Aetolian and Achaean Confederacies, inasmuch as they are attempts to produce the same results by a similar use of corresponding materials; and it is profoundly interesting to observe how far the parallel extends.

We observe, for example, that the Swiss and Dutch experiments were not made on the historic soil of Lombardy and Flanders, which was cumbered with the rubbish of obsolete institutions and with the weeds of ineradicable memories; they were made on adjoining ground,² in the former penumbra of the medieval Western city-state cosmos, where the city-state was neither an unknown institution nor yet an object of idolatrous worship, and where it was therefore not intractable in the hands of a political architect who wished to try the experiment of using a traditionally sovereign type of polity as a modest brick in a larger and more ambitious political building. We also observe that, in the architecture of both the Swiss and the Dutch federal commonwealth, there was a valuable diversity of type among the constituent parts out of which the whole was constructed. While some of these parts were actual city-states, like Berne and Zürich and Basel and Utrecht, and others were clusters of city-states, like Holland and Seeland, there were also Swiss cantons like the original Forest Cantons or the Graubünden, and Dutch provinces like Friesland or Geldern, which, like the duchy of Cleve and the counties of Mark and Burgundy³ and

¹ It may be added that the main line of our modern Western political development, as represented by the English system of representative parliamentary government in a limited monarchy on the kingdom-state scale, has likewise its parallel, in the corresponding chapter of Hellenic history, in the temporary and eventually abortive recrudescence of an old-fashioned kingdom-state régime which is represented by the Kingdom of Macedon, and by the Macedonian 'successor-states' of the Achaemenian Empire, from the generation of King Philip II to the generation of King Perseus. During the span of 170 years that intervenes between the dates of the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.) and the Battle of Pydna (168 B.C.), this Macedonian kingdom-state régime occupies the foreground of the Hellenic political stage; and the truth that this was a side-track, and not the main line of development, did not become manifest until the triumph of Rome condemned all the surviving kingdom-states of the Macedonian type to be *peritura regna*. For an examination of the ultimate victory of the city-state over the kingdom-state in the Hellenic World see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, in vol. iii, above.

² This point has been noticed, by anticipation, in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 351, footnote 1, above.

³ The Imperial County of Burgundy (*Franche-Comté*), as distinct from the French Duchy of Burgundy, had originally been included, like the Tyrol and Cleve and Mark

the Tyrol, were relics of a pre-civic dispensation in Transalpine Europe. These features in the location, composition, and structure of the Swiss and Dutch commonwealths all have their counterparts in the sketch of the Aetolian and Achaean confederacies that we have given above.

These Swiss and Dutch experiments in political construction have played their part, side by side with English work, in saving the modern Western World from being ruined by a Florentine or Venetian idolatry of the medieval Western city-state. Yet, if we have thus succeeded, in the third chapter of our Western history, in avoiding the fatal false step into which our 'philosophical contemporaries'¹ in the Hellenic World slipped in the corresponding chapter of their history, this provisional avoidance of political shipwreck does not warrant us in 'resting on our oars' in a day-dream of self-congratulation over a fancied superiority. If we are tempted to regard ourselves as the Hellenes' superiors in the game of political construction because we have managed to beat their score by a single point, we shall do well to remind ourselves of the Hellenic wisdom which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Solon.² 'In order to appraise any phenomenon, the attention must be directed upon the circumstances in which it meets its end. To many people God has given a glimpse of happiness in order to destroy them root and branch.' Like the Lydian king to whom Solon's observations were addressed, the Hellenic Society has long since met its end, and that end has been tragically disastrous. Yet, in finishing their game in defeat, the Hellenes have at any rate gained the negative advantage that they can no longer take any more false steps or suffer any further losses. For them the whole game is over, for good and for ill, while for us, whose civilization is still 'a going concern', the crucial part of this game is probably still to play. Suppose that we were to lose the next point, and after that to go on losing till the end of the set and the match, then the single point to the good, on which our present pretensions to superiority rest, would soon be lost sight of by the spectators of the tournament, and we should be bracketed thenceforth with our Hellenic rivals in the broad and simple category of 'losers'.³

and all the constituent provinces of the United Netherlands and cantons of the Swiss Confederation, in the domain of the Holy Roman Empire. (Dutch Flanders, which was carved by Dutch arms out of a Spanish possession that had once been included in the Kingdom of France, was not one of the original constituent provinces of the United Netherlands; it was one of the conquered *Generalitätsländer* which served the Confederation as a kind of military glacis on its anti-Spanish front.)

¹ For the philosophical contemporaneity of all representatives of the species of society which we have called 'civilizations', see I. C (iii) (c), vol. i, pp. 172-4, above.

² See the passage quoted in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, on p. 251, above.

³ For the philosophical equivalence of all the civilizations that have ever come into existence up to date see I. C (iii) (d), vol. i, pp. 175-7, above.

This general consideration should move us to take stock of our own position to-day, and to ask ourselves in what sense and to what extent we have really done better than our Hellenic fellow wanderers in the wilderness. Let us grant that we have been rather more successful in finding a satisfactory political response to the challenge of a sudden large increase in the material scale of our social life. Our Western response to this challenge has been to replace the medieval Sovereign City-State, on the pattern of Florence or Nürnberg, by the modern Sovereign National State, on the pattern of France or Great Britain, as the standard sovereign unit in our political system; and this imposing work of political reconstruction, which is now an accomplished fact, does, no doubt, compare advantageously with the abortive Hellenic efforts to replace a sovereign Athens or a sovereign Tarentum by building up an Aetolian or Achaean Confederacy or a Seleucid Asia or a Roman Italy. But is this judgement the last word? Can we pronounce, with any assurance, that the bold and varied Hellenic experiments of the third century B.C. would not ultimately have resulted in successes comparable to ours if this Hellenic experimentation had not been prematurely cut short by Roman 'knock-out blows'? And, when we inquire how these 'knock-out blows' came to be delivered at this critical moment of Hellenic history, can we pronounce, again, that we ourselves are immune from the possibility of a corresponding disaster in our own world at the present day? As soon as we put the question, we are aware that the answer is not, this time, in our favour; for a 'knock-out blow' which will unify our world by force, and at the same time ruin our civilization, in the Roman manner, is a catastrophe of which we now live in daily dread.¹ As we tremble at this menace which darkens our sky, we long in vain for the assurance with which one Jewish observer was able to confront the vast calamities of the second century B.C.

'Thou shalt not be afraid for the terror by night; nor for the arrow that flieth by day;

'Nor for the pestilence that walketh in darkness; nor for the destruction that wasteth at noonday.

'A thousand shall fall at thy side, and ten thousand at thy right hand, but it shall not come nigh thee.'²

The verse that expresses what we actually feel is:

'I am afflicted and ready to die from my youth up; while I suffer thy terrors I am distracted.'³

And these terrors beset us because, so far, we have failed, as utterly as the Hellenes failed, to solve the political problem which is

¹ See the present chapter, p. 407, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 314-15 and 319-21, below.

² Psalm xci. 5-7.

³ Psalm lxxxviii. 15.

crucial for our destinies, as it was for theirs—the problem of establishing a political world order.

If we ask ourselves, last of all, why it is that this vital and ever more importunate problem continues to baffle us, we shall find that our reading of Hellenic history supplies us with a key to the riddle. We have seen that the Hellenic Society brought itself to ruin by an inveterate idolization of City-State Sovereignty; and a similar infatuation with the sovereignty of national states is the corresponding aberration that threatens now to bring our ruin upon us.¹ These Western and Hellenic political idolatries are alike destructive, and this through a fundamental vice which is common to them both. They both substitute a part for the whole as the object of devotion; for, however much the national state and the city-state and the federal commonwealth of city-states or nations may differ from one another in size and constitution and structure, they are all akin in being politics of the parochial species, mere fractions or articulations of the society within which, and for which, they exist and to which they owe their being. Without transcending the sovereignty of such parochial states, it is not possible to establish oecumenical law and order; and, so long as this problem remains unsolved, the difficulty of solving it and the penalty of failing are merely increased by enlarging the unit-size of the parochial sovereign body politic from the dimensions of a Plataea to those of a Seleucid Empire, or from the dimensions of a San Marino to those of a British Commonwealth.

This challenge of the conflict between Parochial Sovereignty and world order confronts our world to-day as it confronted the Hellenic World from the fifth to the last century B.C. Are we going to rise to it, or are we, too, going to succumb? The answer to that question still lies to-day 'on the knees of the Gods'—or, more truly, in the hands of ourselves and our children. With what measure of success or failure we shall handle our destiny we cannot yet prophesy; but there are perhaps two things to be said about the Hellenic parallel. On the one hand the fact that the Hellenic Society was worsted by this challenge does not establish any presumption about our future Western fortunes, either one way or the other; the ordeal has no uniform or predestined outcome; the issue lies with us. On the other hand there is a not unimportant point on which the Hellenic parallel does, perhaps, afford a valid analogy and so supply a basis for a cautious prognostication.

¹ In the Vatican City on the 17th July, 1938, Pope Pius XI, in an address delivered to French missionary nuns, denounced 'this curse of exaggerated Nationalism, which hinders the saving of souls, which raises barriers between people and people, which is contrary not only to the Law of God but to the Faith itself, and to the Creed which is said and sung in all churches throughout the World'.

On the showing of Hellenic history, we may expect that our present Western problem of transcending National Sovereignty will receive its solution—in so far as it receives one at all—in some place or places where this institution of National Sovereignty has not been erected into an object of idolatrous worship. We shall not expect to see salvation come from the historic national states of Western Europe—a France or a Spain or a Hungary or a Sweden—where every political thought and feeling and act is bound up with a Parochial Sovereignty which is itself the recognized symbol of a glorious national past. It is not in this Epimethean psychological environment that our society can look forward to making the necessary discovery of some new form of international association which will bring a Parochial Sovereignty under the discipline of a higher law and so forestall the otherwise inevitable calamity of its annihilation by a ‘knock-out blow’. If this discovery is ever made, the laboratory of political experimentation where we may expect to see it materialize will be some body politic like the British Commonwealth of Nations, which has mated the experience of one ancient European national state with the plasticity of a number of ‘new countries’ overseas; or else it will be some body politic like the Soviet Union, which is attempting to organize a number of non-Western communities into an entirely new kind of polity on the basis of a Western revolutionary idea. In the Soviet Union we may perhaps discern the Seleucid Empire of our world, and in the British Empire its Roman Commonwealth. Will these and such-like bodies politic, on the outskirts of our modern Western cosmos of sovereign nations; eventually produce some form of political structure that will enable us to give more substance, before it is too late, to our inchoate League of Nations? We cannot tell; but we can almost feel sure that, if these pioneers fail, the work will never be done by the petrified devotees of the idol of National Sovereignty.

The East Roman Empire.

A classic case of the idolization of an institution bringing a civilization to grief is the fatal infatuation of Orthodox Christendom with a ghost of the Roman Empire, an ancient institution which had fulfilled its historical function, and completed its natural term of life, in serving as the ‘apparented’ Hellenic Society’s universal state.¹

At earlier points in this Study² we have noticed that the Orthodox

¹ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52–3; IV. C (iii) (b) 10, in the present volume, pp. 208 and 213–14; and the present chapter, p. 306, above.

² In Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 26, and in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, in the present volume, p. 72, above.

Christian Civilization broke down in the last quarter of the tenth century of our Era. The most prominent outward symptom of the breakdown was the outbreak of the disastrous Bulgaro-Roman War of A.D. 977-1019. This disaster overtook Orthodox Christendom, and blighted its growth, barely three hundred years after its first emergence out of the chaos of the post-Hellenic interregnum; and this growth-span is miserably short by comparison with the life-history of our Western Christendom—a sister civilization which was coeval with Orthodox Christendom in its birth, while its growth, for all that we know,¹ may still be going forward in our day, nearly a thousand years after the date at which the growth of the twin civilization was unmistakably cut short.

How are we to account for this striking difference between the fortunes of two societies which started life at the same moment and in the same circumstances? The actual outcome, as the passage of a thousand years has unfolded it before our eyes to-day, is the more remarkable considering that it is the exact inverse of what would have been prophesied by any intelligent and impartial observer—an ambassador from Cordova or Baghdad, or a Confucian litteratus from Si Ngan—who might have happened to make a comparative study of Orthodox and Western Christendom in A.D. 938. Such an observer at such a date—or even a hundred years later, before the tardy vitality of the West and the premature senility of the Orthodox Christian Society had become blatantly manifest—would certainly have declared, and that with some confidence, that the Orthodox Christian Civilization's prospects were decidedly brighter than those of this society's Western sister. He would have justified this judgement on the ground that, of the two, the Orthodox Christian Society was manifestly the more effective; and he could have explained what he meant in concrete terms if he had been challenged to give illustrations. He could have recalled, for example, that when the Primitive Muslim Arabs had broken out of the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century of the Christian Era, they had been brought to a halt on the Orthodox Christian front at the line of the Taurus, almost within sight of the North Arabian Steppe and within easy striking distance of the headquarters of the Umayyad Power at Damascus,² whereas they were able, when they broke into Western Christendom out of Egypt, to

¹ It is, of course, impossible for us, in our generation, to be sure that our civilization has not yet broken down, either in our own time or even some time back. The historical beginning of a 'Time of Troubles' can only be recognized, for certain, in retrospect, and we may be far advanced in social disintegration without being aware of it. We can only be sure, in our day, that our society has not yet been gathered up into a universal state! This question of where we stand in the life-history of our own society in our own day has been touched upon in I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 36-7, above, and is discussed further in V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 312-21, as well as in Part XII, below.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 367-8, above.

overrun the whole of North-West Africa and the whole of the Iberian Peninsula, and to pass the line of the Pyrenees, before they met with any effective resistance.¹ Our hypothetical tenth-century observer could have gone on to point out that the means by which Orthodox Christendom succeeded in stopping the Arab offensive at the line of the Taurus, and thereby retaining possession of the whole of its own Anatolian patrimony, was by rallying and concentrating its own hard-pressed forces through an evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire. The timeliness and effectiveness and apparent permanence of this great political achievement of the Emperor Leo Syrus² would have offered our observer a brilliant foil for showing up the blackness of the failure of the corresponding attempt in the West, when this was made, two generations later, by Charlemagne.³

Why was it, then, that the Orthodox Christian Civilization so soon belied its early promise, while, inversely, the Western Civilization has so very much more than made up for an unpromising start? The explanation lies precisely in the contrast, which we have just called to mind, between Charlemagne's failure and Leo's success. Though the Carolingian evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire was no more than a flash in the pan, its brief flame was enough to burn up the reserves of energy which the infant Western Society had been accumulating for about a hundred years before Charlemagne's accession to power. Charlemagne expended these slender and precious reserves in an unachievably ambitious attempt, first to unify the Western World by force, and then to enlarge its borders by the same means. The fratricidal struggle between the Franks and the Lombards was carried to the extreme conclusion of an outright conquest of one of the two principal surviving Western 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire by the other; and this war of aggression beyond the Alps was capped by another beyond the Rhine—the Thirty Years' War against the Saxons—which was still more exhausting to the official victor.⁴ In fact, Charlemagne's long series of Pyrrhic military victories condemned the infant society, whose resources he was burning up, to a crushing social defeat; and this defeat is registered in the ensuing social calamity of 'the post-Carolingian interregnum', which lasted from the morrow of Charlemagne's death until more than half-way

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 361 and 378-81, with Annex IV, above.

² For the work of Leo Syrus see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 64, footnote 3; III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 274-6; and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, in the present volume, p. 73, above, and the present chapter, p. 341, below.

³ For Charlemagne's failure see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 167, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 343-5 and 368, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), in the present volume, pp. 488-90, below.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 167, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 345-6, above, and, in the present volume, IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), pp. 489-90, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), p. 523, below.

through the tenth century, and which was marked by the recurrence, in an acute form, of the grievous social maladies of the foregoing interregnum that had followed the break-up of the Roman Empire, from which the West had so recently and so painfully shaken itself free.¹ If the West managed to survive this second time of tribulation, at the price of seeing its growth checked and retarded for no longer than 150 years, it had to thank the stars that had fought against Charlemagne in their courses. If Charlemagne's evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire had not proved a fiasco, the infant Western Civilization on whose shoulders he had recklessly imposed this crushing incubus might well have succumbed; and if this diagnosis of our early Western history is correct it will illuminate the history of Orthodox Christendom likewise. If the West was saved by Charlemagne's failure, we may find that the Orthodox Christian Society was ruined by Leo's success.²

In fact, we have already observed, at an earlier point in this Study,³ that Leo's achievement, in effectively resuscitating the institution of the Roman Empire on Orthodox Christian soil, was a response that was over-successful to a challenge that was excessive; and the overstrain of this *tour de force* exacted its penalty in the shape of a malformation. The outward symptom was a premature and excessive aggrandizement of the State in Orthodox Christian social life at the expense of all other institutions. The inward aberration was the idolization of a particular historic polity which had been conjured back from its grave and been decked out in the prestige of an emotionally glorified past in order to save a nascent society from imminent destruction.

This disastrous idolization of a ghost of the Roman Empire in the Orthodox Christian World was, of course, in one sense natural; but in another sense it was perverse; for the region in which the infant Orthodox Christian Society had recently emerged, and the plot of ground on which the East Roman *Imperium Redivivum* was now being erected, were haunted by vivid memories of recent disasters which had been the penalty of an obstinate local idolization of the very polity whose spectre was now being deliberately evoked.

In the last chapter of the history of the Roman Empire, which may be taken, for this purpose, as having begun with the death of

¹ For the Völkerwanderung of the Scandinavians, which was one of the conspicuous external manifestations of the post-Carolingian 'heroic age', see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 194-202, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 346-57, above. For the contemporary Magyar Völkerwanderung see Part III A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 441-3, above.

² This point has been made, by anticipation, in II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 368, above.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 369 and 384-5, above.

the Emperor Theodosius the Great in A.D. 395,¹ there had been, at first, a notable differentiation in the fortunes of the Hellenic universal state in its Latin provinces on the one hand and in its Greek and Oriental provinces on the other. In the Latin provinces there had been an immediate financial, political, and social collapse; the framework of the Empire had broken up and disappeared, and the political vacuum had been occupied by the automatically emancipated proprietors of great agricultural estates and leaders of powerful barbarian war-bands, while the Church had stepped into the social breach. Meanwhile, in an age which thus saw the dissolution of the Empire in the West, the Imperial régime in the Greek and Oriental provinces succeeded in riding one after another of the waves by which its counterpart in the Latin provinces was being broken up.²

For example, the successive barbarian war-lords—a Visigothic Alaric and an Ostrogothic Theodoric—who made a motion to carve out 'successor-states' for themselves in the Constantinopolitan Government's domain in the Balkan Peninsula, were adroitly 'passed on', by Constantinopolitan diplomacy, into the derelict dominions of the sister Imperial Government beyond the Adriatic; and the more ambitious barbarian adventurers in the regular Imperial service, who sought to make themselves the masters instead of the servants of the Imperial Government, were courageously crushed before their plans were ripe. Gainas the Goth, who was destroyed in A.D. 400,³ and Aspar the Alan, who was destroyed in A.D. 471, had been potential Ricimers or Odovacers; but the Imperial authorities at Constantinople were not content simply to nip these attempts at barbarian usurpation in the bud as they threatened to unfold themselves. The statesmanship of Leo the Great (*imperator* A.D. 457-74) cut the evil at the root by releasing the Empire from its perilous dependence upon barbarian mercenaries from a no-man's-land outside the Imperial frontiers. This breach with a vicious practice which had been growing upon the Empire for the past hundred years was a moral triumph; and Leo made it also

¹ For other purposes the year 378, which saw the overthrow of the Roman infantry by the Gothic cavalry at Adrianople, is perhaps a better conventional date for signaling the end of the *Pax Romana*. (For the technical military aspect of the defeat of the legionary by the cataphract at the Battle of Adrianople see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), in the present volume, pp. 440-5, below.)

² See Bury, J. B.: 'Causes of the Survival of the Roman Empire in the East', reprinted from *The Quarterly Review*, vol. cxcii, No. 383, pp. 146-55, in *Selected Essays of J. B. Bury* (Cambridge 1930, University Press).

³ The moral, as well as political, crisis that was resolved in this grim way has left an echo in Synesius's *De Regno*, § 14 (p. 1089 B)-§ 18 (p. 1100 D). The Cyrenaean advocate of strong measures at Constantinople lived to practise in his home province what he had once preached in the capital of the Empire. For Synesius's assumption of the double burden of a shepherd of souls and a warden of the marches see II. D (v), vol. II, pp. 165-6, above.

a material success by finding an alternative recruiting-ground for the Imperial Army in an enclave of recrudescant barbarism in the interior. He relieved the Empire, once for all, of its Gothic and Alan soldiery by substituting his Isaurians;¹ and by this shrewd stroke he killed two birds with one stone; for, in providing a lawful and honourable outlet for the Isaurians' energies, he also relieved the Empire from the ravages of a gang of native brigands in its midst who, in the days of its weakness, had been almost as great a thorn in its flesh as the bands of alien marauders from the north bank of the Danube.²

This strong-minded military reform was given the chance to produce its salutary effects by an equally strong-minded breach with another vicious practice. Leo the Great's successor Anastasius (*imperabat* A.D. 491-518) abolished, in the provinces under the Constantinopolitan Government's rule, the morally iniquitous and economically disastrous institution of corporate responsibility for the payment of taxes, and reintroduced the system of direct collection from each individual taxpayer by Imperial officials.³ Thus, in the course of the fifth century of the Christian Era, an Empire which was going to pieces in the Latin provinces was re-equipped in the Greek and Oriental provinces with a sound army, a sound administration, and a sound financial system. We may add that both Anastasius and his immediate predecessor Zeno (*imperabat* A.D. 474-91) also wrestled, not unsuccessfully, with a particularly difficult problem which was peculiar to their own domain. The threat of a rift between the Greek and the Oriental provinces of the Empire had declared itself, in the fifth century, in the ecclesiastical danger-signal of a Nestorian and a Monophysite reaction against Catholic Christianity;⁴ and this danger was provisionally

¹ These so-called 'Isaurians' who made their mark on the history of the later Roman Empire appear to have been the inhabitants of the ancient Cilicia Trachea (which had been a nest of pirates in the last century B.C. as well as in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era), and not the inhabitants of the cities of Old and New Isaura, which lay, not on the seaward-facing Cilician, but on the landward-facing Lycæonian, slope of the Taurus (see Jones, A. H. M.: *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press), pp. 138-40 and 214).

² The Roman Emperor Leo I's method of pacifying Isauria may be compared with the policy of Lord Chatham in enlisting the Scottish Highlanders in the British Army after the suppression of the rebellion of A.D. 1745. It must be added that the Isaurians were not converted to law and order in a day, and that the Imperial Government found them almost as difficult to manage as the barbarian soldiery from beyond the frontiers whose place they had taken. Politically, however, the Isaurians were very much less dangerous than the Alans or the Goths, as was proved by the Imperial Government's success in eventually reducing them to obedience, not only at Constantinople, but also in their native highland fastnesses, between A.D. 491 and A.D. 496.

³ The benefits that were to be expected, *a priori*, from this reform were perhaps diminished by the practice of putting up these new official posts to auction. This vicious system of appointment must have tended to turn officials who were nominally civil servants into something very like the speculative tax-farmers of the last century of the Roman Republic.

⁴ For the significance of the Nestorian and Monophysite movements as one stage

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parried by the statesmanship of these two Constantinopolitan Emperors.

In fine, the Imperial régime in the Greek and Oriental provinces distinguished itself, throughout the fifth century, by determined efforts to maintain the Empire as 'a going concern' which stand out in striking contrast to the contemporary 'defeatism' of the Imperial régime in the West; and for the moment these efforts seemed to have been rewarded with a triumphant success. The two portions of the divided heritage of Theodosius the Great, which had faced the opening of the fifth century side by side with equally fair—or gloomy—prospects, had apparently drifted poles apart before the same century closed. In the West the Empire had run upon the rocks and suffered total shipwreck; in the Centre and the East the ship of state had not only survived but had actually been overhauled and re-rigged in the course of a stormy passage which had carried it, in the end, into calmer waters. Yet the contrast which the fifth century had brought out was shown by the sixth century to be, after all, superficial and impermanent. For everything that a Leo and a Zeno and an Anastasius had sedulously and cumulatively gathered in was scattered to the winds in the single reign of a Justinian (*imperabat* A.D. 527–65) who was betrayed, by an idolization of the vanished Empire of Constantine and Augustus, into indulging the same prodigious ambition, with the same disastrous results, as his latter-day Austrasian mimic, Charlemagne.¹

The slender store of social energy which had been so carefully hoarded and so conscientiously bequeathed to him by his predecessors was burnt up by Justinian in his abortive efforts to restore the territorial integrity of the Empire by reincorporating the lost Latin provinces in Africa across the Mediterranean and in Europe beyond the Adriatic.² And his death in A.D. 565 was the signal for

in a series of Syriac attempts to expel the intrusive Hellenic culture from the Syriac Society's ancestral domain see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 91; II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 236; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 286–7, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 127, below.

¹ The misguidedness and disastrousness of Justinian's ambition have been touched upon, by anticipation, in III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 162, above. See further V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 223–5, below.

² There was a minor group of Latin provinces—stretching across the Balkan Peninsula, in a narrow belt, from Praevalitana on the Adriatic to Lower Moesia on the Black Sea—which had remained in the Constantinopolitan Government's hands continuously down to Justinian's own day. The Theodosian partition of the Roman Empire had segregated the Latin from the Greek and Oriental provinces without conscious design, and therefore without precision. The line of partition was consciously determined by considerations that were strategic and administrative, not linguistic or cultural. And on purely geographical grounds Constantinople was a more convenient centre than Milan for the administration of the Latin-speaking districts of the Prefecture of Illyricum and the Diocese of Thrace. These Transadriatic Latin provinces were the nursery of a number of famous Emperors. Diocletian came from Praevalitana, Constantine the Great from Dardania. Dardania was also the home province of Justinian himself; and his native Latinity, of which he was not only conscious but was also vain, was one of the factors which moved him to embark upon a programme of reconquest in the Latin West which had not the same attraction for an Isaurian Zeno or for an Epi-

a collapse of the Empire in the Greek and Oriental provinces which resembled the collapse in the West after the death of Theodosius the Great—except that it came with redoubled swiftness and force in revenge for having been staved off for 170 years longer.

In the relatively short interregnum of a hundred and fifty years that intervened between the death of Justinian and the accession of Leo Syrus, the social fabric of the Roman Empire was more cruelly battered, and more thoroughly destroyed, in the East than it was in the West during an interregnum of more than twice as long a Time-span that separated the date of Leo's accession from the death of Theodosius. The intensity of the tribulation in the Constantinopolitan domain, when the storm broke here at last, may be measured by the length and the intensity of the series of great wars with which this century and a half was filled. The two Romano-Persian Wars of A.D. 572-91 and A.D. 603-28 were followed, without a breathing-space, by a life-and-death struggle with the Primitive Muslim Arabs which began in A.D. 632 and which continued to endanger the very existence of a nascent Orthodox Christian Society until after the failure of the second Arab siege of Constantinople in A.D. 717. In this almost unintermittent warfare on the eastern front all the Oriental provinces of the Empire were shorn away, as well as Justinian's conquests in North-West Africa, which the Arabs took in their stride on their war-path from the Nile to the Loire. Meanwhile the greater part of Justinian's Italian conquests fell a prey to the Lombards, and the greater part of the Balkan provinces to the Slavs.

These Balkan provinces, which were the metropolitan territory of the Constantinopolitan Empire on the European side of the Straits, suffered cruelly in spite of their good fortune in lying outside the Oriental war-zone. In these provinces not merely the Imperial régime but the very fabric of Society, including the physical stock of the local human fauna, was almost entirely wiped out. When the darkness that descends upon the Balkan Peninsula after Justinian's death begins to lighten again in the course of the eighth century, we find that the Slavonic barbarians who have been drifting in have not merely conquered the greater part of the country (as the Lombards have conquered Italy), but have also repopulated this *ci-devant* Roman peninsula¹ (as the English barbarians have repopulated the *ci-devant* Roman island of Britain, and the British

damnian Greek Anastasius (though the latter might conceivably have been glad to recover the Island of Sicily, which was an anomalous Greek enclave in an otherwise Latin Prefecture of Italy).

¹ The Slavs appear to have made their first permanent settlement on Roman soil in A.D. 581 (Dvorník, F.: *Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome au ix^e Siècle* (Paris 1926, Champion), pp. 4-5).

refugees the peninsula of Armorica).¹ Just as, in eighth-century Britain, the pre-English population only survived in a recognizable shape in the highlands and peninsulas of 'the Celtic Fringe', so, in the eighth-century Balkan Peninsula, the pre-Slavonic Latin-speaking and Greek-speaking inhabitants only retained their mother-tongue and other remnants of their social patrimony in a few isolated fastnesses among the mountains and along the coasts. This annihilation which Justinian brought upon his own kith and kin in his own Illyrian homeland² stands out in contrast to the tribulations of Italy and Sicily, which respectively remained a Latin-speaking and a Greek-speaking country after all the Alarics and Genseric and Justinians and Totilas and Alboins had come and gone and successively done their worst to turn their Hesperian battle-ground into a wilderness.

Thus, *de facto*, the Roman Empire perished in its Central and Eastern provinces after the death of Justinian, as, after the death of Theodosius a hundred and seventy years before, it had perished *de facto* in the West.³

¹ For the transmarine migrations of the English across the North Sea to Britain and the Bretons across the Channel to Brittany see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 86-100, above.

² Justinian's responsibility for the tragedy of Illyricum is touched upon further in the present chapter, pp. 397-8, and in V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 224-5, below.

³ Among our modern Western historians it is customary to take it for granted that in the eastern portion of the Theodosian heritage the Roman Empire survived until A.D. 1453, and to draw a contrast between its long survival here and its swift disappearance in the West nearly a thousand years earlier, in A.D. 476. This traditional academic antithesis is based on the consideration that the western line of Theodosius's successors, who ruled at Milan or Ravenna, did come to an end in A.D. 476, while the eastern line, whose capital was Constantinople, did officially continue to rule a Roman Empire from A.D. 395 to A.D. 1453 without any formal break (if the Greek princes of Nicaea are accepted as the legal representatives of the Imperial Government of Constantinople during the Latin usurpation of A.D. 1204-61). These facts are not inaccurately stated so far as they go. They are, however, so arbitrarily selected that, in the isolation in which they are usually presented, they become positively misleading. In truth they have as little to do with historical pretensions as they have with historical realities.

If we take our stand on the historical realities, then it seems correct to say, as has been said above, that the Roman Empire began to break up in the western portion of Theodosius's heritage immediately after Theodosius's own death in A.D. 395, and in the eastern portion immediately after the death of his successor Justinian I in A.D. 565. It is true that in Constantinople, between this latter date and the failure of the second Arab siege in A.D. 717, there never ceased to be a Government which claimed to be the Government of the Roman Empire; but, if we ignore claims and take only realities into account, we shall pronounce that, at any rate from the death of Maurice in A.D. 602, the Roman Empire, outside the walls of Constantinople, was as truly non-existent in the *ci-devant* Greek and Oriental provinces as it was in the *ci-devant* Latin provinces in the same age. A so-called Imperial Government in Constantinople which had to look on helplessly while a Slav population supplanted a Latin and Greek population in the Balkan Peninsula, and an improvised system of army-corps districts replaced the Diocletianic provincial system in Anatolia, cannot be regarded as a real Government in any significant sense of the words.

On the other hand, if we amuse ourselves by stepping off the solid ground of reality and following the will-o'-the-wisp of constitutional pretensions, we shall find that, in strict constitutional theory, the two administrative areas into which Theodosius had partitioned the Empire (without prejudice to its remaining constitutionally one and indivisible) were officially re-united in A.D. 476 under the sole authority of the Imperial Government at Constantinople, and so remained (through centuries in which the Constantinopolitan Emperor sometimes had no power, *de facto*, beyond the Bosphorus and the Golden Gate) until the proclamation of Charlemagne as Emperor at Rome on

Indeed, in the seventh century of the Christian Era there was every indication that a nascent society of Orthodox Christendom was entering—tardily yet decidedly—upon a course on which the sister society of Western Christendom was by then already set, and from which Charlemagne subsequently failed to deflect her. When the Empire broke up in the West, it may be said, broadly speaking, that two things happened. In the first place, political authority became plural instead of singular and parochial instead of oecumenical. In the second place—and this second development in the West was a corollary of the first—the political authority of the defunct Empire's parochial 'successor-states' came to be overshadowed by the ecclesiastical authority of an oecumenical Church which, in contrast to the Empire, had succeeded in preserving both its existence and its unity. A symbol for the expression of this unity, and an instrument for the assertion of it, was provided for the Catholic Church in the West by the ancient institution of the Roman Patriarchate or Papacy; and, after the disappearance of the Empire in the provinces which were under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Roman See, the Papacy established a moral hegemony over successive generations of parochial communities in Western Christendom: first over the ephemeral Western 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire itself,¹ and then over the 'successor-states' of the ephemeral Carolingian Empire and of the contemporary English Kingdom of Wessex.² Among the successors of this second batch of 'successor-states', from which the living parochial states of our latter-day Western World are lineally descended, the pretension to a plenitude of parochial sovereignty was not overtly asserted against the Papal claim to an oecumenical supremacy until after the opening of the sixteenth century.³ In the seventh century there were at least two occasions when Orthodox Christendom set its foot tentatively on a parallel path.

the Christmas Day of A.D. 800. From that date until A.D. 811/12 the title to the Empire was in dispute between one Emperor ruling from Constantinople and another ruling from Aachen. After the latter date, at which the rival claimants mutually recognized the legitimacy of one another's titles, there was an East Roman Empire which survived till A.D. 1453, or at any rate till A.D. 1204, and a West Roman Empire ('the Holy Roman Empire') which survived till A.D. 1806 (for this latter constitutional fiction see I. B (iv), Annex, vol. i, pp. 343-4, above), or at any rate until the beginning of 'The Great Interregnum' in A.D. 1254.

It will be seen that the historical realities and the constitutional fictions have little to do with one another, and that in the realm of the realities the Roman Empire broke up in the Greek and Oriental provinces from A.D. 565 onwards, and was virtually non-existent there, as well as in the Latin provinces, after A.D. 602.

¹ For the shortness of the lives, and transitoriness of the influence, of these 'successor-states' see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 58-62, above, and Part VIII, below.

² For the role of the Carolingian Empire in the political history of the Western World see I. B (iii), vol. i, pp. 32-4, and I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 37-9, above. For the role of the Kingdom of Wessex see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 37, and II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 195-6, above.

³ For a discussion of the history of the relations between the Papacy and the parochial states of Western Christendom see IV. C (iii) (b) 11, pp. 214-22, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512-84, below.

In A.D. 618,¹ when the Asiatic provinces of the Constantinopolitan Imperial Government were overrun by the Persians, and its European provinces by the Slavs and Avars, the African Emperor Heraclius, who had been summoned as a saviour to Constantinople and been invested with the purple there eight years before, despaired, before the end of the first decennium of his Herculean labours,² of saving even a simulacrum of the Imperial authority in a region where the reality had dwindled to a shadow. He accordingly made arrangements for transferring the seat of the nominal Imperial Government to his native Carthage, and he had actually conveyed the Imperial gold reserve on board his ships when his intention was discovered and his plan vetoed by the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Sergius, who bound the Emperor over, by a solemn oath, never to abandon the city where the Imperial capital had been established by Constantine. Under this moral compulsion Heraclius renounced his project of evacuation, remained at his post in the East, and crowned a second decennium of labours with the victory of A.D. 628. But this triumph, though complete, was only momentary; for the defeat of the Sasanian Power in a struggle which left both belligerents exhausted simply opened the way for the delivery of a fresh onslaught upon the salvaged wreckage of the Empire by a still more formidable assailant.³ In A.D. 632 the Arabs took up the offensive which the Persians had just been forced to relinquish; and, after the Heraclian Dynasty had battled against this new attack from the east for thirty years on end, with hardly a breathing-space and no prospect of permanent relief, Heraclius's grandson, Constans II, reverted in A.D. 662 to the family policy of evacuating Constantinople and withdrawing westward to the Dynasty's last line of defence against an Oriental aggressor.

Constans actually succeeded in carrying out the project which his grandfather had been compelled to renounce. This time the clergy and people of Constantinople contented themselves with retaining the truant Emperor's household as hostages,⁴ while the

¹ Or perhaps in A.D. 619, if we are to guess that the deciding consideration in Heraclius's mind was the interruption of the corn-supply of the City of Constantinople in consequence of a Persian occupation of Egypt which appears to have taken place not earlier than the latter year (see pp. 40-1 of the proof-sheets of an unpublished paper by Professor N. H. Baynes on 'The Military Operations of the Emperor Heraclius, A.D. 609-30').

² For the labours of Heraclius see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, footnote 4, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 210-11, below.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 287-8, above.

⁴ Constans, unlike his grandfather, was a ruler whose will could not be opposed with impunity. He was also—again, unlike his grandfather—a ruler whose subjects might feel satisfaction rather than regret at the prospect of his departure from their midst. Anyhow the Constantinopolitans either could not or would not take steps to prevent Constans from leaving the Imperial City for the West.

truant himself made war on the Lombard intruders in Southern Italy, visited Rome, and established his headquarters in Syracuse—presumably with an eye to organizing the defence of North-West Africa against the next Arab attack.¹ The execution of Constans' policy, however, was cut short within six years of his departure from Constantinople by the assassination of the truant Emperor in his Sicilian fastness in A.D. 668; his son and successor Constantine IV was promptly invested with the purple in Constantinople; and so it came about that the next great Oriental offensive was met and repulsed by the Heraclian Dynasty at the Dynasty's eastern outpost and not, after all, in its western homeland. The Arabs duly compensated themselves for their discomfiture before the walls of Constantinople in A.D. 673-7 by making their definitive conquest of North-West Africa at the turn of the seventh and eighth centuries, and then pressing on across the Straits of Gibraltar and the Pyrenees; but this diversion of Arab energies was made at Western Christendom's expense,² while the foregoing Arab reverse at the Bosphorus created the conditions³ in which a new turn was given to the history of Orthodox Christendom some forty years later by the fatal genius of Leo Syrus.

We may pause to speculate on the alternative course which Orthodox Christian history might have taken if Heraclius had not been prevented from retreating from Constantinople to Carthage, or if Constans had not been assassinated after making good his retreat from Constantinople to Syracuse. We may conjecture that in either of these events the extinction of the Roman Empire in the East in the seventh century would have been followed by results which would have broadly corresponded to the actual results of its extinction in the fifth century in the West.

In the first place we may suppose that the transference of the Imperial Shadow-Government to an apparently more sheltered seat would have had just the opposite consequences from those which Heraclius and Constans intended and expected. Either Carthage or Syracuse would probably have proved on trial to be not a fastness but a trap; and the eastern line of Theodosius's successors would perhaps have been snuffed out here, before the seventh century came to an end, as ingloriously as the western line was actually snuffed out in Italy in A.D. 476.⁴

In the second place we may suppose that, even if the Heraclian Dynasty had succeeded in evacuating Constantinople, an act of

¹ The Arabs had made a first abortive attempt to conquer North-West Africa in A.D. 647.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 361 and 378-81, with Annex IV, above.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 367-8, above.

⁴ Grounds for this supposition are given in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex I, below.

desertion which might have proved fatal to the Dynasty itself would not have entailed the annihilation of the nascent society of Orthodox Christendom. When the last paroxysm of the post-Hellenic Völkerwanderung had passed, and the flood of Arab and Slav and Avar and Bulgar barbarian invaders of the eastern portion of the Theodosian heritage had ebbed or subsided, an Orthodox Christian Society would have been still in being and still capable of growth in all probability; but its lineaments would then assuredly have been much more like those of the sister society in the West than like those which were actually imposed upon Orthodox Christendom by Leo Syrus.

In this hypothetical event the now derelict eastern portion of the Theodosian heritage would almost certainly have been partitioned politically for good and all among a number of 'successor-states'. Some of these would have been indigenous growths: we can imagine, for example, that the *ci-devant* Imperial army corps which had withdrawn from Syria and Armenia and Thrace, and had been concentrated and cantoned in Anatolia,¹ would have undergone a gradual metamorphosis into political principalities,² while the seafaring population along the seaboard of Anatolia and Greece, and in the Aegean Archipelago, would have fended for itself, like the Venetians and Amalfitans and Neapolitans and Gaetans along the seaboard of Italy, and would have reaped the same reward of *de facto* independence. Contemporaneously the Slav and Bulgar war-bands which fastened upon the Balkan Peninsula would have crystallized into barbarian 'successor-states' corresponding, in a modest way, to those which occupied the greater part of the Western stage during the interregnum that followed the break-up of the Roman Empire in Hesperia.

At the same time we may suppose that this tendency towards

¹ For the parts played by the Anatolic, Armeniac, and Thracensian army corps in Orthodox Christian history see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 79-81, and II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 153-4, above.

² Indigenous 'successor-states' of a similar origin made a momentary appearance on the stage of Western history immediately after the extinction of the Imperial Government in the western portion of the Theodosian heritage in A.D. 476. Examples are the principality of Nepos in Dalmatia and the principality of Syagrius in the Basin of the Seine. A Nepos and a Syagrius, however, were snuffed out by a Theodoric and a Clovis as easily as a Romulus Augustulus had been snuffed out by an Odovacer; and thereafter the barbarian 'successor-states' had the field almost entirely to themselves in the *ci-devant* Latin provinces of the Roman Empire, save for the passing interlude of the Justinianean reoccupation of North-West Africa and Italy and a fraction of Spain. The only parts of Justinian's Hesperian conquests that did not eventually relapse into barbarian hands were those fragments of Italian territory which were kept out of the hands of the Lombards after having been snatched out of the grasp of the Ostrogoths. This was a paltry net gain to set against the prohibitive costliness of Justinian's conquests. The only notable constructive outcome of the permanent 'de-barbarization' of the Romagna was the communication of the Justinianean *Corpus juris* to the Western Society, in and after the eleventh century of the Christian Era, thanks to the fact that the *Corpus* had been deposited at Bologna after the Justinianean reconquest and had been subsequently preserved there in cold storage.

political plurality and parochialism, had it declared itself in the Orthodox Christian World, would have been balanced there too, as it actually was in the West, by a simultaneous tendency in the ecclesiastical sphere towards a perpetuation of the Imperial tradition of oecumenical unity in the constitution of the Church. It may be noted that the Patriarch of Constantinople incorporated the word 'Oecumenical' into his title in A.D. 588, on the eve of the political débâcle which was to reduce the Constantinopolitan Imperial Government to a shadow and to make its parade of oecumenical authority ridiculous. Moreover the Constantinopolitan Patriarch John the Faster (*patriarchico munere fungebatur* A.D. 582-95), who thus ventured to claim an Imperial universalism for his ecclesiastical office, was so fortunate as to find in the Patriarch Sergius (*fungebatur* A.D. 610-38) a successor with the vision and the courage to prove in a time of storm and stress that the pretentious-sounding style with which John had decorated the Patriarchal dignity was really something more than an empty phrase.

Sergius showed his strength of character not only in out-willing Heraclius in A.D. 618, but in demonstrating thereafter that his concern to prevent the Emperor from abandoning Constantinople was not due to any misgiving about his own power to take responsibility for the Imperial City in the Emperor's absence. Sergius succeeded so well in restoring Heraclius's *moral* that four years later, in A.D. 622, when a Persian army was still encamped at Calchedon, Heraclius took the audacious step of sailing from Constantinople—this time eastwards and with the Patriarch's sanction—in order to carry the war into the heart of the enemy's country.¹ This bold strategy, pursued through seven successive campaigns, eventually brought King Chosroes to his knees and ended the war in the Christian Empire's favour; but it required two men of action on the Roman side to make this strategy yield a definitive victory instead of an irreparable disaster; and, of these two, Sergius was one. When Heraclius landed in the rear of the Persian advanced-post at Calchedon² and plunged into the interior of the Asiatic Continent with the pick of his surviving troops, he would have made his desperate throw in vain if he had had to pay for it by the loss of his capital and base of operations; and it was the Patriarch who rendered possible the Emperor's victory in A.D. 628 by captaining³ the citizens of Constantinople in A.D. 626 in their magnificent feat of victoriously resisting a concerted siege of the city by the Persians from the

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, footnote 4, above.

² According to Baynes, *op. cit.*, p. 42, the landing-place was somewhere on the shores of the Gulf of Ismid (not the Gulf of Alexandretta), and the date the 5th April, A.D. 622.

³ The official captain of the garrison of Constantinople was the *Magister Militum Bonus*, but it was the Oecumenical Patriarch Sergius who was the heart and soul of the defence.

Asiatic and the Avars from the European side of the Bosphorus. It was the Patriarch, again, who enabled the Imperial Government to finance this war of exhaustion by making the Government a loan of all the treasures of the Church;¹ and it was the Patriarch, finally, who faced the problem of safeguarding the fruits of a victory that had been so dearly bought. When the Oriental provinces of the Empire were reunited with the Greek provinces for the last time in the Perso-Roman peace settlement of A.D. 628, Sergius saw that a political unity which had been restored by force of arms could only be maintained by a spiritual pacification; and he therefore immediately set himself to heal the breach between Orthodoxy and Monophysitism, which had been alienating the Oriental provinces from the Empire for the better part of two centuries, by proposing the Monothelete compromise. This theological compromise was abortive—perhaps mainly because the immediate Arab conquest of all the Imperial territories south of Taurus remorselessly cut the political Gordian Knot—but this frustration of Sergius's policy through the sudden overwhelming intervention of an external force does not make the Oecumenical Patriarch's far-sightedness and broad-mindedness any less remarkable.

It will be seen that in Sergius the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople found an incumbent who can bear comparison with Pope Gregory the Great;² and we may feel confident that if, after all, Heraclius had proved a broken reed in Sergius's hands—as Heraclius's predecessors, Maurice and Phocas, had proved in the hands of Gregory—then Sergius would have risen to the occasion in Constantinople as nobly as Gregory actually responded to the challenge of being thrown upon his own resources in Rome. In that event we can imagine the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople being launched on Sergius's initiative upon the high career to which the Holy See of Rome was dedicated by Gregory the Great. We can see Sergius, like Gregory, taking upon his shoulders the heavy burden of keeping alive the destitute population of a derelict Imperial City; and we can also see him, again like Gregory, making a material achievement bear spiritual fruit by simultaneously transforming the salvaged political capital of a shipwrecked universal state into the central shrine and oracle of a

¹ See Baynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-2.

² Sergius's courage in allowing Heraclius to embark his expeditionary force for Ismid in A.D. 622, when the Persians were at the gates of Constantinople, may be compared with Gregory's courage in dispatching Augustine to Britain in A.D. 596, when the Lombards were at the gates of Rome (for this comparison see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, footnote 4, above). Sergius's vision in attempting to preserve for Constantinople her reconquered political empire by reconciling the Monophysites with the Chalcedonians through the Monothelete compromise may be compared with Gregory's vision in setting out to conquer for Rome an ecclesiastical empire in place of the political empire which she had lost.

new-born society. Under the impetus of Sergius's will and the inspiration of his memory the Oecumenical Patriarchate might have emulated the Holy See in presiding over the growth and expansion of a Christian civilization—giving spiritual harmony and ecclesiastical order to a body social whose political and economic life was turbulent and unco-ordinated, and so leading the turbulence out of a destructive into a creative channel and making out of the disunity a fruitful diversity instead of a barren chaos.

Indeed, if Sergius failed in Orthodox Christendom to lay the foundations of a social structure of the same grandeur as the Western *Respublica Christiana* that was conceived and inaugurated¹ by Gregory, this was largely because Sergius succeeded, and Gregory had no success, in attaining a nearer and narrower objective at which both patriarch and pope were aiming. Sergius did succeed, by an exercise of spiritual power on the shores of the Bosphorus, in evoking a last spasm of life in the shadowy frame of a moribund Imperial Government, as Odysseus, by his blood-offering on the legendary Cimmerian shores of Ocean Stream, was fabled to have reanimated the anaemic shades of the dead.² And by this very *tour de force* of transfiguring the Emperor Heraclius into a hero *malgré lui* Sergius ruled out for himself the opportunity of playing Gregory's heroic part. More than that, he secured for Leo Syrus the means of giving Orthodox Christian history a quite un-Western turn a hundred years later. For, by the threefold achievement of salvaging the prestige of the Empire and establishing the prestige of Constantinople³ and retrieving the Asiatic patrimony of Orthodox Christendom from the clutches of Oriental invaders, Sergius bequeathed to Leo Syrus the indispensable materials for that solid reconstruction of a Roman Empire on Orthodox Christian soil which was Leo's formidable handiwork. And the restoration of the Empire was fatal to the development of the Oecumenical Patriarchate.

In the light of the eventual divergence between the courses of Orthodox Christian and Western history it is interesting to observe that Gregory was no less eager than Sergius to induce the Imperial Government to do its duty in that part of the Imperial dominions in which his own local responsibilities happened to lie. Gregory

¹ The actual foundation of the Western *Respublica Christiana* is to be ascribed, not to Gregory the Great, but to Hildebrand, who set himself, some 440 years after Gregory's death, to translate his vision into reality, and who eventually assumed his prototype's name when his own turn came to bear the burden of the Papal office. For Hildebrand's work and its outcome see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512-84, below.

² The legend is recounted in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*.

³ The almost morbidly powerful hold which the City of Constantinople acquired over the sentiment and imagination of Orthodox Christendom was her reward for the heroism with which she defended herself in the successive sieges of A.D. 626 and 673-7 and 717-18 (see II. D (v), Annex II, in vol. II, p. 400, above).

called upon the Emperor Maurice to stand by Rome as insistently as Sergius called upon Heraclius to stand by Constantinople; and it was only when he lost all hope of seeing the aggression of the Lombards in Italy effectively met by the dispatch of an adequate Imperial expeditionary force from the other side of the Adriatic that Gregory reluctantly stepped into the breach and personally negotiated with the Lombards the peace which the Imperial Government had persistently neglected to impose upon them by force of arms.¹ Gregory was forced into assuming a responsibility from which he shrank, simply because his appeal to the proper quarter had fallen on deaf ears; and his failure to elicit from the Emperor the response which was elicited by Sergius would appear to be accounted for by the obvious handicap of the Roman See's geographical situation. Gregory might perhaps have obtained the Imperial intervention which he implored if his post had happened to lie in the Imperial capital so that he could have appealed to the Emperor in person instead of by correspondence or through the mouth of an apocrisiarius; or he might have been successful again if, in the Imperial strategy of the day, Rome had still been regarded as a central and a vital point which must be defended at all costs, instead of having sunk, as it had, in the Imperial Government's estimation, to the invidious status of an embarrassing outwork, the defence of which could not be held to justify any further dispersion of the heavily committed Imperial forces. If in spite of these obstacles Gregory had succeeded in obtaining for Rome the Imperial consideration which Sergius did obtain for Constantinople, there is no doubt that Gregory would have felt a vast sense of relief. In fine, it might almost be said that Maurice forced Gregory, as Sergius forced Heraclius, to become a hero in spite of himself.

We may add that Gregory's policy of calling upon the Imperial Power to perform its traditional duties was persisted in for at least four hundred years after Gregory's day by Gregory's successors in the Chair of St. Peter.

In the sixth decade of the eighth century, for example, the situation was just what it had been in the last decade of the sixth. In spite of the loss which the prestige of the Constantinopolitan Government must have suffered in Italian eyes through the conquest of Ravenna by the Lombards in 751,² we find Pope Stephen II³ turning immediately thereafter to the East Roman Emperor Constantine V, in the expectation that a prince whose viceroy had

¹ For this achievement of Gregory see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, above.

² Up to that time Ravenna had been the seat of the Constantinopolitan exarch or viceroy of the surviving Imperial possessions and dependencies in Italy, including Rome.

³ Or Stephen III; if account is taken of the three days' reign of his predecessor and namesake.

just been expelled ignominiously from his Italian capital might still save Rome from meeting with Ravenna's fate; and it was only when it became evident that the Emperor could not be prevailed upon to send an expeditionary force to Italy, either for Rome's or for Ravenna's sake, that the Pope, with much heart-searching, made up his mind to address himself to the King of the Franks.

This inveterate Papal habit of looking for assistance to Constantinople is the more remarkable when we remember that in the Roman See's experience the Imperial Government beyond the Adriatic had not only often proved a broken reed, but had quite as often pierced the hand that sought to lean upon it. As far as the Papacy was concerned, the power of the Constantinopolitan Government in Italy, such as it was, had been displayed in acts of tyranny as frequently as in acts of beneficence. Yet Gregory had not been deterred from appealing to Maurice by any memories of the treatment which his predecessors Silverius and Vigilius had received at the hands of Justinian; and Stephen, in his turn, was not deterred from appealing to Constantine V by a longer subsequent series of even more unpleasant incidents: the treatment of Pope Martin I by the Emperor Constans II; the abortive attempt of the Emperor Justinian II to mete out the same measure to Pope Sergius I; the Iconoclasm of the Emperor Leo III, which was anathema to the Western Church; the revenge which Leo had taken for the Papal opposition to his iconoclastic policy (the offended Emperor had forcibly transferred Sicily and Calabria, as well as Illyricum, from the Pope's to the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical jurisdiction); and finally the Hyper-Iconoclasm of the Emperor Constantine V himself, to whom Pope Stephen's appeal was addressed!

So strong, even then, was the Papal tradition of dependence on the Imperial Power that, when the Papacy turned away, at last, from these forbidding Iconoclasts and applied for aid in a quarter where aid was readily forthcoming, the Apostolic See did not feel at ease until it had invested its new Frankish friends in need with a semblance of political legitimacy. When Pope Stephen came to Frankland in A.D. 753 and persuaded the Franks to embark on an Italian campaign on his behalf, he was careful, before the Frankish army crossed the Alps, to bestow the Semi-Imperial title of 'Patricians' upon King Pepin and his two sons Carloman and Charles. Half-a-century later, on the historic Christmas Day of the year 800, a successor of Pope Stephen II, Pope Leo III, took the last of these three Frank 'Patricians' by surprise in precipitately crowning him 'Augustus and Emperor of the Romans'; and this Papal precipitation, which embarrassed the recipient of the title in his delicate

338 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS relations with the Imperial Government at Constantinople, was apparently, due to the Pope's anxiety to escape from an embarrassment of his own. So far from relishing the status of sovereign independence which had been conferred upon the Holy See by the sluggishness of Constantine V and the generosity of Pepin, the Papacy had found life intolerable in the open air; and after fifty years of this painful experience the reigning Pope was only eager to escape from the inclemency of the political weather by taking cover under the familiar Imperial roof. His eagerness was actually so great that, when he found the ancient Imperial mansion on the shores of the Bosphorus no longer accessible,¹ he could think of no better recourse than to erect a jerry-built substitute on the banks of the Tiber.

Nor was the Papacy cured of its infatuation with the Imperial idea when the ramshackle Carolingian Empire fell about its ears and involved it in the miseries of the post-Carolingian interregnum which was the nemesis of Charlemagne's megalomania.² In A.D. 960 Pope John XII called in Otto the Saxon from beyond the Alps, as Stephen II had called in Pepin the Frank;³ and in A.D. 962 Otto was crowned Emperor in Rome by John, as Charles had been crowned in 800 by Leo. Less than two years after this second Papal evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire in the West, Pope John was deposed by an assembly held in St. Peter's under the presidency of the prince on whom he himself had conferred the Imperial title. This informal parliament of the Roman clergy and people⁴ appointed in the deposed Pope's place the Emperor's nominee, who ascended the Papal Throne as Leo VIII; and at the same time they acknowledged the Emperor's right of veto over all Papal elections in the future. In 966 this right was formally con-

¹ The last occupant of St. Peter's Chair who addressed himself to the Imperial Government at Constantinople, in the hope of inducing it to act as his *deus ex machina*, appears to have been the 'Antipope' Boniface VII, who fled to Constantinople in A.D. 974, after an abortive attempt to establish himself in the Holy See by violence. In 984 Boniface seized the opportunity offered by a momentary paralysis of the Western Imperial Power upon the death of the Emperor Otto II in order to sail for Rome with an East Roman expeditionary force. Boniface took Rome by storm, ousted the reigning Pope John XIV, and died in the saddle in 985 (see further IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, p. 600, below).

² For this post-Carolingian interregnum see the references on p. 323, footnote 1, above.

³ Otto's passage of the Alps in A.D. 961, in response to the call of Pope John XII, was not, of course, his first appearance in Italy, any more than Pepin's passage of the Alps in A.D. 755, in response to the call of Pope Stephen II, was the first occasion on which the Franks had shown themselves under arms on Italian ground. As early as A.D. 951 Otto had already visited Italy on his own initiative in order to establish his suzerainty over the North Italian 'successor-state' of the Carolingian Empire. This was ten years before he himself assumed the Italian Crown at Pavia in A.D. 961, and eleven years before he was crowned Emperor at Rome in 962.

⁴ The assembly also included a certain number of prelates—Transalpine as well as Italian—from beyond the frontiers of the *Ducatus Romanus* (see the list in Liutprand of Cremona: *Historia Ottonis*, chap. 9); and, perhaps on this account, it styled itself a synod.

firmed by Pope Leo VIII himself;¹ and thereafter on one celebrated occasion the Emperor's prerogative was exercised retrospectively in order to annul an accomplished election which proved not to have been carried out according to canonical rules. On the 20th December, 1046, at the Synod of Sutri, Pope Gregory VI abdicated after admitting a charge of simony which was laid against him by the Emperor Henry III; and apparently this synod went so far as to recognize that the Imperial prerogative included not only the right of veto but also the right of nomination.²

It was only after this³ that the indomitable spirit of the Tuscan Ildebrando Aldobrandeschi breathed into the Papacy the courage to aspire deliberately to that painful and perilous eminence which had once been thrust by Necessity upon Gregory the Great. Under Hildebrand's inspiration the Popes nerved themselves for two centuries to brave simultaneously the wrath of the German Imperial Power and the unruliness of rural barons and urban republicans in the Ducatus Romanus—a humiliating local nuisance to which the Holy See now once more laid itself open in pulling down the Imperial roof over its own head. In thus taking its courage in both hands and committing itself to this terrifying venture, the Papacy was acknowledging and embracing, at last, a destiny to which the first Gregory's career had already pointed; and in embracing its own destiny the Roman See at the same time opened a new chapter in the history of Western Christendom.⁴ The Epimethean chapter in which a nascent society in the West had been prompted by a Papal oracle at Rome to continue to idolize a past which was symbolized in the Imperial idea, was now followed by a Promethean chapter in which the Papacy deliberately exposed itself to the buffetings of a tempestuous world in order to create a wholly new institution—a Papal *Respublica Christiana*—which was to meet the needs of a growing society and was to give it the strength to find its feet.

The extraordinary feature in the history of the Papacy is that it should have waited so long for a Gregory VII to lead it to its destiny

¹ The Pope had then just been appointed by the Emperor to be the Imperial viceroy in the government of Rome, after the suppression of the third of three Roman insurrections against the Imperial Power with which Otto had had to deal within the space of three years.

² For the relations of the Papacy with the Western Emperors from Otto I to Henry III inclusive see Bryce, James: *The Holy Roman Empire*, chap. x.

³ The pontificate of Nicholas I (*fungebatur* A.D. 858–67) is an exception which proves our rule, since the reign of this remarkable forerunner of Gregory VII coincides in date with the nadir of the post-Carolingian interregnum.

⁴ As a conventional date for the transition to the second chapter of Western history from the first we may take the year 1075, in which Hildebrand, now seated in St. Peter's Chair after having served the Holy See for thirty years, proclaimed his own conception of the Papal office by the symbolic act of prohibiting lay investiture. (For a consideration of the rise and fall of the Hildebrandine Church see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512–84, below.)

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after a Gregory I had once pointed the way. The explanation lies in the fact that Gregory I's discovery was unintentional, and that a prospect of greatness which one great man's involuntary achievements had opened up remained still uninviting so long as the shelter of an Imperial edifice retained its attractiveness for Papal minds. Nor did the Papacy escape the nemesis of its protracted idolization of the Imperial idea. For the ghost of the Roman Empire, which had been raised by a Papal incantation for the second time in the tenth century, did not submit tamely to be exorcized when the Papacy tardily awoke to the truth that this political anachronism was an incubus and not a shield and buckler. The Papal *Respublica Christiana* was only established at the cost of a life-and-death struggle between the Papal and the Imperial Power which threw the Papacy off its moral balance and betrayed it into replacing a discarded idol by an object of worship which was nobler in its nature and therefore more demoralizing in its effect when it was thus misused. The Papacy escaped from its idolization of the Empire only to fall into an idolization of itself.

This tragic aberration of a Power which had eventually responded to its challenge so well that it had made itself the master-institution of Western Christendom is a classic instance of *ὑβρις*, and we shall have occasion to examine this tragedy when we come to study the nemesis of creativity in its active form.¹ In this place we have merely to point the contrast between the first and the second phase in the Papacy's career, and to observe that during the first phase the Papacy almost condemned Western Christendom to be overtaken by the passive nemesis to which Orthodox Christendom succumbed.

Orthodox Christendom incurred this fate—through a stroke of tragic irony—by making at the first attempt a substantial success of the *tour de force* which was twice attempted in the West and which there twice ended in a fiasco. The ghost of the Roman Empire which was successfully evoked on Orthodox Christian ground in the eighth century of the Christian Era materialized into a substantial and efficient centralized state with a life-span of nearly five hundred years. In its main features this Eastern *Imperium Redivivum* succeeded in being what it set out to be. It was a recognizable reproduction of the original Roman Empire of Augustus and Diocletian and Constantine and Theodosius and Justinian; and it anticipated the political development of Western Christendom by some seven or eight hundred years;² for no state comparable

¹ See IV, C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512-84, below.

² 'The eighth century in the East is a portent of the sixteenth in the West. It is the restoration of materialism with its paramour, obsequious art.'—Bell, Clive: *Art* (London 1928, Chatto & Windus: The Phoenix Library), p. 136.

to the eighth-century East Roman Empire ever made its appearance in the Western World until after the radiation of Italian efficiency into the Transalpine kingdoms at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.¹

How are we to account for this fatally precocious superiority of Orthodox Christendom over the West in political constructiveness? One important factor, no doubt, was the difference in the degree of the pressure which was exerted upon both these Christendoms simultaneously by the aggression of the Primitive Muslim Arabs.² In their assault upon the distant West the Arabs shot their bolt in recapturing for the Syriac Society its lost colonial domain in North-West Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. By the time when they had crossed the Pyrenees and were striking at the infant Western Society's heart, the force of their offensive was spent; and when their wild ride round the southern and western rim of the Mediterranean brought them up short at Tours against an Austrasian shield-wall, their nerveless spear-thrusts and sword-cuts glanced off harmlessly from their stolid target. Yet even this passive Austrasian victory over a tired-out Arab assailant was enough to make the fortunes of the Austrasian Power. It was the prestige won at Tours in A.D. 732 that marked Austrasia out as the leader among the rudimentary principalities of Western Christendom; led Pope Gregory III to look beyond the Alps and address himself to the victor Charles Martel in A.D. 739; and thus brought about that *entente* between the Papacy and the Carolingian House which was the genesis of the first Western essay in a revival of the Roman Empire. If the relatively feeble impact of the Arab explosion upon the West was able to ignite the Carolingian flash in the pan,³ it is not surprising that the solid structure of the East Roman Empire should have been called into existence in Orthodox Christendom as a carapace to withstand the far more violent and far longer sustained bombardment from the same Arab assailant to which Orthodox Christendom was subjected. Another factor which manifestly counted for much in the successful reconstruction of a Roman Empire on Orthodox Christian ground was the personal genius of the Emperors Leo III and Constantine V; and this personal factor had a cumulative effect because the combined reigns of father and son extended continuously over a period of fifty-eight years

¹ For this radiation, and for its political effects, see I. B (i), vol. i, p. 19; III, C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63; IV, C (iii) (b) 8, in the present volume, pp. 198-200; and IV, C (iii) (c) 2 (a), pp. 274-5, above; and V, C (i) (d) 6 (y), Annex I, vol. v, p. 635, footnote 1, and p. 638, below.

² See II, D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 360-4 and 367-9, above.

³ For the local effect of the Arab invasion of Gaul in evoking a Frankish counter-offensive which crossed the Pyrenees in its turn and which did not come to a halt until it had also crossed the Atlantic and created Latin America, see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 38, and II, D (v), vol. ii, pp. 202-6, above, and V, C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 221-2, below.

342 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS (A.D. 717-75).¹ In any case the East Roman Empire was, beyond question, a solid success, whatever the explanation of this success may be.

The new Orthodox Christian Power was founded, to begin with, on a solid territorial basis; for Leo succeeded in reuniting three Orthodox Christian territories—his own army-corps district of the Anatolici, Artavasdus's army-corps district of the Armeniaci, and the incompetent Theodosius's² derelict Imperial City of Constantinople—which had been drifting apart into three mutually independent principalities. This act of reunion was confirmed when, on Leo's death, Constantine succeeded in crushing an attempt on Artavasdus's part to reassert his own independence and to put the Imperial City into his pocket (*bellum civile gerebatur* A.D. 741-2). This gave the East Roman Empire a patrimony embracing the whole of Anatolia north-west of the 'natural frontier' of the Taurus, together with a bridge-head on the European side of the Sea of Marmara which was broad enough to cover Constantinople and to secure to the East Roman Government an absolute command over the waterway through the Straits.³ West of that, the restored Empire gathered under its wing the islands of the Aegean Archipelago and a number of scattered enclaves of continental territory round the coasts of Italy and the Balkan Peninsula—derelict fragments of the Imperial heritage which gravitated automatically towards the solid mass of a state whose torso extended from Adrianople-on-Maritsa to Caesarea-under-Argaeus.

The extent of the territory of this Orthodox Christian Power gave it great material resources; the compactness of its torso offered it the possibility of maintaining these resources intact; and the conservation of the Empire's energy was the cardinal principle of Imperial statesmanship from Leo III's reign onwards for two centuries.

During those two centuries Leo and his successors carefully refrained from indulging in any Justinianean or Carolingian adventures. For example, Constantine V allowed Ravenna to fall to the Lombards and Rome to seek protection from the Franks without making the mistake of sending out another Belisarius or Narses to retrieve the Empire's position in Central and Northern Italy.⁴

¹ For Leo's life-work see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 64, footnote 3; III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 274-6, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, in the present volume, p. 73, above.

² This was Theodosius III in the conventional reckoning which treats the Roman and East Roman Emperors as one continuous series from the first Augustus to the last Constantine.

³ For the geographical function of the East Roman army-corps districts of 'Thrace' and 'Macedonia' as the European bridge-head of an Anatolian Power see Neumann, C.: *Die Weltstellung des Byzantinischen Reiches vor den Kreuzzügen* (Leipzig 1894, Duncker & Humblot), chap. 1, especially pp. 10 and 14.

⁴ See the present chapter, p. 337, above.

Again, the same Emperor—finding the aggressive pagan Bulgars as uncomfortably close to the Straits as Charlemagne found the Saxons uncomfortably close to the Rhine—fought a series of strenuous, and necessarily expensive, campaigns in order to push the encroaching barbarians back to a safe distance; but he was content to relax his effort as soon as this minimum objective had been achieved, instead of pressing on, like Charlemagne, to conquer his barbarian neighbours outright at the cost of exhausting his own realm's strength in the process.¹ In the ninth century Constantine V's successors allowed the Bulgars to engulf the stranded Imperial fortresses in the interior of the Balkan Peninsula and to extend their suzerainty over the Balkan Slavs as far south-westward as the hinterland of Salonica.² They thus abandoned to Bulgaria the lion's share of the Balkan Slavinas, while for their own part they contented themselves with reducing to obedience the virtually insular Slavs of the Morea and the continental Slavs in the immediate northern hinterland of the Gulf of Corinth. A similar avoidance of unprofitable entanglements was the East Roman Government's policy on the farther side of the Adriatic *a fortiori*. When at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries they felt themselves compelled to embark on a forward policy in Southern Italy in order to prevent the Muslim conquerors of the Apulian Lombards from establishing a permanent foothold there,³ they economized their energies by simultaneously abandoning to the Muslims the ancient East Roman province of Sicily. They submitted to the loss of Syracuse in A.D. 878, two years after their entry into Bari; and Tauromenium, which was the last surviving East Roman fortress in Sicily, fell in

¹ For Charlemagne's policy of conquest in dealing with the Saxons, and for the disastrous consequences, see the references on p. 322, footnote 4, above.

² The Romano-Bulgarian peace treaty of A.D. 815-16 left both Philippopolis (Plovdiv) and Sardica (Sofia) under Imperial sovereignty. Both fortresses were engulfed in the course of the ninth century; the interior of Macedonia appears to have been ceded at the moment of Bulgaria's conversion in 865; and after a re-delimitation in A.D. 904 the south-western frontier of Bulgaria came within fifteen miles of Salonica (Runciman, *S.: A History of the First Bulgarian Empire* (London 1930, Bell), pp. 87, 104, and 152).

³ These Muslim conquerors of Lombard territory in Southern Italy came from Ifriqiyah; and a new Muslim Power, ensconced in Bari, might have served as a stepping-stone between Ifriqiyah and Dalmatia, with serious consequences for the East Roman Empire. To begin with, the pagan piratical Narentine Slavs might have become converts to Islam; and after that the Muslim Power in North-West Africa might have felt its way, through a Dalmatian back door, to a contact with Bulgaria. As it was, the Bulgarian Tsar Symeon, when he was planning the grand assault on the East Roman Empire which he made in A.D. 924, sent an embassy to the Fātimid Court at Mahdiyyah to propose a collaboration between Bulgaria's land-power and Ifriqiyah's sea-power, and the Bulgarian Embassy was actually returning with a party of Fātimid envoys when their ship was intercepted by an East Roman naval squadron off the Italian coast. Thereupon the East Roman Government promptly made its own terms with the Fātimid Government (Runciman, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-9). This incident in itself was enough to justify the East Roman Government's Transadriatic policy during the preceding fifty years. For the relations between the Muslims of Ifriqiyah and the Dalmatians and Bulgarians see further Gay, J.: *L'Italie Méridionale et l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing), pp. 91 and 207.

A.D. 902, some thirteen years before the East Romans rounded off their new dominion on the Italian mainland by making their authority effective up to a line drawn from Gaeta to Monte Gargano.

The efficiency of the East Roman Empire in holding together its compact torso, and its statesmanship in economizing its resources and refraining from extravagant adventures, distinguish its history during the two centuries beginning with the elevation of Leo III from the history of any contemporary Western body politic. And both the statesmanship and the efficiency were the fruit of two East Roman institutions—a standing army and a permanent civil service—which were both virtually unknown in the West at any time between the extinction of the western line of Theodosius's successors in the fifth century and the radiation of Italian efficiency into the Transalpine kingdoms in the fifteenth. Those institutions were unknown in the West during those thousand years because the Western World, outside the scattered enclaves of the medieval Western city-state cosmos, did not then command the necessary economic and cultural resources. A professional army and a professional administration cannot exist without a centralized system of public finance and a secular system of higher education; and, unlike the Western Society of that age, the medieval Orthodox Christian Society was able to provide both these indispensable bases for the East Roman Administration and the East Roman Army. In all the metropolitan provinces of the Empire, from Taurus to Rhodope, the revenues were collected by the agents of the Imperial Government and were paid into the Imperial Treasury, which paid out, in its turn, the salaries of the provincial officials and the provincial troops.¹ This financial practice implied, of course, the maintenance of a money economy;² and this money economy was embodied in a gold coinage which had a high reputation, and a general currency, throughout the Western World in one direction and the Syriac World in the other on account of its unflinching sterling standard.³ As for the secular system of higher

¹ In the fragmentary outlying dominions of the Empire west of Rhodope, in the Balkan Peninsula and Italy, the local revenues were collected by the local authorities, who paid out of them the local costs of administration and defence before remitting a balance to Constantinople. This portion of the Empire in which a system of financial decentralization prevailed was, however, small and unimportant by comparison with the main body throughout which the whole system of public finance was centralized in Constantinople.

² A money economy was only maintained in those parts of the Orthodox Christian World that were gathered into the East Roman Empire by Leo Syrus. In the interior of the Balkan Peninsula, which was overrun by the Slavs and Bulgars in the sixth and seventh centuries, and was not incorporated into Orthodox Christendom until the ninth century, the money economy of the Diocletianic Roman Empire broke down, just as it did in the West. After the annexation of West Bulgaria to the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1019 the East Roman Government showed an enlightened common sense in not attempting to introduce the Imperial system of money economy there immediately and *de toutes pièces* (see further p. 394, footnote 1, below).

³ After the catastrophic depreciation of the Roman Imperial currency during the

education, it was provided for the East Roman military officers in the discipline and technique of the Army itself,¹ and for the East Roman civil servants in an academy which was established in Constantinople, within the precincts of the Imperial Palace,² circa A.D. 864, by the Caesar Bardas during the reign of the Emperor Michael III (*imperabat* 842-67),³ *en attendant* the Emperor Constantine IX Monomachus's more ambitious foundation of a University of Constantinople in A.D. 1045.⁴

social convulsions of the third century of the Christian Era the gold coinage, restored by the Roman Emperors Diocletian (*imperabat* A.D. 284-305) and Constantine (*imperabat* A.D. 306-37) was maintained by the Imperial mint at the Constantinian standard, without any fresh depreciation, until the reign of the East Roman Emperor Alexius I Comnenus (*imperabat* A.D. 1081-1118); and throughout this period of some eight centuries the Government at Constantinople never once stopped payments or declared bankruptcy (see Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time* (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.), vol. i, p. 443; and Gelzer, H.: *Byzantinische Kulturgeschichte* (Tübingen 1909, Mohr), p. 78). This solid and striking fact of monetary history clearly militates, as far as it goes, against one of the theses of the present chapter, in which it has been argued that the official continuity of the East Roman Empire with the Roman Empire was a constitutional fiction which ought not to be taken much more seriously than the pretensions of Charlemagne or Otto I or Frederick I Hohenstaufen to be the legitimate successors of Augustus in the West.

¹ The cultivated and scientific character of the East Roman military system is attested by the survival of several treatises on the art of war from East Roman hands (e.g. the *Taktiká* of the Emperor Leo VI; the *Anonymus Vári*; and the *Περί Παράδοσις Πολέμου* of an anonymous officer who had seen his service under the Emperor Nicephorus Phocas (*imperabat* A.D. 963-9). The impetus behind this tenth-century East Roman study of the art of war was derived from the *Taktiká* of the Emperor Maurice (*imperabat* A.D. 582-602), the last effective Roman Emperor in the eastern portion of the Theodosian heritage. The distinguishing feature of this East Roman military science was its principle of adapting its own armaments, tactics, and strategy to the natures of the local *terrain* and the local enemy.

² In the group of buildings called the Magnaura.

³ The foundation of this academy at Constantinople was the sequel to a renaissance of Hellenic culture in Orthodox Christendom which had, itself, followed the successful evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire by Leo Syrus; and this work of cultural reconstruction had to start from zero; for the interregnum between the submergence of the 'apparented' Hellenic Civilization and the emergence of the 'affiliated' Orthodox Christian Civilization had been as complete on this as on every other plane of human activity.

⁴ When the Paschal Chronicle deserts us in A.D. 627, we have no contemporary historians or chroniclers for the general course of the Imperial history until we reach the end of the eighth century. There is a gap of more than a century and a half in our series of Byzantine history. The two writers on whom we depend for the reigns of the Heracliad Dynasty and of the early Iconoclast sovereigns lived at the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth century: the Patriarch Nicephorus and the monk Theophanes. . . . The endeavours of the Isaurian monarchs to renovate the Empire bore such fruits as were possible at a period when the horizon of the human spirit was determined by a series of ecclesiastical formulae. Whereas at the beginning of the [eighth] century there was no distinguished writer, no man of pre-eminent learning within the limits of the Empire, there was at the close of the century quite a large group of literary men who had studied a great many subjects and could write very good Greek' (Bury, J. B.: *Editio Minor* of Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. v (London 1901, Methuen), p. 499; and *A History of the Later Roman Empire* (London 1889, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 518).

Dvorník (*op. cit.*, p. 115) points out that the renaissance which thus began before the close of the eighth century and continued during the ninth was twofold. There was a pious cultural movement that radiated from the monastery of Studium, and a secularist movement that radiated from the Imperial Court. According to the same authority (*op. cit.*, pp. 122-3 and 131), one of the conscious purposes of the Caesar Bardas in founding his academy was to take higher education out of the monks' hands.

⁵ The generation which produced the academy of Bardas was also the generation of Photius (*vivebat circa* A.D. 820-91), who was the most learned and dexterous man-of-letters

These two East Roman institutions of an educated corps of professional military officers and an educated hierarchy of professional lay civil servants were important not merely in themselves but because they made it possible for the resuscitated ghost of the Roman Empire in Orthodox Christendom to achieve its most remarkable and most unfortunate triumph, the effective subordination of the Church to the State. It is in the relations between Church and State that the histories of Orthodox Christendom and Western Christendom show the widest and the most momentous divergence;¹ and here we can locate the parting of the ways that respectively led the Western Society forward along the path of growth and the Orthodox Christian Society away along a path that was to end in destruction.

Leo Syrus and his successors on the East Roman Imperial Throne succeeded in attaining a goal which in the West was never approached by Charlemagne or Otto I or Henry III even with Papal acquiescence, and *a fortiori* not by Henry IV or Henry V or Frederick I or Frederick II in the teeth of Papal resistance. The East Roman Emperors, in their own dominions, turned the Church into a department of state and the Oecumenical Patriarch into a kind of Imperial Under-Secretary of State for Ecclesiastical Affairs,² with

in the Orthodox Christian World of his day, though he remained a layman until the moment of his appointment to the Oecumenical Patriarchate in A.D. 858 at an age of perhaps as much as forty. Similarly, in the eleventh century, Michael Psellus (*vivebat* A.D. 1018-78), who was the leading man-of-letters in Orthodox Christendom in that age, obtained his education as a layman and made his reputation and his career as a literary civil servant before he became a monk at the age of thirty-eight; and his tardy entry into the cloister was followed by a quick and permanent return to the world. In medieval Italian history the earliest counterpart of Michael Psellus is Aeneas Sylvius (*vivebat* A.D. 1405-64), while in modern Transalpine Europe we find no counterparts of Photius until we come to the cultivated Erastian clerics of the eighteenth century. Some of the leading lights of lay literature and learning in the history of the Orthodox Christian culture were bred in the Imperial household and were precluded, by their office or by their sex, from ever taking orders: for example, the publicist-emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*vivebat* A.D. 905-59) and the historian-princess Anna Comnena (*vivebat* A.D. 1083-post 1148). For the foundation and fortunes of the Monomachian University see Hussey, J. M.: *Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire, 867-1185* (Oxford 1937, University Press), chap. 3. There was a Faculty of Philosophy (organized by Michael Psellus) and a Faculty of Law (organized by John Xiphilinus). It may be noted that the revival of a secular system of higher education in Orthodox Christendom from the ninth century onwards had a precedent in the previous foundation of a University of Constantinople by the Emperor Theodosius II in A.D. 425 (see the document of the 27th February, A.D. 425, in the *Codex Theodosianus*, xiv. 9. 3). This fifth-century Theodosian University at Constantinople seems to have been as abortive as the sixth-century Justinianean codification of Roman Law, if its effectiveness is to be measured by the immediate local results. In the post-Justinianean interregnum it passed into the hands of the monks, and thereafter it was liquidated by that *maileus monachorum* the Emperor Leo III (see Dvornik, *op. cit.*, p. 116, for the authorities). But it is possible that the record of Theodosius's work may have inspired the educational activities of Bardas and Constantine Monomachus, as the record of Justinian's work certainly did inspire the legislative activities of the Macedonian Dynasty of East Roman Emperors.

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 67, above.

² The degradation of the Oecumenical Patriarch to the status of an Imperial civil servant is proclaimed even in the ostensible aggrandizement of his position through the enlargement of the territorial area of his ecclesiastical jurisdiction. When, in

a status that was professional but a tenure that was by no means secure.

In relegating the Church to this position, the East Roman Emperors were simply putting into effect one important part of their programme of making their restoration of the Roman Empire a solid reality; for this relation between Church and State was precisely that which had been contemplated by the Roman Emperor Constantine the Great when he decided to take the Christian Church under his patronage;¹ and this Constantinian conception had been actually realized *de facto* in the history of the later Roman Empire from the reign of Constantine himself to the reign of Justinian inclusive.

This later Roman régime, in which the Christian Church was incorporated into the fabric of the Roman body politic, and was made subject, in the last resort, to the absolute authority of the Emperor as the single sovereign lord of the whole politico-ecclesiastical structure, has been nicknamed 'Caesaro-papism' by modern Western scholars; and this 'hyphenated' term would perhaps also aptly describe the effect of Constantine's work from the standpoint of a Primitive Christian Church which had started life as a private association in a proletarian underworld where it had been out of touch with the political institutions of the Hellenic dominant minority.² This insulation of the private life of the Primitive Church from the public life of the pre-Constantinian Roman Empire was defined in the formula 'Render unto Caesar the things

A.D. 732, Calabria and Sicily and the whole of the Imperial Diocese of Illyricum were forcibly transferred from the Pope's to the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction by the Emperor Leo Syrus, and when again, after the establishment of a definitive frontier between the East Roman Empire and the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the fragment of the Patriarchate of Antioch which still remained under Imperial rule was transferred to the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction likewise, these deliberate extensions of the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction up to the territorial limits of the East Roman Emperor's sovereignty were evidence that the Emperor regarded the Oecumenical Patriarch as his creature, in contrast to both the Patriarch of Antioch and the Pope, who could each oppose the Emperor's will with impunity because each of these two sees was now beyond the reach of his arm. It is noteworthy that the East Roman Government's policy of making the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction co-extensive with the ambit of its own sovereign authority was taken up and followed by the Ottoman Government when it entered into the East Roman Government's heritage and provided the Orthodox Christian World with its universal state. The Ottoman Government gave the Oecumenical Patriarch a measure of civil authority over the entire Millet-i-Rûm; and in Ottoman constitutional law this ecclesiastical community embraced the entire Orthodox Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, whatever their previous ecclesiastical allegiance. The military conquests of the 'Osmanlis thus automatically extended the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction over the Archbishoprics of Ochrida and Peç, the Patriarchates of Bulgaria and Antioch and Jerusalem and Alexandria, and the autocephalous Church of Cyprus. It was the supreme irony in the history of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchs that they only made good their oecumenical pretensions through becoming the slaves of a Muslim potentate (on this last point see further IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 622-3, below).

¹ For Constantine's ecclesiastical policy see further V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 650, 693-4, and 707-9, below.

² See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-7, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 74-80, below.

which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's',¹ and it was maintained by the resoluteness of many generations of Christian martyrs who were prepared to sacrifice their lives rather than lend themselves to a formality which signified a recognition of Dea Roma and Divus Augustus as legitimate objects of religious worship. From this Primitive Christian standpoint the 'hyphenated' monstrosity of the word 'Caesaro-papism' expressively symbolizes the impious presumption of a human act which joined together what God had put asunder.² On the other hand, from the standpoint of the Roman Imperial Government the work of Constantine wore a very different aspect. From this standpoint the act of impious presumption had been the Christians' refusal to recognize the Roman State as an object of religious worship as well as a political institution; for in the minds of a Hellenic dominant minority which was the ruling element in the early Roman Empire the dichotomy of Society into 'Church' and 'State', 'clerical' and 'lay', 'ecclesiastical' and 'civil', 'religious' and 'secular', was a shockingly sacrilegious rending in twain of a seamless robe. From the cosmos of city-states out of which it had sprung the Roman Empire had inherited a conception of Society as something one and indivisible which was always represented in its totality in every one of its activities and its institutions. In the Christians' repudiation of the Hellenic universal state in its religious aspect the Roman governing class correctly divined a moral alienation of the Christian community from the Hellenic culture; and they were genuinely indignant at the pretension of these revolutionary proletarians to treat the undisputed fact of their citizenship in the Empire as a limited liability by interpreting it as a merely political tie which carried no religious associations with it. Their denunciation of the Christians as 'atheists'³ was made in complete good faith;⁴ and they were equally sincere in believing that it was the right and duty of the Imperial authorities to exert the full force of the State—and to employ in the last resort the most extreme methods of 'frightfulness'—in order to stamp this in their view anti-social movement out.

The very sincerity and earnestness of the spirit in which the Imperial Government's persecutions of the Christian Church were carried out explains the deepness of the impression that was made on the mind of the persecuting power by the failure of its utmost endeavours to reduce the Christians to conformity. If the Chris-

¹ Matt. xxii. 15-22 = Mark xii. 13-17 = Luke xx. 19-26.

² An inversion of the formula in Matt. xix. 6.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, vol. v, p. 584; V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 40, footnote 2; and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 536, below.

⁴ The point has been noticed by Oswald Spengler in *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. I (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 567.

tians had proved themselves to be more than a match for the Imperial Government, this demonstrated in the eyes of the governing class that the divine powers had deserted their official shrines and had gone to dwell in the strange temples of this invincibly contumacious proletarian sect.

Excessere omnes, adytis arisque relictis,
Di quibus imperium hoc steterat . . .¹

This might be divine wisdom, or it might be just divine caprice. To Hellenic minds the ways of the Godhead were often arbitrary and inscrutable. But, whatever the cause, this secession of the Gods was a patent fact, and it was not a fact which a Hellenic dominant minority with its back to the wall was able to face with equanimity. At the turn of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era these epigoni of the ancient Hellenic order remained as fully convinced as they had been before their defeat at the Christians' hands that the Empire could not stand if it were bereft of its indwelling divinity. A godless Empire would be as savourless and sapless as an Athens without her Athena. The secession of the Gods must be retrieved; the divine powers must be enticed back again into the shrines which they had so alarmingly deserted; and, since meanwhile they had insisted upon assuming a Christian guise, the only recourse for the Empire now, in face of the accomplished fact of this metamorphosis, was to reverse its outward policy in order to achieve, in spite of everything, an inward purpose which remained what it had always been. These promptings of Superstition were supported by the counsels of *raison d'état*. If the Christian Church had defeated the Empire's attempt to suppress it and in that way to preserve the ancient unity of religious and political life in the Hellenic universal state, then the broken unity must be restored in another way by the bold diplomatic counterstroke of taking the Christian Church bodily to the Empire's bosom. In the first flush of astonishment and relief at being transformed in a trice from an outlaw into a favourite the Church might be swept off its feet, and its leaders might be induced to accept a converted Empire's terms under the delusion that they were imposing their own. In fact, the Christians might be coaxed into concurring, at the end of the chapter, in a sentence of *Gleichschaltung* which they had resisted to the death so long as a still Pagan Imperial Government had attempted to put this sentence into execution by force.²

¹ Virgil, *Aeneid*, Book II, ll. 351-2, quoted already in this connexion in I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 57, footnote 1, above. When the writer wrote that passage, he was not yet acquainted with Saint Augustine's quotation of the same lines of Virgil in *De Civitate Dei*, Book II, chap. 22. See further the present Study, V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 279, below.

² Apropos of this passage Professor N. H. Baynes observes, in a letter to the writer

This, in effect, was the policy of the Emperor Constantine himself and of the line of Christian Emperors who succeeded him; and, just because this policy was neither consciously hypocritical nor deliberately dishonest, it was wonderfully successful. After Constantine had arranged his *entente* with the Church, the Church did fall into the place which he had designed for it. It nestled down promptly and cheerfully into the political shell in which the Imperial authorities now invited it to take up its abode; and it did not make any motion to live its own life in the open again until action was forced upon it by the catastrophe of the shell's breaking into fragments. After the Constantinian settlement Leo the Great (*fungebatur* A.D. 440-61) was the first Pope of Rome, and Sergius (*fungebatur* A.D. 610-38) the first Patriarch of Constantinople, to stand out as a great man of action. It will be seen that the dates of these two great prelates' ministries coincide with the respective dates of the break-up of the Roman Empire in the western and in the eastern portions of the Theodosian heritage. Thereafter, as we have seen,¹ the Popes, as well as the Patriarchs, persisted in lamenting the loss of their comfortable Imperial carapace and in attempting to find their way back into it.

This hankering in the mind of the Church itself for a restoration of the Constantinian settlement is not altogether surprising; for the ruling element in the Roman Empire had been right in regarding the pre-Constantinian relation between Church and Empire as a symptom of a social malady. The Primitive Christians' repudiation of Caesar-worship had been in truth one of the outward expressions of an inward secession of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society from the dominant minority, and this schism in the Hellenic body social was a symptom of its being in disintegration.² The healthy state of the Hellenic Society had consisted in

of this Study, that 'the Christian is not in general the foe of the State—only of the Paganism with which the State was intimately associated. The significant thing is rather the Christian approximation to the State in the period before the Great Persecution (Tertullian must not be taken to represent the sentiments of the whole Christian body). It was no sacrifice of conviction for the Church to recognize the Christian State. And in this connexion it is important to realize that the Pagan State had already abandoned the *Gottkönigtum* of the Hellenistic period. [On this point see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 649-50 and 691-4, below.—A.J.T.] Its theory of monarchy was ready to the Christian's hand; it needed only slight modification, and that modification was effected by Eusebius. What is true is that the change effected by Constantine's conversion was so sudden that the Church was taken by surprise. There is no concordat. Constantine by a unilateral transaction takes the Christian Church into partnership. The Church is given no opportunity of elaborating its own terms.'

¹ See pp. 335-40, above.

² The fact that the separation between Church and State is a symptom of a malady in the body social of a civilization does not, of course, necessarily mean that it is a symptom of social retrogression. For a civilization is merely a representative of one particular species of societies; this species is not necessarily the highest possible realization of the potentialities of the genus; and a malady in some creature that is good as far as it goes may incidentally result in the production of something better, as a pearl is produced by a disease in an oyster. The mutation by which the earliest civilizations must have been

that unity and indivisibility of the religious and political aspects of social life which had been a reality during the growth-stage of Hellenic history and which had never ceased to be regarded in Hellenic minds as being the normal state of affairs. Nor was this unity an idiosyncrasy of the Hellenic Civilization. It was one of the regular features of primitive social life;¹ and it had been inherited by the Hellenic Society without a break² from primitive European barbarians who had become the fathers of the Hellenic Civilization after having served an apprenticeship in the external proletariat of the antecedent Minoan Civilization.³ It will be seen that the Constantinian settlement in the last chapter of Hellenic history, and the attempts to re-establish the Constantinian settlement after the post-Hellenic interregnum, had behind them the impetus of a tradition that was of almost universal range and almost immemorial antiquity. In these circumstances the surprising fact is not that Constantine's system should have been successfully re-instituted in Orthodox Christendom by Leo Syrus, but rather that in the West the successive endeavours to do the like that were made first by Charlemagne and Pope Leo III and then by Otto and Pope Leo VIII should have uniformly ended in failure.

Regarded in its 'world-historical' setting, this Western failure seems, indeed, so extraordinary that we can no longer feel much surprise when we see it producing an extraordinary result. In the Papal *Respublica Christiana* 'Church' and 'State' were neither undifferentiated, as they had been in the primitive societies and in the Hellenic city-states; nor, again, were they differentiated without being in relation with each other, as the Primitive Christian Church had been insulated from the early Roman Empire; nor, in the third place, were they reintegrated, *more Hellenico*, through the subordination of the Church to the State, on the pattern of the Christian Roman Empire and of this Empire's East Roman ghost. In the Papal *Respublica Christiana* Church and State were

created out of primitive societies (see Part II. A, vol. ii, p. 188, above) might well have worn the appearance of a malady, when regarded from the primitive societies' standpoint. The possibility that the churches, in their turn, may be a new species of societies of a higher order than civilizations is discussed in Part VII, below.

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 160-1, below.

² In this matter of the unity and indivisibility of social life there is no breach between the religion of an uncontaminated Primitive Mankind and the religion of those primitive societies that have been conscripted into the external proletariat of a disintegrating civilization. In both situations the object of worship is, in effect, the community itself. When a primitive society is conscripted into an external proletariat there is, however, a revolutionary change in the aspect of the community's activity that is singled out to be the focus of religious adoration. A community that has hitherto been worshipped as Vishnu now comes to be worshipped as Shiva. For this religious revolution see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 230-3, below.

³ For the relation of the Achaeans to the Minoan Society on the one hand and to the Hellenic Society on the other see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 92-100, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 315-16, above.

352 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS reintegrated through the subordination of a multiplicity of local states to a single oecumenical church which was the principle of unity and the source of authority in the Western Christian body social;¹ and this 'hierocratic' constitution of Society was a wholly new creation. Indeed, the Papal *Respublica Christiana* shares with the Italian city-state culture² the distinction of being one of the two great creative achievements in the second or 'medieval' chapter of our Western history.³ In the corresponding chapter of Orthodox Christian history there was no comparable creative act, because in an earlier chapter the Orthodox Christian Society, in achieving its successful restoration of the Roman Empire, had renounced the possibility of creation in favour of the easier course of idolizing an institution which was a legacy from the past; and this natural yet disastrous aberration accounts for Orthodox Christendom's premature downfall.

In this Orthodox Christian idolization of the ghost of the Roman Empire which Leo Syrus had evoked, the subordination of the Orthodox Church to the East Roman State was the crucial act; and this act was conscious and whole-hearted. In Leo's own assertion—'Imperator sum et Sacerdos'⁴—we hear the founder of the East Roman Empire making the 'Caesaro-papistical' claim of a Constantine the Great in the imperious accents of a Justinian. We shall not be surprised to find that Leo's success in enforcing this claim throughout the greater part of his dominions⁵ is the first link

¹ In the West 'la religion chrétienne, . . . cessant d'être incorporée à un seul empire, devient un lien commun entre plusieurs États, et rend le siège Rome un point de ralliement entre les nations.'—Turgot, A. R. J.: 'Esquisse d'un Plan de Géographie Politique' in *Œuvres de Turgot* (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 624.

² 'With the Italian city-state culture' rather than with the Italian city-state as a political institution; for this institution in itself was not a new creation, but was a ghost evoked from the life of the antecedent Hellenic Society (see the present chapter, pp. 405-6, below).

³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 375, footnote 2, above.

⁴ The assertion is attributed to Leo in these terms by Pope Gregory II in a letter (Ep. xiii) replying to a no longer extant letter of Leo's. (See Vasiliev, A. A.: *Histoire de l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris 1932, Picard, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 341.) Apropos of this passage Professor N. H. Baynes remarks, in a letter to the writer of this Study, that in the Orthodox Christian *Weltanschauung* 'The Emperor is not a priest, though his functions are closely similar. An Iconoclast emperor might in a moment of exasperation—if the Gregory letter is genuine—claim to be a priest, but it was said in haste. It is not the normal Byzantine view.' It does, however, seem to have been the normal Byzantine expectation that the Emperor should have the last word in ecclesiastical as well as in civil affairs; and if it be true that the Imperial Crown was usually content to leave its supremacy over the Church unasserted in theory so long as it enjoyed a free hand to exercise this supremacy in practice, then Leo's alleged assertion is illuminating. In a moment of exasperation the Emperor had let the Caesaro-papal cat out of the diplomatic bag!

⁵ The test of Leo's pretensions to a 'Caesaro-papal' authority was his attempt to enforce his new-fangled policy of Iconoclasm; and this attempt was not successfully resisted anywhere in Leo's dominions except in the Ducatus Romanus and in the Ravennese Exarchate. In all Leo's other dominions, from Calabria eastwards, his Iconoclastic policy prevailed; and though his successors eventually abandoned Iconoclasm itself, they never ceased to profit by the precedent of Leo's successful insistence that the Emperor was sovereign in matters ecclesiastical as well as in politics. The

in a fatal chain of causation which ends in the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization some two centuries later.

If we study the tragedy of Orthodox Christian history, we shall observe that the destructive effect of Leo Syrus's deed of reincorporating the Church into the State declares itself in two distinct ways—one of them general and the other particular.

The general effect was to check and sterilize the tendencies towards variety and elasticity and experimentation and creativeness in Orthodox Christian life; and we can roughly measure the extent of the damage that was done to the development of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in this general way by noting some of the conspicuous achievements of the sister civilization of the West, in the corresponding stage of its growth, that have no Orthodox Christian counterparts. In the Orthodox Christian body social in its growth-phase we not only find nothing that corresponds to the Hildebrandine Papacy; we also miss the rise and spread of self-governing universities, corresponding to the new Western centres of intellectual activity at Bologna and Paris,¹ and of self-governing city-states, corresponding to the new Western centres of life in Central and Northern Italy and in Flanders.² And while it may

Imperial pretension which was thus successfully asserted in Orthodox Christendom did not, of course, obtain an uncontested victory, and the Orthodox Christian churchmen who opposed it showed as much spirit and resoluteness, before they succumbed to defeat, as their Western colleagues showed when they girded themselves at last for a struggle from which they were ultimately to emerge victorious over a Western revival of the Imperial idea. This abortive, but by no means feeble, resistance of the Church to the revival of 'Caesaro-papism' in the Orthodox Christian World is examined further in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, below.

¹ We have noticed above, on p. 345, that the University of Constantinople was founded and developed a long time in advance of any university in the West; but this Constantinopolitan school of higher studies was virtually a department of the Central Government of the East Roman Empire and was therefore *ex hypothesi* both unique and hide-bound. We miss in the Orthodox Christian World the counterparts of those intellectually adventurous universities which sprang up spontaneously in one region after another of the expanding domain of 'medieval' Western Christendom. It is significant that the South Lombard city of Salerno, which became the seat of one of the most famous and fruitful of these Western universities, had previously been under an intermittent East Roman protectorate, and under a continuous Orthodox Christian influence, from the time of Nicephorus Phocas' South Italian campaign of A.D. 885 down to the Norman conquest of the city in A.D. 1077. Yet the intellectual flourish of Salerno came after its reincorporation into the Western World; and the Salernitan school of medicine, which was already acquiring celebrity during the age of the city's East Roman connexion, owed its inspiration to Arabic rather than to Byzantine sources. (See Gay, J.: *L'Italie Méridionale et l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing), pp. 594-8, and Taylor, H. O.: *The Mediaeval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 251.)

² In this age the Orthodox Christian World not only failed to produce any city-state life of its own; it extinguished, at Cherson, the last surviving city-state of a Hellenic Society to which the Orthodox Christian Society itself was affiliated (see II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 404, footnote 2, above); and it even blighted the development of city-state life in a portion of the Western World which was at this time temporarily under the East Roman Empire's control. There is every indication that in the eleventh century the Southern Lombards—in the East Roman province of Laghvardhia, as well as in the autonomous principalities of Benevento and Capua and Salerno—were ripe for a development of civic institutions like those which actually burst into flower in the same century in the North Lombard regions of Tuscany and the Basin of the Po. In fact,

be argued that in the development of our Western Civilization in its 'medieval' phase both the city-states and the universities were by-products of Hildebrand's work rather than monuments of separate creative acts,¹ we cannot therefore infer that all that was lacking in contemporary Orthodox Christian life was some counterpart of the Papal *Respublica Christiana*; for if we turn to the 'medieval' Western institution of Feudalism, which was independent of, and in conflict with, both the 'medieval' Western Church and the 'medieval' Western city-states, we shall find that the Orthodox Christian counterpart of Feudalism, though not non-existent, was effectively repressed, like the Orthodox Church, by the East Roman Imperial Power—with the unfortunate consequence that, like the Church, this Feudalism asserted itself belatedly and violently in Orthodox Christendom when the weakening of the Imperial Power gave it an opportunity at last.²

during the semi-interregnum in Southern Italy which began with Melo's revolt against the East Roman régime in 1009 and ended with the completion of the Norman conquest *circa* 1080, a number of South Lombard cities did momentarily achieve self-government (see Gay, *op. cit.*, pp. 561–8). Yet, even in this outlying overseas dominion of the East Roman Empire, the East Roman connexion gave an impulse towards the anti-thesis of the city-state dispensation—that is to say, towards a centralized autocratic régime—and this impulse from an alien force was so strong and so persistent that it eventually overcame the indigenous local bent of political development. This victory of political Byzantinism in Southern Italy will appear the more remarkable when we remember that the régime under which it was finally won was not that of the East Roman Empire itself but that of its Norman 'successor-state', which merely took over the East Roman tradition at second hand. The fate of the South Lombard cities was shared by their non-Lombard neighbours. The later history of Naples, for example, who surrendered her city-state autonomy to the Normans in order to become the petty-Constantinople of the Kingdom of Sicily-beyond-the-Faro, affords a striking contrast to that of Venice, who had shared with Naples in an earlier chapter the rare distinction of never having succumbed to a Lombard conquest. From the eleventh century onwards Venice preserved for herself the political birthright that was forfeited by Naples and the economic birthright that was forfeited by Amalfi; and the secret of Venice's material success at this critical moment of Italian history is to be found in a psychological reorientation. From this time onwards Venice steadily emancipated herself from the influence of the Orthodox Christian culture and opened her arms to the culture of the West.

¹ The Western universities largely owed their stimulus and their liberty to the fact that they were under the aegis and auspices of the Papacy, instead of being under the thumb of the local temporal lord or the local bishop. The North and Central Italian city-states found the opportunity to assert their civic liberties in the breach which was made in the power of the Holy Roman Empire by Hildebrand's assault. (On this latter point see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 345, above.)

² For the violent self-assertion of the Orthodox hierarchy against the East Roman Imperial Government from the middle of the eleventh century onwards see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, below. The history of Feudalism in the Orthodox Christian World is not unlike the history of the Church. In the seventh century there was a moment (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex I, below) when it seemed as though something like Feudalism would prevail in Orthodox Christendom as Feudalism actually did prevail in Western Christendom in the early age of our Western history. In Orthodox Christendom, however, this early tendency towards Feudalism was repressed in the eighth century when Artavasdas succumbed to Leo Syrus and to Leo's son and successor Constantine V (see p. 342, above). Feudalism could not remain rampant in a world in which a ghost of the Roman Empire had been effectively resuscitated. But although in Orthodox Christendom Feudalism, like the Church, was dragged into the service of the East Roman *Imperium Redivivum*, it proved, like the Church again, to have been merely bent without having been broken. As soon as the Imperial Government's grip began to relax, the feudal magnates of Central and Eastern Anatolia

This eventual self-assertion of both Feudalism and the Church in the Orthodox Christian World shows that, in these two spheres at any rate, the relative sterility and monotony of Orthodox Christian life in the preceding chapter of history were due not to any lack of vitality or creative power in the Orthodox Christian body social, but to the artificial and temporary repression of these faculties by *force majeure*. At the outset the social landscape in Orthodox Christendom substantially resembled the landscape in the contemporary West. Here, as well as there, the woodman had planted a goodly array of saplings in the expectation of seeing them grow up into a serried grove in the fullness of time; and in the West this reasonable expectation was duly fulfilled. It was the peculiar mishap of Orthodox Christendom that in this plantation a single tree—the 'Caesaro-papal' East Roman *Imperium Redivivum*—shot up with such abnormal speed and vigour that it completely outstripped its fellows and consequently blighted their growth by sucking all the goodness out of the soil into its own far-ramifying roots and intercepting all the light and air of heaven in order to nourish its own widespreading foliage. The excessive luxuriance of the East Roman Empire had to be paid for by the starvation of all the sister institutions within its radius. And so, instead of the grove of many tall trees which came to maturity in the West, the Orthodox Christian World produced a single giant pine ringed round by a miserable undergrowth of stunted bushes and noxious nettles, unhappy offspring of an impoverished soil and an asphyxiating shade. In contrast to the landscape in the West the landscape in Orthodox Christendom now presented a painful picture of that disharmony which is the penalty of mis-growth.

The blighting influence of the single overwhelming institution of the 'Caesaro-papal' State upon Orthodox Christian life is revealed in the perverse vitality which the Church and Feudalism displayed in Orthodox Christendom when they found their liberty at last, and it is also illustrated by some rare flashes of brilliant

raised their heads as defiantly as the Oecumenical Patriarch raised his. As we shall see below, the refractoriness of this element in the body social in this quarter of the Empire gives the measure of the strain that was imposed on Orthodox Christendom by the Romano-Bulgarian Hundred Years' War. The War of A.D. 913-27 was accompanied by the manifestly ineffective agrarian legislation of the Emperor Romanus Lecapenus, while the deadlier War of A.D. 977-1019 was punctuated by a series of open and formidable feudal revolts against the authority of the Emperor Basil II, who did not intimidate his own subjects by earning the title of 'the Bulgar-killer' (see Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 455-60). After the wasting of the Empire's strength by eighty years of inward decay behind a pretentious façade the feudal interest actually succeeded in capturing the Imperial Government by placing on the throne its own representative, Isaac Comnenus (*imperabat* A.D. 1057-9). It is remarkable that this should have happened already before the visible prostration of the Empire in A.D. 1071 through the double blow of the fall of Bari and the débâcle at Manzikert.

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creative genius which the Orthodox Christian Society emitted at certain points in Space and Time at which it happened to be free from its almost ubiquitous Imperial incubus.

In the Space-dimension we may notice the creative achievements of those scattered and neglected outposts of Orthodox Christendom, west of Rhodope, which were never subjected to the full weight of the East Roman Imperial régime as this was felt in Thrace and Anatolia.¹

For example, the monastic stronghold in which the Orthodox Church found its base of operations for a counter-offensive against the Imperial Power was situated in this region, on Mount Athos.² In all probability Macedonian Athos would have seemed no holier a mountain than Mysian Olympus in the eyes of the eleventh-century courtier-monk Michael Psellus, who repaired to the latter mountain when he made his rather perfunctory gesture of withdrawing from the World. But a holy mountain that was in sight of the Imperial City was still not holy enough; and Olympus was debarred, by its very locality, from aspiring to the eminence which Athos triumphantly attained after Psellus's day.³

At a still greater remove from Constantinople, on the farther side of the Adriatic, and at a moment when the East Roman Government's authority was locally in abeyance, Basilian monachism revealed a capacity for creation which it never displayed on Mount Athos and never made even a motion to display in its Anatolian homelands. In Calabria, from the latter part of the ninth to the latter part of the following century, a handful of Basilian monks, who had been expelled from their native monasteries in Sicily by the African Muslim conquerors of the island, and who found the East Roman Government as supine in protecting their Calabrian asylum as it had shown itself in defending their Sicilian home, magnificently rose to the occasion, and took upon their unaccustomed shoulders the arduous social duties which the Emperor had tacitly repudiated. These monastic pioneers relaid the founda-

¹ For the differentiation of the East Roman régime in the Cisrhodopaean and the Transrhodopaean territories of the Empire see p. 344, above. The only conspicuous creative achievement of the Cisrhodopaean torso of Orthodox Christendom during the *floruit* of the East Roman Empire was the creation of the Byzantine Greek Epic; and this is an exception which proves the rule that the East Roman Empire had a sterilizing effect on Orthodox Christian life; for the nursery of this school of 'heroic' poetry was a borderland between the East Roman Empire and the 'Abbasid Caliphate in which the writ of the East Roman Central Government at Constantinople did not run effectively (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 252-8, below).

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 620-1, below.

³ The Greek monastic pioneers who laid the foundations of the federal community on Mount Athos in the latter part of the tenth century were afterwards emulated by the fourteenth-century Greek and Serb founders of the stylite monasteries of *Metéora* in Thessaly (see Miller, W.: *The Latins in the Levant* (London 1908, Murray), pp. 294-6), and by the Bulgarian founders of the monasteries on Mount Rilo. We may notice that *Metéora* and Rilo, like Athos itself, lay well beyond the limits of the metropolitan provinces of the East Roman Empire.

tions of Orthodox Christian social life in a derelict East Roman province which had become a no-man's-land; they reconverted a horde of vagrant and demoralized Sicilian Greek refugees into a settled and orderly community;¹ and they were able to inspire this confidence in their secular co-religionists because they knew how to charm their Muslim persecutors into showing them consideration and paying them respect.² Their cells became the nuclei of new Greek villages and cities on the Italian mainland; and the Latinization of the 'toe' of Italy, which had followed gradually upon the Roman conquest in the third century B.C., was now undone, after the lapse of a thousand years, by these monkish re-creators of the ancient Magna Graecia. St. Nilus and his companions also emulated the ancient Greek pioneers in the Western Mediterranean in spreading their cultural influence far beyond the bounds of their own Greek colonies. As the Chalcidian and Corinthian adventurers who founded Rhegium and Syracuse travelled on to spread the light of Hellenism in Etruria and Latium, so St. Nilus, not content with building a new Greece in Calabria, accepted a call to Rome and provided a new model for Western monasticism in his outpost-monastery of Grottaferrata.³

In their combination of personal adventurousness and social constructiveness these ninth- and tenth-century Basilian monks in the Far West of the Orthodox Christian World can only be compared with the sixth- and seventh-century Irish monks of the short-lived Far Western Christendom;⁴ and the comparison is as instructive as it is inevitable; for the Far Western Christian ethos is at the opposite pole of the spiritual gamut from the Orthodox Christian ethos as it presents itself in those parts of Orthodox Christendom where it was burdened with the incubus of the East Roman Empire. The Irish vitality which Basilian monachism displayed in one corner of the Orthodox Christian World, when for one moment the burden was lifted, proves how crushingly heavy the incubus was and how cruelly it was deforming from its natural bent the society that was condemned to bear it.

This Irish parallel can be carried farther, for in Italy, as in Ireland, the pioneer monks had spiritual issue in a generation of scholars; and the greatest of the Irish scholars, Johannes Scotus

¹ For the work of St. Elias of Castrogiovanni and St. Nilus and the other Basilian saviours of the Orthodox Christian Society in Calabria see Gay, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-86.

² At a critical moment of his hazardous career as a pioneer in the Calabrian wilderness St. Nilus was once saved from starvation by the charity of an African Muslim sea-raider (Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 270), and he was highly esteemed by the Amir of Palermo (Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 282).

³ St. Nilus established himself at Grottaferrata in A.D. 1004. For this Orthodox Christian influence upon Latin Christianity in the Ducatus Romanus at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries see further IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, p. 600, below.

⁴ This comparison has been made already in II. D (vii), vol. II, p. 325, footnote 2, above.

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Erigena, has a namesake and counterpart in Johannes Italus.¹ The Irish and the Lombard philosopher resemble one another in their uniqueness, each in his own time and place,² and in the audacious rationalism with which each of them sought to liberate philosophical speculation from the trammels of theological dogma; and they also experienced the same vicissitudes of fortune, for an audacity which seems to have passed unnoticed in the Far West created a scandal when it was carried beyond the Irish Channel or the Adriatic and was aired in the more conventional atmosphere of ninth-century Laon or eleventh-century Constantinople. Johannes Italus was a Latin convert to the Orthodox Christian culture in Southern Italy³ who caused a flutter in the heart of the Orthodox Christian World; and he was followed—after the political transfer of Southern Italy from East Roman to Western hands as the consequence of a Norman conquest that was achieved in Johannes' own lifetime—by a Calabrian intellectual revolutionary who caused a similar flutter in Western Christendom. Joachim of Fiore (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1145–1202)⁴ was a Calabrian monk who was manifestly not at home in the mental and spiritual world in which his lot had been cast by a political accident; and the impact of his genius upon this alien Western cultural environment left its mark on medieval Western religious thought in a vein of libertarian speculation that is the antithesis of what is popularly supposed to be the 'Byzantine' *êthos*. Some two centuries later again, in an age when the former political association of Calabria with the East Roman Empire was no longer anything more than a dim and distant memory, this long-lost outpost of Orthodox Christendom produced another *enfant terrible* in Barlaam of Seminara (*florebat circa* A.D. 1330–50), who caused an uproar in the fourteenth-century Orthodox Christian World by launching an attack on the new mystical religious movement of Hesychasm⁵ in the name of a new rationalism which was the fruit of a steadily ripening Hellenic Renaissance.

¹ For the affair of Johannes Italus see Anna Cornnena: *Alexias*, Book V, chaps. 8–9, and Hussey, J. M.: *Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire, 867–1185* (Oxford 1937, University Press), chap. 5.

² Compare the uniqueness of Ibn Khaldûn in the cultural history of the Arabic Civilization in North-West Africa (for Ibn Khaldûn see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 321–8, above). Johannes Italus was not altogether without intellectual antecedents at Constantinople, for he was a pupil of Psellus and perhaps his master's successor in his chair of philosophy (see Hussey, *op. cit.*, p. 71). Psellus, too, had been accused of heresy in his time, but Italus's speculations were more daring and they raised a greater storm.

³ Anna Cornnena's account (in *loc. cit.*) of Johannes Italus's career makes it evident that the future Hellenist and his parents had already come under the charm of the Orthodox Christian culture before the migration of the family to the eastern side of the Adriatic gave Johannes his opportunity of obtaining a first-rate Classical Greek education at Constantinople. Anna's indictment against Johannes is that this tactless barbarian convert to the Byzantine culture took the Pagan Hellenic philosophy in deadly earnest instead of *cum grano salis Byzantini*!

⁴ See Grundmann, H.: *Studien über Joachim von Floris* (Leipzig 1927, Teubner).

⁵ See p. 359, below.

Even more significant are those flashes of Orthodox Christian creative genius that blaze out beyond the range of the East Roman Imperial régime by eluding it in the Time-dimension. St. Nilus obtained his opportunity for performing his creative work thanks to the geographical remoteness of his field from the centre of the East Roman Empire in an age when the Empire was at its zenith. There are other creative works of the Orthodox Christian spirit which owe their liberation, not to their spatial distance from the seat of the Imperial Power,¹ but to the Time-span which separates their date from that of the East Roman Empire's apogee.

By the fourteenth century a society which, under the obsession of the Imperial idea, had extinguished the ancient civic liberties of Cherson and had blighted the promise of a new birth of civic life in Southern Italy, had been sufficiently liberated from the cramping influence of its own Imperial régime to blossom out on its own account—and this in Salonica, which at that time was the second city of a diminished Empire²—into an experiment in civic liberty³ which, in its turbulent vitality, was fully a match for twelfth-century Italy or even for the Hellenic World of the fifth century B.C.⁴ It was likewise the fourteenth century that saw the religious life of Orthodox Christendom renew itself in a mystical movement—known as Hesychasm—which sought to make of the Orthodox Church a spiritual ladder for bringing Man into the presence of God, after this Church had been used for some six centuries as an administrative mesh for keeping him in subjection to the State. But perhaps the most astonishing of all these fourteenth-century flashes of Orthodox Christian creativity are the mosaics in the *ci-devant* monastery church of Chora, which is now the Qahriyeh Jāmy'sy. Here, within the enceinte of Constantinople, on the very

¹ In the personality and career of a Joachim and a Barlaam we can see Time and Space working together to produce a prodigy.

² Salonica seems to have developed and maintained a local civic ethos which was a reflexion of her geographical situation. As one of the Transrhodopæan enclaves of the East Roman Empire, she had been thrown upon her own resources and had never been subjected to the full weight of the incubus which the Imperial régime imposed upon the metropolitan provinces. By self-help Salonica had first repelled the assaults of the Slavs and Avars in the sixth and seventh centuries of the Christian Era and had eventually charmed and tamed and reconciled the barbarians who had settled down at her gates after their failure to scale her walls. The local spirit of Salonica was expressed in the worship of her tutelary saint, the warrior Demetrius.

³ See further V. C. (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 107, below.

⁴ For this republican incident in Orthodox Christian political history see Tafrali, O.: *Thessalonique au Quatorzième Siècle* (Paris 1913, Geuthner). The Zealot régime at Salonica lasted from 1342 to 1349, with a short break in 1345. The revolution was provoked by John Cantacuzenus's usurpation of the Imperial Power in 1342—a lawless act which precipitated a long-maturing social conflict between a rich and privileged minority and the masses upon whose shoulders the whole burden of the miseries and disasters of the age had been thrust by their traditional masters. This conflict broke out all over what remained of the Empire, and first of all at Adrianople; but it was at Salonica that it went to the greatest lengths. The Zealots attempted to correct the extreme maldistribution of wealth by confiscating the revenues of the nobles and the monks, who were Cantacuzenus's partisans.

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threshold of the old Iconoclast Lion's den, we can still gaze to-day at this exhibition of an Orthodox Christian art which was able to achieve in the intractable material of the Byzantine artist's choice an effect of movement and life that is scarcely surpassed by any contemporary Italian work in oil or tempera.

These fourteenth-century flashes of creative light produce an extraordinary impression as they flare out against the sombre background of a social fabric in disintegration. The fourteenth century saw the nadir of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles'. At that moment a society which had broken down at the time of the great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977-1019 was on the point of passing out of a four-hundred-years-long agony into the harsh peace of an Ottoman domination. The reason why these flashes occurred at this time can hardly be that the life of this tormented Christendom was then really growing brighter.¹ It seems more likely that the flashes proceeded from a candle, lit in ages past, which had remained hidden under a bushel² until the tardy destruction of that crass impediment at last allowed the light to shine for an instant before men as it was on the point of going out into the other darkness of annihilation.

If these fourteenth-century flashes were given off by the spirit of Orthodox Christendom at the moment when it was being disburdened of the leaden cope of the East Roman Empire in order to be draped in an Ottoman funeral pall, we can detect a sixteenth-century after-glow which was kindled, like the flickering Northern Lights, by a luminary whose orb had already sunk below the horizon. In Domenico Theotokópoulos 'El Greco' (*vivebat* A.D. 1541-1614)³ the Orthodox Christian Island of Crete gave the Western

¹ If there was any increase of light at all in fourteenth-century Orthodox Christendom the illumination came from alien bodies and was a reflexion of their radiation. In that age there were two societies that were exerting a considerable influence upon Orthodox Christendom: the extinct Hellenic Society, to which the Orthodox Christian Society was 'affiliated', and the living Western Society, which was her sister and neighbour and oppressor. The influence of the Hellenic Renaissance is apparent in Barlaam's anti-Hesychast rationalism and in the Salonican Zealots' political and economic radicalism; and in both the same phenomena we may also detect the influence of the contemporary West. Barlaam, for instance, grew up in a long-since partially Westernized outpost of the Orthodox Christian World, and he was at home in Western Christendom (he gave Greek lessons to Petrarch when he was on a diplomatic mission to the Papal Court at Avignon). As for the Salonican Zealots, the dates suggest that their revolution of A.D. 1342 may have been partly inspired by the democratic revolution which had occurred in 1339 at Genoa; for, ever since the breach of A.D. 1204 between the East Roman Empire and the Venetians, the Genoese had been *personae gratiae* in the East Roman ports, and in the first half of the fourteenth century there were well-established Genoese settlements, living on familiar terms with the local Greek population, at Salonica and the neighbouring town of Cassandra (Tafrali, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-6). These good relations continued until the Genoese reconquest of Chios and Phocaea (by the adventurer Simon Vignoso) in 1346 and the Genoese attack upon the capital of the East Roman Empire (by the colonists at Galata) in 1348.

² Matt. v. 15-16 = Mark iv. 21 = Luke xi. 33.

³ See Kyrou, A. A.: *Οἱ Ἕλληνες τῆς Ἀναγεννήσεως καὶ ὁ Δομήνικος Θεοτοκόπουλος* (Athens 1938, Dhimitrakos).

World an artist whose art would appear to be the antithesis of the rigid canon of the Athoan iconists.¹ And yet, in spite of appearances, 'El Greco's' inspiration must have been derived from a native source, since it was so remote from the contemporary style of painting in the West that for more than three centuries after his own generation this changeling was regarded in the society of his adoption as an isolated and unintelligible *lusus Naturae*, until he found his disciples at last in a professedly revolutionary Western school of the present day.²

In 'El Greco's' blazon of a clear-edged shaft of light escaping from behind some opaque obstacle in order to pierce, with gleaming spear-head, the object which it strikes, we may perhaps discern a visual allegory of the Orthodox Christian Civilization's fate. This Cretan juggler with cross-lights would assuredly have found a congenial subject in one of those Solar eclipses in which an ashen Moon so exactly covers the orb of the true luminary, from whom she ordinarily derives her borrowed light, that we should hardly divine the hidden presence of a fiery body behind her—were it not that the veiling of the Sun's own self makes momentarily visible a mane of leaping flames which at other times is paled to nothingness by the transcendent brightness of the godlike head which wears these flaming locks. If we can imagine to ourselves this extraordinary cosmic spectacle depicted by 'El Greco's' hand, our visual simile stands out complete. The Orthodox Christian Society is the luminary under eclipse; the East Roman Empire is the leaden disk that covers it; and the streamers of astounding light that escape round the dark Moon's rim portray for us the creative work of Nilus the saint and John the philosopher and Joachim the visionary and Barlaam the rationalist and the anonymous artist of the Qahriyeh Jamy'sy and the famous Cretan painter to whose posthumous Byzantine genius we are ascribing our imaginary picture. The brilliance of the streamers informs us how great a light is obstructed by how grievous an impediment.³

¹ Just as Joachim of Fiore's theology would appear to be the antithesis of the rigid canon of Byzantine Orthodoxy (see p. 358, above).

² 'El Greco's' astonishing performance in being fully three centuries 'before his time' in the history of the Western art whose temple-courts he had entered as a proselyte may be compared with the similar performance of a Russian genius who likewise migrated out of Orthodox Christendom into our Western World and likewise anticipated the future march of Western history in his own line of activity. For Peter the Great's *tour de force* of anticipating Straker see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 279, above.

³ At a later point in this Study—in Part VI—we shall find that this simile of a Solar eclipse applies not only to the effect of the East Roman Empire upon the life of Orthodox Christendom, but also, not less aptly, to the effect produced upon the life of the 'apparented' Hellenic Society by the Roman Empire, of which the East Roman Empire was a ghost. The prototype, like the copy, eventually became a social incubus after having been instituted originally as a remedy for a social evil. One of the greatest living students of the social history of the Roman Empire (Rostovtzeff, M.: *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1926, Clarendon Press), p. 339)

The case of 'El Greco' may also remind us of another tragic feature in Orthodox Christendom's fate. Both the good and the evil that this luckless society has done have largely accrued to some other society's benefit.

Like 'El Greco' at Rome and Toledo, the Basilians in Calabria and the Lazio did their pioneer work for the future advantage of the alien Christendom of the West; and there is a more notorious example of the same involuntary altruism to the profit of the same neighbour in the fructification of the culture of the West, at the beginning of the modern chapter of Western history, through our Western discovery of the literature of the 'apparented' Hellenic Civilization among the ruins of the sister Christendom's prematurely collapsing social edifice. This fruitful Western discovery could never have been made if Orthodox Christian piety had not sedulously preserved these precious monuments of a common parent-culture through the tempests and earthquakes of the post-Hellenic interregnum in order to bring them out of its treasure-house, and furbish them up for re-use, in a Byzantine Renaissance

has described this sinister metamorphosis, and gauged its consequences, in the following terms:

'I think that the gradual decay of the vital forces of the Empire may be explained by . . . phenomena . . . connected with one prominent feature in the life of the ancient state in general—the supremacy of the interests of the state over those of the population.'

In undergoing this tragic change of role the Roman Empire did not have a peculiar history. The tragedy of the Roman Empire is the regular tragedy of the universal state, which is the species of polity to which the Roman Empire belongs (see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52-3, above). In the disintegration of a broken-down civilization the universal state is the protective institution which the declining society throws up when it finds itself threatened with imminent dissolution in the culminating paroxysm of its 'Time of Troubles'. The foundation of this universal state is the society's last great constructive achievement; and the rally of its moral forces by which this achievement is accomplished wins a momentary reward in the shape of 'the Indian Summer' which visits a storm-tossed world under the universal state's aegis (for this social phenomenon see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, above). This beneficent guise, however, is not the ultimate aspect in which the universal state presents itself; for the moral rally of which it is the outcome is an attempt to cheat Destiny by obtaining a reprieve for a society which by this time is already under sentence of death; and therefore the reprieve which the universal state does win is only temporary and is purchased, at that, at a ruinous price. Destiny takes its revenge in a disastrous transformation of the character of a polity which is the master-institution of the declining society in this penultimate chapter of its history. The ubiquitous presence and pervasive influence of the universal state, which, in the first instance, serve so potently to conserve and revive such vital energies as the sorely stricken body social still retains, proceed thereafter, by a gradual and scarcely perceptible change of operation, to produce precisely the opposite effect—taking instead of giving, until in the end the vampire-institution sucks out the last remaining drops of the doomed society's life-blood. In Part VI, below, this plot of the tragedy of the universal state is analysed in greater detail. In the last phase of its history the universal state subjects the society upon which it has imposed itself to an eclipse which effaces, totally and forever, the moribund culture of the dominant minority; but in this eclipse likewise the darkness is relieved by streamers of light which flare out round the eclipsing body's rim. In this case the streamers come from a new creative spark which has been kindled in the dark by the Internal Proletariat, and they are the heralds of a new civilization whose faint dawn will be visible in the heavens when the eclipse is brought to an end by the break-up of the now maleficent institution which has been the cause of it.

In this tragedy of the universal state the idolization of an ephemeral institution, which is one of the alternative aberrations to which the breakdown of a civilization may be due, reasserts itself in the last act in order to prevent the disastrous consequences of the breakdown from being retrieved at the thirteenth hour.

which began in the same generation as the Carolingian Renaissance in the West and continued thereafter until the fifteenth century.¹ This preservation and resurrection of the mighty works of the Hellenic genius in the bosom of the Orthodox Christian Society ought to have brought its due reward in the fullness of time by inspiring Orthodox Christendom—as it did afterwards most effectively inspire Western Christendom—to achieve original works of its own; but in Orthodox Christian cultural history there was never any struggle for cultural emancipation from Hellenic leading-strings corresponding to that 'Battle of the Books' between the Ancients and the Moderns which was waged in the West through decade after decade of the seventeenth century until there could be no mistake about the Moderns' victory.² Accordingly in Orthodox Christendom the re-born Hellenic culture, like the East Roman *Imperium Redivivum*, became an incubus instead of a stimulus. It was not until its transmission to the lively mental environment of fifteenth-century Italy that this potent mental tonic was able to produce its proper stimulating effect; and thus, as it turned out, Orthodox Christendom actually performed her pious cultural labour for her Western sister's benefit. She played the thankless part of the unprofitable servant who is ordered to be cast into outer darkness because he has hidden in the earth the talent—or besant—that has been given him to work with; while the sister society, into whose possession the hoarded treasure passed, duly turned it to profitable account.

'For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have

¹ For the cultural contact between civilizations in the Time-dimension which is commonly called a renaissance, see Part X, below. The renaissance of the Hellenic culture in its original Greek medium in the bosom of the Orthodox Christian Society made continuous progress from the time of its beginning in the latter part of the eighth century of the Christian Era throughout the next seven hundred years. In this persistence it showed its superiority in driving-force over the contemporary renaissance, in the West, of the same Hellenic culture in its second-hand Latin version. Like the Carolingian resuscitation of the Roman Empire, the Carolingian renaissance of the Latin culture was a flash in the pan which was followed, after another bout of mental stagnation, by a new renaissance of the Latin culture in a different region of Western Christendom. This second Western renaissance, which eventually came to birth in the North and Central Italian city-state cosmos, succeeded—in contrast to the failure of the Carolingian renaissance—because it was the expression of a new act of creation which was performed in Italy by the Western genius in this second chapter of our Western history (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), p. 275, footnote 2, above). Having thus succeeded in resuscitating the Hellenic culture in its Latin version, the medieval Italians crowned their achievement by enriching the Latin derivative with the Greek original, which they now went on to acquire through their contact in the Space-dimension with Orthodox Christendom. This contact between civilizations in the Space-dimension is dealt with in Part IX, below.

² 'The Battle of the Books' might perhaps be described not inaptly as a 'Counter-Renaissance', on the analogy of the 'Counter-Reformation'; for both movements were re-vindications of the native vein of the Western Civilization against the would-be tyranny of a ghost from the past. In the Reformation the Transalpine peoples of Western Christendom had resuscitated the Syriac germ of Western religion, as the Hellenic germ of Western intellectual life had been resuscitated by the Italians in their Renaissance.

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abundance; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.¹

The notorious evil deed of the Orthodox Christian Society which redounded to the advantage of the West was the extermination of the Paulicians.

In the latest age of the history of the 'apparented' Hellenic Society, Anatolia, as we have seen,² had been the seed-bed of Christianity, and in fulfilling this historical function the Asiatic peninsula had produced a rich experimental variety of the cultural crop with which it had been so successfully sown. This Anatolian richness of religious life became part of the original social heritage of Orthodox Christendom when Anatolia came to be included in the nascent civilization's territorial patrimony; and one of the first-fruits of this inheritance was the Iconoclastic movement. Had Iconoclasm asserted itself before the establishment of the East Roman Empire it would perhaps have had better fortune, and it would then probably have been followed by a succession of fresh outbursts and manifestations of religious life which would have made the religious history of Orthodox Christendom as conspicuously *mouvementée* as that of the West. In the event the potentially creative force of Iconoclasm was diverted by Leo the Syrian, and again by Leo the Armenian, from its proper religious field in order to serve the extraneous political purpose of assisting the Imperial Power to assert its claim to a 'Caesaro-papal' authority;³ and Iconoclasm played this political role so well that it missed its religious aim. When the dust of the Iconoclastic struggle (*saeviebat* A.D. 726-843) at last settled down, it became apparent that 'Caesaro-papism' had triumphed in Orthodox Christendom at the Iconoclastic movement's expense. The Imperial Power was no sooner certain of its seat on a 'Caesaro-papal' throne than it showed itself content to let Iconoclasm drop; and the discarded religious movement carried away with it in its fall the whole of that rich and variegated Anatolian religious life of which Iconoclasm itself had been only one manifestation. The traditional Anatolian religious ethos, however, did not resign itself to the doom of annihilation without making a last stand in an outlying fastness.

After the suppression of Iconoclasm in the metropolitan provinces of the East Roman Empire the Anatolian religious spirit still remained incarnate in Paulicianism—a sect which appears to have been a local survival of an archaic 'Adoptionist' school of Christianity⁴—and when, at some date in the ninth century, the

¹ Matt. xxv. 29.

² In IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), p. 271, above.

³ On this point see p. 352, footnote 5, above.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, pp. 624-34, below.

Paulicians set up a militant republic of latter-day saints¹ in a remote and barely accessible no-man's-land between the East Roman Empire and the 'Abbasid Caliphate, on the watershed of the Halys and the Euphrates, they offered to the dissident elements in Anatolia a rallying point which was independent of the waning fortunes of Iconoclasm. If this interesting Paulician community had been suffered to survive, it might conceivably have saved the life of Orthodox Christendom by preserving for it, and eventually restoring to it, those vital elements in the Orthodox Christian social heritage which were incompatible with an East Roman 'Caesaro-papal' régime. In the Imperial capital at Constantinople and the Paulician head-quarters at Tephrike the component elements of the Orthodox Christian religious genius were polarized. But, just because the ideals for which they stood were antithetical, Constantinople and Tephrike could not leave one another in peace. The termination in A.D. 843 of the long struggle between the Iconoclasts and their Iconodule opponents for mastery in the East Roman Empire set the Imperial Government free to bend all its energies against the last remaining heretics; and the Emperor Basil I, who would not exert himself to hold Sicily against the Muslims² or Moravia against the Pope,³ waged a war of extermination against the Paulician Republic⁴ with all the weapons in his armoury. On the theological plane the ingenious and accommodating Oecumenical Patriarch Photius, whom his 'Caesaro-papal' master held in with so firm a hand when he was engaged in baiting the Pope,⁵ was given free rein to employ his gift for heresy-hunting at the Paulicians' expense;⁶ and this heresy-hunt was not carried on with

¹ The foundation of the Paulician polity at Tephrike in the ninth century may be compared with that of the Mormon polity at Salt Lake City in the nineteenth century (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 221-2, above) and with that of the Muslim polity at Medina in the seventh century (see II. D (ii), vol. ii, p. 57, footnote 3, and III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 278, with Annex II, above).

² See pp. 343-4, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 605-10, below.

⁴ It may be noted that the Emperor Basil I's own family came from the very region that produced this Emperor's Paulician adversaries. The founder of the 'Macedonian' Dynasty, like the founder of the 'Isaurian' Dynasty before him (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 274, footnote 2, above), was descended from a race of frontiersmen whose original homes were on the easternmost Asiatic borders of Orthodox Christendom, but who had been transported to the opposite extremity of the Orthodox Christian World—when their Asiatic homes became too hot to hold them—in order to guard the European bridge-head of the East Roman Empire in the Maritsa Basin against the barbarian invaders of the Balkan Peninsula. The 'Isaurian' and 'Macedonian' dynasties were themselves addicted to the policy of transportation which had been applied to their own forebears.

⁵ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 606-7, below.

⁶ The work on the Paulicians that has been handed down under Photius's name appears, however, to be a late tenth-century paraphrase of Petrus Siculus's authentic and contemporary *Historia Manichaeorum seu Paulicianorum*. (See Grégoire, H.: 'Les Sources de l'Histoire des Pauliciens' in *Académie Royale de Belgique: Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, 5th series, vol. xxii, fasc. 4 (Brussels 1936, Palais des Académies), pp. 95-114; eundem, *ibid.*, fasc. 6-9, pp. 224-6.)

spiritual arms alone; the military as well as the theological strength of the East Roman Empire was thrown into the conflict. In a war *à outrance* between powers so unequally matched the outcome could not be in doubt, though it might be long delayed; and, after a struggle which swayed to and fro across Anatolia and lasted from A.D. 843 to about A.D. 875, the hornet's nest at Tephrike was smoked out¹ by the master of the Imperial beehive at Constantinople.

From the East Roman Government's standpoint this was a famous victory; for the vehemence of the Empire's assault upon the Paulicians betrayed a conviction that the existence of the Paulician Republic was a menace to the Empire's security. Considering the incompatibility of principle between the two régimes, we may well believe that the official view was right; but we may also pass the private judgement that in this matter the East Roman Empire's victory was the Orthodox Christian Society's defeat. In eliminating the Paulicians² the East Roman Government did the same disservice to Anatolia that the Christian 'successor-states' of the Umayyad Caliphate did to the Iberian Peninsula when they expelled the Jews and the Muslims, or Louis XIV to France when he expelled the Huguenots, or the National-Socialist régime to Germany when it expelled the Jews and the Liberals. And the measure of this disservice can be taken by observing the benefits which these refugees and exiles conferred upon the countries where they eventually found asylum.

The cases of the French Huguenots and the Peninsular Sephardim have been dealt with already in this Study at an earlier point.³ As for the Paulicians who were deported by the East Roman Government to the European frontiers of the Empire—the farthest distance that the Imperial Power could remove them from their Asiatic home⁴—they took upon their East Roman conquerors the

¹ The metaphor is apt, for Basil never captured Tephrike by force of arms. Its strength daunted him when he pushed his way to the foot of its walls in 871/2. It was not the fall of the fastness, but the death of the leader Chrysocheir, that broke the Paulicians' resistance. After Chrysocheir's death Tephrike was evacuated by his dispirited followers; and the whole of the territory of the Paulician Republic seems to have fallen into the East Roman Government's hands by about the year 875.

² The only monument of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Anatolia in which any trace of a Paulician contribution can still be discerned is the *Akrifas* cycle of the Byzantine Greek Epic; and this is an exception that proves the rule of East Roman implacability in seeking to root Paulicianism out; for the Paulician leaders Chrysocheir and Carbeas have succeeded in finding a place in this Anatolian Orthodox Christian poem only by stealing in through a Melitenian Muslim back door. There is some irony in the fact that, while the hero himself has been invested with the name of Basil in honour of the East Roman Emperor who was the Paulicians' mortal enemy, the historical Basil's two principal Paulician opponents should have been converted by a poet's imagination into the fictitious Basil's grandfather and great-uncle respectively (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 255-6, below).

³ For the Huguenots see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213 and 250; for the Peninsular Sephardim see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 243-6, above.

⁴ For the East Roman Government's regular practice of garrisoning the European frontiers of the Empire with settlers from the Asiatic frontiers see p. 365, footnote 4,

same revenge as was taken upon the Assyrians by the Israelites who were deported on the same grounds of policy from their Syrian home to the cities of the Medes.¹ Thanks to this harsh and high-handed measure, the dragon's-tooth seed which the victorious Power was seeking to eradicate on one flank of its empire won fresh and fairer fields for its dissemination on the opposite flank, to which it could scarcely have found its way if it had been compelled to wait in order to be wafted thither by the wind that bloweth where it listeth,² instead of being carried by a hostile statesman's misguidedly purposeful hand. There were Paulician troops in the army with which Nicephorus Phocas the elder carried out his South Italian campaign in A.D. 885;³ but the destination of the majority of the Paulician deportees was probably the Bulgarian and not the Lombard frontier of the East Roman Empire;⁴ for it was in the Balkan Slavinas that the religion which the Paulician exiles brought with them found its new mission-field.

On the Bulgarian frontier of the Empire, in Thrace, a batch of Asiatic Paulician deportees is known to have been planted as early as A.D. 756 (or 755)⁵ by the Emperor Constantine V; and in A.D. 870, on the eve of the downfall of the Asiatic Paulician Republic of Tephrike, a project for the conversion of Bulgaria was being mooted at that distant East Anatolian head-quarters of the Paulician Church.⁶ In a partial and indirect fashion this Paulician ambition was achieved; for, within less than a hundred years of the extermination of Paulicianism in its original Asiatic cradle through the

above. The earlier Asiatic colonists on the borders of the Empire in the Balkan Peninsula appear, in contrast to the Paulician deportees, to have been, not rebels against the Imperial authority, but loyalists who preferred to leave their homes rather than transfer their allegiance from the Empire to the Arab conquerors of its eastern provinces; but among these unruly frontiersmen the distinction between loyalists and rebels was perhaps not always easy to draw. In this connexion we may speculate whether the Mirdites, who at the present day are one of the leading Gegh clans of Albania, are to be traced back to those Mardaite loyalists who were evacuated from the Lebanon by the Imperial authorities as one of the conditions of the peace settlement of A.D. 688 between the Roman Empire and the Umayyad Caliphate. This similarity of names may, no doubt, be purely fortuitous; yet the present Mirdite territory would have been a natural site for the plantation of a Mardaite settlement by a seventh-century Roman statesman who wanted to cover the surviving enclave of Roman territory round Dyrrhachium against further encroachments on the part of the Slavs.

¹ For the unintended and ironic outcome of the Assyrian policy of deportation in sowing the seeds of the Syriac Civilization in Iran, and thus enabling the Syriac Society, through its very misfortunes, to encircle and finally engulf the Assyrians' own Babylonian World, see I. C (i) (b), vol. I, pp. 79-81, and II. D (v), vol. II, pp. 137-8, above; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), in the present volume, p. 471, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 122-3, below.

² John iii. 8.

³ See Gay, op. cit., p. 133.

⁴ The only deportations of Paulicians from the Asiatic to the European provinces of the Empire that appear to be directly attested are those of A.D. 756 (or 755) and of the eighth decade of the tenth century (see the next footnote and p. 368, footnote 1). For the survival of a Paulician community at Philippopolis as late as the eighteenth century of the Christian Era see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (b), Annex III, p. 632, with footnote 5, below.

⁵ Theophanes: *Chronographia*, sub anno mundi 6247. 'The heretic Syrians' whose deportation to, and settlement in, Thrace is subsequently recorded sub anno 6270 = A.D. 778 were not Paulicians but were Jacobite Monophysites.

⁶ Petrus Siculus: *Historia Manichaeorum seu Paulicianorum*, ad init. et ad fin.

occupation of Tephrike by the East Roman forces in or about A.D. 875, the laborious weeding operations of the East Roman emperor Basil I had been more than made up for by the assiduous sowing of the Bulgarian heresiarch Bogomil. This man of destiny was a Slavophone priest of the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria who became converted to the faith of his country's new Paulician neighbours and showed his genius 'in his adaptation of this intricate Armenian religion to suit the needs of the European peasantry'.¹ This simplified—or modified—version of Paulicianism² spread far and wide over the Continent of Europe. The Slavonic vernacular into which the essence of the Paulician doctrine had been translated by Bogomil carried an Asiatic faith across the north-western frontier of the Bulgarian Empire into the no-man's-land between Orthodox and Western Christendom which eventually became the Kingdom of Bosnia;³ and from this second Euro-

¹ Runciman, S.: *A History of the First Bulgarian Empire* (London 1930, Bell), p. 192. For an account of Bogomil's doctrine and work, and of the relation of the Bogomil daughter sect to its Paulician parent, see op. cit., pp. 190-6. The personal name of the founder of the sect, which became the general appellation of his followers, is a Slavonic translation of the Greek name Theophilus. The *terminus ante quem* of Bogomil's career is settled by the two recorded facts that he lived in the reign of the Bulgarian Tsar Peter (*imperabat* A.D. 927-69) and that he was anathematized by the Oecumenical Patriarch Theophylact Lecapenus, who died in A.D. 956. These dates indicate that the source of Bogomil's Paulician inspiration must have been either the Paulician community that had been domiciled in Thrace since A.D. 756 (or 755), or else some mission sent out by the Asiatic Paulicians before the East Roman Government's occupation of Tephrike circa A.D. 875. We have no record of a deportation of Paulicians to Thrace on the morrow of the fall of Tephrike (see p. 367, footnote 4, above), and Bogomil cannot have owed anything to the Asiatic Paulician deportees who were planted by the East Roman Emperor John Tzimiskes in Eastern Bulgaria after his annexation of this territory in A.D. 972 (see p. 389, below). This latter reinforcement of the Paulician community in Europe may, however, have given an impetus to the subsequent spread of Bogomilism into the West.

² '[In the Balkan Peninsula the Paulicians] seem to have attempted the conversion of the Bulgars, and here also the pure doctrine of Paulicianism would appear to have become adulterated by an infiltration of Manichaeism, or at all events of ideas of a Gnostic and Dualist character; and hence arose the sect of the Bogomils. The connexion between the Paulicians and the Western Cathari is clear; but it is probable that the corrupted Paulicianism of the Bulgarians, rather than the original Paulicianism of Armenia, was the origin of Western Catharism, and that . . . the heresy travelled from Bulgaria, Bosnia and Dalmatia into Hungary and Italy.'—Turberville, A. S., in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. vi (Cambridge 1929, University Press), p. 703.

³ After the East Roman conquest of Bulgaria in A.D. 1019, Bosnia, together with Serbia and Croatia, fell under an East Roman suzerainty. Thereafter Bosnia became first a debatable zone between the East Roman Empire and Hungary, then an autonomous duchy, and finally, in 1376, an independent kingdom. The conversion of the Bosniak ruling class to Bogomilism evoked the unanimous hostility of Bosnia's Orthodox and Western Christian neighbours; and this Ishmael in Christendom was hard put to it to defend itself against a world of Christian enemies until it was rescued, in the nick of time, by the progress of the Ottoman conquests in South-Eastern Europe. The Bosniak nobility demonstrated their gratitude to their Ottoman saviours, and at the same time secured their lands against confiscation, by turning Muslim *en masse*; and from their incorporation into the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1463 down to the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878 the descendants of these Bosniak converts continued to be the most loyal of the Pādīshāh's European subjects. (For Sultan Selim I's Bosniak garrison in Nubia see I. C (i) (8), Annex I, vol. i, p. 386, footnote 1, above; for the Bosniak Muslim school of 'heroic' poetry in the Bosniaks' native Serbo-Croat tongue see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 327-8, below.) In 1878 the Bosniaks resisted their compulsory severance from the Pādīshāh's dominions by force of arms, and, after more than half a century of Christian rule, they remain to-day as faithful as ever to the latest of their successively adopted Asiatic religions.

pean base of operations the new religion continued its advance, beyond the pale of the Orthodox Christian culture and out of hearing of the Slavonic tongue, into the heart of Western Christendom. Traversing the Croatian dependencies of Hungary and the Slovenian marches of the Holy Roman Empire, the Bogomil missionaries acquired Latin flocks in the Patarnes of Lombardy and the Albigenses of Languedoc.

In Western, as in Orthodox, Christendom the appearance of these goats among the sheep—or tares among the wheat—evoked active counter-measures; and the leaders of Western Christendom were ready enough to follow the East Roman emperor Basil I's militant policy of burning the tares¹ and separating the sheep from the goats.² In the crusade against the Albigenses which was authorized by Pope Innocent III³ the vision of an Athenian tragic poet of the fifth century B.C. might have beheld an *ἄγος ἀνήμεστον* which could not be wiped out by Innocent's speedy attempt to undo what he had originally done against his own better feelings and sounder judgement.⁴ Was this war of extermination that was levied in Christ's name by the Papacy at the height of its power the sin that doomed the master-institution of Western Christendom to meet with its tremendous downfall? Whatever may be the answer to that question,⁵ it is certain that the tragedy of Albi reproduced the tragedy of Tephrike on a larger material scale; and if this had been the whole of the Western response to the Cathar challenge we should have to pronounce that the West had responded as unsatisfactorily as Orthodox Christendom; that, here too, the intrusive religion had simply been suppressed by force; and that once again the deed of violence had impoverished the spiritual life of the society which had acted the tragedy, besides demoralizing the institution which had taken the victim's blood upon its head. In Orthodox Christendom this was, indeed, the whole story; but in the West the same challenge evoked an act of creation as well as a crime.⁶

¹ Matt. xiii. 30 and 40.

² Matt. xxv. 32.

³ See further IV. C (iii) (b) 3 (β), pp. 559–60, below.

⁴ Innocent was so horrified at the evil which he had let loose that he sought to head his Crusaders off from Languedoc and push them over the Pyrenees to discharge their savagery upon the devoted heads of the Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula; but his well-meant efforts at a diversion were all in vain. The Christian wolves would not loose their fangs from their 'Manichaean' prey; and the Albigensian War, which had begun in A.D. 1208, dragged on for thirteen years after Innocent's death in 1216, to end at last, in 1229, in a peace of desolation. For Innocent's policy in this matter see further IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 559–60, below.

⁵ For the downfall of the medieval Papacy see further IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512–84, below.

⁶ If the crime has to be debited to Pope Innocent III's account, the same Pope is at the same time entitled to the credit, not indeed for initiating, but for the perhaps hardly less important service of approving and promoting, the positive response with which the challenge of Catharism was met in the West by the saints whose work is touched upon

When the Bogomil wave swept over the valleys of the Po and the Garonne and broke against the Appennines and the Pyrenees, a Saint Dominic beyond the Pyrenees and a Saint Francis beyond the Appennines girded himself for the task of bringing this mounting Cathar flood to a halt; and in this enterprise, at the parting of the ways between a violent and a gentle course, Saint Francis wholeheartedly followed the path of Gentleness while Saint Dominic did not walk exclusively in the path of Violence. In this crisis in the history of the medieval Western Church, Dominic, as well as Francis, perceived that the Christian sheep in the Church's keeping would not have flocked so eagerly into the unfamiliar Cathar fold if they were not being grievously neglected by their own shepherds; and the spectacle of these shepherdless sheep inspired either saint with the creative compassion that had once moved his Master.

'When he saw the multitudes he was moved with compassion on them because they fainted and were scattered abroad, as sheep having no shepherd. Then saith he unto his disciples: "The harvest truly is plenteous, but the labourers are few. Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest that he will send forth labourers into his harvest"'.¹

The Franciscan and Dominican response to the challenge which Catharism presented to Western Christianity at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was to put fresh life in the West into the Christian institution of monachism;² and the two saints did this by bringing the monks out of their rural cloisters—from which in the West they had never emerged since they had retreated into these spiritual fastnesses during the social interregnum that had followed the break-up of the Roman Empire—and sending them to carry their doctrine and their spirit among the neglected populations of the new cities that had latterly been springing up all over the expanding domain of a young and growing civilization.³ The two orders of friars were thus given a harder task than the

in the following paragraphs. The connexion between the positive and negative sides of Innocent III's policy towards Catharism is set out further, on Grundmann's authority, in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), Annex, below.

¹ Matt. ix. 36-8 = Mark vi. 34, and Luke x. 2; cf. John iv. 35, and I Kings xxii. 17.

² Dominic's method of coping with the heresy was 'to live the life of the heretics while teaching the doctrine of the Church' (Grundmann, H.: *Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter* (Berlin 1935, Ebering), p. 102).

³ The friars of the first generation were largely drawn, like Saint Francis himself, from the class which it was their mission to convert. (For the social milieu in which the Cathars won their recruits see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), Annex, below, following Grundmann, H., op. cit.; for the social provenance of the earliest Franciscans see Grundmann, op. cit., p. 165. They were recruited, like the heretics themselves, from the rich bourgeoisie, the nobility, and the clergy.) In making it their special task to bring a new and shepherdless urban population into a Christian fold the friars saved the medieval Western Christendom of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries from an imminent danger of breakdown from which the modern English-speaking world was saved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the Methodists.

Cluniacs or the Cistercians. These earlier reformers of monastic life in the West had set themselves to regain, or surpass, the original Benedictine standards of liturgical or intellectual or manual industry without abandoning the original environment of the Benedictine life. The Franciscans and Dominicans were required to 'let' their 'light so shine before men that they' might 'see' their 'good works and glorify' their 'Father which' was 'in Heaven';¹ and this mission demanded of them the fortitude to practise the monastic virtues without wearing the customary monastic armour against the trials and temptations of the World. The institution of these Christian Berserkers is the enduring monument which the medieval Western reaction to the Cathar propaganda has left behind; and if we look for any Orthodox Christian parallel to this we shall look in vain. In Orthodox Christendom Paulicianism was not only denied the opportunity of performing any creative act of its own; it was not permitted there even to create by proxy through calling into play the creative powers of its Orthodox opponents and destroyers.

Having now surveyed the general effect of East Roman 'Caesaro-papism' in stunting the growth and pruning out the variety of Orthodox Christian life, we may next examine the particular way in which this overwhelming institution was directly responsible for the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization.

We have already observed, in passing,² that the outward visible sign of this breakdown was the Great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977-1019. We may now go on to observe that while one of the belligerents in this war was that simulacrum of the Roman Empire which had been established in the nucleus of a nascent Orthodox Christian World, the other belligerent was the most important among the neighbouring barbarian communities that had been incorporated into a growing Orthodox Christian body social in the process of its expansion. In other words, the expansion and the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Society were intimately connected with each other.

At an earlier point in this Study we have come to the conclusion, on the strength of an empirical survey, that mere expansion is not, in itself, the criterion of growth.³ At the same time, when a society which does bear the genuine marks of being in growth is found simultaneously to be expanding in the geographical sense, we should expect *a priori* in such circumstances that the expansion would recruit the growing society's strength; and we can observe

¹ Matt. v. 16.

² e.g. in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 26, and in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, in the present volume, p. 72, as well as in the present chapter, pp. 321 and 360, above.

³ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 128-54, above.

empirically that this was, in fact, the effect of the contemporary expansion of the sister civilization of the West. If we ask ourselves whether the Western Christendom was strengthened or weakened, during the four centuries beginning with the reign of Pope Gregory the Great, by the successive incorporation of the English, the Bavarians, the Thuringians, the Hessians, the Frisians, the Saxons, the Scandinavians, the Poles, and the Magyars, we shall feel no doubt about the answer. These successive expansions of a growing Western Christian Civilization at the expense of a European barbarism undoubtedly strengthened Western Christendom enormously; and this is true not only in the case of the barbarians who were converted by peaceful penetration. We have seen already how the peacefully converted English and Normans and Swedes and Danes became propagators, in their turn, of the civilization which had won their voluntary allegiance. The English did this work in Germany and on 'the Celtic Fringe';¹ the Normans in the British Isles and in Calabria and Sicily;² the Swedes and Danes on the eastern shores of the Baltic.³ It is more remarkable to find a constructive contribution to the life of Western Christendom being made by the Saxons, who, alone among the nine barbarian peoples enumerated above, had been converted to Western Christianity by force of arms. We have seen how Western Christendom had to pay for Charlemagne's disastrous breach with an established tradition of peaceful expansion by enduring a Scandinavian *revanche* for the Saxons' wrongs;⁴ but we have also seen how the Saxons eventually threw themselves into a role which had originally been forced upon them, and took up the double burden—which had overwhelmed their Austrasian conquerors—of pushing forward the continental frontiers of Western Christendom and at the same time keeping alive a Western ghost of the Roman Empire.⁵

On this Western analogy it is surprising to find the corresponding expansion of Orthodox Christendom apparently doing nothing to enhance the expanding society's strength and vitality, but, on the contrary, precipitating its breakdown by setting the lists for an internecine struggle between the Bulgarian converts and their East Roman instructors. If we are to translate into Western terms the relations between Bulgaria and the East Roman Empire from the conversion of Bulgaria in A.D. 865 down to the outbreak of the War of 977-1019, we must equate the East Romans with the Franks and the Bulgars with the Saxons, and must then imagine

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 336-7, with Annex II, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 201, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 338, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 168, above.

⁴ See the references on p. 322, footnote 4, above.

⁵ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 167-8, and the present chapter, p. 338, above.

the Western Emperors of the Saxon line consuming the energies which they actually devoted to restoring order in Germany and Italy in an internecine struggle with the Crown of Lorraine or the Crown of France for possession of the title to the Holy Roman Empire. In fact, of course, this catastrophe not only did not occur in the Western World at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries, but could hardly be conceived as occurring in an age when the parochial states of Western Christendom had not yet acquired the sharp articulation or the clear self-consciousness which any belligerent communities must have before they can nerve themselves for a fight to the death. To find these conditions anywhere in Western Christendom outside Italy, the historical investigator must turn over the pages of the chronicle through a Time-span of at least another five hundred years. In the Age of the Ottos, the Saxons—whose pagan ancestors had opposed such a desperate resistance to the Frankish conquest a century and a half before the rise of Otto I¹—were bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh² of a Western *Respublica Christiana* from which no city-state of Milan or Florence, nor Kingdom of France or England, had yet seceded in order to assert its own parochial individuality. On the other hand the contemporary Orthodox Christian Bulgars were divided from their East Roman co-religionists by a deeper moral gulf than had been fixed between the same two peoples a hundred years back, at a time when the Bulgars had still been pagans and when the gulf had therefore been religious as well as political. How are we to account for this striking difference in the respective developments of the Western and the Orthodox Christian Civilization in this age?

Before attempting to answer our question, we may cap this difference with another that is antecedent to it. By comparison with the performance of Western Christendom, Orthodox Christendom was astonishingly slow in addressing itself to the task of enlarging its own borders through the conversion of the barbarians at its European gates. While the Constantinopolitan Emperor Heraclius (*imperabat* A.D. 610–41) is reported to have emulated his older Italian contemporary Pope Gregory the Great's achievement

¹ Otto I became German King in A.D. 936 and Holy Roman Emperor in A.D. 962. The war between the pagan Saxons and Charlemagne had lasted from A.D. 772 to A.D. 802.

² One piece of evidence to this effect is the attitude displayed by the Lombard Bishop Liutprand of Cremona in his *Legatio*. This Lombard cleric's spontaneous aversion from everything foreign—a passion which he wears on his sleeve and makes no attempt to control—is aroused in full fury by his contact with the Orthodox Christian World, but is completely dormant when he is dealing with his Saxon masters. For Liutprand in the tenth century, Lombardy and Saxony are simply two parishes of a single Western Christian Republic, and he shows no consciousness of their ever having been divided from one another by a cultural or even a political gulf.

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of converting the pagan English conquerors of Britain by arranging, for his own part, for the conversion of the pagan Serb and Croat interlopers in the Western Illyricum,¹ this spurt of missionary effort was apparently abortive.² The Serbs and Croats relapsed into paganism and the East Slavonic settlers in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula were left to stew in it.³ Nor was there any immediate attempt on the Orthodox Christian side to convert the Bulgar Nomads who established a footing on the south bank of the Lower Danube in A.D. 680. The Bulgars, as well as the Slavs upon whose heels the Bulgars trod, were allowed to remain pagan for the best part of two centuries from that date. The conversion of Bulgaria to Orthodox Christianity did not take place until A.D. 865; and on the eve of that historic event the respective performances, up to date, of the two sister Christendoms in the European mission-field were strangely unequal. By that date Western Christendom had recaptured for its own part every foot of the ground that had formerly been held in this quarter of Europe by the Roman Empire; and it had pushed on beyond the ancient Roman frontiers until its own continental European bounds now extended to the line of the Elbe instead of being confined within the line of the Rhine and the Danube.⁴ At the same date Orthodox Christendom was so far from winning converts beyond its own section of the Roman Empire's former European frontiers that it had not yet begun to win back the Balkan provinces from the pagan barbarism that had submerged them. The unreclaimed barbarian wilderness then still stretched almost to within range of the walls of Adrianople and Salonica and Nicopolis and Durazzo; and the Peloponnese itself was in the hands of interloping Slav tribesmen who had still to be pacified and converted.

This extreme inequality of achievement in the European mission-field appears the more extraordinary when we remember that the Orthodox Church had kept its hands free from one formidable handicap to successful missionary work which the Western Church had imposed upon itself.

In Western Christendom it was taken for granted from the outset that Latin must be the exclusive and universal liturgical lan-

¹ The report is preserved by Constantine Porphyrogenitus in his *De Imperio Administrando*, pp. 148-9 and 153. It is noteworthy that, in the story as it is told, Heraclius is said to have procured his missionaries from Rome—presumably because both the *ci-devant* Imperial Diocese and the *ci-devant* Imperial Prefecture of Illyricum were under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Roman See.

² See Runciman, *op. cit.*, Appendix IV.

³ For the difference in origin between the Serbs and Croats on the one hand and the East Slavonic occupants of the heart of the Balkan Peninsula on the other see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 427, footnote 1, above.

⁴ The weakness of the Rhine-Danube frontier of the Roman Empire lay in its inordinate length (see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex I, vol. v, pp. 591-5, below).

guage not only in the former western provinces of the Roman Empire, whose inhabitants had acquired Latin as their culture-language before Christianity reached them, and had retained a Latin *patois* as their vernacular tongue, but also among the Celtic- and Teutonic- and Slavonic- and Finnish-speaking Christian progeny of the European barbarians who were successively gathered into the Western Church's fold.¹ On this linguistic question the Western ecclesiastical authorities were intransigent. The Moravian Church which was founded by the Orthodox Christian missionaries Cyril and Methodius in A.D. 862 was broken up in A.D. 885 because its founders had endowed it with a translation of the Liturgy into the native Slavonic. On this account it earned the implacable hostility of the Western hierarchy; and this hostility was neither wiped out nor warded off by the founders' conciliatory gesture of placing their newly won converts under the authority of the Roman See.² Thereafter the Slavonic Liturgy, conveyed in the Glagolitic characters, was not tolerated in Western Christendom outside the bounds of certain Croatian frontier-dioceses where the Western Church had to compete with the counter-attractions of Orthodox Christianity at close quarters.² It is noteworthy that the Western Christian prelates who stamped out the Slavonic Liturgy in Moravia were Transalpiners whose vernacular tongue was not Latin but Teutonic. In Transalpine Western Christendom an effective revolt against the liturgical dominion of the Latin language did not break out, even on the Slavonic soil of Bohemia, for another five hundred years, and on Teutonic soil it was delayed for more than a century after that. Nor was the revolt universal, even when it did come at last. Among the host of diverse linguistic groups which divide Western Christendom between them at the present day, there is hardly one which does not number among its members at least a minority that still celebrates the Catholic Liturgy in the original Latin.

In sharp contrast to this tyranny of Latin in the West, Orthodox Christendom cultivated a linguistic policy which was more liberal and indeed more 'catholic' in the non-ecclesiastical meaning of the English word. It is remarkable that in Orthodox Christendom there was no attempt to confer upon the Greek language the liturgical monopoly which Western Christendom conferred upon Latin as a matter of course. The historical nucleus of Orthodox Christendom was the Greek-speaking Christian population of Anatolia, whose forefathers had despised and rejected the Latin tongue of their Roman masters as a barbarous jargon; yet the Christian des-

¹ For the fortunes of this Moravian Slavonic Church see further IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 605-10, below.

² See IV. C (iii) (β) 11, pp. 215-16, with p. 216, footnote 1, above.

cendants of those Greek-speaking subjects of the Roman Empire did not extend their forebears' disdain for Latin to the unquestionably barbarous languages of the peoples beyond the pale whom it was their own mission, not to conquer, but to convert.

The policy of translating the Orthodox Christian Liturgy into the local vernacular was applied in the earliest field of the Orthodox Christian Society's expansion, which was, as we have seen, in the Caucasus.¹ By the momentous year 862, when the Orthodox Church addressed itself at last to the task of converting the Slavs, the domain of the Oecumenical Patriarchate already extended in the opposite direction beyond the eastern limits of the Greek language in Anatolia;² and there, in these Iberian and Abkhasian dioceses, the Orthodox Liturgy was celebrated in the local Caucasian tongues. This linguistic liberality of the Orthodox Church in the Caucasus may have been dictated originally by local considerations of policy,³ but even if it had started as a local peculiarity it had long since been accepted as the precedent for a general rule.⁴ The ninth-century Orthodox missionary Saint Cyril had prepared himself for his mission to the Slavs by reducing the Slavonic language of the hinterland of his native Salonica to literary form; and this literary labour indicates an intention to elevate Slavonic into a liturgical language and not merely to make use of it as a means of oral communication with the prospective converts. Moreover, before he found his life-work in the Slavonic mission-field, Saint Cyril had also set himself to acquire a similar mastery of the Turkish language of the Khazars in preparation for a missionary enterprise on the western fringes of the Great Eurasian Steppe.⁵ It is manifest that the translation of the Liturgy into the mother tongues of barbarian converts was by this time already the Orthodox Church's established practice; and it cannot be doubted that this

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 64, with footnote 3.

² In Anatolia itself the pre-Greek languages had become extinct in the last days of the Roman Empire, in the reign of Justinian I (*imperabat* A.D. 527-65).

³ In the Caucasus the Orthodox Christianity of the Oecumenical Patriarchate had to compete with a series of rival missionary religions: in the first instance with the Monophysite Christianity of Armenia and the Zoroastrianism of Iran, and later on with the Islamic faith of the Arab founders of the Caliphate. Thus Orthodox Christendom had the same incentive towards linguistic liberality in Caucasia that Western Christendom had in Croatia.

⁴ Here again we may observe a contrast between the developments of Orthodox and Western Christendom which is in Orthodox Christendom's favour; for in the West the linguistic concessions which had been made, *à contre-cœur*, to the Slavonic tongue and to the Glagolitic script were never allowed to develop from being a local curiosity into becoming a general practice. The early—and apparently easy—triumph of linguistic liberalism in the Orthodox Christian World gives us another glimpse of that native variety and elasticity of the Orthodox Christian *éthos* which was so cruelly repressed by the incubus of the East Roman Empire.

⁵ For the career and scholarship of Saint Cyril see Dvornik, *op. cit.*, chaps. 5-9, and Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Eastern Roman Empire from the Fall of Irene to the Accession of Basil I* (London 1912, Macmillan), chap. 12, section 3. The mission to the Khazars was abortive.

practice, in itself and *a priori*, gave Orthodox Christendom a signal advantage over Western Christendom in the field of missionary enterprise.

On this showing the *de facto* success of Western Christendom in outstripping Orthodox Christendom in the European mission-field will appear more paradoxical than ever. To resolve the paradox we must suppose that the advantage accruing to Orthodox Christendom from its linguistic liberalism was heavily outweighed by some formidable handicap; and as soon as we look for this handicap it leaps to the eye.

The missionary work of the Orthodox Church was crippled by the subjection of the Oecumenical Patriarchate to the 'Caesaro-papal' authority of the East Roman Imperial Government; for this servitude of the Orthodox Church to the East Roman State presented a painful dilemma to all prospective converts to the Orthodox Faith. If they accepted Christianity at the Oecumenical Patriarch's hands, and so came under his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the change that they were making in their own status would not be only a change of religious belief and practice. In accepting the Patriarch's ecclesiastical jurisdiction they would be accepting implicitly, in the same act, the political sovereignty of the Patriarch's 'Caesaro-papal' master. In other words, they had really to choose between a persistence in their ancestral paganism and a conversion to Christianity which involved a forfeiture of their political independence; and, in the circumstances, it is not surprising that they should flinch from making this latter choice¹—notwithstanding the inducement of being permitted to employ their mother tongue for the celebration of the Christian Liturgy.

This dilemma did not confront those barbarians who were invited into the Christian fold by the missionaries of the Western Church; for the acceptance of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Roman See, though it involved a submission to the linguistic tyranny of the Latin language, did not carry with it the more formidable servitude of acknowledging the political sovereignty of a foreign Government. It is true that during the four centuries, beginning with the pontificate of Pope Gregory the Great, during which the Western Church achieved the conversion of the barbarians of Western Europe, the Papacy was doing its best to place itself in that position of subjection to an Imperial Power into which

¹ In pagan Bulgaria, at any rate, the Khans took positive measures to prevent the spread of Orthodox Christianity. There were persecutions of Bulgarian Christians in the reigns of Krum Khan (*regnabat circa* A.D. 808-14) and his son Omortag Khan (*regnabat* A.D. 815-31), as well as under the intervening usurpers. These persecutions are the more significant inasmuch as these same Bulgarian princes were partial to the material culture of Orthodox Christendom and had no objection to the Greek language (see p. 380, footnote 5, below).

the Oecumenical Patriarchate was thrust when Leo Syrus effectively resuscitated a ghost of the Roman Empire on Orthodox Christian ground. We have seen already¹ how the Papacy clung to the skirts of the Constantinopolitan Imperial Government until these tore away in its hands, and how it then made two successive attempts to find a substitute for a lost Constantinopolitan aegis by investing first an Austrasian and then a Saxon prince with the Imperial mantle. The Papacy, however, was prevented by a kindly Fortune from frustrating its own missionary work by these persistent endeavours to escape the political independence which had been thrust upon it.

The Papacy's first successes in the barbarian mission-field were gained in an age when the Papacy itself was politically independent of any Imperial authority *de facto*, and in regions where Roman rule had either been completely swept away, as was the case in Britain and in Cisdanubian Bavaria and in Frisia, or had never existed at all, as was the case in the Bavarian Nordgau and in Hessen and in Thuringia. In these regions in this age the barbarians were scarcely conscious of the existence of a Roman Empire; and accordingly they looked upon the Roman See, to whose initiative they owed their conversion, not as the ecclesiastical agency of a foreign Government but as a spiritual power that was not subordinate to any temporal authority. To this spiritual power a converted barbarian prince would feel inclined to submit because the priest who wielded it presented himself, not as the servant of a mundane potentate, but as the Vicar of the Prince of the Apostles of Christ; and, by the same token, it was possible for a temporal ruler to make his religious submission to the Roman See without any abdication of his own political prerogative, because the Papacy purported to be a power of a different order from his, as well as of a higher rank. Thus for barbarian converts to Western Christianity at the dawn of Western history there was no political stumbling-block; and the Vicar of the Apostle at Rome would not be held to have convicted himself of a blasphemous hypocrisy if he called upon the heathen in the words of the Apostle's Master:

"Take my yoke upon you and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light."²

Nor was this happy relation between the Papacy and its barbarian converts destroyed by the Papacy's eventual success in resuscitating a ghost of the Roman Empire in the West, for neither the Carolingian nor the Saxon incarnation of this Western Imper-

¹ See pp. 335-40, above.

² Matt. xi. 29-30.

ium Redivivum was either universal or permanent. For example, the English remained loyal sons of the Roman Church without following Pope Leo III's example of paying political allegiance to the Imperial authority of Charlemagne; and their relations with the Holy See were thus not affected by the evocation of the Holy Roman Empire. Again, the Scandinavians and the Poles and the Magyars entered the Roman Church's spiritual fold, as the English had entered it some four hundred years earlier, 'without political prejudice'. Their acceptance of the Pope's ecclesiastical jurisdiction did not carry with it even an implicit acceptance of the political sovereignty of the Holy Roman Empire, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of their conversion this institution was once more 'a going concern'. Though the Popes who received these barbarians into the Western Church acknowledged the Saxon Emperors of the day as their own temporal lords, the actual political effect of the religious transaction was to give the *ci-devant* barbarian principalities of Hungary and Poland and Denmark and Norway and Sweden the status of Western Christian kingdoms which, like the existing Western Christian kingdoms of France and Wessex and Leon, were members of a Western *Respublica Christiana* in their own right and not in virtue of any act of political submission to the Holy Roman Empire. Thus the effect of the ecclesiastical submission of these barbarian principalities to the Roman See was not to impugn their political independence but to confirm it; and their princes took their place not as vassals but as peers of a Western Emperor who was thereby tacitly reduced, for his own part, from an oecumenical monarch to a *primus inter pares*.¹

The expansion of Orthodox Christendom could not proceed on these happy lines because the subjection of the Patriarchal to the Imperial Power was there not an empty form but a stern reality; and the unfortunate consequences which this difference entailed were not slow to work themselves out when in A.D. 865 the East Roman Government felt itself compelled at last, by circumstances which forced its hand,² to secure the conversion of Bulgaria. The inherent disastrousness of 'Caesaro-papism', which disclosed itself in this emergency, is thrown into relief by the fact that, in this affair as in others, the East Roman Government displayed its customary diplomatic moderation. A disastrous institution inexorably produced its inevitable effect in spite of a statesmanlike policy.

¹ On this point see further IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 523-4, below.

² The circumstances were that Orthodox Christendom now found itself involved, willy-nilly, in a competition with Western Christendom for the cultural allegiance of South-Eastern Europe. For the origins and outcome of this competition see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 605-10, below.

To begin with, the conversion of Bulgaria to Orthodox Christianity in A.D. 865¹ was brought about by an East Roman naval and military demonstration.² This misuse of political power for producing a religious effect was slight by comparison with the Thirty Years' War through which a Charlemagne had imposed a Western Christianity upon the Saxons. Moreover the East Roman Government actually gilded the pill by formally ceding to Bulgaria at the same moment a large slice of the Slav-infested no-man's-land between Salonica and Durazzo.³ Nevertheless the converted Bulgarian prince Boris reacted violently to even this tactful touch of an East Roman political whip; for, though he had been gently handled this time, Boris now saw himself exposed in perpetuity to the humiliation of being subject to an East Roman political discipline. One of the conditions of the Romano-Bulgarian treaty of A.D. 865 was that Bulgaria must accept the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Oecumenical Patriarchate.⁴ The implied acceptance of the political suzerainty of the Patriarch's Imperial master, by whom this condition was imposed, was both manifest and intolerable; and, finding himself thus politically as well as ecclesiastically bitted and spurred, the Bulgarian colt promptly kicked against the pricks. In 866, less than twelve months after the signature of the treaty, Boris broke it by transferring the ecclesiastical allegiance of Bulgaria from the Oecumenical Patriarchate to the Roman See. This Bulgarian adherence to the Papacy was maintained from 866 to 870; and though Boris voluntarily retransferred his allegiance to the Oecumenical Patriarchate in the latter year and persisted in this policy thereafter—even when the East Roman Emperor Basil I, with his tongue in his cheek, officially awarded Bulgaria to the Papal jurisdiction in 879⁵—this first Bulgarian attempt to escape

¹ A.D. 864-5 according to Dvorník, F.: *Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome au ix^e siècle* (Paris 1926, Champion), p. 187.

² Runciman, op. cit., pp. 103-4; Dvorník, op. cit., p. 187. Bulgaria was prostrated at the time by a famine, and she had no choice but to yield to the East Roman military demonstration—which was nominally a reprisal for a Bulgar foraging-raid into East Roman territory.

³ Runciman, op. cit., p. 105.

⁴ Runciman, op. cit., p. 106.

⁵ This Bulgarian experiment in allegiance to the Roman See is discussed further in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 605-10, below. The reasons for the abandonment of the experiment are obscure. Perhaps the fundamental reason was because the Western Christian culture had little or no prestige in Bulgaria by comparison with the Orthodox Christian culture. Within the horizon of a contemporary West European barbarian, Latin was the only known culture-language and the Papacy the greatest known cultural institution, and this monopoly gave the Roman Church an immense moral authority in dealing with its barbarian converts in Western Europe. The Papacy had not this advantage in Bulgaria, since in Bulgarian eyes the Roman See could not compare with the East Roman Empire as an institution, while the Latin medium of culture could not compare with the Greek. Ever since the Greek citizens of Adrianople had been carried away into captivity by the Bulgar Khan Krum in A.D. 813, the princes of Bulgaria, in the last phase of their paganism, had been using the services of Greek prisoners-of-war or renegades from the East Roman Empire to introduce them to the rudiments of material culture. The palaces which Krum and his son Omortag (*regnabat* A.D. 815-31)

the political implications of allegiance to the Oecumenical Patriarchate was ominous of evils to come.

Having surmounted the danger of a permanent ecclesiastical secession of Bulgaria from the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction to the Pope's, East Roman statesmanship showed its tact again by doing everything possible to make the mansion of Orthodox Christendom to which the Bulgarian prodigal had returned an agreeable place for him to live in. One of the last acts of the Emperor Basil I (*imperabat* A.D. 867-86) was to emphasize the one obvious amenity that the Constantinopolitan ecclesiastical connexion possessed and the Roman connexion lacked. He placed at Boris' disposal the Slavophone clergy who had been expelled from Moravia in A.D. 885;¹ and the *Ausgleich* between the Khan and the Emperor which was implied in this clever gesture of Imperial courtesy seems to have been tacitly accepted by Boris on his side. During the rest of his reign Boris occupied himself in building up a Slavophone Church in Bulgaria² under the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction; and though this work effectively closed the door upon any return to the Roman ecclesiastical connexion, Boris does not seem to have troubled himself any longer about the East Roman Imperial suzerainty which the Patriarch's jurisdiction constitutionally carried with it. Probably Boris felt that the separate individuality of Bulgaria was sufficiently vindicated *de facto* by the ecclesiastical use of a local vernacular instead of the Greek which was the East Roman language of state; and the fact that the new liturgical language of Bulgaria was the mother tongue of the Khan's alien Slav subjects, and not that of his own Turkish-speaking kinsmen and peers the Bulgar nobility, was no doubt an additional advantage in the eyes of a Bulgarian ruler who aspired to make himself as

built for themselves were designed by Greek architects, and the work was commemorated in Greek inscriptions (see Runciman, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-9). The city of Constantinople, too, exercised a fascination with which a dilapidated ninth-century Rome could not compete (Dvorník, *op. cit.*, p. 255). This cultural legacy from the days of Bulgarian paganism may have been the determining factor in the ecclesiastical policy of the Christian Khan Boris in A.D. 870 and A.D. 879 (see Dvorník, *op. cit.*, p. 264). Conversely, the attraction of an adjacent Western Christian culture may account for the anti-Methodian policy of the Moravian prince Rostislav's betrayer and supplanter Svatoopluk (Dvorník, *op. cit.*, p. 263).

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 608-9, below. These refugee clergy appear to have migrated from Constantinople to Bulgaria on their own initiative, though, of course, with the Emperor's consent (Dvorník, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-12).

² In this work Boris had the help, not only of the refugee Slavophone clergy who came to Bulgaria via Constantinople, but also of another band who came direct overland from Moravia (Dvorník, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-18). The leader of this latter band, Clement, was sent by Boris to the Far West of his dominions in the, by this date, predominantly Slavonic interior of Macedonia (Kutmičevica). Clement made his head-quarters at Ochrida; and from this base of operations he evangelized and civilized all the region round about. It will be seen that the country which Clement thus reclaimed from barbarism towards the close of the ninth century of the Christian Era was coincident with the Western Bulgaria which fought to the death against East Roman Imperialism in the Great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977-1019 (see pp. 390-1, below).

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complete an autocrat in Bulgaria as the Emperor was in the East Roman Empire.¹

By A.D. 889 Boris believed that his work was now sufficiently secure to warrant his abdicating. Four years later, when his eldest son and first successor, Vladímir, threatened to undo what he had done, Boris emerged from the cloister into which he had retired in order to save his work by deposing the betrayer of it. He seems to have made this crisis an occasion for practically completing the process of substituting the Slavonic tongue for Greek as the language of the Bulgarian Church;² and he did not retire into the cloister again until he had brought his third son Symeon out of it to reign in the unworthy Vladímir's stead.³ Boris, however, was unlucky in his choices of sons to succeed him. If in Vladímir he had 'caught a Tatar' whose one idea was to reconvert Bulgaria into an ephemeral Nomad empire *in partibus agrícolarum*,⁴ in his monk-son Symeon he was placing on the throne of Bulgaria a *Hemiargus* or 'semi-Greek' whose megalomania was to prove still more destructive to the Slavonic Christian body politic which Boris had built up.

Symeon had been brought up at Constantinople, where he had lived, apparently, in the Imperial Palace and had received his education not only in the school of Slavonic studies that had been founded by the Patriarch Photius, but also in the Greek academy that had been founded by the Caesar Bardas.⁵ When his father's intervention unexpectedly set the crown of Bulgaria upon Symeon's head, the new Khan at first attempted to find scope for his own Philhellenism, without departing from the Slavophil policy which his father had commissioned him to pursue, by promoting the translation of the Greek Classics—Pagan as well as Christian—into the new Slavonic literary medium. In the spate of translations which he churned out, Symeon at once revealed the demonic energy that was in him. This energy, however, could not find sufficient vent within the limits of a cultural field within which alone the father's narrow-verged common sense could be reconciled with the son's wider horizon and vaster ambition.⁶ The education of Symeon in the Imperial Palace at Constantinople had not been only literary;

¹ There is an acute discussion of Boris' policy from A.D. 886 onwards in Runciman, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–30.

² See Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

³ Boris' reintervention in politics in A.D. 893 is reminiscent of the régime of the series of 'Cloistered Emperors' who governed Japan behind the scenes, after a formal abdication from the throne and withdrawal into a monastery, from A.D. 1087 to A.D. 1156.

⁴ For the transitoriness of the dominion of 'the Desert' over 'the Sown' see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 22–8, above.

⁵ For this foundation see p. 345, above.

⁶ In his sense for *μὲν ἀγὰρ* and his cult of 'the Golden Mean' the Slavophil Boris showed himself a truer Hellenic in spirit than Symeon 'the semi-Greek'.

it had also been political. Besides imbibing a taste for the Greek classics, he had been captivated by 'the great idea' of a Hellenic universal state—an idea which had been raised from the dead and enshrined at Constantinople in the imposing political institution of the East Roman *Imperium Redivivum*. With the crown of Bulgaria on his head Symeon could not long avert his mind from politics, and as soon as he thought about politics he could not be content with the status—that had satisfied his father—of a Georgian or Abkhazian princeling. At the same time his father's Slavophilism and his own Philhellenism conspired to debar him from attaining the political sovereign independence upon which his heart was set by the expedient of reverting to his father's earlier policy and transferring his ecclesiastical allegiance from the Oecumenical Patriarchate to the Roman See. How, then, was Symeon to escape from the, to him, galling status of being the ecclesiastical subject of a political subject of the East Roman Emperor? Since the path to Rome was closed against him only one path remained open; and to take that path meant denouncing the tacit *modus vivendi* into which Boris had entered with Basil I and plunging Bulgaria into a war to the knife with her suzerain and neighbour; for the alternative path was the path to Constantinople. In the circumstances in which he found himself Symeon could only acquire his sovereign independence by using the throne of Bulgaria as a mounting-block for climbing on to the throne of the East Roman Empire itself. He could only escape from being the Patriarch's barbarian slave by becoming his Imperial master. Symeon's clearness of vision was matched by his audacity in choosing his course. He decided to bid for the Imperial Crown, and in taking this decision he signed the death-warrants not only of the kingdom which he possessed and of the empire which he coveted, but also of the society in which these two political institutions had their being.

This fatal ambition had probably not yet taken shape in Symeon's mind at the time when the East Roman Empire was the victim of his first war of aggression. The occasion of this war was commercial; its duration was only four years (A.D. 894-7); and in the matter of Bulgaria's frontiers with the East Roman Empire the peace settlement restored the territorial *status quo ante*. This first venture merely cost Symeon the Transdanubian half of his kingdom.¹ He might not have got off so lightly without the good offices

¹ The Bulgar Nomads were already masters of what are now the provinces of Bessarabia and Moldavia and Wallachia before they established their first footing south of the Danube, on former Roman soil, in A.D. 680. They acquired what is now Transylvania, together with the section of the Hungarian Alföld to the east of the Theiss, at the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries, when the Bulgar Khan Krum partitioned

384 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS of 'the Cloistered Emperor' his father, who was at that time still alive and still, no doubt, capable of giving sensible advice. Thereafter the death of the ex-Khan Boris in A.D. 907 removed a restraint, and the death of the East Roman Emperor Leo the Wise in 912 presented a temptation. In 913 Symeon launched his second war of aggression against the Empire; and this war, which lasted fifteen years (913-27), had far more serious consequences for both belligerents.

In the first year of these fifteen Symeon revealed his war-aim and came as near to attaining it as he was ever to come. In that campaign his offensive carried him to the walls of Constantinople; and before he withdrew he had obtained a promise that one of his own daughters should become the wife of the reigning Emperor, Constantine Porphyrogenitus. Since the Emperor was then a minor, the promise was made by the Oecumenical Patriarch Nicolaus, who was acting as regent. Apparently Symeon intended, when his daughter was installed as Augusta, to wrest the regency into his own hands and then, by an easy metamorphosis, to transform himself from regent into co-emperor.¹ But Symeon's plan miscarried; for the Patriarch's promise was promptly repudiated by the young Emperor's mother, who managed to snatch the reins of government out of the Patriarch's hands² almost immediately after Symeon's withdrawal to his own side of the frontier; and the opportunity, which Symeon had espied, for an unscrupulous man of action to acquire the Imperial title for himself, by way of the regency, was equally apparent to the East Roman Admiral of the Fleet, Romanus Lecapenus, who had the decisive advantage over Symeon of enjoying the freedom of the Imperial City. After taking his time and choosing his moment Romanus Lecapenus occupied the Imperial

the Avar Empire with Charlemagne. These Transdanubian possessions appear to have been retained substantially intact by Krum's successors on the Bulgarian throne till Symeon lost them as a consequence of the Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 894-7. The history of their loss was as follows. In 895 the East Roman Government called in the Magyar Nomads, from the Steppe beyond Bulgaria's north-eastern frontier, to attack the Bulgars in the rear; Symeon retorted by calling in, on his own side, the Pecheneg Nomads, who were treading on the Magyars' heels; the Magyars suffered a disastrous defeat under the combined Pecheneg and Bulgar attack, and were thereby driven to cross the Carpathians into the Alföld, where they acquired a new and permanent home, mainly at the expense of Moravia, but partly also at the expense of Bulgaria. Thereafter the Pechenegs distrained upon their late allies the Bulgars—who owed them handsome payment for their effective intervention against the Magyars—by occupying, for their part, the Bulgarian territories in Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia. (For the movements of the Pechenegs and the Magyars at this time see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 441-3, above.) This was the end of the Bulgars' Transdanubian empire. A critical examination of the interrelation, sequence, and dates of these events in the Eurasian hinterland of Bulgaria will be found in Macartney, C. A.: *The Magyars in the Ninth Century* (Cambridge 1930, University Press), pp. 177-88.

¹ For this interpretation of Symeon's stipulations in 913 see Runciman, op. cit., p. 157, with Appendix X.

² For the relations between the Oecumenical Patriarch Nicolaus, the East Roman Emperor Leo the Wise, and Leo's fourth wife Zoe Carbopsina, who was Constantine Porphyrogenitus's mother, see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 598-601, below.

Palace in the spring of 919; and before the calendar year was out he had married the young Emperor to a daughter of his own and had acquired the Imperial title for himself, while Symeon gnashed his teeth in the outer darkness. Therewith Symeon's last hope of achieving his war-aim was extinguished,¹ but nothing would induce him to stop the war, short of his own death; and that did not overtake him till eight years later.

Meanwhile the East Roman Government baffled its formidable Bulgarian adversary by adopting the strategy which had once been pursued by the Athenians, on Pericles' advice, in the first phase of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. In that Hellenic struggle the Athenians had effectively won the first round by making up their minds to leave at the enemy's mercy the open country of Attica and to stand on the defensive behind the impregnable fortifications that covered Athens and linked her with the Peiraeus and with the sea, whence they could draw unfailing supplies from an overseas empire which was beyond their Peloponnesian adversaries' reach. In the Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 913-27 the East Roman strategy was the same, *mutatis mutandis*. The East Roman Government allowed the Bulgarian armies to range almost at will over the continental European territories of the Empire up to the walls of Constantinople and Salonica and Durazzo,² while the East Roman land-forces stood on the defensive behind the walls of Constantinople and their other European maritime fortresses, and the East Roman Navy kept these fortresses supplied with the necessary provisions and at the same time covered and insulated the metropolitan provinces of the Empire in Anatolia.³

In the open country on the European side of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles the Imperial Government was chary of accepting battle except vicariously; but its vicarious counterstrokes were formidable. In the year 917, for instance, it unleashed against Symeon first the Pecheneg Nomads and then the Serbs: a Western Slav people who had lately been played upon by the radiation of Orthodox Christian culture at second-hand, through Bulgaria, and who were now persuaded, by East Roman diplomacy, to repay their Bulgarian benefactors with the same ingratitude that the Bulgars themselves were showing towards the Greeks. It was perhaps on this occasion that Bulgaria lost to the Pechenegs the last remnant of her Transdanubian possessions in Wallachia.⁴ The entry of

¹ Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

² In 916 Symeon seems to have penetrated as far as the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth (Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 159).

³ The East Roman Navy also insulated Symeon from his potential overseas ally the Fātimid Caliph in Ifriqiyah. For the importance, in this connexion, of the recent East Roman acquisitions in Southern Italy see p. 343, footnote 3, above.

⁴ Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 160, footnote 1.

Serbia into the lists was still more awkward for Symeon; for thenceforth he had to fight on two fronts, and although the Serbs were perpetually being defeated they were never put out of action. At the close of the campaigning season of 924 a parley between the principals¹ resulted in a truce between Bulgaria and the East Roman Empire. But even then Symeon could not bear to revert to the works of peace with which he had opened his reign. He simply diverted his military efforts from the south-eastern front to the north-western, and in 926 he succeeded, at last, in reducing Serbia to subjection; but this conquest merely tempted him in the same campaigning season to attack Serbia's sister and neighbour Croatia, and this last act of aggression brought upon the Bulgarian army an overwhelming and decisive defeat. Symeon died of it in the following year; and in the year of his death—A.D. 927—the Bulgaro-Roman truce of 924 was converted into a peace.

In this peace the East Roman Empire recovered the territorial *status quo ante* in exchange for an acquiescence in the constitutional *uti possidetis*; and this was a compromise for which the way had been prepared by Symeon himself during the last three years of his reign. Having despaired at last, in 924, of transforming himself into the Imperial master of the Oecumenical Patriarch by mounting the East Roman Throne at Constantinople, Symeon had resolved to secure his sovereign independence, as best he could, by assuming the Imperial title within the frontiers of his Bulgarian patrimony and then setting up a local Patriarch of his own. He had proclaimed himself 'Emperor of the Romans and Bulgars' in 925 and had proclaimed the Archbishop of Preslav Patriarch of the new Empire in the following year.² The East Roman Government had recognized neither of these acts, and had explicitly protested against the former of them; and thus at the opening of the peace negotiations of 927 the metamorphosis of the Bulgarian Khanate into a 'Romano-Bulgarian' Empire was only unilaterally a *fait accompli*. In exchange for securing the territorial integrity of the East Roman

¹ The parley took place just outside the walls of Constantinople on an extemporized pier which was run out into the Golden Horn off the Cosmidium (in the neighbourhood of the present suburb of Eyyüb). Symeon boarded this pier by land, the Emperor Romanus (with the Patriarch Nicolaus in his suite) by water. The negotiators parleyed over a wall, like Pyramus and Thisbe, or like the Emperors Napoleon and Alexander in their barge on the Thalweg of the River Niemen in A.D. 1807.

² This time-lag in Symeon's proclamation of a Bulgarian Patriarch is perhaps to be explained by the fact that during the greater part of the year 926 there was a Papal legate at Symeon's court. The Papacy—still hoping to secure Bulgaria's ecclesiastical allegiance—had been quick to recognize Symeon's Imperial title; and the legate had been sent to improve the occasion. Apparently the Papal Chancery had not realized that, instead of reopening the possibility of adherence to the Roman See, Symeon was closing it, once and for all, by formally laying claim to a 'Caesaro-papal' authority. The appointment of a Bulgarian Patriarch necessarily made Symeon's standpoint clear; and on this account, perhaps, the appointment was delayed until after the Papal legate's departure from Preslav (see Runciman, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-4).

Empire in Europe the East Roman Government now consented to perfect for Symeon's son and successor Peter the title which Symeon had unlawfully assumed. In the peace settlement of 927 the Constantinopolitan Chancery accorded to the son the recognition which had been withheld from the father. They made the unprecedented concession of gazetting Peter as an Emperor¹ and the Archbishop of the Bulgarian See of Dristra as a Patriarch independent of the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and supreme over the Orthodox Church within the Emperor Peter's dominions.² At the same time the new Bulgarian Emperor was given the East Roman Emperor Romanus's grand-daughter, Maria Lecapena, in marriage;³ an annual subsidy from the East Roman to the Bulgarian Treasury was arranged for under the 'face-saving' name of a paternal allowance to the Imperial bride; and the Bulgarian Ambassador at Constantinople was made, *ex officio*, the *doyen* of the diplomatic corps.⁴

The peace which was concluded on these terms lasted for forty years; yet in fact, though not in form, it was a mere prolongation of the truce of A.D. 924; for the circumstances in which it was made, and the principle on which it was based, precluded it, *a priori*, from becoming a permanent settlement. Like the tacit *Ausgleich* of A.D. 886 between the Khan Boris and the Emperor Basil I, the Romano-Bulgarian peace-treaty of A.D. 927 was a compromise—but with the fatal difference that the new compromise was not one that could work. Boris had been willing to shelve the delicate constitutional question of the relation in which he and the Emperor stood to one another in virtue of their respective relations to the Oecumenical Patriarch, while Basil on his side had been willing to let Bulgaria

¹ See Runciman, *op. cit.*, Appendix XI.

² Apparently the East Roman Chancery refused to recognize Symeon's Patriarch Leontius of Preslav; and, since Symeon himself was dead, the East Roman Government thus avoided recognizing either of Symeon's two unilateral usurpations of title as far as the original beneficiaries were concerned. The removal of the Bulgarian Patriarchate from the political capital at Preslav to the outlying city of Dristra also promised to weaken the Bulgarian Emperor's 'Caesaro-papal' authority. Just for this reason the Bulgarian Patriarchate seems to have been re-transferred from Dristra to Preslav before long; but the Patriarchs of Preslav never obtained East Roman recognition. (See Runciman, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-2.)

³ Since the Tsar Peter was at this time a minor under a regency, Romanus Lecapenus may have hoped in 927 to make himself master of the throne of his Bulgarian grandson-in-law, as Symeon in 913 had hoped to make himself master of the East Roman Throne by becoming the father-in-law of the young Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus. If so, this roundabout road to a throne proved a blind alley on this occasion as on that. The stakes on the two occasions were not, however, the same; for while it would have been an honour in itself for a Bulgarian princess to marry an East Roman Emperor, even if nothing practical came of it, the condescension involved in the marriage of an East Roman princess to a Bulgarian Tsar was so great that even the incorporation of Bulgaria into the East Roman Empire would hardly have compensated for it.

⁴ This status of the Bulgarian Ambassador at the Court of Constantinople gave umbrage to the Envoy of the Saxon Emperor of the West who visited Constantinople in A.D. 968 (see Liutprand of Cremona: *Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*, chaps. 11 and 18).

acquire her ecclesiastical autonomy, and retain her political independence, *de facto*. In A.D. 913, however, Symeon had destroyed this good understanding by insisting upon dragging out into the open the political implications of Bulgaria's submission to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarch. With tactless logic he had proclaimed the undeniable truth that any one who was a sheep in the Oecumenical Patriarch's flock must, *ipso facto*, be a political subject of the Patriarch's Imperial master; and he had gone on to translate this doctrine from the realm of theory into the realm of practical politics by waging a fifteen years' war on the strength of it. By A.D. 927 it had become impossible to thrust back the formidable problem which Symeon had raised into the oblivion in which Boris and Basil had sought to bury it in 886, and equally impossible to feign blindness to the true solution. It was now demonstrated that in Orthodox Christendom the jurisdictions of the East Roman Emperor and the Oecumenical Patriarch must be geographically coextensive; and, since Symeon had failed to bring about this necessary and inevitable state of affairs by his expedient of attempting to annex the Empire politically to the Patriarch's foreign ecclesiastical province of Bulgaria, it followed that sooner or later the indispensable political unification would have to be brought about by the inverse process of annexing Bulgaria to the Empire.

The further, and fiercer, Romano-Bulgarian war which this process would entail might be delayed by the compromise of duplicating both the Imperial and the Patriarchal office, but it could not be averted by this device, since the East Roman ghost of the Roman Empire was a universal and indivisible institution in its essence. Thus Symeon's act in 913 was ἀνήκεστον; from that time onwards the two leading states in the Orthodox Christian World were doomed to continue their struggle until one or other of them succumbed to a 'knock-out blow'; and on a superficial view it might seem as though this evil was brought upon Orthodox Christendom by Symeon's personal wrong-headedness. The fundamental cause of the disaster, however, was the 'Caesaro-papal' constitution of the East Roman Empire; for it was this that drove Symeon down the wrong path in the first instance and then made the consequences of his error irretrievable. Within the bosom of a single society there was not room, in perpetuity, for more than one 'totalitarian state'.

The peace of A.D. 927 did not last longer than the lifetime of the Bulgarian Tsar's East Roman wife Maria Lecapena, who had been re-christened Irene to signify the truth that the peace settlement was incarnate in her person. She died in 965; and thereupon Tsar Peter was persuaded to insult the East Roman Emperor Nicephorus

Phocas by demanding the continuance of Maria's annual allowance on the ground that it was a 'customary tribute'. Nicephorus retorted by making war upon Bulgaria in the East Roman Government's traditional vicarious fashion; he called in a barbarian—this time the Scandinavian prince Svyatoslav of Russia—to attack Peter in the rear; Peter replied by unleashing the Pechenegs against the Russians; and therewith the situation passed out of the control of both the Imperial Governments. The Pecheneg diversion was abortive, while the Russian menace was so formidable that Nicephorus was soon almost as terrified as Peter himself of the northern monster which the arts of East Roman diplomacy had too cleverly enticed out of its lair. In 969 the two Emperors put their own quarrel behind them and sought to arrange for a joint defence of their respective European possessions against the coming Russian avalanche. In the same year, however, both Emperors were overtaken by Death, and both Empires by Svyatoslav. In an autumn campaign Preslav, the Bulgarian capital, was captured, with the Bulgarian Imperial family inside it, by the Russian invaders; the Bulgarian Empire was swept out of existence; and the heart of Bulgaria between the south bank of the Danube and the Balkan Range, where the Bulgars had found their first footing on Roman soil nearly three hundred years back, now became a battle-field for Russian and East Roman armies.

The stake for which these foreign armies fought on Bulgarian soil was the dominion of the Balkan Peninsula, and this issue was decided in A.D. 972 in a single campaigning-season—at the end of which Svyatoslav found himself compelled to purchase a free retreat across the Danube at the price of leaving all his Bulgarian conquests in the hands of his East Roman conqueror, the Emperor John Tzimisces. The spoils of victory included not only the whole eastern portion of the territory of the Bulgarian Empire, but also the person of the reigning Bulgarian Emperor. At the celebration of John Tzimisces' triumph in Constantinople the Tsar Boris solemnly abdicated from his throne in the East Roman Emperor's favour; and John's first act in his new dominion was to extinguish the Bulgarian Patriarchate. The streets of Constantinople had not witnessed such an Imperial triumph as this since the last king of the Vandals had been led through them, captive, in A.D. 534; yet the words which the unhappy King Gelimir had been heard to repeat as he went through that agonizing ordeal—"Vanity of vanities", saith the Preacher, "Vanity of vanities; all is vanity"²—were not more applicable to Gelimir's humiliation than to Jus-

¹ The incident is recorded by Procopius: *A History of the Wars of Justinian*, Book IV, chap. 9.

² Eccl. i. 2.

tinian's triumph, and not more applicable to the triumph of Justinian than to that of John Tzimisces. Justinian's facile conquest of the Vandal Power in Africa in A.D. 533-4 had lured him into involving himself in his exhausting sixteen years' war of A.D. 537-53 with the Ostrogothic Power in Italy.¹ By a similar operation of 'the Envy of the Gods' the East Roman Emperor John Tzimisces' facile conquest of Eastern Bulgaria in A.D. 972 involved his ward and successor, Basil II, in a war with Western Bulgaria which lasted for forty-three years—from A.D. 977 to A.D. 1019—and wore out Orthodox Christendom.²

The Western Bulgarians found leadership in a new dynasty, which threw down the gauntlet to the conquerors of the Eastern Bulgarians in the symbolic gesture of re-establishing a Bulgarian Patriarchate; and the West Bulgarian Prince Samuel³ proved to be a man of the same stamp as his adversary the East Roman Emperor Basil 'the Bulgar-killer'. The struggle between these two ruthless and indomitable antagonists not only lasted nearly three times as long as the previous war between Tsar Symeon and the cautious regents of Basil's grandfather Constantine Porphyrogenitus; it was also vastly more destructive; for, while Samuel imitated Symeon's strategy of overrunning the whole interior of the Balkan Peninsula, Basil was not content to stand on the defensive; and, since Nicephorus Phocas' unfortunate Russian experiment had taught the East Roman Government to eschew the traditional policy of attacking Bulgaria by proxy, Basil's field operations were conducted, and the consequent losses were sustained, by the East Roman Imperial forces themselves.

During the first phase of the war Samuel pushed even farther afield than Symeon had penetrated before him. He not only recovered Eastern Bulgaria; he passed the Bulgarian frontiers of A.D. 927-69 and rounded off his dominions by conquering the East Roman fortresses of Larisa in Thessaly and Durazzo on the Adriatic. Like Symeon, however, he discovered that such conquests of the fringes of the enemy empire's territory could not bring the enemy to his knees nor the war to an end. The war became a war of attrition; and then Time worked inexorably in favour of the belligerent whose *potentiel de guerre* was the greater. Decade by decade Basil concentrated his strength more and more intensively upon the Bulgarian War and turned the screw tighter and tighter

¹ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 162, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 223, below.

² This disastrous effect of the Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977-1019 has been touched upon by anticipation in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, pp. 72-5, above.

³ The Imperial title does not appear to have been assumed by Samuel so long as he believed that any legitimate representative of the previous dynasty was alive. The event is to be dated *circa* A.D. 996-7—by which date Samuel had been ruler of Bulgaria for about twenty years *de facto* (Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 230).

upon Samuel. Between 990 and 1000 he succeeded in stemming the tide of Bulgarian invasion; in 1001 he set himself to win back Eastern Bulgaria; in 1003 he made his first attack on Macedonia, which was the seat of Samuel's power;¹ from 1006 onwards he wore down his opponent's strength in an unbroken series of annual campaigns which were proportionately costly to himself, since he was setting his troops the task of conquering and holding a wild country in which the enemy was at home, and in which the *terrain*, and the enemy's knowledge of the *terrain*, were formidable obstacles to an invader.

In the last phase of the war Basil's operations resembled Sherman's march through Georgia in A.D. 1864 or Sulla's devastation of Samnium in the years 81-80 B.C.² The conqueror was now striking not merely to kill but to annihilate. He advertised the spirit in which he intended to deliver the *coup de grâce* in his gruesome treatment of the fourteen or fifteen thousand prisoners whom he took at the Battle of the Pass of Cimbalongus in 1014. Out of every two hundred eyes he put out one hundred and ninety-nine, and then sent these companies of ninety-nine blind men with one-eyed leaders to find their way back to their prince. When they reached his presence Samuel died of the sight. In 1015 Basil momentarily occupied Ochrida, the fastness in the Macedonian Lake-Country which Samuel had selected for his political and ecclesiastical capital. But even the death of Samuel and the fall of Ochrida did not bring the end; Basil had to evacuate the dead Tsar's empty lair, and it was not till 1018 that the Bulgarian resistance utterly and irretrievably collapsed. The last and remotest Bulgarian fortress—Sir-mium, on the Save—did not fall till 1019. Therewith the problem which Symeon had unmasked in 913 was solved by Basil's complete attainment of an objective which was the exact inverse of Symeon's war-aim. The 'knock-out blow', which was the sole practicable means of eliminating one of two rival empire-builders, had at last been delivered; and, at the cost of a hundred years' war, the whole of Orthodox Christendom³ now found itself duly united under one Imperial rule; but the victim of these brutal politics was not the East Roman Empire which in Symeon's schemes had been cast for that appalling role. The victim in the event was Bulgaria herself.

In A.D. 1019 it seemed on the surface as though the East Roman

¹ For the geographical coincidence between Samuel's political domain and the ninth-century mission-field of Clement of Ochrida see p. 381, footnote 2, above.

² See the appalling account of Samnium as Sulla left it—and as Strabo still saw it, the better part of a century later—in Strabo's *Geographica*, Book V, pp. 249-50, which is cited again in V. C (i) (c) 1, vol. v, p. 37, below.

³ With the exception of Russia; but Russia had been converted only in A.D. 989 (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 352-3, above).

Empire were completely triumphant and Bulgaria completely prostrate. Bulgaria had, in fact, disappeared from the political map, while the victorious Power was attaining an undreamed-of territorial extension. There was a moment towards the middle of the eleventh century¹ when the dominions of the East Roman Government stretched not only, as before, from the Caucasus to Calabria, but from the Euphrates to the Danube and from Armenia to Croatia. The political map, however, was no index of the social situation. It was a pretentious superstructure erected on rotten foundations; and, although to contemporary eyes this eleventh-century East Roman pile was imposing, it betrays, instead of masking, the underlying rottenness to the eye of a latter-day historian who commands the advantage of being able to survey it in retrospect with a knowledge of its whole story. To the instructed eye this overgrown and top-heavy pile, so far from being a tower of strength, is an architectural enormity which proclaims the imminence of its own collapse. When the crash did come in A.D. 1071,² it seemed to the minds of the astonished and awe-stricken spectators to be an inexplicable act of God. Within little more than fifty years of Basil's crushing victory over Bulgaria the victims' fate had overtaken the victors! In the historian's reckoning, on the other hand, it is the length, rather than the shortness, of the interval between the Bulgarian and the East Roman collapse that is a matter for surprise; for both catastrophes, as the historian sees the picture, were consequences—and inevitable consequences—of the Great Romano-Bulgarian Hundred Years' War. It is only surprising that the East Roman victim of that jointly inflicted and jointly suffered calamity should have been able to stave off its doom for half a century longer than its Bulgarian antagonist in an internecine conflict. On this reckoning the historian is not surprised to find that, when the East Roman Empire met its fate at last, it displayed considerably less capacity than Bulgaria for recuperation.

The substantial recuperation which Bulgaria did, in truth, achieve is vouched for by a fact which we have had occasion to notice in a different context. We have seen³ that, between the conversion of Bulgaria to Orthodox Christianity in A.D. 864-70 and the occupation of the interior of Anatolia by the Saljūq Turkish converts to Islam in A.D. 1070-5, the centre of gravity of Orthodox Christen-

¹ It would be misleading to single out any particular year as the date of the East Roman Empire's territorial zenith, since the Empire's losses in Apulia began as early as A.D. 1040, when the Norman and North Lombard mercenaries who had just returned from Maniakis' Sicilian Expedition revolted against the East Roman authorities and occupied Melfi, while at the other extremity of the Orthodox Christian World the Empire's gains in Armenia did not attain their maximum extent until A.D. 1046.

² The year in which Bari was captured by the Normans and the Emperor Romanus Diogenes was taken prisoner by the Saljūqs at Manzikert.

³ In II. D (iii), vol. II, p. 79, above.

dom—leaving its Russian offshoot out of account—perceptibly shifted from the Asiatic to the European side of the Straits. Inasmuch as Bulgaria had come to occupy the lion's share of the Orthodox Christian domain in the Balkan Peninsula while Anatolia had been the heart of the East Roman Empire as originally constituted by the work of Leo Syrus, this migration of the citadel of the Orthodox Christian Civilization from Anatolia to the Balkans in the course of those two centuries can have only one meaning. It must mean that, in spite of superficial appearances, Bulgaria really came off less badly than the East Roman Empire in the Hundred Years' War of A.D. 913-1019, and that the true victim was the official victor.

This contrast between the respective experiences of the East Roman Empire and Bulgaria, in and after their Hundred Years' War, is one example of a social 'law' which comes into play in conflicts in which the antagonists are not on an equality in their level of civilization. In such a conflict the less civilized combatant is apt to suffer egregious defeats and to show an extraordinary capacity for surviving them, while his more civilized opponent is apt to have the inverse experience of winning brilliant victories and then emerging exhausted from a struggle which, 'on points', has gone entirely in his favour. This 'law' operates because progress in civilization brings with it an enhancement of power to put material and spiritual 'drive' into any action by mobilizing and expending, at any moment and for any purpose, an ever greater proportion of the individual's or community's or society's total skill and energy and strength. In creative or constructive enterprises this gift tells, of course, wholly in its possessor's favour and thereby becomes the cause of further progress, besides being the reward of progress already achieved. But, like all great gifts of the Gods, this enhanced capacity for effective action is an edged tool which may be used at will for either good or evil by the creature in whose hands it has been placed; and its potentialities for evil are let loose as soon as it is employed on a destructive activity like War. When thus employed, the gift does not lose its potency; like some jinn that is constrained to execute blindly the behests of any mortal that happens to have power over the magic talisman, this gift of stronger driving-power, which comes with higher civilization, cannot fail, for evil or for good, to produce its inevitable effect; but when it produces this for evil it brings down an ironic punishment upon the head of the misguided mortal who has misused the gift for that illegitimate purpose. By enabling him to excel in destruction his driving-power condemns him to destroy himself; and therefore, when destruction is the order of the day, the least efficient man of

action comes off the best. An ineffectiveness which may have hindered him from soaring skywards now changes from a handicap into a safeguard that checks the impetus of his fall towards the abyss.

In our own world in our own day the working of this 'law' has been illustrated by the difference in the experience of the several Powers that came out on the losing side in the General War of 1914-18; for the losers numbered among them both the most and the least highly organized of the belligerents, and their fortunes have differed in accordance with this difference in degree of *Aktionsfähigkeit*. Of all the belligerents Germany had carried the art of mobilizing social resources for military purposes to the greatest lengths; and from 1914 to 1918 it was Germany who won the signal victories, while the signal defeats were suffered by Turkey and Russia, two belligerents who were imperfectly naturalized aliens in the Western World, and who were therefore weak vessels for waging war according to Western standards. In the next chapter, however, the roles were reversed; for in 1918 Germany, who for four years had been astonishing the World by her striking-power, excited still greater astonishment by her sudden and complete collapse, while from 1919 to 1922 the Turks and the Russians, who had long since been 'counted out' by the spectators of the conflict, produced a sensation in the opposite sense by posthumously retrieving their previous reverses. At a time when Germany was utterly incapable of taking up arms again and was playing the traditional Turkish role of being 'the Sick Man of Europe', the Turks and the Russians were each doggedly fighting a 'war after the war' against the officially victorious 'Allied and Associated Powers'; and moreover they were actually getting the better of it against adversaries who were almost as highly organized for War, and therefore almost as deeply exhausted by four years of fighting, as Germany herself. If we draw an analogy between the war of 1914-18 and the war of 913-1019 and equate the East Roman Empire with Germany, and Bulgaria with Russia or Turkey, the sequel in this case will become as comprehensible as it is in the comparable case of which we ourselves have been first-hand witnesses.

While Bulgaria lived to make abortive attempts to throw off the East Roman yoke in A.D. 1040 and 1073, and a successful attempt in 1186,¹ the East Roman Empire failed to recover from the social

¹ In an impartial attempt to account for Bulgaria's recuperation after the war of A.D. 913-1019 the entire credit cannot be given to the relative simplicity of the Orthodox Christian culture in Bulgaria at the time of this ordeal. Some credit is also due to the moderation which Basil 'the Bulgar-killer' showed in taking advantage of the victory which he had won by such ruthless methods. Though Basil annexed Bulgaria to the

disorders which it had brought upon itself through its demonic pursuit of military victory. The deep derangement, in this age, of Orthodox Christian life within the East Roman frontiers revealed itself in the outbreak and progress of two maladies which interacted disastrously with one another. The first malady was an agrarian crisis;¹ the second was a bout of militarism; and both were portents, because they were complaints from which the Orthodox Christian body social had been singularly free in the days of its good health.

When the nascent Orthodox Christian Civilization had emerged from the post-Hellenic interregnum at the turn of the seventh and eighth centuries of the Christian Era, it had started life in possession of one immensely valuable social asset which it owed to the very destructiveness of the foregoing age of anarchy. The legislation of the eighth-century East Roman Emperors Leo Syrus and his son Constantine V shows that Orthodox Christendom in their day was very much freer than the contemporary West from that concentration of the ownership of land, and consequent polarization of agrarian society into a handful of magnates and a multitude of serfs, which had been one of the mortal diseases of the moribund Hellenic Civilization in the last days of the Roman Empire. The agrarian life of eighth-century Orthodox Christendom, as mirrored in these contemporary legal texts, bears no resemblance to the social landscape of the Greek-speaking provinces of the Roman Empire in the Age of Justinian. And this breach of continuity was salutary, since it was followed by a new start. The young Orthodox Christian Society that here comes into view is not a world of serfs and magnates but a world of free peasants living in village communities. This healthy agrarian foundation was doubtless one of the causes of the rapid growth which the Orthodox Christian Civilization achieved during the next two hundred years; but with

East Roman Empire outright, he refrained from attempting to assimilate his new dominions to his old dominions administratively. For example, the taxpayers in the *ci-devant* Bulgarian territories were still allowed to pay their taxes in kind, as they had paid them to Symeon and to Samuel, instead of being forced into the East Roman money economy. In the ecclesiastical sphere, again, the reigning Bulgarian Patriarch at Ochrida was simply degraded from the rank of a Patriarch to that of an Archbishop without either losing his see or being deprived of his autonomy or being compelled to abandon the Slavonic in favour of the Greek Liturgy. The acts of A.D. 886 and 926 and 927 were not undone; and under an East Roman domination which lasted for more than a century and a half the Orthodox Church in Western Bulgaria remained Slavonic in its language and exempt in its government from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. (The Oecumenical Patriarchate had to wait for Mehmed the Conqueror to invest it with that cure of West Bulgarian souls which was not entrusted to it by Basil 'the Bulgar-killer'!) In the third place the victorious Power showed its generosity towards the conquered by throwing open the East Roman régime public service to the Bulgarian nobility. Thus the liberality of the East Roman régime played an honourable part in keeping Bulgaria alive under an East Roman yoke. (This point has been touched upon, by anticipation, on p. 344, footnote 2, above.)

¹ This has been touched upon by anticipation in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, pp. 72-3, above.

the outbreak of war between the East Roman Empire and Bulgaria in 913 a sinister change begins to show itself.

In the legislation dating from the reign of Tsar Symeon's East Roman contemporary Romanus Lecapenus (*imperabat* A.D. 919-44) a novel and conspicuous feature appears in a series of repeated (and therefore presumably abortive) enactments for protecting the small freeholder against the encroachments of the great proprietor. If legislation may be taken as evidence for social facts, we may infer that the evil of *latifundia* was now making its appearance in Eastern and Central Anatolia for the first time since the Roman Emperor Justinian I had legislated against the great landed proprietors of Cappadocia;¹ and it can hardly be an accident that the agrarian laws of both Justinian and Lecapenus date from a time at which the legislating Government was engaged in an exhausting foreign war. One of the commonest social effects of War upon the internal economy of a belligerent country is to produce a maldistribution of wealth or to aggravate a maldistribution that already exists. Classic examples are the effect of the Hannibalic War and its aftermath upon the agrarian economy of Roman Italy,² and the effect of the life-and-death struggle with the Danes upon the agrarian economy of the English Kingdom of Wessex.³ The corresponding effect of War in an industrial society is exemplified in the social consequences of the General War of 1914-18, which stare our own generation in the face. On this showing, we may confidently make the sometimes hazardous inference *post hoc propter hoc* in guessing at the relation between the Romano-Bulgarian War of 913-27 and the agrarian legislation of Romanus Lecapenus. We may assume that the relation is one of cause and effect; and we shall be fortified in this view when we find that the longer and more exhausting war of 977-1019 was accompanied, in the internal life of the East Roman Empire, by more violent symptoms of agrarian *malaise*.

In the earlier phases of that war the Emperor Basil was repeatedly diverted from his proper business of killing Bulgars in the Balkan Peninsula through being called away to put down insurrections raised by his own East Roman magnates in Anatolia. The rebellion of Bardas Sclerus in A.D. 976-9 was followed by that of his conqueror, Bardas Phocas, in 987-9; and Bardas Sclerus, who had joined forces on this occasion with his former opponent in order to revolt for the second time, kept up a guerrilla warfare after the defeat and death of his momentary ally until Basil was constrained

¹ The record of Justinian's attack on the Cappadocian *latifundia* is preserved in Novella 30 (44), 5, edition of Zachariä von Lingenthal (Leipzig 1881, Teubner, 2 vols. + 2 appendices), vol. I, p. 268, cited by Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 207-8.

² See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 170-1, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), in the present volume, pp. 507-8, below.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 200, above.

to purchase his capitulation at the price of an amnesty. This flagrant treachery on the part of subjects who cannot have been unaware of the gravity of the foreign war on which the Emperor was then engaged is only to be explained by supposing that, for them, the struggle in the interior of the Empire had become an issue of greater moment than the conflict with Bulgaria. These Anatolian magnates were tempted into rebellion by the prospect of being able to defeat the Imperial Government's hostile agrarian policy at a moment when the Government's strength was being strained by the task of coping with graver troubles at the opposite extremity of its dominions; and it is possible that the rebels were not only tempted into taking up arms by the Government's distress, but were also goaded into rebellion by fresh turns of the governmental screw, imprudences into which the East Roman Government may have been driven by its desperate need of raising additional supplies in order to meet the costs of the first-class war which it was waging at the time in Europe. The worst possible forebodings of the defeated rebels were assuredly fulfilled by Basil's agrarian law of A.D. 996.

Whatever may have been the precise relation between these formidable rebellions in Anatolia and the inexorable pressure of the Great Bulgarian War, the sequel proves conclusively that a Basilios Bulgaroctonus brought the East Roman Empire to disaster by emulating a gross error of statesmanship which had once been committed by a Justinianus Gothicus¹ with similarly disastrous consequences for the universal state that was the East Roman Empire's prototype. In order to achieve an ephemeral conquest of Italy Justinian remorselessly ate out the heart of Illyricum, a region which was of vastly greater value than Italy to the later Roman Empire because it was an irreplaceable recruiting-ground of the Roman Army. This Illyrian recruiting-ground suffered even more cruelly from Justinian's Great Gothic War than the Italian battlefield. The drafts required to replace the casualties on the other side of the Adriatic drained Illyricum of its manhood; and in A.D. 550 some of the last of the Illyrian reserves had to turn aside, when they were on the march to their Italian grave, in order to rap over the knuckles the importunate interloping barbarians, who were in such a hurry to fill the doomed Illyrian peasantry's place that they could not even bring themselves to linger discreetly on the farther bank of the Danube until the last of the race which they were supplanting had been drummed away to die by the perverse ambition of an unpaternal Government. The penalty which the

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 326-8 and 390, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 223-5, below.

Roman Empire paid for Justinian's ephemeral reconquest of Italy was a permanent occupation of the Balkan Peninsula, from Danube to Taygetus, by the barbarian Slavs. In the history of the East Roman Empire the conquest of Bulgaria had a corresponding sequel.

In the East Roman Empire's structure the role which had been played by Illyricum in Roman history from the reign of Probus to the reign of Justinian I was played, from the reign of Leo Syrus to the reign of Basil II, by the Anatolic and Armeniac army-corps districts in Central and Eastern Anatolia. This was the region which was the recruiting-ground of the East Roman Army during the three centuries ending with the Romano-Bulgarian War of 977-1019; and here again the fate which overtook this uniquely valuable region half a century later gives the measure of the sacrifice that a barren victory exacted. As the heart of Illyricum had been occupied in the sixth century by the Slavs, so the heart of Anatolia was occupied in the eleventh century by the Turks; and in this case, as in that, the occupation was permanent. The East Roman Government never succeeded in winning this vital territory back; and the failure is not to be attributed wholly to the prowess of the Saljūq intruders. There is some evidence¹ that the Saljūqs' notable success in holding for the next two centuries the greater part of the Anatolian ground which they had won at a stroke in A.D. 1070-5 was partly due to the sympathy and support that these aliens received from the local remnants of the Anatolian peasantry. These Anatolian victims of Basil 'the Bulgar-killer's' Balkan ambitions² apparently found the Saljūq whips a lighter chastisement than the Imperial scorpions by which they had been tormented for some hundred and fifty years by the time of the Saljūqs' arrival. At any rate, this previously Greek-speaking Orthodox Christian peasantry turned Turk, and turned Muslim, *en masse*;³ and their

¹ This evidence is discussed by Ramsay, Sir W. M., in op. cit. infra, pp. 23-34.

² The peasantry of Eastern and Central Anatolia were the victims not only of Basil II but of Leo Syrus; for it was on their shoulders that the dead weight of Leo's reconstructed Roman Empire ultimately rested. This story has repeated itself in the history of the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom, where, again, the peasantry has had to bear the burden of the political structure erected by Peter the Great. In this case, as in that, an ambitious political structure, recklessly piled up upon inadequate foundations, has turned into a crushing social incubus from which the society that has been cursed with it has only been liberated by a catastrophic collapse. Thus the main incident in the tragedy of Orthodox Christian history has repeated itself with singular exactness. Yet there is no evidence that Peter's fatally successful essay in state-building was inspired by Leo's. Leo's model was the Roman Empire, while Peter borrowed his 'totalitarian state', 'Caesaro-papism' and all (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 283, footnote 2, above), from the contemporary West. For the Protestant inspiration of the Petrine institution of the Holy Synod see Masaryk, T. G.: *The Spirit of Russia* (London 1919, Allen & Unwin, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 61-4.

³ For the progress, in Anatolia, of the Turkish language and the Islamic religion, at the expense of the Greek language and of Orthodox Christianity, from the eleventh century to the present day, see Wächter, A.: *Der Verfall des Griechentums in Kleinasien im xiv. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig 1903, Teubner); Ramsay, Sir W. M.: *The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor: Some of its Causes and Effects* (Oxford 1917, University Press);

wholesale cultural and religious apostasy suggests that before ever their new Turkish masters appeared on the scene they had become spiritually alienated not only from the East Roman political régime, but also from the Orthodox Christian Civilization upon which the East Roman Empire had imposed itself as a crushing incubus.¹

If the East Roman agrarian crisis, which was one of the two social maladies brought on by the conflict with Bulgaria, had this utterly disastrous denouement, the extremeness of the disaster is perhaps partly to be accounted for by the fact that the agrarian evil was accentuated by the accompanying malady of militarism.

As though the economic and social strain of the Great Bulgarian War upon the heart of the East Roman Empire were not enough, the East Roman Government, which had originally been drawn into the conflict in the Balkans against its own will by Symeon's megalomania, so radically changed its policy that before the first round of its life-and-death struggle with Bulgaria was over it had deliberately embarked on a course of military aggression against its Muslim neighbours on its opposite frontier.

In A.D. 926, on the morrow of the Romano-Bulgarian truce of 924—without waiting for the definite conclusion of peace, which did not follow till 927—the Emperor Romanus Lecapenus sent part of his army to win territory on the Euphrates from a foundering 'Abbasid Caliphate. The war of conquest which was thus opened on the Empire's south-eastern frontier was carried on systematically by Romanus's general John Curcuas from A.D. 926 to 944;²

Dawkins, R. M.: *Modern Greek in Asia Minor* (Cambridge 1916, University Press). In the present Study this problem has been touched upon, by anticipation, in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, in the present volume, p. 75, above.

¹ The success of the Slavs and the Bulgars in holding their own permanently in the Balkan Peninsula is perhaps likewise partly to be explained by a similar fraternization, there, between the barbarian interlopers and the local remnant of the provincials—in this case the Latinized Illyrians and Thracians whose survival is attested by the existence of their latter-day representatives, the Balkan 'Diaspora' of Romance-speaking Vlachs. That the ancestors of the Vlachs did fraternize with the Slavs and Bulgars who drifted into the depopulated tracts of the *ci-devant* Illyricum is suggested by the remarkable fact that when—some 600 years after the arrival of the Slavs, and 500 years after the arrival of the Bulgars—Basil 'the Bulgar-killer's' work was undone by the emergence of a Balkan 'successor-state' of the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1186, the foundation of this new polity was the joint achievement of the Bulgars and the Vlachs—so much so that the names of both peoples figured, side by side, in the new Balkan Empire's official style and title. This persistent importance of the Vlachs in Bulgaria raises the question whether they may not actually have given two sovereigns to the Bulgarian state in an earlier chapter of Bulgarian history. In the interval between the extinction of the House of Attila in A.D. 739 and the foundation of the Dynasty of Krum in the last years of the eighth century, two of the ephemeral occupants of the Bulgarian Throne respectively bore the names of Sabinus and Paganus. Were these Latin-speaking Illyrian renegades? Or is the Latin appearance of the two names accidental? Paganus, for example, may be an elegant version of a perfectly good Eurasian Nomad name which was borne, five centuries later, by the Mongol Bayan. Names are seldom good evidence in themselves, and yet this pair of names is intriguing. We may perhaps feel greater confidence in suggesting a Latin etymology (Cimbalongus = Campus Longus) for the name of the Macedonian battlefield of A.D. 1014 (see p. 391, above).

² The cultural effects of Curcuas' conquest, in A.D. 928, of the 'Abbasid Empire's Melitenian march are examined in V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 254–8, below.

and it was subsequently extended to other sectors of the Islamic front by the Emperor Nicephorus Phocas, who conquered Crete in 961,¹ Cilicia in 965, and Northern Syria in 969. John Tzimiskes had no sooner dealt with the Russian peril in the Balkans than he turned his attention to the Syrian front and spent the last years (A.D. 973-6) of his short reign on Syrian campaigns. Even Basil II—who might have been expected to feel that killing Bulgars with one hand and putting down Anatolian rebels with the other was as heavy a tax as he could venture to impose upon his Empire's military strength—did not hesitate to spend still more East Roman blood and treasure on making unprofitable military demonstrations in Syria in 995 and 999. Thereafter, when the Great Bulgarian War had been ended at last—at the terrible cost that has been indicated—by the 'knock-out blow' of A.D. 1018-9, this tardy relief from one military commitment seems only to have sent the East Roman military mind of that generation in search of fresh military adventures in new quarters. One of the last acts of Basil's reign was an abortive expedition against the Muslims of Sicily in 1025; and this was followed up by a naval war against the Muslims of both Sicily and Ifriqiyyah in 1032-5 and by a further attempt to conquer Sicily in 1038-40. This ambitious policy of expansion on the south-west was matched on the north-east by the annexation, between A.D. 1021 and 1046, of one after another of the Monophysite Christian 'successor-states' of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Armenia.

Of all these offensive military operations against the Syriac World along a maritime and continental front that extended from Tunisian waters to the threshold of Azerbaijan, the only two that were perhaps justifiable on political and social grounds were the Emperor Nicephorus's conquests of Crete and Cilicia. In capturing Candia and Tarsus the East Roman conqueror was smoking out two hornets' nests from which the East Roman Empire had been systematically and persistently raided.² But in pressing on across the Amanus to conquer Antioch and establish an East Roman protectorate over Aleppo Nicephorus was simply adding to the liabilities of the Empire by burdening it with a new dominion which was as extensive, and as dangerously exposed to invasion from the interior of the continent, as the new dominion which Basil I and Leo the

¹ Unlike the previous conquests of John Curcuas and the other conquests of Nicephorus Phocas at the Muslims' expense, Crete was not a province of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. It was a *ci-devant* East Roman possession which had been captured in A.D. 823 by Muslim pirates from Andalusia. Before Nicephorus's successful expedition to Crete in 961 there had been an abortive attempt to reconquer the island in 949.

² For the regular half-yearly spring and autumn raids upon Anatolia which were carried out from a base of operations at Tarsus see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 368, with footnote 1. The Andalusian pirates of Candia infested the coasts and islands of the Aegean.

Wise had acquired in Southern Italy—and this without any of the political and strategic necessity which had justified that earlier forward move in that other quarter.¹ As for the Sicilian and Asiatic military adventures of Basil 'the Bulgar-killer' and his successors in the government of the East Roman Empire during the second quarter of the eleventh century, they were directly responsible for the crash of A.D. 1071. In weakening or overthrowing the Muslim 'successor-states' of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Syria and its Monophysite 'successor-states' in Armenia, this East Roman militarism was simply filling valleys and levelling hills in order to prepare the way for the Saljūq and make straight his paths² towards the empty spaces that were awaiting his advent in the rotten heart of an Orthodox Christian Anatolia. Similarly, in attempting to conquer Sicily, the same militarism, with the same perversity, was creating an opportunity for the Normans to seize the East Roman provinces of Laghovahdhia and Calabria, with the Muslim island into the bargain.

The forward policy which was pursued by the East Roman Government in this quarter from 1025 to 1040 was particularly wanton, because it was embarked upon after the Government had received a series of plain warnings that it had more than enough on its hands here as it was. The first warning was the resumption of African Muslim piratical raids.³ Bari itself, after having enjoyed more than a century of immunity, was raided in 988 and again in 1003, and on the latter occasion it was only saved by the intervention of the Venetians,⁴ while it required Pisan assistance to enable the East Roman fleet to defeat its Muslim adversaries off Reggio in 1006.⁵ A further, and still plainer, warning was given by the abortive revolt of the Empire's Apulian Lombard subject Melo at Bari in 1009, and by the fugitive's unsuccessful incursion into Apulia in 1017-18 at the head of a band of Norman mercenaries. For though, once again, the East Roman authorities in Italy were able to repel and punish the assault to which they had been subjected, this assault would scarcely have been attempted if in this quarter the East Roman Power had not been inviting attack by its palpable weakness. Yet, heedless of these warnings, the East Roman Government embarked upon the

¹ For the considerations which were probably in the minds of the East Roman statesmen who were responsible for the forward policy in Italy at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries, see p. 343, above.

² Luke iii. 4-5. See further V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 247, below.

³ This is interpreted by Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 367, as evidence that the East Roman Empire in its South Italian extremity was already suffering from overstrain.

⁴ In or after A.D. 998 Basil II appears to have officially transferred to Venice—which at that time still acknowledged the East Roman Government's suzerainty—the task of policing the Adriatic, with the commercial and political perquisites which this duty carried with it.

⁵ For these naval operations see Gay, *op. cit.*, pp. 368-9.

Sicilian expedition of 1038-40; and it was from this that its Italian disasters arose. The beginning of the end of the East Roman dominion in Apulia was the simultaneous revolt in 1040 of the Apulian subjects of the Empire who were being called upon to supply a fresh draft of conscripts for the Sicilian War,¹ and of the North Lombard and Norman mercenaries² who had returned from the Sicilian war-zone exasperated at the discipline to which they had been subjected there.³

It will be seen that the militarism which made its appearance with the launching of John Curcuas' Asiatic offensive in A.D. 926, and which went on gathering impetus till it was pulled up short, a century and a half later, by the crash of A.D. 1071, was as fatal to East Roman interests as it was foreign to East Roman tradition. How are we to account for this innovation, which involved not only a change of policy but also a change of *ethos*?

The mere change of policy can perhaps be accounted for sufficiently by the temptation which was offered to East Roman ambitions in the spectacle of the decrepitude of the 'Abbasid Power from the early decades of the tenth century onwards. It was the urgency and imminence of the Arab Muslim pressure that had called the East Roman Empire into existence two hundred years back.⁴ Through two centuries of almost unintermittent warfare the Empire had stood the strain and, in standing it, had been the salvation of Orthodox Christendom. Now that the pressure was relaxing—now that the mighty Syriac Power which had so long overshadowed Orthodox Christendom and battered at the Empire's

¹ They revolted under the leadership of Melo's Byzantinized son Argyrus, who made himself master of Bari in 1040 without repudiating his allegiance to the East Roman Empire.

² One of the North Lombard mercenaries who were recruited for the East Roman Government's Sicilian expedition of A.D. 1038-40 was the father of the future philosopher John Italus (see p. 358, footnote 3, above).

³ The story of the quarrel, during the East Roman expedition against Sicily in A.D. 1038-40, between the East Roman commander Maniakēs and the Milanese condottiere Ardwin, with the sequel in which Ardwin revenges himself by raising an Apulian revolt and bringing in the Normans to help him, is singularly reminiscent, point for point, of the Herodotean account of the quarrel, during the Achaemenian expedition against Naxos circa 499 B.C., between the Achaemenian commander Megabates and the Milesian despot Aristagoras, with the similar sequel in which Aristagoras likewise revenges himself by raising an Ionian revolt and procuring the help of the Athenians. (Compare Gay, *op. cit.*, pp. 452-5, with Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 28-38.)

⁴ For this explanation of the genesis of the East Roman Empire see II. D (vii), pp. 368-9, above, and Part IX, below. Compare the history of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, which was called into existence by the pressure of the Ottoman Power upon Western Christendom and which then momentarily expanded at the Ottoman Empire's expense as the Ottoman pressure relaxed—only to fall to pieces in the same catastrophe that carried the break-up of the Ottoman Empire to its completion (see II. D (v), vol. II, pp. 177-88, above). Just as the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy failed to outlive the Ottoman Power whose aggressiveness had been its *raison d'être*, so the East Roman Empire lost its social health and its moral balance as soon as the 'Abbasid Power collapsed—with the result that the East Roman Empire too became a prey for the Latin and Turkish kites who had been attracted, from west and east, by the 'Abbasid Empire's carcass.

gates was itself breaking into fragments—was the Empire to refrain from reaping the fruits of its long endurance? Was it to neglect the opportunity, which had come at last, of turning the tables? It must be admitted that the East Roman counter-offensive was what was to be expected from human nature; yet this general explanation does not altogether meet this special case; for during the two centuries beginning with the accession of Leo Syrus the East Roman Government's statesmanship had consistently shown itself superhuman—or inhuman—in its moderation. The change of policy cannot be fully comprehended unless we can also account for the implied change of *ethos*; and we can, in fact, account for this by observing that a new social element was brought into power at Constantinople by the new Bulgarian peril. Though the Bulgar Khan Symeon could not attain the East Roman Throne himself, he could, and did, unintentionally enable the East Roman naval officer Romanus Lecapenus to seat himself upon it. It was this crowned naval officer who initiated the militarist policy that was inaugurated by the Asiatic campaigns of A.D. 926–44, and it was a pair of crowned military officers—Nicephorus Phocas (*imperabat* A.D. 963–9) and John Tzimiskes (*imperabat* A.D. 969–76)—who carried the new policy farther. Both these latter Emperors had the East Roman military tradition in their bones. The Anatolian magnate Phocas was a grandson of the Nicephorus Phocas who had conquered Southern Italy for Leo the Wise in 885, and a nephew of a Leo Phocas who had been defeated by Khan Symeon on the Achelous in 917. The Armenian soldier-of-fortune John Tzimiskes was a great-nephew of John Curcuas. And Basil 'the Bulgar-killer', whose long reign immediately succeeded the successive short reigns of these two military usurpers, proved to be the one representative of his dynasty who was imbued with the military spirit.¹ Thus for sixty-two years—from 963 to 1025—the East Roman Empire was in military hands;² and the new penchant towards militarism, which was imparted to the Imperial policy under this régime, persisted thereafter by sheer momentum³ until it carried the Empire into irretrievable disaster.

¹ This spirit did not reveal itself in Basil till A.D. 985, when the Emperor was twenty-seven years old and had already been officially sole master of the Empire for ten years (since the death of John Tzimiskes in 976). A conspiracy which threatened his tenure of the Imperial throne in 985 appears to have had the psychological effect on Basil of transforming him from an ostensibly frivolous and idle young man into an ascetic autocrat and an untiring professional soldier.

² The only break in the continuity of this long military régime was the first decade of the sole reign of Basil (see the preceding footnote); but even this decade was a time of war, since the forty-three years' struggle between the East Roman Empire and the West-Bulgarian war-lord Samuel of Ochrida began in A.D. 977.

³ The persistence of this new spirit of military adventure—alien though this was from the original genius of East Roman statesmanship—is demonstrated by the fact that it survived the crash of A.D. 1071 and reasserted itself during the Comnenian rally

The truth was that the spirit of moderation which was the original note of East Roman statesmanship had been the East Roman Empire's saving grace; and when once this spirit was lost an institution which had always been a grievous incubus upon the life of Orthodox Christendom became utterly intolerable. It was not, however, the irrational play of Chance or a malicious stroke of 'the Envy of the Gods' that transformed the original *êthos* of the East Roman Empire into its antithesis with this fatal consequence. The transformation was due to an inward necessity and not to an external accident; for it was natural that a growing society should expand, and inevitable, in the circumstances of Orthodox Christian social history, that such expansion should bring with it a multiplication of the incubus with which the expanding society was already saddled; and, since there was not room for more than one ghost of the Roman Empire to haunt a single house, a life-and-death struggle between the East Roman Empire and its Bulgarian double followed the conversion of Bulgaria automatically. In this internecine warfare between two idolized ghosts the Orthodox Christian Civilization went down to destruction.

We have dwelt at some length upon the idolization of the East Roman Empire and its consequences, because this tragic story throws light on something more than the nemesis that attends the idolization of an ephemeral institution; it shows up the perverse and sinful nature of idolatry itself as a transference of loyalty from the whole to the part and a transference of worship from the Creator to the creature. In Orthodox Christendom from the eighth century onwards the loyalty which should have been reserved for the Orthodox Christian Society as a whole was restricted to a single institution—the East Roman Empire—which was confined to one plane of social life and had been erected there by its worshippers' own hands. From the tenth century onwards, when the expansion of Orthodox Christendom had come to embrace the Bulgars as well as the Greeks within the Orthodox Christian fold, the unworthy object of the idolatrous society's worship was still further

until it precipitated the second crash that brought the Empire to the ground at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. If the Comneni were to save the Empire, it was evident that they must make the most of the opportunity that was offered by the shock which the Saljûq Power in Anatolia had received from the impact of the Crusaders. The Comneni ought to have concentrated the whole of their strength upon a supreme effort to wipe the Saljûqs out and thus recover the heart of Anatolia. Instead of that, they dissipated their energies upon vain attempts to assert their suzerainty over the new Crusader principalities in Syria, and upon barren wars against distant European adversaries: the Hungarians beyond the Danube and the Normans beyond the Adriatic. The Romano-Hungarian wars of 1128-9 and 1151-5 and 1166-8 and the Romano-Norman war of 1147-58 account for the failure of the Comneni to deliver a 'knock-out blow' to the Anatolian Saljûqs in the Romano-Turkish wars of 1109-16 and 1119-20 and 1146-7 and 1160-2 and 1176-7. The defeat of the East Roman army by the Saljûqs at Myrioccephalum in A.D. 1176 reduplicated and clinched the disaster of the defeat at Manzikert in 1071.

narrowed down by being multiplied from the singular into the plural and thereby ceasing to be coextensive with the society in range, even on its own superficial plane. From A.D. 927 onwards the misguided devotion of the Orthodox idolators to a political fetish was divided between one parochial empire at Constantinople and another at Preslav. Since both empires claimed an oecumenical jurisdiction by divine right, a life-and-death struggle between them was inevitable; and when the idolators' house was thus divided against itself, it is no wonder that it could not stand.¹

If the universal nemesis of idolatry is manifested with unusual clarity in the Orthodox Christian case, it is also noticeable that this particular example has a specially close bearing upon a case which touches ourselves more nearly.

The concentration of idolatrous worship upon a political institution, and the dissipation of this political idolatry among a plurality of idolized parochial states whose relations are hostile because their pretensions are incompatible, is an aberration into which the Orthodox Christian Society has not been alone in falling. Our own Western Society has set its feet upon the same path of destruction after having made a promising start upon the path of Life.

In the *Respublica Christiana* which Hildebrand set himself to build in the West² in a generation when Orthodox Christendom had already broken down under the crushing weight of the *Imperium Redivivum*, our Western Society was endowed with an institution which was a new creation instead of being a ghost evoked from the Past, and which promised to become an ever more powerful stimulus to social growth instead of being an ever more cumbersome drag upon it. But this fair prospect was blighted within two hundred years of Hildebrand's time by the *ὑβρις* to which the Papacy succumbed in the hour of its triumph over the Hohenstaufen;³ and, owing to this tragic failure of the master-institution which the Western Christendom had created for itself in the second chapter of its history, the institutional heirloom from this chapter that exercised the dominant and decisive influence upon the course of the next chapter was one of the subordinate institutions of medieval Western Christendom which had been an incidental product of the strife between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. A role which had appeared to be the manifest destiny of the Papal *Respublica Christiana* now passed to the North Italian City-State⁴

¹ Matt. xii. 25 = Mark iii. 24 = Luke xi. 17.

² See the present chapter, pp. 339-40, above.

³ For the Papal performance of the tragedy of *κόρος-ὑβρις-ἄρη* see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512-84, below.

⁴ For the dominant role of the medieval Italian city-state culture in setting the tone of the third chapter of our Western history see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 375, footnote 2, above.

which had found room to establish itself in the no-man's-land between the Papal and Imperial fronts.¹ And the upstart institution which thus came to the fore, after the key to the future of Western Christendom had slipped through the fingers of the Vicar of Peter, had much more in common with the baneful Orthodox Christian institution of the *Imperium Redivivum* than with the abortive Western *Respublica Christiana*.

Like the Byzantine *Imperium Redivivum*, the Italian city-state was a ghost called back to life out of the dead past of the Hellenic Society to which both the Christendoms were affiliated. While the *Imperium Redivivum* was a ghost of the universal state which the Hellenic Society had thrown up in the penultimate stage of its disintegration, the city-state was a ghost of the parochial state in which the Hellenic Society had found its master-institution in its growth-stage. The institution which held the field in Western Christendom at the transition from the second to the third chapter of our Western history was thus parochial in its essence; and when in that time of transition this Italian political invention—or political revival—propagated itself beyond the Alps and translated itself from the city-state on to the kingdom-state scale,² our Western World was saddled in its turn with a plurality of parochial sovereign states of the same calibre, and the same pretensions, as the East Roman and Bulgarian Empires that had confronted one another in the Orthodox Christian World after the peace settlement of A.D. 927.

In thus arriving at the state which was the ruin of the sister society, our Western Society has no doubt been successful—or fortunate—in having managed to postpone the advent of the evil day. The political efficiency which was achieved in Orthodox Christendom in the eighth century was not emulated in the West till the eleventh century, and then only within the limits of Northern Italy, and on the miniature city-state scale. The West was not burdened with an efficient state of the East Roman Empire's calibre until the Italianization of the Transalpine kingdom-states began in the fifteenth century;³ and it was not till the sixteenth century that the tenth-century conflict between the East Roman and Bulgarian Empires in Orthodox Christendom was reproduced in the West in the rivalry between the Hapsburg Power and France. Even since then, Time has continued to be kind to us; for whereas

¹ For the genesis of the medieval Western city-state cosmos see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 344–7, above.

² For this change of scale see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350–63, above.

³ The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is an exception which proves our rule, since this was a Western 'successor-state' of the East Roman Empire, and its talent for efficient administration on a large scale was a Byzantine legacy which came as a windfall to the Norman conquerors and their heir the Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen.

it took little more than a century for the two Orthodox Christian Empires to compass, in destroying one another, the destruction of the society that had borne them both, we live to bear witness that our own Western Society still survives in a generation which stands at a four-hundred-years' remove from the generation of Francis I and Charles V—the two modern Western parochial sovereigns who started that series of modern Western wars which we have not yet succeeded in bringing to an end. But can we count upon Time to prolong our reprieve to Eternity? And is it really a reprieve that Time has been granting us? Has not Time perhaps been fattening our Western body social, like a sacrificial victim, for a mightier holocaust than Orthodox Christendom was ever able to afford?¹ If we face this last question honestly and utter our opinion openly, an affirmative answer may be wrung from our lips as we stand on the threshold of the fourth chapter of our Western history and look back upon the history of a third chapter that is now complete.²

If we seek to sum up what this third chapter has brought to pass, our thoughts will recur to our study of the intractability of institutions,³ and we shall be forced to remind ourselves that for four centuries our modern Western master-institution, the Parochial Sovereign State, has been steadily strengthening its ominous hold upon our Western life by taking advantage of the successive impacts of new social forces. In the impact of Italian efficiency upon Transalpine government, the impacts of Democracy and Industrialism upon War and upon Parochial Sovereignty, the impact of Democracy upon Education, and the impact of Nationalism upon the historic political map, the titanic operations of the Earth-Spirit on the roaring loom of Time—the rhythmic weaving and the glowing life that ought to have fashioned a living garment for God⁴—have been diverted to the sinister task of manufacturing a Shirt of Nessus. The spirit of Nationality, which is the bastard offspring of the impact of Democracy upon Parochial Sovereignty, confronted us with its death's-head glare at the beginning of this Study, where we defined it 'as a spirit which makes people feel and act, and think about a part of any given society as though it were the whole of that society'.⁵ In the same place⁶ we denounced this spirit as a political counterpart of the sin of polytheistic idolatry

¹ This question has been raised already in the present chapter on p. 318, above, and it is taken up again in V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 312-21, below.

² For the transition from the third to the fourth chapter of our Western history in the third quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era see Part I. A, vol. i, p. 1, footnote 2, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (b), *passim*, above.

⁴ Goethe: *Faust*, ll. 501-9, quoted in Part II. B, vol. i, p. 204, above, and in V. C (iii), vol. vi, p. 324, below.

⁵ Part I. A, vol. i, p. 9, above.

⁶ Vol. i, p. 9, footnote 3. See also IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), in the present volume, p. 543, below.

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—the monstrous 'association' of false gods with God—which once aroused the creative indignation of the Prophet Muhammad. If that is the besetting sin of our Western Civilization in our day, as we must perforce confess it to be, then, indeed, we must lay aside every weight;¹ for we shall need the last reserve of our strength for running the race that is set before us against a doom to which our sister society has already succumbed. 'Beware, therefore, lest that come upon you which is spoken of in the Prophets.'²

The Pharaonic Crown.

Up to this point in our survey of the pernicious effects of the idolization of an ephemeral institution the idols which we have passed in review have all been states of some kind or other: city-states or nation-states or universal states or their ghosts. States, however, are not the only kind of institution that has attracted idolatrous worship. Similar honours have been paid, with similar consequences, to the sovereign power in a state—a 'divine' kingship or an 'omnipotent' parliament—or again to some caste or class or profession on whose skill or prowess the existence of some state has been deemed to depend.

A classic example of the idolization of a political sovereignty incarnated in a human being is offered by the Egyptiac Society in the time of 'the Old Kingdom'.³ In another connexion we have noticed already that the acceptance, or exaction, of divine honours by the sovereigns of the Egyptiac United Kingdom was one symptom of a 'great refusal' of a call to a higher mission—a fatal failure to respond to the second challenge in Egyptiac history—which

¹ Hebrews xii. 1.

² Acts xiii. 40.

³ Examples have to be carefully chosen, for there is, of course, no truth in the vulgar Western generalization that 'every Oriental worships his sultan as a god'. This is one of the trite variations on the catchword of 'the Unchanging East' which we have criticized above (in I. C. (iii) (b), vol. i, pp. 164-8). There have, of course, been other non-Western societies besides the Egyptiac Society in which kings have been regarded—or, at any rate, treated—as divine beings. The Andean Society, the Far Eastern Society in Japan, and the Hindu Society in its overseas extensions in Java, Camboja and Champa (see Sir C. Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, p. 115), may perhaps be added to the list; but this form of idolatry has been the exception, not the rule, in the Sumeric Society, and it has not been practised in the Babylonian Society or in the Syriac or in the Indic or in the Hindu in India or in the Sinic or in the Far Eastern Society in China. Divine honours were never paid to an Achaemenian King of Kings, or to an Abbasid Caliph of the Prophet and Commander of the Faithful, or to a Chinese Son of Heaven. On the other hand, in the Hellenic Society, to which our own Western Society is 'affiliated', divine honours were perpetually, and in the end regularly, paid to living conquerors and autocrats from beginning to end of the Hellenic decline and fall. The earliest recorded recipient of this idolatrous worship in the Hellenic World is Lysander, the Spartan soldier and politician who delivered the 'knock-out blow' to Athens in the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. The series continues, through Alexander the Great and the Macedonian rulers of the Hellenic 'successor-states' of the Achaemenian Empire, to Caesar and Augustus and the post-Augustan Roman Emperors. (For a fuller survey of the currency of this practice of deifying the rulers of universal states see V. C. (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 648-57, below.)

brought the Egyptiac Civilization to the early breakdown that so tragically cut short its precocious youth.¹ The crushing incubus which this series of human idols imposed upon Egyptiac life is perfectly symbolized in the pyramids, which were erected by the forced labour of their subjects in order to render the Pyramid-Builders magically immortal and divine.

'It is not only externally that the pyramids at Memphis are the distinctive monument (*das Wahrzeichen*) of "the Old Kingdom"; they are also the expression of its inmost essence. The entire state is concentrated in the person of "the Great God"—as the Pharaoh is styled in the war-memorials of "the Old Kingdom" on the Sinai Peninsula, whereas "the Good God" is the standard later usage—and the state's highest task is to ensure to him the perpetuation of the luxury of his royal estate in death as in life, and this to all eternity. The Egyptiac religion, with its hocus-pocus of magic, knows the road by which this objective can be reached, while the progress of civilization provides the technical and material means for attaining it with the greatest possible completeness.'²

This king-worship had no sooner produced its disastrous effect of breaking the Egyptiac Civilization down than it evoked a moral revulsion against a religious aberration which had demanded so awful a sacrifice. The 'folk-tales' about the Fourth Dynasty, which were handed down till they came to the ears of Herodotus some two thousand five hundred years after the age in which the Pyramid-Builders lived, included a tradition that King Menkaure, the builder of the last of the three classic pyramids at Gîzah, repented him, already, of the evil which his fathers had done, and defied the will of the Divine Ennead itself by insisting upon releasing the people of Egypt from their oppression.³ The monuments and records of the Fifth Dynasty indicate that, in 'the Silver Age' of 'the Old Kingdom', Religion was beginning to take a more moral, and *pari passu* a less regicentric, form;⁴ and the change of outlook came with a rush when 'the Silver Age' passed over into a 'Time of Troubles'.⁵ That age saw the triumph of a religion which came out of the bosom of the Egyptiac internal proletariat and which expressed the spiritual reaction of the Egyptian peasantry to the

¹ See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 212-15, above. The first challenge in Egyptiac history had been the physical task of mastering the jungle-swamp of the Lower Nile Valley (see II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 302-15, above). The second challenge was the question of how the ruler of the United Kingdom of Egypt was to use the enormous power over the lives of his fellow human beings which had been placed in his hands by the accomplishment of the feat of creating an Egypt out of the jungle-swamp.

² Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), 3rd edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 181-2.

³ See the tale of Mycerinus in Herodotus, Book II, chaps. 129-34.

⁴ See Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 177-8.

⁵ For the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles', circa 2424-2070/60 B.C., see I. C. (ii), vol. i, p. 137, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 266-7, below.

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oppression that had broken their back;¹ and the converse of Osiris' advance was the deified Pharaoh's retreat.

The 'endeavour', for which the pyramids stood, 'to achieve immortality by sheer physical force'² was, indeed, discredited during the 'Time of Troubles' by a strictly material demonstration which was conclusive in the case of so strictly material an aim as that which the Pyramid-Builders had been pursuing. Their achievement of immortality in an Other World depended, avowedly, upon their ability to furnish their sepulchres in This World with a never-ceasing service of priests whose task was to say offices and make offerings in *saecula saeculorum*. To this end the Pyramid-Builders had done, in their lifetime, everything that wealth and law and magic in league with one another could do to enslave the energies of future generations for the execution of the Pyramid-Builders' own egotistic purpose. But in the 'Time of Troubles', when 'the land' turned 'round as doth a potter's wheel',³ all their endowments were swept away and all their dispositions were disregarded.⁴

The Bolshevik spirit in which, in that age of anarchy and violence, the common people of Egypt revolted against an incubus under which they had laboured for centuries, is mirrored in a poem—*The Admonitions of a Prophet*—in which the experiences of the breakdown were recorded in retrospect after the rally that accompanied the foundation of the Egytiac universal state.⁵

'The door-keepers say: "Let us go and plunder." The washerman refuseth to carry his load . . .

'Nay, but poor men now possess fine things. He that once made for himself sandals now possesses riches. . . .

'Nay, but Elephantine and Thinis [?] and the . . . of Upper Egypt [?], they pay taxes no more by reason of the unrest. . . . To what purpose is a treasury without revenues? . . .

'Nay, but the public offices are opened, and their lists are taken away. Serfs become lords of serfs.

'Nay, but the [officials?] are slain and their lists taken away. Woe is me because of the misery in such a time!

¹ For the worship of Osiris see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 140-5, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 150-2, below.

² Breasted, op. cit., p. 179, quoted in I. C (i), vol. i, p. 141, above.

³ 'The Admonitions of a Prophet' in Erman, A.: *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, English translation (London 1927, Methuen), p. 95.

⁴ This did not happen until after the 'Time of Troubles' had set in, if that change is to be equated with the transition from the Fifth to the Sixth Dynasty circa 2424 B.C. (see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 137, above). Our modern Western archaeologists have unearthed a decree of King Pepi II in which this Pharaoh of the Sixth Dynasty exempts from all state taxation the priesthood and endowment of the pyramid of a Pharaoh of the Third Dynasty, King Snefru (see Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), p. 81).

⁵ For the foundation of the Egytiac universal state through the political reunification of the Egytiac World circa 2070/60 B.C. see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 139; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 112; and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, in the present volume, p. 85, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 190, below.

'Nay, but the scribes of the sack, their writings are destroyed. That whereon Egypt liveth is a "When I come, it's brought me".'

'Nay, but the laws of the judgement-hall are placed in the vestibule. Yea, men walk upon them in the streets, and the poor tear them up in the alleys.

'Nay, but the poor man hath attained to the condition of the Nine Gods. That procedure of the House of the Thirty is divulged.

'Nay, but the great judgement-hall is a "Go out, that he may come in". The poor go and come in the Great Houses.

'Nay, but the children of the magistrates are thrown on to the streets. He that hath knowledge saith: "Yea". The fool saith: "Nay". He that hath no knowledge, to him seemeth it good.

'Nay, but they that were in the Pure Place, they are cast forth upon the high ground. The secret of the embalmers, it lieth open.'¹

This overwhelming spectacle of the mummies of godlike kings being cast out upon the face of the desert was matched by the spectacle of the desecrated and derelict pyramids, which had now become immortal monuments of their builders' failure to achieve their own immortality. The very wealth which the Pyramid-Builders had heaped up in their sepulchral chambers, or earmarked for the service of their mortuary ritual, had produced the exact opposite of its intended effect by serving as a loadstone to the covetousness of spoilers who were not deterred by any fear of either gods or men and were not visited by either divine or human retribution.

Behold the places thereof;
Their walls are dismantled,
Their places are no more,
As if they had never been. . . .
Lo, no man taketh his goods with him.
Yea, none returneth again that is gone thither.²

No wonder that by the time of the foundation of the Egyptiac universal state the efficiency of the royal mortuary ritual was no longer believed in.³

'If thou callest burial to mind, it is sadness, it is the bringing of tears, it is making a man sorrowful, it is haling a man from his house and casting him upon the hill. Never wilt thou go forth again to behold the Sun. They that builded in granite and fashioned a hall [?] in the pyramid, that achieved what is goodly in this goodly work—when the builders are become gods, then their offering-tables are empty [and they

¹ 'The Admonitions of a Prophet' in Erman, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-100.

² Song on the futility of the pyramids, dating from the time of the Eleventh Dynasty (i.e. the period of transition from the 'Time of Troubles' to the universal state), quoted by Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-3.

³ See I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 142-3, above, and compare Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), 3rd edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 294 and 296.

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are] even as the weary ones which die upon the dyke without a survivor;
the flood hath taken its end [of them] and likewise the heat of the Sun,
and the fish of the river-bank hold converse with them.’¹

These spiritual experiences of the Egyptiac ‘Time of Troubles’ are reflected in a new attitude towards the sovereign power which is discernible after the establishment of the Egyptiac universal state.

‘Under the Twelfth Dynasty the kings . . . eventually attained to a power which was not less absolute than that which had been exercised by the Pharaohs of “the Old Kingdom.” . . . But, all the same, their status is essentially different from that of Snefru and Cheops. The naïve point of view that the whole country only exists in order to serve the King and to build his giant tomb for him has not only disappeared but has actually swung round into the contrary view that the royal power exists because the prosperity of the country, and of all its inhabitants, depends upon it.’²

This narrowing of the gulf between the sovereign and the people during the ‘Time of Troubles’ seems afterwards to have proceeded a stage farther as a consequence of the peculiar sequel to the break-up of the Egyptiac universal state. We have seen³ that the ensuing interregnum was cut short and cancelled by a restoration of the universal state within little more than a hundred years after its fall. This Mycerinus-like defiance of Fate was inspired by a fanatical hostility to the tincture of an alien civilization in the culture of the interloping barbarian Hyksos; and the ‘Zealotism’ which proved to be a sufficiently dynamic force to drive the Hyksos out created a spiritual bond between the rank-and-file of the Egyptiac people and the new dynasty in which they had found their leadership in their ‘holy war’. Under ‘the New Empire’ the divinity of the sovereign was little more than titular, and the Emperor actually lived among his people, and among the other members of the Im-

¹ ‘The Dispute with his Soul of One who is tired of Life’ in Erman, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-8.

² Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), third edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 278-9. The literary evidence on which Meyer’s thesis rests is examined in Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-50. In *The Admonitions of a Prophet* the atmosphere of ruin has already given place to an atmosphere of reconstruction before we reach the point at which our sole manuscript breaks off. ‘Herein . . . we may discern a great transformation. The pessimism with which the men of the early Feudal Age [i.e. the Egyptiac “Time of Troubles”—A. J. T.], as they beheld the desolated cemeteries of the Pyramid Age, or as they contemplated the hereafter, and the hopelessness with which some of them regarded the earthly life were met by a persistent counter-current in the dominant gospel of righteousness and social justice set forth in the hopeful philosophy of more optimistic thinkers’ (Breasted, *op. cit.*, p. 249). In other words, the establishment of an Egyptiac universal state, in the shape of the so-called ‘Middle Empire’, after the ‘Time of Troubles’, was the symptom of a rally on the moral as well as the material plane.

³ In I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 138-9 and 144-5, and in IV. C (ii) (b) 2, in the present volume, p. 85, above. See further Part V. A, vol. v, pp. 2-3; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 152; and V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, p. 351, below.

perial Family, not as a god but as a man.¹ The completely human family life which was led by Ikhnaton² within the privacy of his palace at Tell-el-Amarna may have scandalized the public opinion of his generation; yet the Imperial revolutionary was merely carrying to its logical conclusion a tendency which was already implicit in the spirit of the age.

This 'humanization' of the status of the sovereign was—significantly—accompanied by a corresponding tendency in other matters which were of almost equal importance in Egyptiac life. In the religious field, for example, an immortalization which under 'the Old Kingdom' had been the odious monopoly of a privileged minority at the expense of an exploited majority was brought within everybody's reach by the triumph of the Osirian religion.³ In the literary field, again, the Imperial revolutionary who failed to impose his radical religious reform upon the Egyptiac Society under the restored universal state did succeed in perpetuating his equally radical literary reform of 'scrapping' the dead classical language of 'the Middle Empire'—as he had sought to 'scrap' the classical religious syncretism of his own predecessor Thothmes III⁴—and making a new literary medium out of the living vernacular language of the day.⁵ This vernacular literature which burst into flower in Ikhnaton's reign (*imperabat circa* 1370-1352 B.C.) was more lively than its classical predecessor. 'Men saw the World as it is, and took a pleasure in it'⁶—as is witnessed by the love-songs which this latter-day Egyptiac literature has bequeathed to us.⁷

It is evident that in the course of its long-drawn-out decline the Egyptiac Society made a persistent, and not altogether unsuccessful, effort to recoil from the aberration that had caused its breakdown. The contrast between an Ikhnaton and a Chephren,⁸ or between an anonymous love-song of 'the New Empire' and a royal pyramid of 'the Old Kingdom', reveals the struggle for the Egyptiac soul which a spirit of humanism waged with a spirit of idolatry for two thousand years. But this humanism was not enough to conquer its formidable adversary and reverse the process of decline and

¹ On this point see Hall, H. R.: *The Ancient History of the Near East* (London 1913, Methuen), pp. 277-9.

² For Ikhnaton's abortive religious revolution see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 145-6, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 695-6, below.

³ On this point see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 142-3, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 151, below.

⁴ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 145, footnote 5, above; the present chapter and volume, p. 421; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 530; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 653-4 and 695, below.

⁵ Erman, op. cit., p. xxvi. See also the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, p. 406, below.

⁶ Erman, op. cit., loc. cit.

⁷ See the specimens in Erman, op. cit., pp. 242-51.

⁸ This contrast comes out not only in their recorded aims and achievements, but in the portraits of themselves—as they themselves wished to be portrayed—which they have bequeathed to posterity.

fall; and there is a poignancy of failure in its efforts which touches our own sensibilities as we contemplate to-day the vestiges of its record. The epitaph of this pathetic Egyptiac humanism is 'Too late and too trivial!' It could not prevail against the demonic energy and earnestness of the king-worship which the pyramids embody. If we balance the two contending spirits in those divine scales in which the human soul was weighed at the Osirian judgement of the dead, we shall find that the more amiable spirit lightly kicks the beam. *En fin de compte* the dominant spirit of the Egyptiac Society from the Age of the Pyramid-Builders onwards is that of a 'servile state' and not that of a *fête champêtre*.¹

The Mother of Parliaments.

The idolization of a political sovereignty incarnated in a human being is an aberration that is not exclusively represented by the classical Egyptiac example. If we look for an analogue in our modern Western history, we can easily discern a vulgar version of a royal Son of Re in the French 'roi soleil', Louis XIV. This Western Sun-King's palace at Versailles weighed as heavily upon the Land of France as the pyramids at Gîzah weighed upon the Land of Egypt; and the French Revolution was as inevitable a consequence of the idolization of the Crown as that Egyptiac social upheaval in which 'the land' turned 'round as doth a potter's wheel'.² 'L'État c'est moi' might have been spoken by Cheops, and 'Après moi le déluge' by Pepi II. But perhaps the most interesting example which the modern Western World affords of the idolization of a sovereign power is one that is rather less sensational.

In the apotheosis of 'the Mother of Parliaments' at Westminster the sovereign object of idolization is not a sovereign human being but a sovereign committee; and the incurable drabness of committees has here co-operated with the obstinate conceit of matter-of-factness in the modern English social tradition to keep this idolization of Parliament within respectable limits. The English worshipper of the House of Commons is only required to cast upon the altar that perfunctory grain of incense which sufficed for the Imperial Cult of a pedestrian Claudius or a prosaic Vespasian; and an Englishman who looked abroad upon the World in the year 1938 might reasonably claim that his temperate devotion to his own political divinity was being handsomely rewarded. Was not the country which had preserved its loyalty to 'the Mother of Parliaments' in a happier case than its neighbours who had gone

¹ For the servile ethos of the Egyptiac Society in its latter days see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 215, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, in the present volume, p. 85, footnote 5, above.

² See the quotation on p. 410, above.

a whoring after other gods?¹ Had the Lost Ten Tribes of the Continent found either tranquillity or prosperity in their feverish adulation of outlandish 'Duces' and 'Führers' and 'Kommissars' and 'Corporative States' and 'Third Reichs' and 'Soviet Socialist Republics'? In 1938 the answer to this practical question was undoubtedly in favour of the Englishman who asked it; and yet it still left something to be said; for the Englishman himself would admit that the blessings which his Mother Goddess was now bringing him were conspicuous chiefly by contrast with other men's present ills; and he would also admit that the recent Continental offspring of the ancient Insular Parliament had proved, on the whole, to be a sickly brood—incompetent to bring political salvation to the non-British majority of the living generation of Mankind, and incapable of holding its own against the post-war plague of dictatorships.

Perhaps the truth is that the very features in the character and history of the Parliament at Westminster which are the secret of its hold upon an Englishman's respect and affection are so many positive stumbling-blocks in the way of making this venerable English institution into a political panacea for the World. The Englishman is proud of his Parliament because he remembers that, alone among the many institutions of its kind that had come into being in the Transalpine kingdoms of Western Christendom during the second chapter of our Western history, this English Parliament was successful, at the transition from the Medieval to the Modern Age, in withstanding the impact of the Italian city-state culture by finding a way of combining the new-fangled Italian political efficiency with the old-fashioned Transalpine political liberties.² Yet this unique success of the Parliament at Westminster in outlasting 'the Middle Ages' by adapting itself to the exigencies of the Modern Age perhaps makes it less likely that this antique institution can now achieve another equally creative metamorphosis in order to meet the challenge of a 'Post-Modern' Age which is knocking upon the door with new and different exigencies of its own.

If we look into the structure of Parliament, we shall find that it is essentially an assembly of the representatives of local constituencies. This essential feature is just what we should expect from the date and place of the institution's origin; for the medieval kingdom of England, like other Transalpine kingdoms in the same age, was a congeries of village communities—interspersed with boroughs as a cake is sprinkled with plums. In such a polity as that, the significant and important grouping for political purposes

¹ Judges ii. 17. Compare Exodus xxxiv. 15, and Leviticus xvii. 7.

² For this achievement see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 358–63, and IV. C (iii) (b) 8, in the present volume, pp. 198–200, above.

was that of neighbourhood. The people with whom any given subject of the King was likely to have a common political interest were the people whose homes lay within a day's walking or riding distance of his own; and in a society so constituted the proper constituencies for a representative parliamentary assembly were manifestly local constituencies of sufficiently small size to allow every voter in each of them to know something about his fellow constituents and something about his member. This social basis of the structure of Parliament remained unchanged when the impact of the Italian culture ushered in a new age, and again when this challenge was successfully met by the creative transformation of Parliament in the seventeenth century. But the very success of Parliament in weathering the political storms of the seventeenth century had the consequence of singling England out to be the laboratory for a vast economic innovation during the two centuries that followed; and this English Industrial Revolution has undermined the social foundations beneath the English Parliament's feet. The Industrial Revolution has transformed a congeries of many hundred small and mutually independent units of economic life into a single unit which is co-extensive with the whole of the United Kingdom and which is one and indivisible economically, as the Kingdom itself is politically.¹ In the new England that has been conjured into existence by the new force of Industrialism within the last 150 years, the link of locality has lost its significance for political as well as for most other social purposes. And the new English voter, if we ask him who is his neighbour, will certainly not think of all those hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of people whose homes now lie within one day's travelling-distance of his own home by railway or motor-car. Nor will his own home strike him as a natural centre to measure from; for, in his outlook, it is no longer a fixed point. Unlike the tiller of the ground, who is rooted in the soil like a tree, the urban industrial worker may be here to-day and gone to-morrow to any place to which he may have been drawn by a momentary prospect of employment. For such a voter in such a social milieu the only rational answer to the question 'Who is your neighbour?' is: 'My fellow railwayman or or my fellow miner, in every corner of the Kingdom from Land's End to John-o'-Groat's.' The true constituency has ceased to be local and has become occupational. But an occupational basis of representation is a constitutional *terra incognita* in which the Westminster Parliament could not acclimatize itself without a radical change of structure; and for that 'the Mother of Parliaments' in her venerable old age not unnaturally shows no appetite.

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 4, p. 170, above.

To all this, no doubt, a twentieth-century English admirer of Parliament as it is may justly reply with a *solvitur ambulando*. In the abstract, he may admit, a thirteenth-century system of parliamentary representation is unsuitable to a twentieth-century community; but he will point out that in twentieth-century England the theoretical misfit seems to work as a matter of fact; and he will even be able to explain how this strange thing can be. In prophesying some serious social dislocation if an old political institution is allowed to remain unadjusted to a new economic basis, we have forgotten, he will tell us, to take one pertinent factor into account. In declaring it impossible to square the circle, we have failed to reckon with the skill of an old hand in performing *tours de force*. 'We English', this Englishman will explain, 'are so thoroughly at home with the political institutions which we have built up that, in our own country and among ourselves, I believe we can make them work under any conditions.' This is not an idle boast; and it is therefore quite conceivable that the system of parliamentary representation by local constituencies may actually survive longest in the country where it was earliest put out of date by the Industrial Revolution. This is conceivable because, as our hypothetical Englishman has pointed out, the country which is the birth-place of the Industrial System happens to be the birth-place of 'the Mother of Parliaments' as well. In the circumstances it is even possible that the English may not only cling to their Parliament-worship, but may escape the usual fate of idolators and persist in their error with impunity—to their own edification, and to the amazement of the 'lesser breeds without the law'. By the same token, however, it seems probable that England will not cap her seventeenth-century feat by becoming for a second time the creator of those new political institutions which a new age requires.

In our day the need for fresh political creation is once again urgent; for the flow of the Industrial Revolution, with the fundamental change of social structure that it necessarily brings in its train, has not stopped short at the shores of the island out of whose bosom the volcano originally erupted. Industrialism has now spread far and wide over the World; and in every country where it has established itself it has turned the existing political institutions into social anachronisms. Since few countries have the English luck to possess a political constitution which they know—or think they know—how to work under all conditions, most countries will be forced to find a new constitution to fit the new circumstances of their economic life. When a new thing has to be found, there are only two ways of finding it—namely, creation and mimesis—and mimesis cannot come into play until somebody has per-

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formed a creative act for his fellows to imitate. In the fourth chapter of our Western history, which has opened in our time, who will the new political creator be? Perhaps he will be an Italian or a German, perhaps a Russian or a Chinese; but at the start of a long, and probably arduous, race it is an unprofitable exercise of the fancy to guess at the winner. At this early stage it is only possible to pick out the competitors who are apparently out of the running; and this, at least, we can do in the present case. We can predict with some confidence that the new political creator in the now dawning age will not be any English worshipper of 'the Mother of Parliaments'.

Scribes, Priests, and Janissaries.

We may close this survey of institutional idols by glancing at the idolatrous worship of castes and classes and professions; and here we already have something to go upon. In studying the social structure of the arrested civilizations¹ we have come across two societies of the kind—the Spartans and the 'Osmanlis—in which the keystone of the arch was a caste that was virtually a corporate idol or deified Leviathan.² If the aberration of idolizing a caste is capable of arresting a civilization's growth it will also be capable of causing its breakdown; and, if we re-examine the breakdown of the Egyptiac Society with this clue in our hands, we shall perceive that the 'Divine' Kingship was not the only idolized incubus that weighed upon the backs of the Egyptiac peasantry under 'the Old Kingdom'. They also had to bear the burden of a 'bureaucracy' of litterati; and a share in the responsibility for the breakdown must be attributed to this privileged class.

The truth is that a deified kingship presupposes an educated secretariat. Without such support it could hardly maintain its statuesque pose on its pedestal, any more than Moses could have kept his hands outstretched over the vale of Rephidim from sunrise to sunset if his arms had not been upheld by Aaron and Hur.³ The political unification of the whole of the Lower Nile Valley, from Elephantine to the Mediterranean coast, under a single sovereign power, and the systematic exploitation of the resources of this United Kingdom for the benefit of the deified wearer of the Double Crown, were feats of co-ordinated social effort which re-

¹ In Part III. A, in vol. iii, above.

² If we may rightly classify the Ottoman Pādīshāh's Slave-Household and the Lacedaemonian chain-gang of Spartiate 'Peers' as corporate gods, then assuredly the weaker vessels among the human cells which once composed these inhuman Leviathans must often have anticipated, in their *for intérieur*, the auto-blasphemous reflexion—'It is not all beer and skittles being a god!'—which is attributed to a well-known living god of our own generation.

³ Exodus xvii. 8-16.

quired an elaborate administration; and an organized government on this scale is hardly conceivable without a professional civil service which not only knows how to read and write but which is literate to its finger-tips.¹

Thus the Egyptiac litterati were the power behind the throne, and indeed, in point of time, they were also before it. This bureaucracy could boast of itself that 'before Pharaoh was, I am'. It was indispensable, and it knew it; and it took advantage of this knowledge of its power in order to 'bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne and lay them on men's shoulders,' while the Egyptiac scribes themselves would not 'move' these same burdens 'with one of their fingers'.² The privileged exemption of the litteratus from the intolerable common lot of the sons of toil is the theme of the Egyptiac bureaucracy's glorification of its own order in every age of Egyptiac history. The note is struck blatantly in *The Instruction of Duauf*:³ a work, composed during the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles', which has been preserved to us in copies made a thousand years later, as a writing exercise, by the schoolboys of 'the New Empire'. In this 'instruction which a man named Duauf, the son of Khety, composed for his son named Pepi, when he voyaged up to the Residence, in order to put him in the School of Books, among the children of the magistrates', the gist of the ambitious father's parting exhortation to his aspiring child is:

'I have seen him that is beaten, him that is beaten: thou art to set thine heart on books. I have beheld him that is set free from forced labour: behold, nothing surpasseth books. . . .

'Would that I might make thee love books more than thy mother; would that I might bring their beauty before thy face. It is greater than any calling. . . . If he hath begun to succeed, and is yet a child, men greet him. . . .

'Every artisan that wieldeth the chisel [?], he is wearier than him that delveth. . . . In the night, when he is set free, he worketh beyond what his arms can do; in the night he burneth a light.

'The stone-mason seeketh for work [?] in all manner of hard stone. When he hath finished it, his arms are destroyed, and he is weary. When such an one sitteth down at dusk, his thighs and his back are broken. . . .

'The field-worker, his reckoning endureth for ever; . . . he, too, is wearier than can be told, and he fareth as well as one fareth among lions. . . .

¹ Professor J. L. Myres in *The Dawn of History* (London, no date, Williams & Norgate), pp. 68-70, rightly insists upon the fact that it was the prior invention of the art of writing which made it possible to establish and maintain a polity on the scale of the Egyptiac United Kingdom. Even in the Andean World, where writing, in the strict sense, seems to have been unknown from first to last, the elaborate organization of the Empire of the Incas, which was the Andean universal state (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 121-2, above), depended upon the correspondingly elaborate system of knot-mnemonics or *quipus* (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), vol. v, p. 491, below).

² Matt. xxiii. 4 = Luke xi. 46.

³ Text in Erman, op. cit., pp. 67-72.

'The weaver in the workshop, he fareth more ill than any woman. His thighs are upon his belly, and he breatheth no air. . . .

'Let me tell thee, further, how it fareth with the fisherman. Is not his work upon the river, where it is mixed with the crocodiles? . . .

'Behold, there is no calling that is without a director except [that of] the scribe, and he is the director. . . .'

A thousand years later, under 'the New Empire', the same spirit breathes through the copy-book exhortations and warnings to schoolboys¹ which convey the bureaucracy's unfaltering good opinion of itself as it still bestrides the broken back of a plebs that, by this time, has collapsed under the burden. 'Do not be a husband-man'; 'Do not be a soldier'; 'Do not be a charioteer'; 'Do not be a soldier, a priest or a baker'; 'Be an official': these were the warnings with which the writing-master, in those days, still drove home into his pupils' minds his exhortation to be diligent.

In the Far Eastern World there is a familiar analogue of this Egyptiac 'litteratocracy' in the incubus of 'mandarin rule' which the Far Eastern Society has inherited from the latest age of its Sinic predecessor.² The Confucian litteratus used to flaunt his heartless refusal to lift a finger to lighten the load of the toiling millions by allowing his finger-nails to grow to lengths which precluded every use of the hand except the manipulation of the scribal brush, and through all the chances and changes of Far Eastern history he has emulated his Egyptiac *confrère's* tenacity in keeping his oppressive seat. Even the impact of the Western culture, which has momentarily robbed the Confucian Classics of their prestige, has not thrown the Chinese litteratus out of his saddle. Though the examinations in the Confucian Classics are now abolished and the labyrinthine rows of examination-cells lie desolate, the litteratus still wields his ancient power in the name of a modern sage,³ and imposes upon the peasant as effectively as before by flourishing in his face a diploma from the University of Chicago or the London School of Economics and Political Science.

In the course of Egyptiac history the alleviation which a long-suffering people obtained—albeit, too late—through the gradual humanization of the sovereign power was offset by successive additions to the class-incubus. As though the burden of carrying the bureaucracy had not been enough to bring the common people to the ground, they were further saddled, under 'the New Empire',

¹ Specimens in Erman, op. cit., pp. 189-98.

² For the institution of a competitive public examination in the Confucian Classics, as the avenue of entry into the Imperial Civil Service, in 125 B.C. or 124 B.C. under the Prior Han see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 329-30, above.

³ Since the outbreak of the present Chinese Revolution in A.D. 1911 the place once occupied in Chinese hearts and minds by Confucius seems to have been taken by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.

with the incubus of a priesthood which was organized into a puissant Pan-Egyptiac corporation, under the presidency of the Chief Priest of Amon-Re at Thebes, by the Emperor Thothmes III (*imperabat solus circa* 1480-1450 B.C.).¹ A century after its incorporation the Egyptiac priesthood proved strong enough to defeat the Imperial heresiarch Ikhnaton (*imperabat circa* 1370-1352 B.C.); and three hundred years after that, when 'the New Empire' broke up, the Chief Priest of Amon actually became the residuary legatee of the Divine Kingship itself. About the year 1075 B.C. the reigning pontiff, Hrihor, picked up the now masterless—and powerless—Imperial Crown and placed it on his own head.² Thenceforward the Egyptiac mandarin had a fellow rider in the shape of an Egyptiac Brahman;³ and after that the broken-backed Egyptiac circus-horse was compelled to stumble on upon his everlasting round of the arena until the pair of riders was increased to a trio by the mounting of a *miles gloriosus* on the pillion behind the scribe and the pharisee.

The Egyptiac Society, which had been as free from militarism throughout its natural term of life as the Orthodox Christian Society was in its age of growth, had been goaded by its encounter with the Hyksos—as the East Roman Empire was goaded by its encounter with Bulgaria—into a militaristic course. Not content with driving the Hyksos out beyond the pale of the Egyptiac World, the Emperors of the Eighteenth Dynasty yielded to the temptation of passing over from self-defence into aggression and taking their revenge for the Hyksos' domination over Egypt by carving out an Egyptian Empire in Asia. This wanton military adventure was easier to embark upon than to withdraw from; and when the tide turned again in the days of Ikhnaton the strain began to tell. The Nineteenth Dynasty found itself compelled to mobilize the now fast waning strength of the Egyptiac body social in order to save a remnant of the Asiatic empire and finally to preserve the integrity

¹ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 145, footnote 5, and the present chapter and volume, p. 413, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, p. 530, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 653-4 and 695, below. For the stages by which this corporation developed, during the Dark Age after the decay of 'the New Empire', into a virtually closed hereditary caste, see Meyer, E.: 'Gottesstaat, Militärherrschaft und Ständewesen in Ägypten' in *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Jahrgang 1928, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* (Berlin 1928, de Gruyter), pp. 522-3.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 116, footnote 1, above, and the present volume, IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (8), pp. 515-17, below.

³ The incubus of 'Brahmanocracy' has been inherited by the Hindu Society from its Indic predecessor, as the incubus of 'litteratocracy' has been inherited from the Sinic Society by the Far Eastern. An analogy between the Brahman caste in the Indic and Hindu worlds and the privileged fraternity of 'the pure' (*W'eb*) in the Egyptiac World is accepted by Meyer in op. cit., p. 528; but he finds a closer analogy to the social development of the Egyptiac World after the decay of 'the New Empire' in the social development of the later Roman Empire, with its barbarian soldier caste and its simultaneous tendency to make all occupations hereditary (see Meyer, op. cit., p. 529).

422 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS of Egypt herself; and under the Twentieth Dynasty the aged and tormented frame of the Egyptiac Society was smitten with a paralytic stroke as the price of its final *tour de force* of flinging back the combined hosts of European and African and Asiatic barbarians that had been hurled against the Egyptian frontiers by the impetus of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung.¹ When the fallen body at last lay prostrate and motionless on the ground, worn out by a régime of hard labour which had been imposed without pity or reprieve for a term of more than two thousand years, the native priest and litteratus, who still sat tight in the saddle with no bones broken by the fall, were joined by the grandson of the Libyan invader, who now strolled back as a soldier of fortune into a derelict Egyptiac World from whose frontiers his grandfather had been hurled back by the final feat of native Egyptian arms.² The military caste, begotten of these eleventh-century Libyan mercenaries, which continued to bestride the carcass of the Egyptiac Society for a thousand years after, may have been less formidable to its opponents in the field than the Janissaries or the Spartiates, but it was doubtless just as burdensome at home to the peasantry beneath its feet.³

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 92-3 and 100-2, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 267, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below.

² The apparently peaceful process by which the descendants of these Libyan soldiers of fortune eventually supplanted their native Egyptian employers in the political mastery of the Egyptiac World is compared by Meyer (in op. cit., p. 524) with the supplanting of the Ayyūbids by their own Mamlūks in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era. On this see further V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 352-3, below.

³ The burden upon the backs of the Egyptiac peasantry was perhaps mitigated by the fact—which seems to emerge from the imperfect evidence at our command—that they were not called upon to bear more than one of the two latter-day social incubuses in any given case. The Egyptiac World seems, in fact, to have been partitioned geographically between the intrusive Libyan military caste and the native Egyptian priesthood. The priesthood retained the monopoly of exploiting the peasantry in four temple-states which centred respectively round the shrines of Amon-Re at Thebes, Ptah at Memphis, Re at Heliopolis, and Horus at Letopolis (for these Egyptiac temple-states and their counterparts in the histories of other civilizations see Meyer, op. cit., p. 521; eundem: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (1), 2nd edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 511; and the present chapter, p. 312, footnote 1, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), p. 471, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (b), pp. 515-18, below). The domains of these four temple-states appear to have been free from Libyan military settlements, to judge by the list of these which is given by Herodotus in Book II, chaps. 164-6; for though Herodotus does record the presence of a Libyan garrison at Thebes, there is no trace of any military force except the local native militia in the Thebaid before the destruction of the Theban temple-state during the struggle between the Napatans, Assyrians, and Saïtes in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. (Meyer in op. cit., pp. 522 and 524-6). Except for Thebes, the Libyan garrison-towns in Herodotus's list are all confined to the Delta—and this excluding the three Deltaic temple-states above mentioned. The only place in Upper Egypt where there was certainly a Libyan garrison before the posting of the garrison at Thebes was Heracleopolis; and this city was the seat of a temple-state as well as the seat of the Libyan clan which gave birth to Shosheng, the founder of the Twenty-Second Dynasty (see Meyer in op. cit., pp. 513, 521, 524, 526). It would seem that in the Heracleopolite nome, and in this province only, the Egyptiac peasantry had to pay dues to the priests and to the Libyans simultaneously; but in this connexion it may be observed that the garrison at Heracleopolis is not mentioned by Herodotus, who does mention the garrison at Thebes. Is it possible that the later Theban garrison was identical with the old Heracleopolite garrison, and that there was never at any time more than one Libyan garrison in Upper Egypt, though this garrison was stationed at different places in differ-

With the spectacle of an Egyptiac Society borne down to the ground by this trio of idolized castes we may close our study of the nemesis that attends the idolization of an ephemeral institution. We have next to consider the idolization of an ephemeral technique.

(γ) *The Idolization of an Ephemeral Technique.*

Reptiles and Mammals.

If we now turn to consider the idolization of techniques, we shall recognize at the outset of our inquiry that certain classic examples of the extreme penalty for a flagrant commission of this sin have already come under our observation in our survey of the arrested civilizations,¹ which has also furnished us with our classic examples of the extreme penalty for a flagrant idolization of institutions.² In the Ottoman and the Spartan social systems the key-technique of being shepherds of human cattle, or hunters of human game, was idolized side by side with the two master-institutions of the Pādishāh's Slave-Household and the standing army of Spartiate 'Peers' who were enslaved to the impersonal despotism of the Lycurgean *agôgê*. And when we pass from the arrested civilizations evoked by human challenges to those evoked by challenges from Physical Nature, we find that the idolatrous worship of a technique comprises the whole of their tragedy. The Nomads and the Esquimaux have fallen into arrest through an excessive concentration of their energies on the technique of literally shepherding authentic cattle on the Steppes, and literally hunting non-human game on the ice or in the waters of the Arctic Seas.

In the same connexion we have taken cognizance of the at first sight paradoxical, but on second thoughts manifestly inevitable, fact that in all these cases the cultivation of a human technique into a superfine and excessively exacting art has condemned these human victims of their own human skill to a retrogression towards an animalism which is the negation of humanity; and if we now peer back into pre-human chapters in the history of Life on this planet we shall find ourselves confronted by other examples of the same paradoxical 'law'.

ent periods? The relation between the priests and the soldiers in the Egyptiac World from the time of the foundation of the Libyan Twenty-Second Dynasty onwards may be compared with the relation between the Confucian litterati and the Manchurian 'bannermen' in Intramural China under the Manchu Dynasty. The Egyptiac temple-states of that age have a living counterpart in the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhist temple-state called the Shiretu Khurie Banner which is situated on the western edge of the Extramural Chinese province of Jehol. This living Far Eastern temple-state is ruled by a Prince-Lama, and has a population of about 12,000 sedentary agricultural Mongols occupying a territory measuring about seventy miles by thirty (see Lattimore, O.: *The Mongols of Manchuria* (London 1935, Allen & Unwin), pp. 253-9).

¹ See Part III. A, in vol. iii, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 303-423, above.

This 'law' is enunciated in the following general terms by a modern Western scholar who has made a comparative study of its operation in the non-human and the human domain:

'Life starts in the sea. There it attains to an extraordinary efficiency. The fishes give rise to types which are so successful (such, for instance, as the sharks) that they have lasted on unchanged until to-day. The path of ascending Evolution did not, however, lie in this direction. In Evolution Dr. Inge's aphorism is probably always right: "Nothing fails like success." A creature which has become perfectly adapted to its environment, an animal whose whole capacity and vital force is concentrated and expended in succeeding here and now, has nothing left over with which to respond to any radical change. Age by age it becomes more perfectly economical in the way [in which] its entire resources meet exactly its current and customary opportunities. In the end it can do all that is necessary to survive without any conscious striving or unadapted movement. It can therefore beat all competitors in the special field; but equally, on the other hand, should that field change, it must become extinct. It is this success of efficiency which seems to account for the extinction of an enormous number of species. Climatic conditions altered. They had used up all their resources of vital energy in adapting to things as they were. Like unwise virgins, they had no oil left over for further adaptations. They were committed, could not readjust, and so they vanished.'¹

The fatally complete technical success of the fishes in adapting themselves to the physical environment of Life in the marine overture to its terrestrial history is enlarged upon by the same scholar in the same context.

'At the level when Life was confined to the sea and the fishes were developing, they threw up forms which evolved a spine and so represented the vertebrates in the highest form then evolved. From the spine there spread out on each side, to aid the head, that fan of feelers which in them became the fore-fins. In the shark—and almost all the fish—these feelers were specialized so as to become, no longer feelers, but paddles: amazingly efficient flukes for bringing the creature head-foremost on its prey. Rapid reaction was everything, patient negotiation nothing; and these flukes not only ceased to be testers, explorers, examiners: they became increasingly efficient for water-movement and for nothing else. It looks as though pre-piscan pre-vertebrate life must have lived in warm shallow pools and perhaps always have been in touch with the floor, as to-day the gurnet by its feelers keeps contact with the solid bed. Once, however, swift unpremeditated movement became everything, specialization drove the fishes out into water where they lost touch with the bottom and all solids; and water, which till then had been really no more than a bearing or lubricant to carry them over the solid surface which they were constantly exploring—water then became

¹ Heard, Gerald: *The Source of Civilization* (London 1935, Cape), pp. 66-7.

their only element. This meant [that] their power of being stimulated by new circumstances was greatly limited. . . .

"That type of fish, then, which gave rise to the next advancing order of animals must have been a creature which did not adopt this extreme specialization of the fin. For, first, it must have been a creature which kept in touch with the floor, and so remained more variously stimulated than the fishes which lost touch with a solid environment. And, secondly, it must have been a creature which for the same reason kept in touch with the shallows and kept this touch by means of forelimbs which, because they could not therefore become wholly specialized as water-driving flukes, retained a more generalized "inefficient" exploratory and tentative character. The skeleton of such a creature has been discovered—a creature whose forelimbs are, it might almost be said, rather clumsy hands than proper fins; and through these members it looks as though the transition from shallow pool to flooded shore was made, the deep sea was left behind, the land was invaded, and the amphibians arrived."

In this triumph of the fumbling and irresolute amphibians in their competition with the deft and decisive fishes, we are witnessing an early performance of a drama which has since been replayed many times over with as many different changes in the cast. In the next performance that invites our attention, we shall find the fishes' part being taken by the amphibians' formidable progeny of the reptilian tribe, while the amphibians' own part in the preceding performance is taken this time by the ancestors of those mammalian animals in which the Spirit of Man has recently become incarnate. The primitive Mammals were meek and puny creatures who unexpectedly inherited the Earth because the heritage had been left derelict by the magnificent Reptiles who were the previous lords of terrestrial creation; and the Mesozoic Reptiles—like the Pleistocene Esquimaux and Nomads² and 'Osmanlis and Spartans—were conquerors who forfeited their conquests by straying into the blind alley of over-specialization.

'[The] apparently abrupt ending up of the Reptiles is, beyond all question, the most striking revolution in the whole history of the Earth before the coming of Mankind. It is probably connected with the close

¹ Ibid., pp. 67-9.

² A suggestive double parallel between the respective downfalls of the Mesozoic Reptiles and the Nomads and between the respective triumphs of the Mammals and the peoples of Western Christendom is made by Mr. H. G. Wells in *The Outline of History* (London 1920, Cassell), p. 386:

'Just as in the Mesozoic Age, while the great Reptiles lorded it over the Earth, there were developing in odd out-of-the-way corners those hairy mammals and feathered birds who were finally to supersede that tremendous fauna altogether by another far more versatile and capable, so in the limited territories of Western Europe of the Middle Ages, while the Mongolian monarchies dominated the World from the Danube to the Pacific and from the Arctic Seas to Madras and Morocco and the Nile, the fundamental lines of a new and harder and more efficient type of human community were being laid down.'

of a vast period of equable warm conditions and the onset of a new austerer age, in which the winters were bitterer and the summers brief but hot. The Mesozoic life, animal and vegetable alike, was adapted to warm conditions and capable of little resistance to cold. The new life, on the other hand, was before all things capable of resisting great changes of temperature. . . .

'As for the Mammals competing with and ousting the less fit Reptiles, . . . there is not a scrap of evidence of any such direct competition. . . . In the later Mesozoic a number of small jaw-bones are found, entirely mammalian in character. But there is not a scrap, not a bone, to suggest that there lived any Mesozoic Mammal which could look a dinosaur in the face. The Mesozoic Mammals or mammal-like Reptiles—for we do not know clearly which they were—seem to have been all obscure little beasts of the size of mice and rats, more like a down-trodden order of Reptiles than a distinct class; probably they still laid eggs and were developing only slowly their distinctive covering of hair. They lived away from big waters, and perhaps in the desolate uplands, as marmots do now; probably they lived there beyond the pursuit of the carnivorous dinosaurs. Some perhaps went on all fours, some chiefly went on their hind legs and clambered with their forelimbs. They became fossils only so occasionally that Chance has not yet revealed a single complete skeleton in the whole vast record of the Mesozoic rocks by which to check these guesses.'¹

The propositions put forward by Mr. Wells down to this point in his exposition appear to be generally accepted. The Reptiles were supplanted by the Mammals because the Reptiles had lost the ability to adapt themselves to changes in their environment, and not because they had suffered defeat in any direct encounter with a nascent new order of living creatures who had not yet begun to emerge out of their original weakness and obscurity by the time when the gigantic Reptiles perished from off the face of the Earth. In the post-mortem inquiry over the carcasses of these monsters the verdict of the experts seems to be unanimous. But, in a common ordeal to which the Reptiles succumbed, what was it exactly that enabled the Mammals to survive and in consequence to inherit an Earth which the Reptiles had now vacated at the summons of Death? On this supremely interesting question Mr. Wells' answer is not confirmed by the other contemporary scholar whom we have been quoting in the present context.

According to Mr. Wells the rudimentary Mammals survived because, in spite of their obvious general weakness, they happened to be strong in just that form of strength which the particular ordeal demanded.

'These little Theriomorphs, these ancestral Mammals, developed hair. Hairs, like feathers, are long and elaborately specialized scales. Hair is

¹ Wells, H. G.: *The Outline of History* (London 1920, Cassell), pp. 22-4.

perhaps the clue to the salvation of the early Mammals. Leading lives upon the margin of existence, away from the marshes and the warmth, they developed an outer covering only second in its warmth-holding (or heat-resisting) powers to the down and feathers of the Arctic sea-birds. And so they held out through the age of hardship between the Mesozoic and Cainozoic ages, to which most of the true Reptiles succumbed.¹

Is this the true secret of the Mammals' relative success? If it is, it merely tells us that fur is a more effective physical armour against the cold than scales or carapaces. But other, and perhaps deeper, explanations are forthcoming. Bishop Barnes puts his finger on the principle which we have embraced in this Study under the name of 'Etherialization'.² 'In Mammals, developments resulting in greater simplicity [by contrast with Reptiles] are noteworthy.'³ Mr. Heard suggests that the armour which saved the Mammals' lives was not physical but psychic, and that the strength of this psychic defence lay in a physical defencelessness.

'The giant Reptiles were themselves hopelessly decadent before the rise of the Mammals. There was no hope any longer for this . . . step in Life's advance. They had begun [as] small, mobile, and lively creatures. They grew so vast that these land-ironclads could scarcely move; and many had to remain all their time awash in pools where water would bear some of their otherwise crushing weight. All their energy seems to have gone into their bodies, and their brains remained practically non-existent—in many cases the spinal column hardly enlarging when it entered the skull. Their heads were no more than periscopes, breathing-tubes and pincers.

'Meanwhile, as they slowly swelled and hardened up to their doom—until, it seems (with such a genus, for example, as *Triceratops*), bone-growth went on of itself; a huge degenerative accumulation of rigid tissue—there was already being fashioned that creature which was to leap the boundary and limits then set for Life, and start a new stage of energy and consciousness. And nothing could illustrate more vividly the principle that Life evolves by sensitiveness and awareness; by being exposed, not by being protected; by nakedness, not by strength; by smallness, not by size. The forerunners of the Mammals have now been discovered in the Cretaceous: the age which ends the Age of the Reptiles. These transitional types are minute rat-like creatures. In a world dominated by monsters the future is given to a creature which has to spend its time taking notice of others and giving way to others. It is undefended, given fur instead of scales. It is unspecialized, given again those sensitive feeling forelimbs and, no doubt, those antennae—the long hairs on the face and head—to give it irritating stimulation all the time. Ears and eyes are highly developed. It becomes warm-blooded, so [that] it may be constantly conscious throughout the cold, when the Reptile falls into

¹ Wells, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

² In III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 174-92, above.

³ Barnes, E. W.: *Scientific Theory and Religion* (Cambridge 1933, University Press), p. 472.

anaesthetic coma—kept alive in discomfort, that it may be constantly taking in and [that] its consciousness, in the end, may have to go on comparing conditions [which] it remembers enjoying with those [which] it now endures. So its consciousness is blown upon and developed. The varied continuous stimulant is reacted to with varied answer, because the creature, being unprecedented, is capable not of one but of many replies, none of which can settle the question for it.

'Here, then, we have the sensitive shoot—"the tender plant out of a dry ground"—from which we are sprung.'¹

Manchester and Osaka.

In the tragedy of the Reptiles we are presented with a case in which the penalty for the idolization of an ephemeral technique has been not an arrest upon the threshold of life but a breakdown following the attainment of an exuberant maturity; and we can, of course, think of more familiar cases of this latter variation on the plot of the play in our own human history. Indeed, an English student of history can put his finger on a human case near home; for 'the Mother of Parliaments', whose latter-day constituents are perhaps now in danger of idolizing the great political institution created by their ancestors,² has her domicile in a country that has won for itself in the realm of economic technique the equally proud title of 'the Workshop of the World'; and there are certain alarming indications, in this domain as well, that England in our day is paying her penalty for the perilous honour of having been the first country to achieve the Industrial Revolution.

In our day the country that gave birth to the Industrial System of production is a by-word for its technological conservatism; and its arch-conservatives are not the surviving representatives of the pre-industrial dispensation in those rare patches of the English country-side that have contrived to resist the penetrating and pervasive influence of a latter-day English world of mines and mills. On the contrary, they are the colliers and the textile-manufacturers whose grandfathers and great-grandfathers were the pioneers in the discovery of our modern industrial technique. These pioneers led the way in the Industrial Revolution not only for England but for the World; and it is evidently just for this reason that the epigoni are now making themselves notorious for an *ethos* which is the exact antithesis of the adventurous, experimental, adaptable, creative spirit that made the pioneers' fortune. The epigoni cannot believe that all is not 'for the best' in a technique which gave its inventors a virtual monopoly of the world market for

¹ Heard, Gerald: *The Source of Civilization* (London 1935, Cape), pp. 71-2.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 414-18, above.

industrial products for the greater part of a century; and even the belief that they are still living 'in the best of all possible worlds' for British manufacturers dies singularly hard in the face of a growing array of increasingly successful foreign competitors. It is now more than half a century since Germany and the United States—relieved, by the outcome of the wars of 1861-71, from their former handicaps of geographical disunity and political pre-occupation—first entered the lists of the industrial tournament and threw down the gauntlet to Great Britain;¹ and since the war of 1914-18 the ranks of Great Britain's industrial competitors have been joined by Japan, who was an *alter orbis*, unacquainted with any form of Western technique, until 'the eighteen-sixties', and even by France, who missed her opportunity, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of making the inventions which Great Britain then invented, and winning the rewards which Great Britain duly won, because she then allowed Napoleon to recall her from a new industrial adventure to the old enterprise—already proved barren by a series of abortive essays—of establishing a political hegemony over Europe by military force.² Yet even this formidable and ubiquitous competition with which the *ci-devant* 'Workshop of the World' is now confronted has not led the British manufacturer to overhaul the technique by which his ancestors once made an easy conquest of a virgin world market; and *à fortiori* it has not led him to adopt the technique through which his ancestors' English monopoly has been successfully disputed by his own foreign competitors.

These German, American, and Japanese poachers upon old English industrial preserves have had to face the problem of forcing an entry into a field already occupied by the English pioneers; and they have solved it by working out new kinds of technique which the Englishman had never thought of—or needed to think of—before their intrusion upon the scene: for instance, the technique of co-ordinating under a single management all the successive economic processes from the production of the raw materials to the marketing of the manufactured product, and the technique of procuring an unprecedentedly intimate and effective co-operation between the producer and the financier and between a nationally organized industry and the national Government. Like the English pioneers in their heyday, the present foreign competitors of the English epigoni have been free from the handicap of inheriting

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 4, pp. 175-8, above.

² For the non-French functions of the Napoleonic Empire see V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, vol. v, pp. 619-45, below. For the stimulus given to French industry by the devastation of the principal industrial areas of France in the war of 1914-18 see II. D (iv), vol. ii, pp. 107-8, above.

an older technique with a record of past efficacy which invites its present possessors to continue to bow down and worship it; and so, like the English pioneers, they have been free to make creative inventions. It is the English epigoni—in contrast to both their English predecessors and their foreign contemporaries—who are captivated by the idolization of an ephemeral technique; and the seriousness of the handicap can be gauged by the plight in which our English industry finds itself to-day.

In this light we can see that Great Britain is suffering doubly from her success, since 1914, in avoiding both the two calamities of invasion and inflation which have overtaken France and Germany respectively.¹ It is not only that these two industrial competitors of hers have been positively strengthened by the stimulus of blows to which they have effectively responded. From the English point of view it is perhaps even more serious that Great Britain herself, in escaping these blows, has lost a golden opportunity of relieving herself from the incubus of her own industrial past. She might have faced an industrially rejuvenated France and Germany with less cause for apprehension if only the same stroke of Fortune which has reinvigorated them had at the same time shattered the British idol of an obsolete pioneer technique.

This industrial competition between an old-fashioned England and a new-fangled Germany and Japan and United States is a drama which has the same denouement as the biological competition between the Mesozoic Reptiles and the Cainozoic Mammals; but the plots differ in one important respect. The two orders of animals, as Mr. Wells points out in the passage quoted above, did not compete directly with each other, but settled the question of who was to inherit the Earth by each grappling, separately and independently, with an identic challenge from the Physical Environment. On the other hand, our latter-day human question of who is to capture the world market is being settled by a direct encounter between the competitors, *corps à corps*. The plot of this human drama might be stated, from the point of view of a living English industrialist, in the words of a living English student of one of the physical sciences: 'A step in evolution in any animal group is followed by an evolutionary advance on the part of their parasites.'² In fact, our present conflict of industrial techniques is not inaccurately described—in a phrase which is frequently heard to-day—as 'economic warfare'; and if we now extend our survey to the classic form of warfare in which the technique employed is not

¹ For this English immunity from French and German misfortunes see II. D (iv), vol. ii, pp. 108-9, above.

² Haldane, J. B. S.: *Possible Worlds* (London 1927, Chatto & Windus), p. 42.

economic but military, we shall find that, in this sinister kind of human intercourse, the 'parasite' is perpetually preying upon a 'host' who, on his side, is perpetually being betrayed by his own self-conceit into placing himself at the 'parasite's' mercy.

Goliath and David.

In our human military history the analogue of the biological competition between the tiny soft-furred Mammal and the massive armoured Reptile is the saga of the duel between David and Goliath;¹ and if we take this legendary Syriac combat as our starting-point, we shall find the same drama acted and reperformed in a continuous series of matches between new-fangled and old-fashioned military techniques which will remind us of 'The Chain of Destruction' that Mayne Reid describes in *The Boy Hunters*.

Before the fatal day on which he challenges the armies of Israel, Goliath has won such triumphant victories with his spear whose staff is like a weaver's beam and whose head weighs six hundred shekels of iron, and has found himself so completely proof against hostile weapons in his panoply of casque and corselet and target and greaves, that he can no longer conceive of any alternative armament;² and he believes that in this armament he is invincible. He therefore challenges the enemy of the day to choose a champion to meet him in single combat, on the assumption that, if any champion is forthcoming, he will likewise be a spearman armed *cap-à-pie*, and in the assurance that any Israelite who has the hardihood to fight the Philistine champion with his own weapons will be an easy prey for him. So hard set is Goliath's mind in these two ideas that, when he sees David running forward to meet him with no armour on his body and nothing in his hand that catches the eye except a staff, Goliath takes umbrage, instead of taking alarm, at his adversary's apparent unpreparedness, and exclaims: 'Am I a dog, that thou comest to me with staves?' Goliath does not suspect that this youth's impertinence is not a piece of boyish folly but is, on the contrary, a carefully considered manœuvre (David having actually realized, quite as clearly as Goliath himself, that

¹ See the story as it is told in 1 Samuel xvii.

² For the Assyrian provenance of Goliath's armament see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 165, footnote 1, above. In contrast to this view of the origin of the hoplite's panoply, which is that of Professor G. Glotz, greater credit is given to the native inventiveness of the peoples of the Aegean area in J. Kromayer and G. Veith's *Heerwesen und Kriegsführung der Griechen und Römer* (Munich 1928, Beck), p. 21, footnote 4. 'Although', they write, 'there can be no doubt that certain isolated pieces of equipment were borrowed by the Greeks from the East, there is at the same time no ground for questioning the accuracy of our evidence that, on the banks of the Nile as well as in the army of the Great King of Assyria, the fully-armed Greek hoplite of the 8th and 7th centuries [B.C.], with his heavy but highly protective armament, made a powerful and exotic impression. The panoply of the Homeric hero is thus none the less something peculiarly Greek for having come into existence under Oriental inspiration.'

in Goliath's own accoutrements he cannot hope to be Goliath's match, and having therefore rejected, after trying on, the panoply which Saul has pressed upon him); nor does Goliath notice the sling in the hand which does not hold the staff, nor wonder what mischief may be hidden in the shepherd's bag. And so this luckless Philistine Triceratops stalks forward pompously to offer his unvisored forehead as a target for the sling-stone which is to slay him at one shot before ever his contemptible adversary comes within range of his hitherto lethal spear.

Goliath of Gath was not the first hoplite in the history of Life on Earth to court and incur this disconcerting doom; for armour far more ponderous than his had been worn by reptilian and mammalian cataphracts before ever Goliath's first human ancestor had made his appearance on the terrestrial scene.

'One seductive and ultimately always fatal path [of Evolution] has been the development of protective armour. An organism can protect itself by concealment, by swiftness in flight, by effective counter-attack, by uniting for attack and defence with other individuals of its species and also by encasing itself within bony plates and spines. The last course was adopted by the ganoid fishes of the Devonian with their shining armour. Some of the great lizards of the later Mesozoic were elaborately encased. Some Tertiary mammals, especially in South America, were immense and bizarre creatures; and one wonders how long a period of evolutionary history was needed for them thus to arm themselves. Always the experiment of armour failed. Creatures adopting it tended to become unwieldy. They had to move relatively slowly. Hence they were forced to live mainly on vegetable food; and thus in general they were at a disadvantage as compared with foes living on more rapidly "profitable" animal food. The repeated failure of protective armour shows that, even at a somewhat low evolutionary level, mind triumphed over mere matter. It is this sort of triumph which has been supremely exemplified in Man.'¹

It is ideally exemplified in the saga of David and Goliath. Yet, while this classic tale sums up for all time a philosophic truth that is also illustrated by the slowly unfolding history of human competition in armaments, it is at the same time a matter of historical fact that the individual hoplite champion of the post-Minoan interregnum—a Goliath of Gath or a Hector of Troy—did not succumb to David's sling or Philoctetes' bow but to the Myrmidons' phalanx:² a veritable Leviathan in which a multitude of hoplites set shoulder to shoulder and helmet to helmet and shield to shield.³

¹ Barnes, E. W.: *Scientific Theory and Religion* (Cambridge 1933, University Press), pp. 474-5.

² For the origin and diffusion of the phalanx technique see I. C (iii) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 428, footnote 2; and III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 165, footnote 1, above.

³ *Iliad* xvi, ll. 211-17.

While each single phalangite in the rank-and-file was a replica of Hector or Goliath in his accoutrements, he was the antithesis of the Homeric hoplite in his spirit; for the essence of the phalanx did not consist in the equipment of its component men-at-arms, but in the discipline which had transformed a barbaric rabble of individual warriors into a military formation whose orderly evolutions could accomplish ten times as much as the unco-ordinated efforts of an equal number of equally well-armed individual champions.

This new military technique, of which we already catch some anticipatory glimpses in the *Iliad*, made its indubitable entry upon the stage of history in the shape of a Spartan phalanx which marched through the rhythm of Tyrtæus's verses to its socially disastrous military victory in the second Messeno-Spartan War;¹ but the triumph of the Spartan phalanx was not definitive. After driving all its 'opposite numbers' off the field, it succumbed, in its turn, to new techniques; and it is significant that this discomfiture of the Spartan phalanx came to pass as soon as the Spartans were tempted to 'rest on their oars' on the strength of their victory in the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C.—a victory which seemed to complete the military supremacy of Sparta in Hellas and so to crown the victory which the same Spartan tactics had gained over the Messenians more than two hundred years before. Within thirty-three years of the Athenian débâcle of 404 B.C. the triumphant Spartan phalanx had been ignominiously put out of court: first by an Athenian swarm of peltasts²—a host of Davids with which the phalanx of Goliaths found itself quite unable to cope—and then by a Theban column, a tactical innovation which improved the phalanx, with decisive effect, by introducing an uneven distribution of its depth and weight and 'drive', and thereby capping the old asset of discipline with the new element of surprise. The Athenian and Theban techniques, however, were as swiftly and surely undone by their successive triumphs as the Spartan technique itself; for their respective victories over the Spartan phalanx in 390 and 371 were both cancelled at one stroke in 338 B.C. by a Macedonian formation in which a highly differentiated skirmisher and phalangite had been skilfully integrated with a heavy cavalry into a single fighting force.³

¹ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 165, above.

² For the peltast technique see loc. cit.

³ For the Macedonian combination of phalangite with skirmisher, and for the concomitant change in the phalangite's equipment, see loc. cit., above, and also IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), Annex, p. 636, footnote 3, below.

'One of the characteristics of Alexander's battle-tactics is that the differentiation between the tasks of the different arms has advanced still farther than it had gone in the tactics of Epaminondas. Each individual arm now co-operates—for its part and in its special role—with the whole, in such a way as to give the whole the aspect of a living organism. The function of the Macedonian cavalry is to strike the decisive blow by

If the Macedonian phalanx, with its light-armed fringe and its cavalry arm, surpassed the Spartan phalanx as an instrument of war in the measure of the difference in range between the Macedonian and the Spartan conquests, then the gulf between the two techniques was great indeed, since the Spartan phalanx merely conquered Hellas, while the Macedonian army conquered both Hellas and the Achaemenian Empire. From the banks of the Cephissus and the Eurotas to the banks of the Jaxartes and the Beas, the Macedonians marched at will without meeting any opponent who was able to stand up to them. But the most impressive testimony to the prowess of the Macedonian military machine is not the long list of the military Powers that were successively defeated by Philip II and Alexander the Great; it is the avowal which was made, after the event, by the victorious enemy commander of the opposing army in a decisive battle which was fought 170 years after Philip's crushing victory at Chaeronea.

'The consul Lucius [Aemilius Paullus] had never seen a phalanx in his life until he encountered one—for the first time—in the Roman war with Perseus; and, when it was all over, he used freely to confess to his friends at home that the Macedonian phalanx was the most formidable and terrifying sight that had ever met his eyes—and this from a soldier who had not merely witnessed, but had actually participated in, a greater number of actions than any other captain of the day.'¹

At Pydna, however, in 168 B.C. it was not Perseus' phalanx but Paullus's legions that emerged victorious; and the eulogy of the Macedonian formation which has just been quoted is at the same time a funeral oration pronounced over its dead body by the master of the Roman formation which dealt the phalanx its death-blow. The Macedonian army of the second century B.C. was as little able to cope with the Romans as the Athenian or Theban or Achaemenian fighting forces of the fourth century B.C. had been able to cope with the Macedonian army of Philip II and Alexander the Great; and the cause of this sensational *περίτρετα* in Macedonian military fortunes was the senile adulation of a technique² which had carried all before it through five successive generations.

charging home and then wheeling round to take the enemy on the flank; the function of the Thessalian cavalry is to fight a non-committal action of sorties, retreats, about-turns and renewed onsets; the function of the phalanx is to deliver a frontal attack in heavy massed formation; the function of the light troops is to cover the army's flanks and fight at long range; and the whole set of operations is co-ordinated, and is informed with a unitary spirit.'—Kromayer, J., and Veith, G.: *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer* (Munich 1928, Beck), pp. 118–19. (Cf. pp. 144 and 246–7.)

¹ Polybius, Book XXIX, chap. 17.

² One symptom of this technical senility was the pathological exaggeration of the regulation length of the Macedonian phalangite's *sarisa* (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), Annex, pp. 636–7, below). Another symptom was a tendency to rely more upon the phalanx and less upon the light infantry and the cavalry. As has been noted above, it was a masterly co-ordination of the use of all three arms that was the secret

*"Ἄνδρες Ἀλεξάνδροιο παρασπισταὶ βασιλῆος,
οἱ πάρος εὐρείης λαῖς ἐπέβητ' Ἀσίης,
εἶθ' ἤγειρα παρ' ὕμιν αὐτὴν τε πτόλεμόν τε·
εἶχετε γὰρ χάρμην, εἶχετε, θεσπεσίην.*

A hard-won Macedonian victory over a diminutive Athens and Thebes had been followed by an easy Macedonian conquest of the vast Achaemenian Empire;¹ and thereafter the Macedonian soldiers 'rested on their oars' as the unchallenged masters of all but the outskirts of the Habitable World,² while, beyond their western horizon, the Romans were revolutionizing the art of war through an experience gained from their sufferings in their tremendous struggle with Hannibal. The immense superiority of the post-Hannibalic Roman over the post-Alexandrine Macedonian fighting-machine was conclusively demonstrated at their first encounter;³ and the omen given by the cavalry skirmish in Illyria in 200 B.C.

of the victories of Philip and Alexander; but, if an estimate had to be made of the relative importance of the contribution of each arm to the common achievement, the verdict would be that Alexander might conceivably have conquered the Achaemenian Empire without the phalanx, but could not conceivably have succeeded if he had lacked either of the other two components of his composite fighting-force (see Hogarth, D. G.: *Philip and Alexander of Macedon* (London 1897, Murray), pp. 63-4; eundem: 'The Army of Alexander' in *The Journal of Philology*, vol. xvii (London & Cambridge 1888, Macmillan), pp. 5-17, especially pp. 5 and 8-10).

¹ The conquest was easy all the way from the passage of the Dardanelles to the transit of 'the Caspian Gates'. For the very much sturdier resistance which the Macedonian arms encountered in the north-eastern marches of the Achaemenian Empire, over against the Eurasian Steppe, see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 140, above.

² Though the Macedonians themselves waited blindly and passively for their doom to overtake them, the future was divined on inference from the past—and this as early as the next generation after Alexander the Great—by the Athenian philosopher and statesman Demetrius of Phalerum, who governed Athens in the Macedonian interest from 317 to 307 B.C.; and after Demetrius's prophecy had been conclusively vindicated in 168 B.C. at Pydna it was quoted with admiration by the Arcadian historian Polybius:

"The fate of Macedon has often vividly recalled to my mind the words of Demetrius of Phalerum. In his work on Fortune, in which his object is to indicate unambiguously to his fellow men the mutability of this principle, Demetrius interrupts his narrative of the epoch of the overthrow of the Persian Empire by Alexander in order to make the following observations:

"In order to realize the baffling character of Fortune there is no necessity to take account of vast periods of time extending over many generations. The past half-century provides a sufficient example. Supposing that, fifty years ago, some divinity had foretold the future to the Persians and the King of Persia or to the Macedonians and the King of Macedon, do you imagine that they would ever have believed that at the present date the very name of Persia—at that time mistress of almost the entire Habitable World—would be utterly blotted out, while the Macedonians, whose name was previously unknown, would have the World at their feet? In my belief, however, this is only one of the signs and wonders by which Fortune is perpetually demonstrating to Mankind her power, her incommensurability with human life, and her revolutionary practice of disconcerting human reason. In setting Macedon in the seat of mighty Persia, she has signified the fact that her investiture of Macedon with the insignia of empire is equally revocable and contingent upon her discretion."

"In the case of Perseus this eventuality has come to pass. The words of Demetrius have proved themselves inspired and prophetic; and, now that my own narrative has brought me to the epoch of the overthrow of the Macedonian Kingdom, I feel that, as a first-hand witness of the event, I should not be justified in passing it over without pointing the moral myself and giving his due to Demetrius. To my mind there is a supernatural prescience in his dictum. He has accurately anticipated the course of events almost a century and a half in advance' (Polybius, Book XXIX, chap. 21).

³ See the passage from Livy which has been quoted in II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 163, above.

436 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS
was fulfilled in 197 B.C. at Cynoscephalae and was confirmed in
168 B.C. at Pydna.

The Roman legion triumphed over the Macedonian phalanx because it carried the integration of the light infantryman with the phalangite, which the Macedonians had begun,¹ a long step farther. In the Macedonian technique this integration depended on a meticulously exact co-ordination of two arms which were at the farthest possible extreme from one another in their equipment and their training, and which were actually still segregated from one another in separate units.² If this vital co-ordination between the Macedonian phalanx and the Macedonian light infantry happened to break down on the battle-field, then either arm, just because of its extreme specialization, was in danger of finding itself at the mercy of a more versatile adversary. Accordingly everything depended on the precision of military evolutions in the field; and the necessary precision was obviously impossible to guarantee. Such natural *contretemps* as the fog at Cynoscephalae and the broken ground at Pydna were enough to dislocate a Macedonian army's formation with results that were disastrous when the enemy was a fighting-force with the efficiency of the post-Hannibalic Roman army.

This Roman efficiency was a thing of yesterday; for in the Central Italian penumbra of the Hellenic World an old-fashioned phalanx of the pre-Macedonian, and indeed pre-Theban, type had been seen in the field at as recent a date as the day of Cannae, when the heavy Roman infantry, embattled in an antique Spartan phalanx-formation, had been rounded up from the rear by Hannibal's Spanish and Gallic heavy cavalry, and had then been slaughtered like cattle by his African heavy infantry on either flank.³ But in the hard school of their repeated defeats in the Hannibalic War the

¹ In the Macedonian phalanx as it was in Alexander's day 'we have . . . the best parallel to the Roman infantry' (Hogarth, 'The Army of Alexander', p. 8).

² Hogarth (op. cit., p. 7) gives some grounds for supposing that the phalanx itself may have been 'mixed with lighter files'. If there is anything in this conjecture, it would follow that the post-Hannibalic Roman infantry technique was virtually anticipated by Philip and Alexander.

³ See Tarn, W. W.: *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments* (Cambridge 1930, University Press), p. 67. According to Veith (in Kromayer and Veith, op. cit., pp. 291 and 293) the phalanx-formation in which the Roman heavy infantry fought at Cannae was not the customary Roman formation of the age but was an anachronism—perhaps by then already as much as a century out of date—into which the Romans had relapsed in a kind of psychological 'regression' set in motion by the shock of the disasters which had overtaken the up-to-date 'manipular phalanx' at the Trebia and at Trasimene. In reverting to the old-fashioned phalanx at Cannae the Romans played for safety and incurred annihilation. On this view, the old-fashioned phalanx formation and tactics had been yielding, in the Roman art of war, to the rudiments of the manipular formation and tactics ever since the time of the Romano-Samnite and Romano-Epirot wars (circa 343–274 B.C.). On this showing, the Roman transformation of the Spartan phalanx into the more flexible manipular phalanx was contemporaneous with the Macedonian transformation of the same Spartan phalanx into the more ponderous Macedonian phalanx (see Veith in op. cit., p. 262)—unless Hogarth (see the preceding footnote) is correct in believing that the distinctive feature of Alexander's phalanx, too, was its 'mobility and adaptability' (Hogarth, op. cit., p. 5).

Romans had taught themselves an improvement in infantry technique which transformed the Roman Army, at a stroke, from the least to the most efficient fighting-force in the Hellenic World of the day by eliminating the crucial weakness of the prevailing Macedonian system. In those creative years the Romans had invented a new type of armament and a new type of formation which made it possible for any given soldier, and any given unit, to play either the light infantryman's or the hoplite's part, and to change over from the one kind of tactics to the other at a moment's notice in the face of the enemy.¹

The superiority of this post-Hannibalic Roman infantry technique over a Macedonian technique that had been static for more than a century before the outbreak of the second Romano-Macedonian War in 200 B.C. is lucidly explained by the contemporary Arcadian observer Polybius:

"The phalanx, with its unique and potent technique, can count, as is easily demonstrable, upon sweeping away any enemy formation that ventures to face it front to front. Its charge is irresistible. . . . What,

¹ The post-Hannibalic Roman legionary was capable of playing either the light infantryman's or the hoplite's part for the reason that he was as unlike the one as the other in his equipment. With his throwing-spear, sword, and huge convex oblong shield, he was really a reimpersonation of the Mycenaean warrior of whom we catch a last glimpse in the Homeric Epic as the hoplite supplants him. Moreover the post-Hannibalic legionary, like his Mycenaean prototype, was an individual fighter—though he had discovered the secret of combining the advantages of individualism with those of drill (see Veith in op. cit., pp. 361-2). Is it possible that, in this far corner of the Hellenic World, the Mycenaean equipment and tactics actually survived, in competition with the new-fangled phalanx, in order to come into their own again when the phalanx was played out? Be that as it may, it seems clear that it was the very old-fashionedness of the form of the Spartan phalanx, as the Romans employed it, that gave them the opportunity of developing the manipular phalanx out of it. The Roman version of the Spartan phalanx never reached the stage of homogeneity in armament between the front and rear ranks. The latter never ceased to be manned by imperfectly armed javelin-men; and all that was required in order to produce the rudiments of the manipular phalanx was to make the front and rear ranks exchange arms—handing the *pilani's* javelins to the *hastati* and the *hastati's* spears to the *pilani* (see Veith in op. cit., p. 278). Through this transposition the Romans (unlike the Macedonians, even with their ever lengthening *sarissas* (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), Annex, pp. 366-7, below)), succeeded in solving the problem of bringing into effective action the whole of their force throughout its depth from front to rear. (For this problem see Veith in op. cit., pp. 289-90.) In the new formation the now Mycenaean-armed '*hastati*' opened the battle, while the now Spartan-armed '*pilani*', who had previously been mere makeweights, obtained an independent value of their own as a heavy reserve (the *trarii*, who were thrown into action after the '*hastati*' and the '*principes*' had successively engaged the enemy). This incidental invention of the reserve was perhaps the greatest original Roman contribution to the Art of War (Veith in op. cit., p. 3). According to Veith the lesson of Cannae caused the Romans to repent of their regression to the Spartan phalanx without making them blind to the inadequacy of the manipular phalanx which had been the lesson of the Trebia and Trasimene. They solved the problem by carrying the evolution which was inchoate in the manipular phalanx to the logical conclusion that has just been described; and by the end of the Hannibalic War the process was complete—full-fledged manipular tactics being employed on both sides at the battles of Great Plains and Zama (Veith in op. cit., pp. 293-6). The gradual supplanting of the spear by the javelin-and-sword as the principal weapon of the Roman army in the course of the fourth and third centuries B.C. may be compared with the supplanting of the pike by the musket-and-bayonet in our modern Western military technique in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of our era.

then, is the explanation of the triumph of the Romans? And what is the catch that makes the employment of the phalanx spell defeat?

'The catch lies in the discrepancy between that element of indeterminability—both of situations and of *terrain*—which is inherent in War as a practical art, and the inelasticity of the phalanx, which in practice can only do itself justice in one particular situation and on one particular kind of *terrain*. Of course, if, whenever it was a question of a decisive engagement, the enemy were under compulsion to accept the situation and the *terrain* that happen to suit the phalanx, then presumably the employment of the phalanx would be an infallible talisman of victory. But if it is in fact always possible—and easily possible—for the enemy to decline battle on these terms, then the phalanx-formation ceases to be formidable.

'Moreover it is admitted that the phalanx requires a *terrain* which is level and clear and innocent of any such obstacles as ditches, outcrops, ravines, crags and water-courses—any of which are quite enough to throw it out of step and to dislocate its formation. It will also be admitted on all hands that the kind of *terrain* which the phalanx requires—a *terrain* innocent of obstacles over a stretch of two thousand yards and upwards—is almost impossible to find, or is at any rate exceedingly rare; and, even supposing that it has been found, it is always possible, as we have pointed out, for the enemy to decline battle . . . [or, if he does accept battle with the phalanx on level ground, the enemy can still always secure the victory by keeping part of his own force in reserve, engaging the phalanx with the rest of his force just so far as to loosen the phalanx's formation and cause it to expose its flanks, and then throwing his reserves against the flanks or rear of the phalanx when these are no longer covered by light infantry and cavalry].¹ In short, the situations that are in favour of the phalanx can be easily evaded by the enemy, whereas the phalanx cannot evade the situations that tell against it; and, if the facts as I have stated them are true, this is manifestly an enormous handicap.

'Moreover a phalanx, like any other force, has to march through all kinds of country, to encamp, to forestall the enemy in occupying key-positions, to conduct and undergo sieges, and to encounter unforeseen emergencies. All these operations—which are part and parcel of War—are apt to be influential, and are sometimes decisive, in determining the issue. And for all such operations the Macedonian military technique is clumsy, and sometimes entirely ineffective, because it does not permit the phalangite to do himself justice either in the ranks or as an individual. On the other hand the Roman military technique is effective for all these operations alike, because every Roman soldier, once under arms and on duty, is equally well adapted for dealing with every kind of *terrain* and situation and emergency; and not only so, but he is also equally in his element, and equally master of the situation, whether he is called upon to take part in a general or in a partial engagement, or to go into action by companies, or to carry on individually. It will be seen that

¹ The passage between brackets is a précis of the corresponding passage in the original.—A.J.T.

the Roman fighting-machine is enormously superior to its rivals in its efficiency in detail, and it is therefore only natural that the Romans should be enormously more successful than their adversaries in attaining their military objectives.¹

This versatility, which was the characteristic feature of the full-fledged Roman military genius, made the integration of the skirmisher with the hoplite complete; for the mobility of the one and the irresistibility of the other were now combined in the person of every legionary; and when the legion, after having been evoked by Hannibal and employed, with destructive effect, against the antiquated Macedonian array, had been perfected in the Roman anti-barbarian and civil wars by a series of great captains beginning with Marius and ending with Caesar, it had attained the greatest efficiency which was possible for infantry before the invention of firearms.² At the very moment, however, when the legionary was becoming perfect after his own kind, he received the first of a long series of defeats from a pair of mounted men-at-arms with utterly different techniques—the light horse-archer³ and the mail-clad lancer or cataphract⁴—who between them were eventually to drive the legionary

¹ Polybius, Book XVIII, chaps. 29–32, apropos of Titus Quinctius Flamininus's victory over King Philip V at Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C. The same contrast has been described in the following terms by a modern Western scholar, Dr. Georg Veith:

'The Greek was at all times conscious of his own limitations in the sphere of military capacity; hence his tendency towards specialization, in an effort to bring to the highest perfection—even at the cost of one-sidedness—the relatively little of valuable military material that the individual Greek possessed in himself. This was the origin of the manifold distinctions of special troops within each of the arms, and of that peculiarly characteristic mark of the Greek art of war: an evolution whose line of progress was from the simple to the complex, and which pushed the specialisation of equipment to the farthest limits. (This evolution reached its highest point under Alexander the Great, which was also the moment when the whole Greek art of war was at its zenith.) Conversely, among the Romans we find—as an ideal which was thoroughly attainable and was also actually attained—the soldier in himself, who, in his soldierly capacity, has to be—and duly is—available in equal measure for every kind of special employment. The logical consequence is a development, in the Roman art of war, from a differentiation—which is to be found, here too, at the beginning—to a parity of importance as between the different arms and equipments, and thence to a principal force which is homogeneous through and through (the always indispensable special weapons sinking to the status of subsidiary weapons in the hands of foreign formations). Thus the Greek evolution from the simple to the complex finds its contrast in a Roman development from the complex to the simple; and this simple instrument attains, in virtue of its very simplification, a perfection which renders it capable of at least as great a versatility in its employment as was within the reach of the complicated Greek army of the Macedonian period and the Age of the Diadochi.'—Kromayer, J., and Veith, G.: *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer* (Munich 1928, Beck), p. 3.

² For this chapter in the history of the evolution of the legion see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 166, above.

³ The light build of the horse-archer's (in contrast to the cataphract's) mount is conveyed in the representation on a coin struck by the Roman general Labienus (see *The Cambridge Ancient History*, Plates, vol. iv, plate facing p. 8, fig. [o]).

⁴ The heavily armed cavalryman or cataphract, like the heavily armed infantryman or hoplite, was perhaps an Assyrian invention—the hoplite being in that case the earliest and the cataphract the latest creation of the Assyrian military genius. At any rate, our first evidence for the existence of the cataphract is the portrayal of a rudimentary representative of the type on Assyrian bas-reliefs of the 7th century B.C., where he appears side by side with the heavily armed charioteer. Since these reliefs are later in date than the irruption of the Cimmerian and Scyth Nomads into South-Western Asia (see II. D

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off the field *à la débânde*. The victory of the horse-archer over the legionary at Carrhae in 53 B.C. forestalled, by five years, the classic combat of legionary against legionary in 48 B.C. at Pharsalus, a battle in which the Roman infantry technique was probably at its zenith.¹ The omen of Carrhae was confirmed, more than four centuries later, at Adrianople, where the cataphract gave the legionary his *coup de grâce* in A.D. 378.²

The disaster at Adrianople, which was the tragic end of an ascendancy that the legionary had retained—albeit with increasing difficulty—for nearly six hundred years, has been vividly described by a contemporary Roman officer who was also a Latin historian.³

On the eve of this catastrophe the confidence of the Roman high command in the traditional Roman military technique was still so overweening that the Emperor Valens, who had just succeeded in making contact with the Gothic host that was then ravaging the Roman territory of Thrace, insisted on administering immediate punishment to the refractory barbarians.⁴ He would not wait for

(v), vol. ii, p. 136, above), we may conjecture that the Assyrians were inspired to take this first step towards the creation of the cataphract by their encounter with these horse-archers from the Eurasian Steppe. Assyria, like the Sinic World, probably derived the art of riding from this Eurasian source (see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 167, footnote 1, above), and, *a fortiori*, the art of using the bow on horseback—just as, some twelve hundred years earlier, the neighbours of Eurasia had been initiated, through a previous eruption of Nomads, into the art of chariotry (till then unknown to the sedentary societies, as was, indeed, the horse itself). The Assyrians' reaction to their encounter with the Nomads seems to have been to combine the Nomads' archery-on-horseback with the Assyrian heavy infantryman's defensive armour. In the Achaemenian Age a *cap-d-pie* suit of armour was worn on horseback by the Persian grandee Masistius at the Battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. (see Herodotus, Book IX, chap. 22). The Achaemenidae would also appear to have made a start in armouring the war-horse as well as his rider, *teste Xenophonte* (*Anabasis*, Book I, chap. 8, § 7; *Cyropaedia*, Book VI, chap. 1, §§ 50-1, and chap. 4, § 1; Book VII, chap. 1, § 2; *De Re Equestri*, chap. 12, § 8). From the Achaemenian Empire a fighting-machine which was thus perhaps of Nomadic inspiration was borrowed back—with the improvement of armouring both rider and horse—by the neighbouring Nomads on the border of the Steppe between the Pamirs and the Caspian. The Massagetae, for instance, are described by Herodotus (Book I, chap. 215) as armouring their horses in the fashion that is ascribed by Xenophon to the Achaemenian cavalry. In this Nomad incarnation the cataphract then moved back south-westwards with the Parni who founded the Parthian Empire (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 371, footnote 2, and II. D (vii), Annex V, vol. ii, p. 435, footnote 1), and north-westwards with the Sarmatians, who passed the cataphract on to the Goths when the Goths trespassed upon the great gulf of the Eurasian Steppe between the Black Sea and the northern forests. It was the Parni who made it technically possible to complete a process which the Assyrians appear to have first set in motion. On the pastures of Media they bred a horse of such size, strength, and elegance that he could bear the weight of a complete suit of armour for himself as well as for his rider (see Tarn, W. W.: *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments* (Cambridge 1930, University Press), pp. 76-83; eundem: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 308-10). This Parthian full-fledged cataphract is portrayed in a *graffito* at Dura (see *The Cambridge Ancient History*, Plates, vol. iv, plate facing p. 26, fig. [c]). The Parthian cataphract helped the Parthian horse-archer to defeat the legionary at Carrhae in 53 B.C.; the Gothic cataphract confirmed his defeat in A.D. 378 at Adrianople.

¹ The Age of Caesar marks the 'qualitativen Höhepunkt des römischen Kriegswesens' according to Kromayer and Veith, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

² For the annals of the secular duel between the legionary and the cataphract see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 164 and 166, above.

³ Ammianus Marcellinus: *Res Gestae*, Book XXXI, chaps. 11-13.

⁴ The Goths had been given passage across the Lower Danube by the Roman author-

the reinforcements which his nephew and colleague Gratian was bringing by forced marches from the west, though he had received dispatches announcing that Gratian's army was now on the point of joining hands with his;¹ and he would not entertain the overtures which the Goths—disconcerted at having evoked so strong a Roman military reaction—were belatedly attempting to make to their indignant Imperial adversary. Valens gave the order for his legions to march at once upon the Gothic lager; and at first sight it seemed as though his intransigent policy were justified by its effect. 'The terrifying din of [the legionaries'] clashing arms, and their aggressive drumming on their shields, so intimidated the barbarians—who were also weakened by the absence of a part of their host which was operating at a distance under the command of Alatheus and Saphrax, and had not yet had time to return, though the order was on its way to them—that they sent *parlementaires* to ask for peace.' It looked as though the legions had won their victory without having had to strike a blow; but in reality Valens' intransigence had not broken the Goths' spirit but had inspired them with the courage of despair; and the parley was a feint.

The purpose of the Gothic commander Fritigern was simply to gain time until he could take up the Roman challenge with his whole force—including the absent corps, which consisted of the heavy cavalry—and his ruse was successful; for he managed to draw the parley out—while the Romans stood to arms, without food or water, through the heat of the day—until 'the Gothic cavalry, reappearing on the scene with Alatheus and Saphrax at its head, and stiffened by a contingent of Alani,² burst upon the Roman

ities, at the Goths' own request, out of the *cul-de-sac* in which the great western bay of the Eurasian Steppe comes to an end between the Lower Danube and the Carpathians, and they had been allowed to settle, as *foederati* of the Empire, on Roman territory between the Danube and the Balkan Range. In intention and in principle this had been a friendly act, since the Goths, in the *cul-de-sac* which had been their previous home, were threatened with annihilation by the eruption of the Huns from the heart of the Steppe beyond the Volga and the Yaik. The arrangement between the Gothic refugees and the Roman authorities ought to have proved mutually beneficial, since the refugees, in finding an asylum on Roman soil, might have been expected to become a bulwark of the Empire against the assaults of the common Hun enemy. Unfortunately the execution of the agreement was at once followed by friction; and the blame for this was largely on the Roman side, since the minor officials of the Imperial administration seem to have regarded their Government's generous policy towards the Goths as an opportunity for fleecing and bullying the refugees on their own account. In any case, wherever the fault lay, the Goths broke with the Imperial Government and began to pillage the country-side on which they had been settled as friends and allies of the Empire. And, not unnaturally, this behaviour was hotly resented by the Roman authorities, in whose eyes it was not only flagrant treason but was also base ingratitude.

¹ Valens' impatience is put down by Ammianus to his jealousy of Gratian and his consequent determination to keep all the Gothic laurels for himself. His decision to go into action at once was taken against the advice of his *Magister Equitum* Victor: 'Sarmata, sed cunctator et cautus.'

² The Alani were one of the hordes of those Sarmatian Nomads upon whose pastures the Goths had intruded when they broke out of the northern forests into the great western bay of the Eurasian Steppe. The eruption of the Huns from the heart of the

army as a thunderbolt bursts against a mountain-range, charged at lightning speed, and swept away, in a whirlwind of slaughter, as many of the Roman troops as it managed to engage at close quarters'. The legionaries were thrown out of their formation and were herded together into so dense a mass that they had no longer any room to wield, or even draw, their swords; and in this helpless plight they suffered the fate which their own predecessors had once inflicted on the Macedonian phalangites. Having caught the legionaries at this irretrievable disadvantage, the cataphracts pressed home their attack without giving their discomfited opponents a chance to rally, until 'at length, under the weight and "drive" of the barbarian offensive, the Roman line gave way, and the legionaries—driven to the last resort in a desperate situation—took to their heels in a chaotic *sauve qui peut*'. The historian vouches for the fact that 'the Roman casualties amounted to about two-thirds of the effectives engaged' (the Emperor Valens himself was among the missing); and he expresses the opinion that, 'apart from the Battle of Cannae, there' was 'no record, in all the annals of Roman military history, of any other action in which the carnage was so great as this'.

In measuring Adrianople by Cannae, Ammianus gives proof of his historical insight, for it was the slaughter at Cannae, where the Roman infantry had been at the mercy of Hannibal's heavy cavalry, that had stimulated the Roman military genius into transforming a clumsy phalanx on the old-fashioned Spartan model into the mobile legion which had been victorious first at Zama and then at Cynoscephalae and Pydna. In the year of Adrianople, however, the lesson of Cannae was nearly six hundred years old; and during those six centuries the Roman legionaries had 'rested on their oars', like the Macedonian phalangites before them,¹ until they allowed themselves to be overtaken and ridden down by an Oriental heavy cavalry which was a more formidable engine of war than Hannibal's

Steppe had now blown Sarmatians and Goths, pell-mell, out of Nomads' land into the Roman Empire. It was from the Sarmatians, as we have seen (p. 439, footnote 4, above), that the Goths had acquired the technique of the cataphract.

¹ This Roman repetition of a Macedonian story of degeneration in military technique appears to have been remarkably close. The Macedonian phalangite, who had won his triumphs over his Theban adversary by combining a longer range of weapon with a superior mobility (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), Annex, p. 636, footnote 3, below), had eventually succumbed to the Roman legionary because, in the meantime, he had sacrificed mobility to massiveness (see the present chapter, pp. 434-5, above). On the evidence of Arrian's *Ἐκταῦς καὶ Ἀλάνων* (A.D. 136), a modern Western scholar (Parker, H. M. D.: *The Roman Legions* (Oxford 1928, Clarendon Press), pp. 248-9 and 258-60) has conjectured that in the legions (as distinct from the auxilia) the Roman Army was relapsing, as early as the second century of the Christian Era, from the mobile manipular formation into the unwieldy Theban-Spartan formation to which the Roman infantry had reverted once before with such disastrous consequences at Cannae (see p. 436, footnote 3, above). On this point see also Darkó, E.: 'Influences Turaniennes sur l'Évolution de l'Art Militaire des Grecs, des Romains et des Byzantins' in *Byzantion*, vol. x (Brussels 1935), p. 459.

European squadrons, and which could not be coped with effectively without some fresh innovation in infantry technique. The effective innovation was discovered in the end, but not for a thousand years, and then not by Roman wits. Though the Romans had received repeated warnings of the legionary's inferiority to Oriental cavalry—in Crassus's disaster of 53 B.C. and Valerian's of A.D. 260 and Julian's of A.D. 363—they had not been stimulated to make any fresh creative advance in infantry technique. They had left the legion, unreformed, to its fate; and when 'the knock-out blow' was duly delivered in the fullness of time in A.D. 378 at Adrianople, they could think of no more original remedy than to discard the defeated legionary outright and to take over the victorious cataphract at second-hand.¹ Gratian's colleague and successor, Theodosius, rewarded the barbarian horsemen for having annihilated the Roman infantry by hiring them to fill the vacant place; and, even when the Imperial Government had paid the inevitable price for the brief respite that was purchased by this short-sighted policy, and had seen the mercenary barbarian troopers partition all its western provinces into barbarian 'successor-states', the new native army,² which saved the Greek and Oriental provinces, at the eleventh hour, from going the same way, was armed and mounted on the barbarian pattern.³

¹ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 164, above.

² For the creation of a new native army by the Roman Government at Constantinople in the course of the fifth century of the Christian Era see IV (iii) (c) 2 (B), pp. 324-5, above.

³ See the description—given by Procopius of Caesarea in *A History of the Wars of Justinian*, and quoted in this Study in III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 163, above—of the cataphracts who were Belisarius's instrument for the reconquest of Africa and Italy in the sixth century of the Christian Era. The arm already existed in the Roman Army, even before the disaster of A.D. 378 raised the cataphract's prestige to the skies and reduced the legionary's prestige to zero. At the battle of Adrianople itself, after the legions had given way, the Emperor Valens took refuge with the two heavy-cavalry regiments of Lancearii and Mattiarii, 'qui, dum multitudo tolerabatur hostilis, fixis corporibus steterant inconcussi' (Ammianus, op. cit., Book XXXI, chap. 13); and before that, in the Imperial bodyguard which had accompanied the Emperor Constantius on his state entry into the city of Rome in A.D. 356, there had been 'a sprinkling of cataphract cavalymen, popularly known as *clibanarii*' [i.e. 'hard-ware boys' or 'men in ironmongery', from *clibanus*, which was the Greek word for an iron baker's-oven], of whose accoutrements Ammianus (op. cit., Book XVI, chap. 10) gives the following description: 'Their persons were protected by being cased in cuirasses and swathed in metal hoops which gave them the appearance of being not so much men of flesh and blood as statues brought to a fine finish by the hand of a Praxiteles. Their armour consisted of thin loops of metal plating which were adjusted to the curves of the body and which not only encircled the trunk but were also carried down all the limbs with such skill that, whatever bodily movement the trooper might require to make, his metallic integument would conform to it by adjusting itself at the joints—and this without exposing any gaps.' Evidently the Roman armourers of the fourth century of the Christian Era had borrowed from the Sarmatians the idea of a heavy cavalryman armed *cap-à-pie*, and had then translated the Sarmatian scale-armour into the hoop-armour which was already being worn, at the turn of the first and second centuries, by Trajan's legionaries (both the Roman legionary's hoop-armour and the Sarmatian cataphract's scale-armour are portrayed in the bas-reliefs on Trajan's Column). The hoop-armour of the legionary was confined to shoulder-pieces and corselet; but the more difficult art of encasing, without impeding, an arm or a leg had been worked out on the gladiatorial arena in the armament of the *secutor*. A combination of the *secutor* with the Trajanic legionary gives the fourth-

The ignominy of the legionary's end is accentuated by the strange fact that the cataphract who rode him down on the plains of Thrace in A.D. 378 was himself a degenerate. The Parthian cavalryman who had forced Crassus's legions to capitulate at Carrhae in 53 B.C. had been a horse-archer, like his native Nomad prototype; the Sarmatian and Gothic cataphracts who annihilated Valens' legions at Adrianople were mere lancers¹ who won their victory by the crude and clumsy method of charging home, in substitution for the refined technique of overwhelming their enemy—in the manner of the Suren's horse-archers at Carrhae in 53 B.C.—with a ceaseless discharge of arrows supplied by a never-failing camel commissariat.² Carrhae 'ought to have revolutionized the World's warfare; but in fact it produced little effect, for Surenas was put to death next year and his organization broken up'.³ The future lay not with the light horse-archer but with the cataphract, who had been represented at Carrhae in the Parthian ranks⁴ without making any notable contribution to the brilliant victory of his unarmoured comrade. And the cataphract had no sooner put on the Assyrian infantryman's armour than he had begun to discard the Nomad's bow for the hoplite's lance. The rudimentary Assyrian cataphract still remained a horse-archer; and a force of a thousand Sakas who fought for the last of the Achaemenidae at Gaugamela in 331 B.C. are described as still being equipped with bows⁵ though

century *clibanarius* when the 'hard-ware boy' is mounted on a horse—as he must be if he is to move! (The *clibanarius*'s mount seems to have been as heavily armoured as his rider, to judge by another description, which carries our evidence for the existence of this type of heavy cavalryman in the Roman Army back to the time of Constantius's father Constantine the Great. 'Men and horses alike are encased in a covering of iron. The name that they go by in the Army is *clibanarii*. The men are not only armour-clad themselves; the horses, too, on which they are mounted, have their chests protected by a cuirass that reaches from their heads right down to their legs and makes them proof against the danger of being wounded without hampering their gait' (Nazarius: *Panegyricus Constantino Augusto Dictus*, chap. 22, in Baehrens, G.: *XII Panegyrici Latini* (Leipzig 1911, Teubner), p. 173).) A combination (see Darkó, op. cit., in *Byzantion*, vol. x (1935), p. 466) of the defensive armour of the *clibanarius* with the missile-weapon of the light-armed horse-archer (who was both an older and a longer-lived type of Nomad cavalryman than the heavy-armed lancer) gives the sixth-century Roman cataphract. This re-equipment of the *ci-devant* Nomad heavy cavalryman with the original Nomad weapon which the cataphract had abandoned in favour of the lance (see p. 444, above) was the last stroke of the Roman military genius—unless it was merely a Roman mimesis of a compromise between the Scythian and the Sarmatian equipment which had been worked out, five hundred years earlier, on the Cimmerian Bosphorus (see p. 445, footnote 8, below). We catch a last glimpse of this later Roman cataphract in the *Τακτικά*, attributed to the Emperor Maurice (*imperabat* A.D. 582–602), which, according to Darkó (op. cit., in *Byzantion*, vol. xii (1937), pp. 121–4), was perhaps really written by Maurice's successor Heraclius during his retirement (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, footnote 4, above) in the winter of A.D. 621–2. According to the same Hungarian scholar (op. cit., vol. cit., p. 128) the Roman cavalry equipment described in this treatise was modelled on that of the contemporary Avar Nomads.

¹ Darkó, op. cit., in *Byzantion*, vol. xii (1937), p. 142.

² For the munitions and the tactics that defeated the legionary at Carrhae, see Tarn, W. W.: *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments* (Cambridge 1930, University Press), pp. 83–92, and eudem in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. ix, pp. 606–11.

³ Tarn, *Developments*, p. 91.

⁴ See p. 439, footnote 4, above.

⁵ Arrian: *Alexandri Anabasis*, Book III, chap. 8, § 3.

the horses as well as the men were armoured.¹ When they went into action, however, these Saka *de.ni*-cataphracts did not shoot; they charged.² And the Parthian full-blown cataphract who is portrayed in the *graffito* at Dura³ does not even carry a bow in addition to his lance. Notwithstanding the success of the light horse-archer against Crassus at Carrhae, the failure of the charging cataphract against Ventidius in the next round of this Romano-Parthian trial of strength,⁴ and the renewed success of the light horse-archer against Mark Antony,⁵ the Parthians opted for the cataphract;⁶ and the Arsacids' example was followed by their successors the Sasanidae. It is true that Belisarius's sixth-century Roman cataphracts, as Procopius describes them,⁷ were horse-archers of the Assyrian kind; but in general it was the armoured lancer, and not the armoured horse-archer, who kept the saddle for the next twelve hundred years after the light horse-archer's victory at Carrhae; and there is an extraordinary uniformity in this lancer's accoutrements over a Time-span of more than a millennium and across the length and breadth of Europe and Asia. His identity is unmistakable, whether the portrait in which he presents himself to us happens to be in some fresco, dating from the first century of the Christian Era, in a Crimean tomb;⁸ or on the third- and fourth- and fifth- and sixth-century bas-reliefs of Sasanian kings in Fars; or in the clay figurines of those Far Eastern men-at-arms who were the fighting-force of the T'ang Dynasty (*imperabant* A.D. 618-907);⁹ or in the eleventh-century tapestry at Bayeux which depicts the defeat of the antiquated English foot-soldiers of the day by King William the Conqueror's Norman knights.¹⁰

¹ Arrian, *op. cit.*, Book III, chap. 13, § 4.

² Arrian, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

³ See p. 439, footnote 4, above.

⁴ See Tarn in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. x, pp. 49-51.

⁵ Tarn in *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 71-5.

⁶ This discomfiture of the light horse-archer by the heavy-armed lancer on his native pastures is reflected in the history of the Hellenic mimesis of the Nomadic military technique. In the fourth century B.C. Alexander the Great, when he arrived at the Transoxanian fringe of the Great Eurasian Steppe, took to mixing light native horse-archers with his own Macedonian heavy cavalry; and more than four hundred years later the Roman Emperor Hadrian (*imperabat* A.D. 117-38), in his turn, introduced light horse-archers into the Roman Army (Arrian: *Τέχνη Τακτική*, chap. 44). On the other hand the Roman cavalry of the Emperor Gallienus (*imperabat* A.D. 253-68) were mostly not horse-archers but heavy lancers who were presumably the prototypes of the fourth-century *clibanarii* (see p. 443, footnote 3, above) of the Emperors Maxentius, Constantius and Valens. (For these facts see Darkó, *op. cit.*, in *Byzantion*, vol. x (1935), pp. 452-3, 460 and 462.)

⁷ In the passage already quoted in this Study in III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 163, above.

⁸ See Rostovtzeff, M.: *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford 1922, Clarendon Press), pp. 121, 129, and 169. The Bosphoran knight of the first century, like the Roman man-at-arms of the sixth (see p. 443, footnote 3, above), put on the Sarmatian cataphract's armour without throwing aside the Scythian *hippotoxotes*' bow.

⁹ See Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-4, or, still better, any collection of T'ang figurines.

¹⁰ The Time-interval of nearly seven centuries that separates the Battle of Hastings from the Battle of Adrianople is an illustration of the fact that in the realm of human affairs, as in the Physical Universe, it takes Time to travel through Space. The cataphract's breach of the shield-wall, which took place as early as A.D. 378 in the Thracian

If this longevity and ubiquity of the cataphract are astonishing, it is also noteworthy that he only becomes ubiquitous in a degenerate form; and, since we have observed already, at an earlier point in this Study, that sheer material range and scale are apt to be symptoms of decay, we shall not be surprised when we read the next chapter in the cataphract's history. The story may be told, again, in the words of a contemporary who in this case was also an eyewitness.

'I was in the army of the Under-Secretary when he went forth to meet the Tatars on the western side of the City of Peace [Baghdad], on the occasion of its supreme disaster in the year A.H. 656 [which began on the 8th January, A.D. 1258]. We met at Nahr Bashir, one of the dependencies of Dujayl; and there would ride forth from amongst us to offer single combat a knight fully accoutred and mounted on an Arab horse, so that it was as though he and his steed together were [solid as] some great mountain. Then there would come forth to meet him from the Mongols a horseman mounted on a horse like a donkey, and having in his hand a spear like a spindle, wearing neither robe nor armour, so that all who saw him were moved to laughter. Yet ere the day was done the victory was theirs, and they inflicted on us a great defeat, which was the Key of Evil, and thereafter there befell us what befell us.'¹

Thus the legendary encounter between Goliath and David at the dawn of Syriac history repeats itself at night-fall, perhaps twenty-three centuries later, as an attested historical fact; and, though on this occasion the giant and the pygmy played their parts on horseback instead of on foot, the outcome was the same.

The invincible Tatar qāzāq who overcame the 'Irāqī cataphract and sacked Baghdad and starved the 'Abbasid Caliph to death in his treasury² and gave the *coup de grâce* to a Caliphate which had been a resumption of the Achaemenian Empire and a reintegration of the Syriac universal state,³ was a light horse-archer of the genuine and persistent Nomadic type which had made itself known, and dreaded, in South-Western Asia for the first time through the Cimmeric and Scyth irruption at the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. In the heart of the Steppe, from which the Tatars were erupting in their turn in the thirteenth century of the

enclave of the Eurasian Steppe, did not take place till A.D. 1066 in Ultima Thule. In the language of Relativity we might even go so far as to say that Adrianople and Hastings are not two battles but one battle, of which our vision is here diffracted into two different Space-Time positions.

¹ Falak-ad-Din Muhammad b. Aydimir, quoted at first hand by Ibn-at-Tiqtāqā in *Kitāb-al-Fakhri* (Cairo edition, p. 72), apropos of the attitude of the Persians towards the Primitive Muslim Arabs when these had invaded the Sasanian Empire some six hundred years before. The translation here quoted is taken from Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. ii (London 1906, Fisher, Unwin), p. 462.

² See the story as it is told by Marco Polo in *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, translated and edited by Sir Henry Yule, 3rd edition (London 1903, Murray, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 63-4.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 75-7, above.

Christian Era, the ancient Nomad military technique had lived on to assert its superiority now, at the end of the chapter, over the armour-plated travesty of itself which was what the imitative sedentary societies had made of it in the course of some two thousand years of brief inventiveness and long stagnation. But if David-on-horseback duly discomfited Goliath-on-horseback at this historic moment,¹ the sequel to their encounter in this repetition of the story was also faithful to the original. We have seen² that the mailed champion on foot who was laid low by David's sling-stone was superseded thereafter not by David himself but by a phalanx of Goliaths in which each phalangite was equipped with Goliath's accoutrements but was taught to use them to better effect by fighting in a disciplined formation instead of indulging in the primitive sport of single combat. And now, in the Cavalry Age, discipline won its victory over individualism once more. For Hulāgū Khan's Mongol light horse who had overcome the 'Abbasid Caliph's knights under the walls of Baghdad in A.D. 1258 were subsequently defeated again and again—in A.D. 1260 and 1281 and 1299-1300 and 1303³—whenever they swam the Euphrates and tried conclusions with the Mamlūk masters of Syria and Egypt under whose aegis a new series of 'Abbasid Caliphs had found asylum.⁴ In their accoutrements the Mamlūks were neither better nor worse equipped than their fellow Muslim knights who had been overthrown so ignominiously, a few years before, at Nahr Bashīr; but in their tactics the Mamlūks were true to their name and status⁵ in obeying a discipline; and this discipline gave them the mastery over Mongol sharp-shooter and Frankish knight-errant.⁶

The knights of Saint Louis King of France had met their defeat at Mansūrah at the hands of the Egyptian Mamlūks eight years before the knights of the last 'Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad went

¹ The heavy-armed lancer who had supplanted the light-armed horse-archer in Nomadism's sedentary hinterlands had, however, gained at least one victory over the Nomad in his native war-gear when, in the tenth century of the Christian Era, the German King Henry the Fowler had defeated the Magyar horse-archers by substituting heavy lancers for his own German infantry (Darkó, *op. cit.*, in *Byzantion*, vol. xii (1937), p. 145).

² On pp. 432-3, above.

³ See I. C. (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 350, above.

⁴ For the Cairene 'Abbasid Caliphate, which was the juridical basis of the Mamlūk Power in Egypt and Syria from A.D. 1261 to A.D. 1516, see I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 67, footnote 2, and pp. 70-71, above, as well as Part X, below.

⁵ The name 'Mamlūk' means 'held as property', and the status of the Mamlūks was servitude. For the system, exemplified in the Egyptian Mamlūk polity, of making soldiers and administrators out of slaves—a system which was itself of Nomad origin, and which was carried to its highest perfection in the Ottoman Empire—see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 28-44, above.

⁶ Etymologically 'knight-errant' is perhaps a contradiction in terms, since the Teutonic word 'knight', like the Arabic word 'mamlūk', means the servant of a master. In modern English usage, however, not only 'knight-errant' but 'knight' itself, *sans phrase*, connotes a warrior who is apt to obey no other master than himself. The Egyptian Mamlūks likewise eventually degenerated, as will appear, into a mob of wayward 'knights', without forfeiting a name which they had ceased to deserve.

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down before the Mongols, and ten years before the Mongols in their turn received their first lesson from the Mamlûks on a Syrian battle-field.

In this invasion of Egypt, which was their first essay in that enterprise, the French did their worst to bring their defeat upon themselves by displaying an incompetence which is in significant contrast to the showing which they made upon their next appearance, five hundred and forty-eight years later, under a much less lovable but much more efficient commander. In A.D. 1250 Saint Louis fell into the initial strategic error of attempting to advance from the coast upon Cairo through the Delta, instead of keeping clear of this maze of waterways and marching along the rim of the desert. In consequence his advance was checked at the junction between the Damietta arm of the Nile and the Ashmûn canal; and when the detachment of knights which he succeeded in pushing across the canal on the night of the 7th-8th February immediately forfeited the fruits of this strategic success, by running wildly into a tactical disaster, the campaign was virtually at an end. Driven back into their previous camp, the defeated French were beleaguered by a victorious enemy, and ravaged by camp-fever, until the night of the 5th-6th April, when a desperate attempt on their part to break out and escape by water, down river, gave the defenders of Egypt an opportunity to complete the destruction of the invaders. On this retreat every Frenchman who was not killed was taken prisoner, and among the prisoners was King Louis himself.

It will be seen that the decisive action of the campaign was the battle of the 8th February, when the French first won, and then threw away, their sole chance of extricating themselves from what was by then already an untenable position. The issue hung upon the fortunes of the engagement between the French knights who had gained the farther bank of the canal and the Mamlûks who were covering the town of Mansûrah. The task which King Louis had assigned to these knights, if and when they succeeded in crossing the canal by the ford, was to occupy and hold the canal bank opposite his own camp, in order to make it possible at last for the main body of the French army to complete the causeway which they had been trying, for days, to throw across the water. The builders had laboured in vain so long as the enemy still held the bank towards which they were building, and was therefore in a position to destroy the work as fast as the French could carry it on. If the knights who had now made good their crossing had been content to execute their orders, the main body of their comrades would have been enabled to join them, and the whole French army

might then have resumed its advance. But at this crucial moment the knights behaved as badly as the Mamlûks behaved well. 'The chief credit of the day belongs to the steady fighting of the Mamlûks, who bore the brunt of the battle and inflicted the chief punishment on their rash opponents.'¹ On the other hand the French knights, once across the canal, forgot their orders, and thereby lost the day for their king, in a childish impatience to engage the enemy and a still more childish competition among themselves for the place of honour in their own battle-array—though their orders were explicit on this point as well.

'On avait ordonné que le Temple ferait l'avant-garde, et que le comte d'Artois aurait la seconde bataille, après le Temple. Or advint que sitôt que le comte d'Artois eût passé le fleuve, lui et toute sa gent piquèrent aux Turcs, qui s'enfuyaient devant eux. Les Templiers lui dirent qu'il leur faisait grande vilenie d'aller devant eux quand il devait aller après, et ils le priaient de les laisser aller devant, comme il avait été accordé par le roi. Or le comte d'Artois ne leur osa répondre, à cause de monseigneur Fourcaud du Merle qui le tenait par le frein de son cheval, et ce Fourcaud du Merle, qui était très bon chevalier, n'entendait rien de ce que les Templiers disaient au comte, par ce qu'il était sourd; et il criait: "Or, sus à eux! Or, sus à eux!" Quand les Templiers le virent, ils pensaient qu'ils seraient honnis, s'ils laissaient le comte d'Artois aller devant eux; ils frapperont des éperons à qui mieux mieux, et chassaient les Turcs qui s'enfuyaient devant eux, à travers la ville de la Massoure, jusques aux champs par devers Babylone.

'Quand ils voulurent revenir en arrière, les Turcs leur lancèrent des poutres et des pièces de bois, par les rues qui étaient étroites. Là fut tué le comte d'Artois, le sire de Coucy qu'on appelait Raoul, et tant des autres chevaliers qu'ils furent estimés à trois cents. Le Temple, comme le Maître me le dit plus tard, y perdit deux cent quatre-vingts hommes armés et tous à cheval.'²

This French disaster of the 8th February, 1250, and the crowning catastrophe of the 6th April which was the inevitable consequence, were manifestly the penalties of an unchastened egotism which could not be atoned for by a quixotic individual valour, while the Mamlûks' victory, both in the decisive battle and in the whole campaign, was just as manifestly the reward of a thorough discipline grafted upon a bravery which was not intrinsically inferior to that of the French. The possessors of both the two fundamental military virtues were bound to prevail over an adversary who was utterly lacking in the more important one.

By the close of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, when

¹ Lane-Poole, S.: *A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages*, 2nd edition (London 1914, Methuen), pp. 236-7.

² Joinville, Jean Sire de: *La Vie du Saint Roi Louis* mise en nouveau langage par Henri Longnon (Paris 1928, A l'enseigne de la Cité des Livres), pp. 87-8.

the Mamlūks had established their superiority over the French on the one hand and over the Mongols on the other, they stood in a position of unchallenged military supremacy, within the bounds of their own horizon, that is comparable to the position of the Romans after the Battle of Pydna. In this eminent but enervating situation the Mamlūk, like the legionary, 'rested on his oars'; and it is a curious coincidence that he was allowed to rest on them for almost exactly the same length of time before he was taken unawares by an old adversary armed with a new technique. The Roman triumph at Pydna in 168 B.C. and disaster at Adrianople in A.D. 378 are divided by an interval of five hundred and forty-six years, while the number of years between the Mamlūk triumph at Mansūrah in A.D. 1250 and disaster at Imbābah in A.D. 1798 is five hundred and forty-eight. In the Battle of the Pyramids the enemy who exploded the Mamlūks' traditional reputation for invincibility were descendants of the Frenchmen at whose expense that reputation had been originally acquired; for, while in the life of the Mamlūks Time had been standing still, the passage of five and a half centuries had sufficed for the French to discard the blundering technique of Saint Louis's disorderly knights and to train themselves, instead, in the discipline of a uniformed infantry, equipped with fire-arms, on a new model which had been displayed to Western Christendom since the fourteenth century by the 'Osmanlis.'¹ This metamorphosis of the French may serve as a reminder that the Gothic victory, and Roman débâcle, at Adrianople in A.D. 378 was likewise due to a metamorphosis which had been previously accomplished by the victors. The Gothic cataphracts who put the legions of Valens out of action were descended from North European barbarians of the same stamp as the Sueves and Gauls who had been an easy prey for the legions of Julius Caesar. It was the Goths' intensive schooling in horsemanship on the Steppes, in an age when the legionaries were standing at ease, that enabled Alatheus and Saphrax to avenge the defeats of Ariovistus and Vercingetorix.

We may further observe, without overstraining our parallel, that the warning which the Romans received, at Carrhae in 53 B.C., of the cataphract's coming ascendancy has its analogue in the three successive blows which the Mamlūks received in A.D. 1516-17, when they were routed—first at Marj Dābiq and then at Gaza and then again at Raydāniyah—by the Janissaries.

After the second disaster of the three, the Mamlūk survivors who made their way back to Cairo retailed to a panic-stricken populace

¹ For the Ottoman origin of our modern Western infantry technique see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 38, footnote 2, above.

their terrifying experience of a new and irresistible Ottoman military technique.

'They arrived in the most pitiable state; the plunder and slaughter had been worse than before. Some of the Imperial Mamlūks came back on donkeys, some on camels—all having been deprived of uniforms, horses and arms. None survived, in fact, but a few for whom Fate had so decreed. They said that some of Ibn 'Othmān's troops were armed with hooks on their lances, with which they dragged the rider from his horse and threw him on the ground. Jān Birdī said that he was thus thrown down. . . . They also said that Ibn 'Othmān's troops were in numbers as swarms of locusts; that some of them were armed with muskets (firing a leaden bullet) and were carried in wooden carts, drawn by oxen and buffaloes, moving at the head of the advanced guard; and many other things of this nature.'

The confusion and division of counsels which prevailed in the Mamlūk capital while Selīm the 'Osmanli was advancing, unchecked, from the Taurus to the Nile, is a counterpart of the picture which Joinville paints of Saint Louis's camp in the Delta; and in this case, as in that, there is a grim inevitability about the last act—which was played in January 1517 when the Ottoman army arrived at the feeble fortifications that had been thrown up at the last moment, across the last stage of their road to Cairo, by the last Sultan of the Mamlūks.²

'The drums beat to battle, the chief amīrs and the whole force mounted and extended across the plain. Ibn 'Othmān's soldiers came on like locusts in multitude, and they were superior in point of numbers. The two armies met in the outskirts of Raydāniyah, and a terrible battle ensued. . . . Countless numbers of the Turks were killed, including Sinān Pasha, Ibn 'Othmān's former tutor and his chief wazīr, and a great many of his amīrs. Their bodies lay scattered from 'Allān's fountain (?) to the tomb of Amīr Yashbak, the Dawādār. Then the Turks recovered, coming up from every direction like clouds. They divided into two forces, one advancing under Jabal Ahmar and the other by the camp at Raydāniyah. The noise of their musketry was deafening, and their attack furious. In a short time countless numbers of Egyptian troops had fallen, including a great many of the chief amīrs, among whom was Azbak, the gunner. . . . In the short space of about sixty minutes the Egyptian army was defeated and in full retreat.

'Tūmān Bey stood his ground about eighty minutes after this, and fought on with a few of his armed slaves and Mamlūks, inflicting great losses on Ibn 'Othmān's men. Finally, when the Turks were too many for him, finding himself deserted by his troops, and fearing capture, he folded up the Royal Standard and ran and concealed himself.

¹ Ibn Iyās, Muḥammad b. Ahmad: *An Account of the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt in the Year A.H. 922 (A.D. 1516)*, translated by Salmon, W. H. = *Oriental Translation Fund, New Series*, vol. xxv (London 1921, Royal Asiatic Society), pp. 97-8.

² For these ineffectual activities of Sultan Ashraf abū'l-Nasr Tūmān Bey see Ibn Iyās, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-8.

'This was the third defeat [that] the Egyptian army had suffered.

'The Turkish force that had advanced under cover of Jabal Ahmar came down upon the tents of the Sultan, plundering everything—kit, arms, horses, camels and oxen, including the guns [that] the Sultan had put into position there, with the shields and palisading, and the vehicles on which the Sultan had spent so much time, labour and money, and from which he had reaped no advantage. Everything in the camp was plundered. Such was the decree of Fate.'¹

Fate, however, dealt less harshly with the Mamlūks in the hour of their defeat than she dealt with the country which it had been the Mamlūks' *raison d'être* to defend against all comers. For the Mamlūks were not condemned to the extinction which was the logical penalty for their failure to perform their one and only function,² while Egypt, who had played a purely passive part in the Mamlūk-Ottoman conflict, and had taken it for granted that she would be the prize of the victors, was now compelled to provide an additional consolation prize for the vanquished, and found herself saddled with the double burden of having to maintain a new garrison of victorious 'Osmanlis³ without being relieved of her old garrison of no longer victorious Mamlūks.⁴ Sultan Selim's motive in showing this generosity to his vanquished opponents at his new dominion's expense was perhaps a mixture of soldierly contempt for the Mamlūks' military ineptitude with professional sympathy for a corps which, however decadent, was still akin—in origin and constitution and ethos—to the Sultan's own Slave-Household.⁵ He may have calculated that the Mamlūks, humiliated on the battle-field and reduced in the political hierarchy to a subordinate rank, would be incapable of endangering a once established Ottoman supremacy, while they might at the same time serve as an effective reinforcement to the Ottoman governor and garrison in holding down the Egyptian 'ulamā and fallāhīn, and also perhaps as an effective restraint upon these 'Osmanlis if the wealth and seclusion of the province committed to their charge should ever tempt them to betray their trust and to repudiate their allegiance to the Porte in order to enjoy the good things of Egypt for themselves.⁶ Whatever the expecta-

¹ Ibn Iyās, op. cit., pp. 112-113.

² On this point see also IV. C (ii) (b) 2, p. 113, above.

³ Six (Bosniak) Janissary ojaqs.

⁴ This piling of an Ottoman on the top of the Mamlūk incubus which was already weighing upon the back of the long-suffering Egyptian beast of burden is a feature of the decadence of the Arabic Civilization which may be compared with the cumulative imposition of the litterati and the priests and the military upon the Egyptian peasantry in the decadence of the Egyptian Civilization, some three or four thousand years back (see IV (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 418-23, above).

⁵ For the species of Nomad institution in *partibus agricolarum* of which the Egyptian corps of Mamlūks and the Ottoman Pādīshāh's Slave-Household were alike representatives, see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 28-44, above.

⁶ This last consideration was the determining factor in Sultan Selim's policy according to C. F. Volney: *Voyage en Syrie et en Egypte pendant les années 1783, 1784*,

tions and intentions of the Ottoman conqueror of Egypt may have been, his settlement did secure to the Ottoman Imperial Government an effective mastery over Egypt which lasted almost as long as the antecedent reign of the Mamlûks themselves.¹ In the end, however, the Ottoman garrison of Egypt allowed the military decision of A.D. 1516-17 to be reversed through a gradual and pacific revolution which came to pass because the Ottoman garrison abandoned, while the Mamlûk corps continued to observe, the fundamental common rule of the species of Nomad institution to which both these corporations belonged.

This rule was the rigid exclusion, *ex officio*, of the soldier's children from the soldier's service, and the recruitment of the military corporation, in defiance of human nature, by the purchase of slaves and not by the begetting of sons.² In permitting the Egyptian Mamlûks to survive, Sultan Selîm had implicitly sanctioned the perpetuation of the existing ways and means by which they reproduced their kind in accordance with the general rule of Nomads in *partibus agricolarum*. Under the Ottoman domination the Mamlûks were still free to import slave-boys from their customary sources of supply³ in order to keep their complement up to strength, and they persevered in the practice when the Ottoman garrison in Egypt abandoned it. The Janissaries who were quartered in Egypt suffered still more severely in *moral* than their comrades in other parts of the Empire from the admission of the principle of heredity, which the corps extorted from the Imperial Government after the death of Sultan Suleyman in A.D. 1565.⁴ For this abandonment of the fundamental rule of the service meant that the Janissaries, instead of remaining a people apart, became merged in the local Muslim population from which they took the wives

et 1785, 2nd edition (Paris 1787, Desenne et Volland), vol. 1, pp. 96-7. We may compare the precautions taken by Augustus, after his own conquest of Egypt, to make sure that no Roman governor of the new Imperial province should have it in his power to repeat the performance of Mark Antony.

¹ The Mamlûks had ruled Egypt for 267 years, from their succession to the heritage of the last Ayyûbid Sultan in A.D. 1250 to the overthrow of the last of their own Sultans in A.D. 1517. The Ottoman Imperial Government remained in effective control of Egypt for 229 years from Selîm's entry into Cairo in A.D. 1517 to the *pronunciamiento* of Ibrâhîm Kethûda in A.D. 1746.

² On this vital point see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 28-35, above.

³ The Egyptian Mamlûks had originally made their purchases of boys, through Venetian middle-men, from the Mongol Khans of Qipchâq, who obtained their stocks by making systematic slave-raids upon all the sedentary populations round about their ranges—including the Russians and Poles in one direction and the Circassians in another (see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 30, footnote 3, above). After the Ottoman conquest of Stamboul and Pera in A.D. 1453 and Caffa and Tana in 1475, the supply of slaves from Qipchâq (now reduced to the narrow limits of the Khanate of the Crimea) was diverted from the Egyptian to the Ottoman market (for this source of supply for the Ottoman Pâdishâh's Slave-Household see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 35, footnote 3, above). Thereafter the Egyptian Mamlûks drew their recruits from the Orthodox Christian populations of Georgian nationality in Transcaucasia (see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 32, footnote 2, above).

⁴ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 44-5, above.

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that bore the sons who now, in due course, stepped into their superannuated fathers' places in the ranks; and while the Janissaries of the metropolitan provinces intermarried with the Turkish-speaking Muslims of Rumelia and Anatolia, who were, and felt themselves to be, a ruling race,¹ the Janissaries of Egypt intermarried with an Arabic-speaking townsfolk and peasantry² who had been for centuries the *ra'iyyah* of the Mamlüks.³

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the Mamlüks should have been rewarded for their refusal to 'go native' by obtaining over the degenerate Ottoman garrison an ascendancy which carried with it a *de facto* restoration of the Mamlük rule over Egypt itself, since the Ottoman garrison, before becoming the Mamlüks' creatures, had already reduced to a cipher the authority of the Pasha who was the local representative of the Porte. Though the outward forms of Ottoman sovereignty were all still sedulously preserved at the time of the French observer Volney's visit to Egypt in A.D. 1783-5, the Pasha of the day, in his residence on the citadel of Cairo, was virtually a hostage in the Mamlüks' hands; and the pronouncement of the one Arabic word *Anzal* ('Descend!') from the mouth of the Mamlüks' herald was sufficient to bring this Ottoman bird of passage down from his precarious perch and send him back home to Constantinople at any moment, even before the expiry of his proper three-years' term.⁴ The Porte winked at this practically complete usurpation of its authority in Egypt by a military corps which it had once permitted to exist on sufferance. It not only made no attempt to repeat the exploit of Sultan Selim I and to reassert its authority by force of arms; it did not even think of condemning the Mamlüks to a choice between extinction and degeneracy by resorting to the economic weapon and cutting off the rebels' supply of slave-recruits at its Transcaucasian source!

Thus, by a curious turn of Fortune's wheel, the Mamlüks virtually recovered in the course of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era a dominion over Egypt which they had lost in A.D. 1517; but a comparison of Volney's picture of them with that of Ibn Iyās shows that they had 'forgotten nothing and learnt nothing'⁵ during two and a half centuries of adversity and eclipse. As Volney

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 35, above.

² See Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, H.: *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. i (London 1939, Milford), chap. 4, § 2.

³ The part played by these native marriages of the Egyptian Janissaries in bringing about the historic reversal of the psychological, the social, and eventually the military and political relations between the Egyptian Janissaries and the Egyptian Mamlüks is noticed by Volney in *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 99. The Mamlüks did not mate with Egyptian women, but with Transcaucasian fellow countrywomen, and fellow slaves, of their own (Volney, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 99, footnote 1).

⁴ Volney, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 348-51.

⁵ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), p. 264, above.

saw them, when their accidental reprieve was almost at an end and their final disaster was imminent, the excellence of their weapons (they now affected English carbines) was entirely offset by the ungainliness of their costume, the clumsiness of their saddlery, the roughness of their horsemanship (which ruined a horse's mouth and legs), the childishness of their tactics, and, worst of all, by a lack of discipline which was the very antithesis of their original *esprit de corps*.¹

'La pièce la plus singulière de cet habillement est une espèce de pantalon, dont l'ampleur est telle que dans sa hauteur il arrive au menton, et que chacune de ses jambes pourrait recevoir le corps entier: ajoutez que les Mamlouks le font de ce drap de Venise qu'on appelle *saille*, qui, quoiqu'aussi moelleux que l'elbeuf, est plus épais que la bure; et que, pour marcher plus à l'aise, ils y renferment, sous une ceinture à coulisse, toute la partie pendante des vêtements dont nous avons parlé. Ainsi emmaillotés, on conçoit que les Mamlouks ne sont pas des piétons agiles; mais ce que l'on ne conçoit qu'après avoir vu les hommes de divers pays, est qu'ils regardent leur habillement comme très-commode. En vain leur objecte-t-on qu'à pied il empêche de marcher, qu'à cheval il charge inutilement, et que tout cavalier démonté est un homme perdu; ils répondent: *C'est l'usage*, et ce mot répond à tout.'²

As for the childishness of the Mamlūks' tactics, it was exemplified in A.D. 1776, when they were confronted with the unfamiliar task of besieging the Syrian city of Jaffa in the course of a petty local war—let loose by the breakdown of the *Pax Ottomanica*—between a Mamlūk tyrant of Egypt and an Arab tyrant of Palestine.³ On this occasion the Mamlūks began by pitching their camp within range of the defenders' artillery; and then, when a breach had been blown for them in the flimsy curtain-wall of the besieged city by an English soldier of fortune named Robinson, and the moment came for taking the place by assault,

'les Mamlouks voulaient qu'on le fit à cheval; mais on leur fit comprendre que cela était impossible; et, pour la première fois, ils consentirent à marcher à pied. Ce dut être un spectacle curieux de les voir avec leurs immenses culottes de *sailles* de Venise, embarrassés de leurs beniches retroussés, le sabre courbe à la main et le pistolet au côté, avancer en trébuchant parmi les décombres d'une muraille. Ils crurent avoir tout surmonté, quand ils eurent franchi cet obstacle; mais les assiégés, qui jugeaient mieux, attendirent qu'ils eussent débouché sur le terrain vide qui est entre la ville et le mur: là, ils les assaillirent, du haut

¹ See Volney, *op. cit.*, vol. i, chap. 11, 'Constitution de la Milice des Mamlouks', pp. 151-69.

² Volney, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 155-6. The Parthian and Sasanian cataphracts wore drawers of the same unpractical kind, which immobilized them, with the same fatal results, as soon as they were out of the saddle.

³ See Volney, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 131-9.

des terrasses et des fenêtres des maisons, d'une telle grêle de balles que les Mamlouks n'eurent pas même l'envie de mettre le feu; ils se retirèrent, persuadés que cet endroit était un coupe-gorge impénétrable, puisqu'on n'y pouvait entrer à cheval.¹

This fantastic performance of the Mamlûks at Jaffa, in A.D. 1776, is a worthy pendant to the performance of their old French adversaries at Mansûrah in A.D. 1250. By this date the Mamlûks were incapable of taking a city, even when they had a Frankish artilleryman at their command to open the way. What a contrast to their performance in A.D. 1291, when they had besieged and taken Acre in the teeth of all the Franks in the World, who were then up in arms to defend the last Frankish foothold in the Christian Holy Land! Yet the Mamlûks' latter-day ineptitude in tactics was, if possible, less serious than the dissolution of their ancient discipline.

'Dans notre Europe, quand on parle de troupes de guerre, on se figure sur le champ une distribution d'hommes par compagnies, par bataillons, par escadrons; des uniformes de tailles et de couleurs, des formations par rangs et lignes, des combinaisons de manœuvres particulières ou d'évolutions générales; en un mot, tout un système d'opérations fondées sur des principes réfléchis. Ces idées sont justes par rapport à nous, mais, quand on les transporte aux pays dont nous traitons, elles deviennent autant d'erreurs. Les Mamlouks ne connaissent rien de notre art militaire; ils n'ont ni uniformes, ni ordonnance, ni formation, ni discipline, ni même de subordination. Leur réunion est un attroupement, leur marche est une cohue, leur combat est un duel, leur guerre est un brigandage. . . .'²

The strictures here passed upon the Mamlûks are applied by the same observer, in another place,³ to all the military establishments of the day in Turkey-in-Asia.

'Les Turks, et surtout ceux de l'Asie, diffèrent encore plus des Européens par l'état militaire que par les usages et les mœurs. . . . Il ne faut pas s'imaginer ici des mouvemens combinés, tels que ceux qui, depuis cent ans, ont fait de la guerre parmi nous une science de calcul et de réflexion. Les Asiatiques n'ont pas les premiers élémens de cette conduite.'

In this last passage Volney's acute observation and luminous thought are distinguished by a touch of that historical sense which was the poorest piece in the intellectual armoury of most eighteenth-century French philosophers.⁴ Yet, although Volney is dimly aware

¹ Volney, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 135-6.

² Volney, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 163.

³ Volney, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 113-16, apropos of the army with which 'Alî Bey, the tyrant of Egypt, invaded Syria in A.D. 1771, and the forces with which his aggression was disputed by the Pashas of Saida, Tripoli, and Aleppo. In this other passage the theme—and even the slightly rhetorical peroration—of the passage quoted just above occurs with a more general application.

⁴ The brilliant exception is Turgot.

that the disciplined and scientific Western warfare of his day is something of recent date, he is apparently blind to the extraordinary and illuminating historical *περιπέτεια* upon which he has stumbled. In this vista his vision is already obscured by the two modern Western dogmas of 'the Incomparable West' and 'the Unchanging East', which mask his penetrating eyes like a pair of blinkers.¹ This *fin-de-siècle* Frenchman does not realize that the art of war which the West has acquired within the last century is not an original creation of the Western genius but is merely the result of an industrious and intelligent mimesis of an Ottoman *fait accompli*; and he is still farther from realizing that his satirical contrast between Western discipline and Mamlūk anarchy in the ninth decade of the eighteenth century is the precise inverse of the contrast that he would have had to draw if he had happened to be an Arabic observer making his comparison between the Mamlūks and the French at a date five hundred years back.

We may conjecture that Volney, when he wrote the brilliant book from which we have been quoting, had read neither Busbecq's *Exclamatio*² nor Joinville's chronicle of the Egyptian campaign of Saint Louis; but it is also tempting to conjecture that Volney's own mordant description of the general military ineptitude of the Mamlūks and 'Osmanlis, as he had observed it for himself at first hand, may have come to the notice of the author's younger contemporary Bonaparte at some date between the first publication of Volney's *Travels* in A.D. 1787 and the decision—which was taken at Bonaparte's instance by the Directory in A.D. 1798—to send a French military expedition to Egypt.³

The dazzling prospects which this project opened up, and which Bonaparte found irresistibly attractive, arose from the fact that, in the course of the two preceding centuries, the Governments of the Western World had acted upon the advice which had been pressed upon them so urgently and so eloquently by Busbecq—the first modern Western observer of first-rate ability who saw the Ottoman polity in its prime—in a pamphlet⁴ which he published after his return in 1562 from his diplomatic mission to Constantinople as ambassador from the Court of Vienna. Busbecq's thesis

¹ For the catchword of 'the Unchanging East', and its effect of fortifying, in Western minds, 'the Egocentric Illusion', see I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, pp. 164–8, above.

² For Busbecq's *Exclamatio, sive de Re Militari contra Turcam instituenda Consilium*, see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 36–42.

³ See Charles-Roux, F.: *Les Origines de l'Expédition d'Égypte* (Paris 1910, Plon-Nourrit), pp. 208–15, for the interest excited in France by the publication of Volney's *Voyage* in 1787 and of his *Considérations sur la Guerre Actuelle des Turcs* in 1788. See, further, op. cit., p. 302, for the mention of Volney's *Voyage* in Desaix's notes of a conversation which he had with Napoleon in September 1797 at Passeriano in the Veneto.

⁴ *Exclamatio, sive de Re Militari contra Turcam instituenda Consilium* republished in A. Gislenii Busbequii omnia quae extant (Leyden 1633, Elsevir).

was¹ that the only remaining chance of saving the sovereign Powers of the West from the imminent doom of an Ottoman conquest lay in scrapping the mobs of ragged, ill-armed, and semi-criminal vagrants that passed for armies in sixteenth-century Western Christendom, and replacing them by uniformed, disciplined forces, armed with muskets, on the model of those Janissaries by whose military prowess the sovereignty, and indeed the very existence, of all the Western states was being threatened in Busbecq's time. This course was duly followed by the princes of his own world to whom the Flemish publicist had addressed himself. Between Busbecq's day and Bonaparte's, while the Janissaries were becoming 'a nation of shopkeepers' at Constantinople and were 'going native' at Cairo, a passable imitation of the Janissary corps, as Busbecq had seen and described it, was being recruited—by the approved Ottoman methods of conscripting peasants and drilling jail-birds and kidnapping 'likely fellows'—in all the leading states of Western Europe; and by A.D. 1798 the French Janissaries were ready to repeat the exploit which had been successfully carried out by their Ottoman exemplars in A.D. 1516–17. The Mamlûks, on their part, in the year when Napoleon landed, were just what they had been in 1516, and just what Saint Louis's knights had been in 1250 (when the Mamlûks themselves had borne much more resemblance to the soldiers of Napoleon or the soldiers of the first Selim); and a student of history who compares the records of the three campaigns in the narratives of three eyewitnesses—Joinville for 1250 and Ibn Iyās for 1516–17 and Jabartî for 1798—cannot fail to be struck by the remarkable uniformity of atmosphere, as well as of incident, that he will find in these three pictures. Here is the picture as it is painted by Jabartî.

'On Sunday the 10th of this holy month [of Muharram] messengers from Alexandria brought [to Cairo] letters containing the news that on Friday the 8th of the same month ten English ships had made their appearance in the offing and had approached close enough inshore to be visible from the beach.

'A little later, fifteen more ships came to join them.

'The townspeople were wondering what the foreigners could have come for, when a little boat stood in and landed ten persons, who proceeded to wait upon the notables of the city and upon the governor-plenipotentiary, the Sayyid Muhammad Kuraym, of whom we shall have more to say later.

'These foreigners said that they were Englishmen, and they added that they were on the look-out for some Frenchmen, who had started, with a considerable fleet, for an unknown destination. They were afraid, they said, of seeing these Frenchmen make a surprise attack on Egypt,

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 38, footnote 2, above.

because they knew that the people of Egypt would not be able to repel the invaders or to prevent them from landing.

"The Sayyid Muhammad Kuraym supposed that the English *parlementaires* were laying a trap for him; he did not give the slightest credence to what they said, and his answer to them was forbidding. The foreigners then went on to say: "We shall be content to keep the sea with our ships, in order to defend the city and patrol the coast; we shall ask you for nothing but water and provisions, and for these we will undertake to pay." The notables of the city, however, refused, like the Governor himself, to enter into relations with the English, and said to them: "This country belongs to the Sultan, and neither the French nor any other foreigners have any business here; so be good enough to leave us." At these words the English messengers returned to their ships and went off to look for their provisions somewhere else, instead of at Alexandria, "in order that God might accomplish the work that was foreordained in his decree." . . .

"On Wednesday the 20th of the same month letters [received in Cairo] from Alexandria, Rosetta and Damanhūr brought the news that on Monday the 18th a French fleet, in great force, had arrived off Alexandria. . . . By the next morning the French had spread, like locusts, all round the city. Thereupon the people of Alexandria had joined forces with the Badu who had come from Bahīrah with the *kāshif* of that province, and had attacked the French; but they had found themselves unable either to repel or to resist them. . . . They were quite unprepared for the struggle; and, moreover, the arsenals contained neither arms nor munitions; so they realized that they were courting certain defeat, and accordingly sued for peace. . . .

"On the Monday it was learnt that the French had reached Damanhūr and Rosetta. . . .

"[On Sunday, the 1st Safar] Ibrāhīm Bey [one of the leading Mam-lūks of the moment] went . . . to Bulāq and convened the Pasha, the 'ulamā and all the shaykhs for consultation. They . . . decided that fortifications should be thrown up along a line from Bulāq to Shubrah, and that Ibrāhīm Bey should stay at Bulāq with his troops. . . . On Monday [the 2nd Safar] Murād Bey came to Imbābah to arrange for the construction of fortifications from there to Bashtil; he personally undertook the direction of the work. . . . On the Tuesday the trumpets were sounded to summon the inhabitants to come out of the city and man the fortifications at Bulāq; so everybody went to Bulāq, and nobody was left in Cairo except the women and children and the old men who were past active work. . . .

"On Friday the 6th of the same month the French reached Kūm-al-Aswad, and on the Saturday morning they reached Umm Dīnār. . . . At midday, at the height of the heat, a party of troops, encamped on the west bank of the Nile, mounted and advanced towards Bashtil, near Imbābah, and when these Egyptian troops saw the French army they hurled themselves upon it with fury. The French received them with a continuous fusillade, and in this engagement both sides fought with

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ferocity. The defterdār Ayyūb Bey, the kāshif 'Abdallah Bey, other kāshifs of Muhammad Bey al-Alfī, and large numbers of Mamlūks, were killed in this battle. The survivors were pursued by about six thousand French troops under the command of General Desaix, who was afterwards governor of Upper Egypt. . . .

'Desaix pursued the Mamlūks right up to Murād Bey's fortifications. . . . The French troops who were advancing to engage Murād Bey had manœuvred, as the French do, in such a way that at a certain moment the Egyptian soldiers found themselves caught between two fires, on their front and in their rear; the drums beat, and the musketry fire doubled in intensity, and the artillery fire did the same. The wind whistled, the dust whirled, the air was darkened by the powder-smoke, the combatants' ears were deafened by the ceaseless reports of the explosions—you would have thought that it was an earthquake, or that the sky was falling.

'The engagement lasted three quarters of an hour, and the Egyptian army on the west bank was routed. Many troopers were drowned that day in the Nile, so hard were they pressed by the enemy; many others were taken prisoner. At the close the French were left masters of the battlefield and of all the fortifications. As for Murād Bey, he fled to Gizah with all his suite, looked in at his palace, and then left for Upper Egypt within a quarter of an hour.'

This first-hand account, from the pen of al-Jabartī, of the French descent upon Egypt in A.D. 1798 resembles the first-hand account of the Ottoman descent in A.D. 1516-17—which we have already quoted from the chronicle of Ibn Iyās—in conveying from the direct experience of an unsophisticated spectator of an actual event an impression which is imaginatively created by a stroke of literary art in the opening passages of Mr. H. G. Wells' fantasy *The War of the Worlds*. In this twentieth-century Western work of fiction the 'Martian' invaders suddenly appear 'out of the blue' upon the surface of a planet whose inhabitants have had no suspicion of their approaching advent and have made no preparations for contending with a war-machine which is not only quite unfamiliar and new-fangled but is also so much more potent than their own that it seems completely invincible at the first encounter. In the experience of a sixteenth-century and an eighteenth-century Egyptian observer the unheralded and unexpected impact of the Ottoman and the French infantry—with their 'Martian' uniforms and drill and fire-arms—made the same impression 'in real life', when it swept away the Mamlūks who rode out to meet their fate with that blind confidence in their own ineptitude which had been the death of Saint Louis's knights at Mansūrah in A.D. 1250.

¹ Jabartī, Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-: *'Ajā'ib-al-Āthār, fi'l-Tarājim wa'l-Akhbār* (Cairo, A.H. 1322, 4 vols.), vol. iii, *ad init.* French translation—*Merveilles Biographiques et Historiques* (Cairo 1888-96, Imprimerie Nationale; Paris 1888-96, Leroux: 9 vols.), vol. vi, *ad init.*

The history of the Egyptian Mamlūks illustrates the truth of the saying that

'One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. The Lord . . . is long-suffering to usward, not willing that any should perish. . . . But the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burnt up. . . .¹ For when they shall say: "Peace and safety", then sudden destruction cometh upon them, as travail upon a woman with child; and they shall not escape.'²

On the occasion of their first discomfiture, when they were taken unawares by the Janissaries in A.D. 1516-17 after having vegetated in a military technique which had been obsolete by that time for some two hundred years, the Mamlūks were let off lightly. They were not only reprieved from the doom of annihilation to which they had exposed themselves, but they were also eventually reinstated, by a turn of Fortune, in the dominion over Egypt. But when they then vegetated on and allowed the same fate to overtake them for the second time, they exhausted their draft upon the long-sufferingness of their Creator; and the leniency which the Ottoman Sultan Selim I had been moved to exercise in A.D. 1517 was not displayed by the Ottoman soldier of fortune Mehmed 'Alī, who stepped boldly and ably into the political vacuum which was left in Egypt when the French conquerors of the Mamlūks and the English adversaries of the French had cancelled one another out. The fiasco of A.D. 1798, which demonstrated conclusively that the Mamlūk corps had degenerated into an *ἄχθος ἀρούρης*, received condign punishment in the massacre of 1811.³

We have now traced our 'chain of destruction' from Goliath the first of the hoplites to Murād Bey the last of the cataphracts;⁴ and we need not linger long over the latest links, which are exceedingly familiar to Western students of history in our generation. We need only remind ourselves that, since the moment at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era when the 'Osmanlis allowed the new infantry technique which they had

¹ 2 Peter iii. 9-10.

² 1 Thess. v. 3; cf. Matt. xxiv. 36-51 = Mark xiii. 32-7, and Luke xii. 35-48, xvii. 26-37, and xxi. 34-6.

³ For the destruction of the Mamlūks by Mehmed 'Alī see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 31, and p. 50, footnote 1, above.

⁴ Not quite the last; for the 'Die-Hard' band of survivors from the catastrophe of 1811 who held out against Mehmed 'Alī thereafter in the African hinterland of Egypt on the upper reaches of the Nile (see vol. iii, p. 31, above), bequeathed their armament and technique to those mailed horsemen, in the service of the khalifah of a Sudanese Mahdī, who went down under the fire of British infantry in 1898 at Omdurman (see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 227 and 235, below). In the year 1938 there were cataphracts still to be seen in all their glory in Northern Nigeria and in Rājputāna; but in both these countries their role had by then become merely decorative.

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invented to be wrested out of their hands by their long-despised opponents in the West, this technique has neither remained static nor been held as a permanent monopoly by any single Western nation.

The French army which overthrew the Mamlûks at the Battle of the Pyramids in 1798 was already something different from the earliest version of the Western imitation of the Janissaries. It was a recent product of a French *levée en masse* which, since 1793, had succeeded in superseding, by successfully diluting, the small but superlatively well-drilled professional Western army of the eighteenth century, after this had been brought to the highest perfection of which it was capable by the pedantry of a Frederick William I and the genius of a Frederick the Great.¹ The ascendancy which had been established at Valmy—before the interlude of the Egyptian expedition—by an organized French nation-in-arms over the soldiers of the *ancien régime* was to be confirmed thereafter at Austerlitz² and Jena; and the overthrow of the old Prussian army at Jena was to stimulate a Prussian pleiad of military and political men of genius to outdo the French in the new *tour de force* of combining discipline with numbers—and this with such effect that the humiliations of the War of 1806-7 would be wiped out in the *Befreiungskrieg* of 1813-14.

The French so far failed to take to heart the lesson of those latter years, that they brought defeat upon themselves a second time, with still more calamitous results for France, in 1870-1; but the French were happier than the Mamlûks, inasmuch as their second débâcle did not prove to be the end of their military glories. So far from that, they suffered less, in the long run, from losing the war of 1870-1 than the Germans suffered from winning it; for the Prussian General Staff was so dazzled by the brilliance of its own success in 1870 that, forty-four years later, it was still unable to think of a European war in terms of any other strategy, with the consequence that in the General War of 1914-18 the Prussian war-machine brought defeat upon Germany and her allies by evoking an unforeseen *riposte* in the shape of a siege on an unprecedented scale. In 1918 the old methods of 1870 were proved, by the sensational collapse of the previously predominant con-

¹ This ominous increase in the 'drive' of Western warfare has been touched upon in IV. C (iii) (b) 3, pp. 150-5, above.

² Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz is one of the few European events that Jabarti mentions in a chronicle which runs through the whole period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Even in his account of the year A.H. 1213 (A.D. 1798-9), in which the disturbances in Europe impinged, with a vengeance, upon the even tenour of Egyptian life, the traditionally minded Arabic chronicler designates, as the most important event of the year, the intermission of the annual pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of the Hijâz owing to the alarms and excursions of the Wahhâbis (Jabarti, *Merveilles Biographiques et Historiques*, vol. vi, p. 121).

tinental European military Power, to be no match for the new methods of trench warfare and economic blockade. And in the year 1938 it was again already certain that the technique which had won the war of 1914-18 would not be the last link in the chain—if Mankind were so perverse as to go on cultivating the Art of War after it had attained a degree of deadliness at which any further indulgence in belligerency seemed likely to bring with it the total destruction of Society.

In another war in the West the 'post-war' British Navy and the 'post-war' French system of semi-subterranean frontier fortifications might well prove to be nothing but mill-stones round the necks of the winners of what would then be remembered by Posterity, not as 'the war to end War', but merely as the event of 1914-18 in a military competition which the lacerated competitors had failed to bring to a timely end. In another war the French fortifications might be overleapt, and the British Grand Fleet sunk in harbour, by enemy aircraft laden with all the destructive contrivances of the twentieth-century Western chemists. 'The next war', if it ever came to wipe 'the Great Society' out of existence, might well be won—if the notion of 'victory' then still retained any meaning—by a 'post-war' professional force whose strength would lie, not in numbers, but in a discipline and training which would enable these twentieth-century Janissaries to profit to the full from an unrivalled command over an armoury of new-fangled weapons. A gang of such militarized mechanics might conquer by the same arts and virtues as the grenadiers of Frederick the Great and the musketeers of Selim I; and if the victorious war-band of Strakers-at-arms were the German *Reichswehr*, then the wheel of European military history would have come round full circle. During the thirteen 'post-war' years that elapsed between the coming into force of the Peace Treaty of Versailles in January 1920 and the advent of Herr Hitler to power in the Reich in January 1933, it seemed possible that this destiny might have been forced upon Germany by the enemy statesmen who had imposed a long-service professional army upon her at the Peace Conference of Paris. But this ironical prospect had been superseded by one that was more ironical still by the time when the Austrian Führer of Prussia-Germany had been five years in the saddle. Herr Hitler's mission was to liquidate the *Versailler Diktat*; and he was unwilling to accept from the *ci-devant* victors even a blessing in disguise which they had perhaps conferred on Germany without ever intending to do her good. Herr Hitler's single-track aim was to get rid of every jot that had been imposed on Germany, without taking the tittles on their merits. And accordingly the brilliance of the

audacity with which he duly recovered Germany's military freedom of action was matched by the strictness of the conventionality of the use which he made of this success. He set himself to demonstrate Germany's liberation from the shackles of Versailles by giving her precisely the kind of army that the treaty forbade her to possess; and this imperious psychological necessity entailed a serious technological retrogression. Under the Nazi regime the formidable professional force which had been thrust upon the Weimar Republic by hostile foreign hands was deliberately replaced by a conscript citizen army of that long since antiquated type that had been out of the French 'Ideas of Seventeen Eighty-Nine'!

Having now watched Goliath and David fight first on foot and then on horseback, we cannot leave the amphitheatre without waiting to see the arena transformed into a *naumachia* for our pair of gladiators to repeat their duel afloat. We may aptly conclude our survey of the destruction which is invited by any idolization of an ephemeral technique with an illustration that is offered by one of the curiosities of naval history. When the Romans took to the sea in the course of the first Romano-Punic War (*gerebatur* 264-241 B.C.), they had to face a Carthaginian navy which was heir to all the refinements that had been introduced successively into the art of naval warfare in the Mediterranean during the two centuries that had elapsed since the generation of Themistocles. According to the story—whether this be authentic fact or the 'philosophic truth' of legend—the Roman landlubbers nonplussed the Carthaginian masters of the naval art by cancelling two centuries of naval progress at a stroke and reducing naval warfare once again to that primitive kind of land-warfare-on-shipboard which it had been at the beginning of all things. Incapable of meeting the Carthaginians on equal terms in the skilful game of the *διέκπλους* and ruminating regretfully upon their own conspicuous ascendancy on shore, the Romans are said to have invented a gangway, slung from a mast and fitted with a grappling-iron, by means of which they literally came to grips with the Carthaginian warships. By this shockingly unprofessional innovation in technique¹ they seized the

¹ This alleged Roman invention of the *corax* or *corvus* in the fourth decade of the third century B.C. has one well-authenticated precedent in 'the iron hands' with which the Athenian warships grappled the enemy craft in the great battle of 413 B.C. in Syracuse harbour when the Athenian fleet made its supreme effort to break out and gain the open sea. But the circumstances in which this reactionary technique was employed by the fifth-century masters of the art of naval warfare were manifestly exceptional. The engagement was being fought, of necessity, in a confined space, and, since the number of ships engaged was large on either side, there was simply no room for manœuvring (on this point see Thucydides, Book VII, chap. 70). Moreover, the Athenian commander Nicias is represented as describing this reversion to the methods of land-warfare not as a happy idea but as a dismal necessity: *ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ ἠναγκάσμεθα ὥστε πείλομαχέιν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν* (Thucydides, Book VII, chap. 62).

tactical initiative, inhibited their astonished and indignant opponents from employing their traditional tactics of manœuvring and ramming, and forcibly substituted the tactics of grappling and boarding, with decisive effects upon the fortunes of the war.

If there is any truth in this story, it brings out the connexion between breakdown and idolatry very clearly; for in this instance we see an intrinsically superior technique which has been idolized by its adepts being defeated by an intrinsically inferior technique which has no point in its favour except that it has not yet had time to be idolized, because it is an innovation; and this strange spectacle suggests very forcibly that it is the act of idolization that does the mischief, and not any intrinsic quality in the object. αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀνάτιος.¹

3. Κόρος, ὕβρις, ἄτη

(α) *The Suicidalness of Militarism.*

The Strong Man Armed.

Having concluded our survey of the aberration of 'resting on one's oars' which is the passive way of succumbing to the nemesis of creativity, we may now go on to examine, by the same empirical method, the active aberration which is described in the three Greek words κόρος, ὕβρις, ἄτη.² In order to bring out the difference between these two modes of courting destruction, let us begin our survey of κόρος-ὕβρις-ἄτη in the military field, in which we have just brought our survey of 'resting on one's oars' to a close.

Both modes are exemplified in the behaviour of Goliath, as this is depicted in the Syriac saga. On the one hand we have seen how Goliath incurs his doom by vegetating in the once invincible military technique of the individual hoplite champion without foreseeing or forestalling the new, and superior, technique which David is bringing into action against him. At the same time we may observe that Goliath's destruction at David's hands might have been postponed, and possibly averted, if only Goliath's unenterprisingness in the matter of technique had been accompanied by a corresponding passivity of *êthos*. Unfortunately for Goliath, however, this *miles gloriosus's* technological conservatism was not offset by the saving grace of 'negative self-feeling'; and he was so blind to the danger to which he was exposing himself by rusting in his obsolete panoply that he actually went out of his way to 'ask for trouble' by offering himself as a champion on behalf of the whole Philistine army, and challenging the enemy to send any man they

¹ Plato: *Respublica*, Book X, 617 E.

² For the distinction between 'resting on one's oars' and κόρος-ὕβρις-ἄτη see IV. C (iii) (c) 1, pp. 257-9, above.

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chose to meet him in single-combat. Thus ὕβρις conspired with unenterprisingness in Goliath's soul to entice the giant to his lamentable fate; and the legendary Syriac figure whose name has become a by-word for 'unpreparedness' is also the prototype of the aggressive 'militarist': a Philip II dispatching his infantry against Holland and his armada against England, or a Napoleon III declaring war on Prussia, or a Wilhelm II invading Belgium 'in shining armour'.¹

The blindness of the militarist is the theme of a famous parable in the New Testament:

'When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils.'²

The militarist is so confident of his own ability to look after himself in that social—or anti-social—system in which all disputes are settled *manu militari*, and not by process of law or conciliation, that he throws his sword into the scales when the issue between a régime of violence and a régime of organized peace is trembling in the balance. The sword's weight duly tips the balance in favour of the continuance of the old barbaric dispensation; and the militarist, exultant at having once more made his will prevail, now points to this latest triumph as a final proof that the sword is omnipotent. In the next chapter of the story, however, it turns out that he has failed to prove his thesis *ad hominem* in the particular case which exclusively interests him; for the next event is his own overthrow by a stronger militarist than himself. His success in prolonging the militarist régime has simply insured that he himself shall learn, at last, what it feels like to have one's throat cut. We may think of the Aztecs and the Incas, each remorselessly warring down their weaker neighbours in their own respective worlds, until they are overtaken by Spanish *conquistadores* who fall upon them from another world and strike them down with weapons for which theirs are no match. It is equally illuminating, and considerably more profitable, to think of ourselves.

In the Hellenic Mythology the doom which 'the strong man armed' invincibly insists upon bringing upon himself is portrayed in the legend of how Cronos brutally supplants his father Uranus in the lordship of the Universe, only to taste, in his turn, of Uranus's experience at the hands of the usurper's own son Zeus.³

¹ This rhetorical expression was used by the German Kaiser to describe the posture in which he gave Austria-Hungary his diplomatic support in the European crisis of 1908 over the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia.

² Luke xi. 21-2 = Matt. xii. 29 = Mark iii. 27.

³ For the explanation, in mythological language, of how it was that Zeus, the *τριακτῆρ*

In Zeus we have the picture of the militarist who is saved in spite of himself, thanks to the suffering of another being who is nobler, as well as wiser, than he is; and Prometheus' salvation of Zeus is a Hellenic counterpart of Jesus's salvation of Peter when Peter commits the militarist's crime at the crucial moment in the Garden of Gethsemane.

'And, behold, one of them which were with Jesus stretched out his hand and drew his sword and struck a servant of the High Priest's and smote off his ear. Then said Jesus unto him: "Put up again thy sword into his place; for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword."'¹

In the Old Testament the classic portrayal of the militarist's self-contrived discomfiture is given in the story of Ben-Hadad and Ahab.² When King Ben-Hadad of Damascus is besieging King Ahab of Israel in his city of Samaria, the aggressor sends messengers into the beleaguered city to demand of his victim the surrender of everything that he possesses, and Ahab returns the soft answer: 'My lord, O king, according to thy saying, I am thine and all that I have.' But Ben-Hadad will not forbear from humiliating his humble adversary still further; so he sends a second message to inform Ahab that the conqueror's servants will now come to search his house, and that, 'whatsoever is pleasant in' Ahab's 'eyes, they shall put it in their hand and take it away'. Thereupon Ahab replies that he still accepts the first demand but rejects the second; and, when Ben-Hadad proceeds to breathe fire and slaughter, Ahab says to the bearers of this third message: 'Tell him: "Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off."' Thereafter, according to Ben-Hadad's will, and against the wishes of Ahab, the issue between the two kings is decided in a pitched battle; and in this battle the aggressor brings upon himself an overwhelming defeat. The story ends with a tableau in which the servants of Ben-Hadad come out—from the city in which they and their master are now being besieged in their turn—with sackcloth on their loins and ropes on their heads, and plead with the victorious Ahab for mercy. And Ahab is not betrayed into making Ben-Hadad's mistake by the giddiness of the *περιπέτεια* that

(see Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 171-2, quoted in I. B (v), vol. i, p. 48, above), contrived to avoid the fate of his two predecessors, after having imitated the behaviour of the second of them, see Part III. B, vol. iii, pp. 115-17, above.

¹ Matt. xxvi. 51-2 = Mark xiv. 47 = Luke xxii. 49-51 = John xviii. 10-11. In the passage in the Gospel according to St. John the act of violence is explicitly ascribed to Peter; in the passage in the Gospel according to St. Luke Jesus is represented as also restoring the situation in a material sense by miraculously healing the injured man's wound. (This incident in the story of the Passion of Jesus is touched upon again in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 73; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 393; V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 178-9, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 391-2 and 527-8, below.)

² The story is told in 1 Kings xx.

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has so swiftly inverted the two kings' respective positions. To the message 'Thy servant Ben-Hadad saith: "I pray thee, let me live",' Ahab answers: 'Is he yet alive? He is my brother.' And, when, on his instructions, Ben-Hadad is brought with honour into his presence, Ahab makes a treaty with his penitent opponent—on the extremely favourable terms which Ben-Hadad is in haste to offer him—and then straightway lets him go free.

Assyria.

We may next consider the case of the Assyrian militarism which cast its shadow over the Syriac World in Ahab's and Ben-Hadad's generation.¹

The disaster in which the Assyrian military power met its end in 614–610 B.C. was even more overwhelming than those which overtook the Macedonian phalanx in 197 and 168 B.C. or the Roman legions in 53 B.C. and A.D. 378 or the Egyptian Mamlūks in A.D. 1516–17 and A.D. 1798. The disaster at Pydna cost Macedon her political independence; the disaster at Adrianople was surmounted by the Roman Empire at the price of 'scrapping' the defeated legionary and enlisting the victorious cataphract in his place; the French repetition of the original Ottoman blow was needed in order to remove the Mamlūk incubus, once for all, from the backs of an Egyptian peasantry which managed to survive the French and the Ottoman as well as the Mamlūk domination. On the other hand the disaster which was the end of the Assyrian military power capped the destruction of the Assyrian war-machine with the extinction of the Assyrian state and the extermination of the Assyrian people. In 614–610 B.C. a community which had been in existence for more than two thousand years,² and had been playing an ever more dominant part in South-Western Asia over a period of some two and a half centuries, was blotted out almost completely.

'The noise of a whip and the noise of the rattling of the wheels and of the prancing horses and of the jumping chariots.

'The horseman lifteth up both the bright sword and the glittering spear; and there is a multitude of slain and a great number of carcases; and there is none end of their corpses—they stumble upon their corpses. . . .

'Thy shepherds slumber, O King of Assyria; thy nobles shall dwell in

¹ In 853 B.C. Ben-Hadad and Ahab were fighting side by side against Shalmaneser III at the Battle of Qarqar (see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, p. 67, above; the present chapter, p. 473, footnote 3, and p. 475; and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 303, below).

² For the appearance of the Assyrians in the 27th century B.C. upon the stage of Sumeric history in the rôle of pioneers who had been conquering a commercial empire by the arts of peaceful penetration, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 110, footnote 3, above.

the dust; thy people is scattered upon the mountains, and no man gathereth them.'¹

In this instance the curse of the victim who had lived to see his oppressor's fall was fulfilled in the sequel with an extraordinary precision.² In 401 B.C., when Cyrus the Younger's ten thousand Greek mercenaries were retreating up the Tigris Valley from the battle-field of Cunaxa towards the Black Sea coast, they passed in succession the sites of Calah and Nineveh, and were struck with astonishment, not so much at the massiveness of the fortifications and the extent of the area which they embraced, as at the spectacle of such vast works of Man lying uninhabited. The weirdness of

¹ Nahum iii. 2-3 and 18. The burden of Nineveh is the whole theme of the book of the vision of Nahum the Elkoshite. The great event which evoked this paean of exultation from one of the victims of the vanquished Assyrian monster is described more briefly and dryly in the records of the Power which played the leading part in bringing Assyria to the ground. 'A great havoc of the people and the nobles took place; . . . they carried off the booty of the city, a quantity beyond reckoning; they turned the city into ruined mounds' is the account of the transaction that is given by the Babylonian Chronicle (quoted in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1925, University Press), p. 127).

² It is instructive to compare with Nahum's exultation over the fall of Assyria a passage (Isaiah xiv. 4-12) in the same *genre* in which a later Syriac poet exults over the subsequent fall of Assyria's Babylonian 'successor-state', which had assumed Assyria's sinister role as far as the few then still surviving independent states in Syria were concerned.

'How hath the oppressor ceased! the golden city ceased!

'The Lord hath broken the staff of the wicked and the sceptre of the rulers.

'He who smote the people in wrath with a continual stroke, he that ruled the nations in anger, is persecuted, and none hindereth.

'The whole Earth is at rest and is quiet; they break forth into singing.

'Yea, the fir trees rejoice at thee, and the cedars of Lebanon, saying: "Since thou art laid down, no feller is come up against us."

'Hell from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming: it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the Earth; it hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations.

'All they shall speak and say unto thee: "Art thou also become weak as we? Art thou become like unto us?"

'Thy pomp is brought down to the grave, and the noise of thy viols; the worm is spread under thee, and the worms cover thee.

'How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! How art thou cut down to the ground, which didst weaken the nations!

In sheer poetic power this passage surpasses—at any rate in the seventeenth-century English version—the corresponding passages of Nahum; and in this we may discern a reflexion of the special experience of Judah; for Judah—in common with Tyre but unlike the great majority of the Syrian communities of the age—happened to suffer more cruelly at the hands of Assyria's Babylonian 'successor-state' than at the hands of Assyria herself. On the whole, however, the militarism of the Neo-Babylonian Empire, in spite of being in the Assyrian vein, was a mild affair compared with the Assyrian militarism which it replaced; and, notwithstanding the evil reputation which has been fastened upon him by his Jewish victims, Nebuchadnezzar, as well as Nabonidus, was much less addicted to the arts of war than to those of peace. In the light of this fact it is interesting to observe that this prophecy against Babylon in the Book of Isaiah was not confirmed so signally as Nahum's prophecy against Assyria was by the march of events. It is true that Babylon fell to Cyrus in 539 B.C. as Nineveh had fallen to Nabopolassar and Cyaxares in 612 B.C.; but there is no comparison between the two events. So far from being annihilated by Cyrus, the city of Babylon lived on to rise up in revolt against Darius and Xerxes, to welcome Alexander with open arms, and to enjoy an 'Indian Summer' of intellectual fraternization with Hellas before she peacefully faded out of existence—or, rather, drifted across from the banks of the Euphrates to the neighbouring banks of the Tigris, in order to become Seleucia-Ctesiphon—in the last century B.C., some five hundred years after her annihilation had been proclaimed in the Jewish poem here quoted.

these empty shells, which testified by their inanimate endurance to the vigour of a vanished life, is vividly conveyed by the literary art of a member of the Greek expeditionary force who has recounted its experiences. Yet what is still more astonishing to a modern Western reader of Xenophon's narrative¹—acquainted, as he is, with the history of Assyria, thanks to the achievements of our modern Western archaeologists—is to find that, although Xenophon's imagination was deeply struck, and his curiosity keenly aroused, by the mystery of these deserted cities, he was unable to learn even the most elementary facts about their authentic history. Although the whole of South-Western Asia, from Jerusalem to Ararat and from Elam to Lydia, had been dominated and terrorized by the masters of these cities at a Time-distance of little more than two centuries from the date at which Xenophon passed that way, the best account that he is able to give of them—presumably on the authority of the Greek army's local guides—is more wildly fabulous than the account of the Egyptian Pyramid-Builders which has found its way into the work of Herodotus² after having travelled in the solvent waters of the stream of 'folk-memory'³ for the length of little less than two and a half millennia. As Xenophon heard the story of Calah and Nineveh, these were two cities of the Medes which had been besieged by the Persians when Cyrus was wresting the empire from Astyages, and had been miraculously depopulated by divine intervention after the Persians had found themselves unable to take them by storm. Not even the bare name of Assyria was associated with the sites of her second and third capitals in the current legends, attaching to these sites, which came to the ears of the passing Greek inquirer.

'Where is the dwelling of the lions and the feedingplace of the young lions, where the lion, even the old lion, walked, and the lion's whelp, and none made them afraid?'⁴

As a matter of fact, if the Ten Thousand had happened to march up the right bank of the Tigris, instead of crossing, as they did, to the left bank at Sittace on the Babylon-Susa road, they would have passed the site of Asshur—the first and eponymous capital of the *Assyrium nomen*—and here they would have found, still squatting among the ruins,⁵ a small and miserable population that had not yet forgotten its historical title to the Assyrian name.⁶ Yet

¹ Xenophon: *Expedition of Cyrus*, Book III, chap. iv, §§ 7-12.

² See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, p. 214, above.

³ The operation of 'folk-memory' is examined in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 438-64, below.

⁴ Nahum ii. 11.

⁵ The city of Asshur was taken and sacked by the Medes in 614 B.C., two years before the sack of Nineveh.

⁶ See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1925, University Press), p. 130.

Xenophon's fabulous account of Calah and Nineveh is nearer to 'the philosophic truth' than our own archaeologists' discovery of the traces left by the squatters at Asshur; for in substance the catastrophe of 614-610 B.C. did wipe Assyria out; and in the Achaemenian Empire of Xenophon's day the surviving Assyrian helots were incomparably less conspicuous than the vestiges of the peoples round about, whom the Assyrian militarists had once trampled under foot and ground, as they thought, to powder. In an age when the very name and nationality of Nineveh or Calah were forgotten, Susa, which had been sacked by Asshurbanipal's army *circa* 639 B.C., was the capital of an empire whose effective dominion now extended, in almost every direction, an immense distance beyond the farthest points ever reached by Assyrian raiders. One of the subsidiary capitals of this empire was Babylon, which had been sacked by Sennacherib in 689 B.C. The Phoenician city-states, which the Assyrians had incessantly bullied and fleeced from the ninth century to the seventh, were now autonomous and contented members of a Syriac universal state;¹ and even the Syriac and Hittite communities of the interior, which had apparently been pounded into pulp by the Assyrian flail, had contrived to retain a semblance of their former statehood in the guise of hierocratically administered temple-states.² In fact, within two centuries of Assyria's fall it had become clear that the Assyrian militarists had done their work for the benefit of others, and for the greatest benefit of those whom they had used the most despitefully. In grinding down the highland peoples of the Zagros and the Taurus the Assyrians had opened a passage for the Cimmerian and Scythian Nomads to make their descent upon the Babylonian and Syriac worlds;³ in deporting the broken peoples of Syria to the opposite extremity of their empire they had placed the Syriac Society in a position to encircle and eventually assimilate the Babylonian Society to which the Assyrians themselves belonged;⁴

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 123, footnote 2, below.

² See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1926, University Press), pp. 187-8; Tarn, W. W.: *Hellenistic Civilisation* (London 1927, Arnold), pp. 114-16. The temple-state about which we have by far the fullest information, and which is also of unparalleled historical importance, is the one which was organized round the temple of Yahweh at Jerusalem in the fifth century B.C. But, though uniquely famous, this Judaean hierocracy was only one representative of a class. These post-Assyrian temple-states in South-Western Asia may be compared with the temple-states (Thebes, Heliopolis, Letopolis, Memphis) in the Egyptian World which were the indigenous 'successor-states' of the Egyptian 'New Empire' (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 422, footnote 3, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 515-17, below). There is a modern Western analogue of this in the crop of prince-bishoprics which made its appearance side by side with the secular 'successor-states' of the Holy Roman Empire after 'the Great Interregnum', and which ripened to harvest after the tribulation of the Thirty Years' War (see IV. C (iii) (b) 11, pp. 220-1, above).

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 136, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79-81, and II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 137-8, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 122-3, below.

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in imposing a political unity upon the heart of South-Western Asia by main force they had prepared the ground for their own 'successor-states'—Media, Babylonia, Egypt, and Lydia—and for these successors' common heir, the Achaemenian Empire. Why was it that in the sequel to the long Assyrian terror the monster came off, as these comparisons and contrasts show, so very much worse than his victims?

The victims themselves, in retrospect, could only explain this tremendous *περιπέτεια* by invoking 'the Envy of the Gods'.

'Behold, the Assyrian was a cedar in Lebanon with fair branches and with a shadowing shroud and of an high stature; and his top was among the thick boughs. . . .

'The cedars in the garden of God could not hide him; the fir trees were not like his boughs, and the chesnut trees were not like his branches; nor any tree in the garden of God was like unto him in his beauty.

'I have made him fair by the multitude of his branches, so that all the trees of Eden, that were in the garden of God, envied him.

'Therefore thus saith the Lord God: "Because thou hast lifted up thyself in height, and he hath shot up his top among the thick boughs, and his heart is lifted up in his height—

"I have therefore delivered him into the hand of the mighty one of the heathen; he shall surely deal with him; I have driven him out for his wickedness.

"And strangers, the terrible of the nations, have cut him off and have left him; upon the mountains and in all the valleys his branches are fallen; and his boughs are broken by all the rivers of the land; and all the people of the Earth are gone down from his shadow and have left him."'

Are we able in this instance to interpret the working of 'the Envy of the Gods' in terms of the stricken creature's own behaviour? At first sight the fate of Assyria does, indeed, seem difficult to comprehend; for her militarists cannot be convicted of the passive aberration to which we have attributed the undoing of the Macedonians and the Romans and the Mamlûks, who 'rested on their oars'. At the time when the Mamlûk and Roman and Macedonian war-machines each met with its fatal accident they were each of them long since static, hopelessly obsolete, and shockingly out of repair. On the other hand the Assyrian war-machine, which is singled out by the completeness of its final disaster, is also distinguished from these other war-machines—in what would seem to be the opposite sense—by the efficiency with which it was being perpetually overhauled and renovated and reinforced right down to the day of its destruction.² The fund of military genius which

¹ Ezekiel xxxi. 3 and 8-12.

² See Hunger, J.: *Heerwesen und Kriegsführen der Assyrier auf der Höhe ihrer Macht* = *Der Alte Orient*, 12 Jahrgang, Heft 4 (Leipzig 1911, Hinrichs), p. 34.

produced the embryo of the hoplite in the fourteenth century B.C.,¹ on the eve of Assyria's first bid for predominance in South-Western Asia, and the embryo of the cataphract horse-archer in the seventh century B.C.,² on the eve of Assyria's own annihilation, was also productive throughout the seven intervening centuries, and never more so than in the final paroxysm of the four historic bouts in which the Assyrian militarism discharged itself upon the World.³ The energetic inventiveness, and the restless zeal for improvements, which were the notes of the latter-day Assyrian *ethos* in its application to the Art of War, are attested unimpeachably by the series of bas-reliefs, found *in situ* in the royal palaces, in which the successive phases of the Assyrian military equipment and technique during the last three centuries of Assyrian history are recorded pictorially with careful precision and in minute detail.

On this evidence we can detect the following improvements between the end of the third bout, *circa* 825 B.C., and the end of the fourth bout just over two hundred years later. The mounted infantryman of Assurnazirpal's day, who had been placed on horseback—no doubt, in imitation of the Nomads—without being relieved of the encumbrance of his infantryman's shield, has now turned into an embryonic cataphract who has discarded the shield in exchange for a flexible cuirass.⁴ This equipment of the cavalry with body-armour has been made feasible by an improvement in the shape and material of the cuirass itself, which is now made of metal scales and is cut off at the waist, in substitution for the clumsy wadded or leathern kaftan, reaching from the neck to the knees, which had done duty for a cuirass in the earlier age.⁵ The cavalryman's legs, which are thus left exposed, are protected in compensation by stockings reaching to the thighs and boots reaching to the calf; and the same footgear enables the infantry to operate in rough country with greater ease than in an age when

¹ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 165, footnote 1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), in the present volume, p. 431, footnote 2, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), p. 439, footnote 4, above.

³ The first bout is signalized by the successive Assyrian offensives against the Mitannian Power in Mesopotamia and the Kassite Power in Babylonia in the fourteenth century B.C., and by Shalmaneser I's well-timed attack upon the Hittite World in the third decade of the thirteenth century, when Khatti was within an ace of breaking down under the long strain of her hundred years' war with 'the New Empire' of Egypt. The second bout is marked by Tiglath-Pileser I's momentary expansion to the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean at the turn of the twelfth and eleventh centuries. The third bout begins with Assurnazirpal's repetition of Tiglath-Pileser I's exploit in 876 B.C., continues in Shalmaneser III's systematic and sustained attempt to complete the conquest of Syria, and gradually subsides, in the second half of the ninth century, after the check administered to Shalmaneser by the Syrian coalition at the Battle of Qarqar in 853 B.C. (see the references on p. 468, footnote 1, above). The fourth bout begins with the accession of Tiglath-Pileser III in 745 B.C. and goes on crescendo until the career of Assyria is cut short for ever in the grand finale of 614-10 B.C.

⁴ Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 11. See also the present Study, IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), p. 439, footnote 4, above.

⁵ Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

sandals had been the only alternative to going barefoot.¹ Within the same span of Time there have been a number of improvements in the war-chariots: for instance, an increase in the diameter of the wheels, in the height of the sides of the body, and in the number of the crew—the driver and the archer being now reinforced by a couple of shield-bearers.² There has also been an improvement in the shape of the wicker screens from behind which the foot-archers shoot.³ Perhaps the greatest improvement of all, however, is one of which we are informed, not by the pictorial evidence of the bas-reliefs, but by the written word of the inscriptions; and this is the institution of a royal standing army, which was probably the work of either Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 747–727 B.C.) or Sargon (*regnabat* 722–705 B.C.). The standing army served as a nucleus, and not as a substitute, for the national militia on which the Assyrian Crown had previously depended for the recruitment of its field armies. Nevertheless the establishment of a standing army must have raised the general level of Assyrian military efficiency, and have insured that the technical improvements, mentioned above, should produce the maximum of effect.

By Asshurbanipal's time (*regnabat* 669–626 B.C.), on the eve of the great catastrophe, two centuries of steady progress in the Art of War had produced an Assyrian army which was as well prepared for every task as it was scientifically differentiated into a number of specialized arms. There were the chariotry and the demi-cataphract horse-archers; the heavy foot-archers, armoured from helmet to boots, and the light foot-archers who risked their lives in head-bands, loin-cloths, and sandals; the hoplites, armed like the heavy foot-archers, except that they carried spear and shield instead of bow and quiver; and the peltasts, likewise carrying spear and shield, but wearing, in lieu of a cuirass, a pectoral secured by crossed shoulder-straps.⁴ There was probably also a corps of engineers, for there was certainly a siege-train—not, indeed, of catapults, but of battering-rams and rolling towers—and, when these engines had done their work, and the walls of the enemy fortress had been breached, the Assyrian directors of military operations knew how to cover the storming parties with volleys of arrows from massed batteries of archers. Thus fitted out, the Assyrian army was equally ready for siege operations, for mountain warfare, or for pitched battles on the plains; and its activism in the sphere of technique

¹ Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 8–10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴ In Asshurbanipal's reign the Assyrian peltasts were further differentiated from the hoplites by being equipped with a crested helmet of an Urartian pattern akin to the Hellenic type, in lieu of the conical helmet which was the native Assyrian military headgear (*The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii, p. 20).

was matched by an activism in tactics and strategy. The Assyrians were firm believers in the sovereign virtue of the offensive.¹

'None shall be weary nor stumble among them; none shall slumber nor sleep; neither shall the girdle of their loins be loosed, nor the latchet of their shoes be broken;

'Whose arrows are sharp, and all their bows bent, their horses' hoofs shall be counted like flint, and their wheels like a whirlwind;

'Their roaring shall be like a lion, they shall roar like young lions; yea, they shall roar and lay hold of the prey, and shall carry it away safe, and none shall deliver it.'²

This was the spirit of the Assyrian army down to the last, as was shown by the account which it gave of itself in the Harran campaign of 610 B.C., when it was fighting for a lost cause, with the capital city of the Empire already taken by storm and blotted out. It will be apparent that the Assyrian army on the eve of its annihilation was not at all in the condition of the Macedonian and Roman and Mamlūk armies in 168 B.C. and A.D. 378 and A.D. 1798. Why, then, did it suffer a more appalling disaster than theirs? The answer is that the very activism of the Assyrian military spirit aggravated Assyria's doom when at last it closed in upon her.

In the first place the policy of the unremitting offensive, and the possession of a potent instrument for putting this policy into effect, led the Assyrian war-lords in the fourth and last bout of their militarism to extend their enterprises and commitments far beyond the limits within which their predecessors had kept. Assyria, as we have seen,³ was subject to a perpetual prior call upon her military resources for the fulfilment of her task as warden of the marches of the Babylonian World against the barbarian highlanders in the Zagros and the Taurus on the one side and against the Aramaean pioneers of the Syriac Civilization on the other. In her three earlier bouts of militarism she had been content to pass from the defensive to the offensive on these two fronts, without pressing this offensive *à outrance* and without dissipating her forces in other directions. Even so, the third bout, which occupied the two middle quarters of the ninth century B.C., evoked in Syria the temporary coalition of Syrian states which checked the Assyrian advance at Qarqar in 853 B.C.,⁴ and it was met in Armenia by the more formidable *riposte* of the foundation of the Kingdom of Urartu, an ex-barbarian military Power which now borrowed the Assyrians' culture in order to equip itself for resisting their aggression on equal terms.⁵ In spite of these recent warnings, Tiglath-Pileser

¹ Hunger, *op. cit.*, p. 34. ² Isaiah v. 27-9. ³ In II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 134-5, above.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 67, and the present chapter, p. 468, footnote 1, and p. 473, footnote 3, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 303, below.

⁵ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 135, above.

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III (*regnabat* 746-727 B.C.), when he inaugurated the last and greatest of the Assyrian offensives, allowed himself to harbour political ambitions and to aim at military objectives which brought Assyria into collision with three new adversaries—Babylonia, Elam, and Egypt—each of whom was potentially as great a military power as Assyria herself.

Tiglath-Pileser put a conflict with Egypt in store for his successors when he set himself to complete the subjugation of the petty states of Syria; for Egypt could not remain indifferent to an extension of the Assyrian Empire up to her own Asiatic frontiers, and she was in a position to frustrate or undo the Assyrian empire-builders' work unless and until they made up their minds to round it off by embarking on the more formidable enterprise of subjugating Egypt herself. Tiglath-Pileser's bold occupation of Philistia in 734 B.C. may have been a strategic master-stroke which was rewarded by the temporary submission of Samaria in 733 and the fall of Damascus in 732. But it led to Sargon's brush with the Egyptians in 720, and Sennacherib's in 700, on the Syro-Egyptian border; and these inconclusive encounters led on, in their turn, to Esarhaddon's conquest and occupation of Egypt, from the Delta to the Thebaid inclusive, in the campaigns of 675 and 674 and 671 B.C. Thereupon it became manifest that while the Assyrians were strong enough to rout Egyptian armies and occupy the land of Egypt and repeat the feat, they were not strong enough to hold Egypt down. Esarhaddon himself was once more on the march for Egypt when death overtook him in 669; and though the Egyptian insurrection which then broke out was successfully suppressed by Assurbanipal in 667, he had to reconquer Egypt once again in 663. By this time the Assyrian Government itself seems to have realized that in Egypt it was engaged on Psyche's Task; and when Psammetichus unobtrusively expelled the Assyrian garrisons in 658-651 Assurbanipal turned a blind eye to what was happening. In thus cutting his Egyptian losses the King of Assyria was undoubtedly wise; yet this wisdom after the event was a confession that the energies expended on five Egyptian campaigns had been wasted; and Assurbanipal's withdrawal did not restore the *status quo ante* 675 B.C.; for the loss of Egypt in the fifth decade of the seventh century was a prelude to the loss of Syria in the next generation.

The ultimate consequences of Tiglath-Pileser's intervention in Babylonia were far graver than those of his forward policy in Syria, since they led, by a direct chain of cause-and-effect, to the catastrophe of 614-610 B.C.¹

¹ This Assyro-Babylonian conflict has been touched upon, by anticipation, in II. D (v), vol. ii. pp. 135-6, and in IV. C (ii) (b) 2, in the present volume, pp. 101-2, above.

This Assyrian aggression in this quarter in 745 B.C. must have been difficult to reconcile with the treaty in which the Assyro-Babylonian frontier had been delimited by friendly agreement—and this along a line which was decidedly favourable to Assyria—in the opening decade of the eighth century B.C. Probably Tiglath-Pileser justified his action on the ground that the anarchy into which Babylonia had since fallen was spreading to the Assyrian side of the border; and, after marching in, he appears to have received some kind of mandate from the citizens of Babylon, who saw in this sovereign of a neighbouring sedentary kingdom of kindred culture a possible protector of civic life in Babylonia against the rising tide of local Aramaean and Chaldaean Nomadism. It may also be true that both Tiglath-Pileser and his successors were genuinely anxious to restrict the Assyrian commitments in Babylonia to a minimum, and to avoid annexation. Tiglath-Pileser himself in 745 left Nabopolassar, the reigning king of Babylonia, on his throne; and it was only after Nabopolassar's death eleven years later, and after the subsequent suppression of a consequent Chaldaean tribal insurrection against the Assyrian protectorate, that Tiglath-Pileser 'took the hands of Bel' in 729. This precedent was followed by Shalmaneser V; but it was not followed by Shalmaneser's successor Sargon until a second, and far more serious, Chaldaean insurrection forced Sargon, in his turn, to 'take the hands of Bel' in 710; and, even then, the Assyrian victor sought an understanding with the discomfited Chaldaean arch-insurgent Merodach-Baladan. Thereafter, when Sennacherib succeeded his father Sargon in 705, he deliberately abstained from assuming the Babylonian Crown; and, even when a fresh Chaldaean insurrection necessitated his intervention in Babylonia in 703, he conferred the Babylonian Crown first upon an Assyrianized Babylonian prince, and then upon an Assyrian prince who was not himself the heir to the Assyrian Throne. It was only after the great insurrection of 694-689 that Sennacherib formally put an end to the independence of Babylonia by installing his own son—and designated successor—Esarhaddon as Assyrian governor-general.

These facts certainly seem to testify to an Assyrian policy of moderation *vis-à-vis* Babylonia; but they afford still more conclusive evidence that the policy was a failure. Again and again the Assyrian Government's hand was forced by Chaldaean insurrections which only became more frequent and more formidable in the face of persistent Assyrian forbearance. And while the Assyrian intervention did perform the miracle of conjuring order out of a Babylonian chaos, this order, so far from being achieved under an Assyrian aegis, was the by-product of an anti-Assyrian

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movement which steadily grew in scope and lustily throve upon defeat.

The first stage in a process which continued for a century and culminated in a Medo-Babylonian grand alliance was the political unification of all the Chaldaean tribes of Babylonia between 731 and 721 B.C. under the leadership of the Chief of Bit Yakin, Merodach-Baladan. The next stage was an alliance between the Chaldaeans and the Kingdom of Elam, whose Government had been as seriously alarmed by Tiglath-Pileser's intervention in Babylonia as the Egyptians had been alarmed by his descent upon Philistia. Thanks to this Elamite alliance, Merodach-Baladan was able to enter the City of Babylon in 721 and to reign there as king of Babylonia for some twelve years, in spite of the fact that at this stage the citizens of the capital still felt the rule of the local Nomad more irksome than that of the foreign sedentary Power. Nor was Merodach-Baladan's career at an end when he was ejected from Babylon by the armies of Sargon in 710. After his Assyrian conqueror's death in 705 we find the indefatigable Chaldaean entering into relations with the Arabs of the Shāmiyah and the Hamād, and sending an embassy across their ranges to so distant a fellow enemy of Assyria as the King of Judah, Hezekiah. Thereafter, in 703, Merodach-Baladan succeeded in re-occupying Babylon with the aid of his Elamite allies; and although before the year was out he was ejected for the second time by force of Assyrian arms, and died a few years later as a refugee in Elam, the removal of the Chaldaean leader brought the Assyrian Government no nearer to a solution of the Chaldaean problem; for, with Elam still supporting them, the Chaldaean tribesmen successfully defied Sennacherib's efforts to put them out of action. When the Assyrian war-lord occupied and devastated their tribal lands in Babylonia proper, they took refuge among the marshes and mud-banks at the head of the Persian Gulf; and, when in 694 he built a fleet on the Tigris, manned it with Phoenician crews, and put the Assyrian army on board in order to destroy the Chaldaeans in their aquatic fastness by amphibious operations, he merely gave the Elamites the opportunity to fall upon his line of communications, enter Babylon, and carry his puppet-king of Babylonia away captive. Nor did it profit Sennacherib when he took his revenge next year by defeating the Elamites in the field and capturing, in his turn, the puppet whom they had set upon the Babylonian throne in his own puppet's place; for he failed to re-occupy Babylon; and the vacant throne was mounted by a man of character, Mushezib-Marduk, who succeeded in weaning the citizens of the capital from their pro-Assyrian policy.

This secession of the City of Babylon in 693 from the Assyrian to the Chaldaeo-Elamite camp was perhaps the decisive event in the long process of building up an anti-Assyrian front; for although the Assyrians were, as usual, victorious over the combined Chaldaean and Elamite forces, and were able in the end to teach Babylon a lesson by sacking her in 689, the lesson which she learnt was the opposite of that which her teachers intended. Through this impious outrage upon a city which was the cultural capital of their world, the Assyrians achieved a feat of political alchemy in Babylonia which the Babylonians could never have achieved for themselves. In the white heat of the common hatred which this Assyrian 'frightfulness' had now aroused among the ancient urban population as well as among the intrusive Nomads, citizens and tribesmen forgot the mutual antipathy which had hitherto divided them, and became fused together into a new Babylonian nation which could neither forget nor forgive what it had suffered at Assyrian hands, and which could never rest until it had brought its oppressor to the ground.

At this penultimate stage of the long and tragic process which Tiglath-Pileser III had unwittingly set in motion in 745 B.C., the anti-Assyrian feeling in Babylonia was so strong that it was able to dominate, and bend to its purpose, the soul of an Assyrian prince-of-the-blood who had been placed upon the Babylonian throne by *force majeure* and who was actually the brother of the reigning king of Assyria itself. Circa 654 B.C. Asshurbanipal found the existence of the Assyrian Empire threatened by a hostile coalition between the Babylonian Crown, the Chaldaean and Aramaean tribes of the Babylonian country-side, the Kingdom of Elam, the Northern Arabs, several South Syrian principalities, and the recently established 'successor-state' of the defunct Assyrian dominion over Egypt. This combine of anti-Assyrian forces, which was wider than any that had ever been brought together by Mero-dach-Baladan or by Mushezib-Marduk, was headed by Asshurbanipal's own brother, Shamash-shum-ukin; and his action will appear the more extraordinary when we consider that by that date he had been in peaceful occupation of the Babylonian Throne, with Asshurbanipal's goodwill, for some fifteen years, in execution of their father Esarhaddon's political testament. Moreover the arch-rebel's principal ally, Elam, had just received—perhaps as recently as the very year before Shamash-shum-ukin staked his fortunes on her support¹—the heaviest defeat that had ever yet been inflicted upon her by Assyrian arms, a defeat in which the reigning king

¹ Asshurbanipal overthrew Teumman in 655 B.C.; Shamash-shum-ukin revolted against Asshurbanipal circa 654-653 B.C.

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and his heir-apparent had been killed and both the royal cities captured. These facts give the measure of the strength of the Babylonian national movement that swept Shamash-shum-ukin off his feet.

In this crisis the Assyrian army was victorious once again. The traitor Shamash-shum-ukin escaped a worse fate by burning himself alive in his palace when Babylon was starved into surrender in 648; and *circa* 639 Elam was dealt such an annihilating blow by Assyrian arms that her derelict territory passed under the dominion of the Persian highlanders from her eastern hinterland and became the jumping-off ground from which the Achaemenidae leapt into an empty saddle when they made themselves masters of all South-Western Asia a century later. This sacrifice of the Babylonian nationalists' Assyrian and Elamite instruments in the war of 654-639 B.C. did not, however, prevent the Babylonian national movement itself from attaining its objective; for, if the Achaemenidae found the saddle empty in the sixth century, this was because the Assyrian rider had been thrown at last before the seventh century was out. Immediately after Asshurbanipal's death in 626 Babylonia revolted again under a new national leader; and this Nabopolassar completed the work which Merodach-Baladan had begun. In the new Kingdom of Media he found a more potent ally to fill the place of the defunct Kingdom of Elam; and Assyria, who had not recovered from the War of 654-639, was wiped out of existence in the war of 614-610 B.C. Even then, *in extremis*, the Assyrian army could still win victories in the field. With the help of Assyria's former vassals and present patrons the Saites, it drove the Babylonians back upon Harran in 610, at a stage in this war of annihilation when Harran itself, as well as Nineveh and Asshur, was already sacked and devastated, and when the army was fighting with its back to the Euphrates in the last unconquered corner of the Assyrian homeland; but this final victory must have been the Assyrian army's death agony, for this is the last recorded incident in the Assyrian military annals.

When we gaze back over the century and a half of ever more virulent warfare which begins with Tiglath-Pileser III's accession to the throne of Assyria in 745 B.C. and closes with a Babylonian Nebuchadnezzar's victory over an Egyptian Necho at Carchemish in 605, the historical landmarks which stand out the most prominently at first sight are the successive 'knock-out blows' by which Assyria destroyed entire communities—razing cities to the ground and carrying whole peoples away captive. We think of the sack of Damascus in 732; the sack of Samaria in 722; the sack of Musasir in 714; the sack of Babylon in 689; the sack of Sidon in 677; the

sack of Memphis in 671; the sack of Thebes in 663; the sack of Susa *circa* 639. Of all the capital cities of all the states within reach of Assyria's arm, only Tyre and Jerusalem remained inviolate on the eve of the sack of Nineveh in 612. The loss and misery which Assyria inflicted on her neighbours is beyond calculation; and yet the legendary remark of the canting school-master to the boy whom he is whipping—'It hurts you less than it hurts me'—would be a more pertinent critique of Assyrian military activities than the unashamedly truculent and naïvely self-complacent narratives in which the Assyrian war-lords have presented their own account of their performances for the instruction of Posterity.

The full and bombastic Assyrian record of victories abroad is significantly supplemented by rarer and briefer notices of troubles at home that give us some inkling of the price at which the victories were purchased; and, when we examine this domestic chronicle of Assyria at the height of her military power, we shall no longer find it strange that her victoriousness was eventually the death of her.

An increasing excess of military strain revenged itself in an increasing frequency of palace revolutions and peasant revolts. As early as the close of the second bout of aggression in the ninth century B.C. we find Shalmaneser III dying in 827 with his son on the war-path against him, and Nineveh, Asshur, and Arbela in rebellion. Asshur rebelled again in 763-762, Arrapka in 761-760, Gozan in 759; and in 746 the rebellion of Calah, the Assyrian capital of the day, was followed by the extermination of the ruling dynasty. Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 745-727 B.C.) was a *novus homo* who could not conceal his provenance under the borrowed cloak of an historic name; and, if he was also the Assyrian Marius, the Roman analogy suggests that the establishment of a professional standing army is to be taken as a symptom of an advanced stage of social disintegration. We know that in the Italy of Marius's day it was the ruin of a warlike peasantry, which had been uprooted from the soil by perpetual calls to military service on ever more distant campaigns, that made a standing army both possible and necessary—possible because there was now a reservoir of unemployed 'man-power' to draw upon, and necessary because these men who had lost their livelihood on the land must be provided with alternative employment if they were to be restrained from venting their unhappiness and resentment through the channel of revolution. We may discern in the establishment of the Assyrian standing army a parallel attempt to find the same military solution for the same social problem. This military solution, however, was no more successful in allaying the domestic troubles of Tiglath-

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Pileser's Assyria than it was in allaying those of Marius's Italy. Tiglath-Pileser's successor Shalmaneser V (*regnabat* 727-722 B.C.) seems to have fallen foul of the City of Asshur, like Tiglath-Pileser's predecessors. Sennacherib in 681 was murdered by one of his own sons, who was apparently hand in glove with the Babylonian nationalists; and we have seen already how Asshurbanipal's throne and empire were threatened by the action of his brother Shamash-shum-ukin, King of Babylon, in 654, when this renegade Assyrian prince placed himself at the head of an anti-Assyrian coalition. Therewith the two streams of domestic *stasis* and foreign warfare merge into one; and after Asshurbanipal's death this swells into a mighty river whose rushing waters bear Assyria away to her now inevitable doom. During the last years of Assyrian history the domestic and the foreign aspect of Assyria's disintegration are hardly distinguishable.¹

The approaching doom cast its shadow over the soul of Asshurbanipal himself in his declining years.

'The rules for making offerings to the dead and libations to the ghosts of the kings my ancestors, which had not been practised, I reintroduced. I did well unto god and man, to dead and living. Why have sickness, ill-health, misery and misfortune befallen me? I cannot away with the strife in my country and the dissensions in my family. Disturbing scandals oppress me alway. Misery of mind and of flesh bow me down; with cries of woe I bring my days to an end. On the day of the City-God, the day of the festival, I am wretched; Death is seizing hold on me and bears me down. With lamentation and mourning I wail day and night; I groan: "O God, grant even to one who is impious that he may see Thy light." How long, O God, wilt Thou deal thus with me? Even as one who hath not feared god and goddess am I reckoned.'²

This confession is remarkable in its unconventionality and moving in its sincerity and even pathetic in its bewilderment, but above all it is illuminating in its blindness. When this mood overtook him, did the last of the Assyrian war-lords never find himself silently reciting that terrible catalogue of cities sacked and peoples wiped out by Assyrian arms—a list which concluded with his own sack of Susa and annihilation of Elam? Or was the burden of this memory so intolerable that the tormented militarist thrust it from him, in desperation, whenever it threatened to overwhelm him?

¹ This ultimate fusion between the foreign wars and the domestic troubles of Assyria is an example of that transference of the field of action from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm which we have studied in III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 192-217, above. In detail, the transmutation of the Assyro-Babylonian conflict into a civil war between the two Assyrian brothers, King Asshurbanipal of Nineveh and King Shamash-shum-ukin of Babylon, may be compared with the transmutation of the Romano-Punic conflict over Sicily into the Sicilian slave-wars (III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 198-9, above).

² This passage from Asshurbanipal's own records is quoted in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii, p. 127.

His successor Sin-shar-ishkun, at any rate, must have lived through a moment when these haunting recollections closed in on him and would not be denied, as the Athenians were beset by the ghosts of their misdeeds when they received the news of the Battle of Aegospotami.

'At Athens the disaster was announced by the arrival of the *Paralus*,¹ and a wail spread from the Peiraeus through the Long Walls into the city as the news passed from mouth to mouth. That night no one slept. Besides mourning for the dead they mourned far more bitterly for themselves, for they expected to suffer the fate which they had inflicted upon the Melians (who were colonists of the Lacedaemonians) when they had besieged and captured their city, and upon the Histiaeans, the Scionians, the Toronians, the Aeginetans and many other Hellenic peoples. Next morning they held an assembly in which it was decided to block up all the harbours except one, to clear the fortifications for action, to dispose troops to man them, and to put the city into a thorough state of defence for the eventuality of a siege.'²

As the Athenian *dêmos* felt and acted at this dreadful moment in 405 B.C., the last king of Assyria must have felt and acted in 612 B.C., when he received the news that his Scythian allies, who had been his last hope of worldly salvation, had gone over to the enemy and that the united forces of the hostile coalition were closing in irresistibly upon Nineveh. The rest of the story is not the same in the two cases; for the Athenian *dêmos* capitulated and was spared by the generosity of the victors, while King Sin-shar-ishkun in Nineveh stood a siege, held out to the bitter end, and perished with his people when the city was taken by storm at the third assault. Thus the doom which Asshurbanipal had deprecated overwhelmed his successor and was not averted either by Asshurbanipal's tardy contrition or by his partial conversion from the works of War to the arts of Peace. Asshurbanipal's learned library of Babylonian literature (an Assyrian museum of a culture which an Assyrian militarism had blighted) and his exquisite bas-reliefs (designed by living Assyrian artists, and depicting the scientific slaughter of man and beast by the Assyrian military technique) had made of Nineveh by the year 612 B.C. a treasure-house which is not altogether incomparable with the Athens of 405-404. The treasures of Nineveh were buried under her ruins to enrich a remote Posterity in the heyday of a civilization which does not reckon the Babylonian Society among its forebears. But, if Nineveh perished where Athens survived, this was because Assyria had already committed suicide before her material destruction over-

¹ The *Paralus* and the *Salaminia* were the two fastest sailers in the Athenian navy, and were used for carrying dispatches.

² Xenophon: *Hellenica*, Book II, chap. 2, §§ 3-4.

took her. The clearly attested progress of the Aramaic language at the expense of the native Akkadian in the Assyrian homeland during the last century and a half of Assyria's existence as a state shows that the Assyrian people was being peacefully supplanted by the captives of the Assyrian bow and spear in an age when the Assyrian military power stood at its zenith.¹ Depopulation was the price which had to be paid for militarism, and it was a price that was ultimately as ruinous for the Assyrian army as for the rest of the Assyrian body social. The indomitable warrior who stood at bay in the breach at Nineveh in 612 B.C. was 'a corpse in armour', whose frame was only held erect by the massiveness of the military accoutrements in which this *felo de se* had already smothered himself to death. When the Median and Babylonian storming party reached that stiff and menacing figure, and sent it clattering and crashing down the moraine of ruined brickwork into the fosse below, they did not suspect that their terrible adversary was no longer a living man at the moment when they struck their daring, and apparently decisive, blow.

The Burden of Nineveh.

We have sketched our portrait of the Assyrian militarism at full length because it is the prototype of so many signal examples of the same aberration. The tableau of the 'corpse in armour' conjures up a vision of the Spartan phalanx on the battlefield at Leuctra in 371 B.C.,² and of the Janissaries in the trenches before Vienna in A.D. 1683.³ The ironic fate of the militarist who is so intemperate in waging wars of annihilation against his neighbours that he deals unintended destruction to himself recalls the self-inflicted doom of the Carolingians or the Timurids, who built up great empires out of the agony of their Saxon or Persian victims, only to provide rich spoils for Scandinavian or Uzbek adventurers⁴ who lived to see the empire-builders pay for their imperialism by falling from world power to impotence within the span of a single lifetime.

Another form of suicide which the Assyrian example calls to mind is the self-destruction of those militarists—be they barbarians or people of higher culture with a capacity for putting their talents to a better use—who break into, and break up, some universal

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 79, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 119, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, pp. 487-91 and 499, footnote, 2 below.

² See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 73-4, above.

³ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 46-7, above.

⁴ For the collapse of the Carolingian Empire see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 167; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 343-5 and 368; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, pp. 322-3, above, and the present chapter, pp. 488-90, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), p. 523, below; for the collapse of the Timurid Empire see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 368-77, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 447, above.

state or other great empire that has been giving a spell of peace to the peoples and lands over which it has spread its aegis. The conquerors ruthlessly tear the imperial mantle into shreds in order to expose the millions of human beings whom it has sheltered to the terrors of darkness and the shadow of death,¹ but the shadow descends inexorably upon the criminals as well as upon their victims. Demoralized on the morrow of their victory by the splendour and the vastness of their prize, these new masters of a ravished world are apt, like the Kilkenny cats, to perform 'the friendly office' for one another until not one brigand in the band is left alive to feast upon the plunder.²

We may watch how the Macedonians, when they have overrun the Achaemenian Empire, and have pressed on beyond its farther frontiers into India, within the eleven years following Alexander's passage of the Hellespont, next turn their arms with equal ferocity against one another during the forty-two years intervening between Alexander's death in 323 B.C. and the overthrow of Lysimachus at Corupedium in 281 B.C. The grim performance was repeated a thousand years later in another passage of Syriac history, when the Primitive Muslim Arabs emulated—and thereby undid—the Hellenic Macedonians' work by overrunning in twelve years the Roman and Sasanian dominions in South-Western Asia over almost as wide a sweep of territory as had once been conquered in eleven years by Alexander from the Achaemenidae.³ In this Arab case the twelve years of conquest were followed by the twenty-four years of fratricidal strife which began with the assassination of the Caliph 'Uthmān in A.D. 656 and culminated in the martyrdom of the Prophet's grandson Husayn in A.D. 680. Once again the conquerors of South-Western Asia fell on one another's swords; and the glory and profit of rebuilding a Syriac universal state⁴ which Alexander had overthrown was left to the usurping Umayyads and to the interloping 'Abbasids, instead of falling to those

¹ Luke i. 79.

² The proneness of the victorious barbarian war-bands to exterminate one another has been noticed already in I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 58–9, above; see further V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 221–2, below.

³ For the Primitive Muslim Arabs' feat of conquering the Oriental provinces of the Roman Empire with one hand and the whole of the Sasanian Empire with the other hand simultaneously, between A.D. 632 and A.D. 643, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 73, above. In these twelve years of conquest the Arabs emulated the achievement of the Macedonians in 334–323 B.C. without quite equalling it. While the larger part of the area conquered was the same, the Arabs fell short of their Macedonian predecessors both on the north-west and on the north-east. On the north-west they did not win any permanent foothold in the Anatolian Peninsula; on the north-east they did not begin the conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin until more than half a century, or complete it until more than a century, had passed since their occupation of the north-eastern frontier fortresses of the Sasanian Empire in A.D. 643–51 (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 375–84, above).

⁴ For the Arab Caliphate as a 'reintegration' or 'resumption' of the Achaemenian Empire, which had been the first essay in a Syriac universal state, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 75–7, above.

companions and descendants of the Prophet whose lightning conquests had prepared the way. The same spectacle is presented in the New World when the Aztecs and the Incas go down before the Spaniards. The Spanish *conquistadores* of the Mexic and the Andean universal state overran two continents—from Florida to the Isthmus, and from the Isthmus to Chile—only to fight over the spoils as ferociously as the companions of Muhammad or the companions of Alexander; and the Macedonian war-lord in his grave was not so powerless to maintain discipline among the troops that had once followed him in the field¹ as was a living sovereign at Madrid to impose the king's peace upon the adventurers who paid him a nominal allegiance on the other side of the Atlantic. The same suicidal Assyrian vein of militarism was displayed by the barbarians who overran the derelict provinces of a decadent Roman Empire. The Visigoths were overthrown by the Franks and the Arabs; the smaller fry among the English 'successor-states' in Britain were devoured by Mercia and Wessex; the Merovingians were brushed aside by the Carolingians, and the Umayyads by the 'Abbasids.² And this suicidal ending of our classic example of a 'heroic age' is characteristic, in some degree, of the latter end of all the *Völkerwanderungen* that have overrun the domains of other decrepit universal states.

There is another variety of militaristic aberration of which we shall also find the prototype in the Assyrian militarism when we envisage Assyria not as an artificially isolated entity in herself, but in her proper setting as an integral part of a larger body social which we have called the Babylonian Society.³ In this Babylonian World Assyria was invested, as we have seen, with the special function of serving as a march whose primary duty was to defend not only herself, but also the rest of the society in which she lived and had her being, against the predatory barbarian highlanders from the east and the north and the aggressive Aramaean pioneers of the Syriac Civilization from the opposite quarters of the compass.⁴ In articulating a march of this Assyrian kind out of a previously undifferentiated social fabric, a society stands to benefit in all its members; for while the march itself is stimulated in so far as it responds successfully to the challenge—which it has now taken upon itself—of resisting external pressures,⁵ the interior—which

¹ In the fratricidal wars between the diadochi of Alexander the royal secretary, Eumenes of Cardia, was able to make good the prestige which he forfeited in the eyes of the Macedonian Argyraspides on account of his own non-Macedonian birth by continuing to pitch the royal tent as though Alexander were still alive and in the army's midst. (See Plutarch's *Life of Eumenes*, chap. 13.)

² See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 58, above.

³ For the sense in which the term is used in this Study see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 115-19, above.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 133-7, above.

⁵ For the stimulus of pressures see II. D (v), *passim*, in vol. ii, above.

the march now shields—is relieved of pressure in a corresponding degree, and is thereby set free to face other challenges and accomplish other tasks. This division of labour is salutary so long as the march continues to direct its specialized military prowess exclusively to its appointed task of repelling the external enemy. So long as they are used for this socially legitimate purpose, the military virtues need not be socially destructive—even though the necessity of bringing them into play at all may be a lamentable testimony to the imperfection of human nature in those generations of men who have been setting their feet upon the lower rungs of the ladder of Civilization during these last six thousand years. But these virtues, such as they are, become fatally transformed into the vice of Militarism, in the sinister sense, if ever the frontiersmen turn the arms which they have learnt to use in warfare with the outsider beyond the pale against the members of their own society whom it is their proper task to defend and not to attack.

The evil of this aberration is not so much that it exposes the society as a whole to the assaults of the external enemy whom the frontiersmen have hitherto kept at bay; for the frontiersmen seldom turn against their own kith and kin until they have established so great an ascendancy over their proper adversaries that their hands are free for other mischief and their ambitions fired for aiming at greater objectives. Indeed, when a march turns and rends the interior of its own society, it usually manages to hold the external enemy off with its left hand while it is waging a fratricidal war with its right. The deadly harm of this misdirection of military energies lies not so much in the opening of the gates to an alien invader—though this is sometimes one of the incidental consequences in the end—as in the betrayal of a trust and in the precipitation of an internecine conflict between two parties whose natural relation with each other is to dwell in unity.¹ When a march turns against its own interior, it is taking the offensive in what is really a civil war; and it is notorious that civil wars are waged with greater bitterness and ferocity than any others. This explains the momentousness of the consequences that ultimately followed from the action of Tiglath-Pileser III in 745 B.C., when he turned his Assyrian arms against Babylonia instead of continuing to exercise them exclusively against Nairi and Aram, which were their legitimate field; and we shall see, from a survey of other instances which this Assyrian prototype calls to mind, that the denouement of the ensuing Assyro-Babylonian hundred years' war, catastrophic as it was,

¹ 'Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity' (Psalm cxxxiii. 1) is even more eminently true of the relations between communities than of those between individuals in a human society.

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 was not peculiar to this particular case. The aberration of the march which turns against the interior is, in its very nature, disastrous for the society as a whole; and it is destructive, above all, to the party which commits the original act of ὕβρις. When a sheep-dog who has been bred and trained to be the shepherd's partner lapses into the ethos and behaviour of the wolves whom it is his duty to chevy away, and betrays his trust by harrying the sheep on his own account, he works far worse havoc than any genuine wolf could work so long as a loyal sheep-dog was snapping at his flanks; but at the same time it is not the flock that suffers the most heavily from the catastrophe which follows the sheep-dog's treachery. The flock is decimated but survives; the dog is destroyed by his outraged master; and the frontiersman who turns against his own society is dooming himself to inexorable destruction because he is striking at the source from which his own life springs. He is like a sword-arm that plunges the blade which it wields into the body of which it is a member; or like a woodman who saws off the branch on which he is sitting, and so comes crashing down with it to the ground while the mutilated tree-trunk remains still standing.

Charlemagne.

It was perhaps an intuitive sense of the perversity of this misdirection of energies that moved the Austrasians to protest so vehemently in A.D. 754 against their war-lord Pepin's decision to respond to Pope Stephen's call to arms against their brethren the Lombards. The Papacy had turned its eyes towards this Transalpine Power, and had whetted Pepin's ambition by anointing him king in 749¹ and crowning him on the eve of the projected Italian expedition, because Austrasia in Pepin's generation had distinguished herself by her prowess in serving as a march of Western Christendom on two fronts: against the pagan Saxon barbarians who were pushing their way towards the Rhine from the no-man's-land of Northern Europe,² and against the Muslim Arab conquerors of North-West Africa and the Iberian Peninsula who were pressing on across the Pyrenees.³ In 754 the Austrasians were invited to divert their energies from the fields in which they had just been finding their true mission, and to inflict

¹ The ceremony on this occasion was performed by the Englishman Boniface, the apostle of the Papacy in Transalpine Europe. The subsequent crowning of Pepin in A.D. 754 was performed by the Pope in person at St. Denis.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 167-8, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 203-4; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 361-2 and 378-81; and II. D (vii), Annex IV, vol. ii, pp. 427-33, above; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 221-2, below.

upon the Lombards in Italy the fate which Austrasian arms had prevented the Arabs and the Saxons from inflicting upon the Franks themselves in Gaul. The misgivings of the Austrasian rank-and-file over this Italian adventure were proved by the event to be better justified than their leader's appetite for it; for in overriding the objections of his henchmen King Pepin forged the first link in a chain of military and political commitments which bound Austrasia to Italy ever more tightly. Pepin's Italian campaigns against Aistulf in 755 and 756 led on to Charlemagne's Italian campaign against Desiderius in 773-4—notwithstanding the effort of Charlemagne's mother and Pepin's widow Queen Bertrade to heal a breach between Frank and Lombard which King Pepin had opened against his people's will. When Bertrade arranged a marriage between her own and Pepin's son, who had now succeeded his father, and the daughter of Aistulf's successor Desiderius, Charlemagne repudiated his Lombard wife Desiderata and fulfilled his own father's ambitions by conquering his wife's father's kingdom outright. But Charlemagne's seizure of the Lombard Crown did not dispose of the Italian question or relieve the Transalpine Power of its ultramontane anxieties. In extinguishing the independence of the Lombard Kingdom Charlemagne saddled his own house irrevocably with the burden of defending and controlling the Papacy; and his protectorate over the *Ducatus Romanus* involved him in more distant complications with Lombard principalities and East Roman outposts in the South of Italy. Even when, on the fourth of the expeditions which he was compelled to make to Rome, he attained the apogee of his outward success in being crowned by the Pope, and acclaimed by the Roman people, as Augustus, the honour cost him the annoyance of a diplomatic conflict with the Court of Constantinople which dragged on for more than ten years.¹

The true verdict on Charlemagne's Italian policy is given by the chronological table of the acts of his reign, which shows how these ultramontane commitments repeatedly diverted him—and this often at critical moments—from his major military task of prosecuting the Great Saxon War. After throwing down the gauntlet to the Saxons by marching into the heart of their country, and hewing down the Irminsul, in 772, Charlemagne disappeared beyond the Alps during 773 and 774, and so left the way open for the Saxons in the latter year to take reprisals on Hessen. Thereafter the would-be 'knock-out blow' of 775-6 had to be suspended in the spring of the latter year while the smiter of the Saxons went off on a second ultramontane expedition to put down a rebellion raised by

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 328, footnote 3, above.

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Hrodgaud, the Lombard Duke of Friuli. In the middle of the next and most formidable phase of the war, in which the Saxons were led for eight years (777-85) by Widukind—a captain whose strategy was the offensive defensive—Charlemagne had to pay the third visit to Italy, and second to Rome, of his reign; and the lull in the Saxon War which followed the submission of Widukind in 785 gave no rest to Austrasian arms, for the year 787 saw Charlemagne pay his third visit to Rome, lead an inconclusive expedition against the South Lombard Duchy of Benevento, and impose his authority by a military demonstration upon the Lombards' old friends, and his own restive vassals, the Bavarians. The fourth and last phase of the Saxon War, in which the conquered but uncowed barbarians made a desperate and long-drawn-out effort to throw off the Austrasian yoke with the aid of the Frisians (*nitebantur* A.D. 792-804), was in progress during Charlemagne's fourth visit to Rome, and fifth to Italy, in 800-1.

We have already had occasion to notice how grievously this war of attrition against the Saxons exhausted the Carolingian Power.¹ The exhaustion declared itself in the break-up of the Carolingian Empire on the morrow of Charlemagne's death, and in the Scandinavian *revanche* for the Saxons' sufferings—a counter-attack which was opened even before the Austrasian conqueror of the Saxons had departed this life. It must also be remembered that the Saxon front beyond the Rhine was not the only frontier of Western Christendom for which Austrasia was responsible; she was likewise the warden of the Arab frontier beyond the Pyrenees; and, when Charlemagne overthrew the Lombard Kingdom and reduced the Bavarians to obedience, he inherited from his vanquished adversaries the wardenship of a third frontier, the Avar front beyond the Styrian Alps. It may have been inevitable that in the second year of his deadly duel with Widukind Charlemagne should have been drawn away into the Transpyrenaean expedition which ended so unfortunately at Roncevaux; but with a Transpyrenaean as well as a Transrhenean front to hold, and with disaffection always smouldering in Aquitaine, it is evident that Charlemagne could not afford in any case to enter into new commitments on the Italian side of the Alps; and his Italian policy became suicidal when it was combined, as it was, with an ambitious forward movement on both the Transalpine fronts which the great Austrasian militarist had inherited from his forebears. It was the wantonly imposed burden of Charlemagne's five Italian expeditions that aggravated to breaking-point the load which weighed upon Austrasia's back.

¹ See the references on p. 484, footnote 4, above.

Timur Lenk.

If Charlemagne broke Austrasia's back by turning her arms against the Lombard and Bavarian interior of a nascent Western Christendom when the whole of her strength was required for her terrific struggle with the Saxons beyond her Rhenish pale, Timur, in like fashion, broke the back of his own Transoxania by squandering in aimless expeditions into Iran and 'Irāq and India and Anatolia and Syria the slender reserves of Transoxanian strength which ought to have been concentrated upon Timur's proper mission of imposing his peace on the Eurasian Nomads.

We have seen in an earlier part of this Study¹ how Timur acquitted himself of that mission. In the course of nineteen years (A.D. 1362-80) of strenuous campaigning he had repulsed the attempts of the Chaghatāy Nomads to reconquer the Transoxanian oases; assumed the offensive in his turn against the foiled invaders on their native ranges in 'Mughalistan'; and rounded off his own dominions in the Eurasian march of the Iranic World by liberating the oases of Khwārizm on the Lower Oxus from the Nomads of Jūjī's appanage. Upon the completion of this great task in A.D. 1380 Timur had a greater prize within his reach—no less a prize than the succession to the Eurasian Empire of Chingis Khan—for in Timur's generation the Eurasian Nomads were in retreat on all sectors of the long frontier between the Desert and the Sown.² While Timur was winning his victory over the hordes of 'Mughalistan' and Qipchāq on the sector between the Pamirs and the Caspian, the Moldavians and Lithuanians³ and Cossacks⁴ were cutting short the appanage of Jūjī at its opposite extremity in the great western bay of the Steppe between the Iron Gates of the Danube and the Cataracts of the Dniepr; the Muscovites were shaking off the yoke of the Qipchāq horde; and the Chinese were driving out the Mongol Khāqāns—the senior branch of Chingis Khan's house, and the nominal overlords of all the Chingisid appanages—from Qubilai's capital at Peking⁵ into a no-man's-land beyond the outer face of the Great Wall from which these barbarian intruders had originally come. In every quarter the Nomads were on the run, and the next chapter in the history of Eurasia⁶ was to be a race between the

¹ Part II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 146-8, above.

² See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 439, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 172, above.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 155, above.

⁵ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, p. 351, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 193, below.

⁶ The word is used in this Study to designate the area covered by the Eurasian Steppe together with the ring of sedentary countries round its fringes that are subject to the Steppe's influence. The region thus defined has a much more genuine climatic, social, and historical individuality than the European and Asiatic continents which loom so large in the text-books of geography; for the Ural River—which every schoolboy knows by name as the boundary between Asia and Europe—is not a frontier in any

resurgent sedentary peoples round about for the prize of Chingis' heritage. In this competition the Moldavians and Lithuanians were too remote to be in the running; the Muscovites were wedded to their forests and the Chinese to their fields; the Cossacks and the Transoxanians were the only competitors who had succeeded in making themselves at home on the Steppes without uprooting the sedentary foundations of their own way of life.¹ Each in their own way, they had acquired something of the strength of Nomadism and had combined this with the strength of a sedentary civilization. To a sharp-eyed observer in A.D. 1380 it might have seemed as though the victory in the race for the dominion of Eurasia must lie between these two runners; and at that moment the Transoxanian competitor had, to all appearance, by far the better chance, for, besides being stronger in himself and nearer to the heart of the Steppe, he was also the first in the field, while, as the recognized champion of the Sunnah, he had potential partisans among the sedentary Muslim communities who were the outposts of Islam on the opposite coasts of the Steppe: in Qāzān and Krim on the one hand, and in Kansu and Shensi on the other.

For an instant Timur appeared to appreciate his opportunity and to grasp at it with determination. The civil war between rival sections of the Qipchāq horde, which had permitted Timur to conquer Khwārizm and the Muscovites to assert their independence, was duly taken advantage of by Timur for a more ambitious purpose than the mere acquisition of a single border province. He intervened in the internal affairs of Qipchāq by giving his support to one of the rival pretenders, Toqatmysh; it was thanks to Timur's aid that Toqatmysh was able in the course of the years 1378-82 to unite the whole of Jūji's appanage under his own leadership, reduce the Muscovites to obedience again by taking and burning Moscow itself, and inflict a heavy defeat upon the Lithuanians.² All this was done by Toqatmysh as Timur's vassal, and the effect was to make Timur master, directly or indirectly, of the whole western half of the Eurasian Steppe with its surrounding sedentary dependencies, from the Irtysh to the Dniepr and from the Pamirs to the Urals. At this juncture, however, the Transoxanian conqueror of the Eurasian no-man's-land suddenly turned right-about, directed his arms towards the interior of the Iranic World, and devoted the remaining twenty-four years of his life to a series of barren and destructive campaigns in this quarter. Even when

significant sense. The genuine frontiers that divide the Eurasian Steppe from China, South-Western Asia, Western Europe, and Russia are described in Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 399-402, above.

¹ For the Cossack way of life see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 155-7, above.

² For these events see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 147, above.

Toqatmysh, emboldened by seeing his suzerain fly off at a tangent, unintentionally drew him back into his proper field through an act of audacious aggression, Timur obstinately resumed his new course as soon as he had disposed of the nuisance in Qipchāq in a winter campaign across the Steppes which was the most brilliant and characteristic *tour de force* in the Transoxanian captain's whole history.¹

A brief exposition of the annals of the last twenty-four years of Timur's life will show how persistently, throughout that span of nearly a quarter of a century, he rejected an opportunity which he had held in the hollow of his hand at the moment of transition from the first to the second phase of his career.

Timur spent the seven years 1381-7 in conquering Iran and Transcaucasia, save for a single punitive expedition in 1383-4 against a still recalcitrant Chaghatāy Khan in 'Mughalistan'. He did not even take warning from a brush between his own troops and Toqatmysh's which occurred in 1385 in Azerbaijan; and at the beginning of 1388 he was in Fars, on the point of rounding off his conquest of the Iranian Plateau, when he was urgently recalled to Samarqand by Toqatmysh's invasion of Khwārizm and Transoxania. His crushing victory over Toqatmysh at Urtapa, on the opposite coast of the Qipchāq Steppe, in 1391 replaced in Timur's hands the opportunity which he had held in 1380 and had neglected since 1381. This time it was in his power to make himself the direct master of Qipchāq and all its dependencies. Moreover, after his triumphal return to Samarqand from Qipchāq at the beginning of 1392, he was able to stamp out the last embers of revolt in 'Mughalistan' and to establish his suzerainty definitively over the Chaghatāy horde. Eurasia now lay at his feet; but instead of stooping to pick up the prize he rode off again, that summer, in the opposite direction, made straight for Fars—that is to say, for the point on his course at which he had been compelled to desist from the conquest of South-Western Asia in 1388—and proceeded systematically with the subjugation of 'Irāq and Armenia and Georgia. In the course of this famous 'Five Years' Campaign' (July 1392-July 1396) Timur once again was drawn, in spite of himself, out of his intended course by a fresh incursion of Toqatmysh into Transcaucasia in the spring of 1395. Timur's counter-stroke carried him across the Caucasus and the Terek and the Steppes into Muscovy;²

¹ For this campaign of A.D. 1391 see loc. cit.

² Timur's incursion into Muscovy on this occasion does not appear to have been carried to the point of occupying the city of Moscow itself, *pace* Sharaf-ad Din 'Alī Yazdī, the Persian historian who recorded Timur's career in the generation following Timur's own (see the *Zafar-Nāmah* (Calcutta 1887-8, *Bibliotheca Indica* series, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 761). For Sharaf-ad-Din's tutorship over Yunus Khān Chaghatāy of 'Mughalistan' see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 149, above.

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but in 1396 he retraced his steps from Qipchāq to South-Western Asia, and returned to Samarqand across Iran.

From the summer of 1396 to the spring of 1398 Timur rested at Samarqand from his devastating labours; but this pause was not followed by a consolidation or extension of his hold upon Eurasia. Having now completed the pulverization of the heart of the Iranic World (of which he was himself a child), he set himself next to harry, in turn, its south-eastern and north-western extremities, where the Taghlāqi princes of Hindustan and the 'Osmanli princes of Rūm were at that time extending the Iranic domain at the expense of the Hindu World and Orthodox Christendom respectively. Timur's amīrs objected to crossing the Hindu Kush and attacking their own Turkish kinsmen and co-religionists in India¹ as strongly as the henchmen of Pepin had once objected, in similar circumstances, to crossing the Alps and attacking their Lombard kinsmen in Italy;² but Timur, like Pepin, made his own will prevail.³ The Indian campaign kept him occupied from the spring of 1398 to the spring of 1399; and by the autumn of the latter year he was off again on what was destined to be the most famous, though it was not really the most brilliant, chapter of his military career: a second five years' campaign which included his encounter with the Maghribī philosopher Ibn Khaldūn at Damascus in 1401⁴ and his defeat and capture of the Ottoman Sultan Bāyezīd Yildirim in 1402.⁵

Returning to Samarqand in the July of 1404, Timur was on the war-path again by November; and now at last, for the first time in twenty-three years, his face was deliberately set in an auspicious direction; for his objective, this time, was China; and although it may be doubted, in the light of his record in South-Western Asia, whether he would have repeated the Mongols' feat of conquering China outright—a task which it had taken even the Mongols seventy years (A.D. 1207–77) to complete—nevertheless this latest enterprise of Timur's, had he lived to carry it out, might have had enduring consequences of historical importance; for even a passing raid on China might have left Timur in permanent possession of the eastern sectors of the southern border of the Eurasian Steppe from the Tarim Basin to Manchuria; and that would have placed the whole of the Steppe in his power. At this point, however, we pass into the realm of conjecture; for even a militarist who was

¹ See Lane-Poole, S.: *Medieval India* (London 1903, Fisher Unwin), p. 155.

² See p. 488, above.

³ Timur was doubtless tempted by the anarchy into which the Taghlāqi Power had fallen since the death of Firūz Shah in A.D. 1388. (For Firūz Shah's Slave-household see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 31, footnote 1, above. For the onset, after Firūz Shah's death, of the second bout of a 'Time of Troubles' in the Hindu World see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 301, below.)

⁴ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 327, footnote 3, above.

⁵ See II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 102, and II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 148, above.

favoured with Timur's lucky star could not throw away twenty-three years with impunity. On his China campaign he had marched no farther eastward than Utrār before Death overtook him.

Timur's self-stultification is a supreme example of the suicidalness of Militarism, as will appear from a comparison between his fiasco and Charlemagne's.

In both cases the attempt of the march to conquer the interior was ephemeral—and indeed it is seldom that a relatively backward community does succeed in assimilating to itself by the crude expedient of military conquest another community which is in advance of it on the same path of civilization. Like the Transoxanian domination which Timur imposed by force of arms upon Iran and 'Irāq, the Austrasian domination which Charlemagne imposed upon Lombardy and Bavaria faded away after the conqueror's death. Yet the effects of Charlemagne's militarism were not altogether transient; for his empire held together in some fashion for three-quarters of a century after his own hand was removed; and the destinies of its several parts were permanently modified through their union into a single body social which lived on, in the shape of a *Respublica Christiana*, long after the evaporation of the military force by which the union had originally been brought about. By contrast, Timur's empire was not only shorter-lived than Charlemagne's but was also without any social after-effects of a positive kind. West of the Caspian Gates it dissolved in A.D. 1405 upon the news of Timur's death; in Khurāsān and Transoxania it broke up into weak and warring fragments after Shah Rukh's death in A.D. 1446;¹ and the only traceable after-effect is wholly negative. In sweeping away everything that it found in its path, in order to rush headlong to its own destruction, Timur's imperialism simply created a political and social vacuum in South-Western Asia; and this vacuum eventually drew the 'Osmanlis and the Safawis into a collision which dealt the stricken Iranic Society its death-blow.

Again, Charlemagne's diversion of Austrasian military energies from the frontiers of Western Christendom to the interior was fatal to Austrasia herself without proving equally fatal to the society of which Austrasia was a part. The expansion of the Western Christendom at the expense of the continental European barbarians was eventually taken up and carried on, from the line at which Charlemagne had come to a halt, by the descendants of Charlemagne's Saxon victims, and her expansion at the expense of the Syriac World in the Iberian Peninsula by a number of local Western Christian principalities, several of which were direct 'successor-states' of the Carolingian Empire. On both these fronts

¹ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 369, above.

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the price that the Western Christendom had to pay for Charlemagne's militarism was a pause which lasted for rather less than two centuries, and which was then followed by three centuries (*circa* A.D. 975-1275) of further advance.¹ On the other hand Timur's militarism deprived the Iranic Society for ever of its Promised Land in Eurasia.

The Iranic Society's forfeiture of the heritage of the Nomad World declared itself first on the plane of religion. Throughout the four centuries ending in Timur's generation Islam had been progressively establishing its hold over the sedentary peoples round the coasts of the Eurasian Steppe and had been captivating the Nomads themselves whenever they trespassed out of the Desert on to the Sown. In the tenth century of the Christian Era, when the military and political power of the Muslim sovereigns of the 'Abbasid Caliphate was in dissolution, their religion was conquering the sedentary Turkish peoples on the Middle Volga² and in the oases of the Tarim Basin and the Nomad Turkish followers of the Saljūq and the Illek Khans on the Transoxanian fringe of the Steppe between the Sea of Aral and Lake Balkash. Even in the last and greatest eruption of the post-'Abbasid *Völkerwanderung*, when the Steppe was convulsed to its depths and discharged upon Dār-al-Islām a horde of Nomads who had never been touched by the radiation of the Islamic culture and who were prejudiced against Islam, when they encountered it, by their tincture of Nestorian Christianity,³ the injury which Islam sustained from the spasmodic persecution to which it was subjected by the early Mongol Khāqāns was more than counterbalanced by the unintentional service which it received from the Mongols' policy of deliberately intermixing the peoples and cultures of their vast and heterogeneous empire. It was thanks to these pagan Nomad war-lords that Islam was propagated into China—and this not only into the north-western provinces adjoining the older Islamic domain in the Tarim Basin, but also into the new province of Yunnan in the far south-west, which was carved out of a barbarian no-man's-land and added to China by Mongol arms. Thereafter, when at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Christian Era the three western appanages of the Mongol Empire—the house of Hulāgū in Iran and the house of Jūjī on the Qipchāq Steppe and the house of Chaghatāy in Transoxania and Zungaria—were converted to Islam one after another, it looked as though nothing could now prevent Islam from becoming the religion of all Eurasia; and by the

¹ See I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 38, and II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 167-9 and 204, above.

² The White Bulgars, who were presumably the ancestors of the present Tatars of Qazān.

³ See II. D (vii), Annex VIII, in vol. ii, especially pp. 449-52, above.

time when Timur arose as the champion of the Sunnah in Transoxania, a Muslim 'Diaspora' which had seeded itself round the western and southern coasts of the Steppe had prepared the ground—as we have noticed already¹—for him to reap the harvest of a Pan-Eurasian Islamic empire. It is the more significant that the propagation of Islam in Eurasia, which had made such headway down to Timur's time, came to a dead halt thereafter. The only subsequent gain that Islam made in this quarter was the conversion of the Turkish Khanate of Western Siberia at some date shortly before the Cossack conquest in A.D. 1582;² and this success in one remote and backward corner was little for Islam to boast of in a generation which saw another of the 'higher religions' captivate all the rest of the Eurasian Nomads who had hitherto remained in their primitive paganism.

The outstanding religious event in Eurasia at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era was the conversion of the Mongols (in A.D. 1576-7) and their westerly kinsmen the Calmucks (*circa* A.D. 1620) to the Lamaistic form of Mahayanian Buddhism;³ and this astonishing triumph of a fossilized relic of the religious life of the long extinct Indic culture gives some measure of the extent to which the prestige of Islam had fallen in the estimation of the Eurasian Nomads during the two centuries that had elapsed since Timur's day.⁴

On the political plane the Iranic culture which Timur had first championed and then betrayed proved equally bankrupt. The sedentary societies which did, in the end, perform the feat of taming the Eurasian Nomadism politically were the Russian branch of the Orthodox Christian Society and the Chinese branch of the Far Eastern; and the sentence of servitude which Fate had pronounced upon the Nomads when Timur made his winter-passage across the Steppe and overthrew Toqatmysh at Urtapa in A.D. 1391 was never executed by Transoxanian hands. It was confirmed when, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Cossack servants of

¹ See p. 496, above.

² This, and not 1586 (the date given in II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 157, above), appears to be the true date of Yermak's crossing of the watershed between the Volga and the Ob.

³ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 451, above (following Courant, M.: *L'Asie Centrale aux XVII^e et XVIII^e Siècles: Empire Kalmouk ou Empire Mantchou?* (Lyon 1912, Rey), pp. 12-14 and 17), and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 137, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 309-10, below.

⁴ For the Lamaistic form of the Mahāyāna as a fossil of the Indic culture see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35, and I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2, above. For the role of Tibet as the fastness in which this fossil has survived, see II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1, above. The radiation of a religious influence from Tibet over the eastern half of the Eurasian Steppe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era will appear the more extraordinary when we consider that at this date the pagan Mongol and Calmuck Nomads were insulated from Lhasa geographically by a continuous belt of Muslim population which extended from west to east, through the oases of the Tarim Basin, into the Chinese provinces of Kansu and Shensi.

Muscovy and the Manchu masters of China ran into each other as they were feeling their way in opposite directions round the northern edge of the Steppe, and fought their first battle for dominion over Eurasia in the neighbourhood of Chingis Khan's ancestral pastures in the upper basin of the Amur.¹ The partition of Eurasia and the subjugation of its ancient Nomad occupants by the same pair of competitors was completed a century later when the Emperor Ch'ien Lung (*imperabat* A.D. 1735-96) broke the power of the Zungar Calmucks in A.D. 1755 and gave asylum to the already broken Torgut Calmuck refugees from the dominions of the Tsar in A.D. 1771.² Therewith the latest tidal wave of the Eurasian Nomadism was spent;³ and when the Muscovite and the Manchu Power had divided the allegiance of the Qāzāqs⁴—the flotsam and jetsam of the latest wave but one, who were now drifting sluggishly over the eastern portion of the Qipchāq Steppe, between the Irtish and the Yaik—the whole of Eurasia, up to the northern outskirts of the Transoxanian oases, found itself under either Russian or Chinese control.

Nor did the injury inflicted by Timur's militarism upon the Iranic World, including the conqueror's own Transoxanian homeland, stop short at the loss of a potential field for expansion across and around the Eurasian Steppe. The conclusive condemnation of the destructive militarism which possessed Timur during the last twenty-four years of his career is to be found in the fact that, besides being barren in itself, it actually led in the fullness of Time—as its consequences worked themselves out in the third and fourth generation—to the undoing of the constructive work to which Timur had devoted himself for nineteen years before he ran amok in A.D. 1381. The liberator of the nascent Iranic Society in Transoxania spent the rest of his life in so recklessly wearing out the energies which he had first mobilized against a Nomad intruder that the world which he had made safe against the hordes of Chaghatāy and Jūji found itself exposed, within little more than a hundred years after the death of the liberator-turned-militarist, to a recurrence of the Nomad peril in the shape of the Uzbegs;⁵ and in this emergency the epigoni of Timur's house were impotent—heirs, as they were, to the debilitating social legacy of Timur's mili-

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 19, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 315-6, below.

² For this backward ebb, into the heart of the Steppe, of a Calmuck tide which had poured out of it in all directions a century and a half before, see the reference to De Quincey in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 19, footnote 3, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 315, below.

³ For a discussion of Nomad eruptions in general, and of the Calmuck eruption in particular, see Part III. A, Annex II, in vol. iii, above.

⁴ Incorrectly spelt 'Kazaks' in vol. iii, pp. 18-19, 418, 422, 423 and 521, above. For the etymology of the Turkish word see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 282, footnote 1, below.

⁵ On this point see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 447, above.

tary excesses—to repeat their ancestor's original feat. The Uzbek 'drive' at the heart of the Iranic World was eventually arrested, not by any Timurid prince of Farghānā or Khurāsān, but by the new Safawī Power of Shah Ismā'il; and even Shah Ismā'il's arms, which did effectively bar the Uzbeks' farther progress, were unable to drive the intruders right back into the Eurasian no-man's-land out of which they had issued. With his relatively distant base of operations in Azerbaijan and with his grandiose ambitions on the west—ambitions which involved him in an unequal contest with the 'Osmanlis—his power to play the liberator on the eastern front was limited; and after expelling the Uzbeks once for all from Khurāsān he was compelled in the end to leave them in permanent possession of Transoxania.¹

Thus, a century and a half after the year in which Timur had girded himself to liberate his country from the dominion of the Chaghatāy horde, Transoxania fell under the yoke of another swarm of Nomads, from the back-of-beyond, who were even more barbarous than the hateful and contemptible 'Jātah'; and under this yoke the former Eurasian march of the Iranic World, which had once spread her terror as puissantly as Assyria, was destined to lie prostrate and passive for the next three hundred and fifty years, until, in the third quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the long-ground-down peasantry of the Transoxanian oases obtained at last the alleviation of exchanging an Uzbek for a Russian master.

It is a curious reflection that, if Timur had not turned his back on Eurasia and his arms against Iran in A.D. 1381, the present relations between Transoxania and Russia might have been the inverse of what they actually are. In those hypothetical circumstances Russia to-day might have found herself included in an empire of much the same extent as the area of the Soviet Union but with quite a different centre of gravity—an Iranic Empire in which Samarqand would be ruling Moscow instead of Moscow ruling Samarqand. This imaginary picture of an alternative course of Iranic history may appear outlandish because the actual course has been taking an altogether different direction for the last four hundred years and more. At least as strange a picture will unfold itself before our mind's eye if we plot out an alternative course of Western history in which the consequences of Charlemagne's militarism for our world are imagined to have been as utterly disastrous as those of Timur's militarism actually were for his. On this analogy we shall have to picture Austrasia being submerged

¹ For these transactions in South-Western Asia in the early years of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, above.

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by the Magyars and Neustria by the Vikings in the tenth century, and the heart of the Carolingian Empire remaining thereafter under this barbarian domination until in the fourteenth century the 'Osmanlis step in to impose the lesser evil of an alien civilization upon these derelict marches of Western Christendom.

Thus, besides forfeiting a Promised Land, Timur undid his own work of liberating his native country; but the greatest of all his acts of destruction was committed against himself. He has succeeded in making his name immortal at the price of erasing from the minds of Posterity all memory of the deeds for which he might have been remembered for good. To how many people in either Christendom or Dār-al-Islām to-day does Timur's name call up the image of a champion of Civilization against Barbarism, who led the clergy and people of his country to a hard-won victory at the end of a nineteen-years-long struggle for independence? To the vast majority of those to whom the name of Timur Lenk or Tamerlane means anything at all, it commemorates a militarist who perpetrated as many horrors in the span of twenty-four years as had been perpetrated in a century by a succession of Assyrian kings from Tiglath-Pileser III to Assurbanipal inclusive. We think of the monster who razed Isfarā'in to the ground in 1381; built two thousand prisoners into a living mound, and then bricked them over, at Sabzawār in 1383; piled 5,000 human heads into minarets at Zirih in the same year; cast his Lūrī prisoners alive over precipices in 1386; massacred 70,000 people, and piled the heads of the slain into minarets, at Isfahān in 1387; massacred the garrison of Takrit, and piled their heads into minarets, in 1393; massacred 100,000 prisoners at Delhi in 1398; buried alive the 4,000 Christian soldiers of the garrison of Sivas after their capitulation in 1400; built twenty towers of skulls in Syria in 1400 and 1401; and dealt with Baghdad in 1401 as he had dealt fourteen years earlier with Isfahān. In minds which know him only through such deeds, Timur has caused himself to be confounded with the ogres of the Steppe—a Chingis and an Attila and the like—against whom he had spent the better half of his life in waging a Holy War. The crack-brained megalomania of the homicidal madman whose one idea is to impress the imagination of Mankind with a sense of his military power by a hideous abuse of it is brilliantly conveyed in the hyperboles which the English poet Marlowe has placed in the mouth of his Tamburlaine:

I hold the Fates bound fast in yron chaines,
And with my hand turne Fortune's wheel about,
And sooner shall the Sun fall from his Spheare,
Than Tamburlaine be slaine or overcome. . . .

The God of war resignes his rounge to me,
 Meaning to make me Generall of the world;
 Jove, viewing me in armes, lookes pale and wan,
 Fearing my power should pull him from his throne.
 Where ere I come the fatall sisters sweat,
 And griesly death by running to and fro,
 To doo their ceassles homag to my sword. . . .
 Millions of soules sit on the bankes of Styx,
 Waiting the back returne of Charon's boat,
 Hell and Elysian swarme with ghosts of men,
 That I have sent from sundry foughthen fields,
 To spread my fame through hell and up to heaven. . . .
 Nor am I made Arch-monark of the world,
 Crown'd and invested by the hand of Jove,
 For deeds of bounty or nobility;
 But since I exercise a greater name,
 The Scourge of God and terrour of the world,
 I must apply my selfe to fit those tearmes,
 In war, in blood, in death, in crueltie. . . .
 I will persist a terrour to the world,
 Making the Meteors, that like armed men
 Are seene to march upon the towers of heaven,
 Run tilting round about the firmament,
 And breake their burning Lances in the aire,
 For honor of my woondrous victories.¹

The Margrave turned Moss-trooper.

In analysing the careers of Timur and Charlemagne and the kings of Assyria from Tiglath-Pileser III to Assurbanipal, we have observed the same phenomenon in all three cases. The military prowess which a society develops among its frontiersmen for its defence against external enemies undergoes a sinister transformation into the moral malady of Militarism when it is diverted from its proper field in the no-man's-land beyond the pale and is turned against the frontiersmen's own brethren in the interior of a world which it is their mission to protect and not to devastate. A number of other examples of this destructive social evil will readily occur to our minds.

We shall think of Mercia turning against the other English 'successor-states' of the Roman Empire in Britain the arms which she had sharpened in the performance of her original function as the English march against Wales;² of the Plantagenet Kingdom of England attempting in the Hundred Years' War to conquer the sister Kingdom of France instead of attending to her proper business

¹ Marlowe, Christopher: *Tamburlaine the Great*, ll. 369-72; 2232-8; 2245-9; 3824-30; 3875-80.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 195-6, above.

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of enlarging the bounds of their common mother, Latin Christendom, at the expense of 'the Celtic Fringe'; and of the Norman King Roger of Sicily turning his military energies to the extension of his dominions in Central Italy—at the expense of the South Lombard duchies and the Holy Roman Empire and the States of the Church—instead of devoting himself to carrying on his forebears' work of enlarging the bounds of Western Christendom in the Mediterranean at the expense of Orthodox Christendom and Dār-al-Islām. In the Mexic World we see the Aztecs warring down the Toltecs, to whom they owed their own initiation into the Mexic culture, instead of confining themselves to their proper task of guarding the northern march against the unconverted Chichimecs of the wilderness; in the Andean World we see the Incas bending their energies to the subjugation of their lowland neighbours in the coastlands and their highland neighbours in Ecuador, who were co-heirs with them in the heritage of the Andean Civilization, while they made little headway against the dangerous savages of Amazonia or the valiant barbarians of Southern Chile and the Pampas, whom it was their mission to keep at bay.¹ In like fashion the Mycenaean outposts of the Minoan Civilization on the European mainland misused the prowess which they had acquired in holding their own against the continental barbarians, in order to turn and rend their mother Crete;² and the Macedonians and the Romans, whose function in the Hellenic World was to serve as wardens of the marches against the same barbarians, committed in their turn the same crime as the Mycenaeans when they contended with their neighbours, and finally with each other, for the illegitimate prize of a Pan-Hellenic hegemony.³ In the Sinic World the part of Rome was played by Ts'in, the western march against the barbarian highlanders of Shensi and Shansi and against the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe, when her princes stepped into an arena which had formed itself in the interior and there eventually delivered the 'knock-out blow' in the struggle between the contending states.⁴

In the Egyptiac World the classic Southern March in the section of the Nile Valley immediately below the First Cataract trained itself in arms, in the execution of its duty of damming back the Nubian barbarians up-river, only to turn right-about, direct its arms down-river against the Egyptiac communities in the interior, and take advantage of its military superiority in order to establish by brute force the United Kingdom of the Two Crowns.⁵ This act

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 206-8, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 159-60, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 160-4, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 89, and III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 167, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 291-5, below.

⁵ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 112 and 114-15, above.

of Militarism, which was at once the making and the marring of the Egyptiac Civilization, has been depicted by its perpetrator, with all the frankness of self-complacency, in one of the earliest of the Egyptiac records that have come into the hands of our modern Western archaeologists. The palette of Narmer portrays the triumphant return of the Upper Egyptian war-lord from the conquest of Lower Egypt. Swollen to a superhuman stature, the royal conqueror marches behind a strutting file of standard-bearers towards a double row of decapitated enemy corpses, while below, in the image of a bull, he tramples upon a fallen adversary and batters down the walls of a fortified town. The accompanying script is believed to enumerate a booty of 120,000 human captives, 400,000 oxen, and 1,422,000 sheep and goats.¹

In this gruesome work of an archaic Egyptiac art we have the whole tragedy of Militarism as it has been acted over and over again since Narmer's time by the Sennacheribs and Tamerlanes and Charlemagnes of twenty different civilizations down to our own militarists in the Western World of to-day. Perhaps the most poignant of all the performances of this tragedy during its run of some six thousand years up to date is that of which Athens was guilty when she transformed herself from a 'liberator of Hellas'² into a 'tyrant city'³ by misusing for the oppression of her Hellenic allies and protégées the naval power with which she had armed herself so short a time before in order to save herself—and rescue all Hellas in the act—from the aggression of the Achaemenidae. This Athenian aberration brought upon the whole of Hellas, as well as upon Athens herself, the never-retrieved disaster of 431–404 B.C. And, if an Athens under arms succumbed to so gross a sin, with such fatal consequences, can any of those military and naval Powers of our modern Western World who surpass Athens in arms as signally as they fall short of her in the arts, feel sure of preserving their own moral integrity?

In all the examples of which we have just been reminding ourselves in a cursory review, the suicidalness of Militarism is as evident as it is in the three classic cases with which we have dealt

¹ A photograph of the palette will be found in Rostovtzeff, M.: *A History of the Ancient World* (Oxford 1926, University Press, 2 vols.), vol. i, Plate IV, opposite p. 30; and in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, Plates, vol. i (Cambridge 1927, University Press), plate facing p. 78, fig. [c]. For the statistics of the spoil see Dawson, C.: *The Age of the Gods* (reissue: London 1933, Sheed and Ward), p. 153.

² See the judgement which Herodotus goes out of his way to record in Book VII, chap. 139. The conviction with which this sceptical-minded observer expresses his opinion on the point is made all the more striking by the apologetic tone in which he delivers himself—writing, as he was, at a time when any praise of Athens had been made invidious by the odious misbehaviour of Athens herself.

³ The description of the Athenian Empire which is placed in the mouth of the Athenian politician Cleon by the historian Thucydides (Book III, chap. 37) in his version of a public speech which was delivered by Cleon in 427 B.C.

at greater length; and it comes out most strikingly of all where the fatal change of front has not been exclusively devastating in its effects, but has also been incidentally constructive. The diversion of Athenian and Macedonian arms from the external frontier towards the interior of the Hellenic World was disastrous for Hellas even though the Athenian and Macedonian militarists were doing something to provide the Hellenic Society with the political world order of which it then stood in need.¹ The corresponding changes of front which were made by Rome and Ts'in and the Incas were likewise disastrous to their respective societies in spite of the fact that in each of these cases the militarist community did succeed, through the triumph of its militarism, in providing its society with a universal state. And Narmer's change of front from up-stream to down-stream in the Nile Valley had a sinister effect upon the subsequent course of Egyptiac history even though it resulted in the establishment of the United Kingdom. In the palette of Narmer we have the first evidence of that brutal vein in the Egyptiac *êthos* which so soon arrested the growth of the Egyptiac Civilization. The descendants of the Lower Egyptian peasants whom Narmer had slaughtered or enslaved were those unfortunate human beings who were converted into 'man-power' by the Pyramid-Builders.²

The military field which we have been surveying in this chapter is illuminating for the study of the fatal chain of *κόρος-ὑβρις-ἄτη* because military skill and prowess are edged tools which are apt to inflict fatal injuries upon those who venture to wield them if there is even the slightest clumsiness or misjudgement in their use. When an individual or a government or a community that has command of military power mistakes the limits of the field within which this power can be used with effect, or misconceives the nature of the objectives which it is possible to attain by means of it, the disastrousness of this aberration can hardly fail to make itself conspicuous through the seriousness of the practical consequences. But what is palpably true of military action is also true of other human activities in less hazardous fields where the train of gunpowder that leads from *κόρος* through *ὑβρις* to *ἄτη* is not so explosive. Whatever the human faculty, or the sphere of its exercise, may be, the presumption that because a faculty has proved equal to the accomplishment of a limited task within its proper field it may therefore be counted upon to produce some inordinate effect in a different set of circumstances is never anything but an intellectual and a moral aberration and never leads to anything but certain disaster.

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 10, pp. 210-13; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), p. 265; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 305-6, above.

² See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 212-15, above.

(β) *The Intoxication of Victory.*

The Roman Republic.

One of the more general forms in which the tragedy of κόπος-ὑβρις-ἄρη presents itself is the intoxication of victory—whether the struggle in which the fatal prize is won be a war of arms or a conflict of spiritual forces. Both variants of this drama may be illustrated from the history of Rome: the intoxication of a military victory from the breakdown of the Republic in the second century B.C., the intoxication of a spiritual victory from the breakdown of the Papacy in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era.

The demoralization to which the governing class in the Roman Republic succumbed at the close of half a century of titanic warfare (220–168 B.C.) which had begun with the terrible ordeal of the Hannibalic War and had ended in the conquest of the World, is caustically described by a contemporary Greek observer who happened to be one of the victims.

‘The first result of the friendship between Polybius and Scipio Aemilianus¹ was a dynamic enthusiasm for higher things which took possession of them both and which inspired them with the ambition to win moral distinction and to compete victoriously in this field with their contemporaries. The great prize on which they had thus set their hearts would have been difficult to attain in ordinary circumstances; but unhappily in the Rome of that generation the standard of the competition was lowered by the general demoralization of Society. Some were “all out” for women, others for unnatural vice, and many for “shows” and drink and all the extravagance for which “shows” and drink gave occasion. These were all vices for which the Greeks had a weakness, and the Romans had caught this infirmity from them instantaneously during the third Romano-Macedonian War. So violent and so uncontrolled was the passion for these vices that had overcome the younger generation of Romans that it was quite a common thing to buy a boy-favourite for a talent and a jar of caviare for three hundred drachmae—behaviour which drew from Marcus Cato in a public speech the indignant exclamation that the demoralization of Roman Society was glaringly exposed in the mere fact of handsome boys fetching a higher price than land, and jars of caviare than live-stock. If it is asked why this social malady “lighted up” at this particular time, two reasons can be given in answer. The first reason was that, with the overthrow of the Kingdom of Macedon, the Romans felt that there was no Power now left in the World that could challenge their own supremacy.² The second reason was that the

¹ This friendship started at the time when Polybius was a political deportee, interned in Italy, after the victory of Rome in the third Romano-Macedonian War (*gerebatur* 172–168 B.C.). For the circumstances see III. C (ii) (b), in vol. iii, p. 315, above.—A.J.T.

² The demoralizing release of Roman souls from the salutary fear of a formidable

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material display, both private and public, of life in Rome had been enormously enhanced by the removal to Rome of properties (*χορηγιών*) from Macedonia.¹

This was the moral pass to which the Roman governing class had been brought by the overwhelming victory which had descended upon the Republic after years of agony in which she had been tottering on the verge of an abyss. The first reaction of a generation which had lived through this bewildering experience was a blind presumption that a victor's irresistible material power was the key to a solution of all human problems, and that the only conceivable end of Man was an unbridled enjoyment of the grossest pleasures which this power could place within his grasp.² The victors did not realize that this very state of mind bore witness to the moral defeat which a militarily vanquished Hannibal had succeeded in inflicting upon them.³ They did not perceive that the world in which they passed for victors was a world in ruins, and that their own ostensibly victorious Roman Republic was the most sorely stricken⁴ of all the prostrate states of which this ruined world was made up. In this moral aberration they wandered in the wilderness for more than a hundred years; and in this awful century they inflicted one calamity after another upon a world which their victory had placed at their mercy, and the greatest calamities of all upon themselves.

Even in the military coin which was their own chosen currency their bankruptcy soon became manifest. The hard-won Roman triumphs over a Hannibal and a Perseus were followed by a series of humiliating Roman reverses at the hands of antagonists who were utterly outmatched by Rome in military strength: the broken, disarmed, and almost defenceless Carthage upon whom the Roman

foreign foe is traced by Saint Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*, Book I, chap. 30) to the overthrow, not of Macedon in the Third Romano-Macedonian War, but of Carthage in the Third Romano-Punic War. 'Deleta quippe Carthagine, magno scilicet terrore Romanae rei publicae depulso et extincto, tanta de rebus prosperis orta mala continuo subsequuta sunt ut . . .'.—A.J.T.

¹ Polybius: *An Oecumenical History*, Book XXXI, chap. 25. The effect that Polybius here ascribes to Paullus's victory in Greece in 168 B.C. is ascribed to Sulla's campaigns in Asia in the second decade of the last century B.C. by Sallust: 'Ibi primum insuevit exercitus Populi Romani amare potare, signa tabulas pictas vasa caelata mirari, ea privatim et publice rapere, delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere' (*Bellum Catilinae*, chap. 11).

² 'Qui labores, pericula, dubias asperasque res facile toleraverant, eis otium divitiae, optanda alias, oneri miseriaeque fuere. igitur primo imperi, pecuniae deinde cupido crevit; ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere.'—Sallust, op. cit., chap. 10.

³ 'Quippe secundae res sapientium animos fatigant: ne illi corruptis moribus victoriae temperarent.'—Sallust, op. cit., chap. 11. 'Tunc iam Roma subiugaverat Africam, subiugaverat Graeciam, lateque etiam aliis partibus orbis imperans tanquam se ipsa non valens ferre sua se quodammodo magnitudine fregerat' (Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book XVIII, chap. 45, perhaps unconsciously reproducing Horace's 'Suis et ipsa Roma viribus ruit' (Epode xvi, l. 2, quoted in V. C. (i) 3, vol. v, p. 406, below)).

⁴ 'Similior victo fuerit ille qui vicit.'—Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book III, chap. 19, apropos of the outcome of the Hannibalic War.

Government passed a cold-blooded sentence of annihilation in 149 B.C.; the barbarian Numantines who defied all Roman efforts to subjugate them from 153 to 133; the enslaved and expatriated Orientals who broke out of their ergastula on the Sicilian plantations in 135 and 104;¹ the mutinous gladiators at whose head Spartacus ranged as freely over Italy from 73 to 71² as Hannibal himself had ranged from 218 to 211; the 'Citizens of the Sun' who put their faith in Aristonicus of Pergamum and held out against the power of Rome for three years (132-130) in the strength of their belief in the coming of a new dispensation;³ and the rebellious native princes—a Jugurtha⁴ and a Mithradates⁵—who repudiated their allegiance and taxed their outraged suzerain's strength to the uttermost before she succeeded in bringing them to book.

The reason why Rome thus covered herself with military dishonour on the morrow of a military triumph was because during this century her officers were leading soldiers who had no longer anything to gain by victory against an enemy who, on his side, had no longer anything to hope for from laying down his arms.⁶ Both the mobilization of the Italian peasantry and the subjugation of the barbarians and the Orientals were now being exploited heartlessly for the pecuniary profit of the Roman governing class. The provinces were being drained of their inanimate wealth and their human inhabitants in order to provide lucrative contracts for Roman business men and cheap man-power for Roman senators' cattle-ranches and plantations; and the land which was being stocked with this alien slave-labour in order to multiply the fortunes of a small class of already rich men was Italian land which was being placed at the disposition of these capitalists by the impoverishment and eviction of the former peasant proprietors. The nucleus of the latifundia which 'ruined Italy'⁷ was the devastated area in the South which became public property as a result of the Hannibalic War, partly in punishment for the defection of the original owners to the invader's camp, and partly because the original owners had simply disappeared. Thereafter the new class of post-war 'planters' and 'ranchers' was able to add field to field by buying up the freeholds which were thrown upon the market when their owners were mobilized and kept under arms for years

¹ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 214, and III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 198-9, above; and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 69-70, below.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 70, below.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 69 and 179-80; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 692, footnote 2; and V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, vol. vi, p. 351, below.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 218, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 234, below.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 69, below.

⁶ 'Ei milites, postquam victoriam adepti sunt, nihil reliqui victis fecere.'—Sallust, op. cit., chap. 11.

⁷ C. Plinius Secundus: *Historia Naturalis*, Book XVIII, chap. 6.

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on end in some distant theatre of chronic frontier-warfare—on the western borders of the two provinces in Spain, or on the northern borders of the province of Macedonia.¹

In this age the subjects and the citizens of the Roman Republic were fellow victims of a *ci-devant* Roman governing class which had been transmuted by the intoxication of victory into a band of robbers.² In 104 B.C., when the whole Hellenic World was overshadowed by the common menace of a barbarian avalanche from Northern Europe, the King of Bithynia, which was officially a friendly state under Rome's protectorate, could reply with biting irony, when the highest representative of the Roman Government served him with a requisition for a contingent of troops, 'that most of his subjects had been kidnapped by the [Roman] tax-farmers and were now living in slavery in territories under Roman administration'.³ And in 133 B.C. a high-minded young Roman aristocrat who attempted to carry out a social reform, and thereby precipitated a revolution,⁴ could declare without contradiction:

'The wild animals that range over Italy have a hole, and each of them has its lair and nest, but the men who fight and die for Italy have no part or lot in anything but the air and the sunlight. . . . It is for the sake of other men's wealth and luxury that these go to the wars and give their lives. They are called the lords of the World, and they have not a single clod of earth to call their own.'⁵

The militant refusal of Tiberius Gracchus's peers to support him in seeking a remedy for the Roman peasantry's wrongs evoked a revolution which festered into a civil war; and the self-destructive violence which was let loose within the bosom of the Roman Commonwealth by the murder of the would-be reformer in 133 B.C. was brought under control again only by the establishment of the *Pax Augusta* in 31 B.C. after the Battle of Actium.

To a Roman poet, reviewing the tragedy in retrospect, it seemed evident that in this century of self-inflicted agony the Roman people were being punished for their sins.

¹ For the spread of the slave-plantation system in Southern Italy after the Hannibalic War see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 170-1, above.

² 'Ex divitiis iuventutem luxuria atque avaritia cum superbia invasere: rapere consumere, sua parvi pendere aliena cupere, pudorem pudicitiam, divina atque humana promiscua, nihil pensi neque moderati habere.'—Sallust, *op. cit.*, chap. 12. 'Ut Romani illi qui vita integritate mala metuebant ab hostibus, perdita integritate vitae crudeliora paterentur a civibus; eaque ipsa libido dominandi, quae inter alia vitia generis humani meracior inerat universo populo Romano, posteaquam in paucis potentioribus vicit, obtritros fatigatosque ceteros etiam iugo servitutis oppressit.'—Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book I, chap. 30.

³ Diodorus of Agyrium: *A Library of Universal History*, Book XXXVI, chap. 3.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 78; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 388-9; V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), vol. vi, pp. 52-3; V. C (i) (d) 8 (ε), vol. vi, p. 94; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 219-20, below.

⁵ Tiberius Gracchus, quoted by Plutarch: *Lives of the Gracchi*, chap. 9. See further, V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 70-1; V. C (i) (c) 1, Annex, vol. v, pp. 573-4; and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 381, with Table VIII, logion (α), p. 414, below.

Ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis
 Romanas acies iterum videre Philippi,
 nec fuit indignum superis bis sanguine nostro
 Emathiam et latos Haemi pinguescere campos.¹

And even then, when the blood-price had been paid twice over, Virgil was tormented by a fear that Augustus himself might not be granted grace to lift the curse.

Di patrii, Indigetes, et Romule, Vestaque mater
 quae Tuscum Tiberim et Romana palatia servas,
 hunc saltem everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo
 ne prohibete. satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
 Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae.²

On this note of prayer³ the poem ends, without presuming to anticipate the answer; and in ending thus the poet's intuition was right; for the *Pax Augusta*, as we have seen,⁴ inaugurated no 'Golden Age', but only an 'Indian Summer'.⁵ By the time when Virgil wrote those lines the injury which Roman ὕβρις had already inflicted upon Rome herself, and upon the whole of the Hellenic Society, was quite past repair. The most that the gods of the dominant minority were able to grant to the last of their favourites was a respite which was not a reprieve; and even this respite was to redound to the benefit, not of the bankrupt gods' own people, but of a *nova progenies*:⁶ a 'coming race' whose eyes were set upon a distant horizon and whose faith was founded on the power of a different saviour.⁷ The irreparable event which had occurred in the Hellenic World between the generation of Polybius and the generation of Virgil was the Secession of the Proletariat;⁸ and the inexorable event which was to follow between the generation of Virgil and that of Marcus Aurelius was the budding, within the bosom of this Proletariat, of the germ of a new social order.

The material grievance which Gracchus had sought to remedy by political action was eventually redressed in a perversely anti-social way when the descendants of such Italian peasants as had succeeded in still clinging to the land were ruthlessly evicted by a succession of revolutionary war-lords, from Sulla to Augustus himself, in order to provide allotments for the descendants of their

¹ Virgil: *Georgicon* Book I, ll. 489-92.

² *Ibid.*, ll. 498-502.

³ For the sense of sin to which the prayer testifies see V. C (i) (d) 5, vol. v, pp. 435-6, below.

⁴ In IV. C (ii) (b) 1, pp. 58-63, above.

⁵ In the view of Saint Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*, Book III, chap. 21) Augustus 'videtur . . . quasi morbida vetustate collapsam veluti instaurasse ac renovasse rem publicam'.

⁶ Virgil: *Eclouge* iv, l. 7.

⁷ The diverse conceptions of the Saviour that take shape in the minds of the children of a disintegrating civilization are examined in V. C (ii) (a), *passim*, in vol. vi, below.

⁸ See I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 41, and I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-6, above, and V. C (i) (c), *passim*, vol. v, below.

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uprooted brothers who had long since become incapable of effectively 'going back to the land' after having been forced for years on end to make the camp their home and the sword their means of livelihood.

Impius haec tam culta novalia miles habebit,
barbarus has segetes.¹

This travesty of the Gracchan remedy was even worse than the disease of an uprooted and militarized citizen-proletariat. It dealt the final blow to Italian agriculture.² But, at a moment when the social problems of Italy were utterly defeating all the manœuvres of Roman statesmanship, the parable of the wild things' 'holes' and 'nests', which Tiberius Gracchus had once employed in a political speech as a figurative search-light to show up a social wrong, was being applied to illustrate a different and a deeper truth by a prophet in Syria³ who made no impression on the minds of the Roman authorities of the day (not even when, in the course of their administrative routine, they had occasion to put him to death). When Jesus took upon himself the sufferings of a Galilaean peasantry who had been despoiled by the same predatory hand as the peasants of the Ager Mantuanus, and when he said to the scribe 'the foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head',⁴ he was using the Gracchan image in order to make the Proletariat understand that the wrongful and violent spoliation of their material goods was not a ground for revolutionary reprisals, or even perhaps for political reforms, but was actually a blessing in disguise because it was an unsuspected source of spiritual wealth.

'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the Earth. . . .

'Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.'⁵

In a lesser degree this intoxication of victory, which carried the Roman governing class to perdition after their conquest of the Hellenic World in the half-century ending in the Battle of Pydna, was likewise the ruin of the Spaniards and the Portuguese after their conquest of the New World at the beginning of the Modern Age of our Western history, and again the ruin of the British after their conquest of Bengal and Canada in the Seven Years' War.

¹ Virgil, *Eclough* i, ll. 70-1.

² For the restoration of Italian agriculture, some five or six centuries later, as an incidental economic consequence of the spiritual movement which was started by Benedict of Nursia, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 266, and IV. C (iii) (b) 4, in the present volume, p. 49, above.

³ For the attribution of the same saying both to Tiberius Gracchus and to Jesus see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 381, with Table VIII, logion (α), p. 414, below.

⁴ Matt. viii. 20 = Luke ix. 57-8 = 'Q'. For the literary relation between the Christian and the pagan version of this λόγιον see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, Table VIII, vol. vi, p. 414, below.

⁵ Matt. v. 5 and 10.

The Spaniards and Portuguese, who in A.D. 1493 had obtained from the Pope an arbitral award,¹ partitioning between them the whole of the Overseas World as though no other claimants were in the field, saw their monopoly broken within less than a century when the Dutch and the English and the French made free with the Spanish preserves in America and the Portuguese preserves in Africa and India, and both the Iberian Powers' preserves in the Far East, after the defeat of the Spanish Armada. And the intoxication of the Iberian pioneers with their original achievement—their overweening pride in the knowledge that

We were the first that ever burst
into that silent sea²—

was the gaping joint in their armour through which their lynx-eyed and nimble-handed European competitors directed their disabling thrusts at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

As for the English, they were temporarily shaken out of the moderation which they have studiously practised both before and since by the extraordinary lavishness of Fortune when she showered Canada upon them with one hand and Bengal, simultaneously, with the other. In 1763 it seemed 'the manifest destiny' of the British Empire to swallow up the whole of North America as well as the whole of India. Yet twenty years later Great Britain had lost the better half of one of the two sub-continent and was in imminent danger of losing the whole of the other. It is true that the verdict of History has now acquitted British statesmanship of exclusive responsibility for the break-up of the First British Empire. American historians have latterly done much to show that in the fratricidal war of 1775-83 the war-guilt was divided; and the name of Warren Hastings no longer sounds so sinister as it was made to sound a century and a half ago. Nevertheless the fact remains that the Thirteen Colonies would never have been lost to the British Crown if from 1763 to 1775 it had shown towards them the same tact and consideration as it has repeatedly shown towards Canada from 1774 onwards. Nor would Bengal have been retained—nor, *a fortiori*, enlarged into an empire embracing all India—if the predatory practices of the Company's servants in the East, from Clive and Warren Hastings downwards, during the twenty-six years following the intoxicating victory of Plassey had not been discouraged by the abortive India Bill of 1783 and the effective India Bill of 1784 and the long-drawn-out state trial of 1786-95.

¹ Embodied in Pope Alexander VI's three successive bulls of the 3rd May, the 4th May, and the 25th September, 1493, which were taken as the basis for the Spanish-Portuguese Agreement of the 7th June, 1494.

² Coleridge, S. T.: *The Ancient Mariner*.

However sincerely Clive may have 'marvelled at' his 'own moderation', his economy of virtue would assuredly soon have cost his countrymen the loss of an Oriental dominion which his excess of unscrupulousness had suddenly won for them, if they had not exerted themselves to improve upon Clive's moral standards under the sobering influence of their American disaster.

The Roman See.

Perhaps the most signal of all public examples of the disastrous consequences of the intoxication of victory is afforded by one of the chapters in the long, and still living and lengthening, history of the Papacy.

The chapter in the history of this greatest of all Western institutions which began on the 20th December, 1046, with the opening of the Synod of Sutri by the Emperor Henry III,¹ and which closed on the 20th September, 1870, with the occupation of Rome by the troops of King Victor Emmanuel, displays certain broad correspondences with a chapter of almost equal length in the history of the Roman Republic which began with the *Clades Alliensis* of the 18th July, 390 B.C., and closed with the occupation of Rome by Alaric on the 24th August, A.D. 410. In both these dramas the wheel comes round full circle. In the historical tragedy of Papal Rome the ecclesiastical head of Western Christendom was compelled twice over to capitulate in his own See to a secular sovereign, as in the tragedy of pagan Rome the city which was the warden of the continental European marches of the Hellenic World² was likewise compelled twice over to admit a barbarian trespasser within her walls. In both these chapters of history the period of more than eight hundred years which the wheel of Fortune took to revolve was occupied by an extraordinary feat and an extraordinary fall. And in both chapters Rome brought her fall upon herself.

Without elaborating our parallel too fancifully, we may notice how these two versions of the Roman tragedy resemble one another act by act.

Just as the *Clades Alliensis* evoked among the citizens of the Roman Republic the mood in which, half a century later, they contended with the Samnites for the hegemony of Italy and won the prize through their victory in a fifty years' war (343-290 B.C.),³ so the blow dealt to the Papacy by the Emperor Henry III at the Synod of Sutri reverberated in the soul of Hildebrand⁴ for thirty

¹ For the preceding chapter in the history of the Papacy, which the Synod of Sutri brought to a close, see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 335-40, above.

² For this role of Rome in the life of the Hellenic Society see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 161-4, above.

³ See II. D (iv), vol. ii, pp. 101-2, above.

⁴ While the proceedings at the Synod of Sutri shook Hildebrand and the other

years until he threw down the gauntlet to the Emperor Henry IV and launched the Papacy on its fifty years' contest with the Empire over the question of Investiture (A.D. 1075-1122). And if the conflict between the Papacy and the Salian Dynasty is comparable to the warfare between Rome and Samnium, the more violent, bitter, and devastating conflict between the Papacy and the Hohenstaufen Dynasty is still more strikingly reminiscent of the warfare between Rome and Carthage. In either case the duel between Rome and her arch-enemy took three rounds to fight itself out; and each successive round was fought with greater savagery than its predecessor. If the struggles between Pope Alexander III and the Emperor Frederick I, and between Pope Gregory IX and the Emperor Frederick II, may be regarded as the respective analogues of the First and Second Romano-Punic wars, the spirit in which the Romans made the Third Romano-Punic War, with the deliberate purpose of annihilating in cold blood an enemy who was already prostrate, was unmistakably revived in the Catonian implacability with which an Innocent IV and an Urban IV kept up their feud with the Emperor Frederick II after their great enemy's death, and insisted upon converting it from a quarrel with a single individual into a vendetta which could not be appeased by any lesser retribution than the complete ruin and annihilation of the whole of the offender's house.

In this Hohenstaufen-Punic act of the twice-performed Roman play the resemblances even extend to details. For example, the strategy of Frederick Barbarossa after his acknowledgement, in the peace-treaties of Venice (A.D. 1177) and Constance (A.D. 1183), of his failure to reassert the Imperial authority in Lombardy may be compared with Hamilcar Barca's strategy after the cession of the old Carthaginian dominion in Sicily in the peace settlement of 241 B.C. As Hamilcar set himself to conquer for Carthage a new and more valuable empire in the Iberian Peninsula, so Frederick secured for the House of Hohenstaufen the reversion of the Kingdom of Sicily. In either case a Power which had just been foiled in one trial of strength with its Roman adversary proceeded to occupy a new coign of vantage from which it could attack Rome on a second front with fresh supplies of men and money. In either case the consequence of this masterly stroke on the part of Rome's opponent was a second trial of strength on a greater scale which

Curial champions of reform into militancy, neither Hildebrand himself nor Saint Peter Damian nor Cardinal Humbert appears to have shown any personal animus against the Emperor Henry III—who had, after all, been seeking to serve the cause of reform in his high-handed use, or abuse, of his Imperial prerogative (see the evidence presented by Carlyle, R. W. and A. J.: *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, vol. iv (Edinburgh and London 1922, Blackwood), pp. 20-1).

514 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS ended in confirming Rome's victory, but which brought her, first, so near to defeat, and left the victor's heart so morbidly obsessed by fear and hatred of the vanquished, that Rome could not rest until she had returned to the attack and had dealt her already beaten and stricken enemy 'the knock-out blow'.

In the next act a victorious Rome collapses ignominiously under the weight of a vindictiveness which has led her to pursue her adversary's destruction to her own undoing. The century of humiliation (A.D. 1303-1418) which was the nemesis of the Papacy's relentless pursuit of its vendetta against the Hohenstaufen has its analogue in the century of suffering with which the Roman Republic had to pay for the cold-blooded destruction of Carthage.¹ The desecration of the Pope's personal sacrosanctity through the brutal handling of Boniface VIII by Guillaume Nogaret and Sciarra Colonna may be compared with the pricking of the bubble of Roman military prestige by the ignominy of Mancinus's capitulation to the Numantines. In the sequel 'the Babylonish captivity' of the Papacy may be compared with the bout of revolution into which the Republic fell in 133 B.C.,² and 'the Great Schism' with the civil war out of which the Empire emerged in 31 B.C.

In either version, again, the last act is a melancholy and tedious anti-climax in which the play drags on for some four centuries longer before the curtain descends. If we fix our attention upon the abortive rallies by which the gloom of this twilight age is partially relieved, we may discern a dim resemblance between the pontificate of Martin V and the principate of Augustus and between 'the Counter-Reformation' and 'the Indian Summer' of the Antonines.³ And as we watch the last scene of all we may detect in Pope Pius IX, who became 'the prisoner in the Vatican' as soon as the French garrison withdrew from Rome and the Italian army marched in, an historical counterpart of the Emperor Honorius, who became 'the refugee in Ravenna' when Rome was left at Alaric's mercy by the removal of Stilicho's protecting hand.

It will be apparent that our analogy with a chapter in the history of the Roman Commonwealth can give us some insight into the history of the Roman See between A.D. 1046 and A.D. 1870. Yet on a further analysis both the rise and the fall of the Papacy in this extraordinary passage of its career will be found to display features

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 505-10, above.

² One striking feature that the Papal régime during the period of 'the Babylonish Captivity' at Avignon has in common with the Republican régime in the Post-Gracchan Age is the development, on the grand scale, of an efficient but parasitic system of finance. A fiscal agent of the Papal Curia in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era and a Roman *publicanus* of the second century B.C. would have recognized one another as birds of a feather; and the affinity between them is not fortuitous; for either of these two Roman systems of finance was the Dead Sea fruit of a devastating war.

³ For this 'Indian Summer' see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, pp. 58-63, above.

which it would be difficult to illuminate by any historical parallels. In one aspect after another the Papal *Respublica Christiana* seems to defy classification and to reveal itself as something unique.

Perhaps the closest counterpart of the institution which was founded at Rome by the genius of Hildebrand in the eleventh century of the Christian Era is the régime which was inaugurated at Thebes by Hrihor, the Chief Priest of Amon-Re, in the eleventh century B.C.¹ The Rome of Hildebrand's day, like the Thebes of Hrihor's, was a holy city whose holiness was the legacy of an extinct political power.² In either city the place once filled by the emperor of a universal state was now occupied by the guardian and ministrant of the shrine of the city's tutelary divinity or saint; and this civic ecclesiastical dignity had become the acknowledged shepherd, not only of the city itself, but of an oecumenical flock whose forebears had looked to Rome or Thebes, not for religious guidance, but for political leadership. In either case, again, the

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 116, footnote 1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, p. 421, above.

² Amon of Thebes became the paramount god, and the Chief Priest of Amon-Re the principal ecclesiastical dignity, in the Egyptian World in consequence of the fact that Thebes was the capital city of the Egyptian universal state. If this universal state had not been founded by a dynasty from the Thebaid in the twenty-first century B.C. and restored by a dynasty from the Thebaid in the sixteenth century, it is certain that in the fifteenth century the Chief Priest of Amon-Re would not have been invested, as he was in the actual event, with the presidency of the Pan-Egyptian corporation into which all the priests of all the gods in all the 'nomes' were organized by the Emperor Thothmes III (for this event, see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 145, footnote 5, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, p. 421, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 530, below). On the same showing, we may be sure that Rome would never have come to be the seat of the Papacy if in an earlier chapter of her history she had not been the nucleus and the capital of the Hellenic universal state. If the role of Rome in Hellenic history had been played, as it might have been played, by Athens (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), p. 264, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 306 and 314, above), or by Olynthus (see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, in vol. iii, above), then in a later age the Holy See would have been established on Attic or Chalcidian ground and not in the Ager Vaticanus. It is true that the Popes who laid claim to the loyalty and allegiance of Western Christendom from the eighth century onwards did not base their claim upon the former political supremacy of Pagan Rome. The name of power in which they spoke was not the name of Romulus or Caesar or Augustus, and not even the name of Constantine, but the name of Peter; and their text was not *Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento* but 'Upon this rock I will build my church', while the insignia in which they depicted the nature of their authority were the keys and not the *fascēs*. At the same time it is certain that Peter would never have become connected with Rome (and this is equally certain, whether we regard the connexion as historical or as legendary) if Rome had not already played her historic part in secular history before the beginning of the Christian Era. The association of 'the Prince of the Apostles' with the *caput mundi* was inevitable; and their union would have been consummated without fail even if the capital of the world into which the Christian Church was born had happened to lie elsewhere—in Olynthus or in Athens or wherever it might have been. We may therefore affirm that the fortune of 'the Eternal City' would not have been made for the second time by Saint Peter if it had not been made in the first instance by the statesmen and generals who were the architects of the Roman Empire. It was the Scipios and the Gallios who unwittingly secured for Rome the priceless boon of becoming the Apostle's resting-place. How astonished these patriots would have been if the Delphic Apollo had informed them that their mundane labours were to result in turning their Rome into the holy city of an Oriental religion, and that no other benefit which they could conceivably confer upon her could be so great as this unwitting and involuntary gift. (For the legacy of Pagan Rome to Christian Rome see Schneider, F.: *Rom und Romgedanke im Mittelalter* (Munich 1926, Drei Masken Verlag).)

exercise of this wider authority by a local ecclesiastical functionary was rendered possible by the presence, in every part of the area over which this arch-priest claimed jurisdiction, of a clergy which was recruited, trained, and disciplined on a more or less uniform plan, was united by a potent *esprit de corps*, and was of one mind in looking to the shepherd of souls in the *ci-devant* political capital as the divinely appointed head and centre of a Church Universal. These points of resemblance between Hildebrand's *Respublica Christiana* and Hrihor's *Respublica Ammoniaca* are striking; but behind them all there is one essential difference between the two institutions. Hrihor simply assumed the secular crown¹ which had been worn by the lay rulers of 'the Middle Empire' and 'the New Empire' (the original and the resuscitated Egyptian universal state) from the era of the Eleventh Dynasty down to the reign of the last *fainéant* Ramsid whom Hrihor himself had brushed aside; but this mere transference of a traditional secular authority from the hands of an effete lay dynasty into those of a capable and powerful ecclesiastical functionary was neither a political nor a religious success. The assumption of an alien office taxed the resources and drew upon the prestige of the Chief Priest of Amon-Re without bringing back to life the defunct authority of the Pharaoh whom the priest was impersonating.² The ecclesiastical usurper quickly became as impotent as the secular sovereign whom he had replaced; and, although his descendants prudently forbore from following Hrihor's example in assuming the Pharaonic style and title,³ they were compelled in the tenth century B.C. to yield up their hereditary Chief Priesthood of Amon-Re, together with the *de facto* government of the Thebaid, with which this ecclesiastical office was now bound up, to the descendants of the intrusive Libyan war-lords who had carved up other portions of the derelict domain

¹ Hrihor gives himself the full Pharaonic style and title in his inscriptions (Meyer, E.: 'Gottesstaat, Militärherrschaft und Ständewesen in Ägypten (zur Geschichte der 21. und 22. Dynastie)' in *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Jahrgang 1928, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* (Berlin 1928, de Gruyter), pp. 495-532).

² Hrihor attempted to bolster up his political authority by entering into an *Ausgleich* with a secular Pharaoh, Smendes of Tanis, who was the *de facto* ruler of the Delta. This Deltaic partner was a pillar of strength for the priest-king of the Thebaid, since the political centre of gravity of the Egyptian World had passed from the Thebaid to the Delta as far back as the thirteenth century B.C. (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 112-18, above). Conversely, the traditional religious prestige of the Theban deity no doubt made it well worth while for Smendes to enter into partnership with Hrihor. Either partner seems to have assumed, with the other partner's acquiescence, a plenitude of the Pharaonic power within his own *de facto* domain; and their relation must have been not unlike that which subsisted between the co-emperors who held the Roman Imperial office in commission at various times from the generation of Diocletian to that of Zeno. The Pharaonic crowns of Tanis and Thebes were united on the head of Pinozem I, who was Hrihor's grandson and at the same time son-in-law of Smendes' son and successor Pausennes (Psibkhenno) I. When, however, Pinozem I actually entered into his Tanitic secular heritage, he abdicated from his Theban Chief Priesthood and conferred this upon one of his sons (Meyer, op. cit., pp. 496-8).

³ Meyer, op. cit., p. 497.

of 'the New Empire' into barbarian 'successor-states'.¹ Hrihor had failed to prevent the breakdown of the Egyptiac Society, and *a fortiori* he had brought no new society to birth. In contrast, Hildebrand and his successors in the Holy See never thought of taking to themselves the Roman Imperial Crown. They set themselves a more ambitious aim; and they were far more successful in their pursuit of it, because it was not only more ambitious but was also more practical. While they were wise enough to confine themselves to the ecclesiastical office from which their prestige and power were derived, they were bold enough to proclaim that this power, being of a different and a higher order, was superior to all secular powers within the ambit of the Pope's ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In taking this line and following it out, the Popes created a new system of society under which the nascent Western Civilization increased in wisdom and stature.²

Thus the analogy between Hildebrand's Roman hierocracy and Hrihor's Theban hierocracy breaks down at the crucial point;³ and the other obvious analogies fall still farther short of working out.

For instance, there are many other historical examples of priests taking on the burden of administering communities when a previous secular system of government has collapsed and disappeared. Among the derelict cities in the former domain of a broken-down Roman Empire Rome herself was not, of course, by any means the only one in which the local bishop stepped into the breach. In the western provinces of the Empire during the post-Hellenic interregnum the intervention of the bishops in secular affairs, and their assumption of civic responsibilities, was not the exception but the

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 116, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, p. 422, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 352-3, below. When the Libyan war-lord of Harsieopolis, Shoshenq, took the place of the last of the Tanite Pharaohs *circa* 947 B.C., he installed his own son in the Chief Priesthood of Amon-Re at Thebes, in place of the last Chief Priest of the House of Hrihor (Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 513-14).

² Luke ii. 52.

³ There is, however, a genuine analogy between the Theban temple-state, into which Hrihor's dream of an Amonic *imperium* resolved itself, and the territorial sovereignty over a Central Italian principality which the Papacy was eventually to build for itself out of the ruins of the Hildebrandine *Repubblica Christiana* (see the present chapter, p. 577, below). From the generation of Hrihor onwards until the annexation of the Thebaid by Kashta King of Napata *circa* 750 B.C. (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 116, above) the Chief Priests of Amon-Re of Thebes continued to be the rulers of the Thebaid *de facto*, even when they did not bear the Pharaonic title, and even when the descendants of Hrihor were replaced in the Chief Priesthood of Amon-Re by cadets of the Libyan House of Shoshenq (see Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 498, 499, 513, 521). The Napatan conquerors took the administration of the Thebaid into their own hands, and transferred the trusteeship of the property of the Temple of Amon-Re from the Chief Priest of the god to an 'Adoratrix of the god' who was always a daughter of the reigning Napatan Pharaoh; and this new régime was perpetuated by the Saites when the Thebaid passed out of Napatan into Saite hands (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 521). Yet, though the Napatan conquest brought with it the extinction of Hrihor's Theban temple-state, it also brought a restoration of Hrihor's House to the sovereignty over its hereditary domain, if Meyer is right (see *op. cit.*, p. 531, and *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (2), 2nd ed., p. 52) in his conjecture that these princes of Napata were a branch of Hrihor's family which had retained its hierocratic authority—in the subsidiary temple-

rule; and in another connexion¹ we have already noticed how in the South-Western Asia of the last millennium B.C. a number of the Hittite and Syriac principalities that had been pulverized by the Assyrian militarism subsequently reappeared within the framework of the Achaemenian Empire in the new guise of temple-states. On the other hand no archbishop of Milan or Cologne, and no high priest at Comana or Jerusalem, ever emulated the achievement of the Bishop of Rome in enlarging the dominion which he had acquired within the restricted limits of his own see into an oecumenical dominion over the whole of the world of which his see was a part.

Again, when we consider how much of the Roman See's success in establishing the Papal *Respublica Christiana* was owing to the support which it received from the clergy throughout Western Christendom, we shall find the explanation of the clergy's power in the fact that between the Age of Constantine the Great and the Age of Hildebrand the clergy had become a distinct, and a privileged, caste;² and we shall be reminded of the position of privilege which the Brahmins acquired in the Indic World, and which they confirmed during the interregnum between the dissolution of the Indic Society and the emergence of its Hindu successor.³ Here again, however, the analogy is imperfect; for the Brahminical fraternity is a caste and nothing more, whereas the clergy of medieval Western Christendom was a caste which was also a corporation before it became a perfect hierarchy through accepting the supremacy of a single Roman head. While Brahmin has nothing in common with Brahmin except a liturgical prerogative and a privileged social status, the clergy whose primate was exalted to the highest pinnacle of authority in medieval Western Christendom were united not only by a common status and prerogative but also by their common membership in a more and more highly organized and effectively centralized ecclesiastical polity.

Another aspect of the Papacy's role in the medieval *Respublica Christiana* is that of mentor and censor; and here we may be reminded of the part which was played in the Hellenic World, during

state that centred round the local temple of Amon-Re at the Jabal Barkal—after the temple-state of the Thebaid itself had become an appanage of the Libyan House of Shosheng (see Meyer, *Gottestaat*, pp. 499 and 531). In any case it was in the Napatan principality that the principle of the supremacy of the priesthood in secular as well as in religious affairs was carried out to its extreme logical conclusion (Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 530-1).

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), p. 471, above.

² A caste, however, which was recruited, not by physical procreation, like the Brahmins, but by co-option from among the laity, like the Confucian literati. Whereas the Brahmins are an aristocracy of birth, the medieval Western Christian clergy were—as the modern Roman Catholic clergy still are—an aristocracy of vocation.

³ For the historical relation between the Hindu and the Indic Society see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 85-7, above.

two or three centuries ending in 480 B.C.,¹ by the priesthood of the Delphic Apollo. Like the Apostle at Rome, the god at Delphi advised and reprimanded the Governments of the local states of the world over which he presided, besides dealing with private individuals. In particular, the activities of an Urban II or an Innocent III or a Gregory VIII or a Gregory X in evoking and directing the Crusades find their parallel in the activities of the Delphic Oracle in promoting and guiding an equally militant expansion of the Hellenic Society round the coasts of the Mediterranean in the eighth and seventh and sixth centuries B.C. But this analogy between the tutelary functions of Peter in Western Christendom and Apollo in Hellas is imperfect, like the other analogies which we have already suggested; and, here once more, the difference behind the likeness is fundamental. While the Apostle's authority was to some extent active and jussive, the god's seems to have been almost entirely passive and permissive. The Apostle sometimes took the initiative in issuing commands and prohibitions which were most unwelcome to the Governments or individuals concerned and which would certainly never have been solicited, even if they had to be obeyed when once they had been promulgated by the importunity of a pontiff who had not waited to be asked. On the other hand the god left it to his votaries to approach him or not as they chose, and if, when they did seek his advice, they elected to disregard it, they were free to flout his oracle at their peril. The god took no responsibility upon himself for guiding an inquirer's 'feet into the way of peace'.² A docile inquirer would have to congratulate himself, rather than give thanks to the Lord Apollo, if he were able to testify that 'by the word of thy lips I have kept me from the paths of the destroyer';³ and when an inquirer proved unteachable the god waited sardonically to see his own divine wisdom vindicated in the fullness of time by the human fool's catastrophe. Between Delphi and the rest of Hellas, as between Papal Rome and the rest of Western Christendom, there was a constant coming and going of messengers on sacred errands; but the most significant travellers on the roads which converged upon Delphi were the private inquirers or public *θεωποί*⁴ from the city-

¹ The prestige of Delphi never recovered from the devastating effects of the supreme error—of the heart as well as of the head—which the Delphic priesthood made in ranging itself on the side of the big battalions on the eve of Xerxes' invasion of European Greece. The damage was not repaired by the sedulous propagation of the legend of the god's miraculous intervention in defence of his shrine; and the blow was fatal—coming, as it did, at a moment when the authority of the oracle was bound in any case to be challenged in the light of the intellectual *Aufklärung* which was setting in in the generation of Aeschylus.

² Luke i. 79.

³ Psalm xvii. 4.

⁴ For the technical meaning of the Greek word *θεωπός* see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 253, footnote 1, above.

states of Hellas, while the most significant travellers on the roads which radiated from Rome were perhaps the Papal *legati a latere* to the *mulūk-at-ṭawāʾif* in the provinces of Peter's spiritual empire. This difference in the direction of the more important traffic¹ points to a difference between the god's relation to his votaries and the Apostle's relation to his flock.

Of course the traffic between Papal Rome and her ecclesiastical provinces was not all outward-bound; for every road must also lead to a city from which every road radiates, and the outgoing traffic of legates and tax-gatherers was crossed by an incoming traffic of pilgrims, petitioners, and litigants. These visitors to Rome did not come merely to obtain in person the Apostle's judgements; they came to worship at his shrine and venerate his relics—acts of piety which could not be performed anywhere outside Saint Peter's Church in *Agro Vaticano*. This fact reminds us that the power of the Papacy in medieval Western Christendom was derived from yet one other thing besides the character and ability of the Pope himself and his Curia, the status and organization of the clergy throughout the domain of the Roman Patriarchate, the prestige which Christian Rome derived from her pagan predecessor, and the still greater prestige with which her bishop was invested in his capacity of successor to 'the Prince of the Apostles' who had honoured Pagan Rome by taking her for his see. The other thing, in addition to all these, which contributed to the Papacy's strength—and perhaps had more effect than anything else upon the imagination and emotion of the masses—was the possession of a unique talisman in the shape of the tomb which was reputed to contain the Apostle's mortal remains.² And this aspect of Papal

¹ Mr. Geoffrey Barraclough, who kindly read this chapter before publication, observes, in a letter to the writer: 'In spite of the beginning of the next paragraph, the active, directive side of Roman action seems to me to be overstressed—the element of passive reaction to the calls of private inquirers and private interests made too incidental. The latter was characteristic of Papal government more than the former; or at any rate it was the latter which accounted for the real centralization of the Church in the 13th and 14th centuries.' Fuller expositions of Mr. Barraclough's view on this point will be found in his *Papal Provisions* (Oxford 1935, Blackwell), ch. 12; in *Public Notaries and the Papal Curia* (London 1934, Macmillan), pp. 130–1; and in *The English Historical Review*, vol. xlix, pp. 214–16. On Mr. Barraclough's showing, the analogy between the medieval Papacy and the Delphic Oracle *prae* 480 B.C. is closer than had been supposed by the writer of this Study.

² It was this loadstone that drew the Vicar of Peter back to Rome in the fifteenth century after his migration to Avignon in the fourteenth. There was everything to be said for the migration from the standpoints of administrative convenience and social amenity. Rome—the decayed capital of an extinct Hellenic universal state—was situated in what was now a remote, backward, and turbulent province on the extreme south-eastern edge of the Western Christendom; and her situation had not been appreciably altered by the superficial Westernization of the Orthodox Christian domain in Southern Italy and Sicily as a result of the Norman Conquest in the eleventh century. On the other hand Avignon was an orderly, civilized place near the heart of the medieval Western World. It lay in the middle sector of Lothaire's portion of Charlemagne's heritage (see I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 37–40, above), on the border-line between the Holy Roman Empire and France, in the valley of the Rhône (which, in spite of the growth of

Rome has a number of analogues in other holy cities: in Jerusalem with its Holy Sepulchre, in Medina with its tomb of the Prophet, in Najaf with its tomb of the Caliph and Martyr 'Alī, in Karbalā with its tomb of the Martyr Husayn, and in Canterbury with its tomb of the Prelate and Martyr Thomas Becket.¹ The Rome that contained the tombs of Saint Peter and Saint Paul resembled all these other sepulchre-cities in being a focus of emotion and a lodestar of pilgrimage; but this analogy breaks down like all the rest; for what sepulchre-city save Rome alone has ever succeeded in transmuting a focus of emotion into a seat of authority, and in exerting her magic influence over her pilgrims, not merely at the moment when they are standing, rapt and awe-stricken, on the threshold of the Holy of Holies, but throughout their working lives, in the humdrum environment of their homes?

It will be seen that there is a vein of uniqueness in the Papal *Respublica Christiana* which baffles our attempts to describe its character by the method of analogy. It can be better described, in negative terms, as an exact inversion of the 'Caesaro-papal' régime² against which it was a social reaction and a spiritual protest; and this description perhaps gives, better than any other, the measure of Hildebrand's achievement.

When the Tuscan Hildebrand took up his abode in Rome, as a stranger within her gates, in the second quarter of the eleventh century, he found himself in a derelict outpost of the East Roman Empire which was occupied by a degenerate offshoot of the Byzantine Society. For three centuries past, the natives of the Ducatus Romanus had shown themselves incapable not only of defending their own borders against their Lombard neighbours in Gregory's own Tuscany and in the Basin of the Po, but even of keeping order among themselves when a Transalpine Power stepped in to hold

the traffic over the Brenner, was still the main highway between the Cisalpine and the Transalpine portion of the domain of the Roman Patriarchate). Situated as it was, Avignon was well on the way from the traditional ecclesiastical headquarters of Western Christendom on the lower Tiber to its genuine headquarters of that day in the upper valley of the Saône—at the junction of the routes between the basins of the Rhône, the Rhine, and the Seine—in a Burgundy which embraced Luxeuil (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 330, above) and Cluny and Cîteaux. The fact that, notwithstanding these overwhelming material advantages, Avignon was unable to hold its own against Rome as an alternative residence for the Holy See, gives the measure of the importance of the Tomb in *Agro Vaticano* as a source of Papal prestige and power.

¹ The sagacious Ptolemy Sôtér sought to head this list of sepulchre-cities with the name of Alexandria when he took possession of the founder's body and built a tomb for it in the most famous of the cities that had been called after Alexander in his lifetime. Ptolemy grasped the importance of the prestige which it was possible for a city to derive from the possession of the relics of an historic personality. In the event, however, it was not as the site of Alexander's sepulchre, but as the political capital of Ptolemy's Empire and as the workshop of the Hellenic World, that the Egyptian Alexandria grew to greatness.

² For a definition and discussion of 'Caesaro-papism', apropos of the idolization, in Orthodox Christendom, of a resuscitated ghost of the Roman Empire, see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (8), pp. 347-8, above.

the Lombards at arm's length. And these latter-day Romans were financially and spiritually bankrupt besides being militarily weak and socially turbulent. The overseas portion of the *Patrimonia Petri* or Papal estates, which had still supplied Gregory the Great with resources for keeping alive the population of a *ci-devant* capital city,¹ had subsequently gone the way of the estates on the Italian mainland during the four centuries that had elapsed between the death of the first Gregory and the birth of his seventh Papal namesake; and in the eleventh century the Papacy no longer possessed any assured or regular sources of income.² As for the moral bankruptcy of the *Ducatus Romanus* in that age, it is revealed not merely in the sordid annals of its social history but in the necessity in which the Romans now found themselves of looking abroad for spiritual light and leading. To raise the local standard of monastic life the Romans had to turn for help and guidance to Calabria³ and to Cluny; and the first attempts to regenerate the Papacy took the form of passing over Roman candidates and appointing Transalpines. The precedent was set by the appointment of the Saxon Emperor Otto III's former tutor, the French scholar Gerbert of Aurillac, who mounted the Papal throne as Sylvester II (*pontificali munere fungebatur* A.D. 999-1003); and, after a reversion to Popes of Roman birth which ended in the humiliation of A.D. 1046, the Chair of St. Peter was not occupied by a Roman again until the election of Innocent II in A.D. 1130. Of the fourteen Popes who reigned in the interval, eight were Transalpines,⁴ two were Tuscan Lombards, two were South Italians, and two were Romagnols. This shows how low the reputation of the Roman people stood in the eyes of a Western World which was now to be brought under the spell of the Roman See by the work of Hildebrand and his successors.⁵ The

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, above.

² See p. 536, footnote 2, below.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (b), p. 357, above.

⁴ The Tyrolean Poppo of Brixen, who became Pope Damasus II in A.D. 1048, may be reckoned among the Transalpines for sociological purposes, in spite of the physiological fact that Brixen lies on the southern side of the watershed between the Adige and the Inn.

⁵ What the Lombards thought of the Romans before Rome was restored to glory by the Tuscan Lombard Hildebrand is revealed in the following passage from the works of Liutprand of Cremona, who was Hildebrand's senior by about a hundred years. The passage occurs in the twelfth chapter of Liutprand's report on his mission to Constantinople in A.D. 968. He is describing the high words that passed between himself and the East Roman Emperor Nicephorus Phocas during a dinner-party that the Emperor was giving in his honour.

"When I was on the point," writes Liutprand, "of answering him back . . . he would not let me, but added, by way of insulting me: 'You are not Romans, but Lombards!' He wanted to say more, and signed to me with his hand to keep quiet, but I lost my temper and burst out. 'That fratricide Romulus,' I said, 'after whom the Romans are named, was a son of a whore—born, I mean, in adultery—as every schoolboy knows. What he did was to set up an *alsatia* in which debtors, fugitive slaves, murderers, and other criminals whose lives were forfeit received asylum until their numbers mounted up to a mob of undesirables whom their host dubbed Romans. This is the noble origin of the people whom you style the Lords of the World (*hismocratores, id est imperatores*). And these are also the people whom we—and by 'us' I mean us Lombards, Saxons,

only special asset which the Ducatus Romanus possessed was a certain precocity in the art of administration which it displayed in common with the main body of the Byzantine World.¹ This was the unpromising site on which Hildebrand laid the foundations of his *Respublica Christiana*.

In this despised and alien Rome Hildebrand and his successors succeeded in creating the master-institution of Western Christendom. They won for Papal Rome an empire which had a greater hold than the Empire of the Antonines upon human hearts, and which on the mere material plane embraced vast tracts of Western Europe, beyond the Rhine and Danube, where the legions of Augustus and Marcus Aurelius had never even set foot, not to speak of establishing a permanent occupation. Indeed, this Papal dominion was wider than Charlemagne's, who had succeeded—though at ruinous cost²—in advancing his frontier from the Rhine to the Elbe and thereby achieving a feat which had proved to be beyond the strength of Augustus; for even Charlemagne never pushed his conquests beyond the Channel or the Baltic, while the medieval Papacy had inherited a spiritual dominion over England from the pontificate of Gregory the Great, two hundred years before Charlemagne's time, and had gone on to make a spiritual conquest of Scandinavia some two hundred years after Charlemagne's death.

These Papal conquests were partly due to the constitution of the Christian Republic whose frontiers the Popes were enlarging; for it was a constitution which inspired confidence and affection instead of evoking hostility and resistance.³ The Papal *Respublica Christiana* was based on a combination of ecclesiastical centralism and uniformity with political diversity and devolution; and, since the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal power was a cardinal point of constitutional doctrine, this combination made the note of unity predominant, without depriving the adolescent Western Society of those elements of liberty and elasticity which are indispensable conditions for growth. Indeed, the acceptance of the social unity of Western Christendom, which was implicit in a common recognition of the spiritual authority of the Pope, carried with it a certain guarantee for the political independence of any local

Franks, Lorrainers, Bavarians, Swabians, and Burgundians—despise so utterly that, when we lose our temper with our enemies and want to insult them, we pronounce the single word 'Roman!'—conveying, in the use of this pregnant appellation, all the baseness and cowardice and avarice and effeminacy and mendacity of which human nature is capable."

¹ For this gift and its fatal consequences in Orthodox Christendom see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 320–408, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 167; II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 345; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, pp. 322–3; and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), pp. 488–90, above.

³ On this point see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), in the present volume, pp. 377–9, above.

community that took upon itself the Papal yoke—a burden which, in the eleventh century, was still apostolically light. It was by entering into direct relations with the Holy See, and thereby becoming acknowledged members of the Western Christian Society in their own right, that the newly converted barbarian kingdoms of Hungary and Poland exorcised the danger of being conquered and annexed by the *Regnum Teutonicum* as the Saxons, in their day, had been forcibly 'Westernized' by Charlemagne, and as the Irish and the Prussians in a later century were to be subjected, respectively, by the English Crown and by the Teutonic Order.¹ Thanks to the Holy See the Hungarians and the Poles were able, like the English, to enjoy the social and cultural benefits of membership in the society of Western Christendom without having to pay the price of forfeiting their political independence. It was also thanks, in large measure, to an alliance or community of interests with the Holy See that the city-states of Lombardy were able to vindicate their political autonomy against the Emperor Frederick I and to maintain it against the Emperor Frederick II.²

Nor was the medieval Papacy illiberal in its attitude towards aspirations after local self-government, even in those Central Italian territories over which it claimed secular as well as ecclesiastical authority in virtue of the successive donations of Pepin and Charlemagne and Matilda. It appears to have accepted the situation without protest when the movement which was turning cities into city-states spread from Lombardy, where it had first asserted itself, into Romagna and the Marches and Umbria. In Tuscany in A.D. 1198 Pope Innocent III gave his recognition to the newly formed league of city-states, and urged Pisa to join it; and this benevolence extended to the Ducatus Romanus itself, which was the Papacy's metropolitan province. The Papal influence was here exerted to protect the nascent civic liberties of Tivoli and Tusculum and Viterbo against the aggressiveness of the citizens of Rome; and the Holy See was quick to make peace with the civic movement in Rome itself when it broke out there, in 1143, in a militant and revolutionary form. The Roman revolution of 1143 was followed by the settlement of 1145 between the new republic and Pope

¹ The subjugation of Ireland by the English Crown was sanctioned in advance by an incumbent of the Papal office who was perhaps unable to forget that, before he became Pope Hadrian IV, he had been the Englishman Nicholas Breakspear (for the Bull *Laudabiliter* see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 337, footnote 1, above); but this case seems to be exceptional. Indeed, it is the only notable instance in which the medieval Papacy lent its authority to promote the conquest of a small and weak community within the bosom of Western Christendom by a large and strong one. The part played by the Papacy in helping Hungary and Poland to escape the heavy yoke of the Holy Roman Empire, and the city-states of Lombardy to throw it off, is more characteristic of the Papal policy towards the political system of medieval Western Christendom.

² See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 345-6, above.

Eugenius III; and this settlement was revised and renewed in 1188 during the pontificate of Clement III.

At the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the civic movement was in full flood in Italy and when the Papal authority stood at its zenith over Western Christendom, a Welsh poet was 'pointing out . . . how strange it was that the Pope's censure, which in Rome could not move trifles, was elsewhere making the sceptres of kings tremble; and that he to whom in Rome a poorly kept garden would not yield was striving to bend kingdoms to his nod'.¹ Giraldus Cambrensis fancied that he was here exposing a paradox which was a theme for satire; but if this was one of the subjects which he discussed with Pope Innocent III in an interview which the Pope once granted him in a leisure hour,² we may conjecture that the Pontifical statesman found little difficulty in convincing the Welsh man-of-letters of his error. The very reason why in this age a majority of the princes and city-states of Western Christendom accepted the Papal supremacy with little demur was because the Pope was not then under suspicion of attempting to trespass upon the domain of the secular power.³ So far from claiming a monopoly of territorial sovereignty, like the contemporary emperors at Constantinople, or a primacy *inter pares*, like the Holy Roman Emperors in the West from Otto the Great onwards in their relations with the independent kings of France or England or Leon, the Holy See in this age was not concerned in the competition for territorial rulership.⁴ It was exercising on an occu-

¹ Mann, the Right Reverend Monsignor H. K.: *The Lives of the Popes in the Middle Ages* (London 1910-29, Kegan Paul, 15 vols.), vol. xi, p. 72. The original Latin of Giraldus's verses runs as follows:

Mirum quae Romae modicos sententia papae
non movet, hic regum sceptrum movere potest.
quae minimos minime censura coerces in urbe
saevit in orbe fremens celsaque colla premens.
cui male sublatus Romae non cederet hortus
nititur ad nutum flectere regna suum.

Giraldi Cambrensis Opera, edited by Brewer, J. S., vol. i (London 1861, Longmans Green), p. 377 (with another version on p. 374).

² See Mann, op. cit., vol. xi, p. 68.

³ Evidence, drawn from Innocent III's own letters, that he 'did not, as Pope, claim supremetemporal power', is presented in Carlyle, R. W. and A. J.: *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, vol. v (Edinburgh and London 1928, Blackwood), p. 158.

⁴ There was, however, in Hildebrand's day—and presumably under Hildebrand's inspiration—a movement in the Papal Curia to secure a recognition of the Holy See's feudal overlordship over Western Christian kingdoms which lay outside the limits of the Holy Roman Empire. The Norman principalities in Southern Italy accepted this status of vassalage to the Holy See in A.D. 1059, Aragon in 1063, Dalmatia in 1076, Provence in 1081, Tarragona in 1091, Portugal circa 1140. On the other hand, England rejected a proposal that she should enter into this status circa 1079, and France circa 1081 (Dufourcq, A.: *L'Avenir du Christianisme: Première Partie: Histoire Moderne de l'Eglise*, vol. vi, fourth edition (Paris 1924, Plon), p. 167). After his accession to the Papacy, Hildebrand made similar proposals to the Kings of Hungary and Denmark, to the Corsicans, and even to a Russian prince (see Carlyle, R. W. and A. J.: *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, vol. iv (Edinburgh and London 1922, Blackwood), Part I, ch. 4.

menical scale an authority of a spiritual character which was on a different plane from any territorial prerogative, and which, so long as it remained on this plane, did not become a danger to local political liberties.¹ The proof positive of the Pope's intention to stand above the territorial battle, and of his unwillingness to descend into the arena, was his acquiescence in his own practical exclusion from participation in the civil government of the city which was his episcopal see; and in this light the contrast between the Pope's impotence in Rome and his power in Western Christendom at large is seen to be no paradox at all, but a necessary consequence of the constitution of the *Respublica Christiana*. It is not too much to say that throughout the history of the Papacy down to the present day the oecumenical religious authority of the Popes and their local territorial power have regularly varied in inverse ratio with one another.

This statesmanlike aloofness from territorial ambitions was combined, in the Papal hierocracy at its zenith, with an energetic and enterprising use of the administrative gift which was the Byzantine dowry of Papal Rome. While in Orthodox Christendom this gift had been fatally applied to the *tour de force* of putting substance into a resuscitated ghost of the Roman Empire, and thereby crushing an adolescent Orthodox Christian Society under the incubus of an institution which was too heavy for it to bear,² the Roman architects of the *Respublica Christiana* turned their administrative resources to better account for building a lighter structure, on a new plan, upon broader foundations. The gossamer filaments of the Papal spider's web, as it was originally woven, drew medieval Western Christendom together into an unconstrained unity which was equally beneficial to the parts and to the whole. It was only later, when the fabric coarsened and hardened in the stress of conflict, that the silken threads changed into iron bands, and that these

¹ On this passage the writer has received the following comment from Mr. G. Barraclough:

"'Authority of a spiritual character' is good theory; but such authority has to exercise itself on material things, and there is no guarantee that the boundaries, distinct enough in most spheres, will not become blurred in others. That is, e.g., the difficulty in England. Henry II, Edward I, and Henry IV all grant up mere *spiritualia* to the Pope—or, better, cannot conceive themselves as having any interest in them. But they take a different attitude regarding *causae spirituali annexae* or *causae mixtae*. Thus, in regard to the benefice, is it the *officium* which counts, and is any dispute therefore 'spiritual'? This in regard to the one point of jurisdiction. It can be agreed that the Pope did not then 'attempt to trespass'; neither did the Kings—but there was a 'no-man's-land'. They tried to settle the problems that this raised impartially (cf. Mollat, G.: 'L'Application du Droit de Régale Spirituel en France' in the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 1929, for the Parliament of Paris; Barraclough, *Papal Provisions*, p. 85, for the Roman Rota) and not to make capital out of them; but it was not always easy to do so even in fact, and certainly not in theory. Thus you get the position implied in the phrase: 'Dñs Papa scit et tolerat!' On the major scale of politics, what of Innocent III's interventions all over the medieval world? From his point of view, he was justified in regarding it as an exercise of spiritual authority, but it was natural that others did not.'

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 320-408, above.

came to weigh so heavily upon the local princes and peoples, and so grievously to restrict their movements and cramp their growth, that at last they burst their bonds in a temper in which they hardly cared if, in severally liberating themselves, they were destroying that oecumenical unity which the Papacy had established and preserved.¹

In that Papal work of creation it was not, of course, either a capacity for administration or an avoidance of the snare of territorial ambitions that was the vital creative force. The fundamental reason why the Roman See was able in this age to conjure into existence a Christian Republic under a Papal aegis was because, at this stage, the Papacy threw itself without hesitations or reservations into the task of giving leadership and expression and organization to an adolescent Western Civilization's awakening desires for a higher life and a larger growth. The Hildebrandine Papacy identified its own purpose and *raison d'être* with aspirations which were dimly and dumbly stirring in the hearts and minds of the *Plebs Christiana*; it gave these aspirations form and fame, and thereby transformed them from the day-dreams of isolated individuals or scattered minorities into common causes which carried the conviction that they were supremely worth fighting for, and which swept men off their feet when they heard these causes preached by Popes who were staking upon them the fortunes of the Holy See and perhaps their own lives as well. The victory of the Christian Republic was won in the Papal campaigns for the purification of the clergy from the two moral plagues of sexual incontinence and financial corruption, for the liberation of the life of the Church from the interference of secular powers, and for the rescue of the Oriental Christians and the Holy Land from the clutches of the Turkish champions of Islam; but this was not the whole of the Hildebrandine Papacy's work; for the great Popes under whose leadership these 'holy wars' were fought on those diverse fronts were not entirely engrossed in the struggles of the Church Militant. Even in the times of greatest stress they had a margin of thought and will to spare for works of peace in which the Church was displaying her finest self and was exercising her most creative activity. Pope Alexander III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1159-81) was fostering the nascent universities of the West at a time when he was a penniless refugee, with an Emperor lunging at him from one flank and an Antipope snapping at him from the other. And the series of movements in which a torpid monasticism was first reawakened at Cluny and Cîteaux and then transformed into a new thing by Saint Dominic and Saint Francis, were each in

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, pp. 214-22, above.

turn observed, approved, supported, and propagated by the Holy See, though it was the exception and not the rule for the Pope himself to be a member of a religious order.

This genius for descrying the seeds of noble things and for bringing the crop to harvest was the crowning virtue of the Papacy in the days of its Hildebrandine greatness; and this genius was not displayed only in a fruitful patronage of promising institutions like the universities or the religious orders; besides being an august patron of institutions the Papacy was an apostolic fisher of men;¹ and its greatest triumph was its enlistment of the purest souls and ablest wits and strongest characters of Western Christendom in the service of the Holy See—a service which was embraced with enthusiasm by eminent men and women because it offered them scope for living lives and doing deeds for which there was no opportunity in the secular world. These valiant and faithful servants of the Holy See were drawn from every country of Western Christendom and from every class of society and from every type of character. There were mystics and intellectuals and men of action; monks and kings and peasants and lawyers; Lombards and Burgundians and Frenchmen and Germans and Romans—for the very *faex Romana* which an Otto III and a Henry III had justly judged unworthy, in their day, to supply a Roman candidate for the Roman See, gave birth in the following century to that noble Lotario de' Conti di Segni who was to ascend, as Innocent III, a throne which had been disgraced by the Theophylacts and Crescenzi.

In this goodly company of *servientes servo servorum Dei* there were some, like Hugh of Cluny and Bernard of Clairvaux and Matilda of Tuscany and Louis IX of France, who performed their service in the provinces or *outré mer*, while others were called from the ends of the Earth to do their work in the Curia and there perhaps to rise, through the Cardinalate, to the highest position attainable by any citizen of the medieval Western Republic.

The first name on the roll of eminent servants of the Holy See in the Hildebrandine Age who completed their service in the Papal chair is that of Hildebrand himself: the greatest man of action in the history of our Western Society hitherto, if greatness is to be measured by the nature of the aim as well as by the extent of the performance.² Ildebrando Aldobrandeschi was the child of a Tuscan peasant who was sent to Rome to be educated; was taken into

¹ Matt. iv. 19.

² 'His was that rarest and grandest of gifts: an intellectual courage and power of imaginative belief which, when it has convinced itself of aught, accepts it fully with all its consequences and shrinks not from acting at once upon it.'—Bryce, James: *The Holy Roman Empire*, chap. 10.

the Papal Curia by his schoolmaster when Giovanni Graziano became Pope Gregory VI; and served the Holy See thereafter for 28 years (A.D. 1045-73) before he himself became Pope Gregory VII (*fungebatur* A.D. 1073-85).

The second of the six predecessors of Pope Gregory VII who leaned in turn upon the deacon Hildebrand, and never found him a broken reed, was Bruno of Egisheim, the son of an Alsatian nobleman who was a first cousin of the Saxon Emperor Conrad II. Educated for the Church, Bruno qualified himself for the highest office in it by serving a twenty-three years' apprenticeship in his native Lotharingia. Nominated for the Papacy by the Emperor Henry III in response to a request from the Romans themselves for an Imperial nominee, Bruno only accepted the nomination on condition that it was confirmed in Rome, upon his arrival there, by a free election; and it was on this understanding that Hildebrand, on his part, accepted Bruno's pressing invitation to go to Rome with him as his right-hand man.¹ The noble friendship and potent collaboration of the Alsatian and the Tuscan during Bruno's pontificate as Leo IX (*fungebatur* A.D. 1049-54) launched the Hildebrandine movement on its historic course with a momentum which continued to carry it onward for more than two hundred years.

Among Hildebrand's successors, Odo of Châtillon-sur-Marne was a knight's son who became a monk of Cluny and then served the Curia as Cardinal of Ostia before he became Pope Urban II (*fungebatur* A.D. 1088-99) and translated into action one of Hildebrand's cherished projects when he launched the First Crusade.²

The Romagnol Rainer of Blera was another monk of Cluny who became Pope Paschal II (*fungebatur* A.D. 1099-1118) and all but succeeded in settling with the Emperor Henry V the formidable question—over which Henry IV and Hildebrand had joined battle—of where the line was to be drawn between the respective jurisdictions of Church and State.³

Guy de Vienne was a Burgundian prince who was Archbishop of his own city before he became Pope Calixtus II (*fungebatur* A.D. 1119-24) and brought to terms, by hard fighting and shrewd

¹ Hildebrand had left Rome in 1047 in order to accompany his first master, Pope Gregory VI, in his Transalpine exile; and, after travelling with him to Cologne, he had travelled on, after the exiled Pope's death, to Cluny. From Cluny he had come, like Bruno, to Worms in order to attend the conference which was convened there by the Emperor Henry III for taking action on the Roman request. When Bruno, after his nomination, invited Hildebrand to go to Rome with him, Hildebrand consented against his own desire, as a matter of ecclesiastical obedience.

² See V. C (i) 3, vol. v, pp. 242-4, below, for the origin and range of a movement of Western expansion in which the First Crusade was not quite the first step.

³ On the difficulties of this problem—which is still a cause of perplexity and strife in the latter-day Western World of our own generation—see Mr. G. Barraclough's observations on p. 526, footnote 1, above.

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compromise, the Emperor who had got the better of the less worldly-wise Pope Paschal II.

Bernardo Paganelli was a Tuscan nobleman—a son of the lord of Montemagno in the Lucchese—who became a monk of Clairvaux and was sent by St. Bernard to serve Pope Innocent II in Rome—a service in which he rose to be Pope Eugenius III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1145–53), the negotiator of the settlement of A.D. 1145 between the Holy See and the revolutionary Roman Republic.

Rolando Rainucci, or Bandinelli, was a Sieneſe canonist who learnt his law at Bologna, was brought to Rome and made a cardinal by Pope Eugenius III, and justified his master's opinion of him by the indomitable courage with which he held out victoriously against the Emperor Frederick I and three successive Antipopes as Pope Alexander III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1159–81).¹

Ubaldo Allucingoli was a canonist from Lucca who, as Pope Lucius III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1181–5), knew how to hold the ground which Alexander III had won from the Emperor Frederick.

Umberto Crivelli was the son of Milanese parents—belonging to the prosperous bourgeoisie—who became a canon of Bourges, and afterwards Archbishop of his native city, before he failed, for all his fulminations, as Pope Urban III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1185–7), to prevent the marriage of Frederick's son Henry with Constance of Sicily.

Alberto di Morra was a Beneventan monk of the Premonstratensian monastery of Saint Martin at Laon who served the Holy See as Papal Chancellor before, as Pope Gregory VIII (*fungebatur* A.D. 1187), he became a peacemaker—first between the Holy See itself and the Holy Roman Empire, and then between Pisa and Genoa—in the cause of the Crusades.

Lotario de' Conti di Segni was a nobleman of the Ducatus Romanus who studied in the universities of Paris and Bologna before he was called, at the early age of 37, to preside over the Hildebrandine Church, in its hour of noonday splendour, as Pope Innocent III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1198–1216).

Cencio Savelli was a member of another noble Roman house who served the Curia as *Auditor* (judge) and *Camerarius* (treasurer) before he ascended the Papal throne as Pope Honorius III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1216–27) and attempted to cope with a plausibly evasive Frederick II.

Ugolino de' Conti di Segni was a great-nephew of Pope Innocent III who, as Cardinal of Saint Eustachius, half appreciated and half patronized Saint Francis of Assisi, and who ventured, as Pope

¹ In Mr. Barraclough's judgement (*Papal Provisions*, p. 1) it was Alexander III who translated Gregory VII's claims into accomplished facts.

Gregory IX (*fungebatur* A.D. 1227-41), to try conclusions, in the strength of his worldly wisdom, with 'the Wonder of the World' who had baffled Pope Honorius III.

Sinibaldo Fieschi, son of Ugo Count of Lavagna, was a Genoese canonist who served as Papal *Auditor* and Vice-Chancellor and Rector of the Marche before, as Pope Innocent IV (*fungebatur* A.D. 1243-54), he threw himself—'impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer'¹—into the festering war between the Holy See and the Emperor Frederick II, and waged it *ad internecionem*.

Rainaldo de' Conti di Segni was a nephew of Pope Gregory IX who carried on the Papal struggle against the Hohenstaufen as Pope Alexander IV (*fungebatur* A.D. 1254-61) without departing from his predecessor's policy in this respect, but who at the same time tried to save the Church herself from the evil effects of the political conflict by revoking many of Innocent IV's ruinous acts,² following in regard to the Friars the more generous policy of his own kinsman and predecessor Gregory IX, and preparing the way for Gregory X's valiant strivings to bring about a spiritual rally.

Jacques Pantaléon was the son of a tradesman in Troyes who studied in the University of Paris, became a canonist, served Pope Innocent IV as his legate militant in Germany, and eventually dealt 'the knock-out blow' to the House of Hohenstaufen with his own hand when, as Pope Urban IV (*fungebatur* A.D. 1261-4), he induced the relentless Charles of Anjou to accept the crown of Sicily.

Guy Fulcodi was the son of a nobleman of St. Gilles in Languedoc who had served the Counts of Toulouse as a legal adviser. Guy himself performed the same service for King Louis IX of France till he was made a cardinal by Pope Urban IV and then became Pope himself as Clement IV (*fungebatur* A.D. 1265-8). In passing over from the Law to the Church, and rising from the Cardinalate to the Papal Throne, Fulcodi never won his manumission from the service of a royal master; he merely exchanged a Louis for a Charles; and the exchange was unfortunate; for, if Louis was a saint whose service was perfect freedom, Charles was a hard man, reaping where he had not sown and gathering where he had not strawed.³ For all his uprightness, Pope Clement sank from being Charles' patron to becoming his accomplice, and from being his accomplice to becoming his tool, while the cold-blooded Angevin dealt with the brood of Frederick II as Jehu had dealt with the House of Ahab.⁴

¹ Horace: *Ars Poetica*, l. 121.

² See the criticism of Innocent IV by Alexander IV that is quoted on p. 539, footnote 4, below.

³ Matt. xxv. 24.

⁴ 2 Kings x. 1-11.

Tibaldo Visconti of Piacenza was a student of the University of Paris and Archdeacon of Liège whose heart was in the Crusades. In this cause he laboured single-mindedly as Pope Gregory X (*fungebatur* A.D. 1271-6) at the Council of Lyon in A.D. 1274 to bring to an end 'the Great Interregnum' which had been inflicted upon the Holy Roman Empire by Pope Innocent IV, as well as to heal the schism between the Western and the Orthodox Church. The crusade which he had worked for was in sight when Death overtook him.

Pietro di Morrone was the eleventh son of an Abruzzese peasant who lived as a hermit in the wilderness before the Conclave elected him to be Pope Celestine V (*fungebatur* A.D. 1294), and who abdicated, less than four months after his consecration, from an office which was a torment to him.

Benedetto Gaetani was a nobleman of Anagni who studied the civil as well as the canon law, became a Papal notary and a cardinal, and put his worldly wisdom at the service of Pope Celestine V in order to smooth the path for his unworldly master's 'Great Refusal'¹ and for his own eager but unfortunate acceptance, as Pope Boniface VIII (*fungebatur* A.D. 1294-1303), of the tiara whose weight the hermit could not endure.

This bare list of famous names² is enough to show that the medieval Papacy, like the modern English governing class and the Ottoman Pādishāh's Slave-Household, had the power of attracting into its service all the talents of the society in which it was the master-institution.³ The first impression which the list will make on our minds is that of the extraordinary variety of the aptitudes and experiences which the Hildebrandine Church knew how to use in a cause which was so much vaster and so much grander than the *raison d'être* of any national state or multi-national empire. A closer scrutiny will show that these diverse types of eminence were not all equally apt for doing the precise and special work of controlling the destinies of the Christian Republic through the instrumentality of the Roman Curia. The fortunes of a Gregory VI or a Paschal II—not to speak of Celestine V—suggest that a man who was eminent as an unworldly saint would perhaps find himself at a disadvantage on the Papal throne, where he might be hindered by his office from exercising his gifts and be hampered by his gifts

¹ Dante: *La Divina Commedia*: 'Inferno', Book III, l. 60.

² If we read the roll-call aloud, it is the Lombard names, with their sonorous Italian setting and their intractable Teutonic core, that engrave themselves most deeply on the memory—calling up, as they do, the incisive characters of the great men of action who bore them. A similar impression is made by the South Slavonic names in the roll of the Ottoman vezirs.

³ The kinship of the Roman Church with the Ottoman Slave-Household in this respect is pointed out by the American scholar Dr. A. H. Lybber in a passage which has been quoted in this Study in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 33, above.

from fulfilling his office. When we compare the respective results of a Paschal II's and a Calixtus II's dealings with a Henry V, we may be inclined to think that the virtues of a saint were a less valuable endowment than the family tradition of a sovereign count¹ for a Pope who was called upon to live up to the Hildebrandine faith that God had

'made him lord of his house and ruler of all his substance,
'To bind his princes at his pleasure and teach his senators wisdom.'²

A count in Pope's clothing, like Calixtus II or Eugenius III, might be the most effective vicegerent of God for calling to order a prince like the aggressive Emperor Henry V or a senator like the turbulent revolutionary Arnold of Brescia. If the capable and commanding nobleman were, as Eugenius was, a monk and a saint besides, so much greater the edification; but, for the service of the Holy See, the nobleman's qualities were perhaps more important; and, to judge by the prowess of Alexander III in fighting his desperate battle with Frederick I, the qualities of the lawyer were even more valuable than those of the nobleman for waging the warfare of the Church Militant. It was perhaps better still to combine the lawyer's cutting edge with the nobleman's robust self-assurance; for this was the combination of worldly gifts which triumphed, in an Innocent IV and a Clement IV, over the demonic energies of Frederick II and his offspring. If we follow our argument as far as this, however, we shall find ourselves in deep waters; for Boniface VIII was a nobly born lawyer likewise; and it was Boniface's infatuation that brought down the whole magnificent structure of the Papal *Respublica Christiana* with a crash, to lie in ruins side by side with that Holy Roman Empire which had been shattered, less than half a century back, by an Innocent's implacability. These two stiff-necked and self-confident men of the world, with their aristocratic imperiousness and their legal exactingness, did far more than the soft-hearted and incompetent Abruzzese peasant's son to destroy all that had been built up by Pope after Pope for two centuries on end upon the Hildebrandine foundations.³

¹ Calixtus II's father was the Sovereign Count of Burgundy.

² Ps. cv. 21-2.

³ 'I should not agree with the remarks about Boniface VIII. It is the old Creighton view; but compare, in criticism, Powicke's Creighton lecture, published in *History*, vol. xviii, pp. 307-29. My view would be modified by taking deeper account of the Franco-Angvin policy: i.e. I should look further back in this connexion and in others.'—Mr. G. Barraclough in a letter to the writer. Mr. Barraclough's own view of the pontificate of Innocent IV will be found in *The English Historical Review*, vol. xlix, p. 212. While the writer of this Study would be making himself ridiculous if he ventured to contest either Mr. Barraclough's or Professor Powicke's judgement in this domain, he does venture to submit that his own acceptance—for what it may be worth—of an antique judgement is perhaps not altogether unjustified on the criterion which he himself is following. The *an* incurred by Pope Boniface VIII was not, of course, the end of all things in the history of the Papacy. In administrative efficiency, for example, the Papal Curia may not

If Hildebrand himself on his death-bed could have confronted, with foreknowledge of the event, the long array of his coming successors, he would assuredly have cried out, in his Master's words, 'verily I say unto you that one of you shall betray me';¹ and the only plea that could have been offered in self-defence by a then unborn Benedetto Gaetani or Sinibaldo Fieschi would have been that his future betrayal of Hildebrand was already predetermined by Hildebrand's own betrayal of himself. Our catalogue of great Popes, from Gregory VII to Boniface VIII inclusive, proclaims that the elements of greatness which created the Papal *Respublica Christiana* were also the elements that destroyed it, and that these seeds of destruction were being sown from the outset.

The fall of the Hildebrandine Church is as extraordinary a spectacle as its rise; for all the virtues that had carried it to its zenith seem to change, as it sinks to its nadir, into their own exact antitheses. The divine institution which had been fighting and winning a battle for spiritual freedom against material force was now infected with the very evil which it had set itself to cast out from the body social of Western Christendom. The Holy See which had taken the lead in the struggle against simony now required the clergy throughout the Western World to pay their dues at a Roman receipt of custom for those ecclesiastical preferments which Rome herself had forbidden them to purchase from any local secular power.² The Roman Curia which had been the head and front of moral and intellectual progress—a tower of strength for the saints who were raising the monastic life to new heights, and for the schoolmen who were creating the universities—now turned itself into a fastness of spiritual conservatism. The ecclesiastical sovereign power in the Christian Republic now suffered itself to be deprived by its local secular underlings—the princes of the rising parochial states of Western Christendom—of the lion's share of the product of financial and administrative instruments which the Papacy itself had skilfully devised in order to make its authority effective;³ and this forfeiture of a share in the product was followed by a forfeiture

have reached its apogee until after the migration to Avignon, and the autocratic authority of the Papacy over the Church was only established in and after the pontificate of Martin V (see the present chapter, pp. 573-6, below). On the other hand the moral authority of the Papacy did, surely, never recover from the shock which it had sustained in the days of Innocent IV and Boniface VIII.

¹ Matt. xxvi. 21.

² Fees for investiture with ecclesiastical offices had, of course, always been paid to some one—i.e. to the local ordinary and his officials—before ever the controversy over investiture arose; and, moreover, the payment of a fee upon appointment was not the same thing as the purchase of an office. Yet the essence of the evil which Hildebrand was attacking was the subjection of the life of the spirit to the power of the purse; and this was an evil in which the Papal Curia itself became deeply implicated when its budget was swollen by the portentous cost of the internecine conflict with the Emperor Frederick II.

³ On this point see further pp. 539-40, below.

of the means of production as well when in England a King Henry VIII took over the Papal machinery within the frontiers of his own realm and thenceforward worked the machine with his own hands for his own profit exclusively. In the face of this final act of spoliation the Holy See found itself helpless. And as the local prince of a Papal principality the Sovereign Pontiff eventually had to content himself—like Napoleon on Elba—with the paltry consolation-prize of sovereignty over one of the least of the 'successor-states' of his own lost empire.¹ Has any other institution ever given so great occasion as this to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme?² The downfall of the Hildebrandine Papacy is a more extreme case of *περιπέτεια* than any that we have yet encountered in our study of the nemesis of creativity. How did it happen, and why?

How it happened is foreshadowed in the first recorded transaction in Hildebrand's public career.

The creative spirits in the Roman Church who set themselves in the eleventh century to rescue our Western World from a feudal anarchy by establishing a Christian Republic then found themselves in the same dilemma as their spiritual heirs who are attempting in our day to replace an international anarchy by a political world order. The essence of their aim was to substitute a reign of spiritual authority for the reign of physical force, and in their struggle against violence the spiritual sword was the weapon with which their supreme victories were won. No physical force was exerted in Hildebrand's act of deposing and excommunicating the Emperor Henry IV; yet the moral effect of the Pope's winged words upon the hearts of the Emperor's Transalpine subjects was so intense that within a few months it brought Henry to Canossa. There were, however, other occasions on which it seemed as though the established régime of physical force was in a position to defy the strokes of the spiritual sword with impunity; and it was in such situations that the Roman Church Militant was challenged to give its answer to the Riddle of the Sphinx. Was the soldier of God to deny himself the use of any but his own spiritual arms, at the risk of seeing his advance brought to a standstill? Or was he to fight God's battle against the Devil with the adversary's own weapons, if the only practicable way of ejecting the adversary from his entrenchments was to hoist him with his own petard? Which was the true Christian act of faith? To eschew all weapons but God's, and trust in God to make David's sling prevail against Goliath's

¹ The comparison, of course, is imperfect in one vital point; for after losing his administrative and financial empire over the Western World the Pope still retained an infinitely more important spiritual empire of a kind which a Napoleon could never acquire and which even an Innocent IV could never completely destroy.

² 2 Sam. xii. 14.

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panoply? Or to remind himself that the Devil and his armoury, like everything else in the Universe, were the Creator's creatures, and to believe that no created thing could remain unhallowed if it were used in the Creator's service? 'What God hath cleansed, that call not thou common'¹ was a text which might appear to support the second of these two alternative answers, and it was also a text which might seem to have been directly addressed to the Vicar of Peter.

The question presented itself in an urgent practical form to the would-be reformer Pope Gregory VI when he assumed the burden of the Papal office in A.D. 1045. In order to serve as the instrument of reform, the Holy See must be efficiently organized; to be organized, it must have money; and the necessary supplies of this material means to a spiritual end were not forthcoming; for, while the old Papal revenues from the Patrimonia Petri had disappeared with the Patrimonia themselves, the new revenues arising from the offerings of the pilgrims were being stolen from the very altar of Saint Peter's own church by the brigand-nobles of the Ducatus Romanus²—the one place in Western Christendom where the Prince of the Apostles had no honour, just because it was the country which he had made his own. No one would dispute that this sacrilegious robbery was as wicked in itself as it was damaging to the interests of the Papacy and the Christian Republic; and there was no prospect of the criminals becoming amenable to spiritual appeals or spiritual censures. The physical force which they themselves were employing was the only human agency to which they would yield. Was it justifiable to meet force with force in this flagrant case? The question was answered when the gentle Giovanni Graziano ascended the Papal throne as Gregory VI and appointed Hildebrand to be his *capellanus*; for the guardianship of Saint Peter's

¹ Acts x. 15.

² The scanty evidence in regard to the Papal finances in this age is marshalled by K. Jordan: 'Zur päpstlichen Finanzgeschichte im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert' in *Quellen und Forschungen herausgegeben vom Preussischen Historischen Institut in Rom*, vol. xxv (Rome 1933-4, Regenberg), pp. 61-104. Between the date of the Lombard irruption into Italy in A.D. 568 and that of Pope Stephen III's journey to Frankland in A.D. 753-5 the Papal Patrimonia in the form of landed estates scattered far and wide over the vast domain of the Roman Patriarchate had all been lost save for the remnant contained in the Ducatus Romanus itself; and the temporary financial relief which the Papacy had obtained in the latter part of the eighth century thanks to the donations of Pepin and Charlemagne had been more than offset, between the end of the ninth century and the middle of the eleventh, by the onset of a feudal anarchy which had diverted into alien hands the revenues of estates of which the Papacy was still nominally the owner (Jordan, op. cit., pp. 62-4). The moment of Pope Gregory VI's accession seems to have coincided with the nadir of the Papacy's finances (Jordan, op. cit., pp. 64-5). It is true that, in compensation for the lost revenues from the Papacy's own landed property, the Papal treasury was by this time already beginning to receive revenues of a new kind—dues from monasteries under Papal patronage, and Peter's Pence and tribute from kingdoms on the fringe of Western Christendom which recognized some kind of Papal overlordship (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 378-9, and the present chapter and volume, p. 525, footnote 4, above)—but these new sources of revenue do not appear to have yielded appreciable sums until the twelfth century (Jordan, op. cit., pp. 70-80).

altar, with the gifts that were heaped upon it, was the *capellanus*'s principal duty;¹ and Hildebrand promptly fulfilled it by raising an armed force and routing the brigands *manu militari*.

In taking this first momentous step in his career the Papal *capellanus* was making Muhammad's response to a challenge that had confronted the Arabian prophet in his native city of Mecca. Like Muhammad in Mecca in the seventh century of the Christian Era, Hildebrand in Rome in the eleventh century had to cope with the problem of performing a spiritual task in a political vacuum;² and, in support of a solution in which he was unwittingly following an Islamic precedent, Hildebrand could have quoted Christian Scripture for his purpose. He could have quoted to the brigands 'my house shall be called the house of prayer, but ye have made it a den of thieves';³ and quoted to the Pope 'the zeal of thine house hath eaten me up'.⁴ But which of the scenes in the mystery play was Hildebrand really acting? Was he playing the part of Jesus when he 'made a scourge of small cords'⁵ and 'went into the Temple of God and cast out all them that sold and bought in the Temple and overthrew the tables of the moneychangers'?⁶ Or was he doing in fact what Jesus had been falsely accused of doing when the Pharisees said 'this fellow doth not cast out devils but by Beelzebub the prince of the devils'?⁷

At the moment when Hildebrand took action the inward moral character of his act was difficult indeed to divine. At his last hour, forty years after, the answer to the riddle was already less obscure; for in A.D. 1085, when he was dying as a Pope in exile at Salerno, the more venerable city that was his see lay prostrate under the weight of an overwhelming calamity which her bishop's policy had brought upon her only the year before. In 1085 Rome had just been looted and burnt by the Normans—more ferocious brigands than any native Roman breed—whom the Pope had called in to assist him in a military struggle which had gradually spread from the steps of Saint Peter's altar, where it had started forty years before, until it had engulfed the whole of Western Christendom. The climax of the physical conflict between Hildebrand and Henry IV gave a foretaste of the deadlier and more devastating struggle which was to be fought out *à outrance* between Innocent IV and Frederick II; and by the time when we come to the pontificate of Innocent IV

¹ A general control over the Papal finances seems to have been one of the functions of the office of 'Archdeacon of the Roman Church' to which Hildebrand was subsequently appointed in A.D. 1059 (Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 66).

² See III. C (ii) (b), Annex II, vol. iii, especially pp. 470-2, above.

³ Matt. xxi. 13 = Mark xi. 17 = Luke xix. 46 (see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 425-6, below).

⁴ John ii. 17.

⁵ John ii. 15.

⁶ Matt. xxi. 12.

⁷ Matt. xii. 24.

our doubts will be at an end. Sinibaldo Fieschi bears witness against Ildebrando Aldobrandeschi that, in choosing the alternative of meeting force by force, Hildebrand was setting the Hildebrandine Church upon a course which was to end in the victory of his adversaries the World, the Flesh, and the Devil over the City of God which he was seeking to bring down to Earth.

No Politick admitteth nor did ever admit
the teacher into confidence: nay ev'n the Church,
with hierarchy in conclave compassing to install
Saint Peter in Caesar's chair, and thereby win for men
the promises for which they had loved and worship'd Christ,
relax'd his heavenly code to stretch her temporal rule.¹

If we have succeeded in explaining how the Papacy became possessed by the demon of physical violence which it was attempting to exorcize, we have found the explanation of the other changes of Papal virtues into their opposing vices; for the substitution of the material for the spiritual sword is the fatal and fundamental change of which all the rest are corollaries.

How was it, for example, that a Holy See whose main concern with the finances of the Western clergy had been in the eleventh century the eradication of simony, should have become so deeply engaged, by the thirteenth century in allocating for the benefit of its nominees, and by the fourteenth century in taxing for its own benefit, those ecclesiastical revenues which it had once redeemed from the scandal of prostitution to secular powers for the purchase of ecclesiastical preferment? The unhappy transformation of the Papal Curia's financial role in Western Christendom was manifestly due to the ever increasing demands upon the Papal Exchequer which were being made by the perpetually recurring warfare between the Papacy and the Empire. On this point the dates speak for themselves.² A financial screw which had been given one turn when Alexander III had been at war with Frederick I, was turned again—and this time without mercy—when Gregory IX and Innocent IV were waging their more desperate warfare against Frederick II. It was the clergy of France and England who were chiefly distrained upon; for in Germany the Emperor's authority was still so far effective that it could hinder the clergy of that country from

¹ Bridges, Robert: *The Testament of Beauty* (Oxford 1929, Clarendon Press), Book IV, ll. 259-64.

² In at least one important department of Papal administration and finance, however, the apparent testimony of the dates proves to be deceptive. The institution of Papal 'provisions' grew up between the middle of the twelfth and the middle of the thirteenth century—that is to say, contemporaneously with the fighting out of the hundred years' war between the Papacy and the Hohenstaufen. Yet this development turns out neither to have taken place on the Curia's initiative nor to have worked, at this stage, to the Curia's financial profit. (On this point see Barraclough, G.: *Papal Provisions* (Oxford 1935, Blackwell), pp. 153-5.)

contributing to the war-chest of the Emperor's Papal antagonist; and in Italy—though she was the richest country in thirteenth-century Europe—the Pope found it as difficult to extract subsidies from the Italian clergy as to wring blood from a stone. In England by the middle of the thirteenth century it was being asserted that the revenue flowing out of the country to the Pope, and to the other foreign ecclesiastics who had been 'provided for' by the Pope out of English ecclesiastical resources,¹ was considerably larger than the revenue that was reaching the treasury of the King of England himself.² Both in England and in France this financial exploitation excited a resentment and provoked a restiveness which found voice in energetic protests;³ but, although Innocent IV was enough of a statesman to realize that he was placing an intolerable strain upon an invaluable loyalty, he was too hard pressed by the financial exigencies of his war to the knife with the Hohenstaufen to be able to relax his own pressure upon England and France appreciably.⁴

For this remorseless turning of the financial screw upon the provincial clergy the Roman Curia was forced in the end to pay an ironical penalty.⁵ It was compelled to surrender a share—and eventually the lion's share—of its provincial spoils to the local secular princes. While the clergy writhed under the Papal exactions and lamented the invention of the fiscal machinery through which they were put into execution, the princes merely resented the fact that this new-fangled taxing-machine, which was showing itself so admirably effective, was not at their disposal; and they set themselves, not to destroy it, but to capture it for their own benefit. The transfer of the Papal taxing-machine from the Pope's to the

¹ While the English Crown and clergy may have lost financially through Innocent IV's 'provisions' out of English ecclesiastical resources, these did not, at this date, bring the Curia any appreciable financial gain (see p. 538, footnote 2, above). The advantages derived by Innocent IV from his 'provisions' were not financial but political. They were a means of installing his own supporters in, and excluding his adversary's supporters from, a number of key-positions on the ecclesiastical map of Western Christendom. On the other hand the Papal drafts upon the revenues of the provincial churches that were levied on other accounts came in the course of the thirteenth century to play so important a part in the financial life of the Western World that firms of international bankers were formed to collect and remit them.

² Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xiii, pp. 353-4.

³ For the protests of the English clergy to Innocent IV see Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xiv, pp. 233-66.

⁴ 'Innocentius Papa . . . nimia duri temporis tunc eum importunitate cogente, plura, quamquam forte invitatus, fecisse dinoscitur quae ipsemet proponebat succedente opportunitate utiliter immutare.'—Pope Alexander IV, in a letter dated the 18th August, 1255 (quoted by Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xiv, p. 299). Coming from Innocent's own successor on the morrow of Innocent's death, this discreetly expressed criticism of Innocent's policy is impressive. It has, however, to be discounted to some extent in the light of the relations between the two pontiffs here in question (see p. 531, above). In a letter to the writer of this Study Mr. G. Barraclough recalls that 'Alexander was a firm opponent of Innocent, and had been virtually "retired" during his predecessor's pontificate'. In Mr. Barraclough's judgement Alexander was moved by animus 'to attribute to Innocent many things that were more far-reaching'.

⁵ See pp. 534-5, above.

princes' hands began with the occasional concession, by the Pope to some prince, of a royalty on the Pope's own takings from the clergy in that prince's dominions—either as an inducement to the prince to facilitate the collection of the balance by the Papal agents, or in consideration of the prince's undertaking to spend his royalty, when he received it, on a crusade against the Muslims or the Hohenstaufen. As early as A.D. 1252 Pope Innocent IV and King Henry III of England were suspected of being engaged in this kind of collusion;¹ and in 1254 the Pope actually authorized the King to divert, for the conquest of the Kingdom of Sicily from the Hohenstaufen, the proceeds of a tithe which the King had been collecting from the ecclesiastical revenues of England since 1250, on the Pope's authority, for the purpose of a Crusade to the Holy Land!²

The Kings of England and France and the other countries of Western Christendom beyond the pale of the Holy Roman Empire were wiser in their generation than 'the Wonder of the World' when they turned a deaf ear to Frederick II's appeals to his peers to make common cause with him in resisting the aggression of the Papal Power against himself and his house.³ Frederick tried to frighten them into coming to his help by warning them that, if and when the Papacy did succeed in crushing the greatest of all the secular Powers in the Western body social, the monster would then have the smaller fry at its mercy and would proceed to mete the same measure to them as to the Hohenstaufen Emperor-King. The unwillingness of Frederick's brother princes to respond to his call—notwithstanding their manifest lack of enthusiasm for the cause of Frederick's Papal adversary—seems to show that they did not take the Emperor's warning very seriously⁴ and that they had a shrewder idea than Frederick professed to have, or than Gregory IX and Innocent IV can have had in fact, of what the actual consequences of this 'Punic War' between the Empire and the Papacy would be.

¹ Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xiv, p. 258.

² *Ibid.*, p. 271.

³ Frederick made a general appeal to the other princes of Western Christendom in 1227, after his excommunication by Gregory IX, and again in 1239 after his excommunication by the same Pope for the second time (Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xiii, pp. 217-19 and 286-7).

⁴ An advocate of Frederick's thesis would have been able to adduce some historical evidence of recent date in support of it. He could have pointed out that the war of 1159-77 between Pope Alexander III and the Emperor Frederick I had been matched, in England, by the contemporary struggle—from 1162 to 1174—between Archbishop Thomas Becket and King Henry II. In this provincial conflict between Church and State, however, the ecclesiastical combatant had proved more formidable after his martyrdom in A.D. 1170 than before it. In his lifetime Becket had not found it easy to enlist on his side either the clergy of England or the Roman Curia in a quarrel with King Henry II on what was largely a personal issue. The Pope at the time had his hands full elsewhere, and he had no desire to incur the King of England's hostility. On the other hand the Curia did not miss its opportunity of taking advantage of the crime by which the King in the end put himself hopelessly in the wrong.

The outcome was, of course, the usual outcome of a great war which is fought out to the bitter end. The nominal victor succeeded in dealing the death-blow to his authentic victim at the cost of sustaining fatal injuries himself; and the real victors over both the belligerents were the neutral *tertiū gaudentes*. When Pope Boniface VIII acted as though Frederick's forecast had been correct, and hurled against the King of France the pontifical thunderbolt with which the Emperor had been blasted by Boniface's predecessor Innocent IV, the sequel demonstrated that, as a result of the deadly struggle of A.D. 1227-68, the Papacy had sunk to the level of weakness to which it had reduced the Empire, while the Kingdom of France had become as strong as either the Papacy or the Empire had been before they had destroyed each other. In a trial of strength in which King Philip emerged unscathed by the Papal thunderbolt's blast, Pope Boniface was shown to be defenceless against the sacrilegious buffetings of a Guillaume Nogaret and a Sciarra Colonna; and Boniface's successors learnt this cruel lesson so well that they meekly came to Avignon to sit on the door-step of a new secular master who was quite as imperious as the Henrys and the Fredericks, without possessing the shadow of an Emperor's traditional title to exercise secular jurisdiction over a Pope.

The events of A.D. 1303-5 made it certain that the local secular princes would inherit, sooner or later, within their respective territories, the whole of the administrative and financial power and organization which the Papacy had been gradually establishing for itself all over Western Christendom. The process of transfer was only a matter of time. We may notice, as landmarks on the road, the passage in England of the Statute of Provisors in 1351 and the Statute of Praemunire in 1353; the concessions which the Curia was compelled to make, a century later, to the secular powers in France and Germany as the price of the abandonment of their support of the Council of Basel;¹ the Franco-Papal concordat negotiated at Bologna in 1516, in which the Roman See made an unequal division, with the French Crown, of existing Papal prerogatives in French territory, at the expense of the Gallican Church and the University of Paris; and the passage in England of the Act of Supremacy in 1534. This series of landmarks may remind us that the transfer of the medieval Papacy's prerogatives to the local secular Governments had begun, all over Western Christendom, some two hundred years before the Reformation, and that it worked itself out to its conclusion in the states which remained Catholic as well as in those which became Protestant. In both groups of states alike the sixteenth century saw the process completed; and it is,

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 11, pp. 217-18, above.

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of course, no accident that the same century also saw the laying of the foundations upon which the 'totalitarian' parochial states of the modern Western World have been built up in the course of the last four centuries.

In earlier parts of this Study¹ we have traced the genesis of these modern parochial sovereign states of the kingdom-state calibre back to the city-states of medieval Italy. We can now see that the impact of Italian Civic Efficiency upon Transalpine Government is not the only clash of historical forces out of which our latter-day juggernauts have taken their formidable shape. A second, and perhaps equally prolific, source of the plenitude of power which these parochial sovereign states have now acquired has been the impact of their parochialism upon the Papal *Respublica Christiana*.² When the Papacy exhausted its strength in its deadly conflict with the Holy Roman Empire, it placed itself at the mercy of the parochial secular states; and it was then promptly despoiled by them of the panoply with which it had equipped itself for fighting its medieval battle. The oecumenical administrative and financial machinery through which the medieval Curia governed and taxed the provincial churches survives to-day in the corresponding apparatus of each of the parochial states of the modern Western World.³ The oecumenical system of representative councils—from the First General Council of the Lateran (A.D. 1123) to the Council of Basel (A.D. 1431-49)—through which the members and the head of the Hildebrandine body ecclesiastic periodically adjusted their relations with one another, has a counterpart, if not a relic, to-day in our parochial secular parliaments.⁴ Above all, the devotion which the provincial clergy, throughout medieval Western Christendom, once learnt to give to the Pope, as the living human head of an oecumenical society which was a mundane embodiment of the *Civitas Dei*, now

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63, and IV. C (iii) (b) 8, in the present volume, pp. 198-200, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (b) 11, pp. 214-22, above.

³ For the financial machinery of the medieval Papacy see Barraclough, G.: *Papal Provisions* (Oxford 1935, Blackwell); Lunt, W. E.: 'The Financial System of the Medieval Papacy' in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. xxiii, pp. 251 seqq. (Boston 1909, Ellis); eundem: *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages* (London 1934, Milford); Samaran, C., and Mollat, G.: *La Fiscalité Pontificale en France au XIV^e siècle* (Paris 1905, Fontemoing); Mollat, G.: *Les Papes d'Avignon* (Paris 1912, Lecoffre).

⁴ The general councils of the medieval Western Church have a Western revival of the oecumenical councils of the Catholic Church in the fourth and fifth centuries. Some of the earliest of the Western parochial secular parliaments—e.g. the parliaments convened in England in 1246 and in Apulia in 1256 and the Estates General convened in France in 1302—were summoned for the purpose of resisting an extension of the Papal prerogative. Were these parochial parliaments—in which the local clergy were at least as well represented as the local laity—inspired by the example of the general councils of the Church, on the principle of fighting the Holy See with its own weapons? The verdict of the experts appears, at the moment, to be that the main principles of conciliar and parliamentary organization and procedure are so different as to make it difficult to imagine that the ecclesiastical institution can have served as the model for the secular.

survives in the loyalty which the parochial secular 'successor-states' of the medieval Christian Republic receive to-day from their subjects without much distinction between laymen and clerics.

This hold upon human hearts is the most precious of all the spoils which the 'successor-states' have taken from the greater and nobler institution which they have plundered; for it is by commanding loyalty, far more than by raising and spending revenues or maintaining and employing armies, that these 'successor-states' have succeeded in keeping themselves alive. At the same time this spiritual heritage from the Hildebrandine Church is the element in the constitution of our modern parochial states which has turned these once harmless and useful institutions into a grave menace to the welfare of our civilization. For the spirit of devotion which was a beneficent creative power in Western Christendom when it was directed through the gates of a *Civitas Dei* towards God himself, has degenerated into a maleficent destructive force in the process of being diverted from its original divine object and being offered instead to an idol made by human hands.¹ Parochial states, as our medieval forebears knew, are man-made institutions, useful and even necessary in their place, which deserve from us that conscientious but unenthusiastic performance of a minor social duty which we render, in our time, to our municipalities and county councils. To idolize these pieces of social machinery, which have nothing divine about them, is to court a spiritual disaster; and this is the disaster towards which our modern Western World is heading to-day² as an ultimate consequence of the spiritual spoliation of the Holy See by the secular principalities which were once kept in their place by the Papacy's moral authority.

The sole, and paltry, compensation which the Papacy received from its despoilers was a tiny share in the territorial sovereignty which the local secular princes were forging for themselves out of their Papal spoils. The effective establishment of the Pope's territorial sovereignty proceeded *pari passu* with his virtual eviction from the moral presidency of an oecumenical Christian Commonwealth. In the great age of the Hildebrandine Church the Popes, as we have seen,³ were content—notwithstanding the donations of Pepin and Charlemagne and Matilda—to forgo the practical exercise of territorial sovereignty even in Rome itself. The first piece of territory over which any Pope exercised full powers of civil government *de facto* as well as *de jure* was the Venaissin—a fragment of the Burgundian portion of the heritage of the Counts of Toulouse which was ceded to Pope Gregory X by King Philip III

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 303, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 318-20 and 405-8, above.

³ See pp. 523-6, above.

544 THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS of France in 1274, while the Council of Lyon was in session. Ostensibly this Council—at which Rudolf of Hapsburg sought and obtained the recognition of his election as King of the Romans, and the Greeks sought and obtained their restoration to communion with Rome, on the Pope's own terms¹—was a Papal triumph which placed the coping-stone upon the Hildebrandine edifice. Actually, however, the foundations of the mighty structure had been fatally undermined before its upper-works were finished off; and the collapse of A.D. 1303-5 occurred before the Pope's territorial dominions received their next extension through the purchase of the city of Avignon by Pope Clement VI in 1348. Thereafter, between 1353 and 1367, when the republican movement in Rome had been discredited—after two centuries of licence—by the antics of Rienzi, and when civic liberties were on the wane all over Central and Northern Italy, a Spanish soldier, Cardinal Albornoz, made an effective conquest of the greater part of the Donation of Charlemagne on behalf of a Papal master who was then still hugging the golden chains of a humiliating 'Babylonish Captivity'; and at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, at the height of the Great Schism, Albornoz's work was repeated and confirmed by Pope Boniface IX with one hand, while with the other hand he was contending with his rival Benedict of Avignon. In the course of the next hundred years these Italian possessions of the Papacy became securely welded together into one of the ten despotically governed principalities into which the sixty or seventy medieval city-states of Central and Northern Italy were consolidated during the transition from the Medieval to the Modern Age.² In this one field the Papacy achieved, in its decline, a success which had never come its way in the period of its Hildebrandine greatness; and the achievement was not undone, or even interrupted, by a series of unprecedented disasters: the 'Babylonish Captivity' of 1309-76,³ the Great Schism of 1378-1417, the Reformation, and the Sack of Rome in 1527. The reason was that the erection of the Papal principality was an almost automatic consequence of the establishment of a new international order—or anarchy—in the Western World; and in yielding to this new dispensation, which was an utter reversal of the Hildebrandine régime, the Papacy was simply allowing itself to drift on an irresistible tide which was not, this

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, p. 616, below.

² For this process of consolidation see III. C (ii) (δ), vol. iii, pp. 354-7, above.

³ The disaster lay in the 'capture' of the Papacy by the French Crown, and not in the scene of the 'captivity'; for the metaphorical Babylon on the banks of the Rhône was much better placed than the metaphorical Zion on the banks of the Tiber for serving the fourteenth-century Papal Curia as a centre for the administration of an ecclesiastical empire which extended at the time from Sicily to Ireland and from Portugal to Finland. (On this point see p. 520, footnote 2, above.)

time, of the Papacy's own raising. The modern Papal State was one of the Machiavellian secular 'successor-states' into which the Hildebrandine ecclesiastical commonwealth was partitioned; and it lasted as long as the rest of the territorial system of which it was part and parcel—maintaining itself on the Rhône till A.D. 1791 and on the Tiber till A.D. 1870.

The consciousness that it was now drifting with the tide, and that it had lost control over its own destinies, was no doubt the psychological cause of the conservatism to which the Papacy abandoned itself from the time when it received the shock of the Protestant Reformation until the time when it began to recover from the later shock which was administered to it by the Italian *Risorgimento*. Realizing that it was now at the mercy of wind and wave, the Papacy came to see its safety in stagnation.

'When thou wast young, thou girdedst thyself and walkedst whither thou wouldest; but when thou shalt be old thou shalt stretch forth thy hands, and another shall gird thee and carry thee whither thou wouldest not.'¹

For a person or institution that has come to this pass, any change is formidable, because it will not be a change that is voluntary, and may be a change for the worse. It was in this spirit that the Papacy set its face, not only against the hierarchical and theological innovations of the Protestant Reformation, which were deliberately antagonistic to the Hildebrandine order of society, but also against some of the new discoveries of modern Western Physical Science and new ideas of modern Western Social Philosophy.

We have now perhaps found some answer to the question how the Papacy came to suffer its extraordinary *περιπέτεια*; but in describing the process we have not explained the cause. We may be justified in our thesis that the downfall of the Papacy in every sphere can be traced back to its abandonment of the spiritual in favour of the material sword, and that this fatal change can be traced, in its turn, to Hildebrand's choice in the first act of his public life. Yet, even if it were demonstrable that Hildebrand's decision in A.D. 1045 to parry force with force was the ruin of the Hildebrandine enterprise as a matter of fact, this would not prove that what did happen was bound to happen *a priori*. The single example of the Hildebrandine tragedy, impressive though it may be, can prove no more, in itself, than the truism that the use of material means towards a spiritual end is always a dangerous game. To live dangerously, however, is the inevitable condition of being alive at all; and there is no decisive evidence for the operation of a moral Gresham's Law to make it certain that, whenever

¹ John xxi. 18.

force is employed in a spiritual cause, this dangerous manœuvre will always incur defeat. There may be cases in which the same manœuvre can be resorted to with a chance of success, and some cases, perhaps, among these, in which no other line of action holds out any prospect of victory, so that there the choice will lie between risking defeat in a hazardous move and accepting defeat without a struggle. In fact, notwithstanding the experience of the Hildebrandine Church, this Riddle of the Sphinx remains inscrutable still. And in our own later generation, when we find ourselves confronted once more by Hildebrand's dilemma, with the advocates of an uncompromising pacifism arrayed *ancipiti Marte* against the advocates of enforcing peace, we cannot pronounce that Hildebrand's choice was intrinsically the wrong one simply because it resulted in a disaster in Hildebrand's case. It is therefore not enough to show how this disaster occurred; we have also to answer, if we can, the question why.

Why was it that the medieval Papacy became the slave of its own tools, and allowed itself to be betrayed, by its use of material means, into being diverted from the spiritual ends to which those means had been intended to minister? In the history of the Roman See, as in that of the Roman Republic, the explanation of an ultimate defeat is to be found (so it would seem) in the untoward effects of an initial victory. The dangerous game of fighting force with force had in these cases fatal results because, to begin with, it succeeded only too well. Intoxicated by the successes which their hazardous manœuvre obtained for them in the earlier stages of their struggle with the Holy Roman Empire, Pope Gregory VII and his successors persisted in the use of force, and carried it to extremes, until it defeated the users' purpose by becoming an end in itself. While Gregory VII fought the Empire with the object of removing an Imperial obstacle to a reform of the Church, Innocent IV fought the Empire two hundred years later with the object of breaking the Imperial Power. The downfall of the Hildebrandine Papacy was a supremely tragic performance of the drama of *κόρος-ὑβρις-ἄτη*.

We can verify the working out of this *Leitmotiv* in two ways. We can discern it in a contrast between some earlier and some later scene in the play; and we can detect it by an analysis of the plot.

The first pair of outwardly similar but inwardly diverse scenes is one in which three rival claimants to the Papacy are summoned before the judgement-seat of a council of the Church under the presidency of a Holy Roman Emperor, with the result that two of them are declared illegitimate, the third is permitted to avoid deposition by abdicating, and the Holy See thus rendered vacant is

filled in due course by the election of a new candidate. In A.D. 1046 it was Pope Gregory VI who was compelled by the Emperor Henry III to abdicate, at the Synod of Sutri, in order to make way for Suidger of Bamberg to ascend the Papal throne as Clement II; in A.D. 1415 it was Pope John XXIII who was compelled to abdicate by the Fathers of the Council of Constance, under the auspices of the Emperor Sigismund, in order that Oddone Colonna might become Pope Martin V. Externally the two scenes might seem almost indistinguishable, but there is a difference in *ethos* between the two protagonists which gives some measure of the moral disaster to which the Papacy had succumbed in the course of the four intervening centuries. Pope Gregory VI was an unworldly saint who had rendered himself technically guilty of the offence of Simony by purchasing the Papal office, with money legitimately acquired, in order to rescue it from the hands of his unworthy god-son, Pope Benedict IX. The offence had been so strictly formal, and the motive so plainly pure, that John Gratian's action had been acclaimed by Peter Damian as the salvation of the Church, while Hildebrand showed his opinion of it by taking service under his old schoolmaster as his *capellanus* and assuming this master's pontifical name when his own turn came, long afterwards, to ascend the Papal throne as Gregory VII. The condemnation of Gregory VI was a travesty of justice which aroused indignation all over Western Christendom and inspired Hildebrand¹ to devote his life to fighting for the liberation of the Church from an arbitrary 'Caesaro-papism'. Yet the victim of this judicial act of injustice accepted and endorsed the sentence without a murmur. Not so the condottiere Baldassare Cossa, 'the most profligate of Mankind',² whom the Council of Constance had to deal with as Pope John XXIII. 'He fled, and was brought back a prisoner; the most scandalous charges were suppressed; the Vicar of Christ was only accused of piracy, murder, rape, sodomy, and incest; and, after subscribing his own condemnation, he expiated in prison the imprudence of trusting his person to a free city beyond the Alps.'³ The poison of worldliness had worked potently in the course of less than four hundred years to produce the contrast between this scene and that.

There is another pair of scenes in which a Pope invades Southern Italy with an armed force, meets with an ignominious defeat from

¹ See pp. 512-13, above.

² Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. lxx.

³ Gibbon, op. cit., cap. cit. Since the date at which Gibbon wrote these demurely deadly sentences, a substantial summary of the evidence against John XXIII has come to light (see Waugh, W. T., in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. viii (Cambridge 1936, University Press), p. 7, footnote 2). The reason why 'the most scandalous charges were suppressed' is still, however, unknown (op. cit., p. 8, footnote 1).

the Power whom he is attacking, and dies of chagrin. In the first scene it is Pope Leo IX who is defeated in 1053 by the Normans;¹ in the second scene it is Pope Innocent IV who is defeated in 1254 by Manfred. Outwardly the *ci-devant* Bruno of Egisheim was more deeply humiliated than the *ci-devant* Sinibaldo Fieschi; for he led his army in person, was taken prisoner on the battle-field, and died in virtual captivity, while his more prudent successor two hundred years later assigned the command of his army to his nephew and died a free man. The difference, however, is all the other way when we take account of motives and states of mind. Pope Leo was attempting, in co-operation with the secular arm of the Emperors of both East and West, to carry out a police operation against a band of brigands whom their victims spoke of not as Normans but as Hagarenes, to signify that they were the truceless enemies of Church and State. Yet, even in so good a cause, this nobleman's son who had been brought up among men of war was filled with compunction at the thought that he had lent the countenance of his Papal office to the shedding of blood;² and what broke his heart was the slaughter of his followers and not his own defeat and capture by the outlaws whom he had hoped to subdue. Innocent, on the other hand, was on the war-path against the son of a dead and defeated enemy against whom he nursed such an implacable hatred³ that he must needs pursue his vendetta into the second and the third generation. The chagrin that killed him was his rage at being foiled in an attempt to carry the war into the enemy's country and to chey out of his father's ancestral kingdom a prince who had abandoned his father's aggressive ambitions and who was only anxious to be left in peace.⁴ Militarily, Innocent's and Leo's Apulian expeditions ended in much the same way, but morally there is no comparison between them; and this moral gulf gives the measure of the Papacy's spiritual degeneration during the intervening span of two hundred years.

Yet another pair of scenes whose likeness and difference tell the same tale of a moral decline and fall is a pair which offers the outwardly identic spectacle of a Pope being kidnapped and brutally handled by men of violence with the cold-blooded intention of

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, pp. 611-12, below.

² Herein Bruno's temperament presents an instructive contrast to that of his adviser, and eventual successor, Hildebrand.

³ In substitution for the words 'implacable hatred' Mr. G. Barraclough suggests the phrase 'consistent policy based on a conviction of the impossibility of co-operation with the Hohenstaufen, and of the danger of their presence in Italy'.

⁴ This statement of Manfred's attitude and intentions is, in Mr. Barraclough's submission, 'beside the point from Innocent's point of view, just as Hitlerian protestations of goodwill and peacefulness are beside the point for France to-day'. In the opinion of the writer of this Study Mr. Barraclough's striking parallel damns Poincaré-la-Guerre without exculpating Sinibaldo Fieschi.

breaking his nerve and so bringing him to make a great concession which he would never have conceded on its merits. In the first of these two scenes we see Pope Paschal II being seized in A.D. 1111 by the Emperor Henry V at the high altar of St. Peter's and carried away captive into the Campagna; in the second we see Pope Boniface VIII being assaulted at Anagni in A.D. 1303 by Guillaume Nogaret and Sciarra Colonna. The purpose of Henry V was to extort from Pope Paschal an acknowledgement of the Emperor's right to confer Investiture; the purpose of Guillaume Nogaret was to extort from Pope Boniface a retraction of certain bulls which the Pope had promulgated against Nogaret's royal master. To this extent the two scenes are in conformity; it is when we consider the respective antecedents of this pair of outrages against the Pope's sacrosanctity that the moral difference comes to light. Behind Nogaret's brutal assault upon Boniface there was no treachery and much provocation. For nearly two years past the Pope had been conducting against the King of France an ever more violent war of words, with the evident intention of coercing the King into a public submission and thereby leading him in triumph as a royal captive of the pontifical bow and spear. The first shots had been fired in *Clericis laicos* and *Ineffabilis amoris*. *Salvator mundi* and *Ausculata fili* had been followed up by *Unam sanctam*—a bull which roundly asserted the supremacy of the pontifical over the secular sword—and *Unam sanctam* by *Super Petri solio*, a bull in which the King was excommunicated. In raising the question of swords, Boniface had been 'asking for trouble'; and, when he gets it, we cannot feel that the coin of violence in which Nogaret pays him is very different from the Pope's own mintage. On the other hand the antecedents of Henry's brutal assault upon Paschal were such as to leave the Emperor altogether without excuse. On that very morning, and in those very precincts, he had just concluded with his victim a concordat¹ in which he had renounced the very claim which he now compelled the Pope to concede under physical duress; and he had renounced it in exchange for a renunciation of equal magnitude on Paschal's part. The agreement was that, in consideration of Henry's abandonment of a claim to confer Investiture upon ecclesiastics, the Church should surrender all the *regalia*—the powers and rights and revenues of a secular order—which it had acquired in the course of ages, and should content itself with the proceeds of its tithes and free-will offerings. If this agreement had been ratified and carried out, it would have achieved a radical settlement of

¹ Henry's assent does, it is true, appear to have been given subject to the condition that the agreement should be ratified 'firma et autentica ratione, consilio quoque vel concordia totius ecclesiae ac regni principum assensu' (Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 116, quoting Ekkehard's *Chronicle sub A.D. 1111*).

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the question over which the Empire and the Papacy were then at issue; and Henry's failure to ratify was not Pope Paschal's fault. Henry failed because he could not carry with him the bishops of Germany, who did not care to obtain their liberation from Lay Investiture if the sacrifice of their *regalia* was to be the price; and, having failed, he not only went back upon his bargain but determined to extort a recognition of his previous claim by committing an act of the grossest treachery and violence. If Boniface largely deserved what he got, Pope Paschal assuredly did not.

Finally we may contrast the spectacle of Pope Celestine V making his 'Great Refusal' in A.D. 1294 with the spectacle of that other 'harmless old man' who 'was left in a solitary castle to excommunicate twice each day the rebel kingdoms which had deserted his cause',¹ and who persisted in this exercise from his deposition in 1417 until his death in 1422/3. If the approach of moral decay is foreshadowed in Celestine's pathological flight from responsibility,² its advent is proclaimed in Benedict's pathological clinging to power. In either gesture there is that note of exaggeration which is one of the surest symptoms of moral as well as physical misgrowth.³ The exaggeration runs to the length of caricature; and in either case it is the caricature of an element which is to be found in the character of other Popes of very different spiritual stature. In the soul of each of those spiritual giants the conflicting impulses to which a Celestine and a Benedict respectively gave way had both been perpetually present, and therefore perpetually at war, without ever overriding a will which was able to keep them both in order because it was stronger than either of them. A Gregory VII or a Gregory I had been tormented by the burden of the Papal office because he had all the time been aware of an Other World from which the cares of This World were keeping him in exile; yet he had carried the burden indomitably to his journey's end because he had divined that his duty lay in This World so long as he was a sojourner in it, and that only 'he that endureth to the end shall be saved'.⁴ This ceaseless struggle between conflicting impulses under a higher control—this inward spiritual warfare which wrings from the titan's breast the cry 'O wretched man that I am!'⁵—is the well-spring of Hildebrandine lives and achievements. When we pass from a Hildebrand to a Celestine and a Benedict, and see in them the same creative impulses deprived of all their virtue

¹ Gibbon, *op. cit.*, cap. cit.

² 'A historian might argue that his renunciation was the only sensible thing that Morrone did as Pope—it was not the "flight from responsibility" that was questionable, but the weakness of will that led to its acceptance, and the stupidity of the policy of the cardinals who made the election.'—Mr. G. Barraclough, in a letter to the writer.

³ On this point see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), Annex, below.

⁴ Matt. x. 22.

⁵ Rom. vii. 24.

by a fatal divorce from one another and an equally fatal breakage of their bond of spiritual discipline, we perceive that the end of the Hildebrandine order is at hand.

The operation of *κόρος-ὑβρις-ἄτη* which we have detected in these comparisons of successive pairs of scenes is revealed still more clearly when we take the play as a whole and analyse the plot.

The first act opens in A.D. 1046 with a challenge to the Roman See which is taken to heart by Hildebrand.

In Hildebrand's generation the Western Christendom was passing out of the first into the second chapter of its history—out of a defensive state of mind in which the height of ambition was to keep alive, as the Abbé Siéyès boasted in a later age that he had lived through the French Revolution, into an adventurous state of mind in which this vegetative life for life's sake began to seem hardly worth living unless it could now be transcended, on the Aristotelian scheme of social growth,¹ in an effort to make life a stepping-stone towards attaining the true end of Man. This troubling of the waters of Western life in the eleventh century of the Christian Era revealed itself most powerfully in a mighty movement for reforming the conduct of the Church,² which in that age was another name for the Western Society itself; and this movement presented a challenge to the Roman See because, in the relations between the Papacy and the Western body social, it made it impossible for the *status quo ante* to persist. It was only in a society that was numb with misery—as Western Christendom had been from the twilight of Charlemagne's generation to the dawn of Otto the Great's—that the prerogative of moral leadership could be left, even nominally, in the hands of an institution which was disgracing itself as the Roman See disgraced itself during that profligate passage in its history. From the moment when the Western World as a whole began to shake off its moral torpor and aspire to a better life, the Roman See was confronted with the alternative of leaping at one bound from the lowest to the highest rung of the moral ladder as it stood in that age, or else being pilloried in its actual state of degradation and seeing its kingdom numbered and finished and divided and given to the Medes and Persians.³ There was a danger-signal for discerning eyes in the Lateran in the tremor of indignation which ran through Western Christendom—

¹ Aristotle: *Politics*, Book 1, chap. 2, § 8 (p. 1252 B): *τέλειος πόλις . . . γνωμένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.*

² In the eleventh century 'la renaissance de la richesse, l'essor des nations, la vigueur des états permet à l'Eglise d'abandonner les tâches dont la défaillance de l'Empire Romain l'a peu à peu chargée, et de se consacrer toute à sa mission spirituelle, à son œuvre édicatrice.'—Dufourcq, A., *op. cit.*, vol. vi, 4th edition, p. 2. Compare Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 49-51 and 58-60.

³ Dan. v. 25-8.

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 and with particular vehemence in the Transalpine parts—when it was reported in 1024 that the Greeks were in negotiation with the Papacy for the purchase of Papal acquiescence in the Patriarch of Constantinople's long-maintained and long-contested pretension to the title of 'Oecumenical'.¹ This explosion of anger at an only too credible rumour that the Pope was selling his birthright for a mess of pottage showed that the profligacy of the Roman See was notorious and odious to the Western *Plebs Christiana*. And when, a score of years later, the Papal *capellanus* Hildebrand, in whose own soul the spirit of the age was working, saw an Emperor conduct the trial and procure the condemnation of a Pope on a charge of Simony, he read the meaning of this writing on the wall and went into action. In that hour Hildebrand set himself the tremendous task of reversing the judgement upon the Roman See which had just been pronounced at Sutri; and in thirty years of titanic labour he succeeded in achieving the impossible. By 1075 the double battle against the sexual and the financial corruption of the clergy had been won throughout the Western World, and the victory had been gained by the moral prowess of a Roman See whose profligacy had been the greatest of all the scandals of the Western Church in the preceding century. This victory had been Hildebrand's personal work. He had fought for it beyond the Alps and behind the Papal Throne until the fight had carried him at last into the office which he had raised from the dust; and he had fought with every weapon, spiritual or material, that had come to his hand. It was at the moment of triumph, in the third year of his reign as Pope Gregory VII, that Hildebrand took a step which his champions can plausibly represent as having been almost inevitable² and his critics—no less plausibly—as having been almost inevitably disastrous.³ In that year Hildebrand extended his field of battle from the sure ground of Concubinage and Simony to the debatable ground of Investiture.

Logically, perhaps, the conflict over Investiture might be justified as an inevitable sequel to the conflicts over Concubinage and

¹ For the controversy over this title see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 333, above.

² 'Inevitable' has to be qualified by 'almost', considering that in the view of the leaders of the Cluniac movement the domestic moral reform of the Church by her own efforts, which Cluny had initiated, was not impossible to carry through without undertaking the second and still more formidable task of recovering the Church's freedom from external control by liberating her from lay influence. In the Cluniac view the two issues were not inseparable, and therefore Cluny parted company with the Roman Curia when the battle over Investiture was engaged by Hildebrand.

³ Hildebrand possesses in common with another militantly idealistic religious innovator, Ikhnaton, an apparently perennial capacity for arousing passionate feelings, whether of devotion or of hostility, in the hearts of all who cross his path in *saecula saeculorum*. The controversy that rages over the characters and careers of these two great men among the scholars of our own generation is conducted with at least a touch of the animus which was displayed by Hildebrand's and Ikhnaton's own respective contemporaries.

Simony if all three struggles were looked upon as aspects of one single struggle for the liberation of the Church. To a Hildebrand at this critical point in his career it might almost seem labour lost to have freed the Church from her servitude to Venus and to Mammon, if he were to leave her still fettered by her political subjection to the Secular Power. So long as this third shackle lay heavy upon her, would she not still be debarred from doing her divinely appointed work for the regeneration of Mankind? This argument on the lips of the apologists for Hildebrand's new departure in the year 1075 begs a question which Hildebrand's critics are entitled to ask, even if they fail to prove conclusively that the answer to it is in their own favour. In A.D. 1075, were the circumstances such that any clear-sighted and strong-minded occupant of the Papal throne was bound to judge that there was no longer any possibility of sincere and fruitful co-operation between the reforming party in the Western Church, as represented by the Roman Curia, and the Secular Power in the Western Christian Commonwealth, as represented by the Holy Roman Empire? On this question the onus of proof lies with the Hildebrandines on at least two accounts.

In the first place neither Hildebrand himself nor his partisans ever sought—either before or after the promulgation of Hildebrand's decree prohibiting Lay Investiture in 1075—to deny that the secular authorities had a legitimate role to play in the procedure for the election of the clerical officers of the Church from the Pope himself downwards.¹ In the second place, within the thirty years ending in 1075 the Roman See had been working hand in hand with the Holy Roman Empire in the older conflict over the issues of Concubinage and Simony. Indeed, their co-operation had become so sincere and so cordial that the Emperor Henry III, who had forced Pope Gregory VI out of office and into exile in 1046, chose Pope Victor II ten years later, when the Emperor was on his death-bed, to be the guardian of his six-years-old son.² It is true that, in the domain of the Empire, if not in the Western World as a whole, Henry III's premature death in A.D. 1056 had been followed by a moral relapse—especially in the matter of Simony—which had begun during the minority of Henry III's namesake and son and successor Henry IV and had not ceased when the young prince had taken over the reins of government himself in A.D. 1069.³ In fact, 'behind any particular occasions of difference there lay a more general cause, and this was the fact that after the death of Henry III

¹ On this point see Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, Part I, chs. 2 and 3, and Part II, *passim*, especially ch. 2.

² For the friendliness of the Emperor Henry III's relations with the reform party in the Curia after, as well as before, A.D. 1046 see p. 512, footnote 4, above.

³ See Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 55, 61-2, and 170-1.

the temporal authority was no longer co-operating with the spiritual in the attempt at reform, but seemed rather to be responsible for the continuance of grave evils, such as Simony and the secularization of the clergy. It was under these circumstances that the Papacy began to develop the policy of limiting or prohibiting the intervention of the secular authority in ecclesiastical appointments. This may have been justifiable and even necessary, but it must be admitted that it was a step of an almost revolutionary character;¹ and if, in spite of all justifications and provocations, Hildebrand had foreborne to throw down the gauntlet in A.D. 1075, it is conceivable that the relations of the Emperor Henry IV with Pope Gregory might have ended in being not less happy than his father's relations with Pope Victor.

To raise the new issue of Investiture with a militancy which was bound to set Empire and Papacy at variance was the more hazardous inasmuch as this third issue happened to be far less clear than those others on which the two authorities in Western Christendom had, not so long since, seen eye to eye.

One source of ambiguity arose from the fact that, by Hildebrand's day, it had become established that the appointment of a clerical officer of episcopal rank required, in order to make it valid, the concurrence of several different parties in taking action of several different kinds. It was one of the primeval rules of ecclesiastical discipline that a bishop must be elected by the clergy and people of his see and must be consecrated by a quorum of the validly consecrated bishops of the province. And the secular power had never at any time—since the issue had been raised by the conversion of Constantine—attempted to usurp the ritual prerogative of the bishops or to challenge, at any rate in theory, the electoral rights of the clergy and people. The role which the secular authorities had exercised *de facto*—without prejudice to the question of what the situation might be *de jure*—was that of nominating candidates and wielding a power of veto over elections; and this power, which was grounded in Roman Imperial practice, had been successfully reasserted in the West by the Holy Roman Emperors Charlemagne and Otto I, in anticipation of Henry III, against the Papacy itself, which was the highest ecclesiastical office in the Western World. There may be some uncertainty about the scope of the powers which, on the morrow of the Synod of Sutri, were conferred upon Henry as *patricius* by the Roman clergy and people; but it is certain that the first step in the making of a Pope Leo IX out of a Bruno Bishop of Toul, and of a Pope Victor II out of a Gebhard Bishop of Eichstett, was the despatch of a diplomatic

¹ Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 66.

mission across the Alps from Rome to the Emperor to ask for an Imperial nomination; and in the second of these instances the Roman mission came with Hildebrand at its head. Even as late as the year 1059, after Henry's death, Hildebrand took care to obtain the assent of the Empress Regent before he gave his own support to the candidature of Gerard Bishop of Florence; and at the famous Lateran Council which was held in the same year by Hildebrand's candidate after he had been duly elected to be Pope Nicholas II, when the Fathers laid down a procedure for Papal elections in the future, the Emperor's rights in the matter were once again formally acknowledged, even though they were left undefined. If the traditional role of the Secular Power in the appointment of the highest ecclesiastical dignitary in the West was as substantial as this, the case for the exercise of a corresponding lay influence over the appointment of ordinary bishops and abbots might almost be taken as proven *a fortiori*, and it is not certain that the legitimacy of this influence, within its traditional limits, was disputed by Hildebrand even after the promulgation of the decree of 1075.¹

This uncertainty arises out of a second ambiguity which is of a verbal order and which 'runs through the whole literature of the subject'.² The word 'Investiture' is ambiguous in itself. It may be used in the general meaning of appointment, or in the technical meaning of the bestowal of the pastoral staff and ring. And an opponent of Lay Investiture may be opposing the practice in this narrow technical sense without necessarily at the same time seeking to exclude the secular authorities from influencing appointments to clerical offices in the traditional ways.

By the eleventh century the traditional case for the exercise of some degree of secular control over clerical appointments had been reinforced by a new consideration of a practical kind which likewise applied to the lower ranks as well as to the apex of the Western hierarchy and which introduced yet a third ambiguity into an already complicated problem. This third ambiguity lay in the matter of the clergy's functions. The 'Caesaro-papistical' thesis³ manifestly gains in strength if the clergy over whom the secular power claims to exercise control become possessed, on their part, of secular as well as ecclesiastical emoluments and authority; and this had actually been happening all over Western Christendom during the three centuries ending in the reign of the Emperor Henry III. The donations of Pepin and Charlemagne to the Papacy

¹ For the evidence on this head see Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 69-72.

² Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 74.

³ For the nature of 'Caesaro-papism' see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 346-53, above.

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were merely the classical examples of a wide-spread transfer, into clerical hands, of the civil power's *regalia*; and this oecumenical secular movement had been at no time so active as during the two centuries between the death of Charlemagne and the birth of Hildebrand. By the year 1075, when Hildebrand launched his campaign against the Lay Investiture of clerics, a very large part of the civil administration of Western Christendom was in the hands of clerics who held it as of feudal right, so that the exemption of the clergy from Lay Investiture in the broader sense would now carry with it an abrogation of the Secular Power's authority over large tracts of its own proper field and a transformation of the Church into a civil as well as an ecclesiastical *imperium in imperio*.¹ To demand this—if Hildebrand did unequivocally demand so much—was to declare war; and, if we ask ourselves what can have led so great a man as Hildebrand to take so grave a step, the most convincing answer will be that his judgement was clouded on this critical occasion by the intoxicating consciousness of his previous triumphs.² 'All things are possible to him that believeth'³ is a dangerous text for a human being to act upon, even when the man is a Gregory VII.

The gravity of Hildebrand's action in 1075 is revealed by the dimensions of the catastrophe which was its sequel. On this issue

¹ It will be seen that this awkward logical consequence (on one interpretation of the term 'Investiture') of Hildebrand's declaration of war upon Lay Investiture in A.D. 1075 was the inverse of the equally awkward logical consequence of the Orthodox Church's conversion of the Khan of Bulgaria in A.D. 864-5. Under the then prevailing East Roman régime of 'Caesaro-papism' the Khan of Bulgaria was, as we have seen (in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 379-81, above), implicitly placing himself under the secular sovereignty of the East Roman Emperor in the act of submitting himself to the ecclesiastical authority of the East Roman Emperor's civil servant the Oecumenical Patriarch. Conversely, Hildebrand in 1075 was implicitly claiming, for the Pope and other prelates of the Western Church, a secular independence of, in addition to an ecclesiastical authority over, the Holy Roman Emperor and other secular princes of Western Christendom. In the West in the eleventh century a new idea was colliding with old facts, whereas in Orthodox Christendom in the ninth century an old idea had collided with new facts. But, notwithstanding these antitheses, the two collisions had the identical effect of precipitating a disastrous conflict.

² A hostile critic might perhaps prefer to vindicate Hildebrand's judgement, at the expense of his character, by suggesting that he had never forgiven the Emperor Henry III for having humiliated the Papacy in the person of Hildebrand's own revered master Gregory VI; that in 1075 he at last took a revenge to which he had been looking forward for thirty years; and that he had waited to spring until his redoubtable enemy had been succeeded by an inexperienced son, and until the young man had his hands full with the insurrection that had broken out in Saxony in 1073 almost at the moment of Hildebrand's own accession to the Papacy. No doubt Henry IV's Saxon troubles did influence Hildebrand's choice of his moment for striking; for so great a man of action as Hildebrand was could not be blind to such considerations, and the Saxons did in fact become his close allies in the struggle against a common enemy. Yet a Machiavellian picture of Hildebrand is unconvincing. If he was really nursing his revenge throughout those thirty years, why did he not induce one of his three predecessors on the Papal throne, who were all under his influence, to strike at the Salian Dynasty before Henry IV came of age? He did not think of it because his mind was set in a larger mould and was intent on nobler things than paying off old scores. Canossa was not just a *riposte* to Sutri in Hildebrand's mind, though to smaller minds than his it might assume that appearance in historical perspective.

³ Mark ix. 23.

of Investiture Hildebrand staked the whole of the moral prestige which he had won for the Papacy in thirty years; and his hold upon the consciences of the *Plebs Christiana* in Henry IV's Transalpine dominions was strong enough, in conjunction with the strength of Saxon arms, to bring the Emperor to Canossa. Yet, although Canossa may have dealt the Imperial dignity a blow from which it perhaps never quite recovered,¹ the sequel to that moral triumph was not an end, but a resumption, of the struggle which Hildebrand had let loose two years before. The end was not brought even by Paschal II's fundamental but abortive settlement with Henry IV's son and namesake in 1111, nor again by Calixtus II's successful but superficial settlement with the same Emperor in 1122; for, although the question of Investiture was officially disposed of by the Concordat of Worms, those fifty years of conflict had produced a rift between the Papacy and the Empire which might perhaps be precariously bridged but which was now too wide to be closed and too deep to be filled. When a Frederick I succeeded to the heritage of the Henrys and was armed, by Bolognese doctors of the disinterred *Corpus Juris*, with a Justinianean conception of the Imperial prerogative to match the Hildebrandine conception of the Apostolic power, the unhealed wound in the Western body social broke open again, and the new Justinian's battle with an ineffective Hadrian IV and an indomitable Alexander III reproduced the battle that had been fought by his predecessor Henry V with a saintly Paschal and a masterful Calixtus. The fire which Hildebrand had kindled in 1075 was still burning fiercely a hundred years later.

The second act in the tragedy opens with a respite which coincided in time with the pontificate of Pope Innocent III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1198-1216).

This precious breathing-space had not been secured by the labours of the young man who ascended the Papal throne in 1198 at the age of thirty-seven. In so far as it was due to statesmanship, the credit belonged to Innocent's predecessors Alexander III and Lucius III, the respective Papal negotiators of the Peace of Venice (1177) and the Peace of Constance (1183). Statesmanship, however, had done less for Innocent than the Chance which had drowned Barbarossa in Calycadnus in 1190 and had then carried off his formidable son and successor Henry VI only seven years later, in the very year before Innocent's own accession. These two premature deaths in rapid sequence left the House of Hohenstaufen

¹ 'Had all other humiliation been spared, that one scene in the yard of Matilda's castle . . . was enough to mark a decisive change and inflict an irretrievable disgrace on the crown so abused. Its wearer could no more, with the same lofty confidence, claim to be the highest power on Earth, created by and answerable to God alone. Gregory had extorted the recognition of that absolute superiority of the spiritual dominion which he was wont to assert so sternly.'—Bryce, James: *The Holy Roman Empire*, ch. 10.

without a competent grown man to defend its interests; and the double accident might seem providentially designed to nullify the effects of the Hannibal-stroke by which Henry VI in 1194 had reaped the fruits of a political marriage which his father had arranged, and had offset the loss of Lombardy by the acquisition of Sicily. In 1198 the two crowns—Sicilian and Imperial—which Henry VI had succeeded in uniting were once again on different heads; and although both the wearers were still Hohenstaufen they were in no position to act together against the Holy See because they were both of them politically paralysed: the King of Sicily, Henry's son Frederick II, by his tender age, and the Emperor, Henry's brother Philip, by the rivalry of a *Gegenkaiser* belonging to the rival German house of Welf. With Germany torn in two by civil war, and with the child-king of Sicily under Innocent's own guardianship, the young Pope had his hands free to play the part of President of the Christian Republic as Hildebrand had conceived it; and Innocent III did duly become the Solomon or Suleymān the Magnificent or Hārūn-ar-Rashīd of the Hildebrandine Papacy.¹

This was a brilliant role, and it was impressively sustained by a noble figure; but, if there is any substance in the analogies by which we have just described it, Innocent's pontificate was not so triumphant in reality as it appeared to be on the surface. The three secular potentates with whom we have compared this prince of the Roman Church were all of them spoilt children of Fortune who had entered into other men's labours—Solomon into David's, Suleymān into Selīm's, and Harūn into As-Saffāh's—and all of them, again, were lordly spendthrifts who ran through their own inheritance and left a reckoning to be paid by their successors. This is the company to which Innocent III belongs. As a man of action—and it is as this that he stands or falls—he is unquestionably noble; yet this nobility is tarnished by a touch of *ὕβρις* and balked by a grain of obtuseness.

The fallibility of Innocent's judgement is revealed in his handling of the weapon of the crusade; in his dealings with the Empire and the Hohenstaufen; and in his attitude towards the greatest man of his generation, Saint Francis.²

His first act after his accession was to preach a crusade for the rescue of the remnants of the Frankish principalities in Syria from the clutches of the Ayyubid Power; and this enterprise went grievously awry. Though the outposts of Western Christendom

¹ For the Solomons on the thrones of universal states who sun themselves in the fleeting warmth of 'Indian Summers', see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 191-6, below.

² For the connexion between the first and the third of these three points see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), Annex, below.

in the Holy Land were now in desperate straits, the rescue-party which set out, at Innocent's call, upon the Fourth Crusade were successfully diverted, by deft turns of a Venetian financial screw, to the irrelevant and nefarious work of fighting their fellow-Christians—first as mercenaries and then as adventurers on their own account. While the sack of Zara was being followed by the first and the second sack of Constantinople and the partition of the East Roman Empire among the buccaneers, the Pope was first cajoled and then deceived and eventually confronted with a *fait accompli* by the ruffians who had gone upon the war-path on his authority. In this painful pass Innocent's idealism was displayed in his distress at a scandalous betrayal of the honour of Western Christendom, his largeness of mind in his concern for the fate of a Christian community who in his eyes were schismatics, and his fineness of conscience in his insistence that the conquered Greeks were not to be coerced into union with the Roman Church. But these evidences of a noble spirit increase our wonder at seeing him, only four years after the lesson of 1204, deliberately launching another assault of Christians upon Christians, and this time not even on the alien soil of Orthodox Christendom, but in Languedoc, at the heart of his own Western Christian Commonwealth.¹ Did the Pope who had deplored the horrors of the sack of Constantinople by French crusaders imagine that his Frenchmen would behave less brutally, or show themselves less mercenary or less rapacious, if they were let loose upon one of the richest provinces of the Western *Respublica Christiana*, when this time, instead of being put upon their defence for the crime of having played truant, the crusaders could justify their actions by quoting the Pope's own mandate? Did Innocent suppose that he would succeed any better this time than before in controlling the fearful forces of violence and wickedness that he was letting loose? And when he had failed to prevent a crusade against the Muslims of Syria from being diverted to the conquest of the Christians of Romania, did he seriously expect that he could manage to divert to the conquest of

¹ Innocent's policy towards the Albigenses has been touched upon already in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 369, above. So blind does Innocent appear to have been to the lesson of the Fourth Crusade that he actually made his first approaches to King Philip Augustus—with a view to the armed intervention of the French Crown against the heretics in Languedoc—in May 1204 and February 1205, when the miscarriage of the Fourth Crusade was in the act of taking place. Moreover he renewed these overtures in November 1207. It is true that he did not excommunicate Count Raymond of Toulouse, or absolve his vassals from their allegiance to him, until after the murder of Peter of Castelnau in January 1208; but he had been persistently playing with fire for some four years before he finally threw the lighted match into the powder magazine. In this lurid light it is difficult to excuse Innocent's recourse to the sword in dealing with intransigent Cathars, even if it is possible to explain it as the negative side of a policy which revealed its positive side in Innocent's acquiescence in the Dominican and Franciscan movements. (For the two sides of Innocent III's policy towards Catharism see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), Annex, below.)

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the Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula a crusade which he himself had directed against the Christians of Languedoc? Innocent appears to have been not only just as unhappy and just as helpless but also just as much surprised when his crusaders ran amok the second time as he had been on the first occasion; and it is this surprise that astonishes an observer to whom it can only seem a matter of course that the repetition of an act should be followed by a recurrence of the previous consequences.

This vein of ineptitude which comes out in Innocent's handling of his crusades is also apparent when he is dealing with the affairs of the Empire and the House of Hohenstaufen. Finding, at his accession, the Imperial Crown in dispute between a Hohenstaufen candidate and a Welf, he threw all the influence of the Holy See into the anti-Hohenstaufen scale without being able to prevent Philip of Swabia from holding his own against Otto of Brunswick for ten years. The Pope's action defeated its own aim by alienating a number of Otto's partisans in Germany whose desire to secure the triumph of their own candidate for the Crown was overborne by their unwillingness to see the traditional prerogative of the Transalpine Electors usurped by the Roman Curia.¹ In the end it was not Innocent's moral authority but an assassin's crime that removed Philip from the German arena; and even then, when Chance had intervened in Innocent's favour once more, he made nothing of her gift. The Welf candidate whom Innocent had been supporting for a decade immediately disappointed his Papal benefactor's long-cherished expectations. As soon as his rival's death set him free to descend upon Italy and receive the Imperial Crown from the Pope's willing hands, he showed himself as aggressive as any of his Hohenstaufen or Salian predecessors in asserting his Imperial pretensions. The two allies fell out; and Innocent's only reward for the pains which he had taken to raise the Welf emperor up was the trouble of having to cast him down again. In addressing himself to this thankless task, Innocent made the traditional series of moves in the traditional order. First he excommunicated Otto; then he declared him deposed; as a third step he launched against him a rival claimant to the Imperial Crown; and when he came, at last, to this Papal *ultima ratio* for bringing a recalcitrant emperor to book, he could think of no more original plan than to enlist a Hohenstaufen to overthrow the Welf whom he had previously brought into power in order to overthrow a Hohenstaufen. In thus supporting a Hohenstaufen candidature to the Imperial Crown, Innocent not only reversed what had been his own policy and the policy of his predecessors for more than seventy years

¹ See Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 207-14.

past; he actually selected for his candidate, among the members of the Hohenstaufen House, a boy who already wore the Sicilian Crown, and who would therefore be in a position to execute his father Henry's design of taking the Roman See between two fires if Innocent's assistance enabled him to win the Imperial Crown as well. Innocent's estimate of Frederick II's character and intentions seems to have been as wide of the mark as his estimate of Otto's had been a few years before. No doubt Frederick was anxious to take his revenge upon Otto for having overrun the Sicilian dominions on the Italian mainland, but Innocent had no evidence that the boy was either grateful to Innocent himself for having intervened on his behalf, or well-disposed to the Papacy as an institution. At the interview between the fifty-two-years-old Pope and the eighteen-years-old king in A.D. 1212 Innocent was completely taken in by Frederick's precocious plausibility.

'One of the first acts of Frederick was to renew to the Pope in person the homage he had already paid to his deputy for the Kingdom of Sicily. Innocent, charmed with the youth's courage and docility, espoused his cause with vigour. By letter he called upon the communes of North Italy and the people of Germany to cast in their lot with Frederick; he poured money into the youth's purse, procured for him a Genoese fleet to conduct him to their city, and sent a cardinal-legate with him to win for him greater obedience.'¹

Thanks to Innocent's support Frederick was crowned King of the Romans at Mainz before the year was out, and Otto's star duly sank as Frederick's rose towards its zenith. Yet, when Innocent was thus exerting all his powers in order to make his protégé master of Germany, he does not seem to have taken the precaution of exacting from him in advance a pledge that he would surrender his Sicilian Kingdom if he were successful in his Transalpine enterprise.² It was not till the year 1216, when Innocent was on his death-bed, that Frederick issued a bull engaging himself, as soon as he should have received the Imperial Crown, to hand on the Sicilian Crown to his son, 'in order to preclude the suspicion of anything in the nature of a union between the Kingdom and the Empire . . . to the possible detriment of the Apostolic See and of our own heirs'.³ The declaration, when it came, was specious, like most of Frederick's acts; but from Innocent's point of view it

¹ Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xi, pp. 214-15. The authorities are cited in Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 230-1.

² Perhaps Innocent was counting on the fact that Frederick, before assuming the Imperial title and leaving Sicily for Rome *en route* for Germany, had not only sworn fealty to the Pope and accepted a concordat on Innocent's terms, but had had his infant son Henry crowned as King of Sicily.

³ Latin text quoted in Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xi, p. 220, footnote 3, and in Carlyle, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 237, footnote 3.

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This lack of intuition in divining character, which Innocent showed when he lent his support to an Otto against a Philip and to a Frederick against an Otto, is more flagrantly apparent in his attitude towards Saint Francis. This shepherd of souls who was unduly soft and credulous in accepting at their face value the specious protestations of princes, showed himself unduly cold and cautious when he had to appraise the sainthood that shone like the Sun through Francis' countenance; and here it is difficult to draw the line between obtuseness and *ὑβρις*. Was Innocent unaware of Francis' greatness or indifferent to it? Did his aloofness from the deepest spiritual movement of his age reflect the pre-occupation of a man of affairs or the superciliousness of an aristocrat? Even if we give Innocent the benefit of the doubt and acquit him, as Francis himself would have hastened to acquit him, of *ὑβρις* on Francis' account, at any rate we must count it for righteousness to Innocent's great-nephew Ugolino de' Conti that the future Pope Gregory IX was more sensitive than his relative and predecessor to Francis' sainthood, though he too was an aristocrat and a man of the world. And there is another count against Innocent III on which the charge of *ὑβρις* cannot be rebutted. A Pope whose predecessors had been content to style themselves 'Vicar of Peter' assumed the style of 'Vicar of Christ'.² This was an ominous

¹ For the relations between Innocent and Francis see Sabatier, P.: *Vie de Saint François d'Assise*, chap. 6, and Grundmann, H.: *Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter* (Berlin 1935, Ebering), pp. 128-51. For the relations between Innocent and the religious movement of which Saint Francis was the pioneer within the bounds of the Church see Grundmann, op. cit., *passim*, but especially, perhaps, the passages quoted in the present study in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (8), Annex, below.

² 'Soon after he ascended the Papal Throne, Innocent III began to use the phrase "Vicar of Christ" in connexion with his office. It had not been used before his time; and the implication that the successors of Peter were not his deputies, but received their commission, as he did, immediately from Christ, is significant of the conviction upon which the policy of Innocent was founded. . . . The assertions of Innocent III went far to establish the Papacy in the possession of semi-divine honours.'—Thompson, A. H., in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. vi (Cambridge 1929, University Press), p. 644. On p. 43 of the same volume Professor E. F. Jacob quotes an illuminating passage (which is also quoted from Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. ccxvii, col. 665 A and B, in Carlyle, op. cit., vol. v, p. 153, footnote 2) from a sermon (III) which was preached by Innocent III himself on one of the anniversaries of his consecration: 'Nam caeteri vocati sunt in partem sollicitudinis, solus autem Petrus assumptus est

departure from the humility of a Gregory the Great, who had taken the title of *Servus Servorum Dei* when his colleague John the Faster at Constantinople had proclaimed himself 'Oecumenical' Patriarch. In the year of Innocent's death John's 'Oecumenical' successor was a refugee at Nicaea from a Patriarchal See that was under the heel of Innocent's truant crusaders. The omen was unfavourable to the successors of the first Roman 'Vicar of Christ'. 'Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you'¹ is Innocent's epitaph.

Innocent's failure of judgement can be measured best, like Hildebrand's, by marking its sequel; for the breathing-space which had opened with Innocent's accession did not outlast his death. It was followed by a battle between the Papacy and the Emperor Frederick II which surpassed in fury the battles of earlier Popes with the first Hohenstaufen Frederick and with the last two Franconian Henrys. Up to a certain point history repeated itself. In the first round of the struggle the gentle role of a Paschal II or a Hadrian IV was played by the unwarlike and undecided Pope Honorius III,² while in the next round the harder and more worldly Pope Gregory IX played the militant role of a Calixtus II or an Alexander III. This time, however, it took more than one militant pontificate to wear down the strength of the Papacy's Imperial antagonist; and the worldly-wise Ugolino de' Conti, who had patronized as well as appreciated Saint Francis, and who excommunicated Frederick in 1227 in the mood of a realist who means to stand no nonsense, died fourteen years later *re infecta*. It needed Sinibaldo Fieschi's two-handed sword to shear through the Saracenic armour that had turned the edge of an Ugolino's razor-blade; and that terrible weapon in those implacable hands made havoc of everything in its path as it swung to and fro across the face of Europe in pursuit of its elusive prey.

'In those days wickedness prevailed; the people of God were without

in plenitudinem potestatis. In signum spiritualium contulit mihi mitram, in signum temporalium dedit mihi coronam; mitram pro sacerdotio, coronam pro regno, illius me constituens vicarium qui habet in vestimento et in femore suo scriptum: "Rex regum et dominus dominantium; sacerdos in aeternum, secundum ordinem Melchisedech".'

Even this is not the highest flight of Innocent's *ὕψος*. In another sermon (II) on the same subject (quoted from Migne, op. cit., vol. cit., cols. 657-8, in Carlyle, op. cit., vol. cit., p. cit., footnote 1) Innocent follows up a sentence which is identical with the first sentence of the passage quoted above, with the almost blasphemous assertions:

'Iam ergo videtis quis iste servus qui super familiam constituitur: profecto vicarius Iesu Christi, successor Petri, christus Domini, deus Pharaonis; inter Deum et hominem medius constitutus, citra Deum, sed ultra hominem; minor Deo, sed maior homine; qui de omnibus iudicat, et a nemine iudicatur; Apostoli voce pronuntians: "qui me iudicat, Dominus est".'

Could *ὕψος* call down judgement upon itself more vociferously than this?

¹ Luke vi. 26.

² Honorius's statement of policy after his election in A.D. 1154 was that 'he wished to proceed by clemency rather than by vigour' (*Epistulae Honorii*, i, 30, quoted by Mann, op. cit., vol. xiii, p. 209).

a ruler; Rome lay desolate; the glory of the clergy departed; and the people of God were divided. Some followed the Church, and these took the Cross [against Frederick], while others followed Frederick the *ci-devant* Emperor, and these insulted the Divine Religion. . . . Mercy and Truth and Justice were no longer to be found on Earth.¹

Germany had not seen such a war since Charlemagne's attrition of the Saxons, and Italy not since the extermination of the Ostrogoths by Belisarius and Narses. In Italy, in this fifth decade of the thirteenth century,

'Men could neither plough nor sow nor reap nor cultivate the vine nor gather the vintage nor live on the farms—especially in the territories of Parma, Reggio, Modena, and Cremona. Close to the cities themselves, however, men tilled the ground under the guard of the city militia, who were divided into quarters corresponding to the city gates. Armed soldiers guarded the labourers all day, and the country people carried on their agricultural work under these conditions. This was necessary on account of the highwaymen, thieves and robbers who had multiplied exceedingly and who kidnapped people and carried them off to dungeons to be ransomed for money. They also lifted the cattle, and ate or sold them. If their prisoners did not raise a ransom, they hanged them by the feet or the hands and pulled out their teeth and put paddocks and toads (*buffones sive ruspos*) in their mouths to hurry them up in producing the ransom money; and these tortures were more bitter and abominable to them than any form of death. The brigands were more cruel than demons; and in those times one human being was about as glad to meet another human being on the road as he would have been to meet the Devil himself; for everyone was living in perpetual suspicion of everyone else—suspecting his neighbour of intending to kidnap him and throw him into a dungeon, in order that "the ransom of a man's life" might be "his riches" (Proverbs xiii. 8). So the land was reduced to a desert, empty of both husbandman and wayfarer. For in the days of Frederick—and especially after his deposition from the Imperial office, and after Parma had rebelled against him and had lifted her heel—"the highways were unoccupied, and the travellers walked through byways" (Judges v. 6). And evils multiplied on the Earth. Wild birds and wild animals multiplied quite beyond measure—pheasants, partridges and quails, hares, roebuck and fallow-deer, buffaloes, wild-boars and ravening wolves. These wild beasts no longer found creatures—lambs or sheep—to eat, as they had been used to finding them, on the farms, because the farms had been burnt to ashes. And so the wolves used to gather in packs round the moat (?) of a city (*circa foveas alicuius civitatis*)

¹ 'Eodem tempore prevaluit iniquitas, et populus Dei sine rectore fuit et Roma in desolatione, et decor clericalis perit, et divisus est populus Dei—partim sequebantur Ecclesiam, et hii signati sunt, partim favebant Fridrico quondam imperatori, et hii insultabant Divine Religioni . . . Et Misericordia et Veritas et Judicium de Terra sublata sunt.'—*Annales Scheflarienses Majores*, sub anno 1246, apud *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, ed. by Pertz, S. H., vol. xix of the whole series = vol. xvii of the *Scriptores* (Hanover 1861, Hahn), p. 342. (The Monastery of Schäftlarn stands on the banks of the River Isar, above Munich, in the diocese of Freising.)

and howl aloud under the extreme torment of their hunger. And they used to creep into the cities by night and devour people—women and children among them—who were sleeping under porches or in waggons. Sometimes they even burrowed through the house walls and strangled the babies in their cradles. No one who had not seen them—as I saw them—could believe the horrors which were committed at that time, not only by men, but by beasts of various kinds.¹

This was the darkness that descended upon Western Christendom after the brief noon-day of Innocent III's pontificate. And it was not for nothing that Sinibaldo Fieschi chose Lotario de' Conti's pontifical name when his own turn came to ascend the Papal throne. Notwithstanding the sharpness of the contrast between the characters of the Roman nobleman and the Genoese, the pontificate of the fourth Innocent followed that of the third as inevitably as night follows day.

The third and culminating act of the tragedy opens on the 13th December, 1250, which is the date of Frederick II's sudden and premature death. Would Pope Innocent IV accept this heaven-sent opportunity of restoring peace to Western Christendom, or would he pursue his vendetta against Frederick's house to the bitter end? Peace was not only demanded by the misery and devastation which this latter-day Hannibalic War had spread; it was cried out for by the conscience of the *Plebs Christiana*, which found its spokesman in Saint Louis. The King of France was as unwilling to place his sword at Innocent's service for the destruction of Frederick as he was to make common cause with the Emperor against the Pope. His single-minded aim was to bring to an end this impious civil war in the bosom of Western Christendom in order to release and unite her forces for a fresh crusade. Saint Louis made vain attempts at mediation in 1245, and again in 1246, and his anxiety was well warranted; for in the latter year Innocent actually forbade the preaching of the crusade *d'outre mer* within the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire, and ordered that certain moneys which had been raised in the Empire for the conduct of the war against the Muslims should be diverted to the coffers of the Pope's own puppet *Gegenkaiser*, William of Holland. The Frisian crusaders who had already enlisted under Louis's banner were allowed, and perhaps encouraged, to commute their vows and acquire their merit by fighting, instead, for William against

¹ Salimbene's *Chronicle*, first edition (Parma 1857, Fiacadorii), pp. 70–71, *sub anno* 1247. The last touch in this grim picture recalls to the writer of this Study a vision of Western Anatolia as he saw it, during the Graeco-Turkish war-after-the-war, in 1921, when the only plough-marks on the surface of a desolate country-side were the rootings of the wild boars who had entered into the heritage of the vanished human inhabitants. The picture as a whole will recall to the minds of readers of our generation the aspect of China as it has come to be since the outbreak of the Revolution in A.D. 1911.

Frederick. The utmost concession that Innocent would make to Louis's protests was that the crusade *d'outre mer* should be preached in five Lotharingian dioceses on the fringe of the Empire along the French border.¹ In 1248, when Louis *en route* for his Mediterranean port of embarkation had his last interview with Innocent at Lyon and sought to mediate between Pope and Emperor—once more in vain—the royal saint is reported to have told the Papal sinner that the sin would be on his head if the Egyptian expedition failed;² and by the date of Frederick's death this curse was in operation; for, eight months before Frederick died in Apulia, Louis had been taken prisoner in the Delta.³ Now that Frederick was dead, would Innocent lift the curse by making peace with Frederick's children? Innocent's answer was in the negative; and this negative answer—which assuredly⁴ was no mere error of judgement but was a moral aberration as well—spelt the suicide of the Hildebrandine Papacy.

The death of his arch-enemy did not move Innocent from the stand which he had taken three years before, when he had declared his determination never to make peace so long as either Frederick himself or any of his sons remained king or emperor.⁵ In this declaration Frederick's brood was deliberately included in a ban which had been confined, in an earlier Papal anathema,⁶ to Frederick's own person; and Innocent did not now abate one jot or tittle of the war-aims to which he had committed himself. His rejoinder to the news of Frederick's death was to command the notables of Sicily to place the kingdom at his own disposition. When Frederick's son Conrad took up his father's Sicilian heritage, Innocent renewed the excommunication against him and ransacked Christendom to find a Papal nominee to the Sicilian Throne who could and would take the kingdom from Frederick's heirs by force of arms. When Conrad, dying only four years after his father at

¹ Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xiv, p. 169. The five dioceses in question were Liège, Cambrai, Toul, Metz, and Verdun. It is interesting to observe that these were all French-speaking districts. In the Papal permission accorded to these French-speaking Lotharingians to march with the King of France can we see a first glimmer of our latter-day Western linguistic nationalism?

² Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xiv, p. 170, on the authority of Matthew Paris (*Chronica Maiora*, Luard's edition in the Rolls Series, vol. v, p. 175). The story may, of course, have been *ben trovato*, either for the political purpose of deepening Innocent's infamy or for the artistic purpose of heightening the tragic pathos of the subsequent fortunes of Louis's ill-starred enterprise; yet there is no positive ground for assuming that the incident is fabulous; and it is in entire conformity with the character of both parties.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), pp. 447-9, above.

⁴ Pace the plea of a distinguished modern Western historian which has been quoted on p. 548, footnote 3, above.

⁵ 'Promittimus . . . nec etiam pacem aliquatenus cum praefato Frederico reformabimus ita quod ipse vel aliquis filiorum suorum rex aut imperator existat.'—Innocent IV, letter of the 4th May, 1247, quoted by Mann in *op. cit.*, vol. xiv, p. 97, footnote 1.

⁶ In a letter of the 28th January, 1247, the formula had been promulgated with reference to Frederick alone (see Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xiv, p. 96).

the age of 26, commended his infant son Conradin to the protection of the Holy See, the Pope rejected the bequest and announced his intention, pending the child's coming of age, to take over the government of the kingdom himself. This was the policy which Innocent bequeathed to his successors; and it duly ended in the extinction of Frederick's line through Manfred's death in battle in 1265 and Conradin's on the scaffold in 1268.

Their executioner was Charles of Anjou—a most unsaintly brother of Saint Louis—yet it is significant that even this hard and covetous secular prince should have hesitated for nearly eleven years before he accepted in 1264, at the hands of Pope Urban IV, an offer of the Kingdom of Sicily that had been made to him by Pope Innocent IV as early as 1253. To what considerations in Charles' mind was this extraordinary hesitation due? It was not that he was unambitious, for the passion of his life was to acquire a kingdom as great as that which his brother had inherited; and when once he was launched upon his Sicilian enterprise his lustful vision overshot the Straits of Otranto, as well as the Straits of Messina, and embraced the Empire of Romania. Nor was it that Charles doubted the Pope's ability to 'deliver the goods'; for the Kingdom of Sicily was a fief of the Holy See which was legally at the overlord's disposal if the tenure could be shown to have fallen vacant or forfeit; and in 1246 Innocent had actually enabled Charles to acquire the County of Provence, though this Imperial fief had not been Innocent's to bestow. The consideration which moved Charles' counsellors to oppose his acceptance of Innocent's offer in 1253,¹ and led Charles himself to leave the question in abeyance for ten years after that, was the consciousness that this Papal invitation to do a terrier's work and exterminate Frederick's brood in the hole where they had gone to earth was an invitation to commit an enormity which would cry aloud for vengeance. When Charles eventually succumbed to the temptation which was dangled before his eyes by Innocent and his successors, the enormity was indeed committed and the vengeance duly followed. Manfred and Conradin were avenged upon Charles in the Sicilian Vespers, which paralysed Charles' power and blighted his ambitions three years before his death. They were avenged upon the Papacy when Innocent IV's thirteenth successor, Boniface VIII, picked his quarrel with the second successor of Saint Louis, Philip the Fair.

¹ When this opposition was raised, Innocent 'suggested to his legate a way out of the difficulty which did much more credit to him as a lawyer and a diplomat than as a Pope. Albert was to promise in his name to agree to such recommendations on the disputed points as should be made to him by two prelates and a knight nominated by Charles. But the Count was previously to give the legate an undertaking in writing that the said promise was to be without real effect. But the advisers of Charles were not satisfied.'—Mann, *op. cit.*, vol. xiv, p. 135.

'Woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!'¹ The Papacy's Angevin agent escaped with the loss of half his ill-gotten kingdom; the Papacy itself was punished with the loss of the whole of its Hildebrandine heritage; and it was condemned, in addition, to execute this sentence with its own hands.

If an Athenian tragic poet of the fifth century B.C. could have been given the story of the Hildebrandine Papacy as the theme for a trilogy, he would probably have impersonated *κόρος* in Gregory VII and *ὑβρις* in Innocent IV, and in that case he would certainly have cast Boniface VIII for the role of *ἄτη*; for in the pontificate of Boniface the Papacy, now distraught by the blood-guiltiness which Innocent had fastened upon her, strode over the edge of a precipice with eyes that were open yet unseeing.

The note of *ὑβρις* which Innocent III had struck when he proclaimed himself 'the Vicar of Christ,' and Innocent IV when he included Frederick's children in the remorseless vow which he had taken against Frederick himself, was sounded for the third time by Boniface VIII when he seized the occasion of the turn of the century to inaugurate the institution of the Papal Jubilee. It was the enthusiasm of the response to his call and the multitude of the pilgrims who flocked to Rome in the Holy Year 1300 from all quarters of Western Christendom that fostered in the Pope's imagination his fatally delusive belief in his own terrestrial omnipotence. The fervour was genuine, and the heads could be counted; but this pilgrimage to the Apostle's shrine was an act of homage to the idea of the Papacy as Hildebrand had impressed it upon Western minds, and not to the reality as it had been shaped by the coarser hands of Hildebrand's successors. Boniface saw the pilgrims but not their neighbours who had stayed at home; he heard the acclamations around him, and these agreeable voices drowned, in his ears, the murmurs of a provincial clergy who were still being called upon to pay the Papal war-taxes a generation after the Papal Punic Wars had been brought to their dreadful termination. He did not understand that neither the clergy nor the *Plebs Christiana* would be willing to risk life and fortune in order to support a Papal against a secular tyranny; he assumed that they would rise at his call as they had risen at Hildebrand's. In this delusion he provoked the King of France into drawing his sword, and then ran straight upon the extended sword-point, in confidence that any secular weapon must crumple under the drum-fire of his own ecclesiastical artillery.

The sequel to this suicidal act was the outrage at Anagni and 'the Babylonish Captivity' at Avignon and the Great Schism which

¹ Matt. xviii. 7.

rent Western Christendom in two; and each of these calamities might have been foreseen and feared and averted by Boniface himself if his vision and judgement and action had not been confounded by the *ἀρχή* that was incarnate in him.

A *coup de force* against the Pope's own person was the first counter-attack that any Pope had to expect from a secular prince upon whom he had declared war. Had Boniface forgotten in 1303 how Paschal II had been kidnapped by Henry V in 1111, and Hildebrand himself by Cencio on Christmas Day 1075? If a Henry IV could find a Cencio to do his dirty work, why should not a Philip the Fair find a Sciarra Colonna?

Again, the attraction of the Papacy into the orbit of the French Crown did not begin in 1305 when the Gascon Bertrand de Goth was elected, by grace of King Philip, to be Pope Clement V, and obediently came to be crowned at Lyon and lodged at Avignon on his secular master's threshold. Long before that, Pope after Pope had sought asylum in France from the moment when the struggle between the Papacy and the Empire began. Urban II had come to Auvergne to preach the First Crusade; Paschal II had been safe from outrage when he was negotiating with Henry V at Châlons-sur-Marne; Gelasius II had died out of Henry's reach at Cluny; Calixtus II had fought the same Emperor from a French base of operations until his ascendancy over his adversary was sufficiently well established to enable him to set foot in Rome; Innocent II had fled to France before the face of the Jewish antipope Pietro Pierleone; Alexander III had withdrawn into a French citadel when Frederick I, at the zenith of his power, had made Italy too hot for him; and Innocent IV had followed Alexander's tactics at the height of his own struggle with Frederick II. Even when the destruction of the Hohenstaufen and the Great Interregnum in the Empire had relieved the Papacy from all danger of being attacked by an emperor in Italy, Pope Gregory X looked beyond the north-western bounds of the Italian Peninsula and fixed his choice upon the French-speaking city of Lyon, on the last stage of the road leading out of the Holy Roman Empire into the French Kingdom, as the trysting-place for a council which was to deal with three matters of such capital importance for the whole of Western Christendom as the reconstruction of the Empire and the reconciliation of the Greeks¹ and the resumption of the Crusades. Could not Boniface feel it in his bones that the pull of France had become the greatest danger by which the Holy See was threatened now that the threat from Germany had been removed? And could not he understand that the surest way of making this pull irresis-

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, p. 616, below.

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tible was to challenge the King of France, who now held the Papacy in the hollow of his hand, to a trial of strength?

As for the Great Schism, it had been already foreshadowed by the time of Boniface's pontificate in the series of interregna which had been interrupting the Hildebrandine succession for some fifty years past. A twenty-seven months' interregnum had preceded the election of Boniface's own immediate predecessor Celestine V in 1294; there had been a thirty-three months' interregnum before the election of Gregory X in 1271; and a nineteen months' interregnum before the election of Innocent IV in 1243. The inability of the cardinals to agree upon a successor to Gregory IX at the supreme crisis of the struggle between the Papacy and Frederick II, when Hannibal was thundering at the gates, was proof in itself that the electoral machinery which had been installed on Hildebrand's initiative in 1059 was badly out of gear. The Hildebrandine provision for regular and orderly and peaceable elections to an office which was apt to fall vacant at short intervals was one of the essential foundation-stones of the whole Hildebrandine edifice, just as, conversely, the turbulence and corruption of the Papal elections during the preceding century and a half had been one of the principal causes of the Papacy's abasement in that unhappy period. If the Hildebrandine conclave which had then exorcized the Marozian pandemonium of violence and intrigue were now to beget interregna, the last state of the Papacy might be worse than the first. A corrupt election or a contested election might be less disastrous than a failure to make any election at all. The evil was borne in upon Pope Gregory X by the antecedents of his own election; and three years later, in 1274, the Council of Lyon, sitting under his presidency, passed, in the teeth of the College of Cardinals, the constitution *Ubi periculum* for expediting Papal elections in the future. This constitution, however, was promptly abrogated by Pope John XXI in 1276; a fresh interregnum between the death of Nicholas IV and the election of Celestine V was the consequence; and Boniface VIII, who had been a member of the conclave that stuck in the mud on that unseemly occasion, knew well enough that the eventual choice of the shy Abruzzese hermit had not been an inspiration of the Holy Spirit, or even a sop to public opinion, but had been a counsel of despair. This despair had been justified in the event by the 'Great Refusal' which had opened the way for Benedetto Caetani himself to mount the Papal throne.¹ No living man had had better opportunities than his of apprehending the seriousness of the heart-disease which was the Papacy's legacy from the terrible overstrain of its struggle with Frederick II.

¹ See p. 550, footnote 2, above.

A heart which was subject to such protracted stoppages as these might fail altogether if the patient were exposed to another great exertion or great shock. That Boniface, of all men, knowing what he knew, should have challenged the King of France when the Papacy was in this parlous state would be inexplicable in a man who was altogether in his right senses.

The fourth and last act in the Hildebrandine tragedy opens after the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with the advent of the Conciliar Movement.

The scandal of the Great Schism¹ moved the children of the Papacy—a provincial clergy whom a Hildebrand had once rescued from the heavy hand of the secular power, and universities whom an Alexander III had nursed through their infancy—to come to the rescue of the most venerable institution in Western Christendom. Their misgivings at the rancour and rapacity of an Innocent IV and their resentment at their own sufferings from the growing fiscal and administrative tyranny of the Curia were now reinforced by two further considerations: a concern for the life of the Western body social, which might sustain a fatal injury through the self-destruction of its most vital organ; and a compunction towards an institution whose Hildebrandine virtues were once again remembered, side by side with its Innocentian vices, now that Hildebrand's work was in mortal danger of being utterly undone. Accordingly a Holy See which had commanded devotion in the days of a Hildebrand and an Alexander III, and had then bred disillusionment in the days of an Innocent IV and a Boniface VIII, came to inspire a different emotion again when the house divided against itself was on the verge of collapse. This new attitude, of which the Conciliar Movement was the outcome, combined a filial piety with a moral reprobation. The reformers were anxious to save the Papacy from suicide, but their anxiety was for the sake of the Christian Republic as well as for the sake of the Papacy itself. They were determined to reconstruct the falling house, but not on the former plan. Whatever Hildebrand's original design may have been, his building, as it had grown under his successors'

¹ The Great Schism evidently made a far more painful impression upon the fourteenth-century Western conscience than 'the Babylonish Captivity'. The migration of the Curia to Avignon might be the Romans' funeral; but for the Western *Plebs Christiana* at large, who regarded the Papacy as their common possession, it did not much matter where the Pope took up his abode as long as he remained somewhere within the borders of the Western Commonwealth; and Avignon (see p. 520, footnote 2, above) stood only second to Lyon (see p. 569, above) in respect of its geographical convenience as a centre for the ecclesiastical administration of the Western Patriarchate. On the other hand the Great Schism, which the Romans did not much mind so long as one of the rival Popes again made Rome his headquarters, filled the rest of Western Christendom with dismay because it was destructive of the unity of the *Repubblica Christiana*. On this account the Papal schism evoked a much more vigorous reaction than the Papal sojourn at Avignon in the Western World as a whole.

hands, had become top-heavy. The ancient primacy of the Roman See among the thousand bishoprics of Western Christendom had towered up into a modern centralized autocracy; the Papal aegis that had been stretched over the devoted heads of the *Plebs Christiana* had turned into a cope of lead. This increasing top-heaviness was the fault in the pontifical architecture which was bringing the building down in ruin. It would be folly to re-erect the house on the old lines and so invite a repetition of the catastrophe. The reconstructed pyramid must have a lower apex and a broader base.

It will be seen that in the programme of the Conciliar Movement the Papacy was being offered a chance of retrieving its position, but that the offer was conditional—as any offer of salvation must be if it comes at the thirteenth hour when it is already too late to restore the *status quo ante*. In this act the former relations between the Roman See and the provinces of the Western Ecclesiastical Commonwealth were inverted. It was the provinces, now, that were taking the initiative and coming to the rescue; and a rescuer has an intrinsic right to exercise a certain control over the conduct of the party that is receiving his aid, while, conversely, he who has to accept the help of others because he has failed to help himself has an intrinsic duty to yield to his helpers' guidance. The condition to which the Papacy was asked to assent as the price—and guarantee—of its rehabilitation was the introduction of a parliamentary element into the constitution of the Western body ecclesiastic. In the ecclesiastical field this idea was nothing new. In the history of the Church, Oecumenical Councils were an older institution than Patriarchs; and we have seen above¹ how the Hildebrandine Papacy deliberately revived the Conciliar system in the West in the twelfth century in order to fortify itself against the Empire, and how in the following centuries the Kings of England and France—perhaps herein taking a leaf out of their Papal adversary's book—took care to fortify themselves with parliamentary support when they summoned up their courage to resist the Papal pretensions. In the fifteenth century the Papacy was asked to carry one stage farther in the ecclesiastical field the development of an institution which had been re-introduced into that field by Pope Calixtus II and had since been adopted in the field of parochial secular affairs by King Edward I of England and King Philip IV of France. Would the Papacy be willing to atone for its past and assure its future by bowing, in this matter, to the will of Western Christendom? Once again a Pope had to take a decision which was momentous for the fate of the Western World as well as for that of the Roman See; and, once again, the answer was in

¹ See p. 542, above.

the negative. The Papacy rejected the parliamentary principle and opted for an unrestricted sovereignty in a restricted field as the alternative to accepting a limited constitutional authority over a loyal and undivided Christian Commonwealth.

The decision was taken at the Council of Constance (*sedebat* A.D. 1414-18) in the crucial year 1417. After the Council had performed its negative task of ridding the Western Church of the three unworthy pretenders who had been contending for the title to the Papal office, two further tasks lay before it: the reform of the government of the Christian Commonwealth in both principle and practice; and the election of a worthy incumbent for its highest magistracy. In what order were these tasks to be taken? The Conciliar Party desired that the Council should first decide upon the reforms and then elect a Pope who would be bound in advance to govern in accordance with the new constitution; the Curial Party desired that the Pope should be elected first, in order that the proposed reforms might be worked out under Papal auspices. In this dispute over procedure the question of substance was at stake; and the Conciliar Party accepted defeat when the Emperor Sigismund agreed on their behalf that the new Pope should be elected first. When once this crucial point had been conceded, it was in vain that Sigismund stipulated for the postponement of the new Pope's coronation until after the reforms had been promulgated; in vain that the Council hastened to pass the decree *Frequens*,¹ which provided for the Council's own re-assembly at stated regular intervals; and in vain that, when the conclave was formed, the twenty-three cardinals were reinforced by thirty non-Curial electors representing the five nations into which the Council was articulated. The first act of Cardinal Oddone Colonna, after his election to be Pope Martin V,² was to confirm the rules of the Papal Chancery which had been issued by Pope John XXIII; and this was an ominous act; for John was the most disreputable of Martin's three rival predecessors, and his rules embodied abuses which the Council had marked down for reform, as well as non-contentious standing orders which had to be legally in force if the wheels of Papal administration were to be kept running. Thereafter Pope Martin made proposals for reform on his own part; but he evaded the crucial point of defining the causes for which a Pope might be admonished or deposed; the statutes which were passed under his auspices³ covered only a few

¹ On the 9th October, 1417.

² On the 11th November, 1417.

³ On the 21st March, 1418, seven reformatory decrees were approved and accepted by the Council in fulfilment of a decree of the 30th October, 1417, which had provided, among other things, that, before the dissolution of the Council, the new Pope (who at that date had still to be elected) was, with the Council's assistance, to reform the Church in eighteen specified matters.

of the questions which the Council had placed on the agenda; and the rest were left over for the Pope to deal with in separate concordats which he was to negotiate with the several nations of the Western Commonwealth.¹ By the time when the Council adjourned and the Pope left Constance for Rome, the course of the next chapter of Western history had been determined; for the outcome of the Council of Constance was confirmed by the heavier defeat which the Conciliar Movement sustained at the subsequent Council of Basel (*sedebat* A.D. 1431-49) in the pontificate of Eugenius IV.

'The same year and almost the same day were marked by the deposition of Eugenius at Basel and, at Florence, by his reunion of the Greeks and Latins. In the former synod (which he styled, indeed, an assembly of demons) the Pope was branded with the guilt of simony, perjury, tyranny, heresy and schism and declared to be incorrigible in his vices, unworthy of any title, and incapable of holding any ecclesiastical office. In the latter he was revered as the true and holy Vicar of Christ, who, after a separation of six hundred years, had reconciled the Catholics of the East and West in one fold and under one shepherd. The act of union was subscribed by the Pope, the [East Roman] Emperor, and the principal members of both churches. . . . A clamour was artfully propagated against the remnant of a schism in Switzerland and Savoy which alone impeded the harmony of the Christian World. The vigour of opposition was succeeded by the lassitude of despair; the Council of Basel was silently dissolved; . . . all ideas of reformation subsided; the Popes continued to exercise and abuse their ecclesiastical despotism.'²

This outcome of the rival councils of Basel and Florence might seem to have reinstated the Papacy in the triumphant position which it had occupied at the close of the Council of Lyon in the pontificate of Gregory X, and to have wiped out all the humiliations through which this extraordinary institution had passed during the intervening chapter of its history which had begun at Anagni with the outrage upon Boniface VIII and had closed at Constance with the election of Martin V. In reality that chapter could not be expunged from the pontifical records as though it were an accidental misfortune without any causal relation to its historical antecedents and therefore without any practical significance.³ Actually,

¹ These concordats were duly negotiated, and their terms were registered on the 15th April, 1418; but they were only concluded for a term of five years and they were nowhere properly put into effect (see *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. viii, p. 18).

² Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. lxvi.

³ 'Point after point of the charges brought forward at the Council of Constance against the Papal administration of the preceding thirty years is equally apposite to the conditions obtaining eighty years later. The misdemeanours which were a chronic disease of the Curia in and after the second half of the fifteenth century are in the fullest sense a legacy from the time of the Schism.'—Hofmann, W. von.: *Forschungen zur Geschichte der Kurialen Behörden vom Schisma bis zur Reformation* (Rome 1914, Loescher, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 1.

as we have seen, the fall of A.D. 1303 had followed hard upon the heels of the triumph of A.D. 1274 because the triumph had masked a perilous state of exhaustion and weakness, and in masking it had blinded the Papacy to the urgent need in which it stood of minding its steps and mending its ways. To ignore the lesson of the humiliations of 1303-1417 in an hour when the Papacy was at last triumphant once again was to court a fresh disaster; and this was the mistake which was made by the Curia in the critical years between the election of Pope Martin V in 1417 and the dissolution of the Council of Basel in 1449. Popes Martin V (*fungebatur* A.D. 1417-31) and Eugenius IV (*fungebatur* A.D. 1431-47) were not indeed hostile to reform in principle; so far from that, the former, at any rate, did seriously attempt to carry out many of the measures which the Council of Constance had demanded.¹ But these Papal efforts at reform were stultified by the fatal weakness of their not being the Papacy's paramount aim or interest. During these critical pontificates the Pope's overriding concern was to assert his own pretension to exercise an autocratic authority; and in this frame of mind he was less inclined to welcome the Conciliar Movement as a potent reinforcement to the cause of reform than he was to turn against that cause for fear that its promotion by the Conciliar method might produce, as a by-product, a limitation of the Papal prerogative. This Papal impulse to subordinate the reform of the Church to the aggrandisement of the Papacy was perhaps responsible, more than any other factor, for that misunderstanding between the Papacy and the Conciliar Movement which came to an open breach in the quarrel between Pope Eugenius IV and the Council of Basel. And in the intoxication of its victory over the Conciliar Movement in this naked trial of strength the Papacy abandoned itself once more to the lust for power² which had been its besetting sin since the days of Hildebrand. With one hand it clung to the despotic ecclesiastical power over the provinces of the

¹ 'In face of the attitude of the Pope (which was indeed only the attitude that was to be expected)—and especially after the decree promulgating the Chancery rules [see the present chapter, p. 573, above—A.J.T.] which reaffirmed in traditional fashion all the reservations, including those to which exception had been taken, without regard to the negotiations [at the Council of Constance]—no very energetic measures on the part of the new Pope [Martin V] were to be looked for. A considerable time was, in fact, to pass before the appearance of anything like a thorough-going reform bull. Unobtrusively, however, one individual measure after another was taken for bringing some provisional order into the situation in the individual offices [of the Curia], tightening the control over the existing arrangements, and thus preparing the way for a general reform. . . . There was hardly any motion that the Reform Movement had made which was destined to be left unconsidered in the further course of [Martin V's] pontificate. . . . [And] yet the activity of Martin V's endeavours in this field did not bear fruit in any corresponding success.'—Hofmann, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 11-12.

² For the encroachment of a capricious Papal absolutism upon the Curia's traditional regard for legality and regularity during the interval between the failure of the Conciliar Movement and the outbreak of the Reformation see Hofmann, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 323-6.

Western Church which it had been unexpectedly successful in retaining; with the other hand it continued to build up its secular territorial power in Central Italy, and, in playing their part as fifteenth-century Italian despots, the Popes became steeped in that pride of life which was the dominant note of the medieval Italian culture in its fifteenth-century over-ripeness. In this generation and this mood a Rodrigo Borgia on the Papal throne out-heroded a Baldassare Cossa;¹ and, once again, the fox was caught.² Within less than a hundred years after the dissolution of the Council of Basel in 1449 the Papacy was in even worse case than it had been in when the Council of Constance had opened in 1414.³ The Pope had defeated the Conciliar Movement to his own undoing. 'He made a pit and digged it, and is fallen into the ditch which he made.'⁴

After the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the power which the Papacy had refused to share constitutionally with a parliament of the Christian Commonwealth was lawlessly snatched out of its hands by the parochial secular princes, who might have been kept within bounds by the oecumenical authority of a Pope in Council, but who now found an easy prey in a Pope who alienated and disillusioned the *Plebs Christiana* by recklessly setting his own will to power against the people's yearning for reform and relief. The Papacy had rebuffed the Conciliar Movement as Rehoboam once rebuffed the congregation of Israel, and the same consequences followed.

'The king answered the people roughly, and . . . spake to them . . . saying: "My father made your yoke heavy, and I will add to your yoke; my father also chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions." . . . So when all Israel saw that the king hearkened not unto them, the people answered the king saying: "What portion have we

¹ Cossa reigned as Pope John XXIII from 1410 to 1415; Borgia, as Pope Alexander VI, from 1492 to 1503. Mr. Barraclough objects that 'this moral judgement completely ignores the administrative (and other) capacities of the Borgia'; but *responde finem*.

² 'A hole to catch foxes in' was Pope John XXIII's exclamation when, on his disconsolate journey to Constance, he caught his first sight of the city lying in a hollow of the hills.

³ 'Far from preparing the way for a lasting improvement, the restoration period of the Papacy played its part in leading on to the subsequent situation. Its merit lay in its success in overcoming a number of defects and getting rid of a number of abuses. But this improvement was only a rally; it was not a cure. This comes out in the fact that from this time onwards the same measures had to be renewed again and again at relatively short intervals in regard to the same points. In spite of the warning lessons of the Schism, which had been thoroughly taken to heart at the Council of Constance, the task of striking at the root of the evil—i.e. combating the causes of the increasing deterioration of discipline—was perpetually being put off; and there was a long persistence in the mistaken idea that all defects and misdevelopments could be got rid of merely by issuing ordinances, without at the same time taking severer measures to ensure that such ordinances should be strictly carried out. There was not a total blindness to this inner contradiction; in the later reforms the appropriate means were often proposed, but they were never applied.'—Hofmann, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 16.

⁴ Psalm vii. 15.

in David? Neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse. To your tents, O Israel. Now see to thine own house, David". So Israel departed unto their tents"¹—

and in every tent they found some Henry Tudor who was eagerly waiting for his opportunity to play Jeroboam's part. It was by licence of the disillusionment of a popular feeling which had tried and failed to rally round the Papacy in the Conciliar Movement that the parochial princes could venture with impunity, a century later, to rise up against the Papacy and despoil it.²

The losses of power that were inflicted on the Papacy in the sixteenth century were staggering.

As an Italian territorial sovereign the Pope now saw himself dwarfed, as hopelessly as his peers the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Signoria of Venice, by the rising Transalpine and Transmarine Powers.³ It was in vain that he had welded Tivoli and Viterbo onto Rome, and Umbria and the Marches onto the Agro Romano, and the Legations onto the Marches. A Papal principality which had extended itself from the Tyrrhene Sea to the Adriatic and from the Garigliano to the Po might be a Great Power in Italy, but it was a pygmy in a new world which contained the France of Louis XI and the England of Henry VII and the Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella.⁴ After attempting to strut in arms on this giant's stage, and exposing itself to such humiliating experiences as its war of A.D. 1556-7 with King Philip II of Spain, the Papacy learned the lesson which Athens learned in the Chremonidean War,⁵ and withdrew as far as possible from active participation in an international war-game which it had found too boisterous.⁶ But this tardy Papal recognition of the drawbacks of territorial sovereignty did not save Pope Innocent XI from being bullied by Louis XIV or Pope Pius VII from being dragged at the chariot-wheels of Napoleon.

While the Pope suffered this fate as an Italian secular prince, he suffered still more grievous misfortunes as the oecumenical sovereign of the Western Church. In this latter capacity he saw the

¹ 1 Kings xii. 13-16.

² 'It is the lack of feeling on either side—and notably on the royal side—which is the startling thing about Henry Tudor's "reformation". Indifference not only where indifference was to be expected, but where indifference should not have been—that is the key-note, and that is the failure of the Papacy (before Trent): that it produced, not feeling—even hostile feeling—but indifference'.—Mr. G. Barraclough in a letter to the writer.

³ For this dwarfing of the Italian states by the Italianized Powers of an outer circle see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 299-305, above.

⁴ On this point see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 356-7, above.

⁵ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 338 and 340, above.

⁶ The withdrawal of the Papal principality into a position of persistent neutrality in the seventeenth century was an anticipation of the policy which was adopted in the nineteenth century by the surviving small states of Western Europe: Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian Kingdoms.

whole of his power reft away from him in the states that turned Protestant, and four-fifths of it in those that professedly remained Catholic—for their Catholic Majesties were not less rapacious than their Protestant Majesties in robbing the Papacy of its powers for their own benefit; the only difference in their policy was that they left the Papacy in possession of that fraction of its powers which, in the countries that turned Protestant, was abandoned by the prince to his subjects as a prison-yard exercise-ground for the individual conscience.

These sixteenth-century blows were the nemesis of the Papacy's fifteenth-century relapse into *ὑβρις*; but they were also the stimulus of a sixteenth-century revival.¹ In this extremity the Catholic Church was snatched from the jaws of destruction by the very present help² of a band of saints who utterly eclipsed the respectable but prosaic fathers of Constance and Basel, and whose like had not been seen in Western Christendom since Saint Louis had died in 1270 on the last crusade and Saint Thomas in 1274 on his way to the Council of Lyon. Saint Ignatius Loyola (*vivebat* A.D. 1495–1556)³ captured the intellectual prowess of Italy, which had ministered to a Papal pride of life when a Giovanni de' Medici was reigning as Pope Leo X,⁴ and bent it to the service of reform by yoking it with a Janissarian discipline.⁵ Saint Teresa (*vivebat* A.D. 1515–82) and Saint John of the Cross (*vivebat* A.D. 1542–91) restored the lapsed austerities of the Carmelite Order and found their way through this door into a new world of mystical illumination. Saint Philip Neri (*vivebat* A.D. 1515–95) set a new standard of loving-kindness towards the poor and the sick, and a new standard of devotion for the ministry of secular priests. Saint Charles Borromeo (*vivebat* A.D. 1538–84) wholly succeeded, where Pope Innocent III had half failed,⁶ in performing the exacting task of an ecclesiastical administrator. Saint Francis de Sales (*vivebat* A.D. 1567–1622) was as intrepid a missionary of the Catholic Faith in the Protestant lion's den at Geneva as Saint Francis Xavier (*vivebat* 1506–52) was among the heathen in the Indies. These super-human men and women worked a work in our Western World which is still operative to-day and which has perhaps not

¹ For the stimulus of blows see II. D (iv), vol. ii, above.

² Psalm xlv. 2.

³ For Saint Ignatius Loyola's life as an illustration of the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 270, above.

⁴ *Papa Leo X munere fungebatur* A.D. 1513–21.

⁵ The first General of the Society of Jesus, when he organized his spiritual army, anticipated the secular princes of the West by more than a century in rivalling the discipline of the Ottoman Pādīshāh's Slave-Household. A contemporary 'Osmanlı might have described the Jesuits as the *qullar* of the Patriarch of Rome.

⁶ See the present chapter, pp. 557–63, above, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), Annex, pp. 652–6, below.

yet begun to bear its richest fruits. In their own age, however, (if it is not sheer nonsense for historians to pin down saints within temporal bounds), the dead weight of the Papal tradition brought the sixteenth-century saints' impetuous advance to a premature halt. They liberated the Papacy from the pride of life, but its lust for power proved too strong for them; and so the sixteenth-century rally failed, after all, to save the day. In the seventeenth century the Roman Church relapsed into a spiritual torpor which awoke into a counter-revolutionary activity—both political and intellectual—when it was stirred by the impact of an eighteenth-century Philosophy and a nineteenth-century Physical Science; and by the three hundredth anniversary of Saint Ignatius's death a Papacy which had once been the heart of the Western body social seemed to have become an atrophied member, in which the blood no longer coursed and the life no longer throbbed. The pontificate of Pius IX (*fungebatur* A.D. 1846–78), who saw the territorial sovereignty of the Papacy extinguished when the armed forces of the Kingdom of Italy entered Rome in 1870, marked as abysmal a fall in the fortunes of the Holy See as the pontificate of Clement VII (*fungebatur* A.D. 1523–34), who saw Rome sacked in 1527 by the Protestant mercenaries of the Emperor Charles V, or the pontificate of John XXIII (*fungebatur* A.D. 1410–15), who was brought to book at Constance.

As we read this tale of rout and rally and relapse which brought so great an institution so low in the course of some six hundred years, we shall be struck by a series of signal failures to learn from experience. Hildebrand himself, who had obtained his opportunity because the Emperor Henry III had overplayed a strong hand in 1046, made precisely Henry III's mistake when, thirty years later, he overplayed his own strong hand in dealing with Henry IV. Innocent III, as we have seen, was not deterred by the deplorable outcome of the Fourth Crusade from launching his crusade against the Albigenses with equally deplorable consequences; and the exposure of his credulity towards Otto Welf did not put him on his guard against Frederick II. Innocent IV did not perceive that the Holy See would be as much at the mercy of a King of Sicily who was brother to the King of France as it had been at the mercy of a King of Sicily who was himself the King of Germany—though the essential danger lay in being taken between two fires, without its making any substantial difference whether the Transalpine fire was German or French. Boniface VIII did not apprehend that if an insistence upon legal pretensions insufficiently supported by material power had been fatal to the Emperor Frederick I in his dealings with the Lombard communes, it would be equally fatal to

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Pope Boniface in dealing with the Kingdom of France. A Martin V and a Eugenius IV, when they set themselves to frustrate the Conciliar Movement, did not remind themselves that King Philip IV of France and King Edward III of England had deliberately fortified themselves with parliamentary support before their successful defiance of the Papacy in the fourteenth century, and therefore did not draw the statesman-like inference that an oecumenical parliament of the Western Ecclesiastical Commonwealth, so far from being a menace to the Pope's authority, was likely to be a tower of strength to him in a coming struggle with the parochial secular princes. A Julius II did not reflect that a pagan virtuosity in arts and arms, which had not saved from destruction the Papacy's arch-enemy Frederick II, was unlikely to bring salvation to the power by which Frederick had been conquered. And, in general, the experience of the Papacy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in its encounters with the Renaissance and the Reformation did not make it any the more expert in dealing, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the new forces of Democracy and Physical Science which had been generated by a fresh eruption of the Western social volcano.

As we contemplate this record of flood-lit truths unheeded and golden opportunities untaken, we cease to wonder at the unparalleled series of calamities by which the Hildebrandine Papacy has been afflicted in the long agony of its decline and fall: 'the Babylonish Captivity,' the Great Schism, the Protestant Reformation, the Italian *Risorgimento*. Are these the final fruits of the tree which Hildebrand planted? If so, the nemesis of creativity surpasses itself when it takes the form of the intoxication of victory.

The tragedy of the Hildebrandine Papacy is the tragedy of Periclean Athens. Athens became the oppressor of her sister city-states whom she had liberated from the oppression of the Achaemenidae; the Roman See became the oppressor of her sister churches whom she had liberated from the oppression of the Secular Power in Western Christendom. In both tragedies the protagonist inverts his role; in both, the change is the outward visible sign of an inward spiritual débâcle; and, in both, this mortal sin is visited with a condign punishment. In the Hellenic drama the devastation which the sin and the punishment deal does not stop short at the affliction of the victims and the abasement of the villain of the piece; it takes its course until it brings about the breakdown of the whole civilization in whose life the actors are playing their parts. In our Western drama, in which we ourselves are actors as well as spectators, are the sin and punishment of the Hildebrandine

Papacy destined to bring the history of Western Christendom to the same tragic ending?

As we gaze round our spiritually devastated world in our generation, we can take the measure of the evil which has been brought upon us by the Hildebrandine failure now that its consequences have had nearly seven centuries to work themselves out since Innocent IV fought his Hannibalic War. And in the light of this latter-day knowledge we can see that the Hildebrandine Papacy's greatest crime against our Western Society has been, not its extermination of the Hohenstaufen or its assassination of the Conciliar Movement, but its felony against itself. In committing those crimes the Papacy did its best to commit suicide; and in dealing itself this prostrating blow it has left the house vacant for the entry of seven—and seventy times seven—other spirits who are all more wicked than the supplanted householder.¹ In the four hundred years that have now been added to the tale of Western history since the outbreak of the Reformation the sins of Jeroboam have far surpassed the sins of the degenerate scion of David's house who gave the usurper his chance to seize nine-tenths of the Kingdom.

'And Jeroboam said in his heart: "Now shall the kingdom return to the house of David. If this people go up to do sacrifice in the house of the Lord at Jerusalem, then shall the heart of this people turn again unto their lord, even unto Rehoboam King of Judah; and they shall kill me and go again to Rehoboam king of Judah." Whereupon the king took counsel and made two calves of gold, and said unto them: "It is too much for you to go up to Jerusalem; behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the Land of Egypt." And he set the one in Bethel, and the other put he in Dan. And this thing became a sin. . . .'²

The golden calves which our latter-day Jeroboams have set up in our Western World are called 'totalitarian states'; and these are the gods which they invite—nay, command—us to worship in place of the God of Benedict and the God of Gregory and the God of Hildebrand and the God of Francis. To-day these false prophets of an odious idolatry³ sit in Hildebrand's seat. But their

¹ Matt. xii. 45 = Luke xi. 26.

² 1 Kings xii. 26-30.

³ The disastrousness of the sequel to the breakdown of our medieval Western Papal hierarchy is underlined by Auguste Comte in his *Considerations on the Spiritual Power* (reprinted from his *Système de Politique Positive*, vol. iv (1854), Appendix, in *Early Essays on Social Philosophy*, translated from the French of Auguste Comte by H. D. Hutton, second edition (London, no date, Routledge)):

'Of all the revolutionary prejudices which have sprung up during the last three centuries owing to the decline of the old social system, the most ancient, the most deeply rooted, the most generally accepted, the one that lies at the root of all the rest, is the principle which proclaims that no spiritual power should exist in Society, or, what comes to the same thing, that this power should be entirely subordinated to the Temporal Power' (op. cit., p. 283).

Comte goes on to point out (op. cit., pp. 285-7) that in international relations the

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mandate is not inexhaustible, and, by the same token, our own doom is not sealed.

The cup of these usurpers' iniquities has run over in a generation which has seen the Papacy drink its own cup of humiliation to the dregs. On the 20th September, 1870, the wheel of Destiny completed its Great Year by coming round, full circle, to the pre-Hildebrandine situation of the 20th December, 1046. In the long flood of adversity the *v̄βpis* that was the Holy See's undoing has perhaps at last been washed away, and already history has begun to repeat itself. When the blow which was dealt to the Roman Church by a militant Italian nationalism in 1870 was immediately followed in a militantly nationalist Germany by the launching of the *Kulturkampf*, it almost seemed as though the last hour had struck for the Catholic Faith; yet that bloodless war of attrition on German soil ended in the first victory which the Church had gained for three hundred years—and this in a conflict with Bismarck, the most redoubtable Jeroboam of the age. Nor was the Catholic Church defeated in the struggle with state-worship in France which broke out in 1904. So far from that, it was becoming apparent in the fourth decade of the twentieth century that in France the future lay, not with the anti-religious ideas in the Ideology of 1789, but with the spiritual influence of the lives of a nineteenth-century band of saints whom the challenge of the French Revolution had called into action in France and Piedmont, as the sixteenth-century saints had been called into action in Spain and Italy and Savoy by the challenge of the Reformation.¹ In Saint Jean-Baptiste Vianney, the curé d'Ars (*vivebat* A.D. 1786–1857), there was an epiphany of sainthood in the life of a parish priest; in Don Giovanni Bosco (*vivebat* A.D. 1815–88) there was an epiphany in the life of a 'social worker'; in Saint Bernadette Soubirous of Lourdes (*vivebat* A.D. 1844–79) there was an epiphany in the life of a child of the Proletariat; in Saint Thérèse Martin, 'the Little Flower' (*vivebat* A.D. 1873–97), there was an epiphany in the life of a child of the Bourgeoisie. This outburst of sainthood in the continental strongholds of a nineteenth-century secularism was the movement

Papal authority has been replaced by nothing but a Balance of Power between parochial secular governments, and (op. cit., pp. 288–95) that, within the bosom of each parochial community, the fruits have been a mental anarchy, a lack of public morality, a social materialism, and a corrupt bureaucracy. He damns the Holy Alliance with faint praise (op. cit., p. 328, footnote 1) as a *pis aller*, which is not quite so bad as the Balance of Power, in a society that has not succeeded either in preserving the Spiritual Power or in restoring it.

For Comte's advocacy of the separation of the two powers see further Caird, E.: *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte* (Glasgow 1885, MacLehose), pp. 47–8 and 210–11. Comte saw clearly (Caird, op. cit., pp. 44 and 51) that the Spiritual Power could only exercise its own proper function on condition of resisting all temptations to resort to direct action in the temporal sphere.

¹ See p. 578, above.

from the depths which was reflected on the surface of life in the successful resistance of the Church, as an institution, to the assaults of the German state *post* 1871 and of the French state *post* 1904. In the year 1938 it looked as though the victor in those preliminary skirmishes were now going into action in a pitched battle in which the whole strength of either side might be engaged; and in this conflict, if it was indeed at hand, the fate of Western Christendom would once more be in the balance.

At this hour of decision it is meet and right that all men and women in the Western World who 'have been baptized into Christ' as 'heirs according to the promise'¹—and, with us, all the Gentiles who have become 'partakers of' the 'promise' and 'fellow heirs of the same body'² through the adoption of our Western way of life—should call upon the Vicar of Christ to vindicate the tremendous title which Pope Innocent III has bequeathed to subsequent successors of Saint Peter. Did not Peter's Master say to Peter himself that 'unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required, and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more'?³ To the Apostle at Rome our forefathers committed the destiny of Western Christendom, which was the whole of their treasure; and when 'that servant, which knew his Lord's will', 'prepared not himself, neither did according to his will,' and was beaten, in just retribution, 'with many stripes',⁴ those blows fell with equal weight upon the bodies of 'the menservants and maidens'⁵ whose souls had been entrusted to the keeping of the *Servus Servorum Dei*.

Quidquid delirant reges plectuntur Achiivi.
Seditione, dolis, scelere atque libidine et ira
Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.⁶

The punishment for the *ὑβρις* of the servant who has said in his heart 'My lord delayeth his coming'⁷ has been visited upon us; and it is for him who has brought us to this pass to deliver us from it, whosoever we may be: Catholics or Protestants; Christians or men of other faiths; believers or unbelievers; bond or free.

'They were scattered because there is no shepherd, and they became meat to all the beasts of the field when they were scattered.'⁸

David has no defence against Eliab's taunt.⁹ Yet who but this very David, who has once deserted his flock, has the strength and hardihood to beard and smite and slay the lion and the bear and to deliver the lamb out of his mouth?¹⁰ Will our truant David once

¹ Gal. iii. 27 and 29.

⁴ Luke xii. 47.

⁶ Horace: *Epistulae*, Book I, Ep. ii, ll. 14-16.

⁸ Ezekiel xxxiv. 5.

² Eph. iii. 6.

³ Luke xii. 45.

⁹ 1 Samuel xvii. 28.

⁵ Luke xii. 48.

⁷ Luke xii. 45.

¹⁰ 1 Samuel xvii. 35.

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more take the field, to gather what Rehoboam has scattered and unite what Jeroboam has divided? And if, at a zero hour when all is sin and shame, a second Hildebrand does come to the fight and the rescue, will our deliverer this time be fore-armed, by the wisdom that is born of suffering,¹ against that fatal intoxication of victory which has ruined the great work of Pope Gregory VII?

¹ *πάθει μάθος*—Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 177–8, quoted in this Study in I. C (iii) (b), vol. 1, p. 169, footnote 1; II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. 1, p. 298; and IV. C (iii) (b) 11, in the present volume, p. 218, above; and in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 78; V. C (i) (d) 4, vol. v, p. 416, footnote 3; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 275, below.

ANNEX TO IV. C (i)

WHICH ARE THE TRUE CATASTROPHES: THE BREAK-DOWNS OF CIVILIZATIONS OR THEIR BIRTHS?

IN the passages of Plato that we have quoted in the chapter to which this Annex attaches, there is a noteworthy discrepancy between the *Laws* and the *Timaevs* on the one hand and the *Politicus* on the other.

The passage from the *Politicus* agrees with the passages from the *Laws* and the *Timaevs* in the assumption that the fortunes of Mankind are bound up with the vicissitudes of Physical Nature and that these two co-ordinated series of physical and human events move in a cyclic alternation of prosperity and adversity. It differs from them, however, in its philosophy of human history. According to the *Laws* and the *Timaevs*, the prosperous phases of human history are those which, in this Study, we have called the growth-phases of civilizations, and it is these growths of civilizations (which are conceived as desirable) that are disastrously cut short by the periodic cataclysms. According to the *Politicus*, on the other hand, the prosperous phases of human history correspond to what, in this Study, we have called the static Yin-state of primitive societies¹—idealized into an ἐνὶ Κρόνου βίος.

'When God was shepherd, there was no state and no ownership of women and children. . . . All the historical conditions of life were absent, while on the other hand they enjoyed fruits in abundance from trees and other plants, which were not the product of cultivation but were raised spontaneously by the Earth herself. For the most part they camped in the open without clothes or bedding, the climate having been tempered so as to do them no injury, and they found soft couches in the grass which was produced by the Earth in abundance.'²

According to the *Politicus*, moreover, it was this state of Nature—which was likewise a state of Grace—that was brought to an end by the abrupt reversal of direction in the rotatory motion of the Cosmos at the moment when the divine helmsman let go his rudder;³ and the sinister change in human fortunes which was involved in this cosmic catastrophe was not the change from the growth of a civilization to its breakdown but was the antecedent transition to the genesis of a civilization from the static condition of a primitive society in its Yin-state. In other words, the recurrent

¹ See Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 192-5, above.

² Plato: *Politicus*, 271B 5-272A. Compare the *Tao Te King*, chap. 80.

³ See IV. C (i), pp. 26-7, above.

calamity that overtakes Mankind is not the breakdown of civilizations but their outbreak.

Consistently with this philosophy of history the births and growths of civilizations are explained in the *Politicus* as the response of Mankind to the challenge of the abandonment of the Cosmos by God.

'When Mankind had been deprived of the care of the Spirit who had been our shepherd, the majority of wild beasts that were fierce by nature turned savage, while Man himself became weak and defenceless. In consequence he was harried by the wild beasts, and in this first phase he was destitute of all equipment and resources, since his spontaneous food-supply had failed before he had been taught, by the stress of necessity, to provide for himself. For all these reasons Man found himself in the direst straits, and this is the origin of those legendary Gifts of the Gods with which we have been presented, together with the instruction and training necessary for the use of them—fire from Prometheus, the arts and crafts from Hephaestus and his consort, and seeds and plants from other benefactors. Every stone in the foundations of human life has been hewn from this quarry. The watch (aforementioned) which had been kept over Man by the Gods had now suddenly failed, and Man was forced to live by his own efforts and to keep watch over himself, exactly like the Cosmos as a whole, with which we are ever partakers in its imitation and following of God through all the alternating phases of our own life and growth.'¹

According to the philosophy of the *Politicus* this heroic achievement of Human Civilization, in response to the challenge of Man's desertion by God, is—and can be—nothing but a forlorn hope. 'What God abandoned, these defended'; but the human defences are doomed to fall, because the Cosmos 'always performs its functions best during the phase least far removed from its release', while, 'as time goes on, the . . . original disharmony begins to gain the upper hand, until in the final phase it breaks out openly'.² Ultimately Mankind is saved, not by Man's own efforts, but by a fresh intervention of God—an intervention which is as abrupt and as arbitrary as His original withdrawal. And God saves Man by winding the painful attempt at Civilization up and bringing Human Society back to the blissful primitive level.

On this showing, the attempt at Civilization is not the quest of an attainable and desirable goal, but is at best a creditable *pis aller*. On the other hand in the *Latos* (in the immediate sequel to the passage quoted on p. 24, above) and in the *Timaues* (in the passage above-quoted on pp. 24-5) the births and growths of

¹ Plato: *Politicus*, 274 B-D.

² The passage of the *Politicus* in which these sentences occur has been quoted in the present volume, on p. 27, above, in the chapter to which this Annex attaches.

civilizations, though they are described in much the same terms, are placed in a radically different setting. Instead of being represented as responses to the challenges of cosmic catastrophes, they are represented as following these catastrophes only after vast intervals of time, when the survivors of the catastrophes begin at last to recover from their prostration and stupefaction. Instead of being represented as a *pis aller* and a forlorn hope, these eventual new stirrings of life are assumed to be both admirable and promising endeavours. And instead of being cut short, when they have reached the brink of a disaster, by a beneficent intervention of God which makes all things new by making all things primitive again, these promising endeavours are cut short, when they are on the verge of achievement, by a cruel cataclysm which sweeps away the cumulative results of social progress and brings Man down again to a primitive level which is regarded, in these dialogues, as a state of Nature which is not a state of Grace but a state of Savagery. The difference between the two philosophies may be summed up by saying that the human disaster which the cosmic catastrophe entails is the destruction of civilizations according to the *Laws* and the *Timaeus*, and the perpetration of civilizations according to the *Politicus*. The attempt at Civilization, which is the one philosophy's good, is the other philosophy's evil.

It will be seen that the philosophy of the *Politicus* is identical (apart from the cyclic element) with that of the Syriac myth of the Fall of Man as this is presented in the Book of Genesis, where the state of Nature in the Garden of Eden is regarded as a state of Grace, while Man's response to the challenge of expulsion from the Garden—the response in which he builds up a civilization in the sweat of his brow—is regarded as the working out of a perpetual sentence of penal servitude: a sentence imposed upon Man as the penalty for the sin of disobedience on account of which he has been expelled from the Earthly Paradise.

It will also be seen that it is the Plato of the *Politicus* rather than the Plato of the *Laws* and the *Timaeus* whom Virgil follows in the Fourth Eclogue, when he represents the whole history of the Hellenic Civilization as a criminal aberration from which a long-tormented Humanity is now to be released at last through a return to an idealized state of Primitive Nature:

Te duce, si qua manent sceleris vestigia nostri,
irrita perpetua solvent formidine terras . . .
ipsae lacte domum referent distenta capellae
ubera, nec magnos metuent armenta leones . . .
molli paulatim flavescet campus arista,
incultisque rubens pendebit sentibus uva,

et durae quercus sudabunt roscida mella . . .
cedet et ipse mari vector, nec nautica pinus
mutabit merces: omnis feret omnia tellus.
non rastros patietur humus, non vinea falcem;
robustus quoque iam tauris iuga solvet arator.¹

So much for the contradiction in the minds of the philosophers and poets of the Hellenic breakdown and disintegration. But we, in our world and our generation, assuredly cannot be content simply to take note of this contradiction and to leave it unresolved; for it raises a problem which concerns us to-day as deeply as it once concerned a Plato and a Virgil. We shall return to this problem at a later point.²

¹ Virgil: *Eclogue* IV, ll. 13-14, 21-2, 28-30, 38-41.

² In Part VII, below.

THE TRANSADRIATIC EXPEDITION OF THE EMPEROR
CONSTANS II AND ITS ANTECEDENTS IN HELLENIC
HISTORY

As the memories of childhood reawaken in old age in the consciousness of a human being, so, in the life of a human society, there is sometimes a repetition, in the last chapter of its decline and fall, of some situation which has occurred in its history once already in an earlier chapter. With this clue to guide us we may detect a parallelism between the Emperor Constans II's expedition in the seventh decade of the seventh century of the Christian Era from the latter-day capital of a moribund Hellenic universal state¹ to the remnant of its Transadriatic dominions and a previous series of expeditions from the homelands of the Hellenic Society to its Transadriatic colonial annexes which were undertaken successively by Timoleon of Corinth in 344 B.C.² and King Archidamus of Sparta in 342 and King Alexander of Epirus in 333 and Prince Cleonymus of Sparta in 303 and King Pyrrhus of Epirus in 280-274.³

This ancient series of Greek military expeditions from east to west of the Adriatic had an object which, *mutatis mutandis*, was identical with Constans' object a thousand years later. Constans set out to rescue the Province of Sicily, and the other relics of the Exarchates of Italy and Africa, from the doom with which they were threatened by the simultaneous aggression of the Arabs in Africa and the Lombards in Italy; the Corinthian and Spartan and Epirot knight-errants who led the Hellenic 'crusaders' of the fourth and third centuries B.C. came to defend the colonial Greek communities in Sicily and Magna Graecia against a similar attack on two fronts: a Carthaginian attack in Sicily and an Oscan attack in Italy which was delivered in successive Bruttian and Lucanian and Samnite and Roman waves.⁴ On the earlier occasion the enterprise failed irretrievably after five attempts; and we may suppose

¹ The transference of the centre of gravity of the Roman Empire from Rome to Constantinople in the course of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era is an instance of the general 'law' that the governing power in a universal state first arises on the periphery of the world which the universal state embraces, and then gravitates towards the centre as time goes on. This 'law' is illustrated and discussed in Part VI, below.

² See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 248 and 251, below.

³ All these earlier Hellenic knight-errants in the west except Timoleon made their first landing, like the Emperor Constans, at Tarentum.

⁴ For this South Italian front of Hellenism and its elimination see further V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 213-4, below. The analogy between the Beneventan Lombards and the Samnites is drawn in Gay, J.: *L'Italie Méridionale et l'Empire Byzantin, 867-1071* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing), p. x.

that it would have failed ultimately likewise upon its repetition a thousand years later—even if Constans had lived out his life to its natural term and found successors to carry on his policy—since the factors which were the manifest causes of the failure in the fourth and third centuries B.C., when the experiment was tried out to the bitter end, were also in operation in the seventh century of the Christian Era, when the repetition of the experiment was cut short after a trial of no longer than six years' duration.

On the earlier occasion the enterprise failed for four distinct reasons. In the first place the Western Greeks were heavily out-matched by their assailants; in the second place their champions from the Greek homelands were unable to bring over with them large enough forces to redress the balance; in the third place the effectiveness of the reinforcements, such as they were, was diminished by a lamentable lack of cordiality in the co-operation between the knight-errants and their protégés; in the fourth place the relieving forces were distracted and dissipated by being called upon to intervene on two different fronts simultaneously. All these adverse factors reappear in the local situation as it stood in the seventh century of the Christian Era. For example, Constans found himself just not strong enough to subjugate the Lombard principality of Benevento, as Alexander of Epirus had once failed, by a comparably narrow margin, to subjugate the Samnite Confederacy; and Constans, had he lived, would assuredly have quarrelled with his principal Italian protégée the Papacy,¹ as Alexander of Epirus did live to quarrel with his principal Italian protégée the city-state of Tarentum.

On the earlier occasion perhaps the most potent of all the factors that militated against success was the sheer inferiority of the Western Greeks to their ring of assailants in weight of numbers and extent of territory. The Greek communities in Sicily were so far alive to the danger to which they were exposed by this numerical weakness that, time and again, they submitted to the surrender of their parochial autonomy and their civic liberty for the sake of pooling their resources.² Yet, although they distinguished themselves by this readiness—which was a rare virtue in the Hellenic World—to pay the necessary price for the benefits of solidarity, the strength which the Sicilian Greeks found in their unity under the successive despotisms of the Deinomenidae and the Dionysii and Agathocles and Hiero was still not enough to save them in the end

¹ The protracted martyrdom which had been inflicted by Constans upon Pope Martin from A.D. 653 to A.D. 655 must have been perpetually in the mind of Martin's successor, Pope Vitalian, during the Emperor's twelve days' visit to Rome in A.D. 663.

² For this recurrent and characteristic feature of Sicilian Greek history see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 357, footnote 1, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 183, below.

from being trampled under foot when their island became the battleground of the Carthaginians and the Romans. In this final struggle for supremacy in the Western Mediterranean, in which the victor's prize was the privilege—and burden—of becoming the founder of a Hellenic universal state,¹ the Sicilian Greeks were not in the running.² On this showing we may conjecture that, even if Constans had lived on long enough in Sicily to repeat the performance of those ancient Sicilian Greek empire-builders, his building could not have withstood for long the shock of successive Arab and Berber and Lombard and Frankish assaults. In the seventh century of the Christian Era Syracuse had really no more chance of supplanting Constantinople as the last capital of the Hellenic universal state than she had had of becoming its first capital, instead of Rome, in the third century B.C. From the beginning to the end of Hellenic history Sicily was never at any time capable of providing the basis for a Hellenic world power.

In fine, we may conclude that if either Constans or his grandfather Heraclius had succeeded in carrying out their plan they would have erased, once for all, the last faint shadow of an Imperial Government at Constantinople, but this without succeeding in replacing it by any substantial or enduring Imperial Government at Carthage or Syracuse or Ravenna.

¹ *Omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu
horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris oris,
in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum
omnibus humanis esset terraque marique . . .*

Lucretius: De Rerum Natura, Book III, ll. 834-7.

² In the third century B.C. the Sicilian Greek Power of Hiero and Hieronymus was as utterly outclassed by Carthage and Rome as in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era Venice and Milan were outclassed by France and Spain and the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 357, above).

THE ABORTIVE RESISTANCE OF THE CHURCH TO THE REVIVAL OF 'CAESARO-PAPISM' IN ORTHODOX CHRISTENDOM

IN the chapter to which this Annex attaches, we have noted that in Western Christendom the Church eventually asserted its supremacy over the Temporal Power, and that, in successfully enforcing this pretension in the second chapter of our Western history, the Papacy performed a creative act which enabled our Western Civilization to proceed a stage farther in its growth.¹ In the same connexion we have seen that in Orthodox Christendom the Church succumbed to a pretension on the part of the Temporal Power to possess and exercise the 'Caesaro-papal' authority which had once been wielded in a Christian Roman Empire by a Constantine the Great and a Justinian,² and that this defeat of the Orthodox Church by the East Roman Government is to be regarded, in the history of the society in which both these institutions lived and moved and had their being, as a social aberration which was demonstrably responsible for this Orthodox Christian Society's premature breakdown. For an observer, in retrospect, of these accomplished facts it is a tempting exercise of his historical judgement to summon the Orthodox and the Western Church before his mental judgement-seat, hold a summary inquiry into their respective records in these two historic transactions, and render a comparative verdict eulogizing the Western Church in the measure of its *de facto* success and conversely censuring the Orthodox Church in the measure of its *de facto* failure. Such a verdict would be as injudicious as it is facile, and we must be vigilantly on our guard against being seduced into accepting it.

To put ourselves on our guard we may remind ourselves of the simple fact that the generation of Hildebrand is separated by a Time-span of not much less than six hundred years from the generation of Odovacer, and that, throughout this long period which intervened between the *de facto* break-up of the Roman Empire in the West and the initiation of a deliberate endeavour to establish a Papal *Respublica Christiana*, the persistent policy of the Papacy was to replace itself under an Imperial tutelage from which it had been liberated against its will by *force majeure*.³ At first the Papacy had clung forlornly to the skirts of a still surviving Imperial Government at Constantinople, and then—when the rotten fringe

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 339 and 405, above.

² See *cap. cit.*, pp. 346-53, above.

³ See *cap. cit.*, pp. 335-9, above.

of the worn-out Byzantine *scaramangium* tore away in the Papal suppliant's desperately clutching hands—a Pope Stephen II (III) had gone in search of a substitute-protector beyond the Alps, and a Pope Leo III had invested this barbarian *deus ex machina* with a robe of office which was fondly expected to wear better because it was a counterfeit, woven of coarser stuff than the genuine Imperial silk. This chapter in the history of the Papacy is neither inspiring in itself nor prophetic of the magnificently creative chapter which actually followed. And our observation of this vein of unexpectedness in the course of our Western ecclesiastical history should warn us, when we come to pass judgement on the Orthodox Church, against hastily jumping to the conclusion that, just because the Orthodox Church succumbed to the Temporal Power, it must have brought this fate upon itself by offering its neck poor-spiritedly to the yoke. As a matter of fact we shall find, upon examination, that the Church which was defeated by a Leo Syrus and a Leo Sapiens fought as good a fight as the Church which was victorious over a Henry IV and a Frederick Barbarossa.

The Orthodox Church which was challenged to prove its mettle by a revival of 'Caesaro-papism' in the eighth century had inherited from the Primitive Christian past as fine a tradition of resistance to the Imperial Power as any of which the West could boast. During the struggle of the Primitive Church with the Pagan Empire the Christian martyrs in the Greek and Oriental provinces had been as numerous and as valiant as in the Latin;¹ and in the ensuing Post-Constantinian Age, when the Church had been almost lulled to sleep on the Empire's bosom² and had not yet experienced the rude awakening which was destined to overtake her upon the Empire's imminent death and dissolution, the rather rare examples of clerics who went into opposition against the Christian Imperial Power include Greeks and Orientals³ as well as 'Hesperians'. The

¹ In absolute numbers the Greek and Oriental martyrs were far more numerous, no doubt; but these absolute numbers, if we knew them, would have to be reduced to the percentage which they represented of the total Christian community in the different regions, and down to the generation of Constantine, at any rate, the Christian community in the Latin provinces was in itself a smaller portion of a smaller total population than the Christian community was in the other two-thirds of the Empire. Even on this proportional basis, however, there is reason to believe that the toll of martyrdoms in the Greek and Oriental provinces was at least as heavy as in the Latin provinces, relatively to the difference in the respective absolute numbers of possible candidates for martyrdom in the different regions.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 349–50, above.

³ In the Oriental provinces of the Roman Empire the fifth century saw the Nestorian and Monophysite mass-movements against the 'Melchite' adherents of the Imperial Catholic Church. These movements, however, were endeavours, not so much to free the Church from the domination of the Temporal Power, as to free the still submerged portion of the Syriac World from the Hellenic ascendancy to which it had been subject since the days of Alexander the Great. (For this aspect of Nestorianism and Monophysitism see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 91; II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 236; and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 286–7, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 127, below.)

insistence of Ambrose that Theodosius the Great should do public penance for the sin of the Salonica Massacre was certainly a magnificent display of clerical courage which happened to be crowned with success. Yet the Bishop of Milan's successfully courageous act in calling Theodosius to account is not more worthy of admiration than the unsuccessful bravery of a justly famous Patriarch of Constantinople in publicly protesting against the misdemeanours of Theodosius's son and successor Arcadius. Indeed, we may be inclined to appraise John Chrysostom's defeat at a higher moral value than Ambrose's victory when we bear in mind the difference in the temperaments, endowments, and antecedents of the two saints. Ambrose—the son of a Praetorian Prefect, and himself already launched upon a promising career in the Imperial service before the people of Milan commandeered him for their bishop by main force—was a man of action of the same mettle as Theodosius himself; John Chrysostom was a scholar who would have led the sheltered life of a professor of literature if the dedication of his eloquence to the cause of Religion had not moved his conscience to go into action in the field of public life and inspired him with the faith to endure the pains of defeat in what was for him a strange and formidable arena. We may also remind ourselves that Saint John's see of Constantinople was not merely an Imperial capital but was essentially that and nothing else; for an interregnum of more than a hundred years' length effectively insulated the traditions of the New Rome founded by Constantine the Great in A.D. 330 from those of the ancient Greek city-state of Byzantium which had been devastated, and deprived of its statehood, by Septimius Severus in A.D. 196. On the other hand Saint Ambrose's see of Milan was a *ci-devant* city-state which had preserved its sense of continuity with its own past in spite of being used as an Imperial capital temporarily and provisionally. It is clear that Saint Ambrose would be fortified by his social environment in his resistance to the Imperial Power, while Saint John, on the contrary, would be weakened by his.

If we leap the interregnum which follows the break-up of the Roman Empire, and proceed to examine the respective records of the Orthodox and the Western Church in the critical period that begins with the launching of the Iconoclastic policy of the East Roman Emperor Leo Syrus, we shall find that every famous Western champion of the rights of the Church has his counterpart and peer in Orthodox Christendom.

Pope Gregory II and his successors in St. Peter's Chair were not more stalwart in their opposition to Leo's Iconoclastic decree of A.D. 726 than the Oecumenical Patriarch Germanus, who held out

under the Emperor's nose until at the end of four years the Emperor could find no better means of countering this formidable intransigence than the *ultima ratio* of throwing the Patriarch out of office. If the Papal opponents of Iconoclasm were able to indulge in the same intransigence without incurring the same fate, this was simply because the rehabilitated Government at Constantinople had made up its mind that it could not afford to take energetic action so far afield as Italy beyond the bounds of Calabria.¹ In retaliating against the Papacy Leo therefore contented himself with the forcible withdrawal, from the Pope's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, of all the eastern part of his former ecclesiastical domain from Calabria and Sicily to Crete and Salonica inclusive;² and these territories were transferred to the jurisdiction of the successors of Germanus at Constantinople, whom the Emperor expected to find more amenable to his will now that they had Germanus's fate before their eyes as a warning example of the penalty of clerical opposition to the 'Caesar-Pope' in the Imperial capital. Nevertheless, when Iconoclasm—repealed for a season by the Empress Irene (*imperabat* A.D. 780-90 and 797-802)³—was reinstituted by the Syrian Leo's Armenian namesake Leo V (*imperabat* A.D. 813-20), the indomitable Iconodule Patriarch Germanus found a worthy successor in the reigning Patriarch Nicephorus, who opposed Iconoclasm no less stalwartly, held out no less intransigently, and had likewise to be put out of the way by an eventual recourse to the *ultima ratio* of deposition. Nor was Nicephorus the only famous cleric of his generation in Orthodox Christendom who had the courage to suffer for opposing the Emperor Leo V's religious policy. He had good companions in Theodore of Studium (*vivebat* A.D. 759-826)⁴ and in Theodore's uncle Abbot Plato.

Thus the Oecumenical Patriarchate was at least as fearless as the Papacy in opposing an Iconoclast Imperial Government in act and deed, and this at a much greater material risk; and *a fortiori* the Orthodox Church outstripped the Western Church in fighting the same battle in the field of theological controversy, in which the

¹ For this East Roman policy of conserving energy and avoiding a dispersal of force see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 342-4, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 337 and 346, footnote 2, above.

³ During her first term Irene was acting as regent for her son the Emperor Constantine VI; during her second term she was reigning as his supplanter. The date of the first repeal of Iconoclasm was 787.

⁴ Theodore of Studium appealed from the successor of Constantine to the successor of Peter. His policy was to find in the Papacy a rallying-point and a leadership for all the Iconodule forces in the East Roman dominions; and this policy was reasonable, since the Pope was the most powerful of the Iconodule Catholic Patriarchs who were not at the East Roman Government's mercy. Unhappily Theodore found the Papacy a broken reed; and this was perhaps inevitable, since the Papacy in Theodore's day was anxious, not to assert itself against the Temporal Power, but to take shelter under its wing (see IV. (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 335-9, above).

Latins were notoriously tiros and the Greeks past-masters. This war of ink and paper against Imperial Iconoclasm had, of course, to be conducted by a scholar in some tranquil retreat where he was beyond the reach of the East Roman Emperor's arm; but the historic *malleus iconoclastarum* was not a Latin doctor wielding his pen under the aegis of an Iconodule King of the Franks, but a Greek controversialist, John Damascene, whose patron and protector was a Muslim Umayyad Caliph.¹

After the resistance of Popes Gregory II (*fungebatur* A.D. 715-31) and Gregory III (*fungebatur* A.D. 731-41) to the Iconoclastic policy of the Emperor Leo Syrus the next signal occasion on which a Pope set himself in opposition to an Emperor was when Pope Nicholas I (*fungebatur* A.D. 858-67) refused to countenance the offence of King Lothaire II of Lorraine in repudiating his lawful wife in favour of another woman, and persisted in this refusal even when the Emperor Lewis II took up his kinsman's cause and sought to coerce the Pope by making a military demonstration against Rome. This is the earliest prominent example of one of the most honourable, as well as courageous, ways in which the Papacy, in its prime, was to assert its authority against temporal princes. Pope Nicholas I's bold motion to curb and castigate the licentiousness of Lothaire of Lorraine was rewarded, after a long struggle, by the capitulation of the royal culprit; and this passage of arms inaugurated a long series of victorious Papal assaults upon the matrimonial misdemeanours of princes—a series which was only brought to an end by Pope Clement VII's unlucky experience with King Henry VIII of England some seven centuries later. This long-sustained Papal *tour de force* of 'lion-taming' was, of course, a magnificent performance; for the Pope was utterly out-matched in physical force by the temporal rulers whom he so resolutely called to order; and yet, time and again, these wild beasts quailed under the spiritual coercion of an unarmed priest—snarling and lashing their tails at the first crack of the Papal whip, yet creeping up for pardon in the end with ears laid back and tails between their legs.² The forcefulness—and artfulness—of these Papal tamers of princes is admirable; and the performance is perhaps the

¹ It is perhaps worth noting that the three men—the Emperor Leo Syrus (*imperabat* A.D. 717-40), the Pope Gregory III (*fungebatur* A.D. 731-41), and the theologian John Damascene, *alias* Mansūr ash-Shāmi (*vivebat prae* A.D. 700 – *prae* 754)—who between them did so much to produce the schism between Orthodox Christendom and Western Christendom, were, all three of them, either Syrians or of Syrian origin, though Syria lay outside the domains of both the nascent civilizations whose destinies these three men were deciding. This trivial fact is a small but pointed nail in the coffin of the racial explanation of the histories of civilizations.

² The secret of the Papacy's apparently miraculous power of bringing temporal rulers to heel was, no doubt, the sensitiveness of public feeling and public opinion throughout the Western *Reipublica Christiana* in responding to Papal pronouncements and Papal acts. The temporal subjects of a local prince were all of them at the same time the

supreme demonstration of the medieval Papacy's moral and intellectual power. Yet we may observe that in exercising this moral censorship over the princes of Western Christendom, as in opposing the ritual and doctrinal innovations of the Iconoclast Emperors of Constantinople, the Papacy, while risking much, was not staking its very existence. The limitations of the risk involved were brought out in the final encounter in which one royal lion at last broke this Papal spell, and broke it for ever, by truculently refusing to obey. The militant contumacy of King Henry VIII cost the Papacy the allegiance of England, and this was certainly a serious blow; yet the wound thereby inflicted on the Holy See was patently very far from being a mortal one, for it was manifest, from first to last, that the Patriarchate of Western Christendom was not in danger of bleeding to death in consequence of the amputation of a couple of outlying archbishoprics.

We may now observe that the censorship of princely morals, which was exercised by the Papacy from Pope Nicholas I's time onwards in the tradition of Saint Ambrose, was likewise exercised—with equal fearlessness but, again, at a far greater risk—by the Oecumenical Patriarchate in the same age.

For example, Pope Nicholas I himself was moved to support his contemporary the Patriarch Ignatius, who had been deposed in A.D. 858 for his public protests against the evil living of the Caesar Bardas—the virtual master of the East Roman Empire at the time. Ignatius's stand against Bardas cannot be accounted less courageous or less admirable than Nicholas' stand against Lothaire simply because the East Roman Emperor Basil I managed to use Ignatius (without Ignatius's intention or connivance) as a pawn in his political game, whereas Nicholas managed to get the better of the clumsy and impotent Western Emperor Lewis II. In view of the

spiritual subjects of the Pope; and if their temporal ruler was rash enough to risk a conflict of allegiances he was likely to find that his subjects' allegiance to the Pope had the stronger moral hold upon them, so that the contumacious prince was threatened with a loss of his own local authority, as well as with the moral disapproval of all the rest of Western Christendom. These were forces against which no medieval Western princeling could permanently contend. But the ability of the Papacy to mobilize these formidable moral forces in the Papal cause on any given occasion clearly depended upon the maintenance of a moral prestige which was overwhelmingly superior to that of any temporal ruler. This essential superiority of prestige was possessed in the ninth century by Pope Nicholas I as against Charlemagne's unimpressive diadochi and epigoni; and it was possessed again in still greater measure by a sufficient number of Popes in a series that opened with Hildebrand and closed with Innocent III. From the middle of the eleventh to the middle of the thirteenth century the Papacy could feel confident of emerging victorious in the long run from any conflict with any Western temporal ruler. Thereafter the moral prestige on which this Papal potency depended was ruined by the Papacy itself in its hybriatic self-idolization. Yet the accumulated prestige of the master-institution of the medieval West was so immense that it took centuries of folly and misconduct to dissipate it. 'The Babylonish Captivity' had to be followed by the Great Schism, and the Great Schism by the Conciliar Movement, before a Henry VIII could defy the Papal censorship of royal morals with impunity (see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512-84, above).

political circumstances, Basil's restoration of Ignatius to his Patriarchal chair in A.D. 867 cannot, perhaps, be regarded as a moral victory for the Patriarch over the Imperial Power; indeed, the true situation was made cruelly apparent ten years later when, upon Ignatius's death in 877, Basil promptly appointed to succeed him his erstwhile supplanter, the pliant worldling Photius. Yet this rather ignominious sequel to Ignatius's bearding of Bardas did not deter a more famous and forceful Patriarch in the next generation from discharging in his turn this formidable Patriarchal duty of calling the ruling personality in the East Roman Empire to account.

When the Emperor Basil I's son and successor, the Emperor Leo the Wise, set his heart in A.D. 905 upon marrying for the fourth time, and requested the reigning Oecumenical Patriarch Nicolaus Mysticus¹ to give his blessing to this Imperial project, the Patriarch refused to countenance an act which would be a flagrant breach of canon law—without allowing himself to be influenced by the fact that the Emperor was his personal friend and that he held his office by the Emperor's appointment. The farthest that he would go was to baptize and recognize the son who had just been born to the Emperor, out of wedlock, by the lady with whom the Emperor now desired to regularize his relations; and the Patriarch went thus far only on the understanding that the lady herself should be dismissed from the Imperial Court. When Leo accepted these terms and then broke them—three days after the Patriarch had performed his stipulated part—by having the marriage ceremony celebrated for him by another hand and then crowning this fourth wife as his Augusta, Nicolaus became intransigent; and on Christmas Day 906, when nearly twelve months had passed, he gave publicity to his attitude by a gesture which was worthy of Saint Ambrose himself. On Christmas Day 906 the Patriarch closed the doors of Saint Sophia in the Emperor's face; and this time the contest was not ended by the Emperor's retort—which was, no doubt, a foregone conclusion—of arresting and deporting and deposing the intransigent holder of the Patriarchal office and appointing a more pliant personality to replace him. Nicolaus lived to be restored to the Patriarchate by Leo's brother and successor Alexander after Leo's death in 912,² when Leo's unlawful fourth wife was also duly compelled, after all, to retire from

¹ The surname meant, not mystic, but confidential secretary or *Geheimrat* (Hussey, J. M.: *Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire, 867-1185* (Oxford 1937, University Press), p. 136, footnote 3).

² Leo himself appears to have repented on his death-bed and to have given orders for the Patriarch Nicolaus's reinstatement (*The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1923, University Press), p. 257).

the palace to a convent. Nicolaus then lived on to become, after Alexander's death, the President of a Regency Council which took over the government of the Empire on behalf of Leo's—and his fourth wife's—son Constantine Porphyrogenitus; and he still retained his Patriarchate when he lost his political position in A.D. 913, after a four months' tenure, through the return of the young Emperor's exiled mother to power. He remained in office long enough to see the guardianship of the boy-Emperor, and the mastership of the Empire which this guardianship carried with it, wrested out of the hands of the Empress-Dowager in A.D. 919 by the Admiral Romanus Lecapenus;¹ and under this new régime the Patriarch had the satisfaction of formally registering his own complete official victory in the struggle upon which he had entered some fifteen years before. In A.D. 920 the Patriarch Nicolaus, then in undisputed occupation of his Patriarchal Chair, was able to bring to an end, on his own terms, the schism between his own supporters and those of his temporary supplanter the Anti-Patriarch Euthymius. In an 'Act of Union',² which received the signatures of both parties, fourth marriages were condemned categorically, though in general terms.

Since the ultimate issue in the conflict between the Patriarch Nicolaus and the Emperor Leo the Wise had been not the particular question of fourth marriages but the general question of whether in Orthodox Christendom the Imperial office was subject to Patriarchal censorship, it might seem as though the signature of 'the Act of Union' signified a victory of the Church over the State of the same stamp as Pope Nicholas I's victory over the Emperor Lewis II. Indeed, a disinterested observer, had he been called upon to estimate the relative prospects of the Oecumenical Patriarchate and the Papacy in that year 920, would almost certainly have prophesied that the Patriarchate would have both the greater and the nobler future.³ In A.D. 920 the Papacy—bereaved of Imperial protection through the deliberate abstention of the East Roman Government and the lamentable débâcle of the Carolingians—was in the disgraceful plight of being used as a political tool by a gang of parochial Roman adventurers. From 904 to 966 the Papacy was in the hands of the 'family' of Theophylact the Vestiaris, as represented by the lovers and the sons and the grandsons of this gangster's wife and daughters. As late as 974 his grandson

¹ The political aspect of these events in the domestic history of the East Roman Empire has been dealt with already, in its relation to the Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 913–27, in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 384–5, above.

² 'Ὁ Τόμος τῆς ἑνώσεως.
³ It is significant that throughout the struggle between the Patriarch Nicolaus and the Emperor Leo VI it was the Emperor and not the Patriarch that enjoyed the countenance and support of the Papacy (*The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1923, University Press), pp. 256–8).

Cencius was able to depose and murder a Pope and install a pretender; and when this Antipope had to evacuate Rome he took refuge at Constantinople and was restored in 984 by an East Roman expeditionary force—to such good effect that he died in possession of St. Peter's Chair.¹ Thereafter, in 997, the anti-German faction in the Ducatus Romanus chose a Greek for their Antipope after they had driven out Otto III's Pope Bruno. Nor was it only for material assistance that Rome in this age addressed herself to Orthodox Christendom. At the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries such spiritual life as was to be found in Rome at the time was inspired by Basilian monks who had been drawn to Rome from Calabria by the crying need for filling a spiritual void.² On the eve of Hildebrand's birth there was nothing whatever in the Roman scene to suggest the imminence of the Hildebrandine revival. Even beyond the Alps the Cluniac movement, though now well under way, had not yet revealed its potentialities.³ In fact, for a full century after the Oecumenical Patriarch Nicolaus's triumph in A.D. 920 a disinterested observer might reasonably have pronounced that the spiritual citadel of Christianity was neither Rome nor Cluny but Constantinople. Yet any such pronouncement would have been promptly confuted by the sequel. Our hypothetical observer would not only have been astonished to see Marozia's grandson Pope John XII succeeded by Hildebrand within ninety years; he would have been perhaps even more surprised to see the Oecumenical Patriarch Nicolaus Mysticus succeeded by—nobody!

The truth seems to be that though Nicolaus was a much stronger character, as well as a much abler man, than his predecessor Ignatius, he was nevertheless outmanœuvred by the upstart Emperor Romanus Lecapenus in 919 in much the same way as Ignatius had been manipulated by the upstart Basil I in 867. In any case the Patriarch Nicolaus's ostensible victory did not accrue to the advantage of the Oecumenical Patriarchate—and this in spite of the fact that it could not have come at a more opportune moment for enabling the Patriarchate to recover the position which it had occupied, three hundred years before, in the time of the Patriarch Sergius. From the death of Leo the Wise in A.D. 912 till the end of Basil II's minority in A.D. 985 the legitimate occupants of the Imperial Throne were all the time either minors or political nonentities. Here was an unparalleled opportunity for some other power or institution in the body of the Orthodox Christian Society

¹ For this incident see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 338, footnote 1, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 357, above.

³ Indeed, since about A.D. 940 the Cluniac and other monastic reformers of France and Lotharingia had been coming for inspiration to the Basilian monastic settlements on Monte Gargano (see Gay, J.: *L'Italie Méridionale et l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing), p. 385).

to assert itself at the expense of the Imperial Crown and thus do Society the service of putting an end to that unhealthy predominance of one single institution which had prevailed for the past two hundred years. The power marked out for playing this role was the Oecumenical Patriarchate, which had just won a great moral victory over the Imperial Crown on the eve of the Crown's eclipse. Yet the Patriarchate failed to seize the opportunity that was offered to it. The Patriarch Nicolaus's regency in the year 913 did not create a precedent. Perhaps the deciding factor was the perilousness of the position in which the East Roman Empire found itself at this moment *vis-à-vis* Bulgaria; and this peril, as we have seen,¹ was part of the nemesis to which the Orthodox Christian Society had exposed itself through having subordinated the Church to the State during the eighth and ninth centuries. Whatever the explanation may be, the historical fact is that the regency of the East Roman Empire was not now secured by the Oecumenical Patriarchate as a permanent constitutional prerogative, but was usurped from 919 onwards until 976 by a series of military adventurers, beginning with Romanus Lecapenus and his sons and ending with Nicephorus Phocas and John Tzimiscēs. This military regency was a vigorous but a violent régime; and it met the foreign peril that had brought it into power by a grandiose policy of conquest which was a new and, as it proved, a disastrous departure in East Roman statesmanship.² It was after the East Roman Empire's fifty-seven years of military dictatorship that the Orthodox Christian Civilization broke down; and the breakdown and the dictatorship are demonstrably related to one another in the relation of effect and cause. If, during those critical years in the middle of the tenth century, the unhealthily predominant role of the East Roman Imperial Government in the life of Orthodox Christendom had been moderated by a touch of clericalism instead of being accentuated, as it actually was, by a bout of militarism, it seems probable that the disaster might have been staved off, and possible that it might have been averted.³

If we now glance back, from this point, over the history of the Orthodox Christian Civilization during its prematurely interrupted

¹ In IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 377-91, above.

² For this latter-day East Roman militarism see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 399-403, above.

³ More than a century after the time of the Patriarch Nicolaus Mysticus, his successor Michael Cerularius (*fungebatur* A.D. 1043-58) took advantage of the weakness which had overtaken the Imperial Power, after the death of the Emperor Basil II in 1025, in order to grasp at the prize which Nicolaus had missed. Cerularius seems to have come rather near to success in his dealings with the Emperors Michael VI Stratioticus and Isaac Comnenus; but even if his success had been complete it would have come too late, since the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization had by then already taken place. (The episode of Cerularius's Patriarchate is discussed in Hussey, J.M.: *Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire, 867-1185* (Oxford 1937, University Press), pp. 152-7.)

growth-phase, we can perceive both the extent and the limits of the State's ascendancy over the Church.

In the course of the two centuries that elapsed between the accession of Leo Syrus and the beginning of the regency of Romanus Lecapenus the East Roman State did effectively reduce the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church in its dominions to the status of a public service which had to be as amenable as any other branch of the Imperial administration to the will of a Government which was an absolute autocracy. When a Germanus came into collision with a Leo Syrus, or a Nicephorus with a Leo Armenius, or an Ignatius with a Caesar Bardas, or a Nicolaus with a Leo Sapiens, it was always the Emperor, and never the Patriarch, whose will prevailed; and this 'law' of East Roman history was illustrated just as pointedly when Ignatius was reinstated by Basil I or Nicolaus by Basil's son Alexander. On the other hand the Imperial Crown discovered that it could only carry off this cherished assertion of its sovereign authority over the Oecumenical Patriarchate by constituting itself the unimpeachable guardian and the zealous exponent of an Orthodoxy of which it could not at the same time constitute itself the judge. If the precious political precedent that had been set by Leo's drastic treatment of Germanus was to be harvested by Leo's successors on the Imperial Throne, then they must pay for this political advantage in religious coin by accepting Germanus's views, instead of Leo's, on the subject of the proper place of icons in Christian worship; and, on the same principle, if the Admiral Romanus Lecapenus was to make quite certain that the regency of the Empire, which he had usurped for himself, should not revert to the Patriarch Nicolaus, then, again, he must pay in the same religious coin for the same political commodity by accepting Nicolaus's views on the subject of the unlawfulness of fourth marriages. From the Crown's standpoint the vital necessity, on every occasion of encounter, was to put the Patriarchate in its place: that is, to advertise the fact that the Emperor and not the Patriarch was the master. If this fundamental proposition of East Roman political theory was effectively demonstrated in consequence of an Emperor's decision to purge Christian worship of icons or to contract a fourth marriage, then, when once the demonstration had been made, the Crown could afford to abandon Iconoclasm and to admit that fourth marriages were unlawful—and, henceforth, woe betide the Patriarch who dared to preach or practise what the Emperor had now renounced! So long as he was acknowledged to be master the Emperor was willing to be Orthodox; and so long as he was allowed to assert his mastery by his own tests he was willing to leave the definition of Orthodoxy to his clerical servants.

If this is a correct account of the relations between Church and State in the Orthodox Christian Society during its growth-phase, it will not be found applicable to the 'Time of Troubles' which set in after the breakdown in the tenth century. In the course of this later and more calamitous age we shall notice a considerable shift in the Balance of Power between the two leading institutions of the Orthodox Christian social system, and we shall observe that the change is in the Church's favour. The discomfiture of the State by the Church in this chapter of Orthodox Christian history is proved on the touchstone of the burning question of the age.

As the Orthodox Christian Society disintegrated it grew steadily weaker by comparison with its neighbours—the coeval sister society of Western Christendom on the one side and the nascent Iranic successor of the moribund Syriac Society on the other—and, as this happened, there was a change of emphasis in the field of religious controversy. The icon question, which had long ago been settled by compromise,¹ was now no longer a living issue; the question of ecclesiastical censorship over Imperial morals was in abeyance; the burning question now was that of the relation between the Orthodox and the Western Church. This question, of course, had its doctrinal aspect—the omission or insertion of the *Filioque* in the Creed—and its hierarchical aspect—the ecclesiastical independence of the Eastern Patriarchates or their subordination to the Roman See—but at bottom it was a question of politics. If the two churches could compose their differences, then Orthodox Christendom might hope to secure Western help against Turkish aggression. Conversely, if these differences were to rankle into a permanent and acknowledged schism, then Orthodox Christendom had to fear that the Franks might anticipate the Turks in making her their prey. This political issue was manifestly crucial; the fate of the East Roman Empire, and of the Orthodox Christian Society itself, was in the balance; and once again, as in the eighth and ninth centuries, the Orthodox Church and the East Roman Government were ranged on opposite sides—but this time under new conditions and with a different result.

This time it was not possible to arrive at a compromise on the previously accepted lines of tacitly separating the political and ecclesiastical aspects of the conflict from one another; for the political issue, now, was not simply the question whether the Church should admit the superior authority of the Imperial will on the unwritten and even unspoken understanding that the Constantinopolitan 'Caesar-Pope' should exercise the Papal functions of his 'totalitarian' authority in accordance with ecclesiastical rulings.

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, p. 117, below.

The answer to the political question in the present controversy depended neither upon the Orthodox Church nor upon the East Roman Imperial Government, but upon an alien power: the other, and now far stronger, Christendom in the West. This alien power now had the fate of Orthodox Christendom in its hands; it had the choice of either saving Orthodox Christendom or destroying her; and it would not choose the political course that meant her salvation unless the hierarchical and doctrinal issues were first of all settled to its satisfaction. In these circumstances East Roman statesmanship was bound to exert itself to the utmost in order to satisfy the Western Christians' ecclesiastical demands; and therefore, this time, it was not open to the East Roman Government to achieve its political aim by the time-honoured expedient of leaving the definition of Orthodoxy to the clerics. This time the ecclesiastical question and the political question hung together indissolubly; and the Emperor therefore had to insist *à outrance* upon a definition of Orthodoxy that would make his policy possible. He found, however, that the limits of his authority in the ecclesiastical sphere were unaltered and inelastic. In the definition of Orthodoxy the Church still had the last word; and now that the East Roman Imperial authority was perceptibly on the wane the Imperial statesmanship could not induce the Church to relinquish a prerogative to which it had clung, in the teeth of the Imperial Government, when the Empire had been at its zenith. On the questions of the *Filioque* and the Papal supremacy, as on those of icons and fourth marriages, the Church had its way; and the East Roman Government had to resign itself to the inevitable political consequences, though these were nothing less than the annihilation of the last vestige of the East Roman Empire and the forcible political unification of a long-distracted Orthodox Christian World under the pall of a *Pax Ottomanica*.¹

In this connexion it is noteworthy that the attitude of the East Roman Government on the questions of the Papal supremacy and the *Filioque* was from first to last conciliatory towards the Papacy by comparison with the attitude of the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church.²

¹ For the role of the Ottoman Empire in Orthodox Christian history as the Orthodox Christian universal state see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 190-1, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 298-300, below.

² The Orthodox hierarchy was never ready to acknowledge the Papal supremacy in matters of discipline or of doctrine—even when it was in desperate need of support against the East Roman Imperial Power. In the last resort the Orthodox hierarchy preferred the political yoke of an Emperor to the ecclesiastical yoke of a Pope if it was driven to make a choice between the two servitudes. On the other hand the Basilian monks, who had no hierarchical considerations to deter them, did not hesitate to place themselves under the banner of the Pope in their struggle against the Iconoclast East Roman Emperors.

This difference became apparent during the first crisis in the relations between Orthodox and Western Christendom—a crisis which began with Pope Nicholas I's championship of the *ci-devant* Oecumenical Patriarch Ignatius after his deposition in A.D. 858,¹ and which died away after the second deposition of Ignatius's supplanter Photius in A.D. 886.² The crisis was a dangerous one because the original conflict over a question of ecclesiastical discipline was enlarged and envenomed, not only by the introduction of a question of doctrine, but also by a competition for the ecclesiastical allegiance of the whole interior of South Eastern Europe from the Adriatic to the Carpathians and from the head-waters of the Maritsa to those of the Elbe.³ In this formidable transaction

¹ For the collision between the Patriarch Ignatius and the Caesar Bardas see pp. 597–8, above.

² The formal healing of the schism appears to have been accomplished in the years A.D. 898–900 (*The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1923, University Press), pp. 255–6, and Hussey, J.M.: *Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire, 867–1185* (Oxford 1937, University Press), p. 135).

³ This competition was a consequence of the removal of certain obstacles which had latterly insulated the two Christendoms from one another on the landward side. Under the Roman Empire within the Continental European frontiers that had been secured for it by Augustus (see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex I, vol. v, pp. 591–5, below) there had, of course, been direct communication overland, round the head of the Adriatic, between the Balkan and Asiatic provinces of the Empire on the one side and the West European provinces on the other; but Narses' march from a Balkan base of operations to an Italian theatre of war in A.D. 552 was the last recorded use of this overland route in the Empire's history. The overland communications between Constantinople and Milan, or Constantinople and Cologne, were severed by the Nomad pseudo-Avars' occupation of the Hungarian Alföld in A.D. 567 and the Nomad Bulgars' occupation of the southern as well as the northern half of the Lower Danube Basin in A.D. 680 in the wake of the Slav infiltrations of the sixth century. (See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 425 and 427, above.) By the middle of the ninth century, however, the insulation which had resulted from the combined effect of these barbarian intrusions had been overcome, partly through Charlemagne's extirpation of the incurably barbarous Avars in A.D. 791, and partly through the peaceful radiation of both the two adjoining Christian cultures into Bulgaria and the Slavias. In the seventh decade of the ninth century the pull of the two Christendoms upon the barbarians of South Eastern Europe became strong enough to make the barbarians themselves feel that they could no longer hold their own in the new homes which their immigrant forefathers had bequeathed to them unless they came to terms with one or other of the formidable, and at the same time fascinating, cultures that were exerting an ever-increasing influence upon these barbarians' lives; and, having all come more or less simultaneously to this conclusion, they severally decided that the adventure in civilization on which they had now determined to embark would be less hazardous if they chose the more distant, rather than the nearer, of the two Christendoms to be their god-parent. Accordingly we find Rostislav (or Rastislav), the barbarian prince of the Slavonic principality of Moravia, whose dominions lay close up against the expanding eastern frontier of the Carolingian Empire, applying to the East Roman Government at Constantinople for missionaries to instruct his subjects in the Christian Faith (Dvornik, F.: *Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome au IX^e Siècle* (Paris 1926, Champion), pp. 147 and 157–9), while Boris, the contemporary Khan of Bulgaria, whose dominions lay in an equally uncomfortable proximity to the Thracian frontier of the East Roman Empire, resorted to the East Roman Government's prompt dispatch to Moravia of the missionaries Cyril and Methodius—a move which threatened him with encirclement—by allying himself, in the same year, with the Western Emperor Lewis II (Dvornik, op. cit., p. 186). This Bulgarian move led the East Roman Government, in its turn, to hustle Bulgaria in 865 into an acceptance of Christianity from Orthodox Christian hands by the adroit combination of a military demonstration (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 380, above) and a territorial *douceur* (see the same chapter, p. 343, footnote 2, above). Boris, thus outmanoeuvred by East Roman statesmanship in 865, sought to safeguard a Christian Bulgaria against the overwhelming pressure of the Orthodox Christian Power which was her immediate neighbour by the clever stroke of placing Bulgaria under Papal jurisdiction in 866—a counter-move which promised to neutralize

the East Roman Government limited itself to two moderate aims and contented itself with achieving these and these only. The first aim was to make it unmistakably clear that the Emperor and not the Pope was the Oecumenical Patriarch's master; the second aim was to prevent the Pope from recovering his ancient ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Illyricum, of which he had been deprived in A.D. 732 by the Emperor Leo Syrus.¹ The aims of the Patriarch Photius were more ambitious and more aggressive. He wanted to discredit once for all the Papacy's claim to ecclesiastical supremacy over the other Patriarchates, and in order to compass this aim he was ready to open a doctrinal as well as a disciplinary breach between the Churches by convicting the Pope of heresy. The East Roman Government, however, was careful not to extend its support of its servant the Oecumenical Patriarch any farther than the Imperial policy required.

When Pope Nicholas I insisted upon the restoration of Illyricum, Calabria, and Sicily to his own jurisdiction, as a condition of his recognizing the legitimacy of Photius's investiture, the Imperial Government gave Photius its support. But after Photius, in 867, had gone so far as to denounce the Pope publicly for his concurrence in the Western heresy of adding the *Filioque* to the Nicene Creed, the newly enthroned Emperor Basil I deposed the over-militant Photius and restored Ignatius (whose act of *lèse-majesté* had not been committed against Basil personally, and whose spirit had been chastened in the meanwhile by some nine years of languishing in the wilderness). Thereupon the Emperor wrote to the Pope 'to ask him to send legates to a council at which the past should be forgotten, the Roman precedence stated and supremacy hinted, and no one should mention the word *Filioque*'.² At this Constantinopolitan Oecumenical Council of A.D. 869-70 Basil was, indeed, concerned with other things—to wit, the two fundamental aims of the Imperial policy—and he took the Papal legates by surprise in displaying an efficiency in the pursuit of his own interests which contrasted strongly with his indifference to the interests of his Patriarch. The Emperor saw to it that the procedure for the ex-Patriarch's trial should be arranged to the Emperor's own liking and not to the legates' liking; and when a Bulgarian embassy applied to the Council for a judgement as to whether the ecclesiastical allegiance of Bulgaria was owing to Rome or to Constan-

the East Roman success of the preceding year. It will be seen that the action taken by a barbarian Rostislav and a barbarian Boris in the years 862-6 raised the whole question of the ultimate ecclesiastical and cultural allegiance of South Eastern Europe. There is an illuminating discussion of this question in Dvornik, *op. cit.*, chs. 5-9.

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 337 and p. 346, footnote 2, and the present Annex, p. 595, above.

² Runciman, S.: *A History of the First Bulgarian Empire* (London 1930, Bell), p. f. 12.

tinople, the Emperor saw to it, again, that the representatives of the four Eastern Patriarchates should all pronounce in favour of Constantinople over the Papal legates' heads.¹

When, after this, the Papacy continued to make obstinate efforts to entice Bulgaria back to that ecclesiastical allegiance to the Roman See which she had acknowledged during the five years ending in 870,² Basil took the opportunity of Ignatius's death in 877 to reappoint Photius to the Patriarchal Chair, with instructions, this time, to solicit the Pope's approval for his appointment and to accept the condition, which the Pope proceeded to lay down, that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Bulgaria must be retroceded to the Papacy by the Patriarchate. This Photian *volte face* by Imperial command induced the Pope to send legates to a new council which met at Constantinople in 879; and here the Papal legates were persuaded to concur in referring the question of Bulgaria's ecclesiastical allegiance to the decision of the East Roman Emperor. Presumably they were given to understand in advance that if the Emperor's title to make the award were recognized he would render the award in their Pontifical master's favour. In any case the Emperor did actually decide in this sense; and the transaction is characteristic of the Imperial policy. What the Imperial Government really had at heart was to obtain a public acknowledgement that on the question of the ecclesiastical allegiance of Bulgaria the last word lay neither with the Patriarchate nor yet with the Papacy but with the Imperial Government itself; and for the sake of securing this victory in principle the Imperial Government was not unwilling to make a provisional concession on a point of practice.

As a matter of fact this award in the Papacy's favour cost the East Roman Empire nothing; for the Bulgarians (disillusioned by their short experience of Papal jurisdiction)³ annulled the Imperial

¹ On the historical merits of the case the Eastern Patriarchs were substantially in the right; for both the contemporary Bulgarian capital of Pliska, and the subsequent capital of Preslav, which was substituted for Pliska in the reign of Symeon (*imperabat* A.D. 893-927), lay within the former bounds of the *ci-devant* Roman Province of Moesia Secunda, which belonged to the Imperial Diocese of Thrace, which, in turn, was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. At the same time it is true that the ninth-century acquisitions of Bulgaria in the interior of the Balkan Peninsula, from Sardia south-westwards, lay within the former bounds of the *ci-devant* Roman Prefecture of Illyricum, which had originally fallen within the jurisdiction of the Roman See. As for Transdanubian Bulgaria, which lay within the bounds of the original Roman Province of Dacia, this was an ecclesiastical no-man's-land to which neither the Roman nor the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate could lay claim, since Dacia had been re-abandoned to the barbarians by Aurelian in the third century before the ecclesiastical geography of the Christian Roman Empire had been worked out.

² For this passing incident in Bulgarian ecclesiastical history see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 380-1, and the present Annex, p. 605, footnote 3, above.

³ In his reply to Boris' original overtures to the Roman See in A.D. 866 Pope Nicholas I had returned a non-committal answer to the Bulgarian Khan's request that he should be allowed to have a Patriarch of his own (Dvornik, *op. cit.*, p. 192). Thereafter the

award *de facto* by a policy of 'masterly inactivity'; and no doubt the Emperor had informed himself that this would be the sequel before he entered into his understanding with the Papal legates.¹ Thus the Emperor managed to deprive the Papacy of any plausible ground for convicting him of injustice, or even of unfriendliness, in his dealings with the Roman See, while at the same time he effectively secured that the whole of the interior of the Balkan Peninsula—both the *ci-devant* Diocese of Thrace and the *ci-devant* Prefecture of Illyricum—should be incorporated into the body social of Orthodox Christendom instead of gravitating towards the now alien and rival Christendom of the West.

In pursuing this policy of gaining the gist of what he wanted without goading the Papacy into making a breach with him Basil was also careful not to push his cultural imperialism in South Eastern Europe farther afield than seemed strictly necessary for the East Roman Empire's political security. So long as he could make sure of Bulgaria, which lay at his gates, he was content to let the distant Moravia go; and in this Moravian field the tactics of our modern Western imperialism—'first the missionary, then the consul, then the soldier'²—were not pursued by the cautious ninth-century East Roman statesman. Basil appears to have borne no grudge against the Photian missionaries, Cyril and Methodius, for their early decision³—which they took on common-sense geographical grounds—to place their new Moravian Church under the Papal jurisdiction.⁴ And when, after the death of Cyril's sur-

same Pope had recalled from Bulgaria his legate Bishop Formosus of Porto because he suspected him of pandering to Boris' ambition to obtain ecclesiastical autonomy (Dvornik, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-4). The last stroke that alienated Boris from Rome was the intransigence of the Curia in refusing to appoint as Bishop of Bulgaria the candidate on whom Boris had set his heart (Dvornik, *op. cit.*, p. 195).

¹ In fact, on the question of the ecclesiastical allegiance of Bulgaria the Papal legates were the victims of a trick, and they also succumbed to two other pieces of East Roman diplomatic sharp practice. Without realizing, apparently, what they were doing, they subscribed to an anathema against anybody who added anything to the Nicene Creed (that is, an anathema against the Pope for accepting the *Filioque*); and they also subscribed to a conciliar resolution rejecting the Pope's proposal to prohibit the nomination of laymen to the Episcopate (i.e. rejecting the Pope's manœuvre for disqualifying Photius).

² This description of our modern Western method of encroachment upon the lives of non-Western societies is attributed to the Emperor Theodore of Abyssinia, who duly met his end at the hands of a Western expeditionary force.

³ 'Je connais, avait-il dit, la tactique des gouvernements européens quand ils veulent prendre un état d'Orient. On lance des missionnaires d'abord, puis des consuls pour appuyer les missionnaires, puis des bataillons pour soutenir les consuls. Je ne suis pas un rajah de l'Indoustan pour être berné de la sorte: j'aime mieux avoir affaire aux bataillons tout de suite.'—Lejean, G. (ancien vice-consul de France à Massaua): *Théodore II, le Nouvel Empire d'Abyssinie, et les Intérêts Français dans le Sud de la Mer Rouge* (Paris 1865, Amyot), p. 160.

⁴ This decision seems to have been taken not later than A.D. 867, for the Pope to whom the two Photian missionaries made their application was Nicholas I, who died on the 13th November of that year.

⁵ The persistence of the friendship between the Imperial Court and the Photian missionaries in Moravia is proved by the fact that, circa A.D. 881, Methodius received and accepted an invitation from the Emperor Basil I to pay him a visit at Constantinople,

vivor Methodius in 885, the fledgeling Methodian Church was forcibly broken up, with the Papacy's connivance, by German missionaries of the Latin rite,¹ Basil appears again to have refrained from protesting against a high-handed act which implied the unqualified and definitive incorporation of the Moravian half of the South-East European no-man's-land into the body social of Western Christendom. The East Roman Government contented itself with rescuing the survivors of the Moravian clergy of the Slavonic rite and placing their services at the disposal of the Bulgarians,² who had revealed their intention to throw in their lot with Orthodox Christendom by tactfully ignoring the Emperor's own award of the year 879.³

This display of moderation and humanity was a master-stroke of East Roman diplomacy; for it served three purposes simultaneously. It gave the Bulgarians a concrete proof of East Roman goodwill and good faith; it emphasized the advantages of allegiance to a Church which tolerated and encouraged the ecclesiastical use of the local vernacular, by contrast with the irksomeness of the Western Church's oppressive imposition of an alien Latin; and in the third place it widened the gulf between a Bulgaria which took kindly to the Slavonic Liturgy and a Roman Church which would presumably be unwilling ever to concede to Bulgaria an indulgence which it had revoked so quickly, and so ruthlessly, in Moravia.⁴ Thus Basil anchored Bulgaria to the Orthodox allegiance; and his son and successor Leo the Wise clinched Basil's work by calling in the Nomad Magyars,⁵ with the result that these pagan barbarians

and also acceded to the Emperor's request to him to leave behind him a priest and a deacon of his party, with Slavonic books (Dvorník, op. cit., p. 278).

¹ After the death of Cyril during the two brothers' visit to Rome, Methodius had succeeded, with some difficulty, in persuading Pope Nicholas I's successor, Pope Hadrian II, to give the Moravian Church a *quid pro quo*, in exchange for its acceptance of the Papal jurisdiction, in the shape of a Papal authorization to employ a Slavonic Liturgy (see IV. C (iii) (b) 11, p. 216, footnote 1, above). This insistence of Methodius upon the use of the local vernacular, combined with his refusal to follow the Papacy in introducing the *Filioque*, were the offences which drew down destruction upon the Moravian Church after the death of the second of its two great founders (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 381, above).

² Runciman, op. cit., pp. 124-6; Dvorník, op. cit., pp. 298-9; see also the present Study, IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 381, above.

³ See pp. 607-8, above.

⁴ It is an intriguing, though perhaps an unanswerable, question whether there was any continuity of tradition between the short-lived Cyrillo-Methodian Slavonic Church of Moravia, which was founded in A.D. 862 and was suppressed by violence in A.D. 885, and the likewise ephemeral Hussite Slavonic Church which arose in the Bohemian part of Rostislav's Moravian principality some five centuries later. Both these 'Czecho-Slovak' religious movements were distinguished by a passionate attachment to the mother tongue, a deep hostility to Germanism, and an unwillingness to accept the supremacy of the Roman See except on their own terms. Are these remarkable resemblances simply the outcome of a fortuitous similarity of circumstances? Or was there in fourteenth-century Bohemia a subterranean 'folk-memory' of the Cyrillo-Methodian Church which was brought to the surface by the attraction of the kindred ideas of a latter-day English Wyclif?

⁵ For the circumstances see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 442, above.

occupied the Hungarian Alföld and thereby insulated the Cis-danubian remnant of an Orthodox Christian Bulgaria from the Transdanubian remnant of a Western Christian Moravia.¹ No doubt the East Roman Government was relieved to see the problems that had been raised in A.D. 862, by the establishment of contact between the two Christendoms overland, disposed of in A.D. 895 by the reintroduction of that wedge of insulating paganism which had been provided by the Avars before their annihilation in A.D. 791.²

The East Roman Emperor Basil I showed equal tact in handling the delicate relations between the East Roman Government and the Papacy that were involved in the expansion of the East Roman Empire's political dominions in Southern Italy.³ In A.D. 732 Basil's predecessor Leo Syrus had transferred from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Papacy to that of the Oecumenical Patriarchate⁴ the East Roman territory of Calabria, which in Leo's day was confined to the 'toe' of Italy (from the basin of the River Crati, inclusive, southwards) together with the enclave of Gallipoli in the 'heel'.⁵ Between 876 and 915 this modest overseas holding of the East Roman Empire on Continental Italian ground was expanded into an imposing dominion which included the whole of Southern Italy up to Gaeta on the one coast and the Gargano Peninsula on the other; and all the territory between the new frontier of 915 and the old frontier of 876⁶ was, at the time of the East Roman conquest,

¹ The Magyars evicted the Moravians and the Bulgars from their respective possessions in the Alföld; the Pechenegs, treading on the Magyars' heels, evicted the Bulgars from their remaining Transdanubian possessions in the territories now known as Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 383, footnote 1, above).

² There is an unmistakable conformity between the respective variations of the ecclesiastical relations between the Orthodox and Western churches and the geographical relations between the Orthodox and Western Christian worlds. The ecclesiastical relations became bad at the time of the first re-establishment of geographical contact overland in A.D. 862; this first ecclesiastical crisis passed off about the time when this geographical contact was broken by the Magyar occupation of the Alföld circa A.D. 895; a fresh crisis in ecclesiastical relations broke out after the second re-establishment of contact overland through the conversion of the Magyars to Western Christianity at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries. This time the re-establishment of geographical contact was permanent, and—conformably—the ecclesiastical schism was definitive.

³ For the history and motives of this East Roman expansion in Southern Italy—which began with the occupation of Bari in 876, was consummated in the campaign of Basil's general Nicephorus Phocas the elder in 885, and was confirmed by the extirpation of the nest of African Muslim pirates on the Garigliano in 915—see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 343-4, above.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 337 and 346, footnote 2, and the present Annex, p. 595, above.

⁵ The rest of the 'heel' had been conquered by the Lombard principality of Benevento between A.D. 671 and A.D. 687, after the death of the Roman Emperor Constans II. For Constans' previous attack on Benevento see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex I, above.

⁶ This territory falls into three categories: first the *ci-devant* possessions of the Lombard Duchy of Benevento in Apulia which had been conquered from the Lombards by Muslim raiders from Ifriqiyah in A.D. 840-5, wrested from these African conquerors by the East Roman Government in 876, and annexed to the East Roman Empire out-

under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Papacy. It would have been logical for the Emperor Basil to extend the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of his Patriarch, at the expense of the Pope, *pari passu* with the extension of his own political sovereignty at the expense of the previous political masters of Southern Italy; but a step that would have been logical would also have been highly impolitic, and Basil was careful to refrain from taking it. It has been conjectured that his son and successor Leo the Wise had a tacit understanding with the Roman See over the ecclesiastical allegiance of the South Italian bishoprics on the borderline.¹ In any case the three dioceses of Taranto, Oria, and Brindisi remained under the Papal jurisdiction and continued to use Latin as their liturgical language;² and the only new diocese of Greek language and Constantinopolitan allegiance that was created in Southern Italy at this time was that of Santa Severina in old Calabrian territory which had been under East Roman rule all along.³

This statesmanlike moderation of Basil and Leo remained the norm of East Roman ecclesiastical policy in Southern Italy so long as the East Roman dominion lasted—with a single exception, which proves the rule, during the reign of the military dictator Nicephorus Phocas the younger (*imperabat* A.D. 963–9).⁴ Having quarrelled with the Western Emperor Otto I over the political possession of Southern Italy, the East Roman Emperor Nicephorus revenged himself on the Papacy—which had called Otto in and had taken shelter under his aegis⁵—by setting himself to detach from the Roman allegiance a number of bishoprics in the East Roman provinces of Laghvardhia and Vasilicata—a move to which the Papacy replied by strengthening its own ecclesiastical organization in the East Roman protectorates of Benevento and Salerno.⁶ This change in East Roman ecclesiastical policy may have been one of the causes of the revolt of the Empire's Apulian Lombard subjects against the Imperial Government in A.D. 1009;⁷ but the strain imposed upon the relations between that Government and the Papacy was not so serious as to prevent these two Powers from taking concerted military action in A.D. 1053 against the Norman adventurers

right; second the surviving 'successor-states' of the Lombard Duchy of Benevento—the Duchies of Benevento, Capua, and Salerno—which were compelled to accept an East Roman protectorate in 885; third the three city-states of Amalfi, Naples, and Gaeta which had never been conquered by the Lombards and which paid to the East Roman Empire of Leo Syrus and Basil I the allegiance which they had never ceased to pay to the Roman Empire of Justinian and Heraclius.

¹ Gay, J.: *L'Italie Méridionale et l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing), p. 188.

² Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

³ Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

⁴ The Emperor Nicephorus was the grandson, as well as the namesake, of the general who rounded off the East Roman domain in Southern Italy in the campaign of A.D. 885.

⁵ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 338, above.

⁶ An account of this struggle will be found in Gay, *op. cit.*, pp. 347–64.

⁷ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 401, above.

who were at that time threatening to sweep away the whole political *status quo* in Southern and Central Italy.¹

From the foregoing survey it will be apparent that one of the uses to which the East Roman Government put its 'Caesaro-papal' authority over the Orthodox Christian Church—at any rate, from the reign of Basil I onwards—was to prevent the ecclesiastical rivalry between the Oecumenical Patriarchate and the Papacy from leading to an irremediable rupture. And this use of the monopoly of power which Leo Syrus had concentrated in the East Roman Government's hands was good as far as it went. The monopoly itself, however, was a social evil of such intrinsic maleficence that, as we have seen,² it involved not only the East Roman Empire, but the entire Orthodox Christian body social, in a premature breakdown. And as soon as this breakdown produced one of its inevitable fruits, in a weakening of the East Roman Government's power, the Orthodox Church took its revenge upon an oppressively 'totalitarian' political institution by casting off these galling political chains and trampling vindictively upon the tyrant who now lay prostrate. This belated revolt of the Orthodox Church against the East Roman Imperial Government³ in the days of the Orthodox Christian Society's decline was natural, but it was also suicidal; for the point on which the tardily emancipated Orthodox Church chiefly delighted to oppose and frustrate the East Roman Government's policy was in the matter of the Empire's good understanding with the Papacy; and when this indispensable column in the architectural design of East Roman statesmanship was pulled down, *furore Sampsonico*, by a subversive-minded Church Militant, the whole edifice of Orthodox Christian Society collapsed.

This disastrous consequence of a rather abrupt change in the Balance of Power between the Orthodox Church and the East Roman State was demonstrated by the success of the Oecumenical Patriarch Michael Cerularius (*fungebatur* A.D. 1043-58) in deliberately producing a schism between the Orthodox Church and the Western Church in defiance of the unanimous wishes of the East Roman Government and the Papacy and at the very time of the military alliance of these two Powers against the Normans which has been mentioned above. At this delicate moment, when the existence of the East Roman dominion in Southern Italy was at stake and when

¹ The joint Papal and East Roman operations of A.D. 1053 were, of course, a fiasco. The East Roman expeditionary force (commanded by Argyrus, the Byzantinized son of the Apulian Lombard rebel Melo) was driven off the field, while Pope Leo IX's German troops failed to save their master from being taken prisoner. (Pope Leo IX's military expedition against the Normans is touched upon in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), p. 548, above.)

² In IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 352-404, above.

³ This ecclesiastical insurrection against the incubus of the East Roman Empire was part of a wider movement—extending over most of the non-political field of social life—which has been touched upon in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 353-64, above.

friendly relations with the Papacy were therefore more than ever desirable from the East Roman Government's standpoint, Cerularius opened a bombardment of the Roman Church from those latterly silent theological batteries which had first been mounted by his predecessor Photius. On the occasion of Photius's attempt to play this dangerous game his mischievous activities had been promptly and severely quashed by the Emperors Basil I and Leo the Wise; and, when Cerularius assumed the Photian role, an attempt to repress the Patriarch in the traditional Imperial manner was duly made by Constantine IX Monomachus, the Emperor of the day; but, instead of accommodating himself to the Imperial policy like his pliant predecessor, Cerularius proved recalcitrant and unmanageable.

Imperial pressure did, indeed, so far avail as to conscript Cerularius's ungracious co-operation in an attempt to preserve those correct official relations between the Imperial Government and the Papacy that had subsisted, for the most part, since the healing of the Photian schism in A.D. 898-900; and the Imperial diplomacy was able to insist that the first move in these ecclesiastical negotiations should be made by a cleric who was perhaps rather less out of sympathy with the Imperial policy than the Patriarch himself.¹ The negotiations were started by a letter from the autocephalous Archbishop of Ochrida (an Orthodox prelate whose see lay in the West Bulgarian territories of the East Roman Crown, which were outside the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction)² to the Archbishop of Trani (the most Byzantinophil of the Latin prelates in Southern Italy, by contrast with his neighbour and rival of Bari, who was the protagonist in the anti-Byzantine party).³ This attempt at an ecclesiastical *rapprochement* had the warm approval and support of Argyrus, the Byzantinized son of the Apulian Lombard rebel Melo,⁴ who had been sent out to Italy by the East Roman Government in 1051 on the mission of restoring the Imperial authority after it had been shaken by the double blow of the Norman invasion and the treason of the previous East Roman Governor Maniakis. In fact, it is possible that Argyrus—by origin a Lombard of the Latin rite—was the actual author of the policy, for at the time of his appointment we find him protesting against Cerularius's idea of weaning from the Latin rite the Empire's Latin

¹ Archbishop Leo of Ochrida cannot have struck the Latins as being conspicuously sympathetic to their cause, or he would not have been included, as he was, in the anathema which was pronounced against the Patriarch by the Papal legates in 1054 after the deposit of their bull of excommunication (see p. 614, below).

² For the preservation of the ecclesiastical autonomy of this *ci-devant* West Bulgarian Patriarchate after the annexation of the West Bulgarian Empire to the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1019 see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 394, footnote 1, above.

³ For this first stage of the negotiations see Gay, *op. cit.*, pp. 491-5.

⁴ See p. 612, footnote 1, above.

subjects in Italy.¹ Cerularius, on his part, may have feared that the policy promoted by Argyrus might work together with the contemporary increase in the prestige and power of the Papacy² to checkmate the Oecumenical Patriarchate's South Italian ambitions and perhaps even to eliminate its authority altogether in the regions west of the Adriatic.³ Cerularius was determined to prevent the Imperial Government and the Papacy from securing their respective interests in Southern Italy by a bargain at the Oecumenical Patriarchate's expense; and so he displayed an intransigence and an aggressiveness that were calculated to provoke, and did provoke, a rupture.

In 1053 Cerularius forcibly closed the churches of the Latin rite in Constantinople; and when three Papal legates arrived in Constantinople in the spring of 1054 the Patriarch refused to meet them. The representatives of the Pope were hospitably entertained by the Emperor and were cordially received at the monastery of Studium with its philo-Roman tradition; but the courtesy of the Imperial Government and the monks could neither overcome nor outweigh the Patriarch's studied hostility; and finally, on the 16th July, 1054, the Papal legates deposited on the altar of St. Sophia a document declaring Cerularius excommunicated in the name of their master. The Emperor not only failed in an effort at the thirteenth hour to repair the breach; he was actually compelled by the pressure of public opinion to write the Patriarch an open letter apologizing for his own complacency towards the Roman See and throwing the blame upon Argyrus. Thereafter, with the Emperor's reluctant assent, the Patriarch convened a council of the prelates within his jurisdiction, and on the 20th July, 1054, this Council formally condemned the Papal bull. Thus the East Roman Government's attempt to secure an ecclesiastical *rapprochement* ended unhappily in producing the opposite result of a formal and open schism which was the Patriarchate's tardy but telling revenge upon the Imperial Government for three centuries of humiliation.

This ecclesiastical breach did not break the *entente* between the Papacy and the East Roman Government, but in alienating the sympathies of the East Roman Empire's Latin subjects it played into the hands of the Normans,⁴ and it must therefore be regarded as one of the factors responsible for the extinction of East Roman rule in Italy in the course of the next twenty-five years. In-

¹ Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

² Pope Leo IX (*fungebatur* A.D. 1049-54) was a capable and strong-minded Transalpine cleric who had realized the need for reform and had taken the most effective step possible towards setting a reform movement in motion when he had chosen Ildebrando Aldobrandeschi the Tuscan to be his right-hand man (see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), p. 529, above).

³ Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 497.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 401-2, above.

cidentally the conquest of the East Roman dominion in Southern Italy by the Normans carried with it the retransference of all the conquered territories—including Calabria and Sicily—from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Constantinople to that of Rome. But the Orthodox Christian hierarchy did not draw the obvious inference. Its Italian losses simply exasperated it into an obstinate determination to make sure that the schism of A.D. 1054 should never be closed except—*quod erat absurdum*—through a complete and uncompromising acceptance of the Orthodox Church's terms; and the permanent alienation from one another of the two Christendoms, which was the result of this ecclesiastical intransigence, was a far graver consequence—not only for the East Roman Empire, but for Orthodox Christendom as a whole—than the loss of a Transadriatic outpost.

The policy of keeping on good terms with the Papacy, which had been bequeathed by the Emperor Basil I to his successors on the East Roman Imperial throne, was maintained, with momentary lapses, by the East Roman Government so long as the East Roman Empire continued to exist; but the later Emperors were as unsuccessful as Constantine Monomachus in their attempts to put the policy into effect in the teeth of the Orthodox hierarchy's resistance; and this resistance became all the more fanatical as the disintegration of the Orthodox Christian Society demonstrated, at each further stage of its disastrous course, that the Government and not the hierarchy was in the right.

From the morrow of the restoration of a shadow of the East Roman Empire at Constantinople in A.D. 1261,¹ after the disastrous interlude of a Western usurpation, down to the moment of its final obliteration through the Ottoman Conquest in A.D. 1453, the line of Emperors which began with the re-conqueror of Constantinople, Michael VIII Palaeologus (*imperabat* A.D. 1259–82), and which ended with his descendant Constantine XI Dhraghasis (*imperabat* A.D. 1448–53), made repeated efforts to close the breach that had been opened in A.D. 1054; and these latter-day East Roman statesmen displayed the traditional East Roman sense of political realities. They faced the fact that the Balance of Power between the two Christendoms had now turned overwhelmingly in favour of the West, and they conformed their policy to this change of circumstance by consenting now to come, both literally and metaphorically, on to Western ground. Michael Palaeologus himself was so far from being dazzled by his personal success in recovering the

¹ For the work of the Greek principality of Nicaea in expelling the Western usurpers who had seized Constantinople and Greece in A.D. 1204, under pretext of conducting a 'Fourth Crusade', see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 27, above.

Imperial City that he lived in dread of seeing this audacious vindication of an historic right bring down upon him the Western *revanche* of another 'crusade' with the Greek 'schismatics' for its victims instead of the Muslim 'unbelievers'; and this prudent anxiety led him, in A.D. 1274, to attend an oecumenical council, convened by Pope Gregory X in the Transalpine city of Lyon,¹ where the schism was officially closed by the Emperor's acceptance of the Papal supremacy and the *Filioque*. As early as 1282, however, Michael's weaker successor Andronicus II was compelled to denounce the Union of Lyon under Orthodox ecclesiastical pressure; and the same fate overtook the Emperor John Palaeologus's repetition of Michael's act in 1439 during the Council of Ferrara and Florence. Once again the articles of capitulation to which an East Roman Emperor had given a facile assent in a Western council-chamber were repudiated by his clergy and people at home; and though, this time, the Imperial Government avoided the additional humiliation of being compelled by its own subjects to denounce a compact with an alien Power which was humiliating enough in itself, this last assertion of the Imperial will profited the Empire nothing.

The last of the Palaeologi, the heroic Constantine Dhraghasis, whose fate it was to play Hector's role in the *excidium* of the Third Troy, was still in communion with Rome when he stood in the breach, awaiting the Janissaries' irresistible assault, on the 29th May, 1453; but he had been basely betrayed by the Western allies whose bounden duty it was to succour their beleaguered co-religionist. Giustiniani and his like no more availed to save the devoted city from its doom than Rhesus had availed to bring effective relief to the Byzantine Hector's Homeric prototype. The same day saw the fall of the Imperial City and of the Imperial namesake of Constantine the Great; and, if we may venture to sum up the common cause of their ruin in a single sentence, we may say that this tragedy occurred in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era because the 'Caesaro-papism' of the Roman Emperor Constantine had been first successfully revived in the eighth century by the East Roman Emperor Leo Syrus and then successfully defied in the eleventh century by the Oecumenical Patriarch Michael Cerularius.

If we probe somewhat deeper into the causes of the shift in the Balance of Power between the East Roman Government and the Orthodox hierarchy during the four centuries, ending in the year 1453, which witnessed the Empire's extinction, we shall probably come to the conclusion that the change is not fully explained by the progressive weakening of the Imperial Power. This negative

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 532 and 544, above.

factor would hardly have operated with such potent effect if it had not been reinforced by a positive increase in the strength of the Church; and if we inquire, in turn, into the causes of this advance in ecclesiastical authority, we shall discover two: one of them external to the life of the Church, and the other intrinsic to its development in this age.

The external factor which strengthened the hands of the Orthodox hierarchy in its successful opposition to the Imperial Government's policy of reconciliation with the Papacy was the force of feeling and opinion in the Orthodox Christian World, which became increasingly hostile to the West and therefore increasingly ready to allow the Church to mobilize it against the Imperial Government on behalf of an anti-Western policy.

From the moment when the two Christendoms first re-encountered one another upon the recovery of the Western World from the post-Carolingian interregnum,¹ they each displayed an instantaneous antipathy for the other. On the Western side this feeling declares itself with a ludicrous violence in almost every line of the report on his diplomatic mission to Constantinople in A.D. 968 which the North Lombard bishop Liutprand of Cremona wrote for his Saxon master the Western Emperor Otto I.² On the Orthodox Christian side the learned Imperial authoress Anna Comnena (*vivebat* A.D. 1083–*post* 1148), in her *Alexiad* or history of the life and times of her father the East Roman Emperor Alexius I (*imperabat* A.D. 1081–1118), displays a dislike for the Westerners and all their works which is not less intense for being less vulgarly expressed than Liutprand's animus against Anna's world.³ From

¹ For this interregnum see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 322–3, above.

² See the *Legatio, passim*, in *Liutprandi Episcopi Cremonensis Opera* (ed. by Becker, J.: Hanover and Leipzig 1915, Hahn). It may be noted that this was Liutprand's second visit to Constantinople, and that, in his account of his first visit, which is also extant (see the *Antapodosis*, Book VI, in ed. cit., pp. 151–8), the emotional colour is by no means hostile. How are we to account for this change in Liutprand's feelings towards Orthodox Christendom during the comparatively short interval of nineteen years between A.D. 949 and A.D. 968? Is it simply a personal change which is to be explained by the fact that on his second visit he was in the service of a prince who at that moment was on bad terms with the Constantinopolitan Government? Or are we to detect in Liutprand's change of tone the reflexion of a general change for the worse in public feeling towards Orthodox Christendom throughout the Western World? In this connexion we may observe that Liutprand's Anti-Byzantinism, as he displayed it in A.D. 968, was not shared by all Liutprand's Western contemporaries. His own kinsmen, the Southern Lombards, continued to take kindly to Byzantine culture for at least another hundred years; and this was true *a fortiori* of those Italian communities—an Amalfi and a Naples and a Gaeta and a Ducatus Romanus—which had never fallen under Lombard rule. We have already noticed, in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 357, and in the present Annex, p. 600, above, the influence of Basilian monachism upon the religious life of the Ducatus Romanus of the tenth and eleventh centuries. The secular masters of Rome in the same age—the family of the Vestiaris Theophylact and their descendants the Crescentii and the Counts of Tusculum—were manifestly more 'Byzantine' than 'Transalpine' in their culture and their ethos. And even the Transalpine conquerors of Southern Italy came under the Byzantine spell from Otto II and Otto III to Frederick II inclusive.

³ See, for example, Anna's account of the Western invention of the cross-bow, which

that time onwards until the latter part of the seventeenth century this antipathy persisted on both sides; but, as often happens, the weaker of the two parties to the relation made up for its physical impotence by the vehemence of its feelings.

Within less than a hundred years of Anna's day these feelings had risen to such a pitch of intensity on the Orthodox Christian side that, when the people secured an accomplice on the Imperial throne in the person of the disreputable Comnenus Andronicus I (*imperabat* A.D. 1182-85), they instantly indulged in a general massacre of all the Western residents in the East Roman dominions.¹ The feelings which had prompted this atrocity were naturally not assuaged by the prompt and savage reprisals that were taken by the Sicilian Normans and the Venetians; and the detestation of Western Christendom in the Orthodox Christian World was burnt into the souls of all later generations when Venetian diplomacy diverted 'the Fourth Crusade' from Palestine to Constantinople, with the result that in A.D. 1204 the Imperial City was captured and sacked, and the East Roman Empire itself partitioned, by a piratical gang of Latin military adventurers.

Thereafter a rabid Anti-Westernism became the master-passion of the Orthodox Christian Society; and this was the one field in which the otherwise discordant nations of Orthodox Christendom, who had wrecked their common civilization by their internecine strife,² could bring themselves to make common cause. The Latin conquerors of the East Roman Empire found, to their dismay and their undoing, that the Bulgars—who, after 167 years of political servitude, had successfully thrown off the East Roman yoke in A.D. 1186, only eighteen years before the Latin conquest of Constantinople—were as implacably hostile to the Western interlopers as were their Greek co-religionists. This spirit in Orthodox Christendom not only frustrated the efforts of East Roman statesmanship to achieve a *rapprochement* with the West during the two centuries that followed the Greek reoccupation of Constantinople in 1261; in the

has been cited in III. C (iii), vol. iii, pp. 385-6, above. In dealing with Western people, as distinct from Western things, Anna reserves the cream of her invective for bespattering the Normans, who had, of course, surpassed all other Westerners up to date in the amount of injury that they had inflicted upon the East Roman Empire (and who, for that matter, were hated just as intensely, and with just as good reason, by their own fellow Westerners, and Anna's fellow victims, the Southern Lombards and the English). At the same time Anna arraigns all Westerners, without distinction, for their egotism, self-conceit, loquacity, impulsiveness, inconstancy, and boorishness (see the *Alexiad*, *passim*). Anna's contempt for the Western culture is vindicated by an *argumentum ad hominem* in her anecdote of the fighting priest (*Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 8).

¹ This Near Eastern atrocity of the year 1182 of the Christian Era may be compared with the general massacre of all the Roman residents in Asia Minor in the year 88 B.C.: a similar act of popular fury which was likewise committed under the aegis of a political adventurer who in that episode was King Mithradates Eupator of Pontic Cappadocia (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 69, below).

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, p. 82, footnote 3, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 320-408, above.

same measure, it assisted the contemporary efforts of Ottoman statesmanship to impose the boon of political unification upon Orthodox Christendom by force. After a long and intimate and painful experience of both the two neighbouring societies the Orthodox Christians found the Ottoman version of Islam less unpalatable than the Latin version of Christianity; and when, in the end, they were forced to make the choice between Latin patronage and Ottoman domination, they did not hesitate to choose the latter as the lesser evil. The Greek grandee who declared in A.D. 1453, when Mehmed the Conqueror's hand was already raised above Constantinople to deliver the *coup de grâce*, that 'the turban of the Prophet' was preferable to 'the tiara of the Pope',¹ was accurately expressing in his mordant epigram the sentiments of all his co-religionists—Bulgars and Serbs and Rumans, as well as Greeks—who were now in the act of being united with each other, and divorced from the Christians of the West, through the triumph of a non-Christian Power.

Thus, from the eleventh century onwards, popular feeling fought potently on the side of the Orthodox Church in its contest with the East Roman Imperial Government over the capital question of Orthodox Christian relations with the West; but the Church's eventual victory over the East Roman State was not solely due to the support of this external ally in this part of the battle-field. The Church eventually established its ascendancy over the State not only in the matter of relations with the West but along the whole front on a battle-field that extended over almost every province of life; and this general change to the Church's advantage in the Balance of Power between Church and State must be ascribed to an intrinsic strengthening of the Church—both in organization and in *moral*—which began in the twelfth century² and continued thereafter.

When the Comnenian Dynasty (*imperabant* A.D. 1081-1185)³ temporarily rallied the East Roman Empire⁴ from the shock which

¹ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. lxxviii, quoted already in I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 29, and in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, in the present volume, p. 71, above.

² At the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries the moral standing of the Orthodox Church had been low—the feebleness of the secular clergy being matched by the immorality of the regulars (for a careful yet vivid picture, see Oeconómos, L.: *La Vie Religieuse dans l'Empire Byzantin au Temps des Comnènes et des Anges* (Paris 1918, Leroux), chs. 6-9). The subsequent rally was heralded by the careers of Saint Christó-doulos and Bishop Eustathius.

³ These are the dates of the continuous rule of the Comneni as East Roman Emperors at Constantinople. They do not include the reign of the forerunner Isaac Comnenus (*imperabat* A.D. 1057-9), who stands to his Comnenian successors as the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf of Hapsburg stands to the later Hapsburg wearers of the Western Imperial Crown. Again, these dates do not include the reigns of those acions of the Comnenian House who ruled at Trebizond over a local 'successor-state' of the East Roman Empire from A.D. 1204 to A.D. 1462.

⁴ For this rally see further V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 298, below.

it had received in the middle of the eleventh century through the simultaneous assaults of the Normans and the Saljuqs, they duly re-asserted the Imperial Government's 'Caesaro-papal' pretensions;¹ but this was not the leading note of the relations between State and Church in the new age. The forerunner of the new dynasty, Isaac Comnenus, had recompensed the Patriarch Michael Cerularius for his good offices in hoisting Isaac on to the Imperial Throne by transferring to the Patriarchate in perpetuity certain important rights of patronage and administration in ecclesiastical affairs which had hitherto been retained in the Imperial Government's hands. The *Restitutor Imperii*, Alexius I, himself made a momentous new departure, tantamount to an abandonment of 'Caesaro-papism' in principle, when he conceded civil as well as ecclesiastical autonomy to the Basilian monastic communities on the peninsula of Athos² and the island of Patmos;³ and at Athos this concession in principle obtained its full practical effect when the supervisory control over the monastic federal republic, which Alexius I Comnenus had retained in his own Imperial hands, was transferred to the hands of the Oecumenical Patriarch⁴ by the Emperor Andronicus II Palaeologus (*imperabat* A.D. 1282-1328).

The effect of Alexius's and Andronicus's generosity upon the fortunes of the Orthodox Church is comparable to the advantage which the Papacy secured in the West through the donations of Pepin and Charlemagne. 'The Holy Mountain', like 'the Holy See', became an inexpugnable stronghold from which the Church could confidently take the offensive against the Secular Power, in the knowledge that its opponent could never retaliate by cancelling the gift that it had irrevocably made. With Athos as their base of operations, a new party of 'Zealots' arose in the Orthodox Church in the course of the twelfth century, to do battle with the Photian-

¹ See Vasiliev, A. A.: *Histoire de l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris 1932, Picard, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 121-2, and Oeconómos, L.: *La Vie Religieuse dans l'Empire Byzantin au Temps des Comnènes et des Anges* (Paris 1918, Leroux), chs. 4 and 6. The latter author gives chapter and verse for the view that 'les empereurs du xii^e siècle ne furent pas à l'égard de leurs patriarches plus tolérants que leurs prédécesseurs. Bien au contraire, le chef de l'Eglise byzantine est alors subordonné au basileus plus complètement que jamais' (p. 104).

² The monastery of the Great Laura, which was the nucleus of the cluster of monasteries on the Athos Peninsula, had been founded by St. Athanasius, the spiritual director of Nicephorus Phocas the younger, in A.D. 961, when the peninsula had once more become a safe place for monks to inhabit thanks to Nicephorus's success in destroying the nest of Andalusian pirates in Crete.

³ Vasiliev, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 124. For details of Alexius's act of cession of the island of Patmos to the would-be reformer of Basilian monachism, Saint Christódhoulos, see Oeconómos, op. cit., pp. 147-9; following the documents printed in Miklosich, F., and Müller, J.: *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi Sacra et Profana* (Vienna 1860-90, Gerold, 6 vols.), vol. vi, pp. 44-8.

⁴ Saint Christódhoulos' abortive monastic republic on the island of Patmos had been expressly exempted from the Oecumenical Patriarch's control by the terms of the Emperor Alexius I's charter (Oeconómos, op. cit., p. 149). For the history of the Patmian experiment see also Hussey, op. cit., pp. 190-3.

minded 'political'.¹ And the outcome of the Emperor Andronicus's act of placing Athos under the authority of the Oecumenical Patriarchate *de jure* was to enable the Mountain and 'the Zealots' to capture the Patriarchate *de facto* and to retain their control over it in perpetuity.² This *union sacrée* between the prelates and the monks of the Orthodox Church against the East Roman Imperial Government and the Papacy was both a consequence and a cause of the Imperial Power's decay. It could hardly have been achieved if the hierarchy had not ceased to be subservient to the Emperors or if the monks, on their part, had not ceased to need the support of the Papacy in order to set the Emperors at defiance. At the same time this alliance of the prelates and the monks, under the leadership of the latter, notably increased the fighting power of the Orthodox Church Militant,³ and proportionately decreased the Imperial Government's chances of carrying out a philo-Papal policy against the Orthodox Church's will.

Moreover, by that time the Patriarchate had at last established the right—for which it had fought so courageously against a Caesar Bardas and a Leo the Wise⁴—of censoring an Emperor's morals. In A.D. 1262 Andronicus II's predecessor on the Imperial throne, the redoubtable re-conqueror of Constantinople Michael Palaeologus, had been excommunicated by the Patriarch Arsenius in punishment for his crime of blinding his political victim the ex-Emperor John Lascaris; and, when Michael made the traditional Imperial retort of proclaiming the presumptuous cleric's deposition, Arsenius refused to consider himself deposed. From his place of exile at Proconnesus he exerted a greater spiritual influence over the Emperor's Orthodox subjects than he had wielded when he was in material possession of the Patriarchal Throne at Nicaea and Constantinople; and his moral victory was commemorated in the name of the Arsenites: a new party in the Church, who stood for ecclesiastical independence of the Imperial authority in spiritual things. A similar independence of mind was displayed, in a different cause, by John Vekkos, a cleric who was Arsenius's younger contemporary and who first made himself prominent as an opponent of Michael Palaeologus's project for the Union of the Churches. On this account Vekkos was imprisoned by the Emperor; and although he became a convert to the Unionist cause and was promoted by

¹ Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 354 seqq. A Western student who thinks in terms of his own history will be reminded of the controversy in France, some four hundred years later, between the Catholic League and the *Politiques*.

² Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 360.

³ 'In matters of individual spiritual development, Emperor and secular clergy could only stand aside and share, or envy, the reverence which rich and poor alike gave to those monks whom they could recognize as holy men.'—Hussey, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁴ See pp. 597-9, above.

Michael to the Patriarchate in 1275, after the Union of Lyon, he proved the sincerity of his conversion when, in 1282, the Emperor Andronicus II revoked the Act of Union in deference to the prevailing current of feeling in Orthodox ecclesiastical circles. On this occasion Vekkos refused to abandon a cause which he had deliberately, and profitably, embraced, now that it had turned out to be unpopular; and he remained faithful to his Unionism until his death, thirteen years later, in prison.

In entrenching itself on Athos, and asserting itself in Constantinople, during the second, and culminating, phase of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles',¹ the Orthodox Church was equipping itself—no doubt unconsciously and unintentionally—for the task which was assigned to it by the great Ottoman statesman Mehmed the Conqueror. The ruthless Ottoman slayer and supplanter of the last of the East Roman Emperors not only gave a gracious investiture to a new Oecumenical Patriarch,² but proceeded to confer upon his creature Gennadius³ a jurisdiction to which no incumbent of the Oecumenical Patriarchate would ever have dreamed of aspiring so long as an East Roman Emperor or a Bulgarian Tsar or a Serbian Despot still retained his throne.⁴ The Pādīshāh Mehmed made the Patriarch Gennadius his *millet-bāshī* for the *Millet-i Rūm*, which, being interpreted,⁵ means that he made him the deputy-shepherd of all the Pādīshāh's *ra'īyeh* of the Orthodox Christian Faith throughout the Pādīshāh's dominions. Thus, when the Ottoman Empire attained its widest extent during the century that opened with Mehmed II's reign, the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople found himself—no doubt to his own bewilderment—reinstated over his former Greek flock, given authority over them in civil and temporal affairs, and empowered to exercise the same authority over his Greek subjects' Bulgar and Serb and Ruman and Greek and Arab co-religionists in the ecclesiastical domains of his own peers: the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Jerusalem and Antioch, the President of the Autocephalous Church of the Greek island of Cyprus, the Patriarch of Bulgaria, and the autonomous archbishops of Ochrida and Peč.⁶ At this moment of simultaneous

¹ For this relapse see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 298–9, below.

² See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 203, footnote 4, below.

³ Gennadius was at this time the leader of the Anti-Unionist party in the Orthodox Church. Before taking his monastic vows he had been prominent, under his secular name of George Scholarius, as the private secretary of the Emperor John VIII Palaeologus and a supporter of the Union. He had been converted to the Anti-Unionist persuasion by Mark of Ephesus, who had been the leading 'Die-Hard' at Ferrara and Florence.

⁴ This point has been touched upon by anticipation in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 346, footnote 2, above.

⁵ For the Ottoman social and political system see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 22–50, above.

⁶ For the restoration of the 'autocephaly' of Peč (*Turcice İpek*) by Sultan Süleymān's Serb-born Grand Vizier, Mehmed Sököllü, in A.D. 1557, see Part III. A, vol. iii,

exaltation and abasement the Patriarchate of Constantinople at last justified the title of 'Oecumenical', which it had assumed nearly a thousand years before,¹ by effectively exercising at least a civil jurisdiction over the Orthodox Church throughout the World.²

It will be seen that, in a sense, the fortunes of the Oecumenical Patriarchate were made by the Ottoman conquest of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, somewhat as the fortunes of the Papacy had been made, a thousand years earlier, by the barbarian conquest of the Latin provinces of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era. During the intervening millennium the Papacy had first slowly built up an oecumenical dominion over Western Christendom and had then slowly lost the pre-eminent position that it had previously gained.³ It is curious to observe that the Oecumenical Patriarchate's belated rise approximately coincides, stage by stage, with the Papacy's decline and fall. The Oecumenical Patriarch Arsenius (*fungebatur* A.D. 1255-67), who brought the East Roman Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus to a moral Canossa, was not far from being the contemporary of Pope Boniface VIII (*fungebatur* A.D. 1294-1303), at whose expense the spell of Papal invincibility was so brutally broken by Philip the Fair of France. The rise of 'the Zealots', and of Athos, was contemporaneous with 'the Babylonish Captivity' and the Great Schism; and the triumph of the secular power of the 'Osmanlis, who brought the whole of the Orthodox Christian World under the Oecumenical Patriarch's authority, was quickly followed in the West by the establishment of those modern parochial sovereign Powers that have now broken the Papal *Respublica Christiana* into fragments.

p. 40, footnote 1, above. The Greek imperialism of the Phanariots (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 222-8, above) procured the abolition of Sökölld's Serb Patriarchate of Peč in A.D. 1766; and in 1767 this Greek ecclesiastical triumph was crowned by the abolition of the West Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ochrida (Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, H.: *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. i (Oxford 1939, University Press), ch. 14). The Arabophone Orthodox community had long since felt the weight of a Greek ecclesiastical tyranny that was backed by the irresistible force of the Ottoman Government's political and military power. After the conquest of the metropolitan provinces of the Arabic World by Sultan Selim I (see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 387-8, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), in the present volume, pp. 450-2, above) the first Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem who was a Modern Greek in nationality, Germanos II (*accessit* A.D. 1518: see Bertram, Sir A., and Luke, H. C.: *Report of the Commission appointed by the Government of Palestine to inquire into the Affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem* (London 1921, Milford), p. 23), prohibited the acceptance of Arabophone postulants in Orthodox monasteries and thereby excluded the Arabophones from all possibility of ever becoming bishops, since by this time it was one of the established conventions of the Orthodox Church that its bishops should be taken from the ranks of the regular clergy exclusively (Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., cap. cit.).

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 333, above.

² The whole of the Russian Church remained under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Oecumenical Patriarchate from the conversion of Russia to Orthodox Christianity at the close of the tenth century (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 352-3, above) down to the establishment of the autonomous Patriarchate of Moscow in A.D. 1582-9.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 512-84, above.

PAULICIANS, BOGOMILS, CATHARS

ANY religious community which has been branded as 'heretical' has suffered, *ex hypothesi*, the misfortune that has overtaken the Boeotians and the Philistines.¹ Its reputation has come to be at the mercy of victorious adversaries whose victory has been so complete that it has enabled them not only to stamp out, or keep under, the discomfited sect, but also to make sure that its features shall be known to Posterity through no other picture than the victors' own hostile and malevolent caricature. This was the fate of the Paulicians, until an authentic and original, though mutilated, liturgical book of the Paulician Church—*The Key of Truth*—was discovered² in 1891, and published in 1898, by an English scholar.³ Dr. Conybeare's edition of this text has thrown a wholly new light upon the character and history of a movement which both fascinated and puzzled Gibbon;⁴ and his introduction is a monument of scholarship and a mine of erudition—though it is unfortunately marred by an *odium theologicum* against the 'Incarnationist' (i.e. 'Conceptionist') persecutors of this 'Adoptionist' Church.⁵

From Dr. Conybeare's researches it would appear that the Paulician community was a piece of jetsam that had been deposited in the folds of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus Ranges⁶ by an archaic 'Adoptionist' wave of Christianity which preceded the 'Conceptionist' wave in spreading outwards from a common centre of dispersion in Syria⁷ but which was overtaken and obliterated by the pursuing wave on every sector of their common circular field of expansion except for one or two points where the jetsam cast up by the earlier wave was preserved high and dry in some mountain

¹ See II. D (ii), vol. ii, p. 50, above.

² The manuscript of *The Key of Truth* had been lodged in 1837 in the archives of the Holy Synod of the Gregorian Monophysite Armenian Church at Echmiadzin, after having been confiscated from a group of Paulician Armenians who had migrated from the Ottoman to the Russian side of the Russo-Turkish frontier in Transcaucasia after the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-9.

³ Conybeare, F. C.: *The Key of Truth: A Manual of the Paulician Church of Armenia*: the Armenian text edited and translated with illustrative documents and introduction (Oxford 1898, Clarendon Press).

⁴ See Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. liv.

⁵ In places, Dr. Conybeare's animus almost equals that which was once displayed by this latter-day Western scholar's 'Incarnationist' *bêtes noires* against their ancient 'Adoptionist' victims whom he has so chivalrously taken under his wing and so romantically idealized.

⁶ For other religious survivals in these secluded highlands see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 257-8, above.

⁷ For this primitive 'Adoptionist' version of Christianity see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), pp. 236-8.

fastness.¹ On the opposite edge of the field, 'Adoptionism' found another fastness in the mountains of Asturia, in the remote north-west of the Iberian Peninsula.² Dr. Conybeare hazards the speculation that another relic of 'Adoptionist' Christianity may be found in the Far Western Church of 'the Celtic Fringe', and that the irreconcilability of an 'Adoptionist' with a 'Conceptionist' Christology may have been the real stumbling-block in the way of a good understanding between the Church of St. Columba and the Church of Rome.³

The essence of the 'Adoptionist', as opposed to the 'Conceptionist', faith is a belief that Jesus was not born divine, but that in virtue of his human spiritual achievements and merits he was designated by God as the Son of God when, at the moment of his baptism, he was taken possession of by the Holy Spirit as a human vehicle for its divine activity.⁴ This 'Adoptionist' Christology has been nobly formulated by the statesman-theologian Paul of Samosata, who was Patriarch of Antioch from A.D. 260 to A.D. 272 and from whom the Paulicians appear to have derived their name.⁵

'In fixity and resoluteness of character he likened himself to God, and, having kept himself free from sin, was united to God, and was empowered to grasp, as it were, the power and authority of wonders. By these he was shown to possess, over and above the will, one and the same activity [with God], and won the title of Redeemer and Saviour of our Race. . . .

'We do not award praise to beings which submit merely in virtue of their nature, but we do award high praise to beings which submit because their attitude is one of love—and, so submitting, because their inspiring motive is one and the same, they are confirmed and strengthened by one and the same indwelling power, of which the force ever grows, so

¹ For the phenomena of concentric waves of dispersion and fossils in fastnesses see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 255-9, with Annex; and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 361-93, above.

² For this Asturian 'Adoptionism' see Conybeare, *op. cit.*, pp. clxx-clxxix. It was in the Iberian Peninsula that this form of Christianity assumed this name. For Asturia's historic role of serving as a fastness see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 362, footnote 4, and II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, pp. 446-7, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 205-6, below.

³ Conybeare, *op. cit.*, pp. clxxx-clxxx. To a layman the evidence which Dr. Conybeare cites for this view may seem rather lacking in substance. Indeed, Dr. Conybeare is manifestly prone to espy suppressed and persecuted 'Adoptionists' everywhere. For the Far Western Church see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-40, with Annexes II, III, and IV, above.

⁴ The Christology which Dr. Conybeare calls 'Incarnationist' ought properly to be called 'Conceptionist', since it holds no monopoly of the fundamental Christian belief that God has been incarnate in the human personality of Jesus on Earth. The reality of the Incarnation is not denied by the 'Adoptionists'. The point on which these differ from the 'Conceptionists' is in regard to the moment in the human life of Jesus at which the Incarnation took place. According to Mark it took place, not at the moment of Jesus's conception in his mother's womb, but at the moment of his baptism by John in Jordan. This 'Adoptionist' Marcan Christology still shimmers through the 'Conceptionist' veneer with which it has been overlaid in the Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Luke, and it is not contradicted in the Gospel according to Saint John (see further V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 267-75, below).

⁵ See p. 627, below.

that it never ceases to stir. It was in virtue of this love that the Saviour coalesced with God, so as to admit of no divorce from him, but for all ages to retain one and the same activity with him—an activity perpetually at work in the manifestation of good.¹

Holding this belief about the means by which a human Jesus became a Christ the Son of God, the 'Adoptionists' were led into the further belief that a human follower of Jesus who went through the same spiritual struggle under the inspiration of the same love might win the same guerdon if he were admitted to the same rite of baptism at the same age. The eighth-century 'Adoptionists' of Asturia were said to say 'Et ille Christus, et nos Christi';² and the dogma is elaborated in the *symbolum fidei* of their leader Elipandus: 'Si conformes sunt omnes sancti huic filio Dei secundum gratiam, profecto et cum adoptivo adoptivi, et cum advocato advocati, et cum Christo Christi'.³ In the first half of the ninth century the great Paulician missionary in the East Roman Empire, Sergius, appears to identify himself with Christ in a passage from an alleged epistle of his which is quoted by the Greek Orthodox controversialists of the age.⁴ One of the Paulician *émigrés* from Ottoman to Russian territory in 1837⁵ deposed, in a recantation made to the authorities of the Gregorian Church, that he had heard a certain Gregory of Kalzwan, who was one of the Paulician adepts, say: 'Behold, I am the Cross; light your tapers on my two hands, and give worship. I am able to give you salvation, just as much as the Cross and the Saints.'⁶

This 'Adoptionist' version of Christianity was not only pre-'Conceptionist'; it was also pre-iconic, pre-hierarchical and pre-monastic. Arianism was a sophisticated version of it, Nestorianism a partial reversion to it, Iconoclasm an excerpt from it—an excerpt which was so ample in the Hyper-Iconoclasm of the Emperor Constantine V that Conybeare claims him as a Paulician in all but name.⁷

The name 'Paulician' proves, on philological analysis, to have been given to the sect by their opponents in an Armenian-speaking social milieu; for 'Paulician' is an Armenian adjectival form denot-

¹ Passages quoted, from the surviving fragments of Paul of Samosata's *Discourses to Sabinus*, by F. C. Conybeare in *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, eleventh edition, s.v. 'Paul of Samosata'.

² Just as the adepts in the worship of Osiris became Osirides (see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 143, above) and the Bacchanals Bacchi. This notion is less repugnant to the Orthodox than it is to the Western branch of the Catholic Church. For deification (*θεωσις*) as the goal of Orthodox Christian mysticism see Hussey, J. M.: *Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire, 867-1185* (Oxford 1937, University Press), chap. ii.

³ These passages are quoted by Conybeare, in op. cit., pp. clxxxiii and clxxv, from the *Epistula Heterii et Sancti Beati ad Elipandum*, a Catholic attack on the heretic which was composed in A.D. 785.

⁴ Conybeare, op. cit., pp. li-lij.

⁵ Conybeare, op. cit., pp. xxvii and lii.

⁶ See p. 624, footnote 2, above.

⁷ Ibid., pp. xlii and cxvi-cxvii.

ing association with 'Paulik'; and 'Paulik' is a derogatory Armenian diminutive of 'Paul'. This depreciatory element in the formation of the word shows, further, that the Paul with whom the sect was thus insultingly associated cannot have been St. Paul the Apostle; and there is, in fact, positive evidence that they were named after Paul of Samosata. The derivation of their tenets from this third-century heresiarch is expressly asserted by the Byzantinized Armenian Gregory Magister¹ who persecuted the Paulicians of Armenia, on the East Roman Government's account, in the sixth decade of the eleventh century; and this testimony is borne out by a comparison of *The Key of Truth* with the authentic fragments of Paul of Samosata's doctrine that have survived. In short, the Paulicians were the spiritual descendants of the 'Pauliani' who were condemned by the Council of Nicaea in A.D. 325.²

One seventh-century Paulician missionary, however, seems to have been so little aware of the origin of the faith which he held and propagated that he accepted the abusive *sobriquet* which the sect had received from its enemies and proceeded to identify the Paul, to whom the sect was referred, with the Apostle himself. This Pauline Paulician was the Constantine who came from the North-East Armenian district of Mananalis (next door to the present village of Chaurm, which was the home of the Paulician *émigrés* of A.D. 1837)³ and who founded a new branch of the Paulician Church in the Greek-speaking territory of the East Roman Empire in North-Eastern Anatolia, west of the Euphrates, in A.D. 660. This Constantine took the Pauline name of 'Silvanus', and he called his new church 'Macedonia'. His successors followed his example—four of them taking, respectively, the names of 'Titus', 'Timotheus', 'Epaphroditus', and 'Tychicus', and calling their new foundations 'Achaia', 'Philippi', 'Laodicea', 'Ephesus', and 'Colossae'.⁴ This group of Paulician churches on East Roman ground is the best known part of the Paulician Church, because it was this group that came into collision with the East Roman Government in the ninth century and that propagated the faith in Europe. But this Pauline conceit appears to have been peculiar to them, and to have been unknown in the earlier home of the Paulician Church in the Armenian territories on the other side of the Euphrates.⁵

There is no other evidence that the Paulicians were especially devoted to the Apostle Paul, and there is no evidence at all that this alleged attachment to Paul led them (as their enemies averred)

¹ See the extracts from Gregory Magister's letters in Conybeare, *op. cit.*, Appendix III.

² Conybeare, *op. cit.*, pp. cv-cvi.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. lxix-lxx.

⁴ See J. B. Bury's *editio minor* of Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. vi, 2nd edition (London 1902, pp. Methuen), 112-13.

⁵ Conybeare, *op. cit.*, p. cxxix.

into displaying a hostility towards Peter. *The Key of Truth* merely declares that the Church rests on all the Twelve Apostles, and not on Peter alone;¹ and in the Paulician liturgy for the ordination of the elect, which is preserved in this book, the candidate appears actually to receive the ritual name of Peter at the hands of the officiant, as a sign that he has become, like his Apostolic namesake, a rock on which the Church is built and an authority empowered to bind and to loose.²

Again, the Paulicians were neither Marcionites (as certain modern scholars have conjectured) nor Manichaeans (as their contemporary Catholic opponents persistently asserted in order to defame them with an odious name).³ Both the Greek and the Armenian Anti-Paulician controversialists testify that this sect, which they sought to brand as Manichaean, actually anathematized Mani;⁴ and one of these Armenian theologians, the Gregorian Catholicus Nerses Shnorhali (*fungebatur* A.D. 1165–73), who attacks his Paulician contemporaries, also testifies to the existence, in his day, of genuine Manichees in Armenia who were quite separate from the Paulicians, and whom the Catholicus deals with in a different context.⁵ The Paulician and the Manichaean Church resembled one another in being divided into two orders, and two only, of the *catechumeni* or *auditores* on the one hand and the *electi* or *perfecti* on the other, and also in making the *electus* an object of ritual adoration. But these common features are also to be found in other religions—e.g. the Orphic Faith—which may have been their common source; and the differences that they display are more striking: for example, the Manichaean *electi* were celibate, vegetarian ascetics of an Indic type, whereas the Paulician *electi* had to be married and to bring up children and to earn their own living, like other men.⁶ The Paulicians were not only pre-monastic but were also anti-monastic; and we may reasonably trace to them the anti-monastic vein in the Iconoclasm of Leo III and Constantine V. The only evidence that the Paulicians—or the Bogomils or the Cathars—were Manichaeans, in the sense of holding dualistic views of a Zoroastrian type, comes from the mouth of their enemies;⁷ and this evidence must be heavily discounted, since these enemies, having once branded them with the Manichaean name, would very readily attribute to them, *a priori*, all the tenets which the authentic Manichaeans were recorded to have held.⁸ As a matter of fact, in the crucial field of

¹ Conybeare, *op. cit.*, p. cxxx.

² *Ibid.*, p. cxxx.

³ See Conybeare, *op. cit.*, p. cxxxii, with the quotations from Nerses in Appendix V.

⁴ Conybeare, *op. cit.*, pp. cxxiii and cxxxi.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. xlv–xlvii.

⁶ 'Orthodox Christians often used the word "Manichaean" to describe heretics whose doctrines were imperfectly understood but seemed to impugn the goodness of God or the salvability of the human body. The Bogomils of Bulgaria, the "Cathari" and

Christology the authentic Manichees stood much nearer to the Catholics than to the Paulicians, as appears from *The Acts of Archelaus*, a controversial theological dialogue purporting to have been held in the eighth decade of the third century between Mani and a certain Archelaus who is described as being the Bishop of Kashkar in Lower 'Irāq. In this dialogue the 'Conceptionist' position is maintained by the founder of the Manichaean Faith, while his Christian opponent maintains the 'Adoptionist' position which was afterwards the cardinal tenet of the Paulicians.¹

Finally, we can discard the conjecture that either the seventh-century 'Adoptionism' of the Armenian Constantine of Mananalis or the eighth-century 'Adoptionism' of the Spaniard Elipandus of Toledo was a direct and deliberate reaction of the local Christian Church to the impact of Islam. On this view 'Adoptionism' was a post-Muhammadan movement which was designed to keep the

"Patarenes" of Lombardy, and above all the Albigensians, have often been called Manichees in ancient and modern times. It is likely that fragments of their teaching were really derived from Manichaean sources. But, now that we have so much more exact knowledge of what the Religion of the Manichees really was, I think it misleading to call these sects, even the Albigensians, by the name of Manichees. In any case it is hazardous to use Albigensian material to illustrate the religion we are studying."—Burkitt, F. C.: *The Religion of the Manichees* (Cambridge 1925, University Press), pp. 11-12.

Catholic writers, convinced that the Albigenses were Manichaeans, were content to go to the works of Saint Augustine against the Manichaeans and to attribute indiscriminately to the Albigenses all the errors enumerated in those pages. Such a procedure, not necessarily adopted in any spirit of conscious unfairness, was so obviously unscientific that it makes it difficult to use the evidence of these writers with any confidence."—Turberville, A. S., in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. vi (Cambridge 1929, University Press), p. 699.

After the close of the twelfth century the Catholic polemics against the heresy laid their principal emphasis upon . . . the heretics' dualistic speculations and upon the outgrowth of these—the more eagerly because in these questions Catharism was least able to justify itself by [its favourite argument of] appealing to the New Testament. This exercised such a persistent influence on subsequent views about the heresy that, ever afterwards, this dualism was assumed to be the heresy's kernel and foundation, and all the other tenets were disposed of as mere corollaries of this one. In reality, however, down to the end of the twelfth century, it is not the speculative problems of dualism, but invariably the questions of the religious life and of the Church that are at the heart of the controversy between Heresy and Catholicism. At the first appearance of the heresy in the West, in the first half of the eleventh century, its tenets include, so far as we know, no dualistic doctrines whatsoever. Nevertheless the Catholic literature on the subject styles the heretics "Manichaeans" from the outset. And this practice has often seduced the ecclesiastical polemicists into looking up, in the works of Augustine, what the teaching of the Manichaeans was, and then simply ascribing this teaching to the heretics of the writers' own time. [In a footnote the author cites examples of this practice—A.J.T.] Where this is not the case—where, that is to say, we can be certain, beyond possibility of mistake, that our source is reproducing the genuine convictions and teaching of the contemporary heresy—and more especially in all official ecclesiastical documents dealing with the heresy question, there is either no trace at all of dualistic speculations, or else these speculations retire quite into the background."—Grundmann, H.: *Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter* (Berlin 1935, Ebering), pp. 24-5. Cf. p. 17.

¹ For *The Acts of Archelaus* see Conybeare, op. cit., pp. xcvi-civ. There seems to be some uncertainty about the location of the bishopric that is attributed to Archelaus in this work. If it is the city and district in Lower 'Irāq which are known as Kashkar in Syriac and as Kaskar in Arabic, then the scene of the dialogue has been laid next door to Mani's home-country, Mesene. If, on the other hand, Archelaus's see is, as Conybeare suggests, to be found, not in Lower 'Irāq, but in Middle Kurdistan, at Kharkar (not Kashkar), this would be not so far from Paul of Samosata's see of Antioch.

Christian flock within the fold by revising certain features of the Christian Faith which were particularly vulnerable under a Muslim attack. The theory, however, is decisively refuted by two facts. In the first place the 'Adoptionist' Christology, so far from being post-Muhammadan, is, as we have seen, pre-Nicene, and it can be detected in so early a Christian document as *The Shepherd of Hermas*. In the second place the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors were not concerned to convert their Christian subjects and neighbours outside the limits of Arabia itself. In their non-Arabian dominions they preferred to keep the non-Muslim 'People of the Book' as supertax-payers, rather than convert them at the expense of the public revenues of the Caliphate.¹ Hence the pastors of the Christian flock in or near the Arab Empire were under no pressure at that time to forestall a threatened secession of Christians to Islam by revising their Christology in an Islamic direction. So far as there is any resemblance between the Islamic and the Paulician Christology, this is to be traced to the influence, upon Islam, of Nestorianism; for Nestorianism was a partial reversion to the 'Adoptionist' position which the Paulicians had never abandoned. In so far as Islam did influence the fortunes of the surviving remnant of the 'Adoptionist' Church, this influence was unintentional and indirect.

In both its Armenian and its Spanish fastness this archaic form of Christianity was stirred into fresh activity and dragged out into the light in the eighth century of the Christian Era through the accident that in that age both these fastnesses were violated. The highlands of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus now became a debatable borderland between the Arab Caliphate and the East Roman Empire,² while the highlands of Asturia came to play a similar role between the Caliphate and the Austrasian Frankish Power.³ Therewith, two regions which had both hitherto lain secluded and ignored, far off from the main thoroughfares of the life of the World, rather suddenly acquired an unprecedented importance and notoriety as crucial war-zones and vital marches between contending empires;⁴ and both the two resuscitated ghosts of the Roman Empire were thereby compelled to adopt a definite attitude towards the ancient form of their religion which they each now rediscovered on their respective Syriac frontiers. In these parallel circumstances the Austrasian and East Roman statesmen took opposite lines—Charlemagne lending his authority to an attempt to suppress the Asturian 'Adoptionist' Elipandus, while Leo Syrus—whose family came

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 12, p. 226, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 674-7, below.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 365, footnote 4, above.

³ See II. D (vii), Annex VIII, in vol. ii, above.

⁴ For the literary consequences see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 252-61, below.

from Germanicea,¹ next door to the birthplace of Paul of Samosata—apparently drew inspiration from the remnant of the 'Adoptionist' Church in the Anti-Taurus for launching a new religious movement of his own which he attempted to impose by force upon Orthodox Christendom.

The outcome of this encounter between Paulicianism and Orthodoxy, which began with the opening of Leo's iconoclastic campaign in A.D. 726 and ended with the collapse of the Paulician Republic of Tephrike between A.D. 871 and 875, has been touched upon already in the present volume.² In this Annex it only remains to support the statement, which has been made in the same place,³ that the Cathars of Lombardy and Languedoc, as well as the Bogomils of Bulgaria and Bosnia, were direct offshoots of the Asiatic Paulician Church.

The substantial identity of the Paulician, the Bogomil, and the Cathar faith is not in doubt. The common features are too similar and too numerous to be explained away as fortuitous,⁴ and it is clear that we are in the presence of a single religion masquerading under different names in different places. The only question at issue is whether the Bogomils and the Cathars were European converts of the Paulicians—which would mean that they only became 'Adoptionists' in an age posterior to the transplantation of Paulician *émigrés* from the regions of Malatyah and Erzerum to Thrace in A.D. 756 (or 755)⁵—or whether they were respectively descended from local 'Adoptionists', which would mean that their 'Adoptionism' was as ancient as that of the Paulicians themselves and that they were separate and independent relics of the same archaic pre-Nicene wave of Christian propaganda.

This second view is advocated by Dr. Conybeare;⁶ and the opinion of a scholar who is a past-master in this subject is evidently entitled to the greatest respect. Yet a layman may perhaps hazard the opinion that on this point Dr. Conybeare's scholarship has been

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 274, footnote 2, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 364-6, above.

³ In IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 366-9, above.

⁴ For example, the Albigenes and their contemporary co-religionists in the Rhineland not only made the *electus* an object of ritual adoration (see Conybeare, op. cit., pp. lv-lvii and cxxxiv-cxxxv); they also conferred the ritual name of Peter upon the recipient of their rite of *consolamentum* (see Conybeare, op. cit., pp. cxliii and clxv).

⁵ Theophanes, who reports this transplantation *sub anno mundi* 6247 (= A.D. 756 or 755), observes that it resulted in a diffusion of the Paulician heresy. It was, indeed, to be expected that these *émigrés* would include a considerable number of Paulicians, since the migration was evidently *en masse*, while the regions from which the settlers came all lay within the triangle between Samosata (the home of Paul), Manalalis (the home of Constantine-Silvanus), and Colonea (the field of Constantine-Silvanus's missionary labours). Theophanes does not tell us whether there were any Paulicians as well as Monophysites among 'the heretic Syrians' whose deportation to, and settlement in, Thrace he records *sub anno mundi* 6270 (= A.D. 778) (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2, p. 367, footnote 5, above).

⁶ Conybeare, op. cit., pp. cxlvi-cl and cxevi.

biased by his *odium theologicum*. He has formed a mental picture of the 'Incarnationist' (i.e. 'Conceptionist') Catholic Church as an oppressive institution with a precarious tenure—holding down, temporarily and by force, an older 'Adoptionist' Christianity which has not only been the first in the field everywhere but has also managed everywhere to hold its ground and to reassert itself against its oppressor in the fullness of time. This picture shows up the Catholic Church as a usurper without legitimate title, and reveals the latent 'Adoptionist' Church as the true heir of the Primitive Church Universal.¹ The undisguised pleasure which Dr. Conybeare takes in this view of the history of Christianity gives his readers cause to suspect that he may have unconsciously pushed the evidence in support of it rather farther than it will really go. A case in point is his attempt to claim the Celtic Church² as a part of his ubiquitous 'Adoptionist' Church; and the *reductio ad absurdum* of the view is the suggestion³ that the Bogomils of Bulgaria may have been descended from the local 'Adoptionists' of the Balkan Peninsula, instead of being converts of the Asiatic Paulicians⁴ who are known to have been planted on the Bulgarian frontier of the East Roman Empire in A.D. 756 (or 755) by Constantine V, to have been reinforced in the eighth decade of the tenth century by John Tzimisces, and to have survived at Philippopolis—where John Tzimisces had planted them—till the eighteenth century.⁵ On the eve of the collapse of the Paulician Republic of Tephrike, its indomitable citizens were planning to enter into competition with the Church of Constantinople and the Church of Rome for the spiritual conquest of Bulgaria—according to the testimony of a Greek witness, Petrus Siculus, who spent nine months at Tephrike in A.D. 870⁶—and we can hardly doubt that

¹ 'The Adoptionist Church remained one and undivided, and was unaffected by the scission of East and West. . . . Thenceforward the only real union of East and West was a union of heresy or heresies, and the only bond between the great persecuting churches was their common hatred of the persecuted sects. There continued after the fourth century the same unrestricted intercourse between the Adoptionists of the West and those of the East as there had been up to that age' (Conybeare, *op. cit.*, p. 126). Here, surely, we can see the critical scholar changing, before our eyes, into the pious composer of an edifying legend.

² See p. 625, above.

³ In *op. cit.*, p. cxcvi.

⁴ For the relation between the Asiatic Paulicians and the Bogomils see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 367–8, above.

⁵ For the survival of Paulicians (not Bogomils) at Philippopolis Dr. Conybeare himself (*op. cit.*, pp. cxxxviii–cxxxix) cites a letter of Lady Mary Wortley Montague's, dated Adrianople, 1st April, 1717. The Emperor Alexius I Comnenus (*imperabat* A.D. 1081–1118) had found the descendants of John Tzimisces' Paulician deportees ensconced in Philippopolis cheek-by-jowl with a community of Bogomils and another community of Armenian Monophysite Christians (possibly descended from the deportees of A.D. 778); and he had made a determined attempt to convert them to Orthodox Christianity—but this without success, though he had resorted to force when argument had proved of no avail (Anna Comnena: *Alexias*, Book XIV, chs. 8–9). The same emperor was equally unsuccessful in a subsequent attempt to convert the Bogomils (Anna Comnena, *op. cit.*, Book XV, chs. 9–10).

⁶ See Petrus Siculus: *Historia Manichaeorum seu Paulicianorum*, ad init. et ad fin. (cited in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), p. 367, footnote 6, above).

the Bogomil Church is a monument of the successful execution of this project, which the Paulicians who were already established in Thrace were doubtless able to expedite. The debatable case is that of the Albigenses; for, even if there is no evidence for the existence of a primitive 'Adoptionist' Church in Gaul, the existence of 'Adoptionism' in the North of Spain in the latter part of the eighth century is well attested; and on *a priori* geographical grounds it would, no doubt, seem more credible that the twelfth-century 'Adoptionism' of Languedoc should be derived from eighth-century Spain than that it should have to be traced all the way across Europe and Asia Minor to eighth-century Armenia. Nevertheless there are certain pieces of evidence—and these are placed in our hands by the conscientious scholarship of Dr. Conybeare himself—which do suggest that the more remote derivation is the true one.

For instance, we find some German representatives of a school of heretics who, 'having taken their rise in Gascony, from some unknown author, had multiplied like the sand of the sea in France, Spain, Italy and Germany', being convicted at Oxford in A.D. 1160 under the name of *Publicani*; in 1179, again, the *Publicani* are condemned, by name, by the Third Lateran Council, and are expressly identified with the Albigenses, Cathari, and Patarini; and this word *Publicani* is simply a Latinization of *Pauliciani* in its contemporary Greek pronunciation.¹ Now the name 'Paulicians' does not seem to have attached to the eighth-century Spanish 'Adoptionists', or even to the Armenian Paulicians east of the Euphrates, who are called Thonraketzi (i.e. inhabitants of the district of Thonrak) by their Gregorian compatriots. The name only attaches with certainty to the North-East Anatolian followers of Constantine of Mananalis; and we may fairly infer that, if the name of this Anatolian 'Adoptionist' community is borne, five centuries after Constantine's time, by the twelfth-century 'Adoptionist' Church in Languedoc, then the 'Adoptionist' Faith itself, as well as its Asiatic title, must have come to the valley of the Garonne from the valley of the Euphrates.

There is also a piece of etymological evidence for the passage of the Cathar Faith from Tephrike to Albi via the valley of the Maritsa; for in medieval France the popular term of abuse for the Cathars

¹ Conybeare, *op. cit.*, pp. cxxxix-cxl. Dr. Conybeare suggests (*op. cit.*, p. cxlvii) that in the latter part of the twelfth century the Paulician name was learnedly applied to indigenous Gallic 'Adoptionists' by Western Catholic divines who had already come across the Paulicians in the Levant in consequence of the Crusades and who perceived that the two sects were identical in their beliefs. Such a discovery, however, is more in the line of a twentieth-century student of 'comparative religion' than in that of a twelfth-century inquisitor, and in fact the medieval Western adversaries of the Albigenses betray in their own polemics the haziness of their knowledge of the tenets which they were endeavouring to refute. (On this point see the present Annex, p. 628, footnote 8, above.)

—and, by analogy, for heretics in general—was *Bougres* (i.e. Bulgars).¹ And, apart from this presumptive evidence, we find a connexion between the Cathars of the West and the Bogomils of the Slavinas explicitly attested by contemporary Western observers. It is recorded, for example, that there were delegates from Bulgaria at a General Council which was held by the Cathars in the neighbourhood of Toulouse in A.D. 1167.² And this statement is reinforced by further evidence which dates from the thirteenth century, when, owing to the work of the Inquisition, the beliefs and practices and affiliations of the Cathars had come to be rather better known than they had been in the latter part of the twelfth century, when the existence of the sect in the West had first begun to attract attention. *Sub anno* 1223 Matthew Paris chronicles a report that the Albigenses paid allegiance to a Pope who lived on the confines of Bulgaria, Croatia, and Dalmatia;³ and another Western writer, whose *floruit* was in the middle of the thirteenth century, states that the various Cathar churches of Europe—of which he gives a list ranging from Northern and Southern France and Northern and Central Italy to Slavonia and Constantinople—are all derived from the two parent churches of Bulgaria and 'Dugranicia' (? po-Granica, Krain, Carniola).⁴ Conybeare seeks to explain this twelfth-century association by the hypothesis that by this time the ancient 'Adoptionist' churches of Western and South-Eastern Europe, having now each emerged from their respective lurking-places, had recognized and joined hands with one another. But this hypothesis does not explain how it was that the West European Cathars had come, not only to admit their kinship with their brethren in the Balkans, but also to concede to the latter a primacy in the Faith. The natural explanation of this fact is that which is given by the contemporary Western authorities for it, who explain it by telling us that the Catharism of the Balkans was the *fons et origo* of Catharism in the West. We may therefore allow ourselves to believe, *pace* Dr. Conybeare, that the Western *Publicani* were really spiritual descendants of the Anatolian Paulicians through the Balkan Bogomils.

¹ Turberville, A. S., in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. vi (Cambridge 1929, University Press), p. 702.

² Turberville, *loc. cit.*

³ Conybeare, *op. cit.*, p. cxlvii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. cxlviii.

IDOLATRY AND PATHOLOGICAL EXAGGERATION.¹

It is a commonplace that idolatry, in the narrower technical sense, runs to pathological exaggerations of which the legendary sacrifice of Iphigenia in Aulis—*tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*²—and the authentic ritual of human sacrifice in Mexico³ and procession of Juggernaut's car in Bengal are three classic examples. The same tendency can be observed in a number of other manifestations of idolatry in the broader sense in which the term is used in this Study; and this wider range of the same phenomenon is worth glancing at, because idolatry is one of those things whose essence is illuminated, and not obscured, by caricature.

As our point of departure, we may take a passage from the pen of Monsieur Bergson:

'Is Primitive Humanity accurately mirrored in the "primitives" who are under our observation to-day? That seems improbable, since among them, as among ourselves, Nature is covered by a thick layer of habits which have been preserved by the social milieu and which are deposited by it in each individual. There is reason, however, to believe that this layer is here not so thick as it is in Civilized Man, and that it allows Nature to show through more transparently. The multiplication of habits in the course of centuries must, indeed, have operated among the primitives in a different way—operated, that is, on the surface, by a passage from analogue to analogue, and under the influence of accidental circumstances, in contrast to the progress of technique or of knowledge or, in short, of civilization—a progress which continues in some one single direction over quite long periods, and which is not superficial but cumulative, inasmuch as it is produced by variations which are superposed upon, or dovetailed into, one another, and which accordingly result in profound transformations and not just in superficial elaborations. . . .

It must not be forgotten that the primitives of to-day or yesterday have lived through just as many centuries as we have, and that they have thus had plenty of time to exaggerate—or, as one might put it, to exacerbate—whatever irrational elements there may have been in primitive tendencies which, in themselves, were natural enough. The true primitives were almost certainly more sensible, if [we may assume that] they kept within the limits of the tendency and of its immediate effects. [But] everything is subject to change, and, as we have stated above, the change will take place on the surface if it cannot work down into the depths.

¹ This Annex has a bearing on IV. C (iii) (b) 1, above, as well as on the chapter to which it has been attached.

² Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, Book I, l. 101.

³ See the ghastly description in Frazer, J. G.: *The Golden Bough*, 3rd edition, part vi: *The Scapegoat* (London 1913, Macmillan), ch. 7.

There are societies which progress . . . and the change here takes the form of an increase in intensity: its direction is relatively constant, and the movement is towards an ever higher degree of efficiency. On the other side there are societies which [just] keep their level—and this, necessarily, a low one. Since these societies [likewise] change all the same, there occurs in them something which is no longer the intensification implied in qualitative progress, but is a multiplication or exaggeration of what has been there to start with. In this domain, invention—if the word is still applicable—no longer demands effort. A belief which once responded to a need leads to a new belief which bears an external resemblance to its predecessor and accentuates some one of its superficial characteristics, but which no longer serves any purpose. Thenceforward the society marks time, adding and amplifying incessantly. Through the twofold operation of repetition and exaggeration, irrationality turns into absurdity, and oddness into monstrosity.¹

The pathological exaggeration which is here presented to us by a modern Western philosopher as the characteristic penalty of an infatuation with a particular phase of human social life, displays itself in general in two variant forms. The simpler form is a sheer augmentation of size; the slightly more sophisticated form is an unhealthy exaggeration of characteristic features. The augmentation of size may take place in either one or two or three dimensions.

A hideous illustration of the one-dimensional augmentation is the immoderate growth of a rat's tooth upon the loss of the corresponding tooth, in the opposite jaw, which normally grinds, and is ground by, it. If this natural check is removed, the tooth that no longer has an 'opposite number' to keep it within bounds will proceed to grow *ad infinitum* until it has tortured its wretched owner to death by first making it impossible for him to close his mouth and then, if it is a lower-jaw tooth, transfixing his palate and piercing his brain.

The human analogue of this super-toothed rat is the Macedonian phalangite, whose pike (*sarisa*), like the rat's tooth,² ran incontinently to length as soon as it was left without any 'opposite number' to keep its elongation within reasonable limits. The virtue of this Macedonian pike lay in its outranging the Theban or Spartan spear without outweighing this advantage by simultaneously reducing the mobility of the pikeman;³ and for this purpose the mini-

¹ Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 133 and 143; cf. pp. 171 and 182.

² For the conception of human tools as detachable limbs, or of animal limbs as undetachable tools, see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 79–88, and III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, p. 177, above.

³ The Spartan hoplite's spear was the longest weapon that could be manipulated with one hand, and used for stabbing, over the rim of the large round shield with which the hoplite's other hand was occupied. The Macedonian phalangite was able to manipulate a pike that outranged this Spartan spear because he gave both hands to it at the price of diminishing his defensive equipment by contenting himself with a small round target

mum, and therefore optimum, length of pike-staff was eighteen feet. It was with an eighteen-foot-long pike that the phalangites of King Philip II and Alexander the Great defeated all-comers;¹ but the *sarisa* had no sooner borne down all resistance, and made itself the master-weapon in the world of the day, than it sprouted—in a boundless competition with itself—to a length which transformed it from a potent weapon into a fatal encumbrance. In the generation of the Diadochi the Spartan captain Cleonymus (*vivebat circa* 330–270 B.C.), finding himself in command of an old-fashioned Spartan phalanx and facing a Macedonian phalanx in which the pike was now twenty-four feet long instead of eighteen, won a crushing victory by the simple expedient of making his two front ranks discard their spears, seize the enemy's unwieldy pikes in their naked hands, and hold them immobilized while the rear ranks filed round and stabbed the helpless pikemen to death from the flanks and the rear at their leisure.² On this occasion the Macedonian phalangite met the toothy rat's miserable fate; and after this melancholy experience the length of the *sarisa* was cut down again. But it was only cut down from twenty-four feet to twenty-one;³ and this compromise still left the length so excessive that it not only debarred the Macedonian pikeman from all prospect of winning any more victories, but condemned him to be massacred *en masse* when, at Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C. and at Pydna in 168 B.C., he had to contend with the Roman swordsman.⁴

that was slung on the left elbow. The first step in the process of lengthening the spear and simultaneously lightening the shield seems to have been taken by the Athenian *condottiere* Iphicrates in 374 B.C. (Parke, H. W.: *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford 1933, University Press), pp. 79–80, quoting Diodorus: *A Library of Universal History*, Book XV, ch. 44). And the equipment of the Macedonian phalangite seems to have been a development of the Athenian *condottiere's* invention (Parke, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–6 and 236). The Spartan phalanx itself was eventually re-equipped in the Macedonian fashion by King Cleomenes III towards the end of the third quarter of the third century B.C. (Plutarch's *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, ch. 32).

¹ The figure of eighteen feet, as a maximum length, is attested by an incidental reference in one of the works of a contemporary Hellenic man of science, Theophrastus of Eresus (*Historia Plantarum*, Bk. III, ch. 12, § 2. N.B. Kromayer, J., and Veith, G., in *Heerwesen und Kriegsführen der Griechen und Römer* (Munich 1928, Beck), p. 134, interpret this passage of Theophrastus as implying that, in that age, the different ranks of the phalanx were equipped with *sarissae* of different lengths). In all the figures for the length of the *sarisa* at different dates that are given in the present Annex, it is assumed that the cubit (in terms of which the figures are given in the original Greek authorities) is the equivalent of eighteen inches. It is possible, however, that the cubit in which lengths were reckoned for this purpose may have been a 'short cubit' of some length between 18 inches and 12, and this suggestion is favoured by the fact that Arrian actually substitutes 'feet' for the 'cubits' of the other authorities. This would bring down the length of the *sarisa*, at its longest, to something very near the maximum length of the modern Western sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century pike. The traditional figures for the length of the *sarisa* at different dates are treated with extreme scepticism by Hogarth, D. G.: 'The Army of Alexander' in *The Journal of Philology*, vol. xvii (London & Cambridge 1888, Macmillan), pp. 3–5.

² Polyaeus: *Strategemata*, Book II, ch. 29, Anecdote 2.

³ Polybius, Book XVIII, ch. 29.

⁴ The evolution of the Macedonian phalanx is also discussed in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), pp. 433–9, above.

In the two-dimensional field we have already come across an example of pathological exaggeration in the correlation, that is brought out by an empirical survey, between geographical expansion and social disintegration.¹ In the three-dimensional field we also have examples ready to hand: the big buildings of the termites and the Egyptian Pyramid-Builders and the Ramsids and Constantine the Great and our own twentieth-century *Homo Occidentalis*;² the vast hulks of King Ptolemy IV's Egyptian quadragintareme and King George VI's British battleships; and the gigantic bodies of Goliath and the plesiosaurs.³

When we pass from sheer augmentation of size to an accentuation of characteristic features, the first example that is likely to come into our minds is the pathological distortion of the human body by the pinching in of waists and toes and the distension of lips and ears.⁴ Analogously, the decline of Jewry and of Athens advertised itself in a pathological insistence upon pushing to extremes the master-institution—in the one case the Mosaic Law and in the other case the Solonian Democracy—which was the supreme monument of the declining community's former faculty for creation.⁵ The Egyptian Mamlûks and the French *noblesse* were most vexatiously exacting in the levying of their feudal dues in an age when they had ceased to render any social services.⁶ And in the last generation of the *ancien régime* in England (*circa* A.D. 1800–32) there was a corresponding accentuation of the severity of the Game Laws in particular⁷ and of repressive penal legislation in general. The Papacy, again, procured the formal proclamation of its own infallibility by a council of the Roman Catholic Church at a moment in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era when the *ci-devant* master-institution of medieval Western Christendom was at the very nadir of its authority and prestige in the modern Western World.⁸ In our post-war England we may detect an inclination

¹ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 139–53, above.

² See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 153–4, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), pp. 425–8 and 431–2, above.

⁴ See III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 179–80, above.

⁵ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), pp. 262–3 and 263–9, above.

⁶ 'Ceci amenait une sorte d'absentéisme de cœur, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, plus fréquent encore et plus efficace que l'absentéisme proprement dit. De là vint que le gentilhomme résidant sur ses terres y montrait souvent les vues et les sentiments qu'aurait eus en son absence son intendant; comme celui-ci, il ne voyait plus dans les tenanciers que des débiteurs, et il exigeait d'eux à la rigueur tout ce qui lui revenait encore d'après la loi ou la coutume, ce qui rendait parfois la perception de ce qui restait des droits féodaux plus dure qu'au temps de la féodalité même.'—de Tocqueville, A.: *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, seventh edition (Paris 1866, Lévy), pp. 180–1. Cf. pp. 44–7.

⁷ See Hammond, J. L. and Barbara: *The Village Labourer, 1760–1832* (London 1919, Longmans, Green), pp. 199–206.

⁸ The doctrine of Papal Infallibility was elevated to the status of a dogma by the Oecumenical Council which was held at the Vatican in 1869–70, on the eve of the collapse of the Papacy's temporal power. Even in the carefully tempered and guarded

to canonize, as the latter-day *Arcana Imperii Britannici*, the inveterate British practices of 'making no commitments' and 'muddling through'; and this self-contradictory impulse to elicit *a priori* principles out of empirical rules of thumb is more reminiscent of the ultramontane spirit of Pope Pius IX than of the insular English tradition. Finally, we may refer, by anticipation, to the phenomenon of 'Zealotism': a psychological state—as unmistakably pathological as it is unmistakably exaggerated—which is one of the two possible alternative reactions of the passive party in a collision between two civilizations.¹

This short excursion into the field of social pathology may perhaps serve to drive home the truth that every form of idolatry is intrinsically disastrous for the idolator.

formula in which it was expressed, the new dogma gave rise, at the time, to dissensions in the Council and to searchings of heart in the Church, as well as to widespread demonstrations of hostility in the Non-Catholic World. A psychologist might conjecture that in forcing the dogma through the Council Pope Pius IX was seeking 'compensation' on the plane of theology for the grievous losses that he was about to suffer on the plane of politics.

¹ For this phenomenon of 'Zealotism' see Part IX, below.

MILITARISM AND THE MILITARY VIRTUES

THAT 'Militarism' is suicidal—as we have tried to show empirically in the chapter to which this Annex attaches—is a proposition which will hardly be disputed by any one whose opinion carries weight; but, if this proposition is almost a truism, then it is unlikely to offer a solution of the moral problem that is presented by the institution of War; and, in fact, the word 'Militarism' in itself implies that this suicidal and iniquitous way of using military force is not the only way, but is rather a perversion—for which we have to coin a special name—of an institution which is not proved to be evil in its essence, *ipso facto*, by the admission that it lends itself to a monstrous abuse.

This morally non-committal attitude towards the institution of War in itself has been tacitly accepted in this Study up to a point. For example, in examining the stimulus of blows and the stimulus of pressures¹ we have drawn the majority of our illustrations from the domain of warfare, and have assumed that in this field of human activity, as in others that are less gruesome, the moral law inherent in Challenge-and-Response holds good. It is true that, on the other hand, we have also drawn two of our illustrations of arrested civilizations from communities which have been given over to the practice of War: the Spartans and the 'Osmanlis'.² But this only stamps us as neutrals. It does not place us in the camp of those who have declared a moral war on War as such. Is War intrinsically and irredeemably evil in itself? This is a question which cannot be shirked by any student of history or by any member of our Western Society in our generation, when it is the crucial question on which the destiny of our civilization hangs. The time has come when we must grapple with it; but, before we come to grips, we must make sure that we are taking account of all the difficulties.

The grand difficulty, of course, is the evident existence and importance of 'the military virtues'. These confront us as a monumental fact which cannot be whittled down or explained away. It is one of the commonplaces of popular sociological observation that the military peoples, castes, and classes are apt to win more admiration from us than their neighbours who earn their living by occupations which do not entail the risking of one's own life in the attempt to take some one else's. To English people in our day the

¹ In II. D (iv) and (v), in vol. ii, above.

² In Part III. A, in vol. iii, above.

classic example is the difference which we observe between the diverse peoples and castes of India. We admire the Gurkhas more than the Kashmiris, and the Rājputs more than the Bengalis; and this is not just a prejudice which can be accounted for by our peculiar relation to our Indian fellow subjects; for, by the same token, we admire Colonel Newcome more than Jos. Sedley. There is, indeed, an old-fashioned type of English military or naval officer—nice in his sense of honour, considerate to his fellow human beings, and kind to animals (though he enjoys killing them for sport!)—who has been regarded, for at least two centuries past, as one of the finest English products of our Western Christian Civilization. Nor can this admiration be dismissed with contempt as being naïve or snobbish. If we look into it seriously and with no *parti pris*, we shall assuredly be confirmed in our belief that it is deserved. For ‘the military virtues’ are not in a class apart; they are virtues which are virtues in every walk of life. Courage, which is the most prominent of them, is a cardinal virtue in every action to which a human being can set his hand—or hers; and the other virtues which we have ascribed to our legendary colonel or commodore are also patently legal tender in civil as well as in military life. Colonel Newcome and the Chevalier Bayard; Cœur-de-Lion and Roland; Olaf Tryggvason and Siegfried; Regulus and Leonidas; Partāp Singh and Prithirāj; Jalāl-ad-Dīn Mankobirni and ‘Abdallah al-Battāl; Yoshitsune Minamoto and Kuang Yü: what a goodly company they are, and how large a place they fill in the historical landscape of these last five or six thousand years within which Mankind has embarked upon the enterprise of Civilization!

What are we to make of the vein in our social tradition which till yesterday was still inspiring heroes such as these and which to-day still moves the rest of us to admire them? If we wish to understand either the value of ‘the military virtues’ or the sincerity of the admiration which they win, we must take care to look at them in their native social setting; and one feature of this which is pertinent to our present inquiry leaps readily to the eye. ‘The military virtues’ are cultivated and admired in a milieu in which social forces are not sharply distinguished in people’s minds from the non-human natural forces, and in which it is at the same time taken for granted that natural forces are not amenable to human control.

‘Down to modern times, War was almost universally regarded as something which in itself required no justification. Its drawbacks and horrors were, indeed, recognised, but at worst it was considered an inevitable evil, a calamity, a scourge sent by God, of the same unavoidable

nature as the plague.¹ To a community threatened by Vikings, or other aggressive neighbours, this was the obvious way to regard it. From the victim's point of view there *was* no distinction in principle between the sudden incursions of such people and those of a horde of locusts or a cloud of disease germs. But this made it all the more natural to admire and honour the prowess of an Alfred or a Charlemagne, who could protect his people from disaster in such circumstances. Down to modern times, though the justification for a particular war might be questioned, and its hardship realized, fighting was all in the day's work, an incident of human existence the abolition of which was hardly an imaginable possibility. In these circumstances, while few may have praised war, everyone valued the warrior, and submitted willingly to his leadership and control. Down to the nineteenth century the army was regarded as almost the only profession open to a gentleman, and a gentleman is "armiger".²

The gentleman and scholar who has communicated these observations to the writer of this Study goes on, in the course of the same letter, to make an illuminating comparison between War and 'Sport'.

'In prehistoric times, before the domestication of animals, the hunter discharged a very necessary function in providing food. Surrounded by raiding barbarians, the soldier equally served to make life more tolerable and justice more capable of attainment. The finest men attached themselves to these pursuits, and their achievements were rightly honoured, and the same type of man tends to inherit their instincts with their qualities. This is why we prefer Colonel Newcomes to Jos. Sedleys. But their functions have become less necessary; in the case of the hunter, perhaps, entirely useless.'

The comparison is illuminating because, in the case of hunting, we see a pursuit which, at a primitive level of life, has been socially valuable and even vitally necessary becoming unquestionably superfluous at an early, and a frequently attained, stage of economic advance. At this stage the practice of hunting for a livelihood becomes transformed, perhaps usually by a gradual process of change, into an economically otiose 'sport'. On this analogy, can we posit a stage of social progress at which the practice of War in sheer self-defence against uncontrollable hostile forces becomes comparably transformed into a socially otiose 'Militarism'? On this analogy the sinister 'Militarism' which we can distinguish empirically from the innocent prowess of the happy warrior might perhaps be defined as a practice of War for War's sake when the

¹ 'Choose thee either three years' famine; or three months to be destroyed before thy foes, while that the sword of thine enemies overtaketh thee; or else three days the sword of the Lord, even the pestilence' (1 Chron. xxi. 11-12; cf. 2 Samuel xxiv. 12-13).

² Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy in a letter to the present writer.

institution has ceased both to be, and to be regarded as being, a social necessity.

In our Western World in the so-called 'modern' chapter of its history we have seen War placed on the same shelf as hunting during an eighteenth-century 'lull' when War was only in vogue as 'the sport of kings'.¹ The bad name of 'militarist', which glances off the armour of a Cœur-de-Lion or a Bayard, is a Devil's cockade which sticks fast in the *tricorn* of a Charles XII or a Frederick the Great. The kings who took their sport on the Western battle-fields of that age were 'militarists' beyond question. Yet, in the light of our later experience, it has to be said in their favour that Frederick and his kind were not the most pernicious exponents of 'Militarism' that were to afflict our modern Western Society. Frederick, for example, would never have dreamed of glorifying War as it has been glorified in a classic passage from the pen of a later Prussian militarist, Hellmuth von Moltke.

'Perpetual Peace is a dream—and not even a beautiful dream—and War is an integral part (*ein Glied*) of God's ordering of the Universe (*Weltordnung*). In War, Man's noblest virtues come into play (*entfalten sich*): courage and renunciation, fidelity to duty and a readiness for sacrifice that does not stop short of offering up Life itself. Without War the World would become swamped in materialism.'²

In this extravagant eulogy of War there is a note of passion, of anxiety and of rancour which is a far cry from the urbane and philosophic scepticism of a Frederick the Great. So profound a change of tone is presumably the echo of comparably profound changes of temper and circumstance which had come over the Western World within the period of less than a hundred years that had elapsed between Frederick's death in A.D. 1786 and the year in which von Moltke wrote this letter to Bluntschli. We can observe two such changes which are of this magnitude.

By the time when our nineteenth-century Prussian militarist was an old man, the eighteenth-century cultivation of War as 'the sport of kings' had, in fact, evoked two reactions which were not only distinct but were antithetical. Both reactions proceeded from the common postulate that to fight for fun was shocking; but, while

¹ For War as 'the sport of kings' see IV. C (iii) (b) 3, pp. 143-9, above. For the 'lull' in the eighteenth century see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 315-16, below. The intimacy of the association between the two forms of 'Sport' with which our eighteenth-century Western kings amused themselves is commemorated in the name *chasseurs* or *Jäger* which is still borne by a number of regiments in the historic Continental European armies. The name is a reminder of the fact that, in the eighteenth century, the same footmen were employed as huntsmen and as soldiers, turn and turn about, to suit the convenience or the caprice of their royal masters.

² Letter, dated the 11th December, 1880, from Hellmuth von Moltke to Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, published in Bluntschli's *Gesammelte Kleine Schriften* (Nördlingen 1879-81, Beck, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 271.

one school of reformers took the line that an evil which had been turned into a sport both could and should be abolished altogether,¹ the other took the line that the evil could not be borne if it were not to be endured for a serious purpose. Thus, when the royal sportsmanship of the eighteenth century fell into a unanimous discredit, the nineteenth-century 'pacifists' found themselves confronted by a nineteenth-century brood of 'militarists' of von Moltke's type who were far more formidable than their frivolous eighteenth-century predecessors.

This quarrel over the reform of an eighteenth-century abuse between two opposing parties of nineteenth-century 'progressives' perhaps accounts for von Moltke's tone in the passage that we have quoted. In this *extravaganza* he is bidding defiance to contemporary 'pacifists'.

'It is when an institution no longer appears necessary, that fantastic reasons are sought or invented for satisfying the instinctive prejudice in its favour, which its long persistence has created. It is just the same with the sport of the hunter; you will find its most elaborate defence in very recent literature, precisely because what is now challenged was at an earlier period taken for granted.'²

In this contest between the 'pacifist' who seeks to abolish 'the sport of kings' and the 'militarist' who seeks to re-convert it into a serious business of the peoples, what are the omens to-day? We can hardly forbear to ask a question which may be the riddle of our Society's destiny; but the omens, as far as we can read them, are not at present reassuring. In our own day we see von Moltke's provocative thesis being adopted as one of the fundamental articles of their creed by the prophets of Fascism³ and National-Socialism, and being accepted with enthusiasm by the masses whom these prophets have succeeded in converting to their faith. This so-called 'heroic' attitude towards life is being welcomed with open arms, and taken in deadly earnest, at this moment by millions of young men, and the reason why it appeals to them is manifest. They are greedy for the virtues in the form of 'the military virtues' because they have been starved of other kinds of spiritual bread, like the Prodigal Son who, when starved of human food, 'would

¹ For the tardiness of the development of this movement for the abolition of War see IV. C (iii) (b) 3, pp. 152-3, above.

² Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, in the letter quoted above.

³ 'We are becoming—and shall become so increasingly, because this is our desire—a military nation. A militaristic nation, I will add, since we are not afraid of words. To complete this picture: warlike—that is to say, endowed ever to a higher degree with the virtues of obedience, sacrifice, and dedication to country' (Signor Mussolini, in a speech delivered on the 24th August, 1934, at the close of the Italian army manoeuvres of that summer). 'War alone brings all human energies to their highest tension and sets a seal of nobility on the peoples who have the virtue to face it' (Mussolini: 'The Doctrine of Fascism' in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, vol. xiv, no date [circa 1934]).

fain have filled his belly with the husks that the swine did eat'.¹ Moreover we know what these prodigals' spiritual sustenance used to be, and when their starvation began. These latter-day Western worshippers of 'the military virtues' are the epigoni of generations which were nurtured in 'the Christian virtues'; and they began to be starved of the traditional Christian morality, upon which their forebears had been brought up, when, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the unbelief of a cultivated minority in the Western World began to infect the less sophisticated masses.

The truth is that the spirit of Man abhors a spiritual vacuum; and, if a human being, or a human society, has the tragic misfortune to lose a sublime inspiration by which it has once been possessed, then, sooner or later, it will seize upon any other spiritual food that it can find—however coarse and unsatisfying this new fodder may be—rather than remain without any spiritual sustenance at all. In the light of this truth the recent spiritual history of our Western Society can be told—and the glorification of War can be explained—as follows: Owing to the breakdown of the Hildebrandine Papacy, which was the master-institution of our medieval Western Christendom, our Western *Plebs Christiana* received such a grievous moral shock that the Christian way of life, in which our forebears had been brought up, very largely lost its hold upon us;² and, finding ourselves, at the end of a series of calamities and disillusionments, with our house swept and garnished³ by an intellectual *Aufklärung*, but untenanted by the Christian spirit that had formerly dwelt in it,⁴ we cast about for other tenants to fill an agonizing spiritual void. In this search we addressed ourselves to the alternatives that lay nearest to our hand. Our Western culture had three sources—namely, the internal proletariat and the external proletariat and the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society to which our Western Society was 'affiliated'⁵—and when Christianity, which was the religious legacy of the Hellenic internal proletariat, appeared to fail us we turned hungrily to the religions of the Hellenic external proletariat and the Hellenic dominant minority. As it happened, these two religions were virtually the same; they were, both of them, variants of the primitive idolatrous worship of the tribe or state;⁶ and therefore the

¹ Luke xv. 16.

² On this point see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 580–1, above.

³ Matt. xii. 44 = Luke xi. 25.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 669–72, below.

⁵ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52–62, above.

⁶ It is strange that the creators of the Hellenic Civilization should have remained on the same religious level as the Teutonic barbarians in the no-man's-land beyond the northern frontiers of the Roman Empire; but we have seen (in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 95–100, above) that the Hellenes derived their religion, not from the Minoans who had created the culture to which Hellenism was 'affiliated', but from the Achæan barbarians who had eventually overrun a derelict Minoan World; and we have also seen (in II. D

modern Western apostate from Christianity, in his search after a new god, found the same idol awaiting his adoration in whichever of the two alternative directions he cast his eyes. Machiavelli consulting his Livy and Rousseau his Plutarch and De Gobineau his Sturlason and Hitler his Wagner were each led, by his respective literary or musical oracle, to the altar-steps of the same Abomination of Desolation: the Totalitarian Parochial State. In this pagan worship of the parochial community—be it Hellenic or Gothic or Scandinavian in its inspiration—the cult of ‘the military virtues’ is an obligatory practice, and the glorification of War a fundamental article of faith. And we can now understand why von Moltke exclaims, with a passion which is assuredly sincere, that ‘Perpetual Peace is not even a beautiful dream,’ and why he deprecates the abolition of War in a fear, which is manifestly genuine, lest the realization of the ‘pacifist’s’ dream may simply plunge our neo-pagan world back again into a spiritual vacuum.

In fact, we may be driven to admit that von Moltke is right in taking this stand if he is right in his underlying assumption that modern Western Man is confined to a choice between two, and only two, alternatives. If we have really lost the power or the will to practise the virtues of Gethsemane, then it is certainly better to practise those of Sparta or Valhalla than to practise none at all. And in a *ci-devant*¹ Christian society this conclusion is no longer academic; for, in turning our conditional clause into the simple indicative, von Moltke is now being followed by the masses; and his disciples in our generation can claim, without fear of contradiction, that they have the big battalions on their side. The latter-day Western cult of ‘the military virtues’ as the Ten Commandments of a Totalitarian Parochial State is fast becoming the prevalent religion of the age; and this faith, archaistically² barbaric though it be, will never be overcome by the Mephistophelian spirit of sheer negation³ against which it is itself a victorious protest. Societies are apt to get the religions, as well as the governments, that they deserve; and, if we have become unworthy of our Christian birthright, then we have condemned ourselves to worship the resuscitated ghost of an Odin or an Ares. This barbaric faith is better than none at all; in the deaths of a Leonidas and an Olaf Tryggvason the heroism which ‘Militarism’ inculcates has risen to

(vii), vol. ii, pp. 315–22, and in II. D (vii), Annex V, vol. ii, pp. 434–7, above) that these Achaean barbarians were the cultural kinsfolk of the Teuton barbarians who overran a derelict Hellenic World some eighteen centuries later.

¹ See I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 39, above.

² The expedient of Archaism, which is one of several alternative attempts to find a satisfactory response to the challenge of social disintegration, is examined in IV. C (i) (d) 8, vol. vi, pp. 49–97, below.

³ ‘Ich bin der Geist, der stets verneint!’—*Faust*, I. 1338, quoted already in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 277, above.

the height of sublimity; but this is not the sublimity of the saints, and not a heroism which leads anywhere except to suicide. Witness the fates of the abortive Scandinavian Civilization and the arrested Spartan Civilization, which we have surveyed elsewhere.¹ And such will likewise be the fate of our Western Civilization if von Moltke is right in his underlying assumption of fact, as well as in his moral deduction from it. It remains to be seen whether this assumption is correct, or whether on the other hand Christianity, so far from being out of the running, has still the power to release the soul of *Homo Occidentalis* from the grip of a hideous and destructive paganism by offering him, once more, a higher positive alternative. Can Hildebrand arise again in his might to heal the wounds inflicted upon the souls of his flock by the sins of a Rodrigo Borgia and a Sinibaldo Fieschi?² This is the greatest of all the questions that have to be answered in our Western World in this twentieth century.

In following the clue that has been given us by von Moltke, and examining the hold which the worship of 'the military virtues' has been reacquiring over our Western souls in these latter days, we may find that we have made some progress towards solving our problem of whether the institution of War is intrinsically and irredeemably evil in itself. We have discovered, in effect, that the problem has been wrongly propounded. Perhaps the truth is that no created thing can ever be evil intrinsically and irredeemably, because no created thing is incapable of serving as a vehicle for the virtues that flow from the Creator. 'The military virtues' are virtues none the less for being jewels set in blood and iron; but the value lies in the jewels themselves and not in their horrible setting; and it is flying in the face of all experience to jump to the conclusion that the only place where we can ever hope to find these precious things is the slaughterhouse where they have happened to make their first epiphany to human eyes. The diamond that is secreted in the clay does not remain there, but finds a fitter setting in the crown of a king; and when once the diamond-mine has yielded up its treasure it ceases to be anything but a death-trap for the miner who cannot now tear himself away from the scene of his habitual toil and his accidental trove. What is true of the dross in which the diamond has lain buried is likewise true of the ephemeral institution of War in which an eternal principle of goodness has glimmered darkly for a season, in the guise of 'the military virtues', in order that it may shine out brightly hereafter in the perfect physical peace of the City of God. It is the divine

¹ In II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 340-60, and in Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 50-79, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 583-4, above.

virtue—unchanging in itself, but always changing its temporal abode—that casts the reflexion of its own inner light upon each of its successive dwelling-places; and each of these dwelling-places assumes a derelict ugliness as soon as the temporarily indwelling spirit has ceased to lighten its darkness.

'There is hardly any occurrence or phenomenon about which we need always be of the same mind if we trace it back through the ages. That is, no evil was originally an evil, but only became so. . . . Many . . . instances of things originally good, but which have outlived their purpose, could be quoted; and among them perhaps we might include War. Like everything which has life, War never remains stationary, but is always developing. Animals did not wage war, but human beings did, and our descendants—the "supermen", as Goethe and Nietzsche call them—will cease to do so. . . . The [institution of] War, with which history has acquainted us, was once born; it was young and now is old. But, just as the love of a maid seems to us lovely and that of an old woman repulsive, even so it is with War: we cannot and must not judge alike two things which from their very nature and meaning are wholly different. There is nothing whatever in common between Achilles' eternal Song of Hate and Lissauer's Hymn of Hate to England; and similarly there is the profoundest difference between the battles in the Scamander Valley and the fighting between the Meuse and the Moselle.'¹

If we have persisted in the worship of War when the goodness which once found a genuine though inadequate expression in 'the military virtues' has been given an incomparably higher sphere for its exercise in the Christian life, then we have been guilty of that idolization of an ephemeral institution which is one form of the nemesis of creativity.² And our sin is aggravated if, after centuries spent in attempting the impossible feat of serving two masters, we have latterly held to the lower and despised the higher³—relapsing altogether into the service of Odin and Ares, and repudiating even that half-hearted service which was rendered to Christ by our forebears. This last state of paganism is vastly worse than the first;⁴ for the deliberate and self-conscious perversity of von Moltke's and Mussolini's archaistic 'Militarism' is as different from the innocently archaic 'military virtues' of the Chevalier Bayard and Colonel Newcome as the dusk of evening is different from the gleam of dawn. The innocence which the Colonel inherited from the Chevalier can never be recaptured in our Western World by the heirs of Frederick's and Napoleon's cynicism. Colonel Newcome's own author was well aware, when he created this lovable character in the middle of the nineteenth century, that his creature's charm

¹ Nicolai, G. F.: *The Biology of War*, English translation (London 1919, Dent), pp. 420-1.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 303-423, above.

³ Matt. vi. 24 = Luke xvi. 13.

⁴ Matt. xii. 45 = Luke xi. 26.

and tragedy both owed something to the fact of his being already an anachronism. The devotees of a Mussolinian Mars Redivivus will not be Newcomes or Bayards; they will be Robots and Martians. This process of perversion, which is the Dead Sea fruit of an Idolatry mated with Archaism, is the exact reverse of that process of 'etherialization', and that progressive transference of the field of action from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm, in which, at an earlier point in this Study, we have discovered our criterion of growth.¹ If this criterion is the true one, it informs us *a priori* that the institution of War cannot be morally static. Granting that this gruesome institution has provided a field for the exercise of 'the military virtues' yesterday, we may be sure that to-morrow the 'chivalrous' kind of War will either rankle into a 'Militarism' without a vestige of virtue or beauty or else will be transfigured into a *militia Christi* in which the physical warfare of one man against another will have been translated into a spiritual warfare of all men united in the service of God against the powers of evil.

If our present apostasy proves only to be the last convulsion of a paganism *in articulo mortis*, and if this supreme crisis in the long-drawn-out struggle between paganism and Christianity is to end in paganism being driven completely off the field, we may dream of an age to come in which Physical War will have passed out of our life and faded out of our memory until the very word 'war' loses currency—as the kindred word 'sacrifice' has lost it already—except in a meaning which was originally a metaphor. In those days, when men speak of 'war', they will be referring to the war of the spirit; and if they are ever reminded of the physical warfare which was the constant scourge of their predecessors for some six or seven thousand years, they will think of it in the category of one of those cruel initiation rites to which *Homo Catechumenus* used to submit himself in order to win his way at last into a Communion of Saints in which the theatre of War has been transferred from an outward to an inward battlefield. The warfare of that perfect *Respublica Christiana* has been depicted with a poetic wealth of military imagery,² and has been described with the prophetic vision of sainthood,³ by one of its citizens who came to proclaim the advent of the *Civitas Dei* many hundreds or thousands of years in advance. Saint Paul was delivering his message to the citizens of the war-stricken cities of a Hellenic universal state in an age of Hellenic history when the gleam of 'the military virtues' could still catch and captivate the eye from beneath the tarnish deposited by the 'Militarism' of a 'Time of Troubles'; and the Apostle seizes

¹ See III. C (i) (c) and (d), vol. iii, pp. 174-217, above.

² Eph. vi. 10-17.

³ 2 Cor. x. 3-5.

upon all the noble and glorious connotations of War that still survive in his converts' minds in order to convey to them, in a chain of military metaphors, the more etherial glory and nobility of the Christian life.

"Though we walk in the flesh, we do not war after the flesh (for the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds): casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ."¹

Additional Note

Perhaps the considerations set out above may partially meet the following criticism of an earlier part of this Study which the author has received from Mr. G. F. Hudson of All Souls College, Oxford:

"What troubled me in my reading of the chapters on "Challenge-and-Response" was the fear that too much emphasis on the role of hard conditions in producing Civilization may work in favour of the "heroic" Nazi idea, which I am sure is the last thing you would wish! The advocates of unrestricted economic competition and of *Machtpolitik* have always urged that their kind of world makes for progress and high achievement, while a humanitarian social and international order would lead to stagnation and futility. It seems to me essential to distinguish between the *value* of different kinds of responses and to differentiate a type of challenge presented by power and wealth from that presented by hardship and oppression. Challenges of the latter kind bring responses that are primarily economic and military, and along with great achievement in these fields goes an outlook which tends to be harsh, brutal and "uncivilized" by the finer standards of Civilization (cf. in various ways

¹ The following comment on this passage from the Second Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians has been communicated to the writer of this Study by Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy:

"Saint Paul's great picture of the Christian in Ephesians is rendered attractive by being dressed in all the panoply of War; and herein, to my mind, lies the true significance of the passage of 2 Corinthians which you quote at the end of this section. The stress is by no means on the renunciation of fleshly warfare, but on the substitution of something more terribly effective. This is how it runs in Moffatt's translation:

"My mind is made up to tackle certain people who have made up their minds that I move on the low level of the flesh. I do live in the flesh, but I do not make war *as the flesh does*; the weapons of my warfare are not weapons of the flesh, but divinely strong to demolish fortresses—I demolish theories and any rampart thrown up to resist the knowledge of God, I take every project prisoner to make it obey Christ, I am prepared to court-martial any one who remains insubordinate, once your submission is complete."

"The striking thing here is the sustained use of a military metaphor, as calculated to appeal to man's noblest instincts. Had St. Paul shared the views of the modern "pacifist" with regard to war, or had his hearers done so, the metaphor would sound absurd. It is easy to test this. "The poison with which I seek my ends is not carnal", or "I do not use an earthly 'jemmy' to crack the heavenly crib!" The meaning would be the same, but the argument would lose its appeal. No, St. Paul's constant use of military metaphor signifies that in his day warfare was regarded as a noble and glorious occupation."

At the same time this use of military metaphor in the Epistles of Saint Paul is the first step—and a long step—towards a transfiguration of the word 'War' from a physical to a spiritual meaning.

Rome, Prussia and the North British, Yankee Puritan, Industrial response). But success in the economic and military responses inevitably brings wealth and power: i.e. it eliminates the conditions which gave rise to the civilization; and the challenge now to be met is that of success itself. If such success must bring degeneration, the only remedy is to retain the adverse conditions, or some discipline equivalent to them, artificially. But this introduces a contradiction into human effort, for every response to a challenge is a genuine effort to overcome that challenge. The response to the challenge of the American wilderness was Chicago, but the success of the response eliminates the wilderness. Thus the problems of modern America are of quite a different kind from those of the Frontier Age, and the idea of some Americans (expressed in a film *The World Changes*, which you may have seen) that Industrialism has been all a mistake, and that America can only save her soul by getting back to subsistence-farming, is in fact a counsel of despair, for logically it implies that all Man's effort to conquer Nature and increase wealth is self-defeating. The answer, however, appears to be given by the histories of two places which you quote as examples—Athens and Venice. In both cases a community not favoured by Nature compensates itself and grows great by trade. But in both cases it is only *after* the economic problems have been solved, and the hardships of living on the "thin soil of Attica" or the Lido mudflats have long been forgotten, that the cities make their great contributions to Civilization in the higher sense. Athens and Venice were "sitting on the top of the World" and no longer grappling with "hard countries" when they produced Sophocles and Plato, Giorgione and Titian. It is, I contend, harder to live well in Capua than to cross the Alps; and to suggest that Capua represents the absence of challenge, and emphasize material hardship as a spur to creation, is to weigh down the scales against the finer intellectual and aesthetic and "Epicurean" development of Civilization in favour of Spartans, Puritans, "strong men", "go-getters", "militarists", Cato and Herr von Papen (who have quite enough of the game already!).'

ANNEX TO IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β)

INNOCENT III'S RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF CATHARISM

At two points in this Part of the present Study¹ we have touched upon the connexion between Pope Innocent III's proclamation of a martial crusade against the Albigensian Cathars and his approval of the spiritual movements that were being initiated in Western Christendom at the time by Saints Dominic and Francis. Innocent's approval of the spiritual revival within the bosom of the Church was as lukewarm as his recourse to the sword against the heretics was half-hearted; and this lukewarmness in a good cause will perhaps more than offset the half-heartedness in a bad cause when we are appraising Lotario de' Conti's spiritual worth as a human being. If, however, we mercifully allow that great Pope the easier option of being judged, not as a man, but merely as a statesman, we shall find evidence of statesmanship of an exceedingly high order in the dual policy which Innocent worked out and applied as his solution for the problem of Catharism. The nature of this policy has been clarified in an illuminating work from the pen of a modern Western scholar.²

The problem of Catharism was even graver than that of the relations between the Spiritual and the Temporal Power which confronted the Western Church in the same age. The two problems had both presented themselves in the course of the eleventh century, and their common root was the corruption of the Western Church in general, and the Papacy in particular, in the immediately preceding period of Western history.³ This scandal provoked the simultaneous attacks which the Western Church sustained at the hands of the heretics and of the secular powers respectively. Both attacks were formidable, but the heretics' onslaught was the more dangerous of the two because it had a longer reach. While the secular powers did not look beyond one or other of the alternative aims of exploiting the Church or reforming it, the Cathars threatened to destroy it by proclaiming principles which shook the Church's existing structure to the foundations.

The crucial issue between these converts to an Oriental heresy and the authorities of a Western Church against which they were

¹ In IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 369-71, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 558-60 and 562, above.

² Grundmann, H.: *Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter* (Berlin 1935, Ebering).

³ For this corruption see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), pp. 370-1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), pp. 521-3 and 551-2, above.

in revolt was not the Christological dispute between a Paulician 'Adoptionism' and an Orthodox 'Conceptionism'.¹ Still less was it the more general theological issue between a Manichaean dualism which was attributed to the heretics by the Catholics *a priori*² and a monism which the Catholics professed in theory without always managing to avoid the pitfall of dualism in their own theological speculations when they were off their guard. The principles over which the medieval Western battle between orthodoxy and heresy was fought were not matters of theology at all, but were matters of practical life.

'The notion of Christian poverty and of living the Apostolic life of the itinerant preacher is the essential content of the heresy [which made its appearance in Western Christendom in the eleventh century]. This is so at Cologne as well as in the South of France; and this notion always continued in fact to be the principal *motif* of the heresy, among Cathars and Waldensians alike, down to the beginning of the thirteenth century. To lead the life of the Apostles and to be their true successors is the gist of the heretics' claim; and it was this claim that brought about their breach with the Church. . . . [Theological] speculations retire quite into the background in face of what was really the principal question—the question whether the true Church of Christ is to be found among those who claim for themselves the Apostolic Succession and, with it, the exclusive and effective authority to confer all ecclesiastical orders, or whether, on the contrary, it is to be found among those who live as the Apostles lived and as the Gospel demands.'³

These two evangelical ideals of the Apostolic life and a voluntary poverty made a powerful appeal to the *Plebs Christiana* of the Western World in the second chapter of Western history: in the first place because at this time and place these ideals had the charm of novelty;⁴ in the second place because they shone out so dazzlingly against the dark foil of current conduct in the life of the Established Church; and in the third place because the advocates of this new evangelicalism were impressive practisers of what they were preaching. The Cathars were not disgruntled proletarians⁵ who, under a show of piety, were seeking—even if only half-consciously—to reduce their more prosperous neighbours to a level of poverty above which they themselves had no hope of rising. Catharism was not a protest against the experience of poverty; it was a revulsion from the experience of wealth.⁶ Waldes, for

¹ For the distinction between an 'Adoptionist' and a 'Conceptionist' version of Christianity see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, above, and V. C (ii) (a), in vol. vi, pp. 267–75, below.

² See the passage quoted from Grundmann in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, p. 628, footnote 8 (on p. 629), above.

³ Grundmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 21 and 25–6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 29 and 157.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 58–9, 168–9, and 194–5.

example, the eponymous founder of the Waldenses, was a rich man who had made his fortune by usury.¹ And, while some of the heretics were uneducated (*rusticani*),² the cultivated and well-to-do element predominated.³ Clerics and nobles, but never proletarians, are expressly mentioned as joining their ranks, and the legal profession was well represented among them.⁴ It was the self-imposed rules of these religious communities, and not any involuntary circumstances in the previous state of life of their members, that debarred them from retaining wealth and from accumulating it;⁵ and, if their preachers acquired the name of weavers, this was because they were preachers-turned-weavers (on the model of Saint Paul), not weavers-turned-preachers.⁶

When the rich and noble thus embraced an evangelical poverty for Christ's sake, this was a sure sign of the genuineness of their religious conviction.⁷ The potency of their preaching was proportionate to the degree of their own personal sacrifice. This was a movement which the medieval Western Established Church could not afford either to flout or to ignore. Yet the first reaction of the Church to Catharism was aridly negative. When the ecclesiastical authorities found that they could not snuff Catharism out by giving it the bad name of Manichaeism, they denounced the Cathars on the better substantiated grounds that they were setting up a Counter-Church and that their programme of going back to the Gospels involved the abandonment of a number of vital Catholic institutions.⁸ Even when the authorities did not set themselves to suppress the heresy by force, they refused the heretics permission to put their evangelical ideals into practice. For instance, when in A.D. 1179 the Waldenses petitioned the Roman Curia for licence to live their Apostolic life, they were refused the right to preach after being put through a mere travesty of an examination.⁹ Such levity and lack of vision in high places, of course, merely confirmed, instead of refuting, the heretics' indictment of the Church, and accelerated the progress of the heresy instead of retarding it.

This was the state of affairs as Innocent III found it on his accession; and the policy that he devised for dealing with it is his chief title to be regarded as a great pontiff.

'The decisive turn in the relations between the hierarchical Church and the religious movement was taken during the pontificate of Innocent III. Until then the religious movement had grown, through its own native forces, outside the Church and in increasing opposition to it—

¹ Grundmann, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 159-61.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-61.

² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-5, 159-61, 162, 165-6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-4.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-4.

while the Curia had neglected (apart from the relatively trivial attempts at the beginning of the twelfth century) to look for ways of creating a field of activity inside the Church for the new forms of religious life: voluntary poverty and itinerant preaching. All efforts to secure ecclesiastical recognition for these forms of life had been answered by the Church with a veto and with an instruction that any transgression of this veto was to be punished as heresy. But at the same time the Church lacked both the means and the energy to enforce this veto in practice and to suppress the religious movement effectively.

This was the strained situation which Innocent III found when he mounted the Papal Throne at the beginning of 1198. In this situation he did not immediately intervene with a definite comprehensive programme; and in fact he never attempted to transform the situation on uniform and radical lines by taking systematic creative measures. On the other hand, from the beginning of his pontificate until his death, in all the measures which the Curia felt itself obliged to take *vis-à-vis* the religious movement and the heresy, Innocent steadfastly and unwaveringly maintained a position, and pursued aims, which betokened a fundamental departure from the policy of his predecessors. He sought to bridge the gulf between the religious movement and the hierarchical Church by conceding to the demands for Apostolic itinerant preaching and for evangelical poverty a possibility of finding scope for action inside the Church—but this only on condition that the orthodox doctrine was not tampered with and that the Papal and hierarchical authority received an unqualified recognition. By this policy he compelled the devotees of the evangelical life, voluntary poverty and Apostolic preaching to make the choice between the Church and heresy—without maintaining the previous ruling that allegiance to the Roman Church should imply a renunciation of the ideals of the religious movement. On the other side he showed an uncompromising severity, and brought into action all the forces and the means at his command, in combating heresy in so far as it refused to accept, in consideration of these concessions, its own reincorporation into the ecclesiastical order. And finally he enlisted for this struggle against heresy precisely those circles which shared with the heretics their participation in the religious movement but which had duly consented to be incorporated into the society of the Catholic Church. This policy resulted on the one hand in the formation of a series of communities, congregations and orders (the mendicant orders, above all) in which the movement for religious poverty found its ecclesiastically recognized orthodox expressions, while on the other hand it produced the new ways of combating heresy: the Albigensian War and later the Inquisition. This does not mean that Innocent either created or even willed these new structures and new methods. The living forces that led to them had not proceeded from him, and he had no part or lot in them. His policy was not the expression of a religious conversion of the governing element in the Church; it sprang from a clear insight into the Church's tasks *vis-à-vis* the religious movement of the age—a movement that could never be mastered by mere vetos and condemnations

without any constructive work on the Church's part. Innocent III did not experience in himself the religious forces of his time, but he did recognize their existence; and he has to his credit the important achievement of having known how to incorporate these forces into the hierarchical Church and having exercised the cleverness and the tact, the foresight and the energy, that were requisite for this task. Thereby he not only averted the danger that the hierarchical Church might irretrievably cut itself off from the living religious forces of that age; he also smoothed the path and pointed the way for the reformation of the Christian life in the Catholic Church of the thirteenth century. His policy decided that the formless fermentation of the religious movement should succeed in bringing forth the great new orders and ordinances.¹

If Innocent had not adopted this policy in his Roman Curia, Francis in his Umbrian city-state might have been driven out of the Church's fold into the Cathars' wilderness. Both Francis himself and Bernard of Quintavalle came from just the same social milieu as Waldes;² the first generation of Franciscans, like their Cathar contemporaries, were mainly drawn from the well-to-do bourgeoisie and the nobility and the clergy;³ and they were mistaken for heretics on their first appearance in France.⁴ This affinity between Franciscanism and Catharism in respect of their common virtue of unworldliness enabled the spirit of Saint Francis to prevail over the spirit of Waldes and Bogomil-Theophilus and Constantine-Silvanus and Paul of Samosata when the Western Church had signally failed to quell this alien spirit by calumny and obstructiveness and violence. And on this showing we must conclude that, while Francis might never have been given the scope for doing his work within the bosom of the Church if it had not been for Innocent, it is equally improbable that Innocent's dual policy would have been blessed with success if it had not been for Saint Francis and Saint Dominic. If this is our conclusion, we shall be more than ever at a loss to understand the apparent superciliousness of Innocent's bearing towards Francis at his first encounter with this heaven-sent executant of the worldly will of a hard-pressed ecclesiastical statesman.

¹ Grundmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-2. Compare pp. 10-11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 165.


³ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 154.



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A STUDY OF HISTORY

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A STUDY OF HISTORY

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'Except the Lord build the house,
their labour is but lost that build it.

'Except the Lord keep the city,
the watchman waketh but in vain.'

Ps. cxxvii. 1-2

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V

THE DISINTEGRATIONS OF CIVILIZATIONS

A. THE PROBLEM OF THE DISINTEGRATIONS OF CIVILIZATIONS

IN passing from the breakdowns of civilizations to their disintegrations we have once more to run the gauntlet of a question which has already confronted us, at an earlier point in this Study, when we were passing from the geneses of civilizations to their growths.¹ At that point we found ourselves constrained to pause in order to consider whether we were setting ourselves a genuine problem. If we had previously probed as far as we were able to probe into the geneses of civilizations, had we not thereby already won the right to take their growths for granted, on the assumption that growth must follow birth as automatically and as inevitably as day follows dawn? Now that, in the later part of our Study at which we have since arrived, we have again reached our Pillars of Hercules in probing, this time, into the problem of breakdowns, can we not be content to dismiss the problem of disintegrations, which occupies the next place in our plan of inquiry, as a mere formality, on the assumption that disintegration must follow breakdown as surely as night follows evening?

Perhaps the best way to deal with this question that confronts us now will be to remind ourselves of how we dealt with the analogous question that has presented itself to us before. In this previous case we found that our impulse to dismiss a problem summarily on the strength of an abstract argument *a priori* was checked—as soon as we took our customary precaution of exploring the ground empirically—by an immediate discovery of concrete evidence which showed, in the mere fact of its palpable existence, that our problem was not an empty formality after all. The problem of the growths of civilizations was found to be raised in practical terms by the enigmatic but substantial presence, in the historical landscape, of five arrested civilizations,² every one of which had failed to grow in spite of having succeeded—unlike the four abortive civilizations³—in coming to birth. If we follow this clue in applying our well-tried empirical method once again, we

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 1, above.

² The Polynesian, the Eskimo, the Nomadic, the 'Osmanli, and the Spartan (see Part III. A, in vol. iii, above).

³ The abortive Far Eastern Christian, Far Western Christian, and Scandinavian civilizations, and an abortive Syriac Civilization (see Part II. D (vii), in vol. ii, above).

shall find that our present problem of the disintegrations of civilizations is likewise substantiated by certain palpable matters of fact which have already come under our observation. The set of civilizations that have been arrested after their birth, before they have had time to begin to grow, has its analogue in another set of civilizations that have been petrified after their breakdown before they have had time to complete the downward course that runs through disintegration to dissolution.

The classic example of a petrified civilization is presented by a phase in the history of the Egyptiac Society which we have already had occasion to consider in several different contexts.¹ We have noticed that, after the Egyptiac Society had broken down under the intolerable burden that was imposed upon it by the Pyramid-Builders, and after it had then duly passed through the first and the second into the third of three phases of disintegration—a 'Time of Troubles' and a universal state and an interregnum—this apparently moribund Egyptiac Society then departed unexpectedly and abruptly, at a moment when it was on the verge of completing its life-course, from what we may provisionally regard as the standard pattern of the disintegration-process if we take for our norm the Hellenic case in which these three phases of disintegration first came to our notice.² At the point where the disintegration of the Hellenic Society reached what might be thought to be its natural termination—that is to say, at the point where this disintegration culminated in dissolution—the Egyptiac Society passionately refused to pass away and emulated the legendary *tour de force* of its own historic King Mycerinus³ by rebelling against the execution of the death-sentence which it had lawfully incurred and successfully doubling the period of grace which Fate had allotted to it. When we take the time-measure of the survival of the Egyptiac Society from the moment of its galvanic reaction against the Hyksos invaders in the first quarter of the sixteenth century B.C.⁴ down to the eventual obliteration of the last traces of a distinctive Egyptiac style of culture in the fifth century of the Christian Era, we find that this span of 2,000 years is at least as long as the combined span of the birth, growth, breakdown, and almost completed disintegration of the Egyptiac Civilization—reckoning back from the date of its passionate reassertion of itself in the sixteenth century B.C. to its first emergence above

¹ See I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 136-46; III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 212-15; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 84-6; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 408-14 and 418-23, above.

² See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52-62, above.

³ See Herodotus, Book II, chaps. 129-34, for the legend of King Mycerinus (Ménakaure) of the Fourth Dynasty of the Egyptiac United Kingdom. (The legend has been cited in this Study already in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 409, above.)

⁴ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 144, above.

the primitive level at some unknown date in the fourth millennium B.C. Thus the Egyptiac Society did actually succeed—in spite of having broken down and gone into disintegration—in surviving for double the term of its natural expectation of life; but this unnatural longevity was bought at a price; for the life of the Egyptiac Society during this second aeon of existence which it had wrested from Fate was a kind of life-in-death. During those two supernumerary millennia a civilization whose career during the two preceding millennia had been so full of movement and of meaning—and this during its fall as well as during its rise—lingered on, on a level with the arrested civilizations and indeed with the primitive societies, as one of 'the peoples that have no history'. In fact, it survived by becoming petrified.¹

This extraordinary case of petrification which confronts us in Egyptiac history is perhaps sufficient in itself to dispose of the assumption that the breakdown of a civilization must inevitably be followed by a process of disintegration that runs straight out into dissolution in the Hellenic way. But the Egyptiac example of petrification does not stand alone. If we turn to the history of the main body of the Far Eastern Civilization in China, in which the moment of breakdown may be equated with the break-up of the T'ang Empire in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era,² we can trace the consequent process of disintegration duly following the normal course through a 'Time of Troubles' into a universal state—only to be pulled up in the universal state stage by a reaction of the same unexpected and abrupt and passionate kind as the Egyptiac Society's reaction in the interregnum following the Egyptiac universal state's disappearance. The Southern Chinese revolt, under the leadership of the founder of the Ming Dynasty, Hung Wu,³ against a Far Eastern universal state that had been established by the barbarian Mongols, is strongly reminiscent of the Theban revolt, under the leadership of the founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty, Amosis, against the 'successor-state' which had been erected on part of the derelict domain of the defunct Egyptiac universal state (the so-called 'Middle Empire') by the barbarian Hyksos.⁴ And

¹ For Ikhnaton's abortive act of creation, which was the exception that proved the rule of life-in-death during the Egyptiac aeon of petrification, see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 145-6, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, in the present volume, pp. 695-6, below.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 86, above.

³ For the Ming Dynasty see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 121-2, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 87, above.

⁴ The common vein of convulsive fanaticism in the Chinese Anti-Mongol reaction and in the Theban Anti-Hyksos reaction may be accounted for by a characteristic which the Mongols and the Hyksos displayed in common. Neither of these intruding barbarian war-bands was unadulteratedly barbarian. Each of them had already acquired the tincture of a civilization which was different from the civilization towards which they were now playing the part of an external proletariat. The Hyksos had been

there has been a corresponding similarity in the sequel. For, like the Egyptiac Society, the Far Eastern Society in China has prolonged its existence in a petrified form instead of passing expeditiously through disintegration to dissolution by way of a universal state running out into an interregnum.

It is true that the survival of the Far Eastern Society in China in its petrified state cannot yet compare in duration with the period for which the Egyptiac Society contrived to survive in the same condition. So far, less than six centuries have elapsed since Hung Wu drove the Mongols out beyond the Great Wall in A.D. 1368; and at the present moment it looks as though the Far Eastern Society were fast losing its identity through being merged in 'the Great Society' of a Westernized World. The Egyptiac parallel suggests, however, that these present appearances in China may be deceptive; for if we take the expulsion of the Mongols from China in A.D. 1368 as having its Egyptiac counterpart in the expulsion of the Hyksos from Egypt *circa* 1580 B.C., we find that the year A.D. 1938, in which this volume went to press, is represented in the annals of Egyptiac history by some year in the neighbourhood of 1010 B.C.; and any open-eyed and candid-minded observer, either foreign or native, of the state of the Egyptiac Society in the latter decades of the eleventh century B.C. would almost certainly have taken then as pessimistic a view of the Egyptiac Society's expectation of life as we are apt to take now of the prospects of the Far Eastern Society in China. In spite of that, the Egyptiac Society actually continued to survive—weathering one storm after another in its state of quite incurable yet almost invincible decrepitude—for a further period of nearly 1,500 more years. And, on this showing, we may well hesitate to pronounce that, in our day, a petrified Far Eastern Society in China is within sight of extinction.¹

Thus, in the last phase of Chinese as well as Egyptiac history, we have an empirical proof that the breakdown of a civilization is not necessarily followed by a disintegration that runs out straight

infected with the Sumeric Civilization (see I. C (ii), vol. 1, p. 139, footnote 1, above) and the Mongols with the Abortive Far Eastern Christian Civilization (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 122, footnote 2; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 237-8; II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, pp. 449-51, above). This touch of an alien civilization in the social 'make-up' of the Hyksos and the Mongols is perhaps the common element which accounts for the exceptionally fanatical reaction which they evoked from their Egyptiac and Far Eastern victims. (On this question see further V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 348-53, below.)

¹ So far from there being any certainty that the end of the Far Eastern Civilization in China was at hand in the year A.D. 1938, it seemed possible that this petrified society might be galvanized into a fresh lease of life-in-death by the extreme pressure of the Westernization which was now being applied to China through Japanese as well as through European and American channels. The galvanic effect, both upon the Far Eastern and upon the Egyptiac Society, of successive impacts of alien bodies social has been touched upon already in IV. C (ii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 116-18, above.

into dissolution. And there is a possibility that these two clear cases of the phenomenon of petrification may be reinforced by no less than nine others, if we eventually decide that ten of the twenty-one civilizations which we provisionally identified in the first part of this Study are not, after all, independent societies existing in their own right, but are simply the 'dead trunks' of other trees which we have already counted in our list.¹ On this reckoning the Far Eastern Society itself would have to be regarded as being simply the 'dead trunk' of the Sinic Society; and this would apply to the offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in Korea and Japan, as well as to its main body in China. Similarly the Orthodox Christian Society, both in its Near Eastern main body and in its Russian offshoot, would figure as the 'dead trunk' of the Hellenic Society; and the Iranic and Arabic societies would assume the same role in Syriac history, the Mexic and Yucatec societies in Mayan history, the Hindu Society in Indic history, and the Babylonian Society in Sumeric history. If we take separate account of each of the two limbs of any bifurcating stem this procedure would bring our number of petrified civilizations up to eleven, namely:²

The Egyptian *inde ab Amosi*.

The Sinic in its Far Eastern epilogue in China.

The Sinic in its Far Eastern epilogue in Korea and Japan.

The Hellenic in its Orthodox Christian epilogue in the Near East.

The Hellenic in its Orthodox Christian epilogue in Russia.

The Syriac in its Iranic epilogue.

The Syriac in its Arabic epilogue.

The Mayan in its Mexic epilogue.

The Mayan in its Yucatec epilogue.

The Indic in its Hindu epilogue.

The Sumeric in its Babylonian epilogue.

Moreover, in the history of the Sinic Society in its Far Eastern epilogue in China, we should have one example of something which might aptly, though perhaps rather quaintly, be described as a kind of social biscuit, in which the process of petrification had been undergone twice over: first, when the Sinic Society became petrified in the shape of the Far Eastern Society after the interregnum (*circa* A.D. 175-475) following the break-up of the universal state of the Han Dynasty; and for the second time when the Chinese branch of this petrified form of the Sinic Society became petrified to a still higher degree through that process of reaction

¹ This question has been raised in I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 133-46, above.

² Compare this catalogue with those in I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 131-3, above.

against the Mongol universal state which resulted in the establishment of the Ming Dynasty in A.D. 1368.

Perhaps we shall be wise to dispense with these reinforcements; for we have already discovered that we cannot actually disqualify our ten contested civilizations without exposing ourselves to serious difficulties. For example, if we decide to regard the Orthodox Christian Society as being merely a 'dead trunk' of the Hellenic Civilization, then we cannot refuse—without falling into an unwarrantable inconsistency—to regard our own Western Society in the same light, since the Western and Orthodox Christian societies are sister growths whose relation to the Hellenic Society is manifestly identical, whatever the relation may prove to be. Yet it would be as repugnant to our common sense to dismiss our own Western history as a mere epilogue to Hellenic history, and to decline to see in it the history of an independent society existing in its own right,¹ as conversely it would seem unreasonable to us to

¹ In the table of affinities that has been adopted in this Study the Hellenic and the Western Civilization appear as two separate and independent societies which are connected with one another by the relation for which we have coined the name 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation'. A closer kinship between these two civilizations, in virtue of a common quality which distinguishes the pair of them from all others, is suggested in the following passage of a letter which the writer of this Study has received from Dr. Edwyn Bevan:

"You see the process of history rather as a continual repetition of civilizations, running courses in many respects analogous, whereas it looks to me much more like a single process of unique stages. At least that seems to me the case with our European or "Western" Civilization, though, of course, I allow that civilizations like the Chinese or Indian are separate movements which may now be debouching into a common stream (as Polybius says the history of the Mediterranean peoples did in the third century B.C.) but which have hitherto run alongside of our "Western" Civilization. We should both, no doubt, allow that any bit of the historical process has both certain unique characteristics and also certain characteristics common to other bits of the process; but, while your attention and interest is directed mainly to the common characteristics, it is the uniqueness which impresses me.

"For instance, to begin at the end, the present condition of the World seems to me something like which nothing has ever been before, since *Homo Sapiens* was on the planet. And behind our modern world in time is the ancient Greco-Roman Civilization, the "Hellenic Civilization", as you call it, which I see, not simply as a civilization, but as the unique beginning of something new in the history of Mankind. Never before the Greek culture came into being, never in parts of the globe outside the sphere of that culture, can we see a civilization of the same rationalist character. (I admit it is a question of *degree*: all Mankind are rationalist up to a point.) That started a particular section of Mankind on a new track. Yet rationalist civilization in its first embodiment came to grief and was overrun by primitive barbarians. Then, when it had gradually worked its way up again through the barbarian mass, it got a fresh embodiment in our modern "Western" Civilization. That is to say, rationalist civilization is to-day making only its *second* try, and it seems to me hazardous to found any large generalizations about "civilizations", when, in regard to the particular kind of civilization in which we are primarily interested, you have only *two* examples. I see the movement of rationalist civilization in human history as it might be a battalion's assault on a fortress. The first attack is brought to a standstill and then thrown back by the coming in of an alien body of troops; but, that alien body having been disposed of, the attack is made again under conditions markedly different. No doubt, as one studied the first attack and the second attack, one would see analogous points in them: they would both go over the same ground, and meet some of the same obstacles. But the whole process containing the two attacks would be a single process, a single *élan spirituel* in two efforts."

The writer of this Study has to confess that, on this important point, he finds himself unable to agree with a scholar for whose judgement he has a deep respect. To the present writer's eye the common element of rationalism which may be discernible in

erect the epilogue of Egyptiac history, in the aeon of petrification inaugurated by the establishment of the Eighteenth Dynasty, into the history of a distinct civilization claiming to be as independent of the Egyptiac as our Western Civilization appears in our eyes to be independent of the Hellenic. In this dilemma we shall probably still prefer to retain our original list of twenty-one distinct civilizations that have succeeded in passing from birth into growth, instead of attempting to reduce the number to ten.¹ On the other hand we shall be on sure ground in seeking reinforcements for our two undoubted specimens of petrification—the Egyptiac *post* 1580 B.C. and the Far Eastern in China *post* A.D. 1368—in our existing collection of fossils. Though we may not be warranted in labelling the Hindu Civilization as a petrified form of the Indic, or again the Iranic and Arabic civilizations as petrified forms of the Syriac, we need not doubt that we have discovered

the Hellenic and the Western Civilization is not so distinctive a quality as to mark this pair of societies off from all other representatives of the species. The Hellenic Society may have had a bent for rationalism—as the Western Society may have had one for machinery or the Indic Society one for religion (see III. C (iii), vol. iii, pp. 377-99, above). But the *floruit* of this Hellenic flower was as brief as it was brilliant (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 269-74, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 545-68, below); and while it is, of course, true that there has been a renaissance of the Hellenic culture in the bosom of an 'affiliated' Western Society, and no less true that this Hellenic renaissance has tended to play an ever larger part in our Western life in the course of our Western history up to date, it would be begging the question (see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 34, above) of what the essential character of the Western Civilization may be if we were simply to take it for granted that this is represented by just those elements in our Western life that can be traced to a Hellenic source. If we were to regard the Christian element in our Western culture as being the essence of it, then our reversion to Hellenism might be taken (as is suggested in Part VII, below) to be, not a fulfilment of the potentialities of Western Christendom, but an aberration from the proper path of Western growth—in fact, a false step which it may or may not be possible now to retrieve. In the present writer's view 'a unique beginning of something new in the history of Mankind' is to be seen, if anywhere, not in the flowering of a brilliant rationalism in the springtime of Hellenic history, but in the discovery—or revelation—of a new conception of God, and of Man's relation to God, which was made in the last phase of the dissolution of the Sumeric Society (if that is indeed the date and the provenance of Abraham), and which, ever since then, has gone on gathering light through a series of epiphanies of which the culmination has been Christianity. This view, which is put forward in Part VII, below, is not at variance with that of Mr. Bevan, as he has communicated it to the writer of this Study in a later letter in the same correspondence:

'I see I didn't make my view quite clear in one respect. I should hardly say that the significant central thread of History is the rise of Rationalism: I should say, rather, with you that the central thread is the preparation for the Kingdom of God and its partial coming. . . . I don't think that Rationalism is enough. It enables men to get hold better of the pattern of the Physical World, and by so doing gives them a much greater command of the physical means for accomplishing their ends; but it does not tell them what their ends ought to be. That is where the Kingdom of God comes in. . . . By "Civilization" I don't mean a right development of the whole spirit of Man or a right adjustment of human relations. I mean only an organization of society on rational principles for the attaining of certain ends, good ends or bad ends. . . . The word [Civilization] is ambiguous. You really want a different word for the kind of civilization which implies high moral and spiritual values and the kind which is simply scientific organization. . . . You may say: "A state in which the higher values of the human spirit are suppressed cannot be called 'Civilization'." Then you must find some word to distinguish such a state from an "uncivilized" condition in the sense of Primitive Barbarism. Might we say "Satanic"?'

¹ These ten civilizations which would then remain on our list would be the Egyptiac, Sinic, Hellenic, Syriac, Mayan, Indic, and Sumeric, together with the Hittite, the Minoan, and the Andean.

what are unmistakably fossilized fragments of the Indic Civilization in the Jains of India, the Hinayanian Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, and the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia, and similar fossilized fragments of the Syriac Civilization in the Parsees and the Jews and the Nestorians and the Monophysites.¹

In any case, however cautiously and conservatively we may feel it wise to interpret the findings of the empirical survey that we have just been attempting to make, the evidence seems amply sufficient to demonstrate that the disintegration of broken-down civilizations is not an automatic and inevitable process that can simply be taken for granted. Even when disintegration has set in it does not necessarily run straight out into dissolution; and, though this may still prove to be the normal course of events, the cases of departure from the norm, by way of petrification or fossilization, are numerous enough and striking enough to raise the question of the reasons why the declines and falls of civilizations should sometimes have this alternative denouement. Our classic example of disintegration running straight out into dissolution has been the latter end of the history of the Hellenic Civilization; yet, as an eminent modern Western historian has pointed out, this society which eventually made way for two fresh representatives of the species was at one stage all but overtaken by the petrification which has been the Far Eastern Civilization's fate:

'The spirit of the two most famous nations of Antiquity was remarkably exclusive. . . . The fact seems to be that the Greeks admired only themselves, and that the Romans admired only themselves and the Greeks. . . . The effect was narrowness and sameness of thought. Their minds, if we may so express ourselves, bred in and in, and were accordingly cursed with barrenness and degeneracy. . . . The vast despotism of the Caesars, gradually effacing all national peculiarities and assimilating the remotest provinces of the Empire to each other, augmented the evil. At the close of the third century after Christ the prospects of Mankind [*sic*] were fearfully dreary. . . . That great community was then in danger of experiencing a calamity far more terrible than any of the quick, inflammatory, destroying maladies to which nations are liable—a tottering, drivelling, paralytic longevity, the immortality of the Struldbrugs, a Chinese civilisation. It would be easy to indicate many points of resemblance between the subjects of Diocletian and the people of that Celestial Empire where, during many centuries, nothing has been learned or unlearned; where government, where education, where the whole system of life, is a ceremony; where knowledge forgets to increase and multiply, and, like the talent buried

¹ For the identification of these Indic and Syriac fossils see I, B (iii), vol. i, p. 35, and I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2, above.

in the earth or the pound wrapped up in the napkin, experiences neither waste nor augmentation. The torpor was broken by two great revolutions, the one moral, the other political, the one from within, the other from without.¹

This merciful release for which, on Macaulay's showing, the Hellenic Society in the Imperial Age was indebted to the Church and the Barbarians, is a relatively happy ending which cannot be taken for granted. So long as life persists it is always possible that, instead of being cut off sharp by Clotho's beneficently ruthless shears, it may stiffen, by imperceptible degrees, into the paralysis of life-in-death; and the possibility that this may be the destiny of the Western Civilization² haunts the mind of at least one distinguished Western historian of the present generation.

'I do not think the danger before us is anarchy, but despotism, the loss of spiritual freedom, the totalitarian state, perhaps a universal world totalitarian state. As a consequence of strife between nations or classes there might be local and temporary anarchy, a passing phase. Anarchy is essentially weak, and in an anarchic world any firmly organized group with rational organisation and scientific knowledge could spread its dominion over the rest. And, as an alternative to anarchy, the World would welcome the despotic state. Then the World might enter upon a period of spiritual "petrification", a terrible order which for the higher activities of the human spirit would be death. The petrification of the Roman Empire and the petrification of China would appear less rigid, because [in our case] the ruling group would have much greater scientific means of power. (Do you know Macaulay's essay on "History"? He argues that the barbarian invasions were a blessing in the long run because they broke up the petrification. "It cost Europe a thousand years of barbarism to escape the fate of China.")³ There would be no barbarian races to break up a future world totalitarian state.)

'It seems to me possible that in such a totalitarian state, while philosophy and poetry would languish, scientific research might go on with continuous fresh discoveries. Greek science did not find the Ptolemaic realm an uncongenial environment, and I think, generally speaking, natural science may flourish under a despotism. It is to the interest of the ruling group to encourage what may increase their means of power. That, not anarchy, is, for me, the nightmare ahead, if we do not find a way of ending our present fraternal strife. But there is the Christian Church there, a factor to be reckoned with. It may have to undergo martyrdom in the future world-state, but, as it compelled the Roman world-state in the end to make at any rate formal submission to Christ,

¹ Macaulay, Lord: 'History', in *Miscellaneous Writings* (London 1860, Longmans, Green, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 263-7.

² This possibility has been touched upon in this Study already in IV. C (iii) (b) 4, vol. iv, p. 179, above.

³ Macaulay, op. cit., vol. i, p. 268.—A.J.T.

it might again, by the way of martyrdom, conquer the scientific rationalist world-state of the future.¹

These reflections show that the disintegrations of civilizations present a genuine problem which demands consideration.²

¹ Dr. Edwyn Bevan, in the second of the two letters to the writer of this Study that have been quoted above.

² In this respect the history of Man in process of civilization runs true to the larger movement of the history of Life on this planet.

'The present condition of the Earth reveals to us an assemblage of differing forms of life. These different forms . . . are not all of the same age, they have existed for longer or shorter periods of time; some have persisted practically unchanged from the earliest observable geological formations, others are of relatively recent origin. A just view of the facts demands recognition, therefore, of the phenomenon of modification or change, in relation to the forms of life' (Teggart, F. J.: *Theory of History* (New Haven 1925, Yale University Press), p. 144).

B. THE NATURE OF THE DISINTEGRATIONS OF CIVILIZATIONS

LIKE the phenomenon of petrification, which compels us to study the problem of the disintegrations of civilizations, the different phenomena which reveal the nature of these disintegrations have already come to our notice incidentally. We have encountered them, for instance, in the history of the Hellenic Society, in our examination of the effects of the impact of the Solonian Economic Revolution upon the domestic politics of the Hellenic city-states¹ and upon the international politics of the Hellenic World.² We have met with other illustrations in the history of the Egyptiac Society, in our examination of a failure to throw off, before it was too late, the social incubus of a deified kingship, and a subsequent failure to avoid exploitation at the hands of a series of other social parasites: litterati and priests and professional soldiers.³

These passages of history bring to light certain likenesses and certain differences between the nature of the disintegrations of civilizations and the nature of their growths.

In studying the growths of civilizations we found⁴ that they could be analysed into successions of performances of the drama of Challenge-and-Response, and that the reason why one performance followed another was because each of the responses was not only successful in answering the particular challenge by which it had been evoked, but was also instrumental in provoking a fresh challenge, which arose each time out of the new situation which the successful response had brought about. Thus the essence of the nature of the growths of civilizations proved to be an *élan* which carried the challenged party through the equilibrium of an effective response into an overbalance which declared itself in the presentation of a new challenge; and it was this element of overbalance that converted the single act of Challenge-and-Response, which we had detected in the geneses of civilizations, into the repetitive, recurrent rhythm which the concept of growth implies. This repetitiveness or recurrency is likewise implied in the concept of disintegration, which resembles the concept of growth in signifying a process and not a mere single act; and we duly discern a corresponding rhythm in those illustrations of the

¹ In IV. C (iii) (b) 9, vol. iv, pp. 200-6, above.

² In IV. C (iii) (b) 10, vol. iv, pp. 206-14; and also in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 304-15, above.

³ In IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 408-14 and 418-23, above.

⁴ In Part III. B, vol. iii, pp. 113-27, above.

nature of the disintegrations of civilizations that have already come under our eye.

In each individual performance of the drama of Challenge-and-Response we have, of course, here to write failure for success and to change the plus sign into a minus; but the successive defeats through which the process of disintegration works itself out do nevertheless resemble the successive victories which build up the process of growth inasmuch as they, too, constitute a continuous series in which each performance leads on to the next. For example, in the history of the international politics of the Hellenic World, from the time when the Solonian economic revolution first confronted the Hellenic Society with the task of establishing a political world order, we can see that the failure of the Athenian attempt to solve the problem by means of the Delian League led on to Philip of Macedon's attempt to solve it by means of the Corinthian League, and Philip's failure to Augustus's attempt to solve it by means of a *Pax Romana* upheld by a Principate. Similarly, in the history of the Egyptiac Society's struggle with the problem of social incubuses, we can see that the failure to throw off the incubus of a deified kingship led on to a progressive complication of the unsolved problem as the litteratus and the priest and the professional soldier successively mounted, behind the king, upon the peasant-packhorse's back. In this matter of recurrency in rhythm the nature of the disintegrations of civilizations unmistakably resembles the nature of their growths. On the other hand our examples have already brought out a point of diversity which is no less striking or important than the point of likeness.

In a repetition of performances of the drama of Challenge-and-Response, where the outcome is a process of growth, the fact that the successive performances constitute a series, in which each performance is a consequence of its predecessor, does not mean that the play is staged each time with exactly the same plot. So far from that, we find that in the growth-process a particular challenge is never presented more than once, and indeed, *ex hypothesi*, could not be presented for a second time, since, *ex hypothesi*, so long as growth is being maintained, each successive challenge in the series is being successfully met or, in other words, disposed of as a living issue and relegated to the archives of the Recording Angel as another chapter of past history. By contrast, we can see that, in a series in which the outcome of each successive encounter is not victory but defeat, the unanswered challenge can never be disposed of and is therefore bound to present itself again and again until it either receives some tardy and imperfect answer or else brings about the destruction of a society which has shown

itself inveterately incapable of responding to it effectively.¹ Thus, in the disintegrations of civilizations, the perpetual variety which gives light and life to their growths is replaced by a merciless uniformity;² and intensification, instead of diversification, is the form of change which now relieves the monotony of the series of performances. At each performance, now, the challenge is the same as it has been at every performance that has gone before since the tragic performance which witnessed the original breakdown; but, after each successive failure to respond to it, the old unanswered challenge presents itself ever more insistently and in an ever more formidable shape, until at last it quite dominates and obsesses and overwhelms the unhappy souls that are being progressively defeated by it.

Thus the disintegration of a civilization, like its growth, is a cumulative as well as a continuous process. At the same time, when we are dealing with disintegration, there might seem, at first sight, to be no necessity to deny ourselves the use of the convenient spatial metaphor of 'direction', which we hesitated to apply when we were attempting to comprehend the nature of growth.³ The direction in which disintegration runs might seem to be only too clear. Does not the disintegration of a civilization run to a defeat which brings with it the alternative penalties of an extinction without reprieve and a petrification which is no true mercy, since it is bound to end in dissolution sooner or later and amounts, for however long it may last, to nothing but a meaningless and savourless life-in-death?

This view of the nature of the disintegrations of civilizations may convey a part of the truth. It may be true, as far as it goes, to say that, when once a civilization has broken down—or, at any rate, if and when an original breakdown has been confirmed by a certain number of failures to retrieve the lost position—then the broken-down civilization is (in mythological language) remorselessly condemned to eventual destruction or (in scientific language) mechanically dispatched to the same grim goal on a travelling belt of interlocking cause and effect that can be neither reversed nor broken nor checked. In so far as this is true, the last word on the disintegration of a civilization would seem to be the sublime and chilling Lucretian *Concede: necessest*.⁴ But it would hardly be wise to concur in this famous verdict without being sure that our judgement has been formed in the light of the whole truth, as far as it may be possible for us to comprehend it. The Solonian *Respite*

¹ On this see further V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 280-1, below.

² See V. C (iii), vol. vi, pp. 321-6, below.

³ See Part III. B, vol. iii, pp. 124-7, above.

⁴ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, l. 962.

finem,¹ if it hits the mark at all, is presumably pertinent to all cases; and, until we have seen the end of an individual or a society, to pronounce an absolute verdict of either happiness or unhappiness may be equally premature. 'Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth'² may be as near to the ultimate truth as the dictum, attributed to Solon by Herodotus, that 'to many people God has given a glimpse of happiness in order to destroy them root and branch'.³ The 'son' whom we now see being 'scourged' may be found, in a later act, to be 'received'⁴ after he has passed through his appointed ordeal. We cannot say our last word about the nature of the disintegrations of civilizations till we have studied the process of disintegration from beginning to end, and this in its inward experiences as well as in its outward manifestations.

¹ For the parable of Solon and Croesus see IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, pp. 251-2, above.

² Hebrews xii. 6, quoted already in I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 169, footnote 1, and in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 298, above.

³ Herodotus, Book I, chap. 32, quoted in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, p. 251, above.

⁴ Hebrews xii. 6.

C. THE PROCESS OF THE DISINTEGRATIONS OF CIVILIZATIONS

(I) THE CRITERION OF DISINTEGRATION

(a) A LINE OF APPROACH

IN our study of the process of the growths of civilizations we began by looking for a criterion of growth¹ before we attempted to make an analysis of the process;² and in studying now the analogous process of the disintegrations of civilizations we may take our cue from the analogy³ by applying the same plan of operations *mutatis mutandis*. One welcome difference in our procedure will be that we shall find ourselves absolved, this time, from re-tracing all the steps of our previous inquiry; for this inquiry has already led us to the conclusion that the criterion of growth is not to be found in an increasing command over the environment, either human or physical,⁴ while conversely a loss of command over the environment of either kind has not proved to be the cause of the breakdowns of civilizations.⁵ An empirical survey has left us doubtful whether there is any ascertainable correlation at all between the historical variations in the degree of a society's control over its environment and the historical change in the fortunes of a society whose growth is cut short by a breakdown running into a disintegration. And the evidence, so far as it goes, suggests that, if some correlation did prove to exist, we should find that an increase in command over the environment was a concomitant of breakdown and disintegration and not of growth.⁶

It looks, in fact, as though the internal struggles within the bosom of a society which bring the society's breakdown about, and which become more and more violent as its consequent disintegration proceeds, were actually more effective than the activities of genesis and growth in promoting the extension of the society's command both over the life of other living societies and over the inanimate forces of Physical Nature. In the downward course of a broken-down civilization's career there may be truth in the Ionian philosopher Heracleitus's saying that 'War is the father of all things'.⁷ The sinister concentration of the society's dwind-

¹ In III. C (i), vol. iii, above.

² In III. C (ii), vol. iii, above.

³ For the analogy between the nature of the disintegrations of civilizations and the nature of their growths see Part V. B, above.

⁴ See III. C (i) (a) and (b), vol. iii, above.

⁵ See IV. C (ii), vol. iv, above.

⁶ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 139-54, and III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, *passim*, as well as IV. C (ii), vol. iv, above.

⁷ Heracleitus, fragment 45. It may be noted that, in the life-time of Heracleitus (*vivebat circa* 500 B.C.), Ionia, which had been the cradle of a creative minority in the first chapter of the growth of the Hellenic Society (See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 338-9, above), was already verging towards her decline, though the Hellenic Society as a whole was at that time still in vigorous growth.

ling powers upon the absorbing business of fratricidal warfare may generate a military prowess that will place the neighbouring societies at the war-obsessed society's mercy, and may strike out a military technique that will serve as a key to the acquisition of a far-reaching technical mastery over the Material World. Since the vulgar estimates of human prosperity are reckoned in terms of power and wealth, it thus often happens that the opening chapters in the history of a society's tragic decline are popularly hailed as the culminating chapters of a magnificent growth; and this ironic misconception may even persist for centuries. Sooner or later, however, disillusionment is bound to follow; for a society that has become incurably divided against itself is almost certain to 'put back into the business' of war the greater part of those additional resources, human and material, which the same business has incidentally brought into its hands.

For instance, we see the money-power and man-power which had been won for the Hellenic Society through Alexander's conquest of the Achaemenian Empire being poured into the civil wars between Alexander's successors. The power of the same two kinds which was subsequently swept together into Roman hands through the establishment of Rome's military supremacy over the Hellenic World was almost as quickly expended in the Roman civil wars that preceded the establishment of the *Pax Augusta*. The first charge on the spoils taken by the Spanish *conquistadores* from the Aztecs and the Incas was the provision of the sinews of war for fratricidal struggles between the demoralized parvenu masters of a New World, while the residue that reached the coffers of these adventurers' lawful sovereign in Spain was blown from the cannon's mouth on the battlefields of sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century Europe.¹ Finally, in this same Western Society in our own generation, we have seen all the human and material resources of a Westernized and industrialized world being mobilized to feed the furnaces of Moloch in which *Homo Occidentalis* has made a holocaust of his own children in our great Western civil war of A.D. 1914-18.

Thus the increasing command over the environment which an ironic or malicious or retributive Providence is apt to bestow upon a society in disintegration only serves, in the end, to put a greater driving-power into the suicidally demented society's chosen work of self-destruction; and the story turns out to be a simple illustration of the theme that 'the wages of Sin is Death'.² Our criterion

¹ The historical 'law' exemplified in the self-destruction of the Macedonian and Castilian *conquistadores* has been examined in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 484-6, above.

² Romans vi. 23.

for the process of the disintegration of a civilization has to be sought elsewhere; and the clue is given to us in the spectacle of that division and discord within the bosom of a society to which an increase in its command over the environment can so often be traced back. This is only what we should expect; for we have found already¹ that the ultimate criterion and the fundamental cause of the breakdowns of civilizations is an outbreak of internal discord through which they forfeit their faculty for self-determination.

The social schisms in which this discord partially reveals itself rend the broken-down society in two different dimensions simultaneously. There are 'vertical' schisms between geographically segregated communities and 'horizontal' schisms between geographically intermingled but socially segregated classes.

In the 'vertical' type of schism the articulation of the society into a number of parochial states gives rise to an internecine warfare on a crescendo note between these nominal members of one and the same body social; and this warfare exhausts the energies of the society before it brings itself to an end through a 'knock-out blow' in which a single surviving state is left staggering, half-dead, among the corpses of its fellow combatants. In an empirical survey of a considerable range we have seen how frequently the fatal discord takes this 'vertical' form of destructive warfare between states. Indeed, in no less than fourteen out of the sixteen cases² in which we can pronounce with assurance that a broken-down civilization has brought the breakdown upon itself, we have found that a reckless indulgence in the crime of inter-state warfare has been the main line of suicidal activity.³ At the same time we may observe that this 'vertical' kind of schism is perhaps not the most characteristic manifestation of the discord by which the breakdowns of civilizations are brought about; for the articulation of a society into parochial communities is, after all, a phenomenon which is common to the whole genus 'Human Societies', and is not peculiar to the species 'Civilizations'. This 'vertical' articulation is part of the heritage which civilizations have derived from societies of the primitive species. The so-called 'civilized' state is merely an imposing, 'high-powered' version of the primitive

¹ In IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 119-33, above.

² For these sixteen cases see IV. C (ii) (b), *passim*, vol. iv, especially p. 115, above.

³ The two exceptional cases are the Egyptiac and the Iranic. The breakdown of the Egyptiac Civilization seems to have been due mainly to the idolization of an institution (a deified kingship), and the breakdown of the Iranic Civilization mainly to a religious schism (a recrudescence of the long dormant conflict between Sunnah and Shi'ah). The militant outbreak of Shi'ism in the Iranic World was, of course, followed by fratricidal warfare between the Safawis and the 'Osmanlis (see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, above). For the incubus of the Pharaonic Crown see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 408-14, above.

tribe; and, while the internecine warfare between states in the bosom of a civilization is vastly more destructive than the feeble and desultory warfare between tribes in the bosom of a primitive society, this method of suicide is merely an abuse of a potential instrument of self-destruction which is within the reach of any society of either species. On the other hand the 'horizontal' schism of a society along lines of class is not only peculiar to civilizations but is also a phenomenon which first appears at the moment of their breakdowns and which is a distinctive mark of the phases of breakdown and disintegration, by contrast with its absence during the phases of genesis and growth.¹

We have come across this 'horizontal' kind of schism already in several different contexts in earlier parts of this Study.

We encountered it first when we were exploring the extension of our own Western Society backwards in the Time-dimension. We found ourselves led back to the Christian Church and to a number of barbarian war-bands which had come into collision with the Church in Western Europe inside the northern frontiers of the Roman Empire; and we observed that each of these two institutions—the war-bands and the Church—had been created by a social group which was not, itself, an articulation of our own Western body social and which could only be described in terms of another society, antecedent to ours, which we have labelled 'the Hellenic'. We found that we had to describe the creators of the Christian Church as 'the internal proletariat' and the creators of the barbarian war-bands as the 'external proletariat' of this Hellenic Society.²

At a later point in our inquiry³ we made use of the three institutions upon which we had thus accidentally stumbled—that is to say, the Roman Empire and the barbarian war-bands and the Christian Church—as tokens of a relation which we had found

¹ This is not, of course, to say that either in a primitive society or in a civilization in its growth-stage horizontal lines of social articulation are unknown. So far from that, it is manifest that the structure of both these kinds of society is often highly hierarchical; and some of the hierarchical distinctions to which they are prone are also of a genealogical order which opposes a formidable barrier to the transit of individuals or families from one rank in the hierarchy to another. Even, however, where the gulfs between ranks cannot easily be crossed on bridges of intermarriage or adoption, this 'racial' cleavage in a primitive society or in a growing civilization is not apt to produce a moral schism, because the different ranks which are divided in 'race' are apt to be united morally by a common consciousness of having reciprocal functions to perform which are all indispensable for the welfare, and even perhaps for the preservation, of a society which is one and indivisible. (An example of this unity in diversity is the social relation between knights and vassals which was the ideal—though not always the practice—of our own medieval Western feudal system.) The other chief 'horizontal' line of division in primitive societies is the distinction between different age-classes; and this hierarchy of ages is sometimes elaborately articulated and graded; but an age-class is, of course, in its very nature, a form of 'horizontal' division which is transcended inevitably through the passage of Time.

² See I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-3, above.

³ In I. C (i), vol. i, above.

subsisting between the Hellenic Society and our own Western Society, and which we had labelled 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation'. Our immediate purpose at that stage was to discover, by the test of these tokens, whether there were other known instances of this relation between two civilizations which we had come across so far in a single example; and our ulterior purpose was to identify as many representatives as possible of the species of society which we have labelled 'Civilizations'. In order, however, to employ our three tokens with better effect, we found ourselves led to examine and define them more closely; and this inquiry led on, in its turn, to a subsidiary inquiry¹ into the respective origins and natures, and into the mutual relations, of the different social groups to which our three institutions severally owed their existence in the Hellenic World in which we had come across them.

We found that 'the internal proletariat' of the Hellenic Society, which was the creator of the Christian Church, and its 'external proletariat', which was the creator of the barbarian war-bands, had each arisen through an act of secession from the Hellenic body social during a 'Time of Troubles' in which the Hellenic Society itself was manifestly no longer creative but was already in decline; and, pushing our inquiry another stage back, we further found that these secessions of an internal and an external 'proletariat' had been provoked by an antecedent change in the character of the ruling element in the Hellenic body social. A 'creative minority' which had once evoked a voluntary allegiance from the uncreative mass, in virtue of the gift of charm which is the privilege of creativity, had now given place to a 'dominant minority' which found itself unable to exert the charm because it was destitute of the creative power. This uninspired minority, into whose hands the heritage of leadership had thus passed, could not bring itself to surrender a position of authority and eminence that it lacked the genius to earn; and, rather than climb down from the saddle, it set itself to keep its seat by force. This policy of sheer repression on 'the dominant minority's' part—a policy which was as impracticable as it was wrong-headed—was the grievance which had estranged the 'proletariat' to the point of revolt. The secessions which had eventually resulted in the creation of the barbarian war-bands and of the Christian Church were reactions to the sting of 'the dominant minority's' whip and to the prick of its spurs. Yet this defeat of its own intentions—through the disruption of a society which it was attempting, however perversely, to hold together—is not the only achievement of 'the dominant minority' that came to our notice in this context. If the barbarian

¹ In I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52-62, above.

war-bands and the Christian Church are the Hellenic 'proletariat's' handiwork, the Hellenic 'dominant minority' has also left a monument of itself in the shape of the Roman Empire; and the Empire not only took shape earlier than either the Church or the war-bands: its mighty presence in the world in which these 'proletarian' institutions grew up was a factor in the growth of both of them which cannot be left out of account. This universal state in which the Hellenic 'dominant minority' encased itself was like the carapace of a giant tortoise; and while the Church was reared under its shadow—partly profiting by the protection of this borrowed shield, and partly fighting for life against the crushing pressure of its weight—the barbarians trained their war-bands by sharpening their claws on the tortoise-shell's outer face.

Finally, at a third point in the course of this Study,¹ we tried to obtain a clearer view of the nexus of cause and effect between the loss of a leading minority's gift for creation and the loss of its faculty for attracting the majority by charm without having to think of resorting to force. And here we put our finger upon the Creative Minority's expedient of social drill—as a short-cut for bringing the uncreative mass into line—in which we had already² found the weak spot in the relation between minority and majority in the growth-stage. On this showing, the estrangement between minority and majority which eventually comes to a head in the secession of the Proletariat is a consequence of the breaking of a link which, even in the growth-phase, has only been maintained by playing upon a well-drilled faculty of mimesis; the leaders' failure to continue to play upon this faculty in the rank-and-file is a consequence of the same leaders' failure to reply to a particular challenge by making a creative response; and it is no longer surprising to find that the link inevitably snaps when the leaders' creativity gives out, considering that, even in the growth-stage of the society's history, this link of mimesis has always been precarious by reason of a treacherous duality—the revenge of an unwilling slave—which is part of the nature of any mechanical device.³

These are the threads of inquiry into the 'horizontal' kind of schism in a broken-down society that are already in our hands; and perhaps the most promising way of attempting to pursue our inquiry farther will be to draw these threads together and then spin out the strand.

Our first step⁴ will be to take a closer and wider survey of the three fractions—Dominant Minority and Internal and External

¹ In IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 123-4 and 131-2, above. Compare III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 374.

² In III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 245-8, above.

³ For the mechanicalness of mimesis see IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 119-33, above.

⁴ In V. C (i) (c), pp. 35-276, below.

Proletariats—into which a broken-down society splits when a 'horizontal' schism rends its fabric. So far we have only had occasion to glance at the Hellenic examples; but, since we have found¹ that the respective institutional products of the Dominant Minority and the two divisions of the Proletariat—the institutions of universal state and universal church and barbarian war-bands—are not peculiar to the Hellenic Society but can also be identified in the histories of a number of other societies in their later phases, there is a presumption that each of these other societies, likewise, has split into fractions corresponding to the three which, as creators of the three institutions aforesaid, have already come to our attention in the history of the Hellenic Society in its decline. Our second step² will be to turn—as we turned at a certain point³ in our study of the process of growth—from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm; for, after studying the 'horizontal' schism in the fabric of a disintegrating society under its outward aspect of an increasing discord in the body social, we shall find ourselves moved to re-study it under the complementary inward aspect of an increasing distraction in the soul. Both these lines of search for a criterion of disintegration will lead us to the, at first sight, paradoxical discovery that the process of disintegration works out, at least in part, to a result which is logically incompatible with its nature—works out, that is to say, to a 'recurrence of birth' or 'palíngenesia'.⁴ And this paradox will command our attention⁵ before we address ourselves to an analysis of disintegration by examining, first the relation between disintegrating civilizations and the individual human beings who are 'members' of them,⁶ and then the interaction between these individuals through which the process of disintegration works itself out.⁷ Thereafter, when we are in a position to view the whole course of the process in retrospect,⁸ we shall find, as indeed we might expect, that the qualitative change which it brings with it is exactly opposite in character to that which is the outcome of growth. In a previous part of this Study⁹ we have seen that in the process of growth the several growing civilizations become differentiated from one another. We shall now find that, conversely, the qualitative effect of the disintegration-process is standardization.

This tendency towards standardization is the more remarkable when we consider the extent of the diversity which it has to over-

¹ In I. C (i) (b), vol. i, above.

² In V. C (i) (d), in the present volume, pp. 376-568, and in vol. vi, pp. 1-168, below.

³ Between III. C (i) (b) and III. C (i) (c), in vol. iii, above.

⁴ For alternative possible meanings of the word 'palíngenesia' see p. 27, footnote 2, below.

⁵ In V. C (i) (e), vol. vi, pp. 169-75, below.

⁶ In V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 175-278, below.

⁷ In V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 278-321, below.

⁸ In V. C (iii), vol. vi, pp. 321-6, below.

⁹ In III. C (iii), vol. iii, above.

come. The broken-down civilizations bring with them, when they enter upon their disintegration, the extremely diverse dispositions—a bent towards Art or towards Clockwork, or whatever the bent may be—that they have severally acquired during their growth. And they are also further differentiated from one another in a second sense by the fact that their breakdowns overtake them at widely different ages. The Syriac Civilization, for example, broke down, *post mortem Salamonis*, circa 937 B.C.,¹ at a date which was probably less than two hundred years removed from the date of the original emergence of this civilization out of the post-Minoan interregnum. On the other hand the sister Hellenic Civilization, which emerged out of the same interregnum coevally, did not break down for another five hundred years, if we are right in equating its breakdown with the outbreak of the great Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C.² Again, the Orthodox Christian Civilization broke down upon the outbreak of the great Bulgaro-Roman War in A.D. 977,³ while in this case the sister civilization, which is our own civilization of the West, unquestionably went on growing for several centuries longer and—for all that we know—may not have broken down even yet,⁴ at an age when the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization is now little less than a thousand years behind us in the past.⁵ If sister civilizations can run to such different lengths of growth-span as we find in these two examples, it is manifest that the growths of civilizations are not predestined to any uniform duration; and indeed we have failed to find any convincing reason *a priori* why a civilization that has successfully come to birth, and has avoided the danger of becoming arrested in infancy, should not be able to go on growing *in saecula saeculorum*.⁶ These considerations make it clear that the differences between growing civilizations are extensive and profound. Nevertheless, in the history of a civilization that has been overtaken by the catastrophe of breaking down, we shall find that, as its subsequent disintegration proceeds, the process tends to conform to a standard pattern. A 'horizontal' schism regularly splits the disintegrating society into the same three fractions—Dominant Minority and Internal and External Proletariats—and these three separate social groups which the schism has brought into

¹ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 67–8, above.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 62, above.

³ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 72, above.

⁴ For a tentative diagnosis of the symptoms see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 312–21, and also Part XII, below.

⁵ Even if the Western Civilization were to prove, in retrospect, to have broken down upon the outbreak of the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth century, its growth-span would be longer, even so, than the growth-span of the sister Orthodox Christian Society by a tale of little less than 600 years.

⁶ This problem has been discussed in IV. C (i), vol. iv, above.

existence then regularly create the three institutions—universal state and universal church and barbarian war-bands—that are severally their characteristic handiwork.

We shall have to notice these institutions, as well as their respective creators, if our study of the disintegrations of civilizations is to be comprehensive. But, we shall find it convenient, so far as it may prove possible, to study the institutions for their own sakes in separate parts of the book¹—partly because an attempt to complete our examination of them in the present part would heavily overload it, but also for the stronger reason that these three institutions that are apt to arise in the course of the disintegration of a civilization are something more than mere products of the disintegration-process. Our early encounters with them in this Study² have shown us that they may also play a role in the relations between one civilization and another; and when we examine the universal churches we shall find ourselves led to raise the question whether churches can really be comprehended in their entirety in the framework of the histories of civilizations, within which they make their first historical appearance, or whether we have not to regard them as representatives of another species of society which is at least as distinct from the species 'Civilizations' as the civilizations are distinct from the primitive societies.

This may prove to be one of the most momentous questions that a study of history, within our present range of vision, can suggest to us; but the question lies near the farther end of the line of inquiry which we have just been sketching out. We must begin by returning to our starting-point, which is the 'horizontal' schism of a broken-down society into the three fractions that we have labelled the Dominant Minority and the Internal and External Proletariats.

(b) THE MOVEMENT OF SCHISM-AND-PALINGENESIA

In an anticipatory attempt³ to picture to ourselves the progressive estrangement of the Proletariat from the Dominant Minority in the Hellenic World, in the course of the decline of the Hellenic Civilization, we helped ourselves out by quoting a brilliant and penetrating passage from a famous work of a nineteenth-century French philosopher, de Gobineau.⁴ We may fitly cap this quotation now by another from the *Summa Philosophiae*

¹ In parts VI, VII, and VIII, below.

² In I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-3; I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 55-7; and Part II. A, vol. i, pp. 187-8, above.

³ In I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 54, above.

⁴ De Gobineau, le Comte J. A.: *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines*, vol. i, pp. 93-4.

of de Gobineau's countryman of an older generation, Saint-Simon,¹ for in this passage the social schism that follows the transition from an 'organic period' (i.e. an age of growth) to a 'critical period' (i.e. an age of disintegration)² is delineated in general terms and not merely with reference to the Hellenic instance.

'Aux époques organiques le but de l'activité sociale est nettement défini; tous les efforts . . . sont consacrés à l'accomplissement de ce but, vers lequel les hommes sont continuellement dirigés, dans le cours entier de leur vie, par l'éducation et la législation. Les relations générales étant fixées, les relations individuelles, modelées sur elles, le sont également; l'objet que la société se propose d'atteindre est révélé à tous les cœurs, à toutes les intelligences; il devient facile d'apprécier les capacités les plus propres à favoriser sa tendance, et les véritables supériorités se trouvent naturellement alors en possession du pouvoir; il y a légitimité, souveraineté, autorité, dans l'acception réelle de ces mots. L'harmonie règne dans les rapports sociaux. . . .

'Les époques critiques offrent un spectacle diamétralement opposé. On aperçoit, il est vrai, à leur début, un concert d'activité, déterminé par le besoin généralement éprouvé de détruire; mais la divergence ne tarde pas à éclater et à devenir complète, de toutes parts l'anarchie se manifeste, et bientôt chacun n'est plus occupé qu'à s'approprier quelques débris de l'édifice qui s'écroule et se disperse, jusqu'à ce qu'il soit réduit en poussière. Alors le but de l'activité sociale est complètement ignoré, l'incertitude des relations générales passe dans les relations privées; les véritables capacités ne sont plus et ne peuvent plus être appréciées; la légitimité du pouvoir est contestée à ceux qui l'exercent; les gouvernants et les gouvernés sont en guerre; une guerre semblable s'établit entre les intérêts particuliers, qui ont acquis chaque jour une prédominance plus marquée sur l'intérêt général.'³

This Saint-Simonian sketch of the social strife that accompanies the disintegration of any civilization has been almost effaced in the minds of Posterity by that tremendous picture of the class-war which has been painted—in colours borrowed from the apocalyptic visions of a repudiated religious tradition—by another Western philosopher of a later generation: the German Jew Karl Marx (*vivebat* A.D. 1818–83). The extraordinary impression which the Marxian materialist apocalypse has made upon so many millions of minds—and this often at second or third hand, and at levels of intellectual culture at which the Master's *ipsissima verba* would be unintelligible—is, of course, due in part to the political militancy, as well as to the philosophical impressiveness, of the Marxian

¹ De Gobineau *vivebat* A.D. 1816–1882; Saint-Simon *vivebat* A.D. 1760–1825.

² For these two technical terms of Saint-Simon's philosophy see I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 154, footnote 4, and Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 199–200, above.

³ Bazard, 'Exposition de la Doctrine Saint-Simonienne' in *Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, vol. xli (Paris 1877, Leroux), pp. 171–4.

diagram; for, while this 'blue-print' is the kernel of a general philosophy of history, it is also a revolutionary call to arms in which the industrial proletariat of our latter-day Western World is incited to secede from a 'capitalist' dominant minority and is invited to carry this act of secession to its logical conclusion by shaking off physically an odious and intolerable yoke against which it is assumed already to have risen in spiritual revolt. Whether the invention and the vogue of this Marxian formula of the class-war are to be taken as signs that the civilization of our Western World, in which this portent has now appeared, has its feet already set upon the path of disintegration, is a question which will occupy us in a later part of this Study¹ when we come to look into the prospects of this Western Civilization of ours. In this place we have cited Marx for other reasons: first, because he is the classic exponent of the doctrine of the class-war for our world in our age; and, second, because his formula conforms to the traditional Zoroastrian and Jewish and Christian apocalyptic pattern in unveiling, beyond a violent climax, the vision of a gentle finale.

According to the Communist prophet's intuition of the operations of his familiar goddess Historical Materialism or Determinism or Necessity, the class-war is bound to issue in a victorious proletarian revolution; but this bloody culmination of the struggle will also be the end of it; for the victory of the Proletariat will be decisive and definitive and 'the Dictatorship of the Proletariat', by which the fruits of the victory are to be safeguarded and harvested during the post-revolutionary period, is not to be a permanent institution. A time is to come when a new society that has been classless from birth will be old enough and strong enough to dispense with 'the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'—as, in the Gospel story, the paralytic who has been miraculously healed by Jesus demonstrates the reality of the cure by obeying the Master's command to take up his bed and walk.² Indeed, in its final—and permanent—acme of well-being the New Society of the Marxian Millennium will be able to cast away not only 'the Dictatorship of the Proletariat' but also every other institutional crutch, including the State itself; for in that Marxian earthly paradise to come 'they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels which are in Heaven'.³

The interest of the Marxian eschatology for our present inquiry lies in the surprising yet unquestionable fact that this lingering political shadow of a vanished religious belief does accurately

¹ In Part XII, below.

² Matt. ix. 1-8 = Mark ii. 1-12 = Luke v. 18-26 = John v. 1-16.

³ Mark xii. 25.

plot out the actual course which the class-war, or 'horizontal' schism, in a broken-down society is apt to follow as a matter of historical fact that can be ascertained from an empirical survey of the histories of societies in disintegration. History duly reveals to us in the phenomenon of disintegration a movement that runs through War to Peace; through Yang to Yin;¹ and through an apparently wanton and savage destruction of precious things, created in the Past by Time and Toil and Love, to fresh works of creation that seem to owe their special quality to the devouring glow of the flame in which they have been forged.

The schism in itself is a product of two negative movements, each of which is inspired by an evil passion. First the Dominant Minority attempts to hold by force—against all right and reason—a position of inherited privilege which it has ceased to merit; and then the Proletariat repays injustice with resentment, fear with hate, and violence with violence when it executes its act of secession. Yet the whole movement ends in positive acts of creation—and this on the part of all the actors in the tragedy of disintegration. The Dominant Minority creates a universal state, the Internal Proletariat a universal church, and even the External Proletariat a bevy of barbarian war-bands.

These three achievements are, no doubt, extremely unequal in the respective degrees of the creativity that they manifest. We have noticed at an earlier point² that the universal church, alone of the three, has a prospect in the Future as well as a footing in the Past, while the universal state and the war-bands belong to the Past exclusively. And it hardly needs to be pointed out that, of the two backward-looking institutions, the barbarian war-bands are poor affairs indeed compared with the universal state. By creating a universal state the Dominant Minority performs the worthy feat of checking, for a time, the process of social disintegration which its own past action has precipitated, and thus enabling the temporarily reprieved society to enjoy a brief 'Indian Summer'.³ In creating barbarian war-bands the External Proletariat has merely sharpened its predatory beak and claws in preparation for a carrion-crow's feast upon a dead civilization's carcass. Nevertheless there is a gleam of creativeness to be discerned, even here, in the contrast that strikes our eye if we compare the war-bands that were led by Theodoric the Ostrogoth to Rome, or by Mu'ā-wiyah the Umayyad to Damascus, with the hordes of Cimbri and

¹ For the alternating forces or phases in the rhythm of the Universe which Sinic philosophers have called Yin and Yang, see Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 201-4, above.

² In I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 56-62, above.

³ For this phenomenon of 'Indian Summers' in the penultimate stage of the disintegrations of civilizations see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 56-76, above.

Teutones that had flooded across the Alps at the turn of the second and the last century B.C., or with the hordes of Ituraeans that had silted up, at about the same date, out of the North Arabian Desert against the eastern flanks of Hermon and Antilibanus.¹

Thus the social schism that is the outward criterion of the disintegration of a broken-down society is not just a schism and nothing more. When we grasp the movement as a whole, from beginning to end, we find that we have to describe it as Schism-and-Palingenesia² if we wish to give it a title that does it justice. And, considering that a secession is manifestly a particular manner of withdrawal, we may classify the specific double movement of

¹ For the difference in degree of barbarity between different representatives of the Hellenic external proletariat see further V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 223-7, below.

² 'Palingenesia' is a Greek word (*παλιγγενεσία*) which occurs twice in the New Testament—in Matt. xix. 28 and in Titus iii. 5—and which in both these passages is translated by the English word 'regeneration' in the Authorized Version. This compound abstract substantive noun is derived from the verbal phrase *παλιν γίγνεσθαι*, which is used by Plato, in a passage (*Timaeus*, 23 B) that has been quoted in IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 24-5, above, to describe the fresh start which has to be made periodically by Human Society in Hellas and elsewhere, in contrast to an allegedly unbroken continuity of Civilization in the Egyptian World. The substantive was perhaps coined out of the verbal phrase in order to serve as a technical term in the vocabulary of the Stoic philosophy (see Dey, J.: *Παλιγγενεσία* (Münster i. W. 1937, Aschendorff), pp. 6-13 and 25), which needed a special word to describe the opening of each round of an endlessly and unvaryingly repeated cyclic movement of the Universe. (For this theory of cycles, which is not peculiar to Stoicism, see IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 23-38, above.) There is a clear case of this Stoic usage of the word from a Stoic hand in Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book XI, chap. 1, and there are nine examples of it in the Anti-Stoic treatise *De Aeternitate Mundi* which is traditionally attributed to the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (Dey, op. cit., pp. 8-11). Somewhat later the word seems to have been either borrowed or independently invented for the description of the transmigration of souls in those schools of Hellenic thought into which this doctrine entered (Dey, op. cit., pp. 13-24, 25, and 32). Thereafter the currency of the word spread from the metaphysical to the mundane sphere on the one hand and to the religious sphere on the other. In the mundane sphere *παλιγγενεσία* had made its way, by the last century B.C., into the non-technical vocabulary of cultivated circles, and in this environment at this time it was used in a variety of contexts which provide us with our earliest extant historical evidence for its employment (see Dey, op. cit., pp. 25-30 and 32-3). For example, Josephus uses it (in *The Antiquities of the Jewish People*, Book XI, sec. 3, chap. 9, § 66) in the sense of a political *risorgimento* (the return to Judaea from the Babylonish Captivity), and Cicero (*Ad Atticum*, vi. 6) in the sense of a personal reinstatement into a temporarily forfeited political position (Cicero's amnesty and return from banishment). In the religious sphere, outside the Christian field, the only worship in which the presence of the concept of *παλιγγενεσία* can be traced with any certainty are the Hermetic variety of Gnosticism, the so-called 'Mithras Liturgy', and the personal religion of Philo of Alexandria, in so far as this can be reconstructed from his surviving literary works (Dey, op. cit., pp. 36-128 and 132). In the Epistle to Titus the word *παλιγγενεσία* is used to describe the spiritual effect, upon the Soul, of the Christian rite of Baptism; in the Gospel according to Saint Matthew it is used to describe the social effect of the inauguration of the Kingdom of the Messiah.

The literal meaning of 'palingenesia' is 'a recurrence of birth' or, more vaguely, 'a recurrence of coming into existence' (Dey, op. cit., pp. 23 and 33); and in either variant of this meaning there is an element of ambiguity; for the recurrence might refer exclusively to the event of birth (or of coming into existence) or alternatively its reference might extend to the nature of the thing born (or brought into existence); and while in the latter use the word 'palingenesia' would mean a repetitive re-birth of something that has been born before, in the former use it would mean an unprecedented new birth of something that is now being born for the first time. The Stoic and Orphico-Pythagorean origins of the term indicate (see Dey, op. cit., pp. 7, 23-4, 33, and 125) that, as a matter of history, the use of the word in the sense of 'repetitive re-birth' was the original one. For an application of it in the other possible use, in which it figures in the New Testament, see V. C (i) (e), vol. vi, pp. 169-75, below.

Schism-and-Palingenesia as one version of the generic double movement of Withdrawal-and-Return.¹

Schism-and-Palingenesia certainly runs true to the type of Withdrawal-and-Return in so far as the second beat of the movement is the significant feature in it. The happiness of the palingenesia is not only a reparation for the foregoing agony of the schism; it is also the point of the schism, or, in frankly teleological language, its purpose. And in fact we find that, when once the schism has occurred, nothing but frustration results from a closing of the breach before the due palingenesia has been accomplished. A case in point is the 'union sacrée' between the dominant minority of the Egyptiac Society and its internal proletariat against the external proletariat as represented by the Hyksos;² for it was this reconciliation at the eleventh hour that prolonged the existence of the Egyptiac Society—in a petrified state of life-in-death³—for two thousand years beyond the date when the process of disintegration would otherwise have reached its natural term in dissolution. And this life-in-death was not merely an unprofitable burden to the moribund Egyptiac Society itself: it was also a fatal blight upon the growth of the living Osirian Church⁴ which had been created by the Egyptiac internal proletariat; for the 'union sacrée' between internal proletariat and dominant minority took the form of an amalgamation of the living worship of Osiris with the dead worship of the official Egyptiac Pantheon; and this artificial act of syncretism killed the religion of the internal

¹ For this movement of Withdrawal-and-Return see III. C (ii) (b), in vol. iii, above.

² For this Egyptiac 'union sacrée' and its historical consequences see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 144-6, and Part V. A, pp. 2-3, with the references on p. 2, footnote 1, above.

³ For this phenomenon of petrification see Part V. A, above.

⁴ The word 'church' is used here, and throughout this Study, to mean no more than the collectivity of the devotees of a certain worship. A collectivity of this kind may be united solely by the inward-spiritual bond of their common worship of the same divinity, or alternatively this inward unity may find an outward expression in some kind of social organization. The classic example of an organized church is, of course, the Primitive Christian Church; and this feature of the life of the original Christian community has been preserved not only in the Western Catholic Church but also, on a smaller scale and on a looser rein, in many of the other branches into which the Christian Church has ramified in the course of its history. Another example of a highly organized church is the Egyptiac Church which was established, under the presidency of the Chief Priest of Amon-Re of Thebes, by the Pharaoh Thothmes III in the restoration period of Egyptiac history, after the expulsion of the Hyksos (see I. C (ii), vol. ii, p. 145, footnote 5, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 421, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), in the present volume, p. 530, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 653-4 and 695, below). On the other hand the Osirian Church (see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 150-2, below), its offshoot the Isiac Church in the post-Alexandrine Hellenic World (see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 81, below), and likewise the Orphic Church (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 95-100, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 84-7, below), are examples of churches of the unorganized kind. For the distinction between these two types of church see further, for the Isiac Church, Nock, A. D.: *Conversion* (Oxford 1933, Clarendon Press), pp. 135-6 and 147; for the Orphic Church, Boulanger, A.: *Orphée* (Paris 1925, Rieder), p. 50, and Fracassini, U.: *Il Misticismo Greco e il Cristianesimo* (Città di Castello 1922, 'Il Solco'), pp. 83-5. The structure of the Orphic and Isiac churches was 'congregational' rather than 'hierarchical'.

proletariat without availing to bring the religion of the dominant minority back to life.

The unfortunate outcome of this Egyptian 'union sacrée' suggests that this exceptional sequel to a social schism is one of those exceptions that prove a rule; and we may take the broken rule to be that a new birth, rather than a healing of the breach, is the one possible happy ending of a schism, besides being the normal ending of this particular variation on the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return.

We shall hardly be permitted, however, to take our interpretation of Schism-and-Palingenesia in terms of Withdrawal-and-Return for granted without being challenged to account for one feature in Schism-and-Palingenesia which, at first sight, might look as though it were quite incompatible with the nature of Withdrawal-and-Return as this is displayed in the process of growth. We have seen that civilizations owe their growth to the withdrawal and return of a minority—the Creative Minority which withdraws in order to find a response to some challenge that is confronting the whole society, and then returns in order to persuade an uncreative majority to follow it along the path which it has opened up. On the other hand, in the movement of Schism-and-Palingenesia that manifests itself in the process of disintegration, it would seem, at first sight, to be a majority that withdraws in the Secession of the Proletariat, while a minority—the Dominant Minority—now remains stolidly stationary. Is not this an exact inversion of the minority's and the majority's respective roles? And does not this mean that, after all, the movement of Schism-and-Palingenesia is of a different order from the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return, instead of being—as we had thought—a variation upon a theme with which we are already familiar?

Our best approach to this question will be to consider one difference, of which we have not yet taken note, between the Dominant Minority in a disintegrating civilization and the Creative Minority to which a growing civilization owes its growth.

In the succession of victorious responses to challenges in which the process of growth consists, the Creative Minority to whose enterprise and energy and resoluteness the victory is due is apt to be recruited from different individuals, with different social heritages and different ideas and ideals, at each successive performance of the drama.¹ This is the rule in a growing society even where the powers of government, in the widest sense of the word,

¹ This point has been touched upon, by anticipation, in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 375, footnote 1, above.

are the hereditary monopoly of a close aristocracy of birth;¹ for in such circumstances the rule operates within these social limits no less surely than it operates throughout the society in cases where the whole of the society is enfranchised. In an aristocratically governed society that is in process of growth, we find one group of aristocratic families playing the part of Creative Minority in response to one challenge, and a different group in response to the next; and, if eventually the society is confronted with some challenge which is not successfully met by any group at all within the closed aristocratic circle, the aristocracy's failure does not necessarily bring the society's growth to an end; for the new challenge may still evoke a victoriously creative response from some minority in a stratum of the society that has hitherto been given no opportunity of playing a leading part in the society's affairs; and thus the series of challenges and responses, as it lengthens, may give occasion for the enfranchisement of one social stratum after another. In the history of the Hellenic Society, for example, we have seen how the old agrarian aristocracy was eventually worsted by the Malthusian problem when this was presented in a new form in the sixth century B.C. owing to the success of hostile neighbours in bringing the sheer extensive expansion of the Hellenic Society to a halt; and in the case of Attica (for which our historical record of this age happens to be less meagre than it is for other parts of Hellas) we have observed how the problem was solved nevertheless by the new-fangled class of merchants which made its appearance at Athens in the person of Solon, and how the consequences of the Solonian 'bourgeois' revolution led on in time to the enfranchisement of a new urban working class, side by side with the new urban bourgeoisie.² In the history of our own Western Society, in the so-called 'medieval' chapter of its growth, we can see another instance of the rise of successive creative minorities, outside the circle of a hereditary aristocracy, in the enfranchisement first of a bourgeoisie, and then of an urban working class, in the bodies politic of the North Italian city-states.

This tendency in a growing society for the Creative Minority to be recruited on each successive occasion from a new source can be accounted for by the combined operation of two distinct causes, one positive and the other negative. The positive cause is to be found in a fact which has already come to our notice.³ A con-

¹ The nature of the 'horizontal' lines of social cleavage in growing societies has been touched upon already in V. C (i) (a), p. 18, footnote 1, above.

² For the Attic version of this particular performance of the drama of Challenge-and-Response in the history of the Hellenic Society see I. B (ii), vol. i, pp. 24-5; II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 37-42; Part III. B, vol. iii, p. 122; III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 139-40; III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, p. 197; III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 273, above.

³ In Part V. B, above.

tinuance of growth implies that, in each successive round of Challenge-and-Response, the challenge which is presented is a new one (since *ex hypothesi*, if growth is still being maintained, the last challenge has been victoriously met and, in being met, has been disposed of). But if the challenge, each time, is new, it is only to be expected that this new challenge will be met, each time, by a newly recruited minority which can bring some hitherto unutilized talent into play in wrestling with a hitherto unfamiliar problem. The tendency for a new creative minority to be called up, in each successive emergency, by the operation of this positive factor will be accentuated by the effect of a negative factor which we have found to be a potent cause of the breakdowns of civilizations. We have seen in that context¹ that the gift of creativity is subject to its own peculiar nemesis; and that a minority which has demonstrated its creative power by responding to one challenge victoriously is likely to inhibit itself from repeating its exploit—that is to say, from responding, later on, to a different challenge with equal success—by succumbing to one or other of the two diverse temptations with which every successful creative minority or individual is beset: the temptation to rest on one's oars and the antithetical temptation to kick over the traces and run amok.

For this combination of reasons the Creative Minority in a growing society is apt to be perpetually changing—and this not simply in its personnel, but more profoundly, by far, in its ideas and its ideals. By contrast, the Dominant Minority in a disintegrating society tends to degenerate into a close corporation whose ideas and ideals have the legendary rigidity of the unchanging 'laws of the Medes and Persians'—and this even when its personnel is radically re-cast through the admission of *novi homines* to some share in the corporation's jealously guarded privileges.²

¹ In IV. C (iii) (c), vol. iv, above.

² The personnel of the Dominant Minority does frequently change almost completely in its physical composition in the course of the Dominant Minority's career between the original breakdown and the final dissolution of the disintegrating society; for the Dominant Minority is violently self-destructive, and it would be likely to annihilate itself long before it had come to the end of its brief turn on the stage if its strength were not perpetually recruited by infusions of fresh blood. The Dominant Minority does its best—or worst—to destroy itself by indulging in dissensions in its own ranks in the midst of its truceless warfare with the Proletariat. Its members exterminate one another in civil wars within the bosom of a single commonwealth as well as in wars between state and state; and at the same time they sap their own vitality by running to extremes of luxuriousness and vice and of sluggishness and frenzy. The new blood—'*viscera magnarum domum dominique futuri*' (Juvenal: *Satires*, III, l. 72; quoted again in V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 67, below)—which keeps the Dominant Minority alive is drawn in ever larger draughts from ever more alien sources. For example, the Roman senatorial class which represented the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society in the penultimate phase of its disintegration—between the convulsions in the third century of the Christian Era and the death-throes in the fifth and sixth centuries—would perhaps not have been able to trace more than a tincture in its blood back to the veins of the Roman senatorial class of the Republican Era, with which it was officially identical. The families which were the representatives

This social and mental and spiritual fixity that is characteristic of dominant minorities, in contrast to creative minorities, and that persists through one round after another of the series of unsuccessful responses that constitutes the disintegration-process, can be accounted for by the fact that in the disintegration of a civilization, in contrast to its growth, the challenge that is presented in each successive bout of Challenge-and-Response is always, now, the same.¹ The unanswered challenge recurs again and again, and the discomfited minority keeps the field in order to invite and incur as many successive defeats at the hands of an adversary whom it can neither overcome nor elude. The discomfiture, each time, is a foregone conclusion, since the minority which has become merely dominant has ceased, *ex hypothesi*, to be creative. The defensive posture which it substitutes for a creative activity may be either indolent or recalcitrant; but, whether it is insanely defying the lightning or inertly resting on its oars, in either posture the Dominant Minority is refusing to hand over to other aspirants the protagonist's role which it has already proved itself incompetent to play.

These postures that remain rigidly the same, through one bout after another of a losing battle, are the marks of the Dominant Minority in a disintegrating civilization. The contrast to the fluidity and versatility of the successive creative minorities in a growing civilization is extreme. The creative minorities are in perpetual flux because they are successive incarnations of the diverse forms in which the creative spirit manifests itself in response to challenges which are never the same twice running. The Dominant Minority stands stiff, like the pillar of salt into which Lot's wife was transformed as the penalty for looking back upon the abandoned Cities of the Plain instead of turning her face

of this class at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era were probably descended in the physical sense almost entirely from *ci-devant* members of the internal and external proletariats; from Orientals and barbarians who had acquired the Roman citizenship, or even from slaves who had purchased their freedom. Indeed, in terms of 'Race' there was almost certainly a much greater infusion of new blood into the Roman senatorial class in its decadence as a dominant minority than the aristocracies of the Roman Republic or the Macedonian Kingdom or the Athenian City-State had ever received in their prime when they were still furnishing creative minorities for a growing civilization. In physical race it is the Creative Minority of the springtime, rather than the Dominant Minority of the decadence, that is able to boast of its 'purity'. At first sight this will seem paradoxical; but on a closer view it will be seen to confirm our previous conclusion (reached in II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, above) that Race counts for very little in human affairs. The telling factors are the ideas and the ideals. The Dominant Minority remains, from first to last, the rigid and static corporation that we have described, because the *novi homines* who change its racial composition are only allowed to bring in their new blood on condition of accepting the old tradition of the body into which they are being initiated. Conversely, an aristocracy in a society in the growth-stage may keep itself racially 'pure' without ceasing to throw up one creative minority after another so long as its members forbear to steel their souls against the influence of the spirit that bloweth where it listeth.

¹ On this point see Part V. B, above.

resolutely towards the mountain in which she might have found a happier habitation.

In so far as it takes this stand, the Dominant Minority condemns itself, in advance, to have no further part or lot in the work of creation; but in making its 'great refusal' it impoverishes no one but itself. By disqualifying itself from serving as an instrument, it does not bring the work to an end; for, while this civilization is falling and that civilization is rising, the work of creation still goes on. It not only goes on; it also continues to be performed through that action of Challenge-and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return with which we have become familiar in our analysis of the process of growth. When the growth of a civilization is cut short by a breakdown, and the would-be creative minority that has stiffened into a dominant minority begins to repeat an ineffective gesture which never varies at each onset of an unanswered challenge which never ceases to recur, this monotonous celebration of the tragedy of defeat is not the only drama that is played upon the broken-down civilization's social stage. During the disintegration of a civilization two separate plays with different plots are being performed simultaneously side by side. While an unchanging dominant minority is perpetually rehearsing its own defeat, fresh challenges are perpetually evoking fresh creative responses from newly recruited minorities which proclaim their own creative power by rising, each time, to the occasion.

These ever-changing new creative minorities stand in no fixed relation to the Dominant Minority which persists in holding the floor side by side with them for as long as it retains the strength to remain upon its feet. They are not bound *a priori* to be recruited entirely outside its ranks,¹ any more than they are bound to coincide with the Dominant Minority in their membership, either wholly or in part. Manifestly the chances are in favour of their being recruited from among outsiders, since *ex hypothesi* the Dominant Minority has placed itself in a rigid posture which is inimical to creativity; yet the creative spirit does not wholly depart from the souls of the Dominant Minority before it has performed through them at least two mighty works: the creation of a school of philosophy which prepares the way for a universal church—filling some of the valleys and bringing some of the mountains low² in the spiritual wilderness of a society in disintegration—and the creation of a universal state as a material framework within which a universal church can flower in its tender infancy. Both these

¹ For the recruitment of leaders of the Internal Proletariat from the ranks of the Dominant Minority see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 236-41, below.

² Luke iii. 4-5.

things are the work of creative minorities and creative individuals who arise among the members of the Dominant Minority; but at the same time they are only a part of the work of creation that is being accomplished during the age of disintegration in the disintegrating society's ambit; for at the same time another creative minority's handiwork can be discerned in the creation of a universal church, and another's, again, in the creation of a bevy of barbarian war-bands.

We have now found our answer to the question whether the movement of Schism-and-Palingenesia, as we see it in the process of disintegration, does not differ from the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return, as we have seen this in the process of growth, in the point that in Schism-and-Palingenesia it is a majority that withdraws from a minority. We can see now that the answer to our question is, after all, in the negative. In Schism-and-Palingenesia it is still a minority that withdraws—and this, as before, for the purpose of finding a creative response to a challenge. But in a disintegrating civilization the uncreative mass, from which the Creative Minority distinguishes itself, is differently constituted from the uncreative mass of a civilization that is still in growth. Instead of consisting wholly of an impressionable rank-and-file whom the Creative Minority, when it returns, can induce to follow its lead by playing upon the faculty of mimesis, the uncreative mass now also consists in part of a Dominant Minority which is almost entirely intractable to the new creative minority's influence. What we are watching in the Secession of the Proletariat is thus not really the withdrawal of a majority from a minority. It is the performance of the Creative Minority's familiar work in the familiar way, but in the teeth of another minority of a different order—a recalcitrant minority which is persisting in a hopeless attempt to dominate a situation in which it does not any longer command the initiative. The secession which is thus accomplished by a creative minority under these special difficulties only appears to be the work of a majority because the Creative Minority attracts to itself, as usual, the mimesis of the uncreative mass apart from the fraction of this mass which is now stubbornly resisting this attraction because it has cast itself for the Dominant Minority's role. As usual, 'the floating vote' is given to the Creative Minority every time, while the Dominant Minority attracts no mimesis to itself and can do no more than withhold its own support from its creative rival. It is only this negative power of making 'the great refusal' that distinguishes the Dominant Minority from the rest of the uncreative mass;¹ and this distinction is not fundamental. The

¹ A classic illustration of this is afforded by the contrast between the status and the

most significant, though not the most conspicuous, line of division is still that which divides the whole of the uncreative mass from the Creative Minority in each successive round of Challenge-and-Response.

That the Secession of the Proletariat should thus prove, after all, to be the work of a minority and not of a majority is only what we might have expected. For an act of secession is manifestly an act that requires the exercise of initiative and courage and imagination in a high degree; and these are not the virtues of sheep without a shepherd. This point is illustrated by the historic 'Secessions of the Plebs' in the history of the Roman Republic—in allusion to which our own term 'Secession of the Proletariat' has been coined. It is notorious that in the earlier bouts of the conflict between Plebeians and Patricians the Plebs strove in vain to break its economic and political chains. It was only gradually that the challenge of oppression evoked the latent powers of leadership in a minority of the Plebeian mass; and it was this creative minority—an inchoate 'Plebeian aristocracy', to describe it through a contradiction in terms—that conceived and executed the plan of secession as a stratagem for bringing the oppressive Patricians to their knees. If this minority had not taken the lead, the rank-and-file of the Plebeians would assuredly never have struck out for themselves the master-stroke of first escaping from the pen in which their oppressors fancied that they held them corralled, and then turning at bay in the security of the open wilderness.

(c) SCHISM IN THE BODY SOCIAL

I. *Dominant Minorities*

Our preliminary inquiry into the movement of Schism-and-Palingenesia has incidentally brought out the fact that no one of the several fractions into which a disintegrating society is apt to split—neither the Dominant Minority nor the Proletariat, Internal or External—is all of one homogeneous *êthos* in the spirit that animates its members.

We can now see that there is an element of variety even in the Dominant Minority, notwithstanding the fact that a certain fixity and uniformity of *êthos* is this Dominant Minority's characteristic mark. The Dominant Minority may perform prodigies of sterilization in converting to its own barren *esprit de corps* the *novi homines* whom it is continually drafting into its repeatedly self-decimated

state of mind of the French *noblesse* on the eve of the Revolution (see the quotation from de Tocqueville in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), Annex, vol. iv, p. 638, footnote 6, above). In the France of that generation the aristocracy had stamped itself unmistakably as a dominant minority, whereas in the England of the same generation the aristocracy had not yet ceased to be creative.

ranks; yet, for all its perversity, it cannot prevent itself from putting forth the creative power and activity that are revealed in the creation of a universal state and of a school of philosophy. And accordingly we find that even the Dominant Minority is apt to include a certain number of members who depart very strikingly from the characteristic type of the closed corporation to which they belong.

In the Dominant Minority this characteristic type displays two variants—one passive and the other active—which have both come to our notice already in an extreme form in our study of the arrested civilizations.¹ The passive variant resembles the Nomad who has conquered a sedentary population and who is ruthlessly exploiting his conquest in a *Raubwirtschaft* which is as reckless, and therefore as self-destructive, as it is immoral. The active variant resembles the 'Osmanli or the Spartiate who takes sufficient thought for the morrow to forgo the immediate delight of enjoying what he has won, in order to dedicate himself to the grim task of holding his prize by main force. In the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society in disintegration the nearest approach to the Avar or the Hyksos in *partibus agricolarum* is to be seen in the Roman knighted man of business (*vir equestris*) who fleeced the conquered populations in the second and the last century B.C. by farming the collection, or financing the payment, of their taxes; or in the Roman aristocrat (*vir senatorius*) who, according to his opportunities, played ducks and drakes with the wealth and happiness of a province as a Verres or of a continent as a Lucullus or of a world as a Nero. The nearest approach, in the same social milieu, to a Spartiate 'Peer' or to an Ottoman *qul* is to be seen in a Rupilius stamping out the embers of the Sicilian slave-revolt of 135-131 B.C.;² or in a Crassus planting an avenue of agony—six thousand crosses with a captured follower of the insurgent gladiator Spartacus nailed alive on each—along the whole length of the Great

¹ In Part III. A, vol. iii, above.

² In justice to the Roman name it should be mentioned that in this first of the two Sicilian slave-wars neither Rupilius nor any other Roman was the villain of the piece. The monster who provoked the outbreak was not a Roman citizen but a native Sicilian slave-owner, Dāmophilus of Enna, whose home city-state was politically a subject community. (For a vivid picture of Dāmophilus see Diodorus of Agyrium: *A Library of Universal History*, fragments of Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, §§ 34-7, quoted in V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 72, footnote 2, below.) The role here played by Dāmophilus points the fact that the criterion of membership in the Hellenic dominant minority, in the sense in which we are using the term, was not political citizenship but social class and, above all, economic 'pull'. This dominant minority included many oppressors who did not possess the Roman franchise; and conversely there were many Roman citizens in Dāmophilus's generation (e.g. the common soldiers in the Roman forces that put down the slave-revolt which Dāmophilus had provoked) who had sunk into being members of the proletariat—as is testified by the words and deeds of Tiberius Gracchus. (For the saying attributed to Tiberius Gracchus see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 508, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 70-1, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 381, with Table VIII, logion (α), p. 414, below.)

South Road from Rome to Capua;¹ or in a Titus sowing the site of Jerusalem with salt.

This pair of types—the wastrel and the hangman^a—that are characteristic of the members of a dominant minority in power, has its necessary historical complement in a third type which must evidently have been on the scene in a previous act of the play: and that is the conqueror who has originally won the loot which the hangman is trying to guard and the wastrel is trying to dissipate. This third type, again, can be illustrated by conspicuous examples from Hellenic history. In the disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization the conqueror can first be seen at work in those internecine wars between sovereign states which raged with ever greater violence until the Roman ‘knock-out blow’ imposed a peace of exhaustion. This conqueror in the fratricidal warfare within the bosom of the Dominant Minority was incarnate in a Philip selling the Olynthians into slavery; in an Alexander crushing Thebes; in a Mummius razing Corinth; in a Sulla devastating Samnium;² and in the successive victor-victims of a century of Roman civil wars in which the last round ended in the overthrow of Mark Antony by Augustus. In another field we see the conqueror turning these arms that have been exercised in fratricidal warfare to the conquest of aliens:³ both alien civilizations and alien primitive societies. The outstanding Hellenic example of the conqueror of alien civilizations is Alexander the Great (though his greatness lies, as we shall see,⁴ in a vision of unity through reconciliation which is seldom granted to those who draw the sword to cut the Gordian Knot). The Hellenic conquerors of primitive societies are represented by the long series of consuls and pro-consuls who imposed the Roman yoke upon the necks of all the barbarians of Western Europe and North-West Africa from the Ligurians in the Appennines to the Brigantes in the Plain of York, and from the Kabyles in the Aures to the Dacians in Transylvania: a Publius Cornelius Scipio rewarding the Boii for laying down their arms in 191 B.C. by confiscating half their land to provide allotments for Roman colonists;⁵ a Marcus Claudius Marcellus expelling the peaceful Gallic settlers from Venetia in 183 B.C.;⁶ a Publius Cornelius Cethegus and a Marcus Baebius Tamphilus deporting 40,000

¹ Appian of Alexandria: *Studies in Roman History*: ‘The Civil Wars’, Book I, chap.

120.

² Strabo: *Geographica*, Book V, chap. 11, pp. 249–50, cited already in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 391, above.

³ For this explanation (so far as it goes) of the geographical expansion of disintegrating civilizations see III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 150, and V. C (i) (a), in the present volume, pp. 15–16, above.

⁴ In V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 6–10, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 254, below.

⁵ Livy, Book XXXVI, chap. 39.

⁶ Idem, Book XXXIX, chap. 54.

Apuani from the Appennines to the Abruzzi in 180 B.C.;¹ a Quintus Petillius Spurius annihilating in 176 B.C. the desperate defenders of Mounts Letus and Balista;² a Marius leading a Jugurtha in chains; a Caesar mastering a Vercingetorix.

The sheer conqueror is an even more destructive and repellent representative of the Dominant Minority than the wastrel and the hangman who enter into his heritage; yet these are not the only three types that the Hellenic dominant minority has to show. This close corporation which disgraced itself by producing the Roman conquerors and wastrels and hangmen lived on to become the fertile recruiting-ground of those innumerable and mostly anonymous Roman soldiers and civil servants who partly atoned for the misdeeds of their predatory equestrian and senatorial predecessors by creating and preserving the Hellenic universal state and so making it possible for a moribund society to bask for a moment in the clear pale sunshine of an 'Indian Summer'.³ These later and nobler representatives of the Hellenic dominant minority are to be seen at their fine flower, on the eve of the first sharp winter frost, in the figures of an Arrian and a Pertinax and a Dio Cassius,⁴ while the moral power of the altruistic tradition of social

¹ Livy, Book XL, chap. 38. Later in the same year 7,000 more Apuani were deported to the Abruzzi—in this case by sea—by Quintus Fulvius Flaccus (*idem*, Book XL, chap. 41).

² *Idem*, Book XLI, chap. 18.

³ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 58-61, above.

⁴ While some of the most gifted natures and attractive personalities in the goodly company of Roman Imperial public servants are to be found among its representatives at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era—more than two hundred years after the organization of the service by Augustus—it is noteworthy that the sense of moral responsibility to which Augustus gave a classic institutional expression can be traced back among the Roman governing class to the dark days of the first generation after the Hannibalic War. In the dealings of the Roman Government with the primitive peoples in its path the victory of the policy of humanity over the policy of extermination was won as early as 173-172 B.C. (see V. C (i) (c) 1, Annex, below). The record of Roman dealings with communities which were Rome's equals or superiors in cultivation is much blacker; yet the prosecution and conviction of Verres in 70 B.C., which was made immortal by Cicero's oratory, had been anticipated, by more than a hundred years, in the proceedings which were taken against Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, one of the consuls of 189 B.C., for his treatment of the Greek city-state of Ambracia during his year of office. The story is told by Livy (Book XXXVIII, chaps. 3-9, 43-4; Book XXXIX, chaps. 4-5, 22). Ambracia, being an ally of the Aetolian Confederacy, with which Rome was at war, stood a siege from Fulvius's army but capitulated unconditionally, before being taken by storm, when the Aetolian Government opened negotiations for peace. Thereupon the Ambraciots 'gave' the consul a gold crown of 150 pounds' weight, and the city was stripped by him of all the works of art—bronzes, marbles, and canvases (*Hellenic* 'boards')—for which it was famous. Two years later an Ambraciot deputation appeared before the Roman Senate and accused Fulvius of having perpetrated against their city an enormity which was indisputably perpetrated against the Ligurian Statelli in 173 B.C. by Marcus Popillius Laenas. The Ambraciots declared that the Roman commander had made an unprovoked attack on them when they were showing themselves entirely amenable to the Roman Government's will, and that he had then despoiled them as a punishment for the crime of having exercised the right of self-defence. In response to this plea the Senate resolved that restitution should be made to the Ambraciots of their political and economic sovereignty as well as of their confiscated property, and that Ambracia should not be treated as a city that had been taken by storm (a merciful ruling, since, according to Roman customary law, a conquered community was condemned in perpetuity to put up with a much worse status

duty which this long line of great public servants had marvellously built up out of a poisonous heritage of moral nihilism is to be seen at its strongest in its hold upon natures which were intrinsically violent and self-seeking. One of the most impressive surviving testimonies to the spirit with which the public servants of the Hellenic universal state were imbued is to be found in the last words which are attributed to the Emperor Lucius Septimius Severus.¹

Moreover the Roman public servant is neither the only nor the earliest epiphany of the Hellenic dominant minority in an altruistic role. In the age of the Severi, when the reign of the Stoic Emperor Marcus was an accomplished fact of Roman history, and when a school of Stoic jurists was translating the Stoic *êthos* into terms of Roman Law, it was manifest that the miracle of converting the Roman wolf into a Platonic watch-dog had been the work of Greek philosophy. The high-minded philosopher thus reveals himself as another altruistic representative of the Hellenic dominant minority whose existence and influence are attested and presupposed by the eventual emergence of the dutiful public servant. If the Roman administrator was an altruistic agent of the Hellenic dominant minority's practical ability, the Greek philosopher was a still nobler exponent of its intellectual power; and the golden chain of creative Greek philosophers, which ends with Plotinus (*vivebat circa* A.D. 203-62) in the generation that lived to see the Roman public service collapse, had begun with Socrates (*vivebat circa* 470-399 B.C.) in a generation that was already grown up in 431 B.C., when the Hellenic Civilization broke down.² To retrieve, or at any rate to mitigate, the tragic consequences of that breakdown was the Greek philosopher's, as well as the Roman administrator's, life-work; and the philosopher's labours produced

than that of a community which had accepted Rome's political supremacy by treaty). This was a notable judgement; but the outcome was more dubious, and the precedent created was therefore less effective, than in the parallel case of Popilius. On the one hand the Senate's action against Fulvius seems to have been determined not only by the merits of the case but also in part by the intervention of one of the consuls of the year who was moved by personal motives. On the other hand the moral effect of the judgement was partly undone by the Senate's subsequent action in allowing Fulvius (though this only after a hot debate) to celebrate a triumph in which the stolen works of art from Ambracia figured among the paraded spoils, and to follow this up by spending a considerable part of the gold which he had extorted from the Ambraciots on an elaborate show for the entertainment of the Roman proletariat.

¹ 'Ultima verba eius dicuntur haec fuisse: "Turbatam rem publicam ubique accepi, pacatam etiam Britannis relinquo, senex ac pedibus aeger firmum imperium Antoninis meis relinquens ac boni erunt, imbecillum si mali." iussit deinde signum tribuno dari "Laboremus", quia Pertinax, quando in imperium adscitus est, signum dederat "Militemus".'—'Severus', chap. 23, in the so-called *Historia Augusta*. These words, if authentic, were uttered by Severus at York, within sixteen miles of the place where these lines were being written.

² Greek philosophy may be said to have been born in the hour in which Socrates abandoned his youthful studies of Physical Science in order to concentrate his mind upon the Soul (see the passage from Plato's *Phaedo*, 96-7, which has been quoted in III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 186-7, above).

a more valuable and more durable result than the administrator's, just because they were less closely woven into the material texture of the disintegrating society's life. While the Roman administrators built a Hellenic universal state, the philosophers endowed Posterity with a *κτῆμα εἰς αἰεί*¹ in the Academy and the Peripatus, the Stoa and the Garden, the Cynic's freedom of the highways and hedges, and the Neoplatonist's unearthly Land of Heart's Desire.

If we now extend our survey from the field of Hellenic history to the histories of other civilizations that have broken down and gone into disintegration, we shall find that the noble streak of altruism which relieves the sombre record of the Hellenic dominant minority is not a peculiar grace of the Hellenic Civilization. The types that we have now identified in the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society in disintegration all reappear elsewhere.

If we look for wastrels to match the Roman plunderers of a conquered Hellenic World in the age preceding the establishment of the *Pax Augusta*, we shall find them in the war-lords, lay and ecclesiastic, who ground the faces of the Japanese peasantry in the age preceding the foundation of the Tokugawa Shogunate. We shall find their like again, in the Arabic World, in the Mamlûks who ground the faces of the Egyptian peasantry more outrageously in their military decadence than in an earlier age when they were performing a certain public service in return for their feudal dues.² And our own Western history in its latter days furnishes a long gallery of portraits which are unmistakable examples of the same type: from the flauntingly predatory princes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—a Rodolfo Gonzaga of Castiglione and a Henry VIII of England and a Louis XIV of France—who had shaken off the moral discipline of the medieval Church,³ to the more discreetly predatory plutocrats of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who have put the princes in irons in order to usurp for their own bourgeois profit the adventurer's self-conferred privilege of playing the game of *Raubwirtschaft* with the whole World for their oyster.

Similarly, if we look for hangmen to match a Crassus and a Titus, we shall find them in the Assyrian war-lords, from Tiglath-Pileser III to Asshurbanipal, as they wrestle ever more savagely with their self-imposed *tour de force* of holding down a conquered

¹ Thucydides, Book I, chap. 22.

² For the Egyptian Mamlûks see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 30-1; and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 447-61, above.

³ For the revolt of the local secular princes against the moral authority of the Catholic Church in the Western World at the beginning of the Modern Age, and for the princes' seizure and exploitation of the instruments and methods of public administration which the Papal Curia had invented, see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 534-5 and 539-40, above.

Syria with one hand and a conquered Babylonia with the other, with no hand left free for retaining their hold upon Egypt.¹ We shall find other representatives of the hangman type in the Tsars—an Ivan the Terrible and a Peter the Great and a Nicholas I—who have had recourse to all the weapons in the armoury of political repression in order to keep the yoke of a universal state upon the shoulders of a restive nobility and a ground-down peasantry and a thwarted intelligentsia. And the hangman type, like the wastrel type, presents itself in our own Western World as well. It is unmistakably represented by the sinister figures of sixteenth-century German princes hanging and burning alive their rebellious Anabaptist peasants² (with the approbation of a Martin Luther!). And the same type reappears as plainly in the figures of these princes' latter-day National-Socialist supplanters, who, at the moment when these words were being written, were attempting to break the spirit of Jews, Marxians, Liberals, Pacifists, Christians, and Prussian officers by employing our twentieth-century methods of barbarism in pursuit of a sixteenth-century aim. Nor is this savagery a mere local German departure from a milder Western norm; for the English observer, writing smugly in his study, will find his pen refusing to obey his fingers if he begins to thank God that he and his kinsfolk are not as men are on the Continent. If he is tempted to offer the Pharisee's thanksgiving, his conscience will rise up to remind him of the English-speaking peoples' responsibility for the crime of Negro Slavery,³ and of those English penal laws⁴—repealed scarcely a century ago—under which an English labourer convicted of a petty theft might be sentenced by an English magistrate to deportation for life if he were lucky enough to escape the gallows.

If we want an example of the wastrel and the hangman combined in one person, we shall find it in the Egyptian World in the Pyramid-Builder⁵ whose hold over his subject peasantry was so complete that he could wear them out for the gratification of his own megalomania without having to fear that his victims would rebel under the lash.

We can also add portraits from the histories of other disintegrating civilizations to our gallery of Hellenic conquerors.

The fratricidal warfare within the bosom of the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society which ended in the delivery of

¹ For this phase of Assyrian history see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 476-84, above.

² For the Anabaptists see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 167 and 169-72, below.

³ See IV. C (iii) (b) 2, vol. iv, above.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), Annex, vol. iv, p. 638, above.

⁵ See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 212-15, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 408-10 above.

a Roman 'knock-out blow' has its analogue in the Sinic World in the struggle between the contending states which ended in the triumph of Ts'in,¹ and in the Far Eastern Society in Japan in that Ishmaelitish warfare of all against all which required three successive Caesars—a Nobunaga and a Hideyoshi and an Ieyasu—to bring it to a close.² The disintegration of the Babylonian and Iranian civilizations was carried to its consummation by a duel between two sister Powers: Assyria and Babylonia in the one case,³ and the 'Osmanlis and the Safawis in the other.⁴ In Orthodox Christendom the duel between the East Roman Empire and Bulgaria in the tenth century of the Christian Era opened the way for the Frankish and Turkish inroads of the century following.⁵ And in the Syriac and Hindu worlds a similar orgy of fratricidal warfare likewise opened the way for the Assyrian inroads into Syria⁶ and for the Turkish inroads into Hindustan.⁷ In Central America the forcible incorporation of the Yucatec Society into the Mexic Society seems to have been one of the penalties of the fratricidal 'War of Mayapan' in which a Yucatec dominant minority had enlisted Mexic mercenaries to help it in the suicidal work of tearing itself to pieces;⁸ and it is certain that it was the war between the Aztecs and the Tlaxcalecs that afterwards condemned the Mexic Society itself to become the prey of the Spanish *conquistadores*.⁹

In the abortive cosmos of city-states which tried and failed, in the second chapter of our Western history, to convert a feudal society, within which it had arisen, to its own way of life, this failure can be traced everywhere—in Italy and in Flanders, in Swabia and in the Rhineland—to the internecine strife between the patriciates of one city-state and another.¹⁰ In consequence of this failure our Western Society discarded the city-state and fell back, as we have seen, upon the old-fashioned kingdom-state, with its feudal heritage, when it was groping after a new standard unit of parochial civic organization at the beginning of the third chapter of our Western history. And, when we remind ourselves of that curious check and throwback with which the political history of this third chapter began, we are led to ask ourselves whether by making this fresh start the princes and oligarchies and

¹ I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 89; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 65-6, above.

² IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 94, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 186, 188, and 191, below.

³ IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 476-84, above.

⁴ I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 377-400, above.

⁵ IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 384-404, above.

⁶ IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 67-8, above.

⁷ IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 99-100, above.

⁸ I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 123-4; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 105-6, above.

⁹ I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 120, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 105, above.

¹⁰ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 341-50, especially pp. 348-9, above.

democracies of our latter-day Western kingdom-states and national states have succeeded—while this third chapter in our Western history has been running its course and finally passing into a fourth¹—in avoiding the fratricidal warfare through which the fair promise of the medieval Western city-states was blighted, in an earlier chapter of the same story, by the perverse pugnacity of the city-state patriciates. Unhappily the answer to this fateful question is emphatically in the negative.²

As soon as the modern political map of our Western World began to take shape, the masters of the new-model states made haste to engage in fratricidal warfare on the larger scale which their ampler resources made possible for them. The contest for hegemony between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons, which inaugurated the Modern Age of our Western history, has been followed by the wars of Philip II and the wars of Louis XIV and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of A.D. 1792-1815; our own 'Post-Modern' Age has been inaugurated by the General War of 1914-18; and every one of these major conflicts has brought with it a crop of minor wars—some preceding it as its overture, and others following it as its sequel.³ The life of our Western Society has been as grievously infested by the plague of War during these last four centuries as in any earlier age; and we have already observed⁴ how this social evil, in persisting, has been keyed up to an unprecedented intensity by a new 'drive' that has been put into it since the invention of Democracy and Industrialism, until the former 'sport of kings' has become the absorbing business of whole nations: *la Guerre Totale*. If a furore of fratricidal warfare within the bosom of a society is presumptive evidence that a dominant minority has come on to the scene, we must confess that, to judge by the recent course of our Western history, our Western Society, in its present fourth chapter, has arrived at the stage upon which the Hellenic Society entered after the opening of the third chapter of Hellenic history *post Alexandrum*.

Nor has the dominant minority of the disintegrating Hellenic Civilization been unique in begetting conquerors who turn their arms against aliens.

For example, there are other disintegrating civilizations, besides the Hellenic, that can show their Alexanders (though these non-

¹ For the transition from the third to the fourth chapter of our Western history in the last quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era see Part I. A, vol. i, *ad init.*

² See IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 141-55, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 312-21, below.

³ For the rhythm that can be discerned in the recurrences of wars in the histories of civilizations see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, and Part XI, below.

⁴ In IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, above.

Hellenic Alexanders are apt to be mere men of blood unredeemed by the spiritual vision of Alexander the Great). The Sumeric Society can display a string of them: Lugalzaggisi, Sargon, Naramsin.¹ The Egyptiac Society can show the militarists of 'the New Empire'—a Thothmes I and a Thothmes III and a Ramses II—who conquered and re-conquered the domain of an abortive Syriac Civilization² from Gaza to the Euphrates. In the disintegration of the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society the 'Osmanlis had no sooner completed their work of establishing a universal state in which a *Pax Ottomanica* was imposed upon the whole of Orthodox Christendom apart from Russia³ than they sought new worlds to conquer, both east and west. Selīm I was consciously following in the footsteps of Alexander when he marched against the Persians; and, though his Janissaries insisted on turning back at Tabriz instead of allowing themselves to be led, like Alexander's Macedonians, to the banks of the Beas,⁴ Selim did successfully repeat Alexander's exploit of conquering Egypt;⁵ and his successor Suleymān the Magnificent attempted the superhuman feat of mastering the Safawī Empire with one hand and Western Christendom with the other. The disintegration of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan produced a counterpart of Suleymān in Hideyoshi, who had scarcely completed Nobunaga's work in the Japanese Isles before he recklessly diverted an exhausted society's last energies to grandiose schemes of conquest on the Continent—only to be foiled in Korea without ever coming within range of China. The same megalomania was displayed by the Muscovite makers of the Orthodox Christian universal state in Russia when they attempted to expand their dominions simultaneously at the expense of Western Christendom in the Balticum and Finland and Poland and at the expense of the Iranic World in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This insatiable appetite for territory in potentates who are already gorged, and who cannot digest the resources of the vast tracts which they have inherited, is an example of that mania for sheer magnitude which we have already recognized⁶ as a pathological effort to find some alternative means of self-expression in lieu of a lost creative power. Again, the Iranic Society threw up, in the course of its disintegration, a Nādir Shāh⁷ (*dominabatur* A.D. 1736-47) whose career looks like nothing so

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 64, above.

² For this abortive Syriac Civilization see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 388-91, above.

³ For this *Pax Ottomanica* see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, pp. 385-6, above.

⁵ I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, p. 388; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv, pp. 450-2, above.

⁶ In I. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 153-4, above.

⁷ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 399, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 679-80, below.

much as a caricature of Alexander's as we watch this parvenu Avshār soldier of fortune ramping up and down the famous Macedonian's historic South West Asian stage—now showing his flag for a moment at Baghdad, and now rushing off to plunder Delhi—until suddenly we see him, to our astonishment, being enlightened by a gleam of the genuine Alexandrine vision of reconciliation and unity, and courting—in his daring effort to bring back the Shi'ah to the Sunnah—the assassination that swiftly overtakes him.¹

These non-Hellenic counterparts of Alexander the Great can be matched by corresponding counterparts of the Roman conquerors of the West European and North-West African barbarians. There is a Roman touch in the conquest of Nubia by the Caesars of the Egyptiac universal state—an Amenemhat I (*imperabat circa* 2000–1971 B.C.) and a Senwosret III (*imperabat circa* 1887–1850 B.C.)²—and likewise in the conquest of Yunnan by the Mongol makers of the Far Eastern universal state in the main body of the Far Eastern Society on the Asiatic Continent, while in the insular offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in Japan the subjugation of the primitive Ainu in an age when the Japanese war-lords were strenuously engaged in rending one another³ is as astonishing a feat as the Roman subjugation of Gaul and Numidia in the age of the Roman civil wars.

If we turn in conclusion, as before, to the history of our own Western World in its Modern and its 'Post-Modern' Age, we shall find, here too, the counterparts of a Caesar in Gaul and a Marius in Numidia and an Alexander in Asia—and this in an arena that expands over the whole surface of the planet. Alexander's over-running of the Syriac and Egyptiac and Babylonian and Indic worlds of his day has been rivalled in the Spanish conquest of the Mexic and Andean worlds and the British conquest of the Hindu World and the Dutch conquest of Indonesia and the French conquest of the Maghrib. The Roman conquests of barbarians have been rivalled in the Portuguese colonization of Brazil, in the French and British colonization of North America between the Rio Grande and the Arctic Circle,⁴ and in the opening up of the

¹ See Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 135–8, and Lockhart, L.: *Nadir Shah* (London 1938, Luzac).

² For this first Egyptiac conquest of Nubia by the Theban Emperors of the Eleventh and Twelfth Dynasties see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 115, above. For the role played by the so-called 'Middle Empire' as an Egyptiac universal state see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 137. Senwosret III has commemorated the hardness of his heart in the inscription on the frontier-stele which he erected at Samnah in the sixteenth year of his reign (English translation in Hall, H. R.: *The Ancient History of the Near East* (London 1913, Methuen), pp. 161–2).

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 159, above.

⁴ For the victory of the Western Civilization over the Mexic Civilization in the race for winning the prize of North America see II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, p. 265, footnote 1, above.

whole interior of Tropical Africa, between the Kalahari Desert and the Sahara, by a simultaneous converging movement of French and Belgian and German and English and Afrikaner pioneers.

In sheer geographical range this Western expansion in the last four centuries dwarfs the combined achievements of the Romans and the Macedonians; but the Hellenic conquerors of alien worlds need not fear to measure themselves against their Western counterparts when the comparison is extended from the physical to the spiritual dimension. If the British Rāj in India has succeeded in becoming as humane as the Seleucid régime in Babylonia, on the other hand the Dutch rule in Java is infected with the same taint of commercial exploitation that blights the memory of the Ptolemaic rule in Egypt, while the atrocities committed by the Spanish *conquistadores* in Mexico and Peru surpass the misdeeds of the Roman army which pillaged Asia Minor in 189-188 B.C. Nor, when he turns to consider the treatment of primitive peoples, can the Western historian congratulate himself very heartily upon the fact that the behaviour of the French colonists in Canada towards the local Red Indians can bear comparison with the best practice of the Romans in their dealings with European and African peoples on the same low level of culture; for unhappily this clean French page in the history of our modern Western colonization is an exceptional leaf in the Recording Angel's book. The lion's share of North America has fallen in the end to the French Canadians' English-speaking rivals;¹ and, although the French have played one of the leading parts in the subsequent opening up of Africa, and have partially maintained on the Senegal in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the noble reputation which they first earned on the St. Lawrence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,² the Western conquest of Africa has not, as we have seen, been by any means an exclusively French achievement. When we turn from the single French page to the record of the Belgians in the Congo and of the English-speaking peoples in North America and Kenya, we have to blush at passages which are almost without parallel in the history of Roman imperialism. The Romans did not exterminate the primitive inhabitants of Transappennine Europe,³ as the primitive inhabitants of North America have been exterminated by the English-speaking settlers of the United States.⁴

¹ For this victory of the English-speaking colonists in the struggle between the Western competitors for the acquisition of North America see II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, p. 211, and II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 65-73, above.

² See II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, p. 225, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 1, Annex, pp. 569-74, below.

⁴ For the vein of ruthlessness in the modern English method of overseas settlement see II. C (ii) (a) 1, Annex, in vol. i, above. For the fate of the Red Indians in the United States see II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, pp. 212 and 214, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 277, footnote 2, above.

Nor, when they reduced the conquered native populations to the status of hewers of wood and drawers of water,¹ did the privileged citizens of a Roman colonial city-state attempt to segregate themselves from their fallāhīn by an impassable barrier of caste like the gulf of race-feeling that divides the English-speaking settlers in Kenya Colony from their Indian fellow immigrants and from their Bantu native labour force. When we remind ourselves of the historical fact that, in spite of this more liberal attitude and *éthos*, these Roman colonies in *partibus barbarorum* degenerated into parasitic growths which were eventually swept away by a proletarian revolution,² we shall find ourselves wondering what expectation of life there may be for a modern Western colonial enterprise like Kenya Colony, where a community of about 18,000 White immigrants is striving to-day to dominate about 55,000 Indian and Arab immigrants and 3,200,000 Black African 'Natives' in order to subordinate their welfare to the White minority's interests.

It is now manifest that our own Western Society, as well as the other non-Hellenic societies, can furnish us with examples of three social types—the conqueror, the wastrel, and the hangman—of which we identified our first specimens among the members of the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society in its disintegration. Happily, however, the comparison works out for good as well as for evil; for we have also seen that the Hellenic dominant minority displays a wide range of spiritual variety beyond the narrow limits of these three repulsive types; and the figures that are blazoned on the brighter side of a Hellenic shield can likewise be matched by examples from the membership of the other civilizations.

For instance, the Roman public servant, as he shows himself at his best over a span of two and a half centuries in Augustus's minister Agrippa (*vivebat* 63–12 B.C.) or in Severus's minister Dio Cassius (*vivebat circa* A.D. 155–235), has his worthy counterpart in the Hindu World to-day in 'the Indian Civilian': a child of the British Rāj who has been aptly named, since it is India's need of civic salvation that has called him into existence, while the standard of service which he has set before himself is not a racial idiosyncrasy of the European founders of this Indian institution, but is a spiritual ideal which can captivate and convert and inspire any human soul, irrespective of the shape or colour of its bodily tenement. The medium through which the tradition of the Indian Civil Service is transmitted is not the physical heritage of racial kinship but the spiritual communion of *esprit de corps*; and

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 98–9, above.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 99–100, above.

it is a recognition of this truth that has nerved British statesmanship in our generation to undertake the task of transferring the responsibility for the government of India from English to Indian shoulders. An Englishman of little faith, who finds himself doubting whether this hazardous enterprise can ever be brought to a successful issue, may take heart from the reflection that in the history of the Roman Civil Service the spiritual force of *esprit de corps* did prove equal to the demand that was made upon it when the responsibility for the government of the Hellenic universal state was handed on from an Italian Agrippa or Agricola to an Asiatic Arrian or Dio.

The fact remains, however, that the genesis of the Indian Civil Service is to be found in the labours of Europeans who have been bred in the tradition of Western Christendom; and, while this historical fact may not reveal the whole truth about the Indian Civil Service itself, or foreshadow its ultimate destiny as an Indian institution, it may still serve to remind us that our own Western Society, in its Modern and its 'Post-Modern' Age, has displayed other types in its governing class besides those of the war-lord and the despot and the capitalist. In England in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era this governing class brought forth not only a Henry VIII to play the tyrant's part, but also a Saint Thomas More to lay down his life rather than lend his countenance to the tyrant's policy. In the same century in Lombardy 'the poisoned field' which produced a weed after its own kind in the person of Rodolfo Gonzaga at the same time gave birth to a saint in Rodolfo's brother Aluigi.¹ In the seventeenth century in France the parasitic *noblesse* from which Louis XIV recruited his corrupt and extravagant court was also the recruiting-ground for the high-minded religious community of Port Royal. Nor are we dependent, for proving our point, upon a more or less capricious selection of individual illustrations. The truth is more convincingly demonstrated by a general change of aim and *ethos* which has declared itself unmistakably in the lives of the states of our modern Western World in the course of the last hundred years. It is true that these states have not put off the Old Adam. They are still the expressions and instruments of a lawless will to power—a power of evil which, in our generation, is threatening to bring our society to irretrievable disaster. At the same time we can see that they have latterly begun to assume a second aspect which is so alien from the other that ultimately the two must assuredly prove to be mutually incom-

¹ See the brilliant picture in *The Vocation of Aloysius Gonzaga* (London 1929, Sheed and Ward), by Father C. C. Martindale, S.J., of the identic social environment in which these two brothers grew up to lead two lives which were as different from each other as any two lives could well be.

patible. While continuing to be used as instruments of an immoral violence, these states are now also beginning to be used simultaneously as a means to social welfare. Even in the most old-fashioned communities of our twentieth-century Western World the traditional military state and police-state is now concerning itself to some extent with the promotion of health and education and employment. Nor is the modern Western State only shifting its balance of activity in practice; it is also laying more and more emphasis upon the novel aspect of its functions; and the public pose is perhaps even more significant than the underlying reality; for in thus seeking to present itself to its subjects in the guise of a ministering angel or a fairy godmother, instead of parading as a strong man armed or as a beast of prey, the modern Western State is implicitly concurring in a moral condemnation of its own blood-stained past. In this changing picture of the Western State we can discern at least a partial change of heart in our modern Western governing class; and this change is clearly analogous to the change that came over the Roman governing class in and after the generation of Augustus.¹

Our own society is not, however, unique in furnishing us with counterparts of the Roman civil service. The Confucian litterati who administered the Sinic universal state under the Han Dynasty (*imperabant* 202 B.C.—A.D. 221) attained a standard of service and acquired an *esprit de corps* that place them on a moral level with the Roman civil servants of the first and second centuries of the Christian Era in the Hellenic World and with the English civil servants of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe and India. Even the *chinovniks* who administered the Orthodox Christian universal state in Russia for two centuries, from the reign of Peter the Great (*imperabat* A.D. 1682–1725) to the reign of Nicholas II (*imperabat* A.D. 1894–1917), and who became a byword, at home as well as in the West, for their incompetence and corruption, may be let off more lightly by the verdict of History when their record can be compared with that of the régime which has now taken their place. On this showing, Posterity will perhaps pronounce that, after all, this Petrine Russian officialdom did not acquit itself so discreditably in wrestling with the gigantic dual task of maintaining the Muscovite Empire as a going concern and at the same time transforming it into a new-fangled polity on the

¹ For an illuminating use of this analogy to illustrate the change of heart in the modern Western governing class in England towards the middle of the nineteenth century—a change which here found its practical expression in the passage of the Factory Acts and in the establishment of the Home Civil Service—see J. L. and Barbara Hammond: *The Rise of Modern Industry* (London 1925, Methuen), chap. 15, especially pp. 255–7.

Western pattern.¹ In the main body of Orthodox Christendom the Slave-Household of the Ottoman Pādishāh, which has likewise become a byword for its repression of the *ra'īyeh*, will also perhaps come to be remembered as an institution which performed at least one signal service for the Orthodox Christian Society in imposing upon it, even by main force, that *Pax Ottomanica* which gave a self-tormented world a brief spell of quiet between two weary ages of anarchy.² In the Far Eastern Society in Japan the feudal daimyos and their henchmen the Samurai, who preyed upon Society, in preying upon one another, during the four centuries preceding the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate, survived to redeem their own past by lending themselves to Ieyasu's constructive work of converting a feudal anarchy into a feudal order; and at the opening of the next chapter of Japanese history they rose to a height of self-abnegation which was almost sublime when they voluntarily divested themselves of their ancestors' harshly won and tightly held privileges because they were convinced that this supreme sacrifice was required of them in order to enable Japan to hold her own in the environment of a Westernized World from which she could no longer hold aloof.

This vein of nobility which reveals itself to a discriminating eye in the Japanese Samurai and in the Ottoman *qullar* is the notorious virtue of two other ruling minorities: the Incas who were the masters of the Andean universal state, and the Persian grandees who governed a Syriac universal state as vicegerents of an Achæmenid King of Kings. The nobility of the *orejones* and the *megistânes* is vouched for by the testimony of alien conquerors who supplanted them and reigned in their stead and put on record, from first-hand acquaintance, the only accounts of them that we possess (for both these ruling minorities were singularly dumb, considering the importance and the eminence of their historic roles). This testimony is unimpeachable where it gives a good report, since the alien usurpers had two strong incentives to blacken their predecessors' memory. They would be prone to

¹ Since this sentence was written, there have been indications that the reputation of the Imperial Russian *chinovniks* may be destined to be rehabilitated by the piety of their Communist successors in office! *The Manchester Guardian* of the 16th September, 1937, contains an account of a text-book of Russian history, produced under the direction of a Professor Shestakov, which is reported to have been officially commended as approaching, more nearly than any one of forty-five competing pieces of work, to Stalin's idea of what such a text-book ought to be. The merit of Professor Shestakov's work, from Stalin's point of view, appears (according to the *Izvestiya* of the 24th August, 1937) to have lain, among other things, in the fact that, in this Communist presentation of Russian history, the Tsars Ivan III and Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great are given their meed of praise as empire-builders who laid the foundations of the U.S.S.R.

² See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 70, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 190-1, below.

depreciate the military prowess of warriors whom they had easily beaten at their own game, and they would be tempted to vilify the moral character of rulers whom they had wrongfully despoiled of their empire.¹ With these considerations in mind, we may believe without hesitation any good that the Spaniards tell us of the Incas, or the Greeks of the Persians; and in both records the good report conspicuously predominates over the bad.

In the Greek portrait of the Persians Herodotus's famous thumbnail sketch of the Persian boys' education—'they train them from the age of five to the age of twenty to do three things, and three things only: to ride and to shoot and to speak the truth'²—is not discredited by the companion picture that is presented to us of these same Persians in their manhood. There is the Herodotean tale of Xerxes' suite in the storm at sea doing obeisance to their Imperial Master and then leaping overboard to their deaths in order to save the Pādishāh's life by lightening the vessel in which the discomfited Achaemenian war-lord was fleeing from Europe to Asia after his defeat at Salamis.³ And there is the less tragic incident, of which Xenophon was an eye-witness, when the grandees on the staff of Cyrus the Younger responded with the same unhesitating promptness to the summons of their master to sacrifice—on this occasion not their lives but their hardly less precious finery. The spectacle of these Persian nobles in their gorgeous raiment eagerly plunging into the mud in order to put their shoulders to the wheels of the baggage wagons made a deep impression on the mind of the Greek observer, as any reader of his narrative can tell.⁴ But the most impressive of all Greek testimonies to Persian virtues is that of Alexander the Great, who showed by grave acts, and not just by easy words, how highly he thought of the Persians after he had made their acquaintance. He had no sooner come to know these Persians by the searching test of their reaction to an overwhelming disaster than he took a decision which was not only bound to offend his own Macedonians

¹ For the influence of these motives on the minds of the Spanish historians of the Incas see Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 4. On the other hand, one of the most influential of these historians, Garcilaso de la Vega, shows a bias—which has to be discounted—in favour of the Incas owing to the pride that he took in the Inca blood that ran in his own veins. (His mother was a niece of the Emperor Huayna Capac.) For a less favourable interpretation of the record of the Incas as a ruling minority see Cunow, H.: *Geschichte und Kultur des Inkareiches* (Amsterdam 1937, Elsevier,) pp. 34, 35-6, 41, 42, 46-7, 48, 49-50. The author draws attention to the vigour and obstinacy of the resistance which the Incas encountered at every stage of their progressive conquest of their empire, and he finds no reason for believing that the conquered peoples ever became reconciled to the Incas' rule. This judgement, however, seems to be exceptional, and it is modified by Cunow himself when he comes down to details (see, for example, op. cit., pp. 88-9, for the moderation of the *corvées* which the Incas imposed on their subjects).

² Herodotus, Book I, chap. 136.

³ Herodotus, Book VIII, chap. 118.

⁴ See Xenophon: *Expedition Cyri*, Book I, chap. 5, §§ 7-8.

but was the surest way of outraging their feelings that he could have hit upon if this had been his deliberate aim. He decided to take the Persians into partnership in the government of an empire which the Macedonians' prowess had wrested, only yesterday, out of the Persians' hands; and he put this policy into execution with characteristic thoroughness. He took a Persian grandee's daughter to wife; he bribed or browbeat his Macedonian officers into following his example; and he drafted Persian recruits into his Macedonian regiments. A people who could evoke this extraordinary tribute from the leader of their hereditary enemies—and this on the morrow of their own utter military defeat—must have been transparently endowed with the classic virtues of 'a ruling race'.¹

We have now managed to marshal a considerable array of evidence for the capacity of dominant minorities to produce an admirable governing class; and this evidence is borne out by the catalogue of the universal states that have been created by the dominant minorities of disintegrating civilizations; for the establishment and maintenance of a universal state presupposes the existence of a governing class with a high standard of conduct, a strong *esprit de corps*, and a persistent tradition.

In the course of previous inquiries² we have found incidentally that, out of twenty civilizations which have unquestionably broken down,³ no less than fifteen have passed through a universal state on their road from breakdown towards dissolution. We have identified a Hellenic universal state in the Roman Empire;⁴ an Andean in the Empire of the Incas;⁵ a Sinic in the Empire of the Ts'in and Han dynasties;⁶ a Minoan in 'the thalassocracy of Minos';⁷ a Sumeric in the Empire of Sumer and Akkad;⁸ a Babylonian in the Neo-Babylonian Empire of Nabopolassar and Nebuchadnezzar;⁹ a Mayan in 'the Old Empire' of the Mayas;¹⁰ an Egyptian in 'the Middle Empire' of the Eleventh and Twelfth Dynasties;¹¹ a Syriac in the Achaemenian Empire;¹² an Indic in

¹ For the effect of Alexander's discovery of the Persians' true character in leading the Macedonian man of genius to his greater discovery of the unity of Mankind see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 9, below.

² In I. C (i) (b), vol. i, and IV. C (ii), vol. iv, above.

³ These twenty include all those, with the single uncertain exception of our own Western Civilization, that have not either miscarried before birth or become arrested immediately after it.

⁴ I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52-3; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 61, above.

⁵ I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 120-2; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 103, above.

⁶ I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 89; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65, above.

⁷ I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93-4; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 64, above.

⁸ I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 106; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 63-4, above.

⁹ I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 119; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 100, above.

¹⁰ I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 125-7; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 108, above.

¹¹ I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 137; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85, above.

¹² I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 75-6; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 67, above.

the Empire of the Mauryas;¹ a Hindu in the Timurid Empire of Akbar and Awrangzib.² We have distinguished a Russian Orthodox Christian universal state in the Muscovite 'Empire of All the Russias',³ and another Orthodox Christian universal state, embracing the main body of Orthodox Christendom, in the Ottoman Empire;⁴ and in the Far Eastern World we have met with a corresponding pair: the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan⁵ and the Mongol Empire in China.⁶

We have also observed that a number of these universal states have been prolonged (to their natural term) or restored (after a lapse) or reintegrated (after an interval of alien intrusion) by other hands than those which originally created them. The Empire of the Incas was taken over forcibly by the Spaniards and prolonged in the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru.⁷ The Empire of Sumer and Akkad was restored by the First Dynasty of Babylon in the reign of Hammurabi.⁸ The Neo-Babylonian Empire was engulfed in the Achaemenian Empire,⁹ and this in its turn was taken over forcibly by Alexander, and was prolonged by Alexander's Seleucid successors, before it was eventually broken up by Roman and Parthian hammer-strokes and was subsequently reintegrated by the labours of the Umayyads and 'Abbasids after the complete and final expulsion of the Hellenic intruders from the Syriac Society's domain.¹⁰ The Egyptiac 'Middle Empire' of the Eleventh and Twelfth Dynasties was re-established, after a very much shorter breach of continuity, in 'the New Empire' of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties.¹¹ The Empire of the Mauryas was partially taken over and prolonged by Hellenic conquerors from Bactria, and by these Greek empire-builders' Kushan successors, and was eventually reintegrated by the Guptas, who stand to the Mauryas as the 'Abbasids stand to the Achaemenidae.¹² The Timurid Empire of Akbar and Awrangzib was restored—in more solid masonry and also, perhaps, on a sounder architectural plan—in the British Rāj.¹³ The Mongol Empire over China was re-established, to all

¹ I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86; IV. C. (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 66, above.

² IV. C. (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 97, above.

³ IV. C. (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 88, above.

⁴ Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7; IV. C. (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 70, above.

⁵ IV. C. (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 88, above.

⁶ IV. C. (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 87, above.

⁷ IV. C. (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 80 and 103, above.

⁸ I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 106; IV. C. (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 63-4, above.

⁹ I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 119, above.

¹⁰ I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 72-7, above. It is noteworthy that this final reversal of Alexander's feat of imposing Hellenism upon the Syriac World by force of arms was followed by a voluntary reception of Hellenic culture on the part of the Syriac Society in the 'Abbasid Age. This cultural contact between the Syriac and Hellenic societies at this stage of their intercourse is examined in Part IX, below.

¹¹ I. C. (ii), vol. i, pp. 138-9, above.

¹² I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 84-6; IV. C. (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 66, above.

¹³ IV. C. (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 96-7, above.

Chinese intents and purposes, in the Manchu Empire,¹ which stands to it as the Egyptian 'New Empire' stands to the Egyptian 'Middle Empire'.

It will be observed that—as might have been expected *a priori*—these works of rehabilitation have been performed, more often than not, by new arrivals on the scene who have been culturally alien from the original builders. The Spaniards, for example, were wholly alien from the Incas; the Achaemenidae from the Babylonians; the Macedonians from the Achaemenidae; the Greek and Kushan invaders of India from the Mauryas; and the British from the Timurids (as well as from the Hindus). Even the Amorite Hammurabi, though he was the sixth of his line to reign in Babylon, was probably looked askance at, as a not yet completely reclaimed barbarian, by his Akkadian subjects and *a fortiori* by their Sumerian fellow citizens of that 'Empire of the Four Quarters' which actually owed its restoration to Hammurabi's prowess and statesmanship. And this was certainly the attitude of the Chinese to the Manchus from beginning to end of the Manchu régime, in spite of the Manchus' almost complete freedom from that tincture of an alien civilization which had evoked in Chinese hearts a fanatical hatred against the Manchus' predecessors, the Mongols.²

We shall even find several further examples of alien handiwork among those universal states which were 'original work' and were not restorations of some older building. For example, the Timurid Turks, who made the first essay in providing the disintegrating Hindu Society with a universal state, were children of the Iranic Society and, by this token, were just as alien from the Hindu World as are their British successors. The 'Osmanlis, who gave the main body of Orthodox Christendom the only universal state that it has ever known, were the Timurids' cultural as well as racial brethren. The Mongols, who gave the main body of the Far Eastern Society its first universal state, were decidedly more alien in culture from their Chinese subjects than were the Manchus who afterwards repeated the Mongols' feat.³

Of the other original creators of universal states, a majority—which includes the Romans, the Incas, the Achaemenidae, the Ts'in, the Theban Dynasties, the Muscovites, and the Tokugawas—were Powers which had qualified for the role of empire-builders

¹ IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 87, above.

² For the cultural relation of the Manchus to the Chinese and to the Mongols respectively see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 16, 19, and 31, footnote 1, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 309-10, and V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 348-51, below.

³ For the tinge of Far Eastern Christian culture in the social 'make-up' of the Mongols see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 237-8, and II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, p. 348, below.

by serving an apprenticeship as wardens of the marches;¹ and these frontiersmen on an imperial throne have often been viewed by their more cultivated but less capable subjects in the interior with the eyes of a Sumerian litteratus looking down his nose at a Hammurabi. This, as we know from their own written testimony, was the attitude of Greek men-of-letters towards Roman statesmen and administrators as late as the Age of the Antonines, when these Romans were actually practising, with an effectiveness that no Greek had ever approached, that benevolent 'Hellenic superintendence' (*Ἑλληνικὴ ἐπιμέλεια*) which, five hundred years before, had been so earnestly commended to King Philip by Isocrates.²

In so far as the universal states of which we have made this summary survey³ prove to have been the work of alien hands, they cannot, of course, be taken as evidence of creative power in any fraction of the disintegrating society on whose ground they have been set up. It would, however, be hypercritical to stigmatize the frontiersmen empire-builders as aliens simply because the people of the interior have affected to regard them as such. If we examine more closely the Hellenic case in point, we shall probably come to the conclusion that the Greek rhetor's sensitiveness to the barbarism of the Roman official was not an entirely genuine feeling, but was partly the expression of a self-defensive mental attitude—a refusal to face the humiliating fact that the converted barbarian had proved himself, by Isocrates' own test, to be a better Hellene than the Greek himself.⁴ It would, indeed, be a paradox to maintain that the Romans were no true representatives of the Hellenic

¹ For 'the stimulus of pressures' which has so often given 'marches' an ascendancy over 'interiors' see II. D (v), vol. ii, above.

² Φημί γὰρ χρῆναί σε τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας εὐεργετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεῦν, τῶν δὲ Βαρβάρων ὡς πλείστων ἄρχεω· ἦν γὰρ ταῦτα πράττης, ἅπαντές σοι χάριν ἔξουσιν, οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν εὖ πάσχωσι, Μακεδόνες δ' ἦν βασιλικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ τυραννικῶς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατῆς, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων γένος ἦν διὰ σὲ Βαρβαρικῆς δεσποτείας ἀπαλλαγέντες Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπιμελείας τύχουσιν.—Isocrates; *Philippus*.

³ A complete table of the universal states that come within the purview of the present Study will be found at the end of V. C (iii), in vol. vi, p. 327, below.

⁴ In an earlier chapter of the story of the Greeks' encounter with the Romans—at a stage in which the Romans were still engaged in wrecking the Hellenic Society that they were afterwards to reconstruct—the Greek pretence that the Romans were barbarians had proved impossible to keep up:

'It is said that when Pyrrhus caught his first bird's eye view, from an observation post, of the Roman army in formation, he remarked that he could see nothing barbarous about the barbarians' order of battle; and similar confessions were extorted from Greeks who were making their first acquaintance with Titus [Quintus Flaminius]. They had had it from the Macedonians that a fellow in command of a barbarian host was on the war-path, conquering and enslaving as he came; and now they found themselves in the presence of a young man of gracious mien who was a Greek in speech and accent and was ambitious to deserve true honour. Of course they were extraordinarily charmed, and, when they left his presence to go off to their respective homes, they turned the tide of public feeling in Titus's favour—bringing tidings of him as a leader who had come to conduct the Greeks into the promised land of freedom.'—Plutarch: *Life of Titus Quintus Flaminius*, chap. 5. The fourth-century Greek scholar Heracleides Ponticus hit the mark when, in the earliest mention of Rome in extant Greek literature, he described her as 'a Hellenic city' (see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 212, footnote 3, below).

dominant minority, or the Thebans of the Egyptian. And, even if we leave the borderline cases on one side, there are a number of instances still left in which there can be no dispute over the claim of the creators of a universal state to be representatives of the dominant minority of the society in whose domain the state has been established. Among these unquestionable exponents of a dominant minority's political creative power we may cite the Han Dynasty and 'Minos', the dynasty of Ur and the Neo-Babylonians, the Mauryas and the Guptas.

Is this political capacity the only kind of creative power that is a common attribute of dominant minorities? The question presents itself because in our analysis of the various types of character and activity in the Hellenic dominant minority we found that the creative type was not, in this case, confined to the political field. It was represented not only by the Roman public servant but also by the Greek philosopher;¹ and, if we now repeat the procedure, which we have been following so far, of surveying the lives of the other civilizations in their disintegration in order to learn whether the Hellenic phenomena reappear in them, we shall see that the Greek philosopher, as well as the Roman public servant, has his non-Hellenic counterparts. While we have found about ten disintegrating civilizations, besides the Hellenic, in which the Dominant Minority can be credited with the creative achievement of having established a universal state, we can find at least three, besides the Hellenic, in which the Dominant Minority has also thought out a philosophy.

In the history of the Babylonian Society, for example, the terrible eighth century B.C., which saw the beginning of the Hundred Years' War between Babylonia and Assyria,² seems also to have seen a sudden great advance in astronomical knowledge.³ In this age Babylonian men of science discovered that the rhythm of cyclic recurrence, which had been patent, from time immemorial, in the alternations of Night and Day and in the waxing and waning of the Moon and in the Solar Cycle of the Year, was also discernible on a vaster scale in the secular motions of a heavenly host which included the planets. These stars which were traditionally named 'the wanderers' *par excellence*, in allusion to their apparently erratic courses, now proved to be bound by as strict a discipline as the Sun or the Moon or 'the fixed stars' of the Firmament in the Cosmic Cycle of a *Magnus Annus*;⁴ and this exciting Babylonian discovery

¹ See pp. 39-40, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), vol. iv, pp. 476-80, above.

³ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (ii), third edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 591-5; vol. iii, first edition (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 132-4.

⁴ See IV. C (i) vol. iv, pp. 23-4 and 37, above.

of a hitherto unsuspected application of a familiar law of Physical Nature had much the same effect as our recent Western scientific discoveries have had upon the discoverers' conception of the Universe.

The never broken and never varying order that had thus been found to reign in all the known movements of the stellar cosmos was now assumed to govern the Universe as a whole: material and spiritual, inanimate and animate.¹ If an eclipse of the Sun or a transit of Venus could be dated with certainty to some precise moment hundreds of years back in the past, or predicted with equal certainty as bound to occur at some precise moment in an equally remote future, then was it not reasonable to suppose that human affairs were just as rigidly fixed and just as accurately calculable? And since the cosmic discipline implied that all these members of the Universe that moved in so perfect a unison were 'in sympathy'—*en rapport*—with each other, was it unreasonable to assume that the newly revealed pattern of the movements of the stars was a key to the riddle of human fortunes, so that the observer who held this astronomical clue in his hands would be able to forecast his neighbour's destinies if once he knew the date and moment of his birth? Reasonable or not, these assumptions were eagerly made; and thus a sensational scientific discovery gave birth to a fallacious philosophy of Determinism which has captivated the intellect of one civilization after another and is not quite discredited yet after a run of nearly 2,700 years.

The seductiveness of Astrology lies in its pretension to combine a theory which explains the whole *machina mundi* with a practice that will enable Tom, Dick, and Harry to spot the Derby Winner here and now. Thanks to this twofold attraction the Babylonian philosophy was able to survive the extinction of the Babylonian Civilization in the last century B.C.;² and the Chaldean *mathematicus* who imposed upon a prostrate Hellenic Society³ was represented until yesterday by the Court Astrologer at Peking and the Munejjim Bāshy at Istanbul.

We have dwelt on this Babylonian philosophy of Determinism because it has a greater affinity than any of the Hellenic philosophies

¹ For the belief in a rule of Fate, which is one of the intellectual expressions of a sense of drift that is itself one of the symptoms of a schism in the Soul, see V. C (i) (d) 4, pp. 412-31, below.

² For the incorporation of Astrology into Mithraism see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 540, below.

³ See Wendland, P.: *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*, 2nd and 3rd editions (Tübingen 1912, Mohr), pp. 132-3, and Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 59-60. In taking over Astrology from its Babylonian fathers in and after the 2nd century B.C. the Hellenes put their own imprint upon it, as is witnessed by the fact that, in India at the present day, some of the current technical terms of the practitioners of this pseudo-science are etymologically of Greek origin.

have with the still perhaps rather callow philosophical speculations of our own Western World in its present Cartesian Age. On the other hand there are counterparts of almost all the Hellenic schools of thought in the philosophies of the Indic and the Sinic World. The dominant minority of a disintegrating Indic Civilization brought forth the Jainism of Mahavira, the Primitive Buddhism of Siddhārtha Gautama,¹ the transfigured Buddhism of the Mahāyāna² (which differs from its acknowledged original at least as profoundly as Neoplatonism differs from the philosophy of Socrates), and the diverse Buddhistic philosophies that are part of the mental apparatus of a post-Buddhaic Hinduism. The dominant minority of a disintegrating Sinic Civilization brought forth the moralized ritualism and ritualized morality of Confucius and the paradoxical wisdom of the Tao which is ascribed to the legendary genius of Lao-tse.³

2. *Internal Proletariats*

A Hellenic Prototype.

When we pass from dominant minorities to proletariats, a closer examination of the facts will confirm, here too, our first impression that within each of the fractions of a disintegrating society there is a certain diversity of type. We shall also find, however, that, in the range of this spiritual diversity, the internal and the external proletariats are at opposite poles. While the external proletariats have a gamut which is narrower than that of the dominant minorities, the gamut of the internal proletariats is very much wider. Let us reconnoitre the wider field first.

If we wish to enter upon our survey of internal proletariats by our now customary way of approach—that is, by taking the Hellenic instance first as our standard of comparison—and if we also wish to follow the genesis of the Hellenic internal proletariat from the beginning of the embryo stage, we cannot begin better than by quoting a passage from Thucydides in which the historian of the breakdown of the Hellenic Society describes the consequent social schism in its earliest phase, as it showed itself first in Corcyra.⁴

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 87, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 131-2, below.

² See I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35; II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65, above; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 133-46, below.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 89, and III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 187-9, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 146-7, below.

⁴ For the whole story of these Corcyraean faction-fights (*gerebantur* 427-425 B.C.) during the first phase of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. see Thucydides, Book III, chaps. 70-85, and Book IV, chaps. 46-8. The story has already been cited in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 63, and IV. C (iii) (b) 9, vol. iv, p. 204, above.

'Such was the savagery of the class-war (*stasis*) at Corcyra as it developed, and it made the deeper impression through being the first of its kind—though eventually the upheaval spread through almost the whole of the Hellenic World. In every country there were struggles between the leaders of the Proletariat and the reactionaries in their efforts to procure the intervention of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians respectively. In peace-time they would have had neither the opportunity nor the desire to call in the foreigner; but now there was the War; and it was easy for any revolutionary spirits in either camp to procure an alliance entailing the discomfiture of their opponents and a corresponding reinforcement of their own faction. This access of class-war brought one calamity after another upon the countries of Hellas—calamities that occur and will continue to occur so long as Human Nature remains what it is, though they may be aggravated or mitigated or modified by successive changes of circumstance. Under the favourable conditions of peace-time both countries and individuals display a sweeter reasonableness, because their hands are not forced by the logic of events; but War eats away the margins of ordinary life and, in most characters, adjusts the temperament to the new environment by its brutal training. So the countries of Hellas became infected with the class-war, and the sensation made by each successive outbreak had a cumulative effect upon the next.'¹

Having thus put his finger on the war-spirit as the demoralizing spiritual force which shattered the Hellenic Society's moral solidarity, Thucydides goes on to make a brilliant analysis, which is at the same time an overwhelming indictment, of the demonic impulses of evil which were thus let loose in men's souls like the swarm of evil sprites that poured out of Pandora's wantonly opened box.

'It was a competition of ingenuity in the elaboration of intrigue and in the refinement of reprisals. The customary meaning of words was arbitrarily distorted to cover the conduct of those who employed them. Reckless irresponsibility was treated as courageous loyalty, cautious reserve as cowardice masked under a high-sounding name, restraint as a cloak for poor-spiritedness, and the policy of reason as a policy of *laissez faire*. A frenzied fanaticism was the popular ideal of conduct, while intrigue that took no risks was regarded as a legitimate method of self-defence. Violence of feeling was a warrant of honesty, deprecation of violence a signal for suspicion. Success in intrigue was the test of intelligence and the detection of intrigue a testimonial to superior cleverness, while anyone who so shaped his policy as to dispense with such methods was pilloried as a nihilist towards his own group and a weakling in face of their opponents. In short, approbation was reserved for those who forestalled their enemies in striking a blow or who implanted that suggestion in minds which had not previously conceived

¹ Thucydides, Book III, chap. 82.

it. The ties of party actually became closer than those of kinship,¹ because partisans were readier than kinsmen to throw themselves into an adventure at a moment's notice, and the associations in question were formed, not to secure the benefits of established institutions, but to gain illegitimate advantages by violating them. Complicity in crime was a more effective sanction for loyalty to engagements than a solemn oath. A fair offer from opponents was received as a signal for practical precautions by the dominant party of the moment, instead of evoking any generous response. The exaction of reprisals was valued more highly than an immunity from wrongs demanding them. The rare covenants of reconciliation were only entered into on either side as a momentary last resort and only observed so long as no alternative resource presented itself. Any one who spied a weak spot in his adversary's armour and had the nerve to seize his opportunity took more satisfaction in obtaining his revenge by treachery than in obtaining it in fair fight, the dominating considerations being the elimination of risk and the added halo of intellectual brilliance investing the triumphs of perfidy. . . .

'The cause of this whole phenomenon was the thirst for power arising from the predatory and competitive impulses—impulses which engender conflict, from which passion is engendered in its turn. In all the countries of Hellas the party leaders invented high-sounding catch-words and posed as the champions of political equality for the masses or of moderate conservatism, in order to make spoils out of the public interest which they served with their lips. In their unscrupulous struggle to gain the upper hand over one another they hesitated at nothing and surpassed themselves in the prosecution of their vendettas.' So far from attempting to act within the bounds of moral right and national interest, they recognized no limitations on either side except the caprice of the moment. They did not shrink from bringing themselves into power by verdicts immorally obtained against their opponents, if not by naked force, in order to satiate their momentary rancour. In fact, Religion had lost its hold upon either party, and they relied upon their powers of misrepresentation to retrieve their good name whenever they had occasion to perpetrate an invidious action. Meanwhile the moderate elements in every country were preyed upon by the extremists of both camps, partly for their refusal to take sides and partly out of resentment at the prospect of their survival.

'Thus the class-war plunged the Hellenic Society into every kind of moral evil.'²

This spiritual débâcle which followed the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. continued unchecked during the century of warfare and revolution which was the aftermath of the great catastrophe, and the first social effect was to

¹ Compare Matt. x. 21 and 34-7 = Luke xii. 51-3, xiv. 25-7, and xxi. 16-17 (quoting Micah vii. 6); Matt. xii. 46-50 = Mark iii. 31-5 = Luke viii. 19-21. —A.J.T.

² Thucydides, Book III, chaps. 82-3.

produce a large and ever larger floating population of 'stateless' exiles. During the growth of the Hellenic Civilization the experience of being thus uprooted from one's native social setting had been as rare to meet in Hellas as it had been dreadful to contemplate. Yet the surviving monuments of the Hellenic literature of that age testify clearly that this dreaded experience was foreknown to be the penalty for fratricide. It is one of the maxims of the Homeric Nestor's legendary wisdom that 'outcast, outlawed, out-homed is he who is in love with the lacerating warfare that rends the bosom of the People';¹ and an Athenian poet who was in his prime in the generation before the catastrophe of 431 B.C., and who was only just spared by Death from seeing his country brought low after twenty-seven years of demoralizing conflict, has written a stanza that is a judgement on his own civilization—and on ours.

The craft of his engines hath passed his dream,
In haste to the good or the evil goal.
One holdeth his city's law supreme
And the oath of God in his inmost soul;
High-cited he: citiless the other
Who striveth, grasping at things of naught,
On the road forbidden. From him be hidden
The fire that comforts and the light of thought.²

Sophocles himself lived to see Hellas smitten with this curse; and, within a hundred years of the date at which these foreboding lines were written,³ the Hellenic World was swarming with homeless exiles.⁴ The evil was not overcome by Alexander's great-hearted attempt to induce the reigning faction of the moment in each city-state to allow its ejected opponents to return in peace to their hearths and homes;⁵ and the fire made fresh fuel for itself; for the one thing that the exiles found for their hands to do was to

¹ 'Αφρότηρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος ὃς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου δκρύνετος.—*Iliad*, Book IX, ll. 63-4. In their present context these lines refer to the war between the Achaeans and the Trojans, and not to a civil war in the technical sense. This reference points the truth that all warfare is, 'in the last analysis', fratricidal.

² Sophocles: *Antigone*, ll. 365-75, translated by Gilbert Murray.

³ The *Antigone* appears to have been written in 440 B.C.

⁴ The state of Hellas in this age is luridly illustrated by the following anecdote, in Xenophon's *Hellenica* (Book VII. chap. 4, § 3), of an incident which appears to have occurred in the autumn of 366 B.C.:

'On his way back from Athens, [where he had been carrying out a diplomatic mission], Lycomedes [of Mantinea] met his death by a most extraordinary accident. Finding any number of ships at his disposal, he picked out the ship that took his fancy, contracted to have himself put on shore at whatever point he himself might designate, and selected for his landing-place the exact spot where the exiles [from his own country] happened to be encamped. So Lycomedes met his death in this way; but that did not prevent the alliance which he had been negotiating from being concluded.'

The tacit equation between meeting one's exiles and meeting one's death is more eloquent than words could be.

⁵ For Alexander's vision of *δμόνοια* see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 6-10, and V. C (ii) (d), vol. vi, p. 254, below.

enlist as mercenary soldiers;¹ and this glut of military man-power put fresh 'drive' into the wars by which new exiles—and thereby more mercenaries—were being created. This vicious circle of evil cause and effect first inflamed the fratricidal warfare in the bosom of Hellas itself, and then discharged the men of war who had been trained in this Hellenic school of arms to wreck the *Pax Achaemenia*—first by tempting ambitious provincial governors to break all the tabus of Persian loyalty by hiring this Hellenic weapon for use against the Pādishāh; then by giving Alexander of Macedon the means of successfully accomplishing the subversive feat which the traitor-sātraps had lacked the nerve to carry through; and finally by enabling Alexander's Macedonian successors to keep three continents in turmoil for forty years in their struggle over their master's stolen heritage.

The effect of these direct moral ravages of the war-spirit in Hellas in uprooting her children was powerfully reinforced by the operation of disruptive economic forces which the wars let loose.

For example, the wars of Alexander and his successors in South-Western Asia gave military employment to one swarm of homeless Greeks at the cost of uprooting another. For the mercenaries were paid by putting into circulation the bullion which had been accumulating for two centuries in the Achaemenian treasuries; and this sudden vast increase in the volume of currency in circulation worked havoc among those peasants and artisans in the Greek cities who had been spared by the flail of political strife. Prices soared without any immediate corresponding rise in wages,² and this financial revolution reduced to pauperism an element in the body social which had hitherto enjoyed a modest competence and a relative security.

The same effect of pauperization was produced again, a hundred years later, by the economic consequences of the Hannibalic War in Italy,³ where the peasantry were uprooted from the land, first by the direct devastation that was wrought by Hannibal's soldiery, and then by the ever longer terms of Roman military service which the Italian peasantry had to serve—and this not only in the main Italian war-zone, but in Transappennine and Transmarine 'side-shows'. These distant campaigns in the Po Basin, in the Iberian Peninsula, in Greece and in the East did not come to an end when

¹ For the melancholy history of this mercenary military service in a disintegrating Hellenic Society see Parke, H. W.: *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford 1933, Clarendon Press); and Griffith, G. T.: *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge 1935, University Press).

² For this indirectly but potentially subversive economic effect of Alexander's conquest of South-Western Asia see Tarn, W. W.: 'The Social Question in the Third Century' in *The Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge 1923, University Press).

³ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 170-1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 507-8, above.

Hannibal evacuated Italy or when Carthage sued for peace, but remorselessly continued to increase in range and scale and to demand ever larger drafts of Italian peasant soldiers. Under this tribulation the pauperized descendants of an Italian peasantry that had been uprooted against its will by the call of conscript military service had no resource left but to make a profession out of the career which had been imposed on their ancestors as a *corvée*; and, during the century of revolution and civil war which began in 133 B.C. with the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus and which only ended in 31 B.C. with the Battle of Actium, 'the new poor' took their toll out of the spoils of the conquests that had been won at their grandfathers' cost by taking mercenary service under the rival war-lords who were now contending for the mastery of the new Roman Empire—as the mastery of the old Achaemenian Empire had been previously contended for, with Greek mercenary arms, by the rival successors of Alexander.

In this cruel process of 'deracination' we cannot doubt that we are watching the genesis of the Hellenic internal proletariat—and this notwithstanding the fact that, at any rate in the earlier generations, the victims of the process were *ci-devant* aristocrats as often as not. For proletarianism is a state of feeling rather than a matter of outward circumstance. When we first introduced the term 'Proletariat' into this Study, we defined it,¹ for our purpose, as a 'social element or group which in some way is "in" but not "of" any given society at any given stage of such society's history'; and this definition covers the exiled Spartiate Clearchus and the other aristocratic captains of Cyrus the Younger's Greek mercenary force whose antecedents Xenophon has sketched for us in his account of their adventure,² as well as the meanest of the unemployed Greek and Italian labourers who enlisted as mercenaries under the standard of a Ptolemy³ or a Marius. The true hall-mark of the proletarian is neither poverty nor humble birth but a consciousness—and the resentment which this consciousness inspires—of being disinherited from his ancestral place in Society and being unwanted in a community which is his rightful home; and this subjective proletarianism is not incompatible with the possession of material assets. The homeward-bound survivors of the Ten Thousand, whose home-sickness made them indignantly reject their leader Xenophon's prudent suggestion that they should close with Fortune's offer and should settle down to found a new

¹ In I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 41, above.

² See Xenophon: *Expediitio Cyri*, Book I, chap. 1, §§ 9-11, and chap. 2, §§ 1-3, and Book II, chap. 6. Cf. Book VI, chap. 4, § 8.

³ See Theocritus: *Dramatic Dialogues*, Number 14: 'All for Love of Cynisca'—a poem which must have been commissioned by the Ptolemaic Government to serve the purpose of our twentieth-century Western recruiting-posters.

Greek city-state on an ideal Asiatic site,¹ were desolated to find how unwelcome their reappearance was to their brethren at home in Hellas; and their soreness at this social rebuff was not healed by an offer of temporary economic security in the shape of a new contract for their employment as mercenary troops—this time in the Lacedaemonian service. The same iron must have entered far more deeply into the souls of the survivors of those other Greek mercenaries in a later generation who were massacred, as dangerous drones, by their Macedonian comrades-in-arms when, on the news of Alexander's death, the hirelings deserted their posts in his up-country garrisons and started on the long trek back towards Hellas. It is more surprising, and therefore more significant, to find the same consciousness of being not wanted, the same sense of grievance, and the same restlessness persisting in the souls of the time-expired veterans of Roman revolutionary armies—from Sulla's army to Octavian's—who had been fitted out with new homes and lands, and organized into new civic communities, at the cost of uprooting an equal number of innocent free-holders and contented tillers of the soil through ruthless and reckless measures of unprovoked expropriation.

Thus the Hellenic internal proletariat was recruited first of all from the free citizens, and even from the aristocrats, of the disintegrating Hellenic bodies politic; and these first recruits had been disinherited in the first instance by being robbed of a spiritual birthright; but of course their spiritual impoverishment was often accompanied, and was almost always followed, by a pauperization on the material plane; and they were soon reinforced by recruits from other sources who were material as well as spiritual proletarians from the start. The numbers of the Hellenic internal proletariat were vastly swollen by the aggression of Hellenic arms—made expert in the school of fratricidal warfare—at the expense of alien societies of both the primitive and the 'civilized' species. The conquests of Alexander and his successors swept the whole of the Syriac, Egyptian, and Babylonian societies, and a considerable part of the Indic Society,² into the Hellenic dominant minority's net, while the later conquests of the Romans swept in half the barbarians of Europe and North-West Africa.³

These involuntary alien reinforcements of the Hellenic internal proletariat were perhaps at first more fortunate than their fellow-proletarians of native Hellenic origin in one respect. Though they were morally disinherited and materially despoiled, they were not

¹ Xenophon: *Expedition of Cyrus*, Book VI, chap. 4, § 1—chap. 5, § 4.

² For the partial conquest of the Indic World by the Greek princes of Bactria in and after the second decade of the second century B.C. see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86, above.

³ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 140 and 149, above.

yet physically uprooted; and a majority of them permanently escaped this fate and managed just to keep alive—like the Abbé Siéyès during the Terror of a modern revolution in the West—until they tasted, at last, their long-deferred revenge when they shook off the worn-out shackles of the Hellenic dominant minority nearly a thousand years after Alexander's passage of the Hellespont.¹ Their fortunes varied, however, according to the particular degree to which their respective Hellenic oppressors were minded to turn the screw.

In Asia the Seleucids were content (till they fell upon evil days after Antiochus the Great's disastrous encounter with the Romans)² to take a financial toll from their Oriental subjects for supplying the Royal Exchequer and for endowing newly founded city-states of the Hellenic pattern.³ Like the barbarian proletarians in Europe and North-West Africa who were similarly 'attributed' to the Roman colonial urban foundations of a rather later age, the Oriental proletarians under the Seleucid régime thus escaped comparatively lightly. In Egypt, on the other hand, the local tradition of 'the servile state', with its currency of some 2,500 years since the Age of the Pyramid-Builders,⁴ had acquired a momentum to which the Hellenic conquerors readily yielded; and here we see the Ptolemies, and their heirs the Roman Emperors,⁵ prostituting their Hellenic abilities to the prevailing Egyptian spirit, and making their 'Hellenic superintendence' a curse instead of a boon for its Egyptian recipients, by skilfully monopolizing, for the benefit of an alien Crown, the profits of all the agricultural and industrial production of the country. At the same time a Ptolemaic Egyptian peasant or factory-hand who had travelled westward and caught a glimpse of the contemporary state of the native population in the continental African dominions of Carthage would have come home thanking Isis that she had preserved her Egyptian

¹ For the final and complete undoing of Alexander's work of conquest by the equally rapid and sensational counter-conquests of the Primitive Muslim Arabs see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 75-6, above.

² In the Romano-Seleucid War of 192-188 B.C. For the effect of Roman pressure on the Seleucid Government in aggravating the Seleucid Government's own pressure upon its Oriental subjects see V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 103-5, especially p. 105, footnote 8, below.

³ For these foundations see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 98-100, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 311-13, above.

⁴ See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 212-15; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 408-13 and 418-23, above.

⁵ The Roman Imperial Government gradually relaxed the centralized system of administrative control which it had inherited from the Ptolemies, and devolved upon Egyptian local authorities the responsibility for performing the thankless task of milking the Egyptian milch cow for the Imperial Exchequer's benefit. This policy—which was prompted by slackness and inefficiency rather than by enlightenment or benevolence—had the paradoxical result that, in Egypt alone among all the provinces of the Hellenic universal state, municipal self-government gained ground in an age when elsewhere it was losing ground to bureaucratic centralization (see Jones, A. H. M.: *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press), pp. 316-50).

servant from a worse than Egyptian fate; for, though the Egyptian worker might be robbed scientifically and systematically, like the domestic bee, of almost all the hard-won fruits of his labour, he at least remained in some sense personally free, whereas the Berber subject of Carthage was a hide-bound serf. Yet this serf, in his turn, must have thanked his stars when his conscript military service under his Carthaginian masters' flag brought him face to face with the slave-gangs on the plantations of Sicily. For the lure of the virgin western markets for wine and oil, which had led the Carthaginians to turn the conquered native inhabitants of their continental African hinterland into plantation-serfs, had simultaneously led the Agrigentines to extract the same profit from their own war-devastated and war-depopulated insular domain by stocking it with plantation slaves; and this West-Mediterranean economic régime of plantations worked with an imported slave-labour-force—a social evil of which we first catch sight in Greek Sicily in 480 B.C.—was extended, on a vaster scale and with a second string in the shape of slave-shepherded stock-breeding, to the devastated areas of Roman Italy after the Hannibalic War.¹

During the last two centuries B.C. the uprooted Italian peasant-proprietors were progressively supplanted by rootless slave-hoemen and slave-herdsmen. The wastage of this servile economic man-power on the Italian plantations and ranches was perhaps as heavy as the wastage of the nominally free military man-power of the Italian peasantry in its distant theatres of war, while the profits of the wholesale wine, oil, meat, wool, and leather production which was carried on at this human—or inhuman—cost were great enough to bear the capital charge of perpetually having to replace the human raw material (in contrast to the unprofitableness of the old-fashioned peasant proprietor's subsistence-farming, which could now no longer be made to pay, even when the state came to the peasants' aid by offering them opportunities of exchanging their ancestral holdings on the south side of the Appennines for new and larger plots carved out of the confiscated lands of conquered and evicted Gauls and Ligurians).² In consequence this age saw all the populations within range of the Mediterranean coast—both western barbarians and cultivated Orientals—being lawlessly laid under contribution in order to supply the demands of an insatiable Italian slave-labour-market.

We now see that the internal proletariat of the disintegrating Hellenic Society was composed of three distinct elements: disinherited and uprooted members of the Hellenic Society's own

¹ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 168–71, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 507–8, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 1, Annex, pp. 569–74, below.

native body social; partially disinherited members of alien civilizations or of primitive societies who were conquered and exploited without being torn up by the roots; and doubly disinherited conscripts from these subject populations who were not only uprooted but were also enslaved and deported in order to be worked to death on distant plantations and ranches without any hope of ever seeing their homes or their kinsfolk again.¹ The sufferings of these three sets of victims were as various as their origins were diverse, but these differences were transcended by their overwhelming common experience of being robbed of their social heritage and being turned into exploited outcasts; and the confluence of these diverse streams of human misery into a single slough is celebrated in the famous lines in which the *colluvies gentium*²—Greeks, Orientals, and barbarians—in the slums of Rome is satirically described by a Roman poet whose pen was perhaps envenomed by a dread lest one day he himself might fall into the abyss and be swallowed up in this all-engulfing proletariat, like so many other *ci-devant* members of a Hellenic dominant minority.

Non possum ferre, Quirites,
Graecam urbem—quamvis quota portio faecis Achaei?
iampridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes
et linguam et mores et cum tibicine chordas
obliquas necnon gentilia tympana secum
vexit et ad Circum iussas prostare puellas.
ite, quibus grata est picta lupa barbara mitra.
rusticus ille tuus sumit trechedipna, Quirine,
et ceromatico fert niceteria collo.
hic alta Sicyone, ast hic Amydone relictā,
hic Andro, ille Samo, hic Trallibus aut Alabandis,
Esquillas dictumque petunt a vimine collem—
viscera magnarum domuum dominique futuri.
ingenium velox, audacia perdita, sermo
promptus et Isaeo torrentior: ede, quid illum
esse putes? quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos.
grammaticus, rhetor, geometres, pictor, aliptes,
augur, schoenobates, medicus, magus—omnia novit
Graeculus esuriens: in coelum miseris, ibit.
in summa non Maurus erat, nec Sarmata nec Thrax
qui sumpsit pennas, mediis sed natus Athenis.³

It is not the conquered barbarian nor even the Hellenized Oriental but the disinherited Hellene himself who is the most sordid representative of the Hellenic internal proletariat.

¹ For the fate of these slave-deportees, and their diverse reactions to the oppression which they suffered at the hands of the Hellenic dominant minority, see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213-16, above.

² Livy, Book IV, chap. 2, § 5.

³ Juvenal: *Satires*, No. III, ll. 60-80.

When we come to examine how these targets of satire and victims of injustice reacted to their fate, we shall not be surprised to find that one of their reactions was an explosion of savagery which surpassed in violence the cold-blooded cruelty of those conquerors, wastrels, and hangmen who first provoked them to revolt and then repressed them. It is only natural that the victims of a wanton and intolerable oppression should display a hotter passion in seeking revenge for injuries received than has been displayed by the aggressor in inflicting these injuries without provocation; and a uniform note of passion rings through a pandemonium of desperate proletarian outbreaks.

We catch this note in a series of Egyptian insurrections against the Ptolemaic régime of exploitation—an outbreak which began at the turn of the third and second centuries B.C., as soon as the Egyptian fallāhīn had acquired a stock of arms and *esprit de corps* and self-confidence as a result of the Ptolemaic Government's signal blunder of conscripting the natives into their army, alongside of the Macedonian colonists and the Greek mercenaries, in order to beat off a Seleucid invasion.¹ We hear the same note again in the more celebrated, and more momentous, series of Jewish insurrections against a Seleucid and a Roman policy of Hellenization²—an outbreak which began when Judas Maccabaeus took up arms against Antiochus Epiphanes in 166 B.C., and which was not quelled by the destruction of Jerusalem in the Great Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66–70, but burst out again among the Jewish Diasporā in Cyrene and Egypt and Cyprus in A.D. 115–17,³ and among the Palestinian Jews in a last forlorn hope under the leadership of Bar Kōkabā in A.D. 132–5. It needed hardihood enough for the Palestinian Jews to defy the Seleucid Power in the twenty-fourth year after the Battle of Magnesia; for the loss of prestige which the Seleucid Monarchy had sustained through that defeat at Roman hands had hardly yet come to be felt in Asia Major, east of Taurus, and the latest local Seleucid feat of arms

¹ The newly conscripted native Egyptian phalangites in the Ptolemaic army won—and knew that they had won—the Battle of Raphia for Ptolemy IV Philopator against Antiochus III the Great in 217 B.C. For the part that may have been played by these Egyptian phalangites' mercenary comrades-in-arms in the evolution of the 'ideology' of the Hellenic internal proletariat see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 496–500, below. See further Milne, J. G.: 'Egyptian Nationalism under Greek and Roman Rule' in *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, vol. xiv, parts iii and iv (1928).

² For this lapse of Judaism into militancy see also IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 224–5, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, in the present volume, pp. 657–9, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 120–3, below.

³ An account of this insurrection of the Jewish Diasporā in these three Roman provinces that had once constituted the Ptolemaic Empire will be found in Bell, M. I.: *Juden und Griechen im Römischen Alexandria* (Leipzig 1927, Hinrichs), pp. 36–40. Both the insurrection of A.D. 115–17 among the Diasporā and the insurrection of A.D. 132–5 in Palestine are dealt with in Lagrange, M.-J.: *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris 1909, Gabalda), pp. 305–23.

in Coele Syria had been the triumphant conquest of the province from the Ptolemies in 198 B.C. In the second century before Christ the Maccabees' boldness was rewarded by a temporary military success; but nothing short of an invincible hatred was needed to nerve their successors, three hundred years later, to take up arms for a second and a third time against the omnipotence of Rome, when their first attempt to measure their strength against the Hellenic universal state had drawn upon them Titus's shattering blow. The same reckless fury also moved the semi-Hellenized and highly sophisticated natives of Western Asia Minor to expose themselves to Roman vengeance twice over: first in 132 B.C., when they joined the standard of the Attalid prince Aristonicus¹ upon hearing the appalling news that the last Attalus had bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman People; and for the second time in 88 B.C., when the cities opened their gates to Rome's rebel client-king Mithradates of Pontus, and the citizens took the opportunity to massacre the whole of the Italian business community—to a total, it was estimated, of 80,000 souls²—as a tardy revenge for the Roman filibustering expedition which had plundered Asia Minor, without provocation, just a hundred years before.

The rising of Aristonicus is the connecting link between the outbreaks of the subject Oriental peoples in the conquered provinces and the outbreaks of the imported slaves and the pauperized freemen in the homelands of the Hellenic Society. For slaves and 'mean freemen'³ fought side by side in Aristonicus's rebel band;⁴ and his rising was perhaps inspired by the news of the slave-revolt which had let loose the first of the two great slave-wars in Sicily (*gerebantur circa 135-131 B.C. et circa 104-100 B.C.*).⁵ These two Sicilian outbreaks were perhaps the largest in scale and the longest-drawn-out of the slave-revolts on the western plantations and ranches of the Hellenic World in the Post-Hannibalic Age,⁶ but they were neither the first nor the last of their kind, nor perhaps even the most savage. The series began, in the first decade after

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 507, above; and the present chapter and volume, pp. 179-80; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 692, footnote 2; and V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, vol. vi, p. 351, below.

² Compare the similar wholesale massacre of the Italian business community in the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1183.

³ The phrase may be coined on the pertinent analogy of the 'Mean Whites' in the Southern States of the North American Union.

⁴ Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XIV, chap. 38, p. 646.

⁵ 'As the news' of the outbreak of the first Sicilian slave-war 'spread, slave-revolts flared up everywhere. At Rome a hundred and fifty persons entered into a conspiracy, in Attica over a thousand, and others in Delos and elsewhere.'—Diodorus of Agyrium: *A Library of Universal History*, fragments of Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, § 19. Delos, which was the principal slave-market of the Hellenic World in the second century B.C., was of course on the threshold of the Attalid Kingdom in Western Asia Minor, which was the theatre of Aristonicus's tragic adventure.

⁶ See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 198-9, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 507-8, above.

the temporary restoration of peace between Rome and Carthage in 201 B.C., with an abortive conspiracy of the slaves of the Carthaginian hostages at Setia in 198 B.C.¹ and a rapidly suppressed slave-rising in Etruria in 196.² It was continued in a formidable insurrection of the slave-herdsmen in Apulia in 185;³ and, after a temporary shifting of the scene to Sicily, the climax was reached in the desperate exploit of the runaway Thracian gladiator Spartacus, who ranged up and down the length of the Italian Peninsula—defying the Roman wolf in his very lair—from 73 to 71 B.C.

While in Asia Minor, under Aristonicus's banner, the slaves and the 'mean freemen' made common cause, in Sicily these two wings of the local proletarian forces each went its separate way; and, of the two, it was not the Sicilian slaves, but the Sicilian paupers, who were the more revengeful and the more destructive.

'When Sicily was overtaken by these overwhelming disasters [in the first of the two slave-wars], the Free-Born Proletariat, so far from sympathizing with the victims [i.e. with the murdered slave-owners], actually exulted over them out of resentment at the existing inequalities of wealth and condition. This long-standing resentment was transformed from a painful into a gratifying emotion at the spectacle of magnificence reduced to the level of the misery upon which it had previously looked down with disdain. The most serious feature was that, whereas the [slave] insurgents, who took long and rational views, refrained from burning the farms or injuring the property and the stocks of agricultural produce which they found in them, and did not molest persons devoting their energies to work on the land, the social resentment of the Free Proletariat was, by contrast, so profound that they offered their services against the slaves simply as a pretext for going out into the country and not only pillaging property but burning farms.'⁴

The rancorous resentment against the Hellenic dominant minority which found this ugly vent was not confined to 'mean free' proletarians who were outside the pale of the Roman body politic. Their Roman fellow proletarians who were not only freemen, but were actually citizens of the city-state which was now politically omnipotent in the Hellenic World, were in the still more ironical position of being called 'the lords of the World' without having 'a single clod of earth to call their own', while for them the precious Roman citizenship, which gave their wealthy fellow citizens an invaluable economic 'pull', carried nothing with it but an obligation to 'go to the wars and sacrifice their lives for the sake of other men's wealth and luxury'.⁵ Thus the lot of a 'mean free'

¹ Livy, Book XXXII, chap. 26.

² Livy, Book XXXIII, chap. 36.

³ Livy, Book XXXIX, chap. 29.

⁴ Diodorus of Agyrium: *A Library of Universal History*, fragments of Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, § 48.

⁵ Tiberius Gracchus, quoted by Plutarch in his *Lives of the Gracchi*, chap. 9 (see

pauper who had lost his freehold and had sunk to the position of a casual labourer on the land or an unemployed slum-dweller in the city was still less tolerable for a *togatus* than it was for a citizen of Centuripae or Pergamum; and the Roman pauper's feelings were proportionately bitter. The savagery with which the Roman citizen-proletariat turned and rent the Roman plutocracy in the civil wars, and particularly in the paroxysm of 91-82 B.C., was quite equal to the savagery of a Judas Maccabaeus or a Spartacus; and the most Satanic of all the dark figures that stand out in sinister silhouette against the glare of a world in flames are the Roman revolutionary leaders who had been flung headlong, by some unusually violent turn of Fortune's wheel, out of the *Ordo Senatorius* itself: a Sertorius and a Sextus Pompeius, a Marius and a Catiline.¹

In the desperate outbreaks of which we have given this summary catalogue, the Hellenic internal proletariat displayed a spirit like that of the Lacedaemonian underworld which hungered 'to eat' its Spartiate masters 'alive',² or like that of the Ottoman *ra'iyyeh* on Laconian ground who did succeed in wreaking their vengeance upon their Turkish masters in A.D. 1821, when they massacred every man, woman, and child of the dominant community in the captured fortress of Mistrà. In this spirit the outraged slaves of Dâmophilus repaid the monster in his own coin when at last they had him in their power; the Marians anticipated the worst excesses of the Sullans; and the ferocity of the Jewish Zealots³ was a match for the implacability of the Roman laws of war. In fact, in these orgies of ferocious violence the Hellenic internal proletariat went to the same lengths, in the same direction, as their oppressors the conquerors, wastrels, and hangmen in the Hellenic dominant minority; and this Shiva-like epiphany of the Proletariat, appalling though it may be, is not surprising, when we remind ourselves of the provocation to which it was a retort. It is, however, both

IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 508, above, and V. C (i) (c) 1, Annex, in the present volume, p. 36, footnote 2, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 381, Table VIII, logion (α), p. 414, below).

¹ See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 236-41, below.

² Xenophon: *Hellenica*, Book III, chap. 3, § 11, quoted in Part III. A, Annex III, vol. iii, p. 456, above.

³ Among the Jewish contingent in the Hellenic internal proletariat this spirit of unslaked vengeance found expression for itself in a special genre of literature: the Apocalypse. This genre was in vogue for nearly three centuries, if the critics are right in dating the composition of the Book of Daniel circa 166-164 B.C. and that of the Revelation of Saint John the Divine circa A.D. 93-5. Fragments of an Egyptian apocalypse, closely corresponding to the Jewish Book of Daniel in both content and construction, have now been discovered by our modern Western archaeologists. This Egyptian work seems, like its Jewish counterpart, to have been composed immediately after the local outbreak of the militant Anti-Hellenic revolt of the Proletariat, and, as we have noticed on p. 68, above, this broke out in Egypt some fifty years earlier than in Judaea. It is thus chronologically possible that the Book of Daniel may have been a Jewish copy of an Egyptian prototype (see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 187-8).

astonishing and admirable to find that this was not the only response which was evoked from the Hellenic internal proletariat by the tremendous challenge to which it was subjected. There was also an antiphonal response which was at the opposite extreme of the spiritual gamut; and at this other extremity the internal proletariat not merely attained, but rose far above, the spiritual level which was reached by the altruists in the dominant minority—spurred though these altruists were by pricks of conscience which the proletarians had no occasion to feel, and equipped though they also were with intellectual resources that were quite beyond the proletarians' ken.

We find, in fact, that the outbreaks of violence which we have been recording hitherto were seldom or never the only reactions of the momentary victims to the momentary ordeal. While some of the victims were usually moved to respond to oppression by resorting to force on their own part, there were usually others who met force not by counter-force but by gentleness.¹ Even the frenzied slaves of the monster Dāmophilus had at least the humanity to refrain, in the flood-tide of their vengeance, from returning evil for good—as they showed by the pains that they took to save Dāmophilus's tender-hearted daughter when they were dragging to their deaths the tormenter himself and his equally inhuman wife.² In the semi-legendary Jewish recollections of the ordeal which the Palestinian Jewry had to meet in resisting Antiochus Epiphanes' policy of Hellenizing them by force, the passive resistance, under torture and unto death, of the old scribe Eleazar and of the Seven Brethren and their Mother³ precedes, in the narrative, the militant resistance of the mighty man of valour Judas Maccabaeus.⁴ In the story of the Passion of Jesus the leader's injunction to his companions—'he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one's—'is immediately followed by his 'it is enough' when two

¹ For the ambiguity of this term as it is used in this chapter see V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, pp. 588–90, below.

² [Dāmophilus and his wife Megallis] had a young unmarried daughter of a particularly unspoiled and humane disposition, who invariably did her utmost to intercede for slaves sentenced by her parents to floggings, and to relieve those in chains. Her goodness had won her an intense and universal affection, and on this terrible occasion the gratitude which she had earned enlisted on her behalf the better feelings of her former protégés. No one ventured to lay a violent hand upon her, and her honour was scrupulously respected by all concerned. The most efficient members of the band . . . were detailed to escort her to some relatives at Catana. . . . This was a demonstration that the treatment meted out to the others was not the expression of any innate barbarity in the slaves, but was simply retribution for the wrongs which had previously been inflicted upon them.—Diodorus of Agyrium: *A Library of Universal History*, fragments of Books XXXIV–XXXV, chap. 2, §§ 39 and 13.

³ In Eduard Meyer's view (*Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 161, footnote 2, the latter of these two stories is fabulous but the former substantially historical.

⁴ 2 Maccabees, chaps. vi–vii, in contrast with the remainder of the book.

⁵ Luke xxii. 36.

swords only are forthcoming among all the twelve;¹ and this perfunctory call to arms is finally stultified by the leader's own deliberate refusal to fight when he is on the point of being arrested. At that crucial moment, 'when they which were about him saw what would follow, they said unto him: "Lord, shall we smite with the sword?" And one of them smote the servant of the High Priest and cut off his right ear. And Jesus answered and said: "Suffer ye thus far." And he touched his ear and healed him.'² In the next chapter of the same story the behaviour of Jesus's Apostles, who boldly and obstinately refuse to obey the injunction not to preach, yet offer no physical resistance to the arm of the law, makes a deep impression upon the famous doctor Gamaliel, whose keen eye instantly perceives the striking contrast which the Apostles' behaviour presents to the conventional militancy of the contemporary epigoni of Judas Maccabaeus.

'Ye men of Israel, take heed to yourselves what ye intend to do as touching these men. For before these days rose up Theudas, boasting himself to be somebody, to whom a number of men, about four hundred, joined themselves—who were slain, and all, as many as obeyed him, were scattered and brought to naught. After this man rose up Judas of Galilee, in the days of the taxing, and drew away much people after him. He also perished; and all, even as many as obeyed him, were dispersed. And now I say unto you: Refrain from these men and let them alone. For if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to naught; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it—lest haply ye be found even to fight against God.'³

Here are two responses to an identic challenge which are not only different but are actually contradictory and incompatible. The gentle response is as genuine an expression of the Proletariat's will to secede as the violent response is; for the gentle martyrs who are commemorated in the Second Book of Maccabees are the spiritual progenitors of the Pharisees, and the Pharisees are 'they who separate themselves'⁴—a self-conferred title which would trans-

¹ Luke xxii. 38. For the origin of this incident see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 528, below.

² Luke xxii. 49-51. See V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 392 and 527-8, below.

³ Acts v. 35-9. For the movement of which this Theudas and Judas were representatives, see Lagrange, M.-J.: *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris 1909, Gabalda), pp. 10-27; Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 402-6; von Gall, A.: *Βασιλειαν Θεού* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), pp. 375-6. As a matter of history, Theudas' insurrection was not precedent to Judas', but was subsequent both to it and to the date (*circa* A.D. 30) at which, in the Acts of the Apostles, Gamaliel's speech is represented as having been delivered.

⁴ The Greek word *Φαρισαῖοι* represents the Aramaic 'Perishaye'. According to Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 284, the most probable explanation of the name is that 'it sprang from some particular political occasion, in fact from the events of the year 163 B.C., in which the Pharisees did separate themselves from their previous allies, the followers of Judas [Maccabaeus]. In etymology and history alike, the Pharisees are reminiscent of the Kharijites, i.e. "the Withdrawers", who, in the civil war between 'Ali and Mu'awiyah, renounced their allegiance to 'Ali and withdrew from his camp, because their religious

late itself into 'secessionists' or 'schismatics' in the official language of an Antiochus and a Titus—or indeed of a Jannaeus and a Herod. Here are two alternative ways of shaking the dust of the agora and the arena off the puritan's feet; but both ways cannot be followed at once; and in the history of the Oriental proletariat of the Hellenic World from the second century B.C. onwards we see Violence and Gentleness striving for the mastery of souls, until Violence annihilates itself and leaves Gentleness alone in the field.¹

The issue was raised at the outset; for the gentle way which was taken by the protomartyrs of 167 B.C. was swiftly abandoned by the impetuous Hasmonaeans; and this proletarian 'strong man armed's' immediate material success—tawdry and ephemeral though it was—so dazzled Posterity that Jesus's most intimate companions were scandalized at their Master's own predictions of his fate, and were prostrated when these predictions came true. At the first warning, Peter² began to rebuke him—'saying: "Be it far from thee, Lord. This shall not be unto thee"'³—and at the hour of decision the same Apostle was so demoralized by the order to put up his sword again into his place, after he had just struck the first and last physical blow in the conflict, that he actually perpetrated the thrice repeated denial of his Master which, a few hours before, he had indignantly scouted, as something quite incredible, when he had been warned that this was how he would behave. 'Though I should die with thee, yet will I not deny thee'; and 'likewise also said all the disciples'.⁴ Yet, as soon as Jesus ordered Peter to sheathe his sword, 'then all the disciples forsook him, and fled'.⁵ The way of Gentleness seemed to be confuted once for all in the crucified Jesus—'unto the Jews a stumbling-block, unto the Greeks foolishness'⁶—yet a few months after the Crucifixion Gamaliel was already taking note of the executed leader's miraculously rallied disciples as men who might prove to have God on their side; and a few years later Gamaliel's own disciple Paul was preaching a crucified Christ.

This vastly painful but infinitely fruitful conversion of the first generation of Christians⁷ from the way of Violence to the way of

scruples made them reject both the two opposing claimants as criminals from whom they wished to keep the cause of Islam clear and uncontaminated'. For the subsequent conflicts between the Pharisees and the Hasmonaeans see Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 306–11.

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, pp. 588–90, below.

² Peter's slow conversion from the way of Violence to the way of Gentleness is discussed further in V. C (i) (d) 1, pp. 392–3, below.

³ Matt. xvi. 21–6; xvii. 22–3; xx. 17–28, with the corresponding passages in the other two Synoptic Gospels.

⁴ Matt. xxvi. 35.

⁵ Matt. xxvi. 56.

⁶ 1 Cor. i. 23 (see V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, pp. 150 *seqq.*, below).

⁷ The earliest direct evidence for this conversion is to be found in the canonical epistles of the New Testament. For the relevant passages, exhorting slaves to obey their masters and subjects to obey their rulers, see V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, p. 590, below.

Gentleness had to be purchased at the price of a shattering blow to their material hopes; and what was done for Jesus's followers by the Crucifixion was done for Orthodox Jewry by the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. By that time Christianity had spread beyond the bounds of Palestine so far and wide among the internal proletariat of the Hellenic World that the infant church was in no danger of being overwhelmed by the annihilating catastrophe which now overtook its homeland. In A.D. 70 the Jewish Christian Church in Jerusalem was already eclipsed by the Greek Christian Church in Antioch, the former capital of the Hellenizing Seleucids. But the warning, placed in Jesus's mouth in the Synoptic Gospels,¹ that the Christians in Judaea should flee into the mountains when they saw 'the abomination of desolation'—Hellenic paganism in arms—reappearing on the Palestinian horizon, was spontaneously and unwittingly obeyed by at least one orthodox Jewish doctor.

Before the net of the Roman circumvallation finally closed in upon the devoted Holy City, Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai independently took the momentous decision to break with the tradition of militancy which Judas Maccabaeus had inaugurated. Eluding the vigilance of the Jewish Zealots, he slipped across no-man's-land and prevailed upon the Roman High Command to let him through in order that he might quietly continue his teaching out of earshot of the battle; and, when the tidings of the inevitable catastrophe eventually reached him in the Hellenized Philistine township of Jabneh,² where he had reassembled his school, and the disciple who brought the bad news exclaimed in anguish: 'Woe to us, because the place is destroyed where they make propitiation for the sins of Israel', the master answered: 'My son, let it not grieve thee; we have yet one propitiation equal to it, and what is that but the bestowal of kindnesses?—even as it is written "I desired kindness and not sacrifice"'.³ In act and word Johanan ben Zakkai was proclaiming his conversion from the way of Violence to the way of Gentleness; and through this conversion he became the founder of a new Jewry which has survived—albeit only as a fossil⁴—in all manner of alien and inclement environments down to the present day, and which shows no signs of succumbing to its present tribulations. The secret of this latter-day Jewry's extraordinary survival power lies in its persistent cultivation of the *éthos* which Johanan ben Zakkai has bequeathed to it. After the lessons of

¹ Matt. xxiv. 15-28 = Mark xiii. 14-23 = Luke xxi. 20-4.

² *Hellenic Jamnia*.

³ Burkitt, F. C.: *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses* (London 1914, Milford), p. 8, footnote 1, and Lagrange, M.-J.: *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris 1909, Gabalda), p. 302, both quoting from *Aboth de R. Nathan*, ch. 4.

⁴ For Jewry as a fossil see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35; I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285-6, above.

A.D. 70 and 135¹ a new school of Judaism renounced 'the notion that the Kingdom of God was an external state of things which was just upon the point of being manifested'.² With the signal but solitary exception of the Book of Daniel, the apocalyptic writings in which the Jewish way of Violence had found literary expression since the days of Antiochus Epiphanes were now ejected from the canon of the Law and the Prophets;³ and the contrary principle of abstaining from all attempts to promote the fulfilment of God's will in This World by the work of human hands has become so fast ingrained in the Jewish tradition that the strictly orthodox *Agudath Israel* at this day look askance at the Zionist movement and are holding rigidly aloof from any participation in the work of building up a material Jewish 'national home' under a British mandate in post-war Palestine.⁴

If this change of heart in Orthodox Jewry since the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 has enabled Jewry to survive as a fossil, the corresponding change of heart in the companions of Jesus after the Crucifixion has opened the way to greater triumphs for the Christian Church. The Christians had come unscathed out of the local catastrophe which the militancy of the Jewish Zealots had brought upon Jewry; and, although the Christian Faith was soon officially proclaimed a *religio non licita*, the Imperial Government's standing policy during the first two centuries of the Christian Era was not to force the issue.⁵ Accordingly, during this 'Indian Summer' of the Hellenic Civilization's decline, the persecutions which the Christians had to suffer were intermittent and sporadic; and the Church was not summoned to drink the cup, or to be baptized with the baptism, of its Founder and Master⁶ till the third century, when the whole Hellenic World relapsed into the Ishmaelitic state of anarchy that had afflicted it during the last two centuries B.C.,⁷ and when a Decius and a Valerian and a Diocletian set out to deal with an oecumenical Christian Church⁸ as an Antiochus Epiphanes had dealt in the second century B.C. with the local Jewish community in Judaea. To this challenge the Christian Church responded in the gentle way of Eleazar and the Seven

¹ The failure of Bar Kōkabā (see p. 68, above) confirmed the victory of Johanan ben Zakkai's school (von Gall, A.: *Bavileia tou Θεου* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), pp. 279-80).

² Burkitt, op. cit., p. 12. See further the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 9 (y), vol. vi, pp. 124-9, below.

³ Burkitt, op. cit., p. 9.

⁴ For the *Agudath Israel* see Leonard Stein in Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 376-7. For the deeper difference of attitude that underlies the superficial agreement between the *Agudath Israel* and the school of Johanan ben Zakkai on the negative point of Non-Violence, see Annex III to the present chapter, pp. 588-9, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (y), vol. vi, pp. 127-8, below.

⁵ For the variations in the application of the Roman Government's policy towards the Christian Church in this age see V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), in the present volume, pp. 456-7, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 201-2, below.

⁶ Matt. xx. 22.

⁷ See IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 8, footnote 2, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 205-6, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 291, below.

⁸ See V. C (i) (d) 3, pp. 407-9, below.

Brethren, and not in the violent way of Judas the Hammer; and its reward was the conversion of the Hellenic dominant minority. In the next ordeal, which came at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries when the converted Roman Empire broke up, the Church responded once again in its traditional fashion; and this time its reward was the conversion of the barbarian war-bands with whom it found itself face to face in the fallen Empire's derelict Western provinces.¹ In an age in which the hollow futility of the secular *Fasti Triumphales* engraved in stone on the Capitol was being mercilessly exposed by the ultimate military and political bankruptcy of the Roman body politic, the Church was given the opportunity to celebrate some of the most astonishing of the triumphs of Christian Gentleness. Through this power which worked so mightily upon the men of violence, just because it was of a different order from the force which they exercised and understood, we see a Pope Leo turning back an Attila from his march on Rome when he had already reached the banks of the Mincio from the banks of the Danube and had demonstrated upon Rome's daughter Aquileia the atrocities which he intended to inflict upon Rome herself. We see a Saint Severinus coming to the rescue of Upper Danubian provinces that had been deserted by the Imperial Army and the Imperial Civil Service, and going about his Master's business—defenceless, intrepid, and unscathed—*inter gladios barbarorum*: making Gibuld king of the Alemanni tremble in his presence as he had never trembled in battle; deterring Fera king of the Rugians from carrying into captivity the refugees of Lauriacum; and giving his blessing to the young Odovacer.² And we hear the voice of a Saint Remi answering a Clovis' request for baptism with his 'Mitis depone colla, Sicamber'.³

Thus in the spiritual history of the Hellenic internal proletariat we see the two incompatible spirits of Violence and Gentleness

¹ See I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-1, above. This victory of the Christian Church over the barbarian war-bands during the post-Hellenic interregnum was not won in every part of the field. While in the Western provinces the barbarian intruders were duly converted from the Arianism and the paganism that they had brought in with them (see V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 227-33, below), the outcome, as we have seen, was different in the Greek and Oriental provinces. In the Greek provinces the barbarians were successfully kept at bay, first by a prolongation of the Empire's life and afterwards by its artificial resuscitation; and the Church was then turned into a department of state by the civil power of the East Roman *Imperium Redivivum* (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 346-53, with Annex II, above). In the Oriental provinces the Catholic Christianity which overcame the Arian heresy of the Goths and Lombards in the West was overcome by the Muhammadan heresy of the Arabs, because the 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire in these provinces, which had been established by the Primitive Muslim Arab barbarian invaders, was quickly called upon to play the quite different role of re-establishing the social unity of the Syriac World within the political framework of a 're-integrated' Syriac universal state which took up the interrupted work of the Achaemenian Empire (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 73-8, above).

² Eugippius: *Vita Sancti Severini*, chaps. 1, 19, 31, and 7.

³ Gregory of Tours: *Historia Ecclesiastica Francorum*, Book II, chap. 31.

perpetually struggling with one another, and Gentleness,¹ with the aid of Experience (*πάθει μάθος*),² gradually and painfully gaining the upper hand.

As soon as we grasp the plot of this 'post-classical' Hellenic drama, we see that it is not played exclusively on the proletarian stage; for there are at any rate hints of it in the spiritual history of the Hellenic dominant minority as well. The contrast between an Eleazar the Scribe and a Judas the Hammer, or between a Jesus who dies on the Cross and a contemporary Theudas and Judas who perish with the sword, has its analogue in the contrast between the gentle King Agis and the violent King Cleomenes in the third century B.C. at Sparta, or between the gentle Tribune Tiberius Gracchus and the violent Tribune Gaius Gracchus³ in the second century B.C. at Rome. The recalcitrance of Peter against Jesus's superhuman resignation to the prospect of being wrongfully put to death is anticipated, in the generation of the breakdown at Athens, in Crito's attempt—less brusque in manner than Peter's but not less naïve in essence—to persuade Socrates to allow himself to be smuggled out of the prison where he is lying under a death-sentence that he has not deserved. Again, the victory of Gentleness over Violence in the souls of a Peter and a Paul and a Johanan ben Zakkai has its parallels in the vision of an Alexander⁴ and in the clemency of a Caesar⁵ and in the penitence of an Augustus.⁶

These eight famous representatives of the Hellenic dominant minority whose names have just been called to mind by the analogies which they present, in their actions and in their *êthos*, with as many famous representatives of the Hellenic internal proletariat, include, in the Athenian Socrates, the father of all the schools of Hellenic philosophy,⁷ and, in the Roman Augustus, the founder

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, pp. 588-90, below.

² Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, line 177, quoted in I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 169, footnote 1; II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 298; IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, p. 218; and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 584, above; and in V. C (i) (d) 4, in the present volume, p. 416, footnote 3, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 275, below.

³ In the extant portrait of Gaius Gracchus there are some incongruous traits which testify to a different presentation in which Gaius, instead of serving as a violent foil to a gentle hero in the person of his brother Tiberius, was himself cast for the gentle part, and was provided with a violent foil in the person of Marcus Fulvius Flaccus. Conversely, in the extant portrait of Jesus, there are traces of a different presentation in which he was cast for the violent part and not for the gentle one (see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 378, below).

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 6-10, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 254, below.

⁵ Caesar's tardy clemency could not, of course, repair the damage that had previously been inflicted upon a miserable world by his pertinacious and devastating ambition. For the toll taken by Caesar's militarism in Gaul see Conway, R. S.: *Makers of Europe* (Cambridge, Mass. 1931, Harvard University Press), pp. 15-16; for the toll taken by it in the civil war between Caesar and the Roman Republicans see the present study, V. C (i) (a), vol. vi, pp. 186-7, below.

⁶ See V. C (i) (d) 5, p. 435, V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 648, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 187, below.

⁷ Philosophy in contrast to Physical Science—a study which had been pursued in

of the Hellenic universal state. These two great creative works of the Hellenic dominant minority are monuments, as we have seen,¹ of the labours of the altruists whom this minority bred at the opposite extreme of the spiritual gamut from its conquerors and wastrels and hangmen. If it is true, as we have suggested, that the Hellenic internal proletariat not only matched the destructiveness of these three villainous dominant types with its own proletarian brood of rebels and avengers, but also, at the opposite extreme, rose far above the spiritual level of the altruists, then we must look for signs of this higher attainment in the shape of proletarian creative works which correspond to the schools of philosophy and to the universal state but surpass these in fruitfulness as well as in sublimity; and we shall not look for these signs in vain; for the things that we are seeking stare us in the face. Among the works of the Internal Proletariat the counterparts of the philosophies are 'higher religions',² while the counterpart of the universal state is a universal church.³

Hellas since the days of Thales, more than a century before Socrates' time, and which had been consciously and deliberately abandoned by Socrates himself in his youth (see III. C (i) (c), vol. iii. pp. 186-7, and V. C (i) (c) 1, in the present volume, p. 39, footnote 2, above.

¹ In V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 38-40, above.

² The religions which arise, during the disintegrations of civilizations, within the bosoms of internal proletariats constitute a distinct species within the genus; and some specific name has to be found to distinguish them from the primitive religions which hold the field, not only in the primitive societies, but also in those civilizations which—like the Hellenic Civilization itself—are not affiliated to an antecedent civilization through an internal proletariat, but are either affiliated through an external proletariat or else are derived from some primitive society direct, through a mutation (for the alternative ways in which a civilization may arise, see I. C (ii), vol. i, and Part II. A, vol. i, above). In contrast to the primitive religions, it seems legitimate to distinguish the religions discovered by internal proletariats as 'higher religions'; for a primitive religion is merely one expression, among many, of the corporate life of some local human community, whereas a 'higher religion' is the worship of a Godhead that is conceived of as transcending the whole of human life as well as the whole of the Material Universe. Our term, however, would probably be contested, as question-begging, by the devotees of Shinto in contemporary Japan and of the 'Nordic' Neo-paganism in contemporary Germany, who would agree with one another in holding that the tribe is the tribesman's spiritual absolute, and that therefore the worship of the tribe is the highest form of religion that a human being can have. This is, perhaps, the most crucial question that our Western Society will have to answer in our generation. (The difference between the two kinds of religion here in question has been pointed out by Monsieur Henri Bergson in *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 198: 'La première forme de la religion avait été infra-intellectuelle...; la seconde fut supra-intellectuelle. C'est en les opposant tout de suite l'une à l'autre qu'on les comprendrait le mieux'.)

³ Of course this analogy, like all analogies, reveals no more than a likeness-in-difference. The 'higher religions' do resemble the philosophies in being attempts to find a new way of spiritual life to replace a lost or ruined spiritual heritage; and universal churches do resemble universal states in being social institutions that are constructed in order to gather together under the common shelter of a single roof the scattered children of a society that is far gone on the road from breakdown towards dissolution. There is also, up to a point, an analogy in the relation between each of the two ways of life and the respective social institution that goes with it; for, if the Catholic Church is inconceivable without Christianity, it would also not be difficult to show that Augustus could never have founded the Roman Empire if Socrates and Plato and Antisthenes and Zeno and Epicurus had not previously inoculated with their philosophies the souls of that dominant minority from which Augustus eventually recruited his public servants. At this point, however, the analogy gives out; for this relation between Greek philosophies and the Roman Empire was, in spite of its importance, imperfect. The Roman

In the Hellenic case in point the universal church was the Catholic Christian Church (which became the official church of the Hellenic universal state in the course of the fourth century of the Christian Era);¹ and the victorious 'higher religion' was the Christianity which the Catholic Church embodied. But while there was not—and could not be—more than one church that won its way to universality in the single social field of the Hellenic World, the victorious religion was victor over a bevy of discomfited competitors.

The direct opponent of Christianity was the primitive tribal religion of the Hellenic Society in its latest guise: the idolatrous worship of the Hellenic universal state in the personality of a Divus Caesar or in the abstraction of a Dea Roma.² It was the Church's gentle but intransigent refusal to allow its own members to practise this idolatry, even in a merely formal and perfunctory way, that drew upon it a series of official persecutions and finally compelled the Roman Imperial Government to capitulate to a spiritual power which it had failed to coerce.³ But, though this primitive state-religion of the Roman Empire was maintained and imposed with the whole strength of the Imperial Government's right arm, it had little hold over human hearts.⁴ The conventional respect for it which the Roman magistrate commanded the Christian to show by the performance of an outward ritual act was the beginning and end of this state-religion. There was nothing more in it than this

Empire was not created by Augustus, *de toutes pièces*, for the express purpose of embodying his *Pax Augusta*. It was an historic 'going concern' which he had to take as he found it and to adapt as best he could to his own ends; and the Augustan adaptation was a *tour de force*, for this Roman Empire which was turned by Augustus into an instrument of Peace was actually the child of War: the offspring of 'knock-out blows' which one of the five Great Powers of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World had dealt to the other four. The reason why the *Pax Augusta* eventually broke down was because the Empire was never quite purged of its original sin of Militarism (see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 197-8, below). The dutiful civil servants and soldiers who kept the Empire in being as an instrument of the Augustan Peace were the heirs of those conquerors and wastrels and hangmen who had cleared the ground for it by razing a multitude of older and finer buildings; and these ancestors' criminal impulses sometimes broke out again, disconcertingly and disastrously, in the souls of their contrite successors. The spiritual union between Greek philosophy and Roman imperialism was never complete—not even when the Imperial throne was occupied by a Marcus or a Julian. The measure of the unresolved discord is given by the manifest spiritual discomfort of each of these two philosopher-kings. This unsatisfactory relation between Stoicism or Neoplatonism, as the case may be, and the Roman Empire is utterly different from the relation between Christianity and the Church; for, although the Church may actually never yet have expressed Christianity to perfection, there is at least no inherent impediment here to the attainment of a perfect harmony, since the Church has been called into existence for this purpose and for no other.

¹ The official establishment of the Catholic Church in the Roman Empire was a gradual process, which was begun by Constantine the Great (*imperabat* A.D. 306-37) and was completed by Theodosius the Great (*imperabat* A.D. 378-95), after an Arian interlude under Constantius II (*imperabat* A.D. 337-61) and a pagan reaction under Julian (*imperabat* A.D. 361-3).

² See I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 443, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, in the present volume, pp. 648-50, below.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 347-9, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. vi, pp. 648-50, below.

for those non-Christian citizens of the Empire who performed as a matter of course what was demanded and who could not understand why the Christian insisted upon sacrificing his life rather than comply with a trivial custom. The rivals of Christianity which were formidable in themselves—through a native power of attraction which needed no backing of coercive political force—were neither this state-worship nor any other form of primitive religion, but a number of rival 'higher religions' which sprang, like Christianity itself, from the Hellenic internal proletariat.¹

We can conjure these rival 'higher religions' up by reminding ourselves of the various sources from which the Oriental contingent in the Hellenic internal proletariat was derived. The Christian religion was a contribution from a submerged Oriental people of Syriac antecedents: the Jewish community whose home was in Coele Syria. Syria, however, as we have seen, was only a fraction of the Syriac World in its ultimate extension. We have observed in other contexts how, as an accidental consequence of its breakdown and disintegration, the Syriac World eventually came to embrace Iran.² Did the Iranian as well as the Syrian wing of a thus expanded Syriac Society contribute a 'higher religion' to the Hellenic internal proletariat? The question is answered in the affirmative in the rise and spread of Mithraism, which was an Iranian-born counterpart of a Syrian-born Christianity. This Mithraism was not only Christianity's next of kin: it was also perhaps the most potent of all the 'higher religions' with which Christianity had to compete. The weaker competitors were all alike non-Syriac,³ though they were diverse in genius and in origin. The worship of Isis was contributed⁴ by the submerged northern half of the Egyptian World.⁵ The worship of the Anatolian Great Mother Cybele may perhaps be regarded as a contribution from a Hittite Society which by this time had long been extinct on every plane of social activity except the religious⁶ (though, if we set ourselves in earnest to trace the Great Mother back to her ultimate

¹ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 215-16, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79-82; II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 137-8; III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 140-1, above.

³ For the question whether Manichaeism—which was another Syriac 'higher religion' of partly Iranian origin—has to be reckoned among the competitors of Christianity for the conquest of the Hellenic World, or whether, on the other hand, it has to be classed with Nestorianism and Monophysitism as one of several alternative attempts to purge a Syro-Hellenic religious syncretism of its Hellenic alloy, see the present chapter, p. 127, footnote 4, with Annex I, pp. 575-80, below.

⁴ Isis proved strong enough to insist upon being given legal domicile in Rome, in spite of a strenuous and long-sustained resistance on the part of the public authorities, in the course of the half-century ending in 43 B.C. (Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, 2nd edition, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 125-6).

⁵ For the permanent political partition of the Egyptian World, from the seventh century B.C. onwards, at the line of the First Cataract, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 116-17, above.

⁶ For the Hittite Society and its early death see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 110-15, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 108-12, above.

origins, we shall find her originally at home in the Sumeric World under the name of Ishtar,¹ before ever she established herself as Cybele at Pessinus² or as the Dea Syra at Hierapolis or as the Mother Earth of remote Teutonic-speaking worshippers at her grove on a Holy Island in the North Sea or the Baltic³).

A Minoan Lacuna and some Hittite Vestiges.

Having now studied the genesis of one internal proletariat, and taken an inventory of its works,⁴ in the concrete example that is

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 112, footnote 2, above.

² For the translation, in 204 B.C., from Pessinus to Rome, of the black stone in which the numen of the Pessinuntine Cybele was lodged, see Livy, Book XXIX, chaps. 10, 11, and 14, and the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 685-8, below.

³ For a description of this distant emanation of the worship of Cybele-Ishtar see Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. 40. For the radiation of the worship of Ishtar from a Sumeric centre see the present chapter of this Study, pp. 147-52, below.

⁴ The reader will have noticed that the worship of the Sun has not been mentioned in our catalogue of 'higher religions' arising in the bosom of the Hellenic internal proletariat, while the worships of Cybele, Isis, and Mithra, as well as Christianity, have been included. The omission has been deliberate; for the revolutionary cult of *Ἡλιος ἐλευθέριος*, which can be detected in the romance of Iambulus and in the *émeute* of Aristonicus (see the present chapter, pp. 69 and 179-80, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 692, footnote 2; and V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex, vol. vi, p. 351, below), seems to have been stamped out in the repression of the internal proletariat's abortive attempts to make a social revolution in the last phase of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles', while the would-be conservative cult of Sol Invictus that is so prominent in the religious history of the Hellenic World in the third century of the Christian Era was not one of those popular religions that the internal proletariat discovered for itself. It was in a different category from the other Oriental 'higher religions', and in the same category as the Oriental philosophy of Astral Determinism (see V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 56-7, above), by reason of the facts that it was an abstract and artificial religion; that its discoverers and devotees were members of the dominant minority; and that it was propagated from above downwards and not from below upwards. This was the nature and history of the Sun-worship that was affected by Aurelian and by Constantius Chlorus—and also by Constantius's son Constantine the Great until he abandoned Sol for Christ (see Baynes, N. H.: *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church* (London 1929, Milford), pp. 8 and 95-103). This Hellenic Imperial cult of Sol Invictus in the latter part of the third century of the Christian Era is strictly analogous to the Egyptian Imperial cult of the Solar Disk which was invented by Ikhnaton (and the parallel is an admirable illustration of that uniformity of human nature which sometimes produces surprisingly similar results in similar situations where there can be no suspicion of any connecting link of historical tradition). The third-century Roman Emperors—convinced, by the harrowing experience of their generation, that political institutions required spiritual sanctions and that 'philosophy' was 'not enough'—were now attempting to re-inforce the official Caesar-worship, which was coeval with the Empire itself, and the unofficial Stoic philosophy, on which their own immediate predecessors in the second century had managed to live, with a semi-official Solar religion which was (they fondly hoped) to become a religious link between the dominant minority of the Hellenic World and a now once again militantly hostile proletariat. This artificial religious policy failed—as it was bound to fail—because it had nothing substantial to offer to either of the two parties to whom it was addressed. For the dominant minority Sol Invictus could not provide the 'spiritual vitamins' (if the phrase may be allowed) which Zeno had failed to give them, while for the proletariat the offer of Sol Invictus in place of Magna Mater or Isis or Mithras or Christ was the offer of a stone for bread. In a later chapter of this Study (V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 649-50 and 691-4, below) we shall observe that the fiasco of the cult of Sol Invictus, like the fiasco of Atonism, is an example of a general 'law' to the effect that, while a 'higher religion' can be discovered by an internal proletariat and be communicated by it to a dominant minority, an attempt to reverse the direction of the movement condemns this spiritual commerce to sterility and frustration.

The cult of Sol Invictus must, of course, be distinguished from an entirely different form of Sun-worship which a third-century Roman Emperor of an earlier generation had attempted to thrust upon his subjects by an abuse of political power that presents a sharp contrast to the tact and moderation of his successors who were advocates of Sol Invictus. This other Solar religion was the historic local Sun-worship of the Syrian

offered by the history of the disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization, let us do again what we have done in our foregoing study of dominant minorities. Let us test, by making a survey, whether the phenomena which have thus presented themselves in a single case are unique and therefore of little account or regular and therefore significant. Have the disintegrations of other civilizations besides the Hellenic been accompanied by the Secession of an Internal Proletariat? If they have, has this Internal Proletariat been recruited, in these other cases too, from the same three sources: that is to say, from disinherited members of the Dominant Minority and from partially disinherited alien subject peoples and from doubly disinherited subject-alien deportees? Again, do we find such other internal proletariats responding to an identic challenge of oppression in the two alternative and contrary ways—the violent and the gentle¹—which we have learnt to distinguish in our study of the Hellenic example? And, if the gentle way has been followed by oppressed proletarians in other cases as well, has it led, here too, to the birth of 'higher religions' and to the establishment of universal churches?

In attempting to give a comprehensive answer to this set of questions, we shall find ourselves hampered by the fact that, *ex hypothesi*, the Secession of the Internal Proletariat takes place in the obscurity of an underworld, and that the history of its genesis and of its early growth is apt to be ignored and left unrecorded by the cultivated men-of-letters in the Dominant Minority, while the nascent Proletariat itself is ill equipped for keeping its own records at this momentous early stage of its career.² Thus we often find ourselves in the dark about a proletariat's history until this proletariat bursts out of the subterranean twilight in which it has been born into the broad daylight which plays upon the surface of social life; and the very fact that it has risen to the surface means that a proletariat is already near, or at, its prime by the time when it thus comes into view. This difficulty besets us even when we

city of Emesa (a duplicate of the more famous neighbouring Sun-worship of Heliopolis-Ba'lbak) which was momentarily given precedence over all other worship in the Roman Empire by the whim of Varius Avitus Bassianus—the hereditary High Priest and namesake of this Syrian divinity Elagabalus—during his short tenure of the Imperial throne under the impudently assumed name of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (*imperabat* A.D. 218–22). For the contrast between the respective worship of the Sun as Elagabalus and as Sol Invictus, see Wissowa, G.: *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, 2nd edition (Munich 1912, Beck), pp. 365–8. The Emesan form of Sun-worship might perhaps claim to be a proletarian religion, but it certainly could not claim to be a 'higher' one. All the same, Aurelian, in the course of his campaign against Zenobia in A.D. 272, did visit the shrine of Elagabalus at Emesa, make offerings and dedicate temples to the god, and hold himself indebted to Elagabalus for the victory of Roman over Palmyrene arms (Homo, L.: *Essai sur le Règne de l'Empereur Aurélien (270–75)* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing), p. 101).

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, pp. 588–90, below.

² For the transmuting effect of the waters of the stream of 'Folk-Memory' see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 438–64, below.

are dealing with a disintegrating civilization which, like the Hellenic, has bequeathed to us a legacy of literature; and it still haunts us when we are able not merely to spell this literature out but also to recapture the living thoughts and feelings which the dead words were framed to express. The difficulty is accentuated when we have to depend upon mere fragments of literatures that have been recovered by the modern Western archaeologist's spade without there being any sensitive link of continuous tradition between our lives and those of these long-buried and quite forgotten writers. *Inter enim iectast vitae pausa*¹—and this breach of vital continuity will baffle us in grappling with the Egyptian and Sumeric and Hittite and Babylonian civilizations, notwithstanding the marvellous ingenuity of our scholars in deciphering their scripts. We shall find ourselves baffled still more cruelly by scripts which we have not yet succeeded in puzzling out, and which, for all we know, may be so rudimentary that, even if we could read the riddle, we should merely have gained a knowledge of statistics without having come any nearer to being initiated into the writers' ideas; and this is our predicament when we gaze at the Minoan 'linear script'² and at the Mayan pictograms and at the knotted cords of an Andean *quipu*. In trying conclusions with civilizations as elusive as these, we may be driven to confess that we are not only entirely unable to trace the genesis and growth of an internal proletariat, but that we cannot even guess at the existence or non-existence of such a thing by inference from the presence or absence of the Internal Proletariat's characteristic works, since in some of these cases we shall find that we cannot even say whether there is a trace, or no trace at all, of a 'higher religion' and a universal church.

Did a universal church, or anything like it, take shape during the disintegration of the Mayan or the disintegration of the Minoan Civilization? In the Mayan case we have had to be content with an inconclusively negative answer.³ In the Minoan case our eye has been caught by the tantalizing glimmer of a possibility that the vestiges of something which might be called a Minoan universal church may be preserved among the heterogeneous constituents of the historic Orphic Church which makes its appearance in Hellenic history from the sixth century B.C. onwards.⁴ We cannot, however, be positively certain that any of the practices and beliefs of Orphism, as we know these from Hellenic literature and inscriptions,

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 860-1.

² See V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), p. 491, footnote 3, below.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 127, above.

⁴ On this question see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 95-100, above. M. P. Nilsson (*Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion* (London 1927, Milford), p. 512) inclines to the view 'that Crete actively contributed to the religious revival in the Archaic Age' of Hellenic history.

derive from any of the practices and beliefs of the Minoan religion, as we have to reconstruct these by inference from such Minoan material evidence—in the shape of ecclesiastical furniture and frescoes and vase-paintings depicting religious subjects—as the accidents of archaeological discovery have placed in our hands. So far from bearing indubitable testimony to the existence of a Minoan 'higher religion' and universal church, the appearance of Orphism on the Hellenic scene in the sixth century B.C. may, for all that we know, be more correctly interpreted as presumptive evidence that a Minoan 'higher religion' never came to birth. The existence of such a thing is not conclusively proved by the presence in Orphism of Cretan elements such as the myth of 'the Cretan Dionysus' (the child-god who is wickedly slain and whose slayers are the source of Man's original sin, while the sacrament of eating his body is the key to Man's salvation). On the other hand there are undoubtedly other elements in Orphism which are strongly reminiscent of contemporary Syriac religion and Indic philosophy.

Like Yahweh, and unlike Zeus, the Orphic God Phanes is a creator;¹ and the Orphic personified abstraction 'Ageless Time' (*Χρόνος Ἀγήραος*) has his double in the Zoroastrian 'Endless Time' (*Zrvān Akarana*)—the likeness extending to the grotesquely monstrous details of the visual form in which this strange divinity is presented.² There is an equally unmistakable Indic flavour about the Orphic doctrines that the Universe is an egg;³ that the body is a tomb (*σῶμα σῆμα*) in which a soul is imprisoned as a punishment for sin that has been committed in previous incarnations;⁴ that the punishment is recurrent in a cycle of rebirths from which the soul can never escape so long as there is any debit-balance against it in an account of sin and punishment which runs on through successive births and deaths; but that there does exist a way of escape which brings 'release from the circle and relief from evil'.⁵ The Orphic theology pictures the purified soul, which has obtained its release from the circle at last, as being permitted forthwith for the first time to drink a draught from the Lake of Memory,⁶ in reward for its virtue and in token that its labours are at an end; and this

¹ Guthrie, W. K. C.: *Orpheus and Greek Tradition* (London 1935, Methuen), p. 106.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 86-7, and Boulanger, A.: *Orphée* (Paris 1925, Rieder), p. 55. In Guthrie's opinion (*op. cit.*, pp. 76-8), which is followed here, the Orphic scriptures in which this grotesque figure is described give us a substantially authentic account of the original Orphism of the sixth century B.C. On the other hand Boulanger (*op. cit.*, pp. 53-9) contends that these scriptures reflect an Alexandrian Neo-Orphism of the second century B.C. and after, and that this differs *toto coelo* from the sixth-century original.

³ For the vogue of this idea in the Indic Mythology see Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), p. 87.

⁴ Guthrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-8.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-71.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

picture will remind us of Siddhārtha Gautama's legendary experience of recollecting all his previous incarnations at the moment when he attains the enlightenment of Buddhahood.¹

These Indic and Syriac features in Orphism are unmistakable, and the resemblances are too close to be dismissed as accidental. We have therefore to see in Orphism a 'syncretistic' religion; and we have also to take into consideration the probability that this intricate texture of Orphism is not the undesigned product of Time and Chance. It bears on its face the signs of being the deliberate artifice of a small band of creative individuals² who wove it, at one weaving, from a variety of materials that they picked out as apt for their purpose.³ The result of these theological labours was a 'book religion' in which right belief was accounted more important than correctly performed ritual;⁴ and, in the light of all this, we shall probably come to the conclusion that it is a rather far-fetched explanation to interpret Orphism as an effort to preserve or recapture a Minoan religious tradition which had survived the post-Minoan interregnum and had not been quite trampled out of all recognition by the barbarous Achaean usurpers of the derelict Minoan heritage.

It seems more natural to see in Orphism an effort to fill a fearful spiritual void which desolated the heart of an adolescent Hellenism just because no higher religious heritage had been transmitted to the Hellenes from their Minoan predecessors.⁵ We can well imagine that a sensitive Hellenic soul might become suddenly and painfully conscious of this void in the sixth century B.C.—partly because by that time the Hellenic Civilization had risen high enough above an Achaean barbarism to look down upon Olympus with mingled feelings of horror and contempt, and partly because at that very moment the political union, under the *Pax Achaemenia*, of all South-Western Asia, from the Hellenic coast of Ionia to the

¹ If the Orphic Lake of Memory is the source of Socrates' theory of *anamnesis*, then we can perhaps trace back one runnel of the stream of Hellenic philosophy to an Indic fountain-head.

² Guthrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 107, 120, 123. For the untoward effects of this apparently artificial origin upon the subsequent fortunes of Orphism see the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, pp. 697-8, below. On the other hand, Boulanger (*op. cit.*, p. 45) submits that 'ce serait méconnaître complètement [la] nature [de l'orphisme] que de s'imaginer qu'il a pu sortir tout armé du cerveau d'un initiateur de génie. Il n'y a pas à l'origine de ce mouvement, comme à l'origine du pythagorisme, une puissante personnalité.' The uncertainty of our knowledge of Orphism is illustrated by the direct contradiction between this judgement of Boulanger's and that of Nilsson on the same point. In Nilsson's view (*op. cit.*, p. 511) 'Orphism is a speculative religion created by a religious genius, at least in its most vital doctrines'.

³ Guthrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 106, 110, 116, 194-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 155, 204, 213.

⁵ For the intellectual precocity which, in the abortive Scandinavian as well as in the primitive Hellenic culture, was perhaps the consolation prize for the lack of a 'higher religion' in the new nascent civilization's social heritage, see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 355-7, above.

Indic borderland in the Panjab, had suddenly opened the treasure-house of Syriac religion and Indic philosophy to any Hellene who cared to enter in and help himself to these spiritual riches.¹ This explanation of the origin of Orphism seems, on the whole, to be the more convincing of the two alternatives; and, on this showing, we shall have to confess that, after all, we have no knowledge at all of a Minoan universal church and therefore none, *a fortiori*, of a Minoan internal proletariat.²

We know next to nothing, again, about the internal proletariat of the Hittite Civilization, which perished, as we have seen, at an unusually tender age.³ We can only say that the wreckage of the Hittite Society which survived the great catastrophe at the beginning of the twelfth century B.C. seems gradually to have been assimilated by the Hellenic Society in part and in part by the Syriac, so that we must look to the histories of these two alien societies for any vestiges of the Hittite body social. We have already caught a doubtful glimpse of a Hittite dominant minority in the shapes of prince-prelates presiding over Anatolian temple-

¹ 'Il n'est pas invraisemblable que, par l'intermédiaire de l'Iran, l'Ionie ait pu connaître la doctrine hindoue de la migration des âmes et lui emprunter les formules que l'orphisme a rendues célèbres' (Boulanger, op. cit., p. 45). A hint of the active circulation and collision of ideas which was taking place within the Achaemenian Empire by the end of the sixth century B.C. is given to us in the Herodotean story—legendary though this may be in itself—of how Darius the Great (*imperabat* 522–486 B.C.) amused himself by confronting the Greeks at his Court with the Indians and provoking each of the two parties in turn to express their horror at the other party's customary method of disposing of their parents' corpses. For their mutual edification, what each party said about the other's custom was translated into the latter party's language by the Court interpreters (Herodotus, Book III, chap. 38). Compare the theological disputation at the Court of the Mongol Khāqān Mangū at Qaraqorum in A.D. 1254, as described in chapter 51 of the journal of a Flemish friar of the Franciscan Order, William of Rubruck (English translation in Komroff, M.: *Contemporaries of Marco Polo* (London 1928, Cape)). For the similar appetite of the Emperor Akbar for the comparative study of Religion see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 699–704, below.

² If Orphism is not the creation of a Minoan internal proletariat, it cannot strictly be described as a proletarian product, since the religious experience of the Syriac internal proletariat, upon which it appears to draw, has been drawn upon at second hand, while its Hellenic creators can hardly be counted as members of a Hellenic internal proletariat which, *ex hypothesi*, cannot have come into existence until after the breakdown of the Hellenic Society about a hundred years later (assuming that this breakdown is to be equated with the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War). The self-conscious, academic, bookish element in Orphism is certainly alien from the proletarian religious ethos as we know it in the classical examples. At the same time it is interesting to find the reviewer of Mr. Guthrie's book in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* (vol. IV, part 2 (1935), p. 260) recommending 'the addition of one important point' to Mr. Guthrie's account of the Orphic religion:

'Orphism was a creation of the lower orders of Greek Society. Hence, among other things, its patronage by the House of Peisistratus, in accordance with the usual tyrants' policy of favouring the unprivileged classes. Probably, if all facts were known, we should find that Pythagoreanism was its aristocratic, and therefore more philosophic and reasoned, counterpart—much though that system, at least in its more popular forms, undoubtedly owed to beliefs and practices of a comparatively primitive type.'

If this is the truth, then Pythagoreanism stands to Orphism as the post-Socratic schools of Hellenic philosophy, from Platonism to Neoplatonism inclusive, stand to the worship of Cybele and Isis and to Mithraism, Christianity, and the Mahāyāna.

³ For the early death of the Hittite Civilization see I. C (i) (b), vol. I, pp. 93 and 114; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. IV, pp. 108–12, above.

states¹ and oligarchies governing Etruscan city-states² during the last millennium B.C. The Etruscan aristocracy—whose Hittite origin seems probable, though unproven—undoubtedly gained admittance into the ranks of the Hellenic dominant minority; and we may perhaps espy the vestiges of a Hittite internal proletariat in the Cappadocian temple-serfs.³ Such vestiges, however, must remain unauthenticated unless and until our historical evidence increases; and, even if they did prove to be authentic, they would still remain mere curiosities of history. For every piece of Hittite flotsam and jetsam which may have risen to the surface of an alien civilization in a distant age,⁴ we may be certain that a thousand pieces were for ever submerged.

Changes of Masters.

In this respect the history of the Hittite wreckage, obscure though it is, throws a glimmer of light upon the common fate of all civilizations which have undergone in their disintegration the Hittite experience of being devoured by some alien civilization or civilizations before the disintegration-process has run its full normal course from breakdown to dissolution. Since we have come to suspect expansion of being a symptom of disintegration,⁵ we may assume, as a working hypothesis, that a society which is successfully expanding at a disintegrating neighbour's expense is itself likely to be already in disintegration, and is therefore probably divided already against itself into a dominant minority and a proletariat of its own. In such circumstances the alien elements which the aggressive society devours will be assimilated either to its internal proletariat or to its dominant minority; and the pro-

¹ For these temple communities, which were economic 'estates' and political 'states' at the same time, see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 422, footnote 3, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 471, above.

² For the probable Hittite origin of the Etruscans see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 114-15, with Annex II, 2; II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 85-6; and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 109, footnote 2, above.

³ 'À la fin de chaque guerre, le roi hittite ramène des pays conquis un butin d'hommes, de bétail et d'objets précieux. Les déportés ainsi transplantés en Hatti sont en majeure partie répartis dans les villes, dans les districts à repeupler, dans les propriétés des temples, avec un statut spécial et des droits limités; d'autres sont incorporés dans l'armée; d'autres, enfin, réduits en esclavage au profit des seigneurs et des guerriers' (Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, Renaissance du Livre), p. 184).

⁴ If we are right in regarding Etruria as a Hellenized transmarine asylum of a prematurely shattered Hittite Society, we may perhaps espy a second Etruria in the Taman Peninsula which faces the Crimea across the Straits of Kerch:

'The temples on the Taman Peninsula, as we learn from an inscription of Roman date, were organized like those in Asia Minor, especially those in Pontus, Cappadocia and Armenia: a college of priests or priestesses with a grand priest or priestess at its head; vast domains belonging to the goddess; and serfs working for the goddess and for the priests' (Rostovtzeff, M.: *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford 1922, Clarendon Press), p. 73. Cf. op. cit., pp. 161-2).

⁵ The evidence for this view that expansion and disintegration are correlated with one another is discussed in III. C (i) (α), vol. iii, and in IV. C (ii) (b), *passim*, vol. iv, above, and again in Part IX, below.

letariat is likely to be the receptacle for the majority of these alien recruits, since in conflicts of culture, as in physical warfare, the conquered are seldom admitted to share in the conqueror's privileges.

This *a priori* probability can be tested in the case of our own Western Civilization, which by now has swallowed—and in some degree digested and assimilated—at least eight alien societies: the Mexic, the Andean, the Hindu, the Iranic, the Russian Orthodox Christian, the Japanese Far Eastern, and the main bodies of the Far Eastern and Orthodox Christian societies in China and in the Near East. The number of victims rises from eight to ten if we reckon in the Yucatec and Arabic societies, which their Mexic and Iranic neighbours had respectively succeeded in devouring on their own account before these two gorged beasts of prey were preyed upon in their turn and disappeared down our Western Society's all-devouring throat.¹ Out of all these multitudes of alien souls that have thus been incorporated into the Western body social in the Modern Age, what elements have found their way into the dominant minority of our modern Western World? Apart from Cortez's Tlaxcalec allies in Mexico, whose treaty-rights to equality with the new masters of the Mexic World were respected by the Spanish Crown till its own rule in Mexico came to an end in A.D. 1821, we cannot call to mind more than two drafts of alien recruits which the Western dominant minority has admitted into its own ranks. These two are the governing class of a Muscovite Empire which sought and obtained admission to the comity of Western states at the close of the seventeenth century, and the governing class of a Japanese Empire which followed this Russian example in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Both these contingents of *novi homines* have been weak in numbers; and the Russian contingent has already proved weak in social stamina as well, for in our generation it has been swept out of existence by a shattering revolution. When we look into the present social condition of a more recently Westernized Japan, we shall find ourselves wondering whether the Westernized masters of Japan, who are still in the saddle to-day, may not be destined to-morrow to follow in Russian footsteps for a second time by going through the Russian experience of A.D. 1917. If we do live to see a Westernized Japanese governing class share a Westernized Russian governing class's fate, then

¹ At our first encounter in this Study with the Iranic Civilization (in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 67-70) and with the Mexic Civilization (in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 119 and 123-4) we happened to come across both of them at a stage at which they had already devoured their respective sister civilizations; and accordingly, at first view, we had in either case the illusory vision of a single civilization—the 'Islamic' and the 'Central American'—in a field in which the presence of a pair of civilizations—the 'Iranic' and 'Arabic' and the 'Mexic' and 'Yucatec'—was revealed by further analysis.

we shall have seen the whole 'man-power' of ten disintegrating civilizations absorbed—with all previous social distinctions now confounded and effaced—into the gigantically swollen internal proletariat of the single civilization of the West.

The fate which has overtaken these ten victims of Western expansion in our own age, as well as the Hittite Society before them, suggests that it is not at all unusual for a disintegrating civilization to be devoured by a neighbour before its disintegration is complete. And this is, indeed, what we should expect *a priori*; for, while on the one hand the process of disintegration may be favourable to expansion, it is evident that on the other hand it may also expose a society to becoming the target and victim of attack instead of being the aggressor and the profiteer. A 'house divided against itself shall not stand';¹ and while it may be capable of burying the adjacent buildings under its own ruins if it is left alone to collapse, it will be quickly demolished by the house-breaker if he comes upon the scene and decides to anticipate the leisurely work of Time. A dominant minority is particularly vulnerable to assault from an alien power because it is itself already an alien power in the eyes of its subjects. A moral alienation from the Dominant Minority is the essence of what we mean by the 'Secession' of the Proletariat. What motive has the Proletariat for sacrificing itself, at its momentary master's call, in order to save his mastery for him and thereby condemn itself to remaining in servitude to this particular master instead of allowing his place to be taken by another who may perhaps turn out to have a lighter hand? And even if the Proletariat does prefer its present master—out of fear of the unknown or out of inertia or even out of positive regard for him—is it likely that its servitude will have left it with the spirit and initiative to assert its will, even within this narrowly restricted field of a choice between two alternative yokes?

A test case is the behaviour of the internal proletariat in the Andean universal state when the Spanish *conquistadores* suddenly broke in and challenged the Incas to stand and deliver. The *orejones* were perhaps the most amiable and able dominant minority that any disintegrating society has ever produced; and it seems almost an abuse of words to employ the term 'Proletariat' at all in reference to the conscientiously tended flock of these genuine 'shepherds of the people'.² The docile beneficiaries of a paternal

¹ Matt. xii. 25.

² Both the moral and the technical eminence of the Incas as a dominant minority are revealed in the care which they took to avoid the social evil of 'deracination' (which is one of the most effective efficient causes of an internal proletariat, to judge by the Hellenic example). The Incas were at pains to spare the established local institutions in the conquered territories—although they had absolute power, *de facto* as well as *de jure*, to alter them (Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut

Pax Incaica felt an unqualified veneration for the Incas, and would perhaps even have loved them if they had ever ventured to adopt such a sacrilegiously familiar attitude. Even in the more recently conquered subject communities there seems to have been little discontent and no eagerness for an opportunity to shake off the Grand Inca's rule. The routine of obedience had been so thoroughly inculcated into the people that 'the machine went on working by itself after the mechanic was dead, and we have Ondegardo's testimony for the fact that, after the Spanish conquest, the Indians persisted in the cultivation of the Inca's lands and in the delivery of the crops to the Imperial granaries'.¹ Yet the Inca's submissive subjects were far indeed from being 'a very present help in trouble'² when the Inca, with Pizarro's fangs in his throat, was in desperate need of their loyal and valiant service. We have, no doubt, to allow for the fact that at the moment when the Spaniards appeared on their horizon the mental attitude of the Inca's

d'Ethnologie), p. 62); and it was their policy to leave the hereditary local chiefs (*kuraka*) in office as members of the Incaic official hierarchy (Baudin, op. cit., pp. 119-20); but their anxiety to avoid the evil of 'deracination' is most evident in their methods of redistributing the population of their dominions. While such redistribution was carried out in the Incaic Empire on the grand scale, the cases in which the exchange of populations was made for the political purpose of severing a recalcitrant people's links with its home and its past seem to have been exceptional. Apart from those members of the dominant minority who were planted in the conquered territories as garrisons or supervisors, the great majority of the deportees (*mitimaes*) seem to have been transplanted for economic reasons: either in order to adjust the relative local density or sparseness of population to the relative local scarcity or abundance of the means of subsistence, or else in order to bring some particular kind of human skill—agricultural or industrial—to places where there was a shortage of it and where a larger supply could be employed with economic advantage. These 'economic', as contrasted with the 'political', deportees 'were granted privileges designed to facilitate their resettlement and in particular they were given long terms of exemption from all taxation. They remained under the authority of their own chiefs, and were exempt from the rule of the chiefs of the territory where they were planted. Moreover their fellow-Indians from their home-country used to come and help them at harvest-time and sowing-time.' In some cases the deportees were charged with the duty of keeping their home-country supplied with food and raw materials (e.g. lama-wool); and it became one of the administrative practices of the Imperial Government to couple districts together in pairs—e.g. a cold highland district and a warm lowland district, which might perhaps be a long distance apart—in order that they might make up one another's deficiencies by an exchange of produce. When transfers of population were made between the two districts in a pair of this kind, the deportees had, of necessity, to be exposed to a climate which was different from that to which they were accustomed. On the other hand, when a loyal population was exchanged for a disaffected population as a political measure, care was taken that the loyalists should only be sent to districts where the climate was the same as that of their homes (Baudin, op. cit., pp. 131-6; compare Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), p. 105; Markham, Sir Clements: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), pp. 164-5; Cunow, H.: *Geschichte und Kultur des Inkareiches* (Amsterdam 1937, Elsevier), pp. 58-60).

It will be seen that this scientifically and humanely managed 'internal colonization' in the Incaic Empire was something totally different, both in spirit and in effect, from the Assyrian deportations or from the Roman or modern Western slave-trade. The only people in the Incaic Empire who were both uprooted and enslaved were the *yanakuna*, and these domestic slaves of the Imperial Household, who originated in a band of traitors that had been reprieved from a sentence of death, eventually acquired the powers and privileges of the Ottoman Pādīshāh's *qullar* (Baudin, op. cit., pp. 75-7; Cunow, op. cit., pp. 94-5).

¹ Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 25.

² Psalm xlv. 1.

subjects was confused, and their allegiance divided, by the unprecedented, and therefore profoundly shocking, public calamity of the civil war between Huascar and Atahualpa.¹ This was not, however, the governing factor in the situation. The fundamental cause of the Inca's undoing is to be found in that very belief in his divinity and invincibility which had built his Empire up, and kept it in being, so long as no alien assailant had appeared above the horizon. When these human sheep saw their demigod helplessly defeated, deposed, insulted, and injured, it never occurred to them that they might help him effectively themselves. They were only conscious that their universe had been turned upside-down; and the shock was prostrating and paralysing.² Atahualpa's partisans looked on in horror-stricken passivity while their master was put to death, and the usurper's opponents delivered themselves tamely into his brutal murderers' hands.³

¹ 'On fait grand état du peu de résistance offerte par les Péruviens aux Espagnols, mais... à cette époque les Indiens étaient en pleine guerre civile; ceux du Pérou, dont le souverain légitime Huascar avait été détrôné par le bâtard Atahualpa, regardaient les blancs comme des sauveurs, leur savaient gré d'avoir fait prisonnier cet usurpateur, et leur faisaient fête. Ce sont des Indiens de Cuzco qui ont marché sous les ordres des Espagnols contre les Indiens de Quito. En somme, l'arrivée des blancs n'a été qu'un épisode dans la grande lutte entre les Inka et les Kara... Si les Espagnols étaient arrivés quelques années plus tôt, au moment où régnait Huayna-Kapak, ils n'auraient pas aussi facilement conquis le Pérou... Ajoutons que, sans l'aide des Indiens de Cuzco, jamais les Espagnols n'auraient pu, avec les faibles effectifs dont ils disposaient, soumettre le royaume de Quito.'—Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 209.

It will be seen that Pizarro, like Cortez, was one of Fortune's spoil children. Indeed, his arrival in the Andean World at the moment of the civil war between Huascar and Atahualpa was a far more extraordinary stroke of luck than Cortez's arrival in the Mexic World at the moment of the war between the two city-states of Tenochtitlan and Tlaxcala; for in the Mexic World in its 'Time of Troubles' international warfare was perennial, whereas in the Andean World in its universal state civil warfare was an unheard-of lapse from an established *Pax Incaica*.

² 'Enfin et surtout, en raison même de la centralisation excessive du pouvoir au Pérou, la perte du chef aboutissait à l'anéantissement de l'armée. L'extraordinaire discipline qui régnait dans l'Empire, chez les civils comme chez les militaires, avait à tel point détruit l'esprit d'initiative individuelle que les hommes, n'osaient ou même ne savaient plus agir quand ils n'étaient pas commandés. La preuve en est que les Indiens de l'ancien royaume de Quito, soumis pendant moins de temps que les Péruviens à la puissance de l'Inka, résistèrent vaillamment aux Espagnols... Les Indiens n'étaient point des lâches, mais ils avaient été pendant si longtemps condamnés à une obéissance passive qu'ils n'étaient braves que lorsqu'ils recevaient l'ordre de l'être.'—Baudin, L., op. cit., pp. 209-10.

³ The moral paralysis of the Inca's subjects in face of the Spanish aggressors must not, of course, be exaggerated. The recently subjected population of the *ci-devant* Kingdom of Quito did put up a stout resistance, as is pointed out in the passage quoted from a French authority in the preceding footnote. 'Quant à la débâcle de l'armée d'Atahualpa, dès que celui-ci fut pris par les Espagnols, elle s'explique fort bien. Il y eut d'abord une véritable trahison, car le souverain péruvien recevait les étrangers en amis, sans avoir tenté de les arrêter dans les défilés de la Cordillère, ce qui lui eût été extrêmement facile... Les Péruviens eux-mêmes, quand ils se rendirent compte que les Espagnols détruisaient leurs institutions et dilapidaient leurs biens, trouvèrent parmi eux des chefs énergiques et peu s'en fallut que les blancs ne fussent chassés du plateau.'—Baudin, op. cit., pp. 209-10.

The heroic resistance which was kept up by the Inca 'Die-Hards' in the fastnesses of the Vilcapampa Mountains for some thirty years after the entry of the Spanish *conquistadores* into Cuzco is touched upon, in another context, in V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 213, below.

The last state into which the Andean internal proletariat has sunk since its exchange of indigenous for alien masters has been described at first hand by a practised nineteenth-century English observer:

'The sudden fall of a whole race is an event so rare in history that one seeks for explanations. It may be that not only the royal Inca family, but nearly the whole ruling class, was destroyed in war, leaving only the peasants who had already been serfs under their native sovereigns. But one is disposed to believe that the tremendous catastrophes which befel them, in the destruction at once of their dynasty, their empire, and their religion by fierce conquerors, incomparably superior in energy and knowledge, completely broke not only the spirit of the nation but the self-respect of the individuals who composed it. They were already a docile and submissive people, and now under a new tyranny, far harsher than that of rulers of their own blood, they sank into hopeless apathy and ceased even to remember what their forefathers had been. The intensity of their devotion to their sovereign and their deity made them helpless when both were overthrown, leaving them nothing to turn to, nothing to strive for. . . . The Peruvian subjects of the Incas had reached a state of advancement which, though much below that of the ancient Egyptians and Babylonians, was remarkable when one considers that their isolation deprived them of the enormous benefit of contact with other progressive peoples. . . . The impact of Spanish invasion not only shattered their own rudimentary civilization to pieces, but so took all the heart and spirit out of them that they have made practically no advances during four centuries, and have profited hardly at all by the Western Civilization of their masters.'¹

If this is how the subjects of so good a master as the Inca behaved when this master was being violently and unjustly robbed of his kingdom, we shall not be surprised to see other proletariats accepting or welcoming the overthrow of dominant minorities that have been oppressive in policy or alien in origin or odious on both these accounts at once. We have observed in other contexts² how readily the exploited peasantry of East Central Anatolia, who had been saddled with the burden of the East Roman Government's imperialism, 'turned Turk' upon the advent of the Saljūq Muslim invaders in the eleventh century of the Christian Era. *A fortiori* in India, from the morrow of the death of Awrangzīb to the eve of the Indian Mutiny, the Hindu *ra'iyeh* looked on as harassed yet nevertheless passive and indifferent spectators while the alien Muḡhal Rāj was crumbling away and the likewise alien British Rāj was being erected on its derelict site. We discern the same indifference

¹ Bryce, James: *South America: Observations and Impressions* (London 1912, Macmillan), pp. 114-15 and 481-2.

² In IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 74-5, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (g), vol. iv, pp. 398-9, above.

in the passivity with which the Egyptians accepted the substitution of an alien Macedonian for an alien Achaemenian régime in 332 B.C., ten years after the Achaemenian reconquest¹ had put an end to an interlude of national independence in Egypt and had thereby banished from the field of practical politics the only political prospect that could awaken any enthusiasm in Egyptian hearts.²

The Babylonians' attitude towards the contest for imperial dominion between their alien Achaemenian masters and the alien Macedonian competitors of the Achaemenidae was more positive than the Egyptians' attitude and was to that extent still more conducive to a change of alien régime. The Babylonians did not merely accept Alexander with a cynical resignation as just another Darius in Hellenic costume: they welcomed him with open arms as a liberator—in the spirit in which, some two hundred years earlier, Darius's predecessor Cyrus had likewise been welcomed in Babylonia by Jewish deportees³ to whom the yoke of the Neo-Babylonian Empire of Nebuchadnezzar and Belshazzar had been as grievous as the yoke of the Achaemenian Empire was afterwards felt to be by the dethroned descendants of the Jews' Babylonian oppressors when these oppressors were condemned, by the turn of Fortune's wheel, to receive for themselves the measure which they had formerly meted out to others.⁴ For the Jewish victims of a Babylonian dominant minority in the sixth century B.C. and for the Babylonian victims of a Persian dominant minority in the fourth century B.C. the change of alien masters almost wore the appearance of a 'dayspring from on high' which had come 'to give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death'.⁵

These examples make it evident that, whatever the spirit may be in which a subject population greets a change of masters—whether it naïvely proclaims the dawn of a new era or mutters 'plus ça change plus c'est la même chose'⁶ with a sceptical shrug of the shoulders—the eviction and replacement of one dominant minority by another can very easily take place in any society that has once come to be divided against itself by that schism between Dominant Minority and Proletariat which is a symptom and a

¹ For the reconquest of Egypt in 343–2 B.C. by Artaxerxes Ochus see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 245, footnote 4; V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207; V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 302; and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 442, below.

² In the mental realm of 'folk-lore' the Egyptians seem to have reconciled themselves to living under the Macedonian régime by transmuting Alexander the Great into an Egyptian national hero (see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 441–4, below).

³ For the Jewish attitude towards Cyrus see 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22–3; Ezra i. 1–4; Isa. xlv. 28, and xlv. 1–4.

⁴ For the Babylonians' attitude towards the Achaemenian régime see further the present chapter, p. 123, with footnote 2; V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 347–8; and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 442, below.

⁵ Luke i. 78–9.

⁶ Karr, Alphonse: *Les Guêpes*, January 1849.

penalty of social disintegration. We have dwelt on this point because it is another obstacle with which we have to cope in our survey of internal proletariats. For if a disintegrating civilization is apt to have its term of independence curtailed through being eaten up by some neighbour, we are evidently likely to be baffled, in attempting to follow out the history of this or that internal proletariat, by finding our specimen suddenly incorporated into an alien body social before it has had time to bring forth its own particular fruits. This heavy mortality among disintegrating civilizations may perhaps provide the social anatomist with richer materials for study when he essays to dissect some great voracious shark—a monster such as our own Western Society has come to be in its latter days—which has swept together into its insatiable belly the half-digested remains of a shoal of smaller fry; but, by the same token, the dissection of the shark-society's victims is manifestly bound to be an inordinately difficult business if we can only recover their mortal remains in this half-masticated condition. In such adverse circumstances we must be content if we can identify an organ or trace the development of a function here and there when we are dealing with disintegrating societies whose careers have been thus cut short.

The Japanese Internal Proletariat.

Some clear tokens of the secession of an internal proletariat can be discerned in the history of the disintegration of the Far Eastern Society in Japan, which had run through its 'Time of Troubles' and entered into its universal state before the Western Society swallowed it up.

If we are looking, for instance, for counterparts of those citizens of the Hellenic city-states who were uprooted by the series of wars and revolutions which began in 431 B.C., and who found a disastrous outlet and livelihood as mercenary soldiers, we shall observe an exact parallel in the *ronin*, or masterless unemployed men-at-arms, who were thrown off, during the Japanese 'Time of Troubles', by a feudal anarchy. The parallel extends to details; for Hideyoshi's abortive attempt to conquer Korea and China, like Alexander's successful conquest of South-Western Asia and Egypt, may be interpreted as an expedient for turning these formidable vagrants' arms against an alien body social. Again, the *Eta* or pariahs who survive as outcasts in the Japanese Society of the present day may be accounted for as a still unassimilated remnant of the Ainu barbarians of the Main Island of the Japanese archipelago, who, during the 'Time of Troubles', were forcibly incorporated into the Japanese internal proletariat by the arms of the

wardens of the North-Eastern marches,¹ as the barbarians of North-Western Europe and North-Western Africa were incorporated by Roman arms into the Hellenic internal proletariat during the corresponding phase of the disintegration of the Hellenic Society. In the third place we can discern Japanese equivalents of those 'higher religions'—Christianity and Mithraism and the worships of Isis and Cybele—in which the Hellenic internal proletariat sought and found its final and most effective response to the challenge of the tribulations which it had to endure at the hands of a dominant minority.

In the history of the disintegration of the Far Eastern Society in Japan the corresponding religions² were Jōdo ('Pure Land'), which was founded in A.D. 1175 by Hōnen Shonin (*vivebat* A.D. 1133–1212); the Jōdo Shinshū ('True Sect of Jōdo'), which was founded by Hōnen's disciple Shinran (*vivebat* A.D. 1173–1262); the Hokke ('Lotus Sect'), which was founded by Nichiren (*vivebat* A.D. 1222–82); and the Zen, which was an adaptation of the Chinese Ch'an³ and was introduced from China into Japan by Eisai (*vivebat* A.D. 1141–1215) and Dōgen (*vivebat* A.D. 1200–53). It will be seen that, if we have been right in dating the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan *circa* A.D. 1156–85,⁴ the founders of these four religions all belong either to the generation which came of age at the moment when the Japanese 'Time of Troubles' set in, or else to one or other of the two generations immediately following; and we have positive evidence that *post hoc* does signify *propter hoc* in this case. On the one side the founders themselves were conscious of having been born into a 'Time of Troubles'. Already in the Heian Age, which was the autumn of the exotic Far Eastern culture's brief *floruit* on Japanese soil, the Amidist Mahayanian theologian Genshin (*vivebat* A.D. 942–1017) had declared that 'the fateful days' had 'arrived';⁵ and Nichiren believed himself to be living in the Age of Mappō ('the Destruction of the Law').⁶ On

¹ The Japanese 'Time of Troubles' was inaugurated and precipitated by this conquest and incorporation of the barbarians in the no-man's-land beyond the north-eastern marches (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 158–9; III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 144–5; and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 94, above; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 208, below).

² See Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. i (London 1910, Kegan Paul), pp. 439 and 477–8.

³ This Chinese name Ch'an is derived from a Sanskrit word Dhyāna, meaning 'meditation'; but there appears to be no evidence that the special theory and discipline that were held and practised in China under this name were not an original product of the Far Eastern genius. (On this point see Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 329, and Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Japanese Buddhism* (London 1935, Arnold), p. 285.)

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 94, above.

⁵ Anesaki, M.: *History of Japanese Religion* (London 1930, Kegan Paul), p. 170.

⁶ Nichiren articulated the history of Buddhism into three millennia running from the Buddha's death (which, in the Far East, was reckoned to have occurred in 947 B.C.): first the Age of Shōbō ('the True Law' of the Hinayāna); second the Age of Zōbō

the other side the ground-down peasants and the Spartanly disciplined soldiers to whom the founders of the new religions were addressing themselves were hungry for spiritual food. 'Many minds are turning to religion' is the opening phrase of a tract¹ which Nichiren published in A.D. 1260; and this diagnosis was borne out by the multitude of the converts which each of these new religions won within its founder's lifetime.

These religions of the Japanese internal proletariat resemble those of the Hellenic internal proletariat in being of alien inspiration. All four are variations on the theme of the Mahāyāna; three of the four (i.e. all but Nichiren's creed) had been conceived in the main body of the Far Eastern World, on the continent, before they were adopted and adapted by Japanese apostles for Japanese use; and the two apostles who transplanted the Zen both started operations by making a pilgrimage to China to study their subject in its native setting, in accordance with a precedent which had been set by earlier Japanese divines who had sought to acclimatize other schools of the Mahāyāna in Japan at the time of the original reception of the Far Eastern Civilization. When we compare them, however, with these predecessors of theirs in 'the Nara and Kyoto Period' of Japanese history, we shall find that the characteristic note of the great religious geniuses of 'the Kamakura Period'² is not their receptiveness but rather their vein of originality. In the forms in which it had been introduced into Japan in that earlier age, the Mahāyāna, like the Far Eastern Civilization itself, had been a hot-house plant which had never struck root in Japanese soil or acclimatized itself to the Japanese air. While it had nominally been accepted by all the Emperor's subjects *en masse*, it had never been seriously practised, and indeed never properly comprehended, outside a narrow circle round the Imperial Court; and the people at large had gone on walking in the ways of the primitive paganism of the Japanese 'Times of Ignorance'.³ This paganism, however, no longer sufficed to satisfy the common people's spiritual needs when the glass-house which had hitherto sheltered the exotic culture collapsed in ruins, and when this cultural catastrophe spread social devastation far and wide. In its disastrous downfall the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan at last made an impact upon the masses whose life it had scarcely succeeded in affecting during its

('the Image Law' of the Mahāyāna); third (beginning *circa* A.D. 1053) the Age of Mappō ('the Destruction of the Law'). See Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Japanese Buddhism* (London 1935, Arnold), pp. 277-8 and 424-5.

¹ Quoted in Eliot, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

² For this periodization of Japanese history see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 158-9, above.

³ At this stage the Japanese paganism was accommodated to the Mahāyāna by the formal identification of this or that Japanese *numen* with this or that Bodhisattva (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 528, footnote 2, below).

brief age of artificial and precarious prosperity. The onset of a 'Time of Troubles' turned these masses into a proletariat in sore need of spiritual salvation; and the founders of the four new Japanese religions rose to the height of this critical occasion by offering their people the spiritual bread of the Mahāyāna in forms plain enough for them to manage to digest it.

This provision of a simplified Mahāyāna as a substitute for a primitive paganism was the essence of these Japanese apostles' work; and in consequence that work presents itself in diverse aspects, which differ almost to the point of being mutually contradictory, according to the standards by which we appraise it. If we compare these apostles' teachings—and this is the more apposite comparison—with the primitive paganism which, in fact though not in theory, had continued to be the religion of the common people in Japan until these simple forms of Buddhism were brought within their reach—then we shall see Jōdo and Jōdo Shinshū and Hokke and Zen as so many new 'higher religions'. On the other hand, if we compare them with the sophisticated forms of the Mahāyāna that had been cultivated in Japan by a small *élite* since the sixth century of the Christian Era, and *a fortiori* with the Chinese originals of these Japanese copies, then we shall see in the new Japanese religious mass-movements of 'the Kamakura Age' not a notable advance from paganism but a lamentable relapse, in the religious field, into the barbarism which was at this time unquestionably regaining the upper hand over the exotic Far Eastern culture in other departments of Japanese life. This second view is not untrue, but it is neither the whole truth nor, perhaps, the most significant part of it.

If the work of the Japanese apostles of 'the Kamakura Age' was in one sense an *œuvre de vulgarisation*, this was at least the deliberate act of noblemen and scholars who were not, themselves, either vulgar or ignorant. Hōnen was the son of a provincial official of the Imperial Government; Shinran and Dōgen were the sons of blue-blooded dignitaries of the Imperial Court; and even Nichiren's father, who was a fisherman in a then outlandish eastern province, was said to have been a man of good family who had been banished to this obscure corner in punishment for some political offence. Again, Hōnen, Shinran, Nichiren, and Eisai all spent years of study in the famous monastery of the 'high-brow' Tendai sect on Mount Hiei, overhanging the old Imperial capital of Kyoto, before they ventured to formulate and proclaim new personal messages of their own. What moved them all to break away from an esoteric tradition, and to address themselves to the people at large in terms which simple minds could understand, was a

realization, through their own experience and intuition, that the exotic Chinese forms of Buddhism which were cultivated on Hieizan could no more avail to satisfy a down-trodden Japanese peasant's soul than the exotic Chinese system of government which was practised at Kyoto could avail to keep the Japanese countryside in order. The anarchy let loose by the breakdown of an artificial régime which had never been suitable to Japanese social conditions had been brought home to Hōnen as an eight-years-old child by a poignant personal experience¹ which became the starting-point of his spiritual career. The boy's father, when dying of a mortal wound received in an attack on their home by a band of brigands, had adjured his son to forgo the vendetta which was laid upon him by the conventional code of his class, and to become a monk instead. After duly mastering the traditional lore and practice of the Tendai school of the Mahāyāna, Hōnen eventually 'demonstrated his zeal by abandoning all his former attainments and devoting himself exclusively to faith in the grace of the Buddha'.² Hōnen and his fellow apostles had a deep feeling for the sufferings of their generation, and they strove to find a way of salvation that would be open to all Mankind.

This eagerness to reach and help all sorts and conditions of people is the key to almost every aspect of these Japanese prophets' preaching and practice. Hōnen, Shinran, and Nichiren all threw open the gates of salvation to women by teaching that they too, as well as the other sex, were capable of ultimately attaining Buddhahood.³ In the Zen school the principal difference between Eisai and his successor, Dōgen, is to be found not in their doctrine or in their practice but in the public to which they respectively addressed themselves. While Eisai's 'influence was limited to monks and nobles, . . . Dōgen made every effort to avoid contact with men of high rank'.⁴ The Zen, which in China had been cultivated by recluses, became in Japan (like Mithraism in the Roman Empire) the religion of the soldiers. And in the Japan of 'the Kamakura Age' the soldiers, peasants, and women, between them, vastly outnumbered the courtiers, monks, and scholars.

In addressing themselves to this immense and unsophisticated public, the new teachers adopted the appropriate technique and tactics. For instance, they wrote (those of them who did write) not in Classical Chinese, but in the Japanese vernacular, and they conveyed this in a comparatively simple script.⁵ (The Zen School were not troubled by any literary problem, since they eschewed

¹ Recounted in Anesaki, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-2; Eliot, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

² Anesaki, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

³ Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 327.

⁴ Anesaki, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

⁵ Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

all scriptures and put their whole trust in austerity and intuition.) Again, while both Hōnen and Shinran sat in Kyoto and waited for disciples to find their way to them—until the Government forced both these sedentary apostles into the mission-field by banishing them to distant provinces¹—Nichiren started his ministry by making a round of missionary journeys, and when he reverted to stability he planted himself, with a man of action's eye, not in the old Imperial capital at Kyoto, from which the power had now departed, but in the neighbourhood of Kamakura, which was the head-quarters of the new military régime of the Minamoto Shogunate and the Hōjō Regency. From this point of vantage Nichiren propagated his doctrine by popular preaching in public places. Eisai and Dōgen each in turn settled in Kyoto after coming home from China and each in turn left Kyoto after having given it a trial. Eisai finally gravitated, like Nichiren, to Kamakura, while Dōgen founded a monastery in the province of Echizen.

It was not enough, however, for these preachers of salvation for all Mankind to put themselves into contact with their public in print or in person. If they were to make certain of being 'understood of the people', their doctrine itself must be brought within the people's mental range; and, while the Zen school differed from the rest in making the pursuit of salvation strenuous, they all agreed in depreciating the value of sheer intellect.

The theory of the Zen was that the enlightenment which was its aim could not be attained either through reading scripture or through listening to a teacher, but only through introspection; and this introspection could not arrive at its goal—which was the attainment of enlightenment in a sudden flash of intuition—except through an ascetic spiritual self-discipline. In this indispensable preparatory training the aspirant after the enlightenment of the Zen was thrown almost entirely upon his own spiritual resources; and it was only by hints and nudges that his spiritual director could help him to grope his way through the darkness towards the light.² This way of salvation attracted 'simple soldiers' because it was at once morally difficult and intellectually easy.³ The schools which appealed to a civilian public—to 'the man in the street' and to the woman in the paddy field—were concerned

¹ Hōnen and Shinran both eventually returned to Kyoto in order to die there, but Shinran had spent more than twenty years in the provinces in the interval, though his sentence of banishment had been revoked after he had passed four years in compulsory exile.

² The attitude of the master towards the pupil in the Zen school of Buddhism would appear to resemble very closely that which Plato has described as being his in a passage (Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341 B-E) quoted in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 245, above.

³ The Zen was, in fact, a way of transferring the soldier's activity from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm without changing its ethos (see Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 484-5). In the Kwanto the Zen Buddhist clergy followed the path of secularization to the length of abandoning celibacy (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 482-3).

to make salvation easy in the intellectual and in the moral sense alike; and these schools all found their clue in salvation by faith.

For the Jōdo and the Jōdo Shinshū the subject of this faith was the Bodhisattva Amida (i.e. Amitabha)¹; for the Hokke—which in this respect stood at the opposite pole from the Zen—the object was not a person but a scripture: the Lotus Sutra from which this school derived its name. Already, before the breakdown, Genshin had proclaimed that

'We, the weak and vicious people of the "Latter Days", could not be saved but by invoking the name of the Lord Amida.'²

And this message of salvation by faith in Amida was taken by Hōnen as his principal theme.

'There may be millions of people who would practice [Buddhist] discipline and train themselves in the way of perfection, and yet in these latter days of the Law there will be none who will attain the ideal perfection. Consider that it is now an age full of depravities. The only way available is the Gateway to the Land of Purity.³ . . . There shall be no distinction, no regard to male or female, good or bad, exalted or lowly; none shall fail to be in His Land of Purity after having called, with complete desire, on Amida.'⁴

This concern to make salvation easy almost at all costs—in reaction against the esoteric note of Japanese Buddhism in a preceding age which had ended so disastrously—produced not altogether happy results. Nichiren, who attacked the Jōdo vehemently, nevertheless agreed with Hōnen in virtually reducing the believer's whole duty to the repetition of a spell which was supposed to enshrine the quintessence of the object of faith by invoking that object's name. Hōnen's formula was *Namu Amida Butsu* (abbreviated to *Nembutsu*), meaning 'Adoration to the Buddha of Infinite Life and Light';⁵ Nichiren's was *Namu Myōhō-Renge-Kyō*, meaning 'Adoration to the Lotus of Perfect Truth'; and it was for him 'not a mere oral utterance but a real embodiment of the truths revealed in that book.'⁶ . . . To utter the "Sacred Title" was, according to Nichiren, the method of at once elevating oneself to the highest enlightenment of Buddhahood.⁷ This expedient

¹ Eliot, op. cit., pp. 392-3, draws a parallel between the attitude of the Shinshū towards Amida and that of the Hindu Shaivas and Vaishnavas towards Shiva and Vishnu. The Shinshū can, of course, be traced back to the same Indic-proletarian origins as the worship of the two Hindu deities. For the Jōdo conception of Amida's Paradise see V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, p. 164, footnote 3, below.

² Quoted by Anesaki in op. cit., p. 170.

³ Quoted, from Hōnen's tract *Senchaku-shū*, by Anesaki in op. cit., p. 171.

⁴ Quoted, from Hōnen's *Catechism in Twelve Articles*, by Anesaki in op. cit., p. 174.

⁵ Anesaki, op. cit., p. 173.

⁶ The Lotus Sutra lends itself to this treatment, since its twenty-first chapter is devoted to spells (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 556, footnote 2, below).—A.J.T.

⁷ Anesaki, op. cit., pp. 192-3.

promised to bring salvation within all men's reach at the price of transmuting a sublime philosophy into a rudimentary kind of magic.¹ And this intellectual retrogression had its moral counterpart in a relaxation of the rules of conduct. Shinran, who deprecated Hōnen's insistence upon the value of 'vain repetitions', was led to differ on this point from his master not because he was intellectually sceptical about the efficacy of 'spell-binding', but because he suspected such magical 'works' of being symptoms of a lack of faith in the all-sufficing grace of Amida. On the same ground Shinran deprecated 'any scruple about sins or depravities'; and—regarding celibacy, in this light, as 'a sign of lack of absolute trust in Buddha's grace'—he practised what he preached by discarding his monkish habit and tonsure, marrying a wife, and begetting children, 'in order to "give a living testimony" . . . that the secular life of common people was no obstacle to salvation'.²

While the Jōdo, Jōdo Shinshū, and Hokke schools were thus all at one in seeking, at almost any price, to make salvation morally as well as intellectually easy, they were by no means uniform in their ethos; and in this aspect they display our now familiar contrast between the gentle and the violent reaction of an internal proletariat, the gentleness of the Japanese soul being incarnate in Hōnen, and its violence in Nichiren. Hōnen 'was a man of meek temper and responsive heart, and in this respect he represented the heritage from the culture of the preceding age, while he was a typical pioneer of the new age in his aspiration for the salvation of all'.³ On the other hand, 'Nichiren's religion represented in many respects the robust spirit of Eastern Japan which had always been in revolt against the ritualism and sentimentalism of the aristocratic Buddhists of Miyako [Kyoto]', and 'his appeal found an easy acceptance among the virile warrior classes⁴ and the earnest peasants of the eastern provinces'.⁵ Nichiren denounced Hōnen in unmeasured terms⁶ as a heretic and a decadent. In a 'Treatise on the Establishment of Righteousness and the Peace of the Country' (*Risshō Ankoku Ron*) which he presented to the Hōjō Regent at Kamakura in A.D. 1260⁷ he laid it down that killing

¹ For an analogous transmutation of Hellenic philosophy in the third to fifth centuries of the Christian Era, and of Sinic philosophy in the age of the Han, see V. C. (i) (d) 6 (8), pp. 553-68, below.

² Anesaki, op. cit., pp. 182-4.

³ Ibid., p. 171; cf. Eliot, op. cit., pp. 266-7.

⁴ It is noteworthy that, while the Zen religion appealed to soldiers at least as strongly as Nichiren's, the Zen was nevertheless free (except for the eccentric Fukeshū or Komusō variant of it, which became fashionable among *rōnin* and outlaws: see Eliot, op. cit., p. 285) from that vein of violence which was characteristic of Nichiren's personality, conduct, teaching, and school.—A.J.T.

⁵ Anesaki, op. cit., p. 204.

⁶ See the passage quoted in Eliot, op. cit., p. 277.

⁷ See p. 97, footnote 1, above.

heretics was no murder, and that it was the duty of the Government to extirpate heresy with the sword.¹ And he condemned as heretical every Japanese school of the Mahāyāna except his own. While waiting (as it proved, in vain) for the Government at Kamakura to comply with his demand that the Hokke should be erected into the exclusively authorized and officially established religion of Japan, Nichiren intervened in the tumultuous politics of his world and age with all the vigour and self-assurance of the Prophets of Israel and Judah in the Babylonian 'Time of Troubles'.² He prophesied correctly, eight years before the menace became imminent, that Japan would be invaded by the Mongols, and incorrectly,³ when Qubilay's envoys duly arrived to demand the payment of tribute, that Japan would succumb to the formidable invader unless the Government adopted the prophet's own creed as the national religion.⁴

In view of this attitude and behaviour, it is not surprising that Nichiren should have been perpetually at loggerheads with the public authorities and that on one occasion he should have come within an ace of losing his head. It may seem more remarkable at first sight that the exponents of Zen and of Amidism, including the gentle Hōnen himself, should likewise have suffered persecution. The truth perhaps is that the gentle as well as the violent prophets who arose in Japan in 'the Kamakura Age' were suspect of being subversive in effect, even if not in intention, in virtue of that deep concern for the salvation of Mankind in the mass which was the common, and the dominant, feature of all four schools alike. And, during the hundred years running from the outbreak of the War of Onin in A.D. 1467 to the assumption of dictatorial powers *de facto* by Nobunaga in A.D. 1568, the atrocity of the age⁵ drove the Jōdo Shinshū as well as the Hokke into militancy.⁶

The Russian and the Arabic Internal Proletariat.

In the disintegration of the Orthodox Christian Society in Russia we can watch the recruitment of an internal proletariat from three different sources. One contingent was furnished by the children of the household in the persons of those Russian religious sectaries and political recalcitrants who were expelled or deported to the fringes of an expanding Russian Orthodox Christendom.⁷ A second constituent element was provided by the children of alien civilizations—Western Christians in the Balticum

¹ Eliot, loc. cit.

² See the present chapter, p. 120, below.

³ For the failure of Qubilay's attempts to conquer Japan see IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 93-4, above.

⁴ See Eliot, op. cit., pp. 278 and 280.

⁵ This century seems to have been the nadir of the Japanese 'Time of Troubles' (see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 304-5, below).

⁶ Sansom, op. cit., pp. 366-9.

⁷ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 222, above.

and Lithuania and Poland and Finland; Iranic Muslims in the Caucasus and Transoxania—who were incorporated by conquest. If our analogy is to hold, the third ingredient in the Russian internal proletariat should consist of broken-in barbarians; and this ingredient was in fact supplied by the primitive peoples of the Arctic zone—Samoyeds and Lapps and Uralian Finns; Tungus and Yakuts and Palaearctics—and by the corralled Nomads of the Great Eurasian Steppe.¹ Thus the three elements with which we have become familiar in the Hellenic case all duly contributed to the formation of the Russian internal proletariat; and we can watch this proletariat making its first essays in the two alternative reactions to oppression. The violent way is exemplified in the peasant revolts under the Cossack leadership of Stenka Razin (A.D. 1667–71) and Pugachev (A.D. 1773–4); the gentle way in an accentuation, among certain Russian sects, of the vein of quietism that runs through Orthodox Christianity. That, however, is as far as we can follow the spontaneous development of an internal proletariat in the disintegration of the Russian Orthodox Christendom; for at that point in her history Russia sought and obtained admission to membership in the Western Society, and the remaining acts of the Russian tragedy have been played out, to order, on a wider stage, as incidents in a Western drama.

This same process of Westernization has overtaken the formation of an internal proletariat of the Arabic Society out of the primitive societies of Tropical Africa—and this at a still earlier stage. We catch a glimpse of Moroccan matchlockmen anticipating in the last decade of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era the nineteenth-century French and English conquest of the Sudan.² And we catch another glimpse of 'Umānī and Zanzibarese Arabs emulating in East Africa in the nineteenth century the atrocities which were practised in West Africa during the three preceding centuries by European slave-traders. But these Arabic exploits were a mere prelude to the great African tragedy which is being played in our day; and although, as we watch the present first act of this tremendous drama, we cannot yet guess how the fifth act will turn out, we do already know who are the principal dramatis personae, and we can certify that the Arabic stage-villain of the curtain-raiser is now no longer on the boards. The African play, like the Russian play, has been worked into our Western plot; and it is as a member of our all-embracing Western internal proletariat

¹ For this Russian feat of corraling the Eurasian Nomads see Part III. A, vol. iif, pp. 18–19, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 313–15, below.

² Using the term 'Sudan' in its proper comprehensive sense to include the whole borderland between Tropical Africa and the Afrikan Steppe in all its breadth, from the western escarpment of the Abyssinian Plateau to the debouchure of the Senegal River into the Atlantic.

that the African Negro will have to say his lines and to do his business in his native continent as well as in North America.¹

Internal Proletariats under Alien Universal States.

A curious spectacle is offered by one group of disintegrating civilizations in which, after the indigenous dominant minority has been annihilated or dethroned, the course of outward events still proceeds on normal lines—as though we were watching the dismantled hulk of a derelict society being carried along by some kind of social momentum on a course that had been set by the navigator before the ship's officers shot each other down and the sailors furled the sails and unstepped the masts and a passing pirate placed a prize-crew on board. We have already taken note of three societies—the Hindu, the Far Eastern in China, and the Orthodox Christian in the Near East—which have all duly passed through a universal state on the road from breakdown towards dissolution, but have each received this universal state as a gift—or an imposition—from alien hands instead of constructing it for themselves.² Iranic hands have supplied one universal state to the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the shape of the Ottoman Empire, and another to the Hindu World in the shape of the Timurid Empire which was staked out by Bābur and built up by Akbar. British hands have since reconstructed this jerry-built Mughal Rāj in India from the foundations. In China it has been the Mongols—uncouth Nomads faintly tinged with a dilution of the Far Eastern Christian culture³—that have played the Ottoman or Mughal part, while the work of reconstruction on a firmer basis, which the British have attempted in India, has been attempted in China by the Manchus.

When a disintegrating society is thus compelled to invite—or admit—some alien architect to furnish it with its universal state, it is confessing that its own indigenous dominant minority has become totally incompetent and sterile; and the inevitable penalty for this premature senility is a humiliating disfranchisement. The alien who comes in to do a dominant minority's work very naturally arrogates to himself a dominant minority's prerogative; and in an alien-built universal state the whole of the indigenous dominant minority is thus degraded to the ranks of the internal proletariat. The Mongol or Manchu Khāqān and the Ottoman Pādishāh and

¹ For the religious response of the African Negro to the challenge of being conscripted into the internal proletariat of the Western Civilization through being enslaved and transported to the American side of the Atlantic see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 218–20, above.

² For the hostility that is apt to be aroused by alien builders of universal states see further V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 347–51, below.

³ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 237–8, and II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, pp. 348–51, below.

the Mughal or British Qaysar-i-Hind may still find it convenient to employ the services of the Chinese litteratus or the Greek Phanariot¹ or the Hindu Brahman as the case may be; yet although, in the servant's role, the dispossessed master may still extort our admiration by his doggedness in clinging to a remnant of his former power or by his flexibility in adapting himself to the discomfort of his present *peripeteia*, he cannot hide the fact that he is degraded in his soul as well as in his status. It is evident that in a social situation like this, where a *ci-devant* dominant minority has become confounded in a common abasement with an internal proletariat upon which it has once looked down with disdain, we are unlikely to find the process of disintegration working itself out to the end on genuinely normal lines under the hollow shell of an outward normality that has been preserved by the intervention of alien hands; and, if the normal symptoms can be detected at all, we shall not be surprised if they are faint and transitory and rudimentary.

In the internal proletariat of the Hindu Society in our own generation we can discern the now familiar twofold proletarian reaction in a contrast between the murders committed by a militant school of Bengali revolutionaries and a Non-Violence preached by the Gujarati mahatma Gandhi;² and we can infer a longer past history of proletarian fermentation from the presence of a number of religious movements and organizations in which the same two contrary veins of Violence and Gentleness are likewise both represented. In Sikhism we see a formidable hailstone that has congealed out of the etherial speculations of Kabīr (*vivebat saeculo quintodecimo aevi Christiani*);³ and this warlike proletarian syncretism of Hinduism and Islam has its anathesis in the Brahmō Samāj, a sect in which Hinduism has been compounded with a nineteenth-century Liberal Protestant Christianity by the rarefied spirit of Ram Mohan Roy (*vivebat A.D. 1772-1833*).⁴

¹ For the Phanariots see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 222-8, above.

² It is interesting that in the India of our day the protagonist of Gentleness should be a Gujarati and the protagonists of Violence Bengalis, considering that there is a much stronger vein of enterprise and efficiency in the provincial ethos of Gujarat than in that of Bengal. For the present contrast in ethos between Bengal and the Bombay Presidency see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 127-33, above. For the nature of Mr. Gandhi's creed and tactic of Satyagraha see further V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, pp. 588-9, below.

³ For the relation between Sikhism and the religion of Kabir see Macauliffe, M. A.: *The Sikh Religion* (Oxford 1909, Clarendon Press, 6 vols.) and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 537, footnote 3, below. For the progressive militarization of the Sikh fraternity by the sixth Sikh Guru, Har Govind, and the tenth Sikh Guru, Govind Singh, and for the effect of this metamorphosis on the fortunes of the Sikh religion see Macauliffe, M. A.: 'How the Sikhs became a Militant Race' in *Supplement to the Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, vol. xxxii, July 1903, No. 152, pp. 330-58, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 665-8, below.

⁴ See Farquhar, J. N.: *Modern Religious Movements in India* (New York 1919, Macmillan), chap. ii. 1.

In the internal proletariat of the Far Eastern Society in China under the Manchu régime we can see in the T'ai'p'ing movement, which dominated the Chinese social stage in the middle of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, a work of the internal proletariat which is analogous to the Brahmō Samāj in one respect and to Sikhism in another: to the Brahmō Samāj in being a compound between an indigenous tradition and an exotic distillation of Protestant Christianity;¹ to Sikhism in crystallizing into a militant political force.

In the internal proletariat of the main body of Orthodox Christendom the 'Zealot' revolution at Salonica in the fifth decade of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era² gives us a glimpse of a violent proletarian reaction at the darkest hour of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles'—in the last generation before the Orthodox Christian Society was dragooned into a universal state by the drastic discipline of an Ottoman conquest. A vast subsequent addition to the numbers of the internal proletariat was perhaps the heaviest part of the price which Orthodox Christendom had to pay for receiving from alien hands a social service which it could not do without and yet could not provide for itself.

This addition was supplied from all the three sources which we have learnt to distinguish in the Hellenic case. In the first place the *ci-devant* Orthodox Christian dominant minority whom the 'Osmanlis displaced—that is to say, the epigoni of the old ruling class in the battered fragments of the former East Roman and Bulgarian Empires—were unceremoniously degraded to the proletarian ranks as their due historical penalty for having grossly abused their trust by bringing Orthodox Christendom to its ruin through a rake's progress of fratricidal warfare between the two leading states of the Orthodox Christian World.³ Under Otto-

¹ The T'ai'p'ing movement was, no doubt, a crude and fantastic affair by comparison with the Brahmō Samāj—as was, indeed, to be expected in view of the difference between the respective founders. While Ram Mohan Roy was a highly cultivated man who was in close personal relations with the contemporary Protestant Christian missionaries in Bengal and had a deep understanding of the genius and ethos of both the two religions which he was seeking to blend, Hung Hsiu-ch'uan was the Confucian equivalent of a Bengali 'failed B.A.'—that is to say, an unsuccessful candidate for the degree of *litteratus*—and he had heard no more than a distant and distorted echo of the exotic Western religion which fired his imagination and stimulated his will to act. His source of enlightenment was a set of Protestant Christian tracts compiled by a Chinese convert, and his first mission-field and base of operations was the secluded province of Kwangsi (see Meadows, T. T.: *The Chinese and their Rebellions* (London 1856, Smith Elder), chaps. 6-8 and 19; and Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), chap. 29). The movement was named after a Sinic movement, of similar character, which broke out *circa* A.D. 184 and inaugurated the break-up of the Han Empire (as the nineteenth-century T'ai'p'ing movement was intended to break up the Manchu Empire). Meadows (op. cit., p. 439, footnote) draws a parallel between Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's Neo-T'ai'p'ing movement and Swedenborgianism.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 359, above.

³ For the great Bulgaro-Roman War of A.D. 977-1019 and its fatal consequences see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 72-6, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 390-404, above.

man rule all the elements of the indigenous Orthodox Christian body social—intolerable grandes and exasperated peasantry alike—were confounded in a common proletarian subjection. At the same time this indigenous Orthodox Christian nucleus of an internal proletariat was enlarged both by the conquest of populations of alien culture and by the importation of slaves; and both those methods of making forcible additions to their proletarian man-power were practised by the 'Osmanlis from the latter part of the fourteenth to the latter part of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era on a scale which rivalled the Hellenic practice from the generation of Alexander the Great to the generation of Julius Caesar.¹

In their conquests the Ottoman Pādishāhs followed the lead, but far surpassed the range, of the native militarists whom the internecine Bulgaro-Roman struggle had carried into power in the East Roman Empire in and after the tenth century. The offensive warfare which Romanus Lecapenus and Nicephorus Phocas and John Tzimisce had opened against an expiring Syriac Society on a front which eventually came to extend from the shores of Lake Van to the coasts of Tunisia² was resumed by Selīm I and

¹ While the Ottoman and Hellenic practices of enslavement are comparable, the purpose behind the practice was not the same in the two cases; and, if we take purpose into account, as we ought to take it, in any attempt that we may make to pass a comparative moral judgement, we shall find reason to condemn the Ottoman dominant minority in the Orthodox Christian World of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era less severely than the Macedonian and Roman dominant minority in the Hellenic World of the last four centuries B.C. The purpose of the Macedonian and Roman conquerors and wastrels and hangmen began and ended with their quest for docile 'man-power' to exploit. The 'Osmanlis, whose avidity for docile 'man-power' was equally strong, did at least have in view a more reputable ultimate objective. They wanted this supply of docile 'man-power' in order to distil out of it, by a careful and elaborate system of education and selection, an *élite* which was to replenish the ranks of the ruling corporation itself. We have had occasion to study the recruitment and training of the Ottoman Pādishāh's slave-household already in another context (in Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 31-44, above). The essence of this Ottoman system in its prime was that the Dominant Minority was recruited from the Internal Proletariat wholly and exclusively. The members of the ruling corporation were slaves who remained slaves even when they were occupying the highest posts in the civil and military administration of the Empire; and the slave's career was the sole avenue of entry, whether the slave-aspirant for office had originally been a Western Christian renegade or deserter or prisoner of war or a Russian Christian victim of the Krim Tatar slave-raiders or a tribute-child conscripted by the Ottoman Government itself from its own Greek or Yugoslav Christian subjects. This Ottoman system of recruiting the Dominant Minority from the Internal Proletariat is a particularly clear illustration of the truth—which is also true for all other disintegrating societies, as well as for the main body of Orthodox Christendom—that the barrier between Dominant Minority and Proletariat is the penalty of a moral schism and is not the expression of any difference of birth or race. The Ottoman Pādishāh's slave-household, which served as the dominant minority of Orthodox Christendom during its universal state, was of precisely the same race as the *ra'īyeh* or 'human cattle' which it acquired and tended in order to recruit itself from this stock. The Ottoman ruling corporation had been replenished by adoption as well as by natural increase ever since the first generation after its original settlement in Sultān Ōnū in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era; and in the generation of Mehmed the Conqueror—not to come down so far as Suleymān the Magnificent—there can hardly have been a drop of the immigrant Eurasian Nomad blood to be found still coursing in any 'Osmanli's veins (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 228-9, above).

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 399-404, above.

Suleymān the Magnificent against the nascent Iranic and Arabic societies and was then carried up the escarpment of the Iranian Plateau on the east, and down to the coasts of the Indian Ocean on the south, and as far as the borders of Morocco on the west.¹ The still more wanton offensive warfare with Hungary in which the Comneni had indulged² at a later stage in the East Roman Empire's decline was also resumed by Suleymān the Magnificent and was carried by him up to the gates of Vienna. The impious Ottoman assaults upon the 'Osmanlis' own parent Iranic Society proved abortive; but the simultaneous attacks upon the other two societies which were likewise neighbours of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a vast addition of Arabic Muslim and Western Christian subject populations to the Orthodox Christian internal proletariat. These recruits, who were acquired through an Ottoman conquest of their native countries, were mostly permitted to serve the conquerors as hewers of wood and drawers of water without being uprooted from their homes; but there was also a constant stream of other recruits, from territories beyond the frontiers of the Ottoman dominions, who were plucked out of their native environment—either, against their wills, as prisoners of war and victims of slave-raids, or, by their own act, as deserters and renegades—in order to swell still further the already vastly swollen numbers of the internal proletariat of Orthodox Christendom under the Ottoman régime.³

Both the scale and the effects of this recruitment from abroad are revealed in the testimony of an experienced and skilful English observer who was resident in Turkey during the latter part of the seventeenth century, that is to say at a time when the recruitment from this source was on the point of coming to an end and may therefore be presumed to have dwindled already by comparison with its volume in the age of Suleymān the Magnificent or in the still further past age of Mehmed the Conqueror. In a book published in London in A.D. 1668 Sir Paul Rycaut describes⁴ how, in his day, the population of the Ottoman Empire was still being recruited by imports of slaves from the hinterland of the Black Sea Steppe; and these imports were also still on the grand scale; for the minimum estimate of the average numbers of the annual contingent imported through the single port of Constantinople is

¹ For the extent, and the limitations, of these Ottoman conquests see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, pp. 384-400, and II. D (vii), Annex VII, in vol. ii, pp. 444-5, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 403, footnote 3, above.

³ For these recruits from beyond the Ottoman frontiers see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 35, above.

⁴ Rycaut, Sir Paul: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey and Brome), pp. 80-2. Rycaut was particularly well placed for making his observations, since he served first as English consul at Smyrna and afterwards as secretary to the English Embassy in Constantinople.

placed by Rycaut as high as 20,000. The English observer then goes on to discuss the spiritual effect of this physical deracination.

'The greatest part, being women and children, with easie perswasions and fair promises become Turks; the men, being ignorant and generally of the Russian or Muscovite nation (who are reported not to be over-devout or of famed constancy and perseverance in religion), . . . renounce all interest in the Christian faith.'

In this ready renunciation of their own religious heritage these Russian slave-immigrants into Ottoman Rumelia might seem to compare unfavourably with those Oriental slave-immigrants into Roman Italy who still clung, in exile and adversity, to the worship of Cybele or Isis. It appears, however, from a later passage in the same work, that although these Russians may have drunk rather recklessly of the waters of Lethe, the draught did not altogether overcome them after all.

'We might proceed to recite as many sects as there are towns or schools in the Empire, in every one of which some pragmatistical preacher or other have always started a new opinion which can never want disciples. And certainly the diversity of opinion in Turk[e]y is almost infinite, and more numerous then in England or other parts of Christendom, though commonly not proceeding from the same malice nor laid with the same design to the prejudice of the State. The reason of this variety amongst the Turks I attribute to the many religions which voluntarily, and for interest or by force, have entered into the Mahometan superstition—many of which being Grecians, and instructed in the arts and sciences with which that empire once flourished, which was the mine and treasury of philosophy and learning, did afterwards mix with their new religions (not being wholly satisfied with the Alchoran) certain traditions and opinions of the ancient philosophers. And several other nations—as Russians, Muscovites, Circassians and the like—retaining some few remembrances of their first notions and principles, make a farther addition to this ill-compounded medley.'¹

Here was a spiritual field which had been admirably prepared, by the thorough work of a trenchant Ottoman ploughshare, to receive and foster the seed of a 'higher religion' and perhaps to bring to harvest a universal church; and the golden opportunity was not neglected by would-be sowers—as we have already observed in another context² where we have had occasion to take note of the rudiments of new religious growths which made their appearance in Orthodox Christendom under the *Pax Ottomanica*. As early as the second decade of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, when the Ottoman Empire had only just been established

¹ Rycaut, op. cit., p. 135.

² In IV. C. (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 68-9, above.

and had not yet been rounded off by the occupation of Constantinople, Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn of Simāv was propagating in the Ottoman dominions on both sides of the Straits a syncretism between Islam and Christianity which reminds us of the Islamic-Hindu syncretism of Kabīr or the Christian-Hindu syncretism of Ram Mohan Roy or the Christian-Taoist syncretism of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan; and at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Anatolian provinces of the Empire were being impregnated with Imāmī Shi'ism by the missionaries of the Safawis.¹ Like Bedr-ed-Dīn in A.D. 1416,² the Safawī propagandist Shāh Qūlī blighted his own prospects in A.D. 1511 by impatiently turning from a gentle to a violent course and thereby bringing down upon himself the full weight of the Ottoman Power.³ These early violent sowers of new seed in Orthodox Christian soil were promptly crushed and their seed was trampled into the ground; but the quiet and gradual propagation of esoterically heterodox faiths, under a parade of conformity with the Sunnah, struck deeper and spread wider during the later centuries of the Ottoman Peace; and, if at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the process of Westernization had not followed so hard at the heels of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, we may conjecture that, by the present day, the Bektāshī movement might have won for itself, throughout the Near East, the position which it has actually succeeded in attaining in Albania.⁴

The Ottoman Peace (*durabat circa* A.D. 1372-1774)⁵ did at least

¹ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 365-8, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, in the present volume, pp. 662-5, below.

² The parallel is not quite exact, since Bedr-ed-Dīn only took to violence after his hand had been forced. The Sheykh had resigned himself to a compulsory retirement, on a pension, at Isnik, after having been deposed by Sultan Mehmed I from the high office of Qādi'l-'Asker of Rumili, which he had held from A.D. 1410 to 1413. In A.D. 1416, however, Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn's lieutenant Mustafā Bōrklije rose in insurrection in the natural fortress of the Qāraburun Peninsula (on the Anatolian mainland, facing the Island of Chios). On receiving the news, Bedr-ed-Dīn made his way from Isnik via Sinope to Wallachia and thence invaded the Ottoman territory of Deli Orman (in North-Western Bulgaria, between Ruschuk and Varna). In both places the insurrections were crushed by the Ottoman Government with the utmost energy and ferocity (see Babinger, Fr.: 'Schejch Bedr-ed-Din' in *Der Islam*, vols. xi and xii). It is one of the curiosities of history that the scene of Mustafā's insurrection on Qāraburun in A.D. 1416 should have been within sight of the scene of Aristonicus's at Leucae, just across the Gulf of Smyrna, in 132 B.C. (see p. 69, above); for there is an unmistakable kinship between the two movements. According to Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn's contemporary, the Orthodox Christian historian Michael Ducas (chap. 21), the two main planks in the Sheykh's platform were a fraternization between Muslims and Christians and a communism in everything except wives. One is reminded of Aristonicus's common call to freemen and slaves, and of his attempt to establish, in real life, the Communist Utopia of Iambulus (see V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, vol. vi, p. 351, below).

³ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 365 and 382-3, above.

⁴ For the state of the Bektāshī movement in the latter part of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era see Rycart, op. cit., Book II, chaps. 12 and 19, and also the present Study, IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 68-9, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 295, below.

⁵ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 68, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 298-300, below.

last long enough for the religious ferment which attracted Rycaut's attention in the second quarter of the seventeenth century to brew up out of the *colluvies gentium*¹ that had been collected and confounded in an Ottoman sump, like the ingredients of a cocktail in a shaker, by the cumulative operation of slave-raids and wars of conquest which had been at work, by Rycaut's day, for more than three centuries. The Mongol Peace on the Steppe (*ca.* 1241-1328)² was too brief to give time for the troubling of the waters in this case to produce its normal after-effects. The foregoing-Mongol ravages, however, surpassed the Ottoman ravages in material scale in the measure of the difference in physical magnitude between the main body of the Far Eastern Society and the main body of Orthodox Christendom. While the alien Ottoman builders of an Orthodox Christian universal state ranged beyond the proper bounds of the society on which they were imposing their peace as far afield as Hungary and Azerbaijan and the Yaman and Algeria, the alien Mongol builders of a Far Eastern universal state likewise pushed their raids as far as Hungary in a westerly direction, while eastward they subjugated Korea and southward invaded Burma. From all quarters of the immense tract of European and Asiatic territory that was comprised within these extreme limits, the Mongol stockmen 'lifted' droves of human cattle from their native pastures and herded them together in human cattle-pens which they had hastily constructed in the heart of the Eurasian Steppe. The multiplicity and variety of the diverse cultures which were thus forced into an involuntary intercourse with one another as a result of this titanic Mongol 'round-up' might have produced a social and spiritual ferment of unexampled energy if the Mongol Peace had not fallen short of the Ottoman Peace in its Time-span as signally as it surpassed it in its spacial extension.

In the event the *Pax Mongolica* collapsed, after its ephemeral heyday, as suddenly and unexpectedly as it had sprung into existence; and, upon its collapse, the *colluvies gentium* which had been swept together at Saray-on-Volga and at Qaraqorum-on-Orkhon and at Peking-within-the-Wall either dispersed and evaporated or was absorbed and assimilated or was segregated and sterilized without having been given the time to fulfil its 'manifest destiny' of 'making history'. The sensational history which might have been made in 'the Cauldron of the North',³ if Time and Chance had been auspicious, will leap, however, to

¹ Livy, Book IV, chap. 2, § 5.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121; Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 25; Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 416-17, above; and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, pp. 348-51, and Table I, attached to V. C (iii), vol. vi, p. 327, below.

Jer. i. 13; Ezek. xi. 3 and 7, and xxiv. 1-14.

the eye of any reader of the surviving narratives of those Western observers who visited the head-quarters of the Mongol Khāqān and broke their long journey at the camps of his vassal-princes in the outlying appanages of the Mongol Empire on the morrow of its establishment.¹ For a moment of time in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era Saray and Qaraqorum and Peking bade fair to become as potent 'melting-pots' as a nineteenth-century New York or as a Rome whose dilution of the Tiber with the Orontes has been immortalized in famous lines of Juvenal that have already been quoted.² The fact is attested by the following passages from the pen of a Flemish friar of the Franciscan order who made his adventurous journey to Qaraqorum and back in A.D. 1253-5.

'There is a fair or market following the court of Bātū at all times; but it was so far distant from us that we could not reach it. We were constrained to walk on foot for want of horses. At length certain Hungarians, who had once been clerks, found us, and one of them could sing many songs without book, and was looked upon by other Hungarians as a priest, and was sent to funerals of his deceased countrymen. There was another of them also well instructed in grammar; for he could understand the meaning of everything that we spoke, but could not answer. These Hungarians were a great comfort to us, bringing us *cosmos* [qumyz] to drink, and sometimes flesh to eat. . . .

'Upon a certain day a Cuman accompanying us saluted us in Latin, saying *Salvete, domini*. Wondering at this, and saluting him in return, I demanded of him who had taught him that kind of salutation. He said that he was baptized in Hungary by our friars, and that from them he had learned it. . . .

'I inquired . . . of the city of Talas, where there lived certain Teutons . . . of whom Friar Andrew made mention.³ Concerning these men, I also inquired very diligently in the courts of Sartak and Bātū, but I could get no information of them . . . till I had come to the court of Mangū Khan. And there I was informed that Mangū Khan had removed them out of the jurisdiction of Bātū, for the space of a month's journey from Talas, eastward, to a certain village called Bulaq, where they are set to dig gold and to make armour. . . .

'A few days later we entered upon those alps where the Qāra Qitay people were wont to inhabit. . . . And there we found a certain village where there were Saracens, speaking the Persian language, though they dwelt a huge distance from Persia. . . .

[At Qaraqorum, where the Khāqān Mangū held his court,] 'we

¹ The principal documents, apart from Marco Polo's well-known and frequently published book, will be found in Beazley, C. R.: *The Texts and Versions of John de Plano Carpini and William de Rubruquis* (London 1903, Hakluyt Society), and Komroff, M.: *Contemporaries of Marco Polo* (London 1928, Cape).

² On p. 67, above.

³ This Friar Andrew had visited the court of the Mongol Khāqān in the reign of Kuyuk Khan (*imperabat* A.D. 1246-8).—A.J.T.

went to a large house that we found cold and without a supply of fuel. We were still without food, and it was night. . . . A woman of Metz in Lorraine, called Paquette, and who had been a prisoner in Hungary, found us out and prepared for us a feast of the best she could. She belonged to the court of that lady who was Christian and of whom I have already spoken; she told us of the unheard-of misery she had suffered before coming to the court. But she was fairly well off, for she had a young Russian husband who made her the mother of three little children, and he was a carpenter, which is a good position among the Tatars. Among other things, she told us that there was in Qaraqorum a goldsmith named William, originally from Paris. His family name was Buchier, the name of his father Laurant Buchier. She believed, too, that he had a brother who lived on the Grand Pont and who was called Roger Buchier. . . .

'On Palm Sunday [A.D. 1254] we were at Qaraqorum. . . . The mass said, evening approached, and Master William took us with him to his home for supper, in great joy. His wife was the daughter of one Lorraine, and born in Hungary. She spoke French and Cuman well. We met there another European named Basil, the son of an Englishman and born in Hungary, and who spoke the same languages.'¹

These fellow Western Christians with whom the Flemish Friar William fell in at Qaraqorum and on his journey thither were only one of many contingents of *déracinés* whom the Mongol raiders had carried away captive to the mushroom-capital of an embryonic Far Eastern universal state. Among the new recruits who were thus forcibly levied and conscripted into a Far Eastern proletariat there were also Orthodox Christian Alans and Russians; there were Muslim Turks and Iranians and Monophysite Christian Armenians from an aged Syriac World to which the Mongol invaders had dealt a *coup de grâce*;² there were Lamaist Mahayanian Buddhists from Tibet; there were Catholic Mahayanian Buddhists and Taoists and Confucians from China; and there were the Manichaeans and the Nestorian Christians who were already long since at home in the oases of the Eurasian Steppe³ before Chingis Khan started on his career of conquest. In the course of his anabasis Friar William was not only consoled and fortified by meeting co-religionists: he was also stimulated or exasperated, according to the circumstances, by encounters with representatives of the competing faiths. At an early stage in his journey, on Whitsun Eve, 1253, he was approached by

¹ *Itinerarium Fratris Willielmi de Rubruquis* [Rubruck], *de Ordine Fratrum Minorum, Galli, Anno Gratiae 1253, ad Partes Orientales*, English translation by Komroff, M., in *Contemporaries of Marco Polo* (London 1928, Cape), pp. 120-1, 126-7, 149-50, 172.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 72; II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, pp. 449-52; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 67, above.

³ For the infiltration of Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity from the Syriac World into the Far East see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 237-8; II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 375; II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, pp. 449-50, above.

some Alan adherents of the Orthodox Church who besought this passing Western priest for instruction in Christian doctrine and observance.¹ On Whitsunday itself he was approached by a Muslim whom he instructed and all but converted.² He found Bātū Khan's son Sartak under the influence of Nestorian counselors, and suspected the prince of being a crypto-Nestorian himself.³ When he arrived at Bātū's own court, he raised a laugh among the courtiers by boldly adjuring their master to embrace the Catholic Faith.⁴ In his passage through Uighuristan he visited a Buddhist temple and entered into a theological disputation with the monks.⁵ After his arrival at Qaraqorum the first trace of Christianity upon which he stumbled was a chapel served by an Armenian monk;⁶ and thereafter he found 'a swarm of Christians—Hungarians, Alans, Ruthenians, Georgians, Armenians'⁷—in the Khāqān's capital. When Mangū Khan granted Friar William an audience, the missionary preached the Catholic Faith to the Khāqān as boldly as he had preached it to Mangū's cousin Bātū; and Mangū responded by arranging for the holding of a theological disputation.⁸ His secretaries first took down in writing depositions from the friar and his Nestorian and pagan competitors, and thereafter the three parties were called upon to defend their respective theses by word of mouth before a board of examiners consisting of one pagan, one Muslim, and one Christian. In a subsequent interview Mangū expounded his own religious beliefs in a latitudinarian vein which the Mongol Emperor's Catholic interlocutor interpreted as a confession of agnosticism.⁹

It will be seen that, at this early stage in the history of the universal state which was being imposed on the Far Eastern World by Mongol arms, the competition between the diverse religions of the *déracinés* from all quarters of the Earth who were then being thrown into a Far Eastern 'melting-pot' was already exciting the curiosity of the Mongol master of this enormous empire. And on this showing we may surmise that, if the

¹ *The Journal of Friar William of Rubruck*, chap. 13 (Komroff, pp. 98-9).

² 'He . . . said that he desired to be baptized. But, when we prepared ourselves for baptizing him, he suddenly mounted on horseback, saying that he would go home and consult with his wife what were best to be done. On the next day he told us that he could in no case receive baptism, because then he could drink no more qumyz.'—Rubruck, *op. cit.*, chap. 14 (Komroff, p. 99.)

³ *Ibid.*, chaps. 17 and 18 (*ibid.*, pp. 106-11).

⁴ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, chap. 21 (*ibid.*, p. 118).

⁵ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, chap. 27 (*ibid.*, pp. 130-2).

⁶ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, chap. 31 (*ibid.*, pp. 143-4).

⁷ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, chap. 48 (*ibid.*, p. 174).

⁸ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, chap. 51 (*ibid.*, pp. 183-92).

⁹ 'The [Armenian] monk told me that the Khan believes only the Christians, but that he wants everybody to pray for him. The monk lied, for the Khan believes in no one, as you shall soon learn.'—*Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, chap. 37 (*ibid.*, p. 153).

Pax Mongolica had lasted, some notable religious experiences and discoveries would have followed. As it was, the Mongol khans and hordes of the several branches of the House of Chingis did all eventually exchange their own primitive paganism for one or other of the 'higher religions' of the peoples, west of the Great Wall, who were temporarily engulfed in the Far Eastern internal proletariat as a result of the Mongol conquests. Mangū Khan's own brother and successor Qubilay Khan (*imperabat* A.D. 1257-94) was attracted by his Tibetan subjects' Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism; and this was the religion to which his successors were tardily converted some two hundred years after their expulsion from China.¹ Their cousins in the appanages of Chaghatai and Jūji were converted to the orthodox Sunnī form of Islam,² and so, in the end, were the Il-Khans of Iran and 'Irāq, after they had tried, as alternatives, both Nestorianism and the Shi'ah.³ On the other hand the Mongol Empire broke down and broke up before any of these alien faiths had gained any deep or lasting hold upon the mass of the Far Eastern internal proletariat in Intramural China.

The tincture of Western Christianity which was introduced into the Far East under a Mongol aegis by a series of pioneer-missionaries—from Friar John of Pian di Carpine, who made his journey to Kuyuk Khan's court in A.D. 1245-7, to Friar Odoric of Pordenone, who visited Peking in the third decade of the fourteenth century—had evaporated without leaving a trace by the time when Saint Francis Xavier inaugurated the second attempt to convert China to Catholicism; Nestorianism and Manichaeism seem to have been absorbed into the Chinese tradition without making any visible mark on it; and even Islam, though it did succeed in gaining a permanent foothold in China thanks to the opportunities which it temporarily enjoyed there under the Mongol régime, remained segregated in the far north-western provinces of Kansu and Shensi and in the new far southern province of Yunnan which was carved out of a barbarian no-man's-land by Mongol military enterprise. The Muslim element which survives down to this day in the Chinese population of these three provinces is the most substantial monument, in China, of the short-lived and abortive alien universal state which the Mongols once provided for a disintegrating Far Eastern Society. Yet, although this exotic community has contrived to hold its

¹ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 451, footnote 1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 497, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 145, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 363-4, and II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, p. 451.

ground on the fringes of China, it has remained, even there, a peculiar people; and on Chinese ground there has been no fruitful union between Islam and any indigenous religion or philosophy. The student of the morphology of Religion will search in vain for any Chinese counterpart of the Indian syncretisms between Islam and Hinduism or the Near Eastern syncretisms between Islam and Christianity. To find a Chinese analogue of Kabirism and Sikhism and Bedreddinism and Bektashism the observer must travel far afield in both Time and Space. He must skip the Ming interlude between the Mongol and the Manchu régime, and must then shift the focus of his attention from the hinterland of Peking in the thirteenth century to the hinterland of Canton in the nineteenth century, if he wishes to catch a glimpse of a dynamic impact of alien religious ideas upon the native Chinese tradition. As we have seen above,¹ it was in Kwangsi in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Manchu régime, in its turn, was verging towards its fall, that some casual grains of Protestant Christianity, mingling with the traditional Chinese *Weltanschauung* in the soul of a Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, produced the explosive mixture which discharged itself in the militant movement of the 'T'ai'ping'.

The Babylonian and the Syriac Internal Proletariat. •

If we now pass to the Babylonian World, we shall find that the ferment of religious experience and discovery in the souls of a sorely tried internal proletariat was as active in South-Western Asia under the Assyrian terror of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. as it was, round the Hellenized shores of the Mediterranean Basin, under a Roman terror which set in with the outbreak of the Hannibalic War and did not give way to a Roman Peace until after the Battle of Actium.

Through the agency of Assyrian arms the disintegrating Babylonian Society expanded geographically in two directions, as the disintegrating Orthodox Christian Society expanded through the prowess of the East Roman militarists² and their successors the 'Osmanlis, and the disintegrating Hellenic Society through the conquests of alien ground that were made by the Macedonians and the Romans. Eastward, beyond the Zagros, in Iran, the Assyrians anticipated the Romans' exploits in Europe beyond the Appennines by subjugating a host of primitive societies; westward, beyond the Euphrates, they anticipated the Macedonians' exploits on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles by subjugating

¹ On p. 107.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 399-403 and p. 403, footnote 3, above.

more than one alien civilization; and the two alien civilizations—the Syriac and the Egyptiac—which were thus forcibly incorporated, for the moment, into the Babylonian internal proletariat were actually identical with two of the four which were afterwards temporarily incorporated into the Hellenic internal proletariat *post Alexandrum*. Nor were these alien victims of Babylonian militarism simply conquered without being uprooted. The classic examples of the forcible deportation of a conquered population are the transplantation of the Israelites by the Assyrian war-lord Sargon to the opposite frontiers of an expanding Babylonian World in the recently subjugated barbarian country on the western fringes of Iran, and the transplantation of the Jews by the Neo-Babylonian war-lord Nebuchadnezzar to the heart of the Babylonian World in Babylonia itself.

The compulsory exchange of populations was the sovereign device of Babylonian imperialism for breaking the spirit of conquered peoples and, above all, destroying their political *esprit de corps*; and the atrocity was by no means exclusively inflicted upon aliens and barbarians. In their own fratricidal warfare the dominant Powers of the Babylonian World did not scruple to mete out the same treatment to one another; and the Samaritan community¹—of which a few hundred representatives can be seen, still living under the shadow of Mount Gerizim, in the present mandated territory of Palestine—is a monument of the transplantation to Syria, by Assyrian hands, of deportees from several cities of Babylonia, including the metropolis itself. The Assyrian Government's intention was to wipe out the national consciousness of the proudest and most venerable of the four sister nations² in the Babylonian body social, and at the same time to fill a vacuum which had been left in the recently conquered territories in Syria after the transplantation of a number of the native Israelites to Media;³ but in the end it was the Babylonians with their Median allies, and not the Assyrians, who emerged victorious from the Assyro-Babylonian Hundred-and-Forty Years' War;⁴ and at that stage it was both impossible and unnecessary for the Babylonians to deal with the Assyrians as the Assyrians had

¹ See Gaster, M.: *The Samaritans* (Oxford 1923, University Press).

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 116, and II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 135 and 137, above.

³ The Assyrians seem not to have deported entire populations *en masse*, but to have contented themselves with carrying away captive certain selected classes—the political-minded or the skilful-handed—while the peasantry were left, helpless and leaderless, on their ancestral lands. Both the Israelites who were planted in the cities of the Medes and the Babylonians who were planted in the cities of Israel were probably minorities; and the survival of an Israelitish peasantry in the countryside of Samaria would account for the eventual victory of the indigenous Syriac over the intrusive Babylonian element in the Samaritan religion (see p. 125, footnote 1, below).

⁴ For this devastating war and its outcome see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), vol. iv, pp. 476–84, above.

dealt with them; for by that time there were no more Assyrians left to deal with. By intercalating recurrent domestic revolutions between their perpetual foreign wars, the Assyrians had achieved the extraordinary feat of annihilating themselves;¹ and, apart from a miserable remnant of squatters who continued to preserve the Assyrian name on the site of the city of Asshur itself,² perhaps the only survivors of the Assyrian nation were the offspring of Assyrian garrisons in the former provinces of the Assyrian Empire who purchased their survival at the price of losing their political identity and being absorbed into the surrounding native population. In the Assyrian homeland itself the Assyrian nation was being supplanted by its Syriac victims even before the collapse of the Assyrian state, as is attested by the progress of the conquered peoples' Aramaic language at the expense of the conquerors' Akkadian.³

It will be seen that the *furor Assyriacus* did not spend itself before it had brought into existence a Babylonian internal proletariat which bore a singularly close resemblance to the Hellenic internal proletariat in its origin and composition and experience; and the two trees brought forth similar fruits. While the later incorporation of the Syriac Society into the Hellenic internal proletariat was to bear fruit at the beginning of the Christian Era in the birth of Christianity out of Judaism, the earlier incorporation of the same Syriac Society into the Babylonian internal proletariat bore fruit in and after the eighth century B.C. in the birth of Judaism itself out of the primitive religion of one of the parochial communities into which the Syriac Society had come to be articulated.⁴

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 480-2, above.

² Ibid., p. 470, above.

³ For this victory of Aramaic over Akkadian see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 79, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 484, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), in the present volume, pp. 487-91 and 499, footnote 5, below.

⁴ For the nature of the primitive religion of Israel see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 262, above, and V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 39-49, below. It will be seen that, while Judaism and Christianity appear to be 'philosophically contemporary and equivalent' (in the sense in which these terms have been used in I. C (iii) (c) and (d), vol. i, above) in so far as they can be regarded simply as products of the disintegration of two societies of the species which we have called 'civilizations', there is another angle of vision from which they present themselves in the quite different aspect of successive stages in a single 'ascending' process of spiritual enlightenment. In this picture Christianity stands, not side by side with Judaism, but on its shoulders, while they both tower above the primitive religion of Israel. Nor is the enlightenment of the Prophets of Israel and Judah in and after the eighth century B.C. the only intervening stage of which we have a record or a hint in the chronological and spiritual interval between the primitive worship of Yahweh and the epiphany of Christ. Before and below the Prophets, the Biblical tradition presents us with a Moses, and before and below Moses with an Abraham. These dim figures are regarded by one school of modern Western 'higher critics' as mere creatures of a primitive mythopoeic imagination, and by another school as at least partially authentic historical persons who have left their marks upon 'folk memory'. The student of history will observe that the tradition places both Abraham and Moses in the same historical setting as the Prophets and as Christ, if history is regarded as a conspectus of the rises and falls of civilizations. While Christ made his

The genesis of this 'higher religion' of Judaism among the submerged Syriac elements in the Babylonian internal proletariat has left an incomparably full and clear record of itself in the books of the pre-Exilic Prophets of Israel and Judah; and in these living and breathing memorials of a tremendous spiritual travail the burning question is the issue—already familiar to us from the Hellenic case—between the gentle and the violent way of facing an internal proletariat's ordeal. Moreover, Gentleness eventually prevailed over Violence in this case likewise; for the 'Time of Troubles', as it reached and passed its climax, delivered a series of hammer-stroke lessons which taught even the 'Die-Hards' in the tribe of Judah the futility of attempting to repay Violence in its own kind. The new 'higher religion' which was born in eighth-century Syria, in Syriac communities which were then still being pounded on their native threshing-floor by an Assyrian flail, was brought to maturity in sixth-century and fifth-century Babylonia among the uprooted and deported descendants of one of these battered Syriac peoples.

Like the Oriental slave-deportees in Roman Italy, the Jewish exiles in Nebuchadnezzar's Babylon were proof against the facile adaptability of the Russian slave-deportees in Ottoman Rumelia.¹ These uprooted Syriac members of the Babylonian internal proletariat were no chameleons.

'If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget her cunning.

'If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth.'²

Yet the memory of their home which these exiles cherished in a strange land was not just a negative imprint: it was a positive act of inspired imaginative creation. In the unearthly light of this vision seen through a mist of tears the fallen fastness became transfigured into a holy city built on a rock against which the gates of Hell should not prevail.³ And the captives who refused to indulge their captors' whim by singing them one of the songs of Sion, and stubbornly hanged up their harps on the willows⁴ by Euphrates' stream, were at that very moment composing an inaudible new melody on the invisible instrument of their hearts.

appearance in This World just after the close of a Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' and the Prophets made theirs in the midst of a Babylonian 'Time of Troubles', the epiphany of Moses is traditionally associated with the decadence of 'the New Empire' of Egypt, which was a restoration of the Egyptian universal state, and the epiphany of Abraham with the last days of the Sumerian universal state, after its short-lived reconstruction by the energetic hands of Hammurabi. This relation between recurrent break-downs and disintegrations of civilizations and an apparently progressive process of religious enlightenment is examined further in Part VII, below.

¹ See the present chapter, p. 110, above.

² Ps. cxxxvii. 5-6.

³ Matt. xvi. 18.

⁴ Ps. cxxxvii. 1.

'By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept when we remembered thee, O Sion';

and, in that weeping, the enlightenment of Jewry was accomplished.

It is evident that, in the successive religious reactions of Syriac conscripts in the ranks of an alien internal proletariat, the parallel between Babylonian and Hellenic history is very close; but the response evoked from the internal proletariat by the Babylonian dominant minority's challenge was the richer of the two in so far as it came not only from those victims who were members of an alien civilization but from the barbarian victims as well. Whereas the European and North-West African barbarians who were forcibly incorporated into the Hellenic internal proletariat by Roman arms made no religious discoveries of their own, but simply accepted the seed that was sown among them by their fellow proletarians of Oriental origin, the Iranian barbarians who were passed under the Assyrian harrow begot a native prophet in the person of Zarathustra, the founder of Zoroastrianism. The date of Zarathustra is a matter of dispute among modern Western scholars, and by the same token they are unable to tell us whether his religious discovery was an independent response to the common challenge of Assyrian militarism which was presented to Iranians and Syrians simultaneously, or whether his voice was only an echo of the cry of Israelite prophets who had been marooned in 'the cities of the Medes'.¹ It is evident, however, that, whatever the original relations between these two 'higher religions' may have been, Zoroastrianism and Judaism met on equal terms in their maturity and that, in their spiritual commerce during the Achaemenian and the Macedonian Age, the Iranian religion gave the Syrian religion at least as much inspiration as it received from it.² The spiritual power that was thus displayed by Zoroastrianism in the second chapter of its history is presumptive evidence that the new 'higher religion' of the barbarian wing of the Babylonian internal proletariat was a powerful spiritual force from the beginning.³

¹ This question has been touched upon already in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 81, above. See further Pettazzone, R.: *La Religione di Zarathustra* (Bologna 1920, Zanichelli), pp. 82-4. It may be noted in this connexion that the human adversaries who are equated in the Gāthās with the Powers of Evil are not the Assyrians but the Eurasian Nomads, who swept out of the Steppe on to the Iranian and Anatolian plateaux in the seventh century B.C. (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 136-7 and 138-9, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 410, above).

² See von Gall, A.: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), *passim*, and Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 95-120, 179, and 190-204, as well as the present study, V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), in the present volume, p. 536; V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 43-4; V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, p. 126, footnote 5, and p. 129, footnote 2; and V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, p. 163, footnote 1, below.

³ For the remarkable vein of intellectual abstraction which appears to have been one of the original features of Zarathustra's system see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 43, footnote 4, below.

At any rate, when the Babylonian 'Time of Troubles' was brought to an end by the overthrow and annihilation of Assyria, and the Babylonian World passed on into a universal state in the shape of the Neo-Babylonian Empire, it looked as though Judaism and Zoroastrianism—the new faiths of the Syrian and Iranian wings of the Babylonian internal proletariat—would compete with one another for the privilege of establishing a universal church within the political framework that was now being provided by the Babylonian dominant minority—as, in the disintegration of the Hellenic body social, Christianity and Mithraism and the worships of Isis and Cybele did compete with the weapons of the spirit in the arena of the Roman Empire. At this juncture, however, the course of history was abruptly changed by a sudden and dramatic reversal in the relations between the apparently victorious Babylonian and the apparently vanquished Syriac Society.

This *peripeteia* was the retribution for the unusual deadliness of the injury which the Babylonian dominant minority had inflicted upon itself, during the Babylonian 'Time of Troubles', as well as upon the alien societies within striking distance. Out of the four national states—Babylonia, Assyria, Elam, and Urartu—into which the Babylonian body social had been articulated, one—Assyria—had been annihilated and two others—Elam and Urartu—had been prostrated and overwhelmed by the beginning of the sixth century B.C.; and the sole survivor—Babylonia—who was left to establish the Babylonian universal state, was suffering too severely from the shock of the Assyro-Babylonian Hundred-and-Forty Years' War to be capable of executing this heavy task single-handed. Babylonia could never have carried the long duel with her far more powerful Assyrian sister to a victorious conclusion if the Iranian barbarians had not lent her their formidably decisive aid;¹ and, while the Neo-Babylonian Empire was attempting to serve as a Babylonian universal state, it was living all the time under the shadow of a Median peril. This peril might perhaps have been exorcized, or at any rate mitigated, if the menacing barbarians had been converted to the Babylonian Civilization; but, as we have seen, the Iranians were actually converted to the Syriac Civilization instead;² and therewith, for Nabonidus and Belshazzar, the menace of a barbarian avalanche was merged in the still more terrible menace of a Syriac encircle-

¹ In this respect Babylonia's victory over Assyria with the aid of Median arms at the close of the seventh century B.C. may be compared with France's victory in A.D. 1918 over Germany with the aid of the English-speaking Powers. In A.D. 1938 it looked as though the same historical drama might be re-acted by China, Japan, and the Soviet Union.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79-81; II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 137-8; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), vol. iv, p. 471, above.

ment. The blow fell; the roles were reversed; the Achaemenian Empire supplanted the Neo-Babylonian Empire as the political framework within which the two rising religions of Judaism and Zoroastrianism were to propagate themselves; and the Achaemenian Empire was a Syriac and not a Babylonian universal state; for it was an empire in which the Babylonians found themselves a subject and aggrieved instead of a ruling and self-satisfied community,¹ while the new Iranian masters of South-Western Asia allowed the Babylonians' Jewish victims to return from exile to their Syrian fatherland and took the Babylonians' Phoenician vassals into an honourable partnership in the management of an empire which dwarfed Nebuchadnezzar's.²

¹ See the present chapter, p. 94, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, p. 347, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 442, below.

² Under the Achaemenian régime the four Phoenician city-states—Sidon, Tyre, Byblus, Aradus—each not only enjoyed their own local autonomy, but were actually allowed by the Achaemenian Imperial Government to reign respectively over four miniature *imperia in imperio*. The island city-state of Aradus was mistress on the mainland of a territory which included Marathus and Mariamme and extended eastward from the coast into the interior right up to the Orontes. On Sidon the Achaemenidae bestowed the Plain of Sharon, including Dora and Joppa, while Tyre bore rule over Ascalon and over some city, unidentified, on the coast of the Bay of Acre. Gaza and Ashdod seem to have been the only two Philistine cities that escaped 'mediatization' (to use the corresponding technical term in the constitutional vocabulary of the Holy Roman Empire) and that continued to depend directly upon the Achaemenian Pādishāh instead of being subordinated to one or other of the four Phoenician imperial cities (see Jones, A. H. M.: *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press), pp. 234-5). In the fourth century B.C. the Phoenician city-states were federated with one another—the seat of the federal institutions being at Tripolis (Jones, op. cit., pp. 231-2; Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 138-40). On the other hand the general Achaemenian policy of studied respect for pre-existing local institutions—political, legal, and religious—was eventually defeated in Babylonia by the irreconcilable hostility of the Babylonians to an alien dominion, however moderately exercised and discreetly veiled. Whereas Cyrus had been careful to have himself installed as legitimate King of Babylon, in so far as legitimacy could be conferred by a strict observance of the traditional ceremonies of investiture (see Meyer, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 129), Xerxes followed Sennacherib's example in deliberately refraining from 'taking the hands of Bel' on New Year's Day, 484 B.C. The revolt of Babylonia in the autumn of the same year was the last act of Babylonian recalcitrance with which the Achaemenian Government had to contend, for it was suppressed with such severity that, for the next hundred and fifty years, Babylonia lay sullenly passive under the Achaemenian yoke, until Alexander entered Babylon as a liberator and raised the temple of Bel from its ruins (Meyer, op. cit., pp. 129-32; cf. the present chapter of the present Study, p. 94, above, as well as V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 347-8, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 442, below). The overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Macedonian arms brought with it a reversal of fortune for Phoenicia as well as for Babylonia. Before Alexander had been welcomed as a liberator by Babylon he had taken Tyre by storm and had put her to the sack in reprisal for her obstinate loyalty to the lost cause of the last Darius. Thereafter, under a Seleucid régime which continued to treat Babylonia with Alexander's considerateness (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 56-7), the Phoenicians suffered further reverses. For example, in 259 B.C., when the Aradian monarchy was replaced by republican institutions in the imperial city itself, the Aradian empire on the mainland was simultaneously broken up into city-state republics each depending directly upon the Seleucid Government. When the Seleucid Empire itself broke up at the turn of the second and the last century B.C., Aradus recovered her dominion over Marathus and some other fragments of her former continental empire (Jones, op. cit., pp. 239-40), but in 38 B.C. these possessions were taken away from her again, and this time once for all, by Marcus Antonius (Jones, op. cit., pp. 261-2). These blows were not offset by the spread of Phoenician, at the heels of Greek, traders eastward, overland, into 'Upper Asia' (see Tarn, op. cit., p. 10).

The transformation of the Achaemenian Empire from a semi-Babylonian into a wholly

In a world in which the turn of Fortune's wheel had thus put down the Babylonians from their seat and had exalted Zoroaster's Achaemenian converts and the Jews' Phoenician cousins, the triumph of Judaism¹ and Zoroastrianism might have been expected to be more certain and more rapid than it would have been if Belshazzar's Kingdom had not been given to the Medes and Persians.² But Fortune intervened again to give another unexpected

Syriac universal state can be followed in the history of the Achaemenian Government's official scripts and languages. For inscriptions on stone the Babylonian cuneiform script was employed, and every inscription was trilingual—the three languages in which it was inscribed being those of the three official capitals: Elamite for Susa, Medo-Persian for Ecbatana, and Assyro-Babylonian for Babylon (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 28). For the conveyance of the Medo-Persian language a special simplified version of the cuneiform script was devised. Under the later Achaemenids, however, there was a noticeable increase in the faultiness of the rendering of the cuneiform script, and this suggests that it had come by then to be an anachronism which was being perpetuated officially after it had been abandoned in ordinary life (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 48). *Pari passu* with this decay of the cuneiform script there was an increase in the vogue of the Aramaic script and language. Under the Achaemenian régime Aramaic was the official provincial language for all the western provinces of the Empire—including Egypt and Anatolia, where it was not indigenous as a vernacular (Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–8, and *idem*: *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine* (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs), p. 17; the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), p. 499, below). The Persian language itself was already being written in Aramaic characters on papyrus before the end of the Achaemenian Age (Meyer, *Papyrusfund*, p. 17).

¹ Eduard Meyer has gone so far as to declare that 'Judaism is a creation of the Persian Empire' (*Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine*, p. 96).

² The propagation of these would-be universal religions among the population of the Achaemenian Empire must also have been facilitated by the fact that—mild and even benevolent though the Achaemenian *ethos* was by contrast with the Assyrian (Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–5)—the Assyrian practice of uprooting and transplanting was not altogether abandoned under the Achaemenian régime. For example, the Great King colonized the formidably torrid islands in the Persian Gulf by planting them with deportees who were officially known as *les déracinés* (*οἱ ἀνασarroῖ*); and these appear to have been Iranians, to judge by the type of equipment and armament that is ascribed to them in the catalogue of Xerxes' expeditionary force (compare Herodotus, Book III, chap. 93, with Book VII, chap. 80). Apart from these presumably disloyal members of the dominant minority in the Achaemenian Empire, the principal victims of the deportation-policy appear to have been the recalcitrant members of the Greek subject population. Darius the Great's general Otanes 'netted' the island of Samos and swept it bare of all inhabitants (Herodotus, Book III, chap. 140); and other commanders of the same emperor's forces carried away captive to Susa the people of the Greek city of Barca in Libya (Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 204), of the Greek city of Miletus in Ionia (Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 20), and of the Greek city of Eretria in Euboea (Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 119). These four cases of severity were perhaps exceptional; for we are expressly informed by the Greek historian—who would not go out of his way to present the Achaemenian régime in an unduly favourable light—that Otanes was acting, under provocation, in contravention of Darius's orders that the Samians were neither to be massacred nor to be enslaved (Herodotus, Book III, chap. 147), while, as for the deported Eretrians, Darius is recorded to have taken pity on them when he had them in his power and to have settled them comfortably on an estate of his own in Elam (Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 119). The Milesian deportees were settled at the mouth of the River Tigris (Book VI, chap. 20), and the Barcaeans in Bactria (Book IV, chap. 204).

These indications suggest that the favourable picture of the Achaemenidae which has been painted for us in the Jewish tradition is on the whole true to life. The Greeks themselves are, as we have noticed already (in V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 50–2, above), the most impressive of the witnesses in the Persians' favour. It is noteworthy, however, that—to judge by a passing remark of Plato's—the Greeks appear to have assumed that, if they had succumbed to Xerxes, it would have been their fate to have been swallowed up in the Syriac internal proletariat:

'If the common determination of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians had not rescued Hellas from the doom of servitude which was impending over her, by this time the various Hellenic races would have become almost completely confounded with one another—and likewise the non-Hellenic with the Hellenes, and *vice versa*—to judge by the appalling present condition of the populations under the Persian yoke, which

turn to the course of events. She now delivered the Kingdom of the Medes and Persians into the hands of a Macedonian conqueror; a violent intrusion of the Hellenic Society upon the Syriac World broke the Syriac universal state in pieces long before its role was played out; and therewith the two 'higher religions' which had been converting men's souls under the Achaemenian aegis¹ were driven into the disastrous aberration of exchanging their proper religious function for a political role.² Each on its own ground, they became champions of the Syriac Civilization in its secular struggle against the Hellenism that had intruded have been quite disintegrated by being interlarded and kneaded up together' (Plato: *Leges*: 692B-693A).

¹ We have little information about the spread of Judaism and Zoroastrianism among the population of the Achaemenian Empire before the Achaemenian régime was overthrown by Alexander; but by inference from the rather less fragmentary evidence relating to the subsequent age of the Hellenic ascendancy we can gather that Zoroastrianism found a welcome in Anatolia (particularly in Cappadocia: see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 128-9) and Judaism in the region that had once been Assyria (particularly in Adiabene). The uprooted Babylonians who were transplanted by the Assyrian war-lord Sargon to the territory which had once been the Kingdom of Israel became converted to a bastard form of the religion of Israel. The picturesque story in the Second Book of Kings (chap. xvii, vv. 24-41) is manifestly tinged with legend and tainted with the Jews' notorious anti-Samaritan prejudice; yet its account of the genesis of the Samaritan religion as a syncretism between the worship which the deportees found in their new home and the worship which they brought with them from their old homes is borne out by the evidence of Aramaic papyri, dating from the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., which have been discovered at Eléphantine by our modern Western archaeologists and which relate to the affairs—including the religious life—of a Jewish military colony in this frontier-fortress of the Achaemenian Empire; for the Judaism of this colony had in it a strong tincture of Babylonian polytheism; and this tincture is most easily accounted for on the hypothesis that the colony was of mixed Jewish and Samaritan origin (see van Hoonacker, A.: *Une Communauté Juéo-Araméenne à Eléphantine, en Égypte, aux vi^e et v^e siècles av. J.-C.* (London 1915, Milford), especially pp. 73-85). The Biblical story may thus be taken to be true in essence—and true not only of the Samaritans themselves but of hundreds of other communities of exiles whose history has not been preserved even in the literature of their enemies. As time went on, the new Israelitish elements in the religion of the Babylonian settlers in Samaria must have gained the upper hand over the ancestral worship which the settlers had brought in with them; for the Samaritan religion, as we know it to-day, has the appearance of being a rudimentary or a degenerate form of Judaism, with no conspicuous traces of Babylonian accretions. (A possible explanation of this victory of an indigenous over an imported religion in Samaria has been suggested on p. 118, footnote 3, above.) After the reorganization, on an ecclesiastical basis, of the repatriated Jewish community at Jerusalem, the *ci-devant* Babylonian community at Samaria seem to have adopted the Torah from their little-loved neighbours in Palestine under the direction of some renegade Hierosolymitan priests (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 214; according to the same scholar, *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine* (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs), pp. 80-1, the Samaritans accepted Ezra's reform in all particulars save the centring of the worship of Yahweh upon Jerusalem, for which the Samaritans substituted their own Mount Gerizim). If this has been the history of the Samaritan religion, it gives us a glimpse, in one local instance, of the general process of assimilation through which the whole of the Babylonian body social, with the single exception of the outlying city-state of Harran, was absorbed into the Syriac body social before the beginning of the Christian Era. The strange survival of the Babylonian culture in Harran down to the age of the 'Abbasid Caliphate has been mentioned in another context already (in IV, C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 101, footnote 1, above). The cause of this survival seems to have been the tenacity of the Babylonian outpost at Harran in clinging to an ancestral worship—a tenacity which contrasts very sharply with the pliancy of the Babylonian exiles at Samaria in capitulating to the god whom they found in the land to which they had been transplanted.

² For a general discussion of the relations between 'higher religions' and political potentates see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, below.

upon the Syriac domain.¹ Judaism, in its advanced position west of the Euphrates, was inevitably cast for the part of 'forlorn hope', and it duly broke itself against the overwhelmingly greater material power of Rome in the Romano-Jewish wars of A.D. 66-70 and 115-17 and 132-5.² Zoroastrianism, in its fastness east of Zagros, took up the struggle in the third century of the Christian Era under less desperately unequal conditions. In the Sasanian Monarchy Zoroastrianism found a more potent weapon for an anti-Hellenic 'crusade' than Judaism had been able to forge out of the petty principality of the Maccabees; and the Sasanidae gradually wore down the strength of the Roman Empire in a four-hundred-years-long struggle which culminated in the two great Romano-Persian wars of A.D. 572-91 and A.D. 603-28. This strategy of attrition, however, was even more destructive to the Zoroastrian Church Militant than it was to the Hellenic adversary; and in the end Zoroastrianism had to pay as heavily as Jewry for having lent itself to a political enterprise.³ At the present day the Parsees, like the Jews, survive as a *mère* 'Diasporà'; and the petrified religion which still so potently holds the scattered members of either community together has lost its message for Mankind and has hardened into a 'fossil'⁴ of the extinct Syriac Society in the particular phase of disintegration in which that society happened to find itself at the moment when it was smitten by the impact of Hellenism in the fourth century B.C.⁵

This impact of an alien cultural force did not merely divert the 'higher religions' of the Syriac internal proletariat into political paths: it also split them into fragments, as the stones of a cathedral are splintered by the explosion of a shell, or as a beam of light is diffracted when it is intercepted by a prism. After the transformation of Judaism and Zoroastrianism into instruments of Syriac

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-1; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 203; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 234-6; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285-6 and 374; IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, p. 225, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 262-3, above, as well as V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 657-61, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 120-3, below.

² See the present chapter, p. 68, above.

³ There was, of course, a native vein of militancy in a religion which conceived of the Universe as a battlefield in a cosmic war between opposing forces of Light and Darkness; but in the Achaemenian Age the Achaemenian emperors refrained from using their political power for the forcible propagation of a religion to which the Imperial House itself had become converted. (For this Achaemenian tolerance see further V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 704-5, below.)

⁴ For these and other 'fossils' of extinct civilizations see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35; I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 234-9, above.

⁵ This unfortunate change in the *ethos* of both Judaism and Zoroastrianism is revealed in the pathological exaggeration, in both religions in their petrified state, of the elements of ritual and legal observance (for the Jewish case, see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 262-3, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), Annex, vol. iv, p. 638, above). The change might be described with equal truth in another way by saying that, in their petrified state, Judaism and Zoroastrianism had each partially relapsed from the level of the 'higher religions' towards the lower level of the primitive tribal religions from which both these faiths had originally sprung.

political opposition to a Hellenic dominant minority, the Syriac religious genius took refuge among those elements in the Syriac population under Hellenic ascendancy which were reacting to the challenge in the gentle and not in the violent way; and, in giving birth to Christianity and Mithraism as its contributions to the spiritual travail of a Hellenic internal proletariat,¹ Syriac religion found new expressions for a spirit and an outlook which Judaism and Zoroastrianism had repudiated.² In the next chapter after that, we see the still half-submerged Syriac Society seeking to recapture, for its own benefit, some of the virtue that had gone out of Syriac into Hellenic souls in the preaching of Christianity to the Gentiles. Nestorianism and Monophysitism were alternative attempts to purge a Syro-Hellenic religious syncretism of its Hellenic alloy;³ and the Nestorian and Monophysite 'Diasporas' survive to-day as 'fossils' of an extinct Syriac Society as it was when it was making this second abortive attempt to cast the spirit of Hellenism out.⁴

Two successive failures, however, did not reduce the Syriac opponents of Hellenism to the apathy of despair; a third attempt followed, which was crowned with success; and this final political

¹ 'A dying Roman Society was fascinated by the worships of Isis, Serapis, Horus, and Mithras: worships which, once upon a time, a then just dawning soul in the East had conceived as the first dreamy, anxious expression of its existence and had filled with a new inner meaning.'—Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. I (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 155.

² In Mithraism, as in Zoroastrianism (see p. 126, footnote 3, above), there was, of course, a vein of militancy, and this no doubt accounts for the appeal which Mithraism (like Zen Buddhism) is known to have made to soldiers. The historic achievement of Mithraism was not, however, to inspire Iranian knights (as these were inspired by Zoroastrianism in the Sasanian Age) to bear arms in anti-Hellenic crusades. The soldier-converts of the Mithraic Church Militant were Roman legionaries whose professional duty was to hold the Iranian adversaries of Hellenism at bay. Thus, while Zoroastrianism failed to eject by force of arms the Hellenic intruders upon the former domain of the Achaemenian Empire, Mithraism succeeded in captivating Hellenism for an Iranian religion by making a spiritual conquest of Roman soldiers' hearts. On this showing, the spread of Mithraism in the Roman Army, no less than the spread of Christianity among the civilian population of the Roman Empire, is to be interpreted as a triumph of what Mr. Gandhi would call 'soul force'.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. II, pp. 286-7, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. IV, pp. 325-6, above. On the surface the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies were, like Catholic Orthodoxy, part of a dialectical endeavour to express Christian theological tenets in terms of Greek philosophy; and, in the minds of the heresiarchs themselves, this was, no doubt, the very essence of their life-work, and not just a superficial and deceptive aspect of it. They can neither have intended nor foreseen the subsequent conversion of their own abstruse theologico-philosophical propositions into the popular slogans of an Oriental revolt against the ascendancy of Hellenism. The abiding potency of this ascendancy in the fifth century of the Christian Era, some eight hundred years after the date of its first establishment by the arms of Alexander, is attested by the facts that, even as late as this, the Oriental reaction against Hellenism had still to confine itself, west of the Euphrates, to a cultural field of conflict, and that, even on this ground, it found itself constrained to pay homage to the Hellenism which it was combating by fighting its intellectual battle with weapons of Hellenic make. It is no wonder that these weapons proved unavailing for the incongruous purpose which, *faute de mieux*, their Oriental wielders were attempting to make them serve.

⁴ For the possible role of Manichaeism in this chapter of Syriac history see V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex I, on pp. 575-80, below.

triumph of the Syriac Society over Hellenism was achieved through the instrumentality of yet another religion of Syriac origin. Islam had originally been preached to the Arabian external proletariat of the Roman Empire by a prophet whose soul had been stirred by the Syriac religious influences of Judaism and Nestorianism and Monophysitism.¹ The barbarian prophet's energies had then been diverted from a painfully abortive religious mission to a triumphantly successful political career;² and the political unity which Muhammad and his caliphs or temporal successors succeeded in imposing upon the Arabs enabled these barbarians to conquer the Oriental provinces of the Roman Empire with one hand and the whole of the Sasanian Empire with the other, and thereby to complete the undoing of the political work of Alexander the Great by reuniting the Syriac World and re-establishing the Syriac universal state which had been first established by the Achaemenidae.³ Within the framework of the Arab Caliphate, Islam won the prize of which Judaism and Zoroastrianism had been cheated, when it was almost within their grasp, by the distracting military intervention of Alexander. Before the Arab Caliphate broke up, Islam had become the universal church of the Syriac internal proletariat.⁴

This victory of Islam in the Syriac World resembled the victory of Christianity in the Hellenic World in being vigorously contested and hardly won; but the adversaries were not quite the same and the battle was fought with different weapons. Whereas Christianity found its most formidable opponent in the Roman Imperial Government, the Arab Caliphate was Islam's creature, friend, and ally.⁵ On the other hand the rival religious move-

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 276-8, with Annex II, above. It will be seen that there is a close parallelism between the genesis of Islam and the genesis of Zoroastrianism. Both religions came to birth in a barbarian environment; and the barbarian prophets who conceived them were probably both acting under Syriac religious influences (if we are right in our conjecture that Zarathustra may have been influenced by a contact with the Israelite deportees in Iran, as Muhammad was undoubtedly influenced by his contact with the Jewish and Christian 'Diasporas' in Arabia).

² See III. C (ii) (b), Annex II, in vol. iii, above.

³ For this 're-integration' or 'resumption' of the Syriac universal state by the Umayyads and 'Abbasids see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 72-7, above.

⁴ Islam succeeded where Zoroastrianism and Judaism had failed, in spite of the fact that Islam had fallen, in its turn, into the Zoroastrian and Jewish churches' error of 'going into politics'. The date of the Hijrah, which marks the moment when Muhammad abandoned Gentleness for Violence and exchanged the prophet's for the statesman's career, has been rightly taken by later generations of Muslims as the initial date for the Islamic Era, on the ground that the Hijrah made, instead of marring, Islam's fortune. For a possible explanation of this apparent paradox see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, pp. 673-8, below.

⁵ The Caliphate was the friend of Islam under the Umayyad régime and its ally under the 'Abbasid régime which replaced the Umayyad régime in A.D. 750. The Umayyads, of course, as well as the 'Abbasids, were officially Muslims; but the Umayyads' Islam was perfunctory (the fervour of 'Umar II (*imperator* A.D. 717-20) being the exception that proves the rule), and they never dreamed of forcing Islam upon the non-Muslim 'People of the Book' who constituted an overwhelming majority

ments with which the Sunnah had to contend resorted to a physical violence which was not employed by the rivals of Christianity, any more than it was by Christianity itself, in the competition between 'higher religions' in the Roman Empire.

When we peer into the depths of the Syriac underworld in the age of the Sasanian Empire and in the succeeding age of the Arab Caliphate, we behold a spectacle which recalls the dreadful picture of the Hellenic underworld in the last two centuries B.C. The seething cauldron is never quiet, and it boils over periodically in a militant revolt that is apt to be religious in form but economic or political in substance. The Communist prophet Mazdak who set himself to captivate or capture the Sasanian body politic in the fifth century of the Christian Era¹ reminds us of Aristonicus of Pergamum preaching his 'City of the Sun'. The Sicilian slave-wars of 135-131 and 104-100 B.C. have an almost exact analogue in the 'Irāqī slave-war of A.D. 869-83, in which the African Negro slave-gangs on the plantations in the neighbourhood of Basrah defied the 'Abbasid Power as the Roman Power was defied by the Syrian slave-gangs on the plantations round Enna.² And in the outbreaks of the Khārijīs and Carmathians and Ismā'īlīs (or 'Assassins') we seem to see the Zealots and Sicarii of the militant age of Jewish history being recalled to life. The story of a social

of their subjects. In this matter their policy was that of the Achaemenidae, who were Zoroastrians themselves yet never used their political power as an instrument of Zoroastrian religious propaganda. On the other hand the policy of the 'Abbasids towards Islam was rather more like that of the Sasanidae towards Zoroastrianism; for, though the charter which was conferred upon 'the People of the Book' by the Islamic *Shari'ah* inhibited the 'Abbasids from going to the Sasanian length of imposing their own dynastic religion upon their subjects by main force, the 'Abbasids did follow the example of the Sasanidae in making their state into an instrument of their religion and their religion into a pillar of their state. For a further examination of the respective policies of these four dynasties towards the religions to which they severally paid their private allegiance, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 704-5 (for the Achaemenidae), pp. 659-61 (for the Sasanidae), pp. 675-7 and 704 (for the Umayyads), pp. 678 and 706 (for the 'Abbasids).

¹ See Christensen, A.: *Le Règne du Roi Kawadh I et le Communisme Mazdakite* (Copenhagen 1925, Lunos), and eundem: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin & Munksgaard), chap. 7.

² For an account of this revolt of African Negro slaves in 'Irāq in the ninth century of the Christian Era see Nöldeke, Th.: 'A Servile War in the East' in *Sketches from Eastern History*, English translation (London and Edinburgh 1892, Black). The Zanij, as these Negroes were called, were employed by *entrepreneurs* on the heavy work of digging away the nitrous top-layer of the soil on the flats east of Basrah and laying bare, for cultivation, the fertile layer of soil that was to be found below. There were no personal relations between these slaves and their masters; and the slaves were both ill used and exasperated. When they rose, they were joined by the free rural, but not by the free urban, proletariat. Like the Syrian slave-insurgents in Sicily, these African slave-insurgents in 'Irāq had the constructive idea of establishing a state, and their leader 'Alī b. Muhammad (who was either a North Persian from Verzenin near Tīhrān, or else an 'Abd-al-Qaysi Arab from Bahrayn) founded a city, on the Shatt-al-'Arab below Basrah, which he named Mukhtārah. At different moments in the course of their operations the rebels captured Obolla, 'Abbādān, Ahwāz, Basrah, and Wāsit, and, even when the Baghdad Government managed to concentrate its forces against them, they held out stubbornly in their swamp-fastnesses. The war, which began in A.D. 869, was only brought to an end in A.D. 883 by the capture of Mukhtārah itself.

convulsion which begins as a religious or even as a philosophical movement and ends in a political *emeute* recurs again and again; and the fleeting, futile figures of a Theudas and a Judas of Galilee, as they are conjured up before our mind's eye by Gamaliel's contemptuous phrases,¹ are matched in the 'Abbasid Age by the figures of al-Muqanna', 'the Veiled Prophet' of Khurāsān, and Bābak al-Khurrāmī.² Indeed, in the history of the Syriac underworld from the time of the suppression of Mazdak by the Sasanian King Kawādh (Qubādh) I *circa* A.D. 528-9 down to the time of the smoking out of the Assassins' eyrie on Alamūt by the Mongol warlord Hulāgū *circa* A.D. 1255, the prophets of violence are legion; but the rest of their acts, and the evil that they did, are they not written in *The Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects* by the hand of the omniscient Shahrastānī?³

From the first generation of Islam onwards the sufferings and resentments of the disinherited and outcast masses of the Syriac internal proletariat were projected upon the figures of a martyred 'Alī and his martyred sons, whose spiritual stature increased as they passed out of history into legend; and from that time onwards a majority of the upheavals were manifestations in diverse forms of a single Protean Shī'ah.⁴ The author of the Zanj revolt declared himself to be of 'Alid lineage;⁵ and the violent expression of Shī'ism reached its acme in the fighting fraternity of the Carmathians and the murdering fraternity of the Assassins. It is interesting to observe that in the Shī'ah, as in Jewry, the shattering defeat of the militant movements—at the hands of powers which were overwhelmingly stronger than the insurgent proletarians in the physical force in which the insurgents had put their trust—was followed by a revulsion from Violence towards Gentleness. The trade-guild brotherhoods in which the Shī'ah embodied itself from the twelfth

¹ Acts v. 36-7, quoted on p. 73, above.

² For these and other similar upheavals in the Syriac underworld of the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era see Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. i (London 1908, Fisher Unwin), chap. 9.

³ Shahrastānī, Muhammad al-: *كتاب المل والنحل* edited by Cureton, W.: reprint (Leipzig 1923 Harrassowitz).

⁴ For the history of the Shī'ah from the beginning down to the generation of Shāh Ismā'il see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 353-66 and 400-2, above.

⁵ Compare the 'Alid pretensions of the Idrīsī and the Fātimī dynasties of Ifriqiyyah. To claim 'Alid descent was equivalent to claiming a hereditary spiritual grace or even divinity; and the establishment of this religious pretension was of immense political value, since the credulous might be induced to risk their lives in following a prophet in a 'forlorn hope' which they would have regarded as quite desperate if it had been presented to them as a nakedly political enterprise. The Prophet Muhammad himself owed his political success in large measure to the confidence which his prophetic pretensions inspired in his followers' hearts as well as in his own self; and the Apamean slave Eunus, who instigated and led the slave-revolt at Enna which precipitated the first of the Sicilian slave-wars, prepared the ground by attempting to create a reputation for himself as a psychic 'medium' (see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 34, footnote 5, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 383, below).

to the fifteenth century of the Christian Era bore as little resemblance to the Carmathian war-bands or to the Ismā'īlī *camorra* as was borne by the latter-day Jewish rabbinical schools to the Jewish Church Militant of a Judas Maccabaeus or a Simon bar Kōkabā.¹

The Indic and the Sinic Internal Proletariat.

The disintegrating Syriac Society's experience of having its course interrupted by a brusque and violent intrusion of Hellenism befell the Indic Society likewise;² and it is interesting to examine how far, in this case, an identic challenge evoked a similar response.

At the time when the Indic and Hellenic societies made their first preliminary contact—as a result of Alexander's successful destruction of the Achaemenian Empire and his abortive raid into the Indus Valley—the Indic Society was already so far advanced along the road of disintegration that it was on the point of entering upon its universal state,³ and the Indic dominant minority had long since reacted to the ordeal by creating the two philosophical schools of Jainism and Buddhism.⁴ There is no evidence, however, that the Indic internal proletariat had yet discovered any 'higher religions' corresponding to the Zoroastrianism and the Judaism which were in the act of converting the Syriac World at the moment of Alexander's advent.

The first of the transactions that took place between the Indic philosophers and the remarkable alien society which had suddenly loomed up above their western horizon was an attempt, on the Indic philosophers' part, to convert their new neighbours to their own way of life. The Buddhist philosopher-king Aśoka, who occupied the throne of the Indic universal state from 273 to 232 B.C., has bequeathed to us, among his inscriptions, a record of the philosophic missions which he sent, *circa* 259 B.C., to the realms of five of the Epigoni; and a hundred years later, after the first Indic universal state had broken up and the intrusion of Hellenism upon the Indic World had begun—nearly a century and a half after the crossing of the Dardanelles by Alexander of Macedon—with the crossing of the Hindu Kush by Demetrius of Bactria *post* 190 B.C.,⁵ the 'gymnosophists' were given an opportunity of

¹ For this metamorphosis of the Shi'ah see the note by Professor H. A. R. Gibb in I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 400–2, above. See further Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, H.: *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. i, chap. xiv: 'The Dervishes', for the transition from a 'Thisworldly' violence to an 'Otherworldly' non-violence that accompanied the replacement of the Bātinīs by the Sūfīs.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 84–8, above.

³ Alexander's raid on the fringes of the Indic World took place in 327–325 B.C.; Chandragupta established the Indic universal state in 323–322 B.C.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 1, p. 58, above.

⁵ On this question of date see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86, above. Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 133, dates Demetrius's crossing of the Hindu Kush *circa* 183–182 B.C.

preaching to a Hellenic war-lord on their own ground, in the heart of the Indic World itself, when the flood tide of the Hellenic military invasion left Demetrius's lieutenant and successor Menander high and dry between Indus and Ganges.

This Indic philosophical propaganda had a promising field in the Hellenic Society of the age; for the Hellenic, like the Indic, Civilization was in disintegration; and Buddhism offered—for any dominant minority that was sick in soul and was conscious of its sickness—a spiritual remedy which was more radical and more courageous than the existing native Hellenic philosophical systems of Platonism and Cynicism and Epicureanism and Stoicism. A disciple of any of these Hellenic schools would have found himself at home in the spiritual climate of Buddhism;¹ and, while he would have felt himself to be in the presence of a spirit which was a match for his own in its intellectual power of penetrating to the heart of things, he would have recognized that the Indic was superior to the Hellenic philosophy in its moral power of acting up to its formidable convictions.² Of the five Hellenic princes to whose countries Acoka dispatched his philosophic missionaries, at least one—Antigonus Gonatas—was an admirer of Zeno³ who might have been fired with a deeper admiration for the still more austere and masterly genius of Siddhārtha Gautama. The results of Aṣoka's mission to the Hellenes are, however, unknown, and this negative evidence suggests that they cannot have been very striking, while it would be rash to infer that Buddhism made a serious impression upon Menander⁴ from the fact that this Hellenic intruder's name has been taken in vain by a Buddhist man-of-letters as a label for one of the characters in an imaginary philosophical dialogue.⁵ We can only say that, as a philosophy, Buddhism had and saw, but missed, a chance of captivating the Hellenic dominant minority and driving the native schools of Hellenic philosophy off the field before the lists were entered by any proletarian-born religion. This, of course, was not the end of the story; for, in spite of having lost this golden opportunity, Buddhism did eventually take by storm the outlying, yet extensive and important, province of the post-Alexandrine Hellenic World which was occupied by the Greek

¹ For evidence of this see V. C (i) (d) 10, *passim*, vol. vi, pp. 132-48, and the passage quoted from Mr. Edwyn Bevan in V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, pp. 151-52, below.

² See further V. C (i) (d) 10, vol. vi, p. 140, below.

³ See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 249, below.

⁴ In the opinion of W. W. Tarn: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 269, it would be 'quite unsafe to call' Menander 'a Buddhist even in the limited sense in which Antigonus Gonatas, the nearest analogy, is sometimes called a Stoic'.

⁵ The *Milindapañha* or *Questions of Menander*. Tarn (in op. cit., Excursus, pp. 414-36) brings forward reasons for supposing that this Pāli work may have been at least partly inspired by a Greek original.

Kingdom of Bactria and its Eurasian Nomad 'successor-states', and which embraced a conquered Indic territory in the Basin of the Indus and Ganges as well as a conquered Syriac territory in the Basin of the Oxus and Jaxartes.¹ But Buddhism did not make this triumphant spiritual counter-conquest until it had undergone an extraordinary metamorphosis² through which the old philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama became transformed into the new religion of the Mahāyāna.³

'The Mahāyāna is a truly new religion, so radically different from Early Buddhism that it exhibits as many points of contact with later Brahmanical religions as with its own predecessor. . . . It never has been fully realized what a radical revolution had transformed the

¹ For the political unification of these Indic and Syriac territories under the Hellenic rule of Bactrian Greek war-lords see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 371-2, above. This unification under the rule of the Euthydemid Greek dynasty was short lived; for the conqueror Demetrius does not seem to have crossed the Hindu Kush before 183 B.C. or to have occupied the fallen Mauryan Empire's capital at Pataliputra before about 175 B.C., and the fatal division of the Greek Power in the Far East, through the invasion of the Euthydemid Empire by the Seleucid legitimist claimant Eucratides, seems to have occurred not later than 168 B.C. (Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 132-3). The still vast but no longer united Greek dominions east of Khurāsān were then soon overrun by Nomad invaders from the Eurasian Steppe (see V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 239-40, with Annex II, below). In or shortly before 130 B.C. the Yuechi occupied the Upper Oxus and Jaxartes Basin (Sogdiana and Bactria) up to the line of the Hindu Kush; and, when the Sakas and Parsians who invaded Parthia in 129 B.C. were beaten by the Suren between 124 and 115 B.C., the Parsians compensated themselves by ousting the Greeks, some time before 87 B.C., from Cōphēnē (round the head-waters of the Hilmand and Kābul rivers) and the Sakas by ousting them from Patalēnē (the Indus Delta), Surāshtra (Kathiāwār and Gujerāt), Taxila (the Western Panjab), Gandhāra (the Lower Kābul Valley), and the Paropamisadae (the Upper Kābul Valley) between circa 110 and circa 60 B.C. Thereafter the last Greek principalities in the Kābul Valley and in the Eastern Panjab were extinguished by the Persian masters of Cōphēnē circa 30 B.C., and then in A.D. 19 this Persian Empire, together with the remnants of the Saka Empire in Sind and Surāshtra, was conquered by the Parthian Suren Gondophares. It was, however, not the eastern wing of the Parthians but one of the five war-bands of the Yuechi that achieved a lasting reunification of the dominions which Demetrius the son of Euthydemus had held together between 175 and 168 B.C. The Kushans united all the five Yuechi principalities in Bactria and Sogdiana under their own sovereignty and at the same time made conquests in the Indic World which were almost, if not quite, as wide as those of Demetrius himself; and they presented themselves to their subjects as the extinct Greek princes' legitimate heirs. As early as about 50 B.C. the Kushan chief Miaoos seems to have lent the Greek prince Hermaeus, in the Paropamisadae, military assistance against the Parsians of Cōphēnē, and to have been given a Greek princess in marriage as part of his reward (Tarn, op. cit., pp. 342-3); and it was Miaoos' descendant Kadphises I (*reigned* post A.D. 25-A.D. 50) who united the Yuechi under Kushan rule and began the Kushan conquest of India (*ibid.*, p. 338). There is numismatic evidence (examined *ibid.*, pp. 503-7) which seems to show that Kadphises I Kushan made the most of his descent from Hermaeus's family in order to win the sympathies of the Greek and Philhellene elements in the population of the Paropamisadae when he was contending with a Parthian antagonist for the possession of this Indic country. The Sakas, as well as the Kushans, were successors of the Greeks in India in the sense that they took over, unchanged, their Greek predecessors' institutions: e.g. their administrative system, their coinage, and their calendar (*ibid.* pp. 241-3, 300, 323, 358-9). 'The Sakas simply stepped into the shoes of the Greeks; Indian writers regularly classed them with the Yavanas, and regarded them, as they regarded the Yavanas, as imperfect Kshatriyas' (p. 323).

² A clear account of this, in small compass, will be found in Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Japanese Buddhism* (London 1935, Arnold), pp. 74-87.

³ Seven distinctive notes of the Mahāyāna are set out in Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 6.

Buddhist Church when the new spirit—which, however, was for a long time lurking in it—arrived at full eclosion in the first centuries A.D. When we see an atheistic, soul-denying philosophic teaching of a path to personal final deliverance, consisting in an absolute extinction of life¹ and a simple worship of the memory of its human founder—when we see it superseded by a magnificent High Church with a Supreme God, surrounded by a numerous pantheon and a host of saints: a religion highly devotional,² highly ceremonious and clerical, with an ideal of universal salvation of all living creatures, a salvation by the divine grace of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, a salvation not in annihilation but in eternal life—we are fully justified in maintaining that the history of religions has scarcely witnessed such a break between new and old within the pale of what nevertheless continues to claim common descent from the same religious founder.³

The transformed Buddhism which, in the shape of the Mahāyāna, was now invading the far eastern extremity of a vastly expanded Hellenic World was, in fact, an Indic 'higher religion' of the same type as the Syriac and Egyptiac and Hittite 'higher religions'—Christianity and Mithraism and the worships of Isis and Cybele—that were invading the heart of the Hellenic World in the same age. Like these other alien competitors for the conversion of Hellenic souls, the Mahāyāna made itself doubly attractive to its public by combining a comfortable conformity to the externals of the Hellenic culture with the offer of an inward spiritual treasure which was the great thing lacking in the native Hellenic heritage and which was therefore desirable in Hellenic eyes just in virtue of being exotic.⁴ On the one hand the Mahāyāna seized upon the mediocre version of Hellenic art which was current in the outlying Kingdom of Bactria and its barbarian 'successor-states', and drew from this unpromising source⁵ the inspiration for one of the most sublime and creative schools of art that have yet been produced by the co-operation of the religious with the aesthetic faculty of the Human Spirit.⁶ On the other hand the Mahāyāna offered to a

¹ A more precise account of the Primitive Buddhist conception of *Nirvāṇa*, from the same pen, will be found in V. C (i) (d) 10, vol. vi, pp. 142-3, below. The view that Siddhārtha Gautama conceived of *Nirvāṇa* as a negation of existence, and that he also denied the existence of God and of the Self, is challenged by Sir S. Radhakrishnan in *Gautama the Buddha* (London 1938, Milford), pp. 31-50.—A.J.T.

² For this new vein of emotion, which was not to be found either in the primitive Buddhist philosophy or in the primitive Aryan paganism, see further pp. 135-6, below.—A.J.T.

³ Stcherbatsky, Th.: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* (Leningrad 1927, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.), p. 36.

⁴ See the present chapter, pp. 86-7, above.

⁵ There was, of course, one brilliant exception to the mediocrity of this Far Eastern Greek art, and that was its coinage.

⁶ This resurrection of Hellenic art through the religious power of the Mahāyāna has been noticed, by anticipation, in III C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 131, and III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 247, footnote 2, above. 'The art of Gandhāra was born of Buddhist piety utilizing Yavana technique' (Tarn, op. cit., p. 393, following Grousset). See further the present Study, V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 196, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (β), p. 481, below.

Hellenic convert the un-Hellenic religious experience of an intimate personal relation between the worshipper and his god:¹ a relation of mutual love in which the worshipper's devotion (*bhakti*)² was a response to the god's loving-kindness towards his devotee.

What was the origin of this personal religion which was both the distinctive trait of the Mahāyāna and the secret of its success? This new leaven, which changed the spirit of Buddhism so profoundly, was as alien from the native vein of the Indic as it was from that of the Hellenic philosophy.³ Was it the fruit of the

¹ The Hellenic conception of Man's relation to God is illuminatingly illustrated by some observations of Aristotle's in a passage (1158b-1159a) of his *Ethica Nicomachea*: 'There would appear to be a difference in the meaning of the term equality in its respective applications in the realm of rights and in that of friendship. In the realm of rights moral equality is primary and quantitative equality secondary, whereas in the realm of friendship this order of precedence is inverted. This is clear where there is a wide discrepancy in goodness, badness, wealth or what not; for such a discrepancy rules out not only the possibility of friendship but even the pretension to it. This is most evident in the case of gods, who enjoy a crushing superiority in advantages of all kinds; but it is also clear in the case of kings; for no pretension to friendship with kings, any more than with gods, is made by their extreme inferiors—and likewise none to friendship with the moral and intellectual *élite* by people of no account. It is, no doubt, impossible exactly to define the limit up to which friends can still remain friends in despite of a quantitative inequality between them. Friendship can survive the subtraction of many advantages [from one of the two parties], but it cannot survive where the gulf has become as broad as that which separates a god [from a man]. This raises the puzzling question whether a friend can really desire for his friend superlative advantages; for being a god is an advantage that is assuredly superlative, and yet, when your friend has become a god, you can no longer be a friend for him, and therefore no longer an asset (which is what a friend is). If, therefore, we have been right in supposing that a friend's motive in desiring advantages for his friend is altruistic, then he is bound to want his friend to remain the mere human being that he now is.'

² An analysis of the meaning of *bhakti* will be found in Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 180-4.

³ The contrast between this aspect of the Mahāyāna and the authentic doctrine and ethos of the historical Buddha, Siddhārtha Gautama, is brought out very clearly in Stcherbatsky, Th.: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* (Leningrad 1927, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.). 'The denial of soul as a separate substance . . . provoked, in the Buddhist community itself, opposition which grew ever stronger and resulted, five hundred years after the demise of the Master, in what may be called a quite new religion, reposing on a quite different philosophic foundation' (p. 4). 'The great change produced by the Mahāyāna consisted in the view that the Absolute was immanent to the World' (p. 34). 'The rise of the Mahāyāna was part of the same movement as the rise of the worship of Vishnu and Shiva—pantheism and a radical monism being common features of the Mahayanian and the Hindu faith (pp. 50-1). 'Buddhist art of the ancient period represented Buddha by an empty place or a symbol, which later on is replaced by a divine figure of the Apollo type. . . . The only explanation [of the former manner of representation] seems to be that the total disappearance of Buddha in Nirvana was thus given pictorial expression' (ibid., p. 36, footnote 2)—whereas, in the Mahāyāna, 'the sage Gautama became in practice, if not in theory, a god, with his ears open to the prayers of the faithful, and served by a hierarchy of Bodhisattvas and other beings acting as mediators between him and sinful men' (Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 266). For the role of Love in the Mahāyāna see further V. C. (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, p. 164, footnote 3, below. 'The Buddha-statue played its part in that conversion of [the] Buddha from a man into a god which took place in the Mahāyāna' (Tarn, op. cit., pp. 407-8). Both the idea of representing the Buddha in human form and the earliest of the types in which this idea was worked out were of Hellenic origin; and Tarn (op. cit., pp. 395-404) demonstrates, from a piece of numismatic evidence, that the prototype of the Apollinean statue of the Buddha must have been carved, at latest, early in the last century B.C. The Indic artists accepted the Hellenic device of anthropomorphism but discarded the Apollinean type in favour of a more spiritual representation of their saviour (ibid., pp. 405-7).

spiritual experience of an Indic internal proletariat which had previously been ignored by the supercilious philosopher-members of the dominant minority, and which was belatedly entering into its kingdom now that the philosophers' confidence in their own spiritual powers had been shaken by the impact of Hellenism? This conjecture is suggested by the fact that the Mahāyāna was not the only Indic 'higher religion' in which the spirit of *bhakti* made its appearance.¹ Or was this vital fire in the Mahāyāna no Indic fire at all, but a spark caught from the Syriac flame which had already kindled Zoroastrianism and Judaism and was soon to kindle Mithraism and Christianity as well? This latter conjecture is commended by the chronological fact that the epiphany of the Mahāyāna was preceded by the fusion of Indic with Syriac populations under the rule of the Greek kings of Bactria and their Kushan successors. In default of patent evidence, however, we must confess that the provenance of the vital element in the Mahāyāna is still uncertain.² We must be content to take note of the fact that, with the arrival of this Buddhaic 'higher religion' upon the scene, the religious history of the Indic Society began to take the same course as that of the Syriac Society which we have already surveyed.

As a 'higher religion' which went forth from the society in whose bosom it had arisen in order to evangelize a dominant Hellenic World, the Mahāyāna is manifestly an Indic counterpart of Christianity and Mithraism; and, with this key in our hands, we can easily identify the respective Indic counterparts of the other rays into which the light of Syriac religion was diffracted by the interposition of a Hellenic prism. If we look for the Indic equivalent of those 'fossils' of the pre-Hellenic state of the Syriac Society that have survived in the shapes of the Jewish and Parsee 'Diasporas', we shall find what we are looking for in the latter-day Hinayanian Buddhism of Ceylon and Burma and Siam, which is a relic of the pre-Mahayanian philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama and a 'fossil' of the Indic Society as it was before Demetrius of Bactria crossed the Hindu Kush.³ Again, if we look for the Indic equivalent of a later-deposited stratum of Syriac 'fossils' which is represented by the Nestorian and Mono-

¹ It asserted itself simultaneously in the rise of the post-Buddhaic religion of Hinduism (see p. 138, below).

² The hypothesis of a Zoroastrian provenance is combated by Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), pp. 178-9. On the other hand it is more favourably entertained by Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, pp. 218-22. In particular, Sir Charles Eliot points out the singular closeness of the resemblance between Amitābha's paradise and Ahuramazda's. Cf. *ibid.*, vol. cit., pp. 451-4.

³ For these Hinayanian 'fossils' of an extinct Indic Society see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35, and I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2, above.

physite 'Diasporàs' and fastnesses to-day, we shall find what we are looking for, here again, in the latter-day Tantric Mahayanian Buddhism of Tibet and Mongolia.¹ We have sought to explain Nestorianism and Monophysitism as a pair of Syriac attempts to combat Hellenism, not by the crudely militant tactics of Macabaeian Judaism and Sasanian Zoroastrianism, but by the subtler method of purging the Hellenic alloy out of the Syro-Hellenic religious syncretism of Christianity.² On this analogy we may discern in the Tantric version of the Mahāyāna an attempt to provide a 'de-Hellenized' variety of an Indic religion for those 'Zealots' in the Indic World in whose eyes the Catholic form of the Mahāyāna was vitiated—whether they were aware or not of the true reason for their distaste—by its Hellenic tinge. At any rate, the Tantric version of the Mahāyāna had the same fate as Nestorianism and Monophysitism in missing fire;³ and, just as the Syriac Society had to wait for the emergence of Islam in order to lay its hand upon a religion which was capable of serving as an effective instrument for casting Hellenism out, so we find that the complete and final expulsion of the intrusive Hellenic spirit from the Indic body social was accomplished, not through a 'de-Hellenized' version of the Mahāyāna, but through the purely Indic and utterly un-Hellenic religious movement of post-Buddhaic Hinduism.

This post-Buddhaic Hinduism, which eventually provided the internal proletariat of the Indic Society with its universal church, is an elusive creature. If we fix our attention upon the fact that—in deliberate reaction against every form of Buddhism, pristine or transfigured, philosophic or religious—Hinduism accepts and consecrates the social ascendancy of the Brahman caste, we may be inclined to see nothing more in Hinduism than an archaistic⁴ revival of the primitive paganism of the barbarian Aryas whose *Völkerwanderung* into India out of the Eurasian Steppe was the prelude to the birth and growth of the Indic

¹ For the conversion of the Mongols and the Calmucks to this Tantric form of the Mahāyāna see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 451, IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), vol. iv, p. 497, and the present chapter and volume, p. 116, above.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 286-7, and the present chapter and volume, p. 127, above.

³ The parallelism in the diffraction of the Syriac and the Indic religion has a politico-geographical aspect which has been touched upon already in II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1, above. The Tantric version of the Mahāyāna, like the Nestorian form of Christianity, found an asylum beyond the political pale of Hellenism—Nestorianism in 'Irāq, beyond the eastern frontier of the Roman Empire; the Tantric Mahāyāna in Bengal, beyond the eastern limits of the Bactrian and the Kushan Kingdom. When Nestorianism was supplanted in the plains of 'Irāq by its more effective successor Islam, it found a fastness for itself in the highlands of Kurdistan and a new world to conquer on the Eurasian Steppe. Similarly the Tantric Mahāyāna held out upon the plateau of Tibet and eventually spread from Tibet into Mongolia after the Nestorian 'Diasporā' in Mongolia had died out.

⁴ For the phenomenon of Archaism in the field of Religion see V. C (i) (d) 8 (δ), vol. vi, pp. 83-94, below.

Civilization;¹ for this Aryan paganism had continued to hold the field in the Indic World until the breakdown of the Indic Civilization evoked the 'mental strife' that expressed itself in the Jain and Buddhist philosophies, and one of the outstanding features in the development of this primitive religion during the growth-phase of Indic history was a steady increase in the Brahmans' prestige and power. On the other hand, if we contemplate the philosophical side of the post-Buddhaic Hinduism, and observe how, among those Hindus who claim to be the greatest adepts, this aspect of Hinduism tends to push all other aspects into the background, we may be inclined to see in Hinduism, not a revival of Aryan paganism, but a mimesis of Buddhist philosophy.² We shall not, however, divine the essential nature of Hinduism until we turn our eyes to that personal relation between the god and his devotee³ which—in contrast to the primitive pre-Buddhaic Aryan paganism⁴—the Hindu worships of Vishnu and Shiva have in common with the Mahayanian worships of the Bodhisattvas⁵ and the Egyptiac worship of Isis and the Hittite worship of Cybele and the Syriac worships of Mithras and Christ;⁶ and in the light of this comparison we shall perceive that, under a twofold disguise, this Hinduism is in truth a representative of that now familiar 'higher' species of religions that are brought to birth, out of the agony of disintegrating civilizations, by the poignant spiritual experience of their internal proletariats.

¹ For this Völkerwanderung of the Aryas see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104-7, above.

² The Mahāyāna did not, of course, cease to be a philosophy in becoming a religion as well. In fact, its metamorphosis into a religion was a consequence of its particular philosophic bent, and it is this Mahayanian bent that is followed by the post-Buddhaic Hindu philosophy of the Vedānta. (For the points in common between the Mahayanian philosophy and the Vedānta, and for the reciprocal influence of these two philosophies upon one another from the first to the seventh century after Christ, see Stcherbatsky, Th.: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* (Leningrad 1927, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.), pp. 38 and 61; Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. xi; vol. ii, p. 211.)

³ See Aiyangar, S. K.: *Some Contributions of South India to Indian Culture* (Calcutta 1923, University Press), pp. 209, 212, and 228.

⁴ For the differences between the pre-Buddhaic religion of the Vedas and the post-Buddhaic Hinduism see Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 136-9.

⁵ See p. 136, footnote 1, above. For the common origin of the Hindu worships of Vishnu and Shiva and the Mahayanian cults of Bodhisattvas see Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 12; Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), pp. 178 and 194. For the affinity and contemporaneity of the Hindu worship of Krishna with the Mahayanian cult of Amitābha see Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism*, pp. 87 and 392-3.

⁶ While these Indic and Syriac worships can all be classed in one category in virtue of the personal relation, which is to be found in them all, between the worshipper and his god, Christianity differs from all the rest in demanding a devotion that is not merely personal and emotional but is also exclusive. For this difference between Christianity and the worships of Vishnu and Shiva see further V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 47-9, below. For the possibly Hellenic and Syriac origin of the anthropomorphism and image-worship which are two of the most conspicuous non-Vedic features of the post-Buddhaic Hinduism, see Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. ii, pp. 139 and 171-5.

We have seen that the Indic philosophy—and the religion into which it was transformed at a certain stage of its development—was diffracted, like the Syriac religion, into four separate rays of philosophic or religious light, and that two of the four (namely the authentic philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama and the Tantric version of the Mahāyāna) proved abortive, while the Catholic form of the Mahāyāna radiated out of the Indic into the Hellenic World and the post-Buddhaic religion of Hinduism won the allegiance of the Indic internal proletariat in the last chapter of the story. Up to this point the history of the Catholic Mahāyāna corresponds with the history of Catholic Christianity, which likewise found its field of action in the Hellenic World instead of devoting itself to the conversion of the non-Hellenic society from whose bosom it had sprung; but there is a further chapter in the history of the Catholic Mahāyāna to which the history of the Catholic Christian Church can show no parallel.

In the history of Catholic Christianity the first migration was also the last; for, when the Church had conquered the Hellenic World and had taken upon its own head the responsibility for acting as this moribund civilization's executor and residuary legatee, it stood steadfast at its self-appointed post and offered itself as a shelter from the storm during the terrible tribulation of the post-Hellenic interregnum, until, with the slow passage of Time, two new Christian civilizations, both affiliated to the Hellenic, came to birth and began to grow up under the Church's aegis.¹ This lasting association between the legacy of the Hellenic Society and the work of the Catholic Christian Church is not reproduced in the relation between the Hellenic Society and the Catholic Mahāyāna. The Mahāyāna did, indeed, eventually emulate the Christian Church in linking its own fortunes—'for better for worse, in sickness and in health'—with those of a moribund civilization, but it was not in the Hellenic World that it found this permanent partner. Whereas the Christian Church established its head-quarters, once for all, within the pale of the Roman Empire, the Mahāyāna only tarried for a short breathing-space within the limits of the Kushan 'successor-state' of the Greek Kingdom of Bactria²—a semi-barbarian commonwealth which was the counterpart of the Roman Empire in the eastern extremity of the Hellenic World during the first few centuries of the Christian Era. The reception which the Mahāyāna met with in the Kushan Kingdom offered it every

¹ For the affiliation of the Western and the Orthodox Christian Civilization to the Hellenic Civilization through the mediation of the Catholic Christian Church see I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 39-44; I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52-63; I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 63-7, above, and Part VII, below.

² For the relation of the Kushan Rāj to the Bactrian Greek Rāj see p. 133, footnote 1, above.

inducement to settle down; for the Kushan King Kanishka (*regnat circa* A.D. 78-123)¹ was as solicitous a patron of the nascent Buddhist 'higher religion' as the Roman Emperor Constantine was of Catholic Christianity.² But, while the policy of the Kushan Crown was an invitation to the Mahāyāna to cease from its pilgrimage, the social geography of the Kushan Kingdom was an incitement to move on; for, unlike the Roman Empire, the Kushan Kingdom was not a terminus; it was a 'roundabout' on which four roads converged: one from the Indic World, one from the Syriac, one from the Hellenic, and one from the Sinic.³ When, under a Kushan régime which had 'abolished the Hindu Kush', the Mahāyāna made its passage out of the Indus Valley into the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, it found that it could not halt here and dig itself in; it had to travel on along one or other of the three alternative roads that now opened up before its face; and the circumstances of the age decided that, at this parting of the ways, the Mahāyāna should take the Sinic turning. Travelling across the extremity of a superficially expanded Hellenic World and of the temporarily buried Syriac World which lay beneath it, the Mahāyāna completed its long and devious journey from its Indian birth-place to the Far Eastern scene of its life-work by a route which skirted three sides of the four-square Tibetan bastion.⁴ It was the destiny of the Mahāyāna to play in the Far East, among the ruins of the Sinic universal state of Ts'in and Han, the role of universal church which was played by the Catholic Christian Church in the Western and the Orthodox Christian worlds among the ruins of the Hellenic universal state that had been embodied in the Roman Empire.

In order to understand the triumphal progress of the Mahāyāna in a Sinic World which was geographically so remote from the Mahāyāna's Indian homeland, we have to examine the history of the Sinic internal proletariat.

Considering the intensity of the tribulation of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' when it was reaching its climax during 'the Period of Contending States',⁵ we should expect *a priori* to find an internal

¹ Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press); p. 270. According to Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 352, Kanishka died twenty years earlier, in A.D. 103.

² The stages of Kanishka's cautious and gradual conversion from a rather artificial and frigid religious syncretism to the ardent and single-minded proletarian faith that was sweeping over his dominions can be traced—like the development of the similar religious experience of Constantine—in the images and superscriptions on the princely convert's coins (see Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 265-6; Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. ii, p. 87).

³ For this historical function of the Kushan Empire as a cultural corridor see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 372-3, above.

⁴ For this extraordinary route see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 373; II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1; III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 131, above.

⁵ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 88-90, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 291-5, below.

proletariat being generated on the grand scale in the Sinic World of that age, and this expectation is confirmed by the historical evidence. We can watch the Sinic internal proletariat being recruited from the three regular sources: uprooted members of the disintegrating society's native body social; conquered members of alien civilizations; and conquered barbarians. The first source was drawn upon by the founder of the Sinic universal state, Ts'in She Hwang-ti (*imperabat* 221¹–210 B.C.), when he transplanted some of the desirable elements in the population of his empire in order to fill the new capital city which he had laid out,² and some of the undesirable elements in order to colonize the barbarian territories which he was annexing in the south.³ The forcible enrolment of barbarians was carried out over a longer period and on a vaster scale; and it was by this method that the Sinic World had already expanded, during its 'Time of Troubles',⁴ from the modest domain in the middle and lower valley of the Yellow River, which had sufficed for its birth and growth,⁵ over an area which extended to the south-eastern fringes of the Eurasian Steppe in one direction and towards the southern watershed of the Yangtse Basin in another. North-westward the process of turning recalcitrant barbarians into domesticated proletarians was already complete by Ts'in She Hwang-ti's time, when on this front the Sinic Civilization found itself in direct contact, all along the line, with the alien civilization of the Eurasian Nomads.⁶ On the southern front the process was carried on steadily and systematically under the Ts'in and Han régimes until, rather more than a hundred years after the foundation of the universal state, it was completed, in this direction likewise, *circa* 112–111 B.C.,⁷ by the annexation of the southern sea-board—including the territories that now constitute the French possessions of Tongking and Annam, as well as the sites of the present Chinese provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung and Fukien

¹ The year 221 B.C. was that in which Chêng Wang of Ts'in took the title of She Hwang-ti ('First Universal Monarch') after the overthrow of Ts'î, which had been the last surviving Great Power, apart from Ts'in itself, in the Sinic arena. As local King of Ts'in, Chêng had been on the throne since 246 B.C.

² See Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920–1, Geuthner, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 202; and compare the Armenian successor of the Seleucidae, Tigranes', resort to the same method of barbarism in order to populate Tigranocerta (*circa* 77 B.C.).

³ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 244.

⁴ If the hall-mark of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' is the militarization of the states into which the Sinic body social had come to be articulated, its beginning is probably to be dated, as we have seen (in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 66, above), from the outbreak of the first great war for hegemony in 634 B.C. From this time onwards the surrounding barbarians were drawn into the Sinic vortex on an ever-increasing scale—partly through being conquered by the original states-members of the Sinic constellation, and partly through being compelled to sinify themselves (as Urartu babylonized herself) because this was their only chance of self-preservation.

⁵ For the cradle of the Sinic Civilization see II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, pp. 318–21.

⁶ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 118–19, above.

⁷ Cordier, op. cit., vol. i, p. 212; Franke, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 321–4.

and Chekiang. Before the vast barbarian recruitment of the Sinic internal proletariat was thus brought to a close, the enrolment of members of alien civilizations had already begun, and it was the introduction of this third element into the ranks of the Sinic internal proletariat that inoculated the now moribund Sinic body social with the Mahāyāna.

Sinic statesmanship found the Eurasian Nomads, with whom it was now in direct contact on its north-western front, more difficult neighbours to deal with than the sheerly barbarian highlanders by whom the Sinic World had previously been surrounded—on the one side in Shansi and Shensi, and on the other side along the watershed between the Yangtse and the southern seaboard—and had thus been completely insulated from all other societies of its own species. Ts'in She Hwang-ti himself sought to solve this new problem of 'contact' in negative terms by consolidating into one continuous Great Wall the local fortifications which had been erected against the Nomads by his predecessors on the throne of Ts'in and by the princes of the neighbouring Sinic states that had likewise come to march with the Eurasian Steppe.¹ This enormous work was put in hand in 215 B.C.; yet, even with one of the material Wonders of the World to back it, a merely defensive strategy was found by the rulers of the Sinic universal state to be inadequate for coping with the power of the Hiongnu;² and eventually the Han Emperor Wuti (*imperabat* 140–87 B.C.) passed over to the offensive and launched against the Hiongnu a war of aggression which lasted nearly a hundred years (133–36 B.C.) before it resulted in a temporary pacification, under a *Pax Sinica*, of the Nomads' ranges as far westward as the Zungarian Gap.³ In respect of achieving its main purpose—which was to solve the problem of dealing with Nomad neighbours—Wuti's policy was hardly more successful than Ts'in She Hwang-ti's, for the offensive against the Hiongnu strained the resources of the Sinic universal state almost to breaking-point⁴ without permanently relieving it of its Nomad adver-

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 119, above, as well as Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 206–7, and Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 240–4.

² The record of the relations between the Sinic universal state and the Nomad Empire of the Hiongnu from the reign of Ts'in She Hwang-ti to the reign of Han Wuti gives the impression that, with the passage of time, the pressure of the Nomads was bearing harder and harder upon the sedentary Power behind the Great Wall. This may have been the effect of a bout of aridity on the Steppe, if there is any truth in the theory of climatic pulsations (for this theory and its application to the problem of the periodic eruptions of the Nomads see Part III. A, Annex II, in vol. iii, above); or it may have had nothing to do with the Nomadism of the Hiongnu, but have been simply an instance of the working of one of the general laws (see Part VIII, below) that govern the relations between a civilization and its barbarian neighbours when they are in long-continuing contact with one another along a stationary frontier.

³ For the great war between the Prior Han and the Hiongnu see Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 334–57.

⁴ The strain of the great war on the Steppes may have been one of the causes of the

saries. An incidental consequence, however, of this hazardous forward policy against the barbarians on the Eurasian Steppe was the astonishing discovery that on the farther coast of this arid ocean¹ there was another world—or, rather three other worlds: the Indic, the Syriac, and the Hellenic.² In the last quarter of the second century B.C. the eastern outposts of these new worlds, in the oases of the Tarim Basin,³ were annexed to the Sinic universal state;⁴ their inhabitants were incorporated into the Sinic internal proletariat; and the descendants of these new alien recruits were the carriers of the Mahāyāna, in which the Sinic internal proletariat ultimately found the spiritual bread that it had never been

momentary breakdown of the Sinic universal state during the interregnum between the Prior and the Posterior Han in the first quarter of the first century of the Christian Era (for this interregnum see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 271, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 295, below).

¹ For the analogy between the Steppe and the Ocean see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 7-8, with Annex I, above.

² The discovery was made by a party—half exploring expedition and half diplomatic mission—which was sent out into the Unknown West by the Emperor Wuti in 138 B.C., when he was making up his mind to take the offensive against the Hiongnu, and which duly returned to Ch'ang Ngan in the winter of 126/5 B.C. after having discovered Bactria and Parthia (Franke, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 334 and 337-40; Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 279-84). To Sinic minds in the second century B.C. the news brought back by this party must have been even more astonishing than it was for Western minds to learn of the discovery of the Central American and Andean civilizations on the other side of the Atlantic in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era. For Western minds in that age the surprise was particular and not general, since the Western Society had always been aware that there were other societies of its own species in existence besides itself (e.g. Orthodox Christendom and the Syriac Society with its Iranian and Arabic offspring). On the other hand the members of the Sinic Society had always supposed—until the return of Chang K'ien's party to Ch'ang Ngan in 126/5 B.C.—that the Sinic Civilization was the solitary representative of its species in a universe whose only other human denizens were barbarians and savages; and, to minds brought up in this belief, the discovery of the existence of the Indic, Syriac, and Hellenic civilizations must have been as revolutionary in its intellectual effect as the sixteenth-century Western astronomical discovery that the stellar universe was not geocentric. We may compare the discovery of the Babylonian and Hittite civilizations by the members of the Egyptian Society, in the fifteenth century B.C., in the course of their counter-offensive, across the desert of Sinai, against the Hyksos Eurasian Nomad cousins of the Hiongnu.

³ In the Tarim Basin, by the time when it came within the Sinic Society's purview in the last quarter of the second century B.C., the elements of the three non-Sinic civilizations which had previously arrived on the scene were already blended; but the Indic element was here still predominant over the Syriac and the Hellenic. According to the local tradition of the Khotan oasis, which has been preserved in a Tibetan medium, the city was founded by settlers from India in Aśoka's time, and Buddhism was introduced from India 170 years later (Sir Charles Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, p. 211; Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 193). 'In the Turfan frescoes, the drapery and composition are Indian', while 'the faces are Eastern Asiatic (sometimes, however, they represent a race with red hair and blue eyes)'; and 'the paintings testify to the invasion of Far Eastern art by the ideas and designs of Indian Buddhism rather than to an equal combination of Indian and Chinese influence' (Eliot, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 195).

⁴ The way was first cleared by the conquest, in 121 B.C., of the intervening barrier of Hiongnu territory in the present Chinese province of Kansu. The actual conquest of the Tarim Basin itself was carried out in 104-101 B.C. (Franke, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 342-9). The moment was favourable, since the Greek Power in Bactria had just been overwhelmed, and the Parthian Power in Khurāsān was still hard beset, by the eruption of the Sakas and the Yuechi across the threshold of the Eurasian Steppe between the Pamirs and the Caspian.

able to extract from the Confucian and Taoist philosophies of the Sinic dominant minority.

The transmission of the Mahāyāna along this channel was actually facilitated by the vicissitudes in the political relations between the Sinic universal state and its western dependencies during the three centuries that elapsed between the first assertion of Sinic authority over the Tarim Basin at the end of the second century B.C. and the final break-up of the Sinic universal state itself at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era.

After having lasted for rather more than a century, the first period of Sinic rule in the Tarim Basin came to an end in A.D. 16,¹ when the collapse of the Prior Han Dynasty enabled the Hiongnu to shake off the Sinic yoke and the oasis-states to repudiate their allegiance; and it was not till A.D. 73 that the Posterior Han, after having re-established the Han Empire in the home-provinces, felt themselves strong enough to begin the reconquest of the lost western dependencies. Thanks to the abilities of one great military commander and colonial administrator, Pan Ch'ao, the enterprise was successfully accomplished by the end of the first century of the Christian Era;² and at the moment when the hero re-entered Loyang in triumph in A.D. 102 the westward extension of the Sinic universal state was as wide as it had been in 101 B.C. Pan Ch'ao, however, found no worthy successor; the reconquered peoples became restive as soon as his masterly hand was withdrawn; and this time there was an alien Power on the horizon which could venture to cross swords with the sovereign of 'All that is under Heaven'.

When the Prior Han Emperor Wuti made the first Sinic conquest of the Tarim Basin, the Greek Power in Bactria had just been overwhelmed by the eruption of the Saka and Yuechi Nomads out of the Eurasian Steppe;³ but while Pan Ch'ao (*militabat* A.D. 73-102) was campaigning in Central Asia, Kanishka (*regnabat circa* A.D. 78-123) was completing the expansion of one of the five petty Yuechi 'successor-states' of Bactria into a Philhellene barbarian kingdom which was as extensive and as powerful as the Bactrian Greek principality at its apogee.⁴ In A.D. 90 Kanishka sent an army into the Tarim Basin to dispute Pan Ch'ao's advance, and drew upon himself an ignominious defeat;⁵ but after Pan Ch'ao's disappearance from the scene Kanishka repeated his attempt and this time

¹ Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 383.

² For details see *ibid.*, pp. 395-400.

³ See p. 143, footnote 4, above.

⁴ See p. 133, with footnote 1, above.

⁵ Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 251-2.

he succeeded in wresting the greater part of the Tarim Basin out of Sinic hands and bringing it under his own suzerainty.¹ Thereafter the command over the Tarim Basin appears to have been disputed between the Kushan and the Han until both Powers broke down and disappeared in the early decades of the third century of the Christian Era.² The details of the history of this frontier warfare are obscure³ and unimportant; but the entry of the Mahāyāna into the Sinic World through the avenue of this disputed territory in the course of the second century of the Christian Era is a fact which is as certain as it is momentous.⁴ By the time when, at the turn of the second and third centuries, the Sinic universal state broke up and the Sinic Civilization went into dissolution, the Mahāyāna had effectively established its claim

¹ Smith, op. cit., pp. 262-3. This reconstruction of events would be difficult, though not impossible, to reconcile with the chronological scheme (see p. 140, footnote 1, above) which dates Kanishka's death A.D. 103 instead of A.D. 123.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 373, above.

³ Dated documents that have been recovered by our modern Western archaeologists from the military frontier of the Han Empire in the neighbourhood of Tun-huang show that the Han were in effective occupation of this point between A.D. 98 and A.D. 153 (Eliot, Sir Charles: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, p. 193).

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65, above. The story of the deliberate introduction of Buddhism into the Han Empire in the seventh decade of the first century of the Christian Era by the Emperor Mingti (*imperabat* A.D. 58-75), in obedience to a dream, is rejected as legendary by Franke (op. cit., vol. i, pp. 407-8), who points out the unlikelihood of such a transaction having taken place before the reconquest of the Tarim Basin by Pan Ch'ao. Our own dating of the introduction of Buddhism into the Sinic World will differ greatly according to whether we are speaking of the new Mahayanian religion, to which the Kushan King Kanishka became a convert in the first or second century of the Christian Era, or of the pre-Mahayanian philosophy which was adopted in the third century B.C. by the Mauryan Emperor Aśoka. Whereas the Mahāyāna—which was itself only nascent in Kanishka's generation—can hardly have entered upon its conquest of the Sinic World before Kanishka's conversion to the faith and conquest of the Sinic dependencies in the Tarim Basin, the pre-Mahayanian philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama may have become known in the Sinic World at any time after the dispatch of Chang K'ien's exploring party into the Western *terra incognita* in 138 B.C. For the Hinayanian Buddhist philosophy and the Mahayanian Buddhist religion travelled from their common original centre of dispersion in Northern India in successive waves (see II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1, above); and the Hinayanian wave, which was set in motion by the Indic Emperor Aśoka (*imperabat* 273-232 B.C.), if not by the private enterprise of earlier philosophic missionaries, may well have reached the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, and even the Tarim Basin, within a hundred years of Aśoka's death. Franke (op. cit., vol. i, pp. 408-9) calculates—on the strength of a casual reference, in the Sinic records, to the presence of Buddhist monks and laymen as far afield as the present Chinese province of Kiangsu in A.D. 65—that Buddhism must have begun to penetrate the Sinic World before the beginning of the Christian Era. If this inference is legitimate, the Buddhism in question must, of course, have been of the pre-Mahayanian school; for the conception of the Mahāyāna is not older than the first century of the Christian Era; the doctrine of the Fathers who attended Kanishka's oecumenical council *circa* A.D. 100 was not the full-blown flower of the Mahayanian Faith (see Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. ii, pp. 78-82); and the differentiation of the Mahāyāna from the Hinayāna was not yet complete in the second century when the Buddhist impulse was being transmitted from the Kushan Kingdom to the Han Empire via the disputed territory in the Tarim Basin. According to Sir Charles Eliot (*Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, p. 213), the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna were still not wholly disentangled from one another in the Tarim Basin in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era, and the Hinayāna still survived in Kuchā, on the northern rim of the Tarim Basin, when the Far Eastern Buddhist pilgrim, Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang), passed that way *circa* A.D. 629 (Eliot, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 205 and 211). The problem discussed in this footnote has been dealt with, by anticipation, in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65, footnote 4, above.

to act—like Christianity, two centuries later, in the Hellenic World—as the moribund society's executor and residuary legatee.

If imitation is the sincerest flattery, the hold which the Mahāyāna had already gained, by this time, upon the imagination and emotions of the Sinic internal proletariat may be gauged from the fact that, in the Sinic World in this age, one of the indigenous philosophies of the Sinic dominant minority was transformed into a proletarian religion through a metamorphosis which was perhaps even more extraordinary than that which had conjured the Mahāyāna itself out of the philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama.¹

The Sinic philosophy of the Tao, which had been first propounded, like the Confucian philosophy, during the Sinic 'Time of Troubles', as a response to the challenge of the breakdown of the Sinic Civilization,² was distinguished from the Confucian sister school by an attitude towards life which rather resembled the Buddha's. The essence of the Tao was its belief in the supreme virtue and efficacy of inaction—in which, by a paradoxical but penetrating intuition, the Taoist philosopher saw the most intense and creative form of true activity.³ A doctrine which thus not only condemned violence but went so far as to deprecate exertion of every kind, seemed marked out to be an esoteric discipline which would never be appreciated or practised by more than a few rare spirits; and it is somewhat surprising to find a 'Taoism' in which the genuine 'way' was vulgarized into a mere policy of *laissez faire* laying itself out to meet the needs of practical men in the age of lassitude which followed the refoundation of the Sinic universal state by Liu Pang, the first Emperor of the Han Dynasty. During the first half of the second century B.C. this travesty of Taoism actually anticipated Confucianism both in winning acceptance as the official philosophy of the Sinic universal state⁴ and in purchasing this worldly success at the price of debasing itself into magic;⁵ and when, in the reign of the Emperor Wuti (*imperabat* 140–87 B.C.), Confucianism succeeded in supplanting Taoism once for all at the official centre of the Middle Kingdom, the discomfited practical philosophy did not give up the game, but went underground and retreated into the provinces—lying low and biding its time until at length, when the Sinic universal state broke up, the name of Taoism attached itself to a proletarian 'church'⁶—with

¹ See Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, pp. 227–9.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 89, above.

³ For this cardinal doctrine of the Tao see III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 187–9, above, and V. C (i) (d) 4, in the present volume, pp. 415–17, below.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 4, pp. 418–19, below.

⁵ See Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), p. 225.

⁶ See the present chapter and volume, p. 178, footnote 1, and also V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 557, below. In the preceding generation Taoism had been taken up again, at the centre of the Sinic universal state, by the Posterior Han Emperor Huan-ti (*impera-*

monasteries, temples, and liturgical observances on the Mahayanian pattern¹—which sprang into existence, and converted the population *en masse*, in those *ci-devant* barbarian territories on the south-western fringes of the Sinic World whose inhabitants had been forcibly enrolled in the Sinic internal proletariat through the conquests that were made in this direction by Ts'ing She Hwang-ti and his Prior Han successors.² If this metamorphosis is extraordinary, it is more extraordinary still to see the name of the pacific Tao being taken in vain in order to give a religious sanction of legitimacy and guarantee of success to an armed proletarian insurrection against the Han régime which broke out in the last quarter of the second century of the Christian Era in the wild hill-country on the border between the present provinces of Shensi and Szechwan.³

It will be seen that the history of the Sinic Civilization conforms very closely, in its disintegration-phase, to the Hellenic pattern. In the misguided hands of a minority that was dominant without being creative, the disintegrating society ran its course from breakdown to dissolution through a 'Time of Troubles' and a universal state and an interregnum; there was a secession of the proletariat; and the internal proletariat found for itself, in the Mahāyāna, a universal church which played the part of the Catholic Christian Church in the foundering Hellenic World, while the abortive Taoist Church may be compared with the abortive Neoplatonic Church of Iamblichus and Maximinus Daia and Julian the Apostate and Sallustius.⁴ If we turn next to the history of the disintegration of the Sumeric Civilization, we shall observe that, up to a point, the phenomena are the same, but that the plot of the play does not work out to the same dénouement.

The Legacy of the Sumeric Internal Proletariat.

In Sumeric, as in Sinic and Hellenic, history we can discern a 'Time of Troubles' and a universal state⁵ and an interregnum;

bat A.D. 147-68) (Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), p. 249).

¹ Franke (op. cit., vol. i, p. 420) inclines to the belief that the outward organization of this latter-day 'Taoist' proletarian church was a conscious imitation of the contemporary organization of the Mahāyāna. Compare the relation of the Ryōbō Shinto Church to the popular Japanese adaptations of the Mahāyāna in the Japanese 'Time of Troubles'.

² See p. 141, above.

³ For this insurrection and its Taoist colouring see Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920-1, Geuthner, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 189-90; Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), p. 228; Franke, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 419-21. In the present chapter of this Study this latter-day aberration of Taoism is referred to again on p. 178, footnote 1, below.

⁴ For this abortive Neoplatonic Church see further V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 565-7; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 680-3; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 222-3, below.

⁵ For the foundation of this Sumeric universal state—'the Empire of Sumer and Akkad'—by Ur-Engur of Ur circa 2298 B.C., and its restoration circa 1947 B.C. by Hammurabi, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 106, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 296-7, below.

and the Sumeric, like the Sinic and the Hellenic, Society was compensated for its own dissolution by becoming 'apparented' to younger societies of its own species. The Babylonian and Hittite societies appear to stand to the Sumeric as the main body of the Far Eastern Society in China and its branch in Korea and Japan stand to the Sinic Society, or as the Western and Orthodox Christian societies stand to the Hellenic Society. These points of likeness are offset, however, by one striking difference. In the relation between the Hellenic and Sinic societies and the younger civilizations that were respectively affiliated to them, the link was provided by a universal church which had been created or adopted by the internal proletariat of the disintegrating 'apparented' society and which eventually served as a chrysalis out of which the nascent 'affiliated' societies emerged.¹ The Mahāyāna provided a link of this kind between the Sinic Society and the two Far Eastern societies, and the Catholic Christian Church mediated in the same way between the Hellenic Society and the two Christendoms. On the other hand, when we come to examine the relation between the Sumeric Society and the Hittite and Babylonian societies, we find no trace of the corresponding phenomenon which we should expect to find on the principle of 'the uniformity of Human Nature'.

The religion of the Babylonian World seems to have been taken over, *tel quel*, from the Sumeric dominant minority;² the religion of the Hittite World seems to have been derived from the same source in part, but in the main to have been of non-Sumeric origin—its presumable source being the Anatolian external proletariat of the Sumeric Society which flooded over the Cappadocian provinces of the Sumeric universal state when, after the death of Hammurabi, the Empire of Sumer and Akkad broke up in the nineteenth century B.C.³ The interregnum intervening between the dissolution of the Sumeric Society and the emergence of the Babylonian and Hittite societies is not spanned by any bridge which we can identify as a Sumeric proletarian church; and we cannot even point to any wreckage—a fallen key-stone or a weathered pier—which might warrant us in hazarding the conjecture that such a bridge did once exist. We know so little about the religious history of the Sumeric Society that, as we have already had to confess,⁴ we cannot confidently ascribe to a proletarian origin even those elements in the Sumeric religion—the Penitential Psalms and the worship of Tammuz and Ishtar—

¹ For the function of a universal church as a chrysalis for a new civilization see further Part VII, below.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 115, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 112, with footnote 2, above.

⁴ In I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 115, footnote 1, above.

which assume a distinctively proletarian complexion if we allow ourselves to interpret the internal evidence in the light of a comparison with other religions which are proletarian in their origin beyond question. We can only say that, if the worship of Tammuz and Ishtar really is a monument of the experience and the creativity of the Sumeric internal proletariat, then this attempted act of creation was abortive in the history of the Sumeric Society itself, and only came to fruition in so far as it transmitted a spark of inspiration to kindle spiritual fires in alien souls.

We have already come across one of these remote workings of the worship of Tammuz and Ishtar in observing¹ how the worship of Cybele, who was the Sumeric Ishtar in a Hittite dress, became one of the 'higher religions' of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic World in the course of this goddess's long journey from the interior of Anatolia to the coasts of the Baltic and the North Sea. In this Hittite version of the worship of the Sumeric pair of divinities the figure of the goddess has dwarfed and overshadowed that of the god who plays towards her the diverse and even contradictory roles of son and lover and protégé and victim. By the side of Cybele-Ishtar, Attis-Tammuz dwindles to insignificance; and Nerthus-Ishtar seems to stand in solitary grandeur without the attendance of any masculine consort.² This north-westward road which scaled the Taurus and found its distant terminus on an island in the North European seas was not, however, the only road that was trodden triumphantly by the pair of Sumeric gods who found abroad the honour that was perhaps never wholeheartedly accorded to them in their own country. We can watch them travelling south-westwards simultaneously—down Syria into Egypt—and on this journey there seems to have been an inverse change in the relations between the two divinities—Tammuz increasing while Ishtar decreased. At any rate, the Atargatis whose worship spread from a mother-shrine at Bambyce to a daughter-shrine at Ascalon³ would appear, from her name, to have been an Ishtar whose claim to veneration was based upon her function of serving as Attis' mate; in Phoenicia an Adonis-Tammuz was 'the Lord' whose yearly death an Astarte-Ishtar mourned; and in the Egyptiac World an Osiris-Tammuz—who was associated, in the story of his Passion, with the Phoenician city of Byblus⁴—overshadowed his sister-wife Isis as decidedly

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 81-2, above.

² In the same way Isis-Ishtar, too, eventually eclipsed Osiris-Tammuz, if she did not actually dismiss him from her train, in her triumphal progress from her Egyptiac home to her Hellenic mission-field.

³ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta) p. 137.

⁴ For the probable derivation of Osiris and Isis from Tammuz and Ishtar through Adonis and Astarte see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 140, above.

as Isis, in her turn, overshadowed Osiris when she subsequently won a spiritual empire for herself in the hearts of the Hellenic internal proletariat.¹ This version of the Sumeric faith in which the suffering and dying god, and not the mourning and ministering goddess, was the figure on which the worshipper's attention and devotion were concentrated, seems even to have spread to the remote barbarians of a Scandinavian Ultima Thule, where Balder-Tammuz, like Adonis-Tammuz, was called 'the Lord' *par excellence* in the local vernacular tongue, while Balder's colourless consort Nanna still retained the personal name of the Sumeric mother-goddess.²

In the worship of Osiris the sorely oppressed proletariat of a disintegrating Egyptiac Society found a satisfying expression for a bitter resentment and an ardent hope.³ The resentment was directed against the indigenous gods of the Egyptiac World, who had allowed the dominant minority to purchase an exclusive claim on their divine benevolence with gigantic oblations—culminating in the Great Pyramids—that could only be offered at the cost of a ruthless exploitation of all but a privileged fraction of the people. From these mercenary and heartless divinities the Egyptiac internal proletariat turned away to a god who had tasted the bitterness of death and had won from this agony a strength which could make even the Pyramid-Builders tremble;⁴ and they addressed themselves to Osiris in the hope that this god of their own choice, in whom they had put their trust by a personal act of faith, would bestow upon them the immortality which their oppressors were seeking to purchase at a monstrous price from Re—the Sun-God whose character the Pharaohs had re-minted in their own image.

The resentment and the hope which were thus both expressed in a single proletarian religion were reflected, in the field of action, in that conflict between the spirit of Violence and the spirit of Gentleness with which we have become familiar in the histories of other internal proletariats. The violence discharged

¹ See p. 149, footnote 2, above.

² For this remarkable equation see Dawson, Christopher: *The Age of the Gods*: re-issue (London 1933, Sheed & Ward), pp. 282-3. For Scandinavia as a 'living museum' of elements of culture which have been radiated from distant sources, see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 342, footnote 3, above.

³ For the conflict between the religions of the dominant minority and the internal proletariat during the disintegration of the Egyptiac Society see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 140-3; for the replacement of a creative by a dominant minority in the Egyptiac World in the Age of the Pyramid-Builders see III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 212-15; for the violent proletarian revolt, during the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles', against the idolization of the Egyptiac Double Crown see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 409-11, above; for the proletarian origin of the Osirian Church see Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 37-9.

⁴ For the dread which Osiris inspired in the Pyramid Builders see *ibid.*, pp. 74-5.

itself, during the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles', in the subversive revolutionary outbreaks of which we catch an echo in *The Admonitions of a Prophet*¹ and other works of literature in the same vein which were composed in the following age. In these orgies of savage retaliation the Egyptiac internal proletariat took a revenge upon the Pyramid-Builders which was equal in its enormity to the Egyptiac dominant minority's crying offence.

'He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humble and meek;

'He hath filled the hungry with good things, and the rich he hath sent empty away.'²

But, since in this case the avenger was not a just and compassionate god but a gang of exasperated men who had taken the law into their own hands, the revenge was as barren as it was complete; and the exposure of the futility of the Pyramid-Builders' attempt to attain a selfish immortality for themselves at their subjects' expense, by a ruthless and unscrupulous exploitation of their immense material power, did not in itself reveal any alternative way of attaining the spiritual treasure which the Pharaohs had failed to win but which the proletariat had not ceased to long for. The insurgent Egyptiac internal proletariat did not succeed in quenching its spiritual thirst until it had been disillusioned and at the same time enlightened by the experience of reaping the harvest of Violence and finding that it was Dead Sea fruit. In this chastened mood it recoiled from the way of Violence to the way of Gentleness and reached, by this road, the object of its long and agonizing search. In the age of 'the Middle Empire', which was the Egyptiac universal state, we see the proletarian worshipper of Osiris finding his happiness at last in a personal relation with his god: a god whose blessed immortality was not a divine prerogative which he enjoyed *ex officio deitatis*, but was a special grace which he had won for himself—and could therefore impart gratuitously to his human votaries—in virtue of an experience which was unknown to any other god while it was the common lot of every human being. Osiris could bring salvation to Man because he—alone among the Gods—had passed through the human ordeal of Death.³

In the 'Indian Summer' of Egyptiac history this twofold mystery of Osiris' death and resurrection and of the worshipper's union with the God in his divine bliss, as well as in his tribulation,

¹ See the extracts from this poem in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 410-11, above.

² Luke i. 52-3.

³ For Osiris as an epiphany of the Dying God see further V. C (ii) (α), vol. vi, p. 276, below.

was enshrined in a holy sepulchre and rehearsed in a passion play; and when the Egyptiac Society was *in articulo mortis* it looked as though an Osirian Church were destined to assume, for this moribund civilization, that role of executor and residuary legatee which has actually been played by the Christian Church for the Hellenic Civilization and by the Mahāyāna for the Sinic. It was only at the thirteenth hour, when the Egyptiac universal state had duly broken up and when the ensuing interregnum had set in, that the course of history was suddenly and violently diverted into an entirely different channel by the vehemence of the revulsion of the Egyptiac internal proletariat, as well as the Egyptiac dominant minority, against the alien tincture in the culture of the Hyksos barbarian invaders.¹

The historical consequences of this revulsion have engaged our attention in other contexts already² and only concern us here in their particular effect upon the fortunes of the Osirian Church. We have seen how the prospects of this church were blighted, when the flower was on the point of bearing fruit, by the establishment of an unnatural 'union sacrée' between the nascent religion of the internal proletariat and the moribund religion of the dominant minority in the mummified carcass of the Egyptiac body social. This ultimate fate of the Osirian Church was as tragic as it was inconsequent; but we must not allow an abnormal epilogue to trick us into forgetting the normality of the main action of the play. The Osirian Church had to be called into existence before it could be cheated of its manifest destiny; and, in itself, the creation of the Osirian Church is a proletarian achievement which is worthy to be compared with the creation of the Christian Church or with the creation of the Mahāyāna, while the antecedent struggle between the spirits of Violence and Gentleness in the souls of the Egyptiac internal proletariat is not less illuminating for a historian—or less moving for a fellow human being—than the similar struggle, with the similar outcome, between the gentleness of Eleazar the Scribe and Jesus of Nazareth and the violence of Judas Maccabaeus and Judas of Galilee.

The Symptoms in the Western World.

In order to complete our survey of internal proletariats we have still to examine one more case. Do the characteristic phenomena, with which we have now made ourselves familiar, reappear in

¹ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 139, footnote 1, and p. 144; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (B), vol. iv, p. 421; and Part V. A, in the present volume, pp. 2-3, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 351-2, below.

² In I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 144-6, and in the present Part, Division A, in the present volume, pp. 2-4, as well as in V. C (i) (b), pp. 28-9, above.

the history of the West? When we call for the evidence for the existence of a Western internal proletariat, we may find ourselves overwhelmed by an *embarras de richesses*.

We have already noticed that one of the regular sources for the recruitment of an internal proletariat has been drawn upon by our Western Society on a stupendous scale. The 'man power' of no less than ten disintegrating civilizations has been conscripted, wholesale, into the Western body social within the last four hundred years;¹ and on the common level of membership in our Western internal proletariat, to which they have thus been reduced, a process of standardization has been at work which has already blurred—or even quite effaced—the characteristic features by which these heterogeneous masses of human beings were once distinguished from one another before they were devoured and masticated by the great Leviathan of the West. Nor has the monster been content just to prey upon his own kind. Within the same four centuries he has also hunted down and swallowed up almost all the primitive societies that had not become the prey of other predatory civilizations before the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era; and, while some of the primitive populations that have been rounded up in this way into our Western internal proletariat have simply died of the shock (like the Caribs and the Bushmen and the Tasmanians and the Australian Blackfellows and the great majority of the Red Indian peoples on the North American Continent north-east of the Rio Grande),² there are others (like the Negroes of Tropical Africa) who have managed to survive and to set the Niger flowing into the Hudson.

Under the lash of our Western dominant minority (which has chastised these human rivers with more effect than ever followed from Xerxes' scourging of the insensitive waters of the Dardanelles), the Congo, too, has been made to flow into the Mississippi, and the Yangtse into the straits of Malacca; for in our modern Western World since the opening of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era—as in the Hellenic World after the opening of the third century B.C.—the populations of alien or primitive culture which have been swept into an expanding civilization's net have been not merely subjugated but also uprooted. The Negro slaves who have survived 'the Middle Passage' across the Atlantic from Africa to America, and the Tamil and Southern Chinese coolies who have been shipped to the equatorial or antipodean coasts of the Indian Ocean, are the counterparts of the slaves who,

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 89-90, above.

² For the statistical aspect of the Red Indians' fate see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 277, above.

in the last two centuries B.C., were consigned from all the coasts of the Mediterranean to the ranches and plantations of Roman Italy.¹

There is another contingent of conscripted aliens in our Western internal proletariat who have been uprooted and disoriented spiritually without having been physically evicted from their ancestral homes. In any community that is attempting to solve the problem of adapting its life to the rhythm of an exotic civilization to which it has been either forcibly annexed or freely converted, there is need of a special social class to serve as a human counterpart of the 'transformer' which changes an electric current from one voltage to another; and the class which is called into existence—often quite abruptly and artificially—in response to this demand has come to be known generically, from the special Russian name for it, as the *intelligentsia* (a word whose meaning is expressed in its very formation, in which a Latin root and a Western idea are acclimatized in Russian by being given a Slavonic termination). The *intelligentsia* is a class of liaison-officers who have learnt the tricks of an intrusive civilization's trade so far as may be necessary to enable their own community, through their agency, just to hold its own in a social environment in which life is ceasing to be lived in accordance with the local tradition and is coming more and more to be lived in the style that is imposed by the intrusive civilization upon the aliens who fall under its dominion.

The first recruits to this *intelligentsia* are military and naval officers who learn as much of the domineering society's art of war as may be necessary in order to save the Russia of Peter the Great from being conquered by a Western Sweden, or the Turkey and Japan of a later age from being conquered by a Russia who by this time has herself become sufficiently Westernized in the sphere of military technique to be able to launch out upon a career of aggression on her own account against her still un-Westernized neighbours. Then comes the diplomatist who learns how to conduct with Western governments the negotiations that are forced upon his community by its failure to hold its own in battle against Western armies and navies. We have seen the 'Osmanlis enlisting their *ra'iyeh* for this diplomatic work—and grudgingly allowing them the licence and influence and affluence which are the necessary reward of their services—until a further turn of the Western screw compels the 'Osmanlis at last to master for themselves this despised and distasteful trade.² Next come the merchants—the

¹ For the transplantation of Chinese coolies see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 217-18, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 315; for the transplantation of Negro slaves see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 218-20, above.

² See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 224-8, and Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 47-50.

Hong Merchants at Canton;¹ the compradores of a later generation at Shanghai; the Levantine,² Sephardi,³ Greek,⁴ and Armenian⁵ subjects of the Ottoman Pādishāh in the Échelles du Levant—who manage to hold the long spoons with which any self-respecting non-Western society prefers at first to sup when it is shamefacedly doing commercial business with the Western devils. And finally, as the leaven—or virus—of Western Civilization works deeper into the social life of the society which is in process of being penetrated and assimilated, the intelligentsia develops its most characteristic types: the schoolmaster who has learnt the trick of teaching Western subjects; the civil servant who has picked up the practice of conducting the public administration according to Western forms; the lawyer who has acquired the knack of applying a version of the *Code Napoléon* in accordance with a nineteenth-century French judicial procedure.

This spectacle of the creation of an intelligentsia will occupy our attention again at a later stage when we are studying,⁶ for its own sake, the phenomenon of the contacts between civilizations. In this place we merely have to observe that, wherever we find an intelligentsia in existence, we may infer, not only that two civilizations have been in contact, but that one of the two is now in process of being absorbed into the other's internal proletariat. We can also observe another fact in the life of an intelligentsia which is written large upon its countenance for all to read: an intelligentsia is born to be unhappy.

This liaison-class suffers from the congenital unhappiness of the bastard and the hybrid, who is an outcast from both the families—or a sport in both the races—that have guiltily combined to beget him. An intelligentsia is hated and despised by its own people because its very existence is a reproach to them. Through its awkward presence in their midst it is a living reminder of the hateful but inescapable alien civilization which cannot be kept at bay and which therefore has to be humoured. The Pharisee is reminded of this each time when he meets the Publican, and the Zealot when he meets the Herodian. The intelligentsia's unpardonable offence in the eyes of its own kith and kin is the very indispensability of the social services which the intelligentsia performs—a hard fact which the Pharisees never overtly acknowledge yet perpetually recognize and resent in their hearts. And, while the intelligentsia thus has no love lost upon it at home, it also has no honour

¹ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 232, above.

² See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 230–2, above.

³ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 243–7, above.

⁴ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 223–4, above.

⁵ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 236, above.

⁶ In Part IX, below.

paid to it in the country whose manners and customs and tricks and turns it has so laboriously and ingeniously mastered. In the earlier days of the historic association between India and England a Hindu intelligentsia which the British Rāj had fostered for its own administrative convenience was sometimes ridiculed by English philistines who dishonoured their own nation in insulting their Indian fellow subjects. The more facile 'the babu's' command of English, the more sardonically 'the sahib' would laugh at the subtle incongruity of those minute errors that still inevitably crept in.¹ The philistine perhaps seldom paused to reflect that his own knowledge of Hindustani was far too imperfect to expose him to the same kind of ridicule vice versa, and he did not ask himself whether his depreciation might not be a left-handed kind of praise and his scorn a mask for an unconfessed envy of a virtuosity which the dominant alien was perhaps affecting to despise because he himself lacked either the skill or the application to attain to it. The philistine simply gave rein to his feelings; and, however captious his criticism might be, the shaft of malice would only too often strike home.

The intelligentsia is at the philistine's mercy because the essence of the intelligentsia's profession is, after all, mimesis; its art consists in a *tour de force*; and in other contexts we have already probed the weak points of mimesis and assessed the penalty that has to be paid for making the audacious attempt to add a cubit to one's stature. The insipid mechanicalness of mimesis,² and the pathological distortion and abandoned vulgarity that are apt to result from the division of labour and the practice of mimesis in a society in process of civilization,³ are vices which find a uniquely congenial soil to grow in on the border-line of contact and fusion between one disintegrating civilization and another; and this means that the intelligentsia is exposed to the danger of being infected with these moral maladies *ex officio*. In these circumstances the taunts with which the intelligentsia is assailed by its critics are likely to hit the mark—even though the missile may recoil, like a boomerang, upon the heads of the critics themselves when they do not hesitate to make use, for their own profit, of those valuable social services through the faithful performance of which the intelligentsia acquires its characteristic faults.

It will be seen that the intelligentsia complies in double measure

¹ The present writer can enter personally into the feelings of the Anglophone Hindu through having been brought up to express his own feelings in Greek elegiac verse. He can imagine what game would be made of the verses printed at the beginning of volume i of this Study if an Antipater of Sidon or a Meleager of Gadara were to cast his eye over them in a malicious mood.

² See IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 119-33, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (b) 14 and 15, vol. iv, pp. 232-45, above.

with our fundamental definition of a proletariat¹ by being 'in' but not 'of' two societies and not merely one;² and while it may console itself in the first chapter of its history with the ironical reflection that it is an indispensable organ of both these bodies social, and that this very indispensability is the head and front of its offending, it is robbed of even this consolation as time goes on. For the adjustment of supply to demand is almost beyond the wit of Man when 'man-power' itself is the commodity; and, just because an intelligentsia is an emergency-product which has to be called into existence rather suddenly and artificially *ex nihilo* in the first instance, the measures taken to stimulate production are apt to lead to over-production in the end.

A Peter the Great wants so many Russian chinovniks or an East India Company so many Bengali clerks or a Mehmed 'Ali so many Egyptian mill-hands and shipwrights: incontinently they set to work to perform their conjuring-trick of creating something out of nothing with all the vigour and resourcefulness of the consummate man of action which the successful Westernizer has to be; and then, in the next chapter of the story, they find themselves in the quandary of the hero in the fairy-tale who has learnt the magic formula for making the mill grind salt but has forgotten to acquaint himself with the complementary formula for stopping the machinery when the mill has ground out all the salt that the magician requires. The process of manufacturing an intelligentsia is still more difficult to stop than it is to start; for the contempt in which the liaison-class is apt to be held by those who profit by its services is more than offset by its prestige in the eyes of those who are eligible for enrolment in it; and the competition becomes so keen that the number of the candidates rapidly increases out of all proportion to the number of opportunities for employing them. When this stage is reached, the original nucleus of an intelligentsia which is consoled by being employed becomes swamped by the adventitious mass of an 'intellectual proletariat' which is idle and destitute as well as outcast. The handful of chinovniks is reinforced by a legion of 'Nihilists', the handful of babus who thankfully drive their quills, or resignedly tap their typewriters, by a legion of 'failed B.A.s'. And the bitterness of the intelligentsia is incomparably greater in this latter state than it is in the former.

¹ In I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 41, footnote 3, above.

² This painful insulation is particularly in evidence in the history of the Russian intelligentsia during the century ending in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917:

'From the first, the revolution, whether theoretical or political, had no base of support among the masses. . . . The revolutionary circle had a world of its own, and formed a state within the state.'—Masaryk, T. G.: *The Spirit of Russia* (English translation: London 1919, Allen & Unwin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 106. The whole chapter (pp. 105-114) from which this quotation is taken is illuminating.

Indeed, we might almost formulate a social 'law' to the effect that an intelligentsia's congenital unhappiness regularly increases in acuteness in geometrical ratio with the arithmetical progress of time. The Russian intelligentsia, which dates from the close of the seventeenth century, has already discharged its accumulated spite in the shattering Bolshevik Revolution of A.D. 1917. The Bengali intelligentsia, which dates from the latter part of the eighteenth century, is displaying to-day a vein of revolutionary violence which is not yet to be seen in other parts of British India,¹ where the local intelligentsia did not come into existence till fifty or a hundred years later. In Egypt and Java and China and Japan, where the intelligentsia is of about the same age as it is in Gujerat or in the Panjab, it is also in about the same mild state of exasperation to-day; but in Java and Japan, at any rate, the latest symptoms seem to portend the approach of paroxysms of a Russian or Bengali fury.²

Nor is the rank growth of this social weed confined to the soil in which it is a native plant. While, in our latter-day Westernized World, the intelligentsia has made its first appearance on non-

¹ For this contrast see the present chapter, p. 106, above.

² The symptoms of unrest in the 'intellectual proletariat' of Japan thrust themselves upon the attention of the writer of this Study during a visit to the Far East in the autumn of 1929. The Japanese Government's extreme nervousness about 'dangerous thought' was exhibited to the traveller when, upon landing in Japan, he was required, as part of the regular passport and customs procedure, to make a complete return of any books and pamphlets that might be included in his luggage. Evidently the Japanese authorities believed that some important element in the population was particularly prone to catch the mental infection of foreign subversive ideas; and, equally evidently, they were terrified about the possible consequences of the disease if once it did gain a hold upon the Japanese body social. Some of the grounds for this anxiety on the Japanese dominant minority's part were soon revealed to the writer when, in the university town of Kyoto, he was informed that, out of the last graduation-class of students, only 20 per cent. of the young men and women had succeeded in finding employment. Since a majority of the students were the children of poor parents—mostly workers on the land—and had been given their university education (which incidentally unfitted them for pursuing their ancestral calling) at the cost of heavy sacrifices and privations on their family's part, the failure of their education to bring in any economic return was nothing less than a social disaster. The unemployed ex-student was thrown back, without prospects, to live upon his family in an over-populated and insolvent countryside, and he was embittered by a humiliating sense of failure and frustration, while his relatives were equally embittered by a feeling that all their sacrifices had been in vain. Here indeed was food for 'dangerous thought' to feed on! Finally, on his way home to Europe from the Far East via Siberia, the writer was taught to admire the enterprise and courage of this Japanese 'intellectual proletariat', in its desperate straits, by hearing the personal story of a Japanese girl who was travelling in the same train. Having studied and qualified for being a school-mistress, and having then realized how poor her prospects were in a profession that was already so terribly overcrowded, she was spending her small savings on the venture of taking a year's course in dressmaking at Paris, on the calculation that within the next few years there would be a demand in Japan for *modistes à l'occidentale* owing to the growing tendency for Japanese women to follow the men's example in adopting Western dress. It seemed only too likely that if this admirable Japanese initiative and fortitude in the face of adversity were cheated, by circumstances beyond its control, of its morally due reward, it would find vent sooner or later in a violent explosion. These trivial experiences of the writer in the autumn of 1929 cast a flood of light, for him, upon the Japanese outbreak which duly occurred, two years later, in the autumn of 1931. In the militant policy which the Japanese Empire has been pursuing since then, the driving force has been the revolutionary passion of the young naval and military officers and the rejected cadets; and these are typical members of the Japanese intelligentsia.

Western ground that has been in process of being annexed to the domain of an expanding Western Civilization, it has latterly begun to spread to the homelands of the aggressive society. A lower middle class which has received a secondary and even a university education without being given any corresponding outlet for its trained abilities is the backbone of the post-war Fascist Party in Italy and National-Socialist Party in Germany; and the demoniac 'driving-force' which has carried a Mussolini and a Hitler to the pinnacle of power has been generated out of this 'intellectual proletariat's' exasperation at finding that its painful efforts at self-improvement are not sufficient in themselves to save it from being crushed between the upper millstone of a politically organized Capital and the lower millstone of a politically organized Labour. In Fascist Italy and National-Socialist Germany we can thus identify some of the symptoms that have notoriously accompanied the production of an 'intellectual proletariat' in a half-Westernized Japan or Java or Bengal or Russia. But Italy and Germany are no alien appendages to the Western body social; they are bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; and it follows that the social revolution which has taken place yesterday in Italy and Germany under our eyes may overtake us in France or England or the Netherlands or Scandinavia to-morrow.

As a matter of fact, we do not have to await our present Post-War Age in order to see a Western internal proletariat being recruited from the native tissues of the Western body social; for in the Western, as in the Hellenic, World it is not only the subjugated primitive and alien populations that have been torn up by the roots. In Western Christendom, as in Hellas, the original nucleus of an ever growing internal proletariat has been formed out of *déracinés* who were born and bred in the bosom of the disintegrating society before they were disinherited and driven into exile by the winnowing fan of civil strife which so perversely scatters the grain and leaves the chaff lying on the threshing-floor.¹ As early as the second chapter of our Western history—in the so-called 'Medieval' Age which runs from the last quarter of the eleventh to the last quarter of the fifteenth century of our era—we can see this scourge afflicting the Italian cosmos of city-states; and the figure of Dante stands at the head of the long line of Western exiles, as Thucydides heads the parallel line

¹ For the inverse social selection which is one of the penalties of *stasis* see Seeck, O.: 'Die Ausrottung der Besten' in his *Geschichte des Unterganges der Antiken Welt*, 4th edition (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler, 6 vols., with supplements), vol. 1, part (2), chap. 2. (This chapter of Seeck's work has been cited already in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 63, footnote 1, above.)

in the history of the decline and fall of Hellas.¹ In our Western history, however, this social malady of exile, as the penalty for being left upon the losing side in civil dissensions, did not become rife throughout the Western World until after the Italianization of the Transalpine and Transmarine countries of Western Christendom at the opening of the 'Modern' Age;² and in the West in this age a personal and political hatred of the kind that animated the Florentine and Roman and Athenian faction-feuds has been envenomed with an *odium theologicum*.

The sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century Wars of Religion³ brought in their train the penalization or eviction of the discomfited Catholic faction in every country where the sovereign power fell into Protestant hands, and of the discomfited Protestant faction in every country where a Catholic Government succeeded in maintaining itself; and the odious rule '*Cuius Regio eius Religio*',⁴ which was accepted by Catholics and Protestants alike in their common idolization of the fetish of absolute sovereignty in a parochial state, has left its mark down to this day—on a world which has long since forgotten the Catholic-Protestant quarrel—in the dispersion of the descendants of French Protestant exiles who are scattered over the face of the Earth from Prussia to South Africa and the descendants of Irish Catholic exiles who are scattered, even more widely, from Chile to Austria and from the United States to Australia. Nor has the plague been stayed by the peace of lassitude and cynicism in which our Western Wars of Religion tardily came to their close.⁵ For the fanaticism which seemed to have burnt itself out before the opening of the eighteenth century had lighted up again, before that century came to an end, in a new and larger and still more inflammable pile of fuel. In another context we have observed how the Wars of Religion have been followed, after the briefest respite, by the Wars of Nationality;⁶ and in our modern Western World the spirit of religious fanaticism and the spirit of national fanaticism are manifestly one and the same evil passion masquerading under a superficial diversity of interest and objective.

Our modern Western nationalism has an ecclesiastical tinge; for, while in one aspect it is a reversion to the idolatrous self-

¹ For the effect of exile upon the careers of Thucydides and Dante see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 291-2 and 331-2, above.

² For this process of Italianization see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 299-306 and 357-63, above.

³ For the part played by the Wars of Religion in Western history see further V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 668-72, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 315-19, below.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, pp. 221-2, above.

⁵ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 668-72, below.

⁶ See IV. C (iii) (b) 3 and 4, vol. iv, pp. 150-67, above, and also V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 319-20, below.

worship of the tribe¹ which was the only religion known to Man before the first of the 'higher religions' was discovered by an oppressed internal proletariat,² this Western neo-tribalism is a tribalism with a difference. The primitive religion has been deformed into an enormity through being power-driven with a misapplied Christian driving-force. The Golden Calf—or Lion or Bear or Eagle, or whatever the tribal totem may happen to be—is being worshipped in our world to-day with an intensity of feeling and a singleness of mind which ought not to be directed by human souls towards any god but God Himself.³ And it is not surprising to find that we have been propitiating these blasphemously idolized tribal deities with the human sacrifices which they relish and exact. How should we do otherwise when our Protestant and Catholic forefathers have set us the example by making the same impious oblations to a God whose delight is in mercy and not in Man's cruelty to Man? Thus we see the eviction of the Protestants from France in A.D. 1685 and from Salzburg in A.D. 1731-2 being followed in A.D. 1755 by the eviction of the Acadians from Nova Scotia (a name which tells its own tale of national rivalry) and in A.D. 1783 by the eviction of 'the United Empire Loyalists' from the new-born United States;⁴ and these are the vanguard of a fresh host of exiles—the French aristocratic *émigrés* of 1789; the European liberal *émigrés* of 1848; the Russian 'White' *émigrés* of 1917; the Italian and German democratic *émigrés* of 1922 and 1933; the Austrian Catholic and Jewish *émigrés* of 1938—who have been uprooted in the effort to impose a spiritual uniformity by force: an ideal which loses none of its perversity—though assuredly most of its excuse—for being transferred to the national from the ecclesiastical arena.

To these victims of a politico-religious fanaticism we have to add the tale of exiles who have been carried into captivity from the centre to the fringes of an expanding Western World as a punishment for crimes (some serious, some trivial; some real, some imaginary), and, in particular, the convicts who have been transported from the British Isles to North America before, and to Australia since, the establishment of the independence of the United States. These British convict-exiles to the New World overseas are the counterparts of the criminals whom the Sinic Emperor Ts'in She Hwang-ti planted in the newly conquered barbarian territories of the south,⁵ and of the *déracinés* whom

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 351, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 230-1, below.

² See the present chapter and volume, p. 79, with footnotes 2 and 3, above.

³ See Part I. A, vol. i, p. 9, footnote 3, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 581-2, above.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 4, vol. iv, p. 165, above.

⁵ See the present chapter, p. 141, above.

the Achaemenidae marooned on the islands of the Red Sea.¹ There are also counterparts, in our modern Western internal proletariat, of that floating urban population—irretrievably divorced from the country-side yet never properly acclimatized to the life of the city—which we see silting up in Rome and in the smaller towns of Sicily and Italy in the last two centuries B.C. Indeed, in our own world this element in the proletariat has come to occupy so prominent a place, and to weigh so heavily upon the consciences of statesmen as well as philanthropists, that when we pronounce the word ‘proletariat’ it is this element, to the exclusion of all the rest, that is apt to present itself to our minds.

We have seen how in Sicily and Italy, during the Hellenic ‘Time of Troubles’, the free population was uprooted from the country-side and driven into the towns by an economic revolution in the conduct of the rural industries of agriculture and stock-breeding. The new rural economy was the offspring of War, which presented the *entrepreneur* with the *tabula rasa* of a devastated area and with the edged tool of the cheap labour-force which the enslavement of the prisoners-of-war had thrown upon the market. By placing these two instruments simultaneously in the *entrepreneur*’s hands, War taught him the secret of drawing an unprecedented and almost fabulous profit from the land by a new-fangled process of mass-production for export.² The uprooting and eviction of the free peasant proprietor who had formerly supported himself by subsistence farming on the site of the new plantations and ranches was an incidental consequence of the rural economic revolution which War and the *entrepreneur* had brought about between them. And, when the disinherited peasant was first reduced to the status of a seasonal wage-labourer on the land and was eventually shouldered off the land altogether and penned up in a slum inside the walls of the city, nobody imagined or pretended that there was anything but unmitigated evil in this degradation of a self-supporting peasant into an unemployed town-dweller whose life was just kept in his body by the grudging distribution of a public dole. The capitalist who was making his fortune out of a slave-tilled country-side displayed as ugly a countenance as his patron-god Mars himself; and, for any disinterested spectator of the joint work of this grim pair of partners, it was not surprising to find wickedness producing results which were morally repugnant and socially disastrous.

¹ See the present chapter, p. 124, footnote 2, above.

² For this rural economic revolution in the western parts of the Hellenic World in and after the fifth century B.C. see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 168–71, and IV. C (ii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 48–9, above.

In our modern Western history we have seen an almost exact repetition of this Hellenic social disaster in the rural economic revolution which made it irresistibly profitable to substitute cotton plantations worked with Negro slaves for the mixed farming of White freemen in 'the Cotton Belt' of the Southern States of the American Union in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century.¹ The 'White trash' which was thus degraded to the ranks of the Proletariat in this Transatlantic annex of the modern Western World was of the same quality as the dispossessed and pauperized 'free trash' of Roman Italy who were 'called the lords of the World' without having 'a single clod of earth to call their own';² and this rural economic revolution in North America which produced these two cancerous social growths of White pauperdom and Black slave-labour was only a logically ruthless application, in an overseas environment, of a similar rural economic revolution in England which had been taking place more gradually in the course of the preceding three centuries. The English *entrepreneurs* of the early Modern Age had not followed the bad example of the Portuguese in introducing African slave-labour into a European country-side, but they had imitated the Roman and anticipated the American planters and stockbreeders in uprooting a free peasantry for the sake of economic profit, by turning ploughland into pasture and common-land into enclosures. This modern Western rural economic revolution has not, however, either in Europe or overseas, been the principal cause of the flow of population from the country-side into the towns in the Modern Age of our Western history. The motive-force that has been mainly operative in bringing about this movement on a material scale which dwarfs the Hellenic counterpart of it has been not a push but a pull. While the *ci-devant* self-supporting rural population of the Western World has partly been driven into the towns by a rural agricultural revolution which has deprived it of its former livelihood on the land, it has mostly been drawn into the towns by an urban industrial revolution which has inveigled it into tearing up its own roots by dangling before its dazzled eyes the lure of abundant urban employment at lucrative wages.

When this Western Industrial Revolution broke out first on English ground about a hundred and fifty years ago, its economic profitableness appeared to be so immense and so secure that the great change was welcomed and blessed—social consequences and all—by many observers who were not less well-meaning than a

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 171-2, and IV. C (iii) (b) 2, vol. i v, pp. 139-40, above.

² Tiberius Gracchus, quoted in the present chapter on p. 70, above (see also IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 508, above, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 381, with Table VIII, legion (α), p. 414, below).

Spartan Agis or a Roman Tiberius Gracchus. While deploring the long hours of labour to which the first generation of factory workers, including the women and children, were condemned, and the sordid and unhealthy conditions of their new life in both the factory and the home, the panegyrists of the Industrial Revolution were confident that these were transitory evils which could and would be removed, and they denounced, as an improvident folly, any proposal to check the impetus of Man's crowning victory over Physical Nature for the sake of sparing Society the inevitable growing-pains. If only (they urged) the Industrial Revolution were allowed to work itself out unhindered, the total wealth of Society would be so vastly increased that the workers themselves could not fail to obtain a handsome share of this well-earned increment; and, when once the spoils of Man's conquest of Nature had been gathered in and divided out, then the temporary inconveniences with which the first and second generation of urban industrial workers had been required to put up would be compensated a hundred-fold by the solid comfort in which the third and fourth and subsequent generations would live happily ever after.

The ironical sequel has been that this rosy prophecy has largely come true—in defiance of the gloomy forebodings of the nineteenth-century prophets of woe—but that the blessings of this marvellous entry into an earthly paradise 'in real life' are being neutralized to-day by a curse which was hidden from the eyes of the pessimists, as well as the optimists, of a century ago. On the one hand, child labour has been abolished, women's labour has been tempered to women's strength, hours of labour have been shortened, the conditions of life and work in factory and home have been improved out of all recognition, and at the same time the workers' share in the spoils won from Nature by Industry has been substantially increased—as is shown by the steady proportionate increase of the wages bill by comparison with the profits in the employers' balance-sheet. In all these ways the urban industrial workers' position has improved beyond the most sanguine expectations of the enthusiasts for the Industrial Revolution in the generation of its outbreak. But there is another side to the shield; and this aspect daunts even our optimists to-day when a world that is gorged with the wealth ground out by the magic industrial machine is at the same time overshadowed by the spectre of unemployment. *À la fin du compte* the transfer of population from country-side to town has produced the same cancer in the Western as in the Hellenic body social: the cancer of an urban proletariat which has lost its roots in the country, has struck no roots in the town, and is reminded—every time that it draws its

dole—that it is 'in' but not 'of' the society which has to serve as the unwilling 'host' of this unhappy social parasite.

Through the ingenuity of Industrialism the modern Western World has evaded the curse of Adam—'in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread'¹—which has weighed hitherto upon the life of every human society that has started, from the primitive level, to clamber up the face of the precipice of Civilization.² We have slily transferred the primal curse from our own muscle and bone to the immeasurably more potent material forces of Inanimate Nature; and now we find ourselves trapped by the very brilliance of the success of our technological manœuvre; for our new-found economic abundance has taken us morally unawares. Morally we have allowed ourselves no time to revise the dispensation under which we and our forefathers have been living during six thousand years of Adamic scarcity—a dispensation which prescribes that we shall work 'with labour and travail night and day that we' may 'not be chargeable to any of' our neighbours, and which commands 'that if any' will 'not work, neither' shall 'he eat'.³ And now that an unmanageable abundance has made nonsense of the precept that 'with quietness they work, and eat their own bread',⁴ we find ourselves morally at a loss in our relations with the millions that 'walk among' us 'working not at all'⁵ to-day through no fault of their own. Manifestly these helpless human victims of callously triumphant machines are not the 'disorderly busybodies'⁶ which they would have been if they had been work-shy idlers in the aeon of scarcity; for a 'technological' unemployment cannot be exorcised by an honest will to work. Yet still it cannot be incurred without bringing upon its victims those moral pains and penalties—the sense of frustration and the consciousness of losing caste—which were the proper and inevitable retribution for a wilful work-shy idleness but are a cruel aggravation of an unavoidable lock-out.

This revenge of Nature upon her Western conquerors has been hastened and sharpened by the triumph of an industrialized Western Society over the human as well as over the physical environment. Since the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century in England, we have not only completed our industrial conquest of Nature in Western Europe. We have also taught the tricks of our West European trade to the new communities of Western culture which have been established by our West European colonists overseas, and to the old communities of alien culture which have been forcibly enrolled in the Western

¹ Gen. iii. 19.

² For this simile see Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 192-5, above.

³ 2 Thess. iii. 8 and 10.

⁴ 2 Thess. iii. 12.

⁵ 2 Thess. iii. 11.

⁶ Op. cit., loc. cit.

internal proletariat. The sleight of hand which replaced the poorly remunerated hard labour of human and bovine and equine muscles by the fabulously productive facile labour of iron and coal and steam and oil and electricity has been applied in the cities—and even on the fields—of America and Russia and India and China and Japan, as well as in those of England and Belgium and France and Germany; and, with the physical plethora of plenty, the spiritual curse of plenty—the curse of an unavoidable yet intolerable unemployment—is now spreading from the European metropolis of our latter-day Great Society to its American and Asiatic provinces. We may even live to see the cancer fasten upon the heart of Tropical Africa, where in the post-war years the latest and most primitive of the alien recruits to our Western internal proletariat have been flung into the furnace of Industrialism by the discovery of the copper ores of Northern Rhodesia and Katanga—a discovery which has led the African's latter-day European masters to provide themselves with a Native industrial 'labour-force' by deliberately driving the African out of the kraal into the labour-market through the imposition of poll-taxes and hut-taxes at a rate at which they cannot be paid out of the produce of African subsistence-farming.

In other words,

The ground of a certain rich man brought forth plentifully, and he thought within himself, saying: 'What shall I do, because I have no room where to bestow my fruits?' And he said: 'This will I do: I will pull down my barns and build greater; and there will I bestow all my fruits and my goods. And I will say to my soul: *Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years. Take thine ease, eat, drink and be merry.*' But God said unto him: 'Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee: then whose shall those things be which thou hast provided?' So is he that layeth up treasure for himself and is not rich toward God.¹

If the souls of a modern Western dominant minority have indeed now been summoned to appear before God's judgement-seat, their intelligences must be inquiring, with an anxious curiosity, into the temper of that vast Western internal proletariat whose membership we have cursorily reviewed from the earliest victims of a political revolution in a medieval Italian city-state to the latest victims of the industrial revolution in the primitive kraals of Central Africa. Do we find the two veins of Violence and Gentleness reappearing in our Western internal proletariat's reaction to the proletarian ordeal? And, if both the two alternative tempers are displayed, which one of the two is in the ascendant?

¹ Luke xii. 16-21.

Manifestations of the militant temper in our Western under-world are not far to seek. We can find them in every secret conspiracy or open insurrection of down-trodden social classes and religious or national minorities during the last four centuries: in the revolt of the High German peasantry against their feudal lords in 1524-5; in the seizure of the Low German city of Münster¹ by a band of Anabaptist 'Zealots' who converted a medieval prince-bishopric into a communistic New Jerusalem and successfully defied a world in arms for seventeen months in 1534-5;² in the French revolutions of 1789 and 1830 and 1848 and 1871; in the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917; in the Bavarian and Hungarian 'Red' revolutions which followed the defeat of the Central Powers in the General War of 1914-18; and in the Haitian revolution of 1795-1803, in which a modern Western band of plantation-slaves wrested an enduring success out of that desperate enterprise of exterminating their masters and establishing a freedmen's state which had proved to be beyond the powers of the Zanj slave-insurgents in 'Irāq in the ninth century of the Christian Era³ and the Syrian slave-insurgents in Sicily in the second century B.C.⁴ The wreckage left behind by these explosions of Violence litters the track of our Western Society's recent history; but, when we turn to look for corresponding evidence of a counteracting and constructive spirit of Gentleness, the traces of this hitherto are, unhappily, far to seek.

¹ The revolutionary establishment of an Anabaptist commonwealth at Münster in 1534 was not a unique or unprecedented event. In 1528 a band of Anabaptist Tyrolese peasants had similarly seized and momentarily held the city of Brixen, and, after the collapse of the Anabaptist commune at Münster, there were a number of abortive Anabaptist 'putsches' in the Netherlands.

² The original stimuli and aims of the insurgent peasants and the Anabaptists were not the same, though in the course of their revolt the peasants came under revolutionary religious influences. The peasants were moved to rise against their lords by a recent increase in the weight of their feudal burdens (partly owing to the reception of Roman Law in place of local custom), by an abuse of money-lending, and by the growth of a rural landless proletariat in the south-western and central parts of Germany through which the revolt spread. The substance of the peasants' demand was a reduction of their burdens to the customary amounts and, as far as this essentially conservative programme came to be tinged with more radical ideas, these were more akin to the French ideas of 1789 than to the Russian ideas of 1917 (see Schubert, H. von: *Der Kommunismus der Wiedertäufer in Münster und seine Quellen* (Heidelberg 1919, Winter), p. 9; Schönebaum, H.: *Kommunismus im Reformationszeitalter* (Bonn and Leipzig 1919, Schroeder), p. 27). On the other hand, Anabaptism was an urban movement which was led into communism by considerations that were not economic but religious (see Schubert, op. cit., pp. 7-9 and *passim*; Schönebaum, op. cit., pp. 24 and 41; Carew Hunt, R. N.: 'Some Communist Experiments of the Sixteenth Century' in *The Edinburgh Review*, No. 504, vol. 247, April 1928, p. 285). The revolutionary-minded townspeople sympathized, however, with the rural insurgents and infected them with their ideas. The Swabian peasantry were influenced by Anabaptist secessionists from the Zwinglian Church at Zürich (Schönebaum, op. cit., pp. 30-1), the Franconian and Thuringian peasantry by Thomas Müntzer, one of the 'prophets of Zwickau' who had seceded from the Lutheran Church at Wittenberg (op. cit., p. 25), and who lost his life at the battle of Frankenhausen, at which the tide of war turned, on the 25th May, 1525, against the peasants and in favour of the feudal lords (see Carew Hunt, R. N., in *The Church Quarterly Review* for July 1938 and January 1939).

³ See the present chapter, p. 129, footnote 2, above.

⁴ See the present chapter, pp. 69-70, above.

It is true that we can point to many victims of the cruel process of disinheritance and eviction who have refrained from taking to violent courses. In another context¹ we have passed in review several examples of refugees from religious or political persecution in the European homelands of our Western Civilization whose response to the challenge of having their roots plucked up has been to strike fresh root in virgin soil overseas. Many—perhaps a majority—of the Protestants who were expelled from France and the Catholics whose native Ireland under a Protestant ascendancy became too hot to hold them and the Loyalists who had to leave their homes in the former Thirteen Colonies in 1783 and the Liberals who had to flee from Germany in 1848 have made fortunes and founded families in the overseas countries of their adoption—in South Africa or Chile or Australia or Canada or the United States or whatever the country may be. The same *tour de force* has been achieved by the American and Australian descendants of many English indentured servants and deported convicts. Even the liberated descendants of the Negro slaves in the United States and the Antilles (to leave out of account the victorious rebels in Haiti) have not entirely failed to find a second home in the house of exile. In 'the Black Belt' of the New World to-day there are Negro populations to be found who have settled down as self-supporting peasants on a land in whose features they can recognize the kindly Mother Goddess that nurtured their forebears in Africa before they were torn from her bosom by the slave-raider's sacrilegious hand. But these successful responses to the stimulus of penalization—admirable though they may be in themselves—are none of them examples of the gentle response to the ordeal of serving in the ranks of the Internal Proletariat; for these diverse ways of meeting and conquering adversity all agree in one point: they are all of them ways of refusing to join the Proletariat—or at any rate refusing to remain in it. They are solutions of the proletarian's problem which avoid the necessity of choosing between the violent and the gentle alternative courses by finding ways and means of escaping altogether from the dilemma. In our search for modern Western exponents of the gentle response our only finds will be the German Anabaptist refugee settlers in Moravia and the Dutch Anabaptist Mennonites and the members of the English Society of Friends; and even these three rare specimens of a gentle proletarian *éthos* will slip through our fingers; for, when we follow up their later history, we shall find that, in the end, the Moravian Anabaptists and the Mennonites and the Quakers have each been re-absorbed, in their turn, into the general Western body social.

¹ In II. D (vi), vol. ii, above.

The failure of the Moravian Anabaptists and the Mennonites to preserve their separate communal life is the more extraordinary considering that a secession from the Western Church Universal was the essence of the Anabaptist movement and the significance of the symbolic act of re-baptism from which the movement acquired its name.¹ The problem of asserting this separateness in face of a hostile and intolerant majority of the society from which they were deliberately and defiantly seceding confronted all Anabaptists in virtue of the cardinal point in their creed; and the pacifist

¹ For a general account of the Anabaptist movement see McGothlin, W. J. M., s.v. 'Anabaptism', in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. An interesting sketch, in small compass, will also be found in Piette, M.: *John Wesley in the Evolution of Protestantism* (English translation: London 1937, Sheed and Ward), pp. 18-36. The Anabaptists welcomed the destructive part of Luther's work, but disapproved of his endeavour to construct a new Church Universal on the ruins of the Church of Rome (Müller, L.: *Der Kommunismus der Mährischen Wiedertäufer* (Leipzig 1927, Heinsius), pp. 65-6). They quarrelled with Zwingli likewise for his unwillingness to fall in with their view that the elect ought to be separated off from the rest of Mankind (op. cit., p. 68). The Anabaptist sect may be said to have come into existence when the first re-baptism was performed at Zollikon near Zürich in February 1525 (Müller, op. cit., p. 69; Carew Hunt, op. cit., pp. 277-8; Schönebaum, op. cit., pp. 29-31). In its essence the Anabaptist movement was thus a recrudescence of the movement for the establishment of a separate church of the elect which had declared itself once before in Western Christendom in the twelfth-century vogue of Catharism and other kindred sects (for this affiliation of the Anabaptist movement see Müller, op. cit., p. 65; for Catharism see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 369-71; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 559-60; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, pp. 624-34; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), Annex, vol. iv, pp. 652-6, above).

The following note has been communicated to the writer of this Study by Mr. R. N. Carew Hunt:

'The essential characteristic of Anabaptism is the demand that the Church should be a *Sonderkirche*: that is, that it should consist of believers only, who, after attesting their faith, should be admitted to membership through "believers' baptism". . . . But "believers' baptism", however important, is subordinated in their thought to the *Sonderkirche* idea and to the necessity for a return to Primitive Christianity. Baptism was the means, the *Sonderkirche* the end.

'The movement started in Germany and Switzerland in 1523-4. In Germany the principal exponent was Thomas Müntzer, who had been influenced, through Niclas Storch at Prague, by Taborite opinions, and himself visited Bohemia in 1522-3 [see Mr. Carew Hunt's articles in *The Church Quarterly Review*, cited on p. 167, footnote 2, above.—A.J.T.]. Müntzer was not a thoroughgoing Anabaptist. . . . But he preached, and no one more vehemently, the Anabaptist doctrine of a Church of the Elect, though he did not regard "believers' baptism" as the divinely appointed means of entering it. In his writings and letters he taught, further, that it was for the Elect to arise and slay the godless, and he thus represents the militant spirit which was to come out in the Münster revolt.

'Meanwhile there had arisen in Switzerland a movement against Zwingli of which Conrad Grebel and Felix Manz were the most important leaders. As early as 1523 they began to pester Zwingli to set up a Church of the Elect into which the faithful should be baptized (see Egli, E.: *Die Zürcher Wiedertäufer zur Reformationszeit* (Zürich 1878, Schulthess), pp. 10 seqq.; Kidd, B. J.: *Documents Illustrative of the Continental Reformation* (Oxford 1911, Clarendon Press), pp. 450-8). . . . On the 18th January, 1525, the Council of Zürich ordered infant baptism, and the Opposition set up a church at Zollikon, where, on the 9th February, Grebel baptized Blaurock. From this action Anabaptism, as a sect, technically dates.

'In both German and Swiss Anabaptist circles there was a good deal of talk of communism before 1525; but none of the leaders advanced any clearly defined policy of social reform, and their insistence on communism was no more than a part of their general demand for the establishment of a church modelled on that of the early Christians, whose members had possessed all their goods in common. But the Swiss Anabaptists from the first disallowed the use of force against the ungodly, which Müntzer advocated, and the letter which Grebel, Manz and others addressed to him on the 5th September, 1524, shows the measure of their disagreement.'

communities in the Netherlands and Moravia, as well as the militant messianic commonwealths at Brixen and Münster,¹ were attempts to respond to this formidable challenge. The social pressure to which the Anabaptists were reacting was so heavy that in their violent and in their gentle reaction alike they were driven to extremes.

The violent reaction at Münster (*saeveibat* 9th February, 1534, to 25th June, 1535)² was in an apocalyptic vein.³ An Anabaptist prophet, Melchior Hofmann, whose head-quarters were at Strassburg, had declared himself to be the first of two witnesses to the imminence of the Second Coming, and had proclaimed that the divine event would take place in Strassburg at a precise date and hour in A.D. 1533. After this date had been surmounted without incident, Hofmann's Netherlander khalifah, Jan Matthys the baker of Haarlem, declared himself to be the second witness and changed the *venue* to Münster, where he duly established his militant Messianic commonwealth in February 1534. After Matthys' death in a sortie against the Prince Bishop's free lances on the Easter Day of that year, the prophet's mantle fell on the shoulders of Matthys' disciple Jan Bockelson the tailor of Leyden. And this epigonus of Hofmann's diadochus styled himself 'King of the New Jerusalem' and 'King of Righteousness with universal dominion', to whom God had given the sceptre of David and the sword that was 'to cleave its way through all the World, for the punishment of the unrighteous and the protection of the godly'.⁴ From first to last the Anabaptist régime in Münster was a reign of terror. In the early days of the revolution Matthys preached in a sermon the killing of all Lutherans, Papists, and other unbelievers, in accordance with the Anabaptist doctrine that the ungodly ought to be, not merely boycotted socially, but also physically exterminated. As a compromise with mercy, all who refused to be re-baptized were driven out of the city destitute two days later.⁵ The exiles' goods were impounded by the newly established rulers of the revolutionary commonwealth. The city guilds were overthrown, and communal workshops, breweries, and bakeries were set up, as well as communal eating-houses.⁶ For the sanctification of his own lusts the Messianic King John compelled his subjects to adopt polygamy.⁷

¹ See the present chapter, p. 167, above.

² See Cornelius, C. A.: *Geschichte des Münsterischen Aufruhrs* (Leipzig 1855-60, Weigel, 2 vols.). A collection of documents relating to the affair will be found in Löffler, K.: *Die Wiedertäufer zu Münster, 1534-5* (Jena 1923, Diederichs).

³ Schubert, op. cit., p. 50; Carew Hunt, op. cit., pp. 281-2.

⁴ See Schubert, op. cit., p. 54; Carew Hunt, op. cit., p. 285; eundem: 'John of Leyden' in *The Edinburgh Review*, No. 507, vol. 249, January 1929, p. 89.

⁵ Schubert, op. cit., p. 53; Carew Hunt, 1928, p. 282; idem, 1929, p. 84.

⁶ Carew Hunt, 1928, pp. 283-4; Schubert, op. cit., p. 10.

⁷ Carew Hunt, 1928, p. 284; idem, 1929, pp. 87-8.

At the very time when the short-lived Anabaptist New Jerusalem at Münster in Westphalia was being established and defended by the swords of the Netherlanders Jan Matthys and Jan Bockelson, the Netherlander Menno Simons¹ and the Tyrolese Jacob Hutter were organizing, in Holland and in Moravia respectively, two other Anabaptist communities which were likewise segregatory, communistic, and authoritarian,² but which differed from the disastrous experiment at Münster in the capital point of being pacifist instead of militant.³ Hutter's and Menno's policy for dealing with the ungodly was not to draw the sword against them but to take pains not to give them provocation to draw their own swords against the elect; and since in Moravia, Westphalia, the Netherlands, and indeed everywhere the Anabaptist Chosen People were overwhelmingly outnumbered by the Catholic and Protestant Gentiles, this difference of policy spelled, for Menno's and Hutter's followers and their descendants, the whole difference between extermination and survival. Instead of perishing with the sword like the Melchiorites, the Mennonites and the Hutterites brought upon themselves the more surprising and ironic fate of being slowly stifled by the inevitable rewards of their own distinctive virtues.

Hutter interpreted the Anabaptist institution of communism, not as conferring a licence to spoil the Egyptians, but as imposing upon the Chosen People themselves a religious duty of working unselfishly, conscientiously, and indefatigably for the benefit of the elect community.⁴ Starting with a technological superiority over the native Moravian Slavs,⁵ the German Anabaptist refugees on Moravian soil soon concentrated their energies upon handicraftsmanship in preference to agriculture⁶ and won powerful protectors by making themselves useful to the Moravian landlords as artisans and bailiffs. The very practical success of this policy

¹ See Krahn, C.: *Menno Simons, 1496-1561* (Karlsruhe 1936, Schneider).

² For the key-points in Hutter's system see Müller, op. cit., p. 77. For the origins of the Moravian branch of the Anabaptist movement see Beck, J. von, and Loserth, J.: 'Der Anabaptismus in Tirol,' in *Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte*, vols. 78 (1892), 79 (1893), and 81 (1895); and Loserth, J.: *Balthasar Hubmaier und die Anfänge der Wiedertaufe in Mähren* (Brünn 1893, Winiker). See further Hrubý, F.: 'Die Wiedertäufer in Mähren' in *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, vol. xxx (1933), pp. 1-36 and 170-211, and vol. xxxi (1934), pp. 61-102.

³ The contrast between Menno and Hutter, on the one side, and the ghāzis of Münster, on the other, is reminiscent of the contrast between Johanan ben Zakkai and the Jewish Zealots in A.D. 66-70 (see the present chapter, pp. 75-6, above). In the view of Mr. R. N. Carew Hunt, as expressed in a letter to the writer of this Study, 'the Münster revolt was really a caricature of the movement, which was essentially pacific, and it contained all the worst aspects of Müntzer's teaching (e.g. its emphasis on the Old rather than on the New Testament). Certainly it showed what fanaticism will accomplish; and all Western Europe, Catholic and Protestant, was appalled by it. But it was repudiated by all responsible Anabaptist leaders, and its whole policy and direction was opposed to the generally accepted tenets of the sect.'

⁴ Müller, op. cit., p. 90.

⁵ Ibid., p. 99.

⁶ Ibid., p. 91.

of Gentleness seems gradually to have softened the Hutterites' moral fibre, and this moral decay seems already to have gone too far to be arrested by the blow which the sect suffered in A.D. 1622, when it was expelled from its settlements in Moravia and was confined to the daughter colonies in Hungary and Transylvania.¹ In the colony at Velké Leváry, in Hungary, the fundamental Anabaptist institution of the community of goods was formally abandoned in 1685.² In 1733 these degenerate Anabaptists renounced the symbolic rite from which they derived their name, and allowed their children to be baptized thenceforward in infancy into the Catholic Church.³ In 1741 they departed from the pacifism which was the Hutterites' distinctive mark, and supplied the Royal Hungarian Government with two recruits to fight as hussars against Frederick the Great.⁴ Finally, in 1760-4, they submitted to a forcible wholesale conversion to Catholicism.⁵ Thereafter a fraction of the former Hutterite community at Alvintz in Transylvania found asylum first in Wallachia and eventually in the Ukraine, where their descendants have survived down to this day and have even planted North American offshoots in South Dakota and Alberta.⁶ These survivors, however, are no more than a 'living museum' of the Hutterite Anabaptist *imperium in imperio* in Moravia which had its brief *floruit* in the latter part of the sixteenth century; and the history of the Menonites has run a parallel course of re-assimilation which has been the more remarkable inasmuch as it has been accomplished without any pressure from outside and without any formal abjuration of the community's separatist tenets. With the inevitability of gradualness 'the epoch of heroic exaltation gives place to the banality of a petty tradesman's life'.⁷ And thus, while the Anabaptists who took the path of Violence duly perished by the sword within ten years of the foundation of the sect in 1525, those who chose the alternative way of Gentleness have also been eliminated in due course by the slower yet ultimately not less effective process of re-absorption into the main body of the Western body social.

Within a narrower range of action and on a lower emotional key the history of the Anabaptists has been repeated in that of the Quakers.

In the first generation of the life of this English sect a vein of Violence, which found vent in naked prophesyings and in noisy disturbances of the decorum of church services, drew down upon

¹ Müller, *op. cit.*, pp. 104 and 106.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁷ Piette, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *pag. cit.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-14.

the Quakers a savage chastisement from Episcopalians in England and from Presbyterians in Massachusetts. This Violence, however, was quickly and permanently superseded by a Gentleness which became the Quakers' supreme and characteristic rule of life; and the Society of Friends then for a time seemed destined to play in a modern Western World the classic role of the Primitive Christian Church on whose spirit and practice, as set forth in *The Acts of the Apostles*, they devoutly modelled their own lives, like the Hutterites and the Mennonites before them. But, while the Friends of later generations have never fallen away from the victorious rule of Gentleness, they have long ago travelled right out of the proletarian path which their history for a short time seemed to lay down for them, and, like the Hutterites and the Mennonites again, they have been, in a sense, the victims of their own virtues. It might indeed be said of the Friends that they have achieved material prosperity in their own despite; for much of their success in business can be traced to formidable decisions which Friends have taken at the bidding of conscience, with a trustful faith in God, in the belief that they were acting to the detriment of their own material interests. The first step in their march to material prosperity was taken, all unwittingly, when this originally rural sect migrated from the country-side to the cities, not because they had lost their hereditary agrarian livelihood or because they were tempted by the lure of higher urban profits, but because a voluntary migration seemed the most obvious way of reconciling a conscientious objection to the payment of tithes to the Episcopalian Established Church of England with an equally imperious objection to the alternative course of resisting the tithe-collector by force.¹ Thereafter, when Quaker brewers took to manufacturing cocoa and chocolate because they had come to doubt the lawfulness of supplying their fellow men with an intoxicant, and when Quaker retail shopkeepers took to marking their goods with fixed prices because they scrupled to vary their price in 'the haggling of the market', they were deliberately risking their fortunes for the sake of their faith; and no doubt it seemed to them—as it did to a malevolently quizzical audience of philistine spectators—that in obeying their conscience they were facing blue ruin. The opposite event has illustrated the little-heeded truths that 'honesty is the best policy' and that 'the meek . . . shall inherit the Earth'; but by the same token it has debarred us from retaining any members of the Society of Friends upon the muster-roll of our Western internal proletariat.

In order to find any lasting or recent example of the proletarian

¹ On this point see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 220, footnote 2, above.

Gentleness for which we are in search, we must range beyond the limits of the native Western body social and must bring within our purview the societies of alien culture which have been annexed to our Western internal proletariat by some military or economic or cultural act of conquest. If we allow ourselves this licence, then we can place to the Western proletariat's credit the gentleness of a Gandhi eschewing the violence of the Bengali revolutionaries¹ and the gentleness of a Tolstoy condemning the violence of the Russian Nihilists, to reinforce the native Western pacifism of a Lansbury and a Sheppard.

When we have cast our net for Gentleness and taken so small a catch, it almost goes without saying that we shall fare no better when we scan the works of our Western internal proletariat in search of evidence of a creative religious activity; for, in our survey of the histories of other internal proletariats, we have seen already that it is the gentle and not the violent vein which is apt to be fruitful in the religious field.

If we follow the clues that are offered to us by the histories of the 'higher religions' which were adopted or adapted or created by the Hellenic internal proletariat, we shall find two rather faint modern Western analogues of Christianity and Manichaeism and the worships of Mithras and Isis and Cybele in two religious movements of Islamic origin, the Bahā'iyah² and the

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 106 and 158, above.

² The Bahā'iyah Sect is a derivative of the Bābī Sect, whose founder Sayyid 'Alī Muhammad of Shirāz declared himself to be 'the Bāb' (i.e. 'the Gate' of the Twelfth Imām Mahdī of the Imāmī Shī'ah) in A.D. 1844, and eventually claimed to be the inaugurator of a new dispensation, and a manifestation or incarnation of God. The Bābī movement was promptly denounced by the Imāmī Mujtahids and persecuted by the Persian Government; and the Bāb himself, after being thrown into prison at Mākū, was put to death at Tabriz in 1850. After the persecution had become intensified as a result of an attempt to assassinate Nāsir-ad-Dīn Shāh which was made by Bābī fanatics in 1852, a band of Bābīs was led into exile by the Bāb's at that time generally acknowledged successor, the Subh-i-Azal Mirzā Yahyā. Their first asylum was Baghdad, and here the party was joined by Mirzā Yahyā's elder half-brother, Mirzā Husayn 'Alī. In 1864 the exiles were transferred from Baghdad to Constantinople, and thence to Adrianople, by the Ottoman authorities. At Adrianople, in 1866-7, Mirzā Husayn 'Alī, who had long since been the leader of the exiles *de facto*, declared himself to be 'Him whom God shall make Manifest': the greater prophet of whom the Bāb had professed himself—at least in one phase of his teaching—to be the forerunner. This declaration may be taken as the genesis of the Bahā'iyah Sect; since Mirzā Husayn 'Alī, under the title of Bahā'u'llāh ('the Manifestation of the Beauty of God'), captured from his brother the allegiance of all but an insignificant minority of the Bābīs, in Persia as well as abroad, and was thenceforth regarded by his followers as the founder of their religion, while the figure of the Bāb tended to diminish in stature and to recede into the background (compare the progressive eclipse of Marx by Lenin in the Communist Church of the Soviet Union). In 1868 the Ottoman Government banished Subh-i-Azal to Famagusta in Cyprus and Bahā'u'llāh to 'Akkā on the Syrian coast, where Bahā'u'llāh continued to reside until his death in 1892. The rigorous internment to which the head of the Bahā'ī community was at first subjected at 'Akkā was gradually relaxed, but it was re-imposed upon Bahā'u'llāh's son and successor 'Abd-al-Bahā from 1901 until the Ottoman Revolution of 1908. These physical restrictions, however, did not prevent the propagation of the new religion into Europe and America; and after his liberation in 1908 Abd-al-Bahā went in person on a missionary journey which lasted from 1911 to 1913 and carried him as far afield as the Pacific coast of the United

Ahmadiyah.¹ These two variations upon Islam have arisen in the Iranic World—the Bahā'iyah in Persia and the Ahmadiyah in the Panjab—since the time when the Iranic World first began, about a hundred years ago, to feel our Western pressure, just as the five Oriental religions which we have cited as Hellenic parallels arose in the Hittite and Egyptian and Syriac worlds after these had been overrun and overlaid by an expanding Hellenism. Again, the Bahā'iyah and the Ahmadiyah movements are alike distinguished by a spirit and cult and practice of gentleness² which stand out in sharp contrast to the militancy of the Islam³ from which they are both derived; and this contrast recalls the similar antithesis between the gentle ethos of Christianity and Manichaeism and the violent ethos of Maccabaeen Judaism and Sasanian Zoroastrianism.⁴ A further point of resemblance is that—again like Manichaeism and Christianity—the Bahā'iyah and the Ahmadiyah have been persecuted in their own world and have gone out to seek a kindlier soil for

States. (For the history and doctrines of Babism see Browne, E. G.: 'The Bābis of Persia' in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. xxi [new series] (London 1889), pp. 485–526 and 881–1009; eundem: *A Traveller's Narrative written to illustrate the Episode of the Bāb*, edited and translated (Cambridge 1891, University Press, 2 vols.); eundem: Mirzā Huseyn's *New History of the Bāb* translated (Cambridge 1893, University Press); eundem: 'Personal Reminiscences of the Bābi Insurrection at Zanjan in 1850, translated from the Persian' in *J.R.A.S.*, vol. xxix [new series], (London 1897); eundem: *Kitāb-i-Nuqtatu'l-Kāf*, being the earliest history of the Bābis, compiled by Hajji Mirzā Jāni of Kāshān = E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, vol. xv (London 1910, Luzac); eundem: *Materials for the Study of the Bābi Religion* (Cambridge 1918, University Press); eundem: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1928, University Press). For an account of Bahaism from the Bahā'i standpoint see Esslemont, J. E.: *Bahā'u'llāh and the New Era* (London 1923, Allen and Unwin). For the injustice done to the Bahā'i community in 'Irāq by the Government of the newly fledged sovereign independent 'Irāqi State, at the instigation of the local Shi'i community, see Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934 (London 1935, Milford), pp. 119–22).

¹ The Ahmadiyah Sect was founded in 1882 by Ghulām Ahmad of Qādyān (a place in the Ghurdāspūr district of the Panjab), who claimed to be the Messiah and the Mahdī. After the death of the founder on the 26th May, 1908, the Ahmadiyah split into two branches, with head-quarters at Qādyān and Lahore respectively (the Lahore branch being the more susceptible to Western ideas). Both branches have embarked on missionary activities not only in the Islamic World, but in Great Britain, the United States, and Germany. (See M. Th. Houtsma: 'Le Mouvement Religieux des Ahmadiyya aux Indes Anglaises' (in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, i, 1907, pp. 533–76); H. A. Walter: *The Ahmadiyya Movement* (Calcutta 1918, Oxford University Press); Mirzā Bashir-ad-Dīn Mahmūd Ahmad [son of the founder, and head of the Qādyān branch]: *Ahmad the Messenger of the Latter Days*, Part I (Qādyān 1924; and Madras 1924, Addison Press); eundem: *Ahmadiyyat or the True Islam* (Qādyān 1924); Mawlānā Muhammad 'Alī [head of the Lahore branch]: 'The Ahmadiyya Movement' (in *The Light of Lahore*, 16th October, 1925, translated in *Oriente Moderno*, vi, 2, pp. 108–23.)

² Bahā'u'llāh declared for Non-Violence (see Browne in *J.R.A.S.*, vol. xxi [new series], pp. 954–9, and in *A Traveller's Narrative*, vol. ii, p. xl), in contrast to the militancy into which the Primitive Bābis had lapsed after the imprisonment of the Bāb at Mākū in A.D. 1847.

³ The Sunnah has been militant from first to last, and, while the Shi'ah has sometimes taken on an appearance of gentleness, this has perhaps usually reflected a lack of the power rather than the will to take to violent courses. The Carmathians in the tenth century of the Christian Era and the Ismā'ilis in the eleventh and twelfth centuries were more violent than any Sunnis; and violence has also been the keynote of the militant revival of Imāmī Shi'ism by Ismā'il Shāh Safāwī (see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 661–5, below.).

⁴ See the present chapter, pp. 125–6, above, with the references there given.

their seed in the alien world which has imposed itself upon theirs so masterfully. When the Bāb, who was the forerunner of the prophet of Bahaism, was put to death by his Persian countrymen, and when life in Persia was made almost impossible for the martyred prophet's disciples, the Bāb's successor Subh-i-Azal sought asylum at Baghdad; after the eviction of the exiles from 'Irāq, Subh-i-Azal's supplanter Bahā'u'llāh eventually found a secure resting-place at 'Akkā on the Mediterranean coast of Syria; and from this last well-sited base of operations the Bahā'is have launched their propaganda into the Western World and have gathered Western converts into their fold as far afield as Chicago. The same road has been trodden by the Ahmadi's, who have gained a footing in Europe and America while they have been ignored in their native Panjab and persecuted in their nearest mission-field in Afghanistan.¹ We are reminded of the westward march of Christianity and Manichaeism into the Hellenic World after Jesus had been put to death at Jerusalem and Mani at Ctesiphon, while the relation of Bahaism to Babism calls to mind the relation between Pauline Christianity and the more nebulous pre-Pauline faith that was grasped and shaped and clarified by the Apostle to the Gentiles.

When we turn from the alien 'higher religions' to the alien philosophies that made simultaneous conquests in the Hellenic World, we shall find a counterpart of the Babylonian pseudo-science of Astrology in the Hindu pseudo-science of Theosophy, whose exponents address themselves to a Western public of much the same kind as the Hellenic public which once succumbed to the Chaldaean *mathematici*: a public which has become too conceitedly sophisticated to abide in its own ancestral traditions, but which has not learnt either how to fill for itself the self-inflicted spiritual void in its soul or how to appraise at their proper worth or worthlessness the pretentious alien spiritual wares which are dangled before its uncritical eyes by a swarm of skilful and not always scrupulous salesmen.

We may also now perhaps venture to prophesy that our indigenous modern Western Science will undergo in the course of time a metamorphosis like that which has transformed the philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama into the Mahāyāna² and the philosophy of Plato into the religion of Neoplatonism³ and the philosophy of the

¹ For the persecution of the Ahmadiyah in Afghanistan in A.D. 1924-5 see Toynbee, A. J.: *A Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 568.

² See the present chapter, pp. 133-6, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 552, below.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 271-2, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 545-52, below.

Tao into an explosive mixture of magic and militancy.¹ Already we are beginning to doubt whether our classic nineteenth-century scientific method of weighing and measuring, in which we have put our intellectual trust, is really a talisman which can be counted upon to transmute subjective thought into objective truth; and in the youthful postures of Psycho-analysis, which is the callowest of our Western scientific disciplines, we can see the first tentative essays in a new attitude of mind and cast of feeling and bent of will. Under the mask of a super-intellectualism we detect the resurgent and rebellious spirit of Primitive Man in the act of stealthily slinking back towards its Kingdom of Ancient Night in the hope that, in this reassuring disguise, the truant may be able to elude the vigilance of the secularized angel who wields the flaming sword of scientific scepticism. Is it the humiliating destiny of our Western Science to pander to our *nostalgie de la boue*? Will the twenty-fourth century of the Christian Era bring forth some Rumanian Iamblichus, or the twenty-fifth century some Mexican Proclus, to conjure a rank Neohuxleian theurgy out of a senile experimental technique? The hard-headed chemist or biologist of the present generation whose first impulse will be to scout this vision of our Western mental future as an extravagantly fantastic *jeu d'esprit* will do well to pause and take stock of a not less strange metamorphosis which has actually been taking place under his nose in one great province of the Westernized World of to-day; for in Marxian Communism we have a notorious example in our midst of a modern Western philosophy which has changed, in a lifetime, quite out of recognition by transforming itself into a proletarian religion, taking the path of Violence, and carving out its New Jerusalem with the sword on a Russian scale which utterly dwarfs the sixteenth-century Anabaptist Messianic city-state in Westphalia.

If Karl Marx had been challenged by some Victorian *censor morum* to give his spiritual name and address, no doubt he would have described himself, in all good faith, as a disciple of the great modern Western philosopher Hegel, and would have added that he had made it his own personal philosophic task to apply the Hegelian dialectic to the economic and political phenomena of modern Western social life. In the same Hegelian tradition Lenin, the Russian disciple of Marx, and perhaps—who knows?—even Stalin, the Caucasian disciple of Lenin, would have thought and spoken of himself as a philosopher first and foremost,² and would

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 146-7, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 557, below.

² 'Whereas in France, England, Germany, and everywhere throughout the West, Socialism first manifested itself as Christian or religious socialism, Russian socialism was from the outset a philosophic movement, influenced by Western philosophic doctrines,'—Masaryk, T. G.: *The Spirit of Russia* (English translation: London 1919, Allen and Unwin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 356-7.

have taken an even greater pride in his mastery of the dialectic method than in his power of controlling economic forces and ruling the hearts of men. Yet all the time it is patent to the judicious observer that the picture which paints Communism as a kind of applied philosophy is ludicrously inadequate and misleading; for even in the original Marxian ideology, not to speak of its Leninian and Stalinian application to life, the Hegelian dialectic is only one of the ingredients—and not the dynamic one at that! The elements which have made Marx's version of Hegelianism an even more explosive mixture than Chang Ling's version of Taoism¹ are not derived either from Hegel or from any other modern Western philosopher: they most of them bear on their face their certificate of origin from the ancestral religious faith of Western Christendom—a Christianity which in the nineteenth century, three hundred years after the delivery of the modern Western philosophic challenge by Descartes, was still being drunk in by every Western child with its mother's milk and inhaled by every Western man and woman with the air which the creature breathed. And such of the dynamic elements in Marxism as cannot be traced to Christianity can be traced to Judaism—the 'fossilized' parent of Christianity which had been preserved by a Jewish Diaspora in the Western World and had been volatilized through the opening of the Ghetto and the emancipation of the Western Jewry in the generation of Marx's grandparents.

The distinctively Jewish (or perhaps originally Zoroastrian) element in the traditional religious inspiration of Marxism is the apocalyptic vision of a violent revolution which is inevitable because it is the decree, and irresistible because it is the work, of God himself, and which is to invert the present roles of Proletariat and Dominant Minority in a tremendous *peripeteia*—a reversal of roles which is to carry the Chosen People, at one bound, from the lowest to the highest place in the Kingdom of This World.² Marx has taken the Goddess 'Historical Necessity' in place of Yahweh for his omnipotent deity,³ and the internal proletariat of the

¹ For the (perhaps partly legendary) story of Chang Ling, the Taoist philosopher-alchemist who received a supernatural command from his (perhaps quite legendary) master, Lao-tse himself, to give happiness to Mankind, and who fulfilled this behest by founding, on the borders of the present Chinese provinces of Shensi and Szechwan, a model community which, in the reign of the founder's grandson, played a militant part in the proletarian insurrections against the expiring Han régime in the last quarter of the second century of the Christian Era, see Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920-1, Geuthner, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 189-90; Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), p. 228; Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 419-21. This latter-day aberration of Taoism has been mentioned already in the present chapter, pp. 146-7, above.

² For the originally mundane emplacement of the Messianic Kingdom in the futurist expectations of the Jews see V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 120-3, below.

³ This Marxian Jewish Goddess 'Historical Necessity' has a sister in the Falasha Jewish Goddess Sanbat (see II. D (vi), Annex, in vol. ii, p. 406, above) and in the

modern Western World in place of Jewry;¹ and his Messianic Kingdom is conceived as a Dictatorship of the Proletariat.² But the salient features of the traditional Jewish apocalypse protrude through this threadbare disguise, and it is actually the pre-Rabbinical Maccabaeon Judaism that our philosopher-impresario is presenting in modern Western costume; for it is of the essence of the Marxian apocalyptic doctrine that the Messianic Kingdom is not only to be a material kingdom in This World but is also to be won by a victorious stroke of violence. If this archaic Futurism is the distinctive Jewish element in the Marxian faith, the distinctively Christian element is an Oecumenicalism which is positively antipathetic, and not merely foreign, to the Jewish tradition. 'Go ye into all the World and preach the Gospel to every creature'³ is an injunction which Marx feels to be laid upon himself, and which he lays in turn upon his followers, as imperiously as the duty of establishing the kingdom of righteousness by force. It is not merely a revolution but a world revolution that the good Marxian is in duty bound to strive for.⁴

It is a far cry from the Hegelian dialectic to the embattled church militant of a Soviet Union Communist Party⁵ which with one hand is defending and organizing, through the Government of the Soviet Union, the ground which the Marxian Faith has now already won by the sword, while with the other hand it is working for the completion of the World Revolution through the agency of the Third International. The Marx who has conjured this matter out of that spirit by blending Syriac religion with Western philosophy is a mighty magician. He has performed as extraordinary a feat of 'materialization'⁶ as his Hellenic prototype Blossius of Cumae;⁷ the Stoic prophet of revolution⁸ who was not

Elephantinian Jewish (or Judaeo-Samaritan) Goddesses 'Anath-Yahū and 'Anath-Bethel (see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 46, footnote 1, below).

¹ Compare the substitution of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic World for Jewry by the Christian Church under the influence of the Apostle to the Gentiles.

² In the Marxian eschatology the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is represented as a transient régime which is destined to give place to a stateless form of society as soon as Socialism has become ingrained into the fabric of human life sufficiently to work by itself without any further need of organized force to back it. A similar transitoriness is, of course, one of the traditional features of the Jewish Messiah's millennial reign on Earth.

³ Mark xvi. 15.

⁴ For the socialist element in Marxism and its relation to Christianity see V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, below.

⁵ The Bolshevik or Majoritarian wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Party renamed itself 'the Russian Communist Party' (in homage to the Paris Commune of A.D. 1871) in March 1918 and 'the Soviet Union Communist Party' in May 1924 (in consonance with the by then accomplished fact of the reorganization of the former Russian Empire into a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in which the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was only one (albeit the largest and strongest) of the half-dozen original states members of the Union).

⁶ Or of 'counter-etherialization' in the language of the terminology which we have coined in this Study (see III. C (i) (c), in vol. iii, above).

⁷ See further V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 249, below.

⁸ The question whether it was because of, or in spite of, his Stoicism that Blossius

only Zeno's disciple but was also the master of Tiberius Gracchus and Aristonicus.¹ And, if it had pleased the Goddess fortune to crown Aristonicus's proletarian insurrection with success, then no doubt the names of the Italio Greek prophet and his Pergamene khalifah would be resounding down to this day as loudly as the names of Marx and Lenin do ring in the ears of a generation which has witnessed the triumphant establishment, on Russian ground, of a Marxian counterpart of that Blossian 'City of the Sun'² which Aristonicus tried and failed to establish in Asia Minor in the second century B.C.

Fortune decided otherwise; and the god Helios, to whom Aristonicus's commonwealth was dedicated, no more availed to save his Asiatic Heliopolis than the goddess Atargatis availed to save the contemporary Sicilian freedmen's state that was placed under her auspices by the Syrian slave-prophet Eunus.³ These attempts in a disintegrating Hellenic World to convert a proletarian religion and a proletarianized philosophy into political coin by force of arms were both promptly crushed by Roman military intervention, and they simply served to prove in action a truth which was put into words more than a century later by another leader of the Hellenic internal proletariat when he refused, in the crisis of his earthly career, to follow in Eunus's and Aristonicus's footsteps: 'for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.'⁴ The historical verdict which was pronounced in the Roman military victory over Eunus and Aristonicus was not shaken by the desperate attempts to reverse it which were made in succession by the authors of the Second Sicilian Slave-Revolt and by Spartacus and by Catiline; and some time before the tormented Hellenic World obtained the respite of the *Pax Augusta* it had already become clear that its destiny, whatever it was to be, was at any rate not foreshadowed in the apocalyptic vision of an internal proletariat which had gone, in desperation, upon the war-path.

became a revolutionary and went into practical politics on the forlorn hope of attempting to translate his dream into reality is a matter of controversy among modern Western scholars. According to one view, 'pour tirer les opprimés de leur inertie apathique, il fallut un grand élan de mysticisme dont les missionnaires stoïciens se firent les propagateurs' (Bidez, J.: *La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil chez les Stoïciens* (Paris 1932, Belles Lettres), p. 50). According to another view, 'the slavery question shows that Aristonicus's inspiration was not Stoicism, i.e. Blossius (as Bidez thinks). . . . What moved Blossius was doubtless sympathy with the under-dog and perhaps a family tradition of hostility to the Roman Optimates' (Tarn, W. W.: *Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind* (London 1933, Milford), p. 34, footnote 54).

¹ For Aristonicus see the present chapter, pp. 69-70, above, with the references there given.

² For the worship of the Sun as the divinity who takes up the cause of the Internal Proletariat, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 692, footnote 2, below.

³ For Eunus see further V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, *passim*; for the First Sicilian Slave-Revolt, of which Eunus was the leader, see the present chapter, pp. 69-70, above.

⁴ Matt. xxvi. 52.

In our Western World in our generation the Leninian attempt to fulfil the scripture of the Marxian apocalypse has been treated more kindly by Fortune, at least in the first chapter; for Lenin's proletarian commonwealth on Russian soil has successfully repulsed the first attempt of the Western dominant minority (or 'the Capitalist Society' as it is called in the monomaniacally economic language of the Marxian Sociology) to overthrow the new régime in its puny infancy. More fortunate than his counterparts in the second century B.C., who had to face a dominant minority whose forces were then united under the single command of the omnipotent and ubiquitous power of Rome, Lenin made his *coup* in a world in which the dominant minority was still profoundly divided against itself and was engaged at that very moment in an internecine world-war; and the contending 'Capitalist' states all played their unwilling part in working for the cause of their common arch-enemy. The German Reich gave Lenin his first opening by battering the Russian Tsardom to pieces; and the German authorities actually conveyed the formidable exile himself from Switzerland to Russia across German territory in order that he might complete—to their profit, as they fondly imagined—the task of destruction in which the donkey-work had already been done by German arms. Then, when Lenin succeeded in his enterprise too brilliantly for the Germans' liking, the victorious Allies unintentionally came to Lenin's rescue and saved his work in Russia from being hacked to pieces by the German sword when, for their own purposes, they compelled their defeated German adversaries to evacuate all the occupied Russian territories which Lenin, with his tongue in his cheek, had just ceded to the Central Powers in the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. And after that the nascent military strength of the rising Bolshevik state proved just sufficient for fending off the half-hearted attacks which the war-weary Allies proceeded to make upon the fringes of the Bolshevik domain in the futile hope of dispatching with their own blunted swords the monster whom they had not permitted their German opponents to slay.

In this world of mutually hostile 'Capitalist Powers' which were more concerned to thwart one another than to crush their common proletarian enemy, Lenin's infant Communist Commonwealth in Russia survived the ordeal to which Eunus's Sicilian freedmen's state and Aristonicus's Asiatic Heliopolis both alike succumbed. In the fourth year after Lenin's seizure of power at Petrograd in 1917 it was already clear that the Bolshevik régime was going to maintain itself in all but the outskirts of the derelict domain of the fallen Russian Empire; and eighteen years later

again, in the year 1938, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was still 'a going concern', instead of having faded into the mere 'curiosity of history' which was all that was left, within a year or two of Aristonicus's *coup*, of the Blossian militant revolutionary's pathetic attempt to establish a Hellenic Utopia 'in real life'. This striking difference, up to date, between the respective fortunes of our modern Western Hegelian philosophy militant and of its Zenonian counterpart in Hellenic history raises a question in our case which hardly arose in the other. We are driven to ask ourselves whether it may perhaps be the destiny of our Western Society to be taken captive by this militant movement—as formidable as it is bizarre—which claims intellectual descent from a modern Western philosophy, has caught its spirit of violence from an archaic strain in Judaism, has commandeered an ample base of operations in the vast Russian province of a Westernized World, and has been inspired by an echo of the Christian tradition to attempt the conversion of the whole of Mankind.

Ever since Lenin's advent to power at Petrograd in A.D. 1917 this question has been exercising the minds of men and women all over the World and has been arousing their hopes or their fears in accordance with their diverse outlooks and situations. The established Communist masters of the Soviet Union have hoped that they will not taste of death till they have beheld the world-wide triumph of the Marxian creed and régime which their own hands have already carried to victory in Russia. The non-Russian Communist 'Diaspora' *in partibus infidelium*—or in *Dār-al-Harb*, to use the corresponding Islamic term which seems more appropriate to the militancy of the Marxian *éthos*—has hoped that it may live to see for itself the coming of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat which in Russia is already an accomplished fact; and this hope has perhaps been shared to some extent by some of the non-Communist elements in the Western internal proletariat—for instance, among the avowedly subject or nominally independent peoples of alien culture to whom the propaganda of the Third International has been assiduously addressed in the hope of persuading them to join in building up a common 'anti-Capitalist' and 'anti-Imperialist' front. On the other hand the Western dominant minority beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, which has been the principal target of the Third International's attack, has hoped to see the march of Communism towards the World Revolution arrested at least at the present frontiers of the U.S.S.R.; and the *ci-devant* dominant minority in Russia, in so far as it still survives either at liberty in exile or in its homeland under the Bolshevik yoke, has ventured to hope—unfeignedly or in

secret, according to its place of domicile—that a successful repulse of the Communist offensive abroad may some day be followed up by a counter-attack upon the Communist stronghold in Russia, and that this may eventually result in the repatriation of the *émigrés* and the liberation of those who, under the Bolshevik régime to-day, are sitting in darkness and in the shadow of death.

Officially, the opponents of Communism have been expecting daily—every day since the 8th November, 1917—that the Bolshevik régime will collapse to-morrow, while the Latter-Day Saints of the Communist Church Militant have been awaiting, with the same official certitude, a denouement in the opposite sense on the lines laid down in the militant Jewish apocalyptic tradition. According to the orthodox Communist apocalypse, the heathen Capitalist Powers are sooner or later to join forces in a supreme effort to take the Soviet Socialist Jerusalem by storm and to overwhelm the Communist Chosen People; and on that day, when—on the plains of a Manchurian or Ukrainian Armageddon—the Communist Church Militant is standing at bay against a world of aggressors and is apparently facing hopeless odds, her patron goddess Historical Necessity will manifest her power by putting all the hosts of Midian out of action once for all at a single miraculous stroke. Such are the official expectations on either side; but they give little light to any one who is genuinely seeking to forecast the outcome of the conflict; for it has been evident for some time that both parties have ceased to believe in the respective apocalypses to which they are officially committed. For light we have to look, not to dogmas, but to acts; and, when we examine the recent internal political struggles and external political relations of the Soviet Union, we may feel inclined to predict that neither the Communist nor the anti-Communist apocalypse is likely to come true.

The domestic political life of the U.S.S.R. has been dominated, since Lenin's death in 1924, by a schism¹ in the ranks of his companions—not on any point of theoretical Marxian or Leninian doctrine or 'ideology', in which they all subscribe to an identic orthodoxy, but on the practical question of how these sacrosanct principles are to be translated into action here and now. One faction among the Union Communist Party leaders have taken the line that their immediate and paramount task is to bring about the world-wide triumph of the Communist Revolution, and that,

¹ For this schism and its effects upon the domestic politics and foreign policy of the Soviet Union see Florinsky, M.: *World Revolution and the U.S.S.R.* (London 1933, Macmillan), pp. 125-68; Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1927* (London 1929, Milford), pp. 255-6; *Survey, 1934* (London 1935, Milford), pp. 362-8.

for this purpose, the economic and political and military resources of the U.S.S.R. must be placed unreservedly at the disposal of the Third International. But this Trotskyian policy of 'continuous revolution' has been challenged by an opposing Stalinian policy of 'Socialism in a single country'—a policy which does not question the orthodox Communist doctrine that the Communist Revolution ultimately must be, and will be, world-wide, but does contest the Trotskyian contention that the furtherance of the World Revolution ought to be a first charge upon the assets of the Soviet Union. The first thing to be done, in Stalin's view, is to make Socialism a going concern and a practical success in the one great country in which a Communist régime is already in power; and Stalin contends that this first objective can be attained within the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. independently of what may be happening—or not happening—at the moment in the rest of the World, while admitting that 'Socialism in one country' is only a means to the end of 'Socialism throughout the World', and that, until this consummation is reached, even the most brilliant and imposing achievements in a single country must still be regarded as provisional and precarious. In the year 1938, when the schism was fourteen years old, it was possible to pronounce with some assurance that the Stalinian policy had won. While Stalin was sitting in the Kremlin, Trotsky was vegetating in exile and Zinoviev was rotting in a grave to which he had been sent by the bullets of a firing-squad; and, while the socialization of the Soviet Union was by then an accomplished fact, the Communist World Revolution seemed to be farther off than it had ever been in a world in which Germany had turned National-Socialist. In fact, 'Socialism in a single country' had driven 'continuous revolution' off the field in the arena of Soviet Union domestic politics; and it was noteworthy that the definitive victory of Stalin over Trotsky in Moscow had been quickly followed by an almost sensational change in the relations between the Soviet Union and the states of 'the Capitalist World'.

Since Japan ran amok in the Far East in 1931, and Herr Hitler came into power in Germany in 1933, the Soviet Government has ceased in practice to act upon its official theory of knowing no distinctions between one Capitalist Power and another, and of expecting to see the world-wide triumph of Communism precipitated by a combined attack of all the Capitalist Powers upon the U.S.S.R. Instead, it has begun to show a lively fear lest a concerted attack upon the Soviet Union on the part of two aggressive Capitalist Powers alone may be sufficient to bring about, not the triumph of Communism throughout the World, but its overthrow in its present Russian citadel; and Soviet statesmanship has sought

to parry this threat by making friends among the Mammon of Unrighteousness. As early as 1932 the Soviet Union entered into a political *entente* with France; in 1934 she became a member of the League of Nations; in 1935 she signed treaties of mutual assistance with both France and Czechoslovakia.

These positive acts are proof that Soviet statesmanship no longer expects to see the downfall of Capitalism abroad within any measurable time; for they imply a belief in the reality of the menace to the Soviet Union from the side of Germany and Japan, as well as a belief in the efficacy of an alliance with France and an adherence to the League as expedients for warding the danger off, whereas the peril and the safeguard alike would have to be dismissed in the same breath as sheer illusions by any one who was sincerely convinced that Germany and Japan and France and all the states members of the League were vessels of destruction *ipso facto* because they were products and expressions of an officially doomed Capitalist order of society. Thus the Soviet Government's foreign policy since 1932 presupposes, on the Communist side, a renunciation of the hope of seeing the world-wide triumph of the Communist régime brought to pass within the lifetime of the present generation; and conversely we may infer, on the Capitalist side, a corresponding renunciation of the last lingering hope of living to see the collapse of the Communist régime within the borders of the Soviet Union; for French statesmanship was quite as active as Soviet statesmanship in negotiating the Franco-Soviet *entente* of 1932, and in 1934 most of the existing states members of the League were quite as eager to secure the Soviet Union's adherence as the Soviet Union was to win their consent to its admission; and this attitude implies a belief, in the minds of the statesmen of the Capitalist countries, that the Soviet Union is a valuable associate and not a ramshackle empire that is on the point of falling to pieces. On this showing, it might be said, in the year 1938, that the Soviet Union and a majority, at any rate, of its Capitalist neighbours¹ had reciprocally and simultaneously come to the conclusion that the Communist and the Capitalist régimes were likely to go on existing side by side in the same world for as long a time to come as it was possible for statesmanship to take into account.

¹ Germany, Japan, and Italy are perhaps to be excluded from the list in view of the conclusion of a German-Japanese 'anti-Comintern Pact' on the 25th November, 1936 (see Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1936* (London 1937, Milford), pp. 925-9), and the adhesion of Italy to this pact, with the status of an original party to it, on the 6th November, 1937 (*Survey, 1937*, vol. i, pp. 43-4). On the other hand, some belief in the stability of the Communist régime in the U.S.S.R. was presumably implied in the diplomatic recognition which was belatedly accorded to the Soviet Union by the Government of the United States in 1933.

We may remind ourselves of the similar conclusion which was arrived at—likewise reciprocally and simultaneously—by the Protestant and the Catholic commonwealths of Western Christendom in the last quarter of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era; and the parallel is illuminating. In that earlier case, as we can now see in the retrospect of the intervening two hundred and fifty years, the mutual decision to live and let live has been followed by a steady convergence, towards a single standard type, between two groups of states whose citizens had previously felt themselves to be divided by so great a gulf that, for the first hundred and fifty years after the outbreak of the Reformation, they had assumed with one accord that Christendom was too small to hold them both. Can we see any symptoms of an analogous approximation to-day between the Communism of the Soviet Union and the Capitalism of the rest of the World? We have only to put the question for it to answer itself decidedly in the affirmative.

We can already discern a pronounced tendency towards convergence in this case likewise, and we can observe that this converging movement is proceeding simultaneously from both sides. The 'Socialism in one country' which is the watchword of the Stalinian régime is manifestly generating a new Soviet Socialist nationalism which is finding its basis not in an old-fashioned uniformity of language but in a new-fangled uniformity of institutions which has its counterparts in the Fascist nationalism of post-war Italy and the National-Socialist nationalism of post-war Germany. Conversely, not only these two dictatorially governed communities but also all the other post-war Capitalist national states in their degree are becoming more and more socialist in their constitution as their nationalism becomes more intense. The convergence between the nationalistic socialism of the Soviet Union and the socialistic nationalism of her neighbours is unmistakable; and we can already make out the lineaments of the new common standard type of community towards which our post-war Capitalist and Communist states are thus all tending. The common goal towards which they are headed is a 'totalitarian' régime in a parochial socialist national state which commands the religious as well as the political allegiance of its subjects and imposes itself upon their souls as their supreme and indeed exclusive object of worship.¹

If we are right in this forecast, it is the destiny of the would-be world-wide movement of Communism to be frustrated thrice over:

¹ For the idolatrous self-worship of the primitive tribe see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 351, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 230-1, below. For the relapse of societies in process of civilization into this primitive form of idolatry see the same section of Part IV, *passim*.

first by being imprisoned within the frontiers of a single parochial state; next by being degraded into a local variety of Nationalism after having started its career as a social panacea for all Mankind; and finally by seeing the particular state that has enslaved it gradually assimilate itself to the other sixty or seventy states of the contemporary world by approximating to a common standard type.

This is just the fate by which we should expect to see Communism overtaken on the analogy of the history of other religious or philosophico-religious movements that have similarly turned militant. For example, the militant anti-Hellenic Judaism and Zoroastrianism of the Syriac World in the post-Alexandrine age became imprisoned respectively in the Maccabaeian Kingdom¹ and in the Sasanian Empire;² the militant Imāmi Shi'ism of the Iranic World became imprisoned in the Safawī Empire;³ the militant Muslim-Hindu syncretistic religion of Sikhism became imprisoned in the principality of Ranjit Singh;⁴ and all the four imprisoning states showed the same tendency to approximate in type to their neighbours. The Sikh State became one of those ephemeral 'successor-states' of the Mughal Rāj in India—the Oudes and Rohilcunds—which made their appearance for a moment on the troubled surface of Indian political life before the broken *Pax Mogulica* was re-established as a *Pax Britannica*. The Maccabaeian Kingdom played a corresponding role—until, under the Herodian usurpers, it became scarcely distinguishable in type from the Cappadocias and the Commagenes—as a 'successor-state' of the Seleucid Empire during the brief interval of anarchy which supervened before all these *peritura regna* were expunged by the *Pax Romana*.⁵ The Sasanian Empire both influenced and was influenced by its sole neighbour and rival, the Roman Empire, during the four centuries of their existence in the same world side by side until, on the eve of the Primitive Arab Muslim assault upon them both, it might have needed a practised eye to distinguish the court of Chosroes from the court of Caesar. And South West Asian history repeated itself when a Safawī counterpart of Chosroes prostituted his hereditary head-

¹ For this spiritual imprisonment of Judaism see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 657-9, below.

² For this spiritual imprisonment of Zoroastrianism see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 659-61, below.

³ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 366-93, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 661-5, below. In this connexion we may recall the fact—already mentioned in the present chapter, p. 175, footnote 2, above—that the latter-day emanation from the Imāmi Shi'ism which is known as Babism has been blighted on its native Persian ground as a penalty for its lapse into militancy. It is not in Iran but in the Ottoman Empire and the Western World, and not in its primitive form but in the new guise of Bahaism, that the seed sown by the Bāb has eventually fallen into good ground and brought forth fruit.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 665-8, below.

⁵ On this point see Tacitus: *Histories*, Book V, chap. 8.

ship of a religious order to the mundane political ambition of becoming the *Gegenkaiser* to the Ottoman *Qaysar-i-Rûm*. The same historic penalty for the sin of militancy is apparently being exacted from Communism in our world to-day; and we can now almost foresee the time when Communism and Capitalism will be interchangeable names for a uniform idolatrous worship of the community in a standardized parochial 'totalitarian' state. On this showing, we shall be looking in vain if we look to Communism to provide the internal proletariat of a disintegrating Western Society with the makings of a universal church.

The upshot of our present inquiry seems to be that, while the evidence for the recruitment of an internal proletariat is at least as abundant in the recent history of our Western World as it is in the history of any other civilization, there is singularly little evidence in our Western history so far for the laying of any foundations of a proletarian universal church or even for the emergence of any strong-winged proletarian-born 'higher religions'. Communism seems not to 'fill the bill' any better than Anabaptism or Quakerism or Bahaism or Ahmadism; and these five movements, which make so oddly assorted a company, are a small catch to take in a net which we have thrown so wide.

How is this apparent spiritual barrenness of our Western internal proletariat to be interpreted?

On first thoughts we might perhaps be tempted to draw an encouraging conclusion. We might account for this dearth of creative achievement by the fact, which we have already observed,¹ that some of the finest of the plants that have been uprooted in our Western garden have managed hitherto to strike root again on virgin soil. In other words, some of the most promising of the recruits to our Western internal proletariat have been prevented from making any appreciable contribution to a new proletarian culture by the fact that they have been successfully reabsorbed into an unruptured Western body social; and this is a fact on which we may surely congratulate ourselves; since it may be taken to mean that, in our Western Society, the schism between Proletariat and Dominant Minority has been partially repaired, and that the breakdown of our civilization (if it has broken down) has been to that extent retrieved. The talents of these rehabilitated proletarians may have been lost to the proletariat, but they have certainly not been lost to our society as a whole. So far from that, these *déracinés*' descendants—Non-conformist English, French Protestant South Africans, United Empire Loyalist Canadians, and Irish and German Americans—

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 168-73, above.

are reckoned to-day among the most valuable members of the communities on to which they have been grafted or re-attached. On this line of reasoning the spiritual barrenness of the Western proletariat, so far from being a cause for shame or regret, is actually to be taken as presumptive evidence that the condition of our Western body social as a whole, though it may be serious, is not by any means beyond hope. And if, in our own day, our system shows signs of being able still to conquer and transmute so strong a virus as Communism, we may surely flatter ourselves that there is life and health in our Western Society yet.

These may be our first thoughts; but our optimism will be damped when we look narrowly at the price at which our boasted conquest of Communism is being purchased; for the all-absorbing Western institution to which the Marxian Church Militant shows signs of succumbing turns out, as we have seen, to be the pagan parochial 'totalitarian' state; and, if we remind ourselves of the fate of other civilizations that have come to be articulated into states of this kind, we shall find reason to fear that the future history of our own civilization may be 'nasty, brutish, and short'.¹ An unceasing round of internecine warfare of ever increasing intensity between deified parochial states has been the principal cause of the breakdown and disintegration of some, and perhaps most, of the civilizations that have already gone the way of all flesh. The bones of the Hellenic and Sinic societies—to pick out two conspicuous skeletons—lie whitening ominously on fratricidal battlefields. If our own Western Society in its turn is now assuming this fatal posture and falling into this deadly rhythm, then its prospects, so far from being encouraging, are about as bad as they can be;² for the 'drive' of Democracy and Industrialism, which are the two master-forces in our Western World in this latest age, has already entered into both our parochialism and our warfare; and this terrific head of steam seems likely to carry us at an unprecedented speed to an unparalleled disaster.³ On these second thoughts we may be inclined to look for some alternative solution of our puzzle which will not involve the assumption that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, our Western Civilization is really still flourishing like a green bay tree.

If our Western body social is articulating itself to-day into a congeries of parochial 'totalitarian' states which are irreconcilable with one another because each of them refuses to recognize any higher object of worship than itself, then certainly we are approxi-

¹ Hobbes, T.: *Leviathan*, Part i, chap. 13.

² See V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 312-21, below.

³ See IV. C (iii) (b) 3 and 4, vol. iv, pp. 141-85, above.

mating to the condition in which the Hellenic Society found itself at the moment of its breakdown in the fifth century B.C.; but at this point we shall be struck by a significant difference between Hellenic and Western history. In Hellenic history this parochial paganism was the first state of the ailing society as well as the last; but it has certainly not been the first state—even if it is the present state—of a Western Society which was once entitled to speak of itself as Western Christendom.¹ Moreover, even if we have now at last succeeded in sloughing off our Christian heritage, the process of apostasy has been slow and laborious, and with the best will in the world we are unlikely to have carried it through with all the thoroughness that we might wish; for, after all, it is not so easy to get rid of a tradition in which we and our forebears have been born and bred since the time, now more than twelve hundred years ago, when our Western Christendom was born—a feeble infant—from the Church's womb. When Descartes and Voltaire and Rousseau and Marx and Machiavelli and Hobbes and Lenin and Mussolini and Hitler have all done their best or worst, in their diverse spheres, to de-christianize the various departments of our Western life, we may still suspect that their scouring and fumigating has been only partially effective. The Christian virus or elixir is in our Western blood—if, indeed, it is not just another name for that indispensable fluid—and it is therefore difficult to suppose that the spiritual constitution of our Western Society can ever be refined to a paganism of a Hellenic purity.

Besides, the Christian element in our system is not only ubiquitous: it is also Protean; and one of its favourite tricks is to escape eradication by insinuating a strong tincture of its own essence into the very disinfectants that are so vigorously applied, with intention to sterilize it, by our latter-day neo-pagan social physicians. We have noticed,² for example, the surprising strength and importance of the Christian ingredient in a Communism which purports to be an anti-Christian application of a modern Western philosophy to the practical problems of social life; and, while the violent-handed missionaries of this militant faith betray the extent of their debt to Christianity in the passion with which they deny it, the prophets of Gentleness in a Western or Westernized World—the Tolstoys and the Gandhis—have never sought to conceal their Christian inspiration. The same inspiration is avowed *a fortiori* by those walkers in the way of Gentleness who acknowledge and proclaim themselves Christians like the members

¹ See I. B (iii), vol. i, pp. 32-4, above.

² See the present chapter, pp. 178-9, above.

of the Society of Friends; and we may now remind ourselves of one profoundly touching and impressive religious movement in the bosom of our Western internal proletariat which we have not considered yet in the present context.

Among the many diverse contingents of disinherited men and women who have been subjected, within the last four centuries, to the common ordeal of being enrolled in this Western internal proletariat, the worst sufferers of all have been those Primitive African Negroes who have been uprooted from their homes and sold into slavery on the opposite coasts of the Atlantic. In these slave-emigrants from Tropical Africa to North America we have found our Western analogue of the slave-immigrants who were swept into Roman Italy from all the other coasts of the Mediterranean at the acme of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' in the last two centuries B.C.; and we have observed that the Americo-African, like the Italo-Oriental, plantation-slaves met their tremendous social challenge with a religious response. In comparing the two responses at an earlier stage in this Study,¹ we dwelt upon their points of likeness, but there is also a point of difference which is equally striking and also particularly relevant to our present inquiry; and that is the difference in the sources from which these two sets of uprooted plantation-slaves respectively drew their religious inspiration. The Egyptian and Syrian and Anatolian slave-immigrants into Roman Italy found their religious consolation in those ancestral religions which were the sole element in their heritage that they had been able to carry with them into their land of exile; on the other hand the African Negro slave-immigrants into post-Columbian America have lost the whole of their heritage—religion and all²—and have turned for their religious consolation to the hereditary religion of their masters.

How is this difference to be accounted for? In part, no doubt, by the difference in the nature of the social antecedents of the two sets of slaves. The plantation-slaves of Roman Italy were largely drawn from an ancient and deeply cultivated Oriental population whose children might be expected to cling to their cultural heritage with all their might, whereas the African Negro slaves who were imported into America were primitives whose ancestral religion

¹ In II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213-16 and 218-20, above.

² This statement requires qualification, for the modern American Negro converts to Christianity, like the North European barbarian converts of an earlier age, have blended their acquired 'higher religion' with a primitive religious alloy of their own, and the American Negro debasement of the Western Christian religious coinage seems to have been carried to the greatest lengths in those American Negro communities that have been the most successful in emancipating themselves from the White Man's control. In the sovereign independent Negro Republic of Haiti we can observe to-day, in the shape of Voodooism, a recrudescence of the Primitive Tropical African paganism which has quite thrown off the Christian mask.

was no more fit than any other element in their hereditary culture to hold its own against the overwhelmingly superior civilization of their European White masters. This is a partial explanation of the difference in the sequel; but, in order to explain it completely, the cultural difference between the two sets of masters, as well as that between the two sets of slaves, has to be taken into consideration.

We have already observed¹ that the Oriental slaves in Roman Italy had actually nowhere to look, outside their own native religious heritage, for the religious consolation for which they were athirst, since their Roman masters were living in a spiritual vacuum; and even if the Hellenic dominant minority had not already lost faith in the impersonal Italic *numina* and the barbaric Achaean Pantheon, these crude primitive worships which had been repudiated long since by the Hellenic philosophers would scarcely have been embraced by the Oriental worshippers of Cybele and Isis and Mithras and Christ. In fact, in the Hellenic case the pearl of great price was to be found in the religious heritage of the slaves and not in that of their masters, while in our Western case the spiritual treasure, as well as all the worldly wealth and power, has lain in the hands of the slave-driving dominant minority.

It is one thing, however, to possess a spiritual treasure, and quite another thing to impart it; and, the more we think over it, the more astonishing we shall find it to be that these Christian slave-owners' hands should have been able to transmit to their primitive pagan victims the spiritual bread which they had done their worst to desecrate by the sacrilegious act of enslaving their fellow men. How could a slave-driver evangelist ever touch the heart of the slave whom he had morally alienated by doing him a grievous personal wrong? And why was the religion which he brazenly preached to his slave-victims not utterly discredited, in the slave-catechumen's eyes, by the glaring contrast between the precept and the practice of the master-preacher? This Christian religion which has been repudiated in act and deed by the American slave-owner, as well as by the French philosopher in thought and word, must be animated by an invincible spiritual power if it can still win converts under such conditions. It must still be keeping alive, with a life that is all its own, after the dominant minority in a *ci-devant* Western Christendom has presumed to slough its ancestral Christianity off as though a religious integument were as easily shed as the winter skin of a snake in spring-time. And since Religion has no dwelling-place on Earth except in human souls, it

¹ In II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 215-16, above.

follows that there must be Christian men and women still abroad in a neopagan world who have never renounced their Christian birthright of citizenship in the *Civitas Dei* in order to become the subjects of King Mammon or King Moloch. 'Peradventure there be fifty righteous within the city';¹ and a glance at the American slave mission-field will show us some of these persistent Christians at work; for the American Negro convert to Christianity does not, of course, really owe his conversion to the ministrations of a plantation-gang overseer with a Bible in one hand and a whip in the other. The real workers of the miracle have been the John G. Fees² and the Peter Clavers.

In this miracle of the slaves' conversion to the ancestral religion of their masters we can see the familiar schism between the Proletariat and Dominant Minority being healed in our Western body social by a Christianity which our dominant minority has been trying to repudiate; and the conversion of the American Negro servile wing of our modern Western internal proletariat is only one among the triumphs of a latter-day Christian missionary activity. The eighteenth-century Methodist preachers who sowed the seed of Christianity in the hearts of the North American slaves were at the same time converting other members of the same internal proletariat who were neither slaves in status nor Negroes in physique: for example, the remote backwoodsmen in the Appalachian mountains and the neglected slum-dwellers in the nascent mining and industrial areas of Wales and Northern England. Nor has the Christian revival in a paganized Western World been confined to the Revivalist Movement in the Protestant Churches. In our post-war generation, in which the lately brilliant prospects of a neopagan dominant minority have been rapidly growing dim, the sap of life is visibly flowing once again through all the branches of our Western Christendom; and this spectacle suggests that perhaps, after all, the next chapter in our Western history may not follow the lines of the final chapter in the history of Hellenism. Instead of seeing some new church spring from the ploughed-up soil of an internal proletariat in order to serve as the executor and residuary legatee of a civilization that has broken down and gone into disintegration, we may yet live to see a civilization which has tried and failed to stand alone, being saved, in spite of itself, from a fatal fall by being caught in the arms of an ancestral church which it has vainly striven to push away and keep at arm's length. In that event a tottering civilization which has shamefully

¹ Genesis xviii. 24.

² See Fee, John Gregg: *Autobiography* (Chicago 1891, National Christian Association).

succumbed to the intoxication of a showy victory over Physical Nature, and has applied the spoils to laying up treasure for itself without being rich towards God,¹ may be reprieved from the sentence—which it has passed upon itself—of treading out the tragic path of *κόρος-ὑβρις-ἄτη*; or, to translate this Hellenic language into a Christian imagery, an apostate Western Christendom may be given grace to be born again as the *Respublica Christiana* which is its own earlier and better ideal of what it should strive to be.

Is such spiritual re-birth possible? If we put Nicodemus's question, we may take his instructor's answer.²

3. *External Proletariats*

The Estrangement of the Proselyte.

The External, like the Internal, Proletariat brings itself into existence by an act of secession from the Dominant Minority of a civilization that has broken down and gone into disintegration; and the schism in which the secession results is in this case palpable; for, in contrast to the Internal Proletariat, which continues to live intermingled geographically with the Dominant Minority from which it has come to be divided by a moral gulf, the External Proletariat is not only alienated from the Dominant Minority in feeling but is also actually divided from it by a frontier which can be traced on the map.

The crystallization of such a frontier is indeed the sure sign that the Secession of the External Proletariat has taken place; for, as long as a civilization is still in growth, it has no hard and fast boundaries except on fronts where it happens to have collided with some other member or members of its own species. Such collisions between two or more civilizations give rise to a set of social phenomena which we shall have occasion to examine in a later part of this Study,³ but at the present stage, for convenience' sake, we will take the licence of leaving out of account these geographical contacts of civilizations with one another, and—for our immediate purpose of studying the disintegrations of civilizations—we will confine our attention for the moment to the situation in which a civilization has for its neighbour, not another society of its own kind, but a society of the primitive species. In these circumstances we shall find that, so long as a civilization is in growth, its frontiers are indeterminate; for, if we first place ourselves at the geographical focus of a civilization that is still in growth—taking our stand at some point where the creative minority of the day can be seen at home and at work—and if we

¹ Luke xii. 21, quoted in the present chapter on p. 166, above.

² See John iii. 1-8.

³ In Part IX, below.

then proceed to travel outwards, in any direction that we choose, until we find ourselves sooner or later in another social environment which is not only different but is unmistakably primitive, we shall not be able—at any point on this journey out of the full light of Civilization into the pitch-black darkness of Savagery—to draw a line and set up a mark and inscribe on our boundary-stone: 'Here Civilization ends and we enter the Primitive World.'

This problem of defining limits is one which does not present itself in the relations between the creative minority and the uncreative mass out of whose midst the minority has arisen; for *ex hypothesi*, if a civilization is still in growth, the creative minority of the day, which has found itself through an act of withdrawal, will also have justified itself by making a successful return; and the success will have consisted—*ex hypothesi* again—in the persuasion of the uncreative mass to adopt that response to the challenge of the day which the creative minority has worked out.¹ A returning minority which had failed to cast its spell over the mass would be like a pinch of yeast which had proved too flat to leaven the lump or like a lamp which had proved too dim to light the room. It would have patently broken down in its ambitious attempt to play the creator's part; and the breakdown of a would-be creative minority brings with it the breakdown of the civilization to which this minority has tried, and failed, to give a lead. Our hypothetical civilization, however, is still—*ex hypothesi*—in growth; and this means that, as a matter of fact, the room has been successfully lit and the lump successfully leavened.

No doubt the creative minority's task of converting its uncreative kith and kin is always difficult to achieve, since it is notorious that 'a prophet hath no honour in his own country';² but we have a double proof that the difficulty is not insuperable. We know this empirically from the patent historical fact that civilizations do grow—or, in other words, do respond successfully not merely to a single challenge but to a series of challenges.³ And we can also tell *a priori* that the task is not impossible because we can see that it is not unlimited in its extent. The room which has to be illuminated may be a cavern of darkness, yet the lamp-light will strike—if only it can radiate so far—upon four walls and a ceiling. The lump which has to be leavened may be a mountain of dough, yet the yeast—if only it can permeate so deep—will eventually have worked its way right through this mountainous lump from top to bottom. In the body social of a

¹ For the relation between a creative minority or individual and the uncreative mass in the process of the growths of civilizations see III. C (ii), *passim*, in vol. iii, above.

² John iv. 44; cf. Matt. xiii. 57=Mark vi. 4; Luke iv. 24.

³ For the serial aspect of the growths of civilizations see Part III. B, in vol. iii, above.

growing civilization we may take it that the whole of the uncreative mass has been touched and stirred by the creative minority in some way or other whenever a challenge receives a successful response. For those who do not catch the inspiration in their souls, 'like a light caught from a leaping flame',¹ are induced to conform externally by the enlistment of their faculty of mimesis.

Thus, when a creative minority successfully performs its role in the life of a growing civilization, the spark which it has kindled gives light unto all that are in the house;² but when this light strikes the walls it is not arrested there, for the walls of a growing civilization are walls of glass in a city that is set on a hill and that cannot be hid.³ The light streams out and on to shine before men;⁴ and, when once the rays have passed through the transparent envelope of the crystal chamber out of which they are radiating, they enter a boundless field in which there is nothing to limit their range except the inherent limitations of their own carrying-power. Accordingly, when the light of a growing civilization shines out upon the primitive societies round about, it travels on until it has faded away to vanishing-point. The luminous focus shades off into a penumbra and the penumbra into an outer darkness; but the gradations are infinitesimal, and it is impossible to demarcate a line at which the last glimmer of twilight flickers out and leaves the heart of darkness in undivided possession of the field.

To re-translate our simile into human terms, we find that in a growing civilization the creative minority of the day exercises its attraction not only upon the uncreative mass in whose midst it has arisen but also upon the primitive societies round about, and that it sometimes makes its influence felt at points that are astonishingly remote from the centre of radiation. The Sumeric Civilization sends forth its gods to win honour in Scandinavia;⁵ the Syriac Civilization radiates its Alphabet into Manchuria;⁶ the Hellenic Civilization makes its aesthetic influence felt in the coinage of Britain⁷ and in the statuary of India.⁸ In fact, the carrying-power of the radiation of civilizations among primitive societies is so great that although the younger of the two species of societies is still very young indeed—perhaps not more than six thousand years old as against the hundreds of thousands of years of Primitive Man's existence on Earth up to date⁹—it has long ago suc-

¹ Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341 B-E, quoted in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 245, above.

² Matt. v. 15.

³ Matt. v. 14.

⁴ Matt. v. 16.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 82 and 149-50, above.

⁶ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 130-1, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), in the present volume, p. 500, below.

⁷ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (β), p. 482, below.

⁸ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 131; III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 247, footnote 2; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 134-5, above.

⁹ See I. C (iii) (c), vol. i, p. 173, above.

ceeded (if the word can be used of an activity that has been mostly unintentional and unconscious) in permeating, at least in some minute degree, the whole congeries of surviving primitive societies. The social radiation that has emanated from the twenty-one civilizations, living and extinct, which we have succeeded in identifying, is diffused to-day throughout the Primitive World like the starlight which just relieves the blackness of a moonless night. And it would probably be impossible for our twentieth-century Western anthropologists to discover—even behind a curtain-wall of limestone precipices in the heart of Papua¹—a primitive society which had entirely escaped the influence of some civilization or other. We may confidently affirm that there is no such thing to be seen in the World to-day as a society in the pristine state in which all societies were living before the first of the civilizations emerged.² The societies that we now describe as primitive can only be called so by courtesy; for these latter-day primitives are no longer the untutored—or unspoiled—savages that their forefathers were; instead, they have turned into partially—if only infinitesimally—civilized barbarians; and in a world in which the goal of Civilization has never yet been reached by any society in process of civilization, even at its highest flights, the least civilized of the barbarians are perhaps less far removed from our semi-civilized selves than they are from their own primitive ancestors of the seventh or hundred-and-seventh millennium B.C.

This all-pervasiveness of the influence of the civilizations in what remains of the Primitive World is the aspect of the relations between the two species of Society which strikes us most forcibly when we view these relations through the primitive societies' eyes and embrace in our survey the whole Time-span of the six thousand years or so that have now elapsed since the first civilizations appeared on the scene. On the other hand, if we look at the same process from the standpoint of the civilizations and narrow down our survey to the Time-span of a single civilization's age of growth, we shall be struck no less forcibly by the fact that the strength of the influence that is radiated out wanes *pari passu* with the extension of its geographical range. As soon as we have recovered from our astonishment at detecting the influence of Hellenic art in a coin

¹ For the discovery, in A.D. 1935, of a previously quite unknown society in a region in the interior of Papua which has been insulated physically by the caprice of Nature see *The Times*, 14th August, 1935, and Hides, J. G.: *Papuan Wonderland* (London 1936, Blackie). In a letter, written on the 25th January, 1950, from the centre of this district, Mr. C. R. Stonor has contested the view—formed by the discoverers and accepted in the first edition of this Study—that the Tari Furora were indebted to some alien civilization, more than to their native powers of invention, for their fine technical technique. 'There is one very minor qualification', he writes. 'They discovered them—a crop which they, without doubt, obtained by occasional trading with coastal tribes, who in turn obtained it from Europeans.'

² On this point see Part II, A. vol. 1, pp. 185-7, above.

that was struck in Britain in the last century B.C. or on a sarcophagus that was carved in Afghanistan in the first century of the Christian Era, the edge is taken off our admiration by the hard fact that Hellenism has only achieved the *tour de force* of travelling so far as this at the price of shedding most of its virtue in the course of the journey. Our British coin looks like a caricature of an original stater of Philip the son of Amyntas, and our Gandharan sarcophagus is convicted of being a vile product of 'commercial art' as soon as we set it side by side with the Alexander Sarcophagus. At this remove mimesis passes into travesty. Yet this only happens at the outer extremity of the radiating civilization's range of action; and even the clumsiest and most perfunctory mimesis has its value—as a means of self-education for the party by whom the act of mimesis is performed, and as a tribute of admiration and token of friendship for the party towards whom the mimesis is directed.

Mimesis is evoked by charm; and we can now see that the charm which is exercised, during the growth of a civilization, by a succession of creative minorities preserves the house not only from being divided against itself but also from being attacked by its neighbours—in so far, at least, as these neighbours happen to be societies of the primitive species. Wherever a growing civilization is in contact with primitive societies, the creative minority of the day attracts their mimesis as well as the mimesis of the uncreative majority in whose midst it arises; and, thanks to this attractive power, a growing civilization seldom finds itself in direct contact with savages whose cultural level is so far below its own as to preclude a friendly understanding. It usually finds itself surrounded by a ring of buffer-societies which are continually absorbing its radiation into their own bodies social and then passing it on, *diminuendo*, to an outer ring, which receives and transmits in its turn until the current of energy finally gives out at the extreme range of the civilization's carrying-power.

If this is the normal relation between a civilization and the primitive societies round about so long as the civilization is in growth, a profound change sets in if and when the civilization breaks down and goes into disintegration. This change can be described in two different ways, according as we speak in the language of Life or in terms of Inanimate Nature.

In the language of Life the breakdown consists in the disappearance from the scene of the creative minorities that have won a voluntary allegiance by the charm which their creative power exerts, and in their replacement by a Dominant Minority which attempts to usurp a heritage that it does not deserve to

inherit, and seeks to gain its end by substituting, for the charm which it lacks, the physical force which still remains at its command.¹ This policy, as we have seen, has the moral effect of alienating the victims of it. It goads them into acts of secession; and, while the secession of the masses in whose midst the Dominant Minority stands gives birth to an Internal Proletariat, an External Proletariat is generated by the secession of the primitive societies round about who, so long as the civilization was in growth, were accepting and transmitting its radiation. It would not, however, be an accurate or a complete account of the change in the attitude of these surrounding primitive societies to describe their act of secession as a withdrawal of mimesis from the now disintegrating civilization; for in falling into disintegration a society ceases to be a whole on which other societies can model themselves, or decline to model themselves, consistently and integrally. The cause of breakdown, as we have seen, is a failure of self-determination;² this failure declares itself in a loss of proportion and harmony and inward unity; and—if we now transpose our description of the phenomena into terms of Physical Science—we shall find that this disintegration (in the literal sense) of the broken-down society's fabric is reproduced in the texture of the rays of the radiation which it continues to emit so long as it remains in existence.

While the rays of social radiation that are emitted by a growing civilization may be likened to rays of white light, in which all the constituent elements of light are blended into a single clear beam, the rays emitted by a disintegrating civilization may be likened to physical light which has been diffracted into a sheaf or fan of separate strands that follow distinct paths and display their diverse elemental colours. In social radiation this change in the texture of the ray, which we have just described as diffraction by analogy with a physical phenomenon, has an important effect on its range; for the three elements—cultural, political, and economic—of which a 'white-light' ray of social radiation is composed differ greatly in their carrying-power; and this difference makes itself felt as soon as they are disentangled from one another.

So long as they are interwoven in a single composite ray, the three strands of social radiation travel at an even speed and to an equal distance—a mean distance and a mean speed which strike the average between their respective capacities. But when once they are set free to go each its own way, the three strands begin to travel at the different speeds and to the different distances which are respectively natural to each of them; and the result is

¹ See IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 123-4 and 131-2, above.

² See IV. C (iii), *passim*, in vol. iv, above.

a differentiation of the disintegrating society's radio-activity—an enhancement of this activity on one plane and a reduction of it on another.¹ Since the carrying-power of the economic element is the highest of the three and is therefore above the average, one effect of the breakdown and disintegration of a civilization is an increase in the expansion of its economic influence; there is sometimes also an increase, above the previously maintained average, on the political plane likewise; and this accounts for an apparent 'law'—which has been revealed in another context² by an empirical survey—to the effect that the geographical expansion of a civilization is apt to go hand in hand with its social disintegration. We have now, however, to observe that this enhancement of radiation on the economic plane—and sometimes even on the political plane—which a civilization gains by going into disintegration, is offset by a proportionate reduction of its radiation on the cultural plane; for the natural rate of radiation on this plane is below the average; and, while in the 'white-light' ray of a growing civilization the cultural element is speeded up beyond its own natural pace, and is carried beyond its own natural range, by its unison with two other elements of greater carrying-power, it drops to its own intrinsic range and pace as soon as it is disentangled from them, just as they rise to their longer intrinsic ranges and higher speeds as soon as they are disentangled from it. In fact, while a disintegrating society surpasses a growing society in its radiation on one, or even two, of the three social planes, it simultaneously falls behind it on one plane at least; and, if we now substitute qualitative for quantitative standards of measurement, we shall be left in no doubt that the net result is a moral loss and not a moral gain.

The difference in value between the three elements of social life is, indeed, extreme; for what we have called the cultural element in a civilization is its soul and life-blood and marrow and pith and essence and epitome, while the political and, *a fortiori*, the economic element are, by comparison, superficial and non-essential and trivial manifestations of a civilization's nature and vehicles of its activity. It is only in so far as it succeeds in radiating itself out on the cultural plane that a civilization can ever genuinely and completely assimilate an alien body social with which it has come into contact; for the most spectacular triumphs of economic and political radiation are imperfect and therefore precarious.

¹ We have already come across this differentiation of a society's radio-activity, on the three different planes of economic, political, and cultural action, in attempting to trace backwards in Time, from the situation as it stands at the present day, the variations in the spatial extension of our Western Civilization (see I. B (iii), vol. i, pp. 26–33, above).

² In III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 139–53, above. See also IV C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 57, above.

Accordingly it is more profitable, both for the society which is emitting the radiation and for the society which is receiving it, that an inch should be gained on the cultural plane than a mile on the political plane or a league on the economic.

On this showing, the expansion of a growing civilization is to be commended for being slow but sure; for in a growing civilization the three elements are either completely blended or at worst only slightly diffracted; and under such conditions all the ground that is won is won on the cultural plane as well as on the other two, while at the same time rather more ground is won by the three elements in combination than could have been won by the cultural element in isolation. By contrast, the expansion of a disintegrating civilization is exposed as being showy but unsound; for, while it forges ahead on the economic plane, and perhaps on the political plane as well, the ground thus superficially gained is never definitively secured by a cultural conquest, since the cultural radiation of a disintegrating civilization is losing momentum in exact proportion to the enhancement of its political and economic radio-activity. In fact—to vary our simile—the economic and political seed which a disintegrating civilization contrives to scatter so far afield is sickly seed sown among thorns.¹

If we now return to the standpoint of the barbarian society which has been receiving the radiation of a growing civilization and has been reacting to it by directing its own faculty of mimesis towards the alien source of this new light and life, we shall see that, when the barbarian society's reaction changes after the civilization's breakdown, the new sense of alienation from a neighbour who has lost his soul and changed his countenance, and the act of secession in which this estrangement issues, do not necessarily involve a complete cessation of all mimesis on every plane. The

¹ 'The tree that grows and flowers is tied to the patch of soil in which it is rooted . . . but its ripe fruits can be sown by every wind no matter how far afield. Strassburg Münster could not have grown to be what it is anywhere but in Strassburg, and the Hagha Sofia not anywhere but in Constantinople; but a "modern building in the Renaissance style" can "be produced" just as well at the South Pole as in the primeval forests of Brazil.'—Frobenius, L.: *Paideuma* (Frankfurt a.M. 1928, Frankfurter Societäts-Druckerei), p. 172. Compare the contrast, noted in the present Study in IV. C (iii) (b) 14, vol. iv, p. 243, above, between the performance of an Attic play at one of the regular festivals in the Theatre of Dionysus at Athens, where the Attic drama had its roots, and the performance of the same play, *post Alexandrum*, by the *Διονυσίου Τεχνίται*, anywhere in the world, from Parthia to Spain. This objective phenomenon of the diffraction of the rays of a disintegrating civilization has a subjective counterpart in 'the sense of promiscuity' which is examined in V. C (i) (d) 6, pp. 439–568, below. The psychological shock that is an apparently inevitable accompaniment of the external disturbance involved in the experience of social 'deracination' seems to be so severe that its effects may be devastating even when the social milieu from which the subject is uprooted is itself an artificial and abnormal environment. For example, when barbarian war-bands break through a *limites* (see p. 208, below)—in a *Völkerwanderung* which first uproots them from the no-man's-land in which they have come into being, and then deposits them in the interior of a *ci-devant* universal state—the consequent shock is apt to throw them into a state of demoralization which is examined in Part VIII, below.

estranged and disillusioned barbarian society may abandon its cultural mimesis of a neighbour whose culture has lost its savour, without ceasing to borrow this neighbour's practical institutions or material technique. In fact, by continuing to borrow these it may be providing itself with the most effective means of ensuring that it shall not be compelled to receive the no longer attractive alien culture except in so far as it chooses; for the Dominant Minority with which the barbarians now have to deal will almost certainly act after its kind by seeking to impose its repudiated culture by force; and this force may perhaps be most effectively repelled by adopting and turning against the aggressor one of his own institutions (e.g., his political institution of dictatorship) or some part of his own technique (e.g., his art of war).¹

'Cette pénétration étroite de la sauvagerie et de la civilisation c'est justement ce qui fait la barbarie redoutable: des organismes humains qui ont une résistance et une détente animales; et à leur disposition pourtant l'acquis des vieilles civilisations. C'est l'histoire éternelle, les Francs n'ont pas été autre chose.'²

This disastrous miscarriage in the relations between a civilization and its primitive neighbours has been described in an illuminating passage from the pen of another modern Western scholar:

'There tends to grow up round every centre of the higher civilization a zone of lower culture which is to some extent dependent or parasitic upon its civilized neighbours, while at the same time possessing a higher degree of mobility and a greater aptitude for war. Thus to the settled Semitic civilizations of Mesopotamia and Syria and South Arabia there corresponds the predatory Nomad culture of the Bedouin, and to Egypt the pastoral culture of the Libyans and the other Hamitic peoples of North Africa. So, too, in Eastern Asia we find a similar zone of Nomad Mongolian peoples on the north-western frontiers of China, and in Central Asia the peoples of the Steppes have owed their culture to the settled civilization of Persia and Turkistan; while in prehistoric Europe the same relation existed between the peasant cultures of the Danube and the Dniepr and the warlike peoples to the north and east. . .

'It is . . . probable that it was the civilized peoples who were the first aggressors, and that it was from them that the barbarians first learnt the possibilities of organized warfare, as well, no doubt, as the

¹ A perversely ingenious barbarian instinct of self-defence sometimes even turns to military account a piece, or an instrument, of technique that the civilization from which this impromptu weapon has been borrowed has never thought of employing on its own account for any but peaceful purposes. Thus the camel, which was introduced into North Africa by the Romans as a means of civilian transport for economic objects, was converted into a means of mobility in military operations by the war-bands of the North African Nomad barbarians in the steppe and desert hinterland of the Roman dominions (see Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 162 and 184).

² Gautier, op. cit., p. 317.

use of weapons of metal.¹ Certainly the great wave of invasion of the men of Gutium from the north which overwhelmed Mesopotamia in the twenty-sixth century B.C. followed close upon the period of Sargon and Naramsin, who were the first to lead Mesopotamian armies into the uncivilized mountainous regions to the north and east of Tigris;² and in the same way in Egypt the later days of the Old Kingdom had been marked by expeditions of conquest against "the Sand Dwellers" of the north and the Nubians of the south, which may have helped to provoke the subsequent movement of invasion.³ However this may be, the ultimate advantage was all on the side of the barbarians; for every fresh invasion increased their warlike efficiency, whereas the destructive effects of warfare on the higher civilization⁴ were cumulative.⁵

Broadly speaking, we may say that, when a society in process of civilization has been split by the schism which is the penalty of breakdown, the Proletariat is apt to withdraw its mimesis from all the ideals of the Dominant Minority except its worship of violence, and from all its institutions and techniques except those in which this spirit of violence is embodied.

In our foregoing survey of the experiences and reactions of internal proletariats we have observed how the path of Violence allures them; and we have also seen that, when they do yield to their human passions and attempt to repay their oppressor in his own coin, they usually defeat their own ends and bring disaster upon themselves into the bargain. In his own chosen field of force the hangman-commissary of the Dominant Minority is more than a match for any members of the Internal Proletariat who may be rash enough to take up arms against him. The Theudases and Judases inevitably perish with the sword; and it is only when it follows a prophet who leads it along the path of Gentleness that the Internal Proletariat has a chance of taking its conquerors captive—by taking them unawares on an unfamiliar field of action

¹ Plato (*Leges*, 678 E) has put forward the conjecture that metallurgy, and in consequence war (both civil and international), is in abeyance in a primitive state of society—which, in Plato's view (see IV C (i), vol. iv, pp. 24-7, and IV. C (i), Annex, vol. iv, pp. 585-8, above), is a state that is perpetually recurring as an aftermath of periodical cosmic catastrophes.—A.J.T.

² For Naramsin's militarism and its nemesis see further I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, above, and the present chapter and volume, p. 262; V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 184; and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 296, below.—A.J.T.

³ For this invasion of the Egyptian World by Asiatic barbarians in the latter days of 'the Old Kingdom', on the eve of the onset of an Egyptian 'Time of Troubles', see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 404, above, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 266-7, below.—A.J.T.

⁴ For the social 'law' that, while the military efficiency of a community is proportionate to the degree of its civilization, its capacity for social recuperation from the devastating effects of war is in inverse ratio both to the degree of its civilization and to the standard of its military efficiency, see the present Study, IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 393-4, above.—A.J.T.

⁵ Dawson, Christopher: *The Age of the Gods*, reissue (London 1933, Sheed & Ward), pp. 241 and 245.

on which the hangmen are inexpert and defenceless. In an ordeal by battle the Dominant Minority's victory over the Internal Proletariat is virtually assured *a priori* because its intrinsic superiority in military strength is reinforced—in dealing with this opponent—by the tactical advantage of fighting the action on a limited field on which the victor can be certain of securing a decision. We have seen, for example, in the Hellenic case, how hopeless it was for the Hellenic internal proletariat in the last two centuries B.C. to cross swords with a dominant minority whose force was not only superior in itself but was also by this time concentrated in the hands of the single ubiquitous Roman Power.¹ How do the External Proletariat's chances compare with those of the Internal Proletariat if it ventures, in its turn, to meet the Dominant Minority in battle?

The intrinsic inferiority of the External Proletariat to the Dominant Minority in military prowess is perhaps as extreme as that of the Internal Proletariat—at any rate on the morrow of the schism which has put the Proletariat and the Dominant Minority into a state of war with one another. We have convincing presumptive evidence of this in the fact—which we have observed in a previous context—that one of the regular sources of the recruitment of an Internal Proletariat lies in the conquest of members of the External Proletariat by the Dominant Minority.² In so far as they are simply subjugated instead of being annihilated or evicted, the conquered external proletarians are transferred from the External to the Internal Proletariat by the act of conquest; and this is perhaps the usual fate of those layers of the External Proletariat of a disintegrating civilization that lie nearest to the Dominant Minority's base of operations. At the same time the External Proletariat has one great advantage over the Internal Proletariat in trying conclusions with the Dominant Minority by force of arms. Whereas the whole of the Internal Proletariat lies, *ex hypothesi*, within the Dominant Minority's reach, some part, at any rate, of the External Proletariat is likely to find itself beyond the effective range of the Dominant Minority's military action—and this, again, *ex hypothesi*, since, as we have seen, the radiation of a civilization into the Barbarian World is not, as a rule, brought to a halt by any external obstacle, but runs on unimpeded until it gradually dies away through a progressive diminution of its own energy as it approaches the inherent limits of its carrying-power.

In such circumstances it is evident that, when a growing

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 68–71 and 180, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, *passim*, above.

civilization has broken down, and when the charm exerted by a creative minority has been replaced by the Dominant Minority's substitute of violence, this radiation of force—like the radiation of attractiveness which it has superseded, and indeed *a fortiori*—must come sooner or later, as it travels out into Space, to a point that is so distant from its original place of emission that its effectiveness here dwindles to an infinitesimal quantum. In other words, even if the innermost layer of the External Proletariat succumbs to conquest, and the same fate then overtakes the next layer, or even the next after that, it is only a question of distance for an outer layer to be reached which is so remote from the Dominant Minority's base of operations that the aggressor's intrinsic superiority in military strength is here effectively counteracted by the geographical handicap. At this remove the External Proletariat will be able to take up arms against the Dominant Minority with impunity, in the assurance of being able to hold its own.

It is true that, on certain fronts, some physiographical accident may deprive the External Proletariat of this geographical advantage by compelling it to fight—as the Internal Proletariat always has to fight, if it fights at all—with its back to the wall in a confined space where the Dominant Minority can insist upon bringing it to battle and obtaining a decision. In the Hellenic World the barbarians of the Iberian Peninsula had to fight at this disadvantage against the Roman Power—by contrast with those of North-West Africa on the one side and of Transpyrenaean Europe on the other. In both these other war-zones the depth of the *terrain* which was at the barbarians' disposal for manoeuvre far exceeded the range of Rome's power to strike. On the Trans-mediterranean front in North-West Africa the Roman arm which struck down a Jugurtha in Numidia was not long enough to reach the remoter layers of Berbers in the highlands of the Atlas or on the steppes of the Sahara; and on the Transappennine front in Europe a Power which could both reach and hold the line of the Rhine could not hold the line of the Elbe or even reach the line of the Vistula.¹ In the Iberian Peninsula, on the other hand, the barbarians were trapped between the Pyrenees and the sea; and, when Caesar had finally cut them off from all communication with their Transpyrenaean kin and kind by extending the Roman hold upon Gaul from the Mediterranean slope to the coast of the Atlantic, the last of the independent Iberian barbarians, in the strong but narrow natural fastness between the crest of the Asturian and Cantabrian Mountains and the waters of the Bay of

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex I, pp. 591-5, below.

Biscay,¹ were followed up into their lairs and reduced to subjection by Augustus—some two centuries after the date at which the first Roman soldier had set foot in the Iberian Peninsula in the course of the Hannibalic War.

In the histories of other civilizations we can think of parallel cases in which a detachment of the External Proletariat has been caught by the Dominant Minority in a geographical trap of this kind and has then been either subjugated or annihilated until, on this particular front, the victorious Dominant Minority has successfully carried its advance up to a frontier with no further layer of barbarians beyond it—a 'natural frontier' that is defined and defended by some unnavigated sea or untraversed desert or unsurmounted mountain range.

In the Indic World, for example, under the Maurya régime, the Dominant Minority subjugated the barbarians of Southern India almost up to the tip of the Indian Peninsula and thereby acquired, on this front, a natural frontier which was washed by the sea. Again, in the Sinic World under the Ts'in and Han régime, the Dominant Minority completed the subjugation of the Southern Barbarians up to the unfrequented coasts of the South China Sea and the unscaled eastern escarpment of the Tibetan Plateau.² In Russian Orthodox Christendom the backwoodsmen never gave the barbarian denizens of the north-eastern forests time to throw up a stockade. Within two hundred years of the conversion of Vladimir in A.D. 988/9 the pioneer Russian communities of Novgorod and Vyatka had pushed their way to the White Sea and the Urals; and, when the watershed between Volga and Ob had once been crossed by the Cossacks in A.D.

¹ For the part played by the Biscayan fastness, in a later age, in the collision between the Syriac Society, in its re-integrated universal state, and a nascent Western Christendom, see II. D (vii), Annex VIII, in vol. ii, pp. 446-52, above. After more than four hundred years of acquiescence in the *Pax Romana* the Basques and Cantabrians of the Biscayan highlands, like the Isaurians of the Taurus (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 325, above), had shaken off the authority of the tottering Hellenic universal state and (unlike the Isaurians) had succeeded in maintaining their newly recovered independence. Indeed, they maintained it against successive bands of incoming barbarians—first the Vandals and Sueves and Visigoths and then the Arabs. Nor did they fall under the dominion of the Syriac universal state which the Arabs restored to life in the shape of the Umayyad Caliphate. Farther west, the Asturian highlanders submitted to the Vandals and the Sueves and the Goths, but held out against the Arabs as indomitably as their Cantabrian and Basque neighbours. Compare the tenacity of the resistance opposed by the Three Basque Provinces and Asturias to the Castilian Nationalists and their Italian and German allies in the war that broke out in Spain in July 1936. Compare, further, the survival of a primitive 'Adoptionist' version of Christianity in an Asturian fastness, where there is evidence for its persistence down to the latter part of the eighth century (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, pp. 625, 629, 630, and 633, above). Compare, finally, the survival down to the present day, in the Peninsular provinces of Viscaya, Guipuzcoa, and Navarre, as well as in the adjoining districts of France on the other side of the Pyrenees, of a pre-Indo-European language which has no living counterpart on a continent on which—except in this one corner—all older linguistic strata have been buried and obliterated, centuries ago, under Indo-European and Ural-Altaic deposits.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 141 and 147, above.

1586, it took them little more than fifty years to push on across the Siberian Taiga and Tundra to a natural frontier on the coasts of the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk.¹ In the Arabic World the penetration of Tropical Africa from the Saharan and Nilotic fringes of the Sudan and from the African coast of the Indian Ocean would almost certainly have been rounded off, before the close of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, by a subjugation of the whole 'Dark Continent' if the Arab invaders had not been overtaken and supplanted, at the eleventh hour, by the more redoubtable Franks. Within the fifty or sixty years ending in 1938 the Powers of Europe had partitioned the soil, and subjugated the primitive Negro 'Natives', of the whole of Tropical Africa, from ocean to ocean and from desert to desert; and between the 12th September, 1935, when these lines were written, and the 7th August, 1938, when they were revised for the press, one of these Powers, which had received short measure in the scramble for Europe's African spoils, had broken its own engagements and had defied the verdict and the sanctions of its peers in conquering the last surviving independent Native African state; the Empire of Ethiopia.² In earlier chapters of the history of our Western World in its Modern Age the European colonists overseas kept the Red Indian barbarians on the run in North America from the moment of their first landing on the Atlantic coast of the continent until the time—some two hundred and fifty years later—when they reached their natural frontier on the shores of the Pacific;³ and in the South Seas they decimated the Australian Blackfellows and exterminated the Tasmanian aborigines until they had made themselves masters of the whole surface of both the continent and the island. Nearer home other modern militant pioneers of our Western Civilization have almost as recently made an equally 'clean job' of the White barbarians in the highlands and isles of Scotland⁴ and the bogs and mountains of Ireland; and our subjugation of these barbarians of 'the Celtic Fringe' has its analogue in the Far Eastern World in the subjugation—or

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 157, above.

² For the Italian aggression against Abyssinia in and after A.D. 1935 see further pp. 334–7, below. For the previous history of Abyssinia see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 364–7, above. In A.D. 1935 Abyssinia could accurately be described as the only surviving independent Native African state, since Liberia, which was also both African and independent, was ruled, not by Native Africans, but by the repatriated descendants of Africans who had been sold into slavery in North America. On the other hand the Amharan rulers of the Empire of Ethiopia could fairly claim to be Native Africans, in spite of the fact that their mother tongue was a Semitic language which had been brought in by conquerors from the other side of the Red Sea before the beginning of the Christian Era.

³ See the present chapter, pp. 328–32, below.

⁴ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, p. 237; II. C (ii) (a) 1, Annex, vol. i, pp. 465–7; and II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 311, above; and the present chapter and volume, pp. 320, 321, and 322–3, below.

extermination—of the Ainu barbarians in the Japanese Archipelago.¹

In these and similar cases, where Geography sets bounds to the battlefield, an external proletariat which ventures to cross swords with a dominant minority has to fight at the same disadvantage—and with the same desperate prospects—as an insurgent internal proletariat. Such cases, however, are exceptional; and the normal sequel to the outbreak of war between an external proletariat and a dominant minority is not a running fight that continues until the barbarians have been eliminated by being either exterminated or subjugated up to the line of some natural frontier. While the dominant minority usually draws the first blood and cuts deep into the flesh of the surrounding barbarian body social, its arm is seldom long enough to complete the work of destruction or conquest. At a certain remove from the enemy base of operations the barbarians generally manage to make a stand and hold their own; and therewith the running fight, instead of being brought to an end by the barbarian combatant's annihilation or surrender, simply changes from a war of movement into a war of positions without passing over from war into peace.

When this stage is reached in the warfare between the Dominant Minority and the External Proletariat of a disintegrating civilization, it brings with it the completion of a change—which begins as soon as the civilization breaks down—in the nature of the geographical contact between the civilization and its barbarian neighbours. So long as the civilization is in growth, its home territory, where it prevails in full force, is insulated, as we have seen, from the unreclaimed wilderness of Savagery by a broad threshold or buffer-zone across which Civilization shades off into Savagery in a long series of fine gradations. On the other hand, when a civilization has broken down and fallen into schism, and when the hostilities between the Dominant Minority and the External Proletariat have ceased to be a running fight and have settled down into trench warfare, we find that the buffer-zone has disappeared. The geographical transition from Civilization to Barbarism is now no longer gradual but is abrupt. To use the appropriate Latin words, which bring out both the kinship and the contrast between the two kinds of contact, the *limen* or threshold, which was a zone, has been replaced by a *limes* or military frontier, which is a line that has length without breadth. Across this line a baffled Dominant Minority and an unconquered

¹ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, pp. 229–30 and 236; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 159; II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 311; III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 144–5; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 94; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 95–6, above.

External Proletariat now face one another under arms; and this military front is a bar to the passage of all social radiation except that of military technique¹—an article of social commerce which makes for war and not for peace between those who give and take it.

The social phenomena which follow when the warfare between the Dominant Minority and the External Proletariat of a disintegrating society becomes stationary along a *limes* will occupy our attention later;² and at this point we will not anticipate our coming study of 'heroic ages' and *Völkerwanderungen* except so far as to mention the single cardinal fact that this stationary warfare along a sharply drawn line is not a stable or permanent equilibrium, but is a temporary and precarious balance which invariably ends in a barbarian break-through because, in this situation, Time works inexorably on the barbarians' side.³ The

¹ See pp. 202-3, above.

² In Part VIII, below.

³ We have already come across several illustrations of the working of this law in other contexts. We have seen, for example, how the Celtic *Völkerwanderung*, which broke upon the Hellenic World in a succession of waves between *circa* 425 and *circa* 225 B.C., was provoked by two rash and ill-sustained offensives which were launched by two Hellenic Powers against the Continental European barbarian hinterland of the Hellenic World. The first of these Celtic onslaughts, which descended like an avalanche upon Italy, was a retort to the rashness of the Etruscan maritime colonists of the Maremma in pushing their aggression against the continental barbarians right across the Appennines until the aggressors were brought to a halt along an indefensible *limes* at the foot of the Alps (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 280-1, above). The second Celtic onslaught, which was directed against Greece and Anatolia, was a similar retort to the inconsequence of Alexander the Great and his successors in diverting the whole military strength of Macedonia, first to the task of conquering the Achaemenian Empire and then to the luxury of fighting over the spoils, after Alexander's father Philip had carried the Continental European frontier of Macedonia deep into the interior of the Balkan Peninsula and had thereby saddled his kingdom with a *limes* which it would have taxed her strength to maintain—even if she had not squandered this strength in other directions (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 281, footnote 1, above). We have also seen (in II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 344-5, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 490, above) how the Scandinavian *Völkerwanderung* was similarly provoked by Charlemagne's rashness in carrying the *limes* of the Austrasian Empire from the right bank of the Rhine to the left bank of the Eider without having the strength or staying power to bring his offensive against the North European barbarians to a victorious conclusion by pressing on to the natural frontier of the Arctic Circle.

We may here observe in passing that the two civilizations which made these gross strategic blunders in their warfare with the European barbarians both escaped more lightly than they deserved; for, while the Etruscan and Macedonian and Carolingian *limites* were all duly broken through, the Celtic and Scandinavian counter-attacks were abortive. The common reason for their failure was that they were all made at a time when the civilization which they were attacking still had forces in reserve. The Hellenic Civilization and the Western Civilization were still each in their growth-stage at the respective times when the Celtic counter-offensive was opened and when the Scandinavian counter-offensive was delivered; and in the Hellenic World the Roman Power took its stand in the breach through which the Etruscans and the Macedonians had allowed the Celts to pass (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 160-4, above), while in Western Christendom the Scandinavians, with whom the Carolingians had failed to cope, were brought to a halt, within a hundred years of the first Viking raid, by the rising Powers of Wessex and France (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 194-202, and II. D (v), Annex, vol. ii, p. 401, above).

On the other hand the Iranic World paid the full penalty for Timur Lenk's inconsequence in diverting the energies of Transoxania to the conquest of her sedentary neighbours before he had carried to completion his brilliant feat of using Transoxanian arms to harry the Eurasian Steppe and to break the power of the Nomads (for Timur's career

explanation of this 'law' that will be found to govern the history of the *limites*, or anti-barbarian military frontiers, of disintegrating civilizations is not essential to our immediate purpose, which is simply to bring the External Proletariat on to the stage; and this inquiry can therefore conveniently stand over until the time comes for giving the actor his cue to play out his part. Our first task is to muster the External Proletariat in as large an array of examples as we can contrive to collect by making an empirical survey; and in this survey, as before, we will begin by examining the Hellenic instance.

A Hellenic Instance.

The growth-phase of Hellenic history is rich in illustrations of the *limen* or buffer-zone with which the home-territory of a healthily growing civilization tends to surround itself.

Towards Continental Europe the quintessence of Hellas shaded off, north of Thermopylae, into a semi-Hellenic Thessaly, and, west of Delphi, into a semi-Hellenic Aetolia; and Aetolia and Thessaly, in their turn, were insulated by the demi-semi-Hellenism of Epirus and Macedonia from the undiluted barbarism of Illyria and Thrace.¹ None of these gradations was so brusque or precipitous as to be impassable; for even on the Thracian border, where the Macedonian backwoodsmen extended the bounds of Hellenism by annihilating the barbarian Eordaei and evicting the barbarian Pieres and Bottiaei,² these methods of barbarism were perhaps less characteristic of the propagation of the Hellenic Civilization than the way of Orpheus, the legendary prophet and minstrel whose music captivated barbarian hearts and whose spiritual conquests were sealed by his martyrdom.³

see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 144-50, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 491-5, above). The retort was the Uzbeg Nomad invasion of Transoxania at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era; and this barbarian counter-attack was never effectively met; for at that critical moment the Iranic Civilization broke down and the forces which it still had in reserve were diverted, in their turn, from the urgent common task of dealing with the barbarian enemy, and were expended instead in the fratricidal warfare between the Sunnah and the militant Shi'ism of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī (see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 366-400, above).

We have still to observe (see the present chapter and volume, pp. 284-8, below) that the responsibility for provoking the Scandinavian Völkerwanderung was shared with Charlemagne by contemporary Khazar Nomad empire-builders on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, with consequences for Khazaria which were as disastrous as those which Transoxania and Etruria brought upon themselves by committing the same strategico-political error in their dealings with their own respective barbarian hinterlands.

An abortive Egypto-Ottoman expansion in the Sudan in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, which evoked a Baggara Arab Nomad counterstroke before that century reached its close, is also noticed in the present chapter and volume, pp. 294-5, below.

¹ For this semi-Hellenism and demi-semi-Hellenism of Northern Continental Greece in the growth-phase of Hellenic history see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, p. 478, above.

² Thucydides, Book II, chap. 99.

³ For the mythical figure of Orpheus as a type of the creative minority of a civilization in its growth-stage see IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, p. 123, above. For the historical higher

Towards Asia Minor, again, the quintessence of Hellas shaded off likewise, in the hinterland of the Aeolian and Ionian and Dorian and Lycian city-states of the Asiatic seaboard, into the semi-Hellenism of Caria and the demi-semi-Hellenism of Lydia, before passing over into the barbarism of the Thracian interlopers—Mysians, Phrygians, and the like—who had squatted among the ruins of the Hittite Civilization on the Anatolian Plateau. On this Asiatic border we see Hellenism taking its barbarian conquerors captive, Orpheus-fashion, for the first time in the full light of history. The spell was so strong that, in the second quarter of the sixth century B.C., the conflict between Philhellenes and Hellenophobes came to the forefront of Lydian politics; and even when a Philhellene aspirant to the Lydian throne—the Ionian queen's son Pantaleon—was worsted by his half-brother the Carian queen's son Croesus,¹ the protagonist of the anti-Hellenic party proved so impotent to swim against the pro-Hellenic tide that he became famous for being as generous a patron of Hellenic shrines as he was a credulous consultant of Hellenic oracles.

Even in the hinterlands of the Greek colonies overseas, where the cultural gulf between Hellenism and barbarism might have been expected to be wider and the political relations between the two worlds proportionately more hostile, peaceful relations and gradual transitions appear to have been the rule. The enslavement of the Anatolian Mariandyni by the Greek founders of Heraclea Pontica seems to have been as exceptional a barbarity in the overseas Hellenic World as the enslavement of the Messenians by the Spartans was in Hellas Proper; and the extermination of the Itali² and the Chônes, in the 'toe' of the Italian Peninsula, by the makers of Magna Graecia, is the only overseas analogue of the extermination of the Eordaei by the Macedonians.³ The barbarians of the hinterland were sometimes brought under the political suzerainty of the colonial Greek city-states. In Sicily,

religion of Orphism see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 95–100, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 84–7, above.

¹ See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 92.

² It is one of the curiosities of history that this small and obscure people, which was wiped out of existence before it had had time to bequeath anything to Posterity except its name, should eventually have conferred this name upon a territory extending from the 'toe' of Italy, in which the Itali had their home, to the distant summit of the Alps. In the history of the latter-day expansion of our own Western Society we may compare the capricious and ironic preservation of a few vestiges of the names, and fragments of the languages, of the extinct Red Indian 'Natives' of North America in the outlandish nomenclature of the states and the provinces, the cities and the rivers, of the United States and Canada: Massachusetts and Saskatchewan, Chicago and Winnipeg, Ottawa and Mississippi. Apart from these incongruous memorials, 'the names they bore in common are forgotten, their language perishes, and all traces of their origin disappear. Their nation has ceased to exist, except in the recollection of the antiquaries of America and a few of the learned of Europe' (de Tocqueville, A.: *Democracy in America*, English translation, new edition (London 1875, Longmans, Green, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 345).

³ For the element of violence in the overseas expansion of the Greeks in this age see I. B (ii), vol. i, p. 24, II. D (ii), vol. ii, pp. 42–3, and III. C (ii), vol. iii, p. 121, above.

for example, Syracuse and Agrigentum each established a miniature empire over the neighbouring native Sicilian communities. But there are at least as many examples of *ententes* like that between the Greek colony of Cyrene and the local Libyans, or alliances like that which was eventually established between the Greek colony of Tarentum and the Messapians in the 'heel' of Italy. And, underlying this diversity of political relations, there is a striking uniformity, on the cultural plane, in the peaceful penetration of the interior by Hellenism. In Sicily in the last century B.C., less than five hundred years after the foundation of the latest Greek colony on Sicilian soil, it would have been impossible (as will be apparent to any reader of Cicero's *Verrines*) any longer to distinguish the descendants of native Sicels from those of Greek Siceliots in a population which had long ago been unified by its common Hellenic culture, its common Greek speech, and its common sufferings under Roman misrule.¹ In the Continental Italian hinterland of Tarentum Hellenism spread so rapidly, and 'took' so strongly, among the Illyrian-speaking peoples between the tip of the 'heel' and the 'spur' of Monte Gargano that, as early as the fourth century B.C., Apulia advertised her conversion to Hellenism by becoming the busiest (though not the most exquisite) workshop for the production of red-figure vases. Still farther afield the Sicels' continental kinsmen in Latium took so heartily to the exotic Hellenic institution of the city-state that Greek observers accepted the Latins as Hellenes by adoption.² The earliest mention of Rome in extant literature is a notice, in a surviving fragment of a lost work from the hand of Plato's pupil, Heracleides Ponticus, in which this Latin commonwealth is described as 'a Hellenic city';³ and we have seen already⁴ how Rome earned this compliment by spreading at any rate the political elements of Hellenic culture from the Latin Campagna⁵ into the Sabine and Picentine highlands.

Thus, on all the fringes of the Hellenic World in its growth-stage, we seem to see the same gracious figure of Orpheus casting his spell upon the barbarians round about, and even inspiring

¹ For a sketch of the Janus-face of the Philhellene-Hellenophobe Sicel leader Ducetius see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 235-6, below.

² See IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 19-20, and V. C (i) (c) 1, in the present volume, p. 55, with footnote 4, above.

³ 'A faint and blurred report of the bare event of the catastrophe which Rome suffered in being captured [by the Gauls *circa* 390 B.C.] does appear to have penetrated at the time to Hellas; for Heracleides Ponticus, whose own date is not so very much later, mentions, in his treatise on the Soul, the currency of a story from the West to the effect that a host had burst in from the outer darkness of the land of the Hyperboreans and had captured a Hellenic city called Rome (πόλις Ἑλληνίδα Ῥώμην) which lay at the back of beyond, somewhere in the direction of the Atlantic (ἐκεῖ που κατὰ κλημένην περὶ τὴν μεγάλην θάλασσαν).—Plutarch: *Life of Camillus*, chap. 22.

⁴ In IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 310-13, above.

⁵ For the history of the name Campagna see II. D (i), vol. ii, p. 19, footnote 1, above.

them to rehearse his magic music, on their own simpler lyres, to the ruder peoples of the farther hinterland.¹ This idyllic picture vanishes, however, in a trice upon the Hellenic Civilization's breakdown. As the harmony breaks into a discord, the spell-bound listeners seem to awaken with a start; and, relapsing into their natural ferocity, they now hurl themselves—with more excuse than there ever was for their womenfolk's legendary assault upon the authentic Orpheus—against the sinister man-at-arms whom they have caught masquerading under the gentle prophet's cloak.

The first move in a thousand years' war between barbarians and Hellenes was made, in Orpheus' own Thracian mission-field, in the third year of the Hellenic civil war of 431-404 B.C., when Sitalces the Odrysian invaded and harried Macedonia and put all the Hellenes in a tremor from the Strymon to Thermopylae.² Sitalces' raid was abortive; and, although the voluntary self-Hellenization of Thrace was checked and blighted from that time onwards, Hellas had little further serious trouble with this obstinate Thracian outpost of barbarism at her gates during the four hundred and seventy-four years of cultural stalemate that followed on this front, from 429 B.C. to A.D. 46, before the Odrysian Kingdom was converted into a Roman province, in order to be Hellenized by force, in the reign of the Emperor Claudius (*imperabat* A.D. 41-54). The militant reaction of the external proletariat to the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization was both more violent and more effective in Magna Graecia, where the Bruttians and Lucanians now began to avenge the Chônes and the Itali by entrenching themselves in their extinct barbarian predecessors' desolate fastnesses and insinuating themselves, like hermit crabs, into one Italiot Greek city after another.

Within less than a hundred years after the outbreak of the

¹ On the political plane we can watch the gradual and spontaneous spread of republicanism at the expense of monarchical institutions from the city-states of Hellas Proper, where monarchy is already obsolete at the earliest date to which our surviving records reach back, to the seaboard of Epirus by 430 B.C. (see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, p. 478, above); to the Paeonian and Thracian peoples of the Lower Strymon Valley by 383 B.C. (see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, p. 483, above); to the Romans at some date unknown which was perhaps earlier than either of these; and to the peoples of Gaul (with the exception of the Belgae) before the time of Caesar's conquest. By the time when Tacitus was writing his *Germania*, the wave of republicanism had travelled on into the German zone of barbarism; and at this date the primitive form of kingship was definitely on the wane—even beyond the Rhine—among the Frisians and the Cherusci. Among the Suebi, however, it was still holding its own; and among the Goths and, above all, the Swedes, it was still intact (Chadwick, H. M.: *The Origins of the English Nation* (Cambridge 1907, University Press), pp. 298-9). For the subsequent replacement of both the adoptive republicanism and the indigenous monarchical institutions of the North European barbarians beyond the Roman pale by a new military despotism, which was one of the products of the barbarians' reaction to the challenge of the Roman *limes*, see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 4, footnote 4; V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 228-36; and Part VIII, below.

² See Thucydides, Book II, chap. 101.

Atheno-Peloponnesian War, which was the 'beginning of great evils for Hellas',¹ the few remaining survivors among the formerly prosperous and powerful communities of Magna Graecia were summoning knight-errants—or condottieri—from the mother-country to save them from being driven into the sea.² And these erratic reinforcements were of such little avail for stemming the Oscan tide that the inflowing barbarians had already crossed the Straits of Messina and acquired, in that city itself, a base of operations for the conquest of Sicily before the whole movement was brought to an abrupt end by the intervention of the Oscans' Hellenized Roman kinsmen. The Romans showed themselves to be more discerning, as well as more effective, champions of Hellenism in Italy than their discomfited Epirot adversary Pyrrhus. The Epirot knight-errant had sought to save the mere political independence of Magna Graecia—at the expense of the Hellenism which it was Magna Graecia's mission to propagate beyond her borders—by making common cause with the barbarian enemies at the Italiot Greek cities' gates against the most Hellenic of all the native Powers of Italy; Roman statesmanship saved not merely Magna Graecia but the whole Italian Peninsula for Hellenism by taking the Oscans in the rear, attacking these now inveterate barbarians in overwhelming force, and imposing a common Roman peace upon Italian barbarians and Italiot Greeks.

Thus the South Italian front between Hellenism and barbarism, on which Hellenism had been fighting a losing battle in the fourth century B.C.,³ was suddenly wiped out in the third century B.C. by the Romans' master-stroke; and thereafter successive feats of Roman arms extended the dominion of the Hellenic dominant minority almost as far afield in Continental Europe and the Iberian Peninsula and North-West Africa as it had already been extended in Asia by the conquests of Alexander of Macedon.⁴ But these Macedonian and Roman conquests could not, and did

¹ Thucydides, Book II, chap. 12, quoted in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 62, above.

² For these knight-errants see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex I, vol. iv, pp. 589-91, above.

³ The Oscan barbarian counter-attack, which did not begin earlier than the fourth century B.C. in Magna Graecia, had begun before the end of the fifth century B.C. in Campania; but in the Campanian field the breakdown by which the counter-attack was evoked was not the general breakdown of the Hellenic Society—which may be dated from the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C.—but the earlier local breakdown of the Hellenized Etruscan settlers on the west coast of Italy, who had been as rash in pushing their way inland from the Campanian stretch of the Italian coast as they had been, on a larger scale, farther north. The advancement of the Etruscan *limes* in Campania to the south-western foot of the Abruzzi produced as provocative an effect upon the Oscan highlanders as was produced upon the Celts by the contemporary advancement (discussed in II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 280-1, and in the present chapter and volume, p. 209, footnote 3, above) of the other Etruscan *limes* in the Po Basin to the foot of the Alps.

⁴ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 140 and 150-1; III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, p. 197; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 265, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 305-6, above; and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 289-90, below.

not, relieve a disintegrating Hellenic Society from a social malady that was one of the unescapable penalties of its breakdown. The effect of this morbid military expansion of the Hellenic World was not to eliminate its anti-barbarian fronts but rather to add to their length as it pushed them farther afield from the Hellenic dominant minority's bases of operations; and this progressive lengthening of the lines of communication, as well as of the front itself, diminished the dominant minority's striking power while increasing its commitments.

In another context¹ we have already observed how Rome's very success in stepping into the breach and taking over the Etruscans' commitments against the Celts and the Tarentines' commitments against the Oscans and the Macedonians' commitments against the Thracians and Dardanians led her on, inexorably, step by step, into assuming the sole responsibility for the maintenance of an anti-barbarian front that ran across the whole length of the European Continent from the North Sea to the Black Sea coast² and thus brought the Hellenic Society into a direct and hostile contact with the formidable Eurasian Nomads in the Hungarian Alföld and the Lower Danube Basin, as well as with the sedentary European barbarians in the Teutoberger Wald and the Hercynian Forest and Transylvania. Moreover this vast extension and aggravation of an anti-barbarian front which the disintegrating Hellenic Civilization had inherited from its own past was only part of the additional burden which an ailing society was wantonly taking upon its shoulders; for simultaneously the Hellenic dominant minority was taking over no less than four other anti-barbarian fronts from a Syriac Society which had been forcibly incorporated into the Hellenic World by the Macedonian and Roman wars of conquest.

From an annihilated Carthage Rome inherited one anti-barbarian front in the Iberian Peninsula and another in Numidia, while from a ham-strung Seleucid Monarchy,³ which was itself the Hellenic heir of the Achaemenian Empire, Rome also inherited the task of defending South-Western Asia against assaults both from the Eurasian Nomads who were always ready to pour in through the gateway between the Caspian and the Pamirs⁴ and from the Afrikan Nomads of the Arabian Peninsula whose grazing-fleets were always cruising expectantly off the desert-coast of Syria with an eye to turning pirates at any favourable

¹ In II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 161-4, above.

² This European frontier of the Roman Empire is discussed in V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex I, pp. 591-5, below.

³ A board of Roman commissioners did literally ham-string the Seleucid stud of war-
elephants at Apamea in 162 B.C. (see V. C (i) (d) 9 (y), vol. vi, p. 122, footnote 5, below).

⁴ For this gateway see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 400-1, above.

opportunity.¹ It is true that Rome did not have to carry all these additional burdens to the end of her days; for, as we have seen,² she succeeded, in Augustus's day, in wiping out the front in the Iberian Peninsula, as she had wiped out the front in Southern Italy before the outbreak of the first of the Romano-Carthaginian wars; and in Asia the flood-waters of Eurasian Nomadism, which had spread from the line of the Jaxartes to the line of the Euphrates in the second century B.C.,³ evaporated in the third century of the Christian Era when the Nomad Power of the Parthians was ignominiously suppressed by the resurgent Syriac Empire of the Sasanidae.⁴ In this latter case, however, the net weight of the burden which Rome had to carry was not diminished, but on the contrary was heavily increased, when the barbarian King Log who had been sitting so inertly on the throne at Ctesiphon was suddenly supplanted by a Syriac King Stork with a mission to wage an anti-Hellenic 'Holy War';⁵ and the series of Romano-Sasanian wars of ever-increasing frequency and intensity which occupied the next four hundred years eventually exhausted the belligerents to a degree that left them impotent to prevent the Arab barbarians from breaking out in the seventh century of the Christian Era and overwhelming them both.⁶

This four-hundred-years-long struggle between the Roman and Sasanian Empires, and between the civilizations which they respectively embodied, will call for examination later on in other contexts.⁷ In this place we are concerned only with the anti-barbarian fronts of the disintegrating Hellenic Civilization; and we will confine our attention to four which had a continuous existence from the turn of the third and second centuries B.C.—when Rome 'knocked out' all the other Great Powers of the contemporary Hellenic World and thus acquired a monopoly of all the assets and liabilities of the Hellenic dominant minority—down to the interregnum (*circa* A.D. 375–675) which followed the break-up of the Roman Empire at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era. The four fronts in question are the front against the sedentary barbarians of Continental Europe from the North Sea coast to Transylvania;⁸ the front against the

¹ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 412 and 445, above.

² In the present chapter, pp. 205–6, above.

³ See pp. 239–40, below.

⁴ See p. 240, below.

⁵ For the disastrous effect of this Sasanian militancy upon the fortunes of the Zoroastrian Religion see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 659–61, below.

⁶ This nemesis of a common Militarism did not, however, fall upon the two warring empires with equal weight; for, while the Sasanian Empire was utterly destroyed, its Roman antagonist escaped with its life at the cost of losing its limbs (see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 450, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 128, above).

⁷ For example, in Parts IX and XI, below.

⁸ This Continental European front had an insular extension in the British Isles which

Eurasian Nomads (and the Nomadicized sedentary intruders upon the Nomads' ranges)¹ in the Lower Danubian bay and the Middle Danubian enclave of the Great Eurasian Steppe; the front against the barbarians in the interior of North West Africa (Nomads on the Sahara and highlanders in the Atlas); and the front against the Arabs beyond the desert-coast of Syria who constituted the Asiatic wing of the Afrasian Nomad forces.

When we compare the military annals of these four fronts during the span of some nine hundred years (*circa* 225 B.C.—A.D. 675) over which their history extends from first to last we find that there is a close chronological correspondence between the respective alternating bouts of military activity and relatively

we will pass over in our present survey since we have already dealt with it in our study of the abortive Far Western Christian Civilization (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-40, and II. D (vii), Annexes II, III, and IV, in vol. ii, pp. 420-33, above).

¹ For the alternation between the Nomads' eruptions and the sedentary societies' encroachments in the exposed salients and detached enclaves of the Steppe see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 425-8, above. The ex-sedentary North European barbarian intruders upon the western fringes of the Eurasian Steppe who played a historic role in the history of the disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization were the Goths, who made themselves at home on the Steppe in the third century of the Christian Era during an interval of quiescence between the subsidence of the Sarmatian Nomad eruption and the outbreak of the Hun Nomad eruption. During the century and a half of their residence on Nomad territory the Goths were nomadicized profoundly—and this in their *éthos* as well as in such external things as their art of war (for the adoption, by these sedentary interlopers, of the Sarmatian Nomad cataphracts' equipment and tactics see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 439-44, above). The extent of their conversion from a sedentary form of barbarism to the Nomadic culture can be measured by the difference between their subsequent history and that of their kinsmen the Franks: a sedentary North European barbarian people who had not ventured out of their native forest on to the Steppe and who had therefore not acquired any tincture of the Eurasian Nomad Civilization. When the collapse of the Roman Power gave the signal for both Franks and Goths to break through the Roman *limes* and begin their *Völkerwanderung*, the Goths responded with an initial brilliance which threw the Franks quite into the shade. Within less than half a century after their passage of the Lower Danube on sufferance, as suppliant refugees who were fleeing before the face of the Huns and were throwing themselves on the Roman Government's mercy (see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 440, footnote 4, above), the Visigoths had entered the Imperial City itself as conquerors and had then swept on to carve out an appanage for themselves at the farthest extremity of the Empire, on the Gallic shores of the Bay of Biscay. By the close of the fifth century the Visigoths had made themselves masters of the whole of Gaul south of the Loire and west of the Rhône, together with the whole of the Iberian Peninsula except the north-west corner and the highland hinterland of the Biscay coast (see p. 206, footnote 1, above), while the Ostrogoths, following at their heels, had secured the still choicer prize of Italy, together with the Western Illyricum. In the year A.D. 500 it looked as if the Goths had won for themselves the lion's share of the Roman heritage; but at this point in a hitherto brilliant career they began to show that fatal lack of staying-power, and that incurable inability to strike root, which are characteristic, as we have seen (in Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 22-5, above), of the Nomad conqueror *in partibus agricolarum*. When the Visigoths, who had fought their way from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, collided at Vouillé, in A.D. 507, with the Franks, who had taken as long a time to advance from the right bank of the Rhine to the right bank of the Loire, it was the Franks and not the Goths that won the day (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 166; II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 380; and II. D (vii), Annex IV, vol. ii, p. 428, above); and the ruin of the Goths was completed when the Ostrogoths were exterminated in the Great Romano-Gothic War of A.D. 535-52, and when the half of the Visigothic Kingdom which the Franks had spared in A.D. 507 was overwhelmed in A.D. 711 by the Arabs. This ultimate political failure of the Goths has, however, brought with it a literary reward which has been withheld from the Franks by their ultimate political success. It is the unsuccessful Goths, and not the successful Franks, that have provided a fruitful theme for 'heroic' poetry (see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, pp. 610 and 613, below).

peaceful stagnation on each of them;¹ and in this uniform rhythm we can discern three periods of storm and stress in which the barbarians attempted to break through—on the first two occasions in vain, but the third time with success.

At the height of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' during the last two centuries B.C.² we find the Sarmatian barbarians advancing from the east bank of the Don to new ranges in the Lower and the Middle Danube Basin, where they hovered menacingly on the north-eastern flank of the Hellenic World from that time onwards. Contemporaneously, at the turn of the second and the last century B.C., the Arabs³ drifted into the derelict domain of a moribund Seleucid Monarchy in Mesopotamia and Syria. On the North-West African front the Numidians took advantage of the overthrow of Carthage in the Hannibalic War and her annihilation in 146 B.C. in order to encroach upon the derelict Carthaginian province on the African mainland. And last of all, on the North European front, the first extension of the Roman rule into Transalpine Europe—into Gaul on one side and into Noricum on the other—towards the close of the second century B.C. was answered by the formidable counter-attack of the Cimbri and the Teutones, who bore down on Italy itself along war-paths that were now no longer blocked by the semi-barbarian buffer Powers which had just been crippled or shattered by Roman arms. On three fronts out of the four the Romans found themselves compelled to intervene in order to bring the barbarian offensives to a standstill; and on the North European front they had to fight for their lives—even in this first of the three historic paroxysms of barbarian aggression. In Europe and in Africa the situation was saved by Marius, who snatched victory out of defeat in the war against the Numidian aggressor Jugurtha (*gerebatur* 112–106 B.C.) and in the war against the Cimbri (*gerebatur* 105–101 B.C.).⁴ In Asia the last remnant of the Seleucid heritage was salvaged from the depredations of the Arab war-bands by Pompey when he organized

¹ In order to make the comparison in equivalent terms for all fronts, we have to allow for the possible intervention of a climatic factor—an alternating rhythm of humidity and aridity on the Steppes—on those fronts on which the transfrontier barbarians were Nomads. The question whether a climatic factor of this nature is one of the causes of the occasional eruptions of the Nomads out of their own domain on the Steppes into the adjoining domain of the sedentary societies round about them has been discussed in Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, above.

² It should be noticed that this critical period in the disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization partly coincided in date—if we are to accept the theory of climatic pulsations—with a bout of aridity on the Steppes which lasted from *circa* 225 B.C. to *circa* A.D. 75. In view of this coincidence we may find ourselves at a loss to determine, in the case of the Nomads, whether their movements of aggression against the Hellenic World between these dates were produced by a social pull or by a climatic push.

³ See p. 215, above.

⁴ For the stimulus which was given to the organization and technique of the Roman Army by these Marian wars against the barbarians of Africa and Europe see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 166, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv, p. 439, above.

the Roman province of Syria in 63–62 B.C. Thereafter, when a band of Suevi—undeterred by their Cimbrian cousins' and predecessors' recent fate—set their feet upon the same European war-path, Caesar jumped at the opportunity of improving the Transalpine frontier of the Roman dominions by carrying it (*bellum gerebat* 58–51 B.C.) up to the line of the Rhine, on which it continued to stand, with a few brief fluctuations, for the next four centuries.

The second abortive attempt, on the barbarian side, at a breakthrough on all four fronts was made in the middle of the third century of the Christian Era, when the Roman Empire suddenly tottered—and then almost as suddenly recovered itself¹—like a man who has been smitten by a first paralytic stroke in a late but still vigorous middle age. This time it was the Eurasian, and not the North European, front that was subjected to the heaviest pressure. On this front in this crisis the Goths not only thrust their way overland across the Lower Danube into the heart of the Balkan Peninsula, but also took to the water and harried the coasts of the Black Sea and the Aegean. On the Arabian front the tribesmen likewise returned to the attack—this time under the leadership of the oasis-dwellers of Palmyra²—and, thus led and organized, they momentarily overran not only Syria but Egypt and Anatolia as well. In North-West Africa the Berbers once more went on the war-path for the first time since Jugurtha's day. On the North European front the Franks and Alemanni now crossed the Rhine and treated themselves to a taste of the flesh-pots of Gaul. In this second paroxysm of simultaneous concentric barbarian attacks the Roman Power succeeded in saving the situation once again. The death of the Emperor Decius (*imperabat* A.D. 249–51) at the hands of the Goths was avenged by the Emperor Claudius Gothicus (*imperabat* A.D. 268–70). The blow which Zenobia had dealt to Roman prestige was effaced when the audacious Palmyrene princess was led in triumph through the streets of Rome behind the chariot of Aurelian. The Berbers were cleared out of the African provinces, and the Germans out of Gaul. In fact, all the broken fronts were for the second time restored; but this time the victory had been preceded by heavier reverses and deeper humiliations; it had been purchased at a higher price; and it had only superficially restored the *status quo ante*; for, while the old frontiers had been re-established (except in Swabia and in Transylvania), the relative strength of the Roman and barbarian forces had been permanently changed in the barbarians' favour.

¹ For this temporary collapse of the Empire see IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 8, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, in the present volume, p. 649, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 284, below. For the Illyrian soldiers who set the Empire on its feet again see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below. ² For the history of Palmyra see II. D (i), vol. ii, pp. 9–12, above.

We are thus prepared for the decisive success of the third barbarian offensive, which began in the last quarter of the fourth century of the Christian Era and was kept up, on this front or on that, for some three hundred years (*circa* A.D. 375-675).¹

This time, again, the action opened on the Eurasian front, where the eruption of the Hun Nomads blew the nomadicized Goths right off the Steppe into the far interior of the Roman body politic—as rocks and trees are uprooted and hurled through the air by an exploding shell.² From the end of the fourth century to the end of the sixth the pressure continued to be heavier on this front than on any other, as the ebb of the Hun wave was followed by the onrush of the Avar wave, and the vacuum left by the violent propulsion of the Goths was filled by the gentle infiltration of the Slavs.³ It was only in the seventh century, when the onslaughts of pagan Huns and Avars were outmatched by the demoniac outbreak of the Muslim Arabs, that the main pressure shifted from the Eurasian front to the Arabian.

The organized and purposeful military campaigns of the Muslim Arabs were very different from the half automatic and barely conscious pressure of their ancestors against the yielding desert-frontier of a decaying Seleucid Empire in the second and the last century B.C. They are more comparable to the momentary Arab occupation of the Syrian, Egyptian, and Anatolian territories of the Roman Empire under Palmyrene leadership in the third century of the Christian Era.⁴ But they utterly surpassed both these anticipatory reconnaissances in the potency of their driving-force.⁵ While the Arab encroachments in the last two centuries B.C. had got no farther than the line of the Lebanon and the Orontes,⁶ and the momentary Palmyrene conquests in the third century of the Christian Era had come to a halt at the banks of the Nile and of the Black Sea Straits, the Muslim Arab conquerors penetrated as

¹ In attempting to account for the movements of the Nomads between these dates, it has to be borne in mind that the interregnum which followed the dissolution of the Hellenic Civilization coincided in time—and this even more closely than the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' (see p. 218, footnote 2, above)—with a bout of aridity on the Steppes (if the theory of climatic pulsations is to be accepted). For this hypothetical bout of aridity *circa* A.D. 375-675 see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 414, above.

² See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 426, above.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 317-19, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 327-8 and 397-8, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 224-5, below.

⁴ This comparison has been made already in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 74, footnote 4, and in Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 397-8, above.

⁵ This immense superiority, in potency, of the third of the three Arab offensives against the Hellenic World was almost certainly due to the most conspicuous of its distinctive features: that is to say, to the fact of its having been launched under the auspices of Islam. For the effect of alien religious influences—such as the Jewish and Christian influences that went to the making of Islam—in precipitating eruptions of Nomads see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 450-1, above.

⁶ See Jones, A. H. M.: *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press), pp. 255-6.

far as their Palmyrene predecessors towards the north-west, while on the south-west they left them far behind. In Asia Minor the Constantinopolitan Government succeeded—at the price of abandoning its commitments and cutting its losses on all other fronts—in pushing the Muslim Arabs back from the line of the Straits to the line of the Taurus and holding them there at the cost of grievously overstraining and fatally deforming the nascent body social of Orthodox Christendom.¹ In Africa, however, the wave of Muslim Arab conquest swept on from the Nile to the Atlantic—meeting and overpowering and carrying along with it the lesser wave of Berber aggression which was at that time breaking, likewise for the third time, upon the remnant of the African domain which Rome had inherited from Carthage.

At the Straits of Gibraltar the united Arab and Berber wings of the Afrasian Nomad forces collided with the epigoni of the Visigoths, who had settled down in the Iberian Peninsula at the end of a *Völkerwanderung* which had carried them across the whole breadth of the Roman Empire from a starting-point on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe.² When these Gothic pupils of the Eurasian Nomads now encountered the Afrasian Nomad invaders of the Roman Empire at a point on the Empire's extreme western verge which was almost equally remote from the original mustering-grounds of both the rival war-bands, it was the Afrasian Nomadism that was victorious;³ for the united Arab-Berber forces were not flung back from the Straits of Gibraltar by Roderick in A.D. 711 as the Arabs were flung back from the Bosphorus by Constantine IV in A.D. 677 and again in A.D. 718 by Leo Syrus. Scattering the Goths like chaff, the Arabs and Berbers pressed on across the Pyrenees and reached the banks of the Rhône and the Loire before they collided with the Franks and fared as ill at their hands in A.D. 732 on the road to Tours⁴ as the ancestors of the Arabs' discomfited Gothic adversaries had fared at the same Frankish hands at Vouillé in A.D. 507.⁵ It was characteristic of the heavy-footed gait⁶ of the sedentary North European barbarians that, at dates which were two hundred and twenty-five years apart, they should win their successive victories over their mobile rivals from the Ukraine and the

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 367-9; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 321-2, above.

² For the *Völkerwanderung* of the Goths see p. 217, footnote 1, above.

³ The victory of the Afrasian Nomads over the Visigothic representatives of the Eurasian Nomadism at Xeres, on the Iberian threshold of Europe, in A.D. 711, has the same piquancy as the victory of the Indian over the African elephants at Raphia, on the Egyptian threshold of Africa, in 217 B.C.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 203-4; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 361-2 and 378-81; II. D (vii), Annex IV, vol. ii, pp. 427-33; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 341, above.

⁵ For the Battle of Vouillé between the Frankish war-lord Clovis and the Visigothic war-lord Alaric II see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 166; II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 380; II. D (vii), Annex IV, vol. ii, p. 428; and the present chapter and volume, p. 217, footnote 1, above.

⁶ See p. 217, footnote 1, above.

Hijāz on battlefields that were something less than twenty miles distant from one another as the crow flies.¹ Charles Martel allowed the Arabs to come that much nearer to the home territory of the Frankish Power in the basins of the Seine and the Rhine² than Clovis had allowed the Visigoths to advance in the same direction before marching out to defeat them; but the event was the same. At Tours in A.D. 732, as at Vouillé in A.D. 507, the immovable Franks remained masters of the field.

These Frankish victories over Goths and Arabs were a double triumph for the tortoise who had been content to crawl from the Rhine to the Loire during the time that it had taken one hare to sprint from the Ukraine, and another to sprint from the Hijāz, to the tortoise's doorstep in Aquitaine. In this contest between the barbarians for the division of the Hellenic dominant minority's territorial spoils the race was certainly not to the swift, though the battle may have been to the strong.³ But this revelation of the relative strengths of the rival barbarian war-bands is not the main interest of the two battles in which they tried conclusions with one another. The outstanding historical event to which the battles of Vouillé and Tours bear witness is not the discomfiture of the Goths and the Arabs by the Franks, but the collapse of the resistance of the Roman Power which had been the common arch-adversary of all the three combatants. By the time when, in the heart of the *Orbis Romanus*, the war-bands from beyond one of the four anti-barbarian frontiers encountered and defeated—on derelict Roman ground—the war-bands from beyond each of the other three frontiers, it was manifest that the third of the three attempts of the external proletariat to take the Hellenic universal state by storm had been completely and definitively successful.

After this cursory review of the Hellenic external proletariat's successive relations with the Hellenic dominant minority, from the beginning of the schism down to the dominant minority's collapse, we may be inclined to raise two general questions which are suggested by analogy with our foregoing study of internal proletariats.⁴ In the External Proletariat's reaction to the Dominant Minority's pressure, can we see any symptoms of a gentle as well as a violent response? And can we credit the External Proletariat with any creative activities?

¹ The battle between the Austrasians and the Arabs which is traditionally known by the name of Tours seems actually to have been fought in the neighbourhood of Old Poitiers, in the angle between the rivers Clain and Vienne.

² Charles Martel's sluggishness in marching to the help of the Aquitanians in A.D. 732 may be compared with the sluggishness of the Spartans in coming to the Athenians' aid in 490 B.C. and again in 479 B.C.

³ Ecclesiastes ix. 11.

⁴ In V. C (i) (c) 2, above.

At first sight it might seem that, in the Hellenic case, the answer to both questions was in the negative. We can observe our anti-Hellenic barbarian in diverse postures and positions. As Ariovistus, he is driven off the field by Caesar; as Arminius, he holds his own against Augustus; as Odovacer, he takes his revenge upon Romulus Augustulus. But in all warfare there are these three alternatives of defeat and equal honours and victory; and, in each alike of the three situations, violence monotonously rules and creativity is uniformly at a discount. We may be encouraged, however, to look beyond this first view of the External Proletariat's *éthos* and achievement when we recollect that the Internal Proletariat is apt to display an equal violence and an equal barrenness in its earlier reactions, while the gentleness which eventually expresses itself in such mighty works of creation as a 'higher religion' and a universal church usually requires both time and travail in order to gain the ascendancy. With this clue in our hands we can perhaps detect some faint and rudimentary parallels in the history of the Hellenic external proletariat to the Internal Proletariat's generic saving graces.

In the matter of gentleness, for example, we can at any rate perceive a certain difference of degree in the violence of the various barbarian war-bands.¹ We can see that, on the whole, the Goths compare favourably with the Huns and Vandals and Lombards and Franks, while the Franks, in their turn, compare favourably with the English, the Lombards with the Avars, and the Arabs with the Berbers, Franks, and Goths. If we were given the chance of transferring our lives to the post-Hellenic interregnum, instead of having to live them out in the present age of our own Western history, we should probably find that we had definite preferences, as between the tyranny of one barbarian war-band and another, when it came to choosing the exact time and place for our exchange of fortunes.

To begin with, we would assuredly rather live through the Visigothic sack of Rome in A.D. 410 than through the Vandal and Berber sack in A.D. 455; for, although the first violation of an imperial city which had seen no enemy within her gates for eight hundred years may have given the greater shock to a Roman who heard the news at a distance (as Jerome heard of the Gothic blow at Bethlehem),² we may conjecture that for the victim on the spot

¹ This point has been touched upon already in V. C (i) (b), pp. 26-7, above.

² While this [theological war] was being waged in Jerusalem, terrible news arrived from the West. We learnt how Rome had been besieged, how her citizens had purchased immunity by paying a ransom, and how then, after they had been thus despoiled, they had been beleaguered again, to forfeit their lives after having already forfeited their property. At the news my speech failed me, and sobs choked the words that I was dictating (*haeret vox, et singultus intercipiunt verba dictantis*). She had been captured—

the tempered barbarism of an Alaric must have been distinctly less hard to bear than the unmitigated barbarism of a Genseric. Indeed, the impression made upon contemporaries, when they heard the whole story, by Alaric's grant of asylum in the churches of Rome to the inhabitants of the captured city is commemorated in one of the most celebrated passages of Latin literature.

'All the devastation, massacre, depredation, arson and assault of every kind that has been perpetrated in the catastrophe by which Rome has just been overtaken has been done according to the custom of war; but in this catastrophe there has also been a new departure, an unprecedented spectacle. The dreaded atrocity of the barbarians has shown itself so mild in the event that churches providing ample room for asylum were designated by the conqueror, and orders were given that in these sanctuaries nobody should be smitten with the sword and nobody carried away captive. Indeed, many prisoners were brought to these churches by soft-hearted enemies to receive their liberty, while none were dragged out of them by merciless enemies in order to be enslaved.'¹

In another passage of his *magnum opus* the same Roman man-of-letters and Christian exponent of the philosophy of history upbraids his pagan Roman contemporaries for their ingratitude towards a God who had shown mercy to them beyond their deserts in allowing a divinely ordained capture of Rome by barbarian hands to be executed in A.D. 410 by the comparatively gentle hands of an Alaric rather than in A.D. 406 by the cruel hands of a Radagaisus.

'There is a merciful and miraculous act of God—an act performed within living memory and, indeed, quite recently—which our pagan contemporaries not only refuse to commemorate by returning thanks for it, but actually endeavour, so far as lies with them, to bury, if possible, in a universal oblivion. We should be showing ourselves as ungrateful as they are if we were to pass this mercy over in silence for our part. [The fact to which I refer is that] when Radagaisus, king of the Goths, at the head of a huge and savage war-band, had occupied a position close to the city, where his axe-edge was within striking distance of Roman necks, the barbarian invader was defeated in one day's fighting with such speed and at so slight a cost that, without one single

the City by whom the whole World had once been taken captive (*capitur Urbs quae totum cepit Orbem*). Worse than that, famine had anticipated the work of the sword, so that scarcely a remnant had survived to fall into captivity.'—Saint Jerome, Ep. cxxvii, cap. 12, written circa A.D. 412 (in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, vol. xxii, col. 1094).

¹ Saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book I, chap. 7: 'Quod in eversione Urbis quae asperae gesta sunt de consuetudine acciderint belli; quae vero clementer, de potentia provenerint nominis Christi.' In order to follow Augustine's own argument—which is to demonstrate, not the clemency of the Visigoths, but the power of Christ's name and the blessings of the Christian Era—the passage quoted in the text should be read in its context from the beginning of the Preface to the end of the chapter from which the present quotation has been taken.

Roman casualty—not to speak of the loss of a single Roman life—more than a hundred thousand of the enemy's host were laid low, while the leader himself was promptly captured and put to the death that he so richly deserved. If this fanatically heathen war-lord, with his vast and likewise fanatically heathen forces, had entered Rome, whom would he have spared? What martyrs' shrines would he have respected? In whose person would he have shown a fear of God? Whose blood would he have cared to save from being shed, whose chastity from being violated? . . . And yet our wretched pagans refuse to give thanks to the immense mercifulness of a God who, when He had determined to chastise with a barbarian irruption a generation that had earned a still heavier chastisement by its vices, still tempered His indignation with an immense compassion—of which He gave proof first in causing Radagaisus miraculously to be defeated . . . and then in allowing the capture of Rome to be executed by a different band of barbarians who, contrary to the whole custom of war as it has been waged in the past, gave quarter, out of veneration for the Christian Religion, to all who took sanctuary in our holy places.¹

Yet, without contesting Augustine's thesis that Rome had been let off comparatively lightly in being delivered into Alaric's hands rather than into Radagaisus's, the inhabitant of Rome who had saved himself alive in A.D. 410 by taking the asylum which Alaric had given must still have breathed a sigh of relief when Alaric died and his gentler brother-in-law Atawulf took command of the Visigothic host. And an equal relief must have been felt in A.D. 489–93 by the grandson of our survivor of the catastrophe of A.D. 410 when the barbarian war-lordship in Italy was wrested out of the hands of the Scirian Odovacer by the Ostrogoth Theodoric. Conversely, we know for a fact that on the battlefield of Vouillé, in A.D. 507,

¹ Saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book V, chap. 23: 'De bello in quo Radagaisus, rex Gothorum, daemonum cultor, uno die cum ingentibus copiis suis victus est.' The title of the chapter shows that Augustine's own argument here is to demonstrate, not the difference of degree between the more savage barbarism of a Radagaisus and the less savage barbarism of an Alaric, but, once again, the blessings of the Christian Era and the power of the Christians' God. In the second of the passages omitted from the above quotation Saint Augustine suggests that God's paramount purpose in bringing upon Radagaisus his miraculous defeat was 'to save the minds of the weak from being confounded by the glory that would then have been given to the demons of whom Radagaisus was a notorious worshipper'. And the contingency here referred to is explained in the earlier of the two omitted passages. 'What fine things our pagans would have had to say for their gods, and with what exultant insolence they would have boasted that the secret of Radagaisus's victory (if he had won the day), and of his potency (if a victory had proved it), was that he was placating and soliciting the Gods by daily sacrifices when the Romans were inhibited by the Christian Religion from doing likewise. Why, when Radagaisus was on his march to the place where he was crushed by the effortless exertion of the will of God's Majesty (*nutu summae maiestatis*), and when he was "in the news" all over the World, we were hearing at Carthage that the pagans [at Rome] were believing and propagating and boasting that, in virtue of the protection and assistance that Radagaisus was receiving from gods who were his friends because he offered sacrifice to them every day (so it was said), the barbarian invader was quite invincible in face of Roman opponents who would not perform, and would not allow any one else to perform either, any corresponding acts of worship to the Gods of Rome.'

the grandson of an Arvernian nobleman who had striven to save his native canton from falling under the Visigothic yoke showed himself worthy of his grandfather by fighting and dying under the Visigothic banner to save Aquitaine from being snatched out of the grasp of her first barbarian conquerors by the yet more barbarous Franks.¹ In Aquitaine, as in Italy, at the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era, a Roman *vir senatorius* can have felt no hesitation in preferring a Gothic to a Frankish or a Scirian master; and two hundred years later an Andalusian peasant perhaps found as little difficulty in determining his preference when the Arabs replaced the Visigoths as the barbarian war-lords of the Iberian Peninsula; for the Muslim conquerors treated their new Christian subjects in the west no differently from their older Christian subjects in the east, and we have explicit testimony to the lightness of the Umayyad yoke towards the close of the seventh century in the former Oriental provinces of the Roman Empire. In a chronicle which reflects the views of the conquered provincials it is recorded of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid I (*imperabat* A.D. 680-3) that

'he was a delightful character and enjoyed an extreme personal popularity among all the subject peoples of his dominions, because he never thirsted for any of the pomp which is universally regarded by princes as the prerogative of their high estate, but made himself accessible to everybody and lived like a simple commoner.'²

Between a Yazid, who receives this mead of praise from his subjects, and an Attila who is remembered by his victims as 'the Scourge of God', there is a diversity of barbarian temper which cannot be ignored; and the spiritual history of one of the barbarian war-lords of the post-Hellenic interregnum, who has already been honourably mentioned above, is illuminated by a deposition from Roman lips which shows him in the act of conversion from Violence to Gentleness.

'I myself also [writes Augustine's disciple Orosius, at the close of his chronicle of the tribulations of the Hellenic Society] once was present at a conversation, in the town of Bethlehem in Palestine, between the most blessed Jerome the priest and a gentleman from Narbonne who had had a distinguished military career under the Emperor Theodosius and was also a man of deep piety, mature judge-

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 166, above.

² 'Iucundissimus et cunctis nationibus regni eius subditis vir gratissime habitus, qui nullam unquam, ut omnibus moris est, sibi regalis fastigii causa gloriam appetivit, sed communis cum omnibus civiliter vixit.'—*Continuatio Isidori Byzantia Arabica*, § 27, in Mommsen, Th.: *Chronica Minora*, vol. ii (Berlin 1894, Weidmann), p. 345. In the same paragraph Yazid's son and successor Mu'awiyah II is praised for being like his father; and in § 38 (Mommsen, p. 357) 'Umar II is described as being 'tanta . . . benignitatis et patientiae . . . ut hactenus tantus ei honor lausque referatur a cunctis, etiam ab externis, quantus ulli unquam viventi regni gubernacula praeroganti adlatus est'.

ment and sterling character in his private life. This gentleman told us that at Narbonne he had become extremely intimate with Atawulf, and that he had often been told by him—and this with all the earnestness of a witness giving evidence—the story of his own life which was often on the lips of this barbarian of abounding spirit, vitality and genius. According to Atawulf's own story, he had started life with an eager craving to wipe out all memory of the name of Rome, with the idea of turning the whole Roman domain into an empire that should be—and be known as—the Empire of the Goths. His dream was to see "Gothia" substituted for "Romania" (if I may be pardoned for introducing these convenient "slang" terms) and Atawulf seated on the throne of Caesar Augustus. In time, however, experience had convinced him that on the one hand the Goths were utterly disqualified by their uncontrolled barbarity for a life under the rule of Law, while on the other hand it would be a crime to banish the rule of Law from the life of the State, since the State ceases to be itself when Law ceases to reign in it. When Atawulf had divined this truth, he had made up his mind that he would at any rate make a bid for the glory, that was within his reach, of using the vitality of the Goths for the restoration of the Roman name to all—and perhaps more than all—its ancient greatness; for in that event the barbarian war-lord who had found it beyond his powers to wipe Rome out might still be remembered by Posterity as the architect of her restoration.¹

This passage is perhaps the *locus classicus* for evidence of a change from Violence towards Gentleness in the *êthos* of the external proletariat of a disintegrating Hellenic Society; and in the light of this ascertained fact we can identify certain accompanying symptoms of spiritual creativity—or, at any rate, originality—in partially reclaimed barbarian souls.

Atawulf, for example, was an adherent of the same religion as his brother-in-law Alaric; and Alaric's religion was not the paganism of his forebears—as Augustine points out in drawing his contrast between the Christian Goth Alaric and the pagan Goth Radagaisus.² At the same time, Alaric's Christianity was not the Catholic Christianity of Augustine himself and of Augustine's and Alaric's contemporaries in the derelict Empire on whose territory the barbarian war-lord and his followers were trespassing. On the European front the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire during the post-Hellenic interregnum, in so far as they were not still pagans, were Arians; and, although their original conversion to Arianism instead of Catholicism had been a matter of chance, their subsequent fidelity to Arianism was deliberate.

¹ Orosius, P.: *Adversum Paganos*, Book VII, chap. 43. The vividness of this report of Atawulf's own account of his political conversion may call to mind another famous passage of Hellenic literature in which Plato puts into Socrates' mouth an account of the speaker's intellectual conversion from an interest in the Macrocosm to an interest in the Microcosm (Plato: *Phaedo*, 96-7, quoted in III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 186-7, above).

² See the passage quoted on pp. 224-5, above.

The North European barbarians who broke into the Roman Empire as Arians at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era were the children of fathers who had been converted by Arian missionaries while they were encamped in the no-man's-land beyond a then still standing Roman *limes*;¹ and the Arians of the Empire had been able to carry out this missionary enterprise in the wilderness because, at the time, they were enjoying, at home, the favour of the Imperial Government of the day. In the middle decades of the fourth century Arianism had been the personal religion of the Emperors Constantius II (*imperabat* A.D. 337–61) and Valens (*imperabat* A.D. 364–78) and therefore at the same time the state religion of those portions of the Empire over which the direct authority of these two emperors extended; and the temporary ascendancy to which Arianism attained within the Imperial frontiers, thanks to the active support of these two powerful patrons, was neither seriously impaired by the lukewarm Catholicism of their brothers who ruled in the western provinces nor effectively interrupted by the militant Neoplatonism which momentarily took the place of Arianism as the officially favoured religion during the brief reign of Julian (*imperabat* A.D. 361–3).² In these circumstances the barbarians beyond the Roman pale who became converts to Arianism in the fourth century no doubt accepted, together with the Arian creed, the Arian missionaries' claim to be preaching the form of Christianity which had come into the ascendant—and come to stay—on the Roman side of the line;³ and thus the converts, so far as they were aware, were taking a new departure which would bring them nearer, spiritually and culturally, to their Roman neighbours instead of widening the existing social gulf between those who found themselves on opposite sides of the geographical barrier of the *limes*.

This was, however, an illusion which could not, and did not, persist after the barbarians had broken through the Roman frontier defences in their third offensive, which began before the fourth century closed. In A.D. 378, on the battle-field of Adrianople,

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 96, footnote 4, above.

² The Catholic restoration under Jovian, between the death of Julian in the summer of A.D. 363 and the accession of Valentinian and Valens in the winter of 363–4, was too brief to count.

³ This impression that Arianism was the prevalent form of Christianity in the Roman Empire would be strengthened by the fact that the barbarians to whom the Arian missionaries first addressed themselves were encamped opposite the Lower Danube sector of the Roman frontier, and were therefore within close range of Constantinople, which was the seat of government of both the Arian Emperor Constantius II and the Arian Emperor Valens. From the nomadicized Goths in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe Arianism spread to the Goths' poor relations the Gepids in the borderland between the Eurasian Steppe and the North European forests, and thence to some of the forest-dwelling barbarians of Central Europe, such as the Vandals, Burgundians, and Lombards.

the Arian Goths with their own hands deprived the last of the Arian Emperors of his diadem and his life; and in the next generation, as they flooded in through the breach which had been only momentarily repaired by Valens's militantly Catholic successor Theodosius the Great, the Arian barbarians found themselves masters of the military and political situation in the defenceless territories of a decrepit empire whose Government was now as orthodoxly Catholic as was an overwhelming majority of the provincial population. Under these altered conditions the Arianism to which the triumphant barbarians continued to adhere could no longer be explained away as a half-unconscious tribute to the cultural prestige of the civilization whose body social they were physically assailing. Whatever it may have been before, this Arianism was now a badge¹—deliberately worn and sometimes insolently displayed—of the conquerors' social distinction from a conquered population with which they were now determined not to identify themselves (for the victorious barbarians were eager to exploit the political fruits of their military victory by stepping into the *ci-devant* Imperial Government's shoes and establishing themselves as a privileged ruling caste). This interpretation of the Arian barbarians' attitude towards their sectarian faith after they had carved their 'successor-states' out of the Roman body politic is supported by the fact that, the more truculent an Arian war-band was in its treatment of its provincial victims, the more fanatical it was apt to be in its hostility to Catholicism. While the subject Catholic populations in the Iberian Peninsula and Aquitaine and Italy were treated with tolerance by their Gothic masters, the more atrocious Vandal masters of a subject Catholic population in North-West Africa capped economic exploitation and political oppression with religious persecution.

While an Arianism which its barbarian converts had taken as they found it thus eventually became the distinctive badge of these particular bands of barbarian conquerors *in partibus subditorum*, there were other barbarians on other frontiers of the Empire who showed in their religious life a certain originality, or even creativeness, which was inspired by something more positive than a pride of caste. On the frontier in the British Isles, for example, the barbarians of 'the Celtic fringe', who were converted by Christian missionaries from the Roman Empire almost a hundred years later than the barbarians beyond the

¹ Barbarian or *ci-devant* barbarian conquerors sometimes advertise their distinctiveness by wearing badges that are visible and tangible. For example, Hammurabi continued to dress his hair in the traditional style of his Amorite Badu forefathers (cropped head, shaven upper lip, long beard) when he was the Emperor of the Sumeric universal state (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), third edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 632).

Lower Danube, and were therefore converted to a Catholic instead of to an Arian Christianity, were not content to adopt the alien religion *tel quel*, but moulded it, as we have seen, to fit their own barbarian heritage.¹ On the frontier facing the Arabian section of the Afrasian Steppe the transfrontier barbarians showed an independence which was greater still in their reaction to the same religious influences from the Roman side of the Syrian *limes*. In the creative soul of Muhammad² the radiation of Judaism and Christianity³ was transmuted⁴ into a spiritual force which discharged itself—whether this was the Prophet's original intention or not—as a new 'higher religion' with its own distinctive message and independent organization.⁵ Nor were the Arabs and the Celts the only members of the Hellenic external proletariat who showed a greater originality in the religious field than the Teutonic converts to Arianism. The ancestors of these Eastern Teutons had already tasted the experience of a religious revolution at least once before the Arian missionaries came to preach to them in the Transdanubian wilderness; for the paganism from which these missionaries redeemed their converts was not the primeval paganism which the remoter ancestors of the Transdanubian barbarians must originally have shared with the rest of Primitive Mankind.

The religion of Primitive Mankind is a worship of the community in any or all of the diverse aspects in which the community is revealed by the vital activities on which it depends for its perpetuation.⁶ In the life of a primitive community that is either quite untouched or only faintly titillated from a long way off by the social radiation of the civilizations, the two key-activities are the procreation of the human stock and the acquisition of the food-supply (an economic activity which presents itself, almost as a matter of course, in the form of procreation on the human

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-8, above.

² And also in the soul of the Hijāzi Arab prophet's Najdī Arab contemporary and counterpart Maslamah (see III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 238, above). According to Nöldeke, Th., and Schwally, F., *Geschichte des Qurāns*, 2nd edition (Leipzig 1909-38, Dieterich, 3 parts in 6 instalments), part i, pp. 56-7, Maslamah was a prophet of a genuine originality, and the similarities between his teaching and Muhammad's are traceable to the two Arabian prophets' common debt to Christianity.

³ According to Nöldeke and Schwally, op. cit., part i, pp. 6-7, the Jewish influence that can be discerned in the Qur'ān is more considerable than the Christian influence—though one of the channels along which the Jewish influence percolated into Arabia may have been an Oriental Christianity.

⁴ 'Islam is the form in which Christianity made its way into Arabia at large (*in Gesamt-Arabien Eingang gefunden hat*).—Nöldeke and Schwally, op. cit., part i, p. 8.

⁵ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 276-7, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 450-1, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 127-8, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, in the present volume, pp. 673-8, below.

⁶ For the primitive 'totalitarianism' in which the religious and political and economic aspects of social life are inseparable and indeed indistinguishable, see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 351, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 160-1, above.

pattern when the food-supply is obtained by agriculture¹ and stock-breeding, and by no means necessarily in the form of strife and slaughter even when hunting is the principal economic resource).² A primitive community in this pristine state is apt to be worshipped mainly in the guise of a god or goddess of fertility, and only secondarily, if at all, in the guise of a destructive power. But, since the religion of Primitive Man is always a faithful reflection of his social conditions—whatever these conditions may be—a revolution in his religion is almost bound to take place when his social life is violently deranged by being brought into a contact with an alien human body social that is both close and hostile; and this is what happens when a primitive community which has hitherto been gradually and peacefully absorbing the beneficent influences of a growing civilization tragically loses sight of the gracious figure of Orpheus with his enchanting lyre,³ and finds itself brusquely confronted, instead, by the ugly and menacing countenance of the Dominant Minority in a civilization that has broken down and gone into disintegration. In this event the primitive community is transformed into a fragment of an External Proletariat; and this social revolution goes to extremes in that inmost layer of the External Proletariat which is in immediate contact with the body social of the disintegrating civilization across a regular military frontier.

In this situation there is a revolutionary inversion⁴ of the relative importance of the procreative and the destructive activities in the barbarian community's life. Procreation still counts for something—at least, in the human sphere—since without a supply of warriors it is impossible to make war at all; but, apart from the necessity of satisfying this demand for military 'man-power', it is now the destructive activity which is all-important. With the Dominant Minority's sword at its throat the External

¹ For the spiritual light which Mankind has gained by allowing its feelings and thoughts to play upon the parallelism between the life of plants and the life of men, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 256-63, above.

² A hunting community is apt to look upon its game not as a hostile and hateful enemy but as a beneficent and amiable friend. The act of slaughtering the game does not seem to loom very large in the hunter's feelings and thoughts about his relation with the animals through whose death he lives; and at moments, and in situations, in which he cannot avoid recognizing the ugly truth that, for his own selfish ends, he is depriving the animal of a life which the animal does not wish to lose, the hunter usually shows embarrassment and ruefulness. He prefers to think of the animal—or the god incarnate in the animal—as a benefactor who is voluntarily sacrificing his life for Man's sake. In fact, the primitive hunter's attitude towards his game is not at all like his more sophisticated successor the warrior's attitude towards his human adversary. It is actually more like the Christian's attitude towards Christ.

³ See IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, p. 123, and the present chapter and volume, p. 210, above.

⁴ It will be seen that this particular vein of revolutionary change illustrates the thesis, put forward in IV. C (iii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 135-6, above, that all revolutions are retarded acts of mimesis, in which the individual or community or society that is undergoing the revolution is responding to a 'challenge' from some other party.

Proletariat has to fight for its life; and its impulses towards strife and slaughter are thus diverted from the relatively innocent task of hunting animals to the sinister business of waging war against other human beings. War now becomes the community's all-absorbing occupation—in the first place because the urgency of self-defence drives all other social needs into the background, and secondly because the militarized barbarian gradually discovers—as the balance along the stationary *limes* inclines more and more in his favour¹—that a profession which has been thrust upon him as a necessity for his self-preservation can be turned to economic account as well on a frontier where the barbarian raider has gained the upper hand. When War thus becomes more lucrative, as well as more exciting, than the dull and laborious pursuit of agriculture, how can Demeter, or even Aphrodite, hope to hold her own any longer against Ares as the supreme expression of a deified community that is now no longer mainly intent upon either Aphrodite's or Demeter's work? In the last stage of this process of hammering out the External Proletariat on the anvil of War the once pacific and industrious primitive community resolves itself into a war-band; and when these Martians call upon their god, their cry is

'Blessed be the Lord my strength, which teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight.'²

The god whom a completely militarized External Proletariat has refashioned in its own image is a divine war-lord who employs his superhuman strength on the sub-human business of committing robbery and rape at the head of a divine war-band. We have come across divinities of this barbaric strain in the Olympian Pantheon which was worshipped by the Achæan external proletariat of the Minoan 'thalassocracy';³ and we have seen that these deified brigands in their eyrie on Olympus have their counterparts in the denizens of Asgard who were worshipped by the Scandinavian external proletariat of the Carolingian Empire, as well as in the gods of the Aryas who broke out of the Eurasian Steppe into the derelict domains of the Indus Culture and the Sumeric Civilization and the Egyptiac Civilization in the second millennium B.C.⁴ Another pantheon of the same kind was worshipped by the Teutonic barbarians beyond the European frontiers of the Roman Empire before the Eastern Teutons were

¹ For this 'law' of the *limes* see Part VIII, below.

² Psalm cxliv. 1.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 96-7, above.

⁴ For the family likeness between the Achæan, Scandinavian, and Aryan pantheons see II. D (vii), Annex V, vol. ii, pp. 434-7, above. For the *Völkerwanderung* of the Aryas and their Hyksos *apodasmos* see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104-7, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 388-91, above.

converted to Arianism in the fourth century of the Christian Era and the Franks and the English to Catholic Christianity towards the close of the fifth and the close of the sixth century respectively. And, since Woden and his band were quite as far removed as the garrisons of Asgard and Olympus were from the worthier objects of the worship of an unspoiled Primitive Mankind, the evocation of these predatory divinities in their militarized worshippers' own image must be reckoned as a creative work that has to be placed to the credit of the Teutonic external proletariat of the Hellenic World.

Having gleaned these wisps of creative activity in the field of Religion, can we add to our slender harvest by drawing upon analogy once again? The 'higher religions' which are the glorious discoveries of the Internal Proletariat are notoriously associated with a sheaf of creative activities in the field of art. Every 'higher religion' that has come to flower has expressed itself in architecture and pageantry and music and singing and poetry, as well as in prayer and sacrifice. Have the 'lower religions' of the External Proletariat any corresponding works of art to show? Have they made any atonement in the aesthetic sphere for their moral ugliness?

These questions answer themselves in the affirmative; for, as soon as we try to visualize the Olympian Gods, we see them with our mind's eye as they are portrayed in the Homeric Epic; this poetry is associated with that religion as inseparably as Gregorian plain song and 'Romanesque' and 'Gothic' architecture are associated with medieval Western Catholic Christianity; and the brilliant poetic achievement of the barbarian makers of the Olympian Pantheon is by no means unique. In another context¹ we have observed that the Greek epic poetry of Ionia has its counterparts in the Teutonic epic poetry of England and in the Scandinavian Saga of Iceland. All three of these schools of literary art are expressions of a creative response to the stimulus of new ground on the part of barbarian war-bands who have made their *Völkerwanderung* by sea; and the three corresponding pantheons are manifestly another fruit of the same creative activity. The Scandinavian Saga is bound up with Asgard, and the English Epic—of which *Beowulf* is the principal surviving masterpiece—with Woden and his divine *comitatus*, as the Homeric Epic is bound up with Olympus. And when we inquire whether perchance the lesser stimulus of migration overland, which has been potent enough to evoke the Vedic Pantheon in the imaginations of the Aryas, has also moved them to any works of literary creation,

¹ In II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 94-6, above.

the answer is in the affirmative again; for the epic poetry which was precipitated by the *Völkerwanderung* of the Aryas, when they poured out of a Eurasian no-man's-land into the domain of the Indus Culture before the birth of the Indic Civilization, is to be found embedded—like a pearl in an oyster or like a fly in amber—in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana*.¹

Moreover, if we turn our attention from the North European to the Arabian *limes* of the Roman Empire, we shall see that epic poetry is not the only form of literary self-expression to which the transfrontier barbarians may be stimulated by the rising tension of their relations with the Dominant Minority on the opposite side of the military front. If the Arabic poetry which is traditionally ascribed to the pre-Islamic period is to be accepted as genuine, it affords us an example of a barbarian literature of 'the Heroic Age' which is lyrical in its vein and personal in its interest; and, even if the alleged examples of this pre-Islamic school of Arab literary art are to be rejected as spurious, we can still infer, from the unquestionably authentic rhymed prose of the Qur'ān, that there were poets before the Prophet Muhammad's day in the ranks of the Arabian wing of the external proletariat of the Hellenic World.

Our examination of the genesis, history, and achievements of this Hellenic sample of the External Proletariat is now complete; and we can sum up our findings as follows.

The secession of an external proletariat from the dominant minority of a disintegrating Hellenic Civilization produced a state of war between these two fractions of a formerly undivided and harmonious body social. The resulting hostilities began as a running fight and then turned into a stationary warfare along each of several different fronts. In this stationary warfare there were alternating bouts of activity and sluggishness; and these alternations were synchronous on all fronts. The bouts of activity took the form of successive attempts on the barbarians' part to break through into the dominant minority's domain. The first of these bouts coincided in date with the culmination of the disintegrating civilization's 'Time of Troubles'; the second coincided with a momentary collapse, in mid-career, of the disintegrating civilization's universal state; the third coincided with the social interregnum which followed the final break-up of the universal state and the simultaneous dissolution of the civilization itself. The first two barbarian attempts to break through were abortive, but the third was a success; and this successful break-through re-

¹ The relation of the Sanskrit Epic, in the form in which we have it, with the *Völkerwanderung* of the Aryas is discussed in V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, pp. 596-606, below.

sulted in a Völkerwanderung in which the triumphant barbarian war-bands swept over the derelict provinces of the decrepit universal state and carved out for themselves 'successor-states' in which they tried to settle down in order to exploit their victory and to live upon the conquered population as a privileged caste.

In all these vicissitudes of their struggle with the disintegrating civilization's dominant minority the barbarians walked undeviatingly in the path of Violence; but in the hour of their victory the several war-bands went to different lengths in the degree of the atrocity with which they treated their victims. Among some of them there was at least a tendency to incline from Violence towards Gentleness; and there was at any rate one victorious war-lord who was convinced by his personal experience that the fame for which he thirsted could only be won by his making it his mission to fulfil and not to destroy the work of the age-long adversary whose dominance had been broken at last. Nor was even the violence of the barbarians altogether uncreative. On one front they made for themselves, in the likeness of the war-lord and his band, a new pantheon which bore no closer a resemblance to the pristine objects of the worship of Primitive Mankind than it bore to the vision of God which was beheld by the prophets of the 'higher religions' that were arising; in the same age, in the bosom of the Hellenic internal proletariat. On other fronts they took some one of these 'higher religions' and either refashioned it into something new, or modified it to fit their own barbarian heritage, or at least adopted it in a sectarian form which became their own distinctive barbarian badge. These were rudimentary acts of creation, and this barbarian vein of creativity revealed itself not only in the field of religion but also in works of literary art. The North European barbarians who invented Woden and his band of deified freebooters were also the makers of *Beowulf* and the Continental Teutonic epic poetry. The Arabian barbarians who created Islam out of broken lights of Judaism and Christianity which flickered over their steppes were also the makers of a lyric poetry with a personal note which the Prophet Muhammad turned to religious account in the rhymed prose of the Qur'ān.

The Minoan External Proletariat.

If we have truly succeeded in making out the main features in the portrait of the external proletariat of the Hellenic Society, this scrutiny may provide us with a clue for carrying out the rest of our present survey. Let us now proceed to pass in review the

external proletariats of the other civilizations that have broken down and gone into disintegration, and mark whether any of the same features appear in their portraits too.

If we begin with the Minoan Civilization, to which the Hellenic Civilization is 'affiliated', we shall at once be able to locate the position of one Minoan *limes* which is commemorated down to this day by the still standing walls of Tiryns and Mycenae.¹ Those walls were built to keep at bay the barbarians of Continental Europe; and, while our archaeological evidence does not tell us whether any barbarian raiders from the 'no-man's-land' beyond this frontier had a hand in the first destruction of the palaces at Cnossos and Phaestus at the end of 'Middle Minoan II'—a catastrophe in which we seem to see the culmination of a Minoan 'Time of Troubles'²—Archaeology and Literature corroborate one another in their record of the *Völkerwanderung* in which these Continental European barbarians, after capturing the continental outposts of the Minoan Power and taking to the sea,³ eventually swept over the Minoan World—and hurled

¹ For the contrast between these Minoan frontier fortresses on the European mainland of Greece and the unvalled metropolises of the Minoan universal state on the island of Crete see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 159–60, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 92, footnote 3, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 64–5, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 312, below.

³ For the Vandal-like audacity which was shown by the Continental European external proletariat of the Minoan Society in accepting the challenge of the Sea and bearding the Minoans on their own element see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 93, and II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, p. 333, above. The Achaeans can hardly have performed this feat without already having made themselves masters of the former Minoan fortresses on the mainland; but the archaeological evidence does not enable us to determine the date at which Mycenae and Tiryns changed hands; and it therefore remains uncertain whether the mainlanders who sacked Cnossos *circa* 1400 B.C. were the Achaean assailants or the Mycenaean wardens of the Continental European marches of the Minoan World. It is possible that the Mycenaean turned upon the Minoans *circa* 1400 B.C. (as, in Japan, the pioneer barons in the Kwanto turned upon the Imperial Court in Yamato in the twelfth century of the Christian Era), before the Achaean barbarians took advantage of this dissension among their adversaries in order to overwhelm Mycenaean and Minoans alike. For this possibility see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 160, above. In the opinion of Glotz, G.: *La Civilisation Égée* (Paris 1923, *Renaissance du Livre*), p. 61 (cf. p. 245), our archaeological evidence proves that the Minoan Power in Crete was overwhelmed by the concerted action of the Mycenaean Power and 'the New Empire' of Egypt, which entered into direct relations with the Mycenaean in the reigns of the Egyptian Emperors Amenhotep II (*imperabat circa* 1450–1415 B.C.) and Amenhotep III (*imperabat circa* 1405–1370 B.C.). 'Ces cadeaux sont de véritables documents d'histoire diplomatique. Ils annoncent un événement considérable: le soulèvement du monde mycénien contre la Crète qui l'avait converti et transformé, un choc en retour qui allait détruire la puissance de Cnossos.' According to the same scholar the archaeological evidence proves further that the preceding radiation of Minoan culture from Crete into the Mycenaean domain on the mainland of European Greece had been ominously selective. When, towards the close of the seventeenth century B.C., the Minoan Civilization 'took' on the mainland (see the passage quoted from Glotz, op. cit., in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 94, footnote 1, above), the continental ladies adopted all the Cretan fashions (for the style of these see the passage quoted from Glotz, op. cit., in I. C (iii) (c), vol. i, p. 174; footnote 1, above), but the continental men were refractory and, in particular, were unwilling to follow the Cretan men's fashion of shaving clean (Glotz, op. cit., pp. 78–9, 87, 91). If these external manners and customs (to which alone it is possible for archaeological evidence to bear direct witness) may be taken as outward visible signs of inward spiritual states, perhaps we are warranted in inferring, from the evidence in question, that the male half of the Mycenaean body social was never captivated, as the womenfolk

themselves against the ramparts of the Egyptiac World beyond it—¹ during the post-Minoan interregnum (*circa* 1425–1125 B.C.).

This story is written—for living eyes still to read—in the abiding marks of the fire that seared the faces of the gigantic earthenware jars in the Imperial store-houses at Cnossos on the day when the barbarians broke through the wooden walls of the 'thalassocracy'—which had been the Minoan universal state—round about the year 1400 B.C.;² and if, as we stand among the ruins of Cnossos, we fix our eyes on those sinister smirches that have been brought to light in our day, and then call to mind Saint Augustine's and Saint Jerome's descriptions³ of what their own feelings were when they heard the news of Alaric's sack of Rome in A.D. 410, we can perhaps enter into the feelings of unknown devotees of a falling Minoan Civilization who may have suffered as sharp an agony⁴ without having left any written memorial for a modern Western scholar to decipher. For our literary evidence of the final catastrophe of the Minoan Civilization we must turn to documents which are not the work of the Minoan dominant minority. The archives of the Egyptiac universal state have yielded up the official narrative in which the Government of 'the New Empire' has recorded its own success—through a victory bought at the price of social prostration⁵—in bringing the last and most violent onset of this post-Minoan Völkerwanderung to a tardy halt on the threshold of Egypt itself.⁶ And in the tale of the siege of 'Troy the barbarians' own epigoni have perhaps preserved the memory of a preliminary assault upon an outpost of the Hittite World on the eve of the great migration of 1200/1190 B.C.⁷ If the siege of Troy is an authentic historical event,

were, by the exotic Minoan culture, but always remained at least semi-barbarian at heart—in a state of repressed spiritual revolt which eventually broke out into an act of flagrant savagery at the turn of the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries.

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 93, above, and the present chapter and volume, p. 269, and V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 352, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 93, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 64, above.

³ See the present chapter and volume, pp. 223–5, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 93, footnote 1, above.

⁵ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 422, above.

⁶ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93 and 100–2, above.

⁷ For the westward expansion of the Khatti Power in Anatolia, up to the threshold of a Minoan World which was then in its last throes, after the peace-settlement of 1278 B.C. between Khatti and 'the New Empire' of Egypt, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 114, above. Within the last few years the royal archives of the Khatti capital at Khattusas (the present Boghazköi) have yielded up documents which appear to give us glimpses of some of the movements in the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung between the sack of Cnossos *circa* 1400 B.C., which is recorded in the present condition of the ruins of the palace, and the grand finale of 1200/1190 B.C., which is recorded in the inscriptions of the Egyptiac Emperor Ramses III. These Hittite documents, like the Homeric Epic, show us the searowing descendants of the Continental European external proletariat of the Minoan World bearing down upon the seaboard of the Khatti Empire in Anatolia; but the maritime province which has to bear the brunt of the attack in this chapter of the story is Pamphylia and not the Troad. As early as the time of King Mursil II of Khatti (*regnabat circa* 1345–1320 B.C.) we find the name Akhkhiiyawa (? Achaia) applied to a

it must, of course, have been a minor affair by comparison with the successful raid on Cnossos and the abortive assault upon Egypt; and of these two great exploits there is no echo in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. But, if the Homeric Epic is true to type in ignoring the greatest events of the age by which it has been inspired, and in exaggerating the importance of the affair which it has chosen to take for its theme,¹ it is incomparable in the art with which it has created 'a possession for ever' out of the fruitless deeds and ephemeral experience of one particular set of barbarian war-bands. In this Greek 'heroic' poetry the creative potentialities of an external proletariat have come to their finest flower. The magnificence of the Ionian Epos as a work of art is matched only by the inadequacy of the Olympian Pantheon as an object of worship.

The Syriac External Proletariat.

If we turn next to the Syriac Civilization, we shall find that several of the anti-barbarian fronts which formed themselves on its borders in the course of its disintegration have come to our attention already in considering the fortunes of the Hellenic dominant minority which took these fronts over as a result of Alexander's conquests in Asia and the Roman conquests in North-West Africa and the Iberian Peninsula.

These Syriac fronts set hard in the sixth century B.C., when both the main body of the Syriac Society in Syria and Iran and its offshoot in the western settlements of the Phœnicians overseas passed out of a Syriac 'Time of Troubles' into a universal state. The universal state of the main body was the Achaemenian Empire, which also embraced within its political frontiers the whole of the Babylonian World and that more mature half of the Egyptian World that lay to the north of the First Cataract.² The universal state of the Syriac transmarine world was the Carthaginian Empire. Both these Syriac empires were in contact with the Hellenic World—indeed, it was a Hellenic pressure that

maritime district of Southern Anatolia which seems to correspond to the country which in the Hellenic Age, after the post-Minoan interregnum, was known as Pamphylia, and which was inhabited, in this later age, by a Greek-speaking population. The king of Akhkhayawa who was Mursil's contemporary appears to have borne the name Tawagalawas (? *Ἐρεφονκλέης* or *Eteoclés*), while about a century later the same country was under the rule of an Attarissiyas (? Atreus). These fragments of the archives of Khatti point to the possibility that the Achæan ancestors of the later Greek-speaking Pamphyliaus may have already gained a firm enough footing in Pamphylia to impose the Achæan name upon the province within less than a hundred years of the sack of Cnossos circa 1400 B.C. (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (1) second edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), pp. 546–50; Schachermeyr, F.: *Hethiter und Achæer* (Leipzig 1935, Mitteilungen der Altorientalischen Gesellschaft, vol. ix, Heft 1/2, Harrassowitz), *passim*).

¹ The relation in which 'heroic' poetry stands to history is discussed in V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, pp. 607–14, below.

² For the political partition of the Egyptian World at the First Cataract from the fifth decade of the seventh century B.C. onwards see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 116–17, above.

had prevailed upon the Phoenician colonies in the west to unite their forces under Carthaginian leadership—but either empire also had its anti-barbarian frontiers. The Carthaginian Empire marched with the Afrasian Nomads in the Sahara and with the sedentary barbarians of North-West Africa and Spain. The Achaemenian Empire marched with the Afrasian Nomads in Arabia; with the Eurasian Nomads on the threshold of the Eurasian Steppe between the Pamir Plateau and the Caspian Sea; and with the sedentary barbarians of Europe in Thrace.¹

The history of the warfare between the Syriac dominant minority and the transfrontier barbarians on these five different fronts is rather intricate on several different accounts. In the first place there was no inner connexion—and therefore no significant correspondence in dates—between the respective courses of events on the Achaemenian and on the Carthaginian sectors.² In the second place the history of the Syriac Civilization was interrupted, in this field of action as in others, by the violent intrusion of the Hellenic Society through the force of Macedonian and Roman arms.

For the first two hundred years after the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander all the anti-barbarian fronts of the Syriac World in Asia were occupied and held against the barbarians by Hellenic Powers; and when, in the sixth decade of the second century B.C., Carthage was supplanted by Rome in Africa as well as in Spain, there was a moment when every single front of all the five—in Europe, Africa and Asia alike—was in Hellenic hands. This situation did not last; for, before the third quarter of the second century B.C. had run out, the Eurasian Nomads on the front between the Pamirs and the Caspian had broken the Bactrian Greek Power,³ and the defence of this front had devolved upon the Parthians.⁴ These Parthians, however, were

¹ These sedentary barbarians in Thrace screened both the Achaemenian dominions in Asia Minor and the Hellenic World in Peninsular Greece from a direct contact with the Eurasian Nomads on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe; but the screen was thin. The Odryae themselves, who in this age were the dominant Thracian community in the Basin of the Maritsa, were perhaps of Nomad origin, if their name testifies to a kinship with the Agathyrsi of the Hungarian Alföld (see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 425, footnote 2, above), and there is no doubt about the Nomadism of the Getae, who ranged the Lower Basin of the Danube between the Balkens and the Transylvanian Carpathians. When, at some date before the close of the sixth century B.C., Darius the Great carried the Achaemenian frontier out of Asia into Europe across the Black Sea Straits, he broke right through the screen of sedentary barbarians and made an unsuccessful attempt to subdue the Scythian Nomads in the hinterland of the Milesian Greek colonies on the north coast of the Black Sea.

² There was, of course, a certain inner connexion between the respective relations of the Achaemenian and the Carthaginian Empire with the Hellenic World. This connexion is examined in Part IX, below.

³ See Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), chap. 7: 'The Nomad Conquest of Bactria'.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141, footnote 2, and p. 144, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 412 and 449, above, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 275 and 310, and V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, in the present volume, p. 601, footnote 4, and p. 602, footnote 5, below.

themselves the epigoni of Nomads who had drifted out of Transcaspiā into Khurāsān little more than a hundred years before;¹ and, in summing up the history of South-Western Asia between the irruption of the Sakas² and the Yuechi³ *circa* 130–129 B.C.⁴ and the Battle of Carrhae in 53 B.C., it would be as true to say that the Parthians had carried the banners of Eurasian Nomadism into the heart of the Syriac World from the Caspian Gates to the banks of the Euphrates⁵ as it would be to say that they had shielded the heart of the Syriac World by stemming the tide of Nomad invasion at the Khurasanian escarpment of the Iranian Plateau.⁶ To the peasantry and townsfolk of Western Iran and 'Irāq their Parthian 'saviours' were perhaps hardly distinguishable from the Saka destroyers whom the Parthian arms were keeping at bay; and, in so far as the Parthians acquired a tincture of sedentary culture in the course of their south-westward advance, it was Hellenism rather than the Syriac Civilization that attracted them. Indeed, from first to last, they were better Philhellenes⁷ than they were Zoroastrians. It was not until the Arsacidae had been overthrown and supplanted by the Sasanidae *circa* A.D. 226/232⁸—some five hundred and fifty years after the overthrow of the Achaemenidae by Alexander—that the Khurasanian frontier over against the Eurasian Nomads for the first time passed back into the keeping of a purely Syriac Power; and, even when the Sasanids' other mission of completing the ejection of Hellenism from the Syriac World had been executed—after four hundred years of unsuccessful Sasanian efforts—by the Sasanids' conquerors the Primitive Muslim Arabs, another hundred years had still to pass before the Umayyad Power brought to an end, in A.D. 737–41, a Nomad domination over the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin which by then had lasted for eight centuries and three-quarters.⁹

This Arab conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin restored, over

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 371, above.

² The Saka invaders of Parthia in 129 B.C. appear to have consisted mainly of Massagetae and Sacaraucae (Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 294).

³ The Yuechi appear to have been a horde of Tochari led by an aristocracy of Asii (Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 284–7).

⁴ The *termini post quem* and *prae quem* are respectively 141 B.C. and 128 B.C. The conventionally accepted approximate date *circa* 135 B.C. has been corrected to *circa* 130 B.C. for the Nomad invasion of Bactria, and 129 B.C. for the Nomad invasion of Parthia, by Tarn in *op. cit.*, *cap. cit.*, p. 294. According to the same authority, pp. 278–9, Farghānā had already been conquered from the Greek princes of Bactria by Sakas of the Sai-Wang horde *circa* 159 B.C.

⁵ See p. 216, above.

⁶ For the consequent diversion of these flood-waters from the Syriac World to India see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, pp. 601–4, below.

⁷ This Parthian Philhellenism did not, however, amount to much (see V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 355, footnote 2, below).

⁸ See p. 216, above.

⁹ For the history of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin from the irruption of the Sakas and Yuechi *circa* 130 B.C. down to the Umayyad conquest in A.D. 737–41 see II. D (v), vol. ii pp. 140–1, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 370–84, above. Since the publication of the first three volumes of the present work a masterly study of the subject has appeared in W. W. Tarn's *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press).

against the Eurasian Nomads between the Pamirs and the Caspian, that frontier of the Syriac World which had been originally established in the sixth century B.C. by the Achaemenidae¹ and which had survived the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire for two hundred years. During the brief span of the fifth decade of the eighth century of the Christian Era, the Umayyad Caliphate united, in a single reintegrated Syriac universal state, not only the whole of the former domain of the Achaemenian Empire (save for its north-western provinces in Anatolia and Thrace),² but also all, and more than all, the former domain of the Carthaginian Empire in North-West Africa and the Iberian Peninsula.³ This momentary political unity was lost when the 'Abbasids overthrew and supplanted the Umayyads in Asia in A.D. 750; for a fugitive Umayyad succeeded in saving Andalusia for his House; and even in Africa the authority of the 'Abbasids was never very effectively or securely established west of Egypt. But, if the political re-union of the Syriac World under Umayyad rule was thus ephemeral, the accompanying social unification survived the division of the Caliphate and endured as long as the Syriac Civilization itself. From the eighth century of the Christian Era down to the close of the post-Syriac interregnum (*durabat circa* A.D. 975-1275) there was a unison in the movement of life through all the members of the Syriac body social from Andalusia to Transoxania. In the interior of the Syriac World this unison in this age declared itself in an active and rapid circulation of ideas and emotions and persons and commodities from end to end of this vast domain.⁴ On the anti-barbarian frontiers in the same age the same unison declared itself in a similarity and simultaneity in the vicissitudes of the military struggle on all fronts. In this respect the history of the relations between the Syriac dominant minority and its external proletariat under the 'Abbasid Caliphate and the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate resembles the history of the Hellenic dominant minority and its external proletariat under the Roman Empire.

On the other hand the external proletariat of the Syriac

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 138-9, above.

² In the eighth century of the Christian Era the Thracian and Anatolian territories that had once belonged to the Achaemenian Empire were welded into an East Roman Empire by the genius of Leo Syrus and his son the Emperor Constantine V (see the references in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 322, footnote 2, as well as IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 340-5, above).

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 203, above.

⁴ The intellectual monument of this social solidarity of the Syriac World in the Age of the 'Abbasids is the Arabic literature of the eighth to the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, which is the product of a Republic of Letters in which Cordovans and Samarqandis worked hand in hand. A signal example of the activity of the circulation on the economic plane is the spread through the Syriac World of the art of manufacturing, and the habit of using, paper (see Carter, T. F.: *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward*, revised edition (New York 1931, Columbia University Press), pp. 97-100).

Civilization has distinguished itself from other representatives of its class by performing on two occasions on three different fronts—and each time with momentous historical results—the *tour de force* of enlisting in its own ranks, and carrying away with it in its own marauding adventures, the children of an alien civilization.

The barbarians who broke through the Thracian front of the Achaemenian Empire and overthrew its Government and overran its territories in the third quarter of the fourth century B.C. were not the wild highlanders of the Istranja Dagh or Rhodope, and they were not even the Odrysae of the Maritsa Basin with their possible Nomadic antecedents and their undoubted talent for holding together a barbarian principality. The barbarian destroyers of the Achaemenian Empire were the Macedonian backwoodsmen of the Hellenic World; and they made their impetuous entry onto the Syriac stage in a dual role—as apostles of Hellenism and not merely as plunderers and exploiters of the society that was the victim of their prowess in arms. Similarly, in a later age, the Armenian barbarian soldier of fortune who battered down the defences of the Melitenian march of the 'Abbasid Caliphate¹ was fighting in the service of an East Roman Empire which was the premier state of a politically precocious Orthodox Christian Civilization,² while the Basque and Cantabrian and Asturian barbarians who broke through the European front of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate during the post-Syriac interregnum (*circa* A.D. 975–1275) were reinforced by their Western Christian co-religionists and European neighbours the Franks—wayward children of an infant Western Christian Civilization who readily relapsed into barbarism when their primitive passions were re-awakened by the scent of blood and the prospect of plunder.

The true date of the beginning of the Crusades³ is not A.D. 1095, when Pope Urban II made his historic call to arms, with a Levantine objective, in the market-place at Clermont, but A.D. 1018, when the first war-band of warriors from the northern side of the Pyrenees came over the mountains to join the Christian barbarians of the Iberian Peninsula in their assault upon the tottering defences of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate;⁴ for,

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 253–4, below.

² For the political precocity of the Orthodox Christian Civilization and its untoward results see IV. C (i) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 320–408, above.

³ See I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 38, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 362–3, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, p. 354, below.

⁴ In a different context we have studied the collision between the Syriac and the Western Christian Society in the Iberian Peninsula from the Western Christian point of view, and have watched how the Arab thrust from the Straits of Gibraltar towards the line of the Loire in A.D. 711–32 was answered by a Western Christian counter-thrust which was carried across the Pyrenees by Charlemagne in A.D. 778 and eventually across the Atlantic by Christopher Columbus in A.D. 1492 (see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 38; II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 202–6; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 341, above). But, when

when once the young commonwealth of Western Christendom had joined in this Transpyrenaeen hue and cry, the flame of barbarian aggression spread like wildfire along the whole length of the Mediterranean, from west to east,¹ and found fuel in Orthodox

we look at the same collision of social forces from the Syriac standpoint, the Arab conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in A.D. 711-13 takes on the appearance of a long-deferred but none the less legitimate recovery for the Syriac World of a colonial domain which had been captured for Hellenism by sheer force of Roman arms in the Hannibalic War after it had been fairly won for the Syriac Civilization from Barbarism by a long line of Phoenician empire-builders—beginning with the maritime explorers who gained the first Phoenician foothold on the Iberian coast of the Atlantic at some date in or before the eighth century B.C., and culminating in the person of Hannibal's own father Hamilcar Barca, who carried the Carthaginian Peace into the interior of the Peninsula. It was the dominion exercised in the Peninsula by Hamilcar and Hannibal between the end of the First and the outbreak of the Second Punic War that was re-established, more than nine hundred years later, by Mūsā for the benefit of an Umayyad Caliph at Damascus (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 203, and II. D (vii), Annex IV, vol. ii, p. 432, above); and although, as we have observed (on p. 241, above), the political union of the whole Syriac World, from the Eurasian frontier of Transoxania to the Atlantic coasts of Morocco and the Iberian Peninsula, was thus achieved by the Umayyads only to be undone, within less than a decade, through a partition of the Arab Caliphate, in two extremely unequal portions, between the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids, the surviving Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate, in which a scion of Umayyah's House contrived still to reign over a remnant of his vast ancestral heritage, continued to play in the Peninsula the role of a reintegrated Syriac universal state which had been usurped by the rival and triumphant 'Abbasid Caliphate in the Asiatic and African provinces of the Syriac World. The two Caliphates not only lived on side by side to perform an identical social function in their respective domains: they also both dissolved simultaneously in the general post-Syriac interregnum of A.D. 975-1275; and in this world-wide débâcle the Basque and Asturian barbarians from beyond the European frontier of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate competed with the Murābit and Muwahhid Berbers from beyond its African frontier for the possession of the Umayyads' now derelict Peninsular domain (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 204, above).

It was in these circumstances that the children of Western Christendom on the farther side of the Pyrenees enlisted in the ranks of the European external proletariat of the Syriac World by joining in their Basque and Asturian co-religionists' barbarian invasion of Andalusia. The first of these Transpyrenaeen marauding expeditions from France was made in A.D. 1018 (ten years before the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate finally broke up into a bevy of indigenous 'successor-states') by a Norman war-band under the leadership of Roger de Toeni. These Norman pioneers were followed in A.D. 1033 by a Burgundian war-band which was recruited by Odilo, the Abbot of Cluny, and which presented to the Abbey the booty won from the Muslims. Guy-Geoffrey, Duke of Aquitaine, followed in 1063; Thibaut de Semur, Count of Chalon, in 1065. Eble, Count of Rouci and Rheims, who was the son-in-law of Robert Guiscard and brother-in-law of Sancho King of Aragon and Navarre, took the same road in 1073 under the patronage of Pope Gregory VII. Duke Hugh of Burgundy came to fight for King Sancho in 1078; and from that time onwards, until the stream was diverted from Andalusia to Syria in 1095, there was a steady flow of Crusaders across the Pyrenees from Burgundy—not that the Burgundians were more adventurous than many others, but because the great Abbey of Cluny recruited them and launched them against the Unbeliever' (Petit, E.: *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, vol. i, p. 223, quoted in Bédier, J.: *Les Légendes Épiques*, 2nd edition, vol. iii (Paris 1921, Champion), p. 371).

'La France, comme on voit, n'a point attendu le concile de Clermont pour concevoir l'idée de la croisade et pour la réaliser. Normands, Champenois, Gascons, Provençaux, Bourguignons surtout, les aventuriers de toutes nos provinces y ont collaboré. Les Clunisiens — eux qui devaient plus tard inspirer la *Chronique de Turpin* et soutenir le mouvement du pèlerinage de Compostelle — ont commencé par organiser des expéditions armées en Espagne. Avant de guider sur les routes de paisibles cortèges de pèlerins, ils y ont convoyé des bandes d'hommes équipés en guerre.' (Bédier, op. cit., loc. cit.)

These Transpyrenaeen Crusaders who came over the mountains in the eleventh century of the Christian Era to reinforce the Christian barbarians of the Iberian Peninsula in their warfare against the Andalusian Umayyads and these Umayyads' indigenous successors may remind us of the Transalpine Gaesatae who came to the help of the Celtic barbarians of Italy in their struggle against the Romans in 225 B.C. (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 345, footnote 2, above).

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 362, footnote 5, above.

Christendom as well as in Dār-al-Islām. The Pisans and Genoese chased the African Muslims out of Corsica¹ and Sardinia; the Normans chased them out of Sicily and pursued them as far as their own African coasts from a base of operations in Apulia and Calabria which the first generation of Norman adventurers in Southern Italy had captured from the East Roman Empire.² In the next stage of their aggressive advance the European barbarians—who needed no scratching to make them betray their primitive natures beneath their Western Christian veneer—could hardly be restrained from laying their covetous hands upon the metropolitan provinces of the East Roman Empire as they trekked across Rumania on their way to carve out the Frankish ‘successor-states’ of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate in Syria; and their great day came in A.D. 1204 when they sacked Constantinople itself and divided up the remnants of the East Roman Empire in Greece and the Archipelago. The longing to commit this crime, which was carried into effect in the Fourth Crusade, had by then been smouldering, unavowed, in the hearts of four generations of cross-marked adventurers ever since the Franks who went on the war-path in the First Crusade had noted the riches of the Imperial City of Orthodox Christendom when they were received within her gates as her citizens’ co-religionists and allies. The sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders is a barbarian exploit that deserves to be commemorated on the same roll of dishonour as the sack of Rome by the Vandals and the sack of Cnossos by the Achaeans.

Without attempting to trace the history of the relations between the Syriac dominant minority and its external proletariat through all these complications on each of its five fronts, we can perhaps gain some idea of its likeness to, or difference from, the corresponding passages of Hellenic history by first tracing the alternation of paroxysms and lulls on the principal Syriac anti-barbarian front—that is, the front over against the Eurasian Nomads between the Pamirs and the Caspian—and then surveying synoptically the simultaneous barbarian offensives which broke through the *limes* of a then divided Caliphate³ on all five fronts in the last act, during the post-Syriac interregnum of A.D. 975–1275.

On the Eurasian front we meet with the first great barbarian inroad in the age in which we should expect to find it on our Hellenic analogy. The Cimmerian and Scythian Nomad invasion of South-Western Asia in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. coincided in date with the culmination of the Syriac ‘Time

¹ See further V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, p. 622, footnote 3, below.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 201; III. C (i) (a), Annex, vol. iii, pp. 458–9; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 392, footnotes 1 and 2, and pp. 401–2, above, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 291–2, below.

³ See p. 242, footnote 4, above.

of 'Troubles';¹ and on this occasion the Nomad trespassers from the Desert on to the Sown penetrated almost as far as their predecessors the Aryas in the second millennium B.C.;² for the Scythians, too, made their way from Transoxania to Cisjordania—though, unlike the Hyksos, they were brought to a standstill at Gaza and never watered their horses in the Nile. The tide of barbarian invasion which thus momentarily submerged the whole of South-Western Asia towards the end of the seventh century B.C. was swept back in the sixth century to the north-eastern side of 'the Caspian Gates' by the Medes, and to the other side of the Jaxartes by the Achaemenidae;³ and the Achaemenian watch on the Steppe was so well kept that the Nomads did not move when the Achaemenian Empire stumbled and recovered itself in the middle of the fourth century B.C.⁴ Indeed, they did not even take advantage of the sudden and unexpected overthrow of the Achaemenidae, a few years after this recovery, by a Macedonian invader who broke into the domain of the Syriac universal state from the opposite quarter, out of the Thracian no-man's-land on the European side of the Black Sea Straits; and, even when they were given an opening at last by the break-up of the Achaemenian Empire's Seleucid Macedonian 'successor-state', they did not succeed in emulating the exploits of the Scythians or the Hyksos; for the Parthians, as we have seen, got no farther into the Syriac World than the line of the Euphrates, and the Sakas no farther than the Khurasanian escarpment of the Iranian Plateau; and eventually—when the Arsacids had been supplanted by the Sasanids, and the Sasanids in their turn by the Umayyads—these Umayyad sovereigns of a reintegrated Syriac universal state re-established the Central Asian frontier that had originally been won by Cyrus, and handed this restored frontier on to their own supplanters the 'Abbasids. It was only when the break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate brought with it the dissolution of the Syriac Society that the Eurasian Nomads broke into South-Western Asia once again and, on this occasion, repeated the Hyksos' feat when, in A.D. 1250, the 'successor-state' of the 'Abbasid

¹ It also coincided with an apparent period of aridity—and therefore of explosiveness—on the Steppes (see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 410, above).

² See the references on p. 232, in footnote 4, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 138-9, above.

⁴ The Central Government of the Achaemenian Empire had to fight for its life *circa* 366-359 B.C., when a number of satraps in the Asiatic provinces west of the Euphrates made a concerted revolt with the support of Egypt, which had been independent *de facto*, under an Egyptian nationalist Government, since 404 B.C. The crisis, however, was successfully met. In or about the year 360 B.C. the revolt of the satraps collapsed; and, when the Emperor Artaxerxes Ochus achieved the reconquest of Egypt in 343-2 B.C., it looked as though the Achaemenian Power had acquired a new lease of life (see further V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 94, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207; V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 302; and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 442, below).

Caliphate in Syria and Egypt was usurped from the Kurdish Ayyubids by their Turkish mamlūks.

During this post-Syriac interregnum (*durabat circa* A.D. 975-1275)¹ the successive waves of the barbarian offensive on the Eurasian front all had their counterparts on each of the other four fronts.

In the latter part of the tenth century of the Christian Era, when the Eurasian Nomad Illek Khans were breaking upon the Transoxania, and the Saljūqs upon Transcaspiā, at the head of their respective Turkish war-bands, Arabian Nomads (Banu 'Uqayl and Banu Asad and Banu Kilāb) were breaking upon 'Irāq and the Jazīrah and Syria—partly at the instigation of the militant Shi'ī Carmathians, and partly under the leadership of a host of petty Arab war-lords (the Banu Asad under the Mazyadids and the Banu Kilāb under the Mirdāsids)² whose thirst for plunder did not disguise itself as religious enthusiasm.³ At the foot of the Taurus and the Amanus these tenth-century Arab barbarian invaders of the Syriac World from its Arabian hinterland collided with 'borderers' (ἀκρίται) of the East Roman Empire who were bearing down upon the Mesopotamian and Cilician and Syrian lowlands from the Anatolian plateau;⁴ and the two competing gangs of scavengers divided the local spoils of the 'Abbasid Caliphate mainly by ordeal of battle but partly also by pacific agreement.⁵ At the same moment the Katāma Berber high-

¹ This post-Syriac interregnum coincided exactly in date with an apparent bout of aridity on the Steppes, just as the second paroxysm (*circa* 825-525 B.C.: see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 303, below) of the Syriac 'Time of Troubles' had been contemporaneous with an earlier apparent bout of aridity which may have lasted from about 825 to 525 B.C.

² See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 416, above. These minor Arab trespassers upon the fringes of a derelict 'Abbasid Caliphate at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era may be compared with the Arab trespassers on the fringes of the Seleucid Empire in the same districts at the turn of the second and the last century B.C. (see pp. 215-6 and 218, above).

³ Shi'ism had, however, been professed by the Hamdānid leaders of the Banu Taghlib, who had made themselves masters of the Jazīrah and Northern Syria in an earlier generation (they had gained possession of Mawsil (Mosul) between A.D. 873 and A.D. 904, and of Aleppo in A.D. 944).

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 399-401, above, and the present chapter and volume, p. 242, above, and pp. 253-4, below.

⁵ The Nomad Arab war-band of the Banu Habīb, who had taken up their quarters in the Syrian provinces of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, went over, bag and baggage, to the East Roman camp in A.D. 928 (Grégoire, H.: 'L'Épopée Byzantine et ses Rapports avec l'Épopée Turque et l'Épopée Romane' in Académie Royale de Belgique: *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, 5^e série, tome xvi (Brussels 1930, Lamertin), p. 466; idem: 'Autour de Digénis Akritas' in *Byzantion*, vol. vii (Brussels 1932, Secrétariat de la Revue), p. 288; for the capitulation, in the same year, of the Margrave of the Melitenian march of the 'Abbasid Empire see the present chapter, p. 254, below). The East Roman 'borderers' aggression was vigorously contested by the first of the Hamdānid Arab war-lords of Aleppo, Sayf-ad-Dawlah (*dominabatur* A.D. 944-67); but his successor Sa'd-ad-Dawlah (*dominabatur* A.D. 967-91) gave up the struggle and submitted to an East Roman protectorate in A.D. 969. (For the treaty establishing this relation see Vasiliev, A. A.: *Histoire de l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris 1932, Picard, 2 vols.) vol. i, p. 409; there is a Latin translation of the Arabic text in the Bonn edition of the East Roman historian Leo Diaconus (Bonn 1828, Weber), pp. 392-4.

landers from Eastern Kabylia, under their 'Fātimid' leaders, were bearing down upon Egypt after having already submerged the Aghlabi 'successor-state' of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Ifriqiyah.¹ And at the same moment, likewise, the Iberian highlanders of Asturias and Navarre were making their first conquests at the expense of Dār-al-Islām in Andalusia. In the middle of the eleventh century of the Christian Era, when the Saljūq Turks were following the Parthian trail from Transcaspia to the Euphrates, the Banu Hilāl and the Banu Sulaym were breaking out of Arabia across Egypt into Ifriqiyah,² while the Lamtuna Sanhāja Nomad Berbers from the Sahara, under their Murābit leaders,³ were pouring across the Straits of Gibraltar to contend for the possession of Andalusia with the North Iberian Christian barbarians and their French co-religionists and allies from beyond the Pyrenees.⁴ In the third quarter of the eleventh century the Saljūq Turks collided with the East Roman 'borderers' in a race between these two barbarian competitors for the possession of the 'Abbasid Caliphate's Armenian Monophysite Christian 'successor-states';⁵ and before the close of the eleventh century the Saljūq Turks and the Katāma Berbers and the French Franks, in the course of their simultaneous invasions of the Syriac World from opposite quarters, had all come into collision, in a 'three-cornered duel', in Syria itself. In the middle of the twelfth century, when the Eurasian Nomad Ghuzz were treading on the Eurasian Nomad Saljūqs' heels in Transcaspia and Khurāsān, the Muwahhid Masmuda Berber highlanders from the Atlas were pursuing the Murābit Lamtuna Berber Nomads across the Straits.⁶ It was not until the twelfth century had passed over into the thirteenth that the Eurasian Nomads gave a decisive demonstration of their superiority in staying-power over all their barbarian competitors in the contest for the division of a moribund Syriac Society's heritage.

In the thirteenth century, when the East Roman 'borderers' were fighting their last rear-guard action on the Anatolian side of the Black Sea Straits, when the Arabian and North-West African reservoirs of aggressive barbarian 'man-power' had both temporarily run dry, and when the Frankish barbarian invaders of Syria were barely managing still to cling to their last footholds on the Syrian coast, the Eurasian Steppe delivered itself of the most violent and destructive eruption of Nomads that has ever been recorded in the annals of any of the sedentary civilizations.

¹ See Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 311-29.

² See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 445-6, and Part III. C (ii) (b), Annex III, vol. iii, pp. 473-4, above.

³ See Gautier, op. cit., p. 333.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 204, above.

⁵ See IV. C. (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 400 and 401, above.

⁶ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 204, above.

In this century the Mongols—not content with invading the Far Eastern World in one direction and the Russian Orthodox Christendom in another—simultaneously flung themselves upon the Syriac World through the gap between the Pamirs and the Caspian, and devastated it with a ferocity which quite eclipsed the performances of the Ghuzz and the Saljūqs. The Mongol conquerors of Transoxania and Iran and 'Irāq pushed on across the Euphrates into Syria; and they would certainly have reached the Nile, and perhaps even the Atlantic, if they had not been repulsed on Syrian battlefields by their Turkish cousins the Egyptian Mamlūks, a pack of Eurasian Nomad wolves who had been trained by their Ayyubid masters to serve as Syriac watchdogs.¹

This rather perfunctory survey has perhaps brought to light a sufficient resemblance between the respective histories of the Syriac and Hellenic external proletariats to raise the question whether similar experiences have produced similar spiritual effects. We have seen that the Hellenic external proletariat was stimulated by its struggle with the Hellenic dominant minority into displaying a certain creativity in the two fields of religion and literature. In the same two fields do we find that the Syriac external proletariat has any creative works to its credit?

In the field of religion we shall search the record of the Syriac external proletariat in vain for any parallel either to the North European barbarians' creation of a pantheon in the image of the war-lord and his war-band or again to the Prophet Muhammad's achievement of conjuring a new 'higher religion' out of the religious influences that were radiating from the Hellenic World into the Arabia of his age. On the other hand we shall find several parallels in the history of the intercourse between the external proletariat and the dominant minority of the Syriac World to the Goths' adoption of an Arian instead of a Catholic Christianity and to their deliberate persistence in an originally undesigned sectarianism as a distinctive badge to mark them off from a Catholic subject population after their successful breach of the Roman *limes* had made their fortunes by suddenly promoting them to the status of a privileged ruling caste from their former status as outcasts wandering in the wilderness beyond the pale.

An inclination to resist conversion to the established religion

¹ For the successive Mongol invasions of Syria which were repulsed by the Egyptian Mamlūks see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 350, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv, p. 447, above. This successful stand against the Mongol Nomads which was made in Syria by the ex-Nomad Mamlūks may be compared with the successful stand against the Saka Nomads which was made in Khurāsān by the ex-Nomad Parthians (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141, footnote 2, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 239-40, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, in the present volume, p. 601, footnote 4, and 602, footnote 5, below).

of the Syriac World of the day, without closing their ears to the preaching of the same faith in an unorthodox sectarian form, can be detected among the Syriac external proletariat both in the Sasanian Age, when the established religion was Zoroastrianism, and in the Age of the Arab Caliphate, when the established religion was Islam.

Between the Zoroastrian Church and the Eurasian Nomads there was a secular antipathy, which can be traced back to Zarathustra's own lifetime.¹ While the Iranian prophet addressed himself to the Nomads² as well as to the members of the sedentary society to which he himself belonged, he seems to have found the Nomads impervious to his teaching—as was indeed to be expected, considering that the substance of Zarathustra's message, on the social side, was a call to abandon the Nomadic for the sedentary way of life. Zarathustra's own personal hostility to Nomadism was conscious and avowed; and it seems to have evoked, among Nomads who persisted in the error of their ways, an answering hostility which was perhaps less articulate but which was not on that account less genuine. The Parthians, for example, were never more than lukewarm half-hearted Zoroastrians down to the day when they were overthrown by the zealous Sasanid Defenders of the Zoroastrian Faith—though by that time more than four and a half centuries had elapsed since the moment in the third century B.C. when an Arsacid war-lord had led his followers out of the desert of Transcaspia into the sownland of Khurāsān. Nor did the official patronage of the Arsacids' Sasanian successors avail to enable a Zoroastrianism which was now the established religion of Iran³ to propagate itself even among the *ci-devant* Nomad masters of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin—not to speak of the unreclaimed Nomads on the open Steppe beyond.

In the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin—which had been thrown open to a constant radiation of Indic cultural influence ever since the crossing of the Hindu Kush by the first Bactrian Greek conqueror in the second century B.C.⁴—the Zoroastrian established church of the Sasanian Empire found the Mahāyāna already in possession of the field⁵ in the first half of the third century of the Christian Era; and four hundred years later, on the eve of the Sasanian

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 121, footnote 1, above.

² See Pettazzone, R.: *La Religione di Zarathustra* (Bologna 1920, Zanichelli), p. 91.

³ The official establishment of the Zoroastrian Church by the Sasanian Dynasty, so far from being a boon to Zoroastrianism, cast a blight upon it (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 659-61, below).

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141, footnote 2, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 369-85, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 132-3, above.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 136, above.

Empire's fall, when the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang) travelled across the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin *circa* A.D. 629, on his way to India, it is evident from his narrative that the Mahāyāna had not yet disappeared from Central Asia, even if its hold there had been weakened.¹ This survival of the Mahāyāna at the Sasanian Empire's gates is evidence of the ill success of the Zoroastrian Church's missionary propaganda; and corroborative evidence, which is more cogent still, is to be found in the fact that, while the ebb of the Mahāyāna in Central Asia in the Sasanian Age was undoubtedly due to a return of the tide of native Syriac cultural influences, the native Syriac religions which won ground in Central Asia in this age at the Mahāyāna's expense were Manichaeism,² which was proscribed and persecuted in the Sasanian Empire, and Nestorianism, which was grudgingly and precariously tolerated³ by the Sasanian Government for the negative reason that this sectarian form of Christianity was proscribed and persecuted in the contemporary Roman World. While the Zoroastrian missionary propaganda failed to make any headway beyond the north-east frontier of the Sasanian Empire, the Nestorian missionaries had succeeded, by A.D. 636, in carrying their faith right across the Eurasian Steppe to the capital of the T'ang Empire in the Far East;⁴ and in A.D. 762 the Manichaean missionaries succeeded in converting the Uighur Nomad masters of the Turfan Basin.⁵ The hold which Nestorianism obtained upon the Nomads, as well as upon the oasis-dwellers, in Eurasia was so strong that it even survived the overthrow of the Nestorian Nomad Karāyits and Naimans by the pagan Nomad Mongols at the beginning of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era. The Mongol victors took the conquered Nestorians into their service; and there were occasions, during the last and greatest eruption of the Eurasian Nomad Völkerwanderung into the Syriac Society's domain, on which it pleased the pagan Mongol conquerors of South-Western Asia to show their disdain for a Muslim subject population by ostentatiously bestowing their favours upon the religion of their Nestorian Christian secretaries and accountants.⁶

While the establishment of Zoroastrianism as the official religion of the Sasanian Empire had this unintended effect of commending a sectarian Manichaeism and Nestorianism to the Eurasian

¹ For Hiuen Tsiang's evidence see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 375, above.

² See V. C (ii) (c) 2, Annex I, pp. 575-80, below.

³ This toleration alternated with short but sharp outbursts of persecution.

⁴ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 263-8, above. The date is vouched for by the evidence of the Nestorian inscription of Si Ngan (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 375, footnote 2, above).

⁵ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 415, above.

⁶ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 237-8, above.

Nomad wing of the Syriac external proletariat, the next chapter of Syriac history—in which the Sunnah took the place of Zoroastrianism as the established religion of the Sasanian Empire's 'successor-state' the Arab Caliphate—shows us the Shi'ah, which was proscribed and persecuted throughout the Sunnī Caliph's dominions, making converts among the transfrontier barbarians in no less than three different directions: among the pagan Berbers in Africa; among the Zoroastrian Iranian highlanders in the Caspian Provinces;¹ and among the nominally Sunnī Arab Nomads in Hasā. And the sweeping success of this Shi'ī missionary enterprise in these three barbarian hinterlands of the Sunnī Caliphate procured for the Shi'īs the same revenge upon their orthodox Muslim opponents and persecutors that the discomfited Arians obtained for themselves against the victorious Catholic majority in the Roman Empire through the conversion to Arianism of the Goths and the Vandals.²

In the tenth century of the Christian Era, when the frontier-defences of the reintegrated Syriac universal state collapsed, the East Arabian barbarian harriers of 'Irāq and Syria and the Daylamī barbarian conquerors of Western Iran and Baghdad and the Katāma Berber conquerors of Ifriqiyah and Egypt all alike broke through as Shi'ī invaders of a Sunnī World; and the 'successor-states' of the 'Abbasid Caliphate which were founded by these victorious barbarians' Carmathian and Buwayhid and Fātimid leaders did not merely impose the military yoke of a victorious external proletariat upon the necks of a no longer dominant minority; they also established a Shi'ī minority's dominion over a Sunnī majority.³ This momentary Shi'ī ascendancy in Dār-al-Islām was brought to an end when the first wave of barbarian invaders from the threshold of the Syriac World was swamped by a second wave from an outer zone of barbarism which had never been reached by the Shi'ī missionaries; for these remoter barbarians had been converted, before they broke out of the wilderness, to the Sunnah—and this in an ultra-orthodox form.⁴ In Iran and 'Irāq the Shi'ī régime of the Daylamī Buwayhids

¹ For the parallelism, *vis-à-vis* the Arab Caliphate, between the position of these Zoroastrian barbarian highlanders in the Caspian provinces of Iran and the position of the Christian barbarian highlanders in the Biscayan provinces of the Iberian Peninsula see II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, pp. 446–52, above.

² See pp. 227–9, above.

³ For this temporary ascendancy of the Shi'ah over the Sunnah in the 'successor-states' of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 354–6, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 357, above. It may perhaps be conjectured that these belated Sunnī missions to an outer circle of pagan barbarians beyond the pale were stimulated, like the preceding Shi'ī missions, by the spur of adversity at home. At any rate, the Sunnī missionaries who converted the Sanhāja and the Saljūqs must have been operating from their respective bases of operations in Ifriqiyah and in Iran

was overthrown by the Sunnī Saljūqs, while the Fātimid Shī'i Caliphate which had been established by the strong arm of the Kabylian Katāma was overwhelmed in Ifriqiyah by the Katāma's western neighbours the fanatically Sunnī Kabylian Sanhāja,¹ and was extinguished in Egypt by a studiously orthodox Saladin.² Yet down to the end of the post-Syriac interregnum the Shī'ah continued to exercise its power of attraction upon the barbarian rulers of Sunnī subjects; for at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Christian Era, when the Mongol Il-Khans were experimenting in alternative substitutes for their ancestral paganism, they toyed with the Shī'ah,³ as well as with Nestorian Christianity, before they capitulated to the Sunnī orthodoxy which was the faith of the majority of the population of their dominions.

Thus the Syriac external proletariat resembles the Hellenic external proletariat in showing at least a certain originality—though perhaps not a positive creativity—in the field of religion. When we turn from religion to literature, do we find any poetic achievement of the Syriac external proletariat that can be regarded as an analogue of the Teutonic Epic? The answer is in the affirmative; for, while the African contingents of the Syriac external proletariat have not charged the air with any winged words to commemorate their historic experiences, their Asiatic and European comrades-in-arms have not remained dumb. The Macedonian *conquistadores* who broke through the Thracian front of the Achaemenian Empire in the fourth century B.C. have left a literary echo of their barbarian feat of arms in the Alexander Romance.⁴ The East Roman 'borderers' who broke through the Euphratean front of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in the tenth century of the Christian Era⁵ have left behind them an echo of their corresponding feat of arms in the epic of which the hero is Basil Digénis Akritas. And the French Crusaders who broke through the Pyrenaean front of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate in the eleventh century of the Christian Era have created a work

at a time when these regions were under the Shī'i rule of the Fātimids and the Buwayhids. We may remind ourselves that the Arian Lombards were at the gates of Rome at the moment when Pope Gregory the Great sent out his missionaries to convert the pagan English barbarians in Ultima Thule to Catholicism (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, above).

¹ Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 333-9.

² This overthrow of the Katāma and Daylamite barbarian converts to Shī'ism by the Sanhāja and Saljūq barbarian converts to the Sunnah may be compared with the overthrow of the Arian Visigoths by the Frankish converts to Catholicism.

³ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 363, above.

⁴ For the divergence, which began within Alexander's own lifetime, between the literary tradition that grew into the Alexander Romance and the historical record of Alexander's authentic acts see Annex III to the present chapter, p. 608, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 441-4, below.

⁵ See V. C (iii) (c) 2 (b), vol. iv, pp. 399-400, above.

of art which is the parent of all the poetry that has ever been written in any of the vernacular languages of the Western World. The *Chanson de Roland*, at any rate, has outstripped *Beowulf* in its historical importance just as signally as it surpasses the *chef d'œuvre* of the Teutonic Epic in its intrinsic literary merit.

The geographical and social environment in which the Byzantine Greek Epic of Basil Digénis Akritas came to birth is proclaimed in the hero's standing epithet; for 'Akritas' means 'Borderer',¹ and the scene of action of every incident in the poem is located within the East Anatolian highland no-man's-land² where the East Roman Empire marched with the Arab Caliphate.³ The historical nucleus of the literary character that is the central figure of the poem seems to be an East Roman officer of the Anatolic army-corps⁴ named Diogenes, whose death in battle against the Arabs is recorded by the chronicler Theophanes (*sub Anno Mundi* 6281 = A.D. 788).

'Ces choses se passaient . . . dix ans apres que fut tombé dans la *clisura* de Roncevaux le Digénis Akritas des Francs, le paladin Roland, aussi obscur, aussi fameux que le héros d'Anatolie, mais mieux chanté que lui.'⁵

The original home of the epic which crystallized round this eighth-century East Roman officer's memory seems to have lain in the Taurus defiles and on the Cilician plain;⁶ but in the course of its growth the epic seems to have laid under contribution the personality and exploits of a later historical personage, the Armenian soldier of fortune Mleh (*Graecè* Melias),⁷ who conquered from a by then tottering 'Abbasid Caliphate the March of Lykandos on the East Roman Government's behalf in the

¹ See p. 246, above.

² For this no-man's-land, which gave birth not only to the East Roman Epic but also to both the 'Isaurian' and the 'Macedonian' dynasty of East Roman Emperors, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 274, footnote 2; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 365, footnote 4; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, p. 630, above.

³ The lay of the Akritas Basil Digénis is not the only piece of Byzantine Greek epic poetry to which this Romano-Arab borderland has given birth. It has also generated the heroic ballad of Armourópoulos, which seems to have been precipitated by historical events which occurred in the ninth century (see Grégoire, H.: 'Autour de Digénis Akritas' in *Byzantion*, vol. vii (Brussels 1932, Secrétariat de la Revue), pp. 202-3, and the present chapter, p. 255, footnote 3, below), and likewise the cycle of Andronicus and Constantine Ducas, who are historical personages of the tenth century (see Grégoire, H.: 'L'Âge Héroïque de Byzance' in *Mélanges Offerts à M. Nicolas Jorga* (Paris 1933, Gamber), p. 391; eundem: 'Études sur l'Épopée Byzantine' in *Revue des Études Grecques*, vol. xlii (Paris 1933, Leroux), pp. 48-61).

⁴ For the origin and character of this East Roman army-corps and military district, see II. D (iii), vol. ii, p. 81, with footnote 1, and II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 153, with footnote 1, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 73, above.

⁵ Grégoire, H.: 'Le Tombeau et la Date de Digénis Akritas (Samosate, vers 940 après J.-C.)' in *Byzantion*, vol. vi (Brussels 1931, Secrétariat de la Revue), p. 499. Cf. eundem: 'L'Épopée Byzantine et ses Rapports avec l'Épopée Turque et l'Épopée Romane' in *Académie Royale de Belgique: Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, 5^e Série (Brussels 1930, Lamartin), p. 464.

⁶ Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', p. 464.

⁷ See p. 242, above.

reign of the Emperor Leo VI (*imperabat* A.D. 886-911) and afterwards cooperated with the East Roman general John Curcuas in the more ambitious conquest of the larger and more important Arab March of Malatīyah, on the right bank of the Upper Euphrates, in A.D. 928.¹ The scene of the Byzantine Greek epic hero's imaginary life was transferred from the Taurus to this conquered territory farther north-east, and the domain in the ancient district of Commagene which is assigned by the poet to the Cappadocian Akritas corresponds exactly with the domain which is known to have been assigned by the East Roman Government to their Armenian servant, Mleh 'in real life'.²

It will be seen that, from the Arab point of view, the East Roman 'borderers' whose features have been combined to compose the imaginary portrait of the hero of a Byzantine Greek epic poem were members of an external proletariat who had broken through the north-western *limes* of the 'Abbasid Caliphate when the Syrian universal state, which the Arabs had re-established,³ was *in extremis*; and the celebration of such barbarian feats of arms in epic poetry is something that we have now learnt to expect on the strength of the instances that have already come to our notice in the histories of other alien invaders of other collapsing universal states. The content of the Byzantine Greek Epic has, however, been enriched—and its history, by the same token, complicated—by reason of two facts which are both of them peculiar to this particular example of the phenomenon that we are now studying.

In the first place the East Roman Empire was something more than the barbarian no-man's-land which it looked like in the eyes of Arab wardens of the 'Abbasid marches whose acquaintance with the enemy's country was confined to the wilder regions adjoining the border. The East Roman Empire was, as we have seen in another context,⁴ a deliberate reconstruction of a Roman Empire which had been the Hellenic universal state, and in Byzantine Greek eyes it was the East Roman 'borderers' who were the wardens of the marches of Civilization and their Arab neighbours who were the transfrontier barbarians. The Arabs

¹ For the East Roman wars of aggression against the 'Abbasid Caliphate and its 'successor-states' which began with the campaigns of Curcuas see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 399-400, above. The submission of Malatīyah in A.D. 928 seems to have been followed by a military occupation in 934.

² Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', p. 464; idem: 'Études sur l'Épopée Byzantine' in *Revue des Études Grecques*, vol. xlv (Paris 1933, Leroux), pp. 64-8; idem: 'Autour de Digenis Akritas', p. 288. Compare Goossens, R.: 'Autour de Digenis Akritas' in *Byzantion*, vol. vii (Brussels 1932, Secrétariat de la Revue), p. 316: 'Les chants épiques ont suivi, de la Cappadoce à l'Euphrate et à la Syrie, les frontières changeantes des deux empires dont ils retracent les luttes.'

³ See I. C (ii) (b), vol. i, pp. 76-7, above.

⁴ In IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 322-3 and 340-5, above.

had, indeed, actually played the part assigned to them in the Byzantine mental picture of Arabo-Byzantine relations. Before ever the East Roman 'borderers' found their opportunity to take the offensive at the 'Abbasid Caliphate's expense, the Arabs had conducted, twice in every year, regular seasonal raids into East Roman territory from a *placed'armes* on the Cilician Plain at Tarsus;¹ and the other Arab raiders who had been operating less systematically, and on a smaller scale, from a secondary base at Malatīyah had anticipated the East Roman 'borderers' in running true to the type of barbarians on the war-path. These Melitenian marchmen of the 'Abbasid Caliphate had celebrated their exploits on East Roman ground in a local epic of their own, which, like the contemporary Byzantine Greek Epic, was precipitated by the deeds of two historical personages. The first of these (corresponding to the East Roman officer Diogenes) was the Sayyid Battāl,² who died fighting against the East Romans in A.D. 739, at the Battle of Akroinon. The second (corresponding to the East Roman Government's Armenian henchman Mleh) was a margrave of Malatīyah named 'Umar, who played a part in the capture of the East Roman fortress of Amorium in A.D. 838³ and was finally overtaken, defeated, and killed in A.D. 863, in the course of a raid on Amisus, by the East Roman General Petronas.⁴ This Muslim Melitenian Epic seems also to have derived some of its inspiration from the ninth-century exploits of the Paulicians in the adjoining district of Tephrike,⁵ who, though not co-religionists of the Melitenian Arabs, had in common with them a perpetual feud with their other neighbours the East Romans. In the earliest of the foreign versions in which the Melitenian Arab Epic has come down to us at second hand the historical Paulician leaders Chrysocheir and Carbeas are made into the Amīr 'Umar's father and

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 368, with footnote 1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 400, footnote 2, above.

² See Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', pp. 468-70 and 480; eundem: 'Comment Sayyid Battāl, martyr musulman du viii^e siècle, est-il devenu, dans la légende, le contemporain d'Amer (†863)?' in *Byzantion*, vol. xi (Brussels 1936), pp. 570-5.

³ Amorium was not only the principal fortress in the Anatolic army-corps district; it was also the strategic key-point of all the Asiatic territories of the East Roman Empire, since it commanded the several routes leading from the south-eastern frontier to the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus. The fall of Amorium in A.D. 838 made an impression on East Roman hearts and minds of which the depth and strength are attested by the existence of a Byzantine Greek heroic ballad of which the hero (Armourópoulos = the son of one of the East Roman defenders of Amorium whom the victorious Arabs had carried away captive) avenges and effaces the disaster by the feat of crossing the Euphrates and defeating the Arabs in their own territory (Grégoire, H.: 'L'Âge Héroïque de Byzance' in *Mélanges Offerts à M. Nicolas Jorga* (Paris 1933, Gamber), pp. 388-9; idem, 'Études', pp. 32-47; idem, 'Le Règne de Michel III' in *Byzantion*, vol. v (Paris 1930, Champion), p. 329).

⁴ For 'Umar's death see Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', p. 469; eundem: 'Le Règne de Michel III dans l'Épopée Byzantine' in *Byzantion*, vol. v (Paris 1930, Champion), p. 332.

⁵ For the death-struggle between the Paulician Republic of Tephrike and the East Roman Empire in the ninth century of the Christian Era see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 364-6, above.

uncle respectively, and the capture of Amorium in A.D. 838 is attributed to them.¹

This Melitenian Arab Epic with a Paulician tincture in it must have already taken shape by the year A.D. 928, when the 'Abbasid March of Malatīyah was incorporated into the East Roman Empire. If the annexation of this Muslim territory had been carried out in the same grim spirit and brutal manner as that of the Paulician Republic of Tephrike some fifty-three years before, in or about A.D. 875, the East Romans might never have deigned to acquaint themselves with the work of the Melitenian minstrels' art and would certainly never have allowed it to have any influence on their own epic literature. What has complicated the history of the Byzantine Greek Epic is the fact that the incorporation of Arab Malatīyah into the East Roman Empire was achieved in the end by a voluntary capitulation which satisfied the *amour propre* of both parties and which was followed by a fraternization between these ancient enemies. The Melitenian Arab margrave Abu Hafs who tendered his submission to the East Roman general John Curcuas in A.D. 928² thenceforward fought, side by side with his conqueror, in the East Roman campaigns against Abu Hafs' own co-religionists in the interior of the 'Abbasid Empire.³ The East Romans responded by taking their new companions-in-arms to their bosom; and they gave a gracious literary expression to this union of hearts by incorporating into their own epic of the Akritas the Melitenian Epic in which the leading figure was Abu Hafs' grandfather the Amīr 'Umar.⁴ The association of the Melitenian

¹ Grégoire, 'Études', p. 64; idem, 'Le Règne de Michel III', p. 329. These attributions are made in the Byzantine Greek version of the Melitenian Arab Epic which now figures as Part One of the final form of the epic poem of Basil Digénis Akritas.

² Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', p. 466.

³ Grégoire, 'Le Tombeau et la Date de Digénis Akritas', p. 497.

⁴ The tenth-century Byzantine Greek version of the Melitenian Epic which constitutes Part One of the poem of Digénis in its final form is not the only trace of the Melitenian Epic that has come down to us. It can also be traced in one of the stories in the Arabian Nights (see Goossens, R.: 'Autour de Digénis Akritas: la "Geste d'Omar" dans les Mille et une Nuits' in *Byzantion*, vol. vii (Brussels 1932), pp. 305-12) and in an Arabic romance of the Romano-'Abbasid wars called *Dhāt al-Himmah wa 'l-Battāl* (see Goossens, op. cit., p. 317, and Canard, M.: 'Delhemma: Sayyid Battāl et 'Omar al-No'mān' in *Byzantion*, vol. xii (Brussels 1937), pp. 183-8). Moreover the Melitenian Epic seems to have enriched a non-Arabic literature twice over. After having, in the tenth century of the Christian Era, provided the materials for the present Part One of the Byzantine Greek epic poem of Digénis Akritas, it similarly provided, in the twelfth century, the materials for a Turkish Epic of which the hero is the Sayyid Battāl (though the Akritas figures in this Turkish poem, too, as a secondary character under the name of Akrates). The *terminus post quem* for the composition of this Turkish version of the Melitenian Epic is the conquest of the March of Malatīyah by the Muslim Turkish barbarian invader Gümüşhigin son of Dānışmand at the end of the eleventh century of the Christian Era in the wake of the Saljūqs (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 106, footnote 1; I. C (i) (b), Annex, vol. i, p. 349, footnote 1; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 71; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 398, above). The *terminus prae quem* cannot be very much later, since the last historical event mentioned in this Turkish Epic is the First Crusade (*gerebatur* A.D. 1096-9), while the last 'Abbasid Caliph mentioned is Mu'tasim (*imperabat* A.D. 833-42), who was the contemporary of the Amīr 'Umar of Malatīyah,

margrave 'Umar with the Cappadocian *akritas* Diogenes was neatly effected by a slight manipulation of the name of a Byzantine Greek literary hero whose historical nucleus had long since faded out of mind.

'L'Émir, que chantait sans doute plus d'une cantilène de Malatia, devint le père du héros grec, et Akritas lui-même, étant Digénis¹ ou fils de deux races, put être le héros commun des Grecs et des Syriens, des Cappadociens et des Euphratésiens. Le poème grec, avec ses deux parties, est la traduction poétique de l'annexion de Malatia.²

In the poem of Digénis as we have it, Part One is devoted to the glorification of Digénis' suppositious father 'the Amīr', and the poem breathes throughout a spirit of reconciliation between Greek and Arab. The Amīr is represented as abandoning Islam for Christianity out of love for the Greek princess who is to be Digénis' mother.³ The Amīr's raids into East Roman territory are celebrated as heroic feats of arms, while Digénis is never made to fight Arabs, but only East Roman outlaws.⁴ There is no touch, in the poem, of religious animosity.⁵

The weaving of the tenth-century Byzantine Greek epic poet's⁶ rope out of the diverse strands⁷ which offered themselves to his hand on either side of the Romano-'Abbasid military frontier⁸ has been deftly epitomized by the Belgian scholar who has taken the lead in unravelling this complex piece of literary history.

the hero of Part One of the poem of Digénis (see Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', pp. 471-3 and 480; Canard, 'Delhemma', pp. 186-7).

¹ *Sic*, for 'Diogenes'.—A.J.T.

² Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', p. 478.

³ Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', p. 465.

⁴ Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', p. 465.

⁵ Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', pp. 466-8.

⁶ The tenth-century rhapsode who composed the poem of Digénis as we have it was perhaps the pupil of Paphlagonian ballad-singers who are casually mentioned by Arethas of Caesarea (*vivebat* A.D. 850-932) (see Grégoire, 'Autour de Digénis Akritas', p. 291).

⁷ See Grégoire, 'Le Tombeau et la Date de Digénis Akritas', p. 491; eundem, 'Autour de Digénis Akritas', p. 289.

⁸ The only sources of the poem of Digénis that concern us for our present purpose are the Byzantine Greek heroic poetry from the East Roman side of the border and the Arab heroic poetry from the March of Malatīyah; but at least two other sources which have also been laid under contribution have been detected by the critics. One of these is the contemporary sophisticated Byzantine literature written in Attic Greek: e.g. the work of the historian Genesius (Bonn edition, pp. 121-6) appears to have been drawn upon by the rhapsode who made the present Part One of the poem of Digénis out of the Arab Epic of Malatīyah (Grégoire, 'Le Règne de Michel III', pp. 329-31; idem, 'Le Tombeau et la Date de Digénis Akritas', pp. 493-4). Another source was archaeological. Certain conspicuous ancient monuments of Hellenic origin in Commagene (the southern fringe of the Arab March of Malatīyah, between the Taurus and the Euphrates) were associated with Digénis Akritas in the rhapsode's imagination when the scene of the Byzantine epic hero's life and exploits was translated to this district after the incorporation of the March of Malatīyah into the East Roman Empire in A.D. 928 (Grégoire, 'Le Tombeau et la Date de Digénis Akritas', pp. 500-6). Similarly the name of one of Digénis' legendary adversaries, the Amazon Maximó, seems to have been taken from an ancient Greek inscription of *circa* A.D. 200 at Sebastopolis Pontica in honour of a certain 'Maxima alias Amazonis' (Grégoire, H., in *Byzantion*, vol. xi (Brussels 1936), pp. 607-10).

'De Digénis, héros du viii^e siècle (?), un versificateur du temps du Porphyrogénète [*imperabat* A.D. 911—59]¹ fit à la fois, en l'honneur du fondateur de la dynastie macédonienne, un Basile, et, en l'honneur des vaillants soldats du dernier thème-frontière, un éponyme de ce thème de Lykandos ou des Akrites. Réunissant sur sa tête la gloire impériale de Basile le Macédonien, les exploits récents et historiques de l'Arménien Mleh; évoquant par son second nom des prouesses fabuleuses comme la lutte contre le dieu de la mort; enfin, grâce à l'habile "calembour" d'un rhapsode, recueillant, lui, soldat chrétien, toute la célébrité d'une ascendance musulmane et paulicienne, où figuraient les plus redoutables ennemis de Byzance au ix^e siècle: Amer, Chrysochir, Carbeas, ainsi que toute la renommée d'une antique souche cappadocienne, les Kinnamos, et des deux familles historiques quasi-impériales, les Moselès et les Dukas — Basile Digénis Akritas, le plus composite des héros, nous apparaît comme la somme de la gloire militaire arabo-byzantine au milieu du x^e siècle."²

It will be seen that on the Euphratean front of the 'Abbasid Caliphate the creative effect, on the literary plane, of the border warfare between Arabs and East Romans was not one-sided but was reciprocal. Before the barbarian experience of breaking through the *limes* of a tottering Syriac universal state had inspired Byzantine Greek bards to compose the epic poem of which the hero is Basil Digénis Akritas, the Melitenian Arab marchmen of the 'Abbasid Empire in its heyday had tasted, for their part, the selfsame barbarian experience in their own raids into the East Roman Empire, and had been inspired by their exultation over these exploits to express themselves in a work of the selfsame epic genre of literature. The literary reciprocity between the two contending parties on this particular military border is commemorated in the mixed birth attributed to the hero of the Byzantine Greek Epic and in the duplication of the poem, which celebrates in Part One the exploits of the East Roman 'borderer's' Melitenian Arab adversaries before dealing in Part Two with the exploits of the Akritas himself.³ This peculiar feature of the

¹ The date of the composition of the poem as we now have it can be located within narrower chronological limits than those of Constantine Porphyrogenitus's forty-eight years-long reign. Part One must have been incorporated, from its Melitenian Arab source, after the capitulation of Abu Hafs to John Curcuas in A.D. 928 (see above). On the other hand the political geography of the Romano-'Abbasid frontier, as this is presented in the poem, shows that the poet must have finished his work before A.D. 969, when the situation described or taken for granted in the poem was radically changed as a result of the conquests made by the East Roman Emperor Nicephorus Phocas. More than that, we can infer that the poem was completed before A.D. 944, since it refers to the sacred relic of Edessa, which was transferred to Constantinople in that year, as being at Edessa, without any allusion to its translation (on this question of date see Grégoire, 'L'Épopée', pp. 463-4; eundem, 'Le Tombeau et la Date de Digénis Akritas', pp. 486-7).—A.J.T.

² Grégoire, 'Études', p. 69.

³ The way in which this literary reciprocity worked has been analysed as follows by Grégoire, H.: 'Échanges Épiques Arabo-Grecs' in *Byzantion*, vol. vii (Brussels 1932), p. 378:

'Il y a eu, d'un camp à l'autre, des échanges et des emprunts constants de motifs

Byzantine Greek epic poem of Digenis, which was precipitated by the East Roman 'borderers' barbarian feat of breaking through the *limes* of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in the tenth century of the Christian Era, is not to be found in the French *Chanson de Roland*, which appears to have been precipitated in the eleventh century by a corresponding barbarian feat of the French 'borderers' at the expense of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate and its indigenous 'successor-states' in the Iberian Peninsula. The problem presented by the *Chanson de Roland* is of a different order.

The original assonanced version of the *Chanson de Roland* is known to have been composed some time between A.D. 1080 and 1130;¹ and all the seventy or eighty *chansons de geste* of which the *Roland* heads the list are works of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.² So much is common ground. But, because the heroes of this twelfth-century and thirteenth-century French heroic poetry are mental projections of mortal men who lived in the flesh in the generation of Charlemagne, while the date of the historical Battle of Roncevalles is known to have been A.D. 778, it has been assumed by one school of modern Western scholars that a twelfth-century poem which has Roncevalles for its theme and Roland for its protagonist must be the late flower of a work of art which had grown like a plant and had sprung from a seed that had been sown—as the seed of the corresponding Byzantine Greek Epic may have been sown³—more than three hundred years earlier. On this view we should have to believe that at least the elements of the *Chanson de Roland* took shape on the morrow of those eighth-century events that are celebrated in the poem as we have it. It has been left for a perhaps more judicious scholar of our own generation to maintain by weighty arguments that the earliest extant version of the *Chanson de Roland* is not the ultimate outcome of a long plant-like growth, but is the original creation of a single poet; and the gist of the demonstration consists in a circumstantial proof that the historical events that have kindled this twelfth-century poet's imagination are not those eighth-century campaigns of Charlemagne that have provided Tuoldus with his theme, but are eleventh-century expeditions of crusading French war-bands⁴ which were the liveliest living

"épiques". Mais toujours, et c'est naturel, le poète ou le conteur, soit byzantin, soit musulman, a introduit dans le thème plus ou moins banal une pointe à l'adresse des ennemis, ou des personnages d'origine étrangère. Ce sont ainsi de perpétuels renversements de rôles. Le problème se complique du fait même que les emprunts ne viennent pas toujours du même côté du *limes*. Une partie de la geste de Mélitène a été empruntée par les Grecs. Mais les Arabes ont riposté, en reprenant à leurs adversaires des histoires byzantines dont ils ont pour la plupart retourné la tendance.

¹ Bédier, J.: *Les Légendes Épiques*, 2nd edition, vol. iii (Paris 1921, Champion), p. 191.

² Bédier, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 3.

³ See p. 253, above.

⁴ See pp. 242-3, above.

social experiences of the poet's countrymen in the poet's own age.

'La *Chanson de Roland* n'étant rien qu'un épisode d'une guerre sainte en Espagne, à quelle époque naît l'idée de guerre sainte? Est-ce au temps de Charlemagne? Non; ce n'est ni de son temps, ni au ix^e siècle, ni au x^e;¹ mais bien au xi^e, dans la période qui précède immédiatement l'apparition de la *Chanson de Roland*.

'Cette période, des expéditions de chevaliers français en Espagne l'ont remplie. . . . Pour rendre compte de la *Chanson de Roland*, "il serait . . . naturel de rappeler ce qui s'était passé ou se passait au moment où le trouvère composait ses laisses, c'est-à-dire la guerre permanente que les seigneurs français faisaient aux Sarrasins d'Espagne depuis le début du xi^e siècle; tel est le fait d'histoire qui a déterminé l'auteur et inspiré son travail entier."²

'Ces chevaliers en effet qui au xi^e siècle s'acheminaient vers les antiques champs de bataille de Guillaume et de Roland, prenons garde qu'ils ont ressemblé au Guillaume des chansons de geste plus encore que le Guillaume de l'Histoire lui-même, au Roland des chansons de geste plus encore que le Roland de l'Histoire. Le Roland de l'Histoire meurt dans les Pyrénées en combattant les Basques, des Chrétiens; mais les chevaliers du xi^e siècle traversaient les Pyrénées pour s'offrir aux coups de vrais Sarrasins. Pour eux, bien plus que pour le Roland historique, la guerre sainte fut une réalité.

'Ce sont eux, croyons-nous, qui, les premiers, ont réveillé sur les routes le souvenir des expéditions de Charlemagne. . . . Comme Charlemagne ils s'arrêtaient à ces étapes nécessaires: Bordeaux, Sorde, Dax, Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port. Ils campaient à Blaye, bivouaquaient à Roncevaux. A Blaye les clercs de Saint-Romain leur montraient la tombe de Roland; à Roncevaux ils vénéraient le lieu de son martyre.³

If we accept the theory of the origin and inspiration of the *Chanson de Roland* which is set forth in these terms by Monsieur Bédier, we are entitled to describe the French Epic as a creation of the European wing of the external proletariat of the Syriac

¹ Compare the absence of any trace of the crusading spirit in the tenth-century version of the Byzantine Greek epic poem of Basil Digénis Akritas (see p. 257, above). —A.J.T.

² Luchaire, A., in *Histoire de France depuis les Origines jusqu'à la Révolution*, publiée sous la direction d'Ernest Lavisse, vol. ii, part (2) (Paris 1911, Hachette), p. 392.

³ Bédier, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 368-9 and 372-3. The tomb at Blaye, which was exhibited as the tomb of Roland to the eleventh-century French war-bands on the Pyrenean war-path, as well as to the pilgrims of later generations who followed the Crusaders' trail to the shrine of Saint James at Compostella, will recall to the mind of a classical scholar the grave-mounds that stand out on the sky-line above the shore of the Troad as the ship on which he is travelling from the Peiræus to Constantinople approaches the mouth of the Dardanelles; for in the Classical Age of Hellenic history these mounds were known to fame as the graves of Achilles and Patroclus. Since he first made this note, the writer has learned from Monsieur H. Grégoire ('Le Tombeau et la Date de Digénis Akritas', pp. 500-2) that the tomb attributed to Roland's Byzantine counterpart was in fact a grave-mound of precisely this type and location—standing out, as it did, on the sky-line within conspicuous view of one of the main overland thoroughfares in Com-magene.

World, corresponding to the Byzantine Greek Epic¹ of Basil Digénis Akritas which was created by the Asiatic wing of the same external proletariat under the stimulus of the same experience of breaking through the *limes* of a tottering Syriac universal state. In both the French and the Byzantine Greek Epic we can also see a true analogue of the Teutonic Epic which was created by the North European wing of the external proletariat of the Hellenic World, and with equal justification we may compare them both with the Homeric Epic which was created by the Continental European external proletariat of the Minoan 'thalassocracy'. The emergence of this set of correspondences is possibly an indication that we are on the right track, and is certainly an encouragement to persevere in our present line of exploration.

The Sumeric External Proletariat.

Now that we have finished our examination of the Syriac Civilization's external proletariat, the Babylonian Civilization thrusts itself next upon our attention; but, just because the histories of the Syriac and Babylonian worlds are so closely intertwined in their disintegration-phases, we shall not win much more grist for our mill by threshing a harvest from the Babylonian field. When we scan the last two centuries of the Babylonian 'Time of Troubles' (*durabat circa* 1000-600 B.C.),² we behold the selfsame barbarian war-bands that have already become familiar to us in our study of the almost contemporaneous Syriac 'Time of Troubles' (*durabat circa* 925-525 B.C.). We see the Cimmerians and Scythians bearing down upon South-Western Asia out of the Eurasian Steppe, and the Arabs simultaneously encroaching upon the desert borders of Babylonia and Syria.³ But we have observed and noted these particular barbarian offensives already; and we may therefore take leave to pass on at once to the history of the Sumeric Civilization which looms up in the Babylonian Society's historical background.

The Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' was opened, as we have seen,⁴ by the destructive career of Lugalzaggisi, the militarist master of Erech (Uruk) and Umma (*dominabatur circa* 2677-2653 B.C.), and it was brought to a close (*circa* 2298 B.C.) when

¹ Save for the apparent absence, in the French Epic, of any trace of that reciprocal literary influence between the contending parties on the two sides of the border which is an outstanding feature of the Byzantine Greek Epic (see pp. 254-9, above).

² The annihilation of the Assyrian state, army, and people in the war of 914-910 B.C. (see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), vol. iv, pp. 468-70 and 482-4, above) may be taken as the culmination and close (see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 308, below) of a 'Time of Troubles' which was followed by the establishment of a short-lived indigenous Babylonian universal state in the shape of the Neo-Babylonian Empire (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79 and 119, above).

³ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 410, above.

⁴ In I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 64, above. See also V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 296, below.

Ur-Engur of Ur established 'the Empire of Sumer and Akkad' which became the Sumeric universal state.¹ This age of Sumeric history witnessed the formation of three anti-barbarian frontiers: one towards the Anatolian Plateau, another towards the Iranian Plateau, and a third towards the North Arabian Steppe.

On the Anatolian front the peaceful penetration of Cappadocia by Assyrian traders and prospectors, which had been going on while the Sumeric Society was in growth, was transformed, after the breakdown, into a military occupation in the twenty-seventh century B.C., when the Akkadian conqueror Sargon of Agade (*dominabatur circa* 2652-2597 B.C.) led his troops across the Taurus.² By the twenty-sixth century the relations between the dominant minority of the Sumeric Society and its external proletariat had similarly passed over from peace into war on the Iranian front too; for one of the finest of the monuments of Sumeric sculpture that have been recovered by our modern Western archaeologists is a stele of Naramsin (*dominabatur circa* 2572-2517 B.C.) which displays the militarist Sargon's like-spirited descendant in the act of attacking and slaughtering the highlanders of the Zagros in their mountain-fastnesses. Thereafter, in the twenty-fifth century B.C., when some two hundred and fifty years of unbridled militarism had exhausted the Sumeric body social to a degree at which it became impotent even in warfare, the great-grandchildren of Naramsin's barbarian victims in the Zagros avenged the wrongs of their ancestors by launching a counter-offensive which resulted in a barbarian triumph. For more than a hundred years (*circa* 2429-2306 B.C.) the homeland of the Sumeric Society in 'Irāq had to bear the yoke of the victorious barbarian Gutaeans;³ and this first experience of the bitterness of servitude to a barbarian master lasted until the eve of the foundation of the Sumeric universal state at the turn of the twenty-fourth century B.C. and the twenty-third.

In the meantime, while these Gutaeans 'invaders from beyond the Zagros frontier were battenning like vultures upon the heart of the Sumeric World, the Amorite Nomads from Arabia must have been engaged already on their slower but surer penetration of the western borderlands; for the Sumeric Emperor Hammurabi (*imperabat circa* 1947-1905 B.C.), who emulated Ur-Engur's achievement by reviving the Sumeric universal state which Ur-Engur had founded, was an Amorite in sentiment and tradition as well as in descent; the principality of Babylon, which was Ham-

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 107, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 296, below.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 110, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 184, below.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, and the present chapter and volume, p. 203, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 184 and 234, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 296-7, below.

murabi's ancestral patrimony, was not only, as its name records, a mythical 'Gate of the Gods', but was also the historical gateway through which the Amorite barbarian interlopers found their way into the Land of Akkad out of the North Arabian Steppe; and, since we know that the First Dynasty of Babylon, in which Hammurabi is the greatest figure, had been founded—about a hundred years before his accession—*circa* 2049 B.C., we may perhaps infer that the Amorite barbarian invaders of the Sumeric World were already on the war-path¹ before the foundation, at the beginning of the twenty-third century B.C., of the Sumeric universal state which was to be revived and administered, in the fullness of time, by a Babylonian Amorite saviour of the Sumeric Society.

It will be seen that, on at least two fronts out of the three, the culmination of the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' was marked by encroachments or attacks on the part of the external proletariat, and that one of these attacks was unusually successful. If we set ourselves to translate these Sumeric transactions into terms of more familiar events in Hellenic history, we shall find our parallel to the Amorite infiltration into Syria and Akkad in the Arab infiltration into the same regions during the death agonies of the Seleucid Empire,² while we shall be inclined to compare the Gutaean invasion of the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates with the invasion of the valley of the Po by the Teutones and Cimbri.³ But, in order to make this second comparison work out, we shall have to reverse the historical outcome of the decisive battle on the Raudian Plains outside the walls of Vercellae, and to imagine the barbarians of Northern Europe enjoying in the last century B.C., before the establishment of the *Pax Augusta*, a foretaste of the triumph which in fact they never achieved until the fifth century of the Christian Era, after the Hellenic universal state had both come and gone. Our comparison shows that the synchronization of a bout of exceptionally severe barbarian pressure with the climax of a 'Time of Troubles' is still more emphatically marked in Sumeric history than it is in Hellenic; and, when we reach the last act of the play and watch the curtain rise over the scene of the post-Sumeric interregnum, we find, here again, another bout of barbarian aggression at a stage in the action at which our Hellenic analogy would lead us to look for it.

In the post-Sumeric interregnum the first of the victorious barbarian onslaughts appears to have been delivered on the Zagros front by a horde of Nomads from a distant Eurasian

¹ For the indications of an Amorite Völkerwanderung about the middle of the third millennium B.C. see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 404, above.

² See pp. 215-16 and 218, above.

³ See p. 218, above.

hinterland. The Aryas whose advance-guard burst into Egypt out of the Syrian extremity of the Sumeric World about the year 1680 B.C. must have broken out of the Eurasian Steppe between the Pamirs and the Caspian, and swept on south-westward across the plateau of Iran and the plains of 'Irāq, within the two hundred years that intervened between the moment when these invaders eventually arrived at the north-east frontier of the Egyptiac universal state and the earlier date at which the revived Sumeric universal state had broken up irretrievably after the death of Hammurabi *circa* 1905 B.C.¹ In contrast to the profound effect of their impact upon Egyptiac history, these Nomads left so little trace of their passage across 'Irāq that even the date of it is a matter of inference; but we may conjecture that it was the Aryan invaders' audacious trespass upon the home territories of the Sumeric Society that revealed, in a flash, the decrepitude of the Sumeric universal state under the rule of Hammurabi's Babylonian Amorite successors; and that it was this revelation that moved to action certain other barbarian invaders who made a deeper mark. At any rate we know that Sargon's aggression against the barbarians beyond the Taurus was paid back in the post-Sumeric interregnum—more tardily but not less effectually than Naramsin's aggression in the Zagros had been paid back by the Gutaeans during the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles'—when King Mursil I of Khatti, the principal barbarian 'successor-state' of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad in Anatolia, not only raided the Land of Shinar but actually captured and sacked the city of Babylon,² which was the latter-day capital of the Sumeric universal state. The Cappadocian raiders were content to evacuate Babylon, as Alaric evacuated Rome in A.D. 410, with their hands full of booty and their souls satisfied by the achievement of a revenge which by this time was perhaps as much as nine hundred years overdue; but, while this barbarian wave from beyond the Taurus ebbed as rapidly as the Nomad wave from beyond the Zagros had rolled on, the Land of Shinar did not have peace; for the withdrawal of the Hittites back to the Taurus was followed immediately by the descent of the Kassite highlanders down from the Zagros; and the Kassites, like their predecessors the Gutaeans, came to stay. They sat ponderously upon the neck of a prostrate Babylonia from 1749 to 1173 B.C.³

¹ For the circumstances and date of the Aryan invasion of South-Western Asia and the lower valley of the Nile and the upper valley of the Indus see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104-7 and p. 111, footnote 1; and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 388-91, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 110-11, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 64, with footnote 1, above. As has been noted already in the latter of these two places, this event is dated as early as *circa* 1806 B.C. by Delaporte and as late as *circa* 1750 B.C. by Meyer.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 111, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 64, above.

In this post-Sumeric interregnum, again, we catch glimpses of an originality, and even a creativity, in the barbarian camp along the lines with which we have become familiar in our Hellenic prototype.

We may conjecture, for example, that the Aryas were profiting from the stimulus of their experience in breasting, and eventually breaking through, the north-east frontier of the Sumeric universal state when they created a characteristically barbarian religion and poetry which have been embedded—not in the Land of Shinar, but on the adjacent soil of the Indus Culture—in the Vedic Pantheon¹ and the Sanskrit Epic² of an Indic Civilization that sprang from this soil after the dust of the Aryan *Völkerwanderung* had settled down. There is no corresponding trace of these Aryan works of religious and poetic creation on Egyptiac soil during the brief episode of the Hyksos' occupation of the Delta of the Nile; yet this extreme right wing of the Aryan horde displayed at least a negative originality in refusing to capitulate to the established religion of the Egyptiac World which these migrant Nomads had overrun. During the hundred years of their dominion over the derelict domain of 'the Middle Empire' which had been the Egyptiac universal state, the Hyksos were not converted either to the worship of Re and the other gods of the Egyptiac dominant minority or to the worship of Osiris which was the 'higher religion' of the Egyptiac internal proletariat. They gave their allegiance to Set, who was the villain of the piece in the Osiris myth. And we may conjecture that it was the odiousness of the part which this God of Evil played in the Egyptiac Mythology that commended him to the Hyksos invaders and induced them to substitute Set for—or to identify Set with—their own Indra or whatever other Aryan name may have been borne by the barbarian war-god whom they had brought with them into Egypt as the divine leader of their raid.³

As for the Hittites and the Kassites, their religious history has less in common with that of the Hyksos than with that of the

¹ For the Vedic Pantheon see II. D (vii), Annex V, in vol. ii, and the present chapter, p. 232, above.

² In V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, below, an attempt is made to reconstruct the fifteen-hundred-years-long process of literary development through which the Sanskrit Epic, as we have it, grew out of the heroic poetry of the Aryan invaders of the Indus Valley in the second millennium B.C.

³ For this worship of Set by the Hyksos and for its effect upon the course of Egyptiac religious history see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 144; V. A, in the present volume, p. 3, footnote 4; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 152, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, p. 351, below. The remnants of the Hyksos horde which survived in Syria after their expulsion from Egypt in the sixteenth century B.C. must have carried their Set-worship with them; for the name turns up, in a later age, in the Syriac Mythology. An Egyptiac priest would have found it hard to recognize his God of Evil in the human Seth of Genesis iv. 25-6, who is 'the good boy' in the family of Adam and Eve, and who is rewarded for his virtue by being made the progenitor of Noah.

Aryan invaders of the Indus Valley. Both the Hittite masters of Cappadocia and the Kassite masters of the Land of Shinar appear to have amalgamated a barbarian pantheon of their own creation with the pantheon of the Sumeric dominant minority; but the two resultant syncretistic religions evidently differed markedly in the respective proportions in which the several ingredients entered into the mixture. The sluggish Kassites, who had exposed themselves to the full blast of the Sumeric Civilization's influence by settling upon the metropolitan territory of the Sumeric World, were content to adopt the native worships of Marduk-Bel and Shamash under the names of their own imported gods Kharbe and Buriash;¹ and even these names would have passed into oblivion if they had not happened to enter into the compound titles of Kassite kings who sat on the Throne of Babylon. On the other hand the lively Hittites substituted their own barbarian pantheon for all but a remnant of those Sumeric worships that had managed to obtain a foothold in the outlying Cappadocian province of the Sumeric Society's domain.²

The Egyptiac External Proletariat.

In the Egyptiac World we find three anti-barbarian fronts: first the north-eastern front—facing towards South-Western Asia across the Desert of Sinai—through which the Hyksos broke in about the year 1680 B.C.; second a southern front, up the Nile, over against the barbarians of Tropical Africa; and, third, a north-western front which faced towards North-West Africa across the Libyan Desert.

On the Asiatic front the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles', as well as the post-Egyptiac interregnum, was signaled by an accentuation of barbarian pressure; for the Hyksos who broke through this front at the beginning of the interregnum, in the earlier part of the seventeenth century B.C., had been anticipated by an earlier horde of Asiatic barbarian invaders who had delivered their attack in the middle of the third millennium B.C. and who are perhaps to be identified with the Amorite Afrasian Nomads who, at that very time, were drifting out of the North Arabian Steppe into the western fringes of the Sumeric World.³ Unlike the Hyksos, these earlier Asiatic invaders suffered a repulse; but the Egyptiac Society only saved itself from a barbarian conquest on this occasion at the cost of a supreme military effort⁴ which

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 116, above, and V. C (j) (d) 6 (8), in the present volume, p. 529, below.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 112, above.

³ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 404, and the present chapter in the present volume, pp. 203 and 262-3, above.

⁴ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, third edition, vol. i, part (2) (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 232-3.

brought on, with a run, the disintegration of the Egyptiac Civilization. The Asiatic barbarians were repelled by King Pepi I (*regnabat circa 2400-2380 B.C.*), and the crash¹ came in the reign of the victor's successor King Pepi II (*regnabat circa 2376-2282 B.C.*).²

The Asiatic barbarian offensive in the time of Pepi I appears to have been a retort to a previous Egyptiac movement of aggressive expansion which had begun, with the beginning of the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles', under the Fifth Dynasty;³ and the Sixth Dynasty, of which Pepi I was the third representative on the Pharaonic Throne, seems not only to have kept up this offensive on the Asiatic front until the eve of the Asiatic barbarian counter-stroke, but also to have taken the offensive on the Upper Nile front as well.⁴

In another context⁵ we have already made some study of the effect of this southern anti-barbarian frontier of the Egyptiac World upon the internal life of the Egyptiac Society; and we have observed that the foundation of the Egyptiac universal state *circa 2070/2060 B.C.*, as well as the foundation of the United Kingdom *circa 3200 B.C.*, was the work of empire-builders who arose in the Southern March and whose military prowess had presumably been acquired in frontier-warfare against the adjoining barbarians. After the Theban princes of the Eleventh and Twelfth Dynasties had accomplished their oecumenical task of giving internal unity and peace to an Egyptiac World that had been distracted by a 'Time of Troubles', they turned back as Emperors of an Egyptiac universal state, with all the resources of the Egyptiac World now at their command, to fulfil their own special mission of serving as wardens of the Southern March.

¹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, part (2), pp. 234-5, and the present Study, IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 84, above.

² These dates are reckoned on the basis of Eduard Meyer's chronology for the period of Egyptiac history before the foundation of 'the New Empire' by the first Emperor of the Eighteenth Dynasty, Amosis, *circa 1580 B.C.* While there is a consensus among modern Western scholars in regard to the chronology of the periods of Egyptiac history *post 1580 B.C.*, there is still a wide divergence of opinion in regard to the earlier—and historically far more important and interesting—ages. Meyer's reconstruction, which is one of the shortest in span, appears to the writer of this Study to be the most convincing; and the approximate dates here assigned to the reigns of the two Papis are arrived at by a comparison of two passages in Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums*: vol. i, part (2), third edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 236, and 'Die ältere Chronologie Babylonien, Assyrien und Ägyptens' (Stuttgart and Berlin 1925, Cotta), p. 68. The dating cannot be more than approximate owing to the defectiveness of our information. The combined duration of the Sixth and Eighth Dynasties is known to have been 181 years, which Meyer equates with the years 2423-2243 B.C.; and we also know that Pepi I and Pepi II were respectively the third and the fifth king in this series; that Pepi I reigned for 20 years and Pepi II for 94(1); and that there was an intervening reign of four years' duration. Unfortunately the lengths of the reigns of the first two kings of the series, as well as the seventh to the tenth inclusive, are unknown to us.

³ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, part (2), p. 209.

⁴ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, part (2), pp. 211, 230-1, and 261.

⁵ In II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 112-18, above.

The military conquest of the Nile Valley from the head of the First Cataract to a point above the head of the Second was accomplished by a series of warlike emperors beginning with Amenemhat I (*imperabat circa* 2000-1971 B.C.) and ending with Senwosret III (*imperabat circa* 1887-1850 B.C.). And this forward movement on this front was merely retarded, without being reversed, by the decline of 'the Middle Empire' and by its disastrous end in the successful breach of the Asiatic front by the Hyksos. For, when the Hyksos were expelled and the Egyptiac universal state was restored by another dynasty of Theban princes, the emperors of this Eighteenth Dynasty followed the example of their predecessors of the Twelfth Dynasty in resuming the work of southward expansion as soon as they had fulfilled their prior task in the interior of the Egyptiac World. Under 'the New Empire' the southern military frontier against the Tropical African barbarians was carried forward, as early as the reign of Thothmes I (*imperabat circa* 1557-1505 B.C.), as far as the foot of the Fourth Cataract; and in this chapter of the history of the Southern March the military conquest was followed up by a cultural assimilation of the conquered barbarians which was carried out so thoroughly that the subsequent decay of 'the New Empire' did not bring with it any weakening of the hold of the Egyptiac culture upon the population of 'the New Empire's' Nubian dominions.

Upon the break-up of the 'New Empire' at the turn of the twelfth and eleventh centuries B.C. the frontier-fortress of Napata, which had been planted at the foot of the Fourth Cataract by Thothmes I, now became the capital of one of 'the New Empire's' local 'successor-states'; during the hundred years ending about the year 655 B.C. this Napatan principality came near to success in emulating the thrice-repeated Theban achievement of uniting the entire Egyptiac World into a single state; and, even after it had been forced to renounce this oecumenical ambition, the Napatan Power remained in being for another nine hundred years—during which it maintained its own political independence against the successive Achaemenian and Macedonian and Roman conquerors of the Lower Nile Valley below the First Cataract, and at the same time preserved and even extended the domain of the Egyptiac culture in the Upper Nile Valley. By 300 B.C. the social centre of gravity of this Ethiopian half of the Egyptiac World had moved so far to the south that Napata, which had been first the frontier-fortress of 'the New Empire' and then the capital of its Ethiopian 'successor-state', was forced to surrender this latter honour to Meroe, at the foot of the Sixth Cataract. It was not until the third century of the Christian Era that these successive encroachments

of the Sixth¹ and Twelfth and Eighteenth Dynasties and their successors the Napatan and Meroitic princes of Ethiopia upon the domain of Tropical African barbarism at last evoked an effective barbarian counterstroke. In this century, when the Roman Empire only just succeeded in beating off the barbarian attacks that were launched against it simultaneously on all its four anti-barbarian fronts,² the principality of Ethiopia was overwhelmed and extinguished by a host of Nubian barbarian conquerors.

As for the third of the Egyptiac anti-barbarian frontiers, which faced across the Libyan desert towards North-West Africa, we find no certain trace of barbarian pressure here before the thirteenth century B.C.; and it is possible that the Libyan invasions of the Egyptiac World in this century and the next were not the direct results of hostile intercourse between the Egyptiac Society and the North-West African barbarians, but were rather a product of the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*. At any rate, these Libyan barbarian assaults upon Egypt overland coincided in date with those overseas attacks on the part of the sea-peoples of the Aegean that were undoubtedly a backwash from the troubling of the waters at the foundering of the Minoan 'thalassocracy'.³ In some instances it is evident that the Libyan and Aegean offensives were not merely simultaneous, but were deliberately concerted. And it is likely to have been the Minoan rather than the Egyptiac Civilization whose radiation into North Africa stirred the local primitive peoples up and set them on the move; for North Africa was much more easily accessible to the Minoan pioneers across the waters of the Mediterranean than it was to any Egyptiac pioneers who may have had the hardihood to venture out among the Libyan sand-dunes.

In the supreme crisis of the barbarian offensive against the Egyptiac World on the Libyan and Aegean fronts at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. the Libyan as well as the Aegean invaders were repulsed;⁴ but, unlike their Aegean comrades-in-arms, the vanquished Libyan war-bands did not take 'No' for an answer. While the discomfited Philistines and Teucrians settled down once for all in the Shephelah,⁵ the Libyans who had been hurled back when they presented themselves as invaders soon returned to offer themselves as mercenaries, and within a few generations the children had captured by 'peaceful penetration' the promised land which the fathers had failed to

¹ See p. 267, above.

² See the present chapter, pp. 219-20, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 93, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 236-8, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 352, below.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93 and 101, IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 422, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, p. 352, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below.

⁵ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 101-2, above.

take by storm. From the eleventh century B.C. onwards the domain of the Egyptiac Society from the Delta as far southward as the First Cataract was partitioned between the intrusive Libyan warlords in their garrison-towns and the tenacious Egyptiac priesthood in its temple-states.¹

The Sinic External Proletariat.

In the Sinic World, as in the Babylonian and Syriac worlds, the crucial anti-barbarian front was the frontier against the Eurasian Nomads;² and in this case, as in those, a civilization which was expanding in the course of its disintegration wantonly placed itself in contact with these formidable neighbours through its own act in breaking through a screen of highlander barbarians which had formerly insulated the Desert from the Sown. Just as the Assyrian conquest of the Medes in the eighth century B.C. opened the door for an invasion of South-Western Asia by the Cimmerians and the Scyths,³ so the conquest of the barbarians in the Shensi and Shansi highlands by the Sinic principalities of Ts'in and Chao and Yen in the fourth century B.C. brought the Sinic World into contact with the Hiongnu;⁴ and, though in the Sinic arena 'the Contending States' did not bring down upon themselves the catastrophe of a Nomad avalanche, they dammed it back at the cost of a Herculean effort.

During the last hundred years of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' the states on the Eurasian border managed to divert part of their energies from their own fratricidal struggle for existence to the still more urgent task of building dykes to stem the Nomad flood; and, after the delivery of 'the knock-out blow' in the Sinic internal struggle by King Chêng of Ts'in in 221 B.C.,⁵ the victor justified his assumption of the title of 'the first universal monarch'—*She Hwang-ti*—by consolidating these haphazard local defences into the Great Wall.⁶ Yet even the construction of this classic artificial *limes* did not solve the problem of the relations between the Sinic Society and its Eurasian Nomad neighbours; for the unification of the Sinic World into a universal state was answered by a counter-unification of all the Nomads in the hinterland of the Great Wall,

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 422, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, pp. 352-3, below.

² The Sinic dominant minority were also confronted by an external proletariat in the south, towards the southern watershed of the Yangtse Basin; but in this quarter they succeeded in preventing the formation of an anti-barbarian frontier; for they kept the southern barbarians on the run until, in this direction, they had extended the borders of the Sinic World up to 'natural frontiers' which were furnished by the water's edge of the South China Sea and by the eastern escarpment of the Tibetan Plateau (see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 141-2 and 147, and the present chapter, p. 206, above).

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 136, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 244-5, above.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 118-19, and III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 167, footnote 1, above.

⁵ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 89, above. ⁶ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 119, above.

from the Upper Sungari to the Upper Irtish, into a barbarian anti-state under the leadership of the Hiongnu; and, within less than a hundred years after Ts'in She Hwang-ti had done his work, his successor Han Wuti (*imperabat* 140-87 B.C.) found the policy of standing on the defensive behind a fortified line so unsatisfactory that he deliberately embarked on the hazardous enterprise of conquering and subjecting the Hiongnu as an alternative to holding them at bay. The progress and eventual success of Sinic arms in this hundred years' war (*circa* 133-36 B.C.) have been mentioned in the foregoing chapter in their bearing upon the entry of the Mahāyāna into the Sinic World.¹ In this place we need only add that even the radical solution which Han Wuti put in train, and which was carried to its completion by Han Yuanti's general Ch'ên T'ang, was not, after all, definitive, because these conquests beyond the Great Wall, extensive though they were, did not bring the northern border of the Sinic universal state up to any 'natural frontier' which could insulate the Sinic World from contact with the barbarians in this quarter. When the frontier stood at the relatively remote line of Lake Baikal and the Altai, there was still an apparently boundless barbarian hinterland on the farther side—just as there had been when the frontier had stood at the relatively close-drawn line of the Great Wall. And an ineffectually militant Sinic Society did not even succeed in permanently subjugating, not to speak of assimilating, the barbarian population of the newly annexed territories. When the Prior Han régime collapsed²—perhaps partly under the strain of this titanic war of conquest—the momentarily prostrated Nomads shook themselves free again in the second decade of the first century of the Christian Era; and it was not until the eighth decade of the same century that Pan Ch'ao (*militabat* A.D. 73-102) could begin to reconquer for the Posterior Han that dominion over the Steppes which had been established for the Prior Han by Ch'ên T'ang more than a hundred years earlier.

Moreover, this second annexation of Eurasia to the Sinic universal state was as ephemeral as the first; for Pan Ch'ao's work began to crumble and dissolve as soon as the hero himself disappeared from the scene of action.³ On the Eurasian front the power of the Posterior Han was on the wane throughout the second century of the Christian Era; and the balance of power went on shifting more and more in the barbarians' favour when the post-

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 144-5, above.

² For the temporary relapse of the Sinic World into anarchy at the turn of the last century B.C. and the first century of the Christian Era, between the fall of the Prior Han and the rise of the Posterior Han, see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 142, footnote 4, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 295, below.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 144-5, above.

Sinic interregnum set in, as it did before the century closed. To outward appearance the irretrievable collapse of the Sinic Society was staved off for another hundred years, during which the Empire of the Posterior Han first lingered on through a final phase of impotence (A.D. 172-221), then temporarily broke up into a trio of indigenous 'successor-states'¹ ('the Three Kingdoms' *gerebantur* A.D. 221-280), and was afterwards momentarily restored under the rule of the Western or United Tsin (*imperabant* A.D. 280-317).² But these successive political façades masked a social *dégringolade* which went to its greatest extremes in the relations between the dissolving Sinic Society and the inflowing Eurasian barbarians.

Even in the age when Pan Ch'ao was repeating the exploits of Wuti, the reassertion of Sinic authority on the Steppe was successfully disputed by a new Nomad Power which now loomed up above the Sinic horizon in the no-man's-land beyond the frontier between Korea and the Khingan Range. In A.D. 93 the Northern Hiongnu were conquered by the Sien Pi;³ and in A.D. 132 the name which had dominated the Eurasian hinterland of the Sinic World for the past five hundred years faded out of history when the Northern Hiongnu went into limbo in order to escape from an intolerable servitude to their fellow Nomad Sien Pi masters, while the Southern Hiongnu found shelter from the blizzard on the Steppes by drifting into the domain of the Sinic universal state⁴ and settling down on the lee side of a Great Wall which was no longer effectually manned for obstructing the passage of Nomad trespassers.⁵ These formidable movements of barbarian warbands on the Eurasian threshold of the Sinic World produced their inevitable consequences. At the turn of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era, at a moment when the political

¹ Although 'the Three Kingdoms' were of indigenous and not of barbarian origin, there was a strain of barbarism in their *éthos* which found literary expression in a romantic chronicle of their fratricidal wars that may be compared with the Alexander Romance. In the haze of this romantic tradition a military adventurer of the age, Kuang Yü, who lived and died as a man of flesh and blood, was gradually increased in stature and enhanced in potency until, in A.D. 1590, he was officially deified as the war-god of the Far Eastern World (Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920-1, Geuthner, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 299).

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65, footnote 3, above.

³ See Cordier, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 275 and 278-9.

⁴ See Cordier, op. cit., vol. i, p. 292.

⁵ This passage of the Great Wall of China by the Southern Hiongnu in the second century of the Christian Era may remind us of the passage of the Lower Danube frontier of the Roman Empire, some two hundred years later, by the Visigoths, when these former denizens of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe were fleeing before the face of a Hunnish horde of Nomads in whom some scholars have thought to recognize the descendants of those Northern Hiongnu who had made their escape out of Mongolia in a westerly direction, through the Zungarian Gap, in A.D. 132. For the circumstances of and sequel to the lodgement of the Visigoths on Roman territory in the last quarter of the fourth century of the Christian Era see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 426; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), vol. iv, p. 440, footnote 4; and the present chapter and volume, p. 217, footnote 1, and p. 220, above.

unity of the Sinic World was nominally intact once more under the Western Tsin régime, we are confronted by the apparently sudden emergence, in the Eurasian marches, of three new 'successor-states' with archaistic names;¹ but a closer inspection reveals that both the character of the names and the suddenness of their assumption were deliberate ruses in a desperate and transparent attempt to keep up Sinic appearances. These respectable titles had been assumed with intent to veil the vulgar reality of a barbarian dominion on Sinic soil, and there was actually nothing new about this distressing state of affairs except the open acknowledgement of an accomplished fact which was the cumulative result of some two hundred years of silent and gradual social change. The 'Pe Yen' ('Northern Yen') principality in the Liaotung Peninsula was the Sinic dominion of the Sien Pi; the 'Pe Han' ('Northern Han') Empire in Eastern Shansi was the Sinic dominion of the Southern Hionggnu; the 'Wei' principality in Western Shansi was the Sinic dominion of the To Pa.

The epigoni of these last-named To Pa barbarian conquerors of Sinic ground turned right-about-face and embarked upon a new war of conquest against their own 'poor relations' on the Steppe in A.D. 370;² and in A.D. 386 they celebrated this successful repetition of the Eurasian achievements of the authentic Han by assuming the imperial title in rivalry with their own 'Pe Han' barbarian contemporaries;³ but this enlistment of barbarian arms in a Sinic war of revenge upon the barbarian world was a brief interlude in the course of the post-Sinic barbarian *Völkerwanderung*;⁴ for the Eurasian conquests of the 'Wei' Empire were quickly undone⁵ when, at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries, the vanished Nomad Empire of the Hionggnu was reconstituted by the Juan Juan;⁶ and yet another wave of barbarian attack upon the ruins of the Sinic World was still to follow. In the sixth decade of the sixth century of the Christian Era the Juan Juan were overthrown and replaced by their former subjects the Turks between Altai and Khingan;⁷ and in the same decade, between

¹ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65, above.

² For the cultural *volte-face* of which this military *volte-face* was a corollary, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (a), pp. 477-8, below.

³ See Cordier, op. cit., vol. i, p. 318.

⁴ The post-Sinic interregnum lasted from about A.D. 175 to about A.D. 475, and thus partly overlapped in time with an apparent period of relative aridity (and therefore of Nomad effervescence) on the Steppes which may have prevailed from about A.D. 375 to about A.D. 675 (see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 414, above). The conquest of the Steppe by 'Wei' was carried out on the eve of the onset of this apparent bout of aridity and effervescence; and the date is perhaps sufficient in itself to explain why the conquest was ephemeral.

⁵ On the other hand the 'Wei' Empire succeeded in handing on its pacific cultural achievements to a chain of 'successor-states' which led on to the *imperium redivivum* of the Sui and the T'ang (see V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 356, footnote 6, below).

⁶ Cordier, op. cit., vol. i, p. 346.

⁷ Cordier, op. cit., vol. i, p. 351.

Khingan and Korea, the Khitan came treading on the heels of the Sien Pi.¹

The Indic External Proletariat.

If we turn from the Sinic to the Indic World, we shall find that in Indic history too the successful barbarian invaders were Eurasian Nomads, but we shall also find that the Indic body social—unlike either the Sinic or the Sumeric or the Babylonian or the Syriac—was never in direct contact with the Nomads across a military front. The Nomads who broke into the Indic World had to traverse both the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and the north-eastern corner of the Iranian Plateau on their way from the Eurasian Steppe to the Indus-Ganges Plain; and during the life-span of the Indic Civilization—which extended from the close of the post-Sumeric interregnum about the middle of the second millennium B.C. to the beginning of the post-Indic interregnum in the fifth century of the Christian Era—these intervening territories were held, or at any rate overshadowed and dominated, by the Babylonian and Syriac and Hellenic civilizations in succession, and finally by the Syriac Civilization once again, when, in the third century of the Christian Era, the Syriac culture decisively re-asserted itself over Hellenism in Iran and 'Irāq.²

Whether the Indic Society was already the victim of Eurasian Nomad assaults across this intervening alien ground during the Indic 'Time of Troubles' (*saeviebat circa 725-325 B.C.*)³ is a question that has to be left unanswered for lack of evidence.⁴ The first Eurasian Nomad invasion of the Indic World that is adequately attested (after the Aryan Völkerwanderung which was

¹ Cordier, op. cit., vol. i, p. 359.

² For the expulsion of Hellenism from the Transeuphratean tracts of the Syriac World by the Sasanidae see p. 216, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 86-7, above.

⁴ It is tempting to conjecture that some of the warlike communities that were encountered by Alexander the Great in the Indus Valley in 327-324 B.C. were the descendants of Eurasian Nomads who had been deposited there by a more recent Völkerwanderung than that of the Aryas. The most recent period of aridity and effervescence on the Steppes may have run from about 825 to about 525 B.C. (see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 410, above), and this period partly coincides in date with both the Babylonian 'Time of Troubles' (*saeviebat circa 1000-600 B.C.*) and the Syriac 'Time of Troubles' (*saeviebat circa 925-525 B.C.*). In that age South-Western Asia had been overrun by the Eurasian Nomad Cimmerians and Scyths. Did one wing of this invading horde turn south-eastward after breaking out of the Steppe between the Pamirs and the Caspian, as the Aryan conquerors of the Indus Valley had turned south-eastward in their day when their Hyksos comrades had swept on across 'Irāq and Syria into Egypt? Perhaps the Pactyes on the Indo-Iranian border (Herodotus III, 102; IV, 44; VII, 67 and 85) were part of the offspring of this *apodasmos*, whatever we are to make of problematical Pactyes in Cappadocia (Herodotus III, 93). Is this hypothetical Indo-Iranian settlement, *post* 825 B.C. and *prae* 525 B.C., of Eurasian Nomads bearing the Pactyan name, and presumably belonging to the Iranian-speaking wing of the Nomad natives of the Eurasian Steppe, commemorated in the names Pakhtūn (*plural* Pakhtāna, *Indic* Pathan) and Pakhto, by which the living Iranian-speaking population in the north-eastern corner of the Iranian Plateau and its vernacular language are known respectively at the present day?

the prelude to the rise of the Indic Civilization) is one which was consequent—in the causal as well as in the temporal sense—upon the intrusion of the Hellenic Society on the Indic Society's domain; and this intrusion did not take place until after the Indic 'Time of Troubles' had been followed by the rise and fall of the Maurya Empire which was the first attempt at an Indic universal state.

We have seen¹ how in the second century B.C. North-Western India was united politically with both North-Eastern Iran and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin under the rule of the Greek princes of Bactria; and we have also seen² how, before the century ran out, this Bactrian Greek Empire was swept away by an avalanche of Eurasian Nomads—the Sakas in the van, with the Yuechi at their heels—who broke out of the Steppe, across the former Achæmenian frontier between the Pamirs and the Caspian, about the years 130–129 B.C. In this eruption the Nomads were prevented from sweeping straight on south-westwards by the stubborn resistance of the Arsacid power in Khurāsān; and while the Yuechi were content to vegetate, for the next hundred and fifty years,³ in the *ci-devant* Bactrian Greek provinces, north-west of the Hindu Kush, which they had overrun at their first onset, the Sakas—who were caught between a Yuechi devil at their rear and

¹ In I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 143; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 133, with footnote 1, above.

² In II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141, footnote 2, and p. 144, and in the present chapter and volume, pp. 239–40, above. See also p. 310, below.

³ By the time, in or shortly before 130 B.C., when the Yuechi ousted the Far Eastern Greeks from their possessions in the Upper Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, north-west of the Hindu Kush, these Nomad intruders had been constantly 'on the run', with more powerful Nomad enemies at their heels, since at the latest 174 B.C., and, after these forty years of wandering in the wilderness, they told the Han Power's envoy Chang-K'ien (see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 143, footnote 2, above), when he overtook them at last, in 128 B.C., in Sogdiana (they had not, by then, yet troubled to cross the Oxus as well as the Jaxartes), 'that they were weary of trekking and fighting and only wanted to live in peace' (Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 276–7) and that they were therefore unwilling to entertain the proposal, which the envoy had brought with him from the Court of Ch'ang Ngan, for a concerted convergent assault by the Yuechi and the Sinic Power upon their common enemies the Hiongnu. The first of the five Yuechi war-bands to recover from this lassitude were the Kushans. By about 50 B.C. we find the Kushans not only across the Oxus, but also across the Hindu Kush, on the northern edge of the basin of the Kābul River, somewhere between the Panjshir district and Chitral (Tarn, op. cit., pp. 342 and 506); and the energy which had carried them thus far afield in less than 80 years since the date of Chang-K'ien's visit moved them to respond to the call of a later envoy of the Sinic Power, who was successful in mobilizing the Kushan chief Miao to fight for the local Greek prince Hermaeus against the Parsians of Cōphēnē (see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 133, footnote 1, above). Miao's descendant and eventual successor Kadphises I (*regnabat post A.D. 25 to A.D. 50*) united all five Yuechi war-bands under Kushan leadership and conquered the country of the Paropamisadae (see loc. cit.). The conquest of Taxila, the capital of the Western Panjab, followed circa A.D. 60–4 (Tarn, op. cit., p. 353, footnote 1) in the reign of Kadphises II (*regnabat circa A.D. 50–68*); and the second Kadphises' famous successor Kanishka (*regnabat circa A.D. 78–123*) reigned, from Jaxartes to Ganges, over an empire as extensive as the Bactrian Greek prince Demetrius's in 183–175 B.C. (see loc. cit.). By the time, however, when the Kushans were making their conquests in India, they were no longer barbarians but were authentic and self-conscious heirs of the by then almost extinct Far Eastern Greeks.

the Parthian deep sea straight ahead—evaded annihilation by swerving south-eastward and throwing themselves upon the Indian provinces of a Greek Power in the Far East which had been weakened by becoming divided against itself before being smitten by the impact of the Yuechi upon its Transoxanian frontier facing the Eurasian Steppe.¹ After winning and losing an ephemeral dominion (*circa* 110 B.C.—A.D. 19) in the Indus Valley, these Saka Nomad barbarian intruders on Indic ground succeeded in taking permanent possession of the plateaux of Mālwa (*circa* A.D. 78) and Mahārāshtra (about, or shortly before, the middle of the second century of the Christian Era).² The overthrow of the last of the Saka 'satraps' in Western India at some date between A.D. 388 and A.D. 401 was the decisive act in the restoration of the Indic universal state by the Guptas.³

The Saka Nomad incursion into Indic history during the interlude between the Maurya and the Gupta régimes was not, however, the last Indic social catastrophe of the kind; for, while we have no sure evidence of Nomad assaults upon the Indic World during the Indic 'Time of Troubles' which preceded the foundation of the Maurya Empire by Chandragupta (*imperabat* 322–298 B.C.), a succession of Nomad invasions is a prominent feature of the post-Indic interregnum which set in after the death of the Gupta Emperor Skandagupta (*imperabat* A.D. 455–*circa* A.D. 480).⁴ On this occasion the history of the preceding Nomad assault upon India repeated itself, with the Huns playing the Sakas' part.⁵

The last quarter of the fourth century of the Christian Era saw the advent of a bout of apparent aridity⁶ and manifest effervescence on the Steppes which, on the sector of the steppe-coast between the Khingan Range and the Tien Shan, was signalled by the menacing emergence of the Juan Juan horde above the northern horizon of the Sinic World.⁷ At the opposite extremity of Eurasia the same troubling of the waters of Nomadism declared itself with greater violence in a simultaneous outbreak of the Huns between

¹ For a discussion of the route, and the stages, by which the Sakas reached their Indian destination, see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, pp. 602–3, below.

² For these conquests of the epigoni of the original Saka invaders of India see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, pp. 603–4, below.

³ See Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 290–2. For the part which the Sakas may have played in the evolution of both the Sanskrit and the Iranian Epic, see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, below.

⁴ It will be noticed that the post-Indic interregnum (*circa* A.D. 475–775) partly coincided in time with an apparent bout of aridity (and therefore of effervescence) on the Steppes which may have prevailed from about A.D. 375 to A.D. 675 (see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 414, above).

⁵ This historical parallel has been noticed already in Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 449, above.

⁶ For this bout, which may have prevailed from *circa* A.D. 375 to *circa* A.D. 675, see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 414, above.

⁷ See the present chapter, p. 273, above.

the Pamirs and the Caspian and between the Caspian and the Urals.¹ Perhaps the most convincing explanation of the origin of these several Nomad offensives which were so widely dispersed in Space yet so closely synchronous in Time is to see in them the uniform effects of a single physical cause which was in operation on—and all over—the Steppe itself; but in attempting to account for the diversity of the subsequent fortunes of the several erupting hordes, after they had left their native Sieppes behind and had invaded the domains of their sedentary neighbours, we have to look for an explanation in human instead of in physical terms, and we shall find it in the diverse conditions, at the time, of the different sedentary societies with which the Nomad invaders collided.

The Juan Juan, for example, were prevented from penetrating beyond the fringes of the Sinic World by the resistance of those 'successor-states' of the United Tsin Empire that had been founded in the marches by the Juan Juan's own forerunners the Sien Pi and Hiongnu and To Pa; for these *ci-devant* Nomad principalities served as effective buffers against the next wave of Nomad invasion. On the other hand the principality which the Gothic sedentary barbarians from Northern Europe had established in the Ukraine,² between the main body of the Eurasian Steppe and the Lower Danube frontier of the Roman Empire, during the foregoing bout of apparent humidity and manifest quiescence,³ not only failed to break the shock of the impact of the Huns upon the Hellenic World but actually caused this shock to be more profoundly felt and the blow to strike deeper; for the Hun explosion blew the Gothic principality to pieces, and the flying fragments made breaches in the Roman *limes* through which the Nomad horsemen were able to ride unhindered.⁴ Under the leadership of Attila (*dominabatur circa* A.D. 433-453) the right wing of the Hunnish horde, which had taken the road between the Caspian and the Urals, was able to penetrate, in the track of the exploded Goths, into the heart of the Roman Empire before the united efforts of Goths and Romans succeeded in flinging the Nomads back into the Steppes from which they had issued. Meanwhile the White Huns or Ephthalites, who formed the left wing of the erupting Hunnish horde, had parted company with their comrades-in-arms in order to take the alternative road between the Caspian and the Pamirs; and on this road they met with

¹ For the synchronism between the eruption of the Huns and the emergence of the Juan Juan see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 423, above.

² See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 426, above.

³ For this bout see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 413, above.

⁴ See p. 220, above.

experiences which were different, again, from those of Attila's Huns in Europe as well as from those of the Juan Juan in the Far East.

The sedentary societies which the Juan Juan and the Black Huns found in their path happened, at the time, to be in an advanced stage of dissolution. At the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era the Hellenic Society was approaching, in Europe,¹ the end of its universal state, while the Far East was floundering in the trough of a post-Sinic interregnum. On the other hand, in contemporary South-Western Asia the Syriac Civilization was at this time in process of recovery from the stunning blow of a Hellenic assault. It was at last regaining the upper hand, and was preparing to complete its half-fulfilled task of evicting the intrusive Hellenic Civilization from the Syriac domain. The political instrument of this cultural rally was the Sasanian Empire;² and this young and militant Power was a much more formidable antagonist for the Huns than an old and weary Roman Empire. When they broke out of the Desert into the Sown on the Pamir-Caspian front, the White Huns overthrew the 'successor-states' of the Kushan Empire in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin as easily as, in the same region some five hundred years before, the Bactrian Greek Empire had been overthrown by the Sakas and the Yuechi; but beyond the Oxus and the Murghab, at the foot of the Khurasanian escarpment of the Iranian Plateau, the new invaders found the Sasanian Power waiting to receive their attack as the Arsacid Power had once stood on the same line to withstand the Sakas. In this second battle, on the same field, between Iran and Turan, the representative of the sedentary civilization was once again victorious; and, as before, his Nomad assailant swerved aside into India³ when he found his line of advance into South-Western Asia blocked by a resistance which he was unable to overcome.

The first Hun attack, across the Hindu Kush, upon the Gupta Empire appears to have been delivered at the moment of Skandagupta's accession in A.D. 455; and this attack was repulsed. But in the last decade (*circa* A.D. 470-480) of Skandagupta's reign, when the restored Indic universal state was verging towards its fall, the Nomad assault was renewed in greater force and with greater persistence; and, when the Gupta Empire broke up after Skandagupta's death, the Hun invaders maintained for half-a-

¹ For the differentiation, in the course of the fifth century of the Christian Era, between the simultaneous responses of an identic Roman Empire to identic challenges in its western provinces and in its central and eastern provinces respectively see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 323-6, above.

² See p. 216, above.

³ For the history of this Hun invasion of India during the post-Indic 'Time of Troubles' see Smith, V. A., *op. cit.*, pp. 309-23.

century (*circa* A.D. 480–528) a reign of terror in India¹ in which the war-lord Mihiragula (*militabat circa* A.D. 510–540) played Attila's part. Like his Black Hun cousin, this White Hun 'Scourge of God' made himself so intolerable that he drove the rival successors of the Empire on whose domain he was trespassing to make common cause against him; and the reverse which Mihiragula suffered *circa* A.D. 528 at the hands of Bālāditya and Yasodharman² was more severe than that which had been inflicted upon Attila by Aetius and Theodoric. But it was neither the defeat nor the death of the Ephthalite invader that gave a devastated Indic World security against a repetition of the calamity. The ravaging of India by the White Huns was only brought to an end when this first wave of the Nomad flood in the ebullition of A.D. 375–675 was followed by a second. Between A.D. 563 and A.D. 567 the Turks burst out of the Steppe into the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and succeeded—in alliance with the Sasanid Power, which thus revenged the disaster of A.D. 484—in annihilating the Ephthalites in their home territory, without pushing their own conquests farther in the direction of India than the Kābul Valley.³

Evidence from the New World.

In passing from the Old World to the New, we shall find ourselves handicapped again—as we have been handicapped in attempting to review the Indic 'Time of Troubles'—by a dearth of evidence.

In the history of the disintegration of the Andean Civilization, for example, we can catch no more than a glimpse or two of the relations between a dominant minority and an external proletariat before we reach the date of the establishment of the Andean universal state. We have already observed⁴ that the Incas trained themselves for the task of empire-building by serving as the wardens of the marches of the Andean World against the savages in the forests of Amazonia, and we may now observe that the Chancas—who came nearer than any of the

¹ The Ephthalites won a free hand to concentrate their marauding energies upon India when, in A.D. 484, they defeated and killed the Sasanian Pādīshāh Pīrūz, who had rashly attacked them on their own ground in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, instead of being content with his predecessors' achievement of holding the frontier of Khurāsān.

² See Smith, V. A., *op. cit.*, p. 318.

³ That is, if the Gurjara Nomads—whose descendants we find established in North-Western India in a later age (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 130, footnote 3, above)—were not a spill-over from the crest of this Turkish wave when it broke against the Hindu Kush. In the Hindu records the Gurjaras are mentioned in association with the Huns (see Smith, V. A., *op. cit.*, pp. 321–2), and the most natural inference would be that they were an allied horde which descended upon India in the same avalanche as the Huns themselves; but the association may signify no closer relationship between Huns and Gurjaras than is involved in the facts that both were Nomads and that both entered India in the course of the post-Indic interregnum (*circa* A.D. 475–775).

⁴ In II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 206–8, above.

Incas' other Andean adversaries to cutting the Incas' career of conquest short¹—are believed to have been the descendants of barbarian intruders of Amazonian origin. In the last days of the Inca Empire, on the eve of the Spanish conquest, we find that, in addition to the Amazonian front, the Andean universal state had two other anti-barbarian frontiers to defend: one at the south-eastern escarpment of the plateau (on the edge of the highlands that are now included in the south-eastern extremity of Bolivia and in the north-western extremity of Argentina) and the other on the Pacific sea-board at the line of the River Maule (in what is now Chile). Both the Araucanian barbarians beyond the Maule and the Guarani barbarians in the Chaco were as warlike as the Amazonian savages;² and on the Chaco front the Inca Power had to cope, in A.D. 1526, with a Guarani invasion³ which penetrated farther than the Guaranis' Paraguayan descendants ever succeeded in advancing in their war with Bolivia some four hundred years later.

As for the Mexic World, the Aztec Power, which was on the point of establishing a Mexic universal state at the moment when the Spanish conquerors arrived on the scene,⁴ had arisen, like the Inca Power in the Andean World, in an anti-barbarian march.⁵ While Cuzco was a frontier-fortress against the savages of the Amazonian forest, Tenochtitlan was a frontier-fortress against the barbarians of the North American desert; and the Aztec masters of Tenochtitlan were themselves the descendants of barbarian interlopers from beyond the pale.⁶

We may add that, in the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain, as in the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru, the alien usurpers found themselves compelled to assume responsibility for a conquered commonwealth's anti-barbarian fronts as the price for their seizure of the spoils of victory.⁷ While in South America the *conquistadores* had to carry on the Incas' warfare with the Amazonians

¹ See II. D (iv), vol. ii, pp. 102-3, above.

² See Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 211.

³ See Baudin, op. cit., pp. 44 and 168; Nordenskiöld, E.: 'The Guarani Invasion of the Inca Empire in the Sixteenth Century' in *The Geographical Review*, August 1917.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 105, above.

⁵ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 206-8, above.

⁶ It will be seen that the Aztecs were the Mexic counterparts of the Chancas and not of the Incas; and, if the decisive battle of Sacsahuana (see II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 103, above) had ended in a Chanca victory, the course of Andean history from A.D. 1347 onwards might have been characterized by that brutality which was conspicuous by its presence in the Aztecs and by its absence in the Incas. See further V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 357, below.

⁷ Just as the Romans had to take over the Etruscan frontier in Northern Italy and the Carthaginian frontiers in the Iberian Peninsula and North-West Africa and the Macedonian frontier in the Balkan Peninsula and the Seleucid frontiers against the Arabs and the Parthians (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 161-4, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 215-16, above).

and Guaranis and Araucanians, in North America they had to carry on the Aztecs' warfare with the even more ferocious Apaches and Comanches.¹

Evidence from the Eurasian Steppe.

Before we extend our survey from extinct to extant civilizations, we may notice several examples of the phenomena with which we are now concerned—namely, the secession of external proletariats and the delivery of barbarian counter-offensives—in the histories of certain Nomad Powers which have extended their rule over sedentary populations on the fringe of the Steppe and have thereby liberated themselves from the Nomadic Society's peculiar destiny of being a civilization without a history,² but have won this liberty at the price of exposing themselves to those perils of breakdown and disintegration that beset the path of growth.

In another context³ we have detected the plot of a drama in three acts—quiescence, prosperity, and demoralization—which has been performed on at least three distinct occasions when a Nomad horde has erupted out of the heart of the Eurasian Steppe into its Great Western Bay and has there established a political ascendancy over the sedentary primitive societies in the Northern Forest, while itself falling under the cultural ascendancy of one or more of the sedentary civilizations of the South. In a different context, again,⁴ we have observed that Nomad empires *in partibus agricolarum* carry within themselves the seeds of their own rapid decay, and that the evil day is merely postponed, without being averted, for those Nomad empires on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe whose rulers have embarked on the dangerous experiment of substituting human for horned and hooved cattle without committing the further folly of transferring their own habitation from the Desert to the Sown.⁵ In the end the Royal Scythians and the Khazars and the Golden Horde, who dominated their sedentary subjects from a base of operations on the Steppe, each travelled the same road to destruction as their respective cousins and contemporaries the vagrant Scythians, who terrorized South-Western Asia for less than a hundred years in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., the Pseudo-Avars, who terrorized Central and Eastern Europe for perhaps less than fifty years in the sixth and seventh centuries of the Christian Era, and the Il-Khans, who in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries

¹ The extraordinary conservatism of Spanish military technique on this North American anti-barbarian front has been noticed in III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 136, above.

² For this aspect of Nomadism see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 7-22, with Annex II, above.

³ In Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 428-30, above.

⁴ In Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 22-5, above.

⁵ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 25, footnote 8, above.

reigned for less than eighty years over Iran and 'Irāq. And in the decline and fall of each of the three marginal steppe-empires we can observe the phenomena that have become familiar to us in our survey of sedentary societies. In these steppe-empires, too, an external proletariat duly secedes from a Nomad dominant minority and eventually passes over from the defensive to the offensive in the resulting warfare between the two fractions of a house divided against itself.

The Golden Horde had a special name—Qāzāq¹—for the contumacious barbarian who hovered or lurked, just out of range of the Horde's long whip-lash,² on the fringes of the vast appanage of Chingis Khan's eldest son Jūjī: a steppe-empire which extended, at its widest, from the Altai Mountains to the Iron Gates and from the Sea of Aral to the Gulf of Finland, and which exercised a suzerainty over the Iranic sedentary community of Khwārizm (Khiva) on one flank and over the Orthodox Christian sedentary society in Russia on the other.³ This technical term for the external proletariat of the long since vanished Golden Horde has survived down to the present day as the national name of two separate communities which differ from one another

¹ The word is a regular substantival formation from the Turkish verb *qāzmaq* meaning 'to dig'. Its technical significance in the political vocabulary of the Khans of the Golden Horde is an almost exact equivalent of 'External Proletariat' in the sense in which that term is used in this Study. (For this sense of the term 'Qāzāq' see Czaplicka, M. A.: *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day* (Oxford 1918, Clarendon Press), p. 38.) This usage of the nickname 'Diggers' to describe the external proletariat of the Golden Horde suggests that the section of this external proletariat to which the term was first applied must have been some agricultural population—e.g. the Cossacks of the Dniepr (compare the Scythae Arotēres or 'Ploughboy Scythians', and the Scythae Geōrgoi or 'Agriculturist Scythians', who were to be found in the fifth century B.C. up the River Dniepr on the fringe of the Nomad Scythians' pastures, according to Herodotus, Book II, chaps. 17 and 18)—and that the technical sense of the term must eventually have eclipsed its etymological meaning so completely that it could come to be applied to *all* sections of the external proletariat alike—whether they happened to be sedentary communities like the Dniepr Cossacks (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 155-7, above) or Ishmaelites like the Kirghiz Qāzāqs who, so far from being diggers in the literal sense, were more capriciously vagrant than the more or less disciplined Nomads who took their orders from the Khans of the House of Jūjī.

² See Herodotus, Book IV, chaps. 1-4, for the story of how the Scythians eventually broke the *moral* of their rebellious serfs—who had fortified themselves in a Crimean fastness masked by a dyke and flanked by the mountains and the sea—by laying aside their spears and bows and taking to their horsewhips. 'So long', observed the Scythian psychologist who recommended this gesture, 'as they have seen us bearing arms against them, they have felt on an equality with us, but when they see us armed with whips instead of weapons they will remember that they are our slaves, and when they realize this they will no longer be able to face us in the field.' According to the tale, the baffled Scythians took the psychologist's advice, with the precise result which he had predicted.

³ For the extent of Jūjī's appanage see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 373, and ii. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 145 and 146-7, above. This steppe-empire was founded between A.D. 1219, when the Mongols erupted westwards through the Zungarian Gap, and A.D. 1241, when they raided, but withdrew from, Hungary. It may be said to have come to an end when Shaybāni Khān Uzbek, the leader of the last intact troop of the Golden Horde, abandoned the Steppe and plunged into Transoxania in A.D. 1500, and when the head-quarters of the Golden Horde at the Saray on the Volga were captured in A.D. 1502 by the Mongols' former tributaries the Muscovites (see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 372-4, above).

profoundly in origin and in culture but which nevertheless have in common an identic historical experience which their common name commemorates. Either of these still living peoples is derived from a wing of the long since extinct Golden Horde's external proletariat, and between them they have now occupied almost the whole of the Qipchāq Steppe which was once the Golden Horde's preserve. The Turkish-speaking 'Kirghiz Qāzāq' Nomads,¹ who range to-day from the left bank of the Irtysh to the left bank of the Lower Volga, and who have given their name to a Qāzāq Soviet Socialist Republic which was one of eleven direct constituent states members of the Soviet Union according to the Constitution of the 5th December, 1936,² are descended from Nomad outlaws who once hovered on the Baraba Steppe, on the farther side of the Irtysh, where the writ of the Khan at Saray-on-Volga did not run. The Russian-speaking Orthodox Christian Cossack husbandmen and watermen, whose cantonments were strung along the banks of the Eurasian rivers, from the Don to the Ussuri, until the Russian Communist revolution broke them up, are descended from sedentary outlaws who once lurked, under the nose of the Khan at Saray, in their water-girt 'Sich' on an island in the Dniepr.³ The convergent Qāzāq counter-offensive from both flanks, to which the Golden Horde eventually succumbed, seems to have been opened in the latter part of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era and to have triumphed before the end of the sixteenth.

If we now examine the history of the Royal Scythians and the Khazars in the light of this barbarian counter-offensive which signalized and expedited the decline and fall of the Golden Horde, we shall find counterparts, in either case, of both the Cossacks and the Kirghiz Qāzāqs. The respective Nomad outlaws who eventually broke into the Scythians' and the Khazars' preserves out of the hinterland on the Steppe were the Sarmatians and the Pechenegs;⁴ the respective sedentary outlaws who broke in out of the hinterland covered by the Northern Forest were the Bastarnae and the Varangians.⁵ And, just as, after the dissolution of the Golden Horde at the beginning of the sixteenth century of

¹ 'The Kirghiz Qāzāqs' are so named by the Russians in order to distinguish them from the Russian Cossacks on the one hand and from the Qāra Kirghiz on the other hand; but the so-called Kirghiz Qāzāqs speak of themselves as 'the Qāzāqs', *par excellence*, with no distinctive additional epithet.

² See the English text of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adopted [on the 5th December, 1936] at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow 1937, Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R.), chap. 2, arts. 13 and 28.

³ For the Cossacks see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 155-7, above.

⁴ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 426-30 and 441-3, above.

⁵ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 349, with Annex VI, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 426, above.

the Christian Era, the Cossacks met and fought the Kirghiz Qāzāqs for the possession of the derelict steppe, so the Bastarnae contended with the Sarmatians after the fall of the Royal Scythians, and the Varangians with the Pechenegs (and with the Ghuzz and the Cumans¹ who followed at the Pechenegs' heels) after the fall of the Khazars.

Of the three Nomad empires on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe that are here under consideration, the Empire of the Khazars is the most interesting—and this not only in itself but also in virtue of the reaction which it evoked from the transfrontier barbarians in the Northern Forest and on the farther side of it.

The Khazars were deposited at the mouth of the Great Western Bay, between the Lower Volga and the Lower Don, about the middle of the sixth century of the Christian Era, by the same explosion that blew the [Pseudo-]Avars into the Hungarian Alföld and the Magyars into the Black Sea Steppe between Don and Dniestr and the Turks into the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin; and at the moment of their simultaneous emergence above the horizon of the neighbouring sedentary societies the Khazars gave no sign that they had any greater capacity for civilization than these other Nomads in front of them or than the Pechenegs and Ghuzz and Cumans in their rear. In the seventh century of the Christian Era the Khazars still wore a savage mien for the Azerbaijani peasants whose fields they ravaged as mercenaries in Heraclius's expeditionary force, or for the citizens of Constantinople whose dethroned tyrant-emperor Justinian II consoled himself for his banishment to the Crimea by marrying a Khazar princess. The Khazars were, indeed, one of the scourges of an age which was a time of tribulation for the civilizations of the South. In the eighth century, however, both the nascent Orthodox Christian Society and the senescent Syriac Society began to see better days. Orthodox Christendom coped with its problems by conjuring up a ghost of the Roman Empire; and, although the East Roman Empire eventually became a disastrous incubus,² the first effect of its establishment was to give an impetus to the development of the Orthodox Christian Civilization. Simultaneously in the Syriac World the Umayyad Caliphs emulated and surpassed both the work of Leo Syrus and the work of the Achaemenidae by incorporating the whole of the Syriac Society's domain into a

¹ *Alias* Qipchāq, after whom, as the horde whom they dispossessed (or, it might be more accurate to say, subdued and incorporated), the Mongol Golden Horde named the vast expanse of steppe, between the western foot of the Altai and the eastern foot of the Carpathians, which became Jūji Khan's appanage.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 320-408, above.

single universal state extending from Andalusia in one direction to Transoxania in the other.¹ After the completion of the Arab conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin in A.D. 741 Khazaria was subjected to a concentric fire of Orthodox Christian cultural radiation from the south-west, across the Black Sea and the Caucasus,² and Syriac cultural radiation from the south-east, across the Steppe; and, under this bombardment, the Khazars underwent a social transformation which was profound as well as rapid. About the middle of the century they abandoned their primitive paganism for the Jewish Faith,³ and changed themselves from warlike Nomads who sold their military services in the South into peaceful men of business who hired Southern mercenaries to police their cities and trade-routes.

This self-metamorphosis of the Khazars in the middle of the eighth century of the Christian Era was a remarkable achievement for a Nomad horde; but it was also a hazardous adventure; for at the moment when they were abandoning their ancestral military tradition the Khazars were acquiring an empire, beyond the borders of their native Steppe, which was bound sooner or later to become a serious military commitment. The cause of the change in the Khazars' way of life had been a taste for the profits of commerce, and the motive had been a desire to reap these profits to the full. The strength of the Khazars' trading position lay in their geographical situation midway between the luxury-markets of Constantinople and Baghdad and the Southern furrriers' source of supply in the Northern Forest; and from the middle of the eighth century onwards⁴ the Khazar *coureurs des bois* pushed their way up the Dniepr and over the portage to the northern waters that descended into the Baltic—imposing on the Slav inhabitants of the woods a tribute of furs and wax, and setting up trading-posts which soon turned into embryonic city-states with a measure

¹ See pp. 240-1, above.

² For this early cultural expansion of Orthodox Christendom north-eastward, which was one of the first symptoms of the emergence of a new Orthodox Christian Civilization, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 64, above.

³ See II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 410, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 429, above. The Khazars' choice of Judaism, in preference to either Orthodox Christianity or Sunni Islam, is probably to be interpreted as a deliberate and ingenious attempt to have the best of both worlds. They wanted to civilize themselves, and recognized that the necessary means to this end was the adoption of some 'higher religion'. At the same time they wanted to preserve their own distinct social identity, and therefore refrained from adopting either of the two 'higher religions' that were officially established in the two great sedentary empires next door to the Khazar Steppe. If this reading of the Khazars' conversion to Judaism is correct, we may contrast their deliberate acquisition of a distinctive 'higher religion' in the eighth century of the Christian Era with the Eastern Teutons' accidental achievement of the same result through their conversion to Arianism in the fourth century (see pp. 227-9, above).

⁴ The date is established by finds of Arab coins in the Dniepr Basin—if we may assume that these coins were brought by the Khazar pioneers (see Kliutschewskij, W. [Kluchevski, V.]: *Geschichte Russlands*, vol. i (Berlin 1925, Obelisk-Verlag), pp. 122-3).

of political command over their respective commercial hinterlands.¹

This Khazar penetration of the Russian sector of the Northern Forest is recorded to have been eminently peaceful; and the finds of Arab coins² in the region which the Khazars thus opened up suggests that even the 'tribute' may have been of the nature of a voluntary commercial transaction rather than a toll exacted by an assertion of superior physical force. In this respect the Khazars' activities in their new dominion compare favourably with Charlemagne's contemporary work in the westernmost sector of the Forest, where the Austrasian empire-builder was setting himself to subjugate the Saxons to Frankdom, and to convert them to the Christian Faith, by sheer violence, and was thereby evoking a desperate resistance from his victims.³ In one respect, however, the Khazars' advance from the northern fringe of the Steppe to the northern slope of the watershed between the Black Sea and the Baltic resembled both Charlemagne's simultaneous advance from the Rhine to the Eider and the Etruscans' advance, in another age, from the west coast of Italy to the southern foot of the Alps.⁴ Like these other two unfortunate adventures, the Khazar enterprise was an intrusion upon a boundless barbarian world in which the rash intruder had not the staying-power or the strength to find safety by pushing on to a 'natural frontier', so that he was condemning himself to evoke a barbarian counter-movement which he lacked the power to meet and stem.⁵ The Khazars' experience was to demonstrate that the nemesis of a hasty advance 'into the blue' was much the same, whether the forward movement itself had been pacific or militant.

While the Slavs appear to have been as pacific in the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era as the Khazars were in that age and as the Slavs' own ancestors had shown themselves in A.D. 591,⁶ the Khazars' progress through the forests, from the landward fringe of the Black Sea Steppe towards the Continental coast of the Baltic, had brought their northernmost outposts within range of the warlike barbarians of Scandinavia, who at

¹ Kluchevski, *op. cit.*, German translation, vol. i, pp. 120-1 and 131. The opening-up of the Russian forests by the Khazar fur-traders in the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era may be compared with the opening-up of the North American forests by the French-Canadian fur-traders in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The geographical location of Kiev-on-Dniepr, which became the *entrepôt* of the Russian fur-trade, corresponds to that of Montreal *mutatis mutandis*—that is to say, with the geographical role of the Gulf of St. Lawrence being played by the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe.

² See the preceding page, footnote 4, above.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 344-5, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 488-90, above.

⁴ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 276, 280, and 345, above.

⁵ A number of illustrations of the historical 'law' that can be seen here in operation have been given on p. 209, footnote 3, above.

⁶ See the incident cited in II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 318, above.

this very moment were being awakened from their 'heavy winter dream'¹ by Charlemagne's provocative hammering upon their southern gate. The Arab coins that, under Khazar auspices, had made their way, salmon-wise, up the Dniepr cataracts travelled on over the portage and down the northern waters and across the Baltic until they came into Scandinavian hands in Rothrsland—the seaboard of Sweden in the neighbourhood of Stockholm.² And, while the main body of the Vikings launched their ships on the waters of the North Sea and sought their fortunes on the coasts of France and the British Isles and Iceland, there were other Scandinavian ships'-companies that set sail upon the Baltic to trace the alluring dirhems and dinars to their Khazar source.

According to the legend,³ these Rothrslanders—or Rhôs, as their name was contracted by their victims—came in as peacefully as the Khazars had come before them when they made their first lodgement on the Russian ground that has inherited their Swedish name. It is as difficult to identify the moment, in the early part of the ninth century, at which these Swedish 'warings' or 'varangians' superseded the Turkish Khazars in the effective control of a Slav Novgorod and a Slav Kiev as it is to say exactly when the Achaeans superseded the Mycenaean at Mycenae and Tiryns during the decline of the Minoan 'thalassocracy'.⁴ It is certain, however, that from the beginning—whatever the exact date may have been—the Varangian régime in the forest country differentiated itself from the preceding Khazar régime by taking to violence instead of emulating the Khazars' gentleness.

Violence had, indeed, already gained the upper hand in the heart of the Khazar dominions before the first Varangian fighting trader—or trading pirate⁵—broke out of the forest on to the Steppe in his descent of the Dniepr. The fortress of Sarkel which was built by East Roman military engineers for an already hard-pressed Khazar Khāqān about the year 835⁶ had not availed to hold at bay the other Qāzāqs on the Khazars' opposite anti-barbarian frontier; and we have seen⁷ how, some fifty years later, the Khāqān's ingenious attempt to catch the Transvolgan Pechenegs between two fires and thus annihilate them merely resulted in precipitating the Pecheneg 'break-through' which the Khazar statesman had dreaded. Although the last strongholds of the

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 343 and 345, above.

² See Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, p. 165.

³ See II. D (iii), vol. ii, p. 99, above.

⁴ See the present chapter, p. 236, footnote 3, above.

⁵ The delicate distinction is discussed in Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, p. 129.

⁶ Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, p. 125.

⁷ In Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 441-3, above.

Khazars at the mouths of the Volga and the Don did not fall into the hands of Russian raiding-parties till as late as about A.D. 966,¹ the widespread Khazar Empire which had been established in the eighth century had ceased to exist by the time when, in the last decade of the ninth century, a Pecheneg horde which had driven all its Nomad competitors off the Steppe between the right bank of the Don and the left bank of the Lower Danube collided, along a line that ran a day's journey south-east of Kiev,² with a Scandinavian principality, seated in that city, which had already established its hegemony over the kindred Scandinavian principalities in its rear as far to the north as the shores of Lake Ladoga.³

The Scandinavian war-bands⁴ which thus usurped the Khazars' heritage⁵ in the Northern Forest in the course of the ninth century of the Christian Era display, beyond mistake, the now familiar features of an external proletariat in its hour of triumph. While they were keen traders as well as fine fighters,⁶ they had lost their roots in the soil, and they left the task of cultivation, and also even the more lucrative craft of hunting and trapping, to their forest-born Slav subjects, who were sundered socially from their more sophisticated but also more ferocious Russian masters by a sharp cleavage.⁷ Moreover these barbarian invaders of the Khazar World have left an echo of their deeds and experiences in a 'heroic' poetry which sets its scene in the landscape of the Ukrainian Steppe, with the city of Kiev for its cynosure⁸—though the only places in which the oral tradition of chanting this poetry is known for certain to survive down to the present day are the Olonetz district, between Lakes Ladoga and Onega, at an extremity of the Varangian war-bands' former field of operations which is as remote as could be from Kiev, and the valley of the river Kolyma in North-Eastern Siberia, where the descendants of the most adventurous of all the post-Varangian Russian pioneers rub shoulders now on the Arctic Circle with the Palaearctic rear-guard of Primitive Mankind.⁹

¹ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 427, above.

² Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, p. 159.

³ For the establishment of the supremacy of Kiev over the other Scandinavian 'successor-states' of the Khazar Empire see Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, pp. 144-8.

⁴ For an account of these Varangian war-bands, which came to be known as *drushinas* in the Slavonic tongue of the subject population which they had captured; like cattle, from the Khazars, see Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, pp. 197-9.

⁵ The fact that these Scandinavian war-lords regarded themselves as successors of the Khazars is demonstrated by their adoption of the Khazar title *Khāqān* (see Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, p. 161).

⁶ Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, p. 163.

⁷ Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, p. 166.

⁸ Chadwick, N. K.: *Russian Heroic Poetry* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), p. 25; Chadwick, H. M. and N. K.: *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 23-5, 81, and 93-4.

⁹ See Chadwick, *Russian Heroic Poetry*, pp. 2-5; Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature*,

This Russian 'heroic' poetry is a living monument—remote though it be, to-day, in place as well as in time—of the Varangian war-bands' Völkerwanderung into the domain of the Khazar Empire in the ninth century of the Christian Era. Have other barbarian invaders of other steppe-empires been moved by the same experience to give proof of a similar creativity? The question may remind us that the only 'heroic' poetry of any consequence that is known to have existed in any Turkish language is that which can still be heard to-day on the lips of 'Kirghiz Qāzāq' minstrels¹ whose audience are descendants of the Nomad constituents of the external proletariat of the Golden Horde.²

The External Proletariat of the Main Body of Orthodox Christendom.

When we turn to the history of the Orthodox Christian Civilization, we find that the first of the barbarian offensives which the main body of Orthodox Christendom had to meet was that of the Varangians, whose flotilla of war-canoes bore down upon the Bosphorus out of the Black Sea in A.D. 860 as swiftly and unexpectedly as a swarm of wasps.³ These Russian barbarian invaders of the Orthodox Christian World cannot, however, be regarded as members of an external proletariat which had been generated by Orthodox Christendom itself; for, as we have seen, the stimulus that drove the Rothrslanders on to the war-path was proximately the Khazar penetration of the Northern Forest, and ultimately Charlemagne's aggressive war of extermination in Saxony, and was not any move that had been made by any Orthodox Christian dominant minority. The Varangian assaults on the East Roman and Bulgarian Empires in the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era were incidental effects of the Scandinavian Völkerwanderung into the domain of the adjoining

vol. ii, pp. 10 and 11. The majority of the Russian heroic poems that were recaptured and reduced to writing in the middle of the nineteenth century—when the oral tradition was on the point of becoming extinct—through the labours of modern scholars, were heard in the Olonetz district.

¹ See Vambéry, Arminius: *Das Türkenvolk in seinen Ethnologischen und Ethnographischen Beziehungen* (Leipzig 1885, Brockhaus), pp. 292-8. For the vestiges of a 'heroic' poetry, centring round the figure of Köroghlu, among the Western Turks see Chodsko: *Specimens of the Popular Poetry of Persia as found in the Adventures and Improvisation of Kurroglu, the Bandit Minstrel of Northern Persia, and in the Songs of the People inhabiting the Shores of the Caspian Sea* (London 1842, Allen, for the Oriental Translation Fund).

² See pp. 282-3, above.

³ In the element of suddenness and surprise this Russian naval attack on Constantinople in A.D. 860 is reminiscent of the Gothic naval attack on the Black Sea coasts of the Roman Empire post A.D. 250 and of the Cossack naval attack on the Black Sea coasts of the Ottoman Empire post A.D. 1637 (for the intermittent occupation of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe by bands of non-Nomadic barbarians from the Northern Forest see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 426-8, above). According to Kluchevski (op. cit., German translation, vol. i, p. 127), there is evidence for Russian raids on the Black Sea coasts of the East Roman Empire at a date which must be earlier than A.D. 842.

Khazar Empire—just as the assaults of other sea-rovers upon 'the New Empire' of Egypt in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. were incidental effects of a Central European barbarian *Völkerwanderung* into the domain of the Minoan 'thalassocracy'.¹

In Egyptiac history this backwash from the foundering of a neighbour civilization inflicted serious damage, because the Egyptiac Society itself happened, at the time, to be in a far-advanced stage of decline and exhaustion in which it no longer possessed the necessary reserves of strength for meeting with impunity an unexpected call upon its energies.² On the other hand the Orthodox Christian Civilization was still in growth throughout the period which began with the East Roman Empire's repulse of the surprise attack of Askold's war-canoes in the Bosphorus in A.D. 860, and which culminated in the expulsion of Svyatoslav's war-bands from the Balkan Peninsula in A.D. 972 by the Emperor John Tzimiskēs;³ and the struggle did not end in either the overwhelming or the crippling of the East Roman Empire and the Orthodox Christian Civilization—as the Khatti Empire and the Hittite Civilization were overwhelmed, and 'the New Empire' and the Egyptiac Civilization were crippled, by the impact of the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*. Like 'the New Empire' of Egypt, and unlike the Empire of Hatti, the East Roman Empire proved to the rampant barbarians, on the battle-field, that it was stronger in arms than they were; but the defeated Varangians, unlike the defeated Philistines and Teucrians, were then quickly captivated by the civilization of the victors. The discomfiture of Svyatoslav in A.D. 972 was followed in A.D. 988/9 by the conversion of Vladímir;⁴ and, therewith, the Scandinavian 'successor-state' of the Khazar Empire in the Northern Forest was transmuted into a state-member of Orthodox Christendom, and the trading-post of Kiev into a Russian equivalent of Constantinople. This establishment of a new branch of Orthodox Christendom on Russian soil, which was achieved in the hour of the breakdown of the parent stem, was the last, but also perhaps the gréatest, creative act of the Orthodox Christian Civilization.⁵

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93 and 100-1, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 236-7 and 269, above.

² See p. 269, with the references in footnote 4 on that page, above.

³ For Svyatoslav's overland invasion of the Bulgarian Empire in A.D. 969-72 see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 389-90, above. According to Kluchevski, op. cit., German translation, vol. i, p. 153, the complete list of Russian attacks on the East Roman Empire is as follows: Askold's in A.D. 860; Oleg's in A.D. 907, Igor's in A.D. 941 and 944; Svyatoslav's in A.D. 971; Yaroslav's in A.D. 1043. It will be noticed that all of them except the last were anterior to the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in A.D. 977.

⁴ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 352-3, above.

⁵ For the genesis of the Russian offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Civilization see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 132-4; II. D (iii), vol. ii, p. 80, footnote 2, and II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 154, above.

In forcing themselves upon the East Roman Empire in their alternating roles of pirates and traders, the Varangians were partly moved by the commercial motive of bringing to the market of Constantinople, by the water-route of the Dniepr and the Black Sea, the commodities which they collected in their annual tribute-taking tours of their subject territories in the Northern Forest.¹ But there was also perhaps a political motive which moved the war-lords without their being able to avow it to their war-bands. The most famous of the Varangian princes of Kiev, Vladimir the Great (*dominabatur* A.D. 980-1015), who was responsible, as we have seen, for the conversion of his henchmen and subjects to the Orthodox Christian religion and culture, seems to have been anxious to find an outlet for the formidable energies of the Scandinavian mercenaries who flocked into his camp on the Dniestr in embarrassing numbers; and his solution of the problem was to 'pass on' his superfluous warriors to the East Roman Empire without much caring whether they went as marauders or as mercenaries.² In the course of the eleventh century the same trick was played upon the East Roman Empire on a larger scale, and with more serious results for the victim, by two other neighbours: the rising Western Society on the north-west and the declining Syriac Society on the south-east. The French no doubt breathed a sigh of relief when the great-grandchildren of the Viking companions of Rollo, whom Charles the Simple had perforce accepted as settlers on French soil in A.D. 911,³ rode off across the Pyrenees in A.D. 1018 to fight for the Christian barbarians of the Iberian Peninsula against the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate,⁴ and across the Alps in A.D. 1016 to fight for the Catholic Lombard rebels against the authority of the Orthodox East Roman Empire in Apulia.⁵ And in the next generation the Sunnī Muslims of Iran and 'Irāq were assuredly no less pleased when their Saljūq converts and conquerors began to look for pastures new in the Anatolian dominions of the infidel East Roman Empire in A.D. 1037,⁶ and in the Syrian dominions of the schismatic Fātimid Caliphate in A.D. 1071.⁷

This same year 1071—which saw the East Roman Emperor Romanus Diogenes taken prisoner by the Saljūqs on the field of Manzikert and the East Roman metropolis in Apulia, Bari, fall

¹ See Kluchevski, *op. cit.*, German translation, vol. i, pp. 150-2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 347, above.

⁴ See the present chapter, pp. 242-4 and 259-61, above.

⁵ For the Norman mercenaries whom Melo of Bari employed in his abortive incursion into East Roman territory in A.D. 1017-18 see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 392, footnotes 1 and 2, and p. 401, above.

⁶ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 401, and the present chapter and volume p. 247, above.

⁷ See p. 247, above.

into the hands of the Normans¹—was a disastrous year in the history of the relations between the main body of Orthodox Christendom and the barbarians. These Norman and Saljūq barbarian invaders now carved out of a broken-down East Roman Empire the 'successor-states' which their Varangian forerunners had failed to carve out of an Orthodox Christian body social that was still in growth at the time when they were assailing it.² In one point, however, the Varangians and the Normans and the Saljūqs were all of a piece from the Orthodox Christian standpoint. They were all of them alien barbarians who had been 'passed on' into the Orthodox Christian World by the societies which had bred them. It was not until the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles' (*saeuiebat circa* A.D. 975–1375) had entered upon its last and worst phase, after the Frankish sack of Constantinople in A.D. 1204, that Orthodox Christendom's homegrown barbarians began to play their part in the barbarian assaults upon a tortured and prostrated Orthodox Christian body social.

At the moment of the breakdown of Orthodox Christendom in A.D. 977 there were three directions in which the Orthodox Christian culture was being radiated out among barbarians, and in which it was therefore to be expected, on analogy, that anti-barbarian fronts would crystallize as the broken-down civilization went into disintegration. One of these barbarian thresholds of the Orthodox Christian World was in the Abruzzi, where Lombard Western Christian barbarians were absorbing the cultural influence, while they were kicking against the political suzerainty, of the East Roman Viceroyalty of Apulia. Another was in Armenia, where Gregorian Monophysite Christian barbarians—a Mleh³ and a John Tzimisce⁴—had been finding careers for themselves among the 'borderers' in the East Roman military service. There was also a third barbarian threshold in Jugoslavia and Albania, where the last survivors of the Continental European barbarians—Arnauts and Serbs and Bosniaks—were in relations with the Bulgarian Empire that resembled the relations of the Armenians and the South Lombards with the East Roman Empire. On two thresholds out of these three the front did not have time to form, since the Normans and the Saljūqs, breaking in from the back of beyond, respectively overwhelmed the Lombards and the Armenians and usurped their roles. It was only on the Continental European

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 392, footnote 2, above.

² Between the Varangian prince Svyatoslav's abortive invasion of the Balkan Peninsula in A.D. 969–72 and his Norman kinsmen's successful conquest of the Byzantine dominions in Italy in and after A.D. 1040 the main body of Orthodox Christendom had inflicted on itself the disaster of the Great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977–1019 (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 390–1, above).

³ See pp. 242 and 253–4, above. ⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 400, above.

front of the Bulgarian Empire that the home-grown external proletariat of the main body of Orthodox Christendom succeeded in the end in playing its normal part.

The Serb barbarians were the *tertii gaudentes* in the life-and-death struggle between the two principal Powers of the Orthodox Christian World. They were drawn, as humble allies of the East Roman Empire, into the Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 913-27;¹ and, although, after the East Roman victory in the Great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977-1019, 'the Serbs received for their reward what the Bulgars received for their punishment',² and were temporarily incorporated into the East Roman body politic, they fared better than the Bulgars in the next chapter of the story; for they recovered their political freedom more than a hundred years earlier³ and made greater play with it during the time that was at their disposal before Serbs and Bulgars and Greeks were all compelled to lie down with one another under a *Pax Ottomanica*.⁴ In the middle of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, when the remnant of the revived Bulgarian Empire was in almost as miserable a state as the Nicene Greek principality which had reoccupied the East Roman Imperial Throne at Constantinople,⁵ the Serbian war-bands were marching down the valley of the Vardar and making themselves masters of that Macedonian hinterland of Salonica which had been the battle-field of Greeks and Bulgars for the past five hundred years. And, while the Serbs pushed on into Thessaly and beyond, as far as Thermopylae, the Albanians—now heard of for the first time in Orthodox Christian history⁶—were staking out

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 385-6, above.

² To parody the famous epigram which was originally uttered apropos of the uniform repression to which the Croat loyalists and the Magyar rebels were subjected by the Hapsburg Government after the political convulsions of 1848-9 in the Danubian Monarchy.

³ The Serbs shook off the East Roman yoke *de facto* in, or soon after, A.D. 1081; the Bulgars not until A.D. 1186. The nominal suzerainty of the East Roman Government over the Serbs did, however, last until the death of the East Roman Emperor Manuel I Comnenus in A.D. 1180; and during the last thirty years of his reign (that is, since A.D. 1149) Manuel appears to have asserted his authority over the Serbs more effectively than any of his predecessors had asserted theirs since the loosening of the Empire's hold upon the western part of the Balkan Peninsula in consequence of the Norman invasion launched in A.D. 1081 by Robert Guiscard.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 82, footnote 3, above.

⁵ For the role of these Nicene Greeks as forerunners of the 'Osmanlis see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 27, above.

⁶ It is impossible to say that this was the first time that the Albanians had intervened in the history of any civilization, since we may guess that their ancestors had played a part in Hellenic history. We do not know, however, whether it is from the Illyrians or from the Thracians that the Albanians are physically descended. On *prima facie* geographical grounds we might be inclined to trace the Albanians' ancestry back to the Illyrians, whose national home in the Hellenic Age included the Albanians' present habitat. On the other hand the linguistic evidence points rather to a Thracian pedigree for the Albanians, since the Albanian, like the Thracian, language is unquestionably a member of the Satem-group of the Indo-European Family, whereas the Illyrian language appears to have belonged to the Centum-group, to judge by the extant monuments of the Venetic and Messapic dialects of the Illyrian settlers in Italy.

corresponding claims on the East Roman heritage in Central Greece and the Peloponnese. The whole domain of Orthodox Christendom in the Balkan Peninsula might have been parcelled out, before the close of the fourteenth century, into Serb and Albanian barbarian principalities if the barbarians' progress had not been cut short abruptly by the arrival on the scene of the Ottoman founders of an Orthodox Christian universal state, who conquered Macedonia in A.D. 1371-2 and completed their work in this quarter by annexing the Peloponnese in A.D. 1460.

This tardily arrested incursion of the home-grown external proletariat of the Orthodox Christian World into the heart of Orthodox Christendom on the eve of the establishment of the Orthodox Christian universal state has its pendant, as we should expect, in a second offensive movement of the same barbarian forces at the moment when the universal state broke up. In a different context¹ we have detected the rudiments of a barbarian invasion of the Ottoman Empire, on the same Continental European front, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era, with the same barbarians playing the same parts. In A.D. 1769-79 a band of Albanian mercenaries in the Ottoman service emulated the past exploits of their fellow tribesmen, four hundred years back, by making themselves momentarily masters of the Peloponnese; and in A.D. 1804 the Serbs rose against the Ottoman régime, as they had risen against the East Roman régime *circa* A.D. 1081.

We may also remind ourselves that, in the abortive post-Ottoman interregnum which began in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the Albanian and Serb upheavals on the Continental European front of the Ottoman Empire were synchronous with other barbarian upheavals on other anti-barbarian fronts for which the 'Osmanlı empire-builders of the sixteenth century had made themselves responsible by their conquests at the expense of the Iranic and the Arabic World.² The 'Osmanlis had thereby acquired a highland frontier in Kurdistan and also two desert frontiers—one on the Syrian and 'Irāqī fringes of the Afrasian Steppe in North Arabia, and another on the Egyptian fringe in Nubia—and, when the Ottoman Empire broke down, these African and Asiatic fronts both likewise lit up. The Kurdish highlanders and the Arabian Nomads began to assert themselves before the close of the eighteenth century, at the same moment

¹ In IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 68 and 69, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 76, above.

² For the tardy and reluctant expansion of the Ottoman Empire in these two directions see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 384-90, above.

as the Albanians and the Serbs, while the Sudanese Nomads followed suit in A.D. 1883.¹

We have seen that² on all these four anti-barbarian fronts of the Ottoman Empire 'the triumph of Barbarism' was cut short by the far more potent social movement of Westernization. Yet, brief though their career was, these barbarian heroes of an abortive post-Ottoman interregnum did not succumb to their alternative fates of being killed off by modern Western lethal weapons or taking to top-hats, as the price of being given quarter, without leaving behind them some of the characteristic monuments of a barbarian creativity.

In the sphere of religion there was a marked tendency among the barbarians in the hinterland of several of these fronts to adopt the 'higher religion' of the dominant minority of the day in a form that was sufficiently schismatic to be distinctive. In the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles', for instance, the Bosniak section of the Yugoslav external proletariat of Orthodox Christendom did not follow the example of their kinsmen and neighbours the Serbs in accepting the Orthodox Christian Faith. Instead, they took to Bogomilism, a Bulgarian Slav adaptation of a Paulician Adoptionist Christianity which had lingered on among the trans-frontier barbarians beyond the Armenian front of the East Roman Empire, and which had been subsequently carried into the European provinces of the Empire by Paulician deportees.³ Again, under the Ottoman Empire which performed the function of an Orthodox Christian universal state, the 'higher religion' which won its way among the Albanians was not the orthodox Sunnī Islam that was the official religion of the Ottoman dominant minority. The Islam to which the Albanians yielded themselves was the esoterically heterodox school of the Bektāshī Order of Dervishes.⁴ Finally, during the post-Ottoman interregnum, the Najdī Arabs rose up against the Ottoman régime in Asia, and the Kordofānī Arabs against the Egypto-Ottoman régime in Africa, under the impetus of a Wāhhābī and an Idrīsī puritanism⁵ in the

¹ This counterstroke of the Baggara Arab Nomads of Kordofan against the Egyptian Viceroyalty of the Ottoman Empire was both retarded and provoked by a policy of reckless expansion into the heart of Tropical Africa which had been initiated by Mehmed 'Alī when he conquered Sannār and founded Khartum in A.D. 1821, and which had been persisted in by Mehmed 'Alī's successors in the Pashalyq of Egypt until, at the moment of the explosion in A.D. 1883, the Egyptian flag was flying at the sources of the White Nile in the short-lived province of Equatoria. This Egypto-Ottoman advance into the boundless barbarian world of Tropical Africa is comparable to the Khazar advance into the Northern Forest and to the Etruscan advance into the Po Basin. The same rashness drew down upon itself the same nemesis in this case as in those.

² In IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 76-8, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 367-9, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, pp. 624-34, above, and the present chapter and volume, p. 327, below.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 68-9, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 111, above.

⁵ The Idrīsī Sayyids who ruled at Sabyā, on the Asirī section of the Arabian Tihāmah, from the date of their successful defiance of Ottoman authority in A.D. 1910 until the

sight of which the official Sunnī orthodoxy of the contemporary Ottoman 'Westernizers' was no better than outright Infidelity.

In the sphere of literature the Continental European external proletariat of the Orthodox Christian World has transmuted into 'heroic' poetry the experience of its conflict with the Ottoman makers and masters of the Orthodox Christian universal state. The Serb ballads, which have found their principal theme in the Battle of Kosovo, are true to type in concentrating upon a tragic story as a more promising field than any record of worldly success for the exercise of the epic minstrel's art.¹ At the same time the Kosovo Cycle is peculiar, and perhaps unique, among the works of barbarian poetic genius in being inspired by the experience of a frustrated offensive at the climax of a 'Time of Troubles', instead of reflecting the exhilaration of a 'break-through' at the beginning of an interregnum. For the Battle of Kosovo (*commisum* A.D. 1389) was the disaster that shattered the Serbian barbarians' dream of entering into the heritage of a broken-down Orthodox Christian Society which had not yet passed through its universal state.²

It is true that the Serb *guslari* (minstrels) have not left unsung the later chapters in the history of their warriors' struggle against the 'Osmanlis.

'The heroic songs of the historical cycle deal further with the period of subjugation to the Turks, their oppression and individual reprisals carried out by the *hajduci* and *uskoci*, the memory of whom is preserved in the two cycles thus named, both of which contain many beautiful songs. (The *hajduci* were a kind of guerilla warriors who fought the Turks while they kept Serbia subdued; while the *uskoci* were the Jugoslavs who had fled to Dalmatia and the Croatian littoral after the fall of Herzegovina in 1482, where, as mercenaries of the [Hapsburg] Emperors, they defended the borders from the Turks, often raiding and pouncing upon them.)

absorption of their principality into the dominions of the Wahnabi empire-builder 'Abd-al-'Aziz b. Sa'ūd between the years 1926 and 1934, were puritans of the same type as the Sudanese Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad who led the barbarian counter-attack against the Egypto-Ottoman régime in the Upper Nile Basin in A.D. 1881.

¹ For this (no doubt, unconsciously practised) trick of the epic minstrel's trade see further V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, p. 610, below.

² The 'Time of Troubles' in the history of the Orthodox Christian Civilization may be said to have run from the last quarter of the tenth century of the Christian Era to the last quarter of the fourteenth; the universal state (i.e. the Ottoman Empire) from the last quarter of the fourteenth century to the last quarter of the eighteenth. The historical events of which some memory is embedded in the Serb 'heroic' poetry of the Classical School—which includes the several cycles of Kosovo, Marko Kraljević, George Branković, Vuk 'the Dragon-Despot', and the Jakšića (see Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii, pp. 310–25)—fall within the years 1371–1485 (see *ibid.*, pp. 447–8 and 454). There is, however, also a hazy recollection of the great Czar Stjepan Dušan, who reigned in Macedonia from 1331 to 1356, just before the overthrow of the Serbs by the 'Osmanlis' (*ibid.*, pp. 310 and 454). Compare the recollection, in the Teutonic Epic, of the great Ostrogothic war-lord Hermanoric (*Anglicè* Eormenric), who reigned in the Ukraine in the third quarter of the fourth century of the Christian Era, just before the overthrow of the Ostrogoths by the Huns (Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, pp. 23 and 37).

'The liberation of Montenegro and Serbia at the beginning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively has been described in the two cycles thus named The *guslari* [chanted] for the leaders of the First Rising of the Serbs, during the first two decades of the last century. Filip Višnjić, for instance, spent four years in the district of Mačva, and almost all his songs, which he recited for Vuk Karadžić a few years later, describe the fighting between the Serbs and the Turks which took place in that district while he was there, and glorify the deeds of the contemporary Serbian leaders. There are several instances which prove that many Serbian leaders of that period had their own *guslari*, and these very often composed songs in which the heroic deeds of their masters were glorified. This, perhaps, explains the fact that heroic songs which deal with the liberation of the Serbs, and those which chant the achievements of the *hajduci* and *uskoci*, are far more numerous than those dealing with the events and personalities of mediaeval Serbian history'.¹

The quality, however, of this Serbian 'heroic' poetry of a later age is in inverse ratio to its quantity; for the Hajduk and Uskok cycles 'both—and the former especially—relate true historical events with very little poetry. They differ greatly in this respect from the earlier heroic songs. These are, perhaps, the least interesting and the least beautiful'.²

Such as they are, the Hajduk and Uskok cycles of Serb 'heroic' poetry have an Albanian analogue of approximately the same date,³ and also a Greek analogue in songs which celebrate the prowess of *klephts* and *armatoli* who were the Greek contemporaries and counterparts of the Serb *hajduci* and *uskoci* in the interior of the Ottoman Empire.⁴ The Greek Armatole and Klephtic cycles

¹ Subotić, D.: *Yugoslav Popular Ballads: Their Origin and Development* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), pp. 17 and 23-4.

² Ibid., p. 17.

³ See Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii, pp. 455-6. In its style this Albanian 'heroic' poetry 'seems to resemble Greek "heroic" poetry of the same period, rather than Yugoslav'. In addition to the school of Albanian 'heroic' poetry corresponding in date and in inspiration to the Hajduk and Uskok cycles of Serb 'heroic' poetry, there seems also to be an earlier school, celebrating the exploits of the fifteenth-century Albanian hero Scanderbeg, which would correspond to the Serb Classical School in being a monument of a barbarian experience of the last phase of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles'.

⁴ Whereas the *hajduci* and *uskoci* were transfrontier barbarians of the Ottoman Empire in the literal and exact meaning of the term, the *klephts* were insurgents whose bases of operations lay within the Ottoman frontiers. It will be seen that, in terms of the history of the Roman Empire, the Serb *hajduci* who crossed the Save and broke into the Serb-inhabited districts of the Empire in A.D. 1804 correspond to the German war-bands which crossed the Rhine and broke into the Roman provinces of Upper and Lower Germany on the last day of A.D. 406, while the contemporary upheaval of the Basque and Isaurian highlanders in the interior of the Roman Empire has its analogue in the upheaval of the Rumiliot and Moreot Greek *klephts*. As for the Rumiliot *armatoli*, these were a local Greek Orthodox Christian hereditary militia which had been tolerated, and indeed encouraged, by the Ottoman Power as an instrument for keeping the *klephts* in check on the principle of setting a thief to catch a thief (κλέπτης is the Greek for thief, while ἀρματολός is a Greek version of the Italian word *armatore*, meaning an outfitter of piratical craft: see Vla'hogiánnis, G.: *Κλέπτες τοῦ Μοριά* (Athens 1935, no imprint of publisher's name), pp. 14 and 17).

of 'heroic' poetry¹ belong to the same school as the Serb Hajduk and Uskok cycles,² and like these, again, they wilted away in the

¹ These Greek cycles confront the student of history with some intricate and obscure preliminary problems of literary analysis and criticism from which the contemporary and corresponding Serb cycles would appear to be free; and those literary difficulties are in their turn due, at any rate in part, to three historical facts. The first of these facts is that the principal seed-bed of this Modern Greek 'heroic' poetry lay, not in the Morea, but in Continental Greece north of the Isthmus of Corinth (a region which, under the Ottoman régime, formed part of the Empire's European metropolitan province of Rumili). The second fact is that before, during, and after the Greek national uprising of 1821 the Rumiliot *klephts* and *armatoli* alike were successfully and permanently crushed by the 'Osmanlis (in 1783 'Ali Pasha of Yannina was appointed by the Porte to be general Derbend Aghasy of Rumili, with the mission of destroying both the *klephts* and the *armatoli* of his province; 'Ali carried out this mission efficiently till his fall in 1820; and the ruin of the martial elements in the Greek population of Rumili was consummated through the ultimate failure in Rumili of the Greek national uprising of 1821 which was ultimately successful in the Morea: see Vlachogiannis, op. cit., pp. 181-2). The third fact is that the life and poetry of the Rumiliot Greek warriors whose history ended in this 'heroic' failure won an immense prestige among their comparatively feeble and inglorious Moreot 'opposite numbers' who scored, contemporaneously, the solid worldly success of liberating their peninsula from Ottoman rule and making of it the nucleus of a 'successor-state' of the Ottoman Empire in the shape of a Greek national state on the contemporary Western pattern (see p. 299, below). If the institution of *armatoli* had ever existed in the Morea, it had been destroyed in the turmoil of the Venetian intrusion (*durabat* A.D. 1684-1715: see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 279-80, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, in the present volume, pp. 637-8, below); upon the Ottoman reconquest the duties performed by the Greek *armatoli* in Rumili were assigned in the Morea by the reinstated Ottoman authorities to an alien Albanian militia (Vlachogiannis, op. cit., pp. 13-25) which continued to perform these duties here throughout the restoration period (*durabat* A.D. 1715-1821); the only *ra'iyeh* in the Morea who were authorized to bear arms during this period were the tame apparitors (called *Kάπροι*) of the local Orthodox Christian civilian notables (the *khōja-bāshis*); and the Moreot *klephts* (see *ibid.*, pp. 34-74 and 110-35), who ventured to raise their heads only between 1770 and 1806, and who were never more than 150 strong all told (*ibid.*, pp. 88, 159, 176), were more of a plague to their own co-religionists than they were to the local representatives of the Ottoman 'Ascendancy' (*ibid.*, pp. 37, 155, 160-2, 180-1), and were eventually hunted down or forced to fly the country by a general hue and cry in which law-abiding Christian and Muslim Moreots joined with equal alacrity, and which attained its objective within a few weeks (*ibid.*, pp. 136-82). These inglorious antecedents stung those survivors of the Moreot *klephts* and *kapi* who distinguished themselves in the War of 1821-9 into attempting to ennoble themselves by claiming a fictitious 'Moreot *armatole*' ancestry; and to this end they seem to have gone to prodigious lengths in forging for themselves a 'heroic' history and literature on Rumiliot models (*ibid.*, pp. 11 and 257). These two kinds of Moreot fake are exemplified respectively in the Kolokotronaic family cycle of spurious 'heroic' ballads (see p. 299, footnote 3, below) and in the memoirs of the most illustrious member of this house, Theodore Kolokotronis, which he dictated in his old age under the title of *Διήγησις Συμβάντων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Φυλῆς, 1770-1836* (Athens 1889, Estia, 2 vols.). In this work, on p. 40 of that edition, there is a romantic sketch of the life of the (in truth sordid) Moreot *klephts* and the (in truth non-existent) Moreot *armatoli* which has been devastatingly exposed, for the fancy picture that it is, by Vlachogiannis in op. cit., pp. 42-3. The critic shows that Kolokotronis has purloined his fictitious Moreot colours and outlines from the true portrait of the Rumiliot *armatoli* whose acquaintance he first made as their fellow refugee in Zante in and after 1806. Some of the details of Kolokotronis' sketch appear to have been taken (Vlachogiannis, op. cit., pp. 42-3) from a still unpublished account by an eye-witness of the life of the Rumiliot *armatoli* in the Aspropótamo district during the years 1821-4. It will be seen that the authentic life and literature of the full-blooded Rumiliot *armatoli* and *klephts* are exceedingly difficult to reconstruct.

² The literary affinity here is indeed so close that a Western scholar is said to have discovered the existence of the Modern Greek 'heroic' poetry by inference from his knowledge of the existence of the Serb 'heroic' poetry, as an astronomer sometimes suspects the existence of a hitherto undetected star by inference from his observations of the movements of other heavenly bodies. According to an anonymous article in the *Athena* of the 8th November, 1858 (quoted in Vlachogiannis, op. cit., pp. 198-9), a German scholar from the Rhineland, who was brought to Vienna in 1814 by business relating to the international peace congress that was being held in that city in that year,

hour in which the historic deeds that were the minstrels' theme were crowned with success. How are we to explain this apparently premature drying up of the springs of a barbarian poetic inspiration? Was it the very success of the 'heroes' in real life that debarred their fictitious doubles, who were being conjured into a poetic existence in the minstrels' imagination, from entering upon a career in that 'other world' of literary life in which the Siegfrieds and the Guthheres have grown to so vastly taller a stature than was ever attained by the petty war-lords whose historic names are borne by these famous creatures of imagination?¹ No doubt the Karageorgević or the Obrenović who had laid aside his weapons and stepped out of his forest fastness in order to receive an Imperial patent from a discomfited Pādishāh and then take his seat, as a duly recognized princeling, upon a tawdry little throne, had thereby made himself as poor a subject for 'heroic' poetry as Theodoric when he stepped into Odovacer's shoes in the guise of the Emperor Anastasius's viceroy in Italy, or as Clovis when he accepted the insignia of the consulship from the same Emperor's envoys after his victory over the Visigoths at Vouillé.² On this analogy³ we may surmise that the 'heroic' poetry of the Serb and Greek external proletariat of the Ottoman Empire would in any event have had a short life after the successful establishment of a Serb 'successor-state' of the Empire in the Morava Basin and a Greek 'successor-state' in the Peloponnese. We have noticed, however,⁴ that these barbarian 'successor-states'

suggested to the Director of the Imperial Library in Vienna, Kopitar, who had published a collection of Serb folk-songs, that an inquiry might reveal the existence of a corresponding school of poetry among the Greeks. Kopitar passed on this suggestion to a member of the Greek colony in Vienna, and eventually the Greek colonies in Vienna and Paris, between them, duly collected a number of Greek folk-songs (most of which appear to have been supplied by a Viennese Greek's grandmother, who was living in her grandson's household) and placed their collection in the hands of a French scholar who had made his mark in this field by publishing a collection of French folk-songs. This was the origin of C. Fauriel's *Chants Populaires de la Grèce Moderne* (Paris 1824-5, Firmin-Didot, 2 vols.).

¹ On this point see further V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, pp. 612-13, below.

² On this point see further V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, pp. 613-14, below.

³ A worldly success which might put its winner out of the running for becoming the popular hero of a genuine 'heroic' poetry might, of course, at the same time place it within the barbarian *arriviste's* power to make good the lack of genuine poetry in his honour by procuring the fabrication of fakes. According to Vlachogiannis, op. cit., pp. 215-25, the Greek ballads of which the Kolokotronatoi, individually or collectively, are the heroes, are none of them genuine, but are the offspring of a series of literary forgeries perpetrated by, or on behalf of, the family in the course of the half-century beginning in 1821. According to the same scholar again (op. cit., *passim*), this faking of the Kolokotronaic cycle of Modern Greek 'heroic' ballads is merely the classical example of a contemporary orgy of fabrication for which the motives were the glorification of particular individuals, families, and districts. Any student of history who wishes to arrive at an independent opinion of his own on the subject of Monsieur Vlachogiannis' iconoclastic thesis will find a collection of the Kolokotronaic ballads at the end of the second volume of Theodore Kolokotronis' memoirs in the edition cited above on p. 298, footnote 1. Three are printed in Politis, N. G.: *Ἐκλογὰ ἀπὸ τὰ Τραγούδια τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Λαοῦ* (Athens 1914, Estla), Nos. 53, 60, 64.

⁴ In IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 76-8, above.

of the Ottoman Empire had hardly begun to take shape before they underwent a transformation into the totally different species of states members of the Western comity. And it seems probable that their 'Westernization' was a still more potent factor than their material success in killing the Serb and Greek 'heroic' tradition.

The revolutionary change of social environment which was brought about, within the span of a single lifetime, by the inrush of Western technique and ideas and institutions that accompanied the Greek insurrection against the 'Osmanlis is vividly depicted in the words of a *ci-devant* Peloponnesian *klepht* who had made his name and fortune as a warrior-patriot in the Greek national 'uprising' (*epanastasis*) of A.D. 1821-9. The passage occurs in the memoirs of Theodore Kolokotrónis which were dictated to an amanuensis by this illiterate leader of a barbarian war-band in his old age, when, after having fought and quarrelled and pillaged his way through the Greek War of Independence, he was living, like a shark out of water, under the sovereignty of a king who had been imported from Bavaria in order to guide the feet of the victorious *klephts* into the way of Western Civilization.¹

'In the days when I was young and might have learnt something, schools and academies didn't exist. There were only just a few schools in which they learnt to read and write. The old-time *khōja-bāshis*, who were the leading men of a place, hardly knew how to write their own names. The majority of the archpriests knew nothing but what they had picked up of the ecclesiastical routine; not one of them had had a real education. The Psalter, the Eightfold Chant, the Book of Monthly Offices and other prophetic works were the books that I read. It was not till I went to Zante² that I found the History

¹ King Otto's task was no sinecure. The exotic throne on to which he had mounted with youthful optimism in A.D. 1833 was shaken by a revolution in 1843 and was finally pulled away from under him in 1863. And the Danish dynasty which has since tried its hand in Greece has fared almost as ill as its Bavarian predecessor. In 1938 it was not yet possible to guess what was to be the ultimate sequel to the arbitrary restoration of a monarchical régime in Greece by a military *coup d'état* which had been announced on the day—the 11th October, 1935—on which these lines were being written in the first draft of the present Part of this Study.

² The Ionian Islands, of which Zante was one, had been incorporated into the Western World since their seizure from the East Roman Empire by a Norman admiral and a Genoese pirate towards the close of the twelfth century of the Christian Era. They had eventually all been acquired by Venice, and they remained in Venetian hands until Napoleon took them as part of the French share of the spoils when he partitioned the Venetian dominions with the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy in A.D. 1797. The Islands were then taken from the French by a Russian expeditionary force, which was in occupation in 1806 when Kolokotrónis sought refuge in Zante after having been hunted out of his native Morea as one among some 150 Moreot *klephts* who were suppressed, as a public nuisance, in the first quarter of 1806, by the law-abiding majority of their local compatriots and co-religionists under Ottoman leadership (Vlakhogiánnis, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-65). In 1807 the Russians retroceded the islands to the French; but all of them except Corfu were promptly wrested out of French hands by the British. Kolokotrónis enlisted in a Greek force which the British Government raised in the islands, and he remained in the British service until two years after the close of the Napoleonic Wars: that is,

of Greece in plain Greek. The books that I read often were the History of Greece, the History of Aristomenes and Gorgo, and the History of Scanderbeg. In my opinion it was the French Revolution and Napoleon that opened the eyes of the World. Before that, the nations were not heard of; the kings were treated like gods on Earth; and whatever those kings did was praised as a matter of course. On this account, by the way, it is more difficult to govern people nowadays. In my time, trade was very small; money was scarce; the dollar fetched three gurush; and anybody who had a thousand gurush was "a big noise": with that amount one could do business which one couldn't do now with a thousand of Venetian currency. There was little intercourse; it was only our Revolution that brought all the Greeks together. You could find people who didn't know the next village an hour's walk from their own. Zante seemed as far away then as the ends of the Earth seem now. What America is to us now—that is pretty well what Zante was to them. When they went to Zante, they called it "going to the Western World" (*ἔλεγον εἰς τὴν Φραγκίαν*).¹

The headlong onset of 'Westernization' that is sketched in this passage will convincingly account for the galloping consumption which overtook both the Greek and the Serb school of 'heroic' poetry in the nineteenth century in a doubly deleterious atmosphere of sophistication and commercialization. In Greece 'the ballads of 1821 were not given time to attain their final form, because the prosaic political and social life which descended upon them brought their [natural] evolution to a halt'.² In Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro the life, and with it the minstrelsy, of 'the Heroic Age' survived until the Austro-Hungarian occupation of the two former provinces in and after A.D. 1878;³ and even in the sooner westernized Kingdom of Serbia new 'heroic' poems are credibly reported to have been composed to celebrate incidents in the wars of 1912-18.⁴ Yet there is also a record of a man being approached, in Montenegro, as far back as 1876 with the 'business proposition' that 'he could have his name brought into

till about four years before the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821 gave him his opportunity to return, in the *beau rôle* of a patriot, to a native land from which he had been evicted as a malefactor fifteen years earlier.—A.J.T.

¹ Kolokotrónis, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 48-9. The foregoing first-hand account of how the *ra'iyeh* lived 'in real life' in the last days of the Ottoman Empire is oddly reminiscent of the archaistic Utopia which is sketched as an ideal in the *Tao-te King* (see the passage quoted in V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), vol. vi, p. 59, below). The Moreots' feeling in the years before 1821, to which Kolokotrónis here testifies, that Zante was an *alter orbis* must have been borne in upon the writer by an incident which he himself records at an earlier point (p. 18). In 1805, when the Moreot *klephts* had made their own country too hot to hold them, Kolokotrónis went on a personal reconnaissance to Zante and then came back home with the intention of recruiting some of his Moreot fellow malefactors for mercenary service in the neighbouring island. Though they all knew that on their native heath their days were numbered, Kolokotrónis' comrades rejected his proposal, replying to him with one accord: 'We will not go to Phrangiá; we want to die in our native land.'

² Vlachogiánnis, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

³ Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii, pp. 337 and 434

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

a poem—presumably as a hero—on payment of two plete, i.e. forty kreuzer or about eightpence'.¹ After the turn of the century 'oral tradition among the Orthodox Christians had largely been displaced by printed books of poems, owing to the enterprise of a printer in Nikšić. In the Montenegrin army there was a regular organization of minstrels under a *kapetan od guslara* or "chief of the minstrels". These men composed their poems collectively and sent them to the printer, who in his turn, apparently after some revision, supplied them with printed copies.'²

By the year 1936 the two English students of the subject who have just been quoted found on inquiry

'that nearly every one [in the Serb-speaking parts of Yugoslavia] now can read, and that printed collections of poems are purchasable everywhere, not to mention gramophone records and wireless performances. Moreover, even the most remote districts are no longer inaccessible to external influence'.³

This explanation of the decay of the Serb and Greek schools of 'heroic' poetry is borne out by the fact that the Russian school, which took no harm from the 'Byzantinization' of Kiev in and after the reign of Vladímir (*regnabat* A.D. 980–1015), has proved unable to survive the Westernization of Muscovy in and after the reign of Peter the Great (*imperabat* A.D. 1682–1725).

'The intellectual outlook of the Russian minstrels has hardly kept pace with the growing dignity of their subjects. This increasing disparity becomes most obvious when we come to the last large body of narrative heroic poetry which Great Russia has produced—that on the Napoleonic Wars. In the Tsar Alexander, as in his enemy Napoleon, the poets had subjects which might well have inspired a new school of heroic poetry. Tolstoy's *War and Peace* reflects the consciousness which was felt by all Russians, whether in the officers' quarters or in the Moscow and Petrograd drawing rooms, that they were living in an age of heroes. Yet when we read the *byliny* [heroic poems] on the capture of Smolensk, and observe the part assigned to the Cossack General Platov and to the Tsar himself, we are conscious of a paradox. The function of heroic poets is to glorify human action and exalt human beings; but in the pictures of Platov at the French court, of the Tsar Alexander cutting his beard or receiving the intimation of Napoleon's approach, the poet has unconsciously reduced his heroes far below their actual human dignity. The epic manner and formulae are still preserved, but the exaltation has vanished, the epic figures have become puny. Above all, the presentation of the facts is distorted and unworthy of the great events and changes which were taking place. The breach between the minstrels and their old patrons, which shows itself in the poverty of the treatment of exalted subjects, has become

¹ Chadwick, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 439, following M. Murko.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 434.

final—a breach which was perhaps first foreshadowed when the travels of Peter the Great in search of enlightenment¹ were described by an indulgent but uncomprehending minstrel as “amusing himself abroad”.²

When the rulers of Muscovy ‘went Western’, they were betaking themselves beyond the range of the Russian minstrel’s capacity for imaginative comprehension; and in these circumstances it was so much the worse for the Russian tradition of ‘heroic’ poetry that these changelings thenceforth monopolized the field of action that was fit to become a ‘heroic’ theme. Unable to treat of high matters that passed his understanding, the minstrel was reduced to harping upon prosaic trivialities. Deprived of the grain that was its due, the Russian epic genius quickly died of inanition on a starvation-diet of chaff.

The Hindu External Proletariat.

When we pass from the main body of Orthodox Christendom—with its alien Varangian and Norman and Saljūq barbarian incursions at the beginning of its Romano-Bulgarian ‘Time of Troubles’ and with the abortive ‘heroic age’ of its home-bred Albanian and Serb and Greek barbarians at the dissolution of its Ottoman universal state—we shall find some of the same features reappearing in the history of the relations between the external proletariat and the dominant minority of the Hindu World.

In Hindu history the earliest of the barbarian offensives that accompanied the Hindu ‘Time of Troubles’ (*saevebat circa* A.D. 1175–1575)³ was likewise delivered by invaders from the back of beyond who had been ‘passed on’ by a neighbour civilization. The Turkish war-bands whom Sebukteġin of Ghaznah and his son and successor Mahmūd led down from Zābulistān upon the Panjab at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era⁴ were the kinsmen as well as the contemporaries of the Saljūqs who trespassed out of Transcaspia into Iran in A.D. 1026 and who were ‘passed on’ into the Anatolian territories of Orthodox Christendom in A.D. 1037.⁵ But, just as, in the Orthodox

¹ For an estimate of the true significance of Peter’s Western tour in A.D. 1697–8 see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 281–3, above.—A.J.T.

² Chadwick, N. K.: *Russian Heroic Poetry* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), p. 23. Compare Chadwick, H. M. and N. K.: *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 91–2.

³ See IV. C (iii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 99, above.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 98 and 100, above.

⁵ This cleavage in the host of Nomad invaders of South-Western Asia, at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era, into a right wing which swept on into Anatolia and Syria and Egypt and a left wing which swerved away over the Hindu Kush into India has its analogue in the cleavage between the Hyksos conquerors of Egypt and the Aryan conquerors of India in the second millennium B.C. This analogy has been pointed out in another connexion in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104–7, above.

Christian 'Time of Troubles', the barbarians from the back of beyond—Varangians and Saljūqs and Normans—were followed, in their invasion, by the home-grown Serbs and Albanians, so in the Hindu 'Time of Troubles' the Turkish Nomad invaders from the Eurasian Steppe were followed by other barbarians whose native haunts were nearer at hand, on the south-eastern rim of the Iranian Plateau.¹ The great 'break-through', which carried the barbarian invaders, at one swoop, from the line of the Sutlej to the coast of Bengal, was achieved by the Ghūrīs—an Iranian mountain-people from the highlands between Ghaznah and Herāt and Qandahār² who had previously supplanted the Ghaznawīs both in Zābulistān and in the Panjab. And, although the Eurasian Nomads came to the front again in the war-bands of the 'Slave-Kings' and the Taghlāqīs who ruled over Hindustan in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,³ their successors the Lōdī Afghans, whose reign coincided in time with the last and worst phase of the Hindu 'Time of Troubles',⁴ were highland barbarians of the same breed as the Ghūrīs, from the threshold of the Hindu World beyond the North-West Frontier.

This Hindu 'Time of Troubles', in which the Turkish Nomads and the East-Iranian highlanders had thus taken turn and turn about in serving as 'the scourge of God', was brought to an end by the establishment of a Mughal Rāj which gave the Hindu Society its universal state;⁵ and in the subsequent chapters of Hindu history the home-grown East Iranian external proletariat of the Hindu World has had the field to itself; for since the reign of Akbar (*imperabat* A.D. 1556–1602), who was the true author of the *Pax Mogulica*,⁶ the Eurasian Nomads have not again appeared above the Hindu horizon. When the *Pax Mogulica* prematurely dissolved in the eighteenth century, the barbarians who rushed in—to contend for the possession of the carcase with the Marāthā protagonists of a militant Hindu reaction against an alien universal state—were the East Iranian Rohillas and Afghans; and, when Akbar's work was reperformed by other alien hands, and the Hindu universal state was re-established in the shape of a British in place of a Mughal Rāj, the defence of the North-West Frontier, over against the wild highlanders of North-Eastern Iran, proved to be by far the heaviest of all the frontier-commitments that the

¹ We may also bring into the comparison the descent of the Hittites and the Kassites upon the Land of Shinar, after the passage of the Hyksos, during the post-Sumeric interregnum; and the descent of the Medes upon Assyria, after the passage of the Cimmerians and the Scyths, during the Babylonian 'Time of Troubles'.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 99, footnote 1, above.

³ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 30 and 31, footnote 1, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 301, below.

⁴ See V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 301, below.

⁵ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 97–8, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 301, below.

⁶ See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 191, below.

British empire-builders in India had to take over from the vanquished rival candidates for the succession to the Mughal heritage.¹

By the year 1938 the gravity of this British commitment could be estimated in the light of a mature experience; for by then more than a hundred years had passed since the British masters of India had first addressed themselves to the task of finding a solution for the North-West Frontier problem; and, so far, none of the alternative possibilities had proved, on trial, to be altogether satisfactory.

The first alternative which the British empire-builders tried was to conquer and annex outright the whole of the East Iranian barbarian threshold of the Hindu World right up to the line along which the Mughal Rāj, at its apogee, had marched with its own Uzbek 'successor-states' in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and with the Safawī Empire in Western Iran. The adventurous reconnaissances which were carried out, from A.D. 1831 onwards, by Alexander Burnes,² were followed up by the still more hazardous step of dispatching a British-Indian military force to Afghanistan in 1838; but this ambitious attempt at a 'totalitarian' solution of the North-West Frontier problem had a disastrous ending. For, in the first flush of their triumphantly successful conquest of all India, south-east of the Indus Basin, between 1799 and 1818,³ the British empire-builders had over-estimated their own strength and under-estimated the vigour and effectiveness of the resistance that their aggression would provoke among the untamed barbarians whom they were proposing now to subdue.

At a time when the Panjab was still in the hands of the fully sovereign and formidably martial Power of the Sikhs, while the amīrs of Sind were bitterly hostile to British designs which they could not resist by force, Afghanistan was really beyond the effective reach of a British Rāj whose military operations in the East Iranian highlands had to be conducted from such distant bases as Calcutta and Bombay; and, if the military omnipotence of the British at this time in the Indian territories east of the Indus and south of the Sutlej thus gave no measure of British military strength

¹ Compare the heaviness of the frontier-commitment on the Continental European border of the Hellenic World which the Romans had to take over from the Etruscans and Tarentines and Macedonians (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 161-4, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 215-16, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex I, pp. 591-5, below).

² Burnes, A.: *Travels into Bokhara; being the account of a journey from India to Cabool, Tartary and Persia; also, narrative of a voyage on the Indus, from the Sea to Lahore, with presents from the King of Great Britain; performed under the orders of the Supreme Government of India, in the years 1831, 1832 and 1833* (London 1834, John Murray, 3 vols.); idem: *Cabool: A personal narrative of a journey to, and residence in, that city, in the years 1836, 1837 and 1838*, 2nd edition (London 1843, John Murray).

³ Before 1799 the British Rāj was in effect confined to Bengal. Bombay, Madras, and the Circars were mere enclaves in non-British territory, and had no communications with Bengal except by sea.

at Ghaznah or Kābul, conversely the perpetual political dissensions and civil wars in which the barbarians of Afghanistan were consuming their energies gave no measure of their ability to make common cause against an alien invader who threatened to deprive them all alike of their unanimously cherished privilege of living in a state of anarchy. Times had changed in the East Iranian highlands since the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, when the Mughal and Safawī and Uzbeg Powers had contended with one another for command of the frontier-fortresses of Qandahār and Herāt and Balkh while the highlanders remained sullenly submissive or passively aloof. In the eighteenth century, when the Mughal and Safawī Empires had broken up, while the Uzbeg Khanates were sinking into an ever deeper decay, the highlanders had been having their fling. They had usurped the throne of Shāh 'Abbās from 1722 to 1730,¹ and had raided the plains of Hindustan from 1745 to 1761;² and, although their licence had been curbed before the eighteenth century had run out, and they had ebbed back into the mountains from which they had descended, the memory of their eighteenth-century marauding adventures still inspired them, in the nineteenth century, with a self-conceit and self-confidence that made them rise in vehement revolt against a British effort to reduce them to submission in their native fastnesses. For these various reasons the British attempt to solve the Indian North-West Frontier problem by conquering the entire barbarian hinterland ended, in 1841-2, in a disaster of greater magnitude than the Italian disaster in the Abyssinian highlands in 1896.

After this first resounding failure the second chapter in the history of the British attempt to cope with the North-West Frontier opened in 1849, when the annexation to the British Rāj of Sind in 1843, and of the Sikh principality in the Panjab in consequence of the Anglo-Sikh wars of 1845-9, had carried the north-western boundary of British India forward, along the whole front, to the south-eastern foot of the escarpment of the Iranian Plateau.³ Since 1849 the British Rāj has always possessed the geographico-strategical facilities, which it so conspicuously

¹ See Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 122-33.

² By 1745 the power of the Rohilla Afghan military adventurers in the country on the left bank of the Upper Ganges, on which they have stamped the name Rohilkund, had been already established by their first leader 'Alī Muhammad Khān. The invasions of Hindustan by the Abdālī or Durrānī Afghan military adventurer Ahmad Shāh began in 1747 and culminated in his victory over the Marāthās at Panīpat in January 1761.

³ The earliest British attempt to organize and pacify the piedmont frontier of the Panjab is graphically described at first hand in Edwardes, H. B.: *A Year on the Punjab frontier in 1848-49* (London 1851, Bentley, 2 vols.). The author was serving in the name of a Panjābī Sikh Rāj which had already been taken under tutelage by the British Rāj but had not yet been formally superseded by it.

lacked in 1838, for applying the original policy of conquest to the untamed barbarians in the East Iranian highlands; but, though there have been two more Anglo-Afghan wars since then—one in 1879–81 and another in 1919—the British ambition to make a permanent conquest of the highlands has not ever, in fact, been more than tentatively revived, and the variations in British frontier policy since 1849 have been tactical rather than strategic, since they have all alike been subject to the unvarying fundamental postulate that—whatever the line along which the frontier was to run, and whatever the military and political expedients by which it was to be maintained—there was now to be no question of eliminating by force of arms the untamed barbarian war-bands beyond the pale.

Within the limits allowed by this postulate there have, of course, been considerable variations in method—some local and some temporary.¹ In the south-western section of the frontier the effective military and political front has been established on the summit of the plateau, on the farther side of the wall of mountains by which the plateau is surrounded. In the north-eastern section the front has been kept below the foot of the mountains, part way between the water-shed of the Indus Basin and the channel of the river Indus itself; and on this sector there have been alternations between a tendency to move the limit of effective occupation forward, towards the juridical frontier between India and Afghanistan,² and a tendency to leave unadministered as broad a zone as possible of the barbarian territory that is juridically subject to the Government of India's sovereign authority. In the counsels of the British Indian military and political authorities the 'forward' and the 'close border' frontier policies have alternately prevailed, and then each time each in turn lost credit, as the particular drawbacks and inconveniences of each have once again been exposed under the test of a practical trial. And this history of British Indian frontier policy bears out a social 'law'—which we have mentioned, by anticipation, at the beginning of this chapter, and which we shall seek to demonstrate in a later part³—to the effect that, on a stationary frontier between Civilization and Barbarism, Time does not tell in Civilization's favour. The cogeny of this 'law' was being brought home by

¹ See de Watteville, H.: *Waziristan, 1919-1920* (London 1925, Constable), pp. 6-14 and 28-45.

² This juridical frontier—the so-called 'Durand Line'—was laid down in 1893, by agreement between the British Indian and Afghan Governments, from a point abutting on the Persian frontier in Seistan to a point at the head of the Kurram Valley. Towards its north-eastern extremity this line traversed barbarian territory which, except at a few points, had not yet, by the year 1938, been brought under the effective authority of either of the two contracting parties (see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, vol. 1 (London 1927, Milford), p. 549).

³ In Part VIII, below.

current events at the time of writing of the first draft of this chapter in the autumn of the year 1935, when the Government of India was finding itself once again constrained to undertake elaborate military operations against one of the barbarian war-bands¹ in the non-administered zone of the North-West Frontier Province.

The External Proletariat of the Main Body of the Far Eastern Society.

When we pass from the Hindu World to the main body of the Far Eastern Society, the spectacle that meets our eyes there is the same *mutatis mutandis*. The Far Eastern 'Time of Troubles' (*saeviebat circa* A.D. 875-1275), which set in with the decline and fall of the T'ang Dynasty, was punctuated by a series of barbarian encroachments upon the Far Eastern Civilization's domain in which the Eurasian Nomads opened the first breach and were afterwards followed up by home-grown highlander barbarians from the threshold of the invaded society's territory.² The Khitan Nomads, who *circa* A.D. 550³ had appeared on the horizon of a nascent Far Eastern World at the extremity of the Eurasian Steppe between Korea and the Khingan Mountains, gained a footing south of the easternmost section of the Great Wall *circa* A.D. 927-37.⁴ Some two hundred years later these Nomadic Khitan were supplanted, and their encroachments at the Far Eastern Society's expense were extended, by the Kin barbarians⁵ from the forest-clad highlands between the Manchurian Steppe and Korea (as, in the Hindu World, the Ghūrīs supplanted and out-ranged the Ghaznawī Turks,⁶ and, in the Syriac World, the Muwahhid highlanders from the Atlas followed at the heels of the Murābit Nomads from the Sahara⁷). In the thirteenth century of the Christian Era the Kin, in their turn, were supplanted by the Khitan's fellow Nomads the Mongols, who completed the barbarian conquest of the main body of the Far Eastern World and thereby provided it with a universal state (as the Mughals performed a corresponding service for the Hindu World and the

¹ The Upper Mohmands.

² A brilliant and penetrating study of the continental anti-barbarian frontiers of the main body of the Far Eastern World will be found in Lattimore, O.: *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan). The author has made his observations at first hand; and, both on this account and because of his powers of analysis and generalization, his work throws a flood of light not only on the particular field with which he is concerned but also on the whole subject of anti-barbarian frontiers. The technical term 'reservoir', which Mr. Lattimore has coined for his own use in his book, refers to the same geographico-social phenomenon as the term 'threshold' or *limen*, in the sense in which that is used in this Study (see the present chapter, pp. 208-10, above).

³ See the present chapter, p. 274, above.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 86, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 307, below.

⁵ See the references in the preceding footnote.

⁶ See p. 304, above.

⁷ See p. 247, above.

'Osmanlis for the main body of Orthodox Christendom). Thereafter, when the Mongols had been driven out again to their own side of the Great Wall by the Chinese militant nationalist reaction that was led by the Ming,¹ the Nomadic Mongols' work of establishing a Far Eastern universal state was eventually reperformed by the Kin's fellow highlanders the Manchus.²

Upon all these barbarian invaders of the Far Eastern World, whether Nomads or highlanders, the influence of the culture of the conquered society has worked so swiftly and penetrated so deep that they have had little need, or opportunity, to exercise any creative faculties of their own. The Manchus, in particular, have shown themselves whole-hearted converts to a Far Eastern Civilization which they had been imbibing from the long-established Chinese settlers in South Manchuria before ever they committed their own trespass across the Liaotung Pale and on beyond, through Shanhaikwan. Of all the four successive hosts of intruders—Khitan and Kin, Mongols and Manchus—the Mongols alone have offered a conscious and obstinate resistance to the process of Sinification. The Mongols' native Nomadism, which was the first barrier that divided them from the peasants and litterati of the Far Eastern World, was reinforced, before their intrusion upon Far Eastern ground, by the tincture of Syriac culture which the Nestorian missionaries on the Eurasian Steppe had imparted to the Karāyits and the Naimans.³ And the Mongols thus brought with them into China a distinctive culture of their own. Thereafter their determination to retain their separate social identity was displayed in their attitude towards the Mahāyāna, with which their conquest of China brought them into contact. In spite of the attraction which this 'higher religion' exercised upon these primitive pagans, the Mongols did not embrace the Catholic Mahāyāna which had become the universal church of the Far Eastern World.⁴ They turned, in preference, to the Tantric form of Mahayanian Buddhism which had been begotten in Bengal and had found a second home in Tibet.⁵ Qubilai Khan (*imperabat* A.D. 1259-94) himself showed favour to, and interest in, the Tibetan Lamas; and three hundred years after his time, and two

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 121-2; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 87; Part V. A, in the present volume, p. 3; and V. C (i) (c) 1, p. 54, above; and V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 351; V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 193; and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 305, below.

² For the origin of the Manchus see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 122, footnote 2, above.

³ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 237-8; Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 451; and V. C (i) (c) 1, in the present volume, p. 54, above, and V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 348, below.

⁴ For the conquest of the Far East by the Catholic Mahāyāna during the post-Sinic interregnum see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 139-46, above.

⁵ For this Tantric or Lamaistic form of the Mahāyāna see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35; I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2; II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 137, above.

hundred years after the expulsion of his successors from China to the Nomads' own side of the Great Wall, the Mongols at length adopted this Tantric Buddhism *en masse* in A.D. 1576-7.¹ The adoption of a distinctive religion is, as we have observed,² one of two characteristic manifestations of originality in the souls of barbarians who feel moved to retain and express their own barbarian *êthos* instead of succumbing to the faded charms of the moribund civilization at whose expense they are running amok. The second characteristic form of barbarian self-expression is the creation of a 'heroic' poetry;³ and inquiry reveals that the recalcitrant Mongol barbarian 'borderers' on the Eurasian frontier of the main body of the Far Eastern World have expressed themselves in this way as well. Among the Mongol Nomads whose ranges lay within the boundaries of Manchuria, there could be heard sung, in 1935,⁴ ballads celebrating the exploits of Mongol bandits in the *ci-devant* Imperial Pastures of the Manchu Crown which had been turned, in 1902, into an ordinary administrative district (*hsien*) of the Chinese Republic, where the Mongols' Nomadism would be challenged thenceforth by the advance of the Chinese peasant-colonist's plough.

The Iranic External Proletariat.

In the history of the Iranic World the breakdown of the Iranic Civilization—which we have equated with the schism in the Iranic body social in the generation of Shāh Ismā'il⁵—was accompanied by the Uzbek barbarian Nomads' occupation of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin.⁶ This Nomad encroachment, which corresponds to the Khitan's intrusion upon the Far Eastern World after the fall of the T'ang, was never carried farther; for, at the Khurasanian escarpment of the Iranian Plateau, the Uzbeks were brought to a halt by the Safawis, as the White Huns had been arrested at the same line by the Sasanids and the Sakas by the Arsacids.⁷ Yet, for nearly four hundred years after the Uzbek occupation of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, the Persians had to put up with the perpetual raids of the Uzbeks' Türkmen protégés in Transcaspia;⁸ and in

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 497, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 137, above.

² On pp. 227-33, above.

³ See pp. 233-4, above.

⁴ See Lattimore, O.: *The Mongols of Manchuria* (London 1935, Allen & Unwin), pp. 223-4.

⁵ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, above.

⁶ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, pp. 371-81; and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 498-9, above.

⁷ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141, footnote 2; Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 449; and the present chapter and volume, pp. 239-40, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, pp. 601-2, below. It may be noticed that the Uzbeks, when they were prevented from advancing into South-Western Asia, contented themselves with their conquests in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin like their sixth-century Turkish predecessors, and did not seek an alternative field for further expansion in India, like the White Huns and the Sakas.

⁸ For the eventual subjugation of these Türkmen by the Russians in A.D. 1873-86 see the present chapter, p. 323, footnote 3, below.

the first quarter of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, when the Iranic 'Time of Troubles' was overtaken by its next paroxysm, the Afghan highlander barbarians from North-Eastern Iran also momentarily overran the derelict territories of a decrepit Safawī Empire (as we have noticed incidentally in our foregoing survey of the external proletariat of the Hindu World).¹

The Russian External Proletariat.

In the offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia the 'Time of Troubles'² set in, after an exotic bloom that had lasted for less than a hundred years from the date of Vladímir's conversion, upon the decay of the authority of the principality of Kiev towards the end of the eleventh century of the Christian Era.³ And, in Russian history too, this first stage in the disintegration of a civilization was signalized by the scourge of Nomad barbarian assaults. The Russians, however, were more successful than the Hindus or the Chinese or their own co-religionists in the East Roman Empire in coping with their Nomad adversaries. The Ghuzz and the Cumans, who broke in rapid succession out of the heart of the Eurasian Steppe into the Great Western Bay in the sixth decade of the eleventh century,⁴ when Byzantine Kiev was verging towards her decline, were held at the borderline between Steppe and Forest, and were prevented from trespassing on Russian ground, as effectively as, some hundred and sixty years earlier, the Pechenegs had been checked at the same line by a Varangian Kiev⁵ which, in the ninth century, had been in the first vigour of a barbarian adolescence.⁶ And though, less than two hundred years after the Cumans had been brought to a halt, the Russian forest

¹ See the present chapter, p. 306, above.

² The chapter of Russian history which is officially known as the 'Time of Troubles' is, of course, not this, but an interlude at the beginning of the seventeenth century when there was a momentary collapse of a Muscovite Empire which was the Russian universal state (see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 53, footnote 2; II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 157 and 176; and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 90 and 91-2, above; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 195, footnote 2, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 311, below).

³ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 96, footnote 1, above.

⁴ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 416, above.

⁵ The Varangian principality of Kiev had held, for the benefit of all the other Varangian 'successor-states' of the Khazar Empire, the front along which the Varangian Viking heirs of the forest-clad dependencies of the Khazar Empire in the north-west had come to march with the rival Pecheneg Nomad heirs of the Khazar Empire's home territory in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe (see p. 288, above). No doubt it was in virtue of their service as wardens of the marches of the Scandinavian World that the Varangian princes of Kiev acquired a hegemony over all the other Scandinavian 'successor-states' of the Khazar Empire, from the banks of the Middle Dniepr to the shores of Lake Ladoga (see p. 288, footnote 3, above, together with II. D (v), *passim*, in vol. ii).

⁶ Even, however, in this time of her youth and strength Kiev had found her powers taxed to the utmost by the task of barely keeping the Nomads at bay, and this historical fact is faithfully reflected in the mirror of the Russian 'heroic' poetry (see pp. 288-9, above). 'The warfare of the Kiev Cycle is almost wholly defensive' (Chadwick, H. M. and N. K.: *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1936, University Press), p. 95).

bowed to the earth under the unprecedentedly furious impact of the Mongol tornado—a blast which had been gathering momentum all the way as it swept across Eurasia from the Kerulen to the Dniepr—these Russian tree-trunks even then bent without breaking.

During the two and a half centuries that elapsed between Bātū Khan's sack of Kiev in A.D. 1240 and the Muscovites' capture of Saray-on-Volga in A.D. 1502, the states of Russian Orthodox Christendom—including distant Novgorod on the Baltic slope, as well as the Russian communities in the basins of the Dniepr and the Volga—were all of them for most of the time under the Tatar yoke, except in so far as they succumbed, instead, to the alternative barbarian domination of the forest-dwelling Lithuanians.¹ Successive Russian attempts to throw off the Tatar suzerainty were severely punished. Even as late as A.D. 1382, when the principality of Muscovy had already succeeded in uniting a large part of the Russian World under its own lordship, a Muscovite repudiation of allegiance to the Khan of the Golden Horde was conclusively proved to be premature by Toqatmysh's retaliatory sack of Moscow.² And it was only the union of Muscovy with Novgorod in A.D. 1478—exactly a hundred years after the first Muscovite act of defiance—that created at last a Russian Power which was of a calibre to defy with impunity a Tatar Power which was now *in articulo mortis*. These facts show how long and how heavily the Russians were weighed down by the Tatar incubus; yet they never allowed it to crush them. Their servitude did not go beyond the payment of tribute to Tatar overlords who continued to dwell on their native steppes; and there was no installation of a Tatar ruling caste in the Russian cities, after the fashion of the Manchu 'bannermen' in China or the Turkish war-bands of the 'Slave-Kings' and their successors in Hindustan.

This successful Russian passive resistance to Nomad aggression during the Russian 'Time of Troubles'³ prepared the ground for Russian Orthodox Christendom to pass over to the offensive in the age of the universal state that was brought into existence by

¹ For the south-eastward expansion of these pagan Lithuanian barbarians, at the White Russians' and the Red Russians' expense, until in A.D. 1363 they reached the shores of the Black Sea between the mouths of the Dniepr and the Dniestr, see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 172, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 424 and 428, above. The Red Russians are, of course, identical with the Ruthenians, and these with the Ukrainians. For the relative prosperity of the Red Russian principality of Galicia, by comparison with other parts of Russia, during the first century of the Mongol domination which was the sequel to Batu's raid, see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 310, footnote 2, below. In the course of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era Galicia was annexed to the Western World through being united politically with the Kingdom of Poland and ecclesiastically with the Western Christian Church.

² See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 374, footnote 1, and II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 147, above.

³ In the sense in which the term is used in this Study (see p. 311, footnote 2, above).

the union of Novgorod with Muscovy. And this Russian counter-offensive against the Eurasian Nomadism has been a unique operation in the annals of the warfare between the Eurasian Nomads and the sedentary societies round about; for the Russians have gained a victory over the Nomads which, to all appearance, is complete and definitive.

In this last chapter of the history of Russian Orthodox Christendom's anti-Nomad front the master-stroke of the Empire of All the Russias has been to enlist in its service, as disciplined hunting-dogs, the Cossacks who had made their first entry into the Eurasian amphitheatre as wild wolves snapping at the flanks of the Golden Horde.¹ This remarkable metamorphosis of the Cossacks from barbarians into barbarian-fighters was not accomplished without a struggle;² and the parent Cossack war-band in the 'Sich' in the Dniepr eventually proved intractable. These Dniepr Cossacks could never forget their original freedom from any master; and, even when, in the sixteenth century, they had found it necessary to compromise their liberty by entering into political relations with one of the neighbouring sedentary Powers, their first choice for their suzerain had been Poland-Lithuania. They had only subsequently come under the suzerainty of Muscovy—and this by a voluntary transfer of allegiance which was transacted, in A.D. 1654, through the negotiation of a formal treaty between the Cossack Hetman and the Muscovite Tsar. With this history behind them it is not surprising that the Dniepr Cossacks were unable to accommodate themselves to the requirements of a Muscovite autocracy which, from Peter the Great's time onwards, was inspired by the modern Western as well as by the medieval Byzantine tradition of absolutism. After the last great Cossack revolt against Muscovite authority in A.D. 1773 the Dniepr 'Sich' was dissolved, and the Cossack 'Die-Hards' fled to the Ottoman dominions, where new homes in the neighbourhood of the Danube Delta were granted to them by the Pādishāh. The majority of the Dniepr Cossacks, however, submitted, in this extremity, to the Tsar, and suffered themselves to be deported from their island fastness in the Dniepr, where they had been ensconced for some four hundred years, to more fertile fields along the right bank of the Kuban, where they were now set to guard the western half of the Russian Empire's anti-barbarian front over against the highlanders of the Caucasus, between the coast of the Sea of Azov and the right flank of the Cossacks of the Terek. In the meantime the Russian Imperial Government had met with less recalcitrance from the daughter

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 155-6, and the present chapter, pp. 283-4, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 104, above, and V. C (i) (a), vol. vi, pp. 227-8, below.

Cossack war-bands on the Terek¹ and the Don and the Yaik; and, when once these had been gradually and peacefully incorporated into the Imperial administrative system, it was an easier step still for the Imperial Government to garrison hitherto unguarded river-lines with new Cossack settlements whose fighting-men were ready to eat out of the hand of an Imperial master to whom their *stanitzas* owed their very existence.²

Under the Imperial Russian Government's authority and direction the two new 'hosts' of Orenburg Cossacks and Siberian Cossacks were planted, in the course of the eighteenth century, beyond the left wing of the Yaik Cossacks, across the wide gap in the Russian frontier-defences on the northern threshold of the Eurasian Steppe between the Ural Mountains and the Altai. Thereafter, in 1867, the Siberian dominions of the Empire, north of the Steppe, were linked up with the new dominions, south of the Steppe, in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, which the Imperial Government was then in process of conquering,³ by the establishment of a Semiriev Cossack 'host' between the left flank of the Siberian Cossacks, on the right bank of the Upper Irtysh, and the newly acquired province of Farghānā in the valley of the Upper Jaxartes.⁴ This settlement of the Semiriev Cossacks was proof positive of the Eurasian Nomads' utter discomfiture, for the new Cossack line cut the Eurasian Steppe in two by closing the Zungarian Gap between the Altai and the Tien Shan.

Nevertheless the occupation of this vital line across 'the Seven Rivers' by the Semiriev Cossack 'host' in A.D. 1867⁵ is not to be

¹ The Cossack community on the Terek seems to have been founded in A.D. 1579 and to have formally acknowledged the sovereignty of the Muscovite Empire in A.D. 1712 (Allen, W. E. D.: *A History of the Georgian People* (London 1932, Kegan Paul), p. 164; idem, in *The Baltic and Caucasian States* (London 1923, Hodder & Stoughton), p. 194).

² A map of Eurasia, showing the area covered by the Steppe and the territories occupied by Cossack 'hosts', within the framework of the Russian Empire, on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, will be found in *The Round Table*, issue of June 1918, facing page 562. It will be seen from this map that, in addition to the several Cossack 'hosts' that were established in order to hold the anti-barbarian frontiers of the Russian Empire against the Eurasian Nomads and the Caucasian highlanders, three further 'hosts'—the Transbaikalian, Amur, and Ussuri Cossacks—were established in the Far East in order to confirm the Russian hold upon the new territories which the Tsardom had acquired from the Manchu Empire in the sixth decade of the nineteenth century.

³ The Uzbek Khanates in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin were all conquered by the Russian Empire between A.D. 1863 and A.D. 1873.

⁴ This first essay in forging a direct link between the West Siberian and the Transoxanian territories of the Russian Empire was followed up sixty-three years later, in A.D. 1930, by the opening of the 'Turk-Sib' railway along a route which was approximately coincident with the line of the Semiriev Cossack cantonnements. The Bolshevik régime had swept the Cossacks away, yet it continued to pursue, by other means, the policy of expansion and consolidation in Eurasia for which the Cossacks, in their day, had shown themselves effective instruments in the hands of the Tsardom (for the progress of this expansion under the Soviet régime see Hubbard, G. E., in Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London 1935, Milford), pp. 685-9).

⁵ The foundation of the Semiriev Cossack 'host' in that year was the latest instance of the effective establishment of a new Cossack community; but an abortive attempt to carry out the traditional policy on a new front was made, on the eve of the fall of the

compared, for audacity, with the occupation of the line of the Yaik in the sixteenth century by the Cossack 'host' which took its name from that single stream; for the Semirich Cossacks were established, with the whole strength of the Russian Empire behind them, at a date when the effective resistance of the Nomads had long since been broken, whereas the Yaik Cossacks performed their feat of cutting off the Great Western Bay from the heart of the Eurasian Steppe on their own unsupported initiative—and this in an age when a fresh Nomad eruption was still to come. In A.D. 1616 the newly formed Cossack line along the Yaik was broken through by the impact of the Torgut Calmucks;¹ but it was broken without being swept away; and, when the Don Cossack line brought the tide of Calmuck invasion to a standstill, the Yaik Cossack line closed in again at the Nomad invaders' rear and cut them off from their kin and kind. This successful absorption of the Calmuck shock by the elasticity of the Cossack buffer in the first quarter of the seventeenth century was the beginning of the end of the long struggle between the Russian Orthodox Christendom and its Nomad adversaries; and the eventual Russian counterstroke—which was delivered when the epigoni of the Calmuck intruders ebbed back into the heart of the Steppe in A.D. 1771²—was already a foregone conclusion in 'the sixteen-twenties'.

This apparently conclusive settlement of the problem of the Russian Orthodox Christendom's Eurasian Nomad frontier between A.D. 1616 and A.D. 1771 was facilitated by the *floruit*, in that age, of a restored Far Eastern universal state under the rule of Manchu empire-builders who, like the Cossacks, were sedentary barbarians from the borderland of the Steppe; for the Manchus, likewise, were as masterful towards the Eurasian Nomadism as they were familiar with it;³ and, when, in the latter part of the

Tsardom, during the General War of 1914-18. During this war 'the Russian military authorities on the Armenian front began to create a new Cossack line in the occupied Ottoman territory. Russian colonists were placed on the lands of the Armenians whom the Turkish atrocities had removed, and the infamous project was only put an end to by the Revolution' (*The Round Table*, issue of June 1918, p. 542).

¹ See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 418 and 428, above.

² See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 19, footnote 3, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), vol. iv, pp. 497-8, above.

³ For the non-Nomadic origin of the Manchus and for their attitude to the Eurasian Nomadism and to the Far Eastern Civilization respectively see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 122, footnote 2, and Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 16 and 19, with Annex II, p. 423, footnote 1, above. In the Manchu Imperial Government's policy towards the Nomads it is perhaps possible to detect a certain duality. While the Manchu Government showed the same determination and persistence as the contemporary Russian Government in imposing its authority upon recalcitrant and aggressive Nomads like the Zungar Calmucks, it adopted a patronizingly conciliatory policy towards quiescent Nomads, such as the Mongols were at this date, and especially towards the Imperial Manchus' own Nomad Manchu poor relations on the Transkingan enclave of the Eurasian Steppe. The Imperial Manchus, who were reducing the Zungars to subjection with China's resources and for China's benefit, were at the same time seeking to enlist the Nomad Manchus and the Mongols as reinforcements for the barbarian garrison with which the Imperial

seventeenth century of the Christian Era, the Manchu and Muscovite Empires came into contact with one another in Transbaikalia, the Eurasian Steppe was encircled—for the first time in history, so far as is known—by an unbroken ring of anti-Nomad Powers. Thereafter the Russian blow at the Torgut Calmucks which was delivered in A.D. 1771 was anticipated by the greater feat of the Manchu Emperor Ch'ien Lung (*imperabat* A.D. 1735–96) in breaking the power of the Torguts' more formidable kinsmen the Zungars.¹

Through the simultaneous coercive action of the Manchu and Muscovite Powers—a converging movement which was not the less effective for not having been concerted—it looked as though a greater and more momentous historical result had been achieved than the mere victory of this or that sedentary society over the Eurasian Nomads of a particular time and place. It looked as though, in the Eurasian arena, the Nomadic Civilization itself had at last been defeated decisively in its vaster struggle with a long array of civilizations of the sedentary class. And, though the blows delivered in 1755 and in 1771 broke the Nomads' military and political power without thereby putting a stop to the Nomadic way of life, it seemed merely a question of time for the Nomad herdsman himself to vanish from the face of the Earth before the relentless and irresistible advance of the cultivator and the industrialist.² The Great Society of a Westernized World seemed to have licence to commit the most outrageous crimes and follies against itself without jeopardizing its apparently automatic progress at the Eurasian Nomadism's expense. The Chinese Revolution of A.D. 1911 might throw a China that was in process of Westernization into interminable social disorders, and yet the colonization of the Nomads' ancestral ranges in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria by Chinese peasant settlers might be actually stimulated by the pressure of brigandage, war, pestilence, and famine which the Revolution had brought to bear upon the settlers' ancestral homes in Honan or Shantung. The Russians might be driven to the

Manchus were also holding China down. For the provenance and organization of the Manchu Power's garrisons in China see Lattimore, O.: *The Mongols of Manchuria* (London 1935, Allen & Unwin), pp. 146–8. The unit was the 'banner', which always included a Manchu battalion, and usually a Chinese and a Mongol sister battalion as well. These composite 'banners' were stationed, in groups of varying strength, in the principal cities of Manchuria-within-the-Pale and Intramural China. 'Mongol "banners", forming battalions of the Manchu "banner" regiments, had no tribal function; they consisted of Mongols recruited from the tribes and thereby detached from their native tribal organizations to form hereditary professional troops.' At the same time (see Lattimore, *op. cit.*, pp. 145–6 and 148–51), as the Manchus progressively imposed their rule upon Mongolia as well as upon China, they put the existing Mongol tribal units on a regular permanent footing by organizing them as 'banners' in a second meaning of the term which is not to be confused with its usage to denote a cadre of the Manchu standing army.

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 497–8, above.

² For the Nomad's apparent doom see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 16–22, above.

slaughter by the million in the European War of 1914-18 and might finally fall out of this frying-pan into the fire of revolution, and yet Russian hands could find time between August 1914 and October 1917 to cause the death of thousands of Qāra Kirghiz¹ Nomads who had been stampeded into a panic by rumours that they were to be wrenched out of the only way of life that they could conceive, in order to be conscripted for non-combatant service behind the Russian military front.² Thus it seemed until the other day as though the Nomads could only be implicated in the sedentary civilization's self-inflicted fate and could not look for a reprieve from it.

This continued to be the outlook until the autumn of 1931; but by 1938 the Japanese military outbreak on the Asiatic Continent, and the policy of aggressive expansion which the powers behind the throne at Tokyo had been pursuing for seven years by then, had put a different complexion upon the Nomads' prospects; for the Nomads' two latter-day oppressors, the Chinese and the Russians, were the Japanese imperialists' principal victims, and therefore their principal adversaries, in their continental adventure; and it was a short step from this for the Japanese to single out the rear-guard of the Nomads to be their own protégés and allies. In making up their puppet-state of 'Manchukuo' out of the four conquered Chinese Eastern Provinces, the Japanese empire-builders ostentatiously granted the local Mongol 'banners' their autonomy and put a stop to the process of Chinese peasant colonization at the Mongols' expense.³ And next door, in the Inner Mongolian territories west of the Mongolian province of Jehol which had been incorporated into 'Manchukuo', the Mongols were consequently able to make a bargain for themselves, on equivalent terms, with the Government of the Chinese Republic—under tacit threat of opening the way for a further westward encroachment of Japanese imperialism at China's expense, unless the Chinese were willing to make it worth the Mongols' while to remain faithful to their allegiance to Nanking.⁴ As for Outer

¹ *Sic*, and not 'Kirghiz Qāzāqs', as erroneously stated in Toynbee, A. J.: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, in the passage quoted in this Study, Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 18, above.

² See Czaplicka, M. A.: *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day* (Oxford 1918, Clarendon Press), p. 17, cited in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 19, above. A damning confirmation of this Polish scholar's indictment, out of the ulpit's own mouth, will be found in the extracts translated from the official provincial gazette *Semiriechen-skiya Oblastniya Vedomosti*, Nos. 200-15, in the British Admiralty publication *Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanism* (London, no date, H.M. Stationery Office), pp. 229-34.

³ See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1932 (London 1933, Milford), pp. 443-5 and 459.

⁴ See Hubbard, G. E., in Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1933, pp. 464-6; 1934, pp. 683-5.

Mongolia, which had accepted a Russian in place of a Chinese suzerainty after the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and had become a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924,¹ it remained to be seen whether its 'bannermen' would be affected in their turn by the revival of hope and ambition with which the Mongols of Inner Mongolia and 'Manchukuo' had already been inspired since the advent of the Japanese. By the year 1938, however, the Japanese imperialists had put their country's continental fortunes to the touch in a supreme military hazard; and, in the act, they had drawn into their arena the broad territories in the heart of Eurasia which the Mongols had managed still to retain at the end of four centuries of Russian and Chinese encroachment. Across the pasture-lands of their Mongol protégés—or pawns—the Japanese were then attempting to drive a wedge that was to prise asunder their common Chinese and Russian enemies.

Now that Gobi or Shamo had suffered the grievous misfortune of becoming an East Asian Armageddon, what was likely to be the fate of its last surviving Mongol Nomad denizens? Would they be able to extort a new lease of their old Nomadic life as the price of their military support? Or would they be exterminated to the last horde and herd? Or would they be saved alive—to lead a life-in-death—by being converted *en masse* into standardized replicas of the sedentary *Homo Mechanicus* who had been their bane? For Nomads of the Mongols' indomitably recalcitrant spirit, mechanization—if this third alternative was their destiny—might be more excruciating than annihilation.

¹ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-3* (London 1925, Milford), pp. 428-31; and Hubbard, G. E., in *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London 1935, Milford), pp. 685-6. This Soviet Socialist Republic of Outer Mongolia was not taken into membership of the U.S.S.R.; and in the treaty of the 31st May, 1924, between the Soviet Government at Moscow and the Chinese Government at Peking, which had been signed a few months before the 'People's Republic of Outer Mongolia' was proclaimed, the U.S.S.R. had recognized Outer Mongolia as being an integral part of China under Chinese sovereignty (Art. 5). By the terms of the same article, however, the question of the Moscow Government's military occupation of Outer Mongolia had been left for future settlement (*Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, vol. II, pp. 334-5); and the Russian troops not only remained in command of Outer Mongolia: they also organized, trained, and equipped a Red Mongolian Army. It will be seen that the effect upon the Mongols of the impact of Russian and Japanese influences in the twentieth century of the Christian Era was running exactly counter to the effect of the impact of Tibetan influence in the sixteenth century. The conversion of the Mongols to the Tantric form of the Mahāyāna had counteracted their traditional militarism; their conversion to the Russian form of Western Communism or to the Japanese form of Western Capitalism seemed likely to bring back to Mongol ears the sound of 'ancestral voices prophesying war'. On the 12th March, 1936, the Soviet Governments of the U.S.S.R. and of Outer Mongolia signed a Protocol of Mutual Assistance, in which they undertook to come to one another's aid with their respective armed forces in the event of either of them becoming a victim of aggression at the hands of a third state. After this transaction had been made public, the Government at Moscow assured the Chinese Government that nothing had been done to change the *status quo ante* in the relations between the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, and China (Hubbard, G. E., in *Survey of International Affairs, 1936* (London 1937, Milford), pp. 934-5).

Vestiges and Rudiments in the Western World.

When we come, in conclusion, to the history of the relations between our own Western Civilization and the primitive societies which it has encountered, we can discern an early stage in which, like Hellenism in its growth-phase, this Western Christendom won converts through the sheer attraction of its charm. The most signal of these early converts were the members of the abortive Scandinavian Civilization, who eventually succumbed—and this in their native lairs in the Far North and in their distant settlements in Iceland, as well as in their encampments on Christian ground in the Danelaw and in Normandy—to the spiritual prowess of the civilization which these barbarians had been assailing by force of arms.¹ The contemporary conversion of the Nomad Magyars and the forest-dwelling Poles was equally spontaneous and is almost equally impressive. Yet, if these feats of peaceful penetration are worthy to rank with a growing Hellenic Civilization's cultural conquests in Italy and Asia Minor,² this early age of Western expansion into a barbarian world is also marred by crimes which surpass the criminality of the Hellenic pioneers' subjugation of the Mariandyni and eviction of the Pieres and extermination of the Eordaei and the Chônes.³

Through the misguided zeal of Charlemagne the Saxons were dragged into the fold of Western Christendom by the scruff of the neck;⁴ and, when, two centuries later, their own turn came to extend the bounds of Western Christendom at the expense of the rest of the North European barbarism, the converted descendants of Charlemagne's pagan Saxon victims went beyond the bad example that had been set them in the eighth century by their Austrasian conqueror. Between the latter part of the tenth century and the latter part of the twelfth the Saxons evicted the Slavs between the Elbe and the Oder;⁵ and beyond the Vistula, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Teutonic Knights went so far as to exterminate the Prussians. On this sector of medieval Western Christendom's barbarian threshold it is evident that the relations between the growing civilization and the barbarians within its range went from bad to worse during the passage of

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 347–60, above.

² See the present chapter, pp. 210–13, above.

³ For these crimes of the Hellenic Society in its growth-phase see the present chapter, pp. 210–11, above.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 167; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 345–6; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 322; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 488–90; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 523; and the present chapter and volume, pp. 286–7 and 289–90, above.

⁵ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 168–9, above. The only Slavs in this region who survived were the Abotrites, who saved themselves at the eleventh hour, after a protracted resistance, by volunteering to receive baptism. These Abotrite Slavs are the direct ancestors, after the flesh, of our latter-day Mecklenburger Germans.

the four and a half centuries that elapsed between the opening of Charlemagne's campaign against the Saxons in A.D. 772 and the beginning of the extermination of the Prussians by the Teutonic Knights after their evacuation of the Mediterranean and their migration to the Baltic in A.D. 1228; and the same melancholy picture of moral deterioration meets our eyes when we turn away from the Continent to watch the contemporary progress of Roman Christianity in the British Isles. In this insular story the first chapter is the conversion of the English heathen by a tiny band of Roman missionaries without any force to back them; and these spiritual conquerors of Ultima Thule had been dispatched from Rome on their distant and perilous enterprise by a Pope who had the greatness of heart to take thought for a remote tribe of pagan barbarians at a moment when the schismatic barbarian Lombards were beleaguering him in his own see.¹ It is a sad fall from this height to the level of the next chapter, which records the coercion of the Far Western Christians of 'the Celtic Fringe' by a series of turns of the screw which began with the decision at the Synod of Whitby in A.D. 664 and culminated in the armed invasion of Ireland by King Henry II of England, with Papal approval, in A.D. 1171.²

It will be seen that, in the record of our Western Christendom's relations, in this early phase, with the primitive societies round about, there are more entries on the debit and fewer on the credit side than in the corresponding chapter of the Hellenic Society's account. Nor was this chapter in our own Western account entirely closed by the almost complete elimination of the North European barbarians before the end of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era through the combined operation of the diverse processes of conversion, subjugation, eviction, and extermination. It is true that by A.D. 1400 Western Christendom had expanded up to the 'natural frontiers' of the Atlantic Ocean on the west and the Arctic Circle on the north, while on the east it now marched with Orthodox Christendom from a point on the coast of the Adriatic to another point on the coast of the Arctic Ocean;³ and it is also true that, after the Lithuanians had insured themselves—through an alliance with the Poles and a simultaneous act of conversion to Western Christianity⁴—against being overtaken by their Prussian kinsmen's cruel fate, the only surviving patches of Continental European barbarism were a few scattered enclaves in such natural fastnesses as Bosnia and the Scottish Highlands and Western Ireland. But the tradition of 'frightfulness' to which the Western

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, above.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 333-40, with Annexes II and III, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 168-9, above.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 172-4, above.

Christians had enslaved themselves in their medieval warfare with primitive peoples on the Baltic and the Celtic fronts was unhappily to show a greater vitality than the European barbarians themselves who had been its first victims. Habits acquired by generations of English and Scottish borderers along the Irish Pale and the Highland Line have continued to assert themselves in the behaviour of these medieval Western barbarian-fighters' descendants towards the previously unknown barbarians of a new world which has been brought within our range by the maritime discoveries at the beginning of the Modern Age. And the North American Indian and the Tropical African Negro have been, in their turn, the victims of a ruthlessness which was first evoked on this side of the water in long since forgotten struggles with 'Wild Highlanders' and 'Wild Irishmen'.¹

In the expansion of our Western Civilization over the whole face of the planet in the course of the Modern Age of Western history the impetus of the expanding body social has been so strong, and the disparity in strength so extreme between the aggressive West Europeans and their primitive victims, that the movement of expansion has been apt to sweep on unchecked, from the line at which the West European pioneers have made their first impact on the 'Natives',² until this running fight between two unequally matched forces has reached its term at a 'natural frontier'. We have seen how the English settlers in North America have swept the Red Indians almost out of existence from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast, and how the later opening-up of Tropical Africa by the competitive enterprize of half a dozen West European Powers has resulted in the subjugation of the African Negroes from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and from the Sahara to the Kalahari Desert.³ In this world-wide modern Western offensive against the rear-guard of the primitive societies extermination or eviction or subjugation has been the rule and conversion the exception. Indeed, we can count on the fingers of one hand the number of the primitive societies that our modern Western Society has taken into partnership with itself.

There are the Scottish Highlanders,⁴ who were one of those

¹ For this load of *karma* see II. C (ii) (a) 1, Annex, in vol. i, pp. 465-7, above.

² For the connotation of this word in the vocabulary of Modern Western Imperialism see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 33, and I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, pp. 151-3, above.

³ See the present chapter, p. 207, above. One of the incidents in this opening-up of Africa by West European Powers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era was the extinction of the militant barbarian Power which had been established in the Eastern Sudan by the Baggara Arabs, under the leadership of the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad, on the ruins of the abortive Egypto-Ottoman empire in the upper basin of the Nile (see the present chapter, pp. 295-6, above, and 324, below).

⁴ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, p. 237; II. C (ii) (a) 1, Annex, vol. i, pp. 465-7; II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 311, and the present chapter and volume, p. 207, above.

rare enclaves of untamed European barbarians that were bequeathed¹ to the modern Western World by a medieval Western Christendom. There are the Maoris, who were encountered by the Scottish and English settlers in New Zealand in the nineteenth century. And there are the Araucanians in the barbarian hinterland of the Chilean province of the Andean universal state,² with whom the Spanish settlers in Chile have had to deal since the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire in the sixteenth century. In these three instances the process of cultural conversion has finally prevailed over the alternatives; but even here this solution has only been accepted by the aggressor after the methods of coercion have been tried and found not worth the price of the desperate resistance which they were evoking.³

The test case is the history of the incorporation of the Scottish Highlanders into our modern Western body social after the failure of these White Barbarians' last kick against the pricks in A.D. 1745; for the social gulf between a Dr. Johnson or a Horace Walpole and the war-bands that carried Prince Charlie to Derby was probably not much less difficult to bridge than the gulf between the Western Society of the nineteenth century and the contemporary Maoris and Araucanians. At the present day the great-great-grandchildren of Prince Charlie's shaggy warriors are undoubtedly of one standardized social substance with the descendants of those bewigged-and-powdered Lowlanders and Englishmen who were the victors in the last round of a struggle that reached its end nearly two hundred years before the present volume was published. To-day the epigoni of both parties to that ancient warfare are partners in business and politics and recreation and literature and art, without its being possible for the sharpest-sighted observer to detect even a trace of the historic social cleavage. Yet this happy result cannot be claimed as a clear and unalloyed triumph of the way of Gentleness in contrast to the way of Violence; for, on an impartial examination of the methods by which this act of social assimilation has been accomplished

¹ See the present chapter, pp. 320-1, above.

² For these Araucanian barbarians beyond the frontier of the Inca Empire along the River Maule see the present chapter, p. 280, above.

³ 'For over two hundred years the frontier-line [between Araucanian natives and Spanish colonists in Chile] shifted back and forth of the River Biobio, with a story of struggle exactly similar to that between the Saxons and the Wendish Slavs at the River Elbe from the ninth to the twelfth centuries in Europe. The Araucanians were never conquered, and held all their territory. In 1870 they accepted peacefully the sovereignty of Chile, and traders with disease and alcohol, and farmers with their ploughs, entered their country; but no compulsory training in civilized ways was imposed upon them. Steadily their aboriginal population declined, and continues to decline' (Macleod, W. C.: *The American Indian Frontier* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), pp. 117-18). With slight changes, this passage could be adapted to give an accurate description of the history of the relations between the Maoris and the British settlers in New Zealand.

since the middle of the eighteenth century, it might be difficult for an honest jury to declare that the implacable repression of the Highlanders' ancestral costume and customs has been a less potent factor in the process than the generous admission of the discomfited barbarians to share in the privileges and opportunities of modern Western social life as lived in the United Kingdom.

There are, of course, other barbarians who have managed, in the midst of an elsewhere Westernized World, to hold their own—both unconverted and uncoerced—until to-day, or at any rate until yesterday. But, like the successfully converted Araucanians, these still obstinately persisting barbarian enclaves have been legacies from non-Western civilizations that have not yet been completely absorbed into our Western body social.

We have seen, for example,¹ that the modern Western empire-builders in the Hindu World have been obliged to take over from their Sikh and Mughal predecessors the responsibility for holding the North-West Frontier of India against the highlander barbarians of Eastern Iran; and we have also observed that the British Rāj has had this Indian North-West Frontier problem on its hands for no less than a hundred years without having yet succeeded in solving it. We can now call to mind several other anti-barbarian frontiers of the same kind that have been inherited from other non-Western civilizations by other Western or Westernized Powers. In the eighteenth century a Westernized Russian Empire inherited from a Byzantine Muscovy one anti-barbarian frontier over against the Eurasian Nomads and another over against the highlander barbarians in the Caucasus, while a nineteenth-century France has inherited from a broken-down Arabic Society in the Maghrib one anti-barbarian frontier over against the Afrasian Nomads in the Sahara and another over against the highlander barbarians in the Atlas. When we compare the French and Russian handling of the barbarians on these four fronts with the British handling of the barbarians on the North-West Frontier of India, we shall notice that both the Russians and the French have carried out that 'totalitarian' policy of conquering the barbarians outright which the British first tried and then abandoned in Afghanistan.² The Russians subjugated the Eurasian Nomads in the eighteenth century³ and the Caucasian highlanders

¹ In the present chapter, pp. 304-5, above.

² See the present chapter, pp. 305-8, above.

³ See the present chapter, pp. 313-16, above. The only horde of Eurasian Nomads who were still beyond the reach of the Russian arm at the end of the eighteenth century were the Türkmens in Transcaspia, who lived by raiding Persia from their oasis-fastnesses—carrying away not only goods and cattle but also Shi'i slaves for the Sunni slave-markets in the Uzbeq Khanates. The Russians left these Transcaspian Türkmens alone until after the completion of their conquest of the Caucasus, and then attacked

in the nineteenth, while the French had mastered the Sahara before the nineteenth century closed, and have now completed in Morocco the military task upon which they entered in A.D. 1911¹ by reducing to submission, in the year 1934, the last of the 'dissident' Atlas Berbers.² In another part of the African field, in the Eastern Sudan, we have already recorded³ the abortive attempt of an imperfectly Westernized Egypto-Ottoman Power to push its anti-barbarian frontier southward from the First Cataract to the Equatorial sources of the White Nile. This Egypto-Ottoman commitment in the Nile Basin was subsequently taken over by the British; and in the last decade of the nineteenth century British arms eliminated the recalcitrant enclave of barbarism in this quarter by conclusive military operations⁴ in the manner of the Russians in the Caucasus and Transcaspia—in contrast to the less drastic British handling of the barbarians beyond the North-West Frontier of India.

If at this point we pause to ask ourselves our usual question—whether the External Proletariat has been stimulated, by its struggle for life, to any acts of creativity in the fields of religion and poetry—we shall find it hard to bring together in a single view the straggling army of barbarians with which our Western Civilization has had to deal in the course of a history which has ranged so widely both in Time and in Space. It would be superfluous to re-examine over again the brilliant creative works of those barbarian rear-guards in 'the Celtic Fringe' and in Scandinavia whose attempts to give birth to civilizations of their own were rendered abortive by their unsuccessful encounters with the nascent civilization of Western Christendom.⁵ We may pass on at once to the Modern Age of

them from a Transcaucasian base, from which they were able, thanks to their naval command of the Caspian, to make a lodgement on the opposite coast of that sea. Yet although the Türkmens were thus assailed from an unexpected quarter by adversaries who now had at their disposal the modern Western material technique—including both the steamboat and the railway—their resistance was so stubborn that it took the Russians thirteen years—from 1873 to 1886—to overcome it, whereas it had taken them no more than ten years—from 1863 to 1873—to conquer all the Uzbek Khanates in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin (see p. 314, footnote 3, above).

¹ The French had reached the north-western foot of the Atlas *massif* when they had occupied Wajda (Oujda) in 1907, but it was not until they had completed their subsequent occupation of the Atlantic lowlands of Morocco by their entry into Fez (Fäs) in the spring of 1911 and into Marrākish in the autumn of 1912 that they took over from the Sharīf al *Makhsan* the task of holding the Moroccan 'highland line' and asserting the Sharīf's title to sovereignty on the highland side of it.

² For the competition between the Western Civilization, as represented by the French, and the Arabic Civilization, as represented by the Arabized Sunni Muslim population of the Atlantic lowlands of Morocco, for the cultural allegiance of the nominally Muslim, but practically still almost primitive barbarian, Berber highlanders in the Atlas see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. 1 (London 1927, Milford), pp. 126-7, and Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1937, vol. 1, pp. 524-7.

³ In the present chapter, pp. 209, footnote 3, 294-6, and 321, footnote 3, above.

⁴ See p. 321, footnote 3, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 227, below.

⁵ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-60, above.

Western history; and here we may content ourselves with a single example of barbarian creativity in each of the two spheres in which we have learnt to be on the look-out for it.

In the poetic field we may take note of the 'heroic' poetry which was cultivated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era by the Bosniak barbarians¹ beyond the south-eastern frontier of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy. And this example is interesting, because it is an apparent exception which in reality proves the prevailing rule that the External Proletariat of a disintegrating civilization is not apt to be stimulated to the creation of 'heroic' poetry until the civilization with which the barbarians are at war has passed through its universal state and fallen into an interregnum which gives opportunity for a barbarian *Völkerwanderung*. In our survey up to the present point the only prominent exception to this rule which has come to our notice is the genesis of the 'heroic' poetry of the Serb external proletariat of Orthodox Christendom, which apparently goes back to the last phase of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles' on the eve of the establishment of an Orthodox Christian universal state in the shape of the Ottoman Empire.² On this showing, we should not expect to find any examples of 'heroic' poetry among the external proletariat of our Western World, since it is certain that our Western Civilization has not yet entered into a universal state, and uncertain whether it has even broken down.³ There is, however, one frontier of the Western World on which the local equivalent of a universal state was called into existence more than four hundred years ago by the formidable pressure of an alien civilization; and it is in the hinterland of this front that our Bosniak example of 'heroic' poetry presents itself.

We have seen⁴ that the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy sprang from the defensive union, in A.D. 1526, of the states—or remnants of states—in the south-eastern marches of Western Christendom which were at that moment within striking distance of the Ottoman aggressor; and we have also seen that this hastily concluded union

¹ Accounts of this Bosniak school of 'heroic' poetry will be found in Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 101-3; Subotić, D.: *Yugoslav Popular Ballads: Their Origin and Development* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), pp. 18-21; Chadwick, H. M. and N. K.: *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 325-30, 356-8, 365.

² See the present chapter, p. 296, above. The historical events that have contributed themes to the repertory of the Classical School of Serb 'heroic' poetry fall within the years 1371-1485. The establishment of the Ottoman Empire may be taken as dating from the Ottoman conquest of Macedonia in A.D. 1371-2 (see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 26, above); but the key-stone of the Ottoman arch was not fitted into its place until the conquest of Constantinople in A.D. 1453 by Sultan Mehmed II (*imperator* A.D. 1451-81) (see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 191, with footnote 1, below).

³ See I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 36-7, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 313-15, below.

⁴ In II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 177-90, above.

was preserved—by the continuance of the same external pressure that had produced it in the first instance—until our own lifetime, when, in A.D. 1918, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy fell to pieces in the political convulsion that gave the *coup de grâce* to the Monarchy's efficient cause, the Ottoman Empire. In terms of a simile which we have used in another place,¹ the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy was a carapace which the Western Christian body social grew for itself, out of its own living substance, as a special means of protection against a particular and peculiar external danger; and this simile may be instructive for our present purpose, since it draws attention to the diversity in the appearance of the Monarchy as viewed from outside and viewed from within.

Looked at from a standpoint in the heart of Western Christendom, by an observer standing on the banks of the Rhine or the Po or the Scheldt, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy could never, even in its heyday, be mistaken for anything but a hollow shell which was as thin and as brittle as it was hard. Though the Hapsburg potentate at Vienna might pile the Imperial Crown of the Holy Roman Empire² upon the insignia of so many Danubian kingdoms and lands, no citizen of any state to the west of the Emperor's direct and hereditary dominions could possibly regard as a universal monarch a prince whose writ did not even run in the other principalities of the ramshackle empire of which he was the titular head—not to speak of the admittedly independent kingdoms of France and Spain and Portugal and England and Scotland and Denmark and Sweden and Poland-Lithuania. So far from having entered into a universal state, the Western World in the sixteenth century was farther away from political unity than it had been at any time since the days before Charlemagne's conquest of Lombardy. But though this was the truth about sixteenth-century Western Christendom, it was not the picture that presented itself either to the subjects of the Hapsburg Emperor or to his adversaries beyond the south-eastern frontier of his dominions. To these two contending parties in the drama in which the Emperor was a protagonist, he wore an aspect which he could never wear to any Western European spectator. On his own Danubian ground the Hapsburg filled the political horizon of friends and foes alike as the authentic *Caesarea Majestas*: the supreme head of a Western Christian World which had entered into an *union sacrée* under his leadership in order to stand at bay, in an oecumenical solidarity, against an Ottoman threat to its

¹ In I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 156, footnote 1, above.

² The actual Imperial Crown of Charlemagne was still one of the historic treasures of Vienna down to the annexation of Austria by Germany in A.D. 1938.

existence. Thus, to all intents and purposes, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy did perform the part of a Western universal state from 1526 to 1918 in the eyes of all Europeans whose homes lay anywhere south-east of the Inn and the Isonzo. And it is perhaps not simply chance that a barbarian South-East European community living only just beyond the Hapsburg Monarchy's south-eastern pale should have produced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era, when the Viennese Caesar was most conspicuously fulfilling his oecumenical mission, the most notable school of 'heroic' poetry that has yet arisen in any section of the external proletariat of the modern Western World.

The Bosniaks, who were the authors of this particular 'heroic' tradition, were a rear-guard of the Continental European barbarians who had previously had to endure the unusual—and unusually painful—experience of being taken between the two fires of an aggressive Western and an aggressive Orthodox Christendom. The radiation of the Orthodox Christian Civilization, which had been the first of the two to reach the Bosniaks, had been rejected by them, as we have seen,¹ when it came in its orthodox form; and it had only been able to insinuate itself in the schismatic guise of Bogomilism. This adherence to a Christian heresy had drawn upon the Bosniaks the hostile attentions of their Western Christian as well as their Orthodox Christian neighbours; and in these straits they had welcomed the advent of the 'Osmanlis and had made sure of the good-will of these all-powerful patrons by abandoning their Bogomilism and turning Muslim *en masse*.² Thereafter, under Ottoman protection, these Yugoslav converts to Islam took to playing, on the Ottoman side of the Ottoman-Hapsburg frontier, the same part as was played on the Hapsburg side by the Yugoslav Christian refugees from the territories which had fallen under the Ottoman domination.³ The two opposing sets of Yugoslav barbarian war-bands found an identical occupation in raiding on the one side the Ottoman Empire, which was now performing the function of a universal state for Orthodox Christendom, and on the other side the Hapsburg Monarchy, which was providing the façade of a universal state for the Western World;⁴

¹ In the present chapter, p. 295, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 368, footnote 3, above.

³ For the refugee Serb *ushoci* (*Italici* Morlacchi) and *hajduci*, see the present chapter, p. 296, above.

⁴ Compare the two likewise opposing sets of Arab war-bands that conducted their raids and counter-raids across the North Arabian borderland between the Roman and Sasanian Empires in the age immediately preceding the Primitive Muslim Arab conquest of South-Western Asia. The Sasanian Empire was raided by the Ghassāni Arab wardens of the Roman marches east of Jordan and Orontes; the Roman Empire by the Lakhmi Arab wardens of the Sasanian marches west of Euphrates. The Banu Ghassān were Monophysite Christians, while the subjects of the Lakhmi princes of Hīrah were divided between Monophysitism, Nestorianism, and paganism (see Browne, L. E.: *The*

and on the same fertile soil of border warfare two independent schools of barbarian 'heroic' poetry, both using the medium of the Serbo-Croat language, grew up and flourished side by side¹—to all appearance, without exercising any influence upon one another.²

If we now wish to find among the external proletariat of our modern Western body social an example of creativity in the religious field, we must wing our flight from the Old World to the New and must take leave of the seventeenth-century frontier of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy in Yugoslavia over against the Bosniaks in order to reconnoitre the nineteenth-century frontier of the United States of North America over against the Red Indians.

It is remarkable that the North American Indians should have been capable of making any creative religious response at all to the challenge of European aggression, considering that they were almost continuously 'on the run' from the moment of the arrival of the first English settlers on the Virginian shore of the Atlantic coast of North America in the first decade of the seventeenth century down to the crushing of the last Indian attempt at armed resistance to the power of the United States in the Sioux War of 1890. It is still more remarkable that this Indian religious response, when it came, should have been, not violent, but gentle.

A priori a gentle reaction would not readily have been predicted of a primitive people whose martial qualities—a pride, an endurance, and a demonic energy on the war-path—have made so deep and so lasting an impression upon their White assailants and destroyers that to-day a legendary portrait of a Red Indian warrior

Eclipse of Christianity in Asia (Cambridge 1933, University Press), p. 13). For the conversion of the Serbs and Bosniaks from marauders into mercenaries see V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), pp. 462–3, below.

¹ Like the Orthodox Christian Serbo-Croat 'heroic' poetry of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, the Muslim Serbo-Croat 'heroic' poetry of Bosnia and Herzegovina survived the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era. 'One beg took a minstrel with him when he went to visit the spa of Rohitsch-Sauerbrunn in Styria in 1913' (Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii, p. 438).

² Notwithstanding this apparent absence of reciprocal influence, the Serb and the Bosniak school displayed one prominent common feature which was doubtless acquired by both of them from the uniform impress of a common social environment. Like the epic poetry of the French external proletariat of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate, but unlike the general run of barbarian literature, the two Yugoslav schools of 'heroic' poetry were largely inspired by the 'politico-religious' motif of the Holy War (Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii, p. 365). In this respect the literary history of the Ottoman-Hapsburg frontier in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era offers a sharp contrast to that of the 'Abbasid-East Roman frontier in the ninth and tenth centuries. On this latter frontier the contending 'borderers' were divided from one another not only by their differences of religious and political allegiance, but by a difference of language as well, and yet here, as we have seen (in the present chapter, pp. 256–7, above), the two schools of 'heroic' poetry which were generated on opposite sides of the line by the border warfare were both of them innocent of 'politico-religious' animus and each of them eager to seek inspiration from the other.

who is now physically extinct in consequence of the White Man's ruthlessness has become the conventional type of 'the Noble Savage' throughout the Western World.¹ It might rather have been expected that, if the Red Indians reacted by adopting the religion of their adversaries with some distinctive difference, they would seize upon, and exaggerate, the fanatical militancy of the New Englander's Puritan Calvinist Protestantism,² as in the Old World the Wāhhābī and Idrīsī and Sanūsī religious movements among the Afrasian Nomads have in fact seized upon the corresponding elements in Sunnī Islam in order to nerve their devotees for the ordeal of fighting, with their backs to the wall, against a Westernizing Ottoman Power and its British and French and Italian supplanters.³ Alternatively, if the Red Indians reacted by creating a new religion of their own out of their native religious experience, then this new Red Indian religion might have been expected to conform to the general type of the worship of a divine war-lord and his war-band with which we have now become familiar from Scandinavian and Gothic and Achaean and Hittite and Aryan examples which have come under review at earlier points in this chapter. So far from that, the new religion which the Red Indians did create—under stress of their rapid and tragic retreat towards an inexorable annihilation before the White Man's remorseless advance—displays the distinctive characteristics of the 'higher religions' that have been discovered by those prophets of the Internal Proletariat who have taken the path of Gentleness.

These distinctive characteristics present themselves with an impressive uniformity and persistence in the teaching and practice of a series of Red Indian prophets⁴ who arose from time to time between 'the seventeen-sixties' and 'the eighteen-eighties'. The series begins with two anonymous figures: the prophet of the Delawares (*profatus* A.D. 1762) and the prophet of the Munsee branch of the same tribe (*profatus circa* A.D. 1766–75); it continues in the Shawnee Tenkwatawa, 'the Open Door' (*profatus* A.D. 1795), and the Kickapoo prophet Kanakuk (*profatus* A.D. 1819–*post* 1831); and it culminates in the Far Western trio Smohalla (*profatus post* A.D. 1850) and the two Paiute prophets: Tavibo the

¹ 'Woe unto you! For ye build the sepulchres of the prophets and your fathers killed them' (Luke xi. 47) is a damning stroke of irony which could be applied to the European colonists and the Red Indian 'Natives' of North America almost as justly as it is applied in the Gospel to the doctors of the Jewish Law and the prophets of Yahweh.

² For this element in Protestantism, and for its share in the creation of our modern Western Race-feeling, see II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, pp. 211–27, above.

³ For this militant religious reaction of the Afrasian wing of the external proletariat of the Ottoman Empire see the present chapter, pp. 295–6, above.

⁴ For an illuminating account of these prophets, with indications of their spiritual affinity with other religious leaders in other times and places, see Macleod, W. C.: *The American Indian Frontier* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), pp. 505–32.

Forerunner (*profatus prae* A.D. 1870) and Wovoka the Messiah (*profatus circa* A.D. 1886). The Delaware and Shawnee prophets arose in what has since become the State of Ohio;¹ Kanakuk in what has since become the State of Minnesota; Smohalla in the Rocky Mountains, near the border between the United States and Canada; Taviho and Wovoka in the more southerly western highland region of Nevada. It will be seen that the locus of the birthplace of the prophet of the day moved westward with the movement of the frontier itself. In each generation the would-be saviours of the primitive Red Indian society in North America made their epiphany in the neighbourhood of the line along which the White Man's pressure was being exerted at the time. They addressed themselves successively to the communities which at successive moments were in imminent danger of being subjugated or evicted or exterminated; and among these exposed and threatened communities the influence of each of the prophets in turn spread far and wide, partly as the result of long missionary journeys undertaken by the prophets themselves, and partly through the flocking of pilgrims to the prophets' own headquarters.

It is the more remarkable to find that the principal message of almost all these prophets was one of peace. And while they preached the establishment of this peace in the first instance between the Indian peoples themselves, as a necessary preliminary to to an *union sacrée* against the White intruders, they did not make their call upon their Indian hearers to cease fighting one another in order to direct their followers' arms against a common alien enemy. While they proclaimed that the Indians were a chosen people who were destined to a life of bliss in an earthly paradise in which the living would be rejoined by the souls of their ancestors, this Red Indian Messianic Kingdom was not to be conquered with tomahawks, and still less with bullets. It was to come through an act of God; and God would perform His act when His chosen people had done what was pleasing in His sight. The Indians' part was the spiritual task of watching and praying and the ritual duty of discarding all the innovations that they had accepted from the White Man. The prophets taught that it was the adoption of these alien tools and techniques that had drawn down God's displeasure upon His people, and that an abandonment of these unclean things was the sovereign means of recapturing God's

¹ The territory now occupied by this state member of the North American Union was not the ancestral domain of the Delaware and Shawnee tribes into which these three prophets were born. It was merely the temporary camping-ground of broken fragments of tribes which had long since been evicted from their original homes. Before it gave birth to a prophet, each of these tribes had been 'on the run' before the face of the White aggressor for at least a hundred years.

blessing.¹ The first of the tools that they instructed their followers to lay aside were fire-arms (an injunction which sufficiently proves the good faith of their exhortation to render unto the White Caesar the things that were his, by submitting themselves to the authority of the White Man's Government). The prohibition further extended to peaceful utilities like the flint and steel which had been replacing the Indian's primitive fire-sticks; and it was even applied to agriculture by Smohalla, in whose remote homeland the art of cultivation had been unknown until the White Man's advent.²

The Indian prophets' general advocacy of Non-Violence in face of implacable aggression and intolerable provocation was justified by the event in the rare cases in which either the prophets or their followers lost their difficult faith in the virtue of forbearance. In the first generation of the series the Delaware prophet's religious movement was fatally compromised by the unhappy results of an experiment in militancy on the part of the Delaware's Ottawa disciple Pontiac, who had doubly perverted his master's doctrine by preaching that the object of establishing peace between warring tribes of Indians was to turn their united forces against the British, and that these alien intruders could not be fought effectively without resort to the two exotic weapons of the musket and a French alliance.³ In the next generation Tenkwatawa 'the Open Door' brought his own movement to destruction when in A.D. 1809 he abruptly abandoned the doctrine of Non-Violence which he had been preaching for fourteen years, and took, instead, to a militancy which was the practice of his brother Tecumseh 'the Meteor'.⁴ Finally, the Ghost Dance Religion—the

¹ This notion that, in coping with a more potent culture than one's own, the disastrous error—or deadly sin—is to attempt to fight the aggressive culture with its own weapons, is the fundamental idea of the 'Zealot' reaction (for the alternative 'Zealot' and 'Herodian' reactions to the impact of an alien culture see Part IX, below). The classic exponents of the idea have been the Jewish Zealots from the days of Judas Maccabaeus to the days of Bar Kōkabbā (see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 68 and 126, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, pp. 657-9, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (7), vol. vi, pp. 120-3, below, with the references in the footnotes); but the Jewish Zealots of that age, like the Wahhābis at the present day, combined their puritanism with militancy, whereas the Red Indian prophets, like Johanan ben Zakkai and his rabbinical successors, have combined a similar puritanism with a doctrine of non-resistance.

² Agriculture and the worship of agrarian fertility gods were, of course, indigenous in the New World; and the art had spread from the Mexican Plateau to the region of the Great Lakes before the arrival of the first Europeans on the American side of the Atlantic (see II. C (ii) (a) 2, vol. i, p. 265, with footnote 1, above). The first English settlers in New England found the local Indians cultivating maize; and the three Delaware and Shawnee prophets all arose in communities in which the indigenous agriculture of the New World was in use. These Indian prophets in the east of the Continent thus had no reason to repudiate agriculture, since it would never have occurred to them to class it with fire-arms as a European invention.

³ For Pontiac's 'Beaver War' (*gerebatur* A.D. 1763-5) see Macleod, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-23. For the untoward effect of Pontiac's unsuccessful excursion into militancy upon the fortunes of the Delaware prophet's religion see *ibid.*, p. 515.

⁴ For the Battle of Tippecanoe (*commisum* A.D. 1811) and its disastrous effects upon the fortunes of Tenkwatawa's religion see Macleod, *op. cit.*, pp. 519-21. In A.D. 1814 a comparable disaster overtook the Creek converts to Tenkwatawa's religion when the

fine flower of the Red Indian Messianic Movement, which Tavibo the Forerunner created and handed on to Wovoka the Messiah—sustained a mortal blow when Wovoka's Sioux converts made their desperate and disastrous military outbreak in 1890, and this in spite of the fact that the Sioux insurrection against the United States Government had not been directly inspired by Wovoka's teaching.¹ The Ghost Dance Religion of Tabivo and Wovoka could not give victory to the Sioux warriors in their forlorn hope; but the Dreamer Religion of the older western prophet Smohalla did inspire Chief Joseph and his Nez Percés in 1877 to endure the horrors of a thirteen-hundred-and-twenty-miles-long retreat under the pursuit of a relentless enemy.² As a sheer feat of heroic endurance the Nez Percés' trek in 1877 is worthy to rank with the Torgut Calmucks' trek in 1771;³ and these two long-drawn-out agonies of revolt and flight may be remembered in history as Abel's last protest against Cain in the Old World and in the New World respectively.

At the time of writing it looked as though, for the few antique barbarian communities that still remained on the map of a by this time almost completely Westernized world, the only chance of survival would lie in adopting the tactics of the Abotrites and the Lithuanians, who, in the medieval chapter of the history of the expansion of Western Christendom, had had the foresight to anticipate a forcible by a voluntary conversion to the culture of an aggressive civilization which was too strong for them to resist.⁴ In our latter-day remnant of an antique barbarian world there were still standing out, in 1938, two closely beleaguered fastnesses of Barbarism in each of which an enterprising barbarian war-lord had latterly been making a determined effort to save a perhaps not yet quite hopeless military and political situation by launching a vigorous cultural offensive defensive.

In North-Eastern Iran it seemed possible in 1938 that the North-West Frontier problem of the British Indian Empire might find its solution, not in any drastic military action against the untamed barbarians on the Indian side of the Indo-Afghan frontier, but rather in the Westernization of Afghanistan herself; for one of the crucial issues in this at that time still callow social movement in Afghanistan was the question whether the Central Government at Kabul could succeed in establishing its effective authority over the

local exponents of the Shawnee prophet's faith followed their master's inauspicious example by plunging, in their turn, into militancy (*ibid.*, p. 520, footnote 2).

¹ See Macleod, *op. cit.*, p. 528, with footnote 2.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 499-501.

³ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 19, IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 498, and the present chapter and volume, p. 315, above.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 172-4, and the present chapter and volume, p. 319, footnote 5, and p. 320, above.

untamed barbarians on the Afghan side of the same line; and, if this Afghan endeavour were to achieve success, one of the effects would be to place the war-bands on the Indian side between two fires and thereby make their position ultimately untenable. The Westernizing movement in Afghanistan, with which the Indian frontier problem was bound up, had been launched by King Amānallāh (*regnabat* A.D. 1919-29) with a radical excess of zeal¹ which was a caricature of the contemporary statesmanship of a Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk and a Rizā Shāh Pehlevī; and this intemperance had cost the royal revolutionary his throne. Yet King Amānallāh's personal fiasco was perhaps less significant than the fact that the check had not proved fatal to a movement which had had this unfortunate start. By 1929 the process of Westernization had already gone too far, and a desire for it—or, at least, an acquiescence in it—had become too widespread, for the people of Afghanistan to put up with the unmitigated barbarian reaction of the brigand-rebel Bacha-i-Sakkā ('the Water-Carrier's Son'); and under the régime of King Nādir and his successor the process had been unobtrusively resumed and carried on with a tact which seemed to promise more substantial results in the long run than the ex-King Amānallāh's provocatively sensational gestures.²

The outstanding Westernizer of a beleaguered barbarian fastness in A.D. 1938 was 'Abd-al-'Azīz b. 'Abd-ar-Rahmān Āl Sa'ūd, the King of the Najd and the Hijāz: a soldier and a statesman who, since A.D. 1901, had raised himself out of the political exile into which he had been born until he had made himself master of all Arabia west of the Rub'-al-Khālī and north of the Yamānī Kingdom of San'ā.³ During the thirty-eight years of his public career up to date Ibn Sa'ūd had been as resolute in asserting his authority against rivals and rebels as he has been moderate in the terms which he had accorded to his defeated adversaries. As a barbarian war-lord he could bear comparison with the Umayyad Yazīd I for affability⁴ and with the Amalung Atawulf for enlightenment.⁵ As a Westernizer he had apprehended the potency of the modern Western scientific technique and had shown a discerning eye for those applications of it—artesian wells and motor-cars and aeroplanes—that were particularly effective on the Central Arabian Steppe. But, above all, he had seen that the indispensable founda-

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, p. 103, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 234, below.

² For the history of, and sequel to, Amānallāh's 'raging tearing campaign' of Westernization in Afghanistan see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i, pp. 564-9; 1928, pp. 188-234; 1930, pp. 182-8.

³ For King 'Abd-al-'Azīz's career and policy see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i, pp. 271-346; 1928, pp. 284-307; 1930, pp. 177-82; 1934, pp. 306-8 and 310-21.

⁴ See the present chapter, p. 226, above.

⁵ See the present chapter, pp. 226-7, above.

tion for a Western way of life was law and order. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Āl Sa'ūd stood head and shoulders above the most eminent of his Afghan contemporaries in moral and intellectual stature; and, since this was assuredly a case in which personality counted for more than any material conditions, Sa'ūdī Arabia appeared in 1938 to have a better prospect than Afghanistan of transferring herself from the ranks of the doomed barbarian war-bands to those of the states members of a Westernized Great Society—notwithstanding the fact that the steppes were more vulnerable than the highlands to military attack by the mechanical devices of twentieth-century warfare.

When the last obstinate enclave of antique barbarian life has been eliminated, in one or other of the alternative ways, from the cultural map of a Westernized World, shall we be able to congratulate ourselves on having seen the last of Barbarism itself? A complete elimination of the Barbarism of the External Proletariat would warrant no more than a mild elation, since we have convinced ourselves¹ (if there is any virtue in this Study) that the destruction which has overtaken a number of civilizations in the past has never been the work of any external agency, either human or inanimate, but has always been in the nature of an act of suicide.

'We are betrayed by what is false within.'² And this line of poetry, read in the light of our Western history since the autumn of the year 1935, may give an unintended turn to a passage in this Study on the subject of Abyssinia which was written in the autumn of 1931.

'“The common Christianity” of Abyssinia and the West, in a world which the radiation of our Western Christian Civilization has now unified upon a Western Christian basis, is a theme for satire to which only a Voltaire or a Gibbon could do justice.'³

The theme had not gone stale through seven years' keeping, but the intervening events⁴ had raised the question which of the two parties was to be the satirist's target. In plain words: Who were the barbarians? Which party had cast itself for the part? The Abyssinians, who in the interval had made a vain effort to defend themselves against an unprovoked attack? Or the Italians, who within the same span of time had broken their own deliberately given pledges under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Italo-Abyssinian treaty of 1928 in order to break the Law of Nations, as well as the Law of God, by setting out to conquer a country which was not theirs and by levying war upon a miserably armed people with all the deadly

¹ In Part IV, *passim*, above.

² Meredith, G.: *Love's Grave*, quoted in IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, p. 120, above.

³ II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 364-5, above.

⁴ See p. 207, above.

weapons—including poison gas—that have been added to our modern Western armoury by our modern Western science? If we are to pass beyond the baldly technical sense of the word 'barbarian', and to use it in its deeper moral connotation, then we are bound to declare that, when the Italians attacked and defeated and conquered their Abyssinian victims in East Africa in A.D. 1935-6, the reign of Barbarism in our Great Society was not curtailed but was, on the contrary, most formidably extended.

Who, let us ask ourselves again, are the true barbarians to-day, and where are they to be found? The familiar barbarians of the antique type may have been effectively wiped out of existence through the elimination of the last remaining no-man's-land beyond anti-barbarian frontiers which have now been carried up to the limits set by Physical Nature on every front in the World. But this unprecedented triumph will have profited us nothing if the barbarians, in the hour of their extinction beyond the frontiers, have stolen a march on us by re-emerging in our midst. And is it not here that we find our barbarians embattled to-day? 'Ancient civilizations were destroyed by imported barbarians; we breed our own.'¹ Are we not seeing a host of neobarbarian war-bands being recruited nowadays under our eyes in one country after another—and these in the heart, and not on the outskirts, of what has hitherto been a Christendom? What else but barbarians in spirit are the fighting-men in these *Fascii di Combattimento* and these *Sturmabteilungen*? Have they not been taught that they are the step-children of the Society out of whose bosom they have come, and that, as an aggrieved party with a score to pay off, they are morally entitled to conquer 'a place in the sun' for themselves by a ruthless use of force? And is not this precisely the doctrine that the war-lords of the External Proletariat—the Genseric and the Attilas—have always proclaimed to their warriors as they have led them 'over the top' to plunder some world that has lost the power to defend itself? Black shirts, and not black skins, were assuredly the badges of barbarism in the war that was waged in Africa in 1935-6. So much we can confidently declare; and with no less confidence we can add that the shirted barbarian is a more formidable menace to Society and a more appalling portent for the sociologist than the berserker of whom he has made a prey. The blackshirt is a portent because he is deliberately sinning against inherited lights, and he is a menace because, for the commission of this sin, he has at his disposal an inherited technique² which he is free to

¹ Inge, W. R.: *The Idea of Progress* (Oxford 1920, Clarendon Press), p. 13.

² 'It is the possession of funded civilization which makes the illiterate and morally wild American hunter of the prairies more powerful in fight than the Red Man—the savage of Civilization more terrible than the savage of Barbarism. It is the funded

divert from God's to the Devil's service.¹ But in arriving at this conclusion we have not yet dug down to the root of the matter, for we have not yet asked ourselves what the source may be from which this Italian neobarbarism has been derived.

Towards whom was a Mussolini on the war-path directing his faculty of mimesis? Assuredly not towards his Abyssinian victims, whom he affected altogether to despise.² Our Italian war-lord fancied himself as the builder and not as the destroyer of an empire. In his own estimation he was not a Mihiragula but a Clive. He had stated, in terms, that he thought 'for Italy as the great Englishmen who have made the British Empire have thought for England, as the great French colonizers have thought for France'.³ His intended role was that of an eighteenth-century English or a nineteenth-century French empire-builder; and his West European critics should pause to reflect before angrily or contemptuously dismissing this latter-day Italian caricature of the deeds of their own forebears. A good caricature may be an illuminating portrait; and the Italians, after all, are noted for being past masters of the caricaturist's art. In the repulsive Italian countenance of a neobarbarian apostate from the path of Civilization we may be compelled, with shame and grief, to confess to a recognition of our English ancestors' authentic features. And a twentieth-century Italian dictator's naïve assumption of this old-fashioned West European mien is a formidable indictment of the character of his nineteenth-century and eighteenth-century French and English models. The indictment is formidable just because it is tendered, in complete good faith, as a tribute of admiration. For an imitation which is the sincerest flattery may also be the most crushing condemnation. 'In the last analysis' the inspiration of Signor Mussolini's neobarbarian imperialism would appear to be a Romagnol's Anglomania; and as soon as we admit this

civilization that they possess that alone makes *les classes dangereuses* really dangerous.'—Meadows, T. T.: *The Chinese and their Rebellions . . . to which is added an Essay on Civilization* (London 1856, Smith Elder), p. 518.

¹ The perversity which thus misuses the cultural heritage of Civilization is of the essence of Barbarism; and it is likewise practised, as we have already observed (on pp. 202–3, above), by those antique barbarians that are recruited direct from the ranks of Primitive Mankind. Its effectiveness, and, by the same token, its deadliness, is, however, far greater when the practitioners are neobarbarians who have been recruited, not from the extremities, but from the heart, of a body social that has broken down and gone into disintegration as a consequence of failure in an attempt at Civilization.

² While Signor Mussolini and his kind would have sincerely and indignantly repudiated the charge that they were leading their followers back to Barbarism, they bore unintended witness against themselves in their own unconscious attitudes and gestures. See L. S. Woolf: *Quack! Quack!* (London 1935, Hogarth Press) for synoptic photographs showing snapshots of Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler addressing their followers set side by side with the 'still life' of graven images of barbarian war-gods. The unmistakable resemblance is as instructive as it is amusing.

³ Signor Mussolini in an interview given to the French publicist Monsieur de Kerillis, quoted in *The Times*, 1st August, 1935.

unpalatable truth we find ourselves compelled to trace back the origin of the neobarbarism in our midst to earlier events than the formation of the first *fascii di combattimento* in a post-war Italy. Are not these latter-day Italian Fascist war-bands the spiritual descendants of the ships'-crews of certain Elizabethan patron saints of the British Empire—a beard-singeing Drake and a slave-trading Hawkins?¹ To a Castilian historian the affiliation must be plain; and a Hindu philosopher who had the discernment to recognize, and the generosity to declare, that a conscience-smitten generation of post-war Englishmen and Englishwomen was sincerely and earnestly striving to shake off a disreputable English past might ask us gently—in a voice half compassionate and half ironic—whether we were really still so ignorant of the workings of the Universe as to flatter ourselves that a single good resolution would suffice to release us from a load of *karma* which had been accumulated for us by twelve successive generations of impenitently imperialist ancestors.

But must we not pursue our importunate question still farther? Ought we not to remind ourselves, at the close of this chapter, of our observation that, in the warfare between external proletariats and dominant minorities, it is usually the dominant minorities that denounce themselves as the aggressors by being the first to declare war and to take the offensive?² We have always to remember that the annals of this warfare between 'Civilization' and 'Barbarism', like those of the warfare between the sedentary societies and the Nomads,³ have been written almost exclusively by members of one only of the two parties to the dispute. The classic picture of the external proletarian, which portrays him in the act of carrying his barbarous fire and slaughter into the fair domain of some defenceless civilization, is therefore likely, *a priori*, to be not so much an objective presentation of the truth as an expression of the 'civilized' party's resentment at being made the target of a counter-attack which his own previous aggression has in due course brought down upon his head. The complaint against the barbarian, as drafted by his mortal enemy's pen, perhaps amounts to little more than an elaborate variation upon a simple theme which has been 'shown up' once for all by a nineteenth-century French wit:

Cet animal est très méchant:
Quand on l'attaque, il se défend!⁴

¹ This point has been touched upon, by anticipation, in I. B (i), vol. i, p. 18, above.

² See the present chapter, pp. 201-3, above.

³ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 18, footnote 1, above.

⁴ 'Théodore P. K.': *La Ménagerie* (1868).

4. *Alien and Indigenous Inspirations*

The first criterion that we have applied in order to determine whether a particular civilization, in a particular stage of its history, is in process of disintegration has been the appearance of schism in the body social;¹ and in the course of a long empirical survey we have made ourselves familiar with the lines along which a disintegrating civilization is apt to split, and also with the composition and nature and characteristic works of each of the resulting fractions of the broken-down society. The tripartite division of a disintegrating civilization into three such fractions—a Dominant Minority and an Internal and an External Proletariat—was originally accepted at an early point in this Study² as a provisional working hypothesis on the strength of the single case of the breakdown and disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization. Our present muster of other examples will perhaps have confirmed us in the belief that these are, in fact, the three camps into which any disintegrating civilization tends to divide against itself; and in the light of our survey we shall perhaps also have come to the conclusion that the characteristic works of dominant minorities are schools of philosophy and universal states, and that internal proletariats display their creative power in the creation of 'higher religions' and of universal churches, while external proletariats express themselves in barbarian or dissenting religions and in 'heroic' poetry. Now that we have completed our study of schism in the body social, the next step that suggests itself is to attempt a complementary study of schism in the Soul. But, before we turn the page, we may pause to ask ourselves whether the foregoing investigation suggests any general considerations that may be worth dwelling upon for a moment.

One question of the kind, which almost thrusts itself upon our attention at this point, is that of the source from which the inspirations of these creative works of a disintegrating civilization are derived.

Our earliest definition of societies of the species 'civilizations' was that they were 'intelligible fields of study';³ and this empirical account of them, from the subjective standpoint of an historical observer, turned out to carry with it certain implications about the objective nature of the field of observation. It meant that, on the whole, the course of the lives of civilizations was self-determined, so that, for the most part, this course could be studied and understood in and by itself, without requiring constant allowance for

¹ See V. C (i) (b), pp. 23-35, above.

² In I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-2, and I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 52-63, above.

³ See Part I. B, vol. i, above.

the play of alien social forces. In this objective as well as subjective independence we found an important point of difference between civilizations, seen steadily and whole, and those fragments of civilizations called national states which our modern Western egotism has tried to erect into universes in themselves,¹ while our modern Western paganism has bowed down and worshipped them as idols.² In contrast to these fragmentary national units the bodies social of societies in process of civilization appear to have a genuine life of their own. This appearance has been borne out by our study of civilizations in their geneses³ and in their growths;⁴ and so far it has not been dispelled by our subsequent study of them in their breakdowns⁵ and disintegrations.⁶ For, although a disintegrating society may split into fragments, each one of these fragments turns out to be a chip of the old block. We have seen, for example, that even the External Proletariat is recruited (notwithstanding the name with which we have labelled it) from elements that are already within the disintegrating society's field of radiation—even though they may be only on its fringe.⁷ At the same time our survey of the several fractions of societies in disintegration—and this is true, not only of external proletariats, but of internal proletariats and dominant minorities as well—has frequently required us to take alien as well as indigenous actors into account in our efforts to follow the plot of the play. And this frequent call to extend our mental horizon beyond the limits of the particular society momentarily under view—even after allowing these limits their widest construction—in order to understand what is going on, is a definitely new and distinctive element that has entered into our Study at this stage of it.

The empirical survey which we have now just completed has, in fact, made it clear that, while the definition of a civilization as being 'an intelligible field of study' can be accepted virtually without qualification so long as the particular civilization that we are studying is still in growth, this definition can only be maintained with reservations when we come to the disintegration stage. True though it be that the breakdowns of civilizations are due to an inward loss of self-determination and not to any external blows,⁸ it is not true that the process of disintegration, through

¹ See Part I. A, vol. i, pp. 9-13, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), *passim*, in vol. iv, above.

³ See Part II, *passim*, in vols. i and ii, above.

⁴ See Part III, *passim*, in vol. iii, above.

⁵ See Part IV, *passim*, in vol. iv, above.

⁶ See Part V. A, B, and C (i) (c), 1-3, in the present volume, pp. 1-337, above.

⁷ See V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 194-203, above.

⁸ See IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 119-33, above.

which a broken-down civilization has to pass on its way to dissolution, is equally intelligible without reference to external agencies and activities. In the study of the life of a civilization in the disintegration-stage the 'intelligible field' has proved to be distinctly wider than the ambit of the single society that is the immediate object of observation. And this means that, in the process of disintegrating, the substance of a body social does not merely tend to break up into its component elements but also tends at the same time—in consequence of this dislocation—to resume its liberty to enter into new combinations with extraneous elements derived from foreign bodies—just as the physical disintegration of a bar of iron is accompanied by an amalgamation of certain molecules of the metal, which the process of disintegration releases, with molecules of oxygen that are yielded up by the air. The formation of this oxide or rust, through a dislocation of the molecules of the disintegrating material and through the entry of an alien element into the chemical process, is, of course, the outward visible sign that the iron bar is weathering away; and in the disintegration of a body social the intrusion of alien social elements has a corresponding significance. It will be seen that, now that we have come to the study of the disintegrations of civilizations, we are finding that the ground on which we took our stand at the beginning of this Study is slipping away from under our feet. At the beginning we chose civilizations for the objects of our Study just because they presented the appearance of being 'intelligible fields' which lent themselves singly to being studied in isolation. We now find ourselves already on the move from this standpoint towards a different standpoint which we shall have to take up when we examine, in later Parts,¹ the contacts between one civilization and another—in the Space-dimension first and in the Time-dimension later. Meanwhile, in anticipation of this later systematic study of 'contacts' for their own sake, we may find it convenient at this point to distinguish and compare the respective effects of the alien and the indigenous inspirations that can be discerned in the activities of the several fractions of the body social of a civilization that is in process of disintegration.

Our survey has shown us that in the activities of all three fractions—the Dominant Minority as well as the two sections of the Proletariat—alien inspirations are apt to enter in. But if we now cast our minds back over the results of our survey, with our present purpose in view, we shall notice that the effects of these alien inspirations differ—and indeed are diametrically opposite to one another—in different cases, and that the difference

¹ In Parts IX and X, below.

of circumstance which produces the difference of effect is a difference in the identity of the party which is the recipient and exponent of the alien cultural influence. In the works of the Dominant Minority and the External Proletariat an alien inspiration is apt to result in discord and destruction, whereas in the works of the Internal Proletariat it is apt to produce the exactly opposite effects of harmony and creation.

To begin with the Dominant Minority, we may recall the fact—which has been brought out in our survey¹—that the majority of the universal states that are provided for disintegrating civilizations by their dominant minorities are the work of empire-builders who are indigenous to the society for which they are performing this social service. These indigenous empire-builders may be frontiersmen² from the outer edge of the world upon which they confer the blessing of peace through the imposition of political unity; but this origin does not, in itself, convict them of having any alien tinge in their culture.³ At the same time our survey has also brought to our notice certain cases in which the moral débâcle of a Dominant Minority has been so rapid and has gone to such lengths that, by the time when the disintegrating society has arrived at the natural term of its 'Time of Troubles', and is ripe for entering into a universal state, there is no longer any remnant of the original indigenous dominant minority that is still possessed of the empire-building virtues. In these rather rare cases the task of providing a disintegrating civilization with a universal state is not usually allowed to remain unperformed on account of the indigenous dominant minority's default. The usual denouement is for some alien empire-builder to step into the breach and to perform for the ailing society the service that ought to have been performed by native hands.⁴

We have now to observe that this involuntary acceptance of a universal state from an alien source is a practical confession of social bankruptcy, and that such a confession is seldom or never made with impunity. The alien empire-builder's little finger is apt to be thicker than the native empire-builder's loins.⁵ The outsider who intervenes in order to save a situation with which

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 52-5, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 54-5, above. The stimulus of pressures to which the frontiersmen of a society are exposed, and from which, if they respond successfully to this challenge, they thereby shield—or starve—their neighbours of the same culture in the interior of the same world, has been examined in II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 112-208, above. The misdirection—in the malady of Militarism—of the energies that are evoked by a successful response to the stimulus of pressures on a cultural frontier has been examined in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 501-4, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 55-6, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 53-4, and V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 88-95 and 105-17, above.

⁵ 1 Kings, xii. 10.

the indigenous dominant minority has shown itself incompetent to cope is naturally unwilling to undertake this arduous and ungrateful task 'for love'. He recoups himself for his pains in taking command of a desperate situation by charging an exorbitant fee; and since, *ex hypothesi*, he is in power, he can assess this charge at as high a figure as he likes and can exact the payment as harshly as he chooses. The beneficiary—or victim—of the alien empire-builder's high-handed service has precluded himself, in advance, from the possibility of insisting upon fair terms or reasonable accommodation. He has no choice, at the moment, but to pay whatever price may be extorted from him. But, of course, the less he is able to resist, the more bitterly he resents the necessity of submitting. Impotence is transmuted into vindictiveness; and the retaliation which is beyond the subject's power here and now is saved up for a future settlement of scores against a hated master, at compound interest.

This means that the universal peace which an alien empire-builder provides is never perfect—even in a prosaic worldly sense—because it is never able to grow out of being an external repression that depends for its efficacy upon a perpetual exertion of the physical force by which it was imposed in the first instance. This same crude physical force is, no doubt, the usual means by which any empire-builder—alien or indigenous—establishes his authority at the moment when he is actually founding his universal state; for the 'Time of Troubles', upon which the universal state supervenes, is in its essence an age of violence, and the final paroxysm of this frenzy is usually the worst.¹ Even the best-intentioned and highest-minded empire-builder can hardly be expected to do his business without behaving in the fashion of his age to some extent; and indeed this hardly avoidable initial recourse to violent means seldom provokes any deep resentment; for 'beggars cannot be choosers', and a society which has travelled so far along the path of disintegration as to have reached the culmination of its 'Time of Troubles' must, *ex hypothesi*, have been so cruelly buffeted and battered by the lawless play of force already that by this time, most likely, it will be prepared to acquiesce in one more bout of violence if, at this price, there is some hope of its being able at last to purchase admission into the haven of a genuine and enduring peace. On this account all universal states—whether their founders are natives or strangers—are apt to be accepted with resignation, if not with enthusiasm, at the outset; and it is only in the later chapters of the story that divergences begin to appear in the development of the relations between the rulers and

¹ For evidence of this see V. C (ii) (b), *passim*, in vol. vi, below.

their subjects. When these divergences do appear, however, they tend to be sharply marked.

In general we find that in a universal state which has been established by native hands—as the Hellenic universal state was established by the hands of the Roman frontiersmen of the Hellenic World¹—Time heals the wounds that the work of empire-building has inflicted, and transforms a submission extorted by force into an allegiance accorded by consent or even tendered with enthusiasm.

In the history of the Hellenic Society the Age of the Antonines—though this was but a brief 'Indian Summer' which might delay, but could not avert, the onset of the winter storms²—did at least achieve one notable permanent moral result in the conversion of the Greek Republic of Letters from a passive hostility and resentment³ to an active affection and gratitude towards the Roman Empire. The successors of Greek philosophers and rhetoricians who had still remained unreconciled to Roman rule in the time of the Emperor Domitian (*imperabat* A.D. 81–96), which was already more than a hundred years removed from the date of the original establishment of the *Pax Augusta* in 31 B.C. over the dead body of the last of the Greek Great Powers, were moved by the time of Marcus (*imperabat* A.D. 161–180) to return to the 'real life' of their day—from the asylum of an archaistic wonderland into which they had made their pedantic way through a literary looking-glass⁴—in order to add their cultivated Greek voices to a swelling chorus of praise with which Dea Roma was now being honoured, in all sincerity, by the loyal descendants of her formerly disaffected subjects. Let us listen for a moment to the voice of the Emperor Marcus's academic contemporary Publius Aelius Aristides, who knew how to express, in Greek that was both elegant and eloquent, the sentiments of millions of his British and Arabian and Pontic and Mauretanian fellow-subjects:

'You have made one single household of the entire Inhabited World. . . . Before the establishment of your empire the World was in confusion, upside down, adrift and out of control; but as soon as you Romans intervened the turmoils and factions ceased, and life and politics were illumined by the dawn of an era of universal order . . . so that to-day the Earth and all they that dwell therein are endowed with a clear and comprehensive security. . . .

'The entire Inhabited World now speaks with one voice in closer

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 161–4, above.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 58–61, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 55–6, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 8 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 78–80, below.

unison than a chorus; and the common prayer which this oecumenical chorus utters is for the eternal duration of a Roman Empire which is kept in such masterly order by its emperor-conductor. . . . You Romans are the only rulers known to History who have reigned over freemen. . . . You have endowed the entire Inhabited World with the constitutional liberties of a world-wide city-state. . . . The lustre of your rule is unsullied by any breath of ungenerous hostility; and that is because you yourselves set the example of generosity by sharing all your power and privileges with your subjects . . . with the result that in your day a combination has been achieved which previously appeared quite impossible—the combination of consummate power with consummate benevolence. . . . No one is debarred from being a citizen of Rome either by an estranging sea or by an intervening continent. In this matter no distinction has been drawn between Europe and Asia. Every privilege of Roman citizenship lies within everyone's reach, and no one is treated as an alien who is worthy of responsibility and trust. In fact, the Roman Empire is a world-wide democracy under the governance of one supreme magistrate who is singled out for his pre-eminence in virtue; and Mankind comes together in a common forum where each can be sure of receiving fair measure. As an ordinary city-state stands to its own parochial territory, so stands this city of Rome to the entire Inhabited World. Rome is a town which has the World for its countryside. Rome is a citadel which has all the peoples of the Earth for its villagers. And Rome has never failed those who have looked to her. As the surface of the Earth bears all Mankind, so Rome receives all the peoples of the Earth into her bosom, as the rivers are received by the Sea. And this likeness of Rome to the Sea extends to a further point. The sea is not increased in volume by the inflow of the rivers. There seems to be some law of Nature which adjusts the Sea's capacity to the rivers' discharge. And it is the same with Rome: she does not run to any unseemly enormity, but . . . ever keeps and displays her own proper proportions.¹

This Greek panegyric of Rome from the second century of the Christian Era may be capped with the Latin testimony of two poets who were writing about a quarter of a millennium later than Aristeides, the one just before, and the other just after, the débâcle of A.D. 406–10,² and who came from the opposite extremities of the *Orbis Romanus*—the one from Egypt and the other from Gaul.

This is how Rome is addressed by Claudian of Alexandria in a Latin which was a *tour de force* in the mouth of a Greek citizen of the Roman Commonwealth:

Haec est, in gremium victos quae sola recepit,
humanumque genus communi nomine fovit

¹ Aristeides, P. Aelius: *In Romam*, pp. 396, 360, 362, 376, 373–4.

² Claudian's Third Book *De Consulatu Stilichonis* appears to have been written in A.D. 400, Rutilius's *De Reditu Suo* in A.D. 416.

matris, non dominae, ritu, civesque vocavit
quos domuit, nexuque pio longinqua revinxit.¹

And this is how she is addressed by the Gaul Rutilius in a Latin which was likewise an alien tongue in the mouth of a descendant of Celtic-speaking barbarians:

Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam:
profuit invitis, te dominante, capi;
dumque offers victis proprii consortia iuris,
Urbem fecisti quod prius Orbis erat.
auctores generis Venerem Martemque fatemur,
Aeneadum matrem Romulidumque patrem:
mitigat armatas victrix clementia vires;
convenit in mores numen utrumque tuos.
hinc tibi certandi bona parcendique voluptas:
quos timuit, superat; quos superavit, amat. . . .
te, dea, te celebrat Romanus ubique recessus,
pacificoque gerit libera colla iugo.
omnia perpetuo quae servant sidera motu
nullum viderunt pulchrius imperium.²

The Gallic poet who, in A.D. 416,³ made this famous declaration of admiration and love for a Rome that, six years earlier, had been smitten and humiliated by the hand of Alaric,⁴ had inherited the right to utter these ardent words; for he was descended from ancestors who had been brought under Roman rule by force of arms—and this, at the earliest, not very much more than five hundred years before the poet's own day.⁵ Rutilius was moved

¹ Claudian: *De Consulatu Stilichonis*, Book III, ll. 150-3.

² Rutilius Namatianus, C.: *De Reditu Suo*, Book I, ll. 63-72 and 79-82.

³ A.U.C. 1169 (Book I, ll. 135-6) = A.D. 416.

⁴ The memory of the *Clades Gothica* was still fresh in Rutilius's mind (ll. 39-42 and 115-44). For the impression which the news of the capture of Rome by Alaric had made, at the time, upon the minds of Saint Jerome and Saint Augustine, see V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 223-5, above. Between Saint Jerome's letter on the subject, which has been quoted in V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 223, footnote 2, above, and the first four lines of the passage just quoted, in the present context, from Rutilius's poem, there is a twofold verbal correspondence. Saint Jerome's *capitur Urbs quae totum cepit Orbem* has recognizable echoes in Rutilius's *capit* and in his *Urbem-Orbis*. The chronological facts would allow us to account for these echoes by supposing that Rutilius had read and remembered Jerome's words; for Jerome's letter seems to have been written *circa* A.D. 412, while Rutilius tells us (see the preceding footnote) that the date of his poem is A.D. 416. But this chronological possibility is a psychological impossibility and an historical improbability; for Rutilius, as he also tells us in his poem, had a violent hatred for Christian anchorites and all their works; he would never have been willing to be consciously beholden to Saint Jerome for a phrase or an idea; and it is most unlikely that a letter addressed by Jerome, from Bethlehem, to a Christian correspondent should have come into Rutilius's hands during the Gallic poet's sojourn in Rome as *Praefectus Urbi* in A.D. 414, even if Jerome's correspondent Principia was still resident in Rome in A.D. 412. We must therefore assume that the figures of speech that are common to these two approximately contemporary pieces of Latin literature were commonplace which were 'in the air' in the second decade of the fifth century of the Christian Era. We can, indeed, already discern them in embryo in the passage, already ancient in Jerome's and Rutilius's day, which we have quoted above from Aelius Aristeides.

⁵ That is to say, if the poet's home (which he does not deign to mention precisely) lay in Gallia Narbonensis. If it lay beyond the Rhône and the Cevennes, somewhere

to write by the emotions that welled up within him as he travelled back to his Gallic home after a sojourn in the Imperial City. The feeling that chiefly inspired him was home-sickness; but the home that held his affection was the spiritual home that he was now leaving, and not the distant countryside that was his birthplace and habitual domicile.

At mea dilectis fortuna revellitur oris,
indigenamque suum Gallica rura vocant.¹

And his year's sojourn in the metropolis of his world has been all too short for his taste.

Velocem potius reditum mirabere, lector,
tam cito Romuleis posse carere bonis.
quid longum toto Romam venerantibus aevo?
nil unquam longumst quod sine fine placet.²

Nor is this surprising in Rutilius's case; for the business which had brought him on this long journey to the city that had forcibly imposed her yoke upon his forebears' necks was not the payment of a tribute or the performance of a *corvée* but was a call to investiture with one of the most distinguished offices of state—and this not some oecumenical magistracy which was concerned with the Empire as a whole, but the distinctively metropolitan *Praefectura Urbis*, which might well have been reserved—if any Roman public honour had been thus reserved in this age—for Roman citizens who had been born and bred within the precincts of the city. These happy beings were objects of the departing poet-prefect's wistful and respectful envy.

O quater et quotiens non est numerare beatos
nasci felici quo meruere solo!³

And his gratitude overflowed at the thought that he had been generously summoned from his own provincial birthplace in order to be co-opted into this goodly company.⁴ No wonder that, as he left the city of his dreams after having lingered there for more than twelve months beyond the end of his golden year of office, Rutilius had to shame himself into a faint blush of human

in that larger part of Gaul which had first been brought under Roman rule by Caesar, then Rutilius was a Roman *ressortissant* of less than five hundred years' hereditary standing. ¹ Book I, ll. 19–20. ² Book I, ll. 1–4. ³ Book I, ll. 5–6.

⁴ The list of those doubly-distinguished Prefects of the City who, unlike Rutilius, were of metropolitan origin, was not to close before it had included the future Pope Gregory the Great, who appears to have held the *Praefectura Urbis* in or about the year A.D. 573 (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 267, above), some 160 years after Rutilius, who appears to have held the office in A.D. 414. In Rutilius's own words (Book I, ll. 7–8) Gregory was one of those

Qui Romanorum procerum generosa propago
ingenitum cumulant Urbis honore decus.

feeling for his dull Gallic native land by reminding himself that her war-scarred countenance had a claim upon his pity.

Sed quam grata minus, tam miseranda magis.¹

In the lines² immediately following the first of the passages that have been quoted above, the poet goes on to throw into relief the greatness and goodness of the Roman Empire against a foil which he finds in the work of other empire-builders; and it is interesting to observe the uniformly alien origin of the examples that he picks out: the Assyrians who afflicted a Syriac World with a Babylonian reign of terror; the Medes who imposed a Syriac rule upon their Assyrian oppressors; the Macedonian *conquistadores* who won for Hellenism a dominion over the domain of a Syriac universal state that embraced the Egyptian and the Babylonian World as well as the Syriac; the Eurasian Nomad Parthians who usurped the heritage of the Achaemenids' Seleucid successors.

It was assuredly true that the Gallic poet's crowning eulogy of Rome—'Quod regnas minus est quam quod regnare mereris'³—would never have been uttered by any of these alien empire-builders' subjects—not even in the evening of their reign, when Time had done all that he could to temper the odiousness of their rule with the opiate of familiarity. The Babylonian priests who welcomed Alexander as a deliverer in 331 B.C. were more bitterly hostile to the Achaemenian régime than their predecessors had been two hundred and eight years back, when, in 539 B.C., they had seen the first Achaemenian conqueror, Cyrus, ride in.⁴ And their pent-up feelings burst out with all the greater violence because, for the past century and a half, they had been too heavily crushed to repeat the periodical armed revolts with which they had enlivened the first half-century of their subjection to an alien Syriac yoke. Alexander's reception by the Babylonians may remind an English scholar of the Hindus' acquiescence in the British Rāj in the early days when there was still a popular memory of the more obnoxious alien régime of the Mughals;⁵ and on this analogy we may conjecture that, if the Babylonian Civilization had not solved all its problems by the *ultima ratio* of becoming extinct in the last century B.C.,⁶ Hellenism

¹ Book I, l. 22.

² Book I, ll. 83-6.

³ Book I, l. 91.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 100, footnote 4, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 94 and 123, with footnote 2, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 187-8, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 442, below.

⁵ The Babylonians' attitude towards the Hellenic culture appears to have resembled the Hindus' attitude towards the Western culture. They readily adopted the externals, but were careful to keep the heart of their own culture intact (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 56-60).

⁶ The latest document in the Akkadian language and cuneiform script that has yet been recovered by our modern Western archaeologists dates from 7 B.C. (Tarn, op. cit., p. 57).

might eventually have come to stink in Babylonian nostrils as odiously as the Western Civilization which is embodied in the British régime has actually come to stink in the nostrils of our latter-day Bengali revolutionaries. Certainly the alien *Pax Ottomanica* which had been welcomed in the first quarter of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era by the Greek adherents of the founder of the Ottoman Commonwealth on the Asiatic shores of the Marmara had become an object of loathing to the Greeks who rose in the Morea and in Rumili against the Government of Sultan Mahmūd II in A.D. 1821. In this case the passage of five centuries had produced in Greece a change of sentiment which was the exact inverse of the change in Gaul from the Romano-phobia of a Vercingetorix to the Romano-philia of a Rutilius Namatianus or a Sidonius Apollināris.

Another prominent example of the hatred that is aroused by empire-builders with an alien culture is the animosity of the Chinese towards the Mongol conquerors who provided a distracted Far Eastern World with a sorely needed universal state.¹

The vehemence of this Chinese feeling will impress us when we remind ourselves that the tincture of alien civilization which the Mongols had acquired² before they took it upon themselves to provide the Far East with a *Pax Mongolica* was far too slight to discolour more than infinitesimally the straightforward and inoffensive barbarism which was their native hue. Yet, faint though it was, this taint of discoloration never escaped the sharp sight of the Mongols' Chinese subjects and also never won pardon from their resentful hearts. To a distant observer's eyes the difference of tint between the fly-blown barbarism of the Mongols and the uncontaminated barbarism of the Manchus, who eventually re-established the Far Eastern universal state which the Mongols had originally founded, is so fine that it is barely perceptible, even under a scholar's lens. Yet this fine shade made a world of difference between the respective outcomes of the Mongol and the Manchu attempts at an identical enterprise.

The Mongols were expelled from China, neck and crop,³ only ninety-two years after Qubilai's capture of Hangchow;⁴ the Manchus were suffered to reign over China for the 267 years that elapsed between their entry into Peking in A.D. 1644 and the

¹ This has been touched upon by anticipation in Part V. A, pp. 3-4, and in V. C (i) (c) 1, p. 54, above.

² See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 237-8; Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 451; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 309, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121, above.

⁴ Hangchow capitulated to Qubilai's general Bayan in A.D. 1276; Qubilai's successor Tughān Timūr was driven out beyond the Great Wall in A.D. 1368.

Chinese Revolution which extinguished their effective authority in the same city in A.D. 1911. And, even then, the treatment which the discomfited Manchus received at Chinese hands was entirely different from that which had been meted out to their Mongol forerunners. The Mongols, with their indelible brand of uncleanness in Chinese eyes, had been physically expelled to the farther side of the Great Wall and had then and there resumed with ease—and possibly with relief—their great-grandfathers' nomadic life on their great-grandfathers' pasture-lands. The Sinitized epigoni of the Manchu conquerors who were put down from their seat in 1911 had by then long since lost all personal touch with their ancestral homes far away in the forests above the headwaters of the Sungari. And, if they had been returned, on disapproval, to this wilderness beyond the pale which was their historical place of origin, they would have been no more capable of resuming the pristine Manchu way of life than a butterfly is capable of resuming the life of a caterpillar. Marooned in the Manchurian forests, these latter-day Manchu princes and 'bannermen' would have perished as helplessly there as a Chinese litteratus or a Mongol new-born baby; and their former Chinese subjects, who had opposed them without animus and deposed them without vindictiveness, did not now expose them to this fate. They showed a nicer tact—and perhaps also a keener malice—in simply leaving them where they were, to sink unromantically, like lumps of lead, from the top to the bottom of the social scale of a Far Eastern Civilization that these *ci-devant* barbarians had embraced 'to have and to hold . . . for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health'.

This Chinese tolerance—at first respectful and finally contemptuous—towards the Manchus in the mandarins' midst presents a striking contrast to the violence of the antagonism which the Mongols, with their alien henchmen, excited in Chinese breasts from the beginning to the end of the Mongols' ill-starred attempt to play the part of the Imperial people in a Far Eastern universal state. That Chinese feeling is made manifest in two incidents which have been recorded by a Western Christian man of affairs who worked in China in the service of the Mongol Khāqān Qubilay. In the one case the targets of Chinese xenophobia were Orthodox Christian soldiers; in the other case they were Muslim administrators; but the temper of both Chinese out-breaks was the same.

The story of the encounter between Qubilay's Orthodox Christian soldiers and the Chinese civilian population of a Far Eastern World on which the Mongols were unable to impose their peace

without making a desert of it first¹ is recounted by Marco Polo as follows:

'At the time of the conquest of the great province of Manzi [the Empire of the Sung], when Bayan was in command, he sent a company of his troops, consisting of a people called Alans, who are Christians,² to take this city [of Changchow]. They took it accordingly; and, when they had made their way in, they lighted upon some good wine. Of this they drank until they were all drunk, and then they lay down and slept like so many swine. So, when night fell, the townspeople, seeing that they were all dead-drunk, fell upon them and slew them all; not a man escaped. And, when Bayan heard that the townspeople had thus treacherously slain his men, he sent another admiral of his with a great force, and stormed the city, and put the whole of the inhabitants to the sword.'³

The story of the anti-Muslim conspiracy is still more illuminating, since the feeling which it reveals is not the hot-blooded homicidal mania that breaks out where there is a state of war, but is a colder animosity which smoulders on in peace-time.

'A certain Saracen named Ahmad [from Banākath or Fanākant in Transoxania], a shrewd and able man, . . . had more power and influence with the Great Khan [Qubilai] than any of the others; and the Khan held him in such regard that he could do what he pleased. . . . In such authority did this man continue for two-and-twenty years. At last the people of the country, to wit the Cathayans [i.e., the Chinese], utterly wearied with the endless outrages and abominable iniquities which he perpetrated against them, . . . conspired to slay him and revolt against the Government. . . . [The principal conspirators, who were two Chinese military officers in Qubilai's service with commands at Peking,] sent word to their friends in many other cities that they had determined on such a day, at the signal given by a beacon, to massacre all the men with beards, and that the other cities should stand ready to do the like on seeing the signal fires. The reason why they spoke of massacring the bearded men was that the Cathayans naturally have no beard, whilst beards are worn by the Tatars, Saracens and Christians. And you should know that all the Cathayans detested the Great Khan's rule because he set over them governors who were Tatars, or still more frequently Saracens, and these they could not endure, for they were treated by them just like slaves. You see, the Great Khan had not

¹ 'Ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.'—Tacitus: *Agricola*, chap. 30, *ad fin.*

² The Alans were a rear-guard of the Sarmatian Nomads who had lingered on in the borderland between the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe and the northern foot-hills of the Caucasus. Their conversion to Christianity in the eighth century of the Christian Era had been one of the earliest cultural conquests of a nascent Orthodox Christian Civilization; and the descendants of these converts had survived to be overtaken by the tidal wave of Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, and to find their deaths, in the circumstances here described, at the opposite end of their new masters' immense dominions. (For the conversion of the Alans see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 64, above.)—A. J. T.

³ Polo, Marco: *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, translated and edited by Colonel Sir Henry Yule, 3rd edition (London 1903, John Murray, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 178–9 = Book II, chap. 74.

succeeded to the dominion of Cathay by hereditary right, but held it by conquest; and thus, having no confidence in the natives, he put all authority into the hands of Tatars, Saracens or Christians who were attached to his household and devoted to his service, and were foreigners in Cathay.¹

The measure of the hostility which is evoked by alien authors of universal states—a hostility which is evidently only exacerbated, instead of being mitigated, by the passage of Time—is given by the uniformly fanatical *éthos* of the thoroughbred indigenous régimes which sometimes succeed in bringing such alien universal states to a premature end. This touch of fanaticism is shared by the Ming, who expelled the Mongols from China between A.D. 1351 and A.D. 1368,² with the Marāthās who were the ex-cutors of the Hindu Society's revenge upon the Mughals in the eighteenth century; and we can detect the same temper, not only in the anti-British revolutionary movement in twentieth-century Bengal, but also in the successive Babylonian revolts against Darius the Great and Xerxes, and in the Moreot Greek revolt against Ottoman rule in A.D. 1821.

A no less fanatical temper is apt to be evoked by barbarians with a tinge of alien culture when they present themselves in their normal role of predatory members of the External Proletariat without having gone out of their way to take upon themselves a Dominant Minority's neglected task of establishing a universal state. For example, the Hyksos, who broke into the domain of the Egyptiac Society after the break-up of the indigenous Egyptiac universal state that is known as 'the Middle Empire', were hated with as burning a hatred, and were expelled at the first opportunity, neck and crop, in as vehement a *Befreiungskrieg*,³ as the Mongol trespassers upon the sacred soil of China; and this similarity of the emotional reaction in two encounters which were so widely separated in Time as well as in Space is satisfactorily explained by the identity of the colour of the rag which in each case infuriated the bull. It was the alien Sumeric tinge in the culture of the Hyksos that made the Egyptians 'see red', as it was the alien Far Eastern Christian tinge in the culture of the Mongols that madened the Chinese. And in the Egyptiac case, as in the Far Eastern, our explanation is borne out by the contrast between this morbid fury and the common-sense stolidity with which the momentary maniac afterwards put up with a visitation from a second uninvited guest who was equally unwelcome in himself

¹ Ibid., vol. i, pp. 416-18=Book II, chap. 23.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 121-2, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 417, above.

³ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 139, footnote 1, and p. 144; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 412; Part V. A, in the present volume, pp. 2-3; and V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 152, above.

but who happened to be innocent of the one offence that was unforgivable.

We have seen that the Far Eastern universal state which had originally been founded, with such explosive consequences, by the Mongols, was eventually re-established with impunity by Manchus whose sole, but decisive, point of diversity from their Mongol predecessors lay in the fact that their barbarism was free from any alien cultural taint. There is a parallel in Egyptiac history to this repetition-with-a-difference; ¹for, when the Egyptiac universal state had been re-established in the shape of 'the New Empire' by the Theban expeller of the Hyksos, Amosis, and when 'the new Empire', in its turn, was overtaken by the decadence into which 'the Middle Empire' had fallen in its day, two new barbarian clouds appeared, as we have seen, above the Egyptiac dominant minority's horizon. In the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. a decaying Egyptian Empire was assaulted simultaneously by sea-peoples from the Aegean (the mingled destroyers and survivors of a broken-down Minoan 'thalassocracy') and by Libyan Nomads from the African side of the Afrasian Steppe; ²and in resisting the assailants of Minoan complexion the military emperors of the Nineteenth Dynasty and their immediate successor the second emperor of the Twentieth Dynasty, Ramses III, displayed the same energy as the formidable militarists of the Eighteenth Dynasty—Amosis himself or the first and the third Thothmes—in contrast to the unwarlike intervening reigns of the third and the fourth Amenhotep. ³In so far as the Libyans made common cause with the invaders from the Aegean in this age, both assailants were repelled with equal animosity, and also with equal success, by the pugnacious holders of the beleaguered Egyptiac fort. ⁴But an extraordinary change of temper came over Egyptiac souls after Ramses III, *circa* 1200/1190 B.C., had expended the last ounce of energy that remained in the Egyptiac body social on the task of stemming the last and greatest tidal wave of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung. Thereafter, when the sea-peoples' offensive had been brought to a halt, once for all, at the Asiatic gates of Egypt between Pelusium and Gaza, the Libyan barbarians from beyond the North-West African frontier of the Egyptiac World found themselves knocking at an open

¹ This parallel has been mentioned, by anticipation, in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 421–3, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 93, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 236–7 and 269–70, above.

³ Amenhotep IV is, of course, identical with the Imperial heretic Ikhnaton.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 93 and 101; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 422; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 237 and 269, above; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below.

door as soon as they sought admission by, as well as for, themselves, without any obnoxious confederates from the Aegean to cast doubt upon the Libyans' own clean bill of social health as untainted barbarians.

During the period of social prostration which followed the death of Ramses III (*imperabat circa 1200-1168 B.C.*),¹ the *rois fainéants* who make up the rest of the tale of the Twentieth Egyptian Dynasty allowed the descendants of the Libyan aggressors, who had repeatedly been hurled back by these shadow-emperors' predecessors, to encroach upon the sacred soil of the Egyptian World step by step—with no single step ever effectively opposed—in the role of brigands and mercenaries. And by the tenth century B.C. we find these impudent Libyan intruders in command of all the provinces that had not been reserved by the Egyptian priesthood for the benefit of their own new-fangled temple-states.² These sacerdotal legatees of the Egyptian dominant minority and internal proletariat were evidently at this date in virtual collusion with the external proletariat's Libyan representatives; and at first sight it seems extraordinary that this Libyan barbarism should have been tolerated, at these close quarters, by a fanatically-minded hierarchy which had shown itself uniformly intransigent towards the Philistines as well as towards the Hyksos. On second thoughts, however, we may conjecture that the Libyan interlopers' unmitigated barbarism was the quality which commended them to the complacent proprietors of the domain on which they were now unobtrusively trespassing. To the professional eye of trustees of the Egyptian tradition who were capable of taking a long view, these shapeless plastic lumps of Libyan clay were less disconcerting than those rudimentary Philistine and Hyksos figurines which had begun to set hard in an alien mould before ever they were thrown upon an Egyptian potter's wheel.

A similar preference for the raw over the 'semi-manufactured' barbarian made itself manifest in the Syriac World during the interregnum (*durabat circa A.D. 975-1275*) which was the final

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 101, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 422, footnote 3, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 269-70, above. The process is described as follows by Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (1), second edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 589: '[After their defeat at the hands of Ramses III] the Libyan tribes did not ever attempt any further invasions [of the Egyptian World], so far as we know; but their peaceful dissemination over Egypt (a process which was promoted by Ramses' settlements [of Libyan prisoners of war on Egyptian soil]) went forward all the more vigorously for that. At the same time the [Egyptian] army drew on the Libyans more and more heavily for recruits. . . . As, at the same time, the enlistment of mercenaries from overseas [i.e. from the Minoan World] entirely came to an end after Ramses III's day, and the military vigour of the [native] Egyptians died away to vanishing point, these Libyan troops gradually became the only militarily effective portion of the Egyptian army. The consequence was that, two hundred years later, under Shoshenq I, these Libyans who had been Egypt's serfs converted themselves into Egypt's masters.'

chapter in its long history. Of all the barbarians who, in this age, fell upon the Syriac Society's moribund carcass, the Franks were perhaps the least barbarous. They were, indeed, the children of an adolescent Western Christian Civilization which had already begun to develop a distinctive culture of its own; and—perhaps just on this account—they were invariably rejected by the *Plebs Syriaca* in favour of alternative barbarian masters, wherever and whenever there was a choice. In the derelict domain of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula the victimized provincials put their necks under the successive yokes of the Murābit Sanhāja Berber Nomads,¹ who were as barbarous in fact as in name, and of the Muwahhid Masmuda Berber highlanders,² who out-berbered the Murābits, rather than submit to the dominion of the Basque and Asturian Christian barbarians with their reinforcements from the French side of the Pyrenees.³ In the derelict domain of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Syria the provincials who had been conquered by the Frankish founders of the Crusader principalities⁴ made a corresponding choice when they welcomed as deliverers the Turkish and Kurdish barbarian war-bands⁵ of Zengi and Nūr-ad-Din and Shīrkūh and Saladin.

We can perhaps even venture to formulate something like a general social 'law' to the effect that the barbarian invaders who present themselves free from any cultural taint are apt to make their fortunes—and this even if they persist in their barbarian paganism instead of abandoning it in favour of the orthodox religion of their newly conquered subjects—while those who, before their Völkerwanderung, have acquired either an alien or a heretical tinge must go out of their way to purge themselves of the unclean thing, through some positive act of conversion which their subjects will accept as satisfactory, if they are to escape an otherwise inevitable doom of being either ejected or exterminated.⁶

To take the undiluted barbarians first, we may remind ourselves

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 204, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 247, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 204, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 247, above.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 204-6, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 242-4, above.

⁴ For the Crusades see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 38; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 362-3; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 242-4 and 247, above.

⁵ The Kurdish, unlike the Turkish, warriors who supplied the man-power for this counter-offensive were not in the strict sense members of the external proletariat of the Syriac World. They were an imperfectly tamed highland community in the heart of the Syriac World—who like the Ghūri highlanders of North-Eastern Iran (see IV. C (i) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 99, footnote 1, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 304, above)—had reasserted their barbarian independence upon the downfall of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, as the Isaurians and the Basques had reasserted theirs upon the downfall of the Roman Empire (see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 206, footnote 1, above).

⁶ This 'law' that can be seen at work in the diversity of the fortunes of barbarian conquerors is a particular application of a still wider 'law' which Ibn Khaldūn has brought to light in the field of the arts and sciences (*Muqaddamāt*, de Slane's translation (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 366-7: chapter headed: 'He

that the Aryas and the Hittites and the Achaeans, who each invented a barbarian pantheon of their own during their sojourn on the threshold of a civilization,¹ and who persisted in this authentic barbarian worship after they had broken through and made their conquests, each also succeeded, notwithstanding this 'invincible ignorance', in becoming the fathers of new civilizations: the Indic, the Hittite, and the Hellenic. As for the Kassites and the Parthians, who made a half-hearted and ineffective compromise between the religion which they had brought in with them and the religion which they found in the conquered land, even they were rewarded for their innocence of any alien cultural taint² by being suffered to enjoy a parasitic dominion which was as protracted as it was inglorious, before the society upon which they had billeted themselves lost patience at last and spued out of her mouth these lukewarm Laodiceans.³ When we pass on to the undiluted barbarians who have been converted whole-heartedly from their own barbarian religion to the orthodox faith of their subjects—whatever that faith may have been in any given case⁴—we find that these robust converts have won the signal reward of being co-opted into the fellowship of a civilization which has not owed its origin to their endeavours, and which might, if it had chosen, have gone on its own way without accepting their services.

For example, the Frankish and English and Scandinavian and Polish and Magyar converts from a native paganism to the Western Catholic Christianity secured the opportunity to play a full, and even a leading, part in the building up of Western Christendom. The conversion of the Sakas and the White Huns and the Gurjaras to Hinduism enabled the Sakas to contribute to the foundation of a Hindu universal church in the course of the who possesses the capacity for practising some particular art very rarely manages to acquire another art perfectly):

'A tailor, for instance, who possesses a capacity for sewing, who uses it with the greatest skill, who is really master of his art, and who has made it part and parcel of himself, will be unable afterwards to acquire, to perfection, the art of being a cabinet-maker or a mason. If he did achieve this, that would mean that he did not yet possess, to perfection, the former capacity; it would mean that the dye of that capacity in him had not yet taken fast. Here is the explanation: it is that the capacities—being attributes of the Soul or colours which the Soul is apt to take—cannot overlay one another on the Soul and can only settle on the Soul one at a time. In order to acquire a capacity easily, and to be in a favourable condition for the reception of it, the Soul must be in the primitive state of its nature. Afterwards, when it takes the colour of this or that capacity, it departs from its primitive state; and, since the tincture which has now just been imparted to it is bound to have weakened in the Soul its aptitude for receiving another tincture, the Soul no longer has as much strength as before for acquiring a second faculty.'

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 96-7; II. D (vii), Annex V, vol. ii, pp. 434-7; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 230-3, above.

² The Philhellenism of the Parthians was so superficial that it can hardly have counted among the offences for which the Parthians were eventually condemned and executed by the Syriac 'Zealots' of the Zoroastrian persuasion (see V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 216 and 240, above).

³ Rev. iii. 16.

⁴ For the general principle of policy that may be summed up in the maxim '*Religio Regionis Religio Regis*' see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 704-12, below.

first four centuries of the Christian Era,¹ and the Huns and Gurjaras to play, in the first chapter of the history of the resulting Hindu Civilization, the part which was played in the first chapter of our Western history by the Franks.² Similarly, the conversion to Buddhism of the Kushans when they crossed the Hindu Kush,³ and of the To Pa when they established themselves in Shansi,⁴ conferred upon the Kushans the privilege of serving to speed a nascent Mahāyāna on its way across the Oxus from India to the Far East,⁵ while the subsequent acceptance of the full-blown Catholic Mahāyāna by the To Pa singled out these hitherto obscure Eurasian Nomads to enjoy the honour of laying the foundations for the Far Eastern United Kingdom of the Sui and the T'ang.⁶ In the post-Syriac interregnum the conversion of the Saljūqs on the one side and the Murābits and Muwāhids on the other to the Sunnah⁷ cast these Turks and Berbers for the roles that were played in the post-Hellenic interregnum by the Franks and the English and in the post-Indic interregnum by the Huns and the Gurjaras.⁸ In the disintegration of the main body of Orthodox Christendom we can see that the Serb barbarians, who were converted to Orthodox Christianity,⁹ found a wider field—

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, pp. 605-6, below.

² The evidence for the Hun and Gurjara origin of the Rājputs, who were the ruling element in the Hindu World from the emergence of the Hindu Civilization in the eighth century of the Christian Era until its breakdown in the twelfth, is set out in Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd edition (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 407-15. The crucial act in the metamorphosis of the Eurasian Nomad raider into the Rājput paladin seems to have been his conversion to Hinduism.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 133, with footnote 1, and V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 275, with footnote 3, above.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 272-3, above.

⁵ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 139-40 and 143-6, above.

⁶ The To Pa barbarian 'successor-state' of the Han Empire in Shansi blossomed out, after its conversion to the Catholic Mahāyāna, into the Kingdom of the United Wei (*floruit circa* A.D. 420-534), which absorbed into itself two sister barbarian 'successor-states', Pe Han and Pe Yen (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), p. 477, below), besides momentarily subduing the unreclaimed Nomads in its own rear on the Steppe (for this latter feat see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 273, above; for the Sinification of the To Pa themselves by one of the princes of the United Wei, Hiao-wên ti (*regnabat* A.D. 490-9), see V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), pp. 477-8, below). After half a century of renewed division—this time into two fractions (the Eastern Wei with their successors the Pe Ts'i (*durabant* A.D. 534-77) and the Western Wei with their successors the Pe Chōu (*durabant* A.D. 535-77)—the former dominions of the United Wei were reunited through the Pe Chōu conquering the Pe Ts'i (A.D. 577). The Pe Chōu only enjoyed the fruits of this victory for four years before being supplanted (in A.D. 581) by the new dynasty of the Sui; but this dynastic change not only left the work of consolidation unimpaired but also quickly resulted in its completion; for in A.D. 589 the Sui reunited the South of the Far Eastern World with the North under a single sovereignty, and this put an end to a separation between South and North which had lasted, in all, for 272 years since the fall of the United Ts'in in A.D. 317. After this it only remained for the T'ang to enter into the labours of the Sui, as once, in the history of the appparent Sinic Civilization, the Han had entered into the labours of Ts'in She Hwang-ti.

⁷ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 357, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 251-2, above.

⁸ See V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 293-4, above.

⁹ See p. 355, above.

and this for more effective action—than their kinsmen and neighbours the Bosniaks, who were converted to the heresy of Bogomilism.¹ Finally, we may observe that the Aztecs—who were on the point of imposing their own grim peace upon a distracted Mexic World when the Spaniards suddenly burst in and wrested out of the Aztecs' hands the role of serving as the empire-builders of a Central American universal state—were undilutedly barbarian interlopers² who had embraced, apparently without reserve, the religion which the Mexic Society had inherited from its Mayan predecessor.³

If we now survey the barbarians who have yielded, like the Bosniaks, to the attractions of an alien or a heretical faith, we shall observe that the Bosniaks themselves are in a category of barbarian heretics that have elected to save themselves alive by capitulating to the prevailing orthodoxy before it has been too late. The Bosniaks prudently exchanged their invidious Bogomilism for the Sunnī Islam which was the religion of the alien Ottoman founders of an Orthodox Christian universal state.⁴ The Burgundians and Visigoths and Lombards exchanged their Arianism for the Catholicism of their subjects. And the Mongol Il-Khans of Iran and 'Irāq, after toying with both Nestorianism⁵ and the Shī'ah,⁶ had the wisdom in the end to opt for a Sunnah⁷ which in their days was the faith of the vast majority of the population in the territories over which the Il-Khans' rule extended.

The statesmanship of these barbarian apostates is commended by the spectacle of the untoward fate of their comrades who hardened their hearts; for if 'Paris is worth a mass', it is presumably to be allowed, *a fortiori*, that any apostasy is justified, on Machiavellian standards, when the alternative to it is eviction or extermination; and one or other of these unpleasant experiences seems to have overtaken every one of the heretical barbarian warbands that have insisted upon making themselves unnecessarily odious to their subjects by perversely persisting in the error of their religious ways. The Hyksos worshippers of Set were evicted from the Egyptiac World by Amosis.⁸ The Ostrogoth Arians were

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 368-9, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 295, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 207, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 280, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 127, above, and V. C (i) (d) 5, in the present volume, p. 437, footnote 3, below.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 368, footnote 3, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 327, above.

⁵ See II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, pp. 449-52, above.

⁶ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 363, above.

⁷ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, Annex I, pp. 364 and 401, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 439 and 450, above.

⁸ See p. 351, with the references in footnote 3, above.

evicted from Italy, and the Vandal Arians exterminated in Africa, by Justinian. The Mongols, with their Nestorian Christian taint and their Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist proclivities, were evicted from China by the Ming.¹ The Katāma and Daylamī and East-Arabian Shi'ites, whose Fātimid and Buwayhid and Carmathian leaders seemed destined for a moment to divide between them the heritage of the Sunnī 'Abbasid Caliphate, were all brought to naught at the moment when the prize seemed to be within their grasp. The Buwayhids were supplanted by the Saljūqs; the Fātimids were deposed by Saladin; the Carmathians were hurled back from the borders of 'Irāq and Syria and were left to die of inanition in the deserts in which they had made their lair.² Finally we may notice that the Far Western Christians of 'the Celtic Fringe', who obstinately clung to their own peculiar usages, were absorbed into the body social of Roman Christendom by a process of subjugation, instead of being taken into partnership on equal terms like the Scandinavians. The Scandinavians were no more successful than the Far Western Christians were in their attempt to erect a promising barbarism into an independent civilization in face of the Roman Christendom with which they had collided; but, in the terms of their capitulation to a victorious Roman Christendom, they profited conspicuously, by contrast with the Celts, from the facts that they passed straight out of a native barbarian religion into the Roman form of Christianity and that they made this change through a voluntary act of conversion.³

The outstanding exception to this particular clause of our 'law' is presented by the history of the Primitive Muslim Arab external proletariat of the Roman Empire, who succeeded in making their fortunes—and this with an unparalleled brilliance—notwithstanding their obstinacy in clinging to their barbarian version (or travesty) of Syriac religion⁴ instead of abandoning Islam for the Monophysite Christianity of their new subjects in the conquered Roman provinces of Syria and Egypt. This is, however, one of those exceptions which do not discredit a rule but rather confirm it; for we have noticed, in other contexts,⁵ that

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121, and the present chapter and volume, p. 348, above.

² For this passage in the history of the Shi'ah see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 355-7, above.

³ For this contrast between the fortunes of the Far Western Christians and the fortunes of the Scandinavians see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-60, with Annexes II, III, and IV, above.

⁴ For this description of Primitive Islam, as conceived and expounded by the prophet who was its author, see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 83, III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 276-8, with Annex II, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 128, above.

⁵ In I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 72-7; II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 235; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285-8; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 128-9, above. See further V. C (i) (d) 6 (b), Annex, pp. 672-7, below.

the Muslim Arab barbarian conquerors of these Roman provinces had a subsequent career which was utterly different from that of their Berber and North European and Eurasian Nomad companions-in-arms who broke through the frontiers of the same empire on other fronts. Through the Arabs' incidental conquest of the entire Sasanian Empire, in the course of their victorious assault upon the Oriental provinces of the Roman Empire, the barbarian 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire which the Arabs had founded on Syrian soil transformed itself into a restoration of the Syriac universal state which had been prematurely destroyed, a thousand years before, when the Achaemenidae had been overthrown by Alexander; and the vast new political mission with which the Muslim Arab conquerors were thus, almost accidentally, invested, opened up a new horizon for Islam itself. Alone among barbarian heresies, the Arab prophet Muhammad's amalgam of Christianity and Judaism escaped the scrap-heap which is the usual destination of such crude barbarian blacksmith's work. Under the normal operation of our rule the Arab war-bands that settled upon Syria and Egypt in the seventh century of the Christian Era ought either to have abandoned their Muhammadan heresy or to have been cast out again into their native Arabian steppes before the close of the eighth century. In the actual event the year 800 saw the Arabs politically firm in the saddle through the length and breadth of the Syriac World from Andalusia to Farghānā; and by the same date Islam, so far from being extinct, had already turned into a 'higher religion' with a 'manifest destiny' to provide the Syriac internal proletariat with its long-sought universal church.¹

It will be seen that this history of Islam is a special case which does not invalidate the general results of our inquiry.² In general we are evidently justified in concluding from an empirical survey that, for external proletariats and for dominant minorities alike, an alien inspiration is a curse, because it is a fruitful source of friction and frustration for either of them in their dealings with members of the other two fractions of the three into which a disintegrating society splits up. If we turn now to examine the influence of alien inspirations upon the lives and fortunes of internal proletariats, a survey of the field in this case will lead to a conclusion which is exactly the opposite. For internal proletariats we shall find that an alien inspiration, so far from being a curse, is a blessing which confers upon those who receive it an apparently

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 288, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 677-8, below.

² The history of Islam is also a special case in respect of another social 'law' to the effect that religions bring ruin on themselves by going into politics (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 672-8, below).

superhuman power of taking their conquerors captive¹ and of attaining the end to which they have been born.² And if we hesitate on first thoughts to accept this conclusion, because we can see no reason why an identic cause should have these diametrically opposite effects when it is acting upon different fractions of the same body social,³ we must be content in the first instance to verify the fact in the hope that it may begin to explain itself as we study it at closer range and in greater detail. Our thesis can best be tested by an examination of those 'higher religions' and universal churches which are the Internal Proletariat's characteristic works; and our survey of these has shown that their potency depends upon the presence, and varies in proportion to the strength, of an alien spark of vitality in their spirit.⁴

This alien spark is visible in most of the 'higher religions' which we have identified in an earlier chapter;⁵ for a 'higher religion' usually turns out to have originated in some section of the Internal Proletariat that has at any rate been profoundly influenced by some alien culture, even if it has not actually been recruited from a population which has been forcibly detached and transferred from some alien body social by an act of conquest on the Dominant Minority's part.

For example the worship of Osiris, which was the 'higher religion' of the Egyptiac proletariat, can be traced back tentatively (as we have seen)⁶ to an alien origin in the Sumeric worship of Tamimuz; and the manifold and competing 'higher religions' of the Hellenic internal proletariat can all be traced back to various alien origins with certainty. In the worship of Isis the alien spark

¹ Horace, *Epp.*, Book II, Ep. i, l. 156.

² John xviii. 37.

³ The question why, for the Internal Proletariat, an alien inspiration is a social 'asset', instead of being the social 'liability' that it is for the External Proletariat and for the Dominant Minority, must, of course, be kept distinct from the different question why, for the Proletariat of both kinds, an alien inspiration is attractive. The answer to this second question is obvious. The Proletariat is drawn towards alien elements of culture for the negative reason that these have no associations with a Dominant Minority against whose domination the Proletariat is in revolt. In the case of the External Proletariat we have come across this motive already in observing the External Proletariat's proneness, even when it accepts a 'higher religion' from the Dominant Minority's side of the *lines*, to take this 'higher religion' in some heretical form (see V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 227-30 (Arianism, Celtic Christianity, Islam), pp. 250-2 (Manichaeism, Nestorianism, the Shi'ah), pp. 295-6 (Bogomilism, Bektashism, Wahhabism, Idrisism), pp. 309-10 (Tantric Mahayanian Buddhism), pp. 328-32 (the North American Indian prophetic religions)). Some of the corresponding considerations in the mind of the Internal Proletariat are brought out in the following note by Professor Gilbert Murray:

'The Proletariat (1) craves an imaginary world, or world of faith, to compensate the real world in which all God's chillen obviously have not got wings—or shoes; and (2) feels sure that, whatever the truth is, it cannot be what their masters know or believe (as the English labourer knows that it cannot be the Squire's "Church of England", or the factory hand that it cannot be the Employer's "Liberalism"). Therefore anything from a foreign source is welcome.'

⁴ See I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-1; I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 57; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213-16; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, *passim*, above.

⁵ In V. C (i) (c) 2, *passim*, above.

⁶ In V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 147-50, above.

is Egyptian; in the worship of Cybele it is Hittite; in Christianity and Mithraism it is Syriac; in the Mahāyāna it is Indic; and in each of these cases we are acquainted with the historical circumstances in which the vital fire was introduced into the Hellenic tinder. The first four of the 'higher religions' in this Hellenic list were created by Egyptian and Hittite and Syriac populations which had been conscripted into the Hellenic internal proletariat through Alexander's conquest of the Achaemenian Empire in and after the year 334 B.C., while the fifth—namely the Mahāyāna—was created by an Indic population which had been likewise conscripted into the Hellenic internal proletariat, in and after the second decade of the second century B.C. through the Euthydemid Bactrian Greek princes' conquests in the Indic World.¹

Profoundly though they may differ from one another in their inward spiritual essence, all these five 'higher religions' have at least this superficial feature in common. They are all of them attempts to translate some non-Hellenic religious inspiration into Hellenic terms—devotional or philosophic or aesthetic.² In the first four of them this feature is notorious; but it is also unmistakably recognizable in the Mahāyāna. One of the decisive steps towards the creation of a 'higher religion' out of the philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama was taken when Buddhist sculptors made use of the plastic medium of representation, which the intrusive Hellenic culture had placed in their hands, in order to portray the Buddha in concrete anthropomorphic form.³

This visualization of the Buddha as a being of the Apollinean Hellenic type was attained by a utilization of Hellenic technique on Indic soil, before the nascent 'higher religion' had begun to spread beyond the bounds of the society that had given it birth. But the Buddha who had been clothed in this Hellenic body—a body of cold marble and not of flesh and blood—had only been invested with the bare externals of divine personality. The would-be worshipper had still to discover the living god within the lifeless statue; and this act of intuition was not achieved until, in the next chapter of the story, the statue itself had been spiritualized by an Indic chisel,⁴ and, in the next chapter after that, the

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 143; V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 133, with footnote 1, and p. 139; and V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 275-6, above.

² On this point see further pp. 366-7, below.

³ See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 247, footnote 2, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 134, above.

⁴ The Apollinean type of Buddha statue, which seems to have been the creation of Greek artists working in Gandhāra near the beginning of the last century B.C. at the latest, was discarded, in favour of a more spiritual type, by an Indic school of artists working at Mathurā after the beginning of the second century of the Christian Era, at the earliest (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 396-408).

ci-devant Indic philosophy, with its mantle of thus Indicized Hellenic art, had been propagated from the Indic into the Syriac provinces of the Bactrian Greek Empire's Kushan 'successor-state'.¹ In the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin under the Kushan régime Buddhism underwent a further translation—this time on the devotional plane—into terms of the other alien culture which it encountered here. On this Syriac ground the Indic philosopher portrayed as an Indicized Olympian god was transfigured, to all appearance, into a Zoroastrian saviour;² and it was this second mutation that completed the metamorphosis of Gautama's philosophy into the religion of the Mahāyāna. Thus the Mahāyāna was miraculously born from an Olympian's head and was then still more miraculously brought to life like Pygmalion's statue. And, if, in the next chapter after that, the new religion had travelled westwards in order to compete with its four sisters for spiritual supremacy in the Hellenic World, the Mahāyāna would have presented itself to its Hellenic converts as a Hellenized proletarian-born 'higher religion' with a twofold alien inspiration—part Indic and part Syriac.

In this Indo-Syriac duality the Mahāyāna would not have been an altogether peculiar portent in the spiritual landscape of the Roman Empire, for it would have had a counterpart in Mithraism, which—with its strong infusion of the Babylonian astral philosophy³—might be regarded as a dual Syro-Babylonian rather than as a simple Syriac graft upon a Hellenic stem. As it happened, however, the direction in which the Mahāyāna travelled from its temporary camping-ground on the banks of the Oxus was not westward but eastward.⁴ Under the Kushan régime, as we have observed, it spread from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin to the Tarim Basin in the age when the two were politically united in the Kushan Empire; and from the Tarim Basin—which was a province of the Sinic universal state again after, as it had already been before, the interlude of the Kushan occupation—the Mahāyāna travelled on to conquer a vast new spiritual empire in the Sinic World.⁵

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 139-40, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 136, above. This transfiguration did not, of course, take the form of a direct deification of the historical human figure of Siddhārtha Gautama the Sakya aristocrat from Kapilavastu. When the man Gautama had come to be regarded as an epiphany of Buddhahood, it was a natural, and perhaps inevitable, step for a religion of Indic origin to assume that this epiphany was a term in a series. The new step was to expand the series by an exercise of the devotional imagination. And it was the mythical epiphanies—an Avalokita and a Maitreya and an Amitābha (Amida)—that became the saviour-gods of the Mahāyāna. (For the cult of Amitābha see V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, p. 164, footnote 3, below. For the Japanese adaptation of this cult see V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 96-103, above.)

³ See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 56-7, above.

⁴ See II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65; V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 139-40 and 144-6; and the present chapter, p. 356, above.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 143-5, above.

The victory of the Mahāyāna in the Far East is a triumph which is comparable in magnitude to the victory of Christianity in the Near East and the West; and the irresistible inference is that an alien inspiration cannot be a source of friction and frustration when the party that is fired by it is an internal proletariat and not either an external proletariat or a dominant minority. The Christian religion of the Hellenic internal proletariat was not debarred by its Syriac 'taint' from conquering the Hellenic World; and the Mahāyāna conquered the Sinic World in spite of being saturated with an alien 'taint' that was neither single nor even dual but actually triple—for in Sinic eyes the Indic and the Hellenic and the Syriac elements in the Mahāyāna were all equally exotic; and the Hellenic style of the Mahayanian Buddhist art, which would have served the Mahāyāna as a passport for admission if it had been knocking at the gates of Antioch or Rome, only emphasized its outlandishness in the sight of citizens of Ch'ang Ngan and Loyang. Nevertheless the Mahāyāna triumphantly made its conquest of the outgoing Sinic Civilization and successfully impressed upon the incoming Far Eastern Civilization an imprint of Hellenic art and Syriac devotion and Indic philosophy, though these traits were all decidedly alien from the *êthos* of the apparented Sinic Society to which this nascent Far Eastern Society was affiliated. These indisputable historical facts would appear to suggest that for an internal proletariat an alien 'taint' is no handicap, but is rather a positive advantage. For, while it might perhaps be arguable (though the argument would be a *tour de force*) that Christianity conquered Hellenism in spite, and not because, of the conquering religion's non-Hellenic spark of Syriac inspiration, it would be almost beyond belief that, if alienness were really a hindrance and not a help to the spread of a 'higher religion', the Mahāyāna could ever have conquered the conservative-minded latter-day Sinic World under the crippling handicap of being alien three times over.

Our conclusion will not be shaken by a consideration of certain cases in which an attempt to conquer a society has been made by an alien 'higher religion' without success. There is the abortive attempt of the Shi'ah to become the universal church of the main body of Orthodox Christendom under the Ottoman régime;¹ and

¹ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 382-3, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. xii, above. The process through which the Shi'ah introduced itself into the internal proletariat of the main body of Orthodox Christendom resembles the process by which the Mahāyāna introduced itself into the internal proletariat of the Sinic Society. In this case, as in that, the intrusive religion was able to make its entry owing to the vicissitudes in the history of a border province in which it had gained a foothold. In the case of the Mahāyāna this border province was, as we have seen, the Tarim Basin: an outlying annex of the Indic World which was conquered for the Sinic World by the Prior Han; reconquered for the Indic World (and for the Syriac and Hellenic worlds as well)

the abortive attempt of Catholic Christianity to become the universal church of the Far Eastern Society—in China during the last century of the Ming and the first century of the Manchu régime, and in Japan at the moment of transition from the Japanese 'Time of Troubles' to the Tokugawa Shogunate. Again, the role which has been played by Catholicism in the Far East and by the Shi'ah in the main body of Orthodox Christendom has been played in the Russian Orthodox Christendom, *post Petrum*, by the Protestant variety of Western Christianity. In each of these cases the intrusive 'higher religion' has failed to make its conquest, in spite of the alienness of its origin; but in each case the failure has a convincing explanation which has nothing to do with the question whether the inspiration of the successful religion has been alien or indigenous.

In Russia, for example, Protestantism has been driven off the field in our day by the competition of a rival movement of the same alien origin: the Marxian philosophy. At the time of going to press in A.D. 1938 the triumph of Marxism in Russia was still so recent that it would have been rash to assert that it was definitive or to rule out the possibility that Protestantism—which had shown more fight, under the Marxian persecution, than the native Russian Orthodoxy—might some day return to the attack. But whether it is Marxism or Protestantism that is eventually to be victorious in Russia is a question that does not affect the present argument, considering that both these competing faiths alike have come in from abroad. The defeat—whether temporary or permanent—of Protestantism by Marxism in the Soviet Union is simply an incident in the struggle between competing alien religions, like the defeat which was inflicted upon Mithraism by Christianity in the corresponding struggle for the spiritual conquest of the Roman Empire.

As for the Shi'ah in the Ottoman Empire and Catholicism in Japan, they were both cheated of their prospective spiritual by the Kushans; and finally conquered back by the Posterior Han for a Sinic World which quickly caught fire from a Mahayanian spark that had been conveyed into the Tarim Basin from the west during the Kushan occupation. In the process by which the Shi'ah introduced itself into the main body of Orthodox Christendom, the geographical role of the Tarim Basin was played by Central and Eastern Anatolia: an integral part of the homeland of Orthodox Christendom which was detached, and annexed to the Syriac World, as a result of the Saljûq conquest (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 153-4; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 72-5; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 395-9, above). When the Syriac World went into dissolution, this alien territory which it had conquered *in extremis* was included in the domain which the defunct civilization bequeathed to the 'affiliated' Iranic Society; but in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era this lost Anatolian territory was reannexed to the Orthodox Christian World by the Ottoman founders of the Orthodox Christian universal state. The Shi'ism which then tried and failed to become the universal church of the Ottoman Empire had entered Anatolia from the east during the four centuries (*circa* A.D. 1065-1465) which elapsed between the Saljûq conquest of the Anatolic army-corps district of the East Roman Empire and the Ottoman conquest of the principality of Qaramân.

conquests by being exploited—or at any rate suspected of being exploited—for illegitimate political ends. In either case the Government of the empire which the missionary religion was seeking to convert suddenly abandoned a policy of complacency for the policy of repression because it became convinced that the alien religion whose progress it had been tolerating in its dominions was being insidiously used by a foreign and hostile Power as an instrument for undermining the loyalty, and capturing the allegiance, of an unoffending neighbour's subjects. The Shī'ī insurrection of A.D. 1511 in Ottoman Anatolia under the leadership of Shāh Ismā'il's agent Shāh Qūlī convinced the sluggish Sultan Bāyezid's vehement son Sultan Selim that he was faced with a choice between losing his Asiatic dominions to the Safawis or purging them of Shi'ism; and accordingly he made an end of Shi'ism in Anatolia in the massacre of A.D. 1514:¹ an atrocity which blighted for ever the prospects of the Shī'ah in the Orthodox Christian World. It was on similar grounds in Japan that Catholicism, after being allowed to win a foothold and make some headway during the second half of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, was afterwards frowned upon by Hideyoshi (*dominabatur* A.D. 1582–98) and was finally extirpated remorselessly by the Tokugawa between A.D. 1612 and A.D. 1638. The Japanese Government's objection to Catholicism was of the same political order as the Ottoman Government's objection to Shi'ism. It was believed that both the European Catholic residents in Japan and the Japanese converts were being turned to an illegitimate use by the Spanish Crown as agents in underhand preparations for a Spanish attack on Japanese independence; and it was in order to anticipate this supposed danger that the Japanese Government proceeded to stamp Catholicism out.

The failure of Catholicism in China was not, like its failure in Japan, the incidental effect of an extraneous political cause. In China this alien religion was eventually rejected on religious—or perhaps rather on philosophical—grounds. Yet, even here, it was not its sheer alienness that was fatal to it. In China, too, the prospects of Catholicism were blighted by the action of a foreign Power, though in this case the Power that intervened with disastrous results was of an ecclesiastical and not of a political order. The fatal act was a refusal, on the part of the Vatican and its representatives, to allow the Jesuit missionaries in China to carry on their work of translating an alien Catholic religious idiom into the traditional language of Far Eastern philosophy and ritual.² And this veto

¹ For these events see I. C. (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 382–4, above.

² See Jenkins, R. C.: *The Jesuits in China* (London 1894, Nutt).

dealt a death-blow to the Catholic propaganda in China; for the process of cultural translation is one of the indispensable conditions for the propagation of any alien 'higher religion' in any mission-field.

Our empirical survey has led us to the conclusion that an alien origin is a help and not a hindrance to a 'higher religion' in winning converts; and the reason for this is not far to seek. The light from an alien spark is, *ex hypothesi*, a new revelation; and it is the newness that makes it attractive; but, before it can become attractive, a truth has to be made intelligible; and until this necessary work of exposition has been performed, the new truth will be inhibited from making its potential appeal. On this account the translation of the alien religion into terms of the prospective converts' native culture is a task of vital importance in any missionary enterprise. The progress of the Mahāyāna and Christianity and Mithraism, and of the worships of Isis and Cybele, in the Hellenic World went *pari passu* with the process of their translation into terms of Hellenic art and literature and philosophy, and even into terms of Hellenic ritual and piety¹ (though in these latter points the act of translation touched the very quick of the incoming alien faiths). We may also observe that this process of Hellenization was carried to greatest lengths, and was at the same time carried out with the greatest insight and discrimination, in the metamorphosis of the religion which was the eventual victor among these competitors for the captivation of Hellenic souls.² The Christian victory in the Roman Empire could hardly have been won if the Fathers of the Christian Church had not exerted themselves perseveringly, during the first four or five centuries of the Christian Era, to translate the Christian doctrine into terms of Hellenic philosophy; to build up the Christian ecclesiastical hierarchy on the pattern of the Roman civil service; to portray the Christ in the lineaments of an Orpheus; to desecrate the Cross athwart the disk of Sol Invictus;³ to mould the Christian ritual on the model of the Mysteries; and even to convert pagan into Christian festivals,⁴ and replace pagan cults of heroes by Christian cults of saints.

Whether the Jesuit Catholic missionaries in China were consciously following the precedent of the Early Christian Church in the Roman Empire, or whether they were acting on an inde-

¹ See pp. 361-3, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 83 and 91; I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 155; and II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 374, above.

³ For Professor N. H. Baynes' interpretation of the vision of Constantine the Great see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 693-4, below.

⁴ For the conversion of the birthday of Sol Invictus into Christmas Day see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 693, footnote 2, below.

pendent intuition of their own in seeking the same solution for the same problem, they were unquestionably doing what had been done, not only by the Early Christian Fathers, but by the missionaries of every alien religion that had ever made a spiritual conquest. Matteo Ricci (*in Oriente Extrema Fidem Catholicam propagabat* A.D. 1582-1610) did for Christianity at Macao the service that a Clement (*vivebat circa* A.D. 150—*prae* 215) and an Origen (*vivebat* A.D. 185-254) had done for the same faith at Alexandria some fourteen hundred years earlier.¹ Clement and Origen commended Christianity to the respectful and even sympathetic attention of cultivated Hellenes by deliberately winning recognition for themselves as accomplished Hellenic philosophers. Ricci—the supreme *virtuoso* in the Christian missionary's art—performed the still greater *tour de force* of obtaining for himself a tablet in a Far Eastern hall of fame as an accomplished Confucian litteratus. And if he and his successors had been allowed to persevere in their work for three centuries, instead of being pulled up short after they had been little more than one century in the field, who can say whether, in the year 1938, the former domain of the Far Eastern universal state might not have been as thoroughly permeated with Christianity as the former domain of the Hellenic universal state actually was in A.D. 538, after the unhindered completion of the Early Fathers' long and far-reaching expository work?²

¹ See further V. C. (i) (d) 6 (8), p. 539, below.

² The Jesuit missionaries in China had to contend with two adverse forces: the jealousy of their Franciscan and Dominican rivals in the China mission-field and the ignorance of the Vatican and its representatives. It was the combined operation of these two forces that eventually brought the Jesuits' work in China to naught. And this may perhaps explain why it was that the Jesuits failed in an enterprise in which the Early Fathers succeeded; for, although the rivalry between Jesuits and Friars in China has numerous parallels in the internal struggles within the bosom of the Early Christian Church in the Roman Empire, there is no parallel in this other chapter of Christian history to the obstacle which was placed in the Jesuits' path in China by the Vatican's ignorance of Far Eastern conditions. In order to translate this obstacle into Early Christian terms we should have to draw an imaginary picture of Origen and Clement doing their work at Alexandria under the authority of a supreme ecclesiastical Power whose seat was geographically remote from the Hellenic World, in some Syriac fastness into which the radiation of Hellenism had never penetrated. Supposing that our Alexandrian Christian philosophers had been bound to render an account of their stewardship to a Holy Father whose see lay in the Yaman or in Hyrcania, we may conjecture that they would have been peremptorily called to order. Even as it was, Origen did not altogether escape the stigma of heresy, though the ecclesiastical judges before whose bar his theology had to appear had all been born and brought up in Origen's own Hellenic environment and were therefore able to appreciate, in the light of their personal experience, the full strength of the case for a Christian policy of Hellenization. On this showing, it is not to be wondered at that the Jesuits' policy of Confucianization should have shocked the Vatican, which had no understanding of, or taste for, the Confucian culture to which Ricci and his successors had been making their concessions. Some of these concessions could not fail to be startling to Latin minds which had not been compelled—by the challenge of a missionary's life and work—to grapple with the problem of distinguishing between the sacrosanct essence of Christianity and its local and temporary Syriac and Hellenic and Western accidents. The Vatican's ignorance and lack of imagination were, in fact, pardonable and perhaps even inevitable; but these venial faults of head and heart were none the less disastrous for the prospects of Catholi-

Thus the failure of certain alien religions, in certain circumstances, to achieve a spiritual conquest to which they had aspired is no disproof of our thesis that alienness is, in itself, a help and not a hindrance to the spread of a 'higher religion'. We may now go on to suggest that in the histories of the 'higher religions' an inspiration that is alien and not indigenous has not only been a potent aid to success whenever it has been present, but has also been one of the regular distinguishing features of this particular species of the genus 'religions', while, conversely, a successful 'higher religion' whose inspiration is indigenous to the society in which the religion wins its way is an exceptional and abnormal phenomenon.

Our muster of 'higher religions' which appear, at first sight, to have had indigenous inspirations will include Judaism and Zoroastrianism and Islam—three religions which have found their field in the Syriac World and have also undoubtedly drawn their inspiration from the same quarter—as well as Hinduism: a religion which has found its field in the Indic World and has at the same time manifestly had an Indic inspiration. If we are to take account of imperfect representatives of the class, we may further cite Nestorianism and Monophysitism: two revised versions of Christianity which found their field in the Syriac World and which did their best to purge themselves of the Hellenic element in the Syro-Hellenic syncretism of which Christianity consists.¹ These two Syriac religious reactions against Hellenism have their Indic counterpart in the Tantric Mahāyāna: a branch of the Mahayanian Church which retreated into the interior of the Indic World, and entrenched itself in Bengal,² in the age when the Catholic Mahāyāna was breaking the bounds of its Indic birth-place and was boldly venturing out into Central Asia and thence into the Far East. Like the Nestorian and Monophysite Christianities, the Tantric

cism in China, since they had the effect of deeply offending Chinese susceptibilities which the Jesuit missionaries had been scrupulously careful to spare. As a matter of fact the irreparable damage was not done by the Papal Legate de Tournon—a young and inexperienced Savoyard who was sent out to the Far East without any expert knowledge. The mortal offence was given by the Papal Vicar-General in Fukien, Bishop Maigrot, who ought to have known better, since, as a resident in the Far East, he had as good an opportunity as the Jesuit missionaries of grasping the local situation and seeing how it appeared in Confucian eyes. The crisis was precipitated by Bishop Maigrot's edict of A.D. 1693, and it was brought to a head by his audience with the Emperor on the 12th December, 1706, when the local representative of the head of the Western Catholic Church was publicly convicted, by the head of the Far Eastern universal state, of an utter ignorance of the Confucian philosophy. This was an exposure which the Jesuit propaganda in China could not retrieve and did not survive. (See further V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 539, and V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 23-4, below.)

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 83 and 91; I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 155; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 203; II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 235; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 286-7 and 374; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 27, above.

² See II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 136-7, above.

Mahāyāna sought to adapt itself to a native mission-field by purging itself of all but the native element in its amalgam. Nestorianism and Monophysitism tried to separate their Syriac gold from the single alloy of Hellenism; the Tantric Mahāyāna tried to separate its Indic gold from the twofold alloy of the Syriac conception and the Hellenic portrayal of Buddhahood. It will be seen that our assembly of religions with an indigenous inspiration remains singularly small, even when we have brought in the stragglers from the highways and hedges. If we now inspect our recruits, we shall find that two of them really belong to the 'alien' class after all, and that those which are genuinely 'indigenous' or 'semi-indigenous' are the exceptional products of peculiar circumstances.

In the first place, if we remind ourselves of the origins of Judaism and Zoroastrianism, we shall remember that, while they are indeed, both of them, religions with a Syriac inspiration which have made their first appearance in a Syriac milieu, the Syriac populations among which they came to birth between the eighth and the sixth century B.C. were broken peoples which had been forcibly conscripted into the internal proletariat of the Babylonian Society by the Assyrian men-at-arms of the Babylonian dominant minority. It was this challenge of Babylonian aggression and domination that evoked the Jewish and Zoroastrian religious responses from the Syriac souls that were subjected to the ordeal.¹ And on this showing it is evident that we ought to classify Judaism and Zoroastrianism, not as Syriac religions with an indigenous Syriac inspiration, but rather as religions which were introduced by Syriac conscripts into the internal proletariat of a Babylonian Society upon whose native religious tradition and consciousness the Syriac inspiration of Judaism and Zoroastrianism impinged as an alien spiritual force.

Thus, in the rise and spread of Judaism and Zoroastrianism in the Babylonian World after the Assyrian annexation of the Syriac populations of Syria and Iran to the Babylonian internal proletariat we have an exact parallel to the rise and spread of Christianity and Mithraism in the Hellenic World after the Macedonian annexation of the Syriac populations of South-Western Asia to the Hellenic internal proletariat.² And, if the disintegration of the Babylonian Civilization had been as long drawn out as that of the Hellenic Civilization, and had passed through all the same successive stages, then the birth and growth of Judaism and Zoroastrianism would present themselves, in historical perspective, as events in Babylonian history—as the birth and growth of Christianity and Mithraism do, in fact, present themselves as events

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 119-21, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 80-2, above.

in Hellenic history. Our perspective has been thrown out by the accident that Babylonian history—unlike Hellenic history—came to a premature end owing to the abnormal deadliness of the Babylonian malady of Assyrian militarism.¹ Though the Babylonian World did just manage to struggle out of its 'Time of Troubles' into a universal state, the effort which had been required in order to extinguish the Assyrian conflagration had been so exhausting that the Chaldaean founders of the Neo-Babylonian Empire were left without the strength to accomplish the tremendous task of reconstruction which they had taken upon their shoulders. This Chaldaean attempt at a Babylonian universal state collapsed; and the Syriac conscripts in the Babylonian internal proletariat were able not only to throw off their chains but also to turn the tables on their Babylonian conquerors by taking them captive in body as well as in spirit.² The Iranians became converts to the Syriac and not to the Babylonian culture; the Achaemenian Empire which was founded by Cyrus the Persian played the part of a Syriac universal state instead of taking over the mission of the abortive Babylonian universal state which it had supplanted;³ and within little more than five hundred years of Cyrus's entry into Babylon in 539 B.C. the last remnants of a prematurely disintegrated Babylonian Society had been absorbed into the tissues of the Syriac body social. It is in this perspective that Judaism and Zoroastrianism take on their present appearance of being Syriac religions with an indigenous inspiration. We can now see that in their origin they were religions of a Babylonian internal proletariat to which their Syriac inspiration was alien.

As for the partially de-Hellenized Syriac and Indic religions of Nestorianism and Monophysitism and the Tantric Mahāyāna, and the thoroughly de-Hellenized Syriac and Indic religions of Islam⁴ and Hinduism,⁵ we have already observed in other contexts⁶ that these were all of them expressions, in Syriac and Indic re-

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 468-84, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 79-81 and 119; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 138; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 471; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 94 and 122-3, above.

³ The entente between Cyrus and the Syriac victims of his vanquished Babylonian adversaries was signified in his gracious act of granting the Jews permission to return home from the land of exile; and the Iranian conqueror's Syriac proclivities were appreciated and extolled by these Jewish beneficiaries. This Iranian saviour of Jewry from a Babylonian captivity was the first temporal ruler to be hailed by a Jewish poet with the title of Messiah.

⁴ 'Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus (*Septuagint*: τῷ Χριστῷ μου Κύρῳ), whose right hand I have holden, to subdue nations before him. . . . For Jacob my servant's sake, and Israel mine elect, I have even called thee by thy name; I have surnamed thee, though thou hast not known me' (Isaiah xlv. 1 and 4).

⁵ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 83; II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 288; III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 276-8, with Annex II, V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 127-8, and the present chapter, pp. 358-9, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 672-8, below.

⁶ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 137-8, above, and V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 47-9, below.

⁷ See the references on p. 368, footnotes 1 and 2, above.

ligious terms, of a revolt in the Syriac and Indic worlds against the intrusive social force of Hellenism. This means that these religions are genuine representatives of the class of 'higher religions' whose inspiration is indigenous; and, while Nestorianism, Monophysitism, and the Tantric Mahāyāna may be imperfect specimens, this cannot be said of either Hinduism or Islam. At the same time we may notice that this Syriac and Indic revolt against Hellenism is only the last chapter in the history of the encounter between these three civilizations. This chapter of revolt and estrangement had been preceded by a chapter of forbearance and intercourse; and this earlier and happier relation¹ had likewise found expression in religious terms of its own. Its monuments are the syncretistic religions of Catholic Christianity and the Catholic Mahāyāna; and both of these religions were discovered by the Hellenic internal proletariat in the light of an alien inspiration—Syriac in the one case and Indic in the other. This chapter which saw the birth of a Catholic Christianity and a Catholic Mahāyāna was assuredly a more fruitful and important and significant phase in the encounter between Hellenism and its two neighbours than the later chapter which gave birth to Nestorianism and Monophysitism and the Tantric Mahāyāna, and afterwards to Islam and Hinduism.

In this last sentence we have implicitly made a judgement of value as between one 'higher religion' and another. We have judged that Catholic Christianity is a more valuable representative of its species than Nestorianism or Monophysitism or Islam, and that the Catholic Mahāyāna is more valuable than the Tantric Mahāyāna or Hinduism. Are we warranted in taking a liberty with religions that we have scrupled to take with civilizations? At an early point in this Study² we debated whether we should take account of possible differences of value in comparing one civilization with another, and in this case we decided not to presume to act as judges or dividers.³ When we pass from the study of civilizations to the study of religions, are we going to abandon this discreet attitude of neutrality and to take the perilous plunge into passing judgements and meting measures?⁴ Our reply to this question may perhaps be postponed until we come to deal, in a later Part,⁵ with those universal churches in

¹ We have, however, also seen that there was an earlier chapter still which—like the third, and unlike the second—was a chapter of war and not of peace, though in this first chapter it was the intrusive Hellenic Civilization, and not its Syriac or Indic victim, that took the offensive. In this first chapter, too, the Syriac reaction expressed itself in religious forms: in the militant 'Zealot' outbreaks of a Eunus of Enna and a Judas Maccabaeus (see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 68–9, above).

² In I. C (iii) (d), vol. i, pp. 175–7, above.

⁴ Matt. vii. 2.

⁵ In Part VII, below.

³ Luke xii. 14.

which the victorious 'higher religions' have embodied themselves. In the present chapter we must turn to the consideration of a point which presents itself as a corollary to our conclusion that the 'higher religions' which have alien, and not indigenous, inspirations are the normal representatives of their species.

If a religion has an alien inspiration, then manifestly the origin and the nature of that religion cannot be understood without taking account of a contact between at least two civilizations: on the one hand the civilization in whose internal proletariat the new religion arises, and on the other hand the different civilization (or civilizations) from which the alien inspiration (or inspirations) of the rising religion is derived. This point about the study of 'higher religions' is simple and self-evident; but—all the more imperatively on that account—it compels us to make a radical new departure; for it requires us to relinquish the basis on which this Study has so far been built up.

So far we have been dealing in terms of civilizations; and we have assumed that any single civilization will afford a practicable field of study because, at the outset of our inquiry,¹ we satisfied ourselves that any given civilization constituted a social 'whole' which was intelligible in isolation from whatever social phenomena might present themselves outside the spatial and temporal limits of this particular society. Indeed, we originally defined a civilization as 'an intelligible field of study'; and our approach to the identification of our twenty-one representatives of this species of societies was subjective as well as empirical. We started our inquiry from the observation that the national community—which has been the actual standard unit employed in most of the historical study that has been carried out in our Western World in its Modern Age—proves to be a fragmentary, and therefore unintelligible, slice of some field of greater magnitude; and we then mapped out the bounds of this wider field in our own social landscape by exploring outwards beyond the ragged edges of one particular parochial community—and also backwards behind the brief span of one particular generation—and observing, as we went on enlarging our spatial and our temporal horizon, that the intelligibility of the social landscape at first rose steadily in degree, but then reached a maximum at a certain remove, and afterwards fell off until—long before we had embraced in our field of vision the whole living generation and past ancestry of Mankind on the surface of the planet—the degree of intelligibility of our field of vision had sunk once more to the level at which it had stood to begin with, when we were confining our view within the 'short

¹ In Part I. B, vol. i, above.

and narrow-verged shade' of 'some single herb or tree' in the tribal forest. It was by this empirical manoeuvre from a subjective starting-point that we approximately ascertained the extension, in Space and in Time, of our own Western Society; and it was only after this that we went on to identify twenty other representatives of the same species of society by analogy with our first-found specimen.

This resumé of the overture to our inquiry¹ may serve to remind us that a civilization, in the sense in which we have defined and employed the term, is 'in the last analysis' a field of study which appears to be intelligible within its own limits; and up to this point we have found ourselves able to work on the assumption that the intelligible field is always and everywhere of the order and the dimensions that are exhibited in our own Western body social and in its twenty sisters. By enlarging our field of operations from the nation to the civilization of which the nation is a fragment, we have found it possible to make a study of History in terms of civilizations and their careers—from genesis to growth and from breakdown to disintegration. But 'the relativity of historical thought'² has now caught us out in our turn, as we have seen it catch out the historians who have allowed their horizon to be determined by the narrower frontiers of some single national community or city-state; for the particular 'intelligible field' that has sufficiently well served our purpose so far is manifestly relative, in magnitude to the length, and in locus to the position, of the particular base-line from which we first set out to survey the extent of this field and to plot out its limits. Our original base-line, as we have reminded ourselves, was the modern Western national community which the national historian accepts as his social universe; and it is perhaps really surprising that a survey conducted from this base of operations should have carried us so far as it has; for the national community is far indeed from being adequate to the historian's purpose, even when it is taken as a base-line and not as a boundary.

The first step in our inquiry made it clear to us that the national community, as we know it in our modern Western World, is both eccentric in its position in the historical landscape and petty in its scale; and the combination of these two untoward features makes it a peculiarly unfavourable starting-point for a study of History. For us, in our time and place, it was not within our power to start from anywhere else; for the national community is the social prison-house in which our modern Western souls are incarcerated.

¹ See Part I, *passim*, especially I. B (v) and I. C (ii), in vol. i, above.

² See Part I. A, in vol. i, above.

The best that we could do was to peer over the battlements and extend our field of vision, beyond the imprisoning walls, as far as the eye could reach. But we have come now to a parting of the ways in this mental voyage of exploration. If we cannot or will not now break out of these prison walls, then we must be content to abandon our inquiry at the present point; for we have now surveyed the whole of the landscape that is visible from within the *enceinte* of this outlandish and close-cribbed *donjon*. We have, in fact, now surveyed the whole of the intelligible field that falls within the horizon of an observer who is tied down to a national standpoint; and from this observation-post we can see no farther, however intently we may crane our necks and strain our eyes. From our parochial standing-ground the single civilization is the widest field of vision that can be attained; and, since our reconnaissance has now reached this limit in all four quarters of the compass, one of the alternatives before us is to recite, for the second time, the famous words¹ in which Pindar renounces the pursuit of his quest into the Ocean beyond the Pillars of Hercules.

Probably this would have been the alternative to which a Hellenic inquirer would have resigned himself if he had found himself in our present situation; for his Theban or Athenian horizon was bounded for him by the limits of his Hellas as rigidly as the English or French horizon is bounded for us by the limits of our wider, yet still finite, Western World. We children of Western Christendom, however, have not the same excuse as Pindar and his Hellenic contemporaries for giving up the game at this point; for an alternative course lies open to us; and the way has been pointed by one of the Fathers of our Western Christian Civilization. In the fifth century of our era, when the post-Hellenic interregnum had set in and the Gothic sack of Rome had proclaimed the break-up of the Hellenic universal state, one child of the age—a Hellene who was also a Christian, and a genius who was also a saint—had the spiritual insight to see that the venerable social edifice which was falling about his ears was after all a prison-house, and that the Hellene's catastrophe might spell the Christian's liberation. The falling walls of Jericho which were giving entry to the Israelite invader would also set the Canaanite captive free. And so Augustine's reply to the challenge of Alaric's stroke was to spring out of the shattered prison-house of the City of Man into the infinite liberty of an inviolate and inviolable City of God.²

¹ Pindar's Third Olympian Ode, *ad fin.*, quoted in II. C (i), vol. i, p. 205, above.

² Saint Augustine's theme in the *De Civitate Dei* has been touched upon in V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 224, footnote 1 and p. 225, footnote 1, above. The spirit of Saint Augustine, as it is revealed in the *The Civitate Dei*, may be both compared and contrasted with the spirit

Can we escape from our own present *impasse* by following the lead of this Christian mentor and master? The mental—or rather spiritual—feat that is required of us is to burst the cramping bounds of our English or French or German or American social prison-house—whichever of the nationalisms it may be that has been holding us hide-bound—and to re-occupy the place that belongs to us in a greater kingdom which was Augustine's by right of spiritual conquest and is still ours to-day by privilege of cultural inheritance. If once we can escape from the parochial standpoint of an American or German or French or English member of a Western brood of nations, and can take our stand, instead, upon our birthright in Christendom, which was the spiritual habitation of our forebears,¹ then our social horizon will assuredly expand to farther distances which we have not yet begun to explore. For the 'intelligible field of study' which unfolds itself to an observer whose feet are planted on the mountain-heights of one of the 'higher religions' quite outranges the limits of the single civilization which is the widest field that can be surveyed from the squat battlements of a national prison-fortress. We have just observed² that the single civilization, which, when regarded from the standpoint of one of its national fragments, has worn the appearance of a fully 'intelligible field of study', shrivels up, in its turn, into an unintelligible fragment of some far larger whole when we place ourselves at the standpoint, no longer of a national community, but of one of those churches in which the 'higher religions' embody themselves. Within the ambit of a single civilization the origin and nature of a 'higher religion' are unintelligible *ex hypothesi*, since we have seen that the birth of a 'higher religion' presupposes a foregoing contact and intercourse between two civilizations at the least. In a mental voyage of discovery which takes its departure from a church and not from some parochial political community, it is evident that the 'intelligible field of study' will be of an altogether

that is attributed to Epicurus in a magnificent passage of Lucretius's *De Rerum Natura* which has been quoted at an earlier point in this Study (in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. I, p. 299, above). Like the Hellenic philosopher, the Christian father boldly defied a power which was apparently irresistible, and won by his audacity a passage from a prison-house to freedom; but this superficial likeness covers a fundamental difference; for Epicurus broke his way out of the Hell of Superstition into the Material Universe of Science through a defiance of God, whereas Augustine took the Kingdom of Heaven by storm through a defiance of human forces that were destroying the Kingdom of This World. (For Saint Augustine's vision of the Kingdom of God see further V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, pp. 152-4 and 166-7, and V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 365-9, below.)

¹ For the loss of the consciousness of common citizenship in the Western *Respublica Christiana*, simultaneously with the emergence of the consciousness of parochial nationality, at the beginning of the Modern Age of our Western history see I. B (iii), vol. I, pp. 33-4, above. In the Russian Orthodox Christendom the corresponding consciousness of common Christianity lasted longer. In Russia the ordinary word for 'peasant' was *Khrestianin* down to the Revolution of A.D. 1917.

² On p. 372, above.

higher order of magnitude than that of the single civilization which has sufficed us hitherto. Possibly we shall find that our new field also extends into a different spiritual dimension—but this is a possibility which we can now examine at our leisure;¹ for, almost without noticing what we have been doing, we have chosen and taken our course. The Pillars of Hercules are behind us, and the sea on which we are sailing is no longer the familiar land-bound *Mare Nostrum*.

(d) SCHISM IN THE SOUL

1. *Alternative Ways of Behaviour, Feeling, and Life*

The schism in the Human Body Social, which we have been examining in the foregoing chapter as one of our criteria of the disintegration of a civilization, is an experience which is collective and therefore superficial. Its significance lies in its being the outward visible sign of an inward spiritual rift; and this spiritual rift is riven in human souls; for, among all the almost infinitely various manifestations of Human Nature, the Soul alone is capable of being the subject of spiritual experiences and the author of spiritual acts.² A schism in the souls of human beings will be found at the heart of any schism that reveals itself on the surface of the society which is the common ground of these human actors' respective fields of activity;³ and the several forms which this inward schism may take must engage our attention now, if we wish to pursue our search for a criterion on a deeper level of reality.

Schism in the souls of the human 'members' of a disintegrating civilization displays itself in a variety of shapes because it arises in every one of the various ways of behaviour, feeling, and life which we have found to be characteristic of civilizations—or, rather, of the action of the human beings who play their part in civilizations—in those phases of social history which we have labelled 'genesis' and 'growth'. In the disintegration-phase each of these single lines of action is apt to split into a pair of mutually antithetical and antipathetic variations or substitutes, in which the response to a challenge is 'polarized' into two alternatives—one passive and the other active, but neither of them creative. A choice between the active and the passive option is the only freedom that is left to a soul which has lost the opportunity (though not, of course, the capacity) for creative action through being cast for a part in the

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, pp. 149-68, below.

² This elementary truth—which has not ceased to be true through being unpalatable to many modern Western minds—has been acknowledged already in this Study in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 230-1, above.

³ For this definition of the nature and structure of a society see III. C (ii) (a), in vol. iii, above.

tragedy of social disintegration as either one of the villains or one of the victims of the piece. As the process of disintegration works itself out, the alternative choices tend to become more rigid in their limitations, more extreme in their divergence, and more momentous in their consequences. That is to say, the spiritual experience of schism in the Soul is a dynamic movement, not a static situation.

We may now pass these alternative substitutes for creative activity in review, and take a bird's-eye glance at their interactions with one another, before we attempt an empirical survey of the historical manifestations of each of them.

To begin with, there are two ways of personal behaviour which are alternative substitutes for the exercise of the general faculty of creativeness.¹ Both of them are attempts at self-expression. The passive attempt consists in an *abandon* (ἀκράτεια) in which the Soul 'lets itself go', in the belief that by giving free rein to its own spontaneous appetites and aversions it will be 'living according to Nature'² and will automatically be receiving back, from the cornucopia of this mysterious and therefore possibly puissant goddess,³ the precious gift of creativity which the sick Soul has been conscious of losing. The active alternative to this passive *abandon* is an effort at self-control (ἐγκράτεια) in which the Soul 'takes itself in hand' and seeks to discipline its 'natural passions'—through a régime of spiritual exercises which is conceived on the analogy of the physical training (ἀσκήσις) of an athlete—in the opposite belief that Nature is the bane of creativity and not its source, and that to 'gain the mastery over Nature' is the only way of recovering the lost creative faculty.

Then there are two ways of social behaviour which are alternative substitutes for that mimesis of creative personalities which we have found to be a necessary, though perilous, short cut on the road of social growth.⁴ Both of these substitutes for mimesis are attempts to step out of the ranks of a phalanx whose 'social drill' has failed to work—with the result that the uncreative mass, which formerly followed its leaders through intricate evolutions in orderly formation, now stands immobilized, irresolute, and apprehensive: a helpless target for hostile attack. The passive attempt

¹ An attempt to apprehend—'through a glass darkly'—the nature of creativeness in itself has been made in II. C (ii) (b) 1, in vol. i, above.

² 'The Return to Nature' is interpreted as a symptom of social disintegration by Oswald Spengler in *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 286. Besides being a gesture of *abandon*, it is also an expression of archaistic-mindedness (see V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), vol. vi, pp. 58-9, below).

³ The deification of Nature is a classic example of the human weakness which takes *omne ignotum pro magnifico* (Tacitus: *Agricola*, chap. 30).

⁴ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 245-8, and IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 122-33, above.

to break this formidable social deadlock takes the form of committing the misdemeanour of truancy. The soldier realizes with dismay that the regiment has now lost the discipline which has hitherto fortified his *moral* and secured his safety and given strength to his right arm; and, in this unforeseen and unbargained-for situation, the truant-minded soldier allows himself to believe that he is absolved from his military duty. In that unedifying frame of mind the truant steps out of the ranks backwards—in the contemptible and futile hope of saving his own skin by leaving his comrades in the lurch. There is, however, another alternative way of facing the same ordeal which is illustrated by the famous story¹ of the two Spartiate soldiers Aristodâmus 'the Truant'² and Eurytus.

The story relates that the two men were on leave together in hospital behind the front—both of them incapacitated for active service by an acute attack of ophthalmia—when the news was brought to them that the rest of the devoted band of three hundred Spartiates were being outflanked at Thermopylae by a turning movement and were therefore now doomed to certain death in consequence of King Leonidas' decision not to retreat. In these circumstances Eurytus and Aristodâmus were 'both presented with the possibility of returning safely home to Sparta together unless they preferred the alternative of losing their lives with their comrades', and, 'when this choice was presented to them, they could not make up their minds to agree, but took different views of their duty'. While Aristodâmus slunk off home to Sparta, Eurytus made his batman lead him to the battlefield; and when, upon reaching the front, the Helot servant turned and fled, his Spartiate master flung himself—blind-eyed—into the mêlée in order to meet death still more swiftly, and against still more fearful odds, than his two hundred and ninety eight comrades whom he had rejoined—unbidden—by this heroic *tour de force*. It is evident that Eurytus's way of distinguishing himself from the rank and file was the antithesis of Aristodâmus's. Instead of stepping backwards, he stepped forwards. Instead of lapsing into truancy, he rushed into martyrdom.

A martyr is primarily a soldier who takes it upon himself to bear witness to the supreme value and the absolute obligation of the military virtues in a situation in which his only means of giving his testimony is to sacrifice his own life on a forlorn hope. His self-sacrifice may have the incidental aim of carrying his comrades to victory by breaking a breach in the enemy line—as when

¹ See Herodotus, Book VII, chaps. 229–31, and Book IX, chap. 71.

² ὁ τρέας Ἀριστόδημος.

Arnold von Winkelried threw himself upon the Hapsburg pikes; or when Alessandro Pizzoli drew the fire of the Neapolitan cannon by dropping down into the lane which the piece commanded, and then charging the cannon's mouth at point-blank range;¹ or when the Decii dedicated themselves to Tellus and to the Di Manes as sacrificial victims who were to get themselves slain on the battlefield by the enemy's hand.² But the fundamental motive of martyrdom is not to secure material success here and now for the cause to which the martyr has dedicated himself. The Spartan soldier Eurytus chose to bear witness to the virtues of the Lycurgian *agôgê* by sacrificing his life in an action in which an utter physical defeat was a foregone conclusion; and the same *esprit de corps* has inspired the innumerable heroes of innumerable stricken fields who have died rather than surrender to an already victorious adversary. In essence the martyr is a soldier who steps out of the ranks on his own initiative³ in a forward direction in order to

¹ Trevelyan, G. M.: *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy, June–November, 1860* (new impression, London 1928, Longmans, Green), p. 84.

² For this Roman practice of *devotio*, which was a literal self-sacrifice on the part of the general commanding, see Livy, Book VIII, chaps. 9–10, and Book X, chaps. 28–9.

The practice outraged the Romans' Greek antagonist Pyrrhus both as a rationalist and as a 'clean fighter', and, upon receiving intelligence, on the eve of the Battle of Ausculum, that the commander of the opposing Roman army, Publius Decius Mus the Third, intended to dedicate himself in this fashion on this occasion, Pyrrhus is said to have made an allocution on the subject to his troops, with the twofold object of removing from their minds any superstitious fears which the report of Decius's intention might have aroused, and at the same time instructing them to make the Roman commander's gesture fall flat by insisting upon taking him alive. On the first point Pyrrhus is reported to have observed that 'a single man cannot defeat a multitude by dying, nor can a piece of spell-binding and black art (*ἐπωδὴν καὶ μαγανείαν τινά*) prove more than a match for armaments and valour (*κρείττω τῶν ὀπλῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι*)'. On the second point he was not content with giving orders to his own troops to refuse Decius all opportunity of finding the death which he was proposing to seek: he also sent a message to Decius himself to warn him that his purpose would not meet with success, and further to threaten him that he would be put to death in an unpleasant way after being taken alive (*ζωγρηθέντα κακῶς ἀπολείσθαι*). The story relates that, on receiving this message, Decius gave up the idea (Dio Cassius: fragments of Book X = Zonaras, Book VIII, chap. 5, §§ 1–3. The passage will be found in U. P. Boissvain's edition of Dio, vol. 1 (Berlin 1895, Weidmann), p. 133).

According to Beloch, K. J.: *Römische Geschichte bis zum Beginn der Punischen Kriege* (Berlin and Leipzig 1926, de Gruyter), pp. 440–2, the alleged *devotiones* of the first Publius Decius Mus at Vesperis in 340 B.C. and of his son and namesake at Sentinum in 295 B.C. are both apocryphal and are both to be accounted for as alternative transfers of a genuine *devotio* of the third Publius Decius Mus in 279 B.C. at Ausculum. In Beloch's view P.D.M. III really did commit *devotio*; and the story that Pyrrhus successfully frustrated his intention was afterwards invented in deference to the awkward fact that at Ausculum the Romans actually suffered a heavy defeat, whereas a successfully committed *devotio* ought to have been an infallible means of procuring a victory. This is perhaps an excessive indulgence in 'the higher criticism'!

³ A critic may here object that a martyr is often inspired by the heroic example of a predecessor whom he loves and admires. When Publius Decius Mus devoted himself at Sentinum in 295 B.C., we must suppose (if, *pace* Beloch, we accept the three successive *devotiones* in the tradition as being all alike authentic) that he was consciously imitating his father and namesake who had devoted himself in 340 B.C. at Vesperis; and unquestionably every Christian martyr is consciously imitating the Crucifixion of Christ. Martyrdom, the critic may conclude, is not a substitute for mimesis: on the contrary, it is an illustration of it. We may reply that an act of martyrdom, like any other act, may become an object of mimesis, but that the crucial case is the conduct of the protomartyr in any given series, and that, when we examine this original act of martyrdom, we invariably

go beyond the demands of duty. While in normal circumstances duty demands no more of the soldier than that he should risk his life to the minimum extent that may be necessary for the effective execution of his superior officer's orders, the martyr courts death for the vindication of an ideal, without necessarily having any expectation at all that his self-sacrifice will secure a material victory for his tribe or country. And, if this is true of the military prototypes of martyrhood, it is true *a fortiori*, as we shall see, of the nobler army of martyrs who lay down their lives in contests which make as exacting a demand as any military action can make upon the courage and generosity and faith of the combatant, without offering him those adventitious aids to his *moral* that are provided by the physical excitement and the mass-suggestion of the literal battle-field.

When we pass from the plane of behaviour to that of feeling, we may first take note of two ways of personal feeling which are alternative reactions to a reversal of that movement of Promethean *élan* in which the nature of growth appears to reveal itself.¹ Both these feelings reflect a painful consciousness of being 'on the run' from forces of evil which have not only taken the offensive but have also established their ascendancy so potently that they now march from victory to victory and go from strength to strength.² The passive expression of this consciousness of continual and progressive moral defeat is a sense of being adrift in a Universe in which Evil is triumphant in the Macrocosm. The routed Soul is prostrated by a perception of its objective failure to master and control its environment; and it is tempted to resign itself to the belief that the Universe, including the Soul itself, is at the mercy of a power which is as irrational as it is invincible: the ungodly goddess with the double face who is propitiated under the name of Chance (*Τύχη*) or is endured under the name of Necessity (*Ἀνάγκη*). Alternatively, the moral defeat which desolates the routed Soul may be felt as a failure to master and control the Soul's own self; and in that case the expression of the Soul's consciousness of defeat will be active. The Soul will then be possessed by a sense of sin; and, turning its gaze inwards from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm, it will gird itself for the arduous spiritual enterprise of attacking and overcoming *Karma*: the cumulative burden of the excess of evil over good in the Soul's own action in the past.

We have also to notice two ways of social feeling which are alter-

find that it is a voluntary action which goes beyond the call of duty and which is evoked by a social situation in which the normal 'social drill' of mimesis has broken down. The very object of the protomartyr is to give a new example.

¹ The nature of growth has been discussed in Part III. B, in vol. iii, above.

² Psalm lxxiv. 7.

native substitutes for the sense of style—a sense that is the subjective counterpart of the objective process of the differentiation of civilizations through their growth.¹ Both these feelings betray a loss of this same sensitiveness for form; but their respective ways of responding to an identic challenge are poles apart. The passive response is an acquiescence in the total loss of all sense of form as a consequence of the loss of the particular style of the particular civilization that has now passed over from growth into disintegration. The Soul surrenders itself to the melting-pot; and a negative sense of promiscuity then comes to pervade every sphere of social activity. In the sphere of social intercourse it results in a blending of incongruous traditions and in a compounding of incompatible values (*παμμυξία*); in the media of language and literature and visual art it declares itself in the currency of a *lingua franca* (*κοινή*) and of a similarly standardized composite style of literature and painting and sculpture and architecture; in the realm of philosophical ideas and of religious beliefs and practices it produces ritual and theological syncretisms. This passive response is not always sharply distinguished by students of the phenomena of social disintegration from the active response which is really its extreme antithesis. This active response takes the loss of a style of living which has been local and ephemeral as an opportunity, and a call, to adopt another style which partakes of what is universal and eternal: *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*.² When it rises to this active response, the Soul finds that the effacement of the characteristic form of the disintegrating civilization has brought it face to face, not with a Chaos void of any form at all, but with a Cosmos whose circumambient form and divine architecture are now at last coming into view through the rents in the screen of lath-and-plaster work with which Man has sought to shut out an overwhelming vision of Eternity and Infinity.³

¹ For this differentiation through growth see III. C (iii), in vol. iii, above.

² Saint Vincent of Lérins: *Commonitorium Primum*, chap. 2 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. i, col. 640).

³ An almost naively self-complacent boast of juvenile proficiency in this art of self-protective spiritual jerry-building is made in the following passages from Mr. H. G. Wells' *Experiment in Autobiography*, vol. i (London 1934, Gollancz), pp. 78–9, 96, and 144:

'I was glad to think that between the continental land masses of the World, which would have afforded an unbroken land passage for wolves from Russia and tigers from India, and this safe island on which I took my daily walks, stretched the impassable moat of the English Channel. I read, too, in another book, about the distances of the stars, and that seemed to push the All Seeing Eye very agreeably away from me. . . .

'I felt it must be rather empty and cheerless beyond the stars, but I did not let my mind dwell on that. My God, who by this time had become entirely disembodied, had been diffused through this space since the beginning of things. He was already quite abstracted from the furious old hell-and-heaven Thunder God of my childish years. His personality had faded. . . .

'It must be hard for intelligent people nowadays to realize all that a shabby boy of fifteen could feel as the last rack of a peevish son-crucifying Deity dissolved away into blue sky, and as the implacable social barriers, as they had seemed, set to keep him in

This active response is an awakening to a sense of unity which broadens and deepens as the vision expands from the unity of Mankind, through the unity of the Cosmos,¹ to embrace the unity of God.

If we pass on, in the third place, to the plane of life, we shall encounter, here again, two pairs of alternative reactions to match the two pairs that have already presented themselves on each of the two preceding planes of feeling and behaviour. On this third plane, however, the picture departs from the previous pattern in three respects. For one thing the alternatives which here replace the single movement that is characteristic of the stage of growth are variations on that movement rather than substitutes for it. Secondly both pairs of alternatives are variations upon the same single movement—a movement which we have described² as a transference of the field of action from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm. Thirdly the two pairs of alternative ways of life that make their appearance in the life of a disintegrating civilization, as variations upon the process of transference, are differentiated from one another by a difference which is sufficiently profound to account for the duplication. In one pair the temper of the reactions is violent; in the other it is gentle.

This parting of the ways into violent and gentle courses in the history of a disintegrating society first caught our attention when we were examining the response of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society to the challenge from the dominant minority. We stumbled upon the contrast in the famous antithesis between the violent spirit of Theudas and Judas of Galilee and their partisans and the gentle spirit of Jesus and his disciples.³ In that context

that path unto which it had pleased God to call him, weakened down to temporary fences he could see over and presently perhaps hope to climb over or 'push aside.'

The unconscious irony of these passages is heightened by the very expressiveness of the author's literary genius. Mr. Wells here reveals himself building up defensive screens and fancying all the time that he is pulling down constricting barriers; contracting the spiritual bounds of his microcosm and imagining that he is enlarging the span of the Universe because he is pushing the physical frontiers of his macrocosm out to a mathematical infinity. To all appearance he is unaware of the truth that, as God dissolves into blue sky, the shades of the prison-house are closing around the growing boy.

¹ A human 'political animal' who has apprehended the unity of the Cosmos can most aptly describe his spiritual discovery in the political metaphor of citizenship in a cosmic society; and the Greek name for this cosmic society is *Κοσμοπόλις*; but in the current usage of the English language the adjective 'cosmopolitan', which has been coined from the Greek substantive, has been divorced from its proper meaning in order to describe the *παμμυξία* which the melting-pot produces. This arbitrarily incorrect usage has no doubt played its part in the blurring of the sharp and vital distinction between the true *Cosmopolis* and its exact antithesis the Melting-Pot. The English adjective which comes nearest to expressing the connotation of the Greek word *Κοσμοπόλις* is 'catholic' in the non-ecclesiastical meaning of the term.

² In III. C (i) (d), in vol. iii, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 72-3, above. A distinction between several different positive realities underlying the negative phenomenon of Gentleness or Non-Violence is drawn in V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, pp. 588-90, below.

we went on to notice that the same contrast could be discerned—unmistakably, though perhaps not quite so clearly—in the responses of the Hellenic dominant minority and external proletariat. In the history of the dominant minority we detected this contrast in the antithesis between the destructive temper of the Roman militarists from the time of the Hannibalic War to the time of Augustus and the constructive *êthos* of the Roman civil servants from the time of Augustus to the time of Alexander Severus.¹ In the history of the external proletariat we detected a corresponding contrast, in the last chapter of the story, between the temper of a Genseric and the temper of a Theodoric.² In the rest of our long review of internal and external proletariats we have come across this distinction between violent and gentle courses time and again; and, now that we have passed on from the superficial study of schism in the Body Social to the deeper study of schism in the Soul, we shall find that the prominence of this parting of the ways between Violence and Gentleness in the landscape of social disintegration is no mere fortuitous optical effect of an empirical survey, but is an essential feature in the plot of the spiritual drama which the social process half expresses and half obscures.

With this preface our violent and our gentle pair of variations on the movement of transference from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm may now be brought on to the stage. In the violent pair the passive reaction may be described as Archaism and the active as Futurism. In the gentle pair the passive reaction may be described as Detachment and the active as Transfiguration.

Archaism and Futurism are two alternative attempts to substitute a mere transfer in the Time-dimension for that transfer of the field of action from one spiritual plane to another which is the characteristic movement of growth. In both Archaism and Futurism the effort to live in the Microcosm instead of the Macrocosm is abandoned for the pursuit of a Utopia³ which would be reached—supposing that it could actually be found 'in real life'—without any challenge to face the arduous change of spiritual clime. This external Utopia is intended to do duty, in place of the inward spiritual cosmos, as an 'Other World'; but it is an 'Other World' only in the shallow and unsatisfying sense of being a negation of the Macrocosm in the momentary present state of the Macrocosm's existence here and now. The Soul that has been daunted by finding that it has been called on to play its part in life in the

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 38-9, and V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 78-9, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 223-7, above.

³ For Utopias as attempts to 'peg' falling civilizations see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 88-106, above.

tragedy of social disintegration still cannot repudiate all movement or aim or purpose, since that would mean committing outright spiritual suicide; so it seeks to 'get by' through taking the easiest spiritual option that is open to it. Instead of continuing to attempt to make the formidable passage from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm, it now seeks to fulfil the bare letter of the Law of Life by making a perfunctory transfer which does not involve any departure from the level of the Macrocosm to a different spiritual height or depth. It proposes to perform what is required of it by making its move from the Macrocosm as it is to-day to a goal which is simply another state of the self-same Macrocosm as it may once have been in the Past or as it may some time come to be in the Future. Archaism places in the City of Cecrops¹ the treasure that it withdraws from the City of Pericles, while Futurism withdraws its treasure from the same City of Pericles in order to place it in the City of the Sun.²

In terms that we have coined for ourselves in earlier passages of this Study, Archaism may be defined as a reversion from the mimesis of contemporary creative personalities to a mimesis of the ancestors of the tribe: that is to say, as a lapse from the dynamic movement of Civilization to the static condition of Primitive Mankind in its latest state.³ It may be defined, again, as one of those attempts at a forcible stoppage of change which result, in so far as they succeed, in the production of social enormities.⁴ In the third place, Archaism may be taken as an example of that attempt to 'peg' a broken-down and disintegrating society which, in another context,⁵ we have found to be the common aim of human Utopias and of those insect societies to which the arrested human societies approximate. In corresponding terms we may define Futurism as a repudiation of any mimesis of anybody—present or past, creative or conservative—and also as one of those attempts at a forcible accomplishment of change which result, in so far as they succeed, in the production of social revolutions that defeat their own purpose by tumbling over into reaction.⁶ In fine, Futurism only avoids the static immobility of Archaism at the price of moving like a convict on a treadmill or like a captive

¹ For the City of Cecrops (the patron divinity of archaic Athens) as a title for the Archaistic Utopia see Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book IV, chap. 23.

² For the City of the Sun (the patron divinity of the Occumenical Proletariat that is scattered through all the lands on which the god Helios shines, without possessing a single clod of earth to call its own) see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 69-70, 111, footnote 2, and 179-80, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, p. 692, footnote 2, and V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, vol. vi, p. 351, below.

³ See Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 191-2, above.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (b), *passim*, in vol. iv, above.

⁵ In Part III. A, in vol. iii, pp. 88-106, above.

⁶ See IV. C (iii) (b), *passim*, in vol. iv, above.

mouse in a revolving cage; and the futility of this revolutionary motion is summed up in the devastating aphorism *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.¹

For those who put their trust in either of these would-be substitutes for the transfer of the field of action from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm, there lies in wait an ironical common fate. In seeking their alternative easy options these 'defeatists' are actually condemning themselves—whether blindly or with open eyes—to a violent denouement which is bound to overtake them, when once they have set their feet on either the archaistic or the futuristic path, because in both cases they are attempting something which is contrary to the order of Nature. The quest of the inner life, which seems—and is—so formidable an undertaking, is at any rate no impossibility for a Soul that is playing its temporary part on the stage of the External World; for, since the Microcosm and the Macrocosm are different planes of spiritual experience and activity, the transference of the Soul's treasure from the outward to the inward life is equally difficult, or equally easy, whatever the momentary state of the Macrocosm may be. On the other hand it is intrinsically impossible for the Soul, in so far as it is living in the outward life, to extricate itself from its present place in the current of the 'ever-rolling stream' by taking either a flying leap backward upstream into the Past or a flying leap forward downstream into the Future. The archaistic and the futuristic Utopia alike are Utopias in the literal sense of being localities which have no real existence. These two alluring *alibis* are thus both of them unattainable *ex hypothesi*; and the sole and certain effect of striking out towards either of them is to produce a troubling of the waters with a violence that brings no healing.

The crescendo movement of violence that is set in motion by Futurism has been described, with an inimitable combination of exactitude and vividness, by a famous nineteenth-century Western socialist.

'Lorsqu'arrive le temps des époques critiques ou de destruction,² c'est que des faits nouveaux se sont produits; c'est que la société éprouve des besoins nouveaux, que ne comporte pas et que ne peut comprendre le cadre trop étroit, et devenu inflexible, de la croyance établie et de l'institution politique qui la réalise. Cependant, ces faits nouveaux, ces exigences d'avenir, cherchent à se faire jour, à prendre place; d'abord ils viennent se briser contre l'ordre ancien; mais, par

¹ Alphonse Karr: *Les Guêpes*, Janvier 1849 (ed. Michel Lévy, vol. vi, p. 304), according to Harbottle, T. B., and Dalbiac, P. H.: *Dictionary of Quotations (French and Italian)* (London 1901, Swan Sonnenschein).

² For the sense in which this term is used in the Saint-Simonian philosophy see the present Study, Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 199-200, above.—A.J.T.

leur choc répété, ils finissent par l'ébranler et par le renverser lui-même. La société alors ne présente plus que l'image d'une guerre acharnée, d'une anarchie profonde, au sein de laquelle les sentiments haineux semblent les seuls qui puissent se développer. Bientôt les esprits, effrayés de la confusion qui les frappe, ne pouvant encore apercevoir l'ordre qui doit s'établir, n'éprouvant que de répugnance pour l'ordre qui vient de périr, et dans lequel ils ne voient qu'une longue et oppressive déception, ne tardent point à arriver à cette idée que le monde est livré au désordre. . . .

'Les époques critiques se divisent en deux périodes distinctes: l'une formant le début de ces époques,¹ pendant laquelle la société, ralliée par une foi vive aux doctrines de destruction, agit de concert pour renverser l'ancienne institution religieuse et sociale; l'autre, comprenant l'intervalle qui sépare la destruction de la réédification, pendant laquelle les hommes, dégoûtés du passé et incertains de l'avenir, ne sont plus unis par aucune foi, par aucune entreprise commune. Ce que nous avons dit de l'absence de moralité aux époques critiques ne doit s'entendre que de la seconde des deux périodes qu'elles comprennent, mais non point de la première, non point des hommes qui y figurent et qui, par une sorte d'inconséquence, prêchent la haine par amour, appellent à la destruction en croyant édifier, provoquent le désordre parce qu'ils désirent l'ordre, établissent l'esclavage sur l'autel qu'ils élèvent à la liberté. Ceux-là . . . sachons les admirer, plaignons-les seulement d'avoir été soumis à la mission terrible qu'ils ont remplie avec dévouement, avec amour pour l'humanité; plaignons-les, car ils étaient nés pour aimer, et toute leur vie a été consacrée à la haine.'²

In its tragic climax Futurism expresses itself as Satanism.

'The essence of the belief is that the World Order is evil and a lie; goodness and truth are persecuted rebels. . . . The belief has been held by many Christian saints and martyrs, and notably by the author of the Apocalypse. But we should notice that it is diametrically opposed to the teaching of almost all the great moral philosophers. Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, Kant and J. S. Mill, and Comte and T. H. Green, all argue or assume that there exists in some sense a Cosmos or Divine Order; that what is good is in harmony with this order, and what is bad is in discord against it. I notice that one of the Gnostic schools³ in Hippolytus the Church Father actually defines Satan as "The Spirit who works against the Cosmic Powers":⁴ the rebel or protestant who counteracts the will of the whole, and tries to thwart the community of which he is a member.'⁵

This inevitable ultimate outcome of the spirit of revolution is

¹ Compare the work here being quoted, vol. xli, pp. 87-8.—A.J.T.

² Bazard: 'Exposition de la Doctrine Saint-Simonienne' in *Œuvres Complètes de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, vol. xlii (Paris 1877, Leroux), pp. 18 and 20-1.

³ The school of Saturnilus of Antioch, a contemporary of Basileides.—A.J.T.

⁴ Ἀγγελὸν ἀντιπράττοντα τοῖς κοσμικοῖς (Hippolytus: *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium*, edited by Duncker, L., and Schneidewin, F. G. (Göttingen 1859, Dieterich), Book VII, chap. 28).

⁵ Murray, Gilbert: 'Satanism and the World Order' in *Essays and Addresses* (London 1921, Allen & Unwin), p. 203.

an accepted commonplace among all men and women who are not themselves revolutionaries;¹ and it is not difficult to lay our finger on historic illustrations of the working of this spiritual law.

For example, in the Syriac Society—both in its Iranian and in its Syrian wing—the Messianic form of Futurism made its first appearance as a positive attempt to follow the way of Gentleness. Instead of persisting in a disastrous attempt to maintain his political independence here and now against the assaults of Assyrian militarism, the Israelite, like the Mede, bowed his neck to a present political yoke and reconciled himself to this painful act of resignation by transferring all his political treasure to the hope of a saviour-king who was to arise and restore the fallen national kingdom at some hidden future date. When we trace out the history of this Messianic Hope in the Jewish community,² we find that it worked in favour of Gentleness for more than four hundred years—from 586 B.C., when the Jews were carried away into a Babylonish captivity by Nebuchadnezzar, until 168 B.C., when they were subjected to a Hellenizing persecution by Antiochus Epiphanes.³ The first Jewish martyrs who gave their lives for Judaism in its three-hundred-years-long struggle with Hellenism all suffered and died without offering any physical resistance. Yet the discord between a confidently expected mundane future and an excruciatingly experienced mundane present resolved itself in Violence in the end. The martyrdom of Eleazar and the Seven Brethren was followed, within two years, by the armed insurrection of Judas Maccabaeus; and the Maccabees inaugurated that long line of ever more fanatically militant Jewish Zealots—the innumerable Theudases and Judases of Galilee—whose violence reached its appalling climax in the Satanic Jewish *émeutes* of A.D. 66–70 and 115–17 and 132–5.⁴

¹ It is not surprising to find this commonplace expressed with a classic French precision—'La révolution est satanique dans son essence'—by so militant a counter-revolutionary as Joseph de Maistre. Sombart has taken the same theme as his text for a definition of 'Revolutionismus':

'I am using this term to describe a settled spiritual attitude which seeks to confer upon Luciferism a recognition in principle and an application in practice. In entering into this idea the Revolution ceases to be what it originally was—simply a means to an end—and becomes an end in itself. . . . The revolutionary *must* not concern himself with the question of shaping the Future, because that would cripple his revolutionary energy. He may not think about construction; he must devote himself exclusively to the task of sabotage.'

The writer of this Study owes both these quotations to Curtius, E. R.: *Deutscher Geist in Gefahr* (second edition: Stuttgart and Berlin 1933, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt), p. 38.

It will be seen that, when Futurism rankles into Satanism, it defeats its own original purpose.

² For this history see further V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 120–32, below.

³ See further V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 103–5, below.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 68 and 73, above. For the militancy into which Zoroastrianism likewise eventually fell in the Age of the Sasanidae, see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 203; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285–7 and 374; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 216, above; and V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex I, pp. 578–9, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 659–61, below.

The nemesis of Futurism, which is illustrated by this classic Jewish case, is not unfamiliar; but it is perhaps more surprising to find Archaism being overtaken by the same nemesis at the end of its own apparently opposite path; for, so far from being a commonplace, it may seem something of a paradox to suggest that a pandemonium of Violence is the inevitable outcome of this retrograde movement likewise. Nevertheless the facts of history show that our paradox is as true as our commonplace; and, in anticipation of a survey of the facts, we may point the truth by citing, here again, a single classic case.

In the history of the political disintegration of the Hellenic Society the first statesmen to take the archaistic road were the Eurypontid King Agis IV in the Lacedaemonian commonwealth and in the Roman commonwealth the Tribune of the Plebs Tiberius Gracchus;¹ and there was a singular resemblance in character, as well as in policy, between the Roman and the Spartiate reformer. They were both of them men of unusual sensitiveness and unusual gentleness; and, born (as they both were) into an age of distress and discord, they both set themselves the political task of righting a social wrong, and thereby averting a social catastrophe, through a return to what they believed to have been the ancestral constitution of the commonwealth in the already half legendary 'Golden Age' before the breakdown. Their aim was the restoration of concord and the preservation of peace; yet, because their archaistic policy was an attempt to reverse the current of social life, it inevitably led them into a course of Violence which was contrary both to their policy and to their *êthos*; and the gentleness of their spirit, which moved them to sacrifice their lives rather than go to extremes in combating the fiercer Counter-Violence which their own reluctant Violence had swiftly provoked, did not avail to arrest the avalanche of Violence which they had unintentionally set in motion. Their self-sacrifice merely inspired a successor to take up their work and seek to carry it to success by a ruthless use of the Violence in which the martyr had shown himself half-hearted. The gentle Eurypontid King Agis IV was followed by the violent Agiad King Cleomenes III; the gentle Roman Tribune Tiberius Gracchus by his violent brother Gaius. And this tragic sequence was not the end of the story; for the ruthlessness of Gaius and Cleomenes was only temporarily and superficially successful in

¹ These two historical representatives of the Hellenic dominant minority both had posthumous literary careers as heroes of 'folk-tales' which took shape in the underworld of the Hellenic internal proletariat (see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, *passim*, in vol. vi, below). For their political careers 'in real life' see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 76-7; IV. C (iii) (b) 9, vol. iv, p. 205; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 508; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 78, above; and V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), vol. vi, pp. 52-3, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 219-20, below.

achieving Tiberius's and Agis' frustrated purpose. In either case the successor's career merely illustrated the truth that 'all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword'¹ whether they draw it right out and lay about them, or hold it back, half-drawn, in the scabbard. The ultimate result of the violent successor's ruthless work was simply to give fresh momentum to the wave of Violence which his gentle predecessor had undesignedly set in motion. Between them, the two archaizing Heracleidae and the two archaizing Gracchi let loose a spate of Violence which did not subside² until it had swept away the whole fabric of the commonwealth which the would-be reformers had sought to save.³

Our Hellenic illustration of the fruits of Archaism and our Syriac illustration of the fruits of Futurism perhaps demonstrate, between them, our thesis that both these two variations upon the movement of transference of the field of action end invariably and inevitably in disastrous Violence; for this is their outcome even when they are set in motion by leaders who, by temperament as well as out of policy, are sincere believers in Gentleness. If we now pursue our Hellenic and our Syriac story into the next chapter, we shall find that the pandemonium of Violence which had been let loose by the cult of Archaism in the one case and of Futurism in the other was eventually allayed by an astonishing resurrection of that very spirit of Gentleness which the surging tide of Violence had overborne and submerged and silenced. In the Hellenic dominant minority the gang of conquerors and wastrels and hang-

¹ Matt. xxvi. 52. See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 78, above; and V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), vol. vi, pp. 52-3; V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 178; and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 391-2 and 527-8, below.

² For Cleomenes' ultra-violent successor Nabis and Gaius's ultra-violent successor Sulla see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 220, below.

³ It is strange that the moral of Cleomenes' and Gaius's failure was not observed and taken to heart by Machiavelli, who searched the scriptures of Hellenic history with such diligence and such acumen for illustrations of his empirically established social 'laws'. In this case the Florentine philosopher's insight failed him; for there is a passage in *The Prince* in which he expounds the precise argument for the efficacy of Violence which was drawn by Cleomenes from the history of Agis, and by Gaius from the history of Tiberius, with such fatal consequences for the policies of both of the two 'armed prophets' of the Hellenic dominant minority who acted on this line of reasoning:

'All the armed prophets have been victorious, while the unarmed prophets have come to grief, because . . . the nature of the peoples is inconstant, and it is easy to persuade them of a thing, but difficult to hold them to that persuasion. Accordingly it is expedient to be so equipped that, when their belief gives out, one will have it in one's power to make them believe by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would not have been able to secure the observance of their constitutions very long if they had been unarmed—as may be inferred from what happened in our own times to Brother Girolamo Savonarola, who came to grief over his new dispensation because, when the multitude began to lose belief in it, Brother Girolamo himself lacked the means of either retaining his hold upon those who had once believed or compelling belief on the part of the unbelievers. No doubt the armed prophets encounter great difficulties, and they are assailed *en route* by all the dangers of their undertaking—dangers which it is their business to overcome by their efficiency—but, when once they have overcome them, and have begun to evoke veneration, thanks to having wiped out all their inveterate detractors, they then remain puissant, secure, honoured and happy ever after.'—Machiavelli, Niccolò: *Il Principe*, chap. 6.

men who worked their will upon a distracted world during the last two centuries B.C. begot, as we have observed,¹ a breed of public servants with the conscience and the ability to organize and maintain a universal state; and at the same time the epigoni of the violent-handed archaizing reformers turned into a school of aristocratic philosophers²—Arria, Caecina Paetus, Thrasea Paetus, Seneca, Helvidius Priscus, Arulenus Rusticus, Herennius Senecio—who took no satisfaction in the exercise of their hereditary dominance even in the public interest, and who carried this abdication to the point of obediently committing suicide when the word of command was uttered by a Claudius or a Nero or a Vespasian or a Domitian. Similarly, in the Syriac wing of the Hellenic internal proletariat, the fiasco of the Hasmonaeon attempt to establish by force of arms a Messianic Kingdom in This World—in the trough between the ebbing wave of the Hellenic Power of the Seleucidae and the oncoming wave of the Hellenic Power of Rome³—was followed by the triumph of a King of the Jews whose servants were forbidden to fight because his Kingdom was not of This World,⁴ while in the next generation, on a narrower range of spiritual vision, the savagely heroic forlorn hope of the militant Zealots John of Gischala and Simon of Gerasa was retrieved, in the hour of annihilation, by the sublimely heroic non-resistance of the Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai.⁵ How was it that, in both these cases, a tide of Violence which seemed to have swept away every barrier in its path was thus, after all, brought to a standstill and reversed? In either case the miraculous reversion from Violence to Gentleness can be traced to a change in ways of life. In the souls of the Roman fraction of the Hellenic dominant minority the ideal of Archaism had been supplanted by that of Detachment; in the souls of the Jewish fraction of the Hellenic internal proletariat the ideal of Futurism had been replaced by that of Transfiguration.

What is the nature of these two ideals, which—in the two instances in which we have just been watching them make their unexpected appearance and produce their amazing effect—are historically later arrivals upon the terrestrial scene than the ideals of Archaism and Futurism? Their posteriority in point of time would seem to bear witness to their superiority in spiritual worth; for,

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 38–9, above. For the corresponding breed in other dominant minorities see the same chapter, pp. 47–52, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 3, p. 405, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 250, below.

³ The hard fact that the Hasmonaeans owed their ephemeral military and political success to a passing accident in the political history of the Hellenic World, and not to the strength of their own right arm, was perceived and pointed out by Tacitus (*Historiae*, Book V, chap. 8): 'Iudaei Macedonibus invalidis, Parthis nondum adultis (et Romani procul erant), sibi ipsi reges imposuere.' The explanation was as deeply humiliating for the Jewish futurists as the fact itself was momentarily fortunate for them.

⁴ John xviii. 36.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 75–6, above.

whereas we have seen Gentleness degenerating into Violence under the baneful auspices of Archaism and Futurism, we see Violence giving place again to Gentleness when the spirits of Detachment and Transfiguration begin to move upon the face of the angry waters. Perhaps we can apprehend the distinctive qualities of these two gentle ways of life in the same view as their historical geneses if we approach each of them first through the personality and the life-history of a notable convert: for example, Cato Minor the Roman archaist who became a Stoic philosopher,¹ and Simon Bar Jonas the Jewish futurist who became Peter the disciple of Jesus.² In both of these great men there was a streak of spiritual blindness which obscured their greatness by misdirecting their energies so long as they were pursuing the respective Utopias to the service of which they had first sought to dedicate themselves. And in each of them the long baffled and bewildered soul was enabled, through its conversion to a new way of life, to realize at last its highest potentialities.

As the Quixotic champion of a romantically conceived Roman *πάτριος πολιτεία* which had never existed in any past age 'in real life',³ Cato was almost a figure of fun. In the politics of a generation which he obstinately refused to take as he found it, he was perpetually chasing the shadow and missing the substance; and, when at last he stumbled into playing a leading part in a civil war for the outbreak of which he himself bore no small share of unadmitted responsibility, his political make-believe was doomed to suffer a shattering disillusionment whatever the event might be, since the régime which would have been the consequence of a Republican victory would have been at least as repugnant to Cato's archaistic ideal as the eventually victorious Caesarean dictatorship. In this dilemma, which seemed to offer Cato merely a choice between alternative roads to frustration and failure, the Quixotic politician was redeemed from ineptitude by the heroic philosopher. The man who had lived as an archaist in vain now met his death as a Stoic to such good purpose that, after all, he gave Caesar—and Caesar's successors for more than a century after him—more trouble than all the rest of the Republicans together. The story of Cato's last hours—sublimely magnificent and at the same time profoundly moving—made an impression upon his contemporaries which can be recaptured down to this day by any reader of Plutarch's narrative. With the instinct of genius

¹ For Cato Minor see further V. C (i) (d) 3, p. 405, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 250, below.

² Peter's conversion from the way of Violence to the way of Gentleness has been touched upon by anticipation in V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 74, above.

³ For this expression of institutional Archaism see further V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), vol. vi, pp. 52-6, below.

Caesar apprehended the gravity of the blow which had been dealt to his cause by the Stoic death of an antagonist whom he had never found it necessary to take very seriously as a live politician; and, in the midst of the titanic labour of reconstructing a world while he was stamping out the embers of a civil war, the militarily triumphant dictator found time to reply to Cato's sword with Caesar's pen—the only weapon, as this versatile genius knew well, which might avail to ward off an attack that had been transferred from the military to the philosophic plane by Cato's disconcerting gesture of turning his sword against his own breast. Yet Caesar, for all his versatility, was unable to cope with the Cato who had struck this tremendous parting stroke; and Cato's death irresistibly produced the result which Caesar had feared. It gave birth to a school of philosophic opponents of Caesarism who were inspired by their founder's example to put the new tyranny out of countenance by removing themselves, with their own hand, from a situation which they would not accept and which they could not mend.¹

As for Peter, his Futurism seemed at first as incorrigible as Cato's Archaism. The first of the disciples to hail Jesus as the Messiah,² he was also the foremost in protesting against his acknowledged Master's consequent revelation that his Messianic Kingdom was not to be a Jewish version of the Iranian world-empire of Cyrus;³ and so, having earned a special blessing as the reward for his impulsive faith, he immediately drew down upon himself a crushing rebuke for his obtuse and aggressive insistence that the Master's vision of his own kingdom must conform to the disciple's *idée fixe*.

'Get thee behind me, Satan; thou art an offence unto me. For thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that be of men.'⁴

Satanism, in Hippolytus's meaning of the term,⁵ was indeed the essence of Peter's own untutored Messianic Hope. For, even when his error had been held up before his eyes by his Master's terrible reproof, the lesson made so little effect upon the stiff-necked disciple that he failed again under the next test. When he was chosen out to be one of the three witnesses of the Transfiguration, he immediately took the vision of Moses and Elias standing at his Master's side as the signal for the beginning of a *Befreiungskrieg*, and betrayed his prosaic misconception of what the vision meant by proposing to build on the spot the nucleus of a camp⁶ of the kind that the Theudases and Judases of Galilee were wont to

¹ See p. 390, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 250, below.

² Matt. xvi. 16 = Mark viii. 29 = Luke ix. 20.

³ Matt. xvi. 22 (= Mark viii. 32), quoted in V. C (i) (c) 2, on p. 74, above.

⁴ Matt. xvii. 23 = Mark viii. 33.

⁵ See p. 386, above.

⁶ Matt. xvii. 4 = Mark ix. 5 = Luke ix. 33.

establish in the wilderness during the brief interval of grace before the Roman authorities received intelligence of their activities and sent out a flying column of troops to disperse them. At the sound of this jarring note the vision vanished in an echo of admonition to accept the Messiah's own revelation of the Messiah's path.¹ Yet this second lesson was still not enough to open Peter's eyes. Even at the climax of his Master's earthly career—when all that the Master himself had foretold was patently coming true—the incorrigible futurist drew his sword to fight in the garden of Gethsemane;² and he was so utterly confounded by the decisive veto with which his Master quashed his instinctive recourse to Violence once again³ that he rebounded from a forlorn hope into a dastardly betrayal.⁴ Indeed, even after this crowning experience of his life, when the Crucifixion and the Resurrection and the Ascension had taught him at last that Christ's Kingdom was not of This World, Peter was still fain to believe that even in this transfigured kingdom the franchise must be restricted to the Jews, just as it would have been in the futurist's Messianic Utopia—as though a society that embraced God in Heaven as its King could be bounded on God's Earth by a frontier excluding from it all but one of the tribes of God's human creatures and children. In one of the last scenes in which Peter is displayed to us in the Acts of the Apostles, we see him characteristically protesting against the clear command which accompanied the vision of the sheet let down from Heaven.⁵ Yet Peter does not give place to Paul as the protagonist in the story until the narrative has recorded his comprehension, at last, of a truth which Paul the Pharisee had apprehended in a trice through a single overwhelming spiritual experience. The long work of Peter's enlightenment was completed when the vision on the roof was followed by the arrival of Cornelius's messengers at the gate.⁶ And in his confession of faith in Cornelius's house at Caesarea⁷ and his defence of his action there before the bar of the Jewish-Christian community upon his return to Jerusalem⁸ Peter preached the Kingdom of Heaven in words that would have drawn no reproof from the Christ.

What are these two ways of life which produced these vast spiritual effects when they were respectively adopted in place of Archaism by Cato and in place of Futurism by Peter? In peering into spiritual depths which may prove unfathomable, let us begin by taking note of the common differences between Detachment

¹ Matt. xvii. 5 = Mark ix. 7 = Luke ix. 35.

² Matt. xxvi. 51 = Mark xiv. 47 = Luke xxii. 49-50 = John xvii. 10.

³ Matt. xxvi. 52-4 = Mark xiv. 48 = Luke xxii. 51 = John xviii. 11.

⁴ Matt. xxvi. 69-75 = Mark xiv. 66-72 = Luke xxii. 54-62 = John xviii. 15-18 and 25-7.

⁵ Acts x. 9-16.

⁶ Acts x. 17-33.

⁷ Acts x. 34-48.

⁸ Acts xi. 1-18.

and Transfiguration on the one hand and Archaism and Futurism on the other, and then go on to examine how Detachment and Transfiguration differ from each other.

Transfiguration and Detachment alike differ from both Futurism and Archaism in substituting a genuine change in spiritual clime, and not a mere transfer in the Time-dimension, for the particular form of transference of the field of action from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm which we have found to be the criterion of the growth of a civilization. The kingdoms that are their respective goals are both of them 'otherworldly' in the sense that neither of them is an imaginary past or future state of mundane existence. This common 'otherworldliness', however, is their only point of resemblance; and in every other respect they present a contrast to one another.

The way of life which we have called 'Detachment' has been given a variety of names by various schools of adepts. From a disintegrating Hellenic World the Stoics withdrew into an 'Invulnerability' (*Ἀνάθεια*) and the Epicureans into an 'Imperturbability' (*Ἀραπαξία*). From a disintegrating Indic World the Buddhists withdrew into an 'Immutability' (*Asamskṛta*) or an 'Unruffledness' (*Nirvāna*)—a state in which the wind is hushed and the fire extinct. The positive content of the concept of *Nirvāna* is even harder to apprehend than that of its Hellenic counterparts; for the authoritative descriptions of it define it as being neither one nor other of successive pairs of opposites—for example, neither Permanence nor Annihilation—and in the Buddhist philosophy the question 'whether after death a *tathāgata* (a released person) exists or not, whether he exists and does not exist, whether he is neither existent nor non-existent', is one of those questions that are dogmatically declared to be undetermined.² A positive apprehension of the meaning of 'Detachment' is perhaps, however, not only impossible but also unnecessary; for the four names—two Greek and two Sanskrit—for this way of life which we have just cited are all of them abstract substantives with a negative prefix; and it is the negativeness of the way that is the point of it.

It is a way that leads out of This World; its goal is an asylum; and the fact that that asylum excludes This World is the feature

¹ The connotation of the Greek word *ἀνάθεια*, in its Stoic usage, is perhaps more expressively conveyed in English by the word 'invulnerability' than by the word 'apathy'; for, though 'apathy' is the etymological counterpart of *ἀνάθεια*, the Greek word has changed colour in the process of being Anglicized. 'Apathy' has come to mean an insensibility that is neither an effort nor a virtue, whereas *ἀνάθεια* means a spiritual 'invulnerability' which can be neither achieved nor maintained without the exercise of a self-discipline of an almost heroic severity.

² Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), p. 124. The whole of chapter 10, 'Release and Nirvana', is illuminating in the light which it throws upon the field of our present inquiry.

that makes it attractive—as the goal has to be if the philosophic traveller is to make the renunciations and subject himself to the disciplines which are the indispensable conditions for pursuing his arduous and depressing spiritual journey. The impulse that carries him along is a push of aversion and not a pull of desire. He is shaking from off his feet the dust of the City of Destruction —‘The worldling says: “O beloved City of Cecrops”; and shalt *thou* not say: “O beloved City of Zeus”?’¹—but Marcus’s ‘City of Zeus’ is not the same as Augustine’s *Civitas Dei* which is ‘the city of the Living God’,² and the journey is a ‘withdrawal according to plan’ rather than a pilgrimage inspired by faith. For the philosopher a successful escape from This World is the true and ultimate end of Man; and for this reason the philosopher, if he faces the whole of the truth, must confess that at bottom it does not really matter what he does with himself, or whether he does anything at all, or whether such a thing as his self any longer exists, when once he has crossed the threshold of his city of refuge. The Hellenic philosophers pictured the state of the liberated sage as one of blissful contemplation (*θεωρία*)³—the intellectual bliss of admiring the form of some perfect geometrical figure or ‘watching the stars go round’,⁴ or the emotional bliss of an ecstatic union with the divine element in the Universe—and the earliest and greatest of them, who was born in the first generation after the breakdown, when the iron had not yet had time to enter right into their souls,⁵ made a brave show of finding a supreme positive value in this ‘otherworldly’ condition or activity. Yet Plato himself, in the simile of the Cave, betrays a temptation to cherish the sunlit Other World for its negative value of being an *alibi* from this one;⁶ Plotinus repudiates Plato’s reluctant injunction to return from that world to this;⁷ and Siddhārtha Gautama the Buddha frankly declares that, so long as all possibility of returning has been ruled out

¹ Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book IV, chap. 23 (quoted above on p. 384 and again in V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, vol. vi, p. 335, below).

² Hebrews xii. 22.

³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 253, above.

⁴ Bevan, Edwyn: *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford 1913, Clarendon Press), p. 111, citing Seneca, L. Annaeus: *Ad Marciam de Consolatione*, chap. 25.

⁵ Plato was born *circa* 430 B.C. (i.e. on the morrow of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War), but he lived on till *circa* 347 B.C. (i.e. to the eve of the birth of the fourth generation to be born since the catastrophe); and, though, even in his old age, he may still have remained unseared at heart, he never recovered from the shock which he had suffered in his early manhood when the disastrous ending of a twenty-seven-years-long fratricidal war had been followed by the judicial murder of Plato’s master Socrates. One effect of this shock can be observed in the archaistic antedating of the imaginary dates of Plato’s dialogues to the extent of about half a lifetime (see V. C (i) (d) 8 (γ), vol. vi, p. 79, below).

⁶ See the passages quoted from *The Republic* in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 249–52, above.

⁷ See the passage quoted from Monsieur Henri Bergson in III. C (ii) (b), vol. ii, p. 254, above.

once for all, the nature of the alternative state in which the *tathāgata* has come to rest is a matter of no consequence.

This unknowable and neutral *Nirvāna* or 'City of Zeus', which is the goal of the philosophic movement of Detachment, is the very antithesis of the Kingdom of Heaven or *Civitas Dei*, which is entered by way of the religious experience of Transfiguration. While the philosophic 'Other World' is in essence a world that is exclusive of ours on Earth, the divine 'Other World' transcends the earthly life of Man without ceasing to embrace it.

'And when he was demanded of the Pharisees, when the Kingdom of God should come, he answered them and said: "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation; neither shall they say *Lo here!* or *Lo there!* for, behold, the Kingdom of God is within¹ you."²

The meaning of this passage in the Gospel according to Saint Luke may be expressed in a simile from the ever-changing landscape of the Physical Cosmos as this happens to be depicted at the moment by our Western men-of-science. We may say that the Kingdom of This World is possessed and informed by the *Civitas Dei* as Matter is said to be penetrated and shot through by Radiation. The realms are not external to one another in the dimensions of Space and Time, since only the lower of the two is confined to these dimensions, whereas the higher simultaneously occupies and transcends them—and, in virtue of this all-pervasiveness, coexists with the Kingdom of This World all the time and everywhere. Accordingly the soul that aspires to rise to the higher realm from the lower will find its way, not by seeking to reduce to zero the dimensions of its former spiritual existence, but rather by seeking 'to expand them to infinity. Just as, by the scientist's sleight of hand, the human ear that is wont to hear sounds conveyed through the medium of Matter can be attuned to catch the sounds that are conveyed by Radiation, so, by God's grace, the Soul can be made aware of the eternal omnipresence of God—a presence which per-

¹ The original Greek words ἐντός ὑμῶν may mean either 'within you' or 'among you', but this ambiguity does not affect the significance of the passage for our present purpose. On either interpretation the Kingdom of God is represented as existing in This World as well as outside it. The words would also appear to imply that the immanence of the Kingdom of God in This World, in the hearts of human beings who are its citizens, is a state of things which is present—and, indeed, perpetual. This reading of the passage is contested, however, by A. von Gall in *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), pp. 474-5. Von Gall—taking ἐντός ὑμῶν to mean 'among you'—reads a future meaning into the present tense of the concluding sentence ('before you know where you are, you will find the Kingdom already there'), and he maintains that Jesus (as presented in this passage) agrees with the Pharisees in regarding the advent of the Kingdom as a future event (and not a present reality). According to von Gall, Jesus differs from the Pharisees merely in declaring that this future advent of the Kingdom will take the form of a sudden *fait accompli*, which will take the living generation by surprise, instead of being advertised in advance by signs and portents.—A.J.T.

² Luke xvii. 20-21.

vades This World just in virtue of transcending it—through being rapt into a supra-mundane mode of spiritual being.¹

It will be seen that the *Civitas Dei* is as positive in its nature as the 'City of Zeus' is negative, and that, whereas the way of Detachment, which leads to the 'City of Zeus', is a sheer movement of withdrawal, the way of Transfiguration, which leads to the *Civitas Dei*, is a movement of withdrawal-and-return²—though this on a different spiritual plane from any of those on which we have seen this movement taking place in the growths of civilizations.

This completes our preliminary review of the alternative ways of behaviour, feeling, and life which are opened up by that Schism in the Soul which is always to be found at the heart of the disintegration of any body social. If we are to be faithful to our well-established method, our next task will be to make an empirical survey of each of these spiritual phenomena as they have manifested themselves in the disintegrations of as many civilizations as have left a sufficiently intimate record of their 'members' experience. But before we launch out on to this ocean we may pause for a moment to take our bearings by observing the links between the history of the Soul and the history of Society.

Granting, *ex hypothesi*, that every spiritual experience must be that of some individual human being, shall we find that certain experiences, among those which we have been reviewing, are peculiar to members of certain fractions of a disintegrating society? We shall find, if we cast a glance back at our muster of experiences with this question in our minds, that all the four personal ways of behaviour and feeling—a passive *abandon* and an active self-control, a passive sense of drift and an active sense of sin—can be detected in members of the Dominant Minority and members of the Proletariat alike. On the other hand, when we come to the social ways of behaviour and feeling, we shall have to distinguish, for our present purpose, between the passive and the active pair. The two passive social phenomena—the lapse into truancy and the surrender to a sense of promiscuity—are apt to appear first in the ranks of the Proletariat and to spread from there to the ranks of the Dominant Minority, which usually succumbs to the sickness of 'proletarianization' in so far as it has not already perished through self-inflicted violence. Conversely, the two active social phenomena—the quest of martyrdom and the awakening to a sense of unity—are apt to appear first in the ranks of the Dominant

¹ For this and other similes which may perhaps imperfectly convey at least some of the aspects of the relation between This World and the *Civitas Dei*, see V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, pp. 157–61, below.

² For this likeness and difference between the two movements see also III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 248–63, above, and V. C (i) (e), vol. vi, pp. 170–1, below.

Minority and to spread from there to the ranks of the Proletariat, where Agis' gentle martyrdom is emulated by a proletarian Eleazar, and Cleomenes' violent martyrdom by a proletarian Judas Macabaeus, while the proletarian who hungers after a cosmic society finds his equivalent for a philosophic *Cosmopolis* in a religious catholicism. Finally, when we consider our four alternative ways of life, we shall find that here, conversely, the passive pair are apt to be associated in the first instance with the Dominant Minority and the active pair with the Proletariat. Archaism and Detachment make their epiphany in the ranks of the Dominant Minority; and, while Archaism finds adherents among the External Proletariat as well, it is never adopted by the Internal Proletariat, and Detachment never by either section of the Proletariat, Internal or External. On the other hand, Futurism and Transfiguration make their epiphany in the ranks of the Proletariat and propagate themselves from this starting-point—Futurism gaining converts from the Dominant Minority among the baffled and disillusioned devotees of an Archaism that has failed to bring salvation, while Transfiguration works its miracle in any human soul that awakens to the presence, and aspires to the citizenship, of the *Civitas Dei*.

From these historical associations between the several ways of behaviour, feeling, and life and the several fractions of a society in disintegration we may gain some knowledge of the relations in which the spiritual experiences and activities stand to one another. In general we can see that the passive reactions are apt to be the more barren and the active the more fruitful. For example, at one end of the scale *abandon* leads nowhere, whereas self-control is a constant element in all the virtues which the disintegrations of civilizations bring to flower; and similarly, at the other end of the scale, the life of Detachment, in which Passivity achieves its spiritual *chef d'œuvre*, is put out of countenance by the supremely active life of Transfiguration. Again, when we analyse the components of Detachment, with an eye to distinguishing the points in which it can bear comparison with Transfiguration from the points in which it reveals its inadequacy, we find that Detachment rises to the heights of Transfiguration in its readiness for martyrdom and in its conviction of sin, but is depressed to a lower spiritual level through a failure to rid itself of a clinging taint of truancy and Fatalism when it succumbs to an almost pardonable shrinking from the duty of returning to the night-bound Cave, and to an almost admirable acceptance of the inexorable laws of an impersonal Universe. Here we see two passive ways of behaviour and feeling acting as drags upon their two active counterparts; and there is a corresponding contrast between

the effects of the passive surrender to a sense of promiscuity and the active awakening to a sense of unity. A horror of the melting-pot inspires the two forlorn hopes of an Archaism and a Futurism in quest of Utopia; a yearning after a harmony that is not of This World inspires both the sublime failure of Detachment and the miraculous triumph of Transfiguration.

2. 'Abandon' and Self-Control

The particular manifestations of *abandon* and self-control which are characteristic of societies in disintegration are perhaps rather difficult to identify, just because these two ways of personal behaviour are apt to be exhibited by human beings in every variety of social circumstances. In the life of the primitive societies, for instance, in the static condition in which alone we have knowledge of it,¹ it is already possible to distinguish an orgiastic and an ascetic vein; and in this primitive life, with its cyclic rhythm, the two antithetical moods may be seen predominating in alternation with one another, according to the season, in the tribe's ceremonial corporate expression of its members' emotions. The same two moods can likewise be seen working in harmony—though this on a more intricate pattern and in a more highly sophisticated spirit—in the life of civilizations in the growth stage; and it is in this stage that their interaction is creative. It is only when we come to examine civilizations in their disintegration that we find the same two ways of personal behaviour still indeed both at work, but now at odds in an unreconciled opposition instead of playing in with one another in a creatively harmonious rotation.

In the histories of declining civilizations the phenomenon of *abandon* in our precise meaning of a way of personal behaviour is not, of course, to be confused or equated with the whole of that welter of demoralization of conduct and inversion of ranks and roles and values which is the most prominent of the outward visible signs of any process of breakdown and disintegration.² *Abandon*, as we have defined it,³ implies something more than a mere external rack and ruin. It means a state of mind in which antinomianism is accepted—consciously or unconsciously, in theory or in practice—as a substitute for creativeness.

Examples of *abandon* in this inward spiritual sense can perhaps be identified with least uncertainty if we try to take them in a

¹ See I. C (iii) (e), vol. i, pp. 179–80, and Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 190–5, above.

² See, for example, the picture of the Egyptian 'Time of Troubles' that is given in a passage, quoted above in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 410–11, from *The Admonitions of a Prophet*; and the corresponding pictures of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' (in two successive phases) that are given in a passage of Thucydides quoted above in V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 59–60, and in a passage of Polybius quoted above in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 505–6.

³ In V. C (i) (d) 1, p. 377, above.

single synoptic view side by side with examples of that self-control which is the alternative substitute for creativeness in the same ages of social decline.

In the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles', for instance, in the first generation after the breakdown, a pair of contrasted incarnations of *abandon* and self-control are presented to us in Plato's portraits of Alcibiades and Socrates in *The Symposium* and of Thrasymachus and Socrates in *The Republic*—Alcibiades, the slave of his own passion, standing for *abandon* in practice, and Thrasymachus, the advocate of *Faustrecht*, for the same mood in theory. It is in the next chapter of the Hellenic story that we find the exponents of each of the two attempts at 'self-expression' in lieu of creation seeking an authoritative sanction for their respective ways of behaviour by claiming that these are ways of 'living according to Nature'.

This merit was claimed for the mood of *abandon* by those vulgar hedonists who took in vain, and brought into disrepute, the name of Epicurus, and who for this offence were chidden by the censure of an Epicurean poet who had inherited the genuine austerity of his Master.

Hoc etiam faciunt ubi discubuere tenentque
pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis,
ex animo ut dicant: 'Brevis hic est fructu homullis;
iam fuerit neque post unquam revocare licebit.'¹

On the other side we see the sanction of 'naturalness' being claimed for the ascetic life of self-control in the crudely literal practice of the Cynics and, with a greater refinement, by the Stoic practitioners of a kindred philosophy. In all things that were 'indifferent'—and for a Stoic nothing was either good or evil in itself except the rightness or wrongness of his own will—it was the whole duty of the sage to mortify those human desires which were accepted by the hedonist as the promptings of Nature; and to carry this mortification to a degree at which the sage became able to accept, as natural, not the impulses of the hedonist's 'natural man', but the trials, whatever they might be, that were put upon him by the chances and changes of this mortal life. The course of Nature, thus conceived, must be borne by the Stoic sage with cheerfulness if he was capable of rising to this counsel of perfection, and at all events with calmness and tranquillity if he was to be accounted worthy of being numbered at all among the disciples of Zeno.

The melancholy vein of Stoic self-control is reflected in the *Meditations* of the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius, whose philosophy never could quite brace him to bear on his lonely shoulders the Atlantean load of a collapsing world.

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 912-15.

'The power that rules within, when it is in tune with Nature, has an attitude towards events which enables it to adapt itself easily to anything—within the limits of possibility—that is presented to it. . . .'¹

'Be like the headland against which the waves continually break; but the headland stands firm while the tormented waters sink to rest around it. . . .'²

'This infinitesimally short span of time is something to be passed through in tune with Nature and passed out of with a good grace—like an olive that falls when it is ripe with a blessing for Nature who has brought it forth and a gratitude to the tree which has borne it.'³

The temper to which the careworn Stoic emperor wistfully aspires in the last of the three sentences above quoted had been duly attained by the lame Stoic slave who had been the most conspicuous wearer of Zeno's mantle in the preceding generation.

'What else should we be doing, in public and in private, but singing the praises of the Godhead and speaking good of His name and attempting to express our thanks to Him? Digging or ploughing or eating, should we not ever be singing our hymn to God? . . . And, since most of you have gone blind, was it not meet that there should be somebody occupying this place and singing the hymn to God on behalf of us all? And what else can I, a lame old man, do but sing the praises of God? Were I a nightingale, I would sing like a nightingale; or, were I a swan, I would sing like a swan. But I happen to be a being endowed with reason, and so I must sing the praises of God. This is my work, so I am doing it, and I will never desert this post so long as it continues to be assigned to me. And I call upon the rest of you to sing the same song. . . .'⁴

'And, when Death overtakes me, I hope to be found by him practising what I preach, in order that I may be able to say to God: "Did I ever transgress Thy commandments? Did I ever use, for any other purposes than Thine, the talents or the senses or the innate ideas (*ταῖς προλήψεσιν*) that Thou gavest me? Did I ever reproach Thee? Did I ever blame Thy governance? I was sick, when that was Thy will (my fellows were sick likewise, but when I was sick, I did not rebel). By Thy will I knew poverty, but I rejoiced in it. I never bore rule, because it was never Thy will that I should; but I never desired it. Didst Thou ever see me turn sullen on that account? Was there ever an occasion on which I presented myself before Thee with other than a cheerful countenance, or without being ready for any command or signal that Thou mightest choose to give? And now it is Thy will that I should leave the festival, so I am taking my leave—with my heart full of gratitude to Thee, because Thou hast deigned to allow me to celebrate the festival with Thee and to behold Thy works and to watch the course of Thy governance. When Death overtakes me, may these

¹ Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book IV, chap. 1.

² *Ibid.*, chap. 49.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. 48.

⁴ Epictetus: *Dissertations*, Book I, chap. 16, §§ 15-16 and 19-21.

thoughts be in my mind and these words on my pen or on the page that my eyes are reading."¹

Such was the ascetic mastery over Nature that was attained, in the course of the disintegration of the Hellenic Society, by the noblest adepts of the Stoic school of philosophy. And in the final chapter of Hellenic history we can see the ascetic tradition of an expiring dominant minority blending with the less negative asceticism of the proletariat when the Hellenic philosophy, in its Neoplatonic close and climax, rises to a pitch of mystical feeling at which its dying song of praise to God comes almost into unison with the younger and stronger voice of Christianity.²

If we pass from the Hellenic to the Syriac World in its 'Time of Troubles', we shall find the same unreconciled opposition between *abandon* and self-control reappearing in the contrast between the sedately sceptical theory of the Book of Ecclesiastes and the piously ascetic practice of the monastic community of the Essenes. And in another field again, in the philosophic strife of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles', we shall see Yang Chu suffering Epicurus's fate of being exploited by hedonists³ and at the same time castigated by moral disciplinarians who in the Sinic case were of the Confucian and Mencian school. Similarly, in a latter-day 'Time of Troubles' in Japan which preceded the enforcement of the peace of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the same antithesis reveals itself again in the clash between the abandoned immorality of the Japanese high politics of the age⁴ and the almost inhumanly perfect self-dedication of the contemporary samurai to his feudal lord.

There is another group of civilizations—the Indic, the Babylonian, the Hittite, and the Mayan—which seem, as they disintegrate, to be reverting to the *êthos* of Primitive Man in their apparent insensibility to the yawning breadth of the gulf between the abandoned sexualism of their religion and the exaggerated asceticism

¹ Epictetus, *op. cit.*, Book III, chap. 5, §§ 7-11. The second of the two passages here quoted reappears in Book IV, chap. 10, §§ 14-17, in the following variant:

'If, after this, Death overtakes me, it is sufficient for me if I am able to lift up my hands to God and say: "I have not neglected the talents that I received from Thee in order that I might perceive Thy governance and follow it. I have not disgraced Thee as far as it lay within me. Behold how I have used my senses and my innate ideas (*ταῖς προλήψεσιν*). Did I ever blame Thee? Did I ever take badly anything that happened, or wish that it had happened in some other way? Did I ever transgress the laws of my nature (*μή τι τὰς σχέσεις παρέβην*)? Because Thou hast begotten me, I am grateful for what Thou hast given me. So long as I have been using that which is Thine, it has sufficed for me. Now take back that which is Thine own and assign it to whatever place Thou wilt. For everything was Thine; it was Thou that gavest me all that I had. Should one not be content to depart in this frame of mind? Or is there any better or fairer life, or happier death, than a life and death like these?"

² For this momentary *rapprochement* between Hellenic philosophy and Christianity see further V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 550-3, below.

³ For these Sinic hedonists see Waley, A.: *The Way and its Power: A Study of the Tao Tê Ching and its Place in Chinese Thought* (London 1934, Allen & Unwin), pp. 39-43.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 95-103, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 303-5, below.

of their philosophy. In the Indic (which is the classic) case there is a contradiction which at first sight looks insoluble between lingam-worship and yoga; and we are similarly shocked by the corresponding contrasts between the temple-prostitution and the astral philosophy of a disintegrating Babylonian Society, between the human sacrifices and the penitential self-mortifications¹ of the Mayas, and between the orgiastic and the ascetic aspects of the Hittite worship of Cybele and Attis. Perhaps it was the common vein of sadistic extravagance which entered into their practice of *abandon* and their practice of self-control alike that maintained, in the souls of the members of all these four civilizations in their decadence, an emotional harmony between practices which seem to defy reconciliation when they are observed with the coldly analytic eye of an alien spectator.

If we turn, in conclusion, to the history of our own Western Society, our attention will be caught first by the clash of *abandon* with asceticism in the disintegration of the medieval Italian city-state cosmos. In fifteenth-century Florence the Thrasymachean political theory of Machiavelli and the Epicurean social practice of the Medicean circle were confronted by the puritanical religious fervour of Savonarola;² and in sixteenth-century Lombardy Rodolfo Gonzaga supplied the foil—a murky halo—for his brother Aluigi within the bosom of a single family.³

Are the two conflicting ways of behaviour now re-performing their play upon the broader stage of our Western Society in the modern chapter of its history? There is no lack of evidence for the resurgence of *abandon*; for in the domain of theory it has found its prophet in Jean-Jacques Rousseau with his alluring invitation to 'return to Nature',⁴ while, for the practice of *abandon* by the living generation of Western and Westernized men and women, in Europe and overseas, *si monumentum requiris circumspice*. On the other hand we may still search in vain for traces of a counter-resurgence of asceticism, and may perhaps tentatively draw from this negative evidence the cynical conclusion (which may comfort us or leave us unconsoled, according to the nature of the faith by which we live) that, if our Western Civilization has indeed already broken down in its Modern Age, its disintegration cannot yet be very far advanced.

¹ For these see Gann, T., and Thompson, J. E.: *The History of the Maya* (London 1931, Scribner), p. 143.

² Machiavelli's own consciousness of this antithesis is attested by the passage from *The Prince* which has been quoted in V. C (i) (d) 1, on p. 389, footnote 3, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 40 and 48, above.

⁴ Rousseau's outlook is taken as a psychological symptom of social disintegration by Oswald Spengler in *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 487. Besides being a gesture of *abandon*, it is also an expression of archaistic-mindedness (see V. C (i) (d) 8 (a), vol. vi, pp. 58–9, below).

3. *Truancy and Martyrdom*

If, in our survey of truancy and martyrdom, we follow the same comparative method that we have just been employing in our survey of *abandon* and self-control, we shall find, if we again address ourselves to Hellenic history first, that the contrast between these two ways of social behaviour which are alternative substitutes for the expedient of mimesis comes out repeatedly in successive stages of the Hellenic Society's decline and fall.

In the first generation after the breakdown the truancy of the Attic slaves who ran away from their masters to find asylum within the enemy lines at Decelea in the second act of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War provides a foil for the martyrdom of the Athenian citizen Socrates, who refused to elude a death-sentence by condescending either to abscond from the prison where he was awaiting trial or to prevaricate at the trial when this duly took place¹—though, in the judgement of most of Socrates' own friends and admirers, either of these ways of playing truant would have seemed far less blameworthy than the 'get-away' of the miner-slaves from the *ergastula* at Laurium. In the contemporary Lacedaemonian camp the moral truancy of Gylippus, which ended in his ignominious exile,² was as truly an outcome of the 'beginning of great evils for Hellas' in 431 B.C. as was the vindication of the Spartiate military tradition by Brasidas through the giving of a heroic example which ended in the hero's glorious death.

Some two centuries later, when the fate of the Hellenic World was once more 'on the razor's edge' between the first rally after the original breakdown and the first relapse,³ both Athens and Sparta played truant, at the critical moment, from the common cause of federalism, though the championship of this cause offered the only hope of saving the independence of the historic states at the heart of the Hellenic World now that these had been dwarfed and overshadowed by a ring of giant states on the periphery which the expansion of a disintegrating Hellenism had latterly called into existence.⁴ The Spartan statesman who was perhaps more responsible than any other man of his day for this second blighting of the prospects of the city-states of Greece was King Cleomenes III; and this self-same Cleomenes was one of the two members of the pair of Spartan martyr-kings who gave Sparta her last sunset

¹ For Socrates' repeated and persistent refusals to accept the various loopholes for escaping death which were almost officiously opened for his benefit, see Plato's *Crito*, *Apology*, and *Phaedo*, *passim*, and also the present study, V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 490-2, below.

² See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 70, above.

³ See V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 287-9, below.

⁴ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 341, footnote 1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 265 and 268, above.

glow of glory¹ and at the same time transmitted to the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society as a whole an inspiration which can perhaps be detected, in the fullness of time, in one aspect of the spirit of Christianity.²

In the course of the subsequent relapse³ the antithetic roles of truant and martyr were replayed both on the Roman and on the Syrian section of a Hellenic arena which had now been enlarged to the dimensions of a colosseum. The Gylippan demoralization of the majority of the young men of the Roman governing class in the generation that came to manhood after 'the crowning mercy' of Pydna—when the overthrow of the last surviving rival Great Power within range of Rome had suddenly relaxed a tension under which every Roman of that class had been living, with scarcely a respite, ever since the beginning of the Hannibalic War a full half-century back—was an example of mass-truancy which threw into all the sharper relief the unrotted virtue of a Scipio Aemilianus⁴ and the clear-eyed self-sacrifice of the Gracchi: a pair of Roman martyrs who retrod, step for step, the *via dolorosa* which had been trodden before them, a hundred years earlier,⁵ by the Spartan pair of Heracleidae.⁶ As for the submerged Syriac wing of the Hellenic internal proletariat, it was the years immediately following the definitive establishment, at Pydna, of Rome's supremacy in the Hellenic World that witnessed in Judaea the parting of the ways between the truancy of the Hellenizing Jewish High Priest Jason⁷ and the martyrdom of Eleazar and the Seven Brethren in response to the challenge of Antiochus Epiphanes' policy of forcible Hellenization.⁸

In the last bout of the Roman civil wars, which marks the transition from the first relapse of a disintegrating Hellenic Society to its second rally, the martyrdom of Cato Minor finds its antithesis in the truancy of Mark Antony; and, if the inspiration of Cato's example can be discerned in the deaths of a series of Roman aristocrats who likewise gave their lives for the republican ideal in the course of the next century,⁹ the spirit of Antony's craven and futile flight from a nightmare which was inescapable, because it was a true reflexion of his own defeated soul, has been expressed

¹ See the references in V. C (i) (d) 1, p. 388, footnote 1, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 269, above, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, *passim*, in vol. vi, below.

³ See V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 290-1, below.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 505-6, above.

⁵ For the time-lag in Roman social evolution in this chapter of Hellenic history see IV. C (iii) (b) 9, vol. iv, p. 205, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 288, below.

⁶ See the references in V. C. (i) (d) 1, p. 388, footnote 1, above.

⁷ See V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 103-5, below.

⁸ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 68 and 72, above.

⁹ For this effect of Cato's example see V. C (i) (d) 1, pp. 390 and 392, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 250, below.

with an insidiously imaginative sympathy by the freedman-poet Horace in the sixteenth poem of his Book of Epodes.

Altera iam teritur bellis civilibus aetas,
 suis et ipsa Roma viribus ruit:
 quam neque finitimi valuerunt perdere Marsi
 minacis aut Etrusca Porsennae manus
 aemula nec virtus Capuae, nec Spartacus acer
 novisque rebus infidelis Allobrox,
 nec fera caerulea domuit Germania pube
 parentibusque abominatus Hannibal—
 impia perdemus devoti sanguinis aetas
 ferisque rursus occupabitur solum.

.....

Forte quid expediat communiter aut melior pars
 malis carere quaeritis laboribus;
 nulla sit hac potior sententia: Phocaeorum
 velut profugit execrata civitas
 agros atque Lares patrios, habitandaque fana
 apris reliquit et rapacibus lupis,
 ire pedes quocumque ferent, quocumque per undas
 Notus vocabit aut protervus Africus.

.....

Nos manet Oceanus circumvagus: arva, beata
 petamus arva divites, et insulas,
 reddit ubi Cererem tellus inarata quotannis
 et imputata floret usque vinea.

.....

Juppiter illa piaae secrevit litora genti,
 ut inquinavit aere tempus aureum—
 aere, dehinc ferro duravit saecula, quorum
 piis secunda vate me datur fuga.¹

In the 'escapism' of this Horatian conceit of a 'get-away' from an irreparably ruined real world to the Utopia of some Lotus Eaters' Land or Calypso's Isle² the truancy of the Hellenic dominant minority comes to its dramatic climax at the same moment as the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles'; but the denouement is staved off by the successful establishment of a Hellenic universal state; and we have to sit expectantly until the passage of two centuries has brought us within sight of the bankruptcy of the Roman Peace before we again see the antithetic roles of truant and martyr being played on the Hellenic stage by eminent pairs of mutually antipathetic performers. On the Imperial Throne in the gathering gloom of the outgoing decades of the second century of the Christian Era we behold in the person of Marcus a prince whose

¹ Horace: *Epodon Liber*, carmen xvi, ll. 1-10, 15-22, 41-4, 63-6.

² For the temptations of Odysseus see II D (i), vol. ii, pp. 22-4, above.

title to the martyr's crown is not invalidated, but is on the contrary confirmed, by Death's refusal to cut this martyr's ordeal short by any *coup de grâce*; while in Marcus's son and successor Commodus we are presented with the spectacle of an Imperial truant who makes scarcely an effort to shoulder the burden of his heritage before he turns tail and is off, in headlong moral flight, along the sordid cinder-track of 'proletarianization'.¹ In the next generation after Commodus's we see the contrast between Marcus and his unworthy son being displayed once again, on the same Imperial Throne, by a pair of cousins who both wear the now hallowed Antonine name as a transparent cloak over their notorious Syrian provenance. While Elagabalus dies by violence in retribution for his truancy in neglecting the strenuous duties of a Roman Emperor in a time of crisis in order to indulge—under the aegis of a Roman Peace that can now no longer be taken for granted—in the lascivious relaxations of a High Priest of the Baal of Emesa,² Alexander Severus dies the same death as a martyr to his intrepid attempt to carry out—with the self-sacrificing public spirit of his predecessor and ensample Marcus—the alien, uncongenial, and unpromising task of restoring the antique discipline of the Roman Army.

This ill-assorted pair of Syrian recruits is the last conspicuous entry on our roll of truants and martyrs from the Hellenic dominant minority; for the social class in which the Hellenic culture had hitherto been preserved and handed down, in defiance of the spirit of an age of disintegration, as a continuous and a vital tradition, was almost annihilated in the terrible relapse into the downward path into which the Hellenic World was precipitated by the assassination of Alexander Severus.³ On the other hand the two generations—one of unbridled anarchy and another of ruthless reconstruction—which elapsed between the death of Alexander in A.D. 235 and the death of Galerius in A.D. 311 were signalized by a classic exhibition of both martyrdom and truancy in the ranks of a Christian Church which had been expanding from its original standing ground in the Syriac section of the Hellenic internal proletariat until it had won converts, and put forth branches, in every province of the Hellenic universal state.⁴

¹ For this phenomenon of 'proletarianization' see further V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), pp. 439–80, below.

² For Elagabalus's religion and religious policy see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 82, footnote 4, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 649 and 685–8, below.

³ For this relapse see IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 8, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 219, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, in the present volume, p. 649, and V. C (ii) (δ), vol. vi, pp. 284 and 291, below.

⁴ The Church's unanimity-in-ubiquity had already been proclaimed in the second century of the Christian Era, before the end of the Antonine 'Indian Summer' of Hellenic history, by the Christian Father Saint Irenaeus of Lyon:

'Having received this gospel and this faith, as we have already related, the Church, in spite of her dispersal throughout the World, preserves these treasures as meticulously

The Christian Church was the principal target for the parting strokes of a Hellenic dominant minority which turned savage in its death-agony;¹ for this dying pagan ruling class refused to face the heart-rending truth that it was itself the author of its own downfall and destruction; even *in articulo mortis* it tried to salvage a last shred of self-respect by persuading itself that it was perishing as the victim of a dastardly assault on the part of the proletariat;² and, since the external proletariat was now marshalled in formidable barbarian war-bands which were able for the most part to defy or elude the Imperial Government's attempts at retaliation for their galling raids, the brunt fell upon the Christian Church, which was the master-institution of the internal proletariat and at the same time was not, as the barbarians were, beyond the physical reach of the dominant minority's now distractedly vindictive arm.³ Under the test of this ordeal the sheep in the Christian fold were divided unequivocally from the goats by the challenge of being called upon to make the tremendous choice between renouncing their faith and sacrificing their lives. The renegades were legion—indeed, their numbers were so great that the problem of how to deal with them became the burning question of ecclesiastical politics as soon as the persecutions came to an end—but the tiny band of martyrs was spiritually potent out of all proportion to its

as though she were living under one single roof. She believes in these truths as unanimously as though she had only one soul and a single heart, and she preaches them and expounds them and hands them down as concordantly as though she had only one mouth. While the languages current in the World are diverse, the force of the [Church's] tradition is one and the same everywhere. There is no variety in the faith or in the tradition of the churches that have established themselves in the Germanies or in the Spains or among the Celts or in the East or in Egypt or in North-West Africa, or, again, of the churches that have established themselves at the World's centre. Just as God's creature the Sun is one and the same throughout the World, so likewise the Gospel of the Truth shows its light everywhere.'—Irenaeus: *Contra Haereses*, Book II, chap. 10, § 2 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. vii, cols. 552-3). Cf. Book V, chap. 20, § 1 (col. 1177).

¹ For the Roman Government's persecution of the Christian Church see also IV, C (i), vol. iv, p. 8, and V, C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 76 and 80, above, and V, C (i) (d) 6 (a), pp. 456-7, and V, C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 201-2, below.

² Compare the Hitlerian legend that, in the General War of 1914-18, Germany was defeated, not by the Allied and Associated Powers on the battle-field, but by Liberal, Marxian, and Jewish traitors at the rear. The question whether the break-up of the Roman Empire and the dissolution of the Hellenic Society can properly be described, in Gibbon's phrase, as 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion', has been discussed in IV, C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 58-63, above.

³ In this respect the recurrent bouts of systematic persecution to which the Christian Church in the Roman Empire was subjected between A.D. 235 and A.D. 311 will remind a reader of this Study of the systematic persecution of the Jews in a National-Socialist German Reich. In this post-war Germany the Jews were made the scapegoats for the sufferings and humiliations which had befallen the German people in and after their military defeat in the General War of A.D. 1914-18; and the reason why the Jews were singled out for victimization—on account of a German military defeat with which in truth they had had nothing to do—was because the Germans were unwilling to confess that they had mainly themselves to blame for their own misfortunes, and at the same time were unable (at least in the earlier years of the Nazi régime) to wreak their vengeance upon their Gentile ex-enemies at whose hands they had met with their overthrow in A.D. 1918.

numerical strength. Thanks to the prowess of these heroes who, at the critical moment, stepped forward from the Christian ranks in order to bear their witness at the cost of life itself, the Church emerged victorious from her contest with the melancholy sternness of a Decius and with the boorish brutality of a Daia; and that small but noble army of Eurytus-minded Christian men and women¹ have received no more than their due meed of fame in being remembered by History as 'the martyrs' *par excellence*, in antithesis to 'the traitors' (*traditores*).²

This survey of the recurrent conflict between the two contrary impulses towards truancy and towards martyrdom during the long-drawn-out disintegration of the Hellenic Society may close with a glimpse of two contrasted figures which appear for an instant on a tottering Hellenic stage in the last wild scene of all. On the eve of the dissolution of Hellenism in the break-up of the Roman Empire we see a noble Christian embodiment of the pagan political martyr in the Emperor Majorian (*imperabat* A.D. 457-61), who courted the death that overtook him³ when he refused to play the puppet's part for which he had been designed by the barbarian king-maker Ricimer, and insisted, instead, upon fulfilling the now desperate duty of his Imperial office by attempting to inflict upon barbarian war-bands that were by this time firmly seated in the Roman saddle the chastisement that had been meted out to less formidable predecessors of the fifth-century Franks and Vandals by a Marius or a Claudius Gothicus. As a foil to Majorian's martyrdom we may set the truancy of a renegade Greek man-of-business who in A.D. 448, nine years before Majorian's elevation to the purple, had crossed the path of the Greek historian and Roman diplomatist Priscus of Panium when Priscus was representing the Constantinopolitan Government on a mission to Attila, the Khāqān of the Black Huns, at the Nomad war-lord's camp on the Hungarian Alföld.⁴ The essence of the truant's state of mind is revealed in the ambassador's account of his conversation with this nomadized *ci-devant* citizen of the Roman Empire and member of the Hellenic Society.⁵ According to the narrator of the story the renegade's first confident exposition of the signal advantages

¹ For the story of Eurytus the Spartiate see V. C (i) (d) 1, p. 378, above.

² These original recipients of the opprobrious title 'traitor' (*traditor*) were Christians who delivered up the holy scriptures or the sacred vessels of the Church at the demand of the pagan Imperial authorities.

³ Officially Majorian died of dysentery five days after Ricimer had compelled him to abdicate as a punishment for having reigned too much in earnest. Actually there can be little doubt that his death was brought about by foul play on Ricimer's part.

⁴ See the fragment of Priscus's *History of His Own Times in Historici Graeci Minores*, edited by Dindorf, L.: vol. i (Leipzig 1870, Teubner), pp. 305-9.

⁵ Priscus's renegade is cited again—this time as an example of 'proletarianization'—in V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), pp. 473-4, below.

of 'going native' over staying Hellene broke down lamentably under Priscus's counter-attack on behalf of Hellenic culture and Roman law.

'My interlocutor', the historian records, 'was reduced to tears, and he confessed that the laws were excellent and that the Roman Constitution was admirable, if only the rulers had not so hopelessly lost the spirit of their predecessors that they were ruining Society.'

This Hellenic renegade might well weep when he was confronted by a loyal Hellene and Roman who commanded the ability to state the loyalist's case; for the renegade had not merely repudiated the spiritual and political allegiance to which he had been brought up: he had actually thrown himself into the service of hard-bitten barbarians who were the mortal enemies of both Hellenism and the Empire. This Hellenic act of truancy at the moment of the Hellenic Society's final dissolution has an analogue in the Manchurian marches of the Far Eastern World in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era on the eve of the conquest of Intramural China by the Extramural Manchu barbarians:

'The Chinese in Southern Manchuria . . . while characteristically Chinese in culture and social organization . . . had taken on [before the date of the Manchu conquest of Intramural China] a strong "frontier" colour. . . . Thus they were, for their part, willing to accept the authority, and identify themselves with the drive, of the rising and aggressive Manchu group, which promised them a share of the power and wealth to be garnered in China—the rich land, the land of civilization and luxury; a land whose promise altogether overshadowed any promise of growth and expansion toward the barbarian wilderness. . . . During the rise of the Manchu Power any Chinese who shaved his forehead and grew a queue (thus making it difficult for him to desert at short notice to an anti-Manchu political faction) could be recruited into a Chinese "banner"¹ [of the Manchu Army].'²

In the Syriac World in its 'Time of Troubles', when it was being battered by an Assyrian flail, we see the Prophets of Israel and Judah offering themselves as martyrs in protest against the truancy of a paganizing faction who were seeking an escape from intolerable miseries in a deliberate repudiation of the Chosen People's priceless peculiar heritage, with the base intention of purchasing some relief from pressure at the cost of re-merging the potter's

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 315, footnote 3, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), p. 447, below.—A.J.T.

² Lattimore, O.: *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 45 and 61. These passages bring out the distinction between 'playing truant' and 'going native'; for these Manchurian Chinese recruits to Manchu barbarian war-bands committed the same heinous crime of truancy as Priscus's renegade without also being guilty, as he was, of the additional crime of 'proletarianization'. For a Chinese example of the converse process of 'going native' without at the same time playing truant see V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), p. 474, footnote 2, below.

half-shaped vessel into the still shapeless common clay of the unregenerate Gentiles.

In our own modern World of the West can we discern any traces of the two antithetical ways of social behaviour which we have now observed in the disintegration of three different civilizations? Assuredly we can put our finger on a portentous modern Western act of truancy in 'la trahison des clercs';¹ and the roots of this treason spring from a depth to which the gifted Frenchman who has coined the phrase might perhaps hesitate to trace them—though he has virtually confessed how deep-rooted the mischief is by choosing the medieval ecclesiastical name to denote and indict our modern Western 'intellectuals'. Their treason did not begin with the pair of treasonable acts—a cynical loss of faith in the recently established principles, and a nerveless surrender of the recently won gains, of Liberalism—that have been perpetrated by our 'intellectuals' within living memory. The truancy that has given this latest exhibition of itself was set on foot, centuries earlier, when the 'clerks' repudiated their clerical origin—and in the same act cut our Western culture off from the possibility of drawing nourishment any longer from the sap of the Tree of Spiritual Life—by trying to shift the rising edifice of our Western Christian Civilization from a religious to a secular basis.² This was the original act of *hybris* which is being required in our day by an *âtê* that has been accumulating for centuries at compound interest.³

If we cast our eyes some four hundred years back and then focus them upon the patch of Western Christendom which is known as England, we shall there see in Thomas Wolsey—the precociously modern-minded clerk who pleaded guilty, in the bitter hour of his political disgrace, of having served his God less well than he had served his King—a truant whose truancy was shown up in all its blackness, less than five years after his ignominious end,⁴ by the martyrdom of his contemporaries Saint John Fisher and Saint Thomas More. The modern Western clerkly proto-truant Wolsey has never lacked successors. It remains to be seen whether the blood of the modern Western protomartyrs will be proved, by fresh testimony in our day, to have been the seed of the Church⁵—as was the blood of their forerunners in the Hellenic World in the generations of Decius and Galerius.

¹ See the book with this title by Benda, Julien (Paris 1927, Grasset).

² On this matter see further Part VII, below.

³ For *hybris* and *âtê* see IV. C (iii) (c), *passim*, in vol. iv, above.

⁴ After his downfall in the autumn of 1529 Wolsey lingered on rather more than a year before dying a natural death on the 4th November, 1530; Saint John Fisher and Saint Thomas More were put to death by King Henry VIII on the 22nd June and on the 6th July, 1535, respectively.

⁵ See the phrase from Tertullian's *Apologeticus* that is quoted in V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 202, footnote 3, below.

4. *The Sense of Drift*

The sense of drift, which is the passive way of feeling the loss of the *élan* of growth, is one of the most painful of the tribulations that afflict the souls of men and women who are called upon to live their lives in an age of social disintegration; and this pain is perhaps a punishment for a commission of the sin of idolatry through a worship of the creature instead of the Creator;¹ for in this sin we have found one of the causes of those breakdowns from which the disintegrations of civilizations follow. In terms of the Christian Theology:

"The consequence of the Fall, as a declension of the Soul from allegiance to the Creator to concern with the creature, was, in a word, idolatry. To the early converts this idolatry appeared primarily as the worship of images and of the innumerable gods who were themselves creatures fallen from grace, if not mere phantoms of human conceit; but the most stubborn foe of the Christian, as it had been of the Platonic, Faith was that homage to the idols of the Reason which wears the mask of Philosophy. Call it Stoicism or call it Epicureanism, call it Science or Deism or Realism or mere indifference or what you will, the most insidious and obstinate enemy of Religion was, and is, the subservience of the mind content to see in the World only a huge fatalistic mechanism or a heterogeneous product of Chance or, as the modern Darwinians would have it, a monstrous combination of both. Whatever form the error may take, it is a denial of the Logos as the creative wisdom and purpose of God, a magnification of the creature, a refined, but not the less devastating, species of idolatry."²

Chance and Necessity³ are the alternative shapes in which this idol is saluted by its votaries;⁴ and, though at first sight the two notions may appear to contradict one another to the point of being mutually exclusive, they prove, when probed, to be merely different facets of one identical illusion.

The notion of Chance is expressed in the literature of the Egyptian 'Time of Troubles' through the simile of the giddy spinning of a potter's wheel,⁵ and in the literature of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' through the simile of a ship that has been abandoned,

¹ For this definition of idolatry, which is the sense in which the term is used in this Study, see Part I. A, vol. i, p. 9, footnote 3, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), in vol. iv, pp. 261-2, above.

² More, P. E.: *Christ the Word = The Greek Tradition from the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon: 399 B.C.-A.D. 451*, vol. iv (Princeton 1927, University Press) p. 305.

³ For a discussion and rejection of the view that Necessity is the cause of the breakdowns of civilizations see IV. C (i), vol. iv pp. 7-39, above.

⁴ 'Mihi haec et talia audienti in incerto iudicium est fatone res mortalium et necessitate immutabili an forte volvantur.'—Tacitus: *Annals*, Book VI, chap. 22, *init.* The rest of the chapter is devoted to an exposition of the alternative hypotheses.

⁵ See the passage from *The Admonitions of a Prophet* which is quoted in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 410-11, above.

without a steersman, to the mercy of the winds and waves.¹ In a disintegrating Hellenic Society the sense of drift—'imus, imus praecipites'²—sought expression and relief in a worship of Chance which came near to becoming the prevailing religion of the Hellenic World as the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' worked up towards its climax;³ and the deeply ingrained anthropomorphic habit of the Hellenic imagination conferred upon this new goddess, who was being raised to power by the defeat of a human attempt at self-determination, a 'local habitation and a name'.⁴ Timoleon dedicated to Fortune ('*Ἐρῶ Δαίμονι*') a house which had been given him by the Syracusans in acknowledgement of their gratitude to the liberator of their city; and in this house he built a chapel in which he offered sacrifices to 'Our Lady Automatism' (*Ἀυτοματία*).⁵ In later generations the same goddess won worship farther afield as *Τύχη Ἀντιοχείων* or Fortuna Praenestina *sive* Antias.⁶

O diva gratum quae regis Antium,
praesens vel imo tollere de gradu
mortale corpus vel superbos
vertere funeribus triumphos:

te pauper ambit sollicita prece
ruris colonus; te, dominam aequoris,
quicumque Bithyna lacessit
Carpathium pelagus carina.

te Dacus asper, te profugi Scythae
urbesque gentesque et Latium ferox
regumque matres barbarorum et
purpurei metuunt tyranni,

¹ See the passage from Plato's *Politicus* which is quoted in IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 26-7, above. This simile, which Plato applied to the Universe, was transferred by Seneca to the field of human psychology: 'Pauci sunt qui consilio se suaque disponant; ceteri, eorum more quae fluminibus innant, non eunt sed feruntur.'—Seneca, L. Annaeus: *Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium*, Book III, ep. ii [xxiii], chap. 8.

² Persius Flaccus, A.: *Satires*, No. III, ll. 41-2.

³ 'In the outlook of the general public, [as well as in that of the philosophers,] the [personal] rule of the Gods retires farther and farther into the background, and its place in the determination of human destinies is taken by Tychê or by Automatism—that is to say, by Luck and by Chance.'—Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd edition (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), p. 84.

⁴ *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Scene 1. See I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 443, above. This Hellenic personification of Chance was an expression of the same incorrigible anthropomorphic-mindedness as the impertinence of the unknown Greek sculptor in Gandhâra who carved the first statue of the Buddha in human form (see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 135, footnote 3, above). ⁵ Plutarch: *Life of Timoleon*, chap. 36.

⁶ Even Constantinople was furnished by its Christian founder with a temple dedicated to the Roman Tychê (Parker, H. M. D.: *A History of the Roman World from A.D. 138 to 337* (London 1935, Methuen), p. 301). The worship of this goddess on this spot survived both the definitive triumph of Christianity at the close of the fourth century of the Christian Era (see IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 226-7, above) and the breakdown of the *Pax Romana* in the Greek heart of the Hellenic World in the latter part of the sixth century (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 326-8, above). For this survival of the worship of the Roman Tychê of Constantinople into the Byzantine Age see Cumont, Fr.: 'L'Éternité des Empereurs Romains' in *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses*, vol. i (Paris 1896, Macon et Protat), p. 452.

THE PROCESS OF DISINTEGRATION

iniurioso ne pede prouas
stantem columnam, neu populus frequens
ad arma cessantes, ad arma,
concitet, imperiumque frangat.¹

Has this frank and concrete Hellenic worship of Tychê any analogue in the histories of other civilizations? We shall find a more subtle version of it prevalent in the Sinic World on the morrow of the foundation of the Sinic universal state, and a less straightforward version in our Western World at the present day.

When we look into our hearts, we find the Hellenic goddess now enthroned there—notwithstanding our boast of being hard-headed scientists who deal in facts and not in fictions²—as potently as she was in the hearts of the Hellenes themselves in their decadence. The following profession of faith in the omnipotence of Tychê may be quoted from the preface of a notable book from the pen of one of the most highly distinguished among our living Western historians:

‘One intellectual excitement has . . . been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in History a plot, a rhythm, a pre-determined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave; only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalizations; only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognise in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.’³

This brilliantly phrased passage cannot be dismissed as a scholar’s conceit; for the writer is a Liberal who is formulating a creed which Liberalism has translated from theory into action, and his irony is a sword with a rapier-point which flickers out into the world beyond the walls of the intellectual fencer’s study. This modern Western belief in the omnipotence of Chance gave birth in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, when things still seemed to be going well with Western Man, to the policy of *laissez faire*: a philosophy of practical life which was founded on a faith in the miraculous enlightenment of self-interest. In the light of a transitorily gratifying experience our nineteenth-century grandfathers claimed to ‘know that all things work together for good for them that love’⁴ the goddess Tychê. And even in the twentieth century, when the goddess had begun to show her teeth, she was still the oracle of British foreign policy. The view that was prevalent

¹ Horace: *Carmina*, Book I, Ode xxxv, ll. 1-16.

² For the vanity of this boast on the lips of our modern *Homo Occidentalis* see I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, pp. 442-5, above.

³ Fisher, H. A. L.: *A History of Europe* (London 1935, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. vii.

⁴ Romans viii. 28.

among the people, as well as in the Cabinet, of the United Kingdom during the fateful period of Western history which opened in the autumn of A.D. 1931 was accurately expressed in the following sentence from the files of a great English Liberal newspaper:

'A few years of peace are always a few years gained, and a war that is due in a few years' time may never come off at all.'¹

The doctrine of *laissez faire* which had brought the Western World to the pass in which it found itself in the autumn of 1938 cannot be claimed as an original Western contribution to the common stock of human wisdom. It was current coin in the Sinic World some two thousand years before it captivated modern Western minds; and, while the Sinic Society's pretensions to have anticipated us in our recently acquired technical command over Physical Nature are perhaps not to be taken *au pied de la lettre*,² there is no doubt that the spiritual 'defeatism' which has accompanied our own material triumphs of the last hundred and fifty years can also be detected in Sinic souls in the second century B.C. This Sinic worship of Chance differs, however, from ours in deriving from a less sordid origin. The eighteenth-century French bourgeois came to believe in *laissez faire laisser passer* because he had noticed and envied and analysed the prosperity of his English 'opposite number', and had come to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie might prosper in France as well as in England if only King Louis could be induced or compelled to follow the example of King George in allowing the bourgeois to manufacture what he chose, without restrictions, and to send his goods to any market, free from tolls. In fact, the catchword of our modern Western philosophy of drift has the prosaic original meaning of 'No state interference with business'. On the other hand the line of least resistance along which a weary Sinic World allowed itself to drift during the earlier decades of the second century B.C.³ was

¹ This quotation is taken from a leading article published in *The Manchester Guardian* of the 13th July, 1936.

² See, for example, the anecdote in III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 188-90, above.

³ It will be seen that in Sinic history the psychological self-surrender of a disintegrating society to the drift of the Universe was contemporaneous with the closure of the international anarchy of 'the Contending States' (see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 291-5, below) by the establishment of a universal state in the political arena. The captivation of Sinic souls by the dark power of Chance was of older date than this. It can be traced back into the second, at least, of the two bouts of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles'. In this earlier age, however, the Sinic response to the challenge of Chance had taken an active and not a passive form. The princes of 'the Contending States' did not resign themselves to the mercy of the winds and waves: they sought rather to take advantage of the movements of these elemental forces—tempestuous and menacing though these might be—for the furtherance of their own designs. According to Granet, M.: *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Renaissance du Livre), p. 428, the ideas that were in the ascendant in that age are summed up in two words which are almost impossible to translate: 'chou [anglice *shu*], recettes, méthodes, artifices, et *che* [*she*], conditions, situations, circonstances, forces, influences. Notre mot "chance" est, peut-être, celui qui rend le

conceived of, not as a pack-horse's beaten track from a humming mill to a lucrative market, but as a way which was the truth and the life:¹ the *tao* which 'meant "the way the Universe works"—and ultimately something very like God, in the more abstract and philosophical sense of that term'.²

The Sinic form of the worship of Chance was in fact a subtly decadent perversion of an original and authentic Taoist philosophy which—illuminated by knowledge born of suffering³—had apprehended the truth of 'etherialization',⁴ had resolved to live by it, and had acted on its resolve by taking one of the highest and most arduous flights ever essayed by the Sinic spirit.

In the theistic language of the Syriac religious genius⁵ the Taoist intuition of an absolute energy which is indistinguishable from an absolute tranquillity⁶ has been expressed in the poetic image of God's self-revelation to Elijah through the still small voice which made itself heard when the wind and the earthquake and the fire had come and gone;⁷ and this Hebrew poetry has been transposed into Christian theology in a single sentence of Saint Augustine which is as terse as it is sublime: *Novit quiescens agere et agens quiescere*.⁸ In the language of the Sinic philosophy the same truth is presented in such passages as the following from the *Tao Te King*:⁹

Great Tao is like a boat that drifts;

It can go this way; it can go that.

The ten thousand creatures owe their existence to it, and it does not disown them;

Yet, having produced them, it does not take possession of them.

Tao, though it covers the ten thousand things like a garment,

Makes no claim to be master over them,

And asks for nothing from them.

Therefore it may be called the Lowly.

moins mal le mot "che". Les situations et conditions diverses de temps et de lieu recèlent des occasions dont il faut se mettre en état de capter l'influence et la force pour risquer le sort avec le maximum de chances.¹

² Waley, A.: *The Way and its Power* (London 1934, Allen & Unwin), p. 30.

³ *Πάθει μάθος*—Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, l. 177, quoted in I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 169, footnote 1; II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 298; IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, p. 218; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 584, footnote 1; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 78, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 275, below.

⁴ For the principle of 'etherialization' see III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 174-92, above.

⁵ For the differentiation between a sense of unity which apprehends the unifying principle in a ubiquitous and irresistible law and a sense of unity which apprehends the same principle in a unique and omnipotent deity, see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 15-18, below.

⁶ For this Taoist conception of Wu Wei see III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, p. 187, above.

⁷ I Kings xix. 11-12.

⁸ Aurelius Augustinus: *De Civitate Dei*, Book XII, chap. 18. Cf. the *Tao Te King*, chap. 81: 'Heaven's way is to sharpen without cutting.'

⁹ The English translation here given is Mr. Arthur Waley's, in op. cit. The selection of the passages is inevitably rather arbitrary, since the paradox of the *Tao* is the subject of the whole treatise—or, rather, poem—and almost every chapter is a variation on the anonymous author's inexhaustible theme.

The ten thousand creatures obey it,
Though they know not that they have a master;
Therefore it is called the Great.¹

This 'Way of the Universe' can only be apprehended by human souls through an act of cognition which is at the same time an act of will; and the Taoist sage attains his knowledge of 'the Way' by walking in it himself:

So, too, the sage, just because he never at any time makes a show of greatness, in fact achieves greatness.

Without leaving his door
He knows everything under Heaven.
Without looking out of his window
He knows all the ways of Heaven.
For the further one travels
The less one knows.
Therefore the sage arrives without going,
Sees all without looking,
Does nothing yet achieves everything.²

If only the lesson of the sage's life were taken to heart by the rulers of This World!

Tao never does;
Yet through it all things are done.
If the barons and kings would but possess themselves of it,
The ten thousand creatures would at once be transformed.
And if, having been transformed, they should desire to act,
We must restrain them by the blankness of the Unnamed.
The blankness of the Unnamed
Brings dispassion;
To be dispassionate is to be still.
And so, of itself, the whole Empire will be at rest.³

The philosophy that is hinted at in these passages is as noble as it is profound; and yet, for a human being who sets himself to

¹ *Tao Te King*, chap. 34, Waley's translation (cf. chap. 40).

² *Ibid.*, chaps. 34 and 47, Waley's translation (cf. chaps. 45, 48, 81).

³ *Ibid.*, chap. 37, Waley's translation. Compare a passage from chap. 67 of the *Tao Te King* which is translated as follows by Forke, A.: *Die Gedankenwelt des Chinesischen Kulturkreises* (Munich and Berlin 1927, Oldenbourg), p. 195:

'Whoso seeks to rule the state through knowledge is a scourge to the state; whoso rules it not through knowledge, a blessing.'

This Sinic dictum has a remarkably exact Arabic parallel in the following passage of Ibn Khaldūn's *Muqaddamāt* (Book I, chap. 24):

'Benevolent government is rarely associated with a ruler whose mind is over-alert and intelligence over-developed. Benevolence is most commonly found in rulers who are easy-going or who behave as if they were. The worst defect in the alert-minded ruler is that he lays burdens upon his subjects which are greater than they can bear; and he does this because his mental vision outranges theirs and because his insight penetrates to the ends of things at the beginnings—with disastrous consequences for them. . . . The ideal is the Golden Mean . . . and for this reason a man who is over-intellectual has Satanic attributes attributed to him.'

walk in the way of the *Tao*, the path is not without pitfalls; for the superhuman effortlessness of the divine activity may be confounded in human eyes with the human vice of sloth. A warning against this error is uttered by Saint Augustine in the chapter above quoted: *Non in eius vacatione cogitetur ignavia, desidia, inertia, sicut nec in eius opere labor, conatus, industria*. Nevertheless, when the flesh is weak, the Taoist sage's posture may sink into being little more than a pose that saves a sluggard's face. And Taoism was in fact perverted to this base use by the desperation of a Sinic Society which had found itself cheated, through the swift collapse of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's universal state,¹ of the repose for which it was panting after the hard labour of a 'Time of Troubles'.

'The First Empire lasted only fifteen years (221-206 B.C.). After seven years of terrific wars the country was again united under the Han Empire; but civil wars did not end till 195 B.C. The long years of revolution and war had devastated the country, and the new empire found everything in ruins. . . . What was needed was not positive and meddlesome reforms, but peace and order to allow the people to live and recuperate. So the early statesmen of Han practised the policy of peace and *laissez faire*, and scholars and thinkers tended to exalt the philosophy of Taoism, which taught non-action and non-interference with Nature.'²

The modern Chinese scholar, Dr. Hu Shih, who is the writer of these lines, goes on to quote³ a description of this misapplied Taoism of the early second century B.C. from the brush of a contemporary observer, Sse-ma T'an:⁴

'The Taoists say "Do nothing"; but they also say "Nothing is undone". It sounds subtle, but is in reality easy to work out. Its method lies in postulating nothingness or non-being as the basis of all things, and in following natural evolution as the principle of activity. They recognise no ready-made situation nor constant form; they are therefore able to understand the reality of things. They do not wish to anticipate things too prematurely, nor do they wish to lag behind the times; therefore they are masters of all things.'

'This attitude,' Dr. Hu Shih remarks,⁵ 'suited the temper of the age admirably well; and for nearly three-quarters of a century the people enjoyed peace and thrived in prosperity'—until the Emperor Wuti (*imperabat* 140-87 B.C.) abandoned this travesty of Taoism in order to establish, as the official philosophy of the Sinic uni-

¹ See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 187, below.

² Hu Shih: 'The Establishment of Confucianism as a State Religion during the Han Dynasty' in *The Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. ix (1929), p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴ Dr. Hu Shih mentions that this philosopher Sse-ma T'an was the father of the historian Sse-ma Ts'ien.

⁵ Hu Shih, *op. cit.*, p. 22; cf. Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 286-8.

versal state, a form of Confucianism which was perhaps almost as remote from the teaching of Confucius himself as the contemporary Taoism was from the teaching of the *Tao Te King*.¹

This misapplied Taoism of the second century B.C. might be described equally well as a *modus vivendi* with Chance or as a surrender to Fate;² for the goddess of *laissez faire* has another face, under which she is worshipped, not as Chance, but as Fate or Necessity.³

The two notions of Necessity and Chance are correlative by reason of their very antithesis; for this antithesis does not lie between two alternative and incompatible conceptions of the nature of things, but merely between the human being who feels that he is adrift and the mighty waters that seem to him to be tossing him about as callously as though he were an inanimate piece of flotsam. In a self-regarding mood the castaway views the force that is defeating him in a negative light, as a sheer chaotic disorder, and it is in this mood that he gives the name of Chance to his irresistible adversary and mistress. But the notion of disorder, as Bergson has pointed out,⁴ is essentially relative, like the notion of order itself.⁵ Neither order nor disorder can be conceived except

¹ For the contamination of both Confucianism and Taoism with popular superstition in the Han Age see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 555-7, below. For the official adoption of Confucianism by the Emperor Wuti see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 654 and 707-8, below.

² That Fate works mechanically had been a tenet of the Taoist philosopher Lieh-tse (*vivebat circa 440-370 B.C.*); that Heaven is a blind mechanical force had been a tenet of Hsün-tse (*vivebat circa 310-230 B.C.*) (see Forke, A.: *Die Gedankenwelt des Chinesischen Kulturkreises* (Munich and Berlin 1927, Oldenbourg), pp. 67 and 55).

³ For the 'rationalization' of this surrender to Fate in the Babylonian philosophy of Astrology see V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 56-7, above.

⁴ See Bergson, Henri: *L'Évolution Créatrice*, 24th édition (Paris 1921, Alcan), pp. 239-58.

⁵ The following extracts from the passage just cited may be quoted as examples of the great French philosopher's masterly lucidity in the exposition of his thought:

'If, at a venture, I select a volume in my library, I may replace it on the shelves, after taking a glance at it, with the remark "This isn't verse". But is this really what I perceived when I was turning the pages? Clearly not. I did not see, and I never shall see, an absence of verse. What I did see was prose. But, as it is poetry that I am wanting, I express what I find in terms of what I am looking for; and instead of saying "Here is some prose" I say "This isn't verse". Inversely, if it takes my fancy to read some prose and I stumble on a volume of verse, I shall exclaim "This isn't prose"; and in using these words I shall be translating the data of my perception, which shows me verse, into the language of my expectation and my interest, which are set upon the idea of prose and therefore will not hear of anything else. . . .

'Now let us suppose that there are two species of order and that these two orders are two contrary species embraced in a single genus. Let us further suppose that the idea of disorder arises in our minds every time when we look for one of the two species of order and find the other. The idea of disorder would then have a definite meaning in practical life: it would objectify, for expression in words, the disappointment of a mind which finds itself in the presence of an order that is different from the one which it wants—in the presence of an order for which, at the moment, it has no use, and which in this sense is non-existent for it. . . .

'An order is contingent, and appears so to us, in relation to the inverse order, in the way in which verse is contingent in relation to prose and prose in relation to verse. Just as all speech which is not prose is verse and is necessarily conceived of as verse, and just as all speech which is not verse is prose and is necessarily conceived of as prose, so every manner of being which is not one of the two orders is the other and is necessarily conceived of as the other. But it is possible for us to place a fog of affective states between

in contrast to its opposite. Every time that we make the observation that, in such and such a case, we are confronted with a disorder, our judgement is subjective. What we mean is that we are here being disappointed of some particular form of order which it has been our pleasure, here and now, to impose, in thought or in act, upon the face of the Universe. And the intractable state of the facts upon which we are taking a verbal revenge by giving it the bad name of disorder may—and indeed must—at the same time be an exemplification of the principle of order when the situation is viewed from one or other of the infinitely numerous possible alternative standpoints to that single arbitrary one which happens to be ours at the moment. For instance, the dizzy motion of the Egyptiac potter's wheel, which stands for the acme of disorder in the eyes of an Egyptiac poet¹ whose imagination animates the clay that is helplessly spinning on this wheel's whirling surface, is at the same time an example, on the mathematical plane of existence, of an orderly cyclic motion, while on the teleological plane it is an obedient instrument for impressing upon the clay the spiritual order that is represented by the potter's will.

Said one among them: 'Surely not in vain
My substance from the common earth was ta'en
And to this figure moulded, to be broke
Or trampled back to shapeless earth again?'²

In a similar way the disorderly motion of a rudderless ship, which stands in Plato's eyes for the chaos of a Universe abandoned by God,³

ourselves and our representation of what we are conceiving of, and between ourselves and our perception of the idea that is really present to our minds. . . .

'If we analyse the idea of chance, which is a near relation to the idea of disorder, we shall find the same elements. When the purely mechanical operation of the causes which bring the roulette to a halt on a particular number makes me win and so behaves as a good genius would have behaved if he had been looking after my interests, and when the purely mechanical force of the wind snatches a tile from the roof and flings it down on my head—thus acting as an evil genius would have acted if he had been plotting against my life—in both cases I find a mechanism in a place where I would have looked for—and ought, it would seem, to have encountered—an intention; and that is what I am expressing when I speak of "chance". And in describing an anarchic world, where the phenomena follow one another at the pleasure of their caprice, I shall say, again, that this is the reign of chance, and I shall mean by this that I find myself confronted by acts of will, or rather by "decrees", when what I was looking for was mechanism. . . . The idea of chance simply objectifies the state of mind of someone whose expectation has been directed towards one of two species of order and who then encounters the other.

'Chance and disorder are, then, necessarily conceived of as relative.'

A glimmer of Bergson's clear vision of the meaning of the ideas of 'Chance' and 'Disorder' has been caught by Oswald Spengler in *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 210-11:

'Strange as this may sound, Chance in the everyday sense of the term has an intimate affinity with the principle of Causality. The link between them is the inorganic element and the absence of anything in the nature of "direction".'

For the idea of 'direction' see Part III. B, vol. iii, pp. 124-7, and IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 34-8, above.

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 410-11, and the present chapter and volume, p. 412, above.

² Edward Fitzgerald's translation of the *Rubā'īyāt* of 'Umar Khayyām, Quatrain lxxxiv.

³ See IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 26, and the present chapter and volume, pp. 412-13, above.

can be recognized, by a mind endowed with the necessary knowledge of dynamics and physics, as a perfect illustration of the orderly behaviour of waves and currents in the media of wind and water.¹ When the Human Soul adrift thus apprehends that the force which is baffling it is not simply a negation of the Soul's own will or caprice but is a thing in itself—albeit something that the Soul is failing to grasp or control—then the countenance of the unknown invincible goddess changes from a subjective aspect under which she is known as Chance to an objective aspect under which she is known as Necessity—but this without any corresponding change in the essence of this inhuman power's nature.

In approaching a divinity of so cold and implacable a mien as Necessity wears when she is recognized for what she is, her votaries are tempted to make some pretence of retaining a shadow of freedom which might save them, if it were genuine, from being driven to confess that they are utterly at the goddess's mercy.

At the dwarfed and daunted political heart of the Hellenic World in the second century B.C.,

'Philopoemen admitted that unquestionably a time would come sooner or later when the Greeks would find themselves constrained to obey, without option, any orders which the Romans might choose to give. "But we have still", he said, "some latitude in regard to dates. Do we want to bring this consummation to pass as quickly as possible, or on the contrary to put off the evil day to the latest possible date? Surely the latter?" And so, as he explained it, the difference between his policy and Aristaenetus's policy was this: Aristaenetus was eager to accelerate the march of Destiny (*τὸ χρεῖον*) and to do everything in his power to co-operate with it, while his own (Philopoemen's) policy was to resist and show fight to the limit of his strength.'²

The Achaean politician who was Philopoemen's opponent was acting, whether consciously or not, in the exact spirit of the famous prayer which the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes (*vivebat circa 300-220 B.C.*) had addressed to Necessity under the synonyms of Fate and Zeus:

ἄγον δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺν', ἡ Πεπρωμένη,
ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος,
ὡς ἔψομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἦν δέ γε μὴ θέλω,
κακὸς γένόμενος, οὐδὲν ἥττον ἔψομαι.³

¹ It may be added that, in the *Politicus*, the simile of the ship adrift is only one of two elements that make up, between them, the picture which Plato is painting in the colours of myth. The state in which the Universe drifts at the mercy of Chance alternates, in an endlessly recurrent cycle, with a contrary state in which it is steered by the hand of God according to Plan.

² Polybius, Book XXIV, chap. 13 (ed. Büttner-Wobst, vol. iv, Berlin and Leipzig 1904, Teubner), *ad annum* 181-180 B.C.

³ Cleanthes in von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1905, Teubner), p. 118. The lines have been quoted, apropos of the decline and fall of the Osmanlis, in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 47, footnote 1, above.

This sense of uncontrollable drift on the sweep of Necessity's tide was felt, in the Hellenic World of the second century B.C., in the sheltered garden of scientific research as well as on the blasted heath of international politics.

'The most remarkable feature in [the] history [of Hellenistic science] was its failure to lead on from its first successes to a continuous growth like that which the modern pioneers of science inaugurated. This general falling off from an earlier promise can hardly be attributed to ignorance of scientific method. The best specimens of Hellenistic research reveal precisely that blend of observation and reasoning which usually yields the most solid results in scientific discovery. A more valid if partial explanation is that Hellenistic science lacked instruments of precision, such as the telescope and microscope, and this at a stage when observation by the unaided eye could not carry them much further. This deficiency would help to explain the eventual stagnation of astronomy, botany and medicine. But the chief reason is, no doubt, to be found in that general loss of the spirit of hope and adventure which befell the Greek nation in the second century [B.C.]¹ It is significant that in the second century the Greek World became addicted to the practices of Astrology² and Magic. In pursuing these delusive short cuts to success, it proved that it had lost the faculty of patient research which distinguished the earlier Hellenistic pioneers.'³

The story of the progressive surrender of the Hellenic spirit to a sense of drift expressed in an ever more servile worship of Necessity has been recapitulated in the following terms by a modern Western historian of Hellenic thought:

'To ascribe knowledge and certainty to Physical Science and to deny Man's inner freedom by imprisoning the spirit in a huge mechanism of fixed and calculable Natural Law is to invert the whole order of the

¹ On this dictum a caveat is entered by Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 34-9. 'There is small sign of "decadence" down to about the middle of the 2nd century B.C.' In the Middle East the Greek of the last century B.C. 'did not essentially differ from the Greek of the third'. And as late as the first century of the Christian Era, as far afield as Babylonia, the city-state of Seleucia-on-Tigris still preserved intact both its Greek race and its Hellenic culture and ethos according to the testimony of two Roman men-of-letters of that age ('Neque in barbarum corrupta, sed conditoris Seleuci retinens' (Tacitus: *Annals*, Book VI, chap. 42); 'Libera hodie ac sui iuris Macedonumque moris' (Pliny: *Natural History*, Book VI, chap. 122)).—A.J.T.

² See V. C. (i) (c) 1, p. 57, with footnote 3, above. For the Fatalism which was instilled by Astrology into Hellenic souls, and for the attempts to find a religious way of escape from the astral Wheel of Existence along the alternative avenues offered by the worship of Isis, the rite of 'the Mithras Liturgy', Judaism, and Christianity, see Wendland, P.: *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur* (Tübingen 1912, Mohr), pp. 156-7, 172, with footnote 1, and 399-400; and Dey, J.: *Παλιγγεσσία* (Münster i. W. 1937, Aschendorff), pp. 95-6 and 109. 'Whatever way men took it [Astrology], behind it loomed the gigantic and terrible figure of the Babylonian Fate, immutable and inexorable, neither loving nor hating, which ruled the Universe and before which gods and men were alike puppets playing their pre-determined parts, a figure which outraged the Greek sense of freedom till the history of Hellenistic religion might almost be summed up as a series of attempts to find a way of escape' (Tarn, op. cit., p. 60).—A.J.T.

³ Cary, M.: *A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C.* (London 1932, Methuen), pp. 352-3.

Platonic philosophy. The result of such an inversion is shown strikingly in the different connotations of the word "Necessity" in Plato and Marcus Aurelius. To the former, Necessity meant the resistance of the meaningless and incomprehensible flux of things, whether in Nature or [in] the Human Soul, to the government of order and happiness; it was the exact contrary of the spirit, which is shrined in liberty. To the Imperial Stoic, Necessity was the binding force of the whole World, leaving to the spirit this poor relic of freedom alone, that it might form its own opinion as to the moral character of the universal flux of which it was itself also a part, and so might persist in praising that as good which it felt to be evil.¹

A classical exposition of this latter-day 'totalitarian' Determinism of the Hellenic spirit has been placed on record by an Antiochene adept in Astrology who is believed to have been the Emperor Marcus's contemporary:²

'Life is a plaything and a wandering in the wilderness and a passing show. . . . This is the work of Fate (*Εἰμαρμένης*) and Chance (*Τύχης*), who ever so softly escort us human beings in order to make the lives of some of us happy and the lives of others unhappy with out rhyme or reason. So life travels its wandering and brutal course, and, as it goes, it brings some things to such increase and glory and prosperity and prominence that many fall in love with these prizes, while other things are wounded by Life and corroded and blighted and landed in oblivion and in peril and in odium. . . . For Fate has enacted, to operate in the life of each one of us, an unalterable series of irrevocably accomplished facts. . . . In these circumstances those who are either innocently or wilfully ignorant of the art of prognostication are harried and fleeced by the goddesses Hope and Chance. . . . On the other hand, those who have studied the art and have attained to the truth which it reveals are able to call their souls their own in a freedom that has no taint of slavishness about it. These freemen condemn Chance, do not cling to Hope, do not fear Death, and live unperturbed (*ἀταράχως*), because they have given their souls an anticipatory training in fortitude. They no longer either rejoice at good fortune or are cast down by bad fortune, but are satisfied with what comes to them. They are not in love with the impossible, and so they bear with self-control (*ἐγκρατῶς*) the enactments [of Fate], and, weaning themselves from all pleasure and servility, they enlist as Fate's soldiers. It is impossible for a man by prayers or sacrifices to overcome the destiny that has been laid down for him from the beginning and to establish a different one for himself according to his desires. What has been given will come to be, even without our prayers; and what has not been fated will not come to pass, even if we pray for it. So, just as the actors on the stage change their make-up to fit the book of the words and play, with a professional propriety, sometimes kings, sometimes

¹ More, P. E.: *Platonism*, second edition (Princeton 1926, University Press), pp. 238-9.

² This is the most probable date of Vettius Valens according to W. Kroll in his *editio princeps* of Vettius's *Anthologiae* (Berlin 1908, Weidmann), p. vi.

brigands, and sometimes yokels or cockneys or gods, in the same way we too ought to play the parts with which we are invested by Fate, and to conform to them without morally capitulating (*οὐ συγγνωσκόντες*) to the chances and changes of Life. If any man rebels, "he will have disgraced himself without modifying his destiny by one jot".¹

The Antonine astrologer's cherished freedom seems to be limited to the single privilege of voting in the affirmative when Queen Fate takes a vote of confidence in her dictatorial régime; and there is equally little substance in the show of freedom that is left to the human will in the classic form that has been given to the Islamic theory of Predestination by the masterful theologian Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash'arī (*vivebat circa* A.D. 873-935). Al-Ash'arī attempts to resolve the apparent contradiction between God's Predestination and Man's Free Will by propounding the doctrine of *Iktisāb*, according to which the human will accepts for itself the destiny which God has already assigned to it. On this showing, 'Man is still an automaton, although part of his machinery is that he believes himself free'.²

¹ Vettius Valens: *Anthologiae*, edited by Kroll, W. (Berlin 1908, Weidmann), p. 246 (Book VI, chap. 1); p. 240 (Book VI, Introduction); pp. 219 and 220-1 (Book V, chap. 9). The quotation at the end of the last of these passages—*κακὸς γινόμενος αὐτὸ τοῦτο μέλειται*—is a garbled version of the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes' verse *κακὸς γινόμενος οὐδὲν ἥττον ἐβόμαι* which has been quoted in this Study in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 47, footnote 1, and in the present chapter and volume, p. 421, above.

One of the strangest passages in a strange work is an outburst of resentment at the exhaustion of an atmosphere of freedom of thought without which even Vettius's pseudo-science of Astrology could not live:

'In writing what I have written above I have been filled with pride for my own part in the heavenly science (*θεωρία*) in which I have been clad by the Deity—though nowadays this science is dishonoured and spurned, in spite of its venerable antiquity and its sovereign control over everything in life. Without it, nothing either is or can be, and yet sometimes even to have a name for being an adept in it brings one into odium—in sad contrast to the position of our predecessors, who used to boast of possessing the gift and to congratulate themselves upon it. This fills me with resentment and with envy of those ancient kings and despots who were enthusiasts for the science. Why did I not have the good fortune to live in those spacious days and to breathe the fresh air of their spiritual freedom for research? . . . At the present day the effective investigation of facts is obscured and blighted by Fear. The intellect, driven into negation and no longer fortified by ratiocination, has lost its stability. It has become consequently volatile to a degree at which it threatens to reassume its primeval unconsciousness (*ἀήθη*).'—Vettius Valens, *op. cit.*, ed. *cit.*, pp. 241 and 242 (Book VI, Introduction).

Evidently it had never crossed our author's mind that his own beloved pseudo-science of Astrology itself was both a symptom and a cause of the death, which he is here lamenting, of the Hellenic intellect.

² *The Encyclopædia of Islam*, vol. ii (London 1927, Luzac), s.v. Kadar. Al-Ash'arī's doctrine clearly approaches much nearer towards Predestination than towards Free Will, yet it was intended to establish a middle position between two extreme views which had previously been at war with each other on the arena of Islamic Theology. One of these two earlier opposing views was a thorough-going Fatalism; for, while the Qur'an contradicts itself on the issue of Predestination *versus* Free Will, its author had gradually inclined towards Fatalism, and—no doubt largely in consequence of this tendency in the Prophet Muhammad's own mental evolution—the earliest conscious Muslim attitude towards the problem had been uncompromisingly fatalist. A revolt against this position had, however, broken out—apparently under Christian influences—before A.D. 700; and from that time until the generation of al-Ash'arī the Primitive Muslim Fatalism had been vigorously attacked by the Qadariyah movement, whose supporters maintained that Man has *Qadar* (i.e. command) over his own actions.

After this preliminary observation of the hesitant fatalist's tendency to capitulate in the end to the full rigour of the creed which he has espoused, we may briefly pass in review the graven images of diverse substance in which the same goddess Necessity is worshipped by her whole-hearted devotees. There is, no doubt, an unspeculative form of Fatalism which is content to record Necessity's mighty works without making any inquiry into her nature. This attitude is exemplified in a formula—'Evil had to befall so-and-so, and therefore such-and-such things happened'—which repeats itself, like a refrain, in the history of Herodotus.¹ But more commonly Necessity is envisaged, in less abstract terms, as a force that operates in some particular medium—physical or economic or psychic or theistic.

The dogma of the omnipotence of Necessity on the physical plane of existence seems to have been introduced into Hellenic thought by Democritus—a philosopher whose long life-span (*vivebat circa* 460–360 B.C.) gave him time to grow to mature manhood before becoming a witness of the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization, and thereafter to watch the process of social disintegration for at least another three score years and ten. 'By Necessity', Democritus pronounced, 'are foreordained all things that were and are and are to come'; and in this proposition 'a full and unhesitating Determinism' was indeed 'asserted as a base-principle of the Universe,' in contrast to the half-hearted Determinism of Democritus's predecessor Leucippus.² Yet Democritus appears to have ignored the problems involved in an extension of the empire of Determinism from the physical to the moral sphere;³ and Epicurus, who was content in general to follow Democritus's lead in sketching out his own perhaps rather perfunctory chart of the Physical Universe, took the drastic step of introducing an infinitesimal dose of rebellious caprice—the famous *παρέγκλιαις* or *clinamen*—into the physical department of Necessity's realm, because Epicurus—believing, as he did, that the Soul had a physical basis—was at the same time unwilling to admit the absolute sovereignty of Necessity in the sphere of morals.

'It were better', Epicurus declared, 'to follow the myths about the Gods than to become a slave to the "Destiny" of the natural philosophers

¹ See, for example, Herodotus: Book I, chap. 8; Book IV, chap. 79; Book V, chap. 33; Book V, chap. 92, 8; Book VI, chap. 64; Book VI, chap. 135; Book VII, chap. 11; Book VII, chaps. 17–18; Book VIII, chap. 53; Book IX, chap. 109. Translations of these ten passages will be found in Toynbee, A. J.: *Greek Historical Thought* (London 1924, Dent), pp. 160–1.

² Bailey, C.: *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (Oxford 1928, Clarendon Press), pp. 120–2.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 186–8. It is curious to find this devotee of Physical Necessity castigating, in the field of human action, the weakness of the character that bows down and worships Chance.

(τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένη δουλεύειν); for the former suggests a hope of placating the Gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation.¹

The dogmatic belief in an unmitigated Physical Determinism which was thus proposed by Democritus and declined by Epicurus in the course of the development of Hellenic thought was the foundation of the astral philosophy of the dominant minority in a disintegrating Babylonian World, as we have already had occasion to observe;² and we have also observed that the astrologers did not shrink from carrying to their logical conclusion the scientific principles of the uniformity of Nature and the mutual sympathy of all her creatures by extending the empire of Determinism from the motions of the heavenly bodies to the lives and fortunes of human beings. According to the thesis of at least one distinguished modern Western authority³ Nabonidus's Babylonia contributed more than Democritus's Abdera to inspire Zeno of Citium with the 'totalitarian' Fatalism that distinguishes his philosophy from that of his Athenian contemporary Epicurus. If we now turn from Hellas and Babylon to our own Western World, we shall observe that our modern Western physical scientists have adopted the creed of Physical Determinism with the wholeheartedness of a Democritus, while, in the sphere of the humanities, our moral philosophers have been more ready to follow suit to the physicists, as Zeno did, than to protest in company with Epicurus.

However that may be, the modern Western World seems to have broken virgin soil in extending the empire of Necessity into the economic field—which is, indeed, a sphere of social life that has been overlooked or ignored by almost all the minds that have directed the thoughts of other societies. The classic exposition of Economic Determinism is, of course, that philosophy—or religion⁴—whose founder is Karl Marx; but in the Western or Westernized World of to-day the number of the souls who testify by their acts to a conscious or unconscious conviction that Economic Necessity is Queen of All is vastly greater than the number of professing Marxians, and would be found in fact to include a phalanx of arch-capitalists who would repudiate with horror and indignation any suggestion that they were fundamentally at one, in the faith by which they lived, with the execrable prophet of Communism.

¹ Epicurus, *Letters*, No. 3, § 134. This translation of the passage, together with the original Greek, will be found in Bailey, *op. cit.*, on p. 318.

² In V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 56-7, above.

³ See Bidez, J.: *La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil chez les Stoïciens* (Paris 1932, Les Belles Lettres), *passim*, and especially p. 52.

⁴ For the transformation of the original Marxian philosophy into a new-fangled proletarian religion see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 176-7, above.

The sovereignty of Necessity in the psychical sphere has also been proclaimed by one faction, at least, in our fledgling school of modern Western psychologists, who have been tempted to deny the existence of the Soul—in the sense of a personality or self-determining spiritual whole—in the excitement of an apparent initial success in an endeavour to analyse the Soul's processes of psychic behaviour. And, young though the science of Psycho-analysis is, the worship of Necessity in the medium of soul-stuff can already claim as its convert the most sensationally successful politician of the age.

'I go my way with the assurance of a somnambulist, the way which Providence has sent me.'

These words are quoted from a speech which was delivered by Adolf Hitler at Munich on the 14th March, 1936; and they sent a cold shudder through the frames of millions of European men and women beyond the frontiers of the Third Reich (and perhaps inside them too) whose nerves had not yet had time to recover from the preceding shock of the German military reoccupation of the Rhineland seven days before.

There is another version of the creed of Psychical Determinism which breaks the bounds of the narrow Time-span of a single human life on Earth and carries the chain of spiritual cause and effect both backwards and forwards in Time without a break—backwards to the first appearance of Man on this terrestrial stage, and forwards to his final exit from it. This more formidable application of the dogma of Determinism to spiritual affairs was already a burning question many centuries before either National Socialism or Psycho-analysis were first heard of; and this older and deeper doctrine is found in two variants which, to all appearance, have arisen quite independently of one another. One variant is the Christian conception of 'Original Sin'; the other is the Indic conception of *Karma*, which has entered into both the philosophy of Buddhism and the religion of Hinduism.

These two renderings of one doctrine agree with one another in the essential point of making the chain of spiritual cause and effect—and the corresponding debit-and-credit account in the Book of Judgement—run on continuously from one earthly life to another. In both the Christian and the Indic view the character and conduct of a human being whom we behold alive on Earth to-day are held to have been causally conditioned by the nature of certain actions that have been performed in other lives¹—or in one other life²—lived in the past, while the life that is now being

¹ The Indic variant.

² The Christian variant.

lived is believed not only to have had a spiritual heritage entailed upon it, but also to be destined to bequeath a spiritual heritage to lives that are to be lived in the future.¹ To this extent the Christian and the Indic conception coincide, but beyond this point they diverge from one another.

The Christian doctrine of 'Original Sin' affirms that a particular personal sin of the progenitor of the Human Race has entailed upon all his offspring an untoward spiritual heritage which they would all have been spared if Adam had not fallen from grace; that every descendant of Adam, *ex officio stirpis*, is foredoomed to inherit this Adamic blemish; that he does in fact find himself saddled with it automatically; and that this hereditary spiritual infection is transmitted by physical descent without the moral plague being stayed by the psychic insulation of soul from soul (although this psychic insulation or 'individuality' of each and every soul is both absolute and all-important, according to the Christian belief). It will be seen that this Christian affirmation of the fact, and conception of the nature, of spiritual heredity in Mankind² anticipates the doctrine of a school of modern Western biologists who hold that the physical heritage of living creatures is handed down from one generation to another, across the ever-recurring gulf which divides the successive individual representatives of a species, without any modification of the original specific type through the subsequent transmission of characteristics that may have been personally acquired by individual descendants of the first member of the series. In the spiritual, as in the physical, version of the doctrine of 'Original Sin' the power of transmitting

¹ This conception of 'Original Sin' or *Karma* is accepted by Christianity and by Buddhism alike; and in this measure both Christianity and Buddhism explicitly recognize the sovereignty of the goddess Necessity; but of course it would be a travesty of the truth to classify either of these two faiths as a form of Necessity-worship or Fatalism; for, while they both of them take as their premiss the proposition that Man, in his unredeemed state, is in bondage *de facto* to 'Original Sin' or to *Karma*, the purpose of both faiths is to find for Man some method of release from Necessity's yoke, and their claim to Man's attention and allegiance rests on their conviction that they are able to offer him a method of release that is capable of being effective. 'The difference for Greeks between the teaching of Babylon and the teaching of Buddha' is underlined by Tarn in *op. cit.*, p. 60. This difference—which likewise distinguishes the teaching of Babylon from the teaching of Christ—is momentous, not merely for Hellenes, but for all men in all cultural climes and in all ages.

² The topic of 'Original Sin' has, of course, become one of the main arenas of theological controversy between contending Christian sects; yet the differences between their conflicting views on this subject—wide though these differences may be and bitterly though the points of conflict may be contested between them—seem to presuppose a certain common foundation of belief which is identical in all the contending schools of Christian Theology. The propositions which appear to be accepted by all Christian theologians universally and without contention are (i) that Adam, through a personal sin, has transmitted to all his physical descendants a spiritual heritage which is (a) untoward, (b) automatically inherited; (ii) that this faculty of physically transmitting an acquired spiritual characteristic (which in Adam's case happens to have been a state of lapse from grace) is a property, peculiar to the progenitor of the Human Race, which has never been possessed, and never will be possessed, by any of Adam's descendants, either for good or for evil.

an acquired characteristic from one individual to another is ascribed to Adam but is denied to every one of Adam's descendants.

The apparently arbitrary inner contradictions which are thus latent in the Christian conception of 'Original Sin' are not likewise implicit in the Indic conception of *Karma*. According to this Indic doctrine the spiritual characteristics that an individual acquires through his own acts are all transmitted from first to last, and for good or for evil, without exception; and the bearer of this cumulative spiritual heritage is not a genealogical tree representing a procession of successive separate personalities, but is a spiritual continuum (either a single permanently subsisting self or else a selfless continuum of psychological states)¹ which appears and reappears in the World of Sense through a series of reincarnations in a succession of phenomenal existences whose semblance of separateness from one another and of respective individuality is merely an hallucination in the minds of spectators.² These are the presuppositions of the Indic conception of *Karma*: a Sanskrit word which literally means just 'Action', but which has been restricted, in the technical terminology of philosophy and religion, to bear the special meaning of moral action, flowing from deliberate acts of will, which produces an abiding effect upon the character of the agent and which thus mounts up cumulatively, in an ever-open debit-and-credit account, from one re-incarnation to another.³

Finally we have to take notice of the theistic form of Determinism—a form which is perhaps the most bizarre and perverse of all, since in this Theistic Determinism an idol is worshipped in the likeness of the True God. The addicts to this covert idolatry still theoretically ascribe to the object of their worship all the attributes of a divine personality, while at the same time they insist upon the single attribute of transcendence with an emphasis so disproportionate that their God becomes transformed into a being as unapproachable, unknowable, unaccountable, implacable, and impersonal as *Saeva Necessitas* herself.

The 'higher religions' that have emanated from the internal

¹ The analysis of the human personality into a (not indissoluble) continuum of psychological states is a cardinal point of Buddhist doctrine which can be traced back, almost with certainty, to Siddhārtha Gautama himself; and this psychological scheme involves, at any rate implicitly, a denial of the existence of any such thing as a permanently abiding self (see Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), chap. 8).

² The spectators who suffer from this hallucination include not only outsiders but also the subject himself in his incarnation of the moment, if and when he is not in a state of enlightenment. It is only through attaining to enlightenment that the subject of *Karma* can make his memory leap the gulf between his present incarnation and his former lives, and thus become aware of the whole of the spiritual continuum of which his momentary embodiment is a temporary vehicle.

³ For the effect of a belief in the operation of this law upon the Indic conception of the nature of the Universe see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 19-20, below.

proletariat of the Syriac Society are the spiritual fields in which this idolatrous perversion of a transcendental Theism seems most apt to break out. The two classic examples of it are the notion of *Qismet*—a popular version, current in the modern Islamic World, of al-Ash'ari's classical doctrine of *Iktisab*¹—and the doctrine of Predestination as this has been formulated by Calvin on the alleged authority of Saint Augustine and has been presented in this guise by the modern Western Protestant revolutionary as a return to the original and fundamental teaching of the Christian Church.

Qismet is an Arabic word which means literally just 'distribution', but which has acquired the special meaning of the lot assigned to a human being for his life in This World.

'It is this meaning of the Turkish that is best known. In Turkish, however, *Qismet* is not so much an expression of theological doctrines concerning Predestination as of a practical Fatalism which accepts with resignation the blows and vicissitudes of Fate. The same sentiment is often expressed among Persian and Turkish poets by the words *falak* and *çarkh* to express the irrational and inevitable influence exercised by the spheres.'²

The following description of the practical working of this notion of *Qismet* in ordinary life comes from the pen of an acute English observer who was resident in Turkey over a long span of years in the latter part of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era: that is to say, in an age when the Iranic culture of the 'Osmanlis was already in full decadence without having yet begun to be contaminated by the intrusion of the alien culture of the modern West.

'The doctrine of the Turks in this point [of the nature of Predestination] seems to run exactly according to the assertion of the severest Calvinists. . . .

'They are of opinion that every man's destiny is wrote in his forehead, which they call *Narsip* [*Nasīb*] or *Tactir* [*Taqdīr*], which is the Book wrote in Heaven of every man's fortune, and is by no contrary endeavours, counsels or wisdom to be avoided; which tenent is so firmly radicated in the minds of the vulgar that it causes the souldiery brutishly to throw away their lives in the most desperate attempts, and to esteem no more of their bodies then as dirt or rubbish to fill up the trenches of the enemy. And, to speak the truth, this received assertion hath turned the Turks as much to account as any other of their best and subtilest maximes.

'According to this doctrine, none ought to avoid or fear the infection of the Plague—Mahomet's precepts being not to abandon the city-house where infection rages, because God hath numbered their dayes and predestinated their fate—and upon this belief they as familiarly attend the beds and frequent the company of pestilential persons as we

¹ See p. 424, above.

² *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (London 1927, Luzac), s.v. *Kismet*.

do those that are affected with the gout, stone or ague. And, though they evidently see that Christians—who fly into better airs, and from infected habitations—survive the fury of the years of pestilence when whole cities of them perish and are depopulated with the disease, yet so far is this opinion rooted amongst them that they scruple not to strip the contagious shirt from the dead body and to put it on their own. Nor can they remove their abode from the chambers of the sick—it being the custom in the families of great men to lodge many servants on different palets in the same room, where the diseased and healthful lie promiscuously together; from whence it hath happened often that three parts of a Pashaw's family, which perhaps hath consisted of two hundred men, most youthful and lusty, hath perished in the heat of July and August's pestilence. And in the same manner many whole families every summer have perished, and not one survivor left to claim the inheritance of the house—for want of which, the Grand Signior hath become the proprietor.

'Though the Mahometan Law obliges them not to abandon the city nor their houses, nor avoid the conversation of men infected with the pestilence where their business or calling employs them, yet they are counselled not to frequent a contagious habitation where they have no lawful affair to invite them. But yet I have observed, in the time of an extraordinary plague, that the Turks have not confided so much to the precept of their Prophet as to have courage enough to withstand the dread and terrour of that slaughter the sickness hath made, but have under other excuses fled to retired and private villages—especially the *Cadees* [*Qādīs*] and men of the Law, who, being commonly of more refined wits and judgments than the generality, both by reason and experience have found that a wholesome air is a preserver of life, and that they have lived to return again to their own house in health and strength, when perhaps their next neighbours have through their brutish ignorance been laid in their graves.'¹

In this picture of the prevailing Turkish *êthos* in the decadence of the Iranic Civilization the sense of drift is the feature that dominates the psychological landscape.

¹ Rycaut, Sir Paul: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey & Brome), pp. 115–16. This seventeenth-century English observer's picture of the Turkish state of mind in his own day may be supplemented by the following testimony to the hold of Fatalism over eighteenth-century Turkish souls which is given by two twentieth-century Western scholars:

'As for the prevalence of Fatalism, no European observer of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century fails to dwell on it; for it produced striking results: whole quarters of Istanbul were perpetually being burnt down; every few years the population would be decimated by plague. Yet nothing would make the Muslims build their houses of anything but wood or take the slightest precautions, for themselves or their families, against infection. They were, it is true, quite inconsistent: for instance, they would call in a physician to treat a patient and would do their best to extinguish these conflagrations: what constituted flying in the face of Fate was settled rather by convention than otherwise. The one unpardonable blasphemy was to complain of misfortune; for this was to imply either that an event might occur otherwise than by the will of God, or else that the will of God was unjust. The correct response was an immovable calm and a reference to *Qismet* or *Taqdir*' (Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, H.: *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. i (Oxford 1939, University Press), chap. 13).

5. *The Sense of Sin*

While the sense of drift is a passive feeling¹—even when it finds expression in the seemingly dynamic activities of a militant predestinarianism²—it has an active counterpart and antithesis in the sense of sin which is an alternative reaction to an identical consciousness of moral defeat.

In essence and in spirit the sense of sin and the sense of drift present the sharpest contrast to one another; for, while the sense of drift has the effect of an opiate in instilling into the soul an insidious acquiescence in an evil that is assumed to reside in external circumstances beyond the victim's control, the sense of sin has the effect of a stimulus because it tells the sinner that the evil is not external after all, but is within him³ and is therefore subject to his will—if only he wills to carry out God's purpose and so to render himself accessible to God's grace. There is here the whole difference between the Slough of Despond and the Faith that moves mountains; yet at the same time we can see that there may be a margin of common ground between the mountains and the slough in practical life—an intermediate zone of feeling and conduct across which a soul in travail with the spiritual pangs of an age of social disintegration may make an arduous passage from the passive to the active mood.

The existence of this no-man's-land in which the two moods overlap is implicitly assumed in the Indic conception of *Karma*;⁴ for, although on the one hand *Karma*, like 'Original Sin', is conceived of as a spiritual heritage with which the Soul or the continuum of psychological states is saddled without the option of repudiating it, the accumulation of *Karma*, as it stands at a given moment, is also the net result of a number of acts which—good and evil acts alike—have all been deliberate acts of will; and at any moment it is possible, through other such acts of will, either to increase the weight of the inherited burden or to diminish it. Thus, while *Karma* can be regarded in one aspect as a burden forcibly imposed by the inexorable working of the law of causation, there is an alternative light in which it can be viewed as a burden that is deliberately increased or diminished, assumed or thrown off, by acts which are all within the scope of the agent's own volition.⁵

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 1, p. 380, and V. C (i) (d) 4, pp. 412–31, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 4, Annex, pp. 615–18, below.

³ See IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 120–2, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 4, pp. 427–9, above.

⁵ These two at first sight irreconcilable aspects of *Karma* can perhaps be brought into harmony by the consideration that, while the chain of acts that generates *Karma* is a chain of cause and effect, the acts themselves are all of them deliberate acts of volition.

When viewed under this aspect, *Karma* presents itself as the work of the soul (or bundle of psychoses) that is its subject, and no longer as the work of a Destiny that is external to the subject and unamenable to his (or its) control; and under this aspect *Karma* resolves itself into Sin instead of Fate. It turns out, that is, to be an evil of which the subject is himself the author, but which, by the same token, he has the power to diminish and perhaps even in the end to extinguish.

The same passage to a conquerable Sin from an unconquerable Fate can be made along a Christian road; for the Christian soul is offered a possibility of purifying itself from the taint of 'Original Sin', which is its heritage from Adam, by seeking and finding God's grace; and this divine grace does not operate as a sheerly transcendent spiritual force that scours off from the Soul an impurity which is likewise external to it. Grace comes as a divine response to a human effort; and, in order to merit this aid, the effort has to be directed towards overcoming—not, of course, the infectious primal sin which was committed by Adam and which must therefore *ex hypothesi* be impervious to the human action of any human being except Adam himself—but the personal sin of the particular soul that is now striving to win release. This personal sin may be traceable, *sub specie theologiae*, to an innate predisposition towards concupiscence which is Adam's untoward legacy to every one of his descendants; but a predisposition is not tantamount to a predetermination nor a temptation to a fall. And a sinner cannot find excuse for his sin by pleading that, in committing it, he has been yielding to a congenital frailty. For Adam's offspring, as for their progenitor, the responsibility for the sinner's own personal sin rests on the sinner himself. But, on that hypothesis, this personal sin is an evil which the Soul is capable of resisting and overcoming with the help of God's grace.

An awakening to the sense of sin can be detected in the development of the Egyptiac conception of the Life after Death in the course of the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles';¹ but the classical case is the spiritual experience of the Prophets of Israel and Judah in the Syriac 'Time of Troubles'. When these prophets were

¹ In the time of 'the Old Kingdom' the attainment of bliss in the After Life was held to depend upon the fulfilment, in This World, of ritual requirements involving a material outlay. By the time of the establishment of 'the Middle Empire' the attainment of bliss in the After Life had come to be held to depend upon the living, in This World, of a righteous life. The aspirant to happiness after death no longer expected to be able to extort the prize from the Gods by the exercise of magic: he expected to stand a trial in which the Gods would be the judges, the Soul's moral conduct on Earth would be the subject of the divine scrutiny, and the alternatives of happiness and torment would be respectively the reward and the punishment that awaited the Dead alternatively according to whether the verdict were favourable or adverse (see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 143, above, and also Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), third edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 242).

discovering their truths and delivering their message, the society out of whose bosom they had arisen, and to whose members they were addressing themselves, was lying in helpless agony in the grip of the Assyrian tiger, with the monster's claws lacerating the prostrate victim's flesh and its teeth splintering his bones like matchwood.¹ For souls whose body social was in this fearful plight, it was a heroic spiritual feat to reject the obvious and specious explanation of their misery as the work of an irresistible external force of a material kind, and to divine that, in spite of all outward appearances, it was their own sin that was the true cause of their tribulations² and that it therefore lay in their own hands to win their true release.

This saving truth which had been discovered by the Syriac Society in the ordeal of its own breakdown and disintegration was inherited from the Prophets of Israel, and was then propagated in a Christian guise, by the Syriac wing of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic World. Without this instruction from an alien source in a principle which had already been apprehended by Syriac souls with an altogether un-Hellenic outlook, the Hellenic Society might never—even in its own 'Time of Troubles'—have succeeded in learning a lesson which was so much at variance with the dominant mood in the Hellenic *êthos*. At the same time the Hellenes might have found it still more difficult than they did find it to take this Syriac spiritual discovery to heart if they had not, of their own motion, been moving in the same direction themselves.

This native awakening to a sense of sin can be traced in the spiritual history of Hellenism many centuries before a Hellenic trickle mingled with a Syriac stream in the river of Christianity.³

If we have been right in our interpretation of the origin, nature, and intention of Orphism,⁴ there is evidence that, even before the Hellenic Civilization broke down, at least a few Hellenic souls had become so painfully conscious of a spiritual void in their native cultural heritage that they had resorted to the *tour de force* of artificially inventing the 'higher religion' with which the apparent Minoan Civilization had failed to endow them. It is at any rate certain that, in the very first generation after the breakdown of 431 B.C., the apparatus of Orphism was being used—and abused—for the purpose of providing satisfaction for souls that were already convicted of sin and were groping, however blindly, for release from it. For this we have the testimony of a passage of Plato which might almost have flowed from the pen of Luther.

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 117-19, above.

² Reasons for pronouncing a verdict of suicide, and not one of murder, upon the death of the Syriac Society have been suggested in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 67-8, above.

³ See V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 537, below.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 84-7, above.

'There are the quacks and diviners who peddle their wares to the rich and make them believe that these cheapjacks possess powers, procured from the Gods by sacrifices and incantations, for healing with diversions and festivities any sin that has been committed either by oneself or by one's forebears. Conversely—supposing that one wants to plague an enemy—they pretend to the command of corresponding powers for inflicting injury (upon the just and the unjust indifferently) by charms and spells at a modest price. This they claim to do by inducing the Gods to minister to their purposes; and as their authorities for all this rigmarole they cite the poets . . . and produce a host of books purporting to have been written by Musaeus and Orpheus, whom they palm off as the offspring of the Moon and the Muses. They follow these books in their hocus-pocus; and they persuade even Governments, as well as private people, that a release and purification from sin can be obtained by means of sacrifices and agreeable child's-play! They further maintain that these "rites" (as they call them in this connexion) are as efficacious for the dead as they are for the living. "Rites" liberate us from the torments of the world beyond the grave, while a dreadful fate awaits us if we neglect here and now to make sacrifices.'¹

This first glimpse that is given to us of a native sense of sin in the souls of the Hellenic dominant minority in its 'Time of Troubles' looks as unpromising as it is repulsive. Yet two and three and four centuries later, in the tender consciences of an Agis and a Cleomenes and a Tiberius and a Gaius Gracchus² and in the tardy yet sincere repentance of Augustus,³ we see a native Hellenic sense of sin which has been purified, out of all recognition, in the fires of suffering; and there is almost a Christian note in the voice of the Hellenic dominant minority in the Augustan Age as this makes itself heard in the poetry of Virgil:

Ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis
 Romanas acies iterum videre Philippi;
 nec fuit indignum superis bis sanguine nostro
 Emathiam et latos Haemi pinguescere campos. . . .
 Di Patrii, Indigetes, et Romule Vestaque mater,
 quae Tuscum Tiberim et Romana Palatia servas,
 hunc saltem everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo
 ne prohibete. satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
 Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae. . . .
 quippe ubi fas versum atque nefas; tot bella per orbem;
 tam multae scelerum facies; non ullus aratro
 dignus honos: squalent abductis arva colonis
 et curvae rigidum falces conflantur in ensem.

¹ Plato: *Respublica*, 364B-365A.

² For these four archaistic-minded social reformers see the references in V. C (i) (d) 1, p. 388, footnote 1, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 78, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 648, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 187, below.

hinc movet Euphrates, illinc Germania bellum;
 vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes
 arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe;
 ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae,
 addunt in spatio, et frustra retinacula tendens
 fertur equis auriga neque audit currus habenas.¹

This is a prayer for delivery from a torturing sense of drift which is conveyed in the last three lines by one of the most vivid strokes of Virgil's art. The prayer takes the form of a confession of sin; and, though the sin from which the poet implores Heaven for release is nominally an 'original sin' inherited from Laomedon—a minor character in the Greek Epic Cycle of Troy who by Virgil's time had come to be adopted as a legendary Trojan progenitor for an authentic Roman dominant minority—the tremendous *ergo* which is the first word of the first line and the key word of the whole passage tells the reader that the sin which the Romans were expiating in Virgil's day was really the sin which they themselves had been committing during the two-centuries-long rake's progress upon which they had entered when they plunged into the Hannibalic War²—a sin that, in its fearful climax, had driven the Sun himself to veil his countenance,

cum caput obscura nitidum ferrugine texit,
 impiaque aeternam timuerunt saecula noctem.³

Within a century of the year in which Virgil's poem was written, the spirit that breathes through these passages had become predominant in a stratum of the Hellenic Society which had hardly yet come within range of the radiation of Christianity.

'From whatever quarter, a new spiritual vision had opened, strange to the Ancient World. It is not merely that the conception of God has become more pure and lofty: the whole attitude of the higher minds to the eternal had altered. A great spiritual revolution had concurred with a great political revolution. The vision of the Divine World which satisfied men in the Age of Pericles or in the Punic Wars, when Religion, Politics, and Morality were linked in unbroken harmony⁴—when, if spiritual vision was bounded, spiritual needs were less clamorous, and the moral life less troubled and self-conscious—could no longer appease

¹ Virgil: *Georg.* I, ll. 489-92, 498-502, 505-14. Some of these lines have been quoted already in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 509, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 505-8, above.

³ Virgil: *Georg.* I, ll. 467-8. The crime which, according to Virgil, had been signalized by this portent of diurnal darkness was, of course, the assassination of Caesar and not the crucifixion of Christ. This traditional association of an eclipse of the Sun with the death of a hero who is being cut off in his prime by a heinous piece of foul play can be traced back to the legend of Hēraklēs (see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 473, below).

⁴ For the diffraction, during the process of social disintegration, of the rays of social radiation which are blended into a single clear beam during the process of social growth, see I. B (iii), vol. i, pp. 26-33, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 199-203 above.—A.J.T.

the yearnings of the higher minds. Both Morality and Religion had become less formal and external, more penetrating and exigent. Prayer was no longer a formal litany for worldly blessings or sinful indulgence, but a colloquy with God in a moment of spiritual exaltation. The true sacrifice was no longer "the blood of bulls" but a quiet spirit. Along with a sense of frailty and bewilderment men felt the need of purification and spiritual support. The old mysteries and the new cults from the East had fostered a longing for sacramental peace and assurance of an Other Life, in which the crooked should be made straight and the perverted be restored.¹

This picture of the spiritual state of the Hellenic dominant minority about a hundred years later than the generation of Augustus has been painted by a modern Western scholar with authentic colours that have been preserved in the literature of the age; and it is a different picture indeed from the sketch drawn by Plato some five hundred years earlier. In retrospect it is plain that the generations of Seneca and Plutarch and Epictetus and Marcus were unwittingly preparing their hearts for an approaching enlightenment from a proletarian source out of which these sophisticated Hellenic 'intellectuals' would never have augured the coming of any good thing.²

The Hellenic and Syriac societies are assuredly not the only civilizations in which there has been an awakening to the sense of sin through the shock of seeing an ancient social structure collapse in ruin. We may tentatively interpret the penitential self-mortifications of the Mayas³ in their age of social decadence as an outward visible sign of an inward spiritual state; and we may draw the same inference in the same tentative fashion from certain relics of the Sumeric religion: the Penitential Psalms and the worship of Tammuz and Ishtar.⁴ In the Sumeric and in the Mayan field the historian is working almost entirely in the dark, with only a rare glimmer of uncertain light to guide him. It is strange to find ourselves equally at a loss to answer the question whether a native sense of sin can be detected in the present state

¹ Dill, S.: *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London 1905, Macmillan), pp. 420-1. Compare the passages quoted in V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), pp. 550-1, below.

² John i. 46. On this point see further V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), pp. 550-68, below.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 2, p. 403, above. This vein in the religion of the Mayas in the time of the Mayan universal state duly reappears in the Mayan religious heritage of the Mexic Society (for this heritage see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 127, and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, p. 357, above). Dirges on the themes of mutability and death are a prominent feature in the literature of the interloping barbarian Aztec empire-builders who embraced the religion of the Mexic World (see V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 357, above) and came within an ace of anticipating the Spaniards in establishing a Central American universal state (see Spinden, H. J.: *Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America* (New York 1922, American Museum of Natural History, Handbook No. 3), pp. 212-13).

⁴ For the difficulty of replacing these relics of the Sumeric religion in their historical setting so long as we are handicapped by our present dearth of historical evidence see, I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 115, footnote 1, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 148-9, above.

of mind of the society in which we ourselves actually live and move and have our being.

The sense of sin is, no doubt, a feeling with which our modern Western homunculus is quite familiar. A familiarity with it is, indeed, almost forced upon him; for the sense of sin is a cardinal feature of the 'higher religion' which we have inherited from the dead civilization to which ours is affiliated. In this case, however, familiarity seems latterly to have been breeding—not so much contempt as the more violent reactions of aversion and hostility. And the contrast between this temper of the modern Western World and the contrary temper of the Hellenic World in the sixth century B.C. shows up the vein of perversity in human nature. Though our historical evidence for the early age of Hellenic history is too scanty to be conclusive, it indicates, as we have seen,¹ that the Hellenic Society, starting life with the jejune and unsatisfying religious heritage of a barbarian pantheon, became conscious of its spiritual poverty and exerted itself to fill the void by inventing, in Orphism, a 'higher religion' of the kind that some other, perhaps more fortunate, civilizations have inherited from their predecessors; and the character of the Orphic ritual and doctrine makes it clear that the sense of sin was the pent-up religious feeling for which the Hellenes of the sixth century B.C. were eager, above all, to find a normal outlet. In contrast to the Hellenic Society our Western Society is one of those more generously endowed civilizations that have grown up under the aegis of a 'higher religion' and within the chrysalis of a universal church; and it is perhaps just because Western Man has always been able to take his Christian birth-right for granted that he has persistently depreciated and finally repudiated it.

The history of this graceless *Homo Occidentalis* who has turned against the Christianity that found him a barbarian and has promoted him to the lordship of creation is a tale of *ἔβρις* which has been told in the parable of Jeshurun.

'He found him in a desert land and in the waste howling wilderness; He led him about, He instructed him, He kept him as the apple of His eye. . . .

'He made him ride on the high places of the Earth that he might eat the increase of the fields, and He made him to suck honey out of the rock and oil out of the flinty rock. . . .

'But Jeshurun waxed fat and kicked . . . then he forsook God which made him, and lightly esteemed the rock of his salvation.'²

Of all the gifts of Christianity against which our modern Western Jeshurun has been kicking in these latter days, the sense of sin

¹ In V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 84-7, above.

² Deut. xxxii. 10, 13, and 15.

is perhaps the one which has moved him to the direst fury of rebellion. You have only to mention the sense of sin in order to be sure of making the modern-minded Westerner 'see red'. The degree to which he flatters himself that he has succeeded in plucking this sense out and casting it from him is for him almost the measure of his success in his struggle to emancipate himself from the bondage of that Christian tradition in which he has been bred. And the cult of Hellenism, which has been so potent, and in many ways so fruitful, an ingredient in our secular Western culture during the last four centuries, has been partly fostered and kept alive by a conventional conception of Hellenism as a way of life which gloriously combines with all our own modern Western virtues and attainments an innate and effortless freedom from that hateful sense of sin which Western Man is now industriously purging out of his *ci-devant* Christian spiritual heritage.¹

Will modern Western Man repent of, and recoil from, his *ὑβρις* before it finds its nemesis in *ἄρνη*? If this is the riddle of the destiny of our Western Civilization, the answer cannot yet be forecast in a generation which has been born into the critical act of the tragic drama. But we may anxiously scan the landscape of our contemporary spiritual life for any symptoms that may give us ground for hope that we are regaining the use of a spiritual faculty which we have been doing our worst to sear and sterilize. Dare we allow ourselves to see at any rate a favourable omen in the emphasis that is laid upon a conviction of sin in the 'revivalist' version of Protestantism which has been rife on the English-speaking fringe of the Western World during the last two hundred years and which—winning its first foothold in a nascent industrial proletariat, and spreading thence to a rising lower-middle class—has lately been carried into the citadel of a paganized dominant minority by the shock-tactics of the so-called 'Oxford Groups'?

6. *The Sense of Promiscuity*

(α) *Pammixia and Proletarianization.*

The Receptivity of Empire-Builders.

A sense of promiscuity is the passive substitute for that sense of style which develops *pari passu* with the growth of a civilization.² This state of mind takes practical effect in an act of self-surrender to the melting-pot; and in the process of social disintegration an identical mood manifests itself in equivalent action in every province of social life:³ in Religion and Literature and Language and

¹ For the element of truth in this picture of Hellenism as an historic example of the blessedness of being spiritually 'once-born' see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 355-7, above.

² See III. C (iii), vol. iii, pp. 377-90, above.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 1, p. 381, above.

Art, as well as in a wider and vaguer field that may be labelled 'Manners and Customs'. In attempting an empirical survey of the manifestations of this sense of promiscuity in the declines and falls of those civilizations that have broken down up to date within the brief span of some five or six thousand years during which this species of societies has been in existence so far, it will be convenient to sift out the phenomena for separate consideration under these different heads. It will also be convenient to begin operations in the field of 'Manners', since this is the field which has the widest range, while the spiritual crop that it bears is not to be despised if there is any truth in the adage that 'Manners makyth Man'.

In looking out for the earliest and strongest evidence for the emergence of a sense of promiscuity in the body social of a disintegrating society we shall perhaps be inclined to turn our eyes with the greatest expectancy towards the Internal Proletariat. In bringing the representatives of the Internal Proletariat on to our stage in an earlier chapter¹ we have observed that their common and characteristic affliction is the torture of being torn up by the roots; and this terrible experience of social 'deracination' might be expected, above all other experiences, to produce a sense of promiscuity in souls that had been compelled to undergo it. This *a priori* expectation is not, however, borne out by the historical facts; for, more often than not, the ordeal to which an internal proletariat is subjected seems to strike that optimum degree of severity at which the challenge acts as a stimulating spur and not as a crushing sledge-hammer;² and we see the uprooted and expatriated and enslaved men and women of whom an internal proletariat is composed not only keeping a firm hold upon any shreds of their torn and trampled native social heritage that they have been able to carry with them into exile or captivity, but actually going on to impart these fragmentary remnants of their ancestral culture to a dominant minority who, *a priori*, might have been expected—so far from receiving any cultural impress from that quarter—to impose their own 'culture-pattern' upon the mob of waifs and strays whom they have caught in their net and forced under their yoke.

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, *passim*, above.

² For the notion of Challenge-and-Response see Part II. D, vol. ii, *passim*, above. 'The Golden Mean' in the working of Challenge-and-Response is discussed in II. D (vii). The application of these principles to the life of the Internal Proletariat has been touched upon, in this context, in II. D (vi), which deals with the stimulus of penalizations. The ordeal of 'deracination', which is thus apt to evoke a victorious response from members of the Internal Proletariat, is on the contrary apt to have a demoralizing effect upon members of the External Proletariat when these are uprooted and transplanted in consequence, not of exile or enslavement, but of a *Völkerwanderung* in which their war-bands break through a *limes* and migrate from a no-man's-land into an Eldorado as military conquerors (see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 201, footnote 1, above, and Part VIII, below).

It is still more surprising to see—as, again, we do see—the Dominant Minority showing itself similarly receptive to the cultural influence of the External Proletariat, considering that these truculent war-bands are insulated from the Dominant Minority by a military frontier and that their barbarian social heritage might have been expected to be lacking in both the charm and the prestige that manifestly still cling even to the tatters of those mellow civilizations to which the Internal Proletariat is heir in the persons of some, at least, of its involuntary recruits.

Nevertheless we do find, as a matter of fact, that, of the three factions into which a disintegrating society is apt to split, it is the Dominant Minority that succumbs to the sense of promiscuity the most readily, and this in its military intercourse with the External Proletariat beyond the *limes* as well as in its economic intercourse with the Internal Proletariat in the *ergastulum*. The ultimate result of these two parallel processes of 'proletarianization' to which the Dominant Minority yields itself is a disappearance of that schism in the body social which is the index and the penalty of a social breakdown. The Dominant Minority atones, in the end, for its sins by closing a breach that has been its own handiwork; and it closes it by merging itself in the Proletariat in so far as it does not forestall the completion of this process of 'proletarianization' by an act of suicide.

Before we attempt to follow the course of 'proletarianization' along its two parallel lines, it may be illuminating to glance at the evidence for the receptivity of empire-builders, since this pre-disposition may partly explain the sequel.

The universal states of which these empire-builders are the architects are, for the most part, the products of military conquest, and we may therefore look for our finest examples of receptivity in the sphere of military technique. We may begin by citing testimony to the military receptivity of the Romans which has been given by a Greek witness who was himself a member of the Hellenic dominant minority of the age in which he was writing.

'At the present day', Polybius records, 'the equipment of the Roman cavalryman is practically identical with that of his Greek companion-in-arms. Originally, however, it was otherwise. . . . [Here follows a detailed technical description of the Roman cavalryman's original equipment.] . . . When experience proved their own equipment unsatisfactory, the Romans speedily replaced it by the Greek, which possesses the following advantages. . . . [Technical specifications follow.] . . . The Romans were not slow to make these advantages their own when once they had apprehended them—the fact being that the Romans are without rivals among the nations of the World in their adaptability

and their enthusiasm for progress (ἀγαθοὶ γάρ, εἰ καὶ τινες ἕτεροι, μεταλαβεῖν ἔθη καὶ ζηλώσαι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ 'Ρωμαῖοι).¹

A similar receptivity in the sphere of military technique was shown by the Theban founders of 'the New Empire' of Egypt in borrowing the horse-and-chariot, as a weapon of war, from their defeated *ci-devant* Nomad antagonists the Hyksos; by the marchmen of the Sinic World over against the Eurasian Steppe in following their Nomad neighbours in the substitution of cavalry for chariotry as a more effective way of employing the horse in warfare;² by the Parnian³ and Saka Eurasian Nomad supplanters of Greek empire-builders in Parthia and in India in respectively employing against their Greek antagonists the two Greek weapons of catapults for besieging cities⁴ and naval flotillas for commanding navigable rivers;⁵ by the 'Osmanlis in borrowing the Western invention of fire-arms;⁶ by the Mughals in adopting this same Western innovation at second hand from the 'Osmanlis;⁶ and by the military Powers of the modern Western World in borrowing, in their turn, from their 'Osmanli debtors the immensely potent weapon of a disciplined professional infantry armed with muskets and uniformly dressed and drilled.⁷

The vein of receptivity in the empire-builders which is revealed in this readiness to exchange old lamps for new on points of military technique is not, however, by any means confined to the soldier's business in which these empire-builders have made their fortunes. They show themselves almost equally receptive to 'gadgets' and to habits that have little or nothing to do with the art of war. For example, the Parnian Nomad founders and

¹ Polybius, Book VI, chap. 25, §§ 3-11. A translation of the passage, including the technicalities that have been omitted here, will be found in Toynbee, A. J.: *Greek Civilisation and Character* (London 1924, Dent), pp. 92-3. This receptivity in the sphere of military technique was still being displayed by the Romans in an age, some three hundred years later than Polybius's day, when conservatism had become the note of Roman life in almost every other line of activity.

² The tactics of the Romans in the second century A.D. represent the evolution of a system of warfare based on the experience of centuries of fighting. If the cohort formation and the military camp were essentially Roman products, the phalanx was the contribution of Macedon, and the *gladius* and *lancea* the discoveries of Spain and Gaul. In this effective combination of inventions and inheritances Rome worked out her military organization and strategy, and the secret of her success lay in her willingness to learn from her enemies, and to assimilate the gifts which they had to offer' (Parker, H. M. D.: *The Roman Legions* (Oxford 1928, Clarendon Press)).

³ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 167, footnote 1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv, p. 439, footnote 4, above. The Sinic war-lord to whom this innovation is attributed was, it is true, a prince of Chao and not a prince of Ts'in, which was the border principality that gave birth to the Sinic universal state.

⁴ See II. D (vii), Annex V, vol. ii, p. 435, footnote 1, above.

⁵ Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 21, footnote 1.

⁶ Tarn, op. cit., pp. 91, 320, 322, 329, 349.

⁷ For Bābur's acknowledgements of his indebtedness to the 'Ghazis of Rum' for the *chefs d'œuvre* of his military technique see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, in vol. i, p. 352, above.

⁸ For this military debt of the modern Western World to the 'Osmanlis see Part III A, vol. iii, p. 38, footnote 2, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv, p. 450, above.

masters of the Parthian 'successor-state' of the Seleucid Greek 'successor-state' of the Achaemenian Empire appear to have borrowed a number of administrative devices both from their Seleucid Greek predecessors and from their Euthydemid Greek neighbours.¹ Again, the Saka Nomad founders and masters of 'successor-states' of a Bactrian Greek empire on Indian ground borrowed administrative devices from their Greek predecessors and a religion, a language, and perhaps also a literature from their Indian subjects.² This wider range of receptivity is also strikingly illustrated by the following description, from a Greek observer's pen, of the Persian builders of the Achaemenian Empire—a description which is noteworthy for the abruptness of the contrast between the Persians' receptivity in practice and their exclusiveness in theory:

'Next to themselves, the Persians rate highest the peoples that live nearest to them, next highest the next nearest—and so on in a graduated scale in which appreciation varies in inverse ratio to distance, with the remotest nations at the bottom of the honours list. For they consider their own selves to be by far the finest specimens of Mankind in all points, and they grade the rest on the scale aforementioned, which condemns the remotest nations to rank as the worst. . . . There is no nation like the Persians for adopting foreign manners and customs (*ξενικά δὲ νόμια Πέρσαι προσίενται ἀνδρῶν μάλιστα*). For instance, the civilian dress of the Medes seemed to them handsomer than their own, so [in peace time] they wear that, while on active service they wear Egyptian breast-plates. They are also addicted to all kinds of outlandish self-indulgences which they have picked up—among others, unnatural vice, which they have learnt from the Hellenes.'³

A better taste in promiscuity appears to have been shown by the Inca empire-builders of the Andean universal state.

'Ce n'est pas un des moindres mérites des Inka que de s'être mis toujours à l'école des vaincus. Ils ont beaucoup emprunté au point de

¹ According to Tarn, in *op. cit.*, the 'Parthians' borrowed from their Euthydemid Greek neighbours in Bactria the constitutional expedient of appointing sub-kings (p. 90) and the administrative device of raising *ci-devant* Seleucid eparchies to the status of satrapies (p. 240), while from the Seleucidae they borrowed the devices of an official era (p. 65), a division of the empire into a senior western and a junior eastern kingdom (pp. 203-4), and the appointment of a queen regent (p. 317).

² According to Tarn, in *op. cit.*, the Sakas borrowed from their Bactrian Greek predecessors their administrative organization (pp. 241-3), their mints (p. 323), and their calendar (p. 359). Their subsequent borrowings from their Indian subjects were more momentous. They became converts to Hinduism and patrons of the archaistic revival of the classical Sanskrit language (see V. C (i) (d) 8 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 75-7, below). Their patronage may also have played a part in the precipitation of the Indic Epic in its present form (see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, in the present volume, p. 606, footnote 3, below).

³ Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 134-5. This receptivity of the Persian builders of the Achaemenian Empire is compared with that of the Arab builders of the Caliphate by Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 38.

vue matériel au Royaume de Quito; ils ont peut-être aussi emprunté au point de vue spirituel au Royaume des C[h]imu.¹

A precocity in promiscuity is ascribed to the Athenians by one of themselves who has left us a vivid thumb-nail sketch of the cosmopolitan manners that his countrymen acquired as the makers and masters of a premature and abortive Hellenic universal state² which subsisted, from first to last, for barely three-quarters of a century; and, while 'the Old Oligarch's' testimony against a democratic Athens in which he and his kind were at a discount has in general to be received with caution, what he writes in the following passage is corroborated by all the other evidence that has come down to us.

'If we may be excused for mentioning trivialities, we may add to our catalogue of the consequences of the Athenians' command of the sea first and foremost the eclectic fashion of high living which they have elaborated out of what they have picked up here, there and everywhere in their intercourse with foreigners. Their command of the sea has enabled them to assemble on one table tit-bits from Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Pontus, the Peloponnese or anywhere that you will.'³

These exotic ingredients in the diet of Cleonian Athens cannot fail to conjure up, in the mind of any modern Western reader who has tasted 'the Old Oligarch's' Attic salt, a considerably longer catalogue of trivialities that have become woven by now into the very texture of the everyday life of our modern Western World, and which yet are, all of them, 'souvenirs' of the empire-building activities of a *Homo Occidentalis* who during the past four centuries has been ranging over the face of the planet 'as a roaring lion . . . seeking whom he may devour'.⁴ Our tobacco-smoking commemorates our extermination of the red-skinned aborigines of North America to make room for the re-peopling of 'the New World' (as it has been for us) by a population of European origin and Western culture.⁵ Our coffee-drinking and tea-drinking and polo-playing and pyjama-wearing and taking of Turkish baths commemorate the enthronement of the Frankish man-of-business in the seat of the Ottoman Qaysar-i-Rûm and of the Mughal Qaysar-i-Hind. And our jazzing, which is the most recent addition to this repertory of a Western bourgeois household's common round and daily task, commemorates the enslavement of the African

¹ Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 61, footnote 3.

² For this aspect of 'the First Athenian Empire' see Part III. B, vol. iii, p. 122, footnote 3; III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 340; and IV. C (iii) (b) 10, vol. iv, pp. 208, 211, and 213, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 287, below.

³ Auctor Atheniensis Anonymus: *Institutions of Athens* (edited by Kalinka, E.: Leipzig and Berlin 1913, Teubner), chap. 2, § 7.

⁴ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, Annex, in vol. i; II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 277, footnote 2; and V. C (i) (c) 1, in the present volume, p. 46, above.

⁵ 1 Peter v. 8.

Negro and his transportation across the Atlantic to labour on American soil in plantations which had taken the place of the hunting grounds of the vanished Red Indian.¹

After this prefatory recital of some of the more notorious evidence for the receptivity of the Dominant Minority in a disintegrating society, we may now proceed to our survey, first of the vulgarization of the Dominant Minority through its pacific intercourse with an Internal Proletariat which lies physically at its mercy, and then of its barbarization through its warlike intercourse with an External Proletariat which eludes its yoke.

The Vulgarization of the Dominant Minority.

While the intercourse of the Dominant Minority with the Internal Proletariat is pacific in the sense that the proletarians of this class have already become physically subject to the Dominant Minority *ex hypothesi*, nevertheless it often happens that the first social contact between subjects and rulers—and even between slaves and masters, where the gulf is of that width—takes the form of an introduction of proletarian recruits into the empire-builders' permanent garrisons or standing armies which have been originally established as instruments of domination and have therefore, at the outset, been recruited, with a jealous exclusiveness, from members of the Dominant Minority only.

The classic example of this dilution of military labour is the recruitment of the Slave-Household of the Ottoman Pādishāh from renegades, prisoners-of-war, and child-conscripts supplied by the Pādishāh's own Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh*;² for this dilution of the Ottoman standing army and administrative service set in at an early stage of the 'Osmanlis' history as empire-builders; it was the principal cause of their marvellous military and political triumphs; and it was carried to such extremes that in the heyday of the Ottoman Empire the Imperial slave's career was the sole avenue to power, and yet at the same time every free-born Muslim subject of the Pādishāh was debarred from following this career by the stigma of a birth which in almost every other society would have given him a paramount or exclusive title to bear rule. In a rather cruder form this apparent contradiction-in-terms—a proletarian dominant minority—re-appears in the Mamlūk régime in Egypt,³ and we have found traces of it in the substructure of the

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 137-41, above. For the less trivial influence which the uprooted African Negro recruit to the overseas section of the proletariat of the modern Western World may be destined to have upon our religion, see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 218-20, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 191-3, above.

² An account of the recruitment, training, organization, and employment of the Ottoman *qullar* has been given, in a different context, in Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 22-44, above.

³ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 30-1, above.

Mughal Rāj in Hindustan and in the superstructure of the régime under which Hindustan was ruled by the Mughals' forerunners in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era.¹

This *tour de force* of attaching disabilities instead of privileges to noble birth is the peculiarity of empires built *in partibus agri-colarum* by *ci-devant* Nomads whose line of least resistance, in seeking to adapt themselves to their new circumstances, lies in applying to an internal proletariat of human stock the technique that their own ancestors have worked out, on their native steppes, for the domestication of animals.² But at the same time this is only an extreme example of a tendency which is more widely prevalent; for the same process of dilution can be seen at work likewise in the standing armies of dominant minorities of non-Nomadic antecedents.

The history of the standing army of the Roman Empire, for example, is the story of a progressive dilution which began almost on the morrow of the Roman army's transformation from an *ad hoc* and amateur conscript force to a permanent and professional volunteer force by the act of Augustus. From the beginning the Augustan Imperial army included units of *auxilia*, recruited from subjects or semi-subjects of the Empire who were not Roman citizens,³ besides the legions which still at first continued to be composed of citizens exclusively; the *auxilia* perhaps at no time accounted for less than half the total strength of the regular establishment;⁴ and the differentiation between the 'auxiliary' and the 'legionary' branch of the service steadily diminished in significance as the privilege of Roman citizenship came to be extended to an ever widening circle, until the old distinction vanished altogether when Caracalla (*imperabat* A.D. 211-17) completed the process of enfranchisement by conferring Roman citizenship *ex officio* upon every free adult male inhabitant of the Empire who was either a citizen or a subject of any one of the hundreds of local city-

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 31, footnote 1, above.

² This point has been made in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 28, above.

³ These *auxilia* were, indeed, already a well-established arm of the Roman Army by the date of the Augustan reorganization; for they were the successors of, and substitutes for, an older non-citizen force in the shape of the cohorts furnished by the Italian communities that had formerly been *socii* and not citizens of the Roman state. When these Italian *socii* of Rome had at last extorted, by the *ultima ratio* of armed insurrection, an enfranchisement that had long been overdue, the Roman Government had found itself constrained to look elsewhere for non-citizen troops to brigade with the legions. 'By the enfranchising laws of 90-89 B.C. the recruiting area for legionary troops was extended to all Italy south of the Po. The *socii* disappeared, and the Roman Army was now composed of legions of citizen-soldiers and *auxilia* or detachments of foreign troops serving either as volunteers or as mercenaries' (Parker, H. M. D.: *The Roman Legions* (Oxford 1928, Clarendon Press), p. 46).

⁴ See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. x, pp. 228-9, for the numerical ratio between *auxilia* and legions in the Roman Army as reorganized by Augustus. For the recruitment, character, and history of the *auxilia* see Cheesman, G. L.: *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army* (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press).

states that were the cells of the Imperial body politic.¹ Thereafter (until the radical reorganization of the Imperial army by Diocletian and Constantine) the legions, which had long since struck local roots in their respective cantonments in the provinces, were each recruited almost entirely from the surrounding population within their local radius, and the only surviving units in which the troops were Roman soldiers without being Roman citizens were now those raised (it is true, in growing numbers) from barbarian sources of man-power outside the Imperial frontiers.²

The history of the Roman standing army in a Roman Empire which was the Hellenic Society's universal state is reproduced in the history of the standing army in the Far Eastern universal state as this was reconstructed in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era by Manchu empire-builders;³ and the same tendencies are illustrated by the history of the Arab standing army in the dominions of the Umayyad and the 'Abbasid Caliphate. In its inclusion of Chinese as well as Manchu 'banners'⁴ the Manchu military establishment is an exact counterpart of the Roman with its units of *auxilia* brigaded with the legions.⁵ And the Manchu-Chinese comradeship-in-arms which grew up in the South Manchurian march of the Far Eastern World has a parallel in the Arab-Iranian comradeship-in-arms which grew up in the Syriac World's border-province (as it was in that age) of Khurāsān.⁶ We may also take note of the far-going dilution of the Mongol standing army, within less than a hundred years of the beginning of Chingis Khan's military career, which is illustrated by the episode of the annihilation of the Alan unit in a force which was being employed by Chingis' grandson Qubilay for the conquest of

¹ For this view of the scope of the Caracallan enfranchisement see Jones, A. H. M.: 'Another Interpretation of the *Constitutio Antoniniana*' in *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. xxvi, part 2 (1936).

² Unlike the *auxilia* of the first and second centuries of the Christian Era, these fourth-century and fifth-century *foederati* served in their own native equipment and formations and even under their own native commanders; and this difference was inimical to assimilation.

³ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 87, and V. C (i) (c) 1, in the present volume, pp. 53-4, above.

⁴ For the Manchu Imperial military organization see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 315, footnote 3, and V. C (i) (d) 3, p. 410, above.

⁵ The analogy goes still farther; for, if the Chinese 'banners' of the Manchu establishment are strictly comparable with the units of *auxilia* which were recruited from the non-citizen subjects of the Roman Empire, the Mongol 'banners' correspond, with the same exactness, to those units of *foederati* that were recruited from the transfrontier barbarians.

⁶ Khurāsān was the border-province of the Syriac World over against the Eurasian Nomads during the period of little less than nine hundred years (from the latter part of the second century B.C. to the earlier part of the eighth century of the Christian Era) during which the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was under Nomad occupation. For this episode of Syriac frontier-history and for the historical connexion between the fraternization of Arabs and Iranians in Khurāsān and the replacement of the Umayyad by the 'Abbasid dynasty in the Caliphate see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141, above.

Southern China.¹ The dilution of the standing army of the Achaemenian Empire must have been at least as thorough and at least as rapid, if we may draw any general inference from a glimpse of the organization and *personnel* of a single unit—the garrison of Elephantinê, on the Nubian frontier of Egypt—which has been given to us by our modern Western archaeologists through their discovery of some local records written on papyrus² in the Aramaic *lingua franca* to which the Achaemenidae had given an official currency in all their western provinces.³ A modern Western scholar need not, however, look so far afield as the Nile Valley in the fifth century B.C. in order to observe, in the life, how a military machine may serve as an instrument of vulgarization. He can watch the process at work under his eyes in his own world in his own day. For, though the Western Society has not yet entered into a universal state, the parochial states into which it is still articulated have been driven, by the twofold driving-force of Democracy and Industrialism, into following, one after another, the sinister lead given by France when she raised her *levée en masse* in A.D. 1793.⁴ Since that date we have witnessed, in a Western World that has in the meantime been expanding to a literally world-wide range, a transformation of the eighteenth-century professional standing armies—numerically insignificant forces which were segregated from the civilian population and were stamped, by a Draconian discipline, with the Dominant Minority's mark—into national short-service armies through which the entire able-bodied male population is passed, generation by generation, and in which the conscripts drawn from the Dominant Minority are outnumbered to an extent at which they are, not merely diluted, but swamped by the masses of the Internal Proletariat.

If we now try to estimate the importance of the part which has been played by comradeship-in-arms in the breaking down of the barrier between the Dominant Minority and the Internal Proletariat, we shall find, as we might expect *a priori*, that this factor has been of the greatest account in those cases in which the Dominant Minority has been represented by empire-builders who have been not merely frontiersmen but also men from the wrong side of the frontier—empire-builders, that is, of barbarian origin.⁵ For

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 350, above.

² See Meyer, E.: *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine*, 2nd edition (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs); Hoonacker, A. van: *Une Communauté Judéo-Araméenne à Eléphantine, en Égypte, aux v^es et v^es siècles av. J.-C.* (London 1915, Milford).

³ For this currency of Aramaic as a *lingua franca* in the Achaemenian Empire see V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), pp. 487-91 and 499-501, below.

⁴ For this impact of Democracy and Industrialism upon War in the modern Western World see IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 141-55, above.

⁵ For the several alternative provenances of empire-builders of universal states see V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 52-6, above.

the barbarian conqueror is likely to be still more receptive than the marchman to amenities of life which he finds in use among the epigoni of peoples whom he has reduced by his own prowess to the status of a subject population.

Such, at any rate, was the sequel to the comradeship-in-arms between the Manchus and their Chinese neighbours in the debatable territory in South Manchuria outside the Great Wall, but inside the Willow Palisade:

'The Manchus were, from the beginning, without either the strong tribal consciousness or the strong historical traditions of the Mongols.¹ . . . This very immaturity facilitated their extraordinarily rapid and thorough assumption of Chinese characteristics. Indeed, nothing could be more evident . . . than that the Manchus, from a very early period, not only looked on China as a country to conquer, but on Chinese civilization as something to aspire to. . . . The Manchus . . . had taken on a thoroughly Chinese colour. Their two emperors who ruled from Mukden before the entry into China were emperors in the Chinese manner. . . . It cannot be doubted that the *racial* character of certain laws of privilege passed by the Manchus has been greatly overemphasized. There was a residuum of racial feeling in some of these laws; but all of them, in operation, had an almost purely social function; and in any case their nominal racial character is vitiated by the fact that, from the beginning, Chinese 'bannermen' were counted as Manchus. The 'banners' themselves were purely a military, never a racial, formation. . . . There was no restriction on marriage between Manchus and Chinese 'bannermen', and . . . at an early period Manchus began to marry non-'banner' Chinese girls, although not giving their own daughters in marriage to non-'banner' Chinese men.'²

The same tendency to abandon a *de jure* segregation in favour of a *de facto* symbiosis can be traced, as we have already noted, in the history of another body of barbarian empire-builders: the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of South-Western Asia, who were unintentionally and unconsciously restoring a Syriac universal state which had first taken shape in the prematurely shattered empire of the Achaemenidae.³

In Syria, under the régime of the Caliph Mu'āwīyah (*in Syria*

¹ The Mongols in the Far Eastern World, like the Hyksos in the Egyptian World, paid the penalty of eviction for their unreadiness to soak themselves through and through in the culture of the sophisticated people whom they had conquered. The happier fortune which was common to the Mongols' Manchu successors and the Hyksos' Libyan successors is an indication that, for a barbarian empire-builder, a cultural self-surrender is an indispensable act of atonement and that, if he cannot bring himself to this, he can never hope to win forgiveness for his political presumptuousness. (On this point see V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 348-53, above.)—A.J.T.

² Lattimore, O.: *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 44-7.

³ For this view of the Primitive Muslim Arab empire-builders' work see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 75-7, above. For the comparison drawn by Eduard Meyer between the receptivity of the Arab builders of the Caliphate and that of the Persian builders of the Achaemenian Empire see the present chapter, p. 443, footnote 3, above.

procurabat circa A.D. 640-61; *per Orbem Terrarum imperabat* A.D. 661-80),

'The distinction between masters and subjects appears not to have been so sharp as it was, to begin with, in 'Irāq. In Syria the Muslims did not live segregated in cantonments specially laid out for them: they lived at close quarters with the natives of the country in the old cities—Damascus, Emesa, Qinnasrīn, etc.—and sometimes they actually went shares with the natives in the use of a place of public worship, which then became half church and half mosque.'¹

In Khurāsān, under the last of Mu'āwīyah's Umayyad successors, on the eve of the transference of the Caliphate in A.D. 750 from the Umayyads to the 'Abbasids,

'Arabs and Iranians were not separated from each other by any segregation of domiciles. In the Arab garrison towns—Naysābūr (Bivārd, Sarakhs, Nasā), Marv, Marvrūd and Herāt—the indigenous population lived on, though the citadels were naturally occupied by the conquerors. Moreover the Arabs did not keep together in compact settlements at just a few points, and did not confine themselves to the towns which they had selected as sites for military colonies. They had properties, with serfs, in the country-side, and they spent part of their time there as well—especially in the oasis of Marv, where the town constituted the centre for a host of villages in a unitary system of irrigation. They kept Iranian retainers and married Iranian women; and this influence was bound to make itself strongly felt already in the second generation. . . . The Arabs acclimatized themselves; they felt themselves at one with the natives of the country as inhabitants of the province which was their common home. They, too, were now Khurāsānīs; and they wore trousers like the Iranians, drank wine, and celebrated the festivals of Nawrūz and Mihrigān. The Arab notable adopted the style of the Marzbāns. The daily round and common task brought in their train the need for an understanding with the Iranians; and even in Kūfah and Basrah Persian was at least as much in use as Arabic as the language of business.'²

When we turn to the histories of dominant minorities which have arisen—as dominant minorities normally do arise—from within and not from beyond the disintegrating society's pale, we shall not be able to leave the military factor out of account; for the proletarianization of the Manchu barbarian empire-builders of a Far Eastern, and of the Arab barbarian empire-builders of a Syriac, universal state through a comradeship-in-arms with recruits from the Internal Proletariat is a social phenomenon which is reproduced, as we have already seen, in the histories of the

¹ Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), p. 84.

² *Ibid.*, p. 307.

Roman army in the Imperial Age and of the conscript armies of the national states of the modern Western World.¹ At the same time we shall find that, in a disintegrating society in which the Dominant Minority is indigenous, a comradeship-in-arms is apt to be replaced by a partnership-in-business as the form of intercourse that is the most effectively instrumental in breaking down the social barrier and achieving the passage from segregation to symbiosis.

This comes out clearly in an account—by a contemporary observer whom we have quoted already—of a change in the social relations between masters and slaves at Athens that resulted from the Athenians' premature and abortive attempt to establish a Hellenic universal state in the fifth century B.C.

'Slaves . . . and permanently domiciled aliens enjoy an extreme degree of licence at Athens, where it is illegal to assault them and where the slave will not make way for you [in the street]. The reason why this is the local custom shall be explained. If it were legal for the slave—or the alien or the freedman—to be struck by the free citizen, your Athenian citizen himself would always have been getting hit through being mistaken for a slave. The free proletariat at Athens are no better dressed than the slaves and aliens, and no more respectable in appearance. If any reader is surprised at the further fact that at Athens they allow the slaves to live in luxury and in some instances to keep up an imposing establishment, it would not be difficult to demonstrate the good sense of their policy in this point as well. The fact is that, in any country that maintains a naval establishment, it is essential for slaves to bring in money by their services, in order that I [the master] may receive at least the royalties on the profits of my slave's labour;² and this involves [eventual] manumission.³ In a country, however, in which wealthy slaves exist, it is no longer desirable that my slave should be afraid of you—as he is, for example, in Lacedaemon. If your slave is afraid of me, that fact will keep him under a perpetual threat of having to stand and deliver his own money [to me as blackmail]. This is the reason why we have put our slaves on a social equality (*ισονομίαν*) with our freemen; and we have placed our permanently domiciled aliens on the same footing *vis-à-vis* our citizens because our country needs these aliens' services on account of the multiplicity of our industries, as well

¹ See pp. 446-7 and 448, above.

² The logical connexion between sea-power and making slavery pay is not here explicitly stated by the writer because, in his time and place, it was so notorious that he could count upon his readers' taking it for granted. The connexion is, of course, that, in a Hellenic city-state that maintained a navy, this expensive public luxury had to be paid for by the well-to-do slave-owning class in a burden of taxation which was so heavy as to make it impossible for slave-owners to keep their slaves employed on such occupations as domestic service, in which the capital sunk in the purchase-price of the slave would be, from the financial point of view, an unproductive investment.—A.J.T.

³ In the Hellenic World it was a psychological and economic commonplace that the only way of inducing a slave to work 'on his own' in a competitive trade with the zest of a freeman was by allowing him to put by a proportion of his earnings in order to save up for his eventual purchase of his own freedom.—A.J.T.

as on account of the navy. These are our reasons—and they are good ones—for giving social equality to the aliens as well.¹

When we find that the *Gleichschaltung* of citizens with aliens and of freemen with slaves in the Hellenic Society had been carried as far as this at Athens in the first generation after the breakdown of 431 B.C., it is not surprising to find further that four hundred years later, when the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' had burnt itself out and when the Hellenic universal state, which the Athenians had tried and failed to establish, had come into being at last in the shape of the Roman Empire, the elements in the proletarian underworld which were the fittest to survive in the vicious social environment of a disillusioned and demoralized age had not only maintained the favourable social position which they had reached at Athens before the end of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, but had gone on steadily climbing from one rung of the social ladder to the next till they had attained to dizzy heights of wealth and influence.² In the latter days of the Roman Republic the management of the Roman aristocrats' households, with their huge *personnel* and their elaborate organization, had already become a perquisite of the ablest of the freedmen of the nominal master; and, when Caesar's household, outgrowing and overtopping all its rivals, actually went into partnership with the Senate and People in the management of a Roman commonwealth which had become responsible for the government of the entire Hellenic World, then Caesar's freedmen became the cabinet ministers of a Hellenic universal state. Nor was theirs a hidden hand, like the authority that is exercised with such a discreet self-effacement by the permanent civil servants in the parochial states of our latter-day Western World. So far from that, the three principal portfolios held by freedmen in the Imperial Cabinet—the ministries *ab epistulis*, *a libellis*, and *a rationibus*—came to be part of the recognized insignia of the Imperial office—so much so, that, *imperante Nerone*, in A.D. 64, a member of the Roman aristocracy

¹ Auctor Atheniensis Anonymus: *Institutions of Athens* (edited by Kalinka, E.: Berlin and Leipzig 1913, Teubner), chap. 1, §§ 10–12, quoted in IV. C (iii) (b) 4, vol. iv, p. 156, footnote 3, above.

² Such careers as these were not, of course, typical of the contemporary experience of the whole class to which these self-made men belonged; for one of the effects of the four-centuries-long ordeal which the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' imposed upon the Hellenic internal proletariat was to produce an extreme differentiation of fortunes between different elements in the proletarian mass. While some proletarians, who had the ability and the desire to adapt themselves to the spirit of the age, were able to rise to dizzy, though precarious, pinnacles of worldly success, the majority were ground down to a degree of misery that evoked from them a powerful spiritual reaction—either the violent reaction of Satanism or the gentle reaction which eventually found its expression in Johanan ben Zakkai's Judaism and in Christianity. (For this process of differentiation in the Hellenic internal proletariat see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213–16, as well as V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 72–8, and V. C (i) (d) 1, *passim*, above, and V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, pp. 588–90, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 376–8 and 504–8, below.)

was hounded to death on a charge of treasonable designs against the reigning emperor because, in a fit of childish ostentation, he had rashly taken in vain the titles of the three secretaryships of state by conferring them on three freedmen of his own who, in the management of his private estate, were charged with the corresponding duties.¹

It will be seen that the Imperial freedmen in the early years of the Roman Empire enjoyed a plenitude of power which was comparable to that of those members of the Ottoman Sultan's Slave-Household who attained to the equally powerful—and equally precarious—office of Grand Vizier.² And we shall be reminded again of the rise of the Hellenic internal proletariat to the top of the social tree in the household of Caesar if we turn to the history of the Arab Caliphate and watch clients and patrons slowly but surely changing places with one another in the vast households which the Primitive Arab Muslim conquerors of the first few generations gathered round themselves by throwing the mantle of their protection over men of parts who were members of the non-Muslim subject communities.

In all cases of symbiosis between the Dominant Minority and the Internal Proletariat in which the relation attains to a certain degree of intimacy, both parties are affected by it, and the effect on each of them is to set them in motion on a course which leads towards an assimilation to the other class. On the superficial plane of 'manners' the Internal Proletariat moves towards enfranchisement, and the Dominant Minority towards vulgarization. The two movements are complementary, and both are taking place all the time; but, while it is the enfranchisement of the Proletariat that is the more conspicuous of the two in the first chapter of the story, in the last chapter it is the vulgarization of the Dominant Minority that forces itself upon our attention.

The classic example is the vulgarization, in 'the Silver Age', of the Roman governing class: a sordid tragedy which has been inimitably recorded—or caricatured—in a Latin literature which still preserved its old genius, or at least its old vigour, in the satirical vein long after it had lost its last breath of inspiration in every other *genre*.

This Roman rake's progress can be followed in a series of Hogarthian pictures in each of which the central figure is not merely an aristocrat but an emperor.

'Caligula . . . gave an immense impetus to the rage for singing,

¹ The victim's name was D. Iunius Torquatus Silanus. He was accused *inter liberos habere quos ab epistulis et libellis et rationibus appellet—nomina summae curae et meditamenta*. He anticipated a death-sentence by committing suicide (Tacitus: *Annals*, Book XV, chap. 35).

² For instances see Part III. A. p. 40, footnote 1, above.

dancing, and acting, for chariot-driving and fighting in the arena, not unknown before, which Juvenal and Tacitus brand as the most flagrant sign of degenerate morals. There was indeed a great conflict of sentiment under the early Empire as to some of these arts. Julius Caesar had encouraged or permitted Roman senators and knights to fight in the gladiatorial combats, and a Laberius to act in his own play. But a decree of the Senate, not long afterwards, had placed a ban on these exhibitions by men of noble rank. Tiberius, who was, beyond anything, a haughty aristocrat, at a later date intervened to save the dignity of the order. But the rage of the rabble for these spectacles had undoubtedly caught many in the ranks of the upper class. And Caligula and Nero found, only too easily, youths of birth and breeding, but ruined fortune, who were ready to exhibit themselves for a welcome *douceur*, or to gain the favour of the prince, or even to bring down the applause of the crowded benches of the amphitheatre or the circus. . . .

'Amid all this elaborate luxury and splendour of indulgence there was a strange return to the naturalism of vice and mere blackguardism. A Messalina or a Nero or a Petronius developed a curious taste for the low life that reeks and festers in the taverns and in the stews. Bohemianism for a time became the fashion. . . . The distinguished dinner party, with the Emperor at their head, sallied forth to see how the people were living in the slums. . . . In the fierce faction fights of the theatre, where stones and benches were flying, the Emperor had once the distinction of breaking a praetor's head.'¹

While Nero was content to emulate the proletarian music hall *artiste* ('Qualis artifex pereo!' ²), Commodus, a century later, could not satisfy his craving for proletarianization by any milder feat of exhibitionism than a public appearance in the gladiatorial arena.

'The influence of a polite age and the labour of an attentive education had never been able to infuse into his rude and brutish mind the least tincture of learning; and he was the first of the Roman emperors totally devoid of taste for the pleasures of the understanding. Nero himself excelled, or affected to excel, in the elegant arts of music and poetry. . . . But Commodus, from his earliest infancy, discovered an aversion to whatever was rational or liberal, and a fond attachment to the amusements of the populace—the sports of the circus and amphitheatre, the combats of gladiators, and the hunting of wild beasts. . . . The servile crowd, whose fortune depended on their master's vices, applauded these ignoble pursuits . . . [and], elated with these praises, which gradually extinguished the innate sense of shame, Commodus resolved to exhibit, before the eyes of the Roman people, those exercises which till then he had decently confined within the walls of his palace and to the presence of a few favourites. On the appointed day the various motives of flattery, fear and curiosity attracted to the amphitheatre an innumerable multitude of spectators; and some degree of applause was de-

¹ Dill, S.: *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London 1905, Macmillan), pp. 73-6.

² Suetonius: *Nero*, chap. 49.

servedly bestowed on the uncommon skill of the Imperial performer. Whether he aimed at the head or heart of the animal, the wound was alike certain and mortal. . . . But the meanest of the populace were affected with shame and indignation when they beheld their sovereign enter the lists as a gladiator and glory in a profession which the laws and manners of the Romans had branded with the justest note of infamy. . . . He now disdained the appellation of Hercules. The name of Paulus, a celebrated *secutor*, was the only one which delighted his ear. It was inscribed on his colossal statues, and repeated in the redoubled acclamations of the mournful and applauding Senate.¹

The last stage in the process of vulgarization is displayed in the portrait of an emperor of the next generation.

'The demeanour of Caracalla was haughty and full of pride; but with the troops he forgot even the proper dignity of his rank, encouraged their insolent familiarity, and, neglecting the essential duties of a general, affected to imitate the dress² and manners of a common soldier.'³

Caracalla's way of 'going proletarian' was neither so sensational nor so pathological as Commodus's way or Nero's, but, just on that account, it is perhaps of greater significance as a sociological symptom. A Hellenic dominant minority which had reached the last stage in the repudiation of its social heritage was fitly represented by the figure of an emperor who took refuge in the proletarian freedom of the barrack-room from a freedom of the Academy and the Stoa which he found intolerable just because he knew that it was his birth-right. Indeed, by this date, on the eve of the next relapse of the Hellenic Society into its downward course after the respite of the Augustan rally,⁴ the relative volumes and momenta and speeds of the two mutually contrary streams of influence that flowed respectively from the Dominant Minority and from the Internal Proletariat had changed, in the proletarian stream's favour, to a degree at which the latter-day observer may find himself wondering whether, after all, he has not been

¹ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. iv.

² 'Dressing the part' is one of the ways in which the social turncoat advertises his intention to declass himself; and the proneness of the Roman governing class, in its decadence, to this crude form of exhibitionism is commemorated in the nicknames 'Caracalla' and 'Caligula', under which two *apaches* who were raised by Fortune to the Roman Imperial Throne have succeeded in making themselves remembered by Posterity. The sovereign who wears his own livery may of course be moved by motives of petty policy as well as by a taste for low life; for this is one of the easiest and cheapest ways at his command for currying favour with his lackeys. Suleymân the Magnificent sought to propitiate the Janissaries, who were already beginning to get out of hand before the end of his reign, by enrolling himself in one of their units and drawing a private's pay. Is this trick of Ottoman statecraft the origin of the custom, which is now *de rigueur* for the heads of our Western states, of wearing their own uniforms and holding honorary rank in their own service? (See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 38, footnote 2, § 3, above.) —A.J.T.

³ Gibbon, *op. cit.*, chap. vi.
⁴ For this relapse see IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 8, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 219, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6, Annex, p. 649, V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 284, below.

watching the movement of a single current which now, at a certain moment, has simply reversed its direction. Though this is an illusion, it is true that in the earlier stages of disintegration our attention is more apt to be caught by the downward percolation of emotions and ideas from the Dominant Minority to the Internal Proletariat,¹ while in the later stages we become more and more clearly aware that the Dominant Minority is taking its colour from the Internal Proletariat instead of continuing to exercise that function of leadership which is the Dominant Minority's sole *raison d'être* (and that a doubtful one!).

This increasing moral subservience of a sinking Dominant Minority to a rising Internal Proletariat is illustrated in the history of the Hellenic dominant minority's orientation towards Christianity;² for, in each successive phase, the dominant minority can be convicted of having adopted towards Christianity, tardily and reluctantly, the attitude, whatever it might be, that had shown itself to be prevalent among the internal proletariat of the day. In an age in which a majority of the internal proletariat was still both non-Christian and anti-Christian, the Roman authorities bowed to popular feeling in the last resort by stooping from time to time to a half-hearted official persecution of the unpopular faith. On the other hand, when the Christian Church eventually succeeded—whether in spite of persecution or because of it—in overcoming the proletarian opposition and establishing its own ascendancy over the internal proletariat's life, the dominant minority signified its unenthusiastic acceptance of the proletariat's revised verdict by a wry-faced announcement of its own conversion to a religion which had now decisively proved its title by its sensational victory in the proletarian arena. Nor is this the whole of the story; for, in so far as the dominant minority played its successive proletarian parts of persecutor and convert with a certain scepticism and cold-bloodedness, it was still betraying, under its proletarian shirt, the sophisticated temper of a Gallio. We shall not have taken the full measure of the dominant minority's repudiation of its own traditional *êthos* until we have watched it exchanging this traditional Gallionic indifference for a savagery which, in Gallio's day, would have branded any one who exhibited it as the classmate of a Theudas and Judas of Galilee and a John of Gischala.

'In accordance with the law that governs the religious development of the Imperial Age throughout, the religious zeal which inspired the

¹ This percolation from above downwards is discussed, *à propos* of a concrete case, in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, in vol. vi, below. See, in particular, the passage quoted on pp. 456-7 from Seck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd edition (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 203-4.

² On this see also V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 76 and 80, and V. C (i) (d) 3, pp. 408-9, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 201-2, below.

populace to its deeds [of violence] mounted slowly from below upwards. As the new faith gradually penetrated the ruling strata of Society, the hatred with which Christianity was regarded by its adversaries made its way among the rulers *pari passu*. We see here two currents beating against one another which are both of the same nature.¹

In concrete terms, we see the pagan levity of a Gallienus giving place to the pagan grimness of a Galerius; the lukewarm Christianity of a Philip changing into the fervent Christianity of a Constantine; and the Hadrianic tolerance, which Constantine never sacrificed to the fervour of his own less philosophic age, being thrown to the winds by the pagan fanaticism of a Julian and by the Christian fanaticism of a Theodosius with an equal recklessness.²

If we now turn our eyes from the Hellenic to the Far Eastern World, we shall see the first chapter in our story of the proletarianization of the Roman governing class in the act of reproducing itself in the history of the Manchus at the present moment. And here we are in a position to observe the process at first hand by doing sociological field-work of the kind that is exemplified in the following record from the pen of a living Western scholar, who shows us the struggle for enfranchisement giving way to the drift towards proletarianization within the compass of the single generation that separates a Manchuized Chinese father from his own proletarianized son:

'It was . . . possible, in Manchuria, for a Chinese from China Proper to become, in his own lifetime, an out-and-out "Manchu". An instance of this phenomenon came within my own experience when I formed an acquaintance with a Chinese military officer and his old father. The father, born in Honan, had gone to Manchuria as a young man, had travelled over the most remote parts of the three provinces, and had finally settled at Tsitsihar. One day I said to the young man: "Why is it that you, who were born in Tsitsihar, speak just like the generality of Manchurian Chinese, while your father, who was born in Honan, has not only the speech, but exactly the manner and even gestures, of the old-fashioned Manchus of Manchuria" [which differ somewhat from those of Peking Manchus]? He laughed, and said: "When my father was a young man, it was difficult for a *min-jen* [non-'banner' Chinese, 'a civilian', 'one of the people'] to get on in the world up in the northern regions. The Manchus dominated everything, and they harassed the *min* Chinese. In Tsitsihar, where he settled down, they had a custom of 'chasing out the *min*' twice a year. All the Chinese who had filtered in were liable to be driven out, and often beaten and robbed. Of course many of them came back; but the only way to

¹ Seeck, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., 2nd edition, p. 301.

² For the eventual victory of fanaticism over tolerance in the Hellenic World in the course of the fourth century of the Christian Era see IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 226-7, above.

become secure was to 'follow' [as the phrase went] the Manchus and become so like them as to be undetectable. So my father, when he had learnt their ways, 'entered the banners' and married a Manchu [which, of course, was against the strict law] and has always remained like them. But when I was growing up it was no longer any use to be a 'bannerman', and therefore I became like all the other young men of my generation." This is a story which illustrates the processes of the present as well as of the past; for the young Manchus of Manchuria are becoming rapidly indistinguishable from Manchuria-born Chinese.¹

In this record of the social history of a Chinese father and son we see the stream of vulgarization in the life of a Manchu dominant minority encountering and overwhelming the stream of snobbery in the life of a Chinese internal proletariat. While in the father's generation the proletarian who meant to rise was still compelled to resort to a servile mimicry of his masters, in the son's generation the children of a *ci-devant* proletariat and a *ci-devant* dominant minority were already meeting and mingling on the common level of a proletarian vulgarity.

An Englishman who was moved at this time to do some work of his own in this field of sociological research on living subjects had no need to put himself to the expense of booking a berth on the Trans-Siberian express; for the social changes that were witnessed by our twentieth-century American observer on the banks of the Nonni River could be seen and studied quite as well on the banks of the Thames by his stay-at-home English contemporaries. The proletarianization of a dominant minority could be watched in the London metropolitan area in the year 1938 by any one who entered the doors of either a cinema or a club; for in the cinema he would see people of all classes taking an equal pleasure in films that had been artfully designed to cater for the taste of the proletarian majority of the audience, while in the club he would find that the black ball did not exclude the yellow press. Indeed, if our latter-day British Juvenal was a family man, he could stay indoors and still find his copy. He had merely to open his ears (which was perhaps easier than to close them) to the jazz-music which his children were conjuring out of the wireless set. And then, when, at the end of the holidays, he saw his boys off to school, let him not forget to ask them to point out to him 'the bloods' among their schoolfellows assembling on the platform of the London railway terminus. As, at this passing show, our quizzical paterfamilias discreetly took smart young Commodus's measure, he would notice the rakish proletarian angle at which 'the public schoolboy's' trilby hat was cocked, and would observe

¹ Lattimore, O.: *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 62-3.

that the *apache* scarf, with its convincing air of negligence, had really been carefully arranged so as not to reveal the obligatory white collar. Here was proof ocular and positive that in twentieth-century London, as in second-century Rome, the proletarian style was *à la mode*. And, since a straw really does show which way the wind is blowing, the satirist's trivialities may be grist for the more ponderous mill of the historian.

The Barbarization of the Dominant Minority.

When we pass from the vulgarization of the Dominant Minority through their pacific intercourse with the Internal Proletariat to examine the parallel process of their barbarization—a social change which arises out of their warlike intercourse with the External Proletariat beyond the pale—we find that the plot of both plays is the same in its general structure. In this case, as in that, either party exercises an assimilative influence on the other; and in both cases alike it is the influence of the Dominant Minority upon its proletarian servitor or antagonist that claims our attention in the first act. This time once again, however, there is a second act in which the two actors exchange their roles; and the curtain does not fall until the Dominant Minority has been barbarized in this encounter as decisively and irretrievably as we have already seen it vulgarized in the companion play.

In our present play the *mise-en-scène* is an artificial military frontier—the *limes* of a universal state—across which the Dominant Minority and the External Proletariat are seen confronting each other, when the curtain rises, in a posture which, on both sides alike, is one of aloofness and hostility. As the play proceeds, the aloofness turns into an intimacy which does not, however, bring peace; and, as the warfare goes on, Time tells progressively in the barbarian's favour, until at last he succeeds in breaking through the *limes* and overrunning the vast domain—a whole world in itself—of the universal state which the Dominant Minority's garrison has hitherto successfully protected. The causes and consequences of this denouement of the play on its military side are discussed in a later part of this Study;¹ and in the present place we shall concern ourselves exclusively with the social side: that is to say, with the social assimilation of the two adversaries to one another—an assimilation which is partly the effect, but also partly the cause, of their growing intimacy, and which ends in their fusion into a social amalgam in which the dominant element is the barbarian one.

In the first act the barbarian appears in the successive roles of

¹ See Part VIII, *passim*, below.

hostage and mercenary, and in both these roles he comes on to the Dominant Minority's ground in a figurative as well as in a literal sense; for, in both, he comes over as a more or less docile apprentice. In the second act he still crosses the line, but now only in a sense which is literal with a vengeance; for he now comes neither by command nor by invitation but unbidden and unwanted as a raider who eventually settles down to stay as a colonist or a conqueror. Thus, between the first act and the second, the military ascendancy passes out of the Dominant Minority's hands into the barbarian's; and, although the change is not always easily perceptible while it is in the act of taking place—since the barbarian conqueror may be a time-expired mercenary, and his seizure of the land may be legalized *ex post facto*, by a Dominant Minority eager to save its face, as a payment in kind for military services rendered—all the same, in the end, the reversal of fortune is sensational; for, while at the opening of the play the barbarian is well content if he can hold his own and prevent the frontier of Civilization from being pushed still farther forward at his expense, the close of the play sees the *ci-devant* Dominant Minority resigning itself to the permanent establishment of a barbarian invader on the wrong side of the old front line as the new lord and master, *de facto*, of a ravished world. This sensational transfer of the kingdom, the power, and the glory from the Dominant Minority's to the barbarian's banners has a profound effect upon the Dominant Minority's outlook; and, long before the military and political process is complete, the revolutionary inversion of prestige is proclaimed by the discomfited party itself in deeds that are more eloquent than words. It is now the Dominant Minority that comes on to the barbarian's ground—not, indeed, in the literal sense, for the time has now long since gone by when the garrison of the *limes* could show its mettle by making punitive expeditions into no-man's-land. In the literal sense the Dominant Minority is now yielding ground to the barbarian in an unbroken retreat that is threatening to turn into a rout. But, just for the reason that the barbarian is now manifestly gaining the upper hand, the Dominant Minority seeks to retrieve its rapidly deteriorating military and political position by taking one leaf after another out of the barbarian's book; and imitation is assuredly the sincerest form of flattery.

Having now sketched out the plot of the play, we may pause to survey the scene more closely as it displays itself in the several acts. We may watch the barbarian make his first appearance on the stage as the Dominant Minority's apprentice; see the Dominant Minority begin to 'go native'; catch a glimpse of the two

adversaries at a fleeting moment at which, in their rival masquerades in one another's borrowed plumage, they assume the grotesque generic resemblance of the griffin to the chimaera; and finally watch the *ci-devant* Dominant Minority lose the last traces of its original form by sinking to meet the triumphant barbarian at a common level of barbarism that is quite unmitigated.

Our list of barbarian war-lords who have made their *début* as hostages in the hands of a 'civilized Power' includes some famous names. Theodoric served his apprenticeship as a hostage at the Roman Court of Constantinople,¹ and Scanderbeg² his at the Ottoman Court of Adrianople, where he received the education of an *ich-oghlan*.³ We may perhaps hesitate to number among the barbarians the hostage-son of Amyntas who learnt at Thebes from Epaminondas and Pelopidas the arts of war and peace which he afterwards practised to such brilliant effect when he had mounted his father's throne as King Philip II of Macedon. But we may mention a living example of the type in the person of Muhammad 'Abd-al-Karīm al-Khattābī: a chief of the tribe of the Banu Wuryāghal in the Moroccan Rif who annihilated a Spanish expeditionary force at Anwāl in 1921 and in 1925 performed the greater feat of momentarily shaking the French power in Morocco to its foundations. For 'Abd-al-Karīm's apprenticeship was served in an eleven-months-long sojourn in a Spanish prison at Melilla.⁴

The treatment that the Rifī war-lord received at his Frankish gaolers' hands turned him immediately and inevitably into their implacable enemy; but 'Abd-al-Karīm's experience was the exception and not the rule; for common sense usually moves a dominant minority which is anxious to hold its barbarian frontier with the minimum of trouble and expense to bind its barbarian hostages in chains that are so pleasantly gilded that the captive will be tempted to hug them. Through such tactful handling the young barbarian who comes as a hostage may be induced to stay on as a mercenary; and Theodoric and Scanderbeg both completed their apprenticeship in this fashion by serving for a time, on a more or less voluntary footing, in the army of the empire which they afterwards made it their life-work to combat.⁵

¹ For Theodoric see further pp. 472-3, below.

² For Scanderbeg see Pisko, J.: *Skanderbeg* (Vienna 1894, Frick).

³ For the system of education which was the making of the Ottoman Pādīshāh's Slave-Household in 'the Golden Age' of Ottoman history see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 28-44, above.

⁴ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. xii.

⁵ If it is so manifestly politic for the Dominant Minority to slur over the distinction between mercenary and hostage, it is not surprising that the historian should sometimes find himself at a loss to know whether this or that barbarian warrior ought to be assigned to this or that category. For example, was it as a hostage in Roman hands or as a mercenary in the Roman service that the Cheruscan war-lord Hermann-Arminius

The list of barbarians who have 'come' and 'seen' as mercenaries, before imposing themselves as conquerors, is a long one. The Teutonic and Arab barbarian conquerors of Roman provinces in the fifth and in the seventh century of the Christian Era were respectively the descendants of many generations of Teutons and Arabs who had done their military service in the Roman forces;¹ and the careers of a Theodoric and a Mu'āwiyah are foreshadowed by those of a Maximinus Thrax and a Philippus Arabs—a pair of third-century barbarians who rose in the Roman service from the ranks to the purple. Again, the Turkish body-guard of the 'Abbasid Caliphs in the ninth century of the Christian Era prepared the way for the Turkish buccaneers who carved the Caliphate up into its eleventh-century 'successor-states'. And the present Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which is a barbarian 'successor-state' of the Ottoman Empire on the one hand and of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy on the other, perhaps ultimately owes its existence to past generations of Serbs who served an Ottoman military apprenticeship as hirelings of the Pādishāh,² and later on as *qullar* in the Slave-Household, and a Western military ap-

earned his title to be described by a contemporary Roman man-of-letters as *adsiidus militiae nostrae prioris comes, iure etiam civitatis Romanae decus equestris consecutus gradus* (Velleius Paterculus, C.: *Historia Romana*, Book II, chap. 118)? It is perhaps significant that Hermann is remembered by Posterity under the Latinized form of his native barbarian name, and 'Scanderbeg [i.e. Iskender Bey] under his Ottoman *nom de guerre* and not under his Christian name George Castrioti. Again, the hero and champion (*el Campeador*) of the Western Christian barbarians beyond the pale of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate has been made famous—and this by his own people—under his Arabic title of the Cid and not under his Christian name of Rodrigo Diez de Bivar. We may also notice that a Latin name was borne by one, and a Greek name by another, of the seven kinglets of the Teutonic barbarian Alemanni whose war-bands were caught on the wrong side of the Rhine and roughly handled by the Caesar Julian in A.D. 357; and the Latin historian—who was himself 'miles quondam et Graecus'—has considerably gratified our curiosity by telling us how the Alemannian prince who bore the Greek name had come to be called by it:

'Latus vero dextrum Serapio agebat: etiam tum adultae lanuginis iuvenis, efficacia praecurrens aetatem, Mederichi fratris Chnodomarii filius, hominis quoad vixerat perfidissimī, ideo sic appellatus quod pater eius diu obsidatus pignore tentus in Galliis, doctusque Graeca quaedam arcana, hunc filium suum, Agenarichum genitali vocabulo dictitatum, ad Serapionis transtulit nomen' (Ammianus Marcellinus: *Res Gestae a Principatu Caesaris Nerae*, Book XVI, chap. 12, § 25).

These tell-tale names bear witness that, while the barbarian who has once been domesticated may break loose again and turn all the more savage for having at one time worn chains, the most truculent defiance in after-life can still never quite efface the marks that have been made upon him by an education to which he has been subjected at the impressionable age of youth or early manhood. Even when he is ranging at large again in no-man's-land as the notorious captain of a barbarian war-band, his transmogrified name commemorates his earlier experience of domestication as surely as the 'little bald spot' which 'Mowgli's' finger was able to feel under the fur of Bagheera's throat betrayed the fact that the panther who was now enjoying the freedom of the Jungle had at one time languished in a cage (Kipling, Rudyard: *The Jungle Book*, 'Mowgli's Brothers').

¹ For the mercenary service, in the Roman forces, of the Teutonic-speaking barbarians on the European Continent and in Scandinavia, and also of the Celtic-speaking barbarians in the British Isles, see Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 445-7.

² This is the true history of Marko Kraljević, who has been transfigured into a hero by the genius of Serbian minstrelsy (see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, p. 609, below).

prenticeship as *granichari* in the border regiments¹ with which the Hapsburg Government garrisoned the frontiers of the territories that it wrested out of the 'Osmanlis' grasp at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.² As for the Libyan interlopers who eventually usurped the derelict heritage of 'the New Empire' of Egypt, they reversed the usual order of proceedings; for, after a series of premature attempts (which all ended disastrously for the presumptuous barbarian aggressors) to exchange the mercenary's role for the conqueror's at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C., the Libyans put their pride in their pocket and reverted to their mercenary calling; and they were rewarded for their humility by being permitted to win after all, through a process of peaceful penetration, the prize that had been brusquely denied to them when they had tried to snatch it by main force.³ Finally, if we may venture to treat the Greeks as the barbarians that they appeared to be in Egyptiac and Syriac eyes, we may find the precursors of Alexander's world-conquering army in those 'Brazen Men' of Carian and Ionian provenance who had risen so obligingly from the sea to take mercenary service with the first Psammetichus and with the Pharaohs who followed after him during the next three centuries;⁴ or, more pertinently still, in those fourth-century mercenaries drawn from almost every city-state of a distracted Hellas who fought with the same professional loyalty and political insouciance at Cunaxa for Cyrus the Younger against his Achaemenid brother Artaxerxes and at Gaugamela for the last Darius against Alexander himself.

Our list might be longer still if the historical records of the last agonies of civilizations were not so fragmentary as they are apt to be. But we may at least conjecture that the sea-roving barbarians who hovered round the fringes of the Minoan thalassocracy and sacked Cnossos itself *circa* 1400 B.C. had served their apprenticeship as the hirelings of Minos before they aspired to supplant him; for the contemporary Egyptiac records tell us that 'the Peoples of the Sea' competed with the Libyans in the lucrative business of soldiering for 'the New Empire' of Egypt, and went into partnership

¹ In addition to these regiments of Yugoslav regulars whose task was to guard the frontiers that marched with the Ottoman Empire, the Hapsburg Government, under the stress of its struggle with Frederick the Great, also enlisted Yugoslav irregulars who made themselves a scourge under the name of Pandours. These Pandours are presumably homonyms of the Pindaris who so obstinately resisted the establishment of the *Pax Britannica* in Central India.

² For the previous stages in the history of the Serbs and Bosniaks see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 68 and 69; IV. C. (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 76; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 292-7, 301-2, and 327-8, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 422; V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 269-70, and V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 352-3, above.

⁴ The most distinguished name on the roll of Greek mercenaries in the Egyptiac service is that of King Agesilaus of Sparta (*regnabat* 400-361 B.C.).

with the Libyans in the confederated barbarians' unsuccessful attempt to deal with Egypt as they had dealt with Crete. Can we likewise infer from the semi-legendary figure of Ogier the Dane, who makes his appearance among Charlemagne's paladins in the French Epic, that the Vikings who were already raiding the coasts of the Carolingian Empire before Charlemagne was in his grave were preceded by Scandinavian mercenaries in the Austrasian service?¹ And did the Han dynasty enlist the Eurasian Nomads from beyond the Great Wall—whose descendants were ultimately to reign on Sinic soil as the Han's eventual successors—for patrolling the frontiers of the Sinic universal state?

'The policy for the Middle Kingdom is to employ the barbarians for knocking the barbarians on the head' is a maxim which is to be found in an essay from the brush of Kia Yi, a Sinic political philosopher of the second century B.C.;² but in practice we hear less of Nomad soldiers in the Sinic Imperial service than of Nomad settlers planted, on the Imperial Government's initiative, on Intramural territory; and these settlers evidently correspond not so much to the units of barbarian *foederati* in the Roman Imperial army as to the barbarian agricultural colonists known as *laeti*³ who were recruited from time-expired mercenaries or from prisoners-of-war or even from raiders whom the Government was too lazy to drive out, and who were planted for the purpose of recultivating and repeopling the provinces which these settlers' own kinsmen, or perhaps even the settlers themselves, had previously devastated and depopulated.⁴ It was perhaps in this more peaceful fashion, rather than with weapon in hand, that the Northern Barbarians gained their footing on Sinic soil; and this surmise would appear to be borne out by the notorious fact that the Sinic universal state was not supplanted immediately by 'successor-states' of barbarian origin even in the northern marches. 'The Three Kingdoms',

¹ This conjecture is favoured by the fact—which is known for certain—that the Vikings who embarked on the waters of the Baltic and not on those of the North Sea, and who made their fortunes at the expense of the Khazar Empire in the Russian forests (see V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 286–8, above), instead of making them at the expense of the Carolingian Empire in North-Western Europe, gained entrance as mercenaries before they rose to be masters. 'In the commercial centres, into which the warlike foreign elements were particularly active in pushing their way, their status changed without difficulty. From trading partners or salaried wardens of the trade-routes they easily turned into rulers.'—Kliutschewskij, W. [= Kluchewski, V.]: *Geschichte Russlands*, vol. i (Berlin 1925, Obelisk Verlag), pp. 133–7.

² The general tenor of this essay is reproduced by Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 332–3.

³ For a list of instances of the settlement of barbarian colonists on the land, in districts inside the Roman Imperial frontiers, by the Roman authorities from the reign of Augustus (*imperator* 31 B.C.–A.D. 14) to the reign of Valens (*imperator* A.D. 364–78) inclusive, see Dill, S.: *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, 2nd edition (London 1905, Macmillan), pp. 292–5. See also Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. i, 4th edition (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), Book II, chap. 6.

⁴ The comparison is drawn by Franke in op. cit., vol. ii (Berlin 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 30–6.

which were the direct heirs of the Posterior Han, were all indigenous; and, between them, they covered the whole domain of the universal state which they replaced. It was not till about a hundred years after the break-up of the Han Power (which occurred *de facto* in the last quarter of the second century of the Christian Era, though officially the dynasty lingered on till A.D. 221) that the descendants of the Nomad settlers in the northern marches openly took the sceptre into their own hands.¹

We can also espy several instances in which the barbarian mercenary has missed his 'manifest destiny'. For example, the East Roman Empire might have fallen a prey to the Varangian Guard if it had not been ravished by the Normans and the Saljūqs, carved up by the French and the Venetians, and finally swallowed whole by the 'Osmanlis. And the Ottoman Empire, in its turn, would assuredly have been partitioned among the Bosniak and Albanian mercenaries who were fast asserting their mastery over the provincial pashas and even over the Sublime Porte itself at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era if the Frankish man-of-business had not come treading on the heels of the Albanian man-at-arms to give the last chapter of Ottoman history an unexpected turn by flooding the Levant with Western political ideas as well as with Manchester goods.² The Oscan mercenaries, again, who found a market for their services in the Greek city-states of Campania and Magna Graecia and Sicily made a practice of ejecting or exterminating their Greek employers whenever they gained the opportunity, and there is little doubt that they would have carried on this game—in which the Greeks themselves never ceased to play into their hands—until there would not have been one single Greek community left on the western side of the Straits of Otranto, if the Romans had not taken the Oscan homelands in the rear at the critical moment.³ Finally, we may venture to prophesy that, if these Roman tammers of the Oscans had succumbed in their turn to Hannibal, the profits of that great Punic soldier's success would not have long remained in the pockets of the petty-minded Carthaginian oligarchy whom he was attempting (as it turned out, vainly) to save in spite of themselves. For some three hundred years before Hannibal's time Carthage had been fighting her battles with the arms of barbarian mercenaries whom she recruited from all the hinterlands of the Western Mediterranean; and, after she had escaped destruction at Roman hands in the First Punic War, she had courted it

¹ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65; V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 272-3, and V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 356, above, and the present chapter, pp. 477-8, below.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 76-8, above.

³ For this Roman intervention see V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 213-4, above.

at the hands of her own hirelings, whom she exasperated into mutiny by her close-fistedness in the settlement of their pecuniary claims upon her. The four years of this war at her own gates with the mercenaries (240-237 B.C.) were perhaps as terrible for Carthage as the twenty-four years of the antecedent war with Rome, which had been fought entirely on or over the sea (except for the African expedition of Regulus, which had ended disastrously for the Roman invader). If, in the second trial of strength between Carthage and Rome, the genius of Hannibal had availed to give Carthage the immediate victory, the ultimate victors would assuredly have been Hannibal's native troops: his Libyan and Spanish infantry and his Numidian horse.

This Carthaginian case may remind us of a living instance in which we cannot yet read the riddle of Destiny. At the time of writing the military strength of the French Republic resided—not indeed to a Carthaginian degree, but nevertheless in a formidable measure—in White African man-power drawn from the Carthaginian recruiting-grounds in the Maghrib and Black African man-power drawn from trans-Saharan sources which Carthage never tapped (though her maritime explorers may have rounded Cape Verde). Was it France's destiny, under the increasing strain of an effort to maintain her weakening position in Europe, to serve as the military vehicle through which the valley of the Rhine was to fall under the dominion of barbarians from the Senegal? To an Englishman in his armchair this suggestion might appear to be nothing more serious than a rhetorical question that had been drafted in a German National-Socialist Ministry of Propaganda. On the other hand, to any native of the Rhineland who had not been living abroad between the autumn of 1918 and the 30th June, 1930, the picture of a Europe cowed by African bayonets would suggest, not a piece of fantastic *Zukunftsmusik*, but a grim reality with which he was already acquainted through his personal experience.

In the same sober spirit an Indian of the same generation might speculate on the future role, in India's destinies, of those barbarians—entrenched in a warlike independence in their fastnesses beyond the limits of the Government of India's administration or control—from among whom no less than one-seventh of the Indian Regular Army was recruited in A.D. 1930.¹ Were the Gurkha mercenaries and the Pathan raiders of that day marked out to be remembered in history as the fathers or grandfathers of barbarian conquerors who were to carve out on the plains of Hindustan the 'successor-states' of the British Rāj?²

¹ For these figures see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 128, footnote 1, above.

² For the British Indian Government's local practice and experience in employing

Whether Englishmen and Afridis or Frenchmen and Kabyles were likely, in course of time, to exchange their respective roles was a question which still lay on the knees of the Gods at the time when this volume was published. In cases such as these, in which we find ourselves in the middle of the story, we can only say that such a denouement appears not impossible in the light of the clear evidence that the like has actually occurred in other cases in which the whole of the drama has already been played out. One such case, in which we are acquainted in some detail with the second act of the play as well as with the first, is the story of the relations between the Hellenic Society in its universal state and the European barbarians beyond the northern *limes* of the Roman Empire. On this historic stage we can watch from beginning to end the parallel processes by which the Dominant Minority sinks into barbarism while the barbarians are making their fortune at the Dominant Minority's expense.

In this performance the play opens in a liberal atmosphere of free contract and enlightened self-interest.

'The Empire was not an object of hatred to the barbarians. Indeed, they were often eager to be taken into its service; and many of their chiefs, like Alaric or Ataulphus, had no higher ambition than to be appointed to high military command. On the other hand there was a corresponding readiness on the Roman side to employ barbarian forces in war. From the earliest days of the Empire these auxiliaries appear on the army lists. Germans are found in the bodyguard of Augustus. They fought under Vitellius in the foremost ranks at the battle of Cremona. Vespasian had special confidence in the loyalty of the Sueves, and had two of their chiefs in his service. Marcus Aurelius formed some corps of Germans for his war with their countrymen on the Danube. In the third century the tendency becomes even more marked. Valerian, in a despatch to Aurelian, describes an army which included troops from Ituraea, Arabia and Mesopotamia, and officers bearing such unmistakable German names as Hariomundus, Hildomundus and Haldagates. Claudius II, after the great defeat which he inflicted on the Goths, enrolled a large number of them under his standards. Probus recruited the frontier garrisons with 16,000 from the wreck of the great host which had devastated Gaul. The army of Constantine, in the battle of the Milvian Bridge, was chiefly composed of Germans and Celts and Britons. Of similar composition was the army with which Theodosius defeated Eugenius on the Frigidus.'¹

The scholar from whose work this passage is quoted goes on in the same context² to trace the individual careers of a number of

a Waziri militia to guard the North-West Frontier of India in the Waziristan sector see de Watteville, H.: *Waziristan, 1919-1920* (London 1925, Constable), especially pp. 8-9 and 13-14.

¹ Dill, S.: *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, 2nd edition (London 1905, Macmillan), pp. 291-2.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 295-6.

barbarian military officers who made their mark in the Roman service in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era: the *laetus* Magnentius; the Franks Arbogastes and Merobaudes and Richomer and Bauto; the Goths Munderich and Gainas and Fravitta; and the Vandal Stilicho. The 'Scythian' Modares, likewise, is proclaimed a barbarian by his name, while his generic epithet tells us that he was a child of the Eurasian Steppe; and 'how many more may have disguised their nationality under Roman names no one can tell'.¹ It appears, however, that, about the middle of the fourth century, the Germans in the Roman service started a new practice of retaining their native names;² and this change of etiquette, which seems to have been abrupt, points to a sudden access of self-consciousness and self-assurance in the souls of a barbarian *personnel* which had previously been content to 'go Roman' without any reservations in favour of its own 'native' past.

It is all the more significant that this new insistence on the barbarians' side upon a cultural individuality of their own, which they were now asking their Roman employers to accept as something distinctive and inalienable, did not evoke on the Romans' part any counter-demonstration of an anti-barbarian exclusiveness. So far from that, the barbarians in the Roman service began, at this very time, to obtain admission into an inner sanctum of Roman public life which had never been thrown open to them in earlier centuries when their own attitude had been less aggressively self-assertive.

'German chiefs [now] not only obtained the great military commands; they also rose to the consulship, the highest civil honour which the Emperor had to bestow. Dagelaephus and Merobaudes were colleagues of Gratian in this great office. In the reign of Theodosius, Merobaudes, Richomer and Bauto were consuls in successive years, and at least five more German names appear in the reigns of the last emperors of the West. When an office which the Emperor himself was proud to hold was given so freely to men of barbarian origin, it is plain that the old exclusiveness had disappeared and that the Germans had stolen their way into the very citadel of the Empire long before its distant outworks were stormed.'³

This social triumph of the fifth-century barbarian *novi homines* attained its culmination when the Emperor Theodosius's son and successor Arcadius (*imperabat* A.D. 395-408) deigned to take in marriage the barbarian Bauto's daughter Eudoxia—without scrup-

¹ Dill, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

² Lot, F.: *Les Invasions Germaniques* (Paris 1935, Payot), p. 230.

³ Dill, S.: *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, 2nd edition London 1905, Macmillan), pp. 296-7.

ling to raise the child of a Frankish soldier-of-fortune to the rank of Augusta, the highest honour open to a woman in the Imperial society of the age.

While the barbarians were thus setting their feet upon the top-most rungs of the Roman social ladder, the Romans themselves were beginning to move in just the opposite direction; for, in the generation before that in which the Teutonic mercenary Bauto achieved the double feat of winning the consular *laticlavium* for himself and the Imperial purple for his daughter, the Roman Emperor Gratian (*imperabat* A.D. 375-83) had succumbed to a new-fangled form of inverted snobbery, a mania, not for vulgarity, but for barbarism.

'The most skilful masters of every science and of every art had laboured to form the mind and body of the young prince. . . . But the influence of this elaborate instruction did not penetrate beyond the surface; and, . . . as soon as time and accident had removed those faithful counsellors from the throne, the emperor of the West insensibly descended to the level of his natural genius; abandoned the reins of government to the ambitious hands which were stretched forwards to grasp them; and amused his leisure with the most frivolous gratifications. . . . Among the various arts which had exercised the youth of Gratian, he had applied himself with singular inclination and success to manage the horse, to draw the bow, and to dart the javelin; and these qualifications, which might be useful to a soldier, were prostituted to the viler purposes of hunting. Large parks were enclosed for the Imperial pleasures, and plentifully stocked with every species of wild beasts; and Gratian neglected the duties, and even the dignity, of his rank to consume whole days in the vain display of his dexterity and boldness in the chase. The pride and wish of the Roman emperor to excel in an art in which he might be surpassed by the meanest of his slaves reminded the numerous spectators of the examples of Nero and Commodus; but the chaste and temperate Gratian was a stranger to their monstrous vices; and his hands were stained only with the blood of animals.

'The behaviour of Gratian, which degraded his character in the eyes of Mankind, could not have disturbed the security of his reign if the Army had not been provoked to resent their peculiar injuries. As long as the young emperor was guided by the instructions of his masters, he professed himself the friend and pupil of the soldiers; many of his hours were spent in the familiar conversation of the camp;¹ and the health, the comforts, the rewards, the honours of his faithful troops appeared to be the object of his attentive concern. But, after Gratian

¹ It will be noticed that the respectable Gratian begins his rake's progress at the point which had been the ruffianly Caracalla's limit (see p. 455, above). The inverse contrasts between the two careers and the two characters give the measure of the distance along the road towards proletarianization that had been travelled by the Hellenic dominant minority in the Roman Empire between the first quarter of the third century and the last quarter of the fourth.—A.J.T.

more freely indulged his prevailing taste for hunting and shooting, he naturally connected himself with the most dexterous ministers of his favourite amusement. A body of the Alani was received into the military and domestic service of the palace; and the admirable skill which they were accustomed to display in the unbounded plains of Scythia was exercised, on a more narrow theatre, in the parks and enclosures of Gaul. Gratian admired the talents and customs of these favourite guards, to whom alone he entrusted the defence of his person; and, as if he meant to insult the public opinion, he frequently showed himself to the soldiers and people with the dress and arms, the long bow, the sounding quiver, and the fur garments of a Scythian warrior. The unworthy spectacle of a Roman prince who had renounced the dress and manners of his country filled the minds of the legions with grief and indignation.¹ Even the Germans, so strong and formidable in the armies of the Empire, affected to disdain the strange and horrid appearance of the savages of the North, who, in the space of a few years, had wandered from the banks of the Volga to those of the Seine.²

This craze for barbarian dress and manners eventually cost Gratian his life; but the poor young prince's grisly end did not choke off the rising generation of his class from following the fashion which Gratian had inaugurated.

'There are signs that even in smaller things, such as toilet and dress, Germans, at the beginning of the fifth century, were setting the fashion. Three edicts of Honorius, between 397 and 416, forbid the wearing of trousers,³ long hair and fur coats of the barbarian style within the precincts of the city. The tone of the law of 416 leaves no doubt that the

¹ Yet poor Gratian was only doing what was done with impunity in the eighteenth century by the enlightened monarchs of a modern Western World when they dressed up their troopers (and on occasions their own selves) in the outlandish 'Scythian' kit of a Hungarian 'hussar' or a Polish 'uhlan' (*Turcick* 'oghlan', i.e. one of 'the boys' in the American sense).—A.J.T.

² Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xxvii.

³ The hesitating steps by which the Hellenic dominant minority gradually took to trousers are significant marks of the successive stages in its descent down the slippery slope of barbarization, because trousers were the common badge of the barbarians beyond two frontiers: on the one hand, of the Germans and Dacians beyond Rhine and Danube, and, on the other hand, of the Parthians beyond Euphrates. (The trousers of Iran and those of Northern Europe were, of course, alike derived from the Eurasian Steppe, whence they had been introduced by Nomad invaders: the common descent of the Parthians and the Dacians from the same Eurasian Nomad horde has been mentioned already in II. D (vii), Annex V, vol. ii, p. 435, footnote 1, above.) On this account, trousers were originally regarded as the very insignia of barbarism by the polite society of the Roman Empire, which was at bay on two frontiers against a threat of invasion by war-bands clad in these 'inexpressibles'. When Virgil has to refer to trousers, he resorts to the decent periphrasis 'barbara tegmina crurum' (*Aeneid*, Book XI, l. 777); and in the revolutionary year A.D. 69 the commander of the force that marched on Rome from the Rhine in order to secure the Imperial throne for Vitellius did perceptible damage to his cause by imprudently continuing to wear, on the Italian side of the Alps, a garment to which he had become addicted in the harsher climate of a Rhenish garrison-town. 'Caecina, velut relicta post Alpīs saevitia ac licentia, modesto agmine per Italiam incescit. ornatum ipsius municipia et coloniae in superbiā trahēbant, quod versicolori sagulo, bracas [breeches] indutus, togatos adloqueretur' (Tacitus: *Historiae*, Book II, chap. 20). As late as A.D. 274 it was the trousers on the legs of the captive Gallic pretender Tetricus that caught the eye of the crowd which watched the Emperor Aurelian's triumphal procession (see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 219, above) traversing

rage for German fashions was wide-spread and that the previous edicts had been disregarded.'¹

The fifth century was the age in which the Romans who were 'going barbarian' and the barbarians who were 'going Roman' met one another, in their respective courses, mid-way, and lingered for a moment abreast—until the Romans drifted on again along their downward road towards barbarization and now carried the half-Romanized barbarians backwards with them. This brief phase of social parity in an unstable compromise between Barbarism and Civilization may be illustrated by bringing together the portraits of two men both of whom may claim to rank among the outstanding figures of that world in that penultimate phase of its history. Aetius, who was the older man of the two, was officially a Roman, while Theodoric the Ostrogoth, who was a child of the succeeding generation, was officially a barbarian. Both alike, however, were born frontiersmen; and the birth-place of both was the same sector of the *limes*. It was that Lower Danubian sector where the pressure was always particularly high because at this point the north-eastern corner of the Roman Empire touched the head of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe (a funnel up which the flood of Nomadism was apt to surge with the speed and force of the tide in an estuary).² While their identity of birth-place thus constituted an initial bond between these two distinguished sons of Moesia Secunda, their respective upbringing happened in either case to be such as to bring them still nearer together by counteracting their diversity of social heritage; for, while Aetius

the streets of Rome. 'The use of braccæ, breeches or trowsers was still considered in Italy as a Gallic and Barbarian fashion', is Gibbon's observation (*The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xi, footnote 86). 'The Romans, however,' Gibbon adds, 'had made great advances towards it.' And Gibbon himself was destined soon to see the polite society of his own world do likewise. There is extant a letter dated the 21st June—7th July, 1778, which was written to the Countess of Carlisle by her husband the Fifth Earl when that nobleman was on a diplomatic mission in America (as one of the Royal Commissioners who had been appointed on the 12th April, 1778, in the forlorn hope of persuading the now indomitable insurgent colonists to accept, at the thirteenth hour, some accommodation which would avert a complete severance of the revolted colonies' political connexion with the British Crown); and in this letter the following passage occurs:

'The gnats in this part of the River [Delaware] are as large as sparrows; I have armed myself against them by wearing trousers, which is the constant dress of this country.' (Historical Manuscripts Commission: Fifteenth Report, Appendix, Part VI: The Manuscripts of the Earl of Carlisle, preserved at Castle Howard (London 1897, Eyre & Spottiswoode), p. 345.)

It was only a few years after this, again, that the French disciples of the American revolutionaries earned the nickname of *sans-culottes* for appearing in public, not in nothing but their shirts, but shockingly clad in liberal trousers instead of conservative knee-breeches. A superstitious antiquary might be tempted to infer that the act of going into trousers was an infallible outward visible sign of the demoralization of a *ci-devant* dominant minority.—A.J.T.

¹ Dill, S.: *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, 2nd edition (London 1905, Macmillan), p. 297.

² See Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 401 and 426-8, above;

was brought up as a hostage among the Goths and Huns, Theodoric was brought up as a hostage at the Roman Imperial Court of Constantinople. The two sketches that here follow both come from the deft pen of the same modern Western scholar:

'Aetius . . . était Romain. Il était né . . . à Durostorum (aujourd'hui Silistrie).¹ Son père . . . avait fait une carrière brillante. . . . C'est évidemment parce qu'il appartenait à une famille militaire distinguée qu'Aetius, jeune garçon, fut donné comme otage à Alaric. Le chef des Visigoths distingua l'enfant romain, l'instruisit dans le métier des armes. Puis Aetius passa, toujours comme otage, chez les Huns, sur lesquels régnait le roi Rougila. . . . Il connut à sa cour le neveu du Khan, Attila, et se lia avec lui. Ainsi les deux fameux adversaires de la célèbre bataille du Campus Mauriacus, où devaient s'affronter d'un côté la Romania et les fédérés germaniques, de l'autre la Barbarie tatar avec ses sujets germaniques, alains, etc., se sont connus dès leur prime jeunesse.²

'Ce séjour chez les Huns eut des conséquences importantes. Aetius conserva des intelligences chez ce peuple. C'est chez lui qu'il aimait à puiser les mercenaires dont il composera les armées dites "romaines" pendant une quinzaine d'années. En 424, alors qu'il favorisait l'usurpation de Johannès contre Valentinien III, Aetius avait été chercher une armée hunnique. En 432, lorsqu'il dut prendre la fuite, vaincu sous Rimini par son rival Boniface, Aetius se réfugia chez les Huns et revint, l'année suivante, avec une armée que lui fournit le roi Rougila. Par la terreur, il se fait alors octroyer le titre de généralissime (*magister utriusque militiae*) et la dignité de "patrice": c'est-à-dire, de père adoptif de l'empereur. Le romain Aetius n'agit pas autrement que le visigoth Alaric ou, plus tard en Orient, l'alain Aspar, l'ostrogoth Théodoric. Il est plus barbare d'éducation et de tempérament que le vandale Stilichon.

'Aetius nous est connu surtout par les panégyriques de Mérobaude et un fragment de la chronique de Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus. Ces deux écrivains latins du v^e siècle sont, comme l'indiquent leurs noms, d'origine germanique: signe des temps.

'Il faut reconnaître que, si l'Empire a pu tenir trente ans encore en Occident, de 424 à 454, c'est [dû] à la connaissance approfondie que le patrice Aetius avait des hommes et des choses du monde barbare, tant tatar que germanique, non moins que du monde romain.³

It is instructive to examine this portrait of Aetius in the same synoptic view as the following portrait of Theodoric from the hand of the same artist:

'Nul barbare ne fut plus comblé de faveur que Théodoric. L'empereur Zénon le nomma patrice, l'adopta même comme fils d'armes

¹ Durostorum was one of the fortresses that guarded the Roman military frontier along the south bank of the Lower Danube.—A.J.T.

² It is for this reason that another modern Western scholar (quoted in I. C. (i) (a), vol. i, p. 60, footnote 1, above) describes the conflict between Aetius and Attila as presenting 'the image of a civil war'.—A.J.T.

³ Lot, F.: *Les Invasions Germaniques* (Paris 1935, Payot), pp. 89-90.

(476). Plus tard il sera fait *magister militum*, désigné pour le consulat. Théodoric n'était pas étranger au monde gréco-latin. Donné comme otage par son père en 465, il avait passé à Constantinople dix années, de 8 à 18 ans, les années décisives de l'homme, celles de sa formation. S'il avait été seul, il aurait fait sa fortune au service de l'Empire d'Orient, comme tant d'autres chefs barbares, comme son rival et homonyme Théodoric le Louche. Mais Théodoric appartenait à la race illustre des "Amals". Le peuple ostrogothique, qui le reconnaissait pour son chef, avait mis en lui toute sa confiance. Ce sont les revendications incessantes de ses compatriotes qui expliquent son attitude ambiguë vis-à-vis de l'Empire, tantôt déferente et soumise, tantôt subitement agressive. En 488 enfin, Zénon trouva l'occasion de se débarrasser de ce sujet indocile. Il lui concéda le pays d' "Hespérie" (L'Italie), à charge de s'en rendre maître aux dépens d'Odoacre.¹

If, having examined and compared this pair of fifth-century portraits, we were now to break off our survey and shut our eyes, we might flatter ourselves that we had already witnessed the closing scene in the play, and that the spectacle on which the curtain was falling was a stable amalgam of Roman and barbarian manners on a level which must be at any rate as high as Theodoric's, though it might also be as low as Aetius's. There is, however, still another scene to come; and this further scene—which is really and truly the final one—has met our eyes already in our portrait-gallery of truants.² We have there taken notice of a picture of a *ci-devant* Roman citizen which was drawn from the life in A.D. 448 by a Greek man-of-letters who paid a visit in that year to Attila's camp in the Hungarian Alföld on a diplomatic mission from the Roman Imperial Court at Constantinople. This contemporary of Aetius who is portrayed for us by Priscus had the same taste as Aetius himself—and Aetius's forerunner Gratian—for a barbarian way of life; but the canny Greek (for such he was by birth, like the historian who has immortalized him) had managed to indulge in Gratian's craze without incurring Gratian's fate; for Fortune had enabled him to carry his barbarization to a length from which even Gratian would probably have recoiled. The story is best told in the words of Priscus the Roman envoy and Greek historian.

'While I was waiting' [Priscus tells us, for an audience with Attila's minister Onegesius,] 'and was pacing up and down in front of the enclosure surrounding the establishment, I was approached by an individual whom I presumed, from his Nomad dress, to be a native, but who addressed me in Greek with the words "Good morning" (*χαίρε*)!—a greeting which intrigued me, for here was good Greek issuing from the lips of a Nomad. The Nomads, being the sweepings of the

¹ Lot, F., op. cit., p. 135.

² See V. C (i) (d) 3, pp. 409-10, above.

Earth, supplement their diverse vernaculars by some study of either Hunnish or Gothic or Latin (in so far as they have intercourse with the Romans),¹ while none of them readily speak Greek except the prisoners carried off from Thrace or from the Adriatic sea-board. These unfortunates, however, were recognizable at sight. Their tattered clothing and unkempt heads marked them out as people who had come down in the world, whereas my friend had all the appearance of a prosperous Nomad, with his clothes so smart and his hair so neatly bobbed.

'After returning his greeting, I inquired who he was and where he had lived before he had crossed into No-Man's-Land and adopted the Nomadic Life. He retorted by asking the motive of my eagerness to learn these details. I told him that the cause of my curiosity was his knowledge of Greek. Thereupon he laughed and told me that he was a Greek (*Γραικός*) by race who had come on business to the Moesian town of Viminacium on the Danube. He had stayed there a long time, married a local heiress, and enjoyed a spell of prosperity; but he had been stripped of all this when the town fell into the hands of the barbarians—on which occasion his former wealth had caused him to be reserved for Onegesius himself in the division of the spoils. The well-to-do captives, he mentioned, were the special perquisite (after Attila had taken his choice) of the *élite* in the Nomadic World, because they fetched the highest price when disposed of. However, he continued, he had distinguished himself in the subsequent actions against the Romans and against the [*Khazar*] horde; had made over his winnings on active service to his native master, according to the Nomad etiquette; and had thus obtained his freedom. He had married a native wife; he was the father of children;² he was an honoured guest at Onegesius's table; and he considered his present life preferable to his past.'³

¹ Latin was at this time the language of all the Danubian provinces of the Roman Empire from the Black Forest to the Black Sea, while Greek was hardly spoken any longer anywhere to the north of the Balkan Range (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 326, footnote 2, above).—A.J.T.

² In due course Priscus's renegade might have become the progenitor of a new Nomad tribe or horde, if the dominion of the Huns on Roman ground had not collapsed at Attila's death but had lasted on for nine or ten generations, like the dominion of the Manchus in the Far East. In the territory of the Jasakto Khan 'Banner' of Mongols, in the southern division of the Hsingan Province of 'Manchukuo', there was in 1935 an enclave which was at that date still occupied by a tiny autonomous community of prosperous Nomadic stock-breeders who were known as the Manchu-Mongols. The story of this little horde is told as follows by a modern Western scholar who has obtained his knowledge at first hand (Lattimore, O.: *The Mongols of Manchuria* (London 1935, Allen & Unwin), pp. 228-32):

'In the reign of Ch'ien Lung (*imperabat* A.D. 1736-96) a Manchu Imperial princess was given in marriage to the ruling prince this of [the Jasakto Khan] "banner". In her following were seven "slaves" who were later given Mongol wives. On the death of the princess the then prince established them in their present territory. At the same time he gave them a kind of charter, exempting them from taxes and service, except for the expenses of the annual sacrifices at the tomb of the princess. . . . They have increased to over a hundred families, numbering about a thousand people. . . . The fact that this group is called "Manchu-Mongol" is, in my opinion, misleading. The original seven men were undoubtedly Chinese, and were called Manchu simply because they came as the servants of a Manchu princess. There is a tradition that they were artisans—a carpenter, a mason, and so on—and artisans coming from Peking in the eighteenth century were not likely to be Manchus. The Peking Manchus of that time,

For footnote ³ see opposite page, at bottom.

This *ci-devant* Greek renegade who was encountered by the historian Priscus in Attila's *ordu* in A.D. 448 was a portent of things to come; for he stands at the head of a line of truants from an expiring Hellenic dominant minority who managed to make themselves at home in a barbarian environment and who took to this adoptive barbarism so whole-heartedly that they began to lend a hand in fighting the battles of Hun or Teuton war-lords whose ancestors had been employed by their own ancestors as mercenaries. In a different context¹ we have already noted how at Vouillé in A.D. 507, when the Visigoths and the Franks were fighting out by the ordeal of battle the question which of two barbarian war-bands was to become the permanent possessor of the derelict Roman Imperial heritage in Gaul, there fought and died at the side of the Visigoth war-lord Alaric a grandson of the Latin man-of-letters Sidonius Apollinaris. The grandfather had been a mild and cultivated Gallo-Roman country-gentleman who could have comfortably worn the shoes of Jane Austen's Mr. Woodhouse, but who would have rubbed his eyes at the spectacle of his little grandson breaking Sarmatian lances instead of turning Latin verses as a gentleman should. Yet young Sidonius was acting no differently from other Gallo-Romans of his generation. At Vouillé there were Gallo-Roman forces engaged on the Frankish as well as on the Gothic side; it was the man-power of the Gallo-Roman population of the Seine Basin, whose allegiance Clovis had previously captured from their native leader Syagrius, that furnished the Frankish adventurer with the means of overthrowing all the rival barbarian war-lords within his reach;² the survivors among young Sidonius's Arvernian contemporaries who lived to fight another day had in their turn to exchange an Amalung for a Merowing *heretoga*; and in the sixth century it was the habit of the Frankish kings of Gaul to fight their wars, both civil and foreign, with an unwieldy *levée en masse* in which their Latin and Teutonic subjects were

being at the height of their prestige, were a leisured class who did not have to work as artisans. Furthermore the surnames Wang and Li, given for three of the families, were not Chinese names that were commonly taken by Manchus during the period when they were at pains to distinguish themselves socially from the Chinese. This group offers, therefore, a well established and clearly dated example of Chinese "turning Mongol". The numbers are not important; the amount of Chinese blood in a hundred families descended from seven men of the eighteenth century must be very small indeed. It is the process that is important. It undoubtedly was common in the past; for something of the same sort can still be seen in regions where the Chinese penetrate among the Mongols in small numbers.'

This testimony of Lattimore's from the opposite extremity of Eurasia affords an interesting corroboration of Priscus's story.—A.J.T.

¹ In II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 166, above.

² See Taylor, H. O.: *The Medieval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 120.

³ Priscus of Panium: *History of His Own Times*, in *Historici Graeci Minores*, edited by Dindorf, L., vol i (Berlin and Leipzig 1870, Teubner), pp. 305-9.

conscripted promiscuously.¹ There is no evidence that in this age the descendants of the Roman provincials showed any less alacrity² in following a *Führer* on the war-path than was shown by the contemporary descendants of barbarians to whom, for centuries past, the war-game had been the breath of life.

'Ces populations gallo-romaines désarmées par la méfiance de l'Empire romain reprirent le goût de la guerre avec une rapidité incroyable. On les voit, dès le vi^e siècle, se battre avec rage contre elles-mêmes pour soutenir les querelles insensées d'un Chilpéric, d'un Sigebert, d'un Gontran. L'armement, l'instruction militaire, la tactique furent copiés sur ceux des Francs. Même en temps de paix, le Gallo-Romain prit l'habitude de porter l'épée au côté et de se vêtir d'habillements serrés au corps, à la façon des Barbares. À sa mort, il voulut être enseveli avec ses armes, comme le guerrier franc. De là, l'aspect tout barbare des nécropoles de ce temps. Les prétendus "cimetières francs" sont en réalité, pour la plupart, des cimetières gallo-romains.'³

In the rare intervals when there was no dynastic bickering among their Frankish war-lords to give these sixth-century Gallo-Romans an excuse for indulging in their new-found barbarian sport the Gallo-Roman cities—reviving the pugnacious tradition of international relations between the city-states of the Hellenic World before the establishment of the Roman Peace—now indulged, in flat defiance of the peace of a barbarian 'successor-state', in private wars against one another.⁴ And the local history of the progress of this cult of Barbarism among the epigoni of a Roman governing class can also be traced, and this perhaps most clearly of all, in a change of fashion in names. We have noticed above⁵ that, about half-way through the fourth century, the barbarians in the Roman Imperial service had dropped the practice—handed down by previous generations of barbarian hostages and mercenaries—of Latinizing their barbarian names or even giving them up in order to take good Latin names in place of them. The following century saw, in Gaul, the earliest examples of an inverse move, on the part of true-born Romans, to assume German names instead of imposing them;⁶ in the last third of the sixth century this late-fifth-century fashion abruptly gained the upper hand; and before the end of the eighth century it had become universal.⁶

¹ For instances see Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), pp. 119-20 and 274.

² Lot, F.: *Les Invasions Germaniques* (Paris 1935, Payot), p. 210.

³ Dill, S., op. cit., p. 265.

⁴ On p. 468.

⁵ The process of fusion must have been expedited by the legalization, in A.D. 497, of marriages between Romans and Franks in the Frankish dominions (see Taylor, op. cit., vol. i, p. 120). The Franks do not seem to have thought of treating their Roman fellow subjects as members of a separate and inferior race (Taylor, op. cit., vol. i, p. 123).

⁶ These socially significant changes of nomenclature are recorded by Lot in op. cit., pp. 229-34. In the Visigothic 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire in the Iberian

By Charlemagne's time every inhabitant of Gaul was sporting a German name, regardless of whether his or her ancestry was actually Frankish or provincial.

This trivial point of manners tells us how unsubstantial was the ghost of the Roman Empire that was officially evoked in Western Christendom in Charlemagne's reign and person;¹ and this Gallic testimony is confirmed by the history of a parallel cult of barbarism in the decline and fall of the Sinic World; for this Sinic story has a singularly different ending from that of our tale of Gaul.

If we make a chronological equation between the break-up of the Roman Empire in the West at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries and the break-up of the Sinic Empire of the Han at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era, and if we concentrate our attention, in both cases, upon those ex-Imperial territories that were carved up into barbarian 'successor-states', then the century in the post-Sinic interregnum in Northern China that will correspond to the eighth century of the Christian Era in the post-Hellenic interregnum in Western Europe will be the sixth century or thereabouts. When we examine, however, what was happening by that time in those northern marches of the defunct Empire of the Han which had been carved up, at the close of the third century, into barbarian 'successor-states' under the dominion of *ci-devant* Eurasian Nomads,² we behold a revolution of manners which is the exact inverse of the revolution which was consummated in the eighth century in Gaul.

The respective Sien Pi and Hiongnu and To Pa founders of the three earliest barbarian 'successor-states' of the Sinic universal state had already taken care to drape the nakedness of their barbarism under a veil of decency by archaistically bestowing upon their new political creations the polite Sinic names of 'Pe Yen' and 'Pe Han' and 'Wei';³ and some two hundred years later, after the To Pa principality of 'Wei' had annexed both of its two neighbours and rivals,⁴ the cue of 'de-barbarization' was taken up and followed out to its logical consequences by one of the princes of 'Wei', Hiao-wên ti (*regnabat* A.D. 490⁵-499).⁶ In A.D. 494 this Sinomane

Peninsula the fusion between Romans and Goths seems to have been completed by the middle of the seventh century of the Christian Era (Taylor, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 118).

¹ The hollowness of 'the Holy Roman Empire' has already struck us by contrast with the solidity of the rival structure which was erected in the same century in Orthodox Christendom. For this contrast between 'the Holy Roman Empire' of Charlemagne and the East Roman Empire of Leo Syrus see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 322-3, above.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65; V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 272-3; V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 356; and the present chapter, p. 465, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 273, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 356, footnote 6, above.

⁵ This was the date of Hiao-wên ti's effective accession. He had been on the throne as a minor, under a regency, since his father's abdication in A.D. 471.

⁶ For Hiao-wên ti's reign and policy see Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 208-15.

prince of To Pa barbarian origin transferred the seat of his government from his forefathers' camping-ground at P'ing-ch'êng, in the barbarized marches, to the derelict site of the ancient Imperial capital of Loyang; in the same year he prohibited the wearing of barbarian dress by any of his subjects; in 495 he banned the use of the barbarian vernaculars at Court and compelled the barbarian-descended families in the population to exchange their barbarian names for Sinic substitutes; and finally, in 496, he changed the name of his own dynasty from the tell-tale barbarism of 'To Pa' to the respectable Sinism of 'Yuan'. If the Sinic tradition could cast so strong a spell as this over the native prince of a barbarian 'successor-state' some three hundred years after the break-up of the Sinic universal state, it is not surprising to find the universal state itself being resuscitated, after the passage of another hundred years, by the Sui and the T'ang¹ with an effectiveness that is likewise characteristic of the corresponding work of an Anatolian Leo Syrus, but which is conspicuously lacking in the work of an Austrasian Charlemagne.²

Before closing our inquiry into the barbarization of dominant minorities, we may pause to ask ourselves whether any of the symptoms of this social phenomenon are discernible in our own world of the modern West. On first thoughts we shall perhaps be inclined to think that our question has received a conclusive answer in the recent conquest of one of the strongest of the surviving fastnesses of Barbarism by one of the weakest of the Western Great Powers of our day. Even if there be a dominant minority in our twentieth-century Western World which may find itself constrained to plead guilty to a charge of vulgarization, can this other danger of barbarization be taken very seriously in a world where the last of the transfrontier barbarians are being subjugated or exterminated under our eyes? The spectacle of Ethiopia may impel us to dismiss our question with a curt answer in the negative; yet, before we finally condemn it as inane, we may do well to look farther afield and remind ourselves of the rather disconcerting fact that, in the present heart of our Western Society's 'New World' of North America, there is to-day a large and widespread population of European blood and Western Christian social heritage which has been unmistakably and profoundly barbarized by being marooned in the Appalachian backwoods after serving a preliminary term of exile on 'the Celtic Fringe'.³

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 356, footnote 6, above, for the historical development, through a number of intervening stages, of the *imperium redivivum* of the Sui and the T'ang out of the Han Empire's To Pa barbarian 'successor-state' in Shansi.

² This likeness of the Sinic *imperium redivivum* of the Sui and the T'ang to the East Roman Empire, in a common contrast to 'the Holy Roman Empire', is examined further in Part X, below.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 311-12, above.

The barbarizing effect of the American frontier has been described with equal eloquence and insight by an American historian who is a master of the subject.

'In the settlement of America we have to observe how European life entered the continent and how America modified and developed that life and reacted on Europe. Our early history is the study of European germs developing in an American environment. . . . The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war-cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man. He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish; and so he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the wilderness; but the outcome is not the old Europe. . . . The fact is that here is a new product that is American.'¹

The thesis is that, although the Indian frontier of the United States has ceased to exist as a physical fact with a precise geographical locus, it has succeeded nevertheless in immortalizing itself by setting a permanent spiritual impress upon the national life of a new nation of European origin which, as the frontier travelled westward across the Continent,² was steadily growing in stature on American ground. If this thesis is correct, then we are bound to declare that, in North America at any rate, a social pull of prodigious force has been exerted upon one section of the dominant minority of our modern Western World by one section of the external proletariat. For, on this showing, the influence of the now physically obsolete Indian frontier is visible not only in the 'living museum' of barbarized frontiersmen who have been left stranded in an Appalachian fastness by the westward-rolling tide of American 'nation-building': the frontier has also carved for itself a vaster monument in a more lasting medium by introducing a vein which is certainly distinctive, and possibly predominant, into the new-made American national character. When we remind ourselves of the initial disparity—and this in spiritual culture as well as in corporate physical strength—between the incomers from Europe who have built this new nation up and the American aborigines whom they have swept out of their path, and when

¹ Turner, F. J.: *The Frontier in American History* (New York 1921, Holt), pp. 3-4. Part of this passage has been quoted already in II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 312, footnote 1, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 207 and 328-32, above.

we further recall that the Indian frontier of the European colonies in North America was in physical existence for barely two centuries and a half, reckoning from the landing of the first settlers on the Atlantic coast down to the time when their descendants reached and occupied their natural frontier on the Pacific sea-board of the North American Continent, we shall be more astonished than ever at the strength of the influence exerted by a barbarism which was continually 'on the run' upon an invading civilization which hardly paused in its march across the American Continent and which was animated by the 'driving-power', and backed by the weight, of the whole body social of Western Christendom in its European homeland. In the light of this American portent it would be rash to assume that the spiritual malady of barbarization is a peril which our modern Western dominant minority can afford to disregard. On our American precedent an Ethiopian barbarism that has been crushed by methods more barbarous than its own may perhaps be expected to revenge itself by transferring its habitation from Abyssinian to Italian souls and perpetuating itself, no longer innocuously in a primitive Africa, but lethally in a decadent Europe.

(β) *Vulgarity and Barbarism in Art.*

If we pass next from the general field of 'Manners and Customs' to the special field of Art, we shall find the sense of promiscuity betraying itself, here again, in the two alternative forms of vulgarity and barbarism with which we have now made ourselves familiar. In one or other of these forms the Art of a disintegrating civilization is apt to pay for an abnormally wide and rapid geographical diffusion by forfeiting that distinctiveness of style which is the sign manual of well-being in Art perhaps even more conspicuously than it is in any of the other activities of a civilization that is still in its growth.

Two classic examples of vulgarity in Art are the fashions in which a disintegrating Minoan and a disintegrating Syriac Society successively radiated their aesthetic influence round the shores of the Mediterranean. The interregnum (*circa* 1425-1125 B.C.) which followed the overthrow of the Minoan 'thalassocracy' is marked—in the 'artifacts', disinterred by our modern Western archaeologists, which are our sole evidence for the course of Minoan history—by the vulgar fashion, labelled 'Late Minoan III', which outranges in its diffusion all the earlier and finer Minoan styles;¹ and similarly

¹ For its range see Glotz, G.: *La Civilisation Égéenne* (Paris 1923, Renaissance du Livre), pp. 64 and 248-50. In this age when it was *in articulo mortis*, the Minoan culture spread from the Aegean to Macedonia in one direction and to Cyprus in another, and Syrian princesses took to dressing *à la crétoise*.

the 'Time of Troubles' (*circa* 925-525 B.C.) which followed the breakdown of the Syriac Civilization is marked by the equally vulgar and equally widespread mechanical combination of *motifs* drawn promiscuously from Egyptian and from Babylonian sources which was diffused from Tyrian and Sidonian workshops into the sister Hellenic World in the Aegean, as well as into the barbarian hinterlands of Carthage and of Gades.

In the history of Hellenic art a corresponding vulgarity found expression in the excessively rich decoration which came into vogue with the Corinthian order of architecture—an extravagance which is the very antithesis of the distinctive note of the Hellenic genius; and, when we look for outstanding examples of this fashion, which reached its climax in the Imperial Age of Hellenic history (*circa* 25 B.C.-A.D. 375), we shall not find them at the geographical heart of the Hellenic World. As illustrations of this florid display of aesthetic decadence, the surviving columns of the Olympieum at Athens are not so characteristic as the remains of the temple of a non-Hellenic divinity at Ba'labak, or as the sarcophagi that were manufactured by Hellenic 'monumental masons' to harbour the mortal remains of Philhellene barbarian war-lords on the far eastern rim of the Iranian Plateau.¹

If we turn from the archaeological to the literary record of the disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization, we find that the 'high-brows' of the first few generations after the breakdown of 431 B.C. bewailed the vulgarization of Hellenic music and the deplorable effect upon the Hellenic *êthos* of a change for the worse in an art to which Hellenic souls were particularly sensitive. And we have already noticed in another context² the vulgarization of the Attic drama at the hands of Διονύσου Τεχνῖται ('United Artists, Ltd.') who tore it up from its roots in the theatre of Dionysus at Athens in order to hawk it up and down the world from Parthia to Spain.

In the modern Western World we may observe that it is the floridly decadent and not the severely classical style of Hellenic architecture that has inspired our Western Hellenizing fashions of Baroque and Rococo. And in the so-called 'chocolate-box style' of our Victorian and Edwardian 'commercial art'³ we can discern an analogue of 'Late Minoan III' that bids fair to conquer, not merely the Mediterranean Basin, but the whole face of the planet in the service of a peculiarly Western commercial technique of visually advertising the tradesman's wares.

¹ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 131; III. C (iii) (a), vol. iii, p. 247, footnote 2; V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 134-5; and V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 196, above.

² In IV. C (iii) (b) 14, vol. iv, p. 243, above.

³ For the corresponding modern Western monstrosity of 'commercial architecture' see the passage quoted from Frobenius in V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 201, footnote 1, above.

The fatuousness of 'the chocolate-box style' is so desolating that it has provoked even a generation as aesthetically obtuse as ours¹ into attempting desperate remedies. Our archaistic flight from vulgarity into a pre-'Pre-Raphaelite' Byzantinism is discussed in a later chapter;² but in this place we have to take note of the contemporary and alternative flight from vulgarity into Barbarism. Self-respecting Western sculptors of the present day who have not found a congenial asylum in Byzantium have turned their eyes towards Benin; and it is not only in the glyptic branch of art that a Western World whose own sources of creativeness have apparently run dry has been seeking fresh aesthetic inspiration from the barbarians of West Africa. West African music and dancing, as well as West African sculpture, have been imported into the heart of the Western World on the lips and in the limbs of African conscript-immigrants; Congolese slaves have carried them into America, and Senegalese mercenaries into Europe; and the effect upon the *êthos* of our Western dominant minority has been so swiftly and so deeply demoralizing that, if Plato could have witnessed it, he would assuredly have lifted up his hands and given thanks to Apollo for Timotheus.

This triumph of a Negro art in the northern states of America and in the western countries of Europe represents a much more signal victory for Barbarism than the progressive barbarization of the Hellenic image and superscription on the staters of King Philip's mintage in the course of the long and slow journey of this Hellenic coin-type from the banks of the Strymon to the banks of the Thames in Ultima Thule.³

To a layman's eye the flight to Benin and the flight to Byzantium seem equally unlikely to lead the latter-day Western artist to the recovery of his lost soul.

Hoc se quisque modo fugitat, quem scilicet, ut fit,
effugere haud potis est.⁴

And yet, even if he cannot save himself, it is still not impossible that he may be a means of salvation for others. 'A mediocre teacher, giving mechanical instruction in a science that has been created by men of genius, may awake in some one of his pupils the vocation which he has never felt in himself';⁵ and, if the 'commercial art' of a disintegrating Hellenic World performed the astonishing feat of evoking the supremely creative art of Mahayanian

¹ On the aesthetic obtuseness of modern Western Man see the acute observations of Dean Inge that have been quoted in III. C (iii), vol. iii, p. 387, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 8 (β), vol. vi, p. 60, below.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 198, above.

⁴ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 1068-9, quoted already in I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 55, above.

⁵ Bergson, quoted already in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 247, above.

Buddhism through its encounter with the religious experience of another disintegrating world on Indic ground,¹ we cannot venture to pronounce *a priori* that the modern Western 'chocolate-box style' is incapable of working similar miracles as it is flaunted round the globe on the advertiser's hoardings and sky-signs.

(γ) *Lingue Franche*.

In the field of Language the sense of promiscuity in a disintegrating society reveals itself in the change from a local distinctiveness to a general confusion of tongues.

Though the institution of Language exists for the purpose of serving as a means of communication between one human being and another, the social effect of Language in the history of Mankind up to date, as far as we have knowledge of it, has actually been on the whole to divide the Human Race and not to unite it; for hitherto this institution (which in itself is one of the clearest of the criteria that distinguish men from brutes) has been current in so great a number of such extremely diverse forms that even the languages which have won the widest currency and enjoyed the longest vogue have never yet become common to more than a fraction of Mankind. Even within the narrower subjective world of the individual human being's experience in his brief personal span of Time and Space it has hitherto been rare for him to find himself speaking a language that has been common to all other human beings who have come within his ken either by intercourse or by report. An element which has seldom been absent from Man's mental picture of the world in which he lives is a consciousness of the existence of 'foreigners' whose principal hall-mark is their unintelligible speech; and thus it has come about that an institution which is common to all Mankind and which distinguishes Man from all other embodiments of Life on this planet has hitherto served in practice to distinguish and divide one human community from another as well as to identify and unite with one another the respective members of each one of these innumerable separate linguistic communities into which the Human Family has hitherto been parcelled out. This is the penalty which Mankind has had to pay for the narrowness of the limits of mutual intelligibility. For in fact, so far as our modern Western knowledge goes, there has never really yet been a time when 'the whole Earth was of one language and of one speech'.² A mutual intelligibility that knows no exceptions and no limits is a potential achievement of the power of speech which may be its ultimate purpose and its

¹ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 131; III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 247, footnote 2; V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 134-5; and V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 196, above.

² Gen. xi. 1.

eventual goal; but, if so, we can only say that the purpose has never yet been attained and that the goal still lies hidden in the Future. Hitherto, any widespread uniformity—even within limits far short of a world-wide range—has been exceptional, while an extreme variety of tongues has been the rule. We find this rule of linguistic diversity prevailing, not only in primitive societies like those which still survive in the Sudan,¹ but also in civilizations in their growth stage. The Hellenic World, for example, included non-Greek-speaking Carians and Lycians, as well as Greek-speaking peoples, within the ambit of its city-state culture since the earliest date to which our records of Hellenic history go back;² and among the Greek-speaking majority there was a diversity of dialect and script between one district and another, and even between one city-state and another within the same district, which was jealously preserved as the distinctive shibboleth and hall-mark of a diversity of local character and was only ironed out into complete uniformity by the last tribulations of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles'.³ Again, in our modern Western World in our own day—whether we are living already in a 'Time of Troubles' or still in an age of growth⁴—a local diversity of language within an oecumenical uniformity of culture is an even more conspicuous feature than it was in the Hellenic World in the early and the middle chapters of Hellenic history.

It is in disintegrating civilizations at an advanced stage of their decline that we are apt to see languages—following the fortunes of the communities that speak them as their mother-tongues—waging internecine wars with one another and conquering, when victorious, wide dominions at their discomfited rivals' expense; and, if there is any grain of historical fact in the legend⁵ of a confusion of tongues in the land of Shinar at the foot of an unfinished zigurat in a recently built city of Babel, the story perhaps takes us to Babylon in an age in which the Sumeric universal state was breaking up, and the Sumeric Civilization dissolving, after the death of Hammurabi (*imperabat circa* 1947–1905 B.C.).⁶ Babylon had been the capital of the Sumeric universal state in those latter days when 'the Empire of Sumer and Akkad' was being kept alive

¹ See Part III. A, Annex I, vol. iii, p. 393, above.

² On the other hand it was not until after the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization that the Greek-speaking barbarians north and north-west of the Thermopylae–Naupactus line were brought into the Hellenic fold (see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, p. 478, above).

³ See Buck, C. D.: *Introduction to the Study of the Greek Dialects* (Boston 1910, Ginn), pp. 154–5 and 157.

⁴ This not yet soluble problem of historical diagnosis has been noticed in I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 36–7, above, and is considered further in V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 313–14, below.

⁵ Gen. xi. 1–9.
⁶ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 106 and 110, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 63–4, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 297–8, below.

by a Babylonian dynasty of Amorite princes of whom Hammurabi himself was the most eminent representative;¹ and it might well be remembered in a 'folk-memory'² that 'the Lord did there confound the language of all the Earth, and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the Earth'; for in this catastrophic last chapter of Sumeric history the Sumerian language became a dead language after having played an historic role as the original linguistic vehicle of the Sumerian culture, while even the Akkadian language, which had attained to an upstart parity with Sumerian in the course of the Sumeric decline and fall, had now to contend with a host of external proletarian vernaculars—Hyksos and Hittite and Kassite—which had been brought into the derelict domain of the Sumeric universal state by barbarian war-bands that were ranging over it and settling down upon it during the post-Sumeric *Völkerwanderung*.³

We may thus perhaps venture to interpret this famous legend as the persistent echo of a bitter lament for the passing of a language which had formerly been current for a season, not indeed over the whole Earth, but at least over the whole domain of a single disintegrating civilization; and we may then go on to surmise that a uniform medium of linguistic communication which was looked back to with such poignant regret after it had passed out of currency may have been looked forward to with a proportionately keen longing in an earlier age when the very idea of an oecumenical language was still only a hope or a dream. This conjecture is fully in accord with the picture of the characteristic social circumstances of a 'Time of Troubles' which has already unfolded itself in this Study in other contexts. In a 'Time of Troubles', when a society is violently plucked up by the roots, those traditional articulations of the social structure which have grown up gradually and naturally through the ages are suddenly confounded. The once distinct and separate local communities now collide and intermingle with one another; the Orontes flows into the Tiber;⁴ and the agony which these tribulations are bound in any case to inflict on the human beings who are called upon to endure them is aggravated by the special pains of loneliness and helplessness so long as the victims of the social convulsion, when they are thrown together in their strange new relations of hostility or comradeship, continue

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 103 and 106, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 297-8, below.

² For the nature and operation of 'folk-memory' see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 438-64, below.

³ For this *Völkerwanderung* see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104-11, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 263-6, above.

⁴ The famous passage of Juvenal has been quoted already in V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 67, above.

to be divided by the barriers of linguistic diversity that are a legacy of their former state. The legend of the confusion of tongues is true to life in fastening upon this state of mutual unintelligibility as being a sovereign impediment to concerted social action in face of a new and unprecedented social crisis; and this association of linguistic diversity with social paralysis can be illustrated by examples that stand out conspicuously in the full light of history.

In our Western World in our own generation this was one of the fatal weaknesses of that Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy which perished in the General War of 1914-18; and even in the inhumanly efficient Slave-Household of the Ottoman Pādīshāh in its age of maturity, in A.D. 1651, we see the curse of Babel descending upon the *Ich-oghians* within the precincts of the Seraglio and reducing them to impotence at the critical moment of a palace revolution. In their excitement the boys forgot their artificially acquired 'Osmanli idiom; and the astonished ears of the spectators were smitten by the sound of 'a tumult . . . with different voices and languages—for some cried in Georgian, others Albanian, Bosnian, Mingrelian, Turkish and Italian'.¹ In this historical instance of 'speaking with tongues' the multitude were not miraculously hearing from the lips of others, but were automatically rearticulating on their own lips, their 'own tongue wherein' they had been 'born',² while they were momentarily forgetting the new common language in which they had been sedulously instructed for the very purpose of enabling them to act effectively by acting in concert. We may allow ourselves to surmise that the memory of this paralysing experience inspired this batch of *Ich-oghians* in after-life to master their 'Osmanli language of official intercourse with as thorough a command as they possessed over their now disconcerting mother-tongues. But all the circumstances of this trivial incident of Ottoman history are inverted in the momentous episode in which a 'speaking with tongues' is reported for the first time in the Acts of the Apostles.³ In that scene depicted in the saga of the infancy of the Christian Church the tongues which are spoken are foreign to the lips of the speakers; these speakers are unlettered Galileans, who have hitherto never spoken, and seldom heard, any other language than their native Aramaic; their sudden outbreak into other tongues is represented as being a miraculous gift from God, which they exercise 'as the Spirit' gives 'them utterance'; and this gift is the first in which their new inspiration is manifested; for, according to the tale, the miracle of the Apostles

¹ Rycaut, P.: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey & Brome), p. 18.

² Acts ii. 8.

³ Acts ii. 1-13.

speaking 'with other tongues' breaks out immediately after the descent of the Holy Ghost upon them.

While this tale may be diversely interpreted as history or as legend, there will be no dispute about the point in it which here concerns us. It is clear that, in the view of the writer of the Acts, the gift of tongues was the first enhancement of their natural faculties that was needed by Apostles who had been charged with the tremendous task of converting Mankind to a newly revealed 'higher religion'. Indeed, the world-wide range of their mission and the enhancement of their natural faculties through an in-pouring of the spirit of God are two things which the writer expressly brings into direct relation with one another in an earlier passage:

'Ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you; and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem and in all Judaea and in Samaria and unto the uttermost part of the Earth.'¹

Since the Acts of the Apostles is a mirror of the minds of the Christian missionaries of the first generation, these passages are evidence that the boon of an oecumenical medium of communication was as ardently desired by the pioneer propagators of a new-born Christianity as the loss of an historic *lingua franca* must have been keenly regretted by those survivors of the shipwreck of the Sumeric Society to whose grievous experience we may tentatively trace back the legend of the confusion of tongues in the Book of Genesis. In the view of the authorities behind the author of the Acts the pentecostal gift of tongues is in fact a miraculous substitute for a natural facility—the currency of a *lingua franca*—for lack of which the early Christian missionaries might otherwise have found themselves almost prohibitively handicapped.

If this is a true reading of the passage, the eagerness and gratitude of these early Christian missionaries for the gift of speech in a multitude of local vernacular languages may still, however, at first sight seem surprising when we consider that the Apostles' world in the first century of the Christian Era was far less ill supplied with *lingue franche* than our world is to-day. The mother-tongue of the Galileans of that age was an Aramaic which would carry any Palestinian speaker of it northwards as far as the Amanus and eastwards as far as the Zagros and westwards as far as the Nile, while the Greek in which the Acts themselves are written would carry the writer in Saint Paul's company overseas through 'the Isles of the Gentiles'² as far as Rome—and on beyond Rome to the Rhône and the Pyrenees and the Atlas, if the swords of Paul's

¹ Acts i. 8.

² Gen. x. 5.

Roman gaolers would drop their points to give further passage to the intrepid Greek-speaking preacher of an Aramaic-speaking Christ. Any child of that age who commanded both these two oecumenical languages had it in his power to address himself—through the written word, at any rate—to a public which extended, east and west, from the countrymen of the learned Magi to the subjects of the cultivated King Juba—as is testified by a celebrated contemporary of the anonymous author of the Acts. The Jewish historian Josephus¹ tells us in the preface to one of his works² how he first wrote the book in Aramaic for the information of half his world and then, for the instruction of the other half, published a translation of it in Greek.

In Josephus's opinion the previously published works on the Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66–70 which had been written in Greek by non-Jewish authors were without exception highly unsatisfactory.

'Such works consist of alternate invective and encomium, without a vestige of historical accuracy; and this has induced me to offer to the public of the Roman Empire, in a Greek translation, a work of my own, originally composed in my native language [i.e. in Aramaic] and published in the non-Hellenic Orient (*ἃ τοῖς ἀνω βαρβάροις τῇ πατρίῳ συντάξας ἀνέπεμψα πρότερον*). . . I felt it a paradox that the truth concerning events of such importance should be allowed to remain in doubt, and that the Parthians, the Babylonians, the most remote peoples of Arabia, my own compatriots beyond the Euphrates and the inhabitants of Adiabene should be accurately informed, through my labours, of the origin, vicissitudes and issue of the war, while the Greeks and all Romans who did not serve in the campaign should have nothing better at their disposal than flattering or fictitious accounts which conceal the truth.'

It will be seen that the world for which Josephus was writing was uncommonly well equipped in the matter of *lingue franche* if a command of no more than two languages would suffice to enable an author to bring his book within reach of all potential readers of it. Perhaps the reason for this trivial yet striking exception to the general disharmony and frustration which were the outstanding features of the social life of Josephus's time and place was that Josephus's world was composed of the overlapping domains of no less than three civilizations—the Babylonian, the Syriac, and the Hellenic—which had successively broken down and had so given play for the spread of *lingue franche* in the course of their own disintegration. In the world-wide Great Society of the present age it would be difficult for any writer to reach so large a propor-

¹ For Josephus's career as an example of Withdrawal-and-Return see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 294–6, above.

² Josephus: *The Romano-Jewish War*: Preface = Book I, chaps. 1–16.

tion of his potential public as Josephus was able to reach without having to do more than simply write his book in his own mother-tongue and then translate it into a single other language. In our world neither a Russian book with a French translation nor an Arabic book with an English translation would command so wide a range of readers as was accessible to a book written in Aramaic and translated into Greek by a Palestinian Jew in the first century of the Christian Era.

We may next observe that the peoples mentioned in the catalogue¹ of those in whose local mother-tongues the Apostles miraculously began to speak on the Day of Pentecost are almost all of them included either in the Aramaic-reading or in the Greek-reading portion of Josephus's public. The Parthians and Arabians are mentioned by name in the Acts as well as in Josephus's catalogue of Aramaic-readers; Josephus's Aramaic-reading Babylonians and Adiabeniens are next-door-neighbours of the 'Medes and Elamites and the dwellers in Mesopotamia' whom the writer of the Acts has included in his list; and we may presume that the Aramaic language was also current among these three peoples likewise. Why was it, then, that the Apostles' own native Galilaean Aramaic did not serve them, without any special gift of tongues, for speaking to such of their audience as belonged at any rate to those five out of the fifteen nationalities mentioned, as well as to the Aramaic-speaking dwellers in Judaea? And, as for the other nine—the dwellers in 'Cappadocia, in Pontus and Asia, Phrygia and Pamphylia, in Egypt and in the parts of Libya about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome (Jews and proselytes)', together with the 'Cretes'—could not the Apostles have anticipated Josephus by reaching them, one and all, in a single non-Aramaic language, namely Greek? Was not the gift of a dozen other tongues, in addition to their native Aramaic, a superfluous prodigality? Would it not have sufficed for these hereditarily Aramaic-speaking preachers of the Word to be miraculously endowed with an additional power of speech in Greek, and in Greek only?

This apparent inconsequence may find its explanation in the fact that the people whom the Apostles were addressing were drawn from the same range of countries as Josephus's public without being drawn from the same class. Whereas Josephus was undoubtedly writing for an intellectual *élite*, it seems likely that the 'Jews, devout men, out of every nation under heaven', who, dwelling in Jerusalem, there suddenly (as the story goes) heard issuing from the Apostles' lips the local vernaculars of their respective countries of origin, will for the most part have been

¹ Acts ii. 9-11.

people of a humbler and less highly sophisticated sort.¹ And one of the points of difference between these two different social strata was probably just this, that the people on the lowlier level were masters of their mother-tongue only, while those of the superior rank were masters of one or more *lingue franche* in addition to their mother-tongue, unless they happened (as was the happy fortune of an Aramaic-speaking Galilaean or Judaeon or a Greek-speaking Pamphylian or 'Crete') to have inherited as their mother-tongue one of the languages of wider currency.² One reason why Josephus was able to reach his far-flung public through the medium of no more than two languages was because this public belonged exclusively to a cultured, and therefore bilingual or trilingual, minority. If, instead of setting out to write a 'serious work' for 'high-brows', Josephus had been called, like the Apostles, to preach salvation to the unlettered multitude, neither his own native Aramaic nor his laboriously acquired Greek would have carried him anything like so far. His Aramaic preaching would have been understood of the people from Judaea and Mesopotamia and Babylonia and Adiabene, while his Greek preaching might have been partially intelligible to those from Crete and Cyrene and Pamphylia, as well as to some of those from Asia and from Rome; but, when he came to the pilgrims from the back parts of Arabia and Iran and Anatolia, he would soon have found himself praying for the miraculous gift of tongues as his only hope of being able to enter into communication with these outlandish potential converts whose exotic native vernaculars were the only media through which the Word could be conveyed to them.

This contrast between the respective linguistic problems with which the Apostles and Josephus had to cope brings out more clearly what the difference is between the linguistic situation in a disintegrating society and the situation in other social circumstances. In a disintegrating society, as in other places and times, the masses are masters of their mother-tongue only, and of no other language besides; but at the same time the process of social disintegration is accompanied by two linguistic processes which are specially characteristic of it: in the first place, the original

¹ Such, at any rate, is to-day the general character of the corresponding element in the Jewish community at Jerusalem—in contrast, for example, to the Zionists.

² To pursue our analysis of the respective social ingredients in the Palestinian Jewry of the first and of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, we should perhaps likewise find to-day that, among the 'devout men' belonging to the *Agudath Israel*, only a minority would be masters of a second language in addition to their mother-tongue (whether they were East-European Yiddish-speaking Jews or Central-Asian Tajik-speaking Jews or Yamani Arabic-speaking Jews). On the other hand we should find that all the Zionists possessed at least a smattering of Neo-Hebrew, and that many of them were also masters of one of the world-languages of the day—e.g. English or French—even when they were Jews who had been born and brought up in some European country in which neither English nor French was the local vernacular.

mother-tongue of some communities or countries is ousted by an intrusive language (as, in the case in point, Hebrew had been ousted by Aramaic in Judaea and Assyro-Babylonian by Aramaic in Babylonia and in Adiabene);¹ and in the second place certain of these aggressive languages also become *lingue franche* on the lips of an intellectual *élite* over a far wider geographical range than the regions in which they have succeeded in supplanting the original mother-tongue of the masses (as, in the case in point, Aramaic had gained currency as a *lingua franca* in Parthia and Media and Elam and Arabia without having at the same time supplanted the local Iranian and Arabic vernaculars).²

In the social circumstances in which the need for such a *lingua franca*, or supplementary language of more than local currency, has begun to make itself felt, there are several alternative means through which the growing demand may be supplied in different degrees of efficacy.

The simplest media of mental communication across the boundaries of parochial language-areas are not languages nor even scripts, but are mere systems of numerical notation. The classic example is the famous Incaic system of *quipus*—sets of cords which were variously coloured and knotted to convey a wide range of meanings with the aid of an elaborate scheme of mnemonics—and these unwritten records which spoke the same wordless language to men of different tongues were one of the essential instruments in the administration of an Incaic Empire which grew to the stature of an Andean universal state. A cruder form of the same material device, in the shape of ‘tallies’, was employed in one of the most efficiently administered kingdoms in the Transalpine part of medieval Western Christendom; and a more elegant form is in daily use in our own world to-day in the shape of the Arabic numerals—which have now won their way to an almost ubiquitous currency, though the numbers for which they stand are known in different languages by a vast variety of names conveyed in a considerable variety of scripts.

When we pass from numerals to ‘characters’,³ we see the Latin

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 79; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 484; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 117–19, above, and the present chapter, p. 499, footnote 5, below.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 123, footnote 2, above, and the present chapter, pp. 499, below.

³ On the border-line between numerical notations and scripts that convey, not numerals, but the sounds of articulate human speech, we may conjecturally place the still undeciphered scripts (representing several distinct systems) which have been recovered from the debris of the Minoan World by the enterprise of our modern Western archaeologists (see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 84, above). In the present context we may take note of the fact that, in the history of the Minoan system of writing or notation, as far as it is as yet possible for us to reconstruct it, an original variety seems to have given way to a subsequent uniformity at about the time of the foundation of a Minoan

Alphabet steadily winning its way towards as wide a currency as that of the Arabic numerals, thanks to the convenient fact that the same letters can be employed in different languages with an almost endless variety of phonetic values—while the only rival of the Latin Alphabet which is stubbornly refusing to be driven off the field is the ideographical Sinic script, in which every 'character' stands for a more or less precise and constant meaning, though there may be no recognizable affinity between the respective sounds in which, in different dialects, the same 'character', with the same meaning, is translated out of brushwork into the living speech that can be uttered by human mouths and heard by human ears.¹ If the Arabic numerals are an example of an international notation and the Latin Alphabet an example of an international script, the Sinic ideograms show how a script that has already gained an international currency may go half-way along the further road of evolution into an international language as well; for this ideographical script has achieved the feat of giving a more than parochial currency to mental meanings as well as to visual 'characters'. Yet, regarded strictly as an international language, the Sinic system of ideograms is evidently imperfect, since its success in standardizing the painted sign and the associated meaning has not been crowned by a standardization of the sounds in which this meaning is conveyed in living speech; and, for the social purposes of a *lingua franca*, aural intelligibility is even more important than visual. In order to be complete, a *lingua franca* must be equipped with uniform 'phonemes' or articulate sounds which convey constant meanings to the ear, as well as with the uniform 'characters' by which constant meanings are conveyed to the eye.

Such a *lingua franca*, complete in all its parts, may be deliberately invented—as, for instance, Esperanto has been invented in our own world and age. Indeed, it might have been expected *a priori* that this would turn out to be the usual origin of *lingue franche*; for, in a language which *ex hypothesi* has to be learnt by an effort of will in a utilitarian spirit, instead of being acquired unconsciously as a mother-tongue, it is manifest that the two supreme desiderata will be simplicity and regularity, and these

universal state—if that event is to be equated with the beginning of the period which the archaeologists have labelled 'Middle Minoan III' (for this equation see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 92-3; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 64; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 236, above; and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 312, below). In 'Middle Minoan II', which presumably coincided in date with the final paroxysm of a Minoan 'Time of Troubles', two separate hieroglyphic scripts, known as 'A' and 'B', simultaneously made their appearance. At the beginning of 'Middle Minoan III' a new linear script, composed eclectically out of all the earlier systems, suddenly came on the scene and superseded the two hieroglyphic scripts completely (Glotz, G.: *La Civilisation Égéenne* (Paris 1923, Renaissance du Livre), p. 429).

¹ See III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, p. 175, above.

two qualities are imparted to works of art more easily than they are found in unkempt Nature. As a matter of experience, however, it is notorious that there is no known instance of a synthetic *lingua franca* becoming a really effective instrument of social intercourse; for the utmost intellectual ingenuity that may have been expended on an artificial language by a cunning verbal artificer will not compensate for the absence of the emotional associations that accompany, and invigorate, any natural language—even one which has had half its roots cut away in the process of being converted from a mother-tongue into a linguistic second string for use when wanted over a wider range of intercommunication. An empirical survey will show us that every *lingua franca* that has played a historic role up to date has been a natural language which has first appeared on the scene as the mother-tongue of some local community and has subsequently extended its currency from an original range that may have been very narrow.¹

In examining the causes and the consequences of such transformations of local mother-tongues into oecumenical *lingue franche* we shall find, on the one hand, that a language which wins this kind of victory over its rivals usually owes its success to the social advantage of having served, in an age of social disintegration, as the tool of some community which has been potent in war or else in commerce. On the other hand, we shall find that languages, just like the human beings who speak them, are unable to win victories without paying a price. And the price which a language pays for gaining the currency of a *lingua franca* is the sacrifice of its native subtleties and niceties; for it is only on lips that have learnt it in infancy that any language is ever spoken with that effortless perfection which is the dower of Nature and the despair of Art. In fact, a language—even a natural language—cannot gain an artificial currency without a risk of becoming vulgarized. A flagrant example of this process in the modern Western World is the vulgarization of the Low Dutch mother-tongue of the Netherlanders into Afrikaans on the lips of ex-French-speaking Huguenot refugees in South African territories that were once dominions of the Dutch Republic. These strangers have clumsily broken the sharp edges, and crudely confounded the lights and shades, of an alien language which they have adopted without enthusiasm in the house of exile as one of the incidental hardships of a cruel destiny. The aesthetic and intellectual impoverishment which forces itself

¹ There is a suggestive parallel between the failure of artificial languages like Esperanto to win their way into current use as *lingue franche* and the failure of abstract philosophical or scientific conceptions of deity to win their way into current acceptance as representations of the One True God (see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 18–28, below). There is a corresponding parallel between the triumph of the natural languages and the triumph of Yahweh (see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 38–49, below).

painfully upon the attention of any unprejudiced outsider who sets himself to compare Afrikaans with its European parent is a change for the worse which is characteristic of the evolution of all the *lingue franche*; and we may observe at this point that so grievous a loss of a cherished spiritual heritage is unlikely to be accepted with indifference—and, *a fortiori*, with complacency—in any highly sensitive social milieu. *Lingue franche* are rare in primitive societies and also rare in civilizations while these are still in growth. *Lingue franche* only flourish on a spiritual soil that has been coarsened by that loss of sensitiveness and that appetite for promiscuity which are symptoms of the process of social disintegration.

This vulgarization of a *lingua franca* in the course of its spread, and its indebtedness for its vulgar success to the adventitious aid of war or commerce or both, are characteristic features, to judge by the frequency of their recurrence in the careers of *lingue franche* that have made their mark on History. This judgement can be verified by a survey of the historical evidence.

In the history of the disintegration of the Hellenic Society we see two languages one after the other—first Attic Greek and subsequently Latin—starting as the respective mother-tongues of the two tiny districts of Attica and Latium and then spreading out from these small beginnings until, on the eve of the Christian Era, we find Attic being employed in the chancery of a Greek principality on the east bank of the Jhelum and Latin in the camps of Roman legions on the west bank of the Rhine. In the career of Attic Greek the first step in the expansion which eventually went to these vast lengths can be observed in the time of the Athenian ‘thalassocracy’ in the fifth century B.C., when the city-state of Athens made herself the naval mistress of the Aegean and took advantage of her political ascendancy in order to divert to the Peiraeus the trade of Aegina and Miletus. Thereafter the fortunes of Attic Greek were made, once for all, when this foreign dialect was adopted as the official language of the Macedonian Court by King Philip the son of Amyntas (*regnabat* 359–336 B.C.).¹ As for Latin, its fortunes followed the flag of the Latin-speaking city-state of Rome which succeeded in the fullness of time in establishing that Hellenic universal state which the abortive Athenian ‘thalassocracy’ had prematurely and hazily foreshadowed.² Even, however, when we have taken due account of these adventitious advantages, we shall be lost in admiration at the stupendous triumph of a pair of

¹ Attic belonged to the Ionic branch of the Greek linguistic family, whereas the native Macedonian Greek dialect appears to have been a variety of Aeolic (see Hoffmann, O.: *Die Makedonen* (Göttingen 1906, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), especially pp. 111–15).

² See IV. C (iii) (b) 10, vol. iv, p. 208, above.

local dialects which won their way, each in its turn, to an ocumenical currency—and then, if we exchange the economist's and the publicist's spectacles for those of the philologist and the man-of-letters, we shall be struck no less forcibly by the spiritual impoverishment which the material victory brought with it.

In the history of Attic Greek the ravages of vulgarization were already conspicuous before the Athenian 'thalassocracy' had come to grief. The contemporary Athenian observer whom we have quoted more than once already in other contexts tells us that his countrymen

'have their ears constantly bombarded by all the languages of the World, and have responded by picking up one expression from one language and another from another—with the result that, while the Hellenes in general tend to cultivate a particularism in their speech, as well as in the rest of their manners and customs, the Athenians have made themselves conspicuous by talking a jargon compounded of ingredients for which the whole World—barbarian as well as Hellenic—has been laid under contribution'.¹

In this picture, which was drawn before the close of the fifth century B.C., we can perceive already at work the tendencies which were eventually to transform the exquisite parochial Attic mother-tongue of Aeschylus and Sophocles into the vulgar Attic *κοινή* of the Septuagint and Polybius and the New Testament.² A similar price for a comparable extension of its currency in the Time-dimension as well as in the Space-dimension has been paid by Latin in its vulgarization from the classical language of the Augustan Age to the 'Dog Latin' that was handed down through the slums and the *ergastula* of the western provinces of the Roman Empire to an affiliated Western Christian Society which continued to use this inelegant yet accommodating *lingua franca* for all serious forms of international intercourse until a modern *Homo Occidentalis* who had made up his mind to emancipate himself at all costs at last abandoned 'Dog Latin' for French no longer ago than the seventeenth century.³

¹ Auctor Atheniensis Anonymus: *Institutions of Athens* (edited by Kalinka, E.: Berlin and Leipzig 1913, Teubner), chap. 2, § 8.

² A concise professional account of the evolution of the Attic *κοινή* will be found in Buck, op. cit., pp. 156–9. A curious stage in the process by which a vulgarized Attic gradually supplanted all the non-Attic dialects of Ancient Greek is represented by the Doric and the North-West Greek *kowal*: intermediate forms in which these non-Attic dialects were fused together, and at the same time vulgarized in an Attic direction, as a first step towards that complete Atticization which was their eventual fate. It may also be noted that the history of the Attic Greek language has been reproduced, *mutatis mutandis*, in that of the Attic Greek Alphabet. This Alphabet has succeeded in making itself the vehicle for a number of languages—Coptic and Armenian and Georgian, as well as Bulgarian and Ukrainian and Russian and Serbo-Croat, in addition to Modern Greek—but it has made its foreign conquests at the price of being distorted—in some cases, almost out of recognition.

³ In the realm of learning we may date the change at the generation of the Hano-

In the long-drawn-out disintegration of the Egyptiac Civilization we see the New Egyptian language breaking through the long-since-dead crust of Classical Egyptian in the fourteenth century B.C. in order to establish itself for a short season as the *lingua franca* of a tottering 'New Empire', and for a much longer season as the literary language of an Egyptiac World which had been shorn of all its foreign annexes. The beginning of the end of 'the New Empire' of Egypt was contemporaneous with the beginning of the use of the New Egyptian language as a medium of official and literary intercourse. Both movements date from the reign of the Emperor Ikhnaton (*imperabat circa 1370-1352 B.C.*);¹ and within less than two hundred years of Ikhnaton's accession the loss of the senile empire's non-Egyptiac provinces was complete; yet this short currency as a *lingua franca* with an ever-dwindling geographical range set a stamp upon the New Egyptian language which was never effaced. In the later age when New Egyptian, in its turn, had become a dead language like the Classical Egyptian which it had supplanted, 'particular attention' had to be paid by those who studied it to 'the many foreign words and barbarous names in which' it 'abounded'.²

In the disintegration of the Sumeric Civilization the victory went to the Akkadian language, which in all probability³ had made its first appearance above the Sumeric horizon as the barbarian mother-tongue of a swarm of Semitic-speaking squatters who had verian philosopher Leibnitz (*vivebat A.D. 1646-1716*), who wrote in Latin and in French indifferently (perhaps in both senses of the word). In the realm of public affairs we may remind ourselves that the English poet Milton (*vivebat A.D. 1608-74*) was employed by Cromwell as his Latin Secretary. In the old-fashioned eastern fringes of Western Christendom 'Dog Latin' remained in use as a *lingua franca* for some two hundred years longer—and this not only on paper but *viva voce*. The Hungarian parliament, for example, transacted its business in Latin down to A.D. 1840 (and in A.D. 1938 it could be seen, in retrospect, that the abandonment of the use of this neutral language was one of the detonators of an internecine struggle of intermingled nationalities which had burst out in 1848 and had thenceforward never ceased until it had broken the Crown of St. Stephen into fragments in 1918). In Poland, too, 'Dog Latin' lingered on; and the writer of this Study can remember once meeting a countryman of his own who—travelling as a young man in the Polish provinces of the Russian Empire during the insurrection of A.D. 1863-4—had successfully turned his knowledge of Latin to account for communicating with the insurgent Polish gentry. If the Polish gentry had still gone on speaking Latin in the generation of Marshal Pilsudski, Europe might have been spared the post-war feud between Poland and Lithuania!

¹ 'In the great revolution at the end of the Eighteenth Dynasty, which we associate with the name of Amenophis IV [Amehotep IV = Ikhnaton], . . . men began to write poetry in the actual language of the day, and in it is composed the beautiful hymn to the Sun, the manifesto of the reformed religion. But, whereas the other innovations of the heretical régime disappeared after the collapse, this particular one survived—doubtless because the conditions hitherto existing had become impossible. Under the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties there burst forth into flower a vigorous literature written in the new language.'—Erman, A.: *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, English translation (London 1927, Methuen), p. xxvi. Cf. Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (1), second edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 508.

² Erman, op. cit., p. 187.

³ In attempting to reconstruct the early chapter of Sumeric history to which we must assign the first settlement of the Akkadians in the Land of Shinar, we are thrown back upon inference in the absence of positive historical evidence.

been attracted out of the Arabian Steppe into the fringes of a rising and growing Sumeric World in an early chapter of Sumeric history. The fortune of the Akkadian language was made by the fact of its being the mother-tongue of all but the first of the four outstanding militarists of the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles';¹ and, when a Sumerian-speaking saviour of the disintegrating society arose at last in the person of Ur-Engur of Ur, who brought the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' to an end through the establishment of a universal state,² the Akkadian language was placed on an official parity with the Sumerian, and this elevation of its status was proclaimed in the very title of 'the Empire of Sumer and Akkad'. The position thus accorded to the Akkadian language *de jure* almost certainly, however, did less than justice to the currency which had already been gained by Akkadian *de facto*; for, while in the following age, when the Sumeric universal state was being laboriously held together by an Amorite dynasty from Babylon, Sumerian gave way to Akkadian, even in Sumer itself, as the language of everyday intercourse, and only lived on in the precarious life-in-death of ceremonial usage and learned reminiscence, the Akkadian language still went from strength to strength. In the heyday of the Sumeric universal state, when Elam was one of the provinces of 'the Empire of the Four Quarters', Akkadian temporarily supplanted Elamite, not indeed as the spoken vernacular language of the country, but as the notarial language for private business transactions as well as the language of state.³ And, after Elam had regained its independence and the Empire of Sumer and Akkad had broken up and the Sumeric Society itself had gone into dissolution, the Akkadian language not only held its own among the ruins, but actually rose to the zenith of its career as a *lingua franca*; for during the post-Sumeric interregnum, when the derelict provinces of the Sumeric universal state were parcelled out into barbarian 'successor-states'—Hittite and Hyksos and Kassite and Mitannian—which were all alike under the dominion of non-Semitic-speaking intruders, the ancient Semitic language of Akkad continued to serve as the common language of diplomatic and commercial intercourse for the whole of South-Western Asia for at least six centuries after the death of Hammurabi; and it was in this age that this Akkadian tongue won what was perhaps the

¹ The Sumerian militarist was Lugalzaggisi; his Akkadian successors were Sargon of Agade, Sharrukin, and Naramsin (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 184, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 296, below).

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 106, above; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, in the present volume, pp. 650-1; V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 190; and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 296-7, below.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 117, footnote 4, above. At the same time the Sumerian form of the cuneiform script, which had been adapted to convey the Akkadian language likewise, temporarily ousted in Elam the Elamite variant of cuneiform which had been struck out for the purpose of conveying the Elamite language in an earlier age.

greatest triumph in its history. For, when 'the New Empire' of Egypt established its footing on the wreck of the Hyksos power and eventually extended its rule over the former possessions of the Hyksos Empire in Syria, an Egyptiac Society which had always been inclined towards exclusiveness, and which had recently been exacerbated to an unprecedented pitch of xenophobia by its experience of the Hyksos domination,¹ condescended to borrow from the barbarian upstarts whom it had just overthrown one of the most conspicuous elements in their detested veneer of Sumeric culture. The Government of the reconstituted Egyptiac universal state deigned to correspond even with its own client princes in Syria, as well as with the independent Powers beyond Euphrates and Amanus, in the prevailing South-West Asian *lingua franca*; and, while this use of Akkadian was no doubt virtually forced upon Pharaoh's chancery by the practical necessity of entering into diplomatic relations with the denizens of the strange new world into which 'the New Empire' had allowed itself to be carried by the impetus of a *revanche*, nevertheless the trove of diplomatic documents in the cuneiform script and the Akkadian language which has turned up in Ikhnaton's archives at Tell-el-Amarna is an astonishing testimony to the Akkadian language's power of penetration as a medium of international intercourse.

In the disintegration of the Indic Civilization we may see so many rival competitors for the role of *lingua franca* in the several vernaculars (prākritis) that were respectively employed by Aśoka in his inscriptions in different provinces of the Indic universal state; and yet another competitor is to be seen in the closely related Pāli dialect of the voluminous Hinayanian Buddhist scriptures. Pāli was the linguistic medium in which an Indic culture which was all the time expanding as it disintegrated made its conquest of Ceylon; and on the opposite fringe of the Indic World, in the Tarim Basin, we find the sense of promiscuity acquiescing in the evolution of local *lingue franche* that were blends of the mother-tongue of the native population with intrusive elements of Indic speech. The language that has been labelled 'Nordarisch' by the modern Western archaeologists who have unearthed it has an Iranian base, but it contains an infusion of prākrit, and the resulting amalgam is conveyed in the Brāhmī Indic script.² Another local hybrid language, which was current as a medium of administration in the third century of the Christian Era, has a prākrit base but a large foreign element in its vocabulary, and this

¹ For the psychological effect of the Hyksos domination upon the Egyptiac *ethos* see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 144, and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, pp. 351-2, above.

² See Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold 3 vols.), vol. iii, p. 790,

inversely compounded amalgam is likewise conveyed in an Indic script, which in this case is the Kharosthī.¹

In the disintegration of the Babylonian and Syriac civilizations the ruins of the two simultaneously collapsing societies became ever more indistinguishably intermingled, the thicker they came to be strewn over their common *Trümmerfeld*; and across the broken surface of this promiscuous debris the Aramaic language spread itself with the luxuriance of a weed which flourishes where no crop can grow and which stretches its creeping tendrils, with an indiscriminating alacrity, over every shattered column or splintered pinnacle that can offer them a hold. The expansion of this Aramaic *lingua franca* of the declining Babylonian and Syriac worlds was fostered first by the Assyrian and later by the Achaemenian political power; but the impulsion which it thus received from the operation of political forces was not, in either case, a deliberate act like King Philip's when he chose Attic for his Macedonian Kingdom's language of state, or like the Emperor Aōka's when he made his selection of prākritis for employment in his inscriptions. The Assyrians propagated the Aramaic language and Alphabet involuntarily as an incidental consequence of their ruthless conquests and deportations;² and the Achaemenidae made a determined attempt to give, through their official patronage, an oecumenical currency to three languages—none of which was Aramaic or was even conveyed in the Aramaic script³—before they bowed to a *fait accompli* and accepted Aramaic, with its own Alphabet to convey it, as the regional language of official business for all the western provinces of their empire—including Egypt and Anatolia, where Aramaic had never established itself as the vernacular language of ordinary life.⁴ This was the origin of the Aramaic *lingua franca* in which, in the first century of the Christian Era, Josephus wrote his *magnum opus* before translating it into the Attic κοινή.⁵

¹ See Burrow, T.: *The Language of the Kharosthī Documents from Chinese Turkestan* (Cambridge 1937, University Press).

² See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 79; IV. C. (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 484; and V. C. (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 117-19, above.

³ The three favoured languages were Elamite, Medo-Persian, and Assyro-Babylonian (the last phase of Akkadian); and these three were selected, perhaps rather academically, as the languages current at the time in the three Imperial capitals: Susa, Ecbatana, and Babylon. All three were conveyed in variants of the cuneiform script, and the drastically simplified cuneiform syllabary which was used for the Medo-Persian language would appear to have been specially invented for the purpose (see V. C. (i) (c) 2, p. 123, footnote 2, above).

⁴ See V. C. (i) (c) 2, p. 123, footnote 2, above.

⁵ See pp. 488-91, above. The area within which the Aramaic language supplanted the previous local vernaculars was, of course, narrower than the range over which it established itself merely as a *lingua franca*; yet even as a vernacular it conquered the whole of 'the fertile crescent' that skirts the northern fringes of the Arabian Steppe. Radiating from its homelands in Eastern Syria and in Western Mesopotamia, Aramaic supplanted the previous local Semitic vernaculars first in the Judæo-Samaritan military colony at

The currency of the Aramaic language, however, seems short-lived and narrow-verged by comparison with that of the Aramaic Alphabet.¹ The standard Aramaic Alphabet that had been current under the Achaemenian régime broke up—upon the break-up of the Achaemenids' Seleucid 'successor-state' in the second century B.C.—into a number of variants,² several of which have had the privilege of becoming in their turn the vehicles for great governments or great literatures or great religions. The list of offshoots of the Aramaic Alphabet within the former Achaemenian frontiers includes 'Square Hebrew', Nabataean (a humble script which has left its mark on human history as the parent of the Arabic), Palmyrene, Syriac (which has gradually differentiated itself into separate Nestorian and Jacobite styles), and Pehlevi (the parent of Avestan)—besides the obscurer variants that have been worked out in the bosom of the Mandaean and the Manichaeen churches for the conveyance of their scriptures.³ In the extreme eastern march of the Achaemenian Empire the Aramaic Alphabet gave birth to the Kharosthī script which was used by the Emperor Açoka to convey his prakrit texts in two out of the fourteen inscriptions of his that are known to us;⁴ and in the extreme north-eastern march, again, at a later date, it gave birth to yet another variant—the so-called 'Sogdian'⁵—which gradually made its way eastwards from the banks of the Jaxartes to the banks of the Amur within less than two thousand years after the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great.⁶

It will be seen that the spread of the Aramaic script and language

Elephantinê on the southern frontier of Upper Egypt, then in Palestine (where Hebrew was already falling into disuse in the third quarter of the fifth century B.C.: see Nehemiah xiii. 24, and the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 8 (v), vol. vi, p. 70, footnote 3, below), next in Assyria and Babylonia, and last of all in Phoenicia (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 137; idem: *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs), pp. 17-19; Hoonacker, A. van: *Une Communauté judéo-Araméenne à Éléphantine, en Égypte, aux vi^e et v^e siècles av. J.-C.* (London 1915, Milford), pp. 31-2).

¹ See Jensen, H.: *Geschichte der Schrift* (Hanover 1925, Lafaire), pp. 122-33.

² Ibid., p. 122.

³ Mani's innovation consisted in abandoning the clumsy Pehlevi Alphabet, with its use of Aramaic words as ideograms (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 80, with footnote 3, above, and the present chapter and volume, p. 501, footnote 4, below) and with its rudimentary vowel pointing, and in adopting, in its place, an adaptation of the Syriac Alphabet for writing in the Middle Persian language as well as in the Syriac language (Christensen, A., *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin & Munksgaard), pp. 185-6 and 194).

⁴ A prakrit written in Kharosthī was also current as an official language in the Tarim Basin in the third century of the Christian Era (see Burrow, T.: *The Language of the Kharosthī Documents from Chinese Turkestan* (Cambridge 1937, University Press)).

⁵ The Sogdian Alphabet was derived, not from the Pehlevi Alphabet that was officially current in the Parthian and in the Sasanian Empire, but from the Manichaeen version of the Syriac Alphabet (Christensen, op. cit., loc. cit.).

⁶ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 130-1, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 196, above. Alexander completed the subjugation of the Achaemenian provinces in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin in 328 B.C.; and in A.D. 1599 the Manchu Alphabet was borrowed from the Modern Mongol which had been derived from the fourteenth-century Galik which had been based on the Uigur which had arisen out of the Sogdian

both within and far beyond the bounds of the Syriac World was not interrupted by the unceremonious intrusion of Hellenism; and when, after the passage of nearly a thousand years, the work of Alexander's Macedonians was at last undone by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, and the Syriac universal state which had found its first embodiment in the Achaemenian Empire was re-embodied in the Umayyad and 'Abbasid Caliphates,¹ the career of the Aramaic language was emulated by the sister Semite Arabic language, and the career of the Aramaic Alphabet by the derivative Alphabet in which the Arabic language was conveyed.

While Aramaic owed less of its fortune than was owed by Attic Greek to political influences, Arabic has been indebted to the Arab Caliphate as deeply as Latin to the Roman Empire. Unofficially the conquerors' language radiated from their military cantonnements and tribal settlements in the conquered territories.² Officially Arabic was substituted for Greek (not for Coptic) in the ex-Roman provinces, and for Pehlevi in the ex-Sasanian provinces, in the reign of the Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik (*imperabat* A.D. 685-705).³ And, though the Arabic Alphabet has not succeeded in pushing its way eastwards so far into the heart of Asia as the Aramaic Alphabet, it has at least made a deeper impression as far as it has gone; for, in adopting the Arabic Alphabet in place of the Aramaic to convey their non-Semitic mother-tongues, the Persians and the Turks have allowed the new script to bring in its train an invading host of alien Arabic words into their native vocabularies.⁴

variant of the Aramaic Alphabet (see Jensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-16). It is possible that the Sogdian Alphabet may also be the ancestor of the script used in the Turkish inscriptions of the eighth century of the Christian Era in the basins of the Orkhon and Yenisei rivers; but the origin of this script, like that of the Baltic Runes, is uncertain, and it is possible that it, too, may be derived, not from the Aramaic Alphabet, but from the Greek (Jensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-10).

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 76-7, above.

² The spread of Arabic through this channel was powerfully promoted by the Arab conquerors' practice of recruiting 'clients' from among the members of the subject communities (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (a), pp. 449-50, above).

³ Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), pp. 136-7. In Egypt the official replacement of Coptic by Arabic is known to have taken place in the Islamic year A.H. 87, in the reign of the Caliph Walid (*imperabat* A.D. 705-715). For the introduction of Arabic at Damascus and at Kūfah, see Balādhuri, abu'l-Abbās Ahmad b. Jābir al-: *Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān*, English translation by P. K. Hitti, vol. i (New York 1916, Columbia University Press), pp. 301 and 465-6.

⁴ In thus adopting an Arabic vocabulary as well as an Arabic script, New Persian has gone a step farther than Pehlevi ever went in laying itself open to a Semitic influence. This difference is not apparent to the eye; for in a Pehlevi text, just as in a New Persian text, Semitic words (in this case Aramaic) will be found interspersed among Iranian words written in the same Semitic script. Whereas, however, the Arabic words in New Persian are pronounced as they are spelt (like the French and Latin and Greek words in Modern English), it is believed that the Aramaic words in Pehlevi were employed as ideograms and were pronounced, not according to their spelling, but as though they were their Iranian equivalents (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 80, with footnote 3, above). If this is the fact, then in Pehlevi (unlike New Persian) the Semitic element was confined entirely to the script, and did not extend to the vocabulary, even where an Iranian word was represented by an ideogram which would make a Semitic word if it were pronounced phonetically; and in the spoken, as opposed to the written, form of the Pehlevi language there will then have been hardly a trace of Semitic influence. On the other hand, in the spoken as well as in the written form of both New Persian and Turkish, the Arabic inlay in the vocabulary is conspicuous. It is true that, in both

If we turn next to the abortive cosmos of city-states with its main focus in Northern Italy which arose within the ambit of Western Christendom during the so-called 'medieval' period of Western history,¹ we shall see the Tuscan dialect of Italian eclipsing its rivals, as Attic eclipsed the rival dialects of Ancient Greek, and at the same time being propagated round all the shores of the Mediterranean by Venetian and Genoese seamen and traders and empire-builders, as well as by Pisans and Florentines who spoke Tuscan as their mother-tongue; and this Pan-Mediterranean currency of the Italian language in its Tuscan shape outlived the prosperity, and even the independence, of the medieval Italian city-states. In the sixteenth century of the Christian Era Italian was the service language of an Ottoman Navy that was then fast driving its Venetian and Genoese opponents out of Levantine waters; and in the nineteenth century, again, the same Italian was the service language of a Hapsburg Navy whose Imperial-Royal masters were successful from 1814 to 1859 in reducing Italy herself to the mere 'geographical expression' that Metternich had pronounced her to be. In fact, the 'Osmanlis and the Hapsburgs each in turn found themselves constrained to employ an Italian medium of communication as an indispensable element in the construction of a war-machine which they were creating for the purpose of holding the Italian people in check; and thus the Italian language succeeded twice over in forcing itself down the throats of strangers who were so far from speaking it by nature that they were actually the mortal enemies of the people who had inherited it as their mother-tongue. This Tuscan Italian, however, was no more able than the Attic Greek had been to make such extraordinary foreign conquests with impunity; and we are confronted with an Italian analogue of the Greek *κοινή* in the historical *Lingua Franca*, which may be accurately described, in the very words which our anonymous Athenian author has used of his own fast-changing Attic tongue, as 'a jargon compounded of ingredients . . . for which the whole World has been laid under contribution'.² This *Lingua Franca* of the Levant, with its Italian base almost buried under the load of its miscellaneous foreign accretions, is such an admirable example of the genus which it represents that its historic name has come to bear a generic meaning.

Latterly, however, this historic *Lingua Franca* has been replaced languages, there has eventually been a reaction against this process of Arabicization. In New Persian the weeding out of Arabicisms was begun a thousand years ago by Firdawsi; and in our own day President Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk set himself to liberate the Ottoman Turkish language from its Arabic vocabulary as well as from its Arabic script.

¹ For this city-state cosmos within the medieval Western World see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 341-50, above.

² See the passage quoted on p. 495, above.

by a substitute, even in its congenial Levantine haunts; and this successor that has supplanted it is not a purified Italian but a vulgarized French.

In the history of the decline and fall of the medieval Western city-state cosmos, French came treading on the heels of Italian as, in the decline and fall of Hellenism, Latin followed Attic Greek, or as Arabic followed Aramaic in the longer-drawn-out disintegration of the Syriac Civilization. The fortune of the French language has been made by the fact that during the 'Time of Troubles' of the broken-down cosmos of Italian and German and Flemish city-states—a phase in the history of this sub-society's disintegration which set in towards the close of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era and which lasted until the close of the eighteenth¹—France carried off the victory in the contest among the Great Powers round the periphery of this still expanding world for the mastery over its now decaying centre.² From the age of Louis XIV (*regnabat* A.D. 1643–1715) onwards, France forged ahead of the ungainly Hapsburg Power which had been her principal competitor; French culture began to exert an attraction which kept pace with the progress of French arms;³ and, when Napoleon at length achieved his Bourbon forerunner's ambition of piecing together a mosaic with a French design out of all the broken fragments of medieval city-states which strewn the face of Europe at the French nation's doors from the Italian shores of the Gulf of Genoa and the Adriatic to the German shores of the North Sea and the Baltic, the Napoleonic Empire proved itself to be a cultural force as well as a military system.

It was, indeed, its cultural mission that was the Napoleonic Empire's undoing; for the ideas of which it was the 'carrier' (in the clinical sense of the word) were the expression of a modern Western culture which had sprung to maturity among the ruins of the medieval city-state cosmos and had transmuted the legacy of a medieval Italian culture into a new spiritual force. In the

¹ The various local catastrophes in the last quarter of the fourteenth century which may be taken as signs of the breakdown of the medieval Western cosmos of city-states have been touched upon in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 347–50, above.

² For this contest, and for the light which it throws upon the general principles of the working of the Balance of Power, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 300–5, above, as well as V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), Annex I, in the present volume, pp. 624–33, below.

³ In Germany the triumph of a French culture conveyed in the French language was already assured before the birth of Germany's French military conqueror Napoleon as all but a Genoese subject in Corsica; for the French-writing movement which Leibniz had begun was carried to its climax by Frederick the Great. In the most critical period of the Seven Years' War Frederick spent the short daily ration of leisure and relaxation which he allowed himself on the literary exercise of writing French Alexandrine couplets! This was surely as great a triumph for the French language as was scored by Italian when it was adopted as the service language of the Ottoman and the Hapsburg Navy. (For Frederick's literary recreations, see *Frederick the Great: The Memoirs of his Reader Henri de Catt* (1758–1760), translated by Flint, F. S. (London 1916 Constable, 2 vols.).)

Revolutionary and Napoleonic Age that force was still in the flood tide of its youthful energy; and 'the Ideas of the French Revolution', imbued as they were with this dynamically restless spirit, were not calculated to act as a sedative which might reconcile the Italians and Flemings and Rhinelanders and Hanseatics to the yoke of the French empire-builders by whom these ideas were being introduced. So far from that, the revolutionary impact of Napoleonic France gave these stagnating peoples a stimulating shock which roused them from their torpor and inspired them to rise up and overthrow the French Empire as a first step towards taking their places as new-born nations in a modern Western World side by side with France herself.¹ Thus the Napoleonic Empire carried within itself the seeds of its own inevitable failure in the Epimethean role of serving as the universal state of a decadent world which, once, in its long-past noonday, had created the splendours of Florence and Venice and Bruges and Ghent and Nürnberg and Lübeck.²

The actual task which the Napoleonic Empire did involuntarily perform was to tow the stranded galleons of a derelict medieval armada back into the racing current of Western life, and at the same time to stimulate their listless crews into making their vessels sea-worthy for sailing on a broader ocean than the landlocked seas on which they had hazarded their lives in times past; and this actual French performance was a short and thankless business in the nature of the case. The French Empire has been—as it was bound to be—abortive; the genius of Napoleon I could not avail to sustain this political *tour de force* for even a full score of years after the first passage of the Rhine and the Alps by the armies of Revolutionary France; and all the king's horses and men could not reinstate Humpty Dumpty when once he had suffered the great fall of 1812-14. 'The Hundred Days' were a *fiasco* and the Second Empire ended in a *débâcle*. Since 1871 the French Empire has been dead and buried not only as a European reality but even as a French dream.³ Yet in the Great Society of to-day there is

¹ This repayment of the modern Western World's debt to the medieval Italian culture through the quickening of Italian life from a new Transalpine source of spiritual energy has been touched upon in IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 19, and in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 283-4, above. The Italian experience was not, of course, unique; for the German and Flemish epigoni of the medieval cosmos of city-states were inoculated from the same source and in the same generation with the same new fund of spiritual energy. Heine's *Reisebilder* give a vivid picture of the reanimation of the Rhenish city of Düsseldorf as the result of a dose of French conquest and Napoleonic rule. For a systematic account of the effect of this spiritual medicine upon the German province of the *ci-devant* city-state cosmos see Fisher, H. A. L.: *Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany* (Oxford 1903, Clarendon Press).

² For this aspect of the Napoleonic Empire see V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, below.

³ For the transfer of the field of French imperial aspirations and activities from Europe to the Maghrib see Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1937, vol. i (London 1938, Milford), pp. 489-92.

one substantial legacy of the two-hundred-years-long role, with its brief Napoleonic culmination, which was sustained by France in the last phase of the decline and fall of the medieval city-state cosmos. The French language has succeeded in establishing itself as the *lingua franca* of that central portion of our Western World, and it has even extended its dominion to the far extremities of the former domains of the Spanish and Ottoman Empires, which, from the fifteenth century to the seventeenth, were two of the competitors of France for the hegemony over the colonies and the metropolitan territories of the Italian commonwealths. In Germany and Italy a 'totalitarian' nationalism has latterly been doing its best to efface the marks of French influence; but a knowledge of French will still carry the traveller through Belgium and Switzerland and the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America and Rumania and Greece and Syria and Turkey and Egypt;¹ and the Latin Alphabet, riding on the shoulders of the French language, has superseded a Slavonic Alphabet as the vehicle of Rumanian, and an Arabic Alphabet as the vehicle of Turkish.²

In its haste to reap the fruits of commercial and military and political labours that have all been so much labour lost, the French language—like the other languages that have followed the same questionable career—has stooped to the indignity of vulgarization. And any member of the cultivated nation that enjoys, as not the least valuable part of its birth-right, the privilege of speaking perfect French without ever having consciously to acquire this accomplishment, must feel a horrid tingling in his sensitive ears if ever he is compelled to hear his delicate mother-tongue being butchered to make an Argentinian intelligible to a Pole, or a Brazilian to a Greek—unless, perchance, he may be saved from this excruciation by a blissful unawareness of the fact that South

¹ The vogue of the French language in Egypt has triumphantly survived a British military occupation which lasted for 54 years before it was at length brought to an end as the result of the signature of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty of friendship and alliance on the 26th August, 1936. French never ceased to be the official medium of communication between the representatives of the Egyptian Government and their British advisers; and, when the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Lord Allenby, on the 23rd November, 1924, read to the Egyptian Prime Minister, Zaghlûl Pasha, in *English*, two communications conveying an ultimatum which had been provoked by the assassination of the Sirdar, Sir Lee Stack, the unusual choice of language was doubtless intended to be taken as a mark of displeasure or even discourtesy. Even then, the British High Commissioner deposited written copies of his communications in *French* in order to make sure that their purport should be understood by their Egyptian recipient (see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 216).

² For the substitution of the Latin for the Arabic Alphabet in Turkey in A.D. 1928 on the initiative of President Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk see Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M., *Survey*, 1928 (London 1929, Milford), III A. (viii). It is perhaps even more significant that the Latin, and not the Russian, Alphabet was adopted—and this with the approval, and even encouragement, of the ruling authorities in the U.S.S.R.—as the new vehicle for conveying the twenty-seven Turkish dialects that were spoken in various parts of the territory of the U.S.S.R. at this time (see op. cit., pp. 223-7).

America and Eastern Europe are boasting themselves to be talking Racine's tongue when they are holding intercourse with each other in their voluble *lingua franca*.¹

If this French *lingua franca* is a monument, in the modern Western World, of the decline and fall of a medieval sub-society within the Western body social, we may see in the English *lingua franca*—which, since the War of 1914–18, has been raised to even an official parity with French as an alternative medium of diplomatic international intercourse—a product of that gigantic process of *pammixia* (whatever it may portend) which has expanded—and, in the process, diluted—our modern Western World into a 'Great Society' of literally world-wide range. In this world-wide arena the English language has now gained the ascendancy over French, as well as over Dutch and Spanish and Portuguese; and its definitive victory,² in a struggle which lasted for some two hundred years, was won in the Seven Years' War.³

¹ We may assume with some confidence that no Frenchman—not even so rare an anglomane as Monsieur Clemenceau himself—would have recognized his own mother-tongue in the 'French' to which Mr. Lloyd George is reported to have laid claim when he deftly eluded the effort of a malicious interlocutor who had sought to put him out of countenance by asking him in public how on earth, without knowing French, he had managed to get on at the Peace Conference of Paris. 'But I do understand French', Mr. Lloyd George is reported to have answered very placidly; and, having thus tripped his adversary up, he finished his sentence by adding demurely—'when it is spoken by Lord Grey.' This story is corroborated, if it is not inspired, by Lord Grey's own testimony, apropos of a conference in Paris in 1916 between the French Cabinet and a deputation from the British Cabinet consisting of Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Grey, and Lord Oxford.

'Such part as was taken by us was left to, or, it would be more correct to say, thrust upon myself. Asquith would not, Lloyd George could not, and I *had* to speak French. . . . When the council was over, and we three British Ministers were safely outside, Lloyd George said to me: "You know, your French was the only French that I could understand." If this suggests to a mocking spirit a doubt whether the French Ministers understood it, I can reply that on other occasions when I have had to speak French, I have had proof that it was intelligible even to French ears' (Grey of Falloden, Viscount: *Twenty-Five Years* (London 1925, Hodder & Stoughton, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 245).

² This victory of the English language has mainly taken the form, not of supplanting the discomfited competitor languages in regions where they had already established themselves as vernaculars or even merely as *lingue franche*, but of encircling them and circumscribing their possibilities of further expansion. For example, Dutch has been supplanted by English as the vernacular of the European colonists of the Hudson Valley, but it is still the *lingua franca* of Indonesia; and a Dutch public servant once recounted to the present writer—half proudly and half whimsically—how a party of Javanese 'regents' who had been making the grand tour exclaimed, when they reached Holland in due course, what a relief it was at last to find themselves once more in a place where every one spoke the world-language! As for the French colonists in the St. Lawrence Valley, they have stubbornly retained their French mother-tongue for their vernacular, while succumbing to a passable familiarity with an English that has now become the *lingua franca* of all North America. The Spanish and Portuguese languages have been still more successful in maintaining their currency in the vast domains which they had staked out for themselves before the English language entered the lists against them. The Philippine Archipelago is perhaps the only place where Spanish has given way to English; and in the Philippines Spanish (thanks to the liberal policy of the Spanish Crown in this matter) was never forced upon the natives in substitution for their own mother-tongues; so that in the Philippines it has merely been a question of a change of *lingua franca* (see Wyndham, H.: *Native Education* (London 1933, Milford), pp. 103–4).

³ The view that the Seven Years' War marked a turning-point in the struggle between the French and English languages is supported by the testimony of the life and letters

This triumph of the English language was a corollary of the triumph of Great Britain herself in a military and political and commercial struggle for the mastery of a new world overseas which was being annexed to the domain of a once parochially West European civilization through the competitive growth and expansion of the rival nations into which a medieval Western *Populus Christianus* had latterly broken up in the Western Society's West European homeland; and therefore it is not surprising to find the English language established to-day as the principal vernacular of the North American continent and as the dominant *lingua franca* of the Indian sub-continent, since these two regions were the scenes of Great Britain's eighteenth-century victory over France in these two European Powers' twofold competition in Asiatic empire-building and in American colonization. The prowess of the English language, as distinct from that of the English people and its daughter nations overseas, is perhaps more impressively attested by the present currency of English as a *lingua franca* in the Far East; for here the direct material impact of the English-speaking peoples did not begin to make itself felt until some two hundred years later than the date when it was first felt in India and North America; and, during the hundred and fifty years or so during which the Far East has been subject to the present second bout of Western social pressure,¹ this Western impact has largely taken the peaceful forms of missionary and commercial enterprise, while, by comparison at any rate with the older history of Western penetration into the Indies and the Americas, the corresponding expansion of the Western Powers in the Far East has been accompanied by few aggressive wars, still fewer permanent conquests, and scarcely any colonization. Thus in the Far East the adven-

of Edward Gibbon (*vivebat* A.D. 1737-1794). Gibbon's first work, an *Essai sur l'Étude de la Littérature*, was written in French in 1759, and published in the same language in 1761, while the Seven Years' War was in progress and its issue still in doubt. Thereafter Gibbon continued to use French as his medium in his study *Sur la Monarchie des Médés*, which appears to have been still unfinished at the opening of the year 1763 (see Low, D. M.: *Edward Gibbon, 1737-1794* (London 1937, Chatto & Windus), p. 206), as well as in his abortive *Introduction à l'Histoire Générale de la République des Suisses*, which was finished in 1768. On the other hand, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, which was conceived on the 15th October, 1764, on the morrow of the peace settlement of 1763, was composed in English between October 1772 and the 27th June, 1787 (see IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, p. 148, footnote 3, above). For the considerations which determined Gibbon's choice of English in preference to French as the vehicle for his *magnum opus* see further V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), Annex II, below.

¹ In this second bout, which began towards the close of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the principal agents of Western penetration have been Protestant missionaries and British, French, and American sailors and men-of-business. In the first bout, which began towards the middle of the sixteenth century and came to an end soon after the beginning of the eighteenth, the missionaries were Catholic and the sailors and traders were Spanish and Portuguese. The policy and fortunes of the Catholic missionaries in China, from Ricci's generation to de Tournon's inclusive, are touched upon in V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 365-7, above; and in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 539, and in V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 23-4, below.

titious aid that the English language has received has been distinctly less forceful than elsewhere; and therefore, so far as the language has succeeded in making its way here also, this success can more confidently be ascribed to the language's own intrinsic powers. Accordingly the present currency of English in the Far East may be taken as the measure of its achievements and its prospects in the World at large; and we may venture to rate these high when we find English being employed as a *lingua franca* in Far Eastern cities which have never been under the rule of either the British Empire or the United States, and on the lips of speakers who have been speaking English in the act of carrying on a propaganda campaign against 'British interests'.

English was, in fact, the medium of communication between the people of Southern and Central China and Mr. Michael Borodin, the political adviser who was lent in the summer of 1923 to the Kuomintang Government at Canton by the Soviet Government at Moscow¹ for the purpose of instructing the Kuomintang in the art of launching an anti-foreign mass-movement which was to be pointedly anti-capitalist and still more pointedly anti-British. Mr. Borodin knew no Chinese; and his strenuous political activities during the four years for which his mission in China lasted left him no leisure for mastering a difficult foreign language with the facility that would have been required for making popular appeals to mass-meetings. At the same time the Kuomintang were unable to find on the southern sea-board of China, or even in the Yangtse Valley, Chinese linguists who were sufficiently well acquainted with Russian to be able to serve Mr. Borodin as interpreters from Russian into Chinese. On the other hand there was no difficulty in finding Southern Chinese with an adequate knowledge of English; and, since this was a *lingua franca* which Mr. Borodin, too, could understand and speak, the English language became a vital link in this Russian emissary's anti-British propaganda campaign in a Chinese mission-field. The Chinese invasion of the British Concession at Hankow on the 3rd-5th January, 1927, was the sequel to a series of inflammatory speeches which had been delivered in Hankow by Mr. Borodin in December;² and, in addressing the Chinese mobs whom he was inciting to attack the British, the Russian agitator had to employ the cumbrous method of speaking in English to a Chinese interpreter who then translated the orator's ardently anti-British words out of their original English dress into the local Chinese vernacular.

This English means of communication between a Chinese audi-

¹ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. ii (London 1928, Milford), pp. 311 and 322, and *Survey*, 1926 (London 1928, Milford), pp. 283-4.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 347-51.

ence and a Russian orator on the banks of the Yangtse¹ is not, however, the most striking of the illustrations of the currency of English as a *lingua franca* in the Far East that have come to the notice of the present writer; for, on board an American ship *en voyage* from Shanghai to Kobe in 1929, he witnessed at first hand the employment of English by Chinese as a means of communication, not with foreigners, but with one another.

In this American ship's saloon I was given my place at a table where all the other seats were occupied by Americans or English people, while at the next table to ours the party was entirely Chinese. In a lull in the conversation at our own table we noticed that we were not alone in talking English; for at the Chinese table an English conversation was in full swing—and this in an English which was not less fluent than ours. Why, we speculated, were our Chinese neighbours speaking English among themselves? There was no suspicion that they might be 'showing off' their mastery of the world-language, for they were manifestly quite un-self-conscious; and, even if we had not been able to read this on their countenances at a glance, we could have been sure *a priori* that it would never have occurred to Chinese men and women of good breeding (such as these were) to take any pride in performing the tricks of foreign trades. Their use of English in talking among themselves must therefore serve some strictly practical purpose; and, as we fell into exchanging surmises as to what the point of it might be, I contributed the guess that our Chinese party might be made up of passengers from different provinces, including some of those on the southern and south-eastern seaboard where each province speaks its own local dialect and not the elsewhere current 'mandarin',² so that English might be the only language in which they were all of them sufficiently well versed to be mutually intelligible to one another. By this time our English and American curiosity had become so eager that we ventured to interrupt the neighbouring conversation in order to learn the answer to our riddle—whereupon our Chinese fellow passengers told us, with much good humour, that my explanation was the right one.

The admirable English that was being talked by Chinese passengers on board an American ship in A.D. 1929 is not, however, the only form in which the language may be heard nowadays on lips to which it has not come as a birthright. Indeed, we have not

¹ This was not the last occasion on which the English language was to serve as a means of Russo-Chinese communication. The Russo-Chinese Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression which was concluded on the 21st August, 1937, was drawn up in an English text (Art. 4).

² For this latter-day Chinese *lingua franca* see pp. 512-14, below.

far to seek in order to discover that 'ingredients . . . for which the whole World has been laid under contribution' now also infest the English that is spoken as a mother-tongue in North America and in the South Seas and even in England itself—for the Germanisms¹ in North American English are decidedly less exotic than the Indianisms² of a metropolitan Kiplingese. If 'the Old Oligarch' whose lot was cast in Periclean Athens had been able to turn his attention to this latter-day metropolitan English of ours, he would assuredly have castigated it in terms even more sardonic than those which he was provoked into using in order to express what he felt about the vulgarization, in his own day, of his own metropolitan Attic Greek. We can picture the extremity of disgust to which this Periclean Athenian aristocrat would have been moved if he could have lived to hear a post-Alexandrine Attic *κοινή* being spoken by Susan priests or Gerrhaean sailors or Bactrian villagers. Yet, so far as we know, the Attic *κοινή*—even in its remotest outposts and even in its most degenerate days—never fell into the plight to which English has been reduced as the *lingua franca* of Chinese coolies.

In this 'Pijin English' we have the spectacle of a colloquial Chinese masquerading in an English costume. The tendency—already strong in the native English remnant of our modern English vocabulary—to reduce every word to a monosyllable has been carried, in 'Pijin English', to a Chinese degree. In 'Pijin English' monosyllables are the rule; and, having taken the Chinese cue in this *reductio ad absurdum* of the admirable principle of linguistic simplicity, 'Pijin English' has followed suit to colloquial Chinese in adopting a Chinese cure for a Chinese malady. Colloquial Chinese has worked out an ingenious device for parrying the ambiguity which is apt to beset a monosyllabic language owing to the diversity of meanings which each monosyllable has to bear. It has sought to make its meaning clear by expressing every idea in a pair of monosyllables which happen to be more or less synonymous, and it has thus begun to revert from monosyllabism to dissyllabism in its word-structure. In 'Pijin English' we can observe a reflection of this latest tendency in the indigenous language which has here been moulding the English *lingua franca* of the Far East into accord with the Chinese genius. For instance,

¹ e.g. 'nix' (*nichts*) meaning 'of no account' and 'dumb' (*dumm*) in the sense of lacking, not in the faculty of speech, but in mother wit (to be dumb in this American sense is quite compatible with being voluble).

² e.g. 'pyjamas' (meaning in Persian 'leg-wear') and 'gymkhana' (meaning in Hindustani 'a ball house'). Both these two compound words are packed with linguistic history; for, while three out of the four components are Persian, the English language has acquired them, not from Persian direct, but through the two intermediate stages of Hindustani and Urdu (for these two *lingue francae* of a disintegrating Hindu Society see further pp. 517-18, below).

in monotonously employing the couplet 'look-see' to describe every visual act, 'Pijin English' has sacrificed the proper English discrimination between the passive connotation of 'see' and the active connotation of 'look', for the sake of ensuring that the one nondescript 'hyphenated' word shall at least convey unmistakably the general category of meaning that is common to both its constituents.

The English that has undergone this conversion into a cheap *chinoiserie* may prove puzzling to ears which have been accustomed to hear nothing but English from their infancy; and this un-Englishness of 'Pijin English' is illustrated by a story to which the present writer, as a child, was never tired of listening as it was told by an old great-uncle of his¹ who had served in the English merchant marine and had risen to the command of an East-Indiaman. The incident related in this story purports to be an historical event dating from one of those middle decades of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era when the narrator was navigating his ship in Chinese waters and when the trade which made such a distant voyage worth while for European merchantmen was being forced upon China at the cannon's mouth by European men-of-war. The story tells that, in a lull between the successive naval wars of aggression in which the Western Powers were at that time forcing open the Far Eastern hermit empire's hitherto almost hermetically sealed doors, one Power which had recently been at war with China made an offer to the Chinese Government, through the diplomatic channel, for building a hospital at the foreign Government's own expense at a point on Chinese territory which these unexpectedly benevolent foreigners took the trouble to designate. The offer was made in proper form and in courteous language; but the site which the foreign Government had selected for its benefaction was one of such conspicuous strategic importance that the Imperial Government's suspicions were aroused. To invert the terms of Clausewitz's epigram,² the policy of the European Power that was making the offer was shrewdly suspected by the mandarins of being 'a continuation of war by other means'. However, they had now been taught by painful experience to take every possible precaution against giving these bellicose 'South Sea Barbarians' any shadow of excuse for resorting to arms on the ground that they had been insulted by the Imperial Government's behaviour; so, with an uneasy mind, the mandarins accepted the offer in phrases still more courteous than those in which it had been laid before them. Their uneasiness did

¹ Captain Henry Toynbee (*vivebat* A.D. 1819-1909).

² Quoted in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 298, footnote 2, above.

not diminish as the work progressed; for the building which now swiftly began to rise on the crown of an island commanding the estuary of one of China's finest navigable rivers seemed singularly inappropriate for the philanthropic service to which it was officially dedicated. The windows—mere slits—were as narrow as the walls—veritable ramparts—were massive. And when the roof was on and the donors began to land the medical stores with which the new hospital was to be equipped for performing its works of mercy, the cases were reported by the coolies, hired to carry them up from the beach, to weigh as heavy as lead. At this stage the Imperial Government, feeling that the time for action had arrived, passed the word to a trustworthy gang of its public-spirited coolie-subjects to drop one of the cases, *en route*, with a clumsiness sufficient to break it. The accident was duly contrived; and, sure enough, the bursting medicine-chest disgorged, not Epsom salts or cupping-glasses, but stands of muskets with powder and shot to match. At this shattering exposure one of the coolies who had staged it exclaimed to his European taskmasters, with a consummately innocent air of surprise: 'Hi-yah! Me no savey sick man yam gun.' It would perhaps have been difficult to go farther in denaturing the English medium of an *impromptu* diplomatic retort of which the ironic Chinese point could hardly have been presented more sharply in the most carefully conned note from the officials of the Imperial Ya-men.

After this glance at the vicissitudes with which the English language has met in its career as the *lingua franca* of a Westernized World, we may pass on to consider the fortunes of other living *lingue franche* which have been overtaken by English—and overridden by it, in different degrees—in the course of their own less ambitious careers of expansion over the narrower domains of non-Western societies that have latterly been enmeshed in a world-enveloping Western net.

In the main body of the Far Eastern World, for example, the political unity which has been maintained, off and on, ever since the close of the sixth century of the Christian Era¹ has had its linguistic counterpart in the spread of the so-called 'mandarin' dialect. This Imperial *lingua franca* has now become current through the greater part of the vast area that is occupied at the present day by a Chinese-speaking population; and the mutual intelligibility which it has established as it has spread is such that

¹ This political unity has worn the appearance of a ghost of the universal state of the Sinic Civilization to which the Far Eastern Civilization is affiliated. This aspect of the empire of the Sui and T'ang and Sung and Yuan and Ming and Ch'ing as a resuscitation of the empire of the Ts'in and Han is touched upon in V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 356, footnote 6, and in V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), pp. 477-8, above, and is discussed in Part X below.

to-day an inhabitant of the south-western province of Yunnan, on the far side of the Upper Yangtse, can travel all the way to the extreme north-eastern province of Kirin, which is washed by the Amur, without finding himself, at any stage of his journey, unable to understand the local speech or to make his own speech understood by the local inhabitants. On the other hand there is a chain of five provinces along the southern and south-eastern seaboard—including the province of Kiangsu, which bestrides the estuary of the Yangtse and contains both Nanking and Shanghai—where the local dialects are not only different from 'mandarin' but are so far removed from it, and at the same time so highly differentiated from one another,¹ that in this region the areas of mutual intelligibility rarely exceed the limits of a single province, in sharp contrast to the vastness of the area (some twenty provinces, all told, including those in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria) over which the 'mandarin' dialect uniformly prevails.²

We have already overheard the members of a party of Chinese travellers which included a contingent from some of the non-'mandarin'-speaking provinces communicating with one another in English in the saloon of an American steamer;³ and it is conceivable that the Pan-Chinese oral and auditory *lingua franca*⁴ which is one of China's present crying needs will in fact be provided in the form of an utterly alien Indo-European language, imported from the far side of the Old World, which, in linking the several vernacular language-areas of China with one another, will at the same time be linking up the whole of China with all the rest of the World in virtue of having become the oecumenical language

¹ In spite of this diversity from one another, all the southern and south-eastern Chinese dialects apparently display one common difference from 'mandarin' in the shape of a certain old-fashionedness. These outlying dialects are in some respects living specimens of Chinese speech in a 'pre-mandarin' stage (see III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 138, above).

² During the seven years ending in the autumn of 1938 a number of the Chinese provinces here mentioned had been at least temporarily overlaid by new administrative structures that were the products and at the same time the instruments of Japanese aggression against the main body of the Far Eastern Society. Yet, notwithstanding the immense destruction of life which was inflicted on these ravished Chinese provinces by the Japanese aggressors, it was beyond the power of Japanese militarism to curtail the domain of either the Chinese population or the 'mandarin' *lingua franca* in continental Eastern Asia—as was shown by the fact that 'mandarin' was adopted, as a matter of course, as the official language of every one of the 'puppet states', beginning with 'Manchukuo', which were successively established by the Japanese interlopers on the territory of the Chinese Republic.

³ See p. 509, above.

⁴ China has, of course, from time immemorial been in possession of a *lingua franca* that can be painted with the brush and read with the eye, in the shape of the classical characters, which convey constant and uniform meanings in spite of the extreme variety of their pronunciation in different times and places (see p. 492, above). This ideological *lingua franca* is common to-day not only to all parts of China but to Korea and Japan and Tongking and Annam besides. It appears to have taken shape during the second bout of the Sinitic 'Time of Troubles' (circa 403–221 B.C.: see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, p. 294, footnote 3, below), and to have been standardized by the Emperor Ts'in She Hwang-ti, who was the first founder of the Sinitic universal state (see Granet, M.: *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Renaissance du Livre), p. 457).

of 'All that is Under Heaven' in the literal as well as in the Sinic sense of that term. It is also possible, however, that, while English will indeed become (as would seem, indeed, to be its manifest destiny) the medium of both visual and vocal communication between China and the outer world, it will not, after all, snatch away from the 'mandarin' dialect of Chinese the different function of serving as a universal means of internal communication by mouth and ear within the boundaries of the immense region in which the vernacular languages are all of them dialects of Chinese. For within the last few years the leading spirits in the non-'mandarin'-speaking provinces have been setting themselves to make 'mandarin' as familiar there as it is in the rest of China.¹

At Shanghai in 1929 the writer of this Study was told by the Chinese scholar and philosopher Dr. Hu Shih—who has dedicated his life to the foundation of a popular literature in a simplified form of 'mandarin'—that he had recently hesitated to accept an invitation to go on a lecture tour in the South because the experiment had not proved a success when he had tried it on a former occasion not so very long before. On this previous tour Dr. Hu Shih had not found adequate audiences in the South that could follow him in 'mandarin', while he himself was, of course, unable to address the intelligentsia of each southern province in its own parochial patois. He put these difficulties which he had then encountered to the Southerners who were now inviting him to visit them for the second time; and he received in reply an emphatic assurance that—thanks to the progress which had been made in the South in the intervening years in spreading a familiarity with 'mandarin' there—he need no longer fear any repetition of his previous aggravating experience.

In the Iranic World, before it began to succumb to the process of Westernization, the New Persian language, which had been fashioned into literary form in mighty works of art during the post-Syriac and pre-Iranic interregnum (*circa* A.D. 975–1275),² at the same time gained a currency as a *lingua franca*; and at its widest, about the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era, its range in this role extended, without a break, across the face of South-Eastern Europe and South-Western Asia from the Ottoman pashalyq of Buda, which had been erected out of the wreckage of the Western Christian Kingdom of Hungary after the Ottoman victory at Mohacz in A.D. 1526, to

¹ This new linguistic policy in the provinces of the southern and south-eastern seaboard of China is a sign that, in linguistic and educational matters, the old provincial particularism has now given way to a nationalism on a Pan-Chinese scale; and a change which has thus already taken place on the cultural plane may be expected to follow on the political plane sooner or later.

² See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 363, footnote 3, above, and Part VI, below.

the Muslim 'successor-states' which had been carved, after the victory of the Deccanese Muslim princes at Talikota in A.D. 1565, out of the carcase of the slaughtered Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar.¹ For this vast cultural empire the New Persian language was indebted to the arms of Turkish-speaking empire-builders—reared in the Iranic tradition and therefore captivated by the spell of the New Persian literature—whose military and political destiny it had been to provide one universal state for Orthodox Christendom² in the shape of the Ottoman Empire³ and another for the Hindu World in the shape of the Timurid Mughal Rāj.⁴ These two universal states of Iranic construction on Orthodox Christian and on Hindu ground were duly annexed, in accordance with their builders' own cultural affinities, to the original domain of the New Persian language in the homelands of the Iranic Civilization on the Iranian Plateau and in the Basin of the Oxus and the Jaxartes; and in the heyday of the Mughal, Safawī, and Ottoman régimes New Persian was being patronized as the language of *litterae humaniores* by the ruling element over the whole of this huge realm, while it was also being employed as the official language of administration in those two-thirds of its realm that lay within the Safawī and the Mughal frontiers.

The new Persian language and literature were staples in the intellectual education of the *Ich-oghlan*s who were the *corps d'élite* among the neophytes in the Ottoman Pādishāh's Slave-Household,⁵ and the influence of this Persian mental background naturally persisted among the adult lights and leaders in the Ottoman court and camp. The redoubtable Ottoman militarist Sultan Selim the Grim amused his leisure by writing Persian verse⁶ with better success than ever attended the Hohenzollern militarist King Frederick the Great's poetic efforts in French;⁷ and the lavish patronage of the Muslim courts in India has piled up, through a long series of command performances, a corpus of poetry in the Persian tongue which is as preponderant in mass as it is inferior in merit to the classical Persian poetry that has sprung spontaneously from a less heavily manured Iranian soil that is this fine flower's native

¹ This Empire of Vijayanagar had been founded in A.D. 1336 as a last asylum in which a remnant of the Hindu Society might continue to lead its own life in a state of independence after the Turkish and Iranian Muslim invaders of the Hindu World had conquered the greater part of the Deccan (in sequence to their previous conquest of Hindustan) at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Christian Era.

² Not, of course, including the domain of the Russian offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Society, which was shaking off the Turkish domination of the Golden Horde at the very time when the main body of Orthodox Christendom was succumbing to the Turkish domination of the 'Osmanlis.

³ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 68, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 298-300, below.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 97 above.

⁵ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 39, footnote 4, above.

⁶ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 353, above.

⁷ See p. 503, footnote 3, above.

earth. As for the career of the Persian language on Indian ground as an official vehicle of administration, it was not till A.D. 1829 that Persian began to be discarded for this purpose, in favour of English, in the territories which the British East India Company had taken over from the Mughal Rāj and its 'successor-states'.¹

It is not surprising to find that the New Persian language has had to pay for this ephemeral vogue as a *lingua franca*² by submitting in its day to as radical a vulgarization as has since been the lot of that European language to which Persian has eventually been forced to give way in Hindustan. To begin with, Turkish and not Persian was the mother-tongue of the war-lords and war-bands who were the empire-builders of the Safawī and the Mughal as well as the Ottoman Empire; and all three dominant minorities—including the two which went the length of employing Persian for their public administration as well as for their private literary recreation—retained the use of their native Turkish for the humdrum domestic business of everyday life. In these linguistic circumstances all three of them sought to reconcile nature with culture by doctoring their raw Turkish mother-tongues with a potent infusion of Persian elements.³ The Turkī, Azerbaijānī, and Ottoman Turkish languages, as we know them to-day—or knew them yesterday before a generation of purists or pedants arose to reverse the process—are virtually composite languages with a Persian superstructure that counts for more than the Turkish basis.⁴

¹ In 1829 Lord William Bentinck substituted English for Persian as the linguistic medium of the Sirkar's diplomatic correspondence with Indian princes. On the 7th March, 1835, Lord William Bentinck announced his decision to make English, and not Persian or any other Oriental language, the medium of higher education in British India. Finally, in 1837, Persian was deposed, in British India, from its previous function of serving as the instrument of public business, and was replaced by the local vernaculars in the conduct of both judicial and fiscal proceedings.

² At the present day the one country where Persian is the official language without at the same time being the people's mother-tongue is Afghanistan; for, although the vernaculars of a majority of the tribes within the Afghan frontiers likewise belong to the Iranian family of languages, they all differ very widely from the classical Farsi. There are also, of course, certain districts, not only in Afghanistan but in Persia, in which the local vernaculars are not Iranian at all, but Turkish. A Turkish dialect is spoken in the provinces of Afghanistan between the Hindu Kush and the Oxus, and again in the Persian province of Azerbaijan; and in Fars itself there are tribes of Turkish origin which still continue to speak their ancestral mother-tongue in this citadel of the New Persian language and literature.

³ In Ottoman Turkish the handful of borrowed Persian particles has been a more precious acquisition than the host of borrowed Persian nouns (see III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, p. 178, above).

⁴ It is mainly through this Persian channel—and not, for the most part, direct—that the Turkish languages of the Iranic culture-circle have imbibed their infusion of Arabic. It was likewise the Persian version of the Arabic Alphabet, and not the Arabic original, that these Turkish languages employed for their script until they discarded it, in favour of the Latin Alphabet, only the other day. The iconoclasts who have now substituted the Latin for the Perso-Arabic Alphabet as the vehicle of this westerly group of Turkish languages point out that, after all, the Perso-Arabic Alphabet is not the first in which a Turkish language has ever been reduced to literary form. Long before the Turkish-speaking peoples of the Iranic culture-circle had been carried into their present domiciles, and been there exposed to New Persian cultural influences, as a result of their *Völkerwanderung*, circa A.D. 975-1275, into the derelict domain of the

These Turco-Persian linguistic alloys do not, however, represent the final degree of the New Persian language's debasement; for in the Indian dominions of the Mughal Empire and in the European dominions of the Ottoman Empire the Persian *lingua franca* of the Timurid and 'Osmanlı empire-builders came into contact, not only with these dominant minorities' Turkish mother-tongues, but also eventually with the indigenous languages of the Hindu and Orthodox Christian worlds when the cultures of the subject populations began to captivate their Iranicized Turkish conquerors.

'The character of Akbar, so far as it depended upon heredity, was . . . based on three distinct non-Indian strains of blood existing in his proximate ancestors: namely, the Turk or Turkī, the Mongol or Mogul, and the Persian or Iranian strains. The manners and customs of his court exhibited features which were derived from all the three sources: Turkī, Mongol, and Iranian. During the early years of his reign Indian influences counted for little—the officers and courtiers surrounding him being divided into two parties: the Turks (Mongol or Chaghatāy and Uzbek) on the one side and the Persians on the other. But after Akbar had attained maturity the pressure exercised by his Indian environment rapidly increased, so that in sentiment he became less and less of a foreigner until, in the later years of his life, he had become more than half an Hindu. His personal conduct was then guided by Hindu *dharma* or rules of duty, modified considerably by the precepts of Iranian Zoroastrianism. The Turkī and Mongol elements in his nature were kept so much in the background that he was reputed by Hindus to be a reincarnation of a Brahman sage.'¹

This Indianization of Akbar's soul found its linguistic reflexion in the formation of a new alloy of the Persian language with a vein of base metal that was Indian instead of being Turkish.

'Both Turkī and Persian were spoken at his court, but the former tongue in the course of time dropped out of use, while the latter became the recognized official and literary language. The highly Persianized form of [Western] Hindī known by the name of Urdū, or the camp language,² which developed gradually as a convenient instrument

'Abbasid Caliphate, the Uighur Turkish language had been reduced to writing in an Alphabet of Aramaic origin, and the Altaian Turkish language in the Alphabet of the inscriptions in the basins of the rivers Orkhon and Yenisei—a script which, whatever its origin may be, is certainly not derived from the Arabic Alphabet (see p. 500, footnote 6, above). It may be added that the starkly consonantal Arabic Alphabet is peculiarly ill equipped for conveying any member of a family of languages which has a genius—as the Turkish family has—for both the differentiation and the harmonization of vowel sounds.

¹ Smith, V. A.: *Akbar the Great Mogul*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1919, Clarendon Press), pp. 10-11. The religious aspect of Akbar's eclecticism is examined in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 699-704, below.

² 'Urdū' = 'ordū' = 'horde'. In Turkey at the present day this Mongol word 'ordū' is used with the technical meaning of 'army-corps'. In the Mughal Empire 'Urdū-i-Mu'allā' was the name of the Imperial military bazaar outside the palace at Delhi (*The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, new edition, vol. i (Oxford 1907, Clarendon Press), p. 365).—A.J.T.

of communication between natives and foreigners,¹ was often almost identical in vocabulary with Persian as spoken in India, while retaining the grammatical structure of an Indian tongue.²

The Persian influence on Western Hindī has been so strong that the Hindustānī language has accommodated itself—even in its less impure form, in which the influx of the Persian vocabulary has been kept within more modest limits—to employing the Perso-Arabic Alphabet as an alternative vehicle to the indigenous Brāhmī script—though the latter still serves to convey the greatest of all Hindī works of poetic art: the Eastern Hindī *Rām-Charit Mānas* of Akbar's Hindu contemporary and subject, Tulsī Dās.³

This penetration of a Hindī element into the everyday speech of Akbar's court and camp has a rudimentary analogue in the prevalence, in the same age, of Jugoslav as the domestic language of the Ottoman Pādishāh's Slave-Household; and, if the master institution of the Ottoman Empire had not, after the death of Suleymān the Magnificent, been reduced to a premature decadence by a breach of the fundamental rule that the recruits must be infidel-born,⁴ a Perso-Jugoslav alloy might be playing in the Near East to-day a role corresponding to that of the Perso-Hindī alloy which is still current under the name of Urdu as a *lingua franca* in India. This possibility was blighted by the socially disastrous

¹ The basis of Urdu is Hindustānī: i.e. 'that dialect of Western Hindī whose home is the Upper Gangetic Doāb, in the country round Meerut. The city of Delhi lies close to the southern border of this tract. Here the dialect was in general use, and from here it was carried everywhere in India by the lieutenants of the Mughal Empire' (*The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, new edition, vol. i, p. 365).—A.J.T.

² Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 11. 'When this infusion of borrowed words is carried to an extreme . . . the language is intelligible only to educated Musulmāns and to those Hindus who have been educated on Musulmān lines. . . . The extreme Persianization of Urdū is due to Hindu rather than to Musulmān influence. Although Urdū literature is Musulmān in origin, the Persian element was first introduced in excess by the pliant Hindu kāyasths and khattis employed in the Mughal administration and acquainted with Persian, rather than by Persians and Persianized Mughals, who for many centuries used only their own language for literary purposes. . . . During the first centuries of its existence Urdū literature was entirely poetical. Prose Urdū owes its origin to the English occupation of India and to the need of text books for the College of Fort William. The Hindi form of Hindustānī was invented at the same time by the teachers at that college. It was intended to be a Hindustānī for the use of Hindus, and was derived from Urdū by ejecting all words of Arabic and Persian birth, and substituting in their place words borrowed or derived from the indigenous Sanskrit. Owing to the popularity of the first book written in it, and to its supplying the need for a *lingua franca* which could be used by the strictest Hindus without their religious prejudices being offended, it became widely adopted and is now the recognized vehicle for writing prose by those inhabitants of Upper India who do not employ Urdū. . . . Urdū, as becomes its origin, is usually written in a modified form of the Persian character, while Hindī is generally written, like Sanskrit, in the Deva-nāgarī character' (*The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, new edition, vol. i, pp. 365-6). For this archaistic form of Hindī see further the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 8 (y), vol. vi, p. 77, footnote 2, below.

³ Tulsī Dās *vivebat circa* A.D. 1530-1623; Akbar *vivebat* A.D. 1542-1605. Though Akbar delighted in giving his patronage to eminent Hindus, the genius—and, indeed, even the existence—of Tulsī Dās seems never to have been brought to the Emperor's notice (Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 417-18).

⁴ For the value of this rule and the fatal consequences of its violation see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 34-5 and 44-7, above.

political success of the Pādishāh's free Muslim subjects in taking the Pādishāh's Slave-Household by storm; for most of the free Muslim recruits who forced their way into the Household in and after the later decades of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era were drawn from the Turkish-speaking Muslim population of the metropolitan provinces of the Empire in the Anatolian and Balkan peninsulas. This usurpation of the Ottoman seat of power by a ring of predominantly Turkish-speaking Muslim freemen in the place of a ring of predominantly Yugoslav-speaking Christian slaves has been reflected in the respective fortunes of the rival languages. The Yugoslav language has missed its destiny of becoming, under a Persian veneer, a *lingua franca* for the whole of the Near East, and has been reduced to the modest role of serving as the parochial vernacular of a single one among the Ottoman Empire's numerous 'successor-states'. On the other hand the Turkish language of the original 'Osmanlı empire-builders has escaped the fate—which has overtaken the sister Turkī tongue of the Timurid empire-builders in India—of ceasing to be spoken by the empire-builders' own descendants in the conquered territories. There is, indeed, a striking contrast between the extinction of Turkī in India and the survival of Turkish in Anatolia, where the Ottoman Turkish language has not been content merely to hold its own against the Greek and Armenian which it found in occupation, but has steadily won converts at their expense until in the end it has driven both these predecessors right off this Anatolian field.¹

The most remarkable trophy of the Turkish language's victory here has been its capture of ex-Greek-speaking and ex-Armenian-speaking minorities² who have 'turned Turk', not as an incidental consequence of becoming converts to the Islamic faith of their Turkish conquerors, but in spite of an unbroken loyalty to the Orthodox and to the Gregorian Monophysite Christianity which are their respective religious heritages from a pre-Turkish-speaking past. This now Turkish-speaking remnant of the ancient Christian communities of Anatolia has so utterly lost the command of its pre-Turkish speech that it has come to use a Turkish version of the Orthodox and Gregorian Christian liturgies and to inscribe Turkish texts (in Greek or Armenian letters) upon the tombstones that commemorate its dead. A passing stranger who happened, before the mass-evictions of A.D. 1915–22, to find himself in some Christian village among the secluded mountain fastnesses

¹ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 75, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 398, above, with the authorities cited on p. 398, footnote 3.

² For the commercial prowess of the ex-Greek-speaking Orthodox Christian Qāra-mānliš see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 223, above.

on the watershed between the Halys and the rivers of Cilicia could not have told by the ear that these villagers were of a different religion from their Muslim neighbours. He must use his eyes to observe that the local house of worship was not a mosque but a church; and he must then look still closer—at the tombstones in the graveyard and at the books behind the screen—in order to determine whether the Christianity of these Turcophone Christians was of the Greek-lettered Orthodox or of the Armenian-lettered Gregorian kind.

It is true that this conversion to the Turkish language without a conversion to Islam has not carried with it that sense of political affinity which in the Near East has invariably accompanied a change of faith—even when this has not been followed by a corresponding change of speech. This truth has been recognized on both sides; and the recognition has been acted upon in an interchange of populations—partly by way of forcible eviction, but also partly by way of a more or less voluntary migration—through which the formerly intermingled *millets* of the old Ottoman Empire have sorted themselves out, in the course of about a hundred years ending in 'the nineteen-twenties', into a number of separate and severally homogeneous *blocs* on the pattern of the distribution of nationalities in Western Europe.¹ If we examine the demographic map of the Near East as it stands to-day, when this agonizing process of geographical segregation is practically complete, we shall find that the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians who learnt their Turkish, without giving up their Christianity, in their native Anatolia have now been transplanted to Greece, because they are felt, and feel themselves, to be Greeks in virtue of their religion—while conversely the Greek-speaking and Bulgar-speaking and Yugoslav-speaking Muslims who respectively became converts to Islam, without any change of speech, in their native Crete and Rhodope and Bosnia, have now been transplanted to Turkey because, on the same religious criterion, they are felt, and feel themselves, to be Turks.

On this showing, it might perhaps be imagined that the difference in religion between, for example, a Turkish-speaking Gregorian Christian Armenian and a Turkish-speaking Muslim Ottoman Turk would count for everything, and their identity of language for nothing at all, in determining their attitude towards each other. Did not the religious antagonism between these two Turkish-speaking communities harden the Turkish-speaking Muslims' hearts to the point of attempting to exterminate the Turkish-

¹ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 76-8, and IV. C (iii) (b) 5, vol. iv, pp. 185-90, above, and Part IX, below.

speaking Christians in A.D. 1915-16, without any scruple about acting in this inhuman way towards victims who shared their butchers' mother-tongue?¹ And could the moral gulf between the perpetrators and the survivors of those hideous deportations and massacres ever be bridged? The writer of this Study (whose melancholy task it once was to edit a collection of documents relating to this grim episode in Near Eastern history)² was convinced—until he was presented one day with decisive evidence to the contrary—that the gulf was quite unbridgeable; and, even if it had been foretold to him that a happier relation between at least one Turk and one Armenian would soon be re-established nevertheless, he still would not have guessed that the community of Turkish speech between the Armenian Christian and his Turkish Muslim enemy would be the social substance out of which this miraculous moral bridge would be built. Yet so it was in the experience of a Turkish friend of the writer's, from whose lips he heard the story.

The narrator was Yūsuf Kemāl Bey, an eminent Turkish lawyer who had rallied to Mustafā Kemāl Pasha in his Cave of Adullam at Angora and had distinguished himself as an amateur diplomatist in the service of what seemed a hopeless cause when the Ottoman Turkish people was fighting for its life in the Anatolian war-after-the-war of 1919-22. After the conclusion of peace with honour at Lausanne, Yūsuf Kemāl Bey was appointed Turkish Ambassador at the Court of St. James's; and, as the Turkish Embassy in London had by then been closed for some ten years—ever since the suspension of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the United Kingdom upon the outbreak of war between them in 1914—the new Ambassador found that his official residence was not immediately habitable as it stood when he arrived to reopen it. During the uncomfortable days which had to be passed while the necessary redecorations were being carried out, the Ambassador, with his family and his suite, took his dinner night by night in a neighbouring restaurant; and, in their temporarily forlorn and homeless state, the Turkish diplomatic party were cheered and touched by the markedly cordial solicitude on their behalf which was invariably shown by one, in particular, of the

¹ As a matter of fact, such scruples were both felt and shown by the Turkish-speaking Muslim neighbours of the Turkish-speaking Armenian deportees from Cilicia; and in this district, at any rate, it seems improbable that the traditional relations of good-neighbourliness between the two Turkish-speaking communities would ever have been disturbed if they had been left to themselves. The deportations were engineered and carried out on the initiative of the Committee of Union and Progress: a recently founded Turkish Muslim organization, with its head-quarters far away at Salonica, which was inspired by a fanatical determination to apply throughout the Ottoman Empire the exotic and inappropriate Nationalism of the modern Western World.

² See the British parliamentary paper on *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16* = Cd. 8325 (1916) = Misc. No. 31 (1916).

waiters who here served them at table. On their last visit to the restaurant before the Embassy kitchen was in working order once again, the Ambassador singled this waiter out for a parting expression of his thanks; and then at last the waiter's tongue was loosed. 'O Your Excellency,' he burst out in Turkish, 'you really need not thank me at all, for it is I myself, entirely, that have been the gainer through the stroke of good luck that put me in the way of waiting on you and yours. You see, I am an Armenian from' such and such a place (it was an out-of-the-way spot in Anatolia); 'and now, for years on end, I have had to spend my life earning my living here in London, with the whole breadth of Europe between me and home and without ever hearing a word of my native tongue. And so, Your Excellency, when you and your party came in here for the first time the other night and started to talk Turkish, I felt almost as though I were at home again, and my heart leapt up. Night by night, since then, I have just feasted my ears. Simply by talking to each other, you and your friends were doing me a world of good without ever suspecting it. So you see, Your Excellency, it is really I that am in debt to you!' Here was at least one native of the Near East who was more deeply moved by the sound of his mother-tongue than by the bitter memories of a communal vendetta! As the Ambassador told the story, his countenance beamed with his pleasure at this unlooked-for welcome in London from an Armenian Turkish-speaking mouth; and the Turkish narrator's English listener took the tale as a happy augury for the opening of a new chapter of Near Eastern history.

If we pass now from the Iranic World, with its Indian and Near Eastern annexes, to the sister Arabic World, and then cast our eyes over the borderland between the domain of this Arabic Civilization and its Tropical African hinterland, we can trace the progress of the Arabic language as it has pushed its way westward from the west coast of the Indian Ocean towards the Lakes, and southward from the south coast of the Sahara into the Sudan, in the train of successive bands of Arab or semi-Arabicized stock-breeders and slave-raiders and traders. And the linguistic side of this movement can still be studied to-day in the life; for, while the physical impact of Arab intruders upon the domain of the native Negro peoples in this African 'living museum'¹ of Primitive Humanity has been brought to a standstill by European intervention within the last fifty or sixty years, the linguistic impact of the Arabic language upon the native vernaculars has actually received fresh impetus from an 'opening-up of Africa' which has latterly been taken out of Arab hands and been carried to completion as a

¹ See II. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. i, p. 313, above.

European enterprise. Under the European flags that signify the imposition of a Western régime the Arabic language is proceeding with its advance into the heart of Tropical Africa with better facilities than it ever commanded before the present railways and motor-roads and postal and telegraph and telephone services were placed at its disposal by the energy and ability of European pioneers; and these material services do not exhaust the tale of benefits which have been conferred upon the Arabic language and culture in Tropical Africa by European colonial Powers. Perhaps the greatest benefit of all has been the official encouragement that they have given—for the sake of supplying an administrative need of their own—to the mixed languages that have arisen on the different cultural coasts on which the flowing tide of an Arabic *lingua franca* has been seeping in through native African mangrove swamps. It is French imperialism on the Upper Niger and British imperialism on the Lower Niger and British and German imperialism side by side in the East African hinterland of Zanzibar that have respectively made the fortunes of Fulani and Hausa and 'Swahili'; and all these three languages are linguistic alloys—with an African base and an Arabic infusion—that have been reduced to writing in the Arabic Alphabet. Sawāhili, the East African 'language of the coasts', is an Arabo-Bantu counterpart of the Perso-Hindī alloy which is the Indian 'language of the camp' or Urdū; and the body that has been given to 'Swahili' by an East African dialect of Bantu has been given to Fulani and Hausa by two of the local non-Arabic vernaculars of the semi-nomadic peoples on the Saharo-Sudanese borderland between the Desert and the Sown.¹

When we pass from the Old World to the Americas, we find the Inca empire-builders of the Andean universal state displaying in their linguistic policy, as in everything else, a characteristic authoritarianism which has not yet been emulated by European administrators in Africa. Having come to the conclusion that their subjects could not function as fully efficient human instruments of a 'totalitarian' régime unless they were equipped with some common *lingua franca*, the Incas selected the Quichua language for this purpose and then not merely encouraged but actually compelled all the inhabitants of their empire to make themselves familiar with it.² This linguistic regimentation of the Andean

¹ For Fulani and Hausa see the references given in Part III. A, Annex I, vol. iii, p. 393, above.

² Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), p. 213; Markham, Sir Clements: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), p. 137. The Incas evidently looked upon Quichua as a vulgar tongue; for they had another esoteric classical language of their own, which they kept to themselves. The ordinance prescribing a compulsory universal proficiency in Quichua is ascribed to the Emperor Pachacutec (*imperabat circa A.D. 1400-48*) by Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), pp. 116-17.

peoples at their Inca masters' hands has had lasting consequences, notwithstanding the premature and violent interruption of the Incas' work by the Spanish *conquistadores* who hurled them from the seat of power and enthroned themselves in their stead.¹ For the missionaries of the Catholic Christian Church espied a new world ripe for spiritual conquest in the wreckage of an Incaic earthly paradise which had been ravished and devastated by the material weapons of Pizarro and his ruffianly companions;² and they perceived that a *lingua franca* which was already a 'going concern' throughout the vast domain of the shattered Andean universal state might be as useful an instrument for the propagation of the Christian Faith as it had been for the operation of the Incaic system of government. Accordingly the dissemination of the Quichua language, which the Inca administrators had begun, was carried further by the Catholic Christian hierarchy which partitioned the Incaic heritage with the Spanish Crown; and it is perhaps mainly thanks to this ecclesiastical policy that, on the Andean Plateau to-day, Quichua is still spoken by a numerous population.³ No doubt this consecutive Incaic enforcement and Catholic furtherance of a knowledge of Quichua in the Andean World for three or four centuries on end did much to prepare the ground for the subsequent spread of Spanish over the same area.

This Spanish, unlike the Quichuan, *lingua franca* of a post-Incaic Andean Society serves not merely as a medium of internal intercourse but also as a means of communication with other regions of that Westernized World of literally world-wide extent into which the Andean Society's formerly secluded domain has been incorporated as one of the consequences of the Spanish conquest. Within that 'Great Society' of the present age a common command of Spanish links the Andean World with Spain itself and with those South American territories—now occupied by the republics of Chile and Argentina and Uruguay—in which a sparse and backward aboriginal population has been

¹ This interruption of the Incas' work by the Spaniards has a parallel in the interruption of the work of the Achaemenidae by the Macedonians.

² When the Spanish Crown at length succeeded in Peru in asserting its authority over the demonic licentiousness and destructiveness of the *conquistadores* and their diadochi, the viceroys sought to make the best of a bad business by deliberately restoring as much as possible of the Incaic régime; but the damage had been done and the restoration was a caricature (Baudin, *op. cit.*, p. 241). The Catholic Church showed at any rate a greater ability than the Spanish Crown, if not a greater goodwill, to save something from the wreck.

³ The policy was carried out in the grand style. To begin with, the Catholic missionaries gave the Quichua language the benefit of the art of writing, which they had brought with them to the Andes from the Old World, by reducing Quichua to literary form in the Latin Alphabet. In A.D. 1576 a chair of Quichua was founded at the University of Lima, where it was maintained until 1770; and in 1680 a knowledge of Quichua was made in Peru an obligatory qualification for any candidate for ordination to the Catholic Christian priesthood (*ibid.*, p. 117).

evicted and replaced by a Spanish-speaking population of European origin. At the same time this common Spanish *lingua franca* is a bond between the Andean World and the domain of a neighbouring society in Central America with which the Andeans appear to have had little direct intercourse before the fates of these two indigenous civilizations of the New World were brought into a tragic conjunction by the common calamity of a Spanish conquest which overwhelmed both of them alike in the early decades of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era. In Central America, south-west of the Rio Grande, the Spanish language to-day enjoys as wide a currency as anywhere south of the Isthmus of Panamá—and this in spite of the fact that in Central America no indigenous *lingua franca* has prepared the ground for Spanish as Quichua has prepared it in the Andes. The Spanish conquest which followed the establishment of an Andean universal state by the Incas anticipated the establishment of a Central American universal state by the Aztecs;¹ and, owing to this historical accident, the Western culture—of which the Spanish language has been the vehicle in the Central American as well as in the Andean portion of the vast tract that has now become Latin America—has been compelled in Central America to make its way for itself, instead of finding, as it has found in the Andes, the valleys filled and the rough ways made smooth² by the antecedent cultural labours of indigenous empire-builders.

It may seem strange that any *lingua franca* which has originally been imposed as a result of a military conquest should ever afterwards be able to shake itself free from this odious historical association in the minds of the conquered peoples who have had it forced down their throats. Yet Spanish and Quichua are by no means unique in having been started on their careers in this fashion; this has been the history of more than half the *lingue franche* in our catalogue; and a final example may be cited to illustrate how hard it is for bitter memories to hold their own against convenient habits.

At the Peace Conference of Paris the writer's wife was acting as assistant to the special correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian*; and in the course of her work it fell to her lot one day to accompany her principal when he was waiting on the Georgian delegation in their hotel in order to obtain an interview from them. The leading Georgian delegates who were then in Paris were men whose names had become widely known in a previous chapter of history as those of prominent Menshevik Social-

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 124; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 105-6; and V. C (i) (c) 4, in the present volume, p. 357, above.

² Luke iii. 5.

Democratic deputies in the Imperial Russian Duma at Petrograd; but in Paris in 1919 they were presenting themselves in another role—not as members of one of the great political parties of the *ci-devant* Russian Empire, but as representatives of a non-Russian nationality which was now 'rightly struggling to be free' from a forcibly imposed Russian yoke. In accordance with their professed political metamorphosis the delegates opened the conversation—which was conducted through an interpreter belonging to their staff—by dwelling upon the distinctiveness of the Georgian from the Russian culture; and they sought to drive their point home by reminding their visitors that the Georgian language was not even remotely akin to Russian—as English, for example, was—but actually belonged to an utterly different language-group which had no affinity whatever with the Indo-European family. This picturesque insistence upon the outlandishness of the speakers' mother-tongue caught the assistant-correspondent's fancy; and, whenever the Georgian delegates were priming their interpreter with the representations that he was to pass on to her principal and herself in French, she took advantage of these pauses in her own work of taking notes in order to gratify her curiosity by listening to the cadences of a language whose chief title to consideration seemed to lie in being *sans pareil*.

As the interview proceeded in this fashion—with the touch of tedium that is inevitable in a conversation that has to be interpreted—the listener's mind gradually began to wander; and presently she found herself stumbling on the thought that apparently one has only to open one's ears for a certain length of time to a wholly unknown language in order to begin to catch some glimmerings of an understanding of it. The absurdity of this idea recalled the dreamer, with a start, to wakeful consciousness. How fatuous the mind can be when one allows it to go wool-gathering! And then, as she went on listening with her attention now at full stretch, it was suddenly borne in upon her that perhaps, after all, she had not been so silly as she had supposed; for surely the language which the delegates were talking with the interpreter was Russian—a language of which she did, as it happened, possess a certain knowledge. With her curiosity now sharply whetted, she took the first opportunity to put in a word to the interpreter on her own account. 'I wonder', she said, 'if you would allow me to ask you what language you and the delegates were talking together just now?' And at this the interpreter, looking slightly embarrassed, held a whispered conversation with his chiefs. 'The delegates desire me to tell you,' he finally answered her, 'that, as a matter of fact, they were talking Russian just then; but they were

only talking it for a moment, and you must not attach any importance to that. They have, of course, been talking Georgian all the rest of the time.'

Good manners forbade any cross-examination; but the interpreter's explanation of an unfortunate *lapsus linguae* was hardly convincing; and a different tale was told with greater eloquence by the disconcerted countenances of the delegates themselves. The questioner drew the conclusion (which, no doubt, was correct) that even a Georgian patriot's mind fell into thinking in Russian, the moment it was off its guard, if the subject of its thoughts was political. The Great Russian *lingua franca* of the Muscovite Empire was, after all, the vehicle which had first conveyed to Transcaucasia the exotic political ideas of a Western World that was sundered from Georgia by the redoubtable breadth of all the Russias; and, if your Georgian was being constrained to think in terms of 'natural rights' and 'constitutions' and 'plebiscites' and 'minorities', it stood to reason that it would be exceedingly difficult for him to utter or even frame such thoughts in any other medium than the parliamentary language of a Russian Duma in which he had served his apprenticeship and made his name as a politician. On the conscious plane of his mental life this Georgian politician *à la Russe* might have made up his mind to repudiate his Russian political past and to throw himself into the novel part of a Georgian nationalist; on the subconscious plane, however, he was evidently apt, at unguarded moments, to relapse in a trice into his indelibly Russian political self. It will be seen that the Georgian politician's Russian *lingua franca* was something more than a convenient social tool which could be employed or laid aside at its master's good pleasure; it was a vehicle of thought without which a Georgian could not live the life of a political animal any more than a fish could swim on dry land or a bird fly in a vacuum. In fact, a Georgian political programme of secession from the Russian body politic was in 1919 a political contradiction in terms.

(δ) *Syncretism in Religion.*

In the field of Religion, as in the fields of Language and Art and Manners, syncretism is an outward manifestation of that inward sense of promiscuity which arises from the schism in the Soul in an age of social disintegration.

The phenomenon of religious syncretism may be taken, with some assurance, as a symptom of disintegration in the social milieu in which the phenomenon presents itself, because the apparent examples of religious syncretism in the histories of civilizations

in their growth-stage turn out, on inspection, to be illusory. For instance, when we see the parochial mythologies of innumerable city-states being co-ordinated and harmonized into a single Pan-Hellenic system by the labours of Hesiod and the 'catalogue poets' and the 'logographers' in the early stages of the growth of the Hellenic Civilization, we are watching a mere juggling with names which is not accompanied by any corresponding fusion of different rites or blending of diverse religious emotions. Similarly, when we see Latin *numina* being identified with Olympian divinities—a Jupiter with a Zeus or a Juno with a Hera—what we are watching, in effect, is the mere replacement of a primitive Latin animism by the anthropomorphic pantheon of the Hellenic World in the course of the peaceable conversion of a primitive Latin society to Hellenism.¹ These equations between Latin and Greek names of gods do not bear witness to any dilution of Greek with Latin religious ceremonies or ideas; there has been no give-and-take; for the giving has been all on the Greek and the taking all on the Latin side when Zeus has been installed on the Capitol under the name of Jupiter, no less than when Polydeuces has been installed as 'Pollux', and his brother Castor under his own undistorted Greek name, on a site in the Forum Romanum within a stone's-throw of Zeus-Jupiter's Capitoline seat. It makes no difference whether a Castor and an Apollo are translated from Greece to Latium under their exact original names; or whether, in the process of translation, a Polydeuces is distorted into a 'Pollux' and a Heracles into a 'Hercules' and a Persephone into a 'Proserpine'; or whether a Hestia and a Zeus are transposed into their philological equivalents Vesta and Jovis; or whether a Hephaestus is dubbed 'Vulcanus' and a Demeter 'Ceres' in spite of the absence of any kinship here between the Latin name and the Greek. This arbitrary variety of usage in the matter of nomenclature covers a uniform cultural process which is not a case of syncretism at all, but consists in the introduction of a Greek divinity, *de toutes pièces*, into a Latin vacuum.²

¹ For this conversion of the Latins to Hellenism during the growth stage of the Hellenic Civilization see IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 19-20; V. C (i) (c) 1, in the present volume, p. 55, footnote 4; and V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 212, above.

² 'Les Latins attribuaient à Neptune les aventures de Ποσειδών.'—*Œuvres de Turgot* (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 621 ('Géographie Politique'). There is an almost exact parallel to this process in the history of the Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Society, where, after the introduction of the Mahāyāna into Japan, the indigenous Japanese *numina* (*Japonicé 'kami'*) were systematically identified with famous Mahayanian Bodhisattvas (Holtom, D. C.: *The National Faith of Japan: A Study in Modern Shintō* (London 1938, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner), pp. 35-8; Kato, Genchi: *A Study of Shinto, the Religion of the Japanese Nation* (Tokyo 1926, Meiji Japan Society), pp. 134-6). In this system of 'Ryobu' or 'Dual' Shinto the Bodhisattvas were given the place of honour, as archetypes or ideas (in the Platonic sense) of which the Shinto *kami* were reflexions in the phenomenal world. This relation was reversed by Urabe Kanetome (*vivebat* A.D. 1435-1511) in a counter-system entitled 'Yui-itsu' or

There is a different class of identifications between names of gods in which these verbal equations do occur in an age of social disintegration and also do bear witness to the prevalence of a sense of promiscuity, but which nevertheless will be found on examination to be no genuine religious phenomena, but merely politics under a religious mask. Such are the identifications that are made between the names of different local gods in an age when a disintegrating society is being forcibly unified on the political plane as the mechanical consequence of a series of internecine wars between parochial states into which the society has articulated itself previously in its growth-stage.¹

For example, when, in the concluding chapters of Sumeric history, Enlil the Lord (Bel) of Nippur was merged into Marduk of Babylon, and when Marduk-Bel of Babylon in his turn went incognito for a time under the name of Kharbe,² the *panmixia* commemorated in this deliberate confounding of distinctions between the names of different gods was of a political and not of a religious order. The political significance of this juggling with divine names is indeed prodigious. When the god who was the lord of Nippur was given his lordly title—Bel—in the Akkadian language, we can infer that this Semitic dialect must by that time have been supplanting Sumerian in a city-state which had hitherto been the hub of the Sumeric universe. When Marduk of Babylon was identified with the Bel of Nippur, this was a record of the rehabilitation of a Sumeric universal state through the prowess of a Babylonian dynasty. And, when we find Bel-Marduk of Babylon going under the Kassite name of Kharbe, we can tell that the Sumeric universal state which had been momentarily rehabilitated by Hammurabi has now been superseded, even in its metropolitan territory, by a barbarian 'successor-state' under the rule of Kassite war-lords. Again, in the affiliated Babylonian Society, when we find the same pantheon enthroned in both Babylonia and Assyria, name for name, except that in Assyria the pre-eminent position of the Babylonian Marduk-Bel is occupied by a god called Asshur,³ the true inference is not that there was any substantial difference between Assyrian and Babylonian religious practices and beliefs, but merely that, in the political life of the Babylonian Society, the Assyrians had developed a

'Only One' Shinto, in which the *kami* are promoted to the rank of archetypes and the Bodhisattvas degraded to that of shadows (Holtom, op. cit., pp. 38-41; Kato, op. cit., pp. 136-7).

¹ This internecine warfare which ends in an amalgamation of the local gods begins as a competition between them in which they experience the same changes of fortune as the local communities by which they are respectively worshipped. The vicissitudes in the fortunes of some of the local gods of the Sumeric city-states during the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' are noticed by Sir Leonard Woolley: *Abraham* (London 1936, Faber), pp. 224-5.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 116, above.

³ See loc. cit.

strongly pronounced national consciousness which they expressed in religious terms by calling the high god of the Assyro-Babylonian Pantheon by the name of their own eponymous Assyrian national divinity in preference to using the name of Marduk-Bel with its distinctively Babylonian political associations.

In a similar way in the Egyptiac World, when the obscure local god Amon of Thebes—who seems originally to have been a double of the neighbouring local god Min of Coptos—was identified with Re the Sun-God, who was not only a Pan-Egyptiac divinity but was actually the high god of the Egyptiac Pantheon,¹ this was a mere reflexion, in religious terms, of the political facts that the Egyptiac universal state had not only been founded in the first instance by one Theban prince but had afterwards been reconstituted by another empire-builder from the same southern march of the Egyptiac World after the interlude of a Hyksos barbarian domination.² The god Amon's fortune was made by the prowess of the human rulers who happened to have inherited him as their parochial object of worship; and it is significant that Amen-emhat ('Amon was in the Beginning') was the name of the first Theban Emperor of the Twelfth Dynasty, whose reign inaugurated the 'Indian Summer' of the Egyptiac universal state.³ Thereafter, when, after the Hyksos interlude, Amon had returned to power in the train of another Imperial dynasty—the Eighteenth—from the god's native canton of Thebes, the Emperor Thothmes III organized an ecclesiastical counterpart of the restored Egyptiac universal state in the shape of a Pan-Egyptiac hierarchical corporation under the presidency of the Chief Priest of Amon-Re's Theban sanctuary.⁴

¹ In the Egyptiac World the Sun-God had been raised to this eminence in the course of the 'Time of Troubles' between the breakdown of 'the Old Kingdom' and the establishment of 'the Middle Empire' by Theban hands. This epoch saw 'the completion of a far-reaching progressive transformation of the Egyptiac religion. The ideas, evolved at Heliopolis, regarding the unity of the divine power which reveals itself in the creative energy of the Sun—ideas which had first found their liturgical expression in the Sun-worship of the Fifth Dynasty—now obtained general currency. [The doctrine was that] in truth there is only one single godhead, namely the Sun who is sprung from Nunu, the primeval waste of waters, and this whether the god who dwells in the Sun is called Atum, Re, Khepre "the Creator", or what you will. . . . This is the Solar Monotheism of the Egyptiac Theology. All other gods that are worshipped locally here and there in the Egyptiac World sink to being either mere names for "the One" or, alternatively, to being his assistants and servitors. This doctrine, which had been worked out at Heliopolis, . . . was now propagated all over the Egyptiac World as a piece of esoteric wisdom belonging to the priesthood, and the higher orders, the "Knowing", were initiated into it.'—Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), third edition (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 243-4.

² See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 144; II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 112-13; V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 268, and V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 352, above.

³ See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 192, below. For the foregoing foundation of the Egyptiac universal state by Amenemhat I's predecessor Mentuhotep IV see I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 137; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 117, footnote 1; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 267, above; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 190, below.

⁴ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 145, footnote 5, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 413 and 421, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6, Annex, in the present volume, pp. 653-4 and 695, below.

Through the glory reflected upon him by this political advancement of both his local human prince and his personal human servitor, Amon rose to a pinnacle of greatness to which the Theban god would scarcely have dreamed of aspiring in the days of his obscurity during the growth-phase of Egyptiac history; but, for this immense aggrandisement, Amon had to pay the price of ceasing to be himself. 'His old local characteristics, whatever they may have been,¹ have been supplanted by those of the Sun-God, and the ancient local Amon has been completely solarized. In this way it has been possible to raise him to the supreme place in the Pantheon.'² 'As Amon-Re, he receives a new, and less indecent, shape.'³ 'On the whole, Amon-Re is actually nothing more than the old powerful Sun-God Re,⁴ Harakhti, Atum, Khepre and whatever else he was called. Like him he sails over the celestial ocean, and like him wars with the cloud-dragon Apophis; and all that Re possesses in the way of sanctuaries, ships, names and crowns becomes his property.'⁵

'The Ennead was joined in thy limbs, . . . every god was united with thy body. Thou didst emerge first that thou mightest begin the commencement, O Amon, whose name is hidden from the Gods, great aged one, older than these, Tenen who did shape himself as Ptah. . . .

'Of mysterious form and gleaming shape, the wondrous god with many forms. All gods make their boast in him in order to magnify themselves with his beauty, for he is so divine.

'Re himself is united with his body, and he is the great one who is in Heliopolis.'⁶

This Egyptiac conception of a single universal godhead manifesting itself under a host of local names was not only extended from Re of Heliopolis to Amon-Re of Thebes. In an age when the Egyptiac Civilization itself was on the eve of extinction we find an Egyptiac Isis who by this time had conquered a spiritual empire for herself in an alien Hellenic World laying claim to the same Protean universality in her epiphany to the hero of Apuleius's pornographico-devotional romance.

¹ Amon seems originally to have been, like Min, a local ithyphallic fertility god—an aspect of godhead which is at the very farthest remove from the ethereal and oecumenical figure of the Sun-God with whom Amon now came to be identified.—A.J.T.

² Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), p. 318.

³ Erman, A.: *Die Religion der Ägypter* (Berlin 1934, de Gruyter), p. 104.

⁴ Long before the course of Egyptiac political events had led to the identification of Amon with Re, Re himself had been 'politicized' by becoming 'a kind of celestial reflection of the earthly sovereign' (Breasted, J. H.: *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), p. 17, cited already in I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 141, above).—A.J.T.

⁵ Erman, A.: *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, English translation (London 1927, Methuen), p. 283.

⁶ Chapters 90 and 200 of *The Thousand Songs* in honour of Thebes and Amon-Re (quoted in Erman, *Literature*, English translation, pp. 298-9).

'En adsum tuis commota, Luci, precibus, rerum naturae parens, elementorum omnium domina, saeculorum progenies initialis, summa numinum, regina manium, prima caelium, deorum dearumque facies uniformis, quae caeli luminosa culmina, maris salubria flamina, inferum deplorata silentia nutibus meis dispenso: cuius numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multiugo totus veneratur orbis. inde primigenii Phryges Pessinuntiam deum matrem, hinc autochthones Attici Cecropeiam Minervam, illinc fluctuantes Cyprii Paphiam Venerem, Cretes sagittiferi Dictynnam Dianam, Siculi trilingues Stygiam Proserpinam, Eleusinii vetustam deam Cererem, Iunonem alii, Bellonam alii, Hecatom isti, Rhamnusia illi, et qui nascentis dei Solis inchoantibus inlustrantur radiis Aethiopes Arique priscaeque doctrina pollentes Aegyptii caerimoniis me propriis percolentes appellant vero nomine reginam Isidem.¹

The same deliberate policy of establishing identifications between divinities that were originally local and unrelated comes into evidence in the Andean World in the time of the universal state that was constructed by the Incas;² and the Inca Pachacutec (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1400-48), in whose reign this political unification of the Andean World was substantially completed,³ performed a feat of ecclesiastical organization which was exactly analogous to the Egyptian performance of the Pharaoh Thothmes III. Pachacutec convened a congress of priests from all parts of his dominions at Corichanca—the great temple in Cuzco which was the seat of the Incas' own ancestral Sun-worship—and arranged that all the gods of the Incaic Empire should be marshalled into a pantheon with the Corichancan Sun-God in the role which was assigned by Thothmes III to his own Theban Amon-Re.⁴ Like Thothmes again, Pachacutec provided his heavenly pantheon with an earthly hierarchy in which the Chief Priest of the temple of the Sun at Corichanca occupied the position of the Chief Priest of Amon-Re at Thebes; and in the Andean, as in the Egyptian, World the central shrine of the high god of the pantheon was reproduced in a host of local Sun-temples at the seats of provincial administration, while the whole ecclesiastical establishment was endowed with the produce of lands which were set aside for this purpose in all parts of the empire.⁵

¹ Apuleius: *Metamorphoses*, Book XI, chap. 5.

² See Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), p. 152.

³ See II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 103, footnote 2, above.

⁴ Pachacutec carried out his policy in a way that was more literal and more drastic than anything that Thothmes ventured to do; for in the Andean case the idols of the local divinities were physically removed from their local shrines in order to be assembled at Corichanca (see Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 62).

⁵ See Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilisations of the Andes* (New York and London 1931, Scribner), pp. 427-8; Joyce, op. cit., pp. 156-9; Baudin, op. cit., p. 62; Markham, Sir C.: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), pp. 105-6; and the present Study, V, C (i) d) 6 (8), Annex, in the present volume, pp. 653 and 694, below.

In this Protean capacity for metamorphosis, which is common to Enlil-Bel-Marduk-Kharbe-Asshur and to Min-Amon-Re-Ptah and to the gods who were regimented by the Incas into their Andean Pantheon, we are witnessing not so much a religious phenomenon as politics working through an ecclesiastical medium; and in our own Western World a classical example of this process of political syncretism in an ecclesiastical mould is to be seen in the ecclesiastical history of the English and Scottish Crowns during the last two and a half centuries. Since the time of the Anglo-Scottish political and ecclesiastical settlement which was inaugurated by the accession of King William III to the two thrones, and which was completed by the constitutional union of the two kingdoms themselves in A.D. 1707, the common sovereign with whom the churches that are respectively established in England and in Scotland have each, in virtue of their establishment, continued to be in official relations¹ (though this on quite different terms in the two cases) has so far always been deemed, and has deemed himself, to be a member of both churches.² At the same time, in the same settlement, the churches themselves not only freely went their respective ways and, in doing so, parted company once for all in rite and constitution, if not in doctrine: their respective freedom was also reciprocally guaranteed in a political Act of Union which was formally passed in the common sovereign's name—though in fact, of course, it was a transaction between the two parliaments, or indeed between the two nations, since the monarchy had become constitutionally limited after the deposition of King James II.³ In this Western case we are witnessing, not indeed a theological union of different godheads, but a personal union of different forms of worship of one and the same god through

The ecclesiastical empire of the Sun-temple at Cuzco was divided into nine or ten 'dioceses' with a 'bishop' in charge of each of them under the Cuzcan 'Pope's' supervision (see Cunow, H.: *Geschichte und Kultur des Inkareiches* (Amsterdam 1937, Elsevier), pp. 198–201). In the contemporary Mexic World a process of religious amalgamation seems likewise to have accompanied the process of political unification which, in this world, was heading towards the establishment of a Mexic universal state by force of Aztec arms when the work of the Aztec empire-builders was cut short, on the verge of its completion, by the advent of the Spaniards (see Thompson, J. E.: *The Civilisation of the Mayas* (Chicago 1927, Field Museum of Natural History), p. 36).

¹ The situation in which an English and a Scottish established church are severally in official relations with a single sovereign has, of course, existed since 1603, when the two crowns were first united on the head of King James I/VI.

² King William III's predecessor King James II, as a Roman Catholic, had been a member neither of the English nor of the Scottish Established Church. It may be noted that both King William III himself and Kings George I and II were actually members, not merely of two churches, but of three, since King William was also a member of the Calvinist Church of the United Netherlands, while the first two Georges were also members of the Lutheran Church of Hanover. The Calvinist Church of the Netherlands had the same doctrine as that of Scotland, but the Lutheran Church of Hanover had a doctrine and an ecclesiastical constitution which differed from both the Anglican and the Scottish.

³ For the happy political consequences of this ecclesiastical *Ausgleich* between the English and Scottish constituent state of the United Kingdom see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, pp. 711–12, below.

the common participation of a single crowned head in the membership of different churches.

The foregoing survey has brought out the fact that the parochial gods who come to be identified with one another in a disintegrating society, as a consequence and an acknowledgement of the unification of the parochial states, are apt to have a certain antecedent affinity with one another in virtue of their being in most cases the ancestral gods of different sections of one and the same dominant minority. For this reason the amalgamation of godheads that is demanded, at this stage of a society's history, by *raison d'état* does not, as a rule, go seriously against the grain of religious habit and sentiment. In order to find examples of a religious syncretism that cuts deeper than *raison d'état* and touches the quick of religious practice and belief, we must turn our attention from the religion which the Dominant Minority inherits from a happier past to the philosophy which it strikes out for itself in response to the challenges of a 'Time of Troubles'; and we must watch rival schools of philosophy colliding and blending not only with one another but also with the new 'higher religions' that are imported into the life of a disintegrating society by the alien recruits to the Internal Proletariat. Since these 'higher religions', too, collide with one another besides colliding with the philosophies, it will be convenient first to glance at the relations between 'higher religions' *inter se* and philosophies *inter se* in their originally separate social spheres, before we go on to consider the more dynamic spiritual results that follow when the philosophies on the one side come into relation with the 'higher religions' on the other.

In the disintegration of the Hellenic Society the generation of Poseidonius (*vivebat circa* 135-51 B.C.) seems to mark the beginning of an epoch in which the several schools, which had hitherto delighted in lively, acrimonious, and interminable controversies, now tended with one accord (with the solitary exception of the Ishmaelitic Epicureans) to notice and emphasize the points that united them rather than those that divided them,¹ until a time came, in the first and second centuries of the Roman Empire, when every non-Epicurean philosopher in the Hellenic World of the age subscribed to much the same eclectic set of tenets, whether he chose to call himself a Stoic or a Peripatetic or an Academic. A similar tendency towards promiscuity in philosophy displays itself in the history of the disintegration of the Sinic Society at a

¹ This new tendency towards consensus was facilitated by a likewise new tendency towards dogmatism (see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), pp. 329 and 536) which set in simultaneously; and this dogmatism tended to take a more and more religious and emotional, and a less and less scientific and intellectual, colour (see pp. 550-68, below).

corresponding stage. In the second century B.C., which was the first century of the Empire of the Han, eclecticism was equally the note of the Taoism¹ which was at first in favour at the Imperial Court and of the Confucianism which eventually supplanted it.

'Taoism is a term invented about this time to designate that great eclecticism which was taking place during the second century B.C. and which attempted to embrace all the essential doctrines of the various schools of thought that had flourished during the preceding age of philosophical speculation. . . . "Its method" [says Sse-ma Tan]² "consists of observing the seasonal regularities of the natural forces as taught by the astrologers, and in selecting the best elements in the teachings of the Confucianists and Mo-ists and incorporating into itself the essentials of the schools of the Logicians and the Jurists".'³

This so-called 'Taoism', which was the prevalent philosophy of the Sinic dominant minority during the first two generations of the Han régime, was officially superseded in the reign of the Emperor Han Wuti (*imperabat* 140-87 B.C.) by a 'Confucianism' which 'was not at all what Confucius taught or Mencius philosophized about, but was something so different from the original teachings of the school that we must call it "the Han Confucianism" in order to distinguish it from the moral and social teachings of Confucius and Mencius on the one hand and the Neo-Confucianist philosophy of the Sung Dynasty on the other'.⁴

This syncretism between rival philosophies which we observe in the disintegration of the Sinic Society as well as in that of the Hellenic has its parallel in the relations between rival 'higher religions' nurtured in the bosom of the Internal Proletariat.

For example, in the Syriac World from the generation of Solomon onwards we find a strong tendency towards a *rapprochement* between the Israelitish worship of Yahweh and the worships of the local Baalim of other Syriac communities which were Israel's neighbours;⁵ and the date is significant, because we have seen reason⁶ to believe that the death of Solomon heralded the break-

¹ For this travesty of Taoism see V. C (i) (d) 4, pp. 418-19, above.

² For this Sinic philosopher of the second century B.C. see loc. cit.—A.J.T.

³ Hu Shih: 'The Establishment of Confucianism as a State Religion during the Han Dynasty' in *The Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. ix, 1929, pp. 22-3. For the distinctive tenets of the diverse Sinic schools of philosophy which had grown up during the foregoing 'Time of Troubles', see Waley, A.: *The Way and its Power* (London 1934, Allen & Unwin), Introduction.

⁴ Hu Shih, op. cit., p. 28.

⁵ We may assume that the *rapprochement* which followed the collision between the worship of the god of Israel and the worships of the gods of Moab and Ammon and Phoenicia and Philistia was a matter of give-and-take, even though our records tell us only of the religious influences to which the worship of Yahweh was exposed, while they are silent about any influences that the worship of Yahweh may have imparted to other local cults. The *argumentum ex silentio* would be more than usually hazardous in this case, considering that the evidence at our disposal comes exclusively from the Israelitish side. (On this point, see II. D (ii), vol. ii, p. 50, above.)

⁶ In IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 68, above.

down of the Syriac Civilization and the beginning of a Syriac 'Time of Troubles'. No doubt the remarkable and momentous feature in the religious history of Israel during that age is the exceptional success of the Prophets in combatting the sense of promiscuity and diverting the stream of Israelitish religious development out of the facile channel of syncretism into a new and arduous channel which was peculiar to Israel itself. Yet, when we look at the credit instead of the debit side of the Syriac account of reciprocal religious influences, we shall recall that the Syriac 'Time of Troubles' may have seen the worship of Yahweh make an impact upon the religious consciousness of the peoples of Western Iran in whose midst a 'Diasporà' of Israelitish deportees had been planted by the Assyrian militarists;¹ and it is at any rate certain that there was a powerful counter-impact of the Iranian upon the Jewish religious consciousness in the time of the Achaemenian Empire, which was the Syriac universal state, and in the succeeding age when the Seleucid successors of the Achaemenidae were reigning over the defunct empire's former provinces in Asia. By the second century B.C. the mutual interpenetration of Judaism and Zoroastrianism had gone to such lengths that our modern Western scholars find the utmost difficulty in determining and disentangling the respective contributions that these two sources of Syriac religious experience have severally made to the stream which was fed by their united waters.²

Similarly, in the development of the 'higher religions' of the internal proletariat of the Indic World we see a fusion—which goes much deeper than a mere equation of names—between the worship of Krishna and the worship of Vishnu.³

At this point we may also take note of a type of religious syncretism which is peculiar to the abnormal situation that arises when a disintegrating civilization is provided with its universal state by alien empire-builders, owing to a failure on the part of the indigenous dominant minority to perform even this service for its society.⁴ In this situation there is sometimes, as we have

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 81, with footnote 1, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 121, above.

² There is a wide discrepancy between the estimates of the influence of Zoroastrianism upon Judaism that have been made by different modern Western scholars. For a conservative estimate see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921-3, Cotta, 3 vols.), vol. ii. For a less cautious estimate see von Gall, A.: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter). All scholars, however, seem to be agreed that in this age Zoroastrianism and Judaism did influence one another in some degree. (On this point see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 121, above, and V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 43-4; V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, p. 126, footnote 5, and p. 129, footnote 2; and V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, p. 163, footnote 1, below.)

³ For the failure of Hinduism to transcend the residual separateness of Vishnu-Krishna from Shiva see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 47-9, below.

⁴ These universal states of alien origin have been discussed in V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 53-4; V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 105-17; and V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 347-51, above.

observed in another context,¹ a fusion between the hereditary religion of the alien empire-builders who have earned the status of a dominant minority in the society which they have provided with a universal state, and the hereditary religion of the indigenous dominant minority which has forfeited its birth-right and has in consequence been degraded to the ranks of the internal proletariat. For example, on the morrow of the endowment of the main body of Orthodox Christendom with an alien universal state in the shape of the Ottoman Empire a syncretism between the Islam of the 'Osmanlis and the Christianity of their subjects was propagated by Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn of Simāv.² On the eve of the establishment of an alien universal state in the Hindu World by the Timurid Mughals a syncretism between the Islam of the pre-Mughal Iranic empire-builders in Hindustan and the Hinduism of the indigenous populations, whom these alien intruders were conquering, was conceived in the soul of Kabīr and realized in the Sikh Church Militant.³ And, when the short-lived alien universal state that had been built for the Hindu Society by Timurid hands was reconstructed, after its premature collapse, by a second fatigue-party of alien empire-builders who were recruited, this time, from the West, a syncretism between Hinduism and the Protestant Christianity of the Timurids' English successors was compounded by Ram Mohan Roy.⁴ Finally, in the main body of the Far Eastern World, on the eve of its incorporation into a Great Society with an oecumenical range and a Western framework, the T'ai-p'ing movement was generated by a blend between the indigenous Far Eastern religious and philosophical tradition and the Protestant Christianity of English intruders who were the apostles of Westernization in the Far East as well as in India.⁵

Such breaches in the barriers between religion and religion or philosophy and philosophy in times of disintegration will

¹ In V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 106-7 and 111, above.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 68, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 111, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (b) 13, vol. iv, p. 231, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 106, above, for the Hindu-Islamic syncretism which was precipitated in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era by the genius of Kabir. At the present day there are believed to be about one million non-Sikh Kabir-panthis in India, some of whom regard themselves as Hindus and others as Muslims (Eliot, Sir C.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 266). But the most important of the spiritual heirs of Kabir are not these followers of Kabir himself but those of his younger contemporary Nanak (*vivebat* A.D. 1469-1538), who founded the Fraternity of the Sikhs—largely under the inspiration of Kabir's ideas. The metamorphosis of a fraternity which was originally a purely religious association into a militant political community—a sinister transformation which was carried out, by stages, between the last quarter of the sixteenth and the last quarter of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era—is discussed in V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, pp. 665-8, below.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (b) 13, vol. iv, p. 231, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 106, above.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 107, above.

evidently open the way for *rapprochements* between philosophies and religions; and in these philosophico-religious syncretisms, in which the sense of promiscuity achieves its spiritual *chefs d'œuvre*, we shall find again that the attraction is mutual and that the move is made from both sides. Just as, astride the military frontiers of a universal state, we have watched the soldiers in the imperial garrisons and the warriors in the barbarian war-bands gradually approximating towards one another in their ways of life until at length the two social types cease to be distinguishable,¹ so, in the interior of a universal state, we can watch a corresponding movement of convergence between the adherents of the philosophic schools and the devotees of the popular religions. And the parallel runs true; for in this case, as in that, we find that, while the representatives of the Proletariat do come a certain distance to meet the representatives of the Dominant Minority, the latter go so much farther along their own path of proletarianization that the eventual fusion takes place almost entirely on proletarian ground. In studying the *rapprochement* from both sides it will therefore be convenient to survey the shorter spiritual journey of the proletarian party first before attempting to follow the longer spiritual journey of the Dominant Minority.

When 'higher religions' that have been nurtured in the bosom of the Internal Proletariat find themselves face to face with the Dominant Minority, their advance along the path of adaptation may sometimes stop short at the preliminary step of commending themselves to the Dominant Minority's notice by assuming the outward fashions of the Dominant Minority's style of art. Thus, in a disintegrating Hellenic World, the Mahāyāna and the worships of Mithras and Cybele and Isis all sought to promote the success of their respective missionary enterprises on Hellenic ground by recasting the visual representations of their divinities into forms that might be expected to prove agreeable to Hellenic eyes. Up to this point these eventually unsuccessful rivals of Christianity for the conquest of Hellenic souls were taking the same course as Christianity itself; but none of them made any appreciable move towards taking the further step of Hellenizing itself inwardly as well as outwardly. It was Christianity, alone among them all, that went the length of expressing its creed in the language of Hellenic philosophy.²

In the history of Christianity the intellectual Hellenization of a religion whose creative essence was of Syriac origin was foreshadowed in the employment of the Attic, instead of the Aramaic,

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), pp. 459-80, above.

² On this point see V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 366, above.

κοινή¹ as the linguistic vehicle for the New Testament; for the very vocabulary of this vulgarized yet sophisticated form of Greek carried with it a host of unsuspected philosophic implications.

'In the Synoptic Gospels Jesus is regarded as the Son of God, and this belief is carried on and deepened in the body of the Fourth Gospel. But also in the prologue to the Fourth Gospel the idea is thrown out that the Saviour of the World is the Creative Logos of God. Implicitly, then, though the statement is not made explicitly, the Son of God and the Logos of God are one and the same: the Son as the Logos is identified with the creative wisdom and purpose of deity, the Logos as the Son is hypostatized into a person beside the person of the Father. At one bound the philosophy of the Logos has become a religion'²—

or, to describe the same spiritual mutation in the inverse terms, the religion of the Dying God Incarnate has found a new expression for itself in the hitherto abstract and frigid philosophy of the Logos.

Nor has this first occasion been the only one on which the missionaries of the Christian Faith have translated their good tidings into the language of the philosophers. The legitimate intellectual arts by which the scholarly Alexandrian Fathers Clement and Origen commended Christianity to a Stoic-minded Hellenic dominant minority were reapplied some fourteen hundred years later when Matteo Ricci and his fellow members of the Society of Jesus addressed themselves—with an ability and a discernment which barely failed to win the triumph that they deserved—to the comparable task of converting the souls of a Confucian-minded dominant minority of Far Eastern literati.³

This device of preaching Religion in the language of Philosophy—an intellectual manœuvre to which Christianity has already resorted twice, with an overwhelming success at the first essay which was all but repeated at the second—was one of the heirlooms which Christianity had inherited from Judaism. It was Philo the Jewish philosopher of Alexandria (*vivebat circa* 30 B.C.—A.D. 45) who sowed the seed from which Philo's Christian fellow citizens and fellow philosophers Clement and Origen were to reap so rich a harvest within two centuries of Philo's day; and it was perhaps from the same quarter that the author of the Fourth Gospel gained his vision of the Divine Logos with which he identifies his Incarnate God.⁴ No doubt this Alexandrian Jewish forerunner of Alexandrian

¹ For these two *lingue franche* see V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), pp. 487-91, 494-5, and 499, above.

² More, P. E.: *Christ the Word = The Greek Tradition from the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon*: 399 B.C.—A.D. 451, vol. iv (Princeton 1927, University Press), p. 298.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 366-7, above.

⁴ On the other hand, in the opinion of Eduard Meyer (*Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921-3, Cotta, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 318, the Johannine

Christian Fathers was led into the path of Hellenic philosophy through the gate of the Greek language, like the Christian philosophers themselves; for it was assuredly no accident that Philo lived and philosophized in a city in which the Attic *κοινή* had become the vernacular language of a local Jewish community that had so utterly lost command of Hebrew, and even of Aramaic, that it had been driven by dire necessity to desecrate its Holy Scriptures by translating them into the impious language of the Isles of the Gentiles. Yet in the history of Judaism itself this Jewish father of a Christian philosophy is an isolated figure. He was not the spiritual progenitor of either the Zealot John of Gischala or the Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai;¹ and his ingenious effort to derive the Platonic philosophy from the Mosaic Law remained, for Judaism, a barren aetiological conceit which was 'Alexandrian' in the depreciatory meaning of the epithet.

When we pass from Christianity to Mithraism, which was the Syrian 'higher religion's' Iranian counterpart and rival² in a competition for the spiritual conquest of the Hellenic World, we shall observe that, on its voyage westwards from its Iranian homeland, Mithra's barque took on board a heavy cargo of the Babylonian astral philosophy³ from the now half-submerged continent of the *ci-devant* Babylonian World. Indeed,

'the Chaldaean conception of the Powers of Destiny that manifest themselves in the planets and the stars—the belief that everything has its proper "hour", which is fixed and calculable—becomes a common mental possession of all peoples.'⁴

In similar fashion the Indic 'higher religion' of Hinduism barefacedly despoiled a senile Buddhist philosophy of its intellectual panoply⁵ in order to acquire for itself the last and most potent of the weapons that it needed in order to drive its philosophical rival right out of their common homeland in the Indic World. And it is the opinion of at least one eminent modern Western Egyptologist that the proletarian worship of Osiris only won its

'Logos' was not derived, either through Philo or through any other channel, from the Hellenic philosophical tradition, but was a translation of the Aramaic 'Memra': the Word of God which, in the Judaism of this age, had come to be endowed with something that might almost be called a personality of its own which was felt to be distinct from the personality of its utterer Yahweh. Eduard Meyer also points out, in the same context (op. cit., vol. ii, p. 317), that the Johannine concept of the Logos has an exact analogue in the Islamic concept of the Uncreated Qur'an.

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 75–6, above.

² Both the Syrian religion of Christianity and the Iranian religion of Mithraism were, of course, 'Syriac' in the cultural sense in which that term is used in this Study.

³ For this implacably determinist philosophy see V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 56–7, above.

⁴ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 172. See also the present Study, V. C (i) (c) 1, in the present volume, p. 57, above.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 1, p. 58, above.

way into the citadel of the Egyptiac dominant minority's hereditary pantheon by usurping from Re the ethical role—originally quite foreign to the Osirian Faith—of a divinity that reveals and vindicates Righteousness. According to Breasted, this role had already been assumed by Re before the fall of 'the Old Kingdom'—at a time, that is to say, when the Egyptiac Civilization had been still in its growth-stage—and had then been etherialized, always still in Re's person, through the wisdom born of the suffering of an Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles',¹ whereas Osiris was little better than a hypocrite who gained his entry into the exclusive upper circle of an Egyptiac celestial society under the false pretence of patronizing an ideal of goodness that had not originally been his.² And it was in the strength of this borrowed ideal that the proletarian worshippers of Osiris made their eventual conquest of the Egyptiac World in the time of a 'Middle Empire' which was the Egyptiac universal state. In fact,

'the Lord gave the people favour in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they lent unto them such things as they required. And they spoiled the Egyptians'³—

and this is not only the story of the religion of Osiris in its appropriation of an ethic that had been cultivated by an Egyptiac dominant minority in a 'Time of Troubles': it is likewise (as we have seen) the story of Hinduism in its dealings with Buddhism and of Mithraism in its dealings with Astrology and of Christianity in its dealings with Stoicism and Neoplatonism.

This 'spoiling of the Egyptians', however, may sometimes cost a 'higher religion' dear—as is illustrated by the Egyptiac case in point. In the Egyptiac case an aspiring Osirian Church, which sought to help itself on its way by commandeering an ethic that was the creation of a dominant minority, had to pay for these unceremoniously borrowed plumes by putting itself into the hands of the party that was being constrained to lend them. The master-stroke of the old Egyptiac priesthood was to place itself at the disposal—and, in so doing, also place itself at the head—of a rising proletarian religious movement which it had found itself unable to suppress or even hold at bay, and which might eventually have swept the old established hierarchy away if, at the critical moment, these priests of a pre-Osirian Egyptiac Pantheon had not deftly checkmated their opponents by ostensibly going over to their

¹ 'It is Re who is dominant in the thinking of [the] social philosophers of the Feudal Age. . . . The moral obligations emerging in the Solar theology . . . wrought the earliest social regeneration and won the earliest battle for social justice of which we know anything in history' (Breasted, *op. cit.*, p. 250).

² For this (no doubt, controversial) theory see Breasted, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-8.

³ Exodus xii. 36.

side.¹ By their astuteness in thus taking the Osirian religion under their wing the Egyptiac priesthood raised their order to a pinnacle of power which it had never attained in the days before Osiris had appeared, as a formidable newcomer, above the Egyptiac dominant minority's horizon.²

Astute as it was, this feat of the Egyptiac hierarchy is not unique. The capture of the Osirian religion by the priests of the old Egyptiac Pantheon has its parallels in the capture of the post-Buddhaic Hinduism by the Brahmins³ and in the capture of Zoroastrianism by the Magi.⁴ But there is another, and still more insidious, way in which a 'higher religion' that has made its epiphany out of the bosom of an internal proletariat is apt to fall into the hands of a dominant minority which this rising religion is successfully despoiling of its accumulated spiritual treasures; for the priesthood which gains control over a proletarian church and then abuses this control in order to govern that church in the Dominant Minority's spirit and interest—in impudent defiance of the church's own origin and mission—need not be an ancient priesthood belonging to the Dominant Minority by descent; it may actually be recruited from among the leading lights of the proletarian church itself.

In an early chapter of the political history of the Roman Republic the *stasis* between Plebeians and Patricians was notoriously brought to an end by a 'deal' in which the Patricians took the leaders of the Plebeians into partnership on the tacit understanding that, in consideration of their own admission into the sanctum of the politically and socially privileged class, the appointed champions of the unprivileged lower order would cynically betray their trust by leaving the Plebeian rank-and-file in the lurch.⁵ In a similar fashion on the religious plane, in the history of the internal proletariat of a disintegrating Hellenic World, the rank-and-file of Jewry had been betrayed and deserted, by the time of Christ, by their own former leaders the Scribes and Pharisees. These

¹ See I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 143-4, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 152, above. In these other contexts we have observed that, in its achievement of this *tour de force*, the Egyptiac priesthood was assisted by the fanatical reaction in the Egyptiac body social against the Hyksos barbarian domination—a reaction of which the priesthood took advantage in order to draw the Osiris-worshippers in the internal proletariat into an 'union sacrée' with the Re-worshippers in the dominant minority.

² See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 145, footnote 5; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 116, footnote 1; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 421; and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 515-17, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 421, footnote 3, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 137, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 705, footnote 1, below.

⁵ The traitorous Plebeian leaders were assisted in 'putting over' this 'deal' at the expense of their own followers by the temporary relief from economic pressure which the rank-and-file of the Roman Plebs obtained through land-settlement on lands which came into the possession of the Roman Government as one of the fruits of the Roman conquest of Italy (see IV. C (iii) (b) 9, vol. iv, p. 205, above).

Jewish 'separatists' lived to deserve their self-imposed name in a sense which was the opposite of their meaning at the time when they originally assumed it. The original Pharisees were Jewish puritans who separated themselves from the Hellenizing Jews when these renegades were joining the camp of an alien dominant minority.¹ On the other hand the distinguishing mark of the Pharisees of the time of Christ was their separation of themselves from the rank-and-file of the loyal and devout members of the Jewish community to whom they still hypocritically professed to be setting a good example.

'The learned in the Scriptures, as well as the worldlings, belong to the upper strata of Society; and their attitude is one of condescension mingled with contempt as they look down upon the masses of the working population whom it is their intention to instruct and lead. In [the souls of] these masses, however, the religious life pulsates with a far fiercer intensity. With a fervent credulity they have taken the Law into their bosoms complete. It fills their whole life. . . . At every moment of their existence they feel themselves to be in direct communication with the Godhead, and they discern His operation anywhere and everywhere. The course of events in this chapter of Jewish religious history is the same as it is in all other similar cases—we will confine ourselves here to recalling the various phases of [Christian] monasticism, the Pietists and Methodists, Sufism, and, in the field of Buddhism, the transcendental doctrine of "the Great Vehicle" (the Mahāyāna). In Judaism, likewise, the refinement and etherialisation (*Fortbildung und Verinnerlichung*) of Religion proceeds, not from the learned, but from those strata of the common people that have taken Religion to heart. It is the silent folk of the land (*die Stillen im Lande*)² who live and labour (*leben und weben*) in these ideas. They call themselves "the Pious" *sans phrase*: *chasidim*, meaning literally "the Partakers in Grace", to whom God, in His grace, has granted the proper conduct, god-fearingness and piety. Already in the Psalms the word is used—side by side with the much more common *Saddiqim*, "the Righteous"—as a party name for those who feel themselves to be the true Church of God, the poor and oppressed who put their trust in God alone, in contrast to "the Wicked" (*Resha'im*), the selfseeking and ungodly worldlings who ostensibly are masters of the situation in This World but who all the time are living under threat of punishment in the Judgement which will bring all their pomp to a fearful end when God's long-suffering is exhausted."³

This is the historical background of the scathing denunciation of the Pharisees which echoes through the pages of the Gospels.

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 73, with footnote 3, above, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 103-5, below.

² The same phrase is used by Jung in the passage quoted on p. 567, below.—A.J.T.

³ Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 41-2.

'The Scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses' seat: all, therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do; but do not ye after their works; for they say and do not. For they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders; but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers. . . . They . . . love the uppermost rooms at feasts and the chief seats in the synagogues and greetings in the markets, and to be called of men "Rabbi, Rabbi". But be not ye called "Rabbi"; for one is your master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren. . . . Neither be ye called "masters" . . . but he that is greatest among you shall be your servant. And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted.'¹

Here, through the eyes of the rank-and-file of the Jewish contingent in a Hellenic internal proletariat, we see the Pharisees as Jewish ecclesiastical counterparts of Jewry's Roman political masters; and in the exordium to the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, in which the parable is described as being addressed 'unto certain which trusted in themselves that they were righteous, and despised others',² we are given a complementary definition of a Pharisee which would as aptly describe a Stoic philosopher. Nor was this assimilation of the *ci-devant* spiritual leaders of Jewry to both the two main types of their former Hellenic adversaries just a curiosity of history without practical consequences. In the tragedy of the Passion of Christ we see the Scribes and Pharisees not merely inclining in the privacy of their hearts to the spirit and behaviour of a dominant minority, but also actively ranging themselves at the side of the Roman authorities in the public light of the forum in order to compass the death of a prophet of their own race who had been putting them to shame by doing the very works of which these 'whited sepulchres'³ made no more than a hollow pretence.

'When he saw the multitudes, he was moved with compassion on them, because they fainted and were scattered abroad, as sheep having no shepherd.'⁴

This clear and reproachful apprehension of the treachery that the Pharisees had perpetrated in heartlessly deserting their flock was Jesus's unforgivable offence in the Pharisees' resentful eyes.

Are there other instances of this spiritual treason which the Pharisees exemplify? When we observe the Pharisaic tendencies of the Manichaean and Paulician *electi*,⁵ we may speculate whether

¹ Matt. xxiii. 2-12; with these verses and the rest of the chapter compare Mark xii. 38-40; Luke xi. 39-52; and Luke xx. 46-7.

² Luke xviii. 9.

³ Matt. xxiii. 27.

⁴ Matt. ix. 36, with a reminiscence of Zech. x. 2.

⁵ For the Paulician *electi* see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, p. 628, above; for the Manichaean *electi* see Burkitt, F. C.: *The Religion of the Manichees* (Cambridge 1925, University Press), p. 46.

these 'separatist' leaders of two later Syriac religious movements might not have relieved the Pharisees of the invidious distinction of serving as the classical examples of the type, supposing that Manichaeism had succeeded in conquering the Hellenic World in the fourth century of the Christian Era, or Paulicianism Western Christendom in the thirteenth.

If we pass now to our examination of the complementary movement in which the philosophies thought out by the Dominant Minority make their approach towards the religions discovered by the Internal Proletariat, we shall find that on this side the process begins earlier, besides going farther. It begins in the first generation after the breakdown; and it passes from curiosity through devoutness into superstition.

The earliness of the first infusion of a religious tinge into the Dominant Minority's philosophical speculations is attested, in the classical Hellenic case, in the *mise en scène* of Plato's *Republic*. The scene is laid in the Peiraeus—the oldest crucible of social *pammixia* in the Hellenic World—at some moment before the end of the Peloponnesian War;¹ the master of the house in which the dialogue is supposed to take place is a resident alien and not an Athenian either by origin or by naturalization; and the alleged narrator, Socrates, begins by telling us that he has walked down to the port from the city of Athens, where his own house is situate, 'in order to pay' his 'respects to the Thracian goddess Bendis, and at the same time out of curiosity to observe how they are going to keep the festival that is being celebrated in her honour at the Peiraeus for the first time on this occasion'. Socrates is delighted with the procession of the townspeople, but he is also delighted as much, or even more, with that of the Thracian strangers in whose train the Thracian goddess has come to Greece; and when, as he starts back for home, he is induced to turn aside and spend the rest of the day at Cephalus's house, he finds his host engaged in the concluding rites of a domestic act of worship. Thus, in the atmosphere of this *chef d'œuvre* of Hellenic philosophical literature, Religion is in the air; and the religious celebrations that catch the eye are alien and even exotic. Here, surely, is an introduction which prepares us for the sequel that is described by a modern Western scholar in the following words:

'The extraordinary thing . . . is that, despite the alien source of the new myth, the theology and philosophy of the Greek Fathers should have turned out in essential matters so thoroughly Platonic, or, more

¹ The date at which the dialogue is to be imagined as taking place is nowhere expressly indicated by the author, and the internal evidence, which our modern Western scholars have industriously searched for a clue, has been diversely interpreted. Boeckh places the imaginary date in the year 411 B.C., Adam in the year 410.

accurately expressed, could have been adopted from Plato with so few modifications. Such a coalescence may lead us to conjecture that the mythology which Plato sought to substitute for the old tales of the Gods was not so much antagonistic to the faith of Christianity as imperfectly Christian. . . . From hints here and there it could even be surmised that Plato himself was dimly aware of a theophany to come, of which his allegories were a prophecy. Socrates in the *Apology* had warned the Athenians of other witnesses to the Soul who should appear after him and avenge his death; and elsewhere he had admitted that, for all the reasoning and high imaginings of Philosophy, the full Truth could not be known until revealed to Man by the grace of God (*theia moira*).¹

The religious curiosity which brought Socrates from Athens to the Peiraeus to witness the festival of Thracian Bendis at some date that was previous to the close of the fifth century B.C. was still alive at Athens, not much less than five hundred years later, among 'certain philosophers of the Epicureans and of the Stoics' who 'took . . . and brought . . . unto the Areopagus' a 'babbler' from abroad, 'saying, "May we know what this new doctrine, whereof thou speakest, is?"'—because he seemed 'to be a setter forth of strange gods'.² In the first century of the Christian Era it remained as true as it had been in the fifth century B.C. that 'all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing'.³ And while, as we have noticed in another context,⁴ it was the tragedy of Athens that the promise of *The Republic* was not fulfilled in *The Acts*, still the Hellenic philosophy which had first come to flower on Attic soil did fulfil its destiny of transposing itself into religious terms, and into religious feelings and practices as well, in other provinces of the empire of Hellenism—a cultural empire which was continually expanding as the Hellenic Civilization itself continued to decline.⁵

Our historical record of this metamorphosis of Philosophy into Religion is ample enough in the Hellenic case to enable us here to follow the process clearly through its successive stages.

The cool intellectual curiosity which is the Platonic Socrates' attitude in *The Republic* towards the Thracian religion of Bendis is also the mood of the historical Socrates' contemporary Herodotus in his incidental disquisitions on the comparative study of Religion. The interest, here, is essentially scientific in character; and, to Herodotus's mind, it was evidently of hardly any genuinely

¹ More, P. E.: *Christ the Word = The Greek Tradition from the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon: 399 B.C. to A.D. 451*, vol. iv (Princeton 1927, University Press), pp. 6-7.

² Acts xvii. 21.

³ In IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 269-71, above.

⁴ Acts xvii. 18-19.

⁵ For the correlation between physical expansion and social and spiritual disintegration see III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 139-54, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 199-201, above.

religious consequence at all whether this or that Syriac or Egyptian or Babylonian divinity was, or was not, in truth identical with this or that member of the Hellenic Pantheon.¹ Such theological problems of identity or difference came to be matters of somewhat greater practical concern to members of the Hellenic dominant minority after the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great, when the Hellenic or Hellenizing princes of the 'successor-states' had to make some ritual provision for the religious needs of mixed populations in which the non-Hellenic and Hellenic elements were coming to be ever more intricately intermingled.² At the same time the founders and propagators of the Stoic and Epicurean schools of philosophy were making it their concern to provide a ration of spiritual comfort for individual souls which found themselves forlornly astray in a spiritual wilderness, as a result of their sudden liberation from the social bondage—or expulsion from the earthly paradise—of the close-knit corporate life of the pre-Alexandrine Sovereign City-State. If, however, we take as our gauge of the prevalent tendency of Hellenic philosophy in this age the tone and temper of the school which had been the first in the field and which looked back to the prince of the philosophers as its founder, we shall observe that, in opposition to the Stoa, the Academy, during the first two centuries *post Alexandrum*, was pushing ever farther along the path of scepticism. A course that had been set by Arcesilaus was continued by Carneades (*vivebat circa* 213–129 B.C.), who made it his life-work to unpick the threads of a Stoic web that had been woven by Chrysippus (*vivebat* 280–207 B.C.). It was not till after Carneades' death that the litigiously contending schools were moved to look for points of contact and agreement instead of keeping their eyes open for subjects of dispute.³ But, when at last they did set them-

¹ See, for example, Herodotus's chronological proof, in Book II, chaps. 43–5, that the Egyptian divinity whom the Hellenes of his day called Hēraklēs might be the same as the Tyrian divinity to whom they applied the same name, but that it was impossible to regard either of these alien divinities as being identical with the native Hellenic Hēraklēs whose father was Amphytrion.

² See, for instance, the post-Alexandrine examples of the description of a divinity by a long string of titles, some of them Hellenic and some of them non-Hellenic, which are cited in Wendland, P.: *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum*, 2nd and 3rd editions (Tübingen 1912, Mohr), p. 131. The most interesting of the composite titles there quoted is that from the inscription of King Antiochus I of Commagene (*regnabat circa* 70–29 B.C.) on the Nimrud Dagh (for the identities of the four divinities named in this inscription see Christensen; A.: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin & Munksgaard), p. 152). Alexander's political expedient of arranging literal marriages between Macedonian officers and Iranian ladies (see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 6–7, below) has its politico-religious reflexion in a symbolic marriage—celebrated in an Aramaic inscription of the second century B.C. which has been found at Arabsun in Cappadocia—between the *genius loci*, under the name of Bel, and the Zoroastrian Religion, under the name of Dēn Mazdayasn. This metaphorical marriage appears to signify the 'reception' (in the juristic sense) of Zoroastrianism in the *ci-devant* domain of the Hittite Civilization (see Christensen, op. cit., pp. 152–3).

³ See p. 534, above.

selves to walk in step with one another, they found their single track in a path leading away from an intellectual nihilism towards an emotional faith.¹

After Carneades' death the Academics and the Sceptics suffered an eclipse;² and the Syrian Greek Stoic philosopher Poseidonius of Apamea (*vivebat circa* 135-51 B.C.), who was the leading intellectual light of his age, avenged Chrysippus upon Carneades by opening the gates of the Stoa for the reception of popular religious beliefs and practices to an extent that might have startled, not only Chrysippus himself, but even Poseidonius's own immediate predecessor the Rhodian aristocrat Panaetius.³ Poseidonius lived to see the Academy itself capitulate to the *Zeitgeist* of which the Stoic philosopher was the spokesman. About 80 B.C., at a time when Athens was lying stunned on the morrow of the harrowing experiences which she had brought upon herself through her intervention in the conflict between Rome and Mithradates of Pontus,⁴ another Syrian philosopher, Antiochus of Ascalon, who was at that time president of an Academy that had obstinately remained a citadel of scepticism down to the reign of his immediate predecessor Philo of Larisa, declared that 'Philosophy must go into reverse'.⁵

¹ This emotional faith, like the intellectual nihilism against which it was a reaction, was a pathological exaggeration (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (y), Annex, in vol. iv, above) of one among the several constituents of the harmoniously balanced philosophy with which the founder of the Academy had been inspired by his own master Socrates. In the soul of Socrates three impulses—'an intellectual scepticism, a spiritual affirmation, and a tenacious belief in the identity of virtue and knowledge'—are distinguished by More, P. E.: *Platonism*, 2nd edition (Princeton 1926, University Press), p. 2. According to the same scholar (*Hellenistic Philosophies = The Greek Tradition from the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon: 399 B.C. to A.D. 451*, vol. ii (Princeton 1923, University Press), p. 375, the post-Socratic schools of Hellenic philosophy concocted the diverse fare which they offered, in competition with one another, to a hungry Hellenic public, out of crumbs which had all fallen from their common master's table. Epicureanism was a combination of Socrates' rationalism with his hedonism; Stoicism was a combination of his rationalism with his optimistic endurance (*καρτερία*); Neoplatonism was a combination of his rationalism with his spiritual affirmation; Pyrrhonism was a combination of his scepticism with his hedonism and his endurance. In making these diverse excerpts from the philosophy of Socrates all the schools alike were aiming at the same goal: namely, a reconciliation of liberty with security under the watchword of *αὐτάρκεια*.

² More, P. E.: *Hellenistic Philosophies = The Greek Tradition from the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon: 399 B.C. to A.D. 451*, vol. ii (Princeton 1923, University Press), p. 317. In the strength of the rally which the Hellenic Society succeeded in making when it passed out of its 'Time of Troubles' into its universal state in the generation of Augustus, an archaistic revival of the Hellenic philosophy of Scepticism was set on foot, at the beginning of the Christian Era, by Aenēsidesmus. The author of the chief extant Greek treatise on this Neo-Scepticism, Sextus Empiricus, lived in the last generation of the *Pax Augusta*, circa A.D. 150-230. In Sinic history there was a comparable revival of sceptical thought—in this case, likewise, with an archaistic savour—in a rally that was also reflected in the restoration of the Sinic universal state by the Posterior Han Dynasty after an interlude of anarchy. The moving spirit in this Sinic Neo-Scepticism was Wang Ch'ung (*vivebat circa* A.D. 27-100) (Granet, M.: *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Renaissance du Livre), p. 580).

³ See Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), p. 536, and Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 142-3.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 266, above.

⁵ Seeck, op. cit., loc. cit.

This conversion, which began to take effect in the sensitive souls of philosophers as early as the turn of the second and the last century B.C., took some time to communicate itself to the Hellenic dominant minority as a whole. At a date some three hundred years later than Antiochus of Ascalon's day, in the pale light of an Antonine 'Indian Summer', a vestige of the prosaic *raison d'état* of Antiochus of Commagene is still visible, through the rising mist of piety, in the syncretism that was cultivated, in his private religious life, by the Emperor Alexander Severus (*imperabat* A.D. 222-35).

'The philosophic devotion of that emperor was marked by a singular but injudicious regard for the Christian religion. In his domestic chapel he placed the statues of Abraham, of Orpheus, of Apollonius and of Christ, as an honour justly due to those respectable sages who had instructed Mankind in the various modes of addressing their homage to the supreme and universal deity.'¹

The state of mind here displayed in private life by one of the rulers of the Hellenic universal state on the eve of its first collapse can also be detected unmistakably in the following account of the public religious policy of the second founder² of the Sinic universal state, Liu Pang, the first emperor of the Han Dynasty:

'When the unification of the empire was completed, the city of Ch'ang Ngan was made the capital of the new empire, and all the tribal and local religions and cults were fully represented in the capital, where each sect had its own shrines, priesthoods, and ceremony. There were the Liang Priestesses, representing the sects of the western peoples of modern Szechuan; the Tsin Priestesses representing the tribal worship of modern Shensi;³ the Ts'in Priestesses representing the peoples of modern Shensi and further west; the Chin Priestesses, representing the races of the valleys of the Han and the Yangtse. . . . And, when the Emperor Wuti conquered the tribes of modern Kwangtung (III B.C.),⁴ the Yueh Priestesses were added to the numerous tribal and local priesthoods at the capital city and were allowed to worship their own gods and spirits and practise their peculiar method of divination by means of chicken-bones.'⁵

In fact, in the Sinic, as in the Hellenic, World the original attitude of cultivated minds in the Dominant Minority to the religious practices and beliefs of the Internal Proletariat was that depicted

¹ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xvi. Gibbon's account is based on the following passage of 'the Life of Alexander Severus' (chap. 29) in the so-called *Historia Augusta*: 'Usus vivendi eidem hic fuit: Primum [ut], si facultas esset—id est, si non cum uxore cubuisset—matutinis horis in larario suo, in quo et divos principes, sed optimos electos, et animas sanctiores, in quibus et Apollonium et (quantum scriptor suorum temporum dicit) Christum, Abraham et Orpheum et huiusmodi ceteros habebat et maiorum effigies, rem divinam faciebat.'

² For the historical relation between Liu Pang and Ts'in She Hwang-ti see V. C. (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 187 and 190, below.

³ See V. C. (i) (c) 2, p. 141, above.—A.J.T.

⁴ Hu Shih, op. cit., pp. 30-1.

⁵ Shansi?—A.J.T.

in a famous description, in the Acts of the Apostles, of how the Roman Governor of the province of Achaia behaved when the Jewish community at Corinth hailed Paul, the Apostle of Christ, before his judgement-seat,

'saying: "This fellow persuadeth men to worship God contrary to the Law". And, when Paul was now about to open his mouth, Gallio said unto the Jews: "If it were a matter of wrong or wicked lewdness, O ye Jews, reason would that I should bear with you; but, if it be a question of words and names and of your law, look ye to it; for I will be no judge of such matters". And he drave them from the judgment-seat. Then all the Greeks took Sosthenes, the chief ruler of the synagogue, and beat him before the judgment-seat. And Gallio cared for none of those things.'¹

Yet this Marcus Annaeus Gallio, who has so strangely acquired a reflected fame from a wandering Jew who happened to cross the Roman administrator's path when Gallio was Proconsul of Achaia, had a brother named Lucius Annaeus Seneca who is justly famous in his own right as a philosopher; and

'Seneca is the earliest and most powerful apostle of a great moral revival. . . . He adheres formally to the lines of the old Stoic system in his moments of calm logical consistency. But, when the enthusiasm of humanity, the passion to win souls to goodness and moral truth, is upon him, all the old philosophical differences fade; the new wine bursts the old bottles. The Platonic dualism, the eternal conflict of flesh and spirit, the Platonic vision of God, nay, a higher vision of the Creator, the pitiful and loving Guardian, the Giver of all good, the Power which draws us to Himself, who receives us at death, and in whom is our eternal beatitude—these ideas, so alien to the older Stoicism, transfigure its hardness, and its cold repellent moral idealism becomes a religion. . . .'²

'Hardly less striking is the warmth of devout feeling which suffuses the moral teaching of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. They have not, indeed, abandoned the old Stoic principle that Man's final good depends on the rectitude of the will. But the Stoic sage is no longer a solitary athlete, conquering by his proud unaided strength and in his victory rising almost superior to Zeus.³ Growing moral experience had taught humility and inspired the sense of dependence on a higher Power in sympathy with Man. No true Stoic, of course, could ever forget the divine element within each human soul which linked it with the Cosmic Soul, and through which Man might bring himself into harmony with the great polity of gods and men.⁴ But somehow the Divine Power immanent in the World, from a dim cold impalpable Law or Fate or

¹ Acts xviii. 13-17.

² Dill, S.: *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London 1905, Macmillan), pp. 304-5.

³ Cf. Luke xviii. 9, quoted on p. 544, above.—A.J.T.

⁴ For the Hellenic conception of the *Cosmopolis* see V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, vol. vi, pp. 332-8, below.—A.J.T.

impersonal force, slowly rounds itself off into a Being, if not apart from Man, at any rate his superior, his Creator and Guardian, nay, in the end, his Father, from whom he comes, to whom he returns at death. . . .¹

'We are now on the threshold of another world from which many voices were coming to the age of Plutarch.² After Philosophy has done its utmost to mould the life of sixty or seventy years into a moral harmony, with its music in itself, the effort ends in a melancholy doubt. The precept of Seneca and Plutarch, that you should live under the tutelary eye of some patron sage of the past, revealed a need of exterior help for the virtuous will. The passion for continued existence was sobered by the sense of continued moral responsibility and the shadow of a judgement to come. Vistas of a supernatural world opened above the struggling human life on Earth and in far mysterious distances beyond. When Philosophy had done its utmost to heal the diseases of Humanity, it was confronted with another task: to give Man a true knowledge of God and assurance of His help in This World and the Next. . . .³

'Some may think this a decline from the lofty plane of the older school. The answer is that the earlier effort to find salvation through pure reason in obedience to the law of the Whole,⁴ although it may have been magnificent, was not a working religion for Man as he is constituted. The eternal involution of Spirit and Matter in the old Stoic creed, the cold impersonal unknowable Power which under whatever name—Law, Reason, Fate, Necessity—permeates the Universe, necessarily exclude the idea of design, of providence, of moral care for Humanity. The unknown Power which claims an absolute obedience has no aid or recognition for his worshipper. The monism of the old Stoics breaks down. The human spirit, in striving to realize its unity with the Universal Spirit, realizes with more and more intensity the perpetual opposition of Matter and Spirit, while it receives no aid in the conflict from the Power which ordains it; it "finds itself alone in an alien world". The true Stoic has no real object of worship.'⁵

In the spiritual experience of Hellenic souls the yearning after God which suffused this latter-day Stoicism with a warm religious glow had already found expression, six hundred years earlier—before the age of growth had ended in a breakdown—in the deliberately manufactured religion of Orphism;⁶ and within the

¹ Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 390-1.

² For Plutarch's contribution to the pious work of suffusing Hellenic philosophy with religion—and with superstition and demonology in the same breath—see Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 150-2. 'Among the pagan men of learning who deserve the name, he [Plutarch] is the first to renounce completely the ideal of researching, without prejudice, into the Truth, and to turn Philosophy, unconditionally, into a missionary of Faith.'—A.J.T.

³ Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 416-17.

⁴ A modern Western presentation of the philosophy of 'Holism' will be found in General J. C. Smuts' *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd ed. (London 1927, Macmillan).—A.J.T.

⁵ Dill, *op. cit.*, p. 391. Compare the passage quoted from the same author and work in V. C (i) (d) 5, pp. 436-7, above.

⁶ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 84-7, above.

next two hundred years, at the hour of sunset, the glow was to flare out for one fleeting moment into the gorgeous colours of Neoplatonism.

In another context¹ we have already seen a corresponding metamorphosis overtaking the Indic philosophy of Buddhism and changing it into the 'higher religion' of the Mahāyāna.

'The Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are conceived as mighty beneficent beings rivalling the gods of the surrounding Hinduism. They may not have been conceived as gods in the sense of the ultimate reality of things; but popular thought was not concerned with such problems. It sought objects of worship, and it found them in the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. . . . The element of devotion (*bhakti*)² was thus introduced into Buddhism. . . . In the popular mode of expression the *Tathāgata* does manifest himself. He does so "when men have become unbelieving, unwise, ignorant, careless, fond of sensual pleasures". In the same way the god Krishna in the *Bhagavadgītā*³ says: "Whenever there is a decay of righteousness and a rising of unrighteousness, then I emanate myself. In order to save the good and to destroy evil-doers, to establish righteousness I am born from age to age." The actual historical relations between Buddhism and Krishnaism or Vaishnavism are not known, but here we have popular Mahāyāna Buddhism conforming exactly to the beliefs of contemporary Hinduism. . . . The Buddha has become an eternal being and an object of worship not differing in powers or qualities from the gods of the rival religions.'⁴

It was in this hardly recognizable form of a 'higher religion' appealing to the Proletariat that the Mahāyāna made its subsequent conquest of the Sinic World,⁵ and at the same time stimulated the Sinic philosophy of Taoism to enter into competition with it after accomplishing a similar metamorphosis.⁶

In this phase of suffusion with religious feeling the philosophies of the Dominant Minority show themselves capable of rising, in their highest flights, within range of those heights of spiritual sublimity that are attained by the religions which spring from the bosom of the Internal Proletariat. There are passages in Seneca's philosophical works that are so arrestingly reminiscent of passages in the Epistles of Saint Paul that some of the less critical-minded Christian theologians of a later age have duplicated Philo's conceit of Plato's debt to Moses, and have allowed themselves to imagine that the Roman philosopher was in correspondence with the Christian missionary. Such conjectures are as superfluous as they are improbable; for, after all, there is nothing to surprise us in

¹ In V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 133-6, above.

² See V. C (ii) (c) 2, p. 135, above.—A.J.T.

³ *Bhagavadgītā*, iv, 7, 8.

⁴ Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), pp. 178 and 184-5.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 139-46, above.

⁶ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 146-7, above.

these harmonies of tone between two pieces of spiritual music which were the fruits of the same social experience and the products of the same age—albeit in different souls. On this common ground between the Dominant Minority and the Internal Proletariat, at a certain moment, Seneca stands on a level with Paul, as, at another moment and on different ground which is common to the Dominant Minority and the External Proletariat, Aetius matches Theodoric;¹ and this is only what we should expect. On the other hand it is not only extremely surprising, but also deeply disconcerting, to find that the parallel which we have just drawn continues to run true in the sequel. We have seen² that the military guardian of the physical frontiers of a universal state does not succeed in making a stable combination of the barbarian's virtues with his own. When once he has let himself begin to 'go barbarian', he cannot check his course at some optimum point of his own choosing midway, but runs on willy-nilly till he reaches a full stop in a barbarism that is unmitigated. Worse still, he drags down again, with him, his barbarian 'opposite number' who had been making notable headway in the direction of civilization under the frontiersman's earlier influence. This melancholy history of the *limitaneus* whose duty lies in holding the physical frontiers of the Dominant Minority's domain against an outer darkness has a parallel, which is still more tragic, in the history of the philosopher whose mission is to hold frontiers that are spiritual against a darkness arising from within. The philosophies of the Dominant Minority blossom into Religion at one moment only to rankle into Superstition at the next.

'Up to this point [in Hellenic history] all progress in religious thought had proceeded from the highest circles of Society and of the life of the Spirit; the Oriental worships, on the other hand, pushed their way up from the dregs of the populace. In Rome the first initiates of Isis had been rouds and whores; the gospels of the Great Mother and of Mithras had found their apostles in slaves, pirates and common soldiers. "The extermination of the élite"³ made itself felt in the religious sphere too; and here its consequence was that the leadership in matters of Religion was no longer retained by those who had a claim to it in virtue of their greater maturity in culture, and that the lower classes and the spiritual paupers forced their superstition upon the higher social strata. It would be nearer the truth to say that these latter themselves sank lower and lower, and, in thus sinking, gradually reverted to the lower religious level of their underlings. Even Philosophy, which once upon a time had tolerated the popular religion, *de haut en bas*, solely as a crutch for cripples, now saturated itself with this popular

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), pp. 471-3, above.

² In loc. cit.

³ This terrible phrase of Seeck's—'die Ausrottung der Besten'—has been quoted already in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 62-3, above.—A.J.T.

religion and soon found its mission in either defending or explaining the very thing which, once upon a time, Philosophy itself had undermined.¹

A tendency which thus displays itself throughout the whole field of the religious life of a Hellenic Society in disintegration can also be seen uniformly at work at different geographical points and at different social levels. It can be observed, for example, on Syrian ground under a Hellenic political régime, in the evolution of an Oriental religion which has surpassed all its sisters and rivals in historical interest and importance through its having given birth to Christianity.

'The double-edged ambiguity of the new development [in Judaism] declares itself at once in the fact that here, as in Zoroastrianism, it flings the doors wide open for the entry of Demonology, Superstition and Magic. It fills the World with spirits, whose nature and operation, as well as their names, it strives to apprehend more and more exactly; it sees everywhere the operation of supernatural powers, rejects the rational comprehension of the understanding, and puts in its place the mystical intuition of a spiritually unbalanced sensibility and phantasy, which then—and this is the most disastrous step of all—is paradoxically reduced to an absurd system by the application of the most hard-headed logic. Hereby the "Wisdom" of the learned is perverted into its own opposite, and the road is blocked against the acquisition of any genuinely scientific knowledge. This is the course of development through which all advanced religions (*fortgeschrittene Religionen*) have passed—the Egyptiac religion in ever increasing measure since the fiasco of Ikhnaton's monotheistic reformation, and not only the Egyptiac religion but likewise the Babylonian (under the tyranny of Astrology),² the Persian religion of the Magi, the Indian religions, and in Hellas the mystery religions (this development is already under way in Hesiod) and Orphism, and thereafter, since the beginning of the reaction against the Enlightenment, Neopythagoreanism and Philosophical Eclecticism. Everywhere we find an increase in the moral depth of Religion going hand in hand with a relapse into the most primitive forms of Religion, forms that have long since been completely transcended.'³

Thus, in Hellenic history, the philosophies of the Dominant Minority and the religions of the Internal Proletariat gradually approach one another until at length they contrive to meet on the common ground of Superstition.

In tracing the nemesis of the self-idolization of Athens we have already been witnesses of the portentous spectacle of latter-day Athenian professors of philosophy stooping to practise out of school the primitive arts of the rain-making magician;⁴ and, if we

¹ Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), p. 138.

² See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 56-7, above.—A.J.T.

³ Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 118-19. Cf. pp. 357-8.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (a), vol. iv, pp. 271-2, above.

now examine the activities of these Hellenic philosophers¹ Sinic counterparts at a corresponding stage in the disintegration of the Sinic Civilization we shall receive a second shock in seeing these Confucian sages of the last two centuries B.C. making precisely the same exhibition of themselves as the Attic Neoplatonists of the fifth century of the Christian Era.

'It was in . . . an atmosphere of occultism and superstition that Confucianism was elevated to be the orthodox system of teaching in the [Han] Empire. It was impossible for Confucianism and for the Confucian scholars to escape from the contagious influence of this tremendously powerful atmosphere of the popular superstitions. Indeed, a number of the great Confucianists never attempted to escape from it. Mencius once remarked that Confucius was a timely sage. Confucianism, too, was always a timely system of teaching; it always caught up the fashions of the age. Shu-sen Tung, who was the real founder of [the] Confucianism of the Han Empire, was described by his own disciples as a sage that knew what the time needed. The same may be said of a number of the leading Confucianists of the age. Tung Chung-shu, the greatest representative of Confucian thought of the [Han] Dynasty, was well known in history for his method of praying for rain—which consisted in closing all southern gates of the city and forbidding all use of fire while our Confucian philosopher stood on the northern gate spraying the passers-by with drops of water.¹ Another great scholar of the Confucian School, Liu Hsiang, was an alchemist believing in the possibility of converting base metals into gold through the magic intervention of spirits; and he was once sentenced to death on the charge that he had deceived the Emperor Hsuanti (*imperabat* 73-49 B.C.) with his alchemical forgeries.

'It is to be expected that the New Confucianism established under the patronage of a ruler of such multifarious and insatiable credulity and under the leadership of such equally credulous scholars—this New Confucianism should be a great synthetic religion into which were fused all the elements of popular superstition and state worship, rationalized somewhat in order to eliminate a few of the most untenable elements, and thinly covered up under the guise of Confucian and pre-Confucian classics in order to make them appear respectable and authoritative. In this sense the New Confucianism of the Han Empire was truly the national religion of China. It was a great conglomeration of popular beliefs and practices of the time through a thin and feeble process of rationalization. . . . One may easily see that the New Confucianism of the Han Empire was quite different from the agnostic humanism of Confucius or the democratic political philosophy of Mencius. . . .

'The whole religious and intellectual atmosphere, even in the highest quarters of nobility and royalty, was primitive and crudely supersti-

¹ Another activity of Tung Chung-shu's was the interpretation of the prodigies recorded in the annals of history as evidence for the sympathy between the workings of Physical Nature and the vicissitudes of human affairs (see Granet, M.: *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Renaissance du Livre), pp. 579-80).—A.J.T.

tious. It was but natural that the New Confucianism which was patronized and nurtured in this environment should take on much that was primitive and crudely superstitious. It frankly discarded the naturalistic philosophy of a previous age which had been accepted by such prominent Confucian thinkers as Hsün-tse. It frankly rejected the agnosticism of Confucius himself and openly took a theistic position similar to that of the school of Mo Ti, whom the earlier Confuci[an] philosophers had condemned. These New Confucianists of Han believed that they knew the will of God and were capable of interpreting [the] hidden meaning of all its manifestations in Heaven and on Earth. They believed in magic and practised alchemy. They borrowed their methodology from the astrologers and spent their lives in trying to interpret the significance of physical catastrophes and anomalies by means of historical and scriptural analogies. Yet, for all that, we must forgive them. These Confucian scholars were children of an environment which alone was responsible for their primitiveness and crudity.¹

These rank weeds of Superstition which sprang up and choked a senile Confucianism as well as a senile Neoplatonism have also been the death of the Mahāyāna;² and in the Westernized Great Society of the present day no open-eyed observer will fail to detect symptoms of similar things to come. Already our Natural Science can be seen sprouting into 'Christian Science' and our psychical research into 'Spiritualism' and our comparative study of religions into 'Theosophy'. And, if the Marxian version of Hegelianism succeeds in holding its ground—either in its present posture of an oecumenical faith or even in the more modest role of a distinctive way of life for the peoples of the Soviet Union—we may foresee that the 'red line' which has already run from Hegel through Marx to Lenin will be continued (like the Platonic 'Golden Chain' that once upon a time ran through the sceptics Arcesilaus and Carneades to the medicine-man Proclus) in successors who, in entire good faith, will interpret their Marxian dogma and develop their Marxian practice into shapes which the Fathers of the Communist Church would perhaps hardly be able to recognize as any legacy of theirs if they were one day to revisit the Earth for an inspection of the results of their labours.³

Such is the miserable end of the philosophies of the Dominant

¹ Hu Shih, op. cit., pp. 34-5, 39, and 40.

² The classic Mahayanian sutra that bears the title of *The Lotus of the True Doctrine* includes a chapter on spells as well as a statement of the abstruse metaphysical doctrine of the Void (see Thomas, op. cit., pp. 184 and 186). In the sequel it has been the matter of chapter 21 of *The Lotus*, and not that of chapter 15, that has pervaded the consciousness and attracted the interest of most of the latter-day adherents of a Mahayanian universal church. This sutra was taken as the holy scripture of one of those popular forms of the Mahāyāna that were put into currency among a Japanese internal proletariat after the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan and the onset of a Japanese 'Time of Troubles' (see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 101, above).

³ For the inspiration and evolution of Communism see also V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 177-87, above.

Minority, and this even when they have striven with all their might to win their way on to that kindlier proletarian spiritual soil that is the seed-bed of the 'higher religions'. It profits these philosophies nothing that they, too, have at last broken into flower when this tardy and reluctant flowering revenges itself upon them by degenerating almost at once into an unhealthy and enervating luxuriance. In the last act of the dissolution of a civilization the philosophies finally dry up and wither away, while the 'higher religions' keep alive and in consequence become the defunct philosophies' residuary legatees, with an undisputed claim upon the Future. In a dissolving Hellenic World Christianity survived and succeeded to Neoplatonism (which found no elixir of life in discarding the rationality of Stoicism). In a dissolving Indic World Hinduism similarly survived and succeeded to the Mahāyāna (which could not keep Buddhism alive on its native Indian ground by throwing to the winds the sobriety of the Hīnayāna).¹ And in a dissolving Sinic World a Mahāyāna which had succeeded in completing its metamorphosis from an esoteric philosophy into a popular religion in the course of a long and roundabout journey from the Ganges to the Yellow River through a Hellenic-Syriac corridor,² encountered at its Sinic goal a Taoism that knew how to emulate the Mahāyāna's peculiar *tour de force* of transmuting itself from a philosophy into a religion³ without requiring the Mahāyāna's special stimulus of being driven to wander in an alien wilderness beyond the pale of its native social environment. The result was that on Sinic ground these two new popular religions with philosophic antecedents which they had both of them succeeded in living down now triumphantly divided between them the heritage of a Confucianism that had failed, after all, to season itself by the sordid device of steeping its Master's sovereign common sense in a mud-bath of vulgar Superstition.

This empirical survey, brief though it be, will perhaps have sufficed to bring out the apparent truth that, when philosophies and religions meet, the religions must increase while the philosophies must decrease;⁴ and we cannot turn away from our study of the encounter between these respective spiritual discoveries of the Internal Proletariat and the Dominant Minority without pausing to look into the question why it is that this defeat of the philosophies is—as history testifies—a foregone conclusion.

What, then, are the weaknesses that doom Philosophy to dis-

¹ For this victory of Hinduism over Buddhism—even as travestied in the most extreme of the divers Hinduistic metamorphoses of the Indic philosophy—see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 136–9, above.

² See II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 133–46, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 146–7, above.

⁴ John iii. 30.

comfiture when it enters the lists as a rival to Religion? The fatal and fundamental weakness, from which all the rest derive, is a lack of spiritual vitality.

'The geometry of the Ancients¹ was able to provide particular problems with solutions which look like anticipatory applications of our [modern Western] general methods. But it was not able to extract these methods themselves, because it had not the *élan* that could make the jump from statics to dynamics. The Ancients had simply pushed to the extreme limit a simulation of dynamics in static terms. We receive an impression of the same kind when we compare the doctrine of the Stoics . . . with Christian morality. The Stoics proclaimed themselves citizens of the World, and they added that all men are brothers because they are all children of the same God. These were almost the same words [as those of the Christian Gospel]; but they did not find the same echo, because they were not spoken with the same accent. The Stoics set some magnificent examples. If they did not succeed in drawing Mankind after them, that was because Stoicism is essentially a philosophy. The philosopher who is taken with a doctrine of such loftiness, and who puts himself into it, does, no doubt, lend life to it by practising it—as Pygmalion's love breathed life into the marble that had already been carved into a statue. But it is a far cry from Pygmalion's love to the enthusiasm which propagates itself from soul to soul without limit, like a conflagration.'²

This lack of *élan* lames Philosophy in two ways. On the one hand it diminishes its attractiveness for the mass of Mankind, and on the other hand it discourages the minority to whom it does appeal from throwing themselves into the task of converting their fellows.

One manifest secondary weakness is the proneness of Philosophy to provide for the Intellect out of all proportion to its provision for the other faculties of the Soul.

'The warning voice had sounded out clear to the World and was heard through all the places where men disputed and reasoned; the four hundred volumes of Hasdrubal-Cleitomachus, the compact effective arguments of Aenésidémus, the penetrating irony of Lucian, all these things were there, palpable and audible, during the centuries when the determination of the people of the Graeco-Roman World slowly matured to put themselves under the authority of a new dogma. Men did not answer the Sceptical arguments: they simply went past them, turned their backs upon them. Why was this? Why was the logic of the Sceptics impotent to arrest this movement of the Human Spirit? I think that, as we look at the history more closely, we see why. . . . There was one respect in which the Sceptical Philosophy hopelessly broke down; it broke down just where all Agnosticism must break down, before the exigencies of Life—before the fact that Man is not

¹ i.e. the Hellenes.—A.J.T.

² Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 58.

only a spectator of Reality but a maker of it. If we were minds suspended in Space merely watching what went on, we might well, so far as I can see, take the advice of the Sceptic to hold back from all belief; we might simply wait and see what happened. But we have to act, to-day and to-morrow and all the days to come. It was, when all was said and done, because men wanted guidance for action that they turned, in spite of all [that] the Sceptics could urge, to dogmatic systems—to Stoicism, to Epicureanism, and later on to Neoplatonism and the Church. There was an imperious need which the dogmatic systems set out to supply, and which Scepticism could neither supply nor set aside.¹

Another secondary weakness of Philosophy as a rival to Religion is the proneness of Philosophy to address itself to an intellectual *élite* within the Dominant Minority and to deliver its message in the elaborate and sophisticated terms which will commend it to these cultivated minds, but which, by the same token, will hardly be understood of the people at large, outside this narrow circle.² Alexander's vision of the unity of Mankind³ effaced the ancient division between Hellenes and Barbarians without exorcizing the spirit of exclusiveness itself from the souls of the Hellenic dominant minority; and a spirit which had been quelled in one quarter promptly found vent in another direction.

¹ Bevan, E.: *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford 1913, Clarendon Press), pp. 140-2. In the light of this Hellenic example an analogous course of spiritual development in the modern Western World has been predicted by Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 608-9:

'I declare it in advance: this current century, which has been the epoch of scientific-critical Alexandrianism, will not have passed without having seen [the Western Soul] outlive its will to win victories for Science. European Science is on the road towards a self-annihilation through a refinement of the intellect. First (in the 18th century) we tested the resources of Science, and then (in the 19th century) its power; at the end of the story, to-day, we are seeing through its historical role. From Scepticism there is a path that leads to "the Second [Bout of] Religiosity"—the religiosity of the dying mammoth-cities (*Weltstädte*), of that morbid inner life that comes, not before a culture, but after a culture, bringing a touch of warmth to wizened souls, as was done by the Oriental religions in latter-day Rome.'

While it remains to be seen whether Spengler's proleptic analogy between the respective spiritual histories of the Hellenic and the Western World is to be justified by the event, the rebound from scepticism into credulity which Mr. Bevan has observed in the course of Hellenic history has a Sinic parallel which is likewise already an accomplished fact. The occultism and the superstition to which the Confucian philosophy abandoned itself in the Imperial Age of the Han Dynasty (see pp. 555-6, above) followed hard upon the heels of the esotericism and the scepticism that had been the distinguishing marks of the Confucianism of the philosopher Hsün-tse (see Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1937, Reinhardt), p. 202; and Granet, M.: *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Rennaissance du Livre), p. 579).

² The spirit of intellectual exclusiveness which inspired the Hellenic philosophy from the outset is pithily expressed in the notice which is said to have been inscribed over the gate of the Academy: *Μηδεὶς ἀγawaμέρητος εἰσὶτω* (Tsetzes: *Chiliades*, Book VIII, l. 973). With this Platonic warning we may contrast the Christian boast: *ἐξέστι γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτευομένῳ καὶ ἀνευ γραμμάτων φιλοσοφεῖν . . . κοινὴ γὰρ ἀπάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν γε ἐλομένων ἡ σωφροσύνη* (Clement of Alexandria: *Stromata*, Book IV, chap. 8, § 58, quoted by Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), p. 539, footnote 1). These are the words of an Alexandrian Greek Father of the Church who had made it his life-work to express Christianity in terms of Hellenic philosophy.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 6-10, below.

'The distinction between Hellenes and Barbarians is translated into one between the cultivated and the uncultivated; and the cultivated alone—to the exclusion of the residual masses—are qualified for attaining to the correct apprehension of the truth, and this only if they have genuinely achieved, to perfection, the inward education of the spirit.'¹

This intellectual exclusiveness was not purged out of the Hellenic philosophy by its latter-day suffusion with Religion.

'The gospel of philosophy expounded by Seneca was rather an esoteric or aristocratic creed. With all his liberal sentiment, his cosmopolitanism, his clear conception of human equality and brotherhood, Seneca always remains the director of souls like his own, enervated by wealth, tortured with the ennui of jaded sensibility, haunted by the terror of the Caesars. Indeed, Stoicism was always rather a creed for the cultivated upper class than for the crowd. In its prime its apparatus of logical formulae, its elaborate physics and metaphysics, its essentially intellectual solution of the problems both of the Universe and [of] human life, necessarily disabled it from ever developing into a popular system. . . . In the first century [of the Christian Era] Stoicism came to be much more a religion than a philosophy or even a theology. Its main business, as conceived by men like Seneca, is to save souls from the universal shipwreck of character caused by the capricious excesses of luxury, the idolatry of the world and the flesh, which sprang from a riotous pride in the material advantages of imperial power, without a sobering sense of duty or a moral ideal. But, in the nature of things, this wreck of character was most glaringly seen among the men who were in close contact with the half insane masters of the World in the first century, and who possessed the resources to exhaust the possibilities of pleasure or the capacities of the senses to enjoy. It is to people of this class who still retained some lingering instincts of goodness—weary with indulgence, bewildered and tortured by the conflict of the lower nature with the weak but still disturbing protests of the higher—that Seneca addresses his counsels.'²

It will be seen that, in the Hellenic case, the approach of Philosophy towards Religion which began to declare itself openly in Seneca's day was not accompanied in the narrow circle of the elect by any serious practical attempt to bring the philosopher's esoteric creed within the mental range of a wider public which was likewise hungering for spiritual bread; and this ominous failure of the latter-day Hellenic philosopher's new faith in a supra-mundane Power to express itself in new works of charity towards the semi-convert's fellow human beings is perhaps, after all, not surprising; for by this time the tradition of intellectual, and even

¹ Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1923, Cotta), p. 325.

² Dill, S.: *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London 1905, Macmillan), pp. 334-5.

social, exclusiveness had become deeply ingrained in the practice of all the Hellenic schools of philosophy, with the honourable exception of the Cynics.¹ In the pre-Senecan generation of Augustus the cultivated poet Horace could write without any prick of compunction or fear of bringing odium on himself:

Odi profanum vulgus et arceo;
favete linguis: carmina non prius
audita Musarum sacerdos
virginibus puerisque canto.²

And a contemporary man of science has expressed the same sentiment in even more brutal language.

'A rabble of women and promiscuous vulgarians cannot be induced to answer to the call of Philosophic Reason if you are wanting to lead them into piety and holiness and faith. In dealing with people of that sort, you cannot do without Superstition; and Superstition, in its turn, has to be fed with fairy-tales and hocus-pocus.'³

This inhuman prescription of the Hellenic Enlightenment for giving the Proletariat a stone in lieu of bread⁴ stands in diametrical opposition to the lord's injunction to the servant in a parable⁵ which was soon to be disseminated through the Hellenic World in the scriptures of the Christian Church:

'Go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.'⁶

The contrast is presented in the following terms by a modern Western master of the subject:⁷

'The difference of individualities is recognized by Christianity too: "Many be called, but few chosen."⁸ Here, however, the differentiating

¹ For this exception see Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 68-9.

² Horace: *Carmina*, Book III, *carm.* i, ll. 1-4.

³ Strabo: *Geographica*, Book I, ch. 8, p. 19: οὐ γὰρ ὄχλον γε γυναϊκῶν καὶ παντὸς χυδαίου πλήθους ἐπαγαγεῖν λόγῳ δυνατόν φιλοσόφῳ καὶ προσκαλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ δαιοτήτα καὶ πίστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἀνεν μυθοποιίας καὶ τερατείας. Compare the passage of Polybius quoted in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 646-7, below. This tendency towards intellectual exclusiveness on the part of the cultivated elite of the Hellenic World also comes to light in a philological observation made in the second century of the Christian Era by the Latin scholar Aulus Gellius, who points out (*Noctes Atticae*, Book XIII, chap. 16) that the Latin word 'humanitas' is used in the meaning, not of the Greek word *φιλανθρωπία*, but of the Greek word *παιδεία*: 'Qui verba Latina fecerunt . . . "humanitatem" non id esse voluerunt quod vulgus existimat quodque a graecis *φιλανθρωπία* dicitur . . . sed "humanitatem" appellaverunt id propemodum quod Graeci *παιδείαν* vocant, nos eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artes didicimus.' That is to say, a word which, in virtue of its origin and its literal meaning, ought to stand for something which unites a cultivated man with the mass of his fellow men, has come to stand for something which distinguishes and divides him from them.

⁴ Matt. vii. 9 = Luke xi. 11.

⁵ Luke xiv. 15-24; cf. Matt. xxii. 1-14. This parable has been cited already, as an illustration of the phenomenon of *περιπέτεια*, in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, p. 247, above.

⁶ Luke xiv. 23.

⁷ Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), pp. 325-6.

⁸ Matt. xx. 16, and xxii. 14.

factor is not the intellect and not the individual's own ability, but is the divine grace; and for precisely this reason the preaching of the word is addressed in principle to the whole of Mankind, and in the first place to the middle and lower, and not to the upper, strata of Civilized Society—to those uncultivated and simple souls which are neither born nor bred to pass a logical judgement or to acquire a philosophical apprehension of the truth, but which follow the obscure drift of their sensibilities and are for that reason accessible to the *πνεῦμα*. To these circles Christianity offers something which neither the philosopher nor the Cynic preacher of "moral uplift" can offer to them, and that is a firm foundation for Life and Thought. This foundation is won through Faith: that is, through an acceptance, without reservation, of the revelation that is preached to them, however strange—and, to cultivated minds, nonsensical—its contents may appear to be. A further condition is their willing submission to the divine authority which is showing compassion on them. This is nothing less than a denial of everything that is of the essence of philosophical thought and of its spiritual freedom. The ideal of Philosophy is the sage who relies on himself; the ideal of Christianity is the believer who sinks himself in God.¹

The first penalty that an enlightened Hellenic dominant minority had to pay for its spiritual frigidity was the loss of its moral and material power.

'The leadership slips out of the hands of the cultivated class because they have lost the power to fulfil the tasks with which they are confronted. They have nothing more to offer to the world: intellectual life founders in the trifling business of rhetoric, government is abandoned to the professional civil servants, while, as for the sword, they have let it pass out of their hands and have shuffled off the duty of military service—which in their eyes is unworthy of a cultivated world which attends to its affairs in peace—on to the shoulders of the culturally lowest strata of the population and eventually on to those of mercenaries recruited from beyond the frontiers. The rise of the religious movement and the victory of Christianity is merely the reverse side of the unlimited extension of the military régime since the days of Severus and Caracalla, and after them the Illyrians, in the third century. The state moulded by Augustus had been based on the conception that the upper classes had a vocation to bear rule; as and when these upper classes fail, the decision falls into the hands of the gross, loutish masses; and

¹ 'Here we touch the really decisive point of difference. Philosophy is a movement that comes from above and that is the offspring of the Enlightenment, of the emancipation of the Spirit from the traditional ideas of Religion and of the social heritage (*des Herkommens*); and for this reason Philosophy is in principle unbelieving; it begins with doubt, and this doubt then leads, through scrutiny, either to a complete rational system of knowledge of the World and of Man, or else to scepticism. Christianity, on the other hand, like all the other phenomena of the same order, is a movement that comes from below and that is the offspring of Religion and of the ideas—to which the masses cling so obstinately—of mythical thought and of the supernatural powers, the good and the bad, with their magical properties and their arbitrary operations. For this reason these phenomena are in principle irrational and authoritarian.'

the ascendancy of the masses carries with it an ascendancy of the views and feelings by which these masses are governed (whether consciously or unconsciously) and of an intellectual and religious life that is shaped to fit the masses' needs.¹

At this point the *ci-devant* governing class began to hunger after the spiritual bread which they had so long and so contemptuously rejected; but their tardy repentance only served to bring down upon their heads the nemesis which the Gospel announces:

'I say unto you that none of those men which were bidden² shall taste of my supper.'³

The breath of Religion which momentarily animated the cold and clear-cut marble of the Hellenic intellect in the generations of Seneca and Epictetus rapidly staled, after the generation of Marcus, into a stuffy religiosity; and the heirs of the Hellenic philosophical tradition fell lamentably between two stools. They threw away their precious heritage of Reason without finding their way, through this supreme sacrifice, to the hearts of the masses; and in ceasing to be sages they dropped into crankiness instead of rising to sainthood.⁴

In the moribund Hellenic Society of the fourth century of the Christian Era,

'The motive that impelled Athanasius to idealize Antony was not unlike that which led Julian, the philosopher in the World, to turn from Socrates to Diogenes for his model of Philosophy out of the World. And Diogenes alone—or, let us say, the legendary Diogenes—could stand with the martyrs of the Church, as he stood with the terrible ascetics. . . .

'It might seem as if Socrates would have served such a purpose better than Diogenes, for he had in fact faced Death for his convictions and conquered its fears; but . . . the death of Socrates, as had been his life, was too calm and reasoned to satisfy the religious craving of that age. Julian might make a brave pretence of appealing to the verdict of intelligence, but at heart he was a child of his own generation, and for centuries the World had been receding farther and farther from the old hope of finding salvation in the clear conception of Truth and of what we know and do not know. The change shows itself in the eclectic merging of the various, even contradictory, sects of Philosophy, with a vein of Neopythagorean obscurantism predominating over all.⁵ It is

¹ Meyer, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 335.

² This refers, of course, not to the guests who were now to be brought in from the highways and hedges, but to other guests who had accepted invitations in advance and then, at the last moment, had sent messages praying the master of the house to have them excused.—A.J.T.

³ Luke xiv. 24.

⁴ Monsieur Henri Bergson has pointed out in *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 249, that the saint is not afflicted with the philosopher's morbid aversion from the work of evangelizing the masses.

⁵ For this merger see the present chapter, p. 534, above.—A.J.T.

notable in the waves of emotional superstition that were supplanting the humanized mythology of Olympus.¹ Most conspicuously it is seen in the victory of the Christian Faith, foretold by Saint Paul in the declaration that God hath "made foolish the wisdom of This World"² and verified in the exultant cry of Tertullian: [*Credibile est*] *quia ineptum est!* [*Certum est*] *quia impossibile!*³ Over and over again we find the Fathers, even those most favourably disposed to Plato and most ready to admit that God had not left himself without a witness among the Gentiles—again and again we find them reproaching Philosophy with its inability to convert the stubborn hearts of men and to save the masses. And the Fathers were right. In whatever terms we may choose to state the fact, it is true, as Ambrose said, that "it hath not pleased God to give his people salvation in dialectic".⁴ It is simply true that, in setting the emphasis so strongly upon knowledge and intelligence, and in leaving so little room for the will and the instinctive emotions, Classical Philosophy, even the Philosophy of Plato, had left the great heart of Mankind untouched.⁵

Indeed, in this tragi-comic last act, the epigoni of Plato and

¹ The Olympian Faith was dead before its rival heirs broke into the Hellenic arena to fight over the corpse (see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 57, and II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 215-16, above). 'The decay of religious feeling reveals itself most plainly of all in the fact that the oracles, which once had attained to so great a power, almost all of them gradually became extinct during the last centuries before Christ, because nobody any longer felt it worth while to consult them' (Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), p. 84).—A.J.T.

² I. Cor. i. 20. See also the passages from the same chapter of the same epistle that are quoted in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, p. 249, above, and in V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, p. 150, below.—A.J.T.

³ Tertullian: *De Carne Christi*, 5 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. ii, col. 761). The maxim of Tertullian has been popularized, but scarcely travestied, in the words: *Credo quia absurdum*.—A.J.T.

⁴ Ambrose: *De Fide*, Book I, chap. 5, § 42: 'Non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum.' The Milanese master's aphorism was to become his Hipponian disciple's commonplace. 'Sed forsitan dicet aliquis: "Etsi ipse humiliter natus est, in discipulorum nobilitate iactare se voluit"? Non elegit reges aut senatores aut philosophos aut oratores: immo vero elegit plebeios, pauperes, indoctos, piscatores. Petrus piscator, Cyprianus orator. Nisi fideliter praecederet piscator, non humiliter sequeretur orator.'—Augustine, *Sermo cxcvii*, fragm. 2. Cf. eundem, *Sermo xliiii*, chap. 5 (apropos of I. Cor. i. 26-8): Peter was a fisherman, not an orator, senator, or emperor; *Sermo lxxxvii*, chap. 10 (apropos of the same passage of Scripture): 'Dominus noluit prius eligere senatores, sed piscatores'; *Sermo cclxxxi* (apropos of Psalm cxii. 7-8): 'Nisi prius eligeretur vilis infirmorum, non sanaretur inflatio superbiorum'; *Enarratio in Psalmum xxxvi*, *Sermo ii*, chap. 14 (apropos of I. Cor. i. 27): 'Et non de oratore piscatorem, sed de piscatore lucratum est oratorem, de piscatore lucratum est senatorem, de piscatore lucratum est imperatorem'; *De Civitate Dei*, Book XXII, chap. 5: 'Ineruditos liberalibus disciplinis et omnino, quantum ad istorum doctrinas attinet, impolitos, non peritos grammatica, non armatos dialectica, non rhetorica inflatos, piscatores Christum cum retribus fidei ad mare huius saeculi paucissimos misit atque ita et ex omni genere tam multos pisces et tanto mirabiliores, quanto rariores, etiam ipsos philosophos cepit.' In this matter the two fourth-century Latin fathers Saint Ambrose and Saint Augustine are supported by the nineteenth-century French prophet of the modern Western heresy of Racialism. 'Ce n'est pas l'érudition qui sauve un peuple arrivé à la décrépitude' (de Gobineau, le Comte J. A.: *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (Paris 1853-5, Firmin Didot, 4 vols.), vol. i, p. 278).—A.J.T.

⁵ More, P. E.: *Hellenistic Philosophies = The Greek Tradition from the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon: 399 B.C. to A.D. 451*, vol. ii (Princeton 1923, University Press), pp. 297-9. In the present Study this operation of the principle of *ἀνεπίσχετος* in the intellectual field is touched upon in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, p. 248-9, above, and in V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, pp. 149-54, below.

Zeno confessed the inadequacy of their own great masters and ensamples by abandoning themselves to an imitation of the Internal Proletariat which was in very truth the sincerest flattery of this *profanum vulgus*. Nor was their imitation directed solely towards the inward *êthos* of the rising religions that had made their first epiphany in a proletarian environment: it was also extended, with an indiscriminating zeal, to the details and even the trivialities of these religions' external rites and organization.

'In Iamblichus—as contrasted with Plotinus and also still with Porphyry—the individual religious experience, with the whole of its inspiration, is eliminated. Its place is taken by a mystical church with sacraments, a scrupulous exactness in carrying out the forms of worship, a ritual that is closely akin to magic, and a clergy. To give all this its finishing touch Iamblichus introduces a fanaticism which in the Ancient World is something quite new. Porphyry, for example, is vehemently attacked—without regard to any merit that he may have acquired as an opponent of Christianity—because he does not seem to stand on entirely positive ground. This attitude in itself proclaims the advent of a new age. Julian's attempt to found a pagan state church has hitherto been written off as a completely isolated enterprise of the Ancient Civilization in its last phase; but this view, thus expressed, is not correct. In this field, likewise, the Roman emperor has merely executed the Syrian philosopher's design. To adapt a well-known phrase from Modern History, Julian is an Iamblichus on horseback.

'Julian's ideas about the elevation of the priesthood reproduce . . . exactly the standpoint of Iamblichus, whose zeal for the priests, for the details of the forms of worship, and for a systematic orthodox doctrine had prepared the ground for the construction of a pagan church. Julian's role is simply to develop this conception further. The project of establishing a church of this kind is thus one piece of that organic development in which the rising fervour of pagan piety expressed itself.'¹

The accident of Julian's birth and office made it possible for the emperor-archaist momentarily to shore up the shaky structure of this would-be Neoplatonic universal church by buttressing it with the massive masonry of a not yet fallen Hellenic universal state. Yet Julian's impetuous dedication of these vast political means to that bizarre religious purpose merely served to make it plain that

All the King's horses and all the King's men
Could not set up Humpty-Dumpty again.²

¹ Geffken, J.: *Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums* (Heidelberg 1920, Winter), pp. 113 and 131. See also the present Study, V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 147, above; and V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, p. 584; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 680-3; and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 222-3, below.

² For a more general examination of the relations between churches and governments see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, below.

Julian's state-supported pagan ecclesiastical establishment collapsed in a trice at the news of the death of its Imperial architect and patron; and thereafter nothing remained of Iamblichus's grandiose dream save a pathetically futile coterie of cranks.

'The sketches of the anti-Christian Eunapius give a picture, which is as remarkable as it is vivid, of the inner life of Hellenes—both men and women—in the fourth century. The picture reveals a society of passionately religious philosophers rapt in contemplation and ecstatically absorbed in the Divine. The spirit of the age breaks out in them, almost morbidly, when they are still in their tender years. This amazing state of things seems hardly capable of being keyed up to any higher pitch; and yet it is not till the fifth century that it attains the acme of its eccentricity. No doubt the contemporary Christian Church likewise displays similar features and produces a fair number of very queer saints; but among the Christians we never find, on quite this scale, any community of people who are completely extravagant, and almost entirely engrossed in unprofitable thoughts and actions; such as we find among these late pagan philosophers who drift like sleep-walkers through a Utopian world of their own.

'The special characteristic of these representatives of Paganism is a mutual resemblance which is so close that their common psychic condition absolutely hits the observer in the eye. . . . What is the goal at which these latter-day Hellenes are aiming? It is holiness, purity, the mortification of the flesh, a union with the World of the Gods. This holiness becomes a fixed programme which is followed out with complete singleness of mind. The means employed to this end are an asceticism, an observance of special fast days, and an anchorite's existence which is filled with a constant intentness upon heavenly things. . . .

'As a genuine regard for science diminishes . . . theurgy—and the magic that is directly bound up with it—gain proportionately in prestige. . . . As the lord of Physical Nature, the philosopher makes rain like a primitive warlock, and knows how to ban an earthquake. He drives out devils through the sheer force of his personality . . . though it is true that there is a painful consciousness that this holy lore is beginning to be lost—a consciousness which inspires enthusiasm for such isolated depositories of the ancient theurgy as still survive.

'So their life is lived in a world of miracles and legends—and also of inept and undesignedly ludicrous old-wives'-tales. . . . A mystical catalepsy and a religious transport strip away all that is natural in the life of body and soul. . . . And the disappearance of all simple and natural feeling finds compensation in an accentuation of supernatural powers. . . .

'Pythagoreanism has bequeathed a legacy to this age in the participation—which becomes more and more vigorous—of female adepts in the philosophers' spiritual life. Sosipatra is followed by Hypatia, Asclepigenea, Aedesia. The mystical eccentricity of the men commu-

nicates itself to the women as a matter of course; and then the women in their turn win the men's unstinted admiration if they prove themselves receptive pupils of the theurgi and perhaps go on to practise rain-making under the cloak of "Nephelomancy", like Anthusa of Cilicia.

'The studies of these sages are naturally confined, in essentials, to Religion—apart from the acquisition of the formal sophistic accomplishments. They plunge deep into the hieratic lore of the Egyptians and tread in the footsteps of innumerable predecessors in their interpretations of the animal-worship of the Holy People; and all other known religions are laid under contribution with equal enthusiasm. Proclus, for instance, as his biographer boasts of him, was acquainted with the whole corpus of Theology, Greek and Barbarian. He addressed his prayers to Marnas of Gaza, to Aesculapius Leontuchus of Ascalon, to Theandrites the god of the Arabs, and to Isis of Philae. He kept the religious festivals of all nations. In his eyes the philosopher was the whole World's hierophant.'¹

A fitting epitaph for Proclus—and not for this last of the Neoplatonists alone, but also for his Buddhist and Taoist and Confucian counterparts—is offered us in the following passage from the pen of an eminent living Western psychologist who is manifestly thinking, as he writes, of a world that is neither Julian's nor Skandagupta's² nor Hsuanti's,³ but is the writer's very own:

'Great innovations never come from above; they come invariably from below, just as trees never grow from the sky downward, but upward from the earth, however true it is that their seeds have fallen from above. The upheaval of our world and the upheaval in consciousness is one and the same. Everything becomes relative and therefore doubtful; and, while Man, hesitant and questioning, contemplates a world that is distracted with treaties of peace and pacts of friendship, Democracy and Dictatorship, Capitalism and Bolshevism, his spirit yearns for an answer that will allay the turmoil of doubt and uncertainty. And it is just people of the lower social levels who follow the unconscious forces of the Psyche; it is the much-derided, silent folk of the land⁴—those who are less infected with academic prejudices than

¹ Geffken, J.: *Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums* (Heidelberg 1920, Winter), pp. 190–200. This picture of the last phase of Hellenism is curiously reminiscent of a description of the last phase of the abortive Scandinavian Civilization in Iceland which has been quoted in II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 358, above.

² In the generation of Skandagupta (*imperabat circa* A.D. 455–80), on the eve of the break-up of an Indic universal state that had been re-established by the Gupta Dynasty after the intrusion of Hellenism upon the Indic World (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 85–6, above), Hinduism was gaining ground, under Imperial patronage, at the expense of a Buddhism that was at the same time rapidly ceasing to be distinguishable from the rising religion that was supplanting it (see Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 303).

³ For the credulity of the Han Emperor Hsuanti (*imperabat* 73–49 B.C.) see the passage quoted on p. 555, above, from a paper by Dr. Hu Shih.

⁴ The same phrase is used by Meyer in the passage quoted on p. 543, above.—A.J.T.

great celebrities are wont to be. All these people, looked at from above, present mostly a dreary or laughable comedy; and yet they are as impressively simple as those Galilaeans who were once called blessed.¹

¹ Jung, C. G.: *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, English translation (London 1933, Kegan Paul), pp. 243-4. Compare the quotation from Eduard Meyer in V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), vol. vi, pp. 114-15, below.

ROMAN POLICY TOWARDS PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

THE exception which proves the rule of habitual humanity in the record of the Romans' treatment of primitive peoples is their behaviour towards the Gallic natives of the lowlands between the Appennines and the Po, and the Ligurian natives of the North-West Appennine valleys, during the quarter of a century running from 197 to 173 B.C. This black chapter in the history of the Roman conquest of the European barbarians was distinguished by those acts of eviction, deportation, and extermination which we have cited above¹ as examples of the ruthlessness of the Hellenic dominant minority on the war-path. This Roman application of the policy of 'frightfulness' was, however, strictly local and temporary, and it can be accounted for as the exceptional result of a combination of special causes.²

In the first place the quarter of a century in question was the post-war period after the Hannibalic War, when the war-generation of the *Populus Romanus* was still distraught by the eighteen-years-long agony which it had just had to endure. In the second place the Romans bore a special grudge against these Gallic and Ligurian tribesmen because they had taken Hannibal's side as soon as he had appeared over the crest of the Alps, and had enlisted in his army. The tribesmen had thereby done their worst to bring about the defeat of Rome in her life-and-death struggle with an implacable adversary, and they had undoubtedly helped Hannibal materially to prolong the struggle and so to inflict that deadly wound upon the Roman body social in Italy which was his permanent legacy of revenge upon a Power that was the bane of Carthage. In the third place the Roman Government was desperately in need of lands for the resettlement of ex-servicemen who had been uprooted in formidable numbers from their homes in the Cisappennine war-zone, and who could not be replanted easily in the devastated areas. The lands which were now confiscated from Hannibal's Gallic and Ligurian confederates after the Cartha-

¹ In V. C (i) (c) 1, on pp. 37-8, above.

² The only precedent for the eviction of the Boii in 191 B.C. was the previous eviction of this tribe's kinsmen and neighbours, the Senones, in 283 B.C. This previous act of inhumanity, which was committed two generations before the outbreak of the Hannibalic War and not on the morrow of it, had no excuse. It can only be said that the Roman Government had at first made a moderate use of its victory over the Senones by founding on their territory the single *colonia Latina* of Sena Gallica as a frontier-fortress (Polybius, Book II, chap. 19). The subsequent alienation (in 232 B.C.) of all the rest of the lands of the Senones in allotments to Roman citizens was a demagogic measure which was carried through by Gaius Flaminius in the face of sharp criticism and strong opposition (Polybius, Book II, chap. 21).

ginian invader's defeat were turned to account, between 189 and 175 B.C., in order to add ten new constituent city-states¹ to the Roman Commonwealth;² and the residue that remained in the hands of the Roman State, after the ex-servicemen who were enrolled as citizens of these new communities had been provided with allotments on a generous scale, was divided up, in 173 B.C., into freehold homesteads for individual settlers.³ These were the circumstances in which the four acts of inhumanity above mentioned were committed by the Roman authorities; and in this connexion there are two further points to be noted. In the first place each of the acts in question had either some excuse or some mitigation; in the second place the policy which prevailed from 197 to 173 B.C. was deliberately and effectively changed for the better in 173-172 B.C. by the active intervention of the Senate, which in this age exercised the supreme authority in the Roman body politic.

As regards the first of these two points, the confiscation of the lands of the Boii was mitigated by the restriction of this harsh measure to one half (though this, no doubt, the better half) of the tribal territory.⁴ The deportation of the Apuani was mitigated by the facts that they were granted permission to take their movable property with them; that the move was financed at the cost of the Roman Treasury; that land-allotments were provided for the deportees in their new homes; and that a further Treasury grant was made to them for building and furnishing their new houses.⁵ Again, the eviction of the Gallic settlers from Venetia was partly mitigated by the restoration to them of their movable property and was partly excused by the fact that they had only just arrived—and this without asking permission—from beyond the Alps;⁶ while the extermination of the Ligurian 'Die-Hards' on Mounts Letus and Balista was provoked by the indefensible behaviour of the victims. (After having tendered their submission, they had revolted as soon as the Roman troops had been withdrawn; they

¹ The *coloniae Latinae* Placentia, Cremona, Bononia, Aquileia, and Luca; the *coloniae civium Romanorum* Parma, Mutina, and Luna; and the *oppida civium Romanorum* Florentia and Pistoria. Of these, Placentia and Cremona were not new foundations but restorations. They had been in process of foundation in 218 B.C., when Hannibal arrived on the scene; and the natives had seized the opportunity to wipe them out.

² For the system of 'dual citizenship' on which the Roman Commonwealth was constructed, and for the Roman practice of enlarging the material scale of the structure by founding new city-states on politically virgin soil. see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 311-13, above.

³ Livy, Book XLII, chap. 4. The individual settlers appear to have been organized into *oppida civium Romanorum* (*vici, fora, conciliabula*). Among the townships which owed their origin to the *senatusconsultum* of 173 B.C. we may probably identify Caesena, Forum Livii, Faventia, Forum Corneli, Claterna, Tannetum, Fidentia, Florentia (a second foundation of the name, between Parma and Placentia), Forum Novum (between Parma and Luna), and Forum Druentinarum.

⁵ Livy, Book XL, chap. 38.

⁴ Livy, Book XXXVI, chap. 39.
⁶ Livy, Book XXXIX, chaps. 22, 45, and 54.

had then attacked, plundered, and momentarily occupied the newly founded Roman colony of Mutina (Modena); and, upon the approach of a punitive force, they had carried their prisoners off with them to their mountain fastnesses and had massacred them there.)¹

The second point—that is, the new turn given to Roman policy by the Senate in 173–172 B.C.—is an historical event of considerable interest and importance.²

In 173 B.C. Marcus Popillius Laenas, who was one of the two Consuls of the year, invaded, without provocation, the territory of a Ligurian tribe, the Statelli, who had never been at war with Rome; forced the tribesmen to give battle by making open preparations to attack their capital town; inflicted on them a sanguinary defeat; and then, when they surrendered unconditionally, proceeded to disarm the surviving fighting men, raze the town to the ground, and sell the whole population into slavery, besides selling up their property. When the Senate received the Consul's dispatches boasting of what he had done, they passed a strong resolution censuring him, directing him to make restitution, and recalling him from his province; and, when he showed himself contumacious and opened a second campaign against the Statelli after returning to the province as Proconsul in the following spring, the Senate brought him to heel. By refusing to transact any public business until this public scandal had been removed, they prevailed upon two Tribunes of the Plebs to propose a plebiscite—which was carried by a large majority—empowering the Senate to appoint a commissioner with authority to hold an inquiry and take disciplinary action. The Senate thereupon appointed one of the Praetors of the year; and the insubordinate Proconsul duly appeared before the Praetor's tribunal. Characteristically he was let off with this lesson and was spared—through a deliberate protraction of the judicial proceedings beyond the end of the official year—the humiliation of having sentence passed upon him (a humiliation which might have affected the prestige of the whole governing class). On the other hand effective measures were taken to make what restitution could be made to Popillius's Ligurian victims. The Senate passed a resolution instructing the magistrates of the year (172 B.C.) to liberate all enslaved Ligurians who had not borne arms against Rome since the end of the year 179 B.C.,³ and to settle them on lands beyond

¹ Livy, Book XLI, chaps. 14 and 18.

² The story will be found in Livy, Book XLII, chaps. 7–9 and 21–2.

³ Evidently this date was chosen in order to withhold the amnesty from the enslaved survivors of the Brinates, who had treacherously taken up arms again in 177 B.C., after having made their submission in 179 B.C. (see above).

the River Po. 'Through this resolution of the Senate many thousands of souls were restored to liberty and were transplanted to the farther side of the Po, where lands were duly allotted to them.'

This intervention of the Senate against the Consul Marcus Popillius Laenas achieved more than the redress of a single flagrant act of injustice: it gave a new turn to the policy of Rome towards primitive peoples. From that time onwards the Roman state did in truth act for the most part—at any rate in its dealings with peoples on the primitive level of culture—upon the maxim *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*¹ which was formulated by Virgil retrospectively in words which gave an immortal expression to what had been the normal practice from 172 B.C. down to the poet's own day.

The fact that this great reform of policy was not only introduced but was also subsequently maintained is impressive when we consider that the problem of finding land for uprooted Roman citizens had by no means been solved by the land distributions at the Gauls' and Ligurians' expense between the years 197 and 173 B.C. The Hannibalic War did not merely produce a temporary economic and social disturbance which could be surmounted by emergency measures for tiding over a transitional period: the shock which it administered to the Roman body social and economic in Peninsular Italy was so profound² that it set in motion movements of a secular wave-length as well. There were two of these not only new but also persistent factors—namely the perpetual drafting off of Roman peasant proprietors to serve on long-drawn-out campaigns in distant war-zones overseas³ and an irreversible revolution in economic technique which was making it profitable to buy up small peasant properties and consolidate them into vineyards, olive-yards, and cattle-ranches⁴—that were now combining to uproot the Roman peasantry from their ancestral freeholds in Peninsular Italy as ruthlessly as they had been uprooted by Hannibal's *Landsknechts*; and consequently the pressure upon the authorities to find ever new supplies of free land continued without relief. With these facts in mind we may conjecture that Popillius's undoubtedly unprovoked and apparently wanton attack upon the Statelli in 173 B.C. was a purposeful and not an aimless atrocity: in fact, that the Consul was doing what he conceived to be his public duty by manufacturing a pretext for acquiring a new,

¹ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book VI, l. 853.

² See IV. C (ii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 48-9, with the references on p. 49, footnote 2, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 62-3, above.

⁴ For the untoward social consequences of this economic advance see III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 168-71, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 65-7, above.

and urgently needed, reserve of public land for colonization.¹ If this conjecture is right, and if we may assume that this aspect of the issue was in the minds of the Senate and the Tribunes of the Plebs and the Plebs itself, as well as in the mind of the Consul, then we must conclude that the *senatusconsulta* and *plebiscitum* of 173-172 B.C. were extremely creditable to the Roman Government and People. The Romans were now perhaps deliberately refusing to seek, in cold blood, a solution for their own internal economic and social problem at their external proletariat's expense.

What were the historical consequences of this affair? In one sense the Romans had their reward for their virtue; for a change of policy which placed before the barbarians' eyes a hope of security in return for submission, instead of the previous fear of eviction from their ancestral lands or outright extermination, was a change which made the threat of Roman conquest a tolerable prospect, and which thus paved the way for an extension of Roman rule, in the course of the next two centuries, over hundreds of recalcitrant but not desperate or irreconcilable barbarian tribes from the Appennines and the Po to the Rhine and Atlantic and Sahara.² In another sense, however, the Romans paid—and paid heavily—for their deliberate and persistent refusal to confiscate the lands of the primitive peoples who came under Roman rule by conquest; for, while the Roman People's native subjects in the provinces, like the wild animals in Italy, still had some hole or lair which they could call their own, the Roman citizens who were the provincials' masters and Italy's defenders were now sinking to the condition of proletarians without a stake in the country—houseless

¹ At the moment when the first draft of this sentence was being written in July 1935, Popillius's behaviour towards the Statelli was on the point of being emulated in Signor Mussolini's policy towards the Abyssinians. It may be noted, as one of the minor curiosities of history, that the Romagnol dictator of Italy in A.D. 1935 was a native of the territory from which the Boii were evicted in 191 B.C.

² This statesmanlike consideration was probably in the minds of the Senate in 172 B.C., since the allotment to Roman citizens, in 232 B.C., of the residue of the land that had been confiscated in 283 B.C. from the Senones had immediately provoked the surviving Gallic tribes in the Po Basin to rise in arms against Rome and to recruit reinforcements from the Gallic backwoodsmen beyond the Alps, under the impression 'that the Romans' war-aims were no longer mere political supremacy or even domination, but had come to be nothing short of the complete eviction and extermination of their victims' (Polybius, Book II, chap. 21). In 225 B.C. the Romans had had to meet, on their own ground south of the Appennines, a torrent of invasion in which the whole of Barbarian Europe seemed to be coming down upon Italy in spate. It was no doubt the vivid memory of this disconcerting sequel to Flaminius's ruthless act that led the Senate, in 183 B.C., to send envoys to the Transalpine barbarians in order to explain the Roman Government's reasons for sending the unauthorized Gallic settlers back to their own side of the mountains (Livy, Book XXXIX, chap. 55). In the Western Society of our own age the practice and spirit which were characteristic of the Roman Government's treatment of barbarians from 172 B.C. onwards have been recaptured by the French Republic's great proconsul, Marshal Lyautey, in his dealings with the primitive Berber highlanders in the Atlas (see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 324, footnote 2, above). At the time of writing it looked as though, in the French Zone of Morocco, the genius of a single great man had succeeded in setting upon the policy of France that lasting stamp that was set upon the policy of Rome by the action of the Senate in 173-172 B.C.

and homeless wanderers over the face of the Earth whose share in the good things enjoyed by their fellow members of Society was limited, now, to the air that they breathed and the sunlight that shone impartially on the evil and on the good.¹

This increasing host of disinherited and unemployed Roman citizens had sooner or later to be provided for somehow; and, if the provision was not to be made unjustly, at the expense of primitive peoples who had thrown themselves on the mercy of their Roman conquerors, then justice must be done by adopting the only alternative and carving homesteads for the landless citizen proletariat out of the state domain in Italy itself which the Roman Government had acquired as a consequence of the Hannibalic War. By rejecting Marcus Popillius Laenas' cynical solution of the land-question in 172 B.C. the Senate had logically committed itself to an eventual acceptance of the naïve solution which was proposed by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus forty years later. The Gracchan solution was naïve because, during the seventy years which had elapsed by then since Hannibal's evacuation of Italy, a formidable vested interest in the usufruct of this state domain had been acquired by the prosperous heirs of speculative planters and stockmen to whom this usufruct had originally been granted. Yet it was no policy at all to reject both, in succession, of the only two solutions that were feasible; and accordingly the rejection of the Gracchan alternative precipitated a revolution which continued for a century and was only brought to an end by the establishment of a Caesarean dictatorship.

¹ For a comparison between the *λόγιον* ascribed to Tiberius Gracchus in Plutarch's *Lives of the Gracchi*, chap. 9, and the *λόγιον* ascribed to Jesus in Matt. viii. 19-20, and Luke ix. 57-8, see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 508 and 510, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 70-1, above, and V. C (ii) (α), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 381, with Table VIII, logion (α), on p. 414, below.

ANNEX I TO V. C (i) (c) 2

THE ROLE OF MANICHAISM IN THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE SYRIAC INTERNAL PROLETARIAT AND HELLENISM

IN the chapter to which this Annex attaches, we have described in the Nestorian and Monophysite 'Diasporàs' the monuments of a second abortive attempt on the Syriac Society's part to cast Hellenism out by fighting it with its own intellectual weapons.¹ We may go on to ask ourselves whether Nestorianism and Monophysitism were the only two movements in which this attempt was made, or whether we can catch another echo of the same passage of Syriac history in the voice of Manichaeism: a Syriac religion, founded in the third century of the Christian Era, which has not survived even as a 'fossil'. This question, which we have touched upon already,² may occupy our attention once again for a moment in the present context.

Was it the mission of Manichaeism, too, to reclaim a Syriac spiritual treasure for the Syriac World by purging a Syro-Hellenic religious syncretism of its Hellenic alloy? We might be tempted to answer this question in the affirmative if we ventured to interpret the Manichaean Mythology³ as a 'higher critic' reads the Book of Daniel or as a psycho-analyst explains his patient's dreams.

For example, the invasion of the realm of Light by the ruler of Darkness might be taken to signify the invasion of the Syriac World by Hellenism. The Primal Man who is brought into being by the King of Light in order to fight the Darkness might typify the Achaemenid,⁴ and the Bright Elements which are his weapons might be Judaism and Zoroastrianism.⁵ The stunning of Primal Man and the swallowing of the Bright Elements by the Dark Powers might describe the conquest of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander.⁶ The descent of Primal Man into the Abyss, where

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 127, with footnote 3, and also I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 83 and 91; I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 155; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 203; II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 235; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 286-7 and 374; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (b), vol. iv, pp. 325-6, above.

² In II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 374, footnote 3, above.

³ The presentation of the Manichaean Mythology which is adopted in the present Annex is that which is given in Burkitt, F. C.: *The Religion of the Manichees* (Cambridge 1925, University Press). See also Christensen, A.: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin & Munksgaard), pp. 178-84.

⁴ The establishment of a Syriac universal state in the shape of an Achaemenian Empire just forestalled the establishment of a Hellenic ascendancy over the Egyptian, Syriac, and Babylonian worlds in the sixth century B.C.

⁵ For the role of these two 'higher religions' of the Babylonian internal proletariat as alternative potential nuclei for a Syriac universal church see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 120-2, above. The number of the bright elements in the Manichaean Mythology was, however, not two but five (Christensen, op. cit., p. 179).

⁶ By conquering the Achaemenian Empire in the fourth century B.C. Alexander won

he cuts the roots of the Dark Elements and thereby ensures that these shall never increase, might represent the counter-captivation of the heart of the Hellenic World by a Syriac Underworld which brings its own 'folklore',¹ own religion,² and own *êthos* with it and, by propagating these *in partibus infidelium*, overcomes the Hellenic culture in its own citadel. In the defeat and capture of the Dark Archons we might see an image of the military disasters that were inflicted on the Seleucid brothers Demetrius Nicâtôr and Antiochus Sidêtês³ and on their Roman successor Crassus⁴ by the Parthians. In the two problems which Light now has to solve—the walling off of the realm of Darkness and the extraction, from the captive Archons, of the particles of Light which they have swallowed—we might recognize the political problems of containing the Roman Empire within the line of the Euphrates and dismembering the Hellenic 'successor-states' of the Achaemenian Empire east of the Euphrates in order to use the recaptured territories as a building-site for the Parthian, and later for the Sasanian, Empire. In the lust which is excited in the appetites of the captive Dark Powers by the Light which is successfully extracted, we might find an allegory of the passion which Hellenic souls came to conceive for certain elements of Syriac religion when these had been 'peptonized', to suit Hellenic palates, by having been passed through a Hellenic cultural medium.⁵ And the Sin which is thus incidentally produced by the process of salvaging the Light might be identified with the creation of such Syro-Hellenic religious syncretisms as Christianity and Mithraism (the latter being symbolized in the sin-dragon which falls into the sea and is slain). In the Adam who is generated by the Dark Powers as a receptacle to retain the rest of the stolen Light which the Light Powers are seeking to recapture, we might discern a portrait of the Hellenized Oriental; and when Jesus rouses Adam from his sleep and throws him into a mental agony by revealing to him the duality of his nature, we might fancy ourselves watching that Syriac reaction to Hellenism which we have detected in the Nestorian and Monophysite movements and which may perhaps be the motive of the Manichaean movement as well—a desperate reaction of the Hellenized Oriental against the dark Hellenic envelope in which his soul-spark of Syriac light has been imprisoned.

for Hellenism the Oriental dominions which it would have won for itself some two hundred years earlier if in the sixth century this prize had not been snatched, at the eleventh hour, out of the grasp of Ionian and Carian pirates, mercenaries, and merchants by the prowess of Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius the Great.

¹ See V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 438-64, below.

² See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 215-16, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 81-2, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 75, above.

⁴ See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 164, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv, p. 440, above.

⁵ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 538-40, above.

Such interpretations of the Manichaean Mythology are perhaps not unprofitable exercises of the fancy; but we should be rash to take them so seriously as to conclude, on the strength of them, that Manichaeism is to be placed in the same category of Syriac religious phenomena as Monophysitism and Nestorianism.

If this tentative classification is to be confirmed, it must be shown that Manichaeism stands to Mithraism in the relation in which Nestorianism and Monophysitism both alike stand to Catholic Christianity: i.e., in the relation of a child to a parent against whom the child is in reaction. Manichaeism, however, is not the child of Mithraism; at the closest it is only its first cousin, and it may prove to be only its first cousin once removed. For the closest kinship that can be traced between Manichaeism and Mithraism is through a common Zoroastrian, or perhaps pre-Zoroastrian, element in their respective origins,¹ since Manichaeism derives from Zoroastrianism (in so far as that is its source), not through Mithraism, but direct. While Mithraism is Zoroastrianism—or, alternatively, is a pre-Zoroastrian Iranian paganism—in a Hellenic dress, Manichaeism is Zoroastrianism in a Christian dress.² Further, though it is true that the Christianity which Mani has incorporated into his system is the Christianity of Marcion and the Christianity of Bardesanes, and not Catholicism, it is also a fact that any form of Christianization involves some measure of Hellenization as well. The Hellenic elements in Manichaeism may be slight, but they are unmistakable.³ There can be no mistake, for instance, about the Greek origin of the term βῶλος; and we may conjecture that the source of the term was likewise the source of the bizarre doctrine which the term embodies.⁴ Again, the Manichaean account of the origin and nature of Adam is strongly reminiscent of the anthropological teaching of the abortive Hellenic 'higher religion' of Orphism.⁵ On this showing, the tendency of

¹ The bifurcation of the respective lineages of Manichaeism and Mithraism has to be dated back to the Pre-Zoroastrian Age of Iranian religious history if Mithraism is to be regarded, not as a derivative of Zoroastrianism (in the sense in which Manichaeism is a derivative of Zoroastrianism and Christianity of Judaism), but as a separate and independent development out of a pre-Zoroastrian Iranian paganism (according to the view put forward in Pettazzone, R.: *La Religione di Zarathustra* (Bologna 1920, Zanichelli), p. 167). On this question see further the always suggestive and often brilliant but sometimes fanciful work of Autran, C.: *Mithra, Zoroastre, et la Préhistoire Aryenne du Christianisme* (Paris 1935, Payot).

² See Christensen, op. cit., pp. 186–7. Mani seems to have proclaimed himself to be the Paraclete (Christensen, op. cit., p. 178).

³ See Burkitt, op. cit., pp. 65–6 and 93 seqq.

⁴ Compare the Greek name (Βῆμα) of the Manichaean festival commemorating Mani's martyrdom. At this festival the Prophet's unseen presence was signified in the erection of an empty tribune (*Graecè βῆμα*) (Christensen, op. cit., p. 193). Compare the empty tent that was erected by Eumenes, as a symbol of the unseen presence of Alexander the Great, in the camp of the Argyraspides (Plutarch: *Life of Eumenes*, chaps. 11–13).

⁵ This resemblance may, of course, be the consequence, not of any direct borrowing from 'Orpheus' on the part of Mani, but rather of a common Zoroastrian inspiration in

Manichaeism, so far from being in reaction against, or opposite to, that of its cousin Mithraism, would actually be in harmony with it, while, so far from being the same as the tendency of Nestorianism and Monophysitism, it would turn out to be the exact antithesis of that. While these two versions of Christianity can properly be described as attempts to purge the parent religion of its Hellenism, we should have to regard Manichaeism as being, like Mithraism, an attempt to blend an Iranian religion with a Hellenic alloy.¹

But what could have moved a Syriac prophet to adulterate with Hellenism a pure Syriac religion, such as Zoroastrianism had contrived to remain, in an age when the tide of Syriac feeling was already setting strongly in an anti-Hellenic direction?² Perhaps we may find an explanation in the brilliant conjecture of an Italian scholar,³ who points out that Mani preached his new religion in a generation which saw the foundation of the Sasanian state and the official adoption of Zoroastrianism as the new state's established church. In becoming the established church of an empire which was dedicated to the task of fighting Hellenism with political weapons,⁴ Zoroastrianism was patently repudiating its former mission of providing a universal church for the Syriac internal proletariat.⁵ Signor Pettazzone suggests that Mani was a religious genius who had the insight to understand, and the sensibility to regret, that Zoroastrianism was taking this disastrous turn;⁶ and he interprets Manichaeism as a deliberate attempt to meet this religious emergency by calling into existence a new religion which was to redress the overturned balance between Religion and Politics by assuming the spiritual role which Zoroastrianism had abandoned and by filling the void which this act of betrayal had left in the Syriac religious universe. Pettazzone's theory would explain why it was that Mani's activities were in the end⁷ so actively combated and so ruthlessly repressed by the Sasanian Govern-

both Orphism and Manichaeism (for Zoroastrian elements in Orphism see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 85, above).

¹ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 374, footnote 3, above.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 75-6, above.

³ Pettazzone, R.: *La Religione di Zarathustra* (Bologna 1920, Zanichelli), p. 193.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 203; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285-7 and 374; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 216, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 659-61, below.

⁵ 'It was solely due to outward circumstances that both [Zoroastrianism and Buddhism] were given a national stamp, and that the teaching of Zarathustra actually became the national religion of Iran. Wherever the possibility was open, Zoroastrianism, just like Buddhism and (later) Christianity and Islam, carried on an energetic propaganda beyond the frontiers of the Iranian nationality' (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (1), 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 155).

⁶ For the disastrousness of it see also II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 375, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, in the present volume, pp. 659-61, below.

⁷ Mani was put to death in A.D. 276 by Vahrām I (*imperabat* A.D. 273-6) after having been well treated by Shapur I (*imperabat* A.D. 241-72) (Christensen, op. cit., pp. 189-93).

ment. The Sasanian policy of welding State and Church together into a single 'totalitarian' body politic and ecclesiastic would have been condemned to frustration if this exploitation of Syriac religion for Sasanian political ends had resulted in a wholesale conversion of the votaries of the old 'higher religion', which had now allowed itself to be perverted into an instrument of secular policy, to a new 'higher religion' which promised to furnish hungry souls with the spiritual bread that Zoroastrianism could now no longer offer them.

If this explanation of Mani's Ministry and Passion is the right one, then our tentative comparison of Manichaeism with Nestorianism and Monophysitism falls to the ground. On this showing, the true parallel lies between Manichaeism and Primitive Christianity—Manichaeism standing to a Sasanian Zoroastrianism as Primitive Christianity stands to a Maccabaeen Judaism.¹ In this case, as in that, when the older religion went into politics and immured itself in the prison-house of a particular parochial state, the younger religion took up its predecessor's abandoned vocation of saving the souls of Mankind and preaching a gospel to the ends of the Earth.² More than that, it was the Hellenic World that was the principal mission-field of the Manichaean as well as the Christian—and the Mithraic—missionary. This fact is apt to be overlooked because Manichaeism spread from its original 'Irāqī centre of dispersion'³ in two directions—north-eastwards towards Central Asia as well as westwards towards the Mediterranean—and, while in the western field Manichaeism, like the worship of Mithras, rapidly succumbed to Catholic Christianity, in the Central Asian field it survived, like Nestorianism, in 'Diasporā' till the thirteenth century of the Christian Era.⁴ This now extinct Central Asian 'Diasporā' is the source of our fragmentary first-hand evidence in regard to Manichaean doctrine and practice.⁵ But we must be on our guard against the fallacy of gauging the relative importance of the two Manichaean mission-fields by the relative value of the raw materials which they have respectively yielded to our modern Western captains of historical industry.⁶ The true measure is given by the

¹ For the perversion of Judaism into a political instrument in the hands of the Maccabees see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 657–9, below.

² 'I am come from the land of Babylon to make a cry heard throughout the World.'—Mani, Fragment M 4 a, quoted in Christensen, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

³ Mani's home-country was Mesene, which was approximately coincident with the present province of Basrah (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, p. 629, footnote 1, above). This 'Irāqī prophet seems, however, to have been of Iranian extraction. His father is said to have come to Mesene from Hamadan, and his mother is said to have been of Arsacid birth (Christensen, *op. cit.*, p. 177).

⁴ The greatest single triumph of Manichaeism in its Central Asian mission-field was the conversion of the Uighurs in A.D. 762 (see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 415, 425, footnote 1, and 451, above).

⁵ See Christensen, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

⁶ This fallacy has been exposed already, in the classic example of Ptolemaic Egypt and Seleucid Asia, in Part I. A, vol. i, pp. 5–7, above.

distribution of the efforts and the orientation of the hopes of the Manichaean missionaries themselves; and on this criterion the rapidly defeated Manichaean mission in the Hellenic World takes precedence over the temporarily successful mission in Central Asia. If Manichaeism had succeeded in supplanting Catholic Christianity in the Mediterranean Basin, instead of merely succeeding in surviving for a time, side by side with Nestorianism, in Central Asia, then Mani would have to be numbered among the prophets who have given a decisive turn to the fortunes of Mankind. The western mission of Manichaeism was, as we have observed, abortive; yet the strength of its appeal to Hellenic souls, in competition with Christianity, is illustrated by the fact that in the fourth century of the Christian Era in North-West Africa it made a temporary convert of Augustine of Madaura.

MARXISM, SOCIALISM, AND CHRISTIANITY

THE advocates of Marxism will perhaps protest that in a rather summary account of the Marxian Philosophy or Faith¹ we have made a show of analysing this into a Hegelian and a Jewish and a Christian constituent element without having said a word about the most characteristic and most celebrated part of Marx's message to his fellow men. In the mind of 'the man in the street', the Marxian apologist will point out, Marxism means Socialism; and he will add that 'the man in the street' is substantially right in making this popular equation. Socialism, the Marxian will tell us, is the essence of the Marxian way of life; it is an original element in the Marxian system which cannot be traced to a Hegelian or a Christian or a Jewish or any other pre-Marxian source; and it is a supremely philanthropic ideal—so much so that, when we place it in its proper position at the heart of the Marxian dispensation, the whole of this dispensation will appear in an utterly different light from the lurid colour in which it is maliciously painted by its enemies. As soon as we view it thus in its true proportion and perspective, we shall perceive (we shall be told) that Marxism is eminently humane and constructive in its ulterior aims and in its ultimate effects, and that the destructive violence upon which its enemies have seized as a pretext for discrediting it is no more than an incidental and transitory means to an end which is purely beneficent. Our champion of Marxism will probably follow up this vigorous defence by passing over to the offensive. He will accuse the opponents of his Faith of giving a false pretext for their hostility because they are ashamed of confessing the true reasons. What they really hate and fear in Marxism (he will suggest) is not its revolutionary violence but the fact that its programme of Socialism is a threat to existing anti-social vested interests and an exposure of the inadequacy of pre-Marxian philosophies and religions. The sages and prophets who have left it to Karl Marx to proclaim what is Man's elementary social duty to his neighbour must have been either hypocrites or imbeciles.

In attempting to reply to a Marxian protest on such lines as these we shall readily admit the humaneness and the constructiveness of the ideal for which Socialism stands, as well as the importance of the part which this ideal plays in the Marxian 'ideology'; but we shall find ourselves unable to accept the Marxian contention

¹ This account will be found in V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 177-87, above.

that Socialism is Marx's own original discovery. We shall have to point out, on our part, that there is a Christian Socialism which was practised as well as preached before the Marxian Socialism was ever heard of; and, when our turn comes for taking the offensive, we shall venture to make two assertions. We shall maintain that the Marxian Socialism is derived from the Christian tradition as unmistakably as is the Marxian concern to convert the World. We shall also maintain that the Marxian version of the Christian ideal of philanthropy is an excerpt which has omitted the one thing needful—and indeed indispensable—for making any form of Socialism work.

The social arrangements of the primitive Christian community are only referred to incidentally in the books of the New Testament, because the authors' minds are pre-occupied with other aspects of the life of the Founder and his companions; but these incidental allusions give us glimpses of a picture of a common way of life which is undoubtedly Socialism and indeed Communism in the economic sense¹ of a community of goods and services.

In the story of the Passion as told in the Gospel according to Saint John, Jesus and his companions are represented as having a common purse which is in Judas Iscariot's keeping.² And in the preface to the story of Ananias and Sapphira, as told in the Acts of the Apostles, the economic régime of the infant Church on the morrow of the Ascension is depicted as being that of a miniature and rudimentary yet authentic Communist commonwealth.

'The multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul; neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common. And with great power gave the Apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus; and great grace was upon them all. Neither was there any among them that lacked; for as many as were possessors of lands or houses sold them and brought the prices of the things that were sold and laid them down at the Apostles' feet; and distribution was made unto every man according as he had need.'³

The complete community of goods that is described in this passage did not, of course, become one of the permanent institu-

¹ For the political meaning of Communism as a revival of the Paris Commune of A.D. 1871 see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 179, footnote 5, above. It was this sense of the word that Lenin had in mind when he re-named the Russian Social-Democratic Party 'the Russian Communist Party' in A.D. 1918. The Paris Commune of A.D. 1871 was itself called after the communes of medieval Western Christendom; and these were self-governing commonwealths in which the thing that was shared in common was not property but sovereignty. This medieval usage of the Latin word *commune* in the sense of a self-governing body politic is a perfectly correct piece of Latinity for which classical authority can be found in the works of Cicero and in the C.I.L.

² John xii. 6, and xiii. 29.

³ Acts iv. 32-5.

tions of the Christian Church (as, for that matter, it is not being insisted upon to-day in the Soviet Union either); nor can the testimony of the Acts be taken as conclusive evidence that the picture here presented was ever strictly true to the life of the Church even in the Apostolic Age¹ (any more than the first written constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can be taken as conclusive evidence for the social condition of Russia even in the lifetime of Lenin). What the passage does attest is the social ideal of the early Christian milieu in which the Acts was conceived and written. And, even if this contemporary testimony were lacking, the Christian social ideal of the Apostolic Age could still be reconstructed by inference from the testimony of succeeding centuries, in which the Church was famous for a sensitiveness—that declared itself in material as well as in spiritual good works—to the emotional attitudes and moral responsibilities implied in being one's brother's keeper. This ingrained philanthropic vein in the post-Apostolic Christian tradition comes out in the legend of how St. Lawrence replied to the Roman Government's summons to

¹ As evidence for social facts (though not, of course, as evidence for social ideals) the passage just quoted from the Acts of the Apostles is suspect on account of certain coincidences of content, and even of words, which seem too numerous and too close to be dismissed as fortuitous, with other works of literature, both Syriac and Hellenic. For instance, the first sentence in Acts iv. 34 sounds like an echo of the first sentence in Deuteronomy xv. 4; and the whole passage here quoted corresponds in so many points, both of content and of language, with a description of the life of the primitive Pythagorean community at Croton in Iamblichus's *Life of Pythagoras*, §§ 167-9, that it is hardly possible to account for these correspondences on any hypothesis except that of there being some literary relationship between the two passages. (Their literary affinity positively leaps to the eye when they are set out in parallel columns, as they are in Schubert, H. von: *Der Kommunismus der Wiedertäufer in Münster und seine Quellen* (Heidelberg 1919, Winter), p. 36.) *A priori* there are two alternative possible relationships. Since Iamblichus lived and wrote no earlier than round about the turn of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era, it is chronologically possible that his picture of an early Pythagorean Communism may be a copy of the picture of an early Christian Communism in the Acts; or, alternatively, it is possible that the points of likeness in the two passages may have been inherited independently from some common literary ancestry. Of these two alternative possibilities the former may be ruled out; for, while it is true that by Iamblichus's time the Christian Scriptures were not only accessible but also notorious in pagan circles, it is at the same time almost inconceivable that the spiritual father of a Neoplatonic Antichurch (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 565, above) should have brought himself to borrow any of the properties of a Christian Church which he so passionately hated and despised. We are left with the possibility of a common literary ancestry; and von Schubert (op. cit., p. 37, footnote 1) traces both passages back to a passage of Plato, namely *Respublica*, Book V, 462 c. Presumably there are missing intermediate links in both chains of literary ascent. According to Bertermann, W.: *De Iamblichi Vitae Pythagorae Fontibus* (Königsberg 1913, [dissertation]), p. 74, as cited by von Schubert in op. cit., p. 36, Iamblichus's immediate source was the work of the Sicilian Greek historian Timaeus of Tauromenium (*vixit circa 352-256 B.C.*). As for the immediate inspiration of the author of the Acts, von Schubert conjectures (op. cit., p. 38) that he may have been emulating Josephus's description (in *The Romano-Jewish War*, Book II, chap. 8) of the social life of the contemporary Jewish ascetic confraternity of the Essenes, who practised Communism, were regarded, by Hellenic and Hellenized Jewish observers, as Jewish counterparts of the Pythagoreans, and may in truth have borrowed some of their beliefs and institutions from a Pythagorean source. The general question of correspondences between passages of the New Testament and passages of pagan Hellenic literature is discussed in V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, *passim*, in vol. vi, and in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, *passim*, in vol. vi, below.

deliver up the Church's treasures by collecting a crowd of the poor and needy from the slums of Rome and presenting himself, at their head, to the public authorities. But we need not appeal to an unverifiable Christian legend when we can cite the unimpeachable testimony of Julian the Apostate. The virtual monopoly of social-welfare work by the Christian Church in the Hellenic World of the fourth century of the Christian Era is sorrowfully confessed by Julian in a pastoral letter¹ to one of the pagan prelates of his Neoplatonic Antichurch:²

'If Hellenism [i.e. Neoplatonism] is not yet making the progress which we have a right to expect, it is we, its devotees, who are to blame. . . . Are we refusing to face the fact that Atheism [i.e. Christianity]³ owes its success above all to its philanthropy towards strangers and to its provision for funerals and to its parade of a high puritanical morality? These are all, surely, virtues which we ourselves ought to put into practice *bona fide*. . . . You must establish in every city [in your see] an ample number of hospices, in order that strangers may have the benefit of a philanthropy which will be recognized as ours; and this service must not be confined to strangers of our own persuasion; it must be at the disposal of anybody whatsoever who is in need. I have already provided for the allocation to you of the necessary funds. . . . A fifth of this grant should be spent on the poor who are in the clientèle of the [pagan] clergy; the balance should be distributed to strangers and beggars. It is a disgrace to us that our own people should be notoriously going short of assistance from us when in the Jewish community there is not a single beggar, while the impious Galilaeans are supporting not only their own poor but ours as well. You should instruct the votaries of Hellenism to make voluntary contributions towards these charitable services, and the Hellenic [i.e. pagan] parishes [in your see] to dedicate their first fruits [for this purpose]. You must get our Hellenic community into the habit of doing good works of this kind by instructing them that this is one of our most ancient traditional activities—as is testified by Homer. . . . Do not let us allow hostile competitors to outdo us in our own strong points while we give way to a slackness and indifference which are not merely a disgrace to our religion but a downright betrayal of it.'

These passages from the correspondence of the Emperor Julian and from the Acts of the Apostles and from the Gospel according to Saint John will perhaps suffice to demonstrate our three propositions. In the first place they make it clear that Socialism—and

¹ Letter from the Emperor Julian to Arsaces, the Chief Priest of Galatia (= Letter No. 84 in Bidez, J.: *L'Empereur Julien: Œuvres Complètes*: Tome i, 2^e Partie: 'Lettres et Fragments' (Paris 1924, Les Belles Lettres)).

² For this abortive Neoplatonic Antichurch see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 378; V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 147; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 565-7, above; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 680-3, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 222-3, below.

³ For this Hellenic name for Christianity see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 348, above, and V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 40, footnote 2, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 536, below.—A.J.T.

this in the strict formal sense of a community of goods—is one of the principles of the primitive Christian *Weltanschauung*. In the second place they establish a very strong presumption that the Socialism, as well as the Oecumenicalism, of the Marxian scheme is derived from the Christian tradition.¹ In the third place they reveal the element in the Christian Socialism which the Marxian Socialism has left—or cut—out.

The passage in the Acts represents the philanthropy of the primitive Christian Society as flowing from a God-given grace which was the fruit of a belief in the divinity of Jesus. In other words, the charity which is here depicted as moving the primitive Christians to go—in their mutual concern for one another's welfare—to the extreme length of sharing all their worldly goods is not a mere love of Man for Man (which is the limited literal meaning of the word 'philanthropy'), but is a spiritual relation to which God is a party as well as His human creatures. In fact, this Christian Socialism is a practical application, on the economic surface of life, of the fundamental religious truth that the brotherhood of Man is a consequence of the fatherhood of God—a truth which is driven home with special force by a religion which teaches that God is not only the father and creator of Man, but also his saviour who has been incarnate in human shape and has suffered, and triumphed over, Death.² Christians believe—and a study of History assuredly proves them right—that (beyond the narrow circle of the tribe, in which a parochial 'honour among thieves' is maintained at the prohibitive moral price of an Ishmaelitish warfare against a world of foreign enemies) the brotherhood of Man is impossible for Man to achieve in any other way than by enrolling himself as a citizen of a *Civitas Dei* which transcends the human world and has God himself for its king.³ And any one who holds this belief will feel certain, *a priori*, that the Marxian excerpt from a Christian Socialism is an experiment which is doomed to failure because it has denied itself the aid of the spiritual power which

¹ And perhaps, through this Christian tradition, from a Hellenic tributary of the river of Christian faith and works (see p. 583, footnote 1, above). 'A tenuous thread of historical continuity on the plane of ideas (*eine feine ideengeschichtliche Linie*) runs from the man of action John of Leyden to the theorist Plato across an interval of 2,000 years. . . . In motives and in mental scope the Marxian Communism of the present day is something rather different from the Communism of the sixteenth century. Yet now, as then, the idea fills its devotees with an enthusiasm of a religious fervour, and now, as then, again the intolerable tension between the shining ideal and the commonplace realities of life sets in motion the same socio-psychological forces and produces the same chaotic mixture of the most exalted love with the most savage hatred in the heart of Man towards his fellow men—just as at the time of the outbreak at Münster' (Schubert, op. cit., pp. 56–7). For the vein of Communism in the Anabaptist movement see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 169–72, above.

² For the distinctiveness of this feature in Christianity see further V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 275–8, below.

³ On this point see Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), *passim*.

alone is capable of making Socialism a success. The Christian critic will have no quarrel with the Marxian Socialism for going as far as it does: he will criticize it for not going far enough. Its fatal flaw in his eyes will be a sin of omission and not a sin of commission.

Thus, from the Christian standpoint, the Marxian experiment in Socialism is a tragedy; but this cannot be the Christian observer's last word; for the responsibility for this tragedy is manifestly shared by the Christian Church itself.

How, in face of such evidence as we have cited, are we to explain the Marxian attitude towards Christianity? The Marxians not only maintain that there is no trace of Socialism in the Christian tradition and that their own prophet has been the first to awaken Man's social conscience: they actually declare that Christianity is one of the most formidable obstacles in the way of their own effort to apply Socialism in practice. 'Christianity', they say, 'is the opiate of the People'; and, in the Soviet Union at any rate, this supposed antithesis and incompatibility between Socialism and Christianity has been so sincerely believed in, and so strongly felt, that the votaries of Christianity or of any other theistic religion have been debarred, *ex officio religionis*, from admission to membership of the All-Union Communist Party. In fact, Communism has been definitely and militantly anti-Christian. And, when we ask how this has come to be when Socialism and philanthropy loom as large as they do in the Christian tradition, the answer is, of course, that the Christianity against which the Communists have declared war is neither the first-century Christianity of Jerusalem nor the fourth-century Christianity of the Roman Empire but the nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Christianity of the Western World and Russia. It is our modern Western and modern Russian practice of Christianity that has given this occasion for an enemy to blaspheme; and a practice that has aroused a hatred and contempt which are plainly as sincere as they are vehement must have fallen far indeed below the Christian practice of the first four centuries.

Thus the campaign against Christianity which is to-day an integral part of the propaganda of Marxian Socialism is a challenge to the living generation of Christians to examine their consciences and to throw themselves, once more, into an essential Christian activity which they have neglected, or even abandoned, in modern times; and we may aptly begin by addressing the Apostate's searching questions to ourselves:

'Are we refusing to face the fact that Atheism owes its success above all to its philanthropy? . . . These are virtues which we ourselves ought

to put into practice *bona fide*. . . . Do not let us allow hostile competitors to outdo us in our own strong points while we give way to a slackness and indifference which are not merely a disgrace to our religion but a downright betrayal of it.'

Fas est et ab hoste doceri;¹ and, if we do take to heart the self-reproachful words of a noble adversary, we latter-day Christians may still turn a Marxian attack upon Christianity to good account as, seven centuries ago, a Paulician attack was turned to account, in comparable circumstances, under the inspired leadership of Saint Francis and Saint Dominic.² In that event the verdict of History may turn out to be that a re-awakening of the Christian social conscience has been the one great positive practical achievement of Karl Marx; and, in bringing Marx's endeavours to this unexpected issue, the irony of History would not be so cruel as might at first appear; for, if we are right in our thesis that the Marxian Socialism is doomed, *a priori*, to be a Socialism *Manqué*, then we must believe that Marx's sole chance of realizing his ideal of a socialized world lies in awaking from its inopportune slumber, and speeding upon its abandoned path, that primitive Christian charity which does know the secret of making Socialism work as one of the terrestrial institutions of a supra-mundane *Civitas Dei*.

¹ Ovid: *Metamorphoses*, Book IV, l. 428.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 370-1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), Annex, vol. iv, pp. 652-6, above.

THE AMBIGUITY OF GENTLENESS

'GENTLENESS', in the sense in which we have used the word in the chapter to which this Annex attaches, might equally well be called 'Non-Violence'. This alternative description makes it clear that what we are thus labelling is something negative. If we go on to look below this superficial negative label we may expect to find that it covers more than one positive reality; and a first glance will bring to light at least four distinct positive meanings of our term, every one of which can be illustrated by conspicuous cases in point.

At its lowest the practice of Non-Violence may express nothing more noble or more constructive than a cynical disillusionment with the fruitlessness of a Violence which has been previously practised *ad nauseam* without having produced the intended results. A notorious example of a Non-Violence of this unedifying kind is the religious toleration which has been in vogue in the Western World from about the last quarter of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era down to our own day.¹ Alternatively, Non-Violence may express a conviction that Man's divinely allotted role in the economy of the Universe is to adopt a patiently passive attitude towards a mundane scene on which it is God's exclusive prerogative to execute His divine will through His own action—which would be hampered, and not assisted, if Man were to presume to intervene in what is wholly God's business. Such is, for example, the conviction that underlies the Non-Violence of the *Agudath Israel*.² This second philosophy of Non-Violence is as pious and as scrupulous as our first is unprincipled and cynical; but at the same time it resembles the Non-Violence of Disillusionment in being unconstructive. Non-Violence may, however, also be practised as a means to some constructive end; and such an end, again, may be either mundane or 'Otherworldly'. A classic example of the practice of Non-Violence for a mundane end is presented in Mahatma Gandhi's political tactics of Non-Violent Non-Co-operation.³ The aim of Mr. Gandhi and his followers is to obtain for the People of India the political boon of complete self-government; and the pursuit of this aim by these tactics is

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 142-3 and 150; IV. C (iii) (b) 4, vol. iv, p. 184-5; and IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 227-8, above; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, in the present volume, pp. 669-71, and V. C (ii) (δ), vol. vi, pp. 316-18, below.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 76, above, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, p. 128, below.

³ The most authoritative account of the origin and aim of Mr. Gandhi's movement is to be found in a book by Mr. Gandhi himself: *Satyagraha in South Africa* (Madras 1928, Ganesan).

evidence of a high degree of intellectual and moral originality; for the aim in view has been valued at its present enormously high current price in a Western Vanity Fair; and our Western nationalists have seldom or never abstained from resorting to Violence—of heart, if not of hand¹—in their endeavours to gain possession of this coveted pearl. Mr. Gandhi's tactical recourse to Non-Violence is therefore a noteworthy new departure in the political technique of a Westernized 'Great Society'; but it is not, of course, so great a departure as a practice of Non-Violence for reasons which are not just tactical but are strategic. While Mr. Gandhi practises Non-Violence because he considers this to be the most efficacious means of pursuing an aim that is mundane, the Non-Violence of Jesus and Johanan ben Zakkai is a reflexion, on the mundane plane, of a transference of the field of action² from that mundane plane to another.

In the New Testament this profound shift of interest and change of objective is a *fait accompli*. Considering that the movement, of which the New Testament is a monument, came out of the bosom of the same Hellenic internal proletariat that threw up the Maccabees and the Zealots and Eunus and Salvius and Spartacus, it is not surprising to find in it, here and there, some trace of a violent vein (for examples of this see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 378 and 388, below): what is remarkable is to observe how faint this trace is.

The denunciation of the rich in James v. 1-6, leads on to an exhortation to the poor to—not revolt, but—exercise patience. In general, wealth is represented, not as a material boon to be envied and, if possible, expropriated, but as a spiritual impediment to be deprecated (this is the moral of the simile of the Camel and the Needle's Eye;³ of the antecedent incident of the Young Man with Great Possessions;⁴ and of the pastoral exhortations in 1 Tim. vi. 6-11, and James i. 9-11). Conversely, the poverty which in the sight of a Tiberius Gracchus is damning evidence of the Internal Proletariat's intolerable social grievance is accepted in the New Testament as the distinctive badge of office of the servants of God.⁵

¹ In op. cit., chap. xiii, 'Meaning of Satyagraha', Mr. Gandhi draws a sharp distinction between his own instrument of 'soul force' and the English political expedient of 'passive resistance'. He regards 'passive resistance' as a form of militancy: 'the weapon of the weak', to which they resort as a *pis aller* when they do not command a majority of votes or a superiority in arms. On the other hand, Satyagraha and militancy are, in Mr. Gandhi's view, mutually exclusive in principle. As examples of non-Indian Satyagrahis, Mr. Gandhi cites Christ, the early Christian martyrs, and the Dukhobors. 'In Satyagraha there is not the remotest idea of injuring the opponent, Satyagraha postulates the conquest of the adversary by suffering in one's own person.'

² See III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 192-217, above.

³ Matt. xix. 23-4 = Mark x. 23-5 = Luke xviii. 24-5.

⁴ Matt. xix. 16-22 = Mark x. 17-22 = Luke xviii. 18-23.

⁵ Contrast Plutarch: *Lives of the Gracchi*, chap. 9, with Matt. viii. 19-20 = Luke ix. 57-8; Luke vi. 20; 1 Cor. iv. 9-14; James ii. 5.

It is in the Other World, not in This World, that Lazarus is comforted and Dives tormented.¹ And even for the rich the hope of gaining entry into the Kingdom of Heaven is not completely ruled out.² Finally we may observe that the non-revolutionary attitude of the New Testament towards the current social conflict between Rich and Poor is also its attitude towards the analogous conflicts between Masters and Slaves and between Rulers and Subjects. Examples of this attitude towards Slavery are Ephesians vi. 5-9; Colossians iii. 22-5; 1 Tim. vi. 1-5; Titus ii. 9-10; 1 Peter ii. 18-25; and, above all, the Epistle to Philemon. As for the political conflict, the characteristic attitude of the Primitive Christian Church towards the mundane political authority of the Roman State is expressed in Matt. xxii. 15-22 = Mark xii. 13-17 = Luke xx. 19-26. and in Romans, xiii. 1-7, and not in the Book of Revelation.

The ambiguity of our term 'Gentleness' will now be clear; and at later points in this Part³ we shall have occasion to distinguish sharply between different meanings of the term which are not merely distinct but are positively antithetical to one another. It would have been premature to introduce these distinctions in the chapter to which this Annex attaches, since the purpose of this chapter has been to bring the historic internal proletariats on to our stage as the necessary first step towards a study of their diverse faiths and works.

¹ Luke xvi. 19-31.

² Matt. xix. 25-6 = Mark x. 26-7 = Luke xviii. 26-7.

³ e.g. in V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), 10 and 11, vol. vi, pp. 118-68, below.

THE RHINE-DANUBE FRONTIER OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

THE Rhine-Danube frontier of the Roman Empire is sometimes cited as a classical example of a frontier that is 'natural' or 'scientific'; and this belief, which has been inculcated by our modern Western classical scholars, in the intrinsic rightness or excellence of the long-since obliterated Continental European boundary of the Hellenic universal state has had a perceptible effect upon the political history of our own Western World, since it is one of the grounds of the modern French claim—or ambition—to have the Rhine for the frontier of France from the Alps to the North Sea (an aspiration which was first formulated in the seventeenth century; was translated into fact for a brief span when the Napoleonic Empire was at its height; and was revived, in the dreams of a few Frenchmen, during the Paris Peace Conference of 1918–20).

Whatever may be thought of a Rhine frontier for France, a Rhine-Danube frontier for the Roman Empire undoubtedly does look 'natural' on a small-scale map of Europe on which the two great rivers are apt to show up among the most prominent of the physical features that are picked out for display by the cartographer. Indeed, a river-line is not only conspicuous on the map but is also more precise in actuality than any other physical feature—except a sea-coast—which might serve as a 'natural' basis for a political boundary. Nevertheless a river is apt to be less effective, even as a strategic frontier, than a mountain-range or a desert;¹ and, while mountains and deserts tend to act as social insulators on the economic and the cultural as well as on the military and the political plane, rivers tend, like narrow seas, to bring together rather than to keep apart the populations that face one another across the water. This has certainly been the normal social effect of both the Rhine and the Danube upon the riparian populations ever since the Rhine-Danube frontier of the Roman Empire vanished with the Empire itself—as is witnessed by the present political map of Europe, on which those sections of the courses of the two rivers on which the waterways now serve as political boundaries are very much shorter in the aggregate than those other sections in which either river now runs through the heart of a country and serves as one of its principal internal arteries (the

¹ 'The frontiers of states are either large rivers or chains of mountains or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next; and large rivers occupy the third place.'—*The Officer's Manual: Maxims of Napoleon*, translated from the French by Colonel Sir G. C. d'Aguilar (Dublin 1831, Milliken), Maxim 1, p. 5.

role of the Rhine in Holland and Prussia and Hessen, and of the Danube in Württemberg and Bavaria and Austria and Hungary). On the strength of this contemporary evidence we may hazard the conjecture that the Rhine and the Danube may have performed the same function of bringing together, instead of keeping apart, the populations on their opposite banks in that primitive Transalpine Europe which was artificially and forcibly partitioned into a Roman and a non-Roman half when the Roman frontier was drawn along the river-line.

In any case, even if it were to be conceded, for the sake of the argument, that a river-frontier is a 'natural' one in principle, it would still remain to be proved that the particular river-frontier to which the Roman Empire resigned itself in Europe was 'scientific'; and to prove this would be difficult indeed.

A 'scientific' military frontier presumably means one that has been chosen out of a number of alternative possible lines because it is the easiest of all of them to hold; and, *ceteris paribus*, the most defensible line is the shortest. A glance at the map will make it evident, however, that, of all the river-frontiers in the interior of Europe that could have been selected for an empire which was based on the Mediterranean Sea and which embraced the whole of the Mediterranean Basin, the Rhine-Danube frontier, so far from being the shortest, was in fact the longest.¹ An Elbe-Danube frontier would have been shorter, an Oder-Danube frontier shorter still, and a Vistula-Dniestr frontier the shortest (and on this count therefore the best) of all.² In and after the reign of Vespasian (*imperabat* A.D. 69-79) the Roman Government did manage to shorten the Rhine-Danube frontier slightly—and at the same time to embrace an additional patch of barbarian territory in the Roman pale—by cutting out the Swabian salient between the upper courses of the two rivers and running a line of artificial fortifications overland from the right bank of the Rhine below Coblenz to the left bank of the Danube above Ratisbon. But the saving of length through this substitution of an overland line for the river-line in the Swabian sector was more than offset by Trajan's prodigality in trespassing beyond the river-line in the Lower Danube sector and annexing to the Empire a Transdanubian bridge-head—the new province of Dacia—which included at least the whole of what are now Little Wallachia and Transylvania. Nor was any

¹ This point has been noticed, by anticipation, in II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 162, above.

² After the interregnum that followed the break-up of the Roman Empire, the frontier of the new society of Western Christendom was, of course, pushed forward from the Rhine to the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, and still farther afield to the Niemen, the Dvina, and finally the Narev in the course of the six centuries following the launching of Charlemagne's attack upon the Saxons in A.D. 772 (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 167-9, above).

great net economy of length achieved when, after the paroxysm in the third century of the Christian Era, Aurelian reversed Trajan's policy and withdrew the frontier to the river-line again in this Lower Danube sector; for in the same emergency the Roman Government was compelled also to abandon the transfluvial land-frontier on the Swabian sector likewise, and the withdrawal to the river-line here meant lengthening the frontier instead of shortening it. While the abandonment of Transylvania to the Goths relieved the empire of its own former salient into Barbaria, the abandonment of Swabia to the Alemanni¹ let a new barbarian salient into Romania; and this new salient pointed menacingly towards the Empire's Italian heart.

Thus, through all its successive local fluctuations, the Rhine-Danube frontier was never anything but the longest 'natural', or mainly 'natural', frontier on the European Continent that the Roman authorities could have chosen. But to imply that they did deliberately choose this line is to beg the question of their skill and insight as frontier-makers when we know as a matter of fact that the Roman Government did not ever choose this line, but simply acquiesced in it as a *pis aller*. The fateful decision was made by Augustus in A.D. 9, after he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that the establishment of an Elbe-Danube frontier, at which he had previously been aiming, could only be achieved at the cost of a greater military and financial effort than he could venture to call for from a Hellenic World which was then in urgent need of rest and relaxation after the protracted and cumulative strain of its four-hundred-years-long 'Time of Troubles'. The attempt to reach the Elbe-Danube line, which Augustus thus confessed to be beyond his strength, was not repeated by any of his successors; but Trajan did, as we have seen, succeed in temporarily substituting the mountain-frontier of the Eastern Carpathians for the river-frontier of the Lower Danube when he annexed Transylvania; and Marcus Aurelius would perhaps have succeeded (if his life had not been cut short when he was on the verge of success) in pushing the frontier forward from the river-line to the mountain-line on the Middle Danube sector as well, where he made a determined effort to annex the territories of the Marcomanni and the Quadi in what was yesterday Czechoslovakia.

The truth is that the Roman authorities were always dissatisfied with the Rhine-Danube frontier and showed their dissatisfaction in the strenuous attempts which they made on almost every sector,

¹ Swabia derives its present name from the presumably predominant Suebian element in the *σύνμικτος ὄχλος* of which the Alemannian war-band was composed. (For the social and psychological effects of a *limes* upon the transfrontier barbarians see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 4, footnote 4, as well as Part VIII, below.)

at one time or another, to push their way forward to a better line—Augustus aiming at a shorter river-line and the Flavians at an elimination of the salient between the Upper Rhine and the Upper Danube, while Trajan and Marcus Aurelius each sought, on a particular sector, to get rid of the river-line altogether and to secure a mountain-frontier instead. It was only in the last phase of the Empire's existence, during the lull between the second barbarian offensive and the third,¹ that the Roman frontier in Europe coincided exactly with the courses of the Rhine and the Danube throughout their length from the North Sea to the Black Sea; and in this period the frontier was held at a greater cost and at the same time with less efficiency than during the century and a half that had intervened between the establishment of the Swabian *limes* during the reign of Vespasian and the temporary collapse of the whole frontier in the fifth decade of the third century of the Christian Era.²

On this showing, we must decline to pay the Rhine-Danube frontier of the Roman Empire the compliment of allowing it to be called either 'natural' or 'scientific'. So far from being a monument of Roman strategical ability, it cannot even be regarded as the outcome of a deliberate choice on the Roman Government's part. Meandering, as it did, along the longest axis of Continental Europe, this unduly praised frontier really registered nothing but the undesigned and accidental locus of the geographical line along which two conflicting social forces had come into a transitory equilibrium. At this distance from the Mediterranean the barbarians of Continental Europe found themselves able to check the farther advance, at their expense, of a Hellenic dominant minority which conversely found itself now compelled to leave its European external proletariat half-unconquered because it had previously wasted the strength of the Hellenic Society in a series of internecine struggles that had begun with the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 431 B.C. and had ended in 31 B.C. with Augustus's victory at Actium over Antony and Cleopatra. In fact, the Rhine-Danube frontier of the Roman Empire, though it held, with certain temporary lapses, for nearly four hundred years from first to last, was almost as unnatural and unscientific as the line along which, for

¹ For these two offensives see V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 219–22, above. The lull lasted about a hundred years, *circa* A.D. 275–375.

² In a critique of the policy of Constantine the Great the French philosopher-administrator Turgot has expressed the opinion 'que l'Empire [Romain] ne fut jamais assez grand [et] qu'il fallait joindre au projet de transporter la capitale de l'Empire [à Constantinople] celui de conquérir le Nord de l'Europe et de ne laisser à l'Empire aucun ennemi à craindre'. In order to conserve the Empire's military energies for this urgently necessary conquest of Northern Europe the Imperial Government, Turgot argues, ought to have refrained from aggression against Iran, (Turgot, A. R. J.: *Œuvres* (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 620–1.)

less than four years, an open warfare settled down into a trench warfare on the Western Front after the Battle of the Marne in the General War of A.D. 1914-18. A definitive and therefore satisfactory 'natural' frontier for a civilization on the Continent of Europe was not to be found anywhere short of the limit of human habitation in the latitude of the Arctic Circle. This line—which was never reached by a Hellenic Society that addressed itself to the problem only after it had already gone into decline—was eventually reached by the two affiliated societies of Western and Orthodox Christendom in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era¹ as a result of efforts which had had to be maintained over a span of not less than six hundred years.

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 168-9, above.

THE VÖLKERWANDERUNG OF THE ARYAS AND THE
SANSKRIT EPIC

THE Sanskrit Epic, as it has come down to us, clearly cannot be regarded as the work of the Aryan invaders of the Indus Basin, or even as the work of these invaders' epigoni, in the sense in which the Scandinavian Saga and the Greek and English epics are respectively the work of the Norse settlers in Iceland and the Ionian settlers in Asia Minor and the English settlers in Britain.

On this question the dates are decisive. The incursion of the Aryas into the domain of the Indus Culture certainly took place before the end, and probably before the middle, of the second millennium B.C.—considering that the Hyksos, who were evidently an *apodasmos* of the same Eurasian Nomad horde, are known to have pushed their way as far afield as the Asiatic borders of Egypt before 1680 B.C. On the other hand the making of the Sanskrit Epic in its present form is estimated, on internal evidence, not to have been begun before 400–200 B.C. and not to have been completed before A.D. 200–400.¹ Thus in the Time-dimension there is a great gulf fixed between the composition of the Sanskrit Epic and the experience of the post-Sumeric Völkerwanderung, which must be presumed, on analogy, to have been the mental stimulus that inspired the Aryan invaders or their epigoni to make whatever their contribution may have been to the Sanskrit Epic as we have it.

The breadth of this gulf may be measured by the heterogeneity of the contents of the Epic in its final form; for while our scholars can make out at least a plausible case for unity of authorship in their *critiques* of certain famous works of 'heroic' poetry—for instance, the *Odyssey* or the *Chanson de Roland*—not even the boldest 'unitarian' would have the hardihood to call in question

¹ Sidhanta, N. K.: *The Heroic Age of India: A Comparative Study* (London 1929, Kegan Paul), pp. 48–9. Cf. Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 169. Some independent evidence from the Hellenic side has been brilliantly detected and presented by W. W. Tarn in *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press). The 'heroic' core of the *Mahābhārata* must have been known to the authority followed by the Alexandrian geographer Ptolemy (*vivebat Aevi Christiani saeculo secundo*) when he attributes to the Pandavas of the *Mahābhārata* a territory which had never been occupied by a people of that name at any time since the Indic World had first come within the Hellenic World's horizon (Tarn, op. cit., pp. 511–12). Ptolemy's authority may have been Trogus's Far Eastern Greek source, who seems to have been writing between 87 B.C. and 80 B.C. (Tarn, op. cit., pp. 59). Again, two passages of the *Mahābhārata* (in the form in which we now have it) which apparently belong, not to the original Aryan 'heroic' core but to the much later Hindu religious accretions, are echoed in an inscription on a column at Besnagar which was set up by a certain Heliodorus son of Dio who was in the service of the Far Eastern Seleucid Greek king Antialcidas (*regnabat circa 130–100 B.C.*) (Tarn, op. cit., pp. 313–14 and 380–1).

the compositeness of the authorship of the *Mahābhārata*. It would be fantastic to suggest that the *Bhagavadgītā*—which has been preserved as an episode in the *Bhārata*—is the work of a barbarian minstrel who has been nurtured in the bosom of a war-band and has found his *métier* in celebrating the prowess of his companions-in-arms. The *Bhagavadgītā* is not a piece of 'heroic' literature, but a sophisticated work of religious or philosophico-religious art. And this late and discordant religious element in the Sanskrit Epic does not only make its appearance in separate lays which, like the *Gītā*, can be isolated and detached and lifted bodily out of the main body of the epos. The whole fabric of the epos has been permeated by this religious leaven; and it is evident that, after having passed through the normal earlier stages in the development of a 'heroic' poetry, the literary legacy of the Aryan war-bands fell into the hands of the Brahmans¹ and was eventually incorporated into the scriptures of Hinduism:² the 'higher religion' which was discovered, after the breakdown of the Indic Civilization, by the Indic internal proletariat.³

This capture and exploitation of an ancient barbarian work of art by the apostles of a latter-day 'higher religion' or philosophy is not altogether without parallel. In the latter days of Hellenic history the Homeric Epic was taken up and taken over, in somewhat the same fashion, by the Fathers of the Neoplatonic Church; and Neoplatonism is an amalgam of the philosophy of the Hellenic dominant minority with the religion of the Hellenic internal proletariat which shows an unmistakable resemblance to Hinduism.⁴ The Neoplatonist Fathers, however, never went to the lengths to which the Hindu Fathers permitted themselves to go in taking liberties with their 'heroic' captive. The Neoplatonists contented themselves with re-interpreting 'Homer' allegorically; and, even if they ventured to tamper with the *textus receptus* here and there, they never dreamed of interpolating whole books of 'Orphic' or 'Sibylline' religious verse between the historic cantos of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The complete smothering of an original 'heroic' nucleus under a pile of later religious accretions is a process that is peculiar to the history of the Sanskrit Epic; and it is one of the most striking illustrations of that tendency towards a predominantly religious *habitus* which is, as we have seen,⁵ the special bent of the Indic Civilization.

At the same time we shall observe that the Hindu religious

¹ Sidhanta, op. cit., pp. 66-7.

² Ibid., p. 110.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 137-8, above.

⁴ For Neoplatonism see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 378; V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 147; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 565-7; and V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, p. 584, above; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 680-3, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 222-3, below.

⁵ In III. C (iii), vol. iii, pp. 384-5 and 387-8, above.

manipulators of the Aryan 'heroic' epos have not succeeded in turning it into an entirely religious work of art which is unitary in the sense of being all of one uniform Hindu êthos and texture; for they have not eliminated—or perhaps even sought to eliminate—the original 'heroic' element altogether. In the Sanskrit Epic as we have it, the residual 'heroic' element is still manifest and even conspicuous; and there are even glaring contradictions between the original Aryan and the interpolated Hindu ideas and ideals which the Hindu manipulators of the *Mahābhārata* have not been able to remove.

The êthos and institutions of a barbarian war-band are unmistakably reflected in the thirst for fame and in the Fatalism which the *Bhārata* attributes to its heroes;¹ in the 'atmosphere of savage heroism' which pervades the *Bhārata* (though it is absent from the *Rāmāyana*);² in the importance of the parts that are played by the institutions of kingship and the *comitatus*;³ in the purely personal basis of international relations;⁴ and in the representation of the heroes as being meat-eaters—in contrast to the practice of an Indic Society in which the principle of *Ahimsa* had come to prevail at least as early as the sixth century B.C.⁵ The gods of the Vedic Pantheon also behave in the *Bhārata* according to their kind. Indra has a mansion for warriors slain in battle which corresponds to Odin's Valhalla;⁶ and he comes down to Earth—like Ares and Apollo and Athena in the *Iliad*—to take part in the warfare between rival human war-bands on an equality with the human combatants. This reduction of Indra to the stature of a mortal man does not trouble the later Hindu editor, for whom Indra is only a literary reminiscence and not a living god; but the latter-day poet falls into serious embarrassment when he allows himself to be decoyed—by his respect for the externals of the Aryan 'heroic' tradition—into bringing on to the battlefield his own Hindu god Shiva, who is the genuine object of a fervently pious worship. How can the omnipotent Shiva be allowed to be worsted, or even challenged, by human arms? And, on the other hand, how can the 'heroic' tradition be maintained if the divine combatant, *ex officio deitatis*, is to carry all before him?⁷ In the purely Hindu didactic additions to the *Bhārata* this dilemma does not arise

¹ Sidhanta, op. cit., pp. 82-4.

² Ibid., pp. 177 and 172-4.

³ Ibid., p. 187. For this characteristic feature of 'heroic ages' see further V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 4, footnote 4, below.

⁴ Sidhanta, op. cit., p. 169. We may compare the similar contrast between the diet of the Homeric heroes, who feast on beef and have a horror of fish, and the diet of the latter-day urban communities of the Hellenic World, in which fish was the staple flesh-food, while beef and mutton were rarely eaten.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 210-12.

⁶ For this dilemma see *ibid.*, p. 94.

² Ibid., p. 89.

because the theme is here changed from barbarian warfare to sophisticated speculation; and in these interpolations the Vedic gods are quite eclipsed by Brāhmā, Shiva, and Vishnu.¹

The frequent *actes de présence* that are made in the Sanskrit Epic by Indra and other members of the Vedic Pantheon are sufficient proof that some part, at least, of the 'heroic' element in the *Mahābhārata* is a genuine legacy from the Völkerwanderung of the Aryas in the second millennium B.C.; and we have corroborative evidence to the same effect in strata of Indic literature which are unquestionably of an early date. For instance, Nāra-shamsī songs (κλέα ἀνδρῶν) are mentioned in the *Vedas*, and there are allusions to heroic minstrelsy in the *Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.² These facts would appear to establish, beyond doubt, both the existence of an original Aryan epos which was inspired by the Aryan Völkerwanderung, and also the survival of at least some reminiscence of this ancient epic tradition in the Sanskrit Epic as we have it. Yet there is something extraordinary about this apparent persistence of a 'heroic' literary tradition in an inchoate and fluid form over a period of at least five hundred years between the latest date that can be assigned to the historical events by which this poetry was inspired³ and the earliest date that can be assigned to the crystallization of the Sanskrit Epic in its present shape. This curious chapter of literary history would become more comprehensible if we had warrant for surmising that, about the time when the Sanskrit Epic did, at last, take its classic shape, the interest in the ancient 'heroic' literary tradition of the Aryas was revived in the Indic World of the day by a contemporary recurrence of the social experiences by which the Aryan 'heroic' tradition had originally been precipitated. Between 400-200 B.C. and A.D. 200-400—which are, as we have seen,⁴ the probable *termini post et ante quos* for the composition of the Sanskrit Epic—was there anything in the nature of a new Völkerwanderung and a new 'Heroic Age' in Indic history?

We may perhaps find our answer to this question if we approach it by way of an analogy that is to be found in the history of a comparable 'heroic' tradition which had its home in the Iranian province of the Syriac World.

The Iranian Epic, which has been given its classic and final

¹ Ibid., p. 200.

² Ibid., pp. 55-6.

³ A comparison of the internal evidence of the *Mahābhārata* with evidence afforded by other works of Sanskrit literature which unquestionably date from the early age of Indic history appears to show that the historical characters and events of which there are reminiscences in the *Bhārata* fall within the quarter of a millennium *circa* 1100-*circa* 850 B.C. (Chadwick, H. M. and N. K.: *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 512-20).

⁴ On p. 596, above.

form by the genius of a single great poet,¹ has as long a history as the Sanskrit Epic; for, while Firdawsī lived from about A.D. 930 to A.D. 1020, and the Pehlevī prose work which is supposed to have been his source (through the medium of a New Persian translation) is not ascribed to an earlier date than the reign of the last Sasanian Pādishāh Yazdagird (*imperabat* A.D. 632–51), the mythology which is presented in the *Shāhnāmāh* proves to be identical, even in minor details, with the mythological scheme that is presupposed in the *Avesta*,² and some, at least, of these mythical characters and events appear to be creations of the Iranian imagination in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., when the Iranian peoples were living as members of the external proletariat of a disintegrating Babylonian Society beyond the eastern frontiers of the Assyrian Empire. There are other elements, however, in the *Shāhnāmāh* which date from later ages than this, while they are still considerably older than the age which saw the composition of Yazdagird's *Khudhāynāmāh*. For example, a group of Arsacid Parthian royal names have found their way into the Iranian 'heroic' tradition in connexion with one particular episode;³ and even so recent an historical event as the death of the Sasanian Pādishāh Pīrūz at the hands of the Ephthalites in A.D. 484⁴ has passed over into the realm of legend⁵ and has there become of one substance with the mythical exploits of Jāmshīd and Firūdūn.

Another distinct chronological stratum of 'heroic' matter is perhaps to be found in the tales that are associated with the names of Zal and Rustam; for, while the figures of these two heroes and their adversaries loom large in the Iranian Epic in its final form,⁶

¹ In strict accuracy we ought perhaps to say 'the genius of two poets'; but—whether or not Daqīqī would have grown to Firdawsī's stature if Death had not cut his work short—the older poet's contribution to the *Shāhnāmāh* as we have it is completely dominated by the work of the successor who not only continued the poem but made it what it now is.

² Nöldeke, Th.: *Das Iranische Nationalepos*, 2nd ed. (Berlin and Leipzig 1920, de Gruyter), p. 1.

³ Ibid., pp. 7–8. Several of these historical names are associated with one another in the realm of historical fact as well as in the realm of poetic fiction. An historical King Gotarzes, who is the namesake of Firdawsī's Gōdharz, had to fight for his throne in A.D. 49–50 against an historical pretender, Meherdates (a Latin rendering of the Pehlevī version of the name Mithradates), who is the namesake of Firdawsī's Milādh. Meherdates was supported by the Kāren family, who likewise figure in this episode of the *Shāhnāmāh*.

⁴ For the repercussion of this event upon Indic history see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 279, footnote 1, above.

⁵ Nöldeke, op. cit., p. 9.

⁶ The contents of the *Khudhāynāmāh* have to be reconstructed by inference, since neither the original Pehlevī text nor Ibn Muqaffā's Arabic translation (made in the middle of the eighth century of the Christian Era) is extant (Nöldeke, op. cit., p. 15). Our inference that the *Khudhāynāmāh* did include the Rustam cycle is drawn from the fact that as early as the first half of the seventh century of the Christian Era, before the Arab conquest, the name Rustam is borne by private persons in Western Iran and in Irāq (Nöldeke, op. cit., p. 11)—e.g., by the unfortunate commander of the Sasanian army which was routed by the Arabs in the Battle of Qādisiyyah, circa A.D. 637.

there is no trace of them in the *Avesta*.¹ An indication not only of the date but of the source of the Rustam cycle is perhaps to be found in its geographical locus. The legends in this cycle are all definitely associated with the two East Iranian provinces of Seistan and Zābulistān in the basin of the River Hilmand;² and the name Seistan, or Sakastene, commemorates the fact that the lower basin of the Hilmand, which had previously been known as Drangiana,³ was submerged in the second and third quarters of the second century B.C. by a flood of Saka Nomads from the Eurasian Steppe.⁴ These Saka invaders were part of the external proletariat of a disintegrating Syriac Society who had assembled in a no-man's-land beyond the Transoxanian frontier of the Achaemenian Empire⁵ and had then broken through the former Achaemenian front when the Yuechi Nomads, from the depths of the Steppe, had given an impetus to the Sakas from the rear, and when the forces of the Achaemenian Empire's Macedonian 'successor-state' in Asia had been divided and redivided against themselves by a gradual secession of a Greek principality in Bactria from the Seleucid Monarchy during the latter part of the third century B.C.⁶ and by a half-successful Seleucid attempt, in the fourth decade of

¹ Nöldeke, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 10. When the Arab conquerors pushed their way into Seistan, they found there a place called 'The Stall of Rustam's Horse [Raksh]' (Nöldeke, *op. cit.*, p. 11).

³ This older name of the province survived in the name of its capital city, which continued to be known as Zaranj down to the last days of Syriac history in the Age of the 'Abbasids.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141, footnote 2, and p. 144, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 215-16, 239-40, 275-6, and 310, above. The vanguard of the Saka host which occupied Drangiana in the second century B.C. seems to have planted itself there as early as *circa* 155 B.C., when a body of Saka mercenaries in the service of the Parthian King Mithradates I appears to have made itself at home in this province, without asking its employer's leave, as its self-conferred reward for previous military services which had enabled the Parthian war-lord to conquer Drangiana, Arachosia, and Gedrosia from the Bactrian Greeks in 159 B.C. (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 222-3 and 500). The main body of the Sakas erupted out of the Eurasian Steppe into the Parthian Empire in 129 B.C. under pressure from the Yuechi, who had erupted into the Bactrian principality in 130 B.C. or shortly before (see V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 240, footnote 4, above). The momentarily overrun north-eastern provinces of the Parthian Empire, including Drangiana, were recovered for the Arsacid by his vassal the Suren between 124 and 115 B.C. (Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 224, 320, and 501), and in the process the bulk of the Saka invaders were driven still farther south-eastwards, out of Drangiana into Sind (see pp. 602-4, below); but a sufficient number of them remained in Drangiana permanently, under the Suren's Parthian rule, to impose upon the province their name (Sakastene) and, with it, perhaps, their social impress. The same Parthian reconquest of Seistan that drove some, though not all, of the Saka invaders south-eastwards into Sind seems to have driven one of the trespassing Nomad war-bands—namely the Pasiāni or Parsii—north-eastwards into the highland country, round the headwaters of the Hilmand and Kābul rivers, which subsequently came to be known as Zābulistān. In nationality these Parsian Nomads seem, to judge by their name, to have belonged not to the Saka-speaking but to the Persian-speaking branch of the Iranian family (Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-5 and 469-73).

⁵ For the history of this Eurasian frontier of the Syriac World see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 137-44; Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 444-5 and 448-9; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 239-741, 244-6, and 247-8, above.

⁶ See Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-4.

the second century, to recover this lost dominion by force of arms.¹ It has been conjectured by some of our modern Western scholars that the Rustam cycle—which is so distinct, both in its local colour and in its fabulous atmosphere,² from the rest of the matter of the Iranian Epic—may be a literary reflexion of the social experience of the Sakas in their *Völkerwanderung* in the second century B.C.

This attractive conjecture has been rejected by the great scholar upon whose work we have just been drawing in this Annex.³ But, if, in defiance of Nöldeke's formidable authority, we may venture to entertain the hypothesis unless and until it is decisively refuted, we may find in it a clue to the solution of the Indic problem which has led us to take this Iranian question up.

While Seistan was permanently occupied by the Sakas—as is testified by the permanent change in the province's name—it was not the final resting-place of the whole Saka horde.⁴ The Sakas took the road to Seistan in and after 129 B.C. simply because this was their line of least resistance;⁵ but Seistan, as well as Herat and

¹ See Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–224.

² For this atmosphere see Nöldeke, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 11. But the only reason which Nöldeke gives in support of his adverse judgement is the fact that the personages in the Rustam cycle all bear Iranian names; and this argument seems scarcely cogent, since it is almost certain that the Saka Nomad invaders of Drangiana, as well as the sedentary population which they found in occupation, were an Iranian-speaking people, while the allied war-band of Persian Nomad invaders, who were pushed, by the Parthian counter-attack of 124–115 B.C., out of Seistan up the Hilmand Valley into Zābulistān, probably spoke a language that was not merely Iranian but was actually a member of the Persian branch of that linguistic family (see p. 601, footnote 4, above).

⁴ See p. 601, footnote 4, above.

⁵ With their fellow Nomads the Yuechi at their heels the Sakas could not pitch their tents in the Upper Oxus-Jaxartes Basin (Sogdiana and Bactria), which the Yuechi had just taken for themselves. One war-band of the Saka Rawaka (Sacaraucae) which was pushed back to the north-eastern side of the Oxus in the Parthian counter-offensive of 124–115 B.C. 'perished' in consequence (Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 306–7). Again, they could not push, south of the Hindu Kush, up the valley of the Murghab and down the valley of the Kābul River into the Panjab, partly because of the difficulty of the *terrain* and partly because the Seleucid Greek principality which had been carved out of the Euthydemid Greek Empire of Bactria in the fourth decade of the second century B.C. (see p. 601, above) had not only survived the Yuechi conquest of its provinces in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin but had remained strongly entrenched in a natural fastness between the Hindu Kush Range and the Jhelum River (Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 312). When the Parthian counter-offensive of 124–115 B.C. subsequently drove the Parsii out of Seistan up the Hilmand Valley, they did succeed in pushing across the watershed into the head of the Kābul Valley (Cōphēnē) at some date before 87 B.C. (*ibid.*, pp. 295, 314, and 332); but (although it was the descendants of these Persian invaders of the Kābul Valley that eventually gave the Greek Power in India its *coup de grâce* both in the Kābul Valley and in the Eastern Panjab: see *ibid.*, pp. 349–50) the Greeks of the Paropamisadae and Gandhāra proved strong enough to check the Parsians' progress down the Kābul Valley for some 60 years; and before the end they even managed, with Kushan military and Han diplomatic assistance, to drive the Parsians back between *circa* 50 and *circa* 30 B.C. (*ibid.*, pp. 337–43). Thus in the eighth decade of the second century B.C. the Sakas could not push their way into either the Upper Oxus-Jaxartes Basin or the Kābul Valley; and at the same time they could not advance south-westward, into Western Iran and beyond it, owing to the indomitable defence of the Khurasanian escarpment of the Iranian Plateau by the Arsacid prince Mithradates the Great (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141, footnote 2; Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 449; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 239, above). The only 'get-

Merv, was reconquered by Parthian arms, between 124 and 115 B.C., under the leadership of the Arsacid's vassal the Suren;¹ and, although a Saka rear-guard settled down, nevertheless, under Parthian rule, on the banks of the Hilmand, the greater part of the horde then trekked on still farther south-eastward to find new homes in the Indic World. After making their way out of the Hilmand Basin into the Indus Basin over the Bolan Pass, these Sakas struck the River Indus itself in Northern Sind, took to the water,² and went on to conquer Patalênê (the Indus Delta) and Surāshtra (Kathiāwār and Gujerāt).³ By about 80 B.C. they had established themselves in these provinces so firmly that they were able to turn northwards and attack the Seleucid Greek principality which still survived between the Jhelum and the Hindu Kush. This time, again, the Sakas came by water; and it was a naval victory on the Indus over their Greek antagonists that opened for them the way to the conquest of Taxila before 77 B.C., of Gandhāra before 70 B.C., and of Kapisa, in the Paropamisadae, before 60 B.C.⁴ While he was thus conquering the greater part of the Seleucid Greek principality in India with one hand, the Saka war-lord Maues was at the same time extending his rule in Central India by conquering Ujjain about 62 B.C.⁵ and Mathurā about 60 B.C.⁶ The Euthydemid Greek principality in the Eastern Panjab, however, still held out between the Jhelum and the Ravi,⁷ and both Greek principalities reasserted themselves when, in 58 B.C., Maues was defeated by the Mālavas, lost Ujjain, and met his death.⁸ The Euthydemid Greeks won a naval victory over the Sakas on the Jhelum;⁹ the Seleucid Greeks reasserted themselves in the Paropamisadae;¹⁰ and this collapse of the Saka Power in India seemed to be confirmed when the Sakas' domain in the Panjab, as well as both the two Greek principalities on its flanks, was conquered by the Parsian principality about 30 B.C.,¹¹ and when this ephemeral Parsian Empire was conquered in its turn, together with the remnant of the Saka Empire in Sind and Kathiāwār and Gujerāt, by the Parthian Suren Gondophares in A.D. 19.¹² The Sakas, however, were strong both in numbers and in adaptability,¹³

away' that was left to the Sakas was to steal up the valley of the Heri Rud, between Mithradates' right wing and the Kābul Valley Greeks' left wing; and this route led them straight to Drangiana.

¹ See p. 601, footnote 4, above.

² These Saka Nomads who took to the water are the inverse of the Cossack watermen who took to the steppe (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 156, above).

³ Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-1 and 501.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 321-3, 332, and 501.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

⁷ For the numismatic evidence for this see *ibid.*, pp. 326-9.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 347 and 501.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 346 and 349-50.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 299-300.

and, though the *ci-devant* Saka Empire of Maues in the Indus Valley never came to life again, this defunct empire's two great outlying satrapies—one at Mathurā and the other in Surāshtra (i.e. Kathiāwār and Gujerāt)—both managed to survive, and the southern satrapy subsequently extended the Saka Rāj into Central India far deeper than Maues had ever penetrated in the last century B.C. These epigoni of the Saka conquerors of the Indus Valley reconquered Ujjain about A.D. 78¹ and made themselves masters of Mahārāshtra about the same time; and, although the Saka satrapy in Mahārāshtra was momentarily overthrown by the Andhra Power, from the Deccan, *circa* A.D. 126, the satrapy in Mālhwā recovered Mahārāshtra for the Saka Rāj between A.D. 126 and A.D. 150. From that time until its extinction at the hands of the Guptas *circa* A.D. 390,² this Saka satrapy bore rule, from its capital at Ujjain, 'not only over the peninsula of Surāshtra [Kathiāwār], but also over Mālhwā, Cutch, Sind, the Konkan and other districts—in short, over Western India'.³ It will be seen that the wave of the Saka Völkerwanderung was washing over from the north-eastern fringe of the Syriac World into the north-western fringe of the Indic World in the very age in which the Sanskrit Epic is believed, on quite independent grounds, to have been crystallizing into its present shape; and it is tempting to conjecture that the otherwise extraordinary phenomenon of a revival, in the Indic World in this age, of an interest in a 'heroic' tradition descending from the Aryan invaders of the Indus Valley in the second millennium B.C. may partly be accounted for by the arrival in force, in the course of the last two centuries B.C. and the first two centuries of the Christian Era, of a Saka swarm of barbarian invaders who had lately acquired the same literary tastes, as a result of the same social experience, as their Aryan predecessors who had trodden the road from Eurasia to India more than a thousand years earlier.

It is not necessary to suppose that any of the 'heroic' matter of the Sanskrit Epic, as we have it, is actually of Saka origin—whatever we may think of the theory of a Saka origin of the Rustam cycle in the Iranian Epic. In the Indic case, at any rate, we need not go farther than to suggest that the Saka barbarian invaders who pushed their way into the heart of Western India some time between the end of the second century B.C. and the beginning of the second century of the Christian Era were inspired by their own recent social experience with a taste for that 'heroic' poetry which

¹ Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 335 and 501.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86, above.

³ Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 291.

seems to be the normal form of literary self-expression for barbarians who have been through a *Völkerwanderung*.

When a demand for 'heroic' poetry arises among barbarian conquerors who have settled down to live off their conquests as a ruling caste, this demand can be satisfied in either one of two alternative ways. Either the barbarians can produce minstrels of their own to celebrate their own deeds in their own language; or else they can call upon the subject population to supply them with the spiritual commodity of 'heroic' poetry as well as with the material commodities which they are accustomed to take as tribute.¹ From what we know of the *êthos* of the Sakas, we should expect *a priori* that, if and when they did have an appetite for 'heroic' poetry, they would prefer to borrow what they wanted rather than to make it for themselves; for in other fields the Sakas undoubtedly displayed in a high degree the receptivity that seems to be characteristic of empire-builders.² In their administration, coinage, and calendar they took over the institutions of the Greeks whom they supplanted,³ and in the next chapter of their history they were captivated by the Indic religion of Hinduism and by the associated archaistic revival of the Sanskrit language.⁴ On the strength of these analogies we may perhaps venture to guess that, when the Sakas felt a need for 'heroic' poetry, they addressed themselves to their Indic subjects; and it is evident that, when this demand is made upon a subject population, its poets will be prone, like the householder in the parable,⁵ to bring forth out of their 'treasure things new and old'. They will search out and furbish up, for the delectation of their new barbarian masters, any 'heroic' matter which their own literary tradition may have preserved from a more or less remote barbarian past, but at the same time they will find ways and means of satisfying their own taste, and giving expression to their own interests, by embroidering this ancient stuff with incongruous modern trappings. If we imagine a Hindu poet whose heart—like that of 'every scribe which is instructed unto the Kingdom of Heaven'⁵—is set upon a new 'higher religion', being called upon by an importunate barbarian Saka war-lord to provide him with 'heroic' minstrelsy, is not the Sanskrit Epic, as we have it, exactly the kind of farrago which we should expect to see produced by the *tour de force* of an attempt to provide simul-

¹ We have already come across a case in point in studying the transformation of the Norse settlers in the Lower Seine Valley into the Normans. The *ci-devant* barbarians were so completely captivated by the culture of the society which they had compelled, at the sword's point, to receive them as its adopted sons that they abandoned their Norse mother-tongue for French and thereafter satisfied their taste for 'heroic' poetry by lending their ears to the French Epic (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 201, above).

² See V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), pp. 442-3, above.

³ See Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-13, 300, 323, and 358-9.

⁴ See p. 606, footnote 3, below.

⁵ Matt. xiii. 52.

taneous satisfaction for two tastes that were so diverse and for two interests that were so far apart?

If we may be allowed to follow up our suggestion *jusqu'au bout*, we will even venture tentatively to designate a precise place and time in which the Sanskrit Epic may have taken its final shape. We will put our finger upon 'Ujjain, one of the most ancient cities of India, . . . famous as a seat of learning and civilization';¹ and we will focus our attention upon the age in which Ujjain was the capital of a Saka satrapy which bore rule over the greater part of Western India.² Is it too rash a guess to conjecture that the Sanskrit Epic took its final shape at the Saka Court in Ujjain some time between about A.D. 150 and A.D. 390?³

¹ Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 291.

² See the passage quoted from op. cit. on p. 604, above.

³ This conjecture may be supported by philological as well as social and religious considerations; for the crystallization of the Sanskrit Epic between 400-200 B.C. and A.D. 200-400 occurred in close association, not only with the rise of the Hindu religion, but also with an archaistic revival of the Sanskrit language; and the use of Neo-Sanskrit for official purposes is believed, on the evidence of coins and inscriptions, to have been introduced from the North-West into the Deccan, at some date between A.D. 120 and A.D. 200, by the Saka satraps of Ujjain, who are our hypothetical barbarian patrons of the Sanskrit Epic. 'The later Saka satraps of Surāshtra seem to have inclined personally much more to the Brahmanical than to the Buddhist cult, and they certainly bestowed their patronage upon the Sanskrit of the Brahmins rather than upon the vernacular literature. . . . The restoration of the Brahmanical religion to popular favour, and the associated revival of the Sanskrit language, became noticeable in the second century and were fostered by the satraps of Gujerāt and Surāshtra during the third' (Smith, op. cit., pp. 302-3). The Neo-Sanskrit which was in use in Mahārāstra in the second century of the Christian Era under the Saka régime was still full of solecisms; but this very imperfection of the Saka satraps' Neo-Sanskrit style points the fact that they were the pioneers of the Sanskrit revival in a Pāli-speaking world. In the second century of the Christian Era Pāli continued to be used for inscriptions not only in the Andhra Empire, to the south-east of the Saka satrapy of Ujjain, but also in the Indus Valley (see Franke, R. O.: *Pāli und Sanskrit in ihrem Historischen und Geographischen Verhältnis auf Grund der Inschriften und Münzen* (Strassburg 1902, Trübner), pp. 78-82). If the Saka satraps patronized the revival of the Sanskrit language, they may well have extended their patronage to the ancient 'heroic' poetry which, among all the literary monuments of the favoured language, was the matter which the Sakas themselves would most readily appreciate. (For the archaistic resuscitation of the Sanskrit language as one of the symptoms of a decadence of the Indic Civilization see also V. C (i) (d) 8 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 75-7, below.)

HISTORICAL FACT AND 'HEROIC' TRADITION

IN a notable work of both literary and historical scholarship¹ Professor H. M. Chadwick has collated the references to historical events in the Teutonic Epic with the accounts of the same events that have come down to us in the works of Greek and Latin historians; and from this comparison he has brilliantly brought out the fact that, even where the alleged historical event in the epic story turns out to be authentic, there is apt to be no correspondence whatever between the importance that is ascribed to this event in the 'heroic' tradition and its actual importance as our historical records enable us to estimate this quite independently of the 'heroic' version.²

For example, the Burgundian war-lord Guthhere or Gunther, whose figure looms so large in the *Nibelungenlied*, proves to have played in fact a very minor part in the barbarian infiltration into Gaul in the fifth century of the Christian Era; and, as for the still more famous literary figure of Siegfried, he 'has been identified with a number of famous princes from Arminius to Sigebert', but 'it cannot be said that any one of these identifications is of a nature to carry conviction; in no case, indeed, have they gained wide acceptance'.³ Professor Chadwick suggests that

'It was scarcely through the greatness of their power, much less through the effects of their achievements on after generations, that the characters of "the Heroic Age" acquired celebrity; it was far more through the impression made upon their neighbours and contemporaries by their magnificence and generosity, by their personality, and perhaps above all by the adventures and vicissitudes of fortune which fell to their lot.'⁴

In other words, it is not the military or political effectiveness, but the literary 'availability',⁵ of a barbarian war-lord that makes his literary fortune; and from this it follows that the literary history of a hero of 'heroic' poetry begins to diverge from his authentic history from the moment—which may fall within the hero's own lifetime—when his actions and his character are taken up as

¹ Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press).

² Compare Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (1), 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 222; eundem: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (2), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 295.

³ Chadwick, op. cit., p. 167.

⁴ Ibid. Cf. Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (1), 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 220-1.

⁵ In the sense in which this word is used of a candidate for the Presidency of the United States.

a literary theme by a poet. That moment sees the creation of a 'character' and a plot which have a separate existence from the personality and the transaction 'in real life' by which these creatures of imagination have been evoked in the poet's soul; and thenceforth these 'fictions' live and grow in accordance with aesthetic laws of their own which have little or no relation to the canons of historical veracity.¹

'It is possible for an occurrence to be recounted in a way that departs completely from the real course of events, and this immediately after it has taken place, and in the mouths of the spectators and participants themselves. And, the farther the story spreads and the longer it lives, the more radical becomes the transformation, until at last there remains scarcely a vestige of the original facts.'²

A classic example of such duality in the literature relating to an historical person is the notorious distinction between the perfectly authentic historical records about Alexander the Great and the essentially imaginative 'Alexander Romance'. In this instance the romance and the records not only both began to take shape simultaneously within the hero's lifetime, but also both originated in the same social milieu, which was none other than Alexander's own personal entourage.³

As Professor Chadwick points out,

'Two tendencies are constantly observable: (i) to connect stories or incidents which originally were quite distinct;⁴ (ii) within the

¹ This point has been touched upon by anticipation in V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 299, above.

² Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (1), 4th ed., p. 221.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 252, above, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 441-4, below. The Alexander Romance may formally be included in our catalogue of 'heroic' literature, since Alexander's conquest of the Achaemenian Empire was, in its Macedonian aspect, a barbarian Völkervanderung from the Thracian hinterland into the South-West Asian heart of the Syriac World. There is, however, another aspect of Alexander's work that is more prominent and at the same time more important. Besides being a barbarian war-lord, Alexander was a missionary of the Hellenic Civilization; and it was Hellenism, not Barbarism, whose domain was ultimately extended, as the result of Alexander's labours, at the expense of the Syriac Civilization and also of the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indic civilizations, whose domains had likewise been embraced within the conquered Achaemenian Empire's frontiers. In fact, the immediate effect of Alexander's conquests was to produce a sudden vast increase in the numbers of the internal proletariat of a disintegrating Hellenic Society (see III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 140 and 149-51; III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 197-9; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 64-5, above); and it was in the slums of this Oriental Underworld, and not in the camps of the Macedonian war-bands who were Alexander's comrades-in-arms, that the Alexander Romance took shape eventually (see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, p. 444, below). This example illustrates the fact that the 'heroic' literature of the External Proletariat has its counterpart in a 'folk' literature of the Internal Proletariat. And the divergence of 'fiction' from fact, which in this Annex we are studying in a 'heroic' proletarian milieu, is characteristic of the 'folk' proletarian literature as well (as will appear from the cases examined in V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, vol. vi, and in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, below).

⁴ Cf. Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (1), 4th ed., p. 221. This tendency is strikingly illustrated by the growth of the legend of one of the heroes of the Classical School of Serb 'heroic' poetry, Marko Kraljević (see Chadwick, H. M. and N. K.: *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1936, University Press), p. 388), and by the attraction, into the *Nibelungenlied*, of elements from different cycles

individual story to lose sight of all except the outstanding characters and incidents."

In fact, the finer the work of art that is the ultimate product of poetic genius and rhapsodic tradition, the farther the characters and the plot of the epos are likely to travel away from the historical persons and events by which they were originally inspired. The *chef d'œuvre* of creative perversion of the historical truth has perhaps been achieved in the 'heroic' poetry of the Serbian external proletariat of Orthodox Christendom, in which an historical hero, Vuk Branković, has been transfigured into a 'fictitious' traitor, and an historical traitor, Marko Kraljević, into a 'fictitious' hero.²

and of characters from distant ages (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (1), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 296). In the Russian 'heroic' tradition the figure of the historical Cossack pioneer Yermak, who led the vanguard in the expansion of the Russian Orthodox Christendom across Siberia in the ninth decade of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 157, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 497, above), has similarly been attracted into the saga of Ilya of Murom in the Kiev Cycle of Russian 'heroic' poetry, which is an echo of historical events that had occurred four hundred years, at the latest, before Yermak's day (see Chadwick, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 50). One of the simplest and most easily intelligible illustrations of this tendency is the coalescence of two historical personages who happen to be one another's namesakes into a single character of 'heroic' saga. For example, the 'Prince Vladimir of Kiev' who is the equivalent of King Arthur in the Kiev Cycle of Russian 'heroic' poetry is a 'fictitious' compound of the two historical war-lords Vladimir I (*militabat* A.D. 980-1015) and Vladimir II (*militabat* A.D. 1113-25) (Chadwick, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 24 and 34).—A.J.T.

² Subotić, D.: *Yugoslav Popular Ballads, Their Origin and Development* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), pp. 84-7. Compare Chadwick, op. cit., p. 318. For the stages in the evolution of the historical Vuk Branković into a 'fictitious' traitor see Chadwick, H. M. and N. K.: *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1936, University Press), p. 382. For the converse process of the embellishment of the figure of Marko Kraljević see op. cit., pp. 385-8. The good fortune of Marko Kraljević may prove to have been shared by a still more famous hero of 'heroic' saga. A gloss on a passage in the work of the Britanno-Roman historian Nennius (*Historia Brittonum*, chap. 56) gives an odious picture of Arthur. The following note on this point has been most kindly communicated to the writer of this Study by Professor H. M. Chadwick:

"The text of most of the MSS. is as follows (I am quoting from F. Lot's edition): "Tunc Arthur pugnabat contra illos in illis diebus cum regibus Brittonum, sed ipse dux erat bellorum." C and L add the following sentences: "Et in omnibus victor extitit. Mab Uter Britannice, filius horribilis" Latine, quoniam a puericia sua crudelis fuit. Artur Latine translatus sonat 'ursum horribilem' vel 'malleum ferreum' quo confringuntur molae leonum." Lot says: "add. de plusieurs mains de C copiée par L." I don't know the MSS., but I am under the impression that the additional passage is a gloss—or rather a series of glosses—in C, and that it is incorporated into the text in L. (C is Corp. Chr. Coll. Camb. No. 139; L is Camb. Univ. Libr. Ff. I.27.) In the "Lives" of saints Arthur sometimes behaves in a tyrannical way to a saint. Then the saint performs a miracle, and Arthur becomes penitent and generous. But there is one passage in the Prologue to the Life of St. Cadoc which represents Arthur in a rather more unsympathetic light, and which may perhaps interest you, if you have not seen it. Gwynllw (Woollo), father of Cadoc, has eloped with Gwladys, daughter of Brychan, and is fleeing to his own country, hotly pursued by Brychan and his army. Arthur is playing dice with Cai and Bedwir on the top of a hill, as they pass. He is enraptured by the girl's beauty, and proposes to appropriate her for himself. But Cai and Bedwir say that this would be disgraceful, and that they ought to protect the distressed. So they come to the rescue of the lovers. Woollo and Gwladys eventually became saints, and Woollo's abode is now the cathedral of Newport. But I should doubt if the above incident is an early story. I have taken it from Rees' *Lives of the Cambro-British Saints*, p. 311 f. The Life of St. Cadoc is believed to date from circa A.D. 1075."

Are we here catching a glimpse of an historical Arthur whose authentic lineaments have been embellished out of all recognition in the 'heroic' tradition from which all our other pictures of Arthur are derived? For the historical Marko Kraljević see also V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), p. 462, footnote 2, above.

Besides taking these enormous liberties with the historical persons and events which it does choose to mention, 'heroic' poetry is apt to pass over in silence the persons and events which are actually of the most outstanding historical importance in the age with which the poems are concerned.

'It is . . . a curious fact that Clovis and his great achievements seem to be entirely unnoticed in poetry; [and] it appears . . . that, though most of the principal Teutonic nations are represented in our stories, the relative prominence assigned to them does not at all correspond to what we should expect. Most remarkable is the fact that in stories relating to the Continent nearly all the chief characters (Eormenric, Theodric, Guthhere, Attila, etc.) belong to nations which had passed out of existence before the end of the sixth century.'¹

For the historian it is a paradox that 'the Frankish nation, which ultimately became dominant, is but poorly represented'² in the Teutonic Epic; but this is by no means the greatest of the paradoxes with which the Teutonic Epic confronts him. The greatest of all is the at first sight astonishing fact that the Teutonic Epic almost entirely ignores the existence of the Roman Empire and *a fortiori* the history of the Hellenic Civilization of which the Roman Empire was the universal state.³ How is this silence to be explained, when the age with which these Teutonic 'heroic' poems are concerned is precisely the post-Hellenic interregnum which was occupied by the *Völkerwanderung* of the North European and other transfrontier barbarians into the territories of the Roman Empire?

'The period . . . coincides with what is generally known as the Age of National Migrations (*Völkerwanderungszeit*). It was during this period that many of the Teutonic nations broke through the frontiers of the Roman Empire and carved out for themselves extensive kingdoms within its territories. Among these were the realms of Guthhere and Theodric, and in part also that of Attila. There is no doubt that in all these cases the conquest of the Roman provinces brought with it a great accession of wealth and profoundly affected the life of the invaders.'⁴

More than that, it is this very experience of breaking through the Roman frontiers and becoming masters of a derelict empire, after having been wanderers in a wilderness, that appears to have evoked the Epic in the barbarians' imaginations; and the victorious

¹ Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, pp. 31-2; compare p. 39.

² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

³ 'It is by no means especially the important, nor indeed even the most momentous, events of the age that are immortalized in the [Teutonic] Epic Tradition. So far from that, the tradition knows nothing of the conflicts with Rome, of the invasion of the Roman provinces, or even of the bare existence of the Roman Empire, or, again, of the battle on the Catalaunian Plains.'—Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (1), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 295.

⁴ Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, p. 28.

feat of arms, with this accompanying outburst of 'heroic' poetry, was the last act in a long drama of frontier warfare between the external proletariat and the dominant minority of the Hellenic Society. It was in response to the challenge of this frontier warfare that the barbarian war-lords and their war-bands and their poetry and their pantheon all arose.¹ What has moved the authors of the Teutonic Epic to leave unsung the Roman *causa causans* of their own barbarian art and barbarian world?

The first point to notice is that this remarkable silence is not unique. While we should never have suspected the existence of the Roman Empire and the Hellenic Society—of which we are so amply informed by contemporary Greek and Latin books, documents, and inscriptions—if the Teutonic Epic had been our only source of information, it is a fact that, until some of the public records of 'the New Empire' of Egypt were discovered and deciphered by our modern Western archaeologists, we actually never did guess from the 'heroic' tradition of Israel, as it has come down to us in the Pentateuch, that Palestine in the second millennium B.C. was under an Egyptian dominion which had been long established there over the domain of a foregoing abortive Syriac Civilization.² In the narrative in the Book of Joshua there is no hint that the Canaanites whom the Israelites were assailing were subjects of 'the New Empire' of Egypt, and that many of the cities of Canaan were held at this time by Egyptian garrisons.³ Thus the 'heroic' literature of Israel boycotts an Egyptian Empire as rigidly as the Roman Empire is boycotted by the Teutonic Epic. What is the explanation of this consistently strange behaviour of barbarian poets who ignore the empires which their heroes are engaged in destroying? If the barbarian war-lord's strongest desire is for fame, and if the barbarian minstrel's first business is to give this desire satisfaction,⁴

¹ The nature and genesis of this 'heroic' society is examined further in Part VIII, below.

² For this abortive Syriac Civilization—which has, of course, to be distinguished from the historic Syriac Civilization which afterwards came to birth in the same region—see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 388–91, above.

³ On this silence of the Books of Joshua, Judges, and Samuel in regard to an Egyptian rule in Palestine which lasted on into the twelfth century B.C. see Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii, pp. 634 and 686, and Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (1), 2nd ed., p. 487, footnote 1: 'The Israelitish tradition has lost all recollection of these events [the punitive expedition of the Pharaoh Merneptah against the Israelitish settlements in the hill country of Ephraim at some date before the close of the thirteenth century B.C.] as completely as, for example, the Teutonic Saga has lost all recollection of the [North European barbarians'] conflicts with the Romans.' The Pentateuch does, however, contain a hint (though a very inadequate one) of the part which was played in the genesis of the historic live-born Syriac Civilization by refugees from the Minoan World (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 102, footnote 2, above).

⁴ For the 'Heaven' in which the children of the Hellenic internal proletariat are bidden in the Gospel (Matt. vi. 20) to lay up treasure for themselves, the External Proletariat, in its 'Heroic Age', substitutes the glory that is conferred by canonization as a hero of poetry (Teggart, F. J.: *The Theory of History* (New Haven 1925, Yale University Press), pp. 13–14).

why suppress all mention of a feat of arms which is the greatest that any barbarian war-lord can achieve? Why leave unsung the conquest of long-coveted Gaul and of distant sea-girt Africa, and the sack of Rome herself, in order to make poetry out of rival war-lords' petty conflicts with one another *μήλων ἕνεκ' Οἰδιπόδαο*?¹

For the sophisticated historian it is hard to believe that the barbarian poets are not guilty of a conspiracy of silence to which they have been prompted by some inexplicable prejudice or else by sheer caprice. But it is the historian himself who has conjured up this insoluble problem by making the flagrantly unhistorical mistake of ascribing his own interests and outlook to authors who are poets and not historians and whose social milieu is a barbarian war-band and not a civilization.

"The supposition that it is an interest in History that keeps alive [the memory of] historical events [when these are the subject of "heroic" poetry] is merely an illusion in the mind of Posterity. In reality these tales survive thanks to just those elements in them that are unhistorical—elements which may be of a predominantly mythical or religious, or of an exclusively poetical, order. The true course of events is a matter of complete indifference [to the poet and his audience]."²

There is, in fact, no warrant for assuming that the authors of 'heroic' poetry are interested in historical truth at all, and *a fortiori* no likelihood that they compose their compositions for the purpose of giving Posterity an accurate and justly proportioned historical record of the age in which their heroes have been living. When once we rid our minds of these rather fantastic *a priori* postulates, we can perceive the patent fact that the silence of the Teutonic Epic in regard to Clovis and to Rome is neither capricious nor deliberate.

It is not capricious; for what the 'heroic' poet wants is a suitable theme for his art; and, from his point of view, both Rome and Clovis would be 'bad subjects'. Clovis is the shrewd calculating politician who has been born into the barbarian war-lord's harness and who successfully overthrows his rivals because he possesses qualities, 'making for success', that are rarely developed in men in his position; but these very qualities that have made Clovis a flaming political success, and therefore an outstanding historical figure, are obviously the marks of a rather prosaic and sordid character which is stony ground for a poet's imagination to cultivate.³ As a human subject for poetry, how can a mere 'maker of

¹ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, l. 163.

² Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (1), 4th ed., p. 222.

³ This point has been touched upon, by anticipation, in V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 296 and 297-9, above, in connexion with the history and the poetry of the Serb external proletariat of the main body of Orthodox Christendom. In this context we have

history' like Clovis compare in poetic interest with an ideal tragic hero like the historically unimportant Guthheres and Siegfrieds?¹ And, even in corporate political terms, how can a Frankish tortoise creeping steadily towards hegemony compare in poetic pathos with a Gothic hare bounding headlong to destruction?² As for the Romans, it may be true that they have been unintentionally the prime movers of the *Sturm und Drang* of the barbarian 'Heroic Age', besides now being the principal victims of it. But how can an unsophisticated poet make convincing characters for his tale out of a strange people? How can he attempt to portray, from within, a soul that, for him, is a sealed book? The contemporary citizen of the Roman Empire is spiritually quite beyond the ken of the barbarian minstrel and his barbarian audience in every one of this Roman stranger's diverse tastes and activities—whether he is watching a show in the amphitheatre or gossiping in the baths or discussing the nature of the Trinity or commenting on the *Timæus* or writing a history of his own times. And if the minstrel knows his business he will not attempt to handle subjects that are intractable to his imagination.³

On this showing, we can see that the Teutonic Epic's silence regarding the Romans and Clovis, and the Old Testament's silence regarding the Egyptian officials—and all but silence regarding the Minoan refugees—in the Promised Land, is so far from being capricious that it is not even deliberate. Assuredly the poet does not ever consciously take a decision to avoid mentioning such people; he passes them over quite unconsciously in his practice

observed that the Hajduk and Uskok cycles of Serb 'heroic' poetry, which have for their theme the earlier stages of an ultimately successful Serb breach of an Ottoman *limes*, are artistically inferior to the works of the Classical School of Serb 'heroic' poetry, which has for its theme the crushing defeat of the Serb war-bands by the founders of the *Pax Ottomanica* at the close of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles'. In the same context, again, we have seen that the nineteenth-century Serb counterparts of Clovis have proved to be as refractory as Clovis himself to conversion into subjects of 'heroic' poetry.

¹ In its disdain for mere material success the Barbarian Society of 'the Heroic Age' agrees with the Gospel in its negative precept 'Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon Earth' (Matt. vi. 19).

² This contrast between the respective careers of the Goths and the Franks has been noticed in V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 217, footnote 1, above.

³ The soundness of a rule of the barbarian poet's art which has perhaps never been consciously formulated, yet has certainly seldom been transgressed in practice, is demonstrated by the signal failure of the bards of a Russian school of 'heroic' poetry to find fruitful subjects for their art in the sophisticated social life of the Westernized Russian Orthodox Christendom of the Post-Petrine Age (see V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 302-3, above). The exceptional aberration, in this Russian case, of the proletarian artist's usually sagacious sense of tact is perhaps to be explained by the fact that the Westernization of Russian life was set in train, without any dynastic or even personal break, by a Muscovite Tsar whose predecessors had provided themes for 'heroic' poetry that were quite after the poet's heart. If the Western Civilization had been imposed upon Russia, not by the native hands of a Peter Romanov, but by the alien hands of a Polish King Sigismund III or a Swedish King Charles XII, we may guess with some confidence that the contemporary Russian bards would then have passed over in silence the works and days of such alien performers of a Russian Peter's historic handiwork.

of an art in which he is following the guidance of his artistic intuition without reflecting upon or defining what he is doing and without ever formulating his practice in rules. It has not occurred to him to differentiate between fact and fiction.¹ He simply has an eye for a promising subject and a gift for presenting his theme in a telling way; and in innocently following these lights he has stumbled upon a method which Aristotle has ascribed to him—correctly enough, as regards what our ‘heroic’ poet actually does, but with a fantastic perversion of the truth in so far as the sophisticated philosopher takes it for granted that the barbarian artist is as coldly and consciously purposive when he is composing a poem as Aristotle himself is when he is constructing a syllogism.

‘Homer is the great master of the art of telling falsehoods right. . . . From him one learns to prefer what is impossible but plausible to what is possible but incredible.’²

For the barbarian artist and his audience Beowulf’s adventures in Grendel’s lair in the depths of the lake are more credible than the life which a Theodoric begins to lead when, as the guerdon for his victory in the Rabenschlacht, he exchanges the Gothic camp for the Roman palace in order to rule the Roman People in Italy as the Viceroy of the Emperor at Constantinople. The poet does not seek to follow his lost leader through the folds of the palace-curtains; and as an artist he is right—however culpable his lack of curiosity might have been in the historian that this poet has never set out to be.

On this showing, there is nothing either unusual or surprising in the silence with which the historic sack of Cnossos *circa* 1400 B.C. and the historic sea-fight off the coast of Egypt *circa* 1200/1190 B.C. are passed over in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, or in the comparable silence of the Teutonic Epic in regard to the momentous battle of A.D. 451 on the Catalaunian Plains and to a sack of Rome in A.D. 410 which reduced Saint Jerome to tears and moved Saint Augustine to write *De Civitate Dei*.³

¹ On this point see I. C (iii) (e), Annex I, vol. i, p. 442, above, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 438–64, below.

² Aristotle: *Poetics*, 1460 A, quoted in I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 450, footnote 1, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 223–5, above.

FATALISM AS A SPIRITUAL TONIC

IF we have been right in suggesting that a deterministic creed is an expression of that sense of drift which is one of the psychological symptoms of social disintegration, we have still a problem to solve before we can claim that our proposition has been demonstrated; for it is an undeniable fact that many people—both individuals and communities—who have been avowed determinists have actually been distinguished by an uncommon energy, activity, and purposefulness, as well as by an uncommon assurance.

'The central paradox of religious ethics—that only those are nerved with the courage to turn the World upside down who are convinced that already, in a higher sense, it is disposed for the best by a power of which they are the humble instruments—finds in [Calvinism] a special exemplification.'¹

Calvinism, however, is only one of several notorious examples of a fatalistic creed which is apparently in contradiction with the conduct of its votaries. The temper displayed by the Calvinists (Genevan, Huguenot,² Dutch, and Scottish) has likewise been displayed by other theistic predestinarians: for example, by the Jewish Zealots, by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, and by other Muslims of other ages and races (for instance, by the Janissaries who were observed by Rycaut³ and by the Mahdists who were overthrown by Kitchener).⁴ And in the nineteenth-century Western Liberal votaries of Progress and the twentieth-century Russian Communist Marxians we see two predestinarian sects of an atheistic turn of mind whose *éthos* is manifestly akin to that of their theistic fellow votaries of the idol of Necessity. The parallel between Communists and Calvinists has been drawn by the brilliant pen of the English historian whom we have quoted above.

'It is not wholly fanciful to say that, on a narrower stage but with not less formidable weapons, Calvin did for the *bourgeoisie* of the sixteenth century what Marx did for the proletariat of the nineteenth, or that the doctrine of Predestination satisfied the same hunger for an assurance that the forces of the Universe are on the side of the Elect as was to be assuaged in a different age by the theory of Historical Materialism. He

¹ Tawney, R. H.: *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (London 1926, John Murray), p. 109.

² For the prowess of the Huguenots there is an alternative explanation. It is possible that it may be due, not to their creed, but to their experience as a penalized minority (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 250, above).

³ See the quotation from Rycaut in V. C (i) (d) 4, on p. 430, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 295-6, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 227, below.

set their virtues at their best in sharp antithesis with the vices of the established order at its worst, taught them to feel that they were a Chosen People, made them conscious of their great destiny in the Providential plan and resolute to realize it. . . . Their triumphs in the past, their strength in the present, their confidence in the future, their faith in themselves and their difference from their feebler neighbours—a difference as of an iron wedge in a lump of clay—made them, to use a modern phrase, class-conscious. Like the modern proletarian, who feels that, whatever his personal misery and his present disappointments, the Cause is rolled forward to victory by the irresistible force of an inevitable evolution, the Puritan *bourgeoisie* knew that against the Chosen People the gates of Hell could not prevail. The Lord prospered their doings.¹

The historical link between sixteenth-century Calvinism and twentieth-century Communism is nineteenth-century Liberalism.

'Determinism was much in vogue by this time; but why should Determinism be a depressing creed? The law which we cannot escape is the blessed Law of Progress—"that kind of improvement that can be measured by statistics". We had only to thank our stars for placing us in such an environment, and to carry out energetically the course of development which Nature has prescribed for us, and to resist which would be at once impious and futile. Thus the Superstition of Progress was firmly established. To become a popular religion, it is only necessary for a superstition to enslave a philosophy. The Superstition of Progress had the singular good fortune to enslave at least three philosophies—those of Hegel, of Comte, and of Darwin. The strange thing is that none of these philosophies is really favourable to the belief which it was supposed to support.'²

This at first sight contradictory combination of conduct and creed is evidently of too frequent an occurrence to be fortuitous. Are we to infer that a belief in Predestination is actually a spur to action? And, if this conclusion forces itself upon us, can a predestinarian creed still properly be regarded as an expression of the sense of drift?

These pertinent questions may perhaps be met with the following answer. The belief in Predestination does manifestly act on occasions as a spur to action³—a spur whose prick is exceedingly stimulating—but (if we may vary the simile in order to discover how far it can be pressed) a predestinarian creed may perhaps also be likened to a tonic which—like the drams drunk at half-time by

¹ Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 112 and 210.

² Inge, W. R.: *The Idea of Progress* (Oxford 1920, Clarendon Press), pp. 8-9.

³ The same stimulus has even been derived, by at least one famous man of action, from the usually enervating belief in the omnipotence of Chance. 'Imperatorem esse Fortunae est' was a favourite saying of Constantine the Great, but the moral that Constantine drew was 'agendum ut sint imperio digni quos regendi in necessitatem vis fatalis adduxerit'.—*Historia Augusta*, 'Antoninus Heliogabalus', chap. 34.

improvident players in the football-match described in *Tom Brown's Schooldays*¹—is transitory in its effect and is also apt to leave the drinker's last state worse than his first. Taking a hint from one of the passages quoted above from Professor Tawney, we may also surmise that Predestinarianism is a belief to which people do not readily take unless they are consciously in need of a pick-me-up. 'The hunger for an assurance that the forces of the Universe are on the side of the Elect' may have to be felt before Fatalism can become attractive; and such hunger is surely evidence that the person who feels it has been losing faith in his own power to control events, or, in other words, has been succumbing to the sense of drift.

On this showing, the adoption of a predestinarian creed may be interpreted as an attempt to fortify a weakening human will by making the bold assumption that this human will is coincident with the Will of God or with the Law of Nature or with the decrees of Necessity, and is therefore bound, *a priori*, to prevail. If such a belief is embraced by the convert with even a modicum of sincerity, it is easy to understand how it may give power to his elbow for a season. But by the same token it is evident that the stimulus is artificial; and we may also reflect that, if the predestinarian really believed in Predestination in his heart of hearts, he would turn quietist—which he does not—instead of turning rampant as he does.² The demoniac effort which the predestinarian is prone to make for the purpose of ratifying the decrees of Fate by his own exertions is an idle and indeed an impious activity if the predestinarian's professed convictions are to be taken seriously; and we may venture to draw the conclusion that his belief in the coincidence of his own will with the inevitable course of Destiny is hollow in the exact measure of the believer's display of 'dynamism'. It is at any rate indisputable that Predestinarianism does resemble dram-drinking in this, that the practice revenges itself

¹ 'The leaders are past oranges and apples, but some of them visit their coats and apply innocent-looking ginger-beer bottles to their mouths. It is no ginger-beer, though, I fear, and will do you no good. One short mad rush, and then a stitch in the side and no more honest play: that's what comes of those bottles.'—Hughes, T.: *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, chap. 3.

² It is worth recalling in this context that, in Jewry to-day, Quietism is the attitude of the *Agudath Israel* towards that hope of a return to the Promised Land which is cherished by Jews of all persuasions, while the Zionists are activists both on principle and in practice. The *Agudath Israel* are a strictly orthodox sect who believe implicitly that an ultimate restoration of Jewry is God's will, and that He is certain to accomplish this purpose of His in His own way and in His own time. On the other hand the Zionists partake of the secularist rationalism of the modern Western Goyyim from whom Zionism has taken the tone of its nationalism (see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 76, above). In an earlier chapter of Jewish history the attitude of the Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai presents a similar contrast to the behaviour of the Zealots (see loc. cit., pp. 75–6). For the positive difference between the negatively identical Quietism or Non-Violence of the *Agudath Israel* on the one hand and Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai on the other see V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, pp. 588–9, above.

upon the addict as soon as things begin to go badly with him. For it becomes impossible for him to equate Destiny with his own will as soon as this will of his fails to impose itself triumphantly upon his environment; and, when this failure (which is inevitable sooner or later) eventually overtakes him, then he is driven to equate Destiny, no longer with a will of his own that is now being frustrated, but, on the contrary, with those intractable external circumstances to which this devastating frustration has to be ascribed. When this happens, the predestinarian's artificially stimulated confidence and energy give place abruptly to a proportionately exaggerated discouragement and lassitude. The 'dynamism' of yesterday has to be paid for with the 'defeatism' of the morrow.

ANNEX I TO V. C (i) (d) 6. (γ)

THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AS A UNIVERSAL STATE

THE Napoleonic Empire is usually regarded as an episode in the history of France or—on a rather wider view—in the history of the Balance of Power between the Great Powers of the Western World in the modern chapter of Western history; and from this angle of vision the Napoleonic episode wears the appearance of a sensational interlude which is oddly out of relation with both its antecedents and its sequel. In these customary terms the best account of the Napoleonic Empire that we shall find ourselves able to give is that the titanic personal genius of Napoleon, harnessing to its own aims the no less titanic social driving-force which had been generated by the French Revolution, came within an ace of overthrowing a Balance of Power between the principal states of the Western World which had been steadily maintained over a period of some three hundred years before Napoleon entered the arena; but we shall have to add that Napoleon's career was a brief one¹ and that the eventual miscarriage of his all but successful attempt to make France mistress of the Western World by delivering 'knock-out blows' to all the other Great Powers was so decisive that, since the morrow of the Battle of Waterloo, the history of the Western World might appear to have resumed its pre-Napoleonic course as though the Napoleonic episode had been nothing but a pointless aberration.² Such an account of the Napoleonic episode is so manifestly unsatisfactory and unconvincing that any student of history will be impelled to question the validity of an outlook from which the object of study assumes so queer a shape.

Can we, then, espy anything radically wrong with that conventional way of looking at the Napoleonic Empire which we have just been essaying? Perhaps the mistake may lie in allowing ourselves to see this so-called 'French Empire' through French eyes;

¹ From the Italian campaign of A.D. 1797 to the Hundred Days in A.D. 1815 inclusive, Napoleon's career extended over no more than nineteen campaigning seasons, and the widest extension of the Napoleonic Empire, which did not outlast the year 1812, had not been attained until the close of the year 1809.

² The psychological effect of the Restoration of 1814-15 in one of the Rhenish districts of the non-French portion of the Napoleonic Empire has been vividly conveyed, from a deeply felt personal experience, by Heine in the last of the three pieces that constitute the *Reisebilder*. In 'Das Buch Le Grand' the German-Jewish man-of-letters shows us the *Ancien Régime* clicking back into place with an instantaneous precision which made the Napoleonic interlude seem, in retrospect, as though it must have been a mere political mirage.

'Wo man sonst Französisch sprach, ward jetzt Preussisch gesprochen; sogar ein kleines preussisches Höfchen hatte sich unterdessen dort angesiedelt; und die Leute trugen Hoftitel; die ehemalige Friseurin meiner Mutter war Hoffriseurin geworden, und es gab jetzt dort Hofschneider, Hofschuster, Hofwanzentvilgerinnen, Hofschneaps-läden; die ganze Stadt schien ein Hoflazareth für Hofgeistesranke.'

for though, at first sight, it may seem sheer common sense to take a French view of an empire that was built up by French arms round a French nucleus, we find in general that as a matter of fact an empire is apt to play a less important part in the lives of the empire-builders who have exerted themselves to erect it as a monument to their own egotism than it plays in the lives of their involuntary subjects who have been annexed by force of arms and who have been chafing under a yoke which they feel to be both cramping and humiliating.¹ If we are to apply this general law of empire-building to our Napoleonic case, we must begin by concentrating our attention upon the non-French portion of the Napoleonic Empire in order to observe how this composite body politic looks from a standpoint which is just the opposite of that which its historians have usually taken.

Our first step will be to remind ourselves of the territories which this non-French portion of the French Empire embraced at its greatest extension in the years 1810-11; and to define this area we must exclude France proper, up to her pre-imperial limits as these stood in 1792, besides excluding all countries which cannot be reckoned to have been effectively under the government or the control of the Emperor Napoleon, even at the summit of his power. On this criterion we must unquestionably exclude the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain and the Overseas World (none of which ever fell into Napoleon's hands save for an ephemeral occupation of the soil of Egypt and possession of the title-deeds to Louisiana); and we should scarcely be justified in including either Prussia or Austria or Russia—in spite of the fact that, at certain times between 1805 and 1813, all three of these East European Powers were dominated by Napoleon in different degrees. *A fortiori* we cannot include Spain and Portugal, which were partially occupied by Napoleon's armies without ever being completely subdued. We are left with two sets of territories which hang together *de facto* in spite of an arbitrary juridical distinction which was drawn by the French empire-builders on the principle of *divide et impera*. On the one hand we have the non-French

¹ This paradoxical 'law' of empire-building is tested empirically in Part VI, below. In the Hellenic case there is evidence to show that the conception of the Roman Empire as a Hellenic universal state was first conceived in the minds of the Romans' Greek subjects (see the passage quoted in V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 343-4, above, from Aelius Aristides' *In Romam*) and that the lesson was only learnt at second hand and against the grain by the Romans themselves, who were slow to acquiesce in the idea that an empire built in the sweat of Roman brows was not, after all, an exclusively Roman affair (see Vogt, J.: *Orbis Romanus* (Tübingen 1929, Mohr), pp. 9-10). In Oswald Spengler's picturesque language, 'Imperialism is so necessary a result of every civilization that it takes a people by the scruff of the neck and hurls them into the role of rulers if they refuse to play. The Roman Empire was not a product of conquest. The *Orbis Terrarum* forced itself into this mould and compelled the Romans to give it their name' (Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. ii (Munich 1922, Beck), p. 529).

territories which were annexed to the French Empire outright: the new French departments which were constituted out of the Netherlands; out of the German districts on the left bank of the Middle Rhine and on the lower reaches of the Ems, Weser, and Elbe; out of the Italian districts in the Upper Basin of the Po and along the Mediterranean coast from Nice to Terracina (including the whole of the basins of the Arno, Ombrone, and Tiber); and out of the ex-Venetian and ex-Hapsburg territories on the eastern sea-board of the Adriatic and in its hinterland from the Bocche di Cattaro to the eastern bank of the Isonzo and to the headwaters of the Drave. On the other hand we have those dependencies of the French Empire which were formally not less independent than Prussia, Austria, Russia, or Spain, but were practically not less subject to French control than the neighbouring non-French territories which had been reduced officially to the status of integral parts of the French Imperial body politic; and this second group includes not only the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (which was an integral part of the French Empire in all but name), but also the Kingdom of Naples, the states members of the Confederation of the Rhine, the Duchy of Warsaw, and Switzerland, together with such small fry as the principalities of Lucca, Piombino, Benevento, Pontecorvo, and Neufchâtel, and the republics of San Marino and Danzig.

When these two groups of territories have been amalgamated in our mind's eye, we shall find that, if we leave out of account the two outlying dependencies of Warsaw and Naples, the residue almost exactly coincides in area with the domain of a medieval city-state cosmos which we have plotted out in another context.¹ And, if we now set ourselves to think of the Napoleonic Empire as a belated episode in the history of this medieval galaxy of Northern Italian and Western German and Flemish city-states, we shall find historical explanations for the extent and the date and the duration of Napoleon's conquests, and for the provenance of Napoleon himself, instead of having to resign ourselves to being baffled by a series of historical problems that are insoluble so long as we insist upon thinking of the Napoleonic Empire as a momentary aggrandizement of modern France in the course of her latter-day competition with the other Great Powers of the modern Western World.

In the first place we shall observe that the extent of the Napoleonic Empire, as we have defined it above, is just what we should expect if its social function was to provide the medieval Western city-state cosmos with a universal state (in the sense in which that

¹ In III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 344-7, above.

term is used in this Study).¹ For, in embracing the whole of the cosmos for which it was performing this service, and at the same time including under the same political aegis a broad circuit of extraneous territories, the Napoleonic Empire, looked at in relation to that medieval Western cosmos; displays the same political structure as the Roman Empire looked at as the universal state of the Hellenic World. In this aspect the Roman Empire can be dissected into three distinct geographical parts: first, the Greek core of the Hellenic World which the Roman empire-builders had succeeded in uniting under their own rule; second, the Italian marches of the Hellenic World, which had nurtured these Roman empire-builders and had provided them with the necessary base of operations; and, third, a fringe of alien territories (Syriac and Egyptiac in their culture) which had been incorporated into the Hellenic World in the course of its disintegration and were consequently at the disposal of the Roman empire-builders as materials for adding an architecturally superfluous Oriental wing to their Hellenic political edifice. If we regard the Napoleonic Empire as the universal state of the medieval Western city-state cosmos, we shall find that it resolves itself into three corresponding component parts. In the first place it embraced the Tuscan and Lombard and Swabian and Rhenish and Flemish and Hanseatic core of the cosmos to which we are relating it; in the second place it embraced, in France, a march which played the same active part in the construction of the Napoleonic Empire as was played in the construction of the Roman Empire by Italy; and in the third place the Napoleonic Empire embraced, in the Duchy of Warsaw and in the Kingdom of Naples, certain originally alien territories which had been penetrated by the cultural influence of the medieval city-state cosmos during the modern centuries of its decline.

The Kingdom of Naples was a remnant of the colonial domain which the maritime Italian city-states, in partnership with Norman and other Transalpine adventurers, had acquired in the Mediterranean at the height of their medieval prosperity;² and in this connexion we may also observe that the Mediterranean island which was the birthplace of the Emperor Napoleon was one of the earliest acquisitions of the medieval Italian maritime Powers at the expense of the Syriac and Orthodox Christian worlds.³ When

¹ An explanation of the Napoleonic Empire in this sense has been foreshadowed in II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 104, above.

² For the medieval Mediterranean empires of Venice and Genoa and Florence see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 347, footnote 1, above. For the genesis of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as a Norman Western 'successor-state' of the Orthodox Christian East Roman Empire see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 353, footnote 2, and p. 406, footnote 3, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 244, above. The Italian maritime Powers expelled the Arabs from Corsica in A.D. 1091 (Firenne, H.: *Les Villes du Moyen Âge* (Brussels 1927, Lamer-

we remind ourselves that the Buonaparti were not even native Corsicans but were colonists of Florentine origin,¹ we shall perceive that Napoleon's provenance—so far from being one of the curiosities of history, as it is bound to appear if we think of him primarily as a ruler of France²—is eminently appropriate to the emperor of a universal state that had been called into existence in order to serve the needs of a cosmos of city-states in which Florence was a focal point and in which even Corsica lay within hail of two such brilliant maritime stars in the galaxy as Genoa and Pisa. When we see this Florentino-Corsican military adventurer in the French service winning his spurs in a campaign resulting in the expulsion of the Austrian 'barbarians' from Italian soil, and then immediately following up this success by cajoling his French employers into entrusting him with the command of a French expeditionary force for the purpose of gaining possession of the lost medieval Italian overseas empire in the Levant, it seems hardly fanciful to suggest that, in these illuminating early chapters of his career, Napoleon was—albeit unconsciously—being drawn into the wake of his medieval Italian forebears.³

Again, if we observe the date at which the sudden emergence of

tin), p. 82). Before the close of the eleventh century the Pisans had ousted their Genoese fellow conquerors from both Corsica and Sardinia (Schaube, A.: *Handelsgeschichte der Romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge* (Munich and Berlin 1906, Oldenbourg), p. 54). But during the next two hundred years the Genoese gradually regained ground in Corsica at the Pisans' expense. In 1138 Pope Innocent II divided the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the island between the Pisan and Genoese sees. In 1195 the Genoese established themselves at Bonifacio. In 1347 they were requested by a Corsican national assembly to assume sovereignty over Corsica. And, after a century and a half (1298–1447) of struggle for possession between Genoa and Aragon, Corsica did eventually come under a Genoese rule which was exercised first indirectly through the Bank of St. George and then, from 1559 onwards, by the Genoese Government itself.

¹ See II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, p. 242, footnote 3, above.

² The date of Napoleon's birth was just late enough to allow him to be born a French subject instead of a Genoese (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), p. 503, footnote 3, above). He was born on the 15th August, 1769, and a Franco-Genoese treaty executing the sale of the sovereignty over Corsica by Genoa to France had been signed on the 15th May, 1768. *De facto* the Genoese Government's exercise of authority in Corsica had been ineffective since 1729; and French troops had landed on the island with Genoese acquiescence in 1764. The resistance of the islanders to their French conquerors had collapsed only two months before Napoleon's birth, when, on the 16th June, 1769, their leaders had sailed from Corsica for Leghorn as refugees on board a British ship.

³ Consciously, perhaps, Napoleon owed the inspiration of his Egyptian Expedition to the unearthing of a plan which had been submitted to the French King Louis XIV by the Hanoverian philosopher Leibniz and had been preserved ever since, unutilized, in the French Government's archives (see Ghorbal, S.: *The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehemet Ali* (London 1928, Routledge), p. 3); and certainly in French minds Napoleon in Egypt has commonly presented himself in the guise of a successor of Saint Louis (for the *peripeteia* in the relative military efficiency of the French invaders of Egypt and the Egyptian Mamlüks between Saint Louis' day and Napoleon's see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv, p. 450, above). In the modern history of France, however, Napoleon's Egyptian Expedition remains, nevertheless, as oddly detached an episode as the Napoleonic Empire itself, whereas, if we regard Buonaparte in the light of a would-be founder of an Italo-Flemish universal state, his attempt to follow in the Levantine wake of his medieval Venetian predecessors will become just as intelligible as Mark Antony's attempt to follow in the footsteps of Alexander the Great.

the Napoleonic Empire interrupted the regular course of modern Western history, we shall find that this is just the time when we should expect to witness the foundation of a universal state in the history of the medieval Western city-state cosmos; for we have seen reasons for suggesting that this medieval Western sub-civilization may have broken down in the last quarter of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era;¹ and, since the average duration of those 'Times of Troubles' which intervene between the breakdown of a civilization and the rally that is signalized by the foundation of its universal state² would appear, on the statistical evidence at our command, to run to about four hundred years,³ the end of the eighteenth century, which is the moment when the Napoleonic Empire arose, is the very time when we should be expecting the appearance of some empire of this kind and scale in those parts of Western Christendom into which the medieval city-state cosmos had ramified in its heyday.

Finally we shall find that, by relating the Napoleonic Empire, as we are now doing, to the medieval city-state cosmos, we can explain the brevity of its life and the completeness of its failure to make any notable mark upon the course of Western history beyond assuring the French language of a currency as a *lingua franca*.⁴

If we glance again at the map of the Napoleonic Empire at its apogee from the morrow of the Danubian campaign of 1809 until the eve of the retreat from Moscow in 1812, and concentrate our attention, this time, upon the setting of this empire in the map of the world of the day, we shall observe that its standing during this brief spell of three campaigning seasons—A.D. 1810-12—is almost exactly analogous to that of the Roman Empire during the spell of twenty-two years which began in 168 B.C. on the morrow of the Battle of Pydna and ended in 146 B.C. with the annexation of Africa and Macedonia and the annihilation of Carthage and Corinth.⁵ For the purposes of our comparative study of the standing of the French and Roman Empires in their respective worlds during these two spells of time, we may equate Austria with Macedon; Prussia with Carthage; Spain with the Empire of the Ptolemies; Russia with the Empire of the Seleucidae; Sweden with

¹ For the symptoms of breakdown in several portions of this cosmos in the course of that quarter of a century see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 347-50, above.

² For the rhythm of Rout-and-Rally-and-Relapse in the disintegration of a civilization see V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 278-87, below.

³ The statistical evidence for this Time-span is examined in Part XI, below.

⁴ For this linguistic legacy of the Napoleonic Empire—a legacy which is the *point d'attache* of the present Annex to the main thread of this Study of History—see V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), pp. 502-6, above.

⁵ This comparison has already been foreshadowed in II. D (iv), vol. ii, pp. 103-6. See also III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 310-14 and 339-41, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 265-6 and 268-9, above, and V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 290-1, below.

the Pergamene shadow of the abortive Empire of Lysimachus; the Confederation of the Rhine with Rhodes and Numidia and the rest of those small states of the Hellenic World which had found their advantage in siding with Rome against the other Great Powers who were Rome's defeated rivals and these small states' no longer formidable neighbours; the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy with Continental European Greece to the south of Olympus; the Italian departments of the French Empire with the Roman province of Sicily; and the Rhenish and Netherlandish and Hanseatic departments of the French Empire with Magna Graecia. This elaboration of our analogy will not be labour lost if it serves to bring out the essential points of likeness between the two international situations that we have brought into a synoptic view.

In both tableaux we see the same political landscape with its cluster of venerable and cultivated but minute and broken-down *Kleinstaaten* in the centre and with its ring of large and lusty but upstart and brutal Great Powers round the edges; in both, in the act immediately preceding the respective moments (168 B.C. and A.D. 1810) at which we are raising the curtain on the play, the impotent centre has been serving as an arena in which the boisterous giants from the outskirts have been contending for the maintenance or overthrow of a Balance of Power among themselves; and in both, at the moment of observation, the Balance has in fact been overthrown through a notable triumph of one of the competing Great Powers over its rivals. The victor—Rome in the one case and France in the other—has already set up the conventional trophy of victory in the shape of an exclusive hegemony over the whole cluster of small states in the centre of the ring; and the other Great Powers—though they have not yet been wiped off the map—have been excluded from all influence over the central area, shorn of large slices of their own metropolitan territories, and weakened to a degree at which—if they were ever to venture again to try conclusions with the victor and were to take the obvious precaution of banding themselves into a coalition for the joint conduct of this formidable enterprise—they would scarcely find themselves able, even with united forces, to face their common adversary single-handed.

The political significance of this international map is unmistakable: the old division between the small states at the centre and the Great Powers round the fringes, and the old temperate and therefore recurrent contests¹ between the Great Powers themselves,

¹ For the note of temperateness which 'so advantageously distinguished' the contests between the Great Powers of the modern Western World over a span of three centuries ending in A.D. 1783, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 311; IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 148-9; IV. C (iii) (b) 5, vol. iv, p. 189; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 283, above.

are both now on the point of being brought to an end through the forcible unification of the whole of this hitherto fragmentary world by the arms of a single Great Power which is at last on the verge of expanding into a universal state. One more round of warfare, and the process can hardly fail to be completed! And in the Hellenic case this expectation was in fact duly realized; for the sixth decade of the second century B.C. saw the extinction of the remnants of Carthage and Macedon and the reduction of the remnants of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic Empires to an impotence at which they found themselves as completely at Rome's mercy as if they had been a Pergamum or a Rhodes. In the Western case, however, the play has a denouement which runs quite counter to the plot; for the inevitable next round of warfare, which was fought out in this case in the years 1812-15 of the Christian Era, did not leave the French Empire in sole and thenceforth unchallengeable possession of a completely prostrate world. On the contrary, it resulted in the utter overthrow of a Power which at the end of the preceding act had seemed to be on the verge of becoming a universal state; and this reversal of the fortunes of France was followed by a complete rehabilitation of those rival Powers which, at the end of the preceding act, had seemed to be on the verge of annihilation. Manifestly it is the Napoleonic and not the Scipionic denouement that demands an explanation. Let us see whether we can discover one.

If we return to our comparison between a Hellenic World of the third and second centuries B.C. over which Rome succeeded in establishing a domination that was exclusive and ubiquitous and lasting, and a Western World of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era in which Napoleon tried and failed to emulate this Roman achievement, we shall be able to put our finger upon one point of difference between the two situations which is vital. The Hellenic World of which Rome made herself mistress consisted of the three parts—and these three only—which we have analysed above: first a central cluster of venerable city-states which had been the original Hellas; second an outer ring of parvenu Great Powers of a supra-city-state calibre, including the Roman Commonwealth and its four unsuccessful rivals; and in the third place an appendage of alien territories which had fallen under Hellenic rule in the course of the Hellenic Society's disintegration. We have identified three corresponding components of the world in which Napoleon failed in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era to obtain the conclusive success which the Romans had obtained in their world in the second century B.C.; but we have now to observe that, although this geographical

survey of Napoleon's world does cover the whole of the area of the medieval Western city-state cosmos up to the farthest limits of its latest expansion, it is still far from accounting for the whole of the modern Western World of Napoleon's day—whereas the area over which the Romans extended their dominion in the second century B.C. does account for the whole of the Hellenic World of that time.

In another context we have noticed that the medieval Western city-state cosmos had never succeeded in swallowing up the whole of Western Christendom at any time—not even in the heyday of the city-states in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.¹ The pre-existent Western feudal dispensation survived both the rise and the fall of the medieval Western city-state régime—and this not only in the Transalpine parts of Western Europe, but also in a Cisalpine Piedmont at the very gates of Milan and Genoa.² Moreover this recalcitrant major portion of Western Christendom which had held aloof from the city-state experiment contrived to be the principal beneficiary from a social and cultural venture on which it had obstinately declined to stake its own future; for, when the city-state cosmos broke down at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the hitherto impenitently feudal part of Western Christendom became the residuary legatee of Tuscany and Lombardy and Flanders, and successfully rejuvenated itself by grafting the delicate shoots of a Flemish and Italian culture on to hardier French and Spanish and English stems.³ This feudal second-hand version of a medieval city-state culture was propagated, in the course of the Modern Age of Western history, not only throughout the whole feudal residue of Western Christendom within its medieval limits, but on beyond into newly discovered worlds. It made its way overseas into the Indies and Americas and overland into the Russias. These were the dimensions of the Great Society into which Napoleon was born and in which he had to work; and the two new worlds that had been brought within the ambit of the Western World during the three centuries ending in Napoleon's generation were the factors that upset Napoleon's calculations, wore down his strength, and eventually redressed the balance of the old city-state cosmos, which Napoleon had triumphantly overthrown, by bringing the whole Napoleonic edifice to the ground in irreparable ruin.

The extent and resources of these new worlds with which Napoleon failed to reckon can be measured by recurring to our comparison between the Roman political system in the years

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 346–7, above.

² For the imperviousness of Piedmont to the influence of the North-Italian city-state culture see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 285–6, above.

³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 351–63, above.

168-146 B.C. and the Napoleonic political system in A.D. 1810-12. When we have accounted for everything in the Napoleonic system to which the Roman can supply a counterpart, we shall recollect that we have not found any anti-Roman counterpart of Great Britain—a Power which in A.D. 1810-12 was still holding its own against Napoleon on equal terms—and also that, in taking notice of Napoleon's incursion into the Iberian Peninsula, we have so far overlooked the immunity from French invasion which was enjoyed, from beginning to end of the Napoleonic episode, by the immense Spanish and Portuguese empires overseas under the aegis of a British Navy which held the command of the sea and made use of it in order to insulate all the Transmarine appendages of Western Europe from their normal contact with a continent that had now fallen under Napoleon's military domination. In the third place we shall observe that our equation of Russia with the Seleucid Monarchy—valid though it may be on the points of social structure and cultural role—breaks down on the point of political and military strength, which is the crucial point for our present purpose.

While the reverses which Napoleon inflicted upon Russian armies on Austrian and Prussian ground in A.D. 1805 and A.D. 1807¹ may be comparable to the Roman victories over the Seleucid King Antiochus III at Thermopylae and Magnesia in the War of 192-188 B.C., there is no parallel at all, but on the contrary an extreme antithesis, between the crushing diplomatic humiliation that was inflicted upon Antiochus IV in 168 B.C. by the Roman envoy Popillius Laenas² and the Russian Tsar Alexander's decisive

¹ See II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 106, above.

² Popillius presented himself, without any armed force at his back, at Antiochus's camp before the walls of Pelusium, at a moment when the Seleucid monarch had in his grasp the metropolitan territory of the Ptolemaic Empire which was the historic rival of the Seleucid House. In these circumstances Popillius handed Antiochus an ultimatum from the Roman Government in which the aggressor was called upon to surrender and renounce all his actual and prospective gains at the Ptolemaic Empire's expense. When Antiochus, after reading the text of the ultimatum, asked the bearer for time to consult his ministers on the momentous questions that it raised, Popillius drew a circle round the King with his stick and insisted upon having his answer before Antiochus stepped out of the ring. After a brief hesitation Antiochus gave Popillius to understand that he accepted the Roman Government's terms without reservation. Evidently the paramount consideration in Antiochus's mind, when he submitted to a public humiliation against which his fiery temperament must have vehemently rebelled, was the knowledge that, if he accepted the Roman challenge, he would assuredly bring upon himself and his empire a repetition of the disaster into which his father Antiochus III had blundered in the Romano-Seleucid War of 192-188 B.C. At the same time, according to one modern Western master of the subject (Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 192), Antiochus IV, when he turned the other cheek to the imperious Roman envoy in 168 B.C., was moved not only by prudence but also by ambition. According to this interpretation of Antiochus IV's policy and acts, the conquest of Egypt was for him a secondary aim which he was determined not to allow to divert his energies and resources from his primary aim of reincorporating into the Seleucid Empire the whole of the Far East of the post-Alexandrine Hellenic World, including the vast new dominions which the Bactrian Greek prince Demetrius the son of Euthydemus had recently acquired on Indian ground south-east of the Hindu Kush.

victory over Napoleon in the military campaign of A.D. 1812. For a Roman parallel to Napoleon's retreat from Moscow we must look, not to any Seleucid feat of arms, but to the annihilating defeat which Crassus suffered in 53 B.C. at the hands of the Parthians; and even Crassus's catastrophe at Carrhae, appalling though it was in itself, did not bring the Roman Empire to the ground, as the Napoleonic Empire was brought down by the retreat from Moscow. It is evident that—in contrast to the utter inability of the Seleucidae to stand up, even in Asia, to a Roman assault—the Russians on their own ground were more than a match for Napoleon.

This military and political strength that was displayed by Russia in response to Napoleon's challenge undoubtedly took Napoleon himself by surprise; and it does indeed demand some explanation, considering that Russia was a semi-barbarous offshoot of Orthodox Christendom which had not begun to seek initiation into the 'polite society' of the modern Western World until the reign of Peter the Great; for, between the year 1689, which was the date of Peter's effective accession to power, and the year 1812, in which Russia was called upon to undergo the tremendous ordeal of meeting an attack by a military genius who commanded all the resources of Western and Central Continental Europe, Peter's bold experiment of transposing Russian life from a Byzantine to a modern Western key had been given no longer than 123 years to work itself out. How, then, are we to explain the remarkable outcome of the campaign of 1812? The credit for the triumphant reaction of Russia to her searching Napoleonic test cannot all be assigned to the genius of Peter and to the perseverance of his Westernizing successors in the government of the Petrine Russian state; the surprising solidity which the Petrine structure now showed itself to possess must partly be attributed to the excellence of the sources from which Peter and his successors had derived the Western technique and institutions and ideas with which they had been industriously leavening their Byzantine heritage. These Muscovite apostles of Westernization had turned in the first instance to Holland, and thereafter to the Protestant parts of Germany; and from these quarters they had obtained a modern Western version of the medieval Western culture of Flanders and Northern Italy which possibly had more life in it than the Hellenism which the Seleucid Empire imported in the third and second centuries B.C. from an Athens who by then had passed the prime in which she had been 'the education of Hellas'¹ without

¹ For the decadence of Athens see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 263-74, above. In the third and second centuries B.C., however, Athens was only one of the sources

having handed on her torch to any younger or more lively disciples.

While this invigoratingly Westernized Russia taxed Napoleon's military strength on the Continent to a point at which it gave way under the strain, the naval and economic discomfiture of the would-be maker of a Western universal state was the work of Great Britain; and here is a second opponent of Napoleon's ambitions who—more clearly still than Petrine Russia—is without a counterpart in the ranks of the adversaries with whom Rome had to settle accounts in the third and second centuries B.C.

England was not, as Russia was, a recent and outlandish recruit to the company of the Great Powers of the Western World. She had been reckoned among their number since the beginning of the modern chapter of Western political history and, in the cultural life of Western Christendom, she had never ceased to play a part which was as intimate as it was active. She had, however, adopted at the turn of the Medieval and the Modern Age,¹ and had persistently pursued ever since, a foreign policy in which she was singular among modern Western or Westernized Powers. For some three centuries, ending in Napoleon's day, all the other combatants in the modern Western gladiatorial arena had been contending on Flemish and Rhenish and Lombard battle-fields, with a zest which seemed to be proof against disillusionment, for the prize of hegemony over the derelict domain of the broken-down medieval city-state cosmos. Great Britain, alone among her peers, had shown herself unwilling to play for this stake. Indeed, the British had avoided being drawn into the Continental European arena at all except to the trifling extent to which they might find it expedient to take a hand in Continental 'side-shows' for

in the heart of Hellas from which the Seleucid Empire drew its draughts of Hellenic culture and its drafts of Greek settlers. In another context (IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 20-3, above) we have already observed that the Ionian Greek city-states along the western seaboard of Asia Minor, which had been under an eclipse at the noontide of Athens' brilliance in the fifth century B.C., re-emerged in full splendour *post Alexandrum*, when Athens was in full decline. In the judgement of Tarn (op. cit., p. 34, cited already in V. C (i) (d) 4, p. 422, footnote 1, above) apropos, not of Athens alone, but of Hellas as a whole, 'there is small sign of' decadence 'down to about the middle of the second century B.C.', and 'to talk much about Greek decadence prior at any rate to the Christian Era would . . . give a very false impression'. In the Transuephratean dominions of the Seleucid Monarchy the retransference of political power from Greek to Iranian hands, which was the political consequence of the collapse of the Seleucid régime in those regions, 'had the somewhat unexpected result of instilling fresh vigour into' the Greeks 'and leading to a stronger assertion of their Greekhood, if we may judge by what happened in the sphere of literature and learning'.

¹ The substitution of abstention for intervention in Continental European affairs as the rule of English foreign policy took place between A.D. 1429 and A.D. 1558. The history of England's foreign relations during that transitional period makes it evident that the abstentionist policy which the United Kingdom was afterwards to pursue with might and main, as one of its most precious privileges, had originally been adopted by England against the grain, under *force majeure* (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 366 above).

the sake of furthering the acquisitive enterprises overseas upon which all British energies and interests and ambitions were now being steadily concentrated. The underlying aim of British statesmanship in this age was to take advantage of the other Powers' infatuation with Continental enterprises which in British estimation were not worth their fabulous market price, in order to sweep into the British net as many as possible of the overseas annexes of the modern Western World, which could be won at less cost and retained with less effort because the statesmen who dictated the policy of Great Britain's Continental rivals were prone to estimate the present value of these outlying and undeveloped estates at a very much lower figure than that at which this value was assessed by the business acumen of 'a nation of shopkeepers' who were accustomed to dealing in 'futures'.

This eccentric British policy of eschewing Continental adventures and concentrating upon expansion overseas had become firmly established long before Napoleon's appearance on the scene; and, when the Corsican adventurer made his supreme and all but successful effort to win for his adopted country France—or perhaps, rather, for the Corsican himself from a convenient French base of operations—that elusive Continental hegemony which had been the dream of every Continental Great Power for the past three hundred years, his brilliant failure in playing this old-fashioned Continental game produced one definite and permanent result which was certainly the last thing that the Emperor of the French had either foreseen or desired when he embarked on his extraordinary career. In failing to achieve his own imperialistic ambitions, Napoleon incidentally gave his British arch-enemies an incomparable opportunity for achieving theirs.

The Napoleonic gambit came as a veritable godsend to a generation of British imperialists who, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had hardly yet begun to recover from their disheartening experience of seeing the first British attempt at building an overseas empire checkmated in the American Revolutionary War of 1775–83. British statesmanship accordingly exerted itself to extract the utmost possible advantage out of a situation in which Napoleon had become master of the Continent while Great Britain remained mistress of the seas. Beyond the coasts of his European *terra firma* the Emperor of the French was so impotent in the face of British sea-power that he could neither recover the lost French foothold in India¹ nor make any better

¹ The only effect of Napoleon's abortive attempts to re-establish relations of diplomatic and military co-operation between France and the rulers of some of the indigenous 'successor-states' of the Mughal Rāj in India was to move the British to sweep off the

use of the title-deeds to Louisiana, when he reacquired them from Spain,¹ than to sell them cheap to the United States, who was the only bidder in a position to take delivery.² And, when the Corsican war-lord eventually overran the metropolitan territories of the Spanish Crown in the Iberian Peninsula, the only permanent effect of this inconclusive and ephemeral Continental European exploit of Napoleonic arms was to open to British commerce the vast Spanish overseas empire in South and Central America—where the Spanish colonists eagerly seized upon the chance of throwing off the incubus of the mother-country's hitherto jealously guarded monopoly of the colonial trade. Again, Napoleon's domination and eventual annexation of Holland gave Great Britain an excuse—of which she fully availed herself—for taking possession of the Dutch colonies in Africa and the Indies. Indeed, by the time when Napoleon was riding for his Russian fall, Great Britain had succeeded in drawing to herself the markets and sources of supply of the whole of the Overseas World, and in planting her flag over a considerable part of it into the bargain; and there was a double relation of cause-and-effect between these lucrative British economic and political acquisitions overseas and Napoleon's fatal march on Moscow. For one thing, Napoleon found one of his pretexts for making war on Russia in the Tsar's revolt against the economic sacrifices that his unwilling collaboration in Napoleon's anti-British 'Continental System' had been exacting from him; but—more important, by far, than this—it was Great Britain's access, in defiance of the master of Continental Europe, to the economic resources of the entire Overseas World that had supplied her with the financial means of keeping up single-handed the struggle against Napoleon at the height of Napoleon's power; and it was the stimulus of this British example, and the expectation of obtaining British financial aid if they had courage to take the British political cue, that emboldened the poverty-stricken but populous Powers of Eastern Europe—with Russia in the van

Indian chess-board a number of the pawns that had been lying there at their mercy ever since they had got this Indian game into their own hands by eliminating the French player through their victory in the Seven Years' War. The struggle against Napoleon was carried on by the British Government with so great an economy of British land-forces on the European Continent that Great Britain found herself able to make extensive and decisive additions to her territorial holdings in India at a time when she was waging war against Napoleon with all her might at sea and in the economic field.

¹ King Louis' Government had ceded Louisiana to its ally Spain in the peace settlement of 1763. Napoleon extorted the title-deeds from the Spanish Government in 1800 and sold them to the United States Government in 1803 (see II. D (ii), vol. ii, p. 67, above):

² The United States was in a position to take delivery of Louisiana, even if Great Britain had objected to the transaction, because she was the only Power except the Spanish Empire that marched with Louisiana along a land-frontier, and because (unlike Spain) the United States was militarily stronger than Great Britain was on the North American Continent.

and with Prussia and Austria successively swinging back into line with her—to resume, in and after 1812, the struggle on land against a Corsican war-lord who in 1809 had to all appearance established once for all his own military ascendancy on the Continent.

It is manifest, then, that Napoleon's attempt to attain in his own world in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era that complete supremacy which the Romans did attain in their world in the second century B.C. was frustrated by the resistance of two adversaries of a kind and a calibre that the Scipios never had to reckon with. If we mentally eliminate both Great Britain with her overseas hinterland and Russia with her Asiatic hinterland from the list of the factors with which Napoleon still had to settle accounts after his fourth victory over Austria in 1809, and thus leave him (in our imagination) no adversaries to deal with from that time onwards save an already enfeebled Austria and Prussia and a long since decrepit Spain, we can hardly doubt that under these imaginary conditions Napoleon—even if we still condemned him to die as prematurely on an unoverturned throne as he actually died in captivity at Saint Helena—would have succeeded before his early death in 1821 in imposing his own dominion upon the whole of our imaginarily shrunken Western World as decisively as Rome did succeed in imposing hers upon the whole of the Hellenic World by the year 146 B.C. Even, however, if we agree that this conclusion would follow from our hypothesis, there is a further question which we shall have to ask ourselves. Assuming that, in a Western World that we have imaginarily restricted to the confines of Continental Europe west of the Niemen and north-west of the Ottoman frontiers, Napoleon had indeed been successful in establishing a complete universal state in the course of the years that he had at his disposal between 1809 and 1821, would this Napoleonic erection have been likely to be still standing at the present day? In normal circumstances our answer to this question would be confidently affirmative, considering that the normal expectation of life of a universal state is a span of about 400 years.¹ In the case in point, however, there is a particular consideration which suggests that, even if Napoleon had not been prevented from establishing his universal state by the operation of those British and Russian factors which we have now hypothetically eliminated, the Corsican empire-builder's work would have proved ephemeral because it would anyhow have carried in itself the seeds of its own destruction.

These dragon's teeth had been sown, long before Napoleon's

¹ The statistical evidence for this Time-span is examined in Part XI, below.

day, in the French field which was his indispensable base of military and political operations; for there was one vital point in which Napoleon's France departed from the standard type of empire-building communities that serve as instruments for the establishment of universal states.

In our inquiries into the character and the provenance of empire-building communities¹ we have found that, although it is exceptional for them to be wholly alien in culture from the society in whose service they are working, it is usual for them to be outlying communities which have been trained in the stern school of border warfare against barbarians and have there acquired a military prowess and a political common sense which they eventually turn to account in forcibly uniting under their own rule the hitherto warring members of the disintegrating body social to which they themselves belong. In this situation, which we may take to be the normal one, the service rendered to a distracted society by the community which provides it with its universal state is apt to be exclusively political and military; and, although the social boon of a universal peace imposed by main force is of inestimable value to a society that has arrived at the extremity of a 'Time of Troubles', the policeman's timely virtues do not exhaust all the surviving values of life, even in a society which has been spiritually as well as materially impoverished by a long course of self-laceration. The moral rally which is perhaps one of the necessary conditions for the successful establishment of a universal state could hardly be achieved if the bruised reed of the afflicted society's cultural heritage had been utterly broken; and the cultural, in contrast to the political and military, materials for the construction of a universal state are apt to be provided, not by the empire-building wardens of the marches, but by the militarily and politically decadent communities in the heart of a disintegrating world whom the empire-builders have forcibly united by subjecting them, willy-nilly, to their own high-handed domination. In fact, there is apt to be a certain exchange of social services between the empire-builders and their subjects on the lines of Horace's famous verses:

Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes
Intulit agresti Latio;²

and it is this element of reciprocity that paves the way for a mutual understanding between two parties who have been brought into partnership originally by the sheer force of the dominant party's arms.

If we are right in believing that such an exchange of cultural

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 1, pp. 52-5, and V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 341, above.

² Horace: *Epistles*, Book II, ep. 1, ll. 156-7.

and politico-military services is a normal process in the life of a universal state, and that this kind of social commerce between the divers members of the body politic is no less necessary for the preservation of health than is the circulation of blood in the human body, then we cannot feel sure that the Napoleonic universal state, if it had ever been definitively established, would even then have been capable of keeping alive; for in the Napoleonic Empire there was no reciprocity at all between the French empire-builders and their Italian and Belgian and German subjects; the cultural ideas were a French contribution, as well as the administrative institutions and the military force;¹ and the political content of these

¹ This exceptionally one-sided economy of the Napoleonic Empire will appear the more remarkable when we remind ourselves that the conquered epigoni of the medieval Western city-state cosmos had cultural gifts to give, and that these gifts were of a kind that has usually been acceptable to the empire-builders of a universal state. The classical German literature, which was at its zenith at the time when the Napoleonic Empire was established, was penetrated through and through with both the sense of promiscuity and the sense of unity (see Bruford, W. H.: *Germany in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge 1935, University Press), pp. 304-8); and the great Franconian exponent of this school of thought and feeling once met the Corsican empire-builder face to face. Yet this encounter between Goethe and Napoleon was merely picturesque and not historic; for Goethe did not captivate Napoleon, whereas Napoleon, for his part, did captivate Heine. This might, no doubt, be discounted as an easy conquest, since Heine was a Rhenish man-of-letters who was also a Jew; and for the Jews of the Rhineland the French conquest spelt social emancipation. A more impressive triumph of French cultural ideas was their captivity of the Teutonic souls which were the authors of the *Befreiungskrieg* and the Italian souls which were the authors of the *Risorgimento*.

Why was it, then, that the French (to their own undoing) succeeded in imposing their ideas, as well as their *imperium*, upon the epigoni of the medieval city-state cosmos when the Germans, at any rate, had ideas of their own to contribute to the social outfit of a nascent universal state? Perhaps the explanation is that the *soi-disant* French 'Ideas of 1789' triumphed in the domain of the disintegrating city-state cosmos in virtue of their original provenance from the very quarters which they were now invading from abroad.

In other contexts (for example, in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63 and 369-71; IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 19; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 283-4, above) we have already observed that the one-sided economy of the Napoleonic Empire was a piece of poetic justice; for, while there may have been a lack of reciprocity between the living generation of the French empire-builders and the living generation of their non-French subjects inasmuch as the cultural as well as the political and military contributions were now all coming from the French side, the Frenchmen of Napoleon's generation who were conferring these cultural benefits on their Italian contemporaries and subjects were thereby repaying a cultural debt which had been contracted by these Frenchmen's ancestors to Italians of an earlier age. The French culture with which Napoleon inoculated Italy was a Transalpine version of a North Italian culture which had radiated out into the Transalpine and Transmarine parts of Western Christendom at the time of transition from the Medieval to the Modern Age of Western history. In the Transalpine form in which this originally North Italian culture was reintroduced into Italy by the French empire-builders of the Napoleonic Age, the wine was almost as strange as it was stimulating to the epigoni of those medieval Northern Italians who had produced the first vintage of it. At the same time the ultimately North Italian origin of this modern Italianistic culture from the farther side of the Alps did not count for nothing—as can be seen by comparing the avidity with which this French gift was welcomed in Lombardy and Tuscany and the Romagna with the repugnance that it excited in the continental half of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies—a piece of Italian territory which had been merely a colonial annex (see p. 622, above) to the Italian part of the medieval Western city-state cosmos. (For the recalcitrance against the Napoleonic régime in the Kingdom of Sicily beyond the Faro see Johnston, R. M.: *The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy* (London 1904, Macmillan, 2 vols.).)

Finally, we may observe that, in the precipitation and dissemination of 'the Ideas of 1789', Flanders as well as Northern Italy played its part. While the arch-disseminator

idées napoléoniennes was a leaven of disruption which was as swift as it was potent in its working.¹

This internal ferment perhaps did as much to break the Napoleonic Empire up as the external shock of Napoleon's military and economic collisions with Russia and Great Britain; and this was not all; for the fermentation of French ideas in Italian and Belgian and German minds did more than merely wreck the momentary political structure which had served as a carrier for these revolutionary mental germs. This spiritual upheaval also dispelled beyond recall² a three-hundred-years-old constellation of political forces in Europe which had made the momentary establishment of a Napoleonic Empire possible. It effectively put an end to a situation in which a central cluster of small weak states had been affording a battle-ground to be fought over and a prize to be competed for by the rival members of a surrounding circle of Great Powers. In fact, the universal state with which the medieval Western city-state cosmos was duly endowed, at the close of its 'Time of Troubles', by the Corsican empire-builder's demonic exertions, had a psychological effect upon its beneficiaries which was just the opposite of that which a universal state usually produces. Instead of serving—as the Roman and the Achaemenian and the Ottoman Empire did each serve—as a sovereign rest-cure, it acted as a dynamic stimulus which spiritually transfigured the North Italians and Swabians and Rhinelanders and Belgians of Napoleon's generation by turning the weary epigoni of an expiring civilization into eager participants in one that was still throbbing with life.³ In fact, the advent of the Napoleonic régime, at the

Napoleon Buonaparte himself was a Corsican of Florentine ancestry who found himself a citizen of revolutionary France owing to the acquisition of his native island by the French Crown in the reign of Louis XV (see p. 623, footnotes 1 and 2, above), the arch-precipitator Robespierre was a native of Arras who found himself a citizen of revolutionary France owing to the acquisition of his native city-state by the French Crown in the reign of Louis XIV.

¹ Read Heine's brilliant phantasy in 'Das Buch Le Grand':

'Parbleu! wie viel verdanke ich nicht dem französischen Tambour, der so lange bei uns in Quartier lag, und wie ein Teufel aussah, und doch von Herzen so engelgut war, und so ganz vorzüglich trommelte. . . . Monsieur Le Grand wusste nur wenig gebrochenes Deutsch, nur die Hauptausdrücke — Brot, Kuss, Ehre — doch konnte er sich auf der Trommel sehr gut verständlich machen; z. B. wenn ich nicht wusste, was das Wort "liberté" bedeute, so trommelte er den Marseiller Marsch — und ich verstand ihn. Wusste ich nicht die Bedeutung des Wortes "égalité", so trommelte er den Marsch "ça ira, ça ira . . . les aristocrates à la lanterne!" — und ich verstand ihn. Wusste ich nicht, was "bêtise" sei, so trommelte er den Dessauer Marsch, den wir Deutschen, wie auch Goethe berichtet, in der Champagne getrommelt — und ich verstand ihn. Er wollte mir mal das Wort "l'Allemagne" erklären, und er trommelte jene allzu einfache Urmelodie, die man oft an Markttagen bei tanzenden Hunden hört, nämlich Dum-Dum-Dum — ich ärgerte mich, aber ich verstand ihn doch.'

The first people to feel the effects of the German reaction to this French lesson were the French imperialists themselves.

² The deadliness of the blow which Napoleon dealt to the *ancien régime* as far as his own empire extended can be gauged from the completeness of the failure of the restoration that was attempted after Napoleon's overthrow.

³ The classic description of this extraordinary effect of the Napoleonic régime in

turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in these derelict areas in the heart of Western Christendom, which had fallen out of the race of Western progress since the close of the Middle Ages, served to draw these stranded Western communities back into the ever-rolling stream of Western life—just as, in the course of the hundred years immediately preceding the Napoleonic Age, certain Orthodox Christian communities under Ottoman rule—the Moreot Greeks and the Morava-Valley Serbs—who had never previously moved in a modern Western orbit, were drawn into the current of modern Western Civilization for the first time¹ by the advent of a Venetian régime in the one case and of a Hapsburg régime in the other.

If we pursue on the political plane our comparison between these three examples of cultural stimulation, we shall observe a remarkable uniformity in the sequence of events. In all three cases the cultural stimulus was brought in by an alien, or virtually alien, political régime; in all three cases this régime had only a short life before it was overthrown—with a violence that it had provoked by the antecedent violence of its own original intrusion—in order to make way for a restoration of the *ancien régime*; in

recalling to life the dead-alive epigoni of the medieval Western city-state cosmos is to be found in Heine's account, in his *Reisebilder*, 'Das Buch Le Grand', of the Napoleonic transformation of Düsseldorf. A brilliant picture of the working of the same miracle over the whole field of the German departments and dependencies of the Napoleonic Empire will be found in Fisher, H. A. L.: *Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany* (Oxford 1903, Clarendon Press)—a book which is the fruit of a study of the original documents by an historian of a later age. The recalcitrance of the *ci-devant* Byzantine population of the Kingdom of Sicily-extra-Pharum towards a stimulus to which the Northern Italians, as well as the Western Germans, reacted so eagerly, may be studied in Johnston, *op. cit.*

The vivifying effect of the Napoleonic régime in Lombardy and the Rhineland is notorious; but we must extend our survey to the Illyrian departments of the French Empire—a strip of ex-Venetian and ex-Hapsburg possessions at the remote south-eastern extremity of the Western World—in order to obtain the most impressive testimony of all to the genius of the Napoleonic system for working miracles within the span of a few years (1806 to 1812 in the case of Istria and Dalmatia; 1810 to 1812 in the case of Krain and Croatia). In these backward marches,

'Under the enlightened, if despotic, rule of Marshal Marmont, the long stagnation of the Middle Ages was replaced by feverish activity in every branch of life. Administration and justice were reorganized, the Code Napoléon superseding the effete medieval codes; schools, primary and secondary, commercial and agricultural, sprang up in every direction; the first Croat and Slovene newspapers appeared; the old guild system was reformed and commercial restrictions removed; peasant proprietary was introduced; reafforestation was begun; and the splendid roads were constructed which are still the admiration of every tourist. . . . A well known story relates how the Emperor Francis, during his visit to Dalmatia in 1818, plied his suite with questions as to the origin of the various public works which struck his eye, and met with the invariable answer: "The French, Your Majesty."—"Wirklich Schad" dass s' nit länger blieben sein" ("It's a real pity they didn't stop longer") exclaimed the astonished Emperor in his favourite Viennese dialect; and there the matter rested for eighty years' (Seton-Watson, R. W.: *The Southern Slav Question* (London 1911, Constable), p. 26).

¹ In an earlier age of Western and Orthodox Christian history the Morea had been subjected to the painful experience of being conquered and dominated by the Frankish adventurers who had gone on 'the Fourth Crusade'. From this Frankish yoke the Moreots had almost completed their own liberation by their own efforts before the arrival of the 'Osmanli empire-builders of an Orthodox Christian universal state.

all three cases, however, this restoration was almost as short-lived as the intrusive régime which it had superseded; and then in all three cases, when the ephemeral restoration had been dismantled in its turn, the subject communities, which had first been stimulated and had then been repressed, at length won their way to political freedom and at once made use of this freedom in order to organize themselves politically into national states of the pattern which had become common form in the Western World¹ by the time of the transition from the Modern Age to that 'post-modern' epoch in which we find ourselves living to-day.²

This remarkably uniform sequence of events brings out the at first sight paradoxical yet at the same time unquestionable fact that in all three cases the culture which was introduced by the intrusive empire was directly inimical in the first place to the survival of the empire itself and in the second place to the national interests of the empire-building community. The explanation of this apparent paradox is to be found in a piece of antecedent history that has already come to our notice.³ We have seen that the modern Western version of the medieval Western city-state culture was, in one of its aspects, an adaptation of this culture to the social conditions of the persistently feudal parts of Western Christendom, and that the necessary adjustment was made by transposing the standard unit of political articulation from the city-state to the kingdom-state scale. This pouring of the new wine of Italian efficiency into the old bottles of Transalpine feudal kingdoms had eventually generated a fresh political force with a new institutional expression.⁴ It had brought to birth that modern Western nationalism which can nowhere rest until it has expressed itself in the concrete form of a sovereign independent national state. The France which Napoleon used as the instru-

¹ See Part I. A, vol. i, p. 1, above.

² The historical analogy which we have followed out above can perhaps be presented more graphically in the form of a table:

<i>Derelict Area.</i>	<i>Intrusive Empire.</i>	<i>Period of Intrusion.</i>	<i>Period of Restoration of the Ancien Régime.</i>	<i>Period of Liberation and Organization into National States.</i>
Northern Italy, Belgium, Swabia, Rhineland, and Hanau	{ The Napoleonic Empire }	1797-1814	1815-1848	1848-1871
The Morea	{ The Venetian Empire }	1690-1715	1715-1821	1821-1829
Serbia	{ The Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy }	1718-1739	1739-1804	1804-1828

N.B. Belgium, in contrast to both Italy and Germany, succeeded in overthrowing the restoration régime as early as 1830 and in establishing her sovereign independence as a national state as early as 1831.

³ In III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63, above.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (b) 8, vol. iv, p. 198, above.

ment for his empire-building work had already learnt to think of herself as *la Grande Nation*; and it was manifestly inevitable that the Italians and Belgians and Germans who had become the political pupils of the French, in the act of becoming their subjects, should revolt against a French Imperial régime which, for the sake of the aggrandizement of a nationally adult and emancipated France, was illogically and inequitably depriving these other nations in embryo of the 'natural right' to national self-determination which the French had insistently claimed and successfully secured for themselves. It was in this sense that the Napoleonic French Empire carried with it the seeds of its own destruction in the non-French portions of its domain. And we shall be stating the same historical truth in other terms if we say that the principal benefit which Napoleon conferred upon the epigoni of the medieval Italians and Flemings and Swabians and Rhinelanders and Hanseatics by dragooning them all into his universal state lay in the impulse which he thereby communicated to them—in diametrical opposition to his own life-work—to rise up at the first opportunity and insist upon dissecting the non-French territories of this short-lived French Empire into a number of new-fangled national 'successor-states'.

These Belgian and Italian and German 'successor-states' of the Napoleonic French Empire did not supersede their involuntary parent directly; for, as we have observed, the non-French national movements which the French Empire evoked were successfully exploited for a season by the surviving heirs of the *ancien régime*, who made a passing show of complacency towards the anti-French nationalism which had been kindled among their subjects by the experience of Napoleonic rule, until the explosion of the *Befreiungskrieg* had done its negative work in bringing the Napoleonic Empire to the ground—whereupon the legitimists abruptly changed their tactics and stretched out their hands to monopolize for themselves once again a sovereignty which they could never have wrested back from the grip of the Corsican usurper if the German and Italian converts to 'the Ideas of 1789' had not so naively laboured for the profit of their hypocritical allies. 'The kings crept out, the peoples stayed at home'; and it took the new-born nations thirty-three years—one third of a century—to win back the national rights which, in 1812-15, they had earned by pouring out their blood and had lost through being made the victims of a political swindle. Thus the non-French national states of a 'post-modern' Western World which ultimately owe their existence to a Napoleonic French stimulus have been founded on the ruins of the post-Napoleonic restoration and not on those of the Napoleonic

Empire itself; and so they cannot be regarded as the immediate authors of the Napoleonic Empire's overthrow. On the other hand their establishment has unquestionably had the effect of expunging once for all from the Western political horizon that prospect of a French hegemony over the Western World which was one of the constant concerns of Western statesmen not only during the brief episode of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars but throughout the two centuries ending in 1870; for the preponderance of *la Grande Nation* over rival Powers was due in large measure to the existence of a political no-man's-land on the farther side of France's northern and eastern frontiers; and, since the time when this long-persisting vacuum was turned into a plenum by the successive crystallizations of a Belgian and an Italian and a German national state, France has lost her two-hundred-years-long pre-eminence¹ and has fallen to a level set by the relative strength of French 'man-power' and French industrial power in a Western World which has now been politically rearticulated from one end to the other into an unbroken array of national states which all conform to a standard French pattern, though one of

¹ By the time, in October 1938, when these lines were being revised for the press, it had come to look as if the pre-eminence which France had lost in 1870 had passed, after all, to Germany, notwithstanding the sensational set-back which Germany had suffered through her eventual defeat in the General War of 1914-18. On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918, it seemed that the outcome of that war, so far from blighting Germany's political prospects, might prove to have ensured the eventual predominance of Germany in Europe. In once for all establishing the principle of National Self-Determination as the moral basis for the articulation of Europe into parochial states, the peace settlement of 1919-20 (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 299, footnote 1, above) had made it certain that, sooner or later, the 80 million Germans on the Continent would achieve their national unity in a single Reich which would have almost twice as large a population as the next largest European national state. At the same time the same peace settlement had also made it certain that, when this Pan-German Reich did arise, the intrinsic advantage over the other European Great Powers with which it would be endowed by its superiority in 'man-power' would be reinforced by the adventitious advantage of finding, on the farther side of its eastern and south-eastern frontiers, a political no-man's-land like that which France had found beyond her eastern and northern frontiers from the reign of Louis XIV to the reign of Napoleon III inclusive. When the political vacuum in Central Europe, from which France had profited for two hundred years, was filled at last in the nineteenth century by the crystallization of the Belgian, Italian, and German national states, it was already in process of being replaced by a new vacuum in Eastern Europe. The break-up of the medieval Central European city-state cosmos in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries under the impact of the modernized kingdom-states of feudal Europe has had its historical counterpart in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the break-up of the modern East European dynastic states into national 'successor-states' generated by the principle of Self-Determination. This process, which began in the early decades of the nineteenth century with the secession of the nuclei of a Serb and a Greek national state from the Ottoman Empire, was completed in the peace settlement of 1919-20 by the partition of the Ottoman and the Hapsburg Empire and the mutilation of the Hohenzollern and the Romanov Empire. The result was the creation, between the eastern frontier of the Weimar Republic and the western frontier of the Soviet Union, of an East European no-man's-land precariously tenanted by a dozen *Kleinstaaten*, from Greece to Finland. In this situation it was perhaps inevitable that the truncated post-war Prussia-Germany should eventually be replaced by a Greater Germany including the German population which had been left stranded by the wreck of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and that this 'Third Reich' should then seek to dominate the non-German *Kleinstaaten* on its eastern and south-eastern flanks.

them has now crystallized, in the shape of a Greater Germany, on a physical scale which dwarfs 'the Third Reich's' French prototype.¹

Our analysis of the Napoleonic Empire has now perhaps been carried as far as is necessary for the purpose of this Study; and we can sum up our results in the conclusion that Napoleon did not merely fail to achieve his aim but actually produced, through his unsuccessful endeavours, a number of results which he never intended or foresaw and which in combination entailed the paradoxical consequence of making it for ever impossible for any French successor of this fallen titan to emulate his career with a happier fortune. On the one hand Napoleon failed to weld the derelict domain of the medieval city-state cosmos in Italy and Germany and Belgium on to the living body of France in the bonds of a French Empire which was to perform the service of a Western universal state. On the other hand Napoleon unintentionally made the fortune of Great Britain in seeking to ride rough-shod over the obstacle which she obstinately presented to the attainment of the Corsican megalomaniac's superlative ambitions; and he likewise unintentionally compromised the national prospects of France herself by rousing his non-French subjects from their long political slumber and launching them on a new course of political activity which ended in the establishment of a Belgian and an Italian and a German national state on the continental threshold of France within less than three-quarters of a century from the year in which Buonaparte had entered on his meteoric career by descending upon Italy at the head of a revolutionary French army.²

¹ If we are right in seeing, in the contemporary spectacle of a France now cowering under the menacing shadows of a 'totalitarian' Germany and Italy, the nemesis of the Napoleonic French domination over the Germans and Italians of a hundred years ago, we can put our finger upon corresponding reversals of fortune in the two other cases which we have brought into our comparison. In the same historical perspective the disruption of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy through the prise of a Serbian lever in the General War of 1914-18 is to be regarded as the nemesis of the Hapsburg domination over the Serbs in 1718-39; and even the Venetian domination over the Morea in 1690-1715 has subsequently taken its toll from a United Italy by raising an obstacle, in the shape of a liberated and nationally awakened and consolidated Greece, to modern Italian endeavours to re-establish the medieval Italian Empire in the Levant.

² It did, however, take the better part of these three-quarters of a century for the immense prestige of the Napoleonic Empire to evaporate.

France, which had given the impulse to personal freedom, was able to usher in greater freedom of trade through the Napoleonic treaty-system of 1860-70. England might be treated as an exception by other nations. France was always an inspiration; and, although Free Trade had been an accomplished fact in England in the 'forties, and though the European movement was based originally on English economic writers, yet it needed the French advertisement and Napoleon III to make it European. It is difficult for us to realize the glamour which this France, rejuvenated after the wars of 1815, was able to exercise on its contemporaries in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century' (Knowles, L. C. A.: *Economic Development in the Nineteenth Century: France, Germany, Russia and the United States* (London 1932, Routledge), p. 21).

For the role of France in the modern chapter of Western history as interpreter and disseminator of Italian and English ideas see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 369-71, above. For the Free Trade Movement in the Western World in the middle of the nineteenth century see IV. C (iii) (b) 4, vol. iv, pp. 172-4, above.

Thus the note of the Napoleonic episode in our Western history is a striking discord between irony and consolation. The irony appears in the spectacle of the Corsican empire-builder's consummate self-frustration; the consolation makes itself heard in the sound of a revolutionary French trump that proved to possess the miraculous power of raising the dead to new life.¹ The beneficiary of this miracle was the rotting corpse of a medieval Western city-state cosmos which had committed suicide² four hundred years before the bustling epiphany of the little man who blew the magic blast. It is amazing that he should have blown it without ever having foreseen what the effect of his rousing music was bound to be.

¹ The *risorgimenti* of communities that have previously passed through a phase of social decadence are discussed in more general terms in IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 16-23, above.

² See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 348-50, above.

ANNEX II TO V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ)

EDWARD GIBBON'S CHOICE OF LINGUISTIC VEHICLE

IN the chapter to which this Annex attaches it has been suggested that, in the competition between the English language and the French for the prize of becoming the *lingua franca* of an oecumenical 'Great Society', English won its definitive victory in the course of the Seven Years' War, and that this view is supported by the testimony of the life and letters of Edward Gibbon, who wrote his *juvenilia* in French while the war was still in progress, and his *magnum opus* in English after the war had ended in the discomfiture of France and in the triumph of Great Britain.¹ In this connexion it may be apposite to quote certain passages from Gibbon's own works, and one passage from a letter addressed to Gibbon by Hume, which, when read together, throw some light on the considerations that led Gibbon to adopt French as his vehicle in the first instance and afterwards to abandon French in favour of English.

Gibbon's motives for having recourse to French in his earliest literary venture have been recalled in retrospect by the author himself:

'At Lausanne I composed the first chapters of my Essay² in French, the familiar language of my conversation and studies, in which it was easier for me to write than in my mother-tongue. After my return to England I continued the same practice, without any affectation, or design of repudiating (as Dr. Bentley would say) my vernacular idiom. . . . In modern times the language of France has been diffused by the merit of her writers, the social manners of the natives, the influence of the Monarchy, and the exile of the Protestants: several foreigners have seized the opportunity of speaking to Europe in this common dialect, and Germany may plead the authority of Leibniz and Frederic, of the first of her philosophers and the greatest of her kings. The just pride and laudable prejudice of England has restrained the communication of idioms; and, of all the nations on this side of the Alps, my countrymen are the least practised and least perfect in the exercise of the French tongue. . . . The vanity of being the first English author in the French language might perhaps be excused; but, in sober truth, I wrote, as I thought, in the most familiar idiom.'³

Gibbon's persistence in the use of French in his unfinished and unpublished history of the rise of the Swiss Confederation drew

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), p. 506, with footnote 3, above.

² *Essai sur l'Étude de la Littérature*, written in 1759 and published in 1761.—A.J.T.

³ Gibbon, Edward: *The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon* (London 1896, Murray), pp. 175, 176, and 300.

a friendly criticism from an already famous English man-of-letters who was Gibbon's older contemporary. In a letter addressed to Gibbon on the 24th October, 1767,¹ David Hume took the younger writer to task in the following terms:

'Why do you compose in French, and carry faggots into the wood, as Horace says with regard to Romans who wrote in Greek? I grant that you have a like motive to those Romans, and adopt a language much more generally diffused than your native tongue: but have you not remarked the fate of those two ancient languages in following ages? The Latin, though then less celebrated, and confined to more narrow limits, has in some measure outlived the Greek, and is now more generally understood by men-of-letters. Let the French, therefore, triumph in the present diffusion of their tongue. Our solid and increasing establishments in America, where we need less dread the inundation of Barbarians, promise a superior stability and duration to the English language.'

The impression made upon Gibbon's mind by the last of Hume's points in the letter quoted above is attested by the manifest reminiscence in the following passage in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*—a passage which appears to have been written at least five years, and possibly as long as thirteen years,² after Hume's letter had reached Gibbon's hands:

'If a savage conqueror should issue from the deserts of Tartary, he must repeatedly vanquish the robust peasants of Russia, the numerous armies of Germany, the gallant nobles of France, and the intrepid free-men of Britain; who, perhaps, might confederate for their common defence. Should the victorious Barbarians carry slavery and desolation as far as the Atlantic Ocean, ten thousand vessels would transport beyond their pursuit the remains of Civilized Society; and Europe would revive and flourish in the American World, which is already filled with her colonies and institutions. America now contains about six millions of European blood and descent; and their numbers, at least in the North, are continually increasing. Whatever may be the changes of their political situation, they must preserve the manners of Europe; and we may reflect with some pleasure that the English language will probably be diffused over an immense and populous continent.'³

By the time when these words were published, Gibbon had already staked his hopes of lasting fame upon the fulfilment of

¹ The full text of this letter will be found in op. cit., p. 277.

² For the date of the writing of the 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West', in which this passage occurs, see IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, p. 148, footnote 3, above, in correction of III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 311, footnote 1.

³ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xxxvii: 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West'. The last of the sentences here quoted is a footnote and not part of the main text, and it is possible that this footnote was added as late as the year 1781, even if the 'Observations' themselves were drafted before the 10th May, 1774 (for this *terminus ante quem* see IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, p. 148, footnote 3, above).

Hume's forecast by producing three volumes of *The Decline and Fall* in English; and his eventual choice of language was dramatically justified when an odd volume of *The Decline and Fall*—finding its way into a tract in the heart of North America which had been transformed, since Gibbon's day, from virgin wilderness into the infant State of Illinois—fell into the hands of a certain young backwoodsman, unversed in any tongue but his native English, who was eagerly educating himself with the aid of the few books that he had managed to acquire.¹ It would be a pretty exercise for the fancy to compose, in Gibbon's name and style, some reflections on the American statesman's intellectual debt to the English historian,² could the latter have lived to learn of it. We should be on surer ground in guessing that, if Lincoln's as well as Gibbon's life could have been prolonged into the fourth decade of the twentieth century, these two masters of the English language would have been decidedly of one mind—in spite of their vast diversity in genius—in their judgement on the culture of which their mother-tongue had latterly become the vehicle in the Middle Western core of that 'immense and populous continent' over which the English language has now duly been diffused in an ironically barren fulfilment of Hume's far-sighted prophecy.³ In placing themselves beyond the reach of another barbarian eruption from the Eurasian Steppe the European settlers in North America appear to have escaped from an imaginary danger of being barbarized from outside at the price of undergoing, at any rate for a season, a genuine barbarization of another kind which is far more difficult to withstand because it does not break in from abroad but wells up from the secret places of the heart.

This latest (though assuredly not last) chapter in the cultural history of the Middle West bears out a thesis which has been put forward in this Study already in earlier passages.⁴

¹ See Ludwig, Emil: *Lincoln*: English translation (London and New York 1930, Putnam), p. 36.

² This volume of *The Decline and Fall* came into Lincoln's hands at New Salem at a critical moment in his career, in the interval between his momentous voyage down river to New Orleans and back and his first entry into politics. The future statesman was not more than twenty-three years old at the time; his mind at that age must have been at least as impressionable as it showed itself to be in its maturity; and it seems reasonable to assume that the impression made by any particular book would be in inverse ratio to the number of the books that the young man had had an opportunity of reading up to date.

³ For the deterioration of culture in the Middle West of the United States since the close of the nineteenth century see Lynd, R. S. and H. M.: *Middletown: A Study in American Culture* (London 1929, Constable).

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 119-33, and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, pp. 334-7, above.

ANNEX TO V. C (i) (d) 6 (8)

CUJUS REGIO, EJUS RELIGIO?

IN the chapter to which this Annex refers we have found reason for believing that, when the philosophies thought out by the Dominant Minority and the religions discovered by the Internal Proletariat encounter one another in a competition for the conversion of souls, the outcome of the contest between them is apt to bear out the dictum of a modern Western psychologist that 'great innovations never come from above; they come invariably from below'.¹ On this spiritual plane it is, indeed, the Internal Proletariat, and not the Dominant Minority, that proves to be the victor as a rule, on the showing of an empirical survey of a number of cases in point. But we are still left with the question whether the Dominant Minority has it in its power to make up for its spiritual weakness by bringing its physical strength into play and forcing a philosophy or a religion upon its subjects, from above downwards, by means of a political pressure which might be none the less effective for being illegitimate.

If we now examine the historical evidence on this head, we shall find that in general the Dominant Minority's efforts to impose a philosophy or a religion upon the Internal Proletariat by political means are apt to be as unsuccessful—at any rate in the long run—as its analogous efforts to hold the External Proletariat at bay by military force along an artificial stationary frontier.²

This finding contradicts outright one of the sociological theories of the Enlightenment during the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles'; for, according to this theory, the deliberate imposition of religious practices and beliefs from above downwards, so far from being impossible or even unusual, has actually been the normal origin of religious institutions in societies in process of civilization. This theory has been applied to the religious life of Rome in the following celebrated passage in the work of the historian Polybius (*vivebat circa 206–128 B.C.*):

'The point in which the Roman constitution excels others most conspicuously is to be found, in my opinion, in its handling of Religion. In my opinion the Romans have managed to forge the main bond of their social order out of something which the rest of the world execrates: I mean, out of Superstition. In dramatizing their Superstition theatrically and introducing it into private as well as into public life, the

¹ C. G. Jung, quoted in V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), on pp. 567–8, above.

² For the usual outcome of such relations between the Dominant Minority and the Barbarians see Part VIII, below.

Romans have gone to the most extreme lengths conceivable; and to many observers this will appear extraordinary. In my opinion, however, the Romans have done it with an eye to the masses.¹ If it were possible to have an electorate that was composed exclusively of sages, this chicanery might perhaps be unnecessary; but, as a matter of fact, the masses are always unstable and always full of lawless passions, irrational temper and violent rage; and so there is nothing for it but to control them by "the fear of the unknown" and play-acting of that sort. I fancy that this was the reason why our forefathers introduced among the masses those theological beliefs and those notions about Hell that have now become traditional; and I also fancy that, in doing this, our ancestors were not working at random but knew just what they were about. It might be more pertinent to charge our contemporaries with lack of sense and lapse from responsibility for trying to eradicate Religion, as we actually see them doing.²

This late Hellenic utilitarian theory of the origins of Religion in societies in process of civilization is about as remote from the truth as the modern Western social-contract theory of the origins of states. If we now proceed to examine the evidence, we shall find that, while political power is perhaps not completely impotent to produce effects upon spiritual life, its ability to act in this field is dependent on the presence of certain special combinations of circumstances; and we shall also find that, even then, its range of action is very narrowly circumscribed. In fact, in the history of the occasional endeavours of political potentates to make their wills prevail in the religious sphere by bringing into play the political means at their command, successes are exceptional and failures are the rule.

To take the exceptions first, we may observe that political potentates do sometimes succeed in establishing a cult when this cult is an expression, not of any genuine religious feeling, but merely of some political sentiment that is masquerading in a religious disguise; and in such a case the feat is perhaps not even very difficult to achieve if the political sentiment which the ruler selects for embodiment in a pseudo-religious ritual is one that is already strongly flowing as a spontaneous popular current—such as, for example, the thirst for political unity in a society that has drunk to the dregs the bitter cup of a 'Time of Troubles'. In these particular circumstances a ruler who has already won a hold over his subjects' hearts as their human saviour³ may sometimes even

¹ In this sentence and what follows, Polybius credits the dominant minority in the Roman Commonwealth with having deliberately and successfully put into practice a precept that is cold-bloodedly commended by Strabo in a passage that has been quoted in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 561, above.—A.J.T.

² Polybius: *Historiae*, Book VI, chap. 56.

³ For the figure of 'the saviour with the sword' see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 178-213, below.

succeed in establishing a cult in which his own office and person and dynasty are the objects of worship.¹

The classic example of this *tour de force* is the deification of human rulers in a disintegrating Hellenic World. The practice began, in the first generation after the breakdown, with the payment of divine honours in Samos to Lysander—the Lacedaemonian commander who had delivered the 'knock-out blow' in the Atheno-Peloponnesian War²—and it continued in the deification of Alexander the Great and his successors, until it reached its climax in the deification of Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus and the subsequent Roman Emperors for the next two and a half centuries. For that length of time this worship of the Roman Emperors was a success, because it provided an appropriate means of expressing a sense of devout gratitude towards the Principate which was deeply and widely felt. Throughout that age a majority of the inhabitants of the Hellenic universal state which the Caesars had established were devoutly and sincerely grateful for the priceless gift of unity and peace which the Principate had conferred upon the Hellenic World at the end of four centuries of storm and stress; and, as they also appreciated the supreme difficulty of the achievement, as well as its supreme value for themselves, they were ready to acquiesce without much heart-searching (until the advent of Christianity) in the idea that the authors of such acts as this must be beings of a superhuman order.³

Hic vir, hic est, tibi quem promitti saepius audis,
Augustus Caesar, divi genus, aurea condet
saecula qui rursus Latio regnata per arva
Saturno quondam, super et Garamantas et Indos
proferet imperium.⁴

And this Virgilian acclamation of Augustus as a living god has an equally famous Horatian parallel:

Caelo tonantem credidimus Iovem
regnare; praesens divus habebitur
Augustus adiectis Britannis
imperio gravibusque Persis.⁵

To evoke such strong feelings as these for a worldly saviour and for a political institution is an impressive achievement. Yet the

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 408, footnote 3, above.

² Plutarch: *Life of Lysander*, chap. 18 (citing Duris).

³ For the sense of the unity of Mankind that is awakened during, and in consequence of the disintegration of a civilization, see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 1-49, below. For the gratitude that is evoked by the founders and upholders of universal states, see also V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 181, below. For the penitence of Augustus see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 78, and V. C (i) (d) 5, p. 435, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 187, below.

⁴ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book VI, ll. 791-5. The same semi-religious note of veneration for Augustus is also struck by the same poet in *Aeneid*, Book VIII, ll. 678-81; in *Georgics*, No. I, ll. 500-1; and in *Eclagues*, No. I, *passim*.

⁵ Horace: *Carmina*, Book III, Ode v, ll. 1-4.

spontaneous emotional attitude on which the Imperial Cult in the Hellenic universal state depended for its vitality¹ did not survive the first collapse of the Roman Empire at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era. As soon as the storm rose again and the stress once more made itself felt, the Emperors themselves became conscious that their now fast wilting official divinity was incapable of standing the strain unaided; and those of them who were blessed with foresight and initiative began to cast about for some supernatural sanction behind and beyond their own tarnished and discredited Imperial Genius.² While there may have been nothing but the whim of a spoilt and childish pervert behind the religious revolution which was attempted by Elagabalus (*imperabat* A.D. 218-22) when this changeling-Caesar presented himself in Rome as the servant of the local Sun-God of the Syrian city of Emesa whose hereditary high priest he happened to be,³ we may confidently attribute a higher motive and a more serious purpose to Aurelian (*imperabat* A.D. 270-5)⁴ and to Constantius

¹ For the gratitude of the subjects—even more than the citizens—of the Roman Empire to Augustus and his successors in the Principate for the next two centuries see in particular two Greek inscriptions in honour of Augustus that are quoted in Gall, A. von: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), p. 453, and in general Charlesworth, M. P.: 'Providentia and Aeternitas' in *The Harvard Theological Review*, vol. xxix, No. 2, April 1936; and the same scholar's Raleigh Lecture on *The Virtues of a Roman Emperor* (London 1937, Milford). For the corresponding transfiguration of Augustus, in his grateful subjects' minds, from an unscrupulous and ruthless dictator into a superhuman Saviour of Society see Wendland, P.: *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*, 2nd and 3rd ed. (Tübingen 1912, Mohr), pp. 143-4. Augustus was not, of course, the first Roman saviour to evoke this sense of gratitude in the hearts of the Greek and Oriental subjects of Rome and to have divine honours paid to him in consequence. In the preceding generation the same subjects had shown the same feelings in the same way towards Augustus's adoptive father Divus Julius and towards Julius's rival Pompey. It was Pompey who took the first steps on the Roman Government's behalf to restore order in regions which the Senate had been content to leave derelict during the hundred years (167-67 B.C.) that had elapsed since the end of the Third Romano-Macedonian War; and the impression that his work made on the beneficiaries was deep and lasting. Cicero testified that 'omnes nunc in iis locis Gnaeum Pompeium sicut aliquem non ex hac urbe missum sed de caelo delapsum intuentur' (*De Imperio Gnaei Pompeii*, chap. 41). And, nearly two centuries later, the Emperor Hadrian declared that, as he travelled over the World, he found it full of temples dedicated to Pompey (Gall, A. von, op. cit., p. 452).

² Even at the zenith of the *Pax Augusta* Divus Caesar had perhaps, after all, been an idol with feet of clay. Though he was acclaimed as a saviour,

'This salvation was merely on the material plane and was limited to life on Earth; and, though it may have brought relief and prosperity to the well-to-do and to the cultivated, it offered little or nothing to the masses, who still, as before, felt the heavy pressure of daily life, and who were incapable of improving their position by their own efforts. Caesar-worship gave just as little satisfaction to those who felt in their hearts the longing for something higher than earthly goods, and to whom the uncertain enjoyment of life on this Earth seemed as hollow and as nugatory as the wisdom of Philosophy and of the Enlightenment with their interminable discussions which left the imagination and the spirit cold.'—Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), p. 381.

³ For Elagabalus's abortive attempt to establish his own divine namesake as the high god of the Roman Pantheon see the present Annex, pp. 685-8, below.

⁴ 'Aurelian . . . used to say that the soldiers deceived themselves in supposing that the destinies of the Emperors lay in their hands. For he used to aver that it was God who had bestowed the purple and . . . had decided the period of his reign.'—*Auctor Anonymus post Dionem*, Dindorf's edition, p. 229, quoted by Cumont, F.: 'L'Éternité

Chlorus (*imperabat* A.D. 292–306) when these Illyrian Emperors enlisted under the standard of an abstract and oecumenical Sol Invictus;¹ and we shall also notice that Constantine the Great (*imperabat* A.D. 306–37) took service in his turn, for a season, with his father's Solar tutelary god² before he transferred his allegiance, once for all, to one of the gods of the internal proletariat who, by Constantine's day, had proved Himself more potent than either Sol or Caesar. The pitched battle between Caesar-worship and Christianity which had opened with Decius's challenge in A.D. 249 and had closed with Galerius's capitulation in A.D. 311 had been deliberately provoked by a school of blind-eyed and high-handed occupants of the Imperial Throne who rejected the far-sighted policy of fortifying the Imperial Cult with the patronage of some higher divinity in favour of the foolhardy policy of attempting to impose upon all comers, human and divine, by sheer pressure of physical force, a political rite which could now manifestly no longer depend on its old inward spiritual sanction in the hearts of the worshippers.³ The failure of a Decius and a Galerius to maintain the Imperial Cult by persecution had the same significance as the failure of an Aurelian and a Constantius Chlorus to fortify it by subordinating it to a worship of the Unconquered Sun. Between them, the two failures proved conclusively that Caesar-worship, impressive though it might be, was nevertheless no more than a fair-weather cult which was incapable of riding a storm.

If we turn from the Hellenic to the Sumeric World, we shall observe that there is an analogue of Caesar-worship here in the cult of his own human person which was instituted—not by the founder of the Sumeric universal state, Ur-Engur (*imperabat circa* 2298–2281 B.C.),⁴ but by Ur-Engur's successor Dungi (*imperabat circa* 2280–2223 B.C.).⁵ We shall also infer—from the fact that

des Empereurs Romains' in *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses*, vol. i (Paris 1896, Macon Protat), p. 447. Compare Timoleon's saying that 'he gave thanks to God for having inscribed Timoleon's name upon His divine decision to save Sicily'.—Plutarch: *Life of Timoleon*, chap. 36.

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 82, footnote 4, above, for these two forms of Sun-worship and for the contrast that they present to one another. For the work of the Illyrian Emperors see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below.

² See Baynes, N. H.: *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church* (London 1929, Milford), pp. 8 and 95–103, as well as the present Annex, pp. 693–4, below.

³ For the victory of the Christian Martyrs over the Roman Imperial Government see IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, p. 227, and V. C (i) (d) 3, in the present volume, pp. 407–9, above. By Galerius's day the Caesar-worship that was then delivering the last desperate counter-attack upon an all but triumphant Christian Church was enlisting allies from every quarter to reinforce its anti-Christian front. It was promoting an archaic revival of historic pagan worship (see Geffken, J.: *Der Ausgang des Griechisch-römischen Heidentums* (Heidelberg 1920, Winter), pp. 28–30); it was fostering the worship of Sol Invictus; and it was patronizing Iamblichus's Neoplatonic Antichurch (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 565–6, above, and V. C (i) (d) 8 (γ), vol. vi, p. 88, footnote 3, below).

⁴ For Ur-Engur and his work see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 106 and 109, above.

⁵ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin

Dungi changed the Imperial style and title from Ur-Engur's comparatively modest formula 'King of Sumer and Akkad' to the more pretentious formula 'King of the Four Quarters'¹—that, in calling upon his subjects to worship him as a god, this Sumeric emperor was appealing, as the Roman Caesars appealed, to the gratitude of Mankind towards a being from whose hands they were obtaining the boon of oecumenical unity and peace.² At the same time the records of Sumeric history that have been unearthed by the spade of the modern Western archaeologist inform us, fragmentary though they are, that the Sumeric Imperial Cult also resembled its Hellenic parallel in the further point of being a short-lived fair-weather contrivance. Dungi's three direct successors on the throne of 'the Empire of the Four Quarters' at Ur (*imperabant circa* 2222–2180 B.C.) duly claimed and received divine honours in their turns, and Ur-Engur, as the founder of the dynasty, appears to have been given a posthumous apotheosis.³ But after the collapse of the Third Dynasty of Ur there is only one pretender to dominion over 'the Four Quarters'—Libit-Ishtar of Isin (*imperabat circa* 2096–2086 B.C.)—who is known to have pretended to divinity as well.⁴ And, when the equivalent of Diocletian's and Constantine's work was performed for the Sumeric universal state by Hammurabi (*imperabat circa* 1947–1905 B.C.), after the bout of anarchy which had followed the collapse of the Dynasty of Ur and had continued under the ineffective rule of the Dynasty of Isin,⁵ we find that this Amorite counterpart of the great Illyrian soldiers

1913, Cotta), pp. 557–8, and Fish, T.: *The Cult of King Dungi during the Third Dynasty of Ur* (Manchester 1927, University Press, reprinted from *The Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, vol. xi, No. 2, July 1927). The evidence marshalled by Fish shows that Dungi was worshipped as a god at Lagash, Umma, Drehem, and Ur, and possibly also at Nippur; that a temple (locality uncertain) had already been dedicated to him in his lifetime; and that offerings were made to him as a god (though the dated evidence for these offerings is all posterior to Dungi's death).

¹ Meyer, E., op. cit., vol. i, part (2), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 557. See also the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 2, below.

² On this point see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 1–6, below. The conscious association of emperor-worship with the idea of oecumenical unity is clearly attested in the Sumeric World by the fact that the title 'King of the Four Quarters', which was assumed by Dungi concurrently with his arrogation of divine honours to himself, was not Dungi's own invention but was a revival of the style and title of the Akkadian militarist Naramsin. For Naramsin had also anticipated Dungi in laying claim to divinity, as is indicated by the regular prefixing of the god-determinative to Naramsin's name in his official documents and by the affixing of the visual symbol of divinity—a pair of horns—to the conqueror's helmet on his victory stele (Meyer, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 516 and 528–9). On the other hand, in the interval between Naramsin's generation and Dungi's, a pretension to divinity was not only asserted but was successfully established by Gudea of Lagash, who was no more than the parochial ruler of a single city-state (*ibid.*, p. 542). In claiming divinity without possessing oecumenical sovereignty Gudea could plead that his reign—coinciding, as it happened to do, with a lull in the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' between the subsidence of Akkadian militarism and the onset of the Gutæan Völkerwanderung—was at any rate a time of local peace and prosperity.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 558–9; Jeremias, C.: *Die Vergöttlichung der Babylonisch-Assyrischen Könige* (Leipzig 1919, Hinrichs), pp. 17–18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 18–21.

⁵ See V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 297–8, below.

who came to the rescue of the Roman Empire adopted, on the religious issue, a policy which we have seen to have been likewise the policy of Aurelian and of Constantius Chlorus. Though in general Hammurabi was deliberately and avowedly restoring the universal state of Ur-Engur and Dungi,¹ there was one point in which he broke sharply with Dungi's practice. Instead of ruling as a god incarnate, like Dungi or Augustus, Hammurabi preferred, like Constantius or Constantine, to reign as the human servant of a transcendental divinity who, for this Amorite statesman, took the shape of the Babylonian double of Enlil: the high god Marduk-Bel.² It will be seen that, in the history of the disintegration of the Sumeric Society, the deification of human potentates was the exception, not the rule; and indeed the notion of treating a prince as a god incarnate seems to have been something distinctly foreign to the Sumeric temper and outlook.³

The Sumeric Emperor Dungi is not the only ruler of a universal state who has deified himself as the god incarnate of a 'Kingdom of the Four Quarters'. The self-same title was hit upon—in the opposite hemisphere and in an age that was divided from Dungi's by the lapse of more than three millennia—to designate the universal state of the Andean World;⁴ and the Sapa Inca ('Unique Inca')⁵ who was the sovereign of this American oecumenical empire was also worshipped, like Dungi, as a god incarnate.⁶ How this Incaic Imperial Cult would have fared if it had been granted the time to work itself out is a question that can never be answered; for the Andean universal state had been established for barely a century when it was overtaken by the Spanish conquest; and this

¹ For this see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 106, footnote 2, above.

² Meyer, op. cit., p. 663. For the identification of Marduk of Babylon with Enlil of Nippur at this stage of Sumeric history see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), pp. 529-30, above. In the Babylonian Society, which was affiliated to the Sumeric, Hammurabi's practice appears to have prevailed over Dungi's. It is true that the god-determinative was sometimes prefixed to the names of the barbarian Kassite kings of Karduniash (Meyer, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 633; Jeremias, op. cit., pp. 21-2); but this usage was intermittent and apparently capricious; and there is no reason to suppose that it was intended to be taken any more seriously than the caliphial style and title which was usurped, after the downfall of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, by its Iranian 'successor-states' (see Arnold, Sir T. W.: *The Caliphate* (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press), chaps. 9-14). Pace Jeremias, in op. cit., there appears to be no serious evidence for any assumption of divinity by the kings of Assyria. In the Hittite Society—which, like the Babylonian, was affiliated to the Sumeric—'le roi n'est pas divinisé de son vivant . . . mais il l'est après sa mort: on ne dit pas de lui "il est mort", mais bien "il est devenu dieu" [compare the Roman Emperor Vespasian's expiring sally "puto deus fio"—A.J.T.J.]. Cette formule, fréquente dans les textes en langue hittite, n'est pas traduite littéralement dans les textes en akkadien, où l'on emploie les expressions en usage à Babylone.'—Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, Renaissance du Livre), p. 173.

³ See Meyer, op. cit., vol. ii, part (1), 2nd ed. (Berlin and Stuttgart 1928, Cotta), p. 512, footnote 1.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 2, below, and Cunow, H.: *Geschichte und Kultur des Inkareiches* (Amsterdam 1937, Elsevier), pp. 75-6.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 74.

⁶ See Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), p. 110.

was a storm of such violence that it swept away not only the worship of the Inca Emperor but the Incaic Empire itself, and the whole Andean culture with it, in one all-engulfing cataclysm. There are strong grounds, however, for believing that even the Inca Pachacutec (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1400-48), who may be regarded as the founder of the Andean universal state,¹ did not look upon the official worship of his own person and office as a cult which was capable of standing by itself; for it was Pachacutec who organized a Pan-Andean Pantheon in which the high god was not the Inca himself but his progenitor and protector the Sun-God of Corichanca.²

In another context³ we have already noticed the closeness of the resemblance which the Inca Pachacutec's work of theological and ecclesiastical organization bears to that of the Pharaoh Thothmes III; and indeed the divinity of the Pharaohs in its decline, though not at its apogee in the time of 'the Old Kingdom', seems, like the divinity of the Incas, to have been regarded and represented as derivative from that of the human ruler's celestial parent and patron. If the latter-day Pharaoh was 'the Good God', he enjoyed this divine status in virtue of being the adoptive son of the Sun-God Re.⁴ Moreover, we have observed that, throughout the long course of the disintegration of the Egyptiac Civilization from the time of the Pyramid-Builders onwards, the figure of the Pharaoh was progressively humanized through being gradually divested of its divine attributes.⁵ And Thothmes' decision to organize an Egyptiac Pantheon with Amon-Re at its head may perhaps

¹ See II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 103, footnote 2, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 532, above, and the present Annex, p. 694, below.

³ In the first of the two places cited in the preceding footnote.

⁴ The Pharaonic title 'Son of Re' is rare in the inscriptions of the Fourth Dynasty and not much more frequent in those of the Fifth and Sixth Dynasties. It did not become part of the regular style and title of every Pharaoh until the time of the Heracleopolite princes and their successors of the Eleventh Dynasty (Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, part (2), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 204).

⁵ 'In becoming the son of the Ruler of the Universe the Pharaoh rises in status in one sense, but in another sense he sinks, through being subordinated to a higher religious idea. Vis-à-vis his father Re the King no longer stands on the footing of equality on which the living Horus had formerly stood among the gods; he is Re's obedient son who carries out his father's will. In consequence the Pharaoh of the following age is no longer "the Great God", as in the time of "the Old Kingdom"; he is now merely "the Good God"' (*ibid.*, p. 208).

For 'Adoptionism' in general see further V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 271-5, below. While the living Pharaoh came to be adopted *ex officio* as a son of Re, the living monarchs of the Hindu overseas dominions of Camboja, Champa, and Java seem to have been identified with the gods worshipped in temples which these monarchs had founded. Thus, when Bhadravarman dedicated a temple to Shiva, the god was styled Bhadrésvara. More than this, when a king or any distinguished person died, he was commemorated by a statue which reproduced his features but represented him with the attributes of his favourite god. . . . Another form of apotheosis was to describe a king by a posthumous title indicating that he had gone to the heaven of his divine patron' (Eliot, *Sir Ch.: Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, p. 115).

⁵ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 408-14, above.

be interpreted as a tacitly yet eloquently conclusive confession, on the Pharaoh's own part, that he himself was not, after all, an incarnation of the high god. Nor, perhaps, would it have lain in Thothmes' power to impose on his subjects any religious system at all—not even this one in which the Pharaoh's person was not the supreme object of worship—if the losing battle which the religion of the Egyptiac dominant minority had been fighting in the preceding age against the rising proletarian-born worship of Osiris had not been unexpectedly suspended to give place to an *union sacrée* against the alien worship of the god of the Hyksos.¹

Finally, we shall observe that in the Sinic World, as in the Egyptiac and Andean worlds, the human ruler of the universal state exercised his divine authority as a mandatory rather than in his own right. He was merely the Son of Heaven, and not a very god himself;² and even for this modest executory role, on which the Emperor's hold upon the loyalty of his subjects mainly depended, he was indebted to the Confucian school of philosophers, who invested the Imperial office with this halo of divinity at second hand as a *quid pro quo* when the Imperial Crown at length came to terms with Confucianism and established it as a philosophy of state. Even in the days of their adversity, before the capitulation of the Han Emperor Wuti,³ the Confucian scholars had known how to make a hostile empire-builder realize the potential value of their support.

'When the scholar Liu Chia quoted Confucian classics in the presence of the first emperor [of the Han Dynasty], he was cut short by this scolding: "You fool, I have conquered the empire on horseback; what use have I for your classics?" To this, Liu Chia retorted: "Yes, Sire, you have conquered the empire on horseback; but can you govern it on horseback?"' The Emperor thought that there was something in that, and told him to write a book on why the Ts'ins [had] lost their empire to *him*. The book was duly written and read to the Emperor chapter by chapter. He was pleased, and gave it the title "The New Book", which is preserved to this day.'⁵

¹ See I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 143-4, above.

² See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, a Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), pp. 214-15.

³ For Wuti's conversion to Confucianism, which was one of the momentous events in Sinic history, see Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), p. 173; Forke, A.: *Die Gedankenwelt des Chinesischen Kulturkreises* (Munich and Berlin 1927, Oldenbourg) p. 6; and the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 4, pp. 418-9, above, as well as the present Annex, pp. 707-8, below.

⁴ This is an exact Sinic equivalent of the modern Western *mot*: "The one thing that you cannot do with bayonets is to sit on them."—A.J.T.

⁵ Hu Shih: "The Establishment of Confucianism as a State Religion during the Han Dynasty" in *The Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. ix, 1929, p. 24.

Thereafter Liu Pang's successors on the throne of the Sinic universal state were wise enough to avoid their Ts'in predecessors' fate by coming to terms with the scholars who had inherited—or usurped—Confucius's academic chair;¹ and, as part of this politic *Ausgleich* between the sword and the pen, they were content to accept a status which might fall short of full divinity, but which had the substantial advantage of resting, not upon the arbitrary fiat of the emperors themselves, but upon the moral authority of a school of litterati whose prestige in the sight of the proletariat was rising at this time *pari passu* with the descent of their philosophy towards the proletarian level.² It will be seen that the Sinic Son of Heaven stood nearer to Aurelian the servant of Sol Invictus and to Hammurabi the servant of Marduk than he stood to any Divus Julius or Divus Augustus or deified Naramsin or Dungi. And this less than fully divine status into which the emperors of the Sinic universal state settled down in and after the reign of Han Wuti was taken over by the affiliated Far Eastern Civilization when a ghost of the Empire of the Han was conjured up by the Sui and the T'ang and the Sung,³ and again when, in the course of its disintegration, the main body of the Far Eastern Society was provided with a universal state of its own by the barbarian hands of Mongols and Manchus.⁴ It was only in the Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization that an effective apotheosis was conferred upon two of the three great militarists through whose cumulative labours a Japanese 'Time of Troubles' was brought to an end by the establishment of a Japanese universal state at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era.⁵

¹ 'The Han Emperors entered into the closest possible association with Confucianism; they made its teachings into the foundation of their whole theory of state or (it would hardly be an exaggeration to say) into a hallowed state philosophy.'—Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), pp. 172-3.

² For the proletarianization of the Confucian philosophy in the Age of the Han see the passages quoted from Dr. Hu Shih in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 549 and 555-6, above.

³ This evocation of a ghost of the Sinic universal state in the main body of the affiliated Far Eastern Society has been touched upon in V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), p. 478, above, and is examined further in Part X, below.

⁴ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 87; V. C (i) (c) 1, in the present volume, pp. 53-4; and V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 348-51, above.

⁵ The three founders of the Japanese universal state were, of course, Nobunaga (*dominabatur* A.D. 1568-82), Hideyoshi (*dominabatur* A.D. 1582-98), and Ieyasu (*dominabatur* A.D. 1598-1603; *imperabat* A.D. 1603-16 as a Shogun officially recognized by the Mikado). These three Japanese 'saviours with the sword' are touched upon further in V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 186, 188-9, and 191, below. 'All three are now equal in the eyes of the [Japanese] Government, since they are listed as deities of First Class Government Shrines of Special Rank dedicated to those great ones, not of the Imperial House, who have rendered special service to the country' (Professor A. L. Sadler in a letter to the writer of this Study). Whether the posthumous honours originally conferred upon them were likewise equal seems to be a debatable question. According to the same scholar in the same letter, 'the honours received by Hideyoshi and Ieyasu were practically the same when conferred [cf. eundem: *The Maker of Modern Japan*:

The foregoing survey will perhaps have sufficed to demonstrate the congenital feebleness of cults that are propagated by political

The Life of Tokugawa Ieyasu (London 1937, Allen & Unwin), pp. 17, 20, 35, and 327-31; but the cult of the first was stifled and kept under a bushel very completely all through the Tokugawa Era, whereas that of Ieyasu was naturally elaborated. Nobunaga also received an equivalent deification; but, as his comparatively early death prevented him from becoming master of the whole Empire, as did the other two, he was therefore neglected.' Sir George Sansom appears to concur with Professor Sadler in regard to Hideyoshi and Ieyasu, but to differ from him in regard to Nobunaga, in the following passage from a letter to the writer of this Study: 'Ieyasu and Hideyoshi both received posthumous honours (from the Emperor). Hideyoshi was styled Toyokuni Daimyōjin, and Daimyōjin is a title given to important Shintō deities; whereas Ieyasu was styled Tōshōgū Daigongen, and *gongen* is the word for a manifestation of the Buddha in the form of a Shintō deity. I should say that Ieyasu's posthumous honours were greater. Ieyasu is, or was, spoken of as Gongen Sama, the divine manifestation *par excellence*. Nobunaga received only the posthumous name Sōgen-in, a Buddhist title which is not a sign of deification. All Buddhists are given such a posthumous name.'

When Ieyasu died, there was a dispute among the experts as to what the dead dictator's posthumous status was to be. An adept in the Zen Mahayanian Buddhism (see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 96-103, above), Suden, maintained 'that Ieyasu had told him that he wished to . . . remain or become a Buddha like anyone else, while Tenkai', who was an adept in Shintō, 'quoted his interview of a later date at which he had intimated his intention of becoming a divinity like the late Hideyoshi' (Sadler, *The Maker of Modern Japan*, p. 326). Tenkai's will prevailed; the apotheosis of Ieyasu under a syncretistic Shintō-Mahayanian title was carried out in due form at Nikko in A.D. 1617; and Tenkai devoted the rest of his life to the establishment of the new worship. 'For two hundred and sixty years To-sho-dai-Gongen remained the tutelary deity of the ruling powers, and, through them, of the whole land, until, after the interval of a few decades, his place was taken by the deity of the Meiji Jingu' (Sadler, *op. cit.*, p. 331).

Ieyasu's successors did not receive the high posthumous rank conferred upon him. The second and third Shoguns had splendid shrines built for them, but did not receive such high posthumous titles as Ieyasu' (Sir George Sansom, in the letter quoted above). Under the present régime in Japan Tokugawa Mitsukuni is, however, included, like the three founders of the Japanese universal state, among the deities of First Class Government Shrines of Special Rank.

The status of the Mikado seems to be ambiguous. Sir George Sansom observes, in the letter quoted above, that 'the reigning members of the Imperial House are not, in my opinion, regarded as living gods, though there is, I believe, a school of thought which endeavours to inculcate this conception. In the earliest Imperial rescripts the reigning emperor describes himself as Aki-tsu-Kami, "a Manifest God", but I do not think that this persisted.' Sir George Sansom's opinion on this point is supported by the fact that, under the present régime in Japan, the authorities aver, when dealing with foreign mission schools, that bowing to a Shinto shrine or to the portrait of the Emperor is *not* an act of worship (on this point see Holtom: *The National Faith of Japan: A Study in Modern Shintō* (London 1938, Kegan Paul), pp. 68-70). On the other hand, Professor Sadler, in the letter quoted above, expresses the opinion that 'the Emperor would seem to be a "*kami*" while living: e.g. the primary school text books published by the Government say: "We love him as a father and we reverence him as a deity" [see the verse quoted in Holtom, p. 79, from one of the national readers for primary schools published by the Department of Education at Tokyo.—A.J.T.]. The word used is the same as of Shintō deities, and the custom of doing reverence before the Palace—much encouraged—is the same also. Of course "*kami*" is not God Almighty by any means. . . . They are not immortal or omnipotent. It seems that Meiji Tenno even had shrines dedicated to him while living.' Sir George Sansom adds that 'the emperors are certainly regarded as of divine descent, and the ritual in the Imperial Palace [see Holtom, p. 173.—A.J.T.] includes worship by the Emperor of his divine ancestors, i.e. the Sun-Goddess, the first Emperor, and the Imperial line in general'. 'But this collective worship of the Imperial House may be correctly regarded as an aspect of the family worship of the Imperial Household' (Holtom, p. 173); and a dead emperor apparently does not, as an individual, become a recipient of divine honours automatically *ex officio*. Out of all the emperors and empresses of the past, historical or mythical, not more than twelve emperors and three empresses are to-day in receipt of public worship at Government shrines (Holtom, pp. 172-3).

The root cause of this ambiguity in the status of both the living and the dead is pointed out by Sir George Sansom in an illuminating *caveat*. 'In a country where ancestor worship is important, it is difficult to draw a line between the worship of a departed great man as a god, his worship as a hero, and his worship as a personal or

potentates from above downwards through the instrumentality of the propagators' political power. Even when such cults are political in essence, and religious only in form, and even when they correspond to a popular sentiment that is genuine and spontaneous, they seem to show little capacity for surviving storms; and they are at their weakest when they take the shape of a deification of their human authors. Caesar-worship is apt in course of time either to be abandoned altogether or else to be bolstered up by being placed under the aegis of some higher divinity who is not himself just Caesar masquerading as a god incarnate.

There is another class of cases in which a political potentate attempts to impose a cult which is not a mere political institution in a religious guise but is of a genuinely religious character; and in this field, too, we can point to instances in which the experiment has been a success. It appears, however, to be a condition of success in such cases that the religion which is being imposed in this fashion should already be 'a going concern'—at any rate in the souls of a minority of its political patron's subjects—and, even when this condition is fulfilled and when success is attained, the price that has to be paid turns out to be a prohibitive one; for a religion which, by an exertion of political authority, is successfully imposed upon all the souls whose bodies are subject to the ruler who is imposing it, is apt to gain this fraction of the world at the price of forfeiting any prospects that it may once have had of becoming—or remaining—a universal church.

For example, when the Maccabees changed, before the close of the second century B.C., from being militant champions of the Jewish religion against a forcible Hellenization¹ into being the founders and rulers of one of the 'successor-states' of a Seleucid Empire whose cultural policy they had succeeded in frustrating by force of arms within their own parochial radius, these violent-handed opponents of a persecuting Power immediately became persecutors in their turn. They turned the swords that had first been drawn in self-defence, in order to save the Jewish religion from extinction, to the new and sinister use of imposing this self-same Judaism upon the neighbouring non-Jewish populations—once subject, like the Jews, to the Seleucidae—whom the Maccabees now succeeded in bringing under their own rule. And this

national ancestor. The act of worship performed by a visitor to, say, the shrine of Ieyasu does not differ from the act of worship that he would perform before the tablets of his own ancestors or before the tomb of the Emperor Meiji.¹

¹ For the lapse of Judaism into militancy see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-1; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 203; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 234-6; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285-6 and 374; IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 224-5; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 263; and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 68-9 and 125-6, above; and V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), vol. vi, pp. 120-3, below.

Maccabaeen policy of religious conversion by political force did avail to extend the domain of the Jewish religion from its native Judaea over Idumaea and over 'Galilee of the Gentiles'¹ and over a narrow Transjordanian Peraea. Even so, however, this triumph of force was narrowly circumscribed; for it failed to overcome either the religious particularism of the Samaritans or the civic pride of the two rows of Hellenic or Hellenized city-states which flanked the Maccabees' dominions on both sides—one row along the Mediterranean coast of Palestine in Philistia and the other along its desert border in the Decapolis. In fact, the extension of the domain of the Jewish religion through the force of Maccabaeen arms was inconsiderable; and even the trivial gain of an expansion through persecution within these close-set limits was to cost the Jewish religion the whole of its spiritual future.

It is the supreme irony of Jewish history that the new ground captured for Judaism by the spear of Alexander Jannaeus (*regnabat* 102–76 B.C.) did bring to birth, within a hundred years, a Galilaean Jewish prophet whose message to his fellow men was the consummation of all previous Jewish religious experience, and that this inspired Jewish scion of forcibly converted Galilaean Gentiles was then rejected and done to death by the Judaeen leaders of the Jewry of his age.² In thus deliberately refusing the opportunity that was offered to it of realizing its manifest destiny of flowering into Christianity by opening its heart to the gospel of its Galilaean step-child, Judaism not only stultified its spiritual past but forfeited its material future into the bargain. In declining to recognize its expected Messiah in Jesus, Judaism was renouncing its birth-right in two great enterprises which eventually made the respective fortunes of two different daughters of Judaism by whom these enterprises were duly carried out in the fullness of time. In the first place Judaism was abandoning the fallow and fertile mission-field of the Hellenic universal state to a Christian Church that was to be driven into independence by its eviction from the Jewish fold; and in the second place Judaism was leaving to an Islam whose founder was to be rebuffed by the Jewish Diasporà in his native Hijāz³ the subsequent political task of reuniting a Syriac World which had been divided against itself as one consequence of the forcible intrusion of Hellenism upon Syriac

¹ Matt. iv. 15. For the unexpected and unintended effect of this Maccabaeen conquest of Galilee upon the history of Jewry and of the World see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 73–4, above, and V. C (ii) (d), Annex II, vol. vi, pp. 477–8 and 499, below.

² On this point see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 73–4, above.

³ The Prophet Muhammad's decision to found a new religion instead of finding his mission in the conversion of his pagan fellow countrymen to Judaism was expressed symbolically in his substitution of Mecca for Jerusalem as the *qiblah* towards which his followers were to face when they were performing their prayer-drill.

ground.¹ Instead of embracing either of these alternative opportunities for a great career when it had the refusal of both of them, Judaism preferred to fling itself into the forlorn hope of Zealotism—in order to be retrieved as a mere fossil,² by the tardy wisdom of Johanan ben Zakkai, from the wantonly incurred cataclysm of A.D. 70.³

The same policy of imposing a religious allegiance by the use of political force was adopted, with similar consequences, by the Sasanidae, another dynasty of Syriac anti-Hellenists who succeeded in Iran and 'Irāq in accomplishing once for all that patriotic task of eradicating Hellenism in which the Maccabees were only momentarily successful in their own more exposed position west of the Euphrates.⁴ In the much larger domain over which the Sasanidae succeeded in effectively asserting their political authority, they pursued the Maccabaean policy of using their political power as an instrument for imposing their own religious practices and beliefs upon their subjects.⁵ In this forcible conversion of the eastern half of the Syriac World to Zoroastrianism the Sasanidae obtained, scale for scale, about the same measure of success as had rewarded the corresponding endeavours of the Maccabees in their miniature *Machtgebiet* in Palestine. The Sasanidae were successful in making Zoroastrianism the prevalent religion within the frontiers of their own empire; but even within these limits they never succeeded in getting rid of every remnant of obstinately non-Zoroastrian religious allegiance; and they were never able to make their forcibly established church secure against raids on the part of Nestorian Christianity and other non-Zoroastrian faiths from beyond the frontiers, or even against outbreaks of heresy—Manichaean, Mazdakite, and so on—within the bosom of the Zoroastrian Church itself. On the other hand, as the price of this partial success in imposing itself, with the aid of the secular arm, upon the subjects of the Sasanian Crown, Zoroastrianism had to make sacrifices which were as heavy as those which were exacted from Judaism by the religious policy of the Maccabees.

¹ For this non-religious function of Islam see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 73-7, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 127-8, above; and the present Annex, pp. 672-8, below.

² For Judaism as a fossil see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35; I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2; II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 235; and II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 286, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 75-6, above.

⁴ For the respective success of the Sasanidae and failure of the Maccabees to achieve an identical aim at different times and in different parts of the Syriac World see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285-6, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 125-6, above. For the humiliating debt of the Maccabees, for their brief political *floruit*, to the play of the Balance of Power between the rival Seleucid and Roman representatives of a Hellenic dominant minority see the observation quoted from Tacitus (*Histories*, Book V, chap. 8) in V. C (i) (d) 1, p. 390, footnote 3, above.

⁵ See Pettazzone, R.: *La Religione di Zarathustra* (Bologna 1920, Zanichelli), pp. 184-7.

In the first place a politically regimented Zoroastrian Church had to abandon the mission-fields at its gates to rival churches which had refrained from selling their birthright of freedom.¹ The Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, with its vast hinterlands in the Eurasian Steppe and on the Steppe's Far Eastern coasts, became a debatable ground between a heretical Manichaean version of Zoroastrianism² and a Mahayanian version of Buddhism³ and a Nestorian version of Christianity,⁴ while the orthodox Zoroastrian Church stood aside without taking a hand in the competition for so great a prize.⁵ At the same time the militantly Zoroastrian Empire of the Sasanidae failed as signally as the Jewish Zealots had failed in an earlier age to complete by force of arms the achievement of expelling an intrusive Hellenism from the holdings that it still retained on Syriac ground. The official Sasanian dynastic programme of reconstituting the Achaemenian Empire of Darius remained unfulfilled from first to last, notwithstanding the perpetual wars of aggression, with a view to its accomplishment, which were waged against the Roman Empire by the Sasanian Power over a period of four centuries;⁶ and the demonic effort of the Sasanian Pādishāh Khusrū Parwiz in the last and most devastating of these Romano-Persian wars (*gerebatur* A.D. 603-28) proved as fatal to the Zoroastrian cause as the forlorn hope of the Jewish Zealots in the greatest of the Romano-Jewish wars (*gerebatur* A.D. 66-70) had proved, in its time, to the cause of Judaism.

The duel between Khusrū Parwiz and his Roman antagonist Heraclius ended in a reversion to the *status quo ante bellum* which left the Zoroastrian aggressor still more seriously enfeebled than his Christian victim. And all that Khusrū achieved was to prepare the way for the swift accomplishment, by an Islam-under-arms, of a war-aim which had never been attained by a Zoroastrianism-under-arms from beginning to end of the Sasanian régime down to Khusrū's own day. On the morrow of Khusrū's deposition from the throne by his own war-weary subjects the Primitive Muslim Arabs duly completed the political reunion of the Syriac World by biting off the Syriac provinces of the Roman Empire and

¹ The lifelessness of Zoroastrianism under the Sasanian régime is pointed out by Ameer Ali: *The Spirit of Islam* (revised edition, London 1922, Christophers), pp. xxxv-vi.

² For the relation of Manichaeism to Zoroastrianism see V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex I, above. For the spread of Manichaeism across Central Asia see II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 375; II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, p. 450; and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 415 and 451, above.

³ For the journey of the Mahāvāna from India to the Far East see II. D (vi), Annex, vol. ii, p. 405, footnote 1, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 132-46, above.

⁴ For the spread of Nestorianism across Central Asia see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 236-8, above.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 3, pp. 249-50, and V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex I, pp. 578-9, above.

⁶ See V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 216, above.

at the same bite swallowing the Sasanian Empire whole; and this preliminary and superficial act of political union was followed up by the gradual spread of Islam, under the aegis of the Arab Caliphate, until it became the uniform faith of a dissolving Syriac Society.¹ By the same token the destiny which was seized upon by Islam was forfeited by Zoroastrianism; and at the end of the story the religion which had allowed itself to be enticed into the false position of depending for its own advancement upon the political power of the Sasanidae had to pay the penalty of being reduced to a fossilized state and being driven forth from its native ground to live a lingering life-in-death as a mere 'Diaspora' among the Gentiles in the alien environment of the western seaboard of India.²

The present plight of the Zoroastrian Church would have been inconceivable to the predecessors of our latter-day Parsees in the age when Zoroastrianism—in virtue of having been established as the official religion of the Sasanian Empire, with the whole strength of the Sasanian Government's right arm behind it—was being professed with at any rate an outward show of devotion by all but a small minority of the inhabitants of a vast tract of Asia extending from the Euphrates on the south-west to the Murghab on the north-east. And the extremeness of the change in the fortunes of this once established church of Iran and 'Irāq in the course of the last thirteen centuries raises the question whether another faith—namely, the Imāmī form of Shi'ism—which is prevalent to-day over an area almost co-extensive with the domain of Zoroastrianism in the Sasanian Age,³ may not perhaps be destined in some future chapter of its history to suffer an equally sensational eclipse, considering that the latest chapter in the history of the Imāmī sect of Shi'ism has borne a singularly close resemblance to the Sasanian chapter in the history of the Zoroastrianism which once enjoyed the same status as the Shi'ah in the same region.

As the now long since ruined material fortunes of Zoroastrianism were made—for a spell of four centuries—at a single stroke when Ardashir, the Sasanian prince of Fars, overthrew his Arsacid overlord and established Zoroastrianism as the official religion of his own new empire early in the third century of the Christian Era, so the present material fortunes of the Imāmī sect of Shi'ism have been made by the career and policy of Shāh Ismā'il Safawī,⁴ who,

¹ The reason why Islam escaped the usual nemesis of 'higher religions' that take to politics is discussed on pp. 672-8, below.

² For Zoroastrianism as a fossil see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 35; I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90-2; and II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 236, above.

³ For the present extension of the domain of Imāmī Shi'ism in Iran and 'Irāq see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 255, with footnote 3, above.

⁴ For Shāh Ismā'il's momentous career see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 366-88, above.

at the opening of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, emulated Ardashir's achievements by first overthrowing his Āq Qōyūnlū Türkmen overlord and then carving out a new empire of his own in which he high-handedly imposed his ancestral faith of Imāmī Shi'ism upon the Sunnī majority of the inhabitants of the subjugated territories.¹ Is this forcibly propagated Imāmī Shi'ism destined at some future date to liquidate the sinister debt which it owes to the secular arm of Shāh Ismā'il and his Safawī successors by paying in full the price which has now long since been paid by Zoroastrianism for its propagation by similar means at the hands of Ardashir and his successors on the throne of the Sasanidae? While the question whether the Imāmī sect of Shi'ism will ever be penalized to the extreme degree of being reduced to the plight of an expatriated 'Diaspora' is manifestly one that can only be answered by the course of future events which the present generation will not live to see, it is a verifiable matter of fact that the first instalment of the price that once had to be paid by Zoroastrianism for the political patronage of the Sasanidae has been paid for the political patronage of the Safawīs by the Imāmī sect of Shi'ism already.

The original note of this variety of Shi'ism—a note which at first distinguished it more sharply than any other feature from the rival Ismā'ilī school—was its adherence to the principle of Non-Violence. The primitive Imāmī Shi'is, like the *Agudath Israel* in Jewry to-day,² held the view that the Millennium which they were awaiting would be inaugurated in God's own time by God's own action; and accordingly they conceived it to be the duty of the true believers to wait passively for the advent of the eagerly desired New Age instead of presumptuously attempting to anticipate this divine event by any human action of theirs.³ Possibly it was thanks to this disarming tenet that the non-violent Imāmī form of Shi'ism had been allowed to survive in a predominantly Sunnī world in which the intolerably violent Ismā'ilī sect had invited and incurred an almost complete extermination.⁴ However that may be, there can be little doubt that the Non-Violence of the Imāmī Shi'ah was one of the attractions that enabled it, in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, to find a new mission-field, and to win a considerable number of new converts, in a universal

¹ For evidences of the numerical weakness of the Shi'ah in Iran on the eve of Shāh Ismā'il's forcible conversion of the Sunnī majority of the population see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 361-2, above.

² For the contrast between the passivism of the *Agudath Israel* and the activism of the Zionists see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 76; V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, p. 588; and V. C (i) (d) 4, Annex, p. 617, footnote 2, above.

³ For this original Imāmī doctrine see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 359, with footnote 2, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), Annex, vol. i, p. 358, above.

state which had recently been established by Ottoman empire-builders in the domain of Orthodox Christendom.¹ The statesmen who were shaping the policy of the Ottoman Empire in that age found no reason to mistrust or oppose the peaceful penetration of their dominions by a religion which was debarred by its own principles from trespassing on the prerogative of the secular power by going into politics on its own account. These fair prospects of the Imāmī Shī'ah in its Anatolian mission-field were compromised, however, when in the middle of the fifteenth century Shaykh Junayd Safawī (*jungebatur* A.D. 1447-60)²—the reigning representative of a family of religious adepts in Gilān which by this time had come to be recognized as entitled to a hereditary spiritual leadership of the Imāmī Shī'ī community—betrayed one of the fundamental tenets of the sect of which he was the head by wantonly shifting the sanction for his authority from a spiritual to a military basis.³ In the next chapter of the story the Imāmī Shī'ī

¹ For the spread of the Imāmī form of Shī'ism into that region in that age see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 365 and 382-3, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 111, above.

² For Shaykh Junayd's career see Hinz, W.: *Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im Fünfzehnten Jahrhundert* (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 22-49, and V. Minorsky's review of Hinz's book in the *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1937, Heft 23, 6th June, pp. 953-7. The pugnacity and aggressiveness of Junayd's character are shown up by the chronicle of his actions and experiences. His patent appetite for temporal power quickly made him suspect to his own sovereign Jahānshāh Qāra Qöyünlü; and, when he was deposed by this Türkmen war-lord from the headship of the Safawī Order of Ardabil, the Ottoman Government prudently refused him asylum in Ottoman territory, while those who did show him hospitality were soon given cause to repent of their good nature. In Qāramān he fell into a theological dispute with the head of the dervish *tekke* at Qöniyah which had received him as its guest, and his method of conducting the controversy was to try to raise a band of wild highlanders against the public authorities! In the dominions of the Mamlūks, to which he then managed to escape, he made himself such a nuisance in the derelict Crusader castle which he rented on the Jabal Arsūs, that the religious authorities at Aleppo complained to the Government at Cairo, with the result that Junayd was ejected from his castle by force of arms. The Ottoman viceroy of Jāniq, whither he next repaired, was glad to see him ride off on a holy war against the Orthodox Christian principality of Trebizond. When this pious enterprise miscarried, the Safawī adventurer settled down for three years at Uzun Hasan Aq Qöyünlü's court at Diyarbakr, where he received his host's sister in marriage. But even in a bed of roses Junayd was unable to rest. From Diyarbakr he returned to his native Ardabil, was expelled for the second time, and met his death in an unprovoked invasion of the dominions of the Shirvānshāh.

³ Shaykh Junayd's momentous new departure from the principles of the Imāmī Shī'ah and from the traditions of his own House has been touched upon in I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 366-7, above. In that context it has been suggested that Shaykh Junayd was tempted into taking up arms and going into politics by the sudden creation of a political vacuum in Iran and 'Irāq through the collapse of the Timurid Empire upon the death of Shāh Rukh in the very year of Shaykh Junayd's own accession (compare the similar temptation which beset and overcame the Maccabees upon the collapse of the Seleucid Empire in the latter part of the second century B.C.). In this connexion it may be recalled (see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 364, above) that, although the Safawī House had acquired the leadership of the Imāmī Shī'ī sect, it had not itself originally been of the Imāmī, or even of the Shī'ī, persuasion. The eponym of the House, Shaykh Safiyū'd-Dīn (*wvebat circa* A.D. 1252-1334) appears to have been a Sunni, and the first head of the House who is known for certain to have been an Imāmī Shī'ī is Shaykh Junayd's grandfather Shaykh Khwāja 'Alī (*pontificali munere jungebatur* A.D. 1392-1427). These non-Imāmī antecedents in the family tradition of Shaykh Junayd perhaps partly account for his lapse from the principles of a faith which his grandfather may have been the first member of the family to embrace.

missionary enterprise in the Ottoman Empire was frustrated altogether when Shaykh Junayd's grandson Shāh Ismā'il (*imperabat* A.D. 1500-24) carried his grandfather's resort to militancy a long—though not an illogical—stage farther by setting himself the dual ambition of winning an oecumenical empire by force of arms and then using a ubiquitous political power as an instrument for imposing his ancestral faith upon Mankind as a world religion.¹

In another context² we have seen that, in the event, Shāh Ismā'il failed signally to achieve his ambition in either of its two related aspects. His twenty-five-years-long career of military aggression did not avail either to expand the principality which he had inherited from his grandfather to the dimensions of a universal state or to promote the religion which he had inherited from his great-great-grandfather to the rank of a universal church. All that he achieved was to found a new empire in the central portion of the Iranic World and to impose the Imāmī form of Shi'ism by force upon a majority of the inhabitants of this broad but very far from world-wide realm.³ Even on the political plane his achievement was disappointing; for the extent of the territory which he was able to bequeath to his descendants was conspicuously narrower than that of the empire which Timur Lenk had left behind him a hundred years back; and on the religious plane the results of Shāh Ismā'il's career were utterly disastrous for the religion of which he was the official pontiff and champion.

One consequence—which followed inevitably from Ismā'il's general policy, even if the direct responsibility for it cannot be brought home to him in the present state of the evidence—was that the head of the Imāmī mission in the Ottoman dominions, Shāh Qūlī, took a cue from his Safawī master by taking up arms; and this resort to militancy was fatal to the cause of the Shī'ah in the Orthodox Christian World; for the insurrection of the Anatolian Shī'is against the Ottoman Government in A.D. 1511 was answered by the extermination of this disloyal Shī'ī 'Diaspora' in A.D. 1514, at the command of the Ottoman Pādishāh Selīm the Grim.⁴ Therewith the Imāmī Shī'ah lost its chance of becoming the universal church of a disintegrating Orthodox Christian Society; and in our own day, again, this would-be oecumenical religion has been inhibited, by the lasting effects of its irretrievable error of going into politics, from entering another new mission-field of even wider scope and greater promise. The orthodox form of the Imāmī Shī'ah is not to be found in the company of those 'higher

¹ For the evidence for Shāh Ismā'il's aims see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 367-8, above.

² In I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 366-400, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 392, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 362, 365, 382, and 384, above.

religions' that have latterly begun to compete for the conversion of souls in a Westernized 'Great Society'. On the other hand the list of competitors does include an unofficial and heretical offshoot of the Imāmī established church of the Empire of Iran in the shape of the Bahā'iyah,¹ a free daughter church which has reverted to that principle of Non-Violence which has been abandoned with such disastrous results by its politically compromised mother. The Bahā'iyah sect has been excommunicated by the Imāmī Mujtahids and been evicted from its Iranian homeland; but it is already apparent that these bitter experiences of persecution and expatriation have served this infant religion in good stead; for it has thereby been driven into looking beyond the Mediterranean and the Atlantic for new worlds to conquer in the strength of a principle which is apt to work as an 'open sesame' for any missionary religion that has the faith to embrace it.²

The new departure into which the Imāmī sect of the Shī'ah was led by Shaykh Junayd and his grandson Shāh Ismā'il has an analogue in the Hindu World in the militarization of the religious fraternity of the Sikhs³ by the sixth and tenth gurus in the Sikh pontifical succession. The sixth guru, Har Govind (*fungebatur* A.D. 1606-45), did for the Sikhs what Shaykh Junayd did for the Imāmī Shī'ah by putting arms into the hands of a community which his predecessors had already transformed from an embryonic church into an embryonic state;⁴ and the role of Shāh Ismā'il, the Imāmī militarist *à outrance*, was played in Sikh history by the tenth guru, Govind Singh (*fungebatur* A.D. 1675-1708).⁵ Morally the two militant Sikh gurus were perhaps less blameworthy than

¹ For the Bahā'iyah sect and the Bābī movement out of which it sprang see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 174-6, above.

² It will be seen that the Bahā'iyah stands to the Imāmī Shī'i established church of Iran as Manichaeism once stood to a Zoroastrian established church of Iran. On this analogy it will further be seen that the successful propagation of the Bahā'iyah, beyond the western bounds of Iran, across 'Iraḳ and Syria into Europe and America matches the successful propagation of Manichaeism, beyond the north-eastern bounds of Iran, across the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin on to the Eurasian Steppe and into the Far East (see p. 660, above).

³ For the origins of Sikhism see IV. C (iii) (b) 13, vol. iv, p. 231; V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 106; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 537, footnote 3, above. For the militarization of the Sikhs see Macauliffe, M. A.: 'How the Sikhs became a Militant Race' in *Supplement to the Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, vol. xxxii, July 1903, No. 152, pp. 330-58; eundem: *The Sikh Religion* (Oxford 1909, Clarendon Press, 6 vols.), lives of the sixth and tenth gurus in vols. iv and v respectively.

⁴ There seems to have been an intermediate stage in the evolution of the Sikh military machine out of the Sikh religious fraternity which had been founded by Nanak about a hundred years before Har Govind's time. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era the Sikh community seems to have assumed a form which was already political though it was not yet warlike (see Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 268). Guru Angad's advice to a Mughal soldier who had come to ask him for spiritual guidance was that he should do his military duty; and the military virtues were commended by Guru Arjan, who was Har Govind's father and immediate predecessor (Macauliffe, *J.U.S.I.I.*, vol. cit., pp. 331 and 334).

⁵ See Eliot, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 270.

the two militant Safawī shaykhs; for, whereas the Safawīs were tempted into militancy by the sudden collapse of an aggressive Timurid empire which left the oppressor's former victims in the presence of a political vacuum,¹ the Sikhs were goaded into militancy by the tyrannical oppression of an aggressive Timurid empire which at that time still possessed and exercised both the will and the power to put its victims to death.² Yet, however we may assess the relative degrees of moral guilt, the penalty for the

¹ See p. 663, footnote 3, above.

² The fifth guru, Arjan, who was the father and immediate predecessor of Har Govind, was summoned to Lahore by Jahangir, obeyed the summons without recalcitrance, and was no sooner in the Mughal Emperor's power than he was commanded by the tyrant not to maintain any tenets that were incompatible with either Islam or Hinduism. When the guru refused to obey this Imperial command he was put to torture, and he died in captivity—enjoining, as his last injunctions, upon his son and heir Har Govind that he was to bear arms and to maintain an army (Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, vol. iii, pp. 90-101; *J.U.S.I.I.*, vol. cit., p. 334). Again, the ninth guru, Tej Bahadur, was a man of peace who fell foul of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzib over the latter's misguided policy of trying to impose Islam by force upon his Hindu subjects. In answer to an appeal for support from the persecuted Brahmans of Kashmir, Tej Bahadur authorized them to tell Aurangzib that they were prepared to accept Islam if the Emperor could first succeed in converting Tej Bahadur himself. Thereupon Tej Bahadur was summoned by Aurangzib to Delhi; he obeyed the reigning Mughal Emperor's summons, as his ancestor and forerunner Arjan had obeyed Jahangir's; and history repeated itself to the bitter end; for Aurangzib no sooner had Tej Bahadur in his power than he put him under arrest, ordered him to embrace Islam, and finally beheaded him in A.D. 1675 (Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, vol. iv, pp. 377-87; *J.U.S.I.I.*, vol. cit., pp. 341-3). It will be seen that Har Govind took to the sword under incomparably greater provocation than Junayd, whose father and predecessor Shaykh Ibrahim had died peacefully in his bed, and whose grievance against the world was the purely personal one of having been himself deposed, in favour of his uncle, from the headship of the Safawī fraternity, and having then been driven into exile (Hinz, W.: *Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im Fünfzehnten Jahrhundert* (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 23-4). It is true that Shāh Ismā'il, unlike his grandfather Shaykh Junayd, was able to find in the mission of avenging his father's death a handsome pretext for his own persistence in his father's and his grandfather's warlike courses. Yet Shaykh Haydar Safawī's blood hardly cried aloud for vengeance so imperatively as Guru Arjan's or Guru Tej Bahadur's. For, whereas these two Sikh gurus were men of peace who had been inveigled into a tyrant's power and had then been put to death in cold blood, the Safawī Shaykh Haydar was a hard-bitten militarist who met his death on the battle-field in a war in which he himself was the aggressor (Hinz, op. cit., pp. 83-8). Thus a comparison of the respective histories of the militarization of the Imāmī Shī'is and the Sikhs seems to show that the Sikh gurus' aberration was less wanton than that of the Safawī shaykhs.

Both Har Govind and Govind Singh were, no doubt, fully conscious of the new departure that they were making. Har Govind signalized his accession to the guruship on the receipt of the news of his father's death in captivity by refusing to be invested with the hat and cord of a faqir, which were the Sikh guru's traditional insignia, and donning, instead, a turban with a royal aigrette and a sword-belt (Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, vol. iv, p. 2; *J.U.S.I.I.*, vol. cit., pp. 334-6). Govind Singh—consciously following in his grandfather Har Govind's footsteps—trained his own children to arms, inculcated militarism in his followers by propaganda, instituted the military initiation rite of 'Baptism by the Dagger', and boasted 'that he would change his followers from jackals to tigers, and kill hawks with sparrows' (Macauliffe, *J.U.S.I.I.*, vol. cit., pp. 343-7). Yet neither Har Govind nor Govind Singh was able to carry his policy of militarization without opposition in his own household. Both gurus were opposed by the title collectors of the fraternity, and Har Govind was also opposed by his counsellor Bhai Budha and by his mother—the widow of the murdered Guru Arjan (Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, vol. iv, p. 3, and vol. v, p. 6; *J.U.S.I.I.*, vol. cit., p. 335). Even after Har Govind's newly raised army had met and defeated the Mughals on the battle-field, a Sikh who was noted for his piety exhorted the guru to win security against attack by detachment from 'This World'—to which Har Govind could only reply that he was now too deeply implicated in mundane affairs to be able to draw back (Macauliffe, *J.U.S.I.I.*, vol. cit., p. 337).

social aberration was much the same. As a result of having taken up arms the Sikhs eventually succeeded in taking their revenge upon the descendants of their oppressors Jahangir and Awrangzib.¹ When the Timurid Mughal empire in India collapsed, in its turn, like Timur's own empire in South-Western Asia three hundred years earlier, the Sikhs were able to make themselves masters of one of the derelict provinces of this alien universal state into which a distracted Hindu World had been momentarily gathered together by the labours of Akbar and his successors; but in the act of achieving this vulgar worldly ambition the Sikhs were at the same time depriving the syncretistic Hindu-Muslim faith which they had inherited from their forefathers of any prospect which it might once have had of becoming the universal church of a Hindu Society in dissolution. On the religious side the Sikhs have even less success to boast of than the Safawis or Sasanidae or Maccabees. They have not even succeeded in imposing their own religion upon a majority of the inhabitants of those territories in North-Western India in which, for more than a century, the Sikhs themselves were the political masters. In the Panjab to-day the adherents of the Sikh religion account for no more than eleven per cent. of the present population of the province,² and in the total present population of the British Indian Empire the fraction represented by the Sikhs is infinitesimally small. Nor has the Sikh religion gained anything from the abrupt extinction of the Sikh 'successor-states' of the Mughal Empire by British arms in the fifth decade of the nineteenth century. *A priori* it might have been expected that the conversion of Hindu souls to Sikhism—which had received a check when Har Govind transformed the Sikh community from a politico-religious fraternity into a nation-in-arms, and when Govind Singh led his war-band on the war-path³—would have

¹ Eventually, not immediately. The immediate effect of Govind Singh's plunge into 'totalitarian' militarism was the total defeat and destruction of his army by the combined forces of the Mughal Power and the local Panjābi highland chiefs (compare the total defeat of the Safawī Shaykh Haydar's army by a combination between the forces of the Āq Qöyünlü war-lord Ya'qub and those of the Shirvānshāh in A.D. 1488). Though Govind Singh (unlike Haydar) escaped alive from the stricken field, his two eldest sons were killed in the rout, and his two youngest sons were betrayed to the Mughals and were put to death after having refused to accept the alternative of apostasy. Govind Singh himself became a fugitive in disguise, with his following reduced to five companions. Though he just outlived his conqueror Awrangzib, he never recovered his temporal power, and in dying he bequeathed his succession, not to any human guru, but to the Granth (Macauliffe, *J.U.S.I.I.*, vol. cit., pp. 350-5; Farquhar, J. N.: *Modern Religious Movements in India* (New York, 1919, Macmillan), p. 337).

² The *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, vol. 1 (London 1930, H.M. Stationery Office), p. 60, estimates the Sikh element in the population of the Panjab at 2½ million out of a total of 20½ million.

³ 'The Khālsā became strong to resist the Mughals, but their organization cut them off from their fellow countrymen, and made them practically a new caste. The transformation of the church into an army produced another evil result: living preaching ceased among the Sikhs, and their religious life began to go down' (Farquhar, J. N., op. cit., pp. 337-8).

begun to make progress again as soon as the Khālsā had been relieved of the incubus of military and political power through being forcibly reincorporated into the alien universal state which re-established itself in India, in the shape of a British instead of a Mughal Rāj, after the interlude of anarchy which had followed the Mughals' collapse.¹ Yet, so far from having profited by this salutary divorce from incongruous military and political activities, the Sikh religion has latterly shown a tendency to merge itself again into the circumambient Hinduism out of which it was originally differentiated through being blended with an Islamic alloy by the syncretistic religious genius of a Kabīr and a Nanak.²

We cannot close this survey of the effects that are apt to follow from the attempt to impose a religious allegiance by the use of the secular arm without turning to the ecclesiastical map of the modern Western World in order to inquire how far the present boundaries between the respective domains of Catholicism and Protestantism have been determined by the arms or the diplomacy of the parochial secular 'successor-states' of a medieval *Respublica Christiana*. No doubt the influence of external military and political factors upon the outcome of the religious conflict in Western Christendom in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ought not to be rated too high; for, to take two extreme cases, it is difficult to imagine that the action of any secular authority—however potent or however ruthless—could have availed either to retain the Baltic countries within the fold of the Catholic Church or to bring the Mediterranean countries over into the Protestant camp. At the same time there was an intermediate and debatable zone in which the play of the military and political forces that intervened in the religious strife of that age was certainly influential and was perhaps decisive; and this zone embraces such important portions of the modern Western World as Germany and the Low Countries and France and England. It was in Germany, in particular, that the classical formula *Cujus Regio Ejus Religio* was invented and applied;³ and we may take it that in Central Europe, at least, the secular princes

¹ The episode of Sikh political dominion in the Panjab between the fall of the Mughal Rāj and the rise of the British Rāj in India presents an analogy with the similar episode of Maccabaeen political dominion in Palestine between the fall of the Seleucid Empire and the extension of the Roman Empire over the ex-Seleucid territories west of the Euphrates (see V. C (i) (d) 1, p. 390, and the present Annex, p. 659, footnote 4, above).

² For this tendency of Sikhism to relapse into pure Hinduism see Eliot, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 272-3. Compare the disappearance, in the Far Eastern World, of the syncretistic Taoist-Christian religion of the T'ai'p'ing, which turned militant (see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 107, above) like the Hindu-Islamic religion of Sikhism, and unlike the Hindu-Christian Brahṃō Samāj.

³ This formula has been touched upon already, in a different context, in IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, pp. 221-2, above.

—as well as those shepherds of souls who had gone into politics and had acquired the temporal sovereignty over some of the fragments of a shattered *Respublica Christiana*¹—did successfully make use of their military and political power in order to force down the throats of their subjects whichever of the two competing forms of Western Christianity the local potentate happened to favour for his own part. In the same glance we can also take the measure of the damage which our Western Christianity, Catholic and Protestant alike, has suffered in the sequel as a penalty for having thus allowed itself to become dependent on political patronage and consequently subservient to *raison d'état*.

One of the first instalments of the price which has been paid for these latter-day political liaisons by the Western Christian churches up to date has been the loss of the Catholic Church's mission-field in Japan; for the seedlings of Catholic Christianity which had been planted in Japan by Jesuit missionaries before the close of the sixteenth century were uprooted before the middle of the seventeenth century by the deliberate action of the rulers of a newly founded Japanese universal state, because these Japanese statesmen had come to the conclusion—after a cool-headed study of the evidence at their command—that the Catholic Church was an insidiously pliant ecclesiastical instrument of the formidable political ambitions of the Spanish Crown.² This forfeiture of a large and promising mission-field *in partibus infidelium* must be estimated, however, as a trifling loss by comparison with the spiritual impoverishment which the policy of *Cujus Regio Ejus Religio* was to inflict upon Western Christianity on the home front. For the readiness of all the competing factions of the Western Christian Church in the Age of the Western Wars of Religion to seek a short cut to victory by condoning, and even demanding, the imposition of their own doctrines upon the adherents of rival faiths by the application of political force was a spectacle which sapped the foundations of all belief in the souls for whose allegiance the warring churches were competing.³

A Louis XIV might be successful in forcing upon the Protestant minority of his subjects the tyrannical and inhuman choice between renouncing their religious convictions and being driven out of their ancestral homes to find asylum in distant countries out of

¹ For this enormity see IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, pp. 220-1, above.

² The Western traders in whose wake the Jesuit missionaries had arrived in Japan had been, not Spanish, but Portuguese; but the Portuguese Crown had subsequently come to be associated with the Spanish in a personal union in which Spain was the predominant partner.

³ The sceptical and cynical spirit of the consequent Enlightenment is touched upon in IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 142-3 and 150; in IV. C (iii) (b) 4, vol. iv, p. 184; in IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 227-8; and in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), Annex, vol. iv, pp. 643-5, above; and in V. C (ii) (b), vol. vi, pp. 316-18, below.

reach of the persecuting arm of the Most Christian King.¹ But, although the tyrant could thus enforce, within the frontiers of his own dominions, an outward show of conformity with his own creed and rite, he could neither dragoon his dissenting subjects' consciences nor prevent his cynically irreligious and childishly incongruous method of promoting an ecclesiastical cause from bringing religion of every kind into discredit in the secret places of the heart to which no spy could penetrate. Louis XIV's methods of barbarism eradicated Protestantism out of the spiritual soil of France only to clear the ground for an alternative crop of scepticism; and the spiritual history of France since the latter part of the seventeenth century is merely one outstanding example of an experience that has been common to the whole of our Western Society. In England, for instance, we can see the same sceptical temper setting in—here in reaction against a militant religiosity which had fed the flames of the Civil War—at the moment of the Restoration of A.D. 1660; and we can watch it setting hard after the Glorious Revolution of A.D. 1688. In fine, the effect of the unholy *mariage de convenance* between Religion and Politics was to make Religion itself anathema; and by the end of the seventeenth century the Lucretian verdict on Religion—'tantum religio potuit suadere malorum'²—had come to be endorsed by the enlightened minds of a paganly modern Western World. In the lurid light of the Religious Wars Religion now appeared in the guise of a sinister and anti-social frenzy—a veritable Erinys who was as ruthless in enlisting the secular potentate's sword as she was unscrupulous in paying her political hirelings in ecclesiastical coin for military services rendered. Here was a Fury who might have gone on torturing poor Western Humanity for ever more, if a rescue party of sharp-sighted philosophers had not made the opportune discovery that this demon had an Achilles' heel. The weak spot of Religion was its ridiculousness; and any man or woman whose eyes had been opened to this aspect of the maleficent power was thereby rendered immune against ever again being goaded into homicidal mania by the burlesque Fury's scourge. A horror relieved by ridicule was the defensive posture which had been assumed towards Religion by enlightened Western minds before the seventeenth century was over.³ It was an attitude of mind

¹ For the Huguenots' response to the challenge of penalization see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 250, above.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book I, l. 101.

³ 'It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as if in the present age this were an agreed point among all people of discernment, and nothing remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals for its having so

which sterilized Fanaticism at the cost of extinguishing Faith. And this state of mind has lasted from the seventeenth century into the twentieth.

Indeed, in our time this repudiation of a spiritual principle which is no doubt exposed, in human hearts, to the danger of being poisoned or perverted, but which is none the less the breath of human life, has been carried to such lengths in all parts of a Westernized 'Great Society' that it is beginning at last to be recognized for what it is. It is being recognized, that is to say, as the supreme danger to the spiritual health and even to the material existence of the Western body social—a deadlier danger, by far, than any of our hotly canvassed and loudly advertised political and economic maladies. This spiritual evil is now too flagrant to be ignored; but it is easier to diagnose the disease than to prescribe a remedy; for a lost religious faith is not like a standard article of commerce that can be ordered ready-made from a multiple store, nor again is it like an unquestioningly obedient dog that can be driven off at one moment with a kick and summoned back the next moment with a whistle. The spirit bloweth where it listeth, and we cannot expect it to revisit us on call in response to a tardy and casual summons. It will be hard indeed to refill the spiritual vacuum which has been hollowed in our Western hearts by a progressive decay of religious belief that has been going on by this time for some two and a half centuries; and this problem—which is the most formidable and at the same time the most urgent of all the problems that are remorselessly crowding in upon the present generation—has its origin, as we have seen, in a long continuing yet still unexhausted anti-Caesaro-papistical reaction.¹ We are still reacting against a subordination of Religion to Politics which was the crime of our sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century forebears.² The policy of *Cujus Regio Ejus Religio* is revenging itself up to the hilt, unto the thirteenth and fourteenth generation, upon the children of fathers who perpetrated and condoned this enormity.

If we take a synoptic view of the several surviving forms of Western Christianity in their present state, and compare them in

long interrupted the pleasures of the world.'—Butler, Bishop Joseph: *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*, advertisement (dated May, 1736) prefixed to the first edition.

¹ For the term 'Caesaro-papism' see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 347 and 352, above.

² This still flowing lava-stream of *karma* can be traced back behind the Laodicean Enlightenment and the fanatical Wars of Religion to a medieval fountain-head; for in other contexts we have observed how the secularism and the parochialism which are two of the severest lesions in the social system of our Western Civilization in the Modern Age are due, both alike, to an excessively violent reaction against an excessively autocratic and centralizing tendency to which the Papacy succumbed in the course of its internecine conflict with the Hohenstaufen (see IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, pp. 214-22, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 512-84, above).

respect of their relative vitality, we shall find that this varies inversely with the degree to which each of these sects has succumbed within the last four centuries to secular control. Unquestionably Catholicism is the form of Western Christianity that is showing the most vigorous signs of life to-day; and the Catholic Church—in spite of the lengths to which modern Catholic princes have gone, in certain countries and at certain times, towards asserting their own secular control over the life of the Church within their frontiers—has still never lost the inestimable advantage of being united in an oecumenical communion under the presidency of a single supreme ecclesiastical authority, while in the meantime ‘the Princes of the Church’ have, unwillingly yet auspiciously, been relieved, by the nineteenth-century encroachments of the secular Powers, of the fearful incubus of the ecclesiastical principalities.¹ Next to the Catholic Church in order of present vitality we shall probably find ourselves placing those ‘free churches’ of the Protestant persuasion which have extricated themselves from the control of the secular Governments in whose pockets these marsupial churches started life.² And we shall certainly place at the bottom of the list the Protestant ‘established churches’ which still remain tied to the body politic of this or that modern Western parochial state.³

The moral of this odious comparison seems plain. The diversity in the fortunes of the several fractions of the Western Christian Church in the Modern Age of our Western history is a piece of evidence which would appear to complete our empirical proof of the proposition that a religion stands to lose far more than it can hope to gain by asking for, or submitting to, the patronage of the civil power. There is, however, one conspicuous exception to this apparent rule which will have to be accounted for before the rule can be allowed to pass muster; and this exception is the case of Islam; for Islam did succeed in becoming the universal church of a dissolving Syriac Society⁴ in spite of having been politically compromised at an earlier stage and in an apparently more decisive way than any of the religions that we have passed under review in this survey up to this point.

We have seen that Zoroastrianism was compromised by the action of a dynasty of secular princes in an age when the Zoroas-

¹ For the extinction of the temporal power of the Pope and of the Transalpine Catholic prince-bishops see IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, pp. 220-1, above. In depriving these prelates of their political authority the secular Powers of the modern Western World have perhaps done the same unintentional and unwelcome service to Catholicism as the British Rāj in India has done to the religion of the Sikhs in extinguishing the temporal power of the Khālsā (see the present Annex, pp. 667-8, above).

² For the free Protestant churches see IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, p. 222, footnote 2, above.

³ See IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, pp. 221-2, above.

⁴ For this achievement of Islam see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 235; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 287-8; V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 127-8; and V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 370-1, above.

trian Church had already been in existence for at least three-quarters of a millennium and perhaps for a full thousand years.¹ Judaism was compromised by the action of a family of priests who took up arms against a persecutor at a time when they were not themselves the responsible heads of the Jewish hierarchy. The Sikh community and the Imāmī sect of the Islamic Shī'ah were both of them compromised in a more serious way, because they were both of them launched on a new career of militancy by pontiffs who—unlike the Maccabees—were the responsible heads of their respective churches at the time when they severally committed this flagrant breach of their spiritual trust. The case of the orthodox and original Islam, however, looks at first sight as though it were still more extreme than that of its heretical Imāmī offshoot; for the orthodox Islam was politically compromised within the lifetime of its founder by the action of no less responsible a person than the founder himself.

In another context² we have noticed that the public career of the Prophet Muhammad falls into two sharply distinct and seemingly almost contradictory chapters. In the first chapter Muhammad was entirely occupied in the preaching of a religious revelation by methods of evangelization that were purely pacific; in the second chapter he was mainly occupied in building up a political and military power and in using this power in the very way which has turned out, in other cases, to be disastrous for a religion that takes to it.³ In this Medinese chapter Muhammad used his new-found material power for the purpose of enforcing conformity with at any rate the outward observances of the religion which he had founded in the foregoing chapter of his career, before his momentous withdrawal from Mecca to Medina; and, on this showing, the *Hijrah* ought to mark the date which saw the ruin of Islam, and not the date which saw the making of its fortunes, if we are right in the thesis which we have established inductively as a result of our empirical survey up to this point. How are we to explain the hard fact that a religion which was launched upon the World as the militant faith of a barbarian war-band on the war-path should have succeeded in becoming a universal church in spite of having started under a spiritual handicap that might have been expected, on all analogies, to prove prohibitive?

When we set ourselves this problem in these terms, we shall find

¹ For the wideness of the discrepancy between the dates that have been assigned to the Prophet Zarathustra by different schools of modern Western scholarship see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 121, above.

² In III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 276–8, and III. C (ii) (b), Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 466–72, above.

³ For the political career of Muhammad see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 277–8, with III. C (ii) (b), Annex II, above.

several partial explanations which, between them, may perhaps amount to a solution.

In the first place we shall be able to discount a tendency which is rife—at least among Christian critics—to over-estimate the extent of the use of force in the propagation of Islam even after the *Hijrah*. For example, in the hour of Muhammad's long-delayed triumph over the men of his own house—those implacable Meccan enemies of his who had rejected his message and had driven him into exile—the now at last victorious prophet-under-arms who had so long been without honour in his own country distinguished himself by the moderation of the terms on which he accepted the capitulation of his obdurate kinsmen the Quraysh; and this example of self-restraint was emulated by the Prophet's successors in the temporal leadership of the Islamic Commonwealth. The show of adherence to the new religion which they exacted by force was limited to the performance of a small number of not very onerous external observances; and the forcible imposition of even this perfunctory conformity upon conquered unbelievers was not attempted beyond the limits of the Arabian no-man's-land in which the new state was filling a political vacuum and in which the new religion was supplanting, for the most part, nothing higher than a primitive paganism.¹ In the former dependencies and dominions of the Roman and Sasanian Governments which now fell into the hands of the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors, no compulsion to embrace Islam was applied to any of 'the People of the Book'.² The choice which was actually offered to the conquered populations outside Arabia itself was not 'Islam or death'; it was 'Islam or a super-tax'.³ Even the Arab tribes on the Syrian

¹ The Jewish and Christian communities in the Yaman and the Jewish communities in the Hijāz were no more than islets in a sea of Arabian paganism. The extermination of the Hijāzi Jews and the forcible conversion of the Yamanī 'People of the Book' are among the worst of the political crimes that have to be laid to the account of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors. These were, however, exceptions and not the rule of primitive Islamic policy.

² See IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 225-6, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 204-5, below. Officially 'the People of the Book', who, according to the *Shari'ah*, were entitled to religious toleration if once they tendered their political submission to the Islamic state, included the Jews and the Christians but not the Zoroastrians. In practice, however, the Zoroastrians were accorded, as a matter of grace, the toleration which the two Biblical sects received as a matter of right. In the Qur'an the Zoroastrians are only mentioned in the following passage:

'Surely those who believe [i.e. the Muslims] and those who are Jews and the Sabians and the Christians and the Magians and those who associate [others with Allah, i.e. the polytheists]—surely Allah will decide between them on the day of resurrection.'—Surah xxii. 17.

This solitary reference to the Zoroastrians in the Qur'an leaves their status in doubt. To which of the two sub-groups of non-Muslims is the Prophet consigning them? Is he intending the reader to bracket the Magians with the three sets of 'People of the Book' whose names immediately precede that of the Magians in this catalogue? Or with the polytheists, who are mentioned immediately after? In the event the Prophet's successors humanely and wisely gave the Zoroastrians the benefit of the doubt.

³ See IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, p. 226, footnote 2, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, p. 630, above.

and Mesopotamian and 'Irāqī fringes of the North Arabian Steppe who, before the conquest, had served the Roman and Sasanian Powers as their wardens of the Arabian marches,¹ were allowed by their victorious Muslim Arab kinsmen to remain faithful to Christianity if they chose;² and indeed in the first instance all but an inconsiderable minority of the newly elevated imperial people's vast concourse of newly conquered subjects took an honourable advantage of the tolerant choice that was offered them, and opted for paying super-tax in preference to turning renegade. Nor was this option made invidious for the non-Muslim subjects of the Arab Caliphate under the Umayyad régime which came to stay for a century after the brief antecedent dispensation of the four pre-Umayyad Commanders of the Faithful;³ for the Umayyad Caliphs were Laodiceans to a man,⁴ with the exception of 'Umar II (*imperator* A.D. 717-20).⁵

It was this century of Umayyad tolerance that gave Islam its opportunity to make its fortune by providing a universal church for the Syriac World instead of remaining merely the sectarian religion of a band of barbarian conquerors.⁶ It may be true that

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 73, footnote 1, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 398, above.

² See, for example, the evidence for the remarkably considerate treatment of the Christian Arab tribe of the Banu Taghlib, which is presented in Arnold, T. W.: *The Preaching of Islam*, 2nd ed. (London 1913, Constable), pp. 49-50. The Banu Taghlib's grazing grounds were in 'Irāq 'Arabī, in the environs of Ctesiphon.

³ The reigns of the first four Caliphs, taken together, lasted officially from A.D. 632 to A.D. 661, while the Caliphs of the Umayyad Dynasty reigned officially from A.D. 661 to A.D. 750 from first to last. *De facto*, however, the founder of the Umayyad Dynasty, Mu'āwiyah, had been master of Syria for some twenty years before his accession to the Caliphate was officially recognized after the death of the Caliph 'Alī (Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), p. 35). A striking piece of Christian testimony to the popularity of the Umayyad Caliph Yazīd I (*imperator* A.D. 680-3) has been cited in V. C (i) (c) 3, p. 226, above.

⁴ The prevailing attitude of the Umayyads towards Islam has been touched upon already in V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 128, footnote 5, above. For the scepticism, towards all religions, of the Caliph Mu'āwiyah, who not only founded the Umayyad Dynasty but also set the tone for his successors, see Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 84. The lukewarmness of this dynasty of caliphs towards the established religion of the commonwealth of which they were the secular heads is not at all surprising when it is remembered that the Umayyads were one of the leading families of that Meccan aristocracy which had obstinately opposed the Prophet Muhammad in defence of its vested interest in the local pagan divinities whose worship had made Mecca a goal of pilgrimage before Muhammad had called upon his countrymen to throw this lucrative local paganism away. After the Prophet's final triumph the Umayyads, like the rest of the Quraysh, were quick to see that their cranky fellow tribesman who had eventually succeeded in forcing his own new-fangled religion down their throats had incidentally brought within their reach opportunities of aggrandizement of which they could never have dreamed in 'the Days of Ignorance'. But the skill which was shown by Mu'āwiyah and his descendants in turning the unpalatable results of Muhammad's work to their own advantage, by entering into the fruits of their victorious adversary's material labours, did not imply any enthusiasm on their part for the religion of the prophet on whom they had contrived to take this ironical revenge. (On this point see further pp. 676-7, below.)

⁵ See Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 167.

⁶ It was in this latter capacity—as the distinctive faith of the trans-frontier barbarians in the Arabian section of the no-man's-land beyond the Syrian *limes* of the Roman Empire—that Islam made its first epiphany (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 276-7; Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 450-1; V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 128; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 230, above).

this service was bound to be performed for that world in that age by some religion or other; for at that time the Syriac Society was craving to recover a unity which it had lost as a result of having been overrun by Hellenism a thousand years back; and, now that a unitary Syriac universal state had at last been re-established in the shape of the Arab Caliphate,¹ it was only to be expected that this reunion on the superficial plane of politics should be extended to a deeper plane of life through the establishment of a Syriac universal church within the political framework which the Caliphate had provided. This universal church must be the institutional embodiment of some 'higher religion'; but which of the religions in the field would now bring this body ecclesiastic to life? It by no means followed that Islam would succeed in an enterprise which a number of older religions—Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Nestorianism, Monophysitism—had already essayed without success.² Indeed, a garbled barbarian version of the indigenous Syriac faiths—and this was what Islam was by origin³—might actually have been expected, *a priori*, to prove less attractive to Syriac souls than the finer alternatives which they had already discarded. In these intrinsically adverse circumstances Islam, so far from achieving its historic success, would assuredly have suffered the same fate as Arianism if the Muslim Umayyads had pursued the intolerant ecclesiastical policy of the Arian Vandals,⁴ and had tried to impose Islam upon their Monophysite and Nestorian and Zoroastrian subjects as the Vandals did try to impose Arianism upon the Catholic and Donatist communities in the Roman provinces which Genseric had conquered in North-West Africa. These considerations seem to point to the perhaps unexpected conclusion that the prospects of an Islam which was not a particularly attractive religion in itself, and which had been gravely compromised by its own founder when he withdrew from his spiritual apostolate at Mecca and plunged into a political career at Medina, were retrieved by the crypto-pagan Umayyad usurpers of the Meccan Prophet's political heritage—and this for the paradoxical reason that the Umayyads were indifferent, or even positively hostile, to the propagation of the Islamic faith. For the most part, these worldlings were content to leave the religion of which they were officially the temporal trustees and champions to shift for itself while they cynically enjoyed the sweets of the lucrative office which they were holding on false pretences. And in so far as the progres-

¹ For this aspect of the Arab Caliphate see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 72-7, above.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285-7, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, pp. 125-8, above.

³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 277, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 358, above, and the present chapter, p. 679, below.

sive conversion of their non-Arab subjects to Islam did attract the Umayyad Caliphs' attention from time to time, we may suppose that it exercised—and annoyed—they first and foremost as a financial problem, since, for the Caliphial treasury, every conversion of a non-Muslim subject of the Caliphial Government to Islam brought with it a corresponding diminution of super-tax receipts.

Under these extraordinary conditions Islam had to make its own way among the non-Arab subjects of the Caliphate very largely on its own merits—as Zoroastrianism had once had to make its way among the non-Iranian subjects of the Achaemenidae¹—and without that fatal assistance from the secular arm which had afterwards been accepted by Zoroastrianism under the Sasanian régime. In these circumstances the spread of Islam outside the ranks of the Arab garrisons of the restored Syriac universal state was slow but at the same time sure; and, in the hearts of ex-Christians and ex-Zoroastrians who embraced the new religion in the face of the indifference, if not actually in the teeth of the displeasure, of their nominally Muslim Umayyad masters, Islam became a very different faith from what it had formerly been on the sleeves of Arab warriors who had worn it there as a denominational badge of a privileged political status. The new non-Arab converts not only took their adopted religion to heart: they also adapted it to their own intellectual outlook by doing for Islam what a Clement and an Origen had done for Christianity at a corresponding stage of its history.² They translated the crude and casual assertions of the Prophet of the Arabian external proletariat into the more subtle and more consistent terms of Christian theology and Hellenic philosophy; and it was in this clothing—in which it was clad by the spontaneous intellectual labours of non-Arab converts, and not by the political fiat of Gallionic-minded Arab empire-builders—that Islam was able to become the unifying religion of a Syriac World which had been reunited only on the superficial plane of politics by the sweep of the Arab military conquest.

Within a hundred years of Mu'awiyah's rise to political power the non-Arab Muslim subjects of the Caliphate had become strong enough, even in the military sense, to put down the Laodicean Umayyads from their seat and to enthrone in their place a dynasty whose devoutness reflected the religious temper of their supporters. In A.D. 750, when the favour of the non-Arab Muslim element among the subjects of the Caliphate gave the 'Abbasids the victory over the Umayyads, it is possible that the numerical

¹ For the religious policy of the Achaemenidae see pp. 704-5, below.

² See V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 367, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), p. 539, above.

strength of the religious faction which thus turned the scales in the balance of dynastic power was still as small in proportion to the total population of the Arab Empire as were the numbers of the Christians in the Roman Empire at the moment when Constantine overthrew Maxentius.¹ The mass-conversions of the subjects of the Caliphate to Islam probably did not begin before the first collapse of the 'Abbasid Power in the ninth century of the Christian Era, or reach their term until the final dissolution of the 'Abbasid Empire in the thirteenth century, and it can be said of these belated harvests in the Islamic mission-field—with greater assurance than could perhaps be felt in passing the same verdict on the mass-conversions to Christianity during the death-agonies of the Roman Empire in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries of the Christian Era—that they were the outcome of a spontaneous movement on the part of the masses themselves and not of political pressure on the part of their rulers. It is true that the 'Abbasids surpassed the Umayyads in their devotion to Islam in the measure in which Constantine surpassed Philippus Arabs in his devotion to Christianity; but it is at the same time true that the earlier 'Abbasids abstained, as conscientiously as Constantine himself, from misusing their political power for the purpose of forcing, upon an unbelieving majority of their subjects, a religion to which they themselves happened personally to be attached; and it is also a fact that the later 'Abbasids for the most part remained faithful to this policy of toleration, in honourable contrast to Constantine's successors. The Islamic counterparts of a Theodosius and a Justinian, who departed from the Constantinian policy and did misuse their political power in order to quench the smoking flax of unbelief, are few and far between² in a list of 'Abbasid Caliphs which stretches through five centuries.³

If the facts that have now been set forth may be considered to account satisfactorily for the exception which Islam might appear

¹ The numerical strength of the Christian element in the population of the Roman Empire in A.D. 312 is estimated at about 10 per cent. by Baynes, N. H.: *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church* (London 1929, Milford), p. 4.

² The most flagrant of the exceptions that prove the general rule of 'Abbasid tolerance is the Caliph Mutawakkil (*imperabat* A.D. 847–61) (see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 205, footnote 7, below).

³ This greater constancy which was displayed by the Muslim 'Abbasid Caliphs, in contrast to the Christian Roman Emperors, in abiding by the policy of toleration, is not a matter for surprise; for, whereas the Emperor Constantine's policy of toleration had no sanction behind it except the Emperor's own personal will, the toleration that was practised by the 'Abbasids was founded, not upon a personal or dynastic caprice, but upon one of the standing orders of the religion which the rulers themselves professed. We have noted already (on pp. 674–5, above) that the *Shari'ah* made it obligatory for the Government of the Islamic Commonwealth to guarantee an effective religious toleration to all politically loyal non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic State who were 'People of the Book'. For the victory of this injunction of the *Shari'ah* over the blood-thirstiness of the Ottoman Pādīshāh Selim the Grim see p. 706, footnote 1, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 204, below.

at first sight to present to our empirically established general rule, then perhaps we can abide by our conclusion that, while it is not impossible for the secular power to obtain some measure of success in forcibly imposing upon its own subjects a religion which is already 'a going concern', the price which the politically compromised religion has to pay, as a rule, for a local enforcement by means of political pressure is the prohibitive price of forfeiting any prospects which that religion may previously have had of attaining—or retaining—universality.

The same prohibitive penalty for the moral offence of attempting to impose a religion by political force may also be incurred when the attempt is unsuccessful even within parochial limits. Indeed, such cases would appear to be at least as numerous as the cases, which we have so far been examining, in which there has been at least some measure of parochial success to be placed on the credit side of the account. Among the more notorious cases in which a religion that has accepted the compromising support of the secular arm has suffered an unmitigated loss—with no grain of even local advantage to set off against it—through the inability of the secular power to impose religious conformity by force even within its own frontiers, we may reckon the failure of the Roman Emperor Justinian to impose his own Catholic Orthodoxy upon his Monophysite subjects beyond the Taurus;¹ the failure of the East Roman Emperors Leo III and Constantine V to impose their own Iconoclasm upon their Iconodule subjects in Greece and Italy;² the failure of the Vandal masters of a barbarian 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire in North-West Africa to impose their own Arianism upon the Catholic and Donatist provincials;³ the failure of the British Crown to impose its own Protestantism upon its Catholic subjects in Ireland;⁴ the failure of the Timurid Mughal Emperor Awrangzib to impose his own Islam upon his Hindu subjects;⁵ and finally the failure of the Iranic militarist Nādir Shāh⁶ to bring back into the fold of the Sunnah the descendants of a people whose allegiance had been forcibly detached from the

¹ See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 223, below.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 352, footnote 5, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 4, p. 358, and the present chapter, p. 676, above.

⁴ See II. D (vii), Annex II, vol. ii, above.

⁵ In embarking upon this fatal policy Awrangzib was not only transgressing the injunctions of the *Shari'ah* in regard to 'the People of the Book' (a charter of toleration by which the Hindus had at least as good a claim as the Zoroastrians to benefit by analogy): he was also sinning against the light that had been seen by his ancestor Akbar, the enlightened founder of the universal state which Awrangzib's fanaticism brought to ruin. (For Akbar's religious experience and policy see the present Annex, pp. 699–704, below.)

⁶ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 399, and V. C (i) (c) 1, in the present volume, pp. 44–5, above, as well as Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 135–8, and Lockhart, L.: *Nadir Shah* (London 1938, Luzac).

Sunnah and transferred to the Shī'ah, little more than two hundred years before Nādir Shāh's day, by the act of an earlier Iranic militarist, Ismā'il Shāh Safawī.

These examples show that a signal failure frequently attends the efforts of political potentates to impose upon their subjects a religion of the rulers' choosing, even when this religion is already 'a going concern'; and *a fortiori* it would be difficult to point out a single instance of success in cases in which the system of practices and beliefs which the secular ruler has been attempting to inculcate from above downwards has been not a religion but a philosophy. On the other hand there are two celebrated instances of the failure of an imperial philosopher-missionary. The Roman Emperor Julian failed to establish Neoplatonism as the official philosophy of the Hellenic universal state,¹ and the Maurya Emperor Aṣoka likewise failed to establish the Hinayanian form of Buddhism as the official philosophy of the universal state into which the Indic World had been gathered up by Aṣoka's grandfather Chandragupta. This pair of failures is remarkable, considering the strength of the combination of conditions favourable to success under which Aṣoka and Julian alike embarked upon their respective spiritual missions.

In the first place the philosophies which the two emperors set out to propagate among their respective subjects were not arbitrary systems of the imperial propagandists' own invention, but were 'going concerns' which had been founded and developed by a succession of sages who had not had any political authority at their command but had won a following for their tenets on their intrinsic intellectual and moral merits, long before the birth and accession to power of their latter-day imperial patrons. This is true even of the Neoplatonism that was patronized by the Emperor Julian; for, as we have already observed,² the vein of artificiality and crankiness which is so prominent and so feeble a feature in this pagan counterblast to the Christian Church was not introduced into Neoplatonism by the Emperor Julian's personal caprice, but was inherited by the Neoplatonist emperor from the Neoplatonist hierophant Iamblichus.³

¹ Julian's failure is also touched upon in V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 147; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 565-7; V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, p. 584, above; and in V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, pp. 222-3, below.

² See the quotation from Geffken in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 565, above.

³ For an account of the Iamblichian Neoplatonic Antichurch see Bidez, J.: *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris 1930, Les Belles Lettres), I^e Partie, chap. xi, 'Chez les Disciples de Jamblique', and chap. xii, 'Théurgie Chaldaïque et Mystères Néoplatoniciennes'; for the Emperor Julian's administrative organization of this Antichurch which he had inherited from the philosopher-hierophant Iamblichus see op. cit., III^e Partie, chap. ix, 'Théocratie'.

Among the host of non-Christian worships over which the philosopher's mantle of Plotinus and Plato was enthusiastically flung by Iamblichus and his successors—Julian

As for the state of the Hīnayāna in Aṣoka's day, there is no trace in it, at that stage, of those elements of decadence which may partly account for the fiasco of Iamblichus's and Julian's Neoplatonism. The Hīnayāna that was embraced by Aṣoka was a philosophy that was still in its intellectual and moral prime, like the Stoicism that was embraced by Marcus Aurelius.¹ In Aṣoka's case, at any rate, we cannot trace the failure of his mission to any inherent weakness in the philosophy of his choice.

Nor, again, can the failure of either Aṣoka or Julian be traced to any serious abuse of the enormous power and influence that were concentrated in the hands of both these emperors in virtue of their secular office. It is true that, in this matter again, Julian, with his impulsive and even passionate temperament, has laid himself open to criticisms against which the mortified monk Aṣoka is impregnable proof. Yet even Julian had in him enough of the true philosopher to restrain him from going very far in translating into action an animosity against Christianity which he did not attempt to pluck out of his heart. Julian's first act on succeeding to the supreme authority in the Roman Empire was to institute—as far as this could be done by Imperial decree—a

among the rest—the place of honour seems to have been assigned to the rites prescribed in a work called *The Chaldaean Oracles* from the pen of a Babylonian medicine-man, practising in *parthibus Hellenicis*, who was the namesake of Julian and the contemporary of Marcus Aurelius.

'Dans la théologie assez touffue de ces oracles, se détachait une figure qui, à elle seule, était presque un panthéon: Hécate-Rhée, déesse trimorphe, dont les cheveux se dressaient comme des flammes, dont les serpents enlacés entouraient les tempes et la ceinture, et qui, dans ses flancs, portait du côté droit l'âme du monde, du côté gauche la fontaine de vertu, et la Nature sous son échine.'

In this professedly Chaldaean divinity we seem to see the Minoan Goddess of the Snakes and the Helleno-Hittite Artemis of Ephesus with their features and attributes all exaggerated as they might have been in an Indic caricature; and, indeed, if the Emperor Julian had succeeded in making the medicine-man Julian's syncretistic religion prevail over Christianity, we may conjecture that the outcome would have been something quite as alien from the original philosophy of Plato as the Tantric or Lamaistic form of Mahayanian Buddhism is from the original philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama.

Julian's policy was to retort to the Christian Church's tactics of stealing the intellectual thunder of the Hellenic philosophers by arming his own Neoplatonic Antichurch with the Christian Church's hierarchical organization and philanthropic activities (see V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, p. 584, above). His stumbling-block was the unresponsiveness of the surviving ministers of the non-Christian religions within the frontiers of the Roman Empire in Julian's day. The majority of those for whose support he appealed seem to have failed the Emperor—whether out of laziness or out of timidity or out of a sophisticated self-consciousness which shrank from the prospect of having to make a fool of itself at Don Quixote's dictation. Whatever the cause of this non-co-operation may have been, the result was that the Roman Emperor proved unable to emulate the work of the Pharaoh Thothmes III in 'the New Empire' of Egypt and the work of the Inca Pachacutec in the Andean universal state (for the success of these two non-Hellenic emperors in consolidating the local worship of their respective worlds into a single hierarchical organization see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 530–31 and 532, and the present Annex, pp. 652–4, above). If Julian had been able to enlist for his Antichurch the services of a hereditary corporation or caste of priests like the Magi or the Brahmins (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 542, above), then he might have been able to contend with the Christian Church on less unequal terms than those on which he actually had to fight his losing battle.

¹ For Marcus's notable abstention from any attempt to take advantage of his office in order to propagate his philosophy see the present Annex, p. 705, below.

régime of complete toleration for all the religions that were current among his subjects, without any official differentiation in favour of Paganism or to the detriment of Christianity.¹ When the pagan mob at Alexandria took the law into its own hands by lynching the late Emperor Constantius's Arian bishop George of Cappadocia—and two Christian civil servants along with him—in reprisal for their victim's vexatious treatment of the local pagan worshipers during the preceding reign, Julian did at least address a letter of remonstrance to the Alexandrians in which he condemned their crime in strong terms in despite of his own unconcealed sympathy for the cause in the name of which this crime had been perpetrated.² Finally, when Julian failed to live up to the ideal of toleration which he himself had proclaimed, the discriminatory measures against the Christians to which he then stooped were at any rate strictly negative. The emperor withheld from all professing Christians, *ex officio religionis*, the official licence without which they could not enter, or even remain in, the teaching profession;³ and there is some ground for believing that he also went to the further length of excluding the Christians from all branches of the public service: military, administrative, and judicial.⁴ Yet all this, taken together, falls far short of that first degree of persecution which is known as 'a dry terror' in the new technical terminology with which our modern Western political vocabulary has been enriched by the march of progress in the fourth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era. As for Açoka, he was not only innocent of even the slightest and most indirect recourse to the employment of political pressure for the propagation of the philosophy in which he had put his treasure: he was actually moved to embrace the Hīnayāna by a profound remorse for his own conduct in having once, though once only, resorted to that use of force which is the *ultima ratio regum*. The moral passion which inspired the Emperor Açoka's preaching of the philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama was the obverse side of his horror at the misery which he himself had caused on that one occasion by waging a victorious war of aggression against the kingdom of Kalinga. After this appalling experience Açoka renounced the use of War as an instrument of his Imperial policy; placed his court on a vegetarian diet; abolished the Imperial Hunt; and made the slaughtering of animals illegal for all his subjects on fifty-six days per annum.⁵ So far was Açoka

¹ See Bidez, J.: *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris 1930, Les Belles Lettres), pp. 227-9.

² Bidez, op. cit., pp. 233-5. The text of the letter will be found in Julian's *Œuvres Complètes*, tome i, 2^e partie: 'Lettres et Fragments', edited and translated by Bidez, J. (Paris 1924, Les Belles Lettres), pp. 69-72.

³ Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien*, pp. 263-6.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 295-6.

⁵ This last measure was no doubt a rather authoritarian act of interference with the

from inflicting any disabilities upon the majority of his subjects who did not embrace the Emperor's own philosophical tenets that he deprecated an indulgence even in verbal polemics at the expense of any of the diverse religions that were professed in his dominions; and he set a personal example of magnanimity by bestowing benefactions upon at least one non-Buddhist sect of ascetics.¹ Assuredly it would have been impossible for any one in Aṣoka's position to be more scrupulous than Aṣoka was in refraining from taking any improper advantage of the formidable secular power which he happened to hold in his hands.

The foregoing evidence suggests that Aṣoka, at any rate, deserved to succeed in his mission, and that even Julian hardly deserved to fail. Yet Aṣoka, as well as Julian, did fail conspicuously. The inference would appear to be that the enterprise of attempting to inculcate a philosophy from above downwards into the souls of Mankind in the mass is, for some *a priori* reason, so forlorn a hope that it is doomed to failure even when it is undertaken by an emperor-monk of Aṣoka's heroic spiritual stature.

With the warning of Aṣoka's astonishing failure imprinted on our minds, we may feel certain in advance that a political potentate will be found impotent to propagate from above downwards a system of practices and beliefs when this system is not some philosophy that is already 'a going concern', but is a 'fancy religion' that has been imported from abroad, or been manufactured in his own throne-room, by the monarch himself. On this point we shall find our expectations confirmed by a survey of the classical instances.

The most extreme case of the kind that is on record is perhaps that of the Isma'īlī Shī'ī dissident Caliph al-Hākim bi'amrī'llāh the Fātimid (*imperabat* A.D. 996-1020); for, while we are able, from such knowledge as the uninitiated can obtain of the jealously guarded mysteries of Hākim's eclectic religion, to trace this and that borrowed element to its source—a source which may prove to be either Jewish or Christian or Zoroastrian or Manichaean or Gnostic or Mandaean or Pythagorean or Neoplatonic or Hindu²—'the basis and distinctive dogma of Druze theology' is to be found, not in any of these crumbs from the tables of richer faiths, but in the deification of Hākim himself as the last and most perfect of ten

liberty of the subject, but it can hardly be brought within the category of religious persecution.

¹ These facts of Aṣoka's spiritual experience and political practice are recorded—for the most part on the first-hand evidence of Aṣoka's own inscriptions—in Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 156-8 and 176-9.

² For an analysis of the sources of the syncretistic element in the religion of Hākim see Hitti, P. K.: *The Origins of the Druze People and Religion* (New York 1928, Columbia University Press), especially pp. 4 and 30-54. Hitti's work came into the present writer's hands too late to be mentioned in II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 258, footnote 1, above.

successive incarnations of God: a divine and immortal Messiah who was to return in triumph to a world from which he had mysteriously withdrawn after a first brief epiphany.¹

It is true that this cardinal tenet of the Druse religion was not quite so unfamiliar or so shocking to the minds of Hākim's contemporaries in Hākim's world as might be supposed; for the conception of a god incarnate had been brought within the mental horizon of Islam by the intellectual commerce of Muslim theologians and philosophers with the Christian and Hellenic and Hindu systems of thought; and the Shi'ah, more particularly in the Ismā'īlī branch in which Hākim himself had been brought up, had already made the transition from theory to practice by virtually deifying 'Alī and the series of Imāms who were 'Alī's successors.² At the same time the worshippers of Hākim were careful to propitiate orthodox Muslim opinion by proclaiming themselves to be rigid unitarians;³ and we have seen already that they had done their best to make their new religion attractive to the surviving adherents or admirers of the older religions and philosophies which Islam had overlaid by decking their central dogma out in a variegated plumage which reflected some of the colours of almost every religion or philosophy under the sun. In fact, the inventors of the Druse religion showed a consummate skill in displaying their bizarre spiritual merchandise to the best possible advantage. And yet, as it turned out, this ingenuity was of little avail. The solitary success of the missionaries of the new faith was the conversion by the apostle Darazī, in A.D. 1016, of one tiny community in the Syrian district of Wādī'l-Taym, at the southern end of the Biqā' and at the foot of Mount Hermon.⁴ Not more than fifteen years after this—in A.D. 1031—'the door of the Unitarian Religion was closed' in the sense that the mission of converting the World was deliberately abandoned. Since then the Druse community has neither admitted converts nor tolerated apostates,⁵ but has remained a closed hereditary religious corporation whose members bear the name, not of the god incarnate whom they worship, but

¹ Hitti, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 30, and 31. The concept of the Second Coming has been touched upon in this Study already in III. C (ii) (b), Annex I, vol. iii, pp. 462-5, above.

² For the precedents to, and parallels with, the deification of Hākim see Hitti, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-9. For the worship of 'Alī which has been adopted by the Druses' Syrian neighbours the Nusayriya, as an accretion to the older elements in the curious religion of this fossilized community, see II. D (ii), vol. ii, p. 56, above. This 'Alī-worship that has thus found its way into the Nusayri creed and ritual appears to be a travesty of the veneration paid to 'Alī by the Ismā'īlī Shi'is who forced their way into the Jabal Ansariyah in the Age of the Crusades (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 258, above).

³ Hitti, *op. cit.*, p. 33. They actually assumed the name Muwahhidin, thereby forestalling the puritanical Sunnī Berber highlanders from the Atlas who adopted the same name in the twelfth century of the Christian Era with greater justification (see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 357; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 204; and V. C (i) (c) 3, in the present volume, p. 247, above).

⁴ Hitti, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-21.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

of the missionary who first introduced them to Hākim's strange new gospel.¹ Ensconced in the highlands of Hermon and the Lebanon and the *massif* east of the Hawrān which has latterly come to be known as the Jabal-ad-Durūz *par excellence*, the Druse church universal *manquée* has become a perfect example of a 'fossil in a fastness';² and, by the same token, Hākim's 'fancy religion' has proved a fiasco.³

The same fate has overtaken the almost equally presumptuous attempt of the Syrian pervert Varius Avitus Bassianus to install as the high god of the official pantheon of the Roman Empire, not indeed his own person, but his own parochial divinity the Emesan Sun-God Elagabalus, whose hereditary high priest he was, and whose name he continued to bear by choice after a stroke of fortune had placed him on the Roman Imperial Throne under the official appellation of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.⁴

Elagabalus's endeavour, like Hākim's, turns out upon examination to have been somewhat less fantastic than might be supposed; for, in transporting to Rome, and housing on the Palatine, the fetish-stone in which his divine homonym was believed to reside, he could appeal to a notable precedent. In the year 204 B.C., which was a venerably ancient date by the time of Elagabalus's accession to the purple in A.D. 218, the Roman Government of the day had likewise received with official honours, and likewise lodged on the Palatine—in this case, in the Temple of Victory—another fetish-stone which was believed to be charged with the divinity of the Pessinuntine mother-goddess Cybele;⁵ and from that day down to Elagabalus's own generation this Anatolian talisman had continued to be honoured in that place with traditional orgiastic rites—performed by eunuch-devotees—which were at least as outlandish in

¹ 'Druse' is a garbled form of the Arabic Durūz, which is the plural of Darazi.

² For such 'fossils in fastnesses' see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 255-9, above. Hitti (in op. cit., p. 1) has hit upon the same apt simile for characterizing both the Druses and the Samaritans.

³ Apropos of the question of the sources of the Druse religion, it is perhaps worth noticing that the district in which it struck root was in the near neighbourhood of two other districts of Syria which had also given birth—simultaneously with one another, though this nearly a thousand years before the day of Hākim and Darazi—to two religions each of which likewise preached the divinity of a man as its cardinal doctrine. Christianity arose in the bosom of the Jewish community in Galilee, and the religion in which Simon Magus was worshipped as a god incarnate arose in the bosom of the Samaritan community immediately to the south (for the religion founded by, and centring upon the reputed divinity of, Simon Magus see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), pp. 267-302). The diversity of the respective fates of these three Syrian men-worshipping religions is instructive. The worship of Simon Magus died out in the third century of the Christian Era (Meyer, op. cit., p. 293); the worship of Hākim has survived as the peculiar faith of a parochial community in a fastness; the worship of Jesus has become the faith of a universal church.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 82, footnote 4, and the present Annex, p. 649, above.

⁵ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 216, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 82, above. In the former passage the date of the reception of the Pessinuntine stone at Rome has been erroneously given as 205 B.C. instead of 204 B.C.

Rome as the Syrian worship which the Emperor Elagabalus was seeking to acclimatize there now some four hundred years later. The sense of promiscuity, which had been constantly on the increase in Roman souls during the intervening span of time, might have been expected *a priori* to make Elagabalus's task an easier one than Publius Scipio's.¹ Why was it, then, that the worship of the Pessinuntine fetish which was introduced into Rome in 204 B.C. became a permanent and even an integral element in the Roman religion, whereas the kindred worship of the Emesan fetish which was introduced into Rome in A.D. 218 lasted no longer than the four years which saw out the reign of the emperor who was its patron?

The answer to this question is to be found in the difference in the psychological conditions which respectively attended the successful translation of Cybele to Rome and the abortive translation of Elagabalus.

The Senate's decision to negotiate the transfer of the Cybele-stone from Pessinus to Rome was taken in 205 B.C. at the climax of the Hannibalic War, at a moment when even the sophisticated Roman governing class was overwrought by the strain of the long ordeal to which the Commonwealth had been subjected, while the common people had been reduced by this time to a state of religious emotion which bordered on frenzy. The Senate was acting on precise instructions which had been obtained—or elicited by some shrewd mind—from a consultation of the Sibylline Books, as well as on a hint which was read into an oracle that had lately been received from Delphi; and, when the Government's action duly resulted in the arrival at Rome of the goddess who was to grant the Romans a speedy release from the unrelieved agony of the last fourteen years, the people were enthusiastic. On the day on which the salvation-bringing stone was borne in state from the strand of the Tiber to its new home in the Temple of Victory on the Palatine, 'the whole city poured out into the streets to greet it, while censers, with the incense burning, were placed in front of the doors along the route of the procession'. As the stone was passed from the hands of Scipio, who had received it from its escort on the ship, into the hands of the first ladies of the Commonwealth, who took their turns in carrying it on its way to its resting-place, the goddess was preceded by singers who called upon her 'to enter the city of Rome with good will in her heart and good

¹ Publius Cornelius Scipio had been chosen in 204 B.C. for the honour of bringing to land, from the ship in which it was being conveyed to Rome, the Pessinuntine stone-from-heaven. This choice had been made by the direction of the Delphic Oracle, which in the preceding year had instructed the representatives of the Roman Government to choose out the man of best character in Rome for performing this office (see Livy, Book XXIX, chap. 10, 11, and 14).

fortune in her train'. The day was kept as a feast day; and, when Cybele had been installed in her new shrine, 'the people came in crowds to bring their offerings to her there; a *lectisternium*¹ was celebrated; and games were held which were given the name of *Megalensia* and which became a standing entry in the Roman religious calendar.²

It will be seen that, in bringing the Pessinuntine fetish to the Palatine in 205-204 B.C., the Roman Senate was giving satisfaction to a popular demand which was not only spontaneous but was even passionate. On the other hand, in bringing the Emesan fetish to the Palatine in A.D. 218, Elagabalus was abusing his Imperial prerogative in order to gratify a personal whim of his own which found no echo in the hearts of the Roman populace. In other words, it was only in form that the two religious innovations were on a par with one another in point of being introduced from above downwards; for in fact it was Elagabalus's abortive innovation alone that was truly a transaction of this character. In the successful innovation which had been carried out by the Senate four hundred years earlier, a dominant minority had been humouring an internal proletariat by making themselves responsible for a popular act which was so repugnant to their own aristocratic tradition that they might never have brought themselves to perpetrate it if they had had nothing but their personal prejudices to consider.³ Here is the difference of circumstance which explains

¹ A *lectisternium* was a liturgy in which the images of the Gods were displayed in public round a banqueting table which was laid in their honour.—A.J.T.

² The passages in inverted commas in this paragraph are quoted from Livy, Book XXIX, chap. 14.

³ We may add that in all probability the Senate would have ignored even an insistent popular demand for the translation of the Pessinuntine fetish to Rome if this demand had been made in any other psychological circumstances than those prevailing in 205-204 B.C., when the Roman governing class, as well as the common people, was in an abnormal psychological condition. This seems probable when we observe the severity with which another foreign religion—the worship of Dionysus—which was perhaps not less popular than the worship of Cybele, while it was certainly less exotic, was repressed by the Senate less than twenty years later, in 186 B.C., after peace had been restored and the psychological tension of the war-years had been relaxed (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 216, above). The subsequent policy of the Senate towards the worship of Cybele is described as follows by a modern Western scholar who is a master of the subject:

'Quand le Sénat apprit à mieux connaître la divinité que la Sibylle venait de lui imposer, il dut être fort embarrassé du cadeau qu'Attale lui avait fait. L'exaltation enthousiaste, le sombre fanatisme de la dévotion phrygienne contrastaient violemment avec la dignité calme, la réserve honnête de la religion officielle, et ils excitaient dangereusement les esprits. . . . Les autorités furent balancées entre le respect dû à la puissante déesse, qui avait délivré Rome des Carthaginois, et celui qu'elles éprouvaient pour le *mos maiorum*. Elles se tirèrent d'affaire en isolant complètement le nouveau culte, de façon à se prémunir contre la contagion. Défense fut faite à tout citoyen d'entrer dans le clergé de la déesse exotique ou de prendre part à ses orgies sacrées; les rites barbares, selon lesquels la Grande Mère voulait être adorée, furent accomplis par des prêtres phrygiens et des prêtresses phrygiennes. Quant aux fêtes célébrées en son honneur par le peuple tout entier, les *Megalensia*, elles n'avaient rien d'oriental mais furent organisées conformément aux traditions romaines. . . .

'Mais, malgré la surveillance policière qui l'entourait, malgré les précautions et les préjugés qui l'isolaient, la religion phrygienne vivait. Les esclaves, les affranchis, les

why it was that in 204 B.C. Cybele came to the Palatine to stay, whereas in A.D. 222 Elagabalus was ignominiously ejected from the Palatine as soon as the exercise of the arbitrary political power which had first installed and then maintained him there¹ was suspended by the overthrow and assassination of the intruding Syrian divinity's Imperial namesake and devotee.²

While it may not be so surprising to see an Elagabalus and a Hākim meet with utter failure in their endeavours to make their public political authority minister to their private religious caprice, we shall perhaps be more deeply impressed with the difficulty of propagating creeds and rites by political action from above downwards when we observe the equally striking ill-success of other

marchands asiatiques allaient se multipliant dans la plèbe, et ces Levantins avaient, pour la grande divinité de leur pays, une dévotion superstitieuse qui s'accordait mal avec les restrictions imposées par l'autorité. Une brèche avait été pratiquée dans la forteresse lézardée des vieux principes romains, et tout l'Orient finit par y passer' (Cumont, F.: *Les Religions Orientales dans le Paganisme Romain*, 4th ed. (Paris 1929, Geuthner), pp. 48-9 and 50).

¹ Elagabalus's arbitrary behaviour in this matter is described as follows in the life of this emperor in the so-called *Historia Augusta* ('Antoninus Heliogabalus', chaps. 3 and 5):

'Ubi primum ingressus est urbem, omisis quae in provincia gerebantur, Heliogabalum in Palatino monte iuxta aedes imperatorias consecravit, eique templum fecit, studens et Matris typum et Vestae ignem et Palladium et Ancilia et omnia Romanis veneranda in illud transferre templum, et id agens ne quis Romae deus nisi Heliogabalus coleretur. Dicebat praeterea Iudaeorum et Samaritanorum religiones et Christianam devotionem illuc transferendam, ut omnium culturarum secretum Heliogabali sacerdotium teneret. . . . Sacra Populi Romani sublatis penetralibus profanavit. Ignem perpetuum extinguere voluit. Nec Romanas tantum extinguere voluit religiones, sed per orbem terrarum—unum studens ut Heliogabalus deus unus ubique coleretur. Et in penum Vestae, quod solae virgines solique pontifices adeunt, irrupit . . . et penetrale sacrum est auferre conatus. . . . Signum . . . quod Palladium esse credebat abstulit et . . . in sui dei templo locavit. Matris etiam Deum sacra accepit et taurobolatus est ut typum eriperet et alia sacra quae penitus habentur condita. . . . ablatumque sanctum in penetrale dei sui transtulit. . . . Omnes sane deos sui dei ministros esse aiebat, cum alios eius cubicularios appellaret, alios servos, alios diversarum rerum ministros.'

Elagabalus's abuse of his political power in order to commit these insanely provocative acts of sacrilege is reminiscent of the sacrilegious excesses that are attributed to Hākim:

'Sunni Muslim historians . . . , remembering him as the heretic who abolished the Five Pillars of Islam and ordered the names of the early Caliphs [to be] associated with a curse in the public prayer, have portrayed him in terms of a medieval Nero, tyrannical and unbalanced to the point of mental derangement. The Christian historians . . . , associating his memory with the destruction of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, "leaving not one stone upon another", and the revival of the old regulations . . . which made it incumbent upon all Christians to wear distinctively coloured clothes with heavy wooden crosses dangling from their necks, were equally merciless in his condemnation' (Hitti, op. cit., pp. 26-7).

² While the fetish-stone of Pessinus met with better luck at Rome than the fetish-stone of Emesa, there is another fetish-stone at Mecca which has outdone its Pessinuntine as well as its Emesian counterpart by continuing to be an object of adoration from the dawn of Arabian history down to the present day. For this extraordinary survival the Meccan stone is, of course, indebted to the Prophet Muhammad, whose sagacity was as signal as was the folly of the Emperor Elagabalus. Instead of uprooting the Meccan stone and thereby destroying its religious potency, Muhammad preserved this primitive religious force, and harnessed it to the service of his own new religious dispensation, by leaving the Meccan stone *in situ*, without disturbing its traditional association with the worship of a parochial Meccan divinity whom Muhammad had promoted to ubiquity and omnipotence by identifying Allah, the god of the Ka'bah, with the Jewish and Christian God of the Universe (for the Meccan fetish-stone god's success in imparting his own name, on Muslim lips, to the One True God with whom he had thus been equated, see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, p. 44, below).

rulers who have attempted to take advantage of their political power for the promotion of some religious cause in which they have been interested from more serious and more estimable motives than the sheer desire to gratify a personal whim. There are rulers who have tried and failed to propagate a 'fancy religion' for reasons of state which may have been irrelevant or even irreligious yet at least have not been either personal or disreputable; and there are other rulers who have tried and failed to propagate a 'fancy religion' in which they themselves have devoutly believed, and which they have felt themselves on that account entitled in all good conscience, and perhaps even in duty bound, to communicate by all the means at their command to their suffering fellow men, in order to lighten their darkness and to guide their feet into the way of peace.¹

The classic example of the cold and calculated manufacture of a new religion for the service of a political end is the invention of the figure and the cult of Serapis by Ptolemy Soter—the founder of the Hellenic 'successor-state' of the Achaemenian Empire in Egypt. In embarking on this Machiavellian religious enterprise the Macedonian statesman was pursuing the politically respectable purpose of seeking to bridge the gulf between his Egyptian and his Hellenic subjects by bringing the two communities on to a new and virgin plot of religious ground which they were to be invited to cultivate in common;² and he enlisted a phalanx of experts whose talents were skilfully selected and co-ordinated for the attainment of the object which their employer had in view. A preliminary plan of religious operations was worked out for Ptolemy by a Hellenic-Egyptian committee of two members, in which the Hellenic side was represented by a scion of the hereditary Eumolpid priesthood of the Eleusinian Mysteries, Timotheus, while the Egyptian side was represented by one of the rare Philhellenes in the Egyptian hierarchy in the person of Manetho. A name for the new divinity was coined by combining and Hellenizing the native names of two Egyptian gods, Usur (Osiris) and Api (Apis); Timotheus contributed a 'Golden Legend' (*ἱερός λόγος*) to lend a supernatural sanction to the newly instituted worship; the Athenian philosopher Demetrius of Phalerum composed a set of paeans in the new god's honour; and the Athenian sculptor Bryaxis carved, for the original and central Serapeum at Alexandria, a statue which endowed Serapis with a distinctive visual shape.

¹ Luke i. 79.

² For this Ptolemaic manufacture of the Serapis-cult see Cumont, F.: *Les Religions Orientales dans le Paganisme Romain*, 4th ed. (Paris 1929, Geuthner), pp. 69-94; and Wendland P.: *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum*, 2nd and 3rd ed. (Tübingen 1912, Mohr), pp. 129-30.

Considering the atmosphere of cool professional calculation which surrounded this process of manufacturing a synthetic divinity to a prince's order, we may feel some surprise at the extent of the success that was actually achieved. Even in Egyptian circles the new worship did not altogether fail to gain a foothold—in spite of the hostility of a Thothmean hierarchy who, though now no longer centralized under the Theban High Priesthood of Amon-Re, were still in no mood to submit to being deprived of a monopoly which, by Ptolemy Soter's day, had been theirs for some twelve hundred years, and which they had successfully maintained, a thousand years back, against the legitimate Egyptian Pharaoh Ikhnaton's attempt to do for his new version of the Egyptian Sun-God what the Hellenic usurper was now trying to do for a new version of Osiris.¹ In the Hellenic World the success achieved by the new religion of Ptolemaic manufacture was more extensive—partly, no doubt, because the worship of Serapis had been deliberately accommodated to Hellenic tastes and traditions,² and partly thanks to the easy-going *êthos* of the Olympian Pantheon, whose members could not afford to be 'jealous gods'³ when they had to rub shoulders with one another either as pullulating creatures of imagination on the narrow summit of Olympus or as thronging statues of stone on the still narrower platform of the Acropolis of Athens. As soon as Bryaxis' chisel had called Serapis into a three-dimensional existence in the Hellenic style of representational art, Zeus and Dionysus and Asklepîos obligingly made room for a new recruit who had duly established an Olympian individuality of his own through a felicitous combination of features borrowed from all three of those older-established recipients of Hellenic worship. In the Hellenic World in the course of the five centuries beginning with Ptolemy Soter's own generation the worship of Serapis made its way on its own merits beyond the limited range of an ephemeral Ptolemaic Empire till it had penetrated to the remotest corners of a Hellenic universal state.⁴ It is significant, however, that, in terms of the purpose which had moved the first

¹ For the defeat of Ikhnaton by the Thothmean hierarchy see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 145-6, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 82, footnote 4, above, and the present Annex, pp. 695-6, below.

² This Hellenization of Serapis and his worship was not confined to the visual field. While the figure of the new god was adjusted to Hellenic eyes in the statue from the hand of the Hellenic artist Bryaxis, the liturgy was tuned to Hellenic ears by being drafted in the Greek language, and the ritual to Hellenic habits of feeling and thought by being modelled on the Eleusinian pattern.

³ For the un-Olympian 'jealousy' of the Syriac god Yahweh see V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 39-40 and 45-7, below.

⁴ For the initiation of a trans-frontier barbarian war-lord into the mysteries of Serapis, while he was serving his time as a hostage on the Roman side of the Rhine, about half-way through the fourth century of the Christian Era, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), p. 461, footnote 5, above.

of the Ptolemies to build and launch Serapis' bark, the new religion was an utter failure.

While both Hellenes and Egyptians did take up this artificial religion of the Ptolemaic state in their different fashions and to their different degrees, they each went their own way in the worship of Serapis as in everything else, and concurred in nothing but their unanimous avoidance of the common ground on to which Ptolemy Soter had hoped to bring them by enticing both sets of worshippers into his synthetic divinity's precincts. Notwithstanding the skilfully managed inauguration of the worship of Serapis, the political union of Egyptians with Hellenes under the Ptolemaic régime continued to depend entirely upon the brute force of Hellenic arms; and, as soon as this Hellenic military ascendancy began to show signs of weakening, the Egyptian section of the Hellenic internal proletariat rose in armed revolt.¹ It was not the manufactured worship of Serapis that eventually translated into reality Ptolemy Soter's dream of cementing the compulsory political union between Egyptians and Hellenes by a voluntary union of hearts. The spiritual gulf between the two communities in the dominions of the Ptolemaic Empire was bridged at last by another religion which arose spontaneously out of the bosom of the proletariat in the *ci-devant* Ptolemaic province of Coele Syria a whole generation after the extinction of the last shadow of the Ptolemaic Power,² and which made its way from below upwards instead of being propelled from above downwards by the artful hand of a political potentate.

A similar failure attended the religious policy of the Illyrian soldier-emperors who set the Roman Empire on its feet again after its collapse in the middle of the third century of the Christian Era,³ when they endeavoured to replace—or at least to reinforce—a tottering Caesar-worship by giving the Hellenic universal state a new official religion consisting in the worship of an abstract Sol Invictus.⁴ This religious enterprise was taken up successively, yet in the end without success, by Aurelian and Constantius Chlorus and Constantine the Great; and the discomfiture of these forceful personalities is in some ways more striking than the miscarriage of Ptolemy Soter's project; for the Illyrians' inferiority to the Macedonian in the arts of statesmanship was more than offset by their personal sincerity and by the propitiousness of the

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 68, above.

² The remains of the Ptolemaic Empire had been annexed to the Roman Empire by Augustus after the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.

³ See V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 207, below.

⁴ For this episode of Hellenic religious history see V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 82, footnote 4, as well as the present Annex, pp. 649–50, above.

atmosphere of the age in which they happened to be living and working. The Sol Invictus in whose divine service the Illyrian soldier-emperors enlisted was not a sheer invention of his Imperial orderlies' minds. They had learned to know him as one of the established gods of the Danubian provinces in which they had been born and bred;¹ and, in their endeavour in later life to raise this god of their boyhood and their homeland to a position of supremacy in Heaven corresponding to the universal dominion which these *novi homines* themselves had won on Earth, we may feel certain that they were not so much actuated by Ptolemaic calculations as they were moved by a spiritual need which they felt in their own hearts and divined in the hearts of their subjects.²

¹ This worship of an abstract Sol Invictus, which was already 'a going concern' in the Lower and Middle Danube Basin by the third century of the Christian Era, was presumably a composite product of the radiation of the diverse sun-worships of South-Western Asia, which, at this distance from their respective points of origin, had blended into a single ray with a texture which was more ethereal than that of any of the fires from which it had emanated.

² We may reflect, however, that, if Sol Invictus had in fact succeeded in gaining the popularity which his Imperial votaries no doubt hoped and expected to see him acquire when they gave their patronage to his cult, he might have undergone a metamorphosis in the hearts and minds of the masses which would have been both surprising and distressing to an Aurelian or a Constantius Chlorus.

In the conception of the Illyrian emperors the Sun-God in whose service they had enlisted was a conservative divinity who presided in Heaven over the work of rescue and reconstruction to which his faithful servants were devoting their energies on Earth; for, although the Illyrian emperors were children of a proletariat who had been borne into power on the wings of the revolutionary upheaval of the third century of the Christian Era, they had made their fortunes and found their mission in salvaging a decadent civilization in which the decay had now gone so far that the children of a dominant minority had ceased to be capable of fending for themselves. This epiphany in a conservative role was not, however, the first appearance of the Sun-God above the Hellenic internal proletariat's horizon; and it is rather surprising that the part which this divinity had played in an earlier chapter of Hellenic history—a part for which the title of Sol Invictus would have been equally apt, though the performance in this previous act had been not conservative but revolutionary—should not have been recalled to proletarian minds, even after four centuries of oblivion, by the dreadful return, in the third century of the Christian Era, of those tribulations which had once evoked the revolutionary proletarian worship of *'Ἡλιος Ἐλευθέριος'* in the third and second centuries B.C.

The second and culminating phase of the 'Time of Troubles' which had preceded the foundation of the Hellenic universal state had seen an avatar of the Sun-God which was the very antithesis of Aurelian's idea of him. The proletarian Solar divinity of whom we catch a glimpse in the third-century romance of Iambulus and in the second-century insurrection of Aristonicus (see V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 69, 70, 82, footnote 4, and 180, and V. C (i) (d) 1, p. 384, above, and V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. vi, Annex I, pp. 350-1, below) was the heavenly patron of an earthly commonwealth which was to be established by the arms of the militant votaries of this *'Ἡλιος Ἐλευθέριος'* in the place of the existing Hellenic system of society, in order to reinstate a disinherited internal proletariat in those natural Rights of Man of which they had been brutally and impiously divested by an inhuman dominant minority. The Sun-God of Iambulus and Aristonicus was the just and generous giver who lavished his light upon the poor man who was being oppressed as abundantly as upon the rich man who was this poor man's oppressor; the god's divine gift was the one amenity of life which that dominant minority was powerless to take away from a proletariat which it had succeeded in depriving of every other stake in This World except the procreation of children (see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 41, footnote 3, above); Helios offered a heavenly city to all who, in the earthly city of destruction, were without a clod of earth to call their own or a night's shelter for a weary head; and it was this divinity's influence that inclined the hearts of slave-owners to emancipate their slaves, in anticipation of a future social state—depicted by Iambulus as already realized in his imaginary 'Islands of the Sun'—in which slavery would be unknown because every one alike would take his turn in performing every fatigue duty and filling every

Yet, in spite—or because—of this spiritual integrity which was so honourable a trait in the characters of the Illyrian Imperial votaries of Sol Invictus, the third and greatest of them was to find from his own experience that the worship of the god whose patronage had been bequeathed to him by his forefathers was not, after all, either sufficient in itself or significant except as a stepping-stone from a dead Caesar-worship to a higher religion which had arisen spontaneously in the bosom of the Hellenic internal proletariat, and had long since become 'a going concern' in despite of steady official disfavour and occasional official persecution. In the vision that resulted in Constantine's conversion to Christianity the votary of Sol Invictus saw that

'athwart the Sun—the earthly representation of the god to whom he owed this inherited allegiance—was cast the cross of light. What else could this mean for Constantine than a revelation of the identity of the god of his worship with the god of the Christians? "Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you." The secret of his father's monotheism was disclosed. Apollo—Sol—the pagan panegyrist two years before at Trier had celebrated as "salutifer"; it was true in a sense of which the orator had never dreamt. . . . "Sol Invictus"? What better description for the Victorious Christ?¹

If this brilliant reconstruction of the Emperor Constantine's personal religious experience is correct,² then we may follow the scholar who has made it in finding in this conscious identification of Sol with Christ the explanation of the continuance of the representation of Sol Invictus upon the coins that issued from Constantine's mint for eleven years after the Emperor's vision on the eve of the Battle of the Milvian Bridge.³ In any case Sol Invictus did give place to

office (for these traits of the Iambulan and Aristonican Helios see Bidez, J.: *La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil chez les Stoïciens* (Paris 1932, Les Belles Lettres), pp. 34–50, and Tarn, W. W.: *Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind* (London 1933, Milford), pp. 9–10).

We may speculate whether this glowing revolutionary avatar of the Sun-God as *Ἡλιος Ἐλευθέριος* might not have reasserted itself in the third or fourth century of the Christian Era if the countenance of Constantius Chlorus's Sol Invictus had not been of too pale and sickly a cast to fire the imagination of the *jacquerie* who in Constantius's day were replaying the part of Aristonicus's 'Citizens of the Sun' under the more poetic names of Bagaudae or Circumcelliones.

¹ Baynes, N. H.: *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church* (London 1929, Milford), pp. 97 and 100.

² Professor Baynes's conjecture that Constantine transcended the worship of Sol Invictus by identifying Sol with Christ would appear to be supported by the well-established fact that in the calendar of the Christian Church the celebration of Christmas was deliberately assigned—at some moment in the reign of Constantine's son and immediate successor Constantius II—to the 25th December; for this date had long since been consecrated to the celebration of the *Natalis Invicti*, and its identification with Christmas Day was an act of ecclesiastical policy which directly contradicted and reversed the Church's previous rule of avoiding the celebration of Christmas on any date that was already associated with the worship of a pagan divinity (see Cumont, op. cit., pp. ix and 206–7; Wendland, op. cit., p. 159).

³ Constantine saw his vision of the Cross athwart the Sun in A.D. 312, whereas his coins bearing the image and superscription of Sol Invictus continued to be struck until A.D. 323 (Baynes, op. cit., p. 95).

Christ in the course of Constantine's reign; and, whether the process took the mental form of identification or that of repudiation, the result was conclusive—as was demonstrated by the failure of Constantine's nephew and ultimate successor the Emperor Julian to undo his uncle's work. It was in vain that Julian sought to rekindle the light of his forefathers' Solar divinity by the unpromising method of robbing him of the soldier-like simplicity which had been the secret of his strength and forcing him into the elaborate system of the Apostate's Neoplatonic Antichurch;¹ this point in Julian's religious policy shared the fate of the rest of his forlorn hope; and the fiasco made it impossible any longer to ignore the truth that, within less than a century of the date at which Aurelian had raised him to a position of oecumenical honour, Sol Invictus either had been transfigured out of all recognition or else was defunct beyond all possibility of being raised from the dead.

He saw a greater Sun appear

Then his bright throne or burning axletree could bear.

The abortive attempt to establish Sol Invictus as an oecumenical divinity in the ambit of a Roman Empire which had been salvaged from the débâcle of the third century of the Christian Era has an almost exact Incaic analogue. The founder of the Andean universal state, the Inca Pachacutec, likewise attempted to endow his variegated empire with a single supreme object of worship; and the Cuzcan, like the Illyrian, empire-builder tendered this high god to his subjects in the shape of a local Sun-God who happened to have a hereditary claim upon the emperor's own allegiance.² Pachacutec did his utmost to fortify his artificially established religion of state by endowing it—*more Incaico*—with a minutely regulated and strictly centralized ecclesiastical organization of the kind which the Roman Emperor Julian tried in vain to improvise for the benefit of his Neoplatonic Antichurch. Whether this overwhelmingly paternal Incaic official patronage would have helped or hindered the Sun-God of Corichanca, in the long run, in the effort to find his own feet as a high god of the whole Andean World is a question which can never receive its answer, since the experiment was cut short, within a hundred years of its initiation, by Pizarro's destructive conquest of the empire which Pachacutec had founded.³

¹ For the place assigned to Sol Invictus in Julian's theology see Julian's prose *Hymn to Helios*.

² For the Inca Pachacutec's organization of this oecumenical worship of the originally parochial Sun-God whose native seat was Corichanca, the Sun-temple at Cuzco, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), p. 532, and the present Annex, p. 653, above.

³ If the Andean universal state had been left in peace to live out its natural term, instead of being prematurely shattered, as it was by the impact of an alien civilization

There is yet a third historic case of a Sun-worship being inaugurated and propagated by the ruler of a universal state: namely, Ikhnaton's attempt to substitute for the orthodox Egyptiac Pantheon, under the presidency of Amon-Re, a worship of an etherial and only true God who made his Godhead manifest to human eyes in the Aton or Solar Disk.¹ So far as can be seen, Ikhnaton's attempt to establish this new religion of his was not inspired to any appreciable extent either by Machiavellian considerations of *raison d'état* or by Elagabalus's motive of exerting a despotic power and indulging a personal caprice. If Ikhnaton had been mainly concerned with the political problem of the ecclesiastical unification of the Egyptiac universal state, he would hardly have felt himself called upon to take action, since he would have found his problem practically solved for him already in the syncretistic pantheon and centralized hierarchy which had been effectively established by his predecessor and ancestor Thothmes III; and he would have been under no temptation to try, as he did try, to undo Thothmes' solid work at the cost of tearing a profound schism in the Egyptiac body social.² Nor, again, does Ikhnaton's *éthos* display any striking points of likeness to Hākim's. The demonic spiritual force that drove the Egyptiac emperor-prophet into an uncompromising defiance of the hallowed traditions as well as the vested interests of the society into which he had been born was not an insane egotism: it was a deep religious faith which, like Açoka's philosophical convictions,³ translated itself into evangelical works. The Imperial convert could not rest until he had communicated to his fellow men a divine revelation which

from the farther side of the Atlantic, we may guess that one of the determining factors in the career of the politically established worship of the Corichancan Sun-God would have been the temper animating the religious policy of the Imperial Government. In some respects the policy was drastic. For example, we have noted already (in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 532, footnote 4, above) that the local idols and fetishes were physically removed from their native seats and deposited in the temple of Corichanca. On the other hand fetishes were included in the very short list of articles which were lawful objects of personal property (Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), p. 158).

¹ See I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 145-6, and V. C (i) (c) 2, in the present volume, p. 82, footnote 4, above.

² Ikhnaton's new religion did expressly stand for political unity inasmuch as it conceived of the Aton as a universal creator who shone with an equal benevolence upon the Egyptiac masters of 'the New Empire' and upon their non-Egyptiac subjects in Syria and in Nubia (see the passage from Ikhnaton's hymn to the Aton that is quoted in V. C (i) (d) 7, vol. vi, pp. 11-12, below). Yet even this conception of the brotherhood of all Mankind through the common beneficence of God seems to have been foreshadowed in a Hymn to Amon which is a monument of the orthodox Egyptiac religious thought of at least one generation before Ikhnaton's day. (On this point see Erman, A.: *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, English translation (London 1927, Methuen), p. 290, footnote 4.) And there is no reason to suppose that, in transferring this *motif* from the religion of his forefathers to his own new-fangled worship, Ikhnaton was consciously concerned—as Ptolemy Soter assuredly was when he instituted the worship of Serapis—to forge out of a common religious allegiance a political bond between the Egyptiac and the non-Egyptiac section of his subjects.

³ See pp. 680-3, above.

he was convinced that he had received in order that he might serve as the appointed spokesman of a spiritual truth that had never before been broadcast. The religious motive by which Ikhnaton was inspired was disinterested as well as single-minded; and in its overflow into the secular field it showed itself to be a veritable well-spring of life whose waters possessed the miraculous power of dissolving the classicism of the contemporary Egyptian literature¹ and the formalism of the contemporary Egyptian visual art into a new pulsation of creative activity. In fact, Ikhnaton's revelation held out a promise of translating a legendary Egyptian miracle into a matter of historical fact by evoking new life out of a mummified corpse.² It will be seen that on every ground Ikhnaton deserved to succeed in his religious mission, while conversely the public to which he addressed himself had every reason to accept the emperor-prophet's message with alacrity and gratitude. And yet Ikhnaton's enterprise ended in a failure that was more extreme than Aurelian's or Ptolemy's, and not less extreme than Elagabalus's or Hākim's. This failure can only be attributed to the one conspicuous weakness in Ikhnaton's noble and beneficent endeavour. It was an attempt on the part of a political potentate to propagate a 'fancy religion' from above downwards; and the penalty which the new revelation had to pay for its Pharaonic origin was the implacable hostility which it aroused in the hearts of all the rest of the Egyptian dominant minority. In their eyes Ikhnaton was a detestable traitor; and this invincible opposition which the Egyptian emperor-prophet encountered among his own kind was not counterbalanced by any sympathetic response to his preaching in the hearts of the masses; for in their eyes the new heresy was just as remote and as incomprehensible as the old orthodoxy which it was striving to supersede. Ikhnaton fell between two stools; and this was a fall which all the merits of his character and his gospel were impotent to retrieve.³

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), p. 496, above.

² According to the Osiris-myth, Osiris' son Horus was begotten by his father in an act of sexual union between Osiris and Isis which took place after Osiris had met his death (see Erman, A.: *Die Religion der Ägypter* (Berlin and Leipzig 1934, de Gruyter), pp. 68-9).

³ 'An instructive parallel [to Ikhnaton's abortive religious reform] is afforded by the Iconoclastic Movement in the Byzantine Empire. There too the contradiction between the monotheism of the official doctrine of the Church and the current practice of daily worship led to an attempt to destroy the idolatrous images and forcibly depose the monks who were the head and front of the cult of them; there too there were quite a number of ecclesiastical dignitaries who sided with the Emperor; and there too the enterprise came to grief over a failure to reckon sufficiently with the strength of the religious feelings which the popular form of worship had behind it. The result was that, from that time onwards, the path of progress was closed to the Greek Church', in contrast to the subsequent history of the Western Church.—Meyer, E.: *Geschichte der Altertums*, vol. ii, part (1), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), pp. 414-15. For Iconoclasm and its sequel see the present Study, IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 352, footnote 5, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, vol. iv, pp. 594-5, above. For the

A similar congenital defect seems likewise to account for the abortiveness of Orphism. If our reconstruction of its history¹ is correct, this 'higher religion' was called into existence for the purpose of satisfying a spiritual hunger in Hellenic souls; and this hunger was not—like the craving which was answerable for the translation of the fetish-stone of Cybele from Pessinus to Rome in 204 B.C.²—a mere passing psychological effect of a temporary social ordeal, but was a deep and enduring demand for that spiritual bread which was not to be found in the social heritage of an adolescent and youthfully ravenous Hellenic Society. This yearning after a 'higher religion' is so strong a passion, and the spiritual vacuum which evoked it in the Hellas of the sixth century B.C. is so grave a malady, that it might have been expected *a priori* that any new religious system which offered even a partial satisfaction for this pressing religious need would enjoy a sensational vogue, unless its prospects were blighted by some inherent weakness. This weakness is not to be found in the provenance of the raw materials out of which Orphism was manufactured; for, although, as we have noticed in another context,³ these materials were exotic, the craftsmen who worked them up seem to have been careful to mould them into forms which were in harmony with the native Hellenic tradition.⁴ When we find that, in spite of this combination of uncommonly skilful workmanship with uncommonly favourable predisposing conditions, Orphism in fact missed fire, the fiasco can only be explained as being an ineluctable nemesis for the interestedness of the motives that were at work and for the disingenuity of the means that were employed in the operations of *entrepreneurs* who had set themselves to supply this spiritual demand for their own material profit. There appears to be ground for believing that the propagation of Orphism received its first impulse from the Athenian despots of the House of Peisistratus,⁵ who saw in this 'fancy religion' an apt instrument for their policy of confirming their political hold upon Attica by satisfying the diverse requirements of the formerly unprivileged

petrification which overtook not only the Egyptian religion but the whole of Egyptian life after Ikhnaton's failure see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 144–6, above. It may be noted that Ikhnaton (*imperabat circa 1370–1352 B.C.*) and Leo'Syrus (*imperabat A.D. 717–40*) were, philosophically speaking (see I. C (iii) (c), in vol. i, above), approximately contemporaries, if we equate the interregnum *circa 1675–1575 B.C.* in Egyptian history with the interregnum *circa A.D. 375–675* which was the prelude to the emergence of the Orthodox Christian Civilization.

¹ In V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 84–7, above.

² See pp. 685–8, above.

³ In V. C (i) (c) 2, pp. 85–6, above.

⁴ For an illustration of this careful process of adaptation see Guthrie, W. K. C.: *Orpheus and Greek Religion* (London 1935, Methuen), pp. 104–7.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 2, p. 87, footnote 2, above. On the other hand Boulanger, A.: *Orphée* (Paris 1925, Rieder), pp. 18–29, argues that the cradle of Orphism is to be looked for, not in Attica, but in Magna Graecia.

classes in the Athenian body politic; and the agent of the Peisistratidae in this religious enterprise (if they are to be credited with it) was almost certainly Onomacritus,¹ an expert in religious lore whose recorded exploits make it highly probable that he approached the task which his political patrons had set him in the same cold-blooded spirit in which, some two hundred years later, Ptolemy Soter's commission to launch the worship of Serapis was executed by a Manetho and a Timotheus and a Demetrius and a Bryaxis.² However this may be, the authors of Orphism unquestionably fell between the same two stools as the Pharaonic author of the worship of the Aton.

'Orphism was too philosophical for the masses, too mythological for the intellectual pride of youthful philosophy.'³

Such modest success as Orphism did eventually achieve was posterior to the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization and to the invasion of Hellenic souls by that sense of promiscuity which kept pace with the material expansion of the Hellenic World at the expense of alien societies.⁴

¹ Onomacritus's role is minimized by Boulanger (op. cit., pp. 33-5).

² For the evidence which suggests that Onomacritus may have invented the ritual and the mythology of the Orphic Faith and have composed the corpus of poetry which was put into circulation under the name of Orpheus in order to serve as the sacred scriptures of this manufactured church, see Guthrie, W. K. C.: *Orpheus and Greek Religion* (London 1935, Methuen), pp. 13, 58-9, 107-8, 115-16, 217. Onomacritus's standards of honesty are shown up in the following account, from the pen of Herodotus (Book VII, chap. 6), of the circumstances in which—in a later chapter of his career—the Attic theologian came to second his Peisistratid patrons in the house of exile at Susa in their successful efforts to confirm the Achaemenian emperor Xerxes in his project of attempting the conquest of European Greece—a project in which the *ci-devant* despots of Athens, as well as their Aleuad companions in misfortune who had once been the masters of Thessaly, saw a hope of their own restoration to the lordship from which they had been ejected by their former subjects.

'The Peisistratid exiles at Susa . . . used the same arguments with Xerxes as were used by the Aleuadae, and at the same time they tried to get at him in another way by bringing into action their Athenian fellow countryman Onomacritus, who was an expert in oracles and the editor of those of Musaeus. The Peisistratidae were able to command Onomacritus's services on this occasion because they had made up their quarrel with him before repairing to Susa. This quarrel had arisen out of the act of Hipparchus Peisistratus's son in exiling Onomacritus from Attica when he had been caught red-handed by Lasus of Hermione in the offence of interpolating a [spurious] oracle into the corpus of Musaeus's works. . . . For this offence Hipparchus had sent Onomacritus into exile—in a revulsion from the perpetual recourse which the despot had been by way of having to the theologian's services. However, when the Peisistratids took the road to Susa, Onomacritus was one of the party; and, when he had his audience with the Great King, the Peisistratids made such a song about him that he was graciously permitted to recite his oracles. In complying, Onomacritus took care to suppress everything that suggested the likelihood of a Persian reverse, and to pick out all the most auspicious passages.'

If, at an earlier stage of his career, Onomacritus was as unscrupulous as this in the execution of a Peisistratid commission to manufacture the Orphic religion, it is perhaps not to be wondered at if, in the event, Orphism proved no greater a success than the similarly manufactured worship of Serapis.

The parallel between Peisistratus's role in the launching of Orphism and Ptolemy Soter's role in the launching of the worship of Serapis is pointed out by Boulanger (op. cit., pp. 22-3). In Boulanger's belief, however, the expert services which Peisistratus employed for his purpose were not Attic but Italic. ³ Guthrie, op. cit., p. 238.

⁴ Before the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization—an event which, in this Study,

Our present survey of abortive attempts to propagate 'fancy religions' by means of political patronage may fittingly close with a glance at the Timurid Mughal Emperor Akbar's abortive Din Ilāhī; for, while Akbar's failure was as extreme as the most signal of the comparable fiascos that we have already passed in review, the character and conduct of Akbar himself are so astonishingly Protean that, at one turn or another, they are reminiscent of almost every point that has come to our notice in the several illustrations of our 'law' that we have examined hitherto.¹

In point of completeness the failure of Akbar's enterprise has only two parallels in the list of failures which we have so far compiled; for, like Ikhnaton's substitution of the worship of the Sun-Disk for that of Amon-Re, and like Elagabalus's installation of the Sun-Fetish whose name he bore in the place of honour in the Roman Pantheon, Akbar's disestablishment of Islam to make way for a 'fancy religion' of his own manufacture did not outlive its Imperial author, but fell to the ground as soon as his death had deprived his religious experiment of the political sanction without which it would never have had the slightest chance of even being

we have equated with the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C.—the Orphics' language and a few of their ideas occasionally caught the fancy of philosopher or poet, but in general the gospel which they preached with such enthusiasm and confidence was a cry in the wilderness, because it was a gospel for which the age was not yet ready. . . . It has been said that the rise of mystical cult-societies, or non-social religious groups, seems to coincide with the breaking-up, in the sixth century [B.C.], of the old social units based on the theory or fact of blood-kinship. We see the morality of these old social units subjected to a searching test in Aeschylus. But of the Orphics it may be said with truth that they did not simply reflect and keep step with a social change which was taking place in the Greek World in which they lived (as the statement just quoted might seem to imply), but that they far outstripped that social change in promulgating a religious theory—that of the brotherhood of Mankind—which did not find even philosophical expression until the advent of the Stoics, and for its popular acceptance had to wait until the days of Christianity. . . . There was no place for a religion of this sort in an age when the ties of the family-unit were breaking up only to give place to the equally rigid demands, the new enthusiasms, of the growing city-state. . . . To find a wider response [Orphism] had to wait until the distinctive greatness and distinctive limitations of the Classical Age had broken down' (Guthrie, op. cit., pp. 235 and 238). According to this view the Neo-Orphism of the post-Alexandrine age was not, as Boulanger argues (in op. cit., pp. 58-9), a virtually new religion, but was the authentic Orphism blossoming, at last, in a kindlier social environment.

¹ The quantity of the points of coincidence between Akbar and his compeers will appear the more remarkable when we consider that these similarities were not the product of any conscious policy of imitation on Akbar's part. So far was Akbar from being influenced by the example of any of the other political patrons of 'fancy religions' whom we have mustered in our present review that, in all probability, he was not even aware of the existence of any of them with the possible exception of Hākīm (whom he would have heard of only through being taught to reprobate him). Even Aśoka, whose dominions had been almost exactly co-extensive with Akbar's own, was presumably unknown to Akbar, since there is no evidence to suggest that Buddhism was one of the several non-Islamic systems of belief with which Akbar found the opportunity to make himself acquainted (on this point see Smith, V. A.: *Akbar the Great Mogul*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1919, Clarendon Press), p. 162, footnote 1, and p. 338). The only predecessors of Akbar whose example weighed with Akbar on the testimony of Akbar himself were the Prophet Muhammad and the war-lord 'Alā-ad-Dīn Khilji (*dominabatur* A.D. 1296-1316)—a predecessor with whom Akbar had in common the three points of being a Turk, being a Muslim, and being a militarist who followed his calling in an Indian arena (see Smith, op. cit., pp. 209-11).

given a trial. When we remind ourselves that Hākīm's fantastic self-deification is still cherished as the living faith of at any rate one fossilized community of converts, though more than nine hundred years have now elapsed since the death of the capricious founder of the religion of the Druses, and when we further reflect that the Orphic and Serapian churches, which were manufactured in such cold blood at the instance of a Peisistratus and a Ptolemy Soter, not only lived on for centuries after the deaths of their political promoters but also spread far and wide beyond the frontiers of the Peisistratean Principality and the Ptolemaic Empire, we can take the measure of the moral defeat which was suffered by the Dīn Ilāhī when its nominal adherents incontinently abandoned it to the last man upon receipt of the news that their Imperial master was no longer in a position to visit them with his political displeasure if they ceased to humour his religious vagaries.

As for the many-sidedness which is as conspicuous a feature as the ineffectiveness of Akbar's religious interests and activities, it is at best bewildering and at worst inexplicably self-contradictory; and therefore perhaps the least unpromising approach to the formidable task of attempting an analysis of this extraordinary genius will lie in bringing out the points that Akbar has in common with one or other of the Imperial philosophers and theologians and prophets and claimants to divinity whose failures we have already examined.

One vein in Akbar's genius showed itself in a detached intellectual curiosity and a temperate piety that are both of them reminiscent of the Roman Emperor Alexander Severus. It was in this vein that in A.D. 1575 Akbar established his 'Ibādat Khānah ('House of Worship') as a theatre for discussions of religious and philosophical questions between the representatives of different schools of Islamic thought;¹ and from that moment onwards we can watch the range of Akbar's curiosity constantly expanding. In A.D. 1578 he summoned to his court the Zoroastrian theologian Dastūr Meherji Rānā from Gujerat;² in 1579 he invited from Goa the first of the three successive missions of Jesuit fathers that were to visit his court before the close of his reign;³ in 1582 he sent for the Jain guru Hīravijaya;⁴ and, as the Emperor's circle of religious consultants widened by degrees to this, in Muslim eyes, shockingly latitudinarian radius, Akbar seems to have abandoned his exclusively inter-Muslim public disputations in favour of private sessions at which the representatives of all the different religions

¹ See Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-4.

² For this first Jesuit mission see *ibid.*, pp. 169-76.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-8. Akbar's Jain consultant, like his Zoroastrian consultant, came from Gujerat.

with which he had successively placed himself *en rapport* were required to meet and debate with one another.¹ The results of these excursions into the comparative study of religions came to be reflected in Akbar's daily life in a personal system of private devotions which departed both from the hours and from the exercises of the canonical Islamic prayers, and 'consisted . . . in his latter days . . . largely of acts of reverence to the Sun, fire and light'.²

This intellectual vein, in which Akbar's heart was dominated by his head, was combined in his person with a mystical vein with which it might seem incompatible—if the evidence for the existence of both veins in this one personality were not as convincing as it happens in fact to be. The crucial event in Akbar's religious experience was a fit of ecstasy which came upon him suddenly and unawares in the midst of all the bustle and excitement of a *battue*; and this incident was not an isolated occurrence, for there had been a premonition of it at a date when Akbar was still in his boyhood, and the vein that here came to the surface was active underneath at every stage of Akbar's life.³ It was a response of this element in the emperor-mystic's soul to the admonitions of his Svetāmbara Jain mentor that moved Akbar to pay tribute to the principle of *Ahimsa* ('Non-Injury') by imposing on himself and on his subjects some of the same measures of self-denial which in the same part of the world, more than eighteen hundred years before, had been adopted by the Emperor Aṣoka under the influence of the Hinayanian Buddhism.⁴ Like Aṣoka, Akbar took to a vegetarian diet;⁵ like Aṣoka, he abolished the Imperial hunt; and, like Aṣoka, he established a close time in which the slaughtering of animals was made illegal.⁶

Though this mystical vein in Akbar's character presents a strong contrast to the intellectual vein which we have analysed above, the two veins might both have been expected to contribute—when it came to the practical enterprise of founding a new religion⁷

¹ Ibid., p. 133.

² Ibid., p. 349. Compare the account, that has been quoted above in V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), p. 549, of the private devotions of Alexander Severus in his eclectically furnished oratory.

³ Smith, op. cit., pp. 158-61 and 348-9.

⁴ See the present Annex, pp. 682-3, above.

⁵ Compare Smith, op. cit., p. 167, with the same author's *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 177. It seems certain that Akbar, and probable that Aṣoka, prescribed the death-penalty as a punishment for human beings who infringed these laws for the prevention of cruelty to animals! Aṣoka, however, did, as we have seen, apply the principle of *Ahimsa* to his conduct towards human beings as well, in the capital point of renouncing the use of War as an instrument of his Imperial policy, whereas Akbar never denied himself the indulgence of extending the range of his empire by a pursuit of the practice of aggressive warfare.

⁷ For the institution of the Din Ilāhī see Smith, V. A.: *Akbar the Great Mogul*, pp. 211-22.

—towards informing this work of Akbar's hands with an ethereal and impersonal spirit; and there is one aspect of the Dīn Ilāhī in which this expectation might appear to have been fulfilled; for Akbar's 'fancy religion' was professedly a transcendental monotheism in which an ineffable Godhead was approached in the mind of Akbar—as in the kindred minds of Ikhnaton and Plato and Aurelian and Pachacutec—through an adoration of the Sun in his symbolic role as the Deity's counterpart in the Material Universe.¹ This transcendental aspect of the Dīn Ilāhī was overshadowed, however, by a contrary aspect in which the autocrat's 'fancy religion' can be seen ministering nakedly and unashamedly to its author's overweening egotism.

The promulgation of the new faith in A.D. 1582 was prefaced by two demonstrative assertions of a 'Caesaro-papism' that was as reminiscent of Elagabalus and Hākim as it was profoundly alien from the tradition and the *êthos* of the orthodox Sunnī Islam in which Akbar had been born and bred.² In June 1579 the Emperor insisted on assuming the function of saying the *Khutbah* in the general mosque in his brand-new capital of Fathpur-Sikrī;³ and in the September of the same year Shaykh Mubārak—a Sunnī doctor of the Law who pandered to Akbar's clerical ambitions—followed up this first step by promulgating, in the name of the Sunnī 'ulamā of the Empire, a manifesto⁴ conceding to the Emperor the last word in those questions of faith and doctrine which, according to the Sunnah, were soluble exclusively by the consensus of the 'ulamā themselves and lay entirely beyond the province of the temporal power—even where this was wielded by the Commander of the Faithful himself.⁵ Thereafter, when at the beginning of A.D. 1582 Akbar at last took the decisive step of overtly promulgating a new religion, an insistence upon the supreme spiritual authority of its Imperial maker—an authority that was supported by a pretension to a unique spiritual enlightenment—turned out to be the kernel of a so-called Dīn Ilāhī.⁶ Converts were called upon to sacrifice Religion, as well as Honour, Life, and Property, upon the demand of the emperor-pontiff; and, if the

¹ For Akbar's adoration—under Hindu as well as Zoroastrian influence—of the Sun in particular and of fire and light in general see Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-5 and 349.

² For the 'Caesaro-papism' that has been the ruin of the Orthodox Christian Civilization see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 364-405, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, vol. iv, pp. 593-623, above.

³ Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 178-80.

⁵ For this fundamental rule of the orthodox Sunnī Muslim Faith see the authorities—particularly Arnold, T. W.: *The Caliphate* (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press)—that are cited in Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 25-30. Akbar's outrageous assumption of the authority of an 'ālim in virtue of being the local *sultān* of the Islamic community in Hindustan seems to have been first mooted by Shaykh Mubārak as early as A.D. 1573 (Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-14).

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 213-17.

convert was a Muslim, a written declaration of his repudiation of Islam was required of him. In his special animus against the religion which he himself had deserted, the apostate Sunnī Akbar revealed the apostate Shī'ī Hākīm's cloven hoof; and, though he stopped short¹ of attempting to convert his Muslim subjects to the Dīn Ilāhī by force, Akbar did go so far as to sell into slavery beyond the frontiers of his own dominions a number of shaykhs and fakīrs who had been frank enough and bold enough to declare against the Emperor's spiritual pretensions.² There is even reason to believe that Akbar followed Hākīm to the length of at any rate playing with the idea of representing himself as an incarnation of the Deity.³

The utter failure of this fantastic caprice of an extraordinary genius may perhaps be considered to have completed our demonstration that *Cujus Regio Ejus Religio* is a political programme which is inexorably condemned to miscarry. And indeed the last word on this vain dream of autocrats intoxicated with *hybris* had already been uttered—and that not only before Akbar's time but also within Akbar's knowledge—by one of the councillors of Akbar's own predecessor and ensample, Sultan 'Alā-ad-Dīn Khiljī, at a privy council meeting at which 'Alā-ad-Dīn had divulged his intention of committing the very act of folly which Akbar did commit three hundred years later.

'Religion and law and creeds', declared the prince's councillor on this occasion, 'ought never to be made subjects of discussion by Your Majesty, for these are the concerns of prophets, not the business of kings. Religion and law spring from heavenly revelation; they are never established by the plans and designs of Man. From the days of Adam till now they have been the mission of prophets and apostles, as rule and government have been the duty of kings. The prophetic office has never appertained to kings—and never will, so long as the World lasts—though some prophets have discharged the functions of royalty. My advice is that Your Majesty should never talk about these matters.'⁴

The Khiljī prince to whom this counsel was addressed showed himself wiser in his generation than his more enlightened Timurid successor; for 'Alā-ad-Dīn prudently abandoned his foolhardy enterprise in deference to a warning which, in the same social

¹ Ibid., p. 209.

² Ibid., p. 221.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 177–8, 218, and 351. This suspicion mainly rests upon the use of the phrase 'Allāhu Akbar' as one of the shibboleths of the new religion; for, while the traditional meaning of this pious ejaculation was 'Allah is without a peer', it was also capable of being interpreted as meaning 'Akbar is identical with Allah'.

⁴ Advice given to Sultan 'Alā-ad-Dīn by his councillor 'Alā-al-Mulk, the Kotwāl of Delhi (recorded in Ziyā-ad-Dīn Baranī's *Ta'rikh-i-Firūz Shāhī*, and quoted by Smith, in *op. cit.*, p. 210, from the English translation given in Elliot, H. M., and Dowson, J.: *The History of India as told by its own Historians* (London 1867–77, Trübner, 8 vols.), vol. iii, p. 170.

environment at the later date, was disregarded by Akbar to that self-willed emperor-pontiff's own exemplary discomfiture.

If the lesson of experience up to date thus proves to be that *Cujus Regio Ejus Religio* is a political programme which spells disappointment for any prince who may be rash enough to make it his own, a study of History will also bring to light a converse principle which is apt to prosper the handiwork of a prince who acts upon it, while even the prince who merely refrains from acting at variance with it may look forward to reaping at least the negative reward of escaping Akbar's and Hākim's fiasco. This counter-principle might be expressed in the antithetical catchword *Religio Regionis Religio Regis*; and we may conclude the present Annex by applying our usual test of an empirical survey to this second formula in its turn—reviewing in the first place the fortunes of those princes who have simply forborne from setting the principle at defiance, and in the second place the fortunes of those who have taken it for their positive rule of conduct.

Our catalogue of rulers who have profited by paying deference to the precept *Religio Regionis Religio Regis* in the merely negative way of keeping on the right side of the law must include the name of the Umayyad dynasty of Caliphs, since the Umayyads did refrain from attempting to force upon their subjects the faith to which they themselves officially subscribed, and did duly reap from this tolerance a reward which can be measured by contrasting the policy and the fortunes of the Umayyads with those of the Maccabees.¹ At the same time we cannot rate even the negative merit of the Umayyads very high, considering that every one of the Caliphs of this dynasty, with the single exception of 'Umar II, was supremely indifferent, if not positively hostile, to the Islam which he officially professed, and was therefore presumably free from any serious temptation to press upon the non-Islamic populations under his rule a religious diet for which their sovereign himself had so little appetite. A greater exercise of self-restraint may be discerned in the similar forbearance of the Achaemenidae, with the single exception of Cambyses in Egypt, from any attempt to indoctrinate their non-Zoroastrian subjects with the Zoroastrianism which was the domestic religion of the Achaemenian House;² for on the one hand the language of their inscriptions suggests that the Achaemenidae were keener converts to Zoroas-

¹ For the respective cases of the Umayyads and the Maccabees see the present Annex, pp. 675-7 and 657-9, above. For the case of the Umayyads see also V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 205, below.

² Cambyses' outrageous desecration and violent persecution of the Egyptian religion may perhaps be taken as evidence of a zeal for his own Zoroastrianism—though this Achaemenian fanatic had not time, in Egypt, to progress from the stage of repression to that of propaganda.

trianism than the Umayyads were to Islam,¹ while on the other hand the Achaemenidae showed themselves so scrupulous in acting up to their policy of extending toleration to all religions alike² as to have awakened, in the minds of some modern Western scholars, an uncharitable suspicion that such admirably tolerant princes may not after all have felt any very deep devotion to the faith which they personally professed. However that may be, it is at any rate beyond question that the Achaemenidae served their own interests better by their tolerance than their Sasanian successors and co-religionists served theirs by their fanatical efforts to impose their Zoroastrianism upon their subjects.³

Again, we may be sure that Marcus Aurelius never dreamt of making use of his Imperial prerogative in order to propagate among his subjects—either by precept, like Açoka, or, *a fortiori*, by ordinance, like Julian—the philosophy which was the staff of Marcus's own private life;⁴ and this negative service was certainly the best that Stoicism could have received at the hands of its Imperial professor. The Incas, too, notwithstanding their deliberate and systematic authoritarianism, had the wisdom to temper tyranny with discretion in the execution of their religious policy;⁵

¹ This is possibly truer of the earlier than it is of the later Achaemenian emperors of the House of Hystaspes; for a considerable departure from the strict demands of the Zoroastrian Faith seems to be implied in the public patronage which was extended by Artaxerxes II (*imperabat* 404–358 B.C.) to the worship of the goddess Anahita—a divinity who may in form have been incorporated into the Zoroastrian system of theology, but who was in fact a relic of the pre-Zoroastrian paganism which in all probability continued, from beginning to end of the Achaemenian Age, to be the everyday religion of a majority of the Great King's Iranian kinsmen inside as well as outside the frontiers of the Great King's dominions. While the Achaemenidae were thus inclining to revert from the new 'higher religion' which had been adopted by their House to an older paganism, the Magi, who, before the advent of the Prophet Zarathustra, had established a position for themselves as the hereditary priesthood of Iran, and who had therefore at first seen in Zoroastrianism a menace to their own vested interests, were reversing their original policy of opposition and were setting themselves to capture a Zoroastrianism which they had found themselves unable to suppress (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), p. 542, above). Thus, in the Achaemenian Age, the Dynasty and the Magi were already beginning to converge towards the common ground on the religious plane that was to be the basis of their alliance on the political plane in the Sasanian Age. The political influence which the Magi were eventually to exercise upon the Sasanian Government does not, however, seem to have been acquired until after the fall of the Achaemenian régime (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 125).

² The persecution of the Egyptian religion by Cambyses is the exception that proves the rule; for Darius the Great took pains to efface the traces of Cambyses' subversive work (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 163).

³ See the present Annex, pp. 659–61, above.

⁴ In assessing the motives of Marcus's abstention from philosophical propaganda it is difficult to know how much weight to assign to a scrupulousness of the Achaemenian kind and how much to the esoteric spirit of the Hellenic philosophers, who were mostly content to allow their philosophy to remain caviare to the vulgar (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 559–62, above).

⁵ For one piece of evidence see the present Annex, p. 694, footnote 3, above. For the respect for local customs which was the general policy of the Incas, subject to the imposition of certain common rules of life in the interest of establishing a framework of social uniformity, see Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inkas* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 62.

and we may conjecture that, if the Incaic Empire had been allowed to live out its natural term, this touch of latitudinarianism in the religious sphere would have stood the Incas in better stead than a fanaticism of the kind which was subsequently displayed in this same Andean World by the Incas' Spanish conquerors and successors in their efforts to impose their own Catholic Christianity upon the Incas' former subjects; for these Spanish efforts seem to have been as fruitless in reality as they have been successful in appearance. Nor had the 'Osmanli contemporaries of either the Inca Pachacutec (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1400-48) or the Safawī militarist Ismā'il (*imperabat* A.D. 1500-24) or the Spanish King Philip II (*regnabat* A.D. 1556-98) or the Timurid Mughal Emperor Awrangzīb (*imperabat* A.D. 1659-1707) any cause to regret their own consistently maintained policy of tolerating, in conformity with the *Sheri'ah*, the religious practices and beliefs of the non-Muslim 'People of the Book' who had explicitly submitted to their rule; for the contrast between the long duration of the Ottoman régime and the swift discomfiture of each of those intolerant potentates gives the measure of the reward which the 'Osmanlis obtained for their persistence in resisting all temptations to treat their Christian subjects as the Spanish Crown treated its Muslim subjects and Shāh Ismā'il his Sunnī subjects and Awrangzīb his Hindus.¹

Perhaps the most remarkable, as well as the most honourable, examples of this politic forbearance from employing an autocrat's power in order to propagate the autocrat's religion are those in which a dynasty whose domestic faith has been on the point of triumphing by its own efforts over all the rival creeds has still refrained from dealing these defeated opponents their death-blow. In this magnanimous spirit the 'Abbasids refrained from anticipating the victory of Islam over Zoroastrianism and Nestorianism and Monophysitism in the dominions of the Caliphate,² while in the Indic World the Guptas similarly refrained from hastening the triumph of the rising Hinduism—which they themselves professed—over a Buddhism which was already declining towards its fall in the society which had brought it to birth. This generosity stands out in auspicious contrast to the implacable fanaticism with which,

¹ The exception which proves the rule of Ottoman tolerance is the massacre of the Anatolian Shi'is in A.D. 1514 (see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 362 and 384, above). But this atrocity was committed at a moment of great public danger and under an extreme provocation; and even Sultan Selim I did not extend his persecution of the Shi'ah to his other non-Sunnī subjects—though there is a story that he did once try to trick his Sheykh-al-Islām into inadvertently sanctioning in advance a project which the Pādishāh had in mind for commanding all his Christian subjects—in utter contravention of the *Sheri'ah*—to embrace Islam under pain of death if they refused (for this story see V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 204, below).

² See p. 678, above, and V. C (ii) (a), vol. vi, p. 205, below.

in a dissolving Hellenic Society, a Gratian and a Theodosius and a Justinian pressed the pursuit of a retreating Paganism which was so manifestly incapable of rallying that Time could safely have been left to consummate the already assured victory of Christianity without any further aid from the autocrat's arm. In their behaviour in these circumstances it was assuredly the Hindu Guptas and the Muslim 'Abbasids, and not the Christian epigoni of Constantine the Great, who 'fulfilled' that 'which was spoken by Esaias the Prophet':

'Behold my servant, whom I uphold; mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth; I have put my spirit upon him: he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles. He shall not cry nor lift up nor cause his voice to be heard in the street. A bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking flax shall he not quench: he shall bring forth judgment unto truth . . . and the isles shall wait for his law.'

If we now pass from our survey of these rulers who have merely refrained from trying to force their own religion upon their subjects,² and proceed to review, in their turn, those other rulers who have gone to the length of embracing their subjects' religion in place of the faith which the ruler-converts have inherited from their own forebears, we may find it illuminating to arrange our examples to the best of our judgement in the descending order of their comparative sincerity.

¹ Isa. xlii. 1-4, quoted in Matt. xii. 18-21.

² In passing, we may take note of two sets of rulers who have not refrained from trying to force their own religion upon their subjects, but who have nevertheless acknowledged that, in principle, Religion ought not to be inculcated by political coercion, and who have tried to reconcile their liberal theory with their illiberal practice by representing that the rites which they have been constraining their subjects to perform are not really religious rites at all, but are simply civic ceremonies which can be carried out by anybody without giving any legitimate ground for conscientious scruples. This was the attitude taken up by the Roman Imperial authorities towards Christian citizens or subjects of the Empire who professed conscientious objections against performing the ritual of emperor-worship. The same attitude is taken up to-day by the Japanese Imperial authorities in regard to the ritual of State Shinto:

'In the case of a civilized country there must exist freedom of faith. If Shintō is a religion, however, the acceptance or refusal thereof must be left to personal choice. Yet for a Japanese subject to refuse to honour the ancestors of the Emperor is disloyal. Indeed, a Japanese out of his duty as subject must honour the ancestors of the Emperor. This cannot be a matter of choice. It is a duty. Therefore this cannot be regarded as a religion. It is a ritual. It is the ceremony of gratitude to ancestors. In this respect the Government protects the shrines and does not expound doctrines.' (Ariga, Nagao: 'Shintō as a State Religion' in *Tetsugaku Zasshi*, vol. xxv, No. 280 (June 1910), p. 702, quoted by Holtom, D. C.: *The National Faith of Japan: A Study in Modern Shintō* (London 1938, Kegan Paul), pp. 69-70.)

The question whether State Shinto is a religion, which is answered in the negative by the Japanese authority above quoted, is discussed by Holtom in op. cit., pp. 289-316, and is answered by this Western scholar in the affirmative:

'Modern Shrine Shintō is a thorough-going religion. It is the state religion of Japan. In it we discern an extraordinary example of the survival, in the culture of the present day, of a form of national worship which presents interesting parallels with the state religions that dominated the civilizations of Western Asia and the Mediterranean area thousands of years ago' (p. 306).

Holtom's view is shared by Kato, Genchi: *A Study of Shinto, the Religion of the Japanese Nation* (Tokyo 1926, Meiji Japan Society), pp. 2-3.

On this criterion we shall perhaps be inclined to head our list with the Roman Emperor Constantine the Great and with the Sinic Emperor Han Wuti; for, however much Constantine in embracing Christianity, and Wuti in embracing Confucianism,¹ may have gained—and foreseen that he would gain—politically, those modern Western historians who see in the alleged conversion of these two emperors nothing more than a cynically calculated piece of hypocrisy² are assuredly guilty of a gross psychological anachronism in attributing to the children of a disintegrating Hellenic and a disintegrating Sinic Society a modern Western behaviour which is manifestly incompatible with the spirit of the time and place in which these alleged hypocrites actually lived. It seems far more probable that, if either Constantine or Wuti had been aware in his own heart that he was not acting in good faith, he would have found himself unable to keep up in the sight of his subjects a pretence with which he had ceased to be able to delude his own understanding. And therefore, when we have to explain to ourselves why Constantine did—after a previous declaration of allegiance to his ancestral tutelary deity Sol Invictus³—eventually come to the conclusion that it was his duty as a Roman Emperor ‘so far to disavow Rome’s past as himself to adopt’ a Christianity which was ‘professed by perhaps one-tenth of his subjects’,⁴ we

¹ For the Constantinian part which was played by Han Wuti in securing the adoption of Confucianism as the official philosophy of the Sinic universal state see Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 295–320, and the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 4, in the present volume, pp. 418–19, and the present Annex, p. 654, above. In this partnership it was not the pliant temporal power but the triumphant philosophy that was the loser. A Confucianism that was already becoming intellectually debased as a result of the social *pammixia* in the Sinic universal state (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 549 and 555–6, and the present Annex, pp. 654–5, above) was now also spiritually sterilized through being made official (Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), p. 235).

² This seems, for example, to be Franke’s opinion, to judge by the following passage in op. cit., vol. i, pp. 318–19:

‘A remote resemblance may be discerned between the respective positions of the Emperor Constantine and his successors, down to Theodosius the Great, in the Roman Empire in the fourth century, and of Kaoti and his successors, down to Wuti, in the Chinese Empire. Both found themselves confronted by a spiritual movement—Christianity in the one case and Confucianism in the other—with which they were forced to come to a reckoning. Both, in their own hearts, to start with, even if they were not positively inclined to reject this movement, were at any rate without any special penchant towards it: Constantine did not have himself baptized till he was on his death-bed. . . . Gratian and Theodosius were the first Roman emperors to confer an exclusive legality and right of protection in the Empire upon the orthodox Christian creed, while we have already seen what the Han emperors’ attitude was towards Confucianism. Both, however, were constrained by political circumstances to repress their personal feelings. The Roman Empire became Christian, and the Chinese Confucian.’

This equation of Wuti’s attitude towards Confucianism with the fanatical intolerance of Gratian’s and Theodosius’s devotion to Christianity seems as questionable as the associated equation of Constantine’s attitude towards Christianity with the contemptuous hostility which was publicly displayed towards Confucianism by Liu Pang [= Kaoti] according to the evidence that has been cited in this Annex, on p. 654, above, upon the authority of Dr. Hu Shih.

³ See the present Annex, pp. 650 and 693–4, above.

⁴ Baynes, N. H.: *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church* (London 1929, Milford), p. 4.

shall perhaps show ourselves both better psychologists and better historians if we seek an explanation which does not call in question the imperial convert's sincerity. We may make bold to conjecture that the determining consideration that moved Constantine to make a new departure which was apparently hazardous, and was certainly sensational, was the abiding effect of the impression that had been made upon him as a younger man by the experience of witnessing, at close quarters, the indomitable bearing of the Christian Church under the searching ordeal of the Galerian persecution.¹

The historical sense that warns us against attributing the conversion of a Constantine or a Wuti to motives that are anachronistically cynical will commend an even greater caution in interpreting in terms of an ephemerally and parochially modern Western attitude to life the conversions of barbarian conquerors who have been far less sophisticated than those converted rulers of universal states into whose derelict heritage these barbarians have forced an entry. In other contexts² we have observed that the barbarian conquerors who are converted promptly and outright from their primitive paganism to a 'higher religion' that is prevalent among their more civilized subjects are apt to be rewarded by being given a leading part to play in subsequent history; and we have also observed that the maxim 'Better late than never' holds good in this case, since the pagan or heretical barbarian rulers of 'successor-states' who capitulate to the established local orthodoxy at any time down to the eleventh hour are apt at any rate to escape destruction—even if they may have irretrievably forfeited their chances of achieving greatness—whereas the more stiff-necked barbarians who obstinately persist in their ancestral paganism or heresy are apt to pay the prohibitive price of ejection or annihilation. On this showing, a speedy and thorough-going conversion to the faith of his subjects is the barbarian conqueror's best policy from the standpoint of his own material interests; and yet it would be unwarrantable to assume that this has actually been the usual motive in the minds of those barbarians who have in fact undergone conversion before suffering the penalty for recalcitrance. For one thing, not one of these barbarian converts to a 'higher religion' has had the opportunity to acquaint himself with the array of precedents from which the historian's rational induction

¹ Our own contemporary the Chinese 'Christian General' Fêng Yu-hsiang is said to have been converted as a result of having witnessed, as a young man, the martyrdom of Western Christian missionaries during the 'Boxer' insurrection of A.D. 1899-1900.

² e.g., in V. C (i) (c) 4, pp. 355-7, above, in general, and also in I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 363-4; II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 145; and III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, pp. 429, 439, and 450, in regard to the particular case of the conversion to Islam of the epigoni of the Mongol conquerors of Dār-al-Islām.

is laboriously extracted; but it is still more pertinent to reflect that, even if these data could be placed at the barbarian's disposal by some extraordinary *tour de force*, he would usually be unable and unwilling to turn them to account because he is both destitute of the training and innocent of the taste for making the cynical calculations of *Realpolitik*.¹

No doubt there have been individual exceptions to this general rule of barbarian 'mentality' and behaviour. For example, when we observe that the pagan Frankish war-lord Clovis announced his conversion to the Catholic Christianity of the native population of Gaul on the eve of his wars of aggression against the Arian Burgundians and Visigoths who were then still in occupation of the lion's share of the Gallic spoils of the Roman Empire, it is difficult to resist the suspicion that the barbarian mind of the covetous Frankish interloper was making the same Machiavellian calculations as are known to have been made in similar circumstances by the sophisticated minds of an Henri IV and a Napoleon Bonaparte. An exceptional political precocity may be one of those 'sports' that are part of the order of Nature; and our suspicion that Clovis may in fact have been a modern Western statesman born a thousand years before his due Transalpine date² is supported by the fact—which we have noticed already in another connexion³—that, in spite of the brilliance of his achievements and the importance of their historical effects, the founder of the Frankish power has not become one of the heroes of the Teutonic Epic. It looks as though there was some element in Clovis' character and career which had chilled the imagination and baffled the skill of the minstrels who created the 'heroic' poetry of the barbarian society in which Clovis 'lived and moved'; and this intractable something may have consisted precisely in the fact that this vulgarly successful barbarian 'had his being' in a forbiddingly alien intellectual and moral clime. If, however, this is really Clovis' case, it is probably an exceptional one. For the most part it seems likely that the barbarian converts to the ruling religious orthodoxy of their time and place have been moved far less strongly by conscious calculations of political expediency than by the glamour and prestige

¹ The barbarian war-lord may be exonerated from the imputation of being an addict to the vices of Civilization, without being idealized as 'the noble savage'. The sentimental and the 'realistic' portraits of him are equally out of focus, because each, in its way, is an attempt to depict him in modern Western dress. The barbarian who has entered by conquest into a disintegrating civilization's derelict heritage is prone, as we shall find (in Part VIII, below), to lose his *moral*; but the demoralization to which he succumbs is of a kind that is peculiar to the barbarian's own self in these particular circumstances.

² In Italy, in contrast to the Transalpine parts of Western Christendom, Clovis' *Realpolitik* would have been a normal phenomenon within eight hundred years of Clovis' actual date.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, pp. 610 and 612-14, above.

of a culture which has not lost its power to captivate their imaginations and to daunt their spirits even after they have proved themselves more than a match for it in sheer physical force.¹

In order to find unquestionably authentic examples of a consciously cynical and deliberately calculating attempt to reap political profit by putting the principle of *Religio Regionis Religio Regis* into practice, we must descend to the Modern Age of a Western or Westernized Society; and in naming Henri IV and Napoleon I we have already recalled two of the outstanding cases in point that are to be found in this modern Western field. It only remains to mention the British practice²—which has been current by now for two hundred and fifty years and which is not the outcome of either conscious cynicism or deliberate calculation—for having in the sovereign of the United Kingdom a common member of the Episcopalian Established Church of England and of the Presbyterian Established Church of Scotland, so that, on whichever side of the Border he may happen to be resident at any moment, the King always finds himself at home in matters ecclesiastical as well as in matters secular.³ This thorough-going application of the principle of *Religio Regionis Religio Regis*⁴ has worked as well—at any rate from the political standpoint—for the last two and a half centuries as the previous attempts to regulate the ecclesiastical relations between England and Scotland on the principle of *Cujus Regio Ejus Religio* worked badly during the eighty-six years that intervened between the accession of King James VI of Scotland to the English throne and that of Prince William of Orange to the thrones of both kingdoms. The ecclesiastical status of the Crown that has resulted from the politico-ecclesiastical settlement achieved between A.D. 1688 and A.D. 1707 has indeed been the palladium of the Constitution of the United Kingdom ever since; for the formal equality at law between the respective ecclesiastical establishments of the two kingdoms has been symbolized, in a fashion that can be ‘understood of the people’ on both sides of the Border, in the visible fact that, on both sides alike, the King

¹ For example, it was no doubt the spiritual and cultural potency of the Mahāyāna, and not any mental operations of political arithmetic, that led to the conversion of the To Pa barbarian conquerors of one of the northern marches of the Sinic universal state at a moment when, as a matter of statistical fact, the Mahāyāna was already the established religion of some nine-tenths of these barbarian conquerors’ native Sinic subjects (for this estimate see Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, pp. 249–50).

² Touched upon already in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), pp. 533–4, above.

³ This has only latterly been a matter of practical importance, since no king or queen ever set foot in Scotland during the first 133 out of the 250 years in question (A.D. 1688–1938).

⁴ *Religio Regionis Religio Regis*, but not *Religio Regionis Religio Civis*, since, in both England and Scotland during the period in question, the toleration of dissent has been as much a part of the politico-religious constitution of the country as has been the establishment of the two churches that are severally established in the two kingdoms.

professes a religion which is the officially established (though no longer the exclusively tolerated) religion of the land; and this palpably assured sense of ecclesiastical equality, which is itself the fruit of a spirit of mutual toleration in matters of religion, has provided the psychological foundation for a free and equal political union between two kingdoms which had previously been alienated from one another by a long tradition of hostility and which have never ceased to be differentiated by a wide disparity in area, population, and wealth. The successful negotiation of these formidable obstacles to a union of Scottish and English hearts is a political *tour de force* that is the *chef d'œuvre* of British statesmanship; and by the same token it may be taken as the culminating and decisive proof of our present thesis that *Religio Regionis Religio Regis* is a politically more profitable maxim than *Cujus Regio Ejus Religio* for princes to take as the cue for their ecclesiastical policy.



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A STUDY OF
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A STUDY OF HISTORY

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'Except the Lord build the house,
their labour is but lost that build it.

'Except the Lord keep the city,
the watchman waketh but in vain.'

Ps. cxxvii. 1-2

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V

THE DISINTEGRATIONS OF CIVILIZATIONS (*cont.*)

C. THE PROCESS OF DISINTEGRATION (*cont.*)

(I) THE CRITERION OF DISINTEGRATION (*cont.*)

(d) SCHISM IN THE SOUL (*cont.*)

7. *The Sense of Unity*

IN our preliminary reconnaissance of the relations between the several alternative ways of behaviour, feeling and life in which human souls react to the ordeal of social disintegration, we have observed¹ that the sense of promiscuity, which we have just been studying in various manifestations of it, is a psychological response to a blurring and blending of the sharp individual outlines that are assumed by a civilization while it is still in growth and is therefore still differentiating itself from other representatives of its kind;² and in this connexion we have observed that the same experience may alternatively evoke another response—an awakening to a sense of unity—which is not only distinct from the sense of promiscuity but is its exact antithesis. The painful perturbing dissolution of familiar forms, which suggests to weaker spirits that the ultimate reality is nothing but a chaos, may reveal to a steadier and more penetrating spiritual vision the truth that the flickering film of a phenomenal world in which the forms of outward things take shape only to disappear again is an illusion which cannot for ever obscure the everlasting unity that lies behind.³

This spiritual truth, like other truths of the kind, is apt to be apprehended first by analogy from some outward visible sign; and the portent in the external world which gives the first intimation of a unity that is spiritual and ultimate is the unification of a human society into a universal state through a prosaically brutal process of internecine warfare between parochial states which has

¹ In V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 381, above.

² For the differentiation that accompanies, and bears witness to, the growth of a civilization see III. C, vol. iii, pp. 377-90, above.

³ In the Hellenic World *post Alexandrum* this revelation of unity was apprehended and given expression by Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school of philosophy (Bidez, J.: *La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil chez les Stoïciens* (Paris 1932, Les Belles Lettres), p. 50). In applying his apprehension of this truth to the problem of Man's place in the Universe, Zeno parted company with the Cynics. 'Apprenant à l'homme à se considérer non comme une simple partie (*μέρος*), mais comme un membre (*μέλος*) d'un vaste organisme social, . . . Zénon donne à l'esprit purement négatif et frondeur du cynicisme un espoir positif' (*ibid.*, pp. 29-30; cf. p. 10). For the Hellenic conception of the *Cosmopolis*, which was in large measure the Stoics' work, see V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, pp. 332-8, below.

ended at last in the exclusive and unchallenged dominion of one sole surviving belligerent.

The dawn of a sense of unity on this pedestrian political plane of life is commemorated in the titles in which some of the universal states that have come into existence up to date have proclaimed their rulers' own conception of their nature and function.¹ For example, the prince of the Eleventh Egyptian Dynasty who was the founder of the Egyptian universal state styled himself 'the Uniter of the Two Lands',² and his Sumeric counterpart Ur-Engur gave his similar political handiwork the title of 'the Kingdom of Sumer and Akkad'. Ur-Engur's successor, Dungi, abandoned this mere enumeration of his empire's two principal component parts for the abstract and comprehensive title of 'the Kingdom of the Four Quarters';³ and precisely the same formula was invented independently by the Incas—in another hemisphere and at a Time-remove of more than three thousand years—to designate the universal state into which they had united the political surface of the Andean World.⁴ Again,

¹ Pretensions to oecumenical power can be expressed in the action of a rite or ceremony as well as in the words of a style and title; and the Indic Society established a practical test for pretensions of the kind in 'the antique rite of the horse-sacrifice (*aśva medha*), which, according to immemorial tradition, could only be performed by a paramount sovereign and involved as a preliminary a formal and successful challenge to all rival claimants to supreme power, delivered after this fashion:

"A horse of a particular colour was consecrated by the performance of certain ceremonies, and was then turned loose to wander for a year. The King, or his representative, followed the horse with an army, and, when the animal entered a foreign country, the ruler of that country was bound either to fight or to submit. If the liberator of the horse succeeded in obtaining or enforcing the submission of all the countries over which it passed, he returned in triumph with all the vanquished rājas in his train; but if he failed he was disgraced, and his pretensions ridiculed. After his successful return a great festival was held, at which the horse was sacrificed" (Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 200, quoting Dowson, J.: *Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and Religion, Geography, History, and Literature* (London 1879, Trübner), s.v. *Aśvamedha*).

The first recorded performance of this imperial rite seems to be its celebration by Pushyamitra, the usurper who overthrew the Maurya Dynasty—and attempted in vain to enter into the imperial heritage of Chandragupta and Aśoka—*circa* 185 B.C. (see Smith, op. cit., pp. 200-2). Thereafter, upon the reintegration of the Indic universal state by the Gupta Dynasty after a long interlude of Helleno-Nomad intrusion, the traditional horse-sacrifice was celebrated in succession by Samudragupta, *circa* A.D. 351 (Smith, op. cit., p. 288), and by his grandson Kumāragupta (*imperabat*, A.D. 413-55) (Smith, op. cit., p. 299). The last recorded performance of the horse-sacrifice is its celebration by a scion of the Gupta Dynasty after the death of the Thānēsari emperor Harsha in A.D. 647 (Smith, op. cit., p. 313).

² Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part 2, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 257. According to Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 314-15, 'it was universalism expressed in terms of imperial power [by the emperors of "the New Empire" in and after the reign of Thothmes III] which first caught the imagination of the thinking men of the Empire, and disclosed to them the universal sweep of the Sun-God's dominion as a physical fact, whereas 'commercial connexions, maintained from an immemorially remote past, had not sufficed to bring the great world within the purview of Egyptian thinking'. As evidence of the awakening of Egyptian minds, in the time of 'the New Empire', to a sense of world-unity, Breasted (op. cit., pp. 315-17) quotes a hymn to the Sun-God which was composed in the reign of Amenhotep III (*imperabat*, *circa* 1405-1370 B.C.).

³ Meyer, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 557. See also the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 651, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 652, above, and Cunow, H.: *Geschichte und Kultur des Inkareiches* (Amsterdam 1937, Elsevier), pp. 75-6; Markham, Sir C.: *The*

the sovereign of the Achaemenian Empire, which served as a universal state for the Syriac World, asserted the oecumenical range of his rule by styling himself 'King of the Lands' or 'King of Kings'¹—a title which was laconically translated into Greek in the one word *Βασιλεύς* without even an introductory definite article.² The same claim to exercise an oecumenical authority over a united world is embodied, with complete explicitness, in the phrase *T'ien Hia*—'All that is under Heaven'—which was the official title of the Sinic universal state of the Han; and the transmission, not only of this verbal formula, but also of the outlook which it conveys, from the Sinic Society to the main body of the affiliated Far Eastern Society is attested—among a mass of other evidence—by the terms of a letter from the Manchu Emperor Ch'ien Lung (*imperabat* A.D. 1735–96) to King George III of Great Britain which has been quoted already in this Study.³ The Roman Empire which served the Hellenic World as a universal state came to be equated in the Latin language with the *Orbis Terrarum*⁴ and in Greek with the *Οἰκουμένη* in the sense of the whole of the inhabited world; and the consciousness, in Hellenic souls, of the unity of Mankind, for which the Roman Empire provided an outward visible symbol, may be illustrated by quoting from the works of two writers of the second century of the Christian Era—one a philosopher and the other a historian—who were both of them living under the aegis of an oecumenical Roman Peace.

In a passage in which his main concern is to point out the limitations of Caesar's power, Epictetus begins by remarking:

'You see that Caesar appears to provide us with a great peace, because there are no longer any wars or battles or any serious crimes of brigandage or piracy, so that one can travel at any season and can sail from the Levant to the Ponent.'⁵

Incas of Peru (London 1910, Smith Elder), p. 173. In the Mexic World, where the establishment of an indigenous universal state by Aztec empire-builders was forestalled by a Spanish conquest, the sense of unity which thus never achieved its expression on the political plane seems to have expressed itself, by anticipation, on the religious plane in a conception of the world as a unity articulated into four quarters for ritual purposes (see Spinden, H. J.: *Ancient Civilisations of Mexico and Central America* (New York 1922, American Museum of Natural History), p. 207).

¹ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 24–6.

² This verbal recognition of the uniqueness of the status and office of the Achaemenian Great King was a striking act of homage on the lips of Hellenes who were defying his efforts to extend his oecumenical authority over their own city-states.

³ In I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 161, above.

⁴ See Vogt, J.: *Orbis Romanus* (Tübingen 1929, Mohr). This scholar points out (pp. 23–7) that, while the Romans did have an inkling, in the first century of the Christian Era, that *noster orbis* was not the only one on the face of the Earth (as is indicated in such expressions as Lucan's 'orbis qua Romanus erat' (*Pharsalia*, Book VIII, ll. 211 seqq.)), nevertheless 'the equation of the Roman Empire with the entire *Oecumene* continued to be the predominant point of view'.

⁵ Epictetus: *Dissertations*, Book III, chap. 13, § 9. The sequel, in which Epictetus goes on to draw the contrast between the *Pax Augusta* and the *Pax Philosophica*, is

And this unification of the whole of Mankind under a Roman peace, which Epictetus mentions in order to belittle the achievement, is belauded by Appian in the enthusiastic introduction to his *Studies in Roman History*:

'A few more subject nations have been added by the emperors to those already under the Roman dominion, and others which have revolted have been reduced to obedience; but, since the Romans already possess the choicest portions of the land and water surface of the Globe, they are wise enough to aim at retaining what they hold rather than at extending their empire to infinity over the poverty-stricken and unremunerative territories of uncivilized nations. I myself have seen representatives of such nations attending at Rome on diplomatic missions and offering to become her subjects, and the Emperor refusing to accept the allegiance of peoples who would be of no value to his Government. There are other nations innumerable whose kings the Romans themselves appoint, since they feel no necessity to incorporate them into their empire. There are also certain subject nations to whom they make grants from their treasury, because they are too proud to repudiate them in spite of their being a financial burden. They have garrisoned the frontiers of their Empire with a ring of powerful armies, and keep guard over this vast extent of land and sea as easily as though it were a modest farm.'¹

In this picture of a Hadrian or an Antoninus Pius dealing with the barbarians of his own entourage with that judicious mixture of benevolence and disdain which Ch'ien Lung employed in dealing with the ambassadors of the South Sea Barbarian King George III, we see Rome holding at bay a generation of men who are importing her to place her empire at their disposal as an instrument for giving satisfaction to a sense of unity which is demanding fulfilment in an outward political form. The Roman Emperor of Appian's day does not have to 'go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in, that' his 'house may be filled:'² so far from his being called upon to be a conqueror, his task is to act as the warden of a kingdom that 'suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force'³—in so far as the Emperor, in his wisdom, allows them to have their way.

In truth, neither the Roman Empire nor any other universal state could have either established itself in the first instance or maintained itself thereafter if it had not been led on to fortune upon a tide of desire for political unity which had mounted to its flood as a 'Time of Troubles' approached its climax.⁴ In Hellenic

quoted in the present chapter, p. 16, footnote 2, and at greater length in V. C (i) (d) 10, p. 142, below.

¹ Appian: *Romaica*, Prooemium, 7.

² Luke xiv. 23.

³ Matt. xi. 12.

⁴ This yearning to give political expression to an awakened consciousness of the unity of Mankind is not confined to the Dominant Minority and the Internal Proletariat who

history this longing—or, rather, the sense of relief at its belated satisfaction—breathes through the Latin poetry of the Augustan

find their satisfaction for it in becoming respectively the citizens and the subjects of a universal state: as Appian testifies, it also arises out of an analogous experience, and finds satisfaction in an analogous way, among the External Proletariat in the no-man's-land beyond the stationary artificial *limes* of a universal state which has not arrived at a 'natural frontier' (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 208-10, above).

In this case, as in the other, the consciousness of unity is awakened by a violent process of external unification on the political plane of life. We have seen that, in the course of the 'Time of Troubles' of a disintegrating civilization, the parochial states into which the society has articulated itself in its growth-stage destroy one another through an internecine warfare which ends in the establishment of one universal state by a sole surviving victor. In a similar way the incessant border-warfare, along the *limes* of an established universal state, between the garrisons on the one side and the outer barbarians on the other, results in the break-up of the primitive barbarian tribes and in their replacement by war-bands. These war-bands conform—on a miniature scale and with a barbarous crudity—to the pattern of the adjoining universal state to whose challenge they are a response (see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 230-3, below: one striking example of this, which has been noticed in V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 270-1, above, is the establishment of the steppe empire of the Hiongnu in answer to that of the Sinic universal state of the Prior Han); and one of the ways in which this conformity shows itself is the role which is played by such war-bands, as well as by universal states, in evoking a consciousness of unity out of an experience of *pammixia*. A war-band, like a universal state, is apt to express this consciousness in its style and title. For example, we may see an analogue of the Achaemenian 'Kingdom of the Lands' in the 'Pamphyli', who were one of the bands that descended upon the derelict domain of the Minoan World in the last wave of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung, and an analogue of the Sinic 'All that is under Heaven' in the 'Alemanni' who broke through the Roman *limes* and ensconced themselves in a salient between the upper courses of the Rhine and the Danube during the bout of anarchy through which the Roman Empire passed in the third century of the Christian Era (see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex I, vol. v, p. 593, above). Such names tell their own story; and the social change to which they testify is a replacement of the primitive bonds of kinship by a pan-barbarian comradeship—based on the personal loyalty of a *comitatus* to a war-lord—which is incompatible with the primitive sense of tribal particularism as well as with the complementary sense of solidarity within each tribe. (For this change see Chadwick, H. M.: *The Origins of the English Nation* (Cambridge 1907, University Press), pp. 162-4 and 175; eundem: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 391 and 443; and the present Study, V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 228-36, and especially pp. 231-2, below.) A classic case is that of the war-bands (*druzhinas*) of the Scandinavian barbarian 'successor-states' of the Khazar steppe empire in the Khazars' former sphere of influence in the Russian forests. Both the princes and their war-bands were entirely without 'stability' (in the monastic sense of an enduring attachment to a single community in a single place). The principalities ranked in a definite order of precedence; a prince had to follow a *cursus honorum* which kept him perpetually on the move from one principality to another of higher rank; and the war-bands trekked at their masters' heels. In the twelfth century, 'as before, the *druzhina* was a mixed company. In the tenth and eleventh centuries the Varangians, as we know, had been the predominant element in them. In the twelfth century alien elements also "join up". Besides native Slavs and Russified descendants of the Varangians we also find recruits of alien race from East and West, members of neighbouring communities, Turks, Berendeyans, Polovci, Khazars, even Jews, Ugrians, Liakhi, Lithuanians, and the Chuds' (Kliutschewskij, W. [Kluchevski, V.]: *Geschichte Russlands*, vol. i (Berlin 1925, Obelisk Verlag), pp. 197-8).

This passage from an old-fashioned tribalism to a new-fangled social sense which is individualistic in one aspect but universalistic in another is reflected in the Teutonic barbarians' 'heroic' poetry, in which 'nationalism in the narrower sense—i.e., in the interests of the poet's own nation or tribe—seems to be altogether wanting' (Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, p. 34; cf. p. 335; Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, part (x), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 295). The same Universalism is likewise characteristic of the 'heroic' poetry of the Russians (Chadwick, H. M. and N. K.: *The Growth of Literature*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 92 and 94) and the Achaeans; and it also displays itself—in this case in combination with Anthropomorphism—in the religion of the Teutons, the Achaeans, and the Aryas, who, all alike, worshipped a pantheon conceived in the image of a barbarian war-band with a war-lord at its head (see the present Study, I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 95-100; II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 316; II. D (vii), Annex V, vol. ii, pp. 434-7; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 230-3, above). 'The same gods were, to a large extent at least, recognized everywhere. Whether by

Age; and we children of the Western Society in the present generation are aware from our own experience how poignant this longing may be in an age when the unity of Mankind is being striven for unavailingly. In our day the universal state for which we yearn—the oecumenical commonwealth that will establish its peace from end to end of a Westernized and, by the same token, tormented world—has not yet made its epiphany even on the horizon; yet, in anticipation of its coming, its style and title—‘The Great Society’—has been coined by a twentieth-century English sociologist¹ as a Western equivalent for the Hellenic *Οἰκουμένη* and for the Sinic ‘All that is under Heaven’.

It is this great longing for Peace on Earth after the tribulation of a ‘Time of Troubles’ that has moved the subjects of the founders or preservers of the universal states to venerate them as Saviours of Society² or actually to worship them as gods incarnate.³ And even the historian’s colder judgement will single out, as the greatest of all men of action, those oecumenical rulers—a Cyrus, an Alexander, an Augustus—who have been touched with pity for the sufferings of their fellow men and, having caught the vision of the unity of Mankind, have devoted their personal genius and their political power to the noble enterprise of translating this dearly bought ideal into a humane reality.

Alexander’s vision of Homonoia or Concord⁴ never faded out of the Hellenic World so long as a vestige of Hellenism remained in existence; and the compelling spiritual power of his humanitarian gospel is impressive in view of the recalcitrance of his Macedonian companions towards his efforts to induce them to fraternize with their defeated Iranian antagonists, and the equally stubborn recalcitrance of the rest of the Greeks towards his ordinance that the ruling faction in every city-state should reopen the gates to their exiled opponents of the contrary party. All but a few of the

borrowing or by identification of cults they had ceased to be merely tribal deities. . . . Tribal ideas gave way to Universalism both in the cult of higher powers and in the conception of immortality’ (Chadwick: *The Heroic Age*, pp. 424 and 443). A parochial tribalism was likewise transcended in the abortive movements of resistance to an irresistible tide of European colonization that were set in motion among the North American Indians at different times between A.D. 1762 and A.D. 1886 by a series of barbarian prophets (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 328–32, above); and the subordination of an unusually obstinate tribal particularism to a new sense of Panarab brotherhood was the essence of the immense political achievement of the barbarian Prophet Muhammad in the Arabian hinterland of the Roman Empire.

¹ Wallas, Graham: *The Great Society* (London 1914, Macmillan).

² See V. C (ii) (a), pp. 181–213, below.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 648–57, above.

⁴ The credit for having been the first to catch this vision in the Hellenic World is disputed between Alexander of Macedon and Zeno of Citium by their respective modern Western champions: W. W. Tarn (*Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind* (London 1933, Milford)) and J. Bidez (*La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil chez les Stoïciens* (Paris 1932, Les Belles Lettres)). See now also Tarn: ‘Alexander, Cynics and Stoics’ in *American Journal of Philology*, vol. lx, 1, Whole Number 237 (Baltimore, January 1939, Johns Hopkins University Press).

Macedonian officers whom their royal leader had cajoled or dragooned into embarking with him on the pacific adventure of taking in marriage an Iranian bride might brutally repudiate their unwanted Oriental wives as soon as Alexander had been laid in his premature grave.¹ Yet, some three hundred years after Alexander's death, we find Caesar Augustus putting Alexander's head on his Roman signet-ring as an acknowledgement of the source from which he was seeking inspiration for his arduous work of bringing a tardy peace and unity to a Hellenic World which Alexander's successors had thrown back into disunion and discord;² and some two hundred years after Augustus's time, again, this Alexandrine tradition of humanitarianism still had power to move so coarse-grained and brutal a soul as Caracalla's³ to complete the process—which Julius Caesar had lavishly begun and Augustus cautiously continued—of conferring the Roman citizenship upon the subject majority in the population of the Roman Empire.⁴ Nor did Alexander's example merely influence the action of these later oecumenical rulers who sat in Alexander's seat and caught from that eminence Alexander's bird's-eye view of all his fellow men; the leaven also worked its way down through the variegated strata of a Hellenic Society which had now annexed the children of four submerged alien worlds to the Hellenic internal proletariat. It was Alexander's spirit that moved one Roman centurion at Capernaum to make his humble appeal to Jesus to heal his servant by simply speaking the word without coming under his roof,⁵ and that emboldened another Roman centurion at Caesarea to invite Peter to his house.⁶ It was Alexander's spirit, likewise, that inspired the Greeks who had come up to Jerusalem in order to worship at the feast to ask the disciples of Jesus whether their Master would grant them an audience;⁷ and we may believe that the same Alexandrine vision of the unity of Mankind was the human inspiration in the mind of Jesus himself⁸ when he broke out into

¹ Seleucus set an honourable but not a widely followed example in remaining faithful to Apame.

² Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 18, citing Suetonius: *Augustus*, chap. 50. For the treachery of Alexander's successors towards Alexander's ideals see V. C. (ii) (b), pp. 289-90, below.

³ For Caracalla's role in Hellenic social history as a blatant example of the vulgarization of the Dominant Minority see V. C. (i) (d) 6 (α), vol. v, p. 455, above.

⁴ According to our literary authorities, Caracalla's *Constitutio Antoniniana* conferred the citizenship upon *all* inhabitants of the Empire who were still juridically *peregrini*. Mommsen disputed this and suggested that even Caracalla's extension of the franchise was perhaps limited to those inhabitants of the Empire who were already in possession of some local civic franchise. Since Mommsen's day a fragment of the text of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* itself has come to light in *Papyrus Giessen 40*, but the surviving text is so ambiguous, and the lacunae are susceptible of being filled by so many alternative and equally plausible conjectural restorations, that the discovery has not conclusively disposed of Mommsen's query. (See Jones, A. H. M.: 'Another Interpretation of the *Constitutio Antoniniana*' in *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. xxvi, part 2 (1936).)

⁵ Matt. viii. 5-13 = Luke vii. 1-10.

⁶ Acts x.

⁷ John xii. 20-2.

⁸ If Jesus's breaking of the bounds of Jewry in his intercourse with his fellow men

a paean of exultation upon learning of the Greeks' request,¹ and again when, in his encounters with the dissident woman of Samaria² and with the Hellenized woman of Phoenicia,³ he broke away from an inhuman Jewish tradition of non-intercourse with unbelievers.⁴

If we are convinced that Alexander's gospel of the unity of Mankind did indeed possess this power of creating concord between souls so far removed in time and creed and class from the Macedonian warrior-visionary, then we shall find ourselves impelled to search for the source from which this extraordinary power was derived; and, if we address our inquiry in the first instance to a humanist of the modern Western school,⁵ he will probably reply that the Brotherhood of Man is one of those fundamental truths which, once seen, are recognized, in the same flash, as being self-evident; and he will be likely to add that the duty and desire to serve Humanity require no sanctions outside themselves in any human heart that has become sensitively aware of its kinship with all its fellows. *Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.*⁶ The validity of the principle of Altruism is taken for granted by modern Western humanists of every sect. The Communist, for instance, believes, as devoutly as the Positivist,⁷ that Man's ultimate duty is owed to his fellow men in a Universe in which Humanity is monarch of all it surveys, because Man has no God above him;⁸ and yet we have seen reasons for believing that the dynamic elements in Communism—the springs of the action that has made Communism a force in contemporary human affairs—are derived, albeit unconsciously, from a trinity of theistic religions, if we are right in tracing back some of these elements to Christianity and others to Christianity's two forerunners, Judaism and Zoroastrianism.⁹ If we now return to our inquiry into the basis of the Human-

was indeed partly inspired by the spirit of Alexander, this is not to say that Jesus himself was ever conscious of acting under Alexander's influence, but simply that Alexander's spirit was 'in the air' of Palestine in Jesus's day.

¹ John xii. 23-4. The historical significance of this passage is the same whether it be accepted as a statement of historical fact or interpreted as a piece of retrospective fiction.

² John iv. 1-42.

³ Mark vii. 24-30.

⁴

Judaicum ediscunt et servant ac metuunt ius,
tradidit arcano quodcumque volumine Moyses,
non monstrare vias eadem nisi sacra colenti,
quaesitum ad fontem solos deducere verpos.

Juvenal: *Satires*, No. xiv, ll. 101-4.

⁵ For the modern Western idolization of Humanity at large with a capital 'H'—as distinct from the idolization of some racial or tribal fraction of Mankind—see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 300-3, above.

⁶ Terence: *Heautontimorumenos*, Act I, Scene i, l. 25. Compare the lines of Menander that are quoted on p. 11, footnote 1, below.

⁷ For the Positivist doctrine on this point see Caird, E.: *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte* (Glasgow 1885, Maclehose), p. 53.

⁸ For this forlorn and forbidding aspect of Humanism see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 302-3, above.

⁹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 178-9, above. Compare Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934 (London 1935, Milford), pp. 355-7.

ism of Alexander, shall we find the theistic vein that is latent in Marx's Humanism anticipated in Alexander's vision?

There was, we must allow, in Alexander's life one arresting experience on the ordinary human plane which might have been sufficient, in and by itself, to open Alexander's eyes to the intellectual falsity and the moral indefensibility of the current Hellenic dichotomy of Mankind into 'Hellenes' and 'Barbarians'; and that was his sensational discovery of the unexpected virtues of his defeated Iranian adversaries. In the hostile caricature which had been the convention in Hellas during the interval of 146 years by which Alexander's passage of the Hellespont was separated from Xerxes' unluckier crossing of the same straits in the opposite direction, the Persian grandees had been held up to odium as monsters of luxury, tyranny, cruelty, and cowardice; and now, when Xerxes' abortive aggression had been avenged at last up to the hilt by Alexander's victorious *riposte*, the Macedonian champion of Hellas learnt, through the intimate and illuminating intercourse of warfare, that these arch-barbarians were in reality men capable of showing a bravery in battle and a dignity in defeat which even a Spartan might envy.¹ The deepness of the impression which this unlooked-for discovery made upon Alexander's mind is notorious; but, if we go on to ask whether, in Alexander's opinion, this experience of his own, or others like it, would suffice in themselves to awaken in human souls a consciousness of the unity of Mankind and a will to act upon this great discovery, our evidence (scanty though it is) will inform us explicitly that the answer is in this case in the negative. It is recorded that at Opis, in Babylonia, Alexander once offered up a prayer that his Macedonians and his Persians might be united in *Homonoia*;² and Plutarch reports³ as one of Alexander's sayings:

'God is the common father of all men, but he makes the best ones peculiarly his own.'

If this 'logion' is authentic it tells us that Alexander's anthropology differed from that of Marx in the fundamental point of resting on an avowed theological foundation instead of professedly hanging in the air. It tells us that Alexander discovered the truth that the brotherhood of Man presupposes the fatherhood of God—a truth which involves the converse proposition that, if the divine father of the human family is ever left out of the reckoning, there is no possibility of forging any alternative bond of purely human texture which will avail by itself to hold Mankind together.

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 1, vol. v, pp. 51-2, above.

² For the significance of this prayer see Tarn, op. cit., p. 19.

³ Plutarch: *Life of Alexander*, chap. 27 (cited in Tarn, op. cit., pp. 25 and 41).

The only society that is capable of embracing the whole of Mankind is a superhuman *Civitas Dei*; and the conception of a society that embraces all Mankind and yet nothing but Mankind is an academic chimaera.

If Alexander was indeed the Prometheus who enriched the Hellenic World with a knowledge of this heavenly truth,¹ the care with which the precious revelation was handed down to later generations is impressively attested in the teachings of a Stoic philosopher who was born not much less than four hundred years after Alexander's death.

'Slave, wilt thou not bear with thine own brother, who has Zeus to his forefather and has been begotten like a son from the same sperms, and in the same emission from Heaven, as thyself? If the station in which thou hast been posted here below happens to be one that is somewhat superior to thy brother's, wilt thou have the face to take advantage of that in order to make thyself a tyrant? Wilt thou not remember what thou art thyself and who are these thy subjects—remember, that is to say, that they are thy kinsmen and thy brothers, both in the order of Nature and in their being of Zeus's lineage?'—'Yes, but I have rights of property over them, while they have none over me.'—'Do you perceive the objects upon which your eyes are set? They are set upon the Earth and upon the Pit and upon the wretched laws of a society of corpses, instead of being set upon the laws of the Gods. . . .'²

'What kind of love was it that Diogenes felt for his fellow men? It was the kind that befitted a sage who was the servant of Zeus—a love that was devoted to the creature's welfare yet was at the same time submissive to the Creator's will. In virtue of this, Diogenes alone among men had every land on Earth for his native country, without there being one single spot where he did not find himself at home. When he was taken captive, he felt no homesickness for Athens or for his Athenian friends and acquaintances. He became intimate with the pirates themselves, and did his best to reform them. And when he had been sold into slavery he led just the same life in Corinth afterwards as he had led in Athens before. Nor would he have behaved any differently if he had been packed off to Ultima Perrhaebia.'³

Epictetus's Diogenes has won his freedom of 'the Great Society' of the Hellenic *Οἰκουμένη* by taking the road from Man through God to Man which Paul lays down for his Colossians. In the philosopher's colder and more sophisticated way, Diogenes too, as Epictetus portrays him, has

'put off the old man with his deeds and . . . put on the new man which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him—where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision,

¹ For the mode of Western controversy over this question see p. 6, footnote 4, above.

² Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book I, chap. 13, §§ 3-5.

³ Ibid., Book III, chap. 24, §§ 64-6.

Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ is all, and in all,¹ [because Christ is God Incarnate, and] 'God that made the World and all things therein . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the Earth, . . . that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him—though he be not far from every one of us; for in him we live and move and have our being, as certain also of your own poets have said: "For we are also his offspring".'²

Thus we see a prophet of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society proclaiming in unison with a statesman and a philosopher of the dominant minority the truth that the unity of Mankind is a goal which men can attain by way of the common fatherhood of God and (Paul would add) through the new revelation of the common brotherhood of Christ, but not through any exclusively human endeavours in which God's leading part is left out of the reckoning. If it is true on the one hand that 'where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them',³ it is equally true—as is signified in the legend of the Tower of Babel⁴—that, 'except the Lord build the house, their labour is but lost that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman watcheth but in vain'.⁵ The common experience of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' taught this truth to Alexander the Greek and to Paul the Jew, to Epictetus the Hierapolitan bondsman⁶ and to Diogenes the freeman of the city of the *Οἰκουμένη*; but the Hellenic Society has not been singular either in passing through great tribulation or in learning this lesson by suffering this affliction. In the Egyptian World, more than a thousand years before Alexander made his pilgrimage to the oasis-oracle of Amon, the unity of Mankind was numbered among the mighty works of the divinity, manifested in the Sun-Disk, who was worshipped by Ikhnaton.

'The lands of Syria and Nubia and the land of Egypt—thou puttest every man in his place and thou suppliest their needs. . . . Thou art lord

¹ Col. iii. 9-11. In these words of Saint Paul there is perhaps an echo of some lines of Menander (fragment 533 in Koch's edition):

ὅς ἂν εὖ γεγονὼς ᾗ τῇ φύσει πρὸς τὰγαθά,
καὶν Αἰθίοψ ᾗ, μήτηρ, ἐστὶν εὐγενής.
Σκύθης τίς; ὀλεβρός· ὁ δ' Ἀναχαροῖς οὐ Σκύθης;

² Acts xvii. 24-8. The quotation τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν is from the exordium of Aratus's *Phaenomena*, l. 5, which had been echoed in the Stoic philosopher-poet Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*, l. 4: ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος εἶσ' . . . or ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γενόμεσθ' . . .

³ Matt. xviii. 20. This Christian 'logion' is presumably derived from a Jewish 'logion'—preserved in more than one passage of the Talmudic literature—which runs: 'Where two or three are gathered together to study the Torah, the Shekinah is in the midst of them.'

⁴ Gen. xi. 1-9.

⁵ Ps. cxvii. 1-2.

⁶ Epictetus appears to have been born at Hierapolis (the Carian or the Syrian?) and only to have settled at Nicopolis after having been expelled from Italy (see H. Schenkl's edition of the *Dissertationes* (Leipzig 1894, Teubner), p. iv).

of them all, who wearieth himself on their behalf; the lord of every land, who ariseth for them. . . . All far-off peoples—thou makest that whereon they live.¹

And in the Western World of the present generation a truth which has been strenuously combated by a school of Western humanists for the past five hundred years has at last been boldly and abruptly reaffirmed by a philosopher who is a Frenchman in culture and a Jew by origin.

In a book entitled *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*² the veteran metaphysician Monsieur Henri Bergson has expounded his ethics and his politics at an age of life at which the philosopher's intellect has received the tempering of the man's experience; and Bergson's central theme in this work of his old age is the thesis that there is no terrestrial road along which Man can make the transit from a primitive Ishmaelitish tribalism to an oecumenical concord of all Mankind. Between the tribe and Mankind there is a great gulf fixed, and on the terrestrial plane this chasm is utterly impassable, since the social bond which holds the tribe together is a solidarity for parochial self-defence against a world of human enemies beyond the tribal pale; and a complete removal of this external human pressure would threaten the tribe with dissolution by depriving it of the hostile environment on which it depends for its cohesion. The denizens of the deep sea, whose frames have been built for bearing the enormous pressure of the mass of water that weighs upon them at these formidable depths, are said to burst asunder, long before they reach the surface, if the deep-sea fisherman catches them in his toils and strives to drag them up to the air and light; and in much the same way a tribe of men—though it may be capable of expanding from the dimensions of a kaffir kraal to a British Empire embracing one-fifth of the living generation of Mankind and extending over a quarter of the land-surface of the Globe—is perhaps doomed *a priori* to fall to pieces, long before it comes within sight of attaining an oecumenical universality, at the point, wherever this may lie, where the centripetal outer forces that have been holding it together lose their preponderance over the centrifugal forces from within that are for ever pushing it to dissolve apart. If ever this critical point is reached, the human statesman who has dreamed the dream of elevating his tribe into an oecumenical society must find himself

¹ Ikhnaton's hymn to the Aton, as translated in Erman, A.: *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, English translation (London 1927, Methuen), p. 290. In V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 695, with footnote 2, above, it is suggested that Ikhnaton's proclamation of the unity of Mankind—in virtue of their common enjoyment of the ubiquitous beneficence of the Aton—was a disinterested expression of a genuine intuition and was not the political manoeuvre of a prince whose real concern was to unify a multi-national empire.

² Paris 1932, Alcan.

awakened to a harsh reality in which he is offered the cruel choice between falling back into tribalism and stumbling on into anarchy. On this showing, the attempt to make the transit to an oecumenical society from a parochial tribe is doomed *a priori* to failure so long as it is made on the terrestrial level; and the last word of Bergson's philosophy is a declaration that this transit—which Man must somehow make if he is not to perish from off the face of the Earth—can only be made across a bridge that vaults over an impassable terrestrial gulf by rising to the height of Heaven. The whole of Mankind can never dwell together in a brotherly unity¹ until men have learnt to exchange their intrinsically conflicting as well as parochial tribal loyalties for one common allegiance to a heavenly king.²

This is the final intuition of a modern Western philosopher who stands, in his ripe old age, at the apex of a pyramid of thought that is the cumulative product of the philosophical labours of five industrious centuries of Western mental 'output'; yet the truth which it has cost our philosophers all this time and toil to win by their own lights has been picked up casually by our anthropologists 'out of the mouth of babes and sucklings'.³ The all but annihilated rear-guard of a Primitive Man whom a sophisticated *Homo Occidentalis* alternately pities and abhors for his ignorance of his social solidarity with the main body of Mankind outside the tribal zariba, has never ceased to take for granted the solidarity between the tribe on its narrowly circumscribed terrestrial allotment and the tribal gods in a circumambient Universe;⁴ and, however parochial the 'savage's' horizon may be on the plane of sheerly human life on the surface of this planet, his soul still lives and moves in a spiritual environment with a superhuman dimension which the modern Western humanist has deliberately excluded from his reckoning. The humanist purposely concentrates all his attention and effort upon a purely human cross-section of life which he abstracts from the totality of his spiritual environment by a mental operation that is performed for the practical purpose of bringing human affairs under human control. Yet Reality cannot in truth be eluded by begging the question that is involved in the postulate that 'Man is the measure of all things';⁵ and therefore the unity of Mankind can never be established in fact except within a framework of the unity of the superhuman Whole of which

¹ Ps. cxxxiii. 1.

² This Bergsonian thesis is examined further in Part VII, below.

³ Ps. viii. 2.

⁴ This element in the *Weltanschauung* of Primitive Man has been touched upon by anticipation in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 351, above.

⁵ This saying, which is attributed to Protagoras, is alluded to by Plato in his *Theaetetus*, 183 B.

Humanity is a part. An oecumenical society must preserve or recapture those spiritual dimensions which the tribal societies possess as their birthright if the house with the broader terrestrial site is to stand as stalwartly as its terrestrially diminutive neighbour. However large its area on Earth, Man's universe cannot give Man's spirit room to breathe unless it also extends from Earth to Heaven; and our modern Western school of humanists have perhaps been peculiar, as well as perverse, in planning to reach Heaven¹ by raising a titanic Tower of Babel on terrestrial foundations in three dimensions—as though it were sheer physical distance, and not any difference in mode of spiritual being, that divided and distinguished Heaven from Earth. When we compare this grossly mundane plan of operations which has governed the outlook and behaviour of the Western Society in its Modern Age with the reactions of other civilizations to a comparable social experience, we shall become aware of a contrast. In the Sinic World, for example, the craving for unity that was evoked by a 'Time of Troubles' was never confined to the terrestrial plane.

'To the Chinese of this period the word One (unity, singleness, &c.) had an intensely emotional connotation, reflected equally in political theory and in Taoist metaphysics. And indeed the longing—or, more accurately, the psychological need—for a fixed standard of belief was profounder, more urgent and more insistent than the longing for governmental unity. In the long run Man cannot exist without an orthodoxy, without a fixed pattern of fundamental belief.'²

If this comprehensive Sinic way of pursuing the quest for unity may be taken as the norm,³ and our modern Western cult of an arbitrarily insulated Humanity may be written off as something exceptional or even pathological, then we should expect to see the practical unification of Mankind and the ideal unification of the Universe accomplished *pari passu* by a spiritual effort which would not cease to be one and indivisible because it manifested itself simultaneously in diverse fields. As a matter of fact, we have

¹ Gen. xi. 4.

² Waley, A.: *The Way and its Power* (London 1934, Allen & Unwin), Introduction, pp. 69-70.

³ There is, however, at least one modern Western scholar who claims for the camp of Humanism not only Confucius but all the Sinic philosophers with the possible exception of Mo-tse.

'Confucius eut, semble-t-il, l'idée . . . de faire reposer toute la discipline des mœurs sur un sentiment affiné de l'humanisme. . . . La conception confucienne du *jen* ou de l'homme accompli, et qui mérite seul le nom d'homme, s'inspire d'un sentiment de l'humanisme qui peut déplaire, mais qu'on n'a pas le droit de celer. . . . Seul, semble-t-il, lui paraissait bienfaisant et valable un art de la vie jaillissant des contacts amicaux entre hommes policés. . . . Sauf Mō tseu (s'il faut admettre que ce prédicateur croyait à sa rhétorique), il n'est point, dans l'antiquité, de sage chinois qui ait véritablement songé à fonder, sur des sanctions divines, la règle des mœurs. . . . La sagesse chinoise est une sagesse indépendante et tout humaine. Elle ne doit rien à l'idée de Dieu' (Granet, M.: *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Renaissance du Livre), pp. 473, 486, 489, and 588).

observed already¹ that when, after the breakdown of a civilization, a number of parochial communities are fused together into a universal state, the process of political unification is apt to be accompanied, on the religious plane of ritual and theology, by an incorporation of the diverse parochial divinities into a single pantheon which reflects, and is reflected in, the concomitant change in the order of human life on Earth.² As the internecine warfare between conflicting parochial states results in the supremacy of a single victor and in the subjugation of all the rest, so the parochial god of the victorious human community—an Amon-Re of Thebes or a Marduk-Bel of Babylon—becomes the high god of a pantheon into which the gods of the defeated human communities are marshalled in order that henceforth they may fetch and carry or stand and wait at the pleasure of their new master.

It will be seen, however, that the condition of human affairs which finds its superhuman reflexion in a pantheon of this kind is the situation immediately after the genesis of a universal state, and not the constitution into which a polity of that type eventually settles down in the course of the age that follows its establishment; for the ultimate constitution of a universal state is not a hierarchy which preserves its constituent parts intact and merely converts their former equality as sovereign independent states into a hegemony of one of them over the rest. A political structure which, on the morrow of its establishment, may have been accurately described as 'the Kingdom of the Lands' solidifies in the course of time into a unitary empire articulated into standardized provinces; and a corresponding process of concentration concurrently transforms the Pādishāh or King of Kings—in fact, if not in name—into a solitary autocrat who delegates his plenary authority to creatures of his own instead of simply keeping his foot upon the necks of kinglets whose forefathers had been his own forefathers' peers. In fact, in a fully seasoned universal state which, in maturing, has developed true to type, there are two salient features which dominate, between them, the entire social landscape. On the one hand there is a monarch whose task and title-deeds alike consist in keeping the peace among his subjects by the exercise of his sovereign will; and on the other hand there is the law which is the instrument for translating the monarch's will into action. And in a world of men that is governed on this plan the Universe as a

¹ In V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, pp. 529-32, above.

² This morphological correspondence between the universal state and the pantheon that are constructed by the Dominant Minority at the close of the 'Time of Troubles' has its analogue, in the history of the External Proletariat, in the similar correspondence between the barbarian war-band and the barbarian pantheon of Olympus or Asgard (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 96-7; II. D (vii), Annex V, vol. ii, pp. 436-7; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 230-3, above).

whole is likely to be conceived on a corresponding pattern. If the human ruler of a universal state is at once so powerful and so beneficent that the subjects whom he has delivered from the nightmare of a 'Time of Troubles' are easily persuaded to worship him in person as a god incarnate,¹ then, *a fortiori*, they will be prone to see in him a terrestrial likeness of a heavenly ruler who is likewise unique and omnipotent—a god who is no mere God of Gods like Marduk-Bel or Amon-Re, but who reigns alone as the One True God with mere angels for his ministers and with no other god in existence to share, even in a subordinate role, a divinity which would not be truly divine if it were not strictly indivisible. Again, the law in which the human emperor's will is translated into action is an irresistible and ubiquitous force which suggests, by analogy, the idea of an impersonal 'Law of Nature': a law which governs not only the regular alternations of night and day and winter and summer but also the more wayward movements of the winds and tides and the impenetrably mysterious distribution of joy and sorrow, good and evil, and reward and punishment on those deeper levels of human life where Caesar's writ ceases to run.²

This pair of concepts—a ubiquitous and irresistible law and a unique and omnipotent deity—will be found at the heart of almost every representation of the unity of the Universe that has ever taken shape in human minds in the social environment of a universal state;³ but a survey of cosmologies of this kind will show us that they tend to approximate to one or other of two distinct types.

¹ For this phenomenon of Caesar-worship in universal states see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 648–57, above.

² The limitations upon Caesar's power are pointed out by Epictetus in the sequel to the passage that has been quoted in this chapter on p. 3, above:

'Can Caesar also bring us peace from fever and from shipwreck, or from conflagration or earthquake or thunderbolt? Yes, and from love? Impossible. And from grief? Impossible. And from envy? A sheer impossibility in every one of these predicaments. But, unlike Caesar, the doctrine (λόγος) of the philosophers does promise to bring us peace from these troubles too' (Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book III, chap. 13, § 10).

This Stoic distinction between the two different kinds of peace has (as has been pointed out by Professor N. H. Baynes in *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. xxv, part (1), 1935, p. 85) a Christian counterpart in:

'Peace I leave with you; my peace I give unto you. Not as the World giveth give I unto you' (John xiv. 27).

For the context of the passage of Epictetus see V. C (i) (d) 10, p. 142, below.

³ The Sinic representation of the unity of the Universe which crystallized under the Ts'in and Han régimes must be declared, however, to be an exception to our rule if we are to follow the guidance of Monsieur Marcel Granet in his *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Renaissance du Livre). The formula in which this modern Western scholar sums up (in op. cit., p. 586) his own reading of 'l'esprit des mœurs chinoises' is 'Ni Dieu, ni Loi'; and he gives his grounds for this dictum in other passages of the same book.

'Ché Houang-ti [She Hwang-ti], quand il fonda l'Empire, pensa établir le règne de la Loi. Le régime n'a pas duré. Les Chinois l'ont honni, reprochant aux Légistes leur dureté, leur cruauté. Les Légistes étaient coupables, en effet, d'avoir cru à l'unique vertu de la discipline. . . . Ils ont eu le goût des jugements impartiaux, des évaluations objectives, des arguments concrets. Ces esprits positifs et déjà épris de rigueur scientifique n'ont obtenu qu'un succès fugitif. Les Sophistes n'ont pas réussi à faire accepter

There is one type in which the Law is exalted at the expense of God and another in which God is exalted at the expense of the Law. And we shall also find that the emphasis on the Law is characteristic of the philosophies of the Dominant Minority, while the religions of the Internal Proletariat incline to subordinate the majesty of the Law to the omnipotence of God.

This differentiation of outlook is not difficult to understand if we can imagine ourselves, by turns, in the position of each of the parties. The Achaemenian Emperor and the Persian grandees who were his ministers in the government of the Syriac universal state were acutely conscious of the potency of a Law which was not merely the engine of the Imperial administration but was also a force in itself—the Law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not¹ and which insists inexorably ‘that no decree nor statute which the King establisheth may be changed’,² though the King himself may labour till the going down of the Sun³ to revoke the royal decision that has passed—once made—out of the playground of personal caprice into the realm of the immutable. On the other hand the impotent and insignificant Jewish subjects of the Great King, who knew nothing of the *arcana imperii*,⁴ were vividly aware, and whole-heartedly grateful, when the Great King deigned to take notice of their plight and to speak the saving word. A Cyrus who delivered them from a Babylonish captivity⁵ and an Artaxerxes who intervened at the critical moment to avert the imminent miscarriage of the work of reconstruction that an Ezra or a Nehemiah was carrying out under the Great King’s patronage⁶—these were personalities whose power and will for good made an enduring impression upon the ‘folk-memory’ of the broken peoples over whom they had cast their beneficent aegis.

Such considerations may explain why it is that the mind of the

par les Chinois l'idée qu'il existât des termes contradictoires. De même, les Légistes n'ont pas réussi à accréditer la notion de règle constante et la conception de la Loi souveraine (pp. 470-1). . . .

‘Puisque tout dépend de congruences, tout est affaire de convenances. La Loi, l’abstrait, l’inconditionnel sont exclus—l’Univers est un—tant de la Société que de la Nature. . . . On tient à conserver à toutes les notions, même à celle de Nombre, même à celle de Destin, quelque chose de concret et d’indéterminé qui réserve une possibilité de jeu. Dans l’idée de règle, on ne veut guère voir que l’idée de modèle. La notion chinoise de l’Ordre exclut, sous tous ses aspects, l’idée de Loi’ (p. 590).

This Sinic refractoriness to the concept of Law has its complement in an imperviousness to the concept of God.

‘Les Chinois n’ont aucune tendance au spiritualisme. À peine trouve-t-on la trace, dans les croyances populaires, d’un animisme inconsistant. . . . L’incrédulité, chez tous les sages, est totale, bien plus souriante qu’agressive. . . . Les dieux . . . n’ont aucune transcendance. Trop engagés dans le concret, trop singuliers, ils manquent aussi de personnalité. Et chez aucun sage, en effet, aucune tendance au personnalisme ne se remarque, pas plus qu’au spiritualisme’ (p. 587).

¹ Dan. vi. 8 and 12; compare Esther i. 19.

² Dan. vi. 14.

³ Isa. xlv. 28 and xlv. 1-4; Ezra i.

⁴ Ezra iv; Neh. ii.

² Dan. vi. 15.

⁴ Tacitus: *Annals*, Book II, chap. 36.

Internal Proletariat is apt to dwell upon the omnipotence of God and the mind of the Dominant Minority upon the supremacy of the Law. It must be repeated, however, that the distinction which we are here seeking to draw between two different types of cosmology is no more than a matter of emphasis, and that, in almost every cosmology which a disintegrating civilization brings to birth, both the two fundamental concepts—the concept of God and the concept of Law—are to be found not only coexisting but also interwoven with one another, whatever their respective proportions may be. If we examine some proletarian-born religion—say, Judaism or Islam—in which the personality of God is emphasized to a degree at which it seems to overshadow and overwhelm everything else in the Universe, we find nevertheless that the human worshipper is commanded to observe a rigid law with scrupulous exactitude as the form of human service which is most pleasing in the eyes of the Almighty. Conversely, if we follow out the history of Buddhism—one of the philosophies of the Dominant Minority that carried a belief in Law to the logical extreme of denying the existence of personality, either human or divine¹—we find this austere psychological discipline of Siddhārtha Gautama undergoing its extraordinary transformation into the ‘higher religion’ of the Mahāyāna in order to satisfy souls that cannot be content with a godless Universe by offering them objects of worship that are personal, immortal, and omnipotent divinities in everything but name.²

Having placed this reservation upon the distinction that we are seeking to establish, we may now survey, in succession, those representations of the unity of the Universe in which Law has been exalted at the expense of God, and those other representations in which God overshadows the Law which He promulgates.

In the systems in which ‘Law is king of all’³ we can watch the personality of God growing fainter as the Law that governs the Universe comes out into sharper focus.

In our own Western World, for example, within the last three hundred years, the Triune God of the Athanasian Creed has faded by stages, in an ever-increasing number of Western minds,⁴ as

¹ Sir S. Radhakrishnan, in *Gautama the Buddha* (London 1938, Milford), pp. 31–50, contends that Siddhārtha Gautama himself did not deny the existence either of God or of the Self, and that he conceived of *Nirvāna*, not as a negation of existence, but as ‘a different, deeper mode of life’ which ‘is peace and rest in the bosom of the Eternal’.

² For the metamorphosis of the Primitive Buddhism into the Mahāyāna see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 133–6, above.

³ *Nóμος πάντων βασιλεύς*.—Herodotus, Book III, chap. 38, quoting Pindar.

⁴ See, for example, Mr. H. G. Wells’ account—quoted in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 381, footnote 3, above—of his own successful efforts, as a boy, to eliminate from his picture of the Universe the figure of God which his mother had taken care to implant in his mind.

Physical Science, in its hitherto uninterruptedly triumphal progress, has extended the frontiers of its intellectual empire over one field of existence after another—until at last, in our day, when Science is laying claim to the whole of the Spiritual as well as the Material Universe, we see God the Mathematician fading right out into God the Vacuum. This modern Western process of evicting God to make room for Law to reign in His stead was anticipated in the Babylonian World in the eighth century B.C. when the discovery of the periodicities in the motions of the stellar cosmos¹ inveigled the Chaldaean *mathematici*, in their enthusiasm for the new science of Astrology, into transferring their allegiance from Marduk-Bel to the Seven Planets; for these hitherto less honoured 'rulers of the heavenly spheres' were remote and inexorable powers by comparison with the old familiar tutelary deity of the Land of Shinar, whose votaries had always known where to find him and how to propitiate him, seeing that he was a god in human form with one foot firmly planted in the soil of Babylon and the other in the soil of Nippur.²

In the Indic World, again, when the Buddhist school of philosophy worked out to their extreme conclusions the logical consequences of the psychological law of *Karma*,³ the divinities of the Vedic Pantheon were the most signal victims of this aggressive system of 'totalitarian' spiritual determinism. These barbaric gods of a barbarian war-band were now made to pay dearly, in their unromantic middle age, for the all too human wantonness of a turbulent youth. They suffered the same fate as the Roman patricians when these discomfited aristocrats forfeited all that was politically valuable in their ancestral privileges without obtaining the right to vote in the *concilium plebis* or to offer themselves as candidates for the Tribunate. In a Buddhist Universe in which all consciousness and desire and purpose was reduced to a succession of atomic psychological states which by definition were incapable of coalescing into anything in the nature of a continuous or stable personality, the Gods were automatically reduced to the spiritual stature of human beings on a common level of nonentity. In such a Universe, what serious difference could it make whether the fly

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 1, vol. v, pp. 56-7, above.

² For the manufacture of Marduk-Bel through an identification of the god of Babylon with the lord god of Nippur see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, p. 529, above.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 4, vol. v, pp. 427-9, above. The law under which *Karma* operates is itself conceived of as *Rta* or as *Dharma*. 'All things and beings are under the power of Law. They follow a certain course prescribed for them. . . . *Rta*, the moral order, is not the creation of a god. It is itself divine and independent of the Gods. . . . *Dharma* is the immanent order. It denotes the Law of Nature, the chain of causation. . . . "Who is, venerable sir, the King of Kings?"—"Dharma is the King of Kings" (Radhakrishnan, Sir S.: *Gautama the Buddha* (London 1938, Milford), pp. 36-7, quoting the *Anguttara-Nikāya*, sutra 3).

on the wheel was a human gnat or a divine bluebottle? And what could it matter whether the small deer scampering through the aisles of the towering temple were mannikin mice or godling rats? Yet in their practical treatment of this wretched rabble of the self-enslaved bondsmen of Desire—this motley crowd in which men and gods were tumbling over each other pell-mell under the sage's coldly contemptuous eye—the Buddhist philosophers did still take the trouble to differentiate between the two species in one way that was wholly to the disadvantage of Man's superhuman companion in insignificance. The mouse-like human being was eligible, *ex officio humanitatis*, for admission to the only career that was worth following in a world of suffering and illusion; and from this strait way of release the rat-like god was excluded *a priori, ex officio divinitatis*. Any human being might become a Buddhist monk or nun, if only he or she could stand the ascetic ordeal; and, for this renunciation of the pleasures of *l'homme moyen sensuel*, the compensation that was offered was enormous. Even the subdued philosophy of Primitive Buddhism held out to the steadfast arhat the prospect of ultimately attaining for himself (or, strictly speaking, for his own tangled spillikin-pile of psychological states) a release from the Wheel of Existence and an entry into the oblivion of *Nirvāna*; and the flamboyant religion of the Mahāyāna, which was the Buddhist philosophy's changeling child, outbid its foster mother by bringing within the reach of any one of its human children the nobler and more inspiring aim of becoming a Bodhisattva or candidate for the sublime role of Buddhahood. Thus Buddhism, in both its philosophical and its religious presentation, did offer Man, at a price, a way out of the *impasse* in which he found himself entrapped on the Buddhist map of the Universe. On the Gods, however, the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna unanimously closed the doors of mercy; for 'the Gods are laymen'.¹

In the Hellenic World the gods of Olympus fared better than they deserved if their deserts are to be measured by the punishment that was meted out by a Buddhist justice to their Vedic cousins; for, when the Hellenic school of philosophers came to conceive of the Universe as a 'Great Society' of supra-terrestrial dimensions whose members' relations with one another were

¹ Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), p. 217. This laicity of the Gods was taken so much in earnest that in a Mahayanian sutra a chapter in which the Mahayanian Buddhist doctrine is expounded in exoteric terms that can be understood of the people is formally addressed to the Gods, as a hint that it is an *œuvre de vulgarisation* (ibid., loc. cit.). The Buddha's own view seems to have been that 'the Gods are merely angels who may be willing to help good Buddhists, but are in no wise guides to Religion, since they need instruction themselves' (Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. xxii).

regulated by Law and inspired by Homonoia or Concord,¹ they wrote into the constitution of this *Cosmopolis* the principle of equality before the Law which was the constitutional palladium of the best conducted terrestrial Hellenic city-states. In this Hellenic philosophers' Universe the Gods were at any rate no worse off than their human fellow citizens, even if they no longer enjoyed those traditional privileges which they had never earned and had often abused. And Zeus, who had started life as the disreputable war-lord of the Olympian war-band, was now morally reclaimed and handsomely pensioned off by being elected to the Honorary Presidency of the *Cosmopolis* with a status not unlike that of some latter-day Western constitutional monarch who 'reigns but does not govern'—a king who meekly countersigns the decrees of Fate² and obligingly lends his name to the operations of Nature.³

Our survey has now perhaps made it apparent that the Law which eclipses the Godhead may present itself in a variety of modes. It is a mathematical law that has enslaved the Babylonian astrologer and the modern Western man of science; a psychological law that has captivated the Buddhist ascetic; and a social law that has won the allegiance of the Hellenic philosopher. If we pass next to the Sinic World, where the concept of Law has not found favour, we shall find the Godhead being eclipsed here again by an Order⁴ which in the Sinic *Weltanschauung* presents itself as

¹ For this Hellenic conception of the Universe as a society see further V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, below.

² Zeus is explicitly coupled with Fate in the famous verses of the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes which have been quoted in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 47, footnote 1, and again in V. C (i) (d) 4, vol. v, p. 421, above.

³ The brutal truth was that the only way of making Zeus respectable was to emasculate him; and this *ultima ratio* was eventually applied, in desperation, by the god's philosopher-physicians, who found their patient's lascivious propensities too difficult to cope with by any less drastic means, even for such skilful practitioners as they were. Yet this Stoic solution of the problem of Zeus was a sheer counsel of despair; and Hellenic souls did not resign themselves to it until the Hellenic Civilization was far gone in its decline. During the century immediately preceding the breakdown of 431 B.C., when the noblest souls in Hellas were being inspired by a spiritual yearning which was not yet divorced from hope, the Athenian poet Aeschylus tried to convert Zeus into the One True God of a 'higher religion'.

Zeus! Zeus, Whate'er He be,
If this name He love to hear
This He shall be called of me.
Searching earth and sea and air
Refuge nowhere can I find
Save Him only, if my mind
Will cast off before it die
The burden of this vanity.

(Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 160-7, Gilbert Murray's translation.)

Zeus, however, showed no inclination at all to dance to Aeschylus's piping; and the sublime poet's attempt to enlist the *ci-devant* captain of the Olympian troop in the cause of providing bread, instead of a stone, for hungry Hellenic souls was an even greater failure than his disreputable fellow countryman Onomacritus's attempt to manufacture a higher religion *de toutes pièces* (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 697-8, above).

⁴ See the quotations from Granet on p. 16, footnote 3, above.

a kind of magical congruence or sympathy between the behaviour of Man and that of his environment.

While the action of the environment upon Man is recognized, and manipulated, in the Sinic art of geomancy, the converse action of Man upon the environment is controlled and directed by means of a ritual and an etiquette which are as elaborate and as momentous as the structure of the Universe which they mirror and at the same time modify.

'L'homme et la Nature ne forment pas deux règnes séparés, mais une *société* unique. Tel est le principe des diverses techniques qui réglementent les attitudes humaines. C'est grâce à une participation active des humains et par l'effet d'une sorte de *discipline civilisatrice* que se réalise l'Ordre universel. À la place d'une *Science* ayant pour objet la connaissance du Monde, les Chinois ont conçu une *Étiquette* de la vie qu'ils supposent assez efficace pour instaurer un Ordre total.'¹

The Sinic way of conceiving Time and Space has furnished Sinic intelligences with

'les cadres d'une sorte d'art total: appuyé sur un savoir qui nous semble tout scolastique, cet art tend à réaliser, par le simple emploi d'emblèmes efficaces, un aménagement du Monde qui s'inspire de l'aménagement de la Société. . . Précisons en disant que les sectes ou écoles se sont toutes proposé de réaliser un *aménagement* de la vie et des activités humaines prises dans leur *totalité*—entendez: dans la totalité de leurs prolongements, non seulement sociaux, mais cosmiques. Chaque maître professe une sagesse qui dépasse l'ordre moral et même l'ordre politique.'²

And, on the same principle,

'le Total, *Yi*, l'Entier, c'est le pouvoir universel d'animation qui appartient au Chef, Homme Unique. Toute la conception chinoise des Nombres (comme . . . la conception du Yin et du Yang³ et comme . . . la conception de Tao⁴) sort de représentations sociales, dont elle n'a aucunement cherché à s'abstraire. . . L'ordre de l'Univers n'est point distingué de l'ordre de la Civilisation.'⁵

The human master of the ceremonies who makes the World go round is the monarch of the Sinic universal state;⁶ and, in virtue of the superhuman scope of his function, the Emperor was offi-

¹ Granet, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 113 and 17.

³ See the present Study, Part I. B, vol. i, pp. 201-3, above.—A.J.T.

⁴ See the present Study, III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, p. 187, and V. C (i) (d) 4, vol. v, pp. 416-17, above.—A.J.T.

⁵ Granet, *op. cit.*, pp. 298 and 389.

⁶ This Sinic conception of a magical order of the Universe with the magician himself for its hub is manifestly much less far removed from the *Weltanschauung* of Primitive Man than are the Hellenic and Indic and Babylonian and Western conceptions of Cosmic Law, analogous to Human Law, which we have examined above; and accordingly we shall not be surprised to find Sinic notions foreshadowed in our records of less highly sophisticated human readings of the relation between Man and his environment. For example, the following two passages in the Homeric Epic, which catch a Western reader's attention because they are so startlingly out of gear with the order of the Universe as it presents itself to Western intelligences, would be so immediately and

cially styled the Son of Heaven; yet this Heaven who, in the Sinic Society, was the adoptive father of the magician-in-chief, was as pale as the sky on a frosty winter day in Northern China.

'Création savante de la mythologie politique, le Souverain d'En-haut n'a qu'une existence littéraire. Ce patron dynastique, chanté par les poètes de la cour royale, n'a jamais dû jouir d'un grand crédit auprès des "petites gens", ainsi que semble le prouver l'échec de la propagande théocratique de Mō tseu [Mo-tse]. Confuciens ou Taoïstes ne lui accordent aucune considération. Pour eux, les seuls êtres sacrés, ce sont les Saints ou les Sages.'¹

Indeed, this celestial stalking-horse of the human manipulator of the Sinic Universe had so faint a personality that, in the affiliated Far Eastern Society at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the Jesuit missionaries in China raised a storm when—in their eagerness to translate the doctrines of Christianity into terms that would be familiar and agreeable to their prospective converts²—they employed the Chinese word for Heaven, *T'ien*, to render their Latin word *Deus*. In A.D. 1693 the Papal Vicar-General of the Chinese province of Fukien, Bishop Maigrot, issued an edict prescribing that *Deus* must henceforth be rendered in Chinese no longer by the single word *T'ien* (Heaven)

completely intelligible to a Far Eastern reader that he might be tempted to indulge in the fancy that the Hellenic poet was here taking a leaf out of the Sinic classics.

ἡ γὰρ σευ κλέος οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἰκάνει
ὥς τέ τευ ἡ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος, ὃς τε θεοῦδῃς
ἀνδράσιν ἐν πολλοῖσι καὶ ἰφθίμοισιν ἀνάσσει
εὐδικίας ἀνέχῃσι, φέρῃσι τε γαῖα μέλαινα
πυρρὸς καὶ κριθάς, βριθοὶ τε δένδρεα καρπῶ,
τίκτῃ τ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσά τε παρέχῃ ἰχθῦς
ἐξ εὐηγεσίης, ἀρετῶσι δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

Odyssey, Book XIX, ll. 108-114.

ὥς δ' ὑπὸ λαίλαπι πᾶσα κελαυνή βέβριθε χθὼν
ἡματ' ὀπωρινῶν, ὅτε λαβρότατον χέει ὕδωρ
Ζεὺς, ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἀνδρεσσὶ κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνῃ,
οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας,
ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσσει, θεῶν ὅπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες·
τῶν δὲ τε πάντες μὲν ποταμοὶ πληθῶναι ῥέοντες,
πολλὰς δὲ κλιτὺς τότ' ἀποτμήγουσι χαράδραι,
ἐς δ' ἄλλα πορφυρέην μεγάλη στενάχουσι ῥέουσαι
ἐξ ὀρέων ἐπὶ κάρ, μινύθει δὲ τε ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων·
ὥς ἵπποι Τρωαὶ μεγάλα στενάχοντο θέουσαι.

Iliad, Book XVI, ll. 384-93.

Cf. Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 213-47, and Euripides: *Medea*, ll. 410-13.

¹ Granet, op. cit., p. 587. It will be seen that the Sinic philosophers were of one mind with their Indic *confrères* in assigning a higher rank in the hierarchy of Existence to a disciplined human being than to a volatile divinity. (For the Buddhist sages' attitude towards the gods of the Vedic Pantheon see pp. 19-20, above.)

² For the parallel between the abortive attempt of the Jesuits to facilitate the conversion of the Far Eastern World to Christianity, by transposing the Christian religion into terms of the Sinic philosophy, and the successful restatement of Christianity in terms of the Hellenic philosophy by the Alexandrian Fathers of the Church see V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 365-7, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 532, above.

but by the phrase *T'ien Chu* (the Lord of Heaven);¹ in 1704 Bishop Maigrot's edict was confirmed by a decree of Pope Clement XI;² and the prospects of Catholicism in China were compromised—as it proved, beyond rehabilitation—when, in December 1706, Bishop Maigrot was summoned into the Emperor K'ang Hsi's presence and was dismissed into banishment for his outrageous presumption in venturing to dispute with the Son of Heaven himself on the meaning of the Chinese word *T'ien*, although he was convicted by the Emperor, in a personal colloquy, of being quite unversed in the Sinic philosophy and even ignorant of the Chinese language.³

This unhappy controversy might never have arisen if, in the Sinic World some two thousand years before the day of the Manchu Emperor K'ang Hsi and the French Bishop Maigrot, an enrichment of the Sinic conception of the magical order of the Universe had not brought with it a proportionate impoverishment of the Sinic conception of the Godhead. For the *T'ien* whose personality was so faint that a Papal Vicar-General was unwilling to recognize in him a counterpart of the Christian *Deus* (notwithstanding the willingness of the Son of Heaven to wield his immense authority under an alleged mandate from this nebulous power) was an abstraction from an earlier *Shangti* ('Supreme Ancestor')⁴ whose claim to have been a personal god would appear to be less open to doubt.⁵

If we now turn our attention again for a moment to the Hellenic World, and re-examine the Neoplatonic *Weltanschauung*, we may be struck by its similarity to the Sinic *Weltanschauung* which we have just been considering; and we shall notice that, although this Neoplatonic conception of the Universe, unlike its Sinic counterpart, was abortive, it did nevertheless have the effect, even in

¹ Jenkins, R. C.: *The Jesuits in China* (London 1894, Nutt), p. 25.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 91, and 110-112.

⁴ 'Supreme Ancestor' is the rendering of the term *Shangti* that is given in Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, a Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 36. The fuller title *Hao-t'en Shangti* is analysed in Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), p. 162, footnote 1, as follows:

'La traduction de cette expression doit être considérée comme très approximative, car son sens exact n'est en réalité pas connu. La signification de presque tous les termes est douteuse: celle de *hao* paraît bien avoir été perdue dès le temps des Han. . . . *Chang* [Anglicé 'Shang'] peut signifier en haut, au propre, ou suprême, au figuré. Même les mots *t'ien* et *ti* sont loin d'être simples: étant donné l'antiquité de l'expression, le sens de *t'ien* est douteux; on a remarqué depuis longtemps la forme humaine donnée anciennement au caractère qui sert à écrire ce mot, ce qui semble indiquer une conception anthropomorphe du ciel; et le mot correspondant des langues thaï, *t'en*, désigne les dieux célestes, tandis que le ciel physique, le firmament, est désigné par le mot *fa*. Quant au mot *ti*, il paraît être au propre une désignation des dieux célestes, et ses sens usuels (titre rituel d'un empereur défunt, et, en général, empereur) n'en sont que des dérivations.'

⁵ In this matter of degree of personality the Sinic *Shangti* perhaps stands to the Sinic *T'ien* as the Indic *Varuna* stands to the Hellenic *Uranus*.

embryo, of taking the colour out of the Solar divinity with the worship of whom Neoplatonism was associated. During the time when—in and after the bout of anarchy into which the Hellenic Society fell in the third century of the Christian Era—this last creative work of Hellenic minds was assuming the systematic shape which it wears in the fourth-century tract *De Diis et Mundo*,¹ the highly individual personalities and sharply distinctive visual forms of an Apollo and a Mithras were fading into the abstraction of a Sol Invictus,² and Aurelian's abstract Sol was paling in his turn into Julian's wintry Helios—a shadow-king of the Universe who, in Julian's constitution of the Cosmic Commonwealth, was relegated to the honorary presidency that had been assigned to Zeus by Zeno³ and Cleanthes.

The substitution of Julian's Helios and Aurelian's Sol Invictus for a Mithras and an Apollo in the penultimate chapter of Hellenic history has an exact parallel in Ikhnaton's attempt to substitute the new-fangled worship of an intentionally abstract Sun-Disk for the historic worship of a Protean Amon-Re;⁴ and we may speculate whether, if the Egyptiac emperor-prophet's work had not died with him, it might not have resulted in a radical revision of the whole of the Egyptiac *Weltanschauung* on lines which would have exalted the conception of Law at the expense of the conception of the Godhead.⁵

Andean history affords another instance in which the abrupt and violent intervention of an external force—in this case, the Spanish conquest—may have anticipated the working out of the ultimate consequences of the deliberate substitution of a relatively faint and tenuous representation of the One True God for a relatively clear and concrete one. We have already observed⁶ that the organization of an Egyptiac Pantheon, under the presidency of Amon-Re, on the initiative of the Pharaoh Thothmes III, has an analogue in the Inca Pachacutec's organization of an Andean Pantheon under the presidency of the Sun-God of Corichanca; but there is a further

¹ This illuminating document can now be studied in the admirable edition by Nock, A. D.: *Sallustius 'Concerning the Gods and the Universe'*, edited with Prolegomena and Translation (Cambridge 1926, University Press).

² For Sol Invictus see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 82, footnote 4, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 649-50 and 691-4, above.

³ There is a touch of irony in the fact that the Hellenized Syriac philosopher who reduced the Olympian war-lord to a dignified state of impotence on the pretext of paying him honour was called, in Greek, by a name which engaged him to approach Zeus in the spirit of a devotee rather than in that of a disciplinarian.

⁴ For Ikhnaton's fiasco see I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 145-6, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 695-6, above.

⁵ In the opinion of Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), p. 332, 'it is clear that' Ikhnaton 'was projecting a world religion'.

⁶ In V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 530-2, above. See also V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 652-4, above.

analogy between the histories of the Andean and Egyptian societies on the religious plane to which we have not yet paid attention. If the Andean World had its Thothmes III in the person of the Inca Pachacutec, it also had its Ikhnaton in the person of Pachacutec's immediate predecessor the Inca Viracocha;¹ for this emperor took up, and commended to his subjects, the worship of a creator-god² who was the namesake of his Imperial devotee.³ The Andean religious innovator, however, was wiser in his generation than his Egyptian counterpart.

In his zeal for his own conception of the One True God⁴ Ikhn-

¹ Viracocha *imperabat circa* A.D. 1347-1400; Pachacutec *imperabat circa* A.D. 1400-48.

² For this Andean creator-god see Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilizations of the Andes* (New York 1931, Scribner), pp. 422-40; Cunow, H.: *Geschichte und Kultur des Inka-reiches* (Amsterdam 1937, Elsevier), pp. 175-85. This divinity was known on the Plateau by the name of Viracocha (Means, op. cit., p. 119) and on the Coast by the name of Pachacamec (Means, op. cit., pp. 184-5), and (according to Cunow, op. cit., p. 179) the two names mean respectively 'Earth Creator' and 'World Animator'; but these two general names probably replaced a host of previous local names, since they are both of them taken from the Quichua language (Means, op. cit., pp. 422-3), which was the *lingua franca* of the Incaic Empire (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, pp. 523-4, above). Means (in op. cit., pp. 424-5) brings forward reasons for believing that this Viracocha-Pachacamec was indigenous on the Plateau; that he was originally a sky-god; and that his worship can be traced at least as far back as a period in the growth-stage of Andean history, *circa* A.D. 600-900, which is known among the archaeologists as Tiahuanaco II. This was a period in which, as in the time of the Incaic Empire, there was an active cultural intercourse between the Plateau and the Coast.

³ In this matter of names the Inca Viracocha's adoption of the name of the sky-god of Tiahuanaco is analogous to the gesture which the Pharaoh Amenhotep IV made when he took to calling himself Ikhnaton ('Aton is satisfied') in preference to his proper name Amenhotep ('Amon is at rest')—with, however, the significant difference that the Inca missionary of a new religion did not go out of his way to insult the religion of his fathers. An exact parallel to the Inca Viracocha's identification of himself with a god to whom he was peculiarly devoted is to be found in the assumption of the name Elagabalus by the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus *alias* Varius Avitus Bassianus (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 82, footnote 4, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 685-8, above).

⁴ It may be noted in passing that the Aton, like Viracocha (Cunow, op. cit., pp. 179 and 183-4), was adored by his votaries as the creator and sustainer of the Universe; and the likeness between the Pharaoh's and the Inca's respective conceptions of God—at any rate in this aspect of the divine activity—may be illustrated by a comparison between the following extracts from two hymns: the hymn to the Aton which has been recovered by our modern Western archaeologists from the debris of Ikhnaton's Counter-Thebes at Tell-el-Amarna, and of which the text may be read in Erman, A.: *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, English translation (London 1927, Methuen), pp. 288-91; and a hymn to Viracocha which is translated by Means, op. cit., p. 438, from sources described on p. 477, footnote 27.

The Egyptian hymn runs:

'Beautiful is thine appearing in the horizon of Heaven, thou living Sun, the first who lived. . . .

'Thou who createst (male children?) in women, and makest seed in men! Thou who maintainest the son in the womb of his mother, and soothest him so that he weepeth not—thou nurse in the womb. Who giveth breath in order to keep alive all that he hath made.'

The Andean hymn runs:

'O conquering Viracocha!

Ever-present Viracocha!

Thou who art without equal upon the Earth!

Thou who art from the beginnings of the World until its end!

Thou gavest life and valour to men, saying:

"Let this be a man."

And to woman, saying;

"Let this be a woman."

Thou madest them and gavest them being.

aton tilted against an established religion which by his day was virtually impregnable against attack owing to the consolidation of all its forces, human and divine, into a single hierarchy and a single pantheon by the act of Ikhnaton's own predecessor and ancestor Thothmes III a hundred years before.¹ The Inca Viracocha would not have had to reckon with so formidable a resistance if he had attempted, in Ikhnaton's fashion, to take the fortress of the established religion by assault; for in the Andean World the equivalent of the work of Thothmes III was not carried out until after Viracocha had been succeeded by Pachacutec on the throne of the Incaic Empire. Nevertheless the Inca Viracocha, in his activities on behalf of the god whose name he bore, was careful not to embroil himself with the Sun-God of Corichanca who was the ancestral patron of the Incaic Dynasty. And accordingly, when the Inca Pachacutec set himself to translate his predecessor's ideas into practice, he was able to promote the respective worships of the Creator-God and the Sun-God simultaneously and side by side—in contrast to what happened in the Egyptian World, where Ikhnaton's tactics not only drove Aton and Amon into conflict with one another, but turned their quarrel into a fight to the death.

By contrast, the Inca Pachacutec adroitly preserved the peace between the Creator-God Viracocha and the Corichancan Sun-God by insisting upon the diversity of their natures, spheres, and roles. At his Pan-Andean synod of priests he waited till he had obtained the assembly's consent to the organization of a pantheon of the historic local divinities, with the Corichancan Sun-God at their head, before he made, on his personal initiative, the more surprising, and perhaps also more contentious, suggestion that, side by side with this consolidation of all the other existing worships of the Andean World, a separate cult of Viracocha the Creator should be instituted for the benefit of the spiritual *élite*.² Possibly the consent of the synod to this second of the Inca's two proposals, as well as to the first of them, was the more readily accorded because Pachacutec simultaneously proposed a differentiation in the respective material provisions that were to be made for the service of the Corichancan President of the Pantheon and for that of his creator-colleague. While the Corichancan Sun-God was endowed with estates and revenues in every province and parish of 'the Land of the Four Quarters', as was meet and right for a divinity who was the heavenly patron and counterpart of the Sapa Inca himself, the etherial Viracocha needed no special

¹ Thothmes III *imperabat solus circa 1480-1450 B.C.*; Ikhnaton *imperabat circa 1370-1352 B.C.*

² Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 427-8; Markham, Sir C.: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), pp. 97-8.

endowments or memorials in a world that must everywhere and always bear witness to its Creator's power and glory by the sheer fact of its own existence. In the whole Incaic Empire no more than two temples dedicated to Viracocha are vouched for by the surviving records of Andean history.¹

Supposing that the wayward goddess Fortune had permitted the Incaic Empire to live out the full term of life of a universal state, instead of bringing Pizarro from the farther side of the Atlantic to make havoc of Pachacutec's work within less than a hundred years, we may speculate whether the paternal, authoritarian, collectivist régime which Pachacutec had brought to perfection would have come, in course of time, to be reflected in some representation of the Universe as a commonwealth governed, *more Hellenico*, by a social law, but with a constitution of the Spartan rather than of the Athenian pattern. If we may allow our imagination to picture the development of an Andean *Weltanschauung* on such lines as these, then perhaps—on the analogy of what happened to Zeus—we may also imagine the *ci-devant* sky-god Viracocha being relegated to an Honorary Presidency of the Cosmic Phalanstery.²

We have now to consider those other representations of the constitution of the Universe in which its unity presents itself as the work of an omnipresent and omnipotent Godhead, while the Law which can be discerned in the Universe's structure and movement and life is regarded as being a manifestation of God's will, instead of being thought of as a sovereign unifying force which regulates the actions of gods and men alike if it leaves any place at all in the picture for anything that could be counted as divine.

We have observed already³ that this concept of a unity of all

¹ Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 428-9.

² There is, of course, the alternative possibility that Viracocha—unlike Zeus—might have risen to the occasion of the spiritual crisis under stress of which he was suddenly called upon by his worshippers to play a greater role than that for which he had been previously cast. We have already quoted, on page 21, footnote 3, the famous lines of Aeschylus in which the Hellenic poet expresses his yearning for an epiphany of Zeus in which his worshippers might be able to discern the lineaments of the One True God. This passage of Greek poetry has a remarkable Quichuan parallel in the following passages from a hymn to Viracocha which is translated by Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 437-8, from sources described on p. 447, footnote 26:

'Viracocha, Lord of the Universe!
Whether male or female. . .
Where art Thou?
Would that Thou wert not hidden from this son of Thine!

Creator of the World,
Creator of Man,
Great among my ancestors,
Before Thee
My eyes fail me,
Though I long to see thee.'

³ On pp. 15-18, above.

things through God, as well as the alternative concept of a unity of all things through Law, is conceived by human minds through an analogy from the constitution which a human universal state inclines to assume as, after its foundation, it gradually crystallizes into its final shape. In this process of crystallization we have seen that the human ruler of the universal state, who at the outset is literally a King of Kings, eliminates the client princes who were once his peers and thereby transforms his own constitutional status from a suzerainty to a monarchy in the literal sense of that word. If we now examine what happens simultaneously to the gods of the diverse peoples and lands which the universal state has absorbed into its own body politic, we shall find that there is an analogous change in the reciprocal relations of these objects of human worship. In the place of a pantheon in which a high god exercises a suzerainty over a community of other gods who were once his peers, and who have not lost their divinity in losing their independence, we see emerging a single God whose uniqueness is His essence.

This religious revolution is apt to begin with a general change in the relations between divinities and worshippers. Within the framework of a universal state there is a tendency for all divinities to divest themselves of the bonds that have hitherto bound each of them up with some particular parochial human community. A divinity who has started life as the patron *de jure* and servitor *de facto* of some single tribe or town or valley or mountain now enters on a wider field of action by learning to appeal on the one hand to the Soul of the individual human being and on the other hand to the whole of Mankind; and, as each *genius loci* simultaneously steps out into this wider world which has at last been opened up for him by human empire-builders, there tends to arise, under the aegis of a political peace, a religious competition between rival worships which ends, like the foregoing physical warfare between parochial states, in the victory of some single competitor over all the rest. The course of this religious revolution, as it worked itself out in the arena of the Achaemenian Empire, has been described by Eduard Meyer in a passage which demands quotation in our present context, not only on account of the brilliance of its observation and analysis, but also because the particular chapter of religious history that is here recorded is typical of what is apt to happen on the religious plane of life within the political framework of any universal state.

'The most persistent effects of the Achaemenian Empire—effects which are still exerting a direct influence upon our own present age—are to be found in the domain of Religion. The Achaemenian régime

saw the beginning of a transformation of religions that cut very deep. This development was assisted by the fact that the Achaemenian emperors treated the religions of their subjects with a large-hearted considerateness¹ and sought to erect them into props for their own policy; but a still more potent factor was the mere existence of an empire which embraced the whole World as the Achaemenian Empire did.

'In ancient times Religion had been the most vital expression of the political community. It was the Gods that enabled the State to keep alive, to maintain itself in conflict with other Powers, and to increase in power and prosperity. But all that had changed since the national states, one after another, had been deprived, at the very least, of their political independence and had mostly been annihilated, so that the inhabitants of all the civilized countries of South-Western Asia had had to accustom themselves to seeing their fate decided by foreigners. Occasionally this experience led to a repudiation of the native divinity who had shown himself so weak and powerless that his worship had patently ceased to be worth while. But, so far as can be seen, this consequence was drawn only by isolated individuals. Among people in the mass the belief in the reality of the native divinities was too deeply rooted for there to be any possibility of the people tearing themselves away from their traditional objects of worship. And there was a way out of the dilemma which was always open: either the god was angry, or else he had helped the adversary's cause to triumph because it was the cause that deserved to win. Cyrus is in Babylon the legitimate king who has been elected by Marduk, while Nabonidus is the apostate who has been rejected. In the eyes of the Prophets of Israel the victory of the Assyrians and Chaldaeans over the Prophets' countrymen is the work of the victims' own national god. He wills to chastise his people, and even to annihilate them, because they fail to understand his true nature; and he demonstrates his power all the more dazzlingly by bestowing the gift of world domination upon a nation which knows nothing of him and which fondly imagines that he is one of the powers whom it has vanquished. Others try to console themselves with the idea by which the Delphic Oracle attempted to justify its behaviour towards Croesus: above the god there stands a still mightier power to which the god has to submit—either an inexorable Fate of an impersonal kind (the Necessity of the Orphics), or else the verdict of some supreme Ruler of the Universe.²

'In any case the inevitable result is a revolution in the old concept of God. Already, through a theological extension of a naïve faith, the national gods had everywhere become cosmic powers as well—powers whose creative, life-giving, preservative activity embraces Heaven and Earth. Now, with the annihilation of the National State and the cessation of public life, the political side of the divinity falls away and the universal concept alone survives. Manners and customs converge; the

¹ For the religious policy of the Achaemenidae see also the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 704–5, above.—A.J.T.

² In this last sentence Meyer is, of course, referring to the alternative road which we have already reconnoitred in this chapter and which leads, not towards an Almighty God, but towards a Sovereign Law.—A.J.T.

nations mingle with one another—partly in the peaceful way of commercial intercourse, partly through the coercive action of the rulers; in many cases even the native language disappears before the face of the great languages that are the vehicles of Civilization.¹ In these circumstances the national community falls back more and more upon Religion: that is, upon the worship of the gods who are indigenous in its homeland, and upon the scrupulous observance of their ritual. This very process, however, endows the local religion with a capacity to extend its range beyond the old national frontiers. The worshippers of a given divinity are now no longer the members of the national community who have been born into that divinity's service and are beholden to him for their very existence: his worshippers are now those who acknowledge him and remain faithful to him, whether they be members of the national community or not; and this turns religion into something that is at once individual and universal. The god is no longer expected to bring public prosperity to the body politic: what every one expects of him is personal prosperity and individual advantage for the worshipper himself. And accordingly the foreigner can pray to this god just as well as some one who has inherited his relation to the god from his ancestors. So the divinity becomes an independent self-subsistent power which operates from its seat of worship and offers grace and blessing to all the World. This is how these divinities are regarded by the Achaemenian Imperial Government. The Government grants privileges and endowments to all the larger shrines; and at all of them sacrifices and prayers are offered for the well-being of the Emperor. The immediate ground for this policy is a desire to make capital for the Government out of the high prestige which the shrine possesses in the eyes of the subject population; but the Government is also moved by a genuine belief that these divinities are mighty powers and that it cannot be anything but an advantage to stand well with them.

Thus Universalism and Individualism become the characteristic features of all religions and all worships. Every worship claims to be the highest, and if possible the only legitimate, one; every divinity claims to be a great cosmic power; and they all of them address themselves no longer—or no longer exclusively—to a national community, but primarily to each individual human being—promising him all kinds of profit, both on Earth and in the Other World, and this with greater certitude than any other god can offer. This religious revolution was not accomplished at one stroke, but it begins in the Achaemenian Age.² This age witnesses the prelude to the great competition between religions which fills the later centuries of Antiquity.

¹ For the spread of such *lingue franche* see the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), vol. v, pp. 483–527, above.—A.J.T.

² The progress of the same religious revolution during the Roman Imperial Age is noticed by Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 576–7. A corresponding religious revolution from a public communal to a private personal relation between the Soul and God took place in the Indic World at the birth of the Mahāyāna and of Hinduism (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 135 and 138, above), and in the Egyptian World during the two centuries beginning with the generation of Ikhnaton (Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 348–9 and 355–6).—A.J.T.

'It has also now become possible to pay respect to a divinity at a distance from his local habitation and in detachment from his native soil and from his own people; for the bond which unites god and worshipper is no longer national or political but is personal and therefore indissoluble. Slaves and merchants and artisans who are permanently expatriated carry their divinity with them, found new shrines for him, and win adherents for him in foreign parts, while conversely the stranger who arrives at a seat of worship pays the divinity the tribute of his devotion and can be permanently won for this divinity's service.

'Hence all worships begin to make an active propaganda. They either bestir themselves to widen the circle of the devotees of the shrine and to heighten its prestige and influence far and wide beyond mere parochial limits, or they seek to raise the ideas and the ritual of their religion to a status of commanding importance. For instance, the Babylonian and Egyptian priests broadcast their wisdom everywhere; the priests of the Pessinuntine Mother of the Gods, and those of kindred Anatolian and Syrian worships, enlist from all quarters a circle of fanatical adherents who are prepared to castrate themselves in the service of the divinity and to range over the face of the Earth as mendicant monks. These cults do not, any of them, make outright war upon those of the other gods: they merely relegate them to a position of inferiority, or demand at any rate a recognized position for themselves side by side with them. There are, however, certain religions that do not recognize the legitimacy of alien cults at all (the attitude of Zoroastrianism), or that even go so far as to condemn them as the most grievous sin against their own god (the attitude of Judaism). Their exclusiveness makes these religions all the more active in trying to win foreign adherents who, by their acceptance of the revelation, will save themselves from perdition and at the same time will bear witness among the nations to the power of the Only True God and will thereby raise the status of the god's worshippers in the eyes of the World. The teaching of Zarathustra, which was the religion of the ruling nation, addressed itself, from the very beginning, to the whole Human Race and therefore never had an exclusive national character. The religion of Yahweh did not completely lose, but did recast, its original nationalism under the impact of the blows of Fate which descended on the Jewish people; and, after achieving this transformation, it began to enlist proselytes all the more actively for coming late into the mission-field.

'Inwardly, too, the religions begin to become assimilated to one another. All the worships of the Oriental World now pass through the same process as the parochial worships of the cantons of Egypt. The only surviving differences between them are simply differences of name and of the minutiae of liturgical practice. In substance all these worships are now indistinguishable¹—all gods having become sun-gods and all goddesses heaven-goddesses—and this convergence has the para-

¹ 'En général la religion était partout la même; les dieux seuls étaient différents; et, si leurs cultes s'étendaient quelquefois, c'était en se mêlant et non en se chassant réciproquement des contrées où ils étaient reçus.'—*Œuvres de Turgot* (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 621 ('Géographie Politique').—A.J.T.

doxical effect of stimulating their militant competition with each other. Spiritually, politically, and socially the plane on which the several religions live becomes more and more uniform, and this leads to the formation of uniform religious general ideas which present themselves in the individual worships and individual religions with merely superficial differentiations. No one can any longer find satisfaction in the old notion that the divinity to whom he pays devotion is a local power whose operation is confined to a particular territory. Every one thinks of his god as the epiphany of a universal cosmic power, which both rules the Earth and guides the destiny of Man—as a sun-god or a heaven-god if she is female. Hence in Syria and Phœnicia “the Lord of Heaven” (*Be’elšamin*) acquires ever greater prestige. He is “the good god who rewards his devotees” in the language of later inscriptions, and he is also the Thunderer on High. Sometimes the divinity is invoked without being named. For example, the inscriptions on Palmyrene altars of the Hellenistic Age invoke “Him whose name is praised unto Eternity, the Gracious, the Compassionate”. Side by side with this Unnamed God, Bêl, “the Guider of Fate”, pushes his way in from Babylonia. One feels how close the individual gods have come to one another—how, in some sense, each of them is simply an epiphany of the others. Even the Jews, in addressing themselves to foreigners, designate their god, not as Yahweh, but as “the Heaven-God of Jerusalem”; and by this designation they present him to their Persian masters as the peer of Ahuramazda.¹

One reason why these formerly parochial and variegated divinities were thus being drawn into an ever closer conformity with one another was because they were now subject, all alike, to the influence of a single ensample; and this loadstone was the human monarch of a universal state which had provided the political container for this religious ferment.

‘Après la conquête de Babylone par Cyrus, le culte mazdéen s’installa dans cette antique métropole et un grand nombre de mages s’y établirent. Entre eux et les Chaldéens, un voisinage plusieurs fois séculaire amena des rapports de confraternité, et ainsi le mazdéisme importé en Chaldée subit l’ascendant de la religion autochtone. Toute la théologie des mages se pénétra d’astrologie. Dans cette astrologie chaldéopersique, le gouvernement du ciel, pour demeurer le patron et le modèle des puissances terrestres, dut se prêter à une transformation. A la hiérarchie de justiciers établie là-haut par les anciens Chaldéens, se substitua l’idée d’une royauté sidérale analogue à l’Empire des Achéménides. Puis, cette notion nouvelle d’un palais étoilé se répandit partout où s’imposait la suprématie des Perses et elle s’y perpétua dans le

¹ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 167-71. Cf. eundem: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 17-19, and *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 153-7.

culte. "L'inscription de Nemroud-Dagh¹ parle des trônes célestes de Zeus Oromasdes, et un bas-relief nous le montre assis sur un trône, le sceptre à la main." Hostanès se le figure de même, les anges ou messagers divins faisant cercle autour de lui. Dans des textes nombreux, on retrouve un souvenir, lointain parfois, de la croyance qui fit comparer le Maître du Monde avec le Grand Roi, et ses assesseurs avec des satrapes. C'est de là que devait venir, avec l'idée d'un Royaume des Cieux, si familière à nos esprits, la conception stoïcienne d'une Cité du Monde gouvernée par les planètes et les étoiles fixes, auxquelles les hommes sont assujettis.²

The closing sentence of this last quotation brings us back to the now familiar forking-point of the road which we are attempting to survey; but this time we have not to follow out the branch leading towards a Cosmic Law, which we have explored already, but the other branch which leads towards a Unique and Omnipotent God; and in this direction the first landmark that we shall notice is the influence of the Achaemenian Monarchy upon the Jewish conception of the God of Israel.³

'In the Jewish religion, the [heavenly] court, by which Yahweh is waited upon, is elaborated on a Babylonian pattern, even though certain old native conceptions may account for the origin of the idea.'⁴

And, in Jewish minds, this new conception of Yahweh had worked itself out to completion by about 166-164 B.C., which appears, from internal evidence, to have been the approximate date of the writing of the prophetic part of the Book of Daniel.

'I beheld till the thrones were cast down, and the Ancient of Days did sit, whose garment was white as snow, and the hair of his head like the pure wool; his throne was like the fiery flame, and his wheel as burning fire.

'A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him; thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him; the judgment was set and the books were opened.'⁵

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, p. 547, footnote 2, above.—A.J.T.

² Bidez, J.: *La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil* (Paris 1932, Les Belles Lettres), pp. 7-8.

³ The Jews appear to have taken this turning deliberately, for they rejected and condemned the science of Astrology because they perceived the fundamental incompatibility of its belief in an inexorable mathematical law with a belief in God as an omnipotent personality (Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 54).

⁴ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 172. In his *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 58-9, the same scholar points out that Yahweh is already conceived in the likeness of an Achaemenian emperor in Zech. iii, which was written circa 519 B.C., as well as in the *Book of Job*, which was written about a century later.

⁵ Dan. vii. 9-10. This precise and vivid picture of Yahweh in the likeness of an Achaemenian Great King appears to have been borrowed by Judaism from Zoroastrianism. According to von Gall, A.: *Basileia tou Theou* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), p. 268, 'the Ancient of Days . . . has nothing whatever in common with the god Yahweh, whom the Jews would never have visualized in this shape; the Ancient of Days is Ahuramazda,

The Achaemenian Great King is not, however, the only monarch of a universal state in whose likeness his subjects have shaped their conceptions of an Almighty God. In the Egyptiac World, for example,

'the conception of the Sun-God as a former king of Egypt, as the father of the reigning Pharaoh, and as the protector and leader of the nation, still a kind of ideal king, resulted in the most important consequences for Religion. The qualities of the earthly kingship of the Pharaoh were easily transferred to Re. . . The whole earthly conception and environment of the Egyptian Pharaoh were soon, as it were, the "stage properties" with which Re was "made up" before the eyes of the Nile-dweller. When, later on, therefore, the conception of the human kingship was developed and enriched under the transforming social forces of the Feudal Age,¹ these vital changes were soon reflected from the character of the Pharaoh to that of the Sun-God.'²

who was portrayed by the Persians as he is described in Dan. vii. 9'. Cf. Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii, pp. 195-9. The profoundness of the effect which this Iranian image exerted upon the Syrian imagination, when once it had been transmitted from the Iranian to the Syrian province of the Syriac World, is revealed by a comparison of several scattered pieces of evidence. The most celebrated testimony is the reproduction of the passage quoted above from Daniel (vii. 9-10) in Revelation (i. 13-16), where we see a Christian writer who wishes to present a visual image of his Christ in His glory drawing upon the Iranian imagery of a Jewish work which by this time was not much less than three centuries old. It is perhaps not less significant that one of the features in this literary image is reported to have been simulated 'in real life', by means of a trick, by at least two Syrian men of action who were as far separated from one another in time as the respective authors of the Book of Daniel and the Revelation of Saint John the Divine. Both these tricksters were violent-handed futurist leaders of the Hellenic internal proletariat; and, while the respective arenas in which they fought were far apart—Eunus's arena being in Sicily and Bar Kōkabā's in Palestine—their respective birthplaces were both on Syrian soil, since Eunus is known to have come from Apamea and Bar Kōkabā was presumably Palestinian-born. If both of them practised the same trick at dates divided by so wide an interval—Eunus in the seventh decade of the second century B.C., and Bar Kōkabā in the fourth decade of the second century of the Christian Era—this must mean that in Syria, at any time during the three centuries following the publication of the Book of Daniel, a proletarian agitator who preached insurrection, and who promised to lead his insurgent followers to victory on the strength of a divine commission which he claimed to hold, would be expected to give material evidence of this divine patronage by himself performing one of the prodigies that is attributed, in the Iranian imagery, to the Ancient of Days. According to Dan. vii. 10, 'a fiery stream issued and came forth from before him', while, according to Revelation i. 16, this flame came 'out of his mouth' in the shape of 'a sharp two-edged sword'. Now, according to Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, §§ 6-7, Eunus 'used to emit fire and flame from his mouth, with a certain display of divine possession (*ἐν θείῳ σαταμῶν*), by means of an apparatus; and this was the setting in which he used to declaim his prophecies. He used to take a nutshell or something of the sort, bore two holes in it on opposite sides, stuff it with fire and enough fuel to keep the fire alight, and then put it into his mouth and flare out sometimes sparks and sometimes flame by blowing into it. In the days before he rose in revolt, Eunus used to declare that the Syrian Goddess had granted him an epiphany and had told him that he was to become a king' (see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, p. 383, below). Similarly, according to Saint Jerome, *Adversus Rufinum*, Book III, chap. 31 (= Migne: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. xxiii, col. 480), Bar Kōkabā 'used to put a lighted straw into his mouth and fan it into flame by blowing into it, in order to create the illusion that he was vomiting fire'. Presumably this trick was designed to lend authority to Bar Kōkabā's claim to be the Messiah (i.e. 'the Lord's Anointed').

¹ i.e. the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles'. For this transformation of an earlier Egyptiac conception of the kingship see also the present Study, IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 408-14, above.—A.J.T.

² Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 16-17, cited already in I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 141, above.

In the Sinic World, likewise, we find the same mental imagery already taking shape during the 'Time of Troubles' which preceded the foundation of a Sinic universal state by Ts'in She Hwang-ti. At any rate, the philosopher Mo-tse, who lived from the fifth into the fourth century B.C.,

'pour réfréner les vices des tyrans . . . évoque, à la suite des poètes de la cour royale, l'idée du Ciel Justicier, du Souverain d'En-haut, patron dynastique. Aussi parle-t-il de la Volonté du Ciel (*T'ien tche*) avec les mêmes termes, à peu près, qu'il emploie pour exiger une entière soumission aux décisions du souverain.'¹

This pair of illustrations from the histories of other civilizations may serve to show that the course of religious evolution in the Syriac World, within the political framework of the Achaemenian Empire and its Seleucid 'successor-state',² was not anything exceptional, but was a normal development which exemplifies a general rule. In the political and social circumstances to which the foundation of a universal state gives rise, a number of previously parochial divinities simultaneously assume the insignia of the newly established terrestrial monarch and then compete with one another for the sole and exclusive dominion which these insignia imply, until at length one of the competitors annihilates all the other claimants and thus establishes his title to be worshipped as the One True God. This outcome of the Battle of the Gods is analogous to that of the terrestrial struggle for existence between human princes during the disintegration of a civilization; for, in the course of the two successive rounds in which this political conflict works itself out, one of the competitors first either annihilates or subjugates all his peers in the internecine warfare of a 'Time of Troubles', and afterwards peacefully yet relentlessly eliminates those of them who have temporarily survived the establishment of a universal state by reconciling themselves to becoming client princes of a victorious King of Kings—with the result that the victor-suzerain turns into a monarch who, in his final plenitude of power, is the sole embodiment of royalty and vehicle of sovereignty and source of authority in his world. There is, however, one vital point on which the analogy that we have been drawing does not hold.

In the constitutional evolution of a universal state the universal monarch whom we find enthroned in solitary sovereignty at the end of the story is usually a direct successor—in an unbroken constitutional sequence—of the Pādīshāh, or overlord of client

¹ Granet, M.: *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Renaissance du Livre), p. 495.

² For the transmission to the Seleucid Monarchy of the Achaemenian Empire's function as a political *foyer* for acts of religious creation see Part I. A, vol. i, pp. 5-6, above.

princes, under whose auspices the story opens.¹ When an Augustus who had been content to make his authority felt in Cappadocia or Palestine or Nabataea by maintaining a general superintendence over local kings or tetrarchs was succeeded in due course by a Hadrian who administered these former principalities as provinces under his own direct rule, there was no break in the continuity of the dominant power; for Hadrian, no less than Augustus, was master of the Hellenic *Οἰκουμένη* in virtue of being the head of the Roman State, and he was still exercising this Roman authority in the form of the Principate—a subtle institution which was the principal heirloom in Augustus's political legacy. In fact, the universal state with which the Hellenic World had originally been endowed by Roman empire-builders had not ceased to be a Roman Empire in consequence of the subsequent process by which the former client-states had been administratively *gleichgeschaltet* through being assimilated to the provinces that had been under the direct government of the Princes and the Senate from the beginning. On the other hand, in the corresponding and contemporary religious change, continuity, so far from being the rule, is a theoretically possible exception which it might be difficult to illustrate by historical examples.

The writer of this Study cannot, indeed, call to mind a single case in which the high god of a pantheon has ever served as the medium for an epiphany of God as the unique and omnipotent master and maker of all things. Neither the Corichanean Sun-God nor the Theban Amon-Re nor the Babylonian Marduk-Bel nor the Vedic Dyauspitar nor the Olympian Zeus has ever revealed the countenance of the One True God beneath his own Protean mask.

¹ There is, however, at least one conspicuous exception to this rule in the constitutional history of the Sinic universal state. In the first place the founder, Ts'in She Hwang-ti, attempted to carry through by force, within the span of a single reign, a process of *Gleichschaltung* which, in the constitutional history of the Roman Empire, was spread over a period of not much less than two centuries. In the second place this ruthless radicalism evoked an equally violent reaction which did not indeed destroy the universal state that had just been founded by this empire-builder of the House of Ts'in, but did depose Ts'in She Hwang-ti's dynasty in favour of a *novus homo* whose ancestors had had no part or lot in the Ts'in Dynasty's empire-building work. In the third place the *parvenu* founder of the Prior Han Dynasty tried to repair Ts'in She Hwang-ti's error, and to avoid the Ts'in Dynasty's fate, by abandoning the radical policy of *Gleichschaltung* and centralization for a conservative policy of re-establishing the *cité* parochial states of the Sinic World as client kingdoms under the *parvenue* dynasty's suzerainty. In the fourth place the Han Dynasty soon discovered, by trial and error, that this attempt at political devolution was after all an anachronism; and they then reverted to Ts'in She Hwang-ti's policy of centralization—but this time with greater tact and at a gentler pace. We can transpose the constitutional history of the Sinic universal state into Hellenic terms by imagining what might have happened if the Battle of Actium had been won, not by Octavian, but by Antony and Cleopatra. In that imaginary event the Hellenic universal state which had been established by Roman arms in the course of the preceding two hundred years might have been ruled for the next four centuries by a Government seated at Alexandria and administering Roman Italy as a client republic or even as a subject province. (The psychological reaction of the Alexandrians to the chagrin of having just missed their 'manifest destiny' is examined in V. C (ii) (a), pp. 217-19 below.)

And even in the Syriac universal state, where the god who was worshipped by the Imperial Dynasty was not a divinity of this synthetic kind and was also not a product of *raison d'état*,¹ the deity through whose lineaments the existence and the nature of a One True God became apparent to Mankind was not Ahuramazda the god of the Achaemenidae: it was Yahweh the god of the Achaemenian emperors' insignificant Jewish subjects. This victory of Yahweh over Ahuramazda, and over all the other divinities of the Achaemenian Empire and its 'successor-states' who had been competing with the once parochial god of Israel and Judah for the superlative honour of becoming an eviphany of God Almighty, is the triumph that is celebrated in the Eighty-second Psalm:

'God standeth in the congregation of the mighty; he judgeth among the gods. . . .

' "I have said: *Ye are gods, and all of you are children of the Most High*;

' "But ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes."

'Arise, O God; judge the Earth; for thou shalt inherit all nations.'²

The note of this paean is not pitched too high; for, while Asshur's following had dwindled, by the time when the Jewish poem was written, to as small a company³ as Ahuramazda's worshippers muster to-day,⁴ these stricken gods' rival Yahweh—whose Chosen People was first trampled under foot by the Assyrians and then raised from the dust by the Achaemenidae—has grown into the God of Christendom and Islam as well as the God of Jewry. This contrast between the ultimate destinies of the rival divinities and the momentary fortunes of their respective followers makes it evident that the religious life and experience of generations born and bred under the political aegis of a universal state is a field of historical study which offers to the observer some striking and momentous examples of the phenomenon of *Peripeteia* or 'the reversal of roles';⁵ and in fact it is not an exception, but the rule, for the particular representation of the Godhead which is singled out for becoming a vehicle of the revelation of the unity of God, in this unitary political phase of the disintegration of a civilization, to be an obscure divinity of humble antecedents. At the same time

¹ For the origin and nature of the Zoroastrian religion see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 81, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 121, above; for the religious policy of the Achaemenidae see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 704-5, above.

² Ps. lxxxii. 1 and 6-8.

³ For the remnant of the Assyrian people which continued, for some centuries after the destruction of Nineveh in 612 B.C., to worship their eponymous divinity among the ruins of the city of Asshur in which he and his worshippers had begun their common career, see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), pp. 470-1, above.

⁴ For the downfall of Zoroastrianism, and for its political cause, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 659-61, above.

⁵ For *Peripeteia* see IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, pp. 245-61, above.

this original lowliness and obscurity are not the only features that are characteristic of the divinities that are cast for this overwhelming role.

When we look into the nature and *êthos* of Yahweh as these are portrayed for us in the scriptures that we have inherited from his pre-Christian worshippers, two other features immediately strike the eye. On the one hand Yahweh is in origin a local divinity—in the literal sense *glebae adscriptus* if we are to believe that he first came within the Israelites' ken as the *jinn* inhabiting and animating a volcano in North-Western Arabia, and in any case a divinity who struck root in the soil of a particular parish, and in the hearts of a particular parochial community, after he had been carried into the hill country of Ephraim and Judah as the divine patron of the barbarian war-bands who broke into the Palestinian domain of 'the New Empire' of Egypt in the fourteenth century B.C.¹ On the other hand Yahweh is 'a jealous god',² whose first commandment to his worshipper is: 'Thou shalt have no other gods before me.'³ It is not, of course, surprising to find these two traits of provincialism and exclusiveness displayed by Yahweh simultaneously; for a god who keeps strictly to his own local domain may be expected to be equally strict in warning off any neighbouring gods who show a disposition to trespass. What is, however, surprising—and even repellent, at any rate at first sight—is to see Yahweh continuing to exhibit an unabated intolerance towards the rivals with whom he courts a conflict when, after the overthrow of the parochial kingdoms of Israel and Judah and the establishment of a Syriac universal state in the shape of the Achaemenian Empire, the *ci-devant* god of two small upland principalities steps out into a wider world and aspires, like his neighbours, to win for himself the worship of all Mankind. In this oecumenical phase of Syriac history the persistence of Yahweh in maintaining the intolerant attitude and outlook that were legacies from his parochial past was an anachronism which was undoubtedly out of tune with the

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 102, and V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, vol. v, p. 611, above.

² Exod. xx. 5 and xxxiv. 14; Deut. v. 9 and vi. 15; Joshua xxiv. 19.

³ Exod. xx. 3; Deut. v. 7 and vi. 14. According to Woolley, Sir L.: *Abraham* (London 1936, Faber), chap. 6, pp. 234-5 and 244, the 'jealousy' which is one of the outstanding characteristics of Yahweh the God of Moses was already characteristic of the nameless God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob with whom Yahweh came to be identified by Abraham's descendants in the Mosaic Age. In Woolley's view Abraham's God was the Family God that had been worshipped in every household in Ur, and it was of the essence of this Family God that 'he could admit no alien worshippers and have no outside interests'. In persisting in the worship of this Family God when he left the city gods of Ur behind him, Abraham became, not indeed a monotheist, but at least 'monolatrous'. It will be seen that the God of Abraham (if Woolley is right) resembled the God of Moses in the point of exclusiveness, but differed from him in not being tied to any particular locality. While the worship of Yahweh was bound up with Yahweh's successive local habitations on Sinai, at Bethel, and in Jerusalem, the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob was worshipped by his Nomadic votaries wherever they happened to pitch their moving tents.

temper that was prevalent in that age among the host of *ci-devant* local divinities of Yahweh's kind, who for the most part were conducting their tournament in a spirit of 'live-and-let-live' and 'give-and-take'.¹ This unamiable anachronism was, nevertheless, as we shall see, one of the elements in Yahweh's character that helped him to win his astonishing victory.

It may be instructive to look into these two traits of provincialism and exclusiveness more closely, taking the provincialism first and the exclusiveness second.

The choice of a provincial divinity to be the vehicle for an epiphany of a God who is omnipresent and omnipotent and unique might seem at first sight to be an inexplicable paradox; for, while the Jewish and Christian and Islamic conception of a God with these attributes² has indisputably been derived, as a matter of historical fact, from the figure of a Yahweh who makes his first appearance on the terrestrial scene as the Thunderer of Sinai or as the Ba'al of Shiloh, it is equally indisputable that the theological content, as opposed to the historical origin, of the idea of God which is common to these three monotheistic religions sprung from a single Syriac root is immeasurably different from the primitive representation of Yahweh, and bears a far closer resemblance to a number of other conceptions to which, as a matter of historical fact, the Islamic-Christian-Jewish conception is either indebted less deeply or even—in some of the cases in question—not indebted at all, so far as we can tell. In point of universality the Islamic-Christian-Jewish conception of God has less in common with the primitive representation of Yahweh than it has with the picture of the high god of a pantheon—an Amon-Re or a Corichancan Sun-God or a Marduk-Bel—whose authority at any rate extends in some sense over the whole of the Universe, even though the divinity by whom this supreme power is exercised be neither omnipotent nor unique. Or, if we take as our standard of comparison the degree of the spirituality that the different conceptions of God display, here the latter-day Jewish and Christian and Islamic conception of God has more in common with the abstractions of the philosophic schools: with an Andean Viracocha, an

¹ The abnormality of the exclusiveness that was displayed, in different degrees of militancy, by both Judaism and Zoroastrianism in the Achaemenian Age, is noticed by Eduard Meyer in the passage quoted on p. 32, above.

² It was because Christianity had inherited from Judaism the conception of a God who was unique that the Hellenes looked upon the Christians as being no better than atheists (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 348, and the passage quoted from the writings of the Emperor Julian in V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, vol. v, p. 584, above). 'To the mind of a Roman there was something atheistic in Yahweh's claim to be the only god in existence. For the Roman, *One God was no god*' (Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. ii (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 567). See further V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, in the present volume, p. 536, below.

Egyptiac Aton, a Neoplatonic Helios, a Confucian T'ien, a Stoic Zeus, and even, perhaps, with a latter-day Western 'God the Mathematician'. For the primitive figure of Yahweh, as we see it (through a glass darkly) in the panorama of the Pentateuch, appears equally gross whether we compare it with these philosophic abstractions or with our own idea of the God whose countenance has been astonishingly revealed to us through Yahweh's features. Why is it, then, that, in a mystery play which has for its plot the revelation of God to Man, the supreme role of serving as the vehicle for the divine epiphany has been allotted, not to an etherial Aton or even to an imperial Amon-Re, but to a barbaric and provincial Yahweh whose qualifications for playing this tremendous part might seem, on our present showing, to be so conspicuously inferior to those of so many of his unsuccessful competitors?

The answer to this hard question may perhaps be found in calling to mind one element in the latter-day Jewish and Christian and Islamic conception of God which we have not yet mentioned. We have dwelt so far upon certain qualities which are as prominent in this etherial representation of God as they are conspicuous by their apparent absence from the character of the primitive Yahweh—the three sublime qualities of uniqueness and omnipotence and omnipresence. Yet, for all their sublimity, these three attributes of the Divine Nature are in themselves no more than conclusions of the human understanding; they are not experiences of the human heart; and, while it is no doubt possible for a human soul which has made its first discovery of God on the intellectual plane to enter into communion with Him thereafter on that higher level of spiritual intercourse on which human beings are able to love, as well as know, their human fellow creatures, the attainment of communion with God along a path on which the heart has to wait upon the head is evidently 'hard and rare'. Few human souls have succeeded, like Ikhnaton or Akbar, in winning the *Visio Beatifica* for themselves by this intellectual approach;¹ fewer still have succeeded, like Zarathustra, in communicating to others a vision that has been gained in this primarily intellectual way; and this will not surprise us when we consider what element in God's nature it is that we have so far left out of account; for it is an element that is no mere attribute but is rather the very essence of the Divine Nature as it presents itself to us—an essence apart from which the Godhead could hardly be imagined as existing or as being capable of having any attributes ascribed to it.

For Man, God's essence is that He is a living god with whom

¹ For the failure of Ikhnaton and Akbar to become founders of new religions see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 695-6 and 699-704, above.

a living human being can enter into a spiritual relation that is recognizably akin to his spiritual relations with the living human beings among whom Man lives his earthly life as a social creature. This fact of being alive is the essence of God's nature for human souls that are seeking to enter into communion with Him, and at the same time it is the hardest element in God's nature for human beings to grasp, since this living god has to be apprehended by our human faculties without the aid of those physical evidences of life—a visibility and a tangibility—that are offered by all other living beings that come within Man's ken. And, if it is thus the most difficult part of the knowledge of God to know Him in this essential way, this difficulty is evidently at its maximum for a spiritual explorer who attempts an intellectual approach to his divine goal, since an intellectual apprehension of God's attributes is a way of knowing God which is more remote than any other from the direct communion of Life with Life. The seeker after God who takes this intellectual path is like some climber who gains his first footing on the mountain-side at the point which is not only farthest from the summit but which is also separated from it by the deepest chasms and the sheerest precipices. It is manifestly less difficult—however difficult it still may be—for a human soul which is already in enjoyment of a direct communion with God to enlarge its comprehension of the Divine Nature by grafting a branch of intellectual knowledge on to the living stem of its intuitive religious experience. In short, the natural order of aspiration in any human endeavour to find the way to God is the order which is followed in Francis Thompson's poem:

O world invisible, we view thee,
 O world intangible, we touch thee,
 O world unknowable, we know thee,
 Inapprehensible, we clutch thee!

We can now perhaps see why our latter-day Islamic-Christian-Jewish conception of God has grown, as it has, out of the primitive figure of Yahweh and not out of the sophisticated constructions of the philosophers; for this quality of being alive, which is the essence of God as Jews and Christians and Muslims believe in Him to-day, is likewise the essence of Yahweh as he makes his appearance in the Old Testament.¹ 'For who is there of all flesh that

¹ In the minds of the Israelites this property of 'life' or 'existence' in the god whose worship they had inherited from their forefathers eventually came to loom so large that, at least in official parlance, the genuine traditional name of the god was distorted into conformity with a false etymology which sought to derive the name itself from the outstanding property of the god who bore it. The true form of Yahweh's name appears to have been *Yahô* or *Yahû*; for this is the form in which it figures in the compound proper names into which it enters—and this not only in the Hebrew names in the Old Testament, but also in certain non-Israelite names, some of which are of earlier date (e.g. in compound names current in Shinar in the time of Hammurabi, at Hamath in the time of

hath heard the voice of the living god speaking out of the midst of the fire, as we have, and lived?'¹—is the boast of Yahweh's Chosen People after his epiphany to them on Sinai. And it is this same assurance that the god whom they worship is a living god that nerves the Israelites to invade and occupy the Palestinian provinces of 'the New Empire' of Egypt,² and afterwards to match themselves against the rival Philistine claimants to Pharaoh's derelict Palestinian heritage.³ When this living God of Israel encounters in turn an abstract Zoroastrian Ahuramazda⁴ and an abstract

Sargon, and at Damascus in the time of Esarhaddon). Moreover, Yahū is the form of his name under which the god was worshipped in the fifth century B.C. at Elephantine by the Jewish, or Judaeo-Samaritan, garrison of that frontier-fortress of the Achaemenian Empire. This original Yahū has been twisted into Yahwēh to give the word the appearance of being the third person singular of the imperfect tense of the verbal root HYH, signifying 'existence'—though the correct form of this is not *yahwēh* but *yihyēh*. In Exodus iii. 13-15 this name is represented as being revealed by its divine owner to Israel through the mouth of Moses; and in this place the distortion is carried a stage farther than usual; for while in verse 15 the Lord instructs Moses to declare to Israel that 'Yahwēh the god of your fathers . . . hath sent me unto you' and 'this is my name for ever', in the preceding verse the Lord reveals his name to Moses, not in the third person as Yahwēh (purporting to mean 'He is'), but in a corresponding first person as Ehyēh (purporting to mean 'I am'). This Ehyēh is so far removed from the original Yahū that its origin would be an enigma if we did not happen to know the intermediate term. (For this etymological evidence of the Israelites' sense of the vitality of their god see van Hoonacker, A.: *Une Communauté Judéo-Araméenne d'Éléphantine, en Égypte, aux v^e et v^e siècles av. J.-C.* (London 1915, Milford), pp. 67-73. See also Pauly-Wissowa: *Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, neue Bearbeitung, Halbband xvii, cols. 698-721, s.v. Iao.)

¹ Deut. v. 26.

² Joshua iii. 10.

³ 1 Sam. xvii. 26 and 36.

⁴ Ahura Mazdāh means 'God the Wise'; and in the Zoroastrian conception of him he is as abstract as the Stoic Zeus, even if there be truth in the conjecture that the Iranian, like the Hellenic, abstraction has been drawn out of an historical divinity who, in the Iranian case, would be Varūna, the Aryan counterpart of the Greek Ūranus (for this conjecture see Christensen, A.: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin & Munksgaard), p. 28). Ahuramazda was conceived of by the Prophet Zarathustra as a One True God who was served by attendant spirits of less than divine rank—though, in the Gathas, these spirits, too, are called *ahuras*, like God Himself. The abstractness (see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 59) of the beings who constitute the Zoroastrian Host of Heaven is as evident in Zarathustra's names for these *amesha spentas* as it is in his name for the God whom they serve. They are called (see Christensen, op. cit., pp. 29-30) Vohū Manah ('Good State of Mind'), Asha Vahishta ('The Best Truth'), Khshathra Vairya ('The Desirable Kingdom [of God]'), Ārmaiti ('Submission'—compare Muhammad's term 'Islām'), Haurvatāt ('Integrity' or 'Health'), Ameretāt ('Immortality'), Sraosha ('Obedience'). It is astonishing that this hierarchy of undisguised abstractions should have been substituted by a prophet of the External Proletariat for an anthropomorphically conceived barbarian pantheon—the Iranian counterpart of the Vedic Pantheon of the Aryas—whose members were the hereditary objects of worship of Zarathustra's world; yet, in order to clear the Universe for exclusive occupation by the creatures—or discoveries—of his own penetrating thought, Zarathustra had the audacity to degrade the traditional Iranian gods (the *daēvas*) to the rank of demons in the service of another abstraction: Angra Mainyāush (Ahriman), 'the enemy spirit' or adversary of Ahuramazda. It is still more astonishing to find that this artificial, abstract, and universal religion gradually supplanted the traditional Iranian paganism—though this at the price of incorporating into itself a considerable amount of incongruous pagan ritual and myth. The secret of this success—in which Zoroastrianism is perhaps unique among religions and philosophies of this abstract kind—can hardly be ascribed to the royal patronage which Zarathustra won for his new faith in his own lifetime, and which was retained by Zoroastrianism until the end of the Achaemenian régime; for the Achaemenian Emperors took care not to force upon their subjects the religion which they had embraced for themselves (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 704-5, above); and the intolerant enforcement of a Zoroastrian orthodoxy by the Sasanidae in a later age, so far from proving beneficial to Zoroastrianism, had a disastrous effect upon its destinies

Stoic Zeus and an abstract Constantinian Sol Invictus¹ and an abstract Neoplatonic Helios, it becomes manifest that Yahweh

*ολος πέπνυται, τοι δὲ σκιαὶ αἰσσοῦσιν.*²

For the primitive figure of Yahweh has grown into the Christian conception of God by annexing the intellectual attributes of these abstractions without deigning to acknowledge the debt or scrupling to obliterate their names.³ The completeness of Yahweh's victory in this series of encounters is pointed by its contrast with what happened when another barbaric and parochial yet aggressively living god—the divine patron of the Arabian city-state of Mecca, who was known within the Ka'bah as Allāh, 'the god' *sans phrase*—came to be identified by the Prophet Muhammad with the omnipresent and omnipotent and unique God of Jewry and Christendom.⁴ The Ba'al of Mecca who was thus suddenly magnified by the fiat of a man of genius did not contribute a single new attribute to the intellectual conception of the One True God whose *alter ego* Allāh was now proclaimed to be; but he has given proof of his vitality by imposing his own provincial name upon the God of the Universe on the lips of all the myriads of human beings in every part of the World who have come to know God through embracing Islam.

(see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 659–61, above). A more powerful adventitious aid was the eventual enlistment of the Magi (V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 542, above) in the service of an upstart faith which they had at first done their utmost to stamp out (compare the enlistment of the Brahmins in the service of Hinduism (V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 137–8, above) and the enlistment of the Egyptian priesthood in the service of the worship of Osiris (I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 144, above)). But in the main we must attribute the remarkable success of Zarathustra's religion to the force of the Prophet's character and to the truth and profundity of his ideas. The eight concepts of the Devil, the Last Judgement, Salvation, the Saviour, Transfiguration (Frashōkarati), the Millennium, the Kingdom of God (Khshathra Vairya), and Immortality, which, between them, cover so large a part of the fields of Christian and Islamic theology, are all derived from Zoroastrianism through a Jewish channel (for the Zoroastrian origin of the Jewish eschatology see von Gall, A.: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), pp. ix–x and 156–7; for the Zoroastrian origin of the Jewish belief in Immortality see *ibid.*, p. 160).

¹ For an interpretation of Constantine's vision of the Unconquerable Christ revealing his cross athwart the disk of the Unconquerable Sun see the passage quoted from N. H. Baynes in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 693, above.

² *Odyssey*, Book X, l. 495, quoted in Polybius, Book XXXVI, cap. 8.

³ In the Christian diffraction of the Unity of God into a Trinity of Persons we can observe the extent of the Christian Theology's intellectual debt to the abstract religions and philosophies with which Judaism and Christianity had collided between the sixth century B.C. and the fourth century of the Christian Era. While in the Second Person of the Trinity the quality of being a living god has been brought home to human hearts, with quite a new emotional vividness and spiritual force, by a God who has renounced the unmitigated transcendence of Yahweh in order to become incarnate, the First Person of the Trinity is represented in the iconography of the Christian Church, as He is in the Book of Daniel (see p. 34, footnote 5, above), in the likeness of the Zoroastrian representation of Ahuramazda, and the Third Person of the Trinity is virtually identical in name, as well as in function, with the first of the Zoroastrian *amesha spentas*, Vohū Manah. In this theological plagiarism Christianity has done Zoroastrianism not a wrong but a service, for 'it is not until it has been taken up into Christianity that the *Weltanschauung* of the Iranian prophet begins to have its greatest effect in the field of world history' (Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 441).

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 688, footnote 2, above.

If this persistent quality of being alive is the obverse of Yahweh's primitive provincialism,¹ we may find that the exclusiveness which is an enduring as well as an original trait in Yahweh's character has also some value which is indispensable for the historic role which the God of Israel has played in the revelation of the Divine Nature to Mankind.

This value begins to become apparent as soon as we consider the significance of the contrast between the ultimate triumph of the 'jealous god' of two puny and ephemeral Syriac principalities and the ultimate fiasco of the high gods of the pantheons of the two neighbouring societies which, between them, ground the political structure of the Syriac World to pieces, as a pair of converging icebergs might crush a frail kayak. In respect of being rooted in the soil and of flowing with the sap of visible and tangible life, both Amon-Re and Marduk-Bel could measure themselves against Yahweh on equal terms, while they had the advantage over him in being associated, in the minds of their hereditary worshippers, with the colossal worldly success of their native Thebes and Babylon—a success which was ascribed to the zeal and prowess of these great tutelary divinities on their peoples' behalf, whereas Yahweh's people had been left, in their abasement and captivity, to solve as best they could the problem of vindicating the benevolence and omnipotence of a tribal divinity who had apparently abandoned his tribesmen in their hour of need, without lifting a finger to defend them against a ruthless alien aggressor.² If, in spite of these telling points in their favour, Marduk-Bel and Amon-Re were outstripped, as they were, by Yahweh in the competition between divinities under the Achaemenian régime, we can hardly avoid ascribing their failure to their innocence of Yahweh's jealous vein; for the absence of this trait was as conspicuous in the characters of both the Egyptian and the Babylonian high god as its presence was in the character of their obscure yet victorious Palestinian rival. A freedom—for good or for ill—from the spirit of exclusiveness is implicit in the hyphen which links the two parts of these synthetic divinities' respective names; for, if jealousy had been the ruling passion of either of the original constituents in either case, then neither of these composite high gods could ever even have come into existence.³ No wonder that Marduk-Bel and Amon-Re were as tolerant of polytheism beyond the bounds of

¹ Compare the effect of the same quality in enabling natural languages of an originally no more than local currency to defeat artificial languages like Esperanto in the competition for becoming *lingue franche* (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), vol. v, pp. 492-3, above).

² For the solution of this problem which Yahweh's Jewish worshippers worked out, see the passage quoted from Eduard Meyer on p. 30, above.

³ For the manufacture of Amon-Re and Marduk-Bel as a symptom of the sense of promiscuity in the field of Religion see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 529-31, above.

their own loose-knit personalities as they were tolerant of the disunity in their Protean selves. Both of them alike were born—or, more accurately speaking, were manufactured—to be content with their primal status of suzerainty over a host of other beings who were no less divine, and not even much less potent, than they were; and, by the same token, this congenital lack of ambition doomed them both to drop out of the competition for a monopoly of divinity when Yahweh's devouring jealousy would as surely spur him on to run to the end this race that had been set before them all.¹

The same relentless intolerance of any rival was also manifestly one of the qualities that enabled the God of Israel, after he had become the God of the Christian Church, to outrun all his competitors once again in another Battle of the Gods which was fought out this time in the arena of the Roman Empire. These rival candidates for the spiritual allegiance of the Hellenic internal proletariat were of diverse natures and origins—a Syriac Mithras, an Egyptiac Isis, a Hittite Cybele—but they were in unanimous accord with each other, and in unanimous disagreement with their eventual conqueror, in being ready to enter into a compromise. They would have been willing either to partition the vast population of the Hellenic universal state into as many separate flocks as there were competing divinities, or to find a niche for each and all of the divine competitors in each and every human soul, or even to allow the ingenuity of their hierophants to incorporate these hitherto rival gods into a joint-stock company for a common exploitation of the vast new virgin territory which lay open to the Oriental divinities in a Hellenic World whose native gods were now too decrepit to be capable any longer of fighting even on their own ground in defence of their traditional

¹ Heb. xii. 1. The enterprise of our modern Western archaeologists has disintegrated at Elephantine, in Upper Egypt, the records of one exception to the rule of Yahweh's jealousy which proves the rule to have had the value that we have just attributed to it. In the Aramaic papyri relating to the affairs of the Jewish, or Judæo-Samaritan, garrison of Elephantine under the Achaemenian régime we find that in this community of Yahû-worshippers the god did not enjoy a monopoly of worship but had at least four associates—'Anath-Yahû, 'Anath-Bethel, Ašm-Bethel, Haram-Bethel—of whom the first two, at any rate, were goddesses (see Meyer, E.: *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs), pp. 54-63). These associates of Yahû at Elephantine appear to have been, not survivals from a pre-monotheistic phase of Yahû-worship, but accretions contributed by a Samaritan element in the community at Elephantine (for this explanation see van Hoonacker, op. cit., pp. 73-85, especially p. 82; for the political origin and religious history of the Samaritans see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 125, footnote 1, above). The most interesting feature in the testimony of the Elephantine papyri from our present point of view is the fact that, fragmentary though they are, they inform us, not only that Yahû of Elephantine was a less jealous god than Yahweh of Jerusalem, but also that the worship of Yahû at Elephantine failed to survive. One of the documents is a letter, written in 408-7 B.C., which recounts the destruction of the temple of Yahû by the local priests of the Egyptiac god Khnum with the connivance of the Persian military commandant at Elephantine. And the worship of the easy-going Yahû of Elephantine, in contrast to the worship of the jealous Yahweh of Jerusalem, seems to have perished in the ruin of the shrine in which it had been carried on in this particular place.

rights.¹ This easy-going, compromising spirit was fatal to the rivals of the God of Tertullian when they had to face an adversary who could not be content with a less than 'totalitarian' victory because any abatement of his own exclusive claim to divinity would be, for him, a denial of his own essence.

The most impressive testimony to the value of the jealous vein in Yahweh's *êthos* is perhaps afforded by a piece of negative evidence that comes from an Indic World in which the God of Israel did not begin to make his existence felt until after the religion of the Indic internal proletariat had set hard in an indigenous form² that it still retains to-day.³ In the Indic World, as elsewhere, the process of social disintegration was accompanied by the development of a sense of unity, and this made itself felt very forcibly on the religious plane—as was to be expected in a society in whose *habitus* the religious vein was dominant.⁴ In response to an ever more insistent craving in Indic souls to apprehend the unity of God, the myriad divinities of the Indic internal proletariat gradually coalesced or dissolved into one or other of the two mighty figures of Shiva and Vishnu.⁵

'Vishnu is really all the other gods. Just as he is identical with Brahman and Çiva, so he condescends to manifest himself in beings which do not claim to be self-existent or without beginning. It involves some partial limitation of his own nature, some Docetic assumption of a temporary form. Çaiṇa piety reached the same end in a different way. "Victorious is the Eternal Sthānu (the 'Steadfast' or 'Stable'), whose one body is formed by the coalescence of all the gods": so ran the dedication of King Kakusthavarman (*regnabat* A.D. 500-50) on a great tank in Mysore adjoining a temple of Çiva.⁶

¹ For this decrepitude of the native Hellenic divinities by the time of the foundation of the Roman Empire see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 57; II. D (vi), vol. ii. pp. 215-16; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 349, above.

² For the elements and *êthos* of Hinduism see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 137-8, above.

³ In essentials Hinduism appears to have attained its present form by the time of the Gupta Dynasty (*imperabant circa* A.D. 350-480, or, on a stricter reckoning, *circa* A.D. 390-470: see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 85, footnote 1, above). On the other hand, Islam—which is the vehicle in which the 'jealous god' of Israel has made his epiphany on Indian soil—did not begin to impinge upon the Hindu World, even in the outlying and isolated province of Sind, until after the beginning of the eighth century of the Christian Era, and did not sweep over Hindustan until the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (see IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 99-100, above).

⁴ For this dominance of the religious vein in the *habitus* of both the 'apparented' Indic and the 'affiliated' Hindu Society see the quotations from Sir Charles Eliot in III. C (iii), vol. iii, pp. 384-5 and 388, above.

⁵ The stage in the process of transcending a primitive polytheism which is represented, in the history of Indic religion, by the absorption of all other divinities into either Vishnu or Shiva was never completed in the Babylonian and Egyptian worlds. There does, however, seem to have been an inchoate and abortive tendency, in the time of 'the New Empire' of Egypt, for Amun-Re to attract into his own personality some, at least, of the other divinities of the Thothmean Pantheon—to judge by certain passages from the Egyptian religious literature of that age that have been quoted in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 531, above.

⁶ Carpenter, J. Estlin: *Theism in Medieval India* (London 1921, Williams & Norgate), p. 290.

With a former multiplicity of local divinities thus absorbed into the personality of one or other of two alternative Lords of the Universe, Hinduism has reached the stage that was reached by the religion of the Syriac internal proletariat¹ in the Achaemeno-Seleucid Age, when the mighty figures of Ahuramazda and Yahweh confronted one another as the two survivors on a stricken field of battle between a host of divinities who had been contending for the prize of becoming the vehicle for a revelation of the unity of the Divine Nature. This penultimate stage on the road towards the apprehension of the unity of God was attained by Hinduism at least fifteen hundred, and perhaps two thousand, years ago; and yet, in all the time that has elapsed since then, Hinduism has never taken the final step that was taken by the Syriac religion when Yahweh—intolerant of even a single peer—disposed of Ahuramazda by swallowing him whole. In Hinduism the concept of an Almighty God, instead of being unified, has been polarized round the mutually complementary and by the same token antithetic figures of two equally-matched candidates who have persistently refrained from settling accounts with one another.

In face of this strange situation we are bound to ask ourselves why Hinduism has accepted, as a solution for the problem of the unity of God, a compromise which, so far from offering a genuine solution, involves an unresolved contradiction inasmuch as it is really impossible to conceive of a godhead that is omnipresent and omnipotent—as Vishnu and Shiva each claim to be—without being at the same time unique. As soon as we put this question, the answer stares us in the face. The reason why Hinduism has come to this tragic halt within sight of a goal towards which it has travelled over so long a road is because neither Shiva nor Vishnu is a 'jealous god' in Yahweh's vehement vein. So far from that, the *êthos* of both these Hindu divinities bears a manifest resemblance to that of the Hittite and Egyptian and Syriac divinities—a Cybele and an Isis and a Mithras—whom the God of Israel overthrew after he had become the God of Christianity. In the same easy-going spirit Vishnu and Shiva have always preferred a compromise to a fight to the death; and it might have been expected *a priori* that, in a world where they did not find themselves confronted by any implacable rival, they would have been able to strike their compromise with an impunity that was impossible for Mithras and Cybele and Isis in an arena in which the Christians' 'jealous god' was also one of the combatants. Yet, as it has turned out, the fortunes of Shiva and Vishnu have been hardly happier than

¹ For the Syriac counterparts of the worships of Shiva and Vishnu see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 138, above.

those of their counterparts in the Roman Empire. They have been spared annihilation only to meet the more ironic fate of being reciprocally frustrated and stultified by one another. And this failure to apprehend the unity of God in a world in which the God of Israel has not been on the scene seems to indicate that the jealousy of Yahweh, which at first sight is so repellent, has a value that transcends its sheer survival-value in a struggle for existence between competing divinities. Its transcendent value lies in the disconcerting fact that a divinity who is credited by his worshippers with this spirit of uncompromising self-assertion proves to be the only medium through which the profound and therefore elusive truth of the unity of God has been firmly grasped hitherto by human souls.

8. *Archaism*

(α) *Archaism in Institutions and Ideas.*

Having now taken stock of the alternative ways of behaviour and feeling that present themselves to souls who are born into a socially disintegrating world, we may pass on to a consideration of the alternative ways of life that lie open to be followed in the same challenging circumstances; and here we may begin with that way which, in our preliminary reconnaissance of this stage in our Study, we have labelled 'Archaism'¹ and have defined² as an attempt to remount the stream of life—breasting the current and taking salmon-leaps up cataracts and waterfalls—in the hope of regaining one of those quiet upper reaches that in 'Times of Troubles' are regretted the more poignantly the farther they have been left behind.³

In making an empirical survey of examples of this phenomenon of Archaism, we shall perhaps obtain a clearer view if we once again divide the landscape up into those four fields—Conduct, Art, Language, and Religion—which we have already plotted out in the course of a preceding inquiry into the sense of promiscuity.⁴

¹ In V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 383, above.

² In V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 383–4, above.

³ In recalling our definition of the term Archaism, it may be timely to remind ourselves of the limitations which we are placing upon it in this Study. For our purposes Archaism means an attempt to recapture some elements from the past of the society of which the archaist himself is a member. We are not taking Archaism to mean any and every attempt at a reversion to something in the Past; for we are not including in our use of the term those renaissances of elements in an 'apparented' civilization which an 'affiliated' civilization sometimes achieves. On the conception of History which we are trying to work out in this Study, such renaissances are contacts between different civilizations in the Time-dimension, whereas Archaism is a movement which does not range outside the bounds of the single civilization to which the archaist himself belongs. From our standpoint this difference between Archaism within the Time-horizon of a single civilization and the contact in Time between two different civilizations is more important than the feature—common to Archaism and Contact in Time—of being an attempt at a reversion to the Past.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 6, vol. v, above.

We shall find, however, that in these two different surveys our four fields are not completely coextensive in their several areas, and that this divergence arises from an inward diversity between the two states of mind which are the respective objects of study in the two cases. The sense of promiscuity is a spontaneous, un-self-conscious feeling which sometimes asserts itself, as we have seen, in defiance of tradition and of law and of public opinion and even of the taste and conscience of the person or persons whom the sense of promiscuity is overpowering and carrying away. By contrast, Archaism is a deliberate, self-conscious policy of attempting to swim against the stream of life at the bidding of a conscience and a taste and a public opinion and a law and a tradition which spur the swimmer into attempting his arduous *tour de force*; and accordingly we shall find that in the field of conduct Archaism expresses itself in formal institutions and formulated ideas rather than in un-self-conscious manners, and in the linguistic field in points of style and theme, which are matters of convention and, as such, are amenable to the control of the will, as well as in points of vocabulary, accident, and syntax, in which the wayward spirit of the vulgar tongue is apt to outwit the 'high-brow' purist's most straitly pedantic intentions.

If we now begin our survey by entering upon the field of institutions and ideas, our best plan of operations will be to start by taking a glance at institutional Archaism in detail and then to follow the spread of the archaistic state of mind over a wider and wider area till we arrive, in the end, at an 'ideological' Archaism which is all-pervasive because it is an Archaism-on-principle.

We have already come across one example of an archaistic resuscitation of a particular rite in our survey of civilizations that have come to a standstill on the threshold of life.¹ We have seen² how in Plutarch's day, which was the heyday of the Hellenic universal state, the ceremony of scourging Spartiate boys at the altar of Artemis Orthia—an ordeal which, in Sparta's prime, had been taken over from a primitive fertility-ritual and had been incorporated into the Lycurgean *agôgê*—was being practised at Sparta once again, though now with a pathological exaggeration which is one of the characteristic notes of Archaism in all its manifestations. In the Indic World, too, we have noted³ that the horse-sacrifice, which was a traditional Indic method of asserting a title to an oecumenical authority, was resuscitated first by Pushyamitra, the usurper who overthrew the Mauryas in the second century B.C., and afterwards—more than five hundred years later—by the

¹ In Part III. A, vol. iii, above.

² In Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 77, above.

³ In V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 2, footnote 1, above.

Guptas. It is easy to guess that Pushyamitra and Samudragupta in turn were moved to make this archaistic demonstration of their legitimacy by an inward doubt about the validity of their respective claims to a sovereignty on the oecumenical scale; and it was assuredly an inward loss of certainty about the boasted eternity of Rome that moved the Emperor Philip to celebrate, with the utmost solemnity and magnificence, the traditional *Ludi Saeculares* when, in A.D. 248, the Roman Empire was enjoying a momentary breathing-space in the midst of a bout of anarchy that was threatening to put an end to its very existence.¹

If we pass from recurrent rites to permanent institutions, we shall observe that, in this age in which the Roman Commonwealth appeared to be on the point of dissolution, the revival of the *Ludi Saeculares* in A.D. 248 was followed in or about A.D. 250² by the re-establishment of the venerable office of the censorship. And if we cast our eyes back to the 'Time of Troubles' from which the bout of anarchy in the third century of the Christian Era was divided by a span of effective Roman Peace, we shall see the Gracchi attempting to deal with the economic and social crisis which was the aftermath of the Hannibalic War by legislating for the restoration of a system of peasant-proprietorship which they believed to have been prevalent in the *Ager Romanus* at a date more than two hundred years before their own day.³ If we turn from the Hellenic to the Western World, we shall find an analogue of the re-establishment of the Roman censorship in the third century of the Christian Era in the re-enhancement, in the twentieth century, of the prestige and popularity of the British Crown to a height at which they had never stood at any time since the death of Queen Elizabeth in A.D. 1603.⁴

¹ The *Ludi Saeculares* had been first revived—or had been originally invented—by Augustus in 17 B.C., and had since then been celebrated by Claudius in A.D. 47, by Domitian in A.D. 88, by Antoninus Pius in A.D. 147 (according to Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Roman Empire from its Foundation to the Death of Marcus Aurelius* (London 1913, Murray), p. 524), and by Septimius Severus in A.D. 204. The celebration by Philip in A.D. 248 was officially in honour of the completion of the first millennium of Rome's existence, counting from the legendary date of the foundation of the city. For the symbolic meaning and psychological effect of the ritual act *condere saeculum* see Wendland, P.: *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*, 2nd and 3rd ed. (Tübingen 1912, Mohr), p. 144.

² The date is given as the 27th October, 251, in the so-called *Historia Augusta*, 'Valeriani Duo', chap. 5, § 4; but this can hardly be right, since by that date the Emperor Decius, who was the author of this archaistic measure, was in all probability already dead, and the true date must have been prior to the Emperor's departure from Rome for the campaign against the Goths in which he was to meet his death. (See Schiller, H.: *Geschichte der Römischen Kaiserzeit*, vol. 1, part (2) (Gotha 1883, Perthes), p. 807, footnote 3.)

³ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 508; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 70-1 and 78; and V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 388-9, above; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 219-20, below.

⁴ The prestige and popularity which the British Crown was enjoying in the year 1937 would have astonished even the most sharp-sighted observer of the politics of the United Kingdom in 1837, on the eve of the accession of Queen Victoria—supposing that

If we pass from particular institutions to constitutions extending over the whole domain of political life, we shall observe that the revalorization of the medieval institution of the Crown in Great Britain has been contemporaneous with the organization in Italy of a 'corporative state', and that this is supposed to be a restoration of a political and economic régime which was in force in 'the Middle Ages' in Northern Italy and in the rest of the medieval Western city-state cosmos, and which was based, in its original form, upon the medieval trade-guilds. This modern Western Fascist 'corporative state' is a veritable *πάτριος πολιτεία* ('ancestral constitution') of the kind which was so prominent a portent in a disintegrating Hellenic World both during the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' and after the establishment of a Hellenic universal state in the shape of the Roman Empire.

The slogan 'patrios politeia' implies the claim that a newly inaugurated constitution is in reality an old-established one which is now being brought back into force after an unmerited and unfortunate interval of disuse and oblivion. In the history of the decline and fall of the Hellenic Civilization we find this claim being made, within twenty years of the breakdown of 431 B.C., by the Athenian reactionaries who succeeded, through a *coup d'état*, in imposing upon the Athenian Dêmos the short-lived oligarchic constitution of the year 411. This 'Régime of the Four Hundred' was hailed by its supporters as a return to the Constitution of Cleisthenes and perhaps even to the Constitution of Solon. In a similar tone Agis and Cleomenes—the two Spartan martyr-kings who successively staked and lost their lives on a policy of political and social Archaism in the third century B.C.—proclaimed that they were restoring the Constitution of Lycurgus and that they ought therefore to be applauded as reformers instead of being execrated as revolutionaries.¹ At Rome in the second century B.C.

our imaginary observer could have returned to life after the lapse of a hundred years. It is true that in 1937 the Crown performed a practical service—for which there had been no demand a hundred years back—as a personal link between the several fully self-governing states members of the British Commonwealth of Nations (for this latter-day role of the British Crown see Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 190-1, and IV. C (iii) (b) 5, vol. iv, p. 187, above). Yet a contemporary English observer would not be disposed to believe that the twentieth-century revalorization of the Crown had been wholly, or even mainly, due to any such utilitarian constitutional considerations. The deeper reason why the British Crown was now once more attracting to itself the affections and the hopes of its subjects in the United Kingdom was because the English in this generation had a feeling—which was not the less strong for being unacknowledged—that England had now passed her political zenith. It was this feeling that was sapping the prestige and popularity of Parliament—the master institution of England in her maturity—and was restoring the prestige and popularity of the Crown, which had been the master institution of an age of political adolescence to which the twentieth-century Englishman was now wistfully looking back.

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 76-7; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 78; and V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 388-9, above; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 219-20, below.

the Gracchi professed—and this, no doubt, with the same good faith as their Heracleid forerunners at Sparta—to be exercising the office of the Tribune of the Plebs in the fashion that had been intended at the time when, at the turn of the fourth and third centuries, the dissident Plebeian *imperium in imperio* had been re-absorbed into the legitimate Roman body politic in virtue of a sagacious political compromise.¹

In the same Roman Commonwealth a hundred years later the dictatorship—which by that time had come to be the only possible instrument for appeasing a *stasis* which the Gracchi had provoked—was commended to the *ci-devant* governing class by an Augustan Archaism which was as *rusé* as the Gracchan Archaism had been *naïf*. The assassination of Octavian's adoptive father Divus Julius had shown that the sheer necessity and urgency of establishing a dictatorial régime were not enough to guarantee immunity from criminal violence to a statesman who was attempting to perform this invidious public service. So far from that, the mere admission of the need for a dictatorship was a crushing indictment of the class in whose hands the government of the Roman Commonwealth had been concentrated for the past two centuries. If the Ordo Senatorius were to be forced to confess that a dictator could no longer be dispensed with, then it would be confessing in the same breath its own complete political and moral failure; and the fate of Caesar the dictator-god had shown that it was impossible to extort this confession from the Roman aristocracy without driving them, in the act, into a homicidal frenzy of exasperation. The adoptive Caesar Octavianus might lack the genius of the genuine Caesar the God, but he did possess, in the highest degree, the capacity for learning by experience; and, when the crime of 44 B.C. confronted Octavian with the problem of how to wield Caesar's powers without courting Caesar's fate, he contrived a solution which earned him the titles of Augustus and Pater Patriae and enabled him to become the true founder of the long-yearned-for Hellenic universal state.²

Augustus's solution of the political crux of the age was to 'save the face' of the Ordo Senatorius by tacitly inviting its members to collaborate with him in an open constitutional conspiracy. The unavowed bargain which he induced them to accept was a 'division of powers' in which Augustus received the substance while the

¹ For this chapter of the constitutional history of the Roman Republic see IV. C (iii) (b) 9, vol. iv, p. 205; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 508; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 70-1; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 388-9, above; and V. C (ii) (a), pp. 219-20, below.

² For Augustus's role and achievement see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 648-9, above, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 187 and 190, below.

Senate retained the form; and the offer—which would have been rejected as an insult by the *ci-devant* Roman governing class in its heyday—was accepted by their epigoni with alacrity and gratitude. In consequence, Augustus died in his bed at a ripe old age more than forty years after he had settled down into his dictatorship under the disarming title of Princeps Senatus; and throughout those four decades every urgent autocratic act that he had performed had been juridically warranted by the constitutionally well-established powers of the traditional republican magistracies which the Senate had officially conferred upon him. *De facto* the nature and scope and effect of these powers were magnified out of all recognition by being combined in the person of a single incumbent upon whom they had been conferred in some cases in perpetuity and in the rest with a frequency of iteration which had no historical precedent. Yet this patent fact that the ancient republican magistracies amounted cumulatively to a dictatorship was never allowed—either by Augustus of the one part or by the Senate of the other—to disturb the constitutional fiction that the Princeps Senatus was wielding no power which was alien to the ancient republican constitution of the Roman Commonwealth; and this archaistic constitutional make-believe actually provided so solid a foundation for a new political structure that the Augustan Principate endured for the best part of three hundred years.¹

It is also significant that the meticulous respect that was shown by Augustus, throughout the period of his constitutional rule, for the theory of the sovereignty of the Senate, was equalled and even surpassed towards the close of this three-hundred-years' period after having been cast aside, with various degrees of brutality, by the first emperor's earlier successors from Tiberius onwards. In the breathing-spaces in that half-century of political convulsions, between A.D. 235 and A.D. 284, which was the prelude to a liquidation of the Augustan Principate to make way for an absolute monarchy on the Sasanian pattern, the Senate found itself once again being treated with an honour which it had seldom known since the death of Augustus himself. The struggle against the proletarian dictatorship of Maximinus Thrax was conducted by the Gordians—and, after their deaths, by Maximus and Balbinus—as the Senate's nominees and mandatories. And even after Gallienus had deprived the Ordo Senatorius of their last shreds

¹ It will be seen that Divus Caesar, with his reckless radicalism, is the Hellenic counterpart of a Sinic Ts'in She Hwang-ti, while Augustus, with his artful Archaism, is the counterpart of Liu Pang, the *novus homo* who became the founder of the Prior Han Dynasty. (For this contrast between Ts'in She Hwang-ti and Liu Pang see V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 37, footnote 1, above. For the general distinction between the two classes of saviours with the sword who respectively fail and succeed in an attempt to establish a universal state see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 186-91, below.)

of effective power,¹ and after Aurelian had given the Hellenic World a foretaste of the despotism that was to be imposed upon it, once for all, by Diocletian within less than ten years of Aurelian's death, we find the Army engaging with the Senate in an unprecedented contest in courtesy in which each party insisted, *more Japonico*, that the other should accept the honour of electing Aurelian's successor, until at last the Senators admitted defeat by consenting to nominate one of their own number. In A.D. 275 it was strange indeed to see a proletarian soldiery submitting to the command of a cultivated civilian who was already seventy-five years old; but it was even stranger—when the anxieties and fatigues of his incongruous task brought the aged Emperor Tacitus to his grave within six months of his investiture with the purple—to see his virile successor Probus, who was a peasant-soldier of the same rough Illyrian stock as Aurelian and Diocletian, declining to assume the Imperial title, though he was already the candidate of the Army and the master of the Empire *de facto*, until he had asked for and obtained the Senate's ratification of the Army's choice. Thus, in the constitutional history of the Roman Commonwealth, the Senate was never treated with a greater show of deference than at a moment when it was on the point of losing the last shadow of a sovereignty which by that time had been in abeyance *de facto* for the best part of four centuries.² So strong was the archaistic impulse in a society which was obsessed with the problem of self-preservation under a threat of imminent death.

If we turn from a disintegrating Hellenic to a disintegrating Sinic World, we shall be able here to observe the emergence of a constitutional Archaism of a more comprehensive scope, extending from public into private life and from institutions to ideas.

The challenge of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' produced a spiritual ferment in Sinic minds which displayed itself both in the Confucian humanism of the fifth century B.C.³ and in the later

¹ According to Parker, H. M. D.: *A History of the Roman World from A.D. 138 to 337* (London 1935, Methuen), pp. 178–81, Gallienus (*imperabat solus* A.D. 260–8) made Senators ineligible for appointment to military commands and perhaps also deprived the Senatorial governors of provinces of their authority over the troops stationed in their districts. (This conjecture is based on Aurelius Victor, *De Caesaribus*, 33, 34, as read in the light of the evidence of inscriptions.)

² The Senate's loss of control over the reins of government *de facto* is to be dated neither from the victory of Augustus over Antony at Actium in 31 B.C. nor from the formation of the Second Triumvirate in 43 B.C. nor from the formation of the First Triumvirate in 60 B.C., but rather from the civil war of 90–81 B.C. The Sullan restoration was already an archaistic *tour de force*; and it was the tragedy of the Roman constitutionalists of the generation of Cicero and Cato Minor that they had been born into an age in which the dictatorship was overdue and in which the surviving simulacrum of Senatorial government was a delusive anachronism.

³ For the humanistic ethos of Confucius himself see the passages quoted from Granet in V. C. (i) (d) 7, p. 14, footnote 3, above.

and more radical schools of the 'Politicians' and 'Sophists' and 'Legists';¹ but this burst of spiritual activity was ephemeral.

'Ce sont les efforts tentés par les gouvernements de potentats (dont certains jouaient les despotes éclairés) pour édifier l'État sur un ordre social rénové qui sont à l'origine des concurrences corporatives et des polémiques sectaires par lesquelles se signalent les v^e, iv^e et iii^e siècles. Beaucoup d'idées fécondes furent alors brillamment défendues. Aucune n'a réussi à modifier profondément la mentalité des Chinois. . . . Comme les solutions proposées l'attestent, toute l'activité de pensée que ces problèmes ont provoquée a été déterminée par une crise sociale où le système féodal et la conception traditionnelle de l'Étiquette auraient pu sombrer. L'ordre féodal, cependant, est, pour le fond, demeuré vivace. L'agitation philosophique qui donne tant d'intérêt à la période des Royaumes Combattants a abouti au triomphe de la scolastique. Un conformisme archaïsant a renforcé le prestige de l'Étiquette et de tout le vieux système de classifications, de comportements, de convenances.'²

This revulsion towards the Past can be seen at its clearest in the fate which overtook the Confucian humanism.

'En même temps que s'atténuait l'inspiration humaniste, s'accroissait l'attachement à un décorum archaïsant. Plutôt qu'à observer les comportements de l'homme en cherchant à affiner le sens de la dignité humaine, les héritiers infidèles du Maître s'employèrent à subordonner l'ensemble du savoir à l'étude des traditions rituelles.'³

From this attitude of mind it is a short step to the Archaism-on-principle of Tong Chong-chu (*vivebat circa* 175-105 B.C.), an Imperial civil servant of the Prior Han régime who succeeded in making a *reductio ad absurdum* of the bureaucratic outlook by working out a system for subjecting every administrative act to the test of an historical precedent.

'C'est en se servant des précédents, c'est-à-dire grâce à une interprétation des faits de l'histoire, qu'on justifiera, mais aussi qu'on pourra condamner, les décisions du prince et de ses conseillers. Ceux-ci et leurs décrets se trouveront jugés par le Ciel et le peuple, dès qu'un savant, ayant produit un *fait historique*, l'aura interprété en montrant quel fut, jadis, dans une *situation déclarée analogue* à telle situation actuelle, le jugement du peuple et du Ciel.'⁴

Another example of Archaism-on-principle in a different sphere is the cult of a largely fictitious Primitive Teutonism which has

¹ For a conspectus of the sects and schools of thought which were brought into existence by the ordeal of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' see Granet, M.: *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Renaissance du Livre), Book IV, chaps. 1-3, and Waley, A.: *The Way and its Power* (London 1934, Allen & Unwin), Introduction.

² Granet, op. cit., pp. 423-4 and 417-18.

³ Ibid., p. 553. A still later stage in the metamorphosis of Confucianism, when it degenerated into sheer sorcery, has been touched upon in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 549 and 555-6, above.

⁴ Granet, op. cit., p. 577.

been one of the provincial products of a general archaistic movement of Romanticism in the modern Western World.

This curious superstition has arisen within the last hundred years in certain provinces of Western Christendom in which the current vernacular happens to be some twig of the Teutonic branch of the Indo-European family of languages. The postulates are that the Teutonic language has been spoken, *ab initio*, by a blonde and blue-eyed race; that this race is autochthonous in Northern Europe; and that the region, the race, and the language are all of them uniquely noble.¹ After having afforded a harmless antiquarian gratification to some nineteenth-century English historians and instilled a perhaps more tiresome racial self-conceit into some twentieth-century American ethnologists; this cult of an imaginary Primitive Teutonism has latterly revealed its true nature by becoming—in the watchword 'Blood and Soil'—the palladium of the post-war National-Socialist Movement in the German Reich. We are here confronted with an exhibition of Archaism which would be pathetic if it were not so sinister.² A great modern Western nation which has been brought, by the spiritual malady of this Modern Age,³ within an ace of an irretrievable national collapse, has apparently lost faith in the panoply of a modern Western culture which has not availed to save it from this dreadful experience; and, in a desperate effort to find a way out of the trap into which the recent course of history has inveigled it, this distraught and disillusioned Germany has turned away from a future prospect of interminable humiliation and horror, and has doubled back upon its own historical past. This is, no doubt, a trail which has only to be retraced in the reverse direction in order to lose itself sooner or later in the darkness of the primeval forest out of which our common Teutonic ancestors first emerged into notoriety some two thousand years ago; but it remains to be proved that the *Urwald* is an earthly paradise!

In this latter-day German archaistic resort to a fancied saving grace of the pristine tribal lair and the primitive tribal stock there is a touch of the Sinic style of Archaism with its *flair* for the primitive solidarity between the human tribe and the tribe's non-human environment; but in this modern Western variation on a

¹ The racial facet of this delusion has been examined already in this Study in II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. 1, pp. 207-49, above.

² At the moment of revising this passage for publication in November 1938 the German National-Socialist cult of 'Blood and Soil' had already earned this epithet. For, although it had not so far precipitated a European War, it had already let loose, inside the Reich, an outburst of savage Anti-Semitism.

³ Germany's troubles in the present generation can be ascribed, without dispute, to the contemporary *Zeitgeist* of the Western Society of which Germany herself is a fraction, though it might be more difficult to arrive at an agreement on the minor question of assessing the relative responsibilities of the Germans and their neighbours.

Sinic theme the subtle Sinic touch is incongruously combined with the simple animal instinct which prompts a baby kangaroo in the zoological gardens of a great metropolis to take refuge in its mother's pouch after it has been put out of countenance by the collective stare of an inquisitive crowd of human spectators.

Yet another form of Archaism-on-principle is the hankering after 'a return to Nature' or to 'the simple life';¹ and in our modern Western Society, since the days of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Marie Antoinette, this itch has been apt to seek relief in a variety-show of cranks and affectations—in unfavourable contrast to the corresponding reaction of the Taoist sages of a disintegrating Sinic World, who turned their minds towards the soberer simplicity of the archaic village communities out of which the now decadent Sinic Society had originally sprung.²

'L'idéal politique des maîtres taoïstes paraît avoir été un régime de minuscules communautés paysannes. Dans une bourgade isolée, un saint (vénéreé comme un dieu du sol) peut, de la façon la plus modeste, exercer ses pouvoirs indéfinis. T'chouang tseu déclare que tout va bien dans l'Empire lorsqu'on laisse libre cours aux traditions locales qu'il nomme les maximes villageoises.'³

This archaistic ideal is commended in the nineteenth chapter of the *Tao Te King*:⁴

Banish wisdom, discard knowledge,
And the people will be benefited a hundredfold.
Banish human kindness, discard morality,
And the people will be dutiful and compassionate.
Banish skill, discard profit,
And thieves and robbers will disappear.
If when these things are done they find life too plain and unadorned,
Then let them have accessories;
Give them Simplicity to look at, the Uncarved Block to hold,
Give them selflessness and fewness of desires.

In the eightieth chapter of the same work the same ideal picture is drawn again, but this time with a vividness which conveys, in

¹ This hankering, which in one aspect is an expression of archaistic-mindedness, has another aspect in which it is a gesture of *abandon* (see V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 377, and V. C (i) (d) 2, vol. v, p. 403, above).

² See Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), pp. 109-10, for the view that this hankering after a return to 'the simple life' is a symptom of social senescence.

³ Granet, op. cit., p. 547. While the Taoists were the chief advocates of an archaistic return to the simple life during the final paroxysm of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' in the fourth and third centuries B.C., this idea was not the monopoly of any one of the numerous Sinic schools of philosophy that were evoked by the challenge of being born into that terrible age. There was, for instance, an archaistic vein in the philosophy of Mencius (*vivebat*, 372-289 B.C.) (Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), pp. 187-9 and 192-4).

⁴ The following English translations are taken from Waley, A.: *The Way and its Power* (London 1934, Allen & Unwin).

a few strokes of the Sinic brush, the essence of an Archaism that is elaborated by Plato in page after page of *The Republic* and *The Laws*.

'Given a small country with few inhabitants, he could bring it about that though there should be among the people contrivances requiring ten times, a hundred times less labour, they would not use them.¹ He could bring it about that the people would be ready to lay down their lives and lay them down again in defence of their homes, rather than emigrate. There might still be boats and carriages, but no one would go in them; there might still be weapons of war, but no one would drill with them. He could bring it about that "the people should have no use for any form of writing save knotted ropes, should be contented with their food, pleased with their clothing, satisfied with their homes, should take pleasure in their rustic tasks. The next place might be so near at hand that one could hear the cocks crowing in it, the dogs barking; but the people would grow old and die without ever having been there."²

To an English reader of the *Tao Te King* the note of this passage is already familiar in Gray's *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard*; and in the England of the present writer's day this archaic life was still being lived—in an unbroken continuity with the Past—by some, at least, of the inhabitants of the tract of Yorkshire country-side in which he wrote these lines. If there is any grain of truth in Tong Chong-chu's belief that the lessons of History may elucidate the signs of the times,³ it may be surmised that, to-day, there are children already born in London or in Leeds who will live to be overwhelmed by a passionate archaistic impulse to throw away their motor-cars and wireless sets and Lewis guns and bombing-planes in order to free their hands for handling 'the poor crooked scythe and spade' that are fabled once upon a time to have bestowed a homely happiness upon the modern English urban proletariat's far-off rustic ancestors when; in an unwittingly Taoist vein, 'they kept the noiseless tenor of their way along the cool sequester'd vale of life'.

(β) *Archaism in Art.*

The vogue of Archaism in Art is something so familiar to modern Western Man that he is apt to take it for granted without ever becoming conscious of it. For the most conspicuous of the

¹ Compare the legend of the latter-day Chinese pilot that has been recounted in III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 188-9, above.—A.J.T.

² The passage within double quotation marks is, in Waley's view, a quotation from an earlier Taoist work (see Waley, op. cit., p. 242, footnote 1). In more concrete and prosaic terms this Taoist Sinic idea is also expressed by the Positivist Western philosopher Comte in his suggestion that the great national states of the modern Western World should be broken up into *Kleinstaaten* on the scale of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany (see Caird, E.: *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte* (Glasgow 1885, MacLehose), pp. 239-40).

³ See p. 56, above.

arts is Architecture; in almost every great city of the Western World in A.D. 1938 at least nine-tenths of the buildings then standing were less than a hundred years old;¹ and our modern Western architecture had already been falling under the dominion of Archaism at the time—by then a hundred years back—when this orgy of building had begun.² Thus the worker who travels twice a day between his suburban dormitory and his urban factory or office has registered automatically, on his visual memory, the print of innumerable Neo-Gothic railway-stations and churches, while, if he is a worker in New York, his eye will have become equally well accustomed to the millions of square feet of Neo-Colonial³ brickwork that cast a cloak of archaistic decency over the steel-and-concrete skeletons of the sky-scrapers. If our breadwinner is not in too much of a hurry to glance at the marble bas-relief that crowns the entrance to that Colonial-brick-skinned mammoth office-building, he may find to-day that the lines of the carving have been cunningly reduced to the clumsy stiffness of the pre-Romanesque Dark Ages;⁴ and, if he actually has the leisure to step into the Neo-Gothic ironwork of this municipal art gallery, he may stumble here into a roomful of 'Pre-Raphaelite' pictures.

This triumph of Archaism over the visual arts is, indeed, one of the dominant features in our modern Western urban landscapes; but it is not, of course, a phenomenon that is peculiar to our

¹ The European traveller becomes aware of this as soon as he visits the United States or any other overseas country that is Western in its culture. At first he is surprised to find that cities which are not more than one hundred or two hundred years old can look—when viewed from bus-roof or train-window—so little different from the cities of his own European home, which can count their age in thousands of years instead of hundreds. It is only on second thoughts that it occurs to him that, in all but one or two of the European cities that are to-day in the full swim of modern Western life, nine-tenths of the buildings are no older than ten-tenths of those in Buffalo or Pittsburgh. This is true not only of Manchester and Berlin, but even of London and Cologne and Paris and Milan.

² In this connexion it may be well to draw attention once again to the distinction, pointed out on p. 49, footnote 3, above, between Archaism within the limits of the experience of a single society and that contact in the Time-dimension between two different civilizations which displays itself in what is commonly called a renaissance. In the modern Western World, for example, the Neo-Gothic Archaism of the architecture of the past hundred years has been a reaction against the fashion, which had been prevalent for some three or four centuries before that, of discarding almost every vestige of a native Western style in order to ape the alien architecture of the Hellenes.

³ The Americans use the term 'Colonial' for the eighteenth-century style of architecture which the English call 'Georgian'.

⁴ The primitivism of one school of modern Western sculpture has suggested the following reflexions to a contemporary Western biologist:

'To my mind, the closest analogy to the evolution of a given group is the history of the art and literature of a civilization. The clumsy primitive forms are replaced by a great variety of types. Different schools arise and decline more or less rapidly. Finally a period of decline sets in, characterized by Archaism like that of the last ammonites. And it is difficult not to compare some of the fantastic animals of the declining periods of a race with the work of Miss Sitwell, or the clumsy but impressive with that of Epstein. The history of an animal group shows no more evidence of planning than does that of a national literature. But both show orderly sequences which are already pretty capable of explanation.'—Haldane, J. B. S.: *Possible Worlds* (London 1928, Chatto & Windus), p. 43.

Western Society. If a Londoner travels to Constantinople instead of travelling to New York, and watches the pageant of the sun setting over the ridge of Stamboul, he will see, silhouetted against the sky-line, dome after dome of the mosques which—under an Ottoman régime that has provided the main body of Orthodox Christendom with its universal state¹—have been constructed, with a profoundly archaistic servility, upon the pattern of the Big and the Little Haghía Sophía: the two Byzantine churches whose audacious defiance of the fundamental canons of the classical Hellenic order of architecture had once upon a time proclaimed in stone the emergence of an infant Orthodox Christian Civilization out of the wreckage of a Hellenic World which had already ceased to live.²

If we turn to the decline and fall of this Hellenic Society to which our own, as well as the Orthodox Christian, is affiliated, and watch what the cultivated Emperor Hadrian was doing with his wealth and leisure in the pale clear sunshine of a Hellenic 'Indian Summer',³ we shall see him spending a considerable part of both in furnishing his suburban villa with expertly manufactured copies of the masterpieces of Hellenic sculpture of the archaic period (that is to say, the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.). The taste of a generation of connoisseurs who were too highly refined to appreciate the obvious and were too exquisitely sensitive not to shiver at the mildest touch of a frost in which they could recognize the herald of an approaching winter, found the masterliness of the Hellenic sculptor's art in its fifth-century maturity too self-confident—and at the same time perhaps too painfully close to the verge of the débâcle—to be valued quite at its proper worth. On the other hand the archaic style appealed to the sophisticated intellects of Hadrian's generation as something precious and *recherché*, while it captivated their unconscious selves by instilling a suggestion of the dewy freshness of dawn into the still and stale air of a monotonous evening. In combination, these two distinct motives for preferring the archaic to the classical style made an irresistible appeal to the Hellenic *virtuosi* of Hadrian's day. And similar considerations will explain why it was that, in the latter stages of the long-drawn-out dotage of the Egyptiac Society, the artistic style of 'the Old Kingdom'—the style which had distinguished the growth-stage of Egyptiac history in a remote antiquity

¹ See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 26-7; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 70; V. C (i) (c) 1, vol. v, p. 54; and V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, p. 348, above.

² In IV. C (ii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 54-5, above, it has been argued that the Byzantine breach with a Hellenic past in the domain of Architecture was deliberate.

³ For the view that an ostensible 'Golden Age' of the Hellenic World, during the reigns of the Roman Emperors Nerva to Marcus inclusive, was really no more than an 'Indian Summer', see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 58-61, above.

before the beginning of the 'Time of Troubles'—was taken as a pattern by the Saïte Pharaohs of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty after an interval of some two thousand years.

(γ) *Archaism in Language and Literature.*¹

When the spirit of Archaism is moved to express itself in the field of Language and Literature, the supreme *tour de force* to which it can address itself here is to bring a 'dead language'² to

¹ In this field, Archaism—in the sense of a deliberate return to some form of language or style of literature or range of thought and feeling that has fallen into disuse—has to be distinguished from a mere conservatism which clings, perhaps more often than not out of sheer inertia and with no deliberate policy at all, to a form of language that has ceased to be intelligible or to a style of literature that has ceased to be serviceable or to a range of thought and feeling that has ceased to come natural. The commonest examples of such linguistic and literary conservatism are to be found in one or other of the two moulds of legal formulae and religious liturgies: for instance, in the Norman-French tags in our twentieth-century English judicial and parliamentary procedure, and in the Latin Liturgy of the Catholic Church. Other examples of the preservation, in a living liturgy, of a language that is dead in every other usage are the survival of the Attic *koinē*, Old Slavonic, and Classical Georgian in different versions of the Liturgy of the Orthodox Christian Church; the survival of Classical Syriac, Classical Armenian, Classical Coptic, and Ge'ez in different versions of the Liturgy of the Monophysite Christian Church; the survival of Classical Syriac in the Liturgy of the Nestorian Christian Church; and the survival of Classical Hebrew in the religious life of Jewry.

The Egyptiac Society is perhaps unique in having performed twice over the *tour de force* of preserving a form of language until it has become unintelligible—and this not merely in a liturgy but in a profane literature. 'As far back as we can trace it, the Egyptian language displays signs of being carefully fostered'; the works of literature that were written in this Classical Egyptian during the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles' and the earlier days of the Egyptiac universal state (*circa* 2424–1770 B.C.) 'were read in the schools five hundred years later; and from their language and style no one dared venture to deviate'. The spoken language, however, went its own way, until 'finally . . . the difference . . . became so great that the classical language could scarcely be understood by ordinary people. In the great revolution at the end of the Eighteenth Dynasty which we associate with the name of Amenophis IV [Ikhnaton] these shackles also were broken. Men began to write poetry in the actual language of the day; and in it is composed the beautiful Hymn to the Sun, the manifesto of the Reformed Religion. But, whereas the other innovations of the heretical régime disappeared after its collapse, this particular one survived—doubtless because the conditions hitherto existing had become impossible.' Once more, however, a cultural conservatism was to prevail in Egyptiac intelligences over a human thirst for life. The 'New Egyptian Literature, which, as we might suppose, had set out to be really popular, did not long pursue this course. . . . For something like five centuries this later literature appears to have been cultivated, and then its language also became a dead one, which the boys at school had to learn!' (Erman, A.: *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, English translation (London 1927, Methuen), pp. xxiv–xxvi; see also the present Study, IV. C (ii) (a), vol. iv, p. 55, footnote 3, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, p. 496, above).

This incorrigible conservatism which clings blindly to whatever it may happen to have in hand is evidently not the same thing as an Archaism which deliberately drops what it has been holding in order to set the hand free for grasping at some lost treasure of the Past.

² The term 'dead language' is ordinarily used to describe a language which has fallen into disuse merely as a spoken vernacular, while remaining in use as a vehicle for Ritual or Law or Science or even for Belles Lettres; but, strictly speaking, a language which is in this position (e.g. Latin in the position which it now occupies in the modern Western World) is only half dead. The truly dead languages are those of which some inscribed or written monument has been recovered by the ingenuity of our modern Western archaeologists after the rediscovered language has been not merely in disuse but in oblivion for hundreds or thousands of years—a sequence of death, burial, and disinterment which has been the history of Etruscan, Lycian, Ancient Egyptian both 'Old' and 'New' and 'Demotic', Sumerian, Akkadian, Elamite, Urartian, the Old Persian of the Achaemenian inscriptions, Tokharian, and so on. The criterion of 'deadness' in this stricter sense is that the disinterred texts have to be deciphered either from internal evidence or by the lucky discovery of some bilingual or multilingual

life again by putting it back into circulation as a living vernacular; and such an attempt is being made to-day, under our eyes, in several places in our Westernized World.

In this instance the impulse has come from the modern Western movement of Nationalism, which we have defined in this Study as a transference of interest from the whole to the part and as a withdrawal of loyalty from the Creator in order to bestow it upon the creature.¹ A community that has succumbed to this grave spiritual malady is apt to resent its cultural debt to the society of which it is itself a fragment, and in this frame of mind it will put itself to great trouble and inconvenience for the sake of transposing its culture into a shape that can be certified as being parochially 'national' throughout. One of the staples of such a 'national culture' is a 'national language'; and, while most of the nationalized communities of the modern 'Great Society' have found their 'national language' ready to hand, there are some which have been reduced to the laborious and ludicrous expedient of fabricating the 'mother-tongue' that they are determined to possess, in the temper of a *nouveau riche* who furnishes himself with portraits of appropriate ancestors. In our latter-day Westernized World the would-be self-sufficient nations that have found themselves destitute of natural linguistic resources have all taken the road of Archaism as the readiest way of obtaining a supply of the linguistic commodity of which they are in search. At the present moment there are at least five nations in our world that are engaged in producing a distinctive national language of their own by the process of putting back into circulation as a living vernacular some language which has long since ceased to be current in any but an academic sphere. The five nations whom the writer of this Study has in mind are the Norwegians, the Irish, the Ottoman Turks, the Greeks, and the Zionist Jews; and it will be seen from this roll-call that none of them is a chip of the original block of Western Christendom. The Norwegians and the Irish are respectively remnants of an abortive Scandinavian and an abortive Far Western Christian Civilization which came into collision with the Roman Christendom in the first chapter of our Western history and were successively defeated and devoured by this more puissant neighbour.² The Ottoman Turks and the Greeks are recently Western-

inscription in which one of the other languages employed is some language that has never ceased to be studied (as, for example, a key to Ancient Egyptian was found in the Rosetta Stone, on which one version of the text is engraved in the Attic *κοινή*). Some of these genuinely dead languages (e.g. Etruscan and Lycian) still remain undeciphered because no illuminating bilingual inscription has been found. There is probably no example of any attempt to resuscitate a language that is 'dead' in this stricter sense.

¹ See Part I. A, vol. i, p. 9; IV. C (iii) (b) 4 and 5, vol. iv, pp. 156-90; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (a), vol. iv, p. 261; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 303, above.

² See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 322-60, above.

ized contingents of the Iranic Society in the one case and of the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society in the other. The Zionist Jews are a fragment of a fossil of alien origin which has been embedded in the body of Western Christendom since its pre-natal days.

The need which the Norwegians feel to-day for the production of a modern Norwegian national language is the historical consequence of a political eclipse under which the Kingdom of Norway lay from A.D. 1397, which was the date of the Union of Calmar,¹ until A.D. 1905, when Norway at length recovered her complete political independence. During the greater part of this period of more than 500 years—from 1397, that is to say, until 1814—Norway was politically united with Denmark under conditions which made her culturally as well as politically subordinate to her sister kingdom; and in these circumstances the indigenous Scandinavian literature in the Norse language—a literature which was now no more than a decadent relic of an abortive Scandinavian Civilization—gave place in Norway to a version of the modern Western literature which was written in Danish by Norwegian hands,² though on Norwegian lips its pronunciation was modified into harmony with the contemporary Norwegian vernacular. Thus, when the Norwegians set themselves tentatively *post* 1814, and resolutely *post* 1905, to fit themselves out with a national culture which was to be complete according to the specifications of a conventional French or English pattern, they found themselves without any literary medium, except one of foreign mintage, for conveying modern Western ideas, and without any mother-tongue except a peasant *patois* which had ceased to be a vehicle for the long since extinct Scandinavian literature without ever having been refashioned into a vehicle for a Norwegian version of the modern literature of the Western World. Confronted with this awkward gap in the linguistic department of their national outfit, the Norwegian nationalists have been trying to produce a Norwegian language that will serve peasant and townsman alike by fulfilling simultaneously both the two requirements of being national and being cultivated; and the method that they have followed has

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 175, above.

² In Norway the indigenous Scandinavian literature in the Norse language died out in the fourteenth century; and by the sixteenth century Old Norse had ceased to be generally intelligible to the literate public in Norway—as is testified by Laurents Hanssøn and other sixteenth-century Norwegian men-of-letters who on this account were already beginning to make translations out of foreign languages not into Norse but into Danish for the benefit of Norwegian readers. On the other hand, in Iceland, where the indigenous Scandinavian literature in Norse had attained its greatest brilliance (see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 94–6, and II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 356–9, above), there has been no comparable break in the tradition, either linguistic or literary. Any one who is literate in the living form of Icelandic Norse can still read the Classical Icelandic Norse literature without difficulty down to the present day.

been to provide a substitute for an orally Norwegianized Danish (the *Bokmaal*) by cultivating the contemporary Norwegian vernacular into a New Norse (*Ny Norsk*)¹—in the hope that a *patois* which has shown its mettle in the past by providing the linguistic resources for the creation of a Classical Scandinavian literature may prove strong enough to-day to stand the strain of being suddenly called upon to serve as a vehicle for the ponderous mental panoply of modern Western Man.²

These Norwegian nationalists' Irish contemporaries and counterparts are seeking a similar solution for a linguistic problem of their own which is the same in substance while presenting greater difficulties in almost every detail. In Ireland the British Crown has played the political role of the Danish Crown in Norway,³ and this with much the same linguistic and cultural consequences. The language of the politically dominant Power has come to be the channel through which the dominated people has obtained its

¹ A satirical caricature of the *Maalstrevers*' endeavours has been drawn by Ibsen in *Peer Gynt*:

But ere modern times began
 'Twas the great Orang-utan
 O'er the forest ruled supreme,
 As he chose could fight and scream. . . .
 Ah, but then the foreign yoke
 Came and marred the speech he spoke;
 On the ape descended quite
 'Twice two hundred years of night. . . .
 I have striven to protect
 Our primeval dialect,
 To restore it, and to preach
 General liberty of screech:
 Screeched myself, to show the ways
 It was used in tribal lays.

(G. M. Gathorne-Hardy's translation.)

² While the stimulus which has moved the Norwegian *Maalstrevers* to act has been the modern Western psychosis of Nationalism, the confidence that has nerved them to attempt their *tour de force* has been fortified by the fact that the Norse language has acquitted itself brilliantly once before as a medium for a literature. This archaistic inspiration of the *Maalstrever* movement is apparent in the work of its originator, Ivar Aasen (*vivebat* A.D. 1813-96). Aasen's essay in creating a New Norse literary language was eclectic. He did not try (as some of his successors have tried) to keep within the limits of this or that local living Norwegian dialect; he wrote in a composite language for which a number of different dialects were laid under contribution; and in making his selection he showed an unmistakable preference for those elements in the living Norse *Sprachgut* that were the most closely akin to the Old Norse of the Classical Scandinavian literature, without paying so much attention to the utilitarian consideration of whether the living elements of speech that happened to possess this archaistic title to nobility were also the elements that enjoyed the widest contemporary currency. In this indirect way the Old Norse language of the Classical Scandinavian literature has made its influence felt in the formation of the New Norse that has been called into existence in order to serve as an instrument for modern Western thought. On the other hand the *Maalstrevers* have found it impracticable to extend their sources of linguistic supply by drawing direct upon the vocabulary or upon the style of the extant literature in Old Norse, owing to the remoteness of the Classical Scandinavian literature from that of the modern West in subject and setting and ethos.

³ Since a Danish reader might take objection to this comparison, the English author of this Study will anticipate his critic by making the admission that England has much more to regret in looking back on her behaviour towards Ireland than Denmark has in looking back on hers towards Norway.

access to the literary sources of the modern Western culture; but in the Irish case the resulting difficulties have been aggravated by two unfortunate facts: in the first place the intrusive Teutonic English is far more alien from the native Celtic Irish than Danish is from the sister Norwegian twig of the same Scandinavian branch of a single Teutonic stem;¹ and in the second place the English language has latterly supplanted the Irish language in Ireland not merely as the medium of culture and government but also as the vernacular tongue of the common people—except for a small minority of the peasantry in a few remote and backward districts along the western coast.² Accordingly, in Ireland it is an even greater *tour de force* than it is in Norway to attempt to conjure a cultivated national language out of a peasant *patois*; and in these more desperate circumstances the Irish have resorted to an expedient of which the Norwegians have fought shy. The Irish have tried to lend a rubble foundation the strength to bear the weight of the massive superstructure which they are proposing to build upon it by grouting it with the vocabulary of an ancient and long since extinct literature³—in the hope that, through being reconditioned in this exotic way, it may become capable of serving as a vehicle for the modern Western culture. A foreign observer of this Irish experiment may well feel that Archaism could no farther go—at any rate in the linguistic field. Yet, if the observer happens to be an Englishman, it would ill become him to smile at the extravagance of the nationalism of his Irish neighbours. He would do better to reflect that, if—as seems only too probable—the archaistic *tour de force* of attempting to rehabilitate the Irish

¹ This difference, however, has counted for less than might have been expected; for in the sight of the Norwegian *Maalstrevers*—who have warped their vision by wearing the spectacles of Nationalism—the Danish language is not a sister Scandinavian language to be called in aid, but a hostile foreign language to be expelled from the national territory. The negative process of eliminating everything Danish from the literary language of Norway has been the most assiduous and the most successful of the activities of the *Maalstrever* movement; and for the sake of getting rid of a Danish word these Norwegian linguistic nationalists do not hesitate to alloy their New Norse with an outlandish vocabulary which is neither Scandinavian nor even Teutonic but French, Latin, or Greek in origin.

² This replacement of Irish by English as the vernacular language of the great majority of the Irish people is a recent event. As lately as a hundred years ago Irish was still prevalent among the peasantry in all parts of the island outside the Dublin Pale and the Ulster Plantations. This spread of English at the expense of Irish is to be explained partly by the sheer impassability of the gulf between the two languages (which made it impossible to blend them and therefore necessary to make a choice between them) and partly by the advantage which English acquired through becoming an oecumenical *lingua franca*. Thanks to its attainment of this status, English was employed as a matter of course in the nineteenth century as the vehicle for the spread of education in Ireland; and it was also propagated unintentionally by every Irish emigrant to the United States of America who eventually came home to settle down—or even merely to pay a passing visit to his family.

³ This indigenous Irish literature did not survive the tribulations of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, and its *floruit*—the age in which its surviving masterpieces were composed—was a thousand years before that.

language proves to be a disastrously heavy incubus upon the cultural life of a small and till recently backward people, then this will be one more item on the list of unhappy legacies that Ireland has inherited from her ill-starred political association with the English observer's own country.

The linguistic Archaism in which the Ottoman Turks have been indulging under the late President Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk's régime is perhaps more wanton than the Norwegian, but certainly less tragic than the Irish, excursion along the same regressive path. Modern Ottoman Turkish—as it was until the other day, when the archaizers took it in hand—was a language which, in point of vocabulary, was in much the same condition as modern English, and this for much the same reasons. The ancestors of the modern Turks, like those of their English contemporaries, were outer barbarians who had trespassed on, and squatted in, the derelict domain of a broken-down civilization; and the descendants of both sets of barbarians have made the same use of the vehicle of language as a means for acquiring a tincture of civilization. Just as the English have enriched their meagre primitive Teutonic vocabulary by loading it with a wealth of borrowed French and Latin and Greek words and phrases,¹ so the 'Osmanlis have encrusted their plain Turkish with innumerable jewels of Persian and Arabic speech.² The result, in both cases, has been to endow a poverty-stricken barbarian language with a richness in means of expression which might be envied by the great culture-languages themselves; and the English-speaking peoples, for their part, are still modestly content to enjoy this borrowed abundance without dreaming of repudiating it as a national disgrace. The nationalism of the English-speaking peoples is, however, a native growth and therefore a mild one; for Nationalism is a cultural virus which appears to work with a potency that is proportionate to its novelty. At any rate, this spiritual infection from the West has been taken so seriously by the Ottoman Turks that they have come to the conclusion that they would be unworthy of their Eurasian Nomad ancestors if they forbore to purify their ancestral language from the foreign accretions which it has acquired in the course of an unfortunate but ephemeral episode in its long and glorious history. When it is remembered that the Persian and Arabic element in Modern Turkish is at least as large and as important proportionately as the French and Latin and Greek element in Modern

¹ In taking on board this exotic cargo the medieval English were not guilty of the same wanton extravagance as the modern Norwegians (see p. 66, footnote 1, above). They were filling an empty hold and not jettisoning one cargo in order to make room for another.

² See V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), vol. v, p. 516, above.

English, it will be seen that, in this enterprise of cleansing his native tongue, the Ghāzi set himself a task with which none but a hero could grapple; and the Turkish hero's method of setting about it was the method which he had previously employed in ridding his native country of the alien elements in its population. In that graver crisis Mustafā Kemāl had evicted from Turkey an old-established and apparently indispensable Greek and Armenian middle class, on the calculation that, when once the social vacuum had been produced, sheer necessity would compel the Turks to fill it by taking upon their own shoulders social tasks which hitherto they had lazily left to others. On the same principle the Ghāzi afterwards evicted the Persian and Arabic words from the Ottoman Turkish vocabulary; and, by this drastic measure, he demonstrated what an astonishing intellectual stimulus can be given to mentally sluggish peoples (such as his Turks and our English are) when they find their mouths and ears remorselessly deprived of the simplest verbal necessities of life. In these dire straits the Turks have latterly been ransacking Cuman glossaries, Orkhon inscriptions, Uighur sutras, and Chinese dynastic histories in order to find—or fake—a genuine Turkish substitute for this or that sternly prohibited Persian or Arabic household word; and for an English spectator these frantic lexicographical labours at Angora and Stamboul are an awe-inspiring spectacle; for they give him an inkling of tribulations that the future may hold in store for English-speakers too, if ever the day should come when 'pure English' in the literal sense is required of us by some masterful 'Saviour of Society' as a sacrifice on the altars of our English 'blood and soil'.

If we turn from modern Turkey to modern Greece we shall find here a linguistic Archaism which has the same political background as the Irish and Norwegian examples which we have already examined—with the Turks in Greece taking the place of the English in Ireland and of the Danes in Norway as the political villains of the piece. Rather more than a hundred years ago the Greek insurgents against the Ottoman Pādishāh succeeded, thanks to the intervention of a Western France and England and a Westernized Russia, in carving out of a moribund Ottoman Empire the nucleus of a sovereign independent Greek national state, and they then at once set out to lead a new life as a fledgling Greek nation on Western lines. For this cultural adventure, however, they found themselves equipped linguistically with nothing better than a peasant *patois*¹ which was incapable, as it stood, of serving

¹ At the time of the foundation of the present Greek national state (A.D. 1829-32) the Modern Greek *patois* was by no means so near the point of extinction as the Modern Irish *patois* was at the time of the foundation of the Irish Free State (A.D. 1921). On the other hand it was not (as the Modern Norwegian *patois* was in A.D. 1905) the common

as a vehicle for expressing the ideas of the contemporary West, in whose intellectual life these politically emancipated Greeks were now eager to participate. In their impatience at this obstacle in their Westward path the Greeks anticipated the Irish in resorting to the expedient of reconditioning their *patois* for its strange and exacting new task by grouting it with injections of an antique form of the language—a form which in the Greek case had long since fallen out of use in every sphere except the Liturgy of the Greek-speaking patriarchates of the Orthodox Church. But, in making this same experiment of producing a new language by calling an old one back to life, the Greeks have had to wrestle with a problem which is the antithesis of the difficulty which has confronted the Irish. Whereas the Irish have been handicapped, like the Turks, by the scantiness of the nutriment that they have been able to extract for a living *patois* out of a dead culture-language, the modern Greeks have been overwhelmed by an *embarras de richesses*. For the liturgical Greek which has served their turn is not, like Old Irish (and Old Norse), the fragile blossom of a culture that died in its infancy. The liturgical Greek is the Attic *κοινή*; and, in audaciously drawing upon this reservoir of Ancient Greek, with its vast floating wealth of Pagan as well as Christian literature, the patriots who have been trying to force the growth of a Modern Greek culture-language have been in danger, not of seeing their irrigation-channel run dry, but of bringing down a spate which might obliterate the living *patois* instead of invigorating it. In fact, the besetting temptation in the path of this Modern Greek linguistic Archaism has been to draw upon the resources of Ancient Greek too lavishly; for, in themselves, these resources are almost inexhaustible; and the short cut to the supply of any Modern Greek linguistic need is always to open yet another Attic sluice-gate. These archaistic excesses have provoked a modernist reaction; and the artificial 'language of the purists' (*ἡ καθαρεύουσα*) has been answered in a caricature of the 'popular language' (*ἡ δημοτική*) which is no less artificial in its own contrary way, since it pounces upon every vulgarity that it spies in the gutter, while it avoids every classicism with as prim a pedantry as the champions of the opposing purism display in ejecting even the healthiest Turcisms and Italianisms from their stilted vocabulary. This battle in a Westernized Greece between the advocates of alternative

language of the whole population of the new kingdom. Even within its original narrowly drawn frontiers—which excluded large Greek-speaking and still larger Greek-feeling populations—the Kingdom of Greece included considerable tracts in which the vernacular of the peasantry was not Greek at all. In Attica, for instance, the capital of the new kingdom, which had been placed at Athens, was surrounded by an Albanian-speaking peasantry.

artificial languages has been as bitter in its way as the feud between Constantinians and Venizelists.¹

Our fifth instance of linguistic Archaism in the 'Great Society' of the present day is the reconversion of Hebrew into a vernacular language of everyday life on the lips and in the ears of the Zionist Jews from the Diaspora who have settled in Palestine;² and this is the most remarkable case of all the five; for, whereas none of the other four languages in question, not even the Irish, has ever quite ceased to be spoken or heard, more than twenty-three centuries have passed since the original Hebrew vernacular was supplanted by Aramaic in Palestine itself,³ while even in North-West Africa, where the Hebrew language was introduced by the Israelites' neighbours the Phoenicians and not by the Israelites themselves, it does not seem to have lingered on much later than the lifetime of Saint Augustine (*decessit* A.D. 430).⁴ For more than two thousand years past the language that a Jewish child has learnt at its mother's knee has been the mother-tongue of one or other of the Gentile peoples among whom Jewry has been dispersed abroad: Aramaic or Greek or Latin; Arabic or Castilian; German⁵ or Russian or English.⁶ For all this length of time, until within living memory, Hebrew has survived only as the language of the liturgy of the Jewish Church and of the scholarship that is concerned with the study of the Jewish Law. And then, in the course of a single generation, this 'dead language' has been brought out of the synagogue and has been converted into a vehicle for conveying the modern Western culture—at first in a newspaper

¹ Greece is perhaps the only country in Christendom—either Orthodox or Western—in which popular disturbances over the question of translating the Bible out of a classical language into the vulgar tongue have been excited, not against a veto upon the project of translation, but against a threat to carry the project into effect!

² Zionism has been touched upon already in this Study in II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 252-4, above.

³ Hebrew was ceasing to be spoken by the Jewish community in Palestine as early as the third quarter of the fifth century B.C. on the testimony of Nehemiah (Neh. xiii. 24, already quoted in V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), vol. v, p. 499, footnote 5, above). At the present day the Aramaic which supplanted Hebrew (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 80-1, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (y), vol. v, p. 491, above) and which was afterwards supplanted in its turn by Arabic has likewise become extinct in Palestine and all but extinct throughout Syria. The Aramaic language's last surviving Syrian citadel is the Jabal Qalamūn, an isolated range of hills which rises beyond the north-eastern fringe of the Ghūtah of Damascus and juts out farther in the same direction into the Hamād. In this fastness an Aramaic dialect is still spoken in the villages of Ma'lūlah, Bakh'ah and Jubb 'Adīn. 'The dialect differs very considerably from the vernacular Syriac of the Nestorian Christians in Persia and Kurdistan, so that the communities are not mutually intelligible. 'The dialect of these villages is said to be largely mixed with Arabic, and is never written. Classical Syriac is here and elsewhere used in the liturgies of some of the churches' (British Admiralty Naval Staff Intelligence Division: *A Handbook of Syria, including Palestine* (London 1920, H.M. Stationery Office), p. 196).

⁴ See III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, p. 138, footnote 3, above.

⁵ That is, the Jewish dialect of German known as Yiddish (Jüdisch).

⁶ The Gentile language spoken by a particular Jewish community at a particular date has not, of course, always been the language of the country in which that community has been domiciled at the moment. For example, at the present moment the Jews in the ex-Ottoman countries speak Castilian and the Jews in Poland German.

press in the so-called 'Jewish Pale' in Eastern Europe, and now latterly in the schools and the homes of the Jewish community in Palestine—where the children of Yiddish-speaking immigrants from Europe and English-speaking immigrants from America and Arabic-speaking immigrants from the Yaman and Persian-speaking immigrants from Bukhārā are all growing up together to speak, as their common language, a tongue which, in Palestine, has not been heard on children's lips since the days of Nehemiah.

These five cases of linguistic Archaism in our contemporary Westernized World are all in some degree abnormal in the sense of being, all of them, cases in which a community that is not one of the original members of the Western Society has resorted to Archaism in the linguistic field as one of its ways and means of qualifying itself for naturalization, by fitting itself out with all the equipment that any nation is expected to possess if it is to be admitted to the Western comity. Yet the very fact that Archaism should have come in so handy for this purpose seems to indicate that there must be a strong archaistic vein in our latter-day Western nationalism, at any rate in its linguistic facet.

This alliance between linguistic Archaism and linguistic Nationalism in the modern, or 'post-modern', Western World has a parallel in the Hellenic World in the days of the Hellenic universal state.

'In Roman Imperial times the antiquarian interest in local dialects is reflected in the revival of their use in parts of Greece where for some two centuries previously the Attic *κοινή* had been in general use, at least in inscriptions. So, for example, in the case of Lesbian, Laconian, and to some extent in Elean, where examples of rhotacism reappear in the first and second centuries A.D. It is impossible to determine in every case whether this was a wholly artificial revival of a dialect which had long ceased to be spoken, or was an artificial elevation to written use of a dialect which had survived throughout the interval as a *patois*. The latter is true of Laconian; but for most dialects we have no adequate evidence as to the length of their survival in spoken form.'¹

In the Hellenic World, however, this symptom of social decline in the shape of linguistic Archaism was no mere adjunct of a parochial nationalism, but was something more pervasive than that,

¹ Buck, C. D.: *Introduction to the Study of the Greek Dialects* (Boston 1910, Ginn), p. 161. In the anthology of inscriptions in non-Attic Greek dialects that forms part of this book the author has included one archaistic inscription in Lesbian Aeolic which can be dated from internal evidence to some year between 2 B.C. and A.D. 19 [No. 24], and four archaistic inscriptions in Laconian Doric [Nos. 70-3] which all date from the second century of the Christian Era—a century in which the Hellenic craze for Archaism was at its height in every field. The reason why it can be asserted with assurance that the Laconian dialect continued to be spoken as a peasant *patois*, during the interval between its natural demise and its artificial revival as a culture-language worthy of being inscribed on stone, is that this dialect continues to be spoken down to the present day along the remote and isolated eastern seaboard of Laconia. This 'Tsakonian' *patois* is the only surviving form of spoken Greek that is not derived from the Attic *κοινή*.

and very much more important. For in the course of the disintegration of the Hellenic Society this movement asserted itself not only in official or semi-official records but also in the field of literature.

If you examine a book-case filled with a complete collection of the books, written in Ancient Greek before the seventh century of the Christian Era,¹ that have survived until the present day, you will soon notice two things: first that the overwhelmingly greater part of this surviving corpus of Ancient Greek literature is written in the Attic dialect, and second that, if this Attic part of the corpus is arranged chronologically, it falls apart into two distinct groups. In the first place there is an original Attic literature which was written at Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. by Athenians² who were writing, un-self-consciously and unaffectedly, in the language which they themselves were at the same time speaking and hearing in the course of their daily life in their native country. In the second place there is an archaistic Attic literature which was produced over a period of some six or seven centuries—from the last century B.C. to the sixth century of the Christian Era—and was the work of authors who for the most part did not live at Athens and did not speak Attic as their native tongue—indeed, a number of them were not born speakers of any dialect of Greek at all.

The geographical range over which these Neo-Attic writers are distributed is almost as wide as the *Οἰκουμένη* itself. If we take half a dozen of the non-Christian names, without calling upon the Christian Fathers, we can muster Josephus of Jerusalem and Aelian of Praeneste and Marcus Aurelius of Rome and Lucian of Samosata and Julian of Constantinople (or, ought we to say, 'of Paris'?) and Procopius of Caesarea. Yet, in spite of this wide diversity of origin, the Neo-Atticists display an extraordinary uniformity in one point which, for them, was the essence of their work. In their Attic vocabulary and Attic syntax and Attic style they are, one and all, frank and servile and shameless imitators. They have even bequeathed to us some of the grammars and the glossaries—indispensable tools of their literary craft—which they

¹ This *terminus ante quem* has to be inserted because, from the eighth to the fifteenth century of the Christian Era inclusive, a copious literature in the Ancient Greek language was produced in the Orthodox Christian World, and much of this medieval Greek literature (which corresponds to the medieval Latin literature of Western Christendom) has also survived. On the criterion laid down at the beginning of this chapter (see p. 49, footnote 3, above) this medieval Greek literature is the offspring, not of Archaism, but of 'Contact in Time'.

² Athenians in the geographical sense of natives of Attica, but not necessarily in the political sense of citizens of the Athenian state. For example, the advocate Lysias, whose Attic is unsurpassed in its purity, was politically a resident alien whose devotion to Athens did indeed win for him the Athenian franchise, but did not avail to enable him to retain it.

laboriously compiled for themselves by making a minute and exact study of the linguistic idiosyncrasies of their ancient Athenian examples. They were determined to make their pens proof against solecisms, and they achieved their ambition. Indeed, their success in the game of archaistic writing is vouched for by the very fact that the works of these Neo-Atticists have been preserved in quantities that are at first sight astonishingly voluminous—by comparison either with the actual volume of the surviving Athenian Classics or with the probable volume of the Ancient Greek literature as a whole.

The explanation is that, at the critical time, on the eve of the final dissolution of the Hellenic Society, when the question 'to be or not to be' was being decided for each and every Ancient Greek author by the prevailing literary taste of the day, the test question for copyists was 'Is it pure Attic?' rather than 'Is it great literature?'; and the certified specimens of pure Attic were apt to be picked out for recopying on their formal Attic merits, without any invidious discrimination between a Plato of Athens and a Lucian of Samosata. The consequence is that we find ourselves in possession of a number of works in Neo-Attic which have comparatively little intrinsic merit; and, if some miracle were to give us the chance of making over again, for ourselves, the choice that has actually been made for us by the Atticomaniac copyists of the Imperial and the Post-Imperial Age, we would gladly exchange this mediocre Neo-Attic stuff for one-tenth of that quantity of the mighty works of Greek literature which are now lost to us. Among these lost works are almost all the masterpieces of the third and second centuries B.C.; and these were allowed to drop out of circulation for ever simply because the great Greek writers of that age, like their greater predecessors in the fifth and fourth centuries, wrote un-self-consciously and unaffectedly in the current Greek of their own time and place, and therefore wrote for the most part in a vulgar Attic *κοινή*¹ which the Neo-Attic archaizers of the succeeding age—with their laboriously cultivated hyper-sensitiveness to fine shades of language and style—found almost too excruciating to read and *a fortiori* uninviting to copy out. Why spend labour on preserving these horrors when the only sure result would be to imperil the Attic purism of future generations?

It is this perversely archaistic outlook that has deprived us of all but a fragment of the work of Polybius of Megalopolis (*vivebat circa* 206–128 B.C.),² an author whose surviving literary remains

¹ For this Attic *κοινή* see V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, pp. 494–5, above.

² For the life of Polybius as an illustration of the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 310–18, above.

proclaim him to have been one of the four greatest historians who ever wrote in Ancient Greek from beginning to end of the life-span of the Hellenic Society,¹ and who—perhaps just because he had so much to tell—was content to write in the pedestrian style of his generation. This loss of the work of Polybius is merely one conspicuous illustration of the severity of the losses that have been inflicted upon us by the Neo-Attic Archaism of the Imperial Age of Hellenic literary history. The Greek literature that was written neither in original nor in archaistic Attic has been reduced to shreds and tatters; and the papyri which our modern Western archaeologists have recovered from deposits made in Egypt in the Ptolemaic and the Roman Age have restored to us less of the vulgar Attic Greek literature of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' than might have been expected. The truth is that the Epimethean fixation upon an Attic literary past took possession of Greek minds at the very time when Greek texts began to be deposited in Egypt in consequence of the conquest of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander. And thus even to-day, when we have had the benefit of half a century of papyrological enterprise and ingenuity, our extant specimens of non-archaistic post-Alexandrine Greek literature are still substantially confined to two sets of works: on the one hand the bucolic poetry of the third and second century B.C., which was preserved as a literary curiosity for the sake of its precious Doric; and on the other hand the Greek text of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures—the Septuagint crowned by the New Testament—which was safeguarded by a religious conviction that these linguistically bizarre specimens of the Attic *κοινή* with an Aramaic flavouring were direct utterances of the Living God.²

The Atticism which triumphed in the Archaistic Age of Hellenic history was not the only literary exercise in which the archaists indulged. Our surviving body of Neo-Attic Greek literature has its pendants in the Neo-Ionic pieces of Lucian³ and in the Neo-Homeric epic poetry which was cultivated by a long line of antiquarian scholars⁴ ranging from Apollonius Rhodius, whose lifetime

¹ Two of the four are, of course, indisputably Thucydides and Herodotus; and most Hellenists would probably allow Polybius the third place. As for the fourth place, in the humble opinion of the writer of this Study it should be assigned, not to Xenophon, but to Procopius.

² It was this belief in the verbal inspiration of the Bible that compelled even the most Attically educated of the Christian Fathers to assess the value of this stylistically barbarous farrago on its intrinsic spiritual merits. If they had not been under the discipline of this religious categorical imperative, we may suspect that the vocabulary and style of the Greek Bible would have been intolerable for the Origenes and Basils and Gregories and John Chrysostoms.

³ e.g. his *Περὶ τῆς Ἀστρολογικῆς* and his *Περὶ τῆς Συρίνης Θεοῦ*.

⁴ 'My learned friend'—a form of reference which is in use between fellow barristers in the Law Courts in London at the present day—is the stock epithet for a poet in the language of those Latin poets of the last century B.C. who had learnt their trade from the Greek poets of the Alexandrian school! This usage of the word *doctus* tells a tale.

extended from the third into the second century B.C., through Quintus Smyrnaeus in the fourth century of the Christian Era to Nonnus Panopolitanus, who may have lived to see the fifth century pass over into the sixth.¹

The archaistic resuscitation of the Attic dialect of Greek to serve as a vehicle for a voluminous Neo-Attic literature has an exact parallel in Indic history in the resuscitation of Sanskrit in comparable volume for a similar purpose.²

The original Sanskrit had been the vernacular of the Eurasian Nomad horde of the Aryas, who had broken out of the Steppe and had flooded over Northern India, as well as over South-Western Asia and Northern Egypt, in the second millennium B.C.;³ and on Indian ground this language which had come in on the lips of barbarian invaders had been preserved in the Vedas, a corpus of religious literature which had become one of the cultural foundations of an Indic Civilization that had arisen on the site of the Aryas' Indian camping-grounds after the dust of the Aryan invasion had subsided. By the time, however, when this Indic Civilization had broken down and entered upon the path of disintegration,⁴ Sanskrit had passed out of current usage and had become a classical language which continued to be studied because of the enduring prestige of the literature that was enshrined in it. As a medium of communication in everyday life, Sanskrit had by this time been replaced by a number of younger local vernaculars which were all alike derived from Sanskrit but which had come, in process of time, to be so far differentiated both from their parent and from one another that—from a practical, if not from a philological, point of view—they had become separate languages.⁵ One of these

¹ This linguistic Archaism which is so prominent a feature of the Greek literature of the decline and fall was no doubt stimulated by a literary convention which had established itself in Hellas long before the breakdown of 431 B.C. This convention consisted in allocating a particular dialect to a particular genre of literature, whatever might be the native dialect of the author by whom this genre was being practised. For example, the Attic tragedians of the fifth century B.C. wrote their choruses in an artificial kind of Doric which had come to be recognized as the proper medium for lyrics; and as early as the eighth or seventh century B.C., or whatever the date may have been at which Hesiod was writing, the Homeric dialect—an archaic Ionic with a tincture of Aeolic in it—had become so completely *de rigueur* for any Greek poet who was writing in hexameters that it was employed by the Ascran author of *The Works and Days* as a matter of course, though this Homeric Greek was almost as remote from Hesiod's native Boeotian Aeolic as it was from the native Attic *κοινή* of Apollonius and Quintus and Nonnus.

² This resuscitation of Sanskrit is also discussed in this Study in V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, vol. v, p. 606, footnote 3, above.

³ For the long and widely divergent ramifications of the Völkerwanderung of the Aryas see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 104-7, and p. 111, footnote 1; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 388-91; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 263-4, above.

⁴ In other contexts (e.g. in I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 87, and in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 66-7, above) we have seen reason to date the breakdown of the Indic Civilization before the birth of Siddhārtha Gautama the Buddha, and perhaps even before the end of the eighth century B.C.

⁵ Franke, R. O.: *Pāli und Sanskrit in ihrem historischen und geographischen Verhältnis*

prākṛits—the Pāli of Ceylon—was employed as the vehicle of the Hinayanian Buddhist Scriptures, and several others were employed by the Emperor Aṣoka (*imperabat* 273–232 B.C.) as vehicles for the edicts which he caused to be inscribed at various places in his extensive dominions.¹

Aṣoka's object in varying the prākṛit which he employed according to the locality in which he was employing it was to make sure that his edicts should be intelligible to the local population in each of the districts where they were inscribed. Intelligibility was for him a major consideration, to which he sacrificed the trivial convenience of establishing a single standard official language for the whole of his empire. And the ruler of a universal state who thus forbore to insist upon the use of any one current local vernacular at the expense of the rest would presumably have scouted, *a fortiori*, the suggestion that he should address his subjects in a language which—like Sanskrit in Aṣoka's day—had long since passed out of spontaneous use. Nevertheless, just such an artificial revival of Sanskrit was started, at a point within the frontiers of Aṣoka's empire,² at latest immediately after, and possibly even before, the Emperor Aṣoka's death;³ and this archaizing linguistic movement steadily extended its range⁴ until, by the sixth century of the Christian Era, the triumph of the Neo-Sanskrit language over the prākṛits was complete on the Indian mainland⁵—leaving Pāli to survive as a literary curiosity in the solitary island fastness of Ceylon.

Thus our extant corpus of Sanskrit literature, like our extant corpus of Attic Greek literature, falls into two distinct portions:

auf Grund der Inschriften und Münzen (Strassburg 1902, Trübner), pp. 65–6, 90, and 139–40. The geographical lines of division between these local prākṛits were not clear-cut; the respective ranges of the various dialectical peculiarities overlapped (op cit., p. 126).

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, p. 498, above.

² The geographical centre of dispersion of this archaistic movement for the revival of Sanskrit is shown by the epigraphical evidence to have been the Ganges-Jumna Duab between the foot of the Himalayas and the city of Mathurā (Franke, op. cit., p. 83).

³ Franke (in op. cit., p. 87) dates the beginning of the Neo-Sanskrit movement before the end of the third century B.C.

⁴ The spread of the use of Neo-Sanskrit from its starting-point in the Ganges-Jumna Duab into other parts of India was gradual, and some of the stages can be dated. In inscriptions Neo-Sanskrit did not begin to replace Pāli in any part of the Indic World until the last century B.C. (Franke, op. cit., pp. 50–1); and, even in Northern India, it was not until the second century of the Christian Era that Neo-Sanskrit inscriptions became so numerous relatively to inscriptions in Pāli (ibid., p. 52). In the Deccan Pāli was still holding the field in the second century of the Christian Era, and only began to give way to Neo-Sanskrit in the third century; and in this region some Pāli inscriptions have been discovered which date from as late as the fourth century (ibid., p. 51). There are also extant a number of documents in a mixed language—part Pāli and part Neo-Sanskrit—and these can be arranged in a series showing the gradual transition from a Pāli with an infusion of Sanskrit in it to a Sanskrit with a trace of Pāli in it (ibid., pp. 53–4). In the first century of the Christian Era Pāli was still predominant in the grammatical terminations, but in the second century the Sanskritisms became much more sharply pronounced (ibid., p. 59).

⁵ Ibid., p. 53.

an older portion which is original and a younger portion which is imitatively archaistic.¹

Up to this point we have confined our attention to matters of language and style, without pausing to consider that this linguistic Archaism is unlikely to have been cultivated as an end in itself.² It is, however, manifestly improbable *a priori* that even a pedant would condemn himself to the hard labour of resuscitating a language which had passed out of circulation unless he were moved by some strong desire to make use of the 'dead language', when he had duly succeeded in reviving it, in order to convey to his fellow men some literary message—a complex of emotions or a system of ideas—which was of capital importance in the archaist's own estimation. We must therefore go on to inquire into the literary purposes for which the Neo-Sanskrit and the Neo-Attic linguistic vehicles were actually employed. Were they used for mere literary exercises in genres which were just as much *vieu jeu* as their linguistic medium? Or was there a contrast between the Archaism of the medium and the spirit of the ideas and emotions which the medium was made to convey?

If we put this question first apropos of the Neo-Sanskrit literature we shall find that the archaic vehicle has in fact been used principally for the conveyance of something which is not merely new but is also charged with a creative vitality; for the main use to which the Neo-Sanskrit language has been put has been to serve as a vehicle for the Scriptures of the Mahāyāna and Hinduism;

¹ In the Attic Greek literature the original and the archaistic portions are not only distinct, but are separated from one another chronologically, as we have seen, by an interval of not much less than a quarter of a millennium between the latest Athenian works in original Attic and the earliest non-Athenian works in Neo-Attic. In making a corresponding survey of the Sanskrit literature it is impossible to draw so sharp a line. The Sanskrit Epic, for example, which, in the form in which it has come down to us, is undoubtedly a work of the Neo-Sanskrit Age, may also (as is pointed out in V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, in vol. v, above) contain an original Sanskrit element which it is impossible now to disengage from its Neo-Sanskrit recensions and accretions. Thus, in the Epic, we have one outstanding work of Sanskrit literature which cannot be classified as belonging wholly either to the Neo-Sanskrit or to the original Sanskrit stratum.

² Before leaving the subject of purely linguistic Archaism we may take notice, in the Syriac World, of the epic poet Firdawsi's policy of restricting to a minimum the quota of the Arabic vocabulary in the New Persian language in which he was writing. (For the infusion of Arabic into New Persian see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 80, above, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, p. 501, above.) This is undoubtedly a case of linguistic Archaism; but Firdawsi's archaistic impulse was not very strong; for it did not occur to him to write in Pehlevi, and he was probably unaware of the existence of the two dialects of Old Iranian—uncontaminated by any Semitic taint—that are familiar to us as the respective vehicles of the Achaemenian inscriptions and of the oldest stratum of the Avesta.

The archaistic purge by which Firdawsi relieved the New Persian language of an intrusive Arabic vocabulary has a parallel in which New Persian has been the victim instead of being the beneficiary. The Hindi form of Hindustāni 'was derived from Urdū by ejecting all words of Arabic and Persian birth, and substituting in their place words borrowed or derived from the indigenous Sanskrit' (*The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, new edition (Oxford 1907, Clarendon Press), p. 366, quoted already in V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, p. 518, footnote 2, above). It is one of the curiosities of history that these Hindu archaists should have been missionaries of an alien religion and culture.

and these were a pair of new-born 'higher religions'—Hinduism being a direct product of the religious experience of the internal proletariat of the Indic Society, while the Mahāyāna was a metamorphosis of the Buddhist philosophy of the Indic dominant minority.¹ Was the Neo-Attic language turned to any corresponding account? The answer is in the affirmative; for the corpus of Neo-Attic literature includes both the works of the Neoplatonic philosophers and those of the Christian Fathers. Yet, if we leave our answer at that, it will be misleadingly incomplete; for neither the Neoplatonic Philosophy nor the Christian Theology was the 'subject-matter' for the sake of which the Attic language was so laboriously reconstructed. That tremendous labour of love and learning was lavished upon a dead Attic dialect without any intention of using it to convey a living message. The purpose of the Atticists was indeed the exact contrary of that. The vision that inspired them was the prospect of re-creating a linguistic medium through which they would be able to walk—for all the world like Alice through her looking-glass—out of the living social environment of their own time and place into a dead social environment which could only be recaptured, if it could ever be recaptured at all, by the magic of a literary make-believe.

'Eloquence was now not valued because it affected the practical decisions of the Present, but because it transported men into the Past. Probably more than any other generations of men, before or since, the Greeks of the first Christian centuries found their pleasure in living by imagination in a Past five hundred years gone by. The events of those hundred and eighty years long ago, from the Battle of Marathon to the death of Demosthenes, stood out in peculiar illumination; all that followed was grey. It was as if those hundred and eighty years were the only ones that counted in human history: things had then really happened, events in which it was worth being interested. When you went from the commonplace streets of your town into the hall where a great orator was to speak and submitted yourself to that flow of words, the rhetoric acted, as some drugs do, to carry you into a wonder-world. If the cities of the Greek World had ceased for centuries to have the determination of great events in their hands, the Greeks could still, as in an opium dream, find themselves among the multitude in the Pnyx and listen to Demosthenes thundering against Philip. How much the interval of time between the fourth century B.C. and the present was considered, as far as was possible, non-existent, one may see by the rhetorical sermons of Maximus of Tyre, a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius. They are full of illustrative references and anecdotes, but no allusion, I think, to anything later than the fourth century B.C., except a few references to Epicurus in the third century, and a solitary reference to Carneades in the second. We forget, while the spell of Maximus

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 133-8, above.

holds us, that such a thing as Rome, such a person as Caesar, has ever existed. A still odder indication of this habit of thought may be found in a reference to Stoics in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus, a Greek writer of an even later century than Maximus of Tyre—an indication all the more striking because it is incidental and not supposed, apparently, to cause any surprise. Iamblichus, round about the year A.D. 300, refers to the founders of the Stoic school as *οἱ νεώτεροι*.¹ His standpoint is that of Pythagoras or Plato, and thus philosophers of the third century B.C. appear as "the moderns" or "the more recent"—philosophers separated from Iamblichus by an interval of time as great as separates us from Dante or Chaucer! Centuries later than the third century B.C. do not count.²

This pathetic endeavour to circumvent the remorseless flow of Time by dodging back into a dead and buried Past through a literary door made of mirror-glass began on the morrow of the breakdown of the Hellenic Society and was never abandoned so long as anything that could call itself Hellenism remained in existence. On the morrow of the breakdown we find Plato representing his fictitious dialogues as taking place, not at the time when the author himself was thinking the thoughts which the dialogues expound, or when he was putting these thoughts into words or setting the words down on paper: every dialogue is deliberately ascribed to some date that is prior to the death of Socrates; and for Plato the judicial murder of Socrates in 399 B.C., rather than the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C., was the symbolic catastrophe which proclaimed the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization. The *dramatis personae* are carefully chosen to fit these imaginary dates, and their ages and outlooks are portrayed in conformity with this archaistic regression.³ Since Plato (*vivebat circa* 430–347 B.C.) himself was born immediately after the outbreak of the fatal war, and was still a young man at the time of the inexpiable judicial murder, the Time-span involved in this Platonic Archaism is not more than half a lifetime. This, however, was only the first move in a game that was to be played, as the centuries passed, with an ever-growing extravagance until, in the Hellenic World of the second century of the Christian Era, we are treated to the spectacle of a new Socrates being commemorated by

¹ Page 118 of the Teubner text.

² Bevan, E. R.: 'Rhetoric in the Ancient World' in *Essays in Honour of Gilbert Murray* (London 1936, Allen & Unwin), pp. 208–10.

³ 'His dialogues are not only a memorial to Socrates, but also to the happier days of his own family. Plato must have felt the events of the end of the fifth century keenly, but he is so careful to avoid anachronisms in these dialogues that no one could ever guess from them that they were written after Kritias and Charmides had met with a dishonoured end' (Burnet, J.: *Greek Philosophy: Part I, Thales to Plato* (London 1914, Macmillan), pp. 208–9. Cf. pp. 211–13). For the detachment which was a different and a deeper response of Plato's soul to the challenge of social disintegration see V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 394–6, above, and V. C (i) (d) 10, in the present volume, pp. 132–48, below.

a new Xenophon. Arrian's digest of Epictetus's dissertations is a conscious repetition of Xenophon's act in writing the *Memorabilia*; and the Nicomedian public servant of a Roman Imperial Government can never forget that his literary mission is to follow in the footsteps of an Athenian man-at-arms and man-of-letters who was Arrian's senior by about five hundred years, and whose life had been lived, and *Weltanschauung* been formed, in utterly different social circumstances.

Strange though this Neo-Atticism may appear, the most extraordinary feat of linguistic and literary Archaism in the Hellenic World in the Imperial Age has still to be recorded. In this age, once again, a captive Greece succeeded in captivating her Roman conqueror;¹ and this time she led him a dance; for she now prevailed upon him to fall into step with her retreat, after having once upon a time carried him along with her in the last halting stage of her broken advance; and for the Roman this reverse movement in the train of his Greek Muse meant harking back, not to the glories of an original Attic literature of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., but to the crudities and curiosities of his own ancestors' first attempt to reclothe Greek literature in a Latin dress.

This disease of literary Archaism which the Romans caught from the Greeks in the Imperial Age did not begin to show itself in Latin literature until about a hundred years after Greek literature had succumbed to it; but, when once the infection had taken, its ravages were rapid; and before the end of the second century of the Christian Era the Latin version of Hellenism was quite as far gone as its Greek ensample in a decline that could only end in utter sterility.

The sickening of the Latin genius with this fatal malady can be observed in Tacitus's *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, which is represented as having taken place in the sixth year of the reign of the Emperor Vespasian (A.D. 74-5).² One of the topics of the dialogue³ is a disputation over the relative merits of 'the ancients' and 'the moderns'; and, although the cause of 'the moderns' is championed in spirited language by an advocate who holds up to scorn the perversity of those archaists 'who read Lucilius in preference to Horace and Lucretius in preference to Virgil',⁴ the argument is eventually broken off because the cause of 'the ancients' is assumed to be invincible.⁵ The Latin literary Archaism of Tacitus's genera-

¹ Horace: *Epistolae*, Book II, Ep. i, l. 156.

² Tacitus: *Dialogus*, chap. 17, § 3.

³ Chaps. 14-26.

⁴ Tacitus: *Dialogus*, chap. 23, § 2.

⁵ Tacitus: *Dialogus*, chap. 27, *init.* The rest of the work is devoted to considering not *whether*, but *why*, the eloquence of 'the ancients' (i.e. of Latin orators of the last generation before the establishment of the *Pax Augusta*) was superior to that of 'the moderns' (i.e. the characters in the dialogue and their younger contemporaries of Tacitus's own generation). In this inquiry Tacitus starts from a change for the worse in

tion¹ kept, however, within the bounds of moderation, since the oldest 'ancients' with whom the speakers in the *Dialogus* are seriously concerned are those of the generation of Cicero. Thereafter the deterioration was rapid, for Tacitus himself may have lived to see the principate of Hadrian, and the Latin poet whom Hadrian preferred to Virgil was not the austere Lucretius but the uncouth Ennius. The still more exotic taste of Marcus Aurelius's African tutor Fronto found the greatest merit in the most archaic Latin literature that had survived; and Fronto's Archaism was pushed to a further degree of extravagance by his disciple Aulus Gellius.²

The bilingual folly of this Greek and Latin literary Archaism of the second century of the Christian Era might have been pilloried as the extreme case of its kind, if it were not a matter of attested historical fact that, in this wild-goose chase, Hellenism has been outrun by Sinism.

'Les Chinois, quand ils parlent et quand ils écrivent, s'expriment uniformément en employant des formules consacrées. . . . La littérature chinoise est une littérature de centons. Quand ils veulent prouver ou expliquer, quand ils songent à raconter ou à décrire, les auteurs les plus originaux se servent d'historiettes stéréotypées et d'expressions convenues, puisées à un fonds commun. Ce fonds n'est pas très abondant et, d'ailleurs, on ne cherche guère à le renouveler. Une bonne partie des thèmes qui ont joui d'une faveur permanente se retrouvent dans les productions les plus anciennes et les plus spontanées de la poésie chinoise. . . . Le rôle des centons n'est pas moins grand dans la prose que dans la poésie, dans le style savant que dans la langue vulgaire. . . . Un lecteur attentif des Annales chinoises hésite constamment: veut-on lui présenter des faits particuliers, singularisés, ou lui apprendre ce qu'il convient de faire ou de ne pas faire? La rédaction en termes rituels

domestic life: modern parents do not give the same personal attention as their predecessors gave to the upbringing of their children, but leave it all to servants. He goes on to discuss the changes in the system of apprenticeship for public speaking; and here he has some severe strictures to make upon the modern schools of rhetoric. But his most trenchant point is that fine oratory is the fruit of turbulent times, and that the inevitable price of good government is an atmosphere of dullness which gives human wits no stimulus. 'Magna eloquentia, sicut flamma, materia alitur et motibus excitatur et urendo clarescit' (chap. 36, § 1). Already, half-way through the principate of Augustus, 'longa temporum quies et continuum populi otium et assidua senatus tranquillitas et maxime principis disciplina ipsam quoque eloquentiam sicut omnia alia pacaverat' (chap. 38, § 2). 'Nemo eodem tempore adsequi potest magnam famam et magnam quietem' (chap. 41, § 5). These concluding chapters of the *Dialogus* are a brilliant essay on the theme that Caesar's peace (unlike the Peace of God) is a Yin-state which is not at all conducive to creativity. In a work of a later generation on the same subject (Longinus[?]: *De Sublimitate*, chap. 44), Tacitus's political explanation of the decay of eloquence is re-examined, but is rejected in favour of the alternative thesis that the root of the evil is not the public vice of despotism but the private vices of avarice and self-indulgence.

¹ The fictitious date of the *Dialogus* is placed by Tacitus, *more Platonico*, about half a generation earlier than the author's own *floruit*.

² For this Latin literary and linguistic Archaism of the Antonine 'Indian Summer' in the second century of the Christian Era see Parker, H. M. D.: *A History of the Roman World from A.D. 128 to 327* (London 1935, Methuen), pp. 47-8.

s'explique-t-elle simplement par un parti pris de stylistes ou bien l'histoire n'a-t-elle à conter qu'une succession d'incidents rituels? Il n'y a pas à décider: en fait, le goût des formules toutes faites n'est que l'un des aspects d'une adhésion générale à une morale conformiste. . . . Comme les annalistes, les philosophes chinois sont des conteurs d'historiettes. Dans les ouvrages de tous genres, on trouve, utilisées à satiété, les mêmes anecdotes — si bien qu'un lecteur occidental lisant pour la première fois une œuvre chinoise éprouve presque inmanquablement une impression de déjà lu.¹

When even the earliest of our surviving specimens of Sinic literature—the poetry collected in the *She King* which apparently dates from the Sinic Civilization's growth-stage—already displays this archaistic mental orientation towards the Past, we shall not be surprised to find literary Archaism carrying all before it in the succeeding age of disintegration, and capturing, quickly and completely, the Confucian school of philosophy.

'La passion d'enseigner en commentant signale le fléchissement du goût pour les formes pragmatiques d'enseignement auxquelles Confucius dut apparemment son prestige. Le Maître avait essayé de faire reconnaître la valeur d'une psychologie positive en habituant ses disciples à réfléchir en commun à propos d'incidents journaliers. Ses successeurs enseignèrent en *commentant* les vers du *Che King* aussi bien que les formules du *Tch'ouen ts'ieou*, les aphorismes chers aux devins tout comme les adages des maîtres des cérémonies. Dès la fin du *v^e* siècle, on pouvait les accuser de ne s'attacher qu'à un savoir livresque et de n'accorder de valeur qu'aux semblants rituels.'²

If this were a verdict on the Hellenic thought of the Neo-Attic Age, there might be nothing more to be said; but in studying the actions of Sinic souls we must never forget to reckon with the dexterity of a Sinic genius which delights in the use of unpromising means for the attainment of unexpected ends.

'Si les auteurs s'appliquent à parler par proverbes, ce n'est point qu'ils pensent de façon commune; c'est que la bonne façon, et la plus fine, de faire valoir leur pensée, est de la glisser dans une formule éprouvée dont elle empruntera le crédit. Les centons possèdent une sorte de force, neutre et concrète, qui peut, de façon latente, se particulariser à l'infini, tout en conservant, dans les applications les plus singulières, un égal pouvoir d'inviter à agir. . . . Les poèmes du *Che King* qui sont écrits dans la langue la plus proverbiale sont assurément ceux (l'opinion publique en fait foi) où se sont signifiées les pensées les plus subtiles. La même règle vaut pour les œuvres de tous les temps, de tous les genres. Les poésies les plus riches en expressions consacrées sont les plus admirées. Dans aucune, les formules convenues ne se pressent autant que dans ces sortes de méditations mystiques où le

¹ Granet, M.: *La Pensée Chinoise* (Paris 1934, Renaissance du Livre), pp. 57, 58, 68, 69, and 70.

² *Ibid.*, p. 553.

lyrisme chinois donne sa note la plus haute. La densité en centons ne mesure pas seulement le savoir traditionnel du poète: la densité la plus forte est la marque de la pensée la plus profonde.¹

This Sinic art of turning the trick of literary Archaism from a barren conceit into a potent charm, whose compelling power can strike down to the subconscious fundament of the Soul and then stir it to the depths, will be no secret to any Jewish or Christian or Islamic writer who has had the good fortune to have been equipped for his work by being educated in accordance with the tradition of his forefathers; for the language of the Bible or the Qur'an will have been imprinted on his memory in his childhood as indelibly as the language of the Sinic Classics on the memory of the Far Eastern litteratus; and a mind thus inalienably enriched with the treasures of its native spiritual heritage will be master of that alchemy which knows how to evoke something new out of an allusion to something old or, in other words, how to transmute an act of mimesis into an act of creation.

(δ) *Archaism in Religion.*

In the field of Religion, as in the fields of Language and Art and Institutions, it is possible for a Western student of history at the present day to study the phenomenon of Archaism at first hand within the limits of his own social environment.

Within the past hundred years France, England, and Germany in turn have each been the scene of an archaistic religious movement. In France and in England this religious Archaism has been the expression of a homesickness for the ceremonial and the atmosphere of a medieval Western Christianity; and it is a remarkable spectacle to see this homesickness overcoming two modern Western institutions that have travelled so far from their medieval Christian origins as the Positivist school of philosophy and the Anglican Church: an artificial philosophy that has been manufactured in a Humanistic workshop,² and a parochial Protestant

¹ Ibid., pp. 65 and 68; cf. pp. 73-4.

² The Humanism which has been one of the governing principles of our Western culture in its so-called 'Modern Age' has been touched upon already in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 300-3, and in V. C (i) (d) 7, in the present volume, p. 8, above. Comte's purpose in appropriating the trappings of a medieval Western Christianity for the use of his own 'Religion of Humanity' was not, of course, to revive the worship of the god who had previously been honoured with these rites. On the contrary, Comte was determined to replace the Christians' personal God by a collective Humanity, and to present this 'vrai Grand Être' to his own Positivist disciples as the proper recipient for the traditional divine honours. Comte's 'Religion of Humanity' has been touched upon already in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 300-1, above, in this aspect, as an example of the idolization of an ephemeral self. And this element of anti-Christian idolatry in 'the Religion of Humanity' is, of course, much more important than the element of pseudo-Christian Archaism with which we are concerned in the present context.

This pseudo-Christian Archaism, which Comte (*vivebat* A.D. 1798-1857) gradually worked out on lines of his own (see Caird, E.: *The Social Philosophy and Religion of*

Church that is borne upon the political establishment of one of the national states of the modern Western World. Yet this regression of a French Positivism and a British Anglo-Catholicism towards the religion of medieval Western Christendom is not so startling a phenomenon as the corresponding movement of Hauerism in post-war Germany, where the spiritual strain to which the German people has been continuously subject since July 1914 has eventu-

Comte (Glasgow 1885, MacLehose), pp. 238-47, and Berdyaev, N.: *The Meaning of History* (London 1936, Bles), pp. 163-4), was perhaps originally suggested to his mind by the ideas of two thinkers of an older generation, Joseph de Maistre (*vivebat* A.D. 1754-1821) and C. H. de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon (*vivebat* A.D. 1760-1825). De Maistre was a thorough-going archaist who advocated a revival of the Hildebrandine *Respublica Christiana* under the exclusive and absolute sovereignty of the Pope as the only effective antidote to the Revolution; and his ideas were already familiar by the time when Comte was growing up (de Maistre's masterpiece, *Du Pape*, was finished in 1817 and published in 1819 (Lyon, Rusand, 2 vols.)). Saint-Simon's aim was different; for to his mind the institutions of medieval Western Christendom were outworn, and he wished to replace them by modern equivalents which would perform corresponding functions. Science was to be substituted for the Church, and Industry for Feudalism. These Saint-Simonian ideas were set forth in an unfinished work, *Nouveau Christianisme* (Paris: Bossange, Sautelet), which was published in 1825; and in 1826 Comte wrote his *Considerations on the Spiritual Power* (English translation in *Early Essays on Philosophy translated from the French of Auguste Comte* by Henry Dix Dutton (London, n.d., Routledge)), in which he propounded his own scheme for enlisting an ecclesiastical Archaism in the service of an anthropolatrous Paganism. 'The social condition of the most civilized nations imperiously demands the formation of a new spiritual order as the first and chief mode of ending the Revolutionary Period which began in the sixteenth century and thirty years ago entered on its last stage' (p. 297). 'It would be easy to form empirically a clear idea of the functions of the modern spiritual power by a careful study of those which devolved upon the Catholic clergy at the period of their greatest vigour and complete independence, that is to say, from about the middle of the eleventh to nearly the end of the thirteenth century. . . . For every social relation that fell within the province of the Catholic clergy, an analogous attribute will be found in the new political system as a function of the modern spiritual power' (p. 298). We must emancipate ourselves 'from the pernicious prejudices generally inspired by the Critical Philosophy towards the spiritual system of the Middle Age' (p. 299). On the other hand, due allowance must be made for 'the extreme difference' between the medieval and the modern state of Western Civilization (p. 299); and on this head Comte criticizes de Maistre and the other contemporary philosophers of 'the retrograde school'. 'In them we may remark the radical inconsequence which consists in directly transferring to modern societies considerations exclusively drawn from the observation of medieval societies so essentially different. Associated, moreover, as they invariably are, with projects for restoring a system whose destruction, already almost completed, is henceforward irrevocable, they tend in the present state of men's minds rather to fortify than to uproot the general prejudice against every spiritual power' (p. 351, footnote 2). The details of Comte's own system were afterwards worked out in a *Positivist Calendar* (1849), in which 'Benefactors of Humanity', more *Alexandri Severi* (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 549, above), were substituted for Saints, and thereafter (in 1852) in *The Catechism of Positivism or Summary Exposition of the Universal Religion in Thirteen Systematic Conversations between a Woman and a Priest of Humanity* (English translation, second edition: London 1883, Trübner, with a reprint, at the end, of the *Positivist Calendar*). In the latter work Comte's thesis that Catholicism, on new intellectual foundations, will finally preside over the spiritual life of a reorganized Modern Society (*Positive Philosophy*, vol. v, p. 344) is illustrated by the presentation of Humanity as an 'incomparable goddess' (*Catechism*, English translation, p. 58) in the lineaments of the Theotókos. 'Never will Art be able worthily to embody Humanity otherwise than in the form of Woman. . . . The Symbol of our goddess will always be a woman of thirty with her son in her arms' (*Catechism*, pp. 84 and 99).

In taking the traditional image of the Theotókos and renaming it 'Humanity', Comte was following a precedent which had been set by the Christian Church itself when, in its formative age in the early centuries of the Christian Era, it had made its own image of Mary in the traditional likeness of Isis or Ishtar or Cybele.

It is only in England, and not in his native France, that Comte's dream of establishing a Positivist Church with a corporate life and an order of public worship has come true.

ally betrayed its severity in the desperateness of the reaction in which a certain number of tormented German souls are now seeking to find relief.

Professor Hauer is adjuring his countrymen not merely to repudiate a modern phase of the Western Civilization which to-day, in retrospect, may well be looked askance at by any of its children, but actually to break away from the Western Christianity which is the common primal root and stem of every modern branch of the Western Society. The watchword of Professor Hauer is 'Back to the paganism in which our Teutonic forebears found happiness before they were captivated by an alien Judaistic superstition and an alien Romance culture'. The Hauerites' bugbear is Charlemagne, who in their eyes has been the arch-betrayer of the German Race. They cannot forgive this all-powerful German master of an infant Western Europe for having employed his power in suppressing the paganism of the Saxon barbarians in the outer darkness beyond the north-east frontier of the Austrasian dominions; for, in incorporating Saxony into Western Christendom, Charlemagne, in the Hauerites' view, was capturing for Christ and for Rome the last continental stronghold of a pure and undefiled German culture.¹ And they picture the German paganism which Charlemagne stamped out—and which they themselves are now proposing to revive—in a shape which bears no recognizable likeness to the historical worship of the deified war-lord Woden and his deified war-band.² The religion with which the Primitive Germans are credited by the Hauerites is a worship of the One True God through the symbol of physical light; and, in their sophisticated enthusiasm for this imaginary religious intuition of their primitive ancestors, they would almost have us believe that the valley of the Spree, and not the valley of the Nile, was the scene of Ikhnaton's enlightenment.

In 1938 it was impossible for an English observer to tell how seriously this Neo-Pagan movement in Germany had to be taken as an indication of the religious destiny of the Western World as a whole; but he could hardly be mistaken in citing this portent of Hauerism as evidence that Western souls were no longer proof

¹ Less hysterical modern students of Charlemagne's work will be inclined to censure the Austrasian militarist, not for setting out to reclaim his Saxon neighbours from their pestilent barbarism by converting them from their barren paganism, but for attempting to achieve an admirable social purpose by means of the pernicious instrument of military force. In the present Study Charlemagne's behaviour towards the Saxons has been criticized on this ground already in II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 167; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 345-6; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 322-3; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 488-90, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 523, above.

² For this by no means primitive pagan religion of the North-European external proletariat of the Hellenic World in its 'heroic age' see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 230-3, above. The historical religion of the German participants in a post-Hellenic Völkerwanderung is reflected, not in Professor Hauer's theology, but in Herr Hitler's politics.

against being captivated by a religious Archaism even when this offered itself in an extravagant fancy-dress.

The three living examples of Archaism in the religious field which have met our eyes in the contemporary Western World¹ are none of them impressive; for, while the German movement is patently rabid, the French and English movements are no less patently sentimental. If we now transfer our attention from our own world to the Hellenic, and concentrate it upon that moment in the Hellenic Society's disintegration when Augustus was bringing a Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' to an end by establishing a Hellenic universal state, we shall encounter here an experiment in religious Archaism which may command our admiration.

'The revival of the State religion by Augustus is at once the most remarkable event in the history of the Roman religion, and one almost unique in religious history. . . . The belief in the efficacy of the old cults had passed away among the educated classes; . . . the mongrel city populace had long been accustomed to scoff at the old deities; and . . . the outward practice of religion had been allowed to decay. To us, then, it may seem almost impossible that the practice, and to some extent also the belief, should be capable of resuscitation at the will of a single individual, even if that individual represented the best interests and the collective wisdom of the State. For it is impossible to deny that this resuscitation was real; that both *pax deorum* and *ius divinum* became once more terms of force and meaning. Beset as it was by at least three formidable enemies, which tended to destroy it even while they fed on it, like parasites in the animal or vegetable world feeding on their hosts—the rationalizing philosophy of syncretism,² the worship of the Caesars,³ and the new Oriental cults⁴—the old religion continued to exist for at least three centuries in outward form, and to some extent in popular belief.'⁵

This long-enduring success of Augustus's enterprise of reviving the native religion of the Roman people is remarkable indeed; for

¹ If it be asked why Protestantism has been omitted from a list in which Anglo-Catholicism has been included, the answer is that Anglo-Catholicism is, while Protestantism is not, an example of Archaism in the sense in which the term is used in this Study. In our terminology Protestantism is a case, not of Archaism within the compass of the life of a single civilization, but of the 'Contact in the Time-dimension' between two different civilizations; for, in its endeavour to return to the practice and the spirit of the Primitive Church and to recover this spirit and practice by taking the Canon of Scripture as its exclusive authority, Protestantism was seeking to establish a direct contact with the extinct Syriac Civilization which was the source of the Jewish headwaters of the stream of Christianity. On this showing, the modern Western religious movement known as Protestantism falls into the same category as the medieval Italian and modern Transalpine Western intellectual and aesthetic movement known as the Renaissance, which was an attempt to establish a direct contact with Hellenism. (For the popular confusion of this Renaissance of Hellenism with the radiation of the medieval Italian culture into Transalpine Europe see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 275, footnotes 1 and 2, above.) Both Protestantism and the Western Renaissance are discussed in Part X, below.

² See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 547, above.—A.J.T.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 80, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 648–50, above.—A.J.T.

⁴ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 215–16, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 81–2, above.—A.J.T.

⁵ Warde-Fowler, W.: *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London 1911,

at first sight the Roman statesman's experiment might appear to a modern Western observer to have been not less cold-blooded than the French philosopher Comte's and not less crack-brained than the German professor Hauer's. We may pay tribute to Augustus's insight in recognizing that the spiritual void in the souls of his countrymen and contemporaries must be filled with something or other by any would-be Saviour of Society who was seriously setting himself to heal the wounds of the Hellenic World with the balm of a Roman Peace; for the Romans could not confer an outward peace upon their neighbours until they had established an inward peace within themselves. We may acknowledge Augustus's perspicacity in perceiving that the sophisticated philosophies of the dominant minority were 'caviare to the vulgar',¹ and that the Caesar-worship in which he was capitalizing the popular gratitude towards himself was at best a fair-weather cult which could not be expected to outlast the temporary reprieve that Augustus's exertions had won for the Hellenic Society and for the Roman Commonwealth.² We may also sympathize with Augustus's desire to stem the tide of *pammixia* and proletarianization by damming back the inflow of 'the new Oriental cults'. But when we have conceded all this, we may still find it difficult to understand why Augustus should have attempted the *tour de force* of bringing the native Roman religion back to life. Why did he not put the whole of his Roman treasure in the Greek gods of Athens and Delphi and Eleusis in an age which found Rome already completely acclimatized to the Hellenic culture and at least half-conscious that it was now her mission to salvage a Hellenic Society which she had done so much to wreck in the preceding chapter of Roman and Hellenic history? These Greek divinities might lack the vitality of their aggressive Oriental rivals, but no competitor could eclipse their matchless dignity and grace. Why, then, was Augustus not content with the notable addition that he had made to the array of Roman shrines in which these Greek divinities were installed?³ Was not his Roman religious task fulfilled when he had received into his own house on the Palatine with all due honour the Greek Apollo who, at the crisis of Augustus's career, had sent him victorious in the decisive naval engagement below the cliffs of Actium?⁴

Macmillan), pp. 428-9. The whole of Lecture xix should be read by any one who wishes to obtain a comprehensive view of Augustus's archaistic work in the field of Religion.

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, pp. 559-62, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 649-50, above.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, pp. 528, above.

⁴ Actus haec cernens arcum intendebat Apollo
desuper: omnis eo terrore Aegyptus et Indi,
omnis Arabs, omnes vertebant terga Sabaei.

Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book VIII, ll. 704-6.

Why must he go on to experiment in the extravaganza of attempting also to revive the native Roman religion in its primitive unhellenized nakedness? The ethics of this brutally business-like Roman religion of 'Do ut des' must be laughed away as childish if they were not to be condemned as immoral; and, as for the quaint rites in which this Roman commerce between men and gods had been transacted since the dawn of history, they could hardly be taken seriously nowadays by any one but an antiquary.¹ Would not the resuscitation of this ridiculous native hocus-pocus compromise, instead of crowning, the rest of Augustus's endeavours to win back for Religion at Rome the repute and authority which it had lost? What, then, could have moved so astute a statesman as Augustus to pin his faith to this relic of a primitive past as his sovereign means for evoking that spiritual rally in Roman souls on which the statesman-saviour no doubt rightly set such store?

The vindication of Augustus's apparently unpromising essay in religious Archaism is to be found in the sequel; for, if we date the Augustan reinstatement of the primitive Roman religion from his celebration of the *Ludi Saeculares* in 17 B.C.,² we shall find that Augustus's work of archaistic reconstruction lasted not merely for three centuries, but for four;³ that, even at the end of that long

¹ The existing fragments of the *Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum* of Marcus Terentius Varro (*vivebat* 116-28 B.C.) show that the prince of Roman antiquaries made his study of the official religion of the community into which he had been born in a spirit of thorough-going scientific detachment.

² This is a more significant date than 12 B.C., which was the year in which Augustus became Pontifex Maximus; for the celebration of the *Ludi Saeculares* was an act of religious policy for which Augustus was free to choose his own time, whereas the date of his assumption of the office of Pontifex Maximus was determined for him by the length of the life of the previous incumbent. If Augustus had abused his dictatorial powers in order to anticipate Lepidus's death by evicting him from an office of which the traditional tenure was for life, the would-be restorer of the prestige of the native Roman religion would simply have been defeating his own purpose.

³ Three centuries is the duration claimed for Augustus's work by Warde-Fowler in the passage quoted above; and it is true (see Geffken, J.: *Der Ausgang des Griechisch-Römischen Heidentums* (Heidelberg 1920, Winter), pp. 20-5) that in Rome itself, as well as all over the Roman Empire, *circa* A.D. 240-60, there seems to have been a sudden cessation of pagan cults, on the negative evidence of a widespread breaking off of the serial records of acts of worship in inscriptions. At Rome the records of the proceedings of the Arval Brethren and those of the celebration of the rite of the Taurobolium both alike break off in A.D. 241. On the Nubian border of Egypt, at Ethiopian Talmis, and in the Fayyûm, there are corresponding breaks in the local records after the years A.D. 244, 248, and 250 respectively. At Olympia the last victor inscription is of the year A.D. 261, and the last cult inscription of the year A.D. 265. In Macedonia, where the inscriptions testify to an increase of ritual and liturgical activity in the second quarter of the third century of the Christian Era, the records break off, nevertheless, in A.D. 265. It is only in Attica and in Syria that the series of inscriptions runs on through the third century without a break. At the turn of the third century and the fourth century, however, there was a deliberate and systematic revival of pagan worship all over the Empire by the pagan emperors of the Diocletianic school who were at war with Christianity (see V. C. (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 565-6, and V. C. (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 650, footnote 3, above); and this revival gave another hundred years' lease of life to the Augustan paganism at Rome, as well as to the pagan worships of other parts of the Empire.

Time-span, it did not simply fall to pieces of itself but was deliberately demolished by the fanaticism of the pagan archaist-emperor's latter-day Christian successors Gratian and Theodosius;¹ and that, so far from being accepted with the indifference with which so many similar acts of religious sabotage were received in other parts of the Hellenic World of the age,² this attack upon the once artificially resuscitated paganism of Rome aroused a heart-felt opposition which expressed itself first in a fifteen-years-long constitutional struggle over an altar and statue of Victory (A.D. 382-94)³ and finally in a military *pronunciamento*—engineered by the pagan Frankish mercenary Arbogastes—in which the Christian soldier-emperor Theodosius's title to the Imperial office was audaciously disputed by the pagan professor of literature Eugenius (A.D. 392-4).⁴ The tenacity to which these facts bear witness is evidence that Augustus had, after all, been as competent a builder in his reconstruction of Religion at Rome as in the rest of his handiwork; and we must infer that he knew what he was about when he insisted upon reviving the primitive native Roman religion besides completing the acclimatization of the Greek religion on Roman soil. Augustus must have divined that this native religion, crude and discredited though it might be, had a hold on Roman hearts which an imported Hellenism could never acquire on its own merits, however nicely it might suit the taste of cultivated Roman palates. He therefore deliberately grafted these foreign slips on to a native stem; and this was the secret of the strength of the stately tree whose grain almost turned the edge of a Christian axe four hundred years later.⁵

If we turn from the Hellenic World to the Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Society, we shall find, in a latter-day Japanese attempt to revive the native Japanese variety of Primitive Pagan-

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 226-7, above.

² It is true that the pagan revolt in the West which was headed by the rhetor Eugenius in A.D. 392-4 had been anticipated at Alexandria by a similar revolt, likewise under professorial leadership, in A.D. 391 (Geffken, op. cit., p. 157). On the other hand the cessation of the Olympian Games, after their last celebration in the year A.D. 393 (ibid., p. 159), does not seem to have made the same stir as the removal of the altar and statue of Victory from the Senate House at Rome.

³ The altar and statue of Victory were removed from the Senate House at Rome by the orders of the Emperor Gratian in A.D. 382; and this act—which was intended to be, and was taken as being, symbolic—moved the cultivated pagan aristocracy of the capital to protest with all the vigour that was compatible with their loyalty to the Imperial Government. The last petition for restitution was rejected in A.D. 394. The statue had been brought to Rome from Tarentum and set up in the Curia Julia by Caius Julius Caesar.

⁴ Fuller accounts of the last stand of Augustus's archaistically reconstructed Roman paganism will be found in Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xxxviii; and in Dill, S.: *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire* (London 1905, Macmillan), Book I: 'The Tenacity of Paganism'.

⁵ The compositeness of the grain of the Roman paganism that was given this long new lease of life through the arts of Augustus is illustrated by the fact that the statue over which this Roman paganism fought its last fight was a piece of Greek workmanship.

ism which is traditionally known as Shinto,¹ another essay in religious Archaism which has points in common, not only with Augustus's achievement and with Professor Hauer's conceit, but also with the religious policy which Bismarck attempted to carry out after the foundation of the Second German Reich.

In degree of extravagance the revival of Shinto shows a greater likeness to Hauerism than to Augustus's work; for, whereas the native Roman paganism which Augustus successfully revived was in his time still 'a going concern' in the sense that it had never been officially disestablished, the movement for the resuscitation of the native Japanese paganism did not begin until more than a thousand years had passed since this primitive religion had been partly supplanted, partly absorbed, and partly informed² by the higher religion of the Mahāyāna. The Mahāyāna began to make its spiritual conquest of Japan in the course of the sixth century of the Christian Era³—more than two hundred years before the date at which Christianity was thrust upon Saxony at Charlemagne's sword-point. And the archaistic revival of Shinto was started in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era⁴—at a date which was likewise rather more than two hundred years before a 'return to Woden' began to be preached in modern Germany.

In Japan, as in Germany, the first phase of the movement was academic. The Japanese resuscitation of Shinto was put in train by a Buddhist monk named Keichū (*vivebat* A.D. 1640–1701) whose interest in the subject seems to have been primarily philological;⁵ Keichū was followed by Motoori Norinaga (*vivebat* A.D. 1730–1801), who was not only a scholar but was also a theorist applying his scholarship to an imaginary reconstruction of an obliterated ancestral faith;⁶ and Motoori Norinaga was followed in his turn

¹ Shinto means 'the Way of the Numina' (to use an impersonal Latin word which may be a better translation of the Japanese original than 'gods' or 'spirits'). See Holtom, D. C.: *The National Faith of Japan: A Study in Modern Shintō* (London 1938, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner), pp. 13–14. The modern revival of Shinto is known as Fukko Shinto ('Restoration Shinto') (*ibid.*, p. 44).

² See V. C (ii) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 97, footnote 3, and p. 147, footnote 1; V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, p. 528, footnote 2, above.

³ In this first chapter of its history in Japan the Mahāyāna, while nominally professed by all subjects of the Emperor, was not in fact comprehended and assimilated by Japanese souls outside the narrow limits of a sophisticated court circle. The propagation of the Mahāyāna among the masses, in popular forms which the common man could understand, did not begin until after the onset of a 'Time of Troubles' in the latter part of the twelfth century of the Christian Era (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 97–8, above).

⁴ Its antecedents can, however, be traced back as far as the fifteenth century (Holtom, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–41).

⁵ There was a general revival of Japanese studies at and after the close of the seventeenth century (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), p. 468). Holtom (*op. cit.*, pp. 45–8) presents, as Motoori's principal predecessor, not Keichū but Kamo-no-Mabuchi (*vivebat* A.D. 1697–1769).

⁶ In Japan in the middle of the eighteenth century there was a general romantic revival of interest in the Japanese national past (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. i (London 1910, Kegan Paul), p. 11). Motoori himself was both anti-rationalist and Anti-Sinic (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 476–90). In this Anti-Sinism Motoori had had

by Hirata Atsutané (*vivebat* A.D. 1776-1843), who was not only a theorist but was also a controversialist, and who launched an attack, in the name of Shinto, upon the exotic religion of the Mahāyāna and the exotic philosophy of Confucianism.¹

It will be seen from the dates that the archaistic revival of a primitive Japanese paganism was put in hand, like Augustus's resuscitation of a primitive Roman paganism, immediately after the foundation of a universal state; for in Japanese history the universal state that put an end to an antecedent 'Time of Troubles' was the Tokugawa Shogunate which was the fruit of the successive labours of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi and Ieyasu in the later decades of the sixteenth and the earlier decades of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era.² Whereas, however, the reinstatement of the Roman paganism was carried out almost at one stroke by the fiat of a political dictator, the revival of Shinto began as a work of private enterprise³ which took two hundred years to advance—or regress—from the Varronian objectivity of a Keichū to the Rosenbergian militancy of a Hirata Atsutané.

The Neo-Shinto movement had just arrived at this militant stage when the Japanese universal state was prematurely shattered by the impact of an aggressively expanding Western Civilization. The rigorously maintained artificial isolation which had enabled the Japanese to live for a quarter of a millennium as though Japan were 'All that was under Heaven' had to be abandoned in the third quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era in favour of a diametrically opposite strategy of self-defence in which Japan was to hold her own in a no longer avoidable Western environment by learning to live as one of the nations of a Westernized World. And when, upon the Revolution of 1867-8, this abrupt change from a negative to a positive attitude towards the outer world was given a symbolic expression in the liquidation of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the official restoration of an Imperial Dynasty which had been reigning (though not always governing) in an unbroken succession since the dawn of Japanese history,⁴ the now

forerunners. Kada Adzumaro (*vivebat* A.D. 1669-1736) had presented to the authorities in A.D. 1735 a memorial advocating Japanese as against Sinic studies; and the campaign against an alleged contamination of Japanese by Sinic culture had been continued by Mabuchi (see Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 473-5).

¹ The facts mentioned in this paragraph are taken from Anesaki, M.: *History of Japanese Religion* (London 1930, Kegan Paul), pp. 307-9.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 88, 92, and 94; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 655-7, above, as well as V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 186, 188-9, and 191, below.

³ The Tokugawa régime had a leaning towards Buddhism and regarded the Neo-Shinto movement with suspicion as a threat to the security of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The Neo-Shintoists' idealization and deification of the Imperial House did, in fact, prepare the ground for the Restoration of A.D. 1868.

⁴ During the Japanese 'Time of Troubles' and universal state the Imperial Dynasty at Kyoto had, of course, been leading an obscure and shadowy existence on sufferance

militant Neo-Shinto movement so exactly accorded with a *Zeitgeist* in which a no longer practicable xenophobia was being converted into terms of the archaistically romantic Nationalism of the modern West that it looked for a moment as though a once academic conceit was now to have its fortune made for it by being taken under the potent patronage of the new régime.

"The first step taken by the new Government in regard to Religion was an attempt to establish Shinto as the religion of the State. The . . . National Cult Department . . . an institution for ceremonial observance, having little to do with matters of really religious or political significance . . . was given the highest position among the government offices, and Shinto was proclaimed the national cult or State Religion.¹ This meant at the same time a vigorous suppression of Buddhism, because it was a foreign religion and had flourished under the protection of the Shogunate Government. All privileges granted to the Buddhist clergy were abolished, and a large part of the properties belonging to the Buddhist institutions was confiscated. A reign of persecution was started. Buddhists were driven out of the syncretic Shinto sanctuaries which they had been serving for ten centuries or more. Buddhist statues, scriptures and decorations in those temples were taken out and set on fire or thrown into the water. The "purification" of the Shinto temples was achieved, and the severance of Buddhism and Shinto ruthlessly carried out. . . .²

"At one time it seemed as if Buddhism would be swept away by the persecution, but the danger brought Buddhist leaders to united action. . . . In the official circles, too, some realized that an entire suppression of Buddhism was neither desirable nor possible,³ and the Government was induced gradually to modify their religious policy. The National Cult was replaced by an Ecclesiastical Board in 1872,⁴ under which a central board of preachers was to superintend religious instructions. . . . The Board was abolished in 1877, and the Buddhist bodies were granted autonomy. Shinto was treated in the same way;⁵ and its church bodies

from the militarists who were governing—or misgoverning—the Japanese World in the Imperial Dynasty's name.

¹ This Department of Shinto was set up as early as the first month of the first year of Meiji (A.D. 1868), and was reorganized three times before the close of the fourth year of the Meiji Era. Official instructors in Shinto were appointed by the Imperial Government in November 1870 (Holtom, op. cit., pp. 54-5).—A.J.T.

² For further details of this persecution see Holtom, pp. 56-8.—A.J.T.

³ The persecution was producing a disturbing and disruptive effect at a time of stress in which there was an urgent need for national stability and unity (Holtom, pp. 58-9).—A.J.T.

⁴ While the National Cult Department had been concerned exclusively with Shinto, the new Ecclesiastical Board or Department of Religion had Buddhism as well as Shinto under its aegis (Holtom, p. 59). After having failed, between A.D. 1868 and A.D. 1872, to drive Buddhism off the field by force, the Imperial Government next tried, from 1872 to 1875, to brigade Buddhism with Shinto and to drill the pair of them into working in double harness as a dual state religion (ibid., pp. 59-61). In 1875 this second experiment in regulating the relations between Church and State was abandoned in its turn.—A.J.T.

⁵ The Imperial Government gave up the last remnants of its control over the appointment and dismissal of priests of private sects—Buddhist and Shinto alike—in A.D. 1884 (Holtom, p. 62).—A.J.T.

gradually emerged out of the State Religion,¹ while the ceremonies in the Court and the communal Shinto cult were regarded as having nothing to do with religious teaching, but as civic institutions.² Thus subsided the frenzy of Shinto revival.³

The Western reader will not have failed to notice the curious analogy between this unsuccessful offensive which was launched against the Mahayanian Buddhist Church by a new régime in Japan and the contemporary attack—likewise ending in failure—which was made upon a Christian Catholic Church by a new régime in Germany. Like Bismarck, the architects of the Japanese Imperial Restoration were intoxicated by their success in endowing their country with a new political structure which appeared to answer to the needs of the times; and, like Bismarck again, they conceived it to be their duty, and imagined it to lie within their power, to make the new Nationalism prevail in the religious as well as in the secular sphere. In Japan, as in Germany, the nationalists had to be taught by a humiliating experience that the 'higher religions' which have sprung from the ruins of disintegrating civilizations with a message to deliver to all Mankind cannot easily be dragooned to suit the momentary exigencies of parochial politics.⁴

Our survey of Archaism in the field of Religion has not been exhaustive; for the examples which we have cited from the histories of three civilizations—the Western, the Hellenic, and the Far Eastern—can all be duplicated if we go farther afield. If

¹ The legal separation of the autonomous private Shinto sects from the state-regulated public Shinto establishment was carried out in A.D. 1882 (Holtom, op. cit., pp. 67-8). In 1938 thirteen private Shinto sects enjoyed official recognition, and their aggregate membership was estimated at little less than 17,400,000 (ibid., p. 69). Of these sects, six had been already in existence in the Tokugawa Period (A.D. 1600-1867), six had come into existence during the Meiji Period (A.D. 1868-1912), and one, which took final shape in the Meiji Period, had existed in the Tokugawa Period in an inchoate form (Kato, Genchi: *A Study of Shintô, the Religion of the Japanese Nation* (Tokyo 1926, Meiji Japan Society), p. 1). 'The one conspicuous point of identity between the Shintô of the State and that of the people lies in the deities that are honoured. The *kami* of Sect Shintô and those of State Shintô are for the most part one and the same' (Holtom, op. cit., p. 69). The private Shinto sects differ from State Shinto and resemble the 'higher religions' in the point of having personal founders (ibid., p. 68; Kato, op. cit., p. 210).—A.J.T.

² See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 707, footnote 2, above. On this point Kato, in op. cit., pp. 2-3, expresses the opinion 'that even this State Shintô, which some Japanese go so far as to speak of as no religion at all, is in reality nothing short of evidence of a religion interwoven in the very texture of the original beliefs and national organization of the people, camouflaged though it may be as a mere code of national ethics and State rituals, and as such apparently entitled only to secular respect. . . . Shintô—the State Shintô as well as the Sectarian Shintô—is in very truth a religion.' This authoritative Japanese opinion must carry weight.—A.J.T.

³ Anesaki, M.: *History of Japanese Religion* (London 1930, Kegan Paul), pp. 334-6.

⁴ This is a truth against which the ministers of the 'lower religions' rebel. In the words of a priest of the Atago [State Shinto] Shrine of Kyoto, quoted by Holtom, op. cit., p. 293:

"The shrines are Religion. They are real Religion. They are perfect Religion. If the statement will be permitted, it may be said that Christianity and Buddhism are side movements in Religion. They are incomplete religions. They are secondary religions."

we glance, for instance, at the Hindu World under the British Rāj, we may espy in the Arya Samāj¹ an analogue of the Neo-Shinto movement in its early days under the Tokugawa Shogunate. If we glance at the Babylonian World, we may see in Nabonidus an emperor of the Babylonian universal state who might have anticipated Augustus's archaistic *tour de force* if he had not come to grief through being too poor a politician and too keen an archaeologist. And, if we glance at the Iranian World, we may recognize a contemporary parallel to Professor Hauer's extravaganza of proposing to resuscitate a pre-Christian German paganism in the not less extravagant conceit, with which some play has been made in the Turkey of President Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk, of bringing back to life a dead and buried pre-Islamic Turkish wolf-worship.² Perhaps, however, we have already carried our survey far enough to bring out the psychological relation between the phenomenon of religious Archaism and the experience of social disintegration.

(ε) *The Self-Defeat of Archaism.*

If we now turn back and take a synoptic view of all the four fields in which we have been watching Archaism at work, we shall notice that in each field one or two of the examples which we have examined in order to discover what Archaism is are also illustrations of an apparent tendency in Archaism for the movement to defeat itself.

In the field of Institutions we can watch the two Heracleidae at Sparta, and in their footsteps the two Gracchi at Rome, embark on the archaistic enterprise of re-establishing an ancestral constitution which is still nominally in force but which has admittedly been ignored and even violated with a scandalous laxity. The young reformers are whole-heartedly sincere and enthusiastic in their pursuit of their archaistic aim; and yet their well-meant activities produce results which are the exact opposite of their single-minded intentions.³ Instead of achieving a reform they actually let loose a revolution which does not come to rest again until it has swept the last remnants of the *πάτριος πολιτεία* away. Again, in the field of Art, we see a Pre-Raphaelitism which is athirst to drink at the fountain-head of the Western artistic tradition being led by its archaistic quest into an anti-realism that dries up all the water brooks and leaves a desert in which nothing can

¹ An account of the Arya Samāj will be found in Farquhar, J. N.: *Modern Religious Movements in India* (New York 1919, Macmillan), pp. 101-29.

² We do know something about the pre-Islamic Nestorian Christianity which gained some hold upon the Turks in Central Asia before they began to drift into Dār-al-Islām (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 236-8, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 250, above); but it might be difficult to identify with assurance the mortal remains of a Turkish wolf-totem which, if authentic, must be pre-Christian as well as pre-Islamic.

³ Plutarch brings out this point in his *Comparison of Agis and Cleomenes with the Gracchi*, chap. 5.

live except the demon of Futurism. In the field of Language we see the efforts to call back to life an extinct form of Turkish or Hebrew or Irish succeeding in their *tour de force* of conjuring articulate and intelligible speech out of the silence of the grave—but this only at the price of defeating the archaists' own intentions by composing a new language which the simpletons who once spoke the original language as their mother-tongue might find it difficult either to speak or to understand.¹ In the field of Religion we see the would-be archaist Julian embarrassing the official representatives of a paganism which he is trying to bolster up by expecting these priests of Hellenic divinities to behave as though they were clergy of the Christian Church;² and we also see another would-be religious archaist, Nabonidus, positively enraging the priesthood of the Babylonian World to a degree of exasperation at which they are ready to welcome the alien invader Cyrus with open arms as a liberator from an indigenous régime which has insisted upon making itself intolerable.

These instances of Archaism defeating itself are too numerous and too consistent to be dismissed as mere tricks of Chance. It looks as though there must be something in the essence of Archaism that drives it into self-defeat in frustration of its conscious purpose; and we may be able to put our finger on this disconcerting factor when we remind ourselves that Archaism sets out to be no mere academic exercise but a practical way of life, and that what it promises to do is to grapple with the urgent human problem of combating the malady of social disintegration. If he is to justify his pretensions the archaist has to convince the philistine majority of his public that the nostrum which he is offering them is demonstrably capable of restoring an ailing social system to health. In fact, the archaist is pledged to 'make things work' again; and this formidable commitment compels him to become a man of action instead of remaining the pure archaeologist that, in his heart, he would probably prefer to be.

¹ There is a story—*ben trovato, se non vero*—that an eminent scholar of pure English extraction, who had spent his life in Dublin on the archaistic task of resuscitating the Irish language, at last made up his mind to harvest the reward for his long labour of love by holding converse with the survivors of an Irish-speaking peasantry on the banks of the Shannon. By the time when he reached his destination our scholar's eagerness had mounted to such a pitch that he burst into a torrent of his own Neo-Irish in the face of the first native whom he encountered on alighting from the train. After listening in silence for a minute or two with a look of blank incomprehension on his face, the native interrupted the visitor's flow of speech by remarking politely, in excellent English: 'I am sorry, but I don't know any German.' The scholar's choice vocabulary—culled from ancient Irish epics—had been no more intelligible to the bilingual westerner than so much Double-Dutch; and, finding himself thus surprisingly addressed in a language which he could not recognize as being either English or Irish, he had jumped to the conclusion that the gentleman who was addressing him must be one of those German engineers who were at that time superintending the construction of the Shannon Dam.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, vol. v, p. 584, above.

The point may be illustrated by considering the contrast between an archaeologist's and a dentist's way of dealing with a decayed tooth. When an archaeologist disinters a palaeolithic burial his business is to preserve his trove in a glass case in the exact condition in which he found it below the sod; so all that he has to do to the skeleton's teeth is to coat them with some chemical that will arrest their decay at the point which it has already reached. His problem is a simple one; for in the museum curator's keeping these teeth have no further function except to lie still and be looked at; their biting days are over once for all. The dentist's problem is not so easily solved; for what the dentist has to do with the decayed tooth of his living patient is not to provide an archaeologically-minded public with an informative 'museum piece', but to provide a live human being with a tooth that will stop aching and get back to work; so the dentist sets about 'restoring' the tooth in a way that would outrage the archaeologist's sense of professional honour. The dentist's first act is to whittle away the surviving remnant of the authentic original tooth by grinding out all the rotten parts; his second act is to fill the cavity, which he has thus deliberately enlarged, with foreign matter that will bite as hard as though it were the natural ivory. When the dentist has accomplished each of these two things he proudly assures his patient that he has given the old tooth a new lease of life; but this admirable dentistry would infuriate our archaeologist if he fancied himself as a headhunter. 'This charlatan', he would protest, 'professes to have restored that tooth when, as a matter of fact, as you can verify if you will look, he has removed the greater part of what was left of the real tooth and has then tried to cover his fraudulent tracks by inserting a mass of foreign matter which has been skilfully designed to deceive the layman's eye and make him believe that the "denture" at which he is looking is a genuine antiquity and not (as it really is) a fake. This so-called dentistry is nothing but an impudent deception of a credulous public.'

We may leave our two *dramatis personae* to continue an argument in which they will never be able to agree; but, if we have made it clear that Archaism is a kind of dentistry and not a kind of archaeology—notwithstanding the similarity of the names and the archaist's mistaken belief that they mean the same thing—then we may find that we have arrived at an explanation of the paradoxical fact that Archaism so often ends in defeating its own quite sincerely archaeological intentions. The archaist would, in fact, appear to be condemned, by the very nature of his enterprise, to be for ever trying to reconcile Past and Present; and the proneness of their competing claims to prove incompatible is the weakness of

Archaism as a way of life. The archaist is on the horns of a dilemma which is likely to impale him, whichever way he may lean. If he tries to restore the Past without taking the Present into consideration, then the impetus of Life—an elemental force which he can never arrest—will shatter into fragments the brittle shell that he is bent on retrieving. On the other hand, if he consents to subordinate his whim of resuscitating the Past to the task of making the Present *viable*, then, in the name of restoration, he will be led on and on into 'scrapping' so much of what is left of the Past, and introducing so much new masonry to reinforce the remnant, that his pious work of 'reconstruction' will be difficult to distinguish from the Vandalism of naked demolition and replacement. On either alternative the archaist will find, at the end of his labours, that unwittingly or unwillingly he has been playing the futurist's game. In labouring to perpetuate an anachronism he will in fact have been opening the door to some ruthless innovation that has been lying in wait outside for this very opportunity of forcing an entry.

9. *Futurism*

(α) *The Relation between Futurism and Archaism.*

There is an antithesis between Futurism and Archaism that is brought out by the mere juxtaposition of the two words; yet the obvious difference of orientation which distinguishes these two ways of life is not so significant as are the characteristic features that they have in common. Futurism and Archaism are, both alike, attempts to break with an irksome Present by taking a flying leap out of it into another reach of the stream of Time without abandoning the plane of mundane life on Earth. And these two alternative ways of attempting to escape from the Present but not from the Time-dimension also resemble one another in the further point of being *tours de force* which prove, on trial, to have been forlorn hopes.¹ The two movements differ merely in the direction—up or down the Time-stream—in which they make their two equally desperate sorties from a position of present discomfort and distress which neither the futurist nor the archaist has any longer the heart to hold; and this difference of direction is not a difference of kind. At the same time, Futurism does differ materially from Archaism in the degree in which it goes against the grain of human nature; for, while human beings are prone to seek refuge from a disagreeable Present by retreating into a familiar Past,² they are

¹ These points of likeness between Futurism and Archaism have been touched upon, by anticipation, in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 383-5, above.

² An illustration of this tendency on the political plane is the well-known human

equally prone to cling to a disagreeable Present rather than strike out into an unknown Future.

The spectacle of Time perpetually marching forward over the corpse of a Present that Time's scythe is perpetually mowing down is so appalling to human minds that they are apt to recoil into a passionate yearning for continuity, in the spirit of the mortal worshipper's prayer to an immortal God in the Hundred and Second Psalm:

'I said: "O my God, take me not away in the midst of my days: thy years are throughout all generations.

' "Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the Earth, and the Heavens are the work of thy hands.

' "They shall perish, but thou shalt endure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed;

' "But thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end.

' "The children of thy servants shall continue, and their seed shall be established before thee." '1

In this expression of the pathos of Syriac souls in one chapter of the long-drawn-out disintegration of the Syriac Society we see Humanity seeking to win an exemption from the doom of being carried away on the inexorable flow of the Time-stream by catching at the skirts of a divine Eternity which is naïvely conceived of as a Present prolonged into infinity.²

This natural human horror at the ever imminent prospect of the annihilation of a Present which can never really be prolonged can no doubt be counteracted, and even overcome, either by a philosophical fortitude in facing hard facts without flinching or by a religious intuition of a 'larger hope' lightening the darkness of death.

The philosophical response to the challenge of Mutability is to

weakness of recalling 'elder statesmen' to power in times of political crisis (as, for example, they were recalled in many of the countries that were belligerents in the General War of 1914-18). This is one of the classic examples of a vein of Archaism that is instinctive and unreasoning. A rational calculation would lead to the conclusion that these 'elder statesmen' are the last people to whom a community can safely commit its destinies in an emergency, since, *ex hypothesi*, these 'dug-outs' are doubly incapacitated—in the first place by the lassitude of old age and secondly, and more seriously, by the obsolescence of their outlook and their habits. It is virtually impossible for them to be abreast of the times, considering that the experience on which they have been formed is bound to have been thrown out of date by the very onset of the crisis which the 'elder statesmen' have to thank for their recall.

¹ Ps. cii. 24-8.

² The yearning that is expressed in this passage is foredoomed to frustration, not because it is utterly impossible under all conditions for the Human Soul to enter into God's mode of being by attaining union with Him, but because it is not possible to achieve this spiritual transfiguration without rising above the mundane plane of life. The prayer in the last verse is for a continuity of human social life in This World as a miraculous special dispensation from the 'law'—truly cited in the three preceding verses—which condemns all the works of God's creation, *qua* creatures, to be ephemeral. As a statement, and a magnificent statement, of this 'law', vv. 25-7, without vv. 24 and 28, have already been quoted in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 285, above.

be heard in the concordant voices of an Epicurean poet and a Stoic emperor whose consensus on this crucial point reveals a fundamental unity of outlook at the heart of two classic expressions of the Hellenic philosophy which are superficially antagonistic to one another.¹

Lucretius strikes a note which is as true to the temper of his Master as it is remote from the spirit that is vulgarly attributed to the Epicurean school:

cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas
semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest. . . .
materies opus est ut crescant postera saecula,
quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur;
nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere, cadentque.
sic alid ex alio nunquam desistet oriri,
vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu.²

This Epicurean poetry is echoed by Marcus Aurelius in Stoic prose:

'You are afraid of Change? But nothing can happen without Change; it is something that is of the essence of the nature of the Universe. You cannot even take a hot bath without the fuel undergoing one kind of change, or digest your dinner without the food undergoing another. In fact, without the possibility of Change there could be no satisfaction for any of our needs; and in this light it becomes evident that, when it is your own turn to change into something other than yourself, this is all in the day's work—just another necessity of Nature. . . . In Nature's hands the sum of things is like a lump of wax. At one moment she moulds it into a toy horse; then she kneads up the horse in order to mould the same stuff into a toy tree; then she makes it into a mannikin, and then into something else. The duration of each of these successive shapes is infinitesimally short, but where is the grievance? Does it do a packing-case any more harm to be broken up than it does it good to be knocked together?'³

The religious response to the challenge which Philosophy meets in this way is to be found in the New Testament in two variants of one simile:

'That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die,'⁴

and

'Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die it abideth alone, but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit.'⁵

¹ For the relation between Epicureanism and Stoicism see V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 394, above, and V. C (i) (d) 10, *passim*, in the present volume, pp. 132-48, below.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 964-5 and 967-71.

³ Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book VII, chaps. 18 and 23.

⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 36.

⁵ John xii. 24.

In these flashes of religious light¹ an apparently merciless sacrifice of a sensitive Present to a callous Future is seen as an illusion in which the growing-pains of a single immortal soul have been falsely construed into a war to the knife between two irreconcilable adversaries. On this view the underlying reality is not an inconsequent Mutability but a triumphant Withdrawal-and-Return—a reality which is as glorious as the illusion is repulsive.² Yet, whether they thrill us with their ecstasy or impress us with their fortitude, these two diverse reactions to the prospect of annihilation still testify with one accord to the unnaturalness of a Futurism which spurns the Present instead of clinging to it and which springs forward to meet the Future instead of cowering back to put off the moment of its inevitable impact.

Here is a psychological *tour de force* which is keyed to a distinctly higher pitch than its archaistic alternative; and, in view of this striking difference between Futurism and Archaism in degree

¹ It is curious to observe the diffraction of these beams of light from the New Testament in the labyrinthine preciosity of a modern Western poet. Yet it is indeed the same spiritual truth that is declared in Edmund Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, Canto vii, Stanza 58, in the judgement given by Nature in the contest between Mutability and Jove for the lordship of the Universe:

I well consider all that ye have sayd,
And find that all things stedfastnes doe hate
And changed be: yet being rightly wayd
They are not changed from their first estate;
But by their change their being doe dilate;
And turning to themselves at length againe,
Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate:
Then over them Change doth not rule and raigne;
But they raigne over Change, and doe their states maintaine.

The hope of transfiguration which is implicit in this movement of Withdrawal-and-Return is enlarged upon in the following stanzas in the eighth canto of the same poem:

When I bethinke me on that speech whyleare,
Of Mutability, and well it way:
Me seemes, that though she all unworthy were
Of the Heav'ns Rule; yet very sooth to say,
In all things else she beares the greatest sway.
Which makes me loath this state of life so tickle
And love of things so vaine to cast away;
Whose flowring pride, so fading and so fickle,
Short time shall soon cut down with his consuming sickle.

Then gin I thinke on that which Nature sayd,
Of that same time when no more Change shall be,
But stedfast rest of all things firmly stayd
Upon the pillours of Eternity,
That is contrayr to Mutabilitie:
For all that moveth doth in Change delight,
But thence forth all shall rest eternally
With Him that is the God of Sabbatho hight:
O that great Sabbatho God, grant me that Sabbath's sight.

² The two passages here quoted from the New Testament have been quoted already—the Pauline passage at greater length—in the analysis of the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 258, above. In the two passages of Greek poetry that are quoted on the preceding page of the same volume the opposite belief that the appearance of annihilation is no illusion but is an ultimate as well as inexorable reality is expressed with a poetic pathos which reflects the same mood of resignation as the Stoic and Epicurean note of philosophic fortitude, notwithstanding the difference of tone between these two alternative variations on one theme.

of abnormality, it is remarkable to observe that a lighter penalty is exacted for the wider aberration. While Archaism, as we have seen,¹ is frequently required to pay the crushing penalty of defeating its own aim by collapsing into Futurism, we shall find that Futurism is sometimes rewarded for its greater transgression by being allowed to transcend itself through rising into Transfiguration. If we may liken the catastrophe of Archaism to the crash of a motor-car which skids right round on its tracks and then rushes to destruction in the opposite direction to that in which the unhappy driver was steering before the machine escaped from his control, the happier experience of Futurism may be likened to that of a passenger on board a motor-driven vehicle who believes himself to be travelling in a terrestrial omnibus and observes, with deepening dismay, the ever-increasing roughness of the *terrain* over which he is being carried forward, until suddenly—at the moment when it looks and feels as though an accident can no longer be staved off—the vehicle rises from the ground at a turn of the unseen pilot's wrist and soars over crags and chasms in its own element. While the archaist driver of our imaginary motor-car fares worse than he has had reason to fear, the futurist passenger in our imaginary aeroplane fares better than he has had any right to expect.

(β) *The Breach with the Present.*

The Breach in Manners.

The futuristic, like the archaistic, way of breaking with the Present can be studied empirically in a number of different fields of social activity; but we need not always map these out on precisely the same lines. We may vary the map to suit the subject; and in our study of Futurism it may prove convenient to deal separately with Manners and with Institutions; to bring Language and Literature and the Visual Arts together under the common head of Secular Culture; and to take Religion by itself, as we have taken it before in our studies of Archaism and of the Sense of Promiscuity.

In the field of Manners the first gesture in which Futurism is wont to advertise itself is the exchange of a traditional for an outlandish costume; and in the ubiquitously—though still no more than superficially—Westernized World of the present day² we have already been offered the spectacle of a host of non-Western societies, from China to Peru, abandoning a hereditary and distinctive

¹ In V. C (i) (d) 8 (ε), pp. 94-7, above.

² For the superficiality of the Westernization (so far as it has yet gone) of the surviving non-Western Societies see I. B (iii), vol. i, pp. 35-6, above.

dress and conforming to a drably exotic Western fashion as an outward and visible sign of their voluntary or involuntary enrolment in a vastly swollen Western internal proletariat.

The most famous, as well as the earliest, example of a forcible process of external Westernization is the shaving of beards and banning of kaftans in Muscovy at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era by order of Peter the Great.¹ In the third quarter of the nineteenth century this Muscovite revolution in costume was emulated in Japan. And in our own Post-War Age similar circumstances have evoked similar acts of tyranny in a number of non-Western countries in which a long-postponed course of Westernization is now being taken by forced marches under the lash of local dictators. In the forcibly Westernized Turkey of President Mustafâ Kernâl Atatürk the unveiling of the women² has been the counterpart of the shaving of the men in the forcibly Westernized Muscovy of Peter the Great; but in the Islamic World of this age the main battle of Futurism in the field of dress has been fought over the question of masculine head-gear, which in this society has been traditionally invested with a greater social and even political significance than any other article of dress.³ The landmarks in the progress of this struggle are the Turkish law of November 1925 which has made it compulsory for all male Turkish citizens to wear hats with brims,⁴ and the corre-

¹ The shaving of Muscovite beards was executed not merely by Peter's orders but actually by the futurist Tsar's own hand upon certain conspicuous countenances. This was, in fact, the gesture by which Peter, upon his return from his Western tour in the autumn of A.D. 1698, elected to announce his programme of forcible Westernization to some of the dignitaries of his hitherto Byzantine empire when they presented themselves in order to welcome him home; and we may be sure that this 'positive act', performed by the Tsar in person, had a greater effect upon the Muscovite imagination than the elaborate official regulations, *more Occidentali*, by which it was followed up. Some details of Peter's futuristic campaign against the traditional Muscovite costume have already been set out in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 283, footnote 1, above. In taking this plunge into a forcibly imposed sartorial Futurism, Peter was blindly perpetuating the methods, while abruptly reversing the policy, of his recent predecessors on the Muscovite Imperial Throne. Before Peter's accession the Government of Muscovy had been more conservative than the people, and its exercise of a tyrannical authority in the domain of dress had therefore taken the form of a veto upon innovations. In the reign of Peter's own father Alexei (*imperabat* A.D. 1645-76) the wearing of Polish costume had been forbidden by a law of A.D. 1675 (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 218); and in the same reign the offence of adopting the Western style of coiffure had been punished by excommunication and dismissal from office (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 220). The father's tyrannical Conservatism, however, was a mild affliction by comparison with the son's tyrannical Futurism; for Peter's father had merely been lagging a short distance behind a small minority of his subjects, whereas Peter was forging far ahead of the vast majority of his.

² See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1928 (London 1929, Milford), pp. 202-3.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 203-5, and *Survey of International Affairs*, 1936 (London 1937, Milford), pp. 777-8, as well as Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 73-5.

⁴ The passage of this law had the effect of forcing all male Turkish citizens into making a breach with one of the outward observances of Islam; for the Islamic form of prayer requires the worshipper both to keep his head covered and to touch the ground with his forehead; and it is impossible to observe both these prescriptions in any head-

sponding decrees of Rizā Shāh Pehlevī of Iran and King Amānallāh of Afghanistan which followed in 1928.¹

The Islamic World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era is not the only arena in which a hat with a brim has been adopted as the battle-crest of a militant Futurism. In the Syriac World in the fourth decade of the second century B.C. the High Priest Joshua—who was the leader of a faction in Jewry which was eager at that time to repudiate at least the external trappings of the Jewish community's native cultural heritage—was not content to advertise his programme by the verbal gesture of hellenizing his own name from Joshua into Jason. The 'positive act' which provoked the demonic reaction of the Maccabees was the adoption by the younger priests of the Temple in Jerusalem, at Joshua's instigation, of the broad-brimmed felt sun-hat which was the distinctive headgear of the pagan dominant minority in the Achaemenian Empire's Hellenic 'successor-states'. In the sight of

dress with a brim. In the summer of the year 1929 the writer of this Study noticed the embarrassment which the new law was then inflicting upon the devout worshippers in the Mosque of Sultan Mehmed Fātih in Stamboul (see Toynbee, A. J.: *A Journey to China* (London 1931, Constable), p. 69); and it is difficult not to suspect—though perhaps no less difficult to prove—that this was one of the effects which the law was deliberately designed to produce. It is noteworthy that this futuristic imposition of the Western brimmed hat upon male Turkish citizens in 1925 followed hard upon the heels of a short-lived archaistic fashion of wearing the *galpāq*, a brimless black lambskin cap which was a trivial part of the Ottoman Turks' heritage from the Eurasian Nomad minority of their ancestors. It will be seen that the wearing of the *galpāq* was the equivalent, in the field of dress, of the linguistic Archaism that has been purifying the Ottoman Turkish language of the non-Turkish elements in its vocabulary (see V. C (i) (d) 8 (γ), pp. 67–8, above). The change from the archaistic Eurasian *galpāq* to the futuristic Western Homburg hat was abrupt; for as late as April 1923, when the writer of this Study paid his first visit to Angora, he soon discovered that the hat which he had brought on his own head from London was anathema in Anatolia because in Turkish eyes it was then still a symbol of the imperialism of the Western Powers and of the self-assertiveness of the Orthodox and Gregorian Christian *ra'īyeh*. The *galpāq*, which was so soon to be supplanted by this ex-enemy headgear, had already supplanted the *fez*; and the *fez*, too, had been an innovation in its day. It had been introduced by Sultan Mahmūd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808–39) as an alternative to the invidiously distinctive variety of headgear that had previously been either obligatory or customary in the Ottoman Empire. It is noteworthy that Mahmūd does not appear to have made the wearing of the *fez* compulsory except for public servants.

¹ Rizā Shāh banned the sugar-loaf-shaped felt *kulāh*—which, on the evidence of Achaemenian bas-reliefs, had been the customary Persian male headgear since at least the fifth century B.C.—but he was prudent enough to make a compromise with the susceptibilities of his subjects in selecting his compulsory substitute. Instead of following the precedent of the Turkish law of November 1925, Rizā Shāh constrained his male subjects to wear, not the civilian Western hat of the day, but the so-called *Kulāh Pehlevī*, a fancy head-dress, designed by the Shah himself, more or less on the pattern of the contemporary headgear of officers in the French Army. King Amānallāh—who had to deal with a population which was still more conservative than that of Persia—made the mistake which Rizā Shāh avoided. Amānallāh did attempt to follow the Turkish example; and this was the crowning folly that cost him his throne (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 333, above, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 234, below). On the other hand, in the relatively progressive 'successor-state' of the Ottoman Empire that has been established in 'Irāq, the first sovereign, King Faysal b. Husayn, exercised an even greater prudence than Rizā Shāh; for the 'Faysal cap' which he introduced is modelled, not on the peaked cap of the French Army, but on the soft and brimless forage-cap of the British Army, in which any devout Muslim can perform his prayer-drill without impediment.

the orthodox Palestinian Jews of the day this spectacle was as shocking as it would be to the eyes of our twentieth-century Palestinian Arab Muslims if the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem were to air himself in the Haram-ash-Sharīf with a sola topee on his head. And in the Jewish case in point the rapid progress of the futurist furore was soon to give the puritans reason; for the young priests of Yahweh did not confine their revolutionary cult of Hellenism to the wearing of the *petasus*. Their Hellenic headgear was not so shocking as the Hellenic nakedness with which they practised Hellenic sports in a Hellenic palaestra. Hellenic athletic competitions led on to Hellenic dramatic festivals; and, almost before the conservatively orthodox majority of the Palestinian Jewish community had realized what was happening, the 'raging tearing campaign' of Futurism had arrived at its sacrilegious culmination.

'They shall pollute the sanctuary of strength and shall take away the daily sacrifice, and they shall place the abomination that maketh desolate.'¹

Jason's futuristic campaign had started as a voluntary movement; and, for all its radicalism, it had not trespassed beyond the limits of a secular field of action in which it might give offence to Jewish taste without driving Jewish consciences to desperation. But the Jewish High Priest Jason had been working under the patronage of the Seleucid Emperor Antiochus Epiphanes; and the patron held in the hollow of his hand a client who was merely the prelate of one of those diminutive temple-states which were embedded

¹ Dan. xi. 31. The crescendo movement of Jason's futurist 'ramp' is depicted, in colours which are as vivid as they are unflattering, in a celebrated passage in the Second Book of Maccabees:

'After the passing of Seleucus [IV] and the accession of Antiochus the God Manifest (so called), Jason the brother of Onias wormed his way into the High Priesthood. He achieved this by petitioning the King and promising him 360 talents of silver per annum, besides 80 talents from other sources of revenue. In addition he undertook to levy another 150 talents if he were also empowered by royal authority to establish a physical training centre (*γυμνάσιον*) and a youth club (*ἐφηβείον*) and to register the inhabitants of Jerusalem as citizens of Antioch. The King gave his assent; and the new High Priest had no sooner taken up the reins of office than he set himself to transform his countrymen into Hellenes. He brushed aside the royal charter that had been secured to the Jews by the efforts of John the father of Eupolemus, and he made havoc of their lawful institutions in order to make room for impious innovations. He took a peculiar pleasure in installing his physical training centre under the very shadow of the citadel, enrolling the pick of the youth, and putting them into slouch hats (*ἀρμένις* . . . *τοὺς κρατίστους τῶν ἐφήβων* . . . *ὑπὸ πέτασον ἤγαγεν*). Indeed, the unparalleled profanity of Jason, who behaved more like an enemy of Religion than like a High Priest, gave Hellenism such a vogue and Renegadism such an impetus that the priests lost interest in the Liturgy, looked down upon the Temple, neglected the sacrifices and cared for nothing but to enter themselves for competitions in discus-throwing and to take their part in all the impious performances in the ring. They despised what their forefathers had honoured, and regarded Hellenic notions as the best in the world. In retribution for this they were overtaken by serious misfortunes and received their punishment at the hands of the very nation whose ways they had admired and wanted to ape in every particular. The laws of Heaven cannot be defied with impunity, as the sequel will show' (2 Macc. iv. 7-17).

here and there in the vast body politic of the Seleucid Empire.¹ When it suited Antiochus's convenience he sold Jason's office over Jason's head to a rival aspirant² who was not only a higher bidder for the Jewish High Priesthood but was also a more violent futurist; and, when the evicted Jason descended upon Jerusalem from his asylum in Transjordan and expelled his supplanter by a *coup de main*, Antiochus promptly took advantage of the opening given him by this act of Jewish rebellion in order to intervene personally with a high hand. He marched on Jerusalem; crushed the revolt; installed a Macedonian garrison; confiscated the treasure of the Temple for the benefit of his own insatiable exchequer; and put (as he supposed) the finishing touch to the work of Hellenization, in which Jason had played his part as pioneer, by courteously identifying 'the Heaven-God of Jerusalem'³ with the Olympian Zeus and graciously providing the necessary statue of the god—portrayed in the Emperor's own image—to fill the void in a hitherto bleakly vacant Holy of Holies.⁴ 'The Abomination of Desolation, spoken of by Daniel the Prophet, standing where it ought not,'⁵ was the swift and fearful nemesis of Joshua-Jason's futuristic escapade.⁶

The ultimate outcome of this Jewish essay in Futurism in the second century B.C. was not a triumph like Peter the Great's but a fiasco like Amānallāh's; for the Seleucid Power's frontal attack upon the Jewish religion evoked a Jewish reaction of a violence⁷ with which Epiphanes and his successors found themselves unable to cope.⁸ Yet the fact that this particular essay in Futurism

¹ For these temple-states, which were the debris of shattered civilizations, see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 312, footnote 1, and p. 422, footnote 3; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 471; and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 515-18, above.

² We have no record of the Jewish name which was hellenized into Menelaus by Joshua-Jason's supplanter (Bevan, *Jerusalem under the High Priests* (London 1904, Arnold), p. 80).

³ For this description of Yahweh, under which the tribal god of Jewry had been commended by the Jews themselves to the notice of the Pagan World, see the passage quoted from Eduard Meyer in V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 33, above.

⁴ For the measures taken by Antiochus Epiphanes at Jerusalem see Bevan, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-2.

⁵ Mark xiii. 14; cf. Matt. xxiv. 15.

⁶ The swiftness of the nemesis is impressive if it is true that Antiochus's devastating act of introducing the Hellenic idol into the Jewish Holy of Holies followed within eight years of Jason's apparently innocuous act of putting his young priests into Hellenic hats.

⁷ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 68 and 72-3, above.

⁸ Eduard Meyer, in *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 143, makes a suggestive comparison between Antiochus Epiphanes and the Hapsburg Emperor Joseph II. The Seleucid Empire was already labouring under the shock of its collision with Rome by the time when Antiochus Epiphanes (no doubt unwittingly) challenged Jewry to a fight to the death with the Emperor's Hellenism. Within ten years of the conquest of Coele Syria by Antiochus the Great in 198 B.C. the Seleucid conqueror of the Ptolemy had been routed by Scipio Asiagenus at Magnesia and had been compelled, as part of a peace settlement which was dictated to him by the Roman Government, to consent to a drastic limitation of Seleucid armaments. And Antiochus Epiphanes himself had been publicly humiliated by a Roman Commissioner before the walls of Pelusium (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, vol. v, p. 628, footnote 2,

happens to have been abortive does not make it any the less instructive; and one of the points which it illustrates is the impossibility of indulging in Futurism within fore-appointed limits. The essence of Futurism is a breach with the present; and, when once there has been a lesion at any point in the fabric of social life, the rent will extend itself and the threads will continue to unravel—even if the original rift was minute and even if the point at which it was made lay on the outermost fringe of the web. The *êthos* of Futurism is intrinsically 'totalitarian'; and the evidence which points to this conclusion is by no means confined to the single instance which has led us up to it. Just as the Jew who takes to wearing the *petasus* soon learns to frequent the palaestra and the amphitheatre, so the Muscovite who has been dragooned into wearing a Western wig goes on to dance the fashionable Western dances and play the fashionable Western card-games, while in a later generation the Turk in a Homburg hat and the Persian in a Pehlevî cap cannot be kept off the football field or out of the cinema hall. In these cases, as in that, the abandonment of a traditional style of dress leads on to a general revolution in manners; and this is not the end of the futurist rake's progress. For, while in the Islamic World to-day the post-war fever of Futurism is still in the innocuous preliminary external stage of the Jewish movement under Jason's brief régime, Japan, who anticipated Turkey by three-quarters of a century in discarding her traditional male costume, is already being haunted by the spectre of 'dangerous thought', while in Russia—where the change of costume occurred about a century and three-quarters earlier than in Japan—the process has culminated in our day¹ in a campaign against the ancestral religion of the land

above) only a few months before he stormed the walls of Jerusalem and desecrated the Temple. The main lines of Epiphanes' ill-starred policy can all be traced back to the effects of Roman pressure. His abortive campaign of forcible Hellenization was an ill-judged effort to reinvigorate his empire by consolidating it. His abortive invasion of Egypt was a hazardous attempt to take advantage of the Romans' preoccupation with Perseus in order to secure a belated territorial compensation for the loss of the former possessions of the Seleucid Monarchy north-west of Taurus. The financial straits which tempted Antiochus to resort to the fatal expedient of robbing his Jewish subjects of their temple-treasures were the price of his own costly military adventure in Egypt following upon the payment of the heavy war-indemnity which had been exacted by the Romans from his predecessor Antiochus the Great. Before the Seleucid Government was pushed or led into these fatal courses in consequence of its encounter with Rome, its yoke had weighed lightly, by comparison with the rival Ptolemaic Government's yoke, upon its Oriental subjects' necks (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 65, above).

¹ The pace of Futurism in Russia has, of course, been much slower than the pace at which it moved in Palestine in the second century B.C.; for while, as we have seen, the installation of 'the Abomination of Desolation' in the Holy of Holies may have followed within eight years of the adoption of the *petasus* by Joshua-Jason's young men, there is an interval of no less than 228 years between the date of Peter the Great's effective accession to power in A.D. 1689 and the date of the Bolshevik Revolution of A.D. 1917. This difference of pace is evidently due to one signal difference in the course of events. The hand which placed the statue of Zeus Olympius in the Temple of Yahweh at Jerusalem was the hand of an alien intruder; and the fact that Antiochus was not a Jew but a Greek accounts both for the swiftness with which the Palestinian drama reached its culmina-

which is being conducted with a far more powerful 'drive' than Antiochus was able to put into his casual assault upon the traditional worship of Yahweh.

On this showing, we may expect to see Futurism invade the sanctuary of Religion sooner or later in any society in which this contagious way of life has once asserted itself in the trivial and frivolous spheres of dress and recreation; but in its victorious advance from the outworks to the citadel of the Soul a futuristic movement has to traverse the intermediate zones of Politics and Secular Culture; and we must therefore take a survey of its effects in these two fields before pursuing our inquiry into the supreme effort to break with the Present which Futurism makes when it turns its batteries upon the ancestral religion of a society whose less intimate ancestral institutions have already been razed to the ground in the earlier stages of the offensive.

The Breach in Institutions.

In the political sphere Futurism may express itself either geographically in the deliberate obliteration of existing landmarks and boundaries or socially in the forcible dissolution of existing corporations, parties, and sects or 'liquidation' of existing classes or abolition of existing organs or offices of state; and it may be convenient to survey separately some of the outstanding examples of its operation in these two different fields, though in practice a futuristic political revolution is apt to extend over both fields if it has succeeded in making headway in either one of them.

The classical example of a systematic obliteration of landmarks and boundaries for the express purpose of producing a breach of political continuity is the redrawing of the political map of Attica by a successful revolutionary, Cleisthenes the Alcmaeonid, *circa* 507 B.C. Cleisthenes' aim was to transform a loosely-knit polity, in which the claims of kinship had hitherto usually prevailed over those of the community whenever the two allegiances had come into conflict, into a unitary state in which the obligation of citizenship would in future override all lesser loyalties. He perceived that these lesser loyalties, which he wished to weaken or break, were strong in virtue of their possessing 'a local habitation and a name';¹ and accordingly he replaced—or at any rate overlaid—the

tion and for the fierceness of the reaction which eventually rendered the whole movement abortive. If Joshua-Jason's Seleucid patron and master had had the wisdom to refrain from intervening in person, and had left the Jewish futurist movement to work itself out at its own natural pace under exclusively Jewish auspices, it is conceivable that the first century of the Christian Era might have witnessed an eradication of the worship of Yahweh by Jewish hands instead of witnessing, as it did, the outburst of Jewish Zealotism which culminated in the great Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70 (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 68, above).

¹ Shakespeare: *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act v, Scene 1, l. 17.

traditional Attic *phylae* and *phratritiae* and *genê* with a brand-new set of artificially invented and arbitrarily delimited *phylae* and *trittyes* and *dêmi* which would foster the allegiance of their members to the all-embracing city-state of Athens of which these new geographical circumscriptions, unlike the old kin-groups, were mere articulations without any prior or independent life of their own.¹

This precedent from Hellenic history has been followed in our Western World by the makers of the French Revolution—whether consciously, as part of their cult of Hellenism, or because they lighted independently upon the same means for compassing an identical end. Aiming at the political unification of France as Cleisthenes had aimed at that of Attica, these French political futurists did in fact adopt the Cleisthenic device of abolishing the old provincial boundaries and levelling the old internal customs barriers in order to turn France into a unitary fiscal area subdivided for administrative convenience into departments whose monotonous uniformity and strict subordination were intended to efface the memory of the historic provinces with their persistent traditions of diversity and autonomy. To-day the departments of France bid fair to prove, as the demes of Attica proved, the most durable monuments of the revolution whose fiat first traced their boundaries on the map; and already this feat of geographical Futurism in France has had repercussions in other parts of

¹ Cleisthenes' revolutionary reconstruction of the political map of Attica was justified by its fruits; for it did produce precisely that overriding sense of loyalty to the state which it had been intended to produce; and, with this artificial reinforcement, the Athenian civic consciousness developed a strength and tenacity which could bear comparison even with the Spartiates' public spirit. The brilliance of Cleisthenes' success as a revolutionary may perhaps be accounted for in part by the fact that this Athenian political futurist was also the scion of a noble house with a strong family tradition. At any rate, whether for this or for some other reason, Cleisthenes was one of those rare revolutionaries that have had the insight to understand the potency of Conservatism and the wisdom to harness this mighty social force for their own purposes. When Cleisthenes set himself to replace the four historic *phylae* of Attica with ten brand-new *phylae* of his own invention, he took pains to invest his new creations with an air of antiquity and a halo of sanctity. He solved the delicate problem of providing his new ten tribes with names by drawing up a panel of a hundred names of mythical Attic heroes and then persuading the Oracle at Delphi (where the Alcmaeonidae had influence) to designate ten as being the most appropriate (Aristotle: *Institutions of Athens*, chap. 21). The Cleisthenic 'tribes' thus started life with a religious sanction which soon gave them as powerful a hold upon the allegiance of the citizens enrolled in them as if they had been in existence since time immemorial; and this new allegiance to the ten Cleisthenic tribes, in contrast to the old allegiance to the four Ionic tribes, had the effect of fortifying, instead of competing with, the members' simultaneous allegiance to the Athenian city-state. (It is true that in Attica the Ionic tribes, too, in their day, may have started as artificial articulations of the body politic which were copied, in this case, from Miletus or some other city-state of Ionia in which these tribes were an indigenous institution representing the several 'swarms' of migrants in the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung whose political union in their new place of settlement had brought a new body politic to birth (see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 97-8, above). But, if the introduction of the Ionic tribes into Attica really had been an anticipation of Cleisthenes' invention of his ten tribes, the earlier political revolution had miscarried; for by Cleisthenes' time the Ionic tribes in Attica had become incorporated into the indigenous kin-group organization of *phratritiae* and *genê*.)

Europe. It is true that the departments on the French model which were instituted under the Napoleonic régime in those tracts of Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries that were incorporated into the Napoleonic Empire and its client states did not survive the downfall of Napoleon and the consequent reduction of France to her old limits by the re-establishment of the frontiers of A.D. 1792. Yet, although these departments in the French Revolutionary style *in partibus peregrinorum* were themselves ephemeral, their negative effect upon the political map of Europe has been lasting and profound; for in the short period of their currency they did effectively obliterate the pre-existing political landmarks, and thereby they cleared the ground for the erection of a united Italy and a united Germany whose makers have been persistently inspired by the pattern of a united France until, in our own day, they have turned imitation into caricature by carrying it to 'totalitarian' lengths.¹ In Germany under the National-Socialist régime Herr Hitler has been following out at any rate one of 'the Ideas of 1789' in his move to replace the *Länder* of the Reich, with their unwelcome historic associations of dynastic particularism, by *Gaue* in which the essential unity of the Reich will be proclaimed in the very artificiality of these new-fangled geographical articulations.²

While Herr Hitler has been experimenting—with a caution that seems alien from the Nazi *êthos*—in this enterprise of remapping 'the Third Reich' on futuristic lines, his 'opposite number' Monsieur Stalin has given characteristic expression to the Bolshevik *êthos* in the geographical field by carrying to completion a far more radical rearticulation of the internal divisions of the Soviet Union.

The thoroughness of the breach of continuity which has been made by Stalin in this sphere becomes apparent when the new administrative map of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics³ is superimposed upon the old administrative map of the Russian Empire; for it would be hard to find a sector where the two sets of lines coincide. The autonomous Uzbek khanates and Cossack republics have been swept away as unceremoniously as the subdivisions of those territories that used to be under the direct administration of St. Petersburg; and these old administrative

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), Annex I, vol. v, pp. 636-42, above.

² In theory the *Gaue* into which the National-Socialist Party has been remapping 'the Third Reich' for certain purposes are archaistic restorations of the tribal communities into which the German-speaking population of the Continent of Europe was divided in the Dark Ages, before the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire. The practical purpose, however, which these new *Gaue* are intended to serve is the futuristic aim of obliterating the vestiges of the dynastic states into which Germany broke up as the Holy Roman Empire weathered away.

³ See the English text of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adopted [on the 5th December, 1936] at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow 1937. Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R.), chap. 2, arts. 13 and 22-7.

units have been replaced by a complicated hierarchy of new ones—ranging from the constituent states of the Union down to a number of autonomous republics and districts within their respective borders—which bears no relation whatsoever to the old administrative 'lay-out'. Stalin's motive in carrying out his geographical revolution has been the same as Hitler's and Cleisthenes'. His aim, like theirs, has been to make sure that the common allegiance of his fellow citizens to the commonwealth as a whole shall be stronger than their parochial allegiance to any lesser geographical unit. In pursuing this identical aim, however, Stalin has acted with a subtlety in which he is perhaps a pioneer. Whereas his predecessors and contemporaries have all alike sought to attain their purpose of weakening the existing parochial loyalties by effacing the landmarks to which these loyalties have attached, Stalin has pursued the exactly contrary policy of satisfying, and even anticipating, the cravings of parochialism on the shrewd calculation that an appetite is more likely to be stifled by satiety than it is to be extinguished by starvation.

Stalin has perceived in advance that one of the most formidable impediments to the triumph of the Marxian 'ideology' among the peoples of the Soviet Union is likely to be the attraction of the alternative 'ideology' of Nationalism—a competing Western political idea which has already captured some of the most highly cultivated peoples of the Union, such as the Ukrainians, Georgians, and Armenians, and which is likely to continue to spread until its leaven—or virus—will have infected even the most remote and backward tribes in the mountain-fastnesses of the Caucasus and Altai and in the tundras beyond the Arctic Circle. Recognizing that this unwelcome triumph of Nationalism is at least as probable as the triumph of the Communism which it is his mission to promote, Stalin has set himself to prevent the plague of Nationalism from taking a virulent form by applying the homoeopathic treatment of inoculation. He has thrown open to the peoples of the Union so wide a scope for the satisfaction of nationalist proclivities as to reduce to a minimum the danger that nationalist grievances may be used as a 'red herring' to draw the peoples' feet away from the path of Communism which Stalin wishes them to tread.

In this field, at any rate, Stalin knows what he is about; for he is himself a Georgian by birth and he has thus had a direct experience of the stimulating effect of the old Imperial Russian policy of repression upon national movements among non-Russian subjects of the Tsar. It is therefore perhaps not improbable—in the light of the sequels to the French Revolution of A.D. 1789 and to the Attic Revolution of 507 B.C.—that the futuristic recasting of the

administrative map of the Soviet Union under Stalin's auspices may prove to be the most durable monument of the Russian Revolution of A.D. 1917. And in that event Stalin—who in other connexions may chiefly be remembered as a politician who slyly shepherded his silly sheep back out of the Marxian wilderness in the direction of the bourgeois fold—will also have a second title to fame as a statesman whose brilliant political homoeopathy saved some sixteen per cent. of the land-surface of the planet from being ravaged by the Western political plague of Nationalism with the extreme virulence that is symptomatic of an 'ideological' germ when it is attacking bodies social that have not been preconditioned for resisting it.

Unhappily the homoeopathic treatment which the All-Union Communist Party, under Stalin's inspiration, have applied to the problem of Nationalism within the frontiers of the Soviet Union has not been their policy in dealing with corporations and parties and sects and classes. In this field their Futurism has taken the form of a 'totalitarian' intolerance, and here their pernicious example—which has itself been inspired by the outlawry of the Noblesse in the French Revolution—has been all too faithfully followed by the National-Socialist Party in Germany.

As for the breach in Institutions which takes the form of an abolition of existing organs or offices of state, we may cite, as a classical example, the abolition of the Roman Consulate by the Roman Emperor Justinian.¹

The Breach in Secular Culture and in Religion.

In the field of Secular Culture the classic expression of Futurism is the symbolic act of the Burning of the Books. In the Sinic World the Emperor Ts'in She Hwang-ti, who was the revolutionary first founder of the Sinic universal state,² is said to have systematically confiscated and burnt the literary remains of the philosophers who had flourished during the Sinic 'Time of Troubles', for fear that a transmission of this 'dangerous thought' might thwart his own design of inaugurating a brand-new order of society.³ And in the Syriac World the Caliph 'Umar, who was the veritable reconstructor of the Syriac universal state after it had been in abeyance during a millennium of Hellenic intrusion upon the Syriac World,⁴ is reported to have written, in reply to an

¹ See V. C (ii) (a), p. 224, below.

² See V. C (ii) (a), p. 187, below.

³ According to Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), p. 171, the 'dangerous thought' that Ts'in She Hwang-ti was particularly anxious to suppress was the Mencian version of Confucianism.

⁴ For the Arab Caliphate as a 'reintegration' or 'resumption' of the Achaemenian Empire see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 73-7, above.

inquiry from a general who had just received the surrender of the city of Alexandria and had asked for instructions as to how he was to dispose of the famous library,

'If these writings of the Greeks agree with the Book of God, they are useless and need not be preserved; if they disagree, they are pernicious and ought to be destroyed.'¹

According to the legend, the contents of a library which had been accumulating for more than 900 years were thereupon condemned to be consumed as fuel for the heating of the public baths.

Whatever may be the proportions of fiction and fact in these tales that attach to the names of 'Umar and Ts'in She Hwang-ti, the burning of the books at Münster under the militant Anabaptist régime of A.D. 1534-5,² and in the whole of Germany after the advent of Herr Hitler to power on the 30th January, 1933, is authentic history; and the motive which inspired our modern Western National Socialists was undoubtedly that which the legend ascribes to the Sinic futurist dictator.

Herr Hitler's Turkish contemporary President Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk succeeded in producing an even sharper breach with the Turkish cultural heritage by means of a less drastic but possibly more effective device. The Turkish dictator's aim was nothing less than to wrench his fellow countrymen's minds out of their inherited Iranic cultural setting and to force them, instead, into a Western cultural mould; but, as an alternative to burning the books in which the treasures of Iranic culture are enshrined, he contented himself with insisting upon a change of Alphabet. A law which was duly passed by the Great National Assembly at Angora on the 1st November, 1928, gave legal currency in Turkey to a version of the Latin Alphabet which had been worked out for the conveyance of the Turkish language at the dictator's orders; and the same law went on to prescribe that all newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, advertisements, and public signs must be printed in the new Alphabet on and after the coming 1st December; that all business of public services, banks, and companies must be conducted in it, and all books printed in it, on and after the 1st January 1929; that all administrative and legal forms, documents, and records must be conceived in it on and after the 1st June 1929; and that, as from the last-mentioned date, the public was to correspond in the new Alphabet with government departments,

¹ The anecdote is recounted by Gibbon in his inimitable manner (*The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. li).

² For this outbreak at Münster in these years see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 167 and 170, above. For the particular incident of the Burning of the Books see Carew Hunt, R. N.: 'John of Leyden' in *The Edinburgh Review*, No. 507, vol. 249, January 1929, p. 86.

banks, and companies.¹ The passage and enforcement of this law made it unnecessary for the Turkish Ghāzi to imitate the Arab Caliph's melodramatic gesture. The classics of Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish literature had now been effectively placed beyond the reach of a rising generation of Turkish boys and girls who might otherwise perhaps have been beguiled by the taste of these forbidden fruits into rebelling against the destiny of Westernization to which they had been devoted by the will of their dictator. There was no longer any necessity to burn the ancient books when the Alphabet that was the key to them had been put out of currency. They could now be safely left to rot on their shelves in the assurance that they would soon be as completely undecipherable as a Sinic scroll or a Babylonian tablet to the whole of the Turkish-reading public save for a negligible handful of specialist scholars.²

In the banning of a script or the burning of a book the breach with a cultural tradition is symbolized in a physical act; but the essence of cultural Futurism is a mental revolution, and this may be effectively carried through without being advertised in any outward visible sign. The destruction of the library at Alexandria, for example (if we may believe that the legend contains some kernel of fact), was only one particular expression of the impulse to break with Hellenism which was inherent in Primitive Islam;³ and this impulse itself was inherited by the Primitive Muslims from Christian and Jewish predecessors; for the revolt of Islam was merely the victorious climax of a persistent attempt—perpetually sustained and renewed in despite of repeated discouragements and failures—to liberate a submerged Syriac Civilization from the incubus of a Hellenism which had originally imposed itself on the Syriac World by naked force of arms.⁴ In its first phase this Syriac reaction against Hellenism had taken the form of an archaistic recoil into the native Syriac tradition by way of a pathologically meticulous observance and elaboration of the Mosaic or the Zoroastrian law.⁵ In its later phases the same

¹ See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1928*, III A (viii), especially pp. 228–30.

² The change of Alphabet in Turkey in A.D. 1928 has been touched upon already in IV. C (ii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 52–4, above, where it has been pointed out that the change has been due to a deliberate act of policy and not to a loss of technique.

³ At a later stage, of course, the Syriac Civilization in a more sophisticated Islamic guise drew more copiously upon the mental riches of the Hellenic culture than it had ever been willing to draw in times when it had still been politically and even militarily subject to a Hellenic ascendancy. This cultural contact between the Syriac and Hellenic societies in the Age of the 'Abbasid Caliphate is examined further in Part IX, below.

⁴ For this role of Islam in the conflict between the Syriac and Hellenic cultures see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 90–1; II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 235; II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 285–8; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 675–8, above.

⁵ This phenomenon of 'Zealotism', which is one of the regular psychological concomitants of the contact of civilizations in the Space-dimension, is examined further in Part IX, below.

reaction found a futurist expression in a campaign to reconvert from Hellenism the *ci-devant* Syriac masses who in the meantime had been converted to this alien culture in a more or less superficial way through being forcibly enrolled in the Hellenic internal proletariat. This subterranean mental strife, which gradually prepared the ground for 'Umar's lightning victory in a more flamboyant form of warfare, is described in the following passage from the pen of a modern Western master of the subject:

'The supremacy of the intellect and the disciplined acquisition of knowledge by the understanding, which finds its perfected expression in the [Hellenic] philosophical systems—though it is also striven after by Judaism, in Sirach, in his pursuit of the *Chokmah* or Divine Wisdom, as well as in the interpretation of the Law—is ousted by the forces of emotion: the longing for redemption and for the gift of a peace that passeth all understanding; the longing for a direct union with the supernatural world of God. This longing finds its satisfaction in the expectant approach to the Godhead and in the mystical, intuitive form of knowledge (*Gnosis*) to which this opens the way. In spite, or rather just by reason, of its intellectual derangement, this *Gnosis* has the power to create an inner sense of certainty, to overcome doubt, and to lull the understanding to sleep; and so the mediator between God and Man—the "Son"—calls the simple souls to him and reveals this knowledge to them, while they, for their part, make it their own with alacrity and carry it with ease. The grain of truth that lies in *credo quia absurdum*¹ has found here an ideal expression. The phrase towers high above all the repeated attempts—from Paul's spurts of rabbinical logic onwards—to unite and harmonize faith with the rational form of knowledge. It enunciates the contradiction between them quite clearly without any mitigation of its harshness. . . .²

'What we are witnessing here is the passing of the sceptre from the educated to the uneducated—from the upper strata, whose creative force and capacity for achievement are exhausted,³ to the masses below them. The process moves steadily forward towards completion during the early centuries of the Christian Era, and it manifests itself first in the great religious movement that sets in at the birth, and even before the birth, of the Empire. This is the framework within which Christianity spreads⁴ until finally it conquers all its competitors (though not

¹ For the authentic words of Tertullian see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 564, above.—A.J.T.

² In the passage here omitted Eduard Meyer depreciates the attempts of Clement of Alexandria and Origen and their successors to restate the creed of Christianity in terms of Hellenic philosophy. For a different appreciation of the work of these Christian Fathers see the present Study, V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 366–7, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 539, above.—A.J.T.

³ The degeneration of creative into dominant minorities has been examined in this Study in IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 123–4 and 131–2; V. C (i) (a), vol. v, p. 20; and V. C (i) (b), vol. v, pp. 23–35, above.—A.J.T.

⁴ The futurist note can in fact be heard in those passages from the New Testament and from the works of Saints Ambrose and Augustine that have been quoted in this Study respectively in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, pp. 246–9, and in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 564, footnote 4, above. In those other contexts they have been quoted for the

without being influenced and modified by them profoundly). But the movement has a far wider sweep than that. It embraces every department of cultural, spiritual, and social life and attains a complete supremacy with the establishment of the absolute military monarchy and the régime of the soldier-emperors from the third century onwards.¹

On the intellectual plane the triumph of Futurism is consummated when the heirs of the intellectual tradition of a once creative but now merely dominant minority proclaim their own mental bankruptcy by positively repudiating the cultural heritage which they have failed to defend against the futurist attack and voluntarily embracing the anti-intellectual faith which has been the deadliest weapon of their futurist assailants.² The Hellenic Enlightenment had extinguished its own lamp long before Justinian set the seal upon an accomplished fact by closing the now benighted Athenian schools.³

The illustrations of Futurism in this intellectual sphere that have come to our attention at an earlier point⁴ have been drawn from the histories of the Hellenic and Sinic and Indic civilizations in the course of their disintegration; but there are other illustrations nearer home that stare us in the face; for a futurist assault upon the intellectual heritage of our Western Society is a recent yet already conspicuous feature of our own current history. This contemporary Western vein of anti-intellectual Futurism is in fact a common element in movements which might seem at first sight to be remote from one another. The same animus can be detected in the harmlessly theoretical speculations of the gentle French philosopher Bergson and in the militantly practical policy of the Fascist and Communist worshippers of the idol of 'the Totalitarian State'.⁵

Thought and literature are not, of course, the only provinces of secular culture in which the heritage of the Present from the Past is exposed to a futurist attack. There are other worlds for Futurism to conquer in the visual and aural arts; and in another context⁶

testimony which they bear to an objective truth—the operation of the principle of *περιπέτεια* or 'the reversal of roles'—which is one of the fundamental facts of life. But in enunciating an objective truth these passages also incidentally express a subjective state of mind, and that is the spirit of the futurist who feels it to be his mission to cast out and tread under foot the salt that has lost his savour (Matt. v. 13).—A.J.T.

¹ Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Berlin and Stuttgart 1921, Cotta), pp. 289–90. Compare the quotation from C. G. Jung in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 567–8, above.

² This metamorphosis of philosophies into religions has been examined in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 545–68, above.

³ For the closing of the University of Athens by Justinian in A.D. 529 see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 272–3, above, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 223–4, below.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 545–68, above.

⁵ For the idolatrous worship of states see IV. (iii) (c) 2 (α) and (β), vol. iv, pp. 261–423, above. For modern Western Man's emotional revolt against his intellectual heritage see Watkin, E. I.: *Men and Tendencies* (London 1937, Sheed & Ward).

⁶ In IV. C (ii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 51–2, above.

we have already had occasion to take notice of the impulse which, in our own Western World in our own day, is leading us to abandon our traditional Western styles of music and dancing and painting and sculpture in favour of outlandish innovations. It is, in fact, our modern Western innovators in those fields who have coined the word 'Futurism' in order to apply it to their own handiwork in assertion of a claim to originality. In their case this boast is proved false by the testimony of a bizarre borrowed plumage which flagrantly betrays its incongruous Tropical African and pseudo-Byzantine origins. The title 'futurist' might have been assumed with better right by the genuine Byzantine school of architecture and the other visual arts which, in an offensive that started in the third and triumphed in the sixth century of the Christian Era, made itself mistress of the entire domain of a moribund Roman Empire by attacking and supplanting the Hellenic school with one hand and the Egyptiac with the other.¹

There is one notorious form of Futurism in the field of the visual arts which stands on common ground between the two spheres of Secular Culture and Religion, and that is Iconoclasm. The Iconoclast resembles the modern Western champion of cubist painting or syncopated music in his repudiation of a traditional form of Art, but he is peculiar in confining his hostile attentions to Art in association with Religion, and in being moved to this hostility by motives that are not aesthetic but are theological. The essence of Iconoclasm is an objection to a visual representation of the Godhead or of any creature, lower than God, whose image might become an object of idolatrous worship; but there have been differences in the degree of rigour with which this common underlying principle has been translated into practice by different Iconoclastic schools. The most celebrated school is the 'totalitarian' one that is represented by Judaism and, in imitation of Judaism, by Islam.

'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth beneath or that is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them; for I the Lord thy god am a jealous god.'²

This ban upon all visual art without exception is the logical form of Iconoclasm for a religion which claims to be coextensive with life itself and which therefore refuses to recognize any distinction between one sphere of life which is religious and another which is secular. On the other hand the Iconoclastic movements which have arisen within the bosom of the Christian Church have accommodated themselves to a distinction which Christianity, in con-

¹ See IV. C (ii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 51 and 54-5, above.

² Exod. xx. 4-5.

trast to both Judaism and Islam, has always accepted from the earliest date to which we can trace back the Christian *Weltanschauung*. Though the eighth-century outbreak of Iconoclasm in Orthodox Christendom and the sixteenth-century outbreak in Western Christendom may have been respectively inspired, at any rate in part, by the examples of Islam in the one case and of Judaism in the other, they did not either of them follow the Judaic-Islamic school in going the length of banning the visual arts *in toto*. They did not carry their offensive into the secular field; and even in the strictly religious field, to which both the Western and the Orthodox Christian Iconoclasts confined their attack, the latter eventually acquiesced in a compromise with their Iconodule adversaries which might seem to have given the 'image-worshippers' the best of the bargain. In return for the concession that all three-dimensional representations of persons who were objects of Christian adoration should thenceforth be banned by a tacit common consent the Orthodox Christian Iconoclasts conceded, for their part, that two-dimensional representations should be countenanced even in the religious sphere;¹ and this arbitrary and irrational ecclesiastical distinction between sculpture and painting² was justified of its political fruits, since it did bring a permanent truce to the controversy over images in the Orthodox Church.

In Iconoclasm the spirit of Futurism in the religious field has expressed itself symbolically in a physical act of destruction which is comparable to the burning of books and the banning of scripts in the secular sphere; but here too the same spirit also can be, and has been, at work without any visible advertisement of its activity; and the Iconoclastic movements which we have just been passing in review are manifestations of a Futurism in the religious field which extends beyond Iconoclasm over a vastly wider range of religious life. In our surveys of the internal and external proletariats³ that are generated by the schism in the body social of a broken-down and disintegrating civilization we have observed that both branches of the Proletariat have been apt to express in religious, as well as in political and economic, forms their revolt against the ascendancy of a dominant minority and their repudiation—which

¹ Officially the images were restored in Orthodox Christendom in A.D. 843 without any limitations or reservations; but the perpetuation of the Iconoclasts' ban in respect of three-dimensional representations was not the less effective for being unavowed (see Bury, J. B.: *A History of the East Roman Empire, A.D. 802-867* (London 1912, Macmillan), pp. 152-3).

² Presumably the distinction was based on the qualification of the term 'image' by the epithet 'graven' in the Second Commandment. Yet the commandment goes on (in the passage quoted above) to forbid the use of visual art in general, *sans phrase*, and it has never occurred either to the Jews or to the Muslims to draw the distinction which is the basis of the present practice of the Orthodox Christian Church.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2 and 3, *passim*, in vol. v, above.

is partly the cause of the revolt, and partly its consequence—of that dominant minority's cultural heritage. We have traced the origins of the 'higher religions' (in so far as their appearance on the scene of mundane history may be explicable in sociological terms) to the reactions of internal proletariats; and we have likewise found that external proletariats have tended to assert their social individuality on the religious plane either by appropriating to themselves some peculiar version, or perversion, of a 'higher religion' or alternatively by creating a barbarian pantheon of their own in the likeness of a war-lord's war-band. The spirit in which these proletarian-born religions are embraced by their human foster-parents—as distinct from the sometimes utterly different spirit which these religions reveal in themselves—is manifestly an expression of Futurism in the sense which we have given to the word in this Study; and, on this showing, Futurism in the religious field extends over an enormous range—which need not be re-explored here,¹ since we have attempted to survey it already in bringing the Proletariat on to our stage.

(γ) *The Self-Transcendence of Futurism.*

Futurism is a way of life which leads those who seek to follow it into a barren quest of a goal that is intrinsically unattainable. Yet though the quest is barren and may be tragic it need not be without value or importance; for it may guide the baffled seeker's feet into a way of peace² along which he will perhaps allow himself to be drawn now that he has stumbled upon it apparently by chance, though he might not have been willing deliberately to choose it in the first instance.

Futurism in its primitive nakedness is, as we have seen,³ a counsel of despair which, even as such, is a *pis aller*; for the first recourse of a soul which has despaired of the Present without having lost its appetite for life on the mundane level is to attempt to take a flying leap up the Time-stream into the Past; and it is only when this archaistic line of escape has been tried in vain, or has shown itself, without need of trial, to be manifestly impracticable, that the Soul will nerve itself to take the less natural line of Futurism⁴ as a last resort, and will attempt, in a recoil from some

¹ It will suffice to recall our previous references to the forcible suppression of the Hellenic paganism by the Christian Roman Emperors Gratian and Theodosius the Great (see IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 226-7, and V. C (i) (d) 8 (δ), in the present volume, p. 89, above).

² Luke i. 79.

³ In V. C (i) (d) 9 (α), pp. 97-101, above.

⁴ Futurism is not only less natural than Archaism psychologically: it is also sociologically more difficult than Archaism to embark upon (though not more difficult to carry through to success, considering that Archaism and Futurism are both intrinsically incapable of succeeding). The reason why Futurism is more difficult than Archaism to launch is to be found in the fact (which we have noticed in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 398,

grievously shattered hope, to leap out of a blank and dreary Present, not up-stream into a Past which is at any rate familiar, even if it be now beyond recapture, but down-stream into a Future that is conceived of as a state in which the shattered hope can be repaired and resumed and realized.

The nature of this pure—and by the same token purely mundane—Futurism can best be illustrated by citing some of the classic historical examples of it.

In the Hellenic World, for instance, in the second century B.C. thousands of Syrians and other highly cultivated Orientals were deprived of their freedom, uprooted from their homes, separated from their families, and shipped overseas to Sicily and Italy to serve as a 'labour-force' for plantations and cattle-ranches in areas that had been devastated in the Hannibalic War.¹ For these expatriated slaves, whose need for a way of escape out of the Present was extreme, an archaistic recoil into the Past was out of the question. They could not dream of finding their way back to Syria; and, even if the physical feat of repatriation had been practicable, they could hardly feel homesick for an alien Seleucid régime or for the Seleucids' equally alien Achaemenian or Neo-Babylonian or Assyrian predecessors. The pre-Assyrian cosmos of Syriac city-states in which their ancestors had once been truly at home was now buried deep in oblivion. These Syriac slaves who had been conscripted into the ranks of a Hellenic proletariat in a new world overseas could therefore not look back; they could only look forward; and so, when their oppression became intolerable and they were goaded into physical revolt, the objective which they set before their eyes, in order to give themselves heart in their almost desperate enterprise, was to bring to pass an entirely new thing. They made it their aim to establish a kind of inverted Roman Commonwealth in which the existing order of Hellenic Society was to be turned upside down by an exchange of roles between the present slaves and their present masters. The project was audacious, but in the circumstances it was not fantastic. In a universe in which it had been possible for the insurgent slaves themselves to suffer the extreme change of fortune which they had already experienced, what reason was there to suppose that the top-dog of to-day was immune from the possibility of meeting the same fate to-morrow, or that the bottom-dog of to-day, for his

above) that, while Archaism makes its first appearance in the ranks of the Dominant Minority, Futurism first arises in the Proletariat. This makes the launching of an archaistic enterprise relatively easy and that of a futuristic enterprise relatively difficult, because, in any disintegrating society, the Dominant Minority is *ex hypothesi* in the saddle and the Proletariat *ex hypothesi* under the harrow.

¹ See II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213-16; III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 168-71; and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 66 and 69-70, above.

part, was debarred from the possibility of living to see his own fortune's wheel come round again full circle?

In an earlier chapter of Syriac history the Jews had reacted in a similar way to the destruction of the sovereign independent Kingdom of Judah.¹ After they had been swallowed up in the Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenian Empires and been scattered abroad among the Gentiles they could not hope with any conviction for an archaistic return to the Pre-Exilic dispensation in which Judah had lived a life of parochial isolation. A hope that was to be convincing must not be conceived in terms of a social environment which had disappeared beyond recall; and, since they could not live without some lively hope of extricating themselves from a present in which they were unwilling to acquiesce, the Post-Exilic Jews were driven into looking forward to the future establishment of a Davidic kingdom in a shape which had no precedent in Judah's political past. The Jews now dreamt of the epiphany of a scion of David's House who would restore David's kingdom in the only fashion that was now conceivable in a world which had been first shattered and then refashioned by the sweeping strokes of a Sargon and a Nebuchadnezzar and a Cyrus. If the New David was effectively to reunite all Jewry under his rule—and what but this was his mission?—in an age in which the living generation of Jews was scattered over the face of the Earth, then he must gird himself to acquire a dominion to which his forebears had never aspired in the highest flights of their ambition. He must wrest the sceptre of the world-empire from the hands of its present holder and must make Jerusalem become to-morrow what Susa was to-day and what Babylon had been yesterday. In order to reunite the Jews he must now reign as King of Kings over Jews and Gentiles alike. And why, after all, should the coming champion of Jewry not attain this pinnacle of power and glory? In a world in which a Cyrus or Seleucus could rise and a Cambyses or Antiochus the Great could fall with the speed of the lightning when it flickers between the Earth and the Firmament,² why should not a Zerubbabel have as good a chance of world dominion as a Darius, or a Judas Maccabaeus as an Antiochus Epiphanes, or a Bar Kōkabā as a Hadrian?³

A similar dream once captivated the imaginations of 'the Old Believers' in the Russian province of Orthodox Christendom. In the eyes of these Raskolniks the Tsar Peter's version of Orthodoxy was no Orthodoxy at all; and yet at the same time it was impossible

¹ The Jewish reaction has been discussed in IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 224-5; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 68-9; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 657-9, above.

² Luke x. 18.

³ For the belief in the omnipotence of Chance which is apt to prevail in times of social disintegration—and this with equal potency, whether the belief be unconscious or unavowed or explicit—see V. C (i) (d) 4, vol. v, pp. 412-19, above.

to imagine the old ecclesiastical order triumphantly reasserting itself in the teeth of a secular government that was now omnipotent as well as Satanic. The Raskolniki were therefore driven to hope for something which had no precedent, and that was for the epiphany of a Tsar-Messiah who would be able as well as willing to undo the Tsar-Antichrist's sacrilegious work and restore the Orthodox Faith in its pristine purity because he would combine absolute mundane power with perfect piety. The Raskolniki hugged this wild hope, because their only alternative was the bleak prospect of waiting grimly for the Last Judgement.¹

The significant common feature of these historic exhibitions of naked Futurism is that the hopes in which the futurists have sought refuge and relief have all been set upon a purely matter-of-fact fulfilment in the ordinary and familiar mundane way; and this feature is conspicuous in the Futurism of the Jews—about which we happen to be unusually well informed because it has left behind it a documentary record of its history.

After the destruction of the Kingdom of Judah by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C. the Jews again and again put their treasure in the hope of establishing a new Jewish state on the same purely mundane plane whenever the play of oecumenical politics gave them even the slightest encouragement for embarking on a fresh attempt to translate their dream into reality.² The brief bout of anarchy through which the Achaemenian Empire passed between the death of Cambyses and the triumph of Darius the Great saw Zerubbabel's attempt (*circa* 522 B.C.) to make Jerusalem the capital of a new Davidic Kingdom.³ In a later chapter of history the longer interregnum in the rule of the Hellenic dominant minority over its subject territories on Syriac ground west of Euphrates—an interregnum which was merely the incidental and temporary by-product of a family quarrel between the Seleucid and the Roman representatives of the domineering alien power⁴—was mistaken by

¹ See Wallace, D. Mackenzie: *Russia* (London 1877, Cassell, 2 vols.), vol. ii, chap. xx, pp. 12-13; Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 535-8; Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im 18. Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), pp. 161-72.

² This dream was dreamed, in the years immediately after the Exile, by the author of the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 180-1); and the first attempt to translate it into reality was made by the first party of Jewish exiles in Babylonia who availed themselves of Cyrus's permission to them to return to Judaea. "There was as yet no thought of founding a church; the intention was to restore the political community, or at any rate a fraction of it, a 'remnant', which was to provide a nucleus for the Messianic Empire that was shortly to be expected" (*ibid.*, p. 192).

³ For Zerubbabel's enterprise and its failure see *ibid.*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 194-6; eundem: *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs), p. 68; Gall, A. von: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), pp. 188-97.

⁴ For the family likeness, displayed in a similarity of constitutional structure, between the Roman Commonwealth and the Seleucid Monarchy see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 311-13, above.

the Jews for a triumph of the arms of the Maccabees;¹ and a majority of the Palestinian Jewish community² were so heedlessly carried away by this mirage of mundane success that they were willing—as ‘Deutero-Isaiah’ had been willing four hundred years earlier³—to throw overboard the now long-consecrated tradition that the founder of a new Jewish state must be a son of David, and to cry ‘Hosanna’ to a son of Hasmon instead, just because at the moment the Maccabee might appear to have accomplished what should have been a Davidic Messiah’s appointed mundane task.⁴ Nor were the Jews cured of their crudely futuristic hope of a new mundane Jewish commonwealth when in due course the Hellenic political ascendancy, from which Palestine had temporarily been released when the Romans had hamstrung the Seleucid Monarchy,⁵ was reimposed in the more formidable shape of a dominion exercised in *partibus Syriacis* by Rome herself.

It was, of course, inevitable that Rome should eventually fill a vacuum which Rome herself had created. However unwillingly, she was bound to step into her Seleucid victims’ shoes; and, considering that the Jews had been no match for their old Seleucid masters until the Romans had deliberately tilted the scales in the Jewish insurgents’ favour, it was evident that a Jewish community whose political fortunes Rome had made by one touch of her little finger would find their new Roman masters irresistible when once Pompey had decided to remove the Hasmonaean pawn from the Palestinian square of Rome’s oecumenical chess-board. If the

¹ Tacitus’s biting censure of this Jewish error of political judgement has been quoted already in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 390, footnote 3, above. In a different context the unhappy outcome of the Maccabees’ divagation into politics has been discussed in V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 657–9, above.

² It was to the credit of the Pharisees that they did not let themselves drift with the tide of popular feeling, but parted company with the Maccabees just when, and just because, the Maccabees put their treasure in the establishment of an earthly kingdom.

³ ‘Deutero-Isaiah’—the sixth-century writer of a politico-religious work which has been appended to the genuine text of the real Isaiah and now figures there as chaps. xl–lv—hails Cyrus, the founder of the Achaemenian Empire, as the Lord’s Anointed (Isa. xlv. 1), in the wild hope that the Persian conqueror may be moved to bestow his world-empire upon the Jews!

⁴ For the new era which Simon Maccabaeus inaugurated in 142 B.C. to commemorate the establishment of his new Jewish state, see V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), Annex, in the present volume, p. 344, footnote 5, below. So far from being able to claim descent from David, the Hasmonaeans were not even members of the Tribe of Judah. As priests they traced their origin back, not to Judah, but to Levi. Davidic Messianism came into its own again after the ‘mediatization’ of the Hasmonaean principality by Pompey in 63 B.C. (Lagrange, M.-J.: *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris 1909, Gabalda), p. 10).

⁵ In the year 162 B.C. the Seleucids’ stud of war-elephants at Apamea was literally hamstrung, in execution of instructions from the Senate at Rome, by the orders of Roman commissioners who were visiting the military head-quarters of the Seleucid Empire on a tour of precautionary inspection (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 215, footnote 3, above). This barbarity cost the chairman of the commissioners, Gnaeus Octavius, his life, since it was one of the outrages that moved Leptines to assassinate him (for the hamstringing of the elephants see Appian: *Studies in Roman History*, ‘Rome and Syria’, chap. 46; for the assassination of Octavius see the present Study, V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 219, footnote 1, below).

Jews had been unable to shake off by their own unaided efforts the yoke of a Seleucid Monarchy which had been only one, and that by no means the strongest one, of five contemporary Great Powers in the Hellenic arena, how could the Jews hope to measure themselves against a Rome who in the meantime had swept away not only the Seleucid Monarchy but every other rival Power in the Hellenic World and had thereby transformed her own sole surviving empire into a state that was universal and omnipotent? The answer to these questions was as clear as day to the Idumæan dictator Herod. He never forgot that he was ruler of Palestine solely by the grace of Rome and of Augustus; and so long as he reigned over the Palestinian Jews he contrived to save them from the nemesis of their own folly.¹ Yet, instead of being grateful to Herod for teaching them so salutary a political lesson, his Jewish subjects would not forgive him for being right;² and as soon as his masterly—and masterful—hand was removed they took the bit between their teeth and bolted down their futuristic path till they crashed into the inevitable catastrophe.³ Nor, even then, did a single physical demonstration of Rome's omnipotence suffice. The experience of A.D. 66–70 was not enough to cure the Jews of Futurism. The Diasporà had to repeat the appalling experiment in A.D. 115–17, and the Palestinian Jewry to make yet another trial of it in A.D. 132–5,⁴ before the hope of a new mundane Jewish commonwealth was finally extinguished.⁵ Bar Kōkabā in A.D. 132–5 was pursuing the same end by the same means as Zerubbabel about the year 522 B.C.⁶ It had taken the Jews more than six and a half centuries to learn by an agonizing process of trial and error that Futurism simply would not work.⁷

If this were the whole Jewish story it would not be an interesting

¹ So long as Herod the Great was on the throne the Messianic movement in Jewry was tentative and undecided (Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 12).

² Messianism began to raise its head after Herod had turned against Religion in 25 B.C. The first Messianic conspiracy—in which the wife of Herod's brother Pheroras played a leading part—was hatched *circa* 7–6 B.C. (*ibid.*, pp. 13 and 16).

³ The first serious Messianic crisis was precipitated by Herod the Great's death in 4 B.C. Messianic insurrections became frequent after the death of Herod Agrippa I in A.D. 44 (*ibid.*, pp. 17 and 21–2).

⁴ For these Jewish insurrections against the Roman Imperial Government see the authorities cited in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 68, footnote 3, above.

⁵ The word 'finally' holds good, notwithstanding the recent rise of Zionism; for Zionism is a mimesis of the contemporary Nationalism of the Western World and is not a revival of the Jewish Futurism which was extinguished at last in the blood of the followers of Bar Kōkabā.

⁶ Bar Kōkabā's coinage seems to show that he set up a regular Jewish state (see *ibid.*, pp. 317–18).

⁷ The impracticability of Futurism is reflected in the spirit of the Apocalyptic genre of literature in which it found expression. 'C'est un recul très caractérisé du sentiment religieux tel qu'on le trouve dans les grands prophètes et les psalmistes — recul mal dissimulé par un élan disproportionné vers l'inaccessible et l'insondable. . . . L'apocalypse, tournée toute entière vers l'avenir, se préoccupe surtout des révolutions attendues. . . . Les maîtres, moins attentifs aux circonstances de l'intervention divine, sont dominés par les idées absolues qui doivent être la règle de la vie.'—*Ibid.*, pp. 135 and 147.

one, for it would be nothing but a monotonously repetitive record of the inevitable and well-deserved misfortunes of a stiff-necked people that was its own worst enemy. But this obstinate pursuit of Futurism is, of course, only half the story—and the less important half at that. The whole story is that, while some Jewish souls went on clinging to a mundane hope in the teeth of a succession of disillusionments, other Jewish souls—and even some of the same souls in a different mood or through a different spiritual faculty—were gradually taught by the repeated failure of this earthly quest to put their treasure elsewhere. In the process of discovering the bankruptcy of Futurism the Jews made the further tremendous discovery of the existence of the Kingdom of God; and century by century these two progressive revelations—one negative but the other positive—were being unfolded simultaneously. The expected founder of the new mundane Jewish commonwealth was conceived of, appropriately enough, as a king of human flesh and blood who would not miraculously live for ever but would prosaically found a hereditary dynasty.¹ Yet the title under which this future Jewish empire-builder was predicted—and under which every successive pretender to the role was acclaimed, from Zerubbabel through Simon Maccabaeus down to Simon bar Kōkabā²—was not *melek*, which in the Hebrew vocabulary was the simple word for 'king' with no special connotations: the word that became current and consecrated in this special futurist sense was *m'shiha*,³ meaning 'the Anointed', and this was an abbreviation for 'the Anointed of the Lord'. Thus, even if only in the background, the god of the Jews was associated with the hope of the Jews from the beginning; and as the mundane hope inexorably faded away the divine figure loomed ever larger until, in the end, it dominated the whole horizon.

To call a god in aid is not, of course, in itself an unusual procedure. It is probably as old a practice as Religion itself for a person or people that is embarking on some formidable enterprise to invoke the protection of their traditional tutelary divinity; and it would have been strange if the Syrian slaves had not called upon the name of the Dea Syra, Atargatis,⁴ when they rose in revolt against their Greek masters and Roman rulers in Sicily, or if the

¹ On this point see Gall, A. von: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), pp. 256-7.

² For the recognition of Simon (or Symeon) bar Kōkabā as the Messiah by Rabbi Aqiba see *ibid.*, p. 395, and Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

³ According to von Gall, *op. cit.*, p. 173, footnote 1, the title which in Greek is translated *Χριστός* and transliterated *Messias* is the Aramaic equivalent *m'shiha* of an original Hebrew *m'shiach*.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 130, footnote 5, and V. C (i) (d) 7, in the present volume, p. 34, footnote 5, above, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, in the present volume, p. 383, below.

Jews had not called upon the name of Yahweh when they ventured to measure their strength against the might of a Darius or an Antiochus or a Nero or a Trajan or a Hadrian. The new departure lay not in the claim—expressed in the title 'Messiah'—that the people's human champion had the sanction of a god behind him;¹ what was new, and also momentous, was the conception of the patron divinity's nature and function and power; for, while Yahweh did not cease to be thought of as the parochial god of Jewry in a certain sense, it was in another and wider aspect than this that he was pictured as the divine protector of 'the Lord's Anointed'.

This widening of the conception of the protecting divinity was indeed imperatively demanded by the mundane situation of the day; for the Jewish futurists *post* 586 B.C. were, after all, engaged upon no ordinary political enterprise. They had set their hands to a task which was, humanly speaking, an impossible one; for, when they had failed to preserve their independence, how could they rationally hope to reconquer it—and, what is more, to supplant their own conquerors in the lordship of the World—by the strength of their own right arm? To succeed in this tremendous undertaking they must have behind them a god who was not only competent to see fair play but was also capable of redressing a balance that, on any human reckoning, was hopelessly inclined against this god's terrestrial protégés. If the protégés were engaged on a forlorn hope, then the protector must be nothing less than omnipotent—and it would follow from this that he must also be actively and whole-heartedly righteous; for only an all-powerful godhead who cared for righteousness above everything else would be both able and willing to exert himself with effect on behalf of a people whose cause was just but whose worldly position was insignificant.

'For he that is mighty hath done to me great things, and holy is his name. . . .

'He hath showed strength with his arm; he hath scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts.

'He hath put down the mighty from their seats and exalted them of low degree.'²

This, and nothing less than this, must be the power and the performance of the divinity who stood behind the devoted human leader of a futurist forlorn hope; and it was not only the Jewish

¹ For a survey of other instances in which a mundane power that has come to feel itself unequal to its task has called a god in aid and has placed itself under this divine patron's aegis, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 649-57, above.

² Luke i. 49 and 51-2.

futurists that were forcibly led by their experience in the realm of politics to this conclusion in the realm of theology. The Yahweh who revealed himself behind the Jewish Messiah had his counterparts in the Ahuramazda who was the god behind the Zoroastrian Saošyant (Saviour)¹ and in the Helios who was the god of Aristicus's Heliopolitae.² In the same hard school of Futurism three separate contingents of proletarians made—each independently, under as many different names and aspects³—the same sublime discovery of the One True God.⁴

When once this discovery has been made, a drama which, up to this point, has been played on a terrestrial stage by human actors with mundane aims acquires a new protagonist and at the same time is transposed into a higher spiritual dimension. The human champion who has been the hero hitherto—in virtue of being cast for the part of leading his brethren out of a mundane Wilderness into a mundane Promised Land—now sinks to a subordinate role, while the divinity who has originally been called in aid merely in order to give supernatural power to the human elbow of 'the Lord's Anointed' now comes to dominate the scene. God comes to be recognized as the sole but sufficient saviour of a people that has learnt by bitter experience that its human champion is after all impotent, under any auspices, to save it in its dire extremity. The human champion himself cannot be made equal to what has now proved to be a superhuman task by the expedient of consecrating him with a divine unction. A human Messiah is not enough. God himself must condescend to play the part, which He alone can effectively play, of serving His people as their saviour and their king.⁵

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 163, footnote 1, below.

² For the Heliopolitae see IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 507; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 69–70 and 179–82; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 384; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 692, footnote 2, above, and V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, in the present volume, p. 351, below.

³ For the contrast between the two different aspects of the One True God which were apprehended respectively in the Jewish conception of Yahweh and in the Zoroastrian conception of Ahuramazda see V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 43–4, above.

⁴ This discovery has already been dealt with—as an aspect of the sense of unity—in V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 37–49, above. In other contexts (e.g. in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 82, footnote 4, and in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 649–57, above) it is pointed out that the rulers of universal states are apt (under pressure of the same political necessity that drives the leaders of proletarian futurist *émeutes*) to fall back upon the sanction of a tutelary deity to make good the failure of their own personal prestige.

⁵ The emergence of the conception of Yahweh as king in the course of the development of the religion of Post-Exilic Jewry is traced in detail by Freiherr A. von Gall in *Baaieta roū Oeou* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter). "The hope of a Messiah—i.e. the hope for the reappearance of a king of David's line—can, of course, be only of purely Jewish Post-Exilic origin. The impulse from which this hope started was given by the short-lived kingdom of Zerubbabel. But as far as the majority of the Jews were concerned it seems—so far as we can judge from the surviving literature—that the national form of Messianic hope was still rejected even then. For pious Jews in the mass, Yahweh was and remained the king of the expected new kingdom. This yearning for the kingship of Yahweh himself was stronger than the yearning for the kingship of Yahweh's Anointed"

By this time any modern Western psycho-analyst who is reading these lines and knows his duty will be raising his eyebrows. 'What you have proclaimed as a sublime spiritual discovery turns out,' he will interject, 'now that you have explained what you mean, to be nothing but a surrender to that infantile desire to escape from reality which is one of the besetting temptations of the human psyche. You have described how some unhappy people who have foolishly set their hearts on an unattainable aim attempt to shift the intolerable burden of being saddled with an impossible task from their own shoulders to those of a series of intended substitutes. Their first conscript is a purely human champion; then, when he cannot avail, they exchange him for a human champion whose humanity is reinforced by an imaginary divine backing; and finally, when even "the Lord's Anointed" breaks down, the fools in desperation signal S.O.S. to a wholly fictitious divine being whose alleged omnipotence is expected to make up for the proven impotence of his human inventors. For the psychological practitioner this rake's progress in escapism is as familiar a story as it is a melancholy one.'

In taking account of this criticism we shall readily agree with the psycho-analyst's strictures upon the childishness of calling on a supernatural power to perform a mundane task which we have first wilfully chosen for ourselves and have then discovered to be beyond our own strength. We shall also find, on consideration, that many of the futurists whom we have had under observation have in fact fallen into this spiritual error and have duly paid the material penalty which our psychological practitioner would no doubt have predicted. In the Jewish case in point there were certain schools of Jewish futurists who did persuade themselves that Yahweh would take upon himself his worshippers' self-appointed mundane tasks and would miraculously make up for

(*ibid.*, p. 250). In von Gall's belief the title of king—which was already applied to Yahweh before the destruction of the mundane kingdom of Judah in 586 B.C.—was originally a mere cult title which he bore (in accordance with a Canaanite practice that was pre-Israelite and non-Israelite) in his capacity of city-god of the *ci-devant* Jebusite city of Zion (*ibid.*, pp. 41-2). According to von Gall it was this originally perhaps no more than formal title that suggested the later idea of conceiving of Yahweh as king in a more significant sense. Von Gall follows the growth of the idea in 'Deutero-Isaiah' [i.e. Isa. xl-lv] (pp. 178-88) and in the Books of the Law (pp. 199-208). He seeks to demonstrate that in the Achaemenian Age this hitherto purely native Jewish notion of Yahweh's kingship came to be informed and enriched by the Zoroastrian notion of a Last Judgement that was to be conducted by Ahuramazda (pp. 219-45). And he shows how the conception of Yahweh the god-king of Zion eventually enlarged itself in Jewish minds from the idea of a parochial tutelary divinity of a Palestinian highland fastness into that of a universal and omnipotent godhead who was king of the whole World and of all Mankind, and who would one day exercise, from his seat in Zion, the royal prerogative of oecumenical dominion that was already his by right. This direct reign of Yahweh from Zion was to be inaugurated by a general judgement in which Gentiles as well as Jews would be summoned to present themselves in Zion before the universal god-king-judge's judgement-seat (*ibid.*, pp. 235-6).

their natural disappointments; and these Jewish futurists did, as we have seen, all come to a bad end. There was the melodramatic suicide of the Zealots who faced hopeless military odds¹ in the fanatical faith that the Lord of Hosts would be a host in himself on the side of his self-constituted human instruments; and there has been the prosaic self-stultification of the Quietists who have argued from the same erroneous premisses² to the exactly opposite—but in the end not less hopeless—practice of abstaining from taking any action of their own in a mundane cause which they have decided to register as God's affair.³ At the same time, however, we shall remember that the fanaticism of the Zealots and the Quietism of the *Agudath Israel* are not the only responses to the challenge from the Hellenic dominant minority that were made by the Jewish contingent of the Hellenic internal proletariat. There was the response of the school of the Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai⁴ and there was the response of the Christian Church;⁵ and, while these two other responses both resemble Quietism in the negative feature of being non-violent, they differ from Quietism and Zealotism alike in the far more important positive point that they have ceased to set their heart upon the old mundane purpose of Futurism and have put their treasure, instead, in a purpose which is not Man's but God's and which therefore can only be pursued in a spiritual field of supra-mundane dimensions.

This point is of capital importance because it disposes, in these cases, of the criticism which our psycho-analyst can direct against both the Zealots and the Quietists with such deadly effect. To call in God cannot be denounced as an infantile attempt to escape from the hard necessity of facing the defeat of a human endeavour if, in the act of invocation, the human actor simultaneously withdraws his *libido* from his previous mundane aim. And conversely, if the act of invocation does produce so great and so good a spiritual effect as this in the human soul that performs it, that would appear *prima facie* to give ground for a belief that the power which has been invoked is not a mere figment of the human imagination. At any rate, the onus of proof may now reasonably be laid upon

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 68, above.

² The Quietists hold in common with the Zealots the erroneous idea that God will have made it His own business to fulfil a purpose which His worshippers have chosen for themselves and which is therefore intrinsically mundane. On the other hand they charge the Zealots with impiety (and in this they are surely right) for supposing that, for the accomplishment of a purpose which *ex hypothesi* God has indeed made His own to the best of His worshippers' belief, God can have any need of help from human volunteers. If we accept, for the sake of the argument, the premiss from which both the Quietists and the Zealots start, we must find in the Quietists' favour.

³ For this attitude, which is illustrated by the present aloofness of the *Agudath Israel* from Zionism, see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 76, and V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, vol. v, p. 588, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 75-6, above.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 72-4, above.

the sceptic; and, pending his reply, we may allow ourselves to hold that our description of this spiritual reorientation as a discovery of the One True God was after all correct. A human make-believe about the future of This World has given place to a divine revelation of the existence of an Other World. Through the disappointment of a mundane hope we have been admitted to an apocalypse or discovery of a reality which has been there all the time behind the scenes of the narrow man-made stage that has hitherto set the limits of our field of vision and of action.¹ The veil of the Temple has been rent in twain.

It remains for us to take note of some of the principal stages in the accomplishment of this immense feat of spiritual reorientation.

The social circumstances in which Man gains his first inkling that God's purpose is other than, and better than, Man's own, are vividly depicted in the following analysis of the religious experience of the peoples of the Syriac and Babylonian worlds under the Achaemenian régime:

'The complete state of blessedness, on which human hopes are set, is [evidently] not granted by the Divinity to his worshippers in this present time; if it were, the faithful would be bound to triumph over all their adversaries and to see the supremacy of their god acknowledged by all other nations. This means that the full power of the Divinity is not destined to manifest itself until some future date; at the present moment the Divinity is still engaged in a struggle. The process of shaping the World is not yet at an end; the ideal state of things has not yet been attained; the adversaries have not yet been annihilated. It is quite natural that such eschatological hopes should assume the most lively shape among nations, and in religions, which are being subjected to some particularly severe pressure—such hopes were developed by the Prophets of Judah from as early a date as Isaiah's. But they were not alone in this; for Zarathustra's teaching likewise conceives of life as a struggle between two great powers—a struggle which is to close with the victory of Ahuramazda.² The struggle is pictured on the lines of the Gods' great struggles at the creation of the World—a creation that has not reached its complete conclusion—and so Eschatology becomes a repetition and transformation of the creation-myths.³ This is the

¹ The quest that originally led us into this Study was the hope of seeing through the 'shimmer of relativity in the foreground of historical thought' (Part I. A, vol. i, p. 16, above). We have already observed that the ordeal of social disintegration may awaken a sense of unity (V. C (i) (d) 7, in the present volume, pp. 1-49, above). And we have noted how the two successive blows of the Crucifixion and the Ascension evoked the Acts of the Apostles (II. D (iv), vol. ii, pp. 111-12, above).

² According to the same scholar (Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 113), Zoroastrian influences played their part in the translation of the Jewish conception of the Last Judgement from political into ethical terms.—A.J.T.

³ Compare von Gall, op. cit., p. 236: 'The Kingdom of God, which manifests itself at the end of all things, also existed at the beginning of all things' (citing Deut. xxxiii. 5, and Ps. lxxiv. 12). Compare, further, Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 614, apropos of the *Weltanschauung* of the Western

point in which the Babylonian Mythology has exercised its greatest influence. It has become the basis of a general conception which has found its way into religions of the most diverse kinds.¹

The essence of this conception is that a mundane scene which was once looked upon as a stage for human actors (either with or without superhuman backers) is now regarded as a field for the progressive realization of the Kingdom of God. At first, however, this new idea of the transfiguration of one world by the spiritual irruption of another world of a higher spiritual dimension largely clothes itself, as is to be expected, in imagery that is derived from the old futurist idea of a mundane kingdom which is distinguished from the present state of mundane affairs simply by its position in the Time-stream and by its standard of mundane well-being, and not by any intrinsic difference of spiritual quality. Against this mental background 'Deutero-Isaiah' draws the lineaments of a Kingdom of God² which transcends, while including, the idea of a mundane kingdom,³ but transcends it merely in the point that both Man and Nature are depicted as experiencing a supernatural and miraculous beatification, and not in the deeper sense of exceeding the familiar mundane dimensions of spiritual experience. 'Deutero-Isaiah's' Kingdom of God is really nothing but a new Earthly Paradise—a Garden of Eden adapted to the requirements of a human society which is still mundane though it is no longer primitive—and a distinct advance in spiritual insight is achieved when this new Earthly Paradise comes to be thought of as only a transitory state⁴ which may last, perhaps, for a Millennium but which is destined, at the end of its allotted term, to pass away with the passing of This World itself.

This World must pass in order to give place to an Other World beyond it; and it is in that Other World that the true Kingdom of God is now seen to lie; for the king who is to reign during the

Civilization: 'To-day, in the sunset of the Scientific Age, at the stage when Scepticism is winning the day, the clouds part, and the morning landscape stands out once more with unmistakable clarity.'—A.J.T.

¹ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 173-4.

² See von Gall, op. cit., pp. 181-3.

³ The mundane kingdom which is included in 'Deutero-Isaiah's' Kingdom of God is imagined (see the present chapter, p. 122, footnote 3, above) as an Achaemenian Empire in which Cyrus has taken Zion instead of Susa for his capital and the Jews instead of the Persians for his ruling race, because the God of Israel has revealed to him that it is He (and, by implication, not Ahuramazda) who has enabled Cyrus to conquer the World (Isa. xlv. 1-6). In this day-dream 'Deutero-Isaiah' is exposing himself, with a vengeance, to the censure of our imaginary psycho-analyst. He is conscripting Yahweh to inspire Cyrus to turn the feats of Persian arms to the benefit of the Jews in order that the latter may be compensated for their inability to preserve the independence of their own petty principality of Judah by being invested with the lordship of a universal state! Jewry's thirst to gain a new mundane kingdom was so deep that the Jewish prophet was prepared to recognize the Gentile as 'the Lord's Anointed' (Isa. xlv. 1) if that would secure the fulfilment of these Jewish hopes.

⁴ See von Gall, op. cit., index, s.v. *Zwischenreich*.

Millennium on a glorified Earth is not yet God himself but is merely a Messiah who is God's terrestrial deputy. 'The Lord's Anointed' is, indeed, now portrayed as a supernatural figure, and is no longer thought of as an historical human potentate—a Cyrus or a Zerubbabel or a Simon Maccabaeus or a Simon bar Kōkabā—who is singular only in having God's authority behind him. This supernatural Messiah is all of a piece with a world that has been reconverted into an Earthly Paradise for the last Millennium of its existence. But it is manifest that the construction of a miraculous Millennium in This World, pending the replacement of This World by another, is an untenable attempt at a compromise between two ideas which are not only quite distinct but are also in the last resort mutually incompatible. The first of these ideas is the hope of a mundane kingdom which in no way differs from the present in its spiritual quality and is merely projected into the future in order to give scope for make-believe. The second idea is that of a Kingdom of God which is not in Time at all—either present, future, or past—and which differs from all temporal mundane states in the radical way of being in a different spiritual dimension, but which, just by virtue of this difference of dimension, is able to penetrate our mundane life and, in penetrating, to transfigure it.¹ For making the arduous spiritual ascent to the vision of Transfiguration from the mirage of Futurism the eschatological scheme of a Millennium may be a convenient mental ladder; but when once the height has been scaled the ladder can be allowed to fall away; and therewith the mundane Futurism which has evoked a vision of the Other World in response to the challenge of its own unescapable bankruptcy will at last have been completely transcended.

'The Pharisaic pietist had already learnt under the Hasmonaeans to turn away from This World to Heaven, to the future; and now, under Herod, all the current of national feeling which had been set running during the last generations in such strength beat against a blind wall, and itself found no outlet save through the channels opened by the Pharisee. It was among the people bent down beneath that iron necessity that the transcendental beliefs, the Messianic hopes, nurtured in the Pharisaic schools, spread and propagated themselves with a new vitality. The few books of Pharisaic piety which have come down to us—*Enoch*, the *Psalms of Solomon*, the *Assumption of Moses* and others—show us indeed what ideas occupied the minds of writers, but they could not

¹ Physical similes for spiritual truths are bound to be imperfect and are not unlikely to be misleading; but, in terms of our modern Western Physical Science, the spiritual action of the Other World on This World might perhaps be likened to the play of Radiation upon Matter or to the sweep of a comet's tail through a cluster of planets. This simile of Radiation has been employed already in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 396-7, above. For some alternative similes see V. C (i) (d) 11, in the present volume, pp. 157-61, below.

have shown us what we learn from our Gospels: how ideas of this order had permeated the people through and through; how the figure of the Coming King, "the Anointed One", the "Son of David", how definite conceptions of the Resurrection, of the Other World, were part of the ordinary mental furniture of that common people which hung upon the words of the Lord. . . . But . . . the Christ whom the Christian worshipped was not the embodiment of any single one of those forms which had risen upon prophetic thought; in Him all the hopes and ideals of the past met and blended; the heavenly Son of Man and the earthly Son of David, the Suffering Servant of the Hebrew Prophet and the Slain God of the Greek Mystic, the Wisdom of the Hebrew sage and the Logos of the Greek philosopher, all met in Him; but He was more than all.¹

10. *Detachment*

Our inquiries into the nature and working of Futurism and Archaism have now led us to the conclusion that neither of these two ways of life is permanently *viable* and that the failure of both of them is accounted for by the same fatal error. They are both doomed to fail because both are attempts to perform the impossible acrobatic feat of escaping from the Present without rising above the spiritual plane of mundane life on Earth.² The difference between them is a superficial difference of direction; and a flying leap out of the Present which aims at alighting in another reach of the Time-stream is bound to land disastrously on the rocks just the same whether the leaping fish's unattainable goal happens to lie up stream or down it. Archaism, as we have seen, defeats itself by veering round disconcertingly in mid air and recoiling like a boomerang along a futurist course which runs exactly counter to its aim, while Futurism transcends itself—in the act of coming disastrously to grief—by rending the veil of mundane appearances and bringing into view, beyond them, an Other World of a higher spiritual dimension. The way of life in this Other World is thus revealed to human souls on Earth through a recognition of the bankruptcy of one of the two alternative ways of seeking a change of life without leaving the mundane level; the mystery of Transfiguration is apprehended in a reaction against the fallacy of Futurism. But the bankruptcy of Archaism—which the archaist, in his pursuit of his own fruitless quest, is equally bound to recognize sooner or later—may also bear fruit in a spiritual discovery. The recognition of the truth that Archaism is not enough is a challenge to which the baffled archaist must respond by taking

¹ Bevan, E.: *Jerusalem under the High Priests* (London 1904, Arnold), pp. 158 and 162.

² See V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 383-5; V. C (i) (d) 9 (α), in the present volume, pp. 97-8; and V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), pp. 118-19, above.

some new spiritual departure, unless he is prepared to resign himself to an irretrievable spiritual defeat; and his line of least resistance is to convert a flying leap that is heading for disaster into a flight that will evade the problem of landing by taking permanent leave of the ground. An experience of the impracticability of Archaism inspires a philosophy of Detachment; and we shall do well to examine this simpler way of rising above the mundane level¹—a way which is the archaist's last resort when he finds himself at bay—before we venture to peer into the mystery of Transfiguration.

The experience of life which leads to the conclusion that the only way of life which solves the problem of life is to detach oneself from life has been sketched with an elegant irony in the following imaginary dialogue from the pen of a Hellenic man-of-letters who lived in the Age of the Antonines without mistaking an 'Indian Summer'² for a return of spring.

Charon: 'I will tell you, Hermes, what Mankind and human life remind me of. You must, before now, have watched the bubbles rising in the water under the play of a fountain—the froth, I mean, that makes the foam. Well, some of those bubbles are tiny, and these burst at once and vanish, while there are others that last longer and attract their neighbours till they swell to a portentous bulk—only to burst without fail sooner or later in their turn, as every bubble must. Such is human life. The creatures are all inflated—some to a greater and others to a lesser degree—and there are some whose inflation lasts as long as the twinkling of an eye, while others cease to be at the moment of coming into being; but all of them have to burst sooner or later.'

Hermes: 'Your simile is as apt as Homer's simile of the leaves.'³

Charon: 'Yet, ephemeral though these human beings are, you see, Hermes, how they exert themselves and compete with one another in their struggles for office and honours and possessions—though one day they will have to leave all that behind and come to our place with nothing but one copper in their pockets. Now what do you think? Here we are on an exceeding high mountain. Shan't I shout to them at the top of my voice and warn them to abstain from useless exertions and to live their lives with Death constantly in mind? I will say to them: "You silly fellows, why are you so keen on all that? You had better stop putting yourselves through it. You are not going to live for ever. None of these earthly prizes is everlasting; and nobody, at death, can carry away any of them with him. One day, as sure as fate, the owner will be gone—as naked as he came—and his house and estate and money will pass for ever after to a constant succession of alien possessors." Supposing I

¹ This philosophy of Withdrawal-without-Return has been touched upon already, by anticipation, in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 254-5, above.

² For this diagnosis of the so-called 'Golden Age' of Hellenic history under the régime of the Antonines see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 58-61, above.

³ Quoted in this Study in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 257, above.—A.J.T.

were to shout this at them, or something like it, and could make myself heard, don't you think they might stand to benefit enormously and might also become vastly more sensible than they now appear to be?'

Hermes: 'I am afraid, Charon, you are suffering under an amiable delusion. I don't think you realize the condition to which they have been reduced by their ignorance and self-deception. Even with a gimlet you couldn't now open their ears—they have plugged them and plugged them with wax (as Odysseus treated his companions for fear that they might hear the Sirens singing). They wouldn't be able to hear you, even if you screamed till you burst. In the world of men Ignorance produces the same effect as Lethe in your Hades. All the same, there are a few of them who have refused to put the wax into their ears; and these few do see life steadily, know it for what it is, and incline towards the truth.'

Charon: 'Then shan't we shout to *them*, anyway?'

Hermes: 'Well, even that would be superfluous. You would only be telling them what they knew already. You can see how pointedly they have drawn away from the rest and how disdainfully they are laughing at what is going on. Obviously they are finding no satisfaction at all in all that, and are planning to make a "get-away" from Life and to seek asylum with you. You know they are not exactly loved by their fellow creatures for showing up their follies.'

Charon: 'Well played, sirs! But how terribly few there are of them, Hermes.'

Hermes: 'Quite as many as are wanted.'¹

Having thus brought on to our stage the exponents of the philosophy of Detachment, we may stay to watch them performing their spiritual exercises. We shall find, as we look on, that the practice of Detachment rises through successive degrees from an initiatory act of still reluctant resignation to a climax at which the adept deliberately aims at self-annihilation.

The attitude of mere resignation is illustrated by the consensus between an Epicurean poet and a modern Western Hellenist who has been professor and poet in one.

Quae mala nos subigit vitae tanta cupido?
certa quidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat
nec devitari letum pote quin obeamus . . .
nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum
tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus,
quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti,
proinde licet quot vis vivendo condere saecula;
mors aeterna tamen nilo minus illa manebit,
nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno
lumine qui finem vitae fecit, et ille,
mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante.²

¹ Lucian: *Charon*, 21.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 1077-9 and 1087-94.

A lighter English echo of these massive Lucretian lines can be heard in the following verses of Housman's:

From far, from eve and morning
And yon twelve-winded sky,
The stuff of life to knit me
Blew hither: here am I.

Now—for a breath I tarry
Nor yet disperse apart—
Take my hand quick and tell me,
What have you in your heart.

Speak now, and I will answer;
How shall I help you, say;
Ere to the wind's twelve quarters
I take my endless way.¹

The effort of making this act of resignation to Death may be eased by the reflection that Death automatically draws his own sting, since he cannot extinguish life without also extinguishing consciousness, pain, and desire.

Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum,
quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur;
et, velut anteacto nil tempore sensimus aegri,
ad conflendum venientibus undique Poenis
omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu
horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris oris,
in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum
omnibus humanis esset terraque marique,
sic, ubi non erimus—cum corporis atque animai
discidium fuerit quibus e sumus uniter apti—
scilicet haud nobis quicquam (qui non erimus tum)
accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere,
non si terra mari miscebitur et mare caelo.²

Here again there are English echoes playing round the Latin theme.

Men loved unkindness then, but lightless in the quarry
I slept and saw not; tears fell down, I did not mourn;
Sweat ran and blood sprang out and I was never sorry:
Then it was well with me, in days ere I was born.³

And since this peace-before-birth is a mirror of the peace-after-death from which it is barely separated in time by the brief

¹ Housman, A. E.: *A Shropshire Lad*, xxxii.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 830-42.

³ Housman, A. E.: *A Shropshire Lad*, xlviii.

convulsion of life, the living Englishman may keep up his courage by thinking of the dead Roman.

The gale, it plies the saplings double,
It blows so hard, 'twill soon be gone:
To-day the Roman and his trouble
Are ashes under Uricon.¹

It is the same consolation that is offered by a Stoic philosopher in less harsh language:

'He sounds the retreat, throws open the door, and calls to you "Come". Come whither? Why, to nowhere very dreadful, but only to where you came from. Come to something that is familiar and akin. Come to the elements: fire to fire, earth to earth, breath to breath, moisture to moisture.'²

Death automatically brings oblivion; and anyway the enjoyment of life has limits which are inexorable because they are inherent in the nature of life itself. Life is a movement which has its own proper curve and span. Its secret lies in a succession; and therefore time unduly drawn out can bring nothing but satiety and boredom.

'When you have come to the end of the time that has been allowed you for watching the procession and taking part in the festivities, will you make a fuss', asks our Stoic philosopher, 'on getting the signal to leave, about making your bow and saying "thank you" for the treat and then taking your departure?'—'Yes I will, because I still want to go on having a good time.'—'You are not the only one. But, after all, festivities can't last for ever. So you really must come away and take your leave with at least a show of gratitude and good grace. You must make way for others. Others have to put in an appearance as you have done in your time, and when they present themselves they must be found room and lodging and board. But, if the first-comers won't get out of their light, there will be nothing left for them. Don't be greedy; don't be insatiable; don't take up the whole world.'³

Time is up, and, what is more, you are not likely to enjoy yourself if you overstay your welcome.

Praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque
nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas.
sed, dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur
cetera; post aliut, cum contigit illud, avemus
et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis. . . .
omnia perfunctus vitai praemia marces. . . .
nunc aliena tua tamen aetate omnia mitte,
aequo animoque agendum humanis concede: necessest.⁴

¹ Housman, A. E.: *A Shropshire Lad*, xxxi.

² Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book III, chap. 13, § 14.

³ Ibid., Book IV, chap. 1, §§ 105-6.

⁴ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 1080-4, 956, 961-2.

Nor does the nemesis of satiety lie in wait only for individual human beings; it overtakes whole generations.

Nil erit ulterius quod nostris moribus addat
posteritas: eadem facient cupientque minores.¹

In fact,

'One generation passeth away and another generation cometh, but the Earth abideth for ever. . . . The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be done, and there is no new thing under the Sun.'²

These words of a Syriac sceptic whose mind had perhaps been chilled by a breath of the cold wind of Hellenic philosophy are echoed—in accents that are chillier still—in the meditations of a Roman Stoic sage:

'The rational soul ranges over the whole Cosmos and the surrounding void and explores the scheme of things. It reaches into the abyss of boundless Time and not only comprehends, but studies the significance of, the periodic new birth (τὴν περιοδικὴν παλιγγενεσίαν³) of the Universe. These studies bring the rational soul to a realization of the truth that there will be nothing new to be seen by those who come after us and that, by the same token, those who have gone before us have not seen anything, either, that is beyond our ken. In this sense it would be true to say that any man of forty who is endowed with moderate intelligence has seen—in the light of the uniformity of Nature—the entire Past and Future.'⁴

The purchase given by tedium for levering the Soul away from its attachment to life is so familiar a commonplace of the philosophers that an anthology of variations on the theme culled from Seneca's works alone would be almost enough to fill a volume.⁵

Nor need any one wait till he has reached the point of satiety in order to make the, after all, obvious discovery that mundane life, as it is lived by the *homme moyen sensuel*, is at best insipid.

Lie down, lie down, young yeoman;

The Sun moves always west;

The road one treads to labour

Will lead one home to rest.

And that will be the best.⁶

¹ Juvenal: *Satires*, No. 1, ll. 147-8.

² Eccles. i. 4 and 9.

³ For the history of this word παλιγγενεσία see V. C (i) (b), vol. v, p. 27, footnote 2, above.—A.J.T.

⁴ Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book XI, chap. 1 (compare Book VII, chap. 49, and the present Study, IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 28, footnote 2, above). 'The entire past and future' (τὰ πάντα τὰ καινὰ καὶ τὰ παλαιὰ) sounds like a reminiscence of a Hesiodic formula (τὰ πάντα καὶ τὰ καινὰ καὶ τὰ παλαιὰ, *Op. et Dies*, 32; cf. l. 38)). If there is really a reminiscence of Hesiod here, it illustrates the change of mood that had come over Hellenic minds between Hesiod's and Marcus's day; for Hesiod imagined that he needed the inspiration of the Muses to gain a knowledge which in Marcus's view is known to the average man of forty as a matter of course.

⁵ See, for example, Seneca: *Epistulae Morales*, Ep. xxiv, § 26; Ep. lxxvii, §§ 6 and 17-20; Ep. lxxviii, § 26.

⁶ Housman, A. E.: *A Shropshire Lad*, vii, *ad fin.*

That is depressing; but (since sordidness is worse than insipidity) it is not so repulsive as this:

Tu vero dubitabis et indignabere obire?
mortua cui vita est prope iam vivo atque videnti,
qui somno partem maiorem conteris aevi
et vigilans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas
sollicitamque geris cassa formidine mentem.¹

This drabness of the plain man's life is painful enough. Yet it is not so excruciating as that morbid restlessness of the idle rich which Lucretius depicts with deadly acumen in a passage that has been quoted near the beginning of this Study as an epitome of the state of mind of the Dominant Minority.²

Any one who has ever been in this state of mind, or who has even had an inkling of it at second hand through being haunted by Lucretius's lines, will be inclined to agree with Seneca that life is a synonym for punishment;³ and he may even be persuaded to agree with Lucretius that life is a Hell on Earth:

Atque ea nimirum quaecumque Acherunte profundo
prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis. . . .
hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita.⁴

Lucretius's intuition is Macbeth's experience:

Better be with the dead,
Whom we, to gain our peace, have sent to peace,
Than on the torture of the mind to lie
In restless ecstasy. Duncan is in his grave;
After life's fitful fever he sleeps well.⁵

But Macbeth lives on to sound still deeper depths of horror.

To-morrow and to-morrow and to-morrow
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty Death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 1045-9.

² Ibid., ll. 1053-70, quoted in I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 55, above. This is another Lucretian theme on which Seneca has composed variations: e.g. in *De Tranquillitate*, chap. 2, §§ 6-15 (where Lucretius, Book III, l. 1068, is quoted), and in *Ep. Mor.* iii, § 5.

³ 'Si velis credere altius veritatem intuentibus, omnis vita supplicium est.'—Seneca: *Ad Polybium*, chap. 9, § 6.

⁴ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 978-9 and 1023. The intervening lines are occupied with an ingenious analysis of the genuine terrestrial equivalents of the legendary tortures of Tantalus, Tityus, and Sisyphus and the legendary horrors of Tartarus, Cerberus, and the Furies. (For a hypothesis regarding the origin of these Hellenic legends see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, pp. 522-3, below.)

⁵ Shakespeare: *The Tragedy of Macbeth*, Act III, Scene 2, ll. 19-23.

And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.¹

If life is as grim as that, death must be, by comparison, agreeable.

Numquid ibi horribile apparet, num triste videtur
quicquam, non omni somno securius exstat?²

Seneca justifies his equation of life with punishment³ by comparing the experience of living with that of being adrift on a stormy sea 'from which the only haven is the harbour of death'.⁴

Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis,
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;
non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas,
sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est.⁵

But, if that is sweet, it must be sweeter still to be totally insensible: to know nothing of others' feelings, besides feeling nothing oneself.

Ay, look: high heaven and earth ail from the prime foundation;

All thoughts to rive the heart are here, and all are vain:

Horror and scorn and hate and fear and indignation—

O why did I awake? When shall I sleep again?⁶

'When you will', replies the philosopher; for the time to take action is at hand, and there are effective ways of detaching oneself from life that can be followed if only one is in earnest to the point of willing not merely the desirable end but also the arduous means.

'Ethical prowess (*ἀρετή*) can and will produce felicity (*εὐδαιμονίαν*) and invulnerability (*ἀνάθειαν*) and well-being (*εὖροίαν*) . . . and there is one way only by which well-being can be reached: the way of Detachment (*ἀπόσπασις*) from all morally neutral values (*τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων*). You must not allow yourself to have a sense of property in anything; you must surrender everything to God and to Chance . . . and must concentrate upon one thing only—the thing that is truly your own, and in which no outside power can interfere.'⁷

Spiritual exercises in the practice of Detachment fill many of these 'Leaves from a Stoic Philosopher's Note-Book' out of which

¹ Ibid., Act v, Scene v, ll. 19–28.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 976–7.

³ See the sentence quoted on p. 138, footnote 3, above.

⁴ Seneca: *Ad Polybium*, chap. 9, § 7: 'In hoc tam procelloso et ad omnes tempestates exposito mari navigantibus nullus portus nisi mortis est.'

⁵ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book II, ll. 1–4.

⁶ Housman, A. E.: *A Shropshire Lad*, xlviii; the same theme is handled with a lighter touch in li.

⁷ Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book I, chap. 4, § 3, and Book IV, chap. 4, § 39.

the foregoing sentences have been culled.¹ But if we follow the path of Detachment far enough we shall find ourselves sooner or later turning from a Hellenic to an Indic guide; for, far though the disciples of Zeno may go, it is the disciples of Gautama that have had the courage to pursue Detachment all the way to its logical goal of self-annihilation.²

Detachment is, indeed, a matter of degree. One may play at it in the game of a sophisticated 'return to Nature' that was played by a Marie Antoinette in her Parisian dairy and by a Theocritus in his Coan harvest-field.³ One may carry this game to the length of a pose,⁴ as it was carried by a Diogenes in his tub and by a Thoreau in his wigwam.⁵ One may genuinely stake one's life—as an anchorite in the desert or as a yogi in the jungle—upon the efficacy of this would-be solution of the problem which life presents. But a traveller along the path of Detachment who is to reach the goal and win the reward must do more than stake his life on the quest; he must detach himself from life to the point of being in love with nothing but its negation.⁶

To do this, of course, means flying in the face of human nature, and even a willing spirit may be tempted to humour the weakness of the flesh by accepting the assistance of a god to waft it on its way towards so formidable a destination.

With the great gale we journey
That breathes from gardens thinned,
Borne in the drift of blossoms
Whose petals throng the wind;
Buoyed on the heaven-heard whisper
Of dancing leaflets whirled
From all the woods that autumn
Bereaves in all the World.

¹ e.g. see also Book I, chap. 29, *περί εὐσταθείας*, and Book II, chap. 2, *περί ἀραπαρίας*.

² The Epicurean Hellenic ideal of imperturbability (*ἀραπαρία*) seems to have been conceived and pursued independently in a disintegrating Sinic Society by Hsün-tse, the founder of a school of Confucian philosophy which was the antithesis of the school of Mencius (see Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), p. 201). But the Sinic, like the Hellenic, sages seem to have flinched from going to Indic extremes.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 377; V. C (i) (d) 2, vol. v, p. 403; and V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), in the present volume, pp. 58-9, above. The game that is described in Theocritus's Seventh Idyll and in Lucretius's *De Rerum Natura*, Book II, ll. 20-33 (on which Seneca has embroidered in *Ep. Mor.* xc, §§ 40-3), is also portrayed in the picture by Giorgione that goes by the name of *La Fête Champêtre*.

⁴ A Detachment that is no more than a game or a pose may be suspected of being *Abandon* masquerading in a pretentious disguise (see V. C (i) (d) 2, vol. v, p. 403, above).

⁵ See Thoreau, H. D.: *Walden, or Life in the Woods* (Boston 1854, Houghton Mifflin).

⁶ It is the aim of the Hinayanian Buddhist sage to make his way, through exercises in spiritual concentration, into other and higher worlds of which the keynote is a toning down of feelings to a 'veiled indifference (*Nivṛta-Avyakṛta*)' (Stcherbatsky, Th.: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* (Leningrad 1927, Academy of Sciences of U.S.S.R.), p. 11).

And midst the fluttering legion
 Of all that ever died
 I follow, and before us
 Goes the delightful guide,
 With lips that brim with laughter
 But never once respond,
 And feet that fly on feathers,
 And serpent-circled wand.¹

If one is really going to walk over the edge of a precipice, is it not best to let oneself be led over it in this agreeable way by Hermes Psychopompus? Perhaps it is better to make certain of the guide's identity before putting ourselves in his hands. And, when we look into it, we shall find that the bearer of this imposing Hellenic title is a will-o'-the-wisp who also answers to the Nordic name of the Pied Piper of Hamelin. The Piper hypnotizes children into falling in at his heels; but the trance in which they follow him does not end for them in an escape from life; it ends instead in their sitting in darkness and the shadow of death in the bowels of a mountain into which the deceitful magician entices them. And, even without having the Teutonic fairy-tale to warn him, the Indic candidate for arhatship knows by intuition that the Hellenic expedient of a conducted tour to *Nirvāna* is a snare and a delusion. If one takes an anaesthetic, one cannot commit hara-kiri; and in order to achieve the greater *tour de force* of spiritual self-annihilation one must be alertly aware, from first to last, of what one is about. The key that unlocks the gate of *Nirvāna* is not an aesthetically agreeable hypnosis but an arduous and painful mental strife of the kind that is prescribed in the following passage from a work of the Hinayanian Buddhist philosophy.

'In one who abides surveying the enjoyment in things that make for grasping, craving (*tanhā*) increases. Grasping is caused by craving, coming into existence by grasping, birth by coming into existence, and old age and death by birth. . . . Just as if a great mass of fire were burning of ten, twenty, thirty or forty loads of faggots, and a man from time to time were to throw on it dry grasses, dry cow-dung, and dry faggots; even so a great mass of fire with that feeding and that fuel would burn for a long time. . . .

'In one who abides surveying the misery in things that make for grasping, craving ceases. With the ceasing of craving, grasping ceases; with the ceasing of grasping, coming into existence ceases; with the ceasing of coming into existence, birth ceases; and, with the ceasing of birth, old age and death cease. Grief, lamentation, pain, dejection, and despair cease. Even so is the cessation of all this mass of pain.'²

¹ Housman, A. E.: *A Shropshire Lad*, xlii.

² *Upādāna-sutta*, ii. 84, quoted in Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), p. 62.

The reward that awaits the whole-hearted seeker after Detachment at his journey's end is described by our Hellenic philosopher in a characteristically political simile.

'You see that Caesar appears to provide us with a great peace, because there are no longer any wars or battles or any serious crimes of brigandage or piracy, so that one can travel at any season and can sail from the Levant to the Ponent.¹ But tell me now: can Caesar also bring us peace from fever and from shipwreck, or from conflagration or earthquake or thunderbolt? Yes, and from love? Impossible. And from grief? Impossible. And from envy? A sheer impossibility in every one of these predicaments. But, unlike Caesar, the doctrine (λόγος) of the philosophers does promise to bring us peace from these troubles too.² And what does that doctrine tell us? "My children", it says, "if you listen to me, then, wherever you are and whatever you are doing, you will not be overtaken by sorrow or by anger or by a consciousness either of constraint or of frustration. You will go through with it in a state of invulnerability (ἀπαθείς διάξερε), in which you will be free from all these ills." This is a peace that is proclaimed not by Caesar (how *could* Caesar proclaim it for us?) but by God through the voice of Philosophy (διὰ τοῦ λόγου). And the philosopher who possesses that peace is master of the situation even when he is single-handed. For he can look the World in the face as he thinks to himself; "Now no evil can befall me. For me there exists no such thing as a brigand or an earthquake. For me there is nothing anywhere but peace, nothing but imperturbability (πάντα εἰρήνης μεσά, πάντα ἀταραξίας)." ³

This Hellenic simile veils a metaphysical belief which is embraced in its elemental nakedness by a hardier Indic school of thought.

'The world-process is . . . a process of co-operation between . . . subtle, evanescent elements; and such is the nature of *dharma*s that they proceed from causes and steer towards extinction. Influenced by the element *avidyā*, the process is in full swing. Influenced by the element *prajñā*, it has a tendency towards appeasement and final extinction. In the first case streams of combining elements are produced which correspond to ordinary men; in the second the stream represents a saint.⁴ The complete stoppage of the process of phenomenal life corresponds to a Buddha. . . . The final result of the world-process is its suppression:

¹ This sentence has been quoted already, apropos of the actual *Pax Augusta*, in V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 3, above.—A.J.T.

² These sentences have been quoted already in V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 16, footnote 2, above.—A.J.T.

³ Epictetus: *Dissertationes*: Book III, chap. 13, §§ 9-13.

⁴ With his body still alive
The saint enjoys some feeling,
But in Nirvāna consciousness is gone
Just as a light when totally extinct.

Verses quoted by Candrakīrti, and, after him, by Stcherbatsky, Th.: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna* (Leningrad 1927, Academy of Sciences of U.S.S.R.), p. 184.

Absolute Calm.¹ All co-operation is extinct and replaced by immutability (*Asamskṛta* = *Nirvāna*). . . . The Absolute (*Nirvāna*) is inanimate, even if it is something. It is sometimes, especially in popular literature, characterized as bliss; but this bliss consists in the cessation of unrest (*dukkha*). Bliss is a feeling, and in the Absolute there neither is a feeling nor conception nor volition nor even consciousness. The theory is that consciousness cannot appear alone without its satellites, the phenomena of feeling, volition, &c.; and the last moment in the life of a Bodhisattva, before merging into the Absolute, is also the last moment of consciousness in his continuity of many lives.²

This absolute Detachment has perhaps never been attained, or at least never as a permanent state, outside the school of the Indic philosopher Siddhārtha Gautama.³ As an intellectual achievement

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The body has collapsed,
Ideas gone, all feelings vanished,
All energies quiescent
And consciousness itself extinct.

Ibid.

² Stcherbatsky, Th.: *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word 'Dharma'* (London 1923, Royal Asiatic Society), pp. 74 and 53. The same author, in *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* (Leningrad 1927, Academy of Sciences of U.S.S.R.), p. 40, describes the Hinayanian conception of *Nirvāna* as representing 'some indefinite essence of . . . forces which were active in phenomenal life but are now extinct and converted into eternal death'. See also, however, Radhakrishnan, Sir S.: *Gautama the Buddha* (London 1938, Milford), pp. 41-6, cited in this Study already in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 134, footnote 1, and in V. C (i) (d) 7, in the present volume, p. 18, footnote 1, above, for the view that *Nirvāna*, in Siddhārtha Gautama's own conception of it, is not a negation of existence but is 'a different, deeper mode of life' which 'is peace and rest in the bosom of the Eternal'.

³ The *Nirvāna* that is the normal and permanent goal of the Hinayanian Buddhist arhat was, however, perhaps apprehended as a rare and fleeting experience by Plotinus, whose Neoplatonism was the last of the schools of Hellenic philosophy.

'The ecstatic trance, in which the distinction between the mind and its ideas, the self and self-knowledge, passes away, is not, so Plotinus would have us believe, a mere swooning and eclipse of the Soul while the World goes booming on, but a flight of the Alone to the Alone. Sense and spiritual contemplation and mystic union are psychological states corresponding to cosmic climes, and growth in self-knowledge may be described also as a journey of the Soul through the Universe to its far-off home. Only this should be noted, that the actual attainment of the noetic state, when once the Soul has been released from the bondage of rebirth, brings a cessation of what we regard as personal existence. The heaven of the Nous has no place for memory of the Soul's past lives, and Being there is not an immortality that denotes conscious continuity; it is rather a blissful forgetfulness. And the last stage of identification with the One is a complete loss of identity' (More, P. E.: *Hellenistic Philosophies = The Greek Tradition from the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon: 399 B.C.-A.D. 451*, vol. ii (Princeton 1923, University Press), pp. 197-8).

On this showing, Plotinus's *Visio Beatifica* might be described as an entry into *Nirvāna* that is momentary instead of being permanent, but which is genuine for so long as it lasts. On the other hand the common essence of the Neoplatonic and the Hinayanian Buddhist experience is apparently not to be found in the experience of either the Christian or the Islamic school of mysticism.

'*Fanā*', an important technical term of Sūfism, meaning "annihilation, dissolution". The Sūfī who attains perfection must be in a kind of state of annihilation. . . . The origin of the Muslim conception of *fanā* has . . . to be sought in Christianity, from which it seems to be borrowed. This conception simply means the annihilation of the individual human will before the will of God—an idea which forms the centre of all Christian mysticism. The conception thus belongs to the domain of ethics and not in the slightest degree to that of metaphysics, like the *nirvāna* of the Hindu. . . . The author of the *Kashf al-Mahjub* expressly states that *fanā* does not mean loss of essence and destruction of personality, as some ignorant Sūfīs think' (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (London 1927, Luzac), p. 52).

it is imposing; as a moral achievement it is overwhelming; but it has a disconcerting moral corollary; for perfect Detachment casts out Pity, and therefore also Love, as inexorably as it purges away all the evil passions.

The intellectual reasonableness of this appalling moral conclusion is most easily demonstrable in the case of the Gods, for whom the human philosophy of Detachment can hardly find room except in the contemptible role of spoilt children of the Universe.¹

The habitat of these unedifying privileged beings is the nearest thing to an unearned *Nirvāna*² (a virtual contradiction in terms!) that Epicurus admits into his Cosmos.

Apparet divom numen sedesque quietae
 quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis
 aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina
 cana cadens violat semperque innubilis aether
 integit, et large diffuso lumine rident.
 omnia suppeditat porro Natura neque ulla
 res animi pacem delibat tempore in ullo.³

This Lotus-Eaters' 'no-man's-land'⁴ was necessarily incommensurable with, and therefore also necessarily insulated from, the habitat of Mankind.

Illud item non est ut possis credere, sedes
 esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis.
 tenuis enim natura deum longeque remota
 sensibus ab nostris animi vix mente videtur;
 quae quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum,
 tactile nil nobis quod sit contingere debet.
 tangere enim non quit quod tangi non licet ipsum.
 quare etiam sedes quoque nostris sedibus esse
 dissimiles debent—tenues, de corpore eorum.⁵

It follows that neither the world which Mankind inhabits nor Mankind itself is of the Gods' creation. And, apart from the sheer physical impossibility of the hypothesis, what conceivable motive could the Gods have had for creating anything, even if they had had the power?

¹ The tendency of Philosophy to depreciate God in magnifying Law has been examined in V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 18-28, above.

² In Stcherbatsky, Th.: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* (Leningrad 1927, Academy of Sciences of U.S.S.R.), p. 15, it is pointed out that the saints in the Hīnayānian *Nirvāna* are, like the gods in the Epicurean *μετακόσμου* (see footnote 4, below), quiescent, inactive, and possessed of bodies of a special atomic structure.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 18-24.

⁴ The term is strictly applicable; for Epicurus parked his gods in his *μετακόσμου*, which, in the language of our modern Western astronomy, might perhaps be translated as 'inter-nebular spaces'.

⁵ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 146-54.

Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis
 gratia nostra queat largiri emolumentum
 ut nostra quicquam causa gerere aggrediantur?
 quidve novi potuit, tanto post, ante quietos
 inicere ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?¹

Nor, whatever the myths may say, have the Gods ever intervened in human affairs, any more than they have been responsible for bringing the human race into existence.

Omnis enim per se divom natura necessest
 immortalis aeo summa cum pace fruatur
 semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe.
 nam privata dolore omni, privata periculis,
 ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri,
 nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira.²

And Lucretius's point has been anticipated, in still more shocking lines of Latin verse, by his predecessor Ennius:

Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam caelitem,
 sed eos non curare opinor quid agat humanum genus;
 nam, si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis, quod nunc abest.

It would indeed be uncomplimentary to hold the Gods responsible for works which 'ail from the prime foundation'.

Quod si iam rerum ignorem primordia quae sint,
 hoc tamen ex ipsis caeli rationibus ausim
 confirmare aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
 nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
 naturam rerum: tanta stat praedita culpa.³

But there is another and a deeper reason why it would be impious to credit the Gods with having anything to do with the World, and this is that a perfect Detachment is the very hall-mark of Divinity.

'Being blissful and incorruptible means having no bothers oneself and causing none to others, and this in turn means being detached from all feelings of anger or of gratitude. All that kind of thing is a sure sign of infirmity.'⁴

In a famous work of Indic literature a god is duly made to glory in the Detachment which, in the passage just quoted, is attributed by a Hellenic philosopher to the Godhead *a priori*.

¹ Ibid., Book V, ll. 165-9.

² Ibid., Book II, ll. 646-51.

³ Ibid., Book V, ll. 195-9.

⁴ Epicurus, quoted in Diogenes Laertius: *The Lives of the Philosophers*, Book X, chap. 139: τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον οὐτ' αὐτὸ πρᾶγματ' ἔχει οὐτ' ἄλλω παρέχει, ὥστ' οὐτ' ὀργαῖς οὐτ' ἐχθρίαις συνέχευται· ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. This passage is also to be found in a Latin translation in Cicero: *De Natura Deorum*, Book I, chap. 17 (section 45). The same equation of action with infirmity is made in a passage of Plotinus which has been quoted in this Study in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 254, footnote 4, above.

'I am indifferent to all born things; there is none whom I hate, none whom I love.'¹

These words are placed in the mouth of a god, but it is a human ideal that they express; for the tribe of philosophers is not less prone than the tribes of Thracians and Ethiopians² to portray the Gods in their human makers' image; and the same poem elsewhere extols the same inhumanly complete Detachment as the hall-mark, not of divinity, but of perfection in the soul of a human being.

'He whose mind is undismayed in pain, who is freed from longings for pleasure, from whom passion, fear and wrath have fled, is called a man of abiding prudence, a saintly man. He who is without affection for aught, and whatever fair or foul fortune may betide neither rejoices in it nor loathes it, has wisdom abidingly set.'

'The man whose every motion is void of love and purpose, whose works are burned away by the fire of knowledge, the enlightened call "learned".'

'The learned grieve not for them whose lives are fled nor for them whose lives are not fled.'³

To the Indic sage's mind this heartlessness is the adamant core of philosophy; and the same conclusion was reached independently by the Hellenic philosophers as a result of following likewise to the bitter end a parallel line of escape from life. The Hellenic sage who had struggled out into the sunshine of enlightenment might perhaps feel a greater sense of social obligation to return to the Cave where the vast majority of his former fellow prisoners were still languishing;⁴ but this difference, such as it was, between the Hellenic and the Indic philosopher's code was superficial; for, even if he did return, the Hellenic philosopher was merely to go through the motions of showing mercy upon his suffering fellow creatures. He was not only free, but was in duty bound, to leave his heart behind him. This personal obligation, which the Hellenic philosopher remorselessly laid upon himself, to preserve at all costs his hard-won invulnerability has been described by a modern Western scholar⁵ in terms so startling that we might be inclined to suspect him of rhetorical exaggeration if there were not chapter and verse to warrant every statement to which he commits himself.

'The Wise Man was not to *concern* himself with his brethren . . . he was only to serve them.'⁶ Benevolence he was to have, as much of it as

¹ Bhagavadgītā, ix. 29 (English translation by Barnett, L. D. (London 1920, Dent), pp. 129-30).

² See the quotation from Xenophanes at the beginning of Part I. A, vol. i, p. 1, above.

³ Bhagavadgītā, ii. 56-7; iv. 19; ii. 11 (Barnett's translation (cited in footnote 1, above), pp. 94, 104, 88).

⁴ For Plato's simile of the Cave see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 249-52, above.

⁵ Bevan, E. R.: *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford 1913, Clarendon Press), pp. 66-7.

⁶ 'The sage will not feel pity, because he cannot feel it without himself being in a pitiful state of mind; but everything else that is done by those who do indulge in that

you can conceive; but there was one thing he must not have, and that was love. Here, too, if that inner tranquillity and freedom of his was to be kept safe through everything—here too, as when he was intending to acquire objects for himself, he must engage in action without desire.¹ He must do everything which it is possible for him to do, shrink from no extreme of physical pain, in order to help, to comfort, to guide his fellow men, but whether he succeeds or not must be a matter of pure indifference to him. If he has done his best to help you and failed, he will be perfectly satisfied with having done his best. The fact that you are no better off for his exertions will not matter to him at all. Pity, in the sense of a painful emotion caused by the sight of other men's suffering, is actually a vice.² The most that can be allowed when the Wise Man goes to console a mourner, is that he should feign sympathy as a means of attaining his object; but he must take care not to feel it. He may sigh, Epictetus says, provided the sigh does not come from his heart.³ In the service of his fellow men he must be prepared to sacrifice his health, to sacrifice his possessions, to sacrifice his life; but there is one thing he must never sacrifice: his own eternal calm.⁴

emotion will also be done by him—and this readily and high-mindedly. He will succour a sorrowful neighbour without joining in his grief. He will give a helping hand to the castaway, hospitality to the exile, alms to the destitute. . . . He will allow a mother's tears to purchase the freedom of her son, will release the prisoner from his chains and the gladiator from his barracks, and will even give burial to the criminal's corpse. But he will do all this without any mental agitation or any change of countenance' (Seneca: *De Clementia*, Book II, chap. 6, §§ 1-2).—A.J.T.

¹ 'If you are kissing a child of yours—or a brother, or a friend—never put your imagination unreservedly into the act and never give your emotion free rein, but curb it and check it (like the mentors who stand behind the conqueror in his triumphal car to prompt him to remember that he is only a human being). It is up to you to be your own prompter and to remind yourself that the being whom you love is mortal, so that what you are loving is not your own property. It has been given to you only temporarily, and the gift is not irrevocable or absolute. It is like a fig or a bunch of grapes that one has at the appointed season; and if one goes on craving for it in wintertime one is a fool. It is equally foolish to crave for one's son or one's friend out of season; that is just another form of asking for figs in winter. . . . Indeed, there is no harm in accompanying the act of kissing the child by whispering over him: "To-morrow you will die"' (Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book III, chap. 24, §§ 85-8). The whole chapter—which is entitled "The impropriety of being emotionally affected by what is not under one's control"—is more or less apposite.—A.J.T.

² 'Pity is a mental illness induced by the spectacle of other people's miseries, or alternatively it may be defined as an infection of low spirits caught from other people's troubles when the patient believes that those troubles are undeserved. The sage does not succumb to suchlike mental diseases. The sage's mind is serene and is immune from being upset by the incidence of any external force. The noblest ornament of human nature is greatness of soul; but such greatness is not compatible with grief; for grief bruises the mind and prostrates it and shrivels it up; and the sage does not allow that to happen to him—even in calamities that are his own. . . . Pity is next-door neighbour to pitifulness (*misericordia vicina est miseriae*). . . . Pity is a vice of minds too prone to be appalled at the sight of misery. If you expect the sage to feel pity, you might almost as well expect him to weep and wail at somebody else's funeral' (Seneca: *De Clementia*, Book II, chap. 5, §§ 4-5, and chap. 6, § 4).—A.J.T.

³ 'I do not say that it is inadmissible to groan; the point is that the groan must not come from the heart' (Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book I, chap. 18, § 19). It would perhaps be unfair to Epictetus to overlook the fact that this precept is given apropos of a physical pain afflicting oneself. At the same time Dr. Bevan is no doubt fairly entitled to assume that the precept has a wider application than this in Epictetus's philosophy.—A.J.T.

⁴ 'The sage will always keep the same calm and unmoved countenance—which he could not do if he permitted himself to feel sorrow' (Seneca: *De Clementia*, Book II, chap. 5, § 5).—A.J.T.

Nor, among the dominant minority in a disintegrating Hellenic Society, was this repulsive ideal a mere uncoveted monopoly of a handful of pedants and prigs. The most sensitive and lovable and popular of all the Latin poets has deliberately drawn his hero in the unfeeling philosopher's image; and his heartlessness is the sign in which Aeneas conquers at the crisis of his career, when he successfully steels himself—like an oak standing up to a storm—against Anna's supreme appeal on Dido's behalf.

Mens immota manet; lacrimae volvuntur inanes.¹

A modern Western Hellenist has used his art to preach this sophisticated philosophy in the name of the plain man. In the grave—'in the nation that is not'—sings a Shropshire Lad,

Lovers lying two by two
Ask not whom they sleep beside,
And the bridegroom all night through
Never turns him to the bride.²

Yet, in pressing its way to a conclusion which is logically inevitable and at the same time morally intolerable, the philosophy of Detachment ultimately defeats itself; and it is in vain that its exponents wring a grudging recognition of their fortitude, and even of their nobility, out of the petrified hearts of their audience. In the very act of unwilling admiration we are vehemently moved to revolt. It was the sorrows of Dido and not the virtues of Aeneas that appealed to Saint Augustine in his unregenerate youth; and he lived to write as a saint in middle age: 'It is not true that "No god ever enters into relations with Man"—even if Plato did say so, as Apuleius says he did.'³ The philosophy of Detachment does not, after all, provide a solution for the problem which it sets out to solve; for in consulting only the head and ignoring the heart it is arbitrarily putting asunder what God has joined together.⁴ This philosophy falls short of the truth by refusing to take account of the Soul's duality in unity; and therefore the philosophy of Detachment has to be eclipsed by the mystery of Transfiguration. The Hīnayāna makes way for the Mahāyāna,⁵ Stoicism for Christianity, the arhat for the Bodhisattva,⁶ the sage for the saint.

¹ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book IV, l. 449.

² Housman, A. E.: *A Shropshire Lad*, xii.

³ Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book IX, chap. 16, quoting Apuleius: *De Deo Socratis*, chap. 4, § 21 (edited by Lütjohann, Chr.: Greifswald 1878, Kunike): 'Nam, ut idem Plato ait, "nullus deus miscetur hominibus [θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπων οὐ μίγνυται.—*Symposium*, 203 A]", sed hoc praecipuum eorum sublimitatis specimen est, quod nulla adtractatione nostra contaminantur.'

⁴ Matt. xix. 6.

⁵ For the eruption of the Mahāyāna out of the Hīnayāna see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 133-6, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 552, above.

⁶ For the antithesis between Bodhisattva and arhat see further V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 164, footnote 3, below.

11. *Transfiguration*

We have found that the experience of being constrained to live in the adverse social environment of a disintegrating civilization confronts the Soul with a spiritual problem which is, no doubt, demanding a solution all the time but which can be more or less successfully ignored or evaded so long as the Soul is able to float lazily on the flowing tide of a civilization that is still in growth. When this latent problem of life is forced upon the Soul's attention by the hard fact that a way of life which has hitherto been taken for granted is now failing to work, the Soul is driven into searching for a substitute, and we have already passed in review three different attempts to find one; but, so far, our survey has brought us each time to the dead end of a blind-alley. The way of Archaism ends in self-defeat, the way of Futurism in self-transcendence, the way of Detachment in self-stultification. There is, however, one way left for us still to explore, and that is the way to which we have provisionally given the name of Transfiguration.¹

As we gird up our loins to take this fourth and last turning a clamour of disapproving and derisive voices assails our ears. Shall we allow ourselves to be intimidated by this chorus of protest? Shall we abandon at this point a course of exploration which has hitherto proved as disappointing as it has been laborious? It is tempting to yield to the promptings of weariness and disillusionment. Yet, before we do give in, it may be well to consider whether we really wish to resign ourselves to remaining imprisoned in a city of destruction—like rats in a trap—so long as there is still one possible egress left untried. And it may also be well to ask ourselves whether the hostile chorus is really a bad augury. For whose, after all, are these voices that are eager to deter us? When we look the hostile chorus in the face we see before us nothing more formidable than the sullen countenances of the baffled philosophers and futurists (the archaists have been so deeply discouraged by their own fiasco that they have not had the heart to join in the outcry). Are these familiar companions of our previous journeys now likely to give us good advice? Will they not be prone to be unduly discouraged by their own unfortunate experience, and unduly sceptical about an alternative road which might conceivably arrive at the goal which the roads of Futurism and Detachment have failed to reach? And is their unquestionable eminence in their respective spheres of action and of thought a cogent reason for accepting their authority? May not this be the moment to remind ourselves of the principle of *περιπέτεια*—‘the reversal of

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 390 and 396-7, above.

roles'—upon which we have stumbled at an earlier stage of our inquiry?¹ This principle of irony and paradox is mighty in its operation. A study of history reveals in every act and scene of the play the truth that

'God hath chosen the foolish things of the World to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the World to confound the things which are mighty.'²

This truth which we can thus verify empirically is also known to us intuitively. And in the light and the strength of it we may brave the disapproval of futurists and philosophers alike by stepping boldly out in the footprints of a guide who is neither Simon bar Kōkabā nor Hermes Psychopompus.

'The Jews require a sign and the Greeks seek after wisdom; but we', writes Paul to the Corinthians, 'preach Christ Crucified—unto the Jews a stumblingblock and unto the Greeks foolishness.'³

Why is Christ Crucified a stumbling-block to futurists who have never succeeded in eliciting the sign which they require? And why is He foolishness to philosophers who for their part have never succeeded in discovering the wisdom after which they seek? If we press these two questions, we may not only put ourselves in a position to take a more exact measure of those two spiritual blind-alleys: we may also (and this is of much greater moment) be able to make some progress in exploring the mysterious way of life along which the Apostle is beckoning us.

Christ Crucified is foolishness to the philosopher (be he of a Greek or of an Indian school) because the philosopher's ultimate aim is Detachment; and therefore the philosopher cannot comprehend how any reasonable being who has once attained that forbidding goal can be so perverse as deliberately to relinquish what he has so hardly won. What is the sense of withdrawing simply in order to return?⁴ This passes the understanding of a philosopher who knows by his own experience how heavy a toll of fortitude and perseverance the feat of withdrawal must have taken from any human being who has successfully achieved it. And *a fortiori* the philosopher is completely nonplussed at the notion of a God who has not even had to take the trouble to withdraw from an unsatisfactory World, because He is completely independent of it by virtue of His very divinity, but who nevertheless deliberately enters into the World, and subjects Himself there to the utmost agony

¹ In IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, pp. 245-61, above. See also V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 561-5, above.

² 1 Cor. i. 27, quoted already in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, p. 249, above.

³ 1 Cor. i. 22-3.

⁴ For the contrast between the pagan philosopher's withdrawal and the Christian mystic's withdrawal-and-return see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 249-63, above.

that God or Man can undergo, for the sake of a race of beings of an immeasurably inferior order. 'God so loved the World that He gave His only begotten Son?'¹ That is the last word in folly from the standpoint of a seeker after Detachment. 'He saved others; himself he cannot save!'²

The fact is that

'Mankind has two different ideals before it; and I do not see how the ideal of Detachment is compatible with the ideal of Love. If we choose one, we must forgo the other; each ideal appears faulty when judged by the measure of the other. With the one goes to a large extent the intellect of Ancient Greece and of India, with the other the Christian Church and the hearts of men, the *anima naturaliter Christiana*; for neither in Greece nor India nor China have the philosophers been the whole of the people—nor their philosophy the whole of the philosophers.

'There have been things tending to obscure this divergence between the two ideals. The language used by the Stoics or Buddhists about benevolence may often be taken to be inspired by the Christian ideal of Love. On the other hand the Christian ideal has involved Detachment from many things, from "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches"³ and the lusts of other things, and much of the language used about this sort of Detachment in Christian books may seem to point to the ideal of Ancient Greece and India.⁴ The Stoic sage strenuously labouring to do good and indifferent whether good is done, sighing with his stricken friend, but not from the heart, is a figure serving well to bring home to us the difference. And we may see, I think, that the Stoics and sages of India could say no less without giving up their whole scheme.

'If the supreme end is Tranquillity, of what use would it be to set the Wise Man's heart free from disturbance by cutting off the fear and desire which made him dependent upon outside things, if one immediately opened a hundred channels by which the World's pain and unrest

¹ John iii. 16. This view of what God's feeling and attitude and purpose and action may be seems to have been a Syriac discovery (see V. C (ii) (a), p. 276, footnote 5, below). ² Mark xv. 31. ³ Matt. xiii. 22.

⁴ For example, the following words of Saint John of the Cross might readily be taken in a Stoic or Hinayanian Buddhist sense at a first reading:

'There is no Detachment if desire remains. . . Detachment . . . consists in suppressing desire and avoiding pleasure; it is this that sets the Soul free, even though possession may be still retained. It is not the things of This World that occupy or injure the Soul, for they do not enter within, but rather the wish for, and desire of, them, which abide within it. The affection and attachment which the Soul feels for the creature renders the Soul its equal and its like, and the greater the affection the greater will be the likeness. Love begets a likeness between the lover and the object of his love' (Saint John of the Cross: 'The Ascent of Mount Carmel' in *The Mystical Doctrine of Saint John of the Cross* (London 1934, Sheed & Ward), p. 10).

'This Christian practice of Detachment differs, nevertheless, from the pagan practice in a fundamental point which is indicated by the inclusion of the words 'for the creature'. And these three words give the key, not only to this passage, but to the whole spirit and aim of the Christian mysticism. The unspoken—because unquestioned—premiss of the argument is that the motions of affection and attachment are only to be inhibited in so far as they are directed towards the creature and not towards the Creator. The aim of the Christian practice of Detachment is not to mortify love but to vivify it when it is a love of God. And the truth that 'love begets a likeness between the lover and the object of his love' is as true of the love of God as it is of the love of the things of This World.—A.J.T.

could flow into his heart through the fibres, created by Love and Pity, connecting his heart with the fevered hearts of men all round? A hundred fibres!—one aperture would suffice to let in enough of the bitter surge to fill his heart full. Leave one small hole in a ship's side, and you let in the sea. The Stoics, I think, saw with perfect truth that if you were going to allow any least entrance of Love and Pity into the breast, you admitted something whose measure you could not control, and might just as well give up the idea of inner Tranquillity at once. Where Love is, action cannot be without desire; the action of Love has eminently regard to fruit, in the sense of some result beyond itself—the one thing that seems to matter is whether the loved person really is helped by your action. Of course you run the risk of frustrated desire and disappointment. The Stoic sage was never frustrated and never disappointed. Gethsemane, looked at from this point of view, was a signal breakdown. The Christian's Ideal Figure could never be accepted by the Stoic as an example of his typical Wise Man.¹

No, and neither could the Stoic's Ideal Figure ever be accepted conversely by the Christian as a prototype of his Christ or even as an analogue of his Christian saint. The shortcomings of the pagan philosophy from the Christian standpoint have been starkly exposed by a saint—who has the advantage of being a philosopher as well—in an argument which proceeds from the Christian postulates that 'God is Love'² and that 'perfect Love casteth out fear'.³

In the Hellenic philosophy there are two schools of thought with regard to those mental emotions which are called in Greek *πάθη* and in Latin either "perturbations" (in the usage of Cicero and others) or "affections" (alias "affects") or else "passions" (a more exact translation of the Greek, which is employed, for example, by Apuleius). These perturbations or affections or passions are declared by one school to attack the sage too [as well as the plain man], only in the sage they are moderate and subject to reason, so that the mind maintains its supremacy and imposes on these passions a system of laws which restrain them within proper bounds. This school is the Platonico-Aristotelian. . . . But there is another school, represented by the Stoics, which does not admit that the sage is attacked by any passions of this kind at all. . . . When all is said, [however,] the difference of view, in regard to passions and mental perturbations, between the Stoics and other philosophers is infinitesimal; for both schools agree in seeking to make the mind and reason of the sage immune from the passions' dominion. . . . The Christian doctrine, [on the other hand,] subordinates the mind itself to God, to be ruled—and aided—by Him, and subordinates the passions to the mind, to be governed—and curbed—by it until they are converted into instruments of justice. Consequently in our Christian discipline the question that is asked is not *whether* the religious mind feels anger, but *why* it feels it; not *whether* it feels sadness, but *what* makes it sad;

¹ Bevan, E. R.: *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford 1913, Clarendon Press), pp. 69-70.

² 1 John iv. 8 and 16.

³ 1 John iv. 18.

and not *whether* it feels fear, but *what* it is afraid of. To be angry with the sinner in order that he may receive correction; to be sorry for the sufferer in order that he may win liberation; to be fearful for the soul in peril lest it may go to perdition: I can hardly imagine these emotions being deliberately condemned by any one in his senses. Yet even the emotion of pity is usually censured by Stoics. . . . Far better, far more humane, and far more consonant with religious feeling is what Cicero says in his praise of Caesar: "None of your virtues is more admirable or more lovable than your sense of pity." After all, what is pity but sympathy in our own heart for somebody else's misery—a sympathy which peremptorily commands us to give our help if we can? And this emotion works in the service of reason when pity is bestowed without prejudice to justice—as, for example, when we give to the needy or forgive the penitent. Yet, while such a master of language as Cicero did not hesitate to call this sense of pity a virtue, the Stoics are not ashamed to include it in the catalogue of the vices. . . . [Well,] if emotions and affections which come from a love of the good and from a holy charity are to be called vices, we might as well allow the real vices to be called virtues. . . .

'If we are entirely without these emotions while we are subject to the infirmity of this [earthly] life, that really means that there is something wrong with our way of living. The Apostle abhorred and castigated certain persons whom he has described as being, among other things, *without natural affection*;¹ and one of the psalms, likewise, censures those of whom it says: *I looked for some to take pity, but there was none.*² To be entirely without pain while we are in this place of misery is assuredly "a state which can only be purchased at a prohibitive price in inhumanity of mind and in insensibility of body"—as has been felt, and been put into words, even by one of the secular men-of-letters. On this showing, the state which in Greek is called *ἀπάθεια*³ (and which in Latin would be called "impassibility" if that were a possible Latin word)⁴ may be a thoroughly good state, and even an extremely desirable one,⁵ but is quite incompatible with this life if we understand this state (which is a mental, not a physical, experience) to mean living without those affections which assail us, and upset our minds, in an irrational way. This is the verdict, not of nonentities, but of the most profoundly religious and extremely just and holy souls. *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.*⁶ "Invulnerability" (*ἀπάθεια*) in this sense will not be achieved until Man is without sin. As

¹ Rom. i. 31.

² Ps. lxxix. 20.

³ This Greek word *ἀπάθεια* is rendered in this Study (for reasons given in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 394, footnote 1, above) by the English word 'invulnerability' and not by the English word 'apathy'.—A.J.T.

⁴ This word which Saint Augustine has coined on the pattern of a Greek original, only to reject it as an inadmissible monstrosity, has, of course, since been adopted as a technical term in the theological vocabulary of the Western Christian Church.—A.J.T.

⁵ In examining and criticizing the Peripatetic and Stoic ideal of 'Imperturbability' Saint Augustine quotes (*De Civitate Dei*, Book IX, chap. 4, *ad fin.*), as an illustration of the admirable element in it, the Virgilian line (*Aeneid*, Book IV, l. 449) which has been quoted in this Study in V. C (i) (d) 10, p. 148, above.—A.J.T.

⁶ 1 John i. 8.

things actually are, a life without outward misdemeanor is as good a life as we can aspire to; but any one who imagines that he is living without sin is not achieving freedom from sin but is merely rejecting the chance of forgiveness. On the other hand, if "invulnerability" is to be taken in the other sense of a state in which the mind is completely proof against any feeling, surely every one would consider an insensibility of this degree to be something worse than all the vices. So, while it can be said without absurdity that the perfect state of beatitude will know no sadness and will feel no prick of anxiety, nobody who is not altogether blinded to the truth will say that in that state there will be no love and no joy. If, however, "invulnerability" merely means a state in which there is no fear to terrify us and no anguish to torment us, such "invulnerability" is to be shunned in this life if we desire to live it, as it should be lived, in God's way, but it is to be frankly hoped for in that blessedly happy life which is promised to us as our everlasting future condition. . . .

"The eternal life of blessed happiness will have a love and a joy which will be not only right states of feeling but also assured states, while it will be wholly free from anxiety and anguish. . . . As for the commonwealth—or society—of the irreligious who are living not in the way of God but in the way of Man . . . it is convulsed by these depraved feelings, which upset it like mental diseases. And, if this commonwealth has any citizens who make some show of controlling such emotions and more or less keeping them within bounds, they become elated with such an irreligious pride that any success that they may have in reducing their mental distress is counterbalanced by a proportionate degree of mental inflation, while if there are a few of them who—moved by a vanity which is as inhuman as it is rare—have set their hearts on making themselves entirely proof against being affected by any emotion whatever in any way, such creatures merely lose their last shred of humanity without ever attaining to a true tranquillity. For a thing does not become right just through being hard, or wholesome just through being stupid."¹

Having followed Saint Augustine in this counter-attack upon the philosophers in whose sight Christ Crucified is foolishness,²

¹ Saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book IX, chaps. 4 and 5, and Book XIV, chap. 9.

² The first draft of the present chapter drew from Professor Gilbert Murray, who kindly read it at that stage, a defence of the philosophers which the writer of this Study is glad to be able now to incorporate into the final draft, in the hope that it may serve here as a corrective to any bias in his own presentation of the issue between the way of Detachment and the way of Transfiguration.

"You take late Stoicism in one of its most over-intellectualized doctrines as standing for Greek philosophy altogether: mere intellect as against Christian love. But compare Zeno, fragment 263, where the thing that binds his *πολιτεία* together is "*ἔρως*, and that "*ἔρως* a god. Compare also fragment 88, where the motive spirit is no "merely an *anima rationalis*, but also creates beauty. This is different from pure intellectualism. Again, according to Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1072 B, the Final Cause produces motion by being loved. It is the love of God, "*ἔρως*, that produces all the motion of the World. Of course they tended to shrink from the use of the word "*ἔρως*, just as the Christians did; but Epicurus's *Φιλία* is pretty strong. Fragment 52: *ἡ Φιλία περιχορεύει τὴν Οἰκουμένην κηρύττουσα δὴ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐγείρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν*—it dances round the World calling us to awaken to our blessedness. Also fragment 28: we must run risks for the sake of *Φιλία*. Compare fragments 23 and 78, where the two things that matter are *Σοφία* and *Φιλία*."

The writer of this Study heartily agrees that there is a strong vein of Christianity in

we may go on to deal with the futurists for whose feet He is a stumbling-block.

The Crucifixion is a stumbling-block in the way of Futurism because the death on the Cross bears out—by a logic of events that leaves nothing more to be said—the declaration of Jesus that His Kingdom is not of This World;¹ and, for the Jewish Zealot, this declaration is a contradiction in terms which is not just fatuously illogical but is shockingly impious. The sign which the futurist requires is the announcement of a kingdom which will be bereft of all meaning if it is not to be a mundane success. With what intent has Yahweh promised to send his Chosen People a king who will reign over them as 'the Lord's Anointed'? And by what token will this Messiah be recognized? The Messiah's token and task is to be, as we have seen,² the seizure of the sceptre of world-dominion out of the hands of some Darius or Antiochus or Caesar, and the raising of the Jews to the rank of ruling race in place of the Persians or the Macedonians or the Romans, as the case may be.

'Thus saith the Lord to his Anointed, to Cyrus [or Zerubbabel or Simon Maccabaeus or Simon bar Kōkabā or whatever may be the name of the hero of the hour], whose right hand I have holden, to subdue nations before him (and I will loose the loins of kings, to open before him the two-leaved gates; and the gates shall not be shut):

' "I will go before thee and make the crooked places straight; I will break in pieces the gates of brass and cut in sunder the bars of iron; and I will give thee the treasures of darkness³ and hidden riches of secret places."'⁴

How was this authentically futurist conception of a Messiah to be reconciled with the words of a prisoner who answered Pilate

'Thou sayest that I am a king',⁵

and then went on to give so fantastic an account of the royal mission on which he claimed that God had sent him?

'To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the World, that I should bear witness unto the truth.'⁶

The disconcerting words might perhaps be contested or ignored,

many of the exponents of Hellenism—and, conversely, a strong vein of Hellenism in many of the exponents of Christianity. In quoting Hellenic expressions of the philosophy of Detachment and Christian expressions of the religion of Love he has not meant to imply either that the Christians have never fallen below the ideal of Love or that the Hellenes have never risen above the ideal of Detachment. He has not been attempting to make a critique of either Christianity or Hellenism. His sole concern has been to bring out the respective meanings of Detachment and Transfiguration by quoting testimonies that his readers will accept as *loci classici*.

¹ John xviii. 36.

² In V, C (i) (d) 9 (γ), pp. 120-3, above.

³ It was not the Jews but the Macedonians who eventually appropriated the contents of the Achaemenian treasures.—A.J.T.

⁴ Isa. xlv. 1-3 (i.e. 'Deutero-Isaiah'), cited in V, C (i) (d) 9 (γ), p. 122, above.

⁵ John xviii. 37.

⁶ John xviii. 37.

but the malefactor's death could neither be undone nor be explained away; and we have observed, in the classic case of Peter's ordeal, how grievous this stumbling-block was.¹

The Kingdom of God, of which Christ Crucified is King, is in fact spiritually incommensurable with any kingdom that could ever be founded or ruled by a Messiah envisaged as an Achaemenian world-conqueror who has been turned into a Jew and been projected into the future. As far as this *Civitas Dei* enters into the Time-dimension at all, it is not a mere dream of the future but is a spiritual reality which is at all times present in This World² besides existing—and, indeed, just because it exists—as well in an Eternity and an Infinity that are in a supra-mundane spiritual dimension.³ If there are any moments in Time which can in some sense be regarded, in a Christian *Weltanschauung*, as historical dates of particular irruptions of God's Kingdom into This World, they are moments that are hallowed by descents of the Holy Ghost—upon Jesus at his baptism or upon the Apostles on the Day of Pentecost.⁴ When

'they asked of him saying: "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the Kingdom to Israel?" . . . he said unto them: "It is not for you to

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 392-3, above.

² The interpretation of Luke xvii. 21 has been discussed in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 396, footnote 1, above.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), p. 131, footnote 1, above.

⁴ This is perhaps the point where the gulf between the conception of Transfiguration and the conception of Futurism is at its narrowest. For, while on the one side the transfiguration of This World through its irradiation by the Kingdom of God is conceived of as being in some sense apprehensible as an historical process in Time, it is also true on the other side, as we have had occasion to notice already, that in the *Weltanschauung* of Futurism the difference between the present régime against which the futurist is in revolt and the future kingdom on which his hopes are set is not regarded as being simply—or even, 'in the last analysis', essentially—determined by the difference between the present and the future tense of the verb 'to be'.

When he is driven into a corner by the bankruptcy of his mundane policy the futurist eventually admits, as we have seen (in V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), pp. 128-31, above), that the stormy advent of the kingdom of his hopes will be in the nature of an apocalypse rather than of an act of creation. The triumphant destruction of the present dispensation, when this is at last duly achieved, will not be like the clearing of a hitherto encumbered site for the erection of a brand-new building. It will be like the rending of a veil in order to bring into view a hitherto invisible kingdom that has been in existence in the background all the time and has merely been awaiting the hour appointed for its revelation. Even at the earlier stage at which the futurist's hope of a substantial mundane success has not yet evaporated he will be willing to admit that the catastrophe to which he is looking forward is in the nature of a revolution; and, as we have observed in another context (in IV. C (iii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 135-6, above), Revolution shares with Revelation the particular feature that concerns us here. The outbreak of a revolution in the bosom of a body social is not an event that can be explained in terms of that body alone without reference to anything existing outside it. The superficial phenomenon of the violent substitution of new elements for old elements in the structure of the body in which the revolution is taking place is always found to be the effect of a less obvious yet more significant piece of action in a larger field; and this action consists in the play, upon the revolutionary body, of some external force which must, *ex hypothesi*, have been in operation, and therefore in existence, before the outbreak of the revolution of which this foreign body has been the cause.

On this showing, it would seem as though the abstract conception of Futurism cannot be minted into the coin of concrete thought without being stiffened by the addition of a transfigurational alloy which is decidedly foreign to it.

know the times or the seasons which the Father hath put in his own power. But ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you."¹

The presence of the Kingdom of God in This World is manifested in the operation of the Spirit; and this operation, which since the beginning of Time has never been withheld—though it may now and then have been suddenly intensified—transfigures the World and, in transfiguring, redeems it, according to a tenet that is at the same time a touchstone of Christianity.

'In the conception of the Church—that is, the organized body of believers—as a thing in itself, to be worked for and fostered, lies the true point of difference between Catholicism and Gnosticism, between Aphraates and *The Acts of Thomas*. To the convert of Judas-Thomas there was literally nothing left on this Earth to live for. . . . The old civilization was doomed, but this religious Nihilism puts nothing in its place. To the orthodox Christian, on the other hand, the Church stood like Aaron between the dead and the living, as a middle term between the things of the Next World and of This. It was the Body of Christ and therefore eternal; something worth living for and working for. Yet it was in the World as much as the Empire itself."²

But how can the Kingdom of God be authentically in This World and yet also be essentially not of it?³ This is a question which we are bound to ask but cannot be sure of being able to answer, since it brings to light an apparent contradiction in our conception of the relation between the subject and the object of the act of Transfiguration, and this problem may be intractable to attempts to solve it in terms of logic; but, if we are willing to acknowledge that the nature of Transfiguration is a mystery that passes our understanding—as we have seen that it has passed the understanding of philosophers whose intellects have certainly not been inferior to ours!—we may perhaps be rewarded for a sober recognition of the limits of our intellectual power by finding ourselves able to peer into the mystery through the imagery that conveys the intuition of the poets.

Perhaps the simplest image of the relation of the Kingdom of God to This World is a geometrical simile. We may liken their relation to that between a cube and one of the squares that are presented by the solid figure's faces. If the cube were not there the square would not be there either; yet this does not mean that the relation of square to cube is that of part to whole; for part and whole must be things of the same kind, whereas square and cube are figures of different dimensions.

¹ Acts i. 6-8.

² Burkitt, F. C.: *Early Eastern Christianity* (London 1904, Murray), pp. 210-11.

³ This question is implicit in John xvii. 16 and in 1 John ii. 15-17.

This simile incidentally brings out one of the differences between the Christian conception of the Kingdom of God and the Hellenic conception of the *Cosmopolis*;¹ for the 'City of Zeus' is described by Marcus Aurelius as 'a supreme commonwealth' of which the 'City of Cecrops' and the other commonwealths of that order 'are no more than houses'.² In this description the relation between a mundane commonwealth and the *Cosmopolis* is clearly defined as a relation of part to whole; and this means that the *Cosmopolis*, unlike the *Civitas Dei*, is conceived of as being a society of the same spiritual dimensions as the oecumenical empire of Rome or the parochial city-state of Athens. If, in the imagery of our simile, we once more represent our mundane society by a square, then the *Cosmopolis* will assume the likeness, not of a cube, but of the surface of a chess-board, which differs geometrically from the single chequer in nothing but the superficial feature of extending over an area that is sixty-four times larger.

An alternative image of the relation between the *Civitas Dei* and This World may be drawn from a recent enrichment of our archaeological knowledge which has been a surprising and exciting consequence of our acquisition of the art of flying.

The new technique of aerial photography has lately been revealing to us traces of the handiwork of our human predecessors which for ages past have been totally invisible to successive generations of human beings who have been living and working—ploughing and building—on the very sites on which these traces are imprinted. So long as we have had our feet on the ground, in immediate contact with these enduring marks which our predecessors' labours have left on the face of the Earth, we have been totally blind to something that has been lying there under our noses. It is only in the air that our eyes have been opened; for it is not until we have parted company with the surface of the Earth, and have climbed in our aeroplane to an altitude at which we seem to have lost all contact with the ground for practical purposes, that we begin to enjoy this novel enhancement of our powers of visual observation. The fact is that the hitherto unobserved physical traces of past human activities consist of undulations or discolorations which are so slight in themselves that they are only visible in a field of vision of a vastly wider sweep than can be commanded by an eye that is approximately on their level. To be perceived they must be caught in a bird's-eye view;³ and, now that we are

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, pp. 332-8, below.

² Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book III, chap. 11, and Book IV, chap. 3, quoted in V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, p. 335, below.

³ Even on a bird's-eye view the traces that are a matter of colour and not of contour are often invisible on the bare ground and only come to light in the springing corn; for

able to emulate the vision of a hawk or kite by training upon the ground from an aeroplane a camera fitted with a telescopic lens, we can demonstrate to the astonished yokel, whom we have taken up with us on our survey-flight, that his native village lies within the circumvallation of a Roman camp of which he and his forebears have never suspected the existence—although they have in fact been sleeping every night within that historic rampart, and have been crossing it daily as they have plodded to and fro between their cottages and their fields, from generation to generation.

The relation of the English village to the Roman camp offers us an image of the relation between This World and the *Civitas Dei* that may give us some further insight into that mystery. At any rate, if we work the simile out, we shall find that it presents a number of illuminating aspects.

In the first place we see two settlements—camp and village—coexisting on the same site. In the second place we see that it is possible for them to coexist—in defiance of the geometrical axiom that two different objects cannot simultaneously occupy the same space—because the respective modes of their simultaneous existence are not identical in quality. The fields and cottages of the village provide the inhabitants with physical food and shelter; the ramparts of the camp have provided them with institutions and ideas in virtue of which they are now living together as social animals. In the third place we see that, although the village is palpable whereas the camp is not even visible except on a bird's-eye view, the inhabitants of the site are dependent on the camp, as well as on the village, for commodities which are necessities of life. Indeed, the camp's contribution is, if anything, more important than the village's if it is true, as it seems to be, that, in the course of the evolution of Life, Sub-Man had to become a social animal as a preliminary step towards becoming human.¹ Without the social heritage which they have derived from the invisible empire of which the camp has been an outpost, the inhabitants of the palpable village would find themselves unable to keep up that social co-operation which is the necessary moral condition for the upkeep of their material well-being.

There is yet another point, which is perhaps the most significant of the truths that our simile brings to light; and this is that the existence of the empire, and its effect on the villagers' lives, are

the cause of the discoloration is a slight change in the chemical composition of the soil through a replacement of the natural strata by man-made deposits consisting in part of the debris of human artifacts; and, even in an aeroplane photograph, this local difference in the soil may not be apparent except when it is reproduced—and, in the process, exaggerated—in the colour and height and thickness of a crop that has been sown on the site.

¹ See I. C (iii) (c), vol. i, p. 173, footnote 3, above.

facts which are entirely independent of the beneficiaries' awareness of them. The moment at which the yokel first descried the outline of the camp—as he leant over the side of the aeroplane with the archaeologist at his elbow to tell him where to look and what to look for—was not, of course, the moment at which he first began to draw benefit from the legacy of the oecumenical empire of which the camp was once a local *point d'appui*. As a matter of fact, he began to draw his profit in times before he was born or conceived; for the social heritage which he derives from the empire has been handed down to him by a long line of ancestors. And the fact of the empire's existence has been having its effect just the same, even though the villagers may not have been aware till this moment that their village lay within the empire's bounds—and perhaps not even aware that there was any such thing as this empire within their horizon.

Even if they do now begin to perceive—as a consequence of a belated Pischah-sight from the cock-pit of a newly invented flying-machine—some glimmer of what the empire has been doing all the time for them, as well as for their forefathers, their belated discovery of the empire is even now not likely to extend very far beyond the immediate neighbourhood of their own local habitat. Will the local clue that has just been given them enable them to infer that the empire that has swum into their ken has a vastly wider ambit than the field of vision which has been opened up to them by a single flight in an aeroplane circling just above their home parish? Have they the imagination to picture in their mind's eye the long roads running from camp to camp, and through forum and municipium, till they lead to Rome and out of Rome again to the banks of the Danube and the Euphrates and to the fringes of the Syrian and the Libyan desert? Can they conceive of a Roman Peace which spreads its mantle over Dura and Duros-torum and Timgad as well as over Verulam and Chester? And can they comprehend that the effect which the Roman Empire is having upon their own lives is also being exerted upon the lives of their contemporaries in distant countries under different climes? It hardly seems probable that a majority of the latter-day beneficiaries of the Roman Empire will have gained even an inkling of the full extent of the Roman domain, or of the full range of the Imperial Government's operation, from their discovery of the presence of a Roman camp within the bounds of their English parish; and we can conceive of a state of affairs in which all knowledge of the Roman Empire has been irretrievably lost; for even those physical traces that are, as it happens, still visible from the air might easily have vanished completely in the course of the centuries that went

by before aeroplanes were invented. If that had been the order of events, and if our air-survey had therefore after all brought no Roman camp into view on the site of our English village, would this defeat for Archaeology have wiped off the slate of History either the fact or the effect of the Roman Empire's existence? The answer is, of course, in the negative; and the truth which we can grasp in its mundane application to the Roman Empire can be seen by analogy to be true of the Kingdom of God—and of that Kingdom's King.

"That was the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the World. He was in the World, and the World was made by Him, and the World knew Him not."¹

To know Him—and, through Him, the Kingdom over which He reigns—it is not enough for our yokel in his aeroplane to see the World with the eye of a hawk. The man must be given an eye which not only magnifies but also penetrates into other dimensions. What he needs is the eye of a poet,

To see a world in a grain of sand
And a heaven in a wild flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand,
And Eternity in an hour.²

And the poet who has this vision of the transfiguration of This World by the Kingdom of God must also be something of a prophet, for he must have an intuition of the Godhead which poetry alone cannot give him. The act of Transfiguration is a mystery because it is an act of God and an effect of God's presence—and this is a truth which has been less obscure to the Jewish futurist than to the Greek philosopher.

"The world which was set forth in the philosophy of Poseidonius had many features in common with the world of "Enoch", but "Enoch's" world was not an end in itself. "Enoch" tells us of the World to show us that everything in it is prepared for the inevitable Judgement of the Most High. . . . There is no Great Day in the world of Poseidonius . . . [and] this is the world that Israel refused to accept. The rarefied air of the Stoic heaven was one in which the Jew did not easily breathe. . . . He demanded an ultimate reward for his labour, even at the price of punishment for his faults: otherwise the World seemed to him meaningless. And so, when the Jew does contemplate the World as a whole, as is done in "Enoch", it is all placed under the eye of God, who made it and whose Judgement upon it will give it its meaning. . . . In the last resort the difference between Poseidonius and "Enoch", between late Hellenic Civilization and the Jews that refused to be dominated by it, is symbolized in the sentence from the Fourth Book of Ezra, which says

¹ John i. 9-10.

² Blake, William: *Auguries of Innocence*.

directly and in so many words: "The Most High hath not made one world, but two".¹ This is the essential thing, the central doctrine that animates all the Apocalypses. . . . And those who cling to the belief that human history is not altogether meaningless and that it marches, however slowly and haltingly, to a definite goal, ought to regard the ideas enshrined in books like "Enoch" with sympathy.²

In this revelation of a reality which the veil of Futurism masks until it is rent, the relation between the Kingdom of God and This World can be seen—now no longer in an image but direct (albeit still darkly, through a glass)³—as a manifestation of God's all-pervading presence and activity.

O world invisible, we view thee,
O world intangible, we touch thee,
O world unknowable, we know thee,
Inapprehensible, we clutch thee!

Does the fish soar to find the ocean,
The eagle plunge to find the air—
That we ask of the stars in motion
If they have rumour of thee there?

Not where the wheeling systems darken
And our benumbed conceiving soars!—
The drift of pinions, would we hearken,
Beats at our own clay-shuttered doors.

The angels keep their ancient places—
Turn but a stone and start a wing!
'Tis ye, 'tis your estrangèd faces,
That miss the many-splendoured thing.⁴

But how in fact can God's will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven? In the technical language of Theology the omnipresence of God involves His immanence in This World and in every living soul in it, as well as His transcendent existence on supra-mundane planes of being. In the Christian conception of the Godhead His transcendent aspect is displayed in Gōd the Father and His immanent aspect in God the Holy Ghost; but the distinctive and also crucial feature of the Christian Faith is the doctrine that the Godhead is not a Duality but a Trinity in Unity, and that in His aspect as God the Son the other two aspects are unified in a Person who, in virtue of this mystery, is as accessible to the human heart as He is incomprehensible to the human understanding. In the person of Christ Jesus—Very God yet also Very Man—the divine society and the mundane society have a common member who in

¹ 4 Ezra vii. 50.

² Burkitt, F. C.: *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses* (London 1914, Milford), pp. 31-3.

³ 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

⁴ Thompson, Francis: *In No Strange Land*.

the order of This World is born into the ranks of the Proletariat and dies the death of a malefactor, while in the order of the Other World He is the King of God's Kingdom—and a King who is God Himself and not God's less-than-divine deputy.¹

¹ This Christian conception of Christ the King has points both of likeness to and of difference from both of the two Jewish conceptions of Yahweh the King (see V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), p. 126, footnote 5, above) on the one hand, and of the Messiah on the other. Christ is, like Yahweh, a king who is also God; but at the same time Christ's divinity differs from Yahweh's in being not exclusively transcendent; and on this account Christ's kingship can be felt as a concrete and personal exercise of royal authority, whereas the awful remoteness and aloofness of the God of Israel from his worshippers makes it difficult for them to conceive of Yahweh's kingship as a real function which is something more than a formal title of honour. In this point of realism—and it is a point of capital importance—the figure of Christ the King bears less resemblance to that of Yahweh the King than to that of the Messiah; and it is no accident that the very name of Christ is derived historically from the title (in its Greek dress) of the king whose coming was awaited by the Jewish futurists. The Christian idea of Christ's kingship agrees with the Jewish expectation of the Messiah's kingship in conceiving of the kingship as a reality; but at the same time it differs from this Jewish expectation in believing the king to be God instead of expecting him to be a man sent by God as His human deputy. This point of difference—and it is of not less capital importance than the point of likeness—between the Christian view of Christ and the Jewish view of the Messiah comes out in the significant fact that the connotation of the word 'Christ' has been exactly reversed in the process of being taken over into the Christian out of the Jewish vocabulary. In its literal and original meaning of 'the Lord's Anointed' the title 'Christ' signifies that its bearer is himself some one other than, and lower than, God who has invested him with his office. On the other hand, in the Christian usage the name 'Christ' signifies that its bearer is God besides being the man who bears the name of Jesus. For a Christian, calling Jesus 'Christ' proclaims Him to be God as well as man, while for a Jew the addition of the title 'Christ' to the name Jesus would rule out the possibility of Jesus being a god (e.g. one of the false gods worshipped by the Gentiles), and would certify that he was a purely human emissary of Yahweh.

On this criterion the Zoroastrian figure of the Saošyant or Son of Man, who is to be the king of the *Zwischenreich* for the period of the Millennium (see V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), pp. 126 and 130–1, above), is to be classed with the Jewish figure of the Messiah who is to be the king of the future Jewish universal state, and not with the Christian figure of Christ who is the king of the Kingdom of God. It is true that the Saošyant is credited with certain apparently superhuman qualities and powers, but it is none the less clear that he is conceived of as being, like the Jewish Messiah, both less than divine and other than the One True God. The essential humanity of the Saošyant is guaranteed by his lineage—he is to be of the seed of Zarathustra, as the Messiah is to be of the seed of David—and his relation to Ahuramazda, like the relation of Yahweh's Anointed to Yahweh, is that of an agent and emissary, not that of an aspect or avatar. (See Gall, A. von: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), index, s.vv. *Saošyant* and *Menschensohn*.)

In the Jewish conception of the Messiah the point of capital importance about his birth is his legitimate descent in the male line from David, and this of course rules out all idea of the Messiah being born of a virgin (see V. C (ii) (a), p. 268, footnote 5, below). According to von Gall, op. cit., p. viii, however, Jesus rejected the role of the Jewish Messiah in identifying himself with the Zoroastrian Son of Man, and, according to the Zoroastrian Mythology (ibid., pp. 126 and 418–19; cf. Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 68), both the Son of Man and the Primal Man, of whom the Son of Man is an avatar, are virgin-born. Apart from his virgin birth, the Zoroastrian Son of Man has other features and prerogatives—'pre-existence, a touch of something godlike, Last Judgement, Ascension into Heaven' (von Gall, op. cit., p. 414)—which the Jewish Messiah lacks. The difference between the indigenous Jewish conception of the Messiah and the new figure introduced by the importation, into Jewish minds, of the Zoroastrian conception of the Son of Man is pointed out by Lagrange, M.-J.: *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris 1909, Gabalda), p. 96:

'Le Messie . . . élevé à ces hauteurs, est désormais au niveau des conceptions eschatologiques les plus étendues et les plus spiritualisées. Il y pourra figurer beaucoup plus aisément que le Messie, fils de David, roi d'Israël et conquérant. Mais il faut constater aussi que ce n'est plus le même personnage. Ce n'est pas une solution du problème posé par des conceptions nouvelles et par la tradition sur l'homme-Messie; c'est l'option exclusive d'un des deux éléments qu'il eût fallu concilier.'

But how can two natures—one divine and the other human—be both present at once in a single person? We must be able to give some answer to this question if we are to be sure that we are not just reciting a meaningless form of words when we say that the link between the Kingdom of God and the Society of This World consists in the possession of a common member who is truly native to each of these two diverse spiritual climes. Answers, cast in the form of creeds, have been worked out by Christian Fathers in terms of the technical vocabulary of the Hellenic philosophers; but this metaphysical line of approach to the problem is perhaps not the only one open to us. We may find an alternative starting-point in the postulate that the divine nature, in so far as it is accessible to us, must have something in common with our own; and, if we look for one particular spiritual faculty which we are conscious of possessing in our own souls and which we also can attribute with absolute confidence to God—because God would be spiritually inferior even to Man (*quod est absurdum*) if this faculty were not in Him but were nevertheless in us—then the faculty which we shall think of first as being common to Man and God will be one which the philosophers wish to mortify,¹ and that is the faculty of Love.

This stone which both Zeno and Gautama have so obstinately rejected is become the head of the corner² of the temple of the New Testament.³ In the instruction given to Nicodemus, Love is

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 10, pp. 145–8, and the present chapter, pp. 150–4, above.

² Matt. xxi. 42 (quoting Ps. cxviii. 22). In this Study this text has been quoted already in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, p. 248, above.

³ Love has also become the axle-tree of the vehicle of the Mahāyāna; and its conquest of Buddhism is more surprising than its outburst in Christianity; for the Christian religion of Love is in conscious and deliberate revolt against the Stoic philosophy of Detachment, whereas the Mahayanian religion of Love purports to be fulfilling the Hinayanian law and not destroying it—though, in Hinayanian eyes, the Mahayanian Bodhisattva is a Hinayanian arhat *manqué* (see V. C (i) (d) 10, p. 148, above). The Bodhisattva is in fact an arhat who, at the moment when his age-long efforts to attain Detachment have brought him at last to the brink of *Nirvāna*, refrains from immediately entering into his rest through taking the final step that would precipitate him into the bliss of self-annihilation, and decides, instead, to postpone the consummation of his own spiritual career—and this, may be, for countless ages more—in order to devote himself to the self-imposed task of helping other beings, by communicating to them some of the light of his own enlightenment, to reach, and perhaps to pass, the verge on which the Buddha-to-be now himself stands voluntarily poised (see Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London 1933, Kegan Paul), pp. 169–72). A follower of Christ will agree with the follower of the Mahāyāna that the Bodhisattva who, for love of his fellows, forbears to drink of the liberating elixir of Lethe when the cup is at his lips, is overcoming the Self in a far profounder sense than the arhat who exercises his duly earned right to consummate his own self-annihilation without being deterred by any pity for a groaning and travailing creation. The labour of Love to which the Bodhisattva dedicates himself is not unworthy to be compared with the self-sacrifice of Christ; and there is a Mahayanian counterpart of the Christian Kingdom of God in the Paradise into which a being who finds himself in the toils of This World may be born at his next birth if in his present life he has called, in a spirit of true faith, upon the name of the Bodhisattva whose name is Amitābha ('Measureless Light') or Amitāyus ('Measureless Life'). It is true that this analogy is imperfect. In the first place Amida is not God; in the second place his Paradise is not an eternal abode, but only a *Zwischenreich* beyond which the nonentity of *Nirvāna* still *patet immane et vasto respectat hiatus*

revealed as being both the motive that moves God to redeem Man at the price of incarnation and crucifixion,¹ and the means that enables Man to win access to God.² The working of Love in God's heart—in moving God to suffer death on the Cross—is brought out in the Synoptic Gospels in their account of the circumstances in which Jesus announces to His disciples that His destiny is the Passion instead of being a Jewish Messiah's conventional worldly success. He forbears to reveal to them this, for them, appalling truth until His divinity has been guessed by Peter and has been manifested in the Transfiguration; but, as soon as He has made His epiphany as God, He at once breaks silence about His Passion.³ The meaning of these revelations in this sequence surely is that a Love which loves to the death is the essence of God's nature. As for the working of Love in human hearts as a means of access for Man to God, it is extolled as the sovereign—and sole indispensable—means to this supreme end of Man in the thirteenth chapter of the First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians. And, if we try to take a comprehensive view of the constitution of the *Civitas Dei*, and inquire what miraculous spiritual force it is that makes it possible for its diverse members, human and divine, to dwell together in unity,⁴ we find that Love is the life-blood of this supra-mundane body social and the *arcanum imperii*⁵ of its divine king. The secret is divulged in the fourth chapter of the First Epistle General of John. The love of God for Man—as manifested to Man in Christ Crucified—calls out in Man an answering love for God; and this love of Man for God (which is also a manifestation of the spirit of a God-head who is immanent in the Soul of Man, as He is in all things)⁶

(Eliot, Sir Charles: *Japanese Buddhism* (London 1935, Arnold), p. 106); and in the third place the bliss of Amida's 'Pure Land' is depicted as that of a sort of ethereal Lotus-Eaters' Garden of Eden (ibid.), like the bliss enjoyed by the Hellenic gods in the Epicurean *intermundia* (see V. C (i) (d) 10, p. 144, above). There is, however, one feature of capital importance that is common to the *Civitas Dei* as conceived of by Saint Augustine and to the Paradise of Amida as conceived of by, for example, Ryōyō Shōgei (*vivebat* A.D. 1314–1420), a Japanese Mahayanian Father who was the Seventh Patriarch of the Jōdo Sect (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 96–103, above), and who taught that 'Amida is omnipresent and his Paradise is simply absolute reality—if we can change our point of view and see things as they really are, we can be in the Pure Land here and now' (Eliot, op. cit., p. 385). (For the vein of personal devotion (*bhakti*) in the Mahāyāna see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 134–6, and V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 361–2, above; for the Japanese adaptation of the Mahayanian cult of Amitābha see cap. cit., vol. cit., pp. 96–103, above.)

¹ John iii. 13–17.

² John iii. 3–8.

³ For this association between Jesus's prediction of His Passion and the immediately antecedent revelations of His divinity see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 74, and V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 392–3 above, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, in the present volume, p. 383, below.

⁴ Ps. cxxxiii. 1.

⁵ Tacitus: *Annals*, Book II, chap. 36.

⁶ This love of Man for God, which is both a response to, and a manifestation of, God's love for Man, is expounded as follows by Saint Thomas Aquinas: *Summa Theologiae*, 2 a, 2 ae. Q. 24. Art. 2: 'Charity (*Caritas*) is a kind of friendship (*amicitia*) of Man towards God, which is founded upon the communication [by God to Man] of eternal bliss. This communication, however, is of the order, not of the gifts of Nature, but of

flows on Earth along the channel of Man's love for his human brother.

'Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another. No man hath seen God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us and His love is perfected in us.'¹

In virtue of this Love which is equally human and divine and which is therefore able to circulate through all the members of the *Civitas Dei*, the Kingdom of God has a peace of its own which is not the philosophic peace of Detachment.² It is in these negative terms that the Peace of God is enigmatically proclaimed by Christ the King:

'Peace I leave with you; my peace I give unto you. Not as the World giveth give I unto you.'³

The riddle is wrestled with—and read, perhaps, as far as it can be read by human minds on Earth—in the following passage of Saint Augustine's *magnum opus*:

'The peace of the Heavenly Commonwealth (*caelestis civitatis*) is a perfectly organized and perfectly harmonious common participation in the enjoyment of God and of one another in God (*societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo*).⁴ . . . The commonwealth of the irreligious, in which

the gifts of Grace, because, as is written in Romans vi. 23, "the gift of God is eternal life". It follows that Charity itself likewise exceeds the capacity of Nature; but something that exceeds the capacity of Nature cannot either be natural or be acquired through natural faculties, because a natural effect cannot transcend its own cause. It follows that Charity cannot either be implanted in us by Nature or be acquired by natural powers. It can only be acquired by an inpouring of the Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Father and the Son, and whose indwelling in us is identical with the creation of Charity in us (*cuius participatio in nobis est ipsa Caritas creata*).⁵

This divine transfiguration of the human Soul has also been described by Plato (*Theaetetus*, 176 A-B) in words that he puts into the mouth of Socrates:

'Evil cannot cease to be, for there must ever be something that is the antithesis of the good; and it cannot be situate in Heaven; so it must necessarily haunt This World and prey upon Mortality. So one must seek to fly, as quickly as may be, hence thither. This flight consists in becoming as like to God as it is possible for Man to be (*φύγη δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*). And becoming like to God means becoming rationally righteous and holy (*ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὁσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι*).⁶ In these three sentences Plato successively rejects the mundane Utopias of Archaism and Futurism; takes the path of Detachment; and pushes on to the goal of Transfiguration without halting at the station of *Nirvāna*. If he had added, with Saint Thomas, that Transfiguration (*ὁμοίωσις*) cannot be achieved by Man's natural powers, but only by a gift of God's grace, this passage would have been completely Christian. And in another passage (*Letters*, No. 7, 341 C-D), where he writes of 'light caught from a leaping flame', he has come very near to describing the miracle of Pentecost. Transfiguration is, as we have seen (in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 245-6, above), the ideal relation for which Mimesis is an unsatisfactory substitute. If we now ask ourselves what it is in Transfiguration that Mimesis lacks, we shall answer, with Saint Thomas, that it is the gift of God's grace.

¹ I John iv. 11-12. For the modern Western philosopher Bergson's intuition of the truth that a common love for the One True God is the only feeling that can effectively take the place, and fulfil the function, of that common hatred of some human enemy which is the emotional bond between the members of a primitive society, see V. C (i), (d) 7, pp. 12-13, above, and Part VII, below.

² For the contrast which Epictetus draws between the *Pax Augusta* and the *Pax Zenonica* see V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 3 and 16, footnote 2, and V. C (i) (d) 10, p. 142, above.

³ John xiv. 27.

⁴ This definition is also given, in the same words, in the passage quoted in V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex II, p. 367, below.—A.J.T.

God does not bear rule or receive obedience—an obedience that consists in offering sacrifice to Him alone, so that the mind rules the body, and the reason the vices, with uprightness and loyalty—such a commonwealth will be without the reality of justice. For, although the mind may appear to be ruling the body, and the reason the vices, quite creditably, neither of them will be at all properly fulfilling its task if it is not itself serving God in the way in which God Himself has ordained that He should be served. For how can a soul be mistress of the body and of the vices if it is ignorant of the True God and is not amenable to His rule? . . . The very virtues that it believes itself to possess—the virtues through which it rules the body and the vices—are vices rather than virtues if this soul addresses them to the winning or the holding of anything except God. For, while some people consider that the virtues are genuine and sincere precisely when they are addressed to themselves and are not cultivated for any ulterior object, the truth is that in such conditions they become puffed up and conceited, and are accordingly to be accounted not virtues but vices. What gives life to a physical organism is something which does not proceed from it but which is above it; and, analogously, what gives happiness in life to a human being is something which does not proceed from human nature but which is above human nature.¹

The last sentence of this passage perhaps points to the solution of that spiritual problem which is inexorably presented to the Soul by the poignant experience of mundane life in a disintegrating society. We have found that it is impossible to escape from an intolerable Present either by taking flying leaps up or down the stream of Time or again by seeking to achieve a complete Detachment from life at the cost of annihilating the Self. We have now gained a glimpse of an alternative way of life which does promise 'to give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, to guide our feet into the way of peace';²

and this happy issue out of our afflictions is to be found in enrolling ourselves as citizens of a *Civitas Dei* of which Christ Crucified is king. This way of taking our departure from the City of Destruction is not an act of truancy; it is 'a withdrawal according to plan'; and the plan—as Christ's Passion proclaims—is not to save ourselves by escaping from a dangerous and painful mundane entanglement, but to seize the initiative in order, at our own peril, to save the City of Destruction from its doom by converting it to the Peace of God. For the human citizen of the City of God who is still in the flesh, this movement of spiritual withdrawal-and-return may entail—if the soldier is singled out for special

¹ Saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book XIX, chaps. 13, 24, and 25.

² Luke i. 79.

honour—an act, not of truancy, but of martyrdom; but the martyr's goal is not Gautama's goal of self-annihilation: it is Christ's goal of self-fulfilment through self-surrender. 'To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the World.'¹

The member of a disintegrating mundane society who has taken this road has a surer hope, and therefore a deeper happiness, than the merely 'once-born' member of a mundane society that is still in growth; for he has learnt the saving truths that 'the Most High hath not made one world, but two',² and that the human wayfarer who still finds himself a sojourner in This World is not on that account beyond the pale of the Other World but is travelling all the time within the domain of the Kingdom of God and is at liberty to live as a citizen of this omnipresent commonwealth here and now, if he is willing with all his heart to pay allegiance to Christ the King and to take upon himself those obligations of citizenship which Christ has consecrated by voluntarily fulfilling them in person. This entry into the Kingdom of God is a second birth;³ and, for the 'once-born' denizen of This World, the discovery that it is possible to obtain this freedom⁴ is like finding treasure hid in a field, or finding one pearl of great price.⁵ Such a trove is to be bought even at the cost of selling all that the finder has. And the reckoning of spiritual values that is made in these two parables of the Kingdom of God has been anticipated by the testimony of the first and greatest and most Christian of all the Hellenic philosophers:

'In the struggle that will decide whether good or evil is to prevail in us the issue is immeasurably greater than at first sight it might seem to be; and therefore we must not allow ourselves to be carried away by anything in the World—not by honours, not by riches, not by power, and not by poetry either. For none of these things is worth the price of neglecting Righteousness and the rest of what constitutes Virtue. . . . We must do everything that lies in our power to attain to Virtue and Wisdom in This Life. The prize is so splendid and the hope is so great.'⁶

¹ John xviii. 37.

² John iii. 3-8.

³ 4 Ezra vii. 50, quoted already on p. 162, above.

⁴ Acts xxii. 28.

⁵ Matt. xiii. 44-6.

⁶ Plato: *Republica*, 608 B, and *Phaedo*, 114 C. These two passages are brought into this relation with each other by More, P. E., in *Christ the Word = The Greek Tradition from the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon: 399 B.C.-A.D. 451*, vol. iv (Princeton 1927, University Press), p. 175, footnote 8. The original Greek runs: Μέγας . . . ὁ ἀγών, . . . μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστόν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε τιμὴ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδέμᾳ οὐδὲ γε ποιητικῇ ἀξίον ἀμελήσαι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς (608 B) . . . ἀλλὰ . . . χρη . . . πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄλλο καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη (114 C). With these passages of Plato, More, in loc. cit., brings into comparison Sophocles: *Electra*, ll. 1491-2: λόγων γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄγών, ἀλλὰ σῆς ψυχῆς περί, and also Saint Athanasius: *Ep. ad Episc. Aegypti et Libyae*, chap. 21 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. xxv, col. 588): ὡς τοῦ περὶ παντὸς ὄντος ἡμῖν ἀγώνος. The same reckoning of spiritual values is to be found in Mark viii. 36-7 (= Matt. xvi. 26, and Luke ix. 25), and in Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 1071-5 (already quoted in I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 55, footnote 3, above).

(e) PALINGENESIA

We have now completed our survey¹ of four experimental ways of life which are so many exploratory attempts to find some practicable alternative to a familiar habit of living and moving at ease in a growing civilization. When this comfortable road has been remorselessly closed by the catastrophe of a social breakdown, these four ways present themselves as the alternative possible by-passes. One piece of knowledge that we have gained from our survey of them is some notion of the essential differences between their respective natures.

We have found that the paths of Archaism and Futurism are two alternative substitutes for the growth of a civilization which are both of them incompatible with growth of any kind, since they both deliberately aim at a breach of continuity, and the principle of continuity is of the essence of the movement of growth in whatever terms we may try to describe or define it. Archaism is an attempt to take a flying leap out of the mundane Present backwards into an already vanished mundane Past, while Futurism is an attempt to take a similar leap forwards into a still invisible mundane Future. In both of these *tours de force* the would-be breach of continuity is precisely what makes the spiritual acrobatic feat attractive to those souls that attempt it; and the common vice of Futurism and Archaism is thus not only manifest but also manifestly fatal. Futurism and Archaism are sheer negations of growth, and that is the whole of their tragedy. On the other hand, Detachment and Transfiguration, which are another pair of alternative substitutes for the swan-path of a growing civilization, both differ alike from Archaism and from Futurism in what is the capital point; for, unlike Archaism and Futurism, Detachment and Transfiguration are both of them reactions to the breakdown of a civilization which are still, in themselves, ways of growth—if we are to judge by the criterion of growth that we have tried to work out in an earlier part of this Study.²

The essential feature in which the movements of Detachment and Transfiguration diverge from those of Archaism and Futurism is, as we have seen, that they are not attempts to escape from the Present without abandoning the level of mundane life, but are endeavours to act upon a belief that there can be no salvation from that sickness of the Soul which the breakdown of a civilization brings to light through any less radical remedy than a change of spiritual clime or dimension;³ and this is another way of saying

¹ In V. C (i) (d) 8-11, above.

² See Part III. C (i) (c) and (d), vol. iii, pp. 174-217, above.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 394, above.

that both Detachment and Transfiguration are examples of that 'transference of the field of action' from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm which manifests itself qualitatively in the spiritual phenomenon of 'etherialization'.¹ If we are right in believing that these are symptoms of growth, and right again in believing that every example of human growth will always be found to have a social as well as an individual aspect,² and if we are also bound to assume *ex hypothesi* that the society to whose growth the movements of Detachment and Transfiguration thus bear witness cannot be any society of the species 'civilizations'—considering that a disintegrating society of that species is the City of Destruction from which either movement is an endeavour to escape—then we can only conclude that the movements of Detachment and Transfiguration bear witness to the growth of a society, or societies, of some other kind or kinds.

Is the singular or the dual the right number to use in referring to the social medium in which our two movements of Detachment and Transfiguration take place? The best way to approach this question may be to ask ourselves another: What is the difference between the two movements of Detachment and Transfiguration in terms of social growth? If they are both of them manifestations of social growth and yet are different from one another, does their difference reflect a distinction between two species of society which differ specifically from one another as well as from the species called 'civilizations'? Or does the difference between Detachment and Transfiguration reflect a difference of social growth which is not one of kind but merely one of degree? Are the two movements both of them manifestations of the growth of a single species of society—and perhaps even of a single unique representative of this species—at two different points on a course that runs through a succession of stages from genesis towards prime? When we put our question in this way, we shall see that we already have grounds for giving it the second of the two possible answers; for we have already apprehended³—though this not yet in terms of growth but so far only in terms of direction—the relation which our two movements bear to one another. While Detachment is a simple movement of sheer withdrawal, Transfiguration is a compound movement whose first beat is likewise a withdrawal but whose second beat is a return. The difference between an act of

¹ See Part III. C (i) (c) and (d), vol. iii, pp. 174–217, above.

² This belief follows from the fact that Man is 'by nature a social animal', in the sense that Man's pre-human ancestors did not, and could not, become human until they had first attained to sociality. (For Aristotle's thesis and Eduard Meyer's argument in favour of it see I. C (iii) (c), vol. i, p. 173, footnote 3, above.)

³ In V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 394–7; V. C (i) (d) 10, in the present volume, pp. 132–3; and V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 151, footnote 4, above.

withdrawal and an act of withdrawal-and-return¹ is not a difference between one road and another but merely a difference in the number of stages traversed. And these two different degrees of progress may both be attained on a single road along which both the travellers are moving in the same direction.

The actual identity of the road in the case of the two progresses here in question can be tested and confirmed by taking account of the goal. We have seen what is the goal of that movement of withdrawal-and-return which we have called Transfiguration. The aim of Transfiguration is to give light to them that sit in darkness² and to make the darkness comprehend this light that is shining in it;³ and this aim is pursued by seeking the Kingdom of God in order to bring its life, which is 'the light of men',⁴ into action—or rather into visibility, since God is in action always and everywhere—in the field of life in This World. The goal of Transfiguration is thus the Kingdom of God. And there is a manifest difference, which is not just one of place but rather one of dimension and of kind, between this *Civitas Dei* and the pair of mundane Utopias—a 'City of Cecrops' and a 'City of the Sun'—that are the respective goals of Archaism and of Futurism. But what is the relation between the *Civitas Dei* and the *Nirvāna* that is the goal of Detachment? Are these two supra-mundane goals of human endeavour two mutually exclusive alternatives? Or is only one of the two truly a goal, while the other is merely a halting-place on the way? We have seen already that the second of these two theoretical possibilities is the fact. The Hinayanian Buddhist arhat, for whom *Nirvāna* is the be-all and end-all, is, in terms of Bergson's simile,⁵ like the driver of a locomotive who has mistaken a station for the terminus; and the arhat's misapprehension is shared by the Bodhisattva who, out of compassion towards other living beings, stays poised on the brink of *Nirvāna* for aeons of aeons. The Bodhisattva is like an engine-driver who, having come within view of the station and having seen that the signal just this side of it permits him to pass, pulls up at the signal-box and quixotically sets the signal against himself. But there is also another driver whose train is neither the Hīnayāna nor the Mahāyāna, and that is the Christian mystic who recognizes the station for what it is and manfully opens the throttle again, after the momentary pause which the time-table prescribes, without being deterred by the blackness of the tunnel that engulfs the track

¹ The nature of this compound *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return has been examined in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 248–63, above.

² Luke i. 79.

³ John i. 5.

⁴ John i. 4.

⁵ See the passage of Bergson that has been quoted in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 234–5, above.

when this station has been left behind. This driver knows that he has not yet reached the terminus; and his will to reach it is so strong that it carries him through that 'dark night' in which the road that leads to the goal of the movement of Transfiguration makes its crucial reversal of direction from 'withdrawal' towards 'return'.¹

It would thus appear that, in bearing witness to the growth of some kind of society that is neither a civilization nor a Utopia, the two movements of Detachment and Transfiguration are two pieces of evidence for a single passage of life. Both of them are reactions to the disintegration of a civilization; and, in the imagery of the Sinic *Weltanschauung*, the disintegration of a civilization discharges itself, as we have seen, in a full cycle of the alternating rhythm of Yin-and-Yang.² In the first beat of the rhythm a Yang-movement which has been destructive passes over into a Yin-state which is a peace of exhaustion; but the rhythm is not arrested at the dead point (as the philosophy of Detachment seeks to quench Life in *Nirvāna*); it passes over again from the Yin-state into a Yang-movement which, this time, is not destructive but is creative (like the Christian Faith that carries the Soul on beyond Detachment into Transfiguration). This double beat of the rhythm of Yin-and-Yang is that rendering of the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return on which we stumbled not far from the beginning of the present Part of our Study, and for which we there provisionally coined the name of Schism-and-Palingenesia.³ Our intervening study of 'schism'—first in the Body Social and then in the Soul—has been long and laborious; but it has led us to the threshold of 'palingenesia' at last.

In this Study the word 'palingenesia', like the word 'proletariat',⁴ has been commandeered to serve our purpose; and in the act of laying hands upon it we have noted⁵ that its literal meaning—'recurrence of birth'—has in it an element of ambiguity. The 'recurrence' might refer exclusively to the event of birth or alternatively its reference might extend to the nature of the thing born; and, while in the latter use the word 'palingenesia' would mean a repetitive rebirth of something that has been born before, in the former use it would mean an unprecedented new birth of something that is now being born for the first time. We have observed

¹ See the passages quoted from Bergson in loc. cit. and in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 255-6, above.

² For Yin-and-Yang see Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 201-4; for the analysis of the disintegration of a civilization in terms of Yin-and-Yang see V. C (i) (b), vol. v, p. 26, above.

³ In V. C (i) (b), vol. v, p. 27, above.

⁴ For the sense in which the word 'proletariat' is used in this Study see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 41, footnote 3, above.

⁵ In V. C (i) (b), vol. v, p. 27, footnote 2, above.

in the same place that a recurrent birth of some identical thing was probably the idea in the minds of the Stoic philosophers by whom (as far as can be ascertained) the word 'palingenesia' was originally coined; but we have kept a free hand for ourselves to use the word in our own context in either of two meanings that are both of them equally legitimate. We have now to decide for ourselves which of the alternative meanings we are to adopt.

Are we to use 'palingenesia' in the sense of a rebirth of the actual civilization that is in course of disintegration? This would be a literal application of one of the two possible meanings of the word; but this cannot be our meaning; for it is a meaning which expresses the aim, not of Transfiguration, but of Archaism.¹

Then is our 'palingenesia' to mean, not, perhaps, the literal rebirth of an existing civilization that is in disintegration, but the replacement of this now irretrievably damaged specimen by another representative of the same species? This cannot be our meaning either; for that is the aim, not of Transfiguration, but of Futurism; and, if the process is repeated *ad infinitum* and is translated from the mundane on to the cosmic scale, the result is the cyclic rhythm² which, in the history of Hellenic thought, was proclaimed to be the fundamental 'law' of the Universe by Stoic and Epicurean philosophers who apparently were not put out by the incongruity between their rotativist conception of the nature of Reality and their ethical aim of Detachment.

The Indic philosophers who have pursued the same aim have had the courage to bend their theories into conformity with it, and have set themselves to break the Wheel of Existence as the only sure way of escape from being broken on it. Is the *Nirvāna* that is attained by a complete extinction of desire the 'palingenesia' that we have in mind? No, that is impossible; for *Nirvāna* and 'palingenesia' are terms that are mutually exclusive. The very definition of *Nirvāna* is that this is the state that supervenes when birth has ceased to recur; and, however far-fetched the imagery to which we may have recourse in attempting the impossible feat of depicting 'a perfect and absolute blank', we can be certain beforehand that this particular image will have no place in our picture.

¹ In this archaistic meaning *παλιγγενεσία* is synonymous with *ἀποκατάστασις*—the noun of which the verb is used in Mark ix. 12: 'Elias verily cometh first and restoreth (ἀποκαθιστᾷ) all things.' In the Jewish *Weltanschauung* of Jesus's age this archaistic 'restoration' was not an end in itself, but was merely a prelude to the fulfilment of the futuristic hope of a Messianic kingdom; and the Archaism had accordingly acquired a certain Messianic tinge. Elias' restoration of Israel to its state in the age before the beginning of the Syriac 'Time of Troubles' was to be not just a restoration but a supernaturally glorified revision of the vanished past (see V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), pp. 130-1, above).

² For the cyclic theory of the rhythm of the Universe see IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 23-38, above.

Nirvāna may be a new state—whether of existence or of non-existence or of both or of neither—but the process by which this state of absolute negativity is reached cannot be conceived of as a ‘birth’ by any stretch of the imagination.

There is one other alternative meaning which the word ‘palin-genesia’ can bear. If it means neither the rebirth of a disintegrating mundane society nor the new birth of another representative of the same mundane species nor yet the attainment of a supra-mundane state which is reached by escaping from all birth of every kind, it can only mean an attainment of another supra-mundane state to which the image of birth can be illuminatingly applied because this other state is a positive state of life—though this in a higher spiritual dimension than the life of This World. That is the ‘palingenesia’ of which Jesus speaks to Nicodemus,¹ and which He proclaims in another place in the same Gospel as the sovereign aim of His own birth in the flesh.

‘I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.’²

That is a ‘palingenesia’ in which the work of creation is resumed, but not as a ‘vain repetition’.

Neuen Lebenslauf
Beginne
Mit hellem Sinne,
Und neue Lieder
Tönen darauf.³

The theogony which the Muses had once recited to one of the shepherds of Ascrea at the moment when a growing Hellenic Civilization had been bursting into flower⁴ finds its antiphony in another theogony which was sung to shepherds of Bethlehem by

¹ John iii. 3–8.

² John x. 10.

³ Goethe: *Faust*, ll. 1622–6, quoted already in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 289, above. Dey, J.: *Παλιγγεσία* (Münster i. W. 1937, Aschendorff), pp. 161–2 and 167–8, points out that, in Saint Paul's theology, the spiritual rebirth of the Soul is conceived of as the beginning of a process, not as the end of one. This Pauline ‘palingenesia’ does not bring with it a simultaneous and instantaneous spiritual perfection. It rather introduces into the Soul a spiritual leaven, and Time and Effort are of the essence of the subsequent process of leavening the lump.

⁴ In retrospect it is manifest that Hesiod's poetry is a product of the eve of the brief flowering-time of the Hellenic culture; but such an account of Hesiod's place in history would have astonished and exasperated the poet himself. Hesiod believed that he was living in the last stage of a long course of social decline; and his cry of anguish (*Works and Days*, ll. 174–201) at the harrowing thought that he has been born into the Iron Age is the most poignant passage of any in his surviving poems. Was Hesiod tragically mistaking the ferment of growth for the disintegration of decay? Or was he anticipating, in a flash of intuition, one of the two possible answers to a question which was to be propounded by Plato long afterwards, on the morrow of the Hellenic Society's breakdown? Plato once asked himself, as we have seen (in IV. C (i), Annex, vol. iv, pp. 585–8, above), whether the true catastrophe of a civilization might prove to be its rise and not its fall. Was Hesiod answering this question before it had been framed?

angels¹ at a moment when a disintegrating Hellenic Society was suffering the last of the agonies of its 'Time of Troubles' and was falling into the coma of a universal state. The birth of which the angels then sang was not a rebirth of Hellas and not a new birth of other societies of the Hellenistic species. It was the birth in the flesh of the King of the Kingdom of God.

(II) AN ANALYSIS OF DISINTEGRATION

(a) THE RELATION BETWEEN DISINTEGRATING CIVILIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS

The Creative Genius as a Saviour.

The problem of the relation between civilizations and individuals has already engaged our attention in the course of our attempt, in an earlier part of this Study,² to analyse the process of growth; and, now that we have come to the point at which we must attempt to make a corresponding analysis of the process of disintegration, the same problem presents itself again. This time, however, we need not start from first principles, as we found it advisable to start when the problem confronted us first; for the elements of this problem are the same in both sets of circumstances. If the institution which we call a society consists in the common ground between the respective fields of action of a number of individual souls,³ then we may take it that this is its constant and uniform consistency so long as it is in existence at all. In respect of this fundamental point it makes no difference whether the society happens to be in growth or in disintegration. In either of these two possible phases of social life it is equally true that the source of action is never the society itself, but is always some individual soul;⁴ that the action which is an act of creation is always performed by a soul which is in some sense a superhuman genius;⁵ that the genius expresses himself, like every living soul, through action upon his fellows;⁶ that in any society the creative personalities are always in a minority;⁷ and that the action of the genius upon souls of common clay operates more rarely by the perfect method of direct illumination than through the second-best expedient of a kind of social drill which enlists the faculty of mimesis in the souls of the uncreative rank-and-file and thereby

¹ For this assonance between Hesiod: *Theogony*, ll. 1-34, and Luke ii. 8-20, see further V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, pp. 363-4, below.

² In III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 217-48, above.

³ For this definition of what a society really is, see *ibid.*, p. 230, above.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 230-1, above.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 234-7, above.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 232-4, above.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 237-44, above.

enables them to perform 'mechanically' an evolution which they could not have performed on their own initiative.¹ All this is ground that is fundamental to the problem of the relation between a civilization and the individual souls that are its 'members', whatever the phase through which the civilization may be passing; and, since we have covered this ground already, we need not go over it again, but may proceed at once to look into the more superficial features in which the fundamentally constant and uniform relation between the society and the individual does differ according to whether the society happens to be moving in one or the other of its two alternative directions.

What differences, then, can we detect? Do we find, for instance, that, when a society stops growing and begins to disintegrate, the individuals who take the lead are no longer creative personalities? If the change from growth to disintegration did involve such a change as this in the nature of the society's leadership, then that would be a difference which could hardly be treated as superficial; but as a matter of fact we have discovered already that the difference in the leadership of a society when it is growing and when it is disintegrating is not the difference between creativity and the absence of it. For, while it is true that one of the symptoms of social breakdown and causes of social schism is the degeneration of a minority that has been able to take the lead in virtue of being creative into a minority that attempts to retain the lead by sheer physical domination,² we have also seen that the Secession of the Proletariat—which is the answer that the Dominant Minority evokes from the members of the society whom it shuts out from its now closed and privileged circle—is achieved under the leadership of creative personalities for whose activity there is now no scope except in the organization of opposition to the incubus of uncreative powers that be.³ Thus the change from social growth to social disintegration is not accompanied—either as cause or as effect—by an extinction of the creative spark in the souls of individuals or by a change from creative to uncreative leadership. Creative personalities continue to arise and also continue to take the lead in virtue of their creative power. All that happens is that they now find themselves compelled to do their old work from a new *locus standi* in a society which, in breaking down, has been rent by a schism.

¹ III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 244-8, above.

² For this degeneration of a creative into a dominant minority see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 53-5; V. C (i) (a), vol. v, pp. 17-20; and V. C (i) (c) 1, vol. v, pp. 35-58, above. For the inherent weakness in the device of mimesis which is at least partly responsible for this disaster see III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 245-8; III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 374; and IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 122-33, above.

³ See V. C (i) (b), vol. v, pp. 29-35, above.

Then does the difference lie in the occasion that brings a potential creativity into action? In a growing civilization, as we have seen,¹ a creative personality comes into action by taking the lead in making a successful response to some challenge which confronts him in common with the uncreative rank-and-file of the society of which they are all 'members'. In a disintegrating civilization Challenge-and-Response is still the mould of action in which the mystery of creation takes place,² but the creative leader's task now begins at a different stage and has a different objective. In a growing civilization the creator is called upon to play the part of a conqueror who replies to a challenge with a victorious response; in a disintegrating civilization the same creator is called upon to play the part of a saviour who comes to the rescue of a society that has failed to respond because the challenge has worsted a minority that has ceased to be creative and that has sunk into being merely dominant. Perhaps we have here put our finger upon the true nature of the change in the relation between the rank-and-file of a society and its creative leader when the society passes out of growth into disintegration. It is a difference in the character of the spiritual warfare that the society is waging. In terms of this military simile a growing society is taking the offensive and therefore looks for the leadership of a conqueror who will show it how to capture fresh ground for its advance, whereas a disintegrating society is trying to stand on the defensive and therefore requires its leader to play the more thankless—but by the same token perhaps also more heroic—part of a saviour who will show it how to hold its ground in a rearguard action.

It follows that, in a disintegrating society, the would-be saviour will appear in diverse guises that will vary with his choice of his defensive strategy and tactics. There will be would-be saviours *of* a disintegrating society who will refuse to despair of the Present and will lead forlorn hopes in an endeavour to turn the tide and to convert the rout into a fresh advance, without being willing to 'retreat according to plan' for the sake of even temporarily breaking off contact with an enemy who has at any rate momentarily gained the upper hand. There will also be saviours *from* a disintegrating society who will seek salvation along one or other of four alternative possible ways of escape which we have reconnoitred already.³ The saviours who belong to these other four schools will all agree in ruling out the idea of trying to hold the present front line, and *a fortiori* the idea of trying to push it forward. They will all begin

¹ In II. C (ii) (b), vol. i, pp. 271-338, and Part II. D, vol. ii, *passim*, above.

² Challenge-and-Response cannot fail to be found anywhere where there is Life, since our formula is simply a description of Life itself in terms of Will.

³ In V. C (i) (d) 8-11, pp. 49-168, above.

operations by executing a strategic retreat from the disintegrating social structure of the mundane Present; but it is only in this first negative step that they will take the same line. The saviour-archaist and the saviour-futurist will try to evade the problem of facing defeat by attempting to elude the enemy altogether. The archaist will seek to elude him by making a forced march to a position so far to the archaist's own rear, and so deeply ensconced in the jungle-clad fastnesses of the Past, that the enemy will never be able to follow him up. The futurist will seek to achieve the same result by the bolder method of putting his troops on board aeroplanes and landing them far in the rear, not of his own lines, but of the enemy's. There remain the two alternative strategies of Detachment and Transfiguration, and the saviour from a disintegrating society who follows one or the other of these will appear in quite a different guise. Along the path of Detachment he will present himself as a philosopher taking cover behind the mask of a king, and along the path of Transfiguration as a god incarnate in a man.¹ Let us try to apprehend the present object of our study as he passes through this series of Protean metamorphoses.

The Saviour with the Sword.

The would-be saviour of a disintegrating society is necessarily a saviour with a sword; but a sword may be either drawn or sheathed, and the swordsman may be discovered in either of two corresponding postures. Either he may be laying about him with naked weapon in hand, like the Gods in combat with the Giants as they are depicted on the Delphic or on the Pergamene frieze, or else he may be sitting in state, with his blade out of sight in its scabbard, as a victor who has 'put all enemies under his feet'.² The second of these postures is the end towards which the first is a means; and, though a David or a Hêrâklês, who never rests from his labours until he dies in harness, may be a more romantic figure than a Solomon in all his glory or a Zeus in all his majesty, the labours of Hêrâklês and the wars of David would be aimless exertions if the serenity of Zeus and the prosperity of Solomon were not their objectives. The sword is only wielded in the hope of being able to use it to such good purpose that it may eventually have no more work to do; but this hope is an illusion; for it is only in fairyland that swords cut Gordian knots which cannot be untied by fingers. 'All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword'³

¹ According to Pauly-Wissowa: *Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaften*, Halbband v, col. 1215, this conception of the Saviour as a god incarnate is an Oriental idea which is foreign to the connotation of the Greek word σωτήρ in its original Hellenic usage. On this question see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, *passim*, below.

² 1 Cor. xv. 25 (a reminiscence of Ps. cx. 1).

³ Matt. xxvi. 52.

is the inexorable law of real life; and the swordsman's belief in a conclusive victory is an illusion. While David may never be allowed to build the Temple, Solomon's building is built only to be burnt by Nebuchadnezzar; and, while Hēraklēs may never win his way in this life to the heights of Olympus, Zeus plants his throne upon the formidable mountain's summit only to court the doom of being hurled in his turn into the abyss into which his own hands have already cast the Titans.¹

Why is it that a disintegrating society cannot, after all, be saved by the sword even when the swordsman is genuinely eager to return the weapon to its scabbard at the earliest possible moment and to keep it there—unused and unseen—for the longest possible period of time? Is not this twofold action of drawing and sheathing again a sign of grace which ought to have its reward? The warrior who is willing to renounce, at the first opportunity, the use of an instrument which he is only able now to lay aside because he has just used it so successfully must be a victor who is also a statesman, and a statesman who is something of a sage. He must have a large measure of saving common sense (*σωφροσύνη*) and at least a grain of the more etherial virtue of self-control (*ἐγκράτεια*).² The renunciation of War as an instrument of policy is a resolution which promises to be as fruitful as it is noble and wise; and, whenever it is taken with sincerity, it always arouses high hopes.

Iam Fides et Pax et Honos Pudorque
priscus et neglecta redire Virtus
audet, apparetque beata pleno
Copia cornu.³

In these lines, written to be sung at a public celebration of the beginning of a new era of Hellenic history which was to reproduce a happier past,⁴ Horace seems to be consciously chanting the palinode to Hesiod's poignant lament over the reluctant retreat of the two saving goddesses Aedōs and Nemesis from Earth to Olympus under pressure of the onset of the Age of Iron.⁵ Why

¹ In the theodicy of Aeschylus Zeus succeeds in avoiding the doom that has overtaken his predecessors Uranus and Cronos (see *Agamemnon*, ll. 160–83, and Professor Gilbert Murray's reconstruction of the denouement of the Promethean Trilogy which has been touched upon in this Study in Part III. B, vol. iii, pp. 116–17, above). Aeschylus did not foresee the humiliation that was to be inflicted upon Zeus by the philosophers of a later age of Hellenic history, whose policy towards Zeus was to bind him on his Olympian throne in gilded chains in order that he might serve their turn as a *roi fainéant* for their *Cosmopolis* (see V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 20–1, above, and V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, pp. 337–8, below).

² For this virtue—which is one of those that find scope in societies that are in disintegration—see V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 377, and V. C (i) (d) 2, vol. v, pp. 399–403, above.

³ Horace: *Carmen Saeculare*, ll. 57–60.

⁴ For the *Ludi Saeculares* as an expression of Archaism see V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), p. 51, with footnote 1, above.

⁵ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 197–201. (For Hesiod's philosophy of history see V. C (i) (e), p. 174, footnote 4, above.)

are these seemingly legitimate expectations doomed to be disappointed—as they were in the signal failure of the *Pax Augusta* to achieve the perpetuity that was of the essence of the poet's hopes? Is there, then, 'no place of repentance'?¹ Can the Triumvir who has once perpetrated, and profited by, the proscriptions never truly transfigure himself into a Pater Patriae? The answer to this agonizing question has been given in an Horatian ode by an English poet upon the return of a Western Caesar from a victorious campaign in which the victor seemed at last to have triumphantly completed his military task. A poem which purports to be a paean in honour of a particular victory sounds the knell of all Militarism in its last two stanzas:

But thou, the War's and Fortune's son,
March indefatigably on;
And, for the last effect,
Still keep the sword erect.

Besides the force it has to fright
The spirits of the shady night,
The same arts that did gain
A power, must it maintain.²

This classically phrased verdict upon the career of the earliest would-be saviour with the sword in the modern history of our Western Civilization has a sting in its tail which pricks with a still sharper point in the nineteenth-century *mot* that 'the one thing which you cannot do with bayonets is to sit on them'. An instrument that has once been used to destroy life cannot then be used to preserve life at the user's convenience. The function of weapons is to kill; and a ruler who has not scrupled 'to wade through slaughter to a throne' will find—if he tries to maintain his power thereafter without further recourse to the grim arts which have gained it—that sooner or later he will be confronted with a choice between letting the power slip through his fingers or else renewing his lease of it by means of another bout of bloodshed. The man of violence cannot both genuinely repent of his violence and permanently profit by it. The law of *Karma* is not evaded so easily as that. The Saviour with the Sword may perhaps build a house upon the sand but never the house upon a rock.³ And he will not be able to build for Eternity vicariously by the expedient of a division of labour between a blood-guilty David and an innocent Solomon; for the stones with which Solomon builds will have been of David's hewing; and the veto pronounced against the father—

¹ Μετανοίας γὰρ τόπον οὐκ ἔσται.—Heb. xii. 17, apropos of Esau.

² Marvell, Andrew: *An Horatian Ode upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland*.

³ Matt. vii. 24-9.

'Thou shalt not build an house for my name, because thou hast been a man of war and hast shed blood'¹—spells doom for a house built by the son on the father's behalf.

This ultimate failure of all attempts to win salvation with the sword is not only proclaimed in poetry and myth and legend; it is also demonstrated in history; for 'the iniquity of the fathers' who have had recourse to the sword is visited 'upon the children unto the third and fourth generation'.² In our own day the descendants of the Protestant English military colonists whom Cromwell planted in Ireland to hold a conquered Catholic country down have been evicted from their ancestors' ill-gotten estates by the very weapons of violence and injustice to which they owed their cursed heritage; and, at the moment when these words were being written in August 1937, the wealth of a British community of business men in a treaty-port and settlement at Shanghai which had been founded on the iniquity of 'the Opium War' of A.D. 1840-2 was being destroyed by Japanese and Chinese hands which had been schooled in Militarism by the example of past British success in temporarily transmuting military violence into commercial profit. Nor are these two judgements of History exceptional. The classic saviours with the sword have been the captains and the princes who have striven to found or have succeeded in founding or have succeeded in preserving or have striven to preserve the universal states into which the disintegrating civilizations pass when they have lived through their 'Times of Troubles' to the bitter end; and, although the passage from 'Time of Troubles' to universal state is apt to bring with it so great an immediate relief for the tormented children of a disintegrating society that they sometimes show their gratitude to the successful founder of a universal state by worshipping him as a god,³ we shall find, when

¹ 1 Chron. xxviii. 3.

² Exod. xx. 5 and xxxiv. 7; Num. xiv. 18.

³ For the deification of political potentates in general, and of the sovereigns of universal states in particular, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 648-57, above. It has been suggested in that context that it would hardly be possible for a ruler to secure formal worship as a god without having already won the gratitude and affection of his subjects in the capacity of a human saviour; and indeed the deification of a ruler might almost be described as the translation of this spontaneous popular feeling into official language. But, if it be true that no ruler who has not been recognized as a saviour can be a successful candidate for deification, it is by no means true that, conversely, the official conferment of divine honours is a necessary consequence of the existence of the feeling which it presupposes. For example, the feeling for a living Augustus which is expressed by Virgil in the passages in which he hails the founder of the Hellenic universal state as a god (see V. C (i) (d) (δ), Annex, p. 648, with footnote 4, above) is matched in depth and sincerity by the feeling which is expressed for the same Roman Emperor in a work written more than a quarter of a century after his death by Philo of Alexandria. In his *Legatio ad Gaium*, §§ 143-7, the Jewish philosopher salutes Augustus with a paean of praise.

'What of the hero who towered above the ordinary level of human nature in all the virtues, and who—to signify his combination of supreme dictatorial power with supreme distinction of character—was the first to be called Augustus (a title which he did not inherit from his forefathers like an heirloom, but which he did transmit to his

we come to study these universal states more closely,¹ that they are at best ephemeral, and that if, by a *tour de force*, they obstinately outlive their normal span they have to pay for this unnatural longevity by degenerating into social enormities² which are as pernicious in their way as either the 'Times of Troubles' that precede the establishment of universal states or the interregna that follow their break-up at the normal age.

The association between the histories of universal states and the careers of would-be saviours with the sword does not merely testify in a general way to the inefficacy of force as an instrument of salvation: it enables us to survey the evidence empirically by giving us a convenient clue for sorting out the would-be saviours of this kind and marshalling them in an order in which it becomes possible to pass them in review.

The first to march past will be the tragic battalion of would-be saviours with the sword who have slashed—with blades as futile as the Danaids' sieves—at the welling wars of a 'Time of Troubles'.

In the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' (*circa* 431–31 B.C.) we can perceive, in the first generation, the gallant figure of a Lacedae-

successors fraught with a dignity with which he himself had first invested it)? At the moment when Augustus took charge of the government of the World, he found the World's affairs in a state of perturbation and confusion. Islands were competing for primacy with continents, and continents with islands, under the leadership and championship of the most eminent men in Roman public life. More than that, the prime divisions of the Habitable World were struggling for political supremacy—Asia against Europe and Europe against Asia—and the nations of the two contending continents had risen up, even from the ends of the Earth, and had set themselves to wage devastating wars against one another in all habitable lands and on all navigable seas. Everywhere there were battles and sea-fights, until almost the entire human race was on the verge of complete annihilation through mutual slaughter—but for one man, one leader, Augustus, who deserves to be called the Averter of Catastrophe (*ἀλεξίκακον*). This is that Caesar who calmed the storms that had broken in every quarter, and who cured the plagues that had descended from South and East—upon Hellenes and Barbarians alike—and had run like wildfire right away to West and North, disseminating horrors over the intervening lands and seas. This is he who did not merely loosen, but actually struck right off, the fetters in which the World had lain fast bound and crushed. This is he who put an end both to open wars and to clandestine wars in the shape of brigandage. This is he who cleared the sea of pirates and filled it with merchantmen. This is he who salvaged all the city-states and set them at liberty; who brought order out of disorder (*ὁ τὴν ἀραδίαν εἰς τάξιν ἀγαγών*); who tamed and reconciled all the unsociable, savage nations; who multiplied Hellas in a host of replicas of herself (*ὁ τὴν μὲν Ἑλλάδα Ἑλλάδι πολλαῖς παραυήσας*); who hellenized the most vital sections of the world of Barbarism; the Guardian of Peace; the distributor, to each and all, of what was their due; the benefactor who bestowed, without stint, on the public every gift that he had to give, and who never in his life hoarded up for himself any treasure that was fine or good.

This prose of Philo's is as magnificent a tribute, in its way, as Virgil's verse. Yet this Jewish enthusiast for Augustus and his work would have rejected as a shocking blasphemy any suggestion that he should express his gratitude towards a human saviour by paying him those divine honours that, in Philo's belief, were payable exclusively to the One True God. Philo can have been under no temptation to worship his human hero Augustus in place of the God of Israel—though it is possible that Philo's mind may have moved in the inverse direction and that his conception of the providence of God may have been influenced by his acquaintance with the providence of Augustus (for this interesting conjecture see Charlesworth, M. P.: *The Virtues of a Roman Emperor* (London 1937, Milford), p. 18).

¹ In Part VI, below.

² For the social enormities that are the alternatives to revolutions see IV. C (iii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 135–7, above.

monian Brasidas giving his life to liberate the Greek city-states in Chalcidicê from an Athenian yoke—only to have his work undone within less than half a century by other Lacedaemonian hands which were to open the way for a Philip of Macedon to place a heavier yoke upon the neck of every state in Hellas save Sparta herself.¹ At Brasidas' heels stalks the sinister figure of his countryman and contemporary, Lysander, who successfully liberated the Greek city-states along the Asiatic shores of the Aegean and gave the Athenian 'thalassocracy' its *coup de grâce*—only to bring upon the former subjects of Athens the chastisement of Lacedaemonian scorpions in place of Attic whips and to set his own country's feet upon a path that was to lead her, in thirty-three years, from Aegospotami to Leuctra. Thereafter each successive generation adds some figure to our parade. We see a Theban Epaminondas liberating the Arcadians and Messenians and punishing Sparta as Lysander had punished Athens—only to stimulate the Phocians to inflict the same punishment on Thebes herself. We see a Macedonian Philip ridding Hellas of the Phocian scourge and being hailed as 'friend, benefactor, and saviour'² by the Thebans and Thessalians who had been the principal sufferers from it—only to extinguish the freedom of these two Hellenic peoples that once had been so naïve as to 'think the whole world of him'.³ And we see an Alexander seeking to reconcile the Hellenes to a Macedonian hegemony by leading them on the quest of making a common prize of the entire Achaemenian Empire—only to lose for Macedon the hegemony which his father had won for her, and to feed the flames of Hellenic civil war by pouring into the rival war-chests of his own successors a treasure which the Achaemenidae had been accumulating for two centuries.⁴

A parallel and contemporary procession of unsuccessful saviours with the sword can be observed in that other half of the Hellenic World which lay to the west of the Adriatic.⁵ We have only to recite the catalogue of their names—Dionysius the First and Dionysius the Second, Agathocles and Hiero and Hieronymus—in order to perceive that the failure of each of these dictators in turn is proclaimed in the bare fact of his needing a successor to grapple with the same task all over again. In another context⁶ we have seen that the problem of saving Hellenism in the west by establishing

¹ For the relations between Sparta, the Chalcidians, and Macedon between 432 and 338 B.C. see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, pp. 480-6, above.

² Demosthenes: *De Corona*, chap. 43.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 485; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 62-4; and V. C (i) (d) 11, in the present volume, p. 155, footnote 3, above; and V. C (ii) (b), pp. 289-90 and 318-19, below.

⁵ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 357, footnote 1, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex I, vol. v, p. 590, above.

⁶ In III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 312, above.

an *union sacrée* which would be strong enough to resist the dual pressure of Syriac rivals from Africa and barbarian interlopers from Italy remained unsolved until the fertile seed-bed of Hellenic culture in Sicily was devastated by being turned into the arena of a struggle for oecumenical dominion between Carthage and Rome.

The 'Times of Troubles' of other civilizations present similar spectacles. In the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' (*circa* 2677-2298 B.C.) we find Sargon of Agade (*dominabatur circa* 2652-2597 B.C.) being besought by the Assyrian pioneers beyond Taurus to deliver them out of the hand of the local barbarians;¹ and we see Naramsin (*dominabatur circa* 2572-2517 B.C.) representing himself on a notorious stele as the deliverer of the plains of Shinar from the depredations of the highlanders of Gutium.² But Naramsin's, if not Sargon's, title to rank as a saviour is impugned by the ensuing bout of Gutaean domination over the heart of the Sumeric World (*circa* 2429-2306);³ for this barbarian counterstroke was the nemesis of Akkadian militarism. In the Orthodox Christian World the same battalion of would-be saviours is represented by figures who are more sympathetic without being more effective. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom we see Alexius Comnenus (*imperabat* A.D. 1081-1118)⁴ snatching a prostrate East Roman Empire out of the jaws of Normans and Saljūqs with all the intrepidity of a David rescuing his lamb from the lion and the bear.⁵ And a century later we see a Theodore Lascaris refusing to despair of the republic after the unprecedented and overwhelming catastrophe of A.D. 1204, and turning at bay, behind the walls of Nicaea, against the Frankish conquerors of the holy city of Constantine. But all this Byzantine heroism was in vain. For in the tragic history of the East Roman Empire the French Goliath who came prowling on the Fourth Crusade did not, after all, share the fate of the Norman bear and the Saljūq lion; and the eventual recapture of Constantinople by Michael Palaeologus, which seemed at the moment to have crowned Theodore Lascaris' work with a posthumous success, proved in the sequel only to have sealed the East Roman Empire's doom by showing the 'Osmanlis the way from the Asiatic to the European side of the Black Sea Straits.⁶ In the history of the Russian offshoot of the Orthodox Christian

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 110, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 262, above.

² For the self-exposure of militarism in this work of Sumeric art see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 262, above, and V. C (ii) (b), in the present volume, p. 296, below. For the nemesis of Naramsin's militarism see also I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 203, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 262, above.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, vol. iv, pp. 619-20, above, and V. C (ii) (b), in the present volume, p. 298, below.

⁵ 1 Sam. xvii. 34-6.

⁶ For the Nicene Greek reoccupation of Constantinople as a prelude to the establishment of a universal state in Orthodox Christendom by the 'Osmanlis see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 27, above, and V. C (ii) (b), in the present volume, p. 298, footnote 7, below.

Society we may discern counterparts of an Alexius Comnenus and a Theodore Lascaris in Alexander Nevski (*regnabat* A.D. 1252-63) and Dmitri Donskoi (*regnabat* A.D. 1362-89), who wielded their swords for the salvation of the Russian World, during its separate 'Time of Troubles' (*circa* A.D. 1078-1478), from the simultaneous assaults of Lithuanian pagans and Teutonic Crusaders on the north-west¹ and of Mongol Nomads on the south-east.² These Russian heroes of Orthodox Christendom were happier in their generation than their Greek peers, since the fort which they held so valiantly against such heavy odds was not, in the next chapter of the story, to fall into alien hands. Yet Alexander and Demetrius were no more successful than Alexius or Theodore in fulfilling their personal task of bringing a 'Time of Troubles' to an end.

These saviours with the sword whose lot has fallen in 'Times of Troubles' are patently cast in the mould of Hêraklê's without a touch of Zeus; but the next battalion that comes marching at their heels consists of half-castes between the Herculean and the Jovian type who are not dispensed from performing Hercules' labours but are also not condemned to perform them without any hope of obtaining Jove's reward. These Jovian Herculese or Herculean Joves are the forerunners of the successful founders of universal states. They play the part of a Moses to a Joshua or an Elias to a mundane Messiah or a John the Baptist to a Christ³ (if the would-be saviours of a mundane society may properly be brought into comparison with the harbingers of a kingdom which is not of This World). Some of these forerunners die without passing over Jordan or obtaining more than a Pisgah-sight of the Promised Land, while there are others who succeed in forcing the passage and in momentarily planting the standard of their kingdom on the farther bank; but these audacious spirits who seek to wrest a premature success out of the hands of a reluctant Destiny are visited, for their temerity, with a punishment that is escaped by their peers who recognize, and bow to, their fate; for the universal states which they prematurely set up collapse, like houses of cards, as swiftly as they have been erected; and the jerry-builders' abortive labours only find a place in history as a foil to display the solidity of the work of successors who retrieve the disaster by rebuilding the fallen edifice in granite instead of pasteboard.

The Moses who dies in the Wilderness is represented in Hellenic history by a Marius, who showed the way for a Julius to follow in the next generation, though Marius's own hesitant and clumsy

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 172, and Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 424, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 154, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 311-12, above.

³ For the analogy between Elias and John the Baptist see Matt. xvii. 10-13, and Mark ix. 11-13.

moves towards the establishment of an egalitarian dictatorship not only failed to introduce a reign of order but grievously aggravated an existing state of anarchy. In the Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Society we may perceive—in a different social setting—a more constructive counterpart of Marius in a Nobunaga who girt up his loins to break in the wild horses of an unbridled feudalism.¹ And Nobunaga, in his turn, has a more sympathetic Andean counterpart in an Inca Viracocha who spent in heroically stemming the torrent of Chanca invasion an energy which might otherwise have earned the reward of anticipating the achievements of a Pachacutec.² In the main body of Orthodox Christendom the career of the Inca Viracocha is matched by that of the 'Osmanlı Bâyezîd Yilderim, who came within an ace of anticipating Mehmed the Conqueror's double achievement of capturing Constantinople and settling scores with Qāramān, when 'the Thunderbolt' was blasted in mid-action by the sudden and irresistible impact of a still mightier military force.³ In the main body of the Far Eastern World the Manchu restoration of a Mongol-built universal state was more to the credit of the forerunner Nurhachi (*regnabat* A.D. 1618–25), who never set foot inside the Great Wall, than it was to the credit of his *fainéant* successor Shun Chih (*imperabat* A.D. 1644–61), in whose reign the seat of the Manchu power was triumphantly transferred from Mukden to Peking. In the Sumeric World the task of throwing off a Gutæan yoke was taken in hand by Utüchegal of Erech (Uruk) before it was carried through by Ur-Engur of Ur.

Next to this vanguard who see, but never set foot on, the Promised Land comes a second company of forerunners who momentarily subdue the monster of anarchy—but this not so decisively that he cannot raise his head or show his teeth again.

In the Hellenic World a Pompey and a Caesar divided between them the task of reforming a Roman anarchy into a Roman Peace—only to share the guilt of undoing their common work by turning their arms against each other.

Heu quantum inter se bellum, si lumina vitæ
attigerint, quantas acies stragemque ciebunt. . . .
ne, pueri, ne tanta animis adsuescite bella
neu patriæ validas in viscera vertite vires.⁴

¹ Nobunaga assumed dictatorial power *de facto* in A.D. 1568, and he was effectively master of more than half the provinces of Japan when he met a premature death by violence in A.D. 1582 (Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), pp. 397 and 401).

² For the Inca Viracocha's career see II. D (iv), vol. ii, pp. 102–3, above. In the Inca's career, as in Marius's, the outstanding feat was the stemming of a tide of barbarian invasion.

³ For the 'Osmanlı Bâyezîd Yilderim's career see II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 102, above.

⁴ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book VI, ll. 828–9 and 832–3.

But remonstrance fell on deaf ears; the rival war-lords condemned a world which it was their joint mission to save to be scarified by another bout of Roman civil war; and the victor triumphed only to be 'rejected', like Esau, 'when he would have inherited the blessing', and to find 'no place of repentance, though he sought it carefully with tears'.¹ Caesar did not expiate the deaths of Pompey and Cato by his famous clemency² in the hour of his apparent omnipotence. The slayer who had stayed his sword from further slaughter had nevertheless to die by the daggers of defeated adversaries whose lives he had spared; and in dying this tragic death Caesar bequeathed yet another bout of civil war as his unwilling legacy to a piteous world which he had sincerely desired to save. The sword had to take a further toll of life and happiness before the task which Caesar and Pompey had so lightly thrown to the winds was well and truly executed at last by Caesar's adopted son.

Augustus did succeed, after the overthrow of the last of his adversaries, in demobilizing the swollen armies that were left on his hands on the morrow of the Battle of Actium;³ and in the Sinic World Ts'in She Hwang-ti performed the same hazardous feat of statesmanship after he had destroyed the last rival of Ts'in by the conquest and annexation of Ts'i.⁴ But this touch of grace in the heart of the violent-handed Sinic Caesar did not relieve his handiwork. The Sinic universal state which the Ts'in Emperor had put together fell to pieces at his death;⁵ and the work had to be done all over again by Han Liu Pang.

In Syriac history Ts'in She Hwang-ti and Divus Julius have their counterpart in Cyrus, the would-be bringer of a *Pax Achæmenia* to a world that had been lacerated by a *furor Assyriacus*. It was in vain that Cyrus (as the story goes) paid heed to the sign sent from Heaven by Apollo and repented of the evil that he thought to do⁶ unto Croesus.⁷ Instead of burning his vanquished adversary alive, Cyrus took Croesus for his trusted counsellor—only (according to the Herodotean tale)⁸ to lose his life, years afterwards, through acting on bad advice which Croesus had given

¹ Heb. xii. 17, quoted on p. 180, footnote 1, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 78, above.

³ For the penitence of Augustus see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 78; V. C (i) (d) 5, vol. v, p. 435; V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, p. 648, above; and V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, in the present volume, p. 332, footnote 1, below. This penitence evoked a gratitude which in turn expressed itself in a deification of the repentant militarist (see the third of the four passages here cited).

⁴ See Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine*, vol. i (Paris 1920, Geuthner), pp. 200 and 202.

⁵ See V. C (i) (d) 4, vol. v, p. 418, above.

⁶ Jer. xviii. 8.

⁷ The story is told by Herodotus in Book I, chaps. 86-7, and has been cited in this Study already—in its application to Croesus—in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, p. 252 above.

⁸ Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 206-14.

him in good faith. The last word on Cyrus's career was spoken by the queen of the Nomads when she promised to satisfy the Persian war-lord's insatiable appetite for blood; and Tomyris duly carried out her threat on the stricken field by filling a wine-skin with the blood of the slain and dabbling in it the lips of Cyrus's corpse. Nor was it only Cyrus himself who perished by the stroke of the weapon which he had drawn; for the death of the Achaemenid empire-builder was capped by the collapse of his imposing edifice. Cambyses played the same havoc with Cyrus's *Pax Achaemenia* as a Gaius and a Nero played with Octavian's *Pax Augusta*; and Darius had to salvage Cyrus's ruined work, as Vespasian salvaged Augustus's and Liu Pang Ts'in She Hwang-ti's.

In the same Syriac World more than a thousand years later, when the Arab war-lord 'Umar brought a long interlude of Hellenic intrusion to a tardy end by emulating the Persian war-lord Cyrus's lightning-swift feats of conquest, the captor of Jerusalem showed the same clemency as the captor of Sardis—only to demonstrate once again that, for the would-be saviour with the sword, there is 'no place of repentance'. Once again a sword-built edifice collapsed as soon as the builder's sword-arm had been put out of action. After 'Umar's death his work—like Cyrus's—was first shamefully wrecked and then brilliantly salvaged—though, in the history of the Caliphate, Cambyses' and Darius's roles were both of them played, turn and turn about, by the versatile genius of a single Arab statesman. Mu'āwīyah coldly condemned a world that had just been exhausted by the last round of an inconclusive struggle between Rome and Persia to be further harried by an Arab civil war in order that the astute Umayyad might filch the political heritage of the Prophet Muhammad out of the incompetent hands of the Prophet's own cousin and son-in-law.¹

In the Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern World we see Hideyoshi bringing the work of his master Nobunaga to the verge of completion²—only to divert his energies, with a Julian levity, to the wanton enterprise of carrying the flame of war into Korea³ before stamping out the last embers of it in Japan, with the result that Hideyoshi's work had to be re-performed after his death⁴ by Ieyasu at the cost of a Battle of Sekigehara⁵ and a siege of Ōsaka.⁶ In genius Hideyoshi was as conspicuously superior to Ieyasu as Julius was to Octavian; and the moral of both the Japanese and the Hellenic story is that of Aesop's fable of the Hare and the Tortoise.

¹ For the irony of this outcome of Muhammad's political career see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 675-7, above.

² Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 403.

³ In A.D. 1592.

⁴ In A.D. 1598.

⁵ In A.D. 1600.

⁶ In A.D. 1614-15.

A mediocre ability which never deviates from the pursuit of a single aim may go farther in politics than a wayward genius which is master of everything except its own caprice. Yet this moral is perhaps not borne out by the history of the establishment of the Mughal Rāj which served as a universal state for the Hindu World. In this Mughal version of the play Bābur was the Cyrus whose work was undone by a Humāyūn who was as unfortunate as 'Alī and as disastrous as Cambyses; and Akbar was the Darius who retrieved the disaster and reconstructed the edifice; yet, if Bābur and Akbar were to be measured against one another in respect of either genius or caprice, it would be Akbar and not Bābur who would carry off the palm.¹ If we turn our attention from the Mughal Rāj, which was the first to provide the Hindu World with a universal state, to the British Rāj, which took up the same task after the Mughal Rāj had prematurely broken down, we shall notice, here too, a distinction between the respective achievements of two successive generations of British empire-builders: the generation of the Wellesleys (*circa* A.D. 1800-30), who revealed the promise of a *Pax Britannica* when they broke the power of Tipu Sahib in Mysore and of the Marāthās in the Deccan; and the generation of the Lawrences (*circa* A.D. 1830-60), who turned promise into performance by breaking the still more formidable power of the Sikhs in the Panjab and then riding the storm of a Mutiny in which the newly launched ship of British state in India came as near to foundering as the Achaemenian Empire came in the general revolt against the tyranny of Cambyses.

There is, however, a third company in our battalion of forerunners, and this is composed of Herculeases who hand on to successors the fruits of their own labours without ever tasting these fruits for themselves, but also without any break or setback. In the Babylonian World, Nabopolassar (*imperabat* 626-605 B.C.) spent his life in compassing the death of the Assyrian tiger in order that Nebuchadnezzar (*imperabat* 605-562 B.C.) might sit, unchallenged, on the throne of a Neo-Babylonian Empire which could not stand secure until Nineveh lay in ruins. In the Indic World, when the Indic universal state which had been founded by the Mauryas was re-established by the Guptas, Samudragupta (*imperabat circa* A.D. 330-75) played Nabopolassar to Chandragupta II's Nebuchadnezzar (Chandragupta II Gupta *imperabat circa* A.D. 375-413).² These forerunners whose heritage is transmitted in peace are not far from being true founders of universal states; and, if we now pass to these, we shall find the roll-call easy to recite.

¹ For Akbar's genius see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 699-704, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), Annex, pp. 341-2, below.

The true founder of the Hellenic universal state was Augustus (rather than Divus Julius); of the Sumeric, Ur-Engur;¹ of the Egyptiac, Mentuhotep IV² (the prince of the Eleventh Dynasty who reigned *circa* 2070/60–2015 B.C. and established the so-called 'Middle Empire'). In Egyptiac history Mentuhotep IV has a double in the person of Amosis³ (the first sovereign of the Eighteenth Dynasty and the founder of the so-called 'New Empire') owing to the extraordinary restoration of the Egyptiac universal state after an interlude of barbarian rule.⁴ If we pass from the Egyptiac to the Andean World, we shall find that the Inca Pachacutec's claim to be the true founder of the Andean universal state—a claim which is implicit in the title 'World Changed for the Better'⁵—is borne out by the facts of Andean history.⁶ And, to continue our catalogue, Nebuchadnezzar (rather than Nabopolassar) was the true founder of the Babylonian universal state,⁷ and Chandragupta Maurya the founder of the Indic universal state,⁸ while Chandragupta II Gupta⁹—an Indic empire-builder who lived and reigned nearly 700 years after Chandragupta Maurya's day—is entitled to rank as the second founder of the Indic universal state, since it was he who made the decisive contribution¹⁰ to its reconstruction after an interlude of Hellenic intrusion. To resume: Han Liu Pang (rather than Ts'in She Hwang-ti) was the true founder of the Sinic universal state; Darius I (rather than Cyrus) the true founder of the Syriac universal state; and Mu'āwīyah (rather than 'Umar) the true second founder of the Syriac universal state, inasmuch as Mu'āwīyah was the true founder of the Arab Caliphate which took up and carried through the Achaemenian Empire's uncompleted task¹¹ after an interlude of Hellenic intrusion upon Syriac ground which had lasted for the better part of a millennium.¹² In the main body of Orthodox Christendom the *Pax Ottomanica*, which performed the functions of a universal

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 106; V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, p. 497; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 650–1, above; and V. C (ii) (b), in the present volume, pp. 296–7, below.

² See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 137, and p. 140, footnote 2; II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 112; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 267; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 530, above.

³ See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 138, above.

⁴ For this peculiar feature of Egyptiac history see *ibid.*, pp. 138–9, above.

⁵ For the meaning of the title 'Pachacutec' see further V. C (ii) (a), Annex I, p. 374, footnote 2, below.

⁶ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 121, and II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 103, above.

⁷ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 138, above.

⁸ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86, above.

⁹ For the Gupta Dynasty's role in Indic history see *ibid.*, p. 85, above.

¹⁰ This decisive contribution was the annexation of the Saka 'satrapy' in Western India; and that event, which took place at some date in the last decade of the fourth century of the Christian Era (see *ibid.*, p. 86, above, and V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex II, vol. v, p. 604, above), must have been the work of Chandragupta II Gupta (*imperabat* A.D. 375–413).

¹¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 76–7, above.

¹² Alexander the Great broke into Syria in the year 333 B.C.; the Emperor Heraclius evacuated Syria in A.D. 638.

state, was established by Mehmed 'the Conqueror' of Constantinople.¹ In the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom the founder of the universal state was the Tsar Ivan III (*imperabat* A.D. 1462-1505), since the decisive event in the expansion of the Principality of Moscow into an oecumenical empire was the annexation of the Republic of Novgorod in A.D. 1478.² In the main body of the Far Eastern World the *Pax Mongolica* was established by Chingis Khan. In the Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Society the true founder of the universal state was Ieyasu (rather than Hideyoshi). In the Hindu World the true founder of the Mughal Rāj was Akbar³ (rather than Bābur), while the true founders of the British Rāj were the Lawrences (rather than the British empire-builders of the preceding generation).

To the eyes of an historian of a later age, who can see the careers of these founders of universal states in the light of a distant sequel, their Jovian figures do not stand out as being strikingly different from the Herculean figures of their predecessors. But to the eyes of a contemporary observer, who cannot see things in perspective, there seems to be all the difference here between failure and success. The founders of the universal states appear at the moment to have triumphantly achieved a success which their predecessors have striven for manfully but in vain; and the genuineness of this success appears to be guaranteed not merely by the effectiveness of the founders' own lives and deeds (however eloquently these facts may speak), but most decisively of all by the prosperity of the founders' successors. Solomon's glory is the most telling evidence for David's prowess. Let us therefore now continue our survey of saviours with the sword by passing in review these Solomons who are born into the purple. The swords of the *porphyrogeniti* are speciously muffled in the folds of an imperial robe; and, if ever we see them show their true colours by displaying the hidden blade, we shall always find that this act of self-betrayal has been prompted by wantonness and not enjoined by necessity. If salvation with the sword is to be 'justified of her children',⁴ it must be now, in this Solomonian generation, or never in the whole history of the disintegrations of civilizations. So let us inspect our Solomons closely.

¹ In the estimation of later generations of 'Osmanlis it was Mehmed the Conqueror who raised the Ottoman Power to the rank of an oecumenical empire; but the credit for this achievement properly belongs neither to Mehmed the Conqueror (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81) nor to his forerunner Bāyezid the Thunderbolt (*imperabat* A.D. 1389-1402), but to their predecessor Murād I (*imperabat* A.D. 1360-89), since the decisive event in the establishment of the *Pax Ottomanica* was the conquest of Macedonia in A.D. 1371-2, and not the capture of Constantinople in A.D. 1453.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 88; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 312, above; and V. C (ii) (b), in the present volume, p. 309, below.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 304, above. The decisive event which raised the Mughal Rāj to the rank of an oecumenical empire was the annexation of Gujerat in A.D. 1572.

⁴ Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 35.

The reigns of these Solomons constitute those relatively happy periods of partial peace and prosperity which look like 'Golden Ages' if we confine our view to the life-spans of the universal states in which they occur, but which can be seen to be really 'Indian Summers' as soon as we extend our field of vision to include the whole life-span of the civilization in whose history the coming and going of a universal state is only one of a number of incidents in a long tale of disintegration.¹ An empirical survey of these 'Indian Summers' will bring out two salient features of this historical phenomenon. We shall find that they display a striking uniformity of character combined with an equally striking inequality of duration.

We have seen that the Hellenic 'Indian Summer' began at the accession of the Emperor Nerva in A.D. 96 and ended at the death of the Emperor Marcus in A.D. 180; and these eighty-four years amount to not much less than a quarter of the total duration of a *Pax Romana* which, in the terms of the conventional chronology which dates by public events, may be reckoned to have begun in 31 B.C., on the morrow of the Battle of Actium, and to have ended in A.D. 378, on the day of the Battle of Adrianople. The 'Indian Summer' which the main body of the Far Eastern World enjoyed under the *Pax Manchuana* lasted rather longer than this, if its beginning is to be equated with the definitive subjugation of the South by the Emperor K'ang Hsi in A.D. 1682, and its end with the death of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung in A.D. 1796. In the history of the Egyptiac Society the 'Indian Summer' of 'the New Empire' lasted longer still—from the accession of Thothmes I *circa* 1545 B.C. to the death of Amenhotep III in 1376 B.C. But all these spans are surpassed in the duration of the 'Indian Summer' of 'the Middle Empire', which was the original Egyptiac universal state; for this first Egyptiac 'Indian Summer' was almost coeval with the Twelfth Dynasty, which reigned, from first to last, *circa* 2000–1788 B.C.;² and, even if we date the onset of winter from the death of Amenemhat III in 1801 B.C.,³ the spell of sunshine covers half the total duration of a *Pax Thebana* that lasted in all for about four centuries, if its beginning is to be equated with the accession of Mentuhotep IV *circa* 2070/2060 B.C.⁴ and its end with the irruption of the Hyksos *circa* 1660 B.C.⁵

These 'Indian Summers' that have lasted through successive

¹ For the nature of these 'Indian Summers' see IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 58–61, above.

² See I. C (ii), vol. i, p. 137, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85, above.

³ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 301.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 257, the present Study and chapter, p. 190, above.

⁵ Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 302 and 305.

reigns, and in at least one case for almost the whole period of a dynasty, differ notably in length from other 'Indian Summers' which are also manifestly authentic examples of the same social phenomenon, but which have not outlasted the reign of some single sovereign with whose name they are identified.

In the history of the Sumeric universal state, for instance, the 'Indian Summer' was confined to the reign of the Emperor Dungi (*imperabat circa* 2280-2223 B.C.), whose death was followed by a rapid onset of winter. In the history of the Andean universal state the 'Indian Summer' of Tupac Yupanqui's reign (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1448-82) began to fade out in the reign of his immediate successor Huayna Capac;¹ and the first touch of frost made itself felt in the feud between Huayna Capac's rival heirs, before the Incaic Empire—and, with it, the Andean Civilization itself—was wiped out by the sudden swoop of a storm-cloud from the unsuspected farther shore of a distant Atlantic. In Indic history a Mauryan 'Indian Summer' in the reign of the Emperor Açoka (*imperabat* 273-232 B.C.) was followed in 185 B.C. by the blight of Pushyamiitra's usurpation of power,² while a Guptan 'Indian Summer' in the reign of Kumaragupta I (*imperabat* A.D. 413-55) was followed, in the very year of the serene emperor's death, by the blight of an irruption of Eurasian Nomads which was the first wave of a devastating deluge.³ The Sinic 'Indian Summer' scarcely extended beyond the limits of the reign of the Emperor Han Wuti (*imperabat* 140-87 B.C.), whose 'forward policy' against the Eurasian Nomads was possibly the 'beginning of evils' in the history of a Prior Han Dynasty which both attained and passed its zenith in Wuti's lifetime.⁴ In the history of the *Pax Mongolica* in the main body of the Far Eastern Society the 'Indian Summer' in the reign of the Great Khan Qubilay (*imperabat* A.D. 1259-94) was followed in A.D. 1368 by the eviction of the Mongols from Intramural China.⁵ In the history of the Arab Caliphate the celebrated 'Indian Summer' in the reign of Hārūn-ar-Rashīd (*imperabat* A.D. 786-809) shines out so brilliantly thanks to the depth of the darkness in which this pool of light is framed. The splendours of an 'Abbasid Caliph who was profiting by the cumulative results of the labours of a long line of Umayyad predecessors are set off on the one hand by an antecedent bout of anarchy in which Hārūn's 'Abbasid forebears had wrested the Caliphate out of the Umayyads' grasp, and on the

¹ For this view see Means, P. A.: *Ancient Civilizations of the Andes* (New York 1931, Scribner), p. 274.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 86, above.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 85, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 142, footnote 4, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 271, above, and V. C (ii) (b), in the present volume, p. 295, below.

⁵ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 387; and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (a), vol. iv, p. 491, above.

other hand by a subsequent débâcle, in which Hārūn's 'Abbasid successors fell into a humiliating bondage to their own Turkish body-guard.

In the main body of Orthodox Christendom the *Pax Ottomanica* produced its 'Indian Summer' in the reign of Suleymān the Magnificent (*imperabat* A.D. 1520-66)—an 'Osmanli prince who emulated 'in real life' the legendary glory of his Davidic namesake. Suleymān's Western contemporaries were affected like the Queen of Sheba by the vastness of this latter-day Solomon's dominions and the abundance of his wealth and the grandeur of his buildings; 'there was no more spirit in' them.¹ Yet the curse which the biblical Solomon lived to bring down on himself was also incurred by Suleymān. 'The Lord said unto Solomon: "Forasmuch as this is done of thee, and thou hast not kept my covenant and my statutes which I have commanded thee, I will surely rend the kingdom from thee and will give it to thy servant."'² In another context³ we have observed that Suleymān the Magnificent was the Ottoman Pādishāh who sapped the foundations of the Ottoman social system by making the first breach in the fundamental rule that the Pādishāh's Slave-Household must be recruited from persons who were infidel-born, and that Muslim freemen should be ineligible for enlistment *ex officio religionis*.⁴ In tolerating the enrolment of Janissaries' sons among the '*Ajem-oghlans*, Suleymān opened the flood-gates for a disastrous dilution of the Janissary Corps; and this self-inflicted catastrophe duly rent the kingdom from the 'Osmanli Pādishāh and gave it to his 'human cattle' the *ra'īyeh*.

If we now turn our eyes from the main body of Orthodox Christendom to its offshoot in Russia, we may hesitate at first sight to recognize a counterpart of Suleymān the Magnificent in his contemporary Ivan the Terrible (*imperabat* A.D. 1533-84). Are a reign of terror and an 'Indian Summer' compatible? The two atmospheres will strike us as being so sharply antipathetic to one another that we may question the possibility of their co-existing in a single place and time. Yet the record of Ivan the Terrible's achievements may compel us to admit that his reign was an 'Indian Summer' of a sort;⁵ for this was the reign which saw the prince of

¹ 1 Kings x. 5.

² In Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 44-5, above.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 34-5, above.

⁴ 1 Kings xi. 11.

⁵ There are other reigns in the histories of other universal states which we may be content to annotate with a question-mark. In the history of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which fulfilled the functions of a universal state in the disintegration of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan, can we, for example, discern two shafts of autumn sunlight flickering round the reigns of the Shoguns Iemitsu (*fungebatur* A.D. 1622-51) and Yoshimune (*fungebatur* A.D. 1716-44)? The reader may perhaps find his own answers to this pair of questions if he consults Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 447, and Murdoch, J.: *A History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), p. 314.

Muscovy assume the style and title of an East Roman Emperor and justify this audacity by the conquest of Qāzān and Astrakhan and the opening-up of the White Sea and Siberia. This was assuredly an 'Indian Summer', albeit with thunder in the air; and this reading of Ivan the Terrible's reign is confirmed by the sequel. Before the Emperor's death a shadow was thrown athwart the sinister sunlight of his reign by the outcome of a war for the acquisition of a sea-board on the Baltic which dragged on even longer than the war subsequently waged for the same purpose by Peter the Great,¹ but which ended in a miserable failure that was at the opposite pole from Peter's brilliant success. And when Ivan had gone to his account the strokes of misfortune fell thick and fast upon the body politic which he left behind him. The year 1598 saw the extinction of the House of Rurik, and the years 1604-13 saw a temporary collapse of the Russian Orthodox Christian universal state² from which it did not fully recover till the reign of Peter the Great.

If we now glance back at our catalogue of 'Indian Summers' that have endured for longer than a single reign, we shall observe that these too, for all their staying-power, have succumbed to the onset of winter in the end. In the Hellenic World Marcus was followed by Commodus, and Alexander Severus by 'the Thirty Tyrants'. In the main body of the Far Eastern Society Ch'ien Lung was followed by Hung Hsiu-ch'uan.³ In the Egyptian World in the days of 'the New Empire' Amenhotep III was followed by an Amenhotep IV who has made himself notorious under his self-chosen title of Ikhnaton, while in the days of 'the Middle Empire' the long series of majestically alternating Amenemhats and Senwosrets gave way at last to a dynasty in which no fewer than thirteen

¹ Ivan the Terrible's War of Livonia lasted for twenty-five years (from A.D. 1558 to 1583); Peter's Northern War lasted for twenty-two years (from A.D. 1700 to 1721: see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 283, footnote 3, above).

² This period of collapse at the close of the first chapter in the history of the Russian Orthodox Christian universal state has been remembered by Posterity as the 'Time of Troubles' *par excellence* (see I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 53, footnote 2; II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 157 and 176; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 90 and 91; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 311, footnote 2, above; and V. C (ii) (b), in the present volume, p. 311, below); and it is from this original Russian use of the phrase that we have borrowed it, in this Study, to denote one particular stage in the disintegration of any broken-down civilization. This stage is the chapter that opens with the breakdown itself and closes with the partial recovery that accompanies the eventual establishment of a universal state; and in the history of the Russian Orthodox Christendom the 'Time of Troubles' in this technical sense would run from the decline of the power of the Principality of Kiev in the last quarter of the eleventh century of the Christian Era (see Kliutschewskij, W. [Kluczevskij, V.]: *Geschichte Russlands*, vol. i (Berlin 1925, Obelisk Verlag), p. 166) to the union between the Principality of Moscow and the Republic of Novgorod in A.D. 1478. The later period of collapse in the early years of the sixteenth century which goes by the name of the 'Time of Troubles' in the Russian tradition would, in our terminology, be a 'recurrence' of an earlier 'Time of Troubles' which had been temporarily—but only temporarily—surmounted by the establishment of a *Pax Muscoviana*.

³ For this leader of the Far Eastern internal proletariat in the revolutionary movement of resurgence that bears the name 'Ta'ip'ing', see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 107, footnote 1. above.

ephemeral emperors successively seized and lost the Imperial Throne within the brief span of a quarter of a century.¹

Our survey of 'Indian Summers' has thus, it would appear, been leading us to the conclusion that the careers of the Solomons decisively refute, instead of decisively vindicating, the claim of the sword to be convertible into an instrument of salvation; for, whether an 'Indian Summer' lasts out the life of a dynasty or comes and goes within the briefer span of a single reign, we have seen that it is in any case essentially something transitory. The glory of Solomon is a glory that fades; and, if Solomon is a failure, then David—and David's forerunners—have wielded their swords in vain. The truth seems to be that a sword which has once drunk blood cannot be permanently restrained from drinking blood again, any more than a tiger who has once tasted human flesh can be prevented from becoming a man-eater from that time onwards. The man-eating tiger is, no doubt, a tiger doomed to death; if he escapes the bullet he will die of the mange. Yet, even if the tiger could foresee his doom, he would probably be unable to subdue the devouring appetite which his first taste of man-meat has awakened in his maw; and so it is with a society that has once sought salvation through the sword. Its leaders may repent of their butcher's work; they may show mercy on their enemies, like Caesar, and demobilize their armies, like Augustus; and, as they ruefully hide the sword away, they may resolve in complete good faith that they will never draw it again except for the assuredly beneficent, and therefore legitimate, purpose of preserving the peace against criminals still at large within the borders of their tardily established universal state or against barbarians still recalcitrant in the outer darkness. They may clinch this resolution with an oath and reinforce it with an exorcism; and for a season they may appear to have successfully achieved the pious *tour de force* of biting and bridling Murder and harnessing him to the chariot of Life; yet, though their fair-seeming *Pax Oecumenica* may stand steady on its grim foundation of buried sword-blades for thirty or a hundred or two hundred years, Time sooner or later will bring their work to naught.

Time is, indeed, working against these unhappy empire-builders from the outset; for sword-blades are foundations that never settle. Exposed or buried, these blood-stained weapons still retain their sinister charge of *karma*; and this means that they cannot really turn into inanimate foundation-stones, but must ever be stirring—

¹ These thirteen emperors, who reigned from first to last *circa* 1788/5–1760 B.C., appear to have all belonged to a single dynasty, though the Imperial Crown seems to have made its rapid transit from head to head by violence more often than not (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. (i), part (2), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 302).

like the dragon's-tooth seed that they are—to spring to the surface again in a fresh crop of slaying and dying gladiators. Under its serene mask of effortless supremacy the Oecumenical Peace of a universal state is fighting, all the time, a desperate losing battle against an unexorcised demon of Violence in its own bosom; and we can see this moral struggle being waged in the guise of a conflict of policies.

Can the Jovian ruler of a universal state succeed in curbing that insatiable lust for further conquests which was fatal to Cyrus?¹ And, if he cannot resist the temptation *debellare superbos*, can he at any rate bring himself to act on the Virgilian counsel *parcere subiectis*?² When we apply this pair of tests to Jovius's performance, we shall find that he seldom succeeds in living up for long to his own good resolutions.

If we choose to deal first with the fortunes of the conflict between the alternative policies of expansion and of non-aggression in the relations of a universal state with the peoples beyond its pale, we may begin by considering the Sinic case in point, for there could have been no more impressive declaration of a determination to sheathe the sword than Ts'in She Hwang-ti's immense work of consolidating the unco-ordinated fortifications of the former Contending States of the Sinic World, where these had marched with the Eurasian Steppe, into the single continuous rampart of his Great Wall.³ Yet Ts'in She Hwang-ti's good resolution to refrain from stirring up the Eurasian hornets' nest was broken, as we have seen, less than a hundred years after the Ts'in emperor's death, by the 'forward policy' of his Han successor Wuti.⁴ In the history of the Hellenic universal state the founder himself set a practical example of moderation to his successors by abandoning his attempt to carry the Roman frontier to the Elbe,⁵ before he bequeathed to them his famous counsel to be content with preserving the Empire within its existing limits, without attempting to extend it.⁶ Augustus's attitude is illustrated by Strabo's account of a current controversy over the question whether the Augustan rule might allow of a British exception.⁷ And, although this particular breach of the rule was eventually committed with an apparent impunity, Trajan afterwards demonstrated the soundness of Augustus's judgement when he ventured to break the rule on the grand scale by attempting to realize Crassus's and Julius's and

¹ See p. 188, above.

² Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book VI, l. 853.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 119, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 270, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 271, above.

⁵ See V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex I, vol. v, p. 593, above.

⁶ Dio Cassius: *History of Rome*, Book LVI, chap. 33.

⁷ This passage of Strabo has been quoted in II. D (vii), vol. ii, p. 282, footnote 4, above.

Antonius's dream of conquering the Parthian Empire. The price of a momentary advance from the hither bank of Euphrates to the foot of Zagros and the head of the Persian Gulf was an intolerable strain upon the Roman Empire's resources in money and men. Insurrections broke out not only in the newly conquered territories between the conqueror's feet but also among the Jewish Diasporà in the ancient dominions of the Empire in his rear;¹ the clear sky of a nascent Hellenic 'Indian Summer' was momentarily overcast; and it took all the prudence and ability of Trajan's successor Hadrian to liquidate the formidable legacy which Trajan's sword had bequeathed to him. Hadrian promptly evacuated all his predecessor's Transeuphratean conquests; yet he was able to restore only the territorial, and not the political, *status quo ante bellum*. Trajan's act of aggression made a deeper mark on Transeuphratean Syriac minds than Hadrian's reversal of it; and we may date from this epoch the beginning of a change of temper in the Transeuphratean tract of the Syriac World which was fostered by Roman relapses into a recourse to the sword² until the reaction in Iran declared itself at length in sensational fashion in the revolutionary replacement of an Arsacid King Log by a Sasanid King Stork,³ and the consequent resumption of that militant counter-attack against the Hellenic intruder which had succeeded in evicting Hellenism from its footholds in Iran and 'Irāq in the second century B.C., but had latterly been in suspense since the conclusion by Augustus, in 20 B.C., of a Romano-Parthian 'peace with honour'. Under the auspices of the second pādīshāh of the Sasanian line the Trajanic breach of the Augustan rule in A.D. 113-17 found its nemesis in A.D. 260 in a repetition of the disaster which had been inflicted upon Roman arms in 53 B.C. by the Parthians.⁴

In Egyptiac history we see the Theban sword that had been drawn in a *Befreiungskrieg* by Amosis (*imperabat* 1580-1558 B.C.) and wielded in a *revanche* by Thothmes I (*imperabat* 1545-1514 B.C.)

¹ For the insurrection of the Jewish Diasporà in Cyrene and Egypt and Cyprus in A.D. 115-17 see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 68, footnote 3; and V. C (i) (d) 9 (y), in the present volume, p. 123, above.

² Trajan's error of A.D. 113-17 was repeated by Marcus in A.D. 162-6, by Septimius Severus in A.D. 195-9, and by Caracalla in A.D. 216-18. These three Roman wars of aggression were accompanied by annexations which carried the Roman frontier eastward from the Middle Euphrates to the Khabūr and thereby recaptured for Hellenism a belt of Syriac territory which had been liberated from the Seleucidae by the Arsacidae at the turn of the second and the last century B.C. But this recovery of ground in Mesopotamia was offset in 'Irāq by the indiscriminate barbarity of Marcus's and Severus's soldiery, who sacked the citadel of Hellenism at Seleucia as mercilessly as the head-quarters of the Arsacid power at Ctesiphon. And it was a still worse blow for Hellenism when the twice perpetrated sack of Seleucia-Ctesiphon in the second century of the Christian Era was avenged by Sapor's twice perpetrated sack of Antioch in A.D. 253 and 258-9.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 216, above.

⁴ In A.D. 260, as in 53 B.C., a Roman army laid down its arms; but the captivity of Valerian was more humiliating than the death of Crassus.

being deliberately sheathed by the Empress Hatshepsut (*imperabat* 1501-1479 B.C.)—only to be wilfully drawn and wielded again by Thothmes III (*imperabat* 1479-1447 B.C.) as soon as Death had removed Hatshepsut's restraining hand.¹ The *karma* of the Militarism which governed the policy of 'the New Empire' for the next hundred years (*circa* 1479-1376 B.C.) could not be extinguished by Ikhnaton's passionate repudiation of a policy which he had inherited from four predecessors—any more than the nemesis of Nebuchadnezzar's militarism could be averted by Nabonidus's childish device of ignoring the unwelcome realities of his imperial heritage and seeking to forget the cares of state in the delights of archaeology. Nor, in the history of the Indic universal state, could Açoka's renunciation of War as an instrument of his imperial policy² save the noble emperor's successors from losing the Maurya power by the same lethal arts that Açoka's grandfather Chandragupta had employed in gaining it.

In the history of the Ottoman Power Mehmed the Conqueror (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81) deliberately limited his ambitions to the enterprise of making his *Pax Ottomanica* conterminous with the historic domain of Orthodox Christendom (not including its offshoot in Russia);³ and he resisted all temptations to encroach upon the adjoining domains of Western Christendom and the Iranic World. But—partly, no doubt, because his hand was forced by the aggressiveness of Ismā'il Shāh Safawī—Mehmed's successor Selīm the Grim (*imperabat* A.D. 1512-20) broke Mehmed's self-denying ordinance in Asia,⁴ while Selīm's successor Suleymān (*imperabat* A.D. 1520-66) committed the further error—which was ultimately still more disastrous and which could not be excused on Selīm's plea of *force majeure*—of breaking the same self-denying ordinance in Europe as well. In consequence the Ottoman Power was rapidly worn down by the grinding friction of a perpetual warfare on two fronts against adversaries whom the 'Osmanli could

¹ In thus standing out as an exception to a rule that prevailed afterwards as well as before, Hatshepsut's reign in the series of the Eighteenth Egyptian Dynasty has a Syriac analogue in the reign of the Umayyad Caliph 'Umar II (*imperabat* A.D. 717-20). When 'Umar succeeded to the throne at Damascus he recalled the Arab army that was besieging Constantinople (see II. D (v), Annex, vol. ii, p. 400; and III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 275-6, above); and he also tried, though this in vain, to withdraw his troops from the half-conquered territory of Transoxania (see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 141; and II. D (vii), Annex VIII, vol. ii, pp. 446-52, above). It is noteworthy that 'Umar II was the only member of his dynasty who took his profession of Islam seriously (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 675, above).

² The resolution which Açoka took and kept, after he had been convinced of the wickedness of War by his personal experience of the horrors of his own successful war of aggression against Kalinga, has been touched upon in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 682, above.

³ For this feature of the policy of Mehmed Fātih see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 369-71, above.

⁴ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 384-8, above.

repeatedly defeat in the field but could never put out of action. And this Selimian and Suleymanian perversity came to be so deeply ingrained in the statecraft of the Sublime Porte that even the collapse that followed Suleymān's death did not produce any lasting revulsion in favour of a Mehmedian moderation. The squandered strength of the Ottoman Empire had no sooner been recruited by the statesmanship of the Köprülü's than it was expended by Qāra Mustafā on a new war of aggression against the Franks which was intended to carry the Ottoman frontier up to the eastern bank of the Rhine. Though he never came within sight of this objective, Qāra Mustafā did emulate Suleymān the Magnificent's feat of laying siege to Vienna. But in A.D. 1682-3, as in A.D. 1529, the boss of the Danubian carapace of Western Christendom¹ proved to be too hard a nut for Ottoman arms to crack; and on this second occasion the 'Osmanlis did not fail before Vienna with impunity. The second Ottoman siege of Vienna evoked a Western counter-attack which continued, with no serious check, from A.D. 1683 to A.D. 1922, and which did not expend itself until the 'Osmanlis had not only been bereft of their empire but had even been compelled to renounce their ancestral Iranic culture as well, as the price of retaining possession of their homelands in Anatolia.²

In thus wantonly stirring up a hornets' nest in Western Christendom, Qāra Mustafā, like Suleymān before him, was committing the classic error of Xerxes when the successor of Darius³ launched his war of aggression against Continental European Greece and thereby provoked a Hellenic counter-attack which immediately tore away from the Achaemenian Empire the Greek fringe of its dominions in Asia, and which ultimately led to the destruction of the Empire itself when the work begun by the sea-power of Athens under the auspices of Themistocles was taken up and completed by the land-power of Macedon under the auspices of Alexander. In the history of the Hindu World the Mughal Rāj produced its Xerxes in the person of the Emperor Awrangzīb (*imperabat* A.D. 1659-1707), whose unsuccessful efforts to assert his authority over Mahārāshtra by force of arms provoked a Marāthā counter-attack which ultimately destroyed the authority of Awrangzīb's succes-

¹ For the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy's function as a carapace see I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 156, footnote 1; II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 177-90; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 325-7, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 186-8, and Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 46-7, above.

³ Darius had, of course, extended the bounds of the Empire in his day—as, for that matter, had Trajan's predecessor Augustus and Suleymān's predecessor Mehmed the Conqueror. But the wars of Darius, like those of Augustus and Mehmed, differed from the wars of the Emperor's successors in the vital matter of the objective. Darius was seeking, not to expand his dominions *ad infinitum*, but on the contrary to bring their expansion to a definitive close by finding and establishing a 'scientific frontier' (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 96).

sors in the metropolitan provinces of their empire on the plains of Hindustan.¹

It will be seen that, on the first of our two tests of ability to sheathe the sword, the rulers of universal states do not make a very good showing; and, if we now pass from the test of non-aggression against peoples beyond the pale to our second test of toleration towards the populations that are already living under the vaunted *Pax Oecumenica*, we shall find that Jovius fares hardly better in this second ordeal—though the receptivity which we have seen² to be characteristic of empire-builders might seem likely, on the face of it, to make toleration come easy to them.

The Roman Imperial Government, for example, made up its mind to tolerate Judaism and abode by this resolution in the face of severe and repeated Jewish provocations; but its forbearance was not equal to the more difficult moral feat of extending this tolerance to a Jewish heresy that had set itself to convert the Hellenic World. In the very first collision between the Roman authorities and the Christian Church the Imperial Government took the extreme step of making the profession of Christianity a capital offence; and this declaration of war to the death was the only one of Nero's acts of savagery that was not rescinded by the tyrant's successors on the Imperial Throne.³ The motive of this proscription of Christianity as a *religio non licita* by the rulers of the

¹ It may be noted that the British Rāj in India—which was established on the ruins of the Mughal Rāj and took over its function of providing a *Pax Oecumenica* for the Hindu World—had passed through a phase of boundless ambition which was reminiscent of the temper of an Awrangzib and a Xerxes and a Qāra Mustafā and a Suleymān the Magnificent and a Thothmes III and a Trajan. The vastness and rapidity of the achievements of the British empire-builders of the generation of the Wellesleys so far turned their successors' heads that they seem for a moment to have dreamed of carrying their frontier north-westward from the banks of the Jumna to the banks of the Oxus (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 305-6, above). The extent of these British ambitions in Asia in the 'eighteen-thirties' may be gauged by the range and audacity of the reconnaissances that were made by Burnes (see loc. cit., p. 305, footnote 2) on the eve of the Anglo-Afghan War of A.D. 1838-42; but the annihilation of the British army that occupied Kābul and the execution of Stoddard and Conolly when they pushed on, in Burnes' footsteps, to Bukhara caused the British empire-builders to abandon once for all any idea of dealing with the Afghans and the Uzbeks as they had dealt with the Mughals and the Marāthās. The invasion and annexation of Sind in A.D. 1843 raised a controversy among the British themselves in which the policy of aggressive expansion in Asia was attacked on grounds of morality as well as on those of expediency; and, although the annexation of Sind in 1843 was followed in 1849 by the annexation of the Panjab, the British Rāj never sought to trespass beyond the North-West frontier which it inherited in that year from the *ci-devant* Sikh principalities. The subsequent alternating trials of a 'close border' and a 'forward' policy were a mere matter of military tactics; and this tactical controversy did not reflect any variation of political aim. The steadiness of the British-Indian Government's determination never to repeat the error of A.D. 1838 is revealed in its refusal to make any territorial profit out of its victories over Afghanistan in the wars of A.D. 1879 and A.D. 1919. (For the latter-day policy of the British Rāj on this frontier see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 306-8, above.)

² In V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), vol. v, pp. 439-45, above.

³ This point is made by Tertullian in *Ad Nat.*, Book I, chap. 7 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. i, col. 567): 'Permansit, erasis omnibus, hoc solum institutum Neronianum.'

Hellenic universal state is as significant as the sequel. The element in Christianity that was intolerable to the Imperial Government was the Christians' refusal to accept the Government's claim that it was entitled to compel its subjects to act against their consciences.¹ The Christians were disputing the sword's prerogative; and, in defence of its *laesa majestas*, the weapon which Augustus had contrived to sheathe came shooting out of its scabbard again, like a snake out of its hole, to join battle, this time, with a spiritual power which could never be defeated by the strokes of a temporal weapon. So far from checking the propagation of Christianity, the martyrdoms proved to be the most effective agencies of conversion;² and the eventual victory of the Christian martyr's spirit over the Roman ruler's blade bore out Tertullian's triumphantly defiant boast that Christian blood was seed.³

The Achaemenian Government, like the Roman, set itself in principle to rule with the consent of the governed and was likewise only partially successful in living up to this policy in practice.

¹ This question of principle, which underlay the practice of imposing the death-penalty in case of a refusal to perform, on demand, the outward formalities of the ritual of Caesar-worship, is brought out clearly by Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), pp. 510-19. The same scholar points out in op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 552-65, that during the Hellenic 'Indian Summer' the Roman Imperial authorities deliberately forbore to carry the execution of their policy to its logical conclusion. Between Nero and Decius, Domitian was the only emperor who personally took the initiative in ordering a persecution (p. 553); and, while Trajan did not repeal the Neronian decree that had made the profession of Christianity a capital offence, he mitigated its practical working by ruling that the initiative in procuring convictions was not to be taken by the public authorities and that anonymous denunciations were to be ignored as an abuse which *et pessimi exempli nec nostri saeculi est* (*Correspondence between Trajan and Pliny the Younger*, No. 97 [98]). Thereafter Hadrian ruled (without formally revoking Trajan's ruling) that denunciations of Christians must take the form of an action at law; that the prosecutor must prove, not merely that the defendant was a Christian, but that he had committed a specific offence against the law; and that, if he failed to win his case, he himself should be liable to punishment (Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), p. 295). Under these rulings the profession of Christianity, while still officially proscribed, was largely, though never more than precariously, tolerated (Meyer, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 562-4). This humanely inconsequent compromise did not outlast the *saeculum* for which it was devised. Even before the 'Indian Summer' faded out, the Government of the Emperor Marcus was swept into a campaign of persecution by the fury of a populace which had turned savage under the double scourge of war and plague (Seeck, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 297-9); and, when the storm broke, it was not long before the Government of the Emperor Decius abandoned the Trajanic compromise and imposed a test on every subject of the Empire (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 76, above). 'In accordance with the "law" which governs the religious development of the Imperial Age from first to last, the fanaticism that moved the populace to its deeds [of violence] gradually mounted from below upwards. Just as the new religion itself gradually forced its way up into the dominant social strata, so likewise the hatred of Christianity which was entertained by its opponents spread *pari passu*. The two currents that here met and broke in waves against one another were currents of an identical nature' (Seeck, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 301).

² 'You cannot fail to see that our having our heads cut off or being crucified or being thrown to the beasts or into bondage or to the flames or being subjected to all the other forms of torture does not make us abandon our profession of faith. On the contrary, the more of these martyrdoms that there are, the more we increase in numbers through the excess of conversions over martyrdoms.'—Justin: *Dialogus*, chap. 110 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. vi, col. 729).

³ 'Plures efficimur quoties metimur a vobis; semen est sanguis Christianorum.'—Tertullian: *Apologeticus*, chap. 50 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. i, col. 535).

It did succeed in winning the allegiance of the Phoenicians and the Jews, but it failed in the long run to conciliate either the Babylonians or the Egyptians. The magnanimity with which the Tyrians were forgiven by Cambyses for their refusal to serve against their Carthaginian kinsfolk,¹ and the Jews forgiven by Darius for Zerubbabel's abortive essay in high treason,² sufficed to confirm a loyalty which these two Syriac peoples were inclined in any case to feel towards a Great King whose sword had saved them from Babylonian oppressors in the one case and in the other from Greek competitors. But the conciliation of the Babylonian priesthood by Cyrus and of the Egyptian priesthood by Darius was an ephemeral *tour de force*; no tact or cajolery could permanently reconcile the heirs of the Babylonian and Egyptian civilizations to an alien domination; and Egypt and Babylon never ceased to rise in revolt till Babylon was crushed by Xerxes and Egypt by Ochus.³

The 'Osmanlis had no better success in conciliating their *ra'iyyeh*—notwithstanding the wideness of the scope of the cultural, and even civil, autonomy that they conceded to them in the *millet* system.⁴ The liberality of the system *de jure* was marred by the high-handedness with which it was applied *de facto*; the Ottoman Government was never able completely to win the *ra'iyyeh*'s hearts;⁵ and the perilously practical fashion in which they displayed their disloyalty, as soon as a series of Ottoman reverses afforded an

¹ See Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 17 and 19.

² See V. C (i) (d) 9 (y), in the present volume, p. 121, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 94 and 123, and V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 347-8, above, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, in the present volume, p. 442, below.

⁴ Mehmed the Conqueror himself (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, vol. iv, p. 622, above) went so far to meet the susceptibilities of his non-Muslim subjects that one of his first acts after his capture of Constantinople was to invite the clergy of the Orthodox Church to elect a new Oecumenical Patriarch; and, when they presented George Scholarius as their candidate, the Ottoman master of the Orthodox Christian World took care to ratify the election in accordance with the procedure that had been customary under the East Roman Imperial régime (see Phrantzis, G.: *Chronicon*, Book III, chap. 11, ed. by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1838, Weber), pp. 304-7).

⁵ The friendly relations between Muslims and Dhimmis which prevailed in the earlier days of the Ottoman régime are described in Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, H.: *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. i (London 1939, Milford), chap. 14 (see the passage quoted in the present Study, IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 69, footnote 1, above). For the subsequent change from friendliness to antagonism see op. cit., vol. i, chap. 13. The growth of this antagonism can be measured and dated by the history of the relations between the two communities in the trade-guilds. Originally the Muslim and Dhimmī practitioners of the same trade belonged to the same guild, which would include all the masters of that craft without distinction of religion. From about the middle of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era onwards, however, the guilds began to split into fractions corresponding to the religious divisions between the craftsmen (Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., vol. i, chap. 6). The date of this untoward social change is significant. It coincides with the period of anarchy between the death of Süleymân the Magnificent and the advent of the statesmen of the House of Köprülü (see the present chapter, pp. 207-8 and 208-9, and V. C (ii) (b), p. 299, below). Compare the corresponding coincidence in date between the Decian persecution of the Christian Church and the period of anarchy through which the Roman Empire passed between the death of Marcus and the accession of Diocletian.

opening for treachery on the *ra'iyeh's* part, gave the successors of Selīm the Grim some reason to regret that this ruthless man of action had been deterred (if the tale were true),¹ by the joint exertions of his Grand Vezīr Pīrī Pasha and his Sheykh-al-Islām Jemālī, from carrying out a plan to exterminate the Orthodox Christian majority of his subjects—as he did in fact exterminate an Imāmī Shī'i minority.²

In exerting himself, with success, to defeat Sultan Selīm's atrocious project, Sheykh Jemālī was moved not merely by his own personal feelings of humanity but by the standing orders of the Islamic Canon Law which it was the Sheykh's professional duty to uphold. The *Sheri'ah* required the Commander of the Faithful, or his deputy, to give quarter to non-Muslims who were 'People of the Book'³ if these forbore to resist the sword of Islam by force of arms, and so long as they gave and kept an undertaking to obey

¹ See Hammer, J. von: *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1835-43, Bellizard, Barthès, Dufour et Lowell, 18 vols. + Atlas), vol. iv, pp. 364-5. (This story has been referred to already in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 706, footnote 1, above.)

² C'est surtout pour les chrétiens et les Grecs de Constantinople que Djemali fut un véritable ange sauveur, lorsqu'après le massacre des schiis, Sélim eut conçu l'idée non moins pieuse d'organiser une tuerie générale des chrétiens, ou du moins de leur retirer leurs églises. A cette occasion, il proposa à Djemali cette question captieuse: lequel est le plus méritoire, de subjuguier le monde entier, ou de convertir les peuples à l'islamisme? —Le moufti, qui ne devina pas les intentions de Sélim, répondit que la conversion des infidèles était incontestablement l'œuvre la plus méritoire et la plus agréable à Dieu. Aussitôt Sélim ordonna au grand-vizir de changer toutes les églises en mosquées, d'interdire le culte des chrétiens, et de mettre à mort tous ceux qui refuseraient d'embrasser l'islamisme. Le grand-vizir, effrayé de cet ordre sanguinaire, se consulta avec Djemali, qui, sans le savoir, avait, par son fetwa, sanctionné l'arrêt de mort des chrétiens; le résultat de leur conférence fut le conseil donné secrètement au patriarche grec de demander à comparaître devant le Sultan. Sélim refusa d'abord d'acquiescer à la prière du patriarche; mais il finit par se rendre aux représentations du grand-vizir et du moufti. Le patriarche, accompagné de tout son clergé, fut donc admis à paraître devant le diwan à Andrinople; il appuya ses réclamations sur l'engagement solennellement pris par Mohammed II, lors de la conquête de Constantinople, de ne point convertir les églises en mosquées et de laisser aux chrétiens le libre exercice de leur culte; il invoqua avec éloquence le Koran, qui défend la conversion par la force et ordonne la tolérance envers les nations non musulmanes, moyennant le paiement de la capitation. L'acte constatant la promesse signée par Mohammed II avait été détruit dans un incendie; mais trois vieux janissaires qui, soixante ans auparavant, avaient assisté au siège de Constantinople, attestèrent que le Sultan avait en effet engagé sa parole sur ces trois points aux députés qui lui avaient apporté les clefs de la ville dans un bassin d'or. Sélim respecta les dispositions du Koran et la parole de son aïeul pour ce qui regardait la liberté du culte; mais il ajoutait que la loi ne disait pas que d'aussi beaux édifices que les églises chrétiennes dussent être profanés plus longtemps par l'idolâtrie. En conséquence, il ordonna de changer toutes les églises de Constantinople en mosquées, de réparer celles qui étaient près de tomber en ruines et d'en élever d'autres en bois, afin de ne point porter atteinte au droit des nationaux et des étrangers professant le christianisme. Si Sélim, grâce à l'humanité du grand-vizir Piri-Pacha et du moufti Djemali, n'a pas souillé la fin de son règne par un massacre général des infidèles, comme il en avait souillé le commencement par le massacre des hérétiques, il leur enleva toujours leurs plus beaux temples.

³ For Selīm's massacre of the Shī'ah in Anatolia in A.D. 1514 see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 362 and 384, above.

³ On a strict interpretation of this term the only peoples who could claim the status were the Jews and the Christians; but in Islamic practice the same privileges were accorded by analogy to the adherents of other 'higher religions'—in the first place to the Zoroastrians and eventually to the Hindus as well. See IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 225-6; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 674, footnote 2, above.

the Muslim authorities and to pay a super-tax. This was, in truth, the principle which had been followed by the Primitive Arab Muslim empire-builders, and their faithfulness to it is one of the considerations that account for the amazing rapidity with which they accomplished their work. As soon as the preliminary raids gave place to permanent conquests on the grand scale, the Caliph 'Umar intervened to protect the conquered populations against the rapine, and even against the rights, of the Arab Muslim soldiery;¹ it was 'Uthmān's unwillingness to abandon 'Umar's policy that cost the third of the Caliphs his life;² and in this matter the Umayyads³ showed themselves worthy successors of the 'Rightly Guided' Four. Mu'āwiyah set an example of tolerance⁴ which was followed not only by the later Umayyads⁵ but also by the earlier 'Abbasids.⁶ Yet the latter days of the 'Abbasid régime did not pass⁷ without being disgraced by outbreaks of mob violence against Christian subjects of the Caliphate who had by this time dwindled in numbers from a majority to a minority of the population as a result of the mass-conversions to Islam that heralded the break-up of the universal state and the approach of a social interregnum.⁸

In the history of the Mughal Rāj in India Awrangzib departed from a policy of toleration towards Hinduism which Akbar had bequeathed to his successors as the most important of their *arcana imperii*;⁹ and this departure was swiftly requited by the downfall of the empire which Akbar had built up.¹⁰

Our survey has revealed the suicidal importunity of a sword that has been sheathed after having once tasted blood. The polluted weapon will not rust in its scabbard, but must ever be itching to

¹ 'Umar's policy was emulated, in the history of the expansion of our own Western Society, in the efforts of the Spanish Crown to protect its 'Indian' subjects against the rapacity and brutality of the Spanish *conquistadores* (see Kirkpatrick, F. A., in *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. x, pp. 260-9 and 277).

² For the nature of 'Umar's policy and the causes of 'Uthmān's assassination see Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), pp. 21 and 27-31. For the liberality of the Arab Caliphate towards its non-Muslim subjects in general, as well as in particular cases, see op. cit., pp. 15-16, 18-20, 188-90, 206.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 675-7 and 704-5, above.

⁴ Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 84.

⁵ See, for example, the eulogy of the Caliph Yazid I (*imperabat* A.D. 680-3) from the pen of a Christian chronicler which has been quoted in V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 226, above.

⁶ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 677-8 and 706, above.

⁷ The turning-point seems to have come in the caliphate of Mutawakkil (*imperabat* A.D. 847-61).

⁸ For these outbreaks, which were reminiscent of those against the Christian 'Diaspora' in the Roman Empire in the reign of the Emperor Marcus (p. 202, footnote 1, above), see Tritton, A. S.: *The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects* (London 1930, Milford), especially chaps. 4 and 9.

⁹ Tacitus: *Annals*, Book II, chap. 36.

¹⁰ On the other hand it must be admitted that an earlier universal state which had stood on the same ground had anticipated Akbar's toleration without escaping Awrangzib's punishment. The Guptas had adhered to Hinduism without persecuting Buddhism (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 706, above), yet their empire had been as ephemeral as the Mughal Rāj was.

leap out again—as though the disembodied spirit of the would-be saviour who first had recourse to this sinister instrument could now find no rest until his sin of seeking salvation along a path of crime had been atoned for by the agency of the very weapon which he once so perversely used. An instrument that is powerless to save may yet be potent to punish; the penitently sheathed sword will still thirst implacably to carry out this congenial duty; and it will have its way in the end when it has Time for its ally. In the fullness of Time the din of battle which has ebbed away towards the fringes of Civilization till it has passed almost out of ear-shot¹ will come welling back again in the van of barbarian war-bands that have gained the upper hand over the garrisons of the *limes* by learning from them, in the effective school of a perpetual border warfare, the winning tricks of the professional soldier's trade;² or, more terrifying still, the dreadful sound will come welling up again in the resurgence of an Internal Proletariat that has turned militant once more—to the consternation of a Dominant Minority which has been flattering itself that this *profanum vulgus* has long since been cowed or cajoled into a settled habit of submissiveness. The spectres of war and revolution that have latterly passed into legend³ now once again stalk abroad, as of old, in the light of day; and a *bourgeoisie* which has never before seen bloodshed now hastily throws up ring-walls round its open towns out of any materials that come to hand: mutilated statues and desecrated altars and scattered drums of fallen columns and inscribed blocks of marble reft from derelict public monuments.⁴ These pacific inscriptions are now anachronisms; for the 'Indian Summer' is over; the 'Time of Troubles' has returned; and this shocking calamity has descended upon a generation which has been brought up in the illusory conviction that the bad times of yore have gone for good!⁵

¹ In the heyday of the *Pax Romana* an observer who travelled from Rome to Cologne would have met with no troops on his road, between his last sight of the garrison of the capital and his first sight of the garrison of the frontier along the Rhine, save for a single *cohors urbana* which was stationed at Lyons; and this detachment was only 1,200 men strong (see Mommsen, Th.: *The History of Rome: The Provinces from Caesar to Diocletian* (London 1886, Bentley, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 88, footnote 3).

² See V. C (i) (c) 3, *passim*, in vol. v, above, and Part VIII, *passim*, below.

³ See the passages of Aelius Aristides' *In Romam* quoted in V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 343-4, above.

⁴ Of all the improvised fortifications of this type that the writer of this Study has seen, the example that speaks most eloquently to the eye is the wall of the antique citadel that looks down to-day, with an air of open-mouthed amazement, upon the new-fangled capital city of the Turkish Republic at Angora. The historian's mind will also be conscious of a still more dramatic contrast between these fortifications round the citadel of Angora and the famous inscription on the wall of the Temple of Augustus; for this contrast embodies in visual form the whole tragedy of the relapse from an 'Indian Summer' into a recurrent 'Time of Troubles'.

⁵ Ibn Khaldūn (*Muqaddamāt*, McG. de Slane's translation (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 46-8) points out that, while both the sword and the pen are indispensable instruments of all governments at all times, the sword is at a premium and the pen at a discount at the beginning of an empire's career, when it is being founded,

We have now followed the high tragedy of the saviours with the sword into an act in the drama which makes it plain, in retrospect, that our *dramatis personae* have been foredoomed to failure. But lost causes are the mothers of heroism; and we should be denying ourselves the sight of some of the finest examples of the type of hero that we are now passing in review if we coldly turned our backs upon the stage of history at this poignant moment. Upon the recurrence of the 'Time of Troubles', Zeus yields the stage to Hēraklēs once more; and, if we sit the play out, we shall bear witness, when the curtain falls, that we have never seen Hēraklēs show himself to such advantage as in this forlorn hope.

In Hellenic history this sympathetic part was played by a series of Illyrian soldiers—Claudius, Aurelian, Probus, Carus—who were successively invested with the purple because they had the courage to wear it in an age when it had become a veritable shirt of Nessus, and who duly justified their sensational rise to fortune by indefatigably striking off one after another of Anarchy's hydra-heads until they had cleared the field for the entry of their Jovian compatriot Diocletian. In the recurrence of the Egyptiac 'Time of Troubles' after the decease of the Twelfth Dynasty we may espy the handiwork of some forgotten Egyptiac Aurelian in a slight and transient but unmistakable rally of the Egyptiac Society *circa* 1760 B.C.;¹ and in the duplicate recurrence of the same tribulations in the days of 'the New Empire' after the death of Amenhotep III we can discern four indubitable counterparts of our four Illyrian heroes in the soldierly figures of the fighting pharaohs Seti I and Ramses II and Merneptah and Ramses III.² These Egyptiac saviours, like their Illyrian counterparts in Hellenic history, were *novi homines*, and so was the tradesman Minin who rose up to deliver the Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom from the troubles of A.D. 1604-13. Minin, however, had a companion-in-arms, Prince Pojarski, who had been recruited from the ranks of the Russian dominant minority; and the role of saviour in a recurrent 'Time of Troubles' has sometimes even been assumed by a vigorous scion of an imperial dynasty whose previous decadence has been the immediate cause of the catastrophe. Such were the careers of the Achaemenid Great King Artaxerxes Ochus (*imperabat* 358-338 B.C.) and of the 'Osmanli Pādishāh Murād IV (*imperabat* A.D. 1623-40); and the demonic vein that reveals itself

and again at the end, when it is breaking up, while, in between, there is a middle period of security, prosperity, and ease during which, conversely, the sword is at a discount and the pen at a premium.

¹ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 302.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 92-3 and 100-2; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 422; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 269, above.

in the *êthos* of both of these grim militarists is perhaps an indication that their common effort to turn back the course of dynastic history was too extreme a *tour de force* for flesh and blood to undertake with impunity. We may close our catalogue of 'Illyrians' with the name of one saviour of this class who was not either a *porphyrogenitus* or a *novus homo*. In the middle of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, when the T'ai'ping insurrection was on the point of sweeping a degenerate successor of Ch'ien Lung off the Imperial Throne at Peking, the Ts'ing Dynasty obtained a fifty years' reprieve thanks in large measure to the prowess of a general who came in consequence to be known among his own compatriots as 'Chinese Gordon', but who really—to confess the shocking truth—was a 'South Sea Barbarian' whose sword-arm had been hired by the Emperor in his dire extremity though the Son of Heaven knew very well that this mercenary saviour's barbarous blood had not in it even a tincture of the celestial ichor of the Children of Han.

We need not now linger much longer over a history that continues to repeat itself; but we may observe that, if the 'Illyrians' faithfully fulfil their task, their prowess may make it possible for *Hercules Redivivus* to withdraw in favour of *Jupiter Redux*. The labours of Aurelian opened the way for Diocletian to make his entry on to the stage as a second Divus Julius, and for Constantine, in his turn, to play Augustus to Diocletian's Caesar. And these second founders of the Hellenic universal state have their counterparts in the histories of other civilizations. In the Sumeric World, for example, Ur-Engur's Empire of Sumer and Akkad was refounded by an Amorite prince of Babylon, Hammurabi, after it had been wrecked by a successful revolt on the part of its Elamite subjects,¹ and had lain in ruins thereafter for not less than two and a half centuries.² In the main body of Orthodox Christendom the demonic exertions of the 'Osmanlı Pādishāh Murād IV were followed up by the constructive labours of the Albanian vezīrs of the House of Kōprülü (*fungebantur* A.D. 1656–76; 1687–8; 1689–91; 1697–1702; 1710),³ who gave the *Pax Ottomanica* a new lease of

¹ For this catastrophe and its sequel see V. C (ii) (b), pp. 297–8, below.

² There was an interval of 233 years between the capture of the Emperor Ibisin of Ur in 2180 B.C. and the accession of the Emperor Hammurabi of Babylon in 1947 B.C.; and it took Hammurabi many years of hard labour to accomplish his task of restoring unity and peace to the Sumeric World by welding together again, after so long an interval, the fragments into which the original Empire of Sumer and Akkad had been broken up.

³ The succession of Grand Vezīrs of the House of Kōprülü was as follows: Mehmed 1656–61; Mehmed's son Ahmed 1661–76; Mehmed's son-in-law Siāwush 1687–8; Mehmed's son Mustafā 1689–91; Mehmed's nephew Hüseyn 1697–1702; Mustafā's son Nu'mān 1710. The family ability for administration and diplomacy showed itself in varying measure in all but the last of these six members of the House. On the debit side we have, however, to place Qāra Mustafā, who was Grand Vezīr, with irretrievably

life that lasted until the outbreak of the great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74. In the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom the second founder of the universal state was the Tsar Peter the Great (*imperabat de jure inde ab* A.D. 1682, *sed de facto tantum inde ab* A.D. 1689), who roused the Russian body social out of a torpor in which it had lain since the convulsions of A.D. 1604-13 by giving it a potent injection of an alien culture.¹

The re-establishment of a universal state after its overthrow in a recurrent 'Time of Troubles' has in some cases been accomplished to such good effect that it has resulted in a return of at least a pale similitude of the long-since departed 'Indian Summer'. In the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom, for example, the 'Indian Summer' which had visited Muscovy in the reign of Ivan IV (*imperabat* A.D. 1533-84), thanks to the foundation of a universal state by Ivan III (*imperabat* A.D. 1462-1505), returned at the accession of Catherine II (*accessit* A.D. 1762), and lasted, this time, till the death of Alexander I (*obiit* A.D. 1825), thanks to the re-establishment of the Russian universal state on a new basis by Peter the Great (*imperabat* A.D. 1682-1725). And in the Hellenic World Diocletian and Constantine did their work so well when they reconstructed, on new foundations, the dilapidated political edifice of Julius and Augustus, that they made it possible for the Emperor Justinian to radiate all the glory of a Solomon—in his codification of the Roman Law and his building of the dome of the Church of the Holy Wisdom and his recovery of the Empire's lost dominions in Africa and Italy²—though Justinian did not begin to reign (*imperabat* A.D. 527-65) until 149 years had passed since the defeat and death of Valens at the Battle of Adrianople,³ 243 since the accession of Diocletian, 292 since the death of Alexander

disastrous results, from 1676 to 1683. Qāra Mustafā was not a Köprülü, but he came from Merzifün, in the neighbourhood of the Köprülüs' home-town of Vezir Köprü in North-Eastern Anatolia, and on this account he was given his education by the generosity of Mehmed Köprülü—a bad day's work for the Ottoman Empire!

¹ It is interesting to observe that the Romanov Emperor who was the second founder of the Muscovite oecumenical empire in the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom resorted (no doubt, quite independently) to an expedient which had already been adopted by the Köprülü vezirs who were the second founders of the Ottoman oecumenical empire in the main body of Orthodox Christendom. The identical cure for an identical disease which was applied with successful results in both cases was to invigorate an anaemic body social by a process of blood transfusion (in a metaphorical sense). The Köprülüs had drawn their supply of fresh life-blood from the Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh* of the Pādishāh (see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 222-8, above); Peter drew his from the free peoples of Western Christendom (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 278-83, above).

² In the opinion of the writer of this Study this glory of Justinian's was purchased—like that of so many other princes of the same Solomonian type—at a cost which was socially disastrous, as witness the immediate and abysmal and never-retrieved collapse of the Hellenic body social, as well as the Roman body politic, after the vainglorious emperor's death. (On this point see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 326-8, above, and the present chapter in the present volume, pp. 223-5, below.)

³ Justinian has a happier Indic counterpart in the Emperor Harsha (*imperabat* A.D. 606-47), who entered upon his auspicious reign some 130 years after the Huns had dealt with the Guptas as the Visigoths dealt with Valens.

Severus, and 347 since the death of Marcus in A.D. 180: a date that had marked the end of the original 'Indian Summer' which had lightened for a time the darkness of a disintegrating Hellenic Society in the Age of the Antonines before the recurrence of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' in the third century of the Christian Era.

At this eleventh hour in the long decline of the Hellenic Civilization, Justinian's Solomonian glory was a luxury out of season which had to be paid for at a fancy price; and, forty-five years after Justinian's death, a bill of a staggering magnitude was duly presented to the magnificent emperor's devoted successor Heraclius when he was summoned from Carthage to defend Constantinople against a Persian invader whose advance-guard had by then already pushed its way unhindered right across the Asiatic torso of Justinian's Mediterranean empire—from the banks of the Khabūr to the shores of the Bosphorus. Heraclius, with his ominous name, is a typical representative of the saviour with the sword in his final appearance on the stage, when the tragic actor once for all lays aside a Jovian mask that has now become utterly incongruous, and once more plays *Hēraklēs* in the only scene that it is any longer possible for even a *Hēraklēs* to play. This scene is the death of a 'Die-Hard'; a 'Die-Hard' is a soldier who offers up his life for a cause when he is convinced that all but Honour is already lost; and, as a classic example of the type, the Roman Emperor Heraclius is worthy to rank with the British Colonel Inglis whose call to his men first put the phrase into currency.¹

Heraclius spent twenty-four years out of a reign of thirty-one on the desperate enterprise of trying by force of arms to prevent the Syriac provinces of the Hellenic universal state from shaking off at last an incubus of Hellenic domination which had been weighing upon them ever since the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by the arms of Alexander the Great. The sword of Heraclius could not avail to stem a tide of Syriac resurgence which had been flowing for at least eight centuries in the Trans-euphratean, and for at least four centuries in the Ciseuphratean,

¹ In the verbal armoury of English party politics in the twentieth century of the Christian Era the term 'Die-Hard' has come to be used as a shaft of ridicule to be shot at a politician who makes a parade of his intention of 'dying in the last ditch' in defence of some political cause that is patently lost, and this particularly if his opponents have reason to expect that the *poseur* will prudently resign himself to the inevitable when it actually comes to the point. This latter-day connotation of play-acting does not, however, attach to the sobriquet in its origin. The authentic 'Die-Hards' are an infantry regiment of the British Army; and the Fifty-Seventh won their nickname as a title of honour at the Battle of Albuera in A.D. 1811. In an engagement in which the regiment was being mown down by the enemy's fire, their commander, Colonel Sir William Inglis, as he fell desperately wounded, cried 'Die hard, Fifty-Seventh! Die hard'; and the regiment gained the name of 'Die-Hards' for themselves by taking their fallen Colonel at his word.

territories of the Syriac World by the time when Heraclius was called in to Hellenism's rescue. The Syriac counter-attack was by then already victorious on the deeper planes of life—in religion, in language, in architecture, in art—and, even on the superficial planes of politics and war, the liberation, by Syriac arms, of the homeland of the Syriac culture had already been momentarily anticipated during the recurrence of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' in the third century of the Christian Era, when Zenobia of Palmyra had brought the whole of Syria under her rule and had even pushed her outposts across the Taurus and the Nile.¹ It is evident that Heraclius in the seventh century was courting disaster by venturing to repeat Aurelian's barely successful counterstroke.² Heraclius did succeed, at the end of eighteen years of strenuous and audacious campaigning, in pushing the Persian invader back from Chalcedon to Tabrīz and imposing on the Sasanian Empire a peace-settlement which restored the territorial *status quo ante bellum*. Yet the Persian champion of Syriac liberty had no sooner laid down his arms than an Arab champion stepped into his place in the arena and pitted his fresh vigour against a war-worn Roman Army; and this immediate return, from an unexpected quarter, of a tide which Heraclius had thought himself to have stemmed for good, was a challenge to which the weary emperor's spirit was not equal. In his fight to save Syria from the Arabs Heraclius abandoned after six years a struggle which he had kept up for eighteen years against the Persians, and withdrew from Antioch to Constantinople to die there broken-hearted.³

Heraclius is not the only famous 'Die-Hard' whose figure looms up for a moment in the last scene of the tragedy of the disintegration of the Hellenic Society. The historic fame of the African emperor has been outshone by the legendary glory of a British prince who is reputed to have spent his life, and met his death, in a vain effort to roll back a tide of barbarian invasion from the coasts of Ultima Thule; and the legend of Arthur possibly reflects—through the double refraction of Welsh epic and French romance⁴—the authentic history of an Artorius⁵ who did indeed surpass his fellow Roman Heraclius in stoutness of heart if he faced his fearful

¹ For the historical relation between Zenobia's 'successor-state' of the Roman Empire in Syria and Mu'awiyah's see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 74, footnote 4, and II. D (i), vol. ii, p. 11, above.

² See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, footnote 4; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 330, above.

³ See II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 287–8, above.

⁴ For the attractiveness of the Welsh imagination of 'the Heroic Age' to a 'medieval' Western taste see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 339–40, above.

⁵ For a faint indication of a possibility that the historical Artorius may have been a less attractive character than the legendary Arthur, see V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, vol. v, p. 609, footnote 2, above.

odds, and died his 'Die-Hard's' death, in defending, not the all but impregnable citadel of the Hellenic World,¹ but an outlying and exposed province which had been abandoned by the Central Government and had lost touch with the torso of the Empire before ever Artorius drew his sword.

If we turn our eyes from the Hellenic scene to the spectacle of other dissolving societies and crumbling empires, the mouths of other 'Die-Hards' will answer our roll-call with their 'Morituri te salutamus'. In the dotage of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad'—in an age when the glory of Hārūn had long since been eclipsed by the humiliations that Hārūn's successors had suffered at the hands of barbarian praetorians and heretical Buwayhid mayors of the palace,² and when only two generations were still to run before the advent of the annihilating catastrophe of A.D. 1258—we see the Caliph Nāsir (*imperabat* A.D. 1180–1225), whose reign happened to fall in the trough between the Saljūq and the Mongol wave of a Eurasian Nomad Völkerwanderung, showing the hardihood to profit from this momentary relief by successfully re-establishing the rule of the Commander of the Faithful in regions, beyond the bounds of the metropolitan province of 'Irāq, where the authority of Nāsir's predecessors had been merely nominal for some three centuries past.³ In the death-agonies of the Ottoman Empire we catch a glimpse of an intrepid 'Die-Hard' in the figure of 'Osmān Pasha successfully delaying for nearly five months the descent of a Russian avalanche from the Balkans upon Constantinople by his stand at Plevna from the 20th July to the 10th December, 1877.

¹ The strength of Constantinople lay in a masterly collaboration between Art and Nature that saved the city from capture in the crisis of A.D. 626 (see II. D (v), Annex, vol. ii, p. 400, above). At a moment when Heraclius himself—at the head of an expeditionary force into which he had drafted the best of what remained of the Roman Army—was engaged in the far interior of Asia on a thrust at the Sasanian Empire's heart (see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 269, footnote 4, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 330, above), the Emperor's base of operations at Constantinople had to withstand a concerted attack from the Persians on the Asiatic and the Avars on the European side. The city was saved by the Roman Navy's command of the waters of the Straits, which made it impossible for the two hostile forces to join hands.

² For the domination of the Buwayhids at Baghdad see I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, p. 356, above.

³ See the article on Nāsir in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. This caliph had the temerity to implicate himself in the military struggles between the 'successor-states' of the Caliphate in Iran and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, and he succeeded in temporarily making himself master of Khuzistan by successively playing off the Khwārizmshāh against the Saljūq and the Mongol against the Khwārizmshāh. This hazardous play with an unstable Balance of Power was less statesmanlike than the simultaneous efforts that Nāsir made to rehabilitate the Caliphate by peaceful means. On the one hand he tried to heal the ancient religious schism in Islam by conciliating the Shi'ah of both the Imāmi and the Ismā'ili persuasion. On the other hand he tried to rally the princes of Dār-al-Islām round his own person by reorganizing the religious order of the *Futuwwa* into something like an order of knighthood with himself as its head. Nāsir's rally was perhaps in Ibn Khaldūn's mind when he wrote (*Muqaddamāt*, McG. de Slane's translation (Paris 1863–8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, p. 121) that 'sometimes, when an empire is in the last stage of its existence, it suddenly gives such an imposing exhibition of strength as to create the impression that its decay has been arrested. But this is merely the last flare of a light that is on the point of going out.'

But 'Osmān and Nāsir and Arthur and Heraclius alike must yield the palm of valour to those Inca 'Die-Hards' who—after the deaths of Huascar and Atahualpa and the fall of Cuzco and Ollantay-Tampu and the overthrow, in the twinkling of an eye, of an Andean universal state which it had taken three centuries to build up¹—still refused to despair of a republic which had just been annihilated before their eyes by irresistible invaders from an unknown world that lay beyond the Andean horizon.² In the fastnesses of the Vilcapampa Mountains the Inca Manco dared—without gunpowder, and even without steel—to defy a Spanish victor who was already armed with European lethal inventions that have since been turned by their inventors to such terrible account. Manco died unconquered; and, when one of his sons, Sayri Tupac, capitulated, the other, Titu Cusi Yupanqui, still carried on the unequal struggle. These men of the Bronze Age held out against the men of the Explosive Age for thirty years before Vilcapampa fell at length and the last of the Incas, Tupac Amaru, was taken prisoner and put to death by a Spanish Viceroy of Peru in A.D. 1571.³

The Saviour with the Time-Machine.

The salvation of a disintegrating society is so unpromising a task, and the sword so clumsy an instrument for its execution, that it is not surprising to find other schools of saviours arising as the process of disintegration takes its course in spite of all the swordsmanship of Jovius and Hercules. These other schools all agree with one another, in opposition to the saviours with the sword, in professing to pursue a negative aim. The mundane Present which the swordsman is still struggling to salvage is for them a City of Destruction which it is neither possible nor desirable to save. Salvation *from*, and not *of*, Society is therefore their common watchword; but this is the highest common factor in their several purposes; for each of these four schools, as we have seen,⁴ follows out the aim of salvation from Society along a different path of escape, and they differ further in their choice of instruments and in their drawing of the bounds of the city whose dust they are proposing to shake from off their feet. Let us begin by reviewing those archaist and futurist saviours from Society who draw the line at the mundane Present without abandoning the whole plane of life on Earth, and whose instrument is a 'time-machine' which is to

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 122, above.

² The shattering effect of this unheralded catastrophe upon the moral of the Incas' subjects (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 90-3, above) is the foil against which we should appraise the fortitude of the 'Die-Hard' remnant of the Incas themselves.

³ See Markham, Sir Clements: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), pp. 256 and 274-96.

⁴ In the present chapter, pp. 177-8, above.

transport them, by some stroke of magic, clean out of a Present which has gone awry into a still unblemished Past or a not yet blemished Future.

The notion of a 'time-machine' has been conceived by Lewis Carroll in a passage of his *Sylvie and Bruno* and applied by Mr. H. G. Wells in a fascinating book which has *The Time-Machine* for its title. Mr. Wells makes use of Lewis Carroll's conceit in order to carry his readers, on the wings of his imagination, vast distances up and down the Time-stream—with pauses here and there to view an exotic landscape through the pilot-showman's seductive lens. This conducted tour in the 'time-machine' is a parable of the recent achievements of a modern Western *Homo Mechanicus* in extending the range of his knowledge of, and power over, the Material Universe. But a conceit out of which Mr. Wells has fashioned a hymn of whole-hearted praise to Mr. Straker¹ has been turned to account by its subtle inventor for the deeper purpose of moving our *Homo Mechanicus* not to self-praise but to self-criticism, and perhaps to self-abasement, by a touch of satire which pulls the handy man up short by reminding him of the limitations of what can be done by clockwork.

Lewis Carroll's thrust goes home because his point is a simple one. He allows his ingenious clockwork-maker to outwit Nature and cheat Destiny in one move of the game—only to find that he might just as well have spared himself the pains, since in the next move Destiny and Nature compass the self-same results that they would have produced anyway if the little man had never tried to monkey with them. In Lewis Carroll's fable the observer who holds the magic watch confidently sets back the hands when he sees the bicyclist come to grief, as he spins round the corner, over the cardboard box that has tumbled out of the draper's cart. At the magician-mechanic's sleight of hand Time duly recoils, and this time the philanthropist promptly snatches up the treacherous box before the bicyclist arrives on the scene. *Hi presto*—the trick has worked! For the bicyclist, spinning recklessly round the corner as before, is this time not caught out by colliding with an unexpected obstacle, but shoots on smoothly down the street. Yet, alas! the appearance of one moment is given the lie by the reality of the next; for, when the moment arrives at which, in the first version of the playlet, the bicyclist was lying cut and bleeding after taking his toss, lo and behold! the same moment reveals him in the same plight in the second version—just as though Philanthropy and Magic had not, after all, conspired together to whisk away the stumbling-block from in front of the luckless rider's giddy wheel.

¹ For Mr. Straker see Shaw, G. B.: *Man and Superman*, *passim*.

In this Lucianic parable Lewis Carroll was gently hinting to his complacent Western contemporaries that it was a vain imagination to fancy that mundane realities could be exorcized by mechanical arts. And this apologue of the generation of the velocipede may be capped by another drawn from the everyday experience of the generation of the automobile. A driver whose car is running badly may throw out the clutch, with a sigh of relief, when his road happens to bring him, in the course of its ups and downs, to the head of a gentle downward incline. 'So free-wheeling is the remedy for engine-trouble', our motorist lazily ruminates. 'How extraordinary that so simple a solution should never have been hit upon before.' But as he sits back and congratulates himself, the incline suddenly plunges into a steep descent, and on the instant he remembers that his brakes, as well as his engine, are out of order. No chance of avoiding a crash now except by going back into bottom gear! But by this time the car is racing so swiftly downhill that the result of putting in the clutch now is to strip the cogs off the gear-wheels and to check the car's impetus with a jerk that sends it skidding across the road through a dry-stone wall which masks a precipice.

The moral of our post-Carrollian parable is that the new-fangled 'time-machine' is as incapable as the old-fashioned sword is of permanently eliminating Violence when once Violence has entered in. The driver who free-wheels down the slope does succeed, for a moment or two, in silencing the noise and stilling the jolts and jars of a labouring engine; but the disaster that overtakes him the moment after proves his remedy to have been worse than the disease. The car that now lies overturned at the bottom of the ravine, with its gears stripped and its driver's corpse pinned under the steering-wheel, is in a worse case than the car which, only just now, was travelling right-side-up along the road—however disagreeably its engine might have been knocking and its ignition have been missing fire.

It was, no doubt, theoretically possible that the gentle incline which has lured the unfortunate driver to his horrid fate might have continued all the rest of the way to his journey's end; and if luck had so far favoured him he might have free-wheeled on in fine style till gravity brought him to a standstill at the door of the Roadside Hotel. To translate our imagery into terms of a piece of history that has several times engaged our attention before, we can imagine a devout Jew, who has taken to heart the lesson of Bar Kōkabā's failure, seeking salvation in the manipulation of the 'time-machine' without being taught by another disaster that he has not yet discovered a sure way of extricating himself from the

endless chain of Violence. Our Jewish Quietist—and his descendants for the next sixty generations—may succeed in living, without disaster, in an archaistic and a futuristic Utopia simultaneously. They may successfully render themselves insensible to the painfulness of the mundane Present by a minute observance of a God-given law and by a patient expectation of a Kingdom of God which is to be established on Earth in God's own good time by God's omnipotence alone, without the lifting of one human finger. Yet, even if an unconscious but unconscionable desire 'that we also may be like all the nations'¹ had not inveigled the sixty-first generation of our Jewish Quietists into a hazardous attempt to put itself into gear with the militant nationalism of a twentieth-century Western World,² one single example of a recourse to the 'time-machine'—and this an experiment which, up to date, has escaped a crash but has not yet evaded a question-mark—would hardly avail to invalidate a conclusion that is forced upon us by the rest of the historical evidence. This conclusion is that—as a rule which is not disproved by its exceptions—the would-be saviour with the 'time-machine' is apt, sooner or later, to become so embarrassingly entangled in the intricacies of his own clockwork that he is constrained in the end to throw the ingenious piece of mechanism aside and to pick up in despair his predecessor's rusty sword which Straker has so far contemptuously left to lie in the gutter where Bayard dropped it.

If we wish to test this rule by an empirical survey it may be convenient to review in the first place the saviour-archaists who have set the 'time-machine' to jump backwards, and in the second place the saviour-futurists who have jerked the lever of fantasy in the opposite direction to make the machine jump forwards. In the sequel to both of these manoeuvres we shall see a primitive demon of Violence who has been deftly shown out of the door come slyly creeping in again through the window.

In considering the archaistic variation on this theme we may begin with an illustration which we have examined in this Study already in another context.³ The notion of a 'Nordic Race' which is hypothetically superior to the rest of Mankind in virtue of its physical descent was first conceived and launched by de Gobineau as a neat verbal retort to the grim physical violence which, in the French Revolution, the Jacobins had used upon the Noblesse. De Gobineau effectively exploded the pedantic antiquarianism of those revolutionary leaders of a French proletariat who had sought to

¹ 1 Sam. viii. 20.

² For this interpretation of Zionism see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 252-4, above.

³ In II. C (ii) (a) 1, vol. i, pp. 216-21, and in V. C (i) (d) 8 (a), in the present volume, pp. 56-8, above.

lend an air of respectability to their act of vengeance against a French dominant minority by representing themselves as descendants of the wronged and cultivated Gauls, while their adversaries were held up to odium, and condemned to extermination, as descendants of the barbarous and outrageous Franks. But this amiably academic French political *jeu d'esprit* began to breed a violence of its own when it passed out of de Gobineau's hands into those of a Nietzsche and a Houston Stewart Chamberlain whose caricatures of de Gobineau's theme helped to inspire the masters of the Second German Reich to act the part of 'the Blond Beast' in the real life of the international arena. And now, in the third generation, the platonically archaistic *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* has borne an ultra-Jacobin harvest in the Anti-Semitic enormities of a Third German Reich which has taken the French archaist's fantasy in deadly earnest and has based its policy, at home and abroad, upon a doctrine of 'Blood and Soil'.

This sinister metamorphosis of Archaism into Anti-Semitism in the latest chapter of the history of the Western Civilization has a Hellenic parallel. The eventual establishment of the Hellenic universal state in the form of a Roman Empire left a sting of resentment in the hearts of the citizens of Alexandria, who could not forget that, if the Battle of Actium had gone the other way, their own city might have become the metropolis of the Hellenic world-state.¹ A Greek *bourgeoisie* who, two hundred years back, had remained unmoved by the stirring call of a Spartan hero and had felt no temptation to follow Cleomenes into the streets in order to wrest their liberty by force of arms from the hands of a Macedonian autocrat² were now roused at last when the prize of civic pre-eminence was wrested away by an upstart Oscan city from an Alexandria whose citizens could point to the Tomb of Alexander himself and the Museum and Library of Ptolemy Soter³ as their own city's unchallengeable title-deeds to metropolitan rank.⁴ In

¹ For this unfulfilled historical possibility see V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 37, footnote 1, above.

² Plutarch: *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 58 (see further V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, pp. 381 and 391, below).

³ That Ptolemy I was the founder of the Museum and Library is probable but not quite certain in the present state of our knowledge.

⁴ There is some evidence to show that, as a result of her annexation to the Roman Empire after the Battle of Actium, Alexandria lost, not only her perhaps rather nebulous primacy among the cities of the Hellenic World, but also some of the solid substance of her municipal self-government (see Jones, A. H. M.: *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press), pp. 311-12). It must be added that, according to the same authority (pp. 304 and 471), the Romans were only carrying farther a process of *Gleichschaltung* which the Ptolemies had already begun. A civic council of Alexandria seems to have existed under the earlier Ptolemies, but to have been abolished by the later Ptolemies before the Roman conquest. No doubt the 'totalitarian' structure of the Ptolemaic state and the 'servile' character of native Egyptian social life under the Ptolemaic régime (see IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 85, footnote 5, above) made an unpropitious environment for Hellenic political institutions.

an age when the political liberation of Alexandria was no longer even a forlorn hope, but had become a sheer impossibility, successive generations of Alexandrian city-fathers now intrepidly, though inconsequently, offered up their lives on the altar of civic pride by assuming, in face of the Roman Imperial authorities, an attitude of defiance which left a reluctant Caesar no choice but to pronounce the death-sentence. The 'Acts of the Pagan Martyrs' in the reigns of Claudius and Trajan and Hadrian and Commodus were still being treasured by the Greek community in Egypt in the third century of the Christian Era, as is witnessed by the narratives, dating from that later age, that have been recovered in part by the ingenuity of our modern Western papyrologists.¹ But the piquant name which has been given to these anonymous works of Greek literature by our Western scholars is misleading in at any rate one point that is of capital importance. These martyrs to the civic pride of Alexandria may resemble the martyrs to the religious faith of the Christian Church in the courage, and even truculence, with which they refused to bow the knee to an Imperial Government which held them physically at its mercy. But the Christian martyr's glory of being the victim of a violence with which he had never polluted his own hands was not shared with Stephen and Polycarp by Lampon and Isidore and Antoninus and Appian. These Alexandrian recalcitrants against Roman authority had Jewish blood on their hands before their own blood was shed by a Roman sword which might fairly claim in this case to be vindicating a *laesa majestas*. The Greeks of Alexandria, who were impotent to assail the Roman Imperial Government itself with any missiles except innocuous words, were wont to satisfy their craving to vent their spite in some more effective way than this by massacring their Jewish neighbours.² From the Jewish community in Alexandria it was occasionally possible for the Greek community to take a toll of lives before the Roman garrison could intervene; and these Alexandrian Jews were odious to the Alexandrian Greeks because

¹ For the fragments of this genre of Egyptian Greek literature of the Imperial Age that have turned up on scraps of third-century papyrus see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), pp. 539-48; and Bell, H. I.: *Juden und Griechen im Römischen Alexandria* (Leipzig 1927, Hinrichs), pp. 14-44.

² These periodic massacres of Jews by Greeks in an Alexandria whose Greek citizens were smarting under a Roman yoke that had been weighing upon their city's neck since the Battle of Actium will remind a Western reader, in the present generation, of the persecution of the Jews in a post-war Germany by National-Socialist Gentiles who were smarting under the *Versailler Diktat* and who sought relief for their feelings by hitting the Jews, who happened to be at their mercy, as proxies for the Gentile victors in the General War of 1914-18. It was, of course, these non-German Gentiles, and not the German Jews, who had beaten Germany in the field and then dictated the terms of peace. But, so long as Germany was disarmed, the true authors of the *Versailler Diktat* were beyond her reach; and in these circumstances the Nazis seized upon the German Jews as vicarious targets for a German stroke of revenge.

the Romans deliberately favoured them as a make-weight against the flagrant disloyalty of the Greek citizens of the second city of the Empire. Fragmentary though our evidence is, it would hardly be rash to assume that some guilt, direct or indirect, for the shedding of Jewish blood could be brought home to every one of those Alexandrian Greek 'martyrs' who were condemned to death by the Roman Government in the course of the first two centuries of the Christian Era.¹

We have now found two cases—one in Western and the other in Hellenic history—in which an attempt to evade hard present facts by harking back to an irretrievably lost state of past national or civic glory has only resulted in a savage outbreak of Anti-Semitism. And the same spectacle—which would be comic if it were not tragic—of a saviour-archaist finding himself constrained to throw away his new-fangled 'time-machine' and snatch up his predecessor's old-fashioned sword instead is afforded by the histories of would-be constitutional reformers who have sought salvation in an attempt at a return to some ancestral constitution or 'patrios politeia'.²

In the second phase of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' we have seen³ this ironic fate overtaking a pair of Heracleidae at Sparta and a pair of Gracchi at Rome. In each of these two parallel political tragedies the originator of the reform movement—a Lacedaemonian Agis and a Roman Tiberius—had a horror of violence and lawlessness which was so genuine and so extreme that the would-be reformer actually allowed himself to be murdered by political opponents who did not scruple to resort to these 'methods of

¹ At an earlier stage in the establishment of the Roman domination over the non-Roman sections of a Hellenic dominant minority the Greek ruling class in the Seleucid Monarchy had produced a 'pagan martyr' who had the hardihood to strike at a representative of Rome herself, instead of seeking defenceless scapegoats among Rome's Oriental protégés. In the year 162 B.C., at Laodicea, Gnaeus Octavius, the chairman of a Roman commission of inspection, was assassinated by a Greek nationalist named Leptines (see V. C (i) (d) 9 (y), p. 122, footnote 5, above). The assassin aggravated the enormity of his offence by boasting of it in retrospect; and thereafter—with a view to saving his city and his sovereign from the consequences of his act—he voluntarily repaired to Rome, unfettered and unguarded; delivered himself into the hands of the Roman Government; and made a jaunty appearance at the bar of the Senate. From first to last he prophesied that the Romans would not touch a hair of his head; and the denouement proved him right. For the Senate characteristically preferred the diplomatic advantage of retaining a grievance of the first order against the Seleucid Government to the emotional satisfaction of avenging their murdered representative; and accordingly they took care not to accede to the Antiochene Government's proposal that the Senate should inflict on Leptines whatever punishment they might think good. Roman diplomacy kept the diplomatic incident open at the price of letting the criminal go scot free (see Polybius, Book XXXI, chap. 33, and Book XXXII, chap. 3; Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 237-9).

² This particular expression of Archaism has been examined already in V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), pp. 52-6, above.

³ In Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 76-7; IV. C (iii) (b) 9, vol. iv, p. 205; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 508; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 70-1 and 78; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 388-9; V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), in the present volume, pp. 52-3; and V. C (i) (d) 8 (ε), p. 94, above.

barbarism', in the conviction that this was a lesser evil than it would be for him to give the lie, by getting in the first blow, to the very principles that he was upholding at his own peril. Yet even these two martyrs to a belief in Non-Violence had in one sense brought their deaths upon their own heads by having stooped, on their side, to a violence which was not redeemed by the fact that it was not physical. Before they lost their lives by the hands of some of their countrymen, both Agis and Tiberius had already broken some of the fundamental laws of their country's constitution; and this in itself was enough to stultify the endeavours of statesmen whose political programme was the thesis of the sacrosanctity of a constitutional heritage. The martyr hands that were innocent of having literally shed blood cannot be acquitted of the charge of having wielded the figurative sword of illegality; and the martyrs each inspired a successor who drew from the tragedy of his predecessor's fate the disastrous moral that his fatal error had been a lack of 'realism'.

In girding themselves for the task of making a second attempt to carry out their predecessors' enterprise a Cleomenes at Sparta and a Gaius at Rome did not forbear to draw and use the physical sword which had been abjured by an Agis and a Tiberius.¹ This second pair of 'tough-minded' reformers atoned for their recourse to violence by meeting, after a delusive momentary success, with the same failure and the same death as their 'tender-minded' predecessors. And their fate, in its turn, led a third pair of political adventurers to act on the theory that 'realism', if it was to do its work, must be carried to the point of a 'totalitarian' ruthlessness. By putting this theory into practice, Sulla—at the cost of proscribing half Rome and devastating all Samnium—did succeed, half a century after Tiberius Gracchus's death, in imposing something which passed for a 'patrios politeia' and in making this travesty of his country's ancestral constitution last long enough to allow the cold-blooded dictator himself to die comfortably in his bed. Sulla's Spartan counterpart Nabis did not in the end escape the assassin's knife; yet Nabis, too, lived long enough not only to complete the social revolution into which Agis' reform had been turned on Cleomenes' sword's point, but also to bring Messene and Argos, as well as Lacedaemon, under his tyrannically subversive rule, and to baffle a Roman commander who had just succeeded in beating the Macedonians.

If we turn again from Hellenic to Western history we may ob-

¹ Cleomenes appears to have resorted to violence without hesitation or compunction. Gaius Gracchus was torn in two ways and never whole-heartedly abandoned the gentle for the violent path (on this point see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, pp. 378 and 392, below).

serve in the present context that our Civil War in England was precipitated by endeavours that had been made, in all good faith, to vindicate for the Parliament at Westminster a historic prerogative which, in its champions' belief, had been unlawfully set aside by a Royal Power that had recently been fortifying itself with a new administrative technique of Italian provenance.¹ And we may further observe that the soldier whose sword brought victory to the Parliament's cause played far greater havoc with the Constitution, in his autocratic role of Lord Protector of the Commonwealth, than King Charles had ever sought to play while he was sitting precariously on the throne of his ancestors. In the same Western World in our own day a Cromwellian violence has been used in Italy by a dictator who claims that by this means he has managed to give his countrymen back their 'patrios politeia' in the shape of his 'corporative state'.²

In the tragedy of Ottoman history we can see the two Hellenic series, Agis-Cleomenes-Nabis and Tiberius-Gaius-Sulla, reproduced in the series Selīm III-Mahmūd II-Mustafā Kemāl. Sultan Selīm (*imperabat* A.D. 1789-1807) was the first Ottoman statesman to take in hand the task of saving the heritage of his ancestors when the jeopardy into which it had fallen had been startlingly revealed by the disastrous outcome of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74.³ Like Agis and Tiberius Gracchus, Sultan Selīm set himself to restore a 'patrios politeia' which had been the palladium of the State; like them, he found himself driven to pursue reform along the paradoxical path of innovation; and like them, again, he died a violent death at the hands of political opponents whom he had the courage to defy but not the ruthlessness to crush. In the next act of the Ottoman play Mahmūd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808-39) played Cleomenes' and Gaius's part with all the ruthlessness of Sulla and all the patience of Bismarck. For an opportunity to avenge his predecessor, Mahmūd waited, not ten years, like Gaius, but eighteen;⁴ during all that time he kept his own counsel, in contrast to Gaius's almost ostentatious display of his intention to seek revenge; and in consequence Mahmūd succeeded in extirpating the Janissaries and dying in his bed as comfortably as Sulla himself. Why was it, then, that this Ottoman play required a third act, and Sultan Mahmūd a successor? The reason was that Sultan Selīm's would-be archaizing reform had turned in Sultan Mahmūd's hands into a Westernizing revolution which even Mahmūd forbore to carry right through. Mahmūd required a successor

¹ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 350-63, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 8 (α), p. 52, above.

³ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 48, above.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 49-50, above.

because, 'under the strenuous conditions of the Modern World', the 'Osmanlis could not hold their own if they halted half-way between their broken-down indigenous institutions and an imperfectly assimilated Westernism. A 'totalitarian' Westernizer was needed to finish Mahmūd's work if the 'Osmanlis were to be saved; and in our own day this third Ottoman saviour has appeared in the person of President Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk. The Ghāzi has been able to carry his people with him along a road of Westernization *à outrance*, on which their forefathers would never have followed the Sultans, thanks to the Greek invasion of Anatolia in A.D. 1919-22; for this home-thrust opened the eyes of the Ottoman Turks to the truth that they were fighting now for their very existence and no longer just for their empire.¹

This survey of would-be saviours with the 'time-machine' in the ranks of the Dominant Minority may close with two cases in which the revulsion from the 'time-machine' to the sword took place within a single lifetime.

The Roman Emperor Julian set himself to reinstate and reinvigorate by peaceful means the religion and culture of Hellenism when these had been pushed to the wall by a Christianity that had been enjoying an Imperial patronage since the conversion of Constantine. The moment when Julian was enabled to put this policy in hand—upon his receipt of the news of the death of the Emperor Constantius while Julian himself was on the march from Gaul to Constantinople—was separated by an interval of no more than fifteen months (December, A.D. 361–March, A.D. 363) from the moment when the new master of the Hellenic World marched on eastwards into the domain of the Sasanidae on a campaign in which he was to lose his life. These fifteen months were all the time that Julian had for putting his policy into effect; yet, short though this span was, it was long enough to see the Apostate's original policy change in two respects. Instead of being able to restore the pre-Constantinian régime and pre-Christian dispensation in their authentic shapes, Julian found himself constrained to wage his cultural and religious war on Christianity by organizing a pagan Antichurch on a Christian pattern² which was as alien as Christianity itself was from the genuine Hellenic *êthos*; and at the same time Julian failed to live up to his ideal of an enlightened tolerance. He was quickly disappointed of his romantically unrealistic expectation that, as soon as the Christian Church was deprived of its recent advantage of enjoying official support, a Hellenism that had really been moribund long before the conversion of Constantine would

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 187-8, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, vol. v, p. 584, above.

recapture its lost ground by the use of no other weapons than its own intrinsic merit and charm. In his treatment of his Christian subjects Julian had already crossed the line dividing a contemptuous toleration from a hostile discrimination before his activities in the field of domestic affairs were suspended by his departure for the Persian War; and, if it had been his fate to return victorious, it is difficult to believe that he would not have blackened his reputation sooner or later by crossing, in turn, the further line between discrimination and persecution.¹

Julian's failure in the fourth century of the Christian Era to put the clock back to a pre-Constantinian hour of Hellenic history was not more signal than Justinian's failure to accomplish the lesser *tour de force* of putting the clock back to Constantine's time in the sixth century. Justinian set himself to restore the Constantinian régime in all its aspects. Once again, as of old, the Empire was to be Latin-speaking, Orthodox, and integral; yet, in every sphere, the autocrat's endeavours to achieve his archaistic aim resulted in a sensational self-defeat.

Justinian's wars for the recovery of the provinces that had fallen into barbarian hands merely devastated the Imperial territories that were reconquered while it impoverished those that had hitherto remained intact; and the conquests bought at this price proved ephemeral. In extirpating the Ostrogoths the would-be *Restitutor Orbis Romani* was actually clearing the ground for an immediate occupation of Italy by the more barbarous Lombards, and in extirpating the Vandals he was redeeming a patrimony in Ifriqīyah for the Berbers and the Arabs.² Justinian was no more fortunate in his ecclesiastical policy. The ecclesiastical war which he waged against the Monophysitism of his subjects in the Oriental provinces was as unsuccessful as his military warfare against the barbarians, since it utterly failed of its intended effect of making the Catholic Church oecumenical once more in fact as well as in name. Justinian did not succeed in brow-beating Syria and Egypt back into Orthodoxy.³ What he did achieve was to alienate their affections so deeply and so lastingly that, in the next two generations, they welcomed the Persian armies of Chosroes and the Arab armies of 'Umar as deliverers from a Melchite yoke. As for the closing of the schools at Athens and the building of the Church of Saint Sophia at Constantinople, the first of these two of Justinian's

¹ Julian's failure to establish in the Roman Empire a Neoplatonic Church in lieu of the Christian Church has been touched upon in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 147; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 565-7; V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, vol. v, p. 584; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 680-3, above.

² See III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, p. 162, above.

³ This failure of Justinian's Anti-Monophysite campaign has been touched upon already in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 679, above.

acts gave the *coup de grâce* to Hellenic learning and the second to Hellenic architecture; and, while it is true that the intellectual tradition of Plato and the architectural tradition of Ictinus were both of them already *in articulo mortis* by the time when Justinian thus sped them on their way to death,¹ these parting shots at Hellenism were nevertheless strange gestures from an enthusiast for a Roman Empire whose historic *raison d'être* had been to serve as a Hellenic universal state. It might seem equally strange that the Consulate, which had been the classic magistracy of the Roman Commonwealth, should have been abolished by an emperor who had undertaken the task of codifying the Roman Law;² yet this particularly conspicuous act of constitutional Vandalism was all of a piece with Justinian's legal enormity of abrogating the authority of the original texts on which his *Code* and *Digest* and *Institutes* were based, as soon as these compilations were published.

Hasty, ill arranged, and incomplete though they might be,³ Justinian's new law books were at least a mighty monument of the Latin language; yet, when the emperor who had just re-established the authority of the Constantinopolitan Imperial Government over the Latin-speaking lands of Africa and Italy had to supplement the law which he had codified, he found it advisable, as a matter of practical convenience, to publish his *novellae* in Greek! There could have been no more ironical illustration of the self-frustration of Justinian's policy; for the publication of his own new legislation in Greek was an admission of the fact that in his day the Latin speech of the City of Constantine was being supplanted by a Levantine vernacular;⁴ this linguistic revolution at Constantinople bore witness, in its turn, to the devastation and depopulation of the Imperial City's Latin-speaking European hinterland; and for this social catastrophe in the Latin-speaking provinces in the Balkan Peninsula Justinian himself bore a heavier responsibility than any

¹ For the senile decay of the Athenian intellect see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 269-74; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 563-7; and V. C (i) (d) 8 (γ), in the present volume, pp. 78-80, above; for the abandonment of the Hellenic style of architecture see IV. C (ii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 54-5, above.

² For the abolition of the Consulate by Justinian see V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), p. 111, above.

³ For the contrast in spirit, aim, and efficacy between Justinian's codification of the Roman Law and the contemporary codification of monastic law in Saint Benedict's Rule see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 265-6, above. Justinian fell between two stools. While on the one hand his compilations were an inferior substitute for the originals out of which they were excerpted, on the other hand they still reflected the social conditions of a more highly cultivated age faithfully enough to be inappropriate to the social conditions of the ruder age into which they were launched (on this latter point see Taylor, H. O.: *The Mediaeval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 242 and 248).

⁴ The Greek in which Justinian's *novellae* were cast was an official variety of the Attic *κοινή* which had been minted in the chancelleries of the Hellenic 'successor-states' of the Achaemenian Empire and had remained current, under the Roman régime, in the Greek and Oriental provinces of the Hellenic universal state; but the colloquial Greek which was replacing a colloquial Latin in the streets and fora of Constantinople in Justinian's day was no doubt already in transition from the *κοινή* to Romain.

other man¹—an invidious distinction for a Roman Emperor whose own native province was Dardania, and who delighted in being able in consequence to boast that Latin was his mother-tongue.² Yet, while during Justinian's reign Greek thus gained on Latin in those Balkan territories of the Empire, including the capital itself, in which the Dardanian emperor was eager to keep Latin alive, Justinian was equally unsuccessful in his linguistic policy in the Oriental provinces. South-east of Taurus Justinian's intentions in regard to the Greek language were the opposite of what they were north-west of the Bosphorus; for in Syria and Egypt he was indirectly working to keep alive the established Greek ecclesiastical language of a Catholic Church whose cause he was championing against Monophysite dissenters. Yet, just because the Greek language was traditionally associated with the Orthodox Faith in this part of the Empire, the successful resistance of the Monophysites to Justinian's pressure on Orthodoxy's behalf was reflected in the linguistic field in the adoption of the Syriac and Coptic vernaculars as vehicles for a Monophysite liturgy and literature, in place of a Greek which was now doubly odious in Oriental Christian ears as an alien tongue which was the sign oral of the Melchites. This unfortunate identification, in the Oriental provinces, of the Greek language with a losing ecclesiastical cause was the direct result of Justinian's policy; and it sealed the doom of Greek in a region in which the *κωμή* had been the unchallenged vehicle of culture and administration for not much less than nine hundred years.

These interlocking failures of Justinian's policy in diverse fields amount, all told, to a total bankruptcy; and the story of this fiasco can be recapitulated in one sentence. Justinian produced results which were the opposite of his intentions because his pursuit of Archaism invariably led him into a use of force.

The saviour-archaists whom we have passed in review up to this point have all been representatives of the Dominant Minority; but there is a second company of saviours of the same class who arise in the External Proletariat when its liberty, or even its very existence, is threatened by the aggressiveness of some expanding civilization. When an external proletariat is fighting for its life against a civilization which, almost *ex hypothesi*, is its superior in material force, the members of the hard-pressed primitive society inevitably look back with regret to the easier and less anxious life which their forefathers used to lead before this external pressure began to disturb their peace. This regret for a happiness that is past may turn into a dream of harking back to it; and a people that

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 327-8 and 397-8, above.

² See *ibid.*, p. 326, footnote 2, above.

is dreaming this dream will lend a ready ear to a prophet who promises to translate it into reality. A collision with external forces which has brought disaster and distress in its train is thus apt to excite a movement for jumping clear of the Present and landing safe—by a backward twist of the magic lever of the 'time-machine'—in some previous stage of existence in which the harassed society's life was once free from ills that have since been brought upon it by its undesired contact with a hostile and corroding alien presence.

This archaistic reaction to the painful experience of collision with an alien social force for which the victim is no match is not, of course, peculiar to societies of the primitive species. A primitive society that has been drawn into the External Proletariat of some expanding civilization is in no different case from a civilization that has collided with a more powerful society of its own species. In this identical situation the weaker party—be it a civilization or a primitive society—is apt to make an identical response; and the particular response that we here have in view is examined in greater detail, under the title of 'Zealotism',¹ in a later part of this Study that is concerned with the contact between civilizations in the Space-dimension.² In the present place we need not explore further the psychological phenomena in which 'Zealotism' displays itself, but may confine ourselves to a review of the saviours of the 'Zealot' type who arise in the External Proletariat.

There is no reason in theory why these barbarian saviour-archaists should have recourse to violence in working out their way of salvation;³ but an empirical survey will show that in practice the barbarian saviour with the 'time-machine' refrains from taking to the sword still more rarely than his counterpart who tries to take the same archaistic way of escape out of the miseries of a disintegrating civilization. Indeed, the only non-violent barbarian saviours with the 'time-machine' whom we shall find ourselves able to muster are those prophets who arose among the Red Indians when these primitive inhabitants of North America were being overwhelmed by an immense wave of inflowing European population which was aggressively sweeping westward from coast to coast of the continent.⁴ And even the followers of these Red Indian preachers of salvation through non-resistance were driven in the end, by sheer despair, to hasten the consummation of their doom by taking up arms.⁵ The rest of the barbarian saviours of this class

¹ This term has been coined out of the name 'Zealots', which was applied to a party in Jewry that made itself notorious in the conflict between Jewry and Rome in the first and second centuries of the Christian Era.

² Part IX, below.

³ On this point see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 331, footnote 1, above.

⁴ For these Red Indian prophets see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 328-31, above.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 331-2, above.

present themselves with the 'time-machine' in one hand and the sword in the other. Their posture is that of the Horatii holding the Transtiberine bridgehead against Lars Porsenna; but their fate is more cruel than that of the legendary Roman heroes, for the barbarian swordsmen's heroism seldom avails to purchase for their tribesmen the time to break the bridge before the invader can pass; and in facing enormous odds in a vain attempt to place their home beyond the reach of the aggressor's arm they more often meet the death of those two Horatii who fell than they escape with their lives like the two slain Roman heroes' brother Publius. The Redskin Sitting Bull wiping out Custer's troop of United States cavalry and surviving the feat to die in his bed in Canada is a far rarer figure in the annals of barbarian Archaism on the war-path than the Sūdānī standard-bearer at the Battle of Omdurman indomitably offering his breast to the machine-gun bullets as he still holds the Mahdi's standard defiantly aloft with his feet astride the corpses of his fallen comrades.¹

This barbarian martyr may stand as the type of a tragic company whose roll-call is too long for us to recite. *Honoris causa* we may single out the names of Caesar's Arvernian victim Vercingetorix and Justinian's Ostrogoth victim Totila and Charlemagne's Saxon victim Widukind.² We may recall the scene of the Negus Theodore blowing out his own brains as he charged, like a lion at bay, out of the ring-wall of a fortress which he had obstinately deemed impregnable until his Magdala was on the point of capture by a British expeditionary force. We may mourn 'Abd-al-Qādir's heroic failure to save Algeria, and 'Abd-al-Karīm's to save the Moroccan Rif, and Shāmyl's to save the Highlands of the Caucasus, from a modern Western imperialism that has armed itself with the lethal weapons of 'the Machine Age'; and we may pay equal respect to a Viriathus who failed to save his Lusitania from a Roman imperialism³ which was in effect as irresistible as our own, even though it was not equipped with our present technical facilities for the wholesale destruction of life and property. We may appreciate the intractability, while abhorring the savagery, of a Stenka Razin and a Pugachev⁴ who successively led the revolt of the Cossack marchmen of the Russian Orthodox Christendom against the relentless determination of a Muscovite imperialism to round up these semi-barbarians⁵ into the corral of a Russian universal state,

¹ For the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad's leadership of a revolt of the Kordofānī Arabs against the penetration of the Nilotic Sudan by an Egypto-Ottoman imperialism equipped with Western weapons see *ibid.*, pp. 209, footnote 3, 294-6, 321, footnote 3, and 324, above.

² See *ibid.*, p. 319.

³ For the trapping of the barbarians in the Iberian Peninsula see *ibid.*, pp. 205-6, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 104, above.

⁵ The Cossacks, who were marchmen from the standpoint of the Russian Orthodox

and break them in to leading the servile life of an internal proletariat.¹ And we may lay a wreath on the graves of the obscure heroes who captained the Nairi highlanders in their stand against the Assyrians,² the Transcaspian Türkmens in their stand against the Russians,³ the Araucanians in their stand against the Spaniards,⁴ and the Maoris⁵ and the Pathans⁶ in their stand against the British.

After this review of would-be saviours with the 'time-machine' who have taken the direction of Archaism, we must complete our present survey by reviewing their futurist counterparts; but we may not find it easy here to draw any hard-and-fast line of demarcation. To begin with, we have seen⁷ that it is in the very nature of Archaism to defeat itself by breaking down into Futurism; and we have just been giving ourselves an empirical demonstration of the working of this historical 'law' in our survey of archaist-saviours in the ranks of the Dominant Minority. In one instance after another we have found that, in the act of resorting to the violence into which their Archaism leads them against their will, these enthusiasts for a vanished Past have veered round, involuntarily but unavoidably, out of an archaistic into a futuristic course. The same transmutation of Archaism into Futurism can be observed in the ranks of the External Proletariat; and here the change is not only promoted by a tendency that is innate in Archaism, and is not only precipitated by a resort to force, but is also foreshadowed, and perhaps even fore-ordained, in the history of the genesis of the body social in which the transmutation takes place.

In other contexts⁸ we have observed that, within the brief Timespan of some 6,000 years during which the species of societies that we have agreed to call 'civilizations' has been in existence up to date, the radiation of the civilizations that have already come and gone has travelled so far and so fast that it has long since made its mark upon every primitive society that it has not destroyed. And it is safe to assume that this brand of an alien culture will have burnt deep into the flesh of a *ci-devant* primitive society that has come to such close quarters with an expanding civilization as to

Christendom (see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 155-7, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 313-15, above), were in origin members of the external proletariat of the Golden Horde (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 283, above).

¹ For the eventual success of the Russian Imperial Government in turning the Cossacks into 'running dogs' of a Muscovite imperialism see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 313-15, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 135, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 475, above.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 323, footnote 3, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 322, above.

⁵ See *ibid.*

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 305-8, and 332-3, and the present chapter and volume, p. 201, footnote 1, above.

⁷ In V. C (i) (d) 8 (ε), pp. 94-7, above.

⁸ In Part II. A, vol. i, pp. 185-7, and in V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 196-7, above.

have been conscripted into its imperious neighbour's external proletariat. It is therefore also safe to predict that even the most fanatically archaistic-minded leader of an external proletariat will find himself unable to carry his Archaism to 'totalitarian' lengths. When he has done his utmost, his tribe will still retain some tincture of the very civilization from which its would-be saviour has been striving to keep its life clear; and this alien cultural tincture will infuse a vein of Futurism into the Archaism of the saviour-archaist himself.

This ineradicable element of Futurism in the life and leadership of an external proletariat that is reacting in the 'Zealot' way to the pressure of an aggressive civilization is most evident in the field of military technique. For the Red Indian saviour-archaists were perhaps unique among their kind in carrying their objection to the use of the White Man's tools to the point of forbidding their followers to use in self-defence the fire-arms with which their White assailants were engaged in annihilating them.¹ In other cases the leaders who have arisen to preach salvation-through-Archaism to the rank-and-file of hard-pressed societies of either species have usually allowed—and frequently enjoined—at least this one exception in the practical application of their saving principle; and, in granting to their followers this single licence of fighting an aggressive alien enemy with his own weapons, they have unintentionally opened in their curtain-wall a breach which can never be closed again but which will be worn ever wider by an inflow of alien influences that will start as a trickle to end in a flood. The impossibility of borrowing this or that element of an alien culture at choice, without eventually making an unconditional surrender to the intrusive alien force, is a fundamental law of the contact of cultures which is examined in this Study in other places.² In the present context we are only concerned with this 'law' in so far as it throws light upon the cause of the change of orientation from Archaism to Futurism which is so frequently to be observed in the reaction of an external proletariat towards the dominant minority against which it is up in arms. When once the barbarian has adopted the weapons of the enemy civilization there are two clear alternatives before him: either he will succumb to the enemy through failing to master the borrowed art, or else he will survive through learning in time to beat his master at his own game. If

¹ For this remarkable veto see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 331, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), pp. 106–7, above, and Parts IX and X, *passim*, below. For the particular operation of this law in the intercourse between an external proletariat and a dominant minority across the stationary frontier of a universal state see V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), vol. v, pp. 459–80, and V. C (i) (d) 7, in the present volume, p. 4, footnote 4, above; and Part VIII, *passim*, below.

we translate this pair of alternatives, as we must, from their literal application in the limited field of military technique into terms that cover the whole of life, we shall conclude that an external proletariat has a choice between being exterminated by the dominant minority with which it is at grips or else overcoming its adversary and stepping into his shoes. And this is, in effect, a choice between an Archaism which spells defeat and a Futurism which may be the key to victory. A barbarian saviour-archaist who is resolved at all costs to avoid the romantic doom of a Vercingetorix must embrace the futuristic ambition of a Visigothic war-lord whose 'dream was to see "Gothia" substituted for "Romania" and Atawulf seated on the throne of Caesar Augustus'.¹

In the ranks of the External Proletariat, Atawulf—in this mood of his unregenerate youth²—may stand as the type of the saviour-futurist. And this Visigothic raider of a Hellenic universal state is an exceptionally articulate representative of a host of barbarian war-lords who have been impelled by a usually quite unreflective appetite for loot and fame to lead their war-bands into the derelict domain of a disintegrating society where the unsophisticated barbarian interlopers may still find an eldorado when the delicately nurtured heirs of the kingdom have already perished miserably there of want and exposure. When Atawulf thus supplants Honorius, the first thing that is apt to strike an observer is the contrast between the triumphant avenger of Vercingetorix and the discomfited successor of Caesar. What can there be in common between the war-lord who is making his fortune by the sword and the emperor who has lost the courage to use the weapon even in defence of his heritage? Yet we have seen³ that the Goth's victorious swordsmanship has been learnt in a Roman school; and if we now look into the next chapter of the story we shall perceive that Caesar's barbarian conqueror is a barbarous caricature of Caesar himself, instead of being, as might appear at first sight, a 'noble savage' whose act of rapine is all but justified in equity by the immensity of the splendid robber's moral superiority over his degenerate victim.

In the history of the expansion of the Hellenic Civilization at any rate, the radiation of the expanding society's political institutions and ideas among the barbarians round about is almost as much in

¹ Orosius, P.: *Adversum Paganos*, Book VII, chap. 43, quoted already in V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 227, above.

² The tendency, illustrated by Atawulf's second thoughts, for a victorious barbarian saviour-futurist to experience a revulsion from Violence towards Gentleness, and from Satanism towards Conservatism, has been examined *ibid.*, pp. 223-7, above. This tendency is also illustrated, as we have there seen, by the careers of a Theodoric, a Yazid, and even an Alaric.

³ In V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), vol. v, pp. 459-69, above.

evidence as the radiation of its military technique. In another context¹ we have seen how the republicanism which was one of the prominent political tendencies of Hellenism in its growth-stage spread from its cradle in Hellas into the barbarian hinterland of the Hellenic World until, by the time when Tacitus was writing his *Germania*, this new-fangled Hellenic institution, in its north-westward line of advance through Italy and Gaul, had supplanted its old-fashioned predecessor, the patriarchal hereditary monarchy, among all the peoples—including even the recent immigrants of Teutonic speech—on the left bank of the Rhine, while it had already begun to undermine the traditional form of kingship among the Transrhenane Frisians and Cherusci. By Tacitus's day, however, at the turn of the first and second centuries of the Christian Era, this typical institution of the growth-stage of the Hellenic Society, which was then still winning converts on the verge of Ultima Thule, had, of course, long since lost its hold upon the heart of the Hellenic World; for by this time more than five hundred years had passed since the growth of the Hellenic Civilization had been cut short by the breakdown of the year 431 B.C.; and a republicanism which was bound up with a phase of Hellenic history which had thus ended in disaster had soon been unceremoniously elbowed away from its native ground by a Macedonian counter-attack of patriarchal monarchy² and by the rise, under this and other constitutional masks, of would-be saviours with the sword. In an age in which the Hellenic institutional wave of republicanism was still making its way, unspent, in the North European barbarian no-man's-land beyond the Rhine, the following wave of dictatorship had already arrived at the frontiers of a Hellenic universal state which owed both its creation and its preservation to a monopoly of dictatorial power in the hands of Caesar Augustus. In the next chapter of Hellenic history this second wave, in its turn, travelled on into the Transrhenane no-man's-land in the wake of its precursor, and its progress was marked by a repetition, *in partibus barbarorum*, of the institutional revolution which had already taken place in a disintegrating Hellenic World.

During the interval between the generation of Tacitus, who was writing in the early days of the Hellenic 'Indian Summer', and the generation of Ammianus Marcellinus, who lived to record the Empire's irretrievable military disaster at Adrianople in A.D. 378, both the budding republicanism of the barbarian communities in the neighbourhood of the Roman *limes* and the sheltered

¹ In V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 213, footnote 1, above.

² For this anachronistic recrudescence of patriarchal monarchy in the heart of the Hellenic World between 379 B.C. and 168 B.C. see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, pp. 485-7, above.

patriarchalism of the remoter barbarians beyond the range of the frontier war-zone¹ were blighted by the malignant growth of a new form of government² which a Hellenic political philosopher would have diagnosed as 'tyranny' and would have assigned, in his classification of constitutions, to the same category as the contemporary Caesarism of the Roman Empire.

'The binding force formerly possessed by kinship was now largely transferred to the relationship between "lord" and "man", between whom no bond of blood-relationship was necessary. . . . The form of government truly characteristic of "the Heroic Age" . . . is an irresponsible type of kingship resting not upon tribal or national law—which is of little account—but upon military prestige. . . . The princes of "the Heroic Age" appear to have freed themselves to a large extent from any public control on the part of the tribe or community. . . . The force formerly exercised by the kindred is now transferred to the *comitatus*, a body of chosen adherents pledged to personal loyalty to their chief. . . . The result of the change is that the man who possesses a *comitatus* becomes largely free from the control of his kindred, while the chief similarly becomes free from control within his community.'

³

Is this profound revolution in the institutional life of a primitive society that has been conscripted into an external proletariat a phenomenon that is peculiar to the history of the North European external proletariat of the Hellenic Society? Or is it a revolution that is apt to overtake any external proletariat as a consequence of its relations with a disintegrating civilization across the stationary frontier of a universal state? The second of these two alternative possibilities would appear to be the nearer to the truth; for the passages that have just been quoted from the work of a modern Western scholar all refer to both of two external proletariats of which the author is here making a comparative study. And, if the historical evidence reveals the war-lord, with his war-band, thus asserting himself, in an unmistakably identical fashion, among the Teutonic-speaking barbarians beyond the pale of the Roman Empire and among the Greek-speaking barbarians in the continental hinterland of the Minoan 'thalassocracy', we may venture to infer that an Atawulf who repeats the exploits of a Pelops and an Atreus⁴ is a typical example of a type of barbarian saviour-futurist that is apt to make its appearance in the external proletariat of any

¹ For the survival of the patriarchal monarchy in Tacitus's day among the Suebi, the Goths, and the Swedes see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 213, footnote 1, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 4, footnote 4, above.

³ Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 365, 390-1, and 443.

⁴ Pelops, like Atawulf, acquired his kingdom by marrying a royal heiress; and Atreus, in his turn, succeeded to the heritage of the Perseidae thanks to a marriage connexion—though in this case the lady was the barbarian interloper's sister and the degenerate emperor's mother, in contrast to the affair of Galla Placidia, who was Honorius's sister and Atawulf's bride.

disintegrating civilization. We need not call the roll of Atawulf's peers; for, in bringing the External Proletariat on to our stage in an earlier chapter, we have already made so many of them march past us at the head of their warriors¹ that the figure of the barbarian saviour-futurist is by this time familiar to us. In this place it is perhaps more pertinent to observe that, however distinctive in themselves, and distinct from one another, our Atawulf-type and Vercingetorix-type may be, it is by no means easy to be sure in every case whether a barbarian saviour with the 'time-machine' belongs to the Gallic archaist's or to the Gothic futurist's company.

In the External Proletariat, at any rate, a distinction which is plain in principle is in practice difficult to draw because the replacement of a saviour-archaist by a saviour-futurist as the leader on the barbarians' side in the tug-o'-war along the frontiers of a universal state takes place by way, not of an abrupt mutation, but of a gradual evolution;² and in the course of this long-drawn-out chapter in the history of the struggle between the External Proletariat and the Dominant Minority there will be some barbarian leaders who will remain archaists with impunity and others who will become futurists without escaping disaster.

As examples of the type of the triumphant barbarian archaist we may cite the obscure leaders of the Scythians who foiled Darius's attempt to extend the Achaemenian Empire on to the Black Sea Steppe; the Cheruscan leader Arminius who foiled Augustus's attempt to extend the Roman Empire into the North European Forest;³ the Sa'ūdī leaders of the Wāhhābīs⁴ who threw off *circa* A.D. 1830 the Egypto-Ottoman yoke which Mehmed 'Alī had fastened upon their necks only about twelve years before at the cost of a nine years' war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1810-18);⁵ and the Gutaeans who not only held out when they were assaulted in their native mountain fastnesses by Naramsin (*dominabatur circa* 2572-2517 B.C.), but survived to take their revenge upon a disintegrating Sumeric Civilization—whose earlier convulsions had launched the

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 3, *passim*, in vol. v, pp. 194-337, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 208-10, above, and Part VIII, *passim*, below.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 205, and V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex I, vol. v, p. 593, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 294-6 and 333-4, above.

⁵ Even at the cost of this amount of time and blood and treasure Mehmed 'Alī would probably have gained no more ground in Arabia than Darius gained in Scythia as the result of a single campaign, if the 'Osmanli empire-builder had not had, and taken, the opportunity to enhance the fighting power of his troops by borrowing from the Western World a discipline and a technique which were alien from the Ottoman spirit of that age, though the West itself had perhaps learned these arts in an Ottoman school (see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 38, footnote 2, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), vol. iv, p. 450, above). This adventitious aid enabled Mehmed 'Alī in Arabia to emulate Justinian's achievement in Italy. But his *tour de force* of asserting the dominion of a Cairene Government over the Najd was just as ephemeral as Justinian's analogous *tour de force* of asserting the dominion of a Constantinopolitan Government over the Basin of the Po (which Justinian's exertions merely converted from a Gothia into a Lombardy).

Akkadian militarist upon his career of aggression—when, less than a hundred years after Naramsin's death, the Gutaean war-bands descended upon the Sumeric Society's homeland on the plains of Shinar and kept their yoke upon their victims' necks for four successive generations (*circa* 2429–2306 B.C.).¹

As examples of unsuccessful barbarian futurists we may cite from the history of the Hellenic World the Suevian war-lord Ariovistus,² and the obscurer war-lords³ of the Cimbri and the Teutones,⁴ who dreamed the dream of Atawulf five hundred years too soon and paid the penalty for their precocity by encountering, not Honorius, but Marius and Caesar. These successive roles which were played by an Ariovistus and an Atawulf on the North European front of the Roman Empire have their analogues on its West African front in the careers of a Jugurtha who came within an ace of succeeding⁵ at the stage at which Ariovistus failed, and a Gildo who only just failed⁶ at the stage at which Atawulf was successful. In an intermediate age, and at the eastern extremity of the North European front, we see a Decebalus who had the makings of a Theodoric being blasted by the thunderbolt of a Juppiter Trajanus. From the history of the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society we may cite the Serb war-lord Stjepan Dušan (*dominabatur* A.D. 1331–55), who achieved the success of a Theodoric (though his achievement was as ephemeral as his Ostrogothic counterpart's) at a stage of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles' which corresponds to the times of Jugurtha and Ariovistus in the history of the Hellenic World.⁷ If we turn to the history of the 'Great Society' of the Westernized World of our own age we may cite, from the vast company of its *dramatis personae*, King Amānallāh of Afghanistan, who has come to grief through recklessly forcing the pace in attempting to put into effect a policy of salvation-through-Futurism⁸ which his moderate and circumspect Wahhābī contemporary King 'Abd-al-'Azīz of Sa'ūdī Arabia has been carrying out with signal success.⁹

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 203 and 262, and the present chapter and volume, p. 184, above, and V. C (ii) (b), pp. 296–7, below.

² See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 219 and 223, above.

³ Ariovistus has been raised out of a like obscurity, not by any prowess of his own, but by the accident that his Roman conqueror Caesar was as great a master of the pen as he was of the sword, whereas Marius merely performed, without recording, his feat of exterminating the Cimbri and Teutones.

⁴ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 218, above.

⁵ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 507, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 218, above.

⁶ For the wave of barbarian aggression which began to beat upon the West African front of the Roman Empire in the last quarter of the fourth century of the Christian Era, see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 221, above.

⁷ For the Serb domination over Macedonia in the latter part of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles' see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 293–4, above.

⁸ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 332–3, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), in the present volume, p. 103, above.

⁹ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 333–4, above.

We can also cite at least one unsuccessful barbarian leader who is bafflingly amphibious. Is the Sicel leader Ducetius (*ducebat circa 466-440 B.C.*) to be classified as an archaist or as a futurist? At first glance we may see nothing but an archaist in the man who led the last of the native barbarians in their last stand against the Greek colonists of Sicily. Is not this a hero of the same class as the Red Indian Chief Sitting Bull or the Sūdānī standard-bearer at the Battle of Omdurman? But a closer examination of Ducetius brings to light one futuristic feature after another.

In the first place Ducetius's original enterprise, with its ambitious aim of uniting all the surviving Sicel communities into a single commonwealth, was manifestly inspired by the example of two miniature empires which had recently been exercised by Greek city-states over Sicel perioeci—the empires which had been won respectively for Agrigentum by her despot Theron (*dominabatur circa 488-472 B.C.*) and for Syracuse by the Deinomenidae (*dominabantur circa 485-466 B.C.*).¹ In the second place Ducetius not only emulated the ambitions of contemporary Greek empire-builders in Sicily but also imitated the methods of contemporary Hellenic statesmanship; for the device by which he sought to give his new Sicel commonwealth cohesion was to 'synoecize' it into a city-state *à la grecque* with its civic centre at Palice.² In the third place, after he had courted and incurred disaster by falling foul of Agrigentum and Syracuse simultaneously,³ Ducetius threw himself on the mercy of his victorious Syracusan adversaries and acquiesced in their decision to send the defeated Sicel patriot into an honourable exile at Corinth—the mother-city of Syracuse in the heart of Hellas. In the fourth and last place Ducetius, so far from becoming estranged from the alien civilization which had now proved itself more than a match for his barbarian arms, became instead so complete a convert to Hellenism that he eventually returned from Corinth to Sicily, not as a refugee who had broken out of prison and was shaking the dust of his captivity from off his feet, but as the Sicel leader of a new swarm of Greek

¹ For these Agrigentine and Syracusan 'empires' see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 211-12, above; for the Deinomenidae see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 357, footnote 1, above. Ducetius's attempt to set up a Sicel empire in Sicily which was to take the place of both these Greek empires was made immediately after the Deinomenids' fall from power.

² Herein Ducetius anticipated by a whole generation the Macedonian King Perdiccas II's creative achievement of inducing the Chalcidian Greek communities *ἐνὶ Θράκης* to 'synoecize' themselves at Olynthus *circa 432 B.C.* (see III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, p. 480, above).

³ Compare the similar—and similarly disastrous—error of statesmanship which was committed by the Rifi barbarian saviour-archaist 'Abd-al-Karīm in A.D. 1925, when, not content with being at war with the Spaniards, he invaded the French Zone of Morocco and thereby drove the French into a military co-operation with the Spaniards which sealed the Rifi patriot's doom (see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), Part II, sections (vi)-(viii)).

colonists. When death overtook him thereafter on the soil of his native island, it found him engaged once again, in this last phase of his career, on his original enterprise of attempting to unite all the surviving Sicel communities into a single commonwealth organized, *more Hellenico*, as a city-state. But Ducetius had not been blind to the lesson of his previous failure, and this time he started to build his Sicel state round a Greek nucleus. This was the significant difference between Ducetius's first experiment in 'synoecism' at Palice and his second experiment at Calacte. And if Fate had granted him the time to carry this second essay in empire-building to completion his Sicel hands would have reared a political structure with a Greek apex and a Sicel base which would have conformed exactly to the Hellenic pattern of the antecedent Siceliot Greek empires which had centred, not on Calacte, but on Syracuse and Agrigentum.

The case of Ducetius illustrates the difficulty of sorting out into an archaist and a futurist group, with a hard-and-fast line of demarcation between them, the would-be saviours with the 'time-machine' who have arisen in the External Proletariat. But when we turn to the Internal Proletariat we shall perhaps not reckon *a priori* on being confronted by any corresponding problem. One of the hall-marks of membership of the Internal Proletariat is an apparently congenital inability to make the archaistic response to the challenge of social catastrophe. It can therefore be taken for granted that every would-be saviour with the 'time-machine' who arises in the Internal Proletariat will be a saviour-futurist; and this certainty might be expected to simplify the rest of our present survey. There is, however, one complication, and that lies in the fact that the futurist leaders of the Internal Proletariat are not all of them drawn from the Internal Proletariat's own ranks.¹

At an earlier point in this Study we have noticed the proclivity of the Dominant Minority to succumb to a process of 'proletarianization' which takes the form of 'vulgarization' when the Internal and not the External Proletariat is the proletarian object of the Dominant Minority's mimesis.² And in the present chapter we have seen that this transfer of social allegiance to the Internal Proletariat from the Dominant Minority, which in a Commodus is the last extravagance of a wanton luxury, may be the first necessity of a baffled idealism in a Gaius Gracchus. It is, indeed, one of the tragic ironies of the Dominant Minority's fate that the idealists who arise in its ranks should tread the same path of social

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 71, above.

² For this phenomenon of 'vulgarization' see V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), vol. v, pp. 445-59, above.

migration as the wastrels. And it is even more tragically ironical that Gracchus should involuntarily work far greater havoc through a nobility to which Commodus could never rise than Commodus can work through a vulgarity into which Gracchus would never fall. Yet this is the melancholy truth. For, while Commodus rapidly reduces himself to impotence by a course of social truancy which is also one of spiritual demoralization, Gracchus's spirit is fortified by a decree of social outlawry which is passed upon him, not by any viciousness in himself, but by the impenitence of adversaries in his own household who cannot forgive him for calling in question the right of his own class to the enjoyment of its ill-gotten privileges. And so, in the sequel, Commodus is uneventfully swallowed up by a slough in which he has delighted to wallow, whereas Gracchus breathes a demonic energy and an explosive driving-force into the souls of the proletarians into whose company he has been thrust by the hostile hands of his own kin and kind.

This revolutionary alliance between an outcast saviour-archaist and an outcast Internal Proletariat is perhaps in some sense fore-ordained from the very beginning of the archaist's career, though it is no part of his original intentions or expectations. The essential feature and supreme attraction of the '*patrios politeia*' which the archaist originally sets out to re-establish is its freedom from social cankers that are penalties of social breakdown and symptoms of social disintegration. His aim is to restore the moral health of Society, and his prescription for dealing with the Proletariat is not to set it in the seat of the Dominant Minority but to abolish both classes at one stroke by closing the breach between them. But the social physician who undertakes to heal the body social by getting rid of the Proletariat in this way is committing himself to a policy of righting the wrongs of the proletarians; for the schism in Society can only be repaired by restoring to its proletarian members the 'stake' in Society of which they have been wrongfully deprived.¹ And this plank in the archaist-reformer's platform is an insuperable stumbling-block for his fellow members of the Dominant Minority, because the Proletariat's loss has been the Dominant Minority's gain. In their eyes the archaist's programme of reform is sheer treason against the reformer's own class, while in his eyes their opposition simply shows them up as hypocrites whose professions of public spirit disgracefully break down as soon as their pockets are touched. Misunderstanding breeds alienation; and, when the tension rises to breaking-point and the Dominant

¹ For the original meaning of the Latin word *proletarii*—i.e. persons whose only 'stake' in Society is the fruit of their own physical procreation—see I. B (iv), vol. i, p. 41, footnote 3, above.

Minority casts the contumacious reformer out, the thwarted and disillusioned idealist now almost joyfully parts company with his own kin and kind and throws himself—crying ‘I will be your leader’—into the arms of a Proletariat which by this time is waiting with arms outstretched to receive him. The Proletariat is content to take the archaist-outcast at the Dominant Minority’s valuation. In their eyes he is a champion of the proletarian cause who has sacrificed for their sake everything in the world except their gratitude and trust; and they give practical expression to these by adopting the outlaw as their leader. This dramatic situation is one which we have encountered in this Study before. ‘The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner.’¹ Paul turns away from the Jews who refuse him a hearing, and delivers his rejected message of salvation to the Gentiles’ open ears. And, while in Jewish eyes the Pharisee-Apostle of Christ is an odious renegade, in Paul’s eyes the Jewry of his generation is an Esau sacrilegiously repudiating his birthright.

When we pass in review the legion of saviour-futurists who have led the Internal Proletariat in their desperate revolts against an intolerable oppression, we see turncoats—or outcasts—from the ranks of the Dominant Minority fighting shoulder to shoulder with comrades who are proletarian-born, and in the confusion of the conflict the social antecedents of each dust-begrimed and blood-bespattered figure are not always easy to ascertain.

In the wave of insurgency that swept across the Hellenic World in the seventh decade of the second century B.C.,² a movement which was launched in Sicily by the Syrian slave Eunus and the Cilician slave Cleon was taken up in Asia Minor by a pretender to the throne of the Attalids who was denounced by his opponents as a bastard.³ With which of his contemporaries is Aristonicus to be classed? With Eunus or with Tiberius Gracchus? Eunus assumed the royal name Antiochus when he proclaimed himself king of a community of freedmen; and another insurrection of the slaves in Sicily was captained by a Salvius who called himself King Tryphon. This Salvius-Tryphon was adopting as his throne-name a *sobriquet* that had been borne as a nickname by an adventurer who in the preceding generation had momentarily usurped the diadem of the Seleucidae. And this Diodotus-Tryphon’s role at Antioch had been as equivocal as Aristonicus’s role at Pergamum. In the third and last act of the Sicilian tragedy, which was

¹ Matt. xxi, 42, quoting Ps. cxviii, 22. Compare Mark xii, 10; Luke xx, 17; Acts iv, 11; Eph. ii, 20; 1 Pet. ii, 7. The passage has been quoted in this Study already in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, p. 248, and in V. C (i) (d) 11, in the present volume, p. 164, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 68–71, above.

³ Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XIV, chap. 38 (p. 646); Justin: *Historiae Philippicae*, Book XXXVI, chap. 4, § 6.

played about half a century after the last of the local slave-revolts had been crushed,¹ the enterprise of establishing an Anti-Rome on Sicilian ground was taken up by an insurgent who, so far from being of servile blood, was a true-born son of Pompey the Great. Sextus Pompeius² was driven into the arms of a beaten but unreconciled proletariat when the Second Triumvirate included his name in their proscription-list. And thereafter, with Sicily for his head-quarters and with Oriental freedmen in command of his fleet, he avenged the defeats of Eunus and Salvius on the children of the Rupili and Luculli and emulated the atrocities of the Cilician pirates who had been swept off the seas by this Roman outlaw's father.

Before he gained possession of his maritime stronghold in Sicily, Sextus had found asylum in a Pyrenaean fastness in the country of the Lacetani; and from this Spanish base of operations he had repeated the exploits of Sertorius,³ a refugee-partisan of Marius who, in an earlier round of a hundred-years-long Roman civil war, had held out in Spain for a decade against the elsewhere victorious lieutenants and successors of Sulla. It was an extraordinary feat of arms for the master of a couple of backward provinces to keep at bay, for that length of time, the forces of a Roman Government which not only held Rome itself but also commanded the resources of all the rest of the Roman Empire. What was the secret of Sertorius's astonishing success? When we look into the history of this Roman outlaw, we find that after he had actually been driven out of Spain into Morocco by a Sullan expeditionary force he was able to recover his foothold in the Peninsula thanks to being invited by the recently conquered Lusitanians to come over and help them against the imperialism of the Roman outlaw's own compatriots.⁴ In other words, Sertorius (*in Hispania militabat circa 82-72 B.C.*) was able to set Rome at defiance because he had been invested with the mantle of Viriathus (*militabat circa 150-140 B.C.*). A barbarian people who had been forcibly transferred from the external to the internal proletariat of an aggressively expanding civilization in consequence of the failure of a native leader to stem the tide of Roman conquest, now called in one of their conquerors to deliver them from a yoke in which they had not yet learnt to acquiesce; and in this last act of the Spanish tragedy the Roman turncoat avenged the defeat of the Lusitanian patriot.

¹ The second of the slave-revolts in Sicily had lasted from about 104 to 100 B.C.; Sextus Pompeius's occupation of the island lasted from about 43 to 36 B.C.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 71, above.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ Like Hamilcar Barca a hundred and fifty years or so before him and the Arab Muslim conquerors some eight hundred years later, Sertorius made his descent on Spain from Africa at the head of a force which included a contingent of Berber troops.

In Italy in the same impious age we see the Roman senator Catiline (*insurgebat* 63–62 B.C.)¹ treading in the footprints of the runaway gladiator Spartacus (*insurgebat* 73–71 B.C.).² In the modern Western World we can espy, among the renegades from a dominant minority who put themselves at the head of the insurgent German peasants in A.D. 1524–5,³ a counterpart of Aristonicus in the ex-Duke of Württemberg Ulrich, and counterparts of Sertorius and Sextus Pompeius in the knights Florian Geyer and Götz von Berlichingen. And in the Westernized Russian World of our own day we ourselves have lived to see the dreams of Spartacus and Catiline translated into reality by the hand of a master-revolutionary who was not a workman and not a peasant and not (as Pugachev had been)⁴ a Cossack and not (as Minin had been)⁵ a butcher. The extraordinary genius who succeeded in establishing a 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' on the ruins of the empire of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great was not himself of proletarian origin. Lenin⁶ was baptized as Vladimír Ulianov, and the father who gave him this respectable name was a gentlemanly official in the Imperial civil service.

This survey of revolutionary leaders of the Internal Proletariat who have been recruited from the ranks of the Dominant Minority will perhaps have sufficed to show that the political prophet without honour who withdraws as an outlaw to return as a saviour on a different social plane is a figure of far-reaching historical importance. We shall not learn much about the true character and worth of these social migrants by taking note of the provisional verdict that has been passed on them by their contemporaries, for it is a matter of common form for them to be execrated as turn-coats by their own kin and kind and to be lauded as martyrs by their new-found comrades. We must form our own opinion on the evidence before us; and this empirical method seems likely to lead us on the whole to a favourable judgement; for, if we repeat our roll-call, we shall find that the ne'er-do-wells of the type of Catiline and the desperadoes of the type of Sextus Pompeius and Sertorius are outnumbered by the disinterested and self-sacrificing idealists—among whom we must reckon not only an Agis and a Cleomenes and a Tiberius and a Gaius Gracchus, who will be accorded the title by a general consensus, but also, at least provisionally, an Aristonicus and a Lenin, whose claim—if we do give them the benefit of the doubt—will evoke a volley of indignant protests. The final judgement on satanist-saviours such as these

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 71, above.

² See *ibid.*, p. 70, above.

³ For the Peasants' Revolt see *ibid.*, p. 167, above.

⁴ See the present chapter, p. 227, above.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 207, above.

⁶ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 179–80 and 181–8, above.

must be left to Time and History; but in regard to the outlaw-saviours in general there are certain matters of fact which we may venture to state here and now. In the first place these outlaws are apt to include in their number some of the noblest souls that are ever born into the Dominant Minority of a disintegrating civilization. In the second place their nobility is the cause of their being cast out by their own kin and kind. In the third place this is the cause of their adoption as leaders by their new proletarian comrades. In the fourth place the 'clouds of glory' which these social migrants trail, as they make their painful transit across a monstrous social gulf, do not thereafter 'fade into the light of common day'. The outlook and ideals and standards and examples with which the saviour-outcasts' advent irradiates the Internal Proletariat's murky native 'ideology' are the only elements of the futurist *Weltanschauung* that survive the inevitable failure of the futurists' forlorn hope. After 'the City of the Sun' has shown itself to have been a 'City of Destruction', the alien light in which it was momentarily and bewilderingly apparelled can still be seen shining above the smoking ruins and the blood-soaked sod; and then at last this glory can be recognized for what it is. It is the celestial light that streams from the mansions of the City of God.¹

Now that we have followed the saviour-outlaw to his journey's end, and have recognized the source of the light which this torch-bearer carries with him, we need not go on to call the roll of the native proletarian leaders with whom he throws in his lot, since we have reviewed these once already in bringing the Internal Proletariat on to our stage.² Our survey of would-be saviours with the 'time-machine' may therefore close at this point with a summary of our findings; and these can be stated in a single sentence: the 'time-machine' has proved to be the fraud which it was accused of being by its quizzical inventor.³ This pretentious piece of clockwork is not, after all, an effective substitute for the sword. The sword's results cannot be attained without shedding blood and taking life; and such murderous work can only be done by dint of the sword's cutting edge. That is why the would-be saviour with the 'time-machine' invariably rejects his new-fangled instrument and gets to work again with his well-proved weapon as soon as things become serious—just as, in our British warfare in the eighteenth century, the Scottish clansmen used to throw their muskets away and draw their claymores

¹ The track which this light imprints, in its transit, on the sensitive medium of legend is examined, in one particularly momentous test case, in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, pp. 376-539, below.

² In V. C (i) (c) 2, *passim*, in vol. v, pp. 58-194, above.

³ For Lewis Carroll's elegant exposure of the catch in the mechanism of the 'time-machine' see the present chapter, p. 214, above.

whenever they were coming to close quarters with the 'redcoats'.

Our present inquiry, as far as we have yet carried it, has shown us that, while there may be no salvation in the sword, there is none in clockwork either. But happily these are not the only means of salvation to which human souls have had recourse in response to the challenge of a disintegrating civilization. We must carry the inquiry farther.

The Philosopher masked by a King.

A means of salvation that does not invoke the aid of either 'time-machine' or sword was propounded in the first generation of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' by the earliest and greatest of Hellenic adepts in the art of Detachment.

'There is no hope of a cessation of evils¹ for the states [of Hellas]—and, in my opinion, none for Mankind—except through a personal union between political power and philosophy and a forcible disqualification of those common natures that now follow one of these two pursuits to the exclusion of the other. The union may be achieved in either of two ways. Either the philosophers must become kings in our states, or else the people who are now called kings and potentates must take—genuinely and thoroughly—to philosophy.'²

In suggesting this cure for social troubles which were not peculiar to the Hellenic World of Plato's day but which are apt (as the Hellenic sage divined) to beset the mundane life of Man in all times and places and circumstances, Plato is at pains to disarm, by forestalling, 'the plain man's' criticism of the philosopher's prescription. He introduces his proposal as a paradox which is likely to bring down upon the sage's head a deluge of ridicule and disrepute. If he doesn't look out he will be mobbed, and he will be lucky if he isn't massacred! Yet, if Plato's paradox is a hard saying for laymen—be these kings or commoners—it is an even harder saying for philosophers. Is not the very aim of Philosophy a Detachment from Life?³ And are not the pursuits of Detachment and of Salvation incompatible to the point of being mutually exclusive? How can one set oneself to salvage a City of Destruction from which one is rightly struggling to be free? How, then, is the sage to reconcile the spiritual exercise to which

¹ Plato's phrase *κακῶν παύλα ταῖς πόλεσι* sounds like a reminiscence of Thucydides' phrase *ἀρχὴ μεγάλων κακῶν τῇ Ἑλλάδι* which has been quoted in this Study in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 62, above. The outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, to which the Thucydidean phrase refers, was the social débâcle from which Plato was fain to rally the Hellenes of his own generation.

² Plato: *Respublica*: 473 D, repeated in 499 B and 501 E. The passage has been quoted already in this Study in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 93, above.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 10, pp. 132-48, above.

he has dedicated his life with a residual scruple of conscience which he can neither justify without ceasing to be a philosopher nor overcome without ceasing to be a man?

In the sight of the philosopher the incarnation of self-sacrifice—Christ Crucified—is a personification of folly.¹ Yet few philosophers have had the courage to avow this conviction, and fewer still to act upon it, without at the same time giving Conscience something of her due. For the adept in the art of Detachment has to start as a man who is encumbered with the common human feelings and who is born, *ex hypothesi*, into a 'Time of Troubles'. The sorrows and sufferings of the age, which have impelled this human being to follow the philosophic way of life, are manifestly pressing no less cruelly upon his contemporaries. He cannot ignore in his neighbour a distress of which his own heart gives the measure, or pretend that a way of salvation which is commended by his own experience would not be equally valuable to his neighbour if only it were pointed out to him. Is our philosopher, then, to handicap himself by lending his neighbour a helping hand? In this moral dilemma it is vain for him to take refuge in the Indic doctrine that Pity and Love are vices,² or in the Plotinian doctrine that 'action is a weakened form of contemplation'.³ Nor can he be content to stand convicted of intellectual and moral inconsistencies of which the Stoic Fathers—a Zeno and a Cleanthes and a Chrysippus—are roundly accused by Plutarch. This eclectic *malleus Stoicorum* is able to quote texts in which the third of the three doctors condemns the life of academic leisure in one sentence and recommends it in another within the limits of a single treatise.⁴ And, in so far as these philosophers of the Stoic school did declare in favour of self-sacrifice in the cause of social service, Plutarch charges them with having failed to practise in their lives the conduct which they were preaching in their publications and their lectures.⁵ We need not attempt to ascertain whether Plutarch's damaging accusations against Zeno and Zeno's disciples are altogether well founded. But we may remind ourselves of Plato's reluctant decision that the adepts who had mastered the art of Detachment could not be permitted to enjoy for ever afterwards the sunlight into which they had so hardly fought their way. With a heavy heart he condemned his perfected philosophers to redescend into the Cave for the sake of helping their

¹ 1 Cor. i. 23, already quoted in V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 150, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 10, pp. 144-8, above.

³ Plotinus: *Ennead* III, viii, 4, quoted in this Study in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 254, above.

⁴ See the two passages quoted from Chrysippus's *De Vitis*, Book IV, in chapters 2 and 20, respectively, of Plutarch's *De Stoicorum Repugnantis*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. 2.

unfortunate fellow men who were still sitting 'in darkness and in the shadow of death, fast bound in misery and iron';¹ and it is impressive to see this grievous Platonic commandment being dutifully obeyed by Epicurus.

The Hellenic philosopher whose ideal was a state of unruffled Imperturbability (*ἀραπαξία*) was also, apparently, the one and only private individual before Jesus of Nazareth to acquire the Greek title of Saviour (*σωτήρ*). That honour was normally a monopoly of princes and a reward for services of a public nature.² Epicurus's unprecedented distinction was an unsought consequence of the cool-headed philosopher's good-humoured obedience to an irresistible call of the heart.³ And the fervour of the gratitude and admiration with which Epicurus's work of salvation is extolled in the poetry of Lucretius makes it clear that, in this case at least, the title was no empty formality but was the expression of a deep and lively feeling which must have been communicated to the Latin poet through a chain of tradition descending without a break from Epicurus's own contemporaries who had known him, and adored him, in the flesh. The Lucretian hymn of praise to a saviour who has braved the direst terrors and dared the farthest flights in order to liberate his fellow men from the prison-house of Superstition has been quoted in this Study already in a different context.⁴ In another passage the same poet compares his Master's writings to the flowery pastures of the honey-bees, and declares these 'golden sayings' to be worthy of immortal life because they dissipate the terrors of the mind and push back the walls of the World.⁵ In a third passage Lucretius hails his saviour-philosopher as a god in words which Virgil afterwards adapted to the apotheosis of a saviour-statesman.

Deus ille fuit, deus, inclyte Memmi,
qui princeps vitae rationem invenit eam quae
nunc appellatur sapientia, quique per artem
fluctibus e tantis vitam tantisque tenebris
in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locavit.⁶

¹ Plato: *Respublica*, 520, and Ps. cvii, 10, quoted in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 251-2, above. A catalogue of Hellenic philosophers who 'did take their share of the burden of public life, instead of being good for nothing but intellectual work, and making that an excuse for living out their lives in peace and quiet', is given by Aelian: *Variae Historiae*, Book III, chap. 17.

² See Pauly-Wissowa: *Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 2nd ed., second series, Halbband v, col. 1214. Ibid., col. 1218, it is pointed out that *σωτήρ* is not yet used as a standing epithet of Christ in the Pauline Epistles.

³ For this see the evidence cited by Professor Gilbert Murray in V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 154, footnote 2, above.

⁴ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*: Book I, ll. 62-79, quoted in II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 299, above.

⁵ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 1-17.

⁶ Ibid., Book V, ll. 8-12, imitated by Virgil in *Eclogue* I, ll. 6-10 (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 648, footnote 4, above).

This paean may sound extravagant in Christian ears; and yet,

If we would speak true,
Much to the Man is due

Who from his private gardens, where
He lived reserved and austere
(As if his highest plot
To plant the bergamot),¹

could bring himself, for the sake of his fellow men, to play the uncongenial part of a saviour-king at the cost of sacrificing an Imperturbability which, for this sage who had sought and found it, was the pearl of great price.

The paradoxical history of Epicurus brings out the grievousness of the burden which the philosophers have to take upon their shoulders if, in setting themselves to carry out Plato's prescription, they follow the alternative of themselves becoming kings; and it is therefore not surprising to find that Plato's other alternative—of turning kings into philosophers—has proved highly attractive to every philosopher with a social conscience, beginning with Plato himself. After considering the possibility that 'sometime—either in the boundless Past or in the Present (in some non-Hellenic clime, far beyond our horizon) or else in the Future—first-rate philosophers somehow have been or are being or will be constrained to undertake the government of a state',² Plato goes on to examine the alternative possibility that 'there might be sons of kings or potentates who were born philosophers'. And he submits that when they had been born with this natural endowment it would not be absolutely inevitable that they should be carried off, and that—however difficult it might be for them to be saved alive—it would at the same time hardly be possible to maintain that no single one among them all would ever be saved in all time.³ In this passage Plato exerts his great powers of persuasiveness to demonstrate the theoretical possibility that a saviour of souls from the wreck of a disintegrating society might be thrown up by the fortuitous operation of Time and Nature and Chance.⁴ But a theory which satisfies the intellect of a thinker in his arm-chair may not avail in practice to relieve him of the necessity of shouldering a social burden which will fall remorselessly on the philosopher's own shoulders if he cannot find any one else to play the part of Atlas.

¹ With these lines of Marvell's on Cromwell compare Aristocreon's couplet on Chrysippus, quoted by Plutarch in *op. cit.*, chap. 2.

² Plato: *Respublica*, 499 C.

³ *Ibid.*, 502 A-B.

⁴ This theoretically possible but practically improbable Platonic means of salvation may be compared with the Epicurean means of creation through one 'infinitesimal swerve' (*exiguum clinamen*) of a single atom (see Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book II, l. 292).

The answer to the question whether it is practical politics for our philosopher to count upon the spontaneous generation of philosophically minded princes will depend, of course, upon the actual frequency of the occurrence of this natural phenomenon; and a survey of the histories of the disintegrations of civilizations up to date will show that the miracle is quite as rare as Plato admits it to be in his disarming apologia for this tentative solution of his problem. In another context¹ we have come across two princes—born into two different worlds at dates more than a thousand years apart—who each made it his mission to use his princely power for promoting the moral unity of Mankind without having been prompted, so far as we know, by any philosopher-mentor. 'Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity'² was at any rate never suggested to Alexander the Great by a tutor who held that all non-Hellenes, and especially those in Asia, were slaves by nature, and whose political ideal, even for a Hellenic commonwealth, was a dominant minority living parasitically upon the fruits of the labours of a servile proletariat.³ And, if it is certain that Alexander did not learn his lesson from Aristotle, it is at least not proven that he learnt it from any other source than his own experience of things human and divine.⁴ Nor is there any evidence to impugn Ikhnaton's title to originality—though we know so much less about Ikhnaton's upbringing and antecedents than we know about Alexander's that in this Egyptian case the *argumentum ex silentio* is far from being conclusive. The most that we can say is that, in the present state of our knowledge, both Ikhnaton and Alexander would appear to fall within Plato's category of kings' sons who were born philosophers, who lived to reign, and who attempted, on the throne, to translate into political practice a philosophy that was apparently all their own.⁵ At the same time we shall find that these two

¹ In V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 6-12, above.

² Ps. cxxxiii. 1.

³ The extremeness of the contrast between Alexander's vision of Homonoia and Aristotle's conception of Hellenism as a cultural superiority carrying with it a title to political and economic privileges is brought out in Tarn, W. W.: *Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind* (London 1933, Milford), p. 4. For Aristotle's gospel of social salvation through caste see the present Study, Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 93-7, above.

⁴ The evidence on this question is brilliantly examined by Tarn in op. cit.

⁵ We are bound to speak in these guarded terms in presenting Alexander's and Ikhnaton's claims to originality; for, while it is hardly conceivable that Alexander can have acquired direct from Ikhnaton himself the philosophical idea which was common to these two princes—considering that, in all probability, Alexander did not even know that such a person as Ikhnaton had ever existed—it is not inconceivable that the Macedonian and the Theban philosopher-king may have each derived the idea, quite independently of one another, from a common source. On the one hand we know that the conception of a brotherhood of all Mankind through the common beneficence of God, as this is expressed in Ikhnaton's Hymn to the Aton, was anticipated in Egyptian literature in an earlier hymn—written at least a generation before Ikhnaton's day—which was addressed not to the Aton but to the tutelary god of Thebes who had been raised by Ikhnaton's predecessor Thothmes III to the divine presidency of a Pan-Egyptian

names exhaust our list; and this result of an empirical test will lead us to the conclusion that, if the philosopher is really in earnest in his quest for a philosophically minded prince who will satisfy the demands of the philosopher's social conscience and will thereby absolve the philosopher himself from going into politics, then the philosopher cannot afford simply to sit back and let Nature, uncontrolled, take her utterly wayward course. He must personally take a hand to the extent at any rate of developing and improving upon Nature where she shows herself susceptible of philosophic cultivation. If the philosopher wishes to insure against the risk of being called upon to play Atlas himself, he must be willing at least to play Atlas' mentor.

This solution of the philosopher's moral problem has been propounded by the Stoic Father Chrysippus.

'The sage', he says, 'will readily put up with the institution of kingship, because he will turn it to account. And if he cannot be

Pantheon under the title of Amon-Re (for this anticipation of Ikhnaton's intuition see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, p. 695, footnote 2, above). On the other hand we know that a deep impression was made upon Alexander's mind by what passed between him and the priests of Amon when he visited the god's oracle-shrine in the Oasis of Siwah in 331 B.C. According to Plutarch (*Life of Alexander*, chap. 27), Alexander wrote to his mother Olympias that he had received certain private answers from the oracle which he would communicate to her, and her only, on his return. This message, if authentic, might of course be no more than a hint of the declaration, which the oracle is reported to have made to Alexander, that his true father was not Philip the son of Amyntas but was the god himself. And while this declaration was taken seriously by Alexander—who could hardly help being thrilled at hearing himself hailed as the son of a divinity whom the Hellenes identified with Zeus—it might have meant no more on the lips of the Egyptian priests themselves than an official recognition of Alexander as a legitimate heir to the throne of a Pharaoh who had continued to bear the title of an adopted son of Re long after he had ceased in fact to be regarded as being himself a living god (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 412-13, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, p. 653, above). It is possible, however, that even if these were the words and the meaning of the oracle of Amon when it was consulted by Alexander there may still have been something more than that in the Egyptian divinity's communication to the Hellenic war-lord; and some such larger message may be the source of Alexander's saying that 'God is the common father of all men, but he makes the best ones peculiarly his own' (Plutarch: *Life of Alexander*, chap. 27, quoted in V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 9, above). Did the oracle go on to tell Alexander that, in so far as his divine parentage was not a mere official formality but was a living spiritual truth, this parentage was no single human being's peculiar prerogative, and that, in making the best of his children peculiarly his own, God was charging them with the mission of bringing their fellow men to perceive and live up to the truth that all men were brothers in virtue of God's common fatherhood? In other contexts (in I. C (ii), vol. i, pp. 140-4, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 413, above) we have seen that the principal motif in the drama of Egyptian religious history was the gradual admittance of the common man to a share in certain religious hopes and consolations which had originally been the monopoly of a divine king and his privileged courtiers. This gradually achieved realization of the spiritual brotherhood of all men may have been furthered by the elevation of Amon, the originally parochial god of Thebes, to the status of a high god who was the common lord and benefactor of all Mankind up to the farthest limits of the sweep of Pharaoh's sceptre (for the elevation of Amon to this position by the Emperor Thothmes III see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, pp. 530-1, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 653-4 and 695, above). Was the brotherhood of Mankind through the common fatherhood—or at any rate the common providence—of God one of the special tenets of the worship of Amon-Re from Thothmes III's time onwards? And was this mystery successively and independently learnt from the lips of Amon's priests by Ikhnaton in the fourteenth and by Alexander in the fourth century B.C.?

King himself he will be at the King's elbow both in peace and in war (συμβιώσεται βασιλεὶ καὶ στρατεύσεται μετὰ βασιλέως).¹

And more than a century before these words were written by Chrysippus the policy which they formulate had been put into action by Plato.

No less than three times in his life Plato voluntarily, though reluctantly, emerged from his Attic retreat and crossed the sea to Syracuse in the hope of converting a Sicilian despot to an Athenian philosopher's conception of a prince's duty. In his encounter, on his first visit, with the hard-bitten Dionysius I, Plato's expectations may not have been great; but his hopes rose higher when the founder of the second dynasty of Syracusan despots was succeeded by a son who had been saved by his father's criminal success in wading through slaughter to a throne from the horrid necessity of gaining his own throne by so unpropitious a method. Plato's failure to make a philosopher-king out of Dionysius II was the great practical disappointment of Plato's life. Yet the unexpected barrenness of his second and third visits to Syracuse was partially redressed by the unexpected fruitfulness of the first; for the shaft which, on that first campaign, the Attic archer had shot into the Sicilian air had smitten the heart of a statesman who became the brother-in-law of each of the Dionysii in turn besides being the uncle of the younger of them. 'When', Plato wrote long afterwards in retrospect, 'I conversed with Dio, who was then still quite a young man, and instructed him in my notions of the principles of ethics as a practical ideal for him to act upon, I suppose I had no idea that, all unwittingly, I was really in some sense paving the way for a future overthrow of despotism.'² In the fullness of time Dio put down from his seat a nephew and brother-in-law who had refused to play that part of philosopher-king for which Plato had perhaps rather arbitrarily cast him; and, when Dio, installed in Dionysius's place, brought down upon himself the tragic verdict of being *capax imperii nisi imperasset*,³ the enterprise which had proved too much for this self-consciously enlightened Syracusan prince was executed by the un-self-consciously public-spirited Corinthian freeman Timoleon.⁴

Plato's relation to Dio is the classic example of the influence of the philosopher behind the throne in a situation in which the monarch and his mentor are in immediate personal contact. In later acts of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' this situation is

¹ Chrysippus: *De Vitis*, Book I, quoted by Plutarch: *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*, chap. 20.

² Plato's Letters, No. 7, 327 A.

³ Tacitus: *Histories*, Book I, chap. 49.

⁴ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex I, vol. iv, pp. 589-91, above.

reproduced in the relation of the Borysthenite¹ Stoic philosopher Sphaerus to the Spartan King Cleomenes III,² and in the relation of the Cumaeian Stoic philosopher Blossius to the Roman statesman Tiberius Gracchus and to the Pergamene revolutionary Aristonicus.³ In the history of the Hindu World the acts of the Emperor Akbar—the founder of a Mughal Rāj which served as a Hindu universal state—reflect the results of the Emperor's personal converse with a number of diverse spiritual advisers: Muslim, Zoroastrian, Christian, and Jain.⁴ In the history of the Western World in its so-called 'modern' chapter we can likewise discern in the acts of a Frederick and a Catherine and a Joseph the results of the personal intercourse between these 'enlightened' Hohenzollern and Muscovite and Hapsburg monarchs and the contemporary French philosophers from Voltaire downwards.⁵

Such direct personal relations are no doubt the most effective; but it is not impossible for a philosopher-mentor to find ways and means of exerting his influence on less onerous terms. For example, when the founder of the Stoic school was besought by the restorer of the Macedonian monarchy to come over into Macedonia and help him,⁶ Zeno did not choose to leave his Attic cloister in order to hang about a Pellan court, but sent his disciples Persaeus and Philonides as his proxies.⁷ Nor is it only on princes

¹ Sphaerus was a Borysthenite according to Plutarch (*Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 23), but a Bosporan [i.e. a native of the Cimmerian, not the Thracian, Bosporus?] according to Diogenes Laertius (*Lives of the Philosophers*, Book VII, chap. 177).

² Since, according to Plutarch, op. cit., loc. cit., Sphaerus's sojourn at Sparta, in the course of which the future king imbibed the philosopher's teaching, had already begun when Cleomenes was still a child, it may be conjectured that Sphaerus's influence was a factor in the political career not only of Cleomenes but also of the Agiad saviour-king's Eurypontid predecessor and ensample Agis IV (see Bidez, J.: *La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil chez les Stoïciens* (Paris 1932, Les Belles Lettres), p. 38).

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 179–80, above.

⁴ For Akbar's mentors, and for this eclectically minded monarch's attempt to found a new 'fancy religion' of his own by combining some of the elements of their respective doctrines, see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 699–704, above.

⁵ The eighteenth-century French philosophers were admittedly inspired by seventeenth-century English forerunners; the writings of these English philosophers had been an academic response to the political challenge of a conflict between Crown and Parliament; and the English revolutions of the seventeenth century had been precipitated by a previous impact of Italian institutions and techniques and ideas upon Transalpine Europe (for the political reaction that was evoked, in England, by the enhancement of the royal power through an infusion of Italian efficiency, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 357–63, above).

⁶ For Antigonus's bent towards philosophy see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 132, above, and Tarn, W. W.: *Antigonus Gonatas* (Oxford 1913, Clarendon Press), chap. 8: 'Antigonus and his Circle.'

⁷ Though Persaeus was Zeno's favourite disciple (and incidentally his fellow countryman), he does not appear to have proved himself an altogether satisfactory substitute for the Master himself; and he had an unfortunate end after his Macedonian pupil-patron had eventually disposed of him by making him exchange a mentor's job for a viceroy's. Antigonus placed Persaeus in command of the Macedonian garrison of Corinth; and here, in 243 B.C., the philosopher-in-harness allowed himself to be taken by surprise by the soldier-statesman-in-embryo Aratus of Sicyon. Thus Zeno's experiment in playing mentor to a prince at second hand did not turn out very well; and the philosopher who did have an effect upon King Antigonus Gonatas' life and work was neither Zeno's disciple nor Zeno himself but Bion the Borysthenite—a free lance who atoned for his

who are his own contemporaries that a philosopher-mentor is able to produce an effect at second hand. For, when the Stoic emperor-philosopher Marcus Aurelius (*vivebat* A.D. 121-80) mentions, in the roll-call of his spiritual creditors,¹ the names of two Stoic philosophers—Sextus of Chaeronea and Quintus Junius Rusticus—who had personally instructed him in his youth, he is citing only the last of many links in a golden chain of Stoic mentors of Roman statesmen which can be traced back without a break, through a quarter of a millennium and more, from the age of Marcus and Rusticus to the age of Scipio Aemilianus (*vivebat circa* 185-129 B.C.) and Panaetius.

This Rhodian Stoic Father of the second century B.C., who had sat, with Blossius, at the feet of Antipater of Tarsus, was the mentor of Marcus in a deeper sense than either Rusticus or Sextus. For, though the two Stoic tutors of the future emperor may have been the most celebrated representatives of their school in their day, they would never have had an opportunity to do their work had it not been for their distant Rhodian predecessor who had planted the first shoots of Stoicism in Roman soil. And the chain of philosopher-mentors that runs back from Rusticus to Panaetius has its parallel in the chain of statesmen-pupils that can be traced from Marcus through Domitian's victims Herennius Senecio and Arulenus Rusticus and Vespasian's victim Helvidius Priscus and Nero's victims Seneca and Thrasea Paetus and Claudius's victim Caecina Paetus and Caecina's wife Arria, who showed her husband how to die, till we come to Cato Minor—the Roman Stoic proto-martyr²—and finally to Panaetius's own pupil Gaius Laelius Sapiens, a contemporary of Scipio Aemilianus and Tiberius Gracchus who managed to live into the early years of the Roman century of revolution (133-31 B.C.) without allowing himself to be robbed of his sweetness and serenity.

The chain of Stoic mentors that runs back to Panaetius from the Emperor Marcus's tutors Rusticus and Sextus has a Neoplatonic parallel. Maximus of Ephesus (*vivebat circa* A.D. 300-71), who was the personal instructor of the Emperor Julian (*vivebat* A.D. 331-63), was himself a disciple of Aedesius, who had been in his day the favourite disciple of Iamblichus; and the nonsense which

disreputability by taking the trouble to answer in person the philosophically inclined prince's call. According to a modern Western scholar (Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 235),

'It is probable that Bion's relations with Antigonus were very much closer than written tradition gives us any idea of. Among the fragmentary notices that remain relative to the two men or to their sayings, the parallels in language are too frequent and curious to be accidental.'

In support of this view, Tarn (*op. cit.*, p. 236, footnote 47) quotes six examples.

¹ This roll-call occupies the first book of Marcus's *Meditations*.

² For Cato Minor and the influence of his example on later generations of Roman aristocrats see V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 390, and V. C (i) (d) 3, vol. v, p. 405, above.

Iamblichus had imported into the philosophy of Porphyry and Plotinus had been principally inspired by a work from the pen of a Babylonian medicine-man (a namesake of the Emperor Julian's) who had practised his trade on Hellenic ground in the reign of Marcus Aurelius.¹ This Julian the medicine-man stands to Julian the Emperor as the philosopher Panaetius stands to the Emperor Marcus.

There are also cases of a philosopher exerting an influence upon a prince or statesman across a gulf of time without any chain of intermediaries. For example, Gaius Gracchus was manifestly influenced by the ideas of his elder brother Tiberius's mentor Blossius²—though it is certain that Blossius died seven years before the year of Gaius's first tribunate,³ and uncertain whether Gaius had been in personal touch with Blossius even in the years before the date of the philosopher's flight from Italy after the murder of Tiberius.⁴ Timoleon, again, can hardly have been unaffected by the ideas of his precursor Dio's mentor Plato⁵ when he accepted the mission of sailing to Syracuse in Dio's wake—though by the year in which Timoleon set sail Plato had been some three years dead,⁶ and there is no record of any personal intercourse between the Attic philosopher and the Corinthian statesman during Plato's lifetime. The Indic philosopher Siddhārtha Gautama exerted his influence upon the Mauryan Emperor Açoka after a Time-interval of more than two centuries, if the Buddha died in 487 B.C. and Açoka came to the throne in 273 B.C. But perhaps the most extraordinary example of this exertion of influence at long range is Confucius's effect upon the minds and lives of the two Manchu emperors K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung.

The first of these two Confucian princes did not begin to reign until more than two thousand years had passed since his mentor's death; the Far Eastern Society into which K'ang Hsi was born was sundered from the Sinic Society, in whose bosom Confucius himself had lived and taught, by a social interregnum which deepened the gulf dug by Time; and K'ang Hsi himself was not

¹ For the abortive Neoplatonic Church which Iamblichus tried to found and Julian to establish see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), vol. v, pp. 565–7, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, pp. 680–3, above. For the Emperor Julian's debt to the Babylonian medicine-man of the same name see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, p. 680, footnote 3, above.

² For Blossius's relation to Tiberius Gracchus and to Aristonicus see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 179–80, above.

³ Gaius Gracchus was Tribune of the Plebs for the first time in 123 B.C.; Blossius had committed suicide after the defeat of Aristonicus in 130 B.C.

⁴ Blossius appears to have fled from Italy to Pergamum in 132 B.C., and it was only in this year that Gaius Gracchus returned to Italy from Spain.

⁵ For Plato's general idea of the right relation between philosophy and politics see the passage quoted from *The Republic* on p. 242, above. For Dio's spiritual debt to Plato, as this was estimated by Plato himself, see Plato's Seventh Letter, *passim*.

⁶ Timoleon sailed in 344 B.C.; Plato had died in 347 B.C.

even a native-born son of the Far Eastern Civilization, but was a cultural convert from a horde of recently installed barbarian conquerors. The influence of Confucius upon K'ang Hsi was a brilliant posthumous consolation prize for the disappointment, in Confucius's own lifetime, of the hopes of a Sinic sage whose offers of service had been rejected by the Sinic princes of the day;¹ and this posthumous reversal of fortune was as ironic as it was extreme, for, in offering himself in the role of mentor, the Sinic sage had not just been making a half-hearted compromise with an importunate conscience in the manner of his Hellenic and Indic counterparts. In Confucius's eyes the role which Confucius never succeeded in playing effectively until long after his death was no grudgingly paid debt to the ineradicable human nature of the social animal under the sage's cloak: it was for him the only role in which a philosopher could properly follow his spiritual calling.²

Our survey of philosopher-mentors has revealed some notable instances of successful education. The state of the Indic World under the rule of Gautama's pupil Açoka and that of the Hellenic World under the rule of Panaetius's pupil Marcus bear out Plato's contention³ 'that social life is happiest and most harmonious where those who have to rule are the last people who would choose to be rulers'. And there are other enlightened monarchs who, though they may not have quite lived up to that standard, have at any rate testified to the truth. Antigonus Gonatas, for example, 'when he saw his son behaving all too violently and insolently towards his subjects, said to him "Don't you know, my boy, that our monarchy is only a glorified slavery?"' ⁴ 'Frederick William called himself "the field marshal and finance minister of the King of Prussia", Frederick the Great "the first servant of the State"'.⁵ Yet, in spite of a few successes such as these, our general conclusion will be that the device of serving Humanity through the soul of a king—as a ventriloquist talks to his audience through the mouth of his puppet—is not a satisfactory solution of the philosopher's personal problem of paying his moral debt to Society without abandoning his own precious Detachment.

We observe that a Dionysius II, who had been born and brought

¹ Confucius's career of contemporary failure and posthumous success has been cited as an example of Withdrawal-and-Return in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 328-30, above.

² In Confucius's view the ultimate purpose of self-cultivation, which was the Superior Person's first duty, was the purification of his neighbour and of the entire community. Confucius thought of himself, not as a happily detached sage, but as an unfortunately unemployed man of action (see Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), pp. 466-7 and 543).

³ In *Respublica* 520 D, quoted in this Study already in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 252, above.

⁴ Aelian: *Variae Historiae*, Book II, chap. 20.

⁵ Bruford, W. H.: *Germany in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge 1935, University Press), p. 28.

up in the purple, turned out to be as unpromising a subject for Plato's educative efforts as a Dionysius I who had had to seize his power by force; and neither of the two Dionysii is so discouraging a case for the experimental philosopher as their kinsman Dio; for Dio had the double advantage of possessing an aptitude for philosophy without being either a reigning despot or a despot's heir apparent; yet his mere proximity to a throne had spoilt Dio to a degree which made it almost a foregone conclusion that he would come to grief in the high-minded enterprise on which he eventually embarked. Dio aspired to transfigure his native city-state of Syracuse into Plato's ideal commonwealth by appearing in the role, not of saviour-despot, but of saviour-liberator; but the sequel to his *coup* of ejecting his despot-nephew Dionysius was tragically ironic. The would-be liberator lived to commit a tyrant's crimes before dying a tyrant's death which left the coast clear for his evicted kinsman to come back again. And the sequels to the labours of other philosopher-kings and philosopher-statesmen have been equally disappointing. Though Timoleon was able to execute Dio's unfulfilled design, even Timoleon's success was no more than ephemeral. By the date of the Corinthian elder-statesman's death at Syracuse, Agathocles had already been born at Thermae to become a greater scourge to the Siceliots than either of the Dionysii. The sequel to the career of Sphaerus's pupil Cleomenes was the tyranny of Nabis and the subsequent collapse of the Lacedaemonian body politic. The sequel to the career of Blossius's pupil Tiberius Gracchus was a century of revolution and civil war which tore the Roman body politic to pieces and was only brought to an end at the price of acquiescence in a permanent dictatorship. The sequel to the philosophic eclecticism of Akbar was the religious bigotry of Awrangzib. The West European enlightenment which seeped through philosophical channels into Central and East European courts in the eighteenth century brought in its trail an infection of the West European political virus of Nationalism which first attacked the *bourgeoisie* and is now ravaging the masses. Bion's pupil Antigonus Gonatas was succeeded in due course by a Philip V, whose personal folly undid the political results of Gonatas' personal self-discipline. Panaetius's pupil Marcus deliberately broke with an admirable custom of adoption, which had been inaugurated by Nerva, in order to bequeath the Principate to his own physical offspring in the person of Commodus! The Babylonian medicine-man's pupil and namesake Julian taught Theodosius how to turn a Neoplatonist emperor's fanaticism to a Christian fanatic's account. The personal holiness of Gautama's pupil Açoka did not save the Mauryan

Empire from collapsing at a blow from the fist of the usurper Pushyamitra. And in the Far Eastern World the eighteenth-century splendour of the reign of Confucius's pupil Ch'ien Lung was followed, within little more than forty years from the death of this second Manchu philosopher-emperor, by an age of disasters and humiliations which was opened by the first salvo of British naval ordnance in 'the Opium War' and which was not yet in sight of its end in a year which was the ninety-eighth anniversary of that sinister date.

Nor is the picture different when we turn from these kings who have been made philosophers by force of example to those who have been born philosophers without requiring mentors. Ikhnaton's vision of peace through fraternity was marred, even before the Egyptian visionary's death, by the beginning of the break-up of 'the New Empire'; and in the sequel even the homelands of the Egyptian Society in the Nile Valley were only saved from barbarian clutches by the rude hands of soldier-emperors who unceremoniously thrust their way on to a throne which Ikhnaton and his like were too delicate to hold. As for Alexander's vision of the same ideal goal of human endeavours, it did, as we have seen,¹ continue to haunt the Hellenic World thereafter. But the immediate sequel to Alexander's career was not Augustus's partially successful translation of a Macedonian dream into a Roman reality. The immediate sequel was the warfare of diadochi and epigoni who contended with one another, for two live-long generations, over the spoils of the Achaemenian Empire in campaigns that ravaged the domains of no less than five civilizations.² The practical effect of Alexander's career was thus the very opposite of the philosophic war-lord's intentions. So far from living to establish the ideal *Pax Oecumenica* of which he dreamed, he merely lived to destroy an actual *Pax Achaemenia* which he only learnt to appreciate at its proper worth after he had dealt it its death-blow.³

Thus an empirical survey which registered a certain amount of

¹ In V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 6-11, above.

² The Hellenic, Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indic worlds were all involved in the sordid struggles of the Macedonian *conquistadores*.

³ For Alexander's tardy appreciation of Persian virtues see V. C (i) (c) 1, vol. v, pp. 51-2, and V. C (i) (c) 7, in the present volume, p. 9, above. This feat of insight bears witness both to the sublimity of Alexander's genius and to the profundity of his failure. In his personal attitude towards an imperial people with whom he had become acquainted only as their conqueror and supplanter, Alexander was able to rise above a Hellenic prejudice which had been part and parcel of the Hellenic tradition throughout the century and a half that had passed since the failure of Xerxes' attempt to conquer European Greece, and which, among the Hellenes of Alexander's own generation and entourage, had merely been confirmed and accentuated as a result of Alexander's military victories. Yet this extraordinary spiritual achievement of Alexander's, which puts all his military glory into the shade, was the Dead-Sea fruit of an act of wanton destruction which it proved impossible for Alexander to repair, just because he was almost the only Hellenic of this day who learnt to appreciate the worth of the thing that had been destroyed by Alexander's own military prowess.

success at the first assay now reveals an overwhelming preponderance of failure when the investigation is pursued, beyond the first chapter, to the end of the story. The philosopher-king—be he a philosopher born or the receptive pupil of a philosopher-mentor—turns out, after all, to be incapable of saving his fellow men from the shipwreck of a disintegrating society. To this extent the facts speak for themselves; but we have still to ask whether they also provide their own explanation. And, if we consult them again with this question in mind, we shall again find that they duly yield an answer.

This answer is indeed implicit in the passage of *The Republic* in which Plato introduces on to his stage the figure of the prince who is a born philosopher. After putting forward his postulate that, sometime and somewhere, at any rate one such born philosopher-prince will live to ascend his father's throne and will there make it his business to translate his own philosophical principles into political practice,¹ Plato eagerly jumps to the conclusion that 'a single one such ruler would suffice—if he could count on the consent of the governed (πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην)—to carry out in full a programme that looks quite impracticable under existing conditions'. And the conductor of the argument then goes on to explain the grounds of his optimism. 'Supposing', he continues, 'that a ruler were to enact our ideal laws and introduce our ideal social conventions, it would assuredly not be beyond the bounds of possibility that his subjects should consent to act in accordance with their ruler's wishes.'²

These final propositions are manifestly essential to the success of Plato's scheme for making a philosopher's Utopia work out 'in real life'; but they are no less manifestly dependent upon an enlistment of the faculty of mimesis; and at earlier points in this Study³ we have observed that this resort to a kind of social drill—with the object of bringing and keeping an uncreative rank-and-file abreast of a creative leader—is a short cut which is apt to bring those who take it to destruction instead of expediting their journey towards their goal. The inclusion of any element of coercion—mental or physical—in the social strategy of the philosopher-king would therefore perhaps suffice in itself to account for his failure to bring to pass the salvation which he professes to offer; and, if we examine his strategy more closely from this standpoint, we shall find that his use of coercion is particularly gross. For, though Plato is at pains to give the philosopher-king's government the

¹ For this postulate of Plato's see the present chapter, p. 245, above.

² Plato: *Respublica*, 502 A-B.

³ In III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 245-8, and IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, pp. 119-33, above.

benefit of the consent of the governed, it is evident that there would be no purpose in the philosopher's surprising personal union with a potentate who is to be an absolute monarch unless the despot's power of physical coercion is to be held in readiness for use in case of necessity; and the case in point is as likely to arise as it is obvious to foresee.

'The nature of the peoples is inconstant, and it is easy to persuade them of a thing, but difficult to hold them to that persuasion. Accordingly it is expedient to be so equipped that, when their belief gives out, one will have it in one's power to make them believe by force.'¹

In these wholesomely brutal words Machiavelli brings out a sinister feature in the strategy of the philosopher-king which Plato almost disingenuously slurs over. If ever the philosopher-king finds himself at a point at which he is no longer able to gain his end by the exercise of charm or bluff, he will throw away his copy-book of moral maxims and proceed to enforce his will by laying about him with a sword which he took care not to lay aside when he exchanged his royal robe for a philosopher's mantle. Even a Marcus reluctantly resorted to this *ultima ratio regum*, and that not only against Parthian and Marcomannian fighting-men beyond the frontier, but also against unarmed and unresisting Christians in the interior.² Such a denouement is a scandal which brings the philosopher-king's whole profession into disrepute; for the mantle is an even more deceitful cloak than the robe for concealing a lethal weapon. Once again we are presented with the shocking spectacle of Orpheus changing into a drill-sergeant;³ and in this case the simile is a literal description of the fact; for the king who drops the philosopher's mask is a drill-sergeant whose instruments are not the psychological devices of 'personal magnetism' and 'the confidence trick', but the physical weapons of the cat-o'-nine-tails and the firing-squad.

If a flagrant resort to coercion thus turns out to be the false step that explains the failure of the philosopher-king when he is a philosopher born, the same explanation holds good *a fortiori* when the philosopher-king is merely the royal pupil of an academic mentor. In proof of this it will be sufficient to take note of Plato's analysis of his own motives for accepting the invitation to revisit Sicily which he received, on Dio's initiative, from the Younger Dionysius after the accession of that prince to his father's throne at Syracuse.

'After [the death of the Elder Dionysius] Dio came to think that perhaps he might not for ever remain solitary in holding the views which

¹ Machiavelli, Niccolò: *Il Principe*, chap. 6, quoted already in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 389, footnote 3, above.

² See p. 202, footnote 1, above.

³ For this simile see IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, p. 123, above.

he himself had acquired as a result of the proper instruction [imparted to him by Plato during the Athenian philosopher's earlier visit to Syracuse]. He noticed, from observation, that the same views were taking root in other minds too—not in many, but any way in some; he thought that, with Heaven's help, [the Younger] Dionysius might perhaps come to be numbered among these converts; and, if anything like that did happen, this in turn, as Dio saw it, would raise his own life, and the life of the whole Syracusan community, to a hardly imaginable degree of felicity. Further, Dio thought it essential that at all costs I should come to Syracuse post-haste to collaborate with him in all this. He had not forgotten our previous intercourse with one another and how effectively this had stimulated in him a passion to live the life that was finest and best. If he could now achieve the same result in Dionysius, which was what he had set himself to do, then he had great hopes of being able to make the life of happiness and truth into a general and permanent institution of the country, without the bloodshed and the loss of life and the other evils that have come to pass in the event.

'Having come to these conclusions—which were right—Dio persuaded Dionysius to send me an invitation, and at the same time he sent a personal message of his own, begging me to come post-haste at all costs, before others would have time to gain Dionysius's ear and divert him into some other way of life than the best way. At the risk of prolixity I shall recapitulate the considerations with which Dio supported his plea. "What opportunities", he asked, "are we to wait for that could be more favourable than those which have now been presented by a heaven-sent piece of good fortune?" And he went on to dwell, in detail, upon the extent of the Dionysian dominions in Italy and Sicily, and upon his (Dio's) own power in the state; upon Dionysius's youth and the intensity of his passion for an education in philosophy; upon the ripeness of his (Dio's) own nephews and other intimate friends for conversion to the doctrine and the way of life which I consistently preached; and upon the strength of the influence which they would have on Dionysius, in helping to convert him along with them. "And so (he concluded) now, if ever, is the moment for a realization of all our hopes of a personal union between philosophy and political power¹ in a state of large calibre."

"These—with many others in the same strain—were the arguments with which Dio sought to prevail upon me. As regards my own opinion. it was divided between an anxiety on the score of how things might go with the young people—considering how volatile are the passions of youth and how often they react by "going into reverse"—and a confidence in the character of Dio, which was, I knew, stable by nature and was now also fortified by the comparative maturity of his age. So I long debated and hesitated whether I should go, as I was asked, or what I should do, till in the end I inclined to the opinion that, if ever a philosopher was to set himself to realize his ideas about legislation and government,

¹ See the passage from *The Republic*, 473 C-D, that has been quoted in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 93, and again in the present chapter and volume, p. 242, above.—A.J.T.

this was just the occasion for making that experiment, since I now had only to convince one person thoroughly and at this one stroke I should have achieved a whole world of good.

"These were the considerations that led me to take the bolder course and set out from home, not at all in the spirit with which some people have credited me, but under a most powerful moral compulsion not to lose my own self-respect, as I was in danger of losing it if I were to be convicted, in my own judgement, of being simply nothing but a mere voice—a fellow who would never take action, not even a hand's turn, if he could help it. I was also afraid of waking up to find that I had proved false, among other things, to my friendship with my former host, Dio, and this at a time when he was really in no little danger. Suppose that some misfortune were to overtake him and he were to be banished by Dionysius and his other enemies and then arrive at my door as a fugitive and interrogate me like this: "Plato, I come to you as an exile, not asking for, or wanting, foot and horse for fighting my enemies, but wanting and asking for those persuasive arguments with which you, of all men, as I know, have the ability to arouse in young men an enthusiasm for goodness and righteousness and, in the same act, to bring them into friendship and good-fellowship with one another, whenever occasion arises. It is because I have been left in want of this assistance on your part that I have now had to leave Syracuse and appear here and now on your door-step. But it is not this plight of mine that is the worst reproach to you; for what about your obligations to Philosophy? Are you not always singing her praises and complaining that she is without honour among the rest of Mankind? Yet hasn't she, like me, now been betrayed as far as it has lain with you? If we had happened to be living at Megara, no doubt you would have come to my aid in the cause in which I was invoking your help, on pain, if you had hung back, of feeling yourself the vilest creature on Earth. And now, [when I have called you to Syracuse,] do you really think that you could plead the length of the journey and the immensity of the voyage and the fatigue as a valid defence against an imputation of cowardice? You know very well that you would not have a leg to stand on!"

"If I had had to meet this attack, what plausible answer would there have been for me to make? Just none at all. And so I came for the most unimpeachable of reasons that mortal man could ever have. And on this account I left my own occupations, which were by no means despicable, and put myself under a tyranny which might well be thought unbecoming both to my teaching and to myself. In coming in spite of all this, I acquitted myself of my duty to Zeus Xenios and cleared myself of all reproach on the part of Philosophy—who would have been put to shame in my person if, through defect of hardihood and courage, I had got myself into real disgrace."¹

If this analytical reminiscence is a true account of the workings of Plato's mind at the time when Dionysius's invitation was awaiting

¹ Plato, Letter No. 7, 327 B-329 B.

Plato's answer, it tells us that Plato's mission was doomed *a priori* to failure; for neither of the two principal considerations that he here attributes to himself can bear examination. We here see the philosopher not only yielding to the temptation to exploit the use of the despot's material power as a short cut to the translation of a Utopia into 'real life', but even being influenced by a self-regarding feeling which looks less like a genuine prick of conscience than like a twinge of the scholar's painful sense of inferiority to the man of action; and, whether we adopt the more or the less charitable of these two alternative interpretations, we are bound to discern in either of them a latent lack of confidence in the policy of Detachment on which, *ex hypothesi*, the philosopher has staked his personal hope of salvation.

In fact, the philosopher-king is doomed to fail because he is attempting to unite two contradictory natures in a single person. The philosopher stultifies himself by trespassing on the king's field of ruthless action, while conversely the king stultifies himself by trespassing on the philosopher's field of loveless and pitiless contemplation.¹ Like the saviour with the 'time-machine', the philosopher-king is driven, sooner or later, into proclaiming his own failure by drawing a weapon which convicts him of being a saviour with the sword in disguise. If the sword spells self-defeat and the 'time-machine' self-deception, the philosopher's mantle and the prince's mask are emblems of hypocrisy; and, since 'hypocrite' and 'saviour' are incompatible roles, our search for a genuine saviour must be carried further.

The God Incarnate in a Man.

We have now examined three different epiphanies of the creative genius who is born into a disintegrating society and who bends his powers and energies to the task of coping with the challenge of social disintegration by finding and making some effective response. We have reviewed in turn the would-be saviour of Society who puts his trust in the sword, and the would-be saviours from Society whose respective instruments are the 'time-machine' and the philosopher-king. And in each case we have found that the vaunted way of salvation leads nowhere but to the brow of a precipice. There is no salvation in the sword. It proves impossible after all, as might have been expected *a priori*, to make a deadly weapon do the very opposite of the work for which it has been designedly forged. However cunning the hand that wields it, and

¹ For this attitude of mind, which in Greek is called *θεωπία*, see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 253, and V. C (i) (d) 10, in the present volume, pp. 144-8, above.

however well-meaning the will that governs the hand, the sword can neither be compelled to bring salvation nor prevented from dealing the destruction which it is its nature to bring to pass. The would-be saviour with the sword is self-condemned to self-defeat; and in exposing him for the failure that he is we have also exposed his two competitors; for we have found that both the would-be saviour with the 'time-machine' and the sage who operates as the mentor of a philosopher-king are apt, at the critical moment, to drop their pretentious instruments and take to the old-fashioned killing-tool. We have thus reduced our three ostensibly diverse types of would-be saviour to the single figure of a man with a sword. Whether the weapon happens at the moment to be drawn or sheathed or cloaked, it is the only means of salvation which the man has to offer in the last resort.

What conclusion are we to draw from this series of disillusionments? Do they signify that any and every attempt to find and bring salvation is doomed to end in destruction if the would-be saviour is merely a human being? Let us remind ourselves of the context of the classic statement of the truth which we have been verifying empirically in this chapter. 'All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword' are the words of a saviour who gives this as his reason for commanding one of his followers to sheathe again a sword which this henchman has just drawn and used. In thus taking to the sword at the critical moment, the henchman has done his best according to his present lights.¹ He has taken his own life in his hands for the sake of playing the man on his Master's behalf. But the Master swiftly and sternly rejects an offer of self-sacrifice that is made in this militant form. So far from following up this first blow with a general counter-offensive in the fashion of Judas Maccabaeus² or Ismā'il Shāh Safawī³ or Guru Govind Singh,⁴ Jesus of Nazareth first heals the wound that Peter's sword has already inflicted,⁵ and then delivers his own person up to suffer the last extremes of insult and torment.

Nor is Jesus moved to choose this agonizing alternative by any fear that, if he did take to the sword, he might be courting a military defeat. 'Thinkest thou', he says to Peter, 'that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?'⁶ And to Pilate he says: 'If my kingdom were

¹ For Peter's conversion from a futurist's militancy to the gentleness of a soul which has grasped the meaning of the Transfiguration see V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 392-3, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 68, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 657-9, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), Annex I, vol. i, pp. 366-88, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 661-5, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 665-8, above.

⁵ Luke xxii. 51.

⁶ Matt. xxvi. 53.

of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now is my kingdom not from hence.¹ Jesus's motive for refusing to take to the sword is thus not any practical calculation that, in the particular circumstances, his own force is no match for his adversaries'. He believes that, if he did take to the sword, he could be certain of winning all the victory that swordsmanship can procure. Yet, believing this, he still refuses to use the weapon. Rather than conquer with the sword he will die on the Cross.

In choosing this alternative in the hour of crisis, Jesus is breaking right away from the conventional line of action which has been taken by the other would-be saviours whose conduct we have studied. What inspires the Nazarene saviour to take this tremendous new departure? We may answer this question by asking, in turn, what distinguishes him from the saviours who have refuted their own pretensions by turning into swordsmen. The answer is that these were men who knew themselves to be no more than human, whereas Jesus was a man who believed himself to be the Son of God.² Are we to conclude that 'salvation belongeth unto the Lord',³ and that, without being in some sense divine, a would-be saviour of Mankind will always be impotent to execute his mission in act and deed?⁴ Now that we have weighed and found wanting those *soi-disant* saviours who have avowedly been mere men, let us turn, as our last recourse, to the saviours who have presented themselves as gods.

To pass in review a procession of saviour-gods, with an eye to appraising their claims to be what they profess to be and to do what they profess to do, is perhaps an unprecedentedly presumptuous application of our habitual method of empirical study. And, if we are to venture upon the attempt, it may be easiest to begin with those claimants whose performance of the saviour-god's part has been the most perfunctory. Let us start with the *deus ex machina* and try to ascend from this possibly infra-human level towards the ineffable height of the *deus cruci fixus*. If dying on the Cross is the utmost extreme to which it is possible for a man to go in testifying to the truth of his claim to divinity, appearing upon the stage is perhaps the least trouble that an acknowledged god can decently take in support of a claim to be also a saviour.

On the Attic stage in the century which saw the breakdown of

¹ John xviii. 36.

² For the association between the revelation of Jesus's divinity and the announcement of his Passion see V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 165, with footnote 3, above. ³ Ps. iii. 8.

⁴ In V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), pp. 124-32, above, we have already observed how this conclusion forces itself upon would-be saviours of the futurist school as the insistent lesson of their own repeated and cumulatively disastrous failures to achieve their aim by their own method.

the Hellenic Civilization the *deus ex machina* was a veritable god-send to embarrassed playwrights who, in an already enlightened age, were still constrained by a tenacious convention to take their plots from the traditional corpus of Hellenic Mythology. If the action of the play had in consequence become caught, before its natural close, in some, humanly speaking, insoluble tangle of moral enormities or practical improbabilities, the author could extricate himself from the toils in which he had been involved on account of one of the conventions of his art by resorting to another of them. He could appeal to his stage-manager for help, and that obliging and resourceful technician would promptly wheel or hoist on to the stage a god out of the blue to effect a denouement. This is the role of Artemis in Euripides' *Hippolytus* and of Athena in the same poet's *Ion* and *Iphigeneia in Tauris*; and this trick of an Attic dramatist's trade has given scandal to scholars. The solutions of human problems that are propounded by these Olympian interventionists neither convince the human mind nor appeal to the human heart. Was Euripides simply making use of a traditional convention of his art without troubling to question or criticize it? That can hardly be believed of a 'high-brow' who was patently a born sceptic, and whose natural scepticism had been vehemently stimulated by a catastrophic social experience in which it had been his fortune to participate. Or was he perhaps just professionally incompetent? Was he driven to resort to this clumsy trick by finding that he had tied himself into knots from which he could see no other way of escape? No, it is impossible to attribute such silliness to an intelligence which in all else is so dazzlingly clever. The puzzle seems to admit of only one solution. If our fifth-century Attic dramatist was not a 'low-brow' and not a fool, must he not have been a knave?

It has, in fact, been seriously suggested by one modern Western scholar that Euripides never brings on a *deus ex machina* without having his tongue in his cheek. According to Verrall, the sly Athenian rationalist has made this quaint traditional convention serve his own purposes by using it as a screen for sallies of irony and blasphemy upon which he could hardly have ventured with impunity if he had come out into the open. This screen is ideal in texture, since it is impervious to the hostile shafts of the poet's 'low-brow' adversaries while it is transparent to the knowing eyes of his sophisticated brother sceptics. In fact, the Euripidean use of the *deus ex machina* is an artistic *tour de force* which is a consummate artist's *chef d'œuvre*.

'It is not too much to say that on the Euripidean stage whatever is said by a divinity is to be regarded, in general, as *ipso facto* discredited.

It is in all cases objectionable from the author's point of view, and almost always a lie. "By representing the deities he persuaded men that they did not exist."¹ . . . This character of mere theatrical and conventional pretence, contradictory to the sense of the part and transparent to the instructed reader, which Lucian² rightly attributes to the machine-gods of Euripides, is nowhere better illustrated than by the Athena of the [*Iphigeneia in Tauris*].³

In this play the goddess ostensibly intervenes in order to stop a barbarian tyrant from catching and killing some distinguished Hellenic fugitives. In Verrall's opinion this 'happy ending' is not meant to be taken seriously. The spectator of the performance—or reader of the text—is intended to understand that the play is after all a tragedy. The fugitives are not really going to escape their persecutor's clutches; it is made perfectly clear, all along, that they have not a dog's chance; and, what is more, they do not morally deserve any miraculous reprieve; for it cannot be denied that they have brought this fate upon themselves by trying to practise a fraud upon their barbarian captor. Well, but is not Thoas a savage in fighting whom all is fair? Yes, but are not his captives Hellenes who should scruple to retort even to savagery with deceit?⁴ And how did these representatives of Civilization come to place themselves in the false position for which they are going to pay so tragic a penalty? Were they not 'let in' by the very divinities who are now 'letting them down'? What possessed Orestes to think of stealing the holy image of the Tauric Artemis? Was it not Apollo who sped him on this knavish errand with the promise that, if he brought the stolen statue to Athens, he might hope to win as his reward a breathing-space from the cruel malady which had descended upon him as the penalty for the commission of a greater crime in obedience to a previous behest of the same divinity?⁵

The same scholar applies the same *apparatus criticus* to the interpretation of Euripides' *Ion*. Just as, according to Verrall, Iphigeneia and Orestes and Pylades and the chorus of Attic women are not miraculously reprieved by Athena but are tragically put to death—in the sight and hearing of any audience that

¹ Aristophanes: *Thesmophoriazuse*, ll. 450-1, apropos of Euripides.

² Lucian: *Zeus Tragedus*, § 41.

³ Verrall, A. W.: *Euripides the Rationalist* (Cambridge 1895, University Press), pp. 138 and 201.

⁴ A modern Western reader who finds Euripides' *Iphigeneia in Tauris* too alien in its atmosphere for him to appreciate its point can see this 'ancient' drama replayed in 'modern' dress if he will attend a performance of William Archer's *The Green Goddess*. The colloquy between the Rajah and the *parlementaire ex machina* from the rescue squadron of the R.A.F. raises an issue—'What is Civilization?'—which is precisely the issue that arises (undeclared) between Thoas and Athena.

⁵ Euripides: *Iphigeneia in Tauris*, ll. 85-92 and 1438-41 b.

has ears to hear and eyes to see—so, according to the same interpreter, the illegitimacy of Ion's birth and the unchastity of Creusa's life before her marriage are tragically exposed through the thread-bareness of the veil which Athena makes a pretence of throwing over this pair of scandals.¹

If there is any substance in Verrall's interpretation of Euripides' plays, it would seem to be the practice of the Euripidean gods first malevolently to inveigle the human *dramatis personae* into putting themselves in the wrong, and then heartlessly to abandon their dupes to a doom which ought in justice to overtake the divine mischief-makers and not their human victims. But who, 'in the last analysis', are these odious divinities? Have they really any independent existence in themselves? Are they not, rather, the mythical 'externalizations' of psychological forces that 'in real life' are immanent in the souls of the human actors? And is not Euripides' esoteric theme the moral frailty of his own enlightened countrymen and contemporaries?

On this showing, the *deus ex machina* is nothing but a caricature of the human saviour with the 'time-machine', whose trick we have seen through already.² In bringing this mountebank on to his stage in the mask of a god and not of a mortal the playwright is hinting to his audience that he intends this character to be taken satirically in the spirit of Lewis Carroll, and not seriously in the spirit of Mr. Wells.³ The *deus ex machina* thus turns out to be a joke—and that a bitter one. And the Olympians would hardly be able to rehabilitate themselves even if they could convince us that Verrall's theory is moonshine and that the Euripidean Artemis and Athena are genuinely doing all that they are professing to do. Morally it makes little difference whether a miraculously 'happy ending' is a genuine miracle or a fake; for it cannot in either case save a tragedy from being anything but what it is. What are we to think of divine shepherds who neglect their duty towards their human flocks until the wretched sheep have fallen into the deepest moral errors and suffered the utmost spiritual agonies of which their nature is capable? Are we to acquit them of blame just because, at the thirteenth hour, they are kind enough to avert—by an exercise of magical power which costs them no exertion—

¹ See A. W. Verrall's reconstruction of the epilogue to the *Ion*—as the author (according to the scholar) intends us to read it between the lines of the play—on pp. xx–xliii of his edition and translation of *The Ion of Euripides* (Cambridge 1890, University Press).

² In the present chapter, pp. 213–42, above.

³ This moral depreciation of traditional divinities in the Hellenic World has its analogue in the Indic World in the intellectual depreciation of the members of a kindred pantheon (see V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 19–20, above). In either case a human enlightenment has taken the shine out of the gods to a degree at which their once radiant colours have faded to a positively infra-human drabness.

some of the material consequences of moral disasters which, owing to their neglect, are now beyond repair? Divinities who behave like this cannot defend themselves by pleading that they are practising what has been preached to them by human philosophers;¹ for Epicurus, as we have seen,² had not the heart, when it came to the point, to lower his own conduct to the level of his doctrine; and, if a human sage knew better than to take a heartless philosophy seriously, even when he had invented it himself, his divine disciples, too, ought to know better *a fortiori*. Nor is the practice of tempering a habitual neglect with an occasional intervention morally salvaged by expanding the field of the *deus ex machina*'s perfunctory performance from the stage of the theatre at Athens to the sum-total of the Universe, as Plato expands it in a myth which we have already quoted in another context.³ The *deus ex machina* is indefensible in any field and on any hypothesis. And yet we need not be discouraged by this outcome of our first essay towards a survey of saviour-gods; for a train of ideas that starts with a conceit may end in a revelation. If 'Cloudecockooland' can open human eyes to the Kingdom of Heaven,⁴ it is not impossible that the *deus ex machina* may put us, if we persevere, on the track of another epiphany of God which 'unto the Greeks' was likewise 'foolishness'⁵—the figure of Christ on the Cross.

If putting in an appearance as a *deus ex machina* is the cheapest of all the ways in which a god can present himself to Man as his saviour, the next cheapest kind of epiphany is an avatar. At first sight, perhaps, it might seem to imply a considerably greater expenditure of divine time and trouble when a god condescends to exchange his proper form for a tenement of human flesh and to linger in this shape on Earth for the length of a human lifetime, instead of just for the duration of the last act of a play. On closer scrutiny, however, the apparent generosity dwindles. In point of time those three score years and ten must count for much the same as three minutes in the consciousness of an immortal who has Eternity to play with; and in point of trouble the divinity who is living through an avatar is apt, we shall find, to avail himself of his latent supernatural powers as soon as things look nasty. In Euripides' *Bacchae* Dionysus does not dream of allowing a deluded Pentheus to have his way with this divinity in human disguise. When it comes to the crisis the camouflaged god, with one wave of his magic wand, causes Pentheus' own womenkind to tear

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 10, pp. 144-6, above.

² See the present chapter, pp. 244-5, above.

³ See the passages from Plato's *Politicus* that have been quoted in IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 26-7, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, below.

⁵ 1 Cor. i. 23.

the wretched man to pieces in the blind frenzy of their orgiastic religious exaltation.

The god recovered from the bout;
The man it was that died.

In thus meanly drawing upon his reserves of superhuman potency Dionysus is breaking the rules of his own game, like the human saviour with the 'time-machine' and the human philosopher-king when they drop their pretences and take to their swords. But the god is behaving more detestably than his human counterparts; for the crisis that moves him to make use of his hidden weapon is one that he himself has deliberately provoked. This god incarnate has kept his human assailant in ignorance of his superhuman bugbear's true nature in order to lure the silly fellow into a cruel trap. The show of patience and humility with which the mysterious stranger replies to the headstrong prince's ill-usage of him in the first act of the play is neither sincere nor disinterested. It is not Dionysus's intention to put Pentheus out of countenance, and so win him to repentance, by eventually revealing his own identity. His plan is to catch him out, and his temper is malicious.

Nor does Dionysus, in his sojourn among men, always make even so much as a pretence of being other than an Olympian. The best part of Dionysus's earthly career is devoted to a campaign of world-conquest in which the divine aggressor takes advantage of his supernatural powers in order to anticipate (or emulate), at his ease, the human exploits of Sesostris and Alexander. And woe betide the human potentate who ventures to offer resistance to the conqueror-god's triumphal progress. For the crime of successfully repelling this Olympian invader, Lycurgus King of the Edônes pays the same dreadful penalty that is exacted from Pentheus King of Thebes for his refusal to acknowledge Dionysus's divinity. But the principal theatre of Dionysus's military prowess lies neither in Boeotia nor in Thrace. Dionysus, like Alexander, glories chiefly in being the conqueror of India; and on this Indian soil the Hellenic deity's brutal epiphany has its analogues in the avatars of Shiva and Vishnu.¹ As for Shiva, he is nothing but Destructiveness personified. And even Shiva's divine antithesis is capable of sinking to Dionysus's level when Vishnu goes on the war-path in the guise of a Krishna or a Rama.

If the avatar thus turns out to be morally almost as repulsive as the epiphany *ex machina*, the demigod, who presents himself next, is a decidedly more sympathetic figure. We have only to

¹ For certain likenesses and differences between these two Hindu worships and Christianity see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 138, and V. C (i) (d) 7, in the present volume, pp. 47-9, above.

cast our eye over the goodly company of these heroes: a Sumeric Gilgamesh; a Hellenic Hêrklês and Asklêpios and Castor and Pollux and Perseus and Achilles and Orpheus; and a Sinic contingent that includes, among others, the 'culture-heroes' Yu and Yi and Yao and Shwen.¹ These half-divine beings in human flesh live out their lives on Earth without benefit of that privilege of arbitrarily contracting out of the game which the full-blown gods, in their avatars, retain and abuse. The labours of Hêrklês are at least as serviceable to Mankind as Dionysus's escapades; yet the sufferings which such labours must entail for the labourer in the natural human course of events are suffered by Hêrklês as genuinely as though he were no more than an ordinary mortal. The divinity of the demigods is housed in common clay; and they have to contend with all the challenges which present themselves to 'Man that is born of a woman'.² The demigod, too, 'is of few days, and full of trouble'; and he is not even exempted from having to do battle with Man's 'last enemy'.³ The demigod—and this is his glory—is subject, like Man, to Death.

Still less remote from our common humanity are the authentic human beings who have been credited by their fellows with the half-divine parentage that is the demigods' birthright. The divine paternity which in Euripides' play is ascribed by Athena to Ion has also been attributed to princes and sages that are no legendary figures but are well-known historical characters who have unquestionably lived in the flesh, and whose acts and thoughts are on record in documents that must rank as unimpeachable evidence. In the Hellenic tradition not only Ion and Asklêpios, but also Pythagoras and Plato and Augustus, have been reckoned among the sons of Apollo; and not only Hêrklês and the Dioscuri and Perseus, but also Alexander, among the sons of Zeus, while Apollonius of Tyana has been reckoned alternatively as a son of Zeus or as either a son of Zeus or a son of Proteus.⁴ The common form of the tale is that the human hero's human mother is visited by a superhuman mate who usurps the place of her lawful human husband.⁵ Apollo ousts Mnesarchus and Ariston and Octavius;

¹ See Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), pp. 26–32.

² Job xiv. 1.

³ 1 Cor. xv. 26.

⁴ 'When Apollonius's mother was pregnant with him she was visited by an apparition (φάσμα) of an Egyptian divinity (δαίμων)—it was the Proteus who keeps on changing shape in Homer. The woman was not afraid, and asked him what kind of a child she was going to bear. "Me" was the apparition's reply; "Who are you?" she asked; "I am Proteus, the Egyptian god," said he. . . . The local belief [in Apollonius's home country, the Tyranitis] is that Apollonius was a son of Zeus; but Apollonius himself calls himself the son of [his mother's human husband] Apollonius.'—Philostratus: *Apollonius of Tyana*, Book I, chaps. 4 and 6. For the common features in the stories of Apollonius and of Jesus see Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 183–4.

⁵ When the tale is told of historical characters whose official parents are both of them

Zeus-Amon ousts Philip. Sometimes the divine visitor presents himself in the form of a man, sometimes in the form of an animal, and sometimes in the form of a thunderbolt or a ray of light. Zeus-Amon is fabled to have visited Alexander's mother Olympias in the form either of a thunderbolt or of a snake,¹ and in the course of ages this fable has travelled far and wide. In Italy it was transferred in the third century B.C. from Alexander to Scipio Africanus Major² and in the last century B.C. to Augustus;³ in Central Asia by the fifteenth century of the Christian Era it had come to be transferred to a legendary common ancestor of Chingis Khan and Timur Lenk.⁴ In an etherial version the same story is also told of a man of the people who has outshone every one of these kings and statesmen and philosophers.

"These tales have their counterpart in the Christian legends of the birth of Jesus; and the version followed by Matthew exhibits the direct influence of the Hellenic *motif*.⁵ This influence has not, of course, been

perfectly well known, it is, of course, easier to deny the paternity of the human father than the maternity of the human mother. It would probably be difficult to cite a genuinely historical personage who has been credited, like Orpheus and Achilles, with a mother who was a goddess.

¹ Both fables are recounted, side by side, in Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*, chaps. 2-3.

² See Livy, Book XXVI, chap. 19. The Roman historian, who retells the tale with a sneer, does not inform us whether Scipio's, as well as Alexander's, snake-father was identified with Zeus, or whether his identity was left in doubt.

³ In Asclepiadis Mendetis *Theologuménōn* libris lego.—Suetonius: *Life of Augustus*, chap. 94.

⁴ See Herzfeld, E.: 'Alongoa' in *Der Islam*, vol. vi (Strassburg 1916, Trübner), pp. 317-27. This legendary Mongol hero Budhuntchar is fabled to have had no human father, but to have been conceived in the womb of his mother Alongoa through the incidence of a ray of light. The legend is recited in the inscription on the tomb of Alongoa's reputed descendant Timur Lenk at Samarqand, and in this context it is brought into connexion with the story of the Annunciation to Mary, as this is told in the Qur'an xix. 20 and xix. 17 (Herzfeld, op. cit., p. 318). The same legend, with the same comparison between Alongoa's miraculous experience and Mary's according to the Qur'an, figures (ibid., pp. 318-19) in the *Zafarnāmah* of Timur's biographer Sharaf-ad-Din 'Alī Yazdī (for whom see II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 149, above). It is not, however, through the Qur'an that the tale has attached itself to Timur's and Chingis' legendary common ancestress Alongoa. The tale, as it is told in this context, has come direct from the Alexander Romance (Herzfeld, ibid., p. 326), as is attested by the heroine's name; for 'Alongoa' is a transparent travesty of Olympias (in the inscription on Timur's tomb the name is written, in the Perso-Arabic Alphabet, *الأميرة*); and, if we may assume that the ambiguous letter *ā* has been pointed *ā* [qāf] in mistake for *fā* [fā] at some weak link in a long chain of literary transmission, we arrive at an earlier form 'Alanfoa' which is very near indeed to the original Greek).

⁵ 'The view that the Messiah has to be born of a virgin is notoriously quite unknown to the Jews; it is a purely Christian (pagan) myth' (Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 60, footnote 2), which attaches, not to the Jewish Messiah, but to the Zoroastrian Saoshyant (Meyer, op. cit., vol. ii (1921), p. 68; von Gall, A.: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), pp. 418-19). In the Jewish view the Messiah is a man with nothing superhuman, and *a fortiori* nothing divine, about him (on this point see V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 163, footnote 1, above). To a Jewish mind the Christian attribution of a divine paternity to Jesus seems like a lapse from the slowly and painfully attained monotheism of the Chosen People of the One True God into one of the grossest and most unedifying superstitions of a Hellenic paganism. This Jewish reproach against Christianity is forcefully expressed in a passage placed in the mouth of the Jewish disputant in the *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, chap. 67 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. vi, col. 629) of the Christian philosopher, saint, and martyr Justin (*vivebat aevi Christiani saeculo secundo*):

"Trypho replied: "The Scripture [Isa. vii. 14] does not read *Behold a virgin shall*

transmitted through any literary channel; what has happened is that the popular ideas that have been diffused far and wide through all peoples and all religions have been laid under contribution for the benefit of the Christian myth. Be that as it may, the correspondence between Matthew and the legend of the birth of Plato is as exact as it could possibly be. Before Mary's marriage with Joseph has been consummated, she becomes with child ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου = φάσμα Ἀπολλωνιακὸν συνεγένετο τῇ Περικτιόνη (Olympiodorus). Joseph proposes to put her away when the Angel of the Lord (the mal'ak Yahweh, the representative of the Godhead, as so often in the Old Testament) appears to him in a dream and reveals to him what has come to pass and what is his son's future. In obedience to this revelation Joseph "did as the Angel of the Lord had bidden him and took unto him his wife and knew her not till she had brought forth her first-born son"—the exact instructions that are given to Plato's father.¹

conceive, and bear a son, but *Behold a young woman shall conceive, and bear a son*—and so on to the end of the passage that you have just quoted. And the whole prophecy refers to Hezekiah—in whose life events in consonance with this prophecy can be shown to have taken place. There is, however, in the mythology of the so-called Hellenes, a story of how Perseus was gotten upon Danae, when she was a virgin, by the streaming upon her, in the form of gold, of the [demon] whom the Hellenes called Zeus. You [Christians] ought to be ashamed of reproducing this Hellenic tale, and ought to admit that this Jesus is a human being of human parentage. And, if you want to prove from the Scriptures that he is the Christ, your thesis ought to be that he was accounted worthy to be singled out for being the Christ because he led a perfect life in conformity with the Law. But beware of telling tall stories (ῥεπατολογεῖν) if you do not want to be convicted of being as silly as the Hellenes are."

Justin, however, is not ashamed of finding himself in the Hellenes' company. In his *First Apologia on behalf of the Christians*, which is addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, he submits, in chap. 22 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. vi, col. 361), that 'if we [Christians] say that [Jesus] was born of a virgin, this too has a Hellenic parallel in what you say of Perseus'.—A.J.T.

¹ Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 56-7. This modern Western scholar has not, of course, been the first to point out the parallelism between these two stories. As he himself mentions in the same context (op. cit., p. 55, footnote 4), the Christian father Origen (in his *Contra Celsum*, Book I, chap. 37) 'cites the story of the birth of Plato as a parallel to the birth of Jesus, with the object of making it clear to the Hellenes that what is related in the Gospels is by no means incompatible with Hellenic ideas'. ('In an argument with Hellenes it is quite in place to bring in Hellenic tales in order to show that we [Christians] are not unique in telling this extraordinary tale [of the virgin birth and divine paternity of Jesus]. There are Hellenic authors who have deliberately recorded, as a thing within the bounds of possibility—and this with reference, not to Ancient History or to "the Heroic Age", but to what happened only yesterday or the day before—that Plato was born of Amphionē when Ariston had been debarred from having sexual relations with her until she should have given birth to the child begotten by Apollo.'—Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. xi, col. 732.) How is this parallel to be explained? Are we to suppose that the story of the birth of Jesus was adapted from that of the birth of Plato or Pythagoras or Alexander or Scipio Africanus or Augustus? It is true that the stories attributing a divine paternity to these pagan Hellenic heroes must all have been in circulation by the time when the sources of the Gospels began to take shape. Yet, although the hypothesis of a direct mimesis is thus tenable in point of chronology, it is improbable in itself. It seems more likely that the parallel between the birth-stories of Jesus on the one hand and of our five pagan Hellenic heroes on the other is due, not to an adaptation of the later story from one or other of the earlier stories, but to an independent derivation of each of the six stories from a common source. The essence of each of the six stories is that it ascribes to an historical character the semi-divine parentage that is the birthright of a demigod. And, if we compare the birth-story of Jesus with that of Hēraklēs, we shall find a still greater number of points of correspondence than Meyer has pointed out in his comparison of the birth-story of Jesus with that of Plato. The parallel between the birth-stories of Jesus and Hēraklēs is set out in Pfister, Fr.: 'Hēraklēs und Christus' in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XXXIV, Heft 1/2 (Berlin and Leipzig 1937, Teubner).

This divine paternity of a saviour born of a woman is a form of epiphany which brings the saviour-god into a perfect intimacy with human kind. But how is the nature of fatherhood to be conceived of if God is the subject of it? Can God's fatherhood really be supposed to take the form of an act of physical procreation? It would be hard to say whether the suggestion is the more shocking when the divinity is pictured as masquerading in the body of a human seducer or when this sordid realism is evaded by the childishly grotesque device of turning a god into a beast and a myth¹ into a fairy-tale. In whatever physical shape the god may be portrayed, a literal paternity cannot be attributed to him without making blasphemous nonsense of his fatherhood in the judgement of any human soul that is morally sensitive and intellectually critical. If the hero's divine father was really behaving like a human rake, there is no reason why the hero should have turned out better than any other child that has been born out of lawful wedlock. On the other hand, if it be accepted that the hero has displayed an unmistakably superhuman prowess, and if it be granted that a spiritual endowment which cannot be of human origin can only be accounted for as the gift of a divine parent, then the nature of the divine paternity with which the hero must be credited will have to be conceived of in the non-corporeal terms in which it is in fact presented in our Christian version of the Hellenic myth.² If God has begotten a Son, the divine act must be an eternal truth and not an occurrence in Time. And if God can create the Universe by uttering a word,³ then assuredly he can

pp. 46-7. Amphytrion, the husband of Hēraklēs' mother Alcmena, refrains, like both Joseph and Ariston, from having sexual intercourse with his newly wedded wife until she has conceived and born a child whose paternity is not human but divine. But between the birth-stories of Jesus and Hēraklēs there is a further point of resemblance that is not to be found in the birth-story of Plato. Before the birth of the divine child the child's mother and her husband change their residence—Alcmena and Amphytrion from Mycenae (Alcmena's native city) to Thebes; Mary and Joseph from Nazareth to Bethlehem—so that the child has a birth-place (a Judæan Bethlehem or a Boeotian Thebes) which is not his parents' home (in a Galilaean Nazareth or an Argive Mycenae). We may conjecture that the birth-story of Hēraklēs is the archetype of the birth-stories of all our six historical Hellenic heroes (see further V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, p. 469, below).

¹ For the view that the story or drama of the encounter between the Virgin and the Father of her Child is a mythological image of the mystery of Creation, see II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 272, above.

² In expounding the parallelism between the Christian and the Hellenic Mythology, Saint Justin Martyr (*First Apology*, chap. 21, in Migne: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. vi, col. 360) implicitly absolves the Hellenic motif of divine paternity from the imputation of grossness which is usually read into it. 'When we say that the Logos, which is the first offspring of God, has been begotten without sexual intercourse—the Logos who is Jesus Christ our Master—and that this [Jesus Christ] has been crucified and has died and has risen again and has ascended into Heaven, we are saying nothing novel, for we are saying nothing that is not to be found in the stories of the sons that are attributed, in your Hellenic Mythology, to Zeus.'

³ The Jewish conception of a creative 'Word' ('Memra') of God may be either an independent discovery of the Jewish religious genius or else a Jewish adaptation of the Hellenic conception of the 'Logos' (see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christen-*

send his Son into the World by making an Annunciation.¹ This is the common foundation of all varieties of Christian belief concerning the manner in which the saviour-god has made his historical epiphany. But this primary common ground leaves some critical secondary questions outstanding. To whom, and at what moment, and in what circumstances, will the creative Annunciation be made?

If it be agreed that God's way of revealing himself as a father is to speak with the voice of the Spirit to a human soul, it may still be debated whether the Father is to be expected to announce His divine intention to the human mother of His Son at the moment when her child is physically conceived. May it not be more god-like to confer the grace of this divine paternity upon a soul which has already reached the threshold of its human maturity and has already proved its worthiness of sonship by offering itself to God without blemish or reserve? 'God is the common father of all men, but he makes the best ones peculiarly his own.'² This adoptive kind of fatherhood is not unknown even among men. Even in the gross economy of a purely mundane society the physical act of procreation is not the only means by which a man can acquire a son. As an alternative to the begetting of a child whose character is *ex hypothesi* an unknown quantity, the would-be father may adopt a grown man who has already shown himself capable of taking over the heritage which his adoptive parent has to hand on. And, if this heritage be one that carries heavy responsibilities and imposes exacting tasks involving many people's welfare, then a conscientious man of affairs—be he householder or prince—may well find greater comfort in a son of his choice than in a son of his loins. In such a spirit the second Scipio Africanus³ adopted Scipio Aemilianus; Divus Julius adopted Octavian; and Nerva initiated a succession of imperial adoptions which ran through Trajan and Hadrian and Pius to Marcus. In the Age of the Antonines it had come to be almost a constitutional convention of the Roman Empire that the Principate should be transmitted by adopting a successor and not by begetting one. Did Marcus do well when he broke Nerva's 'Golden Chain' for the benefit of his own child

tums, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 103-4, and the present Study, V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, p. 539, with footnote 4, above).

¹ Had this idea already struck the mind of a Hellenic poet-prophet in a generation that was born before the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization?

λαβούσα δ' ἔρμα Δίον ἀψευδεὶ λόγῳ
γεῖνατο παῖδ' ἀμεμφή,
δι' αἰῶνος μακροῦ πάρολβον.

Aeschylus: *Supplikes*, ll. 580-2.

² This 'logion', attributed to Alexander the Great, has been quoted already in V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 9, above.

³ This physical son of Scipio Africanus Major was himself prevented by ill-health from carrying on his father's work.

Commodus? And, if adoption works better than procreation when the father is a human prince and the heritage a mundane empire, may it not be better, *a fortiori*, when the father is God himself and when the business on hand is Man's salvation?

The belief that a Son of Man may in this way become a Son of God has declared itself, in the first instance, in the deification of oecumenical monarchs.¹ In some oecumenical empires the adoption of the prince by the god has been conceived of as taking place at the moment of the prince's accession, and in others as being deferred until after his death. Posthumous apotheosis appears to have been the rule among the Hittites and in Japan; adoption-upon-accession in the Egyptiac and Sumeric and Sinic and Andean worlds; while in the Hellenic World the two practices came into currency side by side²—with the strange consequence that a Hellenic ruler in the Age of Disintegration might find himself already an object of worship in his own lifetime in certain parts of his dominions or among certain classes of his subjects, while elsewhere he must be content with the knowledge that he would receive—or at any rate become a candidate for receiving—the same honours as soon as he had ceased to be present in the flesh.³ This belief in divine paternity by adoption has had the same social history as the cruder belief in divine paternity by procreation. While it likewise makes its first appearance as an expression of the awe in which an oecumenical ruler is held by his subjects, it also likewise breaks these original bounds and comes to be extended to commoners instead of remaining a monopoly of kings. In the history of the disintegration of the Hellenic Society the earliest example of the deification of a man of the people is to be found in a comedy. In the closing verses of Aristophanes' *Birds* the chorus hail Peithetaerus as 'God of Gods' (δαίμόνων ὑπέρτατε) when, in reward for the feats of having founded 'Cloudcuckooland' and blockaded Olympus into an abject surrender, the Athenian cockney makes a triumphal epiphany with the sceptre of Zeus in his hand and with

¹ For Caesar-worship and its limitations see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 348–9, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, pp. 648–57, above.

² This seems also to have happened in certain overseas domains of the Hindu World—Java, Camboja, Champa—where we have evidence for a deification of monarchs of which there are only slight traces in the main body of the Hindu Society in Continental India (Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, pp. 115–20, already cited in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, p. 653, footnote 4, above.

³ This was the situation of the Roman Emperors in the Age of the Principate. In Rome itself, and in those parts of the Ager Romanus that were peopled by communities of Roman citizens, a princeps was in no circumstances accorded divine honours till after his death, and even then his apotheosis was not a matter of course, but was a special recognition of merit which could only be conferred by act of the Senate. On the other hand the Emperors were worshipped as gods in their lifetime at many places in the Greek and Oriental provinces and protectorates of the Empire, while in Egypt a Roman Emperor automatically became an adopted son of Re upon his accession, in virtue of his recognized status of being a legitimate Pharaoh.

'the Queen' on his arm as his heavenly bride.¹ But a scene which, in the first generation of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles', had thus been played in the theatre of Dionysus at Athens as the crowning extravaganza of a fantastic farce was replayed four and a half centuries later on the banks of the Jordan in an amazingly different setting and spirit. In the story of the Gospels the designation of a Nazarene carpenter as the Son of God is presented as the opening revelation of a mystery which was to culminate in the Crucifixion and which was nothing less than God's scheme for Man's salvation.

In all four Gospels² it is told of Jesus that he was designated as the Son of God after his baptism in Jordan by John, as he was coming up out of the water.³ And in the earliest, as well as in the latest, of the four the whole story begins with this act of adoption, and not with any account of the saviour-god's conception or birth or infancy or upbringing.⁴ There is, of course, an apparent

¹ For this extraordinary finale of the *Birds* see further V. C (i) (d), 11, Annex I, below.

² Matt. iii. 16-17; Mark i. 10-11; Luke iii. 21-2; John i. 32-4.

³ In all the three Synoptic Gospels this designation of Jesus as the Son of God is represented as having been both visual and aural. The Spirit of God is seen descending upon Jesus in the likeness of a dove, and simultaneously the voice of God is heard from Heaven proclaiming Jesus to be God's beloved Son in whom God is well pleased. In the Gospel according to Saint Mark the story is told in words which seem to imply that the vision was seen and the voice heard by Jesus alone in a flash of spiritual enlightenment. The words used in Matthew would seem to imply that the vision was seen by Jesus alone, but that the voice was addressed to—and therefore, presumably, heard by—the spectators. Inversely, the words used in Luke would seem to imply that Jesus alone heard the voice, but that the spectators saw the vision. In the Gospel according to Saint John no mention is made of the voice, while, in regard to the vision, it is explicitly stated that this was seen by John, and is implicitly suggested that it was not seen by any one else—not even by Jesus himself.

⁴ It is noteworthy that this story of the Designation of Jesus, at his baptism, as the Son of God is not omitted in either of the two Gospels which preface this story with an account of Jesus's birth and which represent him as having acquired his divine paternity at the moment of his physical conception and therefore, by implication, not at the moment of his baptism, when, according to Luke iii. 23, he was about thirty years old. The internal evidence can hardly fail to produce on the mind of the literary critic an impression that the form of the story in which this begins with the baptism and Designation of Jesus in his prime is the original form, and that the Lucan and Matthaean prologues represent a later accretion. The discrepancy between an 'adoptionist' gospel and its 'conceptionist' preface is particularly conspicuous in Luke. In the first place Luke iii. 22 reads, in one set of manuscripts (D, a, b, c, ff, &c., with the support of Clement of Alexandria): 'Thou art my beloved Son; *this day have I begotten thee*', in place of the standard reading: 'Thou art my beloved Son; *in thee I am well pleased*'; and it is not impossible that this discarded reading may be the authentic original text (Streeter, B. H.: *The Four Gospels* (London 1924, Macmillan), p. 143; cf. pp. 188 and 276). In the second place the vagueness of the estimate of Jesus's age at the moment of the Designation seems to imply (in contradiction to what is told in chapters i and ii) that little or nothing was known about his life before this event, which is represented as having occurred at his first public appearance. In the third place the genealogy of Jesus's human ancestry (which, curiously enough, is introduced into the story in both Luke and Matthew, while it is not to be found in Mark, where there is nothing with which it would be incompatible) is placed in Luke immediately after the account of the Designation, which would be the natural place for it if this were the beginning of the story, whereas in Matthew it is placed, less awkwardly, at the opening of the preface, before the account of the Annunciation. In the fourth place the genealogy—and this not only in Luke but also in Matthew—is traced through Joseph, with the implication that Jesus was in the physical sense Joseph's son, and not through Mary, though Mary is the sole physical parent of Jesus according to the story told in both these Gospels in their

discrepancy between this account, in all the Gospels, of the adoption of Jesus as the Son of God in the prime of his manhood and the account of his conception by the Holy Ghost which precedes the account of the adoption in the Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Luke. And this raises difficult problems of literary criticism and theological exegesis which have exercised scholars and have divided Christians.¹ Is 'adoption' or 'conception' the proper description of a humanly ineffable utterance of the Creative Word that gave God a man for his son and Mankind a god for their saviour? At what moment in Jesus's human life on Earth did a divine wave of salvation break upon the shoals of Time in the course of its everlasting passage over the boundless ocean of Eternity?² Instead of attempting to answer a question that is humanly unanswerable, it may perhaps be more useful to suggest that the two words 'adoption' and 'conception', which bear their literal meaning in the crude Hellenic embryo of the myth, have in our Christian version acquired a new connotation which is neither legal in the one case nor physical in the other, but is in both cases metaphorical. The essence of the Christian mystery lies in a belief that God has made himself, by means that have been spiritual and not corporeal, the father of a son who has lived and died on Earth as a man in the flesh. This belief in an incarnation of Divinity postulates in its turn the further belief that the human vehicle of the Godhead has been a physical reality with a physiological origin; and, on every Christian interpretation of the story, Jesus the Son of God is deemed to have been born, in the literal physical sense of the word, by a human mother. The issue on which the 'adoptionists' and 'conceptionists' part company is not either the question whether God made himself the father of a man by a

prologues (in the Lucan genealogy (Luke iii. 38), in contrast to the Lucan prologue, it is not Jesus, but Jesus's first human forefather Adam, who is the Son of God). With this we may compare the double paternity that is ascribed to both Alexander and Hēraklēs. Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*, chap. 2, records that Alexander was believed to be a Heracleid on his father's (i.e. Philip's) side, and an Aeacid on his mother's, besides recounting the story of his father's being, not Philip at all, but Zeus-Ammon (the story of Alexander's divine paternity, as recounted by Plutarch, comes closer to the Matthaean than to the Lucan prologue to the story of the Gospels: Herzfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-7). Similarly Hēraklēs is represented as being both the son of Amphitryon and the son of Zeus (Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 47).

¹ For the traces of an 'adoptionist' Christian Church which appears to have been overwhelmed, without having been completely obliterated, by a following wave of the 'conceptionist' Christianity which now prevails, see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, pp. 624-34, above. The 'adoptionist' type of Christianity has manifestly a closer affinity than the 'conceptionist' type has with the Mahayanian cult of the Bodhisattva Amitābha (Amida). 'In the oldest documents he is a man who becomes a Buddha in the traditional manner. The fundamental idea is not that God is Love but rather that Love is God: lovingkindness raised Amida to a place which may be called divine' (Eliot, *Sir Ch.: Japanese Buddhism* (London 1935, Arnold), p. 394).

² 'History is the result of a deep interaction between Eternity and Time; it is the incessant eruption of Eternity into Time.'—Berdyayev, N.: *The Meaning of History* (London 1936, Bles), p. 67.

non-corporeal act or again the question whether the man of flesh and blood had a physical origin. The two schools agree in answering both these questions in the affirmative. They are divided on the question whether the physical procreation of Jesus was normal or miraculous; and it may be neither uncharitable nor unreasonable to suggest that this point of discord—sharp though it be—is minute by comparison with the expanse of the encompassing field of harmony.

In any case a theophany can never avail in itself to fulfil the promise of salvation. Whether *machina* or avatar or conception or adoption be the means that God elects for making his divine intervention in a human tragedy, an epiphany must lead on to a Passion if God Manifest is to become Man's Saviour by proving himself 'a very present help in trouble'.¹ Suffering is the key to salvation, as well as to understanding;² and a saviour's suffering must fathom the uttermost depths of agony. Even a Hellenic philosopher whose idea of salvation was Detachment has demanded an extremity of suffering from the sage who is to testify to his fellow men that Justice is an end in itself which is to be ensued at any cost for the sake of its own absolute and infinite value. The testimony, as Plato perceives, will only carry conviction if the just man bears it out by submitting to be scourged and racked and shackled, to have his eyes seared with red-hot irons, and finally to be impaled after having gone through every lesser torture.³ In imagining this extremity of suffering for an utterly unselfish object, Plato assuredly had in mind the historic martyrdom of his own master Socrates.⁴ And this human martyr who gave his witness at Athens in the year 399 B.C. was following the example of super-human prototypes whose labours and tribulations—undergone for the sake of Mankind—were the themes of the holiest legends in the Hellenic cultural heritage. Even the hero Achilles had deliberately cut short his brief allotted span of life on Earth for the sake of avenging the death of a comrade. Hêrâklês had toiled, and Prometheus endured,⁵ and Orpheus died, for all men. And even the death of this dying demigod was not the acme of divine suffering in the panorama of the Hellenic *Weltanschauung*. For, though no living being can pay a greater price than life itself, the life of a demigod is not so precious as the life of a god of unalloyed divinity;

¹ Ps. xlv. 1.

² For the Aeschylean *πάθει μάθος* see I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, p. 169, footnote 1; II. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. i, p. 298; IV. C (iii) (b) 11, vol. iv, p. 218; IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 584; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 78; and V. C (i) (d) 4, vol. v, p. 416, footnote 3, above.

³ Plato: *Republica*, 360 E–362 C, quoted again in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, p. 494, below.

⁴ Some analogies between the theophany and Passion of Socrates and the theophany and Passion of Jesus are examined in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, pp. 486–95, below.

⁵ For the Passion of Prometheus see III. B, vol. iii, pp. 112–27, above.

and behind the figure of the dying demigod Orpheus there looms the greater figure of a very god who dies for different worlds under diverse names—for a Minoan World as Zagreus,¹ for a Sumeric World as Tammuz,² for a Hittite World as Attis,³ for a Scandinavian World as Balder,⁴ for a Syriac World as Adonis ('Our Lord'),⁵ for an Egyptiac World as Osiris,⁶ for a Shī'i World as Husayn, for a Christian World as Christ.

Who is this god of many epiphanies but only one Passion? Though he makes his appearance on our mundane stage under a dozen diverse masks, his identity is invariably revealed in the last act of the tragedy by his suffering unto death. And if we take up the anthropologist's divining-rod we can trace this never varying drama back to its historical origins. 'He shall grow up before him as a tender plant, and as a root out of a dry ground.'⁷ The Dying God's oldest appearance is in the role of the *ἐναιυρός δαίμων*, the spirit of the vegetation that is born for Man in the spring to die for Man in the autumn.⁸ And both the epiphany and the Passion of this nature-god bring material benefits to Mankind that are plainly indispensable for the physical salvation of the race. If the grass were not clothed in glorious raiment to-day in order to be cast into the oven to-morrow,⁹ the fire on the householder's hearth would go out for lack of fuel; and, if the wheat did not ripen for the sickle, the husbandman would harvest no grain-store for the impending winter and no seed-corn for the following spring. Man profits by the nature-god's death, and would perish if his benefactor did not

¹ See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 98-9, and V. C. (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 85, above.

² See I. C. (i) (b), vol. i, p. 115, footnote 1, and V. C. (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 148-9, above.

³ See V. C. (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 149, above.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 150, above.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 149, above. In the Syriac Mythology the theme has a variation (see V. C. (i) (d) 11, p. 162, above) which is reproduced in the Christian Theology. Side by side with the figure of a god who dies for the World in his own person there is the figure of a god who so loves the World that he gives his only begotten son to save it (John iii. 16). The original Syriac myth, in its Phoenician version, is preserved in a passage from Philo of Byblus's Greek translation of the work of the Phoenician author Sanchuniathon which is quoted by Eusebius of Caesarea in his *Praeparatio Evangelica*, Book I, chap. 10 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. xxi, col. 85): 'Cronos, whom the Phoenicians call Israel [in cap. cit., col. 81, above, his name is given as Il]—a king of Phoenicia who, after his departure from this life, was consecrated into Cronos' Star—had an only begotten son (*υἱὸν μονογενῆ*) by a local nymph called Anðbret (they called him Ield, which is still the word for "only begotten" in Phoenician). When Phoenicia was overtaken by immense dangers arising from war, Cronos arrayed his son in royal insignia, set up an altar, and sacrificed his son upon it.' In the Israelitish version of the same Syriac myth the fatal consummation of the sacrifice of Isaac is averted at the last moment; the son and the father are ordinary human beings and not demigods; and the sacrifice of the son is undertaken by the father on the initiative, not of the father himself, but of the father's god (Gen. xxii). In the saga of Jephthah (Judges xi) the only child is transposed from a son into a virgin daughter who is a Syriac counterpart of the Hellenic Iphigeneia.

⁶ See V. C. (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 150-2, as well as I. C. (ii), vol. i, pp. 137 and 140-5, above.

⁷ Isa. liii. 2.

⁸ For the annual tragedy of the *ἐναιυρός δαίμων* as a prototype of the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return see III. C. (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 256-9, above.

⁹ Matt. vi. 30.

die for him perpetually. 'He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities, the chastisement of our peace was upon him and with his stripes we are healed.'¹ That is one aspect of the salvation which the Dying God's epiphany and Passion bring to Man. But an outward achievement—however imposing and however dearly paid for—cannot reveal the mystery at the heart of a tragedy. If we are to read the secret, we must look beyond the human beneficiary's material profit and the divine protagonist's material loss. The god's death and the man's gain are not the whole story. We cannot know the meaning of the play without also knowing the protagonist's circumstances and feelings and motives. Does the Dying God die by compulsion or by choice? With generosity or with bitterness? Out of love or in despair? Till we have learnt the answers to these questions about the saviour-god's spirit, we can hardly judge the value of the salvation that Man will derive from his death. We cannot tell whether this salvation will be merely a profit for a man through a god's equivalent loss, or whether it will be a spiritual communion in which Man will repay, by acquiring ('like a light caught from a leaping flame'),² a divine love and pity that have been shown to Man by God in an act of pure self-sacrifice.

In what spirit, then, does the Dying God go to his death? If we address ourselves once more to our array of tragic masks and adjure the hidden actor to reply to our challenging question, we shall see the goats being separated from the sheep, and the tragedy³ being transfigured into a mystery, under this searching test. Even in Calliope's melodious lamentation for the death of Orpheus there is a jarring note of bitterness which strikes, and shocks, a Christian ear when it rings out of one of the most beautiful poems in Greek.

τί φθιμένοις στοναχέυμεν ἔφ' υἱάσιν, ἀνίκ' ἀλαλκεῖν
τῶν παίδων Ἀΐδην οὐδὲ θεοῖς δύναμις;⁴

'Why do we mortals make lament over the deaths of our sons, seeing that the Gods themselves have not power to keep Death from laying his hand upon their children?' What a moral to read into the Dying God's story! So the goddess who was Orpheus' mother would never have let Orpheus die if she could have helped it; and *ergo*, if even the Gods are thus impotent to satisfy their dearest wishes, then the only reasonable attitude for feebler beings to adopt when the same pangs of bereavement come upon them is

¹ Isa. liii. 5.

² Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341 c-d, quoted already in III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, p. 445, and in V. C (i) (d) 11, in the present volume, p. 165, footnote 6, above.

³ The word 'tragedy' means literally what the performance was originally: a 'goat-chant'.

⁴ Elegy on the death of Orpheus by Antipater of Sidon (*floruit circa* 90 B.C.).

a posture of dull resignation—barely relieved by the faintest thrill of malicious pleasure at the greater discomfiture of the mightier Olympians. Like a cloud that veils the Sun, the Hellenic poet's thought takes the light out of Orpheus' death. But Antipater's poem is answered in another masterpiece which responds to it like antistrophe to strophe, though it was written at least two hundred years later, and that in a Judaic Greek which would have grated on the aesthetic sensibilities of the exquisite Sidonian Hellenist.

'For God so loved the World that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life. For God sent not his Son into the World to condemn the World, but that the World through him might be saved.'¹

When the Gospel thus answers the elegy, it delivers an oracle. *Οἷος πέπνυται, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσιν.*² 'The one remains, the many change and pass.'³ And this is in truth the final result of our survey of saviours. When we first set out on this quest we found ourselves moving in the midst of a mighty marching host; but, as we have pressed forward on our way, the marchers, company by company, have been falling out of the race. The first to fail were the swordsmen, the next the archaists, the next the futurists, the next the philosophers, until at length there were no more human competitors left in the running. In the last stage of all, our motley host of would-be saviours, human and divine, has dwindled to a single company of none but gods; and now the strain has been testing the staying-power of these last remaining runners, notwithstanding their superhuman strength. At the final ordeal of death, few, even of these would-be saviour-gods, have dared to put their title to the test by plunging into the icy river. And now, as we stand and gaze with our eyes fixed upon the farther shore, a single figure rises from the flood and straightway fills the whole horizon. There is the Saviour; 'and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand; he shall see of the travail of his soul and shall be satisfied.'⁴

(b) THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS IN DIS-INTEGRATING CIVILIZATIONS

The Rhythm of Disintegration.

In the last chapter we have studied the effect of the disintegration of a society upon the individuals who are born into it in this unhappy phase of its history. We have seen that in a disintegrating body social the 'member' who has in him the spark of creative

¹ John iii. 16-17.

² *Odyssey*, Book X, l. 495, quoted in V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 44, above.

³ Shelley: *Adonais*, l. 460.

⁴ Isa. liii. vv. 10-11.

genius finds his field of social action in the role of a saviour. We have passed in review the diverse types of would-be saviours who arise in response to the challenge that social disintegration presents. And we have found that the only claimant to the title who makes his claim good is the saviour *from* Society who does not allow himself to be deflected from his aim. The would-be saviour *from* Society who lapses into the role of a would-be saviour *of* Society is condemning himself to the failure that is in store for his comrade who has cast himself for this role deliberately. It is only in so far as he succeeds in finding, and showing, the way into an Other World, out of range of the City of Destruction, that the would-be saviour is able to accomplish his mission. And this conclusion, to which we have just been led as the result of an empirical survey, will confine the present chapter, *a priori*, within a narrower compass than its predecessor. For in this chapter we are not concerned with the destinies of the pilgrims who are moved by the awful prospect of impending catastrophe to break out of the doomed city and shake off the dust of their feet.¹ If the leader whom they are following in their exodus is a saviour indeed, he will lead them into the Kingdom of God and there build them a New Jerusalem. 'And he led them forth by the right way, that they might go to a city of habitation'²—but that is another story.³ In the present chapter our business is with these pilgrims' unhappy fellow citizens who remain sitting in darkness and in the shadow of death,⁴ whether through lack of the imagination to foresee their city's doom or through lack of the courage to forestall it by making their escape. Our business now is with the interaction between individuals *in* disintegrating civilizations; and this means that we shall not be so much concerned with the relations of the uncreative rank-and-file with creative personalities or minorities, since, *ex hypothesi*, the creators are being moved, *ex officio creativitatis*, to leave the doomed city at the head of the departing bands of pilgrims.

Excessere omnes, adytis arisque relictis
di quibus imperium hoc steterat.⁵

We shall therefore mainly be studying the relations between an uncreative rank-and-file and a minority that in most of its activities is not creative either, but is merely dominant.⁶

¹ Matt. x. 14.

² Ps. cvii. 7.

³ The question whether the New Jerusalem can be brought down to Earth in the shape of a universal church is discussed in Part VII, below.

⁴ Ps. cvii. 10.

⁵ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book II, ll. 351-2, quoted already in this Study in I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 57, footnote 1; in II. D (vi), vol. ii, p. 216; and in IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 349, above.

⁶ See V. C (i) (b), vol. v, pp. 23-35, above. The Dominant Minority deserves its name, since it relies on force, and not on charm, for the maintenance of its hold. At the

This means in turn that we shall not find our key this time in that movement of Withdrawal-and-Return which is the key to the interaction between individuals in civilizations that are still in the growth-stage.¹ All the same, we shall not find the rhythm of social disintegration altogether unfamiliar, for we shall recognize in it several other movements which we have learnt to know in studying the processes of genesis and growth. Indeed, we have observed already at an earlier point in this Part that the disintegration of a civilization, like its growth, is a process that is both continuous and cumulative;² that the process has a rhythm which is repetitive;³ that each beat of the music follows from the last and leads on to the next;⁴ and that the basis of this periodic rhythm is the principle of Challenge-and-Response.⁵ In the same context, however, we have also noted⁶ a point of difference between the rhythm of disintegration and the rhythm of growth which is clearly of capital importance.

In the growth-rhythm each successive beat is introduced by the presentation of a new challenge which arises out of a successful response to a previous challenge, and which is met, in its turn, by a successful response to itself out of which, again, another new challenge arises. This is the nature of the growth-rhythm *ex hypothesi*, since on the one hand the movement could not be continuous if a successful response were the end of the whole story, while on the other hand the movement could not be one of growth if any of the responses to any of the challenges were to prove, not successes, but failures. A failure to respond to a challenge successfully is the essence of the catastrophe of social breakdown which cuts short a process of growth and gives rise, in its place, to a process of disintegration. A disintegrating society is failing *ex hypothesi* to respond to a challenge that is presented to it; and so long as a challenge remains unanswered it will continue to hold the field. This means that a disintegrating society is confronted all the time by a single challenge—the particular challenge over which it has broken down—instead of being called upon, like a growing society, to deal with a series of challenges which are severally different from one another. And this means, in turn, that the periodicity which is one of the features that the process of disintegration has in common with the process of growth cannot be accounted for by the same explanation. While the growth-beats

same time—as we have observed in cap. cit., pp. 33–4—the Dominant Minority cannot be entirely lacking in creative power, since the schools of philosophy and the universal states are the Dominant Minority's handiwork, and both these works bear witness to the creativity of the hands that have made them.

¹ See III, C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 248–377, above.

² See Part V. B, vol. v, pp. 12–13, above.

⁴ Ibid., p. 12, above. ⁵ Ibid., pp. 11–12, above.

³ Ibid., p. 12, above.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 12–13, above.

arise out of a series of successes in responding to a series of different challenges, the disintegration-beats arise out of a series of failures to respond to a single challenge; and, if the disintegration-process, like the growth-process, is continuous, this must be because each successive failure sows, in failing, the seeds of a fresh attempt. This must be the nature of the disintegration-rhythm because, if any one of the failures to respond to the unanswered but inexorable challenge were to prove so conclusive as absolutely to close the door upon all possibility of making any further endeavours, that would mean that, in this particular beat, the process had come to a stop and the disintegration-movement had thus ended—as of course, it must end sooner or later—in the *rigor mortis*.

Thus, while the disintegration-movement resembles the growth-movement in having Challenge-and-Response for its basis, it does not turn this basis to the same account in building its periodicity-structure. In the growth-movement each beat of the rhythm consists in a new performance of the drama of Challenge-and-Response which is at the same time a new rendering; in the disintegration-movement the beats are merely repetitive performances of one rendering of the play that never varies so long as this run of the play lasts; and, if we were to try to formulate the two series of beats as though they were mathematical progressions, we should find that we had to describe them in different terms. Our formula for the growth-progression would be 'a challenge evoking a successful response generating a fresh challenge evoking another successful response and so on, pending a breakdown'; our formula for the disintegration-progression would be 'a challenge evoking an unsuccessful response generating another attempt resulting in another failure and so on, pending dissolution'. Rout-rally-relapse is the form of the disintegration-process that any failure to respond to a challenge sets in train. And this is the pattern of the dance that the individual 'members' of a disintegrating society lead one another.

This interaction between individuals in a disintegrating society may be described in a military simile.

The failure of a response results in a retreat in which ground is lost and discipline is relaxed; but the débâcle is neither complete nor final, because the very danger and disgrace of it call out latent powers of leadership and latent habits of obedience. On some line, at some moment, some officer will temporarily succeed in checking the fugitives' flight and re-forming their ranks; the shaken army will then once more face the enemy and allow itself to be led into another attack upon the objective that it has failed to capture in the previous engagement; and for a time it will almost look as though

the fortunes of the battle might be retrieved. But these reviving hopes soon prove delusive; for the recovery of *moral* upon which the leaders are counting in their hope for better success at a second attempt is no more than a fair-weather courage. The rally has only been achieved after the discomfited army has succeeded in breaking contact with a victorious enemy by shamefully taking to its heels, and it only lasts so long as the troops are not led back into action. Their recovery is more than offset by the shock of finding themselves once again under fire; and the result is another débâcle which is more serious than its predecessor.

In the sphere of human activity from which our simile is taken we have seen a tragic illustration of this process in our own world and generation. On the East European front in the General War of 1914-18 the Russians suffered in 1915 a military disaster which resulted in the first place in a great military retreat and in the second place in a great political revolution. In 1917 the Tsardom was overthrown and was replaced by a Liberal parliamentary government. This change of political régime was followed by a moral rally; and thereupon pressure was brought to bear upon the new Government of Russia—partly by its nationalist supporters at home and partly by its West European allies—to turn this moral rally to military account by launching a new offensive. Against their better judgement the new Russian Government reluctantly consented to do what was being so insistently demanded of them, and the consequences were ruinous beyond their worst forebodings. After an indecisive initial success the new offensive broke down; and the disaster of 1917 quite eclipsed that of 1915. In 1917 the Russian army did not simply retreat: this time it melted away. And the political revolution in which the military disaster was reflected once again was this time far more violent and more destructive than it had been on the former occasion. The Liberal régime which had momentarily taken the place of the old autocracy was now swept away by Bolshevism; and one of the first acts of the Bolshevik Government of Russia was to make peace at Brest-Litovsk on the enemy's terms.

This illustration brings out the grim truth that the process of social disintegration is a galloping consumption. The rider's desperate efforts to rein in the runaway horse do not avail to bring the frantic animal to a halt. They merely stampede him into plunging on again, with a demonic impetus, along his breakneck course.

If Rout-and-Rally is thus the rhythm in which the individual 'members' of a disintegrating civilization are prone to interact with one another, does this rhythm assert itself on the large scale as

well as on the small? Can we discern it in the broad lines of the historical process of social disintegration with which we have now made ourselves familiar?

If, with this question in mind, we now cast our eye over the conspicuous features of the disintegration-process, we shall find an unmistakable example of a rally in the foundation of a universal state, and an equally unmistakable example of a rout in the foregoing 'Time of Troubles'; and we shall also find that the process does not exhaust itself in this single beat of the rhythm; for the establishment of the universal state is not the end of the story. For a time it may look as though this were something better than a rally from a rout. Is not the universal state a genuinely, even if belatedly, successful response to the challenge that has remained unanswered since the original breakdown? This challenge usually seems to take the form of a warfare between parochial sovereign states which threatens to become deadly unless the institution of parochial sovereignty can be transcended. Is not this condition for salvation fulfilled in the establishment of a unitary state of oecumenical range? And does not this justify the creators and preservers of a universal state in expecting that their handiwork will endure for ever? The answer seems to be that the establishment of a universal state is a response which falls short of success because it has been achieved both too late and at too great a cost. The stable door has been bolted only after the steed has fled. The cease-fire has been sounded only after the soldier has been dealt a mortal wound. The sword has been sheathed only after it has drunk so deep of blood that its thirst for bloodshed can never now be slaked until it has stolen out of its scabbard again and buried its blade up to the hilt in the body of the blood-guilty swordsman.¹ And, whatever the explanation, there is at any rate no doubt about the fact; for the march of events proves incontrovertibly that the universal state has an Achilles' heel, and that its belief in its own immortality is nothing but an illusion.² Sooner or later the universal state passes away; and its passing brings the disintegrating society to its dissolution. In the terms of our formula the rally that is represented by the foundation of a universal state is followed by a relapse when the society *in extremis* is either attacked and devoured by some aggressive contemporary or else dissolves in an interregnum out of which an affiliated civilization eventually emerges.³

¹ The truth of the saying that 'they that take the sword shall perish with the sword' is impressively demonstrated by the transitoriness of a universal state's *Pax Oecumenica* (see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 191-206, above).

² For this belief, and its ironical nemesis, see Part VI, below.

³ For these two alternative endings to the life of a disintegrating civilization see IV. C (ii) (b) 1 and 2, vol. iv, pp. 56-114, above.

Thus in the disintegration-phase of the history of any civilization we can trace a movement of the disintegration-rhythm through at least one beat and a half. A rout which begins at the breakdown of the civilization is eventually followed by a rally which begins at the foundation of its universal state and which is eventually followed in its turn by the breakdown of this universal state's *Pax Oecumenica*. This latter breakdown marks the beginning of another rout which, instead of being followed by another rally, runs on unchecked until it results in annihilation.

On this grand scale the pattern is conspicuous; but, if we look into the movement of disintegration more closely, we shall perceive that the beats which catch our attention first are not the whole of the tune: they are major beats that are interspersed with at least as many minor ones.

While it is true, for example, that the foundation of a universal state marks the beginning of a rally, and its breakdown the beginning of a rout, it is not true that the rally maintains itself continuously, without flagging, from the first until the second of these two moments. In our survey of saviours with the sword we have passed in review the company of the 'Illyrians',¹ whose mission is to re-establish the *Pax Oecumenica* of a universal state after the society has suffered a relapse into anarchy; and this is as much as to say that, 'in the last analysis', the reign of the *Pax Oecumenica* proves not to be a single continuous régime, but to resolve itself, under the analyst's lens, into a couple of minor reigns with a minor interregnum in between them. On this showing, the periodicity-formula for a universal state is not a single beat of Rally-and-Relapse but a double one; and, if we employ a more powerful microscope, we may be able to carry our analysis farther.

For example, if we focus upon the Roman Empire, which was the Hellenic universal state, we shall easily discern the minor interregnum—beginning after the death of Marcus in A.D. 180 and ending at the accession of Diocletian in A.D. 284²—which splits the total span of the *Pax Romana* into two discontinuous bouts: the first bout ending in the year of the death of Marcus and beginning in the year of the Battle of Actium (*commissum* 31 B.C.), while the second bout begins in the year of the accession of Diocletian and ends in the year of the Battle of Adrianople (*commissum* A.D. 378). But, if we now take the first of these two bouts of the *Pax Romana* (*durabat* 31 B.C.—A.D. 180) and analyse this in its turn, we shall find that even this bout did not run quite continuously from beginning

¹ See V. C (ii) (a), pp. 207–8, above.

² This temporary collapse of the Roman Empire *post Marcum* has already been noticed in IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 8; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 219; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 649; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 207, above.

to end of its own relatively short span. Even within this sub-period we can put our finger, at the year A.D. 69, 'the Year of the Four Emperors', on a sub-interregnum which is undoubtedly a genuine example of its kind, however mild a case we may pronounce it to be—judging by the length of its duration and the degree of its anarchy—in comparison even with the minor interregnum of A.D. 180–284 and *a fortiori* with the major interregnum which began in A.D. 378 and which was never retrieved.

If we now turn from the Roman Empire to the Tokugawa Shogunate, which was the universal state of the Far Eastern Society in Japan, we may be able to carry our analysis to yet a further degree of refinement. The *Pax Tokugawica* (*durabat* A.D. 1600–1868) did not last out its natural term, because it was overtaken and overwhelmed by the impact on Japan of the alien civilization of the West; yet, even within this exceptionally short Time-span, a modern Western scholar has detected three sub-relapses and two sub-rallies between the foundation of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the year of the Battle of Sekigehara (*commisum* A.D. 1600) and its abrupt end in the year of the Meiji Revolution (*actum* 1868).¹

Again, in the major interregnum that follows the decisive breakdown of a *Pax Oecumenica*, it is possible in some cases to discern a sub-rally punctuating a débâcle which at first glance appears to run on and out, without any check at all, into a never-retrieved annihilation. In the major interregnum that followed the decisive breakdown of the *Pax Romana* in A.D. 378, we can espy a sub-rally of this kind in the reign of Justinian (*imperabat* A.D. 527–65).² In Indic history Justinian has a counterpart in Harsha (*imperabat* A.D. 606–47),³ who temporarily arrested the ebb of a tide which, by the time when Harsha came to the throne, had been running out, unchecked, for no less than four generations since the decisive breakdown of the *Pax Guptica* in the eighth decade of the fifth century of the Christian Era. And, if Harsha is an Indic Justinian, the 'Abbasid Caliph Nāsir'⁴—who for a moment successfully reasserted the temporal authority of his office more than three hundred years after its eclipse in the ninth century of the Christian Era—may be called a Syriac Heraclius. In Sinic history the major interregnum that followed the decisive breakdown of the

¹ See Murdoch, J.: *A History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), p. 427. According to Murdoch, the initial rally, which began with Ieyasu's great victory in A.D. 1600, did not continue for more than seventy years without flagging, and from first to last the Bakufu régime experienced the following vicissitudes: 1600–70: rally; 1670–1709: relapse; 1709–51: rally; 1751–86: relapse; 1786–93: rally; 1793–1868: relapse.

² For Justinian as an example of a 'Second Solomon', see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 209–10, above. For the disastrous effects of Justinian's Archaism see *cap. cit.*, pp. 223–5, above.

³ See V. C (ii) (a), p. 209, footnote 3, above.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 212, above.

Pax Hanica in the last quarter of the second century of the Christian Era was momentarily interrupted—in this case after an interval of about a hundred years—when the political unity of the territories which had formerly been embraced in the Sinic universal state was temporarily restored under the dynasty of the United Tsin (*imperabant* A.D. 280–317).¹ This Sinic sub-rally in the course of a major interregnum was impressive so long as it lasted; but in the sequel it proved as costly a luxury as Justinian's blaze of magnificence. In the Sinic, as in the Hellenic, case the dissolving society was harrowed by more cruel tribulations after the abortive rally than it had ever undergone before it. For example, the 'successor-states' of the Sinic universal state in the first bout of the interregnum, which had followed immediately upon the break-up of the empire of the Posterior Han at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era, had been the indigenous Sinic principalities that still live on in the realm of romance under the name of 'the Three Kingdoms'. On the other hand the 'successor-states' by which the empire of the United Tsin was supplanted in its turn were carved out of the flesh of the Sinic body social by barbarian invaders.²

If we turn, in the third place, from the major interregnum which follows the decisive breakdown of a *Pax Oecumenica* to the 'Time of Troubles' that precedes its establishment, we shall find that this phase, too, in the disintegration of a civilization is not really uniform in colour or seamless in texture. The rout that is precipitated by the breakdown of a civilization does not run quite unchecked until the moment of the rally that is marked by the foundation of a universal state. Just as the *Pax Oecumenica* of a universal state is punctuated by a minor interregnum which splits its reign into two discontinuous bouts, so the anarchy of a 'Time of Troubles' is punctuated by a minor recovery which breaks the seizure up into two distinct paroxysms.

If, in the light of these considerations, we now try to strike a mean between an over-simple and an over-subtle analysis, we may be inclined to concentrate our attention upon a run of the disintegration-rhythm in which it takes three and a half beats of the movement of Rout-and-Rally to cover the journey from the breakdown of a civilization to its dissolution. Let us test our periodicity-pattern, as it presents itself on this scale, by our usual empirical method. Do the histories of the disintegrations of the civilizations whose histories are known to us fall naturally into this shape? Our survey will necessarily be confined to cases in

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 88; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 65, footnote 3; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 272, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 273, above.

which our evidence is sufficient and in which, at the same time, the normal course of events has not been distorted out of all recognition by the disturbing impact of external forces. These conditions are fulfilled in the histories of the Hellenic and Sinic and Sumeric civilizations, and again in the history of the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society. The history of the Hindu Civilization has likewise followed a normal course which in our day is all but complete. And we shall also find it worth while to look at the histories of the Syriac Civilization, the Far Eastern Society both in Japan and in China, the Babylonian Civilization, the Orthodox Christian Society in Russia, and the Minoan Civilization—in spite of the irregularities which deform the first five of these six histories in their later chapters.

The Rhythm in Hellenic History.

The Hellenic example may be convenient to take first, because the challenge that worsted the Hellenic Civilization is one which has been the common bane of most of the civilizations whose breakdowns and disintegrations are on record, and at the same time one which is nowhere more easy to identify than it is in the Hellenic case in point. The challenge under which the Hellenic Civilization broke down was manifestly the problem of creating some kind of political world order that would transcend the institution of Parochial Sovereignty. And this problem, which defeated the generation that stumbled into the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431–404 B.C., never disappeared from the Hellenic Society's agenda so long as such a thing as Hellenism survived in any recognizable form.¹

The moment of the breakdown of the Hellenic Society is not difficult to date; it can be equated with the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C.; and we can be equally confident in dating the establishment of the *Pax Romana*, which served as the Hellenic *Pax Oecumenica*, from Octavian's victory at Actium in 31 B.C. Can we also discern a movement of Rally-and-Relapse in the course of the 'Time of Troubles' that extends between these two dates? If we scan the history of the Hellenic World during the four centuries ending in 31 B.C., the vestiges of an abortive pre-Augustan rally are unmistakable.

One symptom is the social gospel of Homonoia or Concord² which was preached by Timoleon (*ducebat* 344–337 B.C.) in Sicily and by Alexander (*imperabat* 336–323 B.C.) in a vaster field east of

¹ See IV. C (iii) (b) 10, vol. iv, pp. 206–14; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 303–15; and V. B, vol. v, p. 12, above.

² See V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 6–8, above.

the Adriatic.¹ Another symptom of a rally is the subsequent prescription by two philosophers, Zeno and Epicurus, of a way of life for citizens of a commonwealth which was not any parochial city-state but was nothing less than the *Cosmopolis*.² A third symptom is a crop of constitutional experiments—the Seleucid Empire, the Aetolian and Achaean Confederacies, the Roman Commonwealth—which were all of them attempts to transcend the traditional sovereignty of the individual city-state by building up political communities on a supra-city-state scale out of city-states which had been persuaded or coerced into playing the part of constituent cells of a larger body politic.³ A fourth symptom is the endeavour to put new life into a dead-alive ‘*patrios politeia*’ which was made by certain high-minded sons of the Hellenic dominant minority—the two Heracleidae at Sparta and the two Gracchi at Rome⁴—who idealistically overrated the blessings which their country had derived in times past from its traditional constitution when this had been ‘a going concern’, and who were naïvely blind to the dangers of attempting to reinstate an obsolete institution which had now become an anachronism as well as a dead letter.⁵ A fifth symptom is a certain considerateness towards civilian life and property which appears to have been shown by the belligerents in the wars of Alexander’s successors.⁶ A sixth symptom is the social re-enfranchisement, *post Alexandrum*, of the women and slaves.⁷ It will be observed that these symptoms of a rally in the course of the Hellenic ‘Time of Troubles’ extend over four or five generations, reckoning from Timoleon’s to Cleomenes’,⁸ so that it is not easy to pin this rally down between definite dates; but, if we try to determine the period in which all this promise seemed nearest to being translated into performance, we may be inclined to single out the breathing-space of half a century between the death of Pyrrhus in 272 B.C.—an event that marked the end of

¹ For the respective missions of Timoleon and Alexander as a philosopher-statesman and a philosopher-king see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 248, 251, and 253, and pp. 246 and 254, above.

² For the Hellenic conception of the *Cosmopolis* see V. C (i) (d) 7, Annex, pp. 332–8, below.

³ For this crop of constitutional experiments in the third century B.C. see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 309–13, above.

⁴ The two Gracchi are ‘philosophically contemporary with’ the two Heracleidae, though in chronological time they lived and worked a hundred years later. For the concept of ‘philosophical contemporaneity’ see I. C (iii) (c), vol. i, pp. 172–4, above. For the chronological Time-lag of the history of Rome, in the Pre-Imperial Age, behind the histories of the states at the heart of the Hellenic World see IV. C (iii) (b) 9, vol. iv, p. 205, above, and also Part XI, below.

⁵ For the Archaism of the Heracleidae and the Gracchi, and its disastrous outcome, see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 219–20, above.

⁶ On this convention see the passage quoted in IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, p. 147, footnote 1, above from Polybius, who gives to Alexander himself the credit of having been the first Hellenic captain to set this example of humanitarianism.

⁷ See IV. C (iii) (b) 14, vol. iv, pp. 239–40, above.

⁸ And leaving the generation of the Gracchi out of the reckoning, for the reason given in footnote 4, above.

the strife over the division of the heritage of Alexander the Great—and the outbreak of the Hannibalic War in 218 B.C. This relatively prosperous spell of Hellenic history in the third century B.C. is not incomparable with the earlier spell of rather greater prosperity and almost equal length which in the fifth century had intervened between the repulse of Xerxes and the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War; and the two general wars which respectively cut the two breathing-spaces short were disasters of an approximately equal magnitude. It will be seen that, if the third century B.C. witnessed a rally which almost looked like a return of the Periclean Age, this rally was followed by a relapse which was at least as serious a débâcle as the breakdown in which the Periclean Age had found its tragic end.¹

Can we diagnose the weak point in the rally that accounts for its ultimate defeat? The weakness arose out of a sudden great increase in the material scale of Hellenic life that had been a by-product of the first paroxysm of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles'. Hellenic arms which had been exercised and sharpened in a hundred years of internecine warfare were turned against non-Hellenic targets towards the end of the fourth century B.C.; and, in practised Macedonian and Roman hands, these formidable weapons then conquered, and in conquering annexed to the Hellenic World, the domains of four alien civilizations² as well as vast tracts of Barbarism.³ This sudden change of material scale seriously—and, as it turned out, fatally—aggravated the difficulty of solving the unsolved problem on the solution of which the fate of the Hellenic Civilization hung. The problem, as we have seen, was that of creating some kind of political world order that would transcend the traditional sovereignty of the individual city-state; and, while the change of material scale did promise to serve this end in one negative way by making the maintenance of City-State Sovereignty impossible, the same change also had a positive consequence which militated—and this with far greater effect—against the endeavour to bring a world order into being.

Experiments in overcoming a traditional parochialism which were unprecedentedly successful in themselves were now turned

¹ On a first view of Hellenic history we were content to trace the disintegration of the Hellenic Society back to the Hannibalic War and to let our investigations rest at that point for the time being (see I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 40-2, above). It was not till we had come to grips with the problem of the breakdowns of civilizations that we took this inquiry up again and this time traced the story farther back, through an earlier chapter, from the Hannibalic War of 218-201 B.C. to the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. (See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 61-3, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 213, above.)

² The Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indic.

³ For this sudden territorial expansion of the Hellenic World at this time see III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 140 and 150-1; III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, p. 197; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 265; IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 305-6; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 214, above.

to account, not for the large and vital purpose of creating an all-embracing Hellenic world order, but for the petty and perverse purpose of forging new-fangled Great Powers of a supra-city-state calibre which would be capable of continuing, on the new scale of Hellenic affairs, the internecine warfare that had been waged on the old scale by a Sparta and an Athens and a Thebes with such disastrous effects upon the life of the society in which all these parochial communities had their being. Thus the political shape which the Hellenic Society assumed in the new chapter of Hellenic history that had been opened by Alexander's passage of the Hellespont¹ was something that was at the opposite pole from a political world order. When the epigoni of the diadochi of Alexander had fought one another to a standstill and the dust of battle had had time to settle down, the political landscape that became visible in the fourth decade of the third century B.C. revealed a cluster of pygmy states at the heart of the Hellenic World compassed about by a ring of giant Powers whose ambitions were set, and energies bent, upon the perilous game of contending with one another in the central arena for the prize of a hegemony over its puny and defenceless denizens.² Both the geographical expansion of the Hellenic World that had been achieved by Macedonian and Roman military prowess and the constitutional progress in transcending city-state sovereignty that had been accomplished by Aetolian and Achaean and Seleucid and Roman statesmanship had been seized upon, and successfully misapplied, for the purpose of recruiting the strength of the new competitors for a military ascendancy. And these giants' only notion of how to employ their huge physical powers was to refight the battles of Athens and Sparta with a titanic violence that had never come within those old-fashioned belligerents' capacity.

The inevitable consequence was a repetition in the third century of the catastrophe which the Hellenic Society had brought upon itself once already in the fifth century. In that earlier age the city-states which had indulged in 'temperate contests' with one another during the half-century following the repulse of Xerxes had eventually fallen into the internecine conflict of 431-404 B.C. And now, in the third century, the new Great Powers of supra-city-state calibre which had taken Athens' and Sparta's place proved likewise unable to contend with one another for longer than half a century without stumbling, in their turn, into a disaster. The respite that had begun after the death of Pyrrhus ended in the

¹ For this 'new era' of Hellenic history see V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), Annex, p. 340, below.

² For this constellation of Hellenic political forces in this age see III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 310-13 and 339-41, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 265 and 268-9, above.

Hannibalic War of 218-201 B.C. And this time the havoc was proportionate to the unprecedented material 'drive' of the conflicting forces. The overthrow of Athens in 404 B.C. had been followed by nothing worse—bad enough though this might be—than a series of indecisive epilogues to the Great War which had ended at Aegospotami. Sparta, Thebes, and Macedonia in turn had won and lost an originally Athenian hegemony. On the other hand the overthrow of Carthage in 201 B.C. was followed by the destruction or subjugation of three other Great Powers in a series of decisive conflicts from which Rome emerged as the sole surviving combatant. Zama was followed by Cynoscephalae and Magnesia and Pydna; and the cumulative effect of half a century of catastrophic warfare (218-168 B.C.) upon the stamina of the Hellenic Society of the day was so devastating that the victor's triumph was immediately followed by a series of social convulsions which racked the victor himself quite as cruelly as his victims and which left the whole Hellenic body social mortally enfeebled by the time when this second paroxysm of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' was brought to an end at last through the tardy conversion of a Roman Anarchy into a Roman Peace.¹

In the history of the disintegration of the Hellenic Society we have now verified the occurrence of one perceptible rally and one flagrant relapse between the original breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization in 431 B.C. and the establishment of a Hellenic *Pax Oecumenica* in 31 B.C.; and, since we have already taken note² of the subsequent relapse and rally that intervened between the first establishment of the *Pax Romana* in 31 B.C. and its final breakdown in A.D. 378, we can now report that the disintegration of one historic society, at any rate, does in fact present itself in the pattern of a run of three and a half beats of a recurrent movement of Rout-and-Rally. Let us see whether this finding is confirmed in other cases.

The Rhythm in Sinic History.

If we turn to the Sinic case next we shall identify the moment of the breakdown of the Sinic Civilization with the date of the disastrous collision between the two Powers Tsin and Ch'u in 634 B.C.,³ and the moment of the establishment of a Sinic *Pax*

¹ Saint Augustine, in *De Civitate Dei*, Book III, chaps. 18-28, surveys the evils of this second paroxysm of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles', from the outbreak of the Hannibalic War to the establishment of the *Pax Augusta*; and in chaps. 29-30 he submits that at any rate the climax of this paroxysm—i.e. the Roman *stasis* and civil wars of 133-31 B.C.—had been more dreadful than any of the experiences of his own generation, not excluding Alaric's sack of Rome in A.D. 410.

² In IV. C (i), vol. iv, p. 8; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 219; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 649; V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 207; and the present chapter, p. 284, above.

³ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 66, above.

Oecumena with the overthrow, in 221 B.C., of Ts'i by Ts'in—a 'knock-out blow' which left Ts'in alone alive as the solitary survivor in an arena now littered with the corpses of all the other Great Powers of the Sinic World.¹ If these are the two terminal dates of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles', are there any traces of a movement of Rally-and-Relapse within the intervening period? In the Sinic, as in the Hellenic, case the answer to this question is in the affirmative.

There is a perceptible rally in the course of the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' round about the generation of Confucius (*vivebat circa* 551-479 B.C.); and this rally may be taken to have been inaugurated by the disarmament conference of 546 B.C.,² in which a serious attempt was made to grapple with the fundamental problem of Sinic international politics.

In the Sinic World the dangerous political constellation into which the Hellenic World fell *post Alexandrum*³—that is to say, not until half-way through the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles'—had already taken shape in the last phase of the growth of the Sinic Society, before its breakdown. Even as early as that, the geographical expansion of the Sinic culture had produced the political effect of encircling the older states in the cradle of the Sinic Civilization with a ring of younger states which outclassed their elders in material calibre as decidedly as these surpassed the *parvenues* in every other respect.⁴ The catastrophe of 634 B.C. can perhaps be traced back to the failure of a previous attempt to deal with this awkward situation by international co-operation. In 681-680 B.C. the pygmy states in the heart of the Sinic World had organized themselves into a Central Confederacy under the presidency of the eastern Great Power, Ts'i, with the object of opposing a collective resistance to the pressure of the preponderant and aggressive southern Great Power, Ch'u. But, although this Central Confederacy was equipped with a permanent constitution which provided for recurrent assemblies of the heads of states with the Prince of Ts'i as their convener,⁵ its existence did not avail to prevent 'power politics' from becoming the dominant factor in Sinic international relations; and the conference of 546 B.C. represented a fresh attempt⁶ to rescue the Sinic World from a chronic

¹ For the significance of this event see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 89, above.

² See cap. cit., vol. cit., pag. cit.

³ See the present chapter, pp. 289-91, above.

⁴ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 303, footnote 2, and p. 313, footnote 3, above, as well as Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), pp. 286 and 336-7.

⁵ For the foundation, organization, and history of this Sinic Central Confederacy see *ibid.*, pp. 299-301. The Assembly was convened annually for the first four years of the Central Confederacy's existence, but thereafter only at longer intervals which were of no fixed length.

⁶ Between the foundation of the Central Confederacy in 681-680 B.C. and the calling

warfare which, in and after the Tsin-Ch'u War of 634-628 B.C., had ceased to be temperate and had become internecine. This time the two Great Powers which for eighty-eight years past had been struggling inconclusively for the prize of hegemony were implored by Sung—which was one of the most ancient and most respectable of the pygmy states at the centre—to lay aside their mutually incompatible ambitions and to assume a joint presidency of the Central Confederacy on a footing of equality with one another; and this statesmanlike diplomacy did secure a breathing-space for an already grievously self-lacerated Sinic body social.

What the Sung Government accomplished in 546 B.C. gave an opportunity in the next generation for a sage who had been born in the neighbouring central state of Lu about five years before the date of the conference. Confucius was able to devote his life to the self-imposed mission of saving the Sinic Society from suicide by converting its princes to a philosophically archaistic way of living and ruling.¹ But Confucius's personal experience gives the measure of the rally which the conference of 546 B.C. had inaugurated, for Confucius is perhaps the supreme example of a prophet who has been not without honour save in his own time. A sage who was to be honoured superlatively by Posterity after the Sinic World had been tragically overtaken by the catastrophe from which the posthumous hero had hoped to save it, found himself unable to gain the ear of any contemporary ruler. And, if Posterity has been right in recognizing in Confucius's prescription the sovereign cure for Sinic troubles, then it is not to be wondered at that the generation who refused to take this healing medicine when the cup was brought to their lips should have fallen into a relapse which was to prove to be still graver than the seizure that had almost been the death of their fathers.

The first warnings of fresh trouble had already declared themselves quite early in Confucius's own lifetime. For example, the Covenant of 546 B.C. had been broken by Ch'u in 538 after one renewal in 541.² But a disturbing factor to which the relapse of the Sinic Society *post Confucium* can be traced back more directly is the decline and fall of the principality of Tsin. This northern

of the conference of 546 B.C. the Central Confederacy had one conspicuous success when, in the successive assemblies of 655 and 652 B.C., it succeeded in regulating the succession to the throne of the Imperial Dynasty of the Chou. At the second of these two meetings the Governments there represented appear to have subscribed to a Covenant of five articles, in which they pledged themselves to act upon certain rather vaguely formulated principles of political and social behaviour. (See Hirth, F.: *The Ancient History of China* (New York 1908, Columbia University Press), pp. 209-10.)

¹ Confucius's career has been taken as an illustration of the *motif* of Withdrawal-and-Return in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 328-30, above, and as an illustration of the sage's endeavour to save souls by proxy in V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 252, above.

² See Maspéro, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

Great Power, which had been the first Sinic state to militarize itself,¹ was also the first to go to pieces.² Since about 573 B.C. there had been signs that the central government of Tsin was losing its hold over its feudatories; from 497 B.C. onwards this weakening of the central authority in the state began to be reflected in a process of internal disintegration; in the course of the fifth century the principality virtually dissolved into a mere congeries of fiefs; and this anarchy was only overcome at the cost of the life of the principality itself. About the year 424 B.C. Tsin broke up into three 'successor-states'—Chao, Han, and Wei—which secured diplomatic recognition in 403. This was the signal for a fresh outbreak of internecine warfare in the Sinic World; and that warfare was now waged in a larger arena and with a greater intensity than the pre-Confucian bout.

The increase in the extent of the arena was directly due to the break-up of Tsin; for the three 'successor-states' of the defunct principality were none of them of a calibre to play the part of a Great Power effectively; and their individual weakness was enhanced by the interlacement of their territories and by the mutual hostility of their governments; so that the effect of the change was to add three new members to the cluster of pygmy states at the heart of the Sinic World. On the other hand the ring of giants on the periphery was not broken, but was merely expanded, by the transference of the territories of the *ci-devant* northern Great Power from the outer circle to the inner; for all this time the Sinic World as a whole had continued steadily to expand; and by the time when Tsin collapsed a younger Power, Yen, which had latterly come into existence to the north of Tsin, was ready to step into the defunct northern Power's place. As for the increase in intensity that accompanied this increase in the scale of the warfare between the Sinic Great Powers, it is commemorated in the trivial yet significant fact that the name *Chan Kuo*—'the [period of] contending states'—which is properly applicable to the whole of the period between the outbreak of war between Tsin and Ch'u in 634 B.C. and the conquest of Ts'i by Ts'in in 221 B.C., has actually been confined, in the usage of Sinic historiography, to the second of the two paroxysms³ into which the Sinic 'Time of Troubles' is divided by the respite which began at the conference of 546 B.C.

¹ See Maspéro, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 345, 353, 362-3, and 367-8, for the principal stages in a decay which was a gradual process.

³ The beginning of the *Chan Kuo* period seems to have been sometimes reckoned from 403 B.C. (the date of the diplomatic recognition of the three 'successor-states' of Tsin) and sometimes from 479 B.C. (the supposed date of the death of Confucius); but the usage of the term does not seem ever to have been stretched to include either Confucius's lifetime or, *a fortiori*, the bout of internecine warfare before Confucius's birth.

The second paroxysm engraved so much more harrowing an impression upon Sinic minds that it came to be thought of as the 'Time of Troubles' *par excellence*.

'Avec la chute du Tsin, ce n'est pas seulement un des grands états qui avait disparu, c'était aussi tout un idéal d'organisation politique sous la forme d'une sorte de confédération respectant dans une certaine mesure les droits des princes locaux: à partir du ^ve siècle, le vieux système des hégémonies était bien mort, et ce n'est pas pour le ressusciter à leur profit que les grands états luttèrent, ce fut pour s'agrandir directement aux dépens de leurs voisins plus faibles, jusqu'à ce que le triomphe définitif d'un seul réalisât pour la première fois l'unité absolue du monde chinois entier.'¹

Thus in Sinic, as in Hellenic, history we can verify the occurrence of one perceptible rally and one flagrant relapse between the original breakdown of the society and the establishment of its *Pax Oecumenica*; and, if we go on to inquire whether the Sinic, like the Hellenic, *Pax Oecumenica* was punctuated by a relapse and a rally, we shall find this question easy to answer in the affirmative. The break in the continuity of the *Pax Hanica* is marked by a literal interregnum (*durabat* A.D. 9-25) which intervened between the fall of the dynasty of the Prior Han and the establishment of a new dynasty which had no genuine connexion with the House of Liu Pang, though it assumed the name of 'the Posterior Han' in a barefaced endeavour to gloze over its lack of any legitimate title to the Imperial Throne. The historical fact of the interregnum disposes of this fiction of continuity, and the bout of anarchy was longer *de facto* than *de jure*; for the Prior Han had let the reins of government fall from their hands about half a century before they lost the throne itself to the usurper Wang Mang.² It will be seen that the subsequent decisive breakdown of the *Pax Hanica* towards the close of the second century of the Christian Era, when the Posterior Han collapsed in their turn, was the fourth débâcle, reckoning from the initial disaster of 634-628 B.C., in the history of the disintegration of the Sinic Society; and, since this fourth débâcle was not successfully retrieved by the abortive rally in the time of the United Tsin,³ the number of standard beats of the movement of Rout-and-Rally that can be counted in the course of the disintegration-process from first to last turns out in Sinic, as in Hellenic, history to be three and a half.

¹ Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 390-1.

² This collapse of the Prior Han is perhaps to be explained, at least in part, as an effect of the strain of the great wars of conquest on the Eurasian Steppe which had been launched by the Emperor Wuti (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 271, above).

³ See pp. 285-6, above.

The Rhythm in Sumeric History.

If we pass from Sinic history to Sumeric we shall register the same reading here again; for in the course of the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' a beat of Rally-and-Rout is distinctly, even if only faintly, perceptible, while the life-span of the Sumeric universal state is punctuated by a counter-beat of Rout-and-Rally which is unusually emphatic.

If we date the beginning of the 'Time of Troubles'¹ from the career of the Sumerian militarist Lugalzaggisi of Erech (Uruk) and Umma (*dominabatur circa 2677-2653 B.C.*)² and equate its end with the foundation of a Sumeric universal state by Ur-Engur of Ur (*imperabat circa 2298-2281 B.C.*)³ we may detect, in the life-time of the Akkadian militarist Naramsin (*dominabatur circa 2572-2517 B.C.*), at least one symptom of a rally in a sudden notable advance in the field of visual art which had been achieved between the generation of Naramsin and that of his predecessor Sargon (*dominabatur circa 2652-2597 B.C.*)⁴ At the same time this very increase, in this age, of the Sumeric Society's powers of visual representation has served to testify that this successful cultivation of the arts of peace was not accompanied by any renunciation of Militarism. The scene portrayed on Naramsin's celebrated stele cries out for a nemesis that duly overtook the hero's successors.⁵ Within a quarter of a century of Naramsin's death the Akkadian power had been shaken by disputes over the succession to the throne;⁶ within sixty-two years the sceptre had passed back from Akkad to Erech; and within eighty-eight years the Gutaeans who had been brought to bay and slaughtered by Naramsin in their native mountain fastnesses had taken their revenge by descending upon the plains of Shinar and imposing their own rule on both Akkad and Sumer.⁷ This interlude of barbarian domination—which marked the acme of the second paroxysm of the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles'—lasted for 124 years (*circa 2429-*

¹ The dates given in the following paragraphs for events in Sumeric history are all taken, except where other references are given, from Meyer, E.: *Die Aeltere Chronologie Babyloniens, Assyriens und Aegyptens* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1925, Cotta).

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109, above.

³ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 106; V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, p. 497; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 650-1; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 190, above.

⁴ For this advance—for which one of the most striking pieces of evidence is afforded by the stele on which Naramsin has commemorated his aggression against the highlanders of Gutium—see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Alterthums*, vol. i, part (2), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 533.

⁵ For Naramsin's militarism and its nemesis see also I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 109; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 203 and 262; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 184, above.

⁶ The triennium, *circa 2491-2489 B.C.*, which saw no less than four successors of Naramsin come and go may be compared with the Roman 'Year of the Four Emperors'.

⁷ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 262, above.

2306 B.C.) before Utuchegal of Erech (*militabat circa* 2305–2299 B.C.) made his abortive, and Ur-Engur of Ur (*imperabat circa* 2298–2281 B.C.) his successful, attempt to establish a *Pax Sumerica*.¹

The Time-span of this *Pax Sumerica* extends between Ur-Engur's accession *circa* 2298 B.C. and Hammurabi's death *circa* 1905 B.C.; but when we look into the course of Sumeric history between these two dates we find that in this case the 'Peace' is a thin shell encasing a wide welter of anarchy.² The peace which Ur-Engur succeeded in establishing did not remain unbroken for more than 118 years. It was suddenly and violently interrupted when in 2180 B.C. Ur-Engur's fourth successor, the Emperor Ibisin, was defeated and taken prisoner by a host of Elamite rebels. Thereupon 'the Empire of the Four Quarters' broke into fragments. The triumphantly insurgent province of Elam not only recovered its own independence; it also imposed its rule upon a portion of the metropolitan territory of the Sumeric universal state in Shinar, which was now organized into a client-state of Elam with its capital at Larsa and with an Elamite prince installed there as the vassal of an Elamite suzerain who was the King of Elam itself. In other parts of Shinar the tradition of the Empire of Ur was carried on by a 'Realm of the Two Lands'³ with its capital at Isin; but this relic of the Sumeric universal state was not strong enough to hold together the provinces on which the Elamites had not laid hands. This or that city-state (*imprimis* Erech) was perpetually asserting its independence here and there; and 130 years after Ibisin's catastrophe a new 'successor-state' with a greater future was carved out of the former domain of the Empire of Ur by Amorite marchmen who made themselves masters of Babylon in 2049 B.C. From first to last the tide of anarchy that had broken loose in 2180 B.C. went on flowing for more than 200 years. The first sign of a recoil from disruption towards consolidation was the conquest and annexation of the Empire of Isin by the Elamite client-state of Larsa *circa* 1954–1948 B.C. The work of re-union was completed in 1918 B.C. when Rimsin of Larsa, the Elamite conqueror of Isin, was overthrown in his turn by Hammurabi, the Amorite prince of Babylon. In virtue of this feat

¹ See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 106; V. C (i) (d) 6 (γ), vol. v, p. 497; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 650–1; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 190, above.

² The following facts and dates in the history of this recrudescence of the Sumeric 'Time of Troubles' are taken from Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 559–69, as corrected by the same scholar in his *Die Aeltere Chronologie Babyloniens, Assyriens und Aegyptens* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1925, Cotta), pp. 26–31.

³ i.e. Sumer and Akkad. After the catastrophe of 2180 B.C. the demi-emperors at Isin reverted to this original style and title of the Emperor Ur-Engur and abandoned the more ambitious style and title of 'the Empire of the Four Quarters' which had been introduced by Ur-Engur's successor Dungi (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 651, above).

Hammurabi justly regarded himself as the successor of Ur-Engur and Dungi;¹ and there was a moment when he was effectively master of the whole of Dungi's 'Empire of the Four Quarters', Elam included. But Hammurabi's restoration of the *Pax Sumerica* was as ephemeral as it was far-reaching. For the author of it was hardly in his grave before the Sumeric Society was swept off its feet again in a fourth and final débâcle from which it never rallied.²

The Rhythm in the History of the Main Body of Orthodox Christendom.

The now familiar pattern reappears, just complete, in the disintegration of the main body of Orthodox Christendom, and again—this time all but complete—in the disintegration of the Hindu Society.

We have identified the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Society with the outbreak of the great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977-1019;³ and the eventual establishment of a peace which was oecumenical for the main body of Orthodox Christendom—though it did not extend to the offshoot of this civilization on Russian soil—may be dated from the Ottoman conquest of Macedonia in A.D. 1371-2.⁴ In between these two termini of an Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles' we can discern a rally led by the East Roman Emperor Alexius Comnenus (*imperabat* A.D. 1081-1118),⁵ a consequent respite which lasted through the reigns of the next two sovereigns of the Comnenian Dynasty, and a relapse into which the society fell in the ninth decade of the twelfth century.⁶ The subsequent tribulations of Orthodox Christendom, which were only ended by the establishment of a *Pax Ottomanica*,⁷ were still more grievous than the earlier troubles

¹ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (2), 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 633.

² See I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 106 and 110, and IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 63-4, above.

³ See IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 72, and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 390-1, above.

⁴ See Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 27, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 191, footnote 1, above.

⁵ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), Annex II, vol. iv, pp. 619-20, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 184, above.

⁶ This relapse at this date was the penalty that Orthodox Christendom had to pay for the fault of a dynasty which had forgotten its founder's mission of bringing salvation to a disintegrating society. The successors of Alexius I Comnenus succumbed to a fatal spirit of military adventure which had first taken possession of the East Roman Government in the tenth century of the Christian Era (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 399-404, above).

⁷ This second paroxysm of the Orthodox Christian 'Time of Troubles' was faintly relieved in the middle decades of the thirteenth century by the success of the Nicene Greek 'successor-state' of the East Roman Empire in putting together again some of the fragments into which the Empire had broken up between A.D. 1186 and A.D. 1204. In other contexts (Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 27, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 184, above) these Nicene Greek achievements have been taken as symptoms of a turn in the tide of disruption, and as portents of the later and greater achievements of the

which had been momentarily overcome by the prowess of Alexius Comnenus.

The *Pax Ottomanica* which was inaugurated by the Ottoman conquest of Macedonia in A.D. 1371-2 eventually collapsed under the shock of defeat in the great Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74; but, while this collapse marked the decisive breakdown of a régime that had been first established four hundred years earlier, the Ottoman annals of the intervening centuries present plain evidence of an anticipatory relapse that was retrieved by a temporary rally. The relapse is to be discerned in the rapid decay of the Pādishāh's Slave-Household after the death of Suleymān the Magnificent in A.D. 1566.¹ The rally is heralded in the subsequent experiment of compensating for the demoralization of the *qullar* by taking the Pādishāh's Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh* into partnership with the free Muslim citizens of the Ottoman commonwealth—who had now seized the reins of power—without any longer insisting that the *ra'iyeh* should become renegades as the price of their admission to a share in the government of the state.²

This almost revolutionary innovation, which was introduced in the seventeenth century by the statesmanship of the vezirs of the House of Köprülü,³ won for the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century a breathing-space which is still wistfully remembered by the 'Osmanlis of a later day as 'the Tulip Period'. During this brief spell (*circa* A.D. 1718-36) the ruling class of an empire that was already standing on the defensive against the Franks and the Russians was still able for a moment to rest from the toils of war and to forget the cares of state in the recreation of cultivating a flower.⁴ The breathing-space, however, was as short as it was pleasant; for, even before it began, the statesmanlike salvage-work of the Köprülüs had been fatally sabotaged by the reckless

¹ 'Osmanlis. Yet, if the Nicene Greek attempt at political reconstruction is to be regarded as a sub-rally, it must also be written off as an abortive one; for the Principality of Nicaea did not enlarge its dominions, but merely shifted its centre of gravity, when it conquered Adrianople in A.D. 1235 and Macedonia in A.D. 1246 and Constantinople itself in A.D. 1261. As fast as these Greek princes of Nicaea acquired territories in Europe from Greek or Latin rivals, they lost territories in Asia to the Turks. For the subsequent flashes of religious and artistic light in Orthodox Christendom in the fourteenth century see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 359-61, above.

² For this decay see Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 44-7, above.

³ For this experiment see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 223-5, and Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 47-8, above.

⁴ See V. C (ii) (a), pp. 208-9, above. These Albanian statesmen performed the same service for the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era as the Illyrian soldiers had performed for the Roman Empire in the third century.

⁵ For this interlude of dilettantism in the grim history of the Ottoman governing class see von Hammer, J.: *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, French translation (18 vols. + atlas), vol. xiv (Paris 1839, Bellizard, Barthès, Dufour et Lowell), pp. 61-70. 'La passion des fleurs devint le goût dominant du peuple, à tel point qu'elle surpassa bientôt celle qu'un grand nombre d'individus avaient à cette époque en France et dans les Pays-Bas, pour la culture des tulipes' (p. 65). See also Jorga, N.: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs* (5 vols.), vol. iv (Gotha 1911, Perthes), Book II, chap. 4, pp. 361-99.

militarism of Mehmed Köprülü's unluckily chosen protégé Qāra Mustafā.¹ This megalomaniac had wasted the precious strength which the Köprülüs had been nursing back into the Ottoman body politic on a new attempt to conquer Western Christendom—a military task which had proved to be beyond the Ottoman Empire's power when this had been still at its height in Süleymān the Magnificent's lifetime. Qāra Mustafā's folly had precipitated the great war of 1682–99, in which the ascendancy had passed once for all from the Ottoman to the Frankish side.² And, although the Köprülüs' work did avail to stave off disaster for three-quarters of a century—from A.D. 1699 to A.D. 1774—the nemesis of Qāra Mustafā's wanton stroke was merely postponed and was not averted. The military disaster of A.D. 1768–74 proved irretrievable because, by that time, the *ra'īyeh* whose support the Köprülüs had enlisted were ceasing to be content with a partnership in the government of a declining Ottoman Empire and were being captivated by the ambition of carving up the decrepit Ottoman body politic into young national states of their own in the fashion of the rising peoples of the West.³ The sequel to the decisive breakdown of the *Pax Ottomanica*—which was Orthodox Christendom's *Pax Oecumenica*—in the last quarter of the eighteenth century was not a rally: it was a merger of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in a 'Great Society' of a Western complexion.⁴ And thus we see that in Orthodox Christian history, too, the process of disintegration has run through three and a half beats of the movement of Rout-and-Rally from first to last.

The Rhythm in Hindu History.

In the history of the disintegration of the Hindu Society the final half-beat is not yet quite due, since the second instalment of the *Pax Oecumenica*—which in the Hindu World has been provided by the British Rāj—is not yet quite over.⁵ On the other

¹ See V. C (ii) (a), p. 208, footnote 3, above.

² See Part III. A, vol. iii, pp. 46–7, above.

³ For the Westernization of the 'Osmanlis' Orthodox Christian *ra'īyeh*, and for the political consequences of their cultural conversion, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 181–6; II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 226–8; and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 76–8, above.

⁴ See *ibid.*

⁵ Since the usual span of a *Pax Oecumenica*—including both its two instalments and the bout of anarchy in between them—seems to be round about four hundred years, and since the original establishment of the present *Pax Oecumenica* in the Hindu World may be equated (if there is any virtue in a conventional date) with the conquest of Gujerat by Akbar in A.D. 1572—as being the event which, perhaps more than any other, marked the elevation of the Mughal Rāj from a parochial to an oecumenical status—the break-up of the British Rāj was to be expected, on this showing, within thirty or forty years of the time of writing in A.D. 1938. At that moment, however, it seemed rather more probable that the history of India would take a different turn; for the establishment and collapse and re-establishment of a 'sub-continental' *Pax Oecumenica* was not the only experience of first-rate historical importance which India had undergone by then since Akbar's day. In the meantime the contact between India and the Western World,

hand the three earlier beats of Rout-and-Rally have all left some trace on the record of Hindu history. The third beat of the three has been particularly emphatic; for in this beat the 'rout' is represented by the collapse of the Mughal Rāj in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era and the 'rally' by the establishment of the British Rāj in the nineteenth century;¹ and these two instalments of peace—which are separated from one another in Time by no less than a hundred years of virulent anarchy—have been the work of two gangs of empire-builders who are as alien from one another as they both are from their Hindu *ra'iyeh*.² The rally-stroke of the second beat of the rhythm is equally clear. It is represented by the establishment of the Mughal Rāj in the reign of Akbar (*imperabat* A.D. 1556-1602). The foregoing rout-stroke is not so conspicuous. But, if we peer into the history of the Hindu 'Time of Troubles', which ends in the reign of Akbar and begins in the latter part of the twelfth century of the Christian Era with an outbreak of internecine warfare among the Hindu Powers of the age,³ we shall notice—in between the tribulations of India under the heel of the Ghaznawīs and Ghūrīs and Slave-Kings in the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian Era and the similar tribulations that were inflicted upon her in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by the Lōdī Afghans and by Akbar's own ancestor Bābur—some signs of a temporary relief in an intervening period which begins with the accession of 'Alā-ad-Dīn in A.D. 1296 and ends with the death of Fīrūz in A.D. 1388.⁴ If the second beat of Rout-and-Rally in Hindu history, which ends in the establishment of the *Pax Mogulica*, may be taken as beginning with the collapse of Fīrūz's régime after its author's death, we may see in the preceding establishment of 'Alā-ad-Dīn's régime the end of a first beat of Rout-and-Rally which begins with the original breakdown of the Hindu Civilization in the twelfth century of the Christian Era.

The Rhythm in Syriac History.

These cases in which a run of three and a half beats of the disintegration-rhythm can be traced throughout—or almost through-

which Akbar himself had done much to promote, had increased to a degree of intimacy at which India had ceased to be a world in herself and had become, instead, one of the members of a new 'Great Society' of a Western complexion. In A.D. 1947 a British Rāj which had served as a second instalment of a Hindu *Pax Oecumenica* transformed itself into a pair of independent states—an Indian Union and a Pakistan—which became members of a world-wide political society without ceasing at this stage to be members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

¹ See V. C (ii) (a), pp. 189 and 191, above.

² *Anglicè* 'ryot'.

³ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 99-100, above.

⁴ The slave-households that were maintained by these two Turkish empire-builders in Hindustan have been brought into comparison with the Ottoman Pādishāh's Slave-Household in Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 31, footnote 1, above.

out—its entire course may be supplemented by a glance at several other cases in which the same pattern can be made out, beyond mistake, in a run that is incomplete.

In Syriac history, for example, the disintegration-process was interrupted immediately after the third rally by a militant irruption of Hellenism into the Syriac World in the train of Alexander the Great; but down to that point, which in this case was as far as the process went, it followed the regular course which we have learnt to recognize in other instances. The third rally of the Syriac Society had been achieved, on the eve of Alexander's epiphany, by the Achaemenian Emperor Artaxerxes Ochus (*imperabat* 358–338 B.C.),¹ who had crushed a coalition of rebellious satraps and had followed up that victory by the reconquest of Egypt.² The rout which Ochus was stemming had set in about the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. (the first portent had been the secession of Egypt from the Achaemenian Empire in 404 B.C.; and the impunity with which the Egyptians had repudiated their allegiance to the Great King had nerved other rebels, less remote from Susa, to follow this Egyptian example). But the *dégringolade* of the Achaemenian power in the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes II was not, of course, the first chapter of Achaemenian history. It marked the collapse of an effective *Pax Achaemenia* which had first been established by the successive labours of Cyrus and Darius the Great³ and which had not been more than locally disturbed by Xerxes' fiasco in the hinterland of the North-West Frontier.⁴ And that first establishment of the *Pax Achaemenia* in the sixth century B.C. had been the second rally of the Syriac Society in the course of its disintegration. The Achaemenian Empire was the universal state which had put an end to the Syriac 'Time of Troubles'; and in another context⁵ we have identified the original breakdown of the Syriac Society, which had brought the Syriac 'Time of Troubles' on, with an outbreak of internecine warfare among the parochial states of the Syriac World which had occurred towards the end of the tenth century B.C. after the death of Solomon. Between Solomon's generation and Cyrus's, can we observe any symptoms of a first rally and a second rout? One

¹ This grim Achaemenid 'saviour' has been inspected, in company with the Ottoman Pādīshāh Murād IV, in V. C (ii) (a), p. 207, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 94, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 245, footnote 4, above, and V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, in the present volume, p. 442, below.

³ For the respective contributions of these two empire-builders see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 187–8 and 190, above.

⁴ The Achaemenian Rāj in South-Western Asia was no more seriously shaken by the disastrous failure of the Persian invasion of European Greece in 480–479 B.C. than the British Rāj in India was by the even more disastrous failure of the British invasion of Afghanistan in A.D. 1838–42.

⁵ In IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 67–8, above.

plain token of a rally in the course of the intervening age is a coalition of Syriac forces which defeated an Assyrian aggressor at the Battle of Qarqar in 853 B.C.¹ Conversely, we may diagnose a rout in the subsequent relapse of the Syriac states into a fratricidal strife that made it easy for Tiglath-Pileser III and Sargon to conquer piecemeal in the eighth century B.C. a cosmos of Syriac city-states which had not found it difficult in the ninth century to keep Shalmaneser III at bay by making common cause against a common alien enemy.

The Rhythm in the History of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan.

In the disintegration of the Far Eastern Society in Japan the duration of the *Pax Tokugawica* has been cut short, as we have seen, by the collision of Japan with the West; and the observable fluctuations in the fortunes of the Tokugawa Shogunate, so long as it lasted, are of a shorter wave-length than the normal run of the disintegration-rhythm which we are investigating at the moment.² On the other hand the first two beats of this standard run of rhythm can be detected in the preceding chapter of Japanese history³ which ends with the establishment of a *Pax Oecumenica* by Hideyoshi (*dominabatur* A.D. 1582-98)⁴ and which begins in the latter part of the twelfth century of the Christian Era with the overthrow of the régime of 'the Cloistered Emperors' in the military revolutions of A.D. 1156 and 1160 and 1183-5.⁵

A first rally, in reaction to this original breakdown, can be discerned in an attempt to re-establish a civilian government which was made immediately after the downfall, in A.D. 1333, of the military regency which had been ruling Japan from Kamakura since A.D. 1184.⁶ This rally, however, was abortive.⁷ Within five years the restored civilian régime had been superseded by a new military regency⁸ which was not the less true to type because it made the conciliatory gesture of establishing its official headquarters at Kyoto—the ancient Imperial Capital—instead of simply entrenching itself in the north-eastern stronghold from which

¹ For the Battle of Qarqar see *ibid.*, p. 67, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. v, pp. 468, footnote 1, 473, footnote 3, and 475, above.

² For Murdoch's analysis of the rhythm of the Tokugawa Shogunate see the present chapter, p. 285, footnote 1, above.

³ For Nichiren's designation of this period as the Age of Mappō ('the Destruction of the Law') see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 96, footnote 6, above.

⁴ For Hideyoshi's role in Japanese history see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 188-9, above.

⁵ For this revolutionary change of régime in Japan see IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 94, above. For the antecedent and underlying differentiation between the *ethos* of Yamato and the *ethos* of the Kwanto see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 158-9, above.

⁶ See Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 319; Murdoch, J.: *A History of Japan*, vol. i (London 1910, Kegan Paul), p. 539. The civilian Imperial Government at Kyoto had made one previous attempt, as early as A.D. 1221, to overthrow the Kamakura Bakufu (*ibid.*, p. 442).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 554.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 569.

Japan had been ruled for 150 years by Minamoto Yoritomo and his successors. This swift reversion to Militarism was the first symptom of a fresh rout. In the days of the Shoguns of the Ashikaga Dynasty who succeeded one another at Kyoto from A.D. 1338 until the last of the line was hustled off the stage by Hideyoshi in A.D. 1597, Japan suffered worse tribulations than she had known in the days of the previous line of Shoguns who had succeeded one another at Kamakura from 1184 to 1333.¹

The immediate sequel to the establishment of the Ashikaga Shogunate was the unprecedented scandal of a schism of the Imperial House itself into two rival courts. This enormity, which was a sin against religious ritual as well as a breach of political etiquette, had to be atoned for by fifty-five years of civil war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1337-92);² and, even when the Ashikaga Shogunate—acting in the name of the court which was its puppet—eventually succeeded in suppressing the rival court which had refused to acknowledge its title, the tale of calamities did not cease.³ In the fifteenth century of the Christian Era a feudal anarchy which the Shoguns were impotent to reduce to order goaded an intolerably oppressed peasantry into a chronic state of revolt and stimulated the monasteries to militarize themselves—in flat defiance of all precepts of both the Greater and the Lesser Vehicle—as the only alternative to becoming the lay militarists' victims.⁴ In the War

¹ Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

² Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 584-6.

³ Between the end of the War of the Rival Courts in A.D. 1392 and the beginning of the War of Onin in A.D. 1467 there was a minor rally (Sansom, *op. cit.*, pp. 345, 358, and 371).

⁴ This militarization of the monasteries during the Japanese 'Time of Troubles' cannot be entirely explained as an unavoidable measure of self-defence which was forced upon the monks by the turbulence of the worldlings among whom their lot had been cast. The metamorphosis, in Japan, of monks into fighting-men which was completed in this age had a long history behind it, and, while it was partly an effect of the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan, it was also one of the antecedents and causes of this catastrophe. The first recorded case of monks taking up arms in Japan occurred in the seventh decade of the tenth century of the Christian Era (see Eliot, Sir Charles: *Japanese Buddhism* (London 1935, Arnold), p. 246, and the present Study, IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 94, footnote 2, above); and in this case the militant monastery was not defending itself against a lay aggressor, but was resorting to war as a method of asserting its claims against a rival religious house. Thus, when the militarization of the monasteries in Japan is traced back to its origins, it becomes apparent that this was one of several symptoms of a relapse into barbarism which was the cause of the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan, and not a consequence of it. In other contexts we have observed that this relapse was the nemesis of a cultural *tour de force* by which the hot-house plant of Far Eastern culture had been transplanted from its kindly native soil and climate on the Asiatic Continent into the uncongenial environment of the Japanese Archipelago (for this feature of Japanese history see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 158-9, and IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 94, above). Conversely, one of the labours that had to be performed by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi in order to accomplish their mission of imposing a *Pax Oecumenica* by force was to break the military power of the monasteries, which in their day was at its apogee.

'During all the latter half of the sixteenth century [of the Christian Era] Buddhism was an important force in Japan, but, strange to say, more conspicuous as a military and political force than in its proper sphere. The principal monasteries appear on the scene from time to time in exactly the same way as the great military houses with armies and forts of their own, with territorial ambitions and designs to crush or annex their rivals.

of Onin (*gerebatur* A.D. 1467-77) the Imperial City of Kyoto was devastated by street-fighting between contending provincial forces who made the capital their arena. In the sixteenth century the Shoguns were overtaken by the ignominious fate which their predecessors had inflicted on the Emperors. The Shogun's *de jure* powers were now exercised *de facto* by a Kwanryo; and this travesty of government by the deputy of a deputy was perhaps the one thing worse than no government at all.¹ This was the state of misery to which Japan had been reduced by the second paroxysm of her 'Time of Troubles' before her convulsed and writhing frame was forced into a strait-waistcoat by the successive exertions of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi and Ieyasu (*militabant* A.D. 1549-1615).²

The Rhythm in the History of the Main Body of the Far Eastern Civilization.

In the history of the main body of the Far Eastern Society the process of disintegration took an abnormal turn at an earlier stage than in Japan; for, whereas in Japan the *Pax Oecumenica* which had been imposed by Hideyoshi and had been organized by Ieyasu lasted for more than two and a half centuries before the impact of the West precipitated the Meiji Revolution of A.D. 1868, the *Pax Oecumenica* which was imposed on China by alien Mongol arms between A.D. 1209³ and A.D. 1280 did not remain unchallenged for more than seventy years before it was shaken off by a Chinese insurrection which began about A.D. 1351 and which persisted until the Mongol intruders had been driven right out of Intramural China into their native wilderness beyond the Great Wall.⁴ This Chinese counterstroke was followed in its turn by a back-wash of barbarian invasion in which the Manchus re-established the

But the same period witnessed the end of this system and the definite defeat of the Church Militant. There was evidently a danger that the country might be ruled by priests, like Tibet. The leaders of Japan forestalled this danger but were careful to avoid anything like a war against Religion as such' (Eliot, op. cit., p. 301).

¹ The century between the opening of the War of Onin in A.D. 1467 and Nobunaga's assumption of dictatorial powers *de facto* in A.D. 1568 seems to have been the worst phase of the whole of the Japanese 'Time of Troubles' (Sansom, op. cit., pp. 394-5 and 419-20). It was during these hundred years that the four popular Japanese 'higher religions' (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 96-103, above) were at the height of their influence (Sansom, op. cit., pp. 366-7).

² For the respective roles of these three saviours with the sword see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 186, 188, and 191, above. Nobunaga and Hideyoshi both died in harness, and Nobunaga literally under arms (though the hand that took his life was his own). Ieyasu died in the year following his last campaign against the castle of Ōsaka. Hideyoshi and Ieyasu took up arms simultaneously with one another in A.D. 1558.

³ This seems to have been the date of Chingis Khan's first assault upon the principality of Tangut, which was a north-western barbarian 'successor-state' of the Empire of T'ang and Sung. His attack on the far more important north-eastern barbarian 'successor-state'—the principality of the Kin—was not launched until A.D. 1211.

⁴ For the *Pax Mongolica* in the main body of the Far Eastern Society, and for the successful Chinese reaction against it, see II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 121-2; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 86-7; and V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 348-51, above.

empire which the Mongols had won and lost; and this interlude has been followed by the impact of a Western Civilization which has collided with China as well as with Japan in the course of its ubiquitous modern expansion. In a period of Chinese history which has been dominated by this capricious play of external forces it is not to be expected that the pulse of the disintegrating society should register the normal beat. On the other hand, in the 'Time of Troubles' of the disintegrating Far Eastern Society in China, as in Japan, we can detect two beats of Rout-and-Rally which are of the standard wave-length.

In the main body of the Far Eastern Society we have identified the end of the 'Time of Troubles' with the completion of the Mongol conquest of China in A.D. 1280,¹ and the beginning of it with the decay of the T'ang Dynasty in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era;² and in the interval between these two termini there are clear traces of both a rally and a relapse.

On the political plane this first rally in the history of the disintegration of the main body of the Far Eastern Society declares itself in the establishment of the Sung Dynasty in A.D. 960. In the field of technique it declares itself particularly in a remarkable advance in the art of printing.³ In the field of visual art it declares itself in the rise of a school of painting which is the fine flower of Far Eastern achievement in this line.⁴ In the field of abstract thought it declares itself in the work of the five Neo-Confucian philosophers (*vivebant* A.D. 1017-1200),⁵ who reinterpreted Confucius in the light of the Mahāyāna as, in the contemporary Western World, the Schoolmen read the philosophy of Aristotle into the doctrines of Catholic Christianity. In the field of social theory and practice the same rally is represented by the Neo-Confucians' bugbear Wang An Shih.⁶

¹ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 86-7, above.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 86 and 87-8, above.

³ See Carter, T. F.: *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward*, revised edition (New York 1931, Columbia University Press), chap. 10. 'In invention, what the T'ang period conceived, the Sung era put to practical use. The magnetic needle, used in the main in earlier times either as a toy or for the location of graves, was applied to navigation. Gunpowder, already known and used for fireworks, was during the Sung Dynasty applied to War. Porcelain was so developed as to become an article of export to Syria and Egypt. A similar development took place in printing' (p. 55). According to the same authority, *op. cit.*, p. 32, block printing for the production of books had been invented as early as the reign of T'ang Ming Hwang (*imperabat* A.D. 712-56).

⁴ See Münsterberg, O.: *Chinesische Kunstgeschichte*, vol. i (Esslingen 1910, Neff), p. 204.

⁵ See Part II. B, vol. i, p. 202, above.

⁶ See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), chap. 19; Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), pp. 313-15; and Williamson, H. R.: *Wang An Shih* (London 1935-7, Probsthain, 2 vols.). The true purpose of Wang An Shih's administrative and social reforms seems to have been to increase the prosperity of the state by alleviating the burdens of the peasantry, on whose shoulders the political superstructure rested. His most important

The subsequent relapse declares itself in the tragic career of the connoisseur-emperor Huitsung (*imperabat* A.D. 1101-25).¹ Huitsung's life-work was the making of a collection of works of art, and he lived to publish a catalogue of this, in twenty volumes, in A.D. 1120. But the unfortunate collector lived on to see his collection dispersed when, five years later, the city of Kaifêng, in which it was housed, was attacked and captured by the Kin barbarians from Manchuria—not because these uncultivated invaders coveted the possession of Huitsung's artistic treasures, but because Kaifêng happened also to be the political capital of the Sung Empire. This was a challenge which Huitsung was utterly unprepared to meet; and in the last chapter of his life he had to atone for his neglect of his political duties during a reign of twenty-five years by lingering on for another ten years as a refugee, or prisoner, in the tents of the Kin barbarians' evicted predecessors the Khitan—an asylum in which the unhappy exile could neither exert himself as an emperor nor enjoy himself as a connoisseur.² While Huitsung was thus languishing in limbo, the barbarians whom he had so lamentably failed to keep at bay were conquering the northern provinces of the Sung Empire; and this Kin war of conquest, which went on from A.D. 1124 to A.D. 1142 and did not stop until the invaders had reached the line of the River Hwai and the watershed between the Yellow River and the Yangtse, signalized the second rout in the disintegration of the main body of the Far Eastern Society—as the first rout had been signalized by the earlier loss of sixteen frontier districts to the Kin's predecessors the Khitan between the years A.D. 927 and A.D. 937.³ This second rout was not followed by a rally until the Mongols—supplanting the Kin as the Kin had supplanted the Khitan—completed the barbarian conquest of China by pushing on from the northern watershed of the Yangtse to the southern sea-board of China, which they reached in A.D. 1280. It

measures were aimed at protecting the peasants against the twin scourge of the tax-collector and the money-lender. His success is attested by the increase in the population of the Sung Empire—on the evidence of the census returns—during the period in which Wang An Shih's new laws were in force. And the mass-revolts which his critics prophesied never broke out. The new laws were in force throughout the reign of Wang An Shih's Imperial patron the Emperor Shêntsung (*imperabat* A.D. 1068-85). Upon this emperor's death Wang An Shih's reactionary opponents regained the upper hand, and the new laws were in abeyance during the minority of Shêntsung's successor Chêtsung (*imperabat* A.D. 1086-1100). One of the young emperor's first acts, however, upon coming of age and taking the reins of government into his own hands in A.D. 1093 was to call to office Wang An Shih's disciple Ts'ai Ching (Wang An Shih himself had retired in A.D. 1076, before Shêntsung's death). And Wang An Shih's laws were in force again from the date of this appointment, which was made in A.D. 1094, down to the invasion of Northern China by the Kin, *imperante* Huitsung, in A.D. 1124.

¹ See Münsterberg, op. cit., p. 249.

² Huitsung's Babylonian counterpart, the archaeologist-emperor Nabonidus (see V. C (i) (d) 8 (δ), p. 94, above), was *felicior opportunitate mortis*. He was already in his grave when the Neo-Babylonian Empire was overwhelmed by Cyrus.

³ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 86; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 308, above.

will be seen that in the main body, as in the Japanese offshoot, of the Far Eastern Society the 'Time of Troubles' falls into two paroxysms which are separated from one another by a perceptible breathing-space.

The Rhythm in Babylonian History.

If we turn from the main body of the Far Eastern World to the Babylonian Society, we shall find that the Neo-Babylonian Empire, which served as a Babylonian universal state, was cut short as prematurely as the Far Eastern universal state that was provided by the Mongols. Indeed, the respective lives of the two régimes were of an almost equal brevity, if we reckon the reign of the *Pax Mongolica* in China as running from A.D. 1280 to A.D. 1351,¹ and that of the *Pax Chaldaica* in Babylonia as beginning with the annihilation of the last Assyrian fighting force at Harran in 610 B.C.² and ending with the capture of Babylon by Cyrus in 539 or 538 B.C. At the same time we shall find that, if we cast our eyes back from the prematurely ended universal state to the antecedent 'Time of Troubles', at least a fragment of our disintegration-pattern can be recognized at this stage in Babylonian history, as in Far Eastern. The second paroxysm of the Babylonian 'Time of Troubles', which clearly ends in the holocaust of 610 B.C., no less clearly begins with the act of aggression against Babylonia which was committed by King Tiglath-Pileser III of Assyria in 745 B.C.; for this act sowed the seeds of a hundred years' war between the two principal Powers of the Babylonian World, and that war had the decisive battle of Harran for its grand finale.³

The Rhythm in the History of Orthodox Christendom in Russia.

These cases in which a glimpse of our disintegration-pattern can be caught in the earlier, though not in the later, stages of the disintegration-process are balanced by inverse cases in which the pattern is visible in the later stages though not in the earlier. The history of the offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Society in Russia, for example, offers a contrast in this respect to the otherwise analogous history of the offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in Japan.

The Russian 'Time of Troubles' (in the sense in which the term is used in this Study, and not in the original Russian usage of the

¹ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 121; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 86-7; V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 101; and the present chapter, pp. 305-6, above.

² See II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 135-6; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 101, footnote 1; and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 475, above.

³ For Tiglath-Pileser III's intervention in Babylonia, and its consequences, see IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 101-2, and IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, pp. 473 and 476-84, above.

words)¹ may be taken as having been brought to a close by the union of Novgorod with Muscovy in A.D. 1478²—an act of political consolidation which marks the establishment of a *Pax Oecumenica*—and as having been opened by the decay of the principality of Kiev in the last quarter of the eleventh century,³ when the political centre of gravity of the Russian World shifted from the Upper Dniepr to the Upper Volga.⁴ Concomitantly with this politico-geographical change, the exotic plant of Orthodox Christian culture, which at Kiev had been kept artificially in the exquisite condition to which it had been brought by a Byzantine gardener's art, ran wild and at the same time reverted to a barbaric coarseness as the price of becoming acclimatized to a natural life in the open air in this forbidding Russian clime in which it had only managed to keep alive hitherto on condition of being confined in a hothouse. In other contexts⁵ we have noticed an analogy between this chapter of Russian history and a corresponding chapter of Japanese history—and this on both the political and the cultural plane. The north-eastward shift of the Russian political centre of gravity from Kiev^{*} in the Dniepr Basin to Vladímir in the Volga Basin has its analogue in the north-eastward shift of the Japanese political centre of gravity from Kyoto in Yamato to Kamakura in the Kwanto. In Japan, as in Russia, this geographical movement was accompanied by a relapse into anarchy and barbarism. And in the next chapter of the story—again in both cases alike—the backwoodsmen themselves stepped in to rally the disintegrating society from a rout which was their own barbaric handiwork. The *Pax Muscoviana* which was established in A.D. 1478 has its counterpart in the *Pax Tokugawica* which was established at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era by the cumulative labours of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu. These points of likeness between Russian and Japanese history from the original breakdown until the establishment of the universal state are so striking that we should expect *a priori* also to find a Russian parallel to the abortive attempt which was made in the course of the 'Time of Troubles' in Japan to bring back the political centre of gravity from the north-east to the south-west, and at the same time to revert from a military to a civilian régime. Yet, if we look in Russian history for the equivalent of the Japanese flash-in-the-pan

¹ For this difference between the conventional usage in this Study and the traditional Russian usage see the references in V. C (ii) (a), p. 195, footnote 2, above, and in the present chapter, p. 311, footnote 4, below.

² See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 88; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 312; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 191, above.

³ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 96, above, with the authorities there cited in footnote 1.

⁴ See II. D (v), vol. ii, p. 154, above.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 158, and in IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 91-6, above.

in the fourth decade of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era,¹ we shall find ourselves drawing blank.²

On the other hand, when we come to the next chapter of the story, in which the 'Time of Troubles' has given place to a *Pax Oecumenica*, we shall find, when we look for traces of our disintegration-pattern in the respective histories of the two societies at this stage, that there is again a discrepancy but that this time it is the other way round. In this chapter, too, the analogies between the two histories are striking.³ In both Russia and Japan a hibernating society has been overtaken by a collision with the alien civilization of the West before it has completed the normal hibernation period; and in both cases the statesmanship of the society whose repose has been thus abruptly and perilously disturbed has shown itself capable of coping with the emergency.⁴ In Japan, as in

¹ See the present chapter, p. 303, above.

² The abortive endeavour in the fourth decade of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era in Japan to bring back the Kingdom, the Power, and the Glory from Kamakura in the Kwanto to Kyoto in Yamato was made about 150 years after the beginning of the Japanese 'Time of Troubles', if we are right in dating the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan in about the last quarter of the twelfth century of the Christian Era. And, if we are also right in dating the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia about a hundred years earlier than that, then in the Russian field we ought to focus our attention upon the fourth decade of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era and inquire whether, at or about that time, there was an abortive attempt to bring back the Kingdom, the Power, and the Glory from Vladimir in the Volga Basin to Kiev on the Dniepr. This inquiry yields a negative answer. So far from recapturing her ancient status of political primacy in that decade, Kiev suffered in A.D. 1240 the supreme disaster of being stormed and sacked by the Mongol host of Bātū Khan; and from this blow she has never fully recovered. At the same time we shall observe that, while the Russian sceptre did not return to Kiev either then or at any later date, it did pass back from the north-eastern principality of Vladimir, which had likewise been prostrated by Bātū's hammer-stroke, to a south-western principality in whose domain Kiev came to be included—though this not as the capital but only as an outlying dependency. The fortunate Russian principality which thus rose to a position of relative power and prosperity in an age that was one of deep adversity for the Russian World as a whole was Red Russia or Galicia (see V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 312, footnote 1, above). During the ninety years that elapsed between Bātū's onslaught upon the Russian World in A.D. 1238–40 and the gravitation of the hegemony over what was left of Russia to the principality of Moscow in A.D. 1328, Galicia was the leading Russian state. One of the reasons for Galicia's primacy among the Russian states in these earlier decades of the period of Tatar domination was the accident of a geographical position which counted for most in the years when the Tatar yoke was at its heaviest. Galicia was ensconced among the foothills of the Carpathians in the hinterland of the western extremity of the Don-to-Carpathians Steppe (see Part III. A, Annex II, vol. iii, p. 401, above), and its capital, Halicz, on the banks of the Upper Dniestr, was more difficult for Tatar raiders and tribute-collectors to reach than either Kiev on the Dniepr (in a district which now came to be known as the Ukraina or 'borderland' *par excellence*) or even Vladimir in the Upper Basin of the Volga. Thus Galicia's fortune was made by a Mongol conquest of Russia which had overthrown Vladimir and crushed Kiev; and, in the light of this episode of Russian history, we may speculate on what might have happened in Japan if Qubilai's invasion of Japan in A.D. 1281, instead of being the disastrous failure that it was, had been as brilliantly successful as Bātū's invasion of Russia in A.D. 1238 (for the contrast between the respective outcomes of these two Mongol enterprises see IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 92–4, above). In that hypothetical event, would the hegemony in Japan have passed from Kamakura—not to Kyoto, which would then in all probability have suffered the fate of Kiev, but to one of the remoter islands of the Japanese Archipelago?

³ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 82–3 and 88–91, above.

⁴ In the light of the catastrophic sequel to Peter the Great's brilliant attempt to solve 'the Western Question' in Russia, we may hesitate to award him the victor's palm; and,

Russia, a non-Western universal state has been skilfully transformed into a national state member of a 'Great Society' of a Western complexion. But here, once more, the points of likeness only throw into sharper relief the discrepancy in the disintegration-pattern. Whereas the disintegration of the Japanese Society during the prematurely interrupted currency of the *Pax Tokugawica* ran in a rhythm with a wave-length that was shorter than the standard,¹ the normal run of the disintegration-rhythm is conspicuously visible in the course of the *Pax Muscoviana*—in spite of the fact that the Russian universal state was overtaken and interrupted at a still earlier stage than the Japanese by the impact of an alien social force.² Between its foundation in A.D. 1478 and its decay in the latter part of the nineteenth century³ the Russian universal state experienced one notable relapse and one notable rally. The relapse was the bout of anarchy in the early years of the seventeenth century which is known as the 'Time of Troubles' in the Russian historical tradition.⁴ The rally was the subsequent recovery, which was not less astounding than the fall which it retrieved. And the single beat of Rout-and-Rally which is struck out by this sequence of a downward followed by an upward movement in so steep a curve punctuates the history of the *Pax Muscoviana* into two separate chapters which are sharply divided by an interregnum that has made up for the shortness of its length by the virulence of its anarchy. In Russian, as in Sinic, history this punctuation of a *Pax Oecumenica* by a short and sharp interregnum is emphasized by a change of dynasty. The transference of the Sinic Imperial

on this showing, we shall be well advised also to reserve judgement on the Japanese statesmanship which carried out the Meiji Revolution of A.D. 1868. We have to reckon with the possibility that the tragic view of the Westernization of Russia which an alien observer in A.D. 1938 was constrained to take in the light of Russian history since A.D. 1825 might also be taken with regard to the Westernization of Japan by a Posterity as far removed in time from the year 1868 as our own generation is removed from the year 1689. (This point has been touched upon already in IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 88–90, above.)

¹ See the present chapter, p. 285, above.

² While the Japanese universal state had been in existence for rather longer than two and a half centuries by the time of the Meiji Revolution, the Russian universal state had not been in existence for much longer than two centuries before the advent of Peter the Great (see IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 88, above).

³ The outer shell of the Tsardom was not, of course, broken until A.D. 1917, but the spirit had departed from the body at least half a century before that; and, if we wish to identify the end of the *Pax Muscoviana* with some conventional date, the assassination of the Tsar Alexander II in A.D. 1881 will come nearer the mark than the abdication of the Tsar Nicholas II in A.D. 1917. On the same principle the end of the *Pax Romana* is to be identified with the Goths' victory at Adrianople in A.D. 378 and not with their capture of Rome itself in A.D. 410; the end of the *Pax Hanica* with the palace revolutions that began *circa* A.D. 172 and not with the final eviction of the Posterior Han Dynasty from the Imperial Throne in A.D. 221; and the end of the T'ang régime with the great catastrophe of A.D. 878 (see IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 87–8, above) and not with the official abdication of the last of the T'ang emperors in A.D. 907.

⁴ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 53, footnote 2; II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 157 and 176; IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, pp. 90 and 91–2; V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 311, footnote 2; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 195, footnote 2, above.

Sceptre from the Prior to the Posterior Han¹ has a Russian parallel in the elevation of the parvenu Romanovs to an Imperial Throne left vacant by the extinction of the ancient House of Rurik.

Vestiges in Minoan History.

There is perhaps one other case in which our disintegration-pattern can be detected in the history of a universal state without being discernible in the foregoing 'Time of Troubles', and that is in the disintegration of the Minoan Society. In a field in which our evidence is still exclusively archaeological and also still only fragmentary—even in this unilluminating medium—our findings can only be tentative. Yet, while the history of the Minoan 'Time of Troubles' is far too obscure to warrant our venturing upon any analysis at all, we may perhaps provisionally interpret the archaeological strata in historical terms when we come to the following chapter. In other contexts² we have hazarded the conjecture that the Minoan Society, in the course of its disintegration, lived through a universal state that must have been founded after the first destruction of the Cretan palaces at the break between the two stratigraphically attested periods which our archaeologists have labelled 'Middle Minoan II' and 'Middle Minoan III'; and we have suspected that a violent overthrow of our supposed universal state may be the political event that is commemorated in the second destruction which overtook the same palaces, some centuries later, at the break between 'Late Minoan II' and 'Late Minoan III' circa 1400 B.C. If these two termini give the measure of the total span of the duration of 'the thalassocracy of Minos', does the dim light of the archaeologist-miner's lamp enable us to discern any intervening vestige of a beat of Rout-and-Rally? It is perhaps not altogether too fanciful to read a political punctuation into the change of technique and style which is the basis of the archaeologists' distinction between 'Late Minoan I' and 'Late Minoan II'.

Symptoms in Western History.

While a Minoan game of blind-man's-buff may not add much to our knowledge, its very uncertainty may serve to warn us that we are now approaching the limits of the field within which it is possible to pursue with any profit our empirical investigation into the occurrence of the disintegration-rhythm in its standard run of three and a half beats from beginning to end of the process. The results that we have obtained already suffice, however, to show that

¹ See the present chapter, p. 295, above.

² In I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 92-3; IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 64-5; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 236, above.

the pattern which we have been studying does occur with a considerable frequency. And this conclusion leads us irresistibly to a final question. If our pattern has proved to be one of the regular features of the disintegration-process in the histories of those civilizations that have unquestionably made the dreadful transit from growth to decay, is it legitimate to argue in the inverse direction? Supposing that we are confronted with the history of a civilization which it is peculiarly difficult for us to see in perspective, shall we be warranted in pronouncing that this society is already in a state of disintegration on the strength of finding in its history the imprint of our now familiar disintegration-pattern?

Our problematical case is, of course, the history of the society into which we happen ourselves to have been born. At the beginning of this Study¹ we took note of the difficulty with which any Western observer will have to contend, *ex officio originis*, if he tries to take, *en voyage*, the bearings of the ship on board which the observer himself is sailing into the uncharted waters of an unknown Future. The position of our Western Society in our age cannot become known with any certainty of knowledge till the voyage has come to an end; and so long as the ship is under way the crew will have no notion whether she is going to founder in mid-ocean through springing a leak or be sent to the bottom by colliding with another vessel or run ashore on the rocks or glide smoothly into a port of which the crew will never have heard before they wake up one fine day to find their ship at rest in dock there. A sailor at sea cannot tell for which, if for any, of these ends the ship is heading as he watches her making headway during the brief period of his own spell of duty. To plot out her course and write up her log from start to finish is a task that can be performed only by observers who are able to wait until the voyage is over, since it will only be then that the unexplored Future, into which the ship is for ever sailing so long as she is in motion at all, will have been converted, without any dubious residue, into a traversed and recorded Past; and such observers must, *ex hypothesi*, be members of some other society that will still be alive when ours has ceased to exist, since their post of observation must, again *ex hypothesi*, lie not on board the ship, but somewhere outside of her gunwales. Yet, granting that the present position of our now still living and moving Western World cannot be ascertained in this accurate and comprehensive way by observers who are handicapped, as we are, by the fact of living and moving and having our being in the society that is the object of observation, may there not be some rough-and-ready means by which even we, here and now, can reckon,

¹ In I. B (iv), vol. i, pp. 36-7, above.

within a margin of error that will be not excessive for practical purposes, approximately where we stand? And may not a clue have been put into our hands by the acquaintance with the standard run of the disintegration-rhythm that we have gained in the present chapter through a comparative study of the histories of other civilizations than our own in which we have the advantage of knowing the whole story? Suppose that the pattern which we have now detected in the histories of so many disintegrating civilizations were to prove to be discernible in our own Western history too. Might that not be regarded as presumptive evidence that our own civilization has already been overtaken by a process of disintegration which is known for certain to have been the fate of so many other representatives of the species?

If we look into our Western history with eyes sharpened by the practice of the survey that we have just been making, do we in fact perceive, here too, the now familiar beats of the movement of Rout-and-Rally?

On this point there is one observation that we can make at once and have in fact made already:¹ our Western Society, whether it be already in disintegration or not, has at any rate certainly not yet arrived at the second rally in the disintegration-process; for this second rally is regularly marked by the establishment of a *Pax Oecumenica*; and a *Pax Oecumenica* is a state to which our Western Society has certainly not yet attained. Why is it, though, that we are—as undoubtedly we are—so acutely aware of this fact? The answer to that question is that, in our generation in the West, we are no longer content, as our forebears were so complacently, to see our society remain partitioned among a number of parochial sovereign states that are apt to assert their sovereignty by going to war with one another. Unlike our forebears, we in our generation feel from the depths of our hearts that a *Pax Oecumenica* is now a crying need. We live in daily dread of a catastrophe which, we fear, may overtake us if the problem of meeting this need is left unsolved much longer.² It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the shadow of this fear that now lies athwart our future is hypnotizing us into a spiritual paralysis that is beginning to affect us even in the trivial avocations of our daily life.³ And, if we can screw up the courage to look this fear in the face, we shall not be rewarded by finding ourselves able to dismiss it with contempt as nothing but a panic phobia. The sting of this fear lies in the undeniable fact that it springs from a rational root. We are terribly

¹ In Part IV. A, vol. iv, p. 3, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 318-20 and 405-8, above.

³ Written in the autumn of 1937.

afraid of the immediate future because we have been through a horrible experience in the recent past. And the lesson which this experience has impressed upon our minds is indeed an appalling one. In our generation we have learnt, through suffering, two home truths. The first truth is that the institution of War is still in full force in our Western Society. The second truth is that, in the Western World under existing technical and social conditions, there can be no warfare that is not internecine. These truths have been driven home by our experience in the General War of A.D. 1914-18; but the most ominous thing about that war is that it was not an isolated or unprecedented calamity. It was one war in a series; and, when we envisage the whole series in a synoptic view, we discover that this is not only a series but also a progression. In our recent Western history war has been following war in an ascending order of intensity; and to-day it is already apparent that the War of 1914-18 was not the climax of this crescendo movement. If the series continues, the progression will indubitably be carried to ever higher terms, until this process of intensifying the horrors of war is one day brought to an end by the self-annihilation of the war-making society.

We may now remind ourselves that this progressive series of Western wars, of which the War of 1914-18 has been the latest but perhaps not the last, is one of two chapters of a story that we have already studied in another context.¹ We have observed that the history of our Western warfare in the so-called 'Modern Age' can be analysed into two bouts which are separated from one another chronologically by an intervening lull and are also distinguished from one another qualitatively by a difference in the object—or at any rate in the pretext—of the hostilities. The first bout consists of the Wars of Religion² which began in the sixteenth century and ceased in the seventeenth. The second bout consists of the Wars of Nationality, which began in the eighteenth century and are still the scourge of the twentieth. These ferocious Wars of Religion and ferocious Wars of Nationality have been separated by an interlude of moderate wars that were fought as 'the Sport of Kings'. This interlude manifestly did not begin on the Continent till after the end of the Thirty Years' War in A.D. 1648, and in Great Britain not till after the Restoration of the Monarchy in England in A.D. 1660; and it is equally manifest that the lull did not outlast the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War in A.D. 1792, even if we leave it an open question whether it survived the American

¹ In IV. C (iii) (b) 3 and 4, vol. iv, pp. 141-85, above.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 160-1, and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 668-72, above.

Revolutionary War of A.D. 1775-83.¹ On a narrower reckoning we might confine the Time-span of the 'Golden Age' of eighteenth-century moderation between the dates A.D. 1732 and A.D. 1755, if the eviction of a Protestant minority from the Catholic ecclesiastical principality of Salzburg in A.D. 1731-2 is to be taken as the last positive act of religious persecution in Western Europe, and the eviction of a French population from Acadia in A.D. 1755 as the first positive act of persecution for Nationality's sake in North America.² In any case the interlude is palpable; and, whatever dates we may choose to adopt as the props for a conventional scheme of chronological demarcation, the play will fall into the same three acts in the same sequence, and this sequence of acts will present the same plot. This underlying plot, and not the superficial time-table, is the feature that is of interest for our present purpose. And in the plot of this three-act play, with its couple of bouts of ferocious warfare and an interlude of moderate warfare in between them, can we not discern the familiar pattern of a couple of paroxysms, separated by a breathing-space, which we have learnt to recognize as the hall-mark of a 'Time of Troubles'? If we scrutinize in this light the picture that is presented by the modern history of our Western World, we shall find that the cap does at any rate fit to a nicety.

If the outbreak of the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth century is to be taken as a symptom of social breakdown, then the first rally of a since then disintegrating Western Society is to be seen in the movement in favour of religious toleration which gained the upper hand, and brought the Wars of Religion to an end, in the course of the seventeenth century. This victory of the Principle of Toleration in the religious sphere duly won for several succeeding generations that interlude of moderation which gave an ailing Western World a welcome breathing-space between a first and a second paroxysm of its deadly seizure. And the cap fits again when we observe the fact that the relief was only temporary and not permanent, and when we go on to inquire into the reason. For our empirical study of the rhythm of the disintegration-process has led us to expect to see a rally give way to a relapse; and it has also

¹ We have already observed (in IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 147-9, and in IV. C (iii) (b) 4, vol. iv, pp. 163-4 and 165-7, above) that the testimony of the American Revolutionary War is self-contradictory and therefore ambiguous. When we consider the moderateness of the terms which a victorious France imposed upon a defeated Great Britain in A.D. 1783, we shall be inclined to pronounce that in that year Moderation was still reigning. On the other hand, when we consider the treatment of the defeated United Empire Loyalists by the victorious insurgents in the *ci-devant* British colonies in North America, we shall be no less inclined to pronounce that by that time the reign of a fanatical Nationalism had already set in.

² For these two acts of eighteenth-century persecution and their significance see IV. C (iii) (b) 4, vol. iv, pp. 164-5, above.

led us to expect to find that this monotonously repeated tale of failure can be explained in each case by some particular element of weakness by which the abortive rally has been vitiated. Are these expectations fulfilled in the Western case in point? We are bound to reply that, in this case too, the reason for the failure of the rally is as clear as the fact of it is conspicuous. Our modern Western Principle of Toleration has failed to bring salvation after all because (as we must confess) there has been no health in it.¹ The spirits that presided over its conception and birth were Disillusionment, Apprehension, and Cynicism, not Faith, Hope, and Charity; the impulse was negative, not positive; and the soil in which the seeds were sown was arid.

'Some fell upon stony places where they had not much earth, and forthwith they sprung up because they had no deepness of earth; and when the Sun was up they were scorched, and because they had no root they withered away.'²

A Principle of Toleration which unexpectedly clothed the stony heart of our modern Western Christendom in a sudden crop of fresh verdure when the fierce sun of religious fanaticism had burnt itself out into dust and ashes, has wilted—no less suddenly and no less unexpectedly—now that the fiercer sun of national fanaticism has burst blazing through the firmament. In the twentieth century we are seeing our seventeenth-century Toleration making an unconditional surrender to a masterful demon whose onslaught it has proved incapable of withstanding. And the cause of this disastrous impotence is manifest.

A Toleration that has no roots in Faith has failed to retain any hold upon the heart of *Homo Occidentalis* because human nature abhors a spiritual vacuum. If the house from which an unclean spirit has gone out is left empty, swept, and garnished, the momentarily banished possessor will sooner or later enter in again with a retinue of other spirits more wicked than himself, and the last state of that man will be worse than the first.³ The Wars of Nationalism are more wicked than the Wars of Religion because the object—or pretext—of the hostilities is less sublime and less ethereal. The moral is that hungry souls which have been given a stone when they have asked for bread⁴ cannot be restrained from seeking to satisfy their hunger by devouring the first piece of carrion that comes their way. They will not be deterred by a warning from the giver of the stone that the heaven-sent carrion is

¹ The ethos of this modern Western Principle of Toleration has been examined in IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 142-3 and 150; in IV. C (iii) (b) 4, vol. iv, p. 184; in IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 227-8; in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), Annex, vol. iv, pp. 643-5; and in V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 669-71, above.

² Matt. xiii. 5-6.

³ Matt. xii. 43-5; Luke xi. 24-6.

⁴ Matt. vii. 9; Luke xi. 11.

poisoned; and, even when the threatened agonies duly begin to wrack the miserable scavengers' entrails, they will persist in feasting upon the tainted meat with an unabated appetite until death extinguishes their greed—as once in Sicily a routed Athenian army that had gone mad with thirst as it walked through dry places, seeking rest and finding none, drank heedlessly of the waters of the River Asinarus while the enemy was shooting them down from the bank and the stream was running foully red with the blood of the dying drinkers' already slaughtered comrades.

There is yet another point in which our modern Western history conforms to the pattern of a disintegrating society's 'Time of Troubles'; and this is perhaps the most alarming of all these points of congruence. Our survey has shown us that, as a rule, the paroxysm which follows the intermediate breathing-space is more violent than the paroxysm which precedes it; and this rule is certainly exemplified in our Western case if the Wars of Nationality are to be taken as the second paroxysm of our seizure and the Wars of Religion as the first.

Our forebears who fought that earlier cycle of ferocious Western wars may not have been behindhand in the will to work havoc, but—fortunately for themselves and for their descendants—they lacked the means which we now have at our command unfortunately for our children and for ourselves. No doubt the Wars of Religion were much worse—and this in point both of rancour and of command of resources and of technical ability to turn these resources to account—than the Western warfare of previous ages in which our Western Christendom was still unquestionably in growth. The Wars of Religion had been anticipated by the invention of gunpowder and by voyages of discovery that, at least on the material plane,¹ had extended the range of the Western Society from one small corner of the Eurasian Continent to the hinterlands of all the navigable seas on the face of the planet. The bullion that had been accumulating in the treasuries at Tenochtitlan and Cuzco was ultimately expended on paying mercenaries to fight in the Wars of Religion on European battle-fields, after the discovery, conquest, and rifling of the Central American and Andean worlds by the Spanish *conquistadores*—just as, after the corresponding geographical expansion of the Hellenic World through the exploits of Alexander, the treasures piled up by Achaemenian policy at Ecbatana and Susa found their way into the hands of mercenaries who fought in the wars of Alexander's diadochi and epigoni on

¹ For the discrepancy which is apt to reveal itself between the respective extensions of any society, at any date, on different planes of social life, see I. B (iii), vol. i, pp. 27-36, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 199-202, above.

battle-fields in Greece.¹ And the professional soldiery that was maintained in a sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century Western World out of this sudden huge increase in the Western princes' supplies of the precious metals was not only more numerous than the old feudal militia of Transalpine Western Europe. It was also more formidably armed and, worse still, more ferociously enraged against an enemy who now, as a rule, was not only a military opponent but was also a religious miscreant in the eyes of his adversary. The unprecedented violence with which the Wars of Religion were imbued by the combined operation of these several causes would doubtless have shocked both Saint Louis and the Emperor Frederick II if they could have returned to life to witness the Western warfare of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But we may also as confidently presume that the Duke of Alva and Gustavus Adolphus would have been shocked to an equal degree if they, in their turn, could have returned to life to witness the subsequent Wars of Nationality. This later cycle of ferocious Western wars which began in the eighteenth century, and which has not ceased in the twentieth, has been keyed up to an unprecedented degree of ferocity by the titanic driving-power of two demonic forces—Democracy and Industrialism—which have entered into the institution of War in our Western World² in these latter days when that world has now virtually completed its stupendous feat of incorporating the whole face of the Earth and the entire living generation of Mankind into its own body material. Our last state is worse than our first because, in this vastly expanded house, we are possessed to-day by devils more terrible than any that ever tormented even our seventeenth-century and sixteenth-century ancestors.

Are these devils to dwell in our empty and swept and garnished house till they have driven us to suicide? If the analogy between our Western Civilization's modern history and other civilizations' 'Times of Troubles' does extend to points of chronology, then a Western 'Time of Troubles' which appears to have begun sometime in the sixteenth century may be expected to find its end sometime in the twentieth century; and this prospect may well make us tremble; for in other cases the grand finale that has wound up a 'Time of Troubles' and ushered in a universal state has been a self-inflicted 'knock-out blow' from which the self-stricken society

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (α), vol. iv, p. 485; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 62-4; V. C (i) (d) 11, in the present volume, p. 155, footnote 3; and the present chapter, pp. 289-90, above.

² For this impact of Democracy and Industrialism upon War see IV. C (iii) (b) 3, vol. iv, pp. 141-55, above. For the advent of these two demonic forces see Part I. A, vol. i, pp. 1-2, above.

has never been able to recover. Must we, too, purchase our *Pax Oecumenica* at this deadly price? The question is one which our own lips cannot answer, since the destiny of a live civilization is necessarily as obscure to its living members as the fate of a dead civilization is to scholars when their only clues are undeciphered scripts or dumb artifacts. We cannot say for certain that our doom is at hand; and yet we have no warrant for assuming that it is not; for that would be to assume that we are not as other men are; and any such assumption would be at variance with everything that we know about human nature either by looking around us or by introspection.

This dark doubt is a challenge which we cannot evade; and our destiny depends on our response.

'I dreamed, and behold I saw a man clothed with rags, standing in a certain place, with his face from his own house, a book in his hand, and a great burden upon his back. I looked, and saw him open the book and read therein; and as he read he wept and trembled; and, not being able longer to contain, he broke out with a lamentable cry saying "What shall I do?"'

It was not without just cause that Christian was so greatly distressed.

'I am for certain informed [said he] that this our city will be burned with fire from Heaven—in which fearful overthrow both myself with thee my wife and you my sweet babes shall miserably come to ruine, except (the which yet I see not) some way of escape can be found, whereby we may be delivered.'

What response to this challenge is Christian going to make? Is he going to look this way and that way as if he would run, yet stand still because he cannot tell which way to go—until the fire from Heaven duly descends upon the City of Destruction and the wretched haverer perishes in a holocaust which he has so dismally foreboded without ever bringing himself to the point of fleeing from the wrath to come? Or will he begin to run—and run on crying 'Life! Life! Eternal Life!'—with his eye set on a shining light and his feet bound for a distant wicket-gate? If the answer to this question depended on nobody but Christian himself, our knowledge of the uniformity of human nature might incline us to predict that Christian's imminent destiny was Death and not Life. But in the classic version of the myth we are told that the human protagonist was not left entirely to his own resources in the hour that was decisive for his fate. According to John Bunyan, Christian was saved by his encounter with Evangelist. And, inasmuch as it cannot be supposed that God's nature is less constant than Man's,

we may and must pray that a reprieve which God has granted to our society once will not be refused if we ask for it again in a contrite spirit and with a broken heart.¹

(III) STANDARDIZATION THROUGH DISINTEGRATION

We have now arrived at the close of our inquiry into the process of the disintegrations of civilizations; but, before we take leave of this subject and turn our attention to other problems, there is one more manoeuvre to be performed if we are to carry our present operations to their completion. Now that we find ourselves at last at the end of a road on which we have been travelling for so long, we are in a position to look back with an eye to taking in, at one view, the whole of the ground that we have traversed; and such a retrospect will perhaps throw light on a question which at this stage we can hardly leave unasked. In making a journey that, at least in certain stages, may have seemed, while we were on the march, like an aimless wandering in the wilderness, have we perchance been following a single guiding thread? Now that we have surveyed the whole course of disintegration by going laboriously over the ground, does the process prove to be governed by any master-tendency?

If we address ourselves to this concluding question we may obtain a clue to the answer in the findings that we have reached already in the last chapter before this.² In studying the interaction between individuals in disintegrating civilizations we have been led into an examination of the rhythm of the disintegration-process, and in this rhythm we have detected an element of uniformity—a uniform run of three and a half standard beats of the movement of Rout-and-Rally—which is apparently so definite and so constant that, on the strength of its regularity, we have almost ventured to cast the horoscope of one civilization that is still alive and on the move. If, with this clue in our hands, we now cast our eyes backward, we shall find that this tendency towards uniformity is the key-note, not only of the last chapter, but of the whole of the present part of this Study. In that uniform rhythm the principle of uniformity is manifesting itself only in a superficial way. In earlier chapters we have already come across some more significant expressions of uniformity in the uniform schism of disintegrating societies into three sharply divided classes and in the uniform works of creation that are respectively produced by each of these. We have seen dominant minorities uniformly working out philosophies and setting up universal states; internal proletariats

¹ Pss. xxxiv. 18, li. 17.

² In V. C (ii) (b), above.

uniformly discovering 'higher religions' which aim at embodying themselves in universal churches; and external proletariats uniformly mustering war-bands which find vent in 'heroic ages'.¹ The uniformity with which these several institutions are generated in the body social of a disintegrating civilization is indeed so perfect that it is possible to display this aspect of the disintegration-process in tabular form.² But this is still not the most impressive of the ways in which the tendency towards uniformity declares itself in the histories of disintegrating civilizations. The uniformity of institutions that is revealed by a study of schism in the body social is not so illuminating as the uniformity of ways of behaviour, feeling, and life that is revealed by a study of schism in the Soul.³

The conclusion to which this retrospective reconnaissance brings us is that in the histories of civilizations standardization is the master-tendency of the process of disintegration—in antithesis to the differentiation which we have found, at an earlier point,⁴ to be the master-tendency of the process of growth. And this conclusion is only what we should expect *a priori*. For, if differentiation is the natural outcome of a succession of successful responses to a series of different challenges, standardization is no less manifestly the natural outcome of a succession of unsuccessful responses to a single challenge which monotonously continues to present itself so long as it thus remains unanswered.⁵

This fundamental difference between the processes of disintegration and of growth is brought home in the simple parable of Penelope's web.

ἐνθα καὶ ἡματίη μὲν ὑφαίνεσκεν μέγαν ἱστόν,
νύκτας δ' ἀλλύσκεν, ἐπεὶ δαΐδας παραβέιτο.⁶

When the faithful wife of the absent Odysseus had promised her importunate suitors that she would give herself in marriage to one of them so soon as she had finished weaving a winding-sheet for old Laertes, she used to weave away at her loom in the day-time day by day and then spend the night-watches night by night in unpicking her last day's work. If we look into the differences between the heroine's day-work and her night-work we shall perceive that the most obvious difference is not the only one. The most obvious difference is, of course, that in the day-time Penelope was making

¹ The three classes into which a disintegrating society splits up, and these classes' respective works, have been examined in V. C (i) (c), *passim*, above.

² See the tables of universal states, philosophies, higher religions, and barbarian war-bands at the end of this chapter, on pp. 327-31, below.

³ See V. C (i) (d), *passim*, above.

⁴ In III. C (iii), vol. iii, pp. 377-90, above.

⁵ On this point see Part V. B, vol. v, pp. 12-13, and V. C (ii) (b), in the present volume, pp. 280-1, above.

⁶ *Odyssey*, Book II, ll. 104-5.

something, whereas at night she was undoing what she had just made. But there is another difference, besides, which is more pertinent to our present purpose. When the webster set up her warp and began to weave her weft each morning she had at her command an unlimited choice of patterns. If she chose she could make it her practice never to weave the same pattern more than once; and she could have kept up this practice without flagging, even if she had succeeded in carrying on her surreptitious game not just for three years but for thirty. The number of possible patterns was infinite; and, since every different pattern would require from the webster a different set of movements of eye and hand and body, it was open to Penelope to allow herself an infinite variety in the execution of her daily task. But, when each night she had the torches brought in, and set to work to unpick what she had woven between morn and eve, her night-work was monotonously uniform; and from this monotony there was no escape; for, when it came to unravelling the web, the pattern made no difference. However complicated the particular set of movements that had been required for the weaving of the pattern of the day, one simple movement, and this one only, was allowed by the nature of the task of undoing the day's work. The simple movement of drawing the threads has an obligatory rhythm upon which it is inherently impossible to ring any changes at all.

For this inevitable monotony of her night-work poor Penelope is assuredly to be pitied. To have to work into the small hours is hard enough anyway; and the toil becomes excruciating if it is not only hard but dull. If its hardness and dullness led nowhere the drudgery would be quite unbearable. What was it, then, that nerved the heroine to endure this self-imposed penance year-in and year-out? What inspired her was a song in her soul that was the unfaltering accompaniment of her repetitive night-work no less than of her varied daily task; and that song was 'ilayhi marji':¹ 'With Him will I be reunited.' In drawing the threads by night after weaving them during the day Penelope was not blindly repeating a meaningless round of ineffectual labour. She was working and living in hope; and her hope was not disappointed; for those three years spent on a drudgery that kept the suitors at bay just enabled her to tide over the latter end of the decade of Odysseus' absence. The hero returned to find the heroine still his; and the *Odyssey* duly ends in the reunion of the devoted wife who has resisted the suitors' importunity with the devoted husband who has been proof against the blandishments of Calypso.²

¹ 'ilayhi marji'ukum': 'To Him is your return': Qur'ān x. 4, quoted in III. C (iii), vol. iii, p. 390, above.

² See II. D (i), vol. ii, pp. 23-4, above.

If, then, as it turns out, even Penelope has neither woven nor drawn her threads in vain, what of the mightier weaver whose work is our study and whose song our ears have caught already in an earlier part of this book?

In Lebensfluten, im Tatensturm
 Wall' ich auf und ab,
 Webe hin und her!
 Geburt und Grab
 Ein ewiges Meer,
 Ein wechselnd Weben,
 Ein glühend Leben,
 So schaff' ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit
 Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.¹

The work of the Spirit of the Earth, as he weaves and draws his threads on the Loom of Time, is the temporal history of Man as this manifests itself in the geneses and growths and breakdowns and disintegrations of human societies; and in all this welter of life and this tempest of action we can hear the beat of an elemental rhythm whose variations we have learnt to know as Challenge-and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return and Rout-and-Rally and Apparentation-and-Affiliation and Schism-and-Palingenesia. This elemental rhythm is the alternating beat of Yin and Yang;² and in listening to it we have recognized that, though strophe may be answered by antistrophe, victory by defeat, birth by death, creation by destruction, the movement that this rhythm beats out is neither the fluctuation of an indecisive battle nor the cycle of a treadmill.³ The perpetual turning of a wheel is not a vain repetition if, at each revolution, it is carrying a vehicle that much nearer to its goal; and, if 'palingenesia' signifies the birth of something new, and not just the rebirth of something that has lived and died any number of times already,⁴ then the Wheel of Existence is not just a devilish device for inflicting an everlasting torment on a damned Ixion. On this showing, the music that the rhythm of Yin and Yang beats out is the song of creation; and we shall not be misled into fancying ourselves mistaken because, as we give ear, we can catch the note of creation alternating with the note of destruction. So far from convicting the song of being a diabolic counterfeit, this doubleness of note is a warrant of authenticity. If we listen well we shall perceive that, when the two notes collide, they produce not a discord but a harmony. Creation would not be

¹ Goethe: *Faust*, II, 501-9, quoted in Part II. B, vol. i, p. 204, above.

² See Part II. B, vol. i, pp. 196-204, above.

³ See IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 23-37, above.

⁴ See V. C (i) (b), vol. v, p. 27, footnote 2, and V. C (i) (e), in the present volume, pp. 172-5, above.

creative if it did not swallow up in itself all things in Heaven and Earth, including its own antithesis.

But what of the living garment that the Earth Spirit weaves? Is it laid up in Heaven as fast as it is woven, or can we, here on Earth, catch glimpses at any rate of patches of its etherial web? What are we to think of those tissues that we see lying at the foot of the loom when the weaver, in the course of his tempestuous activity, has been at work unravelling? In the disintegration of a civilization we have found that, though the pageant may have been insubstantial, it does not fade without leaving a rack behind. When civilizations pass from breakdown through disintegration into dissolution, they regularly leave behind them a deposit of universal states and universal churches and barbarian war-bands. What are we to make of these objects? Are they mere waste-products of the disintegration-process—a tangle of spoiled threads from a piece of tapestry which the weaver, on an impulse of his inscrutable caprice, has willed to unpick before it has been half completed? Or will these debris prove, if we pick them up, to be fresh master-pieces of the weaver's art which he has woven, by an unnoticed sleight of hand, on some more etherial instrument than the roaring loom that has ostensibly been occupying all his attention and energies?

If, with this new question in mind, we cast our thoughts back over the results of our previous inquiries, we shall find reason to believe that these three objects of study are something more than by-products of social disintegration; for we came across them first¹ as tokens of Apparentation-and-Affiliation; and this is a relation between one civilization and another. Evidently, therefore, these three institutions cannot be explained entirely in terms of the history of any single civilization; their existence involves a relation between one civilization and another; and, to this extent at any rate, they must be independent entities with a claim to be studied on their own merits. But how far does their independence carry them? In dealing with universal states² we have found already that the peace which they bring is as ephemeral as it is imposing; and in dealing with barbarian war-bands³ we have found, again, that these maggots in the carcass of a dead civilization cannot hope to live longer than it takes the putrefying corpse to dissolve into its clean elements. Yet, though the war-bands may be foredoomed to the premature death of Achilles, the barbarian hero's short life leaves at least an echo behind it in the poetry that commemorates

¹ In I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 51-63, above.

² In V. C (ii) (a), pp. 181-213, and V. C (ii) (b), *passim*, above.

³ In I. C (i) (a), vol. i, pp. 58-62, above.

an 'heroic age'.¹ And what is the destiny of the universal church in which every higher religion seeks to embody itself?²

It will be seen that we are not in a position at present to answer our new question off-hand; and at the same time it is clear that we cannot afford to ignore it; for this question holds the key to the meaning of the weaver's work; and a yearning that *tantus labor non sit cassus* will not allow us to rest without trying to unlock the secret of this mystery. Our Study is not at an end; but we have arrived at the verge of the last of our fields of inquiry.

¹ See I. C (i) (a), vol. i, p. 62; II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 94-6; and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 233-4, above.

² We have already asked ourselves this question, without having yet tried to answer it, in V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 371-6, above.

TABLE I. *Universal States*

<i>Civilization</i>	<i>'Time of Troubles'</i>	<i>Universal State</i>	<i>Pax Occumetica</i>	<i>Provenance of Empire-builders</i>
Sumeric	c. 2677-2298 B.C.	The Empire of Sumer and Akkad (The Realm of the Four Quarters)	c. 2298-1905 B.C.	Founders metropolitans (from Ur); restorers
Babylonian	-610 B.C.	The Neo-Babylonian Empire	610-539 B.C.	Founders metropolitans [?] ¹ (Chaldeans); successors barbarians (Achaemenidae) and aliens (Seleucidae)
Indic	-322 B.C.	The Mauryan Empire	322-185 B.C.	Founders metropolitans [?] ¹ (from Magadha)
Sinic	634-221 B.C.	The Gupta Empire	A.D. 390-c. 475	Founders metropolitans (from Magadha)
Hellenic	431-31 B.C.	The Ts'in and Han Empire	221 B.C.-c. A.D. 172	Founders marchmen (from Ts'in); successors metropolitans (Prior and Posterior Han)
Egyptiac	c. 2424-2070/60 B.C.	The Roman Empire	31 B.C.-A.D. 378	Founders marchmen (Romans); restorers marchmen (Illyrians)
Orthodox Christian (in Russia)	c. A.D. 1075-1478	The Middle Empire	c. 2070/60-1660 B.C.	Marchmen (from Thebes)
Far Eastern (in Japan)	A.D. 1185-1597	The New Empire	c. 1580-1775 B.C.	Marchmen (from Moscow)
Western (medieval cosmes of city-states)	c. A.D. 1378-1797	The Muscovite Empire	A.D. 1478-1881	
Western (carapace against assaults of Osmanlis)	c. A.D. 1128 ² -1526	Hideyoshi's dictatorship and the Tokugawa Shogunate	A.D. 1597-1868	Marchmen (from the Kwanto)
Andean	-c. A.D. 1430	The Napoleonic Empire	A.D. 1797-1814	Marchmen (from France)
Syriac	c. 937-525 B.C.	The Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy	A.D. 1526-1918	Marchmen (from Austria)
Far Eastern (main body)	A.D. 878-1280	The Incaic Empire	c. A.D. 1430-1533	Founders marchmen (from Cuzco); successors aliens (Spaniards)
Central American	-A.D. 1521	(The Realm of the Four Quarters) The Achaemenian Empire The Arab Caliphate The Mongol Empire The Manchu Empire The Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain The Ottoman Empire	c. A.D. 525-332 B.C. c. A.D. 640-909 A.D. 1280-1351 A.D. 1644-1853 ⁴ A.D. 1521-1821 A.D. 1372-1768	Barbaro-marchmen (from Iran) Barbarians (from Arabia) Barbaro-aliens (Mongols) Barbaro-marchmen (Manchus) Forerunners barbaro-marchmen (Aztecs); founders aliens (Spaniards)
Orthodox Christian (main body)	A.D. 977-1372	The Mughal Rāj	c. A.D. 1572-1707	Aliens (Mughals)
Hindu	c. A.D. 1175-1572	The British Rāj	c. A.D. 1818	Aliens (British)
Minonan	-c. 1750 B.C.	'The Thalassocracy of Minoes'	c. A.D. 1750-1400 B.C.	No evidence
	-c. A.D. 300	'The First Empire' of the Mayas	c. A.D. 300-690	No evidence

¹ The Chaldeans in Babylonia might be classified either as metropolitans or as marchmen.

² Magadha might be regarded either as part of the interior of the Indic World of the Pre-Mauryan and the Mauryan Age or else as the eastern march of the Indic World in those ages.

³ The date of the outbreak of the first of the wars between Hungary and the 'Osmanlis' East Roman forerunners the Comneni (see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. IV, p. 403, footnote 3, above).

⁴ The date of the capture of Nanking by the T'aping insurgents.

TABLE II. *Philosophies*

<i>Civilization</i>	<i>Philosophy</i>
Egyptiac	Atonism (abortive)
Andean	Viracochaism (abortive)
Sinic	Confucianism
	Moism
	Taoism
Syriac	Zervanism (abortive)
Indic	Hinayanian Buddhism
	Jainism
Western	Cartesianism
	Hegelianism ¹
Hellenic	Platonism
	Stoicism
	Epicureanism
	Pyrrhonism
Babylonic	Astrology

¹ Hegelianism confined to the field of social affairs = Marxism; Marxism transplanted from the Western World to Russia = Leninism.

TABLE III. *Higher Religions*

<i>Civilization</i>	<i>Higher Religion</i>	<i>Source of Inspiration</i>
Sumeric	Tammuz-worship	indigenous
Egyptiac	Osiris-worship	alien [?] (Sumeric [?])
Sinic	The Mahāyāna	alien (Indo-Helleno-Syriac)
	Neotaoism	indigenous but imitative (of the Mahāyāna)
Indic	Hinduism	indigenous
Syriac	Islam	indigenous
Hellenic	Christianity	alien (Syriac)
	Mithraism	alien (Syriac)
	Manichaeism	alien (Syriac)
	The Mahāyāna	alien (Indic)
	Isis-worship	alien (Egyptiac)
	Cybele-worship	alien (Hittite)
	Neoplatonism	indigenous (<i>ci-devant</i> philosophy)
Babylonic	Judaism	alien (Syriac)
	Zoroastrianism	alien (Syriac)
Western	Bahaism	alien (Iranic)
	The Ahmadiyah	alien (Iranic)
Orthodox Christian (main body)	Imāmī Shi'ism	alien (Iranic)
	Bedreddinism	semi-alien (Iranic tincture)
Orthodox Christian (in Russia)	Sectarianism	indigenous
	Revivalist Protestantism	alien (Western)
Far Eastern (main body)	Catholicism	alien (Western)
	T'ai'ping	semi-alien (Western tincture)
Far Eastern (in Japan)	Jōdo	semi-alien (from Far Eastern, main body)
	Jōdo Shinshū	indigenous (from Jōdo)
	Nichirenism	indigenous
	Zen	semi-alien (from Far Eastern, main body)
Hindu	Kabirism and Sikhism	semi-alien (Islamic tincture)
	Brahmō Samāj	semi-alien (Western tincture)

TABLE IV. *Barbarian War-Bands*

<i>Civilization</i>	<i>Universal State</i>	<i>Frontier</i>	<i>Barbarians</i>	<i>Poetry</i>	<i>Religion</i>
Sumeric	The Empire of Sumer and Akkad	NE.	Gutaeans Eurasian Nomads (Aryas) Kassites Hittites Eurasian Nomads (Scythians) Medes and Persians	The Sanskrit Epic	The Vedic Pantheon The Hittite Pantheon Zoroastrianism
Babylonic	The Neo-Babylonian Empire	NW. NE.	Sakas Huns Gurjaras	The Sanskrit Epic (recultivated)	
Indic	The Mauryan Empire The Gupta Empire	NW. NW.	Eurasian Nomads { (Hiongnu) (To Pe) (Juan Juan) Eurasian Nomads (Sseupi) Insular Celts Continental Teutons		
Sinic	The Ts'in and Han Empire	NW.	Eurasian Nomads { (Sarmatians) (Huns)		
Hellenic	The Roman Empire	NE. NW. N.	Arabs Berbers Nubians Hyksos Achaeans Libyans Hebrews and Aramaeans Eurasian Nomads { (Hatars) (Forgut Calmucks)	The Irish Epic The Teutonic Epic	Far Western Christianity First the Continental Teutonic Pantheon, then Arianism
Egyptiac	The Middle Empire The New Empire	NE. SE. SW. S. NE. N. NW. E.		The Pre-Islamic Arabic Poetry	Islam
Orthodox Christian (in Russia)		SE.		The Homeric Epic	Set-worship The Olympian Pantheon Yahweh-worship Islam Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism
Far Eastern	The Tokugawa Shogunate In Europe	NE. NW. N. NE.	Ainu Insular Celts Scandinavians Continental Saxons Wends Lithuanians Eurasian Nomads (Magyars) Bosniaks	The Irish Epic The Icelandic Sagas	Far Western Christianity The Scandinavian Pantheon
Western		E. SE.	Red Indians Amazonians Araucanians	The Muslim Jugoslav 'heroic' ballads	First Bogomilism, then Islam Non-violent 'Zealotism'
Andean	In North America The Incaic Empire	W. E. S.			

Syriac	The Achaemenian Empire	NW. NE. NW. SW. SE. N. NE. NE. NE. NW. NW.	Macedonians Parthians Sakas Franks East Roman 'Borderers' Berbers Arabs Eurasian Nomads (Khazars) Eurasian Nomads ((Turks) ((Mongols)) ((Khitans)) Eurasian Nomads ((Kin)) Eurasian Nomads (Mongols) Eurasian Nomads (Zungar Calmucks) Chichimecs Serbs Albanians Rumeliot Greeks Lazes Kurds Arabs Uzbegs Afghans Achaeans Hebrews and Aramaeans Uzbegs Afghans Gasgas Phrygians Achaeans Bastarnae Sarmatians Varangians Pactenigs Cossacks Kirghiz Qazaqs	The Alexander Romance The Iranian Epic The French Epic The Byzantine Greek Epic The Orthodox Christian Jugoslav 'heroic' ballads The Albanian 'heroic' poetry The Rumeliot Greek Armatole and Klephtic ballads The Homeric Epic The Homeric Epic The Russian 'heroic' ballads The Kirghiz Qazaq 'heroic' ballads	Catholicism Orthodox Christianity Islam Isma'ili Shi'ism Judaism Manichaeism {Nestorianism Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism Bektashi Sunnism Najdi Wahhabism Kordofani Mahdism The Olympian Pantheon Yahweh-worship The Olympian Pantheon Orthodox Christianity
Far Eastern (main body)	The Arab Caliphate	NW. NE. NW. SW. SE. N. NE. NE. NE. NW. NW.			
Central American Orthodox Christian (main body)	[The Time of Troubles] The Manchou Empire The Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain The Ottoman Empire	NW. NE. NW. NE. NW. NW.			
Hindu	The Mughal Raj	NE. SE. S. NW.			
Minoan	The British Raj The thalassocracy of Minoes	NW. N. E.			
Iranic	[The Time of Troubles]	NE.			
Hittite	The Royal Scythian Horde	NE. NE. NW. SW. NW.			
Eurasian Nomadism	The Khazar Horde The Golden Horde	E. NW. E. NW. NE.			

ANNEXES

ANNEX TO V. C (i) (d) 7

THE HELLENIC CONCEPTION OF THE 'COSMOPOLIS'

THE Hellenic conception of the *Cosmopolis* may be illustrated by a cento of quotations from Latin and Greek authors. Of the four who are drawn upon below, the first, Cicero, lived on the eve of the foundation of a Roman Empire which provided the Hellenic World with a universal state and Hellenic minds with a terrestrial image of the constitution of the vaster commonwealth of the Universe. The other three—Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus—lived and worked in the social environment of an established Roman Empire at dates which all fall within the first two centuries of the Roman Peace. Both Marcus and Seneca were called upon to govern the Empire; and they both of them drew from their ideal of the *Cosmopolis* the moral strength to perform a burdensome and thankless mundane task for the sake of which Marcus sacrificed his happiness and Seneca forfeited his life—though Seneca's death at Nero's hands was not so ironical a tragedy as Cicero's death at the hands of a Triumvirate which included the future Augustus.¹

The first concern of these Hellenic philosophers in their disquisitions on the *Cosmopolis* was to demonstrate its existence; and the following proofs, on closely parallel lines, are offered by Cicero and by Marcus. Cicero's argument runs thus:

'Man has a primary social bond with God in their common possession of Reason—seeing that there is nothing higher than Reason, and that this highest of all faculties is to be found in Man and in God alike. Those, however, who have Reason in common have Right Reason in common as well; and, since Right Reason is another name for Law (*lex*), we human beings must be regarded as being associated with the Gods through the bond of Law likewise. But those who share the same law are living under the same juridical dispensation (*ius*), and this implies that they are members of the same commonwealth. If, however, they are subject to the same authorities and powers, then they are also subject, *a fortiori*, to the heavenly ordinance and to the Divine Intelligence

¹ In retrospect Augustus seems to have recognized that the eloquent voice which he had allowed Mark Antony to silence with the sword had been one of the heralds of Augustus's own life-work. At any rate this seems a legitimate reading of the following anecdote in Plutarch's *Life of Cicero*, chap. 49:

'I have heard that, many years later, Augustus once came into a room where one of his grandchildren (a child of his daughter's) was sitting reading one of Cicero's works. The boy was horrified and tried to hide the book under his coat; but his grandfather saw what he was doing, took the book, started to read it, and stood there reading on and on until he had been through a considerable part of the volume. Then he handed it back to the child with the words: "A great writer, my boy, a great writer and a great patriot."

and to Almighty God. And so the whole of this Universe is to be regarded as one single commonwealth of gods and men.¹

Marcus's argument follows much the same course:

'If we have Intelligence in common, we must also have in common the Reason (*λόγος*) in virtue of which we are reasonable creatures; and from this it would follow that we have in common, again, the Reason that tells us what to do and to leave undone. From this it would follow that we have Law (*νόμος*) in common; from this that we are citizens; and from that, again, that we are members of some kind of polity (*πολίτευμα*). If so, the Universe is like a commonwealth (*πόλις*); for what other polity can any one think of which has a membership comprising the entire Human Race? And is not this all-embracing commonwealth the only conceivable source of the intelligent and reasonable and law-abiding veins in our own human nature?'²

The conception of the Universe as a commonwealth, at which Marcus and Cicero have arrived by this road, is worked out as follows by Epictetus:

'This Universe is one commonwealth, and the substance out of which it has been fashioned is likewise one; and there is in its economy an inevitable periodicity which makes things give place to one another—one thing dissolving as another comes on into existence, and some things remaining unmoved while others are in motion. And everything is full of friends: in the first place gods but also human beings, who are likewise natural friends because they have been designed by Nature for living as members of one human family. In the natural course of this family life some have to keep each other company and others have to part company; and while we may rejoice in the companionship we must not grieve at the separation.'³

One of the excellences of the constitution of the *Cosmopolis* is the harmonious solution of the problem of the distribution of allegiance between the cosmic commonwealth and the terrestrial parish—and this is a topic on which we shall obtain the clearest light from those Hellenic philosophers who were at the same time Roman citizens; since Rome, as we have seen,⁴ had been more successful than any other terrestrial community in the Hellenic World in reconciling Cicero the citizen of the municipality of Arpinum with Cicero the citizen of an oecumenical Roman State. The analogous reconciliation of allegiances on the cosmic scale is propounded as follows by Seneca:

'We have to envisage two commonwealths. There is a great one—

¹ Cicero: *De Legibus*, Book I, chap. 7.

² Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book IV, chap. 4.

³ Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book III, chap. 24, §§ 10-11.

⁴ In III. C (ii) (b), Annex IV, vol. iii, p. 481; IV. C (iii) (b) 10, vol. iv, pp. 208-14; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 310-13, above. See also V. C (ii) (b), in the present volume, p. 291, above.

truly deserving of the name—which embraces both gods and men and in which we do not let our eyes dwell on some insignificant corner but include in the bounds of our polity all that is under the Sun. And then there is that other commonwealth in which we have been enrolled by the accident of birth—an Athens or a Carthage or some other state with a citizenship that is not oecumenical but is merely parochial. Some people work for both commonwealths—the greater and the lesser—simultaneously; others exclusively for the lesser; and others, again, exclusively for the greater. It is in our power to serve this greater commonwealth in retirement as well as in active life; and indeed I am inclined to think that in retirement we can actually serve it better.¹

The points here made by Seneca are put more pithily by Marcus:

'*Qua* Antoninus I have Rome for my commonwealth and country; *qua* human being I have the Universe. The public interest of these two commonwealths gives the whole measure of my own private good.'²

If an apparent conflict of duties does arise, the philosopher may take it for granted that his duty to the Universe takes precedence. As Seneca sees it,

'When we have given the sage a commonwealth that is worthy of him by giving him the Universe, he will not be cutting himself off from the common weal by going into retirement. On the contrary, he will perhaps be leaving a hole in the corner in order to pass out into a greater and more spacious life, and to realize—when he finds himself on the heights of Heaven—the lowliness of the seat on which he sat when he used to take the chair or mount the tribunal. Let it sink into your mind that the sage is never so active as when he has brought within his purview the sum of things human and divine.'³

The same answer is given to the same question by Epictetus in his dissertation on the perfect practitioner of the Cynic discipline:

'I suppose you want to ask me whether the Cynic sage will go into politics? You blockhead! What greater field of political activity do you propose to give him than the field in which he is actually at work? Is he to take the floor at Athens and make a speech on revenue or supply when his role is to address the whole World—Athens and Corinth and Rome in the same world-wide audience—and to take for his subject, not supply or revenue or peace or war, but the Soul's prosperity and adversity, good fortune and bad fortune, slavery and freedom? You see a man working in a field of political activity of that titanic scope, and you ask me whether he will be going into politics? Suppose you go on to ask me whether he will take office, and once more I shall say to you: You fool! What greater office could he conceivably hold than the office that he is exercising already?'⁴

¹ Seneca, L. A.: *Ad Serenum de Otio*, chap. 4.

² Marcus, op. cit., Book VI, chap. 44.

³ Seneca, L. A.: *Epistolae*, Book VII, Ep. lxviii, § 2.

⁴ Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book III, chap. 22, §§ 83-5.

In the last resort the Commonwealth of the Universe has a claim upon the sage's allegiance to which the parochial commonwealth must give way; for

'Man [is] a citizen of the supreme commonwealth, in which the other commonwealths are no more than houses;'¹

and this simile reappears in the Stoic philosopher-emperor's confession of faith:

'Everything that is in harmony for thee, O Universe, is harmonious for me likewise. Nothing that is in season for thee is for me either premature or tardy. All is fruit for me that is brought by thy seasons, O Nature. From thee all things proceed; in thee all things subsist; to thee all things return. The worldling says "O beloved City of Cecrops", and shalt *thou* not say "O beloved City of Zeus"?'²

The philosopher may even rise to a height at which the parochial commonwealth fades out of view and leaves the Soul free to live the life of the 'City of Zeus' without any other claim on her attention.

'If there is truth in what the philosophers say about the kinship between God and men, is not the moral of this, for us men, that one should do like Socrates and never say, when asked one's nationality, that one is an Athenian or a Corinthian, but always answer that one is a native of the Universe (*κόσμος*)? Why is it that you call yourself an Athenian, instead of calling yourself simply by the name of the corner in which your vile body happened to be deposited at birth? Isn't it obvious that you call yourself an Athenian or a Corinthian because the area that is denoted by the name of Athens or Corinth is intrinsically more important and at the same time comprehends not merely the corner in which you were actually born, but also the whole of your house and, in short, the roots of your family tree? Well, any one who has studied the economy of the Universe will have learnt that the greatest and most important and most comprehensive of all things is this combine of men and God (*σύστημα τὸ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ Θεοῦ*), and he will also have learnt that God has been the source of life not only for my father and for my grandfather, but for everything that comes to life and grows upon the face of the Earth, and particularly for creatures endowed with Reason, since these alone are capable of enjoying a true intercourse with God thanks to the links by which Reason binds them to Him. A man who has learnt this may properly be called a native of the Universe and a son of God.'³

These words of the philosopher-slave Epictetus are echoed by a fellow Stoic who had to reconcile his freedom of the City of

¹ Marcus, *op. cit.*, Book III, chap. 11, quoted already in V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 158, above.

² *Ibid.*, Book IV, chap. 23, quoted already in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 384 and 395, above.

³ Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book I, chap. 9, §§ 1-6.

Zeus with the slavery of being the sovereign of the Roman Empire.

'Live as though you were on a mountain; for it makes no difference being here or there if, wherever one is, the Universe is one's commonwealth. . . . [And] if, when you find yourself approaching your end, you concentrate upon caring for nothing but your higher self and the spark of divinity that is in you . . . then you will be a man who is worthy of the Universe that has begotten you and at least you will no longer be a stranger in your own true native country.'¹

The Hellenic sage whose citizenship of the Universe thus swallowed up his citizenship of Rome or Athens did not make the mistake of imagining that he was thereby being translated from a harder to an easier state of existence.

'All this that you see—this sum of things human and divine—is a unity. It is a vast body of which we are the members. Nature brought us into the World already bound to one another by the ties of kinship, when she fashioned us from the same elements and placed us in the same environment. It was she who planted a mutual love in our hearts and made us social animals. It was she who created Right and Justice. It is by her enactment that it is more painful to inflict injury than to suffer it. Let us obey her command by holding out our hands to those who need our succour. Let us have on our lips and in our heart the line "I am a child of man and there is nothing human which does not touch me".² Let us hold in common what we have, for we have been born [to a common lot]. Our human society is like nothing so much as an arch—which would fall if the stones did not mutually support one another, whereas it actually remains in position just because they do.'³

This exhortation of Seneca's is capped by Epictetus:

'You are a citizen of the Universe and a member of it—and not one of the menial members either, but one of those in authority; for you have the intelligence to follow the divine economy and to work out its sequence. What, then, is the citizen's vocation? It is to have no private interests of his own and to take no action *in vacuo*, but rather to act as one's hand or foot would act if they were reasonable beings with the intelligence to follow the laws of Physiology—for we may be sure that, if they *were* endowed with Reason, these members would yield to no impulse and entertain no desire without reference to the welfare of the whole organism. On this showing, the philosophers are profoundly right in saying that if the man of honour could foresee the future he would be a consenting party to his own sickness and death and disablement, because he would perceive that his personal lot was an integral part of the order of the Universe, and that the whole was more important than the part, and the commonwealth than the citizen.'⁴

This duty of self-surrender to the operation of the laws of the

¹ Marcus, op. cit., Book X, chap. 15, and Book XII, chap. 1.

² This line has already been quoted in this Study in V. C (i) (d) 7, on p. 8, above.—A.J.T.

³ Seneca, L. A.: *Epistolae*, Book XV, Ep. xcv, §§ 52-3.

⁴ Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book II, chap. 9, §§ 3-5.

Commonwealth of the Universe has received a sublime expression in the following adjuration with which Marcus concludes his colloquy with himself:

'Man, you have enjoyed the franchise of this mighty commonwealth; what difference does it make to you whether your term has been five years or three? To be treated in accordance with the law is equitable treatment, however it may work out for the individual. So where is the hardship if you are removed from the commonwealth by the action, not of a tyrant or of an unjust judge, but of Nature herself by whom you were originally introduced. Isn't it just like the actor being given his dismissal from the stage by the public authority that has engaged him? —"But I haven't played my five acts; I have only played three of them!" —Quite true; but then Life happens to be a three-act play. And what constitutes a complete play is a matter for the decision of the power who was once the author of your composition and is now the author of your dissolution—and in neither of these events have *you* any say. So take your departure with a good grace; for he who dismisses you is gracious.'¹

In this passage the Stoic sovereign of the Roman Empire submits himself to the Olympian sovereign of the *Cosmopolis* with the absolute devotion that is doubtless due to the supreme authority in a truly 'totalitarian' state; yet there is an earlier passage in Marcus's meditations in which the philosopher's faith in the existence of a constitution of the Universe seems to falter and throw him back upon a bleak reliance on the self-respect of a self that can look for no support in the Macrocosm.

'The cyclic movements of the Universe repeat themselves, up and down, from aeon to aeon; and one of two alternatives must be the truth. Either the All-Pervading Intelligence takes a fresh initiative each time—and, if that is the truth, it is for you to acquiesce in it—or else It took one primal initiative once for all, and everything else is a consequence of that—in which case, why extenuate yourself? For this would imply a sort of unbroken continuum. It amounts to this, that if God exists all's well with the world, while, if the ultimate reality is something without rhyme or reason, that is no excuse for you to take this chaos for your own standard of behaviour.'²

In these tragic cries we seem to hear the voice of a devoted citizen of the *Cosmopolis* who has suddenly awoken to find that Zeus has absconded from his presidential post and has left his faithful servant to bear the burden of Atlas on his solitary human shoulders. Marcus himself could never have been guilty of such a betrayal. He bore the terrestrial burden of the Roman Principate till he dropped dead under its weight. But Marcus's Christian readers ought not to be too hard on Marcus's Zeus; for Zeus, after

¹ Marcus, *op. cit.*, Book XII, chap. 36.

² *Ibid.*, Book IX, chap. 28.

all, had never asked to be elected president of a cosmic republic; he had started life as the disreputable war-lord of a barbarian war-band; and all that we know about him goes to show that this was the life that he enjoyed. If a Zeus whom the philosophers had belatedly caught and caged was unable to endure an eternity of enforced respectability as the senior inmate of a Stoic reformatory, have we the heart to blame the poor old fellow for proving incorrigible?

NEW ERAS

ONE of the simplest and most natural ways of celebrating an attempt to make a breach with the Present by taking a flying leap into the Future is to inaugurate a 'new era'.

This may be done in formal terms, as when the authors of a new political régime decree that all documents and events are to be dated officially by their subjects as from the Year One of the reigning Government's accession to power. On the other hand a new era may obtain a wide currency, and exert a profound influence upon the *Weltanschauung* of people who have come to think in terms of it, through being adopted by a free consensus without the intervention of any political authority—as, for example, the new era of Hellenic history *post Alexandrum* came to be adopted as the principal landmark in the historical retrospect of most of the post-Alexandrine Greek historians.

Apart from this superficial distinction between an official and a spontaneous origin, new eras can be classified in a more significant way according to the nature of the breach which they commemorate. This breach may be merely the transition from one chapter to the next in the unbroken history of a single society; or it may be one of those sharper and deeper interruptions of continuity that are produced by the impact of one society upon another.¹ In this sphere the inauguration of a new era may celebrate either the experience of conversion to an alien civilization or the still greater spiritual travail of conversion to an alien religion. It may be convenient to consider each of these different kinds of new era separately in an ascending scale measured by the extent of the breach which they celebrate.

The most notorious Western example of the official inauguration of a new era to mark the advent of a new political régime is the substitution, in Revolutionary France, of Years of the Revolution for Years of Our Lord. In our own day this Revolutionary French conceit has been followed by the Fascist Régime in Italy, in curious contradiction with the Fascists' vociferous repudiation of 'the Ideas of 1789', and with an even more curious disregard for the obvious consideration that a French era which remained in currency for so short a span of time is an inauspicious precedent for an Italian régime which boasts itself to be building for Eternity. The experience of an independent nationhood which has not only maintained

¹ The Contact of Civilizations with one another is dealt with in Parts IX and X below.

itself for more than 150 years but has gone in the meantime from strength to strength would give a greater justification to the Government of the United States if it were to decide to-day to date its own official transactions from the year of the Declaration of Independence; and it is a not impossible *tour de force* for a North American historian to begin his unofficial story with the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers—or at any rate with the voyages of Cabot and Columbus—as an Alexandrian or an Antiochene historian, in his place and day, might have begun with the crossing of the Hellespont by Alexander. In Hellenic historiography the new era which starts from Alexander's passage into Asia and destruction of the Achaemenian Empire has its counterpart in another new era which starts from the foundation of a New Rome on the Bosphorus by the Emperor Constantine; and this latter-day Hellenic era *post Constantinopolim conditam*, which remained a landmark for the affiliated Orthodox Christian Society after the Hellenic Society itself had gone into dissolution, has its analogue in a latter-day Sumeric era, *post primam regum Babylonis dynastiam institutam*, which the affiliated Babylonian Society likewise continued to take as its chronological starting-point.

To return to our own society, we shall find that almost any modern Western economic historian—even if he has been born and brought up, not in the New World overseas, but in the European homeland of our civilization—is capable of producing in a medieval quadrangle and under the shadow of a Gothic spire a history purporting to record the economic achievements of Man which will begin with the Industrial Revolution and will ignore all that happened, either in the Western World or elsewhere, before the advent of the so-called 'Machine Age'.¹ In the same futurist spirit a student of the history of modern Western science—or even of modern Western philosophy—may sometimes yield to the temptation to start with the radiation of the North Italian culture into Transalpine Europe at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era.

The unofficial new era, starting *circa* A.D. 1500, which is commonly taken to mark the beginning of the so-called Modern Age of Western history, is on the borderline between the kind of new era which signalizes merely the beginning of a new chapter in the domestic history of a single society and the other, more profoundly 'epoch-making', kind which signalizes the impact of one civilization upon another. The conventionally accepted signal of the

¹ The contrary view that Man's greatest technical triumphs have been his earliest, and not his most recent, has been put forward in this Study in III. C (i) (b), vol. iii, pp. 158-9, above.

beginning of our Modern Age has affinities in two respects with the eras that signalize an impact. In the first place the North Italian culture which radiated out over the Transalpine parts of the Western World at that time was a variation of the Western culture which had differentiated itself on Italian ground—during a period of political insulation which had lasted for some two centuries—to a degree at which the Italians felt and called their Transalpine fellow Westerners ‘barbarians’, while the Transalpine peoples made a silent but eloquent acknowledgement of the Italians’ accomplished superiority in an imitation of Italian ways which in this case was unquestionably the sincerest form of flattery.¹ In the second place this Italian version of the Western culture, which had already surpassed the Transalpine version by its own efforts, was enriching itself still further, by the time when it was radiating abroad, by drawing upon the treasures of the Hellenic culture which had been brought within its reach by a renaissance of classical Latin and Greek letters.² Thus, for Italy herself, the *Quattrocento* introduced a new era which was marked by a contact in the Time-dimension with the defunct Hellenic Society, while, for Transalpine Western Europe, the *Cinquecento* introduced in its turn a new era in which this Italian contact in Time with Hellenism was transmitted to the Transalpine countries through the agency of a contact in the Space-dimension between this Transalpine ruck of Western Christendom and the now superior Western Civilization of contemporary Italy.

Another new era that is likewise on the borderline between a mere beginning of a new chapter of domestic history and a collision between two different civilizations is the Seleucid Era which runs from the October of the year 312 B.C. In the minds of the Seleucidae themselves this era simply commemorated the definitive establishment of the authority of the Dynasty through the triumphal re-entry of Seleucus Nicator into Babylon on the day that was taken as the initial date; and in this aspect the Seleucid Era is comparable to our modern Western eras of the French Revolution or of the Fascist Régime, while it is precisely analogous to the Gupta Era, running from the 26th February, A.D. 320,³ which commemorates the definitive inauguration of the authority of the Gupta Dynasty that eventually re-established the Indic universal state after an interlude of Hellenic and Nomadic intrusion which

¹ See I. B (i), vol. i, p. 19; III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 299-305 and 341-57; and IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, pp. 274-5, above.

² For the correct usage and the popular misuse of the term ‘Renaissance’ see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 275, footnote 1, above.

³ See Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 280.

had followed the premature fall of the Mauryas.¹ In the minds of the Hellenic contemporaries of the Seleucidae, both inside and beyond the frontiers of the Seleucid Empire, the official Seleucid Era probably stood for much the same thing as the unofficial era which ran from Alexander's passage of the Hellespont some twenty-two years before Seleucus Nicator's re-entry into Babylon. Alexander had destroyed the Achaemenian Empire; Seleucus had founded the principal Hellenic 'successor-state' of the Achaemenian Empire in Asia; and either event would serve to mark the sudden vast territorial expansion of the Hellenic World in that generation. For the Hellenes this expansion was a domestic event, though this an outstanding one, in their own Hellenic history. The expansion, however, had been achieved at the Syriac World's expense; and the sudden violent interruption of the continuity of Syriac history through the irruption of an alien Hellenism was the event for which the Seleucid Era stood in the minds of Syriac peoples who continued to reckon by it long after the Seleucid Dynasty itself had passed away.²

This diverse significance of the Seleucid Era in different eyes has an analogue in the history of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan, where the Meiji Era, which runs from the year A.D. 1868 of the Christian Era, commemorates two events that are distinct from one another notwithstanding their close historical association. On the one hand the new Japanese Era commemorates the domestic event of the restoration of the Imperial Dynasty to a position of authority which it had certainly not enjoyed since A.D. 1192,³ and perhaps not since A.D. 858.⁴ On the other hand it commemorates the deliberate 'reception' of the alien civilization of the West—a landmark in the history of the contact between the Far Eastern and the Western culture which eclipses in importance the domestic Japanese political revolution that was one of its corollaries.

The corresponding 'reception' of the Western Civilization in the Russian province of the Orthodox Christian World at a date about

¹ For the role of the Guptas in Indic history see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 85, above. The inaugural date of the Gupta Era anticipates the actual foundation of the Gupta Empire (as distinct from the embryonic Gupta principality) by about thirty years, and the expansion of this empire to the dimensions of a universal state by about seventy years (see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 189-90, above).

² The Seleucid Era was not only widely adopted but was also widely imitated by dynasties and commonwealths which, instead of taking over the Seleucid Era itself, preferred to institute rival eras of their own (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, part (1), 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 241; Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 359).

³ The date of Yoritomo's formal appointment to the new office of Shogun after his substitution of a Minamoto for a Taira military ascendancy in the Revolution of A.D. 1183-5 and his simultaneous removal of the seat of the *de facto* government of Japan from Kyoto to Kamakura.

⁴ The date of the establishment of the ascendancy of the House of Fujiwara over the Imperial Government at Kyoto.

two centuries and three-quarters in advance of its 'reception' in Japan is not commemorated in any official era; yet the reign of the Emperor Meiji is not a more epoch-making period in the history of Japan than the reign of the Tsar Peter the Great in the history of Russia; and, if we wish to date the beginning of the new age of Westernization in Russia from some particular year, we have several choices at our disposal.¹ We can choose the year A.D. 1689, which is the date, not of the official beginning of Peter's reign, but of his actual advent to power; or we can choose the 16th May, 1703, which is the date of the beginning of the building of St. Petersburg. The foundation of St. Petersburg by Peter was a symbolic act of the same significance as the foundation of Constantinople by Constantine. The Roman Emperor who had made it his mission to convert the Hellenic World to Christianity built himself a new capital which was to be Christian from the start;² and a new capital which was to be Western from the start was built, in pursuance of corresponding considerations of statecraft, by the Muscovite Tsar who had made it his mission to westernize all the Russias.

The conversion of a society to an alien religion is the third type of epoch-making event that is apt to find expression in the inauguration of a new era. A new era commemorating the conversion of the Hellenic World to Christianity would most naturally be dated from some event in the career of Constantine the Great—though it might be difficult to select one single event for the purpose, since Constantine's establishment of Christianity as *the*—or *an*—official religion of the Roman state was (like the Emperor's own personal adoption of Christianity) a gradual and perhaps never quite completed process and not either an abrupt or a 'totalitarian' act.³ Constantine's career was indeed regarded, as Alexander's had been regarded, by later generations as a landmark in Hellenic history which virtually amounted to a new beginning. But this unofficial consensus of feeling was not given expression in the establishment of a Constantinian Era; and after the break-up of the Roman Empire and the concomitant dissolution of the Hellenic

¹ We should be less in doubt if we had to choose a date for the inauguration of the Communist régime under which, in our own day, the process of Westernization, begun by Peter the Great, is being carried forward with incomparably greater intensity in the territories inherited from the defunct Muscovite Empire by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We should have little hesitation in dating our Bolshevik Era from the seizure of power in Petrograd by Peter's authentic successor Lenin on the 7th November (New Style, which is the 25th October, Old Style), 1917.

² On this point Constantine's purpose was only partially achieved; for the newly laid out city that was officially dedicated by its Imperial founder to Christ admitted into its precincts the pagan worship of the Goddess Tychê (see V. C (i) (d) 4, vol. v, p. 413, footnote 6, above).

³ This is clearly brought out by Professor N. H. Baynes in *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church* (London 1929, Milford).

Society the event that stood out the most prominently in retrospect to Christians belonging to new societies that were Christian from the start was not the conversion of the Hellenic World to Christianity in the reign of the Roman Emperor Constantine but the revelation of Christianity itself through the Incarnation of Christ. Accordingly, the era which gained currency in Western Christendom from the post-Hellenic interregnum onwards was an era which took for its initial date the supposed year of the birth of Jesus; but it is noteworthy that this practice of reckoning by years of the Christian Era has prevailed only in Western Christendom, where the evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire has been a fiasco and the renaissance of Hellenic letters has been tardy. In Orthodox Christendom, where a ghost of the Roman Empire was effectively evoked and Hellenic learning effectively reborn in the eighth century of the Christian Era,¹ civil servants continued to date by fiscal 'Indictions'² and historians by 'Years of the World'. In the Orthodox and the other non-Western Christendoms the reckoning by Years of the Christian Era has eventually been introduced as an automatic—and ironical—consequence of their capitulation to the culture of a Western Society which has itself ceased to be intrinsically Christian³ without having taken the trouble to remove the traditional Christian imprint from its official calendar.

We have still to mention a new era which purports to signalize a greater new departure in the way of life on Earth than any of those that we have passed in review so far, and that is the Advent—or, in the Christian version of the belief, the Second Coming⁴—of a supernatural saviour who is to inaugurate a Millennium of life which will still be a life on this Earth and in the flesh, but a life to be lived under unprecedented and unimaginable conditions of righteousness and felicity. This belief, in which the beginning of the new age is not equated with some already accomplished events⁵

¹ For this momentous divergence between the respective courses of events in Western and in Orthodox Christendom from the eighth century onwards see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, pp. 320–408, with Annexes II and III, above.

² i.e. periodical tax-assessments.

³ For the metamorphosis of a once Western Christian Society into a merely Western Society at the beginning of the Modern Age of our Western history see I. B (iii), vol. i, p. 34, above, and Part VII, below. The neutral word 'metamorphosis' can be interpreted to mean either purification or sterilization according to the interpreter's 'ideological' bias; but it can hardly be denied that the process has been, whether for better or for worse, some kind of 'boiling-down' or 'Bowdlerization' which has had the effect of turning thick soup into thin.

⁴ This concept of a Second Coming has been examined in III. C (ii) (b), Annex I, vol. iii, pp. 462–5, above.

⁵ In another context (V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), in the present volume, pp. 129–32, above) it has been suggested that the expectation of a Millennium is apt, in the historical sequence of ideas, to arise as a middle term between the expectation of an entirely mundane futurist kingdom and the expectation of the *Civitas Dei*. In the history of Judaism, at a stage when Jewry was still tempted to follow the will-o'-the-wisp of a mundane Messiah, the year 142 B.C., in which the Hasmonaean anti-Seleucid insurgent Simon

but is discerned in the future by the eye of Faith, seems to be a Zoroastrian idea which Judaism has borrowed and handed on to Christianity.¹ We need not attempt to analyse it in this place, since we have examined it already in another context.²

Maccabaeus succeeded in establishing the ephemeral Hasmonaean 'successor-state' of the Seleucid Empire, was taken as the initial date for a new era in which Jewry was to reckon by the years of the Messianic Kingdom which the Hasmonaean principality was blindly assumed by its partisans to be (see von Gall, A.: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), pp. 388-9).

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 43, footnote 4, above.

² In V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), in the present volume, pp. 129-32, above.

ANNEX I TO V. C (i) (d) 11

‘ARISTOPHANES’ FANTASY OF CLOUDCUCKOOLAND’

IN the chapters¹ to which this Annex attaches, we have studied in succession four alternative ways of trying to escape from the Present which suggest themselves to souls that are being excruciated by the agonizing experience of living in a society that is in process of disintegration. In these chapters we have concerned ourselves mainly with the points of difference between these diverse inward reactions to a single supreme social challenge. We have observed the contrast between the two ways—Archaism and Futurism—which are attempts to escape from the Present without abandoning the plane of mundane life, and the other two—Detachment and Transfiguration—which recognize and act upon the truth that the only possibility of genuinely escaping from the Present lies in renouncing This World altogether and migrating into a different spiritual clime.² Again, we have observed the contrast between the three ways—Archaism, Futurism, and Detachment—which are so many variations upon an act of sheer withdrawal, and the fourth way—Transfiguration—which is an act of withdrawal-and-return.³ There is, however, one feature, common to all four ways, which we have so far taken for granted, and this is that all four are apt to be pursued (to judge by our survey up to this point) with a uniform earnestness which is as tragically intense as the challenge of social disintegration is pitilessly importunate. This last feature perhaps demands further consideration; for, as a matter of historical fact, the importunity of the challenge is not of one constant degree from beginning to end of the process. The long descent that leads from the first breakdown of a society to its final dissolution is not only gradual but is not even continuous; the routs are punctuated by rallies;⁴ and a spiritual pressure which in the end becomes intolerable is not imposed upon the Soul in its full force at the outset, but is the cumulative product of successive turns of a social screw. On this showing, we might expect *a priori* to find that the earnestness of the reaction which the pressure evokes in its victims takes time, like the pressure itself, to arrive at its maximum; and this expectation seems to be borne out by the actual history—which has been reserved for examination in this Annex—of one particular idea,

¹ V. C (i) (d) 8-11, above.

² For this contrast see V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 394, and V. C (i) (e), in the present volume, pp. 169-70, above. ³ See V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 149, and V. C (i) (e), pp. 170-2, above.

⁴ The movement of Rout-and-Rally in the disintegrations of civilizations has been examined in V. C (ii) (b), *passim*, above.

expressing the will to escape, which eventually came to inspire a grimly earnest political movement and a raptly earnest religious one, but which made its first recorded appearance on the stage of history as a *jeu d'esprit*.

When Saint Paul exclaimed that the Christ Crucified whom he was preaching was foolishness in the sight of the Greeks who seek after wisdom,¹ he was almost certainly not aware of the literalness of the sense in which these words were true, for he was almost certainly unconscious of the historical chain of associated ideas which linked the Tarsian Apostle's own faith with a fantasy that had germinated in the fertile imagination of the Athenian dramatist Aristophanes more than four hundred and fifty years back—in the first generation of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles'. The links of this chain hang together, nevertheless, without a break; for Christ Crucified is the King of the Kingdom of God; the Kingdom of God is more commonly known in the New Testament by the name of the Kingdom of Heaven; and the Kingdom of Heaven was introduced by Aristophanes to his Attic audience in the guise of 'Nephelococcygia' or 'Clouducuckooland'—a city of refuge in which the citizens are neither gods nor men but birds.

Aristophanes' *Birds* was produced at the Great Dionysia in the spring of the year 414 B.C.; and this was a critical moment in Hellenic history; for the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization, which had been heralded by the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C., and had then seemed for a moment to have been averted after all by the patching-up of a peace in 421 B.C., had been made irretrievable by the sailing of an Athenian armada to Sicily in the summer of 415 B.C., just before the play was composed. The atmosphere in which the *Birds* was written and produced was therefore tense; and at the same time the tension was not yet of the agonizing degree to which it afterwards swiftly rose when the Peloponnesians occupied Decelea in the following spring and when the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily was annihilated in the following autumn. In the spring of 414 B.C. the *malaise* in Athenian souls was already sufficiently uncomfortable to give topical interest to 'a play of escape', but not yet sufficiently disturbing to warrant any suggestion that there could be anything in this idea of an escape except an entertaining fantasy. The play appears to be innocent of any direct allusion to current military and political events;² but it is studded with words and phrases and

¹ 1 Cor. i. 22-3, quoted in V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 150, above.

² This feature of the *Birds* is commented upon as follows by a modern Western connoisseur of the Attic drama:

'It does seem strange that the poet should have had this successful pursuit of a great kingdom in the clouds staged just at the time when, as Thucydides and Plutarch tell us, Athens was going mad after a kingdom in the west almost as cloudy, and yet should have

incidents that have an historical significance and a consequent emotional timbre for latter-day readers which they cannot have had for a playwright and an audience who were deliberately playing the fool and who were able to enjoy themselves with an unfeigned light-heartedness in that spring of 414 B.C. because they were mercifully unaware of the calamities that were in store for their own generation next year and for succeeding generations throughout the next four centuries. In echoing down the steep of a Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' these incidents and phrases and words that were contrived and coined by Aristophanes and were received by his Athenian countrymen and contemporaries as a delectable piece of deliberate foolishness have called forth unintended and portentous reverberations; and, if we look and listen, we may hear Aristophanes' nonsensical phrases turn into political and religious watchwords, and see his farcical incidents reproduce themselves as acts of high tragedy played out on the stage of 'real life'.

If we wish to assist at a dramatic performance that lasted four or five hundred years instead of the few hours that it took to play the *Birds* in 414 B.C., we may find it convenient first to remind ourselves of Aristophanes' plot and then to follow out its traces along two of the historic lines of escape from the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles'—in one direction along the violent political line of Futurism, and in another direction along the non-political and non-violent line of approach to a spiritual Transfiguration of This World through its irradiation with the light of the Kingdom of God.

The plot of Aristophanes' play is the recapture by the Birds, under the leadership of a human being, of 'the Kingdom' of the Universe which had belonged to the Birds originally before the Gods usurped it.

The Birds' sharp-witted human leader in this brilliantly successful *coup d'état* is a truant citizen of Athens, Peithetaerus ('Mr. Plausible'); and the opening of the play discovers him, in the company of his compatriot Euelpides ('Mr. Hopefulson'), making

intended no particular political reference. Nevertheless it is impossible to discover any direct allusion, or even any clear attitude towards the schemes for the conquest of Sicily and Carthage. It cannot be an intentional encouragement of them, yet on the other hand it does not read like satire. It seems to be just an "escape" from worry and the sordidness of life, away into the land of sky and clouds and poetry. If people want a cloud empire, here is a better one! (Murray, Gilbert: *Aristophanes: A Study* (Oxford 1933, Clarendon Press), chap. 6: 'The Plays of Escape' (*Birds*), pp. 155-6).

In the Athenian mood of the year and the day (which was a holiday in a year of anxiety but not of disaster) a direct allusion to the hazardous military adventure on which Athens was at that moment staking her political fortunes might have been irritatingly unwelcome to Aristophanes' audience. And we may perhaps discern in the playwright's choice of subject for the Great Dionysia of 414 B.C. the same tact which he afterwards showed in taking the even more pointedly non-political theme of the *Frogs* for a play that was to be produced at the Lenaea of 405 B.C., on the gloomy morrow of Arginusae and eve of Aegospotami.

tracks from an Athens which is not that tragic City of Destruction from which Christian flees at the outset of the Pilgrim's Progress, but a ridiculous City of Botheration in which a fellow never has a moment's peace from summonses and demand-notes. The trek-ers are looking for a new home on some soft spot where they can be sure of a quiet life (ll. 27-48 and 121-2); they apply to the hoopoe on the chance that he may happen to know of such a place (ll. 114-22); and, when he fails to make any helpful suggestion, Peithetaerus himself is struck by a bright idea. Why should not the Birds exploit their air-power as the Athenians have exploited their sea-power? The Birds are masters of the clouds and heaven, and this area is the strategic key to the command of the Universe. If the Birds now found and fortify a city here they will have Mankind at their mercy—'like insects' (l. 185)—and will be able to 'do in' the Gods; for they will be able to intercept the sweet savour of sacrifice on its way from Earth to Olympus and so to starve the Olympians into surrender as the Melians had been starved out in 416 B.C. by an Athenian naval blockade (ll. 162-93 and 550-637). No sooner said than done. The heavenly city—for which Peithetaerus invents (ll. 809-25) the name of 'Cloucduckooland' ('Nephelococcygia')—is duly built (ll. 1122-63);¹ the air-lines along which the savour of sacrifice has been wont to ascend from Earth to Olympus are duly cut (ll. 1514-24); and the Gods are quickly forced into a capitulation by this hostile exercise of a veritable 'power of the air'.² In return for the raising of the aerial blockade they have to agree to hand back to the Birds the sceptre which Zeus has usurped, and also to hand over 'the Queen' (*Βασίλειᾶ*)³ to the Birds' *ci-devant* human leader Peithetaerus. In implementation of the terms Peithetaerus ascends to Olympus and returns to 'Cloucduckooland' with Zeus' thunderbolt in his hand and 'the Queen' on his arm in the shape of a buxom bride (ll. 1535-41 and 1713-14). The closing scene is a marriage-feast, and in the last two lines of the play the chorus hails the happy bridegroom as a conquering hero and a God of Gods.

Τῆνέλλα καλλίνικος, ὦ
δαιμόνων ὑπέρτατε.

'Who is the Queen?' Peithetaerus asks when Prometheus gives him the 'tip' to insist on the surrender not only of Zeus' sceptre but

¹ Unlike the never-to-be-completed lines of circumvallation with which an Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily was trying to cut the land-communications of Syracuse at the very moment when the *Birds* was being acted under the lee of the Acropolis of Athens.

² . . . τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ αἵρος—Eph. ii. 2.

³ *Sic* (as the scansion shows): *Βασίλειᾶ*, not *Βασιλείᾶ*, and therefore 'Queen', not 'Sovereignty' or 'Kingdom' (Sheppard, T. J., in *Fasciculus Joanni Willis Clark Dicatus* (Cambridge 1909, University Press), p. 532).

of 'the Queen' as well. Prometheus' answer is that she is 'a lovely girl who keeps in her store-cupboard Zeus' thunderbolt and the rest of his bag of tricks: statesmanship, law-and-order, discretion, naval bases, vituperation, tithe-collector, and dole' (ll. 1537-41). And, though this answer may leave us still guessing,¹ we can at any rate identify the kingdom over which this Queen from Heaven has come down to reign. This Aristophanic caricature is the first appearance in Hellenic dress of a kingdom that is not of This World. If we follow the fortunes of the idea through the subsequent chapters of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles', we shall find it assuming two forms—one political and the other religious—which both agree in taking Aristophanes' jest in earnest but otherwise differ from one another *toto caelo*.

In the political line of evolution the first step—which took rather more than a century—was the metamorphosis of the 'Cloud-cuckooland' which had been a poet's conceit into a 'Kingdom of Heaven' which was the Utopia of a pair of scholars. One of these scholars, Euhemerus, was the protégé, and the other, Alexarchus, was the brother, of the post-Alexandrine war-lord Cassander (*in Macedonia dominabatur* 316-298 B.C.). Cassander's protégé had to be content with describing his Utopia in a book in which Heaven (Uranus) figured as the first founder of an oecumenical empire.² Cassander's brother was able to command the means of bringing the Kingdom of Heaven down to Earth by setting up in real life an oecumenical empire on a miniature scale. On a patch of ground, given to him by Cassander, at the neck of the Athos Peninsula,³ Alexarchus built and peopled—for all the world like Peithetaerus in the play—a model city-state which was to be a practical sample

¹ Mr. Sheppard, *op. cit.*, pp. 533-4, points out that the festival of the Great Dionysia, at which the *Birds* was produced, followed only a few weeks after the festival of the Anthesteria, in which the principal rite was a sacred marriage between the god Dionysus himself and a mortal woman who was 'the Queen' (in this case not *Βασίλισσα* but *Βασίλισσα*) in virtue of being the wife of the King Archon (a ghost of a long since vanished authentic kingship which lingered on to perform the ritual functions of a Rex Sacrifculus). Mr. Sheppard further points out that the Anthesteria, in their turn, were preceded by a festival in which the principal rite was a sacred marriage between Zeus and Hera. Thus, at the season of the Great Dionysia, sacred marriages were in the air. Mr. Sheppard's conclusion (*op. cit.*, p. 540) is that 'Peithetairos . . . recalls to the audience Zeus, with a touch of Dionysus. Basileia recalls the Basilissa, not without a touch of Hera. The whole scene is at once a reminder of two brilliant functions of Athenian ritual, and, in itself, to the superstitious an effectual ceremony for the prosperity of Athens and the fertilizing of the crops'.

² Tarn, W. W.: *Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind* (London 1933, Milford), p. 24.

³ The site bore traces of a ship-canal which had been dug, some two hundred years back, at the command of the Achaemenid Emperor Xerxes in order to give passage to his fleet in a campaign which was to make the Achaemenian Empire literally oecumenical by bringing the Hellenic World under the dominion to which the Syriac and Babylonian worlds and portions of the Egyptian and Indic worlds were already subject. In the immediate neighbourhood the tangle of sea-girt, tree-clad hills between the isthmus and the mountain was one day to harbour a confederation of Christian monasteries of the Basilian Order in which Alexarchus's experiment was to be practised upon the *Civitas Dei*.

of the ideal world-commonwealth; and he called this city 'Urano-polis' ('the Heavenly City') and its citizens 'Uranidae' ('the Children of Heaven').¹

Iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto!²

The title which Alexarchus conferred upon himself in his role of ruler of this Heavenly City was not 'Heaven' but 'the Sun';³ and the constitution of the Solar City was set out—in a Utopia-on-Paper which became only less famous than Euhemerus's work—by Iambulus, a social theorist who may have been a younger contemporary of Euhemerus and Alexarchus, though we know no more than that he wrote at some date between 290 and 132 B.C.⁴ In Iambulus's hands the Kingdom-not-of-this-World was dragged out of the scholar's study into the arena of political controversy; for Iambulus's 'Heliopolis' was a Utopia that was classless and communistic.⁵ The last step was to translate this egalitarian ideal into real life; and the experiment was duly made. The reason why we know that Iambulus's book must have been written before the year 132 B.C. is that this was the date of the desperately serious attempt of Aristonicus of Pergamum to set up in Western Anatolia a revolutionary proletarian commonwealth which its would-be founder inaugurated under the name of 'Heliopolis' and doubtless intended to build up on the pattern of the imaginary Solar City of Iambulus.⁶ Thus the Heavenly Kingdom which had been staged as a joke by Aristophanes at Athens in 414 B.C. was fought for to the death in Asia, 282 years later, by the last of the Attalids. In Aristonicus's hands, however, blood and iron did not show themselves to be such efficacious materials for empire-building as they were one day to prove in Bismarck's; for in 132 B.C. the 'strong man armed' was quickly overcome by 'a stronger than he'.⁷ Aristonicus's callow Pergamene 'Heliopolis' succumbed to the overwhelming power of Rome;⁸ and that was the miserable end of 'Cloudeuckoo-land's' audacious descent into the arena of futurist politics.

¹ Tarn, op. cit., pp. 21–2. Alexarchus's experiment on the Athos Peninsula must have been a 'going concern' at the moment when it gave birth to a daughter city-state of the same name in Pamphylia (Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 12).

² Virgil: *Eclogues*, No. IV, l. 7.

³ Tarn, *Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind*, pp. 22–3. According to Bidez, J.: *La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil chez les Stoïciens* (Paris 1932, Les Belles Lettres), pp. 32–4, this role of the Sun-God was of Oriental provenance, and was imported into the Hellenic *Weltanschauung* by Zeno of Citium's disciple Cleanthes of Assos.

⁴ Tarn, op. cit., pp. 9–10.

⁵ See Tarn, op. cit., loc. cit.; Bidez, op. cit., pp. 37–9; and the present Study, V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 69, 70, 82, footnote 4, and 180; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 384; and V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 692, footnote 2, above.

⁶ Tarn, op. cit., pp. 9–10. Tarn dates the outbreak of Aristonicus's insurrection 133 B.C., not 132 B.C.

⁷ Luke xi. 21–2.

⁸ See IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, p. 507; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 69–70 and 179–82; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 384; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 692, footnote 2; and V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), in the present volume, p. 126, above.

When we turn from Politics to Religion we shall be struck by certain correspondences between the *Birds* and the New Testament which are perhaps sufficiently numerous and remarkable to raise the question whether they are fortuitous assonances or the vestiges of a chain of literary tradition of which nothing now happens to survive except the beginning and the end.¹

The point of correspondence which we may do well to examine first, because it is the point which is of the greatest intrinsic importance, is the assertion—made in both these contexts—that a man is God. In the *Birds*, as we have seen,² this claim is made for Peithetaerus by the chorus; in the Gospels it is made for Jesus both by Peter³ and by Jesus himself;⁴ and, if Aristophanes gives this piece of ‘foolishness’ a place of honour as the crowning joke of his play, that is no doubt because his Attic audience agreed with the Jewish High Priest in feeling such a claim to be the last word in blasphemy.⁵ Thus the formal elements of the incident in the Gospels and in the *Birds* are the same—however profound the difference in spirit and meaning and outcome between the comic scene in the theatre at Athens, where the blasphemously deified protagonist is carried off the stage in mock triumph, and the tragic trial in the High Priest’s palace at Jerusalem, in which the prisoner who declares himself to be the Son of God is condemned to death and led away to execution.⁶

The imagery in which Jesus is represented in the Gospels as making his claim to divinity is taken, of course, from the thirteenth

¹ The possibility that such a tradition may have propagated itself—without being uninterruptedly conscious and uniformly deliberate—by allowing itself, at some stage, to drift, for part of its way, down the primitive mental stream of ‘folk-memory’, is examined in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, pp. 438–64, below. Whatever the channel or the means of conveyance, it is at any rate certain that, somehow or other, the *motifs* of Attic works of literature written before the end of the fifth century B.C. did sometimes find their way, *post Alexandrum*, into works of Oriental literature and did thereby succeed in giving a new Hellenic turn to old Oriental tales. A conspicuous case in point is the infusion of the Hippolytus-and-Phaedra *motif* into the traditional Jewish story of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife as this is retold in *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* and in the *Antiquities* of Josephus (see Braun, Martin: *Griechischer Roman und Hellenistische Geschichtsschreibung* (Frankfurt a. M. 1934, Klostermann), pp. 23–117, and eundem: *History and Romance in Graeco-Oriental Literature* (Oxford 1938, Blackwell), pp. 44–95).

² See p. 349, above.

³ Matt. xvi. 16 = John vi. 69: ‘Thou art he/that Christ, the Son of the Living God.’ In the corresponding passages in the other two Gospels the claim is not to divinity but only to Messiahhood (Mark viii. 29 = Luke ix. 20); and, according to the orthodox Jewish belief, the concepts of Messiahhood and divinity are mutually exclusive (see V. C (i) (d) 9 (7), *passim*, and V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 163, footnote 1, above).

⁴ Matt. xxvi. 63–4 (anticipated in xxiv. 30, and in xvi. 28); Mark xiv. 61–2 (anticipated in xiii. 26, and in ix. 1); Luke xxii. 69–70 (anticipated in ix. 26–7).

⁵ At the time when the *Birds* was produced at Athens there were still ten more years (*sed quales!*) to run before Lysander (an unknown name in 414 B.C.) was to enjoy at Samos the distinction of being the first of the Hellenes to be given divine honours (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (8), Annex, vol. v, p. 648, above).

⁶ The *motif* of mock-acceptance of a claim which the mockery stigmatizes as preposterous does, of course, occur in the story of the Passion. But the claim which is burlesqued in the crown of thorns and the purple robe is not the claim to be God but the claim to be the Lord’s Anointed King.

and fourteenth verses of the seventh chapter of the Book of Daniel, in which the Zoroastrian conception of the coming of the Saošyant—the saviour whose superhuman yet also less than divine status is indicated in his title of ‘the Son of Man’¹—has been seized upon by a Jewish poet-publicist, writing *circa* 166–164 B.C., as a vehicle for the expression of Jewry’s hopes of mundane salvation in its desperate resistance to the high-handed Hellenism of Antiochus Epiphanes.² Yet, although the idea by which Jesus’s claim is inspired may thus be of Zoroastrian origin, the key words both of the imagery in the Book of Daniel and of the narrative in the Gospels are words which are also to be found in a cento of quotations from the *Birds*.

The passage in the Book of Daniel (vii. 13–14) runs as follows:

‘Behold, one like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven (ἐπὶ τῶν νεφελῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ) and came to the Ancient of Days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion (ἐξουσία).’

The passage in the Gospel according to Saint Mark (xiv. 61–4) runs as follows:

‘The High Priest asked him and said unto him: “Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?” And Jesus said: “I am—and ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power (τῆς δυνάμεως) and coming in the clouds of heaven (μετὰ τῶν νεφελῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ).” Then the High Priest rent his clothes and saith: “What need we any further witnesses? Ye have heard the blasphemy”.’³

The passages in the *Birds* which this passage in the Gospel calls to mind are the following:

Peithetaerus: ‘I spy a great *coup* which the Birds can bring off, and a way of getting power (δύναμιν), if only you do what I tell you.’ (ll. 162–3.)

Peithetaerus: ‘Did you see anything?’—*Hoopoe*: ‘Just the clouds and heaven (τὰς νεφέλας γὰρ καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν).’—*Peithetaerus*: ‘Well, isn’t that the fairway of the Birds?’ (ll. 178–9.)

Peithetaerus: ‘Well, what name shall we give our city then?’—*Chorus*: ‘Some utterly vacuous name which we will take from the clouds and from the supernal regions.’—*Peithetaerus*: ‘Will “Cloudcuckooland” do for you? . . . It is the same as the Phlegraean Plain—the place where the

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), pp. 126 and 130–1, and V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 163, footnote 1, above.

² For Antiochus Epiphanes’ policy of forcible Hellenization see V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), pp. 103–5, above.

³ In the corresponding passage according to Saint Matthew (xxvi. 63–5) the Marcan text is reproduced in substance (including, in particular, all the words that have been quoted above in the original Greek, except that the Marcan *μετὰ* is here replaced by the Danielic *ἐπὶ*). In the corresponding passage according to Saint Luke (xxii. 66–71) ‘the right hand of the power of God’ has been retained but the ‘coming in the clouds of heaven’ has been omitted.

Gods took on the Giants, and walked away from them, in a competition in false pretences.' (ll. 817-19 and 824-5.)

Chorus (to Peithetaerus): 'O God of Gods' (ll. 1764-5.)

If these correspondences are not to be dismissed as a fortuitous concourse of accidents, but are to be taken as evidence for some chain of literary reminiscence which runs (through however many missing links and altered meanings) from Aristophanes' *Birds* to the Book of Daniel and thence to the Gospels, then we may see in the change of connotation that has come over the word 'power' *en route*¹ an example of the working of the principle of 'etherialization'.² And this may recall a passage from the Gospel according to Saint Matthew (vi. 26) which we have quoted already in our examination of that principle at an earlier point in this Study.³

'Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap nor gather into barns (*ἀποθήκας*); yet your heavenly father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?'

The first of the three points that are made in this passage of the Gospel—namely, the point that a bird's life is happy in being care-free—is also made in the following passage of Aristophanes' play:

Euelpides: 'And what is life like here—this life that one leads among the Birds?'—*Hoopoe:* 'It is not without charm when you come to try it. Well, first you have to live without a purse.'—*Euelpides:* 'And that at one stroke takes half the falsity out of life.'—*Hoopoe:* 'And then we browse in gardens on white sesame-grains and myrtle-berries and poppy-seed and cress.'—*Euelpides:* 'You seem to live like a bridal pair on honeymoon.' (ll. 155-61.)

A comparison of the two passages shows that, while an identical idea is the theme of both of them, this idea is not expressed in identical words or even in identical illustrations; and in this case, as in the other which we have just examined, it is possible to point out passages of Jewish literature which are older than the Gospel—though not older than *Birds*⁴—from which the Gospel may have

¹ This change in the meaning of the Greek word *δύναμις* from the sense of 'military power' to that of 'divine power' is recorded not only in the vocabulary of Christianity but also in that of the abortive contemporary religion of the Samaritan Simon Magus (see V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 685, footnote 3, above), of whom it was asserted by his worshippers that *οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ μεγάλη* (Acts viii. 10).

² For this principle see III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, pp. 174-92, above.

³ In III. C (i) (c), vol. iii, p. 191. In that place the chapter of the Gospel has been wrongly cited as vii instead of vi.

⁴ The Book of Job is at any rate not older than the *Birds*, though its date of composition is on any hypothesis sufficiently early to make it unlikely that any Hellenic influences should have found their way into it. On the other hand, as far as the question of date goes, there would not be the same *a priori* unlikelihood of Hellenic influences being traceable in the Psalms.

been borrowing. The variant of the same parable in the Gospel according to Saint Luke (xii. 24) runs:

‘Consider the ravens; for they neither sow nor reap—which neither have storehouse (ταμείον) nor barn (ἀποθήκη); and God feedeth them. How much more are ye better than the fowls?’

And this version, in which the theme is enunciated with reference, not to birds in general, but to birds of one particular kind, has at least two antecedents in the Jewish scriptures:

‘He giveth to the beast his food, and to the young ravens which cry’ (Psalm cxlvii, verse 9);

and

‘Who provideth for the raven his food? When his young ones cry unto God, they wander for lack of meat’ (Job xxxviii. 41).

These two passages not only agree with the passage in Luke, and differ from the passage in the *Birds*, in speaking of ravens in particular and not of birds in general; they further differ from the *Birds*, while agreeing this time not only with Luke but with Matthew as well, in the point that they make. They do not remark, as both Aristophanes and the Gospels do, that the birds obtain their livelihood without having to practise the rational and provident but, by the same token, anxious economy which is Man’s characteristic way of earning his living; but they do declare, as the Gospels do but Aristophanes does not, that this enviable insouciance is practicable for the birds because their food is provided for them by God. On this showing, the passage in the Gospels can be at least partially accounted for as a derivative from Jewish sources; and, if this were all, the point of correspondence between the Gospels and the *Birds* which has no counterpart in the Old Testament might conceivably be dismissed as a freak of Chance. We have, however, to take into account another passage of pagan Hellenic literature which is unmistakably related to the passage in the Gospels by a literary kinship which is distinctly closer than that which links the Gospels in this instance to the Book of Job and to the Hundred and Forty-Seventh Psalm; and that is a passage from one of the works of Gaius Musonius Rufus, a Stoic philosopher who was a contemporary of the authors of the two Gospels here in question.¹

This passage of Musonius is a fragment of a dialogue between a Stoic sage and a lay inquirer. The layman is putting the difficulties

¹ On the assumption that the Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Luke were written (as is argued by Eduard Meyer in his *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 239) at some date after the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and before the persecution of the Church, *imperante Domitiano*, in A.D. 95.

that deter him from responding to the philosopher's serious call to a detached and blissful life, and the philosopher is trying to resolve the layman's doubts.

Layman: 'That is all very well; but I am a poor man—financially destitute—and I have a swarm of children. Where am I going to find the means to bring them up?'—*Philosopher*: 'Well, how do these little birds that are much more destitute than you are—the swallows and nightingales and larks and blackbirds—manage to bring up *their* young? Homer, too, has something to say about that: "And as a bird proffers a morsel, when at last she gets one, to her unfledged young, though she is sore an hungred herself . . ."'¹ Are these creatures superior to Man in intelligence? The question can only be answered in the negative. Well, are they superior in physical strength? The answer is in the negative *a fortiori*. Well, do the birds store (*ἀποτίθεται*) food and hoard it?'²

It will be seen that, in contrast to Aristophanes, Musonius not only propounds the same theme as the Gospels, but also propounds it in the self-same words and images (e.g. Musonius's *ἀποτίθεται* corresponds to the *ἀποθήκη* of both Gospels, and his *φυλάσσει* to the *ταμείον* of the Gospel according to Saint Luke). And a still more striking proof of literary kinship is the fact that the text of Musonius contains two of the three points that are made in the Gospels, whereas the passage in the *Birds* and the pair of passages from the Book of Job and from the Hundred and Forty-Seventh Psalm only contain one of these points apiece. The three points are as follows: (α) the Birds manage to live without practising a human economy;³ (β) they manage this because their food is given them by God; (γ) if the birds can manage it, then we human beings, who are so much their superiors, can certainly manage it *a fortiori*. Of these three points, (α) is common to the Gospels and the *Birds* and Musonius; (β) is common to the Gospels and

¹ *Iliad*, Book IX, ll. 323-4.—A.J.T.

² This passage of Musonius will be found in *The Rendel Harris Papyri* of Woodbrooke College, Birmingham, edited by Powell, J. E. (Cambridge 1936, University Press), Part I, No. 1, pp. 4-5. Before the discovery of the papyrus containing this text, the whole of that portion of the fragment which has been quoted above, save for the opening words 'That is all very well', was unknown to modern Western scholarship; for these words were the last in the extract that had been handed down by a continuous literary tradition. The text of the fragment in this already known shorter form, in which the parable of the birds is not included, will be found in O. Hense's edition of Musonius (Leipzig 1905, Teubner), Fragment No. XVA, pp. 78-9. The identity of this already known fragment with the papyrus text, in which the name of the author was missing, was first pointed out by Mr. M. P. Charlesworth; and it was also he who drew the attention of the writer of this Study to the Jewish pedigree of the ravens in Luke xii. 24.

³ This point (α) is also made—apropos, not of the birds of the air, but of the beasts of the field—in Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 228-34; but the Epicurean poet uses this *locus communis* as an argument *against* points (β) and (γ) and *not* in favour of them. The ability of the animals to grow up and live their lives without apparatus, in contrast to the helplessness of the puling human babe, proves the thesis (enunciated *ibid.*, ll. 198-9):

nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
naturam rerum: tanta stat praedita culpa.

the pair of passages from the Old Testament; (γ) is common to the Gospels and Musonius. Thus Musonius not only has one point in common with the Gospels that is not to be found in either Aristophanes or the Old Testament: he also has a second point in common with the Gospels which is not to be found in the Old Testament but *is* to be found in Aristophanes (though it is to be noticed that in this point Musonius comes less close to Aristophanes than he comes to the Gospels, since there is some community of imagery and vocabulary between him and the Gospels, but not between him and Aristophanes).

The exact literary relation between these several passages of Christian and Hellenic and Jewish literature is perhaps impossible to trace out with any certainty. Since Musonius and the authors of the Gospels appear to have been contemporaries, it is theoretically conceivable—in the absence of evidence for determining the exact dates of publication of their respective works—that Musonius may have borrowed direct from the Evangelists, and equally conceivable, vice versa, that the Evangelists may have borrowed from Musonius. But neither of these theoretical possibilities will seem very probable when we consider the greatness of the gulf which in that generation still divided the cultivated circles of the Hellenic dominant minority, to which Musonius belonged, from the Syriac section of the Hellenic internal proletariat which was the cradle of the Christian Church. On the whole it seems more probable that Musonius and the authors of the Gospels were each drawing independently on some common source to which Aristophanes and the Jewish scriptures had each made some contribution (though, as likely as not, an indirect one).¹

¹ There is a parallel to this rather baffling three-cornered literary relation between Aristophanes, the New Testament, and Musonius in another three-cornered relation between the New Testament and a pair of pagan authors of whom, in this second case likewise, one was pre-Christian while the other lived and wrote in the Christian Era. In this second case the piece of imagery in the Gospels that is matched by this pair of correspondences in pagan Greek literature is found in Matthew and Mark, and there is a vestige of it in Luke as well. The pre-Christian Greek author in this case is not Aristophanes but Aeschylus. The post-Christian author is Philostratus (*vivebat circa* A.D. 170-250).

The passage of Philostratus that is reminiscent of both Aeschylus and the Gospels occurs in Philostratus's work on the Hellenic philosopher-thaumaturge Apollonius of Tyana, whose long life was approximately coterminous with the first century of the Christian Era. Near the beginning of his own book Philostratus recounts the following story of Damis—a previous biographer of Apollonius who was his subject's contemporary and disciple.

'On one occasion he [Damis] was being harried by a critic with a loose tongue and a malicious mind who made the point that it was all very well for Damis to put on record important things like Apollonius's maxims and speculations, but that when he went on to pick up tiny trivialities he was doing like the dogs who feed on the scraps that fall from the feast. At this point Damis cut in with the retort that "If there are feasts of the Gods at which it is gods that are feeding, then as a matter of course there will be servants in attendance who will see to it that even the scraps shall not be lost—when these are scraps of ambrosial!"' (Philostratus: *Apollonius of Tyana*, Book I, chap. 19).

There is patently some literary connexion between this passage of Philostratus and

There are two more assonances between the *Birds* and the Gospels which perhaps deserve notice here—in spite of their both being trivial in themselves—for the possible bearing that they may have upon the more important correspondences that have been examined above. The Informer's plaintive question—'What else would you have me do? For I do not know how to dig'¹—is echoed in the Unjust Steward's discreet reflexion: 'What shall I do? For . . . I cannot dig.'² And Jesus's enigmatic saying that 'the Kingdom of Heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force'³ is anticipated by Euelpides' satirical remark that at Athens 'aliens are pushing their way in by violence'⁴ at the very time when he and Peithetaerus, who are native-born Athenian citizens, are leaping out of their native land with both feet in the air. 'I cannot dig' sounds as though it must have been a proverbial apologia for the practice of any easy but discreditable trade; and, if it was a *mot* that passed from mouth to mouth wherever the Attic *κοινή* was spoken, it might find its way into works of literature at wide intervals of time and place without there being any literary kinship between the diverse works in which it made its appearance. On the other hand, the *motif* of outsiders making a forcible entry into a commonwealth which has won prestige abroad is perhaps too

Mark vii. 27–8 (with its counterpart in Matt. xv. 26–7, and its vestige in Luke xvi. 21, where 'crumbs falling from the table' are also mentioned in juxtaposition with 'dogs'), though in this context it is not the dogs that eat the crumbs, but the beggar Lazarus). If Philostratus has taken his story about Damis from Damis himself, who was a contemporary of the authors of the Synoptic Gospels, then the literary problem here is precisely parallel to that of the relation between the Gospels and Musonius. And the echo of Aristophanes in Musonius likewise has its parallel in an echo, in Philostratus, of Aeschylus's saying (quoted already in this Study in I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 449, and in III. C (ii) (δ), vol. iii, p. 339, above) that his tragedies were 'slices from the great banquets of Homer (τεμάχη τῶν Ὁμήρου μεγάλων δεῖπνων)'. Philostratus's relation to Aeschylus would appear to be independent of his relation to the New Testament; for Damis's word 'feasts' (δαιτρες), as reported by Philostratus, comes nearer to Aeschylus's word 'banquets' (δεῖπνων), as reported by Athenaeus, than it comes to the word 'table' in Matthew, Mark, and Luke. On the other hand the Aeschylean epigram lacks the feature, which is common to Philostratus and the Gospels, of scraps of human food falling and being eaten by dogs; and it also stands in *vacuo*, whereas the corresponding sayings that are attributed to Damis and to the Syro-phenician woman are both introduced, in the contexts in which they respectively occur, as disarming retorts to a provocation. The points that are common to all the three contexts are: (α) some one gives an arrestingly humble estimate of his own worth in a simile taken from the dinner-table; (β) the parable consists in a depreciation of the part by comparison with the whole—whether the part be a crumb falling from the table or a slice carved from the joint.

We may also notice a correspondence between the Gospels and a passage in the work of a Stoic philosopher of a later generation than that of Musonius and Damis. 'Can I really fear somebody to whom I am able to abandon my body?' (Epictetus: *Dissertationes*, Book I, chap. 23, § 13) sounds to a Christian ear like an echo of Matt. x. 28, and Luke xii. 4, though the master whom Epictetus here believes himself to be following is not Jesus but Diogenes.

¹ τί γὰρ πάθω; σκάπτειν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι (*Birds*, l. 1432).

² τί ποιήσω, ὅτι . . . σκάπτειν οὐκ ἰσχύω (Luke xvi. 3).

³ ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν βιάζεται, καὶ βιασται ἀρπάξουσιν αὐτήν (Matt. xi. 12; cf. Luke xvi. 16). For a further assonance between this pair of sayings in the Gospels and the *Birds* and a saying that is attributed to King Cleomenes III of Sparta see V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, p. 415, below.

⁴ ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὧν οὐκ ἄστος ἐσβιάζεται (*Birds*, l. 32).

complicated an image to pass, like 'I cannot dig', into popular currency; and, if this *motif* first appears in a context where it does explain itself, and then reappears—and this with a clear verbal echo¹—in a different context where its meaning is obscure, it would be a not unreasonable inference to suppose that the later context in which the *motif* occurs is related to the earlier by a literary tradition in which a *motif* that originally served a purpose has been mechanically preserved after it has ceased to have a point and even ceased to be intelligible.

There is one more question that may conveniently be discussed in this Annex because it arises out of topics that have just been examined in the present context; and this final question may be put in the following way. One of the most prominent of the *motifs* that are common to the *Birds* and the Gospels is a claim to divinity that is made either by or on behalf of beings who are not gods—at any rate not according to the current convention of the time and place at which the claim has been put forward. Whether this claim is treated as a joke (as it is by Aristophanes) or as a supremely serious and momentous revelation of ultimate truth (as it is in the Gospels), there is one common feature in the treatment of it in both contexts: in both it is treated as something unexpected to the point of being startling. Now the beings who are not gods in the ordinarily accepted sense, but in respect of whom this claim to divinity is nevertheless made, are beings of two different kinds. Some of them are men; some of them are birds. And our question is this: To Hellenic minds in 414 B.C., which claim to divinity would seem the more preposterous? A bird's claim or a man's? There is reason to believe that, in the mind of a Hellene of Aristophanes' day, it required a greater effort of imagination to deify a man than to deify a bird.

The ground for this opinion lies in the probability that, even off the comic stage, the birds of the air were invested with a certain aura of divinity in the eyes of the generation of Hellenes who were Aristophanes' contemporaries. Aristophanes himself has devoted an appreciable part of his play (e.g. ll. 467–538 and 685–736) to a presentation of the thesis that the Birds were the original and legitimate lords of the Universe; that the present lordship of the Gods is a usurpation at the Birds' expense; and that even now there are tell-tale traces of the Birds' lost status which the Gods have either neglected or failed to efface. There are two particular traces that the playwright calls in evidence. One is that some of the reigning gods who are represented by statues in human form are also regularly accompanied in Hellenic works of art by

¹ i.e. with *βιάζεται* echoing *ἐσβιάζεται*.

representations of birds that are regarded as being their respective familiars or emblems. Zeus, for example, has his eagle, Athena her owl,¹ Apollo his hawk (*Birds*, ll. 514-16). The second piece of evidence that Aristophanes cites is the role still played by birds in the magic arts of omen-taking and fortune-telling (*Birds*, ll. 716-22). This thesis that the Birds are *ci-devant* gods² is presented by Aristophanes in the tone of mock-earnestness that is proper to the Old Comedy; and, if the evidence that Aristophanes offers us were all that we had at our command, we might be at a loss to know whether it was to be taken at all seriously or whether it was to be written off, from alpha to omega, as a sheer prank of the poet's riotous imagination. Fortunately, however, we have, as it happens, a good deal of independent evidence; and the conclusion to which this leads us is that Aristophanes' thesis was not really such arrant nonsense as the author himself would ostensibly have us believe.

On the one hand we find the Birds figuring as quasi-supernatural beings—and this particularly in virtue of a supposed foreknowledge of impending events—in Modern Greek folklore; and on the other hand it seems (though here the evidence is scantier) that the Birds were objects of religious veneration in the Minoan World.³ If the birds of the air have had this divine, or at any rate semi-divine, status in the eyes of both the pre-Hellenic and the post-Hellenic inhabitants of the region which was Hellas in an intervening age, there would be a presumption in favour of the hypothesis of there being an historical connexion between two cults of birds which are so similar in character and which have been practised in one and the same area, albeit in two different ages that are separated from each other by a chronological gap. On this hypothesis we should expect to find our bird-cult in existence under the surface during the intervening reign of Hellenism—even though, in that age, the dominant religion were anthropomorphic and not theriomorphic. And this is, of course, what we do find; for Aristophanes' thesis that the Birds had a touch of divinity

¹ The owl was Athena's bird in the city that bore her name (or rather the plural name of the multitude of images of her that were to be found there). In the *Odyssey*, however, which was not written on Attic soil, there are two passages in which Athena is depicted, not as being merely accompanied by a bird, but as herself assuming the form of one; and this Homeric bird-shape of Athena is not an owl's in either case. In one passage (*Odyssey*, Book XXII, l. 240) the bird whose form Athena assumes is a swallow; in the other passage (*Odyssey*, Book I, l. 320) it is a sea-eagle, if that is really the meaning of the mysterious word ἀνοταία.

² This notion of *ci-devant* gods who have been deposed and suppressed was of course familiar to the Hellenic minds of Aristophanes' age in the legend of the Titans. The complementary conception of the reigning Olympians as usurpers who have won and kept their dominion by force is inherent in the picture of Zeus and his fellow divinities as a war-lord and his war-band (for this picture see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, pp. 96-7, and V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, pp. 231-3, above).

³ On this point see Murray, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-8.

about them in the eyes of the Hellenes of his own day is borne out by a wealth of other evidence that comes not only from literary but also from archaeological sources.

On this showing, Aristophanes has exercised the professional skill that we should have expected of him in taking the thesis of the Birds being gods as a theme for one of his dramatic *jeux d'esprit*. He has here put his hand upon a joke which, for an audience accustomed to the Hellenic *Weltanschauung* of the day, was preposterous enough to be amusing without being quite so preposterous as to defeat itself by altogether passing the bounds of imagination. The fantasy was not unimaginably fantastic and the blasphemy not scandalously blasphemous because the foolery had in it an ingredient which 'unto the Greeks' was not sheer 'foolishness', but was something that most of the people who were assembled in the theatre at Athens for the Great Dionysia of 414 B.C. would unconsciously take for granted and might even, if pressed, acknowledge to be truth¹—however difficult it might be to reconcile a traditional belief in the semi-divinity of birds with the 'wisdom' after which the Greeks were by this time already beginning to seek along the paths of Reason.²

In Aristophanes' catalogue of Olympian Gods who had birds for their familiars or their emblems³ there is one name which is conspicuous by its absence, and that is Aphrodite's; for the Olympian Goddess of Love was popularly associated with birds, and these of many kinds: the iynx, the swan, the swallow, the sparrow, the dove. None of these bird-familiars of Aphrodite is mentioned by Aristophanes in the play.⁴ The playwright himself, however, figures as a participant in one of Plato's imaginary dialogues—the

¹ For the alloy of 'fact' (whether actual or merely reputed) which is an indispensable ingredient in so-called 'works of fiction', see I C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, pp. 449-50, above.

² Has the poet likewise tempered, by another touch of the same deft art, his salutation of his human hero as 'God of Gods' (l. 1765, cited in this Annex on pp. 349, 352, and 354, above)? We have suggested (on pp. 352 and 359) that, in a generation of Hellenic rationalists who had not yet lived to see divine honours conferred upon Lysander, the deification of a man might appear even more preposterous than the deification of a bird to the minds of an Attic playwright's audience. In the growth-stage of the Hellenic Civilization the distinction between human and superhuman beings was clearly maintained as a rule. There was, however, one exception; for a human being who had successfully performed the supremely creative social act of founding a new city-state was customarily worshipped—not indeed as a god, but as a hero—by the community of which he had made himself the historical ἀρχηγέτης. Now Aristophanes, in the middle act of the *Birds*, almost goes out of his way to show us Peithetaerus painstakingly performing the ritual which would be incumbent upon a founder. He sets to work to inaugurate his aviary by solemnly giving it a name and then clinching the ceremony by offering sacrifice (ll. 809-11), and, in spite of successive interruptions, he succeeds in accomplishing both these duties (ll. 1118-20) before a messenger arrives to announce that the city has been constructed *de facto* (ll. 1122-67) besides having been inaugurated *de jure*. In the minds of Aristophanes' audience, would these transactions imply that Peithetaerus had now qualified himself to rank as an ἀρχηγέτης? And would this perhaps partially prepare them for a *finale* in which the cockney *in excelsis* is saluted not merely as a hero but as a god?

³ See pp. 359-60, above.

⁴ The pairing of the coot with Aphrodite in line 565 is shown by the context to imply that this was *not* a bird that was popularly associated with this goddess in current folklore.

Symposium—in which the topic of discussion is that faculty of Love which was recognized as being Aphrodite's province before it was revealed in a new light as the heart of Christianity; and in the *Symposium* itself a first step is taken on the long journey towards the Christian view of Love from the traditional Hellenic attitude towards it when one of the speakers declares that there is not one Aphrodite but two Aphrodites and therefore not one kind of Love but two likewise.¹ Besides Aphrodite the Vulgar (Pandêmus) there is an Aphrodite the Heavenly (Urania), says Plato's Pausanias.² And this Platonic clue may encourage us to look for traces of the passage of the Heavenly Love, of which this Heavenly Aphrodite was the Hellenic image, from the bleak spiritual clime of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' to a Christian haven. In the story told in the Gospels³ the supernatural designation of Jesus as the Son of God is not only proclaimed orally by a voice from Heaven but is also visually revealed by an opening of the Heavens and a descent of the Spirit upon Jesus in the shape of a dove; and on the strength of this incident in the New Testament the dove has become the emblem of the Holy Ghost in Christian art; but this is not the first case in which the dove has figured as an emblem of divinity; for in Hellenic art, as we have already noticed, the dove is an emblem of Aphrodite. May we venture to infer that the visual image in which the Spirit of God is depicted in the Gospels has been derived from a Hellenic source? Such imagery cannot be of native Jewish origin; for the second of the ten Commandments forbids the visual representation of any object whatsoever, and to portray God Himself in the shape of a living creature that was not even human would be the most shocking violation of the Second Commandment that a Jewish mind could conceive. But if it is thus evident that the image of a dove, even if it should prove to have been inherited by Christianity from Judaism, must previously have made its way into Judaea from elsewhere, then we must look for the nearest possible antecedent provenance; and, as soon as we look, we cannot fail to observe how short a flight it is to the banks of Jordan from the coasts of Paphos.

To return for the last time to the *Birds*, we may notice, in the present connexion, that the descent of a winged harbinger of peace is also one of the incidents in Aristophanes' play,⁴ and that the

¹ The distinction between the two kinds of Love which was thus drawn by Plato was afterwards emphasized, in the Greek vocabulary of the New Testament, by a difference of name. The new word *ἀγάπη* was coined to denote the etherial Love that, in Plato's terms, was the spirit of the Heavenly Aphrodite, in contrast to the grosser Love, patronized by Aphrodite Pandêmus, with which the word *Erôs* was too deeply compromised to be acceptable to a Christian ear.

² Pausanias in Plato's *Symposium*, 180 D-E.

³ Matt. iii. 16; Mark i. 10; Luke iii. 22; John i. 32-3.

⁴ Aristophanes: *Birds*, ll. 1196-1261.

Olympian goddess Iris, whom the Athenian playwright casts for this part, is described by him in an earlier passage¹—in language borrowed from a Homeric simile—as ‘like unto a gentle dove’.²

This brings us to the end of an argument which points to a paradoxical conclusion. If our argument has any force, the conclusion can only be that Aristophanes’ lightly uttered foolishness is somehow less remote than Zeno’s scrupulously pondered wisdom from a Gospel that, in Christian belief, is God’s revelation of His Truth. This verdict would no doubt have astonished the Athenian playwright as greatly as it would have incensed the Cypriot sage; and, if the English reader is inclined, in his turn, to exclaim, with Horatio, that ‘this is wondrous strange’, the writer must answer, with Hamlet, that

‘There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.’

In the comedy which the Muses moved Aristophanes to write for performance in the holy place of Dionysus on the flank of the Acropolis of Athens in the year 414 B.C., the goddesses seem to have been doing their best to exercise the second of two powers of which they had boasted, centuries before, to shepherds ‘abiding in the field’³ on the flank of holy Helicon:

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ’, εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.⁴

The monument of the Muses’ other boasted power—to wit, the knack of telling specious lies⁵—is presumably the theogony which they recited to one of those shepherds of Ascrea whom they had greeted with such an insulting form of address;⁶ but, when the time was to come for another theogony, which might prove to be the truth, to be announced to other shepherds,⁷ the scene of the

¹ I. 575.

² The simile is applied to Iris and Eileithyia in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, l. 114, and to Hera and Athena in *Iliad*, Book V, l. 778.

³ The word used by Hesiod of himself and his fellow shepherds in *Theogony*, l. 26, is *ἀγραιοί*; the word used of the shepherds in Luke ii. 8, is *ἀγραυλοῦντες*. (This assonance was pointed out to the writer of this Study by Professor H. T. Wade-Gery.)

⁴ Hesiod: *Theogony*, ll. 27–8.

⁵ This knack is commended by Aristotle as one of the important weapons in a poet’s armoury (see I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 450, footnote 1, above).

⁶ *καὶ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον* (Hesiod: *Theogony*, l. 26). It is curious to find a variation on this form of insult turning up in the Cretan prophet Epimenides’ poem *Minos* and being quoted with approbation by a missionary of Christianity (Titus i. 12); for the Cretan ‘lie’ against which Epimenides was inveighing was the belief that a god had died and risen again from the dead! (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 99, footnote 2, above).

⁷ Why are ‘shepherds abiding in the field’ chosen, out of all Mankind, to be the recipients of the theogonies? This trait is not only common to the Hellenic and the Christian Mythology: it is also one of the more striking of the details in which these two mythologies agree in painting the same mysterious picture. Some light is perhaps thrown on this particular point of agreement by a passage in the mythical colloquy between Solon and the Saite priest in Plato’s *Timaeus*. The gist of the passage (which has been quoted above in IV. C (i), vol. iv, pp. 24–5) is that Egypt has been exempted

revelation was to be the countryside of Judaea and not of Boeotia, and the glad tidings were to be delivered by the tongues, not of Muses, but of Angels. It would almost seem as though all that the Muses themselves were able to do by way of demonstrating their power to tell the truth when they chose, as well as to counterfeit it as a rule, was to instil here and there a darkly anticipatory meaning into some of the winged words of an *insouciant* Athenian poet on the brink of a Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' that was to close, after unspeakable tribulations, in the Angels' proclamation of 'glory to God in the highest and peace on Earth to men of good will'.¹

by Nature from the incidence of recurrent physical catastrophes which visit the rest of the Earth, including Hellas, and which account for the frequent breaches of continuity—everywhere save in Egypt—in the transmission of culture. When the oecumenical catastrophe takes the form of a deluge, 'the shepherds and herdsmen on the mountains survive, while the inhabitants of your towns in Hellas are swept away by the rivers'—and with them perishes, each time, their barely achieved sophistication. 'When the waters that are above the firmament descend upon you like a recurrent malady' they 'only permit the illiterate and uncultivated members of your society to survive, with the result that you become as little children and start again from the beginning with no knowledge whatever of Ancient History.' This drastic destruction of a cultural heritage is assumed by the Saïte priest to be a grievous loss; but the contrast between the respective states of the Egyptian and Hellenic worlds in either Solon's day or Plato's suggests that there may be another side to the story. The possession of old knowledge may be an impediment to the acquisition of new knowledge; and, if so, the heritage may be a burden from which it is a blessing to be even forcibly relieved. 'Except ye be converted and become as little children ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven' (Matt. xviii. 3). The guileless shepherds who have survived the flood have hearts that are ready to receive a new revelation.

¹ Luke ii. 14.

SAINT AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MUNDANE AND THE SUPRA-MUNDANE COMMONWEALTH

THE problem of the relations between the Kingdom of God and the Society of This World—a society which, for Saint Augustine, is embodied in the oecumenical empire of Rome—is a thread that runs right through the texture of the *De Civitate Dei*; and it would be impossible even to attempt to follow out consecutively the course of Saint Augustine's thought on this question without being drawn into making a systematic analysis of his *magnum opus*. In this place we cannot do more than quote a few passages that illustrate certain crucial points.

One crucial point with which Saint Augustine deals is the question of what is the essential difference between the two commonwealths; and in making this spiritual assay Saint Augustine takes Love as his touchstone.

'The great distinction which differentiates the two commonwealths—the society of the religious and the society of the irreligious—is this: in the one the love of God comes first, in the other the love of Self. . . . Indeed, the two commonwealths have been created by the two loves—the earthly commonwealth by a love of Self that goes to the length of contemning God; the heavenly commonwealth by a love of God that goes to the length of contemning Self. The one glories in itself, the other in the Lord. The one seeks glory from men; the other finds its greatest glory in God as the witness to its own good conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God: *My glory and the lifter up of mine head*.¹ The one is dominated by a thirst for domination in its princes and in the nations which it subdues; in the other those in authority and those under authority serve one another mutually and lovingly by taking counsel and by following it. The earthly commonwealth loves its own strength as displayed in its own mighty men; the heavenly commonwealth says to its God: *I will love thee, O Lord my strength*.² And so in the earthly commonwealth its wise men, living on the human level, pursued the interests of the body or the mind or both, while those among them who succeeded in knowing God *glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise (that is, extolling themselves for their own wisdom under the dominion of pride), they became fools and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible Man and to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things* (for the leaders of the peoples, or their followers, were given over to the adoration of images of this kind) *and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever*.³ On the

¹ Ps. iii. 3.

² Ps. xviii. 1.

³ Rom. i. 21-3 and 25.

other hand, in the heavenly commonwealth there is no wisdom of Man save the devotion with which the True God is properly worshipped—a devotion which He expects to receive as His guerdon in a society of saints (not only human beings, but also angels), *that God may be all in all*.¹²

It may be noted that in this passage Saint Augustine starts from a premiss which is common to him and to the philosophers, but that he arrives at a conclusion which is the opposite of theirs. The philosophers, too, condemn and reject the love of mundane things; but they infer, from their unfavourable experience of Love when it is directed towards one particular kind of object, that Love itself is a spiritual infirmity which the sage must make up his mind to pluck out and cast from him—on the reckoning that it is profitable for him to be without the faculty of Love rather than to renounce the possibility of attaining that absolute Detachment which, in the judgement of a philosophically enlightened understanding, is the only complete cure for a spiritual malady that consists in the very fact of being alive. The philosopher arrives at this radical conclusion because he does not take the precaution, which Saint Augustine does take, of looking into his premiss before proceeding to argue from it; and the philosopher therefore overlooks the capital point that Love *in vacuo* is a logical abstraction which is morally neutral (*ἀδιάφορον* in the Stoic terminology), while the moral character of real Love in action is determined by the nature of the object towards which it is directed. On this criterion the condemnation of the love of the creature is a right moral judgement; but the correct inference from it is not that Love itself is bad, but that the proper object of Love is not the creature but the Creator.

Another crucial point that is discussed in the *De Civitate Dei* is the question of the attitude which the citizen of the supra-mundane commonwealth ought to take up, in his pilgrimage through This World, towards the institutions of the mundane commonwealth which he will find in force around him.

'It is written of Cain that he founded a commonwealth; but Abel—true to the type of the pilgrim and sojourner that he was—did not do the like. For the commonwealth of the Saints is not of This World, though it does give birth to citizens here in whose persons it performs its pilgrimage until the time of its kingdom shall come—the time when it will gather them all together. . . . And then the promised kingdom will be given to them, and they will reign there with their prince, the King of the Ages, world without end. . . .

'The household of those who do not live by faith seeks to win an earthly peace out of the properties and amenities of this temporal life;

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 28.

² Saint Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XIV, chaps. 13 and 28.

but the household of those who do live by faith awaits the blessings which are promised for an eternal future; and so it makes use of earthly and temporal things as a pilgrim would use them—as things which must not be allowed to captivate it and deflect it from its goal (which is God), but on which it may perhaps lean in order to ease and reduce to a minimum the burdens of a corruptible body that weighs upon the Soul. Accordingly, things necessary for this mortal life are made use of by both kinds of person and by both households alike; but, in using them, each has his own distinctive purpose, and these purposes differ profoundly. Even the earthly commonwealth, which does not live by faith, ensues an earthly peace and bases the social harmony of its citizens, in their relations as rulers and ruled, upon some kind of mutual adjustment of human wills in regard to the things that pertain to this mortal life. At the same time the heavenly commonwealth—or, rather, that part of it which is making its pilgrimage in this state of mortality, and which lives by faith—must perforce make use of that earthly peace until the state of mortality, for which that kind of peace is a necessity, has passed away; and on this account, so long as it is leading its pilgrim's life in this earthly commonwealth—and leading it in a virtual captivity, though it has already received the promise of redemption and the gift of the spirit as a pledge [of ultimate release]—it does not hesitate to submit to the laws of the earthly commonwealth by which this mortal life is regulated in the ways most conducive to its maintenance. Mortality itself being common to both commonwealths [in this temporal environment], it is desirable that, in things pertaining to this mortal state, a harmony should be preserved between the two. . . .

While the heavenly commonwealth is making its pilgrimage on Earth it recruits citizens from all the tribes of Man and gathers its society of pilgrims from people of every tongue—not minding the diversity of manners, laws, and institutions (the instruments by which the earthly peace is earned and secured), and not rescinding or destroying any of these institutions, but on the contrary preserving them and falling in with them, because, underlying this diversity of institutions in different nations, there is the single identic purpose of earthly peace. The sole limiting condition of this conformity is that it must not interfere with Religion—in the sense of the inculcation of the worship of the One Supreme True God. So the heavenly commonwealth too, in its pilgrimage here, makes use of the earthly peace; and (as far as may be possible without conflicting with the duties of Religion) it cherishes and ensues that mutual adjustment of human wills in regard to things pertaining to Man's mortal nature; but it orients this earthly peace towards the heavenly peace which really is peace—the only peace worthy of being regarded as such, and of being called by the name, for creatures endowed with Reason. This heavenly peace is a perfectly organized and perfectly harmonious common participation in the enjoyment of God and of one another in God.¹ And, when we reach that state, our life

¹ This definition is also given, in the same words, in the passage quoted in V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 166, above.—A.J.T.

will not be mortal, but will be unmistakably vital; and our body will not be an animal body that weighs down the soul as it decays, but will be a spiritual body that has no wants and that is wholly subject to the will. The earthly peace is possessed by the heavenly commonwealth while it is making its pilgrimage in faith; and by this faith it genuinely lives when it orients towards the winning of the heavenly peace whatever good actions it performs in relation to God and also in relation to human neighbours—the life of a commonwealth being a social life *ex hypothesi*. . . .

‘Thus the highest good of God’s commonwealth is a peace which is eternal and perfect—not just a peace for mortals to travel through between birth and death, but a peace for immortals to abide in without any shadow of adversity. If this be granted, who can deny that that life is blessedly happy, and who refuse to pronounce that, by comparison, this life which we lead here is wretchedly miserable—filled though it may be, to overflowing, with amenities mental, bodily, and external? Any one, however, who lives this earthly life in such a way as to orient his use of it towards an end which is the end of the heavenly life—loving the heavenly life ardently, and loyally hoping for it—any one who lives like that can without absurdity be called blessedly happy even now: happy in the heavenly hope rather than in the earthly reality. On the other hand this earthly reality, divorced from the heavenly hope, is a false happiness which is nothing but the deepest misery. It is false because it does not command the true treasures of the spirit. For wisdom is no true wisdom when it exercises its virtues of discernment, resoluteness, restraint, and justice without directing its intention, in all that it does, to that end where God will be all in all in an eternity that is sure and in a peace that is perfect.’¹

It will be seen that, in Saint Augustine’s view, the duty—and it is, of course, an obvious one—of avoiding the snares of This World can be conscientiously and effectively carried out by the pilgrim-citizen of the supra-mundane commonwealth without his being required to adopt the radical precautionary policy of non-co-operation and non-intercourse. There is a legitimate use which the pilgrim can make of the institutions of the mundane commonwealth as a matter of practical convenience. But Saint Augustine goes farther than that. He tells the pilgrim that he will find that the pagan heroes of the mundane commonwealth have moral lessons to teach which the pilgrim may profitably learn and take to heart for their bearing upon his own duty as a citizen of the *Civitas Dei*.

‘The [Christian] martyrs . . . outdid the Scaevolae and Curtii and Decii in bearing ordeals inflicted upon them, instead of inflicting ordeals upon themselves; and they also outdid them in that true religion which is true virtue—not to speak of their immense superiority in numbers. But the Roman heroes were citizens of the earthly commonwealth

¹ Saint Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XV, chap. 1, and Book XIX, chaps. 17 and 20.

(*terrenae civitatis*); and the object set before them in all the duties which they performed on their commonwealth's behalf was the security of that commonwealth and a dominion that was not in Heaven but on Earth—not in a life eternal, but in a perpetual decease of the dying and succession of generations born to die in their turn—and so what else was there for these Roman heroes to love except a glory through which they hoped to live, even after death, a life of sorts in the mouth of an applauding Posterity?

'To these Roman heroes God was not going to give eternal life with his holy angels in his heavenly commonwealth (*caelesti civitate*)—for that is a society to which the only entrance lies in the true religion which does not pay worship to any but the One True God—and so, if God had not granted to those Romans this earthly glory either (the glory of a magnificent empire), they would have been cheated of the reward that was due to their good qualities, or in other words to the virtues by which they were striving to attain this pinnacle of glory. For God himself has something to say of heroes such as these who perform fine actions with the evident motive of gaining glory among men. *Verily I say unto you, He says, They have their reward.*¹ And in fact those Romans spurned their own private interests for the sake of the common—that is to say, the public—good. . . . As eagerly as though they had been on the true road, they strove, with every faculty that they possessed, to win honours, power and glory; and they did win an honour which was almost world-wide, they succeeded in imposing upon many peoples the laws in which their empire expressed itself, and to-day they enjoy a literary and historical fame that is almost universal. Thus they have no case for impugning the justice of the Supreme and True God: *They have their reward.*

'Vastly different, even in This World, is the reward of the Saints who have to endure contumely for the sake of the truth of God—a truth which is hateful to those for whom This World is all in all. The Saints' commonwealth is everlasting: there, none comes into existence, because none dies; there we find that true and full felicity which is not a goddess but is a gift of God; from there we have received the pledge of faith for the duration of our pilgrimage, while we are longing for that heavenly commonwealth's beauty; there the *Sun* does not *rise on the evil and on the good*,² but the Sun of Justice protects the good alone. . . . And so God's purpose, in allowing the Roman Empire to expand to the extreme of human glory, has not been solely to render to earthly heroes their due reward; God has also meant to afford an example to the citizens of that eternal commonwealth during their pilgrimage here—an example to which He wills them to pay close and careful heed, in order that they may realize the greatness of the love which they manifestly owe to their heavenly country for the sake of the life eternal, if an earthly country has been so greatly loved by its citizens for the sake of glory among men.'³

¹ Matt. vi. 2.

² Matt. v. 45.

³ Saint Augustine. *De Civitate Dei*, Book V. chaps. 14, 15, and 16.

ANNEX I TO V. C (ii) (a)

THE HELLENIC PORTRAIT OF THE SAVIOUR WITH THE SWORD

OUR presentment of the Saviour with the Sword in the diverse postures of a Hêraklês and a Zeus is one of the political common-places of the Imperial Age of the Hellenic Society from whose mythology these two types are taken; and the surviving records of that age of Hellenic history provide a wealth of illustrations of this piece of political imagery. The monuments that are instructive for our purpose are of several kinds. There are the unofficial and semi-official literary works of philosophers and publicists; and there are the official inscriptions on public buildings and legends on coins. The pair of types was given an explicitly official currency when the Emperor Diocletian proclaimed the fulfilment of his task of salvaging the Empire from the bout of anarchy that had preceded his own advent to power by taking the title 'Jovius' for himself and conferring the title 'Herculius' upon his comrade and colleague Maximian. But this was merely the last step in a gradual process of crystallizing the portrait of the Saviour with the Sword in this dual form. It may be convenient to take a glance at this process in the literary medium first, and then to scan the corresponding series of titles on coins and in inscriptions.

In the early days of 'the Indian Summer' of Hellenic history, which began with the accession of the Emperor Nerva in A.D. 96 and ended with the death of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius in A.D. 180,¹ we find the attributes of Hêraklês and Zeus in turn being ascribed to the Emperor Trajan, who had to complete the task of slaying the hydra of tyranny before he could inaugurate the new era of philanthropic government. Trajan was hailed as Hêraklês by the Greek publicist Dio Chrysostom (*vivebat circa* A.D. 45-115),² and as both Hercules and Juppiter in successive passages of a single laudatory address from the mouth of the Roman Senator Gaius Plinius the Younger (*vivebat circa* A.D. 60-110).³ And the activities of the Emperor which entitled him in Pliny's opinion to be regarded as Juppiter's vicegerent on Earth are described by the panegyrist in the following terms:

'These are cares worthy of a prince, and even of a god—to reconcile

¹ The view that this epoch of Hellenic history is to be regarded as an 'Indian Summer' rather than as a 'Golden Age' has been put forward in IV. C (ii) (b) 1, vol. iv, pp. 58-61, above.

² Dio Chrysostom: *Oratio* I, §§ 49-84 (cited again in V. C (ii) (a), Annex II, pp. 470, 471, and 478, below).

³ In Pliny's *Panegyricus* Trajan is praised in the similitude of Hercules in chaps. 14, § 5, and 15, § 4, and in the similitude of Juppiter in chap. 80.

rival cities and to restrain arrogant peoples by reason as much as by authority; to prevent unfairness on the part of magistrates; to reverse anything done amiss; and lastly like some swift star to visit all places, to hear all things, and wheresoever your aid is invoked to appear and stand by like a god.¹

This passage could be matched by many others in the same vein, but we must content ourselves here with a single quotation from a laudatory address to Rome which was delivered by another Greek publicist, Aelius Aristides (*vivebat circa* A.D. 120–80), at a time when the Hellenic 'Indian Summer' was verging towards its close. In reviewing Rome's gifts to the Hellenic World, Aristides extols, as one of the most signal of them, the institution of the Principate:

'In the last instance there is a supreme judge of appeal, whose eye for Justice nothing ever escapes; and at the bar of his tribunal there is the most complete and magnificent equality between the small and the great, the obscure and the distinguished, the poor and the rich, the low-born and the high-born. This emperor-judge is one who, in the words of Hesiod, *hath but to stretch forth his hand, and, lo, the weak receiveth strength and the strong man chastisement*.² He is a judge who suffers Justice to direct him like the wind in the sails of a ship—the wind which shows no favour to the rich man over the poor man in wafting him on his course, but bestows its beneficent service impartially on every man who comes in its way.³

These words were written in a generation when they still rang true; but the term of this 'Indian Summer', during which a Serene Majesty could rule the Hellenic World 'by reason as much as by authority', and could maintain the balance of justice by the touch of an outstretched finger, was shorter than a century. The sword that had been auspiciously returned to its sheath had to be ominously drawn again. While Trajan had been able to exchange the role of Hercules for that of Juppiter, Marcus found himself compelled to descend from his happier predecessors' Olympian throne in order to enter again upon the temporarily suspended round of Hercules' labours;⁴ and, in the age of anarchy that followed, this treadmill had to be trodden by a succession of

¹ Pliny: *Panegyricus*, chap. 80, translated by Charlesworth, M. P., in *The Virtues of a Roman Emperor* (London 1937, Milford), p. 15. The writer of this Study is also indebted to this lecture of Mr. Charlesworth's for the references in the two preceding footnotes.

² 'Ρέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ρέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει.—Hesiod: *Works and Days*, l. 5. In its original context the line refers to Zeus.—A.J.T.

³ Aristides, P. Aelius: *In Romam*, p. 363.

⁴ There is a bitter irony in the fact that this role of Hercules, which was reluctantly assumed by Marcus as a grievously burdensome duty, was lightly fancied as a frivolous pose by Marcus's son Commodus, who did his worst to undo his father's work and to provide urgent labours for a long series of Herculean emperors after him (for Commodus's pose as Hercules see V. C (i) (d) 6 (α), vol. v, pp. 454–5, above).

soldier-emperors—a Decius and a Claudius and an Aurelian and a Probus and a Carus—before it became possible for a Diocletian to slough off the role of Hercules on to a Maximian's uncouth shoulders and to reassume for himself the role of Jove.

If we now pass from the literary to the epigraphical and numismatic evidence¹ we shall find that the official titles and mottoes of the rulers of the Hellenic World in the Imperial Age are apt to strike an attitude which reproduces one or other of our two postures in some epigrammatic phrase—though the posture that an emperor elects to assume by no means necessarily corresponds to, and may even be deliberately intended to dissimulate, the part that has been forced upon him in fact by an inexorable march of events.

This last point is illustrated by the formulae that date from the recurrent 'Time of Troubles' through which the Hellenic World passed between the death of Marcus in A.D. 180 and the accession of Diocletian in A.D. 284.² There are some formulae of this age that breathe the authentic spirit of it. For example, the *Vota Orbis* on coins of Valerian and Gallienus vividly express the agonized suspense of a world that is hanging breathlessly on the issue of the struggle between a single-handed Hêraklês and a hydra

¹ The specimens, here cited, of titles and mottoes in inscriptions and on coins of the Hellenic World in the Imperial Age are taken from Vogt, J.: *Orbis Romanus* (Tübingen 1929, Mohr), pp. 18–22; from Hahn, L.: *Rom und Romanismus im Griechisch-Römischen Osten* (Leipzig 1906, Dieterich), p. 140, footnote 4; and from Homo, L.: *Essai sur le Règne de l'Empereur Aurélien (270–275)* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing), pp. 362–4.

² The cause of this terrible relapse into anarchy was analysed long beforehand, with a prophetic insight, by the Stoic sage and Roman statesman Seneca (*vivebat circa* 5 B.C.–A.D. 65) in a passage of his *De Clementia* (Book I, chap. 4, §§ 1–2) in which the author gives his view of the social function of a prince.

'He is the bond that holds the Commonwealth together; he is the breath of life that is breathed by subjects, in their thousands, who in themselves would be nothing but a burden and a prey if they were left to their own devices through the removal of a presence which is the soul of the Empire.

Their king is safe? One mind informs them all;
Lost? They break troth straightway.

'If this calamity [which Virgil (*Georgics*, IV, ll. 212–13) imagines as overtaking the bees] were to overtake us, it would be the destruction of the *Pax Romana* and the ruin of a great people. This people will be safe from that particular danger for just so long as it has the sense to put up with the curb; but, if ever it snaps the reins—or refuses to allow itself to be bridled again if the bridle has been accidentally shaken off—then the texture of this mighty empire will be rent, and its present unity will fly apart into a hundred shreds. Rome will cease to bear rule at the moment at which she ceases to render obedience.'

A foretaste of the fulfilment of this prophecy that had been made in a treatise addressed to the Emperor Nero was inflicted upon the Hellenic World in A.D. 69 as an immediate consequence of Nero's tyranny; but this touch of calamity acted as a stimulus. 'The Year of the Four Emperors' was followed by the principate of Vespasian; and, when the Neronian reign of terror was reinaugurated by the son of an emperor who had earned the title of 'Saviour and Benefactor of All Men', this tyranny of Domitian in its turn was followed by the philanthropic régime of a series of philosopher-emperors who succeeded one another without a break from Nerva to Marcus. It was only after the death of Marcus that the new 'Time of Troubles' set in; and even then the tyranny of Commodus was followed by the principate of Septimius Severus, who repeated Vespasian's work—albeit with a rougher hand. It was not till after the death of Alexander Severus that the storm broke with an uncontrollable and shattering violence.

with a hundred heads.¹ And there are other contemporary formulae which implicitly confess that the Roman Peace has been broken and the structure of the Hellenic universal state been destroyed—or at any rate gravely damaged. These unwelcome truths are admitted in the title *Pacator Orbis* which is taken by Septimius Severus and Caracalla and Valerian and Gallienus and Postumus and Aurelian and Tacitus and Florian and Probus and Numerian.² And the same admission is made in the title *Reparator Orbis* or *Restitutor Orbis*³ or *Restitutor Generis Humani* or *Restitutor Saeculi* which is taken by Gordianus III and the two Philips, by Otacilia Severa (the wife of the first Philip and the mother of the second), by Valerian, by Gallienus, by Postumus, by Claudius, by Aurelian, by Tacitus, by Probus, by Carus, by Carinus, and thereafter by Constantius II and by Julian. The common characteristic of these titles is their note of frankness. On the other hand it is the wish, and not the fact, that is father to the thought in the motto *Securitas Orbis* which is displayed on the coins, not of any emperor whose reign falls within the Hadrianic and Antonine 'Indian Summer', but of a series which begins with Commodus and continues through Caracalla and Geta and the first Philip and Philip's wife Otacilia Severa and Decius's wife Etruscilla and Gallienus and Probus until it closes in the generation of Diocletian with the great man himself and with his lieutenants Maximian and Galerius and with his opponent Carausius. This catalogue suggests that the men who were responsible for the welfare of the Empire did not find it necessary to boast of the performance of their elementary duty of keeping order except in times when the boast was unwarrantable.

There is another group of formulae which proclaim the metamorphosis of a Hercules into a Juppiter: for example, the specious *Pax Orbis Terrarum* which was a false claim on coins of Otho but a true one on coins of the Flavians; the well-earned *Fortuna*

¹ The *Vota Orbis et Urbis* on coins of Constantine the Great and Licinius perhaps express the recurrence of this anxious atmosphere during the further bout of anarchy between the abdication of Diocletian in A.D. 305 and the overthrow of Licinius by Constantine in A.D. 323.

² There is evidence in the legends on coins for the assumption of this title by all these ten emperors except Tacitus. In Tacitus's case the evidence is epigraphical—and there is also epigraphical as well as numismatical evidence in the case of Caracalla.

³ The evidence for *Restitutor Orbis* is both numismatical and epigraphical, while that for *Reparator Orbis* appears to be epigraphical only. It is noteworthy that the title *Restitutor Orbis Terrarum* appears to have been invented by Hadrian—an emperor who was able to sheathe the sword which Trajan had drawn and to rule thereafter without drawing it again (save for the suppression of Bar Kōkabā). Hadrian was not constrained to emulate Hēraklēs in his labours, though he chose to emulate him in his travels. The work which Hadrian made his special business was more aptly described in his other title of *Locupletator Orbis Terrarum*; for Hadrian was able to devote more of his energy to improving and completing what his predecessors had left unfinished than to merely repairing what they had wrecked or had allowed to fall into ruin.

Redux on coins of Aurelian¹ and *Gloria Orbis* on coins of Probus; the controversial *Liberator Orbis* on inscriptions of Constantine, Magnentius, and Julian; and the audacious *Toto Orbe Victor* which may pass muster in the inscriptions of a Constantius II and a Valentinian and a Theodosius, but which takes our breath away when we find the self-same title in the inscriptions of a Valens or an Arcadius.

Finally we may glance at the group of formulae in which the Saviour of Society displays himself—now serenely at rest, with sword no longer naked but in scabbard—in the posture of a Zeus with Olympus for his throne and with the prostrate Titans for his footstool. There are inscriptions in which Divus Julius is hailed as *Σωτὴρ τοῦ Κόσμου* and as *Σωτὴρ τῆς Οἰκουμένης*;² Augustus as *Custos Imperi Romani Totiusque Orbis Terrarum*; Tiberius as *Κοινὸς τῆς Οἰκουμένης Εὐεργέτης*; Claudius as *Σωτὴρ τῆς Οἰκουμένης*; Nero (I) as *Ὁ Ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων τῆς Οἰκουμένης*; Vespasian as *Ὁ Πάντων Ἀνθρώπων Σωτὴρ καὶ Εὐεργέτης*; Trajan as *Σωτὴρ τῆς Οἰκουμένης* and as *Conservator Generis Humani*.³ There are coins of

¹ Aurelian's *Fortuna Redux* may pass, but his *Felicitas Saeculi* and *Felicitas Temporum* must have drawn wry smiles from the faces of his subjects as they fingered the coins on which these two mottoes were displayed.

² Pauly-Wissowa: *Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 2nd ed., 2nd ser., Halbband v, col. 1214. The former of these two variants of a single title was affected by a number of Caesar's successors, especially by Hadrian; the latter was affected (see below) by Claudius and by Trajan. This title for a ruler of the Hellenic universal state has a remarkably close Andean parallel in the title 'Pachacutec' which was borne by the Inca who has the best claim to be regarded as the founder of the Andean universal state (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 121, and II. D (iv), vol. ii, p. 103, above). According to Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 114, 'Pachacutec' is a compound of the Quichuan substantive 'Pacha', meaning 'World', with a past participle passive 'cutec', meaning 'changed'—i.e., in this context, 'changed for the better'. The grammatical equivalent of 'Pachacutec' would thus be a motto which might appear on a Roman Imperial coin in some such Latin legend as *Orbis [in Statum Meliorem] Conversus*. If this Latin sentence had to be transposed into a Greek epithet, *Σωτὴρ τῆς Οἰκουμένης* would provide as good a translation as could be wished for; and, conversely, the statement, in a Greek inscription of 9-8 B.C. (O.G.I. 458, quoted in Gall, A. von: *Βασιλεῖα τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), p. 453) that Augustus *ἐτέραν ἔδωκε παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ ὅσιν* could be rendered as 'pacha cutec' in Quichuan.

³ For this Latin version of Trajan's title see Pauly-Wissowa, op. cit., col. 1219. Aurelian rings changes on it—*Conservator Orbis* and *Conservator Semper Vitae*—but it reappears in its original form in Arnobius: *Adversus Nationes*, Book II, chap. 64, where it is applied, not, of course, to Trajan, but to Christ. *Conservator* had come to be accepted as the regular Latin rendering of the Greek word *σωτήρ* in the pagan Latin usage of the Imperial Age (though Cicero had resorted to the periphrasis 'Is est . . . σωτήρ qui salutem dedit', on the plea that the Greek title meant something 'ita magnum ut Latine uno verbo exprimi non possit' (*In Verrem*, Actio II, Book II, chap. 63, § 154)). The Christian Latin rendering *Salvator* originated in a solecism, since it is based on a non-classical verb *salvare* which was coined in a Christian mint from the classical adjective *salvus* (Pauly-Wissowa, vol. cit., col. 1220). This solecism makes its first appearance in Latin literature in the works of the African Tertullian; and nearly two hundred years later a greater African father and man-of-letters still shows some discomfort in making use of it. 'Christus inquit, Iesus, id est Christus Salvator [Matt. i. 21] . . . nec quaerant grammatici quam sit Latinum, sed christiani quam verum . . . "salvare" et "salvator" non fuerunt haec Latina antequam veniret Salvator; quando ad Latinos venit, et haec Latina fecit' (Saint Augustine: *Sermo CCXCIX*, chap. 6). 'Verbum ["salvator"] Latina lingua antequam non habebat, sed habere poterat, sicut potuit, quando voluit' (idem: *De Trinitate*, Book XIII, chap. [10] 14).

Galba, Trajan, Commodus, and Caracalla which bear the motto *Salus Generis Humani*; and others on which Didius Julianus (!) and Septimius Severus and Caracalla and Constantine are depicted, holding the globe, with the legend *Rector Orbis*. And there are inscriptions, again, in which the title *Dominus Orbis* is given to Florian (!) and Diocletian and Julian.

In this array of Hellenic Imperial titles the truth is evidently blended with an alloy of make-believe. The debasement was not so gross as to prevent the coin from being accepted at its face value by contemporaries who managed to live through the collapse of the Empire without ever being aware of the tremendous event which they were witnessing and were perhaps even helping to bring to pass. But for our eyes, which can see it in perspective, this Hellenic portrait of the Saviour with the Sword brings out, with all the force of dramatic irony, the truth that mundane weapons, whether naked or sheathed, cannot be converted into effective instruments of even a mundane salvation.

ANNEX II TO V. C (ii) (a)

CHRISTUS PATIENS

The Problem

IN the chapter to which this annex attaches we have found that in a disintegrating society the creative genius assumes the role of a saviour; and an empirical survey of would-be saviours has led us to distinguish four types: the saviour with the sword, the saviour with 'the Time-Machine', the philosopher masked by a king, and the god incarnate in a man. Our purpose in making this tentative classification was to discover which of the alternative ways of seeking salvation is the true road and which are the aberrations; and accordingly, in following out the main thread of our argument, we have paid more attention to points of difference and contrast between our four types of saviour than to points of resemblance and connexion.¹ Yet, *ex hypothesi*, these different types have something in common, or it would have been impossible to apply the same name—'saviour'—to all of them. What is this common element? How far does it extend? And what is its significance?

Perhaps the most promising approach to these questions will be to look for the answer in a concrete case. If we concentrate upon the history of the Hellenic Society in the age of its disintegration, we shall become aware of certain correspondences between the accounts that have come down to us of divers saviours who arose in the Hellenic World in this chapter of its story; and we shall find that these correspondences override our classification of types; for the subjects of them are on the one hand Jesus—the saviour who made his epiphany as God incarnate in a man—and on the other hand a number of the pagan Hellenic saviours with the 'time-machine'. These partial counterparts of Jesus fall, for their part, into two sub-groups. Some of them—i.e. Aristonicus, Eunus, Salvius, Catiline—are leaders of the Hellenic internal proletariat who either were born into it, as Jesus was, or were adopted into it as deserters from the ranks of the Hellenic dominant minority. The saviours in this sub-group, both born proletarians and renegades, differ from Jesus in being futurists. The other sub-group—which includes the two Heracleidae, Agis and Cleomenes; the two Gracchi, Tiberius and Gaius; a companion of the Gracchi,

¹ One point of resemblance has, however, been touched upon in V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, p. 346, above.

Marcus Fulvius Flaccus; and also Cato Minor—consists entirely of members of the dominant minority who lived and died as archaists (though some of them came to be adopted, in the teeth of their own aims and desires, as heroes of an internal proletariat that was marching militantly along a futuristic war-path).¹ It will be evident at once that there is one fundamental difference in aim and outlook between Jesus and all these other saviours. The futurists and the archaists alike were seeking to establish a kingdom in This World, and their quest of Utopia was foredoomed to take to violence and to end in failure, whereas Jesus was seeking to establish a kingdom which was not of This World, he refused to take the sword, and in submitting, without resistance, to an unjust judgement and a painful death he accepted a material defeat which was in itself a supreme spiritual victory. This difference between Jesus and the pagan saviours who are his partial counterparts involves and expresses an element in Christianity which is of its essence, and, by comparison with this deep diversity, the correspondences with which we are now concerned are obviously superficial and trivial. Nevertheless they may still be worth examining for the light which they throw in the first place upon the passage of ideas and feelings across the gulf between the Hellenic dominant minority and the Hellenic internal proletariat, and in the second place upon the scope, and the limits, of the possibility of using old bottles to hold new wine.² If we keep our present *caveat* in mind throughout the following inquiry, we may perhaps be able to reap some of the fruits of what is called 'the Higher Criticism' without losing our sense of spiritual proportion. With this proviso let us now set out the correspondences between the accounts of these saviours of different kinds, and then see whether we can explain them.³

Correspondences between the story of Jesus and the Stories of certain Hellenic Saviours with the 'Time-Machine'

Since the story of Jesus enters into all the correspondences in question, it will be best to tabulate the points in the order in which they occur in the Gospels, after noticing several correspondences of a general nature which have no exact place in a chronological series.

¹ On this point see V. C (i) (a), pp. 236-41, above.

² Matt. ix. 17 = Mark ii. 22, quoted in IV. C (iii) (b) 1, vol. iv, p. 133, above.

³ The writer's purpose is, not to make a case for or against this or that explanation, but to put before his readers all the materials within the writer's knowledge that are relevant to a study of the problem. In the following survey he has therefore included many correspondences which, in his opinion, are certainly slight and almost certainly fortuitous, and has omitted only such as are demonstrably fortuitous (e.g. the example examined on pp. 418-19, below).

1. *There is a pair of heroes who are distinguished from one another by the double difference—of age and of éthos—between a gentle predecessor and a violent successor.*

Since Gentleness and Futurism are incompatible,¹ this correspondence is limited *a priori* to Jesus and the archaists. The double difference comes out most clearly in the contrast between Agis and Cleomenes, and it also appears in the relation between Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus. But in the Gracchan story Gaius does not play the role of the violent hero consistently. At the crisis—when the Government are trying to provoke him into resorting to force—he changes over from the violent to the gentle hero's part, while the part that he discards is taken on by Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, who in this last act of the tragedy plays Cleomenes to Gaius's Agis (see Plutarch: *Lives of the Gracchi*, chaps. 34–8).² At the corresponding crisis in the career of Jesus, Jesus himself reacts with the gentleness of Gaius, and Peter with the violence of Fulvius. But there are also traces in the Gospels (e.g. the description of Jesus's mission that is given in Matt. x. 34–9 = Luke xii. 49–53; the description of the nature of the contrast between the new and the old dispensation that is given in Matt. xi. 11–12 = Luke xvi. 16; the incident of the cleansing of the Temple (Matt. xxi. 12–13 = Mark xi. 15–17 = Luke xix. 45–6 = John ii. 13–17); and the hint, in Luke xxii. 35–8, of at least an impulse in Jesus's mind, on the eve of the Passion, to take to the sword) of a different distribution of roles in which Jesus plays the violent hero's part;³ and if, in the light of this, we ask ourselves who it is that plays Tiberius Gracchus to Jesus's Gaius, the answer will be: John the Baptist.⁴

2. *The hero is of royal lineage.*

Jesus is a son of David according to the Synoptic Gospels (e.g. Matt. ix. 27; xv. 22; xx. 30–1; Mark x. 47–8; Luke xviii. 38–9);⁵ Agis and Cleomenes are Heracleidae; Aristonicus is an Attalid. The Gracchi are not themselves of royal birth, though they are

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 385–7, above.

² Plutarch's *Lives of the Gracchi* and *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes* are cited and quoted here from K. Ziegler's edition (Leipzig 1915, Teubner).

³ This vein of Violence also shows itself here and there in other parts of the New Testament: e.g. in James v. 1–6 (though a violent preamble is here followed by a gentle sequel) and, above all, in the Book of Revelation. See V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex III, vol. v, pp. 580–90, above.

⁴ The writer is indebted to Dr. Martin Braun for having pointed out to him that both Gaius Gracchus and Jesus appear in both the two roles, and that in both cases the violent role is played first, while the change over from Violence to Gentleness is made in the last act, in which the tragedy reaches its crisis. He also owes to the same scholar the equation Tiberius : Gaius = John the Baptist : Jesus.

⁵ On the other hand, John i. 43–51, and vii. 40–53, might be read as implicit rejections of a story that Jesus was of Davidic lineage.

aristocrats; but their mother moves in royal society (Plut., chap. 40) and has, in King Ptolemy, a royal wooer (Plut., chap. 1) who is a counterpart of Jesus's mother's royal husband;¹ and Tiberius is eventually assassinated by his enemies on the ground that he is asking for a crown (Plut., chap. 19).

3. *The hero's genealogy is recited.*

Jesus's genealogy in Matthew i. 1-17, and in Luke iii. 23-38;² Agis' genealogy in Plutarch, chap. 3.

4. *The hero's genealogy has a flaw in it.*

According to the 'conceptionist' (though not according to the 'adoptionist') version of Christianity, Jesus's claim to be a son of David is disputable, inasmuch as it is derived from a descendant of David who is the husband of Jesus's mother but who—in this version of the story—is not, himself, Jesus's father.³ There is a comparable doubt about Aristonicus's claim to be an Attalid (δοκῶν τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ διανοούμενος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ποιῆσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν—Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XIV, chap. 38 = Kramer, p. 646); and, even if he is acknowledged to be King Eumenes' son, the legitimacy of his birth is contested ('Erat ex Eumene Aristonicus, non iusto matrimonio, sed ex paelice Ephesia, citharistae cuiusdam filia, genitus—qui post mortem Attali velut paternum regnum Asiam invasit.'—Justin, Book XXXVI, chap. 4, § 6).

5. *The hero's mother believes in him and encourages him.*

This is the attitude of Jesus's mother towards Jesus in the Gospel according to Saint John (e.g. in John ii. 3-5 and 12; xix. 25-7); and it is also the attitude of Cleomenes' mother towards Cleomenes (Plutarch: *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 27) and of the mother of the Gracchi towards both Tiberius (Plutarch: *Lives of the Gracchi*, chap. 8) and Gaius (chap. 34). Again, it is the eventual attitude of the mother of Agis towards her son (Plut., chap. 7).

N.B. On this point the Gospel according to Saint John is in

¹ This equation Joseph : Mary : Jesus = Ptolemy : Cornelia : the Gracchi holds good only for the 'conceptionist' Christianity according to which Jesus's claim to be a son of David is derived from a husband of the hero's mother who is not, himself, the hero's father. If we assume the, perhaps older, 'adoptionist' position, according to which Jesus is really Joseph's son, the analogy breaks down; for in the Roman story there is no possibility of a version in which the Gracchi turn out to have been really the sons of Ptolemy. Cornelia is not wooed by Ptolemy till after her children are born and the husband to whom she has borne them is dead; and then she does not accept Ptolemy, but rejects him! For the distinction between 'conceptionist' and 'adoptionist' Christianity see IV. C (iii) 2 (β), Annex III, vol. iv, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 271-5, above.

² See *ibid.*, p. 273, footnote 4, above.

³ See the passage of Eduard Meyer that is quoted *ibid.*, pp. 268-9, and also the same chapter, p. 267, footnote 5, above.

apparently deliberate contradiction with the Synoptic Gospels. In all three of these it would appear to be implied that Jesus and his mother are out of sympathy with each other (Matt. xii. 46-50 = Mark iii. 31-5 = Luke viii. 19-21); and his mother is not mentioned among the women who are present at the Crucifixion (see Point 80, below). The two apparently contradictory accounts of the attitude of the hero's mother which are given in this apparently irreconcilable form in two different versions of the story of Jesus are reconciled in the story of Agis, in which the hero's mother starts as a sceptic but ends as a convert (Plut., chap. 7).

6. *The hero is recognized and accepted by a forerunner as the latter's successor and superior.*

Jesus by John the Baptist (Matt. iii. 11-17; Mark i. 7-11; Luke iii. 15-22; John i. 15-17 and 25-37, and iii. 22-36); Eunus by Cleon (Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, § 17); Salvius by Athenio (Diodorus, Book XXXVI, chap. 7, § 2).

7. *The hero inveighs against the powers that be, on the ground that they are usurpers who have driven out or slain without trial the legitimate authorities and have perverted the ancient law.*

Jesus's denunciations of the Scribes and Pharisees (e.g. Matt. xxiii, *passim*; Mark xii. 38-40; Luke xx. 45-7); Cleomenes' denunciation of the Ephors (Plut., chap. 31).

8. *The hero proclaims that the right of membership in the society that is the field of his mission is not a privilege of birth, but is a reward of merit.*¹

This is one of the principal *motifs* in the Gospels:² 'Many that are first shall be last, and the last shall be first' (Matt. xix. 30, and xx. 16 = Mark x. 31 = Luke xiii. 30); it is expressed in the miracle of the healing of the centurion's servant (Matt. viii. 5-13 = Luke vii. 1-10) and in the parables of the Wicked Husbandmen (Matt. xxi. 33-44 = Mark xii. 1-11 = Luke xx. 9-18), the Labourers in the Vineyard (Matt. xx. 1-16), the Father and his Two Sons (Matt. xxi. 28-32), the King's Son's Marriage (Matt. xxii. 1-14 = Luke xiv. 15-24), the Good Samaritan (Luke x. 25-37), Dives and Lazarus (Luke xvi. 19-31), the Pharisee and the Publican (Luke xviii. 9-14). Publicans and harlots who believe are

¹ This truth is, of course, one of the facts that account for the phenomenon of *Peripeteia* (see IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, pp. 245-61, above).

² The clearest enunciation of it is: 'Think not to say within yourselves: "We have Abraham to our father"; for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham' (Matt. iii. 9). But this saying is attributed, not to Jesus himself, but to his forerunner John the Baptist. It is only in the Gospel according to Saint John (viii. 31-59) that it is put—in an elaborated version—into Jesus's mouth.

preferred to Scribes and Pharisees who do not repent (Matt. xxi. 31-2). Similarly, the enfranchisement of non-citizens who are worthy of the franchise is of the essence of the programme of the Spartan and Roman archaists: Agis and Cleomenes enfranchise not only select perioeci but also select aliens (Plut., chaps. 8-10 and 31-2).

9. *The hero denounces a state of affairs in which there are human beings who are so utterly destitute of any part or lot in the inheritance of the Earth that in this respect, at any rate, they are worse off than wild animals.*

Jesus makes this invidious comparison apropos of himself and his followers (Matt. viii. 19-20 = Luke ix. 57-8); Tiberius Gracchus makes it apropos of a *ci-devant* peasantry that has been turned into a landless proletariat (Plut., chap. 9);¹ Aristonicus makes it apropos of his followers implicitly in calling them 'Heliopolitae' (i.e. human beings who, if they can be held to possess civic rights in any commonwealth at all, are certainly not in enjoyment of these in any commonwealth that is to be found on the face of the Earth)² (Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XIV, chap. 38 = Kramer, p. 646).

10. *The hero calls on all who are within hearing to win the reward of merit for themselves by following him through an ordeal.*

Jesus calls to the Cross (Matt. x. 16-42, and xvi. 24-8 = Mark viii. 34-8 = Luke ix. 23-7, and xiv. 25-33); Cleomenes (Plut., chap. 58) and Aristonicus (Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XVI, chap. 38 = Kramer, p. 646) call to liberty. Cleomenes calls upon the people of Alexandria to take up arms and risk their lives under his leadership for the sake of winning their political liberty by overthrowing the autocratic government of the Ptolemies;³ Aristonicus calls upon the proletarian freemen and the slaves in Asia Minor to join his standard for the sake of winning their economic and social liberty by making 'Heliopolis', instead of Rome, into the heir of the Kingdom of the Attalids.

11. *The crowds that flock round the hero are so great that any one who is determined to approach him, or even to see or hear him, has to take extraordinary steps.*

In the picture given in the Gospels the multitude tread on one another as they surge round Jesus (Luke xii. 1); the four men

¹ This correspondence between a saying attributed to Tiberius Gracchus and a saying attributed to Jesus has been touched upon, by anticipation, in IV. C (iii) (c) 3 (β), vol. iv, pp. 508 and 510; in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 70-1; and in V. C (i) (c) 1, Annex, vol. v, p. 574, above.

² For the implications of the term 'Heliopolitae' see V. C (iii) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 69, 70, 82, footnote 4, and 180; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, p. 384; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, p. 692, footnote 2; and V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, in the present volume, p. 351, above.

³ See V. C (ii) (a), p. 217, above.

bearing the man sick of the palsy have to take the tiles off the roof of the house where Jesus is and then let the bed down through the hole, because it is impossible to get in by the door (Mark ii. 1-4); Zacchaeus has to climb a tree if he is to gain even a sight of Jesus (Luke xix. 1-6). When Gaius Gracchus is standing for election to the Tribune of the Plebs, the crowd that flocks to Rome to vote is so great that many fail to find lodgings, and on polling day they have to climb on to the roofs because the campus will not hold them all (Plut., chap. 24).

12. *The hero's programme obtains an extraordinary publicity.*

'That which ye have spoken in the ear in closets shall be proclaimed upon the house-tops' (Luke xii. 3).¹ The acclamations with which Gaius Gracchus was hailed on the campus 'were echoed from the roofs and the tiles' (Plut., chap. 24).

13. *In his domestic life the hero avoids ostentation by deliberately taking a middle course between asceticism and luxuriousness.*

Jesus's attitude towards the Sabbath (Matt. xii. 1-8 = Mark ii. 23-8 = Luke vi. 1-5); Cleomenes' attitude towards the 'Lycurgean' *agôgê* (Plut., chap. 34).²

14. *By his refusal to go to extremes of asceticism—which he combines with a readiness to keep company with people of all sorts and conditions—the hero causes scandal.*

Jesus's avoidance of an extreme asceticism scandalizes the disciples of John the Baptist (Matt. ix. 14-15 = Mark ii. 18-20 = Luke v. 33-5, and vii. 31-5); his keeping company with publicans and sinners scandalizes the Pharisees (Matt. ix. 10-13 = Mark ii. 14-17 = Luke v. 27-32; vii. 36-50; and xv. 1-2). Tiberius Gracchus was censured by Quintus Metellus for allowing himself to be lighted home at night by 'the most offensive and most poverty-stricken people in Rome'—in contrast to the behaviour of Tiberius's father, who had made his countrymen live in such awe of him that during his censorship, whenever he went home after dining out, the householders used to put out their lights for fear that he might think them immoderately addicted to parties and to drink (Plut., chap. 14).

N.B. Cleomenes, too, made himself accessible; but in his case this affability, so far from causing scandal, was decidedly popular (Plut., chap. 34).

¹ Cf. Luke iv. 14-15, quoted in this connexion on p. 471, below.

² This passage of Plutarch is evidently derived from Phylarchus *apud* Athenaeum: *Deipnosophistae*, Book IV, pp. 141 F-142 F (see the present Annex, p. 436, below).

15. *The hero makes a sensational claim to kingship, which he supports by the further claim that he has been commissioned by God (by a god or by certain gods or by the Gods).*

Jesus claims to be the Messiah: i.e. the saviour-king, anointed (i.e. commissioned) by God, whose advent is expected by Jewry (Matt. xvi. 13-20 = Mark viii. 27-30 = Luke ix. 18-21); correspondingly, three leaders of slave-insurrections in Sicily claim, on divine authority, that they are destined to win a victory which will be rewarded with a royal crown. Eunus declares, before he rises in insurrection, that the Dea Syra has appeared to him and has told him that he is to become a king (Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, §§ 5-7).¹ Salvius, who is elected king by the insurgents in the second Sicilian slave-insurrection, is an expert in divination by interpreting the meaning of the entrails of sacrificial victims, and he is also a devotee of 'the feminine gods' (Diodorus, Book XXXVI, chap. 4, § 4); Athenio is an expert in astromancy, and he maintains that the Gods have signified to him through the stars that he is destined to become king of the whole of Sicily (Diodorus, Book XXXVI, chap. 5, §§ 1 and 3).

N.B. According to the traditional Jewish conception of the Messiah's mission, the Messiah was to do for Jewry exactly what the Sicilian slave-kings did momentarily succeed in doing for their insurgent followers. By an act of human physical force which was to acquire an irresistible impetus from the divine auspices under which it was being put into action, the Messiah was to achieve, on the mundane plane of life, a reversal of political roles. The subject people of to-day was to be the imperial people of to-morrow; the Messiah was to transfer the sceptre to Jerusalem from Susa or Antioch or Rome, and, as a result of his victory, the Jews were to step into the shoes of the Persians or the Macedonians or the Romans.² In the Gospels, however, the accounts of Jesus's claim to be the Messiah are associated with a departure, in two important respects, from the traditional Jewish conception of the Messiah's mission and nature; and, on both counts, this departure diminishes the closeness of the correspondence between the claims to kingship that are made respectively by Jesus and by the Sicilian slave-leaders. In the first place Jesus perplexes his disciples' minds and devastates their hopes by telling them at once that his Messiahship spells, not military victory and political triumph, but being put to death (Matt. xvi. 21-3 = Mark viii. 31-3 = Luke

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 34, footnote 5, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), pp. 124-5, above.

² See IV. C (iii) (b) 12, vol. iv, pp. 224-5; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 68-9; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 657-9; and V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), in the present volume, pp. 120-3, above.

ix. 22);¹ in the second place, according to Matthew (xvi. 16)²—though not according to Mark (viii. 29) or to Luke (ix. 20)—Peter hails Jesus as the Son of God as a corollary of his acknowledgement of Jesus's Messiahship—in contradiction with the traditional Jewish view, which expected the Messiah to be, not the divine Son of God, but a human son of David.³

N.B. In the Gospel according to Saint John the incident is transformed to a degree which makes its correspondence with the analogous Sicilian incidents barely recognizable. In this Gospel Peter's declaration—'We believe and are sure that thou art Christ, the Son of the living God' (John vi. 69)—is overshadowed by a preamble (John vi. 22–68) in which Jesus, instead of evoking an acknowledgement of his Messiahship by asking a question, propounds in his own words a claim to have been sent down from Heaven by God to perform, for all men who accept his claim, a service that is analogous to, though infinitely more valuable and more wonderful than, the service that is performed for Mankind by the Spirit of the Vegetation.⁴ The Vegetation Spirit provides material bread for a single year; Jesus is spiritual bread that confers eternal life.

16. *A tableau of a rider riding through the streets of a capital city on a mount which has been commandeered for him by his companions on the spur of the moment without opposition from the owner.*

Jesus riding into Jerusalem on an ass, accompanied by his followers on foot (Matt. xxi. 1–7 = Mark xi. 1–7 = Luke xix. 29–35 = John xii. 14–15); Hippitas, a lame companion of Cleomenes, riding through the streets of Alexandria on a horse—that has been commandeered from a passer-by—in company with Cleomenes himself and with the rest of the king's companions, who are all on foot (Plut., chap. 58).

17. *The hero in person forcibly clears a public place from trespassers who have unlawfully encroached upon it for their private profit.*

Jesus overthrows the tables of the money-changers and the seats of the poulterers (who are selling doves for sacrifice) in the precincts of the Temple at Jerusalem (Matt. xxi. 12–13 = Mark

¹ This new association of ideas has been touched upon in V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 392–3, above.

² Matt. xvi. 16 is echoed in John vi. 69, and xi. 27.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 11, p. 163, footnote 1, above. For the association between Jesus's claim to divinity and his premonition of his death see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 74; V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 392–3; and V. C (i) (d) 11, in the present volume, p. 165, above.

⁴ For the myth of the ἐνιαντὸς δαίμων see III. C (iii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 256–9, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 276–7, above.

xi. 15-17 = Luke xix. 45-6 = John ii. 13-17); Gaius Gracchus pulls down the seats which his fellow magistrates, by an abuse of privilege, have erected round the Forum at Rome in order to let them, for money, to sightseers on the day of a show (Plut., chap. 33).

18. *The authorities want to compass the hero's ruin, but are at a loss how to proceed against him because of his popularity.*

Jesus at Jerusalem (Matt. xxi. 46, and xxvi. 3-5 = Mark xi. 18, and xiv. 1-2 = Luke xxii. 2); Cleomenes at Alexandria (Plut., chap. 54 = Polybius, Book V, chap. 35); Tiberius Gracchus at Rome (Plut., chap. 10).

19. *The authorities try to catch the hero out by asking him awkward questions, but his answers recoil upon the questioners.*

The Pharisees and Herodians ask Jesus whether it is lawful to pay tribute to Caesar; the Sadducees set him a trap over the doctrine of the Resurrection; and a doctor of the Law asks him which is the greatest of the Commandments (Matt. xxii. 15-40 = Mark xii. 13-34 = Luke xx. 20-40); but Jesus silences them all. Similarly, Agis silences Leonidas when he asks him whether Lycurgus had cancelled debts or enfranchised aliens, as Agis was proposing to do (Plut., chap. 10).

N.B. On the other hand Tiberius Gracchus is put out of countenance by a question from Titus Annius (Plut., chap. 14).

20. *At a meal the hero is offered a special luxury by an admirer (by admirers) from outside his most intimate circle.*

The alabaster box of precious ointment that is offered by a woman to Jesus in the house of Simon at Bethany (Matt. xxvi. 6-13 = Mark xiv. 3-9 = Luke vii. 37-50¹ = John xi. 2,² and xii. 1-8); the dinner and gifts that are sent in to Cleomenes, in the prison at Alexandria, by his friends outside (Plut., chap. 58).

21. *The authorities are at a loss how to proceed against the hero because he has a safe retreat.*

Jesus at Jerusalem spends only the daytime in the city and sleeps at night outside the walls at Bethany;³ Agis at Sparta takes sanctuary in the temple of Athena Chalcioecus (Plut., chap. 16);

¹ In this Gospel the incident is placed in a different context.

² In this verse the woman—who in the Synoptic Gospels is anonymous—is identified with Mary the sister of Lazarus.

³ This is recounted in all four Gospels, but in the Gospel according to Saint John the retreat at Bethany has a doublet in a retreat in Ephraim (John xi. 53-4).

Gaius Gracchus at Rome moves house from a fashionable quarter on the Palatine to a working-class quarter in the neighbourhood of the Forum (Plut., chap. 33).

22. *One of the hero's companions undertakes to betray him to the authorities by giving them an opportunity to arrest him at a moment when he is out of shelter.*

Judas undertakes to betray Jesus (Matt. xxvi. 14-16 = Mark xiv. 10-11 = Luke xxii. 3-6); Amphares undertakes to betray Agis (Plut., chap. 18).

23. *The traitor perpetrates his treachery for a trifling consideration.*

Judas for thirty pieces of silver (Matt. xxvi. 15); Amphares in the hope of being able to retain possession of some clothes and plate that he has recently borrowed from Agis' mother Agesistrata (Plut., chap. 18).

24. *The hero's Last Supper.*

Jesus's (Matt. xxvi. 17-29 = Mark xiv. 12-25 = Luke xxii. 7-38 = John xiii-xvii); Cleomenes' (Plut., chap. 58); Fulvius's (Plut., chap. 35); Cato Minor's (Plutarch: *Life of Cato Minor*, chap. 67).

N.B. The atmosphere at Fulvius's Last Supper is at the opposite extreme from the atmosphere at Cato's or Jesus's. In the stories of Jesus's and Cato's Passions the supper is eaten in a mood of sublime tension and with a sense of tragic foreboding, whereas Fulvius and his companions seek to drown care and banish any thought of the morrow by turning the meal into a drunken orgy. This scene of sordid debauchery serves as a foil to an agonizing vigil which, in the Roman story, is not subsequent to the supper but is contemporaneous with it and, by the same token, has a different protagonist. Fulvius and his companions carouse while Gaius Gracchus and his companions watch and pray (for Fulvius's role as the violent foil to Gaius Gracchus when Gaius himself is playing the gentle instead of the violent hero's part, see p. 378, above). Yet, although Fulvius's Last Supper may seem to present as great a contrast to Jesus's and Cato's Last Suppers as it does present, and is intended to present, to Gaius Gracchus's vigil, there is nevertheless a link between these two antithetical presentations of the Last Supper, and this is to be found in the account of Cleomenes' Last Supper. In this scene (Plut., chap. 58) the hero and his companions at table are really in the mood of Jesus and his disciples and of Cato and his circle; but they pretend to be in the mood of Fulvius and his companions in order to deceive the warders. In the scene in Cleomenes' prison, as in the scene in

Fulvius's house, there is a tableau of one (or some) of the carousers lying in a drunken sleep after the carouse is over (see Point 38, below); but, whereas in the Roman scene the drunken sleeper is the hero (in this case Fulvius) himself, in the Alexandrian scene it is the prison warders who are lying drunk and asleep; Cleomenes has deliberately reduced them to this condition in order to be able to effect his escape; and it has been in order to lure the warders into getting drunk that Cleomenes and his companions have pretended to be carousing, when really they have been steeling themselves for facing the ordeal of a forlorn hope.

25. *There are thirteen at table.*

At Jesus's last supper (Matt. xxvi. 20 = Mark xiv. 17 = Luke xxii. 14); at Cleomenes' Last Supper (Plut., chap. 58).

26. *The traitor is denounced (is suspected) at the supper.*

The denunciation of Judas (Matt. xxvi. 21-5 = Mark xiv. 18-21 = Luke xxii. 21-3 = John xiii. 18-22); the suspicion falling on Cleomenes' slave (Plut., chap. 58).

27. *The traitor goes (has gone) out.*

Judas (John xiii. 27-30); Cleomenes' slave (Plut., chap. 58).

28. *A tableau of a favourite companion lying on the hero's breast.*

John on Jesus's breast (John xiii. 23-6); Panteus on Cleomenes' breast (Plut., chap. 58); Philocrates on Gaius Gracchus's breast (Plut., chap. 38).

29. *A religious rite at which the hero gives the participants to eat of the flesh and drink of the blood of a human sacrificial victim.¹*

Jesus at his Last Supper institutes the Communion-Rite of the Christian Church by giving his companions bread to eat and wine to drink as symbols of a metaphorical eating of his own flesh and drinking of his own blood (Matt. xxvi. 26-9 = Mark xiv. 22-5 = Luke xxii. 15-20); Catiline, at the secret meeting which he has convened in order to broach his conspiracy, sacrificially kills a slave and gives this human victim's flesh to eat (Plutarch: *Life of Cicero*, chap. 10; Dio Cassius: *History of Rome*, Book XXXVII, chap. 30) and his blood—mixed with wine—to drink (Sallust: *De Coniuratione Catilinae*, chap. 22) to those present before taking them into his confidence.

N.B. Cleomenes and his companions in prison at Alexandria

¹ The writer owes this point to Dr. Martin Braun.

revolt at the idea of waiting while they are fattened for slaughter 'like sacrificial victims' (Plut., chap. 57).¹

30. *The hero declares to his companions at table his conviction that the death which now stares him in the face will prove a triumph.*

Jesus (John xiii. 31-2, and xvii); Cato Minor (Plutarch: *Life of Cato Minor*, chap. 67).

31. *The hero assures those at table who are his friends that in the hour of his triumph he will reward them for their friendship towards him.*

Jesus at his Last Supper (Luke xxii. 28-30; John xiv-xvi); Eunus at the supper-parties of his master Antigenes (Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, § 8).

32. *When the Last Supper is over, the hero calls for swords (for his sword).*

Jesus (Luke xxii. 35-8); Cato Minor (Plutarch: *Life of Cato Minor*, chap. 68). Fulvius and his companions equip themselves with arms that are hanging in Fulvius's house as spoils of war (Plut., chap. 36).

N.B. Tiberius Gracchus takes to wearing a dagger under his clothes when he finds, in the middle of his conflict with Octavius, that the Senatorial dominant minority are plotting to kill him (Plut., chap. 10); Gaius Gracchus orders all his companions to carry swords under their togas (Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 28^a).

33. *A tableau of the hero and his party going out into the open.*

Jesus and his companions going out on to the Mount of Olives (Matt. xxvi. 30 = Mark xiv. 26 = Luke xxii. 39 = John xviii. 1); Fulvius and his companions going out on to the Aventine (Plut., chap. 36); Cleomenes and his companions going out into the streets of Alexandria (Plut., chap. 58).

N.B. There is, however, a sharp discrepancy in respect of the time of day: Jesus and his companions go out at night (Matt. xxvi. 31 = Mark xiv. 27), Fulvius and his companions at dawn (Plut., chap. 36), Cleomenes and his companions at midday (Plut., chap. 58).

¹ Dr. Martin Braun brings into comparison the cock-and-bull story of the alleged Jewish practice of ritual murder, as recounted by Apion and quoted from this source by Josephus: *Contra Apionem*, Book II, §§ 91-6: 'The practice was repeated annually at a fixed season. They would kidnap a Greek foreigner, fatten him up for a year, and then convey him to a wood, where they slew him, sacrificed his body with their customary ritual, partook of his flesh, and, while immolating the Greek, swore an oath of hostility to the Greeks' (§ 95).

34. *An enthusiastic companion of the hero boasts that he will never desert his leader; but the hero disapproves of the boast and prophesies that it will not be lived up to when it comes to the point.*

Peter and Jesus (Matt. xxvi. 31-5 = Mark xiv. 27-31 = Luke xxii. 31-4 = John xiii. 36-8);¹ Statilius and Cato Minor (Plutarch: *Life of Cato Minor*, chaps. 55-6).

N.B. In the corresponding scene between Therycion and Cleomenes (Plut., chap. 52) Cleomenes disapproves of Therycion's proposal that the party of fugitives should commit suicide instead of leaving Laconian ground as refugees and seeking asylum in the dominions of Ptolemy; but in the sequel the parts are reversed. Therycion lives up to his proposal by duly committing suicide on the beach of Aegialia; Cleomenes does not follow his example on the spot, but does follow it at Alexandria after his disillusionment with his experience of exile (see further Points 54 and 84, below).

35. *The hero singles out three companions (one companion) for a task that demands special endurance.*

Jesus singles out Peter, James, and John to keep watch during his agony (Matt. xxvi. 37 = Mark xiv. 33); Cleomenes—having decided that he and his companions shall die by their own hands—singles out Panteus to wait till the last and make sure that all the rest are dead before putting an end to himself (Plut., chap. 58).

36. *A tableau of the hero in spiritual agony during the night before his dying day.*²

Jesus's agony of prayer to his Father at Gethsemane (Matt. xxvi. 36-46 = Mark xiv. 32-42 = Luke xxii. 40-6); Gaius Gracchus's agony of silent contemplation of his father's statue (Plut., chap. 35; cf. Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 28a).³

N.B. In the picture of Jesus's agony in the Gospel according to Saint Luke the visual correspondence with the picture of Gaius Gracchus's agony is accentuated by the introduction of a feature that does not appear in the other two Synoptic Gospels: according to Saint Luke, Jesus's prayer is answered by the vision of an angel. It may be noted, as a curious though perhaps trivial detail, that, in Mantegna's picture of the agony of Jesus, which follows Luke on this point, the figures of the angels are distinctly statuesque.

¹ In the Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Mark this incident is placed after the exit, on the road to the Mount of Olives; in the Gospels according to Saint Luke and Saint John it is placed before the exit, as a sequel to the denunciation of Judas.

² The correspondence between Jesus's and Gaius Gracchus's foreboding of his fate is noticed by Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 166.

³ In Diodorus's narrative Gaius's agony is placed immediately before the murder of Antullus, and not in the night after it.

37. *Tableaux of a bodyguard (α) keeping watch (β) asleep.*

Jesus takes three of the eleven—Peter, James, and John—and asks them to keep watch while he prays, but three times over they fall asleep (Matt. xxvi. 37-46 = Mark xiv. 33-42 = Luke xxii. 45-6);¹ a number of Gaius Gracchus's supporters, seeing him in agony at his father's statue, accompany him home and spend the night at the door, where they organize themselves into watches which are on and off duty by turns (Plut., chap. 35). Similarly, on the night before the death of Tiberius Gracchus, a number of his supporters camp round Tiberius's house and keep watch (Plut., chap. 16).

38. *A tableau of watchers caught asleep at the moment of crisis.*

In Jesus's Passion Peter, James, and John are caught asleep at the moment when the officers of the Sanhedrin, guided by Judas, take them by surprise (Matt. xxvi. 45-6 = Mark xiv. 41-2); in Cleomenes' Passion the prison warders are caught asleep at the moment when Cleomenes and his companions break out (Plut., chap. 58); in Gaius Gracchus's Passion Fulvius is caught asleep when the return of daylight exposes the Gracchans to the danger of being attacked at any moment by the Government forces (Plut., chap. 36).

39. *The traitor fulfils his undertaking to give the authorities an opportunity of arresting the hero when he is out of shelter.*

Judas guides the officers of the Sanhedrin to the spot where Jesus is praying in Gethsemane (Matt. xxvi. 47 = Mark xiv. 43 = Luke xxii. 47 = John xviii. 2-3); Amphares (aided by Damochares and Arcesilaus) kidnaps Agis on the road back from a bath-house, outside the precincts of Athena Chalcioecus, which Agis has been visiting according to his practice, and drags him off, with the help of accomplices, to a prison which Leonidas then surrounds with a cordon of foreign professional soldiers (Plut., chap. 19).

40. *The traitor tries to put the hero off his guard by a heartlessly deceitful show of affection.*

Judas betrays Jesus with a kiss (Matt. xxvi. 48-9 = Mark xiv. 44-5 = Luke xxii. 47-8); Amphares and his two confederates waylay Agis [on his way back from the bath-house], give him a cordial greeting, and then go along with him—keeping up all the

¹ The Gospel according to Saint Luke does not record that three out of the eleven were picked out to keep watch, and does not represent the disciples as having fallen asleep more than once.

time a patter of talk and chaff, as one would with a young fellow with whom one was on terms of familiarity (Plut., chap. 19).

41. *A tableau of a crowd in a hubbub, with lights.*

In the Passion of Jesus at the moment of the arrest (John xviii. 3); in the Passion of Agis between the passing of the death-sentence and its execution (Plut., chap. 19).

N.B. Whereas in the story of Jesus the crowd is hostile to the hero and intends to arrest him, in the story of Agis it is friendly to the hero and intends to rescue him.

42. *The men who take violent action against the hero and his companions are armed with staves.*

The officers of the Sanhedrin who arrest Jesus (Matt. xxvi. 47 = Mark xiv. 43); the Senators who assault Tiberius Gracchus (Plut., chap. 19).

N.B. In the Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Mark the phrase is *μετὰ μαχαίρων καὶ ξύλων* (which is telescoped into *μετὰ . . . ὀπλων* in John xviii. 3); in Plutarch it runs *περὶ αὐτοῦς ῥόπαλα καὶ σκυτάλας ἐκόμιζον*. In the story of the killing of Tiberius Gracchus the point is made that, while there were more than 300 fatal casualties, not one of the victims was killed with cold steel. The casualties were all inflicted with sticks and stones. Gracchus himself was killed by being hit over the head with the leg of a broken chair.

43. *The officers of the law are overcome by a momentary psychological inhibition.*

The officers of the Sanhedrin flinch from arresting Jesus (John xviii. 6); the officers of the Ephors flinch from carrying out the order to put Agis to death—and so do Leonidas' foreign professional soldiers (Plut., chap. 19).

44. *The hero's party sheds blood.*

One of Jesus's disciples draws his sword and strikes off the ear of a servant of the High Priest (Matt. xxvi. 51 = Mark xiv. 47 = Luke xxii. 50 = John xviii. 10);¹ Cleomenes and his companions draw their swords, as they spring from table and rush into the street, and cut down King Ptolemy's minister Ptolemy son of Chrysermus and also another Ptolemy who is Chief of Police in Alexandria (Plut., chap. 58); Tiberius Gracchus's partisans blind

¹ In the three Synoptic Gospels both the swordsman and his victim are anonymous. It is only in the Gospel according to Saint John that the swordsman is identified with Peter, and the victim's name is given as Malchus.

a slave of Octavius (Plut., chap. 12); Fulvius's companions stab to death with stilettos an officer of the Consuls called Quintus Antullus (Plut., chap. 34).

45. *The hero commands his followers to cease fighting.*

Jesus (Matt. xxvi. 52 = Luke xxii. 51 = John xviii. 11); Cleomenes (Plut., chap. 58); Tiberius Gracchus (Plut., chap. 12); Gaius Gracchus (Plut., *Gracchi*, chap. 34, and *Comparison of Agis and Cleomenes with the Gracchi*, chap. 5).

46. *The hero himself refrains on principle from resorting to force.*

Jesus (Matt. xxvi. 52-4, and John xviii. 36); Agis, of whom his mother Agesistrata testifies, as she embraces his corpse: 'My child, it is your immense moderation and gentleness and humanity that have been your ruin—and ours' (Plut., chap. 20);¹ Tiberius Gracchus (Plut., *Gracchi*, chap. 19, and *Comparison*, chap. 4); Gaius Gracchus (Plut., *Gracchi*, chaps. 33, 34, and 36-8, and *Comparison*, chaps. 4 and 5).²

N.B. This gentleness of Jesus, Agis, and both the Gracchi is in contradiction with the violence that is exhibited by Cleomenes, by all the futurist heroes, and also by Jesus and Gaius Gracchus themselves in certain passages of their careers, before they arrive at the crisis (see Point 1, above). Plutarch (*Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 22, and *Comparison*, chaps. 4-5) regretfully stigmatizes Cleomenes—in contrast to Agis and the two Gracchi—as a man of blood.

47. *The hero's companions take to flight and leave him to his fate.*

Jesus's (Matt. xxvi. 56 = Mark xiv. 50); Tiberius Gracchus's (Plut., chap. 19).

48. *A tableau of a young man in flight leaving a wrap, which is a badge of rank, in the clutches of (one of) his pursuers.*

In the flight of Jesus's companions an anonymous young man leaves in the hands of the officers of the Sanhedrin a wrap of fine linen (*συνδών*) and continues his flight naked (Mark xiv. 51-2); in the flight of Tiberius Gracchus's partisans Tiberius himself leaves

¹ Compare the same author: *Comparison of Agis and Cleomenes with the Gracchi* chap. 3: 'Rather than cause the death of a single one of his countrymen, Agis met his own death almost voluntarily.'

² According to Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 28^a, Gaius himself knocked Antullus down and told his followers to kill him; but this story is rejected by Plutarch (*Comparison*, chap. 5). According to Plutarch (*Gracchi*, chap. 34), the crime was committed by Fulvius's men, and Gracchus, so far from wanting it, was deeply upset by it and indignantly upbraided the perpetrators. Plutarch's version of the incident is supported by Apian (*Studies in Roman History: The Civil Wars*, Book I, chap. 25).

his toga in the hands of one of the assailants and continues his flight in his shirt (Plut., chap. 19).

49. *The hero is arrested and is then immediately brought to an impromptu trial during the night.*

Jesus is brought to trial in the High Priest's palace before the Chief Priests and the Sanhedrin (Matt. xxvi. 57 = Mark xiv. 53 = Luke xxii. 54 = John xviii. 13 and 24);¹ Agis is brought to trial in the prison before the Ephors and some members of the Gerusia (Plut., chap. 19).

50. *A true saying of the hero's is dishonestly twisted by his enemies into a misrepresentation which is extremely damaging to him.*

Jesus has said that the Temple at Jerusalem is going to be destroyed (Matt. xxiv. 1-2 = Mark xiii. 1-2 = Luke xxi. 5-6);² on an earlier occasion he has also said that he himself is greater than the Temple (Matt. xii. 6); at his trial the false witnesses represent him as having said that he is able to destroy (or will destroy) the Temple and is able to build (or will build) another in three days (without having to use the ordinary physical means of construction) (Matt. xxvi. 60-1 = Mark xiv. 57-8).³

Similarly Tiberius Gracchus, in a public apologia for his high-handed and unconstitutional act of deposing his colleague Octavius, argues that a Tribune of the Plebs is sacrosanct only in virtue of having been consecrated to the service of the Plebs, and that he therefore automatically deposes himself from office if he misuses his power in order to do the opposite of what is his proper function. 'A Tribune of the Plebs who demolished the Capitol and set fire to the naval dockyard would have to be left in office; for if he committed these crimes he would still be a Tribune of the Plebs, however bad a one; but, if he set out to bring the Plebs to ruin, then he would no longer be a Tribune. . . . Again, nothing can be so sacrosanct as votive offerings (*ἀναθήματα*)⁴ to the Gods; yet nobody has ever thought of estopping the Plebs from using and moving and transferring such offerings as it thinks fit. On this

¹ In the Gospel according to Saint John the impromptu trial is resolved into two hearings in different places and before different judges—the first before Annas and the second before Caiaphas.

² In Luke xix. 44 the same phrase is applied to the whole city of Jerusalem.

³ This alleged saying of Jesus that is placed in the mouths of the false witnesses at the trial in the Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Mark is placed in Jesus's own mouth, in quite a different context, in the Gospel according to Saint John (ii. 18-22), where it is accepted as being authentic and is then interpreted as being metaphorical (i.e. as an enigmatic prophecy of the Resurrection).

⁴ Cf. Luke xxi. 5-6, *cit. supra*: 'And as some spake of the Temple, how it was adorned with goodly stones and gifts (*ἀναθήμασι*), he said: "As for these things which ye behold, the days will come in the which there shall not be left one stone upon another that shall not be thrown down."'

showing, the Plebs is entitled to transfer the Tribune of the Plebs—which is a votive offering to the Plebs itself—from one incumbent to another' (Plut., chap. 15). On the strength of this speech of Tiberius's, his companion Blossius, in a judicial examination before the Consuls to which he is subjected after Tiberius's death, is asked by Nasica: 'What would you have done if Tiberius had ordered you to set fire to the Capitol?'

Again, when Cleomenes' enemy Nicagoras of Messene wants to compromise Cleomenes in the eyes of King Ptolemy Philopator, he first reports to Ptolemy's minister Sosibius a satirical remark about the King which Cleomenes has really made to Nicagoras. Since, however, the genuine saying of Cleomenes is just personally offensive without being also politically treasonable, Sosibius persuades Nicagoras to write him a letter alleging—what is a sheer fabrication—that Cleomenes has made up his mind to seize Cyrene if Nicagoras will find him the necessary ships and men (Plut., chap. 56).

51. *The hero on trial is reproved by the authorities for contempt of court.*

Jesus is reproved by the High Priest for making no answer to the witnesses' charges against him (Matt. xxvi. 62-3 = Mark xiv. 60-1). Alternatively, he is struck by one of the officers of the court for replying to a question from Annas—not Caiaphas—about his disciples and his doctrine with the answer that all this is a matter of public knowledge (John xviii. 19-23).¹ Similarly Agis at his trial is reproved by Amphares for having burst out laughing at his judges' hypocrisy (Plut., chap. 19).

52. *When a question is put to the hero which offers him a possible line of retreat, the hero does not take the opening, but gives, instead, an answer that is calculated to exasperate the Court more than anything else that he could conceivably have said.*

When the High Priest asks Jesus whether he is (α) the Messiah (β) the Son of God, Jesus, instead of recanting, answers both questions in the affirmative in the most emphatic terms possible (Matt. xxvi. 63-4 = Mark xiv. 61-2 = Luke xxii. 66-70).² Simi-

¹ The saying that is presented in the Gospel according to Saint John as Jesus's answer to Annas is presented in the Synoptic Gospels (Matt. xxvi. 55 = Mark xiv. 48-9 = Luke xxiii. 52-3) as being said at Gethsemane to the officers of the Sanhedrin between the moment when, at Jesus's command, the disciples cease fighting, and the moment when the officers place Jesus under arrest.

² In the Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Mark the two questions are telescoped into one and the two claims are treated as though they were synonymous. On the other hand in the Gospel according to Saint Luke the Court first asks Jesus whether he is the Messiah, and it is the terms of his answer to this question—an answer

larly, when one of the Ephors (not Amphares) asks Agis (α) whether he has been acting under pressure from Lysander and Agesilaus and (β) whether he repents of what he has done, Agis replies to the first question that he has been acting as an entirely free agent and that his source of inspiration has been Lycurgus, while to the second question he replies that he does not repent of what he has done because his policy has been the best that could be conceived (Plut., chap. 19).

53. *On the strength of the hero's answers to the two test questions the Court immediately passes sentence of death upon him.*

Upon Jesus (Matt. xxvi. 65-6 = Mark xiv. 63-4 = Luke xxii. 71);¹ upon Agis (Plut., chap. 19).

54. *The hero's prophecy regarding his enthusiastic companion's boast [see Point 34, above] is fulfilled by the failure of the boaster to live up to it when it comes to the point.*

Peter does not live up to his resolution never to desert Jesus (Matt. xxvi. 69-75 = Mark xiv. 66-72 = Luke xxii. 54-62 = John xviii. 15-18 and 25-7); Statilius does not live up to his resolution of following suit to Cato Minor in committing suicide (Plutarch: *Life of Cato Minor*, chap. 73). (See further Point 84, below.)

55. *The authorities seek to enlist the aid of a foreign potentate for the accomplishment of their purpose of bringing the hero to destruction.*

The Jews bring their fellow countryman Jesus before the Roman Procurator, Pontius Pilate, because the power of life and death is in his hands and not in theirs, so that the sentence of death which they have passed on Jesus cannot be executed unless Pilate endorses it (Matt. xxvii. 1-2 = Mark xv. 1 = Luke xxiii. 1 = John xviii. 28 and 31). The Achaeans make a military alliance against their fellow Peloponnesian, Cleomenes, with the Macedonian King Antigonus Dôson, because they realize that, without the support of Macedon, they will be unable to crush a Sparta which enjoys the support of Egypt.

in which Jesus claims to be the Son of Man (see V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. v, p. 163, footnote 1, above)—that then move the Court to ask, in horror and indignation, 'Art thou then the Son of God?' Of these two versions of the incident the Lucan account alone is in consonance with Jewish beliefs; for according to Jewish doctrine the Messiah is to be, not a son of God, but a son of David (see V. C (i) (d) 11, vol. v, p. 163, footnote 1, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 268, footnote 5, above); and the suggestion that God has any son at all—and *a fortiori* a son incarnate in a man—is the greatest conceivable blasphemy against God's unity and majesty. It is attributing to the One True God a *bessesse* that is attributed to the false gods of Olympus by the Hellenes.

¹ Cf. John xix. 7.

56. *The animus of the hero's enemies in his own household is so intense that they are willing to purchase the foreign potentate's aid at the price of sacrificing one of their own most cherished principles.*

In order to force Pilate to put Jesus to death, the Jews accuse Jesus of having committed high treason against the Roman Imperial Government by declaring himself to be a king—though this indictment involves the Jews themselves in an admission of the legality of the Roman jurisdiction (Luke xxiii. 2, and John xix. 12-15). In order to induce Antigonus to throw his weight into the scales against Cleomenes, the Achaeans submit again to the hegemony of Macedon—which they have made it their mission to throw off—and re-admit a Macedonian garrison into the Acrocorinthus, though this fortress is the strategic key to the military command of the Peloponnese, and the greatest achievement in the past career of the Achaeans' leader Aratus has been his feat of wresting the Acrocorinthus out of Macedonian clutches some twenty years back.

57. *The hero maintains his claim to kingship before the face of a foreign potentate in whose power he finds himself.*

Jesus before Pilate (Matt. xxvii. 11-14 = Mark xv. 2-5 = Luke xxiii. 3 = John xviii. 33-8);¹ Cleomenes before Ptolemy Euergetes (Plut., chap. 53); the Syrian slave Eunus before his Sicilian master Antigones (Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, § 8).

58. *The hero will not accept the good offices of the representative of a potentate who is all-powerful.*

Jesus will not accept Pilate's invitation to reply to the charges against him which the Jewish authorities have repeated in Pilate's presence (Matt. xxvii. 12-14 = Mark xv. 3-5); Cato Minor will not accept Lucius Caesar's offer to intercede on his behalf with Lucius's victorious kinsman Gaius (Plutarch: *Life of Cato Minor*, chap. 66).

59. *The impression which the hero makes on a foreign potentate is a favourable one.*

Pilate is favourably impressed by Jesus (Matt. xxvii. 23 = Mark xv. 14 = Luke xxiii. 22; Luke xxiii. 4 and 14-15 = John xviii. 38,

¹ The maintenance of the claim to kingship is implied in all four Gospels alike, but they differ from one another in their account of the way in which Jesus conveys his meaning. According to Saint Matthew and Saint Mark he conveys it by a bare assent to Pilate's proposition, followed by silence in face of the charges that are repeated against him, in Pilate's presence, by the Jewish authorities; according to Saint Luke by a bare assent to Pilate's proposition; according to Saint John by an exposition of the 'Other-worldly' nature of his kingdom.

and xix. 4 and 6); Ptolemy Euergetes is favourably impressed by Cleomenes (Plut., chap. 53).¹

60. *The hero's fate is affected by an official custom relating to the release of a prisoner.*

At Jerusalem there is a custom that, at the Feast of the Passover, the Roman procurator releases one prisoner, at the people's choice; but, when Pilate offers them the choice between Jesus and Barabbas, they choose Barabbas (Matt. xxvii. 15-26 = Mark xv. 6-15 = Luke xxiii. 16-25 = John xviii. 39-40). At Alexandria there is a custom that a dinner and gifts are sent on the King's behalf to a prisoner who is going to be released; and Cleomenes takes advantage of this custom in order to make his warders believe that his own release has been decreed (Plut., chap. 58).

61. *A potentate who has the hero's fate in his hands allows himself, out of cowardice, in consideration of an embarrassing incidental consequence of the hero's claim to kingship, to be persuaded, against his own conscience, into condemning the hero to an undeserved penalty.*

Pilate condemns Jesus to be crucified for fear that, if he acquits him, his claim to kingship—even though Pilate himself may be aware that the kingship claimed by Jesus is not of the literal mundane kind—may be represented by the Jews to the Emperor as a treasonable pretension which Pilate has culpably neglected to repress (John xviii. 28-40, and xix. 1-16; a hint of the consideration which has prevailed with Pilate is also given in Luke xxiii. 23, when this is read together with Luke xxiii. 2). Ptolemy Philopator condemns Cleomenes to be interned² because he fears that, if he lets him go, he may become a public danger to the Ptolemaic state owing to his popularity with the Peloponnesian mercenaries in the Ptolemaic service and his first-hand acquaintance with the weakness of the Ptolemaic régime (Plut., chaps. 54-6).

¹ Euergetes gave his admiration for Cleomenes the g *A History of Egypt under the erecting a statue of Cleomenes at Olympia* (see Bevan, E.: *Ptolemaic Dynasty* (London 1927, Methuen), p. 221).

² If internment be thought too mild a penalty to be compared with crucifixion, it may be recalled that, whereas Pilate had no obligation towards Jesus except that (on which he, like Philopator, defaulted) of doing justice, Cleomenes was Philopator's guest; that Cleomenes was, moreover, a political refugee towards whom the Ptolemaic Government had obligations of honour; that no formal charges had been brought against him; that, while the penalty of internment may have been mild in itself, its infliction did in fact bring about Cleomenes' death; and, last but not least, that Philopator's ministers had never intended to allow Cleomenes to come out of prison alive (see Plut., chap. 57), though they had not calculated upon getting rid of Cleomenes by way of the heroic and spectacular death which their prisoner succeeded in winning for himself in despite of their cat-and-mouse tactics.

62. *The potentate is subject to a feminine influence which inclines him to be superstitious.*

Pilate under the influence of his wife (Matt. xxvii. 19); Ptolemy Philopator under the influence of his mistress Agathoclea and her mother Oenanthe (Plut., chaps. 54 and 60).

63. *After having, out of cowardice, sent the hero to an undeserved death, the potentate attempts to salve the pricks of conscience by performing a ritual of purification.*

Pilate (Matt. xxvii. 24-5); Ptolemy Philopator (Plut., chap. 60).

64. *A tableau of a Roman ostentatiously washing his hands in public (immediately after he has been instrumental in bringing upon a fellow human being a death by protracted torture).¹*

Pilate washing his hands, in front of his own tribunal, after having sentenced Jesus to crucifixion (Matt. xxvii. 24); Catiline washing his hands, in front of Sulla's tribunal, in the holy water basin at the door of a temple of Apollo, after having brought to Sulla the head of Marcus Marius (Plutarch: *Life of Sulla*, chap. 32), upon whom Catiline has just inflicted 'the death of a thousand cuts' (Seneca: *De Ira*, Book III, chap. 18).

65. *The hero's claim to kingship is callously turned to ridicule.*

Jesus's claim is ridiculed, after Pilate has condemned him to death, by Pilate's soldiers (Matt. xxvii. 27-31 = Mark xv. 16-20), or, alternatively,² by Herod's soldiers before Pilate has condemned him to death (Luke xxiii. 11); Eunus's claim is ridiculed by the guests of his master Antigones: 'The thing [i.e. the slave Eunus's prophecy that one day he would be a king] was taken as a joke; and Antigones, who was entertained by the hocus-pocus, took to producing Eunus at his dinner-parties and cross-questioning him about his kingship.' Eunus's answers used to cause merriment among the guests (Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, § 8).

N.B. The Lucan story of the mocking of Jesus before the Crucifixion corresponds more closely than the alternative story with the episode in the history of Eunus: in the first place Herod, as tetrarch of Galilee, is in the political sense Jesus's master, and it is expressly on this account that Pilate remits Jesus to him (Luke xxiii. 5-7); in the second place Jesus is an object of curiosity as well as of amusement (Luke xxiii. 8); in the third place the way

¹ The writer owes this point to Dr. Martin Braun.

² The version according to Saint John (xix. 2-3) stands midway between the two main variants of the story. According to Saint John the mocking is done by Pilate's soldiers and not by Herod's, but this before, and not after, Pilate has passed the sentence of crucifixion.

in which Herod and his soldiers turn Jesus's claim to ridicule is heartless without being physically cruel (as the Roman soldiers' mockery is cruel in the alternative version of the story).

66. *A tableau of the hero being invested in private with a royal crown (diadem) and robe to which he is not entitled.*

Jesus (Matt. xxvii. 28-9 = Mark xv. 17-18 = Luke xxii. 11 = John xix. 2-3);¹ Tiberius Gracchus: 'Pompeius rose in the Senate in order to depose that he was a neighbour of Tiberius's and that in this way it had come to his knowledge that Tiberius had been presented with a diadem and a purple robe, belonging to the Pergamene regalia, by the Pergamene envoy Eudêmus, in anticipation of Tiberius's becoming King in Rome' (Plut., chap. 14).

67. *A tableau of the hero being exhibited in public as a claimant to kingship.*

'Pilate therefore went forth again and saith unto them: "Behold, I bring him forth to you that ye may know that I find no fault in him." Then came Jesus forth, wearing the crown of thorns and the purple robe. And Pilate saith unto them: "Behold the man!"' (John xix. 4-5). 'The people who were farther off were puzzled about what was going on and were trying to find out; so Tiberius touched his head with his hand as a visual signal—for the benefit of those to whom his voice did not carry—of the danger in which he found himself. When his enemies saw him do this they ran to the Senate to report that Tiberius was asking for a diadem and that this was the significance of his gesture of touching his head' (Plut., chap. 19).

68. *On the hero's way to his execution, people (a person) accompanying him are (is) in tears, whereupon the hero declares that, notwithstanding his present plight, his own lot is nevertheless relatively enviable.*

'And there followed him a great company of people and of women, which also bewailed and lamented him. But Jesus, turning unto them, said: "Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me, but weep for yourselves and for your children"' (Luke xxiii. 27-8). 'On his way to the gallows Agis saw one of the officers of the law

¹ In the Lucan story of the mockery of Jesus by Herod and his men, only the robe is mentioned, and not the crown. (N.B. This follows from the omission of the element of physical cruelty, since the crown in the alternative story is a crown of thorns.) In the Johannine version of the story of the mockery of Jesus by Pilate's soldiers the crown is mentioned as well as the robe, but there is no mention of the reed which figures in the Marcan and Matthaean versions of the same story. According to Mark (xv. 19) they smote him on the head with a reed; according to Matthew (xxvii. 29-30) they first put the reed into his right hand to simulate a sceptre; according to John (xix. 3) they smote him with their hands.

crying and showing other signs of deep distress, whereupon he said to him: "My friend, stop weeping for me. When I am being put to death as illegally and unjustly as I am, I have the moral advantage over my murderers" (Plut., chap. 20).

69. *The hero is crucified.*

Jesus (Matt. xxvii. 35 = Mark xv. 24 = Luke xxiii. 33 = John xix. 18); Cleomenes (Plut., chaps. 59 and 60).

N.B. Whereas Jesus is put to death by crucifixion, Cleomenes dies by his own hand (Plut., chap. 58), and it is only his corpse that is crucified. Agis—who, like Jesus, is put to death, instead of committing suicide like Cleomenes¹—is not crucified but is hanged (Plut., chaps. 19 and 20).

70. *Two other persons are put to death at the same time as the hero and in the same fashion.*

The two thieves are crucified with Jesus (Matt. xxvii. 38 = Mark xv. 27 = Luke xxiii. 32-3 = John xix. 18); Agis's grandmother Archidamia and his mother Agesistrata are hanged with Agis (Plut., chap. 20).

N.B. In the Spartan story the three victims are hanged, not on separate gallows side by side, but on the same gallows one after another; but the three corpses are brought out together (Plut., chap. 21).

71. *The shirt (χιτών) in which the hero has gone to his death is made of a single piece of stuff without a seam.*

Jesus's shirt (John xix. 23); Cleomenes' shirt (Plut., chap. 58).

N.B. The two shirts are, however, seamless for different reasons: Jesus's because it has been originally so woven; Cleomenes' because, at the moment before he rushes out into the street, he rips open the original seam down the right sleeve in order to give free play to his sword-arm.

72. *On an occasion on which the hero's claim to kingship is being turned to ridicule by most of those present, one person (some people) accords (accord) recognition to his claim and asks (ask) to be remembered by him when he enters into his kingdom. The hero grants his (their) petition by giving him (them) a dazzling reward for his (their) act of homage.*

While Jesus on the Cross is being mocked by the people, by the rulers, by the soldiers, and by the Impenitent Thief, the Penitent

¹ The suicide of Cleomenes and his companions in the streets of Alexandria has a correspondence in the suicide of the Sicilian insurgent-slave-leader Satyrus and his companions on the public altars in the amphitheatre at Rome (Diodorus, Book XXXVI, chap. 10, §§ 2-3).

Thief 'said unto Jesus: "Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom." And Jesus said unto him: "Verily I say unto thee, to-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise"' (Luke xxiii. 35-43).¹ When Eunus's master, at his dinner-parties, used to cross-question Eunus about his kingdom [see Point 65, above], one of the questions that he used to ask was 'how he would behave, when king, to each member of the present company. Eunus used to go through his story without turning a hair, explain how kind he would be to the masters, and in fact perform his hocus-pocus so extravagantly as to move the guests to laughter. Some of the guests used to take handsome portions from the table and present them to him with the request that he would remember the favour when he came into his kingdom—and actually, as it turned out, the hocus-pocus ended in Eunus's becoming king in truth and deed, and in his recompensing in sober earnest the favours that had been shown him by those who, at the dinner-parties, had paid him a mock-deference. . . . After his proclamation as king, Eunus put all [the slave-owners] to death with the sole exception of those who, under the *ancien régime*, had welcomed him at dinner-parties or at his spiritualist *séances* when he went out into society with his master, and who had shown their good will in presenting him with portions from the table. These old friends he now surreptitiously set at liberty' (Diodorus, Books XXXIV-XXXV, chap. 2, §§ 8-9 and 41).

73. *The hero's mother is supported in her ordeal by the hero's favourite companion (by the favourite companion's wife).*

Jesus's mother by John (John xix. 25-7); Cleomenes' mother by Panteus' wife (Plut., chap. 59).

74. *The end of an ordeal.*

'He said: "It is finished"; and he bowed his head and gave up the ghost' (John xix. 30). 'When it [i.e. Cleomenes' death-agony] was finished, he [Panteus] . . . slew himself' (Plut., chap. 58).

75. *The hero, hanging dead on the Cross, is hailed as the Son of God (a child of the Gods) under the impression of a portent that is witnessed by the soldiers on duty at the foot of the Cross.*

'Now when the centurion and they that were with him, watching Jesus, saw the earthquake and those things that were done, they feared greatly, saying: "Truly this was the Son of God"' (Matt.

¹ The mocking of Jesus on the Cross is narrated also in the two other Synoptic Gospels (though not in the Gospel according to Saint John); but according to both Saint Matthew (xxvii. 39-44) and Saint Mark (xv. 29-32) both the thieves that are being crucified with Jesus join in abusing him.

xxvii. 54).¹ 'The soldiers who were on guard by Cleomenes' crucified corpse saw a large snake wound round the head and covering the face,² with the result that no carrion-eating bird alighted on it. This portent threw the King into a state of superstitious fear—which gave his women an excuse for starting a fresh bout of purifications—in case the man whom he had put to death might have been peculiarly dear to God and not of any common clay. The populace of Alexandria went farther. They showed their respect by making pilgrimages to the spot and hailing Cleomenes as a hero³ and a child of the Gods' (Plut., chap. 60).

76. *After the hero's death there is a revulsion of public feeling in his favour.*

While Jesus was still hanging alive on the Cross, 'the people stood beholding, and the rulers also with them derided him' (Luke xxiii. 35); but, as soon as he had expired, 'all the people that came together to that sight, beholding the things that were done, smote their breasts and returned' (Luke xxiii. 48). Similarly the Alexandrians, who had not moved a foot to follow Cleomenes, or lifted a finger to help him, when he was calling to them, in their streets, to join him in a fight for freedom (Plut., chap. 58), afterwards paid his crucified corpse a semi-religious veneration (Plut., chap. 60, quoted under Point 75, above). And the Roman Plebs, after allowing the Gracchi to be done to death by the Senatorial dominant minority, afterwards demonstrated their love and their sorrow for them by paying them religious honours (Plut., chap. 39).⁴

¹ According to Saint Mark (xv. 39) the centurion utters the words attributed to him according to Saint Matthew, but here it is not stated that he is speaking under the impression of the experience of a miracle. According to Saint Luke the centurion is neither speaking under the impression of a miracle, nor does he hail Jesus as the Son of God ('Now when the centurion saw what was done, he glorified God, saying: "Certainly this was a righteous man"' (Luke xxiii. 47)).

² The same portent was related of Spartacus—not, however, after death, but in sleep, when his career still lay, unsuspected, before him—and his wife, who was a fortune-teller, interpreted the portent (as Ptolemy Philopator did when it happened to Cleomenes' corpse) as a sign of greatness ('It is said that, when he was first brought to Rome to be sold, a snake was seen wound round his face as he slept. His wife, who was of the same tribe and who had the gift of divination, besides being a Bacchanal, interpreted the portent as a sign that he was going to rise to something very great and formidable, but with an unlucky ending' (Plutarch: *Life of Crassus*, chap. 8, adopting Reiske's conjecture *δρυγής* for *εὐρυγής*). A similar portent was related of Bar Kōkabā. His corpse, in contrast to that of Jesus and that of Cleomenes, was not preserved intact (see Point 78, below), but was mutilated; and thereafter a snake was found coiled, not round his head, but round his severed privy parts (see Lagrange, M.-J.: *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris 1909, Gabalda), p. 320). Again, Tiberius Gracchus took it as a bad omen when snakes hatched out their eggs in his helmet (Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chap. 17).—A.J.T.

³ In its original, and technical, Hellenic sense the word hero has a connotation which is a cross between those of our two Western words 'demigod' and 'saint'.—A.J.T.

⁴ The judicial murders of Agis and his mother and his grandmother likewise aroused indignation among the public at Sparta (Plut., chap. 21); but here the correspondence is imperfect, because in this case the public, so far from having been hostile or even indifferent, had made a move to rescue the hero, and this move had only been foiled by a *fait accompli* (Plut., chap. 19).

77. *The two other persons who are put to death at the same time as the hero do not die till after he is dead.*

The two thieves not till after Jesus (John xix. 32-3); Archidamia and Agesistrata not till after Agis (Plut., chap. 20).

78. *Contrary to what usually happens to a crucified corpse,¹ the hero's corpse remains physically intact.*

Jesus dies so unexpectedly soon (Mark xv. 44-5) that, when the soldiers come with the intention of breaking the legs of the bodies on the crosses in order to hasten their deaths, they find it unnecessary to break Jesus's legs, because he is already dead, so they only break the legs of the two thieves (John xix. 31-3). Cleomenes' corpse is protected from being eaten by carrion-birds through the portent of the snake that winds itself round the head and covers the face (see Point 75, above).

79. *When a soldier pricks the hero's body with the point of a weapon, in order to test whether life is completely extinct, the body gives an unexpected sign of life.*

When a Roman soldier pierces Jesus's side with a spear, blood flows (John xix. 34); when Panteus pricks Cleomenes' ankle with a dagger, Cleomenes' face twitches (Plut., chap. 58).

80. *While the hero is being put to death, some women, with whom he is in an intimate relation, are in the vicinity, though not actually on the spot.*

The Crucifixion of Jesus is witnessed from a distance by Galilaean women whose link with Jesus is not one of kinship but one of personal devotion, and who have shown this devotion by coming to Jerusalem in his entourage; among them are Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James and Joses, and the mother of Zebedee's children or (? *alias*) Salome (Matt. xxvii. 55-6 = Mark xv. 40-1 = Luke xxiii. 49).² While Agis is being hanged inside the building

¹ When Polycrates the despot of Samos received a tempting invitation from Oroetes the Achaemenian satrap of Sardis, he suspected a trap but felt inclined to take the risk. While he was still in two minds whether to accept or to refuse, his daughter had a dream in which she saw her father aloft in the air, being washed by Zeus and anointed by the Sun. In consideration of this dream, she begged her father not to go; and, when he did go all the same, her worst forebodings were fulfilled; for the invitation *was* a trap, and Oroetes, after putting Polycrates to death by tortures too horrible to describe, inflicted on his victim the last indignity of crucifying his corpse. 'So, hanging on the cross, Polycrates fulfilled every particular of his daughter's vision. He was washed by Zeus when it rained, and he was anointed by the Sun when the corpse itself exuded liquid matter' (Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 122-5, already quoted in IV. C (iii) (c) 1, vol. iv, pp. 252-3, above).

² Though the Gospel according to Saint Luke mentions no names, it agrees with the other two Synoptic Gospels in describing the women as Galilaean and stating that they witnessed the Crucifixion from a distance. On the other hand the Gospel according to Saint John (xix. 25), which does mention names, is in implicit, and perhaps deliberate,

called the Dechas, his mother Agesistrata and his grandmother Archidamia are outside, making an outcry (Plut., chap. 19-20).

81. *A tableau of the descent from the Cross (or gallows).*

The dead body of Jesus being lowered from the Cross by men who are being assisted by the women of Jesus's entourage (there is no text in the Gospels describing this event;¹ yet, all the same, the scene is one of the favourite subjects of the traditional iconography of the Christian Church); the dead body of Agis' grandmother, Archidamia, being lowered from the gallows by officers of the law who are being assisted by Agis' mother—who is Archidamia's daughter—Agesistrata (Plut., chap. 20).

82. *A tableau of the Pietà.*

The dead body of Jesus at the foot of the Cross being tended by Joseph of Arimathaea (with the women's assistance)² (Matt. xxvii. 59 = Mark xv. 46 = Luke xxiii. 53 = John xix. 39-40); the dead bodies of Agis and Archidamia, at the foot of the gallows, being tended by Agesistrata (Plut., chap. 20).

N.B. The dead body of Tiberius Gracchus is refused to the dead man's brother by the Government, even when he offers to bury it unobtrusively by night (Plut., chap. 20).

83. *The hero, after his death, comes to receive religious worship.*

Jesus from the Christian Church; the Gracchi from the Roman Plebs: 'They dedicated to them statues, which they erected in public places; they consecrated the spots that had been the scenes of their deaths; and they offered there the first-fruits of all the produce of the seasons, while many people actually made it a daily

contradiction with the Synoptic Gospels on two points. In the first place it names, as having been present, Mary Magdalene, Mary the wife of Cleophas (? *alias* Mary the mother of James and Joses) and—in place of the mother of Zebedee's children (? *alias* Salome)—Mary the mother of Jesus, whose name does not occur in the other Gospels in this context. In the second place the women are standing, according to Saint John, not at a distance, but close to the Cross (xix. 25), within speaking distance (xix. 26-7). In this second feature the version of the incident according to Saint John has a correspondence in the epilogue to the Passion of Cleomenes, in which (not the hero but) the hero's children are put to death in the immediate presence of the hero's mother (Plut., chap. 59).

¹ The only hint of it is to be found in the adverbial prefix 'down', which is attached to the verb 'take' in Luke xxiii. 53; but the Lucan word *καθελῶν* is manifestly an unwarrantable amplification of the Matthaean word *λαβῶν*. What is being recorded here is not the physical descent of the body from the Cross, but the legal delivery of it to Joseph of Arimathaea by Pilate.

² The participation of the women, which is given such prominence in the traditional treatment of the subject in the iconography of the Christian Church, is not mentioned in the Gospels. In the Gospel according to Saint John (xix. 39-40), which is the only Gospel in which Joseph of Arimathaea is represented as having assistance, he is assisted, not by the women, but by Nicodemus. In the Synoptic Gospels (Matt. xxvii. 61 = Mark xv. 47 = Luke xxiii. 55) the women are represented as following at a distance in order to mark the place where the body is being buried.

practice to visit these spots in order to offer sacrifice and to pay their devotions—just as if they were visiting temples of gods' (Plut., chap. 39).

84. *The hero's enthusiastic companion makes good, after the hero's death, the boast to which he has failed to live up during the hero's Passion [see Points 34 and 54, above].*

Peter in the Acts; Statilius at Philippi (Plutarch: *Life of Cato Minor*, chap. 73).

N.B. As between Therycion and Cleomenes, the parts are reversed (see Point 34, above). Therycion lives up to Spartan ideals by practising at once the suicide that he preaches, while it is Cleomenes who does belatedly at Alexandria what Therycion had done betimes at Aegialia.

85. *The villain perishes miserably.*

Judas commits suicide (Matt. xxvii. 3-10, and Acts i. 16-20); Nasica has to flee the country, and he dies a premature death abroad after roaming disconsolately (like Cain or the Wandering Jew) (Plut., chap. 21); Opimius is convicted of having taken bribes from Jugurtha, and he dies in disgrace (Plut., chap. 39).

86. *The most effective executor of the hero's purpose, after the hero's death, is a convert of a younger generation who has never been in personal relations with the hero, has been brought up as a fanatical opponent of his cause, and is indirectly tainted with the blood-guiltiness for the hero's death.*

Jesus's executor Paul; Agis' executor Cleomenes, who is the son of Agis' deadly enemy King Leonidas.

87. *The executor's conversion is partly due to the twofold influence of a martyr who is devoted to the dead hero's person and of a sage who is sympathetic to the dead hero's ideas.*

Paul is influenced by (α) his victim Stephen (Acts vii. 58-60, and viii. 1) and (β) his mentor Gamaliel (Paul's early studies under Gamaliel are mentioned in Acts xxii. 3, and Gamaliel's plea, in the Sanhedrin, for toleration of the Apostles is recorded in Acts v. 33-40). Cleomenes is influenced by (α) Agis' widow Agiatis, who has been forcibly married to the young Cleomenes through the tyranny of Cleomenes' father King Leonidas (Plut., chap. 22) and (β) his mentor Sphaerus of Borysthenes, under whom he has studied as a child (Plut., chap. 23).¹

¹ For the question whether Sphaerus had been Agis' mentor as well see V. C (ii) (a), p. 249, footnote 2, above.

A Synopsis of Results

Our survey of correspondences between the Gospels and the stories of certain pagan heroes of the Hellenic internal proletariat and dominant minority has now yielded us a considerable harvest; but in order to make some effective use of these abundant materials for study we must first sift them out and arrange them in order. Our first need is to make a concordance of the literary authorities from which our evidence has been drawn (Table I). This will give us a basis for submitting the correspondences to a numerical analysis (Tables II and III), and after that we shall find ourselves able to pass from a purely quantitative to a partly qualitative treatment of our materials by singling out, for separate study, several different kinds of common features which our set of correspondences will be found to display. The correspondences work themselves out into an identical drama which appears, at least in essence and outline, to underly the whole of this group of hero-stories, pagan and Christian alike. And this drama has certain common characters (Table IV) common scenes (Tables V and VI), common properties (Table VII), and even common words (Tables VIII and IX).

The synopsis has been reduced as far as possible to tabular form in order to enable the reader to take in at a glance its bearing upon what follows.

[*Tables I-IX, pp. 407-17.*]

TABLE I. *Concordance of the Literary Authorities*

Point	Jesus				The Spartan Archaists			The Roman Archaists				The Futurists					Total of pagan correspondences to points in the Gospels		
	Matthew	Mark	Luke and Acts	John	Agis	Cleomenes	Spartans taken together	Tiberius Gracchus	Gaius Gracchus	Fulvius	Cato Minor	Romans taken together	Aristonicus	Eunus	Salvius	Athenio		Catiline	Futurists taken together
1*	x	x	x	x	x	x	1	x	x	x		1							2
1A†	x	x	x	x	x	x	1	x	x	x		1							2
2	x	x	x	x	x	x	2						x						3
3	x		x	x	x	x	1												1
4	x		x	x	x	x													1
5	o	o	o	x	x	x	2	x	x			2							4
6	x	x	x	x	x	x								x					2
7	x	x	x	x	x	x	1	x	x			2			x				1
8	x	x	x	x	x	x	2	x	x			1	[x]						4
9	x	x	x	x		x	1	x				1	x						2
10	x	x	x	x		x	1		x			1							2
11		x	x	x					x			1							1
12		x	x	x					x			1							1
13	x	x	x	x		x	1					1							1
14	x	x	x	x		o		x				1							1
15	x	x	x	x	[x]							1		x	x	x		3	3
16	x	x	x	x	x	x	1		x			1							1
17	x	x	x	x		x	1					1							1
18	x	x	x	x		x	1	x				1							2
19	x	x	x	x	x		1	o				1							1
20	x	x	x	x	x	x	1		x			1							2
21	x	x	x	x	x	x	1		x			1							1
22	x	x	x	x		x	1					1							1
23	x		x	x	x		1					1							1
24	x	x	x	x	x	x	1			x	x	2							3
25	x	x	x	x		x	1					1							1
26	x	x	x	x		x	1					1							1
27			x	x		x	1					1							1
28			x	x		x	1		x			1							2
29	x	x	x	x		o						1					x	1	1
30			x	x							x	1		x				1	1
31			x	x							x	2						1	2
32			x	x							x	1						1	1
33	x	x	x	x		x	1			x		1						1	2
34	x	x	x	x		o					x	1						1	1
35	x	x	x	x		x	1					1						1	1
36	x	x	x	x					x			1						1	1
37	x	x	x	x								1						1	1
38	x	x	x	x		x	1			x		1						1	2
39	x	x	x	x			1					1						1	1
40	x	x	x	x			1					1						1	1
41				x		x	1					1						1	1
42	x	x						x				1						1	1
43				x		x	1		x			2						1	3
44	x	x	x	x		x	1		x			2						1	3
45	x		x	x		x	1		x			2						1	3

Note: x means a correspondence, o means a contradiction.

* Jesus as the gentle predecessor and Peter as the violent successor.

† John the Baptist as the gentle predecessor and Jesus as the violent successor

TABLE I. *Concordance of the Literary Authorities—continued.*

Point	Jesus				The Spartan Archaists			The Roman Archaists				The Futurists					Total of pagan correspondences to points in the Gospels		
	Matthew	Mark	Luke and Acts	John	Agis	Cleomenes	Spartans taken together	Tiberius Gracchus	Gaius Gracchus	Fulvius	Cato Minor	Romans taken together	Aristonicus	Eunus	Saturnus	Athenio		Catiline	Futurists taken together
46	x			x	x	o	I	x	x			2							3
47	x	x						x				I							I
48		x						x				I							I
49	x	x	x	x	x		I												I
50	x	x	x		o	x	I	x				I							I
51	x	x		x	x		I												2
52	x	x	x		x		I												I
53	x	x	x		x		I												I
54	x	x	x	x		o	I				x	I							I
55	x	x	x	x		x	I												I
56			x	x		x	I												I
57	x	x	x	x		x	I							x				I	2
58	x	x									x	I							I
59	x	x	x	x		x	I												I
60	x	x	x	x		x	I												I
61			[x]	x		x	I												I
62	x					x	I												I
63	x					x	I												I
64	x					x	I												I
65	x	x	x											x					I
66	x	x	x	x				x				I							I
67				x				x				I							I
68			x		x		I												I
69	x	x	x	x		x	I												I
70	x	x	x	x	x		I												I
71				x		x	I												I
72			x											x				I	I
73				x		x	I												I
74				x		x	I												I
75	x	[x]	o			x	I												I
76		x				x	I	x	x			2							I
77				x	x		I												3
78		[x]		x		x	I												I
79				x		x	I												I
80*	x	x	x		x		I												I
80A†				x		x	I												I
81			[x]		x		I												I
82	x	x	x	x	x		I	o											I
83								x	x										I
84			x			o					x	2							2
85	x		x					x	x			I							I
86			x		x		I					2							I
87			x		x		I												I
	60	53	61	45	26†	38†	64†	17†	16	5†	7	45†	4	6	2	1	2	15	124†

* The women are not akin to the hero, and they remain at a distance.

† One of the women is the hero's mother, and she witnesses, from close at hand, the execution of the hero (of the hero's children).

‡ Reckoning the 'pairs' in Points 1 and 1A as one and not two correspondences each.

TABLE II. *Analysis of Correspondences between the Gospels and the Stories of Pagan Heroes*

	In one or more of the Synoptic Gospels only	In John only	In both one or more of the Synoptic Gospels and John as well	In one or more of the Synoptic Gospels, not exclusively	In John, not exclusively	In at least one of the four Gospels
Total number of points in the Gospels	43	13	32	75	45	88*
Correspondences in the story of Agis	13	4	9	22	13	26
" " " Cleomenes	13	8	17	30	25	38
" " " at least one Spartan archaist	25	11	25	50	36	61
" " " Tiberius Gracchus	9	2	5	14	7	16
" " " Gaius Gracchus	6	2	7	13	9	15
" " " Fulvius	2	0	3	5	3	5
" " " Cato Minor	3	1	3	6	4	7
" " " at least one Roman archaist	17	4	13	30	17	34
" " " Aristonicus	4	0	0	4	0	4
" " " Eunus	2	0	4	6	4	6
" " " Salvius	0	0	2	2	2	2
" " " Athenio	0	0	1	1	1	1
" " " Catiline	2	0	0	2	0	2
" " " at least one futurist	8	0	4	12	4	12
Total number of individual pagan correspondences	54	17	51	105	68	122

* Omitting Point 83, but reckoning Points 1A and 80A as separate points.

TABLE III. *Analysis of Correspondences between the Stories of the Spartan Archaists and those of the Other Heroes*

	With the story of Agis only	With the story of Cleomenes only	With both the story of Agis and the story of Cleomenes	With the story of Agis, not exclusively	With the story of Cleomenes, not exclusively	With at least one of the two Spartan stories
Correspondences in the story of Jesus	23	35	3	26	38	61
" " " Tiberius Gracchus	2	5	2	4	7	9
" " " Gaius Gracchus	3	4	2	5	6	9
" " " Fulvius	0	5	0	0	5	5
" " " Cato Minor	0	1	0	0	1	1
" " " at least one Roman archaist	3	10	2	5	11	15
" " " Aristonicus	0	1	1	1	2	2
" " " Eunus	0	1	0	0	1	1
" " " Salvius	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " Athenio	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " Satyrus	0	1*	0	0	1	1
" " " Catiline	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " at least one futurist	0	3	1	1	4	4
Total number of individual correspondences	28	53	8	36	61	89

* See p. 400, footnote 1, above, referring to Point 69.

TABLE IV. *Common Characters*

Characters	Point(s)	Jesus		The Spartan Archais		The Roman Archais				The Futurists					Total of pagan correspondences to characters in the Gospels			
		At least one Synoptic Gospel	John	Agis	Cleomenes	Spartans taken together	Tiberius Gracchus	Gaius Gracchus	Fulvius	Cato Minor	Romans taken together	Aristonicus	Eunus	Salvius		Atheno	Cailline	Futurists taken together
The pair of heroes (a gentle predecessor and a violent successor) .	1*	x	x	x	x	1		x	x		1							2
	1A†	x	x	x	x	1	x	x			1							2
The hero's mother	5+73+80A	o	x	x	x	2	x	x			2							4
The forerunner .	6	x	x										x	x				2
The traitor .	22+23+39+40	x	x	x		1												1
The hero's twelve companions .	25	x			x	1												1
The bosom friend	28		x		x	1		x			1							2
The boaster .	34+54+48	x	x		x	1†				x	1§							2
The chosen companion(s) .	35	x			x	1												1
The enemy victim(s) .	44	x	x		x	1	x		x		2							3
The false witness(es) .	50	x			x	1	x				1							2
The foreign potentate .	55-63	x	x		x	1												1
The mockers .	65+72	x	x										x					1
The hero's two fellow victims .	70	x	x	x		1												1
The convert-executor .	86	x		x		1												1
The convert's martyr .	87	x		x		1												1
The convert's mentor .	87	x		x		1												1

* Jesus as the gentle predecessor and Peter as the violent successor.

† John the Baptist as the gentle predecessor and Jesus as the violent successor.

‡ Therycion was 'a man who was high-souled in deed and high-falutin and boastful in word' (Plutarch: *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 52).

§ Statilius was 'a young man who affected a resoluteness beyond his years and who studied in all respects to appear to be, like Cato, the master of his feelings' (Plutarch: *Life of Cato Minor*, chap. 65).

TABLE V. Common Scenes

Scene	Point(s)	Jesus		The Spartan Archaiats		The Roman Archaiats				The Futurists					Total of pagan correspondences to scenes in the Gospels			
		At least one Synoptic Gospel	John	Agis	Cleomenes	Spartans taken together	Tiberius Gracchus	Gaius Gracchus	Pulvius	Cato Minor	Romans taken together	Aristonicus	Burnus	Salvius		Atheno	The Futurists	
																	Catiline	Futurists taken together
A crowd mounting on to the roof(s) in order to get within range of the hero	11	X						X			1							
A rider, with companions on foot, making a progress through the streets of a city	16	X	X		X													
The hero forcibly clearing a public place of trespassers	17	X	X		X													
A supper	20 + 24 + 65 + 72	X	X		X			X	X	X	2		X				1	
A bosom friend leaning on the hero's breast	28		X		X			X	X	X	1							
A party going out of doors	33	X	X		X													
The Agony	36	X	X		X													
A bodyguard watching and sleeping by turns	37	X	X		X			X	X	X	1							
Watchers (a watcher) caught napping	38	X	X		X													
A hubbub at night-time with lights	41	X	X		X													
A posse of officers of the law abashed in the hero's presence	43	X	X		X													
A fight	44	X	X		X													
A young male fugitive leaving his wrap in the hands of his pursuer(s)	48	X	X		X				X	X	2							
A trial at night-time	49	X	X		X						1							
A Roman washing his hands in a basin in public	64	X	X		X				X	X	1				X			
The hero arrayed in a royal robe and crown	66	X	X		X													
'Ecce homo!'	67	X	X		X				X	X	1							
The Via Dolorosa	68	X	X		X													
The Crucifixion	69	X	X		X													
The acclamation of a crucified man as the Son of God (a child of the Gods)	75	X	X		X													
The pricking of the hero's body with a stabbing weapon	79	X	X		X													
The women in the background	80	X	X		X													
The women in the foreground	80a	X	X		X													
The Descent from the Cross (or gallows)	81	X	X		X													
The Pietà	82	X	X		X													

TABLE VI. *Analysis of Visual Correspondences between the Gospels and the Stories of Pagan Heroes*

	<i>In one or more of the Synoptic Gospels only</i>	<i>In John only</i>	<i>In both one or more of the Synoptic Gospels and John as well</i>	<i>In one or more of the Synoptic Gospels, not exclusively</i>	<i>In John, not exclusively</i>	<i>In at least one of the four Gospels</i>
Total number of points in the Gospels	10	6	9	19	15	25
Correspondences in the story of Agis	3	2	2	5	4	7
" " " Cleomenes	2	3	5	7	8	10
" " " at least one Spartan archaist	5	5	7	12	12	17
" " " Tiberius Gracchus	1	1	2	3	3	4
" " " Gaius Gracchus	3	1	1	4	2	5
" " " Fulvius	1	0	3	4	3	4
" " " Cato Minor	0	0	1	1	1	1
" " " at least one Roman archaist	5	2	5	10	7	12
" " " Aristonicus	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " Eunus	0	0	1	1	1	1
" " " Salvius	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " Athenio	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " Catiline	1	0	0	1	0	1
" " " at least one futurist	1	0	1	2	1	2
Total number of individual pagan correspondences	11	7	15	26	22	33

TABLE VII. *Common Properties*[illegible]

TABLE VIII. *Common Words*

Words*	Point	Jesus					The Spartan Archais	The Roman Archais					The Futurists					Total of pagan correspondences to words in the New Testament			
		Matthew	Mark	Luke	John	Paul	Agis	Cleomenes	Spartans taken together	Tiberius Gracchus	Gaius Gracchus	Fulvius	Cato Minor	Romans taken together	Aristonicus	Eunus	Salvius		Athenio	Catiline	Futurists taken together
(α)†	9	x		x						x				I	[x]					I	2
(β)†	—	x		x				x	I												I
(γ)†	—	x		x				x	I												I
(δ)‡	12			x							x			I							I
(ε)§	36	x	x	x							x			I							I
(ζ)‡	37	x	x								x			I							I
(η)†	50			x						x				I							I
(θ)†	68			x			x		I												I
(ι)§	71				x			x	I												I
(κ)†	72			x												x				I	I
(λ)‡	74				x			x	I												I
(μ)‡	75	x	x	o				x	I												I
(ν)†	—					x		x	I												I

* The letters of the Greek Alphabet in this column refer to the passages quoted at the foot of the present table.

† In the correspondences marked thus the corresponding words in *both* the New Testament *and* the pagan text occur, not in the narrative, but in the mouth of one or more of the characters, as a quotation either from a speech (α, β, γ, η) or from a dialogue (θ, κ, ν).

‡ In the correspondences marked thus the corresponding words are placed in Jesus's mouth (δ, ζ, λ) and in a centurion's mouth (μ) in the New Testament, but occur in the narrative in the pagan text.

§ In the correspondences (ε, ι) marked thus the corresponding words in *both* the New Testament *and* the pagan text occur in the narrative only, and not in the mouth of any of the characters.

(α) 'The foxes have holes (φωλεούς) and the birds of the air have nests (κατασκηνώσεις), but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head' (Matt. viii. 20 = Luke ix. 58). 'The wild animals that range over Italy have a hole (φωλεόν), and each of them has its lair (κοιταῖον) and nest (κατάδυσσις), but the men who fight and die for Italy have no part or lot in anything but the air and the sunlight.¹ Without home or domicile, they wander over the face of the Earth with their children and their wives; and the generals are cheating them when they exhort them, in action, to fight for the sake of their cemeteries and sanctuaries. Of all these thousands of Romans not one has either an ancestral altar or a family tomb. It is for the sake of other men's wealth and luxury that these go to the wars and give their lives. They are called the lords of the World, and they have not a single clod of earth to call their own' (Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chap. 9).²

¹ In this passage of his speech Tiberius Gracchus is making the same point as Aristonicus makes by calling his followers 'Citizens of the City of the Sun' (see the references on p. 381, footnote 1, above).—A.J.T. ² Quoting from a speech by Tiberius Gracchus.

(β) 'The Kingdom of Heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force' (ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν βιάζεται, καὶ βιασταὶ ἀρπάζουσιν αὐτήν) (Matt. xi. 12); 'The Kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it' (ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ εὐαγγελίζεται, καὶ πᾶς εἰς αὐτήν βιάζεται) (Luke xvi. 16). 'To change a political régime without violence and intimidation is not easy' (πολιτείαν μεταβαλεῖν ἄνευ βίας καὶ φόβου χαλεπὸν ἔστιν) (Plutarch: *Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 31).¹

(γ) 'Some of them ye shall kill and crucify' (ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποκτενεῖτε καὶ σταυρώσετε) (Matt. xxiii. 34); 'Some of them they shall slay and persecute' (ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποκτενοῦσι καὶ ἐκδιώξουσιν) (Luke xi. 49). 'To the point of persecuting some of them and slaying others' (ὥστε . . . τοὺς μὲν ἐξελαύνειν, τοὺς δ' ἀποκτινύνειν) (Plutarch: *Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 31).²

(δ) 'That which ye have spoken in the ear in closets shall be proclaimed upon the housetops' (ὃ πρὸς τὸ οὖς ἐλάλησατε ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις, κηρυχθήσεται ἐπὶ τῶν δωμάτων) (Luke xii. 3). ' . . . that many failed to find lodgings, and the acclamations were echoed from the roofs and the tiles because the campus could not contain the multitude' (ὥς πολλοῖς μὲν οἰκήσεις ἐπιλιπεῖν, τοῦ δὲ πεδίου μὴ δεξαμένου τὸ πλῆθος ἀπὸ τῶν τεγῶν καὶ τῶν κεράμων τὰς φωνὰς συνεχεῖν) (Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chap. 24).

(ε) 'He . . . began to be sorrowful and very heavy' (ἤρξατο λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν) (Matt. xxvi. 37); 'He . . . began to be sore amazed and to be very heavy' (ἤρξατο ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν) (Mark xiv. 33); 'Being in agony he prayed more earnestly; and his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground' (γενόμενος ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ ἐκτενέστερον προσήχετο· ἐγένετο δὲ ὁ ἰδρὼς αὐτοῦ ὡσεὶ θρόμβοι αἵματος καταβαίνοντες ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν) (Luke xxii. 44). 'Gaius Gracchus became more and more depressed and unaccountably upset until it ended in his falling into a sort of frenzy in which he was virtually out of his mind. . . . He went off . . . very heavy, like a man who is fey. In this state of mental excruciation. . . .' (αἰὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ταπεινούμενος καὶ παρὰ προσδοκίαν ἀποπίπτων εἰς λύτταν τινὰ καὶ μανιώδη διάθεσιν ἐνέπιπτε. . . . ἀπεχώρησεν . . . ἀδημονῶν καὶ ποινηλατούμενος. οὕτω δ' αὐτοῦ παροίστητος . . .) (Diodorus, Books xxxiv-xxxv, chap. 28^a); 'On his way back from the Forum, Gaius stopped in front of the statue of his father, gazed at it in silence a long while, and finally went off after bursting into tears and lamentations' (ὁ δὲ Γάϊος ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀπερχόμενος ἔστη κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνδριάντα, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον

¹ Quoting from a speech by Cleomenes. In another context (V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, p. 358, above) it has already been noticed that there is also a correspondence between Matt. xi. 12 and Aristophanes: *Birds*, l. 32.

² Quoting from a speech by Cleomenes.

ἐμβλέψας εἰς αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ἐφθέγγετο, δακρύσας δὲ καὶ στενάξας ἀπῆει) (Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chap. 35).

(ζ) 'Sleep on now and take your rest' (καθεύδετε τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθε) (Matt. xxvi. 45 = Mark xiv. 41). 'They passed the time watching and taking their rest by turns' (ἐν μέρει φυλάττοντες καὶ ἀναπανόμενοι διήγον) (Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chap. 35).

(η) 'And as some spake of the Temple, how it was adorned with goodly stones and gifts (ἀναθήμασι), he said: "As for these things which ye behold, the days will come in the which there shall not be left one stone upon another that shall not be thrown down (καταλυθήσεται)"' ¹ (Luke xxi. 5-6). 'Nothing can be so sacrosanct as votive offerings (ἀναθήματα) to the Gods; yet nobody has ever thought of estopping the Plebs from using and moving (κινεῖν) and transferring (μεταφέρειν) such offerings as it thinks fit' (Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chap. 15).²

(θ) 'Weep not for me' (μὴ κλαίετε ἐπ' ἐμέ) (Luke xxiii. 28). 'Stop weeping for me' (παῦσαί με κλαίων) (Plutarch: *Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 20).

(ι) 'The coat (shirt) was without seam' (ἦν δὲ ὁ χιτῶν ἄρραφος) (John xix. 23). 'He put on his coat (shirt) and ripped open the seam across the right shoulder' (ἐνδυσάμενος τὸν χιτῶνα καὶ τὴν ῥάφην ἐκ τοῦ δεξιοῦ παραλυσάμενος ὤμου) (Plutarch: *Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 58).

(κ) 'Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom' (μνησθητί μου, κύριε, ὅταν ἔλθῃς ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ σου) (Luke xxiii. 42). 'With the request that he would remember the favour when he came into his kingdom' (ἐπιλέγοντες ὅπως, ὅταν γένηται βασιλεύς, τῆς χάριτος μνημονεύει) (Diodorus, Books xxxiv-xxxv, chap. 2, § 8).

(λ) 'It is finished' (τετέλεστο) (John xix. 30). 'When it was finished at last' (τέλος ἔχοντος ἥδη) (Plutarch: *Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 58).

(μ) 'Truly this was the Son of God' (ἀληθῶς Θεοῦ Υἱὸς ἦν οὗτος) (Matt. xxvii. 54 = Mark xv. 39). '... hailing Cleomenes as a hero and a child of the Gods' (ἥρωα τὸν Κλεομένη καὶ Θεῶν παῖδα προσαγορεύοντες) (Plutarch: *Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 60).

(ν) 'For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself' (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἑμῶν ἑαυτῷ ζῇ, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἑαυτῷ ἀποθνήσκει) (Saint Paul: *Epistle to the Romans*, xiv. 7). 'It is base for people to live to themselves, and base for them to die to themselves' (αἰσχρὸν γὰρ καὶ ζῆν μόνοις ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν) (Plutarch: *Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 52).³

¹ In the corresponding passage, quoted below, from a speech by Tiberius Gracchus, this same verb (κατελύθη) occurs, a few sentences earlier, with reference to the fall of the monarchy at Rome.

² Quoting from a speech by Tiberius Gracchus.

³ Quoting from a dialogue between Cleomenes and Therycion.

TABLE IX. *Analysis of Verbal Correspondences between the Gospels and the Stories of Pagan Heroes*

	In one or more of the Synoptic Gospels only	In John only	In Paul only	In both one or more of the Synoptic Gospels and John as well	In one or more of the Synoptic Gospels, not exclusively	In John, not exclusively	In at least one book of the New Testament
Total number of points in the Gospels	10	2	1	0	10	2	13
Correspondences in the story of Agis	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
" " " Cleomenes	3	2	1	0	3	2	6
" " " at least one Spartan archaist	4	2	1	0	4	2	7
" " " Tiberius Gracchus	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
" " " Gaius Gracchus	3	0	0	0	3	0	3
" " " Fulvius	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " Cato Minor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " at least one Roman archaist	5	0	0	0	5	0	5
" " " Aristonicus	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
" " " Eunus	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
" " " Salvius	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " Athenio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
" " " at least one futurist	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
Total number of individual pagan correspondences	11	2	1	0	11	2	14

Alternative Possible Explanations

How are our eighty-nine correspondences to be accounted for? Evidently there will be a number of alternative possible explanations; but it is equally evident that the first of these that should be taken into consideration is the play of chance. It is safe to assume *a priori* that at any rate some of these correspondences—it is idle to guess how many—are fortuitous; and there is at least one clear case (which, for this reason, has been excluded from our collection) in which the fortuitousness of the correspondence is demonstrable.

In all four Gospels (Matt. iii. 3 = Mark i. 3 = Luke iii. 4-5 = John i. 23) John the Baptist is quoted as saying, when he starts to preach:

‘The voice of one crying in the wilderness: “Prepare ye the way of the Lord; make his paths straight (εὐθείας). Every valley shall be filled (πάσα φάραγξ πληρωθήσεται), and every mountain and hill shall be brought low; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough ways shall be made smooth (λείας).” ’¹

This passage in the Gospels has a correspondence—which is particularly striking because it extends here and there to an actual identity of words—in the following passage in Plutarch’s *Lives of the Gracchi* (chap. 28):

‘[Gaius Gracchus] was especially keen on road-building, and in this work he had an eye for elegance and beauty as well as for sheer utility. His roads were carried through the countryside dead straight (εὐθείαι . . . ἀτρεμεῖς) . . . The hollows were filled (πιμπλαμένων) with embankments; the clefts carved by torrents or ravines (φάραγγες) were spanned with bridges; the road was graded to the same level on both sides; and as a result of all this care the work displayed a beautiful symmetry (ὁμαλήν καὶ καλὴν ὄψιν εἶχε) throughout its length.’

The closeness of this correspondence might seem at first sight to rule the hypothesis of accident out; and it might appear probable that in this case the Gospels (or their source) were drawing upon Plutarch (or his source), either directly or indirectly, rather than vice versa. We might conjecture that the Roman art and practice of road-building had made a profound impression on the minds of the Romans’ Oriental subjects; that these Oriental admirers of a Roman achievement had concentrated their admiration upon the figure of one of the first great road-builders in Roman history; and that the record of this Roman hero’s road-building

¹ This is according to Saint Luke. The Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Mark give the first sentence only, without the second. The Gospel according to Saint John gives the first sentence only, and that in a paraphrase.

feats had been turned to allegorical account by a Jewish prophet who had grown up under the Roman régime without losing hold upon the Jewish tradition of seeing life in terms of the spirit rather than in terms of matter. Such a theory of the origin of this passage in the New Testament would be as pretty as the Ptolemaic theory of the movements of the heavenly bodies; but it would suffer from the same single but fatal defect of being demonstrably untrue. Its falsity can be verified at a glance; for in each of the four Gospels the passage is ascribed to the Prophet Isaiah; and the ascription is correct. If the Greek text of Luke iii. 4-5 is compared with the Septuagint Greek version of Isa. xl. 3-4, the quotation will be found to reproduce the original with only trifling inaccuracies which do not affect either the general sense of the passage or any of the verbal coincidences with the corresponding passage of Plutarch. The proof of the fortuitousness of the correspondence is decisive; for the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament into Greek was made *circa* 170-132 B.C.;¹ and that is not only long before the earliest possible date of the writing of Plutarch's *Lives of the Gracchi* or the composition of Plutarch's sources; it is, at latest, at least nine years before the earliest possible date at which Plutarch's hero Gaius Gracchus himself can have begun to build his roads after entering upon his first term of office as Tribune of the Plebs in 123 B.C.

On this showing, are we to dismiss as fortuitous every correspondence between the New Testament and pagan Greek literature in which the New Testament passage contains either a quotation (express or tacit) from the Old Testament or a reminiscence of it? It might be rash to accept so sweeping a generalization as that without examining on their merits the actual cases in point.

One instance of a feature in the New Testament which can be traced back to the Old Testament with almost as great a certainty as the passage quoted by John the Baptist from Isaiah is the figure given in Matt. xxvi. 15 for the price paid by the Chief Priests to Judas (Point 23). Matthew's 'thirty pieces of silver' can hardly be explained except as an echo of Zechariah's (xi. 12). In this case sheer accident is clearly a less probable explanation than plagiarism; and, while Matthew makes no express reference to Zechariah in this place, he does refer to the Old Testament—though he names the prophet incorrectly and misquotes the words²—when he gives the sequel to the story of the betrayal (in xxvii. 9-10). This instance, however, is hardly revelant, because the exact figure of the price of the betrayal is not the feature in our Point 23 in

¹ See Tarn, W. W.: *Hellenistic Civilization* (London 1927, Arnold), p. 178.

² On this see further the present Annex, p. 424, below.

which we have detected a correspondence between the respective stories of the betrayal of Jesus and the betrayal of Agis.

We may notice next a pair of cases in which a narrative that has been incorporated into the New Testament seems to have been cut to fit a passage from the Old Testament that is quoted with reference to it.

In the tableau of the rider riding through the streets of a city (Point 16), Mark (xi. 1-7) and Luke (xix. 29-35) mention *one* riding animal only—'a colt'—and make no reference to the Old Testament in connexion with it. John, again, mentions (xii. 12-15) one riding animal only, and quotes, in connexion with it, a passage from Zechariah—introduced anonymously as 'the prophet'—in a shortened form in which there can be no question of more than one animal being intended. The original (Zech. ix. 9) runs:

'Behold, thy king cometh unto thee . . . lowly and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass.'

And, in the version of the incident in Matthew, Zechariah—introduced anonymously as 'the prophet' here too—is quoted in this fuller form (Matt. xxi. 5). In the Matthaean version of the incident in the story of Jesus on which the quotation from Zechariah bears, there are also two animals—'an ass, and a colt with her' (Matt. xxi. 2)—and *both* of these are brought by the disciples to Jesus and are saddled for his use. Now, since a rider cannot bestride two mounts at once, Matthew's divergence from the other three Gospels in the matter of the number of the animals introduces an anomaly into his account of the incident from which the other versions are free. And this may prompt us to conjecture that Matthew has altered the narrative—in defiance of the probabilities—in order to bring it into line with the full text of Zechariah, which Matthew appears to have read as referring to two animals, though it seems much more likely that only one animal is really intended, and that Zechariah is merely indulging in the conceit—which is one of the characteristic ornaments of Hebrew poetry—of saying the same thing twice over in different words.

In the second case (Point 71) in which a narrative incorporated into the New Testament seems to have been cut to fit a quotation from the Old Testament the probable explanation is the same: the literary artifice of repetition in periphrasis has been mistaken for a pair of references to two separate things. Ps. xxii. 18—'They part my garments among them, and cast lots upon my vesture'—is quoted in Matt. xxvii. 35, and in John xix. 24 (with respective references to 'the prophet' and to 'the scripture') in connexion with a statement—that is also made (though here without any reference to the Old

Testament) in Mark xv. 24, and in Luke xxiii. 34—that the soldiers ‘parted his garments, casting lots’. In the Synoptic Gospels, Matthew included, it is assumed that there was a single procedure in which lots were cast in order to determine how the clothes were to be distributed among the claimants. According to John (xix. 23–4), however, all the clothes except a seamless ‘coat’ or shirt (*χιτὼν ἄρραφος*) are parted without any casting of lots—presumably in the literal sense of pulling them to pieces at the seams—and the casting of the lots is a special device for dealing with the seamless coat, which the soldiers are loath to spoil by tearing it. We may conjecture that the writer of the Gospel according to Saint John has altered the narrative in order to bring it into line with the text of Ps. xxii. 18, and that he has been moved to make this alteration because he has interpreted the Psalm as describing, not one act, but two acts.

Again, the betrayal of Jesus by Judas with a kiss (Point 40) may be thought to have been suggested by the incident, narrated in 2 Sam. xx. 8–10, of Joab taking Amasa by the beard with his right hand to kiss him, in order to put him off his guard while he treacherously smites him in the fifth rib with his sword. And, if the incident, as it appears in the New Testament, is really a literary echo of this corresponding incident in the Old Testament (to which it does not make any reference), then we might have to dismiss as a mere effect of chance the correspondence which we have descried, in this point, between the betrayal of Jesus and the betrayal of Agis.

There are two other cases in which it is possible, though not convincingly probable, that a feature in the New Testament has been derived from a feature in the Old Testament to which the relevant passages of the New Testament make no reference. The silence of Jesus, first before the Sanhedrin (Point 51) and then before Pilate (Point 58), *may* have been derived from Isa. liii. 7. Similarly, the picture in the Synoptic Gospels of the women standing afar off to watch the Crucifixion (Point 80) *may* have been derived from Ps. xxxviii. 11.

There is an unmistakable, though again unacknowledged, quotation from Ps. xxii in the Matthaean and Marcan versions of the mocking of Jesus on the Cross (Point 72). Matt. xxvii. 39 and Mark xv. 29 both reproduce Ps. xxii. 7, and Matt. xxvii. 43 goes on to reproduce Ps. xxii. 8. Moreover in Matt. xxvii. 40 (= Mark xv. 29–30) and 43 there are almost certainly reminiscences of a passage in the Book of Wisdom.¹ Since it is hardly credible that

¹ Wisd. of Sol. ii. 12–20, quoted in this Annex on pp. 494–5, below. In this passage ‘the ungodly’ are represented as plotting to inflict a horrible death upon a righteous man who claims to be the Son of God, in order to see whether his Divine Father will deliver him in his extremity.

'in real life' the Jews would have chosen to quote or paraphrase, in mockery, passages of Scripture in which the sympathy is (as it is in both these contexts) on the side, not of the mockers, but of their victim, we may conjecture that these particular taunts in Matthew and Mark are merely echoes, in the evangelist's own mind, of the corresponding verses of the Book of Wisdom and the Twenty-second Psalm, and we might even go so far as to dismiss the whole of this incident in the New Testament as unhistorical on the same ground if it did not include other taunts—e.g. 'he saved others; himself he cannot save' (Matt. xxvii. 42 = Mark xv. 31; cf. Luke xxiii. 35)¹—which do not appear to be reminiscences of anything either in Ps. xxii or in the Book of Wisdom or in any other piece of the Old Testament.

Are we then to explain away, as a mere effect of chance, every correspondence between a point in the Gospels and a point in the story of some pagan Hellenic hero wherever the passage in the New Testament can be shown to contain some reminiscence of a passage in the Old Testament? Such a procedure can best be tested by observing how it works in another set of circumstances. The writer of this Study had an uncle, the late Dr. Paget Toynbee, who in the course of his life contributed a considerable number of letters to *The Times* quoting either Dante or else Horace Walpole with reference to some current piece of news in that newspaper. The subjects were extremely diverse and the quotations were usually apt; and, if one were to slip a file of these letters of Dr. Paget Toynbee's into the hands of a New Testament scholar when he was in an unguardedly 'higher critical' mood, one can imagine the unhappy victim of our practical joke being inveigled into fathering the theory that the passages from two ancient authors which Dr. Toynbee was in the habit of quoting were manifestly the sources of the old-wives' tales about current events which the Editor of *The Times* had palmed off upon his readers as authentic news. The theory is plausible because news is notoriously expensive. It means paying toll to telegraph companies and salaries to correspondents. A frugal editor might surely yield to the temptation to save his purse by coining counterfeit news out of passages of ancient authors with which an assiduous scholar was kind

¹ There are other taunts, again, which are manifestly not derived from the Old Testament, since they are echoes of statements or avowals which are attributed to Jesus in the New Testament itself in the preceding chapter of the story of the Passion: e.g. 'Thou that destroyest the Temple and buildest it in three days, save thyself' (Matt. xxvii. 40 = Mark xv. 29-30, echoing Matt. xxvi. 61 = Mark xiv. 58). Similarly, 'if he be the King of Israel, let him now come down from the cross, and we will believe him' (Matt. xxvii. 42 = Mark xv. 32) may be an echo of Matt. xxvi. 63-4 = Mark xiv. 61-2 = Luke xxii. 67-9. On this showing, the reminiscences of the Book of Wisdom in Matt. xxvii. 40 (= Mark xv. 29-30) and 43, may be at second hand, through Matt. xxvi. 63-4 (= Mark xiv. 61-2).

enough to supply him. The theory is so attractive that its present inventor could hardly have resisted adopting it himself if there were not one flaw in it that is fatal to it. This flaw is a chronological one—for investigation will show that Dr. Toynbee's letters containing the quotations from Dante and Horace Walpole never appeared in *The Times* in advance of the news with reference to which they purported to be written: they always appeared after an interval of at least twenty-four hours!

This imaginary parallel reveals the weak point in the argument with which we have been playing. The fact of an ancient work of literature being quoted, either expressly or tacitly, with reference to an alleged current event is, of course, no proof whatever that the alleged event is a piece of fiction which has been fabricated out of the quotation. The event need not be fictitious just because the quotation is apt. For, if the work that is quoted is of a certain size and has a certain variety of content, and if the scholar who quotes it has a retentive memory, then an appropriate quotation may spring to the scholar's mind in almost any conceivable circumstances. And, if our scholar is a *hāfiz* whose study is the Holy Writ of Islam or Jewry and who has learnt his Qur'ān or his Law and Prophets by heart, then the fact that his narrative of current events contains telling quotations from Scripture will throw little or no light upon the question whether the incidents to which these quotations refer are fictitious or authentic.

In the set of passages from the New Testament with which we are at present concerned there is at least one clear case of a quotation from the Old Testament which certainly cannot be the origin of the incident in the Gospels with reference to which it is quoted. This case occurs in the account of Judas' miserable end (Point 85).

We may begin by taking note of a correspondence between the Gospels and the story of Cleomenes which we have not included in our list. In both stories the question of the payment of the price of a field is introduced in connexion with the machinations of the villain who brings the hero to ruin. In Plutarch's *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 56, Nicagoras' animosity against Cleomenes is put down to his resentment at not having received payment for a field which Cleomenes has bought from him. In the story of Judas a field is bought—according to the Matthæan version (Matt. xxvii. 7) by the chief priests when the thirty pieces of silver have been flung back by Judas in their faces, and according to the Lucan version (Acts i. 18) by Judas himself—out of the blood-money. This particular correspondence is so tenuous that it would be prudent to ignore it in any case—as, in fact, we have ignored it in this Study—but in the present context we may take note

of it to the extent of observing that the question of its significance is not affected one way or the other by the fact that Matthew (xxvii. 9-10) hails the miserable end of Judas as the fulfilment of an Old Testament prophecy.

'Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy the prophet, saying: "And they took the thirty pieces of silver, the price of him that was valued, whom they of the children of Israel did value, and gave them for the potter's field, as the Lord appointed me."'

This alleged fulfilment of scripture proves nothing, because in this case the *hāfiz's* memory has played its owner false. The prophet in question is really not Jeremiah but Zechariah, and the passage (Zech. xi. 13) is misquoted. According to the Septuagint it ought to run:

'And the Lord said unto me: "Drop them into the smelting-furnace (*χαυνεστήριον*) and see if it is genuine, in the manner in which my genuineness was tested on their behalf." And I took the thirty pieces of silver and cast them into the house of the Lord—into the smelting-furnace.'

How has the memory of the writer of the Gospel come to play on its owner the trick of substituting a 'potter's field' for the 'smelting-furnace' of the passage in the Old Testament which this *hāfiz*-caught-napping is trying to recall? The explanation is given, not by anything in Zechariah, but by the context in the New Testament. To the knowledge of the writer of the Gospel according to Saint Matthew there was, on the outskirts of Jerusalem, a burial-ground for strangers which went by the name of 'the Field of Blood' in the writer's (or his source's) own day, and which was remembered to have been a potter's field before it had been acquired for this other use by the Jewish public authorities. The context in the Gospel according to Saint Matthew informs us that, in the tradition of the Christian community at Jerusalem, the current name of 'the Field of Blood' had come to be associated with the last chapter in the story of the treachery of Judas; and for our present purpose we need not raise the question whether that story was an authentic piece of history of which the name of the field was a monument or whether the story was a legend that had arisen as an explanation of a name of which the true origin had been forgotten.¹ Whatever may lie behind the traditional association of the name of the field with Judas' end, it is apparent

¹ The hypothesis that the story of Judas' miserable end is an *aition* (in the technical sense in which that Greek word is used by Hellenic antiquaries) is perhaps favoured by the fact that the person from whose blood the field is alleged to have taken its name is not the same person in the Matthaean as in the Lucan version of the story. According to Matthew (xxvii. 3-8) the field has acquired its name because it has been bought by the chief priests with the blood-money paid to Judas for the betrayal of Jesus. According to the Lucan version (Acts i. 18-19) the blood is not Jesus's but Judas' own—the field having been the scene of Judas' miraculously horrible death.

that the subsidiary tradition of the field having been originally a potter's field has suggested, in the mind of the evangelist or his source, an echo of something in the Old Testament, and that in this case the *hāfiz*'s memory has been at fault. This rules out all possibility of the story of Judas' end being derived from the misquoted text of Zechariah; and our conclusion will be confirmed if we go on to compare the Matthaean version of the story of Judas' end with the Lucan; for in the Lucan version (Acts i. 18-19) there is no mention of 'the Field of Blood' having been originally a potter's field; and while, here too, the story is capped by a quotation from the Old Testament, the texts cited in this Lucan variant of the story (Acts i. 20) are not Zech. xi. 12-13, but Ps. lxxix. 25 and cix. 8, which have nothing in common with the passage from the prophet either in its authentic original form or in Matthew's misquotation of it. It is evident that the story associating 'the Field of Blood' with Judas' end cannot have arisen either out of the verses from Zechariah or out of the verses from the Book of Psalms which are respectively quoted in connexion with the story in Matthew and in the Acts, but which have no other connexion whatsoever with one another.

Even if there had not been the alternative—and incorrect—quotation from Zechariah in Matthew, the two verses quoted from the Psalms in the Acts could not in any case have been seriously supposed to be the origin of the story that has evoked the memory of them in the author's mind—and this for the simple reason that, though they are apposite as far as they go, their appositeness is only of the vaguest and most general order. There are at least three other reminiscences of the Old Testament in our present collection of passages from the New Testament which are in the same case.

One such reminiscence is the combination of a passage of Trito-Isaiah—'Mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all people' (Isa. lvi. 7)—with a passage of Jeremiah—'Is this house, which is called by my name, become a den of robbers in your eyes?' (Jer. vii. 11)—which is cited in all three Synoptic Gospels (Matt. xxi. 13 = Mark xi. 17 = Luke xix. 46) with reference to the incident of the cleansing of the Temple (Point 17). This combination of two passages from the Old Testament cannot have generated the incident with which it is associated in the New Testament; for the text of Isaiah, though not inapposite, is exceedingly vague in its application, while the text of Jeremiah refers, not to people who have had the effrontery to do unlawful business in the Temple, but to people who have had the effrontery to come and worship in the Temple after having done unlawful business

outside its precincts. We shall conclude that these two quotations from the Prophets have not generated, but have been evoked by, the incident in the story of Jesus to which they are attached in the Synoptic Gospels; and this conclusion will be confirmed when we observe that, in the Gospel according to Saint John (ii. 17), the same incident is capped by quite a different quotation—'The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up'—which comes from Ps. lxxix. 9.

The record of Jesus being crucified with a malefactor on either side of him is followed in the Gospel according to Saint Mark (xv. 28)—alone of the four—by the quotation of a verse from Deutero-Isaiah (referred to as 'the scripture'): 'And he was numbered with the transgressors' (Isa. liii. 12). This verse from the Old Testament can hardly be the origin of the incident in the New Testament with which it is associated in one Gospel out of four, since it does not itself comprise any of this incident's distinctive features. There is no mention in it of the transgressors being two in number; no hint of the 'numbering' taking the tragically practical form of being put to death together; and *a fortiori* no inkling of the three victims' simultaneous and identical death being a death by crucifixion. In fact, the bearing of the quotation upon the incident with which it is associated is so vague that we shall be inclined to dismiss it as a reminiscence which throws no light whatever on the incident's origin; and our last hesitation will disappear when we find the same verse of Isaiah being quoted in the Lucan account of the Passion (Luke xxii. 37) in quite a different place, namely in the story of the hero sending, after the Last Supper, for swords (i.e. in connexion with our Point 32 instead of with our Point 70).

Similarly, the text of Zechariah (xii. 10)—'and they shall look upon me whom they have pierced'—cannot seriously be supposed to be the origin of the incident of the piercing of Jesus's side with a spear (Point 79), in reference to which it is quoted (as 'another scripture') in John xix. 37.

The piercing of Jesus's side is related in the Gospel according to Saint John in connexion with the story (xix. 32-3) that the soldiers, after they had broken the legs of the two malefactors, refrained from breaking Jesus's legs because they saw that he was dead already; and with reference to this (Point 78) the evangelist (John xix. 36) quotes, or rather paraphrases, a pair of texts from the Old Testament—Exodus xii. 46 and Numbers ix. 12—in the form: 'A bone of him shall not be broken.' Now, in the two passages thus cited, the prescription refers to the paschal lamb; and the Crucifixion of Jesus was identified with the sacrifice of the paschal lamb at an early stage in the Christian tradition. In Saint Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, v. 7, for example, the identifica-

tion is made explicitly; and it is made tacitly in the Synoptic Gospels, inasmuch as they identify the Last Supper with the Passover meal. Are we to conclude that the same identification of Jesus with the paschal lamb has generated, in the Gospel according to Saint John, the story of Jesus's bones being preserved unbroken on the Cross?

The Fourth Gospel, in contradiction with all the other three, places the Crucifixion—and not the Last Supper—on the day of the preparation of the Passover (John xviii. 28 and xix. 14 and 31; cf. Matt. xxvii. 62);¹ and this was the day on which the Passover lamb was slain and eaten. But this difference of dating, which might seem at first sight to support the hypothesis of the story in John being derived from the identification of Jesus with the paschal lamb, in point of fact rules that hypothesis out of court; for in the Christian tradition the identification is proclaimed in the symbolic act of the consecration by Jesus, at the Passover meal, of bread and wine as his own body and blood; and the author of the Gospel according to Saint John has found himself unable to reconcile this vitally important point in the tradition with his own chronology—according to which, Jesus was already dead, and perhaps already in the tomb, by the hour on the day of preparation at which the Passover meal would have been eaten. Accordingly the author of the Fourth Gospel of necessity refrains from identifying the Last Supper with the Passover meal, and, consistently with this, he omits to mention the institution of the Holy Communion, which is recorded in this context in all the Synoptic Gospels. On this showing, it is evidently improbable that the author of the Fourth Gospel will have been so eager, after all, to identify Jesus with the paschal lamb that he will have invented for this purpose an epilogue of his own to the story of the Crucifixion. Whatever may be the origin of the incident of the soldiers refraining from breaking Jesus's legs, it seems probable that the reference to the ritual prescription concerning the paschal lamb has not generated the incident but has merely been evoked by it.

We shall arrive at a similar conclusion with regard to the relation between Matt. xxvii. 24 (Point 64) and Deut. xxi. 6-7. The correspondence which we have noted between Pilate's hand-washing and Catiline's may seem at first sight to be proved fortuitous when we observe, first, that the outwardly identical act is not inspired by an identical motive, and, secondly, that Pilate's motive has no known ground in Roman, while it has a clear ground in Jewish, religious custom and belief. Catiline washes his hands in order to

¹ For this question of dates see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 167-72.

cleanse them literally from the physical blood of a victim whom Catiline has just killed with his own hand; Pilate washes his in order to cleanse them ritually from blood-guiltiness for the death of a victim whom he has condemned to death but whose blood has not yet been shed. And in this procedure Pilate, as Origen points out,¹ 'Iudaico usus est more . . . faciens non secundum aliquam consuetudinem Romanorum'.² Though the relevant passage in Deuteronomy is not expressly cited in Matthew, there can be no doubt that it was in the evangelist's mind. Are we then to conclude that the incident of Pilate's hand-washing has been generated, not by the visually corresponding incident in the story of Catiline, but by a ritually corresponding prescription of the Jewish Law? This hypothesis may be attractive at first sight, but its probability dwindles as soon as we examine the relevant passage in the Book of Deuteronomy (xxi. 1-9). No doubt this passage has suggested both the *explanation* that is given of the act and the *words* that Pilate utters while he is performing it; but the differences between the two contexts are not less striking than the resemblances. In Deuteronomy the ritual of hand-washing is prescribed as an expiation for the death of a victim who, instead of being about to be slain, has been slain already, and the case envisaged is that of a person who, instead of having been publicly condemned to death, has been found slain without its being known who is the slayer. These circumstances are so different, and the differences touch the essence of the situation so closely, that we are led to the conclusion that the passage in Deuteronomy has merely coloured the incident in Matthew but has not generated it.

Finally we may ask whether the tableau of the fugitive leaving his wrap in the hands of his pursuers (Point 48) may have been derived from an at first sight analogous incident in the Old Testament story of Joseph and Potiphar's Wife (Gen. xxxix. 12), and may therefore, after all, bear no more than a fortuitous resemblance to the last scene in the Passion of Tiberius Gracchus. Here again we shall find that the superficial resemblance between the respective incidents in the New Testament and in the Old Testament will not stand the test of closer examination. The wrap which, in both the story of Jesus and the story of Tiberius Gracchus, is left in the hands of an unknown male pursuer, is left, in the story of Joseph, in the hands of a woman who is the villainess of the piece in which the fugitive is the hero. Moreover in the story of Joseph and Potiphar's Wife the incident of the seizure

¹ Origen: *In Mattheum Commentariorum Series, Vetus Interpretatio*, cap. 124, in Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. xiii, col. 1774.

² The writer's attention has been drawn to this passage of Origen by Dr. Martin Braun.

of the wrap is not isolated, as it is in both the other two contexts, but is merely the prelude to a more important incident in which the abandoned wrap is put by its captor to a fraudulent use as a piece of material evidence for lending apparent credibility to a false accusation of which the owner of the wrap is the victim. On this showing, we may hesitate to pronounce that Gen. xxxix. 12 has even coloured Mark xiv. 51-2.

The results of the foregoing examination of quotations from, and allusions to, and reminiscences of, the Old Testament in the collection of passages from the New Testament with which we are here concerned seem to indicate that while the play of chance may, and indeed must, be taken into consideration as one possible explanation of our correspondences between the Gospels and the stories of certain pagan Hellenic heroes, this explanation cannot be pressed to extremes and will not offer us a complete solution of our problem.

An alternative possible explanation is the production of identical results by identical causes.

One obvious general identical cause is the element of uniformity in human nature. Since every human being is brought into the World by a physical process of conception and birth, every hero, like every one else, is bound to have had a mother, and the hero's mother is as likely as anybody else's mother to play an important part in the life of her son. This would dispose of our Point 5. Again, every human being is eventually removed from the World by death; and therefore any enterprise which cannot be accomplished by a single hero in a single lifetime is bound—if it does not die prematurely by dying with its originator—to be handed on from a predecessor to a successor. This would dispose of one of the elements in our Points 1 and 1 A and 86 and 87. In the third place we may observe that, without possessing the intrinsic universality of the figures of a mother or a predecessor or a successor, the figures of a traitor¹ and a bosom friend and a boaster and a mocker—and perhaps even those of a false witness and a convert—are all of them stock characters in the tragi-comedy of human life. It will be seen that the principle of the uniformity of human nature suffices to account for a majority of the common characters set out above in Table IV.

A more precise identical cause which is likewise capable of producing identical results is to be found in a social environment which is the common setting of all the stories of all the heroes

¹ In the story of Dio, for instance (see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 248 and 253, above), Callippus plays Judas to Dio's Jesus, as is pointed out by Eduard Meyer: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 173.

whom we have brought into comparison with one another in our present inquiry. Their lives are all lived in a society that is in course of disintegration; disintegration, as we have seen,¹ brings standardization in its train; and, if the disintegration-process produces a certain measure of uniformity as between the histories of different disintegrating civilizations, it may be expected to produce the same effect in a still higher degree as between the lives of individuals who are all of them children of one and the same disintegrating civilization. The naturalness of this expectation is pertinent to our present subject, since Jesus and the pagan heroes with whom we are bringing him into comparison are, all alike, children of the Hellenic Society in an age—beginning in the latter part of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' and running over into the early days of the Hellenic universal state—which is all comprised within a span of not more than three centuries from first to last. This identity of social environment would account, in Points 1 and 1 A, for the change from the predecessor's gentleness to the successor's violence, since we have seen² that both Archaism and Futurism—that is, two out of four alternative ways of life that are followed by would-be saviours in times of social disintegration—are doomed *a priori* to explode into violence sooner or later. The same cause would also account for the hero's addressing himself to the Proletariat and denouncing the Dominant Minority (Points 7–10), and likewise for his pretension to kingship (Point 15). In this connexion we may remind ourselves³ that, in this group of points, the superficial likeness is trivial by comparison with the profound dissimilarity between the respective attitudes and actions of our pagan heroes and of Jesus. While the people to whom they appeal and the people whom they denounce are respectively much the same, there is an extreme difference between the heroes' own respective responses to an identical challenge. The pagan heroes—even those who set out with the gentlest intentions—all end sooner or later by meeting force with force and by attempting to substitute a new mundane régime of their own for the existing mundane régime against which they are up in arms, whereas Jesus not only parts company with all his pagan counterparts but actually breaks right away from the Jewish tradition in which he has been brought up when he persists in retorting to violence with gentleness; in accepting death with resignation instead of with defiance; and in proclaiming that his kingdom is not of This World (Points 45 and 46).

It now looks as though the operation of identical causes and the

¹ In V. C (iii), above.

² In V. C (i) (d) 8 and 9, *passim*, above.

³ See V. C (i) (d) 9 (γ), pp. 128–32, and V. C (i) (d) 11, pp. 155–6, above.

play of chance were capable of accounting between them for a majority of our points of correspondence in those chapters of the story that precede the hero's Passion; but this conclusion does not take us very far on our road in search of explanations; for a glance at Table I will show that the points which fall within these earlier chapters amount to no more than 16¹ out of a total of 89,² so that the last chapter, of which the Passion is the theme, accounts for nearly five-sixths of the total number (i.e. for 73 points out of 89). No doubt, in this last chapter too the two causes which we have taken into consideration so far will account for an appreciable number of our correspondences; but in this chapter these correspondences come thronging in such numbers and are also in many cases so remarkably close that we cannot reasonably attribute them all either to the play of chance or to the operation of some identical cause. We must seek farther before we can conscientiously declare ourselves quit of the investigation that we have undertaken. We have still to examine a third possible alternative explanation; and that is the possibility of mimesis.

If mimesis has in fact played a part in producing the correspondences that we are seeking to explain, it is evident that this faculty may have been brought into play in either or both of two quite distinct sets of relations. On the one hand there is the possibility that some of the characters on our historical stage who have made their appearance there at a relatively early date have been taken as objects of mimesis by other characters who have made their appearance later. On the other hand there is the possibility that the mimesis may have been the work, not of our characters themselves, but of the authors who have recorded—and who, in recording, may perhaps have taken liberties with—the heroes' histories.

Is it likely that any of the later characters have modelled their lives and actions to any appreciable extent upon those of other characters that have anticipated them in making their appearance upon the stage of Hellenic history? There is certainly a strong *a priori* probability that the two Gracchi may have consciously and deliberately taken the two Heracleidae as their pattern. In the first place the Roman aristocracy as a whole had already, in the Post-Hannibalic Age, become so deeply imbued with Hellenic culture that the entire Hellenic heritage of memories and ideals had by this time come to be virtually an integral part of the Roman tradition. In the second place we know that the mother of the Gracchi, Cornelia—who was solely responsible for the upbringing of the two heroes, since their father died while they were both

¹ Reckoning 1 A as a separate point.

² Reckoning 1 A and 80 A as separate points.

still quite young¹—moved, with a markedly greater intimacy than most Roman aristocrats of her generation, in the Greek-speaking circles of Hellenic Society. Cornelia was intimate alike with Macedonian Greek royalties and with men-of-letters and philosophers of all Greek nationalities.²

'Gracchus's mother Cornelia saw to it that her son should receive a liberal Hellenic education, and should be thoroughly grounded in Greek literature, from boyhood (*Fuit Gracchus diligentia Corneliae matris a puero doctus et Graecis litteris eruditus*). He always had tutors from Greece who were picked men; and one of these—who had the teaching of Gracchus when he was on the verge of manhood—was Diophanes of Mitylene, who was the greatest master of language in his day in all Greece.'³

This Mitylenaeen rhetor Diophanes, as well as the Cumaeen philosopher Blossius,⁴ is said still to have been Tiberius Gracchus's mentor at the moment when he entered upon his term of office as Tribune of the Plebs and launched his social reforms.⁵ Blossius himself may be reckoned as a semi-Greek in nationality, since Cumae was an Italian city-state of Greek origin which had obtained its charter of Latinization from the Roman Government as recently as the year 180 B.C.⁶ To both Blossius and Diophanes, Agis and Cleomenes would be familiar figures; and their story would be bound to make a deep impression on Tiberius Gracchus as soon as his attention was drawn to it. As aristocrats, as archaists, and as reformers who had made it their first business to grapple with an acute agrarian problem, these two Spartan Heracleidae could hardly fail to suggest themselves to the young Roman statesman as patterns for him to follow.

There is also a certain *a priori* probability that the examples of the Heracleidae or of the Gracchi or of both the Spartan and the Roman pair of heroes may have influenced the leaders of the Hellenic internal proletariat whose stories we have embraced in our comparative view. We have seen⁷ that, in being driven willy-nilly out of the path of gentleness into the path of violence, the would-be archaist reformer is often driven into becoming, in spite of his original intentions, a champion of the Proletariat, and further that, if and when his almost inevitable quarrel with his own kin and kind comes to a climax at which they positively dis-

¹ Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chap. 1.

² Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chaps. 1 and 40.

³ Cicero: *Brutus*, chap. 27, § 104.

⁴ For Blossius of Cumae and his relation to Tiberius Gracchus and to Aristonicus see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 179, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 249, above.

⁵ Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chap. 8.

⁶ 'Cumani eo anno petentibus permisum ut publice Latine loquerentur et praeconiis vendendi Latine ius esset.'—Livy, Book XL, chap. 42.

⁷ In V. C (ii) (a), pp. 236-41, above.

own him, he sometimes seeks and finds a new social habitation and a new political career by turning from an archaist into a futurist and putting himself at the Proletariat's head. One such social migrant is included among our present group of pagan heroes in the person of Catiline. It is evident that a Catiline might bring with him an admiration for a Gaius Gracchus which he might then transmit to the proletarian-born leaders of the Proletariat with whom he had now thrown in his lot.

On this showing, it seems reasonable to make a considerable allowance for the possibility of the direct imitation of one character by another in attempting to account for the correspondences between the stories of our pagan heroes; but this explanation does not carry us very much farther, as will be shown by a glance at Table III above; for, out of 89 instances of correspondences between the stories of one or other of the two Heracleidae and those of the rest of the heroes in our group, only 28 instances are contributed by the stories of other pagan heroes, while no less than 61 are contributed by the story of Jesus. It is these 61 instances from the story of Jesus, and not the 23 from the stories of the Gracchi or the one from the story of Cato Minor or the 4 from the stories of the futurists, that cry out for explanation; and the suggestion that Jesus may have been consciously following in the footsteps of the Heracleidae has only to be formulated in order to refute itself. The Gospels and Josephus alike make it clear that in the first century of the Christian Era the Jews and Hellenes who in that age were living cheek-by-jowl in Palestine lived lives as separate as the Arabs and the Jews are living in the same country to-day. It is improbable that Jesus of Nazareth had ever heard even of his fellow proletarian and fellow Syrian Eunus of Apamea, or of the two Cilician slave-kings, Cleon and Athenio; for, though Coele Syria, and even Cilicia, was not very far from Galilee, these three Oriental futurists only rose to fame in their distant place of exile overseas in Sicily. *A fortiori* it is improbable that Jesus had ever heard of the Gracchi or of Agis and Cleomenes. Accordingly, if we are to believe that the faculty of mimesis has played a part in producing any of the 89 correspondences between the story of Jesus and the stories of our eleven pagan Hellenic heroes, and if we want to discover the field in which mimesis has operated in this case, we must concentrate our attention, not upon the relations between the heroes themselves, but upon the relations between the literary authorities in whose works the heroes' respective stories have been recorded.

In setting out to discover, if we can, whether some of these literary authorities have been influenced by others, our first step

must be to ascertain, as nearly as possible, their respective dates; and our first findings will be—in chronological order—as follows:

Diodorus (*vivebat circa 70–1 B.C.*).

The Gospel according to Saint Mark (*scriptum circa A.D. 65*).¹

Plutarch (*vivebat circa A.D. 45–120*).

The Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Luke (*scripta inter A.D. 70 et 95*).²

The Gospel according to Saint John (*scriptum circa A.D. 100*).³

It will be seen that, while Diodorus's *Library of Universal History* was written at least sixty-five years earlier than any of the other works here in question, the chronological relation of Plutarch's *Lives* to the Gospels cannot be ascertained precisely. We can only say that probably the *Lives* were published later than the Gospel according to Saint Mark, at about the same time as the other two Synoptic Gospels, and earlier than the Gospel according to Saint John.

These results, however, even as far as they go, still leave us on the threshold of our chronological problem; for these works of literature which we have just tentatively arranged in a chronological order all have pedigrees; and, if we now try to grope our way back from the works themselves to their sources, we shall arrive at a different chronological sequence.

To take the Gospels first: Matthew and Luke have one common source in the collection of sayings of Jesus which New Testament scholars call 'Q',⁴ and another common source in Mark; and, while the relative dates of Mark and 'Q' are matters of controversy between scholars, it seems to be generally agreed that both works must have been written before A.D. 70.⁵ The date of Mark is of particular importance for the purpose of our present inquiry, because Matthew, at any rate, is almost entirely dependent on Mark for his account of the Passion.⁶ And, if we proceed to an

¹ 'About half-way through the sixties' according to Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 237; *circa A.D. 65* (i.e. after the Neronian persecution of the Christians, but before the destruction of the Temple at Jerusalem) according to Streeter, B. H.: *The Four Gospels* (London 1924, Macmillan), p. 495.

² Meyer, op. cit., vol. i, p. 239. Streeter dates Luke *circa A.D. 80* (op. cit., p. 540) and Matthew *circa A.D. 85* (op. cit., p. 524).

³ *Circa A.D. 100–20*, according to Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), p. 647. Streeter, on the other hand, dates John *circa A.D. 90–5* (op. cit., pp. 456–7).

⁴ For a tentative reconstruction of 'Q' see Streeter, op. cit., p. 291.

⁵ Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i, pp. 234–6, dates 'Q', on internal evidence, between A.D. 67 and A.D. 70, and therefore slightly later than Mark, which the same scholar, as we have seen (footnote 1, above), dates *circa A.D. 65*. Streeter, on the other hand, who dates Mark between A.D. 64 and A.D. 70, inclines (op. cit., pp. 150 and 191) to date 'Q' earlier than Mark—perhaps as early as A.D. 50.

⁶ Meyer, op. cit., vol. i, p. 212, holds that Luke's, as well as Matthew's, account of the Passion is mainly based on Mark. Streeter, on the other hand, op. cit., p. 202, holds 'that Luke is in the main reproducing an account of the Passion parallel to, but independent of, Mark, and enriching it with occasional insertions from Mark'.

analysis of Mark, we can distinguish one source—'the Twelve-source'—which must have been written later than the martyrdom of the son of Zebedee in A.D. 44, and another, embodying the recollections of Peter, which appears to be of an earlier date than 'the Twelve-source'.¹ *Ex hypothesi*, however, the very earliest sources of the Gospels cannot be anterior in date to the fourth decade of the first century of the Christian Era, and the sources of our pagan authorities for the stories of our pagan heroes can all be traced back to earlier dates than that. For example, the books of Diodorus's work that deal with the history of the Hellenic World during the half century beginning, where Polybius left off, in 146 B.C. are believed to reproduce a continuation of Polybius's history from the hand of Poseidonius (*vivebat circa* 135–51 B.C.).² Plutarch's *Lives of the Gracchi* appears to be derived immediately from a Greek source³ written from the point of view of the philosophic and aristocratic school of Roman republicans whose proto-martyr and fount of inspiration was Cato Minor.⁴ But this immediate source of Plutarch's work appears in turn to have been derived in large measure from Latin biographies of the Gracchi⁵ which were themselves derived from the *Annals* of Gaius Fannius—a statesman-historian who was approximately Tiberius Gracchus's contemporary.⁶ Fannius scaled the walls of Carthage at Gracchus's heels in 146 B.C.,⁷ and he was consul in 122 B.C., which was the year of Gaius Gracchus's second tribunate. We may take it that Fannius's life falls within the dates 166–96 B.C. In the third place Plutarch's *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes* appears to have been derived—again not immediately, but ultimately—in part from the history of Polybius (*vivebat circa* 206–128 B.C.), who must have been born rather less than half a century after Cleomenes himself, and in part from the works of two of Cleomenes' senior contemporaries: his political opponent Aratus of Sicyon (*vivebat* 271–213 B.C.) and his panegyrist Phylarchus (*vivebat circa* 270–210 B.C.).

¹ For the sources of Mark see Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 236–7. For the grounds for supposing that John was put to death at the same time as James, see *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 144–5, and vol. iii, pp. 174–7 and 420.

² It is to this source that we may trace the surprisingly humane and sympathetic attitude towards the insurgent slaves in Sicily which comes out in Diodorus's narrative. While Diodorus of Agyrium might perhaps have been inclined, for his own part, to see the story from the point of view of his own compatriots, Poseidonius of Apamea sees it through the eyes of the slaves from Syria and Cilicia who had started life, like Poseidonius himself, as subjects of the Seleucid Monarchy (Poseidonius and Eunus actually came from the same city).

³ See Kornemann, E.: *Zur Geschichte der Gracchenzeit: Quellenkritische Untersuchungen* (Leipzig 1903, Dieterich), pp. 41–2.

⁴ For this school see V. C (i) (d) 1, vol. v, pp. 390 and 392; V. C (i) (d) 3, vol. v, p. 405; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 250, above.

⁵ Kornemann, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁶ For Fannius's work and life see Kornemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–37.

⁷ Fannius himself is cited as the authority for this anecdote in Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chap. 4.

What is Plutarch's relation to these literary authorities whose works were written perhaps 250 or even 300 years before Plutarch's own? So far from drawing directly upon these original sources, Plutarch seems to have been content to take over his stories in the shape which they had assumed as the result of a long and complicated literary history.

"The foundation of the narrative, which comes from the historians, the piecing together of this with the biographical matter which had to be imported from elsewhere, the arrangement of the whole round the person of the hero—all this was found by Plutarch ready made. . . . His authorities come from here, there, and everywhere. . . . This variegated tissue is part and parcel of the genre of literature of which Plutarch is for us the representative. . . . Plutarch does not dream of claiming to have woven it himself; his achievement is simply to have produced a work that has on it a sheen of newness. . . . Plutarch's *Lives* constitute, through their existence, a proof that, before Plutarch's day, there was a biographical literature of the Plutarchan kind with a history extending over many generations."¹

If Plutarch's work is so remote from the original sources as this, it would seem at first sight improbable that his text would reproduce the original texts at all closely; yet, surprising though this may be, we have evidence that, at least in one passage, Plutarch's *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes* does reproduce Phylarchus's *Histories*² with a closeness that here and there approximates to identity. This may be verified by comparing Plutarch's chap. 34 (our Point 13) with the passage that is expressly quoted from Phylarchus by Athenaeus in *Deipnosophistae*, Book IV, pp. 141 F–142 F.³ And the equally close verbal correspondence between a passage of Plutarch's chapter 50 and a passage of Book XXVIII, chap. 4, of Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus's *Historiae Philippicae* is probably to be explained likewise as an effect of the preservation, in both, of Phylarchus's *ipsissima verba*. When we further consider that the style, tone, and colour of these two passages in the *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes* also prevail through the greater part of this piece of Plutarch's work, and that they exactly tally⁴ with the account of Phylarchus's work that is given by Polybius,⁵ we may feel warranted in concluding that a substantial portion, and perhaps even the greater part, of Plutarch's text consists of *résumés* of the text

¹ Leo, F.: *Die Griechisch-Römische Biographie nach ihrer Literarischen Form* (Leipzig 1901, Teubner), p. 155. The whole of chapter 8, 'Plutarch', and chapter 9, 'Die Form der plutarchischen Biographie', is pertinent to our present inquiry.

² According to Suidas, Phylarchus's work covered the history of the Hellenic World from the death of Pyrrhus in 272 B.C. to the death of Cleomenes in 220 B.C.

³ See Bux, E.: 'Zwei sozialistische Novellen bei Plutarch' in *Klio*, vol. xix (1925), pp. 426–9. It is the latter part of this passage quoted in Athenaeus, i.e. 142 C–142 F, that actually overlaps with the chapter of Plutarch.

⁴ This point is made by Bux, op. cit., p. 428.

⁵ See pp. 457–9, below.

of Phylarchus¹ which survived, with remarkably little defacement, all their temporary lifts in the successive literary conveyances in which they made their long and broken journey from Phylarchus's manuscript to Plutarch's.

This excursion into the realm of *Quellenkritik* gives us the following chronological sequence for our original authorities,² in so far as we can identify these with any certainty:

Aratus (*vivebat* 271-213 B.C.).

Phylarchus (*vivebat circa* 270-210 B.C.).

Polybius (*vivebat circa* 206-128 B.C.).

Fannius (*vivebat circa* 166-96 B.C.).

Poseidonius (*vivebat circa* 135-51 B.C.).

Peter (*testimonium prompsit post* A.D. 30).

'The Twelve-source' (*scriptum post* A.D. 44).

A source peculiar to the Gospel according to Saint Luke³ (*scriptum prae* 'Q', if Meyer is right in dating 'Q' *post* A.D. 67).

'Q' (*scriptum inter* A.D. 67 *et* A.D. 70).

A source peculiar to the Gospel according to Saint Matthew (*scriptum post* 'Q').⁴

The Gospel according to Saint John (*scriptum post* A.D. 100).

Now that we have arrived at this sequence of the earliest authorities which we are able to identify in each case, what are we to make of it? How do our findings bear upon our problem of literary appresentation-and-affiliation? If we are to believe that some, at least, of our correspondences are to be credited to the account of a practice of literary mimesis, then the most obvious conclusion to draw would be that, wherever we have detected a point of

¹ Leo observes in *op. cit.*, p. 175, that Plutarch's '*Lives of Agis and Cleomenes* are reminiscent of his *Life of Aratus*, except that the *Aratus* has been constructed by working the historians into Aratus's *Memoirs*, while the *Agis and Cleomenes* has been constructed by working Aratus and Polybius into the narrative of Phylarchus'. This high estimate of Plutarch's debt to Phylarchus is not impugned by the fact that in the *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes* Phylarchus is cited by name only three times (in chaps. 9, 26, and 49). It is more pertinent to observe that Phylarchus is *not* cited as Plutarch's authority in either of the two passages (in chaps. 34 and 50) which are known, almost for certain, to be of Phylarchian origin. There is a far greater number of other passages in this particular piece of Plutarch's work that can be traced back with certainty to Polybius, and yet Plutarch here cites Polybius as an authority not even three times but only once (in chap. 48). It will be seen that, in Plutarch, the number of express references to an authority gives no indication whatsoever of the extent to which that authority has actually been drawn upon as a source.

² The sequence here given for the sources of the Gospels follows Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 236-7.

³ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 216-24. Streeter, *op. cit.*, p. 218, suggests that this document, which he calls 'L', was the work of Luke himself, and was written by him *circa* A.D. 60, during his two years' sojourn at Caesarea in attendance upon Saint Paul. He further suggests that Luke subsequently combined 'L', first with 'Q' into a 'Proto-Luke', and then, through this intermediate stage, with Mark, to make the Gospel according to Saint Luke as we now have it (*op. cit.*, p. 219).

⁴ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 213-16, and Streeter, *op. cit.*, p. 231. Streeter, *op. cit.*, p. 150, dates 'M' *circa* A.D. 65. This would make 'M', as well as 'L', anterior to 'Q' if Meyer's date for 'Q' is right. On the other hand, 'Q' is anterior to both 'M' and 'L' if Streeter is right in dating 'Q' perhaps as early as A.D. 50 (see p. 434, footnote 5, above).

correspondence between one literary authority and another, the incident as recorded by the earlier or the earliest of two or more authorities is an authentic matter of fact, but that, when the same incident reappears in some later authority or authorities, it is in this context a piece of fiction which has been fraudulently fabricated out of the genuine fact which the earlier authority has honestly put on record. This conclusion may be obvious, but it involves at least three assumptions: first that the earlier authority in each case is reporting, if not the whole truth, at any rate nothing but the truth; second that the later authority has been guilty of a deliberate act of fabrication; and third that the point in common between the two or more authorities that are in question in any given case has ultimately been derived by the later authority or authorities from the earlier or the earliest, even if only at second or at tenth hand—to the exclusion of the alternative possible hypothesis that all the authorities in question, the earlier and the later alike, have derived the point which is common to them from some source that is not identical with any of them and that is earlier than them all. Not one of these three assumptions can properly be taken for granted; and to look into all three of them closely may be the most profitable step for us to take next.

Dichtung und Wahrheit

Is the apparent case of literary mimesis with which we are now concerned a clear case of plagiarism? The concept of plagiarism pre-supposes the existence of a series of works of literature which have been successively published at definite dates in a chronological sequence and which, each and all, can be attributed respectively to the pens of particular individual authors. In any sophisticated social milieu authorship is the normal way of literary creation, and in such milieux it eclipses every alternative way so completely that it becomes easy to forget that works of literature can be brought into existence in any other way than through being deliberately planned in the mind, and as deliberately written by the pen, of somebody who in consequence will be recognized on all hands as the sole and unquestionable author of 'his' book. Nevertheless this sophisticated way of literary creation ought not to be taken for granted, without inquiry, in any and every case; for, while every act of creation is, no doubt, the travail of some individual soul,¹ it does not follow that every creator will think of setting his stamp upon his handiwork in order to apprise the World that it has come from his workshop. This assertion of authorship implies

¹ On this point see III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 230-1, above.

some touch of a self-consciousness and egotism which are ingrained on the seamy side of Civilization but which are conspicuous by their absence on the primitive level of human life; and in human history hitherto Civilization has been the exception and primitiveness the rule. In other contexts we have not only observed that the number of human societies of the primitive species that have come into existence up to date is vastly greater than the present muster-roll of civilizations:¹ we have also observed that within the bosom of any civilization of which we know—and this at any stage of its history in regard to which we have at our command the necessary evidence for making the observation—the individual ‘members’ of the society who still remain at or near the primitive level will always be found to outnumber, and this overwhelmingly, the handful of higher personalities who create and sustain the civilization by projecting a shadow of their own inner life into social institutions which govern the outward lives of the primitive majority of their fellows.² On this showing, it is evident that the primitive *êthos* does not cease to count just because it may have been pushed momentarily into the background; it has to be reckoned with always and everywhere; and this consideration applies to the study of literature no less than to that of any other human activity.

What, then, is the normal means of literary creation—and transmission—in a primitive social milieu? The question can be answered in negative terms which may have a bearing upon our present inquiry. On the primitive level there is no consciousness of authorship, no desire to claim copyright, and consequently no such thing as plagiarism. There is also, in such milieux, no sense of a distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’. In a primitive social circle the tale of life is taken, by teller and listener alike, in the way in which a child takes a fairy story.³ And in the telling of a fairy story everybody and everything is anonymous—‘the author’ as well as his audience, and the heroes and heroines as well as the author. Fairy-tales are, in fact, ‘folk-tales’ which have lingered on in the nursery after they have been swept out of the parlour; for the anonymity of the characters is the hall-mark which distinguishes ‘folk-tales’ from other forms of literature.⁴

Such anonymous ‘folk-tales’ are the native voice of a ‘folk-memory’ which is at work all the time behind the scenes even in those sophisticated theatres of life in which audience and actors

¹ See I. C (iii) (a), vol. i, pp. 147–8, above.

² See III. C (ii) (a), vol. iii, pp. 239–44, above.

³ See I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 442, above.

⁴ See Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 110–111.

virtually conspire to draw a veil over this telltale relic of a simpler past; and in primitive milieux this ancient way of distilling the quintessence of experience and transmitting the elixir from one generation to another holds the field without a rival. 'Folk-memory' performs, for people who are still content to rely on it, substantially the same service as is performed for the sophisticated by the writing and reading of books. It serves as a channel for the passage of a mental current from mind to mind in *saecula saeculorum*; but the waters that flow along this primitive bed have quite a different effect upon the mental works of Man according to whether these works themselves happen to be primitive or sophisticated. For the works of primitive minds the waters of this subterranean mental stream serve as waters of Memory; but on the works of sophisticated minds they act as waters of Lethe. It seems that this current cannot carry along with it the experiences that fall into its stream without reducing them, all alike, to an anonymity which is native to the works of primitive minds, but which for the works of sophisticated minds is tantamount to a loss of identity. As a literal torrent of water tools the rocks and pulps the tree-trunks that cross its path until at length it casts them up again, far down stream, high and dry in the unrecognizable shape of smooth-faced boulders and water-logged driftwood, so the mighty current of 'folk-memory' is perpetually engulfing foreign objects—fragments of historical events, glimpses of historical personages, and sometimes even scraps of sophisticated literature (where a primitive social milieu is in contact with a sophisticated one)—and the flotsam fares as hardly in the mental as in the physical stream. Here too it is battered out of all recognition before it is cast up again as jetsam on a distant strand.¹

In other contexts we have already watched the waters of Lethe at their work of weathering away the authentic original features of historical events and historical personages which have fallen into their bed. We have seen how some barbarian war-lord, whose historical career can be traced, and his historical importance assessed, from the archives of the civilization on which he has preyed, may, as a hero of epic, assume an importance and acquire a career in the realm of poetic imagination which bear little or no relation to his authentic standing in the realm of prosaic fact.² Nor is it only the External Proletariat that displays this imagina-

¹ For example, in the *Ahiqar Romance* the characters of Sennacherib and Esarhaddon have been transformed to a degree at which they no longer betray any recognizable affinity with their historical originals (Meyer, E.: *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs), pp. 120-1).

² See V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, 'Historical Fact and Heroic Tradition', in vol. v, pp. 607-14, above.

tive power of transmuting 'fact' into 'fiction' by an alchemy which is at once destructive and creative. We have also watched the history of Alexander the Great being transmuted into the Alexander Romance at the very time when an authentic record was being made, out of an ample dossier, by conscientious and scientific-minded Hellenic historians.¹ How came the figure of the Macedonian war-lord to be kidnapped and carried off bodily into Fairyland² in the broad daylight of Hellenic rationalism? And whose were the impudent hands that stole the body? The answer is that Alexander's body was snatched by Orientals whom the conqueror himself, in his historical career, had forcibly conscripted into the ranks of the Hellenic internal proletariat.³ And this sensational capture, which was effected almost on the morrow of Alexander's death, was the first successful stroke in an Oriental counter-attack which was to culminate, more than nine centuries later, in the eviction of Alexander's Roman successors from their last foothold on Oriental ground by the prowess of the Primitive Muslim Arabs. A millennial war of *revanche* which was carried to its conclusion on the military plane in the days of the Caliph 'Umar had been opened on the literary plane as early as the days of Alexander's own diadochi.

Why was it that the Orientals, in their long-drawn-out encounter with Hellenism, were able to score this precocious and premonitory success in the field of literature so long before they were able to follow it up in the fields of war and politics? The answer seems to be that, at the time when Alexander suddenly annexed the domain of the Achaemenian Empire to the Hellenic World by the superficial method of military conquest, the ground—or, rather, the river-bed—was already prepared for a rapid transmutation of an episode of Hellenic history into a theme of Oriental romance.

¹ See V. C (i) (c) 3, vol. v, p. 252, and V. C (i) (c) 3, Annex III, vol. v, p. 608, above. 'Pseudo-Callisthenes should be regarded as the narrator and formulator of an historical myth. . . . That he used historical sources is no argument against this, for in the era of Alexandrian scholarship even myths were built upon a foundation of scholarship, as "the Myth of the Twentieth Century" is based upon an interpretation of anthropology and history. It is from the dregs and lower strata of historiography that the Alexander Romance has drawn its "erudition"' (Braun, M.: *History and Romance in Graeco-Oriental Literature* (Oxford 1938, Blackwell), p. 32).

² 'One may be sure that the common people, to whom it belonged spiritually and socially, believed in the truth of the account as implicitly as a child believes a fairy-tale. . . . The Alexander Romance belongs spiritually and socially to the common people who cannot clearly and consciously differentiate between truth (*ἀλήθεια*), lies (*ψεύδος*), and literary fiction (*πλάσμα*) and therefore willingly accept the myth, especially the written myth, above all when this myth appeals to their wishes and ideals, as members of a particular social group. In the Alexander Romance truth and fiction are inextricably interwoven. The categories *ψεύδος* and *πλάσμα* cannot be applied at all to the mass of untrue and fantastic statements. To apply them would be unjust to the anonymous author and his readers, because the standards and categories of the historian are not applicable to their intellectual capacities' (ibid., pp. 33-4).

³ For this social effect of Alexander's conquests see III. C (i) (a), vol. iii, pp. 140 and 149-51; III. C (i) (d), vol. iii, pp. 197-9; and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 64-5, above.

The 'sea-change' which the historical Hellenic figure of Alexander was now to undergo in the imagination of the Oriental subjects of the Achaemenian Empire's Macedonian 'successor-states' had already been undergone by other historical figures who once upon a time had played an authentic part in the histories of two non-Hellenic civilizations—the Babylonian and the Egyptian. By the time when Hellenism imposed itself, by force of Macedonian arms, upon the Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indic worlds, the Babylonian and Egyptian worlds had already been subjugated, by force of Achaemenian arms, to the Syriac. In other contexts we have noticed how vehemently and persistently these two subjugated societies kicked against the pricks, and how warmly they welcomed Alexander as a deliverer from the Syriac yoke.¹ But, while they had been fighting a losing battle against the aggression which the Syriac Society was committing against them on the military and political plane in the shape of an Achaemenian imperialism, the Egyptian and Babylonian societies had all the time been taking their Syriac conquerors captive on the plane of 'folklore'. They had both of them succeeded in instilling a memorial of their own past greatness into the 'folk-memory' of their latter-day masters. And this memorial had taken the form of 'folk-tales' in which certain authentic characters and events of Egyptian and Babylonian history had been transmuted into subjects of romance. The past greatness of the Babylonian World had been embalmed in the romance of 'Ninus and Semiramis'; the past greatness of the Egyptian World in the romances of 'Sesostris' and 'Nectanebos'. And the historical materials out of which these three romances are woven can be identified. The name of the legendary Queen 'Semiramis of Babylon' is taken from that of an historical queen of Assyria, Sammu-ramat, who was the wife of King Shamshiadad V (*regnabat* 824–810 B.C.) and the mother of King Adadnirari III (*regnabat* 809–782 B.C.).² 'Ninus', who plays the hero to Semiramis' heroine, is an abstraction that stands for the prowess of all the kings that ever went forth to war from Nineveh.³ In a similar way 'Sesostris' seems to stand for the prowess of all the emperors of the Twelfth Egyptian Dynasty who were the life and soul of the Egyptian universal state,⁴ while Nectanebos stands for the prowess of all the patriot-kings who ever led Egyptian forlorn hopes against any of the Asiatic oppressors of the Egyptian World from the days of Esarhaddon to the days of Artaxerxes Ochus.⁵

¹ See IV. C (ii) (b) 2, vol. iv, p. 100, footnote 4; V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 94 and 123, with footnote 2; V. C (i) (c) 4, vol. v, pp. 347–8; and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, p. 203, above.

² Braun, Martin: *History and Romance in Graeco-Oriental Literature* (Oxford 1938, Blackwell), p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁵ In these romances the Babylonian and Egyptian imagination found 'compensation'

Thus, by the time when the Hellenes broke in upon the Oriental scene, the Egyptian and Babylonian 'folk-tales' had already travelled far from the historical facts which had been their starting-point; and in this situation the Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations presented themselves for inspection by Hellenic eyes in two distinct guises.¹ In both societies there was a sophisticated upper stratum which wanted, and tried, to set before its Hellenic liberators the authentic history of the venerable civilization for which the constituents of this still surviving upper social stratum felt themselves to be trustees. The monuments of this effort are the learned works of the Egyptian scholar Manetho and the Babylonian scholar Berossus; and the fragments of the two works that have come down to us are enough to show that both these scholars were at pains to exclude all 'folk-lore' from treatises that were intended to be scientific. Manetho boycotts the legend of 'Sesostris', Berossus the legend of 'Semiramis'.² This scholarly conscientiousness, however, was ultimately of no avail; for the sophisticated Hellenic public to which these treatises were intended to appeal was inevitably a small one; and the picture of the Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations that eventually impressed itself on Hellenic minds was not the authentic portrait which the two scholars had presented: it was a fancy picture in the gorgeous colours of the legends which Manetho and Berossus had sought, without success, to suppress. In the matter of Nectanebos the extant literature enables us to catch a glimpse of the stages by which 'fiction' gained the upper hand over 'fact'.³ The historical tradition, in which the motives, as well as the actions, that are attributed to Nectanebos are soberly realistic, has been preserved in Diodorus's *Library of Universal History*.⁴ In the next stage—which appears to be represented by a story, preserved by Josephus, in which the hero's name has been changed from Nectanebos to Amenophis—the actions are still historical, but the motives are already fictitious.⁵ In the third and last stage, which is represented by the Nectanebos Prologue to the Alexander Romance,⁷ the actions as well as the motives have passed out of the realm of History into that of Legend.

It will be seen that, by the time when Alexander burst into view

(in the psycho-analyst's technical sense of the term) for the brute fact of Achaemenian supremacy. The apocryphal conquests of the legendary 'Sesostris' are carefully made to surpass those of the historical Achaemenidae: e.g. Sesostris succeeds where Cambyzes had failed when he conquers the Arabs and Ethiopians, and where Darius the Great had failed when he conquers the Scyths (*ibid.*, pp. 15-17).

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 19-25.

⁴ Diodorus, Book XVI, chap. 48, § 6; chap. 51, § 3 (see Braun, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-2).

⁵ Josephus: *Contra Apionem*, Book I, §§ 243-77, citing Manetho (see Braun, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-2.

over the horizon of the Oriental World, the flood of Lethe was already flowing strong and the waters were waiting to swallow the audacious intruder up. *Patet immane et vasto respectat hiatus!*¹ The alchemy which had done such wonders with the historical Sammuramat and with the historical Nectanebos and with all the Senwosrets was promptly applied to Alexander in his turn. On the magic soil of Egypt the son of Philip became a son of Amon; his Hellenic human head sprouted his Egyptiac father's ram's-horns;² and, in this shape of Dhu'l-Qarnayn, Alexander soon went the way of Nectanebos.³ The Alexander Romance is presented from an Egyptiac standpoint.⁴ It pictures the Egyptiac and Hellenic worlds as in league with one another against the Syriac World.⁵ We may infer that the Alexander Romance was conceived in the womb of a Graeco-Egyptian underworld in the purlieu of the City of Alexandria;⁶ for this Alexandrian fraction of a now vastly expanded Hellenic internal proletariat was the sole remaining beneficiary of Alexander's vision of a universal human fellowship⁷ in an Egyptiac World in which Alexander's Lagid successors had elsewhere substituted a cold-blooded policy of exploitation⁸ for Alexander's own generous dream of fraternization.⁹

Here we see Hellenic history being transmuted into Oriental 'folk-lore'; but this process of transmutation was not a 'one-way' movement. We can also see Oriental 'folk-tales' being transmuted—not, of course, into authentic history but into the sophisticated, instead of the primitive, kind of literature, through being suffused with Hellenic *motifs* that are palpably alien from the native Oriental *êthos*. For example, the Hellenic *motif* of eroticism has made its way into a piece of Jewish literature—*The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*—which appears to have been written towards the end of the second century B.C.;¹⁰ for in *The Testament of Joseph* the Old Testament story of Potiphar's Wife has demonstrably been recast under the influence of the Hellenic story of Phaedra.¹¹ There

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, l. 375.

² These horns found their way on to Alexander's head even on the otherwise Hellenic coins that were designed by Greek artists for the mints of Alexander's Greek successors.

³ For the relation of the Alexander Romance to the Nectanebos Romance see Braun, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 32 and 36-43.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 32 and 36-7.

⁷ For this vision of Alexander's see V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 6-10, and V. C (ii) (a), pp. 246-7, above.

⁸ For this aspect of the Lagid régime see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 65, above.

⁹ For this local Alexandrian realization of Alexander's oecumenical ideal see Braun, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-8 and 40-1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹¹ For the influence of the Hellenic story of Phaedra and Hippolytus upon the Jewish story of Potiphar's Wife and Joseph see *ibid.*, pp. 46-95, and eundem: *Griechischer Roman und Hellenistische Geschichtschreibung* (Frankfurt am Main 1934, Klostermann), pp. 23-117. Dr. Braun's thesis is summed up in the last paragraph on p. 114 of the latter monograph. For what follows on this subject in the present Study the writer is wholly indebted to the results of Dr. Braun's researches.

is even a verbal correspondence between *The Testament of Joseph*, v, 2, and Euripides' *Hippolytus*, ll. 656-8.¹ And we can observe how the cumulative effect of the Hellenic influence upon Jewish literature told during the two hundred years or so that elapsed between the lifetime of the author of *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* and the lifetime of Josephus (*vivebat circa* A.D. 38-108). *The Testament of Joseph* has adopted the *motif* of the Hellenic story of Phaedra without abandoning the native Jewish style, spirit, or ethical standards; and 'the Haggadoth narrator judaizes alien elements' in the same fashion. On the other hand 'Josephus hellenizes Biblical and Haggadic tales, so that they become something completely new and different'.²

In Josephus's sophisticated pages the Hebrew patriarch Joseph has been disguised out of all recognition by being dressed up in the Hellenic habiliments of an invulnerable Stoic sage who is *τύχη δοῦλος, φύσει ἐλεύθερος*.³ In this Josephan Hellenized version of the story of Joseph and Potiphar's Wife there are a number of points of correspondence not only with the story of Hippolytus and Phaedra, but also with the story of Lucretia, as these two Hellenic stories are recounted in the works of five different Greek and Latin authors;⁴ and some of the correspondences between Josephus's *Antiquities* and Seneca's *Phaedra* extend to an identity of words.⁵ How are these correspondences to be explained? It seems unlikely that Josephus has been borrowing directly from the Hellenic authors in whose works the points of correspondence are to be found. Three out of the five—Livy, Ovid, and Seneca—write in Latin; and it seems most improbable that Latin literature was an open book to Josephus, considering the imperfectness of his mastery even of Greek. Of the two Greek authors—Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Heliodorus of Emesa—Dionysius, again, seems unlikely to have been studied by Josephus, while Heliodorus is ruled out of account by the fact that he was Josephus's junior by perhaps not less than 200 years. We are left with the alternative of explaining the correspondences between Josephus and the five pagan Hellenic authors here in question on the hypothesis that they have all of them been borrowing—though not necessarily any of them at first hand—from some common source;

¹ Braun, *History and Romance*, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, p. 93. Compare *Roman und Geschichtschreibung*, pp. 41 and 113.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-4.

⁴ See the table of nine correspondences between Josephus, on the one hand, and Dionysius, Heliodorus, Livy, Ovid, and Seneca, on the other hand, *ibid.*, p. 96.

⁵ e.g. Josephus: *Antiquities*, Book II, § 43 (Joseph's first speech) || Seneca: *Phaedra*, ll. 131-5 (Braun: *Roman und Geschichtschreibung*, pp. 41-2); Josephus: *Antiquities*, Book II, §§ 51-2 (Joseph's second speech) || Seneca: *Phaedra*, ll. 145-64 (Braun, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-7). The second of these two verbal correspondences also extends to a passage of Philo (*ibid.*, pp. 82-4).

and the scholar who has brought this set of correspondences to light has put his finger on a possible common source for them all in the shape of a no longer extant first version of Euripides' *Hippolytus*.¹

Thus, by the time of Josephus, who was an approximate contemporary of Plutarch's, the volatile waters of Lethe had made considerable play with the Hellenic and Oriental flotsam that had been jostling in the current since the time, by then some four hundred years back, when Alexander had troubled the waters in his momentous act of crossing the Hellespont. On the one hand the historical figure of the Hellenic conqueror had been transmuted into the legendary figure of a hero of Egyptian romance; and on the other hand the mythical figure of the Syriac patriarch Joseph—who was the eponym of a pair of Israelitish tribes—had been dressed up in an outfit of Hellenic stage properties borrowed partly from Euripides and partly from Zeno.

These proven facts of Hellenico-Oriental literary history during the first four centuries *post Alexandrum* throw at least three beams of light on the problem which we are studying in this Annex. In the first place these facts make it clear that 'folk-memory' is a highly conductive medium within the limits of its operation. We have observed above that these limits are narrowly drawn. A large part—perhaps the greater part—of the conventional furniture of sophisticated minds will not float in these waters at all; and a piece of this precious furniture that falls into the river is apt to sink like a stone to the bottom of the river-bed, where it may remain stuck in the mud for good and all, without any prospect of being rolled along with the current and so eventually being cast up again on shore. On the other hand we can see now that any foreign bodies that the current of 'folk-memory' is capable of carrying along with it have a prospect of travelling far and fast; and in the second place we can read the secret of this mobility. The characters and events that travel in Lethe's stream become mobile thanks to becoming anonymous. In reducing them to anonymity the alchemy of these waters fines them down to a degree of tenuity at which they are almost capable of passing through a needle's eye.² In this medium

¹ For this possible common source see Braun: *Roman und Geschichtschreibung*, pp. 87 and 97; *History and Romance*, pp. 49–50. On this point Professor Gilbert Murray observes: 'I have always had a difficulty about the First Hippolytus. Normally a second version outbids the first, but here the first goes beyond the second, and the second has more sophrosyne. I think the explanation is that Euripides was putting on the stage a story, an Egyptian 'novelle', and first made the mistake of putting the incidents of the story straight on to the stage: e.g. Phaedra's appeal to Hippolytus. Afterwards he made the technical improvements required for the stage.'

² e.g., 'concepts and figures belonging to the religion of Zarathustra found their way [into Judaism] above all in the lower strata of the [Jewish] people—even though those concerned were perhaps entirely unaware that these elements were of foreign origin'

of 'folk-memory' 'what is associated with the story of one figure is soon attributed to another'.¹ In the third place—and this point is of particular importance for our main inquiry—we can see that, in the shape of 'folk-lore', elements native to one culture can make their way into the life of another culture even at times when, on the sophisticated surface of life, the two cultures which are thus in effective communication with one another at a lower level are consciously antipathetic and are even each doing their utmost to hold the other at arm's length. The 'folk-tales' of 'Ninus and Semiramis' and 'Sesostris' and 'Nectanebos' made their way into the Syriac culture out of the Babylonian and Egyptian cultures at a time when the upper social stratum of the two transmitting societies was in revolt against the recipient society. The *motif* of the Hellenic story of Hippolytus and Phaedra began to make its way into the Jewish story of Joseph and Potiphar's Wife after the breach between Jewry and Hellenism in the second quarter of the second century B.C.;² and this literary commerce reached its climax, about two hundred years later, in a generation which also saw the climax of the conflict between Jewry and Hellenism on every plane of conscious life. It looks as though the stream of 'folk-memory' flows at some level in the psyche at which the consciousness of cultural and national differences does not interfere with the primitive sense of a common humanity. And here we have an underground channel of intercourse between one culture and another which cannot easily be blocked by conscious and deliberate mental inhibitions. When once a piece of mental furniture that is the product of one culture has succeeded—at whatever price in the way of transmutation and attenuation—in keeping afloat in the stream of 'folk-memory', it will have acquired—at this price—a prospect of being carried past obstacles, and under barriers, which would almost certainly have availed to prevent its passage from one culture to another if it had been travelling in its original form on the sophisticated surface of life instead of having sunk to the primitive depths and there changed almost out of recognition.

These lights from other examples of literary intercourse across, or underneath, the superficial barriers between mutually hostile cultures prompt us to ask whether 'folk-memory' may be perchance the medium through which the story of Jesus and those

(Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 95). If for 'even though' (*auch wenn*) we were to substitute 'just because' (*gerade weil*), we might be approaching nearer to the truth.

¹ Braun: *History and Romance*, p. 4.

² See V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 68, and V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), in the present volume, pp. 103-5, above.

stories of pagan Hellenic heroes with which it displays our 89 points of correspondence have come into contact with one another. If the answer to this question is found to be in the affirmative, we shall still have to inquire whether this contact has been direct or whether—as seems the more probable explanation of the correspondences between the story of Joseph and the story of Hippolytus—the two stories, or sets of stories, have acquired their common features through having respectively and independently come into contact with some older piece of jetsam which has been travelling in the stream of Lethe side by side with both of them. It is idle, however, to enter upon these other inquiries until we have answered the prior question whether the story of Jesus on the one hand, and the stories of our eleven pagan Hellenic heroes on the other hand, do contain any elements of ‘folk-lore’. A physiographer can tell, by the evidence of shape and patina, that a boulder or a log has at some stage of its history been water-borne. It may perhaps be practicable for a student of history to tell by analogous signs that a character or event which lies embedded to-day in some work of sophisticated or semi-sophisticated literature has travelled in the stream of ‘folk-memory’ once upon a time.

In the Gospels—to take them first—we shall not be surprised to find elements of this sort; for the Gospels can be properly described as the epic cycle of the Hellenic internal proletariat;¹ and epic poetry is a kind of *Zwischenreich* between the two mental realms of ‘folk-lore’ and history.

We have already taken note² of one piece of ‘folk-lore’ which the Gospel according to Saint Luke has in common with a work of the pagan Hellenic poet Hesiod. Shepherds abiding in the field are startled by an epiphany of the Heavenly Host, who have singled them out to be the recipients of the announcement of a theogony. We may now observe that not only the song of the Heavenly Host (Luke ii. 8–14) but also the song of the seer Simeon, which comes in the same chapter of Luke (ii. 25–35), has a counterpart in one of the Pāli scriptures of the Hinayanian Buddhist school of philosophy (Suttanipāta III, ii, 679–700) in the vision and the song of the seer Asita. This Indic seer has a vision of the Gods singing and dancing for joy, and is told that they are rejoicing over the birth of the Buddha in the form of a man child in the village of the Sakyas. Thereupon Asita goes to Kapilavastu, takes the infant Gautama in his arms, and prophesies his future greatness, with the further prophecy that the seer himself will not live to witness it. On this last point Asita’s feeling is different from Simeon’s;

¹ For this description of them see I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, p. 449, above.

² In V. C (i) (e), pp. 174–5, and in V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, pp. 363–4, above.

instead of being content to depart in peace after one glimpse of the saviour in his infancy, he regrets that he will not live long enough to hear the doctrine that the saviour will preach when he has grown to manhood; but this single point of difference is outweighed by the several points of similarity between the respective passages of the Suttanipāṭa and the Gospel according to Saint Luke; and these resemblances are cumulatively too close to be dismissed as fortuitous.¹

¹ This correspondence between a point in the Gospels and a point in the legend of the Buddha is taken—as are also all the other correspondences between the Gospels and the legend of the Buddha that are cited in the following pages—from Aufhauser, J. B.: *Buddha und Jesus in ihren Paralleltexen* (Bonn 1926, Weber).

How are we to account for the presence of these common elements, which all bear the marks of having either originated in, or travelled down, the stream of 'folk-lore', in the stories of an Indic saviour who lived in Bihar and a Syriac saviour who lived in Palestine? The common source may, of course, be some stratum of 'folk-lore' that was so ancient and widespread that it was inherited by both the Indic and the Syriac culture, independently of one another, from the cultural common stock of Primitive Mankind. This explanation is simple, but it is not very convincing, considering that neither the Indic nor the Syriac Society was one of those primary civilizations that arose directly out of primitive life, and also considering the closeness of the correspondences even in points of detail. It seems unlikely that these correspondences would have remained as close as this if the legends had been travelling down two separate streams of 'folk-memory' since, at latest, the fourth millennium B.C. It seems more probable that these common elements in the stories of Jesus and Gautama have originated either in a specifically Syriac or in a specifically Indic cycle of 'folk-lore' and that they have travelled from the Syriac to the Indic World, or alternatively from the Indic World to the Syriac, at some date not long anterior to that of the latest, and perhaps considerably posterior to that of the earliest, of the Christian and Buddhist scriptures in which they are now embedded.

While the Gospels all appear to date from the second half of the first century of the Christian Era, the Buddhist scriptures here in question have a much wider chronological range. The Suttanipāṭa appears to have been written *circa* 300 B.C., while the date of the Padhānasutta and Samyutta-Nikāya appears to be at any rate anterior to the beginning of the Christian Era (*ibid.*, p. 7); but on the Buddhist side the correspondences are not confined to these relatively early Pāli scriptures of the Hinayanian Buddhist philosophy. Some of them occur in the scriptures of the Mahayanian Buddhist Church which are younger—and this in some cases perhaps by several centuries—than the Christian Gospels, though their sources may be almost as old as the Pāli scriptures of the Hinayāna (*ibid.*, loc. cit.). The correspondences between the Gospels and these Mahayanian scriptures may, of course, be due to elements in the latter which only found their way into them in the latest phase of their literary history; and in that case these particular correspondences might be explicable as the result of an infiltration of Syriac 'folk-tales', which had already made their way into the Gospels, into the Mahayanian legend of the Buddha in an age (*circa* A.D. 78–123, in the reign of the Kushan King Kanishka) when the Mahāyāna was the prevailing religion in a Kushan Empire which bestrode the Hindu Kush and embraced the north-eastern corner of the Syriac World as well as the north-western corner of the Indic World (see II. D (vii), vol. ii, pp. 372–3, and V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 132–6 and 139–40, above). This explanation, however, would not in any case cover the correspondences between the Gospels and the Pāli scriptures which are anterior to the Christian Era; and these will have to be accounted for in one or other of two possible ways. If the common elements are of Syriac origin, we must suppose that they found their way out of the Syriac into the Indic World during the period—beginning before the close of the sixth century B.C. and ending at some date unknown before the invasion of India by Alexander the Great—when the Indus Valley was politically united with the Syriac World under the aegis of a common *Pax Achaemena*. On the other hand, if the common elements are of Indic origin, we must suppose that they found their way from India to Palestine, at some date between Alexander's incursion into Northern India and the middle of the first century of the Christian Era, either by the overland route from Pataliputra via Seleucia-on-Tigris and Antioch-on-Orontes or by the maritime route from the South Indian ports to Egypt. The overland route seems to have been opened after the approximately simultaneous establishment of the Mauryan Empire in India and the Seleucid Empire in South-Western Asia; the trade along this route received a great stimulus from the conquest of the now

We have also already come across another unmistakable deposit of 'folk-lore' in the Matthaean and Lucan prologues to the Gospel story of Jesus's life and preaching; and this tale of the conception and birth of a child who is not the son of his mother's husband is told, as we have seen, not only of Jesus but also of several pagan Hellenic men of mark—Plato, Alexander, Scipio Africanus Major, Augustus—who all of them likewise in some sense played the part of saviours, besides being told of several pagan Hellenic demigods or heroes: Ion, Perseus, Hēraklēs.¹ Another story which hangs together with the miraculous-birth story, and which is found in the Gospels in the same context, is that of the miraculous—or, at any rate, extraordinary—escape of the child from a mortal danger which threatens him in his infancy. In another context² we have already noticed one widespread version of this story in which the babe is a foundling; and in this connexion we have observed that the Lucan account of the infancy of Jesus preserves at least one vestige of the foundling *motif* in representing the new-born babe as being laid in a manger. We may now observe that the Matthaean account preserves a variation on this theme which is also credited in the legend of one of those pagan men of mark who are credited with a divine paternity. In the legend of the infancy of Augustus,³ as in the prologue to the Gospel according to Saint Matthew, the villain does not confine his villainy—as he does in the more usual

derelict domain of the Mauryan Empire by the Euthydemid Bactrian Greek prince Demetrius in the second decade of the second century B.C.; it survived the collapse of the Euthydemid and Seleucid Empires; and it revived in the last century B.C., when Pompey imposed a *Pax Romana* upon Syria and when the Palmyrenes (see II. D (i), vol. ii, p. 11, above) opened up a short cut from Dura to Damascus across the northern corner of the North Arabian Desert (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 61-2, 260-1, 361-3, 366-7). As for the maritime route, the trade along it was commanded by South Arabian middlemen until the first through-voyage from Egypt to India was made by Eudoxus of Cyzicus *circa* 120 B.C. Eudoxus's Greek successors gradually shortened the voyage—which in Eudoxus's day was still made coastwise all the way—by cutting more and more adventurously across the open sea with the aid of the monsoons; and this process of shortening, which began *circa* 100-80 B.C., was completed *circa* A.D. 40-50 (i.e. on the eve of the precipitation of the story of Jesus in the Gospels), when the Greek navigators of the Indian Ocean ventured at last to sail straight across the open sea from the Somali coast to the southern tip of India, without approaching Arabia at all. As a result of this Greek conquest of the Indian Ocean, pepper was obtainable in abundance at Athens in 88 B.C., and a Buddhist gravestone, erected before the end of the Ptolemaic Age, has been discovered by Sir Flinders Petrie at Alexandria (Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-75, superseding eudem: *Hellenistic Civilisation* (London 1927, Arnold), pp. 196-9). It will be seen that the means of communication between India and the Levant steadily improved in the course of the three and a half centuries between the writing of the Suttanipāta in India *circa* 300 B.C. and the writing of the Gospels in the Levant in the second half of the first century of the Christian Era.

¹ See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (α), vol. iv, p. 263, and V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 266-9, above. ² In III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, pp. 259-61, above.

³ Recounted, on the authority of one of Augustus's freedmen, Julius Marathus, by Suetonius: *Life of Augustus*, chap. 94 (see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 57-8). A massacre of innocents, as an expiation for the appearance of a comet, is also ascribed to Nero (Suetonius: *Life of Nero*, chap. 36), but in this case it is not suggested that the villain's motive is a fear that one of his victims may be destined to supplant him on his throne.

version of the tale¹—to an attempt upon the life of a single babe who (he fears) may be destined to supplant him; in order to make sure that his destined supplanter shall not survive, he gives orders for the destruction of all the infant life of an entire community. Herod, made aware by the Magi that a Messiah has been born in Jewry, and informed by the doctors of the Jewish Law that the Messiah's birth-place is to be Bethlehem, decrees the slaughter of all children in Bethlehem from two years old and under.² The Senate, being warned by a prodigy that Nature is pregnant with the future King of the Roman People, decrees that no child born in that year is to be reared.³

If we pass from the Matthaean and Lucan accounts of Jesus's birth and infancy and childhood to the episode of the Baptism in Jordan by John and the simultaneous Designation of Jesus as the Son of God, we may remind ourselves that, in another context,⁴ we have found Hellenic affinities for the figure of a dove as an emblem and emissary of a godhead. And if we pass on from the Designation to the Temptation, which is placed immediately after it in all three Synoptic Gospels⁵ and is recounted in detail in both Matthew and Luke, we shall observe that the Tempter's invitation to Jesus to cast himself down from a pinnacle of the Temple⁶ is one version of a 'folk-tale' which makes its appearance in pagan Hellenic literature in the forms of the challenge to Theseus to cast himself overboard into 'his father's house' in the depths of the sea,⁷ and the invitation to Psyche to cast herself down from the brow of a crag into the arms of Zephyr.⁸

An analogous Temptation of Gautama by Māra (the Indic

¹ e.g. in the legends of Oedipus, Perseus, Jason, Orestes, Zeus, Horus, Cyrus (a single babe), and in the legend of Romulus and Remus (twins).

² Matt. ii. 1-18.

³ The tale, in Exod. i-ii, of Pharaoh's instruction to the midwives to kill all the male children borne by the Hebrew women agrees with the Matthaean and Marathan tale in representing the villain as making an attempt upon the lives of all the (male) children of a community, and not merely upon the life of a single child; but the motive ascribed to Pharaoh is not the same as that ascribed to Herod and to the Senate. In the Matthaean and Marathan tale the villain's reason for deciding to massacre the children wholesale is not because he wishes to exterminate an entire generation, but simply to make sure that a single child, whom he cannot identify, shall not escape. On the other hand Pharaoh's design against the lives of all the (male) children of the Hebrews is not incidental to another aim, but is an end in itself. What Pharaoh fears is not that some particular Hebrew child is going to usurp Pharaoh's throne, but that the Hebrew community as a whole is going to become more than a match for the Egyptian Society as a whole. In this matter of motive the Matthaean and Marathan tale follows, not the tale of Pharaoh's atrocity in Exodus, but the myths of Uranus's and Cronos' atrocities in the *Theogony* of Hesiod. Uranus buries *all* (his own) children alive (ll. 154-60) and Cronos swallows *all* (his own) children (ll. 459-67), for fear (implicitly in the case of Uranus and explicitly in the case of Cronos) of being supplanted one day by *one* of them.

⁴ In V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, pp. 361-2, above.

⁵ Matt. iv. 1-11; Mark i. 12-13; Luke iv. 1-13.

⁶ Matt. iv. 5-6 = Luke iv. 9-11.

⁷ This parallel in Bacchylides, *Dithyramb* xvi [xvii] (F. Blass' edition (Leipzig 1898, Teubner), pp. 121-33), has been pointed out to the writer of this Study by Professor Gilbert Murray.

⁸ This parallel has been pointed out by Braun, *History and Romance*, pp. 66-70. The

counterpart of Ahriman and Satan) is a theme which occurs in several passages in the Pāli scriptures of the Hinayanian Buddhist school of Indic philosophy. In a passage of the Padhānasutta Māra exhorts Gautama not to push his self-mortification to the point of severing the last thread that still binds the philosopher-ascetic to physical life on Earth; in a passage of the Samyutta-Nikāya Māra exhorts Gautama to assume the sovereignty of a mundane kingdom; and these two incidents look like counterparts in the one case of the Devil's suggestion to Jesus to turn stones into bread and in the other case of his suggestion to him to accept a mundane oecumenical sovereignty. The hypothesis of a fortuitous coincidence between these respective legends of the Temptation of Gautama and the Temptation of Jesus would appear to be ruled out by the fact that, in each of the two correspondences here cited, certain details that are to be found in the Gospels are likewise to be found in the Pāli scriptures, though this not in exactly the same relation to the incident as a whole. For instance, the conceit of a superficial resemblance between a stone and a piece of food, which in the Gospels is crystallized into a suggestion for turning a stone into a loaf of bread, turns up in the corresponding passage of the Padhānasutta as a simile of Gautama's impregnability to Māra's assaults. 'A crow,' says Māra, 'was once disappointed at finding that an object which looked like a lump of fat was only a stone after all. The crow had to fly away hungry; and now I, Māra, have to give up Gautama as a bad job—as the crow gave up the stone!' Similarly, in the Samyutta-Nikāya, Māra exhorts Gautama to turn, not a stone into bread, but a mountain into gold as a sequel to his exhortation to him to assume sovereignty over a mundane kingdom. The mountain which Māra names is the Himalaya—and we are left wondering whether, in some common source of the Buddhist and the Christian Temptation-story, this may not have been the 'exceeding high mountain' from the summit of which the Devil showed Jesus all the kingdoms of the World.¹

We may next notice two miracles—the Walking on the Water (Matt. xiv. 22-33 = Mark vi. 45-51 = John vi. 15-21) and the Feeding of the Multitudes (Matt. xiv. 15-21 = Mark vi. 35-44 = Luke ix. 12-17 = John vi. 5-13, and Matt. xv. 32-8 = Mark viii. 1-9)—which are embedded not only in the Gospels but also in

challenge which in the Gospels is represented as a temptation that Jesus resists is represented in the stories of Theseus and Psyche as a test of faith from which the hero (heroine) does not flinch. But the ordeal (and also the tableau in which it is visualized) is the same in all three stories; and in all three, again, the hero (heroine) responds to this identical challenge victoriously, though in the one case the victory is won by a refusal and in the other two cases by an acceptance.

¹ Matt. iv. 8 = Luke iv. 5. Compare the setting of Lucian's dialogue between Hermes and Charon, from which a passage has been quoted in V. C (i) (d) 10, pp. 133-4, above.

Mahayanian Buddhist scriptures (the Jātaka and the still younger Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra)¹ which, at least in their present form, are all of them considerably later than the Gospels in date. Again, there is a tale—‘the Widow’s Mite’—which is found not only in the Gospels according to Saint Mark (xii. 41–4) and Saint Luke (xxi. 1–4) but also in the Sutrālamkāra, IV, 22, which is a work from the pen of one of the early fathers of the Mahayanian Buddhist Church, Aśvaghōṣa (*floruit circa* A.D. 100).² And there are two similes—‘the Birds of the Air’ and ‘Dogs and Crumbs’—which, as we have already observed in another context,³ are each of them to be found on the one hand in the Gospels and on the other hand in two pieces of pagan Hellenic literature, one of which appears to be approximately contemporary with the Gospels, while the other is at least five hundred years older. There is another simile of two roads—representing respectively the ways of Vice and Virtue—which is to be found not only in the Gospel according to Saint Matthew (vii. 13–14) but also in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (Book II, chap. 1, § 21)⁴ and in Hesiod’s *Works and Days* (ll. 287–92). There is also a ‘folk-tale’—recounting the disappointment that is the inevitable consequence of looking for figs out of season—which can be detected as the common source of the incident of the Cursing of the Barren Fig Tree (Matt. xxi. 18–19 = Mark xi. 12–14) and of a passage in one of the lectures of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus (*Dissertationes*, Book III, chap. 24, §§ 85–8) which we have quoted already⁵ in another connexion. We may also here recall two apparently proverbial sayings—‘I cannot dig’ and ‘the city is being taken by storm’—which are to be found on the one hand in the Gospels and on the other hand in Aristophanes’ *Birds*,⁶ and add another saying of the same character—‘Many are called, but few are chosen’—which is to be found on the one hand in the Gospel according to Saint Matthew⁷ and on the other hand in the scriptures of the Orphic Church.⁸

¹ The Walking on the Water is to be found in the introduction to Jātaka 190; the Feeding of the Multitudes in the introduction to Jātaka 78, and in Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra, chap. 10 (a Chinese translation of a Sanskrit scripture of the Mahayanian Church). It will be noticed that in the Mahayanian Buddhist scriptures the two miracles occur in quite different contexts, whereas they are placed in immediate juxtaposition with one another in the Gospels.

² Aśvaghōṣa appears to have been a contemporary of the Kushan King Kanishka, who reigned *circa* A.D. 78–123 (see Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 260–1; Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 82–4).

³ In V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, pp. 354–7 and 357, footnote 1, above.

⁴ See p. 470, below.

⁵ In V. C (i) (d) 10, p. 147, footnote 1, above.

⁶ See V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, p. 358, above.

⁷ Πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσι κλητοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί (Matt. xxii. 14).

⁸ Πολλοὶ μὲν νερθηκοφόροι, παῦροι δὲ τε βάκχοι (*Orphicorum Fragmenta*, Collegit Otto Kern (Berlin 1922, Weidmann), fragments 5 and 235, preserved by Plato in *Phaedo* 69 c).

Most of the topics that we have cited up to this point—as examples of what appears to be the jetsam of ‘folk-lore’ which has been washed up on to the shores of the river of ‘folk-memory’ and has there come to be imbedded in more or less sophisticated works of literature—are topics which not only bear marks of having drifted, at some stage of their literary history, in the current of Lethe’s stream, but which, to all appearance, are native to these waters and display no trace of ever having known any other mental environment than this before they finally came to rest in their present literary context. Miracles and parables and similes and proverbs are the very stuff of which ‘folk-lore’ consists; and if, when we find specimens of any of these primitive genres incongruously embedded in sophisticated works of literature, we can legitimately account for them as being the jetsam of ‘folk-lore’, we need seek no farther than that for an explanation of their origin. There is, however, one set of verbal correspondences¹ between an incident in the Gospels and a cento of passages from the *Birds* which may be explicable on the hypothesis of a subterranean contact on the level of psychic life at which the waters of ‘folk-memory’ flow, but which at the same time cannot be interpreted as a seepage, into the *Birds* on the one hand and into the Gospels on the other, of an element which has not merely travelled for a season in the current of ‘folk-memory’ but has also actually originated at this primitive level of psychic life. The Aristophanic phrases here in question bear no obvious marks of an extraneous origin in ‘folk-lore’; there is no reason to doubt that they are the original work of the Attic playwright himself; and, if so, then in this case we are confronted with a process that is different from, and more complex than, the process that we have been studying so far. We are here apparently in the presence of a group of mental images or ideas which have started life on the plane of sophisticated literature; have percolated down from this starting place to the level of ‘folk-lore’; have travelled at this level from Attica to Palestine in the subterranean stream of ‘folk-memory’; and, after having eventually been washed ashore in a barely recognizable shape, have become embedded in a semi-sophisticated work of literature, the Gospels.² This reconstruction of the literary history of these Aristophanic phrases is supported by the unquestionable occurrence of Menandrian phrases in the New Testament; for we need have no hesitation in accepting as the original work of Aristophanes’ fellow countryman and successor Menander one fragment from this later Attic playwright’s lost plays which recurs *verbatim* in one of Saint Paul’s

¹ See V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, pp. 353–4, above.

² This is perhaps also the history of the proverbial saying about ‘the city being taken by storm’ (see V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, pp. 358–9, above).

Epistles,¹ and another fragment which juxtaposes two *motifs* that both recur in the Gospels, though here in different contexts.² The common source of the manifestly kindred pictures of the Primitive Christian and the Primitive Pythagorean communal life, in the Acts of the Apostles and in Iamblichus's *Life of Pythagoras*,³ can also hardly have been other than a sophisticated piece of literature; and there are two passages in the New Testament—one in the Epistle to Titus⁴ and the other in the speech on the Areopagus which is placed in the mouth of Saint Paul by the author of the Acts⁵—in which a tag of Greek poetry not only reappears *verbatim* but is quoted by the Christian writer with an express acknowledgement of the pagan Hellenic literary source.

We have, indeed, already had occasion to observe that the jetsam on the strand of the stream of 'folk-memory' by no means exclusively consists of matter that has originated in those waters, and that some of the objects which the current deposits high and dry are flotsam which has stood on dry land already once before, at an earlier stage of its existence, before ever it was engulfed by the stream which has now disgorged it. We have noticed, for example, a number of heroes and heroines of romance—'Ninus' and 'Semiramis' and 'Sesostris', 'Nectanebos' and 'Dhu'l-Qarnayn'—whose 'fictitious' shapes have been fashioned out of the authentic portraits of historical personages. And this phenomenon can perhaps also be illustrated from the Gospels. Is it conceivable, for instance, that the parable of the husbandmen who did the dastardly deed of putting to death the son of the owner of the vineyard when his father had sent him to them as his emissary (Matt. xxi. 33–41 = Mark xii. 1–9 = Luke xx. 9–16) is an echo of the historic crime of Opimius, who arrested and executed Fulvius's son when the boy was sent across no-man's-land, under flag of truce, to parley with his father's adversaries (Plutarch: *Gracchi*, chaps. 37–8)? And is it conceivable, again, that the episode of the

¹ Φθείρουσιν ἡθὴν χρηστὴν ὁμίλῳι κακαί: 'Evil communications corrupt good manners.'
—Menander, T. Kock's edition, vol. iii, p. 62, No. 218 = 1 Cor. xv. 33.

² Μειράκιον, οὐ μοι κατανοεῖν δοκεῖς ὅτι
ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἑκάστα κακίας σήπεται,
καὶ πᾶν τὸ λυμαινόμενον ἔστιν ἐνδοθεν.
οἷον δ' ἐμὲν ἰός, ἂν σκοπῇς, τὸ σιδήριον,
τὸ δ' ἱμάτιον οἱ σῆτες, ὃ δὲ θρίψ' τὸν ξύλον.
ὃ δὲ τὸ κάκιον τῶν κακῶν πάντων, φθόνος
φθισικὸν πεπόηκε καὶ πόησει καὶ ποιεῖ,
ψυχῆς πονηρᾶς δυσσεβῆς παράστασις.

Of this fragment of Menander (Kock, vol. iii, p. 162, No. 540) the first three lines are echoed in Matt. xv. 10–20 (the two passages have already been quoted together in IV. C (iii) (a), vol. iv, p. 120, above), while the rest are echoed in Matt. vi. 19 (ὅπου σῆς καὶ βρώσεως ἀφανίσει) = Luke xii. 33.

³ See V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, vol. v, p. 583, footnote 1, above.

⁴ Titus i. 12, quoting Epimenides' poem *Minos* (see I. C (i) (b), vol. i, p. 99, footnote 2, and V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, in the present volume, p. 363, footnote 6, above).

⁵ See V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 11, footnote 2, above.

pilgrimage of the Magi, which is recounted in the Matthaean prologue (chap. ii) to the Gospels, has been precipitated by an impact which may have been made on the imagination of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic World by an historic visit of a party of Magi, not to the infant Jesus at Bethlehem, but to the adult Emperor Nero at Rome, in the suite of Tiridates, when the Arsacid King of Armenia came to pay his respects to his Roman suzerain in A.D. 66 (Pliny: *Historia Naturalis*, Book XXX, chap. 2; cf. Suetonius: *Life of Nero*, chap. 13)?

Whatever judgement we may pass on these two last-suggested possibilities,¹ we shall probably agree that historical events and literary phrases are not the only kinds of foreign matter that can find their way into the stream of 'folk-memory'. How, for example, are we to account for a striking correspondence between two passages in the exordium of the Gospel according to Saint John (i. 16 and 18)—'And of his fullness have we all received' (καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐλάβομεν); and 'No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him' (Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πώποτε· ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο)—and the last words of Plato's *Timaeus* (92 C): 'Having thus received, and been filled full with, living creatures, mortal and immortal, the Cosmos—a living creature that contains the things that are seen, being such a thing itself, a god that is a sensible image of the intelligible [godhead]—has become superlatively great and good and beautiful and perfect, being this unique and only begotten Heaven' (Θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῶα λαβὼν καὶ συμπληρωθεὶς ὁδὲ ὁ κόσμος οὕτω, ζῶον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώτατος γέγονεν εἰς οὐρανὸς ὁδὲ μονογενὴς ὢν)? Does it not seem probable that the stream of 'folk-memory' has provided a channel along which the imagery, and even the vocabulary, of the *Timaeus* has flowed into a semi-philosophical work of Christian literature which, in all probability, was composed not much less than five hundred years after the last sentence of the *Timaeus* had taken shape in Plato's mind?

'In Christianity there are echoes of Stoic or Platonic ideas; but in saying this we do not mean to imply that the Apostles, and certainly not that Jesus Himself, had frequented the schools of the philosophers or had read their books. It is true that the Logos in the opening sentences of the Gospel according to Saint John can be traced back with certainty

¹ Eduard Meyer (*Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. i (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 59, footnote 1) rejects, as unconvincing, this explanation of the appearance of the Magi in the Gospel according to Saint Matthew. For another possible source of the episode of the Magi see p. 524, footnote 2, below.

to Philo; and nothing stands in the way of the supposition that the author of the Gospel may have been acquainted with some of Philo's writings or even have been in personal contact with Philo himself. These, however, are isolated exceptions; and in general the New Testament is very remote from the cultivated life, and, by the same token, from the philosophy, of the age. Yet in similar conditions to-day one often hears people in a humble walk of life reproducing ideas originally put into currency by Schopenhauer or Darwin, although the plagiarist has never read one word of these thinkers' works. The fact is that ideas which suit the times spread rapidly from mouth to mouth, and sometimes turn up in different places simultaneously, without their exponents being necessarily dependent on one another. Whether Christianity is really indebted for its Platonic or Stoic content to the disciples of Plato and Zeno, or whether it is merely a case of the same ideas being evoked in Christianity too by the same *Zeitgeist*, is thus a question which cannot be answered with certainty in any particular instance. The one point that is impregably established is that the teachings of Christianity are not entirely new and original, but are for the most part rooted in the spiritual life of the age.¹

From the foregoing survey it would appear that the Gospels contain, embedded in them, a considerable number and variety of elements which have been conveyed to them by the stream of 'folk-memory', and which have originated partly in these waters but partly also on stretches of once dry ground which the shifting subterranean currents of a perennially flowing primitive psychic life have subsequently undermined and swept away. On this showing, it would seem that the Gospels contain elements which are not 'historical' in the conventional usage of that word. We shall find, however, if we carry our inquiry farther, that in this respect the Gospels are not unique among the works of literature which are our sources for the hero-stories of which we are here trying to make a comparative study. For example, if we now apply to the work of the pagan Hellenic historian Phylarchus the analytical treatment that we have just been applying to the Gospels, we shall see the 'historicity' of this sophisticated Hellenic author's narrative dissolve, almost melodramatically, before our eyes. We have only to turn to the masterly and devastating analysis that has already been made by a genuinely scientific Hellenic historian of the post-Phylarchan generation: to wit, Polybius (Book II, chap. 56, §§ 1-6 and 7-12):

'Among the historians who are Aratus's contemporaries, Phylarchus is one who enjoys a high reputation in some circles; and, as Phylarchus is perpetually breaking out into polemics against Aratus and into con-

¹ Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 203-4, referred to, by anticipation, in V. C (i) (d) 6 (a), vol. v, p. 456, footnote 1, above.

traditions of what Aratus says, it would seem useful, or rather unavoidable, for the present writer, who has deliberately elected to follow Aratus in his account of Cleomenes and all that pertains to him, to take up this issue. If we were to pass it over without looking into it, we might be exposing ourselves to the reproach of leaving Falsehood to take her stand in the field of historiography on a footing of equality with Truth.

'We may begin with the general criticism that the whole of this historian's treatment of his subject bristles with examples of carelessness and slovenliness. In the present place, however, we may perhaps allow ourselves to confine our censure on points of detail to that portion of Phylarchus's work that overlaps with our own: that is to say, the part that deals with the Cleomenic War. This much of his work we cannot avoid subjecting to the lens of criticism. And that will certainly be sufficient to bring to light the *penchant* and the *forte* that Phylarchus displays in his treatment of the whole of his subject. . . .

'In his eagerness to move his readers to pity and to win their sympathy for his story he introduces scenes of women locked in one another's arms, with hair dishevelled and breasts exposed, and throws in, as further ingredients, the tears and lamentations of persons of both sexes, all cluttered up with aged parents and tiny children, on their way to the gallows. He plays this game all through his history, and his perpetual aim in every episode is always to give a visual impression of the horrors. His vein is an ignoble and effeminate one; but we may let that pass and may proceed to examine his work from the standpoint of what is strictly relevant and useful for the professional historian. From this standpoint we may lay it down that the business of a writer of history is not to use his subject as an instrument for making a shattering impression on his public by hocus-pocus (*τεραπευόμενον*),¹ and not to invent oratory that may be appropriate to the occasion or to elaborate the subsidiary details that may be implicit in the facts.² These are the tricks of the playwrights.³ The historian's business is to give an exact record of

¹ N.B.—This is the word that is used of the conjuring tricks that were performed by Eunus (Points 65 and 72).—A.J.T.

² Polybius lives up to these principles when his own turn comes for recording Cleomenes' end. Phylarchus's excruciatingly circumstantial account of the suicide of the hero and his twelve companions (if we may take this to be substantially reproduced in Plutarch, chap. 58, §§ 13–16) is replaced in Polybius's narrative (Book V, chap. 39, § 5) by the unadorned statement: 'They took their own lives with a characteristically Spartan fortitude' (*προσπνεύσαν αὐτοῖς τὰς χεῖρας εὐψύχως πάνυ καὶ λακωνικῶς*).—A.J.T.

³ While Polybius has manifestly kept his own work free from Phylarchus's vice of draping his narrative of historical events in the trappings of melodrama, he has been accused of, no doubt unintentionally, falsifying the true history of at least one episode by mistakenly dramatizing, not the details of the story, but the plot itself. The episode in question is that of the unhappy last phase of the life and reign of King Philip V of Macedon. According to Walbank, F. W.: 'Φίλιππος Τραγωδούμενος: A Polybian Experiment' in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. lviii, 1938, part 1, pp. 55–68, 'The tragic version in Polybius is of his own construction and does not spring from the uncritical use of tragedies or historical novels (if indeed such a thing as an historical novel existed in the Greek literature of Polybius's time). Polybius's strictures on Phylarchus make it at least extremely unlikely that he could have fallen into such a crude error in a matter of source-selection. . . . Polybius's mistake—either his own or perhaps one prompted by his Macedonian informant, who may have retailed popular gossip and superstition then current in Macedon—was to interpret Philip's last years as a career of infatuation induced by Tyche and showing itself in an unreasoned programme of planned aggression against Rome' (p. 67).—A.J.T.

the things that were actually done and the words that were actually uttered, even if these happen to be rather tame. The purposes of History and of the Drama are not identical: they are antithetical. The dramatist's business is momentarily to make a shattering impression on his audience and to carry them away by putting into the mouths of his characters whatever words will make the strongest appeal. The historian's business is for all eternity to instruct and convince scholars by presenting them with the truth, both of act and of word. On the stage, where the object is to take the audience in, the first necessity is to say what will appeal, no matter whether it be a falsehood; in the writing of history, where the object is to be of service to scholars, the first necessity is to tell the truth.'

This Polybian criticism of Phylarchus's manner and method exactly applies to Plutarch's *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, in which (as we have seen reason to believe)¹ long *résumés* of Phylarchus's history are reproduced with a closeness that in places approximates to identity. Indeed, if we may take Plutarch, in this piece of his work, as being tantamount to Phylarchus himself, there are indications that Phylarchus positively gloried in the vices that Polybius attributes to him. The opening sentence of his peroration, for instance, runs (Plutarch, chap. 60):

'Thus Lacedaemon staged a female drama which could hold its own against the male drama that had preceded it. In her last hour of life Sparta showed the World that hers was a virtue that was proof against all the slings and arrows of outrageous Fortune.'

And in an earlier passage (chap. 24) he writes of Xenares as 'reciting the myth' (*μυθολογῶν*) of Agis to Cleomenes, as a way of saying that he told him the story of Agis' life. In fact, it looks as though in Phylarchus's imagination the authentic history of his heroes has already undergone a histrionic and sentimental transmutation which has carried it a long distance away from the original. In other words, Phylarchus's treatment of the lives of Agis and Cleomenes is another example of that mental process which has spun the stuff of romance out of the originally authentic histories of a likewise Hellenic Alexander the Great, as well as an Egyptiac Nectanebos and a Babylonian Sammu-ramat; and this clue, which Polybius's strictures on Phylarchus have placed in our hands, has been followed out to its logical conclusion by a modern Western scholar.²

'There can be no doubt that in both these two of Plutarch's lives there is a workmanship which, for short, we can describe as being "artistic". The mere material is about all that this method of work has in common with the strict laws of our science of historical research; and I can see no

¹ See pp. 435-7, above.

² Bux, E.: 'Zwei Sozialistische Novellen bei Plutarch' in *Klio*, vol. xix (1925).

ground for our continuing to count it as serious history. . . . It would be far better to describe these lives, without beating about the bush, as historical novels, in which everything is centred round the hero himself.¹

Now that we have followed the story of Agis and Cleomenes out of the realm of history into that of romance, can we carry our pursuit of it into the domain of 'folk-lore'? If a piece of sophisticated literature is to win its way into 'folk-lore', the first necessity is that it should have achieved popularity; and the popularity of Phylarchus's treatment of his subject is attested by the first sentence in the passage which we have quoted from Polybius.² This general presumption is supported by at least one piece of positive evidence. In the Plutarchan reproduction of the Phylarchan romance the Passion of Cleomenes is followed by an epilogue which Polybius boycotts as completely as he boycotts the Phylarchan embroideries on the episode of Cleomenes' death; and this epilogue has a heroine who is brought on to the stage at this late hour in the day in the role of Panteus' wife, but who incongruously preserves that anonymity which, as we have seen,³ is the hall-mark of a character in a 'folk-tale'.

In this anonymous heroine of the Cleomenes Romance a modern Western scholar⁴ detects the lineaments of a heroine who appears—at first anonymously, and later under the name of Pantheia⁵—in Xenophon's romance, the *Cyropaedia*, in the role of the wife of Abradatas. Like Panteus' wife, Abradatas' wife is separated from her husband by a military disaster that overtakes a cause to which the husband has devoted himself. Like Panteus' wife, she never rests till she has secured a reunion. Like Panteus' wife, she achieves this reunion with her husband only to suffer a second separation which is worse than the first, since this time the barrier which interposes itself between man and wife is not just an ordinary sea or continent but is the river of Death. And, like Panteus' wife, she reunites herself with her lost husband for the second time by the only means now left to her: that is to say, by committing suicide. In this last scene the two tragedies coincide even in

¹ Bux, op. cit., p. 423. This verdict is based by its author (pp. 417–22) upon certain episodes in particular: e.g. upon Chilonis' intercession with her father Leonidas for her husband Cleombrotus (Plutarch, chaps. 17–18); the Passion of Agis (Plutarch, chaps. 18–21); and the post-Sellasian act of the tragedy of Cleomenes (Plutarch, chaps. 49–60).

² This point is made by Bux in op. cit., p. 430.

³ On p. 439, above.

⁴ Dr. Martin Braun, in a letter to the writer of this Study.

⁵ The tale of Pantheia is told, in instalments that are separated from one another by other matter, in Xenophon: *Cyropaedia*, IV. 6, § 11; V. 1, §§ 1–18; VI. 1, §§ 31–49; VI. 4, §§ 2–11; VII. 3, §§ 2–16. It is not till VI. 1, § 41, that she is called by her name. In the preceding passages she is referred to as 'the woman from Susa who is said to have been the loveliest woman in Asia'; 'the wife of Abradatas of Susa'; 'the lovely woman'. Similarly, in the epilogue to the Cleomenes Romance, the heroine is introduced as 'the wife of Panteus, a woman with a most lovely and noble presence' (Plutarch, chap. 59).

detail. As Panteus' wife, when she is on the point of taking her life, makes all spectators withdraw with the sole exception of the sheriff's officer (Plutarch, chap. 59), so Abradatas' wife makes all spectators withdraw except her old nurse (Xenophon vii. 3, § 14). In this last gesture, it is true, Phylarchus's heroine goes one degree farther than her Xenophontean precursor; for, whereas Abradatas' wife instructs the nurse to drape her corpse and her husband's in one and the same pall, Panteus' wife has 'need of none to lay her body out or drape it in a pall after she is dead'. But this variation is explained by the fact that in the Phylarchan romance the heroine does not slay herself over her husband's dead body; and this antecedent variation is explained in its turn by the fact that in the Phylarchan romance the 'business' (in the theatrical meaning of the term) which in the Xenophontean romance is assigned to the wife alone is distributed between wife and husband.

In the Xenophontean romance Abradatas' wife, when she has struck herself her death-stroke, 'lays her head on her husband's breast and dies in this posture'. In the Phylarchan romance this tableau is not omitted (it constitutes our Point of Correspondence No. 28 between the stories of certain pagan Hellenic heroes and the story of Jesus), but the figure that leans on the hero's breast is not that of a woman but that of a bosom friend who is of the hero's own sex, and the man who is cast by Phylarchus for this part in the last scene of the main drama is the man who figures posthumously as the husband of the anonymous heroine of the epilogue. Nor is this the only tableau belonging to the Xenophontean romance which Phylarchus has thus transferred from his epilogue to his main drama. At the opening of the last act of the tragedy of Pantheia in the *Cyropaedia*, Pantheia is discovered (VII, 3, §§ 5 and 8) with her dead husband's head on her knees in the posture of the *Pietà* (our Point 82);¹ and in the Phylarchan romance this tableau likewise is, not omitted, but lifted out of the epilogue to the Passion of Cleomenes in order to provide an epilogue for the Passion of Agis.

This transference of theatrical 'business' from Panteus' anony-

¹ The resemblance between this Xenophontean *Pietà* and the traditional Christian representation of the same tableau is very close; for, while Pantheia and her attendants are the counterparts of the women in the Christian tableau, Cyrus, who enters after the curtain has risen, corresponds to Joseph of Arimathea. Like Joseph, Cyrus (by proxy through Gadatas and Gobryas) brings costly materials for laying out the corpse. The same tableau, followed by an entry of male characters, constitutes the second scene of the first act of Heliodorus's melodramatic romance, the *Aethiopica* (Book I). A lovely girl (Chariclea) is discovered by pirates sitting motionless on a rock and gazing at the motionless body of a youth (Theagenes). Happily the young man is not dead and the young woman does not commit suicide. In these capital points Heliodorus is bound to part company with Xenophon, because otherwise—since he has introduced the *Pietà* in his first act—his melodrama would be brought to an abrupt and premature end at the outset.

mous wife in the likeness of Xenophon's Pantheia to Panteus himself perhaps offers a clue for finding the answer to the at first sight puzzling question of why the Pantheia-motif should have been dragged into the Cleomenes Romance at all. May we venture upon the guess that Panteus annexed to himself certain appropriate incidents from the Pantheia Romance on the strength of an accidental and superficial resemblance between the two proper names?¹ And that Phylarchus, having first plundered the Pantheia Romance of everything in it that was conveniently transferable to the male deuteragonist in his own melodrama,² packed the rest of the booty into an epilogue because he could not bear not to make some use of such admirable material?

On this showing, Xenophon's heroine has provided Phylarchus with the whole substance for one character that is perhaps entirely

¹ 'Panteus' has a look of being the masculine counterpart of the feminine name 'Pantheia', but this appearance is, of course, deceptive. The correct counterpart of 'Pantheia' is 'Pantheios' and, while this masculine form might perhaps legitimately be contracted by substituting the termination '-eus' for as large a portion as possible of the second member of the compound word, the result, even then, would be not 'Panteus' but 'Pantheus'. The actual form 'Panteus' may itself, no doubt, be a contraction of a compound word; but, if so, then the original form will have been of the order, not of 'Pan-[th-]', but of 'Panta-[]' or 'Panto-[]' (e.g. 'Pantactēs', 'Pantaenus', 'Pantaleon', 'Pantauchus').

² If we were in an aggressively 'higher critical' mood and had confined our attention to Plutarch's *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes* without taking the precaution of comparing this reproduction of Phylarchus's romance with the overlapping portions of the historical narrative of Polybius, we might be tempted into hazarding the further conjecture that the Panteus who plays his part as Cleomenes' bosom friend is not in fact an historical personage who has been posthumously decked out by Phylarchus in borrowed plumes of romance that have been plucked out of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. We might go the length of suggesting that 'Panteus' is a fictitious character through and through, with no substance in him whatsoever beyond the spoils which a third-century Greek historical novelist has pillaged from the work of a fourth-century predecessor. Is 'Panteus' really nothing but Pantheia transformed from a woman into a man? We might seem to have here in our grasp a second anonymous character that has drifted into Phylarchus's romance out of the stream of 'folk-lore'. But we shall abandon this particular path of exploration if we happen to open our copy of Polybius at Book V, chap. 37, § 8; for here we shall find Polybius (whose veracity is above suspicion) showing us a snapshot of Cleomenes prowling up and down the quayside at Alexandria attended by—Panteus and Hippitas! So Panteus turns out after all to be a man of flesh and blood, and likewise Hippitas into the bargain. Polybius has done us a good turn in pulling us up short; for, if, in our 'higher critical' mood, we had taken a synoptic view of this pair of proper names, the comparison might have clinched our conviction that we were here in the presence of the stuff of 'folk-lore'. Hippitas means 'the horseman'; and, when we come to the Plutarchan (i.e. Phylarchan) account of Cleomenes' last sortie at the head of his twelve companions, we find, sure enough, that 'Hippitas' is put up on horseback! If we did not know from Polybius that Hippitas was an historical personage who genuinely bore that name, we might have let ourselves be inveigled into imagining that 'the horseman' in the last scene was an anonymous character from a folk-tale whose 'business' in a scene in which he plays a conspicuous part has been laid under contribution in order to furnish him with a proper name when he is being lifted out of the sump of 'folk-lore' and being interpolated into a chapter of authentic history. The testimony of Polybius proves that, as a matter of fact, we should have no warrant at all for rejecting either Hippitas' or Panteus' claim to historicity on the ground that their respective names were too exquisitely appropriate to be accepted as genuine. On the same line of argument we should be compelled to disbelieve that, a hundred years before Hippitas' and Panteus' day, the cause of Athenian democracy was really upheld against the assaults of Macedonian autocracy by a man bearing the name of Demosthenes! These awful warnings throw horrifying spots of light upon the pitfalls that everywhere beset an inquiry of the present kind.

fictitious and with some heavy embroideries for another character that demonstrably cloaks a genuinely historical personage under these adventitious trappings. There is a wealth of romance in the figure of Pantheia from which Phylarchus has known how to draw profit; and the spectacle of these riches naturally whets our curiosity. By whose hands has Pantheia been endowed with them? Has Xenophon created his heroine *de toutes pièces*? Or has Xenophon anticipated Phylarchus in plundering somebody else's treasure-house? Who is Pantheia? Is she a new woman, or is she one whose countenance is familiar to us already? In the opinion of one modern Western scholar,¹

'Behind the form of Xenophon's Pantheia I suspect a presence which is none other than that of Semiramis. Both women, Pantheia and Semiramis, are "the loveliest in Asia" (Xenophon: *Cyropaedia*, IV, 6, § 11, and V, 1, § 7; Diodorus, Book II, chap. 4, § 1); both of them are desired by a number of different men; both of them are as heroic as they are lovely. Again, both of them are married to a vassal of the King of Assyria (Xenophon: *Cyropaedia*, V, 1, § 3; Diodorus, Book II, chap. 5, §§ 1-2), and in both cases the King desires the woman for himself and wants to take her away from his vassal (Xenophon: *Cyropaedia*, VI, 1, § 45; Diodorus, Book II, chap. 6, §§ 9-10). The husbands of both women are abroad temporarily—but this at a critical moment—in Bactria (Xenophon: *Cyropaedia*, V, 1, § 3; Diodorus, Book II, chap. 6, § 5). The one substantial difference is that Xenophon's Pantheia—and in this she is a forerunner of the heroines of later [Hellenic] romance—has been purged of the "non-moral" elements, proper to Ishtar, which still inhere in the Oriental figure of Semiramis.²

Perhaps we have now followed out our immediate line of investigation far enough to have convinced ourselves that the *soi-disant* 'history' of Phylarchus, as well as the fourfold picture of the life and preaching of Jesus that is presented in the Gospels, does in fact reveal in itself the presence of elements which have all the appearance of being the jetsam of 'folk-lore' that has become embedded in a stratum of sophisticated or semi-sophisticated literature without having lost the characteristic marks that bear witness to its passage through the waters of 'folk-memory' at some stage before it came to rest in its present setting. We are perhaps

¹ Dr. Martin Braun, in a letter to the writer of this Study.

² Semiramis, in one of her adventures, masquerades in a costume which makes it impossible to tell her sex (Diodorus, chap. 6, § 6). If Pantheia is an emanation of Semiramis, this masquerade perhaps throws light on the process by which tableaux that originally depicted the heroine's exploits have apparently come to be attributed to a character of the other sex (see p. 461, above). In Xenophon's romance (*Cyropaedia*, VI, 4, § 2) Pantheia equips her husband with effeminate accoutrements, including just such a dress as Semiramis dons according to Diodorus (in loc. cit. supra). This anecdote of Semiramis' masquerade would appear, from the context in the passage of Diodorus, to be an *aition* to account for the origin of the so-called Median, but originally Assyrian, male costume, which was effeminate in Hellenic eyes.

also warranted in coming to the further conclusion that the quantity of the foreign bodies, bearing marks of this history, in the works of literature that we have been scrutinizing, is abundant enough to justify us in adopting the view that the medium of 'folk-memory'—which we have found to be a highly conductive one—has in fact been one medium of communication between these works. And this conclusion leads on to yet another. We may conclude that this medium of 'folk-memory' has been instrumental in producing that residue of our observed correspondences which has to be attributed to the operation of mimesis after we have made all possible allowance for the several effects of a common social environment and of the uniformity of human nature and of the play of chance. If mimesis has indeed also played its part, then it seems probable that its principal channel of operation has been the 'folk-memory', and that the practice of plagiarism, in the sense of a conscious and deliberate spoliation of one 'author' by another, has been a minor factor.¹ If we are able to accept these results of our inquiry up to this point, we shall now be in a position to address ourselves to the ulterior question which we have raised, by anticipation, already,² and that is: In which of two alternative possible ways has this operation of mimesis through the channel of the 'folk-memory' taken place? Has the stream of 'folk-memory' carried certain elements out of the pages of Phylarchus (or out of those of any of the other pagan Hellenic authors here in question) into the pages of the Gospels? Or has it carried these same elements into the pages of Phylarchus and of the Gospels alike out of some other piece or province of literature which is independent of, and anterior to, both of them? Let us first try to take a survey of possible common sources, before we proceed to examine the possibility of a direct conveyance into the Gospels of elements from those older books that set forth the stories of our eleven pagan Hellenic heroes.

¹ 'The resemblances [between Philostratus's *Apollonius of Tyana* and the Gospels] have evoked the hypothesis that Apollonius's biographer Philostratus has been seeking to create, in his *Apollonius*, a counterpart of Christ, and, with this in mind, has freely invented many of the details of his biography. Yet any one who reads Philostratus's work with an open mind will reject this hypothesis unhesitatingly; for there is nothing that points to the author's having had any close acquaintance with Christianity. The common features can, no doubt, be detected by a scholar versed in the comparative method of research, but they do not by any means force themselves upon the attention of the casual reader. The explanation of them lies simply in the fact that the Gospels, as well as the sources used by Philostratus, have painted the portrait of the immaculate God-Man in the typical form in which this was conceived by the imagination of that age, and have each invested their own hero with this God-Man's characteristic traits, whether these traits were actually to be found [in the historical hero] or not.'—Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii., 2nd ed. (Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 184–5. (For the emergence of the figure of the God-Man, to which Seeck alludes in this passage, see Bieler, L.: *Θεῖος Ἄνθρωπος: Das Bild des 'Göttlichen Menschen' in Spätantike und Frühchristentum* (Vienna 1935–6, Höfel, 2 vols.))

² On p. 448, above.

The Legend of Hêraklêś

There is one obvious possible common source from which the stories of our pagan historical heroes on the one hand and the story of Jesus on the other hand may have acquired independently of one another—along two distinct channels of the stream of 'folk-memory'—at least some of those common features which can only be accounted for on the hypothesis that they are in some sense the consequence of mimesis; and this source is the legend of Hêraklêś.

The picture in Hellenic minds of the life and character of this Hellenic demigod would presumably have, *a priori*, a better opportunity than any other piece of Hellenic mythology for colouring the traditional portraits of eminent representatives of Hêraklêś' reputed offspring, the historical Heracleidae of Sparta. At the same time the Hêraklêś Legend would have at any rate as good an opportunity of affecting the story of Jesus as the Phaedra Legend would have of affecting the story of Joseph; and there is evidence, as we have seen,¹ that, in this latter case, a Jewish story has in fact been perceptibly influenced by a Hellenic myth. If Phaedra has thus found her way into one province of the domain of Jewish literature, there is no reason *a priori* why, in another province, Phaedra's fellow Hellene Hêraklêś should not have gained at least as much ground—especially considering that in the Oriental World *post Alexandrum* Hêraklêś had acquired a number of local *points d'appui*, while Phaedra, so far as we know, never possessed *in partibus Orientalium* any foothold of this kind to assist her in the dissemination of her legend.

When a veneer of Hellenic culture was imposed upon the surface of Oriental life as a consequence of the military triumph of Macedonian over Achaemenian arms, one of the formal means by which the Orientals symbolically signified their deliberate 'reception' of the Hellenic way of life consisted in the official identification of their own gods with approximately equivalent members of the Hellenic Pantheon; and in this expansion of the Hellenic divinities' respective spheres of influence² Hêraklêś was one of the principal beneficiaries. At Tarsus, for example, Hêraklêś now lent his name to the ancient *genius loci* Sandan, and at Tyre to the ancient *genius loci* Melkart.³ In the first chapter of the story of the contact between Hellenism and the four non-Hellenic cultures which were

¹ On pp. 444-6, above.

² For this expansion in this way see the passage quoted from Turgot in V. C (i) (d) 7, p. 32, footnote 1, above.

³ The identification of Melkart of Tyre with Hêraklêś did not have to wait for Alexander's destructive passage in 332 B.C. It was already an accomplished fact in the time of Herodotus, whom it confronted with some difficult problems of both theology and chronology (see Herodotus, Book II, chap. 42).

brought into collision with it through the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander, these identifications of Oriental with Hellenic divinities were merely nominal; but with the passage of time a contact which had begun as a mere collision began to grow into an interpenetration; and one of the ways in which this fruitful change took place was through a progressive fusion of the cults and the myths of those Oriental and Hellenic divinities who, to begin with, had been identified with one another in name only. In this second chapter of the story the native Oriental worships, as they pursued their competition with one another for the allegiance of Mankind,¹ would tend to radiate out not only their own native elements but also some of the elements of the Hellenic worships with which they had come respectively to be identified; and by this means Hêraklês, among other Hellenic divinities, would come to exert by proxy—here in virtue of his identification with Melkart, and there in virtue of his identification with Sandan—an influence upon Oriental hearts and minds which might have remained for ever beyond his power if he had presented himself in his alien Hellenic shape and not in the familiar forms of his numerous Oriental ‘opposite numbers’. Conversely, the once purely Hellenic legend of Hêraklês, in the course of its transmission from its Hellenic homeland into Oriental hinterlands through the prowess of a Hêraklês-Sandan and a Hêraklês-Melkart, would gradually acquire an alloy of Oriental gold to ennoble its native Hellenic metal.

As a matter of fact, it is hardly credible that Hêraklês, of all Hellenic figures, would have been chosen out so frequently for identification with well-established and deeply revered Oriental divinities if, at and after the time of Alexander, the native Hellenic idea of him had still been the gross traditional portrait that is caricatured in the figure of fun—compounded of glutton and blockhead—which Aristophanes brought on to the stage of the Dionysiac Theatre at Athens in 414 B.C. in the penultimate scene of the *Birds*.

This year was indeed perhaps the latest date at which it was still possible to present Hêraklês to a Hellenic public in this light-hearted vein; for the swiftly following disaster to Athenian arms in Sicily and the consequent resumption of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War made the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization unmistakably plain; this vision of material disaster precipitated a spiritual crisis which affected every element in the Hellenic cul-

¹ For the expansion of the field of the various Oriental divinities’ operation from a parochial to an oecumenical range in the Achaemenian and Post-Achaemenian Age see V. C (i) (d) 7, pp. 29-33, above.

tural tradition; and one particularly striking effect was the transfiguration, at this late hour of the Hellenic day, of an invincible peasant-demigod who had obstinately declined either to put on the armour of a warrior in 'the Heroic Age' or to enrol himself, in the next chapter of Hellenic history, as the citizen of a city-state.¹ Hêraklês was now confronted with a choice of allowing himself either to be shown up as a monster or to be 'made over' into a saint; and both these alternative ways of dealing with an uncouth traditional figure which could no longer be taken for granted had been tried already, before the production of the *Birds*, by Attic tragedians who were Aristophanes' contemporaries. Euripides had done his best to salvage the peasant-demigod by putting a touch of something heroic into the character in his *Alcestis* (*actum* 438 B.C.) and afterwards raising it to a completely heroic stature in the last act of his *Hercules Furens* (*actum circa* 423 B.C.),² whereas Sophocles had done his best to jettison Hêraklês by presenting the traditional figure in the *Trachiniae* as the brute that this Hêraklês must be felt to be by the sensibilities of any contemporary Athenian who was willing to let the scales of traditional acquiescence be stripped away from his eyes.³ In the end the Euripidean solution of this Hêraklês-problem prevailed because the Hellenes could not bring themselves, after all, to jettison a figure which by this time had made so deep a mark upon the Hellenic imagination; and, finding that they could not do without their Hêraklês, they went the necessary lengths in idealizing him.

Hêraklês' choice was decided for him by Prodicus in a fable⁴ in which the bastard son of Zeus was exposed to the competing solicitations of Virtue and Vice, and was firmly guided, by the Cean wit who had taken the rustic demigod's education in hand, into reversing the Judgement of Paris. Thereafter Antisthenes shaped Hêraklês into a prototype of the future Cynic sage;⁵ and the boor's education was virtually finished by Diogenes.⁶ When Diogenes in his boyhood had expressed a wish to attend Antisthenes' lectures and had thereby drawn down upon himself an inquiry into his own purpose in life, he had replied that he intended 'to restamp the coinage' (*παραχάραττειν τὸ νόμισμα*); and this

¹ These points are made by Professor Gilbert Murray in an unpublished paper entitled *Ἀριστος Ἄνδρῶν*, sheet 6.

² *Ibid.*, sheet 8.

³ Murray, *ibid.*, sheets 11-12, points out that, in their respective treatments of the traditional character of Hêraklês, Euripides and Sophocles have each tried his hand at the other's usual *modus operandi*.

⁴ See the résumé in Xenophon: *Memorabilia*, Book II, chap. i, §§ 21-34.

⁵ See Pfister, Fr.: 'Hêraklês und Christus' in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, vol. xxxiv, Heft 1/2 (Leipzig 1937, Teubner), p. 43.

⁶ Diogenes, and not his forerunner Antisthenes, was the founder of the Cynic school of Hellenic philosophy (Tarn, W. W.: 'Alexander, Cynics and Stoics' in *American Journal of Philology*, vol. lx, 1, Whole Number 237 (Baltimore, January 1939, Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 47-8).

audacity (for which the truculent boy's father happened at that time to be serving a sentence in jail) was duly perpetrated by the son in his turn as soon as he came of age¹—though the currency on which Diogenes practised was not of the metallic but of the mental kind, and the house of correction—to which the criminal this time condemned himself—was not the conventional jail but a sensational tub. Hêraklês was one of the mental coins that Diogenes re-stamped; and this process of 'recharacterization', which Prodicus had begun and which Diogenes thus completed, has been summed up in one sentence by a modern Western scholar:

'The Hêraklês Saga is one of the crudest of all Greek myths, and perhaps for that very reason became in the hands of allegorizing philosophers, from Herodorus in the fifth century on to the Stoics and Neoplatonists, the most ideal and edifying of all.'²

The unrecognizable shape in which the antique peasant-demi-god was at length allowed to rest from his thirteenth and greatest labour of metamorphosis is sharply printed in the opening words of the article on Hêraklês in an encyclopaedia of Hellenic culture from the hand of one of the pioneers of a renaissance of Hellenism in Orthodox Christendom:³

'Hêraklês: the son of Alcmena: History reveals him as a philosopher. . . .'

This retrospective glimpse of a *Hercules Philosophus* shows how well the Hellenic genius succeeded, before its own eclipse, in solving the awkward Hêraklês-problem with which it had been plagued in the tragic generation of Sophocles and Euripides and Aristophanes and Prodicus. How keep in circulation a treasured mental coin on which the image and the superscription no longer seemed to tally? That was the problem of an image which was Caliban's and a superscription which read ἀριστος ἀνδρῶν—'the finest specimen of manhood'. Sophocles had proposed to remove a no longer tolerable contradiction by sharpening the image and chiselling the superscription off. Diogenes had eventually removed it by the contrary device of retaining the superscription and restamping the image to suit a new idea—revealed by insight won from suffering—of what the traditional legend ought to imply.⁴ And it was the coin as it came from Diogenes' masterful hands that set the standard for a Hêraklês-type which began *post Alexan-*

¹ The story is told by Murray in op. cit., sheet 1. According to Dudley, D. R.: *A History of Cynicism* (London 1937, Methuen), pp. 20-1 and 54-5, following C. T. Seltman, *παπαγαπάρειν* means, not 'restamp', but 'deface', and there is numismatic evidence that Diogenes' father did, in fact, as the magistrate responsible for the mint of Sinope, deface, in order to put out of circulation, imitations of the Sinopic coinage that had been counterfeited by a neighbouring satrap.

² Ibid., sheet 5.

³ Suidas, s.v. *Hêraklês*, quoted by Murray, op. cit., sheet 29.

⁴ Murray, op. cit., sheets 29-30.

drum to pass into circulation in the Oriental World and to be accepted there as interchangeable with the familiar local types of the Melkarts and the Sandans.

Let us scrutinize the portrait of *Hercules Philosophus* which thus gained currency in the former domain of the Achaemenian Empire after having been repainted by the Hellenic genius in the throes of a 'Time of Troubles'. We shall find in it a number of points which correspond with the portrait of Jesus in the Gospels; and we shall also find that many of these correspondences between Jesus and Hêraklês coincide with points of correspondence, that have been noted in this inquiry already, between Jesus and some of those historical pagan Hellenic heroes with whose stories we have been attempting to bring the Gospels into comparison.

(α) *There is a pair of heroes who are distinguished from one another by a double difference of age and of êthos* (= Point 1).

Hêraklês has a half-brother, Îphiklês, who plays Tiberius Gracchus to Hêraklês' Gaius. The contrast of character between the two brothers comes out when Hera sends the snakes to destroy the infant Hêraklês in his cradle (see Point (δ) below). While Hêraklês strangles the snakes, Îphiklês runs away (Apollodorus: *Bibliotheca*, Book II, chap. 62, on the authority of Pherecydes).

(β) *The hero is of royal lineage* (= Point 2).

Hêraklês' reputed father Amphitryon is a son of the Perseid King Alcaeus of Tiryns.

(γ) *The hero's genealogy has a flaw in it* (= Point 4).

Hêraklês' claim to be a scion of the Perseid royal house of Tiryns is disputable, inasmuch as it is derived from a Tirynthian Perseid who is the husband of Hêraklês' mother but who is not, himself, Hêraklês' father.¹

N.B. Hêraklês' claim to be of the royal Perseid blood is, however, salvaged thanks to the fact that his mother Alcmena is a Perseid as well as his reputed father Amphitryon. Alcmena is the daughter of the Perseid King Electryon of Mycenae, who is Amphitryon's uncle. It is noteworthy that one of the means by which the Christian commentators on the Gospels have sought to reconcile Jesus's claim to descent from David with his claim to be the Son of God to the exclusion of his being a son of Joseph has

¹ This correspondence of the birth-stories of Hêraklês and Jesus, not only with one another but also with those of a number of other Hellenic heroes, some legendary and others historical, has been noticed already in V. C (ii) (a), p. 269, footnote 1, above. While Hêraklês is a son of Alcmena by Zeus, his half-brother Îphiklês (see Point (α) above), who is his junior by one night, is a son of Alcmena by her husband Amphitryon—as Jesus's half-brothers are sons of Mary by Joseph.

been by supposing that Mary was related to Joseph as Alcmene was related to Amphitryon.

(δ) *The hero has a miraculous escape from a mortal danger which threatens him in infancy.*¹

Hera plays towards Hêraklês the persecutor's part that Herod plays towards Jesus. The babe is placed in hiding (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 9, § 6),² as Jesus (Matt. ii. 13-21) is taken by Joseph to Egypt, in order to save his life from Hera's murderous designs (compare the stories of Jason, Orestes, Zeus, Zagreus, Horus, Moses, Cyrus).³ Hera afterwards sends a pair of snakes to kill the babe in his cradle; but Hêraklês strangles the creatures by a miraculously precocious exertion of his superhuman physical strength (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 10, § 1).

(ε) *The Temptation in the Wilderness* (= the correspondence between the Temptations of Jesus and of Gautama which has been examined in this Annex on pp. 451-2, above).

On reaching the age of discretion at which the young become masters of their own fate and give an indication whether they are going to take the path of virtue or the path of vice as their approach to adult life, Hêraklês goes out to a quiet spot and sits debating within himself which path to take;⁴ and then and there Virtue and Vice make their epiphany to him in the form of two women who compete for his affections (Xenophon: *Memorabilia*, Book II, chap. i, §§ 21-34).⁵ This fable of Hêraklês' choice has a later variant, according to which the hero is led into the wilderness by Hermes, acting under Zeus' orders, and is taken up by his divine guide into an exceeding high mountain with two peaks, on one of which Kingship is enthroned and on the other Despotism. Hêraklês, of course, makes the appropriate choice between the two (Dio Chrysostom: *Oratio* I, §§ 58-84).⁶

(ζ) *The hero's career is an ordeal* (|| Point 10).

'Hêraklês who has borne so much' (Euripides: *Hercules Furens*, l. 1250). 'When thou hast worked thy way through labours such as these, then, Hêraklês, thou child of worthy parents, the possession of the most blissful felicity is within thy grasp' (*Virtus loquitur apud Prodicum, referente Xenophonte: Memorabilia*, Book II, chap. i, § 33). 'Who, save Hêraklês the son of Zeus, would have been willing, when he was of divine origin, to toil through such peri-

¹ For this *motif* see the present Annex, pp. 450-1, above.

² See Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

³ See III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 260, above.

⁴ For this simile of the two roads see p. 453, above.

⁵ Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 48 (the passage from Dio has been cited already in V. C (ii) (a), Annex I, p. 370, above).

lous and grievous and painful labours?' (Plutarch: *De Alexandri Fortitudine*, ii. 11).¹

(η) *The hero's work obtains an extraordinary publicity* (= Point 12).

'The affair became celebrated through all Hellas (καθ' ἁπλὴν τὴν Ἑλλάδα) and all were amazed at the extraordinariness of it' (πάντων θαυμαζόντων τὸ παράδοξον) (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 10, § 6). 'And there went out a fame of him through all the region round about (καθ' ὅλης τῆς περιχώρου), and he taught in their synagogues, being glorified of all' (δοξαζόμενος ὑπὸ πάντων) (Luke iv. 14-15).²

(θ) *The hero is commissioned by God to exercise a beneficent royal authority over all Mankind* (|| Point 15).

'Zeus commissioned him to reign over the whole human race . . . and . . . to be the saviour of the whole Earth and of all Mankind' (Dio Chrysostom: *Oratio* I, § 84).³ 'Thou sayest that I am a king' (John xviii. 37). 'The Father sent the Son to be the saviour of the World' (1 John iv. 14). 'Zeus sent (Ζεὺς μὲν ἀπέστειλε) orders to him to work for Eurystheus' (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 10, § 7). 'I must preach the Kingdom of God to other cities also; for therefore am I sent' (εἰς τοῦτο ἀπέσταλμαι) (Luke iv. 43).⁴

(ι) *A tableau of the hero in spiritual agony in face of a supreme challenge* (= Point 36).⁵

Hēraklēs made a journey to Delphi and questioned the god [about the orders that he had received from Zeus to work for Eurystheus]. He received an oracle signifying that it was the will of the Gods that he should accomplish (τελέσαι)⁶ twelve labours at the bidding of Eurystheus, and that in reward he should gain immortality. Thereupon Hēraklēs fell into an extraordinary despondency (ἐνέπεσεν εἰς ἀθυμίαν οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν). On the one hand he considered it quite unworthy of his own prowess to serve some one of less distinction,⁷ and on the other hand it seemed to him unsuitable, and indeed impossible, not to obey a Zeus who was at the same time his own father.⁸ This threw him into a distressing spiritual quandary (εἰς πολλὴν οὖν ἀμηχανίαν ἐμπίπτοντος αὐτοῦ) in which Hera seized the opportunity of casting a frenzy upon him ('*Ἥρα μὲν ἐπεμψεν αὐτῷ λύτταν*). Hēraklēs became so sick

¹ Ibid., p. 50.

² Ibid., pp. 48-9.

³ Ibid., p. 45.

⁴ Ibid., p. 49.

⁵ See also Table VIII—Common Words: (ε), on pp. 414 and 415-16, above.

⁶ See Point 74 above = Table VIII—Common Words: (λ) = Point (ξ) below in the present series relating to Hēraklēs.

⁷ Compare: 'The servant is not greater than his lord, neither he that is sent greater than him that sent him' (John xiii. 16).

⁸ Nevertheless, not as I will but as thou wilt' (Matt. xxvi. 39 = Mark xiv. 36 = Luke xxii. 42 (cf. John v. 30, and vi. 38).

in soul that he went out of his mind (ὁ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ δυσφορῶν εἰς μανίαν ἐνέπεσε); and the malady grew upon him to a point at which he took leave of his senses and . . . ' (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 10, § 7, and chap. 11, § 1).¹

(κ) *The hero resigns himself to the will of his heavenly father.*

'On the other hand it seemed to him unsuitable, and indeed impossible, not to obey a Zeus who was at the same time his own father' (Diodorus, loc. cit. in (ι), above). 'Nevertheless, not as I will but as thou wilt' (the Gospels, locc. citt. in footnote 7 on p. 471, above).²

(λ) *A shirt (χιτῶν) in which the hero goes to his death* (|| Point 71).

The shirt plays, of course, a far more important part in the Passion of Hēraklēs than in the Passion of Jesus; for the death of Hēraklēs is actually caused by his putting on the poisoned shirt of Nessus.

(μ) *When other passers-by refuse to perform a friendly office for the hero, one person responds to his request and receives a notable reward for his act of friendship* (|| Point 72).

'Hēraklēs went to the pyre and then began to beg everybody who approached, one after another, to set light to it. No one ventured to do his bidding until at last Philoctetes agreed. He received as a reward for his services the gift of Hēraklēs' bow and arrows' (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 38, § 4).

(ν) *The hero's mother is supported in her ordeal by a young man of the hero's entourage* (= Points 73 and 80A).

Alcmena is present at the Passion of Hēraklēs (according to Seneca in his *Hercules Oetaeus*, though not according to Sophocles in his *Trachiniae*). The part of the favourite companion is played by Philoctetes, who is described as ἐρώμενος Ἡρακλέους in the scholia to Apollonius Rhodius: *Argonautica*, Book I, l. 1207; but the young man who supports Alcmena (according to the Senecan version of the passion-play) is not Philoctetes but Hyllus, who is Hēraklēs' son and therefore Alcmena's own grandson.³

N.B. Philoctetes' friendly office to Hēraklēs (see Point (μ)),

¹ Pfister, op. cit., p. 49. In the legend of Hēraklēs according to Diodorus the hero's spiritual agony discharges itself in a murderous assault upon the hero's faithful companion Iolaus and upon the hero's own children. This was, of course, the common form of this chapter of the Hēraklēs Story. May we infer that the attraction exercised by it is responsible for the Diodoran version of the corresponding chapter in the story of Gaius Gracchus, in which the guilt for the murder of Antullus is laid upon Gaius Gracchus and not upon Marcus Fulvius, and the murder itself is placed after Gaius's agony and not before it? (See p. 389, footnote 3, and p. 392, footnote 2, above.)

² Ibid., p. 49.

³ Ibid., p. 53.

above) corresponds to Panteus' friendly office to Cleomenes (see Point 79).

(ξ) *The end of an ordeal* (= Point 74).¹

'It is finished' (*peractum est*) (Seneca: *Hercules Oetaeus*, ll. 1340, 1457, 1472).²

N.B. The same phrase is repeated twice in the Gospel according to Saint John (xix. 28 and 30).

(ο) *The hero commends his spirit to his heavenly father.*

'Quacumque parte prospicis natum, pater, . . . spiritum admitte hunc, precor, in astra' (Seneca: *Hercules Oetaeus*, ll. 1696 and 1703-4).

'Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit' (Luke xxiii. 46).³

(π) *Three portents* (|| Point 75).

Hercules prays to the Sun to cease to shine on this day of the hero's death (Seneca: *Hercules Oetaeus*, ll. 1131-4). He prays to his father Juppiter to rend the Earth from pole to pole (ll. 1134-6). He prophesies that the buried giants will break out from under the mountains that cover them, and that Pluto will throw open the gates of Hades (ll. 1138-43). All these three portents are mentioned in the Gospels as having occurred at the time of Jesus's death: the darkness in all three Synoptic Gospels (Matt. xxvii. 45 = Mark xv. 33 = Luke xxiii. 44); the earthquake and the opening of the graves in Matt. xxvii. 51-3.

N.B. According to Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 38, § 4, Hêraklês' pyre is miraculously consumed by incendiary thunderbolts. A portent of thunder is mentioned by Apollodorus: *Bibliotheca*, Book II, chap. 160; a portent of darkness by Festus: *De Verborum Significatu*, Book VIII, s.v. *Hercules*.⁴

(ρ) *When the hero is being burnt to death, Iolaus and other intimate companions of his are in the vicinity, though not actually on the spot* (= Point 80).

'Iolaus and the rest waited beholding from a distance to see what would happen' (ἐκ διαστήματος ἀποθεωρούντων τὸ ἀποβησόμενον) (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 38, § 4). 'And many women were there beholding afar off' (ἀπὸ μακρόθεν θεωροῦσαι) (Matt. xxvii. 55 = Mark xv. 40; cf. Luke xxiii. 49).

¹ See also Table VIII—Common Words: (λ), on pp. 414 and 416, above.

² Pfister, op. cit., pag. cit.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 53-4. According to Festus: 'Hercules astrologus dictus quod eo die se flammis iniecit quo futura erat obscuratio Solis.' For the association of the Hêraklês motif of an eclipse with the death of Caesar, as well as with the death of Jesus, see Virgil: *Georgics*, I, ll. 467-8, quoted in V. C (i) (d) 5, vol. v, p. 436, above.

N.B. In the tableau of the Crucifixion of Jesus these onlookers from a distance are a chorus of Galilaean women corresponding to the chorus of Trachinian women who are present at the cremation of Hêraklê's in Sophocles' play. In Seneca's play Iolaus and the rest have followed Hêraklê's from his and their home in Trachis to the scene of his death on Oeta, just as the Galilaean women have followed Jesus from his and their home in Galilee to the scene of his death at Jerusalem.

(σ) *The hero, after his death, comes to receive religious worship* (= Point 83).

Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 39, § 1.

(τ) *The villain perishes miserably* (= Point 85).

'Deïaneira was prostrated at the greatness of the disaster that had befallen Hêraklê's, and, being conscience-stricken by the conviction that the sin was hers, she put an end to her life by hanging herself' (συνειδυία ἐαυτῇ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, ἀγχόνῃ τὸν βίον κατέστρεψεν) (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 38, § 3). 'Then Judas . . . , when he saw that he was condemned, repented himself (μεταμεληθεὶς) . . . saying "I have sinned (ἥμαρτον) . . ." . . . and went and hanged himself' (καὶ ἀπελθὼν ἀπήγγεστο) (Matt. xxvii. 3-5).¹

N.B. Deïaneira's tragedy resembles Judas' in the further point that she, too, has been a tool in hands more villainous than her own.

(υ) *The disappearance of the hero's mortal remains.*

'After [the miraculous conflagration of the pyre by thunderbolts] Iolaus and the rest went to collect the bones; but not one bone was to be found—from which they inferred that, in accordance with the oracles, Hêraklê's had been translated from the world of men to the world of the Gods' (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 38, § 5). After the burial of Jesus, when the women return to visit the Sepulchre, they find it open and empty (Matt. xxviii. 1-8 = Mark xvi. 1-8 = Luke xxiv. 1-9 = John xx. 1); and their extraordinary discovery is confirmed by Peter (Luke xxiv. 10-12) or by John and Peter (John xx. 2-10).²

(φ) *The hero has conquered Death and harrowed Hell.*

Hêraklê's twelfth labour is a descent into Hades to seize and bring back Cerberus. He successfully accomplishes this task, and on another occasion—and this time, too, with success—he

¹ Pfister, op. cit., p. 53.

² Ibid., p. 55.

descends into Hades to rescue and bring back Alcestis. (Compare Seneca: *Hercules Furens*, ll. 604-12 and 889-93, and *Hercules Oetaeus*, ll. 1943-62, with Rom. vi. 9, and 2 Tim. i. 10.)¹

(χ) *The hero, after his death, appears to one (or to two) of the women of his entourage.*

Hēraklēs appears to his mother Alcmena (Seneca: *Hercules Oetaeus*, ll. 1940-82); Jesus appears to Mary Magdalene and 'the other Mary'² (Matt. xxviii. 9) or to Mary Magdalene alone (Mark xvi. 9-11 and John xx. 11-18).³

(ψ) *The hero's disciples return to his and their home.*

Iolaus and his companions from Oeta to Trachis (Diodorus, Book IV, chap. 39, § 1); Peter and his companions from Jerusalem to Galilee (Matt. xxviii. 10 and 16; John xxi).

(ω) *The hero ascends to Heaven in a cloud.*

Hēraklēs (Apollodorus: *Bibliotheca*, Book II, chap. 160); Jesus (Acts i. 9).

This completes our survey of correspondences between the legend of Hēraklēs on the one hand and the stories of Jesus, and of the pagan historical heroes whom we have brought into comparison with Jesus, on the other hand. If we glance at the analysis of our results which is set out in Table X we shall see that the correspondences that we have observed are not only numerous but are also representative of the several different kinds of elements that are common to the Gospels and to the stories of the pagan historical heroes. This finding suggests that the legend of Hēraklēs may be an important common source from which the story of Jesus on the one side and the stories of the pagan historical heroes on the other side may have derived some of their common features, independently of one another, through separate channels of the stream of 'folk-memory'.⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 51.

² i.e. Mary the mother of James and Joses (Matt. xxvii. 56), not Mary the mother of Jesus.

³ Jesus's salutation to Mary Magdalene at the Sepulchre—'Woman, why weepest thou?' (John xx. 15)—has a correspondence in Hēraklēs' adjuration *post mortem* to his mother Alcmena: 'Quid me . . . planctu iubes/sentire fatum?' (Seneca: *Hercules Oetaeus*, ll. 1940-2). There is a closer verbal coincidence in l. 1507: 'Parce iam lacrimis, parens' (Pflster, op. cit., p. 55); but these words are spoken by the hero before his death and not after it. The next line (1508) of Seneca's play—'Superba matres inter Argolicas eris'—corresponds verbally with the salutation—'Blessed art thou among women'—with which Mary the mother of Jesus is greeted first by Gabriel (Luke i. 28) and then by Elisabeth (Luke i. 42).

⁴ This suggestion has already been made apropos of the birth-stories in V. C (ii) (a), p. 269, footnote 1, above.

TABLE X. *Concordance of Correspondences between the Legend of Héraklés and the Stories of Jesus and the Pagan Historical Heroes*

<i>Héraklés</i>	<i>Point in Table I</i>	<i>At least one Synoptic Gospel</i>	<i>John</i>	<i>A Pauline Epistle</i>	<i>At least one part of the New Testament</i>	<i>Agis</i>	<i>Cleomenes</i>	<i>At least one Spartan hero</i>	<i>Tiberius Gracchus</i>	<i>Gaius Gracchus</i>	<i>At least one Roman hero</i>	<i>Aristonicus</i>	<i>Eumus</i>	<i>At least one futurist</i>	<i>Siddhārtha Gautama</i>	<i>Common Element</i>
(a)	1	x	x		2	x	x	1	x	x	1					A pair of common characters
(β)	2	x			1	x	x	2				x		1	x	
(γ)	4	x	x		1							x		1		
(δ)		x	x		1											
(ε)		x	x		1											
(ζ)	10	x	x		1		x	1				x		1	x	
(η)	12	x	x		1					x	1					
(θ)	15	x	x		2								x	1		
(ι)	36	x	x		1					x	1					A common scene
(κ)	36	x			1											A common word
(λ)	71		x		1		x	1								A common property
(μ)	72	x	x		1								x	1		
(ν)	73 + 80A	x	x		1		x	1								Two common characters
(ξ)	74		x		1		x	1								A common word
(ο)		x			1											
(π)	75	x			1		x	1								
(ρ)	80	x			1	x		1								A common scene
(σ)	83								x	x	2					A common property
(τ)	85	x			1				x	x	2					A common character
(υ)		x	x		2											
(φ)		x	x	x	1											
(χ)		x	x		2											
(ψ)		x	x		2											
(ω)		x	x		1											

The Ritual Murder of an Incarnate God

Legend, however, is not the only kind of foreign matter that may fall into Lethe's stream and be carried along by it. According to the anthropologists a myth usually proves, when we are able to trace its history back to its origins, to be the verbal echo of some ritual act;¹ and the deed is anterior to the word² logically as well as historically; for a society that performs some act for its own sake without being moved to seek for any explanation is manifestly in a more primitive mental state than one which is led by a disinterested curiosity into trying to explain the reason for what is

¹ In an aesthetically gifted primitive society or nascent civilization the ritual act is apt to blossom into a religious drama and the myth into Epic or Saga (see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 92-6, above).

² 'Im Anfang war die Tat.'—Goethe: *Faust*, I. 1237.

done when this indulgence of the speculative intellect cannot be supposed to add in any way to the practical efficacy of the customary magical or religious performance. If, therefore, we have found evidence which suggests that a myth may make its way into the stream of 'folk-memory' and may be deposited by these waters in fields of sophisticated literature that happen to adjoin the river banks, then we may expect *a priori* to see pieces of ritual being carried along the same channels to the same eventual resting-places; and, to verify this hypothesis, we need not for the moment look beyond the figure of the demigod who has been engaging our attention in the immediately preceding pages.

We have already come to the conclusion that the legend of Hêraklês would have been unlikely—even in the etherialized form to which it had been refined by the cumulative labours of three successive generations of Hellenic philosophers—to make the headway that it did make in the Oriental World *post Alexandrum* if the Hellenic demigod himself had not first been officially identified with local divinities who were ancient, familiar, and popular. And, if we now look into the reasons why Hêraklês was taken to be the Hellenic equivalent of this or that Oriental god, we shall find that the decisive factor was apt to be some striking point of similarity, not in myth, but in ritual. Sandan the god of Tarsus, for example, was identified with Hêraklês because an effigy—inanimate or living—of the Tarsian god was annually cremated on a pyre.¹ This explanation of Hêraklês-Sandan is hardly open to doubt; and it would likewise seem probable that the Tyrian god Melkart was identified with Hêraklês because the Tyrians celebrated an annual festival of the resurrection of Melkart which recalled to Hellenic minds the triumph of Hêraklês over Death. This Tyrian festival is referred to as that of 'the Resurrection of Hêraklês' (*Ἡρακλέους ἔγερσις*) in a Greek work from the pen of a half-Hellenized Jewish scholar who lived and wrote in the first century of the Christian Era.² Did the Tyrians, we may wonder, look eastward, when the season of this festival came round, to catch sight of, and salute, their lord god as he rose, with the Sun, above the mountains of Galilee? And did some such lingering local custom also direct the steps of certain sons of 'Galilee of the

¹ See Frazer, J. G.: *The Scapegoat = The Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., Part VI (London 1913, Macmillan), pp. 388–90.

² Josephus: *Antiquities*, Book VIII, chap. 5, § 3, cited by Pfister, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–9. The foundation of this festival of the Resurrection of Hêraklês in the month of Peritius is attributed to Solomon's Tyrian contemporary King Hiram by Josephus, *loc. cit.*, on the authority of 'Menander the translator of the archives of Tyre out of the original Phoenician into Greek'. Peritius was the fourth month of a Macedonian calendar which took the autumnal equinox for its New Year's Day, so that, if the Tyrian festival of the Resurrection of Hêraklês was celebrated on the *first* day of the month, its date would be identical with that of the Birthday of the Sun and Christmas Day.

Gentiles'¹—whose grandfathers had been numbered among the heathen before Alexander Jannaeus (*regnabat* 102–76 B.C.) converted them to Judaism by the sword—when, in their agony of sorrow and despair on the morrow of their Master's death, they 'went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them', and 'worshipped him when they saw him'?² In an equally speculative vein we may ask ourselves whether the annual ritual at Tarsus, in which Hêrâklês-Sandan died a cruel death in order to enjoy a glorious resurrection, may not have made on the imagination and emotions of Saint Paul as a boy an impression which we can trace in the grown man's Christology.³ The Hêrâklês who was the universally acknowledged saviour (σωτήρ) of all Mankind⁴ was also, at Tarsus, the local prince (ἀρχηγός) of a community that worshipped him as Hêrâklês-Sandan.⁵ Is it sheer chance that the same two titles of 'prince' and 'saviour' are applied to Jesus in a passage of the Acts of the Apostles in virtue of the prodigy of a resurrection⁶ which is ascribed to Jesus as well as to Hêrâklês-Melkart?

'The God of our fathers raised up (ἤγειρεν) Jesus, whom ye slew and hanged on a tree. Him hath God exalted with his right hand to be a prince (ἀρχηγόν) and a saviour (σωτήρα).'⁷

Does it not seem probable that these three almost technical terms have been inherited by Christianity from the Tyrian worship of Hêrâklês-Melkart and from the Tarsian worship of Hêrâklês-Sandan? And, if this probability is entertained, does it not seem also probable that ritual, rather than myth, was the vehicle in which the three terms were conveyed from one religion to another?

The likelihood that ritual, as well as myth, may have contributed to the production of the correspondences between the story of Jesus and the stories of our eleven pagan historical heroes will not appear less when we remind ourselves that Jesus was not the only

¹ Matt. iv. 15, quoted already in II. D (iii), vol. ii, p. 73, above. See further the present Annex, in the present volume, p. 499, below.

² Matt. xxviii. 16–17.

³ In later years Paul still spoke of his Tarsian birth with pride ('I am a man which am a Jew of Tarsus, a city in Cilicia, a citizen of no mean city.'—Acts xxi. 39). If Tarsus retained this lasting hold over Paul's affections, it seems likely that the impressions of his childhood in Tarsus will likewise have made a lasting imprint upon his imagination. These suppositions are quite compatible with Paul's own account of the next stage of his life, when he was receiving an education in the Jewish Law at Jerusalem ('My manner of life from my youth (ἐκ νεότητος, not ἐκ παιδός), which was at the first among mine own nation at Jerusalem, know all the Jews—which knew me from the beginning, if they would testify, that after the most straitest sect of our religion I lived a Pharisee.'—Acts xxvi. 4–5).

⁴ See the phrase quoted on p. 471, above, from Dio Chrysostom: *Oratio* I, § 84.

⁵ 'Your prince Hêrâklês' (ὁ ἀρχηγός ὑμῶν Ἡρακλῆς).—Dio Chrysostom: *Oratio* XXXIII (*Tarsica Prior*), § 47.

⁶ The ritual of the cremation of Hêrâklês-Sandan is similarly mentioned, in association with his title of 'prince', by Dio Chrysostom in loc. cit.

⁷ Acts v. 30–1. The three verbal correspondences are pointed out by Pfister, op. cit., p. 59.

one of these twelve to become a recipient of worship after his death. The Gracchi, as we have seen (Point 83), are reported by Plutarch's authorities to have been worshipped—and this with a regular ritual which was comparable to the services in the temples of the Gods—at the spots that had been hallowed by these two Roman heroes' deaths. And at Alexandria the spot where the crucified corpse of Cleomenes had been miraculously preserved intact (Points 75, 76, and 78) became a place of pilgrimage where the dead Spartan exile was hailed 'as a hero and a child of the Gods' by the populace of Alexandria.

In the same passage (*Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 60, *ad fin.*) Plutarch (or is it really Phylarchus?) goes on, it is true, to narrate how this nascent worship of Cleomenes was nipped in the bud by the intervention of 'educated people' (οἱ σοφώτεροι), who threw cold water on the rising religious ardour of the Alexandrians by explaining to them that the apparently miraculous portent which had made such an impression on their hearts via their intellects was scientifically explicable as a commonplace effect of certain wholly natural causes. If there is any truth in this tale, it is easy to guess that these zealous rationalists were not exerting themselves *proprio motu*. Behind their propaganda we can discern the policy of the Ministers of King Ptolemy Philopator. While Cleomenes was still alive, the Ptolemaic Government had been seriously concerned at the alarming evidences of their Spartan guest's popularity among King Ptolemy's soldiers and subjects. It was on this account that they had taken the precaution of interning him; and now the romantic fool had turned the tables on these prudent statesmen by managing, in their despite, to die a heroic death and to cap it with a sensational miracle to the credit of his dead body. It was not to be borne that the tiresome fellow should defeat their calculations by now making himself even more popular as a naturalized ghost than he had ever been as a living alien refugee. The blossoming worship of Cleomenes must be sterilized at once by vigorous counter-measures; and we may well believe that, partly by propaganda and partly by intimidation, Sosibius and his colleagues did succeed in driving this pestilent worship of Cleomenes underground. But who shall say what the fortunes of the cult may have been after it had gone to earth? Not even the Ptolemaic security police could certify that this *Schwärmerei* was completely extinct; and not even the Ptolemaic customs cordon could prevent it, if it did manage to survive in an Alexandrian underworld, from being shipped far and wide out of a port which in that age was the central mart and clearing-house of three continents and five civilizations.

The possible social means of conveyance by which a never quite extinguished worship of Cleomenes might have been carried from Alexandria to the Palestinian glaxis of the Ptolemaic Empire are examined at a later point in this Annex.¹ In the present context we may pass on to observe that, while the survival of the worship of Cleomenes is non-proven, and while the institution of a worship of the Gracchi is only vouched for by the unsupported testimony of one of Plutarch's sources, there is no doubt at all about the worship of three other historical Hellenic heroes—Plato, Alexander, and Augustus—who have come into the purview of our present inquiry because they are credited with the divine paternity and the miraculous birth that are likewise attributed to Jesus in the Matthaean and Lucan prologues to the story of the Gospels.²

We may also presume that in cases such as these, in which a religious worship came to be paid to the *manes* of mortal men, the ritual with which these were honoured would be modelled, with a minimum of innovation, on some familiar traditional ritual which was in current use in the worship of superhuman heroes and gods. In Plutarch's source, for example, the Gracchi are visualized in the likeness of the Dioscuri.³ And we may hazard the guess that the pair of historical Roman heroes were thus thought of as counterparts of the pair of Lacedaemonian demigods because the modern statues of them that were dedicated and erected in a conspicuous place⁴ were carved in something like the traditional shapes of Castor and Pollux and were honoured with something like the observances to which these statues of Castor and Pollux had a traditional claim. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the rituals in vogue in the worships of the Dioscuri and of Hêraklês were the only pieces of existing religious or magical practice that were laid under contribution in the process of instituting the worships and shaping the legends of Plato and Alexander and Cleomenes and the Gracchi and Augustus and Jesus. There is no obvious limit to the extent of the field of traditional observance from which some common element may, here and there, have found its way independently into the worships, and thence into the legends, of some or all of the historical heroes whose stories reveal those correspondences that we are seeking to trace back to their origins; and, if we make a reconnaissance into some of the tracts that Sir James Frazer has mapped out in the relevant parts of his vast survey,⁵ we shall come across at least two rites which

¹ On pp. 496–500, below.

² See V. C (ii) (a), pp. 267–9, and the present Annex, pp. 379 and 469, above.

³ Plutarch: *Lives of the Gracchi*, chap. 2.

⁴ Ibid., chap. 39.

⁵ See Frazer, Sir J. G.: *The Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., Part III: *The Dying God* (London 1911, Macmillan), and Part VI: *The Scapegoat* (London 1913, Macmillan).

look as though they may have been the ultimate sources of certain of the correspondences between the stories of our pagan historical heroes and the story of the Gospels.

(α) '*The Ride of the Beardless One.*'¹

There is a Persian rite in which a naked rider, mounted on a horse, ass, or mule, rides through the city at the head of a cortège (Point 16)—apparently for the magical purpose of bringing warmth back to the Earth in spring.² As his reward for playing the part, this human impersonator of the power that annually rejuvenates the face of Nature is allowed to levy contributions on the shop-keepers; and, if they are hesitant about complying with his demands, he is entitled to confiscate the whole of their stock (Point 17). Is this Persian rite the ultimate source of two of our common scenes? The conjecture may be fortified by two apparently corroborative pieces of evidence. On the one hand the rite appears to have precipitated itself, in the shape of a myth, in the incident of Mordecai's ride in the Book of Esther³—a post-exilic work of Jewish literature which was undoubtedly generated by a desire to account retrospectively for the origin of the annual festival of Purim,⁴ which the Jews had adopted, or at any rate adapted, from the practice of the heathen among whom they had been constrained to dwell during their Babylonish captivity. On the other hand the same spring-rite would seem to have played some part in suggesting the idea of an historical piece of horse-play.

(β) '*The Reign of the Mock King.*'

The Jewish Hellenist scholar Philo of Alexandria (*vivebat circa* 20 B.C.—A.D. 50) records⁵ that at Alexandria in A.D. 38, when Herod Agrippa I, the grandson of Herod the Great, was passing through the city on his way home to Palestine from Rome—where he had just been raised to royal rank and been invested with his uncle Philip's former appanage by the Emperor Caligula—the Alexandrian populace, who in this age were violently Anti-Semitic,⁶ gave

¹ See Frazer: *The Scapegoat*, pp. 402-5.

² This interpretation of the rite depends on a combination of points—the season at which it is performed, the nakedness of the rider, and the bystanders' practice of douching him with hot water—which are irrelevant for our present purpose.

³ Esther vi. 7-11.

⁴ At the feast of Purim the Jews—even in Western Europe in the Modern Age—used to act a play which had for its subject the story that is told as a tale in the Book of Esther (see Frazer, *op. cit.*, pp. 414-16).

⁵ Philo: *In Flaccum*, chap. (6), §§ 36-9 (in *Philonis Alexandrini Opera quae supersunt*, edited by Cohn, L., and Wendland, P., vol. vi, edited by Cohn, L., and Reiter, S. (Berlin 1915, Reimer), p. 127), cited by Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 418, following Wendland, P.: 'Jesus als Saturnalienkönig' (= *Hermes*, vol. xxxiii (1898), pp. 175-9).

⁶ For this Alexandrian Anti-Semitism and its causes see V. C (ii) (a), pp. 217-19, above.

expression to their chagrin at the aggrandizement of a Jewish prince by burlesquing Agrippa's investiture in a kind of charade, which they improvised in the streets of Alexandria while their unwelcome royal guest was in their midst. To show what they thought of a Jewish kingship of Roman manufacture, the Alexandrians, according to Philo's story, rounded up a naked beggar named Carabas; chevied him into the public gymnasium; set a papyrus-leaf crown on his head, a rug robe on his shoulders, and a papyrus-stalk sceptre in his hand; paid him mock court (Points 65¹ and 66); and exhibited him in these burlesque regalia to the crowd (Point 67), who hailed him with satirical acclamations of 'Marin! Marin!'²

In this elaborately offensive piece of fooling³ the Alexandrians appear to have combined a vague parody of 'the Ride of the Beardless One' with a close parody of another rite which has, perhaps, a certain affinity with 'the Ride' in respect of its magical purpose and which may also, perhaps, have been combined with 'the Ride' in practice when the two rites were being performed in earnest.⁴ The sceptre and robe and crown with which the historical victim

¹ It will be seen that Philo's story comes closer to the Lucan account of the mocking of Jesus by Herod Agrippa's uncle and brother-in-law Herod Antipas and his men than it comes to the Matthaean and Marcan account of the mocking of Jesus by Pilate's Roman soldiers.

² 'Marin! Marin!' seems to be a garbled version of the Hebrew 'Marna! Marna!' ('Our Lord! Our Lord!'). Compare Matt. xxi. 9 = Mark xi. 9-10 = Luke xix. 38 = John xii. 13.

³ The elaborateness of it will be apparent in the following translation of the whole passage of Philo from Cohn and Reiter's Greek text:

'There was a madman called Carabas whose madness was not of the savage ferocious kind—a kind which shows no more consideration [reading *ἀσκεπτος* for the *ἀσκητος* of the MSS.] for those who come within range than for those who are possessed by it [cf. Matt. viii. 28 = Mark v. 3-4 = Luke viii. 29]—but was of the kind that is relaxed and milder. This man lived all day long, and all night long as well [Mark v. 5], stark naked [Luke viii. 27] in the streets, exposing himself heedlessly to extremes of heat and cold and to the pranks that were played on him by infants and children who had nothing better to do. They [i.e. the Alexandrian mob] chevied this poor creature to the public gymnasium; stood him on a platform where he would be visible to all eyes; flattened out a papyrus-leaf and set it on his head to do for a diadem, and draped the rest of his body in a rug to do for a robe [*χλαμύς*, which is the word used in Matt. xxvii. 28], while, to do for a sceptre, some one handed up a short section of papyrus-stalk (the native Egyptian plant) which he had seen lying in the street where it had been thrown away. When Carabas had thus received the insignia of royalty and been tricked out as a king with all the parade of a pantomime, some young fellows took their stand on either side of him with sloped rods, to do for sloped pikes, like a burlesque bodyguard; and then other people made their approach—some as though they were going to pay him their respects, some as though they were going to lay a suit before him, and some as though they were going to consult him on public affairs. And then, from the crowd standing round in a circle, there thundered out the strange cry of 'Marin', which is said to be the Syrian for 'Lord'—for they knew that Agrippa was a Syrian by race and that a large slice of Syria constituted his [newly conferred] kingdom.'

⁴ The combination of 'the Ride of the Beardless One' with 'the Reign of the Mock King' may have been an established practice in the realm of serious observance before the two rites were combined in the Alexandrian burlesque of A.D. 38. This possibility is suggested by the fact that Philo's account of this Alexandrian practical joke is not the only context in which we find the two rites associated with one another. There are also traces of both of them in the myth of Esther and Mordecai, which has been precipitated by the ritual of the post-exilic Jewish festival of Purim.

of a heartless practical joke was tricked out at Alexandria in A.D. 38 are properties which seem to have belonged, not to 'the Ride of the Beardless One', but to the different rite of 'the Reign of the Mock King',¹ which was apparently intended, not to conjure back the warmth of spring, but to fulfil the antecedent purpose of ushering the Old Year out and the New Year in.

The main features of this second rite present themselves with an astonishing uniformity² in the Babylonian festival of the Sacaea³ and in the Roman festival of the Saturnalia.⁴ In the first place the turn of the calendar year was celebrated in this festival by a temporary abrogation of the workaday social system. At both Babylon and Rome⁵ the masters and the slaves temporarily exchanged their usual roles; and the deliberate topsy-turvyness of this brief holiday régime was symbolized in the enthronement of a mock king who was honoured and pampered, for the period of his burlesque reign, as though he were a king in very deed. He was dressed up in the proper regalia (Points 65, 66, and 67) and was allowed to exercise a far-reaching royal licence.⁶ But—in some, at any rate, of the many variant versions of the rite—this short-lived pomp and indulgence⁷ had to be paid for by the mock king with his life as soon as his ephemeral reign was over.⁸ After

¹ A survey of diverse local variants of a rite which was in vogue, at the time of the disintegration of the Hellenic Society, over an area that embraced both Babylonia and Roman Italy, will be found in Frazer, op. cit., chap. 8: 'The Saturnalia and Kindred Festivals' (= *The Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., Part VI, pp. 306-411).

² We may conjecture that the rite was of Babylonian, or perhaps rather of Sumerian, origin, and that it was gradually propagated from the Land of Shinar into the regions round about. If we ask who brought it from the western shores of Asia to the western shores of Italy, it is tempting to answer: 'The Etruscans'.

³ See Frazer, op. cit., cap. cit., § 5 (= vol. cit., pp. 354-407).

⁴ Ibid., § 1 (= vol. cit., pp. 306-12).

⁵ Frazer, vol. cit., p. 355.

⁶ This first act in the ritual drama of 'the Reign of the Mock King' appears to have precipitated itself, in the shape of a myth, in the tableau (Point 67) of Mordecai coming out of the King's palace into the city arrayed in royal apparel, including a crown and a purple robe (Esther viii. 15).

⁷ The reign of the Roman Saturnalia-king lasted thirty days (Frazer, vol. cit., pp. 414-16), and that of the Babylonian Sacaea-king five days according to the account of the Sacaea in Athenaeus: *Deipnosophistae*, Book XIV, chap. 44, p. 639 c (Athenaeus's authority is Berossus).

⁸ The putting to death of the mock king as soon as his reign is over is mentioned as an integral part of the rite by Dio Chrysostom (*vivebat circa* A.D. 45-115) in his account of the Sacaea (*Oratio*, IV, § 67). In the Saturnalia, as celebrated in Rome and in Roman Italy, the mock king was not put to death in any period in regard to which we have any historical record of the nature of the celebrations; and our authorities do not even give us any hint that the Saturnalia-king had been customarily put to death once upon a time in ages past. We have, however, one apparently authentic account of a celebration of the Saturnalia by the troops of a Roman garrison on a remote frontier of the Empire at a late date in which the rite includes the eventual putting to death, as well as the preliminary honouring and pampering, of the mock king, and is thus in conformity with the Sacaea in all respects. At Durostorum in Lower Moesia on the 20th November, A.D. 303, a Christian Roman soldier named Dasius was beheaded as a penalty for having refused to play the part of Saturnalia-king when this had fallen to him by lot; and in this context it is mentioned that, after his brief burlesque reign, Dasius's life would have been forfeit to the god if he had accepted his allotted role of the mock kingship instead of rejecting it. The Greek text of Dasius's *acta* has been published by Cumont, Franz: 'Les Actes de Saint Dasius' in *Analecta Bollandiana*, vol. xvi (1897), pp. 5-16. The bones of Saint

having honoured him and pampered him (Points 65, 66, and 67) 'they stripped him and scourged him and crucified (or hanged) him' (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀποδύσαντες καὶ μαστιγώσαντες ἐκρέμασαν).¹ Crucifixion or hanging is, as we have seen, the common fate of Jesus and the two Heracleidae (Point 70),² while the preliminary stripping³ and scourging⁴ are also mentioned in the Gospels, though not in the account of the Passion of either of the Spartan heroes. The correspondence between the extant narratives of these historical Passions and the surviving accounts of the annual celebration of 'the Reign of the Mock King' in the Babylonian festival of the Sacaea is so close that it can hardly be fortuitous.⁵ In what direction are we to look for an explanation of it?

Are we to suppose that Jesus was crucified in the role of the mock king? And, if we entertain that supposition, towards which of two possible alternative variants of it are we to incline? Is it likely that Jesus was cast for the role in earnest, and was literally the victim of a ritual murder at one of the annual celebrations of the rite in one or other of its diverse regional forms?⁶ Or is it more

Dasius now repose under the High Altar of the Church of Saint Pellegrino at Ancona, and the white marble sarcophagus in which they once rested is to be seen in the crypt of the Cathedral of the same Italian city (see Frazer, vol. cit., pp. 308-12). The rite celebrated at Durostorum at the beginning of the fourth century of the Christian Era may, of course, have been called Saturnalia by analogy, without having been derived from the genuine Roman Saturnalia as a matter of historical fact.

¹ Dio Chrysostom, op. cit., loc. cit., with reference to the Sacaea. The Greek word ἐκρέμασαν is ambiguous, since it might equally well mean either 'crucified' or 'hanged'. This murderous last act in the ritual of the Sacaea appears to have precipitated itself, in the shape of a myth, in the incident of the hanging of Haman in the Book of Esther.

² Agis is hanged; Cleomenes' corpse is crucified.

³ Matt. xxvii. 31 = Mark xv. 20 (ἐξέδυσαν).

⁴ Matt. xxvii. 26 = Mark xv. 15 (φραγελλώσας παρέδωκεν ἰνα σταυρωθῇ).

⁵ We may notice a further point of correspondence which is not recorded in our extant accounts of the ritual of the Sacaea, but which comes out in the myth of Esther and Mordecai. In the tragedy of Haman, as in the tragedies of Jesus and Cleomenes, the protagonist partakes of a banquet immediately before he meets his violent death (Esther v-vii).

⁶ The conjecture that Jesus may have been the victim of a ritual murder at some celebration of the rite of 'the Reign of the Mock King' is considered by Frazer in a note on 'the Crucifixion of Christ' in vol. cit., pp. 412-23; and the suggestion is not impugned, but is rather fortified, by the fact—of which there can be no question—that Jesus was condemned to death on religious and political grounds which, in themselves, had nothing to do with any such traditional observance. Dio Chrysostom (*Oratio* IV, § 67) tells us that, at the celebration of the Sacaea, they took, for Mock King, some prisoner who had been condemned to death already; and it is indeed evident that the doom of being conscripted to play a part that was to end so grimly in so near a future could not easily be made to fall on any man whose life was not already forfeit. In this connexion Frazer suggests (loc. cit., pp. 418-20) that the word 'Carabas', which according to Philo was the name of the gentle madman who was paraded as Mock King in the Alexandrian charade of A.D. 38, is a corruption of 'Barabbas', and that 'Barabbas' is not a name but a title. This suggestion is philologically attractive, since 'Carabas' is neither Greek nor Hebrew nor Aramaic, whereas 'Barabbas' means in Hebrew 'the Son of the Father'. On this showing, the 'Barabbas' of the Gospels (Matt. xxvii. 16 = Mark xv. 7 = Luke xxiii. 18-19 = John xviii. 40) would be a criminal of unknown name who, having already been convicted and sentenced to death, had subsequently been cast to play the ritual role of 'the Son of the Father' which, on this hypothesis, would be the traditional title of the annually sacrificed Mock King. (Frazer suggests that this title is a relic of an earlier phase in the history of the ritual in which the human victim was, not a condemned criminal, but the first-born son of the authentic king of the land, who sacrificed

probable that, if Jesus was really robed and crowned and stripped and scourged and crucified in accordance with the customary ritual of 'the Reign of the Mock King', this was not a genuine celebration of the rite but merely a parody of it, like the robing and crowning of the victim of the practical joke at Alexandria in A.D. 38?¹ Or are we to reject altogether the supposition that any of our historical heroes were authentically put to death—or crucified posthumously²—in the role of the Mock King, either in earnest or in burlesque, and to explain the apparent correspondences between the narratives of the historical Passions and the accounts of the ritual of the Sacaea by the hypothesis that the rite has precipitated itself in the shape of a myth (as, for example, in the Book of Esther) and that this myth has made its way into the narratives of the historical Passions at some stage in the literary history of these narratives when they were floating, in a plastically receptive state, in the solvent waters of the stream of 'folk-memory'?³ It will be seen that the problem is not a simple one; and in the present state of our knowledge it would be rash to attempt

his offspring to the god as a ransom for himself until a change of custom—which is perhaps commemorated in the myth of the substitution of the ram for Isaac (Gen. xxii)—reprieved the authentic king's son by substituting a less precious victim; alternatively, the title might mean 'the Son of [God] the Father', and this alternative rendering is perhaps favoured by Points 52 and 75.) According to Frazer's theory the Jews prevailed upon Pilate to release the criminal of unknown name who had thus already been cast for the part of the 'Barabbas' in the forthcoming celebration of an annual ritual murder, and to condemn Jesus to play the part in the reprieved malefactor's stead. If Jesus did die in this role, that would explain the exclamation that is attributed to the centurion in the Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Mark (Point 75).

In a critique of Frazer's theory Monsieur Salomon Reinach has pointed out (*Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, vol. i (Paris 1905, Leroux), Essay xxviii, 'Le Roi Suppliqué', pp. 339-40) that in the Armenian, the Syriac, and some of the cursive Greek versions of the Gospels 'Jesus Barabbas' appears instead of 'Barabbas' in the text of Matt. xxvii. 16-17. If this reading (which was already known to Origen) is a survival and not a corruption of the original text, it seems to hint at a vanished variant of the Gospel story in which Jesus was condemned to be put to death as 'the Barabbas' without there being any question of his being substituted for another prisoner who had previously been cast for the part.

¹ One ground for supposing that, if Jesus was put to death in the role of the Mock King, this was done in parody and not in earnest, lies in the date of the Crucifixion; for the Crucifixion took place at the time of the Jewish feast of the Passover, which is celebrated in the spring; and the date of the Passover does not coincide with that of either the Jewish or the Roman celebration of 'the Reign of the Mock King'. If Jesus was mocked by the soldiers of Herod (see Point 65), he was presumably cast by them for the role of Mock King in the Jewish festival of Purim, which falls a month earlier than the Passover (Frazer, loc. cit., pp. 414-16). On the other hand, if the mocking was perpetrated by the soldiers of Pilate (see Point 65), then Jesus was presumably cast for the role of Mock King in the Roman festival of the Saturnalia; and the Saturnalia had been celebrated in December (Frazer, loc. cit., p. 413) since the shifting of the Roman New Year's day from the 1st March to the 1st January in the year 45 B.C. The dates thus tell in favour of the view that the treatment to which Jesus was subjected after his condemnation to death was not part of a genuine celebration of 'the Reign of the Mock King', but was a parody of a familiar ritual which the soldiers improvised, on the spur of the moment, as a sinister practical joke, in allusion to the fact that the offence for which Jesus had been condemned to death by the Jewish ecclesiastical court was his claim—to which he had pleaded guilty (Point 52)—to be the Son of God. It will be seen that in this variant of Frazer's theory there is nothing that is inconsistent with the story of the Passion as this is told in the Gospels.

² As was done with the corpse of Cleomenes.

³ 'This third alternative seems the most likely.'—Professor Gilbert Murray.

to decide between the several alternative possible solutions of it. In this place we may be content with a general conclusion that has a bearing upon our present inquiry; and this is that ritual, as well as myth, is in all probability one of the common sources from which identical elements have flowed, along separate channels of 'folk-memory', into the story of Jesus on the one hand and the stories of our pagan historical heroes on the other.

The Life and Death of Socrates

Ritual and myth would appear to embrace, between them, almost all the possible common sources of which we have to take account. And, if we have thus disposed of the first of our two categories of explanation, we may now turn to the other. We have still to consider whether at least some residue of the correspondences that we are studying may be traceable, not to the influence of some common mythical or ritual source upon each and all of the stories in which our correspondences appear, but rather to the influence of one story upon another.

Is the hypothesis that the story of one historical hero may have influenced the story of another a promising explanation *a priori*? This question appears to be answered in the affirmative by the presence, in the story of Jesus, of a number of elements that wear the appearance of being derived from the story of Socrates; for our extant accounts of the life and death of the Athenian sage are the work of Athenian men-of-letters who were Socrates' contemporaries and associates; they were written from first-hand acquaintance by sophisticated authors at a time and in a place and about a person that were all clearly lit up by the dry light of a mental atmosphere of rationalism; and although, no doubt, it might be imprudent to accept as authentic, *a priori*, all the acts, and *a fortiori* all the words, that are attributed to Socrates by Xenophon and Plato, it would on the other hand be reasonable to suppose that the element of fiction—if such there should prove to be—in the Platonic and Xenophontean picture of the two Athenian writers' common Master is the personal invention of the artists by whom the picture has been painted, and is not a deposit of traditional myth or ritual which might have found its way into the picture of Jesus likewise along some independent channel. If, therefore, certain features of the Platonic and Xenophontean picture of Socrates do reappear in the Gospels, we may reasonably infer that the portrait painted in Attica in the fifth century B.C. is the original which, in these points, has inspired the portrait painted in Palestine in the first century of the Christian Era.

This inference will not, of course, commit us to making the

highly improbable assumption that the authors of the Gospels were copying directly either from Plato or Xenophon themselves or from any later works of Hellenic literature in which the original contemporary Athenian picture of Socrates may have been reproduced at second hand. While the authors of the Gospels were manifestly familiar with the Jewish Scriptures, there is no evidence that any of them were acquainted with the pagan literature of the circumambient Hellenic World; and, when Socratic or other pagan Hellenic literary *motifs* do make their appearance in the Evangelists' work, we must suppose that these have not been copied direct from any literary source but have seeped in through the subterranean channel of 'folk-lore' after having first percolated down from the sophisticated upper mental stratum of the Dominant Minority to the more primitive lower mental level of the Proletariat. In other words, any historical extraneous elements that may have found their way into the Gospels are likely to have come in through the same door as any extraneous elements of a ritual or mythical origin, though this common entrance may be the only thing in common between these different kinds of intrusive foreign matter.¹

Let us try to make a survey of the features in the portrait of Jesus that also appear in the portrait of Socrates, before attempting to estimate whether some, at least, of the correspondences between the portrait of Jesus and the portraits of our eleven Spartan and Roman and futurist heroes may be attributable—as the Socratic elements in the Gospels would appear to be—to the influence of the story of one historical hero upon the story of another historical hero of a later date.

(α) *Before reaching the age of manhood the hero wins his spurs in a disputation with some of the foremost living wits of an older generation.*

Socrates' disputation with Parmenides and Zeno (Plato: *Parmenides*), like Jesus's disputation with the doctors of the Jewish Law in the Temple at Jerusalem (Luke ii. 40-52), gives a foretaste of the hero's future spiritual prowess. Socrates is described (Plato: *Parmenides*, 127 c) as being 'extremely young' (σφόδρα νέον) at the time, and Jesus as being twelve years old (Luke ii. 42). Parmenides

¹ There is a certain *a priori* probability that the story of Jesus may have attracted to itself elements of 'folk-lore' that have been derived from the story of Socrates, because there is a real and deep affinity between the respective roles of Socrates and Jesus in the spiritual history of the Hellenic World, so that Socratic traits would readily harmonize with the character of the protagonist in the drama of the Gospels. The parallelism between the spiritual movements that were originated by Socrates and by Jesus respectively is strikingly displayed in tabular form by P. E. More in *The Greek Tradition from the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon: 399 B.C.-451 A.D.*, vol. iv: *Christ the Word* (Princeton 1927, University Press), p. 138.

and Zeno are represented (Plato: *Parmenides*, 130 A) as being delighted at Socrates' intellectual eagerness, as Jesus's interlocutors in the Temple are represented as being 'astonished at his understanding and answers' (Luke ii. 47).¹

(β) *The hero is recognized and accepted by a forerunner as the latter's successor and superior* (= Point 6).

The recognition of Jesus by John the Baptist has a Socratic analogue in the recognition of Socrates by Protagoras. 'There is something about you', says Protagoras to Socrates, 'that I have mentioned to quite a number of people. I have told them that, of all the people whom I come across, I admire you far the most and far and away the most among the people of your own age. And I go farther than that. I tell them that I should not be surprised if you were to become one of the World's famous sages' (Plato: *Protagoras*, 361 E; compare *Parmenides*, 130 A and 135 D).

(γ) *The hero is proclaimed by the voice of God to be unique among Mankind.*

The designation of Jesus as the Son of God by a voice from Heaven immediately after his baptism by John (Matt. iii. 17 =

¹ Dr. Martin Braun has drawn the writer's attention to the fact that this Socratic trait of an intellectual precocity which is instantly recognized, and generously acknowledged, by the intellectual leaders of the older generation reappears not only in the Gospel according to Saint Luke but also in Josephus's *Autobiography*, §§ 8-9. 'I made great and fruitful progress in my education and gained a reputation for pre-eminence in power of memory and in understanding [*συνέεσις*, the word applied in Luke ii. 47 to the boy Jesus, and in Josephus's own *Ancient History of the Jewish People*, Book II, § 230, to the boy Moses]. While I was still only an adolescent (*ἀρτίμας*), about fourteen years old, I was praised by everybody for my devotion to sound learning, and the chief priests and notables of the city were constantly meeting to consult me on some fine point of the Law.'

Dr. Braun goes on to point out two other correspondences between Josephus's *Autobiography* and the story of the Gospels:

The hero's genealogy is recited [= Point 3] with intent to vindicate for the hero a royal lineage [= Point 2] (*Autobiography*, §§ 1-6).

The hero goes into temporary retreat in the Wilderness, as the disciple of an ascetic anchorite who seeks purity through ablutions of cold water [|| Point 6, with the part played by John the Baptist towards Jesus being played towards Josephus by Baunus] (*Autobiography*, § 11, cited in this Study already in III. C (ii) (b), vol. iii, p. 294, footnote 3, above; see further Rasp, H.: 'Josephus und die jüdischen Religionsparteien' in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, vol. xxiii (1924), pp. 34-5).

In regard to these three correspondences between the story of Jesus and the *Autobiography* of Josephus, Dr. Braun observes: 'Josephus was born at about the time of Jesus's death. His *Autobiography*—that is to say, his 'auto-myth'—thus falls within the period in which the Jesus-myth of the primitive Christian community crystallized. It is a striking fact that the Jesus-biography (or myth) coincides with the Josephus-biography in certain characteristic features. This points to a common pattern (*Grundmodell*), either in the psychological or in the literary sense, to which the 'genius' of the religious, or of any other, order had to conform. Two, at any rate, out of the three points of correspondence here in question [i.e. the encounter with the doctors when the hero is still a boy, and the visit to the anchorite when he is on the threshold of maturity] belong to the realm of romance, legend, myth. It is highly significant that the underlying motif of [the 'precocity' point of correspondence between the story of Jesus and the *Autobiography* of Josephus] should also make its appearance again in the Josephan legend of Moses.'

Mark i. 11 = Luke iii. 22) has a Socratic analogue in the Pythia's answer in the negative to Chaerephon's question whether there is anybody who is wiser than Socrates¹ (Plato: *Apology*, 21 A; Xenophon: *Apology*, §§ 14-15).

N.B. According to Xenophon, loc. cit., Socrates, when he told the story of Chaerephon's question and the Pythia's answer in court, did not fail to point out that the Delphic Apollo was reputed to have paid a much higher tribute to Lycurgus. 'As Lycurgus was entering the temple, the god is said to have addressed him with the words: "I am wondering whether to call you god or man", whereas he did not liken *me* to a god, though he did single me out as being head and shoulders above my fellow men.' For a fuller version of the story of Apollo and Lycurgus, in which the oracle is rendered in verse, see Herodotus, Book I, chap. 65.

(δ) *The hero inveighs against the powers that be* (= Point 7).

Jesus's denunciations of the Scribes and Pharisees have a Socratic analogue in Socrates' exposure of the sophistry of the Sophists.

(ε) *In his domestic life the hero takes hardship and good cheer as they come, and shows himself capable of standing extremes of either of them without turning a hair* (|| Point 13).

During the Athenian siege of Potidaea, Socrates goes barefoot in the frost and snow of a Thracian winter (Plato: *Symposium*, 219 E-220 D); at Agathon's drinking-party he sits the night out and keeps a clear head, after every one else—including the host and even Aristophanes—has succumbed (Plato: *Symposium*, 223 B-D).

(ζ) *By his refusal to go to extremes of asceticism—which he combines with a readiness to keep company with people of all sorts and conditions—the hero causes scandal* (= Point 14).

As Jesus scandalizes the Pharisees by keeping company with Publicans and Sinners, so Socrates scandalizes the Democrats by having kept company with Oligarchs: that is to say, with well-connected or well-to-do young men who have eventually come out as Oligarchs when the débâcle of Athens at the end of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. has opened the way for the establishment of the terroristic régime of 'the Thirty Tyrants'.

¹ The parliamentary formula—'the answer is in the negative'—in which the Pythia's response is couched according to Plato, has been transposed into a positive form and been put into verse—*ἀνδρῶν ἀπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος*—in the later version of the story as this appears in Diogenes Laertius: *De Vitis Philosophorum*, Book II, § 37. This versification of the oracle is also found in the expanded form:

σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης,
ἀνδρῶν δὲ παντῶν Σωκράτης σοφώτατος.

(η) *The hero is publicly declared by one of his disciples to have within him something divine* (= Point 15).

Peter's acclamation of Jesus as the Son of the Living God (Matt. xvi. 16, echoed in John vi. 69, and xi. 27) has a Socratic analogue in Alcibiades' acclamation of Socrates:

'You may take it from me that not one of you knows Socrates, so I am going to reveal him to you. . . . Doesn't he look like a regular Silenus? Of course he is the very image of one; but that is the outer shell, just as it is with your Silenus when he is a work of the sculptor's art. Open this Socrates-Silenus and look inside, and you will find that he is packed with saintliness (σωφροσύνη). . . . He regards all mundane values as valueless and ourselves—let me tell you—as naught. In his intercourse with his fellow men he wears this perpetual mask of simplicity and whimsicality (εἰρωνευόμενος καὶ παίζων . . . διατελεῖ). But sometimes he turns serious and comes open; and I wonder if any of you have seen the figures [of the Gods] inside him which become visible then. I *have* had some glimpses of them, and the effulgence of their divine glory was so amazingly beautiful that I found—to put it in a word—that I had to do just whatever Socrates told me' (Plato: *Symposium*, 216 D-E).

(θ) *The hero claims to be divinely inspired.*

The 'inner voice' which Socrates attributes to a supernatural mentor (δαίμόνιον) is comparable to the Holy Spirit with which Jesus is possessed (Matt. iv. 1 = Mark i. 12 = Luke iv. 1).

(ι) *The hero refrains on principle from trying to evade the operation of the Law of the Land* (= Point 46).¹

As Jesus refrains from attempting to resist arrest, so Socrates declines to make his escape from prison by flight (Plato: *Crito*, *passim*; cf. Xenophon: *Apology*, § 23), or from life by suicide (Plato: *Phaedo*, 61 C-62 E).

(κ) *The hero is brought to trial* (= Point 49).

Socrates is brought to trial before a regular Athenian jury, Jesus before an improvised Jewish ecclesiastical court.

(λ) *A true saying of the hero's is dishonestly twisted by his enemies into a misrepresentation which is extremely damaging to him* (= Point 50).

Socrates has averred that a god's voice speaks to him and signifies to him what he ought to do (θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται σημαίνουσα ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν); Melētus indicts Socrates on a charge of being guilty of not recognizing the gods that are recognized by the

¹ See also V. C (i) (d) 3, vol. v, p. 404, above.

state while introducing new-fangled divinities and corrupting the younger generation (ὥς οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομῶσι, ἕτερα δὲ καὶνὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρει καὶ τοὺς νεοὺς διαφθείρει) (Xenophon: *Apology*, §§ 10-13; compare Plato: *Apology*, 24 B-27 E).

(μ) *The hero on trial is reproved by the jurors for contempt of court* (= Point 51).¹

In one passage of his defence Socrates tells the jury that he intends to obey the dictates of his conscience even at the cost of his life, and that, if they were to offer to acquit him on condition that he should renounce the pursuit of philosophy, he would answer, with all respect, that he proposed to obey God rather than them² and that he would never give his philosophy up so long as any life and strength were left in him. 'Gentlemen of the jury,' he would say, 'you may do what you will. You may find in favour of Anytus or against him; you may acquit me or convict me; but you may as well know that I am not going to mend my ways—no, not even if I am to die a thousand deaths.' At this point Socrates' speech was interrupted by an uproar among the jurors (Plato: *Apology*, 28 B-30 C).

(ν) *When a question is put to the hero which offers him a possible line of retreat, the hero does not take the opening, but gives, instead, an answer that is calculated to exasperate the Court more than anything else that he could conceivably have said* (= Point 52).

The law at Athens was that, when a prisoner on trial had been found guilty by the Court, the prosecutor should table an assessment of the penalty and the prisoner a counter-assessment, and that the Court should then opt between the two assessments. After the Court had found Socrates guilty, Melétus proposed the death penalty; and in this situation the politic course for Socrates, if he were bent upon saving his life, was to make some counter-proposal which, while falling short of the death penalty, would be sufficiently drastic to have a chance of being accepted by the Court as a suitable alternative. So far from taking this line, Socrates virtually ensured that the Court should opt for Melétus's assessment—i.e. for the death penalty—by telling them that, if he was to make a counter-assessment that corresponded to his true deserts, he must assess himself to the penalty of being maintained at the public expense as a veteran benefactor of the community (Plato: *Apology*, 36 B-E; cf. Xenophon: *Apology*, § 23).

¹ See also V. C (i) (d) 3, vol. v, p. 404, above.

² πείσομαι . . . μάλλον τῷ Θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν (Plato: *Apology*, 29 D). Compare Acts v. 29: 'We ought to obey God rather than men' (πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ Θεῷ μάλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις). For this verbal correspondence see further p. 534, below.

(ξ) *On the strength of the hero's answer the Court immediately passes sentence of death upon him (= Point 53).*

The Athenian Court sentences Socrates to death; the Jewish Court, Jesus.

(ο) *A tableau of the hero holding a death-cup, with a small party of intimate companions grouped round him.*

Socrates literally drank his death out of a cup (Plato: *Phaedo*, 116 c-117 c), because at Athens in Socrates' day the statutory way of inflicting the death penalty was to administer a cup of deadly poison;² and in Plato's *Phaedo* (loc. cit.) this act is commemorated visually in a tableau of the hero holding the poison-cup in his hand in a room in which he is surrounded by his intimate friends. In the Ager Romanus in Jesus's day the statutory way of inflicting the death penalty upon malefactors who were not Roman citizens was not by poisoning but by crucifixion; and this was the death that Jesus actually died according to the Gospels. The tableau of the hero holding the cup in the midst of his friends does, however, occur in the Synoptic Gospels in the scene of the institution of the Communion-Rite of the Christian Church (Point 29 = Matt. xxvi. 27-9 = Mark xiv. 23-5 = Luke xxii. 19-20); and in the Passion of Jesus, as in that of Socrates, this scene is placed just before the hero's death. Moreover there is a connexion between the hero's death and the hero's cup in the story of Jesus as well as in the story of Socrates; for, though Jesus does not meet his death, as Socrates meets his, by drinking the cup, which in Jesus's hands contains not poison but wine, this wine is presented by Jesus to his companions as his own sacrificial blood. There are, of course, two signal differences between the Communion Chalice and the Hemlock Cup. While the Hemlock Cup is drunk by the hero himself, the Chalice is administered by the hero to his companions;³

¹ In the picture given by Plato fifteen of those present, including *Phaedo*, are named (*Phaedo*, 59 B-C), and it is mentioned that there were also several others; in the picture in the Gospels the party consists of the Twelve Apostles.

² The poison was hemlock, and the poisonous herb was grated up in a cup of water and was administered to the victim in this liquid form.

³ In the Gospels the death-cup that is drunk by the hero himself does occur more than once, but each time metaphorically and not 'in real life'. Jesus uses this simile first in his answer to the petition of the mother of the Sons of Zebedee (Matt. xx. 22-3 = Mark x. 38-40), and for the second time during the Agony (Point 36 = Matt. xxvi. 39 = Mark xiv. 36 = Luke xxii. 42). The simile is also placed in Jesus's mouth in the narrative of the Passion in the Gospel according to Saint John (xviii. 11), but here not in the context of the Agony (Point 36) but in the adoration with which he commands Peter to stop fighting (Point 45). This image of drinking a cup in the metaphorical sense of having an experience is presumably part of the legacy to the New Testament from the Old Testament, which the Evangelists knew by heart, and in which the use of the image is common. In the Old Testament, however, the simile does not appear ever to be used with reference to the particular experience of dying, and not even invariably with reference to experiences that are unpleasant. There is, of course, the obvious metaphor of draining a cup to the bitter dregs (Isa. li. 17; Ps. lxxiii. 10; Ps. lxxv.

and, while both cups are fraught with death for the hero himself, the Chalice imparts the sacrificial victim's spiritual life to those who are given to drink of it. Here we have a conspicuous example of one significant feature in our collection of correspondences that has been pointed out at the beginning of this Annex.¹ The old bottles of Hellenism are made use of by Christianity for holding its new wine. A *motif* or incident or tableau or saying is taken over into the story of Jesus out of one of the stories of the pagan Hellenic heroes, but, in the act of being taken over, it is given a new meaning—almost as though the old pagan form were being employed deliberately as a foil to bring out the newness of the Christian content.

(π) *When the hero is in articulo mortis, the friends who are with him weep—not for the hero, but for themselves because they are losing him—and then the hero tells them to restrain their tears* (= Point 68).

‘Up to this point, most of us had been fairly successful in stopping ourselves from crying; but, when we saw him drinking and then holding the empty cup, we could no longer bear it; and for my part my utmost efforts could not prevent the tears from flowing in floods. So I buried my face in my coat and wept for—myself, for it was certainly not for Socrates that I was weeping (ἀπέκλαον—ἐμαυτόν, οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε [compare Xenophon: *Hellenica*, Book II, chap. 2, § 3: οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀπολωλότας πενθοῦντες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἔτι αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς (referring to the reception, by the people of Athens, of the news of the disaster at Aegospotami) and Luke xxiii. 28: μὴ κλαίετε ἐπ’ ἐμέ, πλὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτὰς κλαίετε]). I was bewailing my own cruel fate in losing a man who was such an incomparable friend. Crito broke down even before I did, and, when he found that he could not stop his tears from flowing, he got up and went out. And then there was Apollodôrus, who had never stopped crying, even before, and who now burst out into a veritable roar of weeping and lamentation which overcame everybody else in the room except Socrates himself, who now remonstrated with us. ‘My dear good people,’ he exclaimed, ‘what a dreadful exhibition! Why, this was one of my reasons for sending

8); and we also find ‘the cup of fury’ (Isa. li. 17 (cf. Zech. xii. 2); Jer. xxv. 15) and ‘the cup of astonishment and desolation’ (Ezek. xxiii. 31–4). No doubt this usage of the simile in the Old Testament accounts for ‘the wine of the wrath of God’ and ‘the cup of his indignation’ and ‘the cup of the wine of the fierceness of his wrath’ in the Book of Revelation (xiv. 10, and xvi. 19). At the same time the ‘portion of their cup’ in the Old Testament is not invariably ‘snares, fire and brimstone, and an horrible tempest’ (Ps. xi. 6). While the dregs may be the punishment of the wicked, the wine itself may be the reward of the good (Ps. lxxv. 8). And when ‘my cup runneth over’ (Ps. xxiii. 5), this is manifestly ‘the cup of consolation’ (Jer. xvi. 7) or ‘the cup of salvation’ (Ps. cxv. 13).

¹ Cf. p. 377, above.

the women away; I was afraid of their misbehaving just like this. I fancy I have heard that one ought to be allowed to die in peace. Do, please, keep quiet and control yourselves' (Plato: *Phaedo*, 117 C-E).

(ρ) *In laying down his life, the hero demonstrates, by a triumphant response to the severest possible ordeal, that Righteousness has a supreme intrinsic value.*

It is commonly supposed that Plato had in mind his Master Socrates' life and death when—in the course of an essay (*Respublica*, 360 E–362 C) in distilling Righteousness and Unrighteousness, for purposes of comparison, in their pure and undiluted essence—he puts into the mouth of 'those who commend Unrighteousness as preferable to Righteousness' a famous prognostic¹ of the Righteous Man's end:

'They will say this: that the Righteous Man (ὁ δίκαιος), being what he is, will be scourged and racked and shackled and will have his eyes seared out with red-hot irons and finally will be impaled after having gone through every lesser torture—to discover, on the stake, that the right aim to set oneself is not to be righteous but to pretend to be' (Plato: *Respublica*, 361 E).

An echo of this passage of Plato may be caught, by an attentive ear, in a tirade against the Righteous Man which is put into the mouth of 'the ungodly in deed and word' in a post-Alexandrine work of Jewish literature (Wisdom ii. 12–20):²

'Let us set an ambush for the Righteous Man (ἐνεδρεύσωμεν τὸν δίκαιον) because he is a nuisance to us. . . . He claims to possess the knowledge of God (γνώσων ἔχειν Θεοῦ) and calls himself the Child of the Lord (Παῖδα Κυρίου).³ He has shown up the thoughts of our hearts (ἐγένητο ἡμῖν εἰς ἔλεγχον ἐννοιῶν ἡμῶν).⁴ The very sight of him is tiresome to us, because his life is unlike other lives and his tracks are out of the ordinary run. In his estimation we are counterfeit, and he shuns our paths as though they were dirt. He extols a hyperbole of Righteousness and pretends to have God for his father (ἀλαζονεύεται⁵ πατέρα Θεόν). Let

¹ Cited already in this Study in V. C (ii) (a), p. 275, above.

² Eduard Meyer's observations, in *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 39–40, on the way in which the Jewish philosophical literature of the Post-Alexandrine Age was affected by Hellenism, are pertinent to the case of the Book of Wisdom, though they are made apropos of the Book of Ecclesiastes.

³ See Point 75, and compare Plato: *Apology*, 27 C–D: Εἰ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δῆπου . . . τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; Since Socrates himself used the term δαιμόνιον to describe his supernatural mentor (Point (θ) above), it would almost seem to follow that Socrates accepted Alcibiades' declaration (Point (η) above) that there was something divine inside him.—A.J.T.

⁴ Cf. Plato: *Apology*, 21 B–23 B, especially 23 A: οἴονται γὰρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἢ ἄν ἄλλον ἐξελέγω.—A.J.T.

⁵ Cf. Aristophanes: *Birds*, ll. 824–5—οἱ θεοὶ τοὺς γηγενεῖς / ἀλαζονεύόμενοι καθυπερηκόντισαν—quoted in V. C (i) (d) 11, Annex I, pp. 353–4, above.—A.J.T.

us see if his doctrines are true, and let us experiment with his exit. If the Righteous Man really *is* the Son of God (Υἱὸς Θεοῦ), then God will take his part and will deliver him from the hands of opponents.¹ So let us test him with contumely and torture, that we may know his goodness and may verify his long-sufferingness. Let us sentence him to a sordid death. According to his own doctrines, he will be looked after [by God].'

This passage of the Book of Wisdom has a near relationship with another work of Jewish literature of the same age, the Twenty-Second Psalm. Indeed, the affinity is so close that this Psalm could almost be inserted into the text of the Book of Wisdom—as the Righteous Man's cry of agony when his ungodly adversaries carry out their nefarious design—without the reader's being aware that this piece was an interpolation. And it is manifest that both passages have coloured the description, in the Synoptic Gospels, of the mocking of Jesus on the Cross (Point 72 = Matt. xxvii. 39-44 = Mark xv. 29-32 = Luke xxiii. 35-7 and 39).² In this connexion we may recall the incident of the hailing of Jesus by the centurion when Jesus is hanging dead on the Cross (Point 75); for the Lucan variant on the Marcan and Matthaean formula—'Certainly this was a righteous man' (ὅντως ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος δίκαιος ἦν) in place of 'Truly this was the Son of God' (ἀληθῶς Θεοῦ Υἱὸς ἦν οὗτος)—reproduces, as we now see, the title under which the hero is introduced in the passage that we have quoted from the Republic as well as in the corresponding passage of the Book of Wisdom, while in the Book of Wisdom the Marcan and Matthaean formula—'the Son of God'—is also to be found as a description of a status to which the Righteous Man lays claim. The same status is perhaps implicitly claimed by Socrates, too, according to the Platonic version of his *Apology*,³ not indeed for himself, but for the supernatural mentor who speaks to him through an 'inner voice'.

(α) *The hero is better appreciated by foreigners than by his own countrymen.*

As Christianity takes root outside Jewry, among the Gentiles, so the teaching of the Attic philosopher Socrates is propagated by Theban and Phliasian Pythagoreans and by Megarian Eleatics. Of the fifteen disciples of Socrates who are mentioned by name as having been present at his death,⁴ no less than seven are non-Athenians.⁵

¹ Cf. Matt. xxvii. 43 (see p. 421, above).—A.J.T.

² For the influence of Ps. xxii, as well as the Book of Wisdom, on the account of this incident in the Synoptic Gospels see the present Annex, pp. 421-2, above.

³ See p. 494, footnote 3, above.

⁴ See p. 492, footnote 1, above.

⁵ See Burnet, J.: *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato* (London 1914, Macmillan), pp. 151-3.

An Egyptian Bridge between Laconia and Galilee

If a memory of the life and death of Socrates has coloured the story of Jesus to the extent that appears to be indicated by the foregoing survey, we may infer that there is no *a priori* impossibility, or even improbability, in the hypothesis that the same story may also have been coloured in some degree by memories of the lives and deaths of other Hellenic heroes who lived and died in the period intervening between the date of the judicial murder of Socrates in 399 B.C. and the date of the Crucifixion. If we have succeeded in showing that this hypothesis is not ruled out in advance by any insuperable objections, our next step will be to explore the possible ways and means through which the impression made by the careers of our Spartan and Roman and futurist heroes upon the minds of contemporaries of their own kin and kind may have been transmitted to the minds in which—in a different social milieu and in a later age—the story of Jesus took the shape of the four Gospels.

Let us begin by reconnoitring one possible 'geopolitical' way along which the memories of the two Heracleidae, at any rate, may have travelled to Galilee from Laconia, and then examine two possible cultural means, one in a verbal medium and the other in a visual.

If we begin by asking ourselves what was the principal meeting place of Jews and Greeks at all times within the long Time-span during which the Syriac and Hellenic worlds were in contact with one another, we shall not hesitate to answer 'Egypt'. On Egyptian soil Greek and Jewish soldiers of fortune had begun to rub shoulders in the common service of the lords of the land as early as the seventh century B.C.; and a Graeco-Jewish intercourse which had thus begun in Egyptian cantonments under the régime of an indigenous Egyptiac dynasty whose home and capital was at Sais was still going on, four hundred years later, under the régime of an alien dynasty, of Macedonian Greek origin, which had installed itself at Alexandria. In the third century B.C. the structure of the Ptolemaic Empire with its metropolitan territory in Egypt and its outlying dependencies round the eastern and northern coasts of the Levant embraced both the Jewish temple-state of Jerusalem, which formed part of the Ptolemaic province of Coele Syria, and the Greek kingdom of Lacedaemon, which was one of the Ptolemaic Government's dependent allies in Continental European Greece; and there is some evidence that in this age Jerusalem and Sparta were already in direct diplomatic relations with one another.¹

¹ When the by then independent prince of Judaea, Jonathan Maccabaeus, sent an

The next chapter in this story opens with the refugee Spartan king Cleomenes' arrival at Alexandria in 222 B.C. One of the reasons why Cleomenes was eventually interned by the Ministers of Ptolemy IV Philopator was because of Cleomenes' prestige and influence among the mercenaries of Peloponnesian and Cretan origin in the Ptolemaic service who were stationed at Alexandria. The perhaps dangerously powerful hold which the Spartan exile possessed over these important troops had been brought to the Prime Minister Sosibius's notice by Cleomenes himself when—in a political crisis in which Cleomenes had been taken into the Ptolemaic Government's confidence—Cleomenes had offered to go bail to Sosibius for the loyalty of these troops.

"Don't you see", Cleomenes had said, "that there are nearly 3,000 mercenaries from the Peloponnese and about a thousand Cretans, and that I have only to nod to them in order to make them spring forward to do their duty like one man? And, with these troops solidly supporting you, what other troops are you terrified of? It must be the soldiers from Syria and Caria that are giving you bad dreams!"¹

There is no reason to question the authenticity of this incident, which is credible in itself and is reported on the good authority of Polybius; but if it is authentic it is illuminating; for the Spartan hero who already enjoyed this prestige among these troops at a time when he was nothing more than a romantic exile must have completed his conquest of their hearts and minds in the tragic act of his death. And, even if the Ptolemaic Government did succeed, by a deft combination of repression and propaganda, in driving underground an incipient worship of the dead Cleomenes among the populace of Alexandria,² we may guess that the dead Spartan hero's admirers among the Peloponnesian and Cretan soldiery

embassy to Sparta in 145 B.C., he appended to the note which was to be presented to the Lacedaemonian Government by his envoys a document which purported to be a copy of a letter written by King Areus of Sparta (*regnabat* 309/8–265/4 B.C.) to his contemporary the High Priest Onias of Jerusalem. This letter alluded to an alleged historical discovery of a blood-brotherhood between the Spartans and the Jews in virtue of a common descent from Abraham; and, on the strength of this, it proposed a political and economic *entente* between the Lacedaemonian and Hierosolymitan states. This 'letter from Areus' is to be found in the account of Jonathan Maccabaeus's embassy to Sparta in the First Book of Maccabees xii. 21–3, and it has been incorporated, from this source, by Josephus into his *Antiquities*, Book XII, chap. 4, § 10, where the same text will be found transposed into a more elegant style of Greek. As it stands, the document can hardly be genuine, but there is probably some historical fact behind it (on this question see Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 30–1). The legend of the common ancestry of the two peoples turns up again in the Second Book of Maccabees v. 9, apropos of an appeal for support which the High Priest Jason made to Sparta, among other states, after his fall in 170 B.C. (Meyer, op. cit., loc. cit.). It may be noted that King Cleomenes III was King Areus' first cousin once removed (see the genealogical table in Beloch, J.: *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd ed., vol. iv, part 2 (Berlin and Leipzig 1927, de Gruyter), p. 163).

¹ Polybius, Book V, chap. 36.

² For this interpretation of Plutarch: *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 60, see pp. 479–80, above.

silently rendered to him the divine honours which it was their official duty to render to their living paymaster Philopator.

What happened to these 4,000 Greek soldiers of fortune who were stationed in Egypt at the time when the last act of the tragedy of Cleomenes was played at Alexandria in 219 B.C.? We know something of their subsequent history because the year which witnessed Cleomenes' death also saw the launching of a Seleucid war of aggression against the Ptolemaic possessions on the Asiatic mainland; and this formidable threat to Ptolemy Philopator's empire from Antiochus the Great moved Ptolemy's Ministers to take drastic measures for reinforcing and strengthening the Ptolemaic military forces.¹ In the first place they recalled, and concentrated at Alexandria, all the mercenary troops that had previously been stationed in the Ptolemaic Empire's overseas possessions.² In the second place they recruited fresh mercenaries—and these in numbers sufficient to bring up to 8,000 men the total force of mercenaries that they were eventually able to put into the field. In the third place they broke up all the existing formations and organized the men in entirely new *cadres*. Finally, after having spent two years on these preparations, they ventured at last, in 217 B.C., to meet Antiochus in the field, and they inflicted on him a signal defeat at Raphia. Antiochus's discomfiture was so decisive that he immediately evacuated all his conquests in Coele Syria, and the liberated territories were promptly reoccupied by Ptolemy and regarrisoned.³ It is safe to assume that the new Ptolemaic garrisons in Coele Syria were in considerable strength; that they were drawn entirely from the mercenary element in the Ptolemaic Army;⁴ and that, in consequence of the thorough-going reorganization of the Ptolemaic forces before the Battle of Raphia, these garrisons must have included some of the 4,000 Peloponnesian and Cretan mercenaries who had been stationed in Egypt in 219 B.C., together with elements from the outlying garrisons which had been recalled to Alexandria in that year, as well as with elements subsequently recruited.

¹ What follows is stated on the authority of Polybius, Book V, chaps. 62–5.

² Were these 'the soldiers from Syria and Caria' to whom Cleomenes had referred so scornfully? In itself the phrase is ambiguous. In the light of the context the most natural way of interpreting it is as meaning 'soldiers of Syrian and Carian origin who were stationed in Egypt'; but alternatively it might mean 'soldiers stationed in Syria and Caria'.

³ For this sequel to the Battle of Raphia see Polybius, Book V, chaps. 86–7.

⁴ The Ptolemaic Government's practice seems to have been to employ mercenaries for their garrisons outside Egypt, and not to exact garrison duty overseas from the Phalanx, which was a militia recruited originally from military settlers, of Greek origin, in Egypt, and latterly (since the crisis of 219–217 B.C.) from native Egyptians as well. (For the composition of the Ptolemaic garrisons in the outlying dependencies of the Empire see Griffith, G. T.: *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge 1935, University Press), pp. 131–5.)

If these inferences are warranted, two conclusions follow with regard to the history of the cult of Cleomenes between 219 and 217 B.C. The first is that the devotees of Cleomenes among the original 4,000 Peloponnesian and Cretan mercenaries who had been stationed in Egypt would now have every opportunity of imparting their own feeling for the dead hero to their new comrades in arms. The second inference is that the cult of Cleomenes among the troops would now be carried from Alexandria to the garrison-towns in Coele Syria by the new mixed units of mercenary soldiers in the Ptolemaic service which were stationed in these cantonments in and after 217 B.C.

Can we go farther? If 'the soldiers from Syria and Caria' who were recalled to Alexandria in 219 B.C. were native recruits from those regions, and not Greek soldiers who had simply been stationed there, the new Ptolemaic garrisons planted in Coele Syria in 217 B.C. may have included not only some of Cleomenes' Peloponnesian and Cretan devotees but also some soldiers of Syrian nationality (e.g. Judaeans and Galilaean Gentiles).¹ And here we see a possible point of cultural contact between the dominant minority and the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Society of the day.² Did these mixed Ptolemaic garrisons which lay in Coele Syria in and after 217 B.C. serve as incubators in which a new *motif* of Syriac folk-lore was hatched out of a Hellenic cult of an historical Spartan hero whose recent Passion was still a poignant memory in the souls of fellow soldiers who were also his fellow Greeks?

Farther than this it is hardly possible to go; for we have no record of what happened to the Ptolemaic garrisons in Coele Syria in and after 202 B.C., when Antiochus swooped down upon the coveted province for the second time, avenged his defeat of 217 B.C. at Raphia by an equally decisive victory at Panium,³ and then annexed the former possessions of the Ptolemaic Empire in Syria to the Seleucid Empire once for all. Did Ptolemy's mercenary garrisons come to terms with the Seleucid invader and purchase his permission to remain in their quarters by going over to his service? Or did they withdraw to Egypt, as their predecessors had

¹ The Galilaean were still Gentiles at this time and were to remain Gentiles for more than a hundred years to come. They only became Jews through their forcible conversion to Judaism by their Maccabean conqueror Alexander Jannaeus (*regnabat* 102-76 B.C.) (see II. D (iii), vol. ii, pp. 73-4, and the present Annex, in the present volume, p. 478, above). The point is important because the Galilaean, so long as they remained non-Jews, may be reasonably presumed to have been as receptively inclined towards Hellenic culture as other non-Jewish Syrians demonstrably were.

² The Greek soldiers of fortune who played so large a part in the social life of the Hellenic World during the two and a half centuries following the close of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. were the first contingent of broken men from whom the Hellenic internal proletariat was recruited (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 61-4, above).

³ The Battle of Panium was fought *circa* 200/198 B.C.

withdrawn in 219 B.C.? And, if they withdrew, did they leave any legacy of ritual or myth behind them among the local population with whom they had been living cheek by jowl for the past fifteen years?

These are questions to which we do not know the answers;¹ but the mere fact that we have been able to ask them means that we have stumbled upon a possible road along which the legend of Cleomenes—and, with it, the inseparably associated legend of Agis—may have made its way from Laconia through Alexandria to Galilee of the Gentiles, as the legend of Hêrâklês undoubtedly did make its way from its place of incubation in Greece to Galilee's next-door neighbour Tyre.

A Verbal Means of Conveyance

One of the forms in which we meet with the correspondences that we are studying is an assonance of words, and even of whole phrases or sentences, which sometimes amounts to an almost exact identity. Is there any obvious means of conveyance by which these common words might have found their way from one to another of the different contexts in which they are now embedded?

In attempting to answer this question, we may begin by observing that the genres of literary composition that are represented by the Gospels and by their sources—so far as these sources can be reconstructed—are categories which had already become well established in pagan Greek literature long before the Gospels were written, and which are likewise represented in the works of Plutarch, a pagan Hellenic man-of-letters who was approximately a contemporary of the authors of the two Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Luke, if our modern Western scholars have hit the mark in their dating of these two books of the New Testament. The two main categories here in question are 'lives' and 'sayings'. Plutarch's *Lives* are the classical example, among the extant remains of Ancient Greek literature, of a type of composition which Plutarch himself merely inherited from a long line of distinguished predecessors;² and there are several collections of 'sayings' in the corpus of Plutarch's miscellaneous essays which is known as the *Moralia*. One such collection is the *Ἀποφθέγματα*

¹ We do know, however, that the Book of Daniel, which was written in Galilee in the fourth decade of the second century B.C., had an Egyptian prototype which would appear to have been written shortly before the end of the third century B.C. (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 71, footnote 4, above). This is evidence for the existence, at the time in question in our present inquiry, of some channel or channels along which it was possible for an idea to be transmitted from Egypt to Coele Syria in the medium of the literary genre in which this idea had originally found expression. This fact throws at least a side-light on the questions which we are asking ourselves here.

² See the passage quoted from Leo on p. 436, above.

Βασιλέων καὶ Στρατηγῶν (*Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata*) which Plutarch dedicated to Trajan after the latter's accession to the Principate; another is the 'Αποφθέγματα Λακωνικά (*Apophthegmata Laconica*); and both the *Περὶ τῶν Ἀρεσκόντων τοῖς Φιλοσόφοις* (*De Placitis Philosophorum*) and the *Περὶ Στωϊκῶν Ἐναντιωμάτων* (*De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*) really belong to the same class. This latter class of composition is likewise represented by the collection of sayings of Jesus known as 'Q' which is a common source of the two Gospels according to Saint Matthew and Saint Luke.¹ The principal common source of these two Gospels, however, is the Gospel according to Saint Mark; and this, like all the Gospels, is an example of a mixed genre in which a 'life' and a collection of 'sayings' are combined by the artifice of taking the biographical narrative of events as a framework and inserting sayings, or even strings of sayings, at convenient points in the life-story.² This mixed genre, however, is not an invention of the Evangelists. It, too, is a well-established form of pagan Hellenic literary composition, of which the classical extant pagan example is the work *Περὶ Βίων, Δογμάτων καὶ Ἀποφθεγμάτων τῶν ἐν Φιλοσοφίᾳ Δοκιμησάντων* (*The Lives, Doctrines, and Sayings of the Philosophers of Repute*) from the pen of Diogenes Laertius, a pagan Hellenic writer who is believed to have lived in the first half of the third century of the Christian Era.

Did the Evangelists, then, set themselves deliberately to ransack existing works of pagan Hellenic literature—'lives' and collections of 'sayings' and books combining the two genres—in which, *ex hypothesi*, the hero was not Jesus but was Hēraklēs or Socrates or possibly the Spartan pair of Heracleidae or the Roman pair of Gracchi? This hypothesis of plagiarism is, as we have seen,³ not at all a convincing explanation of the verbal correspondences with which we are now concerned. The mere adoption of the pagan Hellenic genres is something that hardly requires explaining; for these well-established categories of composition would be accepted and adopted as a matter of course in the first century of the Christian Era by any one who was writing in Greek; and, as for the recurrence of particular words and phrases, it is much less likely that these were taken direct out of pagan Hellenic books than that they found their way into the Gospels out of a treasure of popular wisdom that was in current circulation by word of mouth. 'Folk-

¹ For a tentative reconstruction of 'Q' see Streeter, B. H.: *The Four Gospels* (London 1924, Macmillan), p. 291.

² According to Meyer, E.: *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs), p. 116, the Ahiqar Romance is another piece of literature of the mixed genre in which the story is merely a setting for the sayings.

³ In the present Annex, pp. 438-9, above

lore' is, in all probability, the immediate source from which the Evangelists drew the words and phrases, as well as the incidents and characters, that the Gospels have in common with certain works of pagan Hellenic literature; and we have seen reason¹ to believe that the same source was drawn upon, at least in some measure, by certain of the pagan Hellenic authors here in question. At the same time there are a number of common words and phrases that can hardly have found their way into the pagan works of literature in which they occur out of the reservoir of 'folk-lore'. For example, in seven of the thirteen verbal correspondences set out in our Table VIII, the word or phrase or sentence in its pagan context is cited as a quotation from some public speech that is said to have been delivered by the hero or from some dialogue in which he is said to have taken part; and it seems unlikely that any anonymous wisdom that was in oral circulation would have found its way into a context of this kind; for, if a speech or dialogue that is attributed to some celebrated historical character in a sophisticated work of literature is not authentic (as it often is not), it can hardly be anything but a deliberate piece of fiction from a forger's pen. When a pagan work—or the source of a pagan work—in which one of our common words or phrases is ascribed to such an origin as this, is demonstrably anterior to the Gospels in its date of composition, the most natural explanation of the recurrence of the same word or phrase in the Gospels is therefore to suppose that the speech or dialogue (whether genuine or spurious) that is cited by the pagan author is the ultimate source from which the corresponding word or phrase in the Gospels has been derived—even though, in the course of its journey from the pagan to the Christian book, the written word may have temporarily detached itself from the papyrus and have travelled part of its way as one of those winged words (the Homeric *ἔπεα πτερόεντα*) that flit, like living creatures, from mouth to mouth.²

An apparent case in point is the correspondence of a well-known pair of mutually contradictory sayings that are attributed to Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels³ with a single self-consistent saying that is attributed to Divus Julius by Cicero. In the Gospels according to Saint Matthew (xii. 30) and Saint Luke (xi. 23) Jesus is reported as saying 'He that is not with me is against me', whereas in the Gospel according to Saint Mark (ix. 40) he is reported as saying

¹ On pp. 457–63, above.

² *Nemo me lacrimis decoret nec funera fletu
faxit. cur? volito vivu' per ora virum.*

Ennius.

³ While the sayings are mutually contradictory, each of them is, of course, in harmony with its own context, and there would be no difficulty about either of them in itself, if it were not for the existence of the other.

'He that is not against us is on our part'. So long as we confine our attention to the Gospels, this pair of sayings is a puzzle, since on the one hand it is impossible to reconcile them, as they stand, with one another, while on the other hand it is difficult to suppose that they are entirely unrelated. Our puzzle appears to be solved by a passage in Cicero's speech *Pro Ligario* (§ 33) in which Cicero attributes *both* sayings to Caesar—just as, in the Gospels, *both* of them are attributed to Jesus—but this in a relation to one another in which, so far from being mutually contradictory, each saying gives point to the other. 'We used to hear you quoted', says the defeated Republican advocate in pleading for mercy upon a Republican political exile at the tribunal of the victorious dictator—'We used to hear you quoted as saying that we (i.e. the Republicans) reckoned as being against us all except those who were with us, whereas you reckoned all who were not against you as being of your party.'¹ It would seem captious to dispute either the authenticity or the originality of the saying that is here attributed to Caesar by Cicero;² and, if these two points be granted, then it becomes difficult to resist the conviction that Caesar's saying has passed into popular currency and has suffered, in the process, the twofold mishap of becoming dissociated from the name of its true author and of falling asunder into two separate sayings which seem contradictory instead of complementary when they are torn out of their original Caesarean setting. In this state of fragmentation these two sayings will then have found their way respectively into 'Q' and into Mark as sayings of Jesus which are mutually contradictory because Jesus is represented as uttering *both* of them apropos of himself, whereas the saying that has drifted into 'Q' ought properly to be said by the sayer of it, not apropos of himself, but apropos of his adversaries—in contrast to the antithetical saying which is correctly represented as being said by the sayer apropos of himself in the Gospel according to Saint Mark.

On this showing, we have to reckon with the possibility that, even if an orally circulating treasure of anonymous wisdom may have been the immediate source from which all the common words that we have detected were derived by the authors of the Gospels, some, at least, of these anonymous sayings may have made their way into this popular oral tradition out of sophisticated works of literature in which these same sayings were attributed—whether truthfully or mendaciously—to famous characters of Hellenic

¹ 'Te enim dicere audiebamus nos omnes adversarios putare nisi qui nobiscum essent, te omnes, qui contra te non essent, tuos.'

² Cicero, loc. cit., introduces the saying that he attributes to Caesar with the words: 'Let that phrase of yours which won you your victory hold good in this present case' ('valeat tua vox illa quae vicit').

history and mythology. If this possibility has to be taken into account, is there any obvious social milieu in which such sayings could have seeped down from a cultural stratum that would be apt to express itself in sophisticated literature to the very different cultural stratum whose natural form of expression would be an orally circulating 'folk-lore'? Is there anything analogous in this field to those mixed battalions of Ptolemaic mercenary troops—part Peloponnesian and part, perhaps, Syrian—which may, as we have seen,¹ have been instrumental in conveying a cult of Cleomenes not only in a vertical direction—from a dominant to a proletarian social stratum—but also in a horizontal direction by transporting this feeling of veneration in human hearts from the tenements and barracks of Alexandria to the cantonments and villages of Galilee? The answer to our question is in the affirmative; for in the Hellenic Society in its disintegration the cultural division between a cultivated and an illiterate class did not coincide with the juridical division between freemen and slaves any more closely than the professional division between soldiers and civilians coincided with the social division between Hellenes and Orientals. While there was a vast herd of freemen-illiterates, there was also an *élite* of slaves who were men of culture; and these cultivated slaves were a highly conductive medium of mental communication between a dominant minority to whom they were culturally akin and an internal proletariat of which they were juridically members.

In the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' the status of slavery in itself was evidence of nothing except a stroke of Fortune—as cruel as it was common—which had deprived a human being of his freedom either before birth or after it. From the fact that a man was here and now a slave it was impossible to tell whether he had been born into slavery or been kidnapped into it;² whether he was illiterate or cultivated; or, supposing that he proved to be cultivated, whether he had acquired his cultivation in a now lost state of freedom or whether he was a born slave who had been given a liberal education—as he might have been trained in the mechanic arts of potting or weaving—by an enterprising owner who had gone to this expense for the improvement of one of his human chattels either because he required a cultivated slave for his own use or because he had speculated that a short-hand calligrapher who knew his way about Greek literature would be likely to fetch so very much higher a price on the slave-market than would be fetched by a potter or a weaver that it would repay the slave-dealer

¹ In the present Annex on pp. 496–500, above.

² For the diverse sources of recruitment of the slave-force in the latter days of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' see II. D (vi), vol. ii, pp. 213–16, above.

to put this particularly brainy piece of man-flesh through the longest and most expensive of the various alternative preparatory processes of improving the article before offering it for sale.

The Hellenic slave-intelligentsia which was recruited in this way—partly from slaves who had been born into slavery and been educated by their owners and partly from free-born members of the dominant minority who had fallen into slavery after having received the liberal education that was customary in their class—was ranged, of course, in several different ranks which were cultivated in different degrees. There were not only slave-amanuenses and slave-secretaries; there were also slave-tutors and slave-physicians and even slave-philosophers who were the pagan equivalents of domestic chaplains. And this cultural *élite* of an enslaved underworld includes names that have left a mark on Hellenic history.

The slave-philosopher Epictetus (*vivebat circa* A.D. 50–130) was the leading exponent of Stoicism in his generation. Epictetus had a younger contemporary in the freedman-scholar Hermippus of Berytus¹ (*floruit imperante Hadriano* A.D. 117–38), who wrote a book on *Slaves who have attained Academic Distinction*.² And Hermippus, in turn, had a younger contemporary, as well as fellow countryman, in the Syrian novelist Iamblichus (*floruit circa* A.D. 164), whose mother tongue was Aramaic, and who decorated his *Babyloniaca* with Oriental local colour, though he was writing in Greek for a Hellenic public. According to Suidas, Iamblichus was of servile origin; and, even though this account of Iamblichus's status may lack authority, there can be no doubt about the status of the slave-tutor Mardonius who in a later age weaned his pupil, the young prince Julian, away from a Christianity that was the adopted faith of the Constantian Dynasty to a Hellenism for which the tutor had an enthusiasm that was infectious. In accomplishing this pedagogic feat Mardonius might have given the history of the Hellenic World another turn, if it had been possible for Julian in his prime to succeed in his endeavour to translate into public policy the sentiments that had been inculcated into him in his boyhood (*inde ab* A.D. 339) by his slave-tutor's teaching.³ Through Julian's failure Mardonius has just missed the fame that was so nearly his; but Tiro (*vivebat ultimo ante Christum saeculo*), who so devotedly served his master Cicero in the more modest roles of

¹ According to Suides, Hermippus was born, not in Bayrūt itself, but in an up-country village.

² *Περὶ τῶν ἐν παιδείᾳ διαπρεφάντων δούλων*—a counterpart, in Greek, of Smiles' *Self Help*.

³ Julian's failure is discussed in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 147; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), vol. v, pp. 565–7; V. C (i) (d) 6 (δ), Annex, vol. v, pp. 680–3; and in V. C (ii) (a), in the present volume, pp. 222–3, above.

secretary and amanuensis, still lives for us in the pages of Cicero's letters—which Tiro preserved by collecting and editing them in a quite disinterested labour of love—as vividly as any other figure of secondary importance, slave or free, whose features happen to be presented to us in the extant remains of a Hellenic portrait gallery that has suffered grievous damage from the ravages of Time. But for a happy accident—contrived by Fortune when, for once in a way, she was in a propitious mood—this goodly company of the Hellenic slave-intelligentsia might have been adorned by the forcible enrolment into it of the greatest intellect to which Hellenism ever gave birth, if there is any truth in the tale that Plato, on his first visit to Sicily, so deeply incensed the Elder Dionysius by the unheard-of freedom of his speech that the Sicilian despot handed over the Athenian sage to the Lacedaemonian Ambassador at the Syracusan Court to dispose of at the Spartan's pleasure. The story goes that Pollis' pleasure was to sell Plato into slavery at Aegina, and that the philosopher only recovered his freedom thanks to the generosity of a Cyrenaean admirer named Annikaris, who bought him up in order to set him at liberty!

It is manifest that the slaves of this cultivated class would be likely to taste both the extreme of happiness and the extreme of misery that would come within the range of a slave's experience under the social system of the Hellenic Society in its disintegration-phase. On the one hand the service of a beloved and considerate master, such as Cicero, might almost charm a Tiro into forgetting the hard fact that, in law, there was a great gulf fixed between himself and this fellow man-of-letters who had never once reminded Tiro, either by deed or by word, of the existence of this juridical enormity. On the other hand a Tiro to whom Fortune had not allotted a master of the Ciceronian stamp might be made more miserable by even a slight failure of tact on his master's part than a slave-herdsman or a slave-gladiator could be made by the most brutal application of the rod or the branding iron. The very sensitiveness that had rendered the slave-intellectual eligible for the comparative amenity of the life that it was his relatively good fortune to live would also expose him to exquisite mental and moral torments. The precariousness of a slave's personal position—even when he was the devoted and valued servant of a high-minded and conscientious master—is illustrated by an incident in the Passion of Cato Minor in which the hero storms at his slaves, and actually draws blood from his own knuckles by striking one slave on the mouth, because, in their fear that their beloved master is meditating suicide, these slaves hesitate to bring back their master's sword which they have surreptitiously removed from its peg in

its owner's bedroom while Cato has been at dinner. The sharpness of the shock which this painful scene causes to the sensibilities of a modern Western reader of Plutarch's narrative¹ gives some measure of the suffering to which a cultivated slave would be perpetually exposed in even the most enviable conditions of service. And an exceptionally happy Tiro, who could thank the Gods for having enslaved him to a master at whose hands he had never in his life been repaid for his devotion with the petulance of Cato *in extremis*, might feel his gratitude tempered by the reflection that his own master's humaneness was, after all, unparalleled, and that consequently he, Tiro, was unique in his happiness among the groaning and travailing millions of his unfortunate companions in servitude.

This contrast between his personal devotion to his own master and his social indignation at the general standards of behaviour that were prevalent in the master-class would almost inevitably produce, in a Tiro's sensitive soul, a psychological conflict which would give the patient no peace till he had found some way of resolving it; and a possible resolution of it is not difficult to descry. The slave's first concern would be to dissociate his own beloved master, in his own mind, from a master-class upon which, as a whole, he could never bring himself to look with any feelings except those of abhorrence.² And he would achieve this mental dissociation by generalizing the beneficence of which Tiro himself was the beneficiary. In the imagination of his fond heart the grateful slave would idealize his beloved master into the likeness of a benefactor, not merely of the single slave who happened to enjoy his exceptional favour, but of the whole great army of all the slaves in the World, to whom even the most fortunate of their number must always remain bound by indissoluble ties of moral and emotional solidarity. In this mood the souls of Tiro and his like would become spiritual crucibles in which the *êthos* and outlook of morally eminent members of the Hellenic dominant minority might be transfigured into imaginary shapes that would have astonished the historical originals of the heroes of these slave-romances. An archaistic-minded reformer like Agis or Tiberius Gracchus—whose authentic purpose in urging his reforms upon his peers had been to salvage a social system which he was no less eager to preserve than they were—might be transfigured in the imagination of an adoring slave into a futurist-minded revolutionary

¹ Plutarch: *Life of Cato Minor*, chap. 68.

² The sharpness of the difference of the respective feelings that were evoked in the hearts of the slaves by good and by bad masters comes out in the passage quoted in Point 72, p. 401, above, from Diodorus's account of the First Sicilian Slave-War. Compare the episode in the same story that is quoted in V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 72, footnote 2, above.

on the pattern of the contemporary leaders who were being thrown up out of the ranks of the Hellenic internal proletariat itself. And, when once a Tiberius Gracchus had thus been assimilated to a Eunus in the 'folk-memory' of a proletarian underworld, it would perhaps almost inevitably follow that the actually spoken and accurately remembered words of the imaginarily proletarianized reformer in the ranks of the Hellenic dominant minority would be ascribed, in a proletarian epic tradition, to this or that authentically proletarian saviour whose own words, as far as these were still remembered, had been of a somewhat similar tenor.¹

On this showing the Hellenic slave-intelligentsia—a social element whose existence in the body social of a disintegrating Hellenic Society is an undoubted matter of historical fact—will suggest itself as a possible means of conveyance of some, at least, of those undoubtedly common words and phrases that occur on the one hand in the extant accounts of heroes who were members of the Hellenic dominant minority while on the other hand they are also to be found in the extant accounts of proletarian revolutionary leaders as well as in the story of Jesus as this is told in the Gospels.

A Visual Means of Conveyance

When, in our consideration of possible means of conveyance, we pass from the verbal to the visual medium, we shall find a clue ready to our hand in the fact, which we have noticed above,² that not only Jesus but also some at least of our pagan historical heroes have come, after death, to receive religious worship. There is an historic association between religious worship and visual art. In the history of Christianity it has been one of the traditional practices of the Church to adorn its places of worship with visual works of art expressing the purpose and meaning of the Liturgy performed within the church walls;³ and the same visual forms of religious expression used to be employed in the temples of both the native and the adopted divinities of the pagan Hellenic World. It is to this Hellenic as well as Christian practice that we owe some of the finest and most famous of the extant remains of pagan Hellenic visual art: for example, the sixth-century frieze, repre-

¹ 'Might not the process be simpler and easier than you say? The educated slave would tell his fellow slaves stories of Socrates or Gracchus, or Agamemnon or Odysseus for that matter, and they would forget the names and contexts and have the stories floating in their minds. Compare the Classical traditions among the Norsemen, learnt partly from books, partly (among other sources) from their fellow soldiers at Constantinople.'—Professor Gilbert Murray.

² On pp. 478–80.

³ The anti-iconic movements in Orthodox Christendom in the eighth and ninth centuries and in Western Christendom since the sixteenth century (see V. C (i) (d) 9 (β), pp. 116–17, above) have been consciously 'Protestant' in the sense of being deliberate breaches with an established practice.

senting the battle between Gods and Giants, from the Treasury of the Cnidians at Delphi; the third-century representation of the same subject on the frieze from the Altar at Pergamum; and the fifth-century representation of the battle between Lapiths and Centaurs on the metopes from the Parthenon at Athens.

The works of visual art in Hellenic places of worship that have just been mentioned all have two features in common: in the first place they portray only a single scene and not a series, and in the second place this single scene has no special connexion with the ritual or the myth of the particular divinity to whom the temple in question was dedicated; but the Pergamene Altar was also adorned with another frieze which portrays a series of successive scenes in the career of one of the local heroes of Hellenic Mythology, Telephus; and there is at any rate one divinity of Syriac origin whose shrines in the Hellenic World in the Imperial Age were adorned with visual representations which portrayed, not some irrelevant Telephus or Briareus, but the indwelling divinity—Mithras—himself. In a Mithraeum the nature, attributes, functions, and career of Mithras were illustrated in a series of tableaux depicting successive chapters of a continuous story, in the style of the Telephus-frieze from Pergamum or of those pictures of the successive Stations of the Cross by which the last act in the Passion of Jesus is illustrated in the modern Western World on the walls of Catholic Christian Churches.¹

Such a series of tableaux has been brought to light in a recently excavated Mithraeum at Dieburg, in Germany,² which, in the opinion of the archaeologists, was built and consecrated not long before the abandonment, *circa* A.D. 260, of the *limes* of the Roman Empire in the gap between the Rhine and the Danube.³ In this case—and there is no reason to suppose that it is in any way abnormal or unrepresentative⁴—the bas-relief in which the god is

¹ The writer is informed by his sister, Miss J. M. C. Toynbee, that the Stations of the Cross do not appear to have been portrayed—or at any rate not portrayed as prominently as is now customary—until comparatively recent times. The present popularity of the theme seems to be traceable to the influence of the Franciscans. This particular theme, however, is, of course, only one of a number of different applications of a distinctive style of portrayal—the ‘continuous style’ in which a story is told by the device of presenting a series of successive scenes—and this ‘continuous style’ is one of the traditional modes of Christian iconography.

² More precisely, in Hessen-Darmstadt, at a point, on the road between the present cities of Darmstadt and Aschaffenburg, which lies just inside the former *limes* of the Roman Empire.

³ See Behn, F.: *Das Mithrasheiligtum zu Dieburg* (Berlin and Leipzig 1928, de Gruyter). For the probable date of the temple see *op. cit.*, pp. 44–5. The excavations which resulted in the discovery were made in June 1926 (*op. cit.*, p. 1). The writer's attention was first drawn to this work by his sister, Miss J. M. C. Toynbee.

⁴ The reliefs on the Dieburg *Kultbild* may now be brought into comparison with at least three kindred works of art: a small relief in the Museo Nazionale Romano; a relief representing Mithras Tauroctonus, surrounded by small painted scenes from the life of Mithras, in the Mithraeum at Dura-Europus (see Rostovtzeff, M.: *Dura-Europus and*

presented in visible material form as an object for public worship is set in a square frame which is composed of twelve smaller reliefs representing as many scenes in Mithras' career. The composition can perhaps be set out most briefly and clearly¹ in a simplified diagram:²

V	VI	VII	VIII
IV	Principal Bas - Relief		IX
III	Inscription ↓		X
II	I	XII	XI

The subjects of the twelve scenes in the frame round the central relief are as follows:

- I. A pair of horses [? representing the Creation of the Universe in an imagery in which the four elements are symbolized by the four horses of a chariot].
- II. Ahriman lying in wait to fight Mithras [?].
- III. The birth of Mithras from the rock.
- IV. Mithras piercing the clouds to bring rain [?].
- V. Mithras up a tree.
- VI. The steer in his stable.

its Art (Oxford 1938, Clarendon Press), pp. 92 and 96-7); eundem: 'Das Mithraeum von Dura' in *Römische Mitteilungen*, vol. xlix (1934), pp. 180 seqq.; and a painting representing Mithras Tauroctonus, framed on either side by painted scenes from the life of Mithras, in the Mithraeum in the gardens of the Palazzo Barberini at Rome (for this Mithraeum, which was discovered in 1936, see the *Giornale d'Italia*, 1st September, 1936, and the *Archäologisches Jahrbuch*, vol. li (1936), 'Archäologischer Anzeiger', pp. 475 seqq. The writer owes these references to his sister, Miss J. M. C. Toynbee.


¹ The scholar who has published the results of the excavations at Dieburg describes the composition in the following terms:

'The margins of the large-scale sculptures of the god that serve as instruments of public worship (*der grossen Kulibilder*) are readily turned to account as fields for the presentation of individual scenes from the Mithras Legend. In the selection of these scenes it is not possible to discern any definite system, but for the most part we find a repetition of uniform types. . . . The Dieburg *Kulibild*, with its twelve sculptured scenes, surpasses all others hitherto discovered, not only in its wealth of *motifs*, but also in the point that, as will appear, a strict chronological order is adhered to in the series of sculptures. The serial order is here completely clear; on the left we find the scene of the birth of the god and on the right, next to the tablet bearing the inscription, his ascension into Heaven—which shows that the series of representations starts, as usual, at the bottom of the left-hand side, and then runs "clockwise". . . . The system that governs this series of scenes, and that is so strictly adhered to, knits them together into what amounts to an extract from the Mithras Legend in the form of a cycle of sculptures; and the order in which the individual sculptures are here placed in the series also throws a good deal of new light on other sculptures that are already well known.'—Behn, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

² This diagram corresponds with the front side of the stone; on the back side there is a different representation of Mithras, here in the guise of Phaethon (Behn, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-2).

- VII. Mithras carrying the steer on his back.
 VIII. Mithras riding on the steer, which is now stampeding.
 IX. Mithras again carrying on his back the steer, which is now dead.
 X. A tree with three branches and with a Mithras-head on each of them.
 XI. Mithras and the steer, now sacrificed; Mithras and Sol drinking to one another, out of horns, over the steer's dead body.
 XII. Mithras mounting Sol's chariot, in which he is to ascend to Heaven.

This composition of the sculptured *Kultbild* of the Mithraeum at Dieburg in Hessen reappears, in essentials, in the painted *Kultbild* of the Mithraeum in the gardens of the Palazzo Barberini in Rome.



The subjects of the ten paintings flanking the central painting¹ are as follows:

- I. Juppiter with his thunderbolt.
 II. Terra Mater.
 III. The birth of Mithras.
 IV. Mithras bringing water out of a rock.
 V. Mithras carrying the steer.
 VI. Mithras initiating Sol, who kneels.
 VII. Mithras kneeling between Heaven and Earth.
 VIII. Sol and Mithras sacrificing.
 IX. Sol and Mithras ascending to Heaven in Sol's chariot.
 X. A heavenly banquet.

Like the series of twelve reliefs at Dieburg, this series of ten paintings in Rome represents in outline the career of the god from its beginning at his birth to its close at his ascension; and the existence of the series of Telephus-reliefs from Pergamum which

¹ It will be seen that here the series starts at the top, instead of the bottom, left-hand corner and runs 'anti-clockwise', in contrast to the arrangement of the Dieburg *Kultbild*, on which the series runs 'clockwise', starting from the bottom left-hand corner.

were carved in the third century B.C. is evidence that the 'continuous style' employed in these Mithraea in Italy and Germany was no recent innovation at the times when their *Kultbilder* were respectively painted and carved, but was a genre that had already been in vogue in the lifetime of King Agis IV of Sparta (*regnabat circa 244-240 B.C.*), who is the earliest in date of the eleven pagan historical heroes whose stories we are here comparing with the story of Jesus. There are also, of course, some conspicuous intervening links—for instance, the series of reliefs which tell a story (or, strictly speaking, act a play) on the Roman victory-columns and triumphal arches of the Imperial Age. Does our archaeological evidence warrant the conjecture that the custom of adorning the temples of the Gods with visual representations in the 'continuous style' dates from an age some five hundred years anterior to the date of the Dieburg Mithraeum? And can we venture further to assume that, if our pair of Heracleidae and our pair of Gracchi did come to receive religious worship, they would be honoured in whatever ways were customary in that age in the current worship of heroes and gods whose title to be worshipped was already well established?¹ If our conjecture and our assumption pass muster, they will lead us to the surmise that, if either Agis or Cleomenes or the Gracchi did have shrines dedicated to them after their deaths, these shrines will have been decorated with visual representations in the 'continuous style', and that the subjects of these series of scenes will have been the lives and Passions of the heroes for whose worship the shrines had been built and adorned. If our imagination will carry us thus far, it will further suggest to us that the scenes included in the series will have been of two different kinds: on the one hand authentically historical scenes commemorating the most celebrated or most critical or most tragic events and moments in the human hero's actual life on Earth; and on the other hand potently traditional scenes which properly belonged to the myth of some god or demigod such as Hêrâklês, and which were so indissolubly associated in the popular mind with the temples of this divinity that there will have been an almost irresistible impulse to introduce them into shrines dedicated to human heroes of a similar character, if there was any possibility of co-ordinating these mythical episodes with those authentic events in the human heroes' careers that were notorious matters of public knowledge.

Are there, as a matter of fact, any known examples in the history of Hellenic visual art of series of scenes in the 'continuous style' in which the characters are not gods or demigods but are human

¹ For this assumption see p. 480, above.

beings whose lives on Earth are matters of history? The majority of the figures are, of course, human in the Parthenon frieze, which is perhaps the most famous surviving work of the Hellenic sculptor's art; but these human figures from the chisel of an Attic master of the fifth century B.C. are human without being historical; for they are not individuals with proper names and with ascertainable dates of birth and death, but are the timeless and anonymous typical representatives of a community. Nor, again, do the scenes of the Parthenon frieze tell a story in the 'continuous style'. We must descend to the sculptures on the Roman columns and arches of the Imperial Age to find figures whom we can identify as historical individuals standing out here and there, in the successive acts of a drama in bas-relief, among the anonymous troops of Roman soldiers and enemy tribesmen. The pictures in the *salon* of the Villa dei Misteri at Pompeii, which must have been painted before the eruption of Vesuvius in A.D. 79, do not quite provide us with the clue that we are seeking. 'The subject of the paintings is the initiation of a bride before her marriage into certain mysteries of Dionysus'; but 'it is not certain whether the pictures represent several brides being initiated separately by various rites or one bride going through successive phases in the liturgical act';¹ and, even if we could be sure that the paintings are to be interpreted as a unity in the 'continuous style', we should still be in the dark as to whether or not the series has any personal reference. 'Maiuri explains the choice of this particular scheme of decoration by supposing that the mistress of the house was an initiate and priestess of some Dionysiac association, and he suggests that the bride seated on a couch in the last scene of all is the lady herself and that the paintings were meant to celebrate her wedding. But this, of course, cannot be proved.'² We shall find ourselves on firmer ground if, without moving from the point at which we here stand in the Time-dimension, we make, in Space, the short and easy journey from Pompeii to Puteoli and at the same time migrate from the realm of archaeological 'fact' into the realm of literary 'fiction'. For there is one character, located most probably at Puteoli³ about the middle of the first century of the Christian Era, who is not a god or hero and not a deified man and not even a public personage, but who nevertheless has the crucial scenes of his life depicted in the 'continuous style' on the walls of his own private house in which he is still living. And, although this character is a 'fictitious' one, it does not follow that his author's description of

¹ Carrington, R. C.: *Pompeii* (Oxford 1936, University Press), p. 164.

² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³ See L. Friedländer's edition of Petronius Arbiter's *Cena Trimalchionis* (Leipzig 1906, Hirzel), pp. 8-10.

his manners and customs is untrue to the facts of the real life of the age.¹

In his account of an imaginary dinner-party at the home of a likewise imaginary self-made millionaire-freedman whom he has named Trimalchio, the Roman novelist Petronius Arbiter (*propria manu obiit* A.D. 66) describes the wall-paintings of which the guests were able to catch a glimpse as they were ushered from the front door to the dining-room.

'On the left as we entered, not far from the porter's cubicle, there was a huge dog (on a chain) painted on the wall, with "Cave canem" written above him in block letters. My companions went into fits of laughter; but for my part, when I had recovered my breath, I was all eyes for what unfolded itself on the rest of the wall. First came a picture of a slave-market, with captions (*cum titulis*),² showing Trimalchio himself, with a [child's] head of hair, bearing Mercury's wand in his hand and entering Rome under the guidance of Minerva. Next, the story of how he had learned to keep accounts and had eventually been appointed a cashier had all been rendered indefatigably, with [explanatory] lettering, by the painstaking artist. At the tail-end of the colonnade the hero was being lifted by the chin by Mercury and being towed through the air towards a lofty tribune, where Fortune with her cornucopia and the three Fates spinning golden distaffs were waiting to receive him. . . . I began to ask the major-domo what pictures they had in the interior. "The Iliad and the Odyssey," says he, "and Laenas' show of gladiators." But it was impossible to have eyes for everything.'³

In thus depicting the successive stages of his own career, and capping his historical feat of making his pile with the mythical *motif* of an ascension into Heaven, to what lengths of audacity was Trimalchio going? Was he casting himself for a role which the prevailing canons of taste and piety would have reserved exclusively for such superhuman heroes of mythology as Hercules and the Dioscuri? Or was he only committing the rather less flagrant enormity of portraying himself as authentically historical human beings were regularly portrayed, in accordance with an accepted convention of Hellenic religion and art, when these mortal men had become recipients of divine worship? Was it Hêraklês or the Heracleidae, was it the Dioscuri or the Gracchi, that Trimalchio was so impudently aping?

These are questions which it may not be possible to answer conclusively in the present state of our archaeological knowledge;⁴

¹ For the indispensable alloy of fact in so-called 'works of fiction' see I. C (iii) (e), Annex, vol. i, pp. 449-50, above.

² Compare the Greek transliteration of the Latin *titulum*—*τίτλον*—which is employed in John xix. 19 to describe the notice which Pilate is said to have affixed to the Cross.—A.J.T.

³ Petronius Arbiter: *Cena Trimalchionis*, chap. 29.

⁴ There is, however, one piece of literary evidence (to which the writer's attention has been drawn by Dr. Martin Braun) which suggests that, round about the beginning of

but an inability to determine exactly what may be the historical affiliations of Trimalchio's pictures of himself need not compel us to rule out all probabilities that we are unable to prove; for the always dubious *argumentum ex silentio* is particularly hazardous in the case in point—as is illustrated by one feature of Petronius's description. Trimalchio's visual record of his own career is not in marble, like the twelve scenes from Mithras' career in the Mithraeum at Dieburg; it is in paint, like the ten scenes from Mithras' career in the Mithraeum in the gardens of the Palazzo Barberini; and this touch may serve to remind us of the enormous extent of the lacunae in the array of our extant specimens of Hellenic visual art. The whole of our surviving record of Hellenic art, both visual and verbal, is fragmentary; in the field of sculpture, as in that of literature, what has come down to us is only an arbitrary and accidental excerpt out of a harvest of which by far the greater part has now been lost; and, if so little has survived of those relatively rare Hellenic works of visual art that were deemed worthy of being immortalized by being carved in marble, we possess to-day next to nothing of those no doubt far more numerous works that—like Trimalchio's picture-gallery—were rendered in evanescent paint on perishable plaster.

Trimalchio's wall-paintings, however, were substantial and durable by comparison with the shapes in which the scenes from the lives and deaths of our Heracleidae and our Gracchi are likely to have been handed down. For Trimalchio had a free hand; had it taken his fancy, he could have immortalized himself in marble without getting into trouble with the Imperial police, since, in the eyes of the public authorities of the age, a living freedman-millionaire would be as innocuous as he was contemptible in the eyes of Nero's *arbiter elegantiae*. There would be no such tolerance for visual works of art that were intended to perpetuate and consecrate the memory of notorious social reformers or revolutionaries who were still more dangerous to the established social order as dead martyrs than they had been as living agitators. It seems unlikely

the Christian Era, the visual representation, in the 'continuous style', of the Passions of historical, or supposedly historical, martyrs of recent date was a familiar idea in the Hellenic underworld—even in that Jewish section of it which was inhibited, by a traditional religious tabu, from the practice of the visual arts. In the Fourth Book of Maccabees, which was composed at some date, between 63 B.C. and A.D. 70, which was probably prior to A.D. 38, the account of the martyrdom of the Seven Brethren and their Mother—a possibly fabulous episode in the Jewish tradition of the persecution of Jewry by Antiochus Epiphanes (see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, p. 72, with footnote 3, above)—contains the following passage: 'And had it been lawful for me to paint, as might some artist, the tale of thy piety (τὴν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἱστορίαν), would not the spectators have shuddered at the mother of seven sons suffering for righteousness' sake multitudinous tortures even unto death?' (Fourth Book of Maccabees xvii. 7, in Charles, R. H.: *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, vol. ii (Oxford 1913, Clarendon Press), p. 683).

that any of the régimes that were successively in power at Rome ever allowed the worship of the Gracchi, that had sprung up spontaneously on the spots where these two heroes had met their deaths (Point 83), to go to the length of housing itself in shrines with sculptures, or even pictures, on their walls. And it seems still more unlikely that any public worship of Cleomenes was ever permitted at Alexandria by a Ptolemaic Government which the Spartan martyr had incited the Alexandrian bourgeoisie to overthrow. A public worship of Cleomenes, in shrines avowedly dedicated to his memory, could not easily have been instituted even in the cantonments of the Ptolemaic garrisons in Coele Syria, where Cleomenes' worshippers would have been less immediately under the eye of the Ptolemaic police. If religious cults of the Heracleidae and of the Gracchi did arise and persist, we must think of them as being carried on underground, in the furtive privacy of an underworld which had learnt by experience how to evade the scrutiny of Lynceus; and our conjectural reconstruction of the visual side of such subterranean cults must be such as will be compatible with this probable environment. A series of scenes in the 'continuous style' from the lives of Agis and Cleomenes or from the lives of the Gracchi could not for long escape detection if either marble or plaster or boards were the medium in which it was conveyed. And on this account we must suppose that, while the plot of the series and the subjects and arrangement of the scenes might be taken from famous sculptures and wall-paintings in which the lives and deaths of Hêraklês or the Dioscuri were publicly exhibited, a clandestine visual record of the Passions of historical heroes, whose worships were *religiones non licitae*, would almost certainly be reduced to a miniature scale and reproduced on less conspicuous materials such as parchment or papyrus.¹ Popular reproductions of celebrated Hellenic works of art used to be made on a small scale and in inferior materials for the sake of cheapness. We know the shape of Pheidias' gold-and-ivory statue of Athena in the Parthenon thanks to the survival, far afield, of dwarf reproductions of it in coarser stone that were manufactured in the Imperial Age; and the author of the Acts of the Apostles

¹ This transposition of bas-reliefs into paintings is the more easy to imagine if we may assume that the Pergamene series of Telephus-reliefs is a typical specimen of the genre of which it is the earliest extant surviving example; for the Telephus-reliefs display a twofold innovation by contrast with the older style that is represented by the contemporary *Gigantomachia* that once adorned the same monument. The Telephus-reliefs are new-fangled not only in telling a story in the 'continuous style' but also in reproducing the painter's effects in relief (on this latter point see, for example, Overbeck, J.: *Geschichte der Griechischen Plastik*, 4th ed., vol. ii (Leipzig 1894, Hinrichs), pp. 285-6). A set of bas-reliefs that had been executed in this *malerische Compositionsweise* would manifestly be easier to re-translate into paint than a set that had been executed in the *echter Reliefstil*.

(xix. 24-5) informs us that one of the industries of Ephesus in the first century of the Christian Era was the mass-production of little silver keepsakes, in the shape of miniature shrines, that were to be bought and taken home by the pilgrims who came to visit the actual shrine of the Ephesian Artemis. We may take it that what was so commonly done for the sake of cheapness would almost certainly be done in cases where the wish for cheapness was reinforced by a need for secrecy.

On this showing, may we venture to imagine sets of pictures—representing scenes of which some would be traditional and others historical—being painted on handy and compact materials and circulating in this form clandestinely, from hand to hand, among members of the Hellenic internal proletariat whose reaction to the oppressiveness of the Hellenic dominant minority was to cherish the memory of reformers and revolutionaries who had died for the people in dying at the hands of the people's rulers? Such sets of pictures might speak for themselves if the mythical scenes were familiar and if the historical scenes were labelled with captions. Alternatively, they might be introduced as illustrations into popular books¹ in which the story of the hero's life and death would also be told in words in the form of either 'lives' or 'sayings' or some combination of the two genres.² In either of these two possible alternative formats the pictures would be so perishable that it would not be at all surprising that no specimens of them should have survived and that our only inkling of their existence should come from verbal tableaux into which (according to our conjecture) these visual images were eventually transposed when the pictures were used as sources for works of literature that were semi-popular and semi-sophisticated.

This hypothesis in regard to the origin of the verbal tableaux that occur on the one hand in the Gospels and on the other hand in the stories of certain pagan historical heroes finds some support in an analogous hypothesis which has been put forward by a distinguished modern Western scholar as a possible explanation of some incongruities in a passage of the Sixth Book (ll. 562-627) of the *Aeneid*. This passage purports to be a verbal description, from the mouth of the Sibyl, of the perpetual torments of the damned which it is not lawful for Aeneas to see with his own eyes; but in the opinion of Salomon Reinach the Sibyl's recitative is really a descriptive catalogue of a picture-gallery.

'Les éléments dont elle se compose offrent des détails graphiques qui laissent entrevoir, derrière les sources littéraires, des sources figurées,

¹ This notion of illustrated *Volksbücher* has been suggested to the writer by Dr. Martin Braun.

² For these genres of Hellenic literature see pp. 500-1, above.

c'est-à-dire des œuvres d'art. C'est comme une galerie de petits tableaux représentant des scènes des Enfers, artificiellement réunies par des formules comme *hic et* (l. 582), *nec non et* (l. 595), *quid memorem* (l. 601). Il importe peu que Virgile ait vu lui-même ces petits tableaux ou qu'il en ait emprunté la description à d'autres poètes; comme nous ne connaissons pas les sources grecques de ce passage, en dehors de l'*Odyssée*, nous pouvons traiter Virgile comme une source et chercher sous ses vers les images dont ils sont la traduction. Un trait comme celui du vers 605 [-6]—*Furiarum maxima iuxta/accubat*—est certainement inspiré d'un modèle graphique; que Virgile ou un autre avant lui s'en soit inspiré, c'est une question insoluble et qui ne nous intéresse pas ici.¹

But why should not the verbal means of conveyance by which these tableaux have actually been transmitted to us be accepted at their face value? In reckoning with these we are on sure ground because authentic specimens of them survive. Why should we go out of our way to postulate the existence of visual means of conveyance as well, when we are unable to support this postulate by bringing forward any material evidence in its favour? The answer is that the social stratum with which we are concerned in our present inquiry was one which, to our knowledge, was to a large extent illiterate; for it is well known that, in illiterate social milieux, things that, *ex hypothesi*, cannot be broadcast in writing are apt to be broadcast in pictorial representations instead, in so far as these can be made to do duty for the written word. In the Soviet Union, for example, in the early days of the Bolshevik Revolution, when the new rulers of half a continent set out to win support for themselves by launching an intensive campaign of mass-propaganda among an illiterate population, it is said that they used to send out propaganda-trains in which the rolling stock was plastered with pictorial posters. The Attica of the fifth century B.C. was much more literate than the Russia of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, as is testified by the institution of Ostracism;² but even in that enlightened century and country, and *a fortiori* in the vast and only superficially Hellenized Hellenic World *post Alexandrum*, the illiterate element in the population was sufficiently numerous to have to be sedulously catered for by being addressed in picture-language.³

The prevalence of a visual habit of mind in fifth-century Attica is attested by at least two passages in the extant masterpieces of the

¹ Reinach, S.: *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, vol. ii (Paris 1906, Leroux), p. 160.

² Ostracism involved the taking of a plebiscite in which every adult male citizen had to write on a potsherd the name of a statesman whom he wished to condemn to banishment.

³ The institution of Ostracism is evidence for literacy being widespread, but not for its being universal—as witness the famous anecdote of the illiterate peasant who, when one of these negative plebiscites was being taken, asked Aristides, not knowing who he was, to write his (Aristides') own name on the peasant's voting-sherd.

Attic drama. In Aeschylus's *Agamemnon*, ll. 231-47, the chorus not only depict the sacrifice of Iphigeneia in what reads like a tableau transposed into words, but actually describe the protagonist in this scene as 'looking as she looks in the pictures' (πρέπουσά θ' ὡς ἐν γραφαῖς). In Euripides' *Hippolytus*, ll. 1004-5, the hero, when he is accused of a monstrous crime, protests his innocence in the words: 'I know nothing of this business [i.e. sexual intercourse] except through hearing of it in talk and seeing it in picture' (οὐκ οἶδα πράξιν τήνδε πλὴν λόγῳ κλύων / γραφῇ τε λεύσσων)—without any mention of the possibility of reading about it in the written word. The survival of the same habit of mind in the Hellenized 'Great Society' of the Imperial Age is similarly attested by a passage in Plutarch's *Lives of the Gracchi* (chap. 2), in which the author tries to convey to his readers the likeness-in-difference or difference-in-likeness between the two brothers by putting it to them that

'just as, in statues or pictures of the Dioscuri, the likeness between the two figures is qualified by a difference which is the difference between a boxer and a runner, so the strong resemblance between our two young Romans in the matters of courage and self-discipline and good breeding and eloquence and nobility of character is diversified by some striking points of unlikeness in the actions and policy in which they respectively realized and distinguished themselves.'

If this visual habit of mind is prevalent in both of two societies that have come into contact with one another, it is conceivable that one of them may transmit to the other its ideas and its myths by the visual means of conveyance without these ever being transposed into written, or even into spoken, words at any stage in their journey from the one social milieu to the other. According to one modern Western scholar,¹ 'bien des difficultés que l'on rencontre quand on veut expliquer certaines similitudes entre les fables et les épopées de la Grèce et de l'Inde s'évanouiraient peut-être si l'on admettait moins des emprunts directs, par la parole ou par l'écriture, que des emprunts par voie iconographique'. And Reinach² cites other archaeological authorities in support of the view that certain Scandinavian myths—for instance, the tale of Odin hanging on the tree, and the description of this tree itself, which is the World-Tree Yggdrasill—are transpositions into words of the sculptured crosses which met the eyes of the Vikings when they carried their raids into the British Isles.³

¹ Clermont-Ganneau, cited by Salamon Reinach, *ibid.*, vol. iv (Paris 1912, Leroux), p. 101 (the reference is to an article in the *Revue Critique*, vol. ii, pp. 215 and 232 (1878)).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 102-3.

³ In this context Reinach further suggests that the decorations carved on stone in such works of the Northumbrian sculptor's art as the Bewcastle and Rothwell crosses

The effectiveness of picture-language as a means of communication is brought out vividly in several well-known passages of Greek and Latin literature. In the Hellenic World in all ages of its history that have left us any legacy of literature the normal first step of a stranger who had arrived in a city which he had never visited before was to make the round of the public monuments—statues, colonnades, and temples—and to look at the bas-reliefs and wall-paintings which the public buildings contained.

This, for instance, is the *motif* of the opening scene (Book I, chap. 1) of Achilles Tatius's novel *Cleitopho and Leucippe*. 'As I was wandering', says the imaginary narrator, 'about the city [of Sidon], surveying the votive offerings in the temples, I saw a painting'—and the author straightway plunges into a detailed verbal description of a picture illustrating the myth of Europa. In a later chapter of the same novel (Book III, chap. 6) two shipwrecked travellers, who are kicking their heels at Pelusium while they are waiting for a passage, spend their time in looking at pictures of Andromeda and of Prometheus—which, again, are described in minute detail—in the temple of Zeus Casius. Nor was it only pagan travellers who condescended to avail themselves of this pleasantly educative means of killing time. 'While Paul waited for' his companions to join him at Athens, 'his spirit was stirred within him when he saw the city full of idols (κατείδωλον οὖσαν τὴν πόλιν)' (Acts xvii. 16); and the Christian apostle took his sightseeing as the text for a missionary sermon: 'For as I passed by and beheld your devotions (διερχόμενος γὰρ καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν), I found an altar with this inscription . . .' (Acts xvii. 23). The urban sightseeing which thus makes its appearance as a *motif* in both the Acts of the Apostles and the romance of *Cleitopho and Leucippe* is translated into a rural setting in the opening scene (Prooemium, chap. 2) of Longus's *Daphnis and Chloë*: 'As I was hunting in Lesbos I saw in a grove of the Nymphs the loveliest sight that I had ever set eyes on, a picture which was a love-story'—and, after describing the subject of the picture, which was a pastoral scene, the author tells his reader that the book which he is about to read is the fruit of a passion, with which the

are not original in their design but are translations into sculpture of the miniature paintings in Irish manuscripts which are themselves inspired by Hellenic prototypes of the Imperial and even the Pre-Imperial Post-Alexandrine Age. In this hypothetical translation of small-scale paintings on parchment into large-scale sculptures on stone we have the exact inverse of our hypothetical translation of sculpture and painting on plaster into miniatures painted on parchment or papyrus to illustrate the lives of Jesus and his pagan counterparts (see pp. 515–17, above). Reinach's hypothesis is, however, a matter of controversy. There are some scholars who hold that Northumbrian sculpture owes nothing to Irish inspiration; and there are others who do not admit that even the Northumbrian school of miniature-painting is of Irish origin (see Dawson, Christopher: *The Making of Europe* (London 1932, Sheed & Ward), pp. 206–8).

author was seized, to put some equivalent of the fascinating Lesbian picture into words (πόθος ἔσχεν ἀντιγράψαι τῇ γραφῇ).¹ The fascination exercised by sermons in stones—or on boards or plaster—was indeed so strong that we find even the conscientious Aeneas succumbing to it out of season.² As soon as he steps across the threshold of the temple of Apollo at Cumae, his attention is entirely absorbed by the scenes from the great corpus of Hellenic Mythology that are painted on the walls, and for the moment he becomes oblivious of the quest on which he is bent, though this quest is the serious and formidable one of making a descent into Hell. Aeneas would have lingered there sightseeing until he had taken in everything that there was to be seen, had not the Sibyl hustled him on into performing his religious duties, as Trimalchio's guests were hustled by the major-domo into taking their places at the dinner table.

quin protinus omnia
perlegerent oculis, nī iam praemissus Achates
adforet atque una Phoebi Triviaeque sacerdos,
Deiphobe Glauci, fatur quae talia regi:
'Non hoc ista sibi tempus spectacula poscit.'

In what did the fascination of this picture-language consist? Perhaps largely in identifying the subjects of the painted or sculptured scenes when these were not provided with captions or when the captions were there but were not intelligible to the sightseer, either because he was illiterate or because they were written in a language and a script which he could not read. This fascinating game of crying *τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο* is played competitively by the chorus in Euripides' *Ion* at their first entry (ll. 184-218). This chorus is composed of Athenian women in the service of Queen Creūsa, and the scene is the temple of Apollo at Delphi which these Athenians are now seeing for the first time. In an animated dialogue they call one another's attention to the works of art with which the temple is decorated, as they recognize one mythical scene or figure after another.

'“See this; look; give your eyes to it; it is the Lernaean hydra being slain by Hēraklēs.”—“Yes, I see it, my dear; and here is Iolaus.”—“Well, but just look at this; here is Bellerophon mounted on Pegasus.”—“My eyes are being drawn in all directions; don't miss the Giants.”—“My dears, we are looking at these.”—“Well, do you see her brandishing

¹ It will be seen that in this passage Longus professes to have done the very thing that is attributed to Virgil, or to Virgil's source, by Reinach in the passage quoted on pp. 517-8, above. In this connexion it is not without interest to note that Longus betrays some acquaintance with Virgil's work (see J. M. Edmonds in the Loeb edition of *Daphnis and Chloe* (London 1916, Heinemann), p. vii).

² Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book VI, ll. 13-41.

³ Ibid., ll. 33-7.

her aegis?"—"See Pallas, my own goddess? No mistake!"—"And then Zeus with his thunderbolt?"—"Yes, I see him; he is blasting Mimas."—"And here is Bacchus."¹

This passage of Euripides' *Ion* bears out Reinach's observation that 'toute image est une énigme qui . . . réclame impérieusement une explication, et les motifs graphiques se transmettent et se perpétuent comme les mots du langage'.² Guessing at the answer to riddles is always fun, but it does not always happen that the guesser guesses right; and Reinach's thesis, in the brilliant essay from which we are here quoting, is that the riddles presented in the series of tableaux in *Aeneid* VI, ll. 562-627, are there interpreted in a sense that makes nonsense of the meaning which the hands that originally designed these pictures were intending to convey.

In the *Aeneid*, of course—and not only there but also in every other work of Greek and Latin literature in which they figure—the subjects of these scenes—Salmoneus, Ixion and Sisyphus, Tityos and Tantalus, Theseus and Peirithous, the Danaids, and the rest—are represented as damned souls who are suffering in an Other World eternal punishments for sins which they committed in This World once upon a time. Reinach submits that this is a false interpretation which has been put upon the pictures in order to make them serve as illustrations of a system of theology which was unheard of in the archaic Hellenic World—or was it the pre-Hellenic Minoan World?³—in which these pictures had originally taken shape. This system is that of Orphism; and Orphism is a cutting from an exotic plant which was deliberately imported into Hellas no earlier than the sixth century B.C.⁴ According to Reinach, the pictures were intended by their original designers to represent their subjects, not as undergoing perpetual tortures in Hell, but as snap-shotted, for the sightseer's information, in either one or other of two alternative postures in which the sightseer would be prone to visualize them. The subject is represented either as engaged in some notoriously characteristic activity of his life or else as *in articulo mortis* if what is notorious about him is, not what he did with his life, but the manner in which he lost it.⁵ The

¹ This is not, of course, a full translation of the passage but only a sketch of the gist of it.

² Reinach, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 183-4.

³ It has been brought to the writer's attention by Professor Gilbert Murray that a number of *motifs* which appear in literary form in the Hellenic Mythology—e.g. Odysseus and the Ram; Oedipus and Laius; Orestes killing Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus—are also to be found in visual form engraved on Minoan gems.

⁴ Reinach, op. cit., pp. 203-4. For the arguments in favour of the view that Orphism was not the revival of a submerged religious legacy from the Minoan World, but was an artificial product that was manufactured by Hellenic hearts and minds out of contemporary Oriental materials in the sixth century B.C., see V. C (i) (c) 2, vol. v, pp. 84-7, above.

⁵ Reinach, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 166-9.

picture of Salmoneus portrays a successful rain-maker producing the thunderstorm and lightning-flash in the sky by the sympathetic magic that he is performing on the ground as he drives a thundering chariot while he waves lightning-torches in his hands. The proper caption for this picture is 'The storm successfully discharged by Salmoneus' and not 'Zeus blasting Salmoneus for his impiety in having attempted to perform a social service which is Zeus' own exclusive prerogative'.¹ Similarly, Ixion lashed for ever to a perpetually revolving wheel is not a sinner undergoing eternal punishment but is the *numen* in the Sun-Disk represented anthropomorphically in the style of the Assyrian Asshur and the Achaemenian Ahuramazda.² And Sisyphus, too, in his own way, is achieving as triumphant a *tour de force* as the divinity that makes the Sun go round or as the magician who brings the rain. Sisyphus³ is not a *forçat* serving a sentence of penal servitude which is as heart-breakingly futile as it is back-breakingly laborious. He is the superb technician who built on the heights of the Acrocorinthus the great white marble structure which was still known as the Sisypheum in the last century B.C.⁴ The stone that he is hoisting up will never, it is true, quite reach the top of the mountain, but that is simply because the emplacement of the Sisypheum lies a little way below the summit!⁵ The Danaids, again, are not miserably expiating the damnable sin of having murdered their husbands, but are beneficently engaged on their life-work of irrigating the thirsty plain of Argos.⁶ As for Tityos, he is really being eaten, not excruciatingly alive, but insensitively dead, by his attendant vultures; for the picture represents, not another of the torments of the damned, but the corpse of a warrior who has died a glorious death on the battle-field⁷—just as Tantalus represents, not a sinner being 'tantalized', but the drowning king of a city that has been engulfed in a lake as the result of an eruption or an earthquake.⁸

These examples of the misinterpretation of visual riddles are all taken from the Hellenic cycle of art and mythology, and are all to be explained (if Reinach's theory is right) as attempts to give old *motifs* a satisfactory meaning in terms of a new theology. But this is by no means the only stage on which the same comedy of errors has been played. There is, for instance, at least one Christian legend that can be accounted for in a similar way. It is told of a number of Christian martyrs that, immediately after their decapitation, they rose to their feet, picked up their own severed heads, and walked off head in hand. This legend appears to be a

¹ Ibid., pp. 160-6.

² Ibid., p. 183.

³ Ibid., pp. 172-7.

⁴ Ibid., p. 174, citing Strabo: *Geographica*, Book VIII, chap. 6, § 21, p. 379, and Diosdorus: *A Library of Universal History*, Book XX, chap. 103.

⁵ Ibid., p. 176.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 193-6.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 170-2.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 177-81.

transposition into words of statues in which these saints were visually represented in this posture; and these statues themselves can be traced back, as the Bollandist Fathers have shown, to a passage of Saint John Chrysostom¹ in which the writer imagines the martyrs appearing before the throne of God with their heads in their hands, as soldiers address themselves to their commander with confidence when they are able to display to him the wounds that they have received in his service.

Let us now apply these prolegomena to the tableaux, set out in Table V above,² that are common to the story of Jesus and the stories of our pagan historical heroes. On a number of points the considerations that we now have in mind may prove illuminating.

In the first place, if we run our eye down the list, we shall see that most of the tableaux in it that do not represent notorious historical scenes in the life of this hero or that can be explained as adaptations of familiar traditional scenes from the myth of some god or demigod.

The tableaux of the Hubbub at Night-time with Lights (Point 41), the Posse of Officers of the Law Abashed in the Hero's Presence (Point 43), and the Trial at Night-time (Point 49), and again those of the Women in the Background (Point 80), the Descent from the Gallows (Point 81), and the *Pietà* (Point 82), would appear to be representations of authentic scenes in the Passion of Agis.³ The

¹ Migne: *Patrologia Graeca*, vols. xlix-l, col. 576: οὕτω καὶ οὗτοι τὰς κεφαλὰς ὡς ἀπεμήθησαν ἐπὶ τῶν χειρῶν βαστάζοντες, καὶ εἰς μέσον παράγοντες, εὐκόλως ἅπαντα, ὅσα αὐτὸν θέλωσι, παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἀνέω δύνανται.

² On p. 411, above.

³ There is another tableau—not included in our table of eighty-nine points—which may perhaps also have found its way into the story of Jesus out of the authentic history of Agis. When, after the introduction of Agis' social reforms, Agis' partisan Lysander, who was now a member of the governing Board of Overseers, was scheming to remove Agis' colleague and opponent King Leonidas by forcing him into exile, Lysander 'proceeded, in company with his fellow Overseers, to "watch for the sign"'. This "watching for the sign" is [an ancient Spartan ritual] to the following effect. Once in every nine years the Overseers choose a clear moonless night and sit through it in silence with their eyes fixed on the sky. If on that night a star shoots across the sky from one quarter to another, they put the Kings on trial on the presumption that they must have committed some offence against Religion, and in the meanwhile they suspend them from office, pending the arrival from Delphi or Olympia of an exculpating oracle. On the occasion in question, Lysander asserted that this "sign" had appeared to him, and on the strength of this he gave notice that there was to be a trial of King Leonidas' (Plutarch: *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*, chap. 11). This piece of star-gazing was a crucial event in Agis' political career, and a picture of it might well have been one of the regular scenes in a standard pictorial representation of Agis' life and Passion. Is it conceivable that this hypothetical picture in a Spartan picture-book may be the source of the verbal tableau in Matt. ii. 9-11? The original picture would presumably represent a group of magisterial-looking men (the Spartan Board of Overseers) sitting in front of a building (the Brazen House of Athena Chalcioecus) and gazing at a shooting star (the motion of which would perhaps be indicated by a trail of light). A Jewish interpreter of this picture would expect the star-gazers to be magi (especially on the morrow of an historic journey of a party of magi from east to west: see pp. 455-6, above). He might jump to the conclusion that there was a connexion between the star and the house, and might suppose that the star had come to rest over the house in order to draw the star-gazers' attention to it. From this, again, he might infer that the house was the goal of a pilgrimage on which the star-gazers had been led by following the star from their home in the east. We may observe that if, in the original Spartan picture, the house really was the temple of

tableaux of a Party going Out of Doors (Point 33), a Fight (Point 44), the Pricking of the Hero's Body with a Stabbing Weapon (Point 79), and the Women in the Foreground (Point 80 A) would appear to be taken, similarly, from the true history of the Passion of Cleomenes. The tableau of the Young Male Fugitive Leaving his Wrap in the Hands of his Pursuers (Point 48) is a picture of the martyrdom of Tiberius Gracchus.¹ The tableaux of a Crowd Mounting on to the Roofs in order to get within Range of the Hero (Point 11), a Bodyguard Watching and Sleeping by Turns (Point 37), and a Watcher Caught Napping (Point 38) look as though they came from the true history of the life and death of Gaius Gracchus. The Roman Washing his Hands in a Basin in Public (Point 64) is entered, in Clio's register, not as Pontius Pilate but as Catiline.

On the other hand the tableaux of a Rider, with Companions on Foot, Making a Progress through the Streets of a City (Point 16) and the Hero Forcibly Clearing a Public Place of Trespassers (Point 17) would appear to portray two scenes out of the ritual of 'the Ride of the Beardless One'.² The tableau of the Bosom Friend Leaning on the Hero's Breast (Point 28) looks like a scene from the romance of Pantheia and Abradatas,³ which in turn is perhaps a version of the myth of Ishtar and Tammuz; and it is possible that the tableau of the *Pietà* was also generated by this Sumeric myth and that it made its way into the Hellenic story of Agis from an Oriental source. The tableau of the Agony (Point 36) looks like a scene from the tragedy of *Hercules Furens*, and the tableau of the Hero Ripping off his Shirt (Point 71) like a scene from the tragedy of *Hercules Oetaeus* (if we may venture to identify the shirt worn by Cleomenes on his dying day with the deadly Shirt of Nessus).⁴ The tableaux of the Hero Arrayed in a Royal Robe and Crown (Point 66) and the Hero being Exhibited in Public as a Claimant to Kingship (Point 67) look like scenes from the ritual of the ephemeral reign of the mock-king of the Saturnalia and the Sacaea;⁵ and the tableau of a Crucified Man being Acclaimed as a Son of God (Point 75) may perhaps be traceable to the same origin.

In the next place we may take note of a pair of tableaux—the

Athena Chalcioecus, then, in the next picture in the Spartan series, 'the house' did harbour 'the King'; for the effect of Lysander's prosecution of King Leonidas on the strength of 'the sign' was to frighten Leonidas into taking asylum in Athena's sanctuary (Plutarch, *cap. cit.*).

¹ Reinach, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 168, suggests that Mark xiv. 51-2 is derived (not from the story of Tiberius Gracchus, but) from Amos ii. 16: 'And he that is courageous among the mighty shall flee away naked in that day.' This suggestion seems far-fetched; for Mark's young man is not represented as being courageous (as is the other anonymous disciple who shows fight in Mark xiv. 47). On the other hand in Amos there is no mention of the fugitive leaving his wrap behind.

² See p. 481, above.

⁴ See p. 472, above.

³ See pp. 460-3, above.

⁵ See pp. 481-6, above.

Descent from the Gallows or Cross (Point 81) and the *Pietà* (Point 82)—which appear to have passed direct out of the Hellenic into our Christian iconography without having been transposed into words, and then retransposed into visual form again, *en route*. The tableau of the Descent is equally prominent in our Christian iconography and in the word-picture in Plutarch's *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes*; on the other hand there is no corresponding text, describing the event, in the Gospels.¹ The *Pietà* is, of course, depicted in a word-picture in the Gospels as well as in Plutarch; but in its portrayal of the same scene the Christian iconographical tradition differs from the Gospels and agrees with the Passion of Agis in one capital point.² In the Christian iconographical tradition, as in the story of Agis, the most prominent actors in this scene are the women of the dead hero's entourage, whereas in the Gospels the women are not mentioned and the laying out of the body for burial is ascribed to a man, namely, Joseph of Arimathaea (who, in the Gospel according to Saint John, is said to have been assisted, not by the women, but by another man, namely Nicodemus). Whatever the ultimate origin of the tableau of the *Pietà*, the assignment of a prominent part in this scene to female characters seems not unlikely to have originated in an authentic feature of the historical Passion of King Agis; for gynaeocracy—'the monstrous regiment of women'—was one of the conspicuous features in the social life of Sparta under the Lycurgean *agôgê*, and this more than ever in the days of Sparta's decadence.³

Such direct transmission of tableaux from the Hellenic to the Christian iconography would appear, however, to be exceptional. All the rest of the tableaux under consideration are to be found in verbal form in the Gospels; not all of them have subsequently found their way back into visual form by being adopted as themes of a Christian iconographical tradition; and, in so far as this retransposition has taken place, the Christian portrayal of these scenes appears to be based upon the text of the Gospels for the most part—though it may have drawn, in addition, upon Hellenic iconographical sources which it is no longer in our power to detect because these have not survived independently.

If we now look into the setting in which our tableaux occur in the Gospels, we may find some corroboration for our conjecture that, at an earlier stage of their history, these tableaux were in circulation in visual form in series which were intended to illustrate the

¹ For the origin of the apparent allusion to the Descent from the Cross in the Gospel according to Saint Luke see p. 404, footnote 1, above.

² On this point see p. 404, footnote 2, above.

³ For the ascendancy of women in 'Lycurgean' Sparta see Part III. A, vol. iii, p. 75, with footnote 4, above.

myths or legends or histories of gods or demigods or human martyrs.

There are, for instance, certain tableaux which in their context in the Gospels seem inconsequent or even incongruous, but which explain and justify themselves in their pagan contexts. This difference in degree of relevancy or congruity suggests that the tableau is native to the context in which it seems to be at home, and that in the other context, in which it does not cohere with its surroundings, it is adventitious. But why should an author have burdened his book with scenes for which he has not succeeded in finding a convenient place or function? The answer may be that the author has been defeated by a problem which he could not solve yet at the same time could not evade. These scenes which he has failed to knit up into the main fabric of his work may have been virtually impossible for him to leave out for the reason that his public may have expected to find them in any *Volksbuch* in which the hero was presented in the role of a saviour. Whether the ultimate origin of these scenes was historical or mythical, they had come, we may surmise, to be regarded as an indispensable part of the credentials of any hero who was a candidate for recognition as being the Saviour *par excellence*. An author whose purpose in writing his book was to present as the Saviour some hero of his own who had not yet won any general acknowledgement could not afford to leave these obligatory scenes out. So in they must go, however difficult it might be to piece them together with the particular story which this particular author was setting out to tell.

Two tableaux which are inconsequent in the Gospels but germane to their other contexts are the Posse Abashed (Point 43) and the Young Man Fleeing (Point 48). The former scene explains itself in the story of Agis, where the men are ordered to put Agis to death and flinch, naturally enough, from executing an order to take the life of a legitimate King of Sparta who has the holy blood of Hêraklê's in his veins. The latter scene explains itself in the story of Tiberius Gracchus, where the fugitive is the hero himself, and where the scene is one of supreme dramatic and emotional interest because it portrays the hero at the instant before he meets his death.

Three tableaux which are incongruous in the Gospels but germane to their other contexts are the Presentation of the Two Swords (Point 32), the Fight (Point 44), and the Command to Cease Fighting (Point 45). In the Gospels all three points are incongruous because, at any rate in the version of the story which has prevailed, Jesus is presented as a gentle hero and not as a violent

one (Point 1), and his non-resistance is one of the hinges on which the plot of the drama turns. On the other hand the fight followed by a command to cease fighting is of the essence of the story of Cleomenes; for Cleomenes is a man of violence who is attempting to make himself master of Alexandria by a *coup de main* and who will therefore fight like a lion so long as his desperate enterprise seems to have any chance of success, but he is also a man of chivalry who will be prompt to avoid what would now be merely aimless bloodshed as soon as it becomes plain that his stroke has failed. As for the tableau of the Presentation of the Two Swords, we may perhaps hazard the guess that the text in the Gospel according to Saint Luke (xxii. 38)—‘And they said: “Lord, behold here are two swords”, and he said unto them: “It is enough”’—may be a transposition into words of one of the details in some popular reproduction of the *Necyia*: a panoramic picture of Hades and its denizens, of which the original, from the hand of no lesser a master than Polygnotus, was one of the treasures of Delphi.¹ Among the heroes of Hellenic Mythology with whose figures Polygnotus’s picture was thronged were that inseparable pair of friends Theseus and Peirithous; and in Pausanias’ description of the picture² this particular group of figures is described in the following words: ‘Below Odysseus are Theseus and Peirithous sitting on thrones—Theseus holding in both hands the swords, Peirithous’s and his own, while Peirithous has his eyes fixed on them.’

We may next return for a moment to the consideration of eight tableaux which, in the Gospels, are all associated with quotations from the Jewish Scriptures and which we have examined in this connexion at an earlier point in our present inquiry.³ These eight tableaux are the Rider (Point 16), the Harrying of the Hucksters (Point 17), the Presentation of the Two Swords (Point 32), the Roman Washing his Hands (Point 64), the Trio of Victims (Point 70), the Shirt (Point 71), the Corpse Intact on the Cross (Point 78), and the Pricking of the Hero’s Body (Point 79). At a first assay we have found ourselves at a loss to understand the relation between these tableaux and the quotations by which they are accompanied in the New Testament. In almost every case the appositeness of the Scriptural text to the tableau is, as we have seen, too slight to warrant the hypothesis that the text may have been the

¹ The present writer’s attention was drawn to Polygnotus’s presentation of Theseus and Peirithous by Reinach’s reference to it in *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 184–6. On the other hand Reinach himself, in another place—*op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 167—suggests that Luke xxii. 38 is derived (not from Polygnotus’s picture, but) from Judges vii. 18 and 20: *‘Ρομφαία τῷ Κυρίῳ καὶ τῷ Γεδεὼν’* (‘a sword for [sic] the Lord and for Gideon’).

² Pausanias: *Descriptio Graeciae*, Book X, chap. 29, § 9. The description of the whole picture occupies chaps. 28–31 inclusive.

³ See pp. 420–8, above.

original material out of which the tableau has been made. And this negative conclusion is borne out by our observation that one of the texts—Isa. liii. 12—is quoted in the Gospel according to Saint Mark apropos of Point 70 and in the Gospel according to Saint Luke apropos of Point 32,¹ while conversely one of the tableaux—No. 17—is accompanied by a combination of texts from Isaiah and Jeremiah in the Synoptic Gospels, but in the Gospel according to Saint John by quite a different text that is taken from one of the Psalms.² How, then, we have still to ask ourselves, have these tableaux and these texts come to be brought into their present association with one another? In the light of the results of our present examination of possible visual means of conveyance we may at last be able to find the answer to this riddle.

Let us suppose that the eight tableaux here in question had come to be regarded as obligatory scenes in any portrayal of any saviour's Passion. Granting this, we may imagine the Evangelists—or the predecessors who served them as sources—being impelled to furnish a Hellenic tableau with a Jewish caption by the consciousness of a need to mitigate the inconsequence, or attenuate the incongruity, of a tableau which an exacting popular tradition would forbid them to leave out, however great might be the difficulty of bringing this tableau into harmony with a story which possessed a plot and an atmosphere of its own that were individual and perhaps unique. The Scriptural caption might not be closely to the point; it might, indeed, be so irrelevant that an identical caption could be fitted by different hands to different tableaux, or an identical tableau be furnished by different hands with different captions. In a semi-sophisticated work such lapses from the sophisticated standard of literary competence might cause little heart-searching either to the author or to his public. On the other hand the author, for his part, might feel himself considerably fortified by the feat of having brought the adventitious Hellenic material into even the loosest relation with the Jewish Canon of Scripture. That feat might be a *tour de force*, and yet the mere juxtaposition of tableau and text would go far to consecrate and justify the tableau in eyes which still saw the Universe through the lens of Judaism. In bringing such tableaux into even a forced and artificial relation with Scriptural texts the Evangelist would be taking not only the first but perhaps actually the decisive step towards capturing from Hellenism, and annexing to Judaism, certain 'features' (in the journalistic usage of the word) which it was obligatory for him to incorporate into his own work because these by now traditional traits had come to be the hall-marks of a *soi-disant* saviour's

¹ See p. 426, above.

² See pp. 425-6, above.

authenticity in the eyes of a public which was already being recruited from the non-Jewish masses of a promiscuous proletarian underworld.

To furnish a picture with a caption is an attempt to give this old picture a new meaning without actually touching the picture itself; but this is an external treatment which can only be expected to be effective if the reinterpretation that is required is superficial. If the picture has to be reinterpreted in a radical way, this can hardly be achieved without at least some retouching; and we can put our finger upon several tableaux which in fact seem to bear the marks of having been repainted to some extent in order to enable them to carry a new meaning.

There are two cases, for example, in which, to all appearance, a scene has been made to fit into a series to which it did not originally belong by reducing the figure of the original protagonist to the dimensions of a minor character. In this fashion the scene of the Rider (Point 16) seems to have been fitted into the story of Cleomenes by transferring the Rider's part from the hero to one of his henchmen¹—in contrast to the treatment of the same scene in the Gospels, where the Rider remains the principal figure that he is in the original rite from which this scene seems to be ultimately derived. In a similar way the scene of the Flight and Pursuit of Tiberius Gracchus on the Day of his Martyrdom (Point 48) seems to have been fitted into the story of Jesus by transferring the Fugitive's part from the hero to one of his henchmen whom an embarrassed adapter leaves anonymous, without attempting to identify this obligatory figure with any of the characters who appear on the stage in earlier acts of the Christian drama.

We may also recall one case in which we have found reason² to surmise that a character—'the Bosom Friend'—has undergone a

¹ Before we traced the tableau of the Rider back to the rite of 'the Ride of the Beardless One' (see p. 481, above), we had already rejected the hypothesis that this tableau might have given rise to the name of Cleomenes' companion Hippitas. We took note (on p. 462, footnote 2, above), of the fact that Hippitas was an authentic historical personage whom Polybius displays to us in the act of strolling, in his leader's company, along the quayside at Alexandria. According to Plutarch-Phylarchus, however, Hippitas was a lame man; and this, according to the same authority, was the reason why, on the day of the abortive *coup*, the lame man's companions commandeered a horse and mounted him upon it. No doubt Hippitas may have been too lame to charge at the double when he was not too lame to stroll; or he may have gone lame in the interval between the scene in which he figures on foot in the narrative of Polybius and the scene (which has no counterpart in Polybius's pages) in which he figures on horseback in the narrative of Plutarch-Phylarchus. It seems more likely, however, that Phylarchus has named Hippitas with his own hand—or stylus—as an excuse for hoisting his victim into the saddle, and that he has singled out Hippitas for playing the Rider's part on account of his name—if we may assume that Phylarchus had found the inclusion of the Rider Scene obligatory, and that he was in difficulties over conscripting somebody to play a part which even the most audaciously romantic historian could not venture to assign to Cleomenes himself when the whole world was aware that, on that day in Alexandria, Cleomenes had charged and fought on foot.

² See pp. 461-3, above.

change of sex.¹ In the tableau of the Favourite Companion Lying on the Hero's Breast (Point 28) the Bosom Friend is of the male sex in the stories of Cleomenes and Gaius Gracchus and Jesus alike. On the other hand in the romance of Pantheia and Abradatas (an older story which is perhaps a version of the myth of Ishtar and Tammuz) the corresponding figure in the same tableau is not male but female. We have already conjectured² that this change of sex may have been the work of Phylarchus, and that this romantic historian may have been tempted to take this liberty by the play of his volatile imagination upon the superficial similarity between the names of Pantheia and Panteus.

The necessity of transferring a tableau from a setting in which the hero is violent to one in which he is gentle has, in at least two cases, apparently compelled the authors of the Gospels—or their sources—to make changes that go farther than a transfer of parts or even a change of sex. For example, in the tableau of the Favourite Companion Lying on the Hero's Breast (Point 28)—as this appears in the story of Abradatas (where the favourite companion is the hero's widow Pantheia), as well as in the stories of Cleomenes and Gaius Gracchus (where the favourite companion is a man)—the hero's body is not alive and in peace but is the corpse of a warrior who has died by violence, while the favourite companion is in the act of slaying herself (or himself) upon the hero's dead body. On the other hand in the same tableau, as this appears in the story of Jesus, the hero is lying, not dead on the ground, but alive in the triclinium, and the favourite companion is leaning on his breast, not in order to join him in death, but in order to talk with him privily. It will be seen that in this case (if our explanation is right) the tableau has been reinterpreted as drastically as it well could be without altering the grouping of the figures. It will also be seen that no lesser change would have availed to fit into the Passion of a gentle hero a tableau which is, in origin, a violent hero's death-scene. The same problem has had to be faced in the transfer, from the Passion of Agis to the Passion of Jesus, of the tableau of a Hubbub at Night-time with Lights (Point 41); and here it has been solved by turning a scene which originally portrayed an attempt to rescue the hero into a portrayal of his arrest.

We may also notice two apparent cases of rationalization in the style of Phylarchus's treatment of the Rider Tableau.³ In the pair of tableaux (Points 66 and 67) in which the hero is arrayed in a royal robe and crown he is dressed (if Frazer's conjecture is right)⁴

¹ Compare the metamorphosis of the Bodhisattva Avalokita into the goddess Kwan-yin in the course of the migration of the Mahāyāna from India to the Far East.

² See pp. 461-3, above.

³ See p. 530, footnote 1, above.

⁴ See pp. 481-6, above.

to fit the part of the mock-king in the ritual of the Saturnalia or the Sacaea. In both the story of Tiberius Gracchus and the story of Jesus, however, this pair of tableaux is given a matter-of-fact explanation which lies quite outside the realm of religious or magical practice. Jesus is represented as being robed and crowned in mockery of the fact that he—an obscure man of the people—has solemnly pleaded guilty to the charge of having claimed to be a king. Tiberius Gracchus is represented as being first robed and crowned in a kind of private dress-rehearsal for a future coronation as King of Rome, and then subsequently denounced to the Senate as asking the People for a diadem. Similarly, when Cleomenes is portrayed as ripping open the seam of his shirt (Point 71), he is represented in the narrative of Plutarch-Phylarchus as performing this trivial action for the matter-of-fact purpose of giving free play to his sword-arm. We may suspect, however, that this ostensibly rational explanation is no more than an ingenious expedient for fitting into the story of Cleomenes a tableau in which, in the original, the Heracleid's ancestor Hêraklês was depicted in the act of trying in vain to tear off from his tormented body the poisoned Shirt of Nessus.

Inversely, there is one case in which an originally matter-of-fact scene appears to have been given a ritualistic meaning in order to fit it into another story. In the original picture the Roman Washing his Hands in a Basin (Point 64) is Catiline; he is washing them because they are literally stained with the blood of a victim whom he has been putting to a lingering death; and the basin that he uses is the nearest one to hand (it happens to be a holy water basin at the door of a temple).¹ In the Gospel according to Saint Matthew, where the Roman's part is transferred from Catiline to Pilate, the blood-stain is not literal but metaphorical; the washing is not a practical or utilitarian act, but a ritualistic and symbolical one; and the water is fetched expressly for the purpose, instead of being casually found at hand. These changes are necessary if the

¹ On this point Professor Gilbert Murray queries: 'Would that incident be depicted? Were there pictures of the doings of villains?' No doubt, a character who was a villain in the eyes of the designer of a picture would not be given the *beau rôle*, or even the central part, in the tableau. If he appeared at all (as, e.g., Judas would appear in the scene of the Betrayal) he would figure simply as a necessary foil to the hero. A character, however, who was a villain in one person's eyes might be a hero in another's. We assume that Catiline was a villain because we see him through the eyes of Cicero and Sallust (even though it is possible, and indeed probable, that we should have formed the same opinion of Catiline independently if we had been in a position to pass judgement on him at first hand). At the same time we know that Catiline was not a villain, but a hero, in the eyes of his fellow desperadoes who responded to his call to arms and died fighting under his leadership; and, if Catiline's 'Passion' was pictorially represented in the 'continuous style', it would be in the circle of his followers and admirers that the series of pictures, commemorating his life and death, would originate and circulate. In such circles the atrocity committed by Catiline upon Marcus Marius might count, not as a crime to be buried in oblivion, but as a *beau geste* to be immortalized.

tableau is to be incorporated into the story of a Passion in which the hero suffers his death on the Cross and not under a butcher's knife.

Finally, we may notice that our hypothetical visual means of conveyance might serve to account, not only for all our 'common scenes' (Table V), but also, incidentally, for at any rate more than one of our 'common words' (Table VIII). If we glance back at Petronius's fictitious account of the series of wall-paintings in the 'continuous style', representing scenes from the past life and future apotheosis of Trimalchio, which meet the eyes of the millionaire-freedman's guests, we shall observe that, according to Petronius, every scene in this set is garnished with a number of explanatory captions.¹ We may now observe that this lettering need not necessarily be cast in the form of a statement in the third person nor necessarily be placed outside the picture in the margin either above it or below it. It is just as feasible, and perhaps more neat, to put the explanatory words into the first person and to paint or inscribe them on a scroll issuing out of the mouth or mouths of one or more of the figures in the picture or bas-relief. In Reinach's opinion,² one of the lines in the Virgilian word-picture of the eternal punishment of Phlegyas—'Discite iustitiam moniti et non temnere divos' (*Aeneid*, Book VI, l. 620)—reproduces a saying which, in the picture that was Virgil's ultimate source, was painted or inscribed as though it were issuing from the mouth of the figure of Phlegyas.

This hypothesis may not, perhaps, account as a rule for those 'common words' in our list that are quoted as extracts from speeches or dialogues; but it may explain three which are cast in the form of exclamations. These three exclamatory phrases are 'Weep not for me, but weep for yourselves' (Point 68 = Saying (θ)); 'Remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom' (Point 72 = Saying (κ)); and 'It is finished' (Point 74 = Saying (λ)). And we may now perhaps hazard a guess at what was the subject of the original series of tableaux in which two, at any rate, out of our three phrases made their first appearance. 'Weep not for me, but weep for yourselves' are words that might aptly have been put into the mouth of the figure of Socrates by a painter or sculptor who was transposing into visual form the scene in Socrates' prison immediately after Socrates has drained the death-cup (Point (o) in the correspondences between the story of Jesus and the story of Socrates), as this scene is described by Plato in his *Phaedo*, 117 C-E (Point (π) in the correspondences between the story of Jesus and the story of Socrates). At any rate, this form of words does

¹ See the passage of Petronius's *Cena Trimalchionis* that has been translated on p. 514, above.

² Reinach, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 182.

succinctly combine Phaedo's unspoken thoughts and feelings (as analysed, in the Platonic dialogue, by Phaedo himself) with the vocal remonstrance that Plato puts into Socrates' mouth.¹ As for 'It is finished' (τετέλεσται), this sounds like an echo of 'This was the end (ἦδε ἡ τελευτή) of our companion', which is the opening phrase of the last sentence of the *Phaedo*; and we can readily imagine our hypothetical painter taking this phrase for the title of a picture in which Socrates would be depicted lying dead after the poison has taken effect. These would, in fact, almost inevitably be the last two pictures in any series that was intended to tell the story of the Life and Death of Socrates graphically in the 'continuous style'. And we can also guess what must have been the first picture in the portrayal of Socrates' Passion. This first picture would be the trial scene; and here an artist whose theme was *The Apology* might summarize the prisoner's speech in his own defence by inscribing 'One ought to obey God rather than men'² on a scroll issuing out of Socrates' mouth.

This last conjecture may conclude our present inquiry.

The Economy of Truth

To what conclusions does this inquiry lead? In the first place it perhaps throws some further light upon the problem of Schism-and-Palingenesia, which has been the chief subject of this part of our Study; and in this light we may be able to see more plainly the bow in the cloud. At first sight it might seem as though the schism that accompanies the breakdown of a civilization were an unmitigated disaster. In this schism a social unity is cleft asunder into a pair of fragments whose ragged edges are divided by an intervening gap, and the stroke of Fate or Fortune that has parted them looks at first like an act of sheer sabotage; but a longer view shows that the shock has not simply shattered the social fabric; it has also set an electric current coursing through its fibres, and in the space where the spark is forced to leap the gap between fragment and fragment it describes, between these severed poles, an arc of light whose glow illuminates the Universe. The vision of salvation as Transfiguration, and of the Saviour as God Incarnate, is attained in a spiritual intercourse, across a social gulf, between souls that have been partially estranged from one another through being confined in the separate prison-houses of a dominant minority and an internal proletariat.

But what of the inquiry itself? The findings of this amateur

¹ A translation of this passage of the *Phaedo* has already been given in this Annex on pp. 493-4, above.

² Acts v. 29 = Apology 29 D (see p. 491, footnote 2, above).

essay in what is called 'the Higher Criticism' will almost certainly have been felt by some readers to be insufferable if false and desolating if true. Is this bound to be the feeling of the devout soul towards the critical intellect?

If we wish to understand the history of a debate between 'the Higher Critics' and the champions of religious orthodoxy which has been going on in our Western World for the better part of a century, we must look first for the agreed basis—the *compromis* as it is called in the technical terminology of the international lawyers—on which the argument is being conducted; and when we observe what the *compromis* here is we shall perhaps be surprised. The tacit understanding seems to have been that what is at stake in this debate is nothing less than the essence of the Christian Faith: the threefold belief in the love of God, in His incarnation in Jesus Christ, and in His perpetual operation in This World through the Holy Spirit. The champions of orthodoxy appear to have tacitly admitted that these foundations of Christianity will collapse if 'the Higher Critics' succeed in proving their case; and 'the Higher Critics', on their side, have been not loath to accept this construction of the wager. On this tacit understanding 'the Higher Critics' are prone to boast that they have won the match whenever they score even a trifling success; and in the same frame of mind the champions of orthodoxy are no less prone to proclaim that the whole method of 'the Higher Criticism' has been discredited whenever they succeed in forcing their opponents to evacuate some recently occupied advanced post. This common assumption of the possibility of a 'knock-out blow' perhaps accounts for the barrenness that has been characteristic of the debate hitherto. For the assumption is assuredly an untenable one.

On the one hand the champions of orthodoxy are surely deluding themselves if they imagine that they will ever be able to drive 'the Higher Criticism' right out of the religious field. Unquestionably this 'Higher Criticism' has come to stay; and the local counter-attacks which may succeed here and there and now and then in driving it out of this or that advanced post can never seriously threaten its main positions. On the other hand 'the Higher Critics', for their part, are surely deluding themselves no less if they imagine that any of their thrusts have touched the quick. So far they have merely been singeing their opponent's beard and sticking pins into his hide; and these are hits which cause annoyance without endangering life. The rather laborious operations of the present writer in the present inquiry have no doubt been of this superficial kind; and his own expectation, for what it may be

worth, is that, at the end of the story, 'the Higher Criticism' will be found to have been, not the bane of Religious Belief, but its useful, though humble, servant.

The 'Higher Critic's' keen-edged blade is not the headsman's but the pruner's; and Religious Belief is a tree whose growth is stimulated by pollarding.¹ The great positive advances in religious insight and saintliness are apt also to have this negative, destructive side; and it was this aspect of both Judaism and Christianity that first struck the imagination of the pagan world on which these two 'higher religions' made their successive impacts. When an Antiochus III and a Pompey forced their way into the Holy of Holies at the Temple in Jerusalem, the one thing that they both of them noticed was that this Jewish sanctum was empty. What an exposure of the hypocrisy of a community that had been making such a fuss about the sacrosanctity of its outlandish religion! So these Jews had not been willing even to go to the expense of providing their Yahweh with the statue that was due to him! On a similar line of reasoning other Hellenes in a later age arrived, *bona fide*, at the conclusion that the Primitive Christians were atheists because these iconoclasts contested the divinity of the pagan gods.² The salutariness of the Jewish and the Christian attack upon idolatry and polytheism escaped the notice of the hostile critics, because they did not apprehend that this negative attitude was ministering to a positive purpose, and that these 'atheists' were sweeping their cloudy pagan pantheon out of the light in order to bring within sight of pagan eyes the beatific vision of the One True God. In the present age it is perhaps not impossible that the same salutary work of unveiling a truth that is divine may be the surprising function of an ostensibly godless 'Higher Criticism'. But an apologist for 'the Higher Critics' cannot file this plea unless he is able to show that, here once again, the pruner's knife is clearing the ground for a more abundant life, and the air for a more penetrating vision.

Perhaps we may plead that our present essay in 'the Higher Criticism' does fulfil this condition in some slight degree. If its negative result has been to call in question the originality of a number of elements in the Gospels, its positive result—which it will have achieved in so far as it has been successful in tracing these apparently adventitious elements back towards their apparently Hellenic origins—will have been to vindicate the claim of Christianity to be a religion in which God has revealed Himself in

¹ For the simile of the pollarded tree see I. C (iii) (b), vol. i, pp. 168-9, above.

² On this point see IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (β), vol. iv, p. 348; V. C (i) (c) 2, Annex II, vol. v, p. 584; and V. C (i) (d) 7, in the present volume, p. 40, footnote 2, above.

history, while translating this claim into terms which, to traditionally orthodox minds, may seem to empty the claim of just those traditional contents which, for them, give it its supreme significance and value. They will see our investigation as an attack upon the historicity of the story of Jesus Christ as this is presented in the Gospels; and at this price they will not thank us for having perhaps slightly extended, at least in one direction, the traditional view of the historical antecedents of the epiphany of Christianity.

The notion that Christianity did not make its epiphany full-grown and fully-armed, like Pallas Athene, is of course in itself not a matter of controversy. In the orthodox tradition of the Church it has always been recognized that the incarnation of God in Christ is the culminating act of a long religious drama. The text of the New Testament itself bears the stamp of the doctrine that the coming of Christ is the fulfilment of Scripture; and it has been one of the most fruitful commonplaces of orthodox exegesis to trace the process of revelation backwards from Jesus to the Prophets, from the Prophets to Moses, from Moses to Abraham. The concept of progressive revelation is thus in itself quite familiar; but, in the orthodox Christian tradition hitherto, this concept has only been applied to the Judaic tributary that has flowed into the river of Christianity out of the Syriac World. Latterly, however, it has been discovered by our modern Western scholarship that the mundane area of catchment of these living waters has been of a wider range than is covered by the single domain of Jewry, notwithstanding the immensity of this Jewish empire in the spiritual dimension. It has come to be realized that the Hellenic World, too, has played some part in catching and transmitting the waters by which the river has been fed, and that the number of the tributaries of Christianity has to be reckoned as not one but two, whose respective names are Judaism and Hellenism.¹ This discovery is not at all sensational; for it merely confirms empirically what was to be expected *a priori* in view of the historical background out of which Christianity emerged. Christianity was born into a world which was the product of a collision between the Syriac and the Hellenic cultures.

To minds that look out upon the Universe through Christian eyes this traditionally Christian concept of a progressive revelation surely need not turn into a stumbling-block in the process of being extended from a Jewish to a Hellenic field. But other minds may challenge the concept in principle and in all its applications, traditional or critical. Why *should* revelation come gradually? Why should not God have declared himself to Man once for all in some

¹ This view has been presented, by anticipation, in V. C (i) (d) 5, vol. v, p. 434, above.

instantaneous blaze of His divine light? The decisive answer to this impatient question is that 'with men this is impossible' though 'all things are possible with God'.¹ Human life in This World is imprisoned in the Time-dimension; and this means that, under mundane conditions, the apprehension of spiritual truth, like all other human activities, must be a process that has its own specific pace. On this showing, the gradualness of revelation is not an arbitrary decree of an omnipotent God but is a necessary consequence of the mundane limitations of Man; and the evidence which goes to show that revelation does come to Man in this gradual way will accordingly remind us that God is master of this, as of every, situation. It is not in a waterspout but in a gentle shower that the golden rain pierces the brazen carapace of Danae's dungeon. And God's method of progressive revelation may be accurately described, in Newman's famous phrase, as 'an economy of truth', if the word 'economy' is taken in its proper meaning of a masterly dispensation, without any connotation of dishonest short measure.

But what is truth? For it is one thing to dispense pure truth in doses that have been adjusted to the capacity of the recipient, and another thing to dole out a truth that has been slyly diluted with falsehood. 'Have you not', some reader may ask, 'been virtually accusing God of practising a fraud when, without denying that the Gospels may be God's revelation, you argue that the Gospels contain elements that are not historical, in the sense that certain recorded acts were not in fact performed, and certain reported words were not in fact uttered, by the person who is credited with them, or in the circumstances assigned to them, by the Evangelists?' This question is perhaps best answered by counter-questioning the questioner. Is God's economy, we may ask, to be dictated to God by Man? Is God to be prohibited by a human veto from revealing Himself through *Dichtung* if He will, as well as through *Wahrheit*? Are not all human modes of expression at God's disposal? Is not divine truth revealed in the story of a fictitious Lazarus and an anonymous Dives? And, if, as a matter of fact, the Parables have been recognized by the Church as being revelation without being history, are we debarred from accepting other elements in the Gospels on the same footing because, unlike the Parables, they do not proclaim themselves to be fiction, but are cast, like epic poetry or 'folk-tales', in the form of statements of fact?

But is it credible that God should have revealed himself in 'folk-lore'? To this last question the answer is that it is in 'folk-lore' if anywhere—for it is certainly not on ballot-papers—that *Vox*

¹ Matt. xix. 26.

Populi becomes *Vox Dei*. And this answer has good authority; for it has been given in one of the sayings that are attributed to Jesus in an early collection which 'the Higher Critics' call 'Q':

'In that hour Jesus rejoiced in spirit and said: "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight."'¹

¹ Luke x. 21 = Matt. xi. 25-6.

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¹ In the cross-references in this index, references in small capitals (e.g. ANATOLIA at the end of the heading Achaeans) are to other main headings, while references in ordinary type are to sub-divisions of the same main heading.

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A STUDY OF HISTORY

2

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A STUDY OF HISTORY

BY

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*Director of Studies in the Royal Institute
of International Affairs
Research Professor of International History
in the University of London
(both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)*

But at my back I always hear
Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near.

ANDREW MARVELL

ποιεῖν τι δεῖ ἄς γόνυ χλωρόν.

THEOCRITUS: *Κυνίσκας* "Ἔρως, l. 70

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

SOLON

My times are in Thy hand.

Ps. xxxi. 15, in the A.V.

But Thou art the same, and Thy
years shall have no end.

Ps. cii. 27, in the A.V.

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PREFACE

THESE four volumes contain Parts VI-XIII of the thirteen parts which are set out in the plan of the book on p. v above, and their publication brings the book to a close.

I was not able to begin writing these concluding eight parts till I had been released from work as a temporary civil servant during the Second World War. By the summer of A.D. 1946, when I found myself free to return to my normal occupations, more than seven years had passed since the publication of volumes iv-vi in the summer of A.D. 1939, forty-one days before Great Britain had gone to war with Germany, and more than seventeen years had now passed since the latest of the notes for the book, which had all been written between June 1927 and June 1929, had been put on paper.

If these notes had not still been in existence—as they were, thanks to their safe-keeping during the war in the hands of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York—I might have found it beyond my power to take up my work again after a seven years' interruption during which there had been a break in my personal life as well as in the life of the society into which I had been born. On the other hand, I should assuredly have failed at this stage to carry the work to completion if, after having set my thoughts moving again by reacquainting myself with my notes in their original form, I had not thrown them into the melting-pot and recast them.

The world around me and within me had, indeed, met with a number of challenging and transforming experiences in the course of the nineteen years and more that, by the summer of A.D. 1946, had already passed since the first of the original notes for the book had been written. The focus and perspective in which the earlier millennia of the Age of the Civilizations presented themselves to the eyes of our generation had been appreciably modified in the meantime by further discoveries in the field of Archaeology. The prospects of a contemporary Western Civilization, and of an *Oikoumenê* which this civilization had enveloped in its world-encompassing net, had become clearer and graver since the National Socialist movement in Germany had given to Western Man—and to his non-Western contemporaries likewise—a horrifying practical demonstration of the moral depths to which the heirs of a Christian civilization were capable of dragging themselves down. A new dimension of the Spiritual Universe had been brought to light by the psychologists, and a new dimension of the Material Universe by the atomic physicists. An Einstein and a Rutherford, a Freud and a Jung, and a Marshall and a Woolley, as well as a Gandhi, a Stalin, a Hitler, a Churchill, and a Roosevelt, had been changing the face of the Macrocosm; and at the same time my inner world had been undergoing changes which, on the miniature scale of an individual life, were, for me, of proportionate magnitude. The cumulative effect of these divers changes in my universe had been so far-reaching that, when in A.D. 1946 I was once more free to think of resuming and finishing my work,

I found that the reawakening of my original thoughts was only the beginning of my next task. In order to carry out my purpose, I should have to think again in the light of the revolutionary experience which the nineteen intervening years had been thrusting upon me and my contemporaries.

The effort required for performing this act of mental rejuvenation might have been beyond my capacity if I had been left to attempt it in solitude; but at this point I was effectively helped on my way by the timely receipt of a series of invitations to give public lectures on the topics that were the agenda for the still unexecuted parts of the plan of the book. In a set of Edward Cadbury Lectures delivered at the University of Birmingham, England, in the autumn of 1946 I dealt with the subjects of Parts VI–VIII; in a set of Mary Flexner Lectures delivered at Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania, in the spring of 1947 I dealt with the subject of Part IX; in a set of Bampton Lectures delivered at Columbia University, New York, in April 1948 I dealt with the subject of Part XII, and, later in the same month, with the subject of Part XIII in a set of Rushton Lectures delivered at Southern College, Birmingham, Alabama. The subject of Part XI was my theme in a set of Chichele Lectures delivered in the autumn of 1948 in the University of Oxford on an invitation from All Souls College. The subject of Part X was broached in a couple of lectures delivered in April 1949 in the University of Chicago on an invitation from the Committee on Social Thought.

I was fortunate in being given these opportunities of feeling my way back into a study of History for the immediate practical purpose of sharing my thoughts and feelings with responsive audiences. The congenial necessity of writing notes for these lectures gave me the stimulus that I needed in order to recast my original notes for the book in a new form answering to the new experiences, public and personal, that I had encountered since the summer of 1927. In the outcome, the original plan of the book still stood and the execution of Parts VI, VIII, X, and XIII was carried out more or less on the lines of the original notes. The subjects of Parts VII, IX, XI, and XII, on the other hand, came, in the event, to be treated very differently from the original design—and the subject of Part XI, in particular, so differently that the title of this Part had to be changed from ‘Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations’ to ‘Law and Freedom in History’.

When these invitations to lecture had thus given me the impetus required for finishing the book in the light of my experience since 1927, I should have found myself overwhelmed by the accumulation of seven years’ arrears of work on the Chatham House *Survey of International Affairs*—work which was the first call on my time and energy—but for the imagination, considerateness, and generosity of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Rockefeller Foundation of New York, and the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N.J., in co-operating with one another to release the major part of my time, for a period of five years beginning on the 1st July, 1947, for writing the rest of *A Study of History*, partly in England and partly in America,

under ideal conditions. My debt to the Rockefeller Foundation, and to the authorities at Bryn Mawr College who were the Foundation's consultants when it was considering this project, is a greater one than I can put into words.

My acknowledgements and thanks for the help of many kinds, from many quarters, which I have received in the writing of the book as a whole are set out at the end (in volume x, on pp. 213-42), since they run to too great a length to allow of their being included in a preface; but I cannot bring myself to postpone my expression of gratitude for certain essential pieces of help in the production of this last batch of four volumes.

The index to the volumes now published, like the two indexes to the preceding six volumes, has been made by my wife and colleague and co-author of the *Survey of International Affairs*. If the reader ever loses the thread of my thought, he will find it again here—as I know from having often found it, myself, in the indexes to the two previous batches of volumes. My gratitude is not lessened by the happy knowledge that this skilful and exacting task has been a labour of love.

Miss Bridget Reddin has completed the enormous tasks—begun in the winter of 1930-1—of typing from a manuscript that has always been complicated, and of deciphering a handwriting that has not improved in the course of putting on paper some millions of words. Both the printer and I would have been at a loss if Miss Reddin had not returned to give us this help after having served during the Second World War, with my wife and me, in the same department of the Government of the United Kingdom.

The book that I am finishing in the act of writing this preface has had a long history on the Time-scale of an individual human life. Now that I have finished it, I can see in retrospect that, without knowing it, I was already at work on it in rather early days. For instance, the Annex to Part VI C (ii) (c) 3 first found its way on to paper, in the form of a child's coloured illustrations to the text of Herodotus, Book VII, chaps. 61-99, in a drawing-book, dated August 1903, which is on my table at my elbow at this moment. Upon it lies the manuscript—running to sixty-four pages of sermon paper and ending with a quotation from the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel xxxvii. 1-10—of an essay on 'the Philosophy of History' read at Oxford to an undergraduate society at some date in the academic year 1910-11. In the summer of 1920, after the philosophic contemporaneity of the Western and Hellenic civilizations had been borne in on me by the experience of the First World War, I for the first time consciously tried—and, at this first attempt, signally failed—to write the present work in the form (dictated by a Late Medieval Italian education in the Greek and Latin Classics) of a commentary on the second chorus (ll. 332-75) of Sophocles' *Antigone*. I did not succeed in finding my way into my subject till more than a year later.

On Saturday, 17 September, 1921, I was travelling with my school-fellow and life-long friend Theodore Wade-Gery in the Orient Express *en route* from Constantinople to England. Before dawn we had been awakened by the rumbling of our train as it crossed the bridge over the

Maritsa, below Adrianople, and, for the rest of that day, we were travelling on westward up the valley of a river that had once been famous as the Hebrus. As I stood, hour after hour, at the corridor window, watching the stream glide by, with an endless fringe of willows and poplars marking out, as they slid past, the curves of the gently flowing waters' course, my mind began to dream of historical and legendary events of which an Hellenic Thrace and an Ottoman Rumili had been the theatre: the legendary violent death of the Prophet Orpheus; the historic violent deaths of the Emperors Valens and Nicephorus; the entrenchment of the Ottoman Power on the European side of the Straits in the reign of Sultan Murād I. When a group of inquisitive Bulgarian peasants clustered round the door of our coach as the train lingered in a wayside station, my eye was caught by the fox-skin cap that one of these Thracian contemporaries of mine was wearing; for this was the headgear in which Herodotus (in Book VII, chap. 75) had paraded the Asiatic Thracian contingent of Xerxes' expeditionary force, and a picture of a Thracian fighting-man in just such a cap, which I had copied into my drawing-book eighteen years ago, had left its imprint on my memory. These stimulating sights and reminiscences must have released some psychic well-spring at a subconscious level. That evening I was still standing at the window, overwhelmed by the beauty of the Bela Palanka Gorge in the light of a full moon, as our train bore down upon Nish. If I had been cross-examined on my activities during that day, I should have sworn that my attention had been wholly absorbed by the entrancing scenes that were passing continually before my outward eye. Yet, before I went to sleep that night, I found that I had put down on half a sheet of notepaper a list of topics which, in its contents and in their order, was substantially identical with the plan of this book as it now stands printed in volumes i, iv, and vii. The path that had thus unexpectedly—and, as it might seem, casually—opened at last before my feet was to carry me farther than I then foresaw on a journey that was to take nearly thirty years to complete; but, once open, the path went on unfolding itself before me till today I find myself at this long journey's end.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

LONDON

16 August 1951

SINCE writing this preface, I have begun to be able to see ahead to the next stage of this Study beyond the moment when I shall have delivered the last proofs of volumes vii-x to the printer.

While these four volumes have been in the press, I have been co-operating with my friend Professor E. D. Myers, of Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, and with my former colleague Mrs. Gomme, who was the head of the cartographical section of the Foreign Office Research Department during the Second World War, in producing the maps, and compiling the gazetteer of place-names that

are either shown on these maps or are mentioned in the text of volumes i-x, which are to be published together in a forthcoming volume xi. This eleventh volume, which is mostly Professor Myers' and Mrs. Gomme's work, will, I believe, be welcomed by readers of volumes i-x.

On the 26th February, 1953, the Rockefeller Foundation once again came to my aid in a most imaginative and effective way by giving my wife and me a grant to cover the costs of travel with a view eventually to revising this book. Our first use of this kind grant was to pay a visit to Mexico, from the 14th April to the 16th May, 1953, for the three-fold purpose of seeing at first hand some of the monuments of the Middle American Civilization and of the Spanish Empire of the Indies in the former Viceroyalty of New Spain and some of the aspects, in the Mexican field, of the current encounter between the World and the Modern West. Thanks to the hospitality and help of the Federal Ministry of Public Instruction and the Autonomous National University of Mexico, we were able to use our precious time in Mexico to good advantage. We look forward to following up this reconnaissance in Middle America by visiting Japan and Peru in 1956 on a journey to and from Australia which is to take us round the World. When, after that, we settle down to the task of revision, our plan is, first, to produce a volume of 'reconsiderations' (*retractationes* in Saint Augustine's usage of the Latin word). Since the first publication of the first batch of volumes in 1934, there have been additions to our historical knowledge, particularly through the wonderful work of the archaeologists, which have changed the appearance of some tracts of the historical landscape. There have also been comments and criticisms, both general and particular, on the ideas presented in the book and on some of the citations of facts by which these ideas have been illustrated and supported. While I have already profited greatly by many of these criticisms in writing the later volumes, I shall not have drawn the full benefit from them till I have taken a synoptic view of them; and this will be the second topic in the volume of *retractationes* that my wife and I are planning to produce.

We also have other books on the stocks, and we should be happy if there could be said of us what Clarendon has said of himself in his autobiography:

'In all this retirement he was very seldom vacant . . . from reading excellent books or writing some animadversions and exercitations of his own. . . . He left so many papers of several kinds, and cut out so many pieces of work, that a man may conclude that he never intended to be idle.'¹

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

LONDON

18 February 1954

¹ *The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon*, written by himself, *ad fin.* (Oxford 1817, Clarendon Press), vol. ii, p. 567, quoted in the present Study, III. iii. 321.

SCRIPTORIS VITA NOVA

O silvae, silvae, raptae mihi, non revidendae,
O mea, Silvani filia, musa dryas,
non dolet: hoc Paeto dictum immortale profata
Arria procudit mi quoque robur et aes—
mi quoque; non solus tamen exsulo: nonne priores
clara creaverunt tristi opera exsilio?
Exsul—et immeritus—divom, Florentia, carmen
edidit, alma intra moenia tale tua
nil orsus, vates. Non iuste expulsus Athenis,
Pangaei clivis advena Threiciis,
scripsit postnatis in perpetuom relegendam
vir, bello infelix dux prius, historiam.
His ego par fato: par sim virtute. Fovetur
acrius aerumnis magnanimum ingenium.
Me patriae excidium stimulat nova quaerere regna.
Troia, vale! Latium per maria atra peto.
Silvae, musa dryas, praesens Silvane, penates,
'non' mihi clamanti 'non' reboate 'dolet'.

*Quae sibi nil quaerens quaerenti tanta ministrat,
quae nil accipiens omnia suppeditat,
quae constanter amat non tali robore amata,
quae dare—et hoc totis viribus—ardet opem,
nonne haec digna suo Beronice nomine sancto?
Quod patet ante oculos, improbe, nonne vides?*

Cui tam cara comes, non exsulat exsul: ubique
patria qua praesens coniugis adsit amor.

*Caece diu, tandem vidisti clarius. Audi:
Perdita mortali gaudia flere nefas:
non datur humanis in perpetuom esse beatos:
mox marcent vitae praemia: segnities
Elysii pretiumst: hebetat dulcedo: doloris
sopitam recreant volnere viva animam.
Haec non quaesitae tibi ianua aperta salutis:
tu fato felix: te nova vita vocat.*

Gavissus iuvenis vitae describere metas,
ausus eram fatum prospicere ipse meum.
Prospexi triplicem—fauste ducentis Amoris,
Musarum comitum, coniugis—harmoniam,
amens, qui, vasti peragrans vagus aequora ponti,
non cavi fulmen, saeva procella, tuom.
Non iterum de me dictabo oracula: nosti,
qui me servasti, Tu mea fata, Deus.

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A KEY TO THE CROSS-REFERENCES

IN THE FOOTNOTES TO VOLS. VII-X

THE final text of this book, like the original notes for it, has been written (except for some of the annexes) in the order in which the chapters appear in the Table of Contents. At each step in both making the notes and writing the text, the writer has always tried to see the particular passage on which he has been working at the moment in its relation to the plan of the whole book; and he has printed in his footnotes to the text the resulting network of cross-references because he believes that a method of continually taking his bearings, which has been an indispensable guide and discipline for the course of his own thought, is likely also to be of some help to his readers.

Since, in the nature of the case, the quantity of these notes of cross-references has increased as one Part of the book after another has been written out in full, the writer has sought, in the printing of this concluding batch of four volumes, to spare the reader's eye—and, in the act, to lighten the printer's labours—by reducing the bulk of his cross-references to a minimum. Accordingly, each reference has been cut down to three entries: a large Roman numeral indicating the Part, a small Roman numeral indicating the volume, and an Arabic numeral giving the page, with an n. to stand for 'footnote' when the reference is to one of these. For example, a reference which in volumes i-vi would have appeared in a footnote in the form 'See IV. C (iii) (c) 2 (γ), Annex, vol. iv, p. 637, above', would appear in the four present volumes as 'See IV. iv. 637'. Neither the printer nor the reader, the writer believes, is likely to regret this compression.

VI UNIVERSAL STATES

A. ENDS OR MEANS?

THE starting-point of this book was a search for fields of historical study which would be intelligible in themselves within their own limits in Space and Time, without reference to extraneous historical events. An empirical pursuit of this inquiry led us to find the self-contained units for which we were seeking in societies of the species called civilizations,¹ and so far we have been working on the assumption that a comparative study of the geneses, growths, breakdowns, and disintegrations of the twenty-one civilizations that we have succeeded in identifying would comprehend everything of any significance in the history of Mankind since the time when the first civilizations emerged among the primitive societies which had previously been the only existing form of human social organization. Up to the present stage of our investigation this assumption has perhaps on the whole been justified by results; yet from time to time we have stumbled upon indications that our first master-key might not serve to unlock all the doors through which we have to pass in order to reach our mental journey's end.

Near the outset, in the act of identifying as many representatives as possible of the species of society that we had set ourselves to study, we found that certain civilizations were related to one another by a tie that was closer than the mere common characteristic of being representatives of the same species. We described this more intimate relation as one of 'apparentation-and-affiliation';² and we found, on analysis,³ that the evidences of apparentation-and-affiliation were certain characteristic social products of a Dominant Minority, an Internal Proletariat, and an External Proletariat into which the 'apparented' society split up in the course of its disintegration. It appeared that dominant minorities produced philosophies which sometimes gave inspirations to universal states, that internal proletariats produced higher religions which sought to embody themselves in universal churches, and that external proletariats produced heroic ages which were the tragedies of barbarian warbands.

In the aggregate, these experiences and institutions manifestly constitute a link between an 'apparented' and an 'affiliated' civilization that cannot be ignored. And this link in the Time-dimension between two non-contemporary civilizations is not the only kind of relation between civilizations that a comparative study of universal states, universal churches, and heroic ages brings to light. Though civilizations may be intelligible fields of historical study and self-contained units of social life on the whole—at any rate by comparison with the relatively parochial and ephemeral political communities into which they are apt to articulate themselves in their growth stage—the fractions, in the shape

¹ See I. i. 17-50.

² See I. i. 44.

³ See I. i. 52-62.

of social classes, into which they disintegrate after breaking down acquire a liberty to enter into social and cultural combinations with alien elements derived from other contemporary civilizations.¹ This receptivity of theirs is revealed in the institutions that are their products. Some universal states have been the handiwork of alien empire-builders; some higher religions have been animated by alien inspirations;² and some barbarian war-bands have imbibed a tincture of alien culture.³

Universal states, universal churches, and heroic ages thus link together contemporary, as well as non-contemporary, civilizations in relations that are closer and more individual than an affinity consisting in the bare fact of their being representatives of the same species of society; and this observation raises the question whether we have been justified in treating these historical phenomena as mere by-products, in each case, of the disintegration of some single civilization and in assuming that the civilizations themselves are the sole objects of historical study which we need to take into account. Now that we have found that universal states, universal churches, and heroic ages cannot, for their part, be studied intelligibly within the framework that the history of a single civilization provides, ought we not to study them on their own respective merits, with a view to testing the validity, or at any rate the sufficiency, of the assumption on which we have been proceeding hitherto? Until we have examined the respective claims of institutions of each of these three kinds to be intelligible fields of study in themselves, and have also considered the alternative possibility that they might be parts of some larger whole embracing them and the civilizations alike, we cannot be sure that we have brought within our purview the whole of human history, above the primitive level, in all its aspects.

This further inquiry was the task that we set ourselves at the end of Part V of this Study.⁴ We shall now try to acquit ourselves of it in Parts VI, VII, and VIII; and happily in this case we are in a position to proceed straight from the formulation of our question to an attempt to answer it, without having to go through the laborious process of seeking, sifting, assembling, and comparing those historical facts that are indispensable raw materials for the empirical method of investigation that we are following in this Study. An incidental survey of philosophies and universal states, higher religions and universal churches, heroic ages and war-bands has already been taken in our review of the dominant minorities and the internal and external proletariats of civilizations in disintegration,⁵ and the results have been summarized in four tables printed in volume vi⁶ and reprinted here.⁷

Accordingly, without further preliminaries, we can now investigate the claims of universal states, and may begin by asking whether they are ends in themselves or means towards something beyond them.

Our best approach to this question may be to remind ourselves of certain salient features of universal states that we have already ascertained.

¹ See V. v. 338-40.

² See I. i. 40-41 and 57; II. ii. 213-16; and V. v. 360-1.

³ See V. v. 351-9.

⁴ See V. vi. 325-6.

⁵ See V. v. 35-337.

⁶ vi. 327-31.

⁷ Tables I-III, pp. 769-71 of the present volume, below, and Table I, in vol. viii, pp. 734-5.

In the first place, universal states arise after, and not before, the breakdowns of the civilizations to whose bodies social they bring political unity. They are not summers but 'Indian Summers', masking autumn and presaging winter.¹ In the second place, they are the products of dominant minorities: that is, of once creative minorities that have lost their creative power.² The negativeness which is the hall-mark of their authorship and also the essential condition of their establishment and maintenance is brought out in the following passages from the works of a nineteenth-century French philosopher and a twentieth-century English satirist.

'The result of the Roman conquest was the destruction of all the city-states in the greater part of the then known world, just as the result of all the partial conquests that merged in the Roman conquest had been already to reduce their numbers. Thereafter one city-state alone, the arch-aggressor, remained standing; but on the very morrow of the establishment of the Empire we see Rome herself promptly divesting herself of her original character, gradually losing her power of aggression and withdrawing into herself. Her dominant aim at this stage is no longer conquest but conservation; the Roman city-state, in short, disappears in order to make way for the Roman Empire.

'But what order, what state of society, did this empire stand for? Was the aim of conservation, which we have just attributed to the Roman Empire, expressed in a new dogma, in a corresponding social hierarchy, as the Roman conquest had been expressed and organised by the religious dogmas and the social institutions of the Roman city-state? Unquestionably, no: in casting our eyes over this immense empire, we do not find anywhere, in all its vast extent, any sentiments, ideas or habits that do not go back to the preceding institution—that of the city-state. And these sentiments, ideas and habits are deprived of energy, are no longer able to receive any [practical] social application, and therefore no longer provide positive links between individuals. In short, the Roman Empire in no sense constitutes a society; for, in its capacity as an empire, it has no religion, no goal, and no general practical aim whatsoever; it represents merely a vast aggregation of human beings, a shapeless congeries of the débris of societies. The imperial administration—in spite of being so far-flung, so complicated, so meticulous, and of giving so great an appearance of symmetry at first glance—does not constitute a political order or a social hierarchy at all; this administration is in strict truth nothing but a vast office for administering Rome's conquests. . . .

'These are the characteristics and the causes of the demoralisation of Rome that has made so lively an impression on the mind of Posterity. This demoralisation had almost reached full measure before the Empire had completed the first century of its existence. Thereafter, this huge body appears to maintain itself merely by a kind of mechanical equilibrium; and, if it does not actually dissolve, that is not so much because there is any positive reason for it to maintain itself as because there is no positive reason, either, for it to undergo any change.'³

The point thus illustrated by Bazard from 'real life' in the instance of

¹ See IV. iv. 56-119, especially 59-60.

² See V. v. 35-58.

³ Bazard, A: 'Exposition de la Doctrine Saint-Simonienne', in *Œuvres Complètes de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, vol. xlii (Paris 1877, Leroux), pp. 181-5.

the Roman Empire is brought out more wittily by Huxley in his imaginary Anti-Utopia:

‘“The Nine Years’ War, the great Economic Collapse. There was a choice between World Control and destruction. Between stability and. . .

“It’s curious . . . to read what people in the time of Our Ford used to write about scientific progress. They seem to have imagined that it could be allowed to go on indefinitely, regardless of everything else. Knowledge was the highest good, truth the supreme value; all the rest was secondary and subordinate. True, ideas were beginning to change even then. Our Ford himself did a great deal to shift the emphasis from truth and beauty to comfort and happiness. Mass production demanded the shift. Universal happiness keeps the wheels steadily turning; truth and beauty can’t. And of course, whenever the masses seized political power, then it was happiness rather than truth and beauty that mattered. Still, in spite of everything, unrestricted scientific research was still permitted. People still went on talking about truth and beauty as though they were the sovereign goods. Right up to the time of the Nine Years’ War. *That* made them change their tune all right. What’s the point of truth or beauty or knowledge when the anthrax bombs are popping all around you? That was when science first began to be controlled—after the Nine Years’ War. People were ready to have even their appetites controlled then. Anything for a quiet life. We’ve gone on controlling ever since. It hasn’t been very good for truth, of course. But it’s been very good for happiness. One can’t have something for nothing. Happiness has got to be paid for. . . .”

“Art, science—you seem to have paid a fairly high price for your happiness,” said the Savage. . . . “Anything else?”

“Well, religion, of course,” replied the Controller: “There used to be something called God—before the Nine Years’ War. . . .”¹

This, however, is not the whole picture; for, besides being accompaniments of social breakdown and products of dominant minorities, universal states display a third salient feature: they are expressions of a rally—and a particularly notable one—in a process of disintegration that works itself out in successive pulsations of lapse-and-rally followed by relapse;² and it is this last feature that strikes the imagination and evokes the gratitude of the generation that lives to see the successful establishment of a universal state set a term at last to a Time of Troubles that had previously been gathering momentum from successive failures of repeated attempts to stem it.³

Taken together, these features present a picture of universal states that, at first sight, looks ambiguous. Universal states are symptoms of social disintegration, yet at the same time they are attempts to check this disintegration and to defy it.

The tenacity with which universal states do cling to life, when once established, is revealed by a survey of their endings. The divers types into which these endings can be analysed form an illuminating series when arranged in an ascending order of the obstinacy with which a universal state rebels against being condemned to death. To comprehend,

¹ Huxley, Aldous: *Brave New World* (London 1932, Chatto & Windus), pp. 56 and 269–70 and 271.

² This rhythm has been analysed and illustrated in V. vi. 278–321.

³ See V. vi. 181–2 and 191.

and compare with one another, these divers typical endings of universal states, we must view each of them in the setting of its own particular version of the common plot of the tragedy of decline and fall; and an attempt at a survey on these lines will be found in an annex to the present chapter at a later point in this volume.¹ The analysis of the divers types of endings of universal states, which this survey of their histories yields, may be summarized here as follows:

When the establishment of a universal state by indigenous empire-builders has been forestalled by the intrusion of an alien society, the impulse, in the body social of the disintegrating society, to pass through the universal state phase before going into dissolution is powerful enough sometimes to be able to constrain the triumphant alien aggressor to provide his victims with the institution which his very triumph has made it impossible for indigenous hands to set up. The Central American, Chibcha Andean, main Orthodox Christian, and Hindu civilizations all succeeded in exacting this social service from alien intruders; the Hindu Civilization actually succeeded in exacting it from two intruders in succession: first from Mughal representatives of the Iranic Muslim Civilization and then from British representatives of the Western Civilization.

When an indigenous universal state has been overthrown by the intrusion of an alien civilization before the exhaustion of the social rally which the foundation of the universal state has inaugurated, the impulse in the body social of the invaded disintegrating society to complete the universal state phase before going into dissolution is powerful enough sometimes to be able to constrain the triumphant aggressor to provide an alien substitute for the indigenous institution which he himself has destroyed, and sometimes to enable the invaded society to bide its time—for many centuries if need be—until at last it finds its opportunity to expel the intruder, re-establish the long ago overthrown indigenous universal state, and, this time, carry it through to the completion of its natural course. The Andean and the Babylonian Society succeeded in exacting from their alien conquerors the social service that they required—the Andean Society from Spanish representatives of the Western Civilization, the Babylonian actually from two intruders in succession: first from Achaemenid representatives of the Syriac Civilization and then from Seleucid representatives of the Hellenic. The Syriac and the Indic Society succeeded in biding their time and eventually re-establishing their overthrown indigenous universal states.

When an indigenous universal state has collapsed after the exhaustion of the social rally which its foundation has inaugurated, the impulse in the body social of the disintegrating society to complete the universal state phase, before going into dissolution, is powerful enough to be able to achieve the restoration of the prostrate indigenous universal state, sometimes—as the Hellenic, Sinic, and Sumeric civilizations achieved this—by self-help alone, and sometimes—as the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia achieved it—by self-help reinforced by the reception of an alien civilization.

¹ On pp. 569-76, below.

After an indigenous universal state has reached the term of its natural expectation of life and has duly given place to the social interregnum in which the dissolution of a moribund civilization is normally consummated, the impulse in the body social of the moribund society to retrieve its life from the jaws of death may be powerful enough—as is witnessed by the Egyptiac Civilization's achievement of this *tour de force*—to be able to restore the defunct universal state and thereafter to maintain it in existence by one means or another until the moribund society, preserved within this institutional mummy-case in an uncanny state of life-in-death, has succeeded, like King Menkaure in the folk-tale,¹ in doubling the span of life allotted to it by the Gods.

Indeed, after a universal state has reached the term of its natural expectation of life, the determination of the body social of the moribund society not to taste of death may be obstinate enough—as is witnessed by the history of the Far Eastern Civilization in China—to be able to maintain the senile universal state in existence, without a break, for an additional term by inducing a vigorous and victorious barbarian invader to shoulder the burden of preserving an institution which he might have been expected to destroy.

These divers endings of universal states bear concordant witness to the craving for life by which these institutions are animated. So strong is this craving of theirs that they refuse to forgo their claims to be brought into existence and to be allowed to live out their normal terms, and sometimes even refuse to pass out of existence after having duly realized their natural expectation of life. In other words, universal states show a strong tendency to behave as though they were ends in themselves, whereas in truth they represent a phase in a process of social disintegration and, if they have any significance beyond that, can only have it in virtue of being a means to some end that is outside and beyond them.

The judgement of History on their idolization of themselves is pronounced in one of the masterpieces of a Modern Western poet:

It is not growing like a tree
 In bulk, doth make Man better be,
 Or standing long an oak, three hundred year,
 To fall a log at last, dry, bald and sere:
 A lily of a day
 Is fairer far in May,
 Although it fall and die that night—
 It was the plant and flower of light.
 In small proportions we just beauties see,
 And in short measures Life may perfect be.²

¹ See IV. iv. 409 and V. v. 2.

² Ben Jonson.

B. UNIVERSAL STATES AS ENDS

(I) THE MIRAGE OF IMMORTALITY

A Paradoxical Misapprehension

AS we have seen in the last chapter, the endings of universal states indicate that these institutions are possessed by an almost demonic craving for life; and, if we now look at them, no longer through the eyes of alien observers, but through those of their own citizens, we shall find that these are apt not only to desire with their whole hearts that this earthly commonwealth of theirs may live for ever,¹ but actually to believe that the immortality of this human institution is assured—and this sometimes in the teeth of contemporary events which, to an observer posted at a different standpoint in Time or Space, declare beyond question that this particular universal state is at this very moment in its last agonies. To observers who happen to have been born into the history of their own societies at a time when these have not been passing through the universal state phase, it is manifest that universal states, as a class of polity, are by-products of a process of social disintegration and are stamped by their certificates of origin as being uncreative and ephemeral.² Why is it, such observers may well ask, that, in defiance of apparently plain facts, the citizens of a universal state are prone to regard it, not as a night's shelter in the wilderness, but as the Promised Land, the goal of human endeavours? How is it possible for them to mistake this mundane institution for the *Civitas Dei* itself?

This misapprehension is so extreme in its degree that its very occurrence might perhaps be called in question, were this not attested by the incontrovertible evidence of a cloud of witnesses who convict themselves, out of their own mouths, of being victims of this strange hallucination.

The Aftermaths of the Roman Empire³ and the Arab Caliphate⁴

In the history of the Roman Empire, which was the universal state

¹ This desire appears to be the characteristic sentiment of citizens of universal states that have been established and maintained by indigenous empire-builders, in contrast to the aversion commonly felt for universal states of alien origin (see V. v. 341-51). An indigenous origin is, of course, the rule, and an alien origin the exception. The love and hatred inspired by these two different kinds of universal state both show a tendency to grow stronger with the passage of time.

² An imperfection that is transparent in universal states is, of course, characteristic of all states of all kinds in all circumstances, as is pointed out by a Modern Western Christian philosopher in the following passage:

'What men call peace is never anything but a space between two wars: a precarious equilibrium that lasts as long as mutual fear prevents dissension from declaring itself. This parody of true peace, this armed fear, which there is no need to denounce to our contemporaries, may very well support a kind of order, but never can it bring Mankind tranquillity. Not until the social order becomes the spontaneous expression of an interior peace in men's hearts shall we have tranquillity; were all men's minds in accord with themselves, all wills interiorly unified by love of the supreme good, then they would know the absence of internal dissension, unity, order from within, a peace, finally, made of the tranquillity born of this order: *pax est tranquillitas ordinis*. But, if each will were in accord with itself, all wills would be in mutual accord, each would find peace in willing what the others will. Then also we should have a true society, based on union in love of one and the same end' (Gilson, E.: *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, English translation (London 1936, Sheed & Ward), p. 399).

³ See xi, map 29.

⁴ See xi, map 37.

of the Hellenic World, we find the generation that had witnessed the establishment of the *Pax Augusta* asserting, in evidently sincere good faith, that the Empire and the City that has built it have been endowed with a common immortality.¹

Tibullus (*vivebat circa* 54-18 B.C.) sings of the 'aeternae urbis moenia',² while Virgil (*vivebat* 70-19 B.C.) makes his Iuppiter, speaking of the future Roman scions of Aeneas' race, proclaim: 'His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono:/imperium sine fine dedi.'³ A soldier-historian may show somewhat greater caution than a philosopher-poet by expressing the same expectation in the form, not of a divine communiqué, but of a human hope. In recording the adoption of Tiberius by Augustus, Velleius (*vivebat circa* 19 B.C.-A.D. 31) speaks of a 'spem conceptam perpetuae securitatis aeternitatisque Romani imperii'.⁴ An historian-propagandist can perhaps afford to be less circumspect, and Livy (*vivebat* 59 B.C.-A.D. 17) writes with the assurance of Tibullus: 'in aeternum urbe condita';⁵ 'urbem . . . diis auctoribus in aeternum conditam'.⁶ But Horace, who was both a poet and a sceptic, was doubly audacious in claiming immortality for his own verse and in taking, as his concrete measure of eternity, the repetition, in *saecula saeculorum*, of the annual round of the religious ritual of the Roman city-state:

Exegi monumentum aere perennius
regalique situ Pyramidum altius,
quod non imber edax, non Aquilo impotens
possit diruere aut innumerabilis
annorum series et fuga temporum.
non omnis moriar . . . : usque ego posterâ
crescam laude recens dum Capitolium
scandet cum tacitâ virgine pontifex.⁷

These lines ring ironically in the ears of a Modern Western student of history as he reflects on the unsuccessful rearguard action that was fought by an outgoing Roman Paganism, only four centuries after Horace's day, to induce a Christian Roman Government to reinstate in the Senate House the statue and altar of Victory that had been placed there by 'Caesar the God' in Horace's lifetime.⁸ If some good-natured deity had forewarned Horace, in time, of this not far distant demise of Rome's native religious institutions, we may guess that the poet would have heartily thanked his informant and hastily changed his measure of duration. Whether Horace's poetry was, as its author believed it to be, immortal, Time, in A.D. 1952, had still to show; but this ethereal creation of an individual genius had already lasted, *volitans viva per ora virum*, four or five times longer than the rites that are the second term of the poet's unlucky comparison. As a sceptic, the Roman poet Horace finds

¹ 'The little rivulet of disbelief which runs counter to the main stream of popular faith, and which takes the form of a belief in an "allotted span" for the Roman state', is traced from the last century B.C. to the fifth century of the Christian Era by D. A. Malcolm in 'Urbs Aeterna', in *The University of Birmingham Historical Journal*, vol. iii, No. 1 (1951), pp. 1-15.

² *Carmina*, Book II, Elegy 5, ll. 24-25.

³ *Aeneid*, Book I, ll. 278-9.

⁴ Velleius Paterculus, C.: *Historia Romana*, Book II, chap. 103.

⁵ Book IV, chap. 4, § 4.

⁶ Book XXVIII, chap. 28, § 11.

⁷ *Carmina*, Book III, Ode xxx, ll. 1-9.

⁸ See V. vi. 89, with n. 3.

his match in the English historian Gibbon; yet Gibbon, who was inspired on the 15th October, A.D. 1764, to record 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion' over the Roman Empire by hearing friars singing Vespers in the Temple of Iuppiter as he sat musing among the ruins of the Capitol¹ nearly 1,772 years after the date of Horace's death on the 17th November, 8 B.C., no doubt believed in the immortality of Horace's verse as confidently as the justifiably conceited poet had believed in it himself.

The same ludicrously inadequate ritual 'yard-stick' that had been taken by Horace as a measure for the duration of his personal literary work was taken by Livy as a measure for the duration of his historical theme the Roman Empire: 'Vestae aedem petitam et aeternos ignes et conditum in penetrali fatale pignus imperii Romani.'² The 'guarantee' (*pignus*) of the Roman Empire's survival is the Palladium.³ In thus reading his modern political symbolism into an archaic religious rite, Livy was perhaps taking a cue from his Imperial patron, and Augustus a cue from his Imperial predecessors on the throne of an earlier universal state which had failed after all to discover the elixir of life. According to an eminent authority,⁴ the interpretation of Vesta's undying flame as a symbol of the eternity of an oecumenical ruler was a Roman adaptation of an Achaemenian idea⁵ that was adopted by Augustus when, in 12 B.C., he became Pontifex Maximus and consecrated a new temple of Vesta in his house on the Palatine. Augustus's successors, from the Antonines onwards, gave publicity to this idea by making it their practice to have Vesta's fire carried in procession in front of them.⁶

During the century and a quarter that elapsed between the death of Augustus in A.D. 14 and the accession of Pius in A.D. 138, the concept of the eternity of Rome and the Roman Empire had been cherished by two bad emperors who both had met their deserts by coming to untimely personal ends. Nero had instituted games 'quos pro aeternitate imperii susceptos appellari [ludos] maximos voluit'.⁷ The *Acta Fratrum Arvalium* record 'aeterni[tati imperi vaccam]' among the proceedings of A.D. 66,⁸ and 'vota si custodieris aeternitatem imperii quod [susci]piendo ampliavit (Domitianus)'⁹ under the years A.D. 86, 87, and 90.

In the Age of the Antonines we find a Greek man of letters expressing the Augustan belief in the more delicate form of a prayer, without a suspicion that he was living in an 'Indian Summer' and was praying that

¹ See IV. iv. 59-60 and XIII. x. 103 and 104.

² Book XXVI, chap. 27, § 14. Cp. Book V, chap. 42, § 7.

³ See Cicero: *Pro Scauro*, chap. xxiii, § 48: 'Palladium illud quod quasi pignus nostrae salutis atque imperi custodiis Vestae continetur'; *Philippicae*, Speech xi, ch. x, § 24: 'signum . . . de caelo delapsum . . . quo salvo salvi sumus futuri', quoted by Malcolm, D. A.: 'Urbs Aeterna', in *The University of Birmingham Historical Journal*, vol. iii, No. 1 (1951), p. 4.

⁴ Cumont, Fr.: 'L'Éternité des Empereurs Romains', in *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses*, vol. i (Paris 1896; printed at Macon), pp. 436 and 441-2.

⁵ In the Achaemenian *Weltanschauung* the symbolization of eternity by fire was connected with a belief in the divinity and eternity of the heavenly bodies (Cumont, op. cit., pp. 443-4).

⁶ See Cumont, op. cit., pp. 437 and 442.

⁷ Suetonius Tranquillus, C.: *The Lives of the Caesars*, 'Nero', chap. 11, § 2.

⁸ *Acta Fratrum Arvalium Quae Supersunt*, ed. by G. Henzen (Berlin 1874, Reimer), p. lxxxi.

⁹ Ibid. pp. cxv, cxix, cxxvi.

a fugitive October might be miraculously transformed into a perpetual June.

'Let us invoke all the gods and all the children of the gods, and let us pray them to grant this empire and this city life and prosperity world without end. May they endure until ingots learn to float on the sea and until trees forget to blossom in the spring. And long live the supreme magistrate and his children likewise. Long may they be with us to carry on their work of dispensing happiness to all their subjects'.¹

Thereafter, when the touch of winter begins to make itself felt, its victims defy a change of season, which they have not foreseen and cannot face, by insisting more and more emphatically that they have been privileged to enjoy an everlasting midsummer's day.² In the Severan Age and its bleaker sequel, the contrast between the official eternity of the emperors³ and the ephemerality that was their actual lot makes a painfully strange impression.⁴ It is still more strange to hear the watchwords of the Augustan poets being no less confidently repeated, in the same Latin, and this by men of letters whose mother-tongue was Greek,⁵ on the eve of the final collapse of all but the easternmost extremity of the Latin-speaking portion of the Empire.⁶ And, even after the truth has been proclaimed, in a deed more eloquent than any words, by Alaric's capture and sack of Rome herself, we can hear, above the reverberations of this resounding blow, the high voice of a Gallic poet reasserting the immortality of Rome as he travels back from the no longer inviolate Imperial City to his own war-ravaged native province.

Erige crinales lauros seniumque sacrat
verticis in virides, Roma, refinge comas. . . .
astrorum flammae renovant occasibus ortus;
lunam finire cernis, ut incipiat.

¹ Aristeides, P. Aelius: *In Romam*, edited by Keil, B., *Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), p. 124 (Or. XXVI, § 109).

² See V. vi. 370-5.

³ In this age of the Roman Empire's decline 'Your Eternity' gradually comes to be used, like 'Your Majesty' in Modern Western Europe, as the stock style and title for a crowned head (Cumont, *op. cit.*, p. 435).

⁴ The inscription 'Aeternitas Augusti' first appears on the Senatorial copper coinage of the Roman Empire in the reign of Vespasian (*imperabat* A.D. 69-79), gradually wins its way on to coins of other series, and holds its own till the close of the fourth century of the Christian Era (Cumont, *op. cit.*, p. 438). Severus (*imperabat* A.D. 193-211), whose accession, like Vespasian's, had cost the Empire a disastrous civil war, perhaps had as much—or little—warrant for inscribing on his coinage the motto 'Aeternitas Imperii' and for evoking a dedication 'pro aeternitate imperii et salute Imperatoris Caesaris L. Septimi Severi' (C.I.L., vol. ii (Berlin 1869, Reimer), p. 31, No. 259). But the same motto becomes a bad joke on coins issued in the names of Caracalla and Geta as well as their father; and it makes a farcical effect on coins bearing the name of a Philip or a Carus. (See Cumont, *op. cit.*, p. 437.)

⁵ In the *Res Gestae* of the Antiochene historian Ammianus Marcellinus the Tibullan phrase 'urbs aeterna' is used as a stock periphrasis for 'Rome': e.g. in Book XIV. vi. 1: in Book XV. vii. 1 and vii. 10; in Book XVI. x. 14; and in eight other places. According to Charlesworth, M. P.: 'Providentia and Aeternitas', in the *Review*, vol. xxix, No. 22 (April 1936). The same conviction is expressed in the circumlocutions 'victura dum erunt homines Roma' (Book XIV. vi. 3) and 'victura cum saeculis Roma' (Book XXVI. i. 14). The Alexandrian poet Claudian, in his *De Consulatu Stilichonis*, Book III, ll. 159-60, declares: 'Nec terminus unquam/Romanae ditionis erit', and spends a dozen further lines on variations on this Virgilian theme.

⁶ For the *tracée* of the geographical line of division between the Latin-speaking and Greek-speaking portions of the Roman Empire, see IV. iv. 326, n. 2.

victoris Brenni non distulit Allia poenam;
 Samnis servitio foedera saeva luit.
 post multas Pyrrhum clades superata fugasti;
 flevit successus Hannibal ipse suos.
 quae mergi nequeunt nisu maiore resurgunt,
 exsiliuntque imis altius acta vadis.
 utque novas vires fax inclinata resumit,
 clarior ex humili sorte superna petis.
 porrige victuras Romana in saecula leges,
 solaque fatales non vereare colos. . . .
 quae restant, nullis obnoxia tempora metis:
 dum stabunt terrae, dum polus astra feret.
 illud te reparat quod cetera regna resolvit:
 ordo renascendi est, crescere posse malis.
 ergo age, sacrilegae tandem cadat hostia gentis:
 submittant trepidi perfida colla Getae.
 ditia pacatae dent vectigalia terrae;
 impleat augustos barbara praeda sinus.
 aeternum tibi Rhēnus aret, tibi Nilus inundet,
 altricemque suam fertilis orbis alat.¹

Perhaps the strangest testimony of all is Saint Jerome's description of the shock that he suffered when the news of the fall of Rome reached him in his remote and still secure retreat at Jerusalem. The saint was devoted to the service of a Church that avowedly placed its hopes in the Commonwealth of God, and not in any earthly polity; yet this news, mundane though it might be, affected Jerome so profoundly that for the moment he found himself incapable of proceeding with his literary labours of theological controversy and scriptural exegesis;² and the language in which he describes his admiration for what Rome has once been and his grief for the fate that has now overtaken her anticipates the language of Rutilius in verbal correspondences that can hardly be accidental.³ Their common stupefaction, perhaps even more than their common sorrow, at the break-up of the universal state that was their common social universe was an emotion strong enough to bridge the moral gulf between the would-be exclusively Christian saint and the aggressively pagan *Praefectus Urbi emeritus*.

The shock administered by the fall of Rome in A.D. 410 to the citizens of a transient universal state which they had mistaken for an everlasting habitation⁴ has its counterpart in the shock suffered by the subjects of the Arab Caliphate when Baghdad fell to the Mongols in A.D. 1258.⁵ In

¹ Rutilius Namatianus, C.: *De Reditu Suo*, Book I, ll. 115-16, 123-34, 137-46. The poet's exhortation to his heroine in ll. 141-2 was duly acted upon by her when, a century and more after Rutilius's day, Justinian annihilated the Visigoths' Ostrogothic cousins in a fight to the finish on Italian soil, and even struck some shrewd blows at the Visigoths themselves in the distant retreat that they had found for themselves in Spain after having sacked Rome *en route*. The sequel, however, was just the opposite of what Rutilius so confidently looks forward to in ll. 143-6. So far from restoring the Empire's revenues, Justinian's reconquest of some of the Empire's lost Latin provinces was achieved at such a cost, in blood and treasure, to the hitherto still sound Greek and Oriental core of the Hellenic universal state that his extravagant régime was quickly followed by a collapse which proved to be irretrievable (see IV. iv. 326-8 and 397-8, and V. vi. 224-5).

² See Saint Jerome, Ep. cxxvii, cap. 12, quoted in V. v, 223, n. 2.

³ See V. v. 345, n. 4.

⁴ Luke xvi. 9.

⁵ A touch of the emotion caused by this catastrophe can be felt in the last words of the passage quoted from Falak-ad-Din Muhammad b. Aydimir in IV. iv. 446.

the Roman World the shock was felt from Palestine to Gaul; in the Arab World, from Farghānah to Andalusia.

'It is difficult to estimate the bewilderment that Muslims felt when there was no longer a Caliph on whom the blessing of God could be invoked in the *khutbah*; such an event was without precedent throughout the previous history of Islam. Their suffering finds expression in the prayer offered in the great mosque of Baghdad on the Friday following the death of the Caliph: "Praise be to God who has caused exalted personages to perish and has given over to destruction the inhabitants of this city. . . . O God, help us in our misery, the like of which Islam and its children have never witnessed; we are God's, and unto God do we return".'¹

The intensity of the psychological effect is even more remarkable in this than in the Roman case, for, by the time when Hūlāgū gave the 'Abbasid Caliphate its *coup de grâce*, its sovereignty had been ineffective, for three or four centuries past, over the greater part of the vast domain that was nominally subject to it.² It is perhaps comprehensible that, even for that length of time, a shadow should continue to be mistaken, half deliberately, for the substance by a dominant minority for whom the moribund universal state represented their own latest achievement and last hope; a more astonishing testimony to the hold that a universal state can acquire over the hearts and minds of contemporaries is the fascination which it also exerts upon members of the now victoriously insurgent internal and external proletariats, who do not so much refuse to admit as, apparently, fail altogether to realize that they are in the act of pulling down with their own hands an institution which, in their eyes, is so venerable that it would be inconceivably impious even to imagine its disappearance.

On the strength of this widespread and long-lasting hallucination, which is itself a psychological and political fact to be reckoned with by the roughest-handed and hardest-headed carvers-out of indigenous or barbarian successor-states, the holders, in lawful succession, of the sovereign authority in a universal state may retain—for generations or even centuries after their loss of all genuine power over their nominal dominions—a by no means negligible status as the sole dispensers of legitimacy. Indeed, this monopoly of an imponderable political commodity usually counts for so much that it is rare to find a barbarian conqueror of an imperial province allowing himself the satisfaction of openly boasting that he has seized his prize by force and is holding it by right of conquest.³ The heretic Arian Vandal conquerors of Roman

¹ Arnold, Sir T. W.: *The Caliphate* (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press), pp. 81–82.

² For the stages in the progressive decline of the 'Abbasid Caliphate from the ninth century of the Christian Era onwards, see Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 57–69.

³ 'The minister who manages to establish an ascendancy over the ruler . . . appropriates the power without giving an inkling of his desire to usurp the throne; he contents himself with the [substantial] advantages of royalty: that is to say, the power of enjoining and prohibiting, of binding and loosing, of deciding and annulling. By this policy he leads the notables of the empire to believe that he is acting under instructions transmitted to him by the sovereign from his cabinet, and that he is merely executing the prince's orders. Although he has appropriated the whole of the authority, he takes care not to usurp the marks, emblems and titles of sovereignty, in order to avoid exciting any suspicions of his ambitions. The curtain which, since the foundation of the empire, has made the sultan and his ancestors invisible to the public, likewise serves to conceal the encroachments of the minister and to make the public believe that this officer is just the

Africa, and the heretic Shi'i Katāma Berber conquerors of 'Abbasid Ifrīqiyah and Egypt, did permit themselves this indulgence; indeed the Katāma's self-declared but unauthenticated 'Fātimid' leaders were not content with repudiating the authority of the legitimate Sunnī 'Abbasid Caliphs at Baghdad, but pretended to the title of Caliphs themselves." For such presumption these two avowedly usurping war-bands both paid the penalty of being liquidated—the Vandals by Belisarius's Roman expeditionary force, and the Fātimids by the Sanhāja Berbers in Ifrīqiyah and by Saladin in Egypt.¹ These, however, are exceptions that prove a rule. The Amalung leaders of the Arian Ostrogoths and Buwayhid leaders of the Shi'i Daylamīs² were wiser in their generation in seeking title for their conquests by ruling them, in official theory, as vicegerents of the Emperor at Constantinople³ and the Caliph at Baghdad⁴ respectively; and, though this tactful handling of a senile universal state did not avail, in their case, to avert the doom to which both of these war-bands condemned themselves by clinging to their distinctive heresy instead of commending themselves to their subjects by adopting the orthodox faiths of Catholic Christianity and of Sunnī Islam,⁵ the same political manœuvre was brilliantly successful when executed by fellow barbarians who had the sagacity or good fortune to be at the same time impeccable in their profession of religious faith. Clovis, for instance, who was the most successful of all founders of barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire, found it worth while to follow up his conversion from paganism to Catholicism in A.D. 496 by obtaining in A.D. 510 from Anastasius, the reigning Emperor at Constantinople, the title of proconsul with the consular insignia.⁶ In the history of the decline of the 'Abbasid Caliphate there are notable examples of a corresponding practice.

'Throughout the whole period of the decline of the Caliphate up to the date of the death of Musta'sim (A.D. 1258), the Caliph was to all orthodox Sunnis⁷ the Commander of the Faithful, and as Successor of the Prophet

prince's lieutenant and nothing more.'—Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, French translation by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 379.

¹ See V. v. 252 and 358. In the former passage, the Sanhāja have been correctly described as Sunnis but incorrectly as Murābits. In the latter passage, the deposition of the Fātimids in Egypt has been erroneously ascribed to Saladin's uncle and companion in arms Shirkūh, who died before the process of extinguishing the Fātimids was completed by Saladin in A.D. 1171.

² For the Buwayhids, see I. i. 356 and V. v. 358.

³ In this device for saving Roman 'face', Theodoric had been anticipated by his predecessor and victim Odovacer.

⁴ See Arnold, op. cit., pp. 60-68, especially the account, on pp. 65-68, of the particularly piquant farce that was played in A.D. 980, at the Caliphial Court of Baghdad, by the Buwayhid 'mayor of the palace' 'Adūd-ad-Dawlah, who chose the occasion of his presentation of an ambassador from his fellow heretic the Fātimid anti-Caliph at Cairo as his moment for obtaining from the 'Abbasid Caliph Tā'i a formal commission to exercise those plenary powers of government in the Caliph's dominions which he had long since usurped *de facto*.

⁵ For the contrast between the respective fortunes of barbarian conquerors who retain an heretical form of religion or a tinge of alien culture and those who adopt the culture and faith of the subject population which they have taken over from a derelict universal state, see V. v. 351-8.

⁶ See J. B. Bury's footnote in his *editio minor* of Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. iv (London 1901, Methuen), p. 119.

⁷ For the mass-conversion to Islam that accompanied the decline of the 'Abbasid Caliphate and anticipated the dissolution of the Syriac Society, see pp. 397-400, below.—A.J.T.

he was held to be the source of all authority and the fountain of honour. The Caliph by his very name led men's thoughts back to the founder of their faith, the promulgator of their system of sacred law, and represented to them the principle of established law and authority. Whatever shape the course of external events might take, the faith of the Sunnī theologians and legists in the doctrines expounded in their textbooks remained unshaken, and, even though the Caliph could not give an order outside his own palace, they still went on teaching the faithful that he was the supreme head of the whole body of Muslims. Accordingly, a diploma of investiture sent by the Caliph, or a title of honour conferred by him, would satisfy the demands of the religious law and tranquillise the tender consciences of the subjects of an independent prince, though the ruler himself might remain entirely autonomous and be under no obligation of obedience to the puppet Caliph. . . . Even the Buwayhids, though their occupation of Baghdad was the culmination of the rapid growth of their extensive dominions, and though the Caliph was their pensioner and practically a prisoner in their hands, found it politic to disguise their complete independence under a pretence of subserviency and to give a show of legitimacy to their rule by accepting titles from him.¹

The precedent set by the heretical Buwayhids was followed by their Sunnī rivals, supplanters, and successors in the scramble for fragments of the 'Abbasid heritage.² Mahmūd of Ghaznah (*dominabatur* A.D. 998–1030)³ obtained a title from the 'Abbasid Caliph Qādir bi'llāh (*imperabat* A.D. 991–1031) to legitimize the dominion which he had won for himself *de facto* by successful rebellion against a Sāmānid master whose Transoxanian principality was itself the fruit of previous successful usurpation at the 'Abbasid Caliphate's expense.⁴ The Saljūq Turkish Nomad supplanters of the Sāmānids and the Buwayhids took over the Buwayhids' ascendancy at Baghdad in A.D. 1055 under the pretext of delivering the 'Abbasids from it. At the opposite extremity of Dār-al-Islām, *circa* A. D. 1086, Yūsuf b. Tāshfin, the founder of a Murābit Berber principality embracing derelict provinces of both the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad in North-West Africa and the Umayyad Caliphate of Cordova in the Iberian Peninsula, obtained a title and insignia from the 'Abbasid Caliph Muqtadī (*imperabat* A.D. 1075–94), who, by his complacency in granting his uncouth petitioner a style barely distinguishable from his own,⁵ rather easily won the empty distinction of being the first of his House whose Commandership was recognized—though not, of course, obeyed—by the Faithful in Andalusia. In A.D. 1175 Saladin, having appropriated, in the preceding year, the heritage of his own dead master Nūr-ad-Dīn's lawful heir, sought and obtained from the reigning Caliph Mustadī (*imperabat* A.D. 1170–80) a retrospective legitimization of the dominion which he had already acquired *de facto* by his act of usurpation. How could the Caliph refuse this request from an orthodox Sunnī champion who had restored the recitation of the Caliph's name in the bidding prayer (*khutbah*) in the mosques of Egypt after an interval of

¹ Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 and 78.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 78–88.

³ For Mahmūd of Ghaznah see I. i. 360, n. 1, and V. v. 303.

⁴ For the role of the Sāmānids as wardens of the North-Eastern Marches of the Syriac World, see II. ii. 142.

⁵ Yūsuf was now entitled to style himself the Amīr-al-Muslimin, in the Maghrib, of the Amīr-al-Mu'minin at Baghdad.

more than two hundred years during which it had been recited there in the names of heretical pseudo-Fātimids?¹ How could he disappoint a hero who had broken an aggressive Frankish Power that, by its lodgement in Syria, had almost severed the geographical link between the Asiatic and the African portion of Dār-al-Islām? And how could he say 'No' to a war-lord whose territories lay next door to the Caliph's own, and who could march, if provoked, on Baghdad as easily as on Cairo, Jerusalem, or Damascus?

In the thirteenth century of the Christian Era a special need for the Caliph's good offices was felt by the 'Slave Kings' of Delhi,² who were masters of a vast new domain that had been added to Dār-al-Islām by the conquest of Hindustan between the years 1191 and 1204 of the Christian Era. The rule over this new dominion was transmitted, not by hereditary succession from father to son, but by acquisition by slave from slave, and each 'Slave King' who mounted the throne, in his turn, by this contentious avenue required a personal ablution from the 'Abbasid fount of honour to make his tenure secure. The practice was initiated by the first ruler of the series, Iltutmysh, who made himself master of Delhi in A.D. 1211 and obtained a retrospective diploma of investiture from the Caliph Mustansir (*imperabat* A.D. 1221-42) in A.D. 1229.

'The document was solemnly read out in a vast assembly held in Delhi, and Iltutmysh from that date put the name of the Caliph on his coins. His successors followed this pious example. The name of the last 'Abbasid Khalifah of Baghdad, Musta'sim (*imperabat* A.D. 1242-58) first appears on the coins of 'Alā-ad-Dīn Mas'ūd Shāh (*dominabatur* A.D. 1241-6); and, though Musta'sim was put to death by the Mongols in A.D. 1258, his name still appears on the coins of successive Kings of Delhi, e.g. Mahmūd Shāh Nāsir-ad-Dīn (*dominabatur* A.D. 1246-65), Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Balban (*dominabatur* A.D. 1265-87), and Mu'izz-ad-Dīn Kayqubād (*dominabatur* A.D. 1287-90), the last monarch of the so-called 'Slave' dynasty; and the first of these continued to have the name of Musta'sim mentioned in the *khutbah*.

'A new dynasty arose, that of the Khaljī [or Khiljī]; the same need for legitimization was apparently still felt, and the coins of Jalāl-ad-Dīn Firūz Shāh II (*dominabatur* A.D. 1290-5) continued to bear the name of Musta'sim, though this Caliph had been trampled to death by the Mongols more than thirty years before.³

¹ Saladin employed the manœuvre of acting in the name of an august puppet twice over. He had established himself in Egypt as the Sunni Wazir of the Shi'i Fātimid Caliph whom he deposed (the inverse of the situation at Baghdad two centuries earlier, when Sunni 'Abbasid Caliphs had been in the power of Shi'i Buwayhid 'mayors of the palace' (see p. 13, n. 4, above)). Saladin now secured legitimization for his acquisitions by holding them, in turn, as the vicegerent of the 'Abbasid Caliph Mustadī.

² See II. ii. 131; III. iii. 30 and 31, n. 1; IV. iv. 99, with n. 1.

³ Though Hülāgū Khan was a pagan under the influence of a Nestorian Christian wife (see II. ii. 238 and 451), he did not take the 'Abbasid Caliph's life without some searchings of heart:

'The awe with which the institution of the Caliphate was regarded, even in these days of its weakness, may be realised by the fact that, cruel and bloodthirsty savage though Hülāgū was, even he hesitated to put to death the Successor of the Prophet, for the Muhammadans him in his army in the expedition against Baghdad had warned him that the Khalifah was shed upon the ground, the World would be overspread with darkness and the army of the Mongols be swallowed up by an earthquake' (Arnold, op. cit., p. 81).

'What was an unfortunate Muslim monarch to do, who felt that his title was insecure? He knew that it was only his sword that had set him on the throne, that his own dynasty might at any time be displaced, as he had himself displaced the dynasty that had preceded him, while his legal advisers and religious guides told him that the only legitimate source of authority was the Khalifah, the Imām; and he realised that all his devout Muslim subjects shared their opinion. So he went on putting the name of the dead Musta'sim on his coins, because he could find no other, and the Muslim theory of the State had not succeeded in adjusting itself to the fact that there was no Khalifah or Imām in existence. His [Jālāl-ad-Dīn's] successor, 'Alā-ad-Dīn Muhammad Shah I (*dominabatur* A.D. 1295-1315), got out of the difficulty by ceasing to insert Musta'sim's name and by describing himself merely as Yamīn-al-Khilāfat Nāsir Amīrī'l-Mu'mīnīn, "the Right Hand of the Caliphate, the Helper of the Commander of the Faithful", and this was sufficient for the satisfaction of tender consciences, though in reality he was giving no help at all to any Caliph, any more than either of his predecessors had done, who had seen the unhappy Musta'sim trampled to death without moving a finger, though they had gone on making use of his name for their own selfish purposes.'¹

The Aftermaths of the Manchu,² Ottoman,³ and Mughal⁴ Empires

The belief in the immortality of universal states which is attested by their ability to maintain their status as dispensers of legitimacy long after they have lost the realities of power—or even after they have actually ceased altogether to exist—can be illustrated from other histories besides those of the 'Abbasid Caliphate at Baghdad and the Roman Empire at Constantinople.

The Government of the Manchu incarnation of the Far Eastern universal state in China—surrounded, as the Middle Kingdom was accustomed to find itself, by tributary states, such as Korea, Annam, and the Mongol principalities, whose rulers did receive investiture from the Son of Heaven at Peking—affected to believe that all sovereigns, in any part of the World, with whom the Celestial Empire might be drawn into diplomatic relations, derived their title from the same unique source of legitimacy.⁵

In the decline of the Ottoman Empire, during the critical period between the disastrous end of the great Turco-Russian War of A.D. 1768-74 and the ignominious end of Sultan Mahmūd II's final trial of strength with Mehmed 'Ali Pasha in the hostilities of A.D. 1839-40, the ambitious war-lords who were carving out successor-states for themselves *de facto*—a Mehmed 'Ali in Egypt and Syria, an 'Ali of Yannina in Albania and Greece, a Pasvānoghlu of Viddin in the north-western corner of Rumelia—were sedulous in doing in the Pādīshāh's name all that they were doing to his detriment in their own private interests; and, even when the greatest and most successful of them all, Mehmed 'Ali, had to submit to seeing the verdict of ordeal by battle between himself and his lawful master reversed by the irresistible decision of the Concert

¹ Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-88.

² See xi, map 51.

³ See, for example, the letter, addressed in A.D. 1793 by the Emperor Ch'ien Lung to King George III of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, that has been quoted in I. i. 161.

⁴ See xi, map 54.

⁵ See xi, map 52.

of Powers of an infidel Western World, his mortification at being awarded the loss of Syria as the fruit of his victory was tempered by his satisfaction at securing from the Powers, as his *quid pro quo*, a diploma, drawn in the Pādishāh's chancery, which conferred the Pashalyq of Egypt on Mehmed 'Ali and his heirs in perpetuity.

Even when an Ottoman Emperor who had been wont to style himself 'Sultan of the Two Continents, Khāqān of the Two Seas',¹ had thus declined into being the 'Sick Man' of Europe,² dependent for his very existence on the infidel Powers finding it convenient still to keep the life in his body for fear of falling out awkwardly among themselves over the disposal of his estate, it became one of the regular practices of Western diplomacy, for the best part of a century, to mitigate, by maintaining the fiction of legitimacy, the shock that was being administered to Muslims, inside and outside the Ottoman Empire, by its progressive break-up. On the model of the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and the Khanate of the Crimea, the embryos of the Ottoman Empire's Orthodox Christian 'successor-states' were required to serve terms in the transitional status of 'autonomous' principalities or provinces under the 'suzerainty' of a Pādishāh³ who had emphasized this aspect of his office by changing his style, as was done by Sultan Mahmūd II (*imperator* A.D. 1808-39), to 'Sultan of the Sultans of the Age'.⁴ Serbia served this apprenticeship from A.D. 1830 to A.D. 1878; Samos from A.D. 1832 to A.D. 1913; Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia from A.D. 1878 to A.D. 1908; Crete from A.D. 1898 to A.D. 1913. The juridical independence of Rumania and Serbia dated only from 1878 and that of Bulgaria only from 1908. The Powers themselves conformed to the formality which they imposed upon their Ottoman Christian creatures and protégés. It was in the name of the Sultan at Constantinople that the Hapsburg Monarchy administered Bosnia-Herzegovina from A.D. 1878 to A.D. 1908 and Great Britain administered Cyprus from A.D. 1878 and Egypt from A.D. 1882 until she found herself at war with Turkey in A.D. 1914.

The Ottoman and Manchu Empires' success in still retaining, in their decline, a monopoly of the prerogative of serving as a fount of legitimacy was not, however, so remarkable as the Mughal Empire's performance of the same diplomatico-psychological *tour de force*; for the Timurid Mughal Dynasty continued to assert this prerogative in its dealings with alien Powers who held the shadow of a *ci-devant* Mughal Empire at their mercy after it had sunk to a degree of impotence to which neither the Ottoman nor the Manchu Empire ever sank until its dying day.

Within half a century of the Emperor Awrangzib's death in A.D. 1707, an empire which had once exercised an effective sovereignty over by far the greater part of the Indian sub-continent had been whittled down to a

¹ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

² The phrase seems to have been struck out by the Tsar Nicholas I of Russia in conversation with Lord Aberdeen in A.D. 1844, but the celebrated occasion of its use by its coinor was in A.D. 1853, on the eve of the Crimean War.

³ 'Pādishāh' was the Persian for 'Foot Shah', meaning a potentate who had his foot on the necks of other potentates. It was thus the equivalent of 'Shāhinshāh' or 'King of Kings'.

⁴ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-8.

torso that was no more than some 250 miles long by some 100 miles broad,¹ and within a hundred years of A.D. 1707 this truncated dominion had been reduced to the circuit of the walls of the Red Fort at Delhi; yet, 150 years after A.D. 1707—the date which had marked the palpable beginning of a decline that had been germinating long before that—a descendant of Akbar and Awrangzib was still squatting on their throne in their imperial palace, and he might have been left undisturbed there for an indefinite time to come, even by British rulers of India who had retorted to ‘the Great Mogul’s’ claim still to be their suzerain by insisting that he had now become their pensioner, if, in A.D. 1857, his apparently fantastic pretension to be still seised *de jure* of his mighty ancestors’ imperial authority had not been unexpectedly vindicated by a flagrant act which the Mughal Emperor could not avert and which his British masters could not overlook.

In 1857, to the Emperor’s own dismay and to his British masters’ indignation, the British East India Company’s mutinous sepoy army insisted upon exploiting a puppet Emperor’s not yet exhausted prestige by inaugurating in his name² the government of a revolutionary counter-rāj which they were seeking to substitute by force of arms for the unconsecrated dominion of their British employers.

‘There is much evidence . . . of the King’s distrust of and distaste for the Army. . . . But there is also no doubt that he clothed their acts with the mantle of his authority’;³

and, in insisting upon acting in a now impotent ‘Great Mogul’s’ name, the Mutineers in A.D. 1857 were taking practical account of a persisting state of Indian public opinion with which their predecessors had likewise found it necessary to reckon. This was the consideration that had moved the British East India Company, in acquiescing in the terms of the imperial farmans of A.D. 1764 and 1765, to acknowledge the Emperor’s suzerainty as the *quid pro quo* for his formal conferment upon them of the right to conduct the administration and collect the revenue in the imperial provinces of Bihar and Bengal; and the same consideration had moved successive Marāthā war-lords of the House of Sindia, from A.D. 1755 to A.D. 1803, to exercise their offensively asserted *de facto* domination over the remnant of the Mughal Empire in the doubly modest official role of deputies for an absentee regent (in the person of the Marāthā Peshwa at Poona) over a puppet Mughal Emperor’s shrunken dominions.⁴

The most striking demonstration that this imponderable remnant of Mughal imperial power did in fact possess a genuine specific gravity that could not be ignored with impunity was afforded by British experience. Though, as early as A.D. 1773, the British had revoked⁵ the recognition, accorded by them in A.D. 1765, of the Mughal Emperor’s continuing suzerainty over Bihar and Bengal, they were confronted as late as A.D. 1811 with a reassertion of the Emperor’s title to a formal sovereignty in

¹ See Spear, T. G. P.: *Twilight of the Mughuls* (Cambridge 1951, University Press), p. 5.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 205–7.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 24, 26, 34, 225.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 32 and 34.

these long-since ceded provinces which they did not find it altogether easy to quash;¹ and in the Emperor's last stronghold at Delhi within the walls of the Red Fort the controversy over the question whether he was the suzerain or a pensionary of the British East India Company² remained unsettled throughout the fifty-five-years' interval between the British military occupation of Delhi in A.D. 1803 and the suppression of the Mutiny in A.D. 1858. The British East India Company's explicit public declaration in A.D. 1811 that it was 'unnecessary to derive from the King of Delhi any additional title to the allegiance of our Indian subjects'³ was a form of words that, to Indian minds, was less significant than the British Resident's continued performance of a subject's customary visible acts of homage when he attended the Emperor's *darbar*;⁴ and the British thesis was overtly challenged in A.D. 1829, when a new incumbent of the office of Nizām of Hyderabad applied to the Mughal Emperor for investiture,⁵ as his predecessor had applied in A.D. 1803.⁶

"Those who took the imperial claims at their face value and those who regarded the Imperial Court as a mere puppet show, alike erred. . . . The British were prone to the latter mistake. But that it was a mistake was shown by the eagerness with which so realistic a man as Madho Rao Sindia sought the cloak of imperial authority for his acts, or a prince like the Nizām solemnly sought confirmation of his accession from Delhi as late as 1803 [and as 1829]. The truth was as nearly expressed as possible by Major Browne when he wrote: "I take the Shah's name to be of as much importance as an Act of Parliament in England if supported by as strong a force." "

The justice of this comparison was to be demonstrated, half a century later, when the British East India Company's own mutinous Indian soldiery followed Sindia's example by cloaking their force under the name of the last occupant of Akbar's imperial throne.

Ghosts of Defunct Universal States

A still more remarkable testimony to the tenacity of the belief in the immortality of universal states is the paradoxical practice of evoking their ghosts after they have proved themselves mortal by expiring. The 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad was thus resuscitated in the shape of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo,⁸ the Roman Empire in the two rival shapes of the Holy Roman Empire of the West⁹ and the East Roman Empire of Orthodox Christendom;¹⁰ the Empire of the Ts'ing and Han Dynasties in the shape of the Sui and T'ang Empire of the Far Eastern

¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 37 and 41-45.

³ Dispatch from the Court of Directors, quoted *ibid.*, p. 44.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 38 and 50. When Francis Hawkins, who had succeeded to the Residency in A.D. 1831, sought to break this practice by the flagrant act of riding right into the innermost court of the Mughal imperial palace, he was so far from carrying his principals with him that he 'found himself relieved first of his charge of the palace and then of the Residency altogether' (see *ibid.*, pp. 77-78).

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 49.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁸ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, chaps vii, viii, and xii, and the present work, I. i, 67, n. 2, 70, 360, and 396; II. ii, 75-76; and X. ix, 15.

⁹ See I. i, 343; III. iii, 276; IV. iv, 378-9; V. v, 477, n. 1; and X. ix, 9.

¹⁰ See I. i, 64, n. 3, 65, 66, and 70; IV. iv, 320; and X. ix, 15.

Society in China.¹ Such ghosts of universal states are conspicuous products of the historical phenomenon of 'renaissance' or contact in the Time-dimension between a civilization of the 'affiliated' class and the extinct civilization that is related to it by 'apparentation',² and, in that aspect, they are dealt with in a later part of this Study.³

The four representatives of this spectral species of polity that are here in question display wide differences from one another both in the timing of their evocation and in their subsequent fortunes. Whereas the Sui and T'ang Empire in the Far East and the Holy Roman Empire in the West were not evoked till after an interval of more than four hundred years since the *de facto* break-up of the universal state of which each of them was respectively a revival,⁴ and the East Roman Empire not till after an interval of some hundred and fifty years,⁵ the 'Abbasid Caliphate was resuscitated at Cairo less than three and a half years after its extinction at Baghdad.⁶ From the date of their prompt installation in A.D. 1261 by the strong hand of the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars to the date of their almost unnoticed cessation as a result of the conquest and annexation of Egypt by Sultan Selīm I 'Osmanli in A.D. 1517, the Cairene 'Abbasid Caliphs were never anything more than the puppets that they were intended to be.⁷ The Holy Roman Empire, after starting as a mighty power in virtue of being imposed upon the Austrasian Frankish state at the culminating moment of its history, shared in the collapse which Charlemagne brought upon his ambitious political structure by recklessly overstraining its resources, and was never more than partially rehabilitated by the successive efforts and sacrifices of Saxon, Franconian, and Swabian heirs of this fatal incubus; yet it survived, at least as a name—the ghost of a ghost—for nearly a thousand years after Charlemagne's death.⁸ On the other hand the East Roman Empire in the main body of Orthodox Christendom and the Sui and T'ang Empire in the Chinese portion of the Far Eastern World fulfilled the intentions of their respective founders by becoming and remaining solid political realities—the East Roman Empire for more than 250 years⁹ and the Sui and T'ang Empire for not

¹ See II. ii. 376; III. iii. 449; and X. ix. 16.

² For this relation of Apparentation-and-Affiliation between civilizations of different generations, see I. i. 44, 45-6, 51-2.

³ In X. ix. 7-21.

⁴ The Empire of the Posterior Han became impotent *de facto circa* A.D. 175; the Far Eastern Society in China was united politically under the Sui Dynasty in A.D. 581. The Roman Empire in the West became impotent *de facto* after the *Clades Gothica* of A.D. 378 or, at latest, after the death of the Emperor Theodosius I in A.D. 395; Charlemagne was crowned Emperor in St. Peter's at Rome on Christmas Day, A.D. 800.

⁵ The Roman Empire in the East ran out between the death of Justinian in A.D. 565 and the overthrow of Maurice in A.D. 602; the East Roman Empire was constructed by Leo Syrus (*imperator* A.D. 717-40).

⁶ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 82, following Suyūti: *Husn-al-Muhādarah*, vol. ii, pp. 53 seqq. and 57. The Caliph Musta'sim was put to death at Baghdad in February 1258; his uncle was installed at Cairo as the Caliph Mustansir in June 1261.

⁷ When the first of them, Mustansir, showed signs of taking his office seriously, his Mamlūk patron Baybars packed him off to his death, on the forlorn hope of reconquering Baghdad from the Mongols, and installed another member of the 'Abbasid House in his stead. This lesson was not forgotten by Caliph Hākim and his successors (see Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95).

⁸ Charlemagne died in A.D. 814; the Emperor Francis II Hapsburg renounced the title of Roman Emperor in A.D. 1806 (see I. i. 343 and X. ix. 11).

⁹ From the raising of the second Arab siege of Constantinople in A.D. 717 to the outbreak of the Great Romano-Bulgarian War in A.D. 977.

much less than 300¹—but this at the cost, on which their founders certainly never reckoned, of exhausting the strength of the still immature societies on whose life-blood these two lusty vampire-states waxed fat for a season.² The common feature, conspicuous above these differences, that concerns us here is the status which these ghosts, like their originals, acquired and retained as founts of legitimacy.

The Haunting of Cairo and Istanbul by the Ghost of the Caliphate

The Mamlûks had been quick to install a refugee 'Abbasid at Cairo because, being themselves usurpers of their Ayyubid masters' heritage, and being faced with the problem of handing it down thereafter from slave to slave, they had the same urgent and recurring need of legitimization as their contemporaries and counterparts the Slave Kings of Delhi. The Mamlûk Sultans and their subjects appear to have treated their 'Abbasid puppets with contempt from first to last,³ and at Mecca their names were never recited in the *khutbah*.⁴ Distance, however, lent them an appearance of dignity, and contemporary Muslim rulers in Hindustan made the same use of the Cairene 'Abbasid Caliphs as their predecessors had made of the last Baghdadi 'Abbasid Caliph Musta'sim. A diploma of investiture was sought and obtained from the Cairene 'Abbasid Caliph of the day not only by the parricide and tyrant Muhammad b. Taghlaq (*dominabatur* A.D. 1324-51) but by his estimable successor Firûz Shâh (*dominabatur* A.D. 1351-88), who had not his predecessor's incentive for seeking external sanction for his régime.⁵ Even Timur Lenk's grandson Pîr Muhammad seems to have thought of taking the same step as a manœuvre in the contest for Timur's heritage, and the Ottoman Pâdishâh Bâyezîd I (*imperabat* A.D. 1389-1402) seems actually to have applied in A.D. 1394 to the reigning Cairene 'Abbasid for a grant of the title of Sultan.⁶

Bâyezîd's descendant Selîm I felt himself in no need of legitimization, and did not covet a title borne by a puppet of his defeated and executed opponent the last Mamlûk Sultan Tûmân Bey.⁷ A new generation of *de facto* rulers of a nascent Iranic Muslim World esteemed the blood of the Eurasian Nomad war-lord Chinghis Khan to be a nobler liquid than that of any Meccan Holy Family, and they were also well aware that the strength of their own right arm was their only valid title in the last resort. In these revolutionary circumstances the maintenance of 'Abbasid Shadow-Caliphs at Cairo, and the occasional utilization of these *fainéants*' services as rubber-stamps by other Muslim potentates besides

¹ From the foundation of the Sui Empire in A.D. 581 to A.D. 878, when the T'ang régime became impotent *de facto* (see IV. iv. 87-88 and V. vi. 311, n. 3).

² For this fatal effect of the success of the East Roman Empire on the fortunes of the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society, see II. ii. 368 and IV. iv. 320-408.

³ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-102.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 101.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 103-5.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 105-6.

⁷ See *ibid.*, chap. xii. 'The fiction that the last 'Abbasid Caliph of Egypt handed over his dignity, by a formal act of transfer, to Sultan Selim, was first enunciated in A.D. 1787 by' the Levantine Christian scholar 'Constantine Mouradgea d'Ohsson in his monumental work *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman*' (*ibid.*, p. 146), thirteen years after the negotiation of the Russo-Turkish peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarja, which seems to have been the first occasion on which the Ottoman Pâdishâh made any attempt to turn his title of Caliph to any practical account (see p. 23, below).

their own Mamlūk slave-masters, had not deterred ex-barbarian *novi homines* from confidently assuming for themselves, and politely applying to one another, the style of 'Caliph' as a synonym for the effective sovereign of a state that was not oecumenical but was merely a Great Power.¹ This inflationary style had already been accepted by Bāyezīd I 'Osmanlı's father and predecessor Murād I (*imperabat* A.D. 1360-89) from the pens of the rulers of neighbouring Turkish principalities in Anatolia.² In these circumstances the history of the Khilāfat might have been expected to come to an end with the death, in obscurity, of the last Cairene Caliph in A.D. 1543; yet this was not, after all, the last chapter in this long-protracted story. After having thought nothing of the Caliphate for more than four hundred years after the unwarrantable ascription of the office to Sultan Murād I, the 'Osmanlis discovered belatedly, in the days of their decline, that this long despised and neglected ornament was worth bringing out of their lumber-room and polishing up.

During the century which began with the negotiation of the Russo-Turkish peace treaty of Küçük Qaynārja in A.D. 1774 and ended with the accession of 'Abd-al-Hamīd II to the Ottoman throne in 1876 the Ottoman Caliphate ceased to be merely titular and became for the first time an active factor in international affairs. This change was the consequence of three new developments: first, the continual transfer of ex-Ottoman provinces, containing Muslim populations, to the rule of Western Governments; second, the successive extinction of all sovereign independent Sunnī Powers of any importance, with the single precarious exception of the fast diminishing Ottoman Empire, and their replacement by the colonial empires of Western Powers (the most conspicuous example of this second development being India, where a large Muslim population passed from the Mughal Rāj to the British Rāj after a short interval of anarchy); and, third, the gradual emergence in Islamic society of a new sense of solidarity and a new desire to express this feeling in some practical form—a development which was a natural and, indeed, almost inevitable reaction to the other two. As a result of these three related developments, interest in the Caliphate revived, and at the same time a confusion of thought arose regarding the character of an office which had been obsolete, in all but name, for many centuries.

"This confusion was due to the misinterpretation of both the history and the theory of the Caliphate by insufficiently instructed Western observers, who drew a false analogy between an Islamic institution which they failed to understand and a Western institution with which they were familiar. They equated the Caliphate with the Papacy; explained it as a "spiritual" office in the Western sense (an abstraction

¹ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, chaps. ix and xi. This rapid depreciation of a title connoting a unique oecumenical sovereignty into one applied by courtesy to any sovereign of any consequence in a comity of parochial states has its parallel in the fate of the title of 'Emperor' in the Western World. The usurpation of this title by Napoleon Buonaparte on the 18th May, 1804, was followed—when the last legitimate Holy Roman Emperor Francis II Hapsburg had opened the flood-gates in proclaiming himself 'Hereditary Emperor of Austria' on the 10th August, 1804, and renouncing his own legitimate title of 'Roman Emperor' on the 6th August, 1806—by the crowning of Dom Pedro I as 'Constitutional Emperor of Brazil' on the 12th October, 1822 (see X. ix. 11).

² See Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-1.

which was quite foreign to Islamic thought); assumed that the double title of Sultan-Caliph implied a personal union of the "spiritual" and "temporal" powers in the Ottoman Pādishāh; and inferred that these powers could alternatively be divided between different persons. Their error obtained a wide currency in the West¹ (except among a few scholars without influence in international affairs) and even among Muslims who had received a Modern Western in place of a Classical Islamic education. It was consciously and skilfully exploited by 'Abd-al-Hamīd in his dealings with Western Governments, with Muslim peoples under Western rule, and with his own Muslim subjects.²

In at least three peace treaties signed between the years A.D. 1774 and A.D. 1913³ the Ottoman negotiators slyly took advantage of this Western Christian misconception of the Caliphate as a 'spiritual' office in order to secure, in territories that the Sultan was being compelled to cede as Pādishāh, a recognition of his continuing authority there as Caliph—a concession which, if maintained and fully implemented, would have restored to him under one title the political authority that he was surrendering under another. As it turned out, the Christian parties to two of these treaties quickly detected the ruse and insisted—in the one case within seven years and in the other within eleven years of the date of signature of the original instrument—on the cancellation of the insidious provisions.⁴

Although, however, the Caliphate, thus refurbished and passed off as a 'spiritual' office, did not, after all, prove an effective instrument for staving off, or even attenuating, the loss of Ottoman political control over ex-Ottoman territories that the Sultan-Caliph had been compelled to surrender owing to the turning of the tables in the military and political relations between the Ottoman Empire and its Western or Westernizing neighbours since the close of the seventeenth century of the

¹ It seems to have been popularized by M. C. M. d'Ohsson in the first volume of his *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1787), in which 'he speaks of the "sacerdotal authority" of the Sultan and styles him the "Pontiff of the Musulmans"' (Arnold, op. cit., p. 170).

² Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (Oxford 1927, University Press): 'The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement', pp. 32-33.

³ The Russo-Turkish peace treaty signed at Küçük Qaynārja on the 21st July, 1774, Art. 3; the Italo-Ottoman preliminaries of peace signed at Ouchy on the 15th October, 1912; the Turco-Bulgarian peace treaty signed at Constantinople on the 29th September, 1913 (see Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 34-36).

⁴ See Toynbee, op. cit., p. 36. The extent to which the minds of the ruling element in Russia had been Westernized by A.D. 1774 is revealed by the success of Ottoman diplomacy in playing this trick upon the representatives of a still officially Orthodox Christian Power; for in Orthodox Christendom the Christian distinction between Church and State had been confounded in the constitution of Leo III's East Roman Empire (see IV. iv. 352-3 and 592-623); and this East Roman 'Caesaro-papism', transmitted to Russia, had been carried a step farther by Peter the Great when, in A.D. 1700, he had allowed the Patriarchate of Moscow to lapse and then, in A.D. 1721, had made the Orthodox Church in his dominions into a department of state in form as well as in fact by the introduction of the administration of a 'Holy Synod' (see p. 38 below). Thus, in the years immediately preceding A.D. 1774, Church and State were so nearly fused together into an indistinguishable unity that it ought not to have been difficult for Russian statesmen of that age to appreciate, by analogy, the non-existence, in Islam, of any differentiation of a 'spiritual' from a 'temporal' sphere of social life. The less obvious implications of the status of the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople as a servant of the East Roman Emperor had been realized immediately by the less sophisticated Bulgars upon their conversion to Orthodox Christianity in A.D. 865 (see IV. iv. 377-81).

Christian Era, it did produce psychological effects which were imponderable yet appreciable factors in international politics. It gave pause to aggressive-minded Western or Westernizing Powers which had taken the measure of the Ottoman Empire's present political weakness but still remained in awe of the explosive religious force of Islam. Conversely, it made the Ottoman Empire—shrunk though it was—a moral rallying-point for a Muslim diasporá, not only in ex-Ottoman provinces which had passed under the rule of Orthodox Christian 'successor-states', but in distant regions, on other fringes of Dār-al-Islām, which had never been under the rule of an Ottoman or any other Caliph. By the date of the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in A.D. 1924 the Muslim minorities in the British Indian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Republic alone numbered considerably more than a hundred million in the aggregate, and these outlying millions—unlike the Arab peoples and others in the solid core of the Islamic World, including the Ottoman Turks themselves—had little prospect of ever being able to attain the current political ideal of a Westernizing World by exchanging the alien rule under which they were living at the time for national states of their own.¹ Their situation was not unlike that of their predecessors in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries of the Christian Era, when Dār-al-Islām was being overrun by barbarians and partitioned among military adventurers, and in these circumstances the Ottoman Caliphate gave them something of the same cohesion and encouragement that the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad had given to Muslims of that earlier age.²

These psychological effects of the Ottoman Caliphate, as turned to account by Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II (*imperabat* A.D. 1876–1909), were such manifestly valuable assets for the Ottoman body politic that the 'New 'Osmanli' liberal opponents of a tyrannous Hamidian autocracy sought, not to abolish the Ottoman Caliphate, but to preserve it for manipulation as an instrument of their own Turkish national policy. The sovereign was styled Caliph, as well as Sultan and Pādishāh, in the Ottoman Constitution of A.D. 1876, and the Caliphate survived 'Abd-al-Hamid's successful *coup d'état* of 1877 and unsuccessful attempt to repeat it in 1909 after the re-establishment of the Constitution in 1908.³ It even survived the abolition of the Sultanate and the vesting of the sovereign power in Turkey in the Great National Assembly at Ankara by a law voted by that body on the 1st November, 1922.⁴ This drastic piece of legislation was a retort to the hostile action of the last Sultan-Caliph Mehmed VI Vahid-ad-Din (*imperabat* A.D. 1918–22), who, seeing

¹ On this point see Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 39. By the time when the present passage was being written, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate was already more than a quarter of a century old, and the Indian Muslims had succeeded in establishing a separate national state of their own in the shape of Pakistan; but it would have been premature to assume that this was necessarily the end of the story.

² For the alertness of Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II in making use of railways, newspapers, and other Modern Western means of communication and propaganda for keeping in touch with a Muslim clientèle all over the World, see Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–40.

³ See Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–43, and the present Study, IX. viii. 261–3.

⁴ The text of this law of the 1st November, 1922, is printed in Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

the monarch's opportunity in the country's adversity, had thrown in his lot with the Empire's ex-victorious adversaries in the late wars of 1914-22 in the hope of putting back the constitutional clock to the point at which it had been marking time before the Revolution of A.D. 1908. In the same law the Caliphate was declared to reside in the House of 'Osmān, and the right of election to the office to lie with the Turkish Great National Assembly. On the strength of a legal opinion (*fatwā*), rendered by the Commissary for the Islamic Law (*Sherī'ah*) in the Government ruling the country in the Assembly's name, to the effect that the office of Caliph had been forfeited by Vahid-ad-Dīn Efendi, the Assembly voted, on the 18th November, 1922, that the office was now vacant, and on the same day they elected another member of the House of 'Osmān, 'Abd-al-Mejīd Efendi, as Caliph without any other title.¹

In attempting to draw this distinction between two traditional titles which historically and juridically were, both alike, emblems of political authority, the followers of Ghāzi Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk were unintentionally playing on themselves the trick which their ancestors had deliberately played on the Russians in A.D. 1774,² and, once again, the equivocal situation created by a false interpretation of the nature of the Caliph's office proved untenable—notwithstanding the suitably in-offensive character of the Assembly's unlucky nominee. When the law of the 1st November, 1922, was followed by another of the 29th October, 1923, proclaiming Turkey a republic and declaring the President of the Republic to be Chief of the State, the incompatibility between the legal position thus created in Turkey and the prerogatives of the Caliphate according to the *Sherī'ah* became so glaring that it was bound to be used as ammunition by Turkish opponents of the régime and to cause overt anxiety among Indian Muslims. The premature publication, in opposition newspapers at Constantinople, of a letter from two eminent Indian Muslims, the Agha Khan and Mr. Ameer Ali, to the Prime Minister of Turkey, intimating, in studiously tactful language, the distress that the Turkish Great National Assembly's actions had been producing among Muslims abroad,³ precipitated the passage by the Turkish Great National Assembly, on the 3rd March, 1924, of a law abolishing the Caliphate and banishing the members of the Ottoman Imperial family from the territories of the Republic of Turkey.⁴ When the news reached Delhi—where, as we have seen, the Caliphate had been revered for seven hundred years with a *naïveté* seldom corrected by first-hand acquaintance—the shock declared itself in a dramatic incident at a Red Crescent tea-party which offers a burlesque counterpart to the

¹ See Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

² The innocent misapprehension under which the Assembly acted in November 1922 was attested in a speech delivered by Mustafā Kemāl Pasha himself on the 30th October, 1922, in the debate preceding the passage of the Law of the 1st November. To the question 'What becomes of the Caliphate when the temporal power is taken away from it?' the Ghāzi gave the Levantine d'Ohsson's erroneous answer: in the days of the 'Abbasid Caliphs at Baghdad and of their successors at Cairo, 'the spiritual and temporal power existed separately side by side'. The relevant passage of the speech is printed in Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

³ The text is printed in Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 571-2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 575.

tragic scene in Saint Jerome's cell at Bethlehem when the Christian scholar received the news of the fall of Rome.¹

'A mission from the Turkish Red Crescent Society, which was collecting funds in India at the moment when the news of the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate arrived, found it advisable to cut short its activities and return home. (*The Times*, 5th March, 1924; *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, p. 181). The news was actually received during a tea-party at Delhi, where the members of the Turkish mission were being entertained by their Indian co-religionists. Upon the recital of the telegram containing the text of the Turkish Law of the 3rd March, [1924,] all but two of the Indians present immediately left the room.'²

At the time when the present chapter was being written, it looked as if this had really been the end of the Caliphate, for an immediate attempt on the part of the Hāshimī King Husayn of the Hijāz to assume the office (on the eve, as it turned out, of his own ejection from his ancestral patrimony by Ibn Sa'ūd) was—in spite of the Sharīf's unimpeachable Qurayshī lineage and his sovereignty, at the moment, over the two Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina—as dismal a failure as most of his other enterprises.³ Nor did any practical action result from a Caliphate Congress held at Cairo on the 13th–19th May, 1926.⁴

Yet, even if this forecast were to prove correct—though, in the light of previous history, it would not be safe to sign a death certificate for so resilient an institution as the Caliphate until it had been in abeyance for at least a quarter of a millennium⁵—the marvel would be, not that the Caliphate should have petered out at last, but that, on the strength of having been an effective sovereignty over a span of less than two hundred years,⁶ it should have been able within that time to acquire a prestige sufficient to keep it alive, and twice revive it,⁷ for another eleven hundred

¹ See the passage quoted in V. v. 223, n. 2.

² Toynbee, op. cit., p. 63, n. 7. Indian Muslims might have inoculated themselves against this shock by previously exposing themselves to another. 'The present writer once heard, from a British resident in Constantinople, of one instance in which this ignorance [of realities in Turkey] was cruelly dispelled. His informant had been in commercial relations with an Indian Muslim merchant who was a capable man of business and a loyal subject of the British Indian Government, but who cherished a keen sentimental regret for the lost dominion of Islam in India and consoled himself with the belief that in the Ottoman Caliphate there survived one Islamic Power which was as splendid as the Mughal Empire and as efficient as the British Rāj. After sustaining his self-respect as a Muslim upon this illusion for many years, this Indian merchant saved enough money to make a pilgrimage to the seat of the Caliphate at Constantinople—which meant more to him than the Holy Land of the Hijāz—and there became the guest of his British correspondent. The contrast between his long-cherished dream of the Caliphate and the sordid reality of the Ottoman Empire caused him a distress which it was painful to witness. He was appalled by the vast difference of standard between Muslim government in *Dār-al-Islām* and British government in India; and he went home with his spirit broken' (Toynbee, op. cit., p. 39, n. 1).

³ See Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 63–66.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 81–90.

⁵ Its latest interregnum had lasted from the death of the last Cairene 'Abbasid Caliph Mutawakkil in A.D. 1543 to the drafting of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Küçük Kaynārja in A.D. 1774.

⁶ From the death of the Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632 to the death of the 'Abbasid Caliph Amin (*imperabat* A.D. 809–13), in a civil war with his brother and supplanter Ma'mūn (*imperabat* A.D. 813–33) over the heritage of their father Hārūn-ar-Rashid (*imperabat* A.D. 786–809).

⁷ i.e. at Cairo in A.D. 1261 and at Constantinople in A.D. 1774.

years¹ during which it never emerged from the state of political impotence into which it had begun to decline in the reign of Hārūn-ar-Rashid's son Ma'mūn (*imperabat* A.D. 813-33).

*'The Holy Roman Empire'*²

This life-curve of the Caliphate, with its successive evocations at Cairo and Istanbul, has its counterpart in the aftermath of the Roman Empire in the West, with its abortive revival there in the shape of the Holy Roman Empire.³ The Roman Power which Pope Leo III and Charlemagne tried to raise from the dead on Christmas Day, A.D. 800, had been effective in the West for rather more than four hundred years.⁴ The Austrasian Power, which thus rashly shouldered the formidable burden of the Roman mantle, was effective for not more than 127 years at the longest reckoning.⁵ Yet, on the strength of these two spasmodic 'jet-propulsions', the Holy Roman Empire not only materialized in the heyday of Austrasia's fortunes, but survived thereafter for all but a thousand years more⁶ in a state of paralysis into which it fell at the death of Charlemagne, the first holder of the title (*regnabat* A.D. 768-814; *imperabat* A.D. 800-14), and from which it never afterwards more than partially recovered.⁷ The shadowy aftermath of the Roman Empire in the West thus attained a span of more than fourteen hundred years in all.⁸ A millennium and a half is no doubt an infinitesimally short span of time on the Time-scale of the age, up to date, of the Human Race or of Life or of the Earth or of the Stellar Cosmos,⁹ but it is a period of almost Egyptian longevity on the scale of the six-thousand-years-old history of the species of human societies called civilizations.

¹ Reckoning from the death of the Baghdadī 'Abbasid Caliph Amīn in A.D. 813 to the deposition of the Constantinopolitan 'Osmanli Caliph 'Abd-al-Mejid in A.D. 1924.

² See xi, map 37.

³ In conformity with our procedure in reckoning back the history of the Caliphate to its inauguration at Mecca in A.D. 632, and not merely to the evocation of its ghost at Cairo in A.D. 1261, we have to reckon back the history of the institution liquidated at Vienna in A.D. 1806 to the foundation of the Roman Empire itself by 'the crafty nephew of Julius' in the year 31 B.C.—as Lord Bryce makes his reckoning in the famous exordium of *The Holy Roman Empire* (quoted in I. i. 343).

⁴ Reckoning from the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C. to the Battle of Adrianople in A.D. 378, or at latest to the death of the Emperor Theodosius I in A.D. 395 (see p. 20, n. 4, above, and p. 40, n. 2, below).

⁵ Reckoning to the death of Charlemagne in A.D. 814 from the Battle of Tecticiacus in A.D. 687 in which Charlemagne's great-grandfather Pepin of Heristal had ended the anarchy let loose by the decay of the Merovingian Power and had brought Neustria as well as Austrasia under the effective rule of the House of Arnulf. The period would be still shorter if its initial date were to be reckoned from Charles Martel's victory over the Arabs at Tours in A.D. 732 or from the crowning of Pepin III in A.D. 754 as King of the Franks (see IV. iv. 488, n. 1), or from the crowning of Charlemagne himself as Emperor on Christmas Day, A.D. 800.

⁶ Reckoning from the death of Charlemagne in A.D. 814 to the renunciation of the title by Francis II in A.D. 1806.

⁷ In Charlemagne's time, and likewise at each of the successive revivals of the Holy Roman Empire after its first rapid lapse into impotence in the hands of Charlemagne's Carolingian successors, this Western ghost of the Roman Empire was an effective political power only in so far as it played the part of a continental march for Western Christendom. Under Charlemagne and the Saxon Emperors the Holy Roman Empire served as a march against the Continental European barbarians (see II. ii. 166-70); under the Hapsburgs it served as a march against the 'Osmanlis' (see II. ii. 177-90).

⁸ Reckoning from the death of Theodosius I in A.D. 395 to A.D. 1806.

⁹ For time-scales, see Zeuner, F. E.: *Dating the Past* (London 1946, 2nd ed. 1950, Methuen), and the present Study, I. i. 173.

It is noteworthy that, like the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the Holy Roman Empire retained, even at the vanishing-point of its effective power, a certain market value as a unique fount of honour.

'To [the] strange political fiction [that the 'Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad were still ruling after they had ceased to govern] there is a parallel in the history of the Holy Roman Empire during the fifteenth century [of the Christian Era]. While the unfortunate Emperor Frederick III, having been driven out of Vienna, was wandering about from monastery to monastery as a beggar, making what money he could out of the fees paid by those on whom he conferred titles, a contemporary jurist, Aeneas Piccolomini (afterwards famous as Pope Pius II), could write that the power of the Emperor was eternal and incapable of diminution or injury, and that anyone who denied that the Emperor was lord and monarch of the whole Earth was a heretic, since his authority was ordained by Holy Writ and by the decree of the Church.'¹

In A.D. 1952, when nearly a century and a half had elapsed since the self-liquidation of the Holy Roman Empire in A.D. 1806 by a voluntary act of the then reigning Emperor, the title of 'Count of the Holy Roman Empire' was still being conferred by the Sovereign Pontiff of the temple-state of the Vatican—who would perhaps have pleaded a victor's right to dispose of the sole remaining spoils of a rival institution which his own predecessors had brought to the ground in the tremendous struggle between Papacy and Empire during the so-called 'Middle Ages' of Western history.²

The Haunting of the 'Osmanlis and the Mongols by 'Ghosts of Ghosts'

While the Holy Roman Empire was compensated for the briefness of its effective reign, and the Cairene Caliphate for being cheated of any effective reign at all, by the inordinate length of a dim epilogue, the East Roman Empire in Orthodox Christendom and the Sui and T'ang Empire in the Far East had to pay for a longer spell of full-blooded life by suffering a more swift and drastic liquidation. No milder remedy than this could have saved from an immediate and premature death the societies on whose life-blood these two vampires had been feasting. The collapse, when it came, was in both societies so extreme that the exhausted civilization was fain to receive its respite and rest-cure in the shape of a universal state from the hands of alien empire-builders—the 'Osmanlis performing this unwelcome and indispensable service for the main body of Orthodox Christendom, and the Mongols for China.³

These aliens began by filling the social void which they found in their field of reconstruction work with characteristic institutions of their own,⁴ and they also eked out their own talents by enlisting ability wherever else they could lay hands on it, rather than from among the demoralized and discredited *ci-devant* dominant minority of the prostrate society for whose government the high-handed conquerors had now made themselves responsible. The Mongols organized their government of China

¹ Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

² See V. v. 348-51, and pp. 570 and 576, below.

³ See IV. iv. 512-84.

⁴ For the institutions that the 'Osmanlis brought with them into Orthodox Christendom from the Eurasian Steppe, see III. iii. 22-50.

with the help of Muslims from the western fringes of their spreading dominion, or of Western Christians from beyond its verge, of whom the most famous was Marco Polo. The 'Osmanlis drew on Western Christian renegades as well as on children of their own Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh* whom they had first 'denatured' by a Platonic system of education. In the governments of both these alien universal states it is the more remarkable to observe, on closer inspection, the presence of a number of institutional survivals of the liquidated vampire polities, and to find the evicted native dominant minority stealthily winning their way back into power as the mandarins who inducted Mongol and Manchu war-lords into the arts of Chinese administration, and as the Phanariots who made themselves indispensable to their Ottoman masters as soon as these were driven to enter into serious diplomatic relations with the Powers of the Western World owing to the loss of their own former military ascendancy.¹ Though the institutional survivals, as they catch our eye, present themselves largely in the forms of outward ceremonial and official insignia and costume, we may infer with confidence, from these outward visible signs, an inward psychological legacy from the East Roman Empire to an Ottoman 'Qaysar-i-Rum' and from the Sui and T'ang Empire to a Mongol 'Son of Heaven'.

'The Great Idea' of the Modern Greeks

The legacy that descended on the victorious 'Osmanlis did not cease to weigh upon the discomfited Greeks. Though the East Roman Empire came to grief in A.D. 1071² through the nemesis of the suicidal policy of military aggression on all fronts³ which had preceded, precipitated, and followed the great Romano-Bulgarian war of A.D. 977-1019, and though the rally led by the Emperor Alexius Comnenus (*imperabat* A.D. 1081-1118)⁴ brought no more than a passing relief, the Byzantine political incubus that was crushing the life out of the Greek people not only made a profound impression on their imaginations but also secured an enduring hold on their affections. When the Western military adventurers whose enterprise was nicknamed 'the Fourth Crusade' gave the stricken East Roman Empire its *coup de grâce* by storming and sacking Constantinople in A.D. 1204, they found the prestige of the battered Imperial Throne at Constantinople still standing so high among the conquered Greek population that they decided to enthrone one of their own number as a usurping 'Latin Emperor', in the hope—a vain one, yet the only hope that they had—that the double magic of the Imperial City and Name might commend their hated rule to their recalcitrant subjects.

These lures did indeed exercise an irresistible attraction upon the East Roman Empire's refugee Greek 'successor-state' at Nicaea in North-Western Anatolia, which had first successfully defied the invaders and had afterwards anticipated the career of the 'Osmanlis by bestriding the Dardanelles and gathering in fragments of ex-Imperial territory in the Balkan Peninsula.⁵ The able princes of Nicaea were

¹ For the Phanariots see II. ii. 222-8 and IX. viii. 187-9.

² See IV. iv. 392, n. 2.

⁴ See V. vi. 298.

³ See IV. iv. 391-404.

⁵ See III. iii. 27.

obsessed from first to last by the ambition of reoccupying Constantinople and there assuming the Imperial style and title; and in A.D. 1261 Michael Palaiologhōs duly achieved these Epimethean ambitions at the cost of losing to Turkish interlopers the best part of that precious Anatolian ground from which his principality had drawn its strength. This loss condemned the outwardly restored Empire to impotence from the start. Yet even the two-centuries-long agony of this shadow of a shadow of the Roman Empire, from the reoccupation of Constantinople in A.D. 1261 to its capture by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1453, did not cure the Greeks of their infatuation with a polity that had proved their ruin. Year by year, till these years had mounted up to little less than half a millennium,¹ the Greeks of Constantinople continued, under Ottoman rule, to expect the restoration of the East Roman Empire by a miraculous intervention of God.² And, in spite of invariable disappointment, 'the Great Idea'³ had power to entice Ypsilandi into making his fatuous raid across the Pruth in A.D. 1821⁴ and Venizelos into embarking in A.D. 1919 on an Anatolian adventure that was to meet with such a tragic ending in 1922. Nothing less than the eviction of a Greek diasporā of some

¹ A.D. 1453-1923.

² This expectation was sufficiently intense and persistent to find its way into Modern Greek folk-lore, where it expressed itself in the two parallel motifs of the miraculously interrupted service in the Cathedral Church of Ayia Sophia in Constantinople and the miraculously interrupted frying of the fishes.

A folk-song about the miraculous interruption of the service on the eve of the capture of the Imperial City by Sultan Mehmed II Fātih in A.D. 1453 is printed in Politis, N.G.: 'Εκλογαὶ ἀπὸ τὰ Τραγούδια τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Λαοῦ (Athens 1914, Estia), pp. 4-5, and a folk-song about the miraculous interruption of the fish-frying in Passow, A.: *Carmena Popularia Graeciae Recentioris* (Leipzig 1860, Teubner), p. 147, No. cxcvii. A folk-tale about the fish-frying is published by Politis in two versions in his *Μελέται περὶ τοῦ Βίου καὶ τῆς Γλώσσης τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Λαοῦ: Παραδόσεις* (Athens 1904, Sakellarios, 2 parts), part i, p. 21 (texts), and part ii, pp. 656-7 (commentary). The writer has been able to run these sources of the legend to earth thanks to the learning and the kindness of Professor R. J. H. Jenkins.

In one of these three pieces of popular Romaic Greek literature—the folk-song about the fishes—the episode of the miracle heralding the fall of Constantinople stands by itself—τὰ ψάρια πεταχτήκανε, τὰ ψάρια ζωνταῖα ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρχιεπισκοπῇ τοῦ καβαλάρησ—without the promise of an equally happy ending for the other two. The other two pieces of literature are the sequel in both the other two places. The first of the two prose versions of the legend about the fish, as given by Politis, runs as follows:

'At the time when the Turks were besieging the City, a monk was frying seven fishes in a frying-pan. He had already fried them on one side and was just turning them over on to the other when someone comes and tells him that the Turks have taken the City. "Never will the Turks set foot in the City," says the monk. "I will wait to believe that till I see these fried fishes come to life again." The words were not out of his mouth before the fishes leapt out of the frying-pan alive and dropped into a piece of water close by; and, down to this day, those fishes that came alive are in Balyqlı [*Anglicē* 'Fishwych'—A.J.T.] and will continue to be found there, still half-fried yet alive again, until the hour comes for us to take the City. Then, they say, another monk will come and finish frying them.'

'The fishes are pointed out in the holy well of the Zoodhókhos, outside the walls [of Constantinople], not far from the Gate of Silymbria (*alias* Piyı), according to Politis, *Μελέται*, part ii, p. 656. According to a Turkish version of the tale (*ibid.*, n. 1), there were originally seven fishes, but only five are now left.

The writer of this Study visited Balyqlı in A.D. 1921, but did not see even a residue of five half-fried fishes swimming there, though, in a year when Eastern Thrace was under Greek military occupation again for the first time since A.D. 1360, the possibility that the Greeks might reoccupy Constantinople too seemed less remote than at any other date, either earlier or later, since A.D. 1453.

³ 'Ἡ Μεγάλη Ἰδέα, meaning a conception of Modern Greece as being the heir of the East Roman Empire.

⁴ See II. ii. 226-7 for Ypsilandi (in Greek spelling 'Hypsēlantēs') and his adventure.

1,280,000 souls from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace¹ availed to banish from Greek minds the persistent dream of restoring the East Roman Empire; and the previous potency of the ghost that was thus at last exorcised is demonstrated by the sequel. Though the Graeco-Turkish war of A.D. 1919-22 had inflicted greater devastation and suffering on both sides than any of its predecessors, it was followed within eight years by a Graeco-Turkish *entente*;² and this apparent paradox admits of only one explanation. The loading of the atmosphere with a new charge of hate was far outbalanced by the lightening of it through the dissipation of an old illusion.

'At Ankara, a silent witness of the historic event of October 1930 was one of the most famous monuments of Classical Antiquity: the longest extant Latin inscription in the World, in which the first of the Roman Emperors had recorded his achievements. The Roman Empire had bequeathed its name to its former dominions in the Near East (Rum, Rum-ili, Romania) and to the peoples which had inherited them. The 'Osmānlis had been known as Romans (Rūmīs) among their Muslim neighbours in Iran and Hindustan, while the modern Greeks had called themselves Romans (Romaioi) until a romantic nationalism, acquired in the West, had taught them to think of themselves as Hellenes. The hold of Rome upon the Near Eastern imagination had only relaxed with the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, which was the Roman Empire's last and strangest reincarnation. The Greeks really repudiated their Imperial Roman heritage when they rose in insurrection in A.D. 1821, the Turks when they signed their National Pact in A.D. 1920. Therewith, the ghost of the Roman Empire, which had so long haunted the Near East, was finally exorcised. The Imperial City of Constantine—the New Rome on the Bosphorus—had ceased to be the capital of an empire or even of a "successor-state". Indeed it was no longer a bone of contention between the states into which the defunct empire had been partitioned. The Oecumenical Patriarch, who had once laid claim, in his very title, to be the head of the Orthodox Church through all the World, had seen his flock diminish until now it was merely represented by that Orthodox Christian minority—less than 100,000 strong—which was recognised as "established" in Constantinople by the terms of the convention of the 10th June, 1930. . . . A meeting, at Constantinople, between the ecclesiastical head of the ancient Greek Church and the political head of the modern Greek State had ceased to be an event of political significance. If there were any statesmen living in 1930 who could claim to have "made history", they were Mustafā Kemal and Eleftherios Venizelos.'³

'Moscow the Third Rome'⁴

While 'the Great Idea' of the Greeks had been a minor tragedy and major curiosity of history, the sowing of the same seed in Russia had been big with consequences of historic importance which, at a date midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, had perhaps not yet come to full harvest.

¹ See the figures given by V. M. Boulter in *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. ii (London 1928, Milford), p. 276.

² For this beneficent revolution in Graeco-Turkish relations, see Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930 (Oxford 1931, University Press), pp. 157-68.

³ Toynbee and Boulter, op. cit., p. 168.

⁴ See xi, map 49.

When the lingering shadow of a restored East Roman Empire—the ghost of the ghost of an Hellenic universal state—was finally effaced by the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in A.D. 1453, the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom¹ was about to enter into a universal state of its own. The establishment of this Russian universal state may be dated from the annexation of the Republic of Novgorod² between

¹ For the relation of Russian Orthodox Christendom to the original home of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Anatolia and the Balkan Peninsula, see I. i. 132–3.
² See IV. iv. 88; V. v. 312; V. vi. 191 and 309; and IX. viii. 126. Prince Dmitri Obolensky comments:

'Is there not some danger of over-estimating the importance of this union? I would say that the annexation of Novgorod and its dependencies by Ivan III, though of course it vastly increased the territories and economic resources of Muscovy, was in itself only a stage in the lengthy process by which the Muscovite sovereigns succeeded in annexing the greater part of their Kievan predecessors' "patrimony" (except, of course, the south-western regions). This process began *circa* A.D. 1300 and may be said to have ended in A.D. 1533, with the death of Basil III; and the annexations of Tver, the Chernigov and Seversk lands, Pskov, Smolensk and Ryazan, which took place in the latter part of Ivan III's reign and in the reign of Basil III, were perhaps in the long run as important landmarks in this process of "gathering" as the conquest of the Novgorodian lands.

'It seems to me, moreover, that the term "universal state" is more applicable to the multi-national Empire that arose out of Ivan IV's Eastern conquests than to the still essentially Russian states of Ivan III and Basil III. For the annexation of Smolensk (A.D. 1514) and the incorporation of the Ryazan principality (*circa* A.D. 1520) into Muscovy mark the final political unification of the Great Russian lands under Muscovite dominion, while the conquest of Qazän, Astrakhan and Western Siberia in the reign of Ivan IV, which brought into the Muscovite realm large areas of non-Russian population and culture, may perhaps be regarded with greater justification as the opening chapters in the history of the Russian "universal state".'

On consideration of the first of the two points here made by Prince Obolensky, the writer of this Study does not find himself persuaded that the union of Novgorod with Muscovy was not, after all, the crucial event in the process of the political unification of the territorial patrimony of a Russian Orthodox Christendom under Muscovite rule. Among the parochial states that had sprung from the ruins of the ascendancy of the principality of Kiev, Novgorod was surely unique in being a commercial community with a vast economic hinterland extending north-eastwards to the shores of the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean as far as the estuary of the River Obi on the farther side of the Urals, and in maintaining an active intercourse with the Hanseatic states members of a contemporary Western city-state cosmos on the cultural as well as on the economic plane. In exchange for the furs produced by her north-eastern hinterland, Novgorod had imported from her Western customers the political institution of self-government on the city-state scale. In virtue of this combination of commercial wealth with political liberties, Novgorod was surely the one other Russian parochial state in this age that might perhaps have competed seriously with Moscow for the role of becoming the nucleus of a Russian universal state which, had it crystallized round Novgorod instead of crystallizing round Moscow, would have had a different *ethos*, as well as a different geographical centre, from the Muscovy that actually performed this historic service for a Russian Orthodox Christendom. On this account the writer remains convinced that, in the building of the Russian universal state, the subjugation of Novgorod by Moscow was the decisive event that may be taken as marking the Russian universal state's establishment (though, of course, the precise dating of the consummation of any historical process is inevitably arbitrary and conventional and consequently open to dispute).

Prince Obolensky's second point turns, as will be seen, on the choice of a different criterion for the epiphany of a universal state from the criterion chosen in the present Study. The term 'universal state' is used here to denote an empire that is 'oecumenical' in the sense of embracing the whole geographical domain of the 'world' constituted by some single civilization, while Prince Obolensky is inclined to appropriate the same term for the different (though, no doubt, equally legitimate) purpose of denoting a state that is universal in the sense of embracing at least parts of the domains of more civilizations than one. In a later chapter (pp. 61–67, below) we shall observe that most of the universal states that had been 'oecumenical' in the sense of embracing the whole domain of some single civilization had also been 'cosmopolitan' in the sense of including parts of the domains of alien civilizations as well; but this feature in the composition of a universal state, though usual, will prove to be neither essential nor indeed invariably present. The essential and never-absent mark of a universal state, in the sense in which the term is used in this Study, is the political unification, within its frontiers, of the whole domain of some single civilization.

A.D. 1471 and A.D. 1479 by the Grand Duke of Moscow, Ivan III (*imperator* A.D. 1462–1505). This swift sequence of momentous events in the main body of Orthodox Christendom and in its Russian off-shoot, and the dramatic contrast between the final downfall of Orthodox Constantinople and the definitive triumph of Orthodox Moscow, made a profound effect upon the Russian imagination.

'The expansion of every nation, the growth of every empire, is usually the outward sign of an inward conviction of the people that they have a special mission to perform. The striking transformation of the small Moscow principality into one of the largest states of the World was the result of the deep-rooted belief of her people that they were called upon to defend Eastern Orthodoxy.'¹

Other Orthodox Slav princes before the Muscovite Ivan III had coveted the dazzling insignia of the East Roman Empire and had audaciously stretched out greedy hands to snatch them from the person of a legitimate Emperor reigning at Constantinople; but, unnerved by their own impiety, they had faltered and failed, with disastrous ulterior consequences for their own principalities. After missing, in A.D. 913, a chance of mounting the Imperial Throne at Constantinople, Khan Symeon of Bulgaria had proclaimed himself 'Emperor of the Romans and Bulgars' in A.D. 925, and the Archbishop of Preslav 'Patriarch' of his hybrid empire in the year after;² but within less than a century the Bulgarian state had been erased from the political map of Orthodox Christendom: a war to the death had ended in the outright annexation of all Bulgaria by an East Roman Empire which Khan Symeon had aspired to supplant.³ The Bulgar Khan had rashly challenged the East Roman Empire at its zenith; at its nadir, when the possession of the beggarly remnant of its domain was being contested between a legitimate Palaiologhos and the pretender John Kandakouzinós, the Serb war-lord Stephen Dushan had had himself crowned by the Patriarch of Bulgaria and by his own Serbian Archbishop of Peć on Easter Day, A.D. 1346, as 'King of Serbia . . . Albania and the sea-board, prince of the Empire of Bulgaria, and lord of almost all the Empire of Romania'.⁴ The misgivings revealed in this cautiously accurate enumeration had afterwards been veiled in the bolder style and title of 'Emperor and Autocrat of Serbia and Romania';⁵ yet the waning shadow of the East Roman Empire had eluded Dushan's grasp, and, within less than half a century, the Serb war-bands had been scattered like chaff by their 'Osmanli competitors for the prize of becoming the founders of a universal state for the main body of Orthodox Christendom. The Muscovites, who afterwards trod with impunity the perilous path down which a Bulgarian Symeon and a Serbian Stephen had carried their ephemeral empires to destruction, were not even inspired directly by either of these two magnificent failures; they drew their inspiration from a Second

¹ Zernov, N.: *The Russians and their Church* (London 1945, S.P.C.K.), p. 49.

² See IV. iv. 384 and 386.

³ See IV. iv. 390–2.

⁴ 'Serviae . . . Albaniae, maritimae regionis rex, Bulgariae imperii princeps et fere totius imperii Romaniae dominus' (Gibbons, H. A.: *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1916, Clarendon Press), p. 88).

⁵ Gibbons, loc. cit.

Bulgarian Empire which had dragged out its undistinguished existence during the two centuries (A.D. 1186-1393) between the collapse of the East Roman Empire in South-Eastern Europe and the political unification of the main body of Orthodox Christendom by the 'Osmanlis.

'The Second Bulgarian Empire with its centre at Trnovo had for a time controlled the Balkans; its rulers had styled themselves Tsar and Auto-krâtôr, and at their court there had been a literary revival when Greek works were translated into Bulgarian. Among these translated works was the verse chronicle of Manasses. In this chronicle the decline of the Roman Power in Western Europe was described: the Old Rome of the West had failed, but Constantinople had taken its place and still stood young and vigorous. In the Bulgarian version Constantinople disappears, and in its stead the chronicler's praise is transferred to "our new Tsarigrad" and the Bulgarian Tsar. Trnovo claimed for itself the imperial glory of the city of Constantine. In A.D. 1393 the Bulgarian Empire fell before the attack of the Turks, and many exiles fled from Bulgaria to Moscow. A Bulgarian, Kiprian, at this time became Metropolitan of Moscow. It looks as if these *émigrés* had carried with them the imperial theory which on Bulgarian soil had been shattered by the Turkish victory. It was Kiprian who, when a dispute had arisen between Moscow and the [East Roman] Empire, wrote to the Patriarch of Constantinople: "We have a church but no Emperor, and we do not recognise him." Byzantium replied by a re-assertion of its sole claim to imperial sovereignty. In A.D. 1438-9 came the Council of Florence and the union of the Eastern and Western churches. Orthodoxy had been betrayed by the Greeks: The Metropolitan Isidor [of Moscow], who had played the traitor's part at the Council, was cursed as a renegade.¹ In A.D. 1453 Constantinople itself fell into the hands of the Turks. The lesson thus taught by history was obvious: here was the hand of God.²

The Muscovites took full advantage of the opportunity that now lay open to them. In A.D. 1472 the Grand Duke Ivan III married Zoë (*Russicé* Sophia) Palaiológos, a niece of the last Constantinopolitan Orthodox Emperor Constantine,³ and adopted as his own coat-of-arms the two-headed East Roman eagle.⁴ In A.D. 1480 he repudiated the

¹ Isidore was not only discredited; he was ejected and replaced by a successor of Russian, instead of Greek, nationality; and at the same time the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical suzerainty over the Metropolitan See of Moscow was repudiated. See IX. viii. 398.—A.J.T.

² Baynes, N. H., and Moss, H. St. L. B.: *Byzantium* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 383-4. Cp. Zernov, N.: *Moscow the Third Rome*, reprint of 2nd ed. (London 1944, S.P.C.K.), p. 34: 'This catastrophe, comparable only to the destruction of Jerusalem or the sack of Rome, required an explanation, and this was found in the apostasy of the Emperor and the Oecumenical Patriarch.'

³ The Thirteenth, counting from Constantine the Great, on one reckoning, the Eleventh on another.

⁴ These two events are, however, given a different complexion by Prince Obolensky in 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage', *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. i (Oxford 1950, Clarendon Press), p. 46:

'Of course there can be no doubt that Russian Tsarism welcomed the theory that the seat of Imperial sovereignty had migrated to Moscow after the fall of Constantinople; the Tsar's adoption of Byzantine titles, heraldry and ceremonial can be regarded as a visible symbol of this claim. But . . . the Christian universalism of East Rome was transformed and distorted within the more narrow framework of Muscovite nationalism. The really significant fact is that the beginning of Russia's turning away from her Byzantine heritage in the late fifteenth century coincided with the growth of her connexions with the West; Ivan III's marriage with Zoë was a harbinger of these connexions; for the

suzerainty of the Tatars of Bātū Khan's Appanage and proclaimed his own independence under the title of Autocrat. His second successor Ivan IV the Terrible (*imperabat* A.D. 1533-84) had himself crowned Emperor in 1547. In A.D. 1551 a Council of the Russian Church asserted the superiority of the Russian version of Orthodoxy over all others.¹ In the reign of Tsar Theodore (*imperabat* A.D. 1584-98), in A.D. 1589, the Metropolitan of Moscow was elevated by the Oecumenical Patriarch of the day to the status of Patriarch of All Russia.² In taking these successive steps the Russians were on stronger ground than their Bulgar and Serb precursors whose ventures had ended so ignominiously. They were not usurpers challenging living legitimate bearers of the Imperial title, but residuary legatees taking over a vacant heritage; and, so far from being conscious of sin, they were confidently self-righteous.

† 'The feeling that the Greeks had betrayed their Orthodoxy, and were therefore punished by God, was particularly strong in the remote Church of Russia, where anti-Latin tendencies were very pronounced. . . . To the Russians it seemed that, if the Greeks were rejected by God for the betrayal of Orthodoxy, they themselves were restored to political independence because of their devotion to the Church. The Russian nation was the last stronghold of the Orthodox Faith, and would thus inherit all the privileges and duties of the Christian Roman Empire.'³

This Russian belief in Russia's high destiny was fortified by Biblical and Patristic authority. The four successive universal states that were a prominent motif in the Book of Daniel⁴ had been identified by the Christian Father Hippolytus (*florebat circa* A.D. 230)⁵ as the Empires of Babylon,⁶ the Achaemenidae, Alexander the Great, and Rome.

'During the ascendancy of the Fourth Realm the greatest events in human history were expected to take place, including the Second as well niece of the last Byzantine Emperor came to Russia from Italy accompanied by a papal legate, and the marriage had been arranged in Rome.'

¹ See Zernov, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

² See Zernov, *ibid.*, pp. 69-73. In spite of his assumption of this style and title, the Patriarch of Moscow did not succeed immediately in extending his ecclesiastical domain beyond the previous limits of the Muscovite Metropolitan See. Russian Orthodox Christians who were political subjects of the United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania and who did not become Uniate ecclesiastical subjects of the Roman Church continued to be ecclesiastical subjects of the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople until after Kiev had fallen under the political sovereignty of Muscovy—as it fell provisionally in A.D. 1667 and definitively in A.D. 1686. After the death of the reigning Metropolitan of Kiev in A.D. 1671, the Muscovite Government deliberately kept the See vacant; and, when in A.D. 1684 they gave their consent at last to the holding of a new election, they stipulated that the new incumbent should be the ecclesiastical subject of the Patriarch of Moscow, and no longer of the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. The Metropolitan of Kiev who was elected on the 29th June, 1685, accordingly obtained investiture from the Patriarch of Moscow; and, when the Oecumenical Patriarch refused to recognize the alienation of the See of Kiev from his own ecclesiastical jurisdiction, he was compelled to give way by the Sultan acting at the instance of the Tsar, whom the Porte was eager to appease, in the vain hope of deterring Moscow from joining the Western Christian coalition against the Ottoman Empire (see Doroshenko, D.: *History of the Ukraine*, English translation (Edmonton, Alberta, 1939, The Institute Press), pp. 324-8).

³ Zernov, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-36.

⁴ Daniel ii. 27-49; vii. 1-28; ix. 24-27.

⁵ Though Hippolytus lived and worked in Rome, he wrote in Greek—which was the language of the proletariat, and therefore of the Church, in the Imperial City till after his day—and his works were therefore current in Eastern Orthodox Christendom.

⁶ i.e. the Neo-Babylonian Empire of Nebuchadnezzar, not the original Babylonian Empire of Hammurabi.

as the First Coming of the Messiah. The collapse of the western part of the Roman Empire in the fifth century did not affect this conviction, for the Eastern Christians believed that Constantinople was the New or Second Rome. They ascribed to her the same promises of indestructibility which were originally made in regard to Rome herself. When Moscow became the only capital among the Eastern Christians free from the control of the Infidels, it was natural that she should be elevated to the position of the Third and Last Rome.¹

This belief was given its classical formulation by an elder of a monastery in Pskov, Philotheus, in an epistle addressed to the Grand Duke Basil III (*imperabat* A.D. 1505-33).

'The Church of Old Rome fell [because of] its heresy; the gates of the Second Rome, Constantinople, were hewn down by the axes of the infidel Turks; but the Church of Moscow, the Church of the New Rome, shines brighter than the Sun in the whole Universe. Thou art the one universal sovereign of all Christian folk; thou shouldst hold the reins in awe of God. Fear Him who hath committed them to thee. Two Romes are fallen, but the Third stands fast; a fourth there cannot be. Thy Christian kingdom shall not be given to another.'²

Two generations later, a paraphrase of this famous passage was written into the installation charter of the first Patriarch of Moscow³ over the signature of his creator the Oecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah:

'Because the Old Rome has collapsed on account of the heresy of Apollinarius, and because the Second Rome, which is Constantinople, is now in [the] possession of the godless Turks, thy great kingdom, O pious Tsar, is the Third Rome. It surpasses in devotion every other, and all Christian kingdoms are now merged in thy realm. Thou art the only Christian sovereign in the World, the master of all faithful Christians.'⁴

The Russians' bold application to their own universal state of the belief in the immortality of an oecumenical Roman Empire seems to have moved a Muscovite Government—in so far as this 'great idea' had any practical influence on Muscovite policy—to concentrate its attention and effort more steadily than ever upon working for the Russian aims of saving a still inviolate 'Third Rome' from suffering 'the Second Rome's' and 'the First Rome's' fates and of liberating from Western political and ecclesiastical domination the Russian Orthodox Christian lands and peoples that had fallen under the rule of Poland and Lithuania since the fourteenth century,⁵ without allowing itself to be diverted by Western diplomacy into fancying itself in the romantic role of a divinely appointed liberator of non-Russian Orthodox Christians who had fallen under Otto-

¹ Zernov, N.: *The Russians and their Church*, p. 50.

² Philotheus of Pskov, op. cit., as cited in Zernov, *The Russians and their Church*, p. 51. In this passage, Philotheus has taken his cue from earlier Russian expressions of the same idea. For instance, 'the chronographer of A.D. 1512 writes: "Constantine's city is fallen, but our Russian land through the help of the Mother of God and the Saints grows and is young and exalted. So may it be, O Christ, until the end of Time!" The words which the Bulgarian translator of Manasses had applied to Tmovo are here claimed for Moscow' (Baynes, N. H., and Moss, H. St. L. B.: *Byzantium* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), p. 384).

³ For the establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow in A.D. 1589, see p. 35, above.

⁴ Text as cited in Zernov, op. cit., p. 71.

⁵ See IX. viii. 126-8.

man Muslim rule as a penalty for 'the Second Rome's' apostasy.¹ The political mission of 'the Third Rome' would be neither to rescue nor to reform 'the Second Rome', but to supplant her, as it had been the Christian Church's mission to supplant the Jewish Church. The effect, in Russian souls, of the concept of 'Moscow the Third Rome' seems to have been to precipitate, focus, and express a Russian sense of the uniqueness of Russia's own destiny as the sole surviving repository and citadel of an impeccably orthodox Christianity; and this sense of destiny subsequently demonstrated its strength by surviving some very formidable opposition.

While 'it is an open question whether Jeremiah himself fully understood the Russian text [of his charter] and shared the interpretation given by the Russians to the act committed by him',² it is certain that, when the four Greek Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem jointly accorded recognition to the Patriarchate of Moscow in A.D. 1593, they assigned to the new Patriarch the fifth and not the first place in their order of precedence.³ Thereafter, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the ideal of 'Moscow the Third Rome' was signally defeated first by Greek Orthodoxy and then by the secular civilization of the West.

In consequence of a schism within the bosom of the Russian Church, arising from the championship of Greek as against Russian ritual practice⁴ by no less a person than the reigning Patriarch of Moscow, Nikon,⁵ the four Greek Patriarchs—Ottoman *ra'iyyeh* though they were—became for a moment the arbiters of Russia's ecclesiastical destiny. At a Council held at Moscow in A.D. 1666–7, over which the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch presided, the opponents of Nikon's Graecizing reforms were excommunicated, and the Russian hierarchy were compelled to sign a statement renouncing the pretension, put on record by the Council of A.D. 1551, that Muscovite Orthodoxy was an ensample for the rest of the Orthodox Church. At the same time Nikon himself was deposed and unfrocked.⁶

¹ See Prince Dmitri Obolensky in *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. i (Oxford 1950, Clarendon Press), pp. 46 and 62, together with the further observations from him and from B. H. Sumner that are quoted, in an annex, on pp. 577–9, below.

² Zernov, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

³ See Zernov, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

⁴ 'The cause of these differences in ritual, discovered by the Russians in the seventeenth century, was their long separation, under the Tatar yoke, from the rest of Eastern Christendom. For, whilst the Church of Byzantium had gradually altered liturgical customs, the Russians had preserved intact the ritual received by them at the time of their conversion in the tenth century' (Zernov, *op. cit.*, p. 100). It will be seen that the circumstances in which this issue between the Russian and Greek versions of Eastern Orthodoxy arose in the seventeenth century were remarkably similar to those in which the issue between the Irish and Roman versions of Western Catholicism had arisen in the seventh century (see the present Study, I. i. 29 and II. ii. 333–6). There is a singular resemblance between the masterful characters, and parallelism between the chequered careers, of Nikon and Wilfrid. The two prelates won a conspicuous and enduring victory for the causes of Constantinople and Rome respectively, and both of them eventually brought personal discomfiture and downfall on themselves through the intolerable hybrid bred in their imperious souls by the brilliance of their previous successes.

⁵ Nikon *patriarchico munere fungebatur* A.D. 1652–66.

⁶ Zernov, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–4. This Greek ecclesiastical ascendancy in Muscovy proved ephemeral. 'In general, the religious and cultural links between the [Russians and the Greeks], which had been steadily increasing during the first three-quarters of the

In the next generation, Peter the Great applied his extraordinary genius to a revolutionary attempt to transform Muscovy from a Russian Orthodox Christian universal state, believing itself to be charged with a unique oecumenical mission, into an efficient parochial state member of the contemporary Western comity. Peter transferred the capital of his dominions from Russian Orthodox Moscow to a new city, founded by him in the maritime Western March of the Russian World and named after its founder; and, on the culturally as well as physically virgin soil of St. Petersburg, a Westernizing Russia was to have a seat of government that would be Western from the start, uncontaminated by any antecedent deposit of Orthodox tradition.¹ Peter also instilled a tincture of Westernism into the Muscovite Church by filling the key posts in the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, hitherto held by Muscovites, with Ukrainian clerics from Kiev and the Ukrainian territories lying east of the River Dniepr that had been acquired by Muscovy from Poland-Lithuania in A.D. 1667;² for, under a Roman Catholic ascendancy, the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy, whether they opposed Romanization or yielded to it, had been constrained to study Roman theology and in the process had been mentally re-oriented to a partially Western outlook.³ Finally, after having left the Patriarchal Throne of Moscow lying vacant for twenty years, Peter replaced the Patriarchate in A.D. 1721 by a 'Holy Synod' composed of ecclesiastics appointed by the Emperor himself and explicitly acknowledging his supremacy; and, to make sure that his control should be effective, he placed the Synod under the supervision of a lay Procurator.⁴

This rain of blows might have been expected to be crushing, yet the ideal once conveyed in the concept of 'Moscow the Third Rome' clung to life in its traditional religious expression and eventually found for itself new expressions in terms of the ideologies of a Westernizing World whose atmosphere the Russians were now constrained to breathe. The

seventeenth-century, had declined in the last quarter, when Kiev [ceded to Muscovy by Poland-Lithuania in A.D. 1667], not Constantinople, proved itself the leading Orthodox cultural influence on Russia. When in A.D. 1685-6 the Metropolitanate of Kiev was placed under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, this was effected without previous agreement with Constantinople, and the [Oecumenical] Patriarch could do nothing but register unavailing protests. Ukrainians, not Greeks, became the leading representatives, in Russia, of new trends in Orthodox thought and education. Constantinople no longer, as in the days of Nikon, represented for Russia the fountainhead of learning and of Orthodox tradition' (Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), p. 64). Both Peter the Great and his ambassador at Constantinople, P. A. Tolstoi, seem to have disliked and despised the Phanariot Greek Orthodox Christian prelates (see *ibid.*, pp. 63-65).

¹ A corresponding consideration had been in the mind of Constantine the Great when he had transferred the capital of the Roman Empire from Old Rome to his own foundation of New Rome or Constantinople. The seat of Government of a converted Roman Empire was to be Christian from the outset, unaffected by the archaic paganism that was dying so hard in its Senatorial fastness on the banks of the Tiber (see V. vi. 89). In making the transfer, both Constantine and Peter were, of course, moved by political and strategic motives in addition to the cultural motive here in question (see II. ii. 157-8 and pp. 221-3, below).

² The Zaporozhian Cossacks, who controlled the southern fringe of the Ukraine, below Kiev (see II. ii. 154-7 and V. v. 283), had transferred their allegiance from Poland-Lithuania to Muscovy already between the years 1648 and 1667.

³ See Zernov, N.: *Moscow the Third Rome*, pp. 89-91.

⁴ See Zernov, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82; eundem, *The Russians and their Church*, pp. 122-4; and the present chapter of the present Study, p. 23, n. 4, above.

excommunicated opponents of Nikon succeeded in establishing and maintaining, under the Petrine régime, the dissident church of the Old Believers,¹ and in a Western Age of Romanticism the Russian faith in Russia's unique destiny and oecumenical mission acclimatized itself to the spiritual temperature of a secular Western culture under the guise of the Slavophil Movement.² When the Petrine political régime collapsed in A.D. 1917, the Patriarchate of Moscow was re-established³ and the political capital was retransferred to Moscow from Petrograd.

It might have been expected, again, that, after this flicker of life, the ideal of 'Moscow the Third Rome' would have received its *coup de grâce* from the Bolshevik régime; for did not Lenin and his companions out-Peter Peter? Was it not the aim of the Communists to complete the Westernization of Russia on a radical futurist pattern? Were they not setting themselves to uproot, not merely Orthodoxy, but the very belief in the existence of God? Did they not deliberately eliminate the name of Russia from the official style of their 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'? The answers to these rhetorical questions are necessarily affirmative, yet they leave unsolved the enigma of the ambiguity in the nature of Bolshevism which has been touched on at an earlier point in this Study⁴ and which still remained obscure at a time when the Soviet Government had been in existence for a third of a century.

The would-be disciples of Marx might prove to be involuntary disciples of Philotheus. It was they, after all, who had repaired Peter's breach with Muscovite geographical tradition by bringing back to Moscow from Leningrad the capital of the Empire which the Soviet régime had inherited from Peter, and Peter from Ivan III; and, though this deliberate act of theirs had no doubt been prompted by other motives,⁵ it was improbable that, once ensconced in the Kremlin, they would be impervious to an atmosphere from which their clear-sighted precursor had taken

¹ See V. vi. 120-1 and IX. viii. 131-2.

² See Kohn, Hans: 'Dostoevsky's Nationalism', in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, October 1945, vol. vi, No. 4 (New York 1945, College of the City of New York), pp. 385-414, and the present Study, IX. viii. 131-2.

³ Tikhon, the Metropolitan of Moscow, was elected Patriarch on the 5th November, 1917 (i.e. after the Bolsheviks had come into power), by a Church Council, including lay as well as ecclesiastical members, which had been convened on the 15th August (Zernov, *The Russians and their Church*, p. 154).

⁴ In III. iii. 200-2. See further IX. viii. 133-6 and 607-8.

⁵ These motives are discussed, in an annex, on pp. 690-1, below. One motive of the Bolsheviks in retransferring the capital from Leningrad to Moscow on the 12th March, 1918, had been to entrench themselves in a strategic position covering the eastern exit of an overland avenue of attack from Western Europe along which the Germans had marched, in Polish and French footsteps, in two world wars. Another of their motives had been to establish their hold over, and spread their doctrine among, the mass of the people whom they had set out to rule, by planting themselves at a point which, besides covering the most dangerously exposed of all Russia's twentieth-century frontiers, had the second advantage of lying much nearer than Leningrad lay to the heart of the country. This was the motive that likewise led the British Government of India to retransfer the capital of the Indian Empire from Calcutta to Delhi in A.D. 1912, the Kemalist Government of Turkey to remove the capital of Turkey from Constantinople to Ankara in April 1920, and the Kuomintang Government of China to retransfer the capital of China from Peking to Nanking in A.D. 1928. Such moves are likely to have two-way cultural effects. While they may fulfil the migrating Governments' purpose of strengthening their own influence over the interior of their dominions, these Governments will also be exposing themselves, by their migration, to the influence of the traditional culture of the interior. (For transfers of capitals and some of their causes and effects, see II. ii. 112-208 and pp. 193-228, below.)

such pains to extricate the new ruling element in his own anti-traditional régime. The spirit of Moscow was a faith in Russia's destiny;¹ and, at the time of writing, the Russians' consciousness of a unique destiny was sharing with the Americans' possession of a unique weapon the invidious distinction of being one of two titanic facts that, between them, were darkening the horizon of a world which had condemned itself to political unification by its two feats of disintegrating the Atom and 'annihilating distance'. This was an impressive testimony to the strength of the belief in the immortality of a Roman Empire which in reality had ceased to exist not less than thirteen hundred years ago.²

The Riddle of the Prestige of the Imperial Office in Japan

A similar testimony to the endurance of the prestige of the Ts'ing and Han Empire is perhaps afforded by the history of the Imperial House of Japan.³

At an earlier point in this Study⁴ an explanation has been offered for the ebbing away of power from the Imperial Government in Yamato to the feudal nobility in the Kwanto. We have still to explain why an Imperial House which exercised effective authority for less than three hundred years after the reorganization of the Imperial Government on a Chinese model in A.D. 645 should have survived for another thousand years in impotence as the sole fount of honour and dispenser of legitimacy. All the *de facto* rulers of Japan, since the time in the tenth century of the Christian Era when the Imperial Government had lost control, had felt it necessary to do their ruling in the Emperor's name. At the time of writing, an utterly victorious occupying Power was finding it convenient to administer the country through a native Japanese Government acting in the name of the Emperor of the day.

This extraordinary vitality of the prestige of the Japanese Imperial House had been attributed by the Japanese themselves to their own official belief that the Imperial Family were descendants, in unbroken line, from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu. But, though, no doubt, this myth went back to the dawn of Japanese history, the deliberate exploitation of it for a political purpose seemed to be no older than the Meiji Period, when the new masters of Japan, who had wrested the *de facto* power from the last of the Tokugawa shoguns in A.D. 1868 and had appropriated to themselves the manipulation of the indispensable Imperial puppet under pretence of 'restoring' him to the status enjoyed by his forefathers, were concerned to enhance the prestige of the institution in whose name they had to rule. Moreover, the Emperor Hirohito did not seem to have forfeited his hold on the allegiance of the Japanese people by his public declaration to them, on New Year's Day 1946, that he was not a god but a man.⁵ It therefore looked as if there were some

¹ For the persistence of this faith and the fundamental identity of the Slavophil and the Communist manifestation of it, see Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 414.

² Reckoning that even the relatively tough Greek and Oriental core of the Roman Empire went to pieces within the hundred years following the death of Justinian in A.D. 565. In the West the Empire went to pieces some two hundred years earlier (see p. 20, n. 4, and p. 27, n. 4, above).

³ For the relation of the offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan to the main stem in China, see I. i. 132-3.

⁴ In II. ii. 158-9.

⁵ In his rescript of that date, the Emperor Hirohito declared: 'The ties between us and

firm foundation, other than the Sun Goddess myth, for the immense esteem which the Imperial House had continued to enjoy through all vicissitudes of their fortunes and Japan's, and this foundation might perhaps be discovered in the historic 'reception', in A.D. 645, of the Chinese Imperial Constitution of that age. This bureaucratic system of administration was far too elaborate and refined to be practicable under the rude conditions of contemporary Japanese society. Yet its exotic character, which doomed it to a speedy failure in the field of practical politics, may have been the very feature that ensured its age-long preservation as a palladium of the Japanese polity; for the Japanese Imperial Constitution of A.D. 645 was modelled on that of the then reigning Chinese dynasty of the T'ang, and the T'ang Empire had been a resuscitation of the Han Empire, which had been the Sinic Society's universal state. On this showing, the Japanese Imperial Office in the twentieth century of the Christian Era was living on political capital that had been accumulated by Han Liu Pang in the second century B.C.

The Grounds of the Illusion

We have perhaps now sufficiently established the fact that the belief in the immortality of universal states survives for centuries and millennia after it has been decisively confuted by plain hard facts. What are the causes of a phenomenon that looks strange at first sight?

One manifest cause is the potency of the personal impression made by the founders of universal states and by their successors who enter into the fruits of their labours¹—an impression that their contemporaries, who receive it at first hand as the direct beneficiaries of these great men's achievements, hand on to a receptive Posterity with an emphasis which, by the cumulative effect of transmission, exaggerates an imposing truth into an overwhelming legend. From among the many famous testimonies to the impression made by the Emperor Augustus, we have singled out already, in another context, the almost lyrical tribute paid by Philo,²

our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the World' (English text published in *The New York Times*, 1st January, 1946).

¹ A survey of representatives of these two generations of 'saviours with the sword' has been given in V. vi. 189-97. See further V. vi. 370-5.

² See V. vi. 181, n. 3. The Alexandrian Jewish man of letters' private and personal tribute to Augustus has an official counterpart in a decree passed—probably in the year 9 B.C.—by the *Kourov* of the Province of Asia, providing that in this province in future Augustus's birthday shall be kept as New Year's Day and that the first month of the new calendar year shall be called 'Caesar'. This inscription (No. 458 in W. Dittenberger: *Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*, vol. ii (Leipzig 1905; Hirschel), pp. 48-60) expresses the same sentiments as Philo in outright religious language:

'[The Most Divine Caesar] has re-established a Universe that had everywhere been in disintegration and had degenerated into a lamentable state. He has put a new face on the whole Cosmos—a Cosmos that would have been only too happy to pass out of existence if, at the critical moment, Caesar had not been born to be the Universe's universal blessing. . . . The Providence that has organised every detail of Human Life has exerted and surpassed Itself in order to bring Life to perfection in producing Augustus—whom It has filled with virtue to be the benefactor of Mankind, sending him to us and to Posterity as a saviour whose mission has been to put an end to War and to set the Universe in order.'

This official eulogy is capped by one from Halicarnassus (No. 94 in *The Collection of Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum*, Part IV, section i (Oxford 1893,

who, as a Jew, a Hellenist, an Alexandrian, and a philosopher, can hardly be suspected of having gone to exceptional lengths in his enthusiasm for the Roman founder of an Hellenic universal state. The prestige to which such tributes gave a flying start can be seen gathering momentum during the next two centuries.

'A very important "virtue", which emerges and takes shape slowly, . . . is the *Providentia* (in Greek *πρόνοια*) of the ruler. This . . . "foresight" or "forethought" . . . as we meet it in Cicero . . . appears to be a virtue at once of the wise magistrate, who foresees and so forestalls dangers, and of the loving father, who makes provision for the welfare and future of the family of which he is the head. Both these senses tend to blend and come together, as they naturally might in a ruler who was at once a magistrate . . . of the Roman People and a father for the whole Empire.

'Through a hundred years it develops till it reaches its first climax under Trajan, "the most provident prince". . . This aspect of the rule of Trajan and Hadrian and the Antonine Emperors, stressed as it was on coins, on buildings, by speakers and publicists, was bound to have its effect. Slowly the common people learnt to look for help and aid to the *Providentia* of their all-powerful ruler—he knows, he cares, he can act: he is like some Hercules, who visits all corners of the World putting down injustice and ending misery. Remembering this, we can form for ourselves some faint idea of how tremendous the effect of Hadrian's great journeys must have been on the provincials: here was an Emperor who did not stay in Rome (or, if he left it, leave merely for campaigns), but who visited every part of his realm to put things in order and to restore. . . As years pass, this *Providentia* of the one ruler becomes more comprehensive. . . When men are in distress and trouble they turn to the one person of whose help they can be sure: oppressed tenant-farmers on an Imperial estate in Africa appeal for aid to the *Divina Providentia* at Rome, and the harassed colonists of Scaptopara in Thrace beg the Emperor to pity them and help them by his *θεία πρόνοια*.¹

'There is something very touching in this faith, this belief in the *providentissimus princeps*: however far away he may be in Rome, he cares for them, he pities them, he cannot be deceived, and he exerts always, to quote the fine phrase of one of Hadrian's officers, "a care that is never tired, with which he watches unrestingly on behalf of the good of Mankind (*indefatigabilis cura, per quam adsidue pro humanis utilitatibus excubat*)". . . Justice, clemency, duty, warlike prowess—these are fine things; but even more important is it that the subject peoples and provincials over this vast area should have believed in a ruler who was not merely a soldier but who cared for them and provided for their needs.'²

Clarendon Press), pp. 63-65), which must have been drafted not earlier than the year 2 B.C., since it cites Augustus's title 'Pater Patriae':

'Considering that the eternal and immortal Nature of the Universe has lavished upon Mankind the greatest blessing, redounding to superlative benefactions, in bringing forth Caesar Augustus, who in the blissful life of our generation is the father of his own fatherland the goddess Rome, and is the ancestral Zeus and saviour of the whole Human Race, whose providence has not only fulfilled but has surpassed the prayers of all Mankind—for there is peace on land and sea, the commonwealths flourish in law-abidingness, concord and prosperity, and there is a peak and a fecundity of every blessing: of good hopes for the future and of good cheer in the present, in a world whose inhabitants have been given full measure of matches and monuments and celebrations. . . '

¹ 'La notion de l'éternité des Césars est . . . étroitement unie à celle de leur divinité' (Cumont, Fr.: 'L'Éternité des Empereurs Romains', in *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses*, vol. i (Paris 1896; printed at Macon), pp. 439-40).

² Charlesworth, M. P.: *The Virtues of a Roman Emperor: Propaganda and the Creation*

This epiphany of the ruler of a universal state as the one shepherd whose oecumenical monarchy makes one fold for all Mankind¹ appeals to one of the Human Soul's deepest longings, as, in Dostoyevski's fable, the Grand Inquisitor reminds a subversive Christ.

'Thou mightest have taken . . . the sword of Caesar. Why didst Thou reject that last gift? Hadst Thou accepted that last counsel of the mighty spirit, Thou wouldst have accomplished all that Man seeks on Earth—that is, someone to worship, someone to keep his conscience, and some means of uniting all in one unanimous and harmonious ant-heap; for the craving for universal unity is the third and last anguish of men. Mankind as a whole has always striven to organise a universal state. There have been many great nations with great histories, but the more highly they were developed the more unhappy they were, for they felt more acutely than other people the craving for world-wide union. The great conquerors—Timurs and Chingis Khans—whirled like hurricanes over the face of the Earth, striving to subdue its people, and they too were but the unconscious expression of the same craving for universal unity. Hadst Thou taken the World and Caesar's purple, Thou wouldst have founded the universal state and have given universal peace. For who can rule men if not he who holds their conscience and their bread in his hands?'²

Another cause of the persistence of the belief in the immortality of universal states is the impressiveness of the institution itself, as distinct from the prestige of the succession of rulers who are its living incarnations. A universal state captivates hearts and minds because it is the embodiment of a rally from the long-unhalted rout of a Time of Troubles, and it was this aspect of the Roman Empire that eventually won the admiration and love of originally hostile Greek men of letters.

'There is no salvation in the exercise of a dominion divorced from power. To find oneself under the dominion of one's superiors is a "second best" alternative; but this "second best" proved to be the best of all in our present experience of a Roman Empire. This happy experience has moved the whole World to cleave to Rome with might and main. The World would no more think of seceding from Rome than a ship's crew would think of parting company with the pilot. You must have seen bats in a cave clinging tight to one another and to the rocks; and this is an apt image of the whole World's dependence on Rome. In every heart to-day the focus of anxiety is the fear of becoming detached from the cluster. The thought of being abandoned by Rome is so appalling that it precludes any thought of wantonly abandoning her.

'There is an end of those disputes over sovereignty and prestige which were the causes of the outbreak of all the wars of the past; and, while some of the nations, like noiselessly flowing water, are delightfully quiet—rejoicing in their release from toil and trouble, and aware at last that all their old struggles were to no purpose—there are other nations which do not even know or remember whether they once sat in the seat of power.

of Belief (London 1937, Milford), pp. 15, 16, 17, and 19–20. Cf. eundem: 'Providentia and Aeternitas', in the *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. xxix, No. 2, April 1936. See also Cumont, Fr.: 'L'Éternité des Empereurs Romains', in *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses*, vol. i (1896), pp. 435 seqq., cited by Charlesworth.

¹ John x. 16.

² Dostoyevski, F.: *The Brothers Karamazov*, Part II, Book V, chap. 5: 'The Grand Inquisitor'.

In fact we are witnessing a new version of the Pamphylian's myth (or is it Plato's own?). At a moment when the states of the World were already laid out on the funeral pyre as the victims of their own fratricidal strife and turmoil, they were all at once presented with the [Roman] dominion and straightway came to life again. How they arrived at this condition, they are unable to say. They know nothing about it, and can only marvel at their present well-being. They are like sleepers awakened who have come to themselves and now dismiss from their thoughts the dreams that obsessed them only a moment ago. They no longer find it credible that there were ever such things as wars; and, when the word "war" is mentioned to-day, it has a mythical sound in most peoples' ears. . . .

"The entire Inhabited World now keeps perpetual holiday. It has laid aside the steel which it used to wear of old and has turned, care-free, to festivities and enjoyment of all kinds. All other rivalries have died out, and one form of competition alone now pre-occupies all the cities—a competition in making the finest show of beauty and amenity. The whole World is now full of gymnasiums, fountains, gateways, temples, workshops, academies; and it is now possible to say with scientific certainty that a World which was in its death-agonies has made a recovery and gained a new lease of life. . . . The whole Earth has been laid out like a pleasure park. The smoke of burning villages and the watch fires (lit by friend or foe) have vanished beyond the horizon, as though some mighty wind had winnowed them away, and their place has been taken by an innumerable multitude and variety of enchanting shows and sports. . . . So that the only people who still need pity for the good things that they are missing are those outside your empire—if there are any such people left. . . ."¹

If there are, they are hardly worth speaking of in the estimation of those inside, and this is another reason why the belief in their immortality that universal states inspire is so blindly persistent. Universal states are the supreme expressions, on the political plane, of a sense of unity which is one of the psychological products of the process of social disintegration.² During the Times of Troubles through which disintegrating civilizations make their rough passage, the vision of unity grows ever clearer and the yearning for it ever more poignant as the reality of it continues to elude the storm-tossed wayfarers; and, when, at the lowest ebb of hope, the long-pursued goal is at last unexpectedly attained, and this in a monumental form, the psychological effect is overwhelming.

'Ahuramazda, the creator of Heaven and Earth, has made the King of the Persians "ruler, far and wide, over this great Earth"—made "him, the one [lord], to be ruler over many"; made him "king over many lands and tongues", "over the mountains and plains this side of the Sea and beyond it" [Babylonian Inscription H]. He can style himself "the lord of all men from sunrise to sunset" [Aeschines, iii. 132]. All the peoples whose representatives are portrayed on the seat of his throne render him obedience, bring him tribute and serve in his armed forces."³

This sense of unity and universality is not a peculiarity of the

¹ Aristeides, P. Aelius: *In Romam*, edited by Keil, B., in *Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), pp. 110-11 (Or. XXVI, §§ 68-70) and p. 120 (Or. XXVI, §§ 97-99).

² See V. vi. 1-49.

³ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 24-25.

Achaemenian Empire;¹ it is the hall-mark of universal states, which stamps those that bear it as authentic representatives of this class of polity. In his eulogy of Rome, the Greek man of letters, quoted above, makes a point of the universality of her rule as well as of the new lease of life that she has brought to a lacerated Hellenic Society.

'Of this city of Rome you could not say either that it was left unfortified with a Lacedaemonian bravado or that it was enclosed in fortifications of a Babylonian magnificence. . . . You have not, however, you Romans, neglected to build walls; only you have run them round your empire and not round your city. You have placed them in the uttermost parts of the Earth; yet they are magnificent walls which are worthy of you and are a sight for the eyes of all who live within their shelter—though it would take an intending sight-seer months or even years to reach them if Rome itself were the starting-point of his journey; for you have pushed your way beyond the outermost circuit of the Inhabited World and there, in no-man's-land, you have drawn a second circuit with a more convenient *tracée* which is easier to defend—for all the world as though you were simply fortifying a city. . . . This circuit is utterly impregnable and indestructible at every point; it outshines all others; and no system of fortifications that was ever constructed before bears any resemblance to it.'²

In this passage, a literary contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, in whose anxious reign Rome's magnificent world-wall was beginning to crack, was re-expounding the theme of a writer of the preceding generation, in whose day the World's defences did indeed look impregnablely secure. During the last two centuries, says Appian of Alexandria (*vivebat circa* A.D. 90-160) in the preface to his *Studies in Roman History*,

'The [Roman] State has reached its highest point of organisation and the public revenue its highest figure, while a long and stable peace has raised the whole World to a level of secure prosperity. A few more subject nations have been added by the Emperors to those already under the

¹ In the sentence immediately preceding the passage quoted above, Eduard Meyer suggests that 'the Empire of the Achaemenidae is the first state known to history to have put forward the claim to universality'. This is surely incorrect. The Sumeric universal state founded by Ur-Engur, *alias* Ur-Nammu (*imperabat circa* 2143-2126 or 2079-2062 B.C.), and re-established by Hammurabi (*imperabat circa* 1792-1750 or 1728-1686 B.C.), advertised a claim to universality by entitling itself 'The Realm of the Four Quarters'; and, though Hammurabi was a contemporary of the epigoni of the Egyptiac Twelfth Dynasty, we may guess that, from the standpoint of 'the Middle Empire', which was the Egyptiac universal state, even the Sumeric 'Realm of the Four Quarters' was an exception, hardly worth speaking of, to Pharaoh's universal rule even at a date when this had in truth fallen into decadence. 'The New Empire's' claim to universality is better attested than 'the Middle Empire's', and also better founded, since, in 'the New Empire's' day, 'the Realm of the Four Quarters' was extinct and its former dominions in Syria and Mesopotamia had become provinces or dependencies of the Emperors who were reigning at Thebes. The Emperor Ikhnoton, who broke so sharply with his predecessors' traditions on so many points, both cherished and accentuated their oecumenicalism. Universality was the leading note of his revolutionary cult of the Aton; and the impartial benevolence with which the Aton showed the light of His countenance to all peoples was symbolized in the foundation of an 'Aton city' in Nubia, and perhaps another in Syria, as counterparts of the original 'Aton city' which Ikhnoton had laid out in Middle Egypt on the site subsequently known as Tall-al-'Amarnah (see Breasted, J. H.: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 322-3).

² Aristides, P. Aelius: *In Romam*, edited by Keil, B., in *Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), pp. 114-15 (Or. XXVI, §§ 79-84).

Roman dominion, and others which have revolted have been reduced to obedience; but, since the Romans already possess the choicest portions of the land and water surface of the globe, they are wise enough to aim at retaining what they hold rather than at extending their empire to infinity over the poverty-stricken and unremunerative territories of uncivilized nations. I myself have seen representatives of such nations attending at Rome on diplomatic missions and offering to become her subjects, and the Emperor refusing to accept the allegiance of peoples who would be of no value to his government. There are other nations innumerable whose kings the Romans appoint themselves, since they feel no necessity to incorporate them into their Empire. There are also certain subject nations to whom they make grants from their treasury, because they are too proud to repudiate them in spite of their being a financial burden. They have garrisoned the frontiers of their Empire with a ring of powerful armies, and keep guard over this vast extent of land and sea as easily as if it were a modest farm.¹

In the view of an Appian and an Aelius Aristeides, the Roman Empire was eternal²

sicut summarum summa est aeterna, neque extra
qui locus est quo dissiliant neque corpora sunt quae
possint incidere et validâ dissolvere plagâ.³

In the lines of the Latin poet, Democritus's argument looks as impregnable as the Roman *limes* itself.

Nec rerum summam commutare ulla potest vis;
nam neque quo possit genus ullum materiai
effugere ex omni, quicquam est [extra], neque in omne
unde coorta queat nova vis irrumpere et omnem
naturam rerum mutare et vertere motus.⁴

A universal state has indeed as little to fear from outer barbarians as the Universe has from stray star clusters that are *ex hypothesi* non-existent; yet the argument is a fallacy nevertheless, for, as we have seen in an earlier context, 'things rot through evils native to their selves'.⁵ In Physical Nature there are elements whose atoms disintegrate by spontaneous radiation, without requiring any bombardment from extraneous bodies; and, in human social life, universal states 'are betrayed by what is false within'⁶ into revealing, for those who have eyes to see through their specious appearance of impregnability, that, so far from being immortal, these are spontaneously fissile polities.

¹ Appian of Alexandria: *Studies in Roman History*, Preface.

² A modern Western student of the religions that were contemporaries of Christianity traces to Syria the association, in Roman minds, of the idea of the Roman Empire's eternity with the idea of its universality:

'L'origine de cette association des deux idées doit sans doute être cherchée en Syrie, où un seul et même mot '*olmo* signifie *aevum* et *mundus*, de telle sorte que le même titre, qu'on trouve porté par un dieu, peut se traduire aussi bien par "maître du monde" que par "maître de l'éternité"' (Cumont, Fr.: '*L'Éternité des Empereurs Romains*', in *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses*, vol. i (Paris 1896; printed at Macon), p. 450, n. 2).

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 361-3.

⁴ Lucretius, op. cit., Book II, ll. 303-7.

⁵ Menander, fragment 540, quoted in IV. iv, 120, n. 3.

⁶ Meredith, George: *Modern Love*, stanza 43, last line, quoted in IV. iv. 120.

(II) THE DOOM OF TITHONUS

If it were the truth—as the course of history had so far invariably indicated it to be—that a universal state is not the goal of human endeavours, the watchword for citizens of universal states should be ‘here have we no continuing city’.¹ Yet the impulse to idolize any institution is so strong,² and the particular institution with which we are here concerned wears so radiant a halo in the deceptive light cast by the mirage of immortality, that it is not surprising to find its citizens persistently mistaking this Gilead for the Promised Land, and translating their error into action by attempting to settle down there in comfort instead of proceeding manfully on their pilgrimage. Transjordan is indeed a better-watered and more smiling land than Palestine, and its woods and pastures appear to offer to the weary fugitive from the desert of a Time of Troubles a home which he can make his own without having to face the final ordeal of crossing Jordan’s stream. The penalty of this intellectual and moral aberration is the doom of Tithonus.

An obscure divinity of the Nubian marches of the Egyptiac universal state³ was transfigured by the genius of Hellenic mythology into a mortal king of the Ethiopians who had the misfortune to be loved by Eôs, the immortal Goddess of the Dawn. The goddess besought her fellow Olympians to confer on her human lover the immortality which she and her peers enjoyed; and, jealous though they were of their divine privileges, she teased them into yielding at last to her feminine importunity. Yet even this grudging gift was marred by a fatal flaw; for the eager goddess had forgotten that the Olympians’ immortality was mated with an everlasting youth, and the other immortals had spitefully taken care to grant her no more than her bare request. The consequence was both ironic and tragic. After a honeymoon that flashed past in the twinkling of an Olympian eye, Eôs and her now immortal but still inexorably aging human mate found themselves condemned for eternity to grieve together over Tithonus’s hapless plight. A senility to which the merciful hand of Death could never set a term was an affliction that no mortal man could ever be made to suffer, and an eternal grief was an obsession that left no room for any other thought or feeling.

The tragic irony of the Hellenic myth has been transposed into the realism of a Flemish picture by the sardonic imagination of Jonathan Swift in the character of Gulliver’s cicerone on the air-borne island of Laputa.

‘He gave me a particular account of the Struldbrugs among them. He said they commonly acted like mortals till about thirty years old, after which by degrees they grew melancholy and dejected, increasing in both till they came to fourscore. . . . When they came to fourscore years, which is reckoned the extremity of living in this country, they had not only all the follies and infirmities of other old men, but many more which arose from the dreadful prospects of never dying. They were not only opinionative,

¹ Heb. xiii. 14.

² For the idolization of institutions, see IV. iv. 393-423.

³ For the authentic god Tetwen, see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, Part II, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 210.

peevish, covetous, morose, vain, talkative, but incapable of friendship and dead to all natural affection. . . . Envy and impotent desires are their prevailing passions. But those objects against which their envy seems principally directed are the vices of the younger sort and the deaths of the old. By reflecting on the former, they find themselves cut off from all possibility of pleasure; and whenever they see a funeral they lament and repine that others are gone to an harbour of rest to which they themselves never can hope to arrive. They have no remembrance of anything but what they learned and observed in their youth and middle age, and even that is very imperfect. And, for the truth or particulars of any fact, it is safer to depend on common traditions than upon their best recollections. . . .

'The language of this country being always upon the flux, the Struldbrugs of one age do not understand those of another, neither are they able after two hundred years to hold any conversation (farther than by a few general words) with their neighbours the mortals; and thus they lie under the disadvantage of living like foreigners in their own country. . . .

'They were the most mortifying sight I ever beheld. . . . Besides the usual deformities in extreme old age, they acquired an additional ghastliness, in proportion to their number of years, which is not to be described; and among half a dozen I soon distinguished which was the eldest, although there was not above a century or two between them.'¹

For any human soul or human institution, an immortality in This World would prove a martyrdom, even if it were unaccompanied by either physical decrepitude or mental senility.

Eadem sunt omnia semper.
 si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus
 confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant,
 omnia si pergas vivendo vincere saecula,
 atque etiam potius, si nunquam sis moriturus.²

'In this sense it would be true to say that any man of forty who is endowed with moderate intelligence has seen—in the light of the uniformity of Nature—the entire Past and Future';³ and, if this estimate of the capacity of human souls for experience strikes the reader as an inordinately low one, he may find the reason in the character of the age in which the philosopher-emperor happened to live; for an 'Indian Summer' is an age of boredom. The price of the Roman Peace was the forfeiture of Hellenic liberty;⁴ and, though that liberty might always have been the privilege of a minority, and this privileged minority might latterly have turned irresponsible and oppressive,⁵ it was manifest in retrospect that the turbulent wickedness of the Ciceronian climax of an Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' had provided a wealth of exciting and inspiring themes for Roman public speakers which their epigoni in a smugly ordered Trajanic epoch might conventionally condemn as

¹ Swift, Jonathan: *Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World by Lemuel Gulliver*, Part III: 'A Voyage to Laputa, &c.', chap. x.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 945-9.

³ Aurelius Antoninus, Marcus: *Meditations*, Book XI, ch. 1, quoted in VI. vi. 137.

⁴ 'Caesar Augustus . . . dedit . . . iura quis pace et principe uteremur' (Tacitus: *Annals*, Book III, chap. 28).

⁵ 'Corruptissimā re publicā plurimae leges . . . continua discordia, non mos, non ius; deterrima quaeque impune ac multa honesta exitio fuere' (Tacitus, loc. cit.).

horrors not *nostri saeculi*¹ but must secretly envy as they found themselves perpetually failing in their laborious efforts to substitute far-fetched artifice for the stimulus of importunate life.²

The doom of Tithonus may overtake a whole society as well as an individual soul.

'Un peuple marche, vit, fonctionne, souvent même grandit après que le mobile générateur de sa vie et de sa gloire a cessé d'être.'³

On the morrow of the breakdown of the Hellenic Society, Plato, seeking anxiously to safeguard the Hellenic Civilization against a further fall by pegging it in a securely rigid posture,⁴ had idealized the comparative stability of the Egyptiac culture;⁵ and a thousand years later, when this Egyptiac culture was still in being while the Hellenic Civilization had arrived at its last agonies, the last of the Neoplatonists pushed their reputed master's sentimentality to an almost frenzied pitch of uncritical adoration.⁶

Thanks to the obstinacy of the Egyptiac universal state in again and again insisting on returning to life after its body, like Êr's, had been duly laid upon the salutary funeral pyre,⁷ the Egyptiac Society lived to see its contemporaries—the Minoan and Sumeric civilizations and the Indus Culture—all pass away and give place to successors of a younger generation, some of which passed away in their turn while the Egyptiac Society still kept alive. Egyptiac students of history could have observed—if they had had the curiosity to observe—the birth and death of the First Syriac,⁸ Hittite, and Babylonian offspring of the Sumeric Civilization, and the rise and decline of the Syriac and Hellenic offspring of the Minoan. Yet, even if they had made the most of this intellectual opportunity, would it have been worth the spiritual price? The fabulously long-drawn-out epilogue to the broken-down Egyptiac Society's natural term of life⁹ was an alternation between dull stretches of boredom, in which the victim lay prone, an *ἄχθος ἀρούρης*,¹⁰ in a cataleptic trance, and hectic bouts of demonic energy into which this somnolent society was galvanized by the impacts of alien bodies social.

The Egyptiac reactions to these impacts of foreign bodies may be likened to the successive explosions that keep a jet-plane in the air. The first recurrence of the Egyptiac universal state in the form of 'the New Empire' was a consequence of Amosis' 'Zealot' reaction against the tincture of Sumeric culture in the Hyksos barbarians who had swooped

¹ Traianus, Marcus Ulpius, in *Correspondence between C. Plinius Secundus and M. Ulpius Traianus*, Letter xcvi [xcviii].

² This point is made by Tacitus in his *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, chap. 36, § 1, chap. 38, § 2, and chap. 41, § 5, quoted in V. vi. 80, n. 5.

³ De Gobineau, J. A.: *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (Paris 1853-5, Firmin-Didot, 4 vols.), vol. i, p. 52.

⁴ For this practical purpose of the construction of utopias, see III. iii. 88-106.

⁵ See, for example, *Timaeus*, 21A-25D, especially the passages quoted in IV. iv. 24-25.

⁶ For the ethos of these cranky but not ignoble fighters of Hellenism's last rearguard action, see V. v. 565-7 and 680-3.

⁷ For the myth of Êr the Armenian, see Plato: *Respublica*, Book X, 614B-621D, to which Aelius Aristides alludes in the passage cited on p. 44, above.

⁸ For this abortive First Syriac Civilization, see II. ii. 388-91.

⁹ See I. i. 136-46 and IV. iv. 84-86.

¹⁰ *Iliad*, Book XVIII, l. 104, *et alibi*.

down to batten on the carcass of 'the Middle Empire' after this original Egyptiac universal state had gone into dissolution in due course.¹ The subsequent re-establishment of the Egyptiac universal state in the northern half of the Egyptiac World under the Saïte régime was a consequence of the 'Zealot' reaction of Psammetichus I (*imperabat* 663–609 B.C.)² against the Babylonian culture of Assyrian invaders.³ Psammetichus and his Saïte successors liberated Egypt from the Assyrians, and kept her free from the Assyrians' Neo-Babylonian successors, by employing the prowess of Ionian and Carian mercenaries. The infiltration of Hellenic culture that seeped into Egypt in the wake of these 'brazen men from the sea'⁴ produced, within a hundred years, a 'Zealot' reaction against Hellenism in which Amasis (*dominabatur* 566–526 B.C.) usurped the throne of the too complacently xenophile Saïtes with a popular mandate to put the intrusive Hellenes in their place. The Achaemenian conquest of Egypt *circa* 525 B.C.—which the conqueror, Cambyses, rendered doubly odious by persecuting the Egyptiac religion and culture with an un-Achaemenian intolerance⁵—evoked a spate of insurrections, the first in 485–484 B.C., the second lasting from 465 to 449, and the third from 404 to 343, that gave Egypt successive interludes of freedom from alien rule. The Achaemenian reconquest of Egypt in 343 B.C. was final only because it was followed within the next few years by a Macedonian conquest of the whole Achaemenian Empire. Yet the Egyptiac capacity for provocation by alien impacts was not exhausted. The Macedonian conquest of Egypt in 332 B.C. was followed, before the close of the third century B.C., by a fresh spate of insurrections,⁶ through which the native Egyptiac community wrung notable concessions from their Hellenic masters. It was not till after the Ptolemaic had given place to a Roman régime that these explosions of xenophobia which had been following one another in the Egyptiac World since the sixteenth century B.C. gave way at last to a counter-movement towards assimilation that culminated in the conversion of the provincial capitals (*metropoleis*) of the 'nomes' into simulacra of Hellenic city-states;⁷ and it was not till the fifth century of the Christian Era that this long-delayed liquidation of the petrified Egyptiac culture was completed by a mass-conversion to Christianity.⁸

¹ See I. i. 138–9; II. ii. 112; V. v. 351–3; and V. vi. 190.

² See II. ii. 116 and IV. iv. 476.

³ The Psammetichian reaction seems to have surpassed the Amosan in vehemence, if this can be measured in terms of Archaism. The Archaists of the Eighteenth Dynasty, under the mild stimulus of the Sumeric tincture in the Hyksos, sought to leap no farther back up the stream of Egyptiac history than the age of 'the Middle Empire'; the Archaists of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty, more violently stimulated by the full-blooded Babylonian Civilization of the Assyrians, sought to carry their flying leap right back to the age of 'the Old Kingdom'.

⁴ Herodotus, Book II, chap. 152.

⁵ See V. v. 704–5.

⁶ The first of these native Egyptiac revolts against the Ptolemaic régime broke out *circa* 213/212 B.C. according to *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. vii (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 151–2; in 216 B.C. according to Tarn, W. W.: *The Hellenistic Age* (London 1927, Arnold), pp. 161–4. The next insurrection followed *circa* 189–184 B.C.

⁷ See IX. viii. 408 and 586.

⁸ Even this final apostasy from their ancestral civilization did not cure the Egyptians of a xenophobia which, by that time, had been their breath of life for two thousand years. The Christianity to which they and their Hellenic contemporaries were simultaneously converted did not bridge the gulf between the Egyptians and their alien masters. Before the fifth century was over, the Egyptians had transferred their religious allegiance from the Catholic—or, as they termed it, 'Imperial' (Melchite)—Church (see II. ii. 236, n. 1,

The same rhythm of trance-like somnolence alternating with outbursts of fanatical xenophobia can be discerned in the epilogue to the history of the Far Eastern Civilization in China.¹ The tincture of Far Eastern Christian culture in the Mongols who had forced upon China an alien universal state evoked a reaction in which the Mongols were evicted and their dominion over China was replaced by the indigenous universal state of the Ming. Even the Manchu barbarians, who stepped into a political vacuum created by the Ming's collapse and whose taint of Far Eastern Christian culture was less noticeable than their receptivity in adopting the Chinese way of life, aroused a popular opposition which, in Southern China at any rate, never ceased to maintain itself underground and broke out into the open again at last in the T'ai'ping insurrection of A.D. 1852-64.² The infiltration of the Early Modern Western Civilization, in its Catholic Christian form, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era provoked the proscription of Catholicism in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. The blasting open of the sea-gates of China for Western trade by military force between A.D. 1839 and A.D. 1861 provoked the retort in kind of the anti-Western 'Boxer' Rising of A.D. 1900; and the Manchu Dynasty was overthrown in A.D. 1911 in retribution for the double crime of being ineradicably alien itself and at the same time showing itself incompetent to keep the now far more formidable alien force of Western penetration at bay.³

In the trance-like phases of this ghastly alternating rhythm, the Egyptiac and the Chinese Society recall the figure of Lot's wife transformed into a pillar of salt as the retribution for her forbidden backward glance at the perishing Cities of the Plain. In the furious bouts in

and IV. iv. 86) to a Monophysitism that could serve them as an expression of their anti-Hellenic feelings. This 'cultural isolationism' survived down to the twentieth century of the Christian Era, some seven centuries after the mass-conversion of all but a small minority of the Egyptian people from Monophysitism to Islam and after the complete replacement of Coptic by Arabic as the language of the Egyptian Christian and Muslim Egyptians alike. In the twentieth century of the Christian Era, when a Westernizing Egyptian intelligentsia was aspiring to make Egypt the cultural and perhaps even the political metropolis of the Arabic World of the day, the Egyptian fallāḥīn—Arabic-speaking Muslims though they now were—felt no more at home with their Asiatic Arab coreligionists than their progenitors had felt with the Hyksos, Assyrians, Persians, and Hellenes. The home-sickness of the Egyptian fallāḥīn that had been sent to Palestine and 'Irāq during the war of A.D. 1914-18, and the reaction of the Egyptian insurrection of A.D. 1919 against a British régime.

¹ See IV. iv. 86-88; V. v. 3-4, 54, and 348-51.

² For the T'ai'ping insurrection, see V. v. 107 and 112. Since the T'ai'ping movement was to some extent stimulated by Western Protestantism, its suppression by the Imperial Government was also in some sense an anti-alien movement, like the contemporary suppression of the Muslim insurrections in Kansu and Yunnan. But the Imperial Government did not get the upper hand over the Western-stimulated T'ai'ping until it had itself enlisted Western military leadership and organization by placing its own forces under the command of General Gordon (see V. vi. 208).

³ The 'Boxer' Rising was anti-Manchu mainly for the reason that the decrepit Manchu régime of the day was only ineffectively anti-Western. From the T'ai'ping insurrection onwards, all Chinese revolts that were directly anti-Manchu were also indirectly anti-Western. We are reminded of the anti-Western impetus of the Wahhābī reaction against the Ottoman Empire of Sultan Selim III and the Mahdist reaction against the Egypt of Khedive Ismā'il (see IV. iv. 76-78; V. v. 294-6, 329, and 333-4; and IX. viii. 601-2). The two subsequent counter-movements towards assimilation—to Western culture through the Kuomintang and to Russian culture through Communism—were counterparts of the successive conversions of an Egyptiac Society to Hellenism and to Christianity under the Roman Empire.

which these same societies are galvanized into action by the stimulus of an alien energy that they abhor, they call up the more horrifying image of Life-in-Death as she displayed herself to the Ancient Mariner.

The western wave was all aflame,
The day was wellnigh done!
Almost upon the western wave
Rested the broad, bright Sun;
When that strange shape drove suddenly
Betwixt us and the Sun. . . .

Are those her ribs through which the Sun
Did peer, as through a grate?
And is that woman all her crew?
Is that a Death? and are there two?
Is Death that woman's mate?

Her lips were red, her looks were free,
Her locks were yellow as gold:
Her skin was as white as leprosy,
The Nightmare Life-in-Death was she
Who thicks man's blood with cold.¹

Happily in this instance life is kinder than legend, for the sentence of immortality that mythology has passed on Tithonus and the Struldbrugs is commuted in real life to a not interminable longevity. Marcus's disillusioned man of forty must die at last though he may outlive his zest for life by fifty or sixty years; and a universal state that kicks again and again against the pricks of death will weather away, in the course of ages, like the pillar of salt that was fabled to be the petrified substance of a once living woman. The struggle for the dreadful prize of immortality is actually foredoomed to failure.

Nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum
tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus
quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti.
proinde licet quot vis vivendo condere saecula:
mors aeterna tamen nilo minus illa manebit,
nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno
lumine qui finem vitae fecit, et ille
mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante.²

¹ Coleridge, S. T.: *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*. In XII. ix. 412-13 this image is applied to the Western Civilization's situation in the twentieth century of the Christian Era.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 1087-94.

C. UNIVERSAL STATES AS MEANS

(I) THE PRICE OF EUTHANASIA

THE attempt to secure immortality in This World is a vain effort, whether blind or deliberate, to thwart the economy of Nature.

Cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas
semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest . . .
materies opus est ut crescant postera saecula;
quae tamen omnia te vitâ perfuncta sequentur;
nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere, cadentque.
sic alid ex alio nunquam desistet oriri,
vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu.¹

The fate of Tithonus testifies that 'whosoever will save his life shall lose it'; but is it likewise true that 'whosoever will lose his life for My sake, the same shall save it'?² In an earlier version of this saying, it is driven home still more pointedly that the sacrifice has to be altruistic in order to be efficacious. 'Whosoever shall lose his life for My sake and the Gospel's, the same shall save it.'³ On this showing, a universal state that eschews the vain quest for immortality and aspires to euthanasia must emulate the Phoenix. It must not only sacrifice its own life; it must make this sacrifice for the sake of something beyond itself. Such voluntary altruism is unheard-of in any universal state and indeed in any institution, since the besetting sin of all institutions is to become idolized ends in themselves.⁴ There had indeed been universal states which, through a fortunate failure to bring upon themselves Tithonus's fate, had won the Phoenix's reward without having risen to the Phoenix's virtue. The Phoenix's reward for the agony of being burnt alive is to conjure up his own double out of his ashes; and there had been universal states which, by dying betimes, had won this reward for the moribund civilizations of which they had been the last political embodiments. For example, the Western and Orthodox Christian civilizations had sprung from the ashes of the Roman Empire,⁵ which had been the Hellenic universal state; the Iranic and Arabic civilizations from the ashes of the 'Abbasid Caliphate,⁶ which had been the Syriac universal state; the Hellenic and Syriac civilizations themselves from the ashes of Cnossos, the seat of 'the thalassocracy of Minos';⁷ the Babylonian and Hittite civilizations, and perhaps the Indic Civilization too, from the ashes of the Empire of the Four Quarters,⁸ which had been the Sumerian universal state; the Hindu Civilization from the ashes of the Gupta Empire,⁹ which had been the Indic universal state; the Far Eastern Civilization from the ashes of the Han Empire,¹⁰ which had been the Sinic universal state; the Mexican and Yucatec civilizations from the ashes of the 'First Empire' of the Mayas,¹¹ which had been the Mayan universal state and

¹ Lucretius: op. cit., Book III, ll. 964-5 and 967-71, quoted in I. i. 48.

² Luke ix. 24; cf. Matt. xvi. 25 and x. 39.

⁴ See IV. iv. 303-423.

⁶ See xi, map 50.

⁹ See xi, map 30.

⁷ See xi, maps 15 and 16.

¹⁰ See xi, maps 27A and 28.

³ Mark viii. 35.

⁵ See xi, maps 33 and 34.

⁸ See xi, map 11.

¹¹ See xi, maps 70 and 71.

which, on one interpretation of the fragmentary and cryptic evidence as to the circumstances of its demise, would have been the only universal state so far known to history that had gone into voluntary liquidation.¹ It is indeed something of a miracle that an institution that is a by-product of social disintegration should play any part at all in a fresh act of creation. Yet, before we attempt to assess what the Phoenix's reward amounts to, we must ask ourselves whether the mere reproduction of its own kind is after all the highest purpose that a broken-down civilization can hope to serve. We will not beg that question, but will reserve it for discussion later.² What concerns us in our present inquiry is the possibility that a universal state may find euthanasia in spite of itself; and we can see at once that this unsought and unmerited good fortune can only be obtained through the tender mercy of God in the guise of stern compulsion.

'Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too, Fate, to that goal, whatsoe'er it be, to which ye have posted me. I will follow without flinching—though, if I turn coward and hang back, I shall follow just the same.'³

The hard but saving truth thus baldly stated by a Stoic philosopher has been expressed by a Christian seer in more movingly mysterious words.

'When thou wast young, thou girdedst thyself and walkedst whither thou wouldest; but, when thou shalt be old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands and another shall gird thee and carry thee whither thou wouldest not.'⁴

The grace of God can lead even the reluctant soul or society into sharing in God's creative work. In the simile of the sowing of the seed⁵ the issue between freedom and compulsion is left dormant.

The destinies of universal states thus prove to be paradoxical. These imposing polities are, as we have seen,⁶ the last works of dominant minorities in the disintegrating bodies social of moribund civilizations, and these dominant minorities are far indeed from consciously accepting the role of self-abnegation that is evidently the only condition on which their latest handiwork can bear fruit. Their conscious purpose, in every case, is to preserve themselves by conserving the wasting energies of the society with whose fortunes their own are bound up, and their intention in establishing a universal state is to use it as a means to this self-regarding end. This intention, however, is never fulfilled. A universal state, however long its life may be drawn out, always proves to have been the last phase of a society before its extinction, and the pursuit of the mirage of immortality, into which a dominant minority is misled through mistaking its ephemeral universal state for the goal of human endeavours, leads the deluded pursuer towards the unsuspected and uninviting goal of petrification, from which the only means of release is the ignominious

¹ For alternative possible explanations of the abandonment of the cities of the First Empire of the Mayas, see Morley, S. G.: *The Ancient Maya* (Palo Alto, Cal. 1946, Stanford University Press), pp. 67-72, and the present Study, I. i. 125-6 and II. ii. 413-20.

² On pp. 422-3, below.
³ Cleanthes: *Hymn to Zeus*. The original Greek text has been quoted from von Arnim, J.: *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1905, Teubner), p. 118, in III. iii. 47, n. 1, and in V. v. 421.

⁴ John xxi. 18.

⁵ See III. iii. 256-9 and V. vi. 99.

⁶ In V. v. 35-57.

fate of eventually being swallowed up and assimilated by an alien civilization.¹ If a dominant minority takes the contrary path that leads through self-abnegation to a fresh opportunity for sharing in a creative act, it always does so in spite of itself. A dominant minority is incapable either of the resignation with which Moses accepted the sentence that he should see the Promised Land, but should not go over thither, or of the selflessness with which he carried out his instructions to charge, encourage, and strengthen his designated successor Joshua for the enviable mission of reaping the fruits of Moses' own thankless labours.² A dominant minority will never show the generosity of David in assembling the materials for a Temple which not he but Solomon is to build,³ or the humility of John the Baptist in confessing 'I am not the Christ';⁴ 'he that cometh after me is preferred before me';⁵ 'he must increase, but I must decrease'.⁶ The actor who has thus been forced into playing the forerunner's part after having failed in an attempt to pose as the heir of the Kingdom⁷ is not a sublime or sympathetic figure; yet even a grudging performance may fulfil the playwright's purpose by carrying out his plot to its designed denouement.

The makers and masters of a universal state have perhaps one excuse for thus kicking against the pricks. However low their handiwork may rank in the general scale of creative achievements, it is at any rate indisputably the highest representative of its kind. Whereas parochial states prey on one another, and for this pernicious purpose cause human beings to shed one another's blood and to regard an anti-social practice as a public virtue, universal states come into existence in order to put a stop to wars and to substitute co-operation for bloodshed. If even universal states prove to be, not permanent ends in themselves, but merely ephemeral creatures whose happiest destiny is to find euthanasia by spending themselves in the service of others, this suggests that, in the hierarchy of human institutions, the place of states in general must be a relatively low one.

If a universal state finds its significance as a means for the performance of services, who are its beneficiaries? They must be one or other of three possible candidates for the part—the internal proletariat or external proletariat of the moribund society itself, or some alien civilization which is its contemporary—and in serving the internal proletariat a universal state will be ministering to one of the higher religions that make their epiphany in the internal proletariat's bosom. In the traditional language of an outgoing Early Modern Age of Western Christian history,

'Tous les grands empires que nous avons vus sur la terre ont concouru par divers moyens au bien de la Religion et à la gloire de Dieu, comme Dieu même l'a déclaré par ses prophètes.'⁸

¹ For this fate, which is one of the alternative possible ends of a disintegrating civilization, see IV. iv. 76–114.

² Deut. xxxiv. 1–6; cf. Deut. iii. 23–28 and Num. xxvii. 12–14.

³ 1 Chron. xxii.

⁵ John i. 15.

⁴ John i. 20 and iii. 28.

⁶ John iii. 30.

⁷ For the relation between heirs of the Kingdom and their forerunners in the series of saviours with the sword, see V. vi. 185–95.

⁸ Bossuet, J.-B.: *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1700), Troisième Partie, chap. i.

(II) SERVICES AND BENEFICIARIES

(a) THE CONDUCTIVITY OF UNIVERSAL STATES

Our next task is to make an empirical survey of the services involuntarily offered by universal states and of the uses made of these facilities by internal proletariats, external proletariats, and alien civilizations; but we have first to find the answer to a preliminary question: How can any services at all be rendered to anyone by an institution that is passive, conservative, archaistic, and in fact negative in every respect?

"The world empire of Rome was a negative phenomenon: the result, not of any surplus of power on the one side (the Romans ceased to enjoy that after [their victory at] Zama), but of an absence of resistance on the other side. It would be quite untrue to say that the Romans conquered the World. They merely took possession of something that was lying about for anyone to pick up. The Roman Empire was brought into existence, not by an extreme exertion of Rome's total military and financial energies, as these had once been exerted against Carthage, but through a renunciation, by the contemporary Oriental World, of the externals of self-determination. . . . The petrified remains of Imperialism are to be seen in empires like the Egyptian, the Chinese and the Roman and in societies like the Indian World and the World of Islam, which remain in existence for hundreds and thousands of years and may pass from one conqueror's hand to another's: dead bodies, shapeless masses of humanity from which the soul has departed, the used-up material of a great historical past.¹ The imperialism that leaves such débris is the typical symptom of social dissolution.²

How—in terms of the expressive Sinic notation for the rhythm of the Universe³—can so unpromising a Yin-state give rise to a new burst of Yang-activity? It is easy, of course, to see that, if once a spark of creative energy has been kindled in the shelter of a universal state, it will have a chance of swelling into a steady flame which it might never have had if it had been exposed to the buffeting blast of a Time of Troubles. The establishment of a universal state marks the beginning of the second rally in the succession of bouts of the rhythm of Rout-and-Rally through which the life of a civilization runs out from breakdown to dissolution,⁴ and this second rally is usually the most vigorous in the series. But this service, though valuable, is negative. What feature in the social situation arising under a universal state is the positive source of that new capacity to create, which is the supreme benefit that a universal state confers on its beneficiaries, though it is apparently unable to profit by it for its own account? Perhaps one clue is to be found in the tendency shown by

¹ This aspect of the psychological condition of the subject populations of universal states has been discussed in the present Study in V. v. 60-95.—A.J.T.

² Spengler, Oswald: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i, 11th-14th edition (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 51. Cp. vol. ii, 1st-15th edition (Munich 1922, Beck), p. 529, quoted in V. v. 620, n. 1. The pith of the point that Spengler is making in these two passages is concentrated in Francis Bacon's dictum, quoted on p. 110, below, that 'it was not the Romans that spread upon the World, but it was the World that spread upon the Romans'.

³ For the Sinic conception of Yin and Yang, see II. i. 201-3.

⁴ This rhythm of disintegration has been analysed in V. vi. 278-87.

Archaism to defeat itself by being inveigled into construction in its efforts to justify itself by 'making things work'.¹

A universal state is pushed into constructive action primarily, no doubt, by the impulse, which is strong in every state, to work for its own self-preservation and do whatever may prove necessary for this purpose. But, though this impulse may be the primary one, it is not the predominant one in this case; for a universal state is not subject to the pressure from other representatives of its kind which is so potent an influence in the life of parochial states—especially at the climax of a Time of Troubles, when the struggle for existence between the warring parochial states of a disintegrating society is apt to attain its highest degree of intensity. The establishment of a universal state brings with it an abrupt transition from internecine warfare to profound peace; and the victims of a change that is a blessing for Society as a whole might appraise the victorious empire-builders' achievement by applying to it the ironic judgement: 'Ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.'² A universal state is established through a knock-out blow by which some single parochial state wipes all competitors off the map and so emerges from the struggle as the sole survivor. A universal state is *ex hypothesi* unique within its own world; and the prestige of this uniqueness works together with the *vis inertiae* of an exhausted society to keep a universal state in being when once it has come into existence. A universal state on the morrow of its foundation thus has little cause to be concerned over its own security. Instances can, no doubt, be found in which this has been the motive of a universal state's policy. For example, the first founder of the Sinic universal state, Ts'in She Hwang-ti, deliberately obliterated the old inter-state frontiers and remapped his now unified Sinic World into a new pattern of artificial provinces which cut across the old pattern of historic principalities; and the second founder, Han Liu Pang, who began by discarding Ts'in She Hwang-ti's new political map as an unnecessarily revolutionary innovation, was led by his own experience virtually to reimpose it.³ The Napoleonic Empire,⁴ which was the abortive universal state of the medieval Western city-state cosmos,⁵ employed the same device in its efforts to wipe out the traces of the states that it had supplanted.⁶ Again, the Inca makers and masters of an Andean universal state modified and systematized the institutions of the conquered peoples, though this without destroying them;⁷ and the Imperial Roman Government displayed what might seem to be an excessive nervousness in suppressing all manner of private associations, and showing some suspicion even of such humble and apparently harmless varieties of the species as friendly societies and funeral clubs. Such symptoms are, however, rare on the whole, and this is an indication

¹ This self-defeat of Archaism has been examined in V. vi. 94-97.

² Tacitus: *Agricola*, chap. 30, § 7.

³ See pp. 169-74, below.

⁴ See xi, map 60.

⁵ See V. v. 619-42.

⁶ This remapping of the medieval Western city-state cosmos by Napoleon and of the Sinic World by Ts'in She Hwang-ti and Han Liu Pang is an instance of the breach in institutions that is one of the manifestations of Futurism (see V. vi. 107-11).

⁷ See Markham, Sir C.: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), p. 161. See also the other authorities quoted in the present Study, V. v. 90, n. 2.

that, in the policy of universal states, the motive of self-preservation does not play an important part.

A different motive for action, which is strong in proportion to the weakness of the universal state's concern for self-preservation, is supplied by the need for conserving, not a state that is universal in virtue of having no surviving competitors, but the society itself that has been unified politically in the universal state—or, rather, what remains of this society and its institutions by the time when the tardy and violent imposition of peace by a single surviving Power has put an end at last to the long-drawn-out and ever-mounting agony of a Time of Troubles. In the course of that terrible experience, most of the institutions inherited from the age of growth have either been destroyed outright or else been so badly hurt that, even after the process of attrition has been arrested by the establishment of the universal state, they crumble and collapse, one after another, through the delayed but inescapable effects of fatal injuries previously received. The inclusion of the surviving fabric of the shattered society within the universal state's political framework does not avail either to restore what has already perished or to prevent the progressive collapse of the remainder; and the menace of this immense and constantly extending social vacuum compels the Government of the universal state to act against its own inclinations by constructing stop-gap institutions to fill the void, as the only means open to it of conserving Society itself—the fundamental task that is the universal state's *raison d'être*.

A classic illustration of this necessity of stepping ever farther into an ever-widening breach is afforded by the administrative history of the Roman Empire during the two centuries following its establishment in 31 B.C. as a result of the Battle of Actium. The Roman *arcanum imperii* was the principle of indirect rule. The Hellenic universal state was conceived of by its Roman founders as an association of self-governing city-states¹ with a fringe of autonomous principalities in regions where the Hellenic culture had not yet struck political root. The burden of administration—which, even at the end of an Hellenic Time of Troubles, was still, in the public estimation, an honourable and covetable load—was to be left resting on the shoulders of these responsible self-governing local authorities; the Imperial Government was to confine itself to the two-fold task of keeping the local communities in harmony with one another and protecting them against attack on the part of the outer barbarians; and, for these limited Imperial activities, a slender military framework and light political superstructure were all that was required. This fundamental policy was never deliberately revised; yet, if we resurvey the Roman Empire as it emerged from a spell of two centuries of Roman Peace, we shall find that its administrative structure had in fact been transformed as a result of innovations that were reluctant and piecemeal but were far-reaching in their cumulative effect because they were all in the same direction.

By the end of the reign of Marcus Aurelius (*imperabat* A.D. 161–80) the last of the client principalities had been *gleichgeschaltet* with the

¹ See IV. iv. 310.

provinces,¹ and, more significant still, the provinces themselves had become organs of direct administration instead of remaining mere frameworks for local groups of self-administering city-states. The cause of these far-going moves towards a centralization of world-government was not any desire on the part of the Imperial authorities to take over the responsibility for details; it was a progressive loss of efficiency on the part of the local authorities that forced the Imperial Government to step in. In the generation of Augustus the government provided by client princes of the stamp of Herod the Great had in general been as effective as it had been ruthless. Among other things, it had been observed that these were more active than the Roman governors of adjoining provinces in defending their territories against the raids of pirates from beyond the pale.² The city-states, again, whatever their juridical status, had been mostly successful in still finding sufficient numbers of citizens of sufficient public spirit, integrity, ability, and affluence to administer their affairs without remuneration and to consider themselves richly rewarded by the honour and prestige which local office still carried with it. In the course of the next two centuries the human resources for the conduct of local government gradually ran dry, and the Central Government, faced with this increasing dearth of the local administrative talent on which it had been accustomed to rely, found itself constrained not only to replace client princes by Imperial governors but to put the administration of the city-states in the hands of 'city managers' who were appointed by the Imperial authorities instead of being elected (as the city-state magistrates were) by the local notables, and who were responsible, through the provincial governor, to the Emperor himself.

In the second century of the Empire's existence, at the very opening of a delusive 'Indian Summer',³ we can follow the progress of this disquieting administrative development in the famous correspondence between the Emperor Trajan (*imperabat* A.D. 98-117) and his friend and subordinate Pliny the Younger during the latter's term of service as governor of the province of Bithynia. Before the end of the story, the whole administration of the Roman Empire, from top to bottom, had passed into the hands of a hierarchically organized bureaucracy, while the self-complacent local magistrates and town councillors of the once self-governing city-states had been degraded into becoming the unwilling

¹ See further p. 166, below. The religious consequences of this process of *Gleichschaltung*—which is not a peculiarity of the Roman Empire but is characteristic of universal states as a species—have been touched upon in V. vi. 36.

² Strabo, writing on the morrow of the establishment of the Augustan Peace, makes the following observation at the end of his description of the piratical raids into the domain of the Hellenic universal state which were at that time the main source of livelihood for the barbarians (Achaei, Zygi, Heniochi) inhabiting the strip of inhospitable country between the crest of the North-Western Caucasus Range and the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea:

'In places under [the] autocratic rule [of princes of client states of the Roman Empire] the victims [of these piratical raids] are afforded some protection by their rulers; for the princes make frequent counter-attacks and bring the war-canoes down, crews and all. The territory under direct Roman administration receives less effective protection owing to the indifference shown by the non-permanent lieutenant-governors sent out from Rome' (Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. ii, § 12 (C 496)).

³ For these 'Indian Summers' in the lives of universal states, see IV. iv. 58-70.

instruments of the central exchequer for extracting ruinously heavy taxes from the local notables.¹

The central authorities themselves had been no more eager to impose these changes than the local authorities had been to suffer them. Both alike had been the victims of *force majeure*; and, in yielding to such necessity, the government of a universal state is indeed defeating its own ends, since the new institutions which it reluctantly constructs with a conservative intention inevitably have an innovating effect. The consequences are revolutionary because these new institutions are highly 'conductive'. In a previous context² we have seen that two leading motifs in the *Zeitgeist* of an age of social disintegration are a sense of promiscuity and a sense of unity; and, though these two psychological tendencies may be antithetical from the subjective standpoint, they conspire to produce an identical objective result. Receptivity is a distinguishing mark of the empire-builders themselves,³ notwithstanding their conservative intentions, and this undesired and unvalued characteristic of theirs may have been one of the causes of their victory in their life-and-death struggle, during a Time of Troubles, with their competitors in command of the other parochial states of their world for the prize of surviving to become the founders of the ultimate universal state. This dominant spirit of the age endows the new stop-gap institutions thrown up by a universal state with a 'conductivity' comparable to that which the Ocean and the Steppe derive, not from a human psychological atmosphere, but from their own physical nature.⁴

'As the surface of the Earth bears all Mankind, so Rome receives all the peoples of the Earth into her bosom, as the rivers are received by the sea.'⁵

And the spectacle of the same universal state had suggested the same simile to the writer of this Study, before he had become acquainted with the passage, just quoted, from the pen of a Greek man of letters who knew the Roman Empire at first hand during the last days of its 'Indian Summer'.

'The writer can best express his personal feeling about the Empire in a parable. It was like the sea round whose shores its network of city-states was strung. The Mediterranean seems at first sight a poor substitute for the rivers that have given their waters to make it. Those were living waters, whether they ran muddy or clear; the sea seems just salt and still and dead. But, as soon as we study the sea, we find movement and life there also. There are silent currents circulating perpetually from one part to another, and the surface water that seems to be lost by evaporation is not really lost, but will descend in distant places and seasons, with its bitterness all distilled away, as life-giving rain. And, as these surface-waters are drawn off into the clouds, their place is taken by lower layers continually rising from the depths. The sea itself is in constant and creative motion, but the influence of this great body of water extends far beyond its shores.

¹ See III. iii. 99-100.

² In V. v. 439-568 and V. vi. 1-49.

³ See V. v. 439-45.

⁴ The conductivity of Nomadism has been noticed in III. iii. 391-4.

⁵ Aristeides, P. Aelius: *In Romam*, § 62 in B. Keil's edition (*Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), p. 108), quoted in V. v. 344.

One finds it softening the extremes of temperature, quickening the vegetation, and prospering the life of animals and men, in the distant heart of continents and among peoples that have never heard its name.¹

The social movements that make their way through the conductive medium of a universal state are in fact both horizontal and vertical. Examples of horizontal motion are the circulation of medicinal herbs in the Roman Empire and the spread of the use of paper from the eastern to the western extremity of the Arab Caliphate.

'Different herbs', says Pliny the Elder, 'are brought from different quarters to and fro all over the World for the welfare of the Human Race. The immense majesty of the Roman Peace reveals to one another not merely human beings, in all their diversity of countries and nationalities, but also the mountains and the ranges that tower up into the clouds, with their fauna and flora. God grant that this divine benefaction may be eternal. The gift bestowed by the Romans on Mankind can only be described as a new form of light.'²

As for the transit of the Far Eastern invention of paper across the conductive expanse of the Arab Caliphate, this was impressively rapid. Reaching Samarkand from China in A.D. 751, the use of paper had spread to Baghdad by A.D. 793, to Cairo by A.D. 900, to Fez (Fas), almost within sight of the Atlantic, by about A.D. 1100, and to Jativa in the Iberian Peninsula by A.D. 1150.³

The vertical movements are sometimes more elusive but often more important in their social effects—as is illustrated by the history of the Tokugawa Shogunate,⁴ which was the universal state of the Far Eastern Society in Japan. The Tokugawa régime set itself to insulate Japan from the rest of the World, and was successful for nearly two and a half centuries in maintaining this political *tour de force*; but it found itself powerless to arrest the course of social change within an insulated Japanese Empire, in spite of its efforts to petrify a feudal system, inherited from the preceding 'Time of Troubles', into a permanent dispensation.

'The penetration of money economy in Japan . . . caused a slow but irresistible revolution, culminating in the breakdown of feudal government and the resumption of intercourse with foreign countries after more than two hundred years of seclusion. What opened the doors was not a summons from without but an explosion from within. . . . One of [the] first effects [of the new economic forces] was an increase in the wealth of the townspeople, gained at the expense of the samurai and also of the peasants. . . . The *daimyō* and their retainers spent their money on luxuries produced by the artisans and sold by the tradesmen, so that by about the year [A.D.] 1700, it is said, nearly all their gold and silver had passed into the hands of the townspeople. They then began to buy goods on credit. Before long they were deeply indebted to the merchant class, and were obliged to pledge, or to make forced sales of, their tax-rice. . . . Abuses and disaster followed thick and fast. The merchants took to rice-broking,

¹ Toynbee, A. J., in *The Legacy of Greece* (Oxford 1922, Clarendon Press), p. 320.

² Plinius Secundus, C.: *Historia Naturalis*, Book XXVII, chap. i (i), § 3.

³ See Carter, T. F.: *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward*, revised ed. (New York 1931, Columbia University Press), pp. 97-100; Lévi-Provençal, E.: *L'Espagne Musulmane au X^{ème} Siècle* (Paris 1932, Larose), p. 185.

⁴ See xi, map 55c.

and then to speculating. . . . It was the members of one class only, and not all of them, who profited by these conditions. These were the merchants, in particular the brokers and money-lenders, despised *chōnin* or townsmen, who in theory might be killed with impunity by any samurai for mere disrespectful language. Their social status still remained low, but they held the purse and they were in the ascendant. By the year 1700 they were already one of the strongest and most enterprising elements in the state, and the military caste was slowly losing its influence.¹

If we regard the year 1590 of the Christian Era, in which Hideyoshi overcame the last resistance to his dictatorship, as the date of the foundation of the Japanese universal state, we perceive that it took little more than a century for the rising of the lower layers of water from the depths to the surface to produce a bloodless social revolution in a society which Hideyoshi's successor Tokugawa Ieyasu and his heirs had sought to freeze into an almost Platonically utopian immobility. This social upheaval was a result of the operation of internal forces within a closed system, without any impulsion from outside the frontiers of the Japanese universal state.

The extent of the resultant change is impressive—and the more so, considering that, for a universal state, the Tokugawa Shogunate was culturally homogeneous to an unusually high degree. Apart from a little pariah community of Dutch business men who were strictly segregated on the islet of Deshima,² the only heterogeneous element in the otherwise culturally uniform Japanese life of that age was a barbarian Ainu strain that was socially impotent in so far as it was not already culturally assimilated.³ In most universal states, such partially assimilated barbarians have been one only—and this the least alien one—of several alien cultural elements. Owing to the tendency of the parochial states of a broken-down civilization in its Time of Troubles to sharpen their weapons in fratricidal conflicts with one another and to take advantage of this dearly bought increase in their military proficiency to conquer neighbouring societies with their left hands while continuing to fight one another with their right hands,⁴ most universal states have embraced not only a fringe of conquered barbarians but substantial slices of the domain of one or more alien civilizations as well. Some universal states, again, have been founded by alien empire-builders, and some have been the product of societies within whose bosoms there has already been some degree of cultural variety—even on a reckoning which does not differentiate between march-men and the denizens of the interior of the same social world.⁵ Such cultural diversity, which is the rule rather than the exception in the structure of universal states, is apt to heighten the effects of the social 'conductivity' that is characteristic of them all.

¹ Sansom, G. B.: *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (London 1931, Cresset Press), pp. 460-2. See further eundem: *The Western World and Japan* (London 1950, Cresset Press), chaps. ix-xi (pp. 177-289).

² See II. ii. 232-3.

³ For the barbarian frontier of the Far Eastern World in Japan, and for the effect of this frontier on Japanese history, see II. ii. 158-9.

⁴ See III. iii. 139-53.

⁵ For the distinction between marches and interiors, and its historical importance, see II. ii. 112-207.

No other universal state known to History appears to have been as homogeneous in culture as Japan under the Tokugawa régime. In 'the Middle Empire' of Egypt,¹ in which a fringe of barbarians on the Nubian glaciis of its Theban march was one element of variation from the cultural norm of the Egyptiac Society of the age,² there was another and more positive feature of cultural diversity in the Empire's culturally Sumeric provinces and client states in Palestine and Coele Syria. As for 'the New Empire',³ which was a deliberate revival of the original Egyptiac universal state, it accentuated the pattern of its prototype by completing the assimilation of the barbarians of Nubia⁴ and by embracing the domain of an abortive First Syriac Civilization in Syria and North-Western Mesopotamia;⁵ and this culturally tripartite structure—in which the cultural domain of the civilization through whose disintegration the universal state has been brought into existence is flanked by culturally alien territories annexed at the expense of both barbarians and neighbouring civilizations—appears to be the standard type.

For example, in the Mauryan Empire,⁶ which was the original Indic universal state, an Indic cultural core was flanked by an alien province in the Panjab, which had been at least partially Syriacized during a previous period of Achaemenian rule⁷ after having been partially barbarized by an antecedent Völkerwanderung of Eurasian Nomads,⁸ while in other quarters the Mauryan Empire's Indic core was flanked by ex-barbarian provinces in Southern India and possibly farther afield in both Ceylon and Khotan as well. The Guptan Empire,⁹ in which the Mauryan was eventually reintegrated, possessed an ex-barbarian fringe, with an alien Hellenic tincture, in the satrapy that had been founded by Saka war-bands in Gujerat and the North-Western Deccan,¹⁰ and a Hellenized fringe, with a Kushan barbarian dilution, in the territories under its suzerainty in the Panjab. In a Han Empire¹¹ which was the Sinic universal state, the Sinic World proper was flanked by barbarian annexes in what was eventually to become Southern China, as well as on the Eurasian Steppe, and by an alien province in the Tarim Basin, where the Indic, Syriac, and Hellenic cultures had already met and mingled before this cultural corridor and crucible was annexed to the Han Empire for the first time in the second century B.C. and for the second time in the first century of the Christian Era.¹² In the Roman Empire,¹³ which was the Hellenic universal state, a culturally Hellenic core in Western Anatolia, Continental European Greece, Sicily, and Italy, with outlying enclaves in Cilicia, in Syria, at Alexandria, and at Marseilles, was combined with the domain of the submerged Hittite Civilization in Eastern Anatolia, with the homelands of the Syriac and Egyptiac civilizations in Syria and in the Lower Nile Valley, with the colonial domain of the Syriac Civilization in North-West Africa, and with ex-barbarian hinterlands in North-

¹ See xi, map 13.

² See xi, map 14.

³ For this abortive First Syriac Civilization, see II. ii. 388-91.

⁴ See xi, map 23.

⁵ One cultural legacy of the Achaemenian régime here was the Kharoshthi script (see V. v. 500).

⁶ See pp. 651-2, below.

¹¹ See xi, maps 27A and 28.

⁹ See xi, map 30.

¹² See V. v. 144-6.

² See II. ii. 115.

⁴ See II. ii. 115.

¹⁰ See V. v. 603-4.

¹³ See xi, map 29.

West Africa and in Western and Central Europe as far as the left bank of the Rhine and the right bank of the Danube.¹

There are other cases in which this standard cultural pattern has been enriched by some additional element.

In the Muscovite Tsardom² a Russian Orthodox Christian core was flanked by a vast ex-barbarian annex extending northwards to the Arctic Ocean and eastwards eventually to the Pacific, and by an Iranic Muslim annex consisting of the sedentary Muslim peoples of the Volga Basin, the Urals, and Western Siberia. This pattern was afterwards complicated by Peter the Great's deliberate substitution of a Westernized for a traditional Orthodox Christian cultural framework for the Russian Orthodox Christian universal state, and by the subsequent annexation of additional alien territories—at the expense of the Islamic World on the Eurasian Steppe and in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, and at the expense of Western Christendom in the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, Poland, and Finland.

In the Achaemenian Empire,³ which was the original Syriac universal state, there was an antecedent cultural diversity, within the Syriac core itself, between the Syrian creators of the Syriac Civilization and their Iranian converts,⁴ and a geographical gap between Syria and Iran that was still occupied by the dwindling domain of the gradually disappearing Babylonian culture.⁵ The Achaemenian Empire also embraced the domain of the submerged Hittite culture in Eastern Anatolia, the best part of the domain of the Egyptiac Civilization,⁶ fringes torn from the Hellenic and Indic worlds, and pockets of partially reclaimed barbarian highlanders and Eurasian Nomads. Moreover, after its life had been prematurely cut short by Alexander the Great, its work was carried on by his political successors, and especially by the Seleucidæ, whom it would be more illuminating to describe as alien Hellenic successors of Cyrus and Darius. In the Arab Caliphate,⁷ in which the Achaemenian Empire was eventually reintegrated,⁸ the Syriac core—in which the earlier diversity between Syrian creators and Iranian converts had been replaced by a cleavage, along approximately the same geographical line, between ex-subjects of the Roman and ex-subjects of the Sasanian Empire—was united politically, by Arab barbarian empire-builders, with barbarian annexes—in North-West Africa, in the fastnesses of Daylam and Tabaristan between the Elburz Mountains and the Caspian Sea,⁹ and on the fringes of the Eurasian Steppe adjoining the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin—and with fragments of alien civilizations: a slice of the new-born Hindu World in Sind;¹⁰ the potential domain of an abortive Far Eastern Christian Civilization in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin;¹¹ an

¹ Leaving out of account the late-acquired and early-lost Transdanubian bridgehead in Dacia.

² See xi, maps 20 and 21.

³ For the gradual assimilation of the Babylonian Society by the Syriac, see I. i. 79 and 119; II. ii. 138; IV. iv. 100-3 and 471; V. v. 122-3 and 370.

⁴ For the permanent political partition of the Egyptiac World from the middle of the seventh century B.C. onwards, see II. ii. 116.

⁵ See xi, map 37.

⁶ See II. ii. 377-8.

⁷ See II. ii. 369-85 and 446-52.

⁸ See xi, map 49.

⁹ See I. i. 79-82.

¹⁰ See I. i. 76-77.

¹¹ See I. i. 105-6 and II. ii. 130.

Orthodox Christian diaspora in Syria and Egypt; and a fossil of the by then elsewhere extinct Babylonian Society at Harran.¹

In the Mongol Empire,² which was a universal state imposed by alien empire-builders on the main body of the Far Eastern Society in China, the annexes to a Chinese core were unusually extensive—including, as they did, the whole of the Eurasian Nomad World, the whole of Russian Orthodox Christendom, and the ex-Sasanian portion of a Syriac World which by that time was *in extremis*. The Mongols themselves were barbarians with a tincture of Far Eastern Christian culture.³ In the Manchurian empire-builders,⁴ who subsequently repeated the Mongols' performance on a less gigantic yet still imposing scale, there was the same tincture in a more diluted form;⁵ and the Chinese universal state in its Manchu avatar once again embraced, in addition to its Chinese core, a number of alien annexes: a 'reservoir' of barbarians in the still unfelled backwoods and still virgin steppes of Manchuria, the whole of the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist World in Tibet, Mongolia, and Zungaria,⁶ and the easternmost continental outposts of the Islamic World in the Tarim Basin, the north-western Chinese provinces of Kansu and Shansi, and the south-western Chinese province of Yunnan.⁷

In the Ottoman Empire,⁸ which provided, or saddled, the main body of Orthodox Christendom with its universal state, the alien 'Osmanli empire-builders united an Orthodox Christian core with a fringe of Western Christian territory in Hungary, with the whole of the Arabic Muslim World except Morocco, the Sudan, and South-Eastern Arabia, and with pockets of barbarians and semi-barbarians in Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, the Mani, the Caucasus, the Crimea, and on the Arabian Steppe. In the Mughal Empire,⁹ which was the Ottoman Empire's counterpart in the Hindu World, the pattern was simpler, since, apart from the Iranian Muslim empire-builders and their co-religionists who had been deposited in the Hindu social environment by earlier waves of invasion from the Middle East and Central Asia,¹⁰ the Mughals' only non-Hindu subjects were the Pathan barbarian highlanders on the north-western fringe of their dominions. When, however, the Mughal Rāj was replaced by a British Rāj,¹¹ the pattern of the Hindu universal state became more complex; for the advent of a new band of alien empire-builders, which substituted a Western element for an Islamic at the political apex of the Hindu universal state, did not expel the Indian Muslims from the stage of Hindu history, but merely depressed their status to that of a numerically still formidable alien element in the Hindu internal proletariat, so that the Hindu universal state in its second phase combined elements drawn from two alien civilizations with a Pathan barbarian fringe and a Hindu core.

There had been other universal states in which, as in the Mughal

¹ See IV. iv. 101, n. 1; V. v. 125, n. 1; and IX. viii. 408, n. 5.

² See xi, map 47.

⁴ See xi, map 54.

⁶ See I. i. 35 and 90-2; II. ii. 405, n. 1; IV. iv. 497; and V. v. 309-10.

⁷ See V. v. 116.

⁸ See xi, map 51.

¹⁰ See II. ii. 78; II. ii. 130-1 and 149; IV. iv. 96-99.

¹¹ See xi, map 53.

³ See V. v. 348-51.

⁵ See loc. cit.

⁹ See xi, map 52.

Empire, the cultural pattern had been less complex than the standard type yet not so simple as that of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

The Empire of Sumer and Akkad,¹ which was the Sumeric universal state, included no representatives of an alien civilization—unless Byblus and other Syrian coast-towns are to be counted as such in virtue of their tincture of Egyptiac culture. On the other hand, the Sumeric Civilization itself was represented in two varieties at least—a Sumero-Akkadian and an Elamite²—and in no less than three if the domain of the Indus Culture should prove also to have been included in 'the Empire of the Four Quarters of the World'.³ Moreover, the Babylonian Amorites, who eventually restored a polity that had been first constructed by the Sumerian Ur-Engur (*alias* Ur-Nammu) of Ur,⁴ were not merely marchmen but marchmen with a barbarian tinge. So, on a broader and a longer view, the cultural pattern of the Sumeric universal state proves to have been less homogeneous than might appear at first sight. 'The thalassocracy of Minos',⁵ again, which was the Minoan universal state, probably included representatives of the continental Mycenaean variety of the Minoan culture as well as the creators of that culture in its Cretan homeland, even if it did not embrace any representatives of an alien civilization.

In the Central American World⁶ two once distinct sister societies—the Yucatec Civilization and the Mexic—had not yet lost their distinctive characteristics, though they had already been brought together by force of Toltec arms, when the task, and prize, of establishing a Central American universal state was snatched, at the eleventh hour, out of the hands of barbarian Aztec empire-builders by Spanish representatives of an utterly alien Western Christendom.⁷ In the Andean World the Empire of the Incas,⁸ which was the Andean universal state, already included representatives of the Kara variety of the Andean culture as well as the creators of that culture in the Peruvian coastlands and its propagators on the Peruvian, Bolivian, and Argentinian sections of the Andean Plateau,⁹ before the indigenous Incan empire-builders were suddenly and violently replaced by Spanish *conquistadores* from Western Christendom who turned the Andean World upside-down, with a vigour reminiscent of Alexander the Great's, by proceeding to convert the indigenous population to Christianity and to variegate the social map by studding it with immigrant Spanish landlords¹⁰ and self-governing municipalities.¹¹

The Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy,¹² which served as a carapace for Western Christendom against the assaults of the 'Osmanlis, and which,

¹ See xi, maps 10 and 11.

² For the distinction between them, see I. i. 117, n. 4.

³ This possibility has been suggested in I. i. 108.

⁴ See I. i. 106 and V. vi. 297-8.

⁵ See xi, maps 15 and 16.

⁶ See I. i. 123-4.

⁷ If we compare the Andean and Sumeric societies in their respective universal state phases, we may see in the coastal communities of Chimu and Nazca the cultural counterparts of Sumer; in the highland communities, south of Ecuador, the counterparts of Akkad; in the Karas of Ecuador the counterparts of Elam; and in the Chibchas of Colombia the counterparts of the makers of 'the Indus Culture'.

¹⁰ See p. 144, below.

¹¹ See pp. 135 and 145, below.

⁶ See xi, map 71.

⁸ See xi, map 68.

¹² See xi, map 51.

seen from the south-east, wore the deceptive appearance of being a full-blown Western universal state,¹ set itself, like the Tokugawa Shogunate, to achieve domestic cultural uniformity, but lacked both the ruthlessness and the insularity which, between them, enabled the Japanese isolationists for a time to put their policy into effect. In pursuing its aim of being totally Catholic, the Hapsburg Power did succeed, more or less, in extirpating Protestantism within its frontiers; but the very success of its stand, and eventual counter-attack, against the Ottoman embodiment of an Orthodox Christian universal state broke up the Danubian Monarchy's hardly attained Catholic homogeneity by transferring to Hapsburg from Ottoman rule a stiff-necked minority of Hungarian Protestants and a host of Orthodox Christians of divers nationalities, most of whom proved unwilling to accept the ecclesiastical supremacy of Rome, even when the yoke was proffered in the easy form of Uniatism, while, among those who did accept this relatively light burden, the rank and file remained nearer in heart and mind to their dissident Orthodox ex-co-religionists than they ever came to be to their fellow Catholics who were of the Latin Rite.

The Neo-Babylonian Empire,² which was the Babylonian universal state, similarly forfeited its cultural purity—and thereby worked unwittingly for the eventual extinction of the Babylonian Civilization itself—when Nebuchadnezzar conquered and annexed the homeland of the Syriac Civilization west of the Euphrates; and the impress of the indigenous Babylonian culture became progressively fainter as the domain which Nebuchadnezzar had bequeathed to a short line of native successors was incorporated first into the barbaro-Syriac Empire of the Achaemenids and then into the Hellenic Empire of the Seleucids.

Our survey has shown that, in the cultural composition of universal states, a high degree of diversity is the rule; and, in the light of this fact, it is evident that one effect of the 'conductivity' of universal states is to carry farther, by less violent and less brutal means, that process of cultural pammixia that is started, in the antecedent Times of Troubles, by the atrocities that these bring in their train. The refugees, exiles, deportees, transported slaves, and other *déracinés* of the more cruel preceding age are followed up, under the milder régime of a universal state, by merchants, by professional soldiers, and by philosophic and religious missionaries and pilgrims who make their transit with less tribulation in a more genial social climate.

The cumulative cultural effect of these voluntary and involuntary migrations within the ambit of a disintegrating society has been examined at earlier points in this Study³ and need not be resurveyed here. The Israelites who were deported by the Assyrians to the cities of the Medes and the exiles from Jerusalem whose memories made them weep by the waters of Babylon may serve as typical representatives of the *déracinés* of a Time of Troubles. In the Papal emissary Friar William of Rubruck's poignant account of how he spent Palm Sunday, A.D. 1254, in the Mongol capital, Qāraqorum, in the company of fellow Catholic deportees from

¹ See II. ii. 177-88 and V. v. 325-7.

² See xi, map 19.

³ Especially in V. v. 58-194 and 439-80.

far-away Western Christendom,¹ we can catch the anarchy of a Time of Troubles in the act of turning into the orderly peace of a universal state. In the secret and silent circulation of the waters of that seemingly motionless sea, the Orontes discharges into the Tiber and the sands of the Shāmīyah are deposited on the banks of the Tyne. The missionary of Christianity, Saint Paul, travels from Antioch to Rome, and, 'as an inscription from South Shields informs us, a Romano-Oriental from Palmyra could marry a Romano-British wife and settle down for the rest of his days in the neighbourhood of Hadrian's Wall'.²

Judgements passed on the effects of this pammixia diverge, poles apart, according to the divers social, political, and historical standpoints of the observers who make them. A grandchild of those European Greeks whose heroic resistance against enormous odds had barely saved them from being incorporated, at the blossoming-season of their own civilization's growth, into the world-empire of the Achaemenidae, can write of 'the appalling present condition of the populations under the Persian yoke, which have been quite disintegrated by being interlarded and kneaded up together'.³ Another Greek, born more than five hundred years later into the 'Indian Summer' of an Hellenic universal state which he could readily appreciate because it was so long overdue, could say to Rome, as the highest praise that he could give her: 'You have made one single household of the entire Inhabited World';⁴ and a Gallic poet, writing more than two hundred years later again, at a moment when the Roman Empire in the West had already received its death-blow, could give the Greek stylist's phrase a Latin echo in the famous epigrammatic line: 'Urbem fecisti quod prius Orbis erat'.⁵ On this controversial question of the value of the result, points of view may differ completely; but there is no disputing the facts themselves, however depreciatory or laudatory may be the literary framework in which they are presented.

'I am not unaware', writes a Roman encyclopaedist towards the end of the first century of the Roman Peace, 'that it may justly be regarded as the lapse of an insensitive and lazy mind to have given so brief and cursory a description of a country that is the nurse of all countries—their nurse and their parent and the chosen vessel of divine grace for the mission of making the skies themselves clearer, gathering the scattered realms into one flock, softening harsh traditional practices, bringing together into mutual converse, through a common medium of linguistic exchange, the discordant and barbarous tongues of innumerable peoples, conferring humanity on Man, and, in a word, becoming the single fatherland of all nations throughout the World'.⁶

What Pliny writes of Roman Italy and of the world-empire that she had built up around herself is true, in some degree, of every universal state.

¹ See the passage quoted from Friar William's narrative in V. v. 113-14.

² Toynbee, J. C. M.: 'Catholicism and the Roman Imperial Cult', in *The Month*, vol. clviii, November 1931, citing *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, vol. iv (Berlin 1881, Reimer), p. 212, No. 718 a: 'D. M. Regina, liberta et coniuge, Barates Palmyrenus, natione Catuallauna, an. xxx.'.

³ Plato: *Leges*, 693A, quoted already in V. v. 124, n. 2.

⁴ Aristides, P. Aelius: *In Romam*, § 102 in B. Keil's edition (*Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), p. 121), quoted already in V. v. 343.

⁵ Rutilius Namatianus, C.: *De Reditu Svo*, Book I, l. 66, quoted already in V. v. 345.

⁶ Plinius Secundus, C.: *Historia Naturalis*, Book III, chap. v. (vi), § 39.

(b) THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEACE

A universal state is imposed by its founders, and accepted by its subjects, as a panacea for the ills of a Time of Troubles. In psychological terms it is an institution for establishing and maintaining concord;¹ and this is the true remedy for a correctly diagnosed disease. The malady from which a broken-down civilization is suffering as the penalty for its breakdown is that of being a house divided against itself, and this schism in Society is a double one. There is a horizontal schism between contending social classes as well as a vertical schism between warring states, and a universal state is born of a paroxysm which exacerbates this twofold strife to an unprecedented and intolerable degree of intensity and, in the same act, puts a sudden stop to it for the time being. The immediate and paramount aim of the empire-builders, in making a universal state out of the Power that emerges as the sole survivor from a war of annihilation between the parochial states of the preceding age, is to establish concord among themselves and with their fellow members of the dominant minority of their society who are survivors of the former ruling element in those parochial states that have succumbed in the fratricidal struggle. Non-violence, however, is a state of mind and principle of behaviour that cannot be confined to one compartment of social life; it must apply in some degree to all social relations if it is to apply to any; and therefore the concord which a dominant minority, in urgent need of being at peace within itself, is moved to seek and ensue² in its own domestic life has to be extended to the dominant minority's relations with the internal and external proletariats and with any alien civilizations with which the disintegrating civilization is in contact. In these relations, if there cannot be perfect and permanent peace, there must at least be an armistice and a *modus vivendi*.

This universal concord, which is the prevailing psychological climate under the dispensation of a universal state, profits its divers beneficiaries in different degrees. While it enables the dominant minority to recuperate to some extent—and indeed is the condition *sine qua non*, if it is to recuperate at all—it brings a greater relative access of strength to the proletariat. Concord is, in itself, a negative boon. 'A bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking flax shall he not quench.'³ The practical effect of such forbearance varies with the quality of the flax and the reed; and, in the case in point, the life has already gone out of the dominant minority and cannot be revived by a belated relief from attrition, whereas the same relief enables the proletariat, which has been stimulated and not crushed by its foregoing tribulations, to 'shoot up and thrive'.⁴ Accordingly, during the armistice inaugurated by the establishment of a universal state, the proletariat must increase but the dominant minority must decrease.⁵ Under the common régime of concord the dominant minority's conservation of energy freezes into

¹ See V. vi. 2-13.

² 1 Pet. iii. 11.

³ Isa. xlii. 3, quoted in Matt. xii. 20.

⁴ The phrase used by Herodotus (Book I, chap. 66) to describe the progress of Sparta under the impetus that she received from the institution of the Lyncurgen *agôgê*.

⁵ John iii. 30.

Archaism,¹ and this Archaism rankles into Esotericism—a regressive Esotericism distinguishable from the progressive form of the same social aberration which is one of the perilous stepping-stones of a civilization in its growth-phase. On the other hand the toleration practised by the founders of a universal state for the sake of getting rid of fratricidal strife among themselves incidentally gives the internal proletariat a chance to found a universal church, while the atrophy of the martial spirit among the subjects of a universal state, resulting from the monopoly of the military profession by the Imperial Power, gives the external proletariat or a neighbouring alien civilization a chance of breaking in and seizing for itself the dominion over an internal proletariat that has been conditioned by the peculiar climate of a universal state to be passive on the political plane, however active on the religious.

The relative incapacity of the dominant minority to profit by conditions which it itself has called into existence through the act of establishing a universal state is strikingly illustrated by its almost invariable failure to propagate a philosophy or a 'fancy religion' of its own from above downwards.² In this matter the political pressure which the sovereign or the ruling element in a universal state is able to bring to bear upon the mass of the population seems to be a positive obstacle to the attainment of the ruler's desire, and his will here defeats itself in attempting to gain its ends by means that generally prove effective in other spheres. The working of this psycho-social 'law' has been examined in this Study already in an earlier passage³ which need not be recapitulated.

It is all the more remarkable to observe how effective a use the representatives of the internal proletariat are apt to make of the opportunity offered by the pacific atmosphere of a universal state for propagating, from below upwards, a higher religion and eventually establishing a universal church. We may recall the more striking examples from a fuller survey that we have made in a previous chapter of this Study.⁴

'The Middle Empire' of Egypt, for instance, which was the original Egyptiac universal state, was used to this effect by the Osirian Church.⁵ The Neo-Babylonian Empire, which was the Babylonian universal state, and its successive alien successor-states, the Achaemenian Empire and the Seleucid Monarchy, were similarly used by Judaism and by its sister-religion Zoroastrianism⁶—a creation of the Iranian wing of the proletariat of the Babylonian World which made converts of the Achaemenid empire-builders but escaped the blight that might have been the penalty for its having become the religion of the powers that be, thanks to the studied religious tolerance of all the Achaemenidae except, perhaps, Cambyses and to the personal religious laxity of the later rulers of the dynasty from

¹ See V. vi. 49-97.

² The most striking apparent exception is the successful establishment of Confucianism as the official philosophy of the Sinic universal state by the Emperor Han Wuti. The success of this imposition of a philosophy of the dominant minority upon the internal proletariat of the Sinic World is at least partly explicable by the fact that the 'Confucianism' which thus became a going concern was an amalgam in which an element of authentic philosophy was heavily alloyed with popular superstitions (see V. v. 418-19, 555-7, 654-5, and 708).

³ See V. v. 646-712.

⁴ See V. v. 149-52.

⁵ In V. v. 58-194.

⁶ See V. v. 120-4.

Artaxerxes II onwards.¹ The opportunities offered by the Roman Peace were seized by a number of competing proletarian religions—by the worship of Cybele and Isis and by Mithraism and Christianity,² as well as by the Babylonian philosophy of astral determinism.³ The corresponding opportunities offered by a *Pax Hanica* in the Sinic World were competed for by an Indic proletarian religion, the Mahāyāna, which had arisen out of a philosophy of the Indic dominant minority in the crucible of the Kushan Empire,⁴ and by the indigenous Sinic proletarian religion of Taoism, which likewise created itself out of a philosophy in emulation of the equally astonishing genesis of its Indic rival.⁵ The Arab Caliphate provided a comparable opportunity for Islam—thanks to the *êthos* of the Umayyad Caliphs, who, with the exception of 'Umar II, were as tolerant and as lax as the Achaemenidae⁶—and the Gupta Rāj in the Indic World for Hinduism.⁷ The Mongol Empire, which for a moment extended an effective *Pax Nomadica* over the Continent from the west coast of the Pacific Ocean to the east coast of the Baltic Sea and from the southern fringes of the Siberian tundra to the northern fringes of the Arabian desert and the Burmese jungle, struck the imagination of the missionaries of a host of rival religions by the portentous scale of the opportunity which this almost literally universal state appeared to offer; and, considering how brief this passing moment actually was, it is remarkable to observe how successfully it was turned to account by the Nestorian and the Western Catholic Christian churches and by Islam, as well as by the Lamaist Tantric sect of Mahayanian Buddhism.⁸ The successive Ming and Manchu avatars of the universal state which the Mongol Empire had provided for the main body of the Far Eastern World gave Western Catholic Christianity a second opportunity of attempting the conquest of a new world,⁹ and the same church made a simultaneous attempt to take advantage of the foundation of a Japanese universal state in the shape of the Tokugawa Shogunate.¹⁰ The Ottoman Empire gave an opening for Bedreddinism, Imāmi Shī'ism, and Bektāshism,¹¹ and the Mughal Rāj in the Hindu World for Kabirism and Sikhism.¹²

The exponents of the higher religions that had thus so frequently profited by the favourable social and psychological climate of a universal state had in some cases been conscious of the boon and had ascribed its bestowal upon them in an auspicious hour to the providence of the One True God in whose name they had been going forth converting and to convert their fellow men. In the eyes of the authors of the Books of 'Deutero-Isaiah', Ezra, and Nehemiah,¹³ the Achaemenian Empire was the chosen instrument of Yahweh for the propagation of Judaism,¹⁴ and

¹ See V. v. 704-5.

² See II. ii. 215-16 and V. v. 80-82.

³ See V. v. 56-57.

⁴ See V. v. 139-40.

⁵ See V. v. 146-7.

⁶ See V. v. 675-7 and 704-5.

⁷ See V. v. 137-8.

⁸ See V. v. 112-17.

⁹ See V. v. 365-7.

¹⁰ See V. v. 365.

¹¹ See V. v. III.

¹² See V. v. 106.

¹³ According to van Hoonacker, A.: *Une Communauté judéo-araméenne à Elephantine aux vi^e et vii^e siècles avant J.C.* (London 1915, Milford), pp. 22-23, Nehemiah (whose first mission this scholar dates in 445 B.C.) really preceded Ezra (whose mission he dates in 398 B.C.).

¹⁴ See V. vi. 17, 122, n. 3, and 130, n. 3. In inverse form and in non-supernatural terms the same conception of the relations between Judaism and the Achaemenian

this conception of the final cause of a universal state was applied to the Roman Empire by a Father of the Christian Church in a passage so felicitous that it gave birth to a patristic commonplace.

'The incarnation of the Word of God united divine nature with human nature so [completely] that God's nature was able to stoop to the depths and ours to be raised up to the heights. In order that the effects of this ineffable act of grace might be spread throughout the World, God's providence previously brought into existence the Roman Empire. Its territorial acquisitions were carried to the lengths required for enabling all nations everywhere to become neighbours in the intimate contact that is established in a universal state. It was thoroughly consonant with the divine plan of action that many kingdoms should thus be confederated in a single empire and that the evangelization of all Mankind should find itself able to make an unimpeded and rapid progress through the ranks of peoples held together under the rule of a single polity.'¹

The inspiration, direct or indirect, of this passage in a fifth-century Christian sermon can be discerned in an ode from the pen of a seventeenth-century Christian poet, when he imagines Nature put out of countenance by her Maker's overwhelming act of becoming incarnate.

But He, her fears to cease,
Sent down the meek-eyed Peace;
She, crown'd with olive green, came softly sliding
Down through the turning sphere,
His ready harbinger,
With turtle wing the amorous clouds dividing;
And, waving wide her myrtle wand,
She strikes a universal peace through sea and land.

No war or battle's sound
Was heard the world around:
The idle spear and shield were high uphung;
The hookèd chariot stood

Empire is presented by Eduard Meyer: 'Once again [i.e. in the light of the newly discovered Elephantine papyri] it is made unquestionably manifest that Judaism is a creation of the Persian Empire: the Babylonian Jews actually set in motion [for their own purposes] the engine of the Imperial Government and made use of its authority to impose on the Jews in Palestine and the Diaspora the Law which Ezra had composed' (Meyer, E.: 'Zu den aramäischen Papyri von Elephantine' in the *Mittheilungen* of the Königl. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Gesamtsitzung vom 23 November, 1911). According to Van Hoonacker, op. cit., p. 20, Meyer exaggerates the extent of the new departure in the development of Judaism in the fifth century B.C.

¹ '[Verbum] caro factum ita divinam naturam naturae univit humanae ut illius ad infima inclinatio, nostra fieret ad summa provectio. Ut autem huius inenarrabilis gratiae per totum mundum diffunderetur effectus, Romanum regnum divina providentia praeparavit; cuius ad eos limites incrementa perducta sunt quibus cunctarum undique gentium vicina et contigua esset universitas. Disposito namque divinitus operi maxime congruebat ut multa regna uno conföderentur imperio et cito pervios haberet populos praedicatio generalis quos unius teneret regimen civitatis' (Leo the Great, Pope: Sermo lxxxii, chap. 2, in Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. liv, col. 423). Leo the Great has been cited as an exponent of the gentle response of Christianity to the challenge of social disintegration in V. v. 77. Another passage in the same sermon, on Rome's debt to the Christian Church, is quoted on p. 697, below. The present passage is anticipated in an address to an Antonine emperor by Bishop Melito of Sardis, which is quoted by Eusebius: *Historia Ecclesiastica*, Book IV, chap. xxvi, §§ 7-8.

Unstain'd with hostile blood;
 The trumpet spake not to the armèd throng;
 And kings sat still with awful eye,¹
 As if they surely knew their sovran Lord was by.²

An opportunity so marvellous as to seem truly heaven-sent is indeed presented to a higher religion by the establishment of an imperial peace; yet, in the relation between a successful missionary church and the universal state within whose framework it is carrying out its purpose of converting Mankind, the climate of toleration, which gives the work of conversion so favourable a start, does not always persist till the end of the story and is sometimes actually transformed into its own opposite by the very success of the tolerated religion in taking advantage of it during the first chapter.

There have, no doubt, been cases in which there has been no such sinister termination of the armistice between an internal proletariat and a dominant minority that is inaugurated by the establishment of a universal state.

For example, in the history of the Osirian Church in the Egyptiac World, the apprehensive hostility which the rising proletarian religion evoked in the hearts of the ruling element in the Egyptiac Society at as early a date as the eve of the Time of Troubles³ does not appear to have led on to any overt trial of strength between this would-be universal church and 'the Middle Empire' that was the Egyptiac universal state; and in the ensuing interregnum the rival religions of the Egyptiac internal proletariat and dominant minority actually made common cause against the religion of an external proletariat with an alien cultural tinge, and entered into an alliance which proved to be the prelude to amalgamation.⁴ Peace likewise seems to have been preserved in the Sinic World between the Mahāyāna and the Taoist Church on the one side and the Han Empire on the other until the Sinic universal state went into dissolution towards the end of the second century of the Christian Era.

When we come to Judaism and Zoroastrianism, we cannot tell what their ultimate relations might have been with either the Neo-Babylonian or the Achaemenian Empire, since each of these universal states in turn had its life cut short by an alien conqueror at an early stage of its history. We only know that, when the Achaemenian régime was abruptly replaced by the Seleucid and eventually, west of the Euphrates, by the Roman, the impact of an alien Hellenic culture, of which the Seleucid and the Roman Powers were the successive political instruments,

¹ This image is perhaps a reminiscence of a passage of Latin poetry (Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 1222-5) depicting the psychological effect produced by the descent from heaven, not of Peace, but of a thunderbolt:

Non populi gentesque tremunt, regesque superbi
 corripiunt divom percussi membra timore
 nequid ob admissum foede dictumve superbe
 pœnarum grave sit solvendi tempus adultum?

² Milton, John: *Ode on the Morning of Christ's Nativity*.

³ See I. i. 140-3. This presentation of Osirism, which had been adopted by the writer of this Study from J. H. Breasted: *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 29 and 140, is contested by Breasted's successor, J. A. Wilson, in his *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University Press), p. 32, n. 12.

⁴ See I. i. 143-4.

deflected both Judaism and Zoroastrianism from their original mission of preaching a gospel of salvation to all Mankind, and transformed them into weapons of cultural warfare in the Syriac Society's retort to the Hellenic Society's aggression.¹ If the Achaemenian Empire, like its post-Hellenic avatar, the Arab Caliphate, had run out its full course, we may conjecture that, under the auspices of a tolerant or indifferent Achaemenian Imperial Government, either Zoroastrianism or Judaism or some syncretism of these two higher religions would have anticipated the achievement of Islam, which—profiting by the indifference of the Umayyads and the conscientious observance, by the 'Abbasids, of the tolerance, prescribed by the *Shari'ah*, towards non-Muslims who were 'People of the Book'²—made gradual headway, uncompromised by the frustrating assistance of the civil arm, until the collapse of the 'Abbasid régime brought a landslide of voluntary mass-conversions among ex-subjects of the Caliphate seeking shelter, in the courtyard of the Mosque, from the storm of an approaching political interregnum.³ Similarly, under a Guptan Empire which was a reintegration of the original Mauryan Hindu universal state, the ousting of the philosophy of Buddhism by the post-Buddhaic higher religion of Hinduism was not only unopposed by a dynasty who were, themselves, adherents of the rising Hindu faith, but was also unimpeded by any left-handed stimulation of the outgoing philosophy through acts of official persecution that would have been alien to the intrinsically tolerant and syncretistic religious *ethos* of the Indic Civilization.⁴

In contrast to these cases in which a higher religion, profiting by the peace of a universal state, had been tolerated by the Imperial Government from first to last, there were other cases in which its peaceful progress had been interrupted by official persecutions that had either nipped it in the bud or had denatured it by goading it into going into politics and eventually taking up arms or, at the lightest, had compelled it to pay a heavy toll of suffering as the price of spoiling the Egyptians.

Western Catholic Christianity, for example, was almost completely extirpated in Japan by the Tokugawa régime in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era,⁵ and was effectively checked in China in the eighteenth century by the less drastic measures then taken against it by the Manchu Power.⁶ Shi'ism was crushed in the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1514 by Sultan Selim the Grim.⁷ Islam was persecuted by the pagan Mongol *khāqāns*—partly because of the Muslims' steadfastness in refusing to abandon Islamic ritual observances that were offensive to Mongol tribal custom, and partly owing to the influence, in Mongol counsels, of Islam's Nestorian Christian enemies⁸—and, though this persecution was more than counter-balanced in the long run by a temporary political union, under Mongol rule, of China and Dār-al-

¹ See I. i. 90-91; II. ii. 203, 234-6, 285-6, and 374; V. v. 125-6 and 657-61.

² See V. v. 674-5 and 678.

³ See V. v. 678.

⁴ See V. v. 706.

⁵ The faithful remnant was driven underground, like the Jews and Muslims in Catholic Spain and Portugal (see II. ii. 232-3 and 244-8 and IX. viii. 569).

⁶ See V. v. 365-7.

⁷ See I. i. 365 and 382-3 and V. v. 365.

⁸ For the adverse consequences of this influence for Islam, see II. ii. 122, n. 2, 237-8, and 449-52; V. v. 3, n. 3, and 250; in the present volume, pp. 256-7 below; IX. viii. 355; and X. ix. 36.

Islām which led to the permanent introduction of Islam into China,¹ Islam in China under the Mongols, like Western Catholic Christianity in China under the Ming and the Manchus, missed its possible destiny of becoming the universal church of the main body of the Far Eastern Society. Islam gained no substantial foothold in China outside the two far north-western provinces of Kansu and Shensi and the new south-western province of Yunnan which was added to China's patrimony by force of Mongol arms; and, even in these two lodgements, the Islamic community in China never became anything more than an alien minority which was goaded, by the precariousness of its position, into recurrent outbreaks of militancy.

This denaturing effect of official persecution, which thus left its mark in China on Islam, is more signally exemplified in the perversion of Sikhism in India in reaction to the sustained and violent persecution to which this possible embryo of a Hindu universal church was subjected by the Mughal Rāj.² In allowing itself to be provoked into militancy, Sikhism renounced its spiritual birthright and opted for the limited and uncreative role of becoming a local political community in a single province of the Hindu World, where, down to the time of writing, the height of its political success had been the dubious achievement of having once carved out one of the ephemeral successor-states of the Mughal Empire.

In contrast to the cases just cited, the untoward after-effects on Christianity of the trial of strength that was the prelude to its triumph over the Roman imperial régime were comparatively slight.³ During the three centuries ending in the conversion of Constantine, while Christianity was benefiting by the facilities unintentionally offered to it by the Roman Peace, it was never out of danger of falling foul of Roman policy; for, besides the suspicion of private associations of all kinds that haunted the Roman State in the Imperial Age,⁴ there was an older and more deeply graven Roman tradition of special hostility to private associations for the practice and propagation of foreign religions; and, though the Roman Government had relaxed this hardest policy in two notable instances—in its official reception of the worship of Cybele at the psychological crisis of the Hannibalic War⁵ and in its persistent toleration of Judaism as a religion, even when the Jewish Zealots forced Rome's hand and ultimately compelled her to obliterate the last vestiges of a Jewish state⁶—the suppression of the Bacchanals in the second century B.C. was an augury of what the Christians were to suffer in the third century of their era.⁷ Unlike the Sikh community under the Mughal

¹ See Broomhall, M.: *Islam in China* (London 1910, Morgan & Scott); de Thiersant, D.: *Le Mahométisme en Chine et dans le Turkestan Oriental* (Paris 1878, Leroux, 2 vols.); Devéria, G.: *Musulmans et Manichéens Chinois* (Paris 1898, Imprimerie Nationale); and the present Study, IV. iv. 496 and V. v. 116. This was an incidental consequence of the Mongols' general policy of intermixing the peoples and cultures of their empire (for an instance of this see V. v. 350-1).

² See V. v. 187 and 665-8.

³ These untoward after-effects are considered again, in a different connexion, on p. 439, below.

⁴ See p. 57, above.

⁵ See II. ii. 216 and V. v. 685-8.

⁶ See IV. iv. 224-5; V. v. 68 and 657-9; and V. vi. 120-3.

⁷ See II. ii. 216.

Rāj, the Christian Church under the Roman régime resisted the temptation to retort to official persecution by perverting itself from a religious into a politico-military association; and it was duly rewarded for remaining substantially true to its own nature by becoming a universal church and an heir of the future. Yet the Christian Church did not come through this ordeal unscathed. Instead of reading and taking to heart the manifest lesson of the triumph of Christian gentleness over Roman force, she presented her discomfited persecutors with a gratuitous vindication and a posthumous moral revenge by taking to her bosom the sin which had consummated their failure. The habit of resorting to persecution as a would-be short cut to overcoming opposition to her practice and beliefs was adopted by the Christian Church before the close of the fourth century of the Christian Era¹ and clung to her thereafter. Even the desperate remedy of clutching at tolerance at the cost of losing hold of faith—an expedient in which Western Christendom had been experimenting since the latter part of the seventeenth century²—had not proved a lasting cure for this wantonly contracted spiritual disease.

Such sinister legacies, bequeathed to higher religions by universal states, are not, however, of the same order of significance as the benefits which are offered to a higher religion by the facilities that a universal state provides. It was within, and with the aid of, this political and social framework that Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and the Mahāyāna won their way to becoming universal churches.

While the internal proletariat, as the creator of the higher religions, is thus the principal beneficiary on the spiritual plane from the dominant minority's impermanent yet momentous achievement of establishing a universal state, the benefits on the political plane are harvested by other hands; and this distribution of advantages arises from the very nature of the situation. The enforced peace of a universal state gives the internal proletariat its opportunity for spiritual prowess in so far as it debars it from the privilege of exercising political power and relieves it of the necessity of bearing arms; and even the empire-builders, bled white by the supreme effort of imposing peace through a knock-out blow that has been the climax of a crescendo of fratricidal warfare, lose the zest that has carried their forefathers to victory in their struggle for existence in the foregoing Time of Troubles. The military service once readily accepted as an honour and as an opportunity for ambition now comes to be shunned as an unwelcome burden; and, in looking about for stalwart and willing shoulders to which this load might be transferred, the imperial authorities are apt to draw an ever larger quota of their military recruits from the ranks of an untamed external proletariat.³ The psychology of peace under the auspices of a universal state thus unfits the rulers themselves for the task of retaining their own political heritage; and accordingly the political beneficiaries of this process of psychological disarmament that is induced by the moral climate of a universal state are neither the rulers nor the ruled; they are intruders from beyond the

¹ See IV. iv. 226-7.

² See IV. iv. 227-8 and V. v. 669-71.

³ See VIII. viii. 43-44. The consequent barbarization of the dominant minority has been discussed in V. v. 459-80.

imperial frontiers who may be either members of the disintegrating society's external proletariat or representatives of some alien civilization.

At an earlier point in this Study¹ we have, in fact, observed that the event which registers the extinction of a civilization—as distinct from the event which precipitates its antecedent breakdown and disintegration—is usually the occupation of the domain of the defunct society's universal state either by barbarian war-lords from beyond the pale or by conquerors coming from another society with a different culture, or in some cases by both kinds of invader, one following at the heels of the other. Barbarians overran the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, the Guptan Empire, the Empire of Ts'in and Han, the Roman Empire, the Arab Caliphate, 'the thalassocracy of Minos', and both 'the Middle Empire' and 'the New Empire' of Egypt.² The Neo-Babylonian Empire, which was the Babylonian universal state, was cut short by Iranian barbarians who were in the act of becoming converts to the Syriac Civilization and architects of the original Syriac universal state; and this Achaemenian Empire, in its turn, was cut short by Macedonian barbarians who had already become disciples and missionaries of Hellenism before the whirlwind campaign in which Alexander the Great overthrew the Achaemenian Power. The Mauryan Empire, which was the Indic universal state, suffered the Achaemenian Empire's fate, 150 years later, at the hands of an Hellenic successor of the Achaemenian Empire in Bactria; and the Empire of the Incas, which was the Andean universal state, was similarly cut short by militant apostles of Western Christendom whose leader emulated the demonic energy, but not the chivalrous generosity, of the Macedonian Alexander. At the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, which had provided an alien universal state for the main body of Orthodox Christendom, incipient barbarian invasions were overtaken, and were then either brought to a halt or changed in character, by the mightier march of Westernization: partly in the form of conquests by Western or Westernizing Powers, and partly through the cultural conversion of the subject peoples of the Empire and of the invading barbarians themselves.³ At the break-up of the Mughal Empire, which had provided an alien universal state for the Hindu World, incipient barbarian invasions were stopped dead by the restoration of the universal state in the form of a British Rāj.⁴

The benefits secured by barbarian or alien aggressors who have succeeded in taking advantage, for their predatory purposes, of the psychological climate induced by a universal state are palpable and, on a short view, imposing. Yet we have observed already,⁵ and shall be verifying in a later part of this Study, that the barbarian invaders of the

¹ In IV. iv. 56-119.

² The Hyksos barbarians who came in at the death of 'the Middle Empire' of Egypt had acquired *en route*, as we have seen, a tincture of the alien Sumeric culture, and this is one possible explanation of the fanatical fury with which the Egyptiac Society rose against them, drove them out, and restored a universal state that had already run its full course before the Hyksos had appeared on the scene (see VI A, Annex, pp. 574-6, below, and the references there given to previous passages in this Study that bear upon this point).

³ See IV. iv. 68-70 and 76-78.

⁵ In I. i. 58-62 and V. v. 194-337, *passim*.

⁴ See V. v. 304 and 305, n. 2.

derelect domain of a crumbling universal state are heroes without a future;¹ and Posterity would assuredly have recognized them as being the disreputable adventurers that they are, but for the retrospective glamour of romance and tragedy that is cast over their sordid escapades by their redeeming intuition of their fate and their marvellous capacity for writing their own epitaphs on their own terms in the language of high poetry.² As for the achievements of the militant missionaries of an alien civilization, these too, though seldom so short-lived as the triumphs of the barbarians, are, like them, delusive and disappointing by comparison with the historic achievement of an internal proletariat that has taken advantage of a *pax oecumenica* by founding, under its aegis, a universal church.

In two instances in which we know the whole story, we have seen that a civilization whose universal state has been prematurely cut short by alien conquerors is capable of going to earth, hibernating for centuries, biding its time, and eventually finding its opportunity to expel the intrusive civilization and resume the universal state phase of its history at the point where this has been interrupted. The Indic Civilization achieved this *tour de force* after nearly six hundred years, and the Syriac after nearly a thousand years, of submergence beneath an Hellenic flood; the monuments of their achievement were the Guptan Empire and the Arab Caliphate, in which they respectively resumed the universal states originally embodied in the Mauryan Empire and in the Achaemenian Empire.³ On the other hand the Babylonian and Egyptian societies were eventually absorbed into the body social of the Syriac, though the Babylonian Society succeeded in preserving its cultural identity for about six hundred years after the overthrow of the Neo-Babylonian Empire of Nabopolassar and Nebuchadnezzar by Cyrus the Achaemenid, while the Egyptian Society⁴ maintained itself for no less than two thousand years after the termination of its natural expectation of life had been signalled by the collapse of 'the Middle Kingdom' in which we have seen its original universal state.⁵

On the evidence of past history there are thus two alternative denouements to attempts on the part of one civilization to devour and digest another civilization by force. The evidence shows, however, that, even when such an attempt is ultimately successful, there may be a period of probation, lasting for centuries or even millennia, before the result is assured; and the Time-scale here revealed might incline twentieth-century historians to be chary about forecasting the outcome of the Western Civilization's latter-day attempts to swallow its contemporaries, considering how relatively short the time had been since even the oldest of these attempts had been inaugurated, and how little had yet been seen of the gradually unfolding story.

In the case of the Spanish conquest of the Central American World, for example, in which the alien conquerors had actually anticipated the

¹ See VIII. viii. 45-72.

² See VIII. viii. 73-81.

³ See I. i. 75-77 and 85-86 and pp. 569-76, below.

⁴ See p. 575, below, with the references there given to previous passages in this study.

⁵ See pp. 49-50, above, and pp. 569-76, below.

establishment of a universal state by indigenous empire-builders, it might well have been supposed that, when the alien substitute, in the shape of the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain,¹ had in due course been supplanted by a Republic of Mexico which had sought, and gained, admission into the comity of Western states, the assimilation of the Central American Society into the body social of the Western Society had become an irreversibly accomplished fact. Yet the Mexican Revolution of A.D. 1821, which might thus have appeared to have completed the incorporation of the Central American into the Western World, had been followed by the Revolution of A.D. 1910, in which the buried but hibernating indigenous society had suddenly bestirred itself, raised its head, and broken through the crust of culture deposited by officious Castilian hands on the grave into which the *conquistadores* had thrust a body that they believed themselves to have slain. This portent from Central America raised the question whether the apparent cultural conquests of Western Christendom in the Andean World and elsewhere might not likewise prove, sooner or later, to have been no more than superficial and temporary.

The Far Eastern Civilization in China, Korea, and Japan, which had succumbed to the influence of the West within the last century before the time of writing, was manifestly far more potent than the Central American Civilization had ever been; and, if the indigenous culture of Mexico was reasserting itself after a four hundred years' eclipse, it would be rash to reckon that the Far Eastern Society was destined to be assimilated by the West or by Russia. As for the Hindu World, the inauguration of two 'successor-states' of the British Rāj in A.D. 1947 might be interpreted as a peacefully accomplished counterpart to the establishment of a Republic of Mexico by revolution in A.D. 1821, and at the time of writing it seemed possible that in this case, as in that, an act of political emancipation which had superficially set the seal upon the process of Westernization by bringing the emancipated state into the comity of Western nations, might prove in retrospect to have been the first step towards the cultural emancipation of a civilization that had been temporarily submerged by a Western tide.

The Arab countries, again, which had recently been gaining admission to the Western comity of nations as sovereign independent states,² had been able to achieve this ambition in virtue of their success in shaking off an Ottoman political ascendancy and an Iranic cultural veneer by which they had been overlaid for four centuries.³ Was there any reason to expect that the latent survival power of the Arabic culture, which had enabled the Arabs to resist assimilation to the kindred culture of a sister society, would not assert itself, sooner or later, against the influence of the far more alien culture of the West? And, if the permanent Westernization of the Arabic World was not assured, there was also no assurance that the Ottoman Turkish converts from the Iranic culture, or even the Greek, Serb, Ruman, Bulgar, Georgian, and Russian converts from the Western Society's sister civilization, Orthodox Christendom, would abide in their new cultural allegiance. We can merely speculate on the

¹ See xi, map 72.

² See IV. iv. 82 and 107.

³ See IV. iv. 113-14.

possibility that cultural conversions which, like those of the Aztecs, the Incas, and the Hindus, have been initiated by force of alien arms may prove less stable than conversions which have been entered into on the converts' own initiative, like those of the Irish,¹ the Scandinavians,² the Orthodox Christians,³ the Japanese,⁴ and the Jews⁵ to the culture of the West, or the assimilation of the Manchus to the Far Eastern Civilization in China.⁶

The general effect of this survey of the ultimate consequences of 'cultural conversions' is to confirm our conclusion that the sole sure beneficiary from the services afforded by a universal state is the internal proletariat. The benefits obtained by the external proletariat are always illusory, while those obtained by an alien civilization are apt to be impermanent.

(c) THE SERVICEABILITY OF IMPERIAL INSTALLATIONS

I. Communications

An Analysis of Imperial Institutions

Having now examined the effects of two general characteristics of universal states—their conductivity and their peace—we may go on to survey the services afforded to their beneficiaries by particular concrete institutions which they themselves deliberately create and maintain, but which are apt to find their historic mission in roles for which they had never been cast by their makers. These imperial institutions may be grouped under the three heads of installations, currencies, and corporations, and each of these heads may be subdivided. The principal installations set up by a universal state are its communications, its garrisons and colonies, its provinces, and its capital city. Its most important currencies are its official language and script, its legal system, and its money, weights and measures, and calendar. Its major corporations are its army, its civil service, and its citizen body. If we consider each of these institutions in turn, we shall find it serving some unintended beneficiary in some measure.

The Spider's Web

Communications head the list, because they are the master-institution on which a universal state depends for its very existence. They are the instrument not only of its military command over its dominions but

¹ The first act in the assimilation of the Irish was their voluntary decision, at the time of the Reformation, when their English rulers turned Protestant, to maintain their allegiance to a Catholicism which had been thrust upon them in the Early Medieval Age of Western history (see II. ii. 421-3). The second act was the captivity of the Irish, in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, by the contemporary Western movement of Nationalism. (For recent Irish Linguistic Archaism as a symptom of Nationalism, see V. vi. 65-67 and 71.)

² See II. ii. 347-60 and V. vi. 64-65 and 71.

³ For the Westernization of the Modern Greeks, see II. ii. 226-7; V. vi. 68-70 and 71; and IX. viii. 161-84. For the deliberate attempt to transform the Russian Orthodox Christian universal state into a member of the comity of Western states, see IV. iv. 88-91.

⁴ See IV. iv. 88-91.

⁵ See II. ii. 252-4; V. vi. 70-71; and IX. viii. 286-8.

⁶ See V. v. 348-9 and 352.

also of its political control through overt imperial inspectors and unavowed secret service agents. For this imperial life-line does not consist merely of the physical media of travel. The highways offered ready-made by Physical Nature, in the shape of rivers,¹ seas,² and steppes,³ do not provide practicable means of communication except in so far as they are effectively policed;⁴ and the same political condition governs, *a fortiori*, the use of artificial or regulated inland waterways and man-made roads. Nor is the maintenance of public security enough in itself to make the potentialities of communication practically operative. In a geographical area so large as is the domain of even the least extensive universal state if measured by the standard of an individual human being's mobility even in a technologically efficient society, the traveller may be hard put to it to reach his destination unless he is given the privilege of using public means of transportation. In most of the universal states so far known to History, these means had taken the form of an imperial postal service; and the imperial postmaster-general at the seat of the central government, with his host of subordinates strung out along the roads radiating from the capital to the frontiers, had been apt to acquire the additional function of a chief of secret police whose most important duty, in the eyes of his masters, had been to turn his opportunities of intelligence to the central government's account by reporting on the conduct and ambitions of provincial governors and frontier commanders, and on the public opinion and temper of imperial troops and subject populations.

A public postal service seems to have been part of the machinery of government of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad. In its metropolitan territory of Shinar, the embankments of the irrigation canals appear to have served as highways for land-traffic.⁵ 'The New Empire' of Egypt, which established its authority over the derelict Syrian and Mesopotamian provinces of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad after an interlude of barbarian Hyksos rule, used the roads which it inherited here from its predecessors for keeping control over the native princelings by a service of diplomatic couriers and travelling inspectors. In the Achaemenian Empire we find the same installations apparently raised to a higher level of organization and efficiency—though this apparent superiority in

¹ In the geographical structure of an Egyptical universal state the natural waterway provided by the River Nile served as a spinal cord, and a corresponding service was performed by the rivers Euphrates and Tigris for the Empire of Sumer and Akkad.

² 'The [Mediterranean] Sea stretches in a belt across the middle of the Inhabited World and across the middle of your [Roman] empire; and round the sea the continents extend "grand and grandly" (*μεγάλοι μεγαλωστί κέκλινται*)—continually supplying your needs with consignments of their products' (Aristeides, P. Aelius: *In Roman*, §§ 10-11 in B. Keil's edition (*Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), p. 94)). For the role of the Mediterranean Sea in the life of the Roman Empire, see further pp. 216-20, below.

³ For the conductivity of the Steppe, see III. iii. 391-4. The centrally situated medium of communication which was provided for the Roman Empire by the Mediterranean Sea—as depicted by Aelius Aristeides in the passage quoted in the preceding footnote—was provided by the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe (see III. iii. 401) for the Nomad empires of the Royal Scythians, the Khazars, and the Golden Horde (see V. v. 281-9), and by the entire Eurasian Steppe for the short-lived Nomad Empire of the Mongol khāqāns who ruled from Qaraqorum (see p. 198, below).

⁴ See the passage quoted from Epictetus in V. vi. 3 and 142, and on p. 92, below.

⁵ See Woolley, L.: *Abraham* (London 1936, Faber), p. 122.

standard may be an illusion reflecting a mere difference in the amount of our information.

'The farther the bounds of the Empire were extended, the more powerful became the position of the provincial governors; and this made it the more necessary to create institutions for preserving the Empire's unity and for ensuring a prompt and unhesitating execution of Imperial commands. Instruments for holding the Empire together were the great roads converging on Susa and traversing the Empire in all directions in the track of the previously existing trade-routes. . . . These roads were measured in parasangs and were permanently maintained in good condition. The Imperial Highway¹ was provided, at intervals of about four parasangs on the average, with "imperial post-stations and excellent inns".² The provincial boundaries and the river crossings were guarded by strongly garrisoned fortresses (πύλαι)³ (the desert frontier of Babylonia, among others, was provided with defences of the same kind).⁴ At these points the traffic was subjected to searching supervision. All post-stations were manned by mounted couriers whose duty it was to convey imperial commands and official dispatches post-haste, travelling day and night without a break—"swifter than cranes", as the Greeks put it.⁵ There is also said to have been a system of telegraphic communications by beacon-signals. To keep the satraps under control, the Emperor would take every opportunity of sending out into the provinces high officials, like the Emperor's "eye" or his brother or son, with troops at their back. These would arrive, without warning, to inspect the administration and report abuses. Further safeguards against misconduct on the satraps' part were provided by the presence of the imperial secretary who was attached to the provincial governor,⁶ and of the commandants of fortresses and other military officers in his province, who all served as instruments of supervision. These checks were supplemented by a highly developed espionage system. The Emperor had a ready ear for denunciations.'⁷

This Achaemenian policy of utilizing the imperial communications system as an instrument for maintaining the central government's control over the provinces reappears in the administration of the Roman Empire, which eventually fell heir to the former Achaemenian dominions west of the Euphrates, and of the Arab Caliphate—a reincarnation of the Achaemenian Empire in which the Syriac universal state found its

¹ i.e. the Great North-West Road connecting Susa with Sardis and Ephesus (see xi, map 20). The central section of this Achaemenian Imperial Highway, between Assyria and Cappadocia, had originally been opened up, as early as the third millennium B.C., by Assyrian pioneer traders whose settlements in Cappadocia had subsequently been embraced in the Empire of Sumer and Akkad (see I. i. 110-11).—A.J.T.

² Σταβμοί τε πανταχῇ εἰσι βασιλῆϊσι καὶ καταλύσεις κάλυπται (Herodotus, Book V, chap. 52).

³ The corresponding installations were called κλεισούραι (i.e. 'clausurae') in the East Roman Empire and 'derbends' in the Ottoman Empire.—A.J.T.

⁴ See Xenophon: *Expedition Cyri*, Book I, chap. 5, § 5.—A.J.T.

⁵ Reminiscences of Herodotus's account of the Achaemenian system of communications, blending with the tenth verse of the seventh chapter of the Book of Daniel (quoted in the present Study, V. vi. 34), may have inspired Milton to write:

His state
Is kingly. 'Thousands at His bidding speed
And post o'er land and ocean without rest.
They also serve who only stand and wait.

The poet's application of this Achaemenian imagery is, of course, all his own.—A.J.T.

⁶ See Herodotus, Book III, chap. 128.—A.J.T.

⁷ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 66-68.

second avatar after the long interruption caused by the intrusion of the Hellenic Civilization upon the Syriac World between the Macedonian conqueror Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont in 334 B.C. and the Roman Emperor Heraclius's withdrawal behind the Amanus in A.D. 636.¹ In the case of the Caliphate a twentieth-century historian had at his disposal a wealth of information; for a full and accurate account of the 'Abbasid road network and postal system had been extracted from the official records and preserved for Posterity in a corpus of treatises which was a notable monument of the classical Arabic literature,² while a picture of the Roman road network and postal system had been pieced together from archaeological and epigraphical evidence by Modern Western classical scholars.³

The Roman Imperial *Cursus Publicus* was instituted by Augustus himself—perhaps consciously on the Achaemenian pattern⁴—and the burden of providing the service, which was originally imposed on the local public authorities, appears to have been progressively taken over by the Imperial Treasury in the reigns of Hadrian and Septimius Severus, though this without ever ceasing to bear heavily on the populations of the territories through which the imperial highways ran.⁵ Official dispatches were carried overland by corps of *tabellarii* and *cursores*, and oversea by *naves tabellariae*.⁶ The Achaemenian inspiration of this Roman institution is betrayed in a characteristic use of couriers as spies. The emissaries of the Roman Imperial Government who went under the euphemistic names of *frumentarii* ('foragers') in the Age of the Principate and of *agentes in rebus* in the post-Diocletianic Age were counterparts, in Roman dress, of an Achaemenian emperor's 'eye'. Their administrative duty of superintending the conduct of the imperial postal service was coupled with the political duty of espionage.⁷

In the Caliphate under the 'Abbasid régime the administration of the public postal service was turned to account for purposes of intelligence and police.

'At the capital of each of the large provinces into which the mighty empire was articulated there was a postmaster (*Sāhib al-Barīd*)⁸ whose

¹ See I. i. 75-77.

² The Arabic texts of this corpus had been published by de Goeje, M. J., in his *Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum* (Leyden 1870-94, Brill, 8 vols.). A masterly summary and appreciation of the facts was to be found in Le Strange, Guy: *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge 1905, University Press).

³ See Hirschfeld, O.: *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian* (Berlin 1905, Weidmann), pp. 190-204, 'Die Reichspost', and pp. 205-11, 'Die Italischen Strassen'.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 190.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 192-3.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 200-4.

⁷ See Grosse, R.: *Römische Militärgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der byzantinischen Themenverfassung* (Berlin 1920, Weidmann), pp. 105-6. The postal service itself must, all the same, have been efficient—at any rate during the halcyon days of an Antonine Indian Summer. Otherwise Aelius Aristides would hardly have ventured to write:

'An administrator sitting [in Rome] can govern the whole Inhabited World with the greatest facility by correspondence. The despatches are no sooner written than they are delivered, just as if they had travelled by air' (*In Romam*, edited by Keil, B., in *Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), p. 101 (Or. XXVI, § 33)).

⁸ This word *barīd*, which is used in Arabic to mean 'postal system', is derived from the Latin *verēda* meaning 'mail-cart'.—A.J.T.

duty it was to keep the Caliph continually informed of all affairs of any importance. The postmaster had even to keep an eye on the conduct of the governor and was thus a confidential agent of the Central Government's, appointed direct by them. The report of a Chief Postmaster of Baghdad, addressed to the Caliph Mutawakkil, has come down to us. . . . We even know the form of appointment of a postmaster. The Caliph commissions him therein to report from time to time on the conduct of the financial officials and of the administrators of the crownlands, on the state of agriculture, on the situation of the peasants, on the behaviour of the officials, and on statistics of the minting of gold and silver coin. He was also to be present when the troops were being reviewed and paid. It is clear that the postal service, as we understand it, was quite a secondary consideration.'¹

The primary consideration was what it had been under the Achaemenian Government.

'The postmasters . . . were the sensitive octopus-arms which the Court of Baghdad extended into the provinces. . . . The postal system was made to serve the purposes of espionage: in this far-flung empire the intelligence service was most efficiently organized. In the later parts of his work, Tabari gives the dates, not merely of the events themselves, but of the arrival at Court of the news of them.'²

The same institutions reappear in two empires built by representatives of an Iranic Muslim Civilization that was affiliated to the Syriac and had retained a memory of the parent society's achievements. Seventeenth-century Western observers of the Ottoman Empire avowed their admiration for the imperial highways—the like of which were not to be found in the Western Europe of that day—and for the courier service, staffed with mounted Tatars, who emulated the hard riding of Darius's Persian equerries. The contemporary empire of the Timurid Mughals in India never attained the Ottoman standard either in the material quality of its roads or in the effectiveness of its public police, but these shortcomings did not prevent it from operating an espionage and intelligence system in the Achaemenian and 'Abbasid tradition. Confidential news bulletins were systematically sent in from each province by an official reporter (*wāqi' ah nawī*) and were submitted to the Emperor by his *mīr bakhshī*.³ When the Mughal Power went to pieces in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, this intelligence organization continued to function longer than most other parts of the dilapidated imperial administrative machine.

Napoleon, who was an active and ubiquitous builder of roads during the short life of the transitory universal state⁴ which he provided for an abortive Medieval Western city-state cosmos,⁵ was in this, as in so much of the rest of his work, making a conscious attempt to evoke a ghost of the Roman Empire; and the Petrine Russian Empire had deliberately set itself to acquire the Western technique which it used in its latter days for establishing and consolidating its hold over Transcaucasia, Trans-

¹ von Kremer, A. *Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen* (Vienna 1875-7, Braumüller, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 193 and 195; English translation by S. Khuda Bukhs: *The Orient under the Caliphs* (Calcutta 1920, University Press), pp. 230 and 232.

² Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), p. 350.

³ See Ibn Hasan: *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire* (Oxford 1936, University Press), pp. 220-1.

⁴ See xi, map 60.

⁵ This aspect of the Napoleonic Empire has been examined in V. v. 619-42.

caspia, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, and a Maritime Province on the Pacific coast of the Continent by railway-building on a scale that outstripped all contemporary achievements in the United States and Canada. But similar circumstances and requirements likewise called similar administrative machinery into existence in other universal states which could not have drawn their inspiration, even at second or third hand, from the practice and experience of imperial chanceries at Ur or Susa or Rome or Baghdad.

Ts'in She Hwang-ti, the revolutionary founder of a Sinic universal state, was a builder of roads radiating from his capital, which he used for making political inspections and carrying out statistical surveys.¹ The inspectorate was elaborately organized. An Inspector-General, with two deputies, in the capital was served by a numerous staff of subordinates both in the capital and in the provinces, and there were special inspectorates, besides, for 'subject barbarians' and 'subject states'.² The Incas, likewise, were builders of roads and fortresses.³ Like the Roman conquerors of Italy, the Incas, in their systematic northward conquests, used these instruments to consolidate each gain of ground, in preparation for the next advance.⁴ The completed system consisted of two main roads running parallel, south and north, one along the Andean Plateau and the other along the Pacific Coast, with transverse connecting roads at intervals. These roads were carried across the rivers by bridges of stone and wood, by suspension bridges of rope, or by cable and basket.⁵ There were store-houses strung along the route, and relays of post-runners⁶ were stationed at intervals of one and a half leagues. A message could travel from Cuzco to Quito—a distance of more than a thousand miles as the crow flies and perhaps half as much again by road—in as short a time as ten days.⁷ The organization of this service was attributed to the eighth Inca, Pachacutec (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1400-48).⁸ The travelling facilities were used by the Inca himself and by itinerant imperial inspectors, intendants, and judges.⁹

'The surveillance [of the Central Government over the provinces] was provided for by inspectors, drawn from the ranks of the *orejones*,¹⁰ who

¹ See Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), p. 168; Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 138; Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 233. Ts'in She Hwang-ti imposed a standard measure for the axle-length of carts, in order that any cart might be able to travel over any of the deeply rutted roads in the loess country in the North and North-West. In the foregoing period of the Contending States, when each locality had had a customary axle-length of its own, through-traffic had been hampered by the necessity, at frequent intervals, of either changing the axles of the cart or else trans-shipping the freight to another cart of the right axle-gauge for the next stage of the journey (Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 138; Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 233).

² See Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 230 and 231.

³ See Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), p. 56.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 94.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 106-7; Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), pp. 189-96.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 196-8.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 197.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 109; Markham, Sir Clements: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), pp. 162-3; Baudin, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-9.

¹⁰ The nickname given to the ruling minority in the Inca Empire by their Spanish conquerors (see V. v. 50-51).—A.J.T.

made general tours of the Empire every three years, and by secret agents of the Inca . . . who paid visits, incognito, to all districts. These agents' instructions were to observe, to listen to complaints, and to report, but it was not within their competence to take measures for the suppression of abuses. Under this system, several brothers of the Inca Tupac Yupanqui were successively appointed inspectors. . . . The duties of inspector-in-chief were performed by the Inca himself; he travelled over the Empire in his golden litter, and during the whole period of his visits—which were very long, considering that he sometimes remained absent [from the capital] for as much as three or four years—he would be hearing petitions and dispensing justice.¹

While the means of communication with which the Inca Empire equipped itself were thus assiduously used by the public authorities, including the Emperor in person, they were not at the disposal of private travellers—in contrast to contemporary practice in Central America, where travelling companies of merchants, organized in a guild, were continually extending the field of their private economic enterprise² in advance of the expansion of the Aztec Empire,³ like the Roman *negotiatores* who, in their irrepressible eagerness for profits, used to push their way in advance of the legions into perilous no-man's-lands,⁴ and linger there after the legions had retreated.⁵ This active international trade in private hands seems to have been part of the heritage of the Mexic Civilization from its Mayan predecessor.⁶ On the other hand no evidence had survived to show that the Aztec Empire had been prompted by memories of 'the First Empire' of the Mayas when it had turned its commercial travellers to account as sources of military and political intelligence⁷ or when it had constructed the installations with which it had confirmed its hold on its conquests in the manner of the contem-

¹ Baudin, op. cit., pp. 120-1. This particular duty afterwards devolved upon the Inca's alien successor the Spanish viceroy. 'The welfare of the Indians was presumed to be his special care, and he was expected to devote a part of two or three days each week to the consideration of Indian petitions' (Haring, C. H.: *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York 1947, Oxford University Press), p. 119).

² On this point see Joyce, T. A.: *Mexican Archaeology* (London 1914, Lee Warner), pp. 126-7; Gann, T.: *Mexico from the Earliest Times to the Conquest* (London 1936, Lovat Dickson), pp. 172-4; Vaillant, G. C.: *The Aztecs of Mexico* (London 1950, Penguin), pp. 122-3 and 208.

³ See xi, map 71.

⁴ As, for example, those who were massacred in Anatolia in 88 B.C. by Mithradates Eupator—to the number, it was said, of eighty thousand (see V. v. 69).

⁵ As, for example, those whom, in A.D. 448, the Constantinopolitan envoy Priscus found doing their business in Attila's ordu in the former Roman province of Pannonia (for Priscus's mission see V. v. 473-4).

⁶ See Gann, T., and Thompson, J. E.: *The History of the Maya* (London 1931, Scribner), pp. 200-1.

⁷ 'In the Aztec period the travelling merchants became a special class, and their security of body and property, preserved at first for the advantages which each town could derive from their wares, was guaranteed by the force of Aztec arms. . . . Having to move step by step, and to intimidate or win over town after town, [the Aztecs] needed patience and knowledge of geographical and political conditions. One reason for the honour in which merchants were held was the information of this character which they could furnish from their travels. . . . In time they performed an important political function, spying out towns to conquer and reporting on the tribute which could be exacted. There is a very modern touch about the economic and political functions of these merchants who so often brought military conquest in their train' (Vaillant, op. cit., pp. 122-3, 208, and 213).

It will be seen that these merchants played in the acquisition of the Aztec Empire the role that in the maintenance of the Achaemenian Empire was played by 'the King's Eye', and in the maintenance of the 'Abbasid Empire by the postmasters.

porary Inca Power. The Aztec Imperial Government built and maintained highroads, threw bridges of stone, wood, or rafts across the rivers, and operated on these thoroughfares an imperial postal service manned by relays of couriers at intervals of five or six miles.¹

In Japan the Great North-East Road,² running up the south-eastern side of the Main Island from the civil capital at Kyoto in the interior to the successive military capitals at Kamakura and Yedo, served first to secure the conquests made by the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan at the expense of the Ainu barbarians and afterwards to bring and keep Yamato under the domination of the Kwanto—as the new northern marches came to be called, after the name of the road by which they had been opened up.³ Under the Tokugawa régime, which provided the Far Eastern Society in Japan with its universal state, this trunk road and its branches ministered to the policy of the Shogun's government at Yedo as an instrument not only for keeping an eye on the impotent Imperial Court at Kyoto, but also for the more formidable task of keeping to heel the feudal lords all over the Empire—especially those 'Outside Lords' (*Tosama*) whose houses had once been rivals of the Tokugawa in the grim struggle for power at the climax of a Japanese Time of Troubles.

These *daimyō* were required by the Shogun to reside in Yedo, with their principal retainers, for so many months in the year, and to leave their wives and families there as hostages when they themselves were in residence in their fiefs, with the triple object of keeping them under supervision, loosening their personal hold on the fiefs from which they drew their political and military strength, and weakening them financially by putting them under social pressure to live, while in the capital, in a style beyond their means.⁴ The migration, twice a year, of these feudal lords, with their retinues, between their fiefs in the provinces and their residences in the capital was one of the distinctive features of Japanese life in the Tokugawa Age; and the grand trunk road and its ramifications were the media of communication for their perpetual coming and going. While the Government were interested in seeing the means of communication kept up sufficiently well to serve this police purpose, they were equally interested in seeing to it that they should not be kept up well enough to tempt disaffected feudal forces into planning a convergent march on the capital; and they 'deliberately refrained from building bridges and otherwise facilitating communications on the main lines of approach to Yedo'.⁵

The Grand Canal

In the main body of the Far Eastern World in China the long-distance transportation of foodstuffs in bulk came to be one of the besetting

¹ See Gann, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

² See xi, map 55A.

³ See II. ii. 158-9.

⁴ See Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, a Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 436; Sadler, A. L.: *A Short History of Japan* (Sydney 1946, Angus & Robertson), p. 217.

⁵ Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 437. Perhaps their scholars had reminded them of the unintended and untoward service that the roads built by Ts'ing She Hwang-ti had once rendered to the rebels who had overthrown his régime a few years after his death (see pp. 99-100, below).

problems of public administration, owing to a tendency towards political unification under an oecumenical government seated in the North which persisted after the economic centre of gravity had shifted conclusively from the North to the Yangtse Valley.

'Commercial growth in China never reached a level which would enable it to overcome the localism and narrow exclusiveness of an agricultural economy. [The] regional groupings were highly self-sustaining and independent of each other; and—in the absence of machine industry, modern facilities of transport and communication and an advanced economic organisation—state centralisation in the modern sense was impossible. In the circumstances, the unity or centralisation of state power in China could only mean the control of an economic area where agricultural productivity and facilities of transport would make possible the supply of a grain tribute so predominantly superior to that of other areas that any group which controlled this area had the key to the conquest and unity of all China. It is areas of this kind which must be designated as the Key Economic Areas. . . .¹

'The Yangtse Valley grew in importance as a productive centre during the Eastern Tsin (A.D. 317–420) and the other Southern dynasties (A.D. 420–589), definitely assuming the position of the Key Economic Area from the time of the T'ang Dynasty (A.D. 618–907).² Politically, the centre of gravity still lay in the North. . . . This anomalous situation rendered the development and maintenance of a transport system linking the productive South with the political North a vital necessity. The link was provided by the Grand Canal,³ which engaged the attention of the best minds of China for more than ten centuries and demanded countless millions of lives and a large portion of the wealth of the country for its improvement and maintenance. . . .⁴

'Although traditionally the canal is ascribed to the genius and extravagance of Yang Ti [*imperabat* A.D. 605–18] of the Sui, it was not built in one period or by one emperor. Like the Great Wall, it was constructed in disconnected sections at different periods.⁵ Yang Ti of the Sui completed

¹ Chi, Ch'ao-ting: *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History as Revealed in the Development of Public Works for Water-Control* (London 1936, Allen & Unwin), pp. 4–5. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

² In the time of Han Yü, a writer on the subject of water control who lived from A.D. 768 to A.D. 824, 'Kiangnan' (i.e. the combined areas of the latter-day provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Kiangsi, and Nganhwei) yielded nine-tenths of the total land-tax of the T'ang Empire (Chi, Ch'ao-ting, *op. cit.*, p. 125).

³ See xi, maps 46, 47, 54.—A.J.T.

⁴ Chi, Ch'ao-ting, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

⁵ Waterways for the transportation of troops, tribute, grain, and merchandise were already being constructed in the Sinic World before the close of the period of Chan Kuo, 'the Contending States', which was the second and climacteric bout of the Sinic Time of Troubles (see *ibid.*, p. 65).

Han Kuo, the earliest canal linking the Yangtse River with the Hwai River, was dug in the second decade of the fifth century B.C. by King Fu Ch'ai of Wu (see *ibid.*, pp. 65 and 117). This Yangtse-Hwai canal was straightened out, after the collapse of 'the United Tsin régime', by the Emperor Mo Ti of the refugee Tsin Dynasty in the South (*imperabat* A.D. 345–61) (see *ibid.*, pp. 112 and 117); and it was restored in A.D. 587, to facilitate the transportation of tax-grain, by Sui Yang Kien (Wên Ti), who, in the ninth decade of the sixth century of the Christian Era, united the North and South of the main body of the Far Eastern World in a single oecumenical empire (see *ibid.*, p. 117). This section was improved by Sui Yang Ti in A.D. 605 (see *ibid.*, p. 117).

The Pien Canal, linking the Hwai River with the Yellow River, is likewise recorded to have been in existence already during the Chan Kuo period of Sinic history (see *ibid.*, pp. 114–15); it appears to have been completed in A.D. 204 (see *ibid.*, pp. 100–1); and under the refugee Tsin it was used by Wang Chün for the conquest of Wu (see *ibid.*, p. 115). The Sui alinement of the Pien Canal was more direct than the preceding

it by linking the various waterways running in a north and south direction into a connected system¹ and adding long sectors both in the North and South.²

While the completion of the Grand Canal, in its original alinement from Hangchow via Loyang to Si-Ngan, was thus the work of Sui Yang Ti, the solution of the problem of provisioning Si-Ngan from Kiangnan was worked out, after the fall of Yang Ti and his house, by the public servants of the succeeding T'ang régime. Granaries were built *en route*—particularly at either end of the Yellow River gorge ('the San Men Gates'), where storage facilities were required in order to allow of a six-mile portage overland.³ This T'ang system of inland water communications was perfected between A.D. 764 and 780 by a public servant named Liu Yen, who, among other improvements, built five different types of boats for use on different sections;⁴ but seven-tenths of the works accomplished under the T'ang Dynasty had been carried out before the outbreak of the devastating rebellion of An Lu-shan (*saevebat* A.D. 755–66).⁵

This disaster was a premonition of a Time of Troubles that overtook the main body of the Far Eastern Society when the T'ang Dynasty finally went to pieces at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era.⁶ After this Time of Troubles had entered on its second and more violent bout in the reign of the Sung Emperor Huitsung (*imperabat* A.D. 1101–25),⁷ China relapsed into political disunity and,

one; it took off from the Yellow River at a point in the neighbourhood of Loyang, instead of at Kaifeng, and from this point it ran direct to the Hwai (see *ibid.*, p. 115); but in this Hwai–Yellow River section of the Grand Canal, as in the Hwai–Yangtse section, Sui Yang Ti still had the advantage of having had predecessors.

The Yangtse–Hangchow section was dug by Yang Ti in A.D. 610, and thereby a continuous waterway was established between Yangchow and Loyang, the former capital of the Eastern Ch'ou and the Posterior Han (see pp. 212–13, below), which was erected by Yang Ti into a subsidiary imperial capital. The main capital of the Sui Empire was Si-Ngan, on the site of the Prior Han Dynasty's capital Ch'ang Ngan (see pp. 212 and 213, below); and Yang Ti carried his through-waterway to Si-Ngan from the new 'key economic area' in the South by restoring a canal, cut by Han Wuti in the seventh decade of the second century B.C., which had connected Ch'ang Ngan directly with the Yellow River—by-passing the Wei River, which was difficult to navigate in the gorge through which it made its way out of 'the Country within the Passes' into the Lower Yellow River Plain (see Chi, Ch'ao-ting, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82 and 119–20).

¹ These vast public works were carried out by correspondingly onerous *corvées*. One hundred thousand men and women are said to have been conscripted by Sui Yang Ti to dig his Yangtse–Hwai canal; one million to dig his Yellow River–Hwai canal (see Chi, Ch'ao-ting, *op. cit.*, pp. 117 and 116); and another million—again including women, to make good a shortage of men—to dig a branch taking off from the Yellow River in the Great Eastern Plain and linking up the main line of the Grand Canal with the Hai Ho Basin (see *ibid.*, p. 120). The terrible harshness and brutality with which the workers on the Yellow River–Hwai (Pien) canal were treated are described in an anonymous contemporary monograph (see *ibid.*, pp. 123–4). The means of communication created at this cost in human suffering served, when in existence, as instruments for enabling a ruling minority to intensify its exploitation of the masses. Hence the unpopularity of Han Wuti and Sui Yang Ti (see *ibid.*, p. 122). The first of the revolts that ended in the overthrow of the Sui Dynasty was provoked by Yang Ti's enterprise of digging his Yellow River–Hai Ho branch of the Grand Canal to bring supplies to Sui armies engaged in a war with the Sui Empire's neighbour the North-West Korean state of Koguryō (see Bingham, W.: *The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty: The Fall of Sui and the Rise of T'ang: A Preliminary Survey* (Baltimore 1941, Waverley Press), pp. 37–46).

² Chi, Ch'ao-ting, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–14.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 127.

⁶ See IV. iv, 86 and 87–88 and V. vi. 306.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 125–7.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 128.

⁷ See V. vi. 307.

therewith, the problem of long-distance grain transport automatically fell into abeyance; but, when unity was restored, and the Time of Troubles brought to an end, by Mongol empire-builders who established a Far Eastern universal state with its capital at Peking, this problem of grain transport presented itself again, and this time in geographical circumstances that made it more difficult to solve than it had been in the days of an oecumenical government seated 'beyond the passes' at Si-Ngan—which the T'ang, like the Sui, had chosen for their capital—and still more difficult than in the days, between A.D. 960 and the disastrous year A.D. 1124, when the Sung had ruled virtually the whole of China from Kaifêng¹—the most convenient of all possible sites in the Yellow River Basin for water communications with the South, lying, as it did, in the very middle of the Great Eastern Plain.

The Mongols had followed the lead of their forerunners the Kin in choosing Peking for their capital because this site lay just inside the northernmost limits of the cultivated land of China, within convenient proximity to the steppes on which the Nomad conquerors of China were at home. Unlike the Kin, however, who had never succeeded in pushing southward beyond the basin of the Yellow River into the basin of the Yangtse, the Mongols had proceeded to conquer the whole of China right down to Canton inclusive; and this achievement raised for them the questions how they were to administer this vast, populous, and wealthy domain from a capital located on its extreme northern verge and how they were to keep this capital supplied from a southern 'key economic area' which was more remote from Peking than it was from Kaifêng, Loyang, or even Si-Ngan. This problem was inherited from the Mongols by their indigenous Chinese supplanters the Ming, who soon found by experience that the military and political considerations telling in favour of Peking outweighed those considerations of cultural sentiment and economic convenience that had led the founder of the new dynasty to try the experiment of transferring the capital to the historic site of Nanking.² But a reunited China could not be governed from Peking without some effective medium of communication for maintaining the Imperial Government's political control over the distant Yangtse Basin and still more distant southern seaboard, and for bringing rice northward in bulk for the two purposes of paying in kind the taxes due to the Imperial Government from the rice-growing provinces and at the same time feeding the vast and increasing population of an economically eccentric capital. This problem was solved by a re-alignment of the Grand Canal which made Peking instead of Kaifêng its northern terminus.

From Peking southwards as far as the River Hwai, the Yüan (Mongol) Grand Canal was an entirely new enterprise, for Sui Yang Ti's branch, linking the Hai Ho with the Yellow River, had not been alined with the direct route between the Hai Ho Basin and the southern sections of the main line, and in any case the whole of the northern part of the Sui canal system had been wrecked by the retreating Sung in A.D. 1128, when they had breached the embankments of the Yellow River in order

See p. 213, below.

² See II. ii. 121-2.

to check the advance of the pursuing Kin invaders.¹ The cutting of the new northern section was started, from Peking southwards, in A.D. 1292, and the completed Yüan Grand Canal continued to be used, after the expulsion of the Mongols, by their successors the Ming and the Manchus,² as the Sui Grand Canal had continued to be used by the Sui's successors the T'ang and the Sung. The Grand Canal served, in fact, as the spinal cord of the Chinese body politic and body economic³ until the dissolution of the traditional structure of Chinese social life in the course of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era under the economic impact of the West.⁴

In all chapters of its history the Grand Canal was, of course, mainly a medium for the slow transport of commodities in bulk, and it could not take the place of roads as media for a postal service. Accordingly, when the main body of the Far Eastern World was politically united, an oecumenical network of roads, to carry an imperial postal service, had to be maintained side by side with an oecumenical system of inland water transport. The Manchus revived a postal system, once maintained by the Ming,⁵ which was perhaps ultimately derived from the system with which a Sinic universal state had been endowed by Ts'in She Hwang-ti.⁶

'All Roads Lead to Rome'

It will be seen that, in constructing and maintaining their impressive systems of communications, the makers and masters of universal states usually had a clear and precise idea of the purposes for which they were burdening their subjects with these costly public works. Yet the sequel shows that the most sagaciously organized system of imperial communications may be utilized by other parties than the Imperial Government—and this for purposes to which the official owners and operators of the system would have been either indifferent or hostile if they could have foreseen this unintended use to which their carefully designed installations were to be put.

This variation on the motif of the victory of the dark horse⁷ is piquantly illustrated in the history of the magnificent communications system of the Roman Empire.

The splendour of this achievement on the social and political plane is ungrudgingly admitted in a passage already quoted⁸ from the pen of a Greek Stoic philosopher, living and teaching near the beginning of the second century of the Roman Peace, who is at the same time sharply

¹ See Chi, Ch'ao-ting, op. cit., p. 140.

² See *ibid.*, p. 140.

³ In the last days of the Yüan régime, when the Mongols were losing their grip on the 'key economic area' in the Yangtse Basin which they had linked with Peking by their new alinement of the Grand Canal, they attempted, from A.D. 1352 onwards, to develop a subsidiary source of supply in the immediate neighbourhood of Peking in the Hai Ho Basin; but this policy never had much success (*ibid.*, pp. 144-6).

⁴ Chi, Ch'ao-ting, op. cit., p. 149. An interesting account of an excursion on the Yüan Grand Canal that was made in A.D. 1853 by an acute Western student of the Far Eastern Civilization in China will be found in Meadows, T. T.: *The Chinese and Their Rebellions* (London 1856, Smith Elder), pp. 213-50.

⁵ See Michael, F.: *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China* (Baltimore 1942, Johns Hopkins Press), p. 118, n. 16.

⁶ See p. 85, above.

⁷ For other variations on the same elemental theme see IV. iv. 245-584, *passim*.

⁸ Epictetus: *Dissertations*, Book III, chap. xiii, §§ 9-13, quoted in V. vi. 3 and 142 (in the latter place, including the moral).

aware of the psychological and spiritual limitations of Caesar's power and, indeed, cites his potency in policing the Hellenic World only in order to bring out this contrast.

'You see that Caesar appears to provide us with a great peace, because there are no longer any wars or battles or any serious crimes of brigandage or piracy, so that one can travel at any season and can sail from the Levant to the Ponent.'

Towards the close of the same century the eulogy was repeated, without the philosopher's reservation, by a Greek man of letters of a school which had recognized the Roman Empire as the Hellenic universal state.

'The common saying that Earth is the all-mother and the universal home has been demonstrated by you Romans to perfection; for to-day Greek or barbarian, travelling heavy or travelling light, is at liberty to go where he pleases, at his ease; and, wherever he goes, he will never be leaving home behind him. The Cilician Gates and the narrow sandy passage through the Arab country to Egypt¹ have both alike lost their terrors. The mountains are no longer trackless, the rivers no longer impassable, the tribesmen no longer ferocious; it is a sufficient passport to be a Roman citizen or indeed a Roman subject; and Homer's saying that "the Earth is common to all men" has been translated into fact by you, who have surveyed the whole Inhabited World and have thrown all manner of bridges over the rivers and have hewn cuttings through the mountains until you have made the Earth *carrossable*—with your post-houses planted in the wilderness and your system and order spreading civilisation far and wide.'²

If the makers and the panegyrists of the Roman imperial system of communications could have foreseen the future, they would have found it intolerable no doubt, but not unintelligible in a world in which 'all roads' led 'to Rome', that the thoroughfares which in their time were bringing prisoners, petitioners, and sightseers to the Imperial City should one day bring barbarian war-bands or the armies of rival empires. They might even have taken a rueful pride in the thought that, in their impartial service to foes and friends alike, the Roman roads would still be bearing witness to the Empire's former greatness in those latter days of her adversity. These imperial highways certainly enabled, and possibly inspired, the barbarians to make straight for the heart of the Hellenic World.³

The Vandals, for instance, entered Spain within three years, and appeared before the walls of Carthage within twenty-four years, of their passage of the Rhine on the 31st December, A.D. 406. The Arabs arrived in Egypt within six years, at Carthage within sixty-four years, and all but in sight of the River Loire within ninety-nine years of their first raid across the Syrian *limes* of the Roman Empire in A.D. 633. And the Romans' Persian rivals for world dominion reached Calchedon, the

¹ See Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 4-7 and 88.—A.J.T.

² Aristeides, P. Aelius: *In Roman*, §§ 100-1 in B. Keil's edition (*Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), pp. 120-1).

³ This strategy of the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire is pointed out by Nilsson, M. P.: *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion* (London 1927, Milford), p. 33.

Asiatic suburb of Constantinople, within twelve years, and Alexandria within sixteen years, of their crossing of the Mesopotamian frontier of the Roman Empire in A.D. 603.

The inland sea which the Romans had confidently styled *mare nostrum*¹ proved even more serviceable to barbarian raiders than the Empire's overland media of communication. Goths who had won a frontage on the north coast of the Black Sea by descending from the interior of the Continent and seizing the Roman Empire's local client state, the Bosphoran principality, took to the water in A.D. 254 and, forcing their way out through the Straits into the Aegean, sacked Athens in A.D. 268. A band of Franks, who had been planted by the Emperor Probus (*imperabat* A.D. 276-82) on the sea-coast of Pontus, to hold for the Empire against the Alans a frontier at the opposite extremity to the sector that was threatened by the Franks themselves from their native lair, seized ships and succeeded in exploring their way 'from the mouth of the Phasis to that of the Rhine'.² This Frankish exploit was subsequently surpassed by the Vandals, who, after establishing themselves in Carthage, likewise took to the sea and put Epictetus's limited homage to Caesar out of date by turning a Mediterranean that had been 'a Roman lake' since the morrow of the Battle of Actium into the naval arena that it had been at the climax of the foregoing Time of Troubles, when Sextus Pompeius was defying Augustus, or when the Cilician pirates were challenging the might of a Roman Republic that had overthrown all its peers, or when Carthage was contending with Rome for the dominion of the Hellenic World. Indeed the Vandals achieved what the Pompeians and Cilicians and Carthaginians had hardly dreamed of accomplishing. In A.D. 455 they captured Rome from the sea. Such a sensational reversal of maritime fortunes had not been witnessed in Mediterranean waters since, more than eighteen hundred years before, 'the thalassocracy of Minos' had been overthrown by Vandal-like Mycenaean and Goth-like Achaean sea-rovers.

If Romans of the generation of Domitian or of the seemingly halcyon Age of the Antonines could have foreknown these coming events, they might have been overcome by horror and indignation, yet they would hardly have been bewildered as they certainly would have been if they had been told that, by their time, the superb imperial system of communications had already fulfilled its historic mission by facilitating the journeys of a private Roman citizen of whom they had never heard. When Augustus imposed the Roman Peace on a Pisidia that had not been effectively subdued by either the Achaemenids or the Seleucids, he was unconsciously paving the way for Saint Paul, on his first missionary journey from Antioch-on-Orontes, to land in Pamphylia and travel inland, unmolested, to Antioch-in-Pisidia, Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe. And Pompey had swept the Cilician pirates off the seas in order that Paul might make his momentous last voyage from a Palestinian Caesarea

¹ See p. 81 with n. 2, above, and pp. 216-17, below.

² Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xii, following Panegyrici Veteres (the passage will be found on p. 145 of Bährens' edition) and Zosimus, *Historiae*, Book I, chap. lxxi, §§ 3-5. The audacious adventurers sacked Syracuse *en route*.

to an Italian Puteoli without having to brave man-made perils in addition to the ordeals of tempest and shipwreck.

If we think of Antioch-on-Orontes as the base of operations from which Saint Paul achieved his spiritual conquests, we shall realize how successful and enduring Paul's achievements were by comparison with the military and political enterprises of the House of Seleucus, which had operated from the same headquarters from the day when Seleucus Nîcâtôr had ousted his rival war-lord Antigonus Monophthalmus from this key position and had removed the rising city of Antigoneia to a more commanding adjacent site to which he had given the new name of Antioch.¹ The appeal 'Come over into Macedonia and help us',² which moved Saint Paul to deliver his triumphantly audacious assault upon the European shore of the Hellenic World's Aegean heart, had been heard, and responded to, by Seleucus Nîcâtôr at the height of his fortunes, in an hour when the overthrow of Lysimachus in succession to the overthrow of Antigonus had made him master of the lion's share of the Achaemenian heritage in Asia; and it had sounded again in the ears of Nîcâtôr's descendant Antiochus the Great, when, after emulating his ancestor's exploits by driving to the wall Lysimachus's Pergamene heirs, he was hovering, like Paul in a later age, in the Asiatic hinterland of the Hellespont. Yet the enterprise which Paul was to carry to so brilliant a conclusion on the spiritual plane had ended in both political and personal disaster for Seleucus I and Antiochus III.

Seleucus—impelled by homesickness to revisit at last the native land which he had not seen since he had crossed the Hellespont with Alexander fifty-three years before—had hardly recrossed the Straits and set foot again in Europe when he was treacherously assassinated by an unscrupulous adventurer; Antiochus, ambitiously aspiring to snatch the championship of the Macedonian cause against Rome out of the hands of Antigonus's descendant King Philip V of Macedon and to avenge, in his rival's stead, the honourable defeat which Macedonian arms had suffered at Cynoscephalae, only brought upon himself his ignominious military fiascos at Thermopylae and Magnesia, and had to pay the political penalty of surrendering all Seleucid possessions in Europe and Asia north-west of Taurus. Following in these inauspicious footsteps, Saint Paul, in his spiritual campaigns, succeeded where the Seleucidae had failed. In the Hellespontine city of Alexandria Troas, which had closed its gates against Antiochus,³ Paul succeeded in founding a Christian congregation.⁴ And the fatuous boast of Antiochus's swashbuckler Aetolian allies that they would pitch their camp on the banks of the Tiber⁵ sets a standard by which we may measure Paul's successful fulfilment of his prediction that he was to see Rome as well as

¹ For the relation between Antioch and its forerunner Antigoneia, see Tschirikower, V.: *Die Hellenistischen Städtegründungen von Alexander dem Grossen bis auf die Römerzeit* (Leipzig 1927, Dieterich), p. 61; Bouché-Leclercq, A.: *Histoire des Séleucides* (Paris 1913-14, Leroux, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 32-33, and vol. ii, p. 522; Bevan, E. R.: *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Edward Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 211-12. See also the present Study, pp. 201-3, below.

² Acts xvi. 9.

³ See Acts xx. 6-12.

⁵ See Livy, Book XXXV, chap. 33.

³ See Livy, Book XXXV, chap. 42.

her Oriental and Greek dominions.¹ He reached Rome as a political prisoner, but, whatever the length of his sojourn there and in whatever way he may have met his end in This Life, it is certain that his presence and action in the Imperial City ensured the survival there of an infant Christian congregation that was to have a greater destiny than any other in the Hellenic World.²

The Roman Roads' Service to the Christian Church

If this contrast between Paul's success and the Seleucids' failure is mainly to be explained by the difference of the planes on which the Apostles of Jesus and the Successors of Alexander were operating, the no less striking contrast between Paul's success and the Mauryan Emperor Açoka's failure in a philosophic missionary enterprise in the same Mediterranean area may be ascribed in a large measure³ to the establishment of the Roman Peace in the Hellenic World between the Buddhist philosopher-king's and the Christian Apostle's day. Açoka has left us a notice of the philosophic missions which he sent to the realms of five of Alexander's successors in the second generation,⁴ but no record of his emissaries' activities has come to us from their mission field, and, whatever their fortunes may have been, they made no discernible effect upon the history of Mankind. In seeking to propagate the philosophy of Siddhārtha Gautama beyond the western limits of his own Mauryan Peace, Açoka was unlucky in his generation, for the Achaemenian Peace, which had proved so conductive a medium for Judaism and Zoroastrianism,⁵ and had perhaps conveyed to the Hellenic World the Zoroastrian and Indic elements that are to be found in Orphism,⁶ had been broken up by force of Macedonian arms two generations before Açoka's time, and the anarchy that racked the Syriac and Hellenic worlds, with little intermission, from this break-up of the Achaemenian Peace to the establishment of the Roman Peace was particularly unpropitious for missionary work.

On the other hand the Roman Peace proved as propitious a social environment for Paul's successors as it had been for Paul himself. In the latter part of the second century of the Roman Empire's existence, Saint

¹ See Acts xix. 21.

² Though Rome had been the queen of Christian cities in the history of Christianity so far, it would have been unwarrantable in A.D. 1952 to assume that she was destined to retain her historic primacy in perpetuity. The advent of Christianity was then still a recent event, even on that time-scale of the histories of civilizations which was so infinitesimally short by comparison with the age of the Human Race or with the aeons of geological and astronomical reckonings (on this point see I. i. 173, n. 2). At the time when these lines were being written, Christianity had hardly yet begun to retrieve the loss of its former Nestorian and Monophysite provinces by winning converts beyond the bounds of the two societies—those of Western and Orthodox Christendom—which were the daughter civilizations of the Hellenic Society. By the same date, however, the Western Civilization had already thrown the tentacles of its communications system and its technology round the whole habitable and traversable surface of the planet. If Christianity were to make as good a use of this opportunity as it had once made of the similar opportunity presented by the Roman Empire, there was no knowing where in the World its eventual centre of gravity would be found.

³ In large measure, yet only in part, for Açoka was handicapped in his spiritual enterprise by his political power. The ineffectiveness of political power as an instrument for propagating philosophies or religions from above downwards has been discussed in V. v. 646-712.

⁴ See V. v. 131-2.

⁵ See V. v. 124-5.

⁶ See V. v. 85-87.

Irenaeus of Lyon—a Christian Father who was an approximate contemporary of the pagan Greek man of letters Publius Aelius Aristides—was paying an implicit tribute to the Empire in extolling the unity of the Catholic Church throughout the Hellenic World.

‘Having received this gospel and this faith, . . . the Church, in spite of her dispersal throughout the World, preserves these treasures as meticulously as if she were living under one single roof. She believes in these truths as unanimously as if she had only one soul and a single heart, and she preaches them and expounds them and hands them down as concordantly as if she had only one mouth. While the languages current in the World are diverse, the force of the [Church’s] tradition is one and the same everywhere. There is no variety in the faith or in the tradition of the churches that have established themselves in the Germanies or in the Spains or among the Celts or in the East or in Egypt or in North-West Africa, or, again, of the churches that have established themselves at the World’s centre. Just as God’s creature the Sun is one and the same throughout the World, so likewise the Gospel of the Truth shows its light everywhere.’¹

This successor of Paul’s failed to recognize—or at any rate forbore to acknowledge—how much the Christian Church was indebted for her marvellous unanimity-in-ubiquity to the communications system of the Roman Empire. But the connexion was disagreeably evident two hundred years later, in an age when the Church had become the official partner of the Roman State, to a pagan historian bred in the city that had been the spiritual headquarters of Saint Paul and the political headquarters of the Seleucidae.

‘[The Emperor] Constantius [II],’² writes Ammianus Marcellinus of Antioch, ‘found the Christian religion uninvolved and straightforward and proceeded to muddle it up with old wives’ superstitions. As his delight in complicated theological hair-splitting was greater than his sense of responsibility for maintaining harmony, he provoked innumerable dissensions, and he added fuel to the galloping flames by organizing acrimonious debates. One consequence was that crowds of prelates made use of the public post-horses (*iumentis publicis*) for rushing to and fro on the business of these “synods”, as they call them. The prelates’ object was to wrench the whole practice of their religion into conformity with their own caprice; Constantius’s achievement was to ham-string the postal service (*rei vehiculariae succideret nervos*).’³

The sentiments of Ammianus, a Roman soldier of Greek birth writing history in the Latin tongue, would have been applauded by the Roman administrators who had called the imperial system of communications into existence and by the Greek men of letters who had eulogized it as its apogee. Though the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the pavement of the chaussées leading inland from its shores were free for all comers to traverse at their own risk, exertion, and expense, the imperial postal service was not a facility provided by the Government for the

¹ Irenaeus: *Contra Haereses*, Book II, chap. x, § 2 (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. vii, cols. 552–3), quoted already in V. v. 407, n. 4.

² Constantius II *imperabat* A.D. 337–61.—A.J.T.

³ Ammianus Marcellinus: *Res Gestae*, Book XXI, chap. xvi, § 18.

convenience of the public, but a burden imposed on the public by the Government for strictly official purposes;¹ and, before the bishops took the mail-carts by storm, the passes (*diplomata*) entitling private persons to travel by public post were issued very sparingly, and this only on warrants from the very highest authorities.² Itinerant second-century Greek lecturers who would have been happy to receive passes for themselves would have grudged them to itinerant fourth-century prelates if they could have foreseen the appearance of such strange personages above the historical horizon of their conventional-minded age. But the Roman system of imperial communications is not the only one that illustrates the irony of history.

The Beneficiaries of Means of Communication created by Other Universal States

The Empire of Sumer and Akkad was as hard hit by its own efficiency in this department of imperial administration as the Roman Empire was in the last chapter of the story. Its north-eastern highways³ eventually conveyed both the flood of Mitanni Nomad invasion which swept across Mesopotamia and over Syria into the Nile Delta⁴ and the contemporary infiltration of Kassite mountaineers into Shinar—a sluggish flow whose waters, eventually submerging Babylon, turned the latter-day capital of a Sumeric universal state into a cultural morass that it was to take the best part of a thousand years to reclaim.⁵ The corresponding north-western highway⁶ conveyed Hittite marauders from the Anatolian Plateau on the lightning raid in which they sacked Babylon *circa* 1595⁷ or 1531 B.C.⁷ The success with which the barbarians thus used the imperial thoroughfares of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad to break the Empire's power and to plunder its wealth was sensational, yet at the same time it was a performance which was to have little lasting effect on the fortunes of Mankind, as was evident in the perspective of some three and a half millennia of subsequent history. There was, however, another unintended beneficiary from these roads whose influence, under many masks, was still at work in the World in A.D. 1952; for it was the forerunners of this Sumeric

¹ See Hirschfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-1 and 204.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 198-200.

³ See xi, map 11.

⁴ See I. i. 104-7.

⁵ The Babylonian Civilization which eventually arose on the derelict site of the Sumeric World must have been in full cultural health in the eighth century B.C., when it began to make major discoveries in the field of astronomy (see IV. iv. 23-24).

⁶ 'Astronomy was not a science at a fabulously early time; its beginnings as a science date back only to the late Assyrian period, its best-known devotees lived under the Achaemenid Persians, its greatest triumphs were under Seleucid or even Parthian rule. . . . The first advance is attributed to the Babylonian King Nabu-nasir, whose era, beginning 747 and remembered to late classical times, introduced a nineteen-year cycle of intercalation which was later modified but never abandoned in principle. Significant is the fact that the first eclipses quoted by Ptolemy date from exactly this time. Evidently there was a new emphasis on observation. . . . Scientific astronomy was primarily developed from practical considerations, and, in particular, from the need of adjusting the calendar' (Olmstead, A. T.: 'Babylonian Astronomy—Historical Sketch', in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, vol. lv, April 1938, No. 2, pp. 114 and 117).

⁷ See xi, map 11.

⁸ The historical context, as well as the dating, suggested for the Hittite sack of Babylon in I. i. 111 and V. v. 263-4, had to be reconsidered in the light of archaeological discoveries made since the writing of the first six volumes of this Study (see the Note on Chronology in vol. x, on pp. 167-212, below).

imperial communications system that had conveyed the worship of Ishtar and Tammuz, the Mother and her Son, on the first stages of that long journey which—in diverging directions and through continual metamorphoses—was to carry this rudiment of a Sumeric higher religion over Syria to the shrine at Abydos on the banks of the Nile, and over Asia Minor to the Island of Heligoland among the waters of the North Sea.¹

When the Achaemenidae, establishing a wider empire on the site of Ur-Nammu's and Šulgi's, reconditioned the same north-western highway and extended it to the shores of the Aegean and the Hellespont, they, in their turn, were leading a lightning conductor into the heart of their dominions. Their magnificent installations opened the way for the Pretender Cyrus the Younger to march his invincible ten thousand Greek mercenaries from Sardis to Cunaxa,² and for Alexander to follow, from the Granicus to Arbela, the trail which the Ten Thousand had blazed for an Hellenic conquest of South-Western Asia. The lightning speed of Alexander's marches in the western and central provinces of the Empire bears witness to the excellence of the Achaemenian roads as well as to the endurance of the Macedonian troops and to their leader's own demonic energy.³ The political achievements of Alexander and his successors were, however, as negative and ephemeral as they were astonishing. While it took them no more than five years to break the Achaemenian Empire up, they never succeeded in putting the fragments together again. The true beneficiaries of the Achaemenian empire-builders' constructive work were two higher religions, Judaism and Zoroastrianism, and the tragically efficient destructive ability of the Macedonian *conquistadores* cleared the field, not for a Macedonian reproduction of the Achaemenian Empire, but for an influx of Hellenic culture.

When, after an interval of nearly a thousand years of Hellenic intrusion, the Syriac universal state, originally embodied in the Achaemenian Empire, was reconstituted at last in the shape of the Arab Caliphate,⁴ it was the turn of the north-eastern highway—now pushed forward again by Arab empire-builders up to the Transoxanian shore of the Eurasian Steppe⁵—to serve as the suicidally directed lightning conductor for a *Blitzkrieg* in the Nomadic style of warfare. The *coup de grâce* which the Empire of Sumer and Akkad had received from the Hittites, and the Achaemenian Empire from the Macedonians, pouring down the north-west highway from a barbarian reservoir in Europe, was administered to the Caliphate by Turks and Mongols breaking in from the Eurasian Steppe in the track of the Mitanni.⁶ Contemporaneously, other barbarian

¹ See V. v. 148-52 and IX. viii. 453.

² The efficiency of the Achaemenian system of communications is attested, not only by the ease and rapidity of Cyrus the Younger's south-eastward march, but by the necessity in which the Ten Thousand found themselves, on their subsequent retreat, of abandoning the Imperial Highway, and taking to the trackless mountains of Kurdistan, in order to shake off their pursuers (see Xenophon: *Expedition Cyri*, Book III, chap. v, §§ 7-18).

³ North-east of the Caspian Gates, Alexander had a very much rougher and slower passage. An explanation of this contrast has been offered in II. ii. 139-40.

⁴ See I. i. 73-77.

⁵ See II. ii. 141-2 and 378-84.

⁶ On this point see I. i. 104-6.

invaders of the Caliphate were sped on their way by other imperial thoroughfares. The North African coast-road from Alexandria to the Straits of Gibraltar,¹ which the Primitive Muslim empire-builders had opened up, and the road from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Rhône,² which they had taken over from the Roman Empire's Visigothic successor-state, served to carry the barbarian Arab Banu Hilāl and Sulaym from east to west, the Western Christian invaders of the Peninsular domain of Dār-al-Islām from north to south, and Berber war-bands—unsuccessfully disguised by the high-sounding names of 'Fātimids', Murābits, and Muwāhhids—both eastward to the Nile and northward to the Ebro. Here too, however, the lasting beneficiary from the imperial system of communications was not any barbarian invader. The historic mission of the wonderful organization described in the Corpus of Arab Geographers³ was to facilitate the propagation of Islam.

A few more illustrations of our theme may be cited to complete the tale. The thoroughfares traversing the Eurasian Steppe in all directions—from the Carpathians, Pamirs, and Kwenlung to Qāraqorum and Peking—that were opened up for the short span of about ninety years⁴ by the Mongol Empire, were to serve, not the Mongol empire-builders, but alien religious missionaries. These Mongol-made thoroughfares gave Western Catholic Christianity its first opportunity to attempt the conversion of China;⁵ they gave Islam two footholds within China's western borders;⁶ and they prepared the way for the eventual conversion of the Mongols themselves and their Calmuck kinsmen to the Tibetan Tantric form of Mahayanian Buddhism.⁷ The Grand Trunk Canal which was the *chef d'œuvre* among the public works of the Far Eastern universal state in China served to convey a second wave of Western Catholic Christian missionaries from the southern ports to Peking. The communications system of the Timurid Mughal Empire in India, which was too ramshackle to hold the Empire together, sufficed to carry contemporary Catholic missionaries on successive expeditions from Goa to Agra and made it possible for the Emperor Akbar to assemble at his court a mixed company of exponents of rival faiths whose seances in his presence inspired him to promulgate his own abortive *Din Ilāhī*.⁸ The roads efficiently provided by the Aztecs and the Incas enabled Cortés and Pizarro to overrun two new worlds with the lightning speed of a Macedonian Alexander, and thereby opened the way for Catholicism to make lasting spiritual conquests in these evanescent military *conquistadores'* wake. In the Sinic World, Ts'in She Hwang-ti's work was overtaken by the same nemesis.

"The construction of roads was a benefit to the Empire, but it proved a danger to the Ts'in Dynasty. When the great revolt occurred, the armies of the rebels found that the new roads served their purposes as well [as], or better than, those of the soldiers of Ts'in. For all the roads centred on the capital. The rebel armies were thus able to move swiftly and easily into the western hill country, hitherto so difficult of access, while the Ts'in

¹ See xi, maps 33 and 37.

² See *ibid.*

³ See p. 83, above. ⁴ Circa A.D. 1241-1328 (see V. v. 112 and XIII. x. 76, n. 3).

⁵ See V. v. 113-15. ⁶ See pp. 74-75, above, and p. 160, below.

⁷ See III. iii. 451; IV. iv. 497; and V. v. 309-10. ⁸ See V. v. 699-704.

generals, endeavouring to cope with rebellion in all parts of China, were hampered by the lack of lateral communications.¹

During a Napoleonic occupation of Dalmatia that lasted less than ten years, the French empire-builders did their road-building so well for the benefit of a Hapsburg Monarchy which was to enter into the fruits of their labours that the subsequent spectacle of these fine public works which the French had left behind them startled the astonished Emperor Francis into exclaiming that it was a pity that the French had not stayed in Dalmatia a bit longer.²

*An Islamic Pilgrims' Way*³

There was one famous road, 'the King's Highway',⁴ which had played an historic part in the life of one empire after another. This thoroughfare ran north and south, along the border between Syria and the Syrian Desert, from the crossings of the Euphrates, at the point where the river bends nearest to the Mediterranean, through Damascus and Transjordan to the head of 'Aqabah, where the road branched westwards across the Desert of Sinai towards Egypt and south-eastwards into Arabia. This King's Highway had served successively the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, 'the New Empire' of Egypt, the Neo-Babylonian Empire, and the Achaemenian Empire. After the shattering of the Achaemenian Peace by Alexander, the Ptolemies and the Seleucids, holding opposite ends of the thoroughfare, had contended with one another for possession of the whole of it, and the Seleucids had won the contest only to give place to Rome—till the King's Highway had changed hands again from the Roman Empire to the Arab Caliphate and thereafter, in its southern sector, from the 'Abbasids' Fātimid successor-state to the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.

In the course of its long and chequered history the King's Highway has been used, not only by its official masters of the moment, but by rebels, raiders, and rival Powers. The Elamite and Babylonian warlords who had twice taken this road in the eighteenth century B.C. in order to reimpose the long dormant authority of an Empire of Sumer and Akkad on the princelings of Syria had been pursued along their own highway on their return march, and been relieved of their booty, by an untamed band of Hebrew Nomads.⁵ In the eighteenth or seventeenth

¹ Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 138. This mistake of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's was avoided by the Tokugawa (see p. 87, above).

² See V. v. 636, n. 3.

³ See xi, maps 11, 14, 20, and 21A.

⁴ Num. xx. 17 and xxi. 22. See Wright, V. E., and Filson, F. V.: *The Westminster Historical Atlas of the Bible* (London 1946, Student Christian Movement Press), p. 40, fig. 25, for an aerial photograph of a section of this road in Transjordan.

⁵ See Gen. xiv. The historical events which here loom through a mist of tradition may perhaps be dated some time between the annexation of the Sumerian Empire of Isin by the Elamite State of Larsa circa 1799-1793 or 1735-1729 B.C. and the annexation of Larsa by the Amorite State of Babylon in 1762 or 1698 B.C. (see V. vi. 297). The account in Gen. xiv. 13-24 of Abraham's audacious but successful surprise attack on the plunder-laden army of the retreating imperialists is reminiscent of the attack by the Brygi on an Achaemenian army marching along the coast road from the Hellespont to European Greece circa 492 B.C. (Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 45) and of the similar attack by Thracians on a Roman army following the same route in 188 B.C. (Livy, Book XXXVIII, chap. 40).

century B.C. the King's Highway had carried a Palestinian barbarian Hyksos war-band to the north-eastern corner of Egypt, and perhaps also an advance guard of the Eurasian Nomad Mitanni to the north-western corner of Arabia, on the last stage of their long trek from the south-western shore of the great Eurasian Steppe.¹ In the fourteenth or thirteenth century B.C. the Children of Israel had been refused a passage along the southernmost section of the King's Highway by the Edomite successor-state of 'the New Empire' of Egypt,² and had forced a passage along another section in the teeth of opposition from an Amorite successor-state in the Peraea,³ on their way to carve out a domain for themselves on the western side of Jordan. In the ninth, eighth, and seventh centuries B.C. the independent principalities of Syria that had emerged from a dark age following the collapse of 'the New Empire' of Egypt and the overthrow of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' had fallen victims to Assyrian aggressors following on Chedorlaomer's track; and when the downfall of Assyria had seemed to promise them relief they had been cheated of it by the immediate substitution of Babylonian for Assyrian rule. On the eve of the overthrow of the Neo-Babylonian Empire by Cyrus the Achaemenid, the King's Highway had once again come to the fore in the play of international politics, and a would-be leader of an anti-Babylonian movement among the remnant of Judah had exhorted his countrymen to recondition this historic route in order to expedite the passage of Cyrus's liberating armies.

'The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness: Prepare ye the way of the Lord; make straight in the desert a highway for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain.'⁴

'The road was to follow much the same route that Nabonidus', the last emperor of the short-lived Neo-Babylonian Empire,⁵ 'had taken east of Jordan and through Ammonitis, Northern and Eastern Edom.'⁶

At the break-up of the Achaemenian Empire's Seleucid successor-state, Nabataean intruders from Arabia, treading in the footsteps of the Children of Israel, had followed the King's Highway, without turning off it to pass over Jordan, till they had reached and occupied Damascus; and at the break-up of the Roman Empire the Primitive Muslim Arabs—taking the same war-path, and avenging, in a decisive victory at the passage of the Yarmuk, their discomfiture at Mu'tah in their first encounter with the Roman veterans of the last and greatest Romano-Persian War—had not only captured Damascus but had established

¹ See the Note on Chronology in vol. x, and p. 201, n. 3, below.

² Num. xx. 14-22 and xxi. 4.

³ Num. xxi. 21-32.

⁴ Isa. xl. 3-4. The technique of making military thoroughfares seems to have been borrowed by successive empire-builders from their predecessors, to judge by the remarkable correspondence between the Pentateuch Greek version of this passage of Deutero-Isaiah, quoted in the Gospels, and a passage in Plutarch's *Lives of the Gracchi* (chap. 28). These two passages have been compared in V. vi. 418-19, and it has there been pointed out that the correspondence cannot be due to any literary influence of either passage on the other.

⁵ Nabonidus *imperabat* 556-539 B.C.—A.J.T.

⁶ Smith, Sidney: *Isaiah, Chapters XL-LV: Literary Criticism and History* (London 1944, Milford), pp. 65-66.

there the capital of an empire whose boundaries they had pushed out, within the next hundred years, to Farghānah on the one side and to the Atlantic coasts of Morocco and the Iberian Peninsula on the other. At the break-up of the Arab Caliphate the Crusaders, bursting into Syria through the Cilician Gates and by sea, had forced the passage of the Jordan in the reverse direction to that of the Israelites' trek, and had pushed their way southwards, down the southernmost stretch of the King's Highway, till they had reached the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah and had thereby momentarily cut the land communications between the African and Asiatic domains of Dār-al-Islām.¹

This history of the King's Highway over a period of some three thousand years might look like a monotonous repetition of contests between successive universal states claiming legitimate sovereignty over the thoroughfare and outsiders disputing their title by force of arms. Yet the historic importance of the King's Highway lay in none of these episodes. This long-fought-over thoroughfare was to find its destiny at last as an Islamic Pilgrims' Way on which, year by year, a peaceful multitude of Muslims—converging from the far-flung outposts of Dār-al-Islām in Fez and Sarayevo and Vilna and Qāzān and Kāshghar—would make the Hajj, at first on foot or camel-back and latterly by train,² to the Holy Cities of the Hijāz.

The Mahāyāna's Transcontinental Royal Road

This pacific exploit of Islam was surpassed by the Mahāyāna, which laid one empire after another under contribution to prepare the way for its astonishing journey from the Ganges to the Yellow River round three sides of the Tibetan Plateau.³ When Cyrus II had opened a road from Oxus to Indus over the Hindu Kush in order to annex the Panjab to the Achaemenian Empire; when Chandragupta had carried Cyrus's high-land highway on south-eastwards, across the whole expanse of the plains of Hindustan, from Taxila to Magadha, in order to clinch his hold on

¹ This curiosity of historical geography had an effective precedent in the Völkerwanderung that followed the collapse of 'the Middle Empire' of Egypt and an Empire of Sumer and Akkad that had been momentarily re-established by Hammurabi, and it also had an abortive parallel in the Völkerwanderung that had followed the collapse of 'the New Empire' of Egypt and 'the thalassocracy of Minos'. In the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C. an advance guard of the Hurrian highlanders, who had been set on the move by the impact of the Eurasian Nomad Mitanni, had established themselves in the highlands overhanging the Wādi 'Arābah (see Gen. xiv. 6). In the twelfth century B.C., when the main body of the Philistine refugees from the Aegean Basin and invaders of the Egyptian World had ensconced themselves in the coastal cities of the Shephelah, one war-band of Cherethite intruders from overseas had penetrated into the arid Negeb, south-east of Gaza, and had established themselves there at Ziklag (see 1 Sam. xxvii. 6 and xxx. 14). Possibly they had been attempting the feat, which the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem was momentarily to achieve in its day, of gaining possession of a land-bridge between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. If that had been their objective, they had been foiled by the successful establishment of an Edomite successor-state of 'the New Empire' of Egypt in the Wādi 'Arābah and on the plateau to the east of it, whose Hurrite occupants the Edomite invaders had exterminated (see Deut. ii. 4-5, 12, and 22). See further IX. viii. 358, n. 1.

² The building of the Hijāz railway southwards from Damascus along the route of the King's Highway was begun in A.D. 1900 and was completed as far as Medina in A.D. 1908. Put out of action in the war of 1914-18, the Hijāz Railway remained derelict thereafter from Ma'ān southwards.

³ For this adventurous route see II. ii. 405, n. 1.

an Indic universal state which he had founded by expelling Alexander's feeble garrisons from Cyrus's and Darius's derelict Indian provinces; when the Greek princes of Bactria and their Kushan successors had taken an unintended advantage of Cyrus's and Darius's and Chandra-gupta's work in order to 'abolish the Hindu Kush' by establishing their rule from Farghānah to Bihar;¹ when the Prior Han, feeling their way westward beyond the north-western extremity of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's Wall and crossing the sand-sea in the Tarim Basin from oasis to oasis, had 'abolished the Tien Shan' by descending on Farghānah;² when the Posterior Han had contended for the possession of this coveted route with the Kushan Emperor Kanishka;³ not one of these empire-builders can have suspected that the mighty public works which each had believed himself to be carrying out for his own carefully calculated purposes were mere fragments of a grand design in which he and his rivals and adversaries, and his and their predecessors and successors, were each unconsciously performing their allotted task in the *corvée*. He would have been still more astonished to learn that this gigantic network of communications was being constructed by a press-gang of empire-builders for the benefit, not of some superlative secular empire of Pan-Asian dimensions, but of an Indic philosophy which was being transfigured into a religion⁴ as it travelled—along the road that captains and kings had prepared for it—towards its mighty mission field among the peoples of the Far East.⁵ This truth was, nevertheless, to be revealed by the course of history; and, where the Mahāyāna had shown the way, a procession of other religions—Manichaeism, Nestorianism, Islam, and Western Christianity⁶—was to follow as soon as facilities were unintentionally provided for them by other empire-builders: the T'ang whose political necromancy succeeded in evoking a ghost of the Sinic universal state to haunt a nascent Far Eastern World,⁷ and the Mongols who, after China had been crushed by the incubus of the T'ang's success, imposed on her an alien universal state⁸ which momentarily embraced, besides, all the other shores of the vast Eurasian Steppe.

The Challenge to Christianity in a Western Technology's 'Annihilation of Distance'

Our survey has brought to light so many cases in which a brilliantly planned and magnificently executed system of public communications has ultimately been turned to account by unexpected and unintended beneficiaries that we may tentatively regard this tendency as illustrating an historical 'law', and in A.D. 1952 this conclusion raised a momentous question about the future of the Westernizing World in which the writer of this Study and his contemporaries were living.

By the year A.D. 1952 the initiative and skill of Western Man had been engaged for some four and a half centuries in knitting together the whole habitable and traversable surface of the planet by a system of

¹ See II. ii. 141, n. 2, and 370-3.

² See II. ii. 373 and V. v. 144-5.

³ See V. v. 139-40, 144-6, and 356.

⁷ See pp. 20-21, above, and X. ix. 16 and 20.

² See V. v. 143.

⁴ See V. v. 136 and 362.

⁶ See V. v. 112-17.

⁸ See V. v. 105 and 116.

communications that was unprecedented in the two features of being literally world-wide and being operated by a technique which was constantly surpassing itself at a perpetually accelerating pace. The wooden caravels and galleons, rigged for sailing in the eye of the wind, which had sufficed to enable the pioneer mariners of Modern Western Europe to make themselves masters of all the oceans, had given way to mechanically propelled iron-built ships of relatively gigantic size;¹ 'dirt-tracks' travelled by six-horse coaches had been replaced by macadamized and concrete-floored roads travelled by automobiles; railways had been invented to compete with roads, and aircraft to compete with all land-borne or water-borne conveyances. Concurrently, means of communication which did not require the physical transportation of human bodies had been conjured up, and put into operation on a world-wide scale, in the shape of telegraphs, telephones, and wireless transmission—visual as well as auditory—by radio. The movement of sea-borne and air-borne traffic had been made detectable at long range by radar. There had been no period in the history of any other civilization in which so large an area had been made so highly conductive for every form of human intercourse.

In the light of the histories of all other known civilizations, the development of this system of communications foreshadowed the eventual political unification of the society in which these technological portents had appeared. At the time of writing, however, the political prospects of the Western World were still obscure;² for, even though an observer might feel certain, in his own mind, that political unity would come about in some form sooner or later, neither the date nor the manner of this apparently inevitable unification was yet possible to divine. In a world which was still partitioned politically among sixty or seventy self-assertively sovereign parochial states, but which had already discovered the technique of flying and the 'know-how' of manufacturing the atom bomb, it was manifest that political unity might be imposed by the familiar method of the 'knock-out blow'; and it was also probable that, if peace was thus to be imposed in this case, as it had been in so many others, by the arbitrary fiat of a single surviving Great Power, the price of unification by force, in terms of moral, psychological, social, and political, as well as material, devastation, would be relatively still higher than it had been in other performances of this tragedy. At the same time it was possible that—even if political unification were inevitable and indeed indispensable—it might be achieved by the novel alternative method of voluntary co-operation, without coercion or catastrophe, which had been tried after the war of 1914-18 in the League of Nations and was being tried again after the war of 1939-45 in the United Nations Organization. The prospects of this great political experiment, as they appeared at a date rather more than half-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, are discussed in a later part of this Study.³ But, whether the political future of the Westernizing World of the day was to be rough or smooth, and whatever form of political

¹ See XI. ix. 364-74.

² See XII, *passim*, ix. 406-644.

³ In XII, *passim*, ix. 406-644.

unity was to be attained in this world by whatever road, it could be predicted with some confidence that the world-wide network of unprecedentedly efficient communications which the Western Civilization had already installed for its own purposes would find its historic mission in the familiar ironic role of being turned to account by unintended beneficiaries.

Who would draw the largest benefits in this case? In another context we have seen reason for expecting that, in this Western World that had come to embrace the whole surface of the planet, the barbarians of the external proletariat would play an even less significant part than they had played in the histories of other civilizations.¹ On the other hand the extant higher religions, whose domains had been linked up with one another, and with the dwindling tenements of pagan Primitive Man, by the West European technologist's ever closer-meshed spider's web, had already begun to take advantage of the fresh opportunities thus opened to them, without waiting for the establishment of a universal peace. Saint Paul, who had once travelled from the Orontes to the Tiber under the aegis of a *Pax Romana*, had been eagerly venturing forth on other seas still broader and stormier than the Mediterranean. On board a Portuguese caravel he had travelled on from Rome round the Cape of Good Hope on his second journey to India,² and farther afield again, through the Straits of Malacca, on his third journey to China.³ Trans-shipping to a Spanish galleon, the indefatigable Apostle had crossed the Atlantic from Cadiz to Vera Cruz, and the Pacific from Acapulco to the Philippines. Nor had Western Christianity been the only living religion to take this advantage of Western technique. While Western Catholic Christianity was reaching the Pacific coasts of China and Japan by sea, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, in the train of Cossack pioneers equipped with Western fire-arms, had been making the long trek from the River Kama to the Sea of Okhotsk;⁴ and these sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century missionary enterprises of Christianity in Asia had been emulated in Tropical Africa in the nineteenth century by Christianity and Islam in competition. It was not inconceivable that the Mahāyāna might one day recollect its marvellous journey over a succession of royal roads from Magadha to Loyang, and, in the strength of this buoyant memory, might turn such Western inventions as the aeroplane and the radio to as good account for its own work of preaching salvation as it had once turned the Chinese invention of the printing-press.⁵

The issues raised by this stimulation of missionary activities on a world-wide range were not just those of ecclesiastical 'geo-politics'. The

¹ See V. v. 332-4.

² Reckoning the Nestorian lodgement in Travancore as the first attempt of Christianity to convert India, and the Jesuit mission to the court of Akbar as the second.

³ Reckoning the seventh-century Nestorian lodgement at Si-Ngan as the first attempt of Christianity to convert China, the thirteenth-century and fourteenth-century Western Christian missions overland as the second, and the sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century Western Christian missions by sea as the third.

⁴ See II. ii. 157 and IV. iv. 497.

⁵ For the use of printing in China, from the ninth century of the Christian Era onwards, in the propagation of the Mahāyāna among the masses, see Carter, T. F.: *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward*, revised edition (New York 1931, Columbia University Press), pp. 17-19 and 39-46.

entry of established higher religions into new missionary fields brought up the question whether the eternal essence of a religion could be distinguished from its ephemeral accidents; the encounters of the religions with one another brought up the question whether they could live and let live side by side or whether one of them would supersede the rest.

The ideal of religious eclecticism had appealed to certain rulers of universal states—an Alexander Severus¹ and an Akbar²—who had happened to combine a sophisticated mind with a tender heart; and Akbar's decorous séances had been crudely and clownishly anticipated at the Court of the Mongol Khāqān Mangū.³ But in each of these instances the attempt to attain religious unity by the political device of confederation had been abortive, and a different ideal had inspired the pioneer Jesuit missionaries—a Francis Xavier and a Matteo Ricci—who were the earliest Apostles of any religion to grasp the opportunities opened for missionary enterprise by the Modern Western technician's titanic conquest of the oceans. These audacious spiritual pathfinders aspired to captivate for Christianity, in their own day, the Hindu and Far Eastern worlds, as Saint Paul and his successors had captivated the Hellenic World in theirs; but—endowed, as they were, with an intellectual genius that matched their heroic faith—they did not fail to recognize that their audacious enterprise could not succeed without fulfilling one exacting condition, and they did not shrink from accepting the consequences in their own missionary strategy and tactics.⁴ They perceived that a missionary, if he was to give himself a chance of success, must convey his message in terms—intellectual, aesthetic, and emotional—that would appeal to his prospective converts. The more revolutionary the message in its essence, the more important it would be to clothe it in a familiar and congenial presentation. But this would require that the message should be stripped of the incompatible clothing in which the missionaries themselves happened to have inherited it from their own cultural tradition; and that, in turn, would demand of the missionaries that they should assume the responsibility, and take the risk, of attempting to determine what the essence of their religion might be.

The crux of this policy was that, in removing a stumbling-block from

¹ See V. v. 549.

² See V. v. 700-1.

³ See V. v. 115. Mangū was not the only Eurasian Nomad ruler to anticipate Akbar in taking a comparative survey of living higher religions by listening to disputations in his presence between their rival spokesmen. The Khan of the Khazars, who ruled over a parochial steppe empire in the Eurasian Steppe's Great Western Bay (see III. iii. 428-30) is said (see Dvornik, F.: *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe* (London 1949, Polish Research Centre), p. 169, n. 92) to have listened to a disputation of the kind before opting for Judaism in the eighth century of the Christian Era (see II. ii. 410 and V. v. 285); and in the following century a successor of this royal Khazar convert's is said to have given the East Roman Orthodox Christian missionary Constantine-Cyril an opportunity of disputing in his presence with representatives of Judaism, Islam, and paganism. The familiarity of this practice is attested by the two celebrated stories of the disputation between Khazar advocates of Judaism, White Bulgarian advocates of Islam, and East Roman advocates of Orthodox Christianity at the court of the Russian war-lord Vladimir before he opted for the East Roman faith, and of the disputation between Wilfrid and Colman in King Oswiu's presence at Whitby in A.D. 664 (see II. ii. 335).

⁴ The policy of the Jesuits in China has been touched upon, by anticipation, in V. v. 366-7.

the path of the non-Christian societies which he was setting out to convert, a missionary would be placing another stumbling-block before the feet of his own co-religionists. On this rock the Early Modern Jesuit missions in India and China suffered an undeserved and tragic shipwreck. They were the victims of an unscrupulous jealousy on the part of rival missionaries of other orders and of a timid conservatism in high places in the Vatican. Yet the frustration of their noble and imaginative enterprise at the dawn of the unification of the Inhabited World (*Oikoumenê*) by Modern Western technique seemed unlikely to be the end of the story; for the underlying issue which they had raised was a crucial one for the destinies of all the higher religions.

If the local swaddling clothes in which Christianity had been wrapped when it came into the World in Palestine had not been masterfully removed by Paul of Tarsus, the Christian artists of the Catacombs at Rome and the Christian philosophers of the divinity school at Alexandria¹ would never have had their chance of presenting the essence of Christianity in terms of Greek vision and thought and thereby paving the way for the conversion of the Hellenic World. And, if, in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, Origen's and Augustine's Christianity could not divest itself of trappings acquired in those successive Syriac, Hellenic, and Western posting-stations at which it had once paused to rest on its historic journey, it would not be able to take advantage of the world-wide opportunity that had now been opened up for every living higher religion by the technical achievements of a Modern Western secular civilization. A higher religion that allows itself to become 'dyed in the wool' with the imprint of a temporary cultural environment is condemning itself to become stationary and earth-bound—to be the slave, and not the master, of the secular civilizations and their works. On the other hand any living higher religion that might save itself from this fate by taking Ricci's lesson to heart and putting his policy into practice would be opening for itself thereby a boundless field for new spiritual action. And, if Christianity itself were, after all, to embrace this manifest destiny, it might repeat in a latter-day *Oikoumenê* what it had once achieved in the Roman Empire.

In the spiritual commerce that had been served by Roman means of communication, Christianity had drawn out of, and inherited from, the other higher religions and philosophies, which it had thus encountered, the heart of what had been best in them. In a world materially linked together by the many inventions of Western technique, Hinduism and the Mahāyāna might make no less fruitful contributions than Isis-worship and Neoplatonism had once made to Christian insight and practice. And if, in a Western World too, Caesar's empire were to rise and fall—as his empire always had collapsed or decayed after a run of a few hundred years—an historian peering into the future in A.D. 1952 could imagine Christianity then being left as the heir of all the philosophies from Ikhnaton's to Hegel's and of all the higher religions as far back as the ever latent worship of a Mother and her Son who had started on

¹ For the significance of the interpretative work of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, see V. v. 366-7.

their travels along the King's Highway under the names of Ishtar and Tammuz.

2. *Garrisons and Colonies*

The Mixture of Motives in the Minds of Imperial Authorities

Whereas Imperial systems of communications are installed by their makers with the single-minded self-regarding aim of maintaining the imperial government's authority, imperial garrisons and colonies have a dual function. Like the public highways along which they are strung, they are, of course, designed primarily to preserve the universal state by whose rulers they have been planted; but in some cases they are also intended to serve the distinct purpose of preserving the civilization whose domain has been embraced within the universal state's frontiers.

Plantations of loyal supporters of the imperial régime—who may be soldiers on active service, militiamen, discharged veterans, or civilians—are an integral part of any imperial system of communications linking the capital of a universal state with its frontiers across intervening tracts of subject territory. The presence, prowess, and vigilance of these human watch-dogs provide the indispensable security without which the most efficient physical installations—roads, bridges, posting-stations, and the rest—would be of no practical use to the imperial authorities (as in fact they eventually fall out of use when the imperial system of security and defence breaks down). This imperial network of practicable communications in the shape of garrisoned roads does not consist merely of the thoroughfares radiating from the capital to the frontiers; the frontiers themselves are part and parcel of the same system; for even the most elaborately fortified frontier lines—such systems as the Military Frontiers of the Hapsburg Empire over against the Ottoman Empire during the century beginning in A.D. 1777¹ or the Roman *limites* in Germany and Britain or 'the Great Wall of China' itself—prove, on analysis, to be lateral highways, skirting the outermost verge of an empire's domain, along which the fortresses have been strung so close together that they have coalesced into a continuous chain.²

Some of these frontier garrisons—or lines of garrisons dressed in close order to hold a *limes* or a wall—are new installations, established by the universal state *in partibus barbarorum* where it has had no predecessors. Others, on the other hand, are replacements of garrisons formerly posted along the same line, for defence against the same barbarian or alien adversary, by parochial Powers that have perished in the fratricidal struggle that has ended in the imposition of a universal peace by a single survivor among the competitors. Thus Rome, in the acts of imposing her hegemony on the city-states of Etruria and extinguishing the Carthaginian and Macedonian Powers, was taking upon her own shoulders a

¹ See V. v. 463.

² 'The Great Wall' of China and 'the Roman Wall' in Britain between Tyne and Solway were each originally laid out as a chain of garrisoned fortresses strung along a road and connected by an embankment of earthwork which served as a demarcation line rather than as a military barrier. In both cases the construction of an actual wall of masonry, along the line of the embankment, was the last phase. (For the structural evolution of the Chinese Wall, see Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 240-2.)

responsibility for holding the former Etruscan frontiers against the barbarians of Northern Italy, the former Carthaginian frontiers against the barbarians of the Iberian Peninsula and North-West Africa, and the former Macedonian frontiers against the barbarians of South-Eastern Europe.¹ In the Sinic World the march state of Ts'in, which won the last round in the long strife of the Contending States, had to pay for its victory by taking over the frontiers previously held by the other two march states, Chao and Yen, against the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe. The overthrow of these two frontier Powers left a gap in the defences of the Sinic World between the eastern terminus of the sectional anti-barbarian frontier of Ts'in and the Pacific coast of the Sinic World; and, in filling this gap, Ts'in She Hwang-ti, the founder of the Sinic universal state, had at least to double the length of the frontier against the Eurasian barbarians that had been held by his own predecessors.² In the Hindu World, likewise, the British Rāj had to take over the north-west frontier of the Sikh principalities against the highlander barbarians of North-Eastern Iran;³ and in the Egyptian World, when the alien empire of the Achaemenidae had conquered the Saïte Kingdom, the conquerors found themselves saddled with the defence of their Saïte victims' southern frontier at Elephantinë⁴ against the still independent Napatan Power in the southern portion of the Egyptian Society's domain.

In taking over the defence of derelict frontiers from extinguished parochial Powers, a universal state is, of course, acting in self-preservation as well as in the interests of the society over whose domain it has established its rule. But, besides planting garrisons along frontiers of which it finds itself the residuary legatee, a universal state may be moved to plant colonies in the interior, not for purposes of defence or police, but in order to repair ravages inflicted by the devastating struggle for power during a Time of Troubles before the imposition of the imperial peace.

It was this that was in Caesar's mind when he planted self-governing colonies of Roman citizens on the desolate sites of Capua, Carthage, and Corinth. In the course of the foregoing struggle for survival between the parochial states of the Hellenic World, the Roman Government of the day had deliberately made an example of Capua for her treacherous secession to Hannibal at a moment when Rome had been at the nadir of her fortunes,⁵ and of Carthage for the crime of having almost got the better of Rome in the struggle between them for world power, while Corinth had been arbitrarily singled out for the same treatment among the states members of an Achaean League whose declaration of war on Rome had endangered the existence of no state except the puny commonwealth that had so frivolously put itself in the wrong by assuming the role of the aggressor. Under the pre-Caesarean republican régime at

¹ See II. ii. 161-4 and V. v. 212-22.

² See Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., loc. cit.; Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 137; and the present Study, II. ii. 119 and V. v. 270.

³ See V. v. 304-8.

⁴ For the crystallization of this frontier *circa* 661-655 B.C., see II. ii. 116.

⁵ See II. ii. 19.

Rome, the conservative party had been stubbornly and bitterly opposed to the restoration of these three famous cities. They had succeeded in frustrating or undoing or arresting three attempts to recolonize Capua,¹ and one attempt to recolonize Carthage,² before Caesar succeeded in forcing through what amounted to a re-establishment of Capua in his agrarian law of 59 B.C., and thereafter re-established Carthage and Corinth in 45 B.C. over the dead body of the Roman Senatorial régime.

By the time that Capua had lain desolate for 153 years (211-58 B.C.) and Carthage and Corinth for a hundred, while Rome had been confirming her already unchallengeable supremacy, the ground of the opposition to rescinding the three penal sentences had, of course, long ceased to be the original motive of fear. The long-drawn-out controversy in Roman domestic politics over the treatment of the three cities had by that time become the symbol of a wider issue. Was the *raison d'être* of the Roman Empire the selfish interest of the particular Power that had succeeded in establishing it by conquest? Or did the Empire exist to serve the common weal of the Hellenic World of which it was a political embodiment? Caesar's defeat of the Senate was a victory for the more liberal, humane, and imaginative of these two views; and the praise which an English philosopher-statesman has given to the Romans *sans phrase* should be reserved—as it was by Greek men of letters in the Antonine Age—for the Roman Imperial régime which Caesar inaugurated.

'Never any state was . . . so open to receive strangers into their body as were the Romans; therefore it sorted with them accordingly, for they grew to the greatest monarchy. Their manner was to grant naturalisation (which they called "ius civitatis"), and to grant it in the highest degree—that is, not only "ius commercii, ius connubii, ius hereditatis", but also "ius suffragii" and "ius honorum"; and this not to singular persons alone, but likewise to whole families—yea, to cities, and sometimes to nations. Add to this their custom of plantation of colonies, whereby the Roman plant was removed into the soil of other nations, and, putting both constitutions together, you will say that it was not the Romans that spread upon the World, but it was the World that spread upon the Romans.'³

This striking difference in moral character between the régime which Caesar inaugurated and the régime which he superseded was not a peculiar feature of Roman and Hellenic history. A similar change of attitude towards the use and abuse of power had accompanied the transition from a Time of Troubles to a universal state in the histories of other civilizations and other empire-builders, and in a general way it would appear that the devastation of cities, destruction of communities, and uprooting of populations are characteristic crimes of the rulers of

¹ Gaius Gracchus's abortive colony projected in 123 B.C. and cancelled after his tragic death in 121 B.C.; Marcus Iunius Brutus's colony planted in 83 B.C. and uprooted in 82 B.C. by Sulla; and the abortive project embodied in an agrarian law introduced by Publius Servilius Rullus in 64 B.C. and withdrawn by its author next year (see Cicero's speech *In Rullum*, which helped to kill the bill).

² Gaius Gracchus's colony planted in 123 B.C.

³ Bacon, Francis: *The Essays, or Counsels Civil and Moral*, xxix: 'Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates'. Compare the dicta of Oswald Spengler's that have been quoted in the present Study, V, v. 620, n. 1, and p. 56, above.

contending parochial states, while it is a characteristic virtue of the governments of universal states that they attempt to repair the moral and material ravages perpetrated by their predecessors. But, though this historical 'law' may be discernible, it is far from being absolute or exact.

On the one hand we find Times of Troubles generating not only uprooted and embittered proletariats¹ but constructive and successful colonization enterprises on the grand scale—as exemplified by the host of Greek city-states that were planted far and wide over the former domain of the conquered Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great and his successors, and by the contemporary colonies of Latins and Roman citizens that were founded by Republican Rome to secure her conquests in Italy.² This constructive work of the Hellenic Time of Troubles was the foundation on which Caesar and his successors built in the subsequent Imperial Age—just as Caesar's liberality in conferring Roman citizenship, which was a revolutionary departure from the narrow-hearted policy of the Roman republican régime of the Post-Hannibalic Age, was a reversion to the more generous-hearted policy of the Republic in the age before that,³ at a time when the Roman governing class of the day had been inspired with confidence by its success in conquering Italy, and had not yet had its heart seared by having to face the formidable issue of world-power or downfall with which Rome was to be confronted in the next chapter of her history by her encounter with Carthage.

Conversely the change of heart on the part of a dominant minority, which is the moral and psychological counterpart of the institutional reform accomplished in the establishment of a universal state,⁴ is seldom so thorough or so steadfast that it does not occasionally relapse into the brutal practice of a foregoing Time of Troubles. The Neo-Babylonian Empire, which stood on the whole for a moral revolt of the interior of the Babylonian World against the brutality of its Assyrian marchmen,⁵ lapsed into uprooting Judah as Assyria had uprooted Israel, Damascus, and Babylon itself. The Achaemenidae, who permitted and assisted the Jews to return home to Judea from their Babylonish captivity, and who were welcomed as liberators by the Phoenicians,⁶

¹ See V. v. 58-194, *passim*.

² A conspectus of the Macedonian and Roman plantations of colonies will be found in Tschirikower, V.: *Die Hellenistischen Städtegründungen von Alexander dem Grossen bis auf die Römerzeit* (Leipzig 1927, Dieterich); Jones, A. H. M.: *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press); eodem: *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford 1940, Clarendon Press); Beloch, K. J.: *Der Italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie* (Leipzig 1880, Teubner); eodem: *Römische Geschichte bis zum Beginn der Punischen Kriege* (Berlin and Leipzig 1926, de Gruyter).

³ Salient examples of this policy are to be seen in the treatment of the Sabines and the Picentes. The Sabines were granted passive Roman citizenship immediately after their conquest by Rome in 290 B.C.; this was converted into active citizenship as early as 268 B.C., and a new Roman tribal constituency was created in 241 B.C. for Sabine voters. The Picentes, who were conquered after 290 B.C., were given passive Roman citizenship in 268 B.C., and this had been converted into active citizenship by 241 B.C., when a new Roman tribal constituency was created for Picentine voters (see Beloch, *Der Italische Bund*, pp. 32, 54-55, and 76).

⁴ For this change of heart, which gives the public servant and the philosopher a chance of repairing the ravages of the conqueror, the wastrel, and the hangman, see V. v, especially pp. 38-40 and 47-52.

⁵ See II. ii. 135-6 and IV. iv. 468-84.

⁶ See V. v. 123, n. 2.

uprooted the Greek city-states Samos, Barca, Miletus, and Eretria,¹ and colonized the inhospitable islands of the Persian Gulf with *déracinés* who appear to have been themselves of Iranian origin.² The Jews whom the Persians had repatriated encountered a new Nebuchadnezzar in the Seleucid King Antiochus Epiphanes, whose house was as well liked by the Babylonians as the Achaemenidae had been by the Jews,³ and they were uprooted for the second time—and this far more drastically than in their first experience at Nebuchadnezzar's hands—by a Roman Imperial Government which had manifested its intention of breaking with the inhuman policy of its republican predecessors when it had re-peopled the desolate sites of Capua, Carthage, and Corinth.

It is true that Nebuchadnezzar's prisoner of state, the ex-King of Judah, Jehoiachin, was released from prison (after he had languished there for thirty-seven years) by Nebuchadnezzar's successor Amel-Marduk;⁴ that the Achaemenidae showed concern for the welfare of the Greek communities which they had carried away captive;⁵ and that the Romans, in their dealings with the Jews, exercised almost superhuman self-restraint before the Zealots forced their hand in A.D. 66 and finally in A.D. 132.⁶ It must be noted, however, on the other side of the account, that the constructive colonization that is characteristic of a universal state is not easy to distinguish sharply from the destructive tearing up of social roots that is characteristic of a Time of Troubles; for, if the hallmark of a Time of Troubles is violence and coercion, it is also true that redistributions of population under the auspices of a universal state are not always, or altogether, voluntary. The selected colonists may be reluctant to make a change of domicile which may be judged by their rulers to be desirable in the public interest without being, on that account, acceptable to the men, women, and children who are required to undergo this ordeal. It is known that the Incas—in spite of the immensity of their prestige and the general benignity and efficiency of their administration—met with resistance, now and again, among loyal populations whom they were proposing to transplant.⁷ The Greek veterans whom Alexander the Great had planted in the recalcitrant Eurasian marches of the Achaemenian Empire, north-east of the Caspian Gates, four or five months' journey up country from the Greeks' beloved Mediterranean Sea, left their posts and drifted westwards again *en masse* as soon as they heard the news of Alexander's death; and we may guess that, if we knew the full story of the colonies planted by Rome, we should come across similar cases here.⁸ Moreover, a willing or even

¹ See V. v. 124, n. 2.

² See V. v. 124, n. 2, and p. 602, below.

³ See V. v. 94, 123, and 347, and V. vi. 442.

⁴ See Jer. lii. 31-34; 2 Kings xxv. 27-30.

⁵ See Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 204; Book VI, chaps. 20 and 119.

⁶ See V. v. 68.

⁷ See Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), pp. 134-5. In general, the Spaniards found the transplanted elements in the population of the Inca Empire more ready than the un-uprooted elements to leave their domiciles in the service of their new masters (op. cit., p. 135).

⁸ Though the Roman peasantry in the *Ager Romanus* in Italy south of the Appennines had been ruined and uprooted by the Hannibalic War and, after Carthage had

eager candidate for resettlement may have been the victim of social or political upheavals that have uprooted him from a home which he would never have left except under *force majeure*.¹ And in the third place a demand for new homes on the part of one element in the population of a universal state may require for its satisfaction the forcible uprooting of another element. Augustus found farms in Italy for his demobilized veteran soldiers by evicting a civilian peasantry;² and in resorting to this ruthless expedient he was following a precedent set by the reactionary war-lord Sulla in an age that had not yet been graced by a Caesarean clemency or an Augustan Peace.

capitulated, by a continuing drain of manpower to maintain the Roman armies of occupation in the former Carthaginian dominions in the Iberian Peninsula, the Roman settlers in the new Latin colony Bononia (Bologna)—founded in 189 B.C., twelve years after the conclusion of peace between Rome and Carthage—had to be bribed with allotments of land of 50 acres each for infantrymen (i.e. more than seven times the pre-war standard allotment of 7 acres) and 70 each for cavalry troopers (see Livy, Book XXXVII, chap. 57). Alarmed at having thus set a precedent that would rapidly use up even the vast tracts of public land available for colonization north of the Apennines, the Roman Government next tried the experiment of converting the bribe to colonists from an economic into a political currency. In founding the colonies Parma and Mutina (Modena) in 183 B.C., they reduced the size of the standard allotments to 8 acres and 5 acres respectively, but, in compensation, they allowed the colonists not only to retain their Roman citizenship but to incorporate themselves in local city-states with substantially the same powers of self-government as they would have enjoyed if they had been constituted as Latin communities instead of being allowed, as they were, to remain within the Roman body politic (see Livy, Book XXXIX, chap. 55). The new political precedent thus set at Parma and Mutina appears, however, to have alarmed the Roman authorities as much as the new economic precedent set at Bononia, and, in founding Aquileia in 181 B.C., they reverted to customary constitutional practice and gave the new colony the Latin status. They found, however, that, in order to induce even ruined Roman peasants to settle in the extreme north-eastern corner of the Po Basin and to pay for this drastic transplantation by forfeiting their Roman citizenship, they must again allot 50 acres to the private infantry soldier and, this time, 70 to the centurion and no less than 140—a veritable estate—to the cavalry trooper (see Livy, Book XL, chap. 34).

¹ For example, the colonists from Italy south of the Apennines who were planted in the Po Basin by the Roman Government between 190 and 173 B.C. had been uprooted by the Hannibalic War and its aftermath. The host of landless agricultural labourers whom the Gracchi planted on public land, of which the state had resumed possession for the purpose, was a product of the continuing consequences of the same great social catastrophe—and so were the veterans of the semi-private armies raised by Marius, Sulla, Caesar, the Second Triumvirate, and finally Augustus after the elimination of his two colleagues. An economic interpretation of History would account for the Roman civil wars of the century preceding the establishment of the Augustan Peace as being a desperate device for endowing by force a landless rural proletariat which had failed to obtain satisfaction for their needs by the peaceful methods of Tiberius Gracchus. In effect the armies that fought the civil wars were trade unions of unemployed agricultural workers, and the war-lord politician who raised an army to back him was a labour boss. The understanding between the war-lord and his soldiers was that, if they were to succeed in bringing him into political power by winning a civil war for him, he on his part would use his power to reward their services by planting them on the land in Italy—no matter by what methods or at whose expense. This incentive explains the relative ease with which armies were raised by a succession of Roman war-lords from Marius to Augustus inclusive, in contrast to the difficulty of recruitment during the hundred years between the end of the Hannibalic War and the beginning of Marius's career. (This point has been touched upon, by anticipation, in V. v. 62-3.)

² The individual exemption of the poet Virgil from this grievous injustice that was being inflicted on his neighbours is the celebrated theme of his First Eclogue. If we can shake off the spell that the poetry casts over us and see the picture through Meliboeus's instead of Tityrus's eyes, we shall be less impressed with the young Octavian's capricious act of generosity towards one man of genius than with the harsh rule that was broken by this facile exception. Meliboeus's fellow sufferers were legion; Tityrus's companions in good fortune were an insignificant minority. The *beau rôle* conferred on Augustus by Virgil's magic words was cheaply bought and ill deserved.

Incaic Examples of Divers Types of Resettlement

Notwithstanding these overlaps and inconsistencies, it is still broadly true that a relatively constructive and humane colonization policy is one of the distinguishing marks of a universal state.

The most extensive, scientific, and beneficent application of such a policy among the instances on record is the system worked out by the Incas.¹ During the relatively short period of little more than a century which intervened between the foundation of the Andean universal state and its overthrow by the Spaniards, if we date its foundation from the accession of the Inca Pachacutec (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1400–48),² the Incas redistributed the population of their dominions on so large a scale that, according to the testimony of subsequent Spanish observers, there remained hardly a valley or a village in all Peru where there was not a settlement of *mitimaes*, as these deportees were called. This high-handedly systematic manipulation of human communities as though they were pawns on a chessboard is said to have been initiated by Pachacutec himself.³

The resettlements fell into four classes,⁴ of which only one was penal, while one was for military and two were for economic purposes.

Rebellious populations were compulsorily exchanged with loyal populations,⁵ who received as their reward what was meted out to the rebels as their punishment.⁶ But these penal and precautionary deportations in the Assyrian style seem to have been much less characteristic of the Inca régime than those falling within the other three categories. Military colonies, recruited from populations that were both loyal and martial, were settled along the frontiers,⁷ where they were employed in agriculture and on public works as well as on their military duties. The honourableness of their status was advertised by the gift of wives, garments, and valuables which they received from the Inca. These military colonies in the marches had their counterpart, in the interior, in civilian settlements of small groups of families which corporately performed the function of permanently domiciled inspectors or spies.⁸

Of the two types of resettlement for economic purposes, one began with transfers of surplus population from overpopulated to underpopulated districts, and developed—through a practice of requiring the settlers to contribute to the food-supply of their original homes—into a systematic linking together of economically complementary districts (e.g. a highland district with a lowland one) with a view to an interchange of products.⁹ Settlers of this class were treated by the Govern-

¹ This has been touched upon by anticipation in V. v. 90, n. 2.

² See IV. iv. 103.

³ See Baudin, op. cit., p. 135, n. 2.

⁴ Described in Baudin, op. cit., pp. 132–4.

⁵ After the conquest of the warlike and recalcitrant Karas of Ecuador, loyal elements were drafted into their country to hold them in check (Baudin, op. cit., p. 135).

⁶ 'As has been well said, what the Magyars received as punishment was bestowed upon the non-Magyars as reward' [after the *émeute* of A.D. 1848–9 in the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy] (Seton-Watson, R. W.: *The Southern Slav Question* (London 1911, Constable), p. 35, quoted in V. v. 293, n. 2).

⁷ For example, a military march was organized in Chile over against the unconquered Araucanians (Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), p. 224).

⁸ See Baudin, op. cit., p. 135.

⁹ This type of resettlement and interchange seems to have been an officially organized

ment with studied consideration. They were granted long terms of exemption from all taxation. They were also exempted from the jurisdiction of the local authorities in the districts in which they were planted, and were allowed to form autonomous communities administered by headmen of their own. In addition it was arranged that their kinsmen who had been left at home should come periodically to help them in their agricultural labours at the busy seasons of the year.¹ The second type of resettlement for economic purposes was designed to raise, not the quantity of production, but its quality, and in this case the resettlement was not by whole communities but by single families. Selected families of specially skilful cultivators were settled in districts where the standard of agricultural technique was low, and, conversely, skilled families of artisans were drafted away from centres where there was a surplus of skilled workmanship.

'To sum up, the Inca regulated all displacements of population; he installed good husbandmen where there was a dearth of them, he provided instructors for populations that lacked them, he planted restless and stiff-necked communities in the neighbourhood of submissive ones; he distributed his subjects over the different regions under his rule with a sovereign hand, as though they had been pawns on a chessboard, and brewed together the peoples under his rule in order to unify his empire.'²

These different types of resettlement for divers purposes, which were combined and co-ordinated in the Empire of the Incas, have partial counterparts in the institutions of other universal states.

Penal Deportations

A classical case of penal deportation is the treatment of Judah by Nebuchadnezzar (*imperabat* 605-562 B.C.) when this little but never negligible highland principality overlooking the southernmost sector of the coast road between Damascus and Pelusium³ persistently refused to acknowledge that, in forcing the Saïte Power to withdraw from Asia once for all in 605 B.C.,⁴ the Neo-Babylonian Empire had become the legitimate heir to all its Assyrian predecessor's rights and titles in the

and systematically applied version of practices that had grown up piecemeal and haphazard before the establishment of the Inca Empire. For example, Aymará settlers from the highlands had already migrated to the coastal lowlands, not under governmental auspices, but under the spur of economic need, and in their new settlements they had maintained commercial relations with their former fellow countrymen. Conversely, the Chincha and Chimú lowlanders had already acquired landed property in the highlands, which they used for pasturing llamas in order to obtain a wool-supply for their clothing industry (Baudin, *op. cit.*, p. 133). There was also an interchange of products between the highlands and the tropical forest-clad lowlands to the east of them, on the western fringe of the Amazon Basin (see Markham, Sir C.: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), p. 199).

¹ This practice of mutual aid survived the overthrow of the Inca imperial régime by which it had been fostered. An instance in which it operated for the benefit of a community that had been the victim of Spanish atrocities is recorded by the Spanish historian Cieza de Leon (see Markham, *op. cit.*, p. 166).

² Baudin, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-6.

³ This road—which followed the present track of the Hijāz Railway from Damascus to Haifa, running down the gorge of the Yarmuk and along the Vale of Esdraelon to Megiddo, where it found its way between Mount Carmel and the Hill Country of Ephraim and so descended into the Shephelah—was a variant of the southernmost section of 'the King's Highway' (see pp. 100-2, above), from which it branched off in the Hawrān.

⁴ See 2 Kings xxiv. 7.

former Assyrian dominions and dependencies between the Middle Euphrates and the Desert of Sinai. King Jehoiachin's recalcitrance was punished in 597 B.C. by the deportation to Babylon of the contumacious king himself, the royal family, the members of the court and administrative service, 7,000 fighting-men, and 1,000 metal workers and other artisans, the total number of deportees amounting to about 10,000 souls in all.¹ The subsequent rebellion of Zedekiah, whom Nebuchadnezzar had set on the throne of Judah, in Jehoiachin's stead, to play the part of a quisling, was punished in 586 B.C. by the execution of Zedekiah's sons before their father's eyes, the blinding and relegation to Babylon of the rebel king himself, the burning of Jerusalem—including private houses as well as public buildings—and a second deportation which was perhaps larger and less discriminating than that of 597 B.C.²

Ts'in She Hwang-ti's penal deportations seem to have been more sweeping than Nebuchadnezzar's—even allowing for the difference in scale between the Sinic World of the third century B.C. and the Babylonian of the sixth. The founder of the Sinic universal state deported no fewer than 120,000 families of feudal notables from the conquered and extinguished parochial states that had once been rivals and adversaries of Ts'in, and planted them in the citadel of Ts'in, 'the Country within the Passes' (the latter-day Province of Shensi).³ This tide of compulsory migration from the East and South to the North-West was crossed by another flowing in the opposite direction, if we are to credit the statement that Ts'in She Hwang-ti clinched his hold on the ex-barbarian territories that he was annexing in the South-East and South by colonizing them with deported criminals.⁴ There are parallels in the Achae-

¹ See 2 Kings xxiv. 14-16.

² Eduard Meyer estimates the numbers deported in 586 B.C. at something between 30,000 and 50,000 (*Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 175). This estimate appears to be based on the record, preserved in the Book of Nehemiah, chap. vii, of the numbers that returned from Babylonia to Judaea in 538 B.C. after Nebuchadnezzar's sentence of deportation had been rescinded by Cyrus. The total given in this document amounts to no less than 42,360 free persons and 7,337 slaves, and the figures are convincing, since they are the sum total of thirty-nine precise items, while there is also a note of one group that was of doubtful legitimacy and of another that was definitely rejected. All the same, Eduard Meyer's estimate for the deportation of 586 B.C. seems hazardingly high in the light of the information (fragmentary and ambiguous though it is) in the second Book of Kings and in the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah. Even in 586 B.C. Nebuzar-adan, Nebuchadnezzar's captain of the guard, 'left of the poor of the people, which had nothing, in the land of Judah, and gave them vineyards and fields at the same time' (Jer. xxxix. 10; cf. 2 Kings xxv. 12); and this statement means, on the face of it, that the agricultural population of Judah was not only left undisturbed, even in 586 B.C., but was given possession of the former property of the executed or deported notables. Even the deportation of 586 B.C. may have been confined to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and we cannot be certain that the urban population was deported *en masse* even on this second occasion. 'Now the rest of the people that were left in the city, and the fugitives that fell away to the King of Babylon, with the remnant of the multitude, did Nebuzar-adan . . . carry away' (2 Kings xxv. 11; cf. Jer. xxxix. 9) has to be taken with a grain of salt considering that the same authority declares that Nebuchadnezzar had 'carried away all Jerusalem' in 597 B.C. (2 Kings xxiv. 14). Moreover, a quite incompatible set of figures, on a far smaller scale, is given from some different source in Jer. lii. 28-30: 3,023 persons deported by Nebuchadnezzar in 597 B.C.; 832 deported by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C.; 745 deported by Nebuzar-adan in 581 B.C.; making only 4,600 souls in all.

³ See Fitzgerald, C. P.: China, *A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 139.

⁴ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 244-6, cited in the present Study, V. v. 141.

menian Government's policy of marooning *déracinés* on the islands of the Persian Gulf¹ and in the Muscovite Government's policy of granting toleration to religious dissenters from the Orthodox Faith when these consented to serve the interests of the Muscovite empire-builders by going out as pioneers into the wilderness to prepare the way for future advances of the Muscovite Empire's frontiers.²

Garrisons along the Frontiers

A classical example of a chain of military garrisons strung along a frontier is afforded by the Roman Empire, which held by this means its two cross-country *limites* in Germany and Britain, its three river lines along the Rhine, the Danube, and the Euphrates, and its two desert frontiers over against the Syrian Desert and the Sahara. This Roman institution was reproduced, whether consciously or not, with remarkable similarity in the Military Frontier over against the Ottoman Empire³ that was the *raison d'être* of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy.⁴

The Hapsburg frontiersman⁵ was liable to military service from the age of eighteen onwards,⁶ but, like the Roman legionary cantoned on the military frontiers organized by Augustus, he was also a cultivator of the soil on regimental lands corresponding to the Roman *prata legionum*. During the static last phase of the Hapsburg-Ottoman frontier, after the 'Osmanlis had been expelled from their conquests in Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia, but before they had ceased to be a formidable military power, a continuous strip of Hapsburg territory, extending from the Adriatic coast of Croatia, between Fiume and Dalmatia, to the south-western extremity of the Carpathian Mountains, where these overhang the north bank of the Danube at the Iron Gates,⁷ was kept administratively separate from the Crownlands through which it ran, and was articulated into a number of local regimental districts under the direct control of the military authorities at Vienna.⁸ The Hapsburg Military Frontier was organized along this line in A.D. 1777⁹ and was reabsorbed into Croatia-Slavonia between the years 1871 and 1881,¹⁰ when both the military and the political situation had been transformed by the cumulative effect of the departure of the Turkish military garrisons from Belgrade and the other Ottoman fortresses in Serbia in A.D. 1867, the

¹ See V. v. 124, n. 2, and p. 602, below.

² See II. ii. 222.

³ *Vojna Krajina* in the Serbo-Croat language that was the mother tongue of a majority of the troops composing the garrisons in the last phase of this Hapsburg military installation.

⁴ The Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy took shape after the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hungary at the Battle of Mohacz in A.D. 1526 in order to provide Western Christendom with a new and more effective anti-Ottoman carapace (see II. ii. 177-90 and V. v. 325-8).

⁵ In Serbo-Croat, *granichar* (see V. v. 462-3).

⁶ See Seton-Watson, R. W.: *The Southern Slav Question* (London 1911, Constable), pp. 22-23.

⁷ The Hapsburg-Ottoman frontier came to rest along this line in the peace settlement concluded at Belgrade in A.D. 1739.

⁸ A list of eleven such districts will be found in Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 373. The territories of the six most easterly Grenzregimenten, and the Czaikistenbataillon cantoned in the angle between the Danube and the Tisza, are shown in the map inset in the bottom right-hand corner of Plate 75 of Spruner, K. von, and Menke, T.: *Hand-Atlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neueren Zeit*, 3rd edit. (Gotha 1880, Perthes). The name 'Czaikisten' ('boatmen') is derived from the Turkish word *qayyq*.

⁹ See Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 93.

Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* of 1867 and Hungaro-Croatian *Ausgleich* of A.D. 1868, and the evaporation of the last vestiges of Ottoman power from the regions adjoining the Hapsburg frontier as a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 and the consequent grant, at the Berlin Conference of 1878, of independence to Serbia and Rumania, autonomy to Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, and a mandate to Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹ It is one of the more interesting curiosities of history that, for some 350 years from first to last—reckoning to the morrow of the Berlin Conference from the morrow of the Battle of Mohacz—so close a replica of the Roman system of frontier defence should have been installed by Hapsburg Emperors who laid claim to *Caesarea Majestas* over against Ottoman Pādīshāhs styling themselves *Qaysar-i-Rūm*.

By comparison with either the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy's or the Roman Empire's problems of frontier defence,² 'the New Empire' of Egypt had a simple task when once it had tacitly abandoned the attempt to retain an effective hold over its Asiatic dominions.³ Thereafter, it was in a position to seal its frontiers against attack from any quarter by maintaining one fortress at the north-eastern corner of the Delta barring the coast road from Asia, a second fortress at the north-west corner of the Delta barring the coast road from North-West Africa, and a third at some point on the Upper Nile to block invasions from farther upstream. In a different context⁴ we have noticed that the north-eastern frontier fortress, Ramses, actually became the capital of the Empire in the thirteenth century B.C., when this frontier was being subjected to cumulative pressure from the Nomads of the North Arabian Steppe, the Hittite Power from beyond the Taurus, and 'the Sea Peoples' pouring out of the Aegean Basin in a *Völkerwanderung* precipitated by the collapse of 'the thalassocracy of Minos'.

After the Libyan barbarians had succeeded in gaining by 'peaceful penetration' the entry into Egypt which had been denied them when they had sought to break in by force of arms,⁵ and had subsequently demonstrated their incapacity to serve the Egyptian Society as a military caste by their utter ineffectiveness when, at the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., the Assyrians and the Ethiopians had borne down, from opposite quarters, upon the heart of the Egyptian World,⁶ the founder of the Saïte Power, Psammetichus I (*regnabat* 663-609 B.C.), who eventually succeeded in getting rid of both invaders, perceived that he must find more mettlesome troops than the official defenders of

¹ See p. 17, above.

² The Roman Empire's problem was aggravated by the Empire's failure to carry its European land-frontier forward to the short line across the waist of Eastern Europe, between the north-west corner of the Black Sea and the south-east corner of the Baltic, and its further failure to maintain its Asiatic land-frontier along the short line across the waist of South-Western Asia, between the head of the Persian Gulf and the south-west corner of the Caspian Sea (for the European frontier see V. v. 591-5; for the Asiatic frontier see I. i. 390).

³ Egyptian rule in Syria seems to have ceased to be more than nominal by the time of the infiltration of the Israelites, which appears to have taken place in the thirteenth century B.C. The existence of the Egyptian régime is ignored in the Hebrew tradition (see V. v. 611, n. 3).

⁵ See IV. iv. 422, n. 3; V. v. 269-70 and 353.

⁴ In II. ii. 113.

⁶ See II. ii. 116.

the country to garrison the frontiers, if Egypt was to be preserved from the fate of again becoming a battlefield for neighbouring Powers. At the cost of alienating the established Libyan military caste, and perhaps even provoking some of their number to emigrate from the Saïte dominions to new cantonments offered them by the rival Ethiopian Power on its own southern frontier between the White and Blue Niles,¹ Psammetichus recruited Greek and Jewish mercenaries² to man his three frontier-fortress Daphnê-by-Pelusium, Marea barring the approaches from the Western Desert, and Elephantinê at the First Cataract,³ where the frontier between the Saïte and Napatan Powers, between whom the Egyptiac World was now partitioned, settled down about 655 B.C.⁴

When the Saïte Power was extinguished by Cambyses, the Achaemenian Government continued to maintain the two fortresses of Daphnê and Elephantinê.⁵ Persian garrisons were posted at both places,⁶ but at Elephantinê an economy was made in the employment of Persian manpower by taking over and retaining the Jewish military colony which the Saïtes had planted there.⁷

¹ For the expansion of Ethiopia up-river, see II. ii. 117. For the story of 'the Deserters', see Herodotus, Book II, chap. 30.

² The Ionian Greeks' exploits in the Saïte Government's service in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. have been touched upon, in another context, in IV. iv. 21. The Greek inscriptions carved upon the two southern colossi of the Great Temple at Abu Simbel prove that Greek troops in Saïte service were at least once employed in an expedition against Ethiopia in the reign of Psammetichus II (*regnabat* 593-588 B.C.), but there seems to be no evidence of their having shared with the Jewish military colony at Elephantinê the duty of permanently garrisoning the southern frontier of the Saïte dominions. The reception of Jewish settlers on Egyptiac ground had precedents of very long standing in Egyptiac history. Whatever may be the truth about the Israelite tradition of a sojourn of Israel in the north-eastern marches of 'the New Empire' of Egypt, there is documentary evidence that under 'the Middle Empire', in the sixth year of the reign of the Emperor Senwosret II (i.e. in the year 1892 B.C.), a 'barbarian chief' called Ebsha, with thirty-seven 'Amu followers from the desert, made application to the Imperial Warden of the Eastern Desert for permission to settle on Egyptiac territory (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, Part II, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 283-4).

³ See Herodotus, Book II, chap. 30.

⁴ See II. ii. 116.

⁵ See Herodotus, Book II, chap. 30.

⁶ See Herodotus, loc. cit.

⁷ Modern Western archaeological enterprise had unearthed a cache of documents, written on papyrus in Aramaic, which threw a flood of light on the life and fortunes of this community under the Achaemenian régime during the fifth century B.C. This information had been sifted and interpreted by Eduard Meyer in *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantinê* (2nd ed.: Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs) and by A. van Hoonacker in *Une Communauté Judéo-Araméenne à Eléphantine en Égypte aux VI^e et V^e siècles avant J.-C.* (London 1915, Milford). This Jewish community was treated by the Achaemenian Government with studied consideration. For instance, Cambyses spared their temple at Elephantinê when he destroyed the temples of the Egyptians (Meyer, p. 36; van Hoonacker, p. 42). In 410 B.C. the Egyptian priests of the local temple of Khnum took advantage of the absence of the Governor-General of Egypt, Arsham, on a visit to Susa to induce the local Persian commandant Widarnag (*Graecè* Hydarnes) to destroy the Jewish temple. The Jewish community's protest at this outrage appears to have moved the Achaemenian Government to put Widarnag and his son to death (Meyer, op. cit., pp. 78-79; van Hoonacker, op. cit., pp. 40-42 and 45-46). The Achaemenian Government had as good reasons for retaining and conciliating the Jewish military colony at Elephantinê as it had for mistrusting and disbanding the Greek garrison at Daphnê. The Greeks were the Persians' rivals for the immense prize of domination over the Egyptiac, Syriac, and Babylonian worlds, which had been left exhausted, and incapable of defending themselves against any vigorous aggressor, by the appalling after-effects of the last and most ferocious bout of Assyrian militarism (see IV. iv. 475-6). The Jews were the Achaemenids' protégés, whom they had liberated from the yoke of the Neo-Babylonian Empire and allowed to return home from their Babylonish

A Persian frontier garrison of which the Achaemenidae were justly proud was the isolated outpost at Doriscus, on the Thracian coastal road from the Hellespont to Continental European Greece, which, after the disastrous outcome of Xerxes' attempt in 480-479 B.C. to unite the Hellenic World under Achaemenian rule by force of arms, was the sole surviving fragment of the pre-war Achaemenian province between the Hellespont and the Strymon styled 'Those beyond the Sea' in the official lists.¹ This vestige of a lost dominion was preserved for the Empire, in the teeth of Athenian sea-power and in defiance of repeated assaults, for perhaps not less than half a century after the disasters of 480-479 B.C., by the valour of its commandant Mascames and his descendants.²

While we are thus informed about the Achaemenian garrisons at Doriscus and Elephantinê, we have no record of any corresponding installations for the defence of the north-east frontier of the Empire over against the Eurasian Steppe, though this frontier, on which Cyrus himself had met his death, must always have been the most critical and most important of all in the estimation of the Government at Susa.³ This silence may be due to an accidental gap in our knowledge; but it is also possible that the north-eastern frontier was not in fact guarded by imperial frontier garrisons of the kind familiar on the west because its defence was provided for otherwise. On its Sogdian sector this frontier was screened by a military alliance with a Nomad horde in Farghānah described in the official lists as 'the Hauma-(?)drinking Saka' (Saka Haumavarga, *Graecè* Amyrgioi);⁴ and, behind this screen of barbarian *foederati*, a defence in depth that would undoubtedly be more effective than any fixed garrisons could be for foiling Nomad raids was afforded by the presence of a warlike feudal nobility throughout the broad territories, running back from the north-east frontier to the Caspian Gates, that constituted the imperial marches in this quarter. This mobile feudal cavalry based on almost impregnable castles was master, like its counterpart in a Medieval Western Christendom,⁵ of the local military situation.

captivity to Judaea. Moreover, in Egypt the Jews, though they had originally been planted at Elephantinê by a native Egyptian régime, were as odious as the Persian conquerors themselves in the sight of the native Egyptian population in the fanatical temper that was invariably aroused in Egyptian hearts by alien domination (see V. v. 351-3; pp. 5-6 and 49-50, above; and Meyer, op. cit., p. 75). The Jewish colony at Elephantinê fell a victim to this temper in the end, if there is truth in the conjecture that it was finally wiped out by massacre during the Egyptian nationalist revolt against Achaemenian rule that was led by Amyrtaeus II in 404 B.C. (see van Hoonacker, op. cit., pp. 51-52). This Jewish garrison at Elephantinê under the Achaemenian régime has a counterpart in the cluster of Bosniak garrisons, planted in A.D. 1520 by the 'Osmanli conqueror of Egypt, Selim I, who held for the Ottoman Empire the Nubian march, between the First and the Third Cataract, which it had taken over from the extinguished Mamlūk régime (see Budge, E. A. Wallis: *The Egyptian Sudan, Its History and Monuments* (London 1907, Kegan Paul, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 207-8; Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 236).

¹ See pp. 682-4, below.

² See Herodotus, Book VII, chaps. 105-6. It is to Xerxes' credit that he singled Mascames out for appointment to this post in place of the previous commandant installed by Darius.

³ On this point see II. ii. 138-9.

⁴ See pp. 644-5, below.

⁵ The trouble which this feudal nobility in the north-eastern marches of the Achaemenian Empire gave to Alexander the Great has been noticed above in II. ii. 139-40.

When the Arab Caliphate re-established the Syriac universal state of which the Achaemenian Empire had been the first embodiment, and took over from its own immediate predecessors, the Sasanidae, the responsibility for defending the north-eastern borders of the Syriac World, the Arab empire-builders garrisoned Khurāsān—which had been the frontier province since the submergence of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin under a flood of Eurasian Nomad invasion in the second century B.C.¹—with Arab tribal cantonments of the kind that they had already established in the interior of their dominions;² and, when, in the eighth century of the Christian Era, the north-eastern frontier of the Caliphate was carried forward from Khurāsān to Farghānah, the political reunion of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin with the rest of the Syriac World was confirmed by the establishment of similar Arab cantonments in the newly conquered territories.³ The north-western frontier of the Caliphate was not stabilized until the Umayyads' ambition to complete their conquest of the Roman Empire had been quenched by the disastrous ending, in A.D. 718, of their second attempt to capture Constantinople and by the overthrow of the Umayyad Dynasty itself twenty-two years later. After the 'Abbasids had transferred the capital of the Caliphate from Damascus, within short range of the East Roman frontier, to the more distant site of Baghdad, the north-western marches were stabilized and organized by Hārūn-ar-Rashīd (*imperabat* A.D. 786–809). The forward zone, in which the two principal military centres were Tarsus⁴ and Malatīyah,⁵ became known as the Thughūr ('the barrier fortresses'),⁶ the rearward zone as the 'Awāsīm ('the [places] that give protection').⁷

The Ottoman Empire practised on the grand scale the policy, followed by the Achaemenian Empire at Elephantinē, of drawing on loyal peoples who were not themselves members of the ruling nationality for the purpose of frontier defence, and thereby kept down to a minimum the proportion of their own admirable professional army⁸ that had to be locked up in garrisons and so withdrawn from active service in the field. On their critical eastern frontier over against the Safawī Power, the 'Osmanlis induced the local Kurdish tribal chiefs to serve as wardens of the Ottoman marches by investing them with the insignia of Ottoman feudatories without requiring them to give up their own ancestral

Our records do not tell us whether these barons were the native aristocracy of the North-East Iranian peoples, or whether they were incomers of Persian origin who had been endowed with fiefs in these territories at the time when the Achaemenian Power had salvaged them from Nomad occupation (see II. ii. 138).

¹ The consequent segregation of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin from the main body of the Syriac World between the Saka conquest in the second century B.C. and the Arab conquest in the eighth century of the Christian Era has been noticed in II. ii. 141, with n. 2.

² For the cantonments in Khurāsān, see Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), pp. 256–9, and the present Study, II. ii. 141, n. 3. The cantonments in the interior are dealt with on pp. 130–1, below.

³ See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 272–3.

⁴ See II. ii. 368, n. 1.

⁵ See V. v. 254.

⁶ See Ahmad al-Balādhurī: *Kitāb Futūh-al-Buldān*, English translation by Khitti, P. Kh., vol. i (New York 1916, Columbia University Press), pp. 253–65.

⁷ See *op. cit.*, pp. 202–3; and the present Study, II. ii. 368, with n. 1, and p. 150, n. 3, below.

⁸ For the recruitment, training, and ethos of the Ottoman professional army, see III. iii. 22–50.

hereditary tenures.¹ And, with the same audacious disregard for Human Nature's sensitiveness to climate which the Incas showed in interchanging the populations of the Andean Plateau and the Pacific coastal plain, the 'Osmanlis planted Bosniaks in Nubia in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era to hold a new frontier there,² and Circassians in Transjordan in the nineteenth century to guard an old Ottoman frontier against the Arab Nomads of the Hamād.

The policy by which the 'Osmanlis enlisted the services of the Kurds for the defence of their frontier against the Safawis has an almost exact counterpart in the Manchus' policy towards the Mongols. The Manchus roped these elusive Nomads into their system of frontier defence against the Zungar Calmucks and the Russians by giving the Mongol tribes the nominal status of 'banners' (i.e. units of the Manchu Government's regular standing army), without attempting in practice to interfere with the traditional Mongol tribal organization.³ In this light-handed treatment of the Mongol tribesmen the Manchu Imperial Government was applying to them a policy which its predecessor the Ming Imperial Government had previously applied to the Imperial Manchus' own tribal ancestors; for the original nucleus of the Manchu state had been a Manchu war-band which the Ming had organized into a feudatory statelet in order to use it as a frontier garrison of barbarian *foederati*.⁴

Garrisons in the Interior

In turning our attention from garrisons on the frontiers to garrisons in the interior of a universal state, we shall find, as might be expected, that, the more efficient the defence of the frontiers and the more successful the pacification of the subject peoples inside them, the smaller, in general, are the forces that an imperial government finds it necessary to maintain for the preservation of internal law and order.

In the Roman Empire Augustus was so successful in dealing with pockets of recalcitrant barbarism within the vast area embraced by his new frontiers along the Rhine, the Danube, and the Euphrates that by the end of his reign three legions sufficed to keep in order the highlanders of North-Western Spain,⁵ and nine colonies of time-expired soldiers to overawe Pisidian highlanders who had defied successive attempts of Achaemenids, Seleucids, Attalids, and Galatians to subdue them.⁶ The newly subjected Alpine peoples seem to have required no

¹ See I. i. 389-90. In the Mughal Empire the Rājput chiefs were given a similar status *de facto*.

² See p. 119, n. 7, above.

³ See Lattimore, O.: *The Mongols of Manchuria* (London 1935, Allen & Unwin), pp. 145-6 and 148-51, quoted in the present Study, V. v. 315, n. 3.

⁴ See Michael, F.: *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China* (Baltimore 1942, Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 39.

⁵ See Sutherland, C. H. V.: *The Romans in Spain, 217 B.C.-A.D. 117* (London 1939, Methuen), p. 150. One of these three legions was withdrawn with impunity by Claudius soon after A.D. 43 (op. cit., p. 177), and another by Vespasian in A.D. 71 (op. cit., pp. 190 and 191-2). The single remaining legion sufficed to keep the Roman peace in Spain thenceforward.

⁶ Augustus's Roman military colonies in and round Pisidia were Pisidian Antioch (an originally Seleucid foundation which was reinforced with a Roman military colony in or before 27 B.C.); Olbasa, Comama, Cremna, Parlais, Lystra, Germe, and Ninica, all founded in 6 B.C.; and Isaura of uncertain date (see Hahn, L.: *Röm und Romanismus im Griechisch-Römischen Osten* (Leipzig 1900, Dieterich), pp. 93-94). Claudius found it necessary to add Claudiopropolis, Seleucia Sidera, and Iconium (Hahn, op. cit., p. 148).

garrisons at all. In the heyday of the Roman Peace the only garrison on the road between Rome and the Upper Rhine via the Riviera and the Rhône Valley was a battalion, perhaps 1,200 men strong, at Lyon; and this was merely one of the *Cohortes Urbanae* ('Metropolitan Battalions')—an armed police force that could hardly be counted as part of the Roman combatant army.¹ A sister-battalion at Carthage was the only garrison, in the opposite direction, between Rome and the frontier of the Empire in the desert hinterland of North-West Africa. In the latter days of an Antonine 'Indian Summer', it could be declared that

'The cities are free from garrisons, and mere battalions (*μόραι*) and squadrons (*ἑταῖαι*) are sufficient to provide for the security of whole nations. Even these units are not posted in large numbers in every city in each national territory. They are scattered so thinly over the countryside in such small numbers that there are many nations that do not know where their garrison is posted. . . .

'Yet [in spite of your devotion to the arts of peace,] you have not made the mistake of depreciating the god of War. . . . Nowadays, however, Arēs dances his unceasing dance on the banks of the frontier rivers, and he keeps his arms unsullied by the stain of blood.'²

Less secure or less well-ordered régimes have to devote a higher proportion of their military resources to the preservation of internal peace. When Hammurabi (*imperabat circa* 1792–1750 or 1728–1686 B.C.) had succeeded in restoring the Empire of Sumer and Akkad after a 260-years-long eclipse,³ he sought to safeguard the results of his efforts by building fortresses⁴ and by endowing his army with fiefs of land in order to keep it in being.⁵ Similar measures were taken for the same purpose by the Achaemenidae.

In addition to the detachments of troops which they posted at river-crossings, mountain-passes, and other strategic points on the roads connecting the capital with the frontiers,⁶ the Achaemenian Government maintained standing garrisons in fortresses in the interior.⁷ All these units were under the command of the Central Government and not of the Governor of the province within whose boundaries their posts happened to lie.⁸ The Achaemenian Crown was also generous in rewarding distinguished services by the grant of appanages in conquered territories,⁹ and, whether as a fortuitous or as a designed result of this policy, an Iranian feudal nobility like that in the north-eastern marches¹⁰ struck root in other parts of the Empire where the mass of the population

¹ See Arnold, W. T.: *Studies of Roman Imperialism* (Manchester 1906, University Press), p. 110.

² Aristeides, P. Aelius: *In Romam*, in *Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, edited by Keil, B., vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), p. 110 (Or. XXVI, § 67) and pp. 122–3 (Or. XXVI, § 105).

³ This eclipse had lasted from the overthrow of Ibī-Sin of Ur by Elamite insurgents *circa* 2025 or 1961 B.C. to the overthrow of the Elamite war-lord Rimsin of Larsa by Hammurabi in 1762 or 1698 B.C. (V. vi. 297).

⁴ See Meyer, Eduard: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), Part II, Book 2, p. 630.

⁵ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 627.

⁶ See the passage quoted from Eduard Meyer on p. 82, above.

⁷ See Meyer, E.: *op. cit.*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 68.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 70.

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 36 and 60–61.

¹⁰ See p. 120, above.

was non-Iranian.¹ Cappadocia, from the north-western slopes of Taurus to the coast of the Black Sea, became in this way a New Iran on a small scale;² and the top dressing of Iranian population and culture that was deposited under the Achaemenian régime continued to make its presence felt after the Achaemenian Empire's downfall. The Iranian barons in Cappadocia managed to avoid being conquered by either Alexander or any of his Macedonian successors; and two of the leading local Iranian feudal houses succeeded, with the support of their peers, in founding here, on this distant Hittite ground, two of the three earliest of the Achaemenian Empire's Iranian successor-states.³ The greatest statesman whom these dynasties produced, Mithradates Eupator, King of Pontic Cappadocia (*regnabat* 115–63 B.C.), almost succeeded in undoing all that Alexander the Great had done⁴ and achieving all that Xerxes had failed to achieve. And, though both the Iranian dynasties of Cappadocia sought and obtained admission, at an early date, into the comity of Hellenic states, the Cappadocian kingdoms were slower than Transjordan or Bactria in accepting anything more than a tincture of Hellenic culture. It was not till the fourth century of the Christian Era that Cappadocians, educated at Athens, won a tardy distinction as Greek men of letters who found their field of action in the Christian Church.

The policy of planting the interior of a universal state with feudal barons of the ruling nationality was applied, with a thoroughness unknown to the Achaemenidae, by the architects of the Ottoman Empire.⁵

The Ottoman network of military fiefs extended over all the European provinces of the Empire, the provinces in Asia Minor in which the predominant element in the population was Muslim and Turkish-speaking, and some of the provinces beyond the Taurus in which the population was Muslim and Arabic-speaking.⁶ It was in fact almost ubiquitous except for Ottoman Kurdistan, where the native hereditary chiefs were incorporated into the Ottoman feudal system only nominally,⁷ and Egypt, where the Ottoman conquerors tolerantly—but, as it turned out, unwisely—allowed the Mamlûks to perpetuate themselves under

¹ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 37.

² The success with which an Iranian feudal nobility struck root here may perhaps be accounted for partly by the presence in Cappadocia of an earlier stratum of Iranian population—the sediment left by the invasion of the Cimmerian Nomads (see III. iii. 404 and 431, n. 1, and the present volume, pp. 606–10, below)—and partly by the physical similarity between the Anatolian and the Iranian Plateau, which would make a settler from Media or Persis feel at home in Cappadocia.

³ The third was the principality of Media Atropatênê (Azerbaijan).

⁴ See V. v. 69.

⁵ Convenient summaries of our information about the Ottoman feudal system will be found in Bélin, F. A.: 'Du Régime des Fiefs Militaires dans l'Islamisme et particulièrement en Turquie' (*Journal Asiatique*, vi^e série, tome xv, Paris 1870) and in Tischendorf, P. A.: *Das Lehnswesen in den Moslemischen Staaten, insbesondere im Osmanischen Reiche* (Leipzig 1872, Giesecke & Devrient). The principal Ottoman sources on which these Western scholars draw are the treatise of 'Aynî 'Alî (written circa A.D. 1606, when an attempt was being made to retrieve the Ottoman feudal system from the decay into which it had fallen by that date) in Ahmed Vefik Efendi's edition, and a *Mémoire sur les Causes de Décadence de l'Empire* written in A.D. 1630 by Khoja Beg (alias Kuchi Bey) and translated by Behrmauer in the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* for 1861, pp. 272–332 (see Bélin, *op. cit.*, pp. 237–8).

⁶ While effective in Syria and the Jazīrah, the Ottoman feudal system was very imperfectly established in the province of Baghdad (see Bélin, *op. cit.*, pp. 259–89).

⁷ See p. 121, above.

Ottoman rule.¹ The military obligation incumbent on a fief-holder was to reside on his fief,² to serve personally in the field, and to bring with him a retinue of men-at-arms (*jebeli-ler*), whose number was determined by the officially registered annual value of his fief in terms of money,³ whenever the feudal force of his province was called up for active service by the Central Government. In all provinces the fiefs were on two standard scales;⁴ but any fief-holder who distinguished himself might be rewarded by the grant of an additional 'portion', the tenure of which was personal to the recipient and automatically terminated at his death.⁵ Though in both Rumili and Anadolu there were fiefs that were hereditary freeholds,⁶ this was exceptional. In general the indispensable condition for legal investiture with even the smallest fief was the receipt, from the Pādishāh himself, first of a waiting-ticket of candidature⁷ and then of a warrant of appointment—and this whether the fief in question was officially registered in the 'ticket' or the 'non-ticket' category (*teskereli* or *teskeresiz*).⁸

When the Ottoman feudal system was in its heyday, the fief-holders were recruited from two sources only: from the sons of deceased fief-holders and from the issue of members of the Pādishāh's slave-household, who were invested with fiefs as a consolation prize to compensate them for the personal hardship inflicted on them by the rigid rule debarring the grandsons of administrative officials and of troopers in the household cavalry ('Sipāhīs of the Porte'),⁹ and the sons of all public slaves of lower categories, from being admitted into the slave-household themselves.¹⁰ No allowances were paid to the sons of a fief-holder in their father's lifetime, but the father might retire in favour of one of his sons, and, if the father died in battle, a 'portion' might be given to his son as a retaining fee while he was a candidate for a vacant fief.¹¹ The rules governing the assignment of 'portions' and the award of fiefs to sons of fief-holders were worked out by Sultan Süleymān the Magnificent¹² (*imperabat* A.D. 1520-66). He ruled that more than one son of a deceased fief-holder might be enfeoffed.¹³ Sons of fief-holders offering themselves as candidates were, however, required to substantiate their claim to be their fathers' sons.¹⁴ Süleymān rather grudgingly admitted, under strict

¹ See III. iii. 30-31.

² See Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 87. In the province of Anadolu the fief-holders themselves were exempt from personal service and were required merely to send men-at-arms (see Bélin, *op. cit.*, p. 254).

⁴ The holders of the larger fiefs (*timars*) were known as *timarjy-lar*, those of the smaller fiefs (*zi'āmet*s) as *zā'im-ler*.

⁵ See Bélin, *op. cit.*, p. 240; Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38. Conversely, any excess of the actual income of a fief over its registered value had to be surrendered by the fief-holder to the Treasury, which applied it to the creation of a separately bestowable 'portion' (see Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 87).

⁶ See Bélin, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-4; Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

⁷ See Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 95. During the period of probation the candidate had to serve in the field as a volunteer who had 'staked his head' (*serden geçdi*) on a forlorn hope (see Bélin, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-3).

⁸ See Bélin, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

⁹ These privileged members of the Pādishāh's slave-household must not be confused with the provincial feudal cavalry, who were also known as sipāhīs.

¹⁰ On this point see the present Study, III. iii. 34, n. 2.

¹¹ See Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38 and 95; Bélin, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

¹² See Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

¹³ See *ibid.*, p. 47.

¹⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 40.

control and limitations, a father's right to bequeath to his son a fief of the *yurd* or *oĵāq* category of tenure.¹ He did not show the same hesitation about giving protection to the peasantry (*ra'īyeh*) by whom the fiefs were cultivated and the rents paid. He affirmed their right to bequeath their holdings to their children, and he made it illegal for fief-holders to bestow vacant peasant holdings upon their own relatives.² The peasant was thus deliberately given a security of tenure which was no less deliberately withheld from the holder of the fief on which the peasant lived and worked.³ All these regulations were enforced by a strict system of official control. The records of the fiefs were kept in provincial registers, and these were called in and examined at the Porte by Süleymān when he made his general review of the Ottoman feudal system.⁴

As a basis of Ottoman military and political power, this feudal system was second in importance only to the Pādishāh's slave-household itself; and, though, after the death of Süleymān, the feudal system was affected by the general decay of the Ottoman body politic which then set in, determined efforts were made, some seventy years later, to bring the system back to its former level of efficiency. During the years A.D. 1632-7, in the reign of Sultan Murād IV (*imperabat* A.D. 1623-40),⁵ musters of fief-holders were held, and fiefs found vacant were given to members of the Pādishāh's slave-household in lieu of pay.⁶ The two fundamental institutions of the Ottoman Empire were finally abolished by the same reforming hand. After destroying the Janissaries in A.D. 1826,⁷ Sultan Mahmūd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808-39) liquidated the feudal system as well. The fiefs were reabsorbed into the public domain, and the living fief-holders were pensioned off, under the terms of the *Khatt-i-Sherīf-i-Gülkhāneh* of A.D. 1839.⁸

While the Ottoman feudal system was more highly organized than the Achaemenian, both institutions alike were of secondary importance—both for the defence of the imperial frontiers and for the maintenance of the Imperial Government's authority in the interior of the Empire—by comparison with the garrisons and mobile formations of professional troops in the Imperial Government's service. By contrast, the Mughal Imperial Government, which made similar efforts to maintain a professional force drawing its pay from the Imperial Treasury and therefore directly subject to the Emperor's control, found itself unable to prevent this Imperial Army from disintegrating into a host of feudal contingents, each virtually at the disposal of its own commander in consequence of their coming to be paid out of provincial land-revenue assigned to their commanders for collection by them without this revenue any longer passing into and out of the Imperial Treasury on the way.

While even the later Mughal emperors did succeed in keeping up a

¹ See Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

² See *ibid.*, p. 49.

³ Ottoman fief-holders had no political authority over their peasants, and a peasant had the right to prosecute his feudal lord in the qādi's court (see Bélin, *op. cit.*, p. 189).

⁴ On this occasion Süleymān confirmed in their holdings any *ra'īyeh* whom he found in actual occupation of fiefs.

⁵ For Murād IV's herculean efforts to put the Ottoman Empire on its feet again, see V. vi. 207.

⁶ See Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁷ See III. iii. 49-50 and IX. viii. 239.

⁸ See Bélin, *op. cit.*, p. 294; Tischendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

small body of artillerymen, matchlockmen, and cavalry organized and commanded, as well as paid, by the imperial authorities themselves,¹ the Imperial Government, as early as Akbar's day, depended for the recruitment and maintenance of the greater part of its cavalry on *bloc* grants of divers grades of salary to office-holders (*mansabdārs*) who, in return, were required to produce proportionate numbers of troops. Even when these *mansabdārs* were paid their salaries—as Akbar made a point of paying them—out of the Imperial Treasury, the Imperial Government seems to have failed to secure from them the upkeep of their full stipulated quotas of men-at-arms; and, after Akbar's death, his successors lapsed into the slovenly and perilous practice—traditional among pre-Mughal Central Asian Muslim *conquistadores* in India—of compounding for the payment of the *mansabdārs*' salaries by assigning to them the right to collect particular local allotments (*jāgīrs*) of provincial revenue up to an equivalent value. In thus signing away its own right to collect the local revenue, the Imperial Government was in effect relinquishing its hold on the local administration as well; and the effect of a widespread grant of *jāgīrs* was thus no less pernicious for the political integrity of the Mughal Empire than it was for the military efficiency of the Mughal Imperial Army.²

The deadliness of Feudalism in the history of the Mughal Empire in India throws into relief, against a foil of Mughal inefficiency, the masterliness of the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan. A traditional institution that was the death of the Mughal Empire was deliberately adopted by the Tokugawa as the basis for the establishment of an oecumenical peace after a Time of Troubles; yet the Tokugawa régime's experience in Japan was just the opposite of the Mughal régime's in India. In Japan, down to the moment when the internal play of forces was suddenly upset by the impact of the Western Civilization in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the local feudal lords, so far from progressively shaking off the Central Government's control, found themselves caught more and more tightly in its toils as time went on.

Immediately after the inauguration of their rule the Tokugawa were so successful in insulating the Japanese Archipelago from contact with the outside world that, for some two and a half centuries ending at the appearance of Commodore Perry's squadron in Yedo Bay in A.D. 1853, they were not called upon to provide for frontier defence. But their very success in relieving Japan from foreign pressure must have reduced almost to vanishing-point, in Japanese minds, one powerful motive for loyalty to the Tokugawa régime, and this must have added to the intrinsic difficulty of the Tokugawas' crucial political problem of maintaining their domination over the great feudal lords who had submitted to their suzerainty only under *force majeure*, and then only at the

¹ See p. 319, below.

² See H. Blochmann's note on the Mughal *mansabdārs* on pp. 236-47 of vol. i of his translation of the *Ayn-i-Akbari* (Calcutta 1873, Baptist Mission Press); Irvine, W.: *The Army of the Indian Moghuls* (London 1903, Luzac), chaps. 1, 2, and 6; Smith, V. A.: *Akbar the Great Mogul, 1542-1605*, 2nd ed., revised (Oxford 1919, Clarendon Press), pp. 360-7; Moreland, W. H.: *India at the Death of Akbar* (London 1920, Macmillan), pp. 65-68.

eleventh hour. Some of these lords had been more powerful than the Tokugawa themselves had been until the eve of the establishment of their ascendancy; many of them could boast of a much more illustrious past; and even under Tokugawa overlordship they still retained much of their former wealth and prestige.¹ To hold them in check and gradually reduce their power was a delicate and difficult task. In another context² we have noticed the device of requiring the periodic residence of the *daimyō* and their families at the Shogun's capital at Yedo. Another method of 'belling the cat' was to make Feudalism itself serve as an instrument for keeping Feudalism in order.

'The Shogunate . . . depended for its supremacy on the balance of power of its possible opponents. The *daimyōs* were by this time divided into three classes: first, the Related Houses (*Shimban* or *Kamon*), sons of Ieyasu [the first Tokugawa Shogun] and their descendants; second the Vassal Clans (*Fudai*), hereditary vassals of his house and their descendants; the third, Outside Feudatories (*Tozama*), or lords who did not come under this head. The *Bakufu* [i.e. the Shogunal Government] arranged that all the strategic positions should be held by the first two classes,³ and that the "Outside Lords" should be so placed that they were separated by these, and adjacent to unfriendly neighbours. Thus these "Outside Lords" mutually checked each other and were in turn restrained by the hereditary vassals. The Related Houses also might in an emergency be controlled by the hereditary vassals, and both these classes were finally overawed by the Shogun's personal bodyguard, the *Hatamoto*, whose interests were entirely bound up with those of the *Bakufu*. How successful was this system that Ieyasu put together with such shrewdness can be seen from the fact that from this day till the latest period of the Shogunate in 1850 there was not a single rebellion of any of these feudatories.'⁴

While the Achaemenian institution of a feudal system thus found its classic application in Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Achaemenian institution of imperial garrisons posted at key-points in the interior of the Empire was likewise unconsciously reproduced, in a more thoroughgoing form, in a Far Eastern universal state in China under the Ming régime and its Manchu successor. The Ming planted garrisons of hereditary professional troops throughout their empire—not only along the frontiers over against the Eurasian Steppe and the Manchurian forests, but also along the coasts (which were harried by Japanese pirates) and along the vital inland waterway of the Grand Canal.⁵ In the interior of the Empire the military districts occupied by such garrisons were thinly scattered enclaves in the territory under ordinary civil administration;⁶ but the south-western corner of Manchuria, outside the Great

¹ See Sansom, G.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 436.

² See p. 87, above.

³ 'The hereditary vassals, though not so rich in estates as the great *Tozama*, were assigned lands at points of strategic importance, commanding the main highways and towns, or so situated with relation to the domains of possible enemies of the Shogun as to threaten their flank or rear should they ever venture to march upon Yedo' (Sansom: op. cit., p. 436).

⁴ Sadler, A. L.: *A Short History of Japan* (Sydney 1946, Angus & Robertson), pp. 209-10.

⁵ See Michael, F.: *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China* (Baltimore 1942, Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 29-30.

⁶ See *ibid.*, loc. cit.

Wall but inside the Willow Palisade, which had been a Chinese-inhabited country since the Age of the Contending States, was mapped out into military districts exclusively.¹ The original nucleus of the Manchu state that was to be the Ming's successor had, as we have observed,² been a local Manchu tribe whom the Ming had fitted into their military system; and this system was the model followed by the architect of the Manchu Power, Nurhachi.³

The organization of the Manchu military establishment in 'banners' on the Ming pattern preceded the beginning of the Manchu conquest of the Chinese-inhabited country between the Willow Palisade and the Great Wall.⁴ A social and administrative, as well as a military, revolution was carried out in A.D. 1601 when the Central Government of the nascent Manchu Power registered its subjects, organized them in 'banners' for civil as well as military purposes, and decreed that this new order was to override all traditional feudal claims and ties.⁵ After the subsequent Manchu conquest of China, these 'banners' were the units out of which a Manchu Imperial Government reigning in the former Ming Imperial Government's stead constituted the garrisons that it stationed in Peking, the imperial capital, and in the Chinese provinces inside the Great Wall, as well as outside the Great Wall in both the Chinese-inhabited and the Manchu-inhabited zone of the Dynasty's previous domain. In the standard 'banner' of the Manchu Imperial Government's professional army after the Conquest, one battalion of Manchu troops was brigaded with one of Chinese and one of Mongols;⁶ but there were some 'banners' in which the Manchu component had no Chinese or Mongol complement. The standard garrison consisted of detachments⁷—corresponding to the *vexilliones* of the Roman Imperial military organization—drawn from four 'banners' in each case originally and afterwards from eight; but there continued to be some garrisons of less than eight units, while some were raised to a still higher number, though the maximum was always less than sixteen.⁸

Sedentary barbarians, like the Manchus,⁹ find less difficulty than Nomads, like the Mongols, in assuming the role of an imperial people. The antecedent attempt of the Mongols to impose an alien peace on China on their own account had been markedly less successful than the Manchus' repetition of the enterprise, in which the Mongols had to be content to serve as the Manchus' junior partners. It is true that the Mongols were handicapped not only by their Nomad background but

¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

² On p. 122, above.

³ See Michael, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 62, and 75.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 63.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 64.

⁶ These Mongol battalions of hereditary professional soldiers, individually recruited, in the 'banners' of the Manchu imperial army must be distinguished from the so-called Mongol 'banners', which were the war-bands of the Mongol tribes under Manchu suzerainty (see p. 122, above).

⁷ See Michael, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-66.

⁸ See Lattimore, O.: *The Mongols of Manchuria* (London 1935, Allen & Unwin), pp. 146-8, and eudem: *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), p. 32. The military organization of the Manchus has been touched upon, by anticipation, in V. v. 315, n. 3, and 447.

⁹ For the social and economic background of the Manchu restorers of a Far Eastern universal state in China, see II. ii. 122, n. 2; III. iii. 16, 19, and 423, n. 1; and V. v. 315.

by a taint of Far Eastern Christian culture which provoked the demonic uprising of the Chinese against them,¹ and we have seen that the Libyan Nomads, who were undefiled—or unredeemed—by any such alien cultural tincture, were suffered by a hyper-sensitively anti-alien Egyptiac Society not only to drift into the Egyptiac World but to remain there without bringing down upon their heads any counter-stroke from the hands of the population on whose labours they had settled down to live as parasites.² The Libyans, however, made the fatal mistake of severing their connexion with an ancestral Nomadic way of life in which their martial qualities had been bred. They spread themselves over the Egyptian countryside³ and, in so doing, forfeited their strength, like Sampson when he allowed Delilah to shear his locks.⁴ This Libyan mistake was not repeated by the Primitive Muslim Arab Nomad warriors when they burst into the Roman and Sasanian empires, broke down the seven-centuries-old political partition between them,⁵ and thereby re-established a Syriac universal state that had been originally embodied in the empire of the Achaemenidae.⁶

The Arab empire-builders realized that, if they were to retain a lasting hold over the vast dominions which they had so swiftly won, they must preserve the martial qualities of their badawī soldiery and must also keep their garrisons in *partibus agricularum* in close and constant touch with the reservoir of badawī man-power on the Arabian steppes. Their device for meeting both these requirements was to plant permanent cantonments (*jundās*) of badawī professional troops (*muqātilah*)⁷ along the borderline between the Desert and the Sown, as the sea-faring empire-builders of a thalassocracy control their overseas dominions from the sea-ports linking them with the metropolitan territory across the water.⁸

The first four Arab Muslim cantonments of this type were planted, along the borderline between the Syrian Steppe and Syria, in Trans-jordan, at Damascus, at Homs (*alias* Hims, *alias* Emesa), and at Qinnasrīn.⁹ These four garrisons were located in existing centres of

¹ See V. v. 348–51.

² See IV. iv. 422, n. 3; V. v. 269–70 and 352–3.

³ The only districts in which the Libyan intruders did not plant themselves were those reserved for the temple-states which were established by their confederates the Egyptiac priesthood.

⁴ An elaborately dressed side-lock was part of the insignia of a Libyan warrior.

⁵ See I. i. 75–76.

⁶ See I. i. 76–77.

⁷ Also called 'migrants' (*muhājirah*), because they had left their ancestral tribes or oases in order to become members of one of these newly constituted military communities (see Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), p. 16).

⁸ The typical structure of a thalassocracy is illustrated on the Aegean scale by 'the thalassocracy of Minos' and by the Athenian Empire that grew out of the Delian League, and on the Oceanic scale by the British Empire. The British conquered India from three maritime bases: the river-port of Calcutta, the sea-port of Madras, and the inshore island of Bombay. The transfer of the political capital of the British Indian Empire from Calcutta to New Delhi in A.D. 1912 was a step towards the renunciation of British rule over India (on this point see pp. 194–5, below).

⁹ See Ahmad Al-Balādhuri: *Kitāb Futūh-al-Buldān*, English translation by Hitti, P. Kh., vol. i (New York 1916, Columbia University Press), p. 202. Quinnasrīn was constituted into a separate *jund* by the Caliph Yazid (*imperabat* A.D. 680–3). It had previously been included in the Jund of Homs. Balādhuri, in this passage, leaves it uncertain whether there was or was not also a Jund of Filastīn (i.e. Cis-Jordanian Palestine).

population, but their counterparts on other coasts of the desert were all laid out on previously unoccupied sites.¹ 'Irāq was overawed from cantonments at Basrah (*conditum* A.D. 635) and Kūfah (*conditum* A.D. 636) on the right bank of the Euphrates, where the Arab garrisons were not insulated by any water-barrier from their Arabian source of reinforcement.² A corresponding site on the right bank of the Nile, just above the head of the Delta, was chosen for Fustāt (*conditum* A.D. 641), 'the camp' from which the Arabs dominated Egypt. North-West Africa was dominated from Qayrawān (*conditum* A.D. 670) on a site, at the meeting-point between the low-lying arid south-eastern zone and the mountain-ribbed fertile north-western zone of Ifrīqiyah, which corresponded topographically to the sites of the cantonments dominating Syria.

Owing to the acquisition of the Caliphate and foundation of a dynasty by an Arab war-lord—the Umayyad Mu'āwiyah—who had started his career, and made his fortune, as governor of Syria, the Arab cantonments, not only on the desert coasts of Syria, but on those of 'Irāq, Egypt, and North-West Africa as well, were garrisoned by Syrian Arab troops.³ The basis of military organization was tribal. Ziyād, whom Mu'āwiyah appointed as his governor, first of Basrah and then of Kūfah as well, tried to reorganize the military colony at Kūfah on non-tribal lines, but he seems to have achieved no permanent success in this, and in his parallel reorganization at Basrah he did not even make the attempt.⁴ Tribal loyalties and rivalries were the governing factors in the life of the Arab cantonments throughout the Umayyad Age; and the resulting disunity and disorder, which was chronic and irrepressible, was no doubt one of the causes of the downfall of the Umayyad dynasty and of the eventual decay and disappearance of the cantonments themselves.

¹ See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

² Wāsit ('the centre') was planted by Al-Hajjāj on the far side of the Euphrates, on an island between two arms of the Shatt-al-Hayy; but this aptly named military centre for the Syrian garrison of 'Irāq was not laid out till A.D. 702, and by that time Arab rule over 'Irāq had long since been securely established.

³ See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-6. These troops were 'Syrian' for the most part in the sense of being drawn from those badawī Arab armies, recruited in Arabia, that happened to have been directed to the Syrian theatre of the Primitive Muslim Arab wars of conquest and to have remained in Syria, after its subjugation, under the command of Mu'āwiyah. There were also, however, Syrian Arab troops whose connexion with Syria was less casual. Before the Muslim Arabs had invaded Syria, there had been two Arab infiltrations—one in the last century B.C. and the second since the latter part of the fourth century of the Christian Era—and, since the sixth century, the wardenship of the Arabian marches of Syria had been entrusted by the Roman Government to the Christian Arab dynasty of the Banu Ghassān (see I. i. 73, n. 1, and VIII. viii. 50-51). Alone among the peoples conquered by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, the Christian Arabs already established in the conquered territories were compelled (except for the Banu Taghlib in 'Irāq) to embrace Islam (see Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15) and were thereby compulsorily included in the ruling element in the Arab Empire. The Umayyad Caliphate might be described as an aggrandisement of the Ghassānid principality, and we may guess that the Syrian garrisons of the Umayyad cantonments were, to quite a large extent, of Ghassānid origin (see Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 83). Analogously the abortive Caliphate of 'Alī b. Abī Tālib, who established his seat of government at the Arab cantonment of Kūfah, on the desert border of 'Irāq, might be described as an aggrandisement of the rival pre-Muslim Arab principality of the Lakhmids who had served as wardens of the Arabian marches of the Sasanian Empire, considering that Kūfah had been planted in the immediate vicinity of Hirah, the Lakhmids' former capital (see VIII. viii. 51, n. 1).

⁴ See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

Civilian Settlements

The installation of standing military garrisons along the frontiers and in the interior of a universal state by the empire-builders can hardly fail to bring civilian settlement in its train. The Arab military *muhājirah* were allowed to bring their wives and children with them to the cantonments in which they settled.¹ The Roman legionaries, though debarred from contracting legal marriages during their term of active service, were permitted in practice by the military authorities to enter into permanent marital relations with concubines and to bring up families; and, after their discharge, they were able, by an easy process of law, to convert a concubinate into a legal marriage and to obtain retrospective legitimization for their children born out of wedlock. Moreover, the auxiliaries, who, unlike the legionaries, were recruited from among the Roman Empire's subjects, and not from among its citizens, seem to have been given the franchise upon their discharge at the end of the full statutory term of service, and sometimes earlier.² Thus the Roman *canabae*³ and Arab cantonments became nuclei of civilian settlements which, in turn, became sources of recruitment for the garrisons round which they had gathered. The growth of the civilian element in the Arab cantonments was given a further impetus when the Caliph 'Umar II (*imperabat* A.D. 717-20) granted to members of the non-Arab subject population who became converts to Islam the option of migrating to an Arab cantonment from their home town or village.⁴ On these analogies we may infer that the Turkish Muslim civilian population, which amounted, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to a considerable proportion of the total population of the Ottoman provinces in Europe, and this not only in the towns but also on the land, was a by-product of the Ottoman military fiefs which, by that date, had been in existence in these provinces for about four hundred years on the average. And we may guess that a Persian civilian population had been generated in Cappadocia by the Persian feudal baronies there before the Achaemenian régime was brought to its premature close.

Besides arising as undesigned by-products of military establishments, civilian colonies are also planted by empire-builders as an end in themselves. For example, the North-East Anatolian districts in which the Achaemenidae had granted appanages to Persian barons were colonized by the 'Osmanlis with Albanian converts to Islam, on whose loyalty they

¹ See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

² See Last, H., in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (Cambridge 1936, University Press), p. 443, and pp. 140 and 155, below.

³ See Rostovtzeff, M.: *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1926, Clarendon Press), p. 51.

⁴ In this ruling, 'Umar was deliberately rescinding the practice of the celebrated governor of 'Irāq, Hajjāj (*proconsulari munere fungebatur* A.D. 691-713), who had forbidden converts to migrate and had even forcibly repatriated those who had done so. Under 'Umar's ruling, migration presumably became the rule, as the theoretical alternative of remaining on the land and continuing to pay, under the less offensive name of 'rent', the tribute (*kharāj*) due from non-Muslims was hardly likely to be attractive to many converts (see Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 175). The fiscal considerations that inclined the earlier Umayyad Caliphs, first and foremost Mu'āwiyah I, to refrain from encouraging the conversion of the Arab Empire's non-Muslim subjects are discussed by Lammens, S.J., le Père H.: *Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'āwīyah I^{er}* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), pp. 424-6.

could count for helping them to hold these anti-Safawī marches.¹ In the commercial centres in the heart of their dominions—Constantinople, Smyrna, Salonica, Sarayevo—the 'Osmanlis settled civilian communities of refugee Sephardi Jews from Spain and Portugal.² In the Roman Empire, not only military cantonments but civilian settlements—of which Caesar's colonies of Roman citizens at Capua, Carthage, and Corinth may be regarded as the exemplars³—were planted by Caesar, Augustus, and their successors.

Caesar himself may have been the founder of the Roman colonies in three ports of entry—Dyrrhachium (Durazzo), Buthrotum (Butrinto), and Dyme—from Italy to Continental European Greece; in two other Greek cities—Dium and Philippi—which commanded respectively the southern and the eastern exit from the province of Macedonia;⁴ and in four Anatolian ports—Lampsacus, the Bithynian Apamea, Heraclea Pontica, and Sinope—on the coastal shipping route through the Hellespont to the mouth of the Phasis.⁵ Augustus reinforced these three groups of Roman civilian colonies by adding Byllis and Patrae to the first, Pella and Cassandrea to the second, and Alexandria Troas and Parium to the third. He did something to repair the ravages of his civil war with Sextus Pompeius⁶ by founding other Roman civilian colonies in Sicily, and he made a momentous new departure in policy when in 15 B.C. he planted two Roman civilian colonies in Syria:⁷ one at Berytus (Bayrūt)⁸ and the other at Heliopolis (Ba'lbak). Claudius added a Roman colony at Ptolemais in Palestine to Augustus's Syrian foundations, and broke new ground in two regions—Cappadocia and Thrace—which had both hitherto shown an exceptional imperviousness to Hellenism. After suppressing the native client kingdom in Thrace which had been ruled for Rome by the princes of the Odrysae, Claudius founded a colony of Roman citizens at Apri, where the Great East Road running from Dyrrhachium and Apollonia through Thessalonica and Philippi forked

¹ One of these Albanian settlements in North-Eastern Anatolia, Vezir Köprü, gave birth to the Köprülü family whose eventual flowering, in a crop of distinguished statesmen, was one of the causes of the rally of the Ottoman Empire in the latter part of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era (see V. vi. 208, with n. 3, and 299).

² For the motives of this deed of humanity and stroke of statesmanship, see II. ii. 244-6.

³ For the long-drawn-out conflict between opposing policies and political ideals which was the historical background of these three foundations, see pp. 109-10, above.

⁴ For the plantation of Macedonia with Roman colonies and municipia under the early Principate, see *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 567-8.

⁵ See Hahn, L.: *Rom und Romanismus im Griechisch-Römischen Osten* (Leipzig 1906, Dieterich), pp. 60-61.

⁶ See V. v. 71 and V. vi. 239.

⁷ See Hahn, op. cit., pp. 92-94. Another civilian settlement of Roman citizens planted by Augustus on Asiatic ground was his Roman colony at Tralles, founded in 26 B.C. (ibid.).

⁸ This Syrian outpost of the Latin-speaking world was so successful in preserving its Latin character that it became a centre for the study of Roman Law. Justinian treated the academy of law at Berytus as the peer of those at Constantinople and Rome (see Cumont, F., in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi, pp. 626-7, and Collinet, P.: *Études Historiques sur le Droit de Justinien*, vol. ii: 'Histoire de l'École de Droit de Beyrouth' (Paris 1925, Recueil Sirey)). According to Collinet, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 20-22, the law school at Berytus owed its rise to the Imperial Government's practice—established at some date before A.D. 196—of using Berytus, in virtue of its being the easternmost Latin-speaking community in the Empire, as its depot for the distribution, in the Oriental provinces, of the texts of new laws.

on its divergent ways to the Hellespont and the Bosphorus. In Cappadocia, which Tiberius had brought under direct Roman administration, Claudius founded a Roman colony at Archelais, just within the western borders of the province. Vespasian followed up Claudius's initiative in Thrace by founding a Roman colony at Deultum under the name of Flaviopolis, and Claudius's initiative in Palestine—where Vespasian blasted away the Jewish obstruction to Hellenization which Antiochus Epiphanes had failed to overcome—by reinforcing Ptolemais on the coast with two new Roman colonies in the interior: one at Emmaus and the other at Samaria, which Vespasian renamed Flavia Neapolis.¹

The Roman Imperial Government did not, however, confine its programme of civilian colonization to the establishment of colonies of the ruling Latin nationality. While it did set itself systematically to Latinize—and thereby indirectly Hellenize in Latin dress—the barbarians on whom it had imposed its peace in the Danubian territories beyond the former northern frontiers of Macedonia² and in the West European and North-West African territories whose political destinies had been decided by Rome's victory in her struggle with Carthage,³ the foundation of Roman colonies on Greek or Oriental ground was in this quarter only a side-line of Roman Imperial policy. In European Greece and in all parts of the Empire lying to the east of it the predominant aim of Roman Imperial statesmanship was to preserve and complete the Hellenizing work of Alexander the Great and his successors; and this aim was pursued with a steadiness and effectiveness which were tardily recognized and rewarded when, in the second century of the Imperial Peace, the Empire was at last acclaimed by Greek men of letters as an embodiment, on an oecumenical scale, of the Platonic ideal of the rule of the philosopher-king.⁴

The exemplar of this Hellenizing aspect of the Roman Imperial Government's policy of internal colonization was the synoecism by Augustus, *more Alexandrino*, of a new Greek city on the grand scale under the name of Nicopolis to adorn the scene of his crowning victory at Actium and to keep its memory alive by periodical celebrations in honour of the event. Trajan's foundation of a Greek city of the same name in the Trans-Haeman fringes of the province of Thrace⁵ was evidence of the sincerity of the Roman Government's intention to make Thrace a replica of Greek-speaking Macedonia and not of Latin-speaking Moesia.⁶ This Hellenization of Thrace in Greek dress at Roman

¹ See Hahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-9.

² See II. ii. 163-4.

³ See I. i. 40.

⁴ See V. v. 343-4, and pp. 41-44, above. Aelius Aristides goes so far as to suggest that Alexander's enduring achievement lay in his having served as Rome's forerunner:

'The only achievement and memorial, worthy of his genius, that Alexander left behind him was the city on the coast of Egypt that bears his name; and it is his merit that he founded Alexandria for you Romans, in order that she might be yours, and that you might be masters of the city which is the greatest in the World, next to your own'—(Aristeides, P. Aelius: *In Roman*, edited by Keil, B., in *Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, vol. ii (Berlin 1898, Weidmann), p. 99 (Or. XXVI, § 26). Cp. p. 119 (§ 95)).

⁵ The grounds for believing that Nicopolis-ad-Istrum was originally included in the province of Thrace, and not in that of Lower Moesia, are given by Mommsen, Th.: *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, English translation, vol. i (London 1886, Bentley), p. 307, n. 2.

⁶ For the spread of the Latin language all the way down the right bank of the Danube, see IV. iv. 326, n. 2.

hands was consummated by Hadrian when he gave his own name to the Greek city that he founded on a site which, under a Nomad-minded Odrisian régime, had been crying out, unheeded, for synoecism ever since the time, five hundred years back, when the sister-city of Philippopolis had been duly founded by the father of Alexander the Great. Planted, as it was, at the junction of the River Hebrus with its principal tributary, on the military road to the Bosphorus from Aquileia and Sirmium, Adrianople provided Thrace with the convenient urban centre that it had lacked hitherto.¹

This practice of diffusing Hellenism in the Roman Empire by means of the foundation of city-states was reproduced in the Spanish Empire of the Indies; and the Medieval Spanish institution which was thus propagated in the Americas in an Early Modern Age of Western history was in truth a renaissance of the Hellenic institution that had originally been propagated in Spain by Roman *conquistadores* from Italy.² Like the Hellenic cities planted in the post-Alexandrine Age by Macedonian empire-builders in South-West Asia and Egypt and by Roman empire-builders round all the shores of the Mediterranean, these Spanish cities in the Americas had individual founders;³ they were laid out on the rectangular plan that, in the history of Hellenic town-planning, had been inaugurated in the fifth century B.C.⁴ by Hippodamus's layout of the Peiraeus; and each *civitas* had a rural *territorium* 'attributed to' it, to use the Roman technical term.⁵ In the more settled regions of the Spanish Empire these municipal *territoria* were conterminous; and, in the undeveloped regions on the fringes, some of them were of vast extent.⁶ By A.D. 1574 about a hundred Spanish city-states had already been founded within the area of the Incaic Empire's former domain.⁷ 'The Spanish American provinces, therefore, were in many instances a collection of municipalities, the latter . . . being the bricks of which the whole political structure was compacted.'⁸

If these Spanish colonial city-states thus resembled the post-Alexandrine Hellenic colonial city-states in serving as the cells of an intrusive alien régime's administrative and judicial organization, they likewise resembled them in enjoying little more than a simulacrum of local self-government; for they had no sooner been founded than the Crown took into its own hands the appointment of the municipal officers.⁹ Above all, they resembled their Hellenic prototypes in being parasitic.

'In the Anglo-American colonies the towns grew up to meet the needs

¹ Though Adrianople was thus marked out by its geographical position for playing the part of a capital city, it had not so far achieved its manifest destiny except during the century ending in A.D. 1453, when it had been the seat of government of the Ottoman Empire. There had, on the other hand, been two periods in which Adrianople had had the misfortune to find itself serving as a frontier fortress: first during the three centuries ending in the annexation of Eastern Bulgaria by the East Roman Empire in A.D. 972 (see IV. iv. 389) and again since the carving of the autonomous principalities of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria out of the body of the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1878 (see p. 17, above).

² See Haring, C. H.: *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York 1947, Oxford University Press), p. 159.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 161.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 161.

⁵ See Haring, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 160.

⁸ See the present Study, III. iii. 98, with n. 2.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 160, n. 4.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 164-5.

of the inhabitants of the country: in the Spanish colonies the population of the country grew to meet the needs of the towns. The primary object of the English colonist was generally to live on the land and derive his support from its cultivation; the primary plan of the Spaniard was to live in town and derive his support from the Indians or Negroes at work on plantations or in the mines. . . . Owing to the presence of aboriginal labour to exploit in fields and mines, the rural population remained almost entirely Indian.¹

The Spanish empire-builders' Inca predecessors' practice of linking together districts that were geographically far apart and at the same time economically complementary² has counterparts in the economy of both the Roman Empire and the Arab Caliphate.

The vacant public land which the Roman Government acquired in the Po Basin through the conquest of the country between the years 197 and 173 B.C. and the concomitant eviction of the more recalcitrant of its native Gallic and Ligurian inhabitants³ was not all transferred to individual ownership through the foundation of Latin and Roman colonial communities of freeholders and the grant of freeholds to other settlers individually (*viritim*). Tracts were also granted to corporations domiciled in Italy south of the Appennines—both ecclesiastical corporations, such as the sorority of the Vestal Virgins and other colleges of priests belonging to the established public service of the Roman State,⁴ and political corporations in the shape of self-governing city-states that were incorporated in, or externally associated with, the Roman body politic.⁵

¹ Haring, *op. cit.*, pp. 160 and 159. ² See pp. 114-15, above. ³ See V. v. 569-74.

⁴ See Hyginus: *De Condiçionibus Agrorum* (in *Die Schriften der Römischen Feldmesser*, ed. by Blume, F., Lachmann, K., and Rudorff, A., vol. i (Berlin 1848, Reimer), p. 117) and Siculus Flaccus: *De Condiçionibus Agrorum* (in *op. cit.*, pp. 162-3).

⁵ The self-governing communities incorporated in the Roman body politic were colonies and municipia of Roman citizens; those externally associated with it were Latin city-states, whose relations with the Roman State were governed by custom, and *civitates foederatae* which were bound to Rome by written treaties, the terms of which varied in accordance with the particular circumstances in which each community had entered into permanent political association with Rome. Cis-Appennine city-states of both classes received corporate grants of land in the Po Basin from the Roman Government—presumably as a recompense for services rendered by the military contingents from these states in the Roman armies by which the Po Basin had been conquered from its native inhabitants. The aggregate extent of their holdings must have been considerable, to judge by the part that they played in the opposition of the various vested interests to the Gracchan policy of reasserting the Roman State's right of eminent domain over all Roman public land that had not been assigned in freehold to individual proprietors (see Appian of Alexandria: *Studies in Roman History*, 'The Civil Wars', Book I, chap. x, § 6, and chap. xix, § 1, where πόλεις ἰσοπολιτεῖες signifies *municipia civium Romanorum*, πόλεις ἀποικοὶ the *coloniae Latinae*, and Ἰταλιῶται the citizens of *civitates foederatae*).

Both the ecclesiastical and the municipal corporations that possessed these endowments of land in the Po Basin appear to have turned them to account by letting them to tenants. The ecclesiastical tenancies ran for either one-year or five-year periods (Hyginus: *De Condiçionibus Agrorum*, in *Die Schriften der Römischen Feldmesser*, ed. cit., vol. i, p. 117). We have two glimpses of the management of the municipal estates in the collected correspondence of Cicero. In a letter written in 46 B.C. (*Ad Familiares*, Book XIII, Letter 11), Cicero introduces to his correspondent, Decimus Iunius Brutus, governor of Cisalpine Gaul, the three commissioners whom the municipal authorities of Arpinum (Cicero's own home town) are sending out with instructions 'to inspect the properties let out on lease (*vectigalia*) which they possess in the Province of Gaul, to collect the rents due from the tenants (*colonis*), and generally to examine and deal with the situation there'. In a letter written in 45 B.C. (*Ad Familiares*, Book XIII, Letter 7), Cicero asks his correspondent Cluvius to intercede with Caesar on behalf of the municipality of Atella in the matter of that community's agricultural property let out on lease (*de agro vectigali municipii*), which was threatened with confiscation. According to Cicero these rents were

In the Arab Caliphate under the Umayyad régime we find a parallel to the Inca practice which is almost exact from the geographer's standpoint though perhaps not so close from the sociologist's. Just as the Incas established economic partnerships between lowland districts and highland districts, so the Umayyads endowed the two cantonments of Basrah and Kūfah not only with arable land on the adjoining plains of 'Irāq (the fabulously productive 'Black Earth': *As-Sawād*), but also with meadow-land, pasture, and forest in 'the Highlands' (*Al-Jibāl*) through which the Great North-East Road wound its way up towards the frontier of the Syriac World over against the Eurasian Steppe.¹ The difference between the Umayyad and the Inca application of the same device lies in the motive, which in the Umayyads' case seems to have been primarily military and only incidentally economic. The frontier garrisons which the Arab empire-builders pushed forward up the Great North-East Road,² first into Khurāsān and eventually into Transoxania,³ were originally recruited, and subsequently reinforced, by drafts from the cantonments at Basrah and Kūfah;⁴ and the grant to these

an important item in the budgets of the municipalities to which they were payable. In the first of the two letters here cited, he writes that the people of Arpinum depend on this source of income for 'all their ways and means of providing for public worship and keeping public buildings, both religious and secular, in a sound state of repair'. In the second letter he goes so far as to write that 'the municipal finances of Atella are entirely dependent on this source of income'.

Evidence of a grant of forest and pasture land in the Po Basin to the *civitas foederata* Aquinum, situated in the distant basin of the Liris (Garigliano), is preserved in the name 'Saltus Galliani qui cognominantur Aquinates' (meaning 'Estates, situate in Cisalpine Gaul, of the city-state of Aquinum') which was borne by one of the self-governing municipalities of Roman citizens in the eighth of the eleven regions into which Augustus grouped the city-states of Italy (see the list in Plinius Secundus, C.: *Historia Naturalis*, Book III, chap. xv (xx), § 116). At some date between the end of the first quarter of the second century B.C. and Augustus's day, the tenants and squatters on this estate must have been incorporated as an autonomous community.

¹ For example, the revenues of the city and district of Dinawar were payable to the cantonment of Kūfah, and those of Nihāwand to the cantonment of Basrah (Le Strange, Guy: *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge 1905, University Press), pp. 189 and 197).

² See xi, map 37.

³ See p. 121, above.

⁴ In the Arab military occupation of Khurāsān, it was Basrah, not Kūfah, that played the predominant part, and this fact was unhappily reflected in the transplantation to Khurāsān not only of the Basran soldiery but of the inter-tribal feuds that were Basrah's heritage from a pre-Islamic Arabia (see Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), pp. 247, 256, and 131). The Basran Arab garrisons in Khurāsān were not deterred from pursuing these inter-tribal feuds either by the numerical preponderance of the native Iranian population or by the proximity of the Eurasian Nomad adversary on the farther side of the frontier. Ziyād—whom the Caliph Mu'āwiyah appointed governor not only of Basrah and Kūfah but of all Arab dominions beyond them, as far as Khurāsān inclusive, which were dominated from the cantonments on the Euphrates by way of the Great North-East Road—sent large numbers of Basran and Kufan Arab families to Khurāsān (see *ibid.*, p. 79). Further drafts of 25,000 men each from the two cantonments were sent to Khurāsān by Ziyād's son Rabi', on whom his father's governor-generalship was conferred by Mu'āwiyah after Ziyād's death. By the end of the seventh century of the Christian Era there was in Khurāsān an Arab population of about 200,000, including about 40,000 fighting-men (see *ibid.*, p. 266). The military and political dependence of the greater part of the Iranian Plateau on a Power installed on the plains of 'Irāq, which was a salient feature in the administrative organization of the Umayyad Empire, has its counterpart in the similar situation after the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire, when the successors of Alexander were contending for the fragments of the carcass. In that struggle, Seleucus Nicator emerged as one of the victors largely owing to his ability to dominate, from his base at Babylon, all the former Achaemenian dominions lying to the north-east and east of Babylonia, save for an easternmost fringe which he was constrained to cede to Chandragupta in exchange for a park of war-elephants.

two Arab military corporations in 'Irāq of estates on the Iranian Plateau—whose productive resources were thus laid under contribution for the benefit of Basrah's and Kūfah's war-chests—was an economic reflection of the military fact that the outlying garrisons protecting the Iranian provinces of the Caliphate were detachments from the two great nurseries of soldiers cantoned on the distant borderland between the Euphrates and the Arabian Steppe.

The Inca practice of transporting individually selected skilled workers and their families, in order to improve the quality of production in economically backward districts, has counterparts—economically comparable, though incomparably brutal and indiscriminate from the human standpoint—in both Hellenic and Syriac history. The scientific agricultural exploitation, with imported slave labour, of the coastlands of the Western Mediterranean from the fifth century B.C. onwards and of the seaboard of Lower 'Irāq in the ninth century of the Christian Era has already been noticed in this Study in another context.¹ There are indications that the Incas may have brought artificers from the culturally maturer lowland region of Chimú to raise the standard of workmanship in their own highland capital at Cuzco.² This was certainly the purpose of the Mongols in carrying Chinese, Russian, and Western Christian craftsmen away captive from the extremities of the Old World to its heartland when they were trying to transform Qaraqorum from an encampment of Nomads into a city fit to be the capital of a world empire.³ Ts'in She Hwang-ti may have had the same end in view in bringing selected settlers from other parts of his empire to recruit the population of Hien-yang,⁴ when he was making an imperial capital out of a city that had hitherto only had to serve as a capital for the parochial state of Ts'in.⁵ On the other hand Nebuchadnezzar, in deporting to Babylon from Jerusalem 'all the craftsmen and smiths',⁶ was probably more concerned to deprive Judah of her armaments industry—and thereby render it impossible for her to make any further attempt at armed insurrection against the Neo-Babylonian régime⁷—than he was to improve the age-old craftsmanship of Babylon, whose practitioners would have felt that they had little to learn from a handful of artisans picked up from a rustic highland principality in a remote corner of the empire.

A type of internal colonization which is apt to become prominent in the last phase of the history of a universal state is the plantation of barbarian husbandmen on lands that have come to be depopulated either as a result of raids perpetrated by these barbarians themselves (or by neighbours of theirs in their former homes in the no-man's-land beyond the *limes*) or as a result of some social sickness, native to the

¹ In V. v. 66 and 129.

² Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 134.

³ See the passage quoted from Friar William of Rubruck's narrative in V. v. 113-14, and Olschki, L.: *Guillaume Boucher, A French Artist at the Court of the Khans* (Baltimore 1946, Johns Hopkins University Press).

⁴ See V. v. 141.

⁵ The successive changes in the location of the capital of the Sinic universal state are dealt with below on pp. 210-13.

⁶ 2 Kings xxiv. 14 and 16, cited already on p. 116, above.

⁷ This had unquestionably been the motive of the Philistines when, in the eleventh century B.C., they had placed a ban upon the practice of the metallurgical industry in the subjugated territory of Israel (see I Sam. xiii. 19-22).

depopulated empire itself, which has laid it open to barbarian attack by sapping its powers of resistance.

A classic example is presented in the picture of a post-Diocletianic Roman Empire in the *Notitia Dignitatum*, which records the presence of a number of German and Sarmatian barbarian corporate settlements on Roman soil in Gaul, Italy, and the Danubian provinces. The technical term *laeti*, by which these barbarian settlers were known, is derived from a West German word¹ denoting semi-servile resident aliens; and we may infer that the Romans' *laeti* were the descendants of defeated barbarian adversaries of the Roman Imperial Government who had been punished or rewarded for past acts of aggression by being coerced or coaxed into migrating permanently to become peaceful cultivators of the Promised Land on the inner side of the *limes* which they had formerly devastated as raiders. From the Roman Government's standpoint this arrangement would serve the dual purpose of employing the barbarians to repair the damage that they themselves had inflicted and of giving them at the same time an interest in keeping the peace for the future instead of continuing to break it. The *laeti* were cautiously planted in the interior of the Empire, not in the immediate neighbourhood of the *limites*,² and in Gaul, at any rate, each settlement of *laeti* was attached to a particular Gallic canton and was required to pay its land-tax to the municipal authorities, not to the Imperial Treasury.³ In its gazetteer of the western portion of the Empire the *Notitia Dignitatum* mentions twelve *praefecturae* of German *laeti* attached to divers Gallic cantons⁴ and twenty-two *praefecturae* of Sarmatian *laeti* in Gaul and Italy,⁵ as well as a settlement of Sarmatae and Taifali Gentiles in the Gallic canton Pictavi⁶ and a Gens Marcomannorum, administered by a tribune, in the Middle Danube province of Pannonia Prima.⁷

'The Melting-pot'

Our survey of garrisons and colonies installed by builders of universal states has perhaps borne out our contention that these systematic transfers of population—which are characteristic of the universal state phase in the decline of a civilization—are on the whole much more humane, in execution as well as in design, than the capricious and vindictive uprooting of individuals and communities which is characteristic of the antecedent Time of Troubles. At the same time our survey has brought to light the truth that these two morally diverse processes produce similar social results. And the cumulative effect of the empire-builders' statesmanship, following upon the war-lords' atrocities,⁸ is to

¹ *Leto, litu, let, laet, lat* (see Grosse, R.: *Römische Militärgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der Byzantinischen Themenverfassung* (Berlin 1920, Weidmann), p. 208).

² See *ibid.*, p. 209.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ *In Partibus Occidentis*, chap. xlii, §§ 33-44.

⁵ *Ibid.*, §§ 46-63 and 66-70; cp. Codex Theodosianus VII. 20, 12, of A.D. 400: 'Laetus (MS. luctus) Alamannus, Sarmata'.

⁶ *In Partibus Occidentis*, chap. xlii, § 65.

⁷ *Ibid.*, chap. xxxiv, § 24.

⁸ The successive types of 'saviours with the sword' whose sequence punctuates the stages of the decline and fall of a civilization have been reviewed in V. vi. 178-213.

intensify and accelerate a process of pammixia and proletarianization¹ that is characteristic of Times of Troubles and universal states alike.

Permanent military garrisons installed on the frontiers of universal states become 'melting-pots' in which the dominant minority of a disintegrating society fuses itself with both the external and the internal proletariat. In an earlier part of this Study² we have observed that, on the organized military frontier of a civilization over against outer barbarians, the wardens of the marches and the opposing barbarian war-bands tend, with the passage of time, to become assimilated to one another first in military technique and equipment and eventually also in culture and *éthos*. But, long before the dominant minority of a disintegrating society has been barbarized by hostile contact, across the frontier, with the external proletariat, it will have been vulgarized by fraternization, within the frontier, with the internal proletariat.³ For empire-builders who have gained their position by emerging as sole survivors from a struggle for existence between the parochial states of their world do not often preserve either sufficient manpower or sufficient zest for the profession of arms to be able to contemplate holding and defending their hardly won empire unaided.

In this quandary their first recourse is to reinforce their own military strength by enlisting, not barbarians from beyond the pale, but subjects of the empire who have not lost their martial virtues. While they seldom push this policy to the extreme to which the Achaemenidae went when they took over into their own service the Jewish military colony that had been installed in the Egyptian frontier fortress of Elephantinê by their Saïte predecessors,⁴ they frequently raise new military formations from among their subjects and brigade these with the troops of their own ruling nationality. Thus Augustus and his successors manned the immensely long frontiers of the Roman Empire, which Augustus had staked out, by brigading with the Roman legions *auxilia* recruited from Roman subjects who were not Roman citizens.⁵ The detachments of Arab professional soldiery from Basrah and Kūfah, which were posted in Khurāsān to hold the north-east frontier of the Umayyad Empire, enlisted the help of the warlike native Iranian inhabitants of the province and fraternized with their new comrades-in-arms, in contrast to the aloofness of the parent cantonments on the Euphrates from the subject civilian population of 'Irāq.⁶ Khurāsānī Arab officers adopted the Iranian custom of surrounding themselves with a *comitatus* of picked Iranian fighting-men, and they also raised separate Iranian military formations under Iranian officers.⁷ The local Iranians, on their side, had good reasons for responding favourably to these bids for their co-operation that were made to them by their Arab conquerors.

'As a result of the conquest, their position, on the whole, changed only slightly, and this hardly for the worse. The defence of Khurāsān against enemies from outside—that is, against the Turks—was conducted by the

¹ For this process, see V. v. 439-80, *passim*.

² See V. v. 439-59.

³ See V. v. 446, and p. 132, above.

⁴ See V. v. 447, and Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 307, quoted in the present Study in V. v. 450.

⁵ See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

⁶ In V. v. 459-80.

⁷ See pp. 118-19, above.

Arabs more successfully than it had been managed under the Sasanian régime. . . . The *Mawālī* (as non-Arabs who had become converts to Islam and become adopted members of the Arab tribes were called in Khurāsān, as elsewhere) fought shoulder to shoulder with the Arabs against their traditional national enemy, the Turks. They also fought for Islam against their own Sogdian kinsmen, in so far as the latter were Islam's enemies and the Turks' confederates. . . . The domestic life of Khurāsān was not interfered with by the Arabs very much. They left the administration to the *marzbans* and *dihqans* and did not impinge upon the subject population except through these native intermediaries. Even in the garrison towns and in the seats of administration the native authorities continued to play their part side by side with their Arab colleagues. For one thing, they had to collect the taxes, for the due payment of which, on the agreed scale, they were responsible to their conquerors. However, the burden of taxation had doubtless weighed as heavily on the *misera contribuens plebs* under the Sasanian régime.¹ The Iranians were also left undisturbed in the practice of their religion; in the agreements providing for payment of tribute it is always assumed that they are going to retain their ancestral faith. . . . They appear, all the same, to have had no very serious attachment to Zoroastrianism. . . . The attraction of Islam for the Iranians was in the first instance not so much on account of its intrinsic merits as for the sake of the material advantages which it had to offer. They used it as a means of diminishing the gulf between themselves and the ruling class and of obtaining a share in their privileges by "going Arab". They adopted Arabic names and secured admission into an Arab tribe.²

Even the Manchus—who, as mere restorers of their Mongol predecessors' empire-building work in China, had not to pass through the ordeal that is the usual price of founding a universal state—did not attempt to hold, with their own unaided strength, the vast and populous domain of which they had made so easy a conquest. In the 'banners' of which their garrisons were composed, their general practice was, as we have seen,³ to brigade a Chinese and a Mongol with each Manchu battalion.

Our records, fragmentary though they are, give us vivid glimpses, here and there, of 'the melting-pot' at work. A piece of first-hand evidence for the mutual assimilation of the Chinese 'bannermen' in Manchu service and their Manchu fellow soldiers has been quoted in this study at an earlier point.⁴ At Elephantinē under the Achaemenian régime—which was particularly liberal⁵ in giving openings to non-Persians—the Jewish military unit constituting the garrison had on its strength not only some soldiers of Babylonian origin but also at least one

¹ According to Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 310, Khurāsān was not exempt from the general rule that land-tax continued to be payable, both by native converts to Islam and by Muslim Arabs who had become local landowners, on land originally belonging to the native non-Muslim population. On the other hand, according to the same authority, *op. cit.*, p. 19, non-Muslim subjects of the Caliphate who performed military service for frontier defence were exempted from taxation.—A.J.T.

² Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-9.

³ See pp. 128-9, above, with the references there given.

⁴ In V. v. 457-8; *cp.* p. 449.

⁵ On this point see Meyer, E.: *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantinē*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs), p. 26.

Chorasmian.¹ It is remarkable that this soldier should have found his way to the First Cataract of the Nile from his native land in the delta of the Oxus, at the opposite extremity of the Achaemenian Empire. It is still more remarkable that this representative of the high-spirited Iranian peoples of the north-eastern marches, who were to offer such a stubborn resistance to Alexander the Great,² should not have felt it beneath his dignity to serve shoulder to shoulder with Syrians in a regiment of mercenaries.

In the civil life of this Jewish military colony, Babylonian influence was strong, though the colony had originally been founded by the Neo-Babylonian Empire's Saïte rivals and adversaries, and though it is probable that the Saïtes had recruited at least the first nucleus of the force from among those 'die-hards' in Judah who had preferred to be refugees in Egypt rather than deportees in Babylonia.³ The marriage contracts, for example, that had survived from the community's archives were Babylonian rather than Israelite in form, and this Babylonizing tendency in Elephantinian Jewish personal law had been strong enough to raise the general status of women above the customary Jewish level of that age.⁴ One medium through which this Babylonian influence had seeped in was the Aramaic language and alphabet of the Jewish community at Elephantinê, which were identical with those in use in contemporary Babylonia and Assyria.⁵ The tincture of Babylonian polytheism in the Yahweh-worship of the Elephantinê community⁶ suggests that there may have been Babylonian elements in the community itself; and this, in turn, suggests that the original nucleus may have been a mixed band including refugees from Samaria as well as from Judah,⁷ since the Samaritans were a hybrid community in which a remnant of Israel was mingled with deportees from Babylonia whom the Assyrian warlord Sargon had planted in place of the Israelites whom he had deported to 'the cities of the Medes'.⁸ These facts and probabilities indicate that Achaemenian Elephantinê was a 'melting-pot' indeed; and, on this analogy, we may picture the corresponding role of the Arab military cantonments in the Umayyad Empire.

'[The non-Arabs] went over to Islam in large numbers, and such conversions were particularly numerous among the masses of Iranian prisoners-of-war in Kûfah and Basrah.'⁹

This non-Arab element in the cantonments was continually reinforced by the effect of 'Umar II's ruling that non-Arab converts in the provinces

¹ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 28, and van Hoonacker, A.: *Une Communauté Judéo-Araméenne à Elephantinê en Égypte aux vi^e et v^e siècles avant J.-C.* (London 1915, Milford), p. 5.

² See II. ii. 140.

³ See 2 Kings xxv. 26 and Jer. xl-xliii.

⁴ See van Hoonacker, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-29.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 29-30. For the process of peaceful penetration by which the Aramaic language and alphabet replaced the Akkadian language and cuneiform characters in the homelands of the Babylonian Civilization, see I. i. 79-80, and V. v. 486-91 and 499-501.

⁶ See V. v. 125, n. 1.

⁷ This is van Hoonacker's conjecture, in *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

⁸ See 2 Kings xvii.

⁹ Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 45. For instances, see Ahmad Al-Balādhurī: *Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān*, English translation by Hitti and Murgotten, Part (ii) (New York 1924, Columbia University Press), pp. 105-11.

must migrate to a cantonment if they wanted to avoid the alternative of continuing, after their conversion, to pay the tax imposed on non-Muslim subjects of the Empire.¹ All non-Arab converts had to obtain affiliation to some Arab tribe or clan,² and this institution of clientship

¹ For this ruling, see p. 132, above.

² See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 45. For example, the soldiers of a Persian cavalry force in Ahwāz which deserted to the Arabs and turned Muslim *en masse* appear to have settled first in Basrah as clients of the Banu Tamīm and afterwards to have transferred their allegiance to the Banu S'ad. Besides these Persian Asāwirah, there were Sindi deserters from the Persian army known as Zutt (i.e. Jāts), and others known as Sayābijah and Andaghār. Under the Sasanian régime these Zutt had had their pastures on the borders (*tufūf*) of 'Irāq over against the North Arabian Steppe, while the Sayābijah had been settled on the coast of the Persian Gulf, and the Andaghār in the desert borderland between Kirmān and Seistan. These three peoples were all now settled at Basrah as clients of the Banu Tamīm, and they afterwards transferred their allegiance to the Banu Hanthalah (see Balādhuri, *op. cit.*, Part (ii), pp. 105-107, 109, and 111). We also hear of a Persian family from Umān migrating to Basrah via Yamāmāh (see *ibid.*, p. 100), and of the inhabitants of the Persian city of Qazwīn surrendering to the Arabs on terms, accepting Islam, and settling in Kūfah, under the name of Hamrā' ad-Daylam, as clients of Zuhrah b. Hawiyah (see *ibid.*, p. 10). Prisoner-converts from Bukhārā were settled by 'Ubaydallah b. Ziyād at Basrah (see *ibid.*, p. 111).

Some of the Zutt and Sayābijah deserters from the Persian army were transplanted in A.D. 669 or 670 by the Caliph Mu'awiyah I from Basrah to Antioch (see *ibid.*, pp. 110-11, and vol. i (New York 1916, Columbia University Press), p. 250). When the Arabs conquered Sind, another batch of Zutt, whom the conquerors had uprooted from their native pastures, seem to have been sent to Syria by Hajjāj (*proconsulari munere fungebatur* A.D. 691-713) and eventually to have been sent on by the Caliph Walid I (*imperabat* A.D. 705-15) to join the previous batch of Zutt deportees at Antioch (see Balādhuri, *op. cit.*, Part (ii), p. 111, and vol. i, p. 250)—whence some, again, were sent on by the Caliph Yazīd II (*imperabat* A.D. 720-4) to Massīṣah (Mopsuestia) in Cilicia (see Balādhuri, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 259). But the bulk of Hajjāj's deportees from Sind—who included representatives of other Sindi tribes besides the Zutt, and who were 'accompanied by their wives, their children and their buffaloes' (Balādhuri, *op. cit.*, Part (ii), p. 109)—seem to have been settled by Hajjāj in 'Irāq, in the Kaskar district. Here their numbers were subsequently recruited, according to Balādhuri (*ibid.*, p. 109), by runaway black slaves and by contumacious clients of an Arab tribe and an Arab grandee; and in the reign of the 'Abbasid Caliph Ma'mūn (*imperabat* A.D. 813-33) they broke out into a rebellion which it took him and his successor Mu'tasim (*imperabat* A.D. 833-42) the best part of twenty years to quell. According to Mas'ūdī (in his *Tanbih*, Baron Carra de Vaux's translation, p. 455) these ninth-century Zutt insurgents in the marches of South-Western 'Irāq were the descendants of immigrants from Sind who had migrated to 'Irāq in large numbers across Kirmān, Fars, and Khūzistān. Whether there had or had not been a voluntary immigration as well as a compulsory deportation of Zutt to 'Irāq from Sind, we may take it that, in the course of the first two centuries of Arab rule, man-power from Western India had, in one way or another, been flowing into a South-Western Asia that, on the eve of the Arab conquest, had been depopulated by the two last and most devastating of the Romano-Persian wars.

After the capitulation of the 'Irāqī Zutt insurgents in A.D. 834, Mu'tasim deported some of them to Jalūlah and Khāniqīn, astride the Great North-East Road, and the rest to 'Ayn Zarbah (*Graecē* Anazarbus) in Cilicia, in the valley of the River Jayhān (*Graecē* Pyramus) to the north-east of Massīṣah (see Balādhuri, *op. cit.*, Part (ii), p. 110, and vol. i, p. 264, and the other authorities cited by M. J. de Goeje in *Mémoires d'Histoire et de Géographie Orientales*, No. 3: 'Mémoire sur les Migrations des Tsiganes à travers l'Asie' (Leyden 1903, Brill), pp. 30-31). These were not the first Zutt to be settled at 'Ayn Zarbah; for Zutt from 'Ayn Zarbah had already been drafted by Hārūn-ar-Rashīd (*imperabat* A.D. 786-809) to reinforce the garrison of the neighbouring Cilician fortress Kanīsat as-Sawdā' (see Balādhuri, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 264). Thereafter, in A.D. 855, the East Romans descended on 'Ayn Zarbah and carried off into East Roman territory, to the north-west of the Taurus Range, the Zutt deportees there, together with their women and children and buffaloes (Tabarī III, 1426, cited by de Goeje in *op. cit.*, p. 31). This thrice deported detachment of the Zutt were the advance guard of the Gypsies of Orthodox and Western Christendom. We may guess that they were reinforced by their kinsmen at Massīṣah and Antioch after the reconquest of Cilicia and Northern Syria by the East Roman Empire in the tenth century of the Christian Era.

It will be seen that the Arab Caliphate played a part in the dissemination of the Gypsies that corresponded to the part played by the East Roman Empire in the dissemination of the Paulicians (see IV. iv. 624-34).

made the relation between non-Arab and Arab Muslims intimate, even though it did not place the two categories of Muslims on a footing of equality with each other. The resulting social fusion went far. Even at Basrah and Kūfah, at least as much Persian as Arabic was spoken in the markets,¹ and in Khurāsān the process naturally went farther still. In the Khurāsānī army which, under Abu Muslim's leadership, overthrew the Umayyad régime in the great insurrection of A.D. 747-50, even the Arabs were predominantly Persian-speaking.² The Khurāsānī Arab officer who caught and killed the fugitive Umayyad Caliph Marwān in Upper Egypt in the summer of A.D. 750 gave the word of command in Persian when he ordered his troops to attack.³

In the Roman Empire, likewise, the military cantonments and civilian colonies acted as social 'melting-pots'.⁴ The ferment must have been particularly active in the Roman colony planted in 45 B.C. by Caesar at Corinth,⁵ since the Roman citizens whom Caesar settled here were freedmen;⁶ and these 'stepsons of Italy'⁷—as Publius Scipio Aemilianus had once called the free populace of the city of Rome to their face, in contemptuous allusion to the servile source to which so many of them owed their origin, even as early as Aemilianus's day—were drawn from all quarters of the Hellenic World and its hinterlands. In their settlement at Corinth, Caesar's freedman-colonists were merely consummating a process of pammixia of which they themselves were earlier products.

Who are the Beneficiaries?

In promoting this process of pammixia and proletarianization in the body social of a universal state, for whose benefit do civilian colonies and military garrisons chiefly operate?

There have been cases in which the beneficiary has been an alien civilization. For example, the transfers of population on the grand scale, to which the Incas' subjects had been broken in by their rulers' benevolently high-handed policy, prepared the ground for the more revolutionary acts of the Incas' Spanish supplanters and successors. The Spanish authorities were adopting Incaic practice in attempting to regroup the subject 'Indian' population into new local communities⁸ and in retaining and protecting the village headmen⁹ whom the foregoing Incaic régime had installed.¹⁰ The Spanish Viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo (*proconsulari munere fungebatur* A.D. 1569-81) was said also to have been consciously and deliberately following Incaic precedent when he organized a system of universal compulsory conscription for

¹ See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

² According to Tabarī, cited by Wellhausen in *op. cit.*, p. 308.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 342.

⁴ The Roman Army's role in propagating the Latin version of the Hellenic culture in the Greek-speaking and Oriental provinces of the Roman Empire and at the same time introducing Greek and Oriental influences into the Latin western provinces is described in Hahn, L.: *Rom und Romanismus* (Leipzig 1906, Dieterich), pp. 160-6.

⁵ See pp. 109-10, above.

⁶ See IV. iv. 270, with n. 4.

⁷ 'Quorum noverca est Italia' (Velleius Paterculus, C.: *Historia Romana*, Book II, chap. iv, § 4).

⁸ See Haring, C. H.: *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York 1947, Oxford University Press), pp. 70-71, 142, and 174-5.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 63, n. 44, and p. 215.

¹⁰ See p. 115, above.

civilian labour, under which 'the Indians' were called up in rotation for periods of three or four months' service at a time in numbers that kept one-seventh of the total labour force perpetually mobilized;¹ and the long-suffering native peasantry that was thus periodically rounded up² like Ottoman *ra'îyeh* to meet the Spanish colonists' seasonal demands for labour were also placed, when at home, at the disposal of Spanish *encomienderos*.³ These Spanish counterparts, in the Andean countryside, of the Persian barons whom the Achaemenidae planted in Cappadocia were not the only agents of a Western Christian cultural penetration of the Andean Society under the newly imposed alien régime. The Spanish self-governing municipalities founded at key-points in the Andean World had as potent an effect as the Greek self-governing city-states that were founded in Egypt and South-Western Asia by Alexander and his successors;⁴ and these municipalities, like the *encomienderos*, were beneficiaries of an antecedent Incaic Imperial régime which had schooled an uprooted and regimented Andean population to become docile 'Indians' for *conquistadores* from the Old World.

In the European interior of the Western World a quarter of a millennium later, the main body of the Western Society was the beneficiary of the short-lived universal state which was provided for the mouldering remains of a Medieval Western city-state cosmos by the Napoleonic Empire. The stagnation into which the life of Flanders, Western Germany, and Northern Italy had sunk since the Medieval Western city-state cosmos's decay⁵ was stirred into fresh and vigorous movement by the intrusion of semi-alien French garrisons; and, brief though this disturbing French visitation was, it had the decisive and historic effect of drawing back into the main stream of Western life the waters of a branch that had become a backwater.⁶ The impact of the Napoleonic soldiery, and of their more polished forerunners under the *ancien régime*, on the mustily vegetating society of eighteenth-century Frankfurt and Düsseldorf has been vividly depicted in two masterpieces of German literature.⁷

Such cases, however, as these are as rare as they are interesting, and it is evident that an alien civilization is not the normal beneficiary from the colonies and garrisons that have been installed by a universal state. On the other hand, the barbarians beyond the pale of a civilization derive conspicuous benefits from cantonments screening a universal state's

¹ See Haring, op. cit., p. 64.

² See p. 112, n. 7, above.

³ An exact account of the *encomienda* will be found in Haring, op. cit., pp. 44-45 and 62. The strictness with which, at least in juridical theory, the rights of the Crown on the one hand and of the peasants on the other hand were safeguarded in the terms on which an *encomienda* was granted to a Spanish *conquistador* is reminiscent of the limitations on the rights of Ottoman fief-holders (see pp. 124-6, above).

⁴ See p. 135, above.

⁵ See III. iii. 344-50.

⁶ See V. v. 619-42.

⁷ In Goethe's *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Book III, there is an account of the impression made on Goethe in his childhood by the French 'town major', Count Thorane of Grasse, who was billeted in Goethe's father's house after the occupation of Frankfurt by the French Army on the 2nd January, 1759. In Heine's *Reisebilder*, in 'Das Buch Le Grand', there is an analogous picture of the impression made on Heine in his childhood by the French drummer who was billeted in Heine's father's house in Düsseldorf. The Jewish child was captivated by the French plebeian, as the Frankfurter patrician child had been by the French aristocrat.

outer frontiers; for the education which the barbarians gradually acquire from these military outposts of a civilization—first as adversaries and later as mercenaries of the imperial power—makes them capable, at the moment when the empire collapses, of swooping across the fallen barrier and carving barbarian successor-states out of derelict imperial provinces. This adventure and its sequel have been discussed in previous parts of this Study¹ and are dealt with further below.² At this point it is only necessary to remind ourselves that the barbarians' triumphs are as short-lived as they are sensational.³ The transfers and mixtures of population in a universal state produce deeper effects, with more important historical consequences, on the relations between the dominant minority and the internal proletariat.

In both the Roman Empire and the Arab Caliphate, for example, the relative positions of these two social factions had undergone a revolutionary change to the dominant minority's disadvantage—though this without any commensurate gain for the internal proletariat—long before the barbarians succeeded in founding their ephemeral successor-states. In the Arab Caliphate this internal social revolution expressed itself politically in the substitution of the 'Abbasid for the Umayyad régime after the short and sharp civil war of A.D. 747–50. In the Roman Empire the political expression of the corresponding social revolution was the replacement of an Augustan 'principate' by a Diocletianic despotism after a long-protracted bout of disorder which, in its most acute phase, rankled into outright anarchy.⁴ In both cases the revolution was provoked by the disillusionment of the internal proletariat with a formal enfranchisement which had not made them genuine equals of the dominant minority; in both cases the insurgent internal proletariat succeeded in depriving the dominant minority of the power and privileges which they had retained till then *de facto*; and in both cases, again, the ruin of the dominant minority did not achieve the revolutionists' aim of setting the victorious internal proletariat in their former masters' seat. Equality, indeed, was attained, but on the level of a common servitude to a new master in the shape of a totalitarian régime.

This ironical turn of events through which History cheated the proletarian insurgents of the fruits of their victory was a consequence of the violence with which the revolution had been carried out. This recurrence of disorders characteristic of a Time of Troubles put to rout the social rally that had been achieved through the foundation of a universal state. Therewith, the temporarily arrested disintegration of a declining civilization was set in motion again, and the social effort thenceforth fruitlessly expended on the forlorn hope of saving the life of a civilization that was by that time *in extremis* took such a tremendous toll from the society's fast-dwindling energies that no margin remained for allocation to individual liberties—not even on the restricted scale of inordinate privileges for a small minority. The totalitarian régime, which was a last

¹ In V. v. 194–337 and 459–480.

² In VIII. viii, *passim*.

³ On this point, see I. i. 58–62 and VIII. viii. 45–87.

⁴ The period of disorder lasted from the death of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius in A.D. 180 to the accession of Diocletian in A.D. 284. The chapter of anarchy ran from the murder of Alexander Severus in A.D. 235 to the official triumph of Aurelian in A.D. 274.

desperate and swiftly bankrupt expedient for staving off social dissolution, demanded, and exacted to the uttermost farthing, the surrender of the individual's residual treasure of personal freedom.

The Triumph of Equality and Despotism in the Arab Caliphate

The dissatisfaction of the non-Arab converts to Islam¹ with their treatment under the Umayyad régime had substantial grounds. For example, non-Arab prisoners-of-war

'secured by conversion their personal freedom,² but not the full status of citizens and members of the army, and therefore not the privileges which this status carried with it: they became *Mawālī*, i.e. clients of an Arab clan. It was only on these terms, as subordinate hangers-on of Arab clans, that converts obtained admission to the ranks of the theocracy; for Islam by itself did not suffice to produce this result. The theocracy was in reality a specifically Arab state, an imperium exercised by the Arabs over the conquered peoples.'³

Even the Khurāsānī Iranians whom the local Arab military colonists had accepted as their comrades-in-arms⁴

'were not looked upon by the Arabs as being fully their peers. If they served in the army they had to fight on foot and not on horseback, and if they distinguished themselves they were regarded with mistrust. They did receive pay and a share in prize-of-war, but no regular salary. Their names did not appear on the military salary-roll (*diwān*). Though they were adopted into the Arab tribes, they were still distinguished, as "peasants", from the "tribesmen". And, though they were Muslims, they were not exempted from the tax payable by subjects.'⁵

In their natural dissatisfaction with an Umayyad régime under which they were kept in this ambiguous, uncomfortable, and irritating position, the Iranian converts to Islam found allies in members of the Arab ruling race who were hostile to the Umayyads on religious grounds; and a series of attempts on the part of these two different dissident elements to make common cause, against a régime that was obnoxious to both, resulted eventually in the Umayyads' overthrow.

The first attempt—an unsuccessful one—was made under the auspices of Sabaism, an extreme form of the Shi'ah which glorified the Caliph 'Alī at the cost of tampering with a fundamental tenet of Islam.⁶ This sect struck root in some of the Arab clans in the cantonment of Kūfah, which 'Alī had made the seat of his government; it gained adherents among the numerous Persian freedmen there; and in the anarchy let loose by the civil war between the adherents of 'Alī and those of Mu'āwiyah the Sabaïtes momentarily succeeded in overthrowing the ruling Arab aristocracy of Kūfah and substituting a Sabaïte régime

¹ See V. v. 449-50 and 501, n. 2.

² 'It was, however, only customary, and not obligatory, to grant their freedom to prisoners-of-war if they accepted Islam.'

³ Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁴ See the passage quoted from Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, on pp. 140-1, above.

⁵ Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-10.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 42 and 312-13. The Sabaïtes perverted the Islamic belief in the singleness and transcendence of God by introducing the doctrine that the prophets were successive vehicles of the spirit of God, and that 'Alī was the next of these avatars in succession to Muhammad.

under which the invidious distinction of status between Arab Muslims and non-Arab converts was abolished.¹ After the collapse of a movement that was too heretical to succeed, the Iranian converts found more effective allies in less extreme representatives of the Shi'ah and in the hyper-orthodox and militantly anti-Umayyad Kharijites (*Khawārij*), who condemned 'Alī himself for his half-heartedness in the cause of God.² Seeds of both Kharijism and Shi'ism were carried from Kūfah to Khurāsān by the drafts of Kūfan fighting men that were sent to reinforce the garrisons on the North-East Frontier;³ and, after the Umayyads and their Syrian Arab war-bands had enjoyed nearly a century of ascendancy over all other elements in the Empire, they were overthrown at last by Khurāsānī Iranian converts to Islam with Arab co-operation and largely under Arab leadership.⁴

The anti-Umayyad movement in Khurāsān which came to a head in A.D. 747 in the armed insurrection of Abu Muslim at Merv, and which ended in the replacement of the Umayyads by the 'Abbasids, had been set on foot, about A.D. 720, by agitators from Kūfah who had been Iranian converts by descent and shopkeepers and artisans by profession.⁵ Abu Muslim himself appears to have been of the same origin,⁶ while the nucleus of his rebel army was mainly recruited from peasant Iranian converts in the Merv oasis.⁷ But, though the targets of the insurgents' attack were the Arab representatives of the Umayyad régime, Khurāsānī Arabs were in a majority among Abu Muslim's lieutenants and the insurgents were not consciously working for the cause of Iranian nationalism; the insurrection was an *union sacrée* of Iranian and Arab Khurāsānī Muslims in the cause of Islam;⁸ yet its very success inevitably transformed it into an Iranian *revanche* for the Arab conquest of the Sasanian Empire a hundred years back.

The Khurāsānī conquerors took full advantage of the admirable network of roads which the Umayyads had inherited from the Sasanidae and from the Romans and from those Powers' Achaemenian predecessors. While it had taken the Primitive Muslim Arabs nineteen years (A.D. 634-51/2) to conquer the Sasanian dominions from the Euphrates to Merv, and the Macedonians five years (334-330 B.C.) to conquer the Achaemenian dominions from the Hellespont to the scene of Darius's death beyond the Caspian Gates,⁹ it took the Khurāsānīs

¹ See Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 43.

² For the *Khawārij* see Wellhausen, op. cit., pp. 40-41. In the Primitive Islamic community this faction—whose name means 'the Withdrawers'—took the same line towards the political-minded supporters of both 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah as the synonymous 'Pharisees' took towards the Maccabees in the second century B.C. They differed, however in their consequent tactics, for the *Khawārij* took to militancy while the Pharisees persevered in non-violence (see V. v. 73).

³ See Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 310.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 323.

⁵ See pp. 137-8, above.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 315 and 320.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 331.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 320 and 333-4. In the recently conquered province of Tukhāristān, adjoining Khurāsān on the north-east, Arab conquerors and native Iranians likewise made common cause in this crisis, and likewise accepted a non-Arab as their leader because the Arab aspirants to leadership could not agree among themselves. But this *union sacrée* in Tukhāristān was directed not against the Umayyads but against the Khurāsānī rebels (see *ibid.*, p. 334). This loyalty of the recently conquered Iranians of Tukhāristān to the Umayyad régime is reminiscent of the loyalty of the recently conquered Sikhs in the Panjab to the British Rāj in the crisis of the Indian Mutiny.

⁹ See II. ii. 140.

less than three years to sweep over the Umayyad dominions from Merv to the point in Upper Egypt where they caught and killed their quarry the Umayyad Caliph Marwān. The capitulation, in the summer of A.D. 749, of the Syrian Arab garrison of Nihāwand—the fortress commanding the Great North-East Road at an easily defensible point on the western brow of the Iranian Plateau—retrieved the disgrace of the catastrophic defeat of the Persians by the Arabs on the same spot in A.D. 641 or 642. The crushing defeat of Marwān himself by a mere detachment of the Khurāsānī forces in a ten days' battle (*commisum* 16th–25th January, A.D. 750) on the banks of the Greater Zāb wiped out the older score of the equally crushing defeat that had been inflicted in this neighbourhood in 331 B.C. on the last Darius's last army by Alexander's expeditionary force. In bursting out of Asia into Egypt, and obtaining the allegiance of all the former Umayyad dominions in Africa up to the Atlantic coast of Morocco, the Khurāsānī adherents of the 'Abbasids surpassed the feat of the Sasanian army which had occupied Alexandria in A.D. 619, but had exhausted its impetus some distance short of Carthage,¹ in the course of the last and worst of the Romano-Persian wars. Indeed, they achieved the ambition of the Achaemenid conqueror Cambyses, whose intention of following up his conquest of Egypt by a naval expedition against Carthage had been frustrated by the refusal of the indispensable Phoenician contingent in his fleet to carry out an order to subjugate their colonial kinsmen.²

The brilliant victory of the Khurāsānīs in the civil war that swept across the dominions of the Caliphate in A.D. 747–50 was decisive in its negative results. The Umayyad régime and the hegemony of the Syrian Arab military cantonments, of which the régime had been an expression, were overthrown once for all,³ and the Khurāsānīs ostensibly reigned in their stead under the banner of the 'Abbasids.

'The Khurāsānīs had won for the 'Abbasids their victory and they took their own share of the spoils. In a certain sense they became the heirs of the Syrians, though their relation to the Government was not the same.

¹ See p. 93, above.

² 'Cambyses gave orders to his fleet to sail against Carthage, but the Phoenicians refused to obey. They submitted that they were bound by solemn engagements and that they would be guilty of a crime if they made war on a daughter-community. This unwillingness of the Phoenicians [to lend themselves to Cambyses' designs against Carthage killed the project, since] the remainder of the fleet was inadequate for the task. So, thanks to their Phoenician kinsmen, the Carthaginians escaped subjugation at Persian hands; for Cambyses felt it impolitic to try to coerce the Phoenicians, considering that they had come under Persian sovereignty voluntarily and that the naval power of the Persian Empire depended entirely on them' (Herodotus, Book III, chap. 19). For the relations of the Phoenician city-states to the Achaemenian Imperial Government, see V. v. 123, n. 2.

³ See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 347. As this authority here points out, the success of the subjects of the Caliphate in throwing off the yoke of the Arab cantonments on the borders of the Desert and the Sown had the effect of breaking those links between the subject territories of the Caliphate and the reservoir of badawī Arab military man-power on the Arabian Steppe which had been forged with such care and skill by the original Arab empire-builders. 'The ancient home of the Arabs now "went native" (*verwilderte*) again so completely that it actually became a dangerous business to make the pilgrimage.' Cp. Caetani, L.: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. iii (Milan 1914, Hoepli), p. 50. In the post-Syriac interregnum *circa* A.D. 975–1275, in which the 'Abbasid Caliphate foundered, the Nomads of Arabia played the role, not of upholders of the tottering empire, but of invading barbarians on all fours with the Berbers and the Turks (see III. iii. 445–6).

They were called the *Shi'ah* ('the Party'), the *Ansār* ('the Helpers')¹ or the *Abnā'-ad-Dawlah* ('the Sons of the New Era').² They held in their hands the external power; they had a military organization. . . . They constituted the Caliph's standing army, and the Caliph lived in the midst of these guards of his. Baghdad was in fact laid out, not as an oecumenical capital, but as a cantonment for the Khurāsānīs in which the Caliph could reside at a safe distance from Kūfah. In this cantonment they still maintained their links with their home,³ and the predominance which they had won in the service of the 'Abbasids, both as a party and as a military force, became a predominance of their nation and their country—Eastern Iran—over the rest of the Empire.⁴

This ostensible hegemony was retained by the Khurāsānī garrison of Baghdad for rather more than a century before the military control over the central government of the 'Abbasid Caliphate passed into the hands of a Turkish slave-bodyguard recruited from the Eurasian Steppe beyond the pale of both Khurāsān and Transoxania; and, in terms of the nationality of the founders of successor-states, the general Iranian political ascendancy in the 'Abbasid dominions may be reckoned to have lasted for more than three centuries, if we place to its credit the Transoxanian Iranian successor-state established by the Sāmānids,⁵ and if we take as the terminal date the overthrow of the Daylamī Iranian Buwayhids by the Turkish Saljūqs in A.D. 1055–6.⁶ Compared with the ephemeral subsequent triumphs of the barbarian war-bands that came in at the death of the Caliphate—an ill-assorted mob of Turks and Mongols, Arabs and Berbers, Normans and Franks—the Iranian ascendancy in

¹ The original *Ansār* had, of course, been the people of Medina who had invited the Prophet Muhammad to come and rule over them. Under this name they had been distinguished from the *Muhājirīn* who were the Prophet's Meccan fellow refugees. Now that the name *Muhājirīn* had come to signify the Arab military settlers in the cantonments, the adoption of the name *Ansār* by the Khurāsānīs had an obvious political connotation.—A.J.T.

² Wellhausen notes (op. cit., p. 347) that the original meaning of *dawlah* was 'new era' and that it was the choice of this term by the 'Abbasids to describe their régime that led to its acquiring the general meaning of 'government' or 'dynasty'. Wellhausen also draws attention to the affinity between the title 'Sons of the Kingdom' and the language of Matt. xvii. 25; 'Of whom do the kings of the Earth take custom or tribute? Of their own children, or of strangers?'—A.J.T.

³ The geographical situation of Baghdad in relation to the Iranian Plateau corresponded exactly to that of Basrah and Kūfah in relation to the Arabian Steppe. Baghdad was laid out on a site as near to the heart of 'Iraq as a Khurāsānī garrison could find itself without placing a river barrier between itself and its sources of . . . North-Eastern Iran. The 'geopolitical' significance of the sites of Basrah and Kūfah has been noticed on p. 131, above. When Hārūn-ar-Rashīd (*imperator* A.D. 786–809) organized the North-Western March of the Caliphate over against the East Roman Empire (see p. 121, above), he planted Khurāsānī garrisons at Adana, Tarsus, and 'Ayn Zarbah, *alias* Anazarbus (Ahmad Al-Balādhuri: *Kitāb Futūh-al Buldān*, English translation by Khitti, P. K., vol. i (New York 1916, Columbia University Press), pp. 260, 262, and 264).

⁴ Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 348.

⁵ See II. ii. 142, above. Iranian successor-states of the 'Abbasid Caliphate arose to the west as well as to the east of the 'Abbasid metropolitan province of 'Irāq. The Zanātā Berber Kharijite principality which held the hinterland of Ifriqiyyah from A.D. 761 to A.D. 908 was founded by a Persian adventurer named Rustem, and the ancestor of the so-called 'Fātimids' was said to have come from Ahwāz in the Iranian province of Khūzistān (see I. i. 355). The Ikshid, who in A.D. 935 founded for himself and his heirs a successor-state in Egypt and Syria by carrying out the 'Abbasid Government's mandate to suppress the previous local successor-state ruled by the Tulunids, was a Transoxanian Iranian princeling. His ancestral principality was Farghānah (see Lane-Poole, S.: *A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (London 1914, Methuen), pp. 81–82).

⁶ See I. i. 356.

the more palmy days of the 'Abbasid Era was long-lived and historically important. On the other hand it was unsubstantial by comparison with the antecedent Arab hegemony which had been brought to an end by the Khurāsānī insurrection of A.D. 747-50. The effective immediate heir of the Syrian Arab cantonnments in Syria and 'Irāq was not the Khurāsānī cantonnement at Baghdad but the 'Abbasid totalitarian régime—which did indeed inaugurate a 'new era' when it supplanted its comparatively easy-going Umayyad predecessor.

'The change of dynasty brought with it a transformation of the inward nature of the régime. . . . The Arabs had imposed themselves, by right of conquest, as a ruling nobility over against the populations which they had subjugated. . . . Under the Umayyads this primitive system persisted in essentials. . . . Under the 'Abbasids it vanished—along with the distinction of classes which was its pre-supposition. The 'Abbasids did not, like the Umayyads, stand on the shoulders of a strong aristocracy of which they themselves were members; the Khurāsānīs, on whom their power was based, were not their kinsmen; they were merely their tools. The whole Muslim community stood in a uniform relation to the 'Abbasids, without any gradations of a natural order in the political standing of different elements; the dynasty alone possessed the divine right to rule as heirs of the Prophet. There were no impediments to prevent them from shaping the régime in accordance with technical considerations, as might seem best for efficiency and also for the interests of the dynasty itself. They succeeded in bringing greater order into the administration, especially in the departments of taxation and justice; they were zealous in giving a hearing to, and taking action on, the complaints of subjects who appealed to them as a court of supreme instance.¹ But they suppressed the general living interest in politics—which had formerly been part and parcel of religion—far more thoroughly than had proved practicable for the Umayyads. . . . The State shrank to the dimensions of the Court. . . . And the Court comprised a

¹ This 'Abbasid and likewise Caesarean *arcanum imperii* was also taken to heart by the 'Abbasids' Sāmānīd successors in the North-East. It was remembered of the Sāmānīd prince Ismā'il b. Ahmad, surnamed 'Al-'Ādil' ('the Just') (*dominabatur* A.D. 892-907) that, even in the depth of winter, when the ground was under snow, he would sit motionless on horse-back, armed cap-à-pie, in open court, in order to render himself continually accessible to petitioners.

'I have read, in the works of our forefathers, that it was the usual practice for the Kings of Persia to have a lofty scaffold erected and to station themselves there on horse-back, to enable them to distinguish, among the multitude assembled on the plain, all petitioners complaining of oppression, and so to give themselves the opportunity of doing justice. The reason for this custom was that, when a prince remains inside a palace with doors, barriers, vestibules, corridors and curtains, perverse and ill-intentioned persons can obstruct the entry of petitioners and prevent them from reaching the royal presence. . . .

'Ismā'il b. Ahmad had a practice, when the cold was most severe and when the snow was falling most heavily, of repairing, unattended, to the Great Square [at Bukhārā] and remaining there on horseback till the moment of the dawn prayer. It might happen, he used to say, that some victim of injustice might come to my Court to inform us of his needs, and he might have neither money to cover his expenses nor a roof to shelter him. Because of the rain and the snow, they would not allow him to reach my presence; but, when he knew that I was here, he would come to find me, would obtain satisfaction, and would return home re-assured and rejoicing in complete security.'

This Sāmānīd royal practice, thus described by Hasan Abu 'Alī Nizām-al-Mulk in his *Siyāsat-Nāma*, chap. 3, *ad initium* and *ad finem* (on pp. 12 and 26 of the French translation by Schefer, Ch.: *Sīasset Namēh* (Paris 1893, Leroux)), was still being followed, some nine hundred years later than Ismā'il b. Ahmad's day, in the Transcaucasian Kingdom of Georgia on the eve of its annexation by Russia, according to a self-complacently contemptuous allusion in the work of a Modern Persian (see de Maistre, J.: *Lettres et Opuscules Inédits*, vol. i (Paris 1851, Vaton), p. 215).—A.J.T.

throng of civil servants who were no longer identical with the officers [of the military establishment].¹ Most of these civil servants were creatures and favourites of the sovereign. Freedmen were preponderant among them. Under the previous régime freedmen may have enjoyed the ruler's confidence and exercised a corresponding influence; they now attained to the highest positions in the public service.² They were raised from the dust, to be hurled down into the dust again. . . . It was not birth, but the Caliph, that made people's fortunes. . . . The aristocracy was replaced by a Court hierarchy of officials, distributed between recognized grades and kept under one another's surveillance. At the top stood the Wazîr, who was the head of the Caliphial Chancery and eventually became the visible *alter ego* of a Caliph who no longer appeared in public.³

The Triumph of Equality and Despotism in the Roman Empire

This masterly portrayal of the features of the 'Abbasid régime in which it presented so striking a contrast to its Umayyad background could be adapted with little change to portray the corresponding revolution in the Roman Empire which substituted the Diocletianic despotism for the Augustan 'Principate'. The Augustan régime, like the Umayyad Caliphate, had respected in large measure the liberties of an 'ascendancy'⁴ as against the Imperial Government at the price of tolerating the maintenance of this 'ascendancy's' privileged position as against the subject population of the Empire. In the Roman Empire under the Principate, as in the Arab Caliphate in the Umayyad Age, these privileges were partly positive and partly negative.

An inner circle of Roman families whose members enjoyed a customary right of entry into the Senate actually shared with the Emperor—who tactfully described himself as 'Leader of the House' (*Princeps Senatus*) in the administration of the Roman dominions. A number of pacific provinces in the interior had been handed back to the Senate by Augustus; and, in the provinces which the Emperor continued to keep in his own hands, with the important and significant exception of Egypt, the governorships were reserved in practice for senators, who were reconciled by the splendour of these posts to the indignity of having to hold them as the Emperor's servants. The senatorial class also staffed the senior posts in the Imperial Army. And, though the administration of Egypt was not the only sphere in which the Emperor delegated the realities of power to non-senatorial agents, the authority still left to the senatorial class was considerable in reality and even more imposing in its carefully-kept-up appearances.

A wider circle of Roman citizens who were not of the senatorial class but who were domiciled in Italy enjoyed a monopoly of the right to serve in the Imperial Guard—the nine 'praetorian' ('headquarters') battalions

¹ Compare the segregation of the civil and military services under the Diocletianic régime in the Roman Empire.—A.J.T.

² Compare the corresponding transformation of the freedmen-stewards of Caesar's private household into virtual ministers of state (see V. v. 452-3). In the Roman Empire this political consequence of social *Gleichschaltung* occurred at an early stage of 'the Principate'.—A.J.T.

³ Wellhausen, op. cit., pp. 348-50.

⁴ In the sense in which the term came to be used of the Protestant dominant minority in Ireland under the British Crown from the Tudor Era down to the establishment of the Irish Free State.

that were permanently quartered in the City of Rome itself—and further possessed the valuable negative privilege of being exempt from direct taxation. Under the Principate this 'ascendancy' of an inner circle within the Roman citizen body occupied a position not unlike that of the Syrian Arab soldiery on the salary-rolls of the Arab cantonments in the Caliphate under the Umayyad régime. Like the Syrian Arabs, these specially privileged Roman citizens were a small minority of the total population of the Empire; and, just as, in the Caliphate, there came, as time passed, to be an ever larger body of converts to Islam whose conversion proved not, after all, to have made them the peers of their Arab masters, so likewise in the Roman Empire there was an ever larger body of legally naturalized citizens who found themselves still outside the privileged circle.

In the Roman Empire, as in the Caliphate, and indeed for the same reasons, the formal status of membership in the ruling community was easier for members of the subject population to obtain than were the substantial advantages that had originally been associated with that status automatically. The ring of senatorial families was reluctant to see the value of their privileges depreciated by a widening of their circle. Caesar's revolutionary act of making Roman senators out of the uncouth notables of recently conquered Gallic cantons raised so fierce a storm that Augustus beat a retreat in the interests of his policy of reconciling the Senate to the Principate, and it was not till A.D. 48 that it became practical politics for the Emperor Claudius to enrol senators from among the notables of the Aedui, a Gallic canton that had already been Rome's ally before Caesar's conquest.¹ The Roman Imperial Treasury, for its part, was as reluctant to see its sources of revenue diminished as a result of progressive extensions of the Roman franchise to non-citizen subjects of the Empire as the Umayyad Treasury was to suffer a similar loss through the progressive conversion of non-Muslim subjects of the Caliphate to Islam.²

The immunity from direct taxation which was enjoyed under the Principate by Roman citizens domiciled in Italy dated from the morrow of the Third Romano-Macedonian War (*gerebatur* 171–168 B.C.);³ and at that date the entire Roman citizen body had occupied a territory embracing less than half of Italy south of the Appennines.⁴ When the

¹ See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. x (Cambridge 1934, University Press), p. 377.

² All treasuries are apt to think alike, but the Umayyad Treasury was actually the historical heir to the Roman Treasury's tradition. At the time of the conquest the Primitive Arab Muslim Government had taken on the existing inland revenue organization as a going concern—including the official personnel as well as the records and the practice—in both their ex-Roman and their ex-Sasanian dominions. Ruling, as they did, from Damascus, the Umayyads were influenced by the Roman fiscal tradition predominantly.

³ Having destroyed in that war the last surviving Great Power in the Hellenic World apart from the Roman Commonwealth itself, the Romans felt that the consequent decrease in their own military and political liabilities, and increase in the external sources of their public revenue, made a combination of new circumstances that justified them in ceasing to impose direct taxation on themselves. They did not, however, abolish the tax of 5 per cent. on the manumission of slaves, which had been introduced as early as 357 B.C. and which had a social as well as a fiscal purpose. This tax remained in force under the Empire (see Hirschfeld, O.: *Die Kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1905, Weidmann), pp. 106–9).

⁴ A map displaying the areas in Italy that were included in the territory of the Roman

Roman citizenship had been subsequently conferred, first on all previously alien Italian communities south of the River Po,¹ and then on all communities between the Po and the Alps,² the exemption from direct taxation had accompanied the conferment of the franchise as a matter of course. When, however, under the Principate, the still expanding body of Roman citizens burst even the generous bounds that had been assigned to Italy by Augustus and came to constitute an appreciable and increasing element in the population of the provinces as well, the Imperial Treasury took alarm, and laid down the new doctrine that the immunity from direct taxation which had been one of the attributes of Roman citizenship since 167 B.C. was applicable only to citizens domiciled in Italy; all persons domiciled in provincial Roman territory were now deemed to be liable to direct taxation even if they happened to be Roman citizens;³ the only exception to this ruling was in favour of Roman citizens domiciled in the territory of a Roman municipality, outside Italy, on which 'Italian status' (*ius Italicum*)⁴ had been expressly conferred; and the Imperial Government was very sparing in its grant of this boon: it was obtained by few non-Italian communities of Roman citizens beyond those which were at least partially of Italian origin.⁵

The Roman Treasury could, and did, thus create a class of non-privileged provincial Roman citizens, but it could not prevent this class either from harbouring resentment or from steadily growing in numbers until it found itself strong enough to sweep away by main force the privileges which a favoured minority of the citizen body had so long retained for itself.

The non-privileged element in the Roman citizen body in the Age of the Principate was recruited from various sources. The military policy, inaugurated by Augustus, of insisting that the Roman legionary infantry of the line should continue to be composed exclusively of Roman citizens but should be stationed henceforward mainly on the frontiers and wholly outside Italy⁶ ensured, when combined with legal facilities for legitimizing

State between the end of the Hannibalic War and the secession, in 90 B.C., of a confederacy of Italian states hitherto externally associated with the Roman Commonwealth will be found in Beloch, J.: *Der Italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie* (Leipzig 1880, Teubner), *ad finem*.

¹ By the *Lex Plautia Papiria* of 89 B.C.

² By Caesar in 49 B.C.

³ It will be seen that this Roman Treasury ruling was identical with the Umayyad Caliph 'Umar II's ruling, noticed on p. 132, above, that a non-Arab convert to Islam must migrate to one of the Arab military cantonments in order to qualify for obtaining the comparatively favourable fiscal treatment that Arab Muslims enjoyed.

⁴ See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 455-6. This *ius Italicum* had a juridical as well as a fiscal aspect. Roman citizens not domiciled in territory possessing this status were thereby debarred, not only from the right of exemption from direct taxation, but also from the right of owning land in freehold as *ager privatus ex iure Quiritium*.

⁵ 'Italian status' was, for example, possessed by the Roman 'colony' of Vienna Allobrogum (Vienna) in the province of Gallia Narbonensis, in spite of the fact that the Roman citizens inhabiting this titular Roman colony were Latinized natives and not settlers from Italy. Yet Vienna was the only municipality in the province that did possess this *ius Italicum*, though, at an early stage in the history of the Principate, Narbonensis as a whole had become almost as thoroughly Latinized in language and culture as the Transpadane fringe of Italy itself. The less exceptional phenomenon of the possession of the *ius Italicum* by a Roman community situated outside Italy but composed of settlers of Italian origin is illustrated by the case of Lugdunum (see Arnold, W. T.: *Studies of Roman Imperialism* (Manchester 1906, University Press), pp. 99 and 107-8).

⁶ See II. ii. 20 and p. 117, above.

the legionaries' children retrospectively,¹ that a warlike population of Roman citizens, who could have the last word in Imperial politics if ever they awoke to a realization of their power, should establish itself on the Empire's fringes. Where militarily suitable citizen recruits for the legions were not forthcoming in sufficient numbers (as, for example, in the Anatolian areas of recruitment for the eastern legions), it is probable that militarily suitable non-citizens were naturalized *ad hoc* in order to make them eligible for enrolment,² and it is also probable that soldiers enrolled in the non-citizen formations called *auxilia* could obtain naturalization as Roman citizens upon their discharge from the service, if not before.³

Moreover, as the civilian population of one ex-barbarian province after another became Latinized in language and culture, naturalization was granted wholesale by a regular series of stages. The first stage was to confer on a subject community the political status of a city-state externally associated with the Roman Commonwealth on the customary terms traditionally called the *ius Latinum*. A citizen of a Latin community who was elected by his fellow citizens to a local magistracy thereby acquired Roman citizenship automatically, and this door of entry into the Roman citizen body came to be known as the *Latium Minus* after the institution (perhaps in Hadrian's reign)⁴ of a *Latium Maius* which automatically conferred the Roman citizenship on a citizen of a Latin community who was elected to his local town council.⁵ There were even non-Latin communities—for example, the Gallic canton of the Aedui—whose elected local magistrates became Roman citizens *ipso facto*.⁶ Through all these avenues the body of non-privileged Roman citizens was steadily recruited under the Principate for nearly a quarter of a millennium⁷ till,

¹ See p. 132, above.

² See Parker, H. M. D.: *The Roman Legions* (Oxford 1928, Clarendon Press), p. 170. Aelius Aristides seems, in a passage in his *In Romam* (Keil's edition, vol. ii. pp. 112–13 (§§ 75–78)), to imply that, in his day, *all* recruits for the Imperial Army were non-citizens who were enfranchised when they were enrolled.

³ See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (Cambridge 1936, University Press), p. 443, cited on p. 132, above.

⁴ 'Between A.D. 100 and the death of Pius' (*The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 452–3).

⁵ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 99, n. 2.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 111.

⁷ It will be seen that the ascendancy of a privileged minority lasted nearly twice as long in the Roman Empire under the Principate as in the Arab Caliphate under the Umayyad régime. This notably greater longevity is perhaps to be explained by the fact that in the Roman case the ascendancy was exercised less crudely and was monopolized less exclusively. The Augustan settlement was a compromise between the monstrously harsh and predatory tyranny which the masters of the Roman State had exercised over the Hellenic World during the last century and a half of the Roman Republican régime and the drastic dictatorship on behalf of the 'under-dog' that had been the ideal, and the death, of Caesar; and the Caesarean element in the genius of the Principate tended to gain ground at the expense of the oligarchic element. For example, the area of recruitment for the Praetorian Guard, which appears to have been confined to Central Italy when Augustus founded the corps (see Tacitus: *Annals*, Book IV, chap. 5), was progressively extended, first up to the limits of Italy within Augustus's boundaries, and later to communities of Roman citizens in adjacent provinces (e.g. Macedonia and Noricum) and in Baetica. There was a corresponding tendency to extend the area of recruitment for the Senate; and, though Senators of non-Italian origin were required by the Emperor Trajan to re-invest one-third of their property in Italian real estate, the proportion was reduced to one-fourth by Marcus Aurelius (see *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 212, 370, and 419). This policy of gradually widening the privileged circle was eventually applied to the Principate itself. Of the five emperors, from Nerva to Marcus inclusive, whose successive reigns covered the 'Indian Summer'

in the year A.D. 212, the Emperor Caracalla took the logical concluding step of conferring Roman citizenship on all—or, at any rate, all but an insignificant residue—of the still unenfranchised subjects of the Empire by his celebrated *Constitutio Antoniniana*.¹

This superficially liberal measure might perhaps have been expected to exorcise the danger of a social revolution; for, after all, the inferior form of Roman citizenship that did not carry the *ius Italicum* with it was nevertheless something well worth having. Whatever its fiscal and juridical shortcomings may have been, it was undoubtedly a palladium of civil liberties—as was found by Saint Paul when he put its efficacy to the test on three critical occasions in his missionary career.² Yet the *Constitutio Antoniniana* did not avert the upheaval of A.D. 235–74, and may actually have played some part in bringing it to pass. For on the one hand it did not diminish, and possibly increased, the financial burdens of its beneficiaries;³ and on the other hand it made the inequity of privileges still enjoyed by a minority *de facto* more glaring now that all inhabitants of the Empire had become Roman citizens *de jure*.

The first stroke in the battle against privilege had indeed been struck already by Caracalla's father and predecessor Septimius Severus. This professional soldier of colonial Phoenician origin⁴ had been able to seize a vacant imperial throne thanks to finding himself in command of the frontier defence force nearest to Rome at a moment when the Praetorian Guards had unpardonably abused their trust by assassinating an excellent emperor and proceeding to sell the purple by auction to a worthless bidder. When Severus marched on Rome at the head of his Pannonian legions, the Praetorians proved to be as unwarlike as they were murderous and corrupt. They submitted tamely to a sentence of disbandment and banishment, and the provincial war-lord who had thus given these privileged Italian guardsmen their deserts not only cashiered the men but made a complete break in the basis of recruitment of the corps. It was recruited thenceforth from the *élite* of the legions (in practice, from soldiers of the Danubian legions and of one eastern legion, the Sixth

of Hellenic history, two (Trajan and Hadrian) came from Baetica, one (Antoninus Pius) from Narbonensis, while the family of a fourth (Marcus) was of Baetican origin. The only Italian among the five was Nerva, the first—and the least estimable—in the series. No doubt this progressive widening of the privileged inner circle of the Roman citizen body delayed the revolt of the ever-growing mass of Roman citizens of inferior status. Conversely, in the Sinic universal state the ascendancy of the victorious empire-building principality of Ts'ing was overthrown only twelve years after the establishment of the *Pax Sinica* because it had immediately been made intolerable by the inhumanly revolutionary policy of Ts'ing in She Hwang-ti.

¹ See V. vi. 7, with n. 4.

² In dealing with the magistrates of the Roman colony of Philippi (see Acts xvi. 37–39); in dealing with Claudius Lysias, the Roman military tribune in command of the castle at Jerusalem (see Acts xxii. 23–xxiii. 31); and in dealing with two successive Roman procurators of Judaea: Antonius Felix and Porcius Festus (see Acts xxiii. 31–xxvi. 32).

³ It is possible that one of the motives and effects of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* was to extend to all inhabitants of the Empire the special taxes—death duties (at the merciful rate of a mere 5 per cent.), a general sales tax (at the rate of 1 per cent.), a special tax on sales of slaves (at the rate of 4 per cent.)—which Augustus had imposed on Roman citizens domiciled in Italy as a device for diminishing the inequality in the distribution of the burden of taxation between this minority and the rest of the inhabitants of the Empire (for details see Hirschfeld, O.: *Die Kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1905, Weidmann), pp. 93–105).

⁴ Severus's home town was the Punic city of Leptis in Tripolitania.

Ferrata). Severus also stationed at Albano, within one short march of Rome, the second of his three new *Legiones Parthicae*. The commanders of these new legions were not of senatorial rank, and the soldiers were probably for the most part Roman citizens from Illyricum and Thrace.¹

After this decisive demonstration of the military impotence of a still privileged minority, the sequel was almost a foregone conclusion. The upheaval of A.D. 235-74 was a revolt of the provinces against Italy, of the non-senatorial classes against the Senate, and of the uncultivated masses against the heirs of the Hellenic culture; and on all three battlefields the former 'ascendancy' was decisively defeated.² The 'ascendancy' did not, indeed, allow itself to be deposed without a struggle. The successful organization of armed resistance to the intolerable Thracian soldier Maximinus was a last triumph of the *concordia ordinum* and *consensus Italiae* that had been the political ideals of Cicero. But the discomfiture of the Senate was made manifest by the exclusion of senators from all military command, direct or indirect, by act of the Emperor Gallienus (*imperabat* A.D. 253-68);³ and it was sealed when Florianus, the brother of the last senatorial occupant of the imperial throne,⁴ was rejected by the Senate itself as a candidate for the succession in favour of the capable Illyrian soldier Probus. This liquidation of the long-respected partnership of the Senate in the government of the Empire was accompanied by a violation of the equally long-respected immunity of Italy from direct taxation. After the devaluation of the currency during the anarchy, the primitive practice of raising a levy in kind (*annona*) for the support of the army and the civil service was applied to Northern Italy as well as to the provinces. After this progressive *Gleichschaltung* of Italy with the provinces and of the Senate with the rest of the inhabitants of the Empire, the inauguration of a totalitarian régime by the Illyrian soldier-statesman Diocletian was inevitable and indispensable.⁵ This was the political price that had to be paid for long overdue

¹ See Parker, H. M. D.: *A History of the Roman World from A.D. 138 to 337* (London 1935, Methuen), pp. 60 and 80-84. There is, of course, an almost exact analogy between this measure of Severus's and the substitution, by the 'Abbasids, of a Khurāsānī garrison at Baghdad for the Syrian Arab garrisons at Basrah, Kūfah, and the four cantonments on the desert border of Syria itself.

² The social and cultural aspects of this great revolution in the Roman Empire have been imaginatively apprehended and brilliantly portrayed by M. Rostovtzeff in *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1926, Clarendon Press). The scholarly author of this magnificent piece of historical work has incurred some criticism on the ground that he has read into the history of the Roman Empire in the third century of the Christian Era his own experience of the Russian revolution of A.D. 1917. It is possible, perhaps, that here and there Rostovtzeff may have been carried by this analogy beyond the limits of the evidence; but it is certain that his illuminating and instructive interpretation of a momentous passage of history would not have enriched our whole understanding of History, as it has done, if Rostovtzeff had not lived through that experience as a human being and had not possessed the imaginative power to turn it to account as an historian.

³ This was a portent, considering that the Emperor who pronounced these aristocrats no longer fit for military command was himself a man of culture. Yet the process of pushing the Senate out of public life, which was thus carried a long step farther by Gallienus, had been covertly set in train by his far more cultivated predecessor Augustus (for Gallienus's measures, see Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-80).

⁴ For the significance of the reign of Florianus's brother and predecessor Tacitus (*imperabat* A.D. 275-6), see V. vi. 55.

⁵ The complete exclusion of senators from the civil service as well as from military command, and the extension of liability to imperial taxation to Cis-Appennine as well as

acts of social justice by which, in reaction against an invidious former discrimination between classes, every Roman citizen in a Roman World in which virtually the whole population had now been enfranchised was made eligible henceforward for appointment to any post, up to the highest, in the Roman Imperial Army¹ and Civil Service.

The Utilization of Imperial Garrisons and Colonies by Higher Religions

In the sequel to this genuine social but illusory political triumph of an internal proletariat over an 'ascendancy', we have still to discover who were the beneficiaries in the long run; for we have already ascertained that the immediately resulting totalitarian régime was transitory and that the subsequent 'heroic age' of the barbarians was ephemeral. The truth would appear to be that while the internal proletariat was not appreciably more successful than any of the other competitors for the spoils of a disintegrating civilization in so far as it was competing with them in their own currency of material power—economic, political, and military—it did achieve an enduring and momentous success in so far as it placed its treasure in the spiritual enterprise of propagating a higher religion. The ultimate beneficiaries from the organized redistribution and intermixture of population that precipitated a social revolution in both the Roman and the Arab Empire were Christianity in the one case and Islam in the other.

The military cantonments and frontier garrisons of the Umayyad Caliphate manifestly served Islam as invaluable *points d'appui* in that extraordinary deployment of latent spiritual forces by which Islam transfigured itself, and thereby transformed its mission, in the course of six centuries. In the seventh century of the Christian Era, Islam had burst out of Arabia as the distinctive sectarian creed of one of the barbarian war-bands that were carving out successor-states for themselves in provinces of the Roman Empire; by the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, Islam had become a universal church providing shelter for sheep left without their familiar shepherds through the collapse of the 'Abbasid Caliphate at the dissolution of the Syriac Civilization.²

Time and again it looked, on the surface, as if Islam had been cheated of this spiritual destiny by being successfully exploited for political and social ends.

'The original driving-force behind the insurrection of the Khurāsānīs was Islam and not [Iranian] nationalism . . . [but] the nationality of the victors asserted its preponderance over [the cause of] Islam. . . . The international [fraternity of] Islam was a mask for the triumph of the Iranian cause over the Arabs. . . . This was inherent in the situation, though not in the original design.'³

Trans-Appennine Italy, do not appear to have taken place before the Diocletianic reorganization. This was the logical fulfilment of the piecemeal reforms of Septimius Severus and Gallienus.

¹ In the post-Diocletianic Roman Army there were no distinctions of class (see Grosse, R.: *Römische Militärgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der Byzantinischen Themenverfassung* (Berlin 1920, Weidmann), p. 196). The classless military hierarchy established by Diocletian and Constantine at the turn of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian era lasted, substantially unchanged, until the seventh century (see *ibid.*, p. 107).

² This transfiguration of Islam has been touched upon already in V. v. 127-8, 230, and 673-8.

³ Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 334 and 348.

In the next chapter of the story it looked, again on the surface, as if the 'Abbasids had been still more adroit than the Khurāsānīs in making Islam serve their purpose.

'The 'Abbasids took credit for having brought Islam—which they accused the Umayyads of having repressed—into its due position of dominance. They professed a desire to bring to life again the extinct tradition of the Prophet. They gathered round themselves in Baghdad the doctors of the Islamic Law from Medina, which had been their headquarters hitherto, and they constantly took legal opinions from them; for the 'Abbasids made a point of handling political questions in juristic form and of seeing that decisions were taken on the basis of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. In reality, though, they made Islam subservient solely to their own ends. They domesticated the doctors of the Law at their court and secured the stamp of their approval for even the most discreditable of their own measures. [In fact,] they made the pious opposition innocuous by the very act of leading it to victory.'¹

Yet this 'Abbasid statecraft, in spite of all its cunning, was no more successful in the long run than Iranian nationalism in harnessing Islam to the service of a political purpose. The 'Abbasid Caliphate itself was merely the last phase of a universal state, and, as such, it was *ex officio* condemned to death before it was born, notwithstanding the mirage of immortality with which it managed to delude its audacious assailants as well as its loyal supporters.² When the Mongol war-lord Hūlāgū took and sacked Baghdad in A.D. 1258, 'the Caliphate that had created Baghdad, and for five hundred years had made it a magnificent centre of art, science and letters, was forever extinguished; but Islam did not die'.³ It not only retained the allegiance of the ex-subjects of the defunct 'Abbasid Empire; it also took their savage conquerors captive. In spite of the tincture of Nestorian Christianity with which Hūlāgū, like other Chingisids of his generation, was imbued,⁴ his descendants who governed, after him, the appanage of the Mongol Empire which Hūlāgū had established in the derelict domain of the Caliphate, from Merv to the east bank of the Euphrates, did not remain pagans or become outright Nestorians or succumb to the Lamaistic form of the Tantric Mahāyāna which proved so attractive to the main line of the House of Chingis in China and which eventually won the allegiance of those Mongols and Calmucks who had stayed at home on their native steppes;⁵ the Mongol Il-Khans of Hūlāgū's line became converts to Islam, and they did not even follow the frequent practice of barbarian converts by adopting the religion of a conquered population in a distinctively heretical version.⁶ After playing with the Shi'ah as they had previously played with Nestorianism, the Il-Khans finally embraced Islam in its Orthodox Sunni form, though this was the form in which it was followed by the Il-Khans' arch-enemies the Mamlūks and by the Mamlūks' puppet 'Abbasid Caliphs at Cairo.⁷

¹ Ibid., p. 350.

² See pp. 7-16, above.

³ Gilman, A.: *The Saracens* (London 1887, Fisher Unwin, in 'The Story of the Nations' series), p. 441.

⁴ Hūlāgū himself had a Nestorian Christian wife (see II. ii. 238 and 451).

⁵ See IV. iv. 497; V. v. 137 and 309-10.

⁶ For this practice see V. v. 229-30 and 235.

⁷ See I. i. 363-4.

Within little more than a hundred years of the sack of Baghdad by Hülāgū the example thus set by his house had been followed by the eastern as well as the western branch of the House of Chaghatāy, which dominated the sedentary Muslim population of the Upper Oxus-Jaxartes Basin from the Central Asian Steppe between the Zungarian Gap and the Sea of Aral.¹ The House of Jūjī ('the Golden Horde'),² which dominated the sedentary Muslim populations on the Lower Oxus and the Middle Volga from the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe between the Sea of Aral and the Carpathians, was finally converted within the same period under the influence of its allies the Mamlūks.³ Even the dissident 'qāzāq' Nomads who hovered out of range of the Golden Horde's long whip-lash on the steppes of Western Siberia⁴ followed the Golden Horde's lead in embracing Islam; and the Mongol Khāqāns in the Far East, who had no penchant towards Islam themselves,⁵ helped Islam to win new outposts on the north-western and south-western fringes of China.⁶ Meanwhile, Islam continued to make spiritual conquests of comparable magnitude in other quarters: in India, in Indonesia, in Tropical Africa.⁷ And thus, so far from dying at the death of the Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate, Islam lived on to become, by the fourteenth century of its own era, one of the four principal higher religions of a World that in that age was being unified on a literally oecumenical scale by the world-wide expansion of the Western Civilization.

What was the secret of Islam's power to survive the death of its founder, the downfall of the Primitive Arab empire-builders, the decline of the Arabs' Iranian supplanters, the overthrow of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, and the collapse of the barbarian successor-states that established themselves, for their brief day, on the Caliphate's ruins? The explanation was to be found in the spiritual experience of the converts to Islam among the non-Arab subjects of the Caliphate in the Umayyad Age. 'Islam, which they had originally adopted mainly for external reasons [of social self-interest], struck root in their hearts as well, and was taken by them more seriously than by the Arabs themselves.'⁸ A religion which thus succeeded in winning loyalty in virtue of its intrinsic religious merits was not doomed to stand or fall with the political régimes which had successively sought to exploit it for non-religious purposes; and this spiritual triumph of Islam was the more remarkable considering that such exploitation for political ends had proved fatal to other higher religions and that Islam had thus been placed in jeopardy not only by its founder's successors but by Muhammad himself, when he had migrated

¹ For the successive conversions of the Western and the Eastern Chaghatāy to the Sunni form of Islam, see II. ii. 145.

² See III. iii. 429.

³ The bond of this friendship was a commercial one. The most lucrative export from the domain of the Golden Horde was the supply of slaves, drawn from the martial races inside and beyond the Golden Horde's borders, through which the Mamlūks of Egypt recruited their own ranks. The Golden Horde was finally converted to Islam in the reign of Uzbek Khan (*regnabat* A.D. 1312-40). The individual conversion of Uzbek's predecessor Baraqa Khan (*regnabat* A.D. 1256-66), like that of the Il-Khan Ghazan in 1295, had been a premature flash in the pan.

⁴ See pp. 256-7, below.

⁵ See pp. 74-75 and 99, above.

⁶ See Arnold, T. W.: *The Preaching of Islam*, 2nd ed. (London 1913, Constable), especially chaps. 8-12.

⁷ Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

from Mecca to Medina and had become a brilliantly successful statesman instead of remaining a conspicuously unsuccessful prophet.¹ In this *tour de force* of surviving its betrayal by its own founder, Islam had borne witness, through the ages, to the spiritual value of the religious message which Muhammad had brought to Mankind, and to the disinterestedness and sincerity of the messenger himself during the heart-breaking and hazardous thirteen years of his thankless mission to his own countrymen at Mecca.

Thus, in the history of the Caliphate, the carefully considered policy of the empire-builders in planting garrisons and colonies and regulating the transfer and intermingling of populations had the unintended and unexpected effect of expediting the career of a higher religion: and corresponding effects were produced by the same causes in the history of the Roman Empire.²

In the Age of the Principate the most conspicuously active conductors of religious influences were the military garrisons along the frontiers, and the religions that were propagated the most rapidly along these channels were the Hellenized Hittite worship of the 'Iuppiter' of Dolichê and the Hellenized Syriac worship of the originally Iranian divinity Mithras. We can follow the transmission of these two religions from the Roman garrisons on the Euphrates to those on the Danube, on the German *limes*, on the Rhine, and on the Wall in Britain, and the spectacle recalls the contemporary journey which the Mahāyāna, in the last stage of its long trek from Hindustan round the western flank of the Tibetan Plateau,³ was making from the Tarim Basin to the shores of the Pacific along the chain of garrisons guarding the frontier of a Sinic universal state over against the Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe. In the next chapter of the story the Mahāyāna succeeded in penetrating from the north-western marches of the Sinic World into the interior and thereby becoming the universal church of the Sinic internal proletariat⁴ and eventually one of the four principal higher religions of a latter-day Westernizing World. The destinies of Mithraism and of the worship of Iuppiter Dolichênus were more modest. Bound up, as they had come to be, with the fortunes of the Roman Imperial Army, these two military religions never recovered from the blow dealt to them by the Army's temporary collapse during the turbulent transition from the Augustan Principate to the Diocletianic Autocracy; and, as far as they had any permanent historical significance, it was as forerunners of Christianity and tributaries to the ever-growing stream of religious tradition fed by the confluence of many waters in the bed which Christianity dug for itself as it poured over the Roman Empire along a different channel.

While Iuppiter Dolichênus and Mithras used the frontier garrisons of the Roman Empire as their stepping-stones in a north-westward march which brought them in the end from the banks of the Euphrates to the Empire's opposite extremity on Tyneside, Saint Paul made a corresponding use of colonies planted by Caesar and Augustus in the

¹ See III. iii. 466-72.

³ See II. ii. 373 and 405, n. 1; III. iii. 131; and V. v. 140.

⁴ See V. v. 145.

² See xi, map 29.

interior of the Empire as stations on the successive missionary journeys which culminated in his last voyage to Rome itself. On this first journey he sowed seeds of Christianity in the Roman colonies Antioch-in-Pisidia and Lystra;¹ and on his second in the Roman colonies Troas, Philippi, and Corinth as well, while on his third journey he revisited these and other scenes of his previous labours. Paul was, of course, far from confining his activities to places in which Roman colonies had been planted. In the course of his third missionary journey, for instance, he established his headquarters for two years at Ephesus and from that centre systematically evangelized the province of Asia.² Nor did all the Christian congregations founded by him in Roman colonies distinguish themselves particularly in the subsequent history of Christianity. Corinth, however, where Paul stayed for eighteen months³ when he revisited it on his second journey, continued to play an important part in the life of the Church in the post-Apostolic Age, and we may conjecture that the prominence of the Christian community here was due, not only to the unique geographical situation of Corinth at the cross-roads of overland and maritime lines of communication, but also to the cosmopolitan character of the settlement of Roman freedmen that had been planted here by Caesar.⁴ While the social origin of the population among which Paul had made his Corinthian converts goes far to explain the moral laxity with which the Apostle had to contend, we may also conjecture that the business ability and the world-wide connexions of this brood of twice-uprooted *déracinés* had something to do with the energy which the Church of Corinth displayed in the next chapter of its history.

The most signal example, however, of a Roman colony being turned to Christian account is not Corinth but Lyons, for the advance of Christianity from colony to colony did not come to a stop when it had reached the metropolis and did not cease with the death of Saint Paul. 'Never was the rise of a great city less accidental and less arbitrary than in the case of Roman Lyons.'⁵ Planted in 43 B.C. on a carefully chosen site, in the angle formed by the confluence of Rhône and Saône—a node of land and water communications that rivalled the situation of Corinth itself—Lugdunum was a Roman colony not only in name but in fact; and this settlement of Roman citizens of genuinely Italian origin on the threshold of the vast tracts of Gallic territory that had been added to the Roman Empire by Caesar's conquests had been designed to radiate Roman culture through this Gallia Comata as it had already been radiated through a Gallia Togata by the older Roman colony of Narbonne. Lugdunum, as we have seen, possessed the coveted *ius Italicum*⁶ and was the seat of the only Roman garrison between Rome itself and the Rhine.⁷ Moreover, it was not only the administrative centre of one of the

¹ It is uncertain whether the Roman colony planted at Iconium by the Emperor Claudius (*imperabat* A.D. 41–54) was in existence at the time of Paul's first or second passage through the place, but it must have been established by the date of his third missionary journey.

² See Acts xix. 10.

³ See IV. iv. 270, with n. 4, and pp. 109–10 and 133, above.

⁴ Arnold, W. T.: *Studies of Roman Imperialism* (Manchester 1906, University Press), p. 108.

⁵ See p. 154, with n. 4, above.

⁶ See Acts xviii. 11.

⁷ See p. 123, above.

three gigantic provinces into which Gallia Comata had been divided; it was also the official meeting place of 'the Council of the Three Gauls', where the representatives of the sixty or more cantons comprised in these three provinces assembled periodically round an Altar of Augustus erected here by Drusus in 12 B.C.¹ In fact, Lugdunum had been deliberately called into existence to serve particularly important Roman imperial purposes. Yet by A.D. 177 this Roman colony had come to harbour a Christian community of sufficient vitality to provoke a massacre; and here, as elsewhere, the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the Church;² for it was as bishop of Lugdunum during the immediately following quarter of a century that Irenaeus—a Greek man of letters of possibly Syrian origin—worked out the earliest systematic presentation of Catholic Christian theology.

Thus, when the Principate, and the 'ascendancy' of which it was the instrument, collapsed in the third century of the Christian Era, the ultimate beneficiary of this political and social revolution was neither the insurgent mass of previously unprivileged Roman citizens nor the Diocletianic autocracy nor Iuppiter Dolichēnus nor Mithras but the Christian Church.

Christianity in the Roman Empire, Islam in the Caliphate, and the Mahāyāna in the Sinic universal state each took advantage of the garrisons and colonies installed by secular empire-builders for their own purposes; yet these unintended religious consequences of orderly redistributions of population were not so signal as those of Nebuchadnezzar's relapse into Assyrian methods of barbarism; for, in carrying Judah away captive, the Neo-Babylonian war-lord did not merely foster the progress of an existing higher religion but virtually called a new one into existence.

Ἄνδρες ἀνάσπαστοι, φύλον τάλαν, αἰνὰ παθόντες,
οὓς πάρος ἐκ ριζῶν Μῆδος ὑπερφίαλος
Ἀσσύριός τ' ἀγέρωχος ἀνέσπασε νηλεῖ θυμῷ,
χαίρετ'. ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν ὀψιγενὴς ἔταρος.
κάμῃ κατέπληξεν τοῖος μόρος· ἀλλὰ χαρῶμεν,
ἡμεῖς γὰρ Μεγαλοῦ φίλτατα τέκνα Θεοῦ.
ἡμεῖς τοῖο προφῆται· ἀπήμονας οὐκ ἐμύησεν
μάρτυρας ἀνθρώποις εἴλετο τοὺς τάλανας.

3. Provinces

The Mixture of Motives in the Minds of Imperial Authorities

Like the garrisons and colonies which the builders of universal states distribute over their dominions, the provinces into which they carve these dominions up have two distinct functions: the preservation of the universal state itself and the preservation of the society for whose body social a universal state provides the political framework. But, whereas in the installation of garrisons and colonies the function of maintaining

¹ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

² The passage in which this famous phrase of Tertullian's occurs has been quoted in V. vi. 202, n. 3.

the political supremacy of the empire-builders is, as we have seen, the predominant one, we shall find that, in the organization of provinces, the two functions play less unequal parts—though of course their relative weight will vary, *ad hoc*, according to the particular train of historical events through which a universal state has been brought into existence.

The alternative possible functions of an imperial province can be aptly illustrated from the histories of the Roman Empire and the British Rāj in India.

For example, the Roman provinces of Africa, Macedonia, and Bithynia-et-Pontus owed their origin wholly to the Roman State's concern for its own self-preservation. The Romans installed their own administration there not at all for the benefit of their new subjects, but in order to prevent the resurrection of three rival Powers—the Carthaginian Empire and the Kingdoms of Macedon and Pontic Cappadocia—which had proved such formidable and persistent antagonists of Rome that she did not feel her hard-won victory secure till she had erased them once and for all from the political map. On a similar reckoning, the ex-Carthaginian dominions in the Iberian Peninsula were organized into the two Roman provinces of Nearer and Farther Spain,¹ and the ephemeral conquests of King Tigranes of Armenia at the expense of the last of the Seleucidae into the Roman province of Syria, in order to make sure that these strategically important but politically derelict territories should not again fall into hostile hands. On the other hand, when the Romans accepted invitations to undertake the direct administration of the dominions of the client kingdom of Pergamum, and afterwards to take over Cyrenaica and Cyprus, which had been dependencies of the client kingdom of Egypt, they were tempted, no doubt, by the bait of immediate windfalls for the Roman Treasury and of future profits for Roman tax-farmers, investors, and traders; but, though their motives may have been self-seeking, they were in fact undertaking here a public service from which the previous local rulers were seeking relief because they no longer felt equal to continuing to discharge it themselves.

An element of public spirit in a larger cause than the direct political self-interest of Rome herself is less ambiguously apparent in the creation of the Roman province of Cilicia, which in its original extension embraced the fastnesses of all the wild highlanders of South-Eastern Anatolia. When the Romans had taken over the heritage which the last of the Attalids had bequeathed to them some thirty years before,² they had deliberately excluded these unremunerative and burdensome territories from their new province of Asia, and they had thereby created in the expanding no-man's-land between the south-eastern boundary of Roman Asia and the north-western boundary of the fast dwindling dominions of the expiring Seleucidae a breeding-ground for pirates who

¹ 'Why did the Roman Government, whose policy at that time evidently did not contemplate the acquisition of countries beyond the sea, not rid itself of so troublesome a possession? . . . They could not abandon Spain without putting it into the power of any adventurer to revive the Spanish empire of the Barcides' (Mommson, *Th.: The History of Rome*, English translation, vol. ii (London 1888, Bentley), p. 213).

² King Attalus III of Pergamum had died in 133 B.C.; the original Roman province of Cilicia was created in 102-101 B.C.

rapidly extended their activities all over the Mediterranean. The Roman Government's assumption of administrative responsibility for this uninviting no-man's-land that had become a pirates' lair was followed up by the Roman People's successive commissions to Publius Servilius, to Marcus Antonius, and to Pompey to sweep the pirates off the seas,¹ and this series of measures signified Rome's recognition and acceptance of imperial responsibilities. The same motive inspired the restoration of order in Cilicia and the subsidiary operations by which the Romans deprived the pirates of their insular stronghold in Crete and brigaded the island with Cyrene to form a single Roman province.² In the mind of Augustus a broad concern for the welfare of the Hellenic World as a whole was evidently combined with the narrower motive of providing for the military security of the Roman State when he extended the area of the province of Hispania Tarraconensis by subduing the wild highlanders of North-Western Spain, and when he carried the frontiers of the Empire up to the line of the Danube at the cost of saddling Rome with the responsibility for administering the vast ex-barbarian territories included in his new provinces of Rhaetia, Noricum, Pannonia, and Moesia.

Similar illustrations of the diversity of the functions that the provincial organization of a universal state may perform are afforded by the history of the British Rāj in India. While the annexations of territory at the expense of the Muslim war-lord Tipu Sahib of Mysore, the Marāthā states in the Deccan and Central India, and the Sikh principalities in the Panjab were mainly dictated by considerations of military and political security for the British Rāj itself, the annexations in the Ganges Basin, from Bengal to Delhi inclusive, were to some extent forced upon the British East India Company by the decay of the Mughal Empire; and, though no doubt the momentous British decision to take over the administration of Bengal was prompted, like the Roman acceptance of the bequest of the last Attalus, by the prospect of lucrative profits for British empire-builders, one of the effects of this self-seeking British act was to meet the Hindu World's need to be delivered from the anarchy that had arisen through the creation of a political vacuum in the place that the Mughal Empire had formerly occupied. Augustus's annexations of barbarian territory in the joint interests of the Roman Empire and the Hellenic World likewise find their counterpart in British annexations of tribal territory on the North-West frontier of India; and the risk of military disaster to which empire-builders expose themselves in their search for 'natural frontiers' is exemplified in the outcome of the First Anglo-Afghan War as well as in the results of Crassus's attempt to subdue the

¹ A Roman 'province' in the original meaning of a frontier command had been created in the western and northern fringes of this no-man's-land *circa* 102-101 B.C. (see Mommsen, Th.: *The History of Rome*, English translation, vol. iii (London 1888, Bentley), p. 140, n. *; *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. ix (Cambridge 1932, University Press), p. 442; Jones, A. H. M.: *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press), p. 202) and was called 'Cilicia' though it appears to have included neither Cilicia Tracheia nor Cilicia Pedias. Servilius received his commission in 79 B.C., Antonius his in 74 B.C., and Pompey his in 67 B.C.

² Cyrenaica was bequeathed to Rome by Ptolemy Apion in 96 B.C. and was definitively organized as a Roman province in 74 B.C. Crete was annexed in 67 B.C.

Parthians and Augustus's attempt to move the North-West European frontier of the Roman Empire forward from the Rhine to the Elbe.

While the histories of the Roman Empire and of the British Rāj in India thus indicate that the two main alternative functions of the provincial organization of a universal state are to maintain the supremacy of the empire-building Power and to fill a political vacuum arising in the body social of the disintegrating society through the destruction or collapse of its former parochial states, the relative importance and the reciprocal relations of the two functions vary widely from case to case.

There is, no doubt, a general tendency for the function of filling a vacuum to become increasingly important with the passage of time, as the memory—and the loyalty evoked by the memory—of the extinguished parochial states grows fainter, while those that have been allowed to survive as clients of the victorious empire-building Power are progressively rotted by the general process of social disintegration that is still creeping on under the veneer of an oecumenical peace. In the Roman Empire, for example, this tendency had resulted,¹ within a century of the establishment of the Augustan Peace at the Battle of Actium, in the conversion into provinces of all client states except three on the eastern frontier,² though it was a seldom broken tradition of Roman statesmanship³ to shrink from the burden of administering alien subject territories and to confine even unavoidable annexations to a minimum area.⁴ *Pari passu*, and this likewise against the grain of traditional Roman policy, the Roman Government found itself constrained, in the administration of its provinces, to leave less and less of the responsibility in the hands of local organs of self-government, and to take more and more of it upon the shoulders of the imperial civil service.⁵

This latter process likewise occurred in the administrative history of the British Rāj in India; on the other hand, the process of annexation did not take the same course here as in the history of the Roman Empire. While they were in the act of empire-building, the British conquerors of India showed less hesitation than the Roman conquerors of the Hellenic World in making sweeping annexations of territory and undertaking wide responsibilities for direct administration. The British-administered

¹ This point has been touched upon already on p. 58, above.

² The Nabataean Principality, Commagênê, and Armenia Minor.

³ The most flagrant breaches—in the shape of unprovoked annexations—were made by the radical imperialists who annexed Gallia Narbonensis in 120 B.C., by Caesar when he invaded and conquered the rest of Gaul, and by Trajan when he extinguished the Nabataean Principality, not, apparently, on account of any incompetence in the native administration, but because he wished to bring this territory under his own direct control as an overture to his ambitiously aggressive attack on the Parthian Empire. On the other hand, Trajan's creation of the new province of Dacia out of the conquered dominions of a dangerous enemy of Rome was in the same category as Pompey's creation of the province of Bithynia-et-Pontus.

⁴ For instance, the Roman province of Africa, within its original boundaries, did not include the whole of the former dominions of Carthage in North-West Africa; the western districts were given to Rome's client state Numidia. Similarly, when the Romans created their province of Asia out of the former dominions of the Attalids, they gave some districts to their surviving client states in Anatolia and left others derelict (see p. 164, above). Again, Pompey's new province of Bithynia-et-Pontus embraced only the semi-Hellenized western parts of the former dominions of Mithradates Eupator.

⁵ See pp. 58–60, above.

territories in India were expanded in three successive waves. The first wave (A.D. 1757-66) brought under British rule Bengal, Bihar, and the Northern Circars along the north-west shore of the Bay of Bengal; the second (A.D. 1790-1818) brought the Carnatic, the Upper Ganges Basin, and the Western Deccan; the third (A.D. 1843-9) brought the Indus Basin. In the course of this expansion, all other parts of India were lassoed in an encircling belt of British-administered territories and were reduced to the status of client states; and, under Lord Dalhousie's régime, the annexations of the client states of Satára in A.D. 1848, Jhansi in 1853, Nagpur in 1854, and Oudh in 1856 seemed to portend a rapid extension of direct British rule over the whole of the rest of the peninsula. On the other hand, after the mutiny of the Indian units in the British East India Company's Army in A.D. 1857-8, it became the general policy of the British Government of India to keep the surviving client states intact; and, though this new rule was not invariably observed, nevertheless the annexation of the Kingdom of Oudh, which had been reminiscent of the Roman Emperor Tiberius's annexation of the Kingdom of Cappadocia, was, after all, not followed up by the progressive extinction, *more Romano*, of the remaining Indian client states.

The extent to which the founders of a universal state are tempted to resort to the devices of annexation and direct administration as measures of insurance against the danger of a resurgence of the victorious empire-builders' defeated rivals depends, no doubt, on the degree of the loyalty and regret that the abolished parochial states continue to evoke in the minds of their own former masters and subjects after their overthrow by the empire-building Power; and this, in turn, depends on the pace of the conquest and on the antecedent history of the society in whose domain the universal state has established itself. Victorious empire-builders have most reason to fear a violent undoing of their work when they have established their rule at one stroke and when they have imposed it on a world of parochial states long accustomed to enjoy and abuse a status of sovereign independence.

In the Sinic World, for example, effective political unity was imposed for the first time (at any rate, in recorded history) by the empire-building state of Ts'in within a period of no more than ten years (230-221 B.C.). Within that brief span of time, King Chêng of Ts'in overthrew the six other till then surviving parochial states Han, Chao, Wei, Ch'u, Yen, and Ts'i,¹ and thereby became the founder of a Sinic universal state under the title of Ts'in She Hwang-ti. But, in bringing to this sudden end the long-drawn-out struggle for existence in which the contending states of the Sinic World had been engaged since the beginning of the Sinic Time of Troubles, Ts'in She Hwang-ti could not extinguish with equal rapidity the political selfconsciousness and *esprit de corps* of the former ruling elements in the six states that had survived, side by side with Ts'in, until this last swift round in the contest. The political reunification of the Egyptiac World by Mentuhotep, the ruler of the

¹ See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 70, and Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 198-9.

march-state of Thebes who became the founder of 'the Middle Empire',¹ seems likewise to have been achieved by a sudden stroke;² and, here too, the victorious empire-builder and his successors had still to reckon with disaffection on the part of nomarchs who had been resubjected by force to an oecumenical authority without having ceased to regret the parochial independence which they had enjoyed in the anarchic sequel to, and reaction against, the inordinately centralized régime of 'the Old Kingdom'.³

The political unification, under the Napoleonic Empire, of the relics of an abortive Medieval Western city-state cosmos in Northern Italy, Western Germany, and the Low Countries⁴ was also rapidly accomplished, if we reckon that it was begun by the French Revolutionary armies that invaded the Southern Netherlands and the Rhineland in the autumn of A.D. 1792 and was completed on a raft in the River Niemen on the 25th June, 1807, at the personal encounter between Napoleon and the Russian Emperor Alexander I in which the two emperors partitioned between them the European end of the Old World; and, though the French empire-builders had little recalcitrance to contend with among the subjects of the statelets which they had suddenly and uncereemoniously swept out of existence, since the once exuberant political vitality of the city-states of Western Christendom had long since sunk into a coma, Napoleon felt his hold on these easily subjugated territories insecure so long as he had not finally disposed of the surrounding Great Powers that had been the peers and competitors of France in the pre-Napoleonic Balance of Power.

The Persian empire-builders who founded the Achaemenian Empire had to cope, like Ts'in She Hwang-ti, with persisting prior parochial loyalties, which flared up into energetic and widespread rebellion upon the assassination of Gaumata in 522 B.C.,⁵ when it might have been expected that an established oecumenical peace would have been accepted passively, if not actively welcomed, by populations who, for three hundred years, had had their parochial patriotism pounded out of them by unflagging blows from an Assyrian flail.

This identical problem of having to guard against a resurgence of parochial political feeling was handled by the empire-builders on similar lines in all four cases. They sought to break these traditional parochial loyalties by erasing the traditional parochial frontiers from the political map and replacing the overthrown parochial states by artificially created imperial provinces with new boundaries and a new administrative régime which would ensure the due subordination of the provincial governors to the central government of the parvenu universal state.⁶

¹ See I. i. 137 and 140, n. 2; II. ii. 112; IV. iv. 85; V. v. 267 and 530; and V. vi. 190.

² Possible evidences of the rapidity of Mentuhotep's rise to fortune are the indications (if these are the correct interpretations of the archaeological data) that, in the course of his reign, he changed his style and title and remodelled his mortuary temple on more sumptuous lines than those of the original plan (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. 1, Part II, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 257-8; see further Winlock, H. E.: *The Rise and Fall of the Middle Kingdom in Thebes* (New York 1947, Macmillan), pp. 28-32).

³ See Meyer, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 226-30 and 262-4.

⁴ See II. ii. 104; III. iii. 344-7; and V. v. 619-42.

⁵ See pp. 599-604, below.

⁶ These deliberately revolutionary redrawings of the political map are instances of

Administrative Policy in the Sinic Universal State

The issue was sharply formulated in the entourage of the Emperor Ts'in She Hwang-ti, and the radical solution was advisedly adopted by a personal decision of the Emperor, as the result of a clash between opposing schools of policy that has been dramatized by the historian Sse-ma Ts'ien in the form of a tournament of set speeches in the Imperial Council.¹ By whatever processes the issue may have been fought out, it is certain that the radical policy prevailed and that in 221 B.C. Ts'in She Hwang-ti ratified the redistribution of the whole territory of his newly established universal state, including not only the dominions of Ts'in's six former rivals and recent victims but also those of the victorious empire-building state as well, into thirty-six military commands (*chün*), which were each sub-divided into a number of prefectures (*hsien*).² Each military command had a civilian administrator as well as a military governor, and the prefectures were administered by civilian prefects.³

In applying this non-feudal provincial system to the whole of his empire, Ts'in She Hwang-ti was extending to the territories of the six states which he had just subjugated a régime that had been in force in his own ancestral state of Ts'in for more than a hundred years past. As far back as the year 350 B.C. the entire territory of Ts'in, within its frontiers at that date, had been redistributed into thirty-one *hsien* by the radical reformer Shang Yang.⁴ This recasting of the internal administrative map had been one of a number of interrelated political and social innovations which had transformed Ts'in from a feudal state of the same type as its contemporaries and rivals in the Sinic World into a centralized bureaucratic and almost 'totalitarian' state of a new pattern; and it had been this political reformation that had enabled Ts'in, from that time onwards, to gain the upper hand over its antagonists in the Sinic arena in a progressive series of successes which had culminated in Ts'in She Hwang-ti's own sensational and conclusive achievement of overthrowing

the psychological phenomenon of Futurism, which has been illustrated already in the political field in V. vi. 107-11.

¹ Renderings of this debate, as presented by Sse-ma Ts'ien, will be found in Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), pp. 139-40; Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 229-30; Bodde, D.: *China's First Unifier: A Study of the Ch'in Dynasty as seen in the Life of Li Ssü* (Leiden 1938, Brill), pp. 78-79.

² These two units of non-feudal local administration under the direct authority and control of a central government were not new inventions of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's radical-minded minister Li Sse. They had been made use of in the administration of the former parochial states of the Sinic World from an early stage in the Sinic Time of Troubles. *Hsien* are first heard of in the State of Ts'in itself in 688 B.C., *chün* in the State of Wei (the successor-state of Ts'in) circa 400 B.C. *Hsien* may have originated as a form of administration for territories conquered by one of the Contending States from another, *chün* as military marches of Sinic states against their Eurasian Nomad neighbours. The radical innovation that was confirmed in 221 B.C. was not the invention of these two units of non-feudal administration but the sudden application to the whole of the Sinic World of a system of non-feudal administration, which had previously been exceptional, in place of a feudal system which had been the general rule (for these points see Bodde, op. cit., pp. 134-43 and 238-46).

³ See Bodde, op. cit., p. 135; Franke, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 230.

⁴ See Bodde, op. cit., p. 143. For this important statesman's life and work, see Duyvendak, J. J. L.: *The Book of Lord Shang* (London 1928, Probsthain).

six rival states in ten years and thereby unifying the Sinic World politically.

In assuming, however, that he could impose abruptly on the rest of the Sinic World a régime that was commended by its proven success in his ancestral state of Ts'in, Ts'in She Hwang-ti was leaving out of his reckoning certain significant differences between Ts'in and her defunct competitors. The statesmen who had carried out these sweeping local reforms in Ts'in with such successful results had been working on an exceptionally malleable human material. In the first place Ts'in was a march-state of the Sinic World,¹ and in the hard school of their perpetual struggle for existence against the outer barbarians the people of Ts'in had been broken in to adapting themselves to any social or technical innovations that might be necessary for securing their own survival. In the second place Ts'in, in virtue of being 'the Country within the Passes', was secluded by physiographical barriers from the rest of the Sinic World, and was culturally backward by comparison with the heart of the Sinic Society on the plains of the lower basin of the Yellow River.² Her relation to her western neighbours was like that of Macedon in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. to the Hellenic city-states beyond the passes of Tempe and Volustana, or like that of Piedmont,³ in the medieval and early modern ages of Western history, to Lombardy, Venetia, the Romagna, and Tuscany. Like Macedon, Ts'in was culturally plastic, and she thus escaped the cultural ossification which overtook her more cultivated neighbours.

The peoples at the cultural centre of the Sinic World were naturally predisposed to idolize a culture of which they themselves were the principal originators and exponents, and they had latterly been encouraged in this foible by the philosophers of the Confucian school, whose founder had diagnosed the social sickness from which the Sinic Society was suffering in its Time of Troubles as being due to a neglect of traditional rites and practices, and had prescribed as the sovereign remedy a return to the supposed social and moral order of the early Sinic Feudal Age as idealized in retrospect by Confucius himself.⁴ This sentimental Confucian canonization of a half-imaginary past had made little impression on the people of Ts'in. The only one of the Sinic philosophical schools of the Confucian and post-Confucian Age that had made its influence felt effectively 'within the passes' was the irreverent ruthless school of the Legists, and it was this radical spirit that had inspired the work of the series of great statesmen from other parts of the Sinic World who had found their field for action in Ts'in, beginning with Shang Yang from Wei⁵ (*decessit* 338 B.C.), who had laid the foundations of Ts'in's greatness,⁶ and ending with Li Sse of Ch'u (*vivebat*

¹ See II. ii. 118.

² For this heart and cradle of the Sinic World, see I. i. 318-21.

³ See IV. iv. 285-9.

⁴ See Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-1.

⁵ i.e. the Wei which was one of the three successor-states of the former state of Tsin, though Shang Yang traced his ancestry back to the princely house of the older state of Wei, still nearer to the heart of the Sinic World (see Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 99).

⁶ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 183-4.

280-208 B.C.), Ts'in She Hwang-ti's minister, who had raised Ts'in to the pinnacle of power.

The sudden imposition of the institutions of this uncultivated and unfamiliar march-state of Ts'in upon Sinic communities who had been conquered by her through force of arms, without ceasing to regard her as a semi-barbarian stepdaughter of the Sinic family of cultivated peoples, was bound to arouse violent resentment among the *ci-devant* feudal aristocracy of the extinguished states. After having lost the power and status that had been theirs under the régime of parochial independence, they were now deprived of all hope of retaining some vestige of their former position through being taken into the service of the newly established Sinic universal state. In these days of their adversity and impotence, these *chün tze* rallied under the standard of the Confucian school of philosophy whose founder's theories and counsels had been ignored during his lifetime by their predecessors; but Ts'in She Hwang-ti's only retort to this *union sacrée* between the aristocratic and the philosophical devotees of conservatism was to take the offensive against philosophy as well as against feudalism. A petition from the conservatives for the re-establishment of feudal principalities under princes of the House of Ts'in seems to have given the occasion for the famous measure of cultural *Gleichschaltung* known as 'the Burning of the Books'.¹

In thus recklessly closing every safety-valve, Ts'in She Hwang-ti was inviting an explosion, and the first Ts'in emperor's death in 210 B.C. was followed in 209 B.C. by the outbreak of a general revolt, and in 207 B.C. by the capture of the capital of the Ts'in empire² and extinction of the Ts'in dynasty itself by one of the rebel leaders, Liu Pang.³ Ts'in She Hwang-ti's radicalism had thus defeated its own ends; yet this victory of the violent reaction against the revolutionary work of the founder of the Sinic universal state did not, after all, result in a restoration of the *ancien régime*. It was significant that both Ch'êng Shê, the bold initiator of the revolt, and Liu Pang, the rebel who gave the Ts'in Power its *coup de grâce* by capturing its capital, were peasants from outlying southern provinces,⁴ not feudal aristocrats from the centre of the Sinic World; and, in the subsequent struggle among the victorious rebels for possession of the spoils of their joint victory, the peasant Liu Pang again emerged as the victor over his cultivated aristocratic opponent Hsiang Yü, whose ancestors had held an hereditary office in the military hierarchy of the former parochial state of Ch'u.

Liu Pang, unlike either Hsiang Yü or Ts'in She Hwang-ti, succeeded

¹ The connexion is pointed out by Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 141. 'The Burning of the Books' has been cited already in this Study, as an illustration of Futurism, in V. vi. 111.

² The seat of government had remained at Hsien Yang, the city 'within the passes' that had been the parochial capital of Ts'in before her conquest of the rest of the Sinic World in 230-221 B.C.

³ In this context English students of history will recall that the restoration of the monarchy in England in A.D. 1660 followed within two years of Oliver Cromwell's death and within five years of his remapping of the Kingdom, in A.D. 1655, into ten military commands under major-generals in place of the traditional feudal organs and institutions of English local self-government.

⁴ Ch'êng Shê (*alias* Ch'êng Shêng) was a native of the former state of Ch'u in the Middle Yangtse Basin; Liu Pang came from a coastal district, north of the mouth of the Yangtse, in the northern part of the latter-day province of Kiangsu.

in founding a stable and enduring régime because he did not attempt to re-establish either the anachronistic feudal order or Ts'in She Hwang-ti's revolutionary substitute for it. Liu Pang's policy was to feel his way gradually towards Ts'in She Hwang-ti's Caesarean goal through an Augustan semblance of compromise.

In the short interval between the collapse of the Ts'in Power in 207 B.C. and the general recognition of Liu Pang as sole master of the Sinic World in 202 B.C. the experiment of attempting to restore the *ancien régime* had been tried and proved unworkable.¹

Under Hsiang Yü's auspices, a legitimate scion of the House of the former parochial state of Ch'u had been invested with the oecumenical style and title and ceremonial prerogatives of the ancient Imperial House of Ch'ou, which Ts'in She Hwang-ti's grandfather had suppressed in 256-249 B.C.; and the other extinguished states, with the exception of Ts'in, had likewise nominally been restored. In order to make sure that Ts'in should not again establish its domination over the rest of the Sinic World, it had been broken up, as a measure of security, into four fragments.² Three of these, covering between them the ancient domain of the state, had been granted to high officers of the Ts'in army who had deserted to Hsiang Yü in good time. The fourth, consisting of recently annexed ex-barbarian territories on the north-western fringes of the Yangtse Basin (in the latter-day provinces of Southern Shensi and Szechuan) had been assigned by Hsiang Yü to Liu Pang as a scurvy reward for his embarrassingly valuable services.³ Naturally the other rebel leaders had also had to be rewarded with grants of territory, and these new lordships had had to be carved out of the historic dominions of the nominally restored states of the previous era. The parvenu warlords, as well as the restored representatives of the old houses, had taken the title of king (*wang*), and the king-maker, Hsiang Yü, had styled himself 'suzerain king' (*pa wang*), with the intention of managing this travesty of the pre-Ts'in dispensation in the name of the nominal emperor of the parochial House of Ch'u.

This makeshift arrangement had been neither a genuine restoration of the old régime nor an alternative instrument for furnishing the Sinic World with the sorely needed oecumenical peace that Ts'in She Hwang-ti had effectively provided at an exorbitant price. On the surface the cause of the immediate breakdown of Hsiang Yü's attempt at a settlement had appeared to be the personal antagonism between Hsiang

¹ For the details see Franke, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 257 and 259-61; Fitzgerald, op. cit., pp. 149-50.

² Compare the Romans' experiment of breaking up the Kingdom of Macedon into four autonomous republics in 167 B.C., after the Third Romano-Macedonian War (see Livy, Book XLV, chaps. 29-30). It was not till after the Macedonian insurrection of 149-148 B.C. that the Romans resigned themselves to the necessity of converting Macedon into a province under direct Roman administration.

³ As this new 'Kingdom of Han' (so called after the Han River which flows into the Yangtse at Hankow) lay 'within the passes', Hsiang Yü was nominally honouring the preliminary agreement that had been made between the restored King of Ch'u and the rebel leaders that whichever of the latter should be the first to penetrate the passes and overthrow the Ts'in Power on its home ground should become King of 'the Country within the Passes'. Liu Pang had qualified for winning this prize by his capture of Hsien Yang, and by rights he should have received the entire territory of the state of Ts'in within its frontiers of 230 B.C., and not merely an outlying semi-barbarian march.

Yü and Liu Pang. A deeper cause had been the bankruptcy of the old feudal aristocracy who had been the mainstay of the historic parochial states. They had not only been decimated in the particularly murderous last round of fratricidal wars that had ended in the victory of Ts'in over all her competitors; their spirit had been further broken by Ts'in She Hwang-ti's subsequent massacres and deportations;¹ and, above all, they had been discredited in the eyes of the vast peasant majority of the population of the Sinic World by the plight to which the anarchy of the Contending States had brought the Sinic Society in the last phase of its Time of Troubles.

With both Ts'in She Hwang-ti's and Hsiang Yü's failures in mind, Han Liu Pang and the succeeding emperors of his dynasty followed a Fabian policy of hastening slowly.² In the first act Liu Pang duly conferred fiefs on his most deserving lieutenants, and even left undisturbed the existing fief-holders of Hsiang Yü's régime who had managed to come to terms with the victor. But, one by one, the enfeofed generals were degraded and put to death, while other fief-holders were frequently transferred from one fief to another and readily deposed, without ever being given a chance of establishing any dangerously close personal relation with their temporary subjects. In 144 B.C. Liu Pang's successor Hsiao Ching changed the law of succession for fief-holders by abolishing primogeniture and decreeing that their fiefs should be divided among their sons, and the consequent rapid subdivision of their domains reduced them to final impotence.

Meanwhile Liu Pang had taken effective measures for maintaining and progressively increasing the preponderance of the Imperial Power. The parochial kingships, though they were now no more than shadows of their former selves, were strictly reserved, nevertheless, for members of the Imperial House; the entire 'Country within the Passes' was kept by the Emperor under his own direct administration; and, in the rest of the Han Empire, he retained enough of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's provincial organization to reduce the autonomous kingdoms and fiefs to the position of dwindling enclaves within a steadily expanding network of imperial provinces. Thus, in effect, Ts'in She Hwang-ti's ideal of a universal state controlled from the centre through a hierarchy of artificially mapped out units of local administration was once more translated into fact within a hundred years of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's death; and this time the achievement was definitive, because the Fabian statesmanship of Han Liu Pang and his successors had given the Imperial Government time to create the human instrument for lack of which the first Ts'in emperor's grandiose design for an oecumenical provincial organization had come to grief.

A centralized government cannot be operated without a professional civil service, and, in contrast again to Ts'in She Hwang-ti,³ the Han Dynasty succeeded in building up a civil service that was acceptable,

¹ See pp. 116-17, above.

² For the details see Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 270-2 and 276; Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-3.

³ See pp. 351-3, below.

and therefore effective,¹ by entering into an alliance with the Confucian school of philosophy, which had originally associated itself with the feudal régime and had been driven still farther in that direction by Ts'in She Hwang-ti's intransigence.² The failure of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's régime had discredited the Legist school of philosophy, in whose spirit it had been conceived, without rehabilitating the prestige of the Confucian advocates of the old feudal order, and Han Liu Pang, who shared the anti-Confucian feelings of Ts'in She Hwang-ti, inclined, during the *laissez faire* overture to his long-term policy, towards the passive philosophy of Taoism.³ Yet, before the close of his reign, Liu Pang (*imperabat* 202-195 B.C.) had thought better of his earlier hostility towards Confucianism and had himself initiated⁴ that *rapprochement* between the Han Dynasty and the Confucian School which was consummated when his successor Wuti (*imperabat* 140-87 B.C.) made the somewhat debased Confucianism of the day into the official philosophy of the Sinic universal state.⁵

Han Liu Pang and his successors weaned the Confucian philosophers from their former alliance with the old narrow military aristocracy of birth by opening the public service to a new and broader-based aristocracy of cultural merit as measured by proficiency in the Confucian lore. This historic innovation was introduced in a decree promulgated by Liu Pang in 196 B.C.⁶ The result was the creation of a new class of public servants—the Confucian litterati—with as strong a vested interest in the preservation of the Empire of the Han as the hereditary feudal nobility had had in the maintenance of the former parochial states. The transition was made so gradually and was managed so skilfully that the new aristocracy inherited the old aristocracy's historic appellation—*chün tze*—without any overt recognition that a momentous social and political revolution was taking place.

Administrative Policy in 'the Middle Empire' and in 'the New Empire' of Egypt

Our relatively abundant information about the vicissitudes of the political struggle which ended in the definitive victory of bureaucracy over feudalism in the Sinic World may help us to piece together the fragmentary surviving record of the similar struggle, in the Egyptian World, between the nomarchs and the central government of 'the Middle Empire'.

There is, to begin with, a remarkable parallel between the external careers of the respective founders of the Sinic and the Egyptian universal state, Ts'in She Hwang-ti and one of the Mentuhoteps. Either achieved a dramatic personal success—starting as the ruler of a parochial principality and ending as an oecumenical emperor. Both of them enjoyed long reigns: Ts'in She Hwang-ti was on the throne for thirty-six

¹ For the details see Franke, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 272-6; Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 153. See also the present Study, pp. 355-7, below.

² See p. 171, above.

³ See the passage from a paper by Dr. Hu Shih quoted in V. v. 418.

⁴ See the anecdote quoted from Hu Shih, op. cit., in V. v. 654.

⁵ See V. v. 655.

⁶ German translation in Franke, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 274-5.

years (246–210 B.C.) all told, and this Mentuhotep for fifty-one (*circa* 2061–2010 B.C.).¹ Yet their deaths were followed, after brief intervening reigns of one or two nonentities, by the extinction of their houses and the foundation of new dynasties;² and thus, in spite of achievements that might have been expected to make the fortune of the empire-builder's race for many generations to come, either monarch was virtually the last of his line. This apparent paradox is explained in Ts'in She Hwang-ti's case by the known facts that have been considered above; and, on this analogy, we might hazard the guess that a Mentuhotep brought the same catastrophe upon his house by making the same mistake of trying to force the pace too fast in asserting the authority of his newly established oecumenical government over the defeated yet still formidable representatives of a previous parochial régime. At any rate, we find the founder of the succeeding Twelfth Dynasty Amenemhat I (*imperabat circa* 1991–1962 B.C.) and his successors apparently avoiding a frontal attack on the status of the parochial nomarchs, yet at the same time working steadily to reduce their power by stages.

The deposition of particular nomarchs who found themselves on the losing side in the civil war through which Amenemhat I appears to have won the Imperial Crown³ may have set a precedent for his subsequent practice of overriding the customary right of hereditary succession and transferring the government of nomes from the old princely houses to his own nominees.⁴ Historic families that retained their principalities were tactfully allowed to save their face by keeping up their state, and the most magnificent of their tombs are the last in the series.⁵ But Modern Western archaeologists had not discovered any such tombs that were of later date than the reigns of Senwosret II (*imperabat circa* 1897–1879 B.C.) and Senwosret III (*imperabat circa* 1878–1843 B.C.), and the inference was that the power of the nomarchs had been finally broken, at the latest, by the reign of Amenemhat III (*imperabat circa* 1842–1797 B.C.). The administrative vacuum created by this progressive reduction in the power of the nomarchs was perhaps⁶ filled by the organization of 'the Middle Empire' into three provinces: 'the North' embracing the Delta, 'the South' embracing the Nile Valley from the head of the Delta to the northern boundary of the Theban march, and 'the Head of the South' embracing the Theban march itself within the boundaries of the principality which Mentuhotep had inherited from

¹ See Winlock, H. E.: *The Rise and Fall of the Middle Kingdom in Thebes* (New York 1947, Macmillan), p. 22. This Mentuhotep's conquest of Heracleopolis—which had the effect of uniting the Egyptian World, as the Sinic World was united by Ts'in She Hwang-ti's conquest of Ts'i in 221 B.C.—is dated 1252 B.C. by Winlock in *op. cit.*, p. 28. Winlock's reconstruction of this passage of Egyptian history is commended by J. A. Wilson in *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), p. 127. On the other hand, E. Drioton and J. Vandier, in *L'Égypte* (Paris 1946, Presses Universitaires de France), pp. 234 and 271–2, contest the identification of a Nebhaptre Mentuhotep who united the Egyptian World with a Nephherure Mentuhotep who enjoyed a long reign over an Egyptian universal state.

² Compare the similar sequels to the deaths of Alexander the Great and Oliver Cromwell.

³ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, 3rd ed., vol. i, Part II (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 265.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 269.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 276.

⁶ Eduard Meyer's reconstruction, followed here, had been challenged by some later scholars.

his forebears before he had brought the rest of the Egyptiac World under his rule.¹

When this Mentuhotep's empire-building work was repeated some five hundred years after his day by the founder of 'the New Empire', Amosis, the seat of power, which the Twelfth Dynasty had quickly transferred from Thebes to the neighbourhood of Memphis, remained this time at Thebes for two hundred years,² and this different location of the political centre of gravity seems to have been reflected in a difference in the grouping of provinces. Under 'the New Empire' two out of the three former provinces of 'the Middle Empire', the Delta and the Nile Valley to the north of the Theban march, which had been united under the rule of the Hyksos, were perhaps brigaded by their Theban 'liberators' in a single province governed by 'the Intendant of the North' or 'of Memphis', while the Theban march was placed under an officer of equal rank, styled 'the Intendant of the Southern Capital', and was divided, perhaps for symmetry's sake, into two sub-provinces, one to the north of the imperial city and the other to the south of it.³

Administrative Policy in the Napoleonic Empire

The Napoleonic Empire was overthrown by external forces at so early a stage of its existence that there was little time for the consequences of Napoleon's internal administrative policy to begin to work themselves out. This policy was identical with Ts'in She Hwang-ti's. Starting his career by becoming the ruler of an empire-building parochial state, and finding the home territory of this state newly remapped into artificial administrative divisions in place of the historic territorial units of a past feudal age, Napoleon proceeded to remap the Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian, and 'Illyrian' territories that had been annexed to France outright, or been externally associated with her like the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, into departments on the pattern of those of Revolutionary France herself. Before the reaction to this drastic policy had time to declare itself, the Napoleonic Empire came to a premature end because Napoleon was not content with the immense achievement of having won for France that hegemony over the derelict domain of an abortive Medieval Western cosmos of city-states⁴ for which she had been contending inconclusively with the other Great Powers of an Early Modern Western World for some three hundred years past.⁵

Napoleon insisted on setting France the further and more formidable task of establishing her supremacy over the whole of an expanding Western World that had come to include the overseas economic dependencies of Great Britain in one direction and the continental hinterland of the Russian Empire in the other; and this task proved too heavy for

¹ For these three provinces, see Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 274-5. The march-state of Thebes in the Egyptiac World, like the march state of Ts'in in the Sinic World, had played no part in the history of the civilization during its growth stage and had emerged from its original obscurity only in the course of a Time of Troubles which it had eventually brought to an end by imposing its own rule upon all its rivals.

² See pp. 215-16, below.

³ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, Part I, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), pp. 59-60. This reconstruction, too, had subsequently been challenged.

⁴ See III. iii. 344-7.

⁵ See III. iii. 311 and IV. iv. 283.

France's strength.¹ We are left to conjecture whether, in the Napoleonic Empire, the same revolutionary administrative policy would have provoked the same explosive reaction as in the empire of Ts'in She Hwang-ti if Napoleon had not brought his empire to grief by invading Russia in A.D. 1812; and, in the nature of the case, such facts as we have to go upon are insufficient to yield us a conclusive answer; yet, such as they are, they do strongly suggest—for a reason that has been considered at earlier points in this Study²—that, even if the Napoleonic Empire had avoided bringing destruction on itself at the hands of foreign Powers, it would have failed sooner or later to secure the acquiescence of its non-French subjects in a thoroughgoing administrative assimilation of the annexed or dependent territories to the French core of the Napoleonic body politic.

The governing fact in the situation was that France herself was not one of those dead-alive successors of the city-states of Medieval Western Christendom which she had just succeeded in gathering together under her rule; the vigour and enterprise which France had displayed in this notable piece of empire-building work were characteristic of the lively Modern Western World in which these mouldering débris of an unsuccessful medieval experiment were embedded. Napoleonic France was a member of this wider and more energetic society, and her membership in it not only led her on into over-ambitious military adventures that resulted in the loss of her newly established dominion over a smaller and tamer world; it also made France the carrier of Modern Western political ideas and ideals that ran clean counter to the spirit and objective of her empire-building enterprise.

The political service that France was performing for the wreckage of an abortive new order in Medieval Western Christendom, which had missed its destiny and broken down as far back as the fourteenth century, was to build the fragments of that shattered world into a universal state; and this service was not unacceptable to Germans, Flemings, and Italians of the generation and outlook of Goethe, who felt themselves stifled by the atmosphere of a Frankfurt, Bruges, or Venice in decay and were eager to escape from it by becoming citizens of the World, without shedding a tear over the extinction of decrepit statelets whose parochial independence had long since lost all meaning and value for their subjects. On the other hand, the political gospel to which France had given her own allegiance, and which she was preaching to her non-French subjects by example, was not Oecumenicalism but Nationalism, and this was the political lesson that the younger generation of Germans, Italians, and Belgians learnt—through both attraction and repulsion—from their intercourse with the very Frenchmen who were the agents of French imperialism. The portent of the German national uprising against French imperial rule in A.D. 1813 makes it evident that, even if the Napoleonic Empire had escaped or survived Napoleon's Russian adventure, the uniform departmental organization of the Napoleonic French administration would have provoked—in the name of the very principles of the French Revolution—the same disruptive national

¹ See V. v. 626-33.

² In IV. iv. 283-4 and V. v. 633-42.

movements that were to break a post-Napoleonic Hapsburg hegemony over Italy and Germany within little more than half a century after the Battle of Leipzig. Indeed, the nationalist reaction against a continuance of the drastic process of absorption into the French body politic might have been more vehement than the actual reaction in the 'liberated territories' against a rickety post-Napoleonic restoration of a sluggish *ancien régime*.

Administrative Policy in the Achaemenian Empire

In the administrative history of the Achaemenian Empire the sequence of policies was the inverse of the course of events in the Sinic universal state under the successive régimes of Ts'in and Han. The policy of the first founder, Cyrus II, was not unlike that of Han Liu Pang. He styled his empire 'the Realm of the Lands', and he made it his endeavour to reconcile the conquered peoples to Achaemenian rule by governing each of them as far as possible, at least in outward form, through its own peculiar political institutions.¹ Even the demonic Cambyses, who rode rough-shod over the Egyptians' religious susceptibilities, showed extreme consideration towards the Phoenicians.² This policy of deliberate administrative *laissez faire* was proved inadequate by the widespread and obstinate insurrections that broke out in 522 B.C. at the news of the assassination of Cambyses' successor on the imperial throne, who had professed himself to be Cambyses' brother Smerdis; for Smerdis had been the last male representative of the Cyran branch of the Achaemenidae; and, when the assassin Darius, representing the Ariaramnan branch of the house, had succeeded in restoring order and re-establishing the Empire at the cost of almost superhuman exertions, he sought to insure himself and his successors against a repetition of a catastrophe in which the Empire had all but perished by organizing his dominions, behind the façade of the Cyran dispensation, into twenty artificial taxation districts³ under central control.

The easy-going genius of the Achaemenidae refrained from pushing this new Darian dispensation to the degree of uniformity and centralization that was aimed at in the departmental organization of the Napoleonic Empire or in the network of *chiün* and *hsien* into which the Sinic World was remapped by Ts'in She Hwang-ti. Though Darius's successor Xerxes put an end to the constitutional existence of the Babylonian monarchy in form as well as in fact by refusing to repeat, on New Year's Day 484 B.C., the annual ceremony of 'taking the hands of Bel' that was the traditional warrant and sanction of legitimate sovereignty over Marduk-Bel's city,⁴ Darius and his successors were as careful as the

¹ See p. 582, below.

² As is illustrated by the anecdote quoted on p. 140, n. 2, above.

³ This was the original number according to the list in Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 80-94. See further pp. 582-4, below.

⁴ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 129-30, cited in the present Study, V. v. 123, n. 2. Darius himself had long-sufferingly observed the traditional procedure, in spite of Babylon's having revolted twice during the period of anarchy after Cambyses' death. Xerxes' deliberate discontinuance of the traditional rite was followed immediately by the third and last revolt of Babylon against Achaemenian rule.

Ptolemies and the Caesars were, after them, to rule Egypt in the style of a legitimate Pharaoh;¹ and, though, in the interior of the empire as reorganized by Darius, Cilicia² was the only surviving client state that was allowed to retain a juridical status of sovereign independence,³ there were many smaller principalities, temple-states, and city-states that retained their autonomy as enclaves within the territories under direct administration. Indeed, within the taxation district labelled 'Athurā' ('Syria'), the Phoenician city-states were invested with minor empires of their own.⁴

It was likewise characteristic of the spirit of the Achaemenian régime that the viceroys (satraps) retained extensive powers even under the stricter Darian dispensation.⁵ An imperial secretary who presumably reported direct to the Central Government was, however, attached to each of them⁶ and appears to have been a member, *ex officio*, of the provincial council, mainly consisting of local Persian notables, whose concurrence the governor had to obtain in the more important of his acts of state. Moreover, in some of the more inveterately nationalist-minded viceroyalties—e.g. in Media, Armenia, Babylon-cum-Beyond the River, and West Anatolia—the likelihood of either a traitorous viceroy or an insurgent pretender being able to carry the whole country with him must have been decidedly diminished by the dissection of these four viceroyalties into four, three, two, and two taxation districts respectively.⁷

Administrative Policy in the Arab Caliphate

In contrast to the four instances, examined above, in which a provincial organization was introduced in a universal state as a means of combating persistent parochial opposition to the establishment of an oecumenical régime, a classical example of the opposite situation, in which a provincial organization was required for the filling of an administrative vacuum, is afforded by the Arab Caliphate. The Arab conquests were comparable, in point of speed, to Ts'ing She Hwang-ti's, Mentuhotep's, Napoleon's, and Cyrus's; for it took the Arabs only nineteen years (A.D. 633–51)⁸ to conquer the whole of the Sasanian Empire up to Merv, inclusive, on the north-east, as well as not much less than half of the surviving dominions of the Roman Empire up to

¹ It must be added that the tactfully treated Egyptians remained as irreconcilable to Achaemenian rule as the unceremoniously treated Babylonians.

² Erroneously reckoned in the Herodotean list as the fourth taxation district. The effects of this error on Herodotus's presentation of the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire are discussed on pp. 594–7, below.

³ Beyond the frontiers of the territory under direct imperial administration there were friendly peoples in treaty relations with the Imperial Government who were allowed to retain a juridical status of equality with their imperial ally in consideration of their service to the Empire in screening it from the assaults of outer barbarians. Two such allied peoples were 'the Hauma(?)drinking Saka' in Farghānah and the Arabs astride the road up the Euphrates from Babylonia to Syria and along the shore of the Mediterranean Sea from Syria to Egypt (see pp. 644–5 and 658–9, below).

⁴ See V. v. 123, n. 2.

⁵ For their powers and functions see Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 52–54.

⁶ See p. 82, above.

⁷ See pp. 582–3, below.

⁸ The Arab conquests are here reckoned to have begun with the campaigns of A.D. 633, and not with the reconnaissance of A.D. 629 which ended so disastrously for the Muslims at Mu'tah.

the Amanus Range on the north and up to the approaches to Carthage on the west.¹ Yet, in spite of the abruptness of the imposition of their rule, the Arab empire-builders were not confronted with any widespread vigorous movements to restore pre-existing régimes.²

The Arabs' administrative task was easy in this respect because the vast populations which they had so swiftly subjugated had by that time been broken in by more than eleven centuries' experience of being ruled by successive foreign empire-builders,³ till they had grown accustomed to submitting passively to any new masters who might assert their title to rule by overthrowing their predecessors. Moreover, throughout this long period of time in most parts of this wide area, the dominant tendency had been for local self-government and parochial autonomy to give place to direct imperial rule, and this imperial administration itself had tended to become more and more centralized. This tendency had been only partially and temporarily counteracted by the break-up of the Achaemenian Empire and the planting of autonomous city-states on provincial territory by the successors of Alexander and by the Romans in their wake. The Sasanian Persian and Diocletianic Roman régimes which were the Arab Caliphate's immediate predecessors had been more highly centralized, not only than their own respective immediate predecessors the Arsacid hegemony and the Roman Principate, but than any of the other imperial régimes that had followed one another in South-West Asia and Egypt since the days of the Achaemenidae. Thus the mapping out of the Arab Caliphate into provinces was called for, not to meet the challenge of any rival political order, but to carry on an oecumenical system of government which, in virtue of its long monopoly, was the only practical possibility in the field. It is not surprising that the provincial organization of this resuscitated Syriac universal state should have borne, in its best days under the early 'Abbasid Caliphs, a striking resemblance to the provincial organization with which the original Syriac universal state had been endowed by Darius the Great.⁴

¹ Carthage itself was momentarily occupied by the Arabs for the first time in A.D. 697 and was not definitely conquered by them till perhaps as late as A.D. 703, though they had established themselves in Tripolitania as early as A.D. 647 (see Becker, C. H.: *Islamstudien*, vol. i (Leipzig 1924, Quelle & Meyer), p. 118).

² Successful resistance to the imposition of Arab rule was put up only in a few natural fastnesses: in the ex-Sasanian territories between the Elburz Range and the south coast of the Caspian Sea; in the coastal highlands of Syria; and, after the later Arab conquest of the Visigothic successor-state of the Roman Empire in the Iberian Peninsula, in a strip of territory between the Asturian Mountains and the south coast of the Bay of Biscay which was a miniature counterpart of Daylam and Tabaristan (the geographical similarity of these two regions has been noticed already in II. ii. 446-7). The most sensational of these resistance movements was that of the Mardaïtes in Syria, who managed to hold their own within short range of the four or five Arab cantonments there and within a stone's throw of the Umayyads' capital city, Damascus, itself. The Mardaïtes, however, seem to have drawn their strength and their *moral* largely from the support which they received from the Roman imperial authorities. Their movement was one of infiltration from a base in unconquered Roman territory, and they were sufficiently under the Roman Government's control for it to be able to undertake to withdraw them as part of the *modus vivendi* into which it entered with the Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik in A.D. 688.

³ Reckoning from the date of Darius's administrative reorganization of the Achaemenian Empire in the last quarter of the sixth century B.C.—but Syria and Egypt had had a still longer training in the hard lesson of political submissiveness (see V. v. 118 and IX. viii. 90-97).

⁴ A statistical comparison of the areas and assessments of the provinces of the 'Abbasid

Financial Functions of Provinces

A synoptic view of the provincial systems of the divers universal states that have come under consideration in the present chapter brings to light three main functions—a financial, a judicial, and a military—for which a province may serve as the local agency of an oecumenical government. The relative importance of these different functions will be found to vary widely from case to case, in accordance with historic differences in the policies of the respective empire-builders, in the degree of their ability to carry their policies into effect, and in the temper and traditions of their subjects; and there are cases in which one or more of these normal functions has been altogether in abeyance.

The essential and never dormant function is the financial one. Even the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of Roman and Sasanian territory, barbarians though they were, appreciated from the outset the importance, in their own interests, of maintaining as a going concern the existing financial administrative machinery—built up gradually through a continuous practice extending over many generations—of surveys, censuses, assessments, collections, and, above all, trained personnel for carrying all these administrative procedures out. Accordingly the Arabs left undisturbed at their posts the host of inland revenue officials whom they found in operation on either side of the former Romano-Persian frontier; and they wisely allowed them to continue to keep their books in Greek and Pehlevi till the reign of the Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik (*imperator* A.D. 685–705),¹ by when the lapse of half a century had made the conquerors' language and alphabet sufficiently familiar to their subjects to make it possible to transpose the official book-keeping into Arabic without throwing the financial service into confusion and bringing the collection of revenue to a standstill.²

Yet, although the provincial organization of a universal state seems always to be used for some financial purpose, the respective roles of the provincial administration and the central government in the control of finance vary within very wide limits. In both the Arab Caliphate and its prototype the Achaemenian Empire each province was financially autonomous. The provincial government not only carried out the collection of all revenue within its own boundaries; it retained, for provincial use, all receipts beyond a fixed tribute payable to the imperial treasury. On the other hand the financial administration of the British Indian Empire and the Roman Empire was highly centralized, and the imperial treasury here kept in the hands of its own revenue service both the collection of revenue in the provinces and the payment of charges for provincial administration—thus using the provinces as mere organs of the central government for financial purposes.

Caliphate, as recorded by the classical Arab geographers, with those of the taxation-districts of the Achaemenian Empire, as recorded by Herodotus, might yield interesting results.

¹ See V. v. 501, with n. 3, and p. 242, below, where an error in vol. v, p. 501, n. 3, is corrected.

² See Ahmad al-Balādhuri: *Kitāb Futūh-Al-Buldān*, English translation by Hitti, P. Kh., vol. i (New York 1916, Columbia University Press), pp. 301 and 465–6.

Judicial Functions of Provinces

The judicial function of provincial governors had likewise varied in importance. This was a prominent feature of a provincial governor's duties in both the Achaemenian and the Roman Empire. Indeed, in the acts of Christian martyrs, in which this aspect of a Roman provincial governor's duties is in the foreground in the nature of the case, the governor is frequently referred to simply as *iudex*. In the government of British India the criminal law was administered, above the level of the petty cases dealt with by village headmen or *panchayats*, by salaried magistrates who, *more Romano*, were usually revenue and administrative officers as well as judges; but civil law at the same level, and criminal as well as civil law at all levels higher than that, was here administered, in accordance with a principle already established in the government of the United Kingdom, by a judiciary separate from, and independent of, the administrative service.¹ Even in the loosely organized Achaemenian Empire there appears to have been a bench of imperial judges whose importance in the scheme of imperial government is indicated by the facts that they were recruited from the leading Persian noble houses and that, if they were discovered to have taken bribes, they were arraigned before the Emperor himself and were punished by him with the utmost severity.² In the Roman Empire, again, the judicial discretion of a provincial governor in cases to which Roman citizens were parties was limited by the citizens' right of appeal to Caesar; and this procedure had the curious result that the Praetorian Prefect, who had originally been simply the Commander of the Emperor's bodyguard, in course of time became the president of a central court of final appeal through which the Emperor's prerogative was exercised.³ Under the Diocletianic constitution this court of appeal was decentralized like the imperial office itself, and the Empire was divided into four praetorian prefectures, each presided over by a prefect of its own who had the last word in all judicial business within his area.

Military Functions of Provinces

The military function of provincial governors had varied in scope and character even more widely than the judicial and the financial.

In the Achaemenian Empire the standing army maintained and controlled by the central government was very small by comparison with the size of the total population and area of the Achaemenian dominions. It consisted merely of a bodyguard attached to the emperor's person and of garrisons stationed at key points along the imperial lines

¹ See the *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, vol. i (London 1930, H.M. Stationery Office = Cmd. 3568), pp. 292-7.

² See Herodotus, Book V, chap. 25, and Book VII, chap. 194.

³ Compare the analogous evolution in the Achaemenian Empire by which the Hazarapatish (*Graecè* Chiliarch), who had originally been the commander of the Emperor's bodyguard of a thousand men, became something like the president of a council of ministers (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 43, and Junge, P. J.: 'Hazarapatish: Zur Stellung des Chiliarchen der Königlichen Leibgarde im Achämenidenstaat', in *Klio*, vol. xxxiii (Neue Folge, vol. xv) (Leipzig 1940, Dietrich), pp. 13-38).

of communication.¹ The title 'hazarapatiš' (commander of one thousand troops'), borne by the imperial officer who eventually came to perform the functions of a head of the civil administration,² indicates that the imperial bodyguard had originally been only 1,000 men strong; and, even if the *corps d'élite* known as 'the Immortals', who served in Xerxes' expeditionary force in 480-479 B.C., were a standing professional force and not merely the cream of a Persian national militia, their number was in any case fixed at no more than 10,000.³ Allowing for the partial recruitment of the imperial garrisons from non-Persian sources⁴ and further for the possibility that the original 1,000 Persian picked troops were included in the eventual 10,000 and that these were not all Persians,⁵ it will still seem improbable that any considerable number of additional Persian troops can ever have been raised from the thinly populated home territory of the ruling nation in the highlands of Pārsa (*Graecè* Persis, the latter-day Fars) after more than one half of its area, and perhaps not much less than one half of its population, had been detached from Pārsa by Darius I through his act of degrading the dissident Asagartiyā in Kirmān and dissident Yautiyā and Maciyā in Lāristān to the status of subject peoples.⁶ Accordingly, when the Achaemenian Imperial Government was called upon to make a serious war effort, it had to draw very largely on provincial militias, and these again were recruited not merely from the local Persian settlers but from the native populations as well.

The training, inspection,⁷ and command of these provincial militias were responsibilities of the provincial governors, and the military power which these prerogatives placed in their hands was not effectively kept in check by the presence, within their domains, of a few imperial garrisons under the central government's control—as was demonstrated by the ever-increasing frequency and formidableness of the rebellions on which provincial governors ventured. The Mughal Empire paid the same penalty for lapsing into the slovenly practice—against which Akbar had set his face in vain—of providing for the payment of the imperial officers (*mansabdārs*), charged with the maintenance of contingents of troops, by assigning to them provincial land revenue which they were empowered to collect for themselves, instead of collecting the revenue on its own account and paying the *mansabdārs* out of the Imperial Treasury.⁸ In the Ottoman, unlike either the Mughal or the Achaemenian, Empire the central government had at its disposal a

¹ For these garrisons see p. 123, above.

² See p. 182, n. 3, above, and p. 344, below.

³ See Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 83.

⁴ See p. 119, with n. 7, above.

⁵ On the evidence of the friezes at Susa, A. T. Olmstead holds (see *A History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), p. 238) that the Ten Thousand were recruited from among the Medes and the Elamites as well as the Persians.

⁶ See pp. 583, 622-3, and 637, below.

⁷ There would appear to have been periodic musters—presumably for inspection and perhaps also for manœuvres—to judge by the formula 'commander of all the forces whose appointed place of assemblage is the Plain of Castolus', which was part of the terms of appointment issued by Darius II to his son Cyrus in 408 B.C. according to Xenophon: *Expeditio Cyri*, Book I, chap. ix, § 7 (cp. op. cit., Book I, chap. i, § 2, and eundem: *Historia Graeca*, Book I, chap. iv, § 3). See further this Study in the present volume, p. 674, with n. 3, and IX. viii. 548, n. 1.

⁸ See p. 127, above.

professional army which, in its best days, was admirably disciplined, mobile, and efficient;¹ yet in wartime the Ottoman Empire, too, had to draw heavily upon provincial forces, and, though, as we have seen,² the central government exerted itself to keep under its own control the assignment of the fiefs by which the provincial feudal cavalry was maintained, the feudal contingent of each province was commanded in wartime by the provincial governor.

In the Roman Empire during the Principate, all units of the professional army except the Emperor's Praetorian Guard and the so-called *Cohortes Urbanae* ('Metropolitan Battalions')³ were under the command of provincial governors; but, in the Augustan constitution, this arrangement did not carry with it that decentralization of military power which was a dangerous weakness of the Achaemenian, Mughal, and Ottoman Empires. At this stage of its history the Roman Empire enjoyed such a decided ascendancy over both the enemy beyond the frontiers⁴ and recalcitrant tribesmen in patches of the interior that it was able to keep its troops concentrated in a small fraction of the imperial territory, and this mainly along the borders. In his division of the control over the provinces between himself and the Senate, Augustus was careful to retain in his own hands all provinces in which troops had to be stationed, and the governors of these provinces were the Emperor's own appointees and military subordinates. Constitutionally, therefore, the whole Imperial Army, wherever stationed, remained under the Emperor's own undivided command, and normally this control was effective—though the civil wars of A.D. 69 and A.D. 193–7, in which governors of different imperial provinces who were *ex officio* deputy chiefs of rival army-groups fought one another for the prize of the vacant imperial office, were portents of the greater bout of anarchy, arising from this inherent weakness in the constitution of the Principate, in which the Empire itself was to come within an ace of destruction in the third century of the Christian Era.

By the time when Diocletian (*imperabat* A.D. 284–305) undertook the reorganization of the Roman Empire, the terrible experience of the two preceding generations had demonstrated the danger of combining the civil government of a province with the local military command, even when local commands were constitutionally subordinate to an imperial commander-in-chief and when this dangerous combination of powers was confined to one of two categories of provinces. In Diocletian's day it was no longer practically possible to maintain the distinction between military and civilian provinces which had been of the essence of Augustus's system, for by this time the frontier defences of the Empire had broken down and, in the new military situation, if the Empire could be defended at all, it could be defended only in depth by mobile forces which might need to operate in any part of the imperial territory. These two considerations led Diocletian and his successors to take a radical new departure. They set up a small number of high military commands each embracing a wide area and covering, between them, the whole of

¹ See III. iii. 32–44.

³ For these see p. 123, above, and pp. 321–2, below.

² See pp. 125–6, above.

⁴ See p. 320, below.

the Empire,¹ but they confined the powers of this professional military hierarchy to military affairs and placed the civil administration—from governorships of provinces² up to praetorian prefectures inclusive—in the hands of a professional civil service. This division of powers continued till the break-up of the Empire in the fifth century of the Christian Era in the west and in the seventh century in the east and centre.³

In the Sinic World the experience of the last and most appalling round of the warfare between the Contending States led Ts'in She Hwang-ti, in founding a Sinic universal state, into the path that was to be followed in another society by Diocletian when he refounded the Roman Empire. Though Ts'in She Hwang-ti chose an historic institution of military government—the *chün*—as the major unit of provincial administration for his dominions,⁴ he separated the civil administration of his *chün* from the military command and placed the two offices in different hands, while the *hsien*—which in Ts'in She Hwang-ti's system became a subdivision of the *chün*—seems to have been under exclusively civilian control.⁵ This division of civil and military powers was, of course, the antithesis of the traditional Sinic feudal régime, yet, like other radical and provocative innovations introduced by the first Ts'in emperor, it ultimately prevailed. The permanent victory of this new principle of Sinic administration was assured when, in consequence of the eventual alliance between the Han Dynasty and the Confucian school of philosophy, the Confucian scholar, selected individually for intellectual merit, replaced the feudal warrior, inducted by right of birth, as the typical representative of the Sinic governing class. And a principle thus established in the Sinic Society in the last chapter of its history was resuscitated—after the social interregnum in which the Han Empire foundered—in the affiliated Far Eastern Society in China.

The Utilization of Provincial Organizations by Alien Civilizations

Who had been the principal ultimate beneficiaries from the systems of provincial administration which universal states had set up?

Conspicuous benefits had been secured by intruders of alien culture. The provincial organization of the Achaemenian Empire, for instance, was taken over and turned to good account by the Hellenic successor-states into which the Achaemenian dominions were partitioned at the turn of the fourth and third centuries B.C. after the overthrow of the Empire by Alexander the Great; and when, in the second decade of

¹ See pp. 322-3, below.

² Under the Diocletianic régime the provinces were reduced in size and were increased in number, by comparison with the administrative map of the Roman Empire under the Principate, owing to a progressive transfer of business that had once been handled by local organs of municipal self-government to the shoulders of imperial officials.

³ When a ghost of the Roman Empire was conjured up in the Orthodox Christian World by Leo Syrus in the eighth century of the Christian Era, this division of civil and military powers was not one of the imperial institutions that were revived. It had proved too complicated an arrangement to weather the storms of a political interregnum, and, even before the crash had come in the centre and the east, the first steps towards a reversal of the Diocletianic policy had been taken here and there by Justinian (*imperabat* A.D. 527-65). See Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Later Roman Empire* (London 1889, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, chap. 13.

⁴ See p. 169, above.

⁵ See Bodde, D.: *China's First Unifier* (Leiden 1938, Brill), p. 135.

the second century B.C., an Hellenic ruler of the ex-Achaemenian province of Bactria emulated Alexander's feat by overrunning the Indic universal state that had been established by Chandragupta Maurya, the provincial organization that had been worked out during the preceding 137 years (322-185 B.C.) by Chandragupta himself and his Mauryan heirs¹ was no doubt similarly serviceable to the Hellenic princes who ruled North-Western India for the next hundred years.²

The British Rāj in India was indebted in the same way to the foregoing Mughal Rāj, particularly in the financial sphere;³ for, though so many Mughal institutions, good and bad alike, had perished during the century of anarchy that had followed Awrangzib's death in A.D. 1707, the military adventurers—Indian, Afghan, and West European—who had since been contending for the spoils of a derelict Mughal heritage had all been careful—like the barbarian Arab conquerors of the Sasanian and Roman Empires—to preserve an imperial administrative machine for the collection of revenue that was the irreplaceable source of pay for their troops. Accordingly the British empire-builders, when they came on the scene, were not faced with the task of rebuilding from the foundations in the revenue department. Thanks to the legacy which they here inherited from their Mughal forerunners, the organization, information, experience, and, above all, the habits which are indispensable conditions for success in the administration of finance were to a large extent at British disposal as going concerns; and one of the most effective of the devices by which the British made themselves masters of India was the employment of a financial leverage for bringing into British hands the command of the troops and the administration of the territories of successor-states of the Mughal Empire that became the Honourable East India Company's allies.

'Our participation in Indian wars began when the English lent a military contingent to assist some native potentate. The next stage came when we took the field on our own account, assisted usually by the levies of some prince who made common cause with us, and whose soldiery were undisciplined, untrustworthy, and very clumsily handled. . . . What was needed was a body of men that could be relied upon for some kind of tactical precision and steadiness under fire; but for this purpose it was of little use even to place sepoys under European officers unless they could be regularly paid and taught to obey one master. So the system soon reached the stage when the native ally was required to supply not men but money,⁴ and the English undertook to raise, train, and pay a fixed number of troops on receiving a subsidy equivalent to their cost. . . . Large sums had been

¹ The fragmentary information about this aspect of the Mauryan Empire is presented in Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 163-4.

² The scanty information about the provincial organization of the Greek successor-states of the Mauryan Empire is sorted out, with a masterly hand, by Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 230-43 and 259.

³ The administrative and financial organization set up by the Mughal Darius, Akbar (*imperabat* A.D. 1556-1605), is set out in Moreland, W. H.: *India at the Death of Akbar* (London 1920, Macmillan), p. 33.

⁴ In the Hellenic World of the fifth century B.C. the requirement of money instead of ships was the process by which the Athenians converted a Delian League under Athens' leadership into an Athenian Empire under Athens' thumb.—A.J.T.

hitherto spent by the native princes in maintaining ill-managed and in-subordinate bodies of troops, and in constant wars against each other; they might economise their revenues, be rid of a mutinous soldiery, and sit much more quietly at home, by entering into contracts with a skilful and solvent administration that would undertake all serious military business for a fixed subsidy. But, as punctuality in money matters has never been a princely quality, this subsidy was apt to be paid very irregularly; so the next stage was to revive the long-standing practice of Asiatic governments: the assignment of lands for the payment of troops.¹

This method of extending direct British rule in India was applied by Lord Wellesley (*proconsulari munere fungebatur* A.D. 1798-1805) with special vigour to the two important successor-states of the Mughal Empire whose respective rulers were the Wazir of Oudh and the Nizām of Hyderabad, and the territory thus acquired by the British Rāj from Oudh was of crucial importance.

'The result of Lord Wellesley's somewhat dictatorial negotiations was that the Wazir ceded all his frontier provinces, including Rohilcund, to the Company, the revenue of the territory thus transferred being taken as an equivalent to the subsidy payable for troops. . . . Oudh was thenceforward enveloped by the English dominion. This most important augmentation of territory transferred to the British Government some of the richest and most populous districts in the heart of India, lying along the Ganges and its tributaries above Benares to the foot of the Himalayan Range. It consolidated our power on a broader foundation, brought a very large increase of revenue, and confronted us with the Marattha chief Sindia along the whole line of his possessions in Upper India.'²

While the British in India were entering into the heritage of an empire that had collapsed a hundred years before, and the Hellenic supplanters of the Mauryan and Achaemenid empires overthrew régimes that were already in decay, the Spanish *conquistadores* of the Andean World seized an Incaic Empire that was still intact, and they profited from this piece of good fortune notwithstanding the blind brutality and pride which moved them to destroy so many Inca institutions that were valuable in themselves and would have also served the interests of the new masters of the Andean World. The paternal totalitarian éthos of the Inca régime had been faithfully reflected in its system of provincial administration. A hierarchy of administrative units—based on the natural social unit of the family and the natural geographical unit of the valley—ascended through communes, departments, and provinces to the four viceroyalties, reminiscent of the praetorian prefectures of a Diocletianic Roman Empire, from which this Andean 'Realm of the Four Quarters' took its name.³ Though this elaborate system was too delicate a tool to fit the alien conqueror's rough hand, the habit of obedience that had been inculcated into the population of the Empire by the minutiae of Incaic administration made these subjects most accommodatingly submissive

¹ Lyall, Sir A.: *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India* (London 1894, Murray), pp. 244-5.

² Lyall, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

³ For the administrative map of the Inca Empire, see Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inkas* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), pp. 118-19; and the present Study, xi, map 68.

to the more rudimentary administrative methods of the Inca's Spanish supplanters.

The inability of the Spanish *conquistadores* to derive substantial advantage from the administrative system which they found on their hands is characteristic of barbarian conquerors. The German and Sarmatian invaders of the western provinces of the Roman Empire were similarly unable to take advantage of the Diocletianic organization. The signal exception which proves the rule is the success of the Arab invaders of Roman Syria and Egypt in preserving the Roman financial system as a going concern, and this goes far to explain the Arabs' unparalleled achievement of transforming one of the barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire into an avatar of the Syriac universal state that had once been embodied in the Empire of the Achaemenidae. The administrative receptivity of the Primitive Muslim Arabs has its counterparts in the less striking achievements of the Arsacid 'Parthian', Saka, and Kushan barbarian supplanters of Hellenic empire-builders on former Achaemenian ground in South-West Asia east of Euphrates and on former Mauryan ground in North-West India.¹ But these were all exceptional cases, and, for the most part, the barbarian invaders of universal states had failed to profit from their victims' work in the field of provincial administration.

The Utilization of Provincial Organizations by Churches

On the other hand, the provincial organization of a universal state had more than once been turned to ecclesiastical account.

When the Egyptiac Emperor Thothmes (Tuthmosis) III (*imperabat circa 1490-1436 B.C.*) organized the priests of the parochial divinities of the nomes into a Pan-Egyptiac ecclesiastical corporation under the presidency of the Chief Priest of Amon-Re at Thebes,² we may guess that he was extending to the ecclesiastical field the existing political structure of 'the New Empire' of Egypt; for 'the New Empire' was a resuscitation of 'the Middle Empire' after an interregnum of Hyksos barbarian ascendancy, and, as we have seen,³ 'the Middle Empire' had succeeded, step by step, in extinguishing the autonomy of the once virtually independent nomarchs and eventually bringing the nomes under the direct administration of the imperial government. One of the moves made by the emperors of the Twelfth Dynasty on their road to this objective had been to enter, over the heads of the nomarchs, into direct relations with the priests of the local shrines and to purchase their alliance by sending officials of the Imperial Office of Works to repair and improve their temple buildings at the charge of the Imperial Treasury.⁴ Thothmes' historic act set the coping-stone on the construction of this mutually profitable partnership between the local priesthoods and the Imperial Crown.

The hierarchical organization of the local Egyptiac priesthoods into a

¹ See V. v. 442-3.

² See I. i. 145, n. 5; IV. iv. 421; and V. v. 530-1.

³ On pp. 174-6, above.

⁴ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, Part II, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), p. 274.

Pan-Egyptiac ecclesiastical corporation under a supreme pontiff, on the initiative and under the patronage of the secular Imperial Power, has a parallel in the position accorded to the Magi in the Sasanian Empire (*stabat* A.D. 224¹–641 or 642²). The fundamental difference in structure between the Sasanian Persian Monarchy and the Arsacid 'Parthian' régime which it supplanted lay in the Sasanids' effective assertion of the central government's authority. Provincial governors, appointed by the Sasanian Emperor, now replaced the hereditary local kinglets³—seldom effectively under the control of their Arsacid overlord and often in overt rebellion against him—of whom the founder of the Sasanian Empire, Ardashir I, had himself been one before he carried a successful rebellion to its logical conclusion by slaying his master and seizing his throne. This Sasanian centralization of the civil administration of South-West Asia east of Euphrates was reflected in the corresponding organization of the Zoroastrian Church under Ardashir I's auspices and, according to tradition, on his initiative. Ardashir not only made Zoroastrianism the established church of his empire; he organized the Magian priesthood of the imperial religion into a hierarchy⁴ rising from the local Magi (*Mōghān*), through the Chief Magi (*Mōghān Mōghān*) of eminent shrines and their superiors the Archimagi (*Mōbadhān*), to a supreme Archimagus (*Mōbadhān Mōbadh*) who was the ecclesiastical counterpart of the Sasanian Emperor himself.⁵ This organization had a territorial basis: the empire was divided and subdivided into the equivalents of Christian archbishoprics, bishoprics, and parishes, each under the jurisdiction of an ecclesiastic of the corresponding rank.

Though Ardashir's and Thothmes' acts of state wear the appearance of creations *ex nihilo*, this is doubtless partly an illusion arising from the scantiness of our information about their antecedents. We do know that the Egyptiac priesthood to which Thothmes gave an oecumenical organization had previously ensured its own survival by coming to terms with the perhaps intrusive Sumeric worship of Osiris in an *union sacrée* against the alien religion of the Hyksos;⁶ and the Magi—an ancient ecclesiastical caste which had originated in the pre-Zoroastrian age of Iranian paganism—had shown a similar resourcefulness in capturing the revolutionary higher religion founded by Zarathustra after they had come to the conclusion that they could neither stamp it out nor prevent its spread.⁷ The Magi had also succeeded in commending Zoroastrianism (in the hardly recognizable form in which it had emerged from the Magian crucible) to

¹ The probable date of the overthrow of the last Arsacid king of kings, Artabanus V, by Ardashir I of the House of Sāsān.

² The date of the Battle of Nihāwand, after which the Sasanian Government was virtually non-existent, though the last Sasanian Emperor, Yazdagird III, survived as a fugitive in Khurāsān till A.D. 651 or 652.

³ This unbridled local autonomy had been so characteristic a feature of the Arsacid régime that this whole episode of South-West Asian history came to be known, in the Arabic version of the Sasanian tradition, as the age of the *mulūk-at-tawā'if* (the parochial princelings who were mere 'kings of shreds and patches').

⁴ See Christensen, A.: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin & Munksgaard), pp. 112–13.

⁵ A second order of ecclesiastics, the *Hērbadhān*, who were specialists in ritual, were similarly brigaded together under a supreme *Hērbadhān Hērbadh* (Christensen, *op. cit.*, p. 114).

⁶ See I. i. 140–5.

⁷ See V. v. 542 and 705, n. 1; and V. vi. 43, n. 4.

the Arsacid princes of the Azerbaijānī line (*regnabant* A.D. 10/11–224) who had been the Sasanids' immediate predecessors; and, though these latter-day Arsacids had not gone to the length of making Zoroastrianism the official religion of their state, the captivation of these ex-barbarians by the Magi was a more remarkable achievement than this ecclesiastical corporation's alliance with the Sasanidae. In the act of supplanting the Arsacids, the Sasanidae had virtually committed themselves to Zoroastrianism in advance by claiming to be the legitimate successors of the Achaemenidae, since the personal adherence of the great emperors of the Achaemenian Dynasty to the religion of Zarathustra was one of the few facts of pre-Alexandrine Iranian history of which a lively recollection had been preserved in the folk-memory of the Iranian people during the long ascendancy of an alien Hellenic culture.

Thus both the Magi and the Egyptian Priesthood had known how to help themselves before their fortunes were made by a stroke of the secular arm, and, in the sequel, both ecclesiastical corporations demonstrated their capacity to survive the state that had called them into existence. The Chief Priest of Amon-Re at Thebes, Hrihor,¹ actually took over the Egyptian Imperial Crown in the eleventh century B.C. from the last decrepit secular pharaohs of 'the New Empire';² and, though nothing came of this attempt to keep 'the New Empire' in being through a personal union of the supreme temporal and ecclesiastical offices, the Pan-Egyptian ecclesiastical corporation instituted by Thothmes III did continue to maintain itself—and, in doing so, to preserve the distinctive character of the Egyptian Society—for some fifteen hundred years after the Theban priest-king Hrihor's day, under successive alien ascendancies and native Egyptian reactions against them, until at last, under Roman rule, its close-grained fabric yielded to the solvent of Christianity. As for the Zoroastrian Church, it failed to emulate the tenacity of the Egyptian priesthood on its native soil; when the Sasanian Empire was overthrown, the Magian hierarchy fell with it; yet, though Zoroastrianism did not succeed in holding its own at home, it did achieve the even more difficult feat of preserving its identity in diasporá, and the credit for this was largely due to the perennial adaptability of the Magi, who retained their hold over their flock, and thereby kept this flock together, by making the most of their role as executors of a ritual and doctors of a religious law after they had lost their ecclesiastical lordship over a territorial empire.³

¹ According to recent findings of Modern Western Egyptologists, Hrihor himself was not a priest by profession but was a military adventurer who had usurped the Chief Priesthood of Amon-Re of Thebes without being properly qualified to hold it (see Edgerton, W. F.: 'The Government and the Governed in the Egyptian Empire', in the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. iv, July 1947, No. 3 (Chicago 1947, University Press), pp. 152–60). Edgerton makes this statement on p. 153 on the authority of Kees, H.: 'Hrihor und die Aufrichtung des Thebanischen Gottesstaates', in *Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, Neue Folge, Fachgruppe 1, 2. Band (1936–8), pp. 1–20). If this is the fact, it is a further testimony to the potency of the office in Hrihor's day. If it had not been the most favourable 'jumping-off ground' within Hrihor's reach for going on to usurp the Pharaonic Crown, the Chief Priesthood of Amon-Re would hardly have excited the cupidity of a soldier of fortune.

² See II. ii. 116, n. 1; IV. iv. 421 and 515–17; and p. 692, below.

³ There was, of course, a remarkable similarity between the Zoroastrian and the Jewish response to the identic challenge of exile and dispersion.

The Christian Church showed still greater initiative and independence in turning to its own account the provincial organization of the universal state within whose framework it arose.¹ In building up its body ecclesiastical it availed itself of the city-states that were the cells of the Hellenic body social and of the Roman body politic. From the days of Saint Paul and his fellow pioneers in the Christian mission field, city-states were the primary units of the Church's territorial structure, and, as the traditions of the Hellenic Civilization gradually died out, a city came to mean a town that was the seat of a Christian bishop, instead of meaning a town possessing institutions of civil self-government and chartered as a municipality of the Roman Commonwealth. A local bishop whose see was the administrative centre of a Diocletianic Roman province came to be recognized by the bishops of the other cities of the same province as their superior; such metropolitans or archbishops, in their turn, acknowledged as their primate the bishop whose see was the administrative centre of one of those groups of provinces which, in the Diocletianic system, were known as *dioceses*;² and bishops, metropolitans, and primates alike paid ecclesiastical allegiance to regional patriarchs, who corresponded hierarchically to the Diocletianic praetorian prefects, though there was no correspondence at this level, as there was at the lower levels, between the areas of ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction. In the Diocletianic Empire the west and centre were partitioned between three praetorian prefectures, while the east, from the Lower Danube to the First Cataract of the Nile, and from Thrace and Cyrenaica to Mesopotamia, was united in a single vast circumscription. In the Christian ecclesiastical organization, on the other hand, the Diocletianic Praefecture of the East was eventually divided between the four patriarchates of Alexandria, Jerusalem, Antioch, and Constantinople, while the circumscriptions of the other three praefectures were united in the single vast ecclesiastical domain of the Patriarchate of Rome.

This territorial organization of the Christian Church was not called into existence by the fiat of any Roman Thothmes or Ardashir; it was built up by the Church itself in the days when, in Roman official eyes, Christianity was a *religio non licita*; and all but the top story—whose architecture was implicit in the structure of the lower tiers—was in existence by the time of the conversion of Constantine. In virtue of this original independence of the secular imperial régime whose territorial organization it had thus adapted to its own purposes, the Roman-inspired territorial structure of the Christian Church was able to survive the Roman Empire's disappearance. In Gaul, for example, where a tottering Roman imperial régime had sought at the eleventh hour to rehabilitate itself on a novel basis of local support by instituting periodic regional congresses of notables, the Church, after the Empire had faded

¹ The preservation of the lineaments of an obsolete Roman political map in those of a surviving Christian ecclesiastical map is examined further on pp. 693-5, below.

² Though this technical term of Diocletianic Roman administration had been adopted as the designation of the 'diocese' of a Christian bishop, this usage was historically incorrect, since the standard domain of a bishopric was the territory of a city-state or canton, whereas the *dioceses* of the Roman Empire each contained several hundreds of territorial units of that order of magnitude.

out of existence, took its cue from this secular precedent by convening regional congresses of bishops;¹ and, though in many regions once included in the Roman Empire the Church's structure had eventually weathered away like its secular prototype, the indebtedness of the Church to the Roman Empire in this administrative sphere, as well as its ability to survive its Roman model, was apparent on the face of a latter-day map.

On the medieval ecclesiastical map of France, for example, an historian could discern in the mosaic of bishoprics the boundaries of the city-states of Gallia Togata and the cantons of Gallia Comata, while the archbishoprics preserved the outlines of the Diocletianic subdivisions of the four Augustan provinces Narbonensis, Aquitania, Lugdunensis, and Belgica. Even the five patriarchates, which were the precarious superstructure of the Christian ecclesiastical pyramid, were all still in existence—four in Eastern Orthodox hands and one in Western Catholic hands—at the time when these lines were being written; and, though the areas of their circumscriptions, and the distribution and nationality of their ecclesiastical subjects, had undergone vast changes during the fifteen centuries that had elapsed since the date of the Fourth Oecumenical Council (*sedebat Chalcedone*, A.D. 451), their mortifying losses had been partially offset by gains that could never have been foreseen at the time when the patriarchates had first taken shape.

For example, the Patriarchate of Rome had lost its African sees to Islam, its South-East European sees to Eastern Orthodoxy, and its North European sees to Protestantism, but it had won hundreds of new bishoprics and millions of new subjects overseas in the Americas and the Indies. The four Eastern Patriarchates within their own historic bounds had suffered losses—to Monophysitism first and to Islam in the sequel—that were far more severe than the corresponding reverses of the Papacy; yet, in drawing up the balance-sheet of fifteen centuries of chequered history, they could still take heart from two signal achievements. They had preserved, as between themselves, their unity of rite and creed without sacrificing their independence of one another as units of ecclesiastical administration; and they had jointly called into existence a number of new sister churches that in rite and creed were at one with the four patriarchates and with one another, while enjoying in the sphere of ecclesiastical administration the same independence as the patriarchates themselves. Thanks to this liberality, this ecclesiastical commonwealth of Eastern Orthodox churches had never yet provoked a secession such as the ecclesiastical autocracy of the Roman Church had brought upon itself in a Protestant Reformation or the secular British Empire in an American Revolutionary War. The British Empire might indeed take credit for having learnt its lesson and converted itself into a commonwealth of fully self-governing communities of equal status; but this wisdom after the event could merely exorcise the danger of further

¹ See Burns, C. Delisle: *The First Europe* (London 1947, Allen & Unwin), pp. 541-2, for an illuminating comparison between an imperial rescript, issued at Constantinople on the 17th April, 418, in the names of the Emperors Honorius and Theodosius II, and a letter, dated the 23rd August, 546, written by Pope Vigilius.

secessions; it could not induce an independent United States to return to the British fold. The Commonwealth of Eastern Orthodox churches had risen to a higher level of statesmanship in being wise in time and thereby managing to retain within its circle the giant Church of Russia to champion the cause of Eastern Orthodoxy in an age when the onset of Western Nationalism, following the inroads of Islam and Monophysitism, had reduced to shadows of their former selves the once mighty patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.

4. *Capital Cities*

'Laws' governing the Migration of Capital Cities

The seats of the central governments of universal states show a decided tendency to change their locations in course of time, and this is one of the clearest indications that, whatever may have been the motives and intentions of the founders of a universal state, the true *raison d'être* of their handiwork is not the kingdom, power, or glory of the empire-builders but the welfare of their subjects.

Empire-builders usually begin by ruling their dominions from a seat of government convenient to themselves: either the established capital of their own fatherland, which they have transformed from a parochial into a universal state by overthrowing its rivals and imposing its peace on an entire society; or else some new site on the fringe of the subjugated territories, at a point where these are particularly accessible from the empire-builders' home country. But, as time goes on, the experience of imperial administration or the pressure of events is apt to lead either the original empire-builders or successors of theirs who take their empires over or rebuild them after a temporary collapse to transfer the imperial capital to a new site which is commended by its convenience, not for the original empire-building Power, but for the empire itself as a whole. This new oecumenical outlook will, of course, suggest different new locations in different circumstances. If the first consideration is administrative convenience, the capital is likely to shift to some point, enjoying good facilities for communication, that is geographically central.¹ On the other hand, if the most urgent demand is for defence against some barbarian or alien aggressor, the new capital may gravitate towards the particular sector of the imperial frontiers on which the hostile pressure is heaviest at the time.²

We have seen that the founders of universal states are not always of the same origin. Sometimes they are representatives of a civilization which is foreign to the society for whose political needs they are providing. Sometimes the empire-builders are barbarians who have become morally alienated from the society which they are supplying with a universal state, but have nevertheless continued to gravitate towards it. Frequently the empire-builders are marchmen who have vindicated their claim to be members of the society by defending its borders

¹ This point is made by Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 308-9.

² This last-mentioned determining factor in changes in the locations of capitals of universal states has been examined already in II. ii. 112-208.

against outer barbarians before turning their arms against the interior of their own world and forcibly endowing it with an oecumenical peace. Such marchmen empire-builders are indeed true heirs of the civilization which they salvage from a Time of Troubles; yet, in the sight of their co-heirs for whom they have performed an invidious social service, they are sometimes hardly distinguishable from those outer barbarians with whom the marchmen have become familiar through the intercourse of border warfare. Lastly there are cases—apparently rather rare—in which the empire-builders have been neither aliens nor barbarians nor marchmen but ‘metropolitans’ from the interior of the world on which they have conferred the boon of political unity.

In universal states founded by aliens or barbarians the imperial capital is apt to start on the edge of the empire and to travel towards the interior. When the empire-builders are marchmen the same tendency sometimes asserts itself, but in this situation there are sometimes counter-pulls which tend to hold the capital in its original location. A margrave-emperor may find himself still tied to his ancestral base of operations in the back-woods by the continuance of pressure from the barbarians whom it is his first duty to keep at bay; and, if he does now succeed in disposing of this barbarian menace once for all by mobilizing against it the total resources of the society which he has united under his imperial rule, this very success may have the effect of extending his dominions so far afield into former barbarian territory that his seat of imperial government at the headquarters of his former march is consequently relegated to the interior of his expanded empire. In universal states founded by metropolitans the capital is, of course, likely to be located from the beginning at some point in the interior which is convenient for oecumenical administration, but nevertheless it may be drawn away towards a frontier if a threat of aggression from that quarter comes to be the imperial government’s paramount concern. It is evident that the changes in the location of the seats of government of universal states are subject to certain ‘laws’ of political geography, but that the operation of these ‘laws’ is modified, in practice, by such complicated combinations of historical contingencies that particular cases have to be examined and analysed *ad hoc*.

Migrations of the Capital Cities of Alien Empire-builders

The operation of the ‘law’ governing the location of capitals of universal states founded by alien empire-builders is illustrated in the history of the British Rāj in India.¹ Reaching India, as they did, from overseas, and coming there to trade with the inhabitants before they ever dreamed of ruling over them, the English established their first footholds on Indian ground in the seaports Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay; and, of these three British maritime commercial settlements, Calcutta became the first political capital of British India because the East India Company happened to acquire the political dominion over the two great provinces Bengal and Bihar, in the hinterland of Calcutta, some forty or fifty years before they began to make any comparable acquisitions of territory in the

¹ See xi, map 53.

hinterlands of Madras and Bombay. Calcutta continued to be the capital of British India for more than a hundred years after the design of bringing all India under British rule had been first conceived by Wellesley (*proconsulari munere fungebatur* A.D. 1798-1805) and for more than sixty years after this ambition had been achieved. But the gravitational pull of a politically unified sub-continent eventually proved strong enough to draw the seat of the British Indian central government away from Calcutta, where it had been located for the convenience of a British thalassocracy, and to attract it to Delhi,¹ which was the natural site for the capital of a continental empire including the basins of both the Ganges and the Indus.

Delhi was, of course, not merely a natural site; it was also an historic one. The Mughal predecessors of the British rulers of India had governed India from Delhi since the days of Shāh Jahān (*imperabat* A.D. 1628-59),² and before Shāh Jahān's day they had governed it from the neighbouring city of Agra,³ which was situated, like Delhi, on the banks of the Upper Jumna. The Mughals, like the British, had been aliens in the Hindu World on which they had imposed a universal state, but, unlike the British, they had never tried to govern India from a site on the threshold across which they had made their entry. It is true that the Mughals had arrived in India as fugitives from their own country; yet, when once they had placed the barrier of the Hindu Kush between themselves and their Uzbeq pursuers, they might have been tempted to establish their seat of government on some site in the highlands of North-Eastern Iran, where the climate, scenery, and fruits would have resembled those of their lost but lovingly remembered Farghānah. It is noteworthy that Bābur and his successors never in fact cast Kābul for the role of an imperial capital. As soon as they found themselves strong enough to descend upon the plains of the Panjab and Hindustan, they not only conquered them; they also immediately planted their seat of government on the sultry banks of the Jumna, in the heart of their newly acquired dominions. On the administrative map of the Mughal Empire, Kābul was merely the local capital of the north-western march and was never the overland equivalent of the maritime capital at Calcutta from which India was ruled by British hands for a century.

The Spanish *conquistadores* who established a universal state in Central America and took possession of a universal state in the Andean World were alien intruders from overseas like the British conquerors of India,

¹ The transfer of the capital of the British Indian Empire to Delhi in A.D. 1912 has already been touched upon in II. ii. 132.

² See II. ii. 131, with n. 3, for the establishment of the capital of the Mughal Empire at Delhi from the reign of Shāh Jahān onwards and for the previous history of Delhi, first as a frontier fortress of the Hindu World against Muslim aggression and afterwards as the capital of successive Muslim rulers of Hindustan from the Muslim conquest of the Ganges Basin at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era down to the replacement of a Lōdī Afghan by a Mughal Turkish rāj in the sixteenth century.

³ Akbar's attempt to establish a new capital *ex nihilo* at Fātihpūr Sikri was no more successful than his attempt to launch a new higher religion, the Dīn Ilāhī (for these two failures of Akbar's, see II. ii. 131, n. 3, and V. v. 699-704). It is noteworthy that Ikhnaton, who likewise tried and failed to launch a new religion of his own invention, also made a similarly unsuccessful attempt to establish a new capital city at Tall-al-Amarnah (see p. 215, below).

but, in the location of their seats of government, the Spaniards did not make the move from an original capital on the coast to a subsequent capital in the interior; in this matter they went to opposite extremes in the two new worlds of which they made themselves masters. In the Andean World they laid out a maritime capital at Lima which they never abandoned in favour of the inland capital at Cuzco from which the Andean Realm of the Four Quarters had previously been ruled by the Incas. In Central America, on the other hand, they never attempted to govern their dominions from the seaport which they laid out at Vera Cruz. They immediately located their seat of government in the interior on the site of Tenochtitlan—the highland capital of the Aztecs who were in the act of building a Central American universal state when the Spaniards suddenly came on the scene and usurped the Aztecs' role.

Why did the Spaniards thus adopt opposite policies in two at first sight similar situations? The Mexican Plateau may have attracted them by its resemblance to their native plateau of Castile; yet, if that was the decisive consideration, why did it not lead them to pass over Lima, as they passed over Vera Cruz, and locate their Andean seat of government in the highland city of Cuzco, which was the existing capital from which the Andean universal state was actually being governed by the Incas at the time of the Spaniards' arrival? The explanation of this apparent inconsistency may lie in a difference in the previous historical roles of the respective environs of Vera Cruz and Lima. The lowlands lying between the Mexican Plateau and the shores of the Gulf were no longer playing a great part in the life of the Mexic Civilization. By contrast, the lowlands lying between the Andean Plateau and the shores of the Pacific Ocean had been the cradle of the Andean Civilization and had lost none of their economic or cultural importance since their political incorporation into an Andean universal state established by Inca empire-builders from the highlands.¹ Thus, in consulting their own convenience by abandoning the highland capital of the Incas at Cuzco and establishing their own seat of government in the seaport of Lima, the Spaniards were at the same time selecting a site in the cultural heart of the Andean World.

We may even raise the question whether the Incas themselves might have been impelled to transfer their seat of government from their ancestral capital at Cuzco to some site in the coastal lowlands if their dominion had endured for its natural term instead of having been abruptly brought to an end by the Spanish conquest not more than a hundred years after the establishment of an Andean universal state by the Inca Pachacutec (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1400–48). The decisive act in the elevation of the Inca Empire into an Andean universal state had been Pachacutec's conquest of the lowland states along the seaboard; and, with the passage of time, this epoch-making addition to the Empire's domain might well have affected its administrative structure. In the empire which Pachacutec put together and Pizarro took over, Cuzco was not more centrally situated than Lima; for the Incas had won their way by serving as marchmen, and their ancestral city had become an

¹ See I. i. 121–3 and II. ii. 103, n. 2.

imperial capital without ceasing to be a frontier fortress guarding the eastern brow of the Andean Plateau against the fierce and aggressive barbarians of the Amazonian tropical forest.¹ If the Incas had been given a longer time to harvest the experience of administering an empire in which highlands and lowlands were linked together, it seems not unlikely that they might have followed up their scientific redistribution of population² by a transfer of the seat of their central government. Indeed, before the Spaniards arrived, the Incas had already built two imperial palaces on the coast.³

The Ottoman dominion over Orthodox Christendom and the Mongol dominion over China were established, like the Mughal Rāj in India, by invasion overland, and not, like the British Rāj in India or the Spanish Empire in the New World, by assault from across the sea; yet, in the location of their capital cities, their histories followed the British and not the Mughal pattern.

The 'Osmanlis started their empire-building operations from a base just beyond the eastern borders of the Orthodox Christian World within the limits to which Orthodox Christendom had been reduced by the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Christian Era,⁴ and, as the 'Osmanlis' dominions expanded, their seat of government travelled *pari passu*. First it moved from Eskişehir, 'the old city' just within the north-western rim of the Anatolian Plateau, to Yenisehir, 'the new city' in the lowlands within range of the Sea of Marmara. In A.D. 1326 it moved on to Brusa. In A.D. 1366 it leapt the Dardanelles and entered the Balkan Peninsula, into which the centre of gravity of the Orthodox Christian World had already shifted since the Saljūq Turkish conquest of the interior of Anatolia in the later decades of the eleventh century of the Christian Era.⁵ The first location of the Ottoman capital in the Balkan Peninsula was at Adrianople, but this was only a halting-place and not its final destination.⁶ The Ottoman Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror (*imperator* A.D. 1451-81), who completed the political unification of the main body of the Orthodox Christian World under Ottoman rule, was also the statesman who brought the Ottoman seat of government to its final resting-place at Constantinople, the former capital of the East Roman Empire and the cultural metropolis of Orthodox Christendom. Constantinople did not lose the status which Mehmed the Conqueror had conferred upon her till after the Ottoman Empire itself had been snuffed out of existence through the reconstitution of an Anatolian remnant of Mehmed the Conqueror's realm into a Republic of Turkey on the 29th October, 1923. In virtue of Article 2 of the Constitution of the 20th April, 1924, Constantinople forfeited juridically to Ankara the role of being the official seat of government of this Turkish successor-state.⁷

¹ See II. ii. 207.

² For this, see pp. 114-15, above.

³ See Markham, Sir C.: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), p. 238.

⁴ See II. ii. 151.

⁵ See II. ii. 79-80 and 152.

⁶ See p. 135, n. 1, above.

⁷ Since the autumn of 1919 Ankara had, of course, been the *de facto* provisional seat of the revolutionary Kemalist movement out of which the Republic of Turkey had sprung.

The progressive advance of the capital of the Ottoman Empire towards the heart of the Orthodox Christian World has a parallel in the series of stages by which the capital of the Mongol Khāqāns followed the China-ward course of Mongol conquest. The first signal successes in Chingis Khan's career were his conquests of the Karāyits and Naimans,¹ the two Nestorian Turkish Nomad peoples whom the Mongols found in occupation of the choicest portion of the High Steppe² in the basin of the River Orkhon. By a long-established tradition the Orkhon Basin was the domain of the paramount Nomad community on the High Steppe,³ and, when the Mongols acquired this paramountcy in their turn by the customary right of conquest, and then proceeded to extend their rule over a number of sedentary societies round about, their first essay in living up to their newly attained dignity and making use of their newly acquired wealth was to lay out a permanent capital for themselves in the Orkhon Basin at Qāraqorum.⁴ For the translation of this dream into reality, skilled artificers were uprooted from their distant homes in China, Russia, and Western Christendom and were carried away captive to beautify the Khāqān's rising city on the Steppe;⁵ but before the work was finished it was made of no avail by the triumph of Mongol arms on the Chinese front.

The Mongol Khāqān Qubilāy (*imperabat* A.D. 1259-94) achieved what had proved beyond the strength of the Mongol conquerors' Kin and Khitan forerunners. He conquered not merely Northern China but the whole continental domain of the Far Eastern Society, including the Yangtse Basin and the southern seaboard; and the gravitational pull of this Far Eastern sub-continent, now once more politically united, immediately made itself felt in the location of the Mongol Khāqān's capital. In A.D. 1264 Qubilāy began to recondition Peking—the site in the north-east corner of China, just inside the Great Wall, where the previous Kin conquerors of Northern China had placed their seat of government⁶—and in A.D. 1267 he moved his own capital to Peking from Qāraqorum.⁷ Though Qubilāy's head dictated this move, his heart remained homesick for its ancestral pastures, and the semi-Sinified

¹ See V. v. 250 and 309.

² The Great Eurasian Steppe consisted of two areas which were geographically distinct, though both had been theatres of one uniform Nomad way of life. There was the High Steppe (the Alexandrian Hellenic geographer Ptolemy's *Scythia extra Imaum*) on the immense plateau which was bounded on the west by the Altai and Tien Shan Mountains, and there was the Low Steppe (Ptolemy's *Scythia intra Imaum*) which extended westward from the Tien Shan to the Carpathians. The two areas were in communication with one another through the Zungarian Gap between Tien Shan and Altai.

³ This position had been occupied in succession by the Hiongnu, the Juan Juan, the Northern Turks, and the eastern Turkish successors of the united Turkish steppe-empire of the sixth and seventh centuries of the Christian Era. The eighth-century Turkish masters of the Orkhon Basin had left there a memorial of themselves in their celebrated inscriptions. It was not an accident that the seat of government of a latter-day Soviet Socialist Republic of Outer Mongolia was located in the same neighbourhood, at Urga.

⁴ See III. iii. 397 and V. v. 312-15.

⁵ See Olschki, L.: *Guillaume Boucher, A French Artist at the Court of the Khans* (Baltimore 1946, The Johns Hopkins Press).

⁶ The Kin themselves had taken the site over from their own predecessors the Khitan, who had laid the foundations of Peking's political fortunes by choosing this hitherto obscure spot for the location, not of their central seat of government, but of their southern residence.

⁷ See II. ii. 121, n. 3.

Mongol statesman indulged his unregenerate Nomad feelings by building himself a subsidiary residence at Chung-tu, a point on the south-eastern rim of the Mongolian Plateau where the Steppe approached nearest to the new imperial city.¹ But Qubilāy's 'Xanadu' was a 'pleasure dome' and no more; his serious business of state was transacted at Peking. The requirements of a conquered world had won a pacific victory over the inclinations of its conqueror which was to have a more lasting effect than the Mongols' mere military victory over the Empire of the Sung.

When the Manchus followed in the Mongols' footsteps by conquering the whole of China and reconstituting a Far Eastern universal state in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era after an interlude of some two centuries during which China had managed to keep herself free from barbarian rule, history duly repeated itself in the location of the imperial capital. Before the Manchus set about the conquest of China within the Wall, they had already made a new capital for themselves at Mukden,² the South Manchurian meeting-point of the Manchus' native forests, the Mongols' pastures, and the arable land, beyond the shelter of the Wall, which had been won for the plough by Chinese peasant pioneers in the course of ages. The Manchus were more firmly planted at Mukden than the Mongols had been at Qāraqorum. Their leaders, at any rate, were already half Sinified before they crossed the Great Wall, and Mukden had become a seat not merely of Manchu government but of Chinese culture. Yet the Manchu conquerors of China took the same decision as the Mongol Qubilāy. The guardians of the Manchu boy-king Shun Chih (*imperabat* A.D. 1644-61), when they proclaimed him Emperor, transferred the Manchu seat of government to Peking³ and allowed Mukden—which had been 'the education of' the Manchus—to sink to a subordinate status.⁴ The Manchu rulers of China made the same concession to their own home-sickness as their Mongol forerunners. They built for themselves a counterpart of Qubilāy's Chung-tu in the shape of a magnificent holiday resort at Jehol, a highland paradise on the road back from Peking to the dynasty's original home in the hill-country of North-Eastern Manchuria. Yet, in spite of this backward gesture, the requirements of a conquered China had overcome the inclinations of her conquerors once again.⁵

¹ See vol. cit., loc. cit.

² Mukden was founded by the second prince of the Manchu Dynasty, T'ai Tsung (*extra Murum regnabat* A.D. 1625-43).

³ See II. ii. 123.

⁴ Mukden (*Sinicè Shēngking*) did retain some vestiges of its former status. For instance, the Manchu Emperor Ch'ien Lung (*imperabat* A.D. 1736-96) directed in A.D. 1782 that one of four fair copies of the manuscript of his Ssu-k'u Ch'üan Shu ('The Four Treasuries') which were designed for official use was to be lodged at Mukden in a building specially erected to hold it (see Mayers, W. F.: 'Bibliography of the Chinese Imperial Collections of Literature', in the *China Review*, vol. vi (1877-8), No. 5, p. 295). The writer of this Study had the privilege of being taken to see this building, the Wen So K'o, with Ch'ien Lung's immense *corpus scriptorum Sinarum* still safely housed in it, on the 17th November, 1929. The corresponding buildings for housing the other three official fair copies were located respectively in the precincts of the Imperial Palace at Peking, at Yüan-ming Yüan, and at Jehol (see further X. ix. 56).

⁵ When the gravitational pull of a united China had drawn the Mongols' capital to Peking from Qāraqorum and the Manchus' capital to Peking from Mukden, why, in both cases, did the change of location go thus far and no farther? Why did the seat of imperial

We may conclude this survey of the histories of the capital cities of alien empire-builders by considering one of those exceptions that sometimes prove a rule.

When the successors of Alexander were contending for the spoils of the Achaemenian Empire, Seleucus Nicator made his fortune by concentrating his efforts on gaining possession of the vast interior. There was less keen competition for this prize than for provinces with seaboard on the Mediterranean that offered their Macedonian holders an easy access to the heart of the Hellenic World round the shores of the Aegean Sea; yet the prize on which Seleucus had set his heart was attractive for an empire-builder with the vision to divine its possibilities. Babylonia, which Seleucus had selected for his base of operations, had been both the granary and the industrial workshop of the Achaemenian Empire,¹ and, apart from its economic value, it was the strategic key to the political control of all the ex-Achaemenian provinces to the north-east of it, up to the southern borders of Nomads' Land in Central Asia and the western borders of Chandragupta's Indic Empire in Eastern Iran.² Seleucus saw this prize, won it, and made statesmanlike provision for retaining it by laying out, and stamping with his own name, a new metropolis in Babylonia on the right bank of the Tigris at the point where Tigris and Euphrates approached nearest to one another. Seleucia-on-Tigris was a better site than Babylon both for the administration of Babylonia itself and for the command of the great North-East Road linking the Lower Tigris-Euphrates Basin with the Upper Oxus-Jaxartes Basin over the crown of the Iranian Plateau. Thanks to the skill which Seleucus displayed in its location,³ Seleucia-on-Tigris remained an important city and a flourishing centre of Hellenic life and culture for more than five centuries after its foundation towards the end of the fourth century B.C.⁴ But it missed its political destiny through an error of political judgement committed by the founder himself.

The sagacity of Seleucus's original design for constructing a successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire out of its dominions east of Euphrates was conclusively demonstrated after the Seleucid Dynasty's demise by

government come to rest at Peking, instead of travelling on to Loyang on the Yellow River or to Nanking on the Yangtse? Loyang and Nanking had been historic imperial capitals in the past. Why did History fail to repeat itself to this extent on these two occasions? And why did it eventually repeat itself to this extent in A.D. 1928? An attempt to find the answers to these questions has been made in II. ii. 121-7.

¹ According to Herodotus, Book I, chap. 192, Babylonia supplied the Achaemenian court's and mobile army's requirements in kind for four months out of every twelve (cp. p. 205, n. 4, below).

² For the analogy between the Seleucid and the Umayyad control over the Iranian Plateau from a base on the plains of the Land of Shinar (*alias* Babylonia, *alias* 'Irāq 'Arabi), see p. 137, n. 4, above. This portion of the former Achaemenian Empire lying east of Euphrates, which Seleucus marked out for his own share, was the portion which the last Darius had proposed to retain for himself when, during the interval between the battles of Issus and Arbela, he had offered to divide the Empire with Alexander.

³ Whereas Seleucia was an artificial foundation deliberately located with an eye to its possibilities as an oecumenical capital, Babylon had become an oecumenical capital through the accident that the Amorite marchmen of the Sumeric World, who had established themselves there on the borders between the Desert and the Sown, had eventually played the part of restorers of a Sumeric universal state (see II ii. 133, and pp. 226-8, below).

⁴ The exact date of the foundation of Seleucia-on-Tigris is not known (see Bouché-Leclercq, A.: *Histoire des Séleucides* (Paris 1913-14, Leroux, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 524-5.

the histories of the Arsacid and Sasanian Powers, each of which lasted for some four hundred years within these limits, whereas the Sasanian Empire came to grief still more quickly than its Seleucid predecessor when it seriously attempted, under the misguided impulsion of Khusrū Parwīz, to extend its dominions westward to the shores of the Mediterranean and the Bosphorus. Seleucus was enticed to his own death and his dynasty's eventual undoing by the completeness of the triumph of two successive coalitions of Macedonian war-lords in which Seleucus found himself each time on the winning side. In 301 B.C. at the Battle of Ipsus, Seleucus of Babylonia, in alliance with Ptolemy of Egypt and Lysimachus of Thrace, succeeded in overthrowing their common adversary Antigonus, who, from his commanding central position in Syria and Anatolia, had aspired to reassemble all the fragments of the Achaemenian Empire under his own rule at the expense of his fellow successors. Thereafter, in 281 B.C., at the Battle of Corupedium, Lysimachus, in his turn, was overthrown by Seleucus and Ptolemy. The cumulative effect of these two decisive successes was to give Seleucus Nicator, who had originally made his way without access to the western seas, both a Syrian seaboard on the Mediterranean and an Ionian seaboard on the Aegean; and this westward expansion of his empire exposed Nicator and his successors to temptations which they failed to resist.

Nicator himself took over Antigonus's half-built capital city Antigoneia-on-Orontes, within one short day's march from the north-east corner of the Mediterranean, and removed it to a more commanding adjacent site to become the capital of his own monarchy under the name of Antioch,¹ and he met his death on his road to Macedon by way of his newly acquired and precariously far-flung dominions in Western Anatolia and Thrace.² In the sequel, Seleucus's successors drained away the resources of Babylonia and the Iranian provinces on the farther side of Babylonia in an inconclusive struggle with a mobile and elusive Ptolemaic sea-power for the command of the coasts of the Levant all the way round from Gaza to the Hellespont;³ and even the ultimate success of the Seleucidae in this warfare between the elephant and the whale was fraught with disaster. When, in 200-198 B.C., Antiochus the Great conquered Coele Syria from Ptolemy Eurgetes' feeble successor Ptolemy Epiphanes, he was bequeathing to his successors the insoluble problem of dealing with the Jewish temple-state in the hill-country between the two branches of 'the King's Highway';⁴

¹ See p. 94, above.

² See p. 94, above.

³ One object of this misguided Seleucid policy was to keep open an overland pipe-line through which soldiers and settlers from the heart of the Hellenic World round the shores of the Aegean could be pumped into the interior of the Seleucid dominions; but these reinforcements of Greek manpower could assuredly have been obtained even if the Seleucid Monarchy had not spent its resources in trying to maintain a maritime frontage. The dominant consideration was the prestige attaching to suzerainty over historic Greek city-states, however insignificant. We may recall the equally misguided Hapsburg policy of spending the resources of the Danubian Monarchy during the eighteenth century of the Christian Era in efforts to retain possession of Silesia, the Southern Netherlands and the Breisgau, at the cost of letting slip a golden opportunity for wresting from the Ottoman Empire the whole of South-Eastern Europe between Vienna and Constantinople (see II. ii. 180-6 and cp. III. iii. 301-6).

⁴ See pp. 100-2, above, and xi, maps 11, 14, 20, and 21A.

and, when he proceeded to reassert the claim of his house to Seleucus Nicator's acquisitions on both sides of the Hellespont, the result was an irretrievably disastrous collision with the overwhelmingly superior power of Rome.

While the Seleucidae were absorbed in gaining or losing some canton, city-state, or islet on the western fringes of their expanded dominions, they were losing one province after another in the neglected, exploited, but indispensable East. By 248-247 B.C., fifty-four years after Seleucus Nicator's ill-omened victory at Ipsus, the Parnian Nomads had established themselves in the Seleucid province of Parthia astride the Great North-East Road at the point where it descended from the Iranian Plateau towards the Oxus, and the consequent insulation of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin from the main body of the Seleucid Monarchy quickly resulted in the establishment of an independent state by the Greek 'ascendancy' there.¹ When the Arsacid war-lords of the Parni went on to occupy Media, where the Great North-East Road² made its way through the western mountain ramparts of the Iranian Plateau, and when they proceeded, through this open gate, to descend upon Babylonia itself in 142 B.C., they were tearing out the Seleucid Monarchy's heart; and, after Demetrius Nicator's and Antiochus Sîdêtês' successive attempts in 140 and 130 B.C. to reconquer Babylonia and Media had ended in repeated disaster, the remnant of the Seleucid Empire in Syria was doomed to extinction at an early date. The Seleucid Monarchy met its ignominious end when Tigranes King of Armenia—a hitherto obscure non-Hellenic successor-state of the shattered empire of Antiochus the Great³—unconsciously avenged the overthrow of Antigonus Monophthalmus by occupying Antioch-on-Orontes in 83 B.C.

Such was the nemesis of Seleucus Nicator's momentous decision to establish the seat of his central government on a site adjoining his defeated rival Antigonus's abortive capital at Antigoneia-on-Orontes instead of establishing it in a metropolis of his own creation at Seleucia-on-Tigris.⁴ Nicator could not conjure away inexorable geographical facts which had once been apparent to him by disguising a virtual reconstruction of Antigoneia under a family name of his own;⁵ for a site command-

¹ See II. ii. 143-4. This Greek Power in Bactria seems to have established its independence gradually between 246 and 228 B.C. (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 72-74).

² See xi, map 20.

³ The creation of the Kingdom of Armenia Major by the House of Artaxias—a former lieutenant of Antiochus the Great's who declared his independence after his suzerain's disastrous defeat by the Romans in 190 B.C.—is touched upon on p. 626, below.

⁴ It is worth noticing that the corresponding false step was avoided by both the Arsacid and the Sasanian successor-states of the Seleucid Monarchy, each of which lasted nearly twice as long as the Seleucid Monarchy itself. The Arsacidae, and the Sasanidae after them, unhesitatingly established their seat of government at Ctesiphon, a suburb of Seleucia-on-Tigris which was presumably called after the name of the Greek who had originally laid it out, and which was situated on the farther side of the river, on its Iranian bank. The Arsacidae did not attempt to govern Babylonia from Hecatompylos, their previous capital at the north-eastern exit of the Caspian Gates between the central desert of Iran and the Elburz Range; and the Sasanidae did not attempt to govern it from Istakhr, their previous capital in Fars. Istakhr and Hecatompylos both gave way to Ctesiphon, as, in the Far Eastern World, Mukden gave way to Peking after the Manchu conquest of China (see p. 199, above).

⁵ Seleucus named his new capital in the neighbourhood of Antigoneia 'Antiocheia' after his own father Antiochus.

ing the landward end of the gorge down which the River Orontes forced its way through a coastal range of mountains to the Mediterranean was as unsuitable for the capital of an empire whose heart lay in Babylonia and whose eastern provinces extended across the Iranian Plateau into the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin as it had been felicitous for the capital of an empire which, like Antigonos's empire in its last phase, had been virtually confined to Anatolia and Syria and had not extended farther into the interior of Asia than the western bank of the Euphrates in the section of the river's course in which it approached nearest to the Mediterranean. When eventually the founder's descendants Demetrius Nicator (*imperabat primum* 145-139 B.C.) and Antiochus Sidëtês (*imperabat* 139/8-129 B.C.) were made keenly aware of the indispensability of Babylonia by the painful experience of the consequences of its loss, the elder brother forfeited his liberty and the younger his life in vainly seeking to undo the untoward effects of the century and a half that had elapsed between the establishment of the capital at Antioch by their ancestor the first Seleucus in 300 B.C. and their own ill-fated expeditions on the forlorn hope of recovering Seleucia. If the change made by Seleucus I in his focus of geographical interest had been the other way about—from the banks of the Orontes, on the western edge of the Achaemenian dominions, to the banks of the Tigris in their heart—the Seleucid Monarchy might have had a longer and a happier history.

Migrations of the Capital Cities of Barbarian Empire-builders

Having now surveyed the shifts in the seats of administration of universal states founded or captured by aliens, we may turn to a consideration of the cases in which the empire-builders were barbarians or marchmen.¹ We may begin with the Persian barbaro-marchmen who gave the Syriac World its universal state, and the Arab barbarians who reconstituted the Empire of the Achaemenidae after a thousand-years-long interlude of Hellenic intrusion.

'The homeland of the Persians lies out of the way of the theatres of historical life. The great highroad that links the West with the Eastern World² runs, from Babylon towards the interior, up the valley of the Gyndes [Diyālah] and out of it into the valley of the Upper Choaspes [Karkhah], past the rock of Behistan [*alias* Bisitun], to Ecbatana [Hama-dan], and from here it proceeds along the northern rim of the Iranian Plateau. And so we find that, although the Persians, like the Arabs, have repeatedly launched far-sweeping movements, their country has never been able to become the permanent centre of a great state. As soon as the reaction sets in, Persis [Pārsa, Fars] once more disappears, for centuries on end, from the stage of historic life.'³

According to a story with which Herodotus concludes his work,⁴ Cyrus the Great deprecated a suggestion that the Persian people, now

¹ The Manchu Empire, whose founders were barbaro-marchmen, has been considered already, by anticipation, in connexion with the Mongol Empire in China, whose founders were barbarians with a tincture of alien culture; and the Inca Empire, whose founders were marchmen, in connexion with the Spanish Empire by which it was supplanted.

² See xi, map 20.—A.J.T.

³ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, 1st ed. (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 22.

⁴ The passage has been quoted in the present Study in II. ii. 21.

that they had become masters of the World, should evacuate their bleak highland homeland and settle in one of the many more agreeable countries that were now at their disposal. But, whether or not it was the Achaemenian Government's policy to discourage the Persian people as a whole from migrating to more genial tracts of their newly acquired empire, it is an historical fact that, more than a hundred years before the Empire was established through Cyrus II's overthrow of his Median suzerain Cyaxares, the Achaemenian Dynasty had transferred its own seat of government from its ancestral highlands—which stood not in Fars (Pārsa) but in Lūristān (Parsuwaš)—to the first piece of lowland territory of which it had gained possession. King Teispes of Parsuwaš (*regnabat circa 675–640 B.C.*), the son and first successor of Achaemenes the dynasty's founder and eponym, figures in the Assyrian records as 'King of the city of Anšan';¹ and Anšan was believed by twentieth-century Western scholars to have lain somewhere in the neighbourhood of both the Babylonian district of Der and the city of Susa, the capital of Elam—perhaps at some point where a fortress would command the corridor of lowland territory linking the plains of Elam with the plains of Babylonia between the south-eastern extremity of the Kabīr Kuh Range's Pusht-i-Kuh foothills and the northern extremity of the swamps through which, in that age, the rivers Kārūn, Tigris, and Euphrates made their separate exits into the Persian Gulf.² The importance attached to this earliest acquisition of the Achaemenids in the lowlands is attested in the retention of the title 'King of Anšan' by Teispes himself and by his first three successors in the elder branch of his house—Cyrus I, Cambyses I, and Cyrus II the Great³—even after Teispes had taken the opportunity to make himself master of Pārsa, on the far side of Elam, while Elam and Assyria were engaged in the last and most exhausting of the Assyro-Elamite wars (*gerebatur circa 663–638 B.C.*), and even after the reunion of the two portions of Teispes' dominions in the hands of the elder branch of Teispes' line—which seems to have come to pass, in or shortly before the year 547 B.C., through the deposition of King Arsāmēs (Aršāma), the son of Cyrus I's younger brother Ariaramnes (Ariyāramna) and the heir of Ariaramnes' appanage Pārsa, by Cambyses I's son and Cyrus I's grandson Cyrus II the Great.⁴

For more than a hundred years after the Achaemenidae had acquired their footing in the lowlands of Anšan, just to the west of Susa, and for not much less than a hundred years after they had gone on to acquire the highlands of Pārsa, to the south-east of Elam, Susa remained in non-Achaemenian hands. The former capital of Elam was annexed by Assyria after she had erased Elam from the political map⁵ and was inherited

¹ See Cameron, G. G.: *A History of Early Iran* (Chicago 1936, Chicago University Press), p. 180; Olmstead, A. T.: *A History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, Chicago University Press), p. 23.

² See König, F. W.: *Altteste Geschichte der Meder und Perser* (Leipzig 1934, Hinrichs), p. 10; Cameron, op. cit., pp. 212 and 218.

³ According to F. H. Weissbach in Pauly-Wissowa: *Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Neue Bearbeitung, Supplementband iv, cols. 1141–2, s.v. 'Kyros', followed by Kent, R. G., in his *Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon* (New Haven, Conn. 1950, American Oriental Society), p. 159.

⁵ See Cameron, op. cit., p. 211.

from Assyria by Assyria's Neo-Babylonian successor-state. There was archaeological evidence that Susa was included in the Neo-Babylonian Empire in Nebuchadnezzar's day (*imperabat* 605-562 B.C.);¹ and it was not till after his death² that the Achaemenian Kingdom managed to gain possession of a city which, ever since Teispes' acquisition of Pārsa, had insulated the dynasty's major new dominion from its minor original patrimony as awkwardly as, from A.D. 1466 to A.D. 1772, the two sections of the Hohenzollern dominions were insulated from one another by a city-state of Danzig under Polish suzerainty marching with a corridor of Polish territory extending to the shore of the Baltic Sea and thereby cutting East Prussia off from Prussian Pomerania and Brandenburg.

After Susa had at last fallen into Achaemenian hands, it was as inevitable that the capital of the Achaemenian Empire should be transferred to Susa from Anšan as it was that the capital of the Ottoman Empire should be transferred to Constantinople from Adrianople after Sultan Mehmed II's capture of the Second Rome in A.D. 1453; and this step was duly taken by Darius I before the end of the year 521 B.C.³ It will be seen that the geographical situation of Susa *vis-à-vis* the highlands of Fars, the highlands of Lūristān, and the great plain of Shinar was comparable to the position of Peking *vis-à-vis* the highlands of Eastern Manchuria, the Orkhon High Steppe and the great plain of Northern China. The site lay between the semi-barbarian empire-builders' two main reservoirs of military man-power in a corner of the lowlands that were the Empire's main granary and workshop; and the site's proximity to the military reservoirs was the reason for its selection and retention notwithstanding the inconvenience of its location for the purpose of administering the Empire as a whole.

In Darius's reorganization of the Achaemenian Empire it proved not impossible to lead into Susa both the Great North-East Road and the Great North-West Road; yet this achievement of the Achaemenian ministry of works remained something of a *tour de force*, and the awkwardness, even of Susa, as a seat of government for an empire extending to the Jaxartes, Indus, Nile, and Danube, is attested by the fact that the Achaemenian Imperial Court did not reside in the official capital of the Achaemenian Empire year in and year out, but moved round in an annual migration between Susa and two other imperial residences.⁴ The winter residence was Babylon, which was far better placed than Susa, though not quite so well placed as the future Seleucia-

¹ 'Bricks [identical in make with bricks of Nebuchadnezzar's found at Babylon, and stamped] with his name were used to erect buildings in that city, while an alabaster vase with his inscription and a weight with his legend are further witnesses of his control' (Cameron, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-20).

² According to Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 221, Susa, together with the rest of the lowlands of Elam, was lost by the Neo-Babylonian Empire to the Achaemenidae before Nabonidus's accession in 556 B.C. According to Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 43, it was lost when, in 546 B.C., the Neo-Babylonian Government's commandant of the citadel of Susa, Gobryas, turned traitor and joined forces with Cyrus II.

³ See Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁴ According to Xenophon: *Expeditio Cyri*, Book III, chap. v, § 15, and *Cyropaedia*, Book VIII, chap. vi, § 22, the Achaemenian Court used to spend seven winter months in Babylon, two summer months in Ecbatana, and only three spring months out of every twelve at Susa (*cp.* p. 200, n. 1, above).

on-Tigris, for serving as the point of junction of the two main imperial highways.¹ The summer residence was Ecbatana (Hamadan), the former capital of the Median Power, which lay at the strategically important point on the Great North-East Road where this highway dropped down to the level of the Iranian Plateau after surmounting the Zagros Range that wallled in the plateau on the west.²

The significant point here for the purpose of our present investigation is that the Achaemenian Court's fixed annual time-table of circulation from one imperial residence to another does not appear to have allowed for any regular annual residence at any site in the Persian homeland of the imperial people. The Achaemenian emperors showed their reverence for Pārsa by being crowned there and their affection for it by being buried there. Cyrus built for himself a tomb (still standing at the time of writing) in the Persian canton of Clan Pasargadae,³ near the latter-day village of Murghāb; and, lower down the course of the little River Pulvār, Darius and his successors hewed out their sepulchres in the face of a cliff at the point latterly known as Naqsh-i-Rustam.⁴ Cyrus is said also to have built for Clan Pasargadae in the course of the years 559-550 B.C. a city called by the clan name;⁵ and between 512 and 494 B.C.⁶ Darius I

¹ Seleucia-on-Tigris was skilfully sited by its Macedonian founder to serve as the point of junction not only between the Great North-East Road and the Great North-West Road, but also between the two alignments of the latter. The north-eastern alignment of the Great North-West Road, as described by Herodotus (Book V, chaps. 52-3), ran from Susa to Ephesus to the east of the middle course of the Tigris and to the north of the central desert of Anatolia. The south-eastern alignment ran from Susa to Ephesus via Babylon and the east bank of the middle course of the Euphrates through the Cilician Gates. The north-eastern alignment traversed the derelict capitals of both Assyria and the Hittite Power. The south-western alignment was followed by Cyrus the Younger in 401 B.C. and by Alexander in 434-433 B.C., and it became the life-line of Seleucus Nicator's dominions after he had extended them to the shores of the Mediterranean and the Aegean, since the more southerly of the two Iranian successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire in Cappadocia succeeded in maintaining itself astride of the north-eastern branch.

² The choice of Ecbatana for the summer residence of the Achaemenian Court was doubtless partly due to the coolness of its climate and partly to its historic prestige as the former capital of the Median Power which the Achaemenian Empire had supplanted. Under the Achaemenian régime, even after its reorganization by Darius I on a narrower political basis, the Medes were second only to the Persians in the hierarchy of imperial peoples. At the same time the selection of this site at a key-point on the Great North-East Road is also evidence of the high priority of the North-East Frontier among Achaemenian cares of state.

³ According to Herodotus, Book I, chap. 125, the House of Achaemenes was one of the septes of this Clan Pasargadae. Are we to infer that the Pasargadae had migrated from Lūristān to Fars either at the time of the acquisition of Fars by the Achaemenid king of Parsuwaš-and-Anšan, Teispes, or else at the time of its acquisition by Teispes' great-grandson the Cyran Achaemenid King of Parsuwaš-and-Anšan, Cyrus II?

⁴ The shock administered to the Persian people by their sudden overthrow from their high estate through the prowess of their Macedonian conquerors was so severe that it broke the continuity of their folk-memory; and, after forgetting that these sepulchres had been hewn and occupied by the greatest potentates of their own race, they expressed their continuing sense of wonder at the mightiness of these ancient monuments by naming the locality after a parvenu hero of an epic cycle which was perhaps of Saka origin (see V. v. 602-4). Even the crushing experience of 334-330 B.C. could hardly have produced so extreme a lapse of memory as this if the association of the Persian people in their homeland with the universal state which Persian hands had built had not been rather tenuous.

⁵ For a description see Herzfeld, E. E.: *Archaeological History of Iran* (London 1934, Milford), pp. 27-28. 'Such a plan cannot be called exactly a town. It looks more like the first settlement of nomads, and such in fact was the case.'

⁶ The imperial archives disinterred at Persepolis by twentieth-century Western archaeologists indicated that Persepolis had been built between these dates, and that the

constructed at the point where the gorge of the Pulvār opens out into the plain of Marv-Dasht¹ an imperial centre for the Persian people as a whole which, like the civic centres of the cantons of Gaul under the Roman Empire, came to be known by the name of the nation itself² and not of the locality in which it happened to have been laid out. The layout of this artificial capital was dominated by a magnificent audience hall,³ but the visits paid by Achaemenian emperors to Persepolis and Pasargadae were as rare and brief as those paid by Hapsburg king-emperors to their royal palace at Buda or by sovereigns of the United Kingdom to their royal palace at Holyrood. The unusualness of the spectacle of an Achaemenian emperor giving audience in the stupendous *apadāna* looking out on to the plain of Marv-Dasht is attested by the handsomeness of the rare imperial visitor's customary atonement for his necessary misdemeanour of being a chronic absentee. Whenever an emperor did, for once, set foot on Persian ground, he used to give a gold piece to every woman of Pasargadae⁴ or, as some Greek men of letters reported,⁵ to every man and woman in the whole of Fars.

The munificence of this largesse could be afforded thanks to its infrequency. Persepolis remained unknown to the Hellenes before Alexander fought his way to the spot through a barrage of brigand tribesmen. Its name is not mentioned in the Babylonian, Jewish, Phoenician, or Egyptian records either;⁶ and the only indication that Persepolis may after all have been of some political importance is the fact that Alexander felt it worth while to burn the place down. If the intention of this unworthy act of vandalism was to break the prestige and efface the memory of the imperial dynasty that Alexander was aspiring to supplant, he would have employed his destructive energies to better effect on the more arduous task of defacing the gigantic bas-relief and trilingual inscription, recording the mighty deeds of Darius the Great, which the second founder of the Achaemenian Empire had graven on the face of a precipitous cliff far up above the reach of any ordinary saboteur. But, if the Macedonian usurper had set out to destroy this all but impregnable monument, he would not have found it in Fars, but on a crag overhang-

work of construction had been most actively pressed forward between the years 503 and 497 B.C. (see Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 176).

¹ Olmstead (*in op. cit.*, p. 172) conjectures that Darius's reason for abandoning Pasargadae was its association with the rival Cyran branch of the Imperial House.

² 'Pārsa-tyā', in an inscription of Xerxes'. From this usage the Greeks coined the word 'Persepolis', but, in current Greek parlance, to go to this imperial centre of the Persian people was expressed simply as going *és Ilépas* (as a Gallo-Roman would say 'Parisios' instead of 'Lutetiam'). On this point see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, 1st ed. (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 31-32.

³ The Sasanidae followed the policy of the Achaemenidae in adorning their native Fars with magnificent monuments as a compensation for the removal of their seat of imperial government to a more convenient site. Eighteen out of twenty surviving Sasanian rock-sculptures were in Fars (Herzfeld, E.: *Archaeological History of Iran* (London 1935, Milford), p. 79).

⁴ 'Whenever the Emperor of the Persians visits Pasargadae, he distributes a largesse of gold to the Persian women. The value of this donative amounts to twenty Attic drachmae per head' (Ctesias: *Persica*, Books IV-VI, p. 116 in J. Gilmore's edition (London 1888, Macmillan). Cp. Nicolaus of Damascus, fr. 65, in *Historici Graeci Minores*, ed. by Dindorf, L., vol. i (Leipzig 1870, Teubner), p. 63).

⁵ Xenophon: *Cyropaedia*, Book VIII, chap. v, § 21, and chap. vii, § 1; cp. Plato: *Leges*, Book III, 695 D, and Plutarch: *Life of Alexander*, chap. 69.

⁶ See Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

ing one of the stations on the Great North-East Road in the section where the imperial highway climbed the Zagros Range *en route* from Babylon to Ecbatana. In choosing a site for his own sepulchre, Darius might indulge his personal sentiment for the Persian crownland of his Ariaramnan Achaemenid ancestors, and in deciding where to lay out an imperial palace he might feel it politic to flatter the vanity of the imperial people on whose loyalty to his throne and house the stability of his empire and dynasty depended. But, in the location of a monument that was to serve neither piety nor policy but publicity, Darius showed the shrewdness of his judgement by putting his finger on the rock of Behistan, where his record would force itself on the attention of the maximum number of his subjects as they travelled on their lawful occasions along the busiest thoroughfare in his empire.

When the universal state that had been originally provided for the Syriac World by Persian empire-builders from the south-west corner of the Iranian Plateau was eventually reconstituted by Hijāzī empire-builders from the western rim of the Arabian Plateau, history repeated itself with emphasis. Thanks to the intuition of the discordant oligarchs of an oasis-state in the Hijāz, who had invited the rejected prophet of a rival community to make himself at home with them and try his hand at being their ruler, in the hope that he would bring them the concord which they had failed to attain by themselves, Yathrib became, within thirty years of the Hijrah, the capital of an empire embracing not only the former Roman dominions in Syria and Egypt but the entire domain of the former Sasanian Empire.¹ Yathrib's title to remain the seat of government for this vast realm was indisputable on its juridical merits. This remote oasis-state was the territorial nucleus out of which the Muslim Arab world-empire had burgeoned in its miraculously rapid growth, and it was now also hallowed as *Madinat-an-Nabī*, the City of the Prophet which had recognized his mission and had furnished him with home, throne, and sepulchre. This title was so impressive that *de jure* Medina remained the capital of the Caliphate—at any rate until the foundation of Baghdad by the 'Abbasid Caliph Mansūr in A.D. 762.² Yet *de facto* the swiftly expanding dominions of the Prophet Muhammad and his successors were governed from Medina for no longer than thirty-four years; for the fact was that this oasis hidden away in the interior of the Arabian Plateau—a vaster, wilder, barer, emptier counterpart of the Plateau of Iran—had condemned itself to political nullity by the immensity of its political success.

It would have been still less practicable to rule 'the Fertile Crescent' and the Lower Nile Valley and the Upper Basin of the Oxus and Jaxartes from Medina than to rule them from Istakhr or Persepolis or Pasargadae. The last event in Medina's brief career as an operative

¹ Ibn Khaldūn suggests that the Primitive Muslim Arabs' success in conquering the whole of the Sasanian Empire was a consequence of their conquest of the Sasanian imperial capital Ctesiphon, and that their contemporary failure to conquer more than a portion of the Roman Empire was a consequence of their inability to conquer the Roman imperial capital Constantinople (see the *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 333).

² See pp. 148-50, above.

imperial capital was the assassination there of Muhammad's third Caliph Uthmān in A.D. 656. Thereafter, 'Alī (*imperabat* A.D. 656–61) tried to rule the Caliphate from Kūfah, one of the cantonments of Arab tribal troops on the borderline between the Arabian Steppe and 'Irāq, and Mu'āwīyah (*imperabat* A.D. 661–80) succeeded in ruling it from Damascus, on the borderline between the Arabian Steppe and Syria. Under the Umayyad régime Medina was never the *de facto* seat of government; it was the academic fastness of embittered orthodox exponents of the Islamic Law; and the usurping dynasty, in its wary handling of this impeccable hornet's nest, seldom allowed itself to be provoked into committing invidious acts of repression; it was usually able to dispose of the fulminations of the Medinese doctors of theology by the more elegant and baffling riposte of a mock-respectful disregard.

When the Umayyad usurpers were supplanted by the semi-legitimate 'Abbasids, orthodox Medina's situation did not improve but deteriorated, for the road (if it could be called a road) from this West Arabian oasis to the 'Abbasids' metropolitan territory in 'Irāq was longer and more arduous than the road from Medina to Damascus. Moreover, the downfall of the Umayyads had put an end to that Arab hegemony in the Caliphate which, under the Umayyad régime, had been a link between the Desert and the Sown. The change of dynasty in the Caliphate was accompanied by a virtual secession of the badu of the Arabian Steppes;¹ and, though this break-away was less overt than the insurrection which had broken out after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, it was, unlike the *Riddah*, enduring in its effects. Medina was insulated from Baghdad by a Nomad no-man's-land; and, while the 'Abbasid Caliphs might occasionally advertise their piety by visiting the Haramayn as pilgrims,² these imperial pilgrimages to a couple of oases at World's End, where a Commander of the Faithful had no political business to transact, were as infrequent as they were hazardous.

To judge by the experience of later, less august and, by the same token, less opulent Muslim pilgrims to the two principal holy cities of Islam, we may assume that the badu made Hārūn-ar-Rashīd and his ever more degenerate successors pay toll for the right of way across their steppes. Recalcitrant tribesmen are no respecters of persons; and we know for a fact that, when the Achaemenian emperors paid their occasional visits of family piety to Persepolis and Pasargadae from Susa, they had to pay toll to the wild highlanders commanding the mountain passes on their route for the privilege of travelling through to scatter their largesse among their own Persian kinsfolk in Fars. When these impudent Uxii³ imprudently notified Alexander, on his arrival at their borders in

¹ See p. 149, n. 3, above.

² The stations on the two pilgrimage routes of the 'Abbasid Age from 'Irāq to the Hijāz—one route taking off into the Arabian steppe from Kūfah and the other from Basrah—are plotted out in Spruner-Menke: *Hand-Atlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neuere Zeit*, 3rd. ed. (Gotha 1880, Perthes), Map 81.

³ This was a Greek version of the name of a people which appears as Ūvijyā (standing for Hūjiyā) in Old Persian. In the Achaemenian official lists of *dahyāva*, the land name Ūvja or Ūja (standing for Hūja) denotes Elam in the widest sense, including the Susian lowland as well as its highland hinterland. In a later age the same country continued to be known by the same name in the form Hūzistān (or Khūzistān), while its latter-day

331 B.C., that they would not let him pass either unless he paid them their customary fee, the conqueror gave the blackmailers the surprise of their lives;¹ and thereafter, in the winter of 324-323 B.C., he diverted himself by conducting a miniature lightning campaign against the Uxians' north-western neighbours and fellow brigands the Kassites,² who had likewise acquired a customary right of levying blackmail—presumably also, like the Uxii, from the Achaemenian Emperor himself, since the Kassites' highland fastness lay astride the direct road from Susa to Ecbatana.³

Migrations of the Capital Cities of Marchmen Empire-builders

We may now pass from empires founded by barbarians like the Primitive Muslim Arabs, or by barbaro-marchmen like the Persian henchmen of the Achaemenidae and the Manchu conquerors of China, to empires

capital (the provincial successor of an imperial Susa) was called Ahwāz, the Arabic plural of Hūz, which was the singular of an ethnicon corresponding to the old Persian Hūjiyā.

¹ See Arrian: *Expediitio Alexandri*, Book III, chap. xvii. If these uncouth brigands of the Southern Zagros had been as ready-witted as the accomplished Tyrrhenian pirate, they might have taken a verbal revenge for their military discomfiture by pointing out to Alexander that he was engaged in a larger way in the same trade that they were practising on a petty scale (see the story as told by Saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book IV, chap. 4, and translated in XI. ix. 223, n. 1).

² See Arrian: *Expediitio Alexandri*, Book VII, chap. xv, §§ 1-3.

³ The Kassites' customary right to take toll from august travellers seeking passage through their country was flouted in 317 B.C. by Antigonos, as the Uxians' had been by Alexander in 331 B.C., but the sequel was not the same, for this time it was the Macedonian war-lord who was given the surprise of his life by the Iranian mountaineers. Antigonos, confronted with the problem of rapidly extricating his troops from a precarious military situation and a formidably high summer temperature in the lowlands of Elam, had decided to evacuate them to Media—the nearest quarter of the Iranian Plateau—to recuperate and refit. For reaching this destination, he had a choice of two alternative routes: a detour, estimated to involve a forty days' march, for the most part through sultry lowlands, or a short cut, amounting to no more than a nine days' march, through the cool highlands of the Kassite country. The detour would have taken him from Susa along the north-east alignment of the Great North-West Road to a point where this road crossed the Babylon-Ecbatana section of the Great North-East Road, and from there he would have marched to Ecbatana, past the rock of Behistan, along the main highway of the Achaemenian Empire. Diodorus Siculus's source rightly characterizes the detour as being *καλή καὶ βασιλική*. The short cut through the Kassite country was presumably the Ecbatana-Susa diversion of the Great North-East Road of which the proper south-western terminus was not Susa but Babylon. Against advice, Antigonos insisted both on taking the short cut through the Kassites' country and on trying to force his passage without purchasing the tribesmen's acquiescence. The Kassites did not get their money, but they made their redoubtable visitor pay dear in soldiers' lives (Diodorus Siculus: Book XIX, chap. 19). So much for the effect of Alexander's flamboyant chastisement of the Kassites only five and a half years before! It is easier to chastise wild tribesmen than to break their spirit or change their habits, as empire-builders have discovered in many different areas and ages. Tribesmen, like bayonets, are awkward to sit on.

When the Uvjiyā and the Kassites felt the disconcerting weight of Alexander's arm, they could hearten themselves by recalling that they and their ancestors had survived many previous punitive expeditions of the kind (ignorant though they were of Naramsin's stele portraying him chastising the Gutaeans). The Kassites had, indeed, been sitting, unscotched, in their local fastness in the Zagros since at least as early as the eighteenth century B.C., and a detachment of their braves had made history by descending on a Land of Shinar which Hammurabi had just exhausted in the act of re-establishing the Empire of Sumer and Akkad by main force. This momentarily resuscitated Sumeric universal state had come and gone, but the Kassites had battened on their Babylonian prey for five or six hundred years (see I. i. 111). At the time of writing the social condition of this corner of Iran was much like what it had been in the eighteenth century B.C. and in the fourth. In the twentieth century of the Christian Era the Kassites called themselves 'Lūrs' and the Uxii 'Bakhtiyāris'.

founded by marchmen who were genuine, though rustic, members of the society which they furnished with a universal state. In such cases likewise the normal tendency, as we have noted by anticipation,¹ is for the seat of imperial government to travel from the site of the former parochial capital of the empire-building march-state to some new site nearer the heart of the civilization whose whole domain has now been united politically. A classical illustration of this tendency is afforded by the course of Sinic history.

The cradle of the Sinic Civilization had been the great plain which lay between 'the Country within the Passes' on the west and the hill-country of Shantung on the east, and which was inundated by the waters of the Yellow River in the lower part of its course;² but, at an early date, a secondary centre had arisen in the little plain watered by the lower course of the River Wei,³ the principal right-bank tributary of the Yellow River, which joins the main stream just at the point where the Yellow River bends, in an acute angle, from a south-by-westerly to an east-by-northerly course and forces its way through the mountain barrier that separates the little western plain 'within the passes' from the Great Eastern Plain which was the heart of the Sinic World.

The empire-building march-state Ts'in had started its career as a western outpost of the Sinic World far up the Wei Valley, but, after centuries of progressive expansion, its capital had come—by the time when Ts'in She Hwang-ti united the Sinic World politically by conquering and annexing Ts'in's six rivals⁴—to be located at Hsien Yang, on the left bank of the Lower Wei near the western end of the little western plain 'within the passes'; and Ts'in She Hwang-ti retained this existing capital of his hereditary kingdom as the seat of government for his newly established universal state.⁵ Upon the overthrow of the Ts'in régime after Ts'in She Hwang-ti's death and the capture of Hsien Yang by Liu Pang,⁶ the former capital of the Ts'in Power was laid waste in cold blood by the arch-rebel Hsiang-yü.⁷ This aristocrat had inherited an implacable hatred of Ts'in and all its works from forebears who had been hereditary dignitaries of the state of Ch'u, Ts'in's principal rival.⁸ The peasant-born founder of the Han Dynasty had no such vested interest in the vendettas of a dead feudal past. When he had occupied Hsien Yang in 207 B.C. and thereby brought the Ts'in régime to an end, he had achieved this *coup* by the combination of a politic clemency with military force, and had been content to spare the stones and timbers of the city as well as the life of the last Ts'in emperor, when once the latter had resigned the insignia of the imperial office.⁹ When, after his successful issue from his inevitable settlement of accounts with Hsiang-yü, Han Liu Pang found himself sole master of the Sinic World, he followed in the footsteps of his Ts'in forerunners, not only in keeping the whole of 'the Country within the Passes' under his own direct administration,¹⁰

¹ On p. 194, above.

³ See II. ii. 118-19, and xi, map 26.

⁵ See p. 171, n. 2, above.

⁷ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 259.

⁹ See Franke, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 258.

² See I. i. 90 and 318-21, and xi, map 25.

⁴ See p. 167, above.

⁶ See p. 171, above.

⁸ See p. 171, above.

¹⁰ See p. 173, above.

but in locating his seat of government at the western end of the little plain of the Lower Wei. Ch'ang Ngan, where Han Liu Pang laid out his new capital, lay near the right bank of the Wei just opposite the devastated site of Hsien Yang on the farther side of the river.

This avatar of the capital of Ts'in remained the capital of the Han Empire for the duration of the Prior Han Dynasty (*imperabant* 202 B.C.–A.D. 9). When, however, after the interregnum arising from the usurpation of Wang Mang (*dominabatur* A.D. 9–23),¹ the Empire was reinstated by the Posterior Han Dynasty (*imperabant* A.D. 25–221), the seat of government was transferred by them from Ch'ang Ngan in the Lower Wei Valley, just 'within the passes', to Loyang, just outside the passes, on the western verge of the Great Eastern Plain, in the lower valley of the River Lo, which was the next right-bank tributary of the Yellow River below the Wei.²

This site, just within the plain that was the heart of the Sinic World, was already historic ground by the time when the Posterior Han decided to plant their capital there. The transfer of the seat of government of the Han régime that was made in A.D. 25 had been anticipated in 770 B.C.,³ when the Chóu Dynasty had evacuated their previous capital 'within the passes' at Tsung Chóu (a few miles to the south-west of the subsequent site of Ch'ang Ngan) after it had been sacked in 771 B.C. by barbarian raiders from the west, and had taken refuge at Loyang, which had previously been no more than a secondary seat of theirs.⁴ Moreover, before the Chóu had established this at first subsidiary

¹ See V. vi. 295.

² See II. ii. 119.

³ See Hirth, F.: *The Ancient History of China* (New York 1908, Columbia University Press), p. 176.

⁴ The political sequels of these two coincident shifts in the location of the seat of government of the Sinic World were not the same. When made in A.D. 25, the transfer of the capital gave the Han régime a new lease of life; when made in 770 B.C., it resulted in the Chóu Dynasty's becoming *rois fainéants* who lingered on, in a miniature imperial domain and with merely ceremonial functions, till they were snuffed out by Ts'in She Hwang-ti's grandfather Kung Chao Hsiang of Ts'in in 256–249 B.C. The histories of the Chóu and Ts'in dynasties had, however, run almost exactly parallel in an earlier chapter, and, even in the last chapter, the two denouements resembled one another in being, both of them, ironic.

Either dynasty had started its career as a western outpost of the Sinic World in the upper reaches of the Wei Basin. Both of them had subsequently moved their seat of government down into the little plain of the Lower Wei (Chóu perhaps in 1150 B.C., Ts'in after 770 B.C.). Both had then broken out of their western march-state 'within the passes' and had conquered the heart of the Sinic World on the Great Eastern Plain: Ts'in She Hwang-ti's overthrow of Ts'in's six eastern rivals in 230–221 B.C. had its precedent in Chóu Wu Wang's overthrow of the Shang (*alias* Yin) Power on the Great Eastern Plain at some date, not precisely determinable, between 1122 B.C. (the traditional dating) and about 1050 B.C. In the next chapter the two histories diverged. The Chóu Dynasty attempted to organize the government of its eastern conquests by devolution on feudal lines, and thereby reduced itself, by stages, to impotence: the first shock was suffered by the Chóu Power in 841 B.C., the second in 771–770 B.C., and the end came in 249 B.C. Warned (we may guess) by the miscarriage of the Chóu Dynasty's policy, Ts'in She Hwang-ti sought to confirm his hold on his eastern conquests by a policy of extreme *Gleichschaltung* and centralization, and thereby defeated his own personal and dynastic ends by provoking a violent reaction which extinguished the Ts'in Power for ever within three years of the First Ts'in Emperor's death. Thanks, however, to the genius of Han Liu Pang and to the hardly less notable statesmanship of the founder of the Posterior Han Dynasty, Kwang Wuti, Ts'in She Hwang-ti's empire and system of government lasted, in a modified and on that account more practically effective form, for nearly four hundred years—from Ts'in She Hwang-ti's death in 210 B.C. to the decay of the Posterior Han Power towards the close of the second century of the Christian Era (see II. ii. 118–19).

western seat of theirs at Loyang, the neighbourhood had already been a focus of political power. A site a few miles farther down the course of the Lo River, not far from its junction with the Yellow River, had been one of the successive capitals of the Shang (*alias* Yin) Dynasty, which had ruled in the Great Eastern Plain before the Chóu had descended from 'the Country within the Passes' and had brought this Shang régime to an end.¹

In the history of the main body of the Far Eastern Society that was affiliated to the Sinic Civilization, this episode of the transfer of a seat of government from the little western plain in the Wei Basin to the Great Eastern Plain repeated itself after the evocation of a ghost of the Sinic universal state by the Sui Dynasty.² The Sui, and the T'ang after them, located the capital of a politically united China at Si Ngan (the latter-day Sian-fu),³ on a site adjoining that of Ch'ang Ngan; and the capital of this resuscitation of the Ts'in and Han Empire remained at this spot as long as the Sui and T'ang dynasties endured (*imperabant* A.D. 589-907). But, after an interregnum following the decay of the T'ang Power that had set in before the close of the ninth century of the Christian Era, the reunion of all but a fraction of the former dominions of the T'ang⁴ by the Sung Dynasty in A.D. 960 was accompanied by an eastward shift in the seat of government⁵ along the historic west-east axis. This time, Loyang was not the beneficiary; under the Sung régime she did not re-emerge from the secondary position that she had occupied under the T'ang.⁶ The Sung laid out their capital more than a hundred miles farther to the east, at Kaifêng, in the middle of the Great Eastern Plain, and not on its western verge.

The course of empire in the Yellow River Basin had had a parallel in

¹ By the time of writing, archaeological discoveries had confirmed the Sinic literary tradition by producing independent evidence for the existence of the Shang culture (see xi, map 25) on the Great Eastern Plain in the second millennium B.C. (The authenticity of the Hsia Dynasty, which was the traditional precursor of the Shang, still remained to be proved.) The capital of the Shang Power was traditionally recorded to have lain in the Lower Lo Valley from 1386 to 1198 B.C. During the last phase of the Shang régime, traditionally dated 1198-1122 B.C., the seat of government was recorded to have lain farther to the north-east, at Mo (see xi, map 25), on the main northern arm of the Lower Yellow River itself. After the overthrow of the Shang Empire, the dynasty survived as hereditary princes of the parochial state of Sung (see xi, map 25) to the east of Loyang in the upper basin of the Huai River. During the Sinic Time of Troubles that resulted from the decay of the Chóu Power, Sung was one of those little states in the centre of the Sinic World which were the stakes in the contest for hegemony between the great states on the fringes.

² For this achievement of the Sui Dynasty, and its prolongation by their successors the T'ang, see II. ii. 120; pp. 19-21, above; and X. ix. 16.

³ See II. ii. 120.

⁴ Though inconsiderable in area compared with the total extent of the main body of the Far Eastern World, this fragment of former T'ang territory which the Sung failed to reincorporate into the reunited empire was strategically and historically important. The sixteen districts of which it consisted (see II. ii. 121) lay just within the Great Wall and included the site of the future imperial city of Peking at the northern extremity of the Great Eastern Plain. The Khitan Nomad barbarians, to whom this fragment of territory had been ceded, *circa* A.D. 927-37, during the post-T'ang interregnum, chose this site for their southern residence and thus prepared the way for it to become the capital of their successors the Kin, after these had shifted the centre of gravity of their dominions southward by conquering the Yellow River Basin from the Sung in A.D. 1124-42 (see V. vi. 307).

⁵ See II. ii. loc. cit.

⁶ At the time of writing, Loyang was serving, under the name of Honan-fu, as the local centre of administration of the central province of Northern China.

the Nile Valley below the First Cataract.¹ In Egyptiac as in Sinic and Far Eastern history, political unity was conferred—or imposed—on the society no less than three times over by a march-state starting from a base of operations up-river;² and in Egyptiac history likewise the aggrandisement of a march into a universal state was followed on each occasion by a shift in the location of the seat of government from the former parochial capital of the empire-building marchmen to a new site nearer to the heart of the domain of the politically unified society.

The foundation, *circa* 3100 B.C., of a united kingdom of Upper and Lower Egypt was achieved by empire-builders from the extreme south of the Egyptiac World of the day, in the neighbourhood of the modern Al-Kāb,³ between Thebes and the First Cataract. The political union, from this base of operations, of the whole of the Lower Nile Basin between the First Cataract and the Mediterranean was immediately followed by a northward shift of the seat of power. The Hieraconpolite empire-builders established their imperial residence at Thinis, and their necropolis at Abydos on the opposite bank of the Nile, down-stream from their ancestral canton; and the *de facto* centre of imperial administration seems soon to have moved on still farther down-stream to Memphis.⁴ Thereafter, this ideally convenient site, at the point of junction between the mouth of the Nile Valley and the head of the Delta, remained the seat of government of 'the Old Kingdom' to the end. The *de facto* capital of its spring-time became the *de jure* capital of its summer, when the Thinites were followed by the pyramid-builders of the Third and Fourth Dynasties;⁵ and, when summer passed over into autumn, Memphis was still the place from which the demonic pyramid-builders' pious Heliopolitan successors attempted to exert their gradually diminishing authority.⁶

After the Time of Troubles following 'the Old Kingdom's' collapse, the establishment, *circa* 2052 B.C., of an Egyptiac universal state by a prince of the southern march-state of Thebes was similarly followed, in the reign of the Emperor Amenemhat I (*imperabat circa* 1991-1962 B.C.), by a transfer of the capital of 'the Middle Empire' from Thebes to a site, only a few miles up-stream from Memphis, which its founder named 'the Conqueror of the Two Lands' (*Egyptiacè* 'Iz-Tau').⁷ Though Thebes was slightly less remote than Al-Kāb had been

¹ This parallel has been pointed out, in another connexion, in II. ii. 118.

² See I. i. 140, n. 2, and II. ii. 112-13.

³ The nucleus of the 'nome' (canton) which was the original domain of these Horus-worshipping empire-builders consisted of a pair of cities facing one another across the Nile: Necheb (*Graecè* 'Eileithuia') on the site of the modern Al-Kāb on the east bank of the Nile, and Nechen (*Graecè* 'Hieracônpolis', in allusion to the hawk ('hierax') which was both the heraldic emblem of the city and the symbol of its god Horus) on the west bank. (See Hall, H. R.: *The Ancient History of the Near East* (London 1913, Methuen), pp. 93-94; Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, Part II, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 80 and 111).

⁴ See Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-9; Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., ed. cit., p. 134.

⁵ See Meyer, *ibid.*, p. 169.

⁶ It is significant that, whereas the Thinites were buried at Abydos, far up the Nile Valley though not so far as Al-Kāb, the Heliopolitans as well as the pyramid-builders chose the neighbourhood of Memphis for the site of their sepulchres (see *ibid.* pp. 132 and 202-3).

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 267.

from the heart of the Egyptiac World, the gravitational pull of the body social which Theban prowess had reunited proved once again so strong that Thebes on this occasion, like Al-Kāb before her, had to pay for her political achievement by ceasing to be the seat of government of the oecumenical polity which she had called into existence. When, however, after an abortive interregnum,¹ the Egyptiac universal state was restored *circa* 1570 B.C. by another prince of Thebes, as a result of his triumph in a holy war of liberation against the hated alien Hyksos conquerors of Lower Egypt, the power and prestige of Thebes stood so high that this time she was able to resist successfully, for more than two hundred years,² the gravitational pull which made itself felt again now that the Egyptiac World was for the third time politically united.

'[The] structure of "the New Empire" presents a very peculiar picture: the seat of government lies far away from the geographical centre in the southernmost part of the [Egyptiac] Civilization's domain, 700 kilometres above Memphis and only 200 kilometres below the frontier at the First Cataract, as the Nile flows [and not as the crow flies]. This makes the impression of a defiance of the conditions set by Nature. . . . In terms of the Kingdom of Prussia,³ it is as though the seat of government had lain at Königsberg [instead of at Berlin]. . . . The distortion is not appreciably abated by the fact that Nubia has now once again been incorporated into the permanent domain of the empire. This unnaturalness of "the New Empire's" structure bears striking testimony to the truth that the [Eighteenth] Dynasty's hereditary dominions were, and continued to be, the source of the dynasty's strength.'⁴

In this instance, Nature proved unable to reassert herself till a man of genius came to her aid. Applying his revolutionary philosophy consistently, as he did, to every side of life, the Emperor Ikhnaton (*imperabat circa* 1380-1362 B.C.)⁵ not only deposed the god Amon-Re of Thebes from his established primacy in the Egyptiac pantheon in favour of an etherialized sun-disk; he also transferred his capital from Thebes to Tall-al-'Amarnah, about half-way, as the Nile flows, from Thebes to Memphis. Ikhnaton, like Ts'in She Hwang-ti and Akbar, defeated his own ends by going to extremes that provoked an overwhelming reaction.⁶ What can a solitary philosopher-king achieve against the cumulative momentum of a cultural tradition? Ikhnaton's Tell-el-Amarna suffered the fate of Akbar's Fātiḥpūr Sikrī. Yet Ikhnaton's discomfiture did not enable Thebes to recapture her geographically unnatural prerogative of serving as the seat of imperial government for a united Egyptiac World. Under Horemheb (*imperabat de facto circa* 1349-1319 B.C.) a still united Egyptiac World was ruled once again from its geographical centre at

¹ See I. i. 137-9.

² See p. 176, above. It is worth noticing that this was about the length of time for which, in a Sinitic World politically united under the Han régime, Ch'ang Ngan 'within the passes' succeeded in resisting the gravitational pull on the seat of government which eventually caused the capital to travel to Loyang, on the verge of the Great Eastern Plain.

³ Presumably the writer is thinking of Prussia within the frontiers of A.D. 1866-1918.—A.J.T.

⁴ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, Part I, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 60.

⁵ Or, on another reckoning, *circa* 1370-1352 B.C.

⁶ See I. i. 145-6 and V. v. 695-6.

Memphis; but this time the victory of the interior over the marches was as short-lived as it had been long-delayed. In the next chapter of Egyptiac history the seat of imperial government was prised out, split, and polarized by pressures of unequal magnitude from beyond the frontiers. Two major pressures from the north-east and the north-west drew the principal capital away into the Delta, while a secondary capital arose at Napata, near the foot of the Fourth Cataract, which, under 'the New Empire', had superseded Thebes and Al-Kāb as the southern bulwark of an Egyptiac World that had now expanded southward to take in Nubia.¹

In Hellenic history the fortunes of Rome are reminiscent of those of Egyptiac Thebes. Rome had won her spurs by taking over from the Etruscans the wardenship of the Italian marches of the Hellenic World over against the Gauls,² as Thebes had won hers by taking over from Al-Kāb the wardenship of the First Cataract of the Nile over against the barbarians of Nubia. Like Thebes, again, Rome had afterwards turned her arms inwards and imposed political unity on the society of which she was a member. At the same time the geographical location of Rome in the empire which she eventually gathered round her was so much more central than that of Thebes in either 'the Middle Empire' or 'the New Empire' that Rome might have been expected to remain the seat of the Roman imperial government as long as the Roman Empire lasted. The Roman Empire was, in geographical terms, a Pan-Mediterranean 'thalassocracy', and Rome's own situation at the mid-point of the west coast of Italy, on the banks of a river which was navigable up to Rome by the sea-going vessels of the day, was not far from being the geographically ideal site for the capital of an empire embracing all the shores of the Mediterranean and holding this ring of continental provinces together by a network of maritime communications.³ As a Greek man of letters, writing in the age of the Antonines, expressed it in an invocation to Rome and the Romans,

'The sea stretches in a belt across the middle of the Inhabited World and across the middle of your empire; and round the sea the continents extend "grand and grandly"—continually supplying your needs with consignments of their products.'⁴

Nevertheless, Rome, like Thebes, did eventually lose her imperial pre-

¹ See II. ii. 113-15.

² See II. ii. 161.

³ In a Pan-Mediterranean 'thalassocracy' the ideal seat of imperial government, corresponding to Memphis in the fluvial Egyptiac World, would be one or other of two sites in Sicily—Messina and Marsala—which command respectively the narrower and the wider of the two straits through which the south-eastern and the north-western basins of the Mediterranean communicate with one another. The despots who imposed an imperfect and precarious political unity on the Greek city-states in Sicily and the toe of Italy in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. (see III. iii. 357, n. 1) had never possessed a sufficient surplus of power to enable them to unite the whole Hellenic World, not to speak of the whole circumference of the Mediterranean, round a Sicilian political centre. Syracuse was the capital of a Mediterranean thalassocracy for the first and last time during the residence there of the Roman Emperor Constans II in the years A.D. 663/4-8 (see IV. iv. 330-1 and 589-91).

⁴ Aristeides, P. Aelius: *In Romam*, §§ 10-11 (*Aelii Aristidis Quae Supersunt Omnia*, edidit B. Keil (Berlin 1898, Weidmann, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 94), quoted on p. 81, n. 2, above.

rogative of serving as the seat of government for an empire which she herself had created.

While Rome lay not far from the centre of the Mediterranean Basin, she was by no means so centrally situated from the standpoint of an Hellenic World of which she was ostensibly the mistress but in the last resort the servant. The Hellenic Civilization had grown up round the shores, not of the Mediterranean, but of the Aegean, which was a north-eastern bay of the larger sea that, for the Romans, was *mare nostrum*; and, though, by the time when the Roman Empire was established, Continental European Greece had lost its former military, political, and economic pre-eminence, the Hellenic and Hellenized provinces of the Empire in Anatolia and Syria were gaining steadily in population and wealth, while Italy, which had conquered the Mediterranean Basin largely in virtue of her then abundant man-power, began, under the *Pax Augusta*, to fall into the same decline as Greece.¹ Accordingly, under the Roman Empire, though Greek influence continued to radiate into Italy, and Rome herself became for a time a predominantly Greek-speaking city,² the centre of gravity of the Hellenic World travelled away from the Aegean Basin, not north-westward towards Rome, but south-eastward towards Antioch and Alexandria. At the same time the centre of gravity of the Empire—which was a hollow ring of land encircling the Mediterranean—was travelling northwards owing to the doubling of the thickness of this ring on its northern side through the annexation of Britain, Gallia Comata, the Danubian provinces, and Cappadocia between the years 58 B.C. and A.D. 84.

These two gradual but persistent displacements of the Empire's economic and social centre of gravity were already exerting a gravitational pull upon the imperial seat of government when, in the third century of the Christian Era, their effect was suddenly and violently accentuated by pressures from beyond the frontiers: a pressure on the Euphrates from the aggressive Sasanian Power that had replaced the lethargic Arsacidae; a pressure on the Lower Danube from semi-nomadized North European barbarian intruders on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe;³ and a pressure on the Rhine and on the Rhine-Danube *limes* from local sedentary barbarians who had made themselves more formidable neighbours by learning something of the Roman arts of war and of state-building. Through the play of these divers social forces the seat of government of the Roman Empire, like that of the Egyptian 'New Empire', was prised up, split, and polarized.

¹ This decay of Italy can be traced back to the social effects of the devastation produced by the Hannibalic War (see I. i. 40), and, in Italy south of the Appennines, these effects had already become alarming by the generation of Tiberius Gracchus (*tribunatum plebis gerebat* 131 B.C.). The depopulation of Peninsular Italy was, however, counterbalanced at that stage by the colonization of the Po Basin, and, largely on this account, the relative decline of Italy as a whole, within the Alpine boundaries conferred on her by Augustus, did not begin to become pronounced until about the second century of the Roman Empire's existence, during 'the Indian Summer' of the Antonine Age.

² 'Non possum ferre, Quirites, Graecam urbem' (Juvenal: *Satires*, No. III, ll. 60-61, quoted already in V. v. 67) is merely an exaggeration of a truth which is attested, for example, by the extant works of the Christian Father Hippolytus, who lived in Rome and wrote in Greek in the third century of the Christian Era.

³ See III. iii. 399 and 426-8.

In this case the principal capital was drawn away eastward from the banks of the Tiber to the shores of the Bosphorus. Diocletian was governing the Empire from Nicomedia, at the point where the road from the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus leaves the sea behind and plunges into the interior of Anatolia, when he gave the signal, in A.D. 303, for the launching of an oecumenical campaign to extirpate the Christian Church. Constantine laid out his New Rome on the European shore of the Bosphorus, on the site of the Greek city of Byzantium,¹ in A.D. 324. Simultaneously a secondary capital likewise detached itself from Rome and then travelled, not eastward, but north-westward—lingering at Milan and coming to a halt at Trier.²

Of all the sites open for consideration by any ruler of the Roman Empire who had once shaken himself free from a traditional inhibition against moving the capital from Rome herself, a site on or near the Bosphorus offered the greatest combination of political advantages in the social and strategic circumstances of Diocletian's and Constantine's day. In a city with a harbour opening on to the narrow seas through which the Black Sea communicated with the Aegean, the imperial government would find itself within easier reach of the original heart of a maritime Hellenic World. At the same time it would find itself posted midway between the two frontiers—the Lower Danube and the Middle Euphrates—which in that age headed the list of its military anxieties, while at its doors, in Thrace and Illyricum, would lie the main reservoir of military man-power from which the Empire was now recruiting its armies. The cumulative weight of these considerations was decisive, and a secondary capital in the basin of the Po or the Moselle was necessary merely for looking after those economically backward ex-barbarian provinces in the far west, from Britain to Morocco inclusive, which could not be directly controlled by way of either the sea-routes or the land-routes that radiated out from Constantinople.

At the turn of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era the transfer of the principal capital of the Roman Empire from Rome to Constantinople or to some maritime city in that neighbourhood was, in fact, inevitable. But it is remarkable to find evidence that, more than three hundred years earlier, when Rome was towering at the zenith of her power under the auspices of Julius Caesar and Augustus, the Romans were already anxiously foreboding a shift in the seat of the imperial government, and were expecting that the Roman dictator with whom the decision of Rome's destinies now lay would choose his new site in that very region—on or near the shores of the waterway between the Aegean and the Black Sea—which did in fact eventually attract the choice of Diocletian and Constantine.

One of the causes of the unpopularity that gave Julius Caesar's enemies at Rome their opportunity for compassing his death was said to have been a rumour that he was proposing 'to migrate to Alexandria [Troas] or Ilium and at the same time to transfer thither the empire's

¹ The navigational advantages which had previously made Byzantium a key-point in the Hellenic system of maritime communications have been examined in II. ii. 43-48.

² See II. ii. 164.

resources after exhausting Italy by levies of man-power and leaving friends of his own as his agents for administering the city of Rome'.¹ This anecdote might have been discounted as an echo of a malicious propaganda campaign were it not for a revelation of the same anxiety in a celebrated passage in one of Horace's odes.² The Augustan poet must have written these lines not many years after the Battle of Actium had disposed of the Egyptian Alexandria's attempt to challenge, with Roman arms, Rome's title to be the imperial capital of a politically unified Hellenic World. At that moment³ Rome stood in solitary omnipotence without any rival to dispute her primacy; and Augustus, who had at last succeeded in winning the support of a *consensus Italiae* by defeating Mark Antony's attempt to transfer the seat of government of the Mediterranean World to the Levant, could not readily be suspected, without substantial evidence, of planning to make on his own initiative a move which had proved a fatal false step for his rival and a damaging insinuation against his predecessor. One of the fundamental principles of Augustus's policy was to steer clear of his adoptive father's fate by eschewing provocatively revolutionary acts and pursuing Caesarean aims by Fabian tactics. Yet it is plain that Horace, writing when and as he did, believed a transfer of the capital of the Roman Empire from Rome to some site on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont to be both a serious possibility and a dangerous subject. Horace tactfully misrepresents a cold-blooded 'geopolitical' calculation as a pious tribute to the legendary derivation of Rome from Troy, and, after cautiously expressing his disapproval in the form of a mythological conceit, he precipitately breaks off with an apology for trespassing on high matters of state in a mere poet's *jeu d'esprit*.

In the political geography of the Roman Empire,⁴ Troy or Alexandria Troas were the equivalents in Augustus's day of Nicomedia or Byzantium in Diocletian's and Constantine's;⁵ and the whimsical prophecy, put

¹ Or 'the cities of Italy' if the correct reading is not 'Urbis' but 'urbium'. This passage occurs in Suetonius Tranquillus, C. : *The Lives of the Caesars*, 'Divus Iulius', chap. 79.

² Horace: *Carmina*, Book III, Ode iii, ll. 57-72.

³ This challenge, and the abiding resentment of the Greek citizens of Alexandria Aegyptiaca at their city's defeat in her audacious trial of strength with her great Italian rival, have been touched upon in V. vi. 37, n. 1, and 217-19.

⁴ See xi, maps 28 and 29.

⁵ Before the addition to the Roman Empire of the continental northern tier of provinces from Britain to Cappadocia inclusive (see p. 217, above), the main route from the European to the Asiatic territories of the Empire had run from Rome via the Via Appia to Brundisium, had crossed the mouth of the Adriatic by a sea-passage to Dyrrhachium or Apollonia, and had then followed the Via Egnatia, via Thessalonica and Lysimacheia, to the Hellespont. By Diocletian's day the corresponding main route had come to be an unbroken overland highway running from Lyons via Milan and Aquileia (or even north of the Alps, from Trier via Augsburg and Vienna) to Belgrade, and thence south-eastwards, up the valley of the Morava and down the valley of the Maritsa, to the Bosphorus. As late as the year A.D. 360, when the Rhine-Danube *limes* had long since been submerged and when Swabia was in the hands of the independent and aggressive barbarian confederacy of the Alemanni, the Emperor Julian took the route north of the Alps in his march upon Constantinople from Northern Gaul. Yet, although by Constantine's day the Bosphorus had thus supplanted the Hellespont in the role of affording the most convenient passage across the narrow seas between Roman Europe and Roman Asia, Constantine is said to have started to build his new imperial capital on a site commanding the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont, at a point between Alexandria Troas and Ilium, before arriving at his eventual decision in favour of a site commanding the European shore of the Bosphorus (see Zosimus: *Historiae*, Book II, chap. xxx, §§ 2-3).

by Horace into the goddess Juno's mouth, that, if Troy were to be refounded by the Romans, she would infallibly be recaptured by the Greeks, did in fact come true of Byzantium after her refoundation as a New Rome by Constantine. Though the Latin-speaking Dardanian founder of Constantinople and his successors down to his Latin-speaking fellow countryman Justinian were resolved to make and keep their new Rome a Latin-speaking city,¹ the Greek language had captured the New Rome by the close of the sixth century of the Christian Era, as it had captured the Old Rome in Juvenal's time, some four hundred years earlier; and at Constantinople, with its Greek-speaking hinterland, the Latin language had no chance of repeating the victorious counter-attack by which at Rome it eventually overwhelmed what had never been more than a Greek-speaking enclave in an elsewhere Latin-speaking Italy.

Unlike Rome and Thebes, both Moscow and Yedo successfully avoided the fate of seeing the imperial throne removed from their precincts and permanently transferred to another site, and in both cases this difference of fortune was due to the same cause. Though Moscow and Yedo were on a par with Rome and Thebes in starting their careers as capitals of march-states which became the nuclei of universal states, and, though again, in both pairs of cases alike, the former march was afterwards relegated to the interior in consequence of a victorious expansion of the society into what had previously been barbarian territory beyond the pale, the eventual sequel was not the same. After Moscow and Yedo had thus changed their relative positions in their respective worlds from a former situation near the edge to a latter-day situation much nearer the centre, the advantage of this change for the purpose of serving as the seat of an oecumenical government was not counteracted in either case by the pressure of hostile forces from beyond the new frontiers which the expansion of the society had called into existence. Neither the Japanese World in its northward expansion up the Main Island of Japan and over the Tsugaru Straits into Hokkaido nor the Russian World in its eastward expansion across the Ural Mountains into Siberia ran into such formidable military commitments as those which Rome, for example, eventually incurred as a result of having expanded her dominions from the line of the Appennines to the line of the Rhine and the Danube.

For this reason the locus, half-way up the eastern seaboard of the Main Island of Japan, which became a seat of abortive oecumenical government at the site named Kamakura during the Japanese Time of Troubles and a seat of effective oecumenical government at the site named Yedo after the foundation of the Tokugawa Shogunate, succeeded in retaining its prerogative for the duration of the Tokugawa régime; and, thanks to Japan's being an archipelago in which Yedo, like every other important centre of population, lay almost within a stone's throw of the sea, the site which had proved itself a convenient seat of government for an insulated Japanese universal state did not forfeit its prerogative when Commodore Perry's expedition, by demonstrating that Japan no longer had it in her power to go on living in isolation as

¹ See V. vi. 224.

a self-contained social universe, precipitated a revolution which sought to transform Japan into a parochial state member of a world-wide society within a Western framework. Yokohama, the port of Yedo, was as handy for sea communications with North America or Western Europe as Kobe or Nagasaki; and therefore Japan's decision to open her doors to the West did not confront her with a geographical as well as a cultural problem. The cultural volte-face of the Meiji Revolution did not require any change in the existing capital except a ceremonial change of name from Yedo to Tokyo to signify the inauguration of a new era.

On the other hand in a land-locked Russia the desirability of providing the seat of government of a Westernizing régime with easy access to a maritime Western World raised a geographical problem for which it was difficult to find a satisfactory solution; and, unlike Yedo, Moscow was temporarily deprived of her prerogative as a result of her rulers' decision to open their doors to the West. So far from being able to retain her historic status at the cheap price of a change of name, Moscow was compelled, for more than two hundred years, to see her empire governed from a capital which was not only given a new name but was planted on virgin soil on a far-distant site.¹

When Seleucus Nicator chose for the capital of his newly carved-out successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire an Antioch-on-Orontes within a stone's throw of the Mediterranean in preference to a Seleucia-on-Tigris in the heart of South-Western Asia, he was acting in accordance with the feelings of the Hellenic ruling element in his dominions and was ignoring the feelings of a subject population which in his day was politically impotent. The transfer of the capital of the Russian Empire by Peter the Great from Moscow in the heart of Holy Russia to Saint Petersburg on the banks of the Neva, within a stone's throw of the Baltic, is comparable to Nicator's choice in its cultural and geographical aspects.² In this case, as in that, the seat of government of a land-locked empire was planted in a remote corner of the empire's domain in order to provide the capital with easy access by sea to the sources of an alien civilization which the imperial government was eager to introduce into its dominions. In its political aspect, however, Peter's act was much more audacious than Nicator's; for, in seeking to supplant Moscow by Saint Petersburg, Peter was ignoring the feelings of the Orthodox Christian ruling element in Muscovy with a brusqueness reminiscent of the revolutionary acts of Julius Caesar and Ts'in She Hwang-ti. The Russians whose capital Peter uprooted and transplanted were not a defeated people; on the contrary, they were at that time in process of defeating their Swedish Western enemy under Peter's own auspices; and the site of the new capital which Peter laid out to take the place of Moscow and to serve as a window for letting in Western cultural influence lay in territory wrested from a Western Sweden by Russian force of arms. In the light of this political situation it is astonishing that Saint Petersburg should have remained the capital of the Russian

¹ See pp. 690-1, below.

² This comparison has been suggested already in II. ii. 157.

Empire for more than two hundred years (A.D. 1712¹–1918²). The length of this interlude in Moscow's reign is a testimony both to the force of Peter's personality and to the potency of the alien Western Civilization of which Peter had constituted himself a missionary.³

Yet even this combination of forces in Saint Petersburg's favour could not avail either to maintain the seat of government there permanently or to avert the untoward effects of its remaining there as long as it did. In the Russian Empire under the Petrine régime the location of the capital at the extreme north-western corner accentuated the tendency, inherent in the imperial government's Westernizing policy, for a Westernized official class to become alienated, like the Hellenic and Hellenized ruling element in the Seleucid Monarchy, from the unassimilated mass of the population. This social schism was the price paid by the Russian Empire for a reception of the alien civilization of the West which never went far enough on the technological plane to achieve Peter the Great's ambition of making Russia capable of holding her own in war against the strongest Western antagonist who might enter the field

¹ This was the date on which Saint Petersburg officially became the capital of the Russian Empire; but the site of the new city had already been the seat of government *de facto* since May 1703, when Peter the Great had started work on the building of Saint Petersburg; for, though the task of conjuring a great city out of a wilderness of waterway and marsh was naturally a labour of many years, the Tsar had at once planted himself on the spot to direct the work in person; and the Tsar, wherever resident, was the Imperial Government incarnate.

² The seat of government was moved back from Saint Petersburg to Moscow in A.D. 1728, but was retransferred to St. Petersburg in A.D. 1732 (see Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Reformation of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 199).

³ There is no doubt that the past domestic history of Russian Orthodox Christendom which may have helped Saint Petersburg to maintain itself as the capital of the Russian Empire for as long as it did. The Empire had been brought into existence through the imposition of the rule of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy upon the city-state of Novgorod between A.D. 1471 and 1479. At that date Novgorod represented one half of Russian Orthodox Christendom, and this not merely in the extent of her territory but also in the complexion and orientation of her culture. The Russian state which had been converted to Eastern Orthodox Christianity by the cultural influence of the East Roman Empire at the close of the tenth century of the Christian Era had been founded by pagan seafarers who had made their way into Russia at her opposite extremity, from Scandinavia. Their port of entry had been Novgorod, on the River Volkhov, which the sea-going ships of the Vikings were able to ascend via the River Neva and Lake Ladoga. When the Scandinavians in their homelands were converted to Western Catholic Christianity—a conversion which was simultaneous with that of the Russians to Eastern Orthodoxy—Novgorod became a point of contact between Russia and Western Christendom, and it continued to perform this function till its subjugation by Muscovy. The heavy hand of Muscovite autocracy extinguished both Novgorod's overseas trade with the West and the self-governing institutions that were her heritage from the pagan Viking Age and that had been favoured by the cultural effects of Novgorod's subsequent commercial intercourse with the Hansa towns. In crushing Novgorod and what she stood for, the Muscovite empire-builder Ivan III and his successors were depriving Russian Orthodox Christendom of a valuable cultural asset, and conversely Peter the Great, in founding Saint Petersburg, was in a sense merely restoring to Russia this treasure of which his predecessors had robbed her. In purely geographical terms, Saint Petersburg was the eighteenth-century counterpart of a medieval Novgorod, taking into account the increase in the size and draught of sea-going ships that had taken place in the meantime. In cultural terms the effect of the removal of the capital of the Russian Empire to Saint Petersburg from Moscow was to create at that stage the situation which would have been created in the fourteen-eighties if at that date the political unification of Russia had been brought about through the city-state of Novgorod's conquering the Grand Duchy of Moscow instead of through Moscow's conquering Novgorod. In the light of this historical background, Peter the Great's act of transferring his capital from Moscow to Saint Petersburg appears somewhat less perverse than Seleucus Nicator's act of transferring his from a site in Babylonia to Antioch.

against her. Peter's successors thus fell between two stools; and this was one of the causes of the progressive decay of an always unsound Petrine régime after the assassination of the Tsar Alexander II in A.D. 1881.

In the War of A.D. 1914-18 the Russian Empire narrowly escaped the fate of the Seleucid Monarchy in 83 B.C. Indeed, Saint Petersburg had come near to proving as fatal to the Russian Empire as Antioch proved to be to the Seleucid Monarchy before the empire-building work of Tsar Ivan III and Tsar Ivan IV was salvaged at the eleventh hour by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks snatched the Russian Empire out of the jaws of destruction in order to transform it into a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the general tendency of the Russian Communist Revolution was to carry the process of Westernization, initiated by Peter the Great, a long stage farther, albeit, at this stage, along a line which was heretical from the orthodox Western standpoint of the day. But in one vital point the Bolsheviks made a change which was unquestionably a return to the Pre-Petrine Muscovite tradition. They retransferred the seat of government from Saint Petersburg to Moscow;¹ and this was perhaps the most effective single step that they could have taken to ensure that the results of their salvaging work should be lasting.

As for the capitals of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy and the Napoleonic Empire, we can do no more than speculate about the changes of location that might have taken place if the Napoleonic Empire had been less short-lived and if the Danubian Monarchy had either made good its academic pretensions or seized its golden opportunity. If in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era the Hapsburg Power had not allowed itself to be diverted, by inconclusive contests with rival Western Powers for the possession of relatively small and unimportant morsels of territory, from achieving its manifest destiny of entering into the heritage of the Ottoman Empire in the whole of South-Eastern Europe from the eastern outworks of Vienna to Adrianople and Yannina,² it is conceivable that in such circumstances the seat of government might have travelled down the Danube from Vienna to Budapest, or even as far as Belgrade. On the other hand, if by some miracle the Hapsburg Monarchy had succeeded in becoming in reality the oecumenical power, embracing the whole of Western Christendom in a single polity, which it purported to be in its style and title and which it was pictured as being in the imaginations of its own Catholic subjects and of its Orthodox Christian and Muslim neighbours and adversaries on the south-east³, it is conceivable that in such circumstances the capital might have travelled in the opposite direction—up the Danube from Vienna to Ratisbon or Ulm, or even farther afield to either Milan or Frankfurt. It is likewise conceivable that one or other of the two last-mentioned cities might have eventually superseded Paris as the capital of the Napoleonic Empire if the French empire-builders had known how to perpetuate their momentary success in achieving their own less impracticable task of

¹ Petrograd, as Saint Petersburg had been rechristened in a fit of Slavophil fervour after the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany in A.D. 1914, was poorly compensated for ceasing to be the seat of government by having its name changed once again—this time from Petrograd to Leningrad.

² See II. ii. 179-80 and 182, n. 4.

³ See V. v. 326-7.

unifying politically the debris of an abortive medieval cosmos of city-states in Northern Italy, Flanders, and Western Germany.

Migrations of the Capital Cities of Metropolitan Empire-builders

If we take, in conclusion, a glance at those universal states that had been founded neither by aliens nor by barbarians nor by marchmen but by some metropolitan power, we shall observe here a general tendency for the seat of government to start in a central position and subsequently to travel towards the frontiers of a politically unified world.

The classical example of this tendency is afforded by the history of the Indic universal state, which was both originally founded and subsequently re-established by dynasties whose ancestral domain was the centrally situated state of Magadha. The Mauryas and the Guptas alike retained their seat of government at Pataliputra (the latter-day Patna), which had previously been Magadha's parochial capital. Standing, as it did, at the junction of the Ganges with the Jumna and with two other tributaries, Pataliputra was the natural administrative centre for the Ganges Basin;¹ yet, in spite of the practical advantageousness of the site, which worked together with the imponderable forces of tradition and prestige to preserve Pataliputra's prerogative, the seat of government eventually travelled north-westward in both these two parallel chapters of Indic history, and in both cases alike it was drawn in that direction by politico-military pressures from beyond the frontier in that quarter.

After the derelict domain of an enfeebled Mauryan Empire had been overrun by the Euthydemid Bactrian Greek prince Demetrius in the second decade of the second century B.C., the conqueror transferred the seat of government from Pataliputra to a new site far along the Great North-West Road² connecting the former Mauryan capital with Demetrius's own former capital at Bactra (Balkh) on the Central Asian side of the Hindu Kush.³ Demetrius's New Taxila⁴ lay near the old city of the same name, in the neighbourhood of the latter-day Rawalpindi, which, before the foundation of the Mauryan Empire, had been the capital of a parochial Indian state; and it commanded the approaches, on the Indian side, to the difficult section of the highway in which a traveller had to negotiate the three successive obstacles of the River Indus, the Khyber Pass, and the main chain of the Hindu Kush.

This neighbourhood was the natural location for the capital of a Power which was seeking to 'abolish the Hindu Kush' by uniting the Ganges-Jumna Basin with the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin.⁵ The Greek war-lord Demetrius's pioneering essay in this audacious defiance of physical

¹ See II. ii. 130.

² See xi, maps 23 and 24.

³ For this road, which ran into the Great North-East Road of the Achaemenian Empire on the steppe of Türkmenistan, between the left bank of the Oxus and the north-eastern edge of the Iranian Plateau, see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 61-62.

⁴ See Tarn, op. cit., p. 179.

⁵ This 'geopolitical' *tour de force* which was achieved by the Bactrian Greek prince Demetrius and was repeated by his Kushan barbarian successors had its counterpart in Western history in the long-continuing political union of Piedmont with Savoy in defiance of the intervening physical barrier of the Alps (see IV. iv. 285-6). In this miniature Western reproduction of the mountain-bestrident realm of Demetrius and Kanishka, Turin corresponded in location to Taxila (Rawalpindi), Vercelli to Sāgala (Sialkot), Susa to Peshāwar, and Chambéry to Bactra (Balkh).

geography proved ephemeral. The Bactrian Greek Power had no sooner overrun the Mauryan Empire than it was broken up by fratricidal warfare which opened the way for Nomad invasions of its dominions on the Indian as well as the Central Asian side of the Hindu Kush;¹ but, when, after more than two centuries of kaleidoscopic political changes,² the momentary achievement of the Greek empire-builder Demetrius was repeated in the first century of the Christian Era by the Kushan empire-builder Kadphises I and was perpetuated by Kadphises' successors, the seat of government of this reconstituted political union of North-Western India with Central Asia came to rest not far from the spot originally selected for it by Demetrius. The capital of the Kushan Empire was planted at Peshāwar, on the Great North-West Road between the Indus and the Khyber Pass.³

After the Mauryan Empire had been re-established by the Guptas, history repeated itself. The Guptas, like their predecessors, ruled the Indic World from Pataliputra; but, when the Guptan Empire collapsed in its turn and was momentarily restored by the Emperor Harsha (*imperabat* A.D. 606-47),⁴ this last of all the rulers of an Indic universal state placed his seat of government, not at Pataliputra, but at Sthaneshvara on the banks of the Upper Jumna, above the site of Delhi, covering the north-western approaches to the Ganges Basin from the quarter from which Hun and Gurjara Nomad invaders had swept down on the Guptan Empire from the Eurasian Steppe in the preceding chapter of Indic history.⁵

Like the Mauryan and Guptan empires, 'the Empire of the Four Quarters', which was the Sumeric universal state, was founded by a power situated in the heart of the world on which it conferred political unity. The founder, Ur-Engur, *alias* Ur-Nammu (*imperabat circa* 2143-2126 or 2079-2062 B.C.), was the ruler of Ur, one of the oldest of the Sumerian city-states in the Tigris-Euphrates Delta; and Ur remained the capital till 'the Empire of the Four Quarters', 118 years after its foundation, was broken up by an Elamite revolt. After an interlude of more than two hundred years, the empire of Ur-Engur was at length partially restored by Hammurabi (*imperabat circa* 1792-1750 or 1728-1686 B.C.);⁶ but this Amorite saviour of the Sumeric Society did not

¹ During the brief period about half-way through the second century B.C. when Demetrius's dominions were partitioned between one Greek Power in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and another in North-Western India, the Greek ruler in India, Menander, placed his capital at Sāgala (Sialkot) on the Great North-West Road a few stages nearer than New Taxila to Pataliputra (see Tarn, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-8).

² For this obscure passage in the history of the contact of the Indic, Hellenic, Syriac, and Nomadic civilizations, see V. v. 133, n. 1, following Tarn, W. W., *op. cit.*

³ See Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 261-2. On the political map of the World in A.D. 1952 the role of Taxila (Rawalpindi) in Demetrius's realm and of Peshāwar in Kanishka's was being played by Kābul as the capital of a Kingdom of Afghanistan which had reproduced the structure of the Bactrian Greek and the Kushan Empire by uniting territories lying on opposite sides of the Hindu Kush. The domain of this twentieth-century kingdom of Afghanistan was, of course, much less extensive than those of either of its forerunners. On the north-west it did not extend beyond the left bank of the Upper Oxus, while on the south-east it did not now touch the right bank of the Indus at any point.

⁴ See V. vi. 209, n. 3.

⁵ See II. ii. 130.

⁶ For this chapter of Sumeric history see V. vi. 297-8. For the chronology see the Note in vol. x, pp. 167-212.

reinstate Ur in her former role of serving as the imperial seat of government. Hammurabi governed the empire which he had partially re-established from his own ancestral capital at Babylon—a city which was ‘the gate’, not only of the Gods, but also of the Amorite barbarians who, during the anarchy following the collapse of the dominion of Ur, had found in Babylon their port of entry from the North Arabian Steppe into the north-west corner of the Land of Shinar.

Regarded from the standpoint of Sumer—the cradle of the Sumeric Civilization in the south-eastern quarter of the Tigris–Euphrates Delta—or even from the wider standpoint of the combined domains of Sumer and its Semitic neighbour and pupil Akkad, Babylon lay on the north-western fringe of the Sumeric World; but the geographical situation had been transformed to Sumer’s own detriment, and to Babylon’s ultimate profit, by the very success of the Sumeric empire-builder Ur-Engur. The universal state which Ur-Engur had founded and which Hammurabi had partially re-established was not confined to Sumer and Akkad; in its original avatar, at any rate, it embraced the whole of ‘the Fertile Crescent’, girdling the northern bay of the North Arabian Steppe from the Land of Shinar through Assyria and Mesopotamia as far as Syria and Palestine, which had been opened up during a preceding Time of Troubles by Assyrian traders and Akkadian war-lords; and, in establishing an empire of this extent, Ur had deprived herself and the other cities of Sumer once for all of the central position which they had originally occupied. The expansion of the Sumeric World up-river, north-westward, by commerce and conquest had been an incomparably quicker process than its expansion down-river, south-eastward, by the gradual silting-up of the head of the Persian Gulf.

Thus Ur’s empire-building work made Babylon’s fortune; and, though Babylon’s first innings as the capital of a universal state did not outlast the final collapse of ‘the Empire of the Four Quarters’ which followed Hammurabi’s death, the parvenu Amorite imperial city lived on to enjoy a second innings and a third. After she had recovered her prestige and renewed her youth by bringing the ancient sedentary population of the Land of Shinar into a fraternal union with the interloping Chaldaean tribesmen in an heroic resistance to Assyrian militarism,¹ Babylon was the inevitable capital of Nabopolassar’s and Nebuchadnezzar’s Neo-Babylonian Empire, which provided a universal state for the Sumeric Civilization’s Babylonian successor. And, after the life of this Neo-Babylonian Empire had been cut short by an Achaemenian conquest, the city of Babylon once again survived a political catastrophe to become, as we have seen,² the principal capital, *de facto*, of its alien conquerors.

This virtual retention of an onerous imperial status never reconciled Babylon to Achaemenian rule. No doubt the Babylonians were aware that they owed their dubious good fortune, not to their alien masters’ goodwill, but to the felicitousness of their city’s geographical position, which constrained the Achaemenidae to use her as a political centre, however much political trouble she might give them. No doubt the Babylonian priesthood were quick to regret their folly in having facilitated

¹ See IV. iv. 477–9.

² On p. 200, n. 1, and on p. 205, n. 4, above.

Cyrus's task by turning against their own emperor Nabonidus; and indeed it is remarkable that Nabonidus's unpopularity should have been so extreme as to inveigle the opposition in his own household into cutting off its nose to spite its face. One cause of this unpopularity was the archaeologist-emperor's tactlessly pedantic religious policy;¹ another cause may have been a fear that his penchant towards awkward innovations might inspire him to transfer the capital from Babylon to some other site. Nabonidus showed a marked interest in the North-West Mesopotamian city of Harrān, which not only happened to be his own home town (if this inference from the evidence is correct),² but was well placed for serving as a northern bulwark for the Neo-Babylonian Empire against the Achaemenian successor-state of an expansive Median highland Power which had been encircling 'the Fertile Crescent' from the Zagros to the Antitaurus.³ Was Nabonidus planning to move the seat of government of his threatened empire to this distant outpost?⁴ Or was he perhaps planning to move it to his yet more distant asylum at Taymā in the Hijāz?⁵ Nabonidus's hostile Babylonian contemporaries may have had no better intelligence than twentieth-century Western scholars had about what was really brewing in their cranky emperor's mind; but we may guess that their conjectures and anxieties on this score played some part in the prompting of their suicidal policy.

In the event, Babylon succeeded in preserving her imperial prerogative in despite of Nabonidus's caprice as well as the Achaemenids' hostility, and the blow which was to deprive her not only of her status but of her existence was dealt her by her Macedonian deliverers from Achaemenian domination. Seleucus Nicator put Babylon out of court by planting his new foundations of Seleucia-on-Tigris⁶ on a site still more convenient than the site of Babylon itself for the oecumenical purpose that Babylon had been serving since the days of Hammurabi. The location of Seleucia-on-Tigris was indeed so well chosen that, as we have seen,⁷ the Seleucids' barbarian Arsacid successors and the Arsacids' militantly anti-Hellenic Sasanid supplanters made Ctesiphon, the east-bank suburb of Seleucia, into the seat of government of their dominions; and, under the 'Abbasid Caliphs, Ctesiphon had an avatar in the shape of Baghdad.⁸ As for Babylon herself, she had dwindled to vanishing-point by the first century of the Christian Era. Yet, after she had forfeited to Seleucia-Ctesiphon the imperial role which Hammurabi had first conferred on her, her site once more demonstrated its felicity by reverting

¹ See V. vi. 30 and 94-95.

² See Thompson, R. Campbell, in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1925, University Press), pp. 218-19; Smith, Sidney: *Isaiah, Chapters XL-LV* (London 1944, Milford), pp. 24-25.

³ The political fortunes of Harrān during the seventy years between the fall of the Assyrian Empire in 610-609 B.C. and the fall of the Neo-Babylonian Empire in 538 B.C. are discussed further on pp. 655-6, below.

⁴ After having served as an outpost of the Babylonian Society, Harran became a fastness in which a fossil of the Babylonian Civilization survived the fall of the Neo-Babylonian Empire for some fourteen hundred years (see IV. iv. 101, n. 1, and IX. viii. 408, n. 5).

⁵ For the road to Taymā, see p. 101, above. The Neo-Babylonian Emperor Nabonidus's 'funk-hole' at Taymā had its counterpart in the Roman Emperor Honorius's at Ravenna.

⁶ See p. 200, above.

⁷ See p. 202, n. 4, above.

⁸ See p. 150, with n. 3, above.

to the part which it had played under Hammurabi's own ex-Arabian Amorite ancestors. Both Hīrah, the capital of the Lakhmid Arab principality that stood on guard over the Arabian marches of the Sasanian Empire, and Kūfah, the cantonment of the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of 'Irāq and Iran,¹ were virtually west-bank suburbs of Babylon-on-Euphrates.²

As a final example of the tendency for the capital of a universal state to travel from the centre towards the fringes when the empire-building Power has been a metropolitan community, we may observe how in Minoan history the imperial sceptre passed from Cnossos to Mycenae. Cnossos was the natural capital for a 'thalassocracy of Minos' ruling the waves of the Aegean from a Cretan base of operations; but, in extending her dominion to the coasts of Continental Greece, Cnossos paved the way for Mycenae to supersede her.

Who are the Beneficiaries?

Having now cursorily surveyed the histories of the capitals of universal states, we may go on to inquire who were the beneficiaries of the insight and will-power that called these capitals into existence. These seats of imperial governments served the divers purposes of both violent and gentle interlopers. Barbarians swooped down on them in quest of mere plunder. Conquerors bred in an alien culture occupied them as a step towards reigning in the stead of a legitimate régime whose inheritance they aspired to usurp. Restorers of dilapidated empires, and revivers of empires that had completely disintegrated, were aided in their reconstruction work by the lingering prestige of the ancient seat of imperial government. Alien cultures, either forcibly imposed by conquerors or voluntarily imported by native 'Herodians',³ found the capitals of universal states convenient stations for the radiation of their influence. Higher religions found them equally convenient for their own more audacious missionary enterprise of seeking to convert, not merely a cultural *élite*, but Mankind in the mass. During the Babylonish captivity of Nebuchadnezzar's deportees from Judah the capital city of a secular oecumenical empire actually served an embryonic higher religion as the incubator in which it found its soul by exchanging a parochial for an oecumenical outlook.

The seat of government of a universal state is indeed good ground for

¹ See p. 131, above.

² If the Primitive Muslim Arab cantonment at Kūfah may be regarded as an avatar of an earlier Amorite cantonment at Babylon, Kūfah's sister foundation at Basrah may similarly be regarded as an avatar of Obolla (*Latīnē* Apologus). Obolla had been one of the cities of Mesēnē, a successor-state of the Seleucid Monarchy in the extreme south-east of Babylonia, skirting the head of the Persian Gulf; and this Mesēnē was an avatar of the Sea Land which had been a successor-state of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad. The political secession of the Sea Land from the rest of the Land of Shinar after the death of the Emperor Hammurabi may be interpreted as a political expression of a Sumerian national consciousness which had survived the replacement of the Sumerian by the Akkadian language as the living speech of the population of the former territory of Sumer. The special function of the city of Obolla—if its name is derived from the Sumerian word for 'door'—was to serve the Sea Land, as Babylon, 'the Gate', served Akkad, by providing a port of entry from 'the Desert' into 'the Sown'.

³ The contrast between alternative 'Herodian' and 'Zealot' reactions to the impact of an alien civilization is discussed in IX. viii. 580-623.

spiritual seeds to fall into;¹ for a city that is performing this oecumenical function is the epitome of a wide world in small compass. Its walls enfold, at close quarters, representatives of all nations and classes, speakers of all languages, and adherents of all religious connexions and persuasions, while its gates lead out on to highways running in all directions to the World's end. The same missionary can preach on the same day to the populace in the slums and to the Emperor in his palace; and, if, in the power of the spirit, he does gain the Emperor's ear, he may hope to see the mighty machine of imperial administration set in motion in the cause of the Church. Nehemiah's key-position in the Achaemenian imperial household at Susa gave him his opportunity for enlisting the effective patronage of the Emperor Artaxerxes I for a temple-state at Jerusalem which was still the emotional focus of a world religion in the making; and the Jesuit Fathers who sought and won a footing in the imperial court at Agra and the imperial court at Peking in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era dreamed of winning India and China for Catholicism by the Nehemian strategy of converting the Great Mogul and the Son of Heaven. Had not the Mongol Khāqān Qubilāy been half-converted by Tibetan missionaries of the Tantric Mahāyāna?

The Pillage of Capital Cities by Barbarians

The barbarian's appetite for plunder was sated in the looting of Delhi by the Marāthās; of Tenochtitlan and Cuzco by the Spaniards; of Susa, Persepolis, and Ecbatana by the Macedonians; of Ctesiphon by the Primitive Muslim Arabs; of Baghdad by the Mongols; of Loyang by the Hiongnu; of Kaifêng by the Kin; of Thebes by the Assyrians; of Rome by the Visigoths and Vandals; of Babylon by the Hittites; of Cnossos by her Mycenaean marchmen; and of Mycenae, in her turn, by her continental backwoodsmen. An imperial capital in which the tribute of a subject world has silted up for centuries is an irresistibly tempting material prize for invaders who have no subtler or more abiding objective; but the seed sown by covetousness so crude as this bears a vindictive karma. The unsophisticated barbarian squanders his ill-gotten gains as quickly as he snatches them; the more cultivated alien conqueror who, in behaving as a barbarian, is sinning against the light of his own higher moral law, brings a more ironic retribution on the society that has bred him. The ill-gotten gains of the Macedonian and Spanish *conquistadores* slipped through their fingers no less quickly than those of the Vandals and the Mongols; but in these two heinous cases the barren harvest was followed by a calamitous aftermath. The Hellenic Society of the fourth century B.C. and the Western Society of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era were not only put to shame by the barbarism into which their militant apostles had relapsed; they were also devastated by it. For a crime which primitive barbarians can commit with economic impunity does not go unpunished in societies that have risen to a money economy. The rifling of the treasure-houses of the Americas and South-Western Asia put into sudden circulation an

¹ Matt. xiii. 8.

avalanche of bullion which produced a catastrophic inflation, and the sins of Spanish plunderers at Cuzco and Macedonian plunderers at Persepolis were expiated by German peasants in Swabia and by Ionian artisans in the Cyclades.¹

The Exploitation of the Prestige of Capital Cities by Empire-builders

A less barbarous use has been made of imperial capitals by conquerors or successors who have looked beyond the immediate indulgence of crude appetites towards the more constructive aim of supplanting, re-conditioning, or reviving the régimes into whose heritage they have entered. Thanks to the camouflaging mirage of immortality that is apt to glimmer round the grave of even a long since defunct universal state,² a *ci-devant* imperial capital may retain its prestige long after it has ceased to perform its function; and this prestige may stand an interloping empire-builder in good stead if he inherits or adopts the hallowed site as his own seat of government.

When a usurper takes over his victim's former capital as a going concern, the effect is to lighten his task of hoisting himself into the saddle and keeping himself there. Though Peking was first promoted to be a seat of imperial government by the intruding barbarian Khitan, and not by any thoroughbred Chinese dynasty whose choice of the site might have stamped it with the hall-mark of legitimacy in Chinese eyes, the subsequent domination of the Chinese people by the Kin in place of the Khitan and by the Mongols in place of the Kin was undoubtedly facilitated by the retention, under each of these successive barbarian régimes, of a capital from which a subject Chinese population had gradually grown accustomed to receiving a barbarian master's word of command. *A fortiori*, in a later passage of Far Eastern history, the retention of Peking as the seat of imperial government must have facilitated the usurpation of the Manchu barbarians when they took the imperial city over, not from barbarian predecessors, but from the thoroughbred Chinese dynasty of the Ming.

A similar advantage was secured by the Spaniards when they established the seat of government of the universal state which they imposed on the Central American World on the site of Tenochtitlan, which had been the capital of the Spaniards' Aztec forerunners. The political value of the accumulated prestige of an existing imperial capital was rated so high by the Japanese statesmen who engineered the Meiji Revolution that they kept the seat of government at Yedo and induced the Imperial House to migrate thither from Kyoto, although Yedo was the seat of a 'forced power'³ which had been in the saddle for not much longer than a quarter of a millennium, while Kyoto had been for more than ten centuries (A.D. 795-1869) the seat of the legitimate dynasty which was now being rehabilitated. The decisive consideration in the sagacious revolutionaries' minds was no doubt the hard fact that the Japanese

¹ For the inflation of prices that was inflicted on the Hellenic World by the Macedonians' looting of the Achaemenian treasures, see Tarn, W. W.: 'The Social Question in the Third Century', in *The Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge 1923, University Press).

² See pp. 7-46, above.

³ Marvell, Andrew: *An Horatian Ode upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland*.

people had by that time become accustomed to being governed from Yedo *de facto*, whereas Kyoto, for the greater part of its long and venerable history, had been an historical museum and political lumber-room.

The restorer of a universal state likewise finds his task eased if his own initial seat of government happens to be the former capital of the prostrate empire which he is seeking to re-erect. When Amosis successfully repeated the achievement of a Mentuhotep by restoring 'the Middle Empire' of Egypt in the form of 'the New Empire', the founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty was assuredly assisted, and conceivably inspired, by the fact that, like his Eleventh-Dynasty predecessor, he had started his career as prince of Thebes. In the history of the Indic Society a corresponding service was rendered by Pataliputra to the Guptas when they set out from the Mauryas' historic capital to restore the Mauryas' imperial régime.

Dethroned imperial capitals have sometimes been deliberately reinstated by empire-builders who have not had the good fortune either to find these seats of imperial government still at their disposal as going concerns or to inherit them as the local capitals of parochial successor-states of ruined universal states which they have set out to restore.

We have seen¹ that, when Han Liu Pang had made himself sole master of the Sinic World, he laid out a new oecumenical capital in the immediate neighbourhood of the Ts'in Power's historic seat of government at Hsien Yang, which had been wantonly destroyed by Hsiang Yü after it had been carefully spared by Liu Pang himself. When, some eight hundred years later, Han Liu Pang's Ch'ang Ngan was reinstated by the Sui Dynasty, under the new name of Si Ngan, as the capital of an empire which was intended by its founders to be an avatar of the Empire of Ts'in and Han, this act of Sui statesmanship bore witness to the vitality of the prestige that clings to a site which has once been a seat of oecumenical dominion; for by that date nearly six hundred years had passed since Ch'ang Ngan had been dethroned. When the Posterior Han Dynasty had re-established the Han Power after its momentary collapse in A.D. 9, they had not reinstated the Prior Han Dynasty's capital. They found Ch'ang Ngan in ruins; for in the anarchy of A.D. 9-25 the city laid out by Liu Pang had suffered the fate of Hsien Yang in the anarchy after the death of Ts'in She Hwang-ti; but in choosing a new site the second founder of the Han Power, Kwang Wuti, did not overlook the value of historic associations. His substitute for Ch'ang Ngan was Loyang, which had been the last seat of the Ts'in Power's predecessors the Chóu. The Chóu, as we have seen,² had been extinguished by Ts'in She Hwang-ti's grandfather in 249 B.C.; and, for more than five centuries before that, their authority had been as shadowy as was that of the Japanese Imperial House during the ten centuries preceding the Meiji Restoration. In the tiny enclave round Loyang which was all that then remained of their once extensive patrimony within as well as outside 'the passes', the Chóu had continued to perform certain customary ritual functions without retaining a shred of practical power.

¹ On p. 212, above.

² On p. 212, n. 4, above.

It is remarkable that this simulacrum of an imperial past should have invested Loyang with a prestige so abiding as to make its fortune more than 250 years after even a nominal primacy had been taken from it. Yet this Sinic case, though extreme, is not unique.

The prestige of Delhi, for example, survived the decline and fall of the Mughal Empire after the death of Awrangzib so triumphantly that, more than two hundred years later, she compelled the British to transfer the seat of government of a rāj which had been rebuilt on a basis of British sea-power to the inland site of the capital of their Mughal predecessors from the maritime site of their own original capital at Calcutta. Moscow, too, possessed sufficient prestige to allow her to wait, as Delhi waited, for more than two hundred years for her eventual triumph over a parvenu competitor. Saint Petersburg was Calcutta's twin in her fate, as well as in her location.

As for Babylon, it was inevitable¹ that she should be the capital of a Neo-Babylonian Empire that was a political embodiment of Babylon's genius, but it is remarkable that her situation and prestige should have compelled her Achaemenian conquerors to perpetuate Babylon's imperial prerogative by making her one of the seats of government of their own dominions in preference to a loyal though unpractical Persepolis. It is even more remarkable that the situation and prestige of Peking should have compelled the Ming Dynasty to reverse a deliberate break with an odious past. When the Ming had succeeded in expelling the Mongols from Intramural China, they had transferred the seat of government to Nanking from a city whose only role in Far Eastern history till then had been to serve as the capital of successive barbarian conquerors. Peking was obnoxious to Chinese sentiment for the reason that had rendered her attractive to the Mongol successors of the Kin and to the Kin successors of the Khitan. Yet she was able to compel the Ming to reinstate her at the risk of stultifying themselves in the eyes of their own militantly anti-barbarian Chinese supporters.²

In a Medieval Western World the 'Roman Emperors' of the German nation could not acquire a perfect title to legitimate investiture with their purple shirt of Nessus without paying at least one visit to the ruins of Rome in order to be crowned in the midst of them by the Pope and acclaimed by 'a Roman People' who in their day were, not the *faex*, but the *faex faecis Romuli*.³ For German potentates whose strength was derived from hereditary dominions lying north of the Alps, this Italian expedition was always as costly and perilous as it was frequently barren and humiliating. Yet the prestige of a dead Rome's shadow was still so great that, for the sake of it, these moth-kings sacrificed a living Germany's substance; and, though the medieval German Kingdom eventually came to grief through a persistent pursuit of this Roman will-o'-the-wisp, Napoleon's subsequent experience was to indicate retrospectively the difficulties in which the medieval Western Emperors might have involved themselves if they had refused to pay their personal homage to the ex-imperial city's imponderable power.

¹ The reason has been indicated on p. 226, above.

² See II. ii. 121-2.

³ See Cicero: *Ad Atticum*, II. i, § 8.

When Napoleon set to work to build the débris of a cosmos of medieval Western city-states into an empire founded on the might of the most populous and powerful Western national state of his day, he signalized his intention of providing an effective substitute for 'the Holy Roman Empire' by pointedly breaking with the traditional procedure for investiture with the imperial office. Instead of making a pilgrimage to Rome in the wake of an Austrasian Charlemagne and his Saxon and Franconian successors, Napoleon summoned the Pope from Rome to Paris and required him to assist at his coronation in his own imperial capital. Though 'the Corsican usurper' himself was neither Roman nor French, Napoleonic Paris might well feel that she could look contemporary Rome in the face. Had not Paris been the intellectual centre of the Western World since the twelfth century and its cultural centre as well since the seventeenth? And was not her new imperial master now doing for Paris what Augustus had done for Rome when—finding her a city of brick and leaving her a city of marble¹—he gave her the physical presence that befitted the capital of the World? For the drily rational intelligence of a Napoleon, such considerations might be conclusive; yet the event was to prove that, in the Year Thirteen of the New Era of the French Revolution, Napoleon had under-estimated the longevity of traditional pieties. By flouting Rome and bullying her sovereign pontiff, he won, not respect for his own political power, but sympathy for the helplessness of his venerable victim.

While the Old Rome in the days of her physical impotence thus compelled a series of Western war-lords to reckon with her during a thousand years running from the date of Charlemagne's coronation to the date of Napoleon's, the New Rome gave proof of a comparable power by hypnotizing first the Palaiológhi and then the 'Osmanlis.

When Michael Palaiológhos took Constantinople from its unhappy Western occupants in A.D. 1261, he was relieving them of an untenable position at the cost of creating one for himself and his heirs. In concentrating his efforts on the capture of the ex-imperial city he had let slip through his fingers the best part of his dominions in Anatolia;² and, in thus exchanging a countryside that had been the source of his strength for a city that was a liability, he found himself constrained to seek support against the Turkish enemy whom he had neglected from the Latin enemy whom he had affronted. An Eastern Orthodox Christian principality in these straits could not hope to buy military assistance from Western Catholic Christendom except at the price of ecclesiastical submission to the Papacy; and this payment was repeatedly offered by the Palaiológhi, to be invariably rejected by a fanatically Orthodox Greek clergy and people.³ This insoluble problem of reconciling incompatible terms of appeasement was the rock on which the Palaeologan ship of state eventually foundered:

Und das hat mit ihrem Singen
Die Lorelei getan.

¹ Suetonius Tranquillus, C.: *The Lives of the Caesars*, 'Divus Augustus', chap. xxviii, § 3

² See V. vi. 298, n. 7, and p. 30, above.

³ See IV. iv. 615-19.

The Palaiológhi obtained a posthumous revenge; for, in attracting the 'Osmanlis into their wake and drawing them out of Asia into Europe,¹ they exposed these conquerors and supplanters of theirs to the lure of the siren-city by whom they themselves had been brought to shipwreck. The 'Osmanlis could not resist the temptation of seizing a prize that had twice eluded the grasp of their Arab co-religionists and ensamples. They were beckoned forward by the legendary figure of the martyr Seyyid Battāl.² Yet, when in A.D. 1453 Mehmed 'Osmanli the Conqueror repeated Michael Palaiológhos's feat, he too was yielding to the magic of the imperial city against the dictates of a sober *raison d'état*. In impelling Sultan Mehmed to conquer her, Constantinople succeeded at last in retrieving her own long-adverse fortunes. By the time of the Conqueror's descendant Suleymān the Magnificent's death in A.D. 1566, Constantinople found herself the capital of a larger empire than she had been ruling in A.D. 565, at the death of Justinian the Prodigal. Yet, by the same token, the commonwealth of which she was the ornament and incubus was by that time once more on the verge of a calamitous decline; and in Ottoman history this decline was to be consummated by a fall before the revolutionary architects of the Ottoman Empire's Turkish successor-state could summon up the courage to transfer the seat of government from Constantinople to Ankara.

This defiance of Constantinople's magic power was indeed the Turkish nationalists' only alternative to committing national suicide; yet even then they could not bring themselves to throw away the millstone that the Ottoman Conqueror of Constantinople had hung about the Turkish nation's neck.³ Though Atatürk and his fellow revolutionaries dethroned Constantinople, they insisted on retaining possession of her; and in getting their way on this point they did their worst to defeat the governing purpose of all their policy. This governing purpose was to nurse their new-born national state into a vigorous and healthy maturity. The reformers realized in principle that, if they were to give this delicate infant a fair chance of survival, they must allow it to start life free from the grievous burdens that had broken the back of the old Ottoman Empire; and in two cases in point they did not flinch from putting this principle into practice. They renounced bona fide all ambition to re-impose Turkish rule on either the Arabs or the Balkan Christians. Yet, when they had to take their decision about the most formidable burden of all, they opted for clinging to Constantinople and thereby stultified the rest of their acts; for, in burdening the Turkish Republic with Constantinople, they were condemning her, sooner or later, to fall foul of the Soviet Union for the same ineluctable reasons of strategic and commercial geography that had brought the old Ottoman Empire into collision with the old Russia. At the time of writing, it seemed not impossible that Constantinople might once again play her sinister role of luring to destruction a state which had failed to resist the temptation of possessing her.

¹ See III. iii. 27 and V. vi. 184.

² See V. v. 255 and 256.

³ Matt. xviii. 6.

The Use of Capital Cities as Transmitting-stations for the Radiation of Cultures

Having now examined certain passages of history in which an ex-imperial city has enchanted some empire-builder into purchasing the asset of her prestige at a prohibitive price, we may go on to consider cases in which an imperial capital has served as a transmitting-station for the diffusion of an alien culture. This was the role of Vienna in the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy,¹ of Saint Petersburg in the Petrine Russian Empire, of Antioch-on-Orontes and Seleucia-on-Tigris in the Seleucid Monarchy, of Calcutta in the British Indian Empire, of Mexico City in the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain, and of Lima in the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru.

It will be seen that in most of these instances the imperial 'radio city' was a new foundation planted on virgin soil; and in the founding of Seleucia and Antioch and Saint Petersburg this geographical breach with the past was certainly deliberate. Peter the Great realized that the most effective installation for radiating Western culture into Russia would be a seat of Russian government that had no pre-Western associations, and he rejected Moscow, as Seleucus Nicator rejected Babylon, because she was a citadel of the culture which he was planning to replace. Yet this cultural missionary's rule of thumb was broken with impunity by the Spanish foundation of Mexico City and by the Seleucid

¹ Vienna served as a station for the transmission of the Western culture to sub-Western and non-Western receivers, though the province of Lower Austria, in which Vienna lay, was, like the city itself, an integral part of the Western World. Vienna was situated just to the west of the cultural boundary between the heart of Western Christendom and its eastern marches—the lands of the Crown of the Hungarian King Saint Stephen and the United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania—in which the Western Christian culture was diluted with a tincture of the Nomad culture of the Eurasian Steppe. Vienna's cultural function was to radiate an authentic Western culture, native to Vienna itself and to its western hinterland, into the imperfectly Westernized eastern marches of the Western World and, beyond these again, into Eastern Orthodox Christendom and Dār-al-Islām. Vienna's performance of this cultural task was facilitated by her geographical location; for, while she lay just to the west of the cultural frontier along the line of the River Leitha (where 'the East begins' according to an illuminating Viennese *bon mot*), she lay just to the east of the Austrian Alps, which constituted 'the natural frontier' of Western Christendom in this quarter. Standing, as she thus stood, with her back to the eastern foothills of the Alps, and looking down the course of the River Danube from a point where, after having threaded its way through the Alps, it is heading for the Hungarian Alföld, *en route* for the Iron Gates and for the western tip of the Eurasian Steppe's Great Western Bay, Vienna could not fail to find her missionary field in the sub-Western and non-Western worlds to the east and south-east of her.

Though the writer of this Study did not pay his first visit to Vienna till the summer of A.D. 1929, at a date more than ten years after she had been reduced politically from being the imperial capital of a cosmopolitan empire to being the national capital of an Austrian Republic whose narrow bounds embraced none of the sub-Western or non-Western territories of a now defunct Danubian Monarchy, he found the evidences of Vienna's historic cultural mission still impressively prominent. In A.D. 1929 the names of the subscribers to the Vienna telephone service, as recorded in the book, testified that this city was a melting-pot in which Rumans, Serbs, and Bulgars, as well as Poles, Magyars, and Croats, were being reminted into pure Westerners (see IX. viii. 530); and, when the observer travelled on eastwards to the 'Saxon' cities of Transylvania, which had been under Rumanian rule since the dissolution of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy in A.D. 1918, he found these outposts of a Western Civilization, which were now marooned and in peril of being submerged under the resurgent flood of an alien culture, desperately clinging to a traditional link with Vienna which was their cultural lifeline—as the marooned outposts of Hellenism in Western Iran still clung to their traditional link with Antioch-on-Orontes after the military occupation of Media and Babylonia by the Arsacid Power in the sixth decade of the second century B.C.

foundation of Seleucia-on-Eulaeus. Mexico City was not prevented from fulfilling her revolutionary cultural task by any lingering ghost of an Aztec Tenochtitlan; nor was the Seleucid avatar of Susa inhibited from being an active and long-lived focus of Greek life and letters by the more formidable legacy of a site which had been the national capital of Elam before rising to its political apogee as the imperial capital of the Achaemenidae.

The success of this subsidiary transmitting station for the diffusion of Hellenism on an historic site, which, under the Seleucid régime, had ceased to be a capital city, brings out another prevalent feature in the policy of alien empire-builders who use their seats of government for the diffusion of their culture. The Seleucidae were not content to provide for the radiation of Hellenism from a single centre only. When Seleucus Nicator rejected Seleucia-on-Tigris in favour of Antioch-on-Orontes in choosing the location for his imperial capital,¹ he did not deprive the abortive Tigrine seat of government of its cultural role. Seleucia-on-Tigris 'made history' as the local transmitting-station for Hellenism in Babylonia for the next five centuries, and it was the glory of the Seleucidae that, not only on the banks of the Orontes and the Tigris, but throughout their dominions, from Seleucia-on-Eulaeus to Laodicea-on-Lycus, they sowed with a generous hand a star-dust of Greek city-states which continued, long after the disappearance of the missionary dynasty that had called them into being, to shine like a Milky Way across the face of South-Western Asia.²

The Spaniards likewise were not content to confine themselves to the use of Mexico City in Central America, or of Lima in the Andean World, as stations for the radiation of the culture that they had brought with them across the Atlantic from Western Europe. As we have already noticed,³ the Spanish Crown planted its vast new dominions overseas with settlements of Spanish colonists, organized in self-governing municipalities, who, like the Greek colonists in the Seleucid dominions, were to propagate their distinctive way of life by the display of a living example; and, in rural tracts which the radiation of these scattered Spanish municipalities could not reach, the conversion of the subject population was catered for by the Achaemenian expedient of conferring feudal appanages on grantees of the ruling race. In the Spanish Empire such *encomiendas*⁴ were granted to their recipients on the condition that, in return for the economic privilege of being furnished by the Crown with a supply of native labour, they must provide for the instruction of their serfs in the Catholic version of the Christian Faith. In the British Empire in India, Madras and Bombay played their part, side by side

¹ See p. 201, above.

² The cultural idealism of the Seleucidae is thrown into relief by the sharpness of its difference from the narrow-hearted cultural policy of the Seleucids' neighbours and rivals the Ptolemies, whose objective was, not to Hellenize their Egyptian subjects, but to exploit them. On Egyptian ground the Ptolemies added only the single Greek community of Ptolemais in Upper Egypt to Alexandria and to the pre-Alexandrine Greek settlement at Naukratis. Yet even the Ptolemies emulated the Hellenizing policy of the Seleucidae in their non-Egyptian dominions—as is witnessed by the names of the Greek cities in Transjordan and along the Palestinian section of the shores of the Mediterranean.

³ See pp. 135-6, above.

⁴ See p. 145, above.

with Calcutta, in the dissemination of an inflowing alien culture, as the provincial centres in Spanish America and Seleucid Asia played theirs side by side with Lima and Mexico City and Antioch and Seleucia; and Saint Petersburg was singular in serving as the sole centre for the diffusion of Western culture, as well as the sole political capital, in the structure of the Petrine Russian Empire.

The Use of Capital Cities as Seminaries for Higher Religions

We have now made some survey of the divers services that imperial capitals perform for alien cultures, for alien or indigenous empire-builders, and for predatory barbarians; but their historic mission lies in the religious field.

The potent effect on the destinies of Mankind which the Sinic imperial city of Loyang was still exercising at the time when these lines were being written was not a consequence of her former political role as the seat of the Eastern Ch'ou Dynasty and subsequently of the Posterior Han; she was exercising it in virtue of having been the nursery in which the seeds of the Mahāyāna—wafted by the winds of History from India to China over the Eurasian Steppe—were acclimatized to a Sinic cultural environment and were thus enabled to resow themselves broadcast over the face of the Sinic World. It is true that this historic religious mission would not have fallen to Loyang if the Emperor Kwang Wuti had not previously chosen her for the service of a political purpose; but it was the unforeseen religious consequence of the Posterior Han statesman's political choice that gave Loyang her opportunity to make a lasting mark on history.

The abiding significance of other seats of a transitory political power was likewise due to their religious associations. Si Ngan, for example, was still influencing the life of Mankind in the twentieth century of the Christian Era not because, from A.D. 589 to A.D. 907, she had been the political capital of the Empire of the Sui and T'ang but because, under the T'ang régime, she had become a centre for the diffusion of the Mahāyāna, Manichaeism, and the Nestorian form of Christianity. The desolate site of Qāraqorum was still invisibly alive because, as an undesigned effect of this ephemeral steppe-city's meteoric political career in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, she had brought missionaries of the Roman Catholic Christianity of the West face to face with Central Asian exponents of Nestorianism and Tibetan exponents of Lamaism. Peking, in her turn, had won immortality when, as the political capital of successive Mongol, Ming, and Manchu régimes, she had fallen heir to Qāraqorum's role as a disseminator of higher religions. In A.D. 1928 the city from which a large portion of the Human Race had been governed in succession by Qubilāy and Yung Lo and Ch'ien Lung was at last deprived for a season by a victorious Kuomintang of the political prerogative which she had so long enjoyed; yet, twenty years later, before she had yet found her opportunity of constraining the Kuomintang's Communist successors to serve her purpose by making her the political capital of China once again, she was still making her mark in the life of the contemporary world as an intellectual centre under the

non-committal new name of Peiping;¹ and this cultural role, which had thus survived Peking's fall from her imperial estate, had been conferred on her by a succession of religious missionaries who had preached and practised within her gates: the Tibetan Lamas who had gained the ear of Qubilāy; the emissaries of the Roman Church who, twice over,² had won a footing in this distant base of operations; and the Protestant educator-evangelists who had followed in the Jesuits' footsteps and had prepared the way for Peiping to fulfil her latter-day function.

In the year A.D. 1952 it was manifest that Peter and Paul, not Romulus or Augustus, had been the true authors of the immortality of Rome. By that date, more than sixteen centuries had run their course since Rome had forfeited to Constantinople and Trèves the prerogative of serving as the political capital of a united Hellenic World; and the paltry political consolation prize which the former imperial city had tardily received when, in A.D. 1870, she had been turned into the national capital of a Modern Western parochial state had been written down to its true value by the humiliation of the Kingdom of Italy in the world war of A.D. 1939-45. The world-wide influence which Rome was nevertheless still exercising—unaffected by political vicissitudes—was a consequence of the work and death, in Rome, of the two Apostles nineteen hundred years before. It was also a consequence of Christianity's subsequently displayed genius for assimilating and transmuting vital elements of other alien religions which had made themselves at home in Rome before the seeds of Christianity had been sown there. The Great Mother who was to play so distinctive a part in the Roman version of Christianity had been escorted in pomp by the Roman Senate and People from Tiber-side to the Palatine³ 265 years before Paul, after landing at Puteoli, had slipped unnoticed into Rome in the company of the little party that had gone out along the Appian Way to meet him at the Three Taverns.⁴

As for Constantinople, her religious mission was manifest from the moment of her birth; for this New Rome was founded by Constantine the Great, as Saint Petersburg was founded by Peter the Great, with a spiritual as well as a 'geopolitical' purpose.⁵ When the first Christian Emperor laid out his new capital on ground that had been cleared by his pagan predecessor Septimius's vindictive erasure of Byzantium, he was founding a city that was to be Christian from the start; and in A.D. 1952 it was apparent that this religious function was of more lasting significance than the superb geographical location⁶ that had prompted Constantine to plant his new Christian capital on that particular site. In the course of the following sixteen hundred years, Constantinople had lost and won and lost again the political prerogative of serving as an imperial capital for the Roman Empire, the East Roman Empire, and the Ottoman Empire in turn; and, at the time of writing, such influence

¹ Pei-ping meant merely 'northern city', in contrast to Pei-king, which meant 'northern capital'.

² In the fourteenth century of the Christian Era and again in the sixteenth.

³ See V. v. 685-7.

⁴ See Acts xxviii. 15.

⁵ This comparison had been suggested, by anticipation, in V. vi. 343.

⁶ See p. 218, above.

as she was still exercising in the World of the day was due to her being the seat of a Patriarch who was still recognized by the ecclesiastical heads of the other Eastern Orthodox churches—including the mighty Church of Russia—as *primus inter pares*.

(d) THE SERVICEABILITY OF IMPERIAL CURRENCIES

1. *Official Languages and Scripts*

Alternative Possibilities

It can almost be taken for granted that a universal state will have provided itself with official media of mental communication, and that these will include not only one or more languages transmitted viva voce and received by ear, but also some system of visual records that can be preserved and be consulted by the eye after the passing of the minute span of time during which the ear is sensitive to vibrations set in motion by 'winged words'. In the apparatus of nearly all the universal states whose history was within the ken of twentieth-century students, the official system of visual records had taken the form of a visual notation of the meaning of some oral and auditory official language; and, though the Incas had succeeded in creating and maintaining an almost totalitarian régime without the aid of any notational system beyond the wordless semantics of their *quipus*,¹ this *tour de force* was no more than an exception to a general rule that the written word had been an indispensable instrument of oecumenical government.²

There had been cases in which some single language and single script had previously driven all other possible competitors off the field throughout the area which the empire-builders had eventually brought under a single government, and in such cases History had virtually decided in advance what the official language and script of the new universal state were to be. In the Egyptian 'Middle Empire', for example, they were bound to be the Classical Egyptian language and the hieroglyphic characters; in Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate they were bound to be the Japanese language and the particular selection and usage of Chinese characters that had been worked out already in Japan for conveying the Japanese language visually; in the Russian Empire they were virtually bound to be the Great Russian language and Great Russian variety of the Slavonic version of the Greek Alphabet.³ This simple situation had not, however, been the usual one; for, in a society that is a 'civilization', more than one language and more than one script are current as a rule, and we have also observed, in another context,⁴ that the dominions of universal states are apt to embrace territories of

¹ See V. v. 491.

² See Myres, J. L.: *The Dawn of History* (London, no date, Williams & Norgate), pp. 68-70.

³ It was, of course, conceivable that the Muscovite Government might have adopted for its own secular use the 'Church Slavonic', fashioned by the Greek Christian missionaries Cyril and Methodius out of the living Macedonian Slavonic dialect of the ninth century of the Christian Era, which had continued to be the ecclesiastical language of the Slavonic-speaking Orthodox Christian peoples. This would not have been so extreme a *tour de force* as the Guptas' adoption of Neo-Sanskrit (see p. 253, below).

⁴ See pp. 62-67, above.

alien culture in addition to the domain of the civilization on which the empire-builders have imposed political unity. More often, therefore, than not, when it comes to deciding what the official language and script of a universal state are to be, the empire-builders find themselves confronted, not with an accomplished fact to ratify, but with a difficult choice to make between a number of competing candidates.

In these circumstances, most empire-builders had given official currency to their own mother tongue, and, if this ancestral language of theirs had hitherto been unprovided with the visual form of presentation which is a necessity for any language that is to be used as an instrument of oecumenical government, they had borrowed or adapted or invented a script for their purpose. There had, indeed, been cases in which empire-builders had passed over their own mother tongue in favour of another language already current in their dominions as a *lingua franca*¹ or even in favour of a classical language which would have been extinct long since if it had not been artificially kept alive or resuscitated.² The most usual practice, however, had been for empire-builders to give official currency to their own national language and script without granting these a monopoly. Indeed, in the administration of universal states a plurality of official languages and scripts appears to be the rule; and a medium that enjoys a legal primacy may not in practice be the medium most in use. There may be secondary languages that reign supreme in particular regions of the empire or in particular imperial services; and these may be *lingue franche* that have won this position for themselves *de facto* without having been given recognition *de jure*. *Lingue franche* that are already going concerns may force their way into official or unofficial use in the service of a universal state that has come into existence after they have already won an established position for themselves; and, conversely, the use of a *lingua franca* in the service of a universal state may be a factor in the making of this language's fortune.

These general propositions may perhaps be usefully illustrated in an empirical survey.

A Monopoly for Some Single Language or Script

In the Sinic World the problem was solved in a characteristically drastic fashion by Ts'in She Hwang-ti.³ The founder of the Sinic universal state gave exclusive currency to the version of the Chinese characters that had been in official use in his own ancestral state of Ts'in⁴ and thereby succeeded in arresting the tendency, which had gone

¹ *Lingue franche* are products of social disintegration. A survey of them has been made in V. v. 483-527.

² A survey of instances of such archaism in language and literature has been made in V. vi. 62-83.

³ It would be interesting to know whether, in A.D. 1928, President Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk was aware of this Sinic precedent for his own equally high-handed act of making the use of the Perso-Arabic Alphabet illegal, and the use of the Latin Alphabet obligatory, for conveying the Ottoman Turkish language within the frontiers of the Turkish Republic.

⁴ See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 137; Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 233-40. Franke gives German translations of the relevant passages in the work of Sse-ma Ts'ien.

far by the end of the foregoing Time of Troubles, for each of the Contending States to develop a parochial script only partially intelligible to litterati outside those parochial limits. Since the Sinic characters were 'ideograms' conveying meanings, not 'phonemes' representing sounds,¹ the effect of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's act was to endow the Sinic Society with a uniform visual language, which would continue—even if the spoken language were to break up into mutually unintelligible dialects—to serve as a means of oecumenical communication by sleight of hand and skill of eye for the very small minority that could learn to read and write so complex a script—just as, in a Western World in A.D. 1952, the Arabic numerals conveyed identical meanings on paper to peoples who, *viva voce*, called the numbers by different names and wrote these names out in different alphabets.² Yet, as this parallel indicates, Ts'in She Hwang-ti's standardization of the Sinic characters would not, in itself, have availed to save the Sinic Society from the curse of a babel of tongues if in the Sinic World there had not been other forces working in favour of uniformity in speech as well as in script.

To begin with, the Sinic World, at the time when the first Ts'in Emperor united it politically under his own rule, happened still to be homogeneous in language to an unusual degree, though by that time it had expanded far and wide from its original nucleus. A great majority of the population even of this vastly extended area spoke some variety of the Chinese branch of the Chinese-Siamese group of the great Asian family of monosyllabic languages,³ and the heterophone minority largely consisted of speakers of some language of the kindred Tibeto-Burman group. Yet the unifying influence of this original linguistic homogeneity might have been more than counteracted by the combined effect of the geographical expansion and the political disruption of the Sinic Society during its Time of Troubles if Ts'in She Hwang-ti had not opened a new chapter of Sinic history by imposing political unity, and if his Han successors had not underpinned this edifice of oecumenical government by calling into existence, to administer it, the acceptable and therefore effective oecumenical civil service that Ts'in She Hwang-ti had failed to create.⁴ These professional civil servants, recruited from all quarters of the Empire and posted in any province except that of their birth, could not conduct their business with one another and with the public solely by brushwork. In addition to the common visual language, provided by Ts'in She Hwang-ti's fiat, which had become the silent shibboleth for admission into the service of the state, the new imperial governing class required a common means of communication *viva voce*; and it was a standardized official vocalization of a standardized official script that was to save the Sinic Society, and later on the main body of the succeeding Far Eastern Society, from being afflicted with that multiplicity of languages that was to make the Western World an easy prey for the malady of Nationalism.

Ts'in She Hwang-ti's standardization of the Sinic characters may have been anticipated by the founder of a Minoan universal state whose

¹ See V. v. 492.

² See V. v. 491.

³ See II. i. 318.

⁴ See pp. 169-73, above, and pp. 351 and 352, below.

name had not yet been discovered by Modern Western archaeologists in A.D. 1952. Though none of the scripts in use in the Minoan World at divers times and places had yet been deciphered, their sequence gave evidence of a reform in the art of writing that was still more revolutionary than Ts'in She Hwang-ti's. At the transition from 'Middle Minoan II' to 'Middle Minoan III',¹ two separate hieroglyphic scripts, which had made their appearance simultaneously at the beginning of the former period, were suddenly and completely superseded by a single new linear script which was not just one version of the form of writing previously in use, but which drew on its predecessors for the construction of a new form of a different and superior order.² In the history of the Syriac Society, we know³ that Ts'in She Hwang-ti did have a counterpart in the Umayyad Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik (*imperabat* A.D. 685-705), who substituted the Arabic language and script for the Greek in the ex-Roman provinces of the Arab Caliphate, and for the Pehlevi in the ex-Sasanian provinces, as the official vehicle for the public records, including the all-important registers of the inland revenue.⁴ When this change was put in hand, there was evidently some anxiety in official circles as to its possible effect on the efficiency of the public administration, particularly in the vital matter of the collection of the land-tax, and there was a corresponding relief when the transition was achieved without the awkward consequences that had been foreboded.

In the Spanish Empire in the Americas, Spanish became both the official language and the unofficial *lingua franca* of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, which provided the Central American World with its universal state, and it was given the same official status in the Andean universal state which the *conquistadores* had converted into the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru. In the Andean World, however, the Spanish Crown demonstrated the sincerity of its profession to be a devoted secular agent for the propagation of the Catholic Christian Faith by allowing and encouraging the Roman Church to utilize and develop for its own purposes the Quichuan *lingua franca* to which the Spaniards' Inca predecessors had given an oecumenical currency⁵ by making its acquisition compulsory for all their subjects.⁶

¹ The possibility that the break between 'Middle Minoan II' and 'Middle Minoan III' might be the mark left on the archaeological record by the foundation of a Minoan universal state has been suggested in I. i. 92-93; IV. iv. 64-65; V. v. 236; and V. vi. 312.

² See V. v. 491, n. 3.

³ From the testimony of Ahmad Al-Balādhuri (*Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān*, pp. 300-1 and 465-6 in the English translation by Hitti, P. K., vol. i (New York 1916, Columbia University Press)); Tabarī (2, 1034); and Theophanes (*Chronographia*, ed. by de Boor, C. (Leipzig 1883-5, Teubner, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 376, *sub Anno Mundi* 6199). Theophanes ascribes the innovation, not to 'Abd-al-Malik, but to his successor Walīd I (*imperabat* A.D. 705-15). Walīd I appears to have completed 'Abd-al-Malik's work by substituting the Arabic language and script for the Coptic in Egypt, where the Coptic had formerly been used side by side with the Greek. This local change in Egypt, which was carried out in A.H. 87 according to Makrizi, *Khitāt*, i. 98, cited by Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), p. 137, n. 1, seems to have been confused by Theophanes with the previous displacement of Greek throughout the ex-Roman provinces of the Caliphate. In the present Study, V. v. 501, n. 3, Theophanes' error has been carelessly reproduced, notwithstanding Wellhausen's elucidation.

⁴ See V. v. 501, and p. 181, above.

⁵ See Markham, Sir C.: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), p. 165.

⁶ See V. v. 523-4, and p. 251, below.

A Partnership between Several Different Languages or Scripts

We may now pass on to consider some instances of the more frequent practice of providing a universal state with several official languages and scripts, including the empire-builders' own.

In the British Rāj in India the English mother tongue of the rebuilders of a Mughal Rāj was, for certain purposes, substituted for Persian, the official language that had been bequeathed by the Mughals to their British and other successors. In A.D. 1829, for instance, the British Indian Government made English the medium for its diplomatic correspondence, and in A.D. 1835 the medium for higher education in its dominions. But when in A.D. 1837 the final step was taken in the deposition of Persian from its official status in British India, the British Indian Government did not introduce the use of English for all the other purposes that Persian had previously served. In the conduct of judicial and fiscal proceedings, which were provinces of public administration that personally concerned all Indians of every nationality, caste, and class, the British Indian Government replaced Persian, not by English, but by the local vernaculars;¹ and the Sanskritized Hindī vernacular known as Hindustānī was actually manufactured by British Protestant missionaries to provide the Hindu population of Northern India with a counterpart of the Persianized Hindī vernacular, known as Urdu, which the Indian Muslims had already manufactured for themselves.² This humane and politic decision to forbear from misusing political power by giving exclusive official currency to the alien empire-builders' own mother tongue perhaps partially accounts for the remarkable fact that when, 110 years later, their descendants voluntarily handed over their rāj to the descendants of their Indian subjects, it was taken as a matter of course, in both of the British Indian Empire's polyglot Indian successor-states, that the English language would remain at least provisionally in use *de facto* for the purposes which it had served under the British régime.

In the Napoleonic Empire in Western and Central Europe, the local vernaculars—Italian, German, and Dutch—which had previously been in use as official languages in parochial states, were allowed to retain their official status side by side with French. In earlier chapters of Western history the French language had made pacific conquests at the expense of Flemish in the Southern Netherlands and of a local High German dialect in Alsace. In both these countries, French had not only become a *lingua franca* but had been accepted as the medium for literature and administration. The Napoleonic Empire had too short a life to furnish any indication whether, if it had endured, its builders' language would have been likely by the same process of peaceful penetration to win for itself over a wider area the position which it had already attained in Alsace and Flanders. The nationalism which the French Revolution had begotten in France, and of which the Napoleonic Empire was inevitably a 'carrier',³ would in any case have militated against the prestige which the French language and culture had

¹ See V. v. 516, n. 1.

² See V. v. 518, n. 2.

³ See V. v. 503-4.

acquired in Central Europe under the *ancien régime*.¹ One thing of which we can be certain is that the French language's prospects, whatever they might otherwise have been, would have been blighted if the Napoleonic régime had attempted, in the manner of the Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik, to impose the use of the empire-builders' own mother tongue on their non-French-speaking subjects.

We can assert this with confidence in the light of the then recent failure of the Emperor-King Joseph II (*res gerebat solus* A.D. 1780-90)² to impose the use of German on the non-German-speaking peoples of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy. Though economic utility and cultural amenity alike told in favour of this attempted *Diktat* of political authority, Joseph's linguistic policy was a disastrous failure. It not only met with prompt defeat in the territories of the Crown of Saint Stephen, where the vigorous survival of medieval constitutional rights had kept a Magyar and a Croat national consciousness alive, and where the diaspora of German urban and agricultural settlers was very thinly sown; it also evoked the first new stirrings of the long since dormant national consciousness of the Czechs and the Slovenes, who by Joseph's time had been so deeply submerged by a flowing tide of Germanization that, in the judgement of even the sharpest-sighted contemporary observer, their complete assimilation at no distant date might have been taken as a foregone conclusion. The only substantial success which the Josephian policy secured was the retention of German, until the break-up of the Monarchy in A.D. 1918, as the universal language of command in a unitary Imperial-Royal Army. In the Imperial-Royal Navy the language of command had been Italian;³ and the fact that this Hapsburg fighting service continued during the nineteenth century to employ for this purpose the mother tongue of its principal adversaries in that chapter of its history testifies both to the placidity of the Hapsburg ethos and to the vitality of the Italian language as a maritime *lingua franca* in the Mediterranean.

The Turkish masters of the Ottoman Empire never embarked on the policy which was successfully applied in the Arab Caliphate and unsuccessfully in the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy. The founders' native Turkish was the official language of imperial administration; but in the heyday of the Ottoman Power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era the *lingua franca* of the Pādīshāh's slave-household was Serbo-Croat⁴ and the *lingua franca* of the Ottoman Navy Italian⁵—for the same reason that prevailed upon the Hapsburg Navy to employ the same language. Moreover, on the civil side the Ottoman Government, like the British Indian Government, followed a policy of allowing its subjects as far as possible to use languages of their own choice in public affairs that were of personal concern to the individual—though it approached this same statesmanlike objective along a different consti-

¹ See V. v. 503, n. 3.

² Joseph was Holy Roman Emperor from A.D. 1765 onwards, and from the same date he was also associated with his mother Maria Theresa in the government of the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg; but it was not till after her death in A.D. 1780 that he had a free hand to pursue a policy of his own.

³ See V. v. 502.

⁴ See V. v. 518-19.

⁵ See V. v. 502.

tutional avenue. Whereas the British Government in India boldly set aside the previously established Muslim ecclesiastical courts and succeeded in providing an acceptable alternative for its Muslim subjects by applying the Muslim *Shari'* Law in British courts and by conducting the judicial proceedings in the local vernaculars, the Ottoman Government delegated this great province of public administration to autonomous communal authorities, officially recognized and supported by the Sublime Porte, which conducted their judicial business in languages traditionally employed by them for public purposes.¹ Since these communal authorities were ecclesiastical, the languages which they used for civil as well as for religious affairs were the sacred languages of their respective religions. The law administered in the communal courts of the Muslim community throughout the Ottoman Empire was written in Arabic,² the law of the communal courts of the Orthodox Christian community throughout the Empire in Greek, the law of the Gregorian Monophysite community in Armenian, and so on. It will be seen that the 'Osmanlis in the Orthodox Christian and Arabic worlds showed the same restraint as the British in India in limiting the scope of the official currency which they gave to their own mother tongue.

A similar restraint was shown by the Romans in the imposition of Latin as an official language in provinces of their empire in which Greek was either the mother tongue or the established *lingua franca*. They contented themselves with making Latin the exclusive language of military command for units of the Imperial Army, wherever recruited and wherever stationed,³ and the principal language of municipal administration for colonies of Italian origin on Greek or Oriental ground. For

¹ See IX. viii. 184-6. The non-Muslim autonomous communities were known by the name of *millet*—a word of Arabic origin with a meaning betwixt and between the connotations of the Western words 'nation' and 'church'. Though the dominant Muslim community was not called a *millet*, its constitution and status were in essence the same as those of the Jewish *millet* and of the several Christian *millets* of different denominations. Indeed, the *millet* system, which confounded the traditional Christian distinction between Church and State, was an expression of the Islamic conception of Society which could hardly have taken shape in a predominantly Christian political milieu. In the Ottoman Empire there were two privileged groups within the Muslim community—the kinsfolk of the Prophet Muhammad (*Seyyids*) and the members of the Pādishāh's slave-household (*qullar*)—each of which enjoyed a communal autonomy of its own in the judicial sphere (see Lybyer, A. H.: *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass. 1913, Harvard University Press), pp. 116 and 216).

² In addition to the *Shari'ah* the Ottoman ecclesiastical courts did, however, also administer the *qānūns* (imperial rescripts of the Ottoman *pādishāhs*) and '*ādet* (local customary law). The *qānūns* were written in Ottoman Turkish, while '*ādet*, if written at all, was not necessarily written in either Turkish or Arabic (see Lybyer, A. H.: *op. cit.*, pp. 152 and 223).

³ The two policies of giving Latin a monopoly in the Army and paying deference to Greek ran counter to one another in Thrace. In another context (pp. 133-4 and 134-5 above) we have noticed that, when the Romans annexed the client kingdom of the Odrysae, they carried their respect for the Greek language to the point of making Greek, and not Latin, the *lingua franca* and official language of this new Roman province. At the same time Thrace became as prolific a source of recruitment for the Roman Army as the adjoining provinces along the right bank of the Danube. In consequence, Thrace, as well as Moesia and Pannonia, came to be Latinized to a large extent, though in Thrace, unlike the Danubian provinces, the Latinization was not deliberate. For the penetration of Thracians into the Praetorian cohorts from the Severan revolution of A.D. 193 onwards until the disbandment of these units in A.D. 312 by Constantine the Great, see Durry, M.: *Les Cohortes Prétorienes* (Paris 1938, Boccard), pp. 248 and 255.

other purposes they continued to employ the Attic *koinê*¹ wherever they found it already in official use;² and they made its official status in their own empire conspicuous by giving it a place, side by side with Latin, in the central administration as well. At Rome under the Principate the Imperial Chancery was organized in duplicate, with a Greek as well as a Latin side, so that correspondents using either of 'the two languages' (as Latin and Greek were styled *sans phrase*) could be sure of being able to transact their business with the imperial authorities in the language of their choice.

This Roman forbearance towards the Greek language was something more than a tribute to the pre-eminence of Greek over Latin as a medium of culture; it represented a signal victory of statesmanship over *hybris* in Roman souls; for in those far-flung territories of the Empire, extending from Moesia to Mauretania and from Bruttium to Britain, in which Greek was not in competition with Latin on the morrow of the Roman conquest, the triumph of Latin was so sensational that it might have turned the heads of any but the most sober-minded empire-builders. So far from having to impose the use of Latin upon their subjects and allies in territories outside the Greek language's range, the Romans were in the happy position of being able to enhance its attractiveness by treating the use of it as a privilege that had to be sued for.³ Nor did Latin win its peaceful victories solely at the expense of languages that had never been reduced to writing or enshrined in a literature. In Italy it had to contend with sister Italic dialects like Oscan and Umbrian, and with Illyrian dialects like Messapian and Venetian, which had once been on a cultural par with Latin—not to speak of Etruscan, which was freighted with the cultural heritage of its Anatolian homeland. In Africa, again, Latin had to contend with Punic. Yet, in these contests with non-Greek 'culture languages' already in the field, Latin was invariably victorious; and, although in Africa the wave of Punic speech continued under Roman rule to advance from the coast into the interior, and to penetrate from the upper to the lower strata of society, at the expense of Berber, it now lost ground to a Latin wave, following hard in its wake, as fast as it gained it from a Berber sump. This triumphal progress of the Latin language west of Syrtis and north of Haemus is the setting in which we have to regard the Romans' deference towards the Greek language in order to appreciate this attitude at its full worth.

An even more remarkable restraint was shown by the Sumerian

¹ See V. v. 494-5.

² In Egypt the Romans continued the Ptolemies' practice of employing, side by side with the Greek language and alphabet, the New Egyptian language and the hieroglyphic and demotic scripts for inscriptions addressed to the native Egyptian population. This practice had been copied by the Ptolemies from the Achaemenidae, who, in Egypt, had employed the Egyptian language and scripts side by side with the Aramaic (see p. 248, below).

³ For example, in 180 B.C. the municipality of Cumae, whose citizens had possessed the passive rights of Roman citizenship (the Roman *civitas sine suffragio*) since 338 B.C., was allowed, in response to a petition from the municipal authorities themselves, to substitute Latin for the community's native Oscan as its official language ('*Cumanis eo anno petentibus permissum ut publice Latine loquerentur et praeconibus Latine vendendi ius esset*,'—Livy, Book XL, chap. 42).

founders of 'the Realm of the Four Quarters' when they put the upstart Akkadian language officially on a par with a Sumerian which was not only the empire-builders' mother tongue but was the historic vehicle of the Sumerian culture. This large-minded policy was no doubt inspired by the practical consideration that in Ur-Engur's (Ur-Nammu's) day (*imperabat circa* 2143-2126 or 2079-2062 B.C.) Akkadian was gaining ground¹ while Sumerian was on the ebb; and, in the event, Sumerian had become almost a dead language by the time when a universal state which Sumerian-speaking empire-builders had inaugurated reached the end of its chequered career after the death of Hammurabi (*imperabat circa* 1792-1750 or 1728-1686 B.C.).² The Amorite restorer of a Sumerian political edifice did 'not strive officiously to keep alive' the moribund mother tongue of his predecessor Ur-Engur; but it is significant that he also appears to have made no attempt to fill the Sumerian language's now all but vacant place with his own ancestral Canaanite dialect, but to have allowed Akkadian—which in his time stood at its zenith—to enjoy, unchallenged, the virtual monopoly which by then it had won for itself *de facto*.

The Achaemenidae gave as modest a place in the government of their empire to their Persian mother tongue as to their Persian mother country.³ Darius the Great's account of his own acts on the rock of Behistan, overhanging the Great North-East Road, was inscribed in triplicate in three different adaptations of the cuneiform script conveying the divers languages of the three imperial capitals: Elamite for Susa, Medo-Persian for Ecbatana,⁴ and Akkadian for Babylon. The same three languages and scripts were likewise employed in the inscription on Darius's own tomb at Naqsh-i-Rustam in Fars,⁵ and in official inscriptions on imperial buildings in all parts of the Empire.⁶ It is to the credit of the Achaemenidae that they should thus have placed two other languages officially on a par with their own mother tongue, but this conscientious even-handedness was too pedantic and too clumsy to meet the practical needs of current imperial administration. The Elamite tongue, for example, though it did happen to be the language of Susa, was not a *lingua franca* and was already moribund even in its own parochial domain;⁷ and the version of the cuneiform script that had been specially devised for the conveyance of the Medo-Persian language failed—in spite of its technical excellence—to win its way into general use, and consequently failed to perpetuate itself. The increasing inaccuracy of its use in the inscriptions of Artaxerxes II (*imperabat* 404-358 B.C.) and Artaxerxes III (*imperabat* 358-338 B.C.) betrays the truth that its proper usage was

¹ See V. v. 496-9.

² See V. v. 485.

³ For the location of the several cities that divided between them the function of serving as capitals of the Achaemenian Empire, see pp. 203-8, above.

⁴ For Ecbatana, the former capital of the Median Monarchy and the actual summer residence of the Achaemenian Court, see p. 206, above. This Medo-Persian was, of course, also the language of the Persian imperial people's homeland in Fars, but, at the date when the Behistan Inscription was carved, the building of Persepolis was certainly not finished and may not even yet have begun.

⁵ See pp. 206-7, above.

⁶ See V. v. 499, n. 3, following Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, 1st ed. (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 28.

⁷ See Meyer, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 29.

being forgotten within perhaps less than two hundred years of its invention.¹

This infelicity in the Achaemenids' original choice of official scripts and languages was only partially offset by their liberality in the use of unofficial languages and scripts which had a regional currency—for example, the Greek language and alphabet in the neighbourhood of the Aegean, and in Egypt the New Egyptian language conveyed alternatively, for different purposes, in the hieroglyphic and in the demotic form of the Egyptiac characters.² It seems, indeed, to have been their regular practice to provide translations, in the local vernaculars, of official documents addressed to their subjects.³ But the stroke of statesmanship by which they saved a situation which their own pedantry had created was their act of giving official currency to the Aramaic alphabet and language—side by side with the three hyper-official languages and scripts—in all provinces of the Empire to the west of Babylonia.⁴

The sequel showed that commerce and culture may be more potent instruments than politics for making a language's fortune. In the Achaemenian Empire the speakers of Aramaic were politically of no account,⁵ whereas the speakers of Medo-Persian were politically dominant; and, apart from this political 'pull', the Medo-Persian language was by no means at a disadvantage in other respects. The area over which it was spoken as a mother tongue was probably not less extensive,⁶ though it was of course much less populous, than the area over which Aramaic was current at the time not merely as a *lingua franca* but as the language of daily life. Moreover, the unknown man of genius who had adapted the cuneiform characters for the conveyance of the Medo-Persian language had endowed it with a script that was almost as convenient as the Aramaic Alphabet. Taking his cue, we may suppose, from the Alphabet itself, he had achieved with the cuneiform characters what had never been achieved with them by their Sumerian inventors or their Akkadian, Elamite, and Hittite users: he had contrived to convey visually all the sounds of the Medo-Persian language in an all but alphabetic syllabary

¹ See Meyer, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 48.

² See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, 1st ed. (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 48; eundem: 'Zu den Aramäischen Papyri von Elephantine', in *Sitz. Kön. Preuss. Ak. Wiss.*, Gesamtsitzung vom 23 November, 1911, Mitth. vom 26 October, p. 1040.

³ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, 1st ed. (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 48-49.

⁴ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, 1st ed. (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 48; eundem: *Sitz. Kön. Preuss. Ak. Wiss.*, loc. cit.; *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine* (Leipzig 1912, Hinrichs), p. 17 (both cited in this Study already in V. v. 123, n. 2). See further Olmstead, A. T.: *A History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, Chicago University Press), pp. 116-17, 178, 480-1.

⁵ Any prospects of political greatness that the Aramaean peoples might ever have been able to look forward to had been blighted when they had lost their long-drawn-out battle with Assyria in the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C. (see II. ii. 134), and the final blow had been the destruction of the south-westernmost of the Aramaean states, the Kingdom of Damascus, in 732 B.C. (see IV. iv. 476). But, at every stage of their military martyrdom, the Aramaeans had snatched cultural victories out of political reverses (see I. i. 79-80).

⁶ We do not know the geographical boundaries of the Medo-Persian dialect of the Iranian language in the Achaemenian Age. The dialect of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, known in a later form as 'Sogdian', may already have become differentiated from the dialect or dialects of the Iranian Plateau, and we cannot identify the homeland of the Avestan dialect in which Zoroaster composed his *Gathas*.

of not more than thirty-six characters.¹ Yet in the competition between the Medo-Persian and the Aramaic scripts and languages it was the Aramaic that won.

It was not so surprising that the Aramaic language should have beaten the Medo-Persian in a competition for capturing the domain of a faltering Akkadian tongue, for here Aramaic had been the first in the field,² and it enjoyed, in addition, the overwhelming advantage of being a sister Semitic language which an Akkadian-speaker might substitute for his own mother tongue without having to make that conscious and laborious effort to speak an utterly alien language which would be required of him if he were to try to make himself at home with an Indo-European dialect. The really remarkable triumph was achieved by the Aramaic script, which succeeded in replacing the cuneiform as the medium for conveying the Medo-Persian language in its post-Achaemenian phase. This victory must appear the more extraordinary considering that it was accompanied by a lamentably perverse retrogression in the art of writing. Whereas the forgotten inventor of the Achaemenian script for the conveyance of the Medo-Persian language had shown his originality by making an exclusively phonetic use of cuneiform characters that had originated as ideograms, the inventors of the Pehlevi script for the conveyance of the same language in its next phase mishandled a ready-made phonetic Alphabet by coining ideograms out of it. Instead of consistently conveying Persian words by spelling them out in Aramaic letters used phonetically, they lapsed into conveying them by writing Aramaic words that were their equivalents in meaning but were, of course, entirely unrelated to them in sound.³ This ability of the Aramaic Alphabet to capture the Persian language even in a usage that stultified the Alphabet's own distinctive technical excellence gives some measure of the prestige which it must have acquired, by then, in Persian minds; and one source of this prestige was undoubtedly the official status that had been given to the Aramaic Alphabet and language by Achaemenian Emperors whose mother tongue was not Semitic but Indo-European.

The Manchu restorers of a Far Eastern universal state showed the same liberality, and same touch of pedantry, as the Achaemenidae in placing their own mother tongue and the languages of their Mongol allies and Chinese subjects on a footing of official parity. The Manchus, like the Achaemenidae, inscribed their public records in triplicate: the Chinese text in Sinic characters, the Mongol text in an adaptation of a Uighur version of a Sogdian variant of the Aramaic Alphabet,⁴ and the Manchu text in an adaptation of the Mongol Alphabet.⁵ In the Manchu, as in the Achaemenian, Empire, two out of the three languages and scripts that had thus been made official on rather formal grounds failed to qualify for this privileged position on the strength of their actual or

¹ The inventor of the Medo-Persian cuneiform Alphabet had been anticipated by the inventor of the Phoenician cuneiform Alphabet used at Ras ash-Shamrah on the coast of Northern Syria about a thousand years earlier. But the Ras ash-Shamrah Alphabet had long since fallen into disuse and oblivion, and the inventor of the Behistan Alphabet must have made the same invention independently.

² See I. i. 79-80 and V. v. 499.

⁴ See V. v. 500, n. 6.

³ See I. i. 80 and V. v. 500.

⁵ See *ibid.*

prospective currency. The habitat of the Manchus' Mongol-speaking allies was confined to an outlying and sparsely populated glacis of the Manchu Empire; and the northern and north-eastern parts of Manchuria, where, if anywhere, the Manchus' mother tongue had some prospect of surviving, were almost equally remote from the heart of the imperial people's now far extended dominions. In Southern Manchuria the Manchus had entered into a symbiosis with a local Chinese population, and the ruling element among the Manchus had already become half-Sinified before their entry into Intramural China in A.D. 1644. The complete Sinification of the Manchu civil and military 'Bannermen' inside the Wall¹ was manifestly only a matter of time. In fact, the successful achievement of the Manchus' political ambitions had condemned the Manchus' mother tongue to sink *de facto*, whatever its status *de jure*, to the level of a local patois spoken only by the imperial Manchus' country cousins in a 'reservoir' of man-power in the north-eastern marches.²

Fortunately for the Manchu Imperial Government, however, the uselessness, for most practical purposes, of two out of the three official languages and scripts of their choice was fully counterbalanced by the all but universal currency, throughout their dominions, of the Sinic characters and the 'mandarin' *lingua franca* of the Chinese civil service.³ In Eastern Asia in the Manchu Dynasty's day, these two media of visual and oral communication held the field as ubiquitously as the Akkadian language and Akkadian adaptation of the cuneiform characters in South-West Asia in the days of Ur-Engur (Ur-Nammu) and Hammurabi. As compared with the Manchus, the Achaemenidae were unlucky in their generation; for by their time the Akkadian language had lost its former monopoly of serving as a South-West Asian *lingua franca* and was giving way to Aramaic even as the parochial speech of the single province of Babylonia. From Babylon westwards a babel of tongues confronted the Achaemenidae with an administrative problem from which the Manchu rulers of Eastern Asia were exempted by a lucky accident of local linguistic history; and, thanks to this, the Manchus never found themselves compelled like their Achaemenid counterparts to institute a fourth official language in order to redress the inadequacy of three.

In the Mauryan Empire the philosopher-emperor Açoka (*imperabat* 273-232 B.C.) succeeded in reconciling the demands of impartial justice with those of practical convenience by employing a number of different local living vernaculars conveyed in two different scripts, the Brahmi and the Kharoshthi.⁴ This happy catholicity in Açoka's choice of media

¹ For the Manchu 'Banners', see pp. 128-9, above; for the civil service of the Manchu Empire, see pp. 346-8, below.

² The function performed by 'reservoirs' of this kind in universal states established by semi-barbarian or barbarian empire-builders is brilliantly expounded by Lattimore, O., in *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 31-52.

³ For the spread of this 'mandarin' dialect of Chinese, see V. v. 512-14.

⁴ See Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 166-70 and 172-4, and the present Study, V. v. 498 and 500. 'Two recensions of the Fourteen Rock Edicts, inscribed on rocks at places near the North-West Frontier of India, were executed in . . . Kharoshthi. . . All the other inscriptions [about thirty-two in number] are incised in one or other variety of the early Brahmi Alphabet' (Smith, op. cit., pp. 166-7).

for communication with his subjects was prompted by the single-minded purpose of acquainting them with the way of salvation revealed to Mankind by Açoka's master Gautama,¹ as the Spanish successors of the Incas were moved by their eagerness for the propagation of the Roman Catholic form of Christianity to allow the Gospel to be preached in the Andean World in a Quichuan *lingua franca*.² This Quichuan had gained the wide currency that it enjoyed at the time of the Spanish conquest because the Spaniards' Inca predecessors had made the learning of Quichuan compulsory³ and had imposed this intellectual corvée on themselves as well as on their subjects—if it is a fact that the Incas had an esoteric language of their own which they did not choose to vulgarize.⁴

Empire-builders who have refrained from giving Official Currency to their own Mother Tongue

This Incan self-denying ordinance might have been dismissed as a peculiar product of the Incas' ultra-totalitarian ethos if there were not other examples of imperial peoples refraining from giving any official status to their own mother tongue.

The Mongols, for instance, did not take advantage of their immense conquests in order to propagate the Mongol language from the Pacific to the Euphrates and the Carpathians. The Mongol Khāqāns employed the Sinic characters and the 'mandarin' dialect for the government of China, and the Mongol Il-Khans the New Persian language and the Perso-Arabic Alphabet for the government of Iran and 'Irāq. Even the Khans of Chaghatāy's and Bātū's appanages, who did not transfer their headquarters from 'the Desert' to 'the Sown', nevertheless abandoned the use of their Mongol mother tongue in favour of a Turkish that was current among a majority of their Nomad subjects.

The Turkī dialect that was adopted by the Mongol Chaghatāy Khan's successors from the local Nomads of whom they had taken command in Zungaria had also become the current language of their sedentary subjects in Transoxania; and, when, under the leadership of Timur Lenk (*imperabat* A.D. 1369-1405), the Transoxanians reversed the Mongol political order by force of arms and asserted their own mastery over the Eurasian Nomads,⁵ their Turkī tongue was fashioned into a literary language on a Persian model by the Timurid Sultan Husayn's minister Mir 'Alī Shīr Nawā'ī (*decessit* A.D. 1501).⁶ In the next generation Bābur (*vivebat* A.D. 1483-1530)—a scion of the House of Timur who retrieved his family's fortunes by laying the foundations of a new Timurid Empire on the Indian side of the Hindu Kush—made a brilliant use of the vehicle for literary expression that Nawā'ī had provided for him in his own Turkī mother tongue by writing in Turkī his celebrated memoirs.

In the light of these antecedents, it might have been expected that, when Bābur's pioneer empire-building work in India was followed up and completed by his grandson Akbar (*imperabat* A.D. 1556-1605), the Timurid Mughal Dynasty's now literate mother tongue would have

¹ See V. vi. 75-76.

² See p. 242, above.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ See V. v. 523, n. 2, following Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), p. 213.

⁵ See II. ii. 144-8.

⁶ See I. i. 351 and II. ii. 149.

become one of the official languages of the universal state which these Turkī-speaking empire-builders from Central Asia had imposed on the Hindu World. The architects of the Mughal Rāj in India did indeed select for the official language of their empire one of the established literary languages of the Iranic Muslim Society of which they themselves were members, but the language of their choice was not Turkī but Persian;¹ and, in the unofficial hybrid *lingua franca* that was begotten of the social intercourse between a Mughal Court and Army and a Hindu subject population, it was Persian again, and not Turkī, that was infused into Hindustānī.² Even in their own household the Mughal Dynasty in India eventually took to speaking Persian instead of their mother tongue. This defeat of Turkī by Persian on all fronts was the more remarkable considering that the discomfited language was the ancestral speech not only of the Timurids themselves but of the most martial contingent of their polyglot henchmen, and also considering that the Emperor Bābur's literary gift reappeared among his descendants. Bābur's daughter Gulbadan Bēgum wrote a history of her brother Humāyūn, and Humāyūn's grandson Jahāngīr emulated his great-grandfather's literary achievement by writing memoirs of his own life and reign;³ but Gulbadan's *Humāyūn Nāma* and Jahāngīr's *Tuzūk* were written, not in Turkī, but in Persian. When Bābur's pen as well as Bābur's sword had been thrown into the Turkī scale, the balance would hardly have inclined on the Persian side, as it did, if the prestige of the victorious language had not been allowed to pull its weight by a deliberate forbearance on the part of the gifted Turkī-speaking princes with whom the last word lay.

A similar forbearance was shown by the Emperor Hammurabi (*imperabat circa 1792-1750 or 1728-1686 B.C.*) when he refrained⁴ from attempting to substitute his living Canaanite mother tongue for a moribund Sumerian as one of the official languages of a momentarily restored Empire of Sumer and Akkad, and thereby left the way open for the Aramaic dialect of a later wave of Semitic-speaking interlopers from the Arabian Steppe eventually to supersede Akkadian as the *lingua franca* of South-Western Asia. It was even more remarkable that in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., in the hour of the Aramaic language's triumph, when the Akkadian language was manifestly on the wane, as the Sumerian had been in Hammurabi's day, the Chaldaean leaders of an anti-Assyrian resistance movement and founders of a Neo-Babylonian Empire should have followed Hammurabi in making the Akkadian language and Akkadian version of the cuneiform script their official media of communication. The Chaldaeans had been carried into the marshlands of South-Western Babylonia in the same Völkerwanderung that had swept the Hebrews⁵ into Southern Syria and the Aramaeans into Damascus and Mesopotamia, and we may infer that, at the time when these three Semitic peoples simultaneously broke out of Arabia, they were all speaking some variety of a common ancestral Aramaic.⁶ If there

¹ See V. v. 515.

³ See II. ii. 149.

⁵ Including under this term Moab and Ammon and Edom and Judah as well as Israel.

⁶ On this hypothesis, both the Chaldaeans and the Hebrews were originally Aramaic-speaking peoples who eventually readopted their ancestral speech after an interval during

² See V. v. 517-18.

⁴ See p. 247, above.

is substance in this conjecture, it speaks volumes for the prestige of Babylon that the Chaldaeans should have been moved to discard an ancestral Aramaic dialect in favour of the Akkadian speech of their Assyrian oppressors because this Akkadian was also the traditional language of an imperial city and treasure-house of culture which Nabopolassar's Chaldaean followers longed to make their own¹ as eagerly as Mehmed the Conqueror's Turkish followers desired to possess 'the Abode of Felicity' on the shores of the Bosphorus.

The adoption of Akkadian by the Chaldaeans as the official language of the Neo-Babylonian Empire may have prolonged the currency of Akkadian as a living language for perhaps five hundred years. Sanskrit was adopted by the Guptas as the official language of a restored Indic universal state perhaps a thousand years after it had died a natural death.² It is one of the curiosities of history that the rebuilders of Açoka's Empire should have chosen for their official medium of communication a language which had been passed over, as obsolete, by Açoka himself some seven hundred years earlier.

Who are the Beneficiaries?

If we now pass from our survey of official languages in universal states to a review of the beneficiaries, we shall find that official languages had been turned to account by restorers of the empires in which these languages had enjoyed official currency; by other latter-day secular agencies, both public and private, political and economic; and by the propagators of higher religions and organizers of universal churches.

Akkadian, for example, as we have seen, was taken over from Ur-Engur's 'Realm of the Four Quarters' by Hammurabi, and again from the Neo-Babylonian Empire by the Achaemenidae. Classical Egyptian was taken over by 'the New Empire' from 'the Middle Empire'; Greek by the Umayyad Caliphate from the Roman Empire; and Persian by the British from the Mughal Rāj in India. It may be observed, however, that in a majority of these cases the inherited official language was not permanently retained. The British Indian Empire discarded Persian in favour of English employed in combination with local Indian vernaculars; the Umayyad Caliphs discarded Greek—and likewise Coptic and Pehlevi—in favour of Arabic; the archaistic-minded 'New Empire' of Egypt acquiesced in Ikhnaton's iconoclasm in the one point of sub-

which—unlike their Aramaean kinsmen and northern neighbours—they had succumbed to the languages of the sedentary peoples among whom they had settled—to Akkadian, that is, in the Chaldaeans' case and to Canaanite (hence miscalled 'Hebrew') in the Hebrews'. In both cases this adoption of the established language of the occupied country was to be expected; for the penetration of the Chaldaeans into Babylonia and of the Hebrews into Palestine was, as we know, a gradual process, and in each case the interlopers were mingling with a sedentary population that was more numerous and more cultivated than they were. On the other hand, it is not surprising that the Aramaean conquerors of the desert-port of Damascus and of the sparsely inhabited Mesopotamian Steppe should have preserved their ancestral language and should have been able, in a key-position at the mid-point of 'the Fertile Crescent', to convert an unextinguished local dialect into an oecumenical *lingua franca*.

¹ The relations between the Chaldaean tribesmen and the citizens of Babylon in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. have been touched upon in IV. iv. 476-80.

² For the artificial revival of Sanskrit which culminated under the Gupta régime, see V. vi. 75-77.

stituting the living Egyptian speech of the day for the now dead classical language; the Achaemenidae found themselves constrained to supplement a waning Akkadian language and script by giving a supernumerary official status to a waxing Aramaic.

Akkadian, again, continued, after the final collapse of 'the Realm of the Four Quarters', to be used as a medium of diplomatic intercourse, commerce, and culture, not only within the former frontiers of the now defunct Sumeric universal state, but also in regions never ruled by either Hammurabi or Ur-Engur, and never even trodden by the great Akkadian war-lords of an earlier age, a Sargon or a Naramsin. In the fourteenth century B.C. the Akkadian language and script were being employed in the archives and libraries of Hittite Kings at Boghazqal'eh, and, *mirabile dictu*, in the correspondence between the Imperial Government of Egypt and its client princes in its own dominions in Syria, as well as in its transactions with such independent Powers as Khatti and Mitanni. A comparable triumph was achieved by the French language after the meteoric rise and fall of the Napoleonic Empire. In the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, French not only retained the role—which, under the *Ancien Régime*, it had already captured from Latin—of serving as the diplomatic language of the Western World; in the less superficial role of a culture-language it now also found new worlds to conquer in the successor-states of a defunct Spanish Empire of the Indies and in an Ottoman Empire that was rapidly going the Spanish Empire's way.¹

An even more remarkable resilience was shown by Aramaic when, upon the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander, it was brusquely deposed, in favour of the Attic *koinê*, from the official status that the Achaemenidae had conferred on it in their western dominions. Deprived of the imperial patronage which it had enjoyed for two centuries, the Aramaic language succeeded, by the first century of the Christian Era, in completing the process, which it had begun without imperial patronage in the eighth century B.C., of supplanting Akkadian on the east and Canaanite on the west as the living language of the entire Semitic-speaking population of 'the Fertile Crescent'.² And, likewise on the strength of its own unaided merits, the Aramaic Alphabet achieved far wider conquests. In A.D. 1599, within less than two thousand years of the Achaemenian Empire's downfall, it was adopted for the conveyance of the Manchu language on the eve of the Manchu conquest of China.³

This diffusion of the Aramaic Alphabet was a technological and intellectual conquest which surpassed in its sweep the military and political conquests of the Mongol and Arab herdsmen-warriors, but the ultimate victors in this field were the higher religions which sped the Aramaic Alphabet on its way by taking it into their service. In its 'Square Hebrew' variant it became the vehicle of the Jewish scriptures and

¹ In the Ottoman Empire the way had been prepared for the entry of French by the previous currency of the philologically germane Tuscan *koinê* known as the *Lingua Franca*; and no doubt the adoption of French as the culture-language of Hispanic America was similarly facilitated by the kinship between French and the two locally current Romance languages: Spanish and Portuguese.

² See V. v. 499.

³ See V. v. 500, with n. 6.

liturgy; in an Arabic adaptation of its Nabataean variant it became the Alphabet of Islam; in its Syriac variant it served impartially the two antithetic heresies of Nestorianism and Monophysitism into which Christianity polarized itself south-east of Taurus; in an Avestan adaptation of its Pehlevi variant it enshrined the sacred books of the Zoroastrian Church; in a Manichaean adaptation it laboured for a heresiarch whom Christians and Zoroastrians agreed in execrating; in a Kharoshthi variant it provided the Emperor Açoka with an instrument for conveying the teachings of the Buddha to his subjects in the former Achaemenian province in the Panjab.¹ This latter-day ecclesiastical use of the Aramaic Alphabet had given it an abiding place in history which it would never have won from its ephemeral secular canonization as one of the official scripts of the Achaemenian Empire; and, in this point, its fortunes were by no means peculiar.

In like manner the Latin and Attic Greek official languages and alphabets of the Roman Empire had won their place in history as the liturgical, theological, and administrative vehicles of the Roman Church in the West and the Greek Church in Orthodox Christendom,² while the Neo-Sanskrit official language of the Gupta Empire had justified its resurrection by providing a literary medium for both Hinduism and the Mahāyāna.³ Even the Emperor Ts'in She Hwang-ti's mighty deed of standardizing the Sinic characters might live to be remembered, not for the service that it had done to ethics and politics by providing the Confucian School of Philosophy and the imperial civil service with a common instrument of literary expression, but for its service to religion in preserving in translation certain indispensable scriptures of the Mahāyāna that were no longer extant in the original Sanskrit. The Incas' pedagogic imposition of compulsory Quichuan on their long-suffering subjects would perhaps similarly be commemorated by these pagan Andeans' Catholic Christian descendants for its unintended assistance in furthering the propagation of Christianity in the New World. And it could be predicted that the Buddha's devoted exponent, the Emperor Açoka, would continue to win the blessings of Pāli-reading Hīnayānian Buddhists for his deliberate adoption of the living languages of his subjects as the media for his inscriptions.⁴

2. Law

The Three Provinces of Law

The field of social action which is the domain of Law divides itself into three great provinces: there is an administrative law that lays down the duties of subjects towards a government, and there are a criminal and a civil law, which are alike concerned with acts in which both parties are private persons, but which nevertheless differ, from a government's point of view, in the degree to which they affect governmental interests.

No government, of course, can be indifferent to administrative law;

¹ See V. v. 500-1, and p. 250, above.

² For the enlistment of a Neo-Attic Greek language, reconstructed by pagan Hellenic archaists, in the service of the Greek Church, see V. vi. 77-78.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ See V. v. 498 and V. vi. 76, and p. 251, above.

indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that this province of law is bound to have priority over any government's other concerns; for the first concern of a government is to keep itself in existence; it cannot exist if it does not effectively impose its authority on its subjects by preventing or repressing all those acts of insubordination—ranging from high treason to arrears in the payment of taxes—in which a subject may show himself recalcitrant to a government's will; and the enforcement of governmental authority requires the formulation and execution of a body of administrative law. The same considerations lead governments, in so far as they have the strength, to concern themselves with the criminal law as well; for, though the criminal may not be attacking his government's authority intentionally or consciously in his assaults upon the life, limb, or property of his fellow subjects, he is in fact trespassing on the government's preserves by arrogating to himself, without official licence, a use of force which the Government must jealously preserve as its own monopoly if it is to maintain its authority intact. It will be seen that, in concerning itself with the criminal as well as with the administrative law, a government is primarily actuated by the motive of self-preservation, and for this reason there is in these two provinces of law a close approach to uniformity in the practice of all governments of both the parochial and the universal type. On the other hand, as far as they concern themselves with civil law, governments are acting for Society's and the individual's benefit more directly than for their own; and accordingly we shall not be surprised to find an empirical survey here revealing wide differences in the practice of those universal states which are our subject in the present Part of this Study.

Instances of Failure and Success in Attempts to impose a Uniform Imperial Law

In the domain of law, universal states, by reason of their historical role and their social function, are faced by a special problem of their own which does not confront parochial states—or, at any rate, not ordinarily in so extreme a degree. Universal states do not start life with a clean slate, and they have not time to work out the development of their institutions gradually. They usually establish themselves in place of their parochial predecessors abruptly, as an emergency measure for forestalling a now imminent social collapse. But those predecessors do not perish without leaving—in the domain of law, as in other fields of social action—a legacy with which their destroyer and successor has to reckon.

There had been at least one instance in which the empire-builders had been so abysmally inferior in culture to their conquered subjects that they had found themselves unable to impose on these any part of their own ancestral law. When the Mongols gave the Chinese main body of the Far Eastern Society its universal state and also roped into their empire both a nascent Iranic Muslim Society and a Russian offshoot of the main body of Orthodox Christendom, their leader Chingis Khan naïvely imagined that the legislator's pen would be as puissant an instrument in his hand as the conqueror's sabre.

“The Great Yasa” was . . . made obligatory on all, including the head

of the Empire, the Khāqān, himself. . . . He drew this immutable law neither from the institutions of the more civilised nations with which he came in contact . . . nor from the revelations of a supreme spirit . . . but from the ancient traditions, usages and ideas of his clan and of his nation. He was convinced that . . . he had established eternal norms, good for all time. But . . . "the Great Yasa" has ceased to be law, and the modern Mongols have lost all recollection of it."¹

A fortiori, this Nomad code failed to supersede the existing laws of the Mongol Khāqān's sedentary subjects, and, even when it came into head-on collision with them, it did not prevail, though it had the Mongol sword to back it. It conflicted, for example, with the Islamic *Shari'ah*² by prohibiting the washing of hands in running water and by laying down an incompatible ritual procedure for the slaughtering of cattle. Chingis himself recklessly attempted to ride roughshod over the *Shari'ah* by making it a capital offence to slaughter cattle in the Muslim fashion;³ but, instead of thereby breaking-in for himself submissive subjects, he found himself inspiring defiant martyrs. This deliberately savage and provocative ordinance was revived by Chingis' successor Qubilāy (*imperabat* A.D. 1259-94)⁴ and was not only inflicted on the Muslim diaspora in the Khāqān's own personal domain in Eastern Asia, but was also applied in the Transoxanian subject territories of the Appanage of Chaghatāy,⁵ and in the dominions of the Il-Khan Arghūn (*regnabat* A.D. 1284-91)⁶ in Iran and 'Irāq, where the Muslims constituted an overwhelming majority of the sedentary population. Yet this third Mongol persecution of Islam⁷ was no more successful than its predecessors; and this defeat of the *Yāsāq* by the *Shari'ah* was typical of the *Yāsāq*'s fortunes in all the Mongols' immense possessions.⁸

The 'Osmanlis—who, unlike the Mongols, found a long-enduring solution for the problem of stabilizing a Nomad empire over a sedentary population⁹—not only dealt summarily with high treason and firmly with the collection of taxes, but also took care to keep in the Ottoman Imperial Government's own hands the administration of the criminal law—to whatever *millet* the criminal or his victims might belong—with the sole, though portentous, exception of the members of the Pādishāh's slave-household, who had extorted from Sultan Bāyezīd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1481-1512) the privileges of being exempted from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Muslim community and of being made amenable exclusively to the judgement of their own officers.¹⁰ On the other hand,

¹ Vladimirtsov, B. Y.: *The Life of Chingis-Khan*, English translation (London 1930, Routledge), pp. 74-75.

² See p. 74, above; IX. viii. 355; and X. ix. 36.

³ See Howorth, H. H.: *History of the Mongols*, Part I (London 1876, Longmans Green), pp. 111-12.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 273-4.

⁵ See Cahun, L.: *Introduction à L'Histoire d'Asie: Turcs et Mongols des Origines à 1405* (Paris 1896, Colin), p. 412.

⁶ See Arnold, T. W.: *The Preaching of Islam* (London 1913, Constable), p. 226.

⁷ There appears to have been a second persecution in the reign of the Khāqān Kuyūk (*imperabat* A.D. 1246-8). See *ibid.*

⁸ The eventual utilization of the Mongol Empire by Islam has been noticed on p. 160, above.

⁹ See III. iii. 22-50.

¹⁰ See Lybyer, A. H.: *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass. 1913, Harvard University Press), pp. 97, 116, and 216. See also the present Study, IX. viii. 186, n. 2, and X. ix. 37.

as we have seen,¹ the Ottoman imperial authorities showed an equal concern to avoid being implicated in the administration of the civil law, for which the 'peculiar institution' of the Pādishāh's slave-household could not be made to serve as an instrument.

In this province of law the slave-household's only positive concern was its insistence upon enjoying a communal autonomy of its own. As far as other Ottoman Muslims were concerned—apart from the Seyyids (i.e. reputed descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), who enjoyed the privilege of communal autonomy, like the members of the Pādishāh's slave-household²—the 'Osmanlis not only conformed to the traditional practice of their adopted Islamic Faith by leaving all matters of civil law to be administered in accordance with the *Sharī'ah* by the Islamic ecclesiastical courts under the authority of the Sheykh-el-Islām; they took the logical further step—which had been taken by other Muslim governments before them, but had never, perhaps, before been carried out so systematically—of granting the same autonomy, on the same ecclesiastical basis, to the non-Muslim communities under their rule. Indeed, they showed an injudiciously light-hearted consistency in conferring corresponding powers on the foreign colonies of Frankish business men of divers nations whom they permitted to reside in the chief commercial centres of their empire—and thereby opened a chink in the curtain-wall of the Ottoman imperial fortress which was eventually to be enlarged into a breach by the lusty application of Frankish diplomatic and military levers.³

Thus in the province of the civil law the tendency in the Ottoman Empire was for an initial diversity to become increasingly accentuated with the passage of time, but in this point Ottoman history would appear

¹ The Ottoman institution of *millet*s has been touched upon on pp. 244-5, above, *d' propos* of its linguistic aspect. See further IX. viii. 184-6.

² See Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 206, 207, and 216.

³ Though the name 'capitulations', by which these Ottoman charters to colonies of resident aliens came to be known, meant simply 'articles' and not, of course, 'terms of surrender', they did in fact have the effect of putting the Ottoman Empire at the mercy of the Frankish Powers in the latter days of the Empire's weakness. In origin these instruments were unilateral acts by which the Sublime Porte conferred on Frankish Christian residents the same right to administer their own civil affairs that it granted to its non-Muslim subjects. The 'capitulations' were inspired by the same motive of disinclination towards undertaking the distasteful task of administering the affairs of infidels in a field that did not appear to touch the security either of Islam or of the Ottoman State. Moreover, the 'capitulations', as well as the *millet*s, had been a going concern in the parochial states whose place the Ottoman Empire had taken. They had originally been granted by the Western Christian Crusader successor-states of the Abbasid Caliphate to colonies of business men from Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Amalfi, and other medieval Italian city-states, and the practice had spread thence both to the dominions of the Egyptian Mamlūks and to the Orthodox Christian successor-states of the East Roman Empire. It was thus easy to understand how the 'Osmanlis slipped into their error of conferring 'capitulations' not only on the old-established Venetian and Genoese residents but on the French, Dutch, and English who now came bustling in at the Italians' heels. The error lay in failing to perceive that the analogy between charters granted to 'millet' consisting of Ottoman subjects and 'capitulations' conferred on resident colonies of the subjects of foreign Powers was one of form without being one of substance. The essential difference was that, in the second case, the rights and powers were accorded, not to Ottoman subjects, but to foreign governments who, unlike the *millet-bāshī* of the *Millet-i-Rum*, were not in the Pādishāh's power, but, on the contrary, wielded power of their own which they could use, in the hour of the Sublime Porte's weakness, for forcing upon the Porte their own interpretation of the 'capitulations' to the advantage of their subjects in *partibus Ottomanorum*.

to have been exceptional. In most universal states the tendency seems to have run contrariwise, towards uniformity. Indeed, even in Ottoman history there was an undercurrent in this direction; for from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century of the Christian Era the dominant Muslim community in the Ottoman Empire was continually gaining adherents at the subject non-Muslim communities' expense, and, if this process had not been checked by a decline in the 'Osmanlis' prestige in the eyes of their Orthodox and Monophysite Christian subjects when the tide turned against 'the Ghāzis of Rum'¹ in their warfare with the Christians of the West,² it is conceivable that eventually the Empire might have arrived at uniformity in civil law through attaining uniformity in religion.

In the more frequent cases in which the tendency towards uniformity had prevailed over opposing forces, this common result had not always been reached by the same means or at the same pace.

In the Sinic World, Ts'in She Hwang-ti characteristically imposed an oecumenical uniformity of law at one stroke by decreeing that the legislation in force in his own ancestral kingdom of Ts'in should be applied throughout the territories of the six rival states which he had suddenly conquered and annexed.³ This act was doubly revolutionary, for these abruptly imposed Laws of Ts'in did not represent the traditional customs even of that outlandish march-state. They were one of those sweeping innovations executed in Ts'in, rather more than a hundred years earlier, by the philosopher-statesman Shang Yang (*deces-sit* 338 B.C.) which had prepared the way for Ts'in's decisive victory over her competitors in Ts'in She Hwang-ti's generation. Shang Yang had been one of the pioneer exponents of the so-called 'Legist' School of philosophy,⁴ which had challenged the sanctity of customary rights and duties and had preached to the receptive ears of sovereigns the Machiavellian doctrine that all means were legitimate for attaining the socially expedient end of breaking the power of a feudal aristocracy for the benefit of parvenu monarchies.

Ts'in She Hwang-ti's revolutionary act had at least two Modern Western parallels. Napoleon introduced his newly minted codification of French law not only in France within her pre-Napoleonic limits, but in Italian, Flemish, German, and Polish annexed territories and client states of the Napoleonic Empire. The British Government of India introduced 'the Common Law' of England—partly in its original form and partly in adaptations embodied in local legislation—throughout the Indian territories over which it established its own direct rule.

This act of British statecraft, as far as it went, was more audaciously revolutionary than either of the other two, for the new law which Napoleon and Ts'in She Hwang-ti imposed on their subjects had, after

¹ The title by which the 'Osmanlis are saluted by their Timurid Mughal Turkish kinsman Bābur in his memoirs.

² For this change in the relations between the 'Osmanlis and their Orthodox Christian subjects see II. ii. 223-5; III. iii. 47-48; V. vi. 203-4, 299, and 300; and IX. viii. 161-5.

³ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 233; Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 136.

⁴ For Shang Yang's doctrine and achievements, see pp. 169 and 170, above.

all, come out of the bosom of the society of which the autocrat and his subjects alike were members, whereas the English 'Common Law' was the outcome of Western religious, political, and economic traditions and influences that were alien to the Muslim as well as to the Hindu subjects of the British Rāj. But, though, in this instance, the wind was not tempered to the shorn Indian lamb, his British shearers tactfully made the operation tolerable for him by shaving him only partwise, like a Parisian poodle.

The civil province of law can be divided into two departments, one concerned with what, in laymen's language, may be described as the 'business relations' between private individuals, and the other with what, in the language of the art, is known as 'personal statute'. 'Business relations' are a broad field in which the pocket is touched without deeply affecting the heart; 'personal statute' is a relatively narrow field, but it touches the quick, for its agenda are the intimacies of social life—marriage, wills, inheritance, wardship, and the like. The 'Osmanlis, as we have seen, consigned both these departments of the civil province of law to be dealt with in the separate communal courts of the Muslim community and of the non-Muslim *millets* of the Ottoman Empire in accordance with their respective communal laws. In the derelict domain of a defunct Mughal Empire in India, the British found a *macédoine* of religions, cultures, and peoples closely resembling the contemporary hotch-potch in the Ottoman dominions, but they worked out a different solution for a similar problem. They gave jurisdiction over the whole field to their own newly instituted British Indian courts, but, in prescribing the law that was to be applied in these courts, they confined the application of the English 'Common Law' and its British Indian derivatives to the department of 'business relations', and laid down that cases concerning 'personal statute' should continue to be governed by the communal law of the parties.¹

Like the British in India, the Incas in their Andean Empire partitioned the field of law—apparently on somewhat similar lines.

'The customary rules, varying from one clan to another, [under which their subjects had lived,] were subordinated by the Incas to their own law, which was rigorous and uniform. The customary rules survived in great numbers, as was natural, in the domain of private law. The Incaic Law, which was by far the more important of the two, constituted a civil and criminal law of very wide scope.'²

The Romans were slower than the Incas or the British or Napoleon or Ts'ing She Hwang-ti in achieving uniformity of law in their empire.

¹ This was done, not by drawing up any general definition of the field covered by 'personal statute', but by enumerating in each case the subjects in respect of which the existing communal law of the parties was to be applied in the British Indian courts. The area of the field was different in different cases. The legal institution enabling an owner of property, by making a will which, if valid, is recognized and made enforceable by the law, to determine during his lifetime how his property shall be disposed of after his death, was a feature of Islamic Law, as it was of Western Law, but was unknown to Hindu Law. As a consequence of this historical fact, the testamentary province of personal law came, for Hindus, to fall within the field of the English 'Common Law' or its British Indian derivatives, while for British Indian Muslims it continued to be administered in accordance with the *Shari'ah*.

² Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 182.

To live under Roman Law was one of the reputed privileges of Roman citizenship, and the progressive conferment of the citizenship on the Empire's subjects was not carried to its completion till the reign of Caracalla (*imperabat* A.D. 211-17).¹ As and when they received the citizenship, however, the inhabitants of the Roman Empire automatically came under the rule of Roman Law in all its provinces and departments, and thus the universal reign of Roman Law, when it did come, was all-embracing. In the parallel history of the Arab Caliphate the reign of the Islamic Law was progressively extended by conversions of non-Muslim subjects of the Caliphate to the empire-builders' religion, and, though the non-Muslim residue in the Caliphate was never reduced to the same infinitesimal fraction of the population as the non-citizen residue in the Roman Empire in its latter days, the mass-conversion to Islam that took place in the Caliphate and its successor-states from the ninth to the thirteenth century of the Christian Era gained in momentum as the effective power of the Caliphate progressively decayed, and this produced a far more homogeneous result than the corresponding process in the Ottoman Empire, which, as we have seen, was checked, instead of being stimulated, by the political decline of the universal state.²

The Attempt to stabilize the Law in Japan under the Tokugawa Régime

In the Roman Empire and other universal states in the days of their decline, attempts were made to arrest the course of deterioration by 'freezing' an existing legal or social situation. The Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan was perhaps unique among universal states in applying this prescription of 'freezing' from first to last and in achieving the *tour de force* of arresting change in the outward forms of social life (though not, of course, in the inward realities) over a span of more than 250 years.

In the domain of law the Tokugawa régime, so far from regarding equality before a uniform law as being a desirable ideal, exerted itself to accentuate and perpetuate a caste division between the feudal aristocracy and their retainers on the one side and the rest of the population on the other which was one of the worst of the wounds that the Japanese Society had inflicted on itself during a foregoing Time of Troubles. The cue was given by Tokugawa Ieyasu's predecessor and patron Hideyoshi in an edict of A.D. 1587 (popularly known as 'the Taikō's Sword Hunt') ordering all non-samurai to surrender any weapons in their

¹ See V. v. 446-7, and pp. 155-6, above, and p. 375, below.

² This at first sight puzzling difference is to be explained by a difference in the character of the external enemies by whom a declining Ottoman Empire and a declining 'Abbasid Caliphate were respectively menaced. The most formidable assailants of the 'Abbasid Caliphate were pagan Turkish and Mongol Eurasian Nomads who were as terrifying to the Caliphate's Zoroastrian and Christian subjects as to the ruling Muslim community. In these circumstances the subjects found salvation in adopting Islam themselves and helping their former masters to convert to their now common religion the barbarian conquerors of both parties alike (as the ex-Roman citizen body in Gaul dealt with their pagan Frankish conquerors by converting them to their own recently adopted Catholic Christianity). By contrast, the most formidable assailants of the Ottoman Empire were Western Christians whose culture became extremely attractive to the Ottoman Christians in the secularized version of it that was placed on the international market towards the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, at the very time when the tide of war was turning against the 'Osmanlis.

possession.¹ The recently and arduously established central government further sweetened the pill for the feudal lords whom it had deprived of their long-abused *de facto* local independence by leaving them a very free hand to maintain and develop as they pleased, in all matters that the central government did not consider pertinent to the preservation of its own authority, the variegated 'house laws' which the ruling family of each fief had gradually hammered out and enforced, within the limits of its own parochial jurisdiction, during the later stages of the foregoing Time of Troubles, particularly during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era.² The edict entitled 'the Laws of the Military Houses' which Tokugawa Ieyasu promulgated in A.D. 1615, on the morrow of his crushing retort to the last challenge to his absolute authority,

'is a document which, like the formularies and "house laws" of earlier times, is not so much a systematic collection of specific injunctions and prohibitions as a group of maxims, in somewhat vague language, supported by learned extracts from the Chinese and Japanese classics.'³

'This "Constitution" . . . was regarded by the Shogunate as fundamentally unchangeable. It was re-affirmed by each shogun on his succession, in a solemn ceremony attended by all his vassals; and, though circumstances sometimes forced them to alter it in detail, they never admitted or even contemplated any deviation from its essential principles, and they punished without mercy any breach of its commands.'⁴

It is noteworthy that under this ultra-conservative régime a tendency towards the standardization of local laws did nevertheless declare itself.

'Within their own fiefs the barons enjoyed a very full measure of autonomy. . . . But the Shogunate, without interfering, used to keep a sharp watch on the conduct of the feudatories, and it was one of the chief duties of the censors (*metsuke*) and their travelling inspectors to report upon affairs in the fiefs. For this and similar reasons there was a general tendency among the *daimyō* to assimilate their administrative and judicial methods to those of the central authority, and the legislation in which the Shoguns freely indulged soon began to displace the "house laws" of the fiefs where it did not clash with local sentiment and habit.'⁵

The Expedient of Codification

In universal states in which a progressive standardization of the law had resulted in the attainment of approximate uniformity, there had sometimes been a further stage in which a unified imperial law had been codified by the imperial authorities.

In the history of the Roman Law, the first step towards codification was the 'freezing', in A.D. 131, of the *Edictum Perpetuum* that had hitherto been promulgated afresh by each successive Praetor Urbanus at the beginning of his year of office,⁶ and the final steps were the promulgation

¹ Sansom, Sir G.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), pp. 422 and 450.

² For these local 'house laws', see *ibid.*, pp. 418-20.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 450.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 438.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 449.

⁶ Since *circa* 367-366 B.C.—the traditional date at which the practice of annually electing a governing college of three magistrates had been reinstituted (or perhaps in reality introduced for the first time)—or at any rate since 243 B.C., when the number

of the Justinianean *Code* in A.D. 529¹ and *Institutes* and *Digest* in A.D. 533² and the subsequent abrogation of the legal validity of all previous legislation and learned comment except in so far as it was reproduced in one or other of the three components of the new *Corpus Iuris Romani*. In the Spanish Empire in the Americas, after two abortive attempts at codification, a Creole Tribonian was found at last, in the person of Antonio León Pinelo, to codify the existing laws of the Indies in a *corpus iuris*, entitled *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias*, which was completed in A.D. 1635 and eventually published, in a revised version, in 1681.³ Thereafter the stream of legislation continued to flow till the *Recopilación* had fallen out of date. But a project, first for revising and then for replacing it, which was launched in A.D. 1765, was never carried through.⁴ In the Sumeric 'Realm of the Four Quarters' an earlier code compiled under the Sumerian emperors who had ruled this Sumeric universal state from a seat of government at Ur during the first chapter

of annually elected Roman magistrates of the rank of 'praetor' (the next highest rank to the supreme magistracy represented by the two consuls) had been increased from one to two, one praetor had always been detailed to take charge of the conduct of legal business in the metropolis, and hence had come to be known as the Praetor Urbanus. The transformation of a once socially simple peasant community first into one of the Great Powers, and finally into the imperial mistress, of a complicated and sophisticated Hellenic Society had gradually made it necessary for the Praetor Urbanus to interpret—and, by interpreting, to extend—the existing Roman Law in order to make it applicable to an ever-increasing range and complexity of cases. In order to cope with this problem, it had become customary for each successive Praetor Urbanus, on his accession to office, to draw up, in consultation with the best living legal authorities whose advice he could obtain, a declaration of the lines on which he proposed to administer the law during his own term of office. This practice had been regularized by a *Lex Cornelia* of 67 B.C., which had made it thenceforward obligatory, and no longer merely customary, for the Praetor Urbanus to adhere to the terms of his own edict when once he had posted it up, in order that jurymen, judges, litigants, and the general public might know in advance the terms on which the law was going to be administered during the current year (Strachan-Davidson, J. L.: *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law* (Oxford 1912, Clarendon Press, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 72–73). From 67 B.C. to A.D. 131 it had still been theoretically open to each successive Praetor Urbanus to ignore the edicts of his predecessors and to draft an entirely new annual edict which, though it would be binding on the draftsman, would no more bind his successors than he himself had been bound to follow the drafts of his predecessors. But, though the word *perpetuum*, as used in the *Lex Cornelia*, had thus meant no more than 'valid for twelve months', the effect had been to confirm the practice—no doubt by then already well established—of carrying over the major part of the edict from year to year, since a Praetor Urbanus who had actually exercised his theoretical right to recast it *in toto* would merely have thrown the administration of the law into confusion if he had accomplished the *tour de force* of executing this herculean labour. Thus from 67 B.C. to A.D. 131 the *Edictum Perpetuum* had been a supple instrument in which the benefits of a substantial continuity had been combined with opportunity for the law to grow in response to changes in the social life with which the law was concerned. The Emperor Hadrian commissioned the legal expert Salvius Iulianus to edit, rearrange, and systematize the *Edictum Perpetuum* of the day, and Iulianus's edition was given the force of law, and at the same time made definitive, by a *senatus consultum* of A.D. 131. The effect, of course, was, not to bring the development of Roman Law to an end, but to transfer to the Senate and the Princes the virtual legislative power which, under the terms of the *Lex Cornelia* of 67 B.C., the Praetor Urbanus had previously been sharing with them *de facto*.

¹ According to Collinet, P.: 'The General Problems raised by the Codification of Justinian', in *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis* (Haarlem 1923, Tjeenk Willink), p. 6, there were two editions of the *Code*, of which the first was ordered on the 13th February, 528, and was promulgated on the 7th April, 529, while the second was promulgated on the 17th November, 534.

² According to Collinet, *ibid.*, the *Digest* was ordered on the 15th December, 530, and was promulgated on the 16th December, 533; the *Institutes* were promulgated on the 21st November, 533.

³ See Haring, C. H.: *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York 1947, Oxford University Press), pp. 110–15.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 114.

of its history (*imperabant circa* 2143-2026 or 2079-1962 B.C.) appears¹ to have been the basis of the later code, promulgated by the Amorite restorer of the Empire, Hammurabi of Babylon,² which was brought to light in A.D. 1901 by the Modern Western archaeologist J. de Morgan in the course of his excavations at Susa, whither the stele on which Hammurabi's code had been engraved had been carried away from Babylon in the twelfth century B.C. by the Elamite raider Shutruk-Nachchunte.³ In the main body of the Far Eastern World the victory of the law of the Mongols' sedentary subjects over their Nomad conquerors' *Yāsāq*⁴ was celebrated in the codification of Chinese law in and after the reign of Hung Wu (*regnabat* A.D. 1367-98),⁵ the Chinese patriot leader who had founded the indigenous Ming Dynasty by expelling the Mongols from China-within-the-Wall.⁶ In the Napoleonic Empire a labour which elsewhere was usually 'staggered' over a span of many generations was crowded, for once, into the compass of a single lifetime.

The Historical Background of Codification in the Spanish Empire of the Indies

In all these otherwise diverse instances the work of codification was an urgently needed social service. Hung Wu and Hammurabi were confronted with the problem of conjuring order out of the confusion to which the law, like the rest of the apparatus of oecumenical government, had been reduced by the respective intrusions of alien Mongol and alien Elamite conquerors. In the Andean World, where the Incaic Law had been as strictly administered as it had been sternly conceived,

'Things changed completely when the Spaniards arrived. The swift and inexorable justice of the Inca disappeared, there was a multiplication of

¹ See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 1, 1st ed. (Cambridge 1924, University Press), pp. 435 and 461; Rostovtzeff, M.: *Caravan Cities* (Oxford 1932, Clarendon Press), p. 9; Hrozný, B.: *Die Älteste Geschichte Vorderasiens und Indiens* (Prague 1943, Melantrich), p. 113. Hrozný ascribes the first essay in codification to the revolutionary reformer Uru-kagina of Lagash, who lived in the third quarter of the twenty-sixth century B.C., or in the first quarter of the twenty-fifth century (see the Note on Chronology in vol. x.).

² English translations of Hammurabi's Code are given in Smith, J. M. P.: *The Origin and History of Hebrew Law* (Chicago 1931, University of Chicago Press), pp. 181-222, and in Pritchard, J. B.: *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton 1950, University Press), pp. 163-80. A convenient summary of the contents will be found in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. cit., ed. cit., pp. 516-21. Pritchard, in op. cit., pp. 159-63, gives translations of fragments of codes promulgated at Isin and at Eshnunna during the interval between the fall of Ibbi-Sin of Ur and the rise of Hammurabi.

³ See Hrozný, op. cit., p. 113.

⁴ See pp. 256-7, above.

⁵ 'The first Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, immediately following the capture of Wuchang, ordered a revision of the existing law. In the tenth month of the first year of his reign as King Wu, Li San-Chang was appointed Head of the Law Codification Commission, assisted by Yang Shien, Liu Chi and Dao An. The Code was completed in the twelfth month. In the sixth year of the reign of Hung Wu, Liu Wei-chien was designated to compile the Code of Great Ming, which was submitted by Sung Lien to the Emperor for approval the following year. The Code underwent modifications from time to time after that, and was finally completed and revised by Wu Wei-yung and Wang Kwong Yang. It was promulgated in the thirtieth year of the same reign.' (Note communicated to the writer on the 12th December, 1947, by the kindness of the Chinese Ambassador at the Court of St. James's, Mr. F. I. Cheng, from the record in the official History of the Ming Dynasty.)

⁶ The retransfer of the capital of China from Nanking to Peking by Hung Wu's son and second successor Yung Lo has been discussed in II. ii. 122-3 and on p. 237, above.

interminable suits, the judges were full of tenderness towards criminals and debauchees, and in the markets of the great cities there were Indians to be found who gained their livelihood by serving as witnesses.¹

Moreover,

'Under an absolute and paternalistic [Spanish] monarchy, legislation for the Indies soon became very voluminous, touching every aspect of the duties, rights and responsibilities of the colonists and of the officials set to rule over them. This legislation was intended to carry over into America the spirit and intent of the law of the metropolis, as Philip II explicitly declared in A.D. 1571. It implied the transplanting of society and institutions from an Old World to the New. Yet the legislation of Castile itself had in the colonies the force only of supplementary law. From the very first the Crown had to "adapt the distinct physiognomy acquired by traditional institutions" to circumstances, both geographical and historical, which were radically different from those in the metropolis. The peculiar conditions prevailing in America called for the elaboration of a new legislation with a distinct character of its own. Moreover, in spite of the centralist and unifying tendencies of Hapsburgs and Bourbons, the Crown was forced to take into account, both in legislation and in its application by viceroys and governors, the great differences between one region in America and another. A surprising amount of autonomy was often permitted to colonial authorities. There likewise grew up a substantial amount of customary law in the overseas dominions derived from the jurisprudential practices of the times, which had a recognized legal force if accepted by the Crown and if no written legislation was applicable. Much of this customary jurisprudence developed from the modifications of royal orders by viceroys and captains-general to meet the exigencies of a local situation. Finally, the Crown tried to incorporate into its American legislation some of the juridical customs of the aborigines—especially of those, such as the Incas and the Aztecs, who had evolved a strong political and economic organization—customs which were not in contradiction to the fundamental precepts of Spanish organization and control.'²

In the *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias*, 'León Pinelo reduced the laws of the Indies to over 11,000, extracted from some 400,000 royal *cédulas*.'³ It is little wonder that this clearance of an Augean stable took even that 'zealous and indefatigable' labourer ten years. But it reflects some discredit on the Spanish imperial administration that the task should not have been placed in Pinelo's competent hands until after A.D. 1624, considering that an abortive preceding essay in codification had been commissioned as far back as A.D. 1582. It is perhaps still more discreditable to the authorities that, though Pinelo's draft was completed in A.D. 1635 and was approved by them within the next seven months, the eventual revised version was not published until A.D. 1681.⁴

The Historical Background of Codification in the Roman Empire

This complexity of the historical background of Pinelo's *Recopilación* is surpassed by that of Tribonian's *Corpus Iuris*. The Law of the Twelve Tables, which, according to the traditional chronology, had been pro-

¹ Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 186.

² Haring, op. cit., pp. 109-10.

³ Ibid., p. 113.

⁴ See *ibid.*

mulgated in 451-450 B.C. by the Board of Decemvirs appointed to draft it, had equipped the still archaic Roman community of the age with an instrument that, by that time, would already have been out of date in the heart of an Hellenic World on whose outskirts Rome then lay. The subsequent progressive and cumulatively enormous revolution in Rome's social and political position demanded, and duly evoked, a flood of new legislation which flowed for ten centuries in a number of different channels: laws enacted by the *Populus Romanus*; votes, possessing the force of law, passed by the Plebs; the *Edictum Perpetuum* of the Praetor Urbanus; the resolutions of the Senate; and the acts, decisions, and decrees of Caesar after the Republic had been succeeded by the Principate. When the stream of often capricious and inconsequent acts of Plebs and *Populus* had ceased to flow, the new stream of imperial legislation became, as time went on, even more inconsequent, capricious, and voluminous till, in the western half of the Empire during the century ending in A.D. 476, a climax was reached in a spate of decrees reiterating the same commands on a rising note of hysteria, with threats of ever more savage penalties for disobedience which merely advertised the truth that the imperial legislators in that part of the Empire had by that stage become impotent to enforce their authority. 'Et septemgemini turbant trepida ostia Nili.'¹ The ancient river of Roman legislation had dispersed its waters into a mazy delta on its way to losing them in an 'unharvested sea'.

Yet this maze of legislation was not so formidable as the jungle of learned comment that had sprung up on its marge. Law is by nature conservative, and its ineradicable resistance to change calls always and everywhere for the services of skilled interpreters to ensure that it shall continue to serve the practical needs of social life in spite of perpetually losing its unequally matched race with changing circumstances. In the administration of the Roman Law during the thousand years following the promulgation of the Twelve Tables, the lag—to be made up by interpretation—between the formal state of the law and the social task required of it was enlarged to an unusual degree of magnitude in consequence of the extraordinary political career through which a rustic city-state had grown into an oecumenical empire. If the Roman juriconsults were to succeed in bridging this formidable gulf,² they stood in need of all the intellectual building-materials on which they could lay hands; and, after the reception of Hellenic philosophy at Rome in the second century B.C., the ethics of the Stoic School gradually came to supply the interpreters of the Roman Law with those comprehensive maxims, logical principles, and imaginative vistas that were required for transforming the peculiar local customs of a primitive-minded peasantry into a system acceptable to the Hellenic World.

Under the early Principate as well as under the late Republic, a still persisting aristocratic tradition kept the study and interpretation of the

¹ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book VI, l. 800.

² The archaic title *pontifices* would have described the functions of these secular Roman juriconsults more aptly than those of the Christian bishop who eventually took it over from the college of pagan priests who were its original bearers.

law in the hands of a governing class—confined to the senatorial and equestrian orders—whose members were expected to be men of action as well as men of culture and would not have been allowed by their superiors or their peers to rise to high positions of political responsibility exclusively in virtue of eminent legal ability, without having also shown at least some aptitude for military command and public administration. This aristocratic way of public life, with its obvious merits and its equally obvious limitations, was abandoned, in the field of law, in the reign of the Emperor Hadrian (*imperabat* A.D. 117–38),¹ whose personal policy was consciously inspired by a zeal for efficiency but at the same time served the purposes of a *Zeitgeist* that was already up in arms against social privileges and political monopolies.² Hadrian converted his predecessors' informal and indefinite entourage of advisers into an imperial council of salaried juriconsults of senatorial and equestrian rank, and he also created a panel of eminent legal authorities (*iuris prudentes*) whom he invested with powers of replying officially to legal queries (*ius respondendi*) and, in effect, of acting corporately as a legislative body, since he provided that their opinion, when unanimous, should have the force of law. By these measures, Hadrian called into existence a professional class of legal specialists; and the consequent lawyers' 'Golden Age' outlasted the Antonine 'Indian Summer' and survived—though not unscathed—the intermittent frosts of the ensuing Severan overture to winter.³

The virtues and abilities of Papinian—whom Posterity regarded as the brightest link in all the golden chain of the Roman legal tradition⁴—found a lawyer's mind to appreciate them and a soldier's arm to protect them combined in the person of Septimius Severus, who had been Papinian's predecessor in the office of *Advocatus Fisci* before becoming his imperial master and patron. Yet even the grim founder of the Severan Dynasty could not save Papinian from paying the extreme penalty for his probity to the savagery of Septimius's brutal son and successor Caracalla; and Papinian's disciple Ulpian was assassinated in his turn, by the praetorian guards, in the presence of his impotent imperial friend and admirer the gentle Alexander Severus. Paul, and Paul only, was left; and when, seven years after the murder of Ulpian, the last Emperor of the House of Severus himself succumbed to the tragic fate from which he had failed to rescue an esteemed and beloved public servant, this culminating political crime heralded a blizzard of anarchy in which liberal legal studies were blasted and seared. Yet, even so, the golden century of Roman legal studies, from the 'freezing' of the Urban Praetor's Perpetual Edict in A.D. 131 to the 'revolt of Caliban' in A.D. 235, had produced a volume of output so enormous that for Tribonian and his colleagues, three hundred years later, the compression of this matter

¹ See p. 262, with n. 6, above.

² See pp. 152–8, above.

³ See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (Cambridge 1936, University Press), pp. 314–15 and 816–26.

⁴ A rescript of Galla Placidia's, dated the 7th November, A.D. 426, gave Papinian the casting vote in any conflict of authority between two or more of the five classical jurists (Papinianus, Paullus, Gaius, Ulpianus, Modestinus) in which the *theod.* i. iv. 3). including Papinian, were ranged in equal numbers on either side (*Cod. Theod.* i. iv. 3).

into the *Digest* was the heaviest of their three titanic tasks, though they virtually confined their selection of materials to the contents of treatises produced within this relatively short period in the long history of Roman Law.

'Seventeen lawyers, with Tribonian at their head, were appointed by the Emperor [Justinian] to exercise an absolute jurisdiction over the works of their predecessors. If they had obeyed his commands in ten years, Justinian would have been satisfied with their diligence; and the rapid composition of the *Digest* or *Pandects* in three years (15th December, A.D. 530—16th December, A.D. 533) will deserve praise or censure according to the merit of the execution. From the library of Tribonian they chose forty, the most eminent civilians of former times; two thousand treatises were comprised in an abridgement of fifty books; and it has been carefully recorded that three millions of lines or sentences were reduced, in this abstract, to the moderate number of one hundred and fifty thousand.'¹

By comparison with this second of his labours, Tribonian's first feat of compiling the *Code* was easy. In codifying within a term of fourteen months (13th February, A.D. 528—7th April, A.D. 529) the decrees that had been promulgated by successive emperors in the course of the four centuries that had elapsed between the accession of Hadrian² and the current year of Justinian's reign, Tribonian could avail himself of the existing works of three forerunners: the unofficial codes compiled by Gregorius (later than the 19th October, A.D. 294, and probably in A.D. 297) and by Hermogenianus (later than the 21st March, A.D. 295)³ and the official supplement to them promulgated, on the 15th February, A.D. 438, by the Emperor Theodosius II (*imperabat* A.D. 408–50),⁴ which covered the years A.D. 312/13–437 for the Eastern Half of the Empire and the years A.D. 312/13–432 for the Western Half.⁵ By comparison, again, with the arduousness of compiling the *Code*, it was child's-play for Tribonian to round off his threefold enterprise by enucleating the elements of Roman Law in the *Institutes*.

The Historical Background of Codification in the Napoleonic Empire

The *Corpus Iuris Iustinianum* had a worthy counterpart in the Napoleonic array of codes in respect of both the speed and the immensity of the labours of which it was a monument.

'The difficulties of this undertaking consisted mainly in the enormous

¹ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xlv.

² The series did not begin before Hadrian's reign because Hadrian was the initiator of the practice of promulgating imperial decrees undisguisedly as such. 'From Augustus to Trajan, the modest Caesars were content to promulgate their edicts in the various characters of a Roman magistrate; and, in the decrees of the Senate, the epistles and orations of the Prince were respectfully inserted. Hadrian appears to have been the first who assumed, without disguise, the plenitude of legislative power' (Gibbon, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.). This new departure of Hadrian's was at variance with the spirit of the Principate as inspired by Augustus.

³ A second edition of Hermogenianus's code was published (probably by Hermogenianus himself) in the reign of Constantine the Great (*imperabat* A.D. 306–37), and a third during the joint reign of Valentinian and Valens (A.D. 364–75).

⁴ The Theodosian Code had taken just under nine years to compile, since the commissioners had been appointed on the 26th March, 429.

⁵ See Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt* (Stuttgart: Metzler), vol. vi (1920), pp. 164–83, and vol. vi, Anhang (1921), pp. 428–32.

mass of decrees emanating from the national assemblies, relative to political, civil and criminal affairs.¹ This amorphous product of more than eleven years of French revolutionary legislation² was comparable with the spate of decrees of the Roman Emperors, from Hadrian to Justinian, which Papinian had to confine within the dykes of the Justinianean *Codex*. The resemblance extended beyond the sheer volume to the intrinsic nature of the materials. 'Many of these decrees, the offspring of a momentary enthusiasm, had found a place in the codes of laws which were then compiled; and yet sagacious observers knew that several of them warred against the instincts of the Gallic race.'³ The French legislators had been attempting, like the Roman jurists, to transfigure a litter of ancient local customary laws by suffusing it with a modern philosophy; but they had sought to achieve at a stroke what their Roman ensamples had been content to accomplish in the course of three or four hundred years, and they had gone to work with an inferior intellectual instrument; for the self-confident iconoclastic humanism of Rousseau or Voltaire was a jejune spiritual elixir by comparison with the ripe and rueful wisdom of a Stoicism that had been refined by many generations of suffering.

The Napoleonic codifiers were therefore well advised in rejecting their revolutionary heralds' academic ideal of making a clean break with the past; yet they could not contemplate reinstating the antediluvian law as it had stood.

'Old French law had been an inextricable labyrinth of laws and customs, provincial privileges, ecclesiastical rights, and the later undergrowth of royal decrees; and no part of the legislation of the revolutionists met with so little resistance as their root-and-branch destruction of this exasperating jungle. Their difficulties only began when they endeavoured to apply the principles of the Rights of Man to political, civil and criminal affairs.'⁴

The revolutionary legislators' axes had cleared away the primeval forest to force a rank second growth in the name of simplicity and reason, and it was left for the Napoleonic codifiers to produce a blend of old and new which could serve the practical needs of the Western Society of the day.

In putting this hard but urgent task in hand, Napoleon did not have to start entirely *de novo* or unaided. Before the expiration of the *Ancien Régime* the industry and sagacity of pre-revolutionary French jurists had already gone far towards distilling a common essence out of the divers provincial varieties of French customary law; and, in following up their work, Napoleon had at his elbow, in the Second Consul Cambacérès, a learned and clear-headed lawyer who had stumbled upon the pitfalls of the revolutionary attitude and method in failing, in A.D. 1793, to obtain the approval of the Convention for a draft of a civil code which he and his fellow committeemen had taken six weeks to prepare instead of the month which the Convention had assigned for the completion of the

¹ Rose, J. H.: *The Life of Napoleon I* (London 1904, Bell, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 287-8.

² Reckoning from the opening session of the States-General on the 5th May, 1789, to the appointment, on the 12th August, 1800, of a commission to draft a civil code.

³ Rose, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 288.

⁴ Ibid., p. 288.

work. The four commissioners appointed on the 12th August, 1800, by Napoleon, to try again where the Convention's committee had failed, succeeded in carrying out their instructions to produce a first draft in four months. It was printed on the 1st January, 1801; and, though it then still had to run the gauntlet of the Court of Cassation, the Courts of Appeal, the Legislative Section, and the General Assembly of the Council of State, and thereafter the Tribunal, a civil code of 2,281 articles, embodying the amendments of these successive critics, was duly promulgated between the 15th March, 1803, and the 30th March, 1804, and was thus completed only three and a half years after the drafting commission had been nominated. Within nine and a half years of the same initial date, the entire gigantic task of producing not only a civil code but also a code of civil procedure, a criminal code, a code of criminal procedure, and a commercial code had been completed by the promulgation of the fourth and last book of the criminal code on the 2nd March, 1810.

The extent of Napoleon's own personal contribution to the shaping of these five Napoleonic codes may continue to be disputed. We may believe contemporary reports that, in some episodes of the thirty-five sittings, out of eighty-seven in all, at which the First Consul was present and in the chair while the draft of the Civil Code was being debated in the General Assembly of the Council of State, Napoleon 'fatigued the attention of his audience by the confused abundance and the unexpected turns of his thought'.¹ We may follow a recent English master of Napoleonic studies in his verdict that 'the Civil Code was a hasty piece of work, and' that 'the First Consul imported a strong gust of passion and of politics into the laboratory of legal science'.² But any student of history who, at however low a level, has had dealings with both scholars and men of action, and has also had it laid upon him to induce them to co-operate with one another on a common task, will not be blind to the significance of Napoleon's decisive intervention, on the 1st April, 1802, to shorten, simplify, and improve the procedure for passing the draft of the Civil Code at a moment when the cumbrous wheels of an academic constitution had almost stopped turning. And he will readily be convinced that, 'without [Napoleon's] driving power, [the Civil Code] would certainly not have come into existence so soon, and might not have come into existence at all'.³

The Price of Codification

Who had been the principal beneficiaries of the empire-builders' legal heritage and of their successors' codifying labours?

The victims of codification would hardly have reckoned themselves among the beneficiaries if they could have risen from the dead to inspect their successors' handiwork. Among the codifiers whom we have just passed in review, the Napoleonic team alone could have contemplated with equanimity a personal encounter with predecessors who, in this

¹ Fisher, H. A. L., in *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. ix (Cambridge 1906, University Press), p. 152.

² *Ibid.*, p. 162.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

exceptional case, would have been compelled, on confrontation, to confess that these deft and elegant surgeons had improved, out of all recognition, the uncouth build of a *corpus vile*. By contrast, the ghosts of Papinian and Ulpian might have protested in all sincerity that they would liefer have felt again, in their own flesh, the agonizing edge of their assassins' swords than have voluntarily submitted the exquisite products of their masterly intellectual labours to be butchered by the rough-and-ready workmanship of Tribonian and his colleagues.

'Instead of a statue cast in a simple mould by the hand of an artist, the works of Justinian represent a tessellated pavement of antique and costly, but too often incoherent, fragments.'¹

And it is possible that a twentieth-century historian might have felt moved to apply Gibbon's dictum to the Code of Hammurabi if the extant fragments of the underlying work of Hammurabi's Sumerian predecessors² that had been preserved independently had been sufficient to enable the latter-day student to extract and reconstruct the copious borrowings from the same source that were to be looked for in Hammurabi's redaction.

The Exceptional Service rendered by the 'Code Napoléon' to a Late Modern Western Society

In their high-handed treatment of their predecessors' work, are the codifiers performing a valuable service for their contemporaries and successors? In the judgement of an eminent post-Gibbonian Western student of Roman Law,

'Justinian's intention was to promulgate legislation applicable to the peoples of diverse race who were living under the law of the Empire of the East, using as his materials the texts of the Roman Law as he found it—first and foremost, the texts of the classical jurists. The basis thus given to his work was the best that he could have taken; for, in the decadent state of the science of Law in his day, he could never have succeeded in obtaining a codification comparable in merit to the system with which his name is actually associated if he had instructed his commissioners to do the drafting themselves. Just because, however, he chose the basis that he did choose, the materials that entered into the composition of his codification, and particularly into the Digest, had to be transformed—as stones from an old building that are being used in a new one are re-cut and re-mortared—in order to be brought into harmony with the exigencies of a civilization that was younger by three centuries at the least, and with the needs of an empire—the Empire of the East—whose boundaries were no longer identical with those of the *Orbis Romanus* of the generation of Gaius or Ulpian.³ This task of adaptation required the constant employ-

¹ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xlv.

² Twenty-five laws, in all, of the code compiled in the Sumerian language by the Emperor Ur-Engur and succeeding sovereigns of the Third Dynasty of Ur had been preserved on two clay tablets from Nippur and one from Uruk (*The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. i, 1st ed. (Cambridge 1924, University Press), p. 461). Whatever might be the respective merits of the draftsmanship, there seemed to be no doubt that, in the penalties prescribed, the Sumerian emperors' code was superior to Hammurabi's in point of humanity.

³ According to Collinet, P., *Études Historiques sur le Droit de Justinien*, vol. i, 'Le

ment of an adequate instrument, [and this instrument was found in the device of] interpolation.¹

The claim made in this passage on behalf of the authors of the *Corpus Iustinianum* could undoubtedly be substantiated by the authors of the *Code Napoléon*; but this may be one of those exceptions that prove a contrary rule; for the *Code Napoléon* was the work of empire-builders to whom History, as we have seen, had assigned the peculiar task of providing a universal state for a moribund sub-society within a larger body social that had not yet lost its vitality; and these unusual circumstances, which condemned the Napoleonic Empire itself to an early death, ensured a brilliant career for the code that was its offspring. The *ci-devant* city-state cosmos in Italy, the Low Countries, and Germany, whose incorporation into a universal state was the Napoleonic Empire's historical *raison d'être*, did duly dissolve with the downfall of the Napoleonic political edifice that had housed it in its last phase; but in this unique case the sequel was not the catastrophe of a social interregnum but a 'happy ending' in which an abortive sub-society that had failed to make a success of its deliberate departure from the standard pattern of the Western Civilization now at last succeeded in divesting itself of a separate identity which had long since ceased to be anything but a handicap and an embarrassment to it by re-entering the main stream of Western life from which it had once self-consciously sought to part company. It had been the mission of the French empire-builders to draw their non-French subjects back into a flowing current of life which was the imperial people's own native element, and from which their legal tradition and *éthos* were derived; and for this reason the successful accomplishment of a French political task, which made the Napoleonic Empire superfluous, launched the *Code Napoléon* on a flood-tide leading on to fortune.

Caractère Oriental de l'Œuvre Législative de Justinien' (Paris 1912, Recueil Sirey), the *Corpus Iustinianum* was intended to serve the current needs of the Greek and Oriental provinces of the Roman Empire (p. 14). The work is a monument of 'the transformation of Oriental elements, that had previously been merely provincial, into imperial elements [during the interval] between [the generations of] Constantine, who is a Roman emperor reigning in a Roman city, and Justinian, who is an Oriental emperor reigning over an Empire of the East' (ibid., p. 16). Justinian's board of commissioners was composed of representatives of four parties: Constantinopolitan officials, Constantinopolitan professors, Berytan professors, and advocates practising in the court of the Praefectus Praetorio per Orientem at Constantinople (ibid., p. 23)—i.e. the law schools of Constantinople and Bayrūt alone were represented, to the exclusion of those of Rome, Alexandria, Caesarea, and Athens (ibid., p. 23). According to Collinet, the Code was wholly, and the Institutes were mainly, the work of the Constantinopolitan commissioners, while the Berytan commissioners were perhaps principally responsible for the Digest (ibid., p. 24). The *Corpus Iustinianum* is a codification of the living law of the Roman East (ibid., p. 28); and this was a fusion of Hellenic Law with a Roman Law which had been adapted to Oriental requirements by an abandonment of some of its original native Roman elements (ibid., p. 29). In Justinian's day a Roman Law that, by then, had already become static in the West was still evolving in the East on Oriental lines (ibid., pp. 34, 159, and 314); and, in order to bring the *Corpus Iustinianum* into conformity with the living Roman Law of the East, a number of traditional Roman legal institutions were jettisoned in the compilation of it (ibid., pp. 213-14). The *Corpus Iustinianum* was distinguished from contemporary Western Roman Law in two ways: it was more *savant*; and, instead of being stagnant, it embodied the results of regional progress (ibid., pp. 314 and 317).—A.J.T.

¹ Collinet, P.: *Études Historiques sur le Droit de Justinien*, vol. i: 'Le Caractère Oriental de l'Œuvre Législative de Justinien' (Paris 1912, Recueil Sirey), pp. xxv-xxvi.

On the day of its promulgation the Napoleonic Civil Code automatically became law, not only for all inhabitants of France within her pre-Revolutionary frontiers, but for Walloons and Flemings in the Southern Netherlands and Germans west of the Rhine, who on the 21st March, 1804, were already fellow citizens of the French in a Republic that, on the 18th May, was to be converted into an Empire. Thereafter, from A.D. 1804 to A.D. 1811, the Code's domain was being constantly enlarged. It gained ground partly through the enlargement of the French Empire itself, which continued to swallow up satellite states and conquered territories till it stretched north-eastwards as far as Lübeck and south-eastwards as far as Terracina,¹ and partly through the 'reception' of the Code in satellite states that survived or that were increased in stature or that were enlisted as new recruits. On the 30th March, 1806, the Code was promulgated in the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, which by that time had been enlarged to include almost all the former dominions of Venice;² and, before the Napoleonic edifice collapsed, the Code had become law throughout Continental Italy, including the satellite Kingdom of Naples. It seeded itself in several Swiss cantons. It was promulgated in Holland on the 18th October, 1810. And it made a triumphal progress across Napoleonic Germany, where it was received in the Kingdom of Westphalia on the 15th November, 1807; in the Free City of Danzig on the 19th November, 1807; in Arenburg on the 28th January, 1808; in the Grand Duchy of Baden on the 5th July, 1808; in the Grand Duchy of Frankfurt on the 15th September, 1809; in the Grand Duchy of Berg on the 1st January, 1810; in the newly constituted Lippe and Hanseatic Departments of the French Empire on the 29th May and the 10th December, 1810, respectively; in the Duchy of Köthen on the 28th December, 1810; and in the Duchy of Nassau on the 1st and 4th February, 1811.³

The most distant and exotic of the Code's pacific conquests was the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, where it was received in A.D. 1808 in the ex-Prussian nucleus, and in A.D. 1810 in the ex-Austrian annex.⁴ In A.D. 1928 it was still in force in a fragment of territory, wedged in between the left bank of the River Niemen and the eastern frontier of East Prussia, which had once constituted the north-eastern extremity of the Duchy of Warsaw and its successor the 'Congress Kingdom' of Poland, but which in 1928 formed part of the *Saisonstaat* of inter-war Lithuania.⁵

This widespread 'reception' of the Code was brought about by a

¹ Without reckoning in the Illyrian Provinces, insulated geographically from the main body of the French Empire by the breadth of the satellite Kingdom of Italy, which France acquired from Austria in the Peace Treaty of Schönbrunn (14th October, 1809).

² All, indeed, except the Ionian Islands. The Kingdom of Italy obtained these acquisitions through the Franco-Austrian Peace Treaty of Pressburg (26th December, 1805). In the territorial rearrangements following the conclusion of the subsequent Franco-Austrian Peace Treaty of Schönbrunn (14th October, 1809) the Kingdom of Italy lost Dalmatia but acquired the Trentino.

³ This calendar of the progressive reception of the Code in Germany is taken from Fisher, H. A. L.: *Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany* (Oxford 1903, Clarendon Press), p. 380, n. 2.

⁴ See *ibid.*

⁵ This curiosity of legal history was imparted to the writer of this Study one day in that year when he was standing in Kovno and gazing across the Niemen towards its once Napoleonic western bank.

variety of means, ranging from a more or less genuine free choice to sheer and undissimulated coercion.

"The transplantation from one country to another of a code of laws, and of a system of judicial organisation, must in all cases be a delicate proceeding, for, though the elementary principles of justice are universally appreciated, nation differs from nation in the principles of their application. . . . The immediate introduction of the French codes into the Grand Duchy of Berg seemed to the conservative mind of Count Beugnot [the French Imperial Commissioner] to savour of indiscretion. "Germany", as he reminded his Government, "had not, like France, been levelled by the legislation of iconoclastic assemblies." It would require time and instruction before she could properly attune herself to the new melodies of the Code. Nor was there any danger in delay. . . . These representations were received and rejected. On the 12th November, 1809, an imperial decree ordered that the *Code Napoléon* was to have the force of law in the Grand Duchy of Berg from the 1st January, 1810, and at the same time the Imperial Commission was requested instantly to furnish a draft scheme for judicial organization. Beugnot had no option but to obey."¹

In the Kingdom of Westphalia, likewise, the *Code Napoléon* was made law, as from the 1st January, 1808,² by the terms of a constitution, promulgated from Paris on the 15th November, 1807, which 'may be considered either in the light of a treaty or in that of a guarantee'.³ But here the peremptoriness of the imperial dictate was mitigated by the tender-handedness of its local application. In the crucial matter of feudalism, for example, a declaration of 'the unconditional abolition of serfage passed through the crucible of successive legal refinements';⁴ and when

'some proprietors complained of these proceedings as too revolutionary, the Government replied with justice that, according to the liberal principles of the *Code Napoléon* and of the Act constituting the Kingdom of Westphalia, all rights of serfage and feudalism might have been suppressed. . . ; that the suppression had been general in Genoa, Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany; but that the Westphalian Government had preferred an equitable temperament between the rigour of the laws and the respect due to long possession. They had kept everything which they could keep without violating principle.'⁵

In any case, whatever the political circumstances of its local 'reception' might have been, the intrinsic merits of the *Code Napoléon* were such as to secure its survival when the Napoleonic Empire was overthrown through an irresistible reaction of its non-French subjects and victims against an intolerable abuse of French military and political power.

"When the project for the German Civil Code came before the Reichstag in 1900, it was stated that seventeen per cent of the fifty million inhabitants of the German Empire were still ruled by French law. In the Prussian, Hessian and Bavarian Rhine provinces, and in Alsace-Lorraine, the *Code Napoléon* was administered in its original tongue; while a German translation, only slightly differing from its French prototype, was current in

¹ Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-8.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

² See *ibid.*, p. 232.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Baden. That the Code should have persisted in any portion of Germany, when all the circumstances of the War of Liberation are taken into account, is a remarkable tribute to its merits. We may admit that its preparation was hurried, that the discussions in the Council of State were often unsatisfactory, and that it is based upon an imperfect survey of practical contingencies. There is doubtless great weight in Savigny's contention that Germany was not ripe for a code, and that the legal system of a country should be the natural result of its historical development. But the choice in 1807 and in 1815 did not lie between pure German and pure French law. It lay between the *Code Napoléon* on the one hand, sketchy, no doubt, and over-simplified, but lucid, intelligible and portable,¹ and an "endless waste of contradictory, conjectural and motley ordinances. . . ." We cannot wonder that, in comparison with this hybrid miscellany, the French Code seemed to many Germans to be the utterance of Reason herself.²

Even in territories where, upon the downfall of the Napoleonic Empire, the *Code Napoléon* was abrogated, along with all other Napoleonic innovations, by the 'Zealotism' of a momentarily restored *Ancien Régime* that was too uncertain of its tenure to venture to be discriminating in its policy, the imported French law was not in every case rescinded *in toto*, while in other cases it crept back, unacknowledged yet effectively operative, in a non-French disguise, when the mounting pressure of nineteenth-century Industrialism and Democracy compelled even unrepentant reactionary régimes to overhaul the antiquated law that they had reinstated in the *Code Napoléon's* place. This happened in several of the temporarily re-erected pre-Napoleonic statelets in Italy; and, when, in belated response to Napoleon's trumpet-call,³ an Italian Risorgimento

¹ The portability of the *Code Napoléon* proclaims its success; its lucidity and intelligibility account for its portability; and this trinity of virtues was heaven-sent; for the substitution of one system of law for another, *in toto* and at one stroke, is, at best, a formidable undertaking. Even when the substitute exists, ready-made, and has merely to be translated and enacted in order to give it the force of law on paper, it cannot become practically operative without the introduction of a corresponding new code of procedure and without the training up of a new generation of judges, barristers, and solicitors who have familiarized themselves with the new law and new procedure by daily practice in the courts. When the writer of this Study visited Lithuania at Eastertide, 1928, he found that, in their enthusiasm for reorganizing their life on a Lithuanian national basis, the Lithuanians had taken two steps which, in their combined effect, were producing serious practical difficulties. On the one hand they had set themselves to draft a unitary national Lithuanian system of law to replace both the *Code Napoléon*, which was in force in the fragment of Lithuanian territory on the left bank of the Niemen, and the Imperial Russian Law, which was in force in the rest of the country. Simultaneously, in their educational system, they had deposed the Russian language from its former position of being the first foreign language to be learnt by Lithuanian children, and had replaced it by a choice between the leading Western languages. This replacement of the Russian language in the Lithuanian schools was, of course, as quick and easy a step as the replacement of the Imperial Russian Law in the Lithuanian Courts was slow and difficult. By A.D. 1928 the Lithuanians had realized, too late, that their self-imposed task of introducing a new national Lithuanian system of law was not going to be fulfilled as a going concern within any foreseeable period of time; but by 1928 a time could already be foreseen when the Imperial Russian Law would have to be administered in Lithuania by a rising generation of Lithuanian judges and lawyers who would have been brought up without having been taught the Russian language. To tide over the awkward interim stage that could thus be seen ahead, could not the Imperial Russian Law be translated into Lithuanian? Alas, no; for this was not a code but a congeries of 'case law', and the use of it demanded a familiarity with decisions of the Imperial Russian Senate running into hundreds of volumes. In such a situation the merits of the *Code Napoléon* were conspicuous. Happy that small minority of Lithuanian judges, lawyers, and litigants whose business was transacted on the River Niemen's Napoleonic bank.—A.J.T.

² Fisher, op. cit., p. 379.

³ See V. v. 642.

had swept this political lumber away, to make room for an Italian national state that aspired to be liberal as well as united, Italian codifiers frankly took the *Code Napoléon* as their model in drafting the Italian Civil Code that was adopted on the 25th June, 1865, and was brought into force on the 1st January, 1866.

The *Code Napoléon*'s most remarkable triumphs, however, were its conquests of alien worlds on which the claws of the Napoleonic eagle had never fastened. During Napoleon's trial of strength with Great Britain, British sea power had foiled his attempt to conquer Egypt and Syria, forced him to sell Louisiana to the United States,¹ and prevented him from following up his military occupation of Spain and invasion of Portugal by pouncing upon these decrepit Powers' great possessions in the Americas. Yet the *Code Napoléon* struck roots both in the Americas and in the Levant. It became an important constituent of the local law of the State of Louisiana within the North American Union;² it influenced the development of the established variety of pre-Revolutionary French customary law in the anti-Revolutionary Canadian Province of Quebec;³ while in the successor-states of the Spanish Empire of the Indies it came as a god-send to fill the legal vacuum left by the failure of the Spanish Bourbon régime to bring up to date the worthy Pinelo's long-since antiquated *Recopilación de Leyes de Los Reynos de las Indias*.⁴

As for Egypt, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the *Code Napoléon* found a second home in this stronghold of Islam after the process of Westernization, foreshadowed in the shattering but transitory visitation of Napoleon's expeditionary force, had been put in hand in good earnest by Mehmed 'Alī. In the whole field of civil law outside the communal preserve of Personal Statute, the *Code Napoléon* was 'received' in Egypt in A.D. 1876 as the law for the new Mixed Courts and in A.D. 1883 (a sensational triumph, this!)⁵ as the law for the new system of civil and criminal jurisdiction,⁶ applying to Ottoman subjects in Egypt,

¹ French land power had enabled Napoleon, in a secret convention signed at Saint Ildefonso on the 7th October, 1800, to extort from the Spanish Crown the retrocession to France of the originally French possession of Louisiana, which the French Crown had ceded to Spain in the peace settlement of A.D. 1763; but Napoleon missed his opportunity for seizing this Transatlantic prey during his momentary enjoyment of the freedom of the seas after the conclusion of the Anglo-French Peace Treaty of Amiens on the 25th March, 1802; and the naval war was in full swing again by the 20th December, 1803, when the sale of Louisiana by the French Empire to the United States was completed.

² The state law of Louisiana was a blend of several different elements: the local French customary law of the *Ancien Régime*, the law of the Spanish Indies, introduced after the cession of Louisiana by France to Spain in A.D. 1763, and the English 'Common Law' introduced after the retrocession of Louisiana by Spain to France in A.D. 1800 and its purchase from France by the United States in A.D. 1803. The Napoleonic codes were grafted on to the existing local French law *pari passu* with the introduction of the 'Common Law' current in the United States.

³ This influence was manifest in the Quebec Civil Code of A.D. 1867.

⁴ See p. 263, above.

⁵ Sensational in view of the gulf between the *Code Napoléon* and the communal systems of law which it was replacing. It did, however, share one vital common source with the Islamic *Shari'ah* as well as with the communal laws of the several Christian *millets*. All these legal systems alike were derived in large measure from varieties or transmutations of Roman Law. The influence of Roman Law on Islamic Law is discussed on pp. 288-91, below.

⁶ The traditional *Shari'* courts retained their jurisdiction in matters of 'personal statute'.

that was introduced in that year. This naturalization of French Law in Egypt goes far to account for the strength of the hold which French culture obtained in Egypt notwithstanding the ultimate discomfiture of France in her military and political struggle with Great Britain for ascendancy there. The French military occupation of Egypt had lasted for little more than three years (reckoning from the landing of Napoleon's expeditionary force on the 1st July, 1798, to the ignominious surrender of 'Abdallah Menou on the 2nd September, 1801); the second and single-handed British occupation¹ had lasted for fifty-four years (reckoning from the landing of a British expeditionary force on the 20th August, 1882, to the ratification of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance signed on the 26th August, 1936), and in A.D. 1952 the vestiges of British occupation which the terms of the Treaty had preserved had not yet been entirely removed. Yet on the morrow of the General War of 1939-45 the by this time penetratingly Westernized governing class of Egypt bore its Western imprint in the French and not in the British variety of the pattern.

One of the most remarkable episodes in the history of the dissemination of the *Code Napoléon* was the role that it was called upon to play in Japan during the Meiji Era. In embarking on a general programme of Westernization the authors of the Meiji Revolution showed their wisdom in the field of law by hastening slowly. Their first step, taken in A.D. 1870, was to have the French Codes translated into Japanese. Law schools for French, English, and German Law were successively established in A.D. 1872, 1874, and 1887. In A.D. 1875 a commission was appointed to compile a civil code, and, after its draft, which followed the Napoleonic Civil Code very closely, had been submitted to the Japanese Government in A.D. 1878 and had been rejected, a member of the commission, the French jurist Boissonade, was asked in 1880 to prepare a new draft. His draft was published on the 27th March, 1890, and a complementary draft by Japanese jurists, covering the province of 'personal statute', on the 16th October of the same year, and the whole code was to come into force on the 1st January, 1893.

This apparent acceptance, in Japan, of a Napoleonic *Code Boissonade* was the high-water mark in the flow of the *Code Napoléon*'s influence over the face of the globe; and a turn in the tide was not slow to follow. Before the arrival of the date fixed for bringing the *Code Boissonade* into operation, the newly created Japanese Imperial Diet voted, on the 16th May, 1892, for postponing the date till the 31st December, 1896. Thereupon, a third draft was commissioned, and this draft, which was published in instalments in 1896 and 1898 and was brought into force in July 1899, was inspired, not by the *Code Napoléon*, but by the second draft of a German Civil Code, which had been published in 1895.²

The controversy in Japan which resulted in this victory of German

¹ In response to the challenge of the French occupation, British troops had already set foot on Egyptian soil from the 8th March, 1801, to March 1803; but on this first occasion they had come by invitation of the lawful sovereign of Egypt, the Ottoman Pādīshāh, and in the company of a Turkish expeditionary force.

² In the German Empire this draft was subsequently adopted on the 16th August, 1896, and was brought into force on the 1st January, 1900.

over French law had not arisen over the respective merits of two variant Western schools of jurisprudence, but had been

'a deep-seated conflict between two fundamental ideas of law. The immediate enforcement party contended for the juristic idea embodied in the theory of the school of Natural Law, namely that Law was based upon Human Nature, that it is of a universal character, and that, inasmuch as the codification of a civilised country like France was a refined expression of Human Nature or of the universal character of Law, it could be adopted by Japan. The postponement party stood for the juristic idea of the historical school, that Law, like Language, was an expression of national character and a product of History, and that the introduction of a foreign code into Japanese Society was absurd and preposterous.'¹

On the 16th May, 1892, the majority in the Japanese Diet showed their impartial hostility towards exotic law of all varieties by voting for the postponement of the coming into force, not only of a French-inspired civil code, but of a German-inspired commercial code, which they had already condemned to a first period of postponement in a previous vote on the 16th December, 1890. Nevertheless, in the Japanese civil code that was eventually brought into force in 1898, as well as in the commercial code brought into force in 1899, it was a German, not a Japanese, influence that replaced the French; and this eventual adoption, in Japan, of a German instead of a French model might be read as the opening of a new chapter in the history of the dissemination of Western Law. For the German Civil Code was likewise taken as the basis for the Swiss Civil Code adopted on the 10th December, 1907, and brought into force on the 1st January, 1912; and the Turkish Civil Code, adopted on the 17th February, 1926, was, in its turn, virtually a translation of the Swiss.

The German Civil Code was, indeed, a more scientifically executed piece of work than its famous French forerunner; yet, even if the outlook for German cultural influence abroad had not been blighted by the sinister military and political events of A.D. 1914-45, the ghosts of Napoleon's draftsmen might, not unjustly, have booked the German Civil Code's successes to the credit of their French account. The workmanlike instrument that saw the light in Germany in A.D. 1895 could never have emerged out of the 'hybrid miscellany' of German customary law if the *Code Napoléon* had not pegged out a drove-road for ruminant German jurists to follow; and it would have been surprising, after all, if this German cud had not been well digested when it had been chewed for more than ninety years.

The Normal Failure of Codification to arrest Decay

In any case, whatever verdict History might eventually pronounce on the respective merits and achievements of the Revolutionary French Code and its slow-footed German competitor, our glance at the *Code Napoléon's* nineteenth-century history has perhaps made it evident that

¹ Takayanagi, Kenzo: *Reception and Influence of Occidental Legal Ideas in Japan* (Tokyo 1929, The Japanese Council, Institute of Pacific Relations), p. 11.

this ninety-years-long triumphal progress from Paris to New Orleans and Buenos Aires and Cairo and Tokyo was the exceptional result of peculiar historical circumstances. As a rule—and this rule is inherent in the very nature of the declines and falls of civilizations—the demand for codification reaches its climax in the penultimate age before a social catastrophe, long after the peak of achievement in jurisprudence has been passed, and when the legislators of the day are irretrievably on the run in a losing battle with ungovernable forces of destruction. Justinian himself had no sooner turned at bay against Fate, and thrown up in her face the imposing barricade of his *Corpus Iuris*, than he was driven by the Fury's relentless hounds to sprint on again in a paper-chase in which he was constrained to strew the course with the tell-tale sheets of his *Novellae*. Yet in the long run Fate is apt to deal kindly with the codifiers, even when they have not shared Napoleon's fortune in being moved to do their work at an exceptionally auspicious hour; for the mead of admiration which their outraged predecessors would have refused, with indignation, to accord to them has been offered to their *manes*, in full and overflowing measure, by a Posterity that has been too remote, too barbarous, or too sentimental to be capable of arriving at a soberly correct appraisal of the codifiers' work.

Even this uncritically admiring Posterity, however, finds the consecrated codes impossible to apply in real life until they have suffered a sea change; for it is the tragedy of the codifiers that, in reducing the law of a happier and more cultivated past age to the social, moral, and intellectual level of their own melancholy generation, they have still pegged it so high that it is bound to pass forthwith beyond the reach¹ of a herd running violently down a steep place into the sea.²

'In the parts in which they were borrowing from the classical law—of which they preserved many useful rules—as well as in Justinian's own personal constitutions and in the interpolations, the [Justinianean] commissioners succeeded, notwithstanding the difficulties of their task, in producing a work which, without being free from contradictions and obscurities, was better suited to the needs of the populations of their countries than were the admirable classical masterpieces. One might even say that, in itself, this work was still too strong meat for the juridically uncultivated minds to which it was addressed. In the East it does not appear to have succeeded in dethroning the Syro-Roman Customal, which was unquestionably less scientific. In the West its only effect on legal practice was by way of glosses which were never more than mediocre before the study of the Justinianean Law received its impulsion from the School of Bologna.'³

In the last phase of the Roman Empire in its last strongholds, Justinian's reign was promptly followed by a deluge of Lombard, Slav, and Arab barbarian invasion; in the last phase of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, Hammurabi's strenuous work of political and social reclamation on the plains of Shinar was no less promptly waterlogged by a Kassite

¹ See V. vi. 224, with n. 3.

² Matt. viii. 32; Mark v. 13; Luke viii. 33.

³ Collinet, P.: *Études Historiques sur le Droit de Justinien*, vol. i: 'Le Caractère Oriental de l'Œuvre Législative de Justinien' (Paris 1912, Recueil Sirey), p. xxix.

inundation from the hills; in the Andean World the rule of the Inca law-givers was brought to a sudden end by the calamity of the Spanish conquest. Even in the Anatolian core of Justinian's empire, when Leo the Restorer and his successors set to work, after a virtual interregnum of 150 years, to replace the wreckage of Justinian's pretentious imperial edifice by something more modest, more practical, and, above all, more firmly based, they found apter materials in the Mosaic Law than in the Justinianean *Corpus Iuris* for meeting the simple needs of a new society that was struggling to be born under their aegis.¹ In Italy, whom Justinian succeeded in 'liberating' momentarily from barbarian rule at the cost of finally wrecking her social structure and her cultural life, the immediate future lay, not with the secular *Corpus Iuris*,² but with the monastic rule of Saint Benedict,³ which was conceived during the agony of the Great Romano-Gothic War (*gerebatur* A.D. 537-53) and was disseminated to Ultima Thule before Monte Cassino was laid desolate by the Lombards. In the former Transalpine provinces of the Roman Empire that Justinian neither inherited from his imperial predecessors nor reconquered from barbarian war-bands, the Justinianean *Corpus Iuris* did not, of course, obtain even the short-lived currency that it enjoyed in Italy and North-West Africa pending the undoing of Justinian's work there by the Lombards and the Arabs.⁴

The Decay of the Roman Law in the Roman Empire's Teutonic Barbarian Successor-states

In these lost and never even temporarily recovered Transalpine dominions of Rome a Roman subject population was permitted, by the indulgence or indifference of its new barbarian masters, to continue to live under Roman civil law in its locally prevalent pre-Justinianean embodiments; and the milder and more statesmanlike of the emperors' barbarian successors went so far as to anticipate Justinian by promulgating local codes of Roman Law—a *Lex Romana Burgundionum* and a Visigothic *Breviarium Alarici*—for the use of their Roman sheep without a jurisprudent shepherd. The *Breviarium* of the Visigoth King Alaric II, which was mainly based on the Theodosian Code, had also actually preserved extracts from the *Sententiae* of the Severan jurist Paulus which would have been lost to latter-day scholars if the sole surviving

¹ See III. iii. 276 and X. ix. 21-27.

² Collinet, in op. cit., vol. cit., points out that Italy had not yet come under Justinian's rule at the time—A.D. 528-34—when Justinian's *Corpus Iuris* was being compiled (p. 11); and that no Italian jurists were included in the board of commissioners by whom the work of codification was carried out (p. 13). Justinian's legislation did not apply to Italy automatically; it was made applicable there by express provisions, and this only *pari passu* with the progress of the reconquest (p. 12). At the same time, Collinet suggests elsewhere that an already formed design of reconquering Italy may have been one of Justinian's motives in compiling his *Corpus Iuris*. While he did not draw upon the local Italian version of the Roman Law, he did wish to provide himself with a *Corpus Iuris* that would be applicable in Italy (Collinet: 'The General Considerations raised by the Codification of Justinian', in *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis*, vol. iv (Haarlem 1923, Tjeenk Willink), pp. 7-8).

³ See III. iii. 265-7 and V. vi. 224, n. 3.

⁴ This point is brought out by Burns, C. Delisle: *The First Europe* (London 1947, Allen & Unwin), p. 326.

official anthology of the masterpieces of Roman jurisprudence had been Tribonian's *Digest*. In the first phase of the Visigothic régime in Southern Gaul and Spain, King Euric I (*regnabat* A.D. 466-84) enlisted the services of Sidonius Apollinaris' friend and correspondent the Roman jurist Leo of Narbonne.¹ Yet this precarious survival of Roman Law in the West was limited in its range and, even within those limits, was a wasting asset. Roman subjects of Teutonic barbarian successor-states were subjected, it would seem, from the outset, to a regressive barbarian criminal law providing for the payment of a *wergeld* to the injured party or his heirs, in lieu of punishments imposed and exacted by the state;² and, though, in the deliberately conciliatory common law for Romans and Burgundians that was embodied in the Burgundian war-lord Gundobad's *Liber Constitutionum*,³ the invidious differentiation of scales of *wergeld* was based on differences of class and not of community, in the *wergeld* tariff of the ultra-barbarous Frankish *Lex Salica* 'the life of an ordinary Frank' was 'reckoned worth double that of a Roman'.⁴ What is still more significant, the Roman Law was now in retreat even in the tolerated departments of business relations and 'personal statute'.

'The Roman Law survived, but it sank to the level of custom.'⁵ Since

¹ See Apollinaris, Sidonius: *Epistulae*, Book VIII, Letter iii, § 3.

² See Lot, F.: *Les Invasions Germaniques* (Paris 1935, Payot), pp. 166-8.

³ In Southern Gaul at the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era the subject Romans gained a notable improvement in their legal status from the play of power politics between their barbarian masters of the moment—the Nomadicized East German Burgundians and Visigoths—and the neighbouring Frankish backwoodsmen from the Lower Rhineland, who, under Clovis' leadership, were now showing themselves formidably aggressive. In the preface to the Burgundian *Liber Constitutionum* it is declared to be the king's benevolent intention to secure justice, unalloyed by either corruption or communal inequality, for Burgundians and Romans alike, by providing a common law for cases between a Burgundian and a Roman, and a separate code for cases in which both parties are Romans (see Dill, Sir S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), p. 65). This Burgundian profession of virtue is borne out by the sixth-century Gallic Roman historian Gregory of Tours. '[Gundobadus] Burgundionibus leges mitiores instituit, ne Romanos opprimerent' (*Historia Francorum*, Book II, chap. 9, *ad fin.*); and the evidence is impressive when a Roman and Francophil Catholic ecclesiastic testifies in favour of a barbarian and Arian Burgundian war-lord whose dynasty had been suppressed by Gregory's Frankish patrons by the time when Gregory was writing. Dill (op. cit., p. 63) dates the first edition of Gundobad's *Liber Constitutionum* about A.D. 501; Burns (op. cit., p. 330) about 503 (the dating turns on an article, dated the 28th May, 502, which appears in the final edition). The *Breviarium* of the Burgundian Gundobad's Visigoth contemporary Alaric II (*regnabat* A.D. 484-507) is dated by Dill (op. cit., p. 94) and by Burns (op. cit., p. 330) *circa* A.D. 506, on the eve of the Battle of Vouillé. This battle, which was fought in A.D. 507, resulted in the conquest of all Southern Gaul save Septimania from the Visigoths by the Franks (see II. ii. 166, 380, and 428; V. v. 217, n. 1, and 221, 225-6). The Burgundian principality had suffered its first Frankish invasion in A.D. 500. These coincidences of date bear out the view that at the turn of the century the Visigothic and Burgundian governments were attempting to offset the odium of their heretical Arian faith by granting genuine equality before the law to their Catholic Roman subjects. Though their conciliatory policy did not induce the Catholic Roman clergy in their dominions to cease working for the victory of their own barbarous Frankish convert Clovis, some of the Roman laity felt differently. A grandson of Sidonius Apollinaris fell at Vouillé fighting for the Visigoths; and, though, when the converted Franks conquered Aquitaine and Burgundy, they left in force the liberal *Breviarium Alarici* and *Lex Romana Burgundionum* and *Liber Constitutionum Gundobadi* that had been enacted by their Visigoth and Burgundian victims, the Aquitanians chafed under the Frankish yoke for centuries thereafter. The Catholic clergy, however, were privileged in all contingencies. Under the barbarian law of the Riparian Franks it cost four times as much to kill even a sub-deacon, and nine times as much to kill a bishop, as to kill an ordinary Roman layman (Burns, op. cit., p. 336).

⁴ Dill, op. cit., p. 47; cp. Lot, op. cit., p. 195.

⁵ Cp. Collinet, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 312-13.—A.J.T.

the Empire had disappeared, there was no longer any legislation to put fresh life into the old law by adapting it to new necessities.¹

In the sixth century [of the Christian Era] in the West, the destinies of Roman Law were dominated by one key phenomenon: an arrest in the development of the classical law. When we analyse this phenomenon in order to examine it in its diverse aspects, we can see that there are three elements in it: a traditional persistence of the classical institutions;² an evolution of these institutions in which there is nothing creative; and, as an inexorable consequence of these first two facts, a general regression in legal standards. . . .

The full measure of the feebleness of the evolution comes to light when one measures it by this sixth-century Western World's needs. In the troubled period that marks the end of the Ancient World and ushers in the Middle Ages, the new needs were numerous and pressing. In whatever direction one turns one's eyes—towards the political, the economic, the moral or the religious situation—one sees nothing but the overthrow of the ancient traditional order, the Roman order, of things. At this decisive moment in history, did Italy and Gaul, to confine our attention to them, make any attempt to satisfy these needs in so far as they affected private law? When it had become clear that the barbarian conquest had come to stay, the accomplishment of [legal] reforms that would have sufficed to bring the law in force into harmony with the new way of life—a harmony that was imperatively required—called for energetic and intelligent men (such as were the feudal jurists of a later age) who would labour diligently to bring the [necessary] evolution to pass. Evolution does not take place without effort, and is never automatic. The times called for someone with the courage to apply the pick-axe to the dilapidated edifice of law, and with the authority and ability to build up a new edifice [in place of the old one]. But this was something beyond the powers of the men of [sixth-century] Italy and Gaul. Their impotence is attested by the decadence which had brought them under the yoke of their new masters and had opened the way for the profound transformation of economic life. . . .

'The West [in the sixth century] was "a static society in which nothing could die because nothing was coming to birth there any longer". In this static world, stagnation and decadence had incontestably gained the upper hand over progress. This is the spectacle presented by Roman Law in Italy and Gaul at the very moment when the names of Constantinople and Justinian were lighting up the World with their lustre.'³

Thus, in the last chapter of the history of Roman Law in the West, the Theodosian Code played a dwindling part and the Justinianean *Corpus* no part at all. In Western and Orthodox Christendom alike, the Justinianean *Corpus* eventually came into its own, not by showing itself proof against death, but by surmounting a *vitai pausa*⁴ through a feat of hibernation. Though in Italy as a whole the *Corpus* had an innings of no more than fifteen years (reckoning from the end, in

¹ Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

² e.g. *mancipatio*, which was abolished by Justinian, persisted in Italy down to the ninth century of the Christian Era (Collinet, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 216). *Dictio dotis*, which was likewise abolished by Justinian, was retained by Alaric in his *Breviarium* (*ibid.*, p. 220). See further *ibid.*, p. 308.—A.J.T.

³ Collinet, P.: *Études Historiques sur le Droit de Justinien*, vol. i: 'Le Caractère Oriental de l'Œuvre Législative de Justinien' (Paris 1912, Recueil Sirey), pp. 309-14.

⁴ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, l. 930.

A.D. 553, of the Ostrogoths' last stand to the beginning, in A.D. 568, of a piecemeal Lombard conquest), it came to life again, some four hundred years later, in an eleventh-century juristic renaissance at Bologna, the principal city in the bridgehead which the Constantinopolitan Government's Italian exarchs had maintained till A.D. 751 in the hinterland of Ravenna. From there from that time onwards, Tribonian's work radiated its influence into extremities and extensions of an expanding Western World that had lain beyond the political horizon not only of Justinian but of Trajan; and, thanks to Bologna's capacity, in the Dark Ages, for intellectual cold storage, a version of Roman Law was eventually 'received' in Modern Holland, Scotland, and South Africa. In Orthodox Christendom the Justinianean *Corpus Iuris* survived, with greater ease, the less exacting ordeal of hibernating for three centuries at Constantinople, and re-emerged in the tenth century of the Christian Era in the Imperial Code (*Vasiliká*) by which the Emperors of the Macedonian Dynasty replaced the Mosaic legislation of their eighth-century Syrian predecessors. These parallel juristic renaissances in Orthodox and in Western Christendom will occupy our attention in a later Part of this Study.¹ In the present place we are inquiring into cases in which the juristic legacy of a defunct universal state has been inherited direct, not rediscovered as a treasure-trove.

The Failure of the Spanish Empire of the Indies to profit by the Law of the Incaic and Aztec Empires

In the broken history of the Andean universal state, we have seen² that some vestiges of the oecumenical law of the Incas did find their way into the heterogeneous and ill-digested *corpus iuris* of the Spanish Empire of the Indies, but the greater part of this precious Incaic legal heritage, which had been so carefully adapted by its authors to the social needs of the Andean World, was sacrificed by the destructiveness of the *conquistadores* and the unimaginativeness of their more reputable successors the *licenciados*. It is true that among the legal advisers of the Spanish Crown in the Indies there were individuals who saw that

'the most difficult problems . . . were those arising from the government of an Indian population which could not be reduced to the norms of Spanish law. Juan Matienzo, judge in the Audiencia of Charcas and intimate adviser to [the Viceroy] Toledo (*proconsulari munere fungebatur* A.D. 1569-81), in his celebrated text-book of Peruvian administration, *Gobierno del Perú* (circa A.D. 1570), warns the Spanish authorities not "to try and change the customs abruptly and make new laws and ordinances, until they know the conditions and customs of the natives of the country and of the Spaniards who dwell there; for, as the country is large, so customs and tempers differ. One must first accommodate oneself to the customs of those one wishes to govern and proceed agreeably to them until, having won their confidence and good opinion, with the authority thus secured one may undertake to change the customs." ³

¹ See X. ix. 27-34.

² On p. 265, above.

³ Haring, C. H.: *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York 1947, Oxford University Press), p. 110.

But the indigenous customs that were incorporated into Spanish colonial law on the strength of such considerations as those set forth by Matienzo

'had to do, naturally enough, with the life of the lower orders of society: the regulation of labour, the succession and the privileges of native chiefs, Indian village organisation, agricultural practices, etc. . . . Basically . . . people in the Indies, especially in the domain of private law, lived according to the same judicial criteria as in Spain.'¹

The Infusion of a Decadent Roman Law into the Customary Law of the Roman Empire's Teutonic Barbarian Conquerors

In the more usual situation in which the aggressors who have snatched the sceptre out of the hands of the rulers of a universal state are not the representatives of some alien civilization, but are barbarians, we should expect *à priori* to see the governments of the barbarian successor-states take over much more of the juristic heritage of a former oecumenical Power which has eventually succumbed to force of barbarian arms without having lost its cultural prestige in barbarian eyes. We have, indeed, noticed already² that in the Teutonic barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire the new masters were ready to allow their Roman subjects to continue to live under Roman Civil Law. On the other hand the barbarians' impulse to maintain a distinctive communal culture of their own in the alien social environment in which they have placed themselves through their conquests is apt to declare itself in the field of law, as well as in the fields of religion and poetry in which we have studied it in another context.³

The extant collections of the laws of divers Teutonic war-bands on ex-Roman ground gave a latter-day student the impression that these barbarians wanted to accommodate themselves to their new social environment with as little change in their own traditional life as local circumstances might allow. The most archaic of these collections was the Frankish *Lex Saliica*;⁴ but the same imperviousness to Roman influence was displayed in the rather more sophisticated provisions of the other law-books which had been put into their final form at a later date: for instance, the laws of the Riparian Franks, the Alamanni, the Bavarians, the Frisians, the Lombard conquerors of Italy, and the English conquerors of Britain. The backbone of these laws consisted of such utterly un-Roman institutions as ordeal by battle and the atonement for crimes of violence by the payment of compensation to the injured party or his heirs.⁵ This contrast in character between the sophisticated Roman Law of a moribund Hellenic World and the archaic barbarian law of the Teutonic war-bands who had settled on the Roman Empire's derelict provinces had its counterpart in a corresponding contrast between the Sumerian Law, as mirrored in Hammurabi's Code, and the law of the

¹ Haring, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

² See V. v. 194-337, *passim*.

³ See the *aperçu* of it in Dill, Sir Samuel: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), pp. 43-62.

⁴ An illuminating survey and analysis of the history of this institution among the Teutonic barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire and their successors is given by Phillpotts, B. S.: *Kindred and Clan* (Cambridge 1913, University Press).

⁵ On pp. 280-1, above.

Hittite barbarians who had settled on a moribund Sumeric World's Anatolian fringes. The difference in the spirit of the law was here two-fold. From one point of view the Hittite Law gave the impression of being more advanced than the Sumerian; for, whereas in Hammurabi's Code the punishments prescribed were savage and, in particular, the *lex talionis* was worked out to forbiddingly pedantic extremes,¹ the Hittite law substituted fines for Hammurabi's sentences of death or mutilation as the penalty for a number of offences.² From another point of view, however, the Hittite Law represented a regression; for, in dealing with crimes against persons, it substituted a tariff of *wergeld* for the punishments, to be imposed and exacted by the state, that had been prescribed for the same crimes by Hammurabi.³

What were the prospects of life for these barbarian systems of law on the alien ground of a decadent civilization whose domain the barbarians had overrun? The Hittite Law, in the redaction in which it happened to have been disinterred by twentieth-century Western archaeologists, dated from the later days of the second phase of Hittite history, for which the Carolingian Age of Western history would be the Frankish equivalent both in cultural terms of the contemporary state of society and in chronological terms of the passage of time since the emergence of a nascent new civilization out of a cultural interregnum.⁴ Here we have an historical example of a law of barbarian origin successfully providing for the needs of a civilization in the first chapter of its history. Beyond this point, however, Hittite history does not carry us; for, not long after the date at which the Hittite Code was promulgated in the redaction that had been unearthed, the homeland of the Hittite Society in Eastern Anatolia was overwhelmed by a barbarian *Völkerwanderung* from the Balkan Peninsula and the Aegean which had been set in motion by the catastrophic dissolution of the neighbouring Minoan Society, and thereafter the Hittite Civilization lingered on only in refugee communities, beyond the Taurus in Northern Syria and overseas along the

¹ The articles in which it was applied are set out in Smith, J. M. P.: *The Origin and History of Hebrew Law* (Chicago 1931, University of Chicago Press), p. 24, n. 2.

² See Hrozný, B.: *Die Älteste Geschichte Vorderasiens und Indiens* (Prague 1943, Melantrich), pp. 114 and 167; Götze, A.: *Hethiter, Churriter und Assyrer* (Oslo 1936, Aschehoug), pp. 64-65; Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, La Renaissance du Livre), p. 231.

³ See Cavaignac, E.: *Le Problème Hittite* (Paris 1936, Leroux), p. 105. The institution of *wergeld* thus turns out to be a common feature of Teutonic and Hittite barbarian law. 'The idea of settling conflicts by a money indemnity is not peculiar to the Germans. It is found among other peoples and is of a high antiquity. We come across it already, fourteen centuries before the beginning of our Era, among the Hittites of Asia Minor' (Lot, F.: *Les Invasions Germaniques* (Paris 1935, Payot), p. 166).

⁴ This Hittite law, as latter-day Western students had it, was a code drafted in the language of the Power that had exercised political hegemony over the Hittite World from the sixteenth century B.C. onwards. It was written in the Akkadian cuneiform script on two clay tablets, containing one hundred paragraphs each, which were discovered on the site of the Hittite Empire's capital, Boghazqaleh, in A.D. 1906-7. This redaction dated from the fifteenth century B.C. according to Hrozný, op. cit., pp. 166-7; from the thirteenth century according to Cavaignac, op. cit., p. 105. According to Delaporte, op. cit., p. 214, there were three successive redactions, of which the second was made in the fifteenth or fourteenth century B.C. English translations of the disinterred text will be found in Smith, J. M. P.: *The Origin and History of Hebrew Law* (Chicago 1931, University of Chicago Press), pp. 247-74, and in Pritchard, J. B.: *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton 1950, University Press), pp. 188-97.

west coast of Italy, which were eventually absorbed by the Syriac and the Hellenic Society respectively.¹ It was as if, in the ninth century of the Christian Era, the collapse of the Carolingian Empire had resulted in the destruction of the nascent Western Christian Civilization at the hands of Scandinavian, Eurasian Nomad, and Muslim Arab invaders. If we are to follow the fortunes of barbarian law in a growing civilization farther than this point, we must turn from Hittite to Western history, where we find the law of the English barbarian settlers on ex-Roman ground in Britain succeeding, without any deliberate or systematic 'reception' of Roman law at any stage,² in developing sufficiently, out of its own resources, to be able to provide for the needs of a civilization that has arrived at a high degree of social sophistication and economic complexity.

This unique ability of the English Common Law to keep pace with the growth of the Western Civilization could be explained as the effect of three distinct causes. In the first place, at the time of the post-Hellenic Völkerwanderung, the barbarian law of the English invaders of Britain was largely relieved of such hampering archaic institutions as *wergeld* thanks to the exceptionally rapid disintegration of the kin-group organization of society in a migration across the sea.³ In the second place the ex-Roman population did not, in Britain, survive under barbarian rule as a distinct community, continuing to live under its own Roman law, as it survived in the Continental Teutonic successor-states of the Roman Empire. In Britain the provincials were exterminated, expelled, or assimilated by the English settlers. In the third place, at the opening of the second chapter of Western history towards the close of the eleventh century of the Christian Era the English law was carried forward and, above all, was effectively enforced, thanks to the exceptionally strong and efficient monarchy that was imposed on a politically united England by a Norman conquest. The survival of the English Common Law, however, was an exception that proved a rule; for the ancestral law of the other Teutonic barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire failed to stay the course. In all other cases we find Roman influence seeping in from an early date.

To begin with, the earliest versions of all the Teutonic law-books, with the significant exception of the English, were drafted in Latin; and, when we turn our attention from this point of form to matters of substance, we catch glimpses of Teutonic custom fighting a stubborn rear-guard action against the moral pressure of Roman concepts and Christian standards. The comparatively enlightened King Liutprand of the ultra-barbarian Lombards declares frankly, in a law promulgated in A.D. 731, 163 years after the Lombards' eruption into the comparatively highly cultivated social environment of Italy, that ordeal by battle is a Lombard

¹ See I. i. 114-15; III. iii. 139; IV. iv. 109; V. v. 88; and IX. viii. 438-9.

² This is not, of course, to say that 'the Common Law' of England remained impervious to the influence of Roman Law after this influence had become prevalent in Western Christendom as a whole in consequence of the Justinianean juristic renaissance at Bologna in the eleventh century of the Christian Era (see X. ix. 31-34).

³ On this point, see the passage quoted from Phillpotts, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-65, in the present Study, II. ii. 90-91.

custom which it is beyond his power to ban, though he is 'uncertain of the judgment of God and' has 'heard that many litigants have unjustly lost their case through' this practice.¹ On the other hand the genial Burgundians had mellowed under Roman influence within less than a hundred years of their crossing the Rhine.

'There is hardly a trace of German ideas or institutions in the legislation of Gundobad.² He has no resemblance to the old German chief, surrounded by his assembled warriors. His type and model is the political authority wielded by the Emperor or the great Praetorian Prefects. . . . In the Salian Law pecuniary compensation is almost universal: other punishments are almost unheard of. In Burgundy, besides the pecuniary sanction, there are many and various punishments for crime, some of them even harsh and cruel. This, however, it has been observed, does not prove a less civilised social tone, but rather the reverse.³ The Burgundian legislator, in fact, is striving to abolish the vindictiveness of private conflicts by making the state the avenger of personal wrongs.⁴

The Burgundian *Liber Constitutionum* marked a radical departure from archaic Teutonic law not only in its character but in its application; for, while the *Lex Salica* and other Teutonic law-books of that type were merely communal prescriptions for the exclusive use of an intrusive barbarian war-band, Gundobad and Sigismund were enacting, as we have observed already, a 'common law' for their barbarian Burgundian followers and their Roman subjects. The *Edictum Theodorici*,⁵ which was promulgated in the Ostrogothic dominions at about the same date, either *circa* A.D. 500 or *circa* A.D. 511-15,⁶ was a 'common law' in the same sense of applying alike to Theodoric's Ostrogoth followers and to the Roman population under his rule; and in this case the scales already incline heavily in the Romans' favour. The contents of this barbarian war-lord's edict are drawn from Roman sources—the Theodosian Code and the *Sententiae* of Paulus—and the Ostrogoth masters of Italy are referred to as 'barbarians' throughout the document. It is even more remarkable that the Visigothic *Breviarium Alarici*, which was promulgated within a few years of Theodoric's *Edictum* and Gundobad's *Liber Constitutionum* and was compiled, from the same sources as Theodoric's work, avowedly for the benefit of the Visigoths' Roman subjects, declares in its preamble that its prescriptions apply to 'both Romans and barbarians'.⁷

The promulgation of these three codes of 'common law' by Teutonic war-lords on ex-Roman ground at the opening of the sixth century of

¹ *Liutprandi Leges*, cxviii: 'Incerti sumus de iudicio Dei, et multos audivimus per pugnam sine iusticiam [sic] causam suam perdere, sed, propter consuetudinem gentis nostrae Langobardorum, legem ipsam mutare non possumus.'

² i.e. in his 'common law' for Burgundians and Romans (see p. 281, above). His version of Roman Civil Law for the use of his Roman subjects among themselves is not in question here.—A.J.T.

³ Compare the corresponding contrast between the salutary severity of Hammurabi's Code and the inexpedient laxity of the Hittite Code, to which attention has been drawn above.—A.J.T.

⁴ Dill, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁵ See Hodgkin, T.: *Italy and Her Invaders*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1892-9, Clarendon Press, 8 vols), vol. iii, pp. 276-7 and 309-14.

⁶ See Collinet, P.: 'The General Problems raised by the Codification of Justinian', in *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis*, vol. iv (Haarlem 1923, Tjeenk Willink), pp. 6-7.

⁷ Burns, C. D.: *The Law of Europe* (London 1947, Allen & Unwin), pp. 329-30.

the Christian Era was only the beginning of the transfusion of Roman law into the body of Teutonic custom. In the unstable social situation produced by the establishment of barbarian rule over Roman populations, legislation could not stand still. The rulers of the Teutonic barbarian successor-states followed the example of their Imperial Roman predecessors, from the Emperor Hadrian onwards, by issuing a spate of decrees; and these decrees, in their turn, were inevitably coloured by the legal traditions of their Roman social setting. The classic example is the corpus of rescripts, issued in Theodoric's name, which were largely drafted, besides being collected and published, by the Ostrogoth war-lord's Roman minister Cassiodorus. The Ostrogothic régime in Italy, however, met with an early violent end at Roman hands, and the Iberian Peninsula under Visigothic rule was the place where the natural course of events had time to work itself out before the Visigothic Power was overthrown, in its turn, by the more competent rival hands of the Visigoths' fellow barbarian invaders the Primitive Muslim Arabs.

The Visigothic King Receswinth (*regnabat* A.D. 649-72) restored to the former Roman territories under his rule the uniformity of law that they had enjoyed from the time of Caracalla until the Visigothic conquest. In A.D. 654 he put out of commission the *Breviarium* of his predecessor Alaric II (*regnabat* A.D. 484-507) and gave sole force of law to a code¹ compiling the decisions of the Visigothic Kings from Euric down to Receswinth himself.

'These decisions are thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Roman Law. . . . Where else [in the field of Teutonic barbarian legislation] can one find anything comparable to Book I [of Receswinth's *Forum*], entitled *De Legislatore, De Lege*, in which an effort is made to formulate general principles of legislation?'²

The end of the story was the blending of Roman with Teutonic law in as many different mixtures³ as there were local customary laws⁴ in Medieval Western Christendom.⁵

The Infusion of a Decadent Roman Law into the Islamic Shari'ah

This infusion of Roman Law into the custom of Teutonic barbarians who had no future was, however, neither so important an event nor so striking a feat as its surreptitious and unavowed yet unmistakable infiltration into the Islamic law of the Arab barbarian conquerors of other ex-Roman territories. The two elements that blended here were even more incongruous, and the result of their blending was the creation, not

¹ Known under the alternative names of *Liber Iudicum* and *Forum Iudiciorum*, and eventually translated into Castilian as the *Fuero Jueazgo*.

² Lot, F.: *Les Invasions Germaniques* (Paris 1935, Payot), pp. 182-3.

³ The close resemblance of medieval Spanish customary law to Scandinavian law leads Lot (op. cit., p. 183) to surmise that, in the Visigothic dominions, an unwritten Gothic customary law survived both the *Breviarium Alarici* and Receswinth's *Forum Iudiciorum*.

⁴ In France, this diversity of local customary laws survived even the effective political unification of the kingdom and was only ironed out by the legislation of the 'iconoclastic assemblies' convened by the Revolution.

⁵ The main contributions of Roman Law on the one side and Teutonic Law on the other are set out by Lot, op. cit., pp. 245-7.

just of a parochial law for a barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire, but of an oecumenical law which was to serve the needs of a restored Syriac universal state and, after surviving the break-up of this political framework, was to govern and mould the life of an Islamic Society that, after the fall of the Caliphate, was to continue to expand until, at the time of writing, its domain had come to extend from Indonesia to Lithuania and from South Africa to China.

Unlike their pagan and Arian Teutonic counterparts, the Primitive Muslim Arabs had been roughly shaken out of their archaic traditional way of life before they administered to themselves the additional shock of a sudden change of social environment by bursting out of the deserts and oases of Arabia into the fields and cities of the Roman and Sasanian empires. A long-continuing radiation of Syriac and Hellenic cultural influences into Arabia had produced a cumulative social effect which had declared itself dramatically in the personal career of the Prophet Muhammad;¹ and his achievements had been so astonishing and his personality so potent that his oracles and acts, as recorded in the Qur'ān and the Traditions, were unquestioningly accepted by his followers as the source of law for regulating, not only the life of the Muslim community itself, but the relations between the Muslim conquerors and their at first many times more numerous non-Muslim subjects. The speed and sweep of the Muslim conquests—which brought half of what remained of the Roman Empire and the whole of the Sasanian Empire under the rule of Muhammad's successors within less than twenty years of the Prophet's death—conspired with the irrationality of the accepted basis of the Muslim empire-builders' new-laid law to create a problem which was hardly more awkward for the non-Muslim population of the Caliphate than it was for their Muslim masters; for, even when the Qur'ān was eked out by the Traditions, the task of wringing out of these unpromising materials an oecumenical law for a sophisticated society was as preposterous as the demands for welling water in the wilderness that the Children of Israel were said to have addressed to Moses.²

For a jurist in search of legal pabulum for sustaining social life, the Qur'ān was indeed stony ground. The chapters dating from the non-political Meccan period of Muhammad's mission, before the *Hijrah*, offered far less matter for the practical jurist than he would find in the New Testament; for this literary legacy of the politically disinterested first phase of the Prophet's career contained little beyond a patently sincere and monotonously reiterated declaration of the unity of God and denunciation of the moral and intellectual error of polytheism and idolatry. The chapters afterwards delivered at Medina might look, at first sight, more promising; for at the *Hijrah* Muhammad achieved in his own lifetime a position that was not attained by any follower of Jesus till the fourth century of the Christian Era;³ he became the head of a state, and his utterances during this Medinese period were mainly concerned with public business. Yet it would be at least as difficult to elicit

¹ See III. iii. 276-7.

² Exod. xvii. 1-7.

³ The difference between the respective political environments in which Christianity and Islam came to birth has been noticed in III. iii. 466-72.

a comprehensive system of law for a sophisticated society from the Medinese *surahs*, unsupplemented, as it would be to perform the same juristic conjuring trick with the Epistles of Saint Paul. Like the apostle-missionary, the apostle-podestà found that the flurry of improvising provisional solutions, *ad hoc*, for a ceaseless succession of emergencies, serious or trivial,¹ left him no breathing-space for attempting to sort out these stray sibylline leaves into anything like a comprehensive or systematic code. Yet, even if Muhammad had succeeded, where Paul had failed, in performing this superhuman labour, the result would have been of less practical use to the Arabian prophet's successors than a Pauline code would have been to the Christian Roman Emperors; for the private business of religious congregations in important cities of the Roman Empire in Paul's day actually had more in common with the public business of the Roman Empire in the fourth century of the Christian Era than had the public business of the agricultural, non-commercial, oasis-state of Medina under Muhammad's rule during the years A.D. 622-32 with the public business of the universal state, embracing all but a fraction of the Syriac World, of which Muhammad's thirty-third successor Mu'tamid found himself master upon his accession in A.D. 870.²

In these compelling circumstances the men of action who built the Arab Caliphate let theory take its chance and resorted to self-help. In a legal no-man's-land where the oracles of the Qur'ān were dumb and where even the beaten track (*Sunnah*) of concordant Tradition faded out, they found their way through by the aid of common sense, analogy, consensus, and custom.³

'In the oldest period of the development of Islam the authorities entrusted with the administration of justice and the conduct of the religious life had in most cases to fall back on the exercise of their own *ra'y* (common-sense personal judgment) owing to the scarcity of legislative material in the Qur'ān and the dearth of ancient precedents. This was regarded as a matter of course by everyone. . . . Corresponding to this recognition of *ra'y* as an approved source of law are the instructions ascribed to the Prophet and the early Caliphs, which they gave to the officials sent to administer justice in the conquered provinces. . . . In the digests which were developed from these simple origins we find deduction from decisions in allied cases expressly mentioned, i.e. the application of analogy (*qiyās*) as a methodical adjustment of equity (*ra'y*). . . .

'We have—there is evidence for it at a very early period—a kind of popular element adopted among the constitutive sources for the deduction

¹ For these characteristics of Muhammad's personal legislation in the Medinese *surahs*, see Margoliouth, D. S.: *The Early Development of Mohammedanism* (London 1914, Williams & Norgate), pp. 5 and 12. 'It has been noticed that the word which we ordinarily render "reveal", and which literally means "send down", is properly applied to royal rescripts; the suppliant "raises" a petition and the sovereign "sends down" the reply. The faithful at Medinah used to await fresh revelations each day somewhat as we in these days are on the look out for the morning paper.'

² i.e. three hundred years after the birth of Muhammad in A.D. 570.

³ 'It is likely that [Muhammad] meant current practice to continue except where his legislation had abrogated it' (Margoliouth, op. cit., p. 66). To begin with, the custom which counted for most was that of the Arabian oasis-dwellers and Nomads whose conquests re-established a Syriac universal state. The custom which eventually prevailed was that of the Arab empire-builders' converted subjects.

of laws: the conception of consensus (*ijmā'*), i.e. the general usage of the community which has been established by agreement in the larger circles of believers independent of the written, traditional or inferred law. . . .

'It was quite natural, from the changed conditions after the conquests, that the formation of the law, not only in its special provisions, but particularly in the point of view they adopted in their method of deductive operation as laid down in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), was greatly influenced by what the authorities on the development of law in Syria and Mesopotamia were able to learn of Roman Law, sometimes of the special laws for the particular provinces. It was obvious that a quite uncultured people, coming from a land in a primitive stage of social development into countries with an ancient civilization where they established themselves as rulers, would adopt from among their new surroundings as much of the customary law of the conquered lands as could be fitted in with the conditions created by the conquest and be compatible with the demands of new religious ideas. . . . The comparative study of one chapter of private law has yielded the most conclusive proofs of the thorough-going adoption of Roman Law by the jurists of Islam.¹ . . . Roman Law, however, does not exhaust the sources drawn upon in the development of Muslim Law. The receptive character that marks the formation and development of Islam also found expression, naturally first of all in matters of ritual, in borrowings from Jewish Law. According to [von] Kremer,² even many of the provisions of Roman Law that have been adopted by Islam only found a place in *fiqh* through the intermediary of the Jews.'³

The Mosaic Law's Debt to the Codification of the Sumeric Law by Hammurabi

This Jewish Law, which had so long a history behind it already by the time of Muhammad's *hijrah* from Mecca to Medina, had originated, like the Islamic *Shari'ah*, as the barbarian customary practice of Nomads who had broken out of the steppes of Northern Arabia into the fields and cities of Syria; and, for meeting the same emergency of an abrupt and extreme change of social environment, the primitive Israelites, like the Primitive Muslim Arabs, had recourse to the existing law of a sophisticated society which they found in operation in the Promised Land.

While the Decalogue—at any rate in a pristine form, in which all the Commandments were couched in the lapidary style still preserved in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth⁴—would appear, on the face of it, to be a native Hebrew product, the next piece of Israelite legislation, known to scholars as 'the Covenant Code',⁵ betrays its debt to the Code of Ham-

¹ Schmidt, F. F.: *Die Occupatio im Islamischen Recht*, reprinted from *Der Islam*, i (Strassburg 1910).

² Kremer, A. von: *Culturgeschichte des Orients* (Vienna 1875-7, Braumüller, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 535; English translation by Khuda Bukhsh, S.: *The Orient under the Caliphs* (Calcutta 1920, University Press), chap. viii, 'The Origin and Development of Muslim Law', Section 6, 'The Sources of Muslim Law'.

The influence of local Medinese Jewish jurisprudence on the early school of Islamic jurisprudence at Medina is emphasized by Margoliouth, op. cit., p. 74: 'There is no evidence that Roman Law penetrated into this primitive city.'

³ Goldziher, I., in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (London 1927, Luzac), s.v. *Fikh*, quoted with the permission of the publishers.

⁴ A conjectural reconstruction of the whole Decalogue in this presumably original style will be found in Smith, J. M. P.: *The Origin and History of Hebrew Law* (Chicago 1931, University of Chicago Press), pp. 6-7.

⁵ The Covenant Code 'exists in two forms: one very short, viz. Exodus xxxiv, 17-26;

murabi more patently than the *Shari'ah* reveals its corresponding debt to a Syrian Roman law-book.

'It has been calculated that, out of forty-five, or possibly fifty-five, judgments preserved in this old Hebrew Law, thirty-five have points of contact with the Hammurabi Code, and quite half are parallel.'¹

This masterful influx of a code of Sumerian Law into legislation enacted at least nine centuries later in one of the local communities of a latter-day Syriac Society testified to the depth and tenacity of the roots which the Sumeric Civilization had struck in Syrian soil during the millennium ending in Hammurabi's generation. A First Syriac Civilization, affiliated to the Sumeric, had miscarried as a result of the insatiable aggressiveness of the Hyksos barbarians, who, not content with carving out for themselves a successor-state in the Syrian provinces of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, had driven on into the Egyptian World and had thereby eventually brought down upon Syria an Egyptian counter-invasion.² On the political plane, Syria had been included, for two centuries, in a reinstituted Egyptian universal state and thereafter been partitioned, for two further centuries, between this Egyptian Power and a rival Hittite Empire. On the cultural plane the subject Syrian peoples, while continuing, down to the reign of the Egyptian Emperor Ikhnaton (*imperabat circa* 1380-1362 B.C.), to employ as their medium of literary expression the Akkadian language, conveyed in the cuneiform characters according to the Akkadian usage, had experimented in working out an Alphabet for the conveyance of their native Canaanite speech, and, after testing the adaptability of the cuneiform characters for alphabetic use,³ had discarded them in favour of the notation—possibly of Minoan origin—which they immortalized by creating the historic Alpha-

the other more extended, viz. Exodus xx, 23—xxiii, 33. This code is incorporated in two of the documents which compose the Hexateuch: Exodus xxxiv, 17-26, in the J document, and Exodus xx, 23—xxiii, 33, in the E document. These two documents arose in the latter part of the ninth century or the early part of the eighth century B.C., J being probably a half-century or so older than E' (Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 15).

¹ Johns, C. H. W.: *The Relations between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples* (London 1914, Milford), p. 49. In the third of the three lectures composing this book, the writer takes up the question whether the indubitable and, indeed, striking points of similarity between Hammurabi's Code and the Covenant Code are to be accounted for as products of a uniformity of Human Nature, in virtue of which we find different individuals or communities independently making similar responses to similar challenges, or whether these particular similarities are to be traced to a process of diffusion through which the Covenant Code has borrowed from Hammurabi's Code or both have borrowed from some common source. Johns' conclusion is that most of the matter which the Covenant Code shares with Hammurabi's Code has been borrowed by the Covenant Code from the earlier of the two compilations. He argues from the similarity, down to arbitrary details, of the provisions in the two codes concerning (i) debt slavery (Johns, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-60; *cp.* pp. 39-46) and (ii) the prescription of the penalty of burning alive for two particular offences (*op. cit.*, pp. 60-61), and from the grouping of the laws, in both codes, in sets of fives and tens (*op. cit.*, pp. 26-27 and 61). Thus, in Johns' view, Sumerian Law, as finally codified by Hammurabi, is the main common element in the two codes. He does, however, allow for a subsidiary common element in the shape of a primitive customary law of the Semite Nomads of Arabia which may have been imported independently by Hammurabi's Amorite ancestors into Shinar and by the Hebrews, in their turn, into Palestine, and have been injected, in both cases, by the Nomad conquerors into the existing law of the conquered sedentary population (*op. cit.*, pp. vi-vii, 28, and 32-33).

² See II. ii. 388-gr.
³ In this experiment, they were anticipating the work of the creator of the Medo-Persian cuneiform Alphabet, which was invented—to all appearance, quite independently—about a thousand years later (see p. 247, above).

bet out of it. Finally, the Syrians had struck out for themselves, in all departments of life, a new civilization of their own which was affiliated to the Minoan, and not to either the Sumeric or the Egyptian. Yet the Israelite Covenant Code is evidence that, through all these political and cultural revolutions in Syria, the Sumerian Law, as embodied in Hammurabi's Code, had remained in force among the descendants of Hammurabi's Syrian subjects—and this in such vigour as to impress itself imperiously upon the callow legislation of the Canaanites' Hebrew barbarian conquerors.¹

In thus entering into the law of barbarians who happened, exceptionally, to be incubators of a higher religion, the Sumerian Law, like the Roman Law, made a greater mark on history than when it was influencing barbarians whose destiny was the usual inglorious exit of their kind. At the time of writing, the Sumerian Law was still a living force in virtue solely of its Mosaic offprint. On the other hand, the Islamic *Sharī'ah* was neither the sole nor the liveliest living carrier² of the Roman Law at the same date. In the twentieth century of the Christian Era the chief direct heirs of the Roman Law were the canons of the Eastern Orthodox and Western Catholic Christian Churches. In the domain of law, as in other fields of social action, the master institution created by the internal proletariat was the universal state's principal beneficiary.

3. *Calendars; Weights and Measures; Money*

The Concern of Governments with Standard Measures

Generally accepted and effectively operative standard measures of time, distance, length, volume, weight, and value are necessities of social life at any level above the most primitive. They are needed not only by manufacturers, stock-breeders, and agriculturists, but by hunters of the higher type that does not simply wait passively for game to turn up, but pursues a strategy dependent on ability to forecast and anticipate its

¹ The Covenant Code was a selection from the Code of Hammurabi. 'There are 282 laws in the Code of Hammurabi, and only 50 in the Covenant Code' (Smith, op. cit., p. 18); and the selection had been made to suit the requirements of a much more backward society than that for which Hammurabi was legislating. 'The provisions in the case of each law in Hammurabi's Code are much more detailed and elaborate and presuppose a much greater experience with the practices of an advanced social and economic order' (ibid., p. 18). 'It would . . . seem that wages for service were higher in Hammurabi's day than when the Covenant Code was drawn up' (ibid., p. 19). The legislation in Hammurabi's Code on the subject of runaway slaves has no counterpart in the Covenant Code as we have it (ibid., p. 29). 'The Code of Hammurabi is much the more severe of the two and uses the penalty of capital punishment to a much greater extent' (ibid., p. 20), but, as we have seen in comparing the Hittite Code with Hammurabi's and the Teutonic barbarian laws with Roman Law, the absence of severe penalties may be evidence, not of humane feeling, but merely of impotence, on the legislator's part. Moreover, the law concerning the working off of debt by the enslavement of the debtor or members of his household to the creditor is less harsh in Hammurabi's Code than in the Covenant Code. Hammurabi's Code frees male and female debt-slaves alike after three years' service; the Covenant Code exacts six years' service from males and enslavement for life (with certain reservations and exceptions) from females (ibid., pp. 18-19). The Israelite laws prescribing the punishments for divers unnatural forms of sexual practice are likewise harsher than the corresponding provisions in the Hittite Code (see the comparative table in Cavaignac, E.: *Le Problème Hittite* (Paris 1936, Leroux), p. 109, n. 1).

² The continuous carriers of an institution are, of course, to be distinguished from reconverted renegades who have adopted the same institution *de novo* in a 'renaissance'.

victims' movements and behaviour. Social currencies of these kinds are older—perhaps far older—than governments; and they become matters of concern to governments as soon as these come into existence in their turn. The positive *raison d'être* of governments is to provide central political leadership for common social enterprises, and common enterprises cannot be operated without standard measures. Again, the negative *raison d'être* of governments is to ensure at least a modicum of justice in the private relations between their subjects, and, in most private issues of a 'business' kind, standard measures of some sort are involved. While governments thus find themselves implicated *ab initio* in the maintenance and enforcement of standard measures as one of their essential functions which they cannot afford to neglect, they also eventually discover that the administration of these institutions—for example, of the calendar at one end of the scale and of a coinage at the other—can be turned to account by them incidentally for the secondary purpose of moving their public in the direction of their policy.

In these various ways, standard measures concern governments of every species; but they are of particular concern to the governments of universal states for two reasons. In the first place, such governments start life as parvenus who have to take active steps to win the obedience, respect, and loyalty of subjects whom they have taken over, without consulting their wishes, from the former parochial states that they have overthrown and replaced by force. In the second place, universal states, by their very nature, are confronted with the problem of holding together far greater numbers of subjects and far wider areas of territory than any single one of their parochial predecessors; and for this reason, again, they have a special interest in the social unity and uniformity that standard measures promote when effectively enforced.

Calendrical Cycles

Of all the standard measures here in question, a standard system of registering time is the earliest felt and the most persistently imperative need; and the first necessity here is a measurement of the seasons of the year-cycle, which continues, even in technically advanced societies, to be the indispensable basis of Man's unceasing struggle to win a livelihood from Non-Human Nature.¹ But the problem of measuring the seasons soon carries the pioneer chronometrist into calculations of vastly longer aeons of Time than the single year-period within which the seasons revolve. The measurement of the seasons requires a harmonization of the three different natural cycles of the year, the month, and the day; the discovery that the ratios between these three cycles are not

¹ At first sight it might look as if Man's primeval servitude to the seasons had been thrown off in a Modern Western factory in which the temperature and atmosphere were 'conditioned' by artificial regulation and in which the machinery was worked by shifts of operatives for 24 hours in the day and for 365 days in the year. But this appearance of successfully contracting out of the tyranny of Nature was, of course, an illusion. Factories were fed by raw materials, and factory-workers by food, and in a Westernizing Modern World, no less than in the Higher Palaeolithic Society, the ultimate constituents of both food and raw materials had to be wrested from Nature. Moreover, this continuing war with Nature was still being waged, even in this technologically precocious society, by such 'higher hunters' as the trawler and the whaler, as well as by their younger brothers the husbandman and the shepherd.

simple fractions but surds leads a would-be harmonizer into thinking in terms of vaster cycles—the products, not of observation, but of reasoning—in which the elusive correspondences between the beginnings or between the ends of days, months, and years are found, by a mathematical computation, to recur after a formidably long lapse of time; and, when the habit of reckoning with these ampler periods leads the budding astronomer to take into his account the real or apparent cyclic movements of the planets and the ‘fixed’ stars, besides those of the Sun, Moon, and Earth, the chronological horizon recedes to a distance which is not easy to express and is still less easy to imagine—narrow-verged though it may seem to a latter-day cosmogonist in whose eyes our particular solar system is no more than one speck of star-dust in the Milky Way, and the Milky Way itself no more than one *ci-devant* nebula out of myriads of nebulae on their way from a flaming birth towards a deathly incineration.

Short of this latest stage in the mental exploration of chronological magnitudes, the ‘least common measure’ of the recurrent coincidences between the apparent movements of the Sun and those of a single one of the ‘fixed stars’ had generated the Egyptiac ‘Sothic Cycle’ of 1,460 years,¹ and a recurrent common cycle of the Sun, the Moon, and five planets the Babylonian *Magnus Annus*² of 432,000 years,³ while, in the

¹ These 1,460 years were ‘Sothic’ years: i.e. years reckoned from heliacal rising to heliacal rising of the star Sothis (Sirius), its heliacal rising being the first occasion in the year on which the star is visible above the horizon before dawn. Throughout the life-span of the Egyptiac Civilization the Sothic-year was virtually coincident in length with the Julian year of 365½ days, whereas the Egyptiac official year was a conventional one of 365 days. Thus a period of 1,460 Sothic years was exactly equal to a period of 1,461 official years, and in the course of a 1,460-years-long Sothic cycle the New Year’s Day of the official year would travel right round the Sothic year-clock. The mathematical device of controlling the palpably inaccurate conventional year by relating it to the much more nearly accurate Sothic year must have been inaugurated in—or been based retrospectively on—some year in which the New Year’s Day of the official year actually coincided with the heliacal rising of Sirius. In the latitude of Memphis in the fifth and fourth millennia B.C. this astronomical event occurred on the 19th July of the Julian Calendar, which in that age corresponded to the 15th June of the Gregorian Calendar—a date approximate to the Summer Solstice and also to the beginning of the annual rising of the Nile in the Lower Nile Valley and the Delta. It seems a fairly safe guess that, at the time when the official year of 365 days was first put into commission, it was set to begin on a date which was of such paramount importance for the whole life of the Egyptiac World. The Egyptiac official year did actually open on the 19th July of the Julian Calendar in each of the four-year periods A.D. 140/1–143/4, 1321/1320–1318/1317 B.C., 2781/2780–2778/2777 B.C., and 4241/4240–4238/4237 B.C. Since the Egyptiac Calendar, with its Sothic correction, is known to have been in use at both the two first-mentioned of these dates, the inaugural year—or retrospectively calculated starting-point—must fall within one or other of the two last-mentioned four-year periods. Eduard Meyer opts for the earlier of the two alternatives, i.e. 4241/4240–4238/4237 B.C., on the ground that, by the time of the Old Kingdom, the Calendar was already a long since established institution (see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, Part II, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1913, Cotta), pp. 28–30).

² See IV. iv. 23–24 and 37, and V. v. 56–57.

³ *Quarum [stellarum] ex disparibus motionibus magnum annum mathematici nominaverunt, qui tum efficitur cum Solis et Lunae et quinque errantium ad eandem inter se comparisonem confectis omnium spatiis est facta conversio. Quae quam longa sit, magna quaestio est; esse vero certam et definitam necesse est’* (Cicero: *De Natura Deorum*, Book II, chap. 20).

‘Homines . . . populariter annum tantummodo Solis, id est unius astri, reditu metuntur; cum autem ad idem, unde semel profecta sunt, cuncta astra redierint, eandemque totius anni descriptionem longis intervallis retulerint, tum ille vere vertens annus appellari potest—in quo vix dicere audeo quam multa saecula hominum teneantur’ (Cicero: *Somnium Scipionis*, chap. 7 = *De Republica*, Book VI, chap. 22, in Cardinal Angelo Mai’s edition (Rome 1823, Mawman)).

³ This appears to have been the estimate that was traditional in the Babylonian school

stupendous Mayan Grand Cycle of 374,440 years, no less than ten distinct constituent cycles were geared together.¹

Governmental Methods of Keeping Count of Time

Governments, like astronomers, find themselves concerned with computations of terms of years, as well as with the seasonal articulation of the recurrent year-cycle. Their interest in the seasonal calendar is obvious, for it is the key not only to the livelihood of their subjects, for which governments are held responsible in the last resort, but also to their own ability to command the resources without which they cannot perform a government's recognized functions. Even in a technically advanced and highly industrialized state of society the parochial governments of a Westernized World in the year A.D. 1952 were having their policies dictated to them by the results of the last harvest and the prospects of the next one; and in simpler states of society this domination of weather over policy had made itself felt *a fortiori*. Governments had not been able to mobilize and maintain armies without a sufficient surplus of food stocks with which to feed them, and they had been constrained to time their military campaigns to coincide with the slack season of the agricultural year (whichever of the seasons this might happen to be in the particular climate in which their dominions were situate and under the particular system of agricultural production that was practised there).

In a state of society in which a money economy is either unknown or else only partially operative, the government even of a sedentary agricultural community may have to make an annual round of seasonal migrations to draw on food-supplies which, under the technological conditions of the time and place, are less mobile than even august human bodies. We have already taken note of the Achaemenian Court's regular distribution of its time between three different imperial residences.² The Merovingian Frankish rulers of the most barbarous of the Continental Teutonic successor-states of the Roman Empire in one of the most backward of the Empire's former territories used to roam from one estate to another of their royal domain in order to browse on the fat of the land. Where the government has been of Nomad origin and has brought with it, out of 'the desert' into 'the sown', a war-band of Nomad empire-builders who persist, *in partibus agricularum*, in following their ancestral way of life, this migratory dance of attendance on the

of astronomers (see Cumont, F.: *Les Religions Orientales dans le Paganisme Romain*, 4th ed. (Paris 1929, Geuthner), pp. 164 and 289). Macrobius, in his commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*, II. 11, rushing in where Cicero had feared to tread, ventures on an estimate of his own in which he reckons the span of the Magnus Annus at 15,000 solar years, and Cicero himself had proposed a figure of 12,954 years in his *Hortensius* (inaccessible in A.D. 1952), according to Tacitus in his *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, chap. 16. Cicero's and Macrobius's shots fell much nearer the mark than their Babylonian predecessors' conscientious calculations, if the true figure is 25,817 solar years (see Pickman, E. M.: *The Mind of Latin Christendom* (London 1937, Oxford University Press), p. 119).

¹ See Morley, S. G.: *The Ancient Maya* (Palo Alto, California 1946, Stanford University Press), pp. 262 and 289; Thompson, J. E. S.: *Maya Hieroglyphic Writing: Introduction* (Washington, D.C., 1950, Carnegie Institution of Washington), pp. 141-56. Like the Egyptian Sothic Cycle, the Mayan Grand Cycle was a device for correcting the inaccuracy of an official year of 365 days.

² See pp. 205-6, above.

seasons is, of course, a still more conspicuous feature of public business. Yet even the most primitive and rudimentary government cannot allow its enslavement to a tyrannous annual round to preoccupy its attention to the exclusion of all provision for reckoning in terms exceeding the length of a single year; for the first concern of every government is to keep itself in existence; the most incompetent government may last for a whole lifetime, and perhaps for a term spanning a number of successive generations; and the most naïve administration soon discovers that it cannot remain in business without keeping some permanent record of its acts.

For this purpose the gigantic astronomical cycles evolved by the chronometrists were, however, as useless as the miniature calendar of the annual round, since the spans of time to which the continuous acts of even the longest-lived governments had run had, in human history up to date, been of a lesser order of magnitude than even the relatively modest length of the Sothic period. Consequently, governments had had to work out methods of their own for dating events over a series of years.

One of their methods had been based on the distinctiveness of every individual human being and on the personal names in which this distinctive individuality was expressed. They had taken to dating their acts by the names of magistrates with an annual term of office, such as the Assyrian *limmu*, the Athenian *archôn epônymus*, and the Roman pair of consuls; alternatively they had dated them by the series of regnal years of successive sovereigns ruling (short of accidents) for life. This system of dating does effectively distinguish every year in the count from every other; its weakness is that, when the continuous life of the institution employed as a time-measure happens to be prolonged for 1,050 years, as the life of the Roman consulate was from the reputed date of its institution in 509 B.C. to its abolition by the Emperor Justinian in A.D. 541,¹ a list of eponymous magistrates becomes far too long to be retained in the memory with the ease with which it is possible, for example, to learn by heart the twenty-six letters of the Latin Alphabet in their arbitrary sequence; and in these circumstances the denotation of a date by the citation of the consuls of the year no longer suffices to call the date to mind without a tiresome search through a list of perhaps a thousand pairs of names. The reckoning by reigns is ultimately open to the same objection, even when the names of individual sovereigns are grouped together under the names of dynasties, and when each individual reign is articulated, not only into single regnal years but into tax-assessment periods each extending over a number of years (the fifteen-yearly 'indications' of the Later Roman Empire). The difficulty is not overcome by inventing an artificial cycle of official years with 'fancy' names, such as the Sinic cycle in which the years are named after animals (real and mythical) and other objects with auspicious associations; for, if the cycle is kept within the manageably short compass of

¹ See V. vi, 111 and 224. The life-span of the consulate would have to be reckoned as having been 990 years if we were to take as the initial date the traditional year, not of the inauguration of the institution itself (509 B.C.), but of its first restoration (449 B.C.).

the Latin Alphabet, it will recur so frequently that confusion will arise between one of its occurrences and another, while, if such confusion is to be avoided, this can only be done by drawing out the series towards the unmanageable length which the Roman consular *fasti* had reached by the year A.D. 541.

The only satisfactory way out is to adopt the different method of choosing some particular year as an initial date and reckoning subsequent years from that date onwards in a numerical sequence which can, if necessary, be continued *ad infinitum* without in any way diminishing the convenience of the system for ready reckoning.¹ The dates chosen as the starting-points for new eras had in some cases been those of events of which the authenticity and the time of occurrence had been established beyond dispute. Classical examples were the eras starting from the Fascist occupation of Rome on the 28th October, 1922; from the establishment of the First French Republic on the 22nd September, 1792; from the Prophet Muhammad's *hijrah* from Mecca to Medina on the 15th July, A.D. 622;² from the assumption of a formal claim to oecumenical authority in the Indic World by the Gupta Dynasty on the 26th February, A.D. 320; from the definitive establishment of the Seleucid Empire's Hasmonaean successor-state in Judaea in 142 B.C.; and from the triumphal re-entry of the founder of the Seleucid Monarchy, Seleucus Nicator, into Babylon in 312 B.C. (an event which, for chronometrical convenience, was retrospectively equated with the 1st of the Macedonian month Dios (October) of that year).

There were other cases in which eras had been reckoned from events of which the precise date had been disputable. For example, there was no evidence that Jesus had in fact been born in the first year of a Christian Era that did not become current in divers provinces of Western Christendom till divers dates in and after the sixth century from the birth of Christ according to this computation;³ there was likewise no evidence that the city of Rome had in fact been founded in the year 753 B.C. from which later generations of Romans had reckoned their era *post urbem conditam*; and the year 776 B.C., which figured as the first year of 'the First Olympiad' quadriennium, was admittedly not the ascertained first year in which the Olympian Festival had been celebrated, but merely the first year in which there was a record of the name of a victor in the games at the chronometrist's disposal for use as an eponym. In the third place there were cases in which eras had been reckoned from an imaginary event in the cosmogonical scheme of some particular school of theology: for example, the supposed instantaneous creation of the World by the fiat of a unique and omnipotent personal God, which had been discrepantly dated the 7th October, 3761 B.C., by the Jews, the 1st September, 5509 B.C., by the Eastern Orthodox Christians,⁴ and

¹ 'New eras' have already been discussed, as symptoms of 'Futurism', in V. vi. 339-45.

² This is the proper correction for the popular traditional date 16th July, 622. D. S. Margoliouth dates the *Hijrah* the 20th September, 622 (*Mohammed and the Rise of Islam* (3rd ed.: London 1905, Putnam), p. xx).

³ The traditional Christian Era is said to have been instituted in A.D. 525 at Rome, by the Abbot Dionysius Exiguus, at the instance of the Pope. Even within the limits of Western Christendom it did not become generally prevalent till the ninth century.

⁴ The Eastern Orthodox Christian reckoning by 'Years of the World' appears to have

6.0 p.m. on the evening before the 23rd October, 4004 B.C., Old Style, by the Anglo-Irish chronologist-archbishop Ussher (*vivebat* A.D. 1581-1656).¹

The Inability of New Eras to establish themselves without Religious Sanctions

In the two preceding paragraphs the eras passed in review have been marshalled in a descending order of the cogency of the evidence for the events chosen by their originators for setting their initial dates; but, if we now resurvey these same eras from the standpoint of their relative success or failure in gaining a wide and lasting currency, we shall observe that the talisman by which their destinies had been decided had not been the touchstone of historical attestation, but the presence or absence of a religious sanction. In A.D. 1952 the historically dubious Western Christian Era was in the ascendant in the World on the unexpended strength of its ancient appeal to the former religious sentiment of its once Christian Western disseminators. The Islamic Era of the Hijrah, which was now on the defensive against the Christian Era, was still holding its own, in so far as it was succeeding in doing so, in virtue of its living appeal to the surviving religious sentiment of a majority of its hereditary adherents, and not at all in virtue of its being, as it was, as impeccable historically as the Christian Era was vulnerable to assaults of the higher criticism. At the same date the Jews were still persistently reckoning by their hallowed version of the date of the Creation. The vitality that was thus being displayed by the religious eras in A.D. 1952 was thrown into sharp relief by its contrast with the mortality rate of these consecrated eras' unhallowed secular counterparts. The Era of the First French Republic had been discarded by Revolutionary France herself in its fourteenth year on the 1st January, 1806; the Era of the Italian Fascist Revolution had shared the downfall of Fascism itself; and even the Seleucid and Gupta eras, after remaining in use for centuries, and being adopted or imitated by successive epigoni and supplanters of their originators, had long since fallen out of use.²

It is also significant that other secular events which, in the minds of contemporaries and Posterity, were no less epoch-making than those cited above, were never taken as the starting-points of new eras—not even of new eras that were abortive. Cases in point are the beginning, in May 1703, of the building, at St. Petersburg, of a new capital for Russia that was to be Western from the start;³ the landfall of the Pilgrim Fathers in New England on the 21st December, 1620; the

arisen at Constantinople in the seventh century of the Christian Era. In Russia, it was abrogated by Peter the Great, in favour of the Western Christian reckoning by 'Years of Our Lord', as from the 1st January, 1700. The celebration of New Year's Day thenceforward on the 1st January, in lieu of the 1st September, was made obligatory (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 227).

¹ See XI. ix. 178. Bishop Ussher's chronology found its way into the margin of the Church of England's Authorized Version of the Bible.

² 'The tenacity of the Seleucid calendar was remarkable: Doura used it when under Roman rule and Jews down to the eleventh century, and it is said to have still been in use among Syrian Christians at the beginning of the present century' (Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 65).

³ See p. 221, above.

opening of a new chapter in Western history towards the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era (an event which could have been dramatically symbolized either in the crossing of the Alps by King Charles VIII of France in A.D. 1494, or in da Gama's landfall at Calicut on the 20th May, 1498, or in Columbus's landfall on one of the Antilles on the 12th October, 1492, or in the publication of the first Western printed book in A.D. 1445-6). We might add to this catalogue the beginning, in the year A.D. 324, of the building, at Constantinople, of a new capital for the Roman Empire that was to be Christian from the start,¹ and the crossing of the Hellespont by Alexander the Great in 334 B.C.

Evidently the recognition of the authenticity and the importance of an event is not enough, in itself, to make such an event eligible for serving as a mark for the measurement of Time. If the historic event is not consecrated by some religious sanction, its intrinsic merits as a starting-point for an era may count in practice for little or nothing. There is indeed a traditional association, which cannot be dissolved with impunity, between the measurement of Time by human intellects and the hold of Religion over human souls, and the ground for this is not difficult to descry. Religion dominates every side of life or aspect of the Universe that is recognized by Man as being out of his control, and in this respect there is a striking contrast between Man's relation to the heavenly bodies whose cyclic movements give him his measures of Time and the divers objects which he subjects to measurements of length, volume, weight, and value. Man has at least an illusion of being master of the flour that he metes out in a man-made vessel after having ground it from grain produced by a harvest that Man himself has sown and reaped; he has a still greater sense of mastery over the piece of metal that he strikes into a coin after having smelted it from ore that he has detected in, and extracted from, the bowels of the Earth; but the stars in their courses overawe him by their inexorable aloofness, though in truth the astronomer's intellectual mastery over them is a more wonderful achievement than any physical feats of miner, miller, husbandman, or metallurgist.

In caeloque deum sedes et templa locarunt,
per caelum volvi quia nox et luna videtur—
luna, dies et nox et noctis signa severa,
noctivagaeque faces caeli flammaeque volantes . . .
nam cum suspicimus magni caelestia mundi
templa super stellisque micantibus aethera fixum,
et venit in mentem solis lunaeque viarum,
tunc aliis oppressa malis in pectora cura
illa quoque expergefatum caput erigere infit,
nequae forte deum nobis immensa potestas
sit, vario motu quae candida sidera verset.²

So far from readily falling into the delusion that he can affect the move-

¹ See pp. 218 and 238, above. The dedication date of the completed city was the 11th May, 330.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 1188-91 and 1204-10.

ments of the heavenly bodies, Man has found it difficult to shake off the contrary delusion that these movements influence human destinies.

The persistence of this superstition in the inaccessible subconscious depths of the Psyche, even in societies that had attained a degree of sophistication at which Astrology had been professedly discredited and repudiated, was attested by the rarity of the instances in which a revolutionarily rational reform of the Calendar had succeeded in establishing itself. The French Revolution, whose rationalized codes of law went forth, conquering and to conquer, to the ends of the Earth¹ and whose pedantically new-fangled weights and measures—grammes and kilogrammes and milligrammes, metres and kilometres and millimetres—enjoyed a *succès fou* and ran like wildfire round the globe, was utterly defeated in its attempt to supersede a pagan Roman calendar that had been rejuvenated through being consecrated by the Christian Church, though the substitute which the lucid French Reason offered was the attractive one of a neatly proportioned new series of picturesquely renamed months—a Brumaire, a Ventôse, a Germinal, a Fructidor—each cut to a uniform length of thirty days grouped in three ten-day weeks. The batch of five supernumerary days that made up the tale of the ordinary (non-leap) year ‘hardly marred the most sensible calendar ever invented—too sensible for a country which calls the tenth, eleventh and twelfth months of the year October, November and December’.² Yet, while the fantastically erroneous lunar year of an archaic Meccan oasis-state had been adopted, as the calendar of Islam, by hundreds of millions of people over a vast area extending almost from end to end of the Old World, the ‘sensible’ calendar devised by French votaries of Reason did not manage to outlive its fourteenth year, and the shortness of its life testified that, after all, the French revolutionaries had been less wise in their generation than the Roman conservatives.

The Roman misnomers pointed out by a distinguished Modern Western historian in the passage quoted just above were neither casual nor imbecile but deliberate and sagacious. The six months originally denoted in the Roman calendar by numerals, and not by the names of gods, had not, of course, been wrongly numbered when their names had first been bestowed on them. Originally the Roman official year had begun on the 1st March, in the spring of the solar year, and this month had been a convenient starting-point for the annual round of administration and warfare, as well as agriculture, so long as the Roman Government’s range of action had extended no farther afield than a few days’ march from the Pomoerium; for, under those conditions, an annual magistrate elect who had entered on his term of office on the 15th March could still take up the local command, assigned to him by the Senate, in time to take advantage of the spring campaigning season. When, however, in and after the Hannibalic War, the field of Roman military operations expanded out of Italy overseas into the Balkan Peninsula and the still more distant Iberian Peninsula, a magistrate,

¹ See pp. 271–8, above.

² Thompson, J. M.: *The French Revolution* (Oxford 1943, Blackwell), p. ix.

appointed to one of these distant commands, who had to wait till the 15th March before setting out from Rome might find himself unable to get into action before the summer was at its height and the autumn was approaching.

During the half-century immediately following the end of the Hannibalic War, this hampering loss of the best part of each annual campaigning season, with which the Roman state was threatened now that it had come to be fighting its wars in theatres at a distance of as much as several months' journey from the Italian homes of a Roman peasant soldiery, was at first largely offset by a discrepancy between the Roman official calendar and the actual cycle of the seasons resulting from the Pontifical College's cumulative neglect to keep the official year in step with the solar year by inserting intercalary months of the requisite length at the requisite intervals. For example, in the year 190 B.C., in which a Roman army inflicted a decisive defeat upon a Seleucid army on the Asiatic battlefield of Magnesia, the legions found time to arrive on the threshold of Sardis before the current season was over, because in that year the official 15th March fell on a day that was in reality the 16th November of the preceding solar year, while in the year 168 B.C., in which another Roman army inflicted an equally decisive defeat on a Macedonian army at Pydna, the official 15th March fell on a day that was in reality the 31st December of the solar year 169 B.C.¹ In these two militarily critical years the campaigning season was thus salvaged for Roman military operations thanks to a calendrical error; but, whether this error had been dictated by military considerations or by superstition, its efficacy diminished as the Roman calendar was progressively brought back nearer to correspondence with the solar year. The additional time now needed for arriving at a theatre of war before the campaigning season would be too far advanced had therefore to be provided by some alternative means; and, with this eminently practical consideration in mind, the Roman Government secured the passage of a law providing that, as from the year 153 B.C. onwards, the date on which the annually elected magistrates were to enter on their term of office was to be advanced, by two and a half months, from the 15th March to the 1st January,² and in consequence January instead of March became the first month of the year.³

Finding themselves thus constrained by *raison d'état* to call upon their

¹ In these two cases the magnitude of the Roman calendar's deviation from the current solar year can be calculated because Livy has recorded the dates of eclipses in terms of the day of the official Roman month (see Bouché-Leclercq, A.: *Histoire des Séleucides* (Paris 1913-14, Leroux, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 205).

² The original provision in the United States for a four months' interval between the election of a President's electors and the President Elect's assumption of office was made with the similar practical purpose of ensuring that he should have sufficient time to convey himself to Washington by horse-traction from his home state, even if this happened to be Georgia or New Hampshire. Within half a century of the year in which the Constitution had been adopted, the invention of steam-traction by railroad had stultified the practical purpose which this provision had originally been designed to serve, but it was not till the 6th February, 1933, that the interval was shortened by 36 days through the coming into force of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution (see XII. ix. 496).

³ The definitive replacement of the 1st March by the 1st January as the Roman New Year's Day seems to have taken place on the 1st January 45 B.C. as part of Julius Caesar's reform of the Roman Calendar.

public to put up with one shock to its habits and prejudices, the Roman authorities forbore to aggravate an already somewhat vexatious demand upon the Roman People's capacity for adaptation by simultaneously asking them to alter the traditional names of six of their twelve months merely out of respect for a different kind of reason which would have been, not political, but sheerly pedantic. Satisfied with their success in meeting the bare practical need of the day, the Conscrip't Fathers let the names of the months alone, and more than a century was allowed to pass before two out of the six resultant misnomers were corrected. At length the architects of the Principate took the bold step of renaming the first two of those six months which a Roman poverty of imagination had hitherto left unanimated and unhallowed by the names of gods. The month that was now the seventh, though still called 'the fifth' (*Quinctilis*), was renamed after Divus Iulius, and the following month (previously *Sextilis*) after Divus Augustus. The audacious innovation caught on, and in A.D. 1952 the calendars of both the Orthodox Christian and the Western World were still bearing the superscription of those two Roman statesmen in the month-names 'July' and 'August'.

Such currency is indeed apotheosis, if not immortalization; yet, in thus achieving a nomenclatory *tour de force* that proved beyond the capacity of French revolutionary enthusiasts, the astute authors of the Julian Calendar were exceptionally successful. In the United Kingdom in the supposedly enlightened eighteenth century of the Christian Era, disturbances were caused by an Act of Parliament, passed in A.D. 1751, for replacing the inexact Julian by the virtually perfect Gregorian calendar. This amended calendar had first been introduced by Pope Gregory XIII as far back as A.D. 1582, and in the meantime it had been adopted in most of the leading states of the Western World. But, in the sacrosanct sphere of the Calendar, religious susceptibilities long inhibited English Protestants from embracing a Papistical innovation, even if it were astronomically correct; and, sure enough, when the Act was published, it became suspect of having a catch in it. By the year 1752, in order to bring the current Julian reckoning into line with the Gregorian reckoning when this was substituted for it, it was necessary to drop eleven days out of the calendar year in which the change was being inaugurated. In their superstitious fear of calendrical magic, the British public were impervious to the simple truth that the eleven days which were to be dropped were only theoretical days on paper; they jumped to the conclusion that they were being cheated of eleven days' pay,¹ or perhaps even being docked of eleven days of life, and vociferous crowds went about demanding to have their stolen eleven days given back to them.

The Conservation of Pagan Calendars by Churches

Who had been the beneficiaries of calendars inherited by universal states from a dim religious past and rationalized by them at their peril?

¹ In fact, of course, everyone who was paid by the year or the month stood to gain, while anyone who was paid by the week or the day did not stand to lose, by the omission of eleven days in the month of September, 1752.

The marvellously exact, though formidably complex, Mayan calendar was bequeathed by 'the Old Empire' of the Mayas to the Yucatec and Mexic societies that were affiliated to the Mayan Civilization. The Sinic calendar was similarly bequeathed by the Empire of Ts'in and Han to the Far Eastern society affiliated to the Sinic Civilization. The Sumerian calendar, after having been bequeathed by 'the Realm of the Four Quarters' to the Babylonian Society affiliated to the Sumerian Civilization, and having survived to serve the Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenian Empires in their turn,¹ acquired at this stage a new lease of life through being adopted by the Jewish Church that was the enduring monument of Judah's fifty-years' exile by the waters of Babylon. The Roman calendar was bequeathed by the Roman Empire to the Christian Church and was transmitted² by this original legatee to secondary recipients—in the first place to the Orthodox Christian and Western societies, and thereby eventually to a number of universal states founded by Orthodox Christian and Western empire-builders: e.g. the Muscovite Empire in the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom; the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy; the Spanish Empire of the Indies; the British Rāj in India. By a still stranger caprice of Fortune the archaic lunar calendar of Mecca, thanks to its adoption by Islam and by the Caliphate, became the calendar of the Iranic and Arabic Muslim societies and hence the calendar of the Ottoman Empire and of the Timurid Mughal Empire on Indian ground.

This brief survey shows that in the histories of calendars the function most frequently performed by a universal state had been to take over a calendar from a primitive pagan past and to transmit it to a higher religion. In the process of transmission the universal state had sometimes stamped the pagan calendar with its own political imprint; yet, when once a calendar had been adopted from a universal state by a 'higher religion', it was apt, notwithstanding the patent evidence of its unhallowed origin, to acquire the sacrosanctity with which the higher religions had been tempted to invest their casually acquired external accessories as well as their inner spiritual essence; and a calendar that had received this consecration had to be taken as it had been found by civilizations and universal states of a later generation who had inherited it from some higher religion that had incubated them. The accoutrements of a church usually cannot be refurbished by any party except the Church's own recognized supreme authority, whatever that authority may be. In Northumbria in the seventh century of the Christian Era the abandonment of a traditional method of reckoning the date of Easter, which had survived in a Far Western Christendom, in favour of a

¹ In the Jewish garrison-community at Elephantine under the Achaemenian régime, the Babylonian calendar was current officially and the Egyptian unofficially (Meyer, E.: 'Zur Chronologie der Papyri von Elephantine', in *Kön. Preuss. Ak. Wiss., Gesamtsitzung* vom 23 November, 1911: *Mitt.* vom 26 October, pp. 1040-1).

² With the important addition of a reckoning by Jewish weeks as well as by Roman months. The Jewish community's original count of weeks—from the forgotten initial date at which this had been started—was still being kept, in A.D. 1952, in all living communities with a Jewish, Christian, or Muslim background. This was an historically notable common practice of the three religions—though Christianity and Islam had taken care to differentiate their practice from the Jews' and from one another's by choosing a different day of the week for their own equivalent of the Jewish Sabbath.

novel method which was a Roman innovation, implied a recognition of the Roman Church's supremacy over the churches of 'the Celtic Fringe'.¹ In a Western Catholic Christendom in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era the Julian Calendar—work of pagan genius though it was—could not have been reformed by any other authority than the Papacy; and the act of Pope Gregory XIII was as effective as it was uncharacteristic of the normally conservative *éthos* of an established universal church.

The Defeat of a Duodecimal by a Decimal System of Reckoning

When we pass from calendars and eras to weights and measures and money, we enter a province of the field of social currencies in which the rationalizing intellect holds sway uncensored by those religious scruples that had sometimes welled up forcefully from the subconscious depths of the Psyche when Reason had sought to extend her rule over the reckoning of Time.

The French Revolutionaries, who suffered such a shattering defeat in their attempt to inaugurate a rational new calendar and new era unfortified by an augur's indispensable religious prestige, scored with their new weights and measures an oecumenical success that eclipsed even the triumph of the Napoleonic Codes. And a kindred spirit, Ts'in She Hwang-ti, the revolutionary founder of a Sinic universal state, succeeded in imposing the current weights and measures of his own hereditary parochial state of Ts'in upon the conquered remainder of the Sinic World² without, apparently, provoking in this case the stultifying reaction by which, in other fields, his work, like that of his French *confrères*, was so largely undone within a few years of its recklessly sweeping execution.

Though it is evident that weights and measures are a sphere in which the revolutionary intellect can disport itself with an unusual impunity, a comparison of the respective fortunes of the French and the Sumeric new model metric system suggests that the dazzling success of the French reformers' work was due, above all, to their judicious moderation in setting common-sense bounds to their pursuit of their ideal. They were uncompromising in reducing the bewilderingly variegated tables of the *Ancien Régime* to one single system of reckoning; but they showed their practical good sense in irrationally following for this purpose the inconvenient decimal system which had been unanimously adopted by all branches of the Human Race, neither on its merits nor as the result of some laboriously achieved diplomatic compromise between conflicting better plans, but simply because the normal human being was born with ten fingers and ten toes.

It was one of Nature's unkind practical jokes that she had furnished some of the tribes of her vertebrate brute creation with six digits apiece for each of their four limbs without endowing the possessors of this

¹ See II. ii. 326, 332, and 335.

² See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), pp. 136-7; Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 233.

admirable natural abacus with the intellectual capacity for mathematical calculation, while she had dealt out to the *Genus Homo* a niggardly allowance of appendages that added up, not to dozens and double dozens, but only to decades and scores. Given the human anatomy, a decimal notation of Man's mathematical affairs was as inevitable as it was unfortunate. It was unfortunate because, on a decimal count, the basic scale of reckoning is divisible only by the low-powered number Two and the not very useful number Five, while the lowest number divisible alike by all the three key-factors Two, Three, and Four is Twelve. The decimal notation was nevertheless inevitable because, by the time when any wits in any society had come to appreciate the intrinsic superiority of the number Twelve over the number Ten, the decimal notation had become ineradicably entrenched in practical life, in language, and perhaps even already in written records.

The reformers of the French weights and measures forbore to kick against these ten-pronged pricks, but they had Sumerian predecessors who had been less wise in their generation. The Sumerian discovery of the virtues of the number Twelve was a stroke of pure intellectual genius, for there were no obvious sets of twelve articulations on the surface of the human body to guide a pioneer mathematician to the ideal choice for a scale of reckoning. The Sumerians not only saw the advantages of the number Twelve; they took the revolutionary step of recasting their system of weights and measures on a duodecimal basis; but apparently they did not realize that, unless they could also achieve the further, and far more difficult, step of leading their fellow men to substitute a duodecimal for a decimal basis of reckoning for all purposes,¹ the convenience of acquiring, for the simple purpose of weighing and measuring, a basic scale divisible by both the numbers Three and Four would be far more than offset by the inconvenience of having two incommensurable scales in operation side by side. This hopeless irreconcilability of an ideally convenient Twelve with a practically ineradicable Ten foredoomed an intrinsically superior duodecimal system of weights and measures to ultimate defeat, and assured a whole-hogging decimal system of a rapid victory. In the course of the four thousand years preceding the inauguration of the French decimal metric system the Sumeric duodecimal metric system had spread, notwithstanding its inherent handicap, to the ends of the Earth. Yet this long start in Time and Space did not save it from being almost entirely supplanted by its latter-day decimal competitor within 150 years of this rival system's promulgation. By A.D. 1952 the twelve ounces constituting a troy-weight pound and the twelve pence constituting a shilling in the antediluvian

¹ Technically the step would be simple enough in a society employing the originally Hindu 'Arabic' numerals or any other application of the device of making the numerical value of a figure depend on its relative location in a group. All that would be needed would be the invention of two new figures to represent the numbers Ten and Eleven. The notations 10 and 11 would then be released to stand respectively for Twelve and Thirteen. Twelve would be represented by 10, Twenty-four by 20, One Hundred and Forty-four by 100, and so on. The difficulty would lie, of course, not in cyphering, but in thinking, duodecimally; for in the common cultural tradition of the Human Race the decimal count was so immemorably old a piece of mental furniture that it had come to be virtually a fixture.

metronomy of the United Kingdom were almost the last surviving monuments of an unpractical stroke of Sumerian genius; and in an obstinately decimal-minded world it could not be maintained that this piously conservative loyalty to a provedly unsuccessful intellectual experiment was anything but a hindrance to the dispatch of business.

The Invention of Coinage

As soon as it has come to be recognized and accepted that honest dealing in weights and measures is a matter of social concern transcending the personal interests of the parties directly involved, and that therefore any government that aspires to be worthy of the name must make the giving of false weight and measure a prosecutable and punishable offence at law, the invention of money lies just round the corner. Yet this corner can only be turned by the taking of certain precise successive steps, and the requisite combination of moves in fact remained unachieved in the history of any society in process of civilization before the seventh century B.C., though by that time the species of societies called civilizations had already been in existence for perhaps as long as three thousand years.

The first step was the invention of the commercially useful expedient of giving some particular commodity or commodities the special function and status of serving as media of exchange and thereby acquiring a secondary use independent of their intrinsic utility. But this step did not, in itself, lead on to the invention of money when the commodities selected as media of exchange were multifarious and not exclusively metallic. In the Mexic and Andean worlds, for example, by the time of the Spanish conquest, the substances known and coveted in the Old World as 'the precious metals' existed in quantities that seemed fabulous to the Spanish *conquistadores*, and the natives had long since learnt the art of extracting, refining, and working this local gold and silver; but, though they valued it as material for works of art and ornaments, they had not thought of turning it to account as an exclusive medium of exchange,¹ though they, too, had hit upon this secondary use of com-

¹ Chronological facts forbid the otherwise almost irresistible conjecture that some report of this Mexic and Andean practice (so strange to the ears of denizens of the Old World) of estimating gold and silver, like any other commodity, at a valuation based on their mere intrinsic utility inspired a famous passage of More's *Utopia*:

'They keep an inestimable treasure, but yet not as a treasure. . . . Gold and silver . . . they do so use as none of them doth more esteem it than the very nature of the thing deserveth. And then who doth not plainly see how far it is under iron—as without the which, men can no better live than without fire and water, whereas to gold and silver Nature hath given no use that we may not well lack, if that the folly of men had not set it in higher estimation for the rareness' sake. . . . Whereas they eat and drink in earthen and glass vessels, which indeed be curiously and properly made, and yet be of very small value, of gold and silver they make commonly chamber-pots and other vessels that serve for most vile uses. . . . Furthermore, of the same metals they make great chains, fetters and gyves, wherein they tie their bondmen. . . . Thus by all means possible they procure to have gold and silver among them in reproach and infamy' (More, Sir Thomas: *Utopia*, English version, Book II: 'Of their Journeying or Travelling Abroad').

Utopia, however, was published before the end of A.D. 1516, and 'it is important to remember that the Inca Empire of Peru, which in more than one detail had a likeness to Utopia, was not known till some fourteen years later; Cortés had not yet conquered Mexico' (Chambers, R. W.: *Thomas More* (London 1935, Cape), p. 143). Evidently these dates rule out the possibility that the passage in *Utopia*, quoted above, could have been inspired by reports of Central American or Andean institutions. It may, however,

modities independently of the Old World and perhaps also independently of one another.

In the Mexic World the Spaniards found cacao beans, cotton cloths, T-shaped pieces of copper, and quills stuffed with gold dust circulating as media of exchange;¹ in the Andean World they found pimento, dried fish, cotton, maize, chuño, birds' feathers, salt, coca, and copper being used for the same purpose.² There was also at least one instance in which they found sea-shells being employed in this way, as the cowrie shell likewise was employed round the shores of the Indian Ocean.³ It will be seen that the civilizations of the New World came near to employing standard units of metal in the fashion which, in the Old World, had led to the invention of money more than two thousand years earlier, while the employment of shells—a commodity without any intrinsic value of its own—was an anticipation of that use of paper money which in the Old World had already arisen, before the Spaniards' conquest of the Americas, as a sequel to the use of metallic coin.⁴ Yet, though the civilizations of the New World thus came within an ace of inventing money, they failed to take the final step, and the verdict of History on their achievements in this sphere is that 'a miss is as good as a mile'.

In the commercially interwoven Egyptian, Babylonian, Syriac, and Hellenic worlds by the date of the invention of money in the Hellenic World in the seventh century B.C.,

'the use of the precious metals in bar form as measures of value had been a regular institution for thousands of years past. They circulated, not in the form of coin minted by a state and guaranteed as legal tender, but as units of weight which passed from hand to hand in established forms such as rings, plaques, ornaments and so on, but which, in the act of payment, had to be verified by being weighed like any other commodity.'⁵

This usage had perhaps become customary in the Sumerian World in the time of its universal state;⁶ but a regular metallic medium of exchange was the raw material of money without being the thing itself.

have been inspired by reports of already discovered fringes of the Americas where 'the precious metals' were given the same valuation by the inhabitants as in Mexico and Peru—whether in consequence of the radiation of one or other or both of these indigenous civilizations of the New World, or because even the more backward among the 'native' peoples had arrived independently, by the light of Nature, at the same common-sense valuation of gold and silver as their more progressive neighbours. 'We can only understand *Utopia* if we remember the Europe for which it was written; . . . the travels of Vespucci in every man's hands: Vespucci, who had found folk holding property in common and not esteeming gold, pearls or jewels' (ibid.).

Though the historic institutions of the Incaic Empire did not inspire *Utopia*, the imaginary institutions of More's ideal society did inspire one of the more beneficent and successful attempts, on the part of the Spanish conquerors of the New World, to fill the social vacuum which they themselves had produced by brutally shattering the fabric of Central American and Andean society. The Spanish philanthropist Vasco de Quiroga, who arrived in the Indies in A.D. 1530 as an enthusiastic disciple of More, succeeded in founding Indian *pueblos* on lines that were a deliberate attempt to reproduce *Utopia* in real life (Haring, C.: *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York 1947, Oxford University Press), p. 193). The present writer visited some of these on the 23rd–26th April, 1953.

¹ See Gann, T.: *Mexico from the Earliest Times to the Conquest* (London 1936, Lovat Dickson), p. 174; Vaillant, G. C.: *The Aztecs of Mexico* (London 1950, Penguin), p. 132.

² See Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p.

³ See ibid.

⁴ See pp. 312–13, below.

⁵ Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, 1st ed. (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 79.

⁶ See Rostovtzeff, M.: *Caravan Cities* (Oxford 1932, Clarendon Press), p. 11.

The decisive steps which conjured money into existence were taken in the seventh century B.C. by some Greek city-state, or perhaps by several of the commercially foremost Greek city-states of the day simultaneously, when their governments went beyond the existing practice of putting metallic media of exchange on a par with other commodities and thereby including them under the common ruling that made it an offence at law to give false weight and measure in the transfer of any commodity from hand to hand. These pioneer city-states now took the two revolutionary steps of making the issue of these metallic units of value a government monopoly and of stamping this exclusive governmental currency with a distinctive official image and superscription as a guarantee that the coin was an authentic product of the governmental mint and that its weight and quality were to be accepted as being what they purported to be on the face of them. When a government had assumed this prerogative, the clipping or filing of authentic coins became a political crime against the state and not merely an offence in civil law against some private individual on whom the fraudulently reduced lump of metal had been palmed off, and counterfeit coining by private individuals became a crime of the same order—a crime which would be not a whit less heinous if the unauthorized coiner's politically bad money happened to be as good in weight and quality as the legitimate coinage of the realm.¹

The Diffusion of the Use of Coinage

Since the management of a coinage is evidently least difficult in a state with a minimum area and population, it was perhaps no accident that city-states should have been the political laboratories in which the invention was made. At the same time it is equally evident that the utility of a coinage increases with every enlargement of the area and population in which it circulates as legal tender. Such Greek city-states as Phocaea, Lampsacus, Miletus, Aegina, and Corinth, which were pioneers in minting coin, were of miniature material dimensions; and the narrow range of currency of these city-state issues was not appreciably extended when, as happened in several notable instances, two or three city-states situated in different quarters of the Hellenic World—one, perhaps, in Ionia or on the Hellespont, a second in Continental European Greece, and a third in Sicily or Magna Graecia—went into commercial partnership and arranged to issue uniform coinages which could all circulate *de facto*, if not *de jure*, throughout the issuing governments' combined domains. In the wide world beyond, where the writ of these petty governments did not run, their minted coinage was not accepted at its face value but was still treated like any unminted standard unit of metal whose value had to be assayed by weighing, every time the piece changed hands.²

¹ It will be seen that the invention of coinage is analogous, in the field of commerce, to the epoch-making change that takes place in the field of criminal law when a government takes to treating crimes as political offences against itself instead of regarding them merely as personal injuries to be avenged by the private self-help of the victim or his surviving kinsmen, in regard to which the government's own responsibility, at its widest, is limited to promulgating a tariff of *vergelde*s.

² In out-of-the-way places with no coinage of their own, this practice of treating

A regional jump in scale was achieved when, in the earlier decades of the sixth century B.C., the Lydian Monarchy conquered all the Greek city-states round the western coasts of Anatolia except Miletus, as well as the interior of the peninsula as far east as the River Halys, and issued a coinage of electron (gold alloyed with silver), based on the local standard of the subjected Greek city-state of Phocaea, which was given a general currency throughout the Lydian dominions. The last and decisive step was taken when the Kingdom of Lydia, with its subject Greek city-states, was incorporated, in its turn, into the Achaemenian Empire. The Achaemenidae had the imagination to perceive the value, for a universal state, of this new invention which they had stumbled upon on the far western fringe of their South-West Asian World. They issued a gold coinage superior to the Lydian both in weight and in purity of metal, with a subsidiary silver coinage to supplement it, and they made the coining of gold an imperial monopoly. At the same time, with characteristic liberality, they permitted autonomous Greek and Phoenician city-states, client principalities, and even the Persian viceroys of imperial provinces, to issue, on their own account, not only small change in copper, but also silver money to circulate side by side with the silver issues of the imperial mints.¹

In a more jealous vein the Roman Imperial Government in its day monopolized, throughout its dominions, the coining of silver as well as gold, and left nothing but copper cash to be issued by autonomous and allied states members of the Roman Commonwealth.² The prerogative, asserted by the Roman Imperial Government, of monopolizing the coining of gold was tacitly respected by the Arsacid Government, in spite of an insistence on their political independence which they vindicated successfully by force of arms on several critical occasions; and, when the easy-going Arsacidae were supplanted by militant Sasanidae who asserted, not merely their independence of Rome, but a political parity with her, these self-conscious successors of the Achaemenids in the Cis-Euphratean portion of the former Achaemenian dominions found themselves debarred by economic inability from emulating their Achaemenian ensamples and flouting their Roman contemporaries by taking to coining in gold as well as in silver.

After the Primitive Muslim Arabs had achieved the unfulfilled ambitions of the Sasanidae by reuniting under a single oecumenical régime, for the first time since the death of Alexander the Great, the bulk of the

foreign coins as if they were pieces of uncoined metal lasted for at least twelve hundred years after the invention of coinage on the shores of the Aegean. For example, 'at Mecca in Muhammad's day Roman gold pieces and Persian dirhems were already in circulation, but in commercial transactions they were valued by their weight' (Kremer, A. von: *Culturgeschichte des Orients* (Vienna 1875-7, Braumüller, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 169).

¹ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, 1st ed. (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 80-82. A viceroy who presumed to issue a silver coinage with as low a content of alloy as the alloy content of his Achaemenian imperial master's gold coinage was, however, found guilty of high treason by Darius *ipso facto*, according to Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 166.

² A provincial silver coinage was issued at Alexandria, and for a time at Antioch as well, by local branches of the Imperial Mint; on the other hand, in the western provinces even the copper cash in circulation was mostly of Roman and not of local mintage (see Rostovtzeff, M.: *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1926, Clarendon Press), p. 171).

former Achaemenian dominions, including the latterly Roman provinces in Syria and Egypt as well as the entire domain of the Sasanian Empire,¹ successive attempts were made by the Umayyad Caliphs Mu'āwiyah I (*imperabat* A.D. 661–80) and 'Abd-al-Malik (*imperabat* A.D. 685–705) to restore the long-lost monetary unity of the Syriac World.² There are indications,³ however, that, in the matter of coinage, weights, and measures, the Caliphate did not in practice succeed in re-establishing a unity which was so triumphantly re-established under its aegis on the social, cultural, and spiritual planes.

The Invention of Paper Money

The oecumenical Achaemenian gold coinage had given the then still recent invention of money an impetus that had sped it—as the Revolutionary French decimal metric system and the Napoleonic Codes were to be sped in a later age—on an irresistible and almost ubiquitous course of conquest. Coined money was launched on its historic career in India by the temporary annexation of the Panjab to the Achaemenian Empire itself.⁴ The more distant Sinic World became ripe for adopting the new institution after Ts'in She Hwang-ti's revolutionary empire-building work had been salvaged through being tempered by the tactful hands of Han Liu Pang. In its first fumbings with this puzzling alien device, the Prior Han régime betrayed its failure to apprehend one of the essential principles involved when in 175 B.C. the Emperor Hsiao Wên (*imperabat* 180–157 B.C.) sought to make up a shortage of currency by abandoning the imperial monopoly of issue and giving licences to local governors and princes of the Imperial House to mint copper cash.⁵ The consequent inflation was eventually cured in 113 B.C. by the drastic steps of demonetizing all current coins and issuing a new imperial currency minted exclusively at Ch'ang Ngan under the direct control of imperial officials,

¹ See I. i. 76–77.

² See Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und Sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), pp. 135–6. According to Ahmad Al-Balādhurī: *Kitāb Futūh-al-Buldān* (English translation by Hitti, P. K., and Murgotten, F. C. (New York: Columbia University Press), vol. i (1916), pp. 383–4, and part ii (1924), pp. 263–6, 'Abd-al-Malik started coining gold (in ex-Roman territory) at Kūfah at the end of A.H. 74, and his eastern viceroy Al-Hajjāj silver (in ex-Sasanian territory) at Kūfah at the end of A.H. 75. The same authority reports that the occasion was a quarrel between the Umayyad and Roman Governments over a delicate question of images and superscriptions. According to Al-Balādhurī, the Caliphate had been selling to the Roman Empire Egyptian papyrus (which the Romans could not do without) in exchange for Roman gold coin (for circulation in the ex-Roman part of the Umayyad dominions). The water-mark on the papyrus (which was processed in Egypt before export) had been provocatively changed by 'Abd-al-Malik from the sign of the Cross to the Qur'anic text 'Say: He alone is God'. The Romans had threatened to retaliate by inscribing their—as they believed, indispensable—gold pieces with strictures on the Prophet Muhammad. This threat moved the Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik to start coining gold for himself. According to the East Roman chronicler Theophanes, *sub* A.M. 6183 (*Theophanis Chronographia*, ed. C. de Boor, vol. i (Leipzig 1883, Teubner), p. 365), the Roman Imperial Government refused to accept these new Damascene gold pieces in payment of the tribute which had been one of the stipulations in the treaty of A.D. 688 prolonging the peace settlement of A.D. 685, and this was the occasion of the recrudescence of war between the Umayyad Power and the Roman Empire in A.D. 692 (see Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Later Roman Empire* (London 1889, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 322; von Kremer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 168–70.

³ See Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 80.

⁵ See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 161.

while at the same time granting an amnesty to the host of convicted coiners¹ who had continued to mint cash without licence in defiance of the Imperial Government's reassumption of its monopoly. But in 119 B.C., in the reign of the Emperor Wuti, in the course of preliminary gropings after some less arduous method of reconstituting a sound currency, the Imperial Government redeemed its compromised reputation for financial acumen by a quaint expedient based on a brilliant intuition of the hitherto undiscovered truth that metal is not the only stuff of which good money can be made.

'In the imperial park at Ch'ang Ngan the Emperor had a white stag, a very rare beast, which had no fellow in the empire. On the advice of a minister the Emperor had this animal killed, and made a kind of treasury note out of its skin, which, he believed, could not be copied. These pieces of skin were a foot square, and were made with a fringed border and decorated with a pattern. Each piece was assigned the arbitrary value of 400,000 copper coins.² The princes, when they came to pay their respects to the Throne, were compelled to buy one of these pieces of skin for cash, and present their gifts to the Emperor upon it. This precaution ensured the circulation of "the White Stag Notes". The skin of the white stag was, however, a limited quantity, and the time soon came when this device ceased to supply the Treasury with much needed money.'³

Leathern money—in this case apparently made from sable pelts—turns up again in Russia in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, at a time when she was politically associated with China under a common Mongol domination,⁴ but the invention of currency notes did not become effectively applicable till it had become associated with the two subsequent inventions of paper (invented in the penultimate chapter of Sinic history under the Posterior Han Dynasty)⁵ and printing (invented in the early summer of the affiliated Far Eastern Society under the T'ang Dynasty).⁶

Negotiable paper ('flying money'), in the form of cheques tallying with stubs retained by the Imperial Treasury at Si Ngan, was issued by the T'ang Government in the years A.D. 807 and A.D. 809;⁷ but there is no evidence that the inscriptions on these cheques were printed. Paper money on which there was probably an imprint was issued in the Chinese province of Szechwan—first by a group of private men of business, and later by the local government through the agency of a bank established for the purpose—during the interval (*durabat* A.D. 907–60) of political disunity in China between the extinction of the T'ang Dynasty and the re-establishment of an all but oecumenical régime by the Sung.⁸ In A.D. 970 the invention of printed paper money was taken up by the Sung Government, and in China and its dependencies from that date onwards until the reign of the third Ming sovereign Yung Lo

¹ See Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

² Not 400,000 but 40,000, according to Ma Tuan-Lin: *Wên Hsien T'ung K'ao*, quoting from the Dynastic History of the Prior Han, as translated in Carter, T. F.: *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward*, revised edition (New York 1931, Columbia University Press), pp. 222–3.—A.J.T.

³ Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, pp. 164–5.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 1–6 and 190–1.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 70–71 and 223.

⁴ See Carter, *op. cit.*, pp. 76 and 225.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 28–32 and 201–4.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 71–72 and 223–4.

(*regnabat* A.D. 1403-25) paper money was continuously and ubiquitously current.¹ In the latter part of the twelfth century of the Christian Era the practice was taken over from the Sung by the Kin barbarian invaders who had wrested the Yellow River Basin out of the hands of the Sung in A.D. 1124-42; and from the Kin it was taken over in succession by their more redoubtable supplanters the Mongols.²

The Mongols' sweeping conquests round all the shores of the Great Eurasian Steppe carried the western frontiers of an empire based on China up to the Euphrates and the Carpathians and thereby made China momentarily accessible to Iranic Muslim and Western Christian observers; and the paper money current in China at the time is mentioned by Marco Polo³ and at least seven other pre-Renaissance Western authors, as well as by a number of Muslim authorities.⁴ In Hülāgū Khān's appanage of the Mongol Empire in Iran and 'Irāq, in the reign of his descendant Gaykhātū Khān (*dominabatur* A.D. 1291-5), in the year A.D. 1294, an issue of printed paper notes, with a bilingual inscription in Chinese and Arabic, was uttered in the commercial capital, Tabrīz. The local business community did not take kindly to the innovation, and their protests were so violent that the issue had to be withdrawn after two or three days' trial. It has been conjectured that some of this historic but unprofitable printed paper money may have been unloaded on to the hands of the Venetian and Genoese merchants residing in Tabrīz at the time.⁵

The Utility of a Monetary Currency as a Medium for Governmental Propaganda

Who had been the principal beneficiaries from this institution of money in the divers material media in which it had been issued by innumerable governments—parochial and oecumenical, ephemeral and rather longer-lasting—since its invention in the Hellenic World in the seventh century B.C.? Undoubtedly this device had proved, on balance, a convenience in the private transactions of the issuing governments' subjects—in spite of the socially subversive fluctuations of inflation and deflation, and temptations to borrow and lend at usurious rates, which the invention had brought in its train. But a greater benefit had assuredly accrued to the issuing governments themselves; for the issue of money is an *acte de présence* which brings a government into direct and constant contact with at least an active, intelligent, and influential minority of its subjects, even where the circulation does not extend through the entire population; and this monetary epiphany—which does not cease to be

¹ Yung Lo withdrew it from circulation (no doubt in view of the inflation that had occurred in the latter days of the Mongol régime in China, and, before that, in the latter days of the Sung). No further issues of paper money were made in China till A.D. 1851, when the Manchu Dynasty, in its turn, was declining towards its fall (see Carter, *op. cit.*, p. 76).

² See Carter, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-76 and 224-5.

³ An English translation of the passage, accompanied by valuable notes, will be found in *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, translated into English and edited by Sir Henry Yule, 3rd ed., revised by Henri Cordier (London 1903, Murray, 2 vols.; 1920, supplementary volume), vol. ii, pp. 423-30.

⁴ See Carter, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-79 and 225-6.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 128-9 and 238.

impressive by becoming familiar—not only automatically fosters a government's prestige and authority; it also gives a government a magnificent opportunity for deliberately indoctrinating its subjects with sentiments, beliefs, and views.

The hypnotic effect of a coinage even on the minds of a population under alien rule who resent this political yoke and abominate the Power by whom it has been imposed, is conveyed in a classic passage of the New Testament.

"They send unto Him certain of the Pharisees and of the Herodians, to catch Him in His words. And when they were come, they say unto Him: "Master, we know that thou art true, and carest for no man; for thou regardest not the person of men, but teachest the way of God in truth. Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar, or not? Shall we give, or shall we not give?"

'But He, knowing their hypocrisy, said unto them: "Why tempt ye me? Bring me a penny, that I may see it." And they brought it, and He saith unto them: "Whose is this image and superscription?" And they said unto him: "Caesar's". And Jesus answering said unto them: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's".¹

'And they could not take hold of His words before the people, and they marvelled at His answer, and held their peace.'²

This automatic moral profit which the prerogative of issuing money yielded, even in a formidably adverse political and religious environment, was of incomparably greater value to the Roman Imperial Government than any mere financial gains which the management of the mint might incidentally bring in. The Emperor's likeness on a coin gave the Imperial Government a certain status in the minds of a Jewish population which not only regarded Rome's dominion as illegitimate but treasured, as the second of ten commandments believed to have been received by Moses from Yahweh *viva voce*, the explicit injunction:

'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any likeness of anything that is in Heaven above or that is in the Earth beneath or that is in the water under the Earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them; for I the Lord thy God am a jealous god.'³

When in 167 B.C. the Seleucid sovereign Antiochus IV Epiphanes had placed a statue of Olympian Zeus in the Holy of Holies of Yahweh's temple at Jerusalem, the horror and indignation of the Jews at seeing the 'abomination that maketh desolate'⁴ 'standing where it ought not'⁵ were so intense that, thenceforward, they could not rest until they had thrown off every vestige of Seleucid rule. Again, when in A.D. 26 the Roman procurator Pontius Pilate smuggled into Jerusalem, draped and under cover of night, Roman military standards bearing the Emperor's image in medallions, the reaction of the Jews was so vehement as to compel Pilate to remove the offensive emblems from the precincts of the Holy City.⁶ Yet in their holy land the Jews had schooled themselves

¹ Mark xii. 13-17. Cp. Matt. xxii. 15-21; Luke xx. 20-25.

² Luke xx. 26. Cp. Matt. xxii. 22; Mark xii. 17.

³ Exod. xx. 4-5. Cp. Deut. v. 8-9.

⁵ Mark xiii. 14. Cp. Matt. xxiv. 15.

⁴ Dan. xi. 31 and xii. 11.

⁶ Josephus: *Antiquitates*, Book XVIII, chap. iii, § 1; *Bellum Iudaicum*, Book II, chap. ix, §§ 2-3.

meekly, not only to seeing, but to handling, using, earning, hoarding, and by all these compromising actions progressively countenancing, the abominable image on Caesar's coinage, and had thereby anticipated in action the observation of their future Roman chastiser Vespasian that sordid money does not smell.¹

The Roman Government was not slow to perceive the value of an oecumenical coinage as an instrument of policy.

'From the middle of the first century onwards the Imperial Government had appreciated, as few governments have done before or since, not only the function of coinage as a mirror of contemporary life—of the political, social, spiritual and artistic aspirations of the age—but also its immense and unique possibilities as a far-reaching instrument of propaganda. Modern methods of disseminating news and modern vehicles of propaganda, from postage-stamps to broadcasting and the press, have their counterpart in the imperial coinage, where yearly, monthly—we might almost say, daily—novelties and variations in types record the sequence of public events and reflect the aims and ideologies of those who control the state.'²

The designers of the Roman imperial coinage could make play with a combination of image and superscription for giving visual form to the issuing government's political directives. The Umayyad successors of the Roman Empire in Syria, Egypt, and North-West Africa, and the innumerable Muslim governments that had succeeded the Umayyads in their turn down to the time of writing, were required to perform the still more skilful feat of conveying their messages to their subjects by superscription alone, since the Jewish tabu on graven images had been adopted by the Prophet Muhammad. In this inverted Psyche's task of spinning straw out of gold, they were fortunate in operating with a version of the Alphabet whose beauty, like that of the Sinic characters, when displayed by a master of calligraphy, could still be appreciated even by an eye whose owner's mind was illiterate. This capacity of a superscription, even when unsupported by an image, to transmit to the users of a coinage the message impressed on it by its makers was attested by the variety and abundance of the issues uttered by Muslim states.

The User's Demand for Conservatism in the Reproduction of Coin Types

There is, however, one golden rule that has to be rigidly observed if a coinage, iconic or aniconic, is to produce its psychological effect. A type that has once caught the imagination of its clientèle will not retain its hold unless it is reproduced in successive issues with blind fidelity.

The abortive first essay in an Umayyad gold and silver coinage—made by the founder of the dynasty, Mu'āwiyah, himself—is recorded

¹ 'Reprehendenti filio Tito, quod etiam urinae vectigal commentus esset, pecuniam ex primā pensione admovit ad nares, sciscitans num odore offenderetur; et, illo negante, "Atquin", inquit, "e lotio est"' (Suetonius Tranquillus, C.: *The Lives of the Caesars*, 'Divus Vespasianus', chap. xxiii, § 3).

² Toynbee, J. M. C.: *Roman Medallions* (New York 1944, The American Numismatic Society), p. 15. See further eandem: *The Hadrianic School: A Chapter in the History of Greek Art* (Cambridge 1934, University Press), pp. 2-5 and 24-159, for the 'province' coin series; p. 5 for the 'exercitus' coins; and Sutherland, C. H. V.: *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy*, 31 B.C.-A.D. 68 (London 1951, Methuen).

to have been boycotted by the public because it did not bear on its face the reassuringly familiar symbol of the Cross which was the hall-mark of the antecedent Christian Roman mintage.¹ Vexatious experiences of this kind no doubt explain the rigid conservatism of the Attic and Achaemenian mints, which continued to strike their primitive Athenian 'owls' and Daric 'archers' in latter days when the artificers' fingers must have itched to replace these stiff archaic types by something in a more lifelike modern style. Such sedulously mummified coin-types may indeed continue not only to pass current but to be uttered for centuries after the disappearance of the government whose image and superscription they bear. Silver *dirhems* (drachmae) bearing the image of Athena's owl were still circulating in the highland fastness of the Yaman² down to the date of the Umayyad Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik's (*imperabat* A.D. 685-705) new oecumenical gold and silver issue, though by that time more than nine centuries had gone by since the native Attic issues of silver 'owls' from an Athenian mint had been discontinued by the Athenians themselves.³

After a brief taste of the novel experience of being a province of a universal state, the Yaman promptly took advantage of the weakening of the Caliphate's hold in the latter days of the 'Abbasid régime in order to revert to her familiar way of life as a 'hermit kingdom'; and in A.D. 1952 the most popular monetary medium of exchange in the dominions of the Imām of San'ā, as well as in the adjoining Arabian regions of the Hadramawt and the hinterland of Aden, was the Maria Theresa dollar of an extinct Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy which, in the Hapsburg dominions themselves, had ceased to be legal tender as long ago as A.D. 1858.⁴ The writer of this Study, when he was travelling on foot in

¹ See Wellhausen, J.: *Das Arabische Reich und Sein Sturz* (Berlin 1902, Reimer), p. 136.

² See *ibid.*, p. 136. During the interval between the annexation of the Yaman to the Medinese nucleus of the Arab Empire, in the last days of the Prophet Muhammad's lifetime, and the Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik's new issues, these Himyarite silver 'owls' were actually in circulation, in small numbers, throughout the Arab dominions, side by side with Sasanian silver and with Roman silver and gold.

³ This change of Attic coin types appears to have been made soon after the liberation of Athens from Macedonian occupation in 229 B.C. (see Ferguson, W. S.: *Hellenistic Athens* (London 1911, Macmillan), p. 245).

⁴ See Hans, J.: *Zwei Jahrhunderte Maria-Theresien-Taler, 1751-1951* (Klagenfurt 1950, Hans), p. 16.

Of the 320 million MTT that had been minted since A.D. 1751, more than 150 million had been minted within the thirty years ending in A.D. 1950 (see *ibid.*, pp. 3 and 10). Between A.D. 1751 and A.D. 1866, 82,727,621 had been minted in divers Hapsburg mints; between 1867 and 1935, 163,202,763 had been minted at Vienna; between 1935 and 1949, 72,326,022 had been minted at Vienna, Rome, London, Paris, Brussels, and Bombay (see *ibid.*, pp. 14-15). The number minted at Vienna and exported to the Levant had been 15 million in 1925 and 15½ million in 1927 (see *ibid.*, pp. 3 and 22); and, during the years 1935-9, 19,445,000 MTT, minted at Rome, had been imported by the Italian authorities into Abyssinia (p. 34).

The type of the MTT which thus made its fortune so far afield from the Queen-Empress' dominions was the issue minted at Günsburg in A.D. 1780, which was the last year of Maria Theresa's reign (p. 7). More than a hundred years later, in the last decade of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, MTT of this type were circulating in a vast area extending in Africa from Algeria to the Upper Niger and to Madagascar and in South-West Asia as far as Maskat and Trebizond (according to a map, cited by Hans, p. 16, in Peez, C., and Raudnitz, J.: *Geschichte des Maria-Theresien-Thalers* (Vienna 1898)), and they were also circulating in China, side by side with Mexican dollars, circa A.D. 1900, according to Kann, E.: *The Currencies of China* (Shanghai 1928), cited *ibid.* In Abyssinia the MTT was the officially recognized coin of the realm from about the begin-

out-of-the-way districts of the Kingdom of Greece in A.D. 1911-12, found that gold 'Napoleons' of the French Second Empire were the most convenient coins to carry in his stocking; for the image and superscription of a bankrupt French political adventurer then still retained all their prestige in the eyes of Greek peasants and Vlach shepherds, though forty years had passed already since Napoleon III's capture by the Prussians and deposition by his own French subjects. On this showing, it might be anticipated that the English gold 'sovereign', of which Englishmen saw the last in A.D. 1914, might still be circulating in Albania for generations, and in Arabia for centuries, after that portentous date.¹

ning of the nineteenth century until the Italian occupation in the years A.D. 1936-41 (Hans, p. 24).

For more than a hundred years, dating from the Ottoman Government's unsuccessful attempt in and after A.D. 1837 to replace the MTT by the Mejidiyeh in its Arabian provinces as well as in the rest of the Empire (p. 21), the MTT triumphantly resisted repeated attempts to drive it out of circulation by the substitution of alternative metallic currencies. It did not begin to lose its hold upon the loyalty of its Abyssinian and Arabian addicts until after the liberation of Abyssinia from Italian occupation in A.D. 1941, and then it succumbed, not to any more attractive metallic currency, but to a belated adoption of the latter-day Western institutions of paper money, cheques, and bonds. In A.D. 1867 a British expeditionary force in Abyssinia had found itself compelled to import large quantities of MTT, specially minted at Vienna for its use, because the Abyssinian public had been unwilling to take payment in gold sovereigns (p. 20); in A.D. 1941 another British expeditionary force in Abyssinia found the public eager to surrender MTT in exchange for British East African paper money (see Hans, op. cit., p. 41, citing Lord Rennell of Rodd: *British Military Administration of Occupied Territory in Africa during the years 1941-1947* (London 1948, H.M. Stationery Office): see pp. 365-7, 370-1, 373-4, 379). Yet there were indications (see Hans, op. cit., pp. 50-51 and 53-54) that in A.D. 1950 the MTT was still being hoarded in large quantities in its old domain. A fine silver coin was, after all, proof against the two dangers, to which a paper note was exposed, of being eaten by termites and being devalued by politicians.

¹ During the general war of 1914-18, both the Albanians and the Arabs welcomed the opportunity of being paid by the belligerents for continuing to conduct their own inter-tribal feuds in the role of their respective foreign paymasters' partisans. So long as they might go on fighting one another, they did not greatly care whether it was the Entente Powers or the Central Powers that were financing their customary activity, but they were unanimous and intransigent in insisting that they must be paid for their services in gold, cash down—not because they foresaw a coming catastrophic depreciation of paper money with a prescience denied to the wily financiers of Lombard Street and Wall Street, but for the simpler reason that, in Albania and Arabia, an invention that had been made in China only a thousand years back (see pp. 312-13, above) had not succeeded in acclimatizing itself yet by the beginning of the twentieth century of the Christian Era. The European belligerent governments—fighting, as they were, for their lives, and therefore clutching at straws—could not resist purchasing the nominal support of rival Albanian and Arab war-bands, and, to buy this dubious asset, they ruefully disgorged some of the gold that they had so ruthlessly withdrawn from circulation at home. An amusing sequel to this war-time tragi-comedy was witnessed by the writer of this Study at the Paris Peace Conference of A.D. 1919-20. The moving spirit of the Hashimite Hijāzi Arab delegation was Colonel T. E. Lawrence, and, when he was on his delegation's official business, he used to make a point of wearing the highly distinctive uniform of an officer of the Hijāzi Army. One day, in a corridor of the Hôtel Majestic, the present writer had the good fortune to see this picturesque and animated figure run into a weary-looking official of the British Treasury. In a flash, Lawrence had whipped out from under the folds of his robe a magnificent dagger with a head of chased gold, and was holding it under the Treasury official's nose, saying: 'Do you know what that is made of?' 'No, I don't,' said the Treasury official rather testily. 'A hundred and fifty of your sovereigns,' Colonel Lawrence retorted; and the intended shock was duly registered by his victim. During the antecedent hostilities, while Colonel Lawrence had been having the fun of carrying bags of 'sovereigns' on camel-back and dispensing them to the Hijāzi allies of His Britannic Majesty's Government, the Treasury official had been saddled with the vexatious task of trying in vain to induce these Arab recipients of 'sovereigns' to part with them again in exchange for Indian piece goods, which he had dangled, like carrots, before a knowingly irresponsible donkey's nose. The Arabs had found a better use for British 'sovereigns' than that. So long as the gold remained in the form of minted coin, it might

(e) THE SERVICEABILITY OF IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS

1. *Standing Armies**The Difficulty of Creating and Maintaining a Mobile Standing Army*

Our survey of imperial installations and imperial currencies has indicated that these had been features in the life of all the universal states that had come into existence down to the time of writing; and indeed it is difficult to imagine any universal state establishing or maintaining itself without roads and postal arrangements, garrisons and colonies, a provincial organization, a capital city, one or more official languages and scripts, a code of law, a calendar, a set of weights and measures, and the rudiments or equivalents of money. By contrast, imperial corporations—standing armies, civil services, and citizenships—were to be found in the life of different universal states in various degrees of development ranging over the whole gamut between the rudimentary bud and the full-blown flower; and, because of this, they provided criteria for arranging the score of universal states on our panel in a tentative order of comparative maturity.¹

In the role played in the lives of universal states by organized military force, the extent of the variation had been particularly great.

In the history of 'the Old Empire' of the Mayas there was no certain evidence for the existence of armed forces even in the form of a police cordon to keep out barbarians from beyond the imperial frontiers. The Spanish Empire of the Indies had been almost equally innocent of armaments on land during the two centuries and more that had elapsed between the domestication of the epigoni of the *conquistadores* and the establishment of a common land-frontier between the Spanish and the British dominions in the New World in the territorial settlement after the Seven Years War. During the intervening age the only permanent professional troops in the Indies had been the few hundred halberdiers in the ceremonial bodyguards of the Viceroy of New Spain and Peru. It had not been till A.D. 1762 that the Spanish Empire in the Americas had found it necessary to provide itself with a standing army and a militia.²

In the Achaemenian Empire, the Caliphate, and the Mughal Rāj the

(they felt) slip through their fingers; so they had converted it into dagger handles, which were not only more beautiful but more secure, since they could be carried more snugly on the person and were riveted to an automatic caretaker in the shape of a formidable steel blade.

¹ Of our twenty-one civilizations, the Hittite, Iranic, Arabic, Mexic, and Yucatec had apparently failed to produce universal states. On the other hand, the Egyptian, Syriac, Indic, and Far Eastern societies had produced recurrent universal states, while, in the histories of the Sumeric, Hindu, Andean, and Russian universal states, there had been a break of continuity which not only permitted but constrained a student of History to treat as separate instances the Sumerian régime at Ur and the Amorite régime at Babylon; the Mughal Rāj and the British Rāj; the Incaic Empire of the Andes and the Spanish Empire of the Indies; and the pre-Petrine dispensation and the post-Petrine dispensation in Russia. See the table of contents of the atlas in vol. xi.

² Haring, C. H.: *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York, 1947, Oxford University Press), pp. 124, 125, and 145. The Empire of the Indies was not, of course, as defenceless as it might appear to have been, for down to A.D. 1763 it was more or less effectively insulated by the Spanish Navy from direct contact with the dominions of any other Power except France in Louisiana.

standing army included garrisons at strategic points along the frontiers¹ and in the interior² as well as the emperor's personal bodyguard at the headquarters of the imperial administration;³ the 'small but efficient standing army', which even the later Mughal emperors managed to keep up 'consisted of cavalry and matchlockmen, and its kernel was the imperial park of artillery, without which no great fortress could be forcibly reduced';⁴ but, when there was a call for mobile armies of any considerable strength, all three empires depended upon levies *ad hoc*. In all three the first ban was furnished by the imperial people itself. The Mughal and Achaemenian empires could call up their feudal cavalry, and the Caliphate its henchmen quartered in the cantonments (Arabs under the Umayyad Caliphs and Khurāsānīs under the 'Abbasids). When, however, it was a question of a major military enterprise, these empires had to call upon the population at large.⁵ When Xerxes invaded European Greece in 480 B.C., he not only mobilized his personal bodyguard and his Persian fief-holders and the rest of the manhood of the Perso-Median imperial people; he also raised levies from the subject population of all the provinces.⁶ The regular spring and autumn raids from Cilicia into the East Roman Empire which were one of the institutions of the Caliphate for some two hundred years, until the tide of war turned in the East Roman Empire's favour at last in the second quarter of the tenth century of the Christian Era, were made by Muslim volunteers from all over the Caliph's dominions who assembled and dispersed behind the double screen of fortresses known as the Thughūr and the 'Awāsīm.⁷

On the other hand, standing armies capable of providing mobile forces for campaigns, besides imperial bodyguards and provincial garrisons, were maintained by the Roman, Han, Manchu, Ottoman, Danubian Hapsburg, and Napoleonic empires, by the British Rāj in India, and by the post-Petrine Russian imperial régime.⁸ The histories of these standing armies show that mobility is difficult to maintain. With the lapse of time a mobile professional force tends to degenerate into a sedentary militia.

The Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy and the British Rāj counteracted this tendency by deliberately organizing a local militia, distinct from the mobile army, to man chronically restless *limites*. There were the Croat

¹ See pp. 120-1, above.

² See pp. 123-4 and 130-1, above.

³ See pp. 182-3, above.

⁴ Spear, T. G. P.: *Twilight of the Mughuls* (Cambridge 1951, University Press), pp. 7-8. 'The Mughul train of artillery, in maintaining internal security, had something of the potency of the Tudor monopoly of gunpowder. The artillerymen were generously paid, Europeans were freely engaged at high rates, and even supplied with servants so that they should be relieved of all labour save that of aiming the guns' (*ibid.*, p. 8).

A detailed account of the Mughal artillery is given in Irvine, W.: *The Army of the Indian Moghuls* (London 1903, Luzac), chaps. 10-12.

⁵ See p. 183, above.

⁶ See the army list in Herodotus, Book VII, chaps. 61-99.

⁷ See II. ii. 368, with n. 1, and the present volume, p. 121, above.

⁸ After the Russian Empire had been equipped with a Western-model professional army by Peter the Great, efforts continued to be made to improve this army's professional standards. In A.D. 1731 an officer's cadet corps was founded, with places for 150 Russian nobles and 50 Livlanders. In A.D. 1732 garrison schools were started (see Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), pp. 82 and 314).

and Serb territorial regiments which, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era, held the line of the Save for the Hapsburg King-Emperor against their Bosniak and Turkish hereditary adversaries;¹ and there were the Pathan militias whom the British Indian military authorities on the North-West Frontier of India recruited during the century beginning in A.D. 1849 from among the wild tribesmen on the principle of setting a thief to catch a thief. These Danubian Hapsburg and British Indian sedentary *limitanei* were of minor importance compared to the mobile armies which they supplemented, whereas in the Ottoman military system the Kurdish *foederati* who, under the command of their own tribal chiefs, held the Ottoman frontier over against Persia,² and the Turkish feudal cavalry whose fiefs were sown thick over the Empire except in the more remote of the Arab provinces,³ together considerably outnumbered the Pādishāh's Slave-Household. Yet the existence of this border militia and provincial feudal array did not preserve the Janissaries, after the death of Suleymān the Magnificent, from losing their mobility and changing, in their turn, into a militia, cantoned in Constantinople and the provincial capitals, which became ever more unwarlike and ever more seditious *pari passu*, till there was nothing to be done with this once magnificently soldierly force except to annihilate it in order to rebuild an Ottoman professional army from the foundations—this time on an alien new model derived from the West.⁴ In the Manchu and Roman empires the originally mobile 'banners' and legions likewise struck root through vegetating in fixed stations—the 'banners' in the interior of China and the legions on the frontiers of the Roman World.

The Creation of a Mobile Standing Army in the post-Diocletianic Roman Empire

In the history of the Roman Imperial Army this loss of mobility—of which the danger did not become apparent so long as the prestige of the Empire stood so high that no outsider ventured seriously to attack it⁵—was one of the causes of the catastrophe in which the Empire all but came to grief in the third century of the Christian Era. The improvisation of a new mobile army was the creative act of that desperate age; and, though it was achieved in adverse circumstances at the eleventh hour, it proved so great a success that it prolonged the life of the Empire for one and a half centuries even in the West and for three and a half centuries in the East and the Centre.⁶

¹ See pp. 117-18, above.

² See I. i. 389-90, and pp. 121-2, above.

³ See pp. 124-6, above.

⁴ For Sultan Selim III's tragic failure, and Sultan Mahmūd II's grim success, in coping with the task of superseding the Janissaries, see III. iii. 48-50 and IX. viii. 239.

⁵ See p. 184, above.

⁶ This impressive chronological evidence of the success of the Diocletiano-Constantinian reorganization of the Roman system of imperial defence would seem, to a layman's eyes, to suffice in itself to refute Zosimus's savage critique of it in his *Historiae*, Book II, chap. xxxiv. Zosimus submits that the withdrawal of units from the frontiers to create a mobile reserve in the interior exposed the Empire to uncontested invasion, located the troops in places not requiring defence, brought ruin upon the cities in which they were stationed, and demoralized the troops themselves in the process. Zosimus does not mention the telling truth that, during the century ending in A.D. 284, when the

The truth that a military force can be kept mobile only by relieving it of sedentary tasks had been perceived and translated into action by the genius of Julius Caesar. Out of the thirty-two legions that he had in hand at the close of his civil wars, he posted twenty-six on the frontiers and kept six in reserve.¹ Thereafter, Augustus posted all his twenty-eight legions² on the frontiers³—whether from lack of his adoptive father's strategic insight or because a further bout of civil wars had left him with that amount less of man-power and sinews of war at his command.⁴ Apart from the 4,500 men in the nine praetorian cohorts constituting the Emperor's personal bodyguard⁵ and the 1,500 men in the original three urban cohorts,⁶ which—as their designation ('Metropolitan Battalions') pointedly proclaimed—were a semi-civic force, Augustus's army possessed no striking force, no field army, no reserves, and the only means of reinforcing the garrison of one sector of the imperial frontier was the drafting of a detachment (*vexillatio*) from the garrison of another sector.⁷ Domitian carried the process of immobilizing the legions one stage farther by ruling that each legion was to have a camp of its own.⁸ After Hadrian had made a rule of the already prevailing tendency for the legions, like the *auxilia*, to be recruited locally,⁹

Augustan system of frontier defence had still been in operation, the Empire had suffered far more grievously from barbarian invasion than it suffered thereafter, under the new system, during the century ending in A.D. 378. His flagrantly incorrect ascription of the Augustan system to Diocletian, the pagan innovator whose reforms a Christian Constantine had merely carried through to completion, seems to indicate that Zosimus's critique of a policy which he falsely attributes to Constantine's initiative was at least partly prompted by religious animus.

¹ See Grosse, R.: *Römische Militärgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der Byzantinischen Themenverfassung* (Berlin 1920, Weidmann), p. 55.

² This appears to have been the establishment of Augustus's standing army in 16 B.C. The number was reduced to 25 by the loss of three legions in Vespasian's campaign in Germany in A.D. 9. This number was raised to 27 by Gaius or (more probably) by Claudius. By the end of the civil wars of A.D. 69 the number had perhaps risen to 31. It was reduced to 29 by Vespasian, but had been raised again to 30 by A.D. 83; and this seems to have been regarded as the standard establishment for the next 110 years. To maintain this figure, Trajan appears to have replaced one legion lost by Domitian in Sarmatia in A.D. 92, and another lost by himself, and Marcus Aurelius to have replaced two lost (perhaps) by Hadrian in Britain and in Palestine respectively. Thereafter, Septimius Severus raised the standing army to a higher strength than it had ever yet possessed by adding his three *Legiones Parthicae* to Marcus's thirty (see Parker, H. M. D.: *The Roman Legions* (Oxford 1928, Clarendon Press), chaps. 3 and 4, pp. 72–117, and compare the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. x (Cambridge 1934, University Press), pp. 123 and 221).

³ See p. 184, above.

⁴ At the moment when this final bout of civil wars was brought to an end by the overthrow of the last of Augustus's competitors for the mastery of the Roman World, the victor had on his hands perhaps as many as sixty legions. In his *res gestae*, Augustus claims to have replanted 300,000 discharged soldiers in civilian life by either repatriating them in their original communities or settling them in new colonies. Twenty-eight legions was presumably the maximum establishment that, in Augustus's view, an exhausted world could be expected to support.

⁵ The original strength of both a praetorian and an urban cohort was 500 men. The strength of the praetorian cohorts was raised from 500 to 1,000 momentarily during the crisis of A.D. 69 and then permanently in A.D. 193 by Septimius Severus. Septimius also raised the strength of the urban cohorts from 500 to 1,500 (see Durry, M.: *Les Cohortes Prétoiriennes* (Paris 1938, Boccard), pp. 82–87).

⁶ For these, see pp. 123 and 184, above. By Vespasian's time (*imperabat* A.D. 70–79) the number of urban cohorts appears to have risen to four stationed in Rome and the two posted in the provinces at Lyons and at Carthage respectively (see the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (Cambridge 1936, University Press), p. 135).

⁷ See Grosse, op. cit., p. 55.

⁸ See Suetonius Tranquillus, C.: *The Lives of the Caesars*, 'Domitianus', chap. 7.

⁹ See Durry, op. cit., p. 246.

and had carried to completion the Augustan system of fixed frontier defences, 'the whole Roman Army was degraded into being a bevy of gendarmes and customs officials'.¹ In the third century, 'when the whole empire became one single gigantic fortress assaulted simultaneously from all sides, the old method of frontier-defence inevitably proved totally inadequate, and the need for a strong field army that could be brought into action rapidly at any point inevitably declared itself ever more insistently'.² Before the third century was over, this need had been met. Gallienus (*imperabat* A.D. 260-8) made a beginning by detaching the cavalry from the legions and grouping them under an independent command,³ and the work of reorganization was continued by Aurelian (*imperabat* A.D. 270-5)⁴ and was completed by Diocletian (*imperabat* A.D. 284-305).

Out of the best of the battered units of the Augustan Army, without any discrimination between legionary *vexillationes*⁵ and auxiliary cohorts and *alae*, the third-century reformers built up a mobile army of all arms; and, within this category of troops trained and equipped to accompany the emperors on campaign (*Comitatenses*),⁶ there were gradations of mobility, proficiency, and privileged proximity to a throne that dire necessity of state had now transformed into a portable camp-stool which was pitched from day to day wherever the need for the emperor's presence might happen at the moment to be the greatest.⁷ Within the *Comitatenses* there came to be an *élite* of *Palatini*,⁸ an inner guard composed of the *Scholae*⁹ and the *Candidati*, and a personal bodyguard of *Protectores* and *Domestici*¹⁰ who provided the new mobile army with the

¹ Grosse, op. cit., p. 56.

² Ibid., p. 56.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 15, 18, and 56.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

⁵ By Diocletian's time the Augustan legions seem to have been already broken up into detachments (*vexillationes*) of the strength of the cohorts which had always been the units of the *auxilia* and had also been the principal subdivisions of the legions themselves since the reforms of Marius. At the same time the auxiliary cohorts of infantry and *alae* of cavalry had become detached from the legions with which they had been brigaded under the Principate. After this dissolution of the Augustan legion of 10,000 to 12,000 men (including its complement of *auxilia*), the name legion came to denote a *vexillatio* of perhaps no more than 500 men. The fifth-century *Notitia Dignitatum* catalogues 174 legions, as against the 33 in the army of the Principate after the addition of three to the previous total by Septimius Severus (see Grosse, op. cit., pp. 30-32).

⁶ A Latin inscription (*C.I.L.* vi. 2759) witnesses that the *Comitatenses* were in existence at latest by A.D. 301 (see Grosse, op. cit., p. 59).

⁷ After the foundation of Constantinople on a site where the new political capital of the Roman Empire could simultaneously serve as a military base for the defence, in depth, of both the Lower Danube and the Upper and Middle Euphrates frontier (see pp. 217-18, above), the Imperial camp-stool was pitched here more often than not; and this concentration of the Imperial headquarters to the shores of the Bosphorus is reflected in the location of the standing cantonments of the *Comitatensian* infantry legions (excluding the *Palatini*) according to the *Notitia Dignitatum*. No less than twenty of these units were cantoned in Thrace, as compared with nine apiece in Oriens and Gaul, eight apiece in Eastern Illyricum and Africa, and five apiece in Western Illyricum, Italy, and Spain (see Grosse, op. cit., p. 90).

⁸ First heard of in A.D. 365 (see *ibid.*, p. 61). The name was, of course, by that time an anachronism; for it was more than a century since the Roman Empire had been governed from the Palatine Hill.

⁹ The *Scholae*, once unofficial clubs organized by officers, in the Empire's halcyon days, to provide amenities for their leisure hours, had become part of the working organization of the Army in consequence of their feat of surviving the general dissolution of institutions in the third century.

¹⁰ The Praetorian Cohorts had perished in the last gusts of the hundred-years-long social tornado by which the Roman Empire had been ravaged. Diocletian had depressed

equivalent of a much-needed staff college.¹ The leavings of the Army, when the mobile *Comitatenses* had been formed out of it, were assigned to a frontier force (*Ripenses*, *Riparienses*, *Limitanei*)² which was frankly permitted to be the sedentary militia³ that the Army of the Principate had tended to become *sub rosa*⁴ ever since it had been cantoned along the frontiers by Augustus, while the mobile standing army embodied in the *Comitatenses* constituted at last, after a dearly paid-for delay of nearly 350 years, that mobile reserve which had been designed, on a smaller scale, by *Divus Iulius*.⁵

Esprit de corps

The superiority of a mobile standing army over a sedentary militia in professional technique is surpassed both in degree and in importance by its superiority in *esprit de corps*. A militiaman tends to be drawn back into civilian life and ethos by a fixed domicile, by marriage, and by the pressure on him to engage in gainful occupations in order to support a family which cannot live on a soldier's pay. This masterful process of demilitarization overtook the Roman Army of the Principate after the removal, by Septimius Severus, of the ban on marriage while with the colours,⁶ and it overtook the Janissary Corps after the relaxation of its discipline upon the death of Suleymān the Magnificent. By contrast, a professional soldier in a mobile standing army is 'conditioned' by an insulating way of life and a differentiating discipline into being first and

their status and reduced their importance by keeping them at the long since evacuated seat of imperial government at Rome (Grosse, op. cit., p. 59, citing Aurelius Victor, 39, 47, and Lactantius, *De Mortibus Persecutorum*, 26). Thereafter, Constantine the Great had abolished them after they had fought on the losing side at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge on the 28th October, A.D. 312 (see Durry, op. cit., pp. 170 and 393; Grosse, op. cit., p. 60).

¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 61-63 and 93-96.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 66 and 68.

³ We are ignorant of the date at which the soldiers of the frontier garrisons became *adscripti glebae* by being given personal and hereditary holdings of land to cultivate, but there is no doubt that, from the fourth to the sixth century of the Christian Era, the frontier troops were in fact 'a militia of sedentary peasants' (*ibid.*, pp. 64-65).

⁴ In theory the Army of the Principate was always mobile, and the symbol of this theory was the legal inability of the serving soldier to contract a valid marriage so long as he was with the colours. Considering, however, that, upon a soldier's honourable discharge, a permanent illicit union could be converted into a legal marriage and children already born of it be legitimized retrospectively (see p. 132, above); that the soldiers' families were allowed to live in civilian *canabae* adjoining the camps; and that the men were free, while still on active service, to cultivate the *prata legionum*, it is evident that the difference *de facto* between the pre-Severan legionary and the post-Diocletianic *limitaneus* was not by any means as great as the difference in theory. The rights of contracting a legal marriage while on active service and of leasing plots in the *prata legionum* were granted to soldiers by Septimius Severus (see Grosse, op. cit., p. 248; *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xii (Cambridge 1939, University Press), p. 32).

⁵ Not the least part of this price of a long delay was a formidable increase in the total strength of the Army in an age when the economic resources of the Empire were dwindling. Even after Septimius Severus had increased the number of the legions from 30 to 33, the Army of the Principate had amounted to not much more than 300,000 men. Diocletian raised the figure by perhaps something like two-thirds, from about 300,000 to about 500,000 (see Grosse, op. cit., p. 253). Within this total, the field army may have had a nominal strength of 148,000 infantry and 46,500 cavalry (see *ibid.*, p. 254).

⁶ See Grosse, op. cit., p. 248. In the post-Diocletianic Army, both the soldier and his wife (if he were married in lawful wedlock) were tax-free after he had completed five years' service (see *ibid.*, p. 202). Nevertheless, private soldiers as well as officers were still apt to get entangled in civilian business concerns in the sixth century of the Christian Era (see *ibid.*, p. 278).

foremost a member of his corps and paying only a secondary and conditional allegiance to the civilian community which bears the cost of keeping him under arms; and, if and when the interests of community and corps diverge, the professional soldier is apt to become, in relation to the community, that portentous creature, the unsocial human being, who, as Aristotle sees him, is 'either a beast or a god'.¹ In this predicament the professional soldier can, indeed, either sink to a depth of inhumanity or rise to a height of heroism that are alike beyond the range of his brethren who have not put themselves outside the pale of civilian life through being initiated into a professional military fraternity.

In sacrificing himself to his professional duty the soldier is, of course, happiest when *esprit de corps* gives the same orders as patriotism.

ὦ ξείν', ἄγγελον Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῆδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι

and this famous epitaph by Simonides on the Three Hundred Spartans who fell, to the last man but one,² at Thermopylae was to inspire a worthy counterpart in Housman's epitaph on a British army of mercenaries that likewise faced and met certain death in pitting itself against overwhelming odds in order to purchase eventual victory for its cause by checking the first onset of a formidable invader.

These, on the day when Heaven was falling,
The hour when Earth's foundations fled,
Followed their mercenary calling
And took their wages and are dead.

Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood, and Earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned, these defended,
And saved the sum of things for pay.

No doubt, in all situations, the professional soldier's First Commandment is

Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die;

yet there are degrees of heroism which can be measured by the desperation of the situation in which the soldier obeys the call to give his life. The Spartan soldier who died in 480 B.C. and the British soldier who died in A.D. 1914 in the act of saving a civilization was not confronted with so severe an ordeal as the Assyrian soldier who, in 610-609 B.C.,³ made the same supreme personal sacrifice in the baneful cause of striving to undo the World's accomplished deed of liberating itself from the scourge of Assyrian militarism; for the *moral* of Assyria's last army, which took the field again and perished in that last campaign, had been proof against the shock of seeing Assyria herself laid desolate and her fortress-capital Nineveh taken by storm and put to the sack two years

¹ Aristotle: *Politics*, Book I, chap. i, §§ 9-12 (p. 1253A), quoted in I. i. 173, n. 3.

² The tragic story of the sole survivor Aristodamus has been told, with sympathetic insight, by Herodotus, Book VII, chaps. 229-31, and Book IX, chap. 71 (see III. iii. 63, n. 3).

³ See IV. iv. 475 and 480.

earlier.¹ In 610 B.C. Assyria still lived within a defeated but undismayed army's lines at Harrân, as in A.D. 1848 Austria survived in Radetsky's camp within the Quadrilateral of Hapsburg fortresses in Lombardy.

In deinem Lager ist Österreich,
Wir Andern sind einzelne Trümmer.²

While manfully standing to arms for a new trial of strength with adversaries who had won the preceding round, the Assyrian army in 610 B.C. hoped as sanguinely against hope as Radetsky's army in A.D. 1848 that, this time, they would retrieve their country's fortunes by rescuing her from the very jaws of destruction. While the Assyrians duly failed in their forlorn hope, Radetsky's army played a capital part in winning for the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy a seventy years' reprieve from her eventually inevitable doom of disruption by the mounting force of Nationalism.³ Yet, though Radetsky's success might be less romantic than the Assyrians' failure, it was the fruit of a greater *tour de force* in the art of leadership.

The Assyrian army of 610 B.C., like the British Light Brigade of A.D. 1854 and Expeditionary Force of A.D. 1914, was a military formation of a homogeneous national texture fighting in its own national cause without any conflict of mutually incompatible loyalties, whereas the Austria that, in A.D. 1848, was incarnate in Radetsky's camp on the banks of the Po was a miniature reproduction of the house divided against itself in the valley of the Danube. The troops who in that year held together in Lombardy under Radetsky's command had to withstand a twofold psychological assault upon their *esprit de corps*. They were being asked to go on fighting for a state which not only appeared to have dissolved already in their rear, but which, for many of them, was not their own country but was, rather, their country's hereditary oppressor whose yoke had just been broken, not by their Italian opponents in the field, but by their own kinsmen on the home front in a revolutionary upheaval that was threatening to rankle into an outright civil war. Radetsky's army in the Quadrilateral was a mixed multitude in which German

¹ This steadfastness of Assyrian military *moral* in 610-609 B.C. will appear the more remarkable when it is recalled that, although by that date the Assyrian state had been in serious adversity for no longer than about sixteen years, since the death of Assurbanipal in 626 B.C., the Assyrian soldier had been living under a severe personal strain for more than a hundred years past, ever since the opening of the fourth and final bout of Assyrian militarism in 745 B.C. (see IV. iv. 476-7) had first carried him away from home on distant, protracted, and consecutive campaigns. In the fragments of Assyrian law, dating from an earlier chapter of Assyrian history, that Modern Western archaeologists had recovered, a significantly high proportion of the legislation was concerned with situations arising from a soldier's return home from foreign service after so long an absence that his wife had given him up for dead. (Convenient English translations and commentaries will be found in Smith, J. M. P.: *The Origin and History of Hebrew Law* (Chicago 1931, University of Chicago Press), pp. 233-45, and in Pritchard, J. B.: *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton 1950, Princeton University Press), pp. 180-8.) An Englishman who had lived through the World War of A.D. 1939-45 would be reminded of the similar marital troubles arising from the absence of British troops from home for years on end in the Middle East and Burma. A student of Roman history would be reminded of the personal strain on the Roman peasant-soldier during the four generations that elapsed between the beginning of the Hannibalic War and the creation of a professional army by Marius.

² Grillparzer, Franz: *Feldmarschall Radetzky* [written at the beginning of June 1848].

³ See II. ii. 182-6.

Austrians found themselves cheek by jowl with Magyars whose kinsmen at home were repudiating a German ascendancy, and with Slavs whose kinsmen—in the hope of winning Imperial-Royal support in their struggle to throw off the ascendancy of German and Magyar alike—were rallying to a refugee King-Emperor whose flight from Vienna had been as humiliating as Radetsky's ejection from Milan. When full allowance has been made for the momentum of a habit of co-operation that had been inculcated by more than two centuries of professional military discipline, it will still seem little less than a miracle that Radetsky's troops did not turn their arms against one another when their spirits, already depressed by the experience of defeat at the front, were further unsettled by the news of national uprisings in their rear.¹

Die Gott als Slav' und Magyaren schuf,
Sie streiten um Worte nicht hämisch,
Sie folgen, ob deutsch auch der Feldherrnruf,
Denn: Vorwärts! ist ung'risch und böhmisch.²

A greater miracle of the same kind was worked by the *esprit de corps* that, in the Tropical African theatre of the World War of A.D. 1914-18, kept von Lettow-Vorbeck's Bantu askaris in the field for more than four years in a cause that was not their own, with no hope at all of reinforcements, and none of fresh supplies except such as they might succeed in capturing from the enemy. Yet the armistice imposed on them by Ludendorff's failure of nerve in a reverse that had not yet carried the war on to German territory in Europe found these mercenary askaris still fighting gamely for their German masters in Portuguese East Africa after having been driven out of German East Africa by the tardy pressure of a decisively superior enemy force. Equally noteworthy was the loyalty to the British Rāj, during the mutiny of the East India Company's older sepoy-troops in A.D. 1857-8, of the regiments then daringly recruited from a warrior community of Sikhs who, only nine years before, had

¹ The *esprit de corps* of the Austrian Army, which gave such a good account of itself in Radetsky's camp in Lombardy in A.D. 1848, eventually succumbed to the ordeal of the World War of A.D. 1914-18. In that war, Czech regiments deserted *en masse* to their Russian fellow Slavs, and after the armistice of 1918 the Army of the Isonzo, as it drifted back from a defensive campaign which, with German help, it had carried on to enemy territory, dissolved into mutually hostile national elements. This end of an army that had been called into existence, four hundred years back, to defend the eastern flank of Western Christendom against the 'Osmanlis, had been described to the writer of this Study by an Austrian friend of his who, being at that moment a civilian, had been caught in the eastward-ebbing tide of self-demobilizing troops as he was trying to make his own way, across the current, from Graz to Innsbruck. The Imperial-Royal comrades-in-arms of yesterday, as they sorted themselves out into Czechs, Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukrainians, Rumanians, and Yugoslavs, were eyeing one another suspiciously, with forebodings of the fratricidal conflicts into which they were to be drawn on the morrow. Since Radetsky's day the unitary tradition of a once professional Austrian Army had been undermined by the introduction of universal compulsory short-term military service, which, in a general mobilization, inevitably filled the cadres to bursting-point with men who were civilians and nationalists at heart while they were soldiers and servants of the King-Emperor against the grain. Yet, even in this war that was the old Austrian Army's death, the Hungarian, German, and Polish subjects of the Dual Crown, whose national interests happened to coincide with the interests of the Monarchy, still gave a good account of themselves; and the Croats, among whom a military tradition of personal loyalty to the Dynasty was still alive, fought valiantly against their Serb fellow Yugoslavs.

² Grillparzer, *op. cit.*

fought the British for the second time and, this time, had paid for a second defeat the penalty of forfeiting, at one stroke, their ascendancy over the other communities in the Panjab and their own political independence. Yet all these signal triumphs of professional *esprit de corps* were surpassed by the unsung achievement of the sepoy mutineers themselves, in which the honours had to be divided between the British officers who had once inculcated the discipline and the Indian non-commissioned officers and privates who succeeded in maintaining it in spite of the deadly wounds which they had dealt to their own *moral*. The mutineers had committed the militarily and morally unforgivable sin of breaking faith with their employers and murdering their superiors; and by this treachery they had deprived themselves of an alien leadership which had held together a mixed multitude of mutually antipathetic Hindus and Muslims and had welded them into a professional army that had not met its match east of Indus. Yet, disabled though they were by these self-inflicted handicaps, they had the spirit to challenge their British makers, and in the ensuing struggle they came within an ace of repeating the feat of those Mamlûks who, in Egypt six hundred years earlier, had wrested the sceptre irrevocably out of the hands of their Ayûbid masters.¹

The Problem of Controlling Alien or Barbarian Troops

This professional military *esprit de corps* is both more necessary and more notable in a universal state than it is in a parochial state; for, in contrast to the standing armies of parochial states, which are usually homogeneous in their personnel, the armies of universal states are usually composed of heterogeneous elements that have to be inspired by artificial influences of discipline and tradition with a community of feeling which the recruit does not bring with him, ready-made, from civilian life. While one of these artificially associated elements, and this the leading one, had generally, though not invariably, been the imperial people itself, the empire-builders, however generous they might have been in taking outsiders into their ranks, had seldom had the numbers or the strength to win and hold their empire unaided. In most of the universal states that had come into existence up to date, the rulers had found it expedient to take into military partnership in their standing armies the military *élite* of their subjects within their frontiers or of the barbarians beyond their pale, or even to enlist representatives of an alien civilization.

The unpopularity of the Napoleonic Empire, which was one cause of its premature fall, was due in large measure to the 'blood-tax' which Napoleon imposed not only on the French but on the non-French populations incorporated into the Empire and on the peoples of the client states. When he invaded Russia in A.D. 1812, he compelled even Prussia and Austria to furnish contingents—if only as hostages to ensure that these two discomfited Great Powers should not rise and attack him in the rear after he had traversed their dominions on his eastward march. In the Grand Army that started to cross the Niemen on the

¹ See III. iii. 30-31.

24th June, 1812, only about 120,000 out of 363,000 men were Frenchmen.

The Mongols swiftly won and momentarily held their far-flung dominion over the sedentary peoples round the periphery of the Great Eurasian Steppe by first taking into partnership all but a small fraction of the rest of the Eurasian Nomads and then drafting troops from one conquered sedentary sub-continent to assist in the conquest of another. In the Mongols' service Chinese military engineers played their part in the capture of Transoxanian cities, while Muslim troops from Transoxania, and Orthodox Christian Alan cavalry from the northern slopes of the Caucasus,¹ were brought into action in China against the recalcitrant Empire of the Sung.

The Mughal conquerors of India reinforced their own scanty numbers with drafts of fellow Muslims from an Iranic World out of which they themselves had issued; and in their dearth of martial man-power they did not hesitate to accept recruits from among the barbarous Uzbegs who had driven Bābur out of Farghānah and the heretical *gyzyl-bāshis* with whom he had allied himself, against his conscience, in a vain attempt to recover the Transoxanian heritage of his ancestor Timur from the Uzbeg invader.² Yet even the most generous-handed sharing of the spoils of India with fellow Iranic Muslims enlisted at the eleventh hour did not give the Mughals the strength to complete the conquest of the peninsula, or even to hold securely what they had already won, against the obstinate resistance of the epigoni of earlier Muslim conquerors; and they found themselves constrained to sin against the spirit and tradition of Islam by enlisting the services of the infidel chivalry of their Rājput client states in their fratricidal wars against their True Believing rivals.

The Achaemenian Empire, which on the military plane was perhaps the least efficient of all the universal states in our catalogue, exposed its own incompetence to the World and to itself by embarking on the formidable enterprise of trying to conquer European Greece. The humiliating outcome of the thirty years' war (480-450 B.C.) that Xerxes had wantonly brought upon himself and his successors convinced the Achaemenian Government of their need for a mobile standing army; but, instead of building up one of their own out of the excellent military man-power and abundant economic resources that the Empire could afford, they contented themselves with the unimaginative, slovenly, expensive, and dangerous makeshift of hiring Greek to meet Greek. After the break-down of the Hellenic Civilization had been signaled by the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, the daric could purchase any number of seasoned soldiers from among the uprooted citizens of the faction-ridden city-states of Hellas; but, of course, the latter-day Achaemenids' Greek mercenary army, so far from arresting the Hellenic Society's counter-offensive, invitingly blazed a trail for their fellow Hellenes into the heart of South-Western Asia. After ten thousand Greek mercenary troops in an Achaemenid pretender's

¹ See the passages of Marco Polo quoted in V. v. 350-1.

² For this episode in Bābur's history, see I. i. 375-80.

service had demonstrated their ability to march unhindered from Ephesus to Cunaxa and back again from Cunaxa to Trebizond, it was evident that the thirty-six thousand Greeks whom Alexander led across the Hellespont would suffice to overthrow the Achaemenian régime and to conquer the Empire from the Aegean to the Pamirs.

The fate of the Arab Caliphate shows that a standing army of barbarians from beyond the pale may be almost as great a political danger as one recruited from the *déracinés* of an alien civilization. When, on the Khurasanian frontier of the Umayyad Power, the local garrisons of Arab empire-builders had fraternized and blended with comrades-in-arms enlisted from the local Iranian subject population,¹ the ruling element in the Caliphate had been strengthened by this broadening of its basis. But when, after the revolution that had brought the 'Abbasids into power, the Khurāsānī henchmen of the new régime were supplanted, in their turn, by Turkish mercenaries from beyond the Oxus, the mastery of the Caliphate passed first to these Transoxanian Turkish praetorians and eventually to the Nomad Turkish Saljūqs from the Eurasian Steppe. In 'the New Empire' of Egypt a similar consequence followed from the recruitment of a mercenary army of Minoan *déracinés* and Achaean and Libyan barbarians. Though this hazardous expedient appeared to have vindicated itself when, at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C., the barbarians in the Egyptian service loyally assisted their native Egyptian comrades-in-arms to repel successive waves of barbarian invasion,² the policy stood condemned when, in the event, the discomfited Libyans sauntered back, unopposed, into the Egyptian World and settled down upon the land as an incubus-militia.³

The 'Osmanlis in their heyday were unique among empire-builders in debarring the imperial people itself from participation in either the defence or the government of their empire, and in relying exclusively on the services of subjects and aliens. In a different context⁴ we have seen how they achieved this *tour de force* by detaching their recruits from all previous ties of family, nationality, and religion, and reconditioning them through a strenuous course of broadly conceived and skilfully devised education. The system was so efficient that it produced its transforming effect not only upon tribute-children subjected to it at a tender age but also upon adult prisoners-of-war and renegades; but, when the system broke down owing to the defiance of human nature which was the price at which its efficiency had been purchased, and the free Muslim population of the Empire was grudgingly admitted to a long-overdue participation in public power and responsibility, the Ottoman Empire began to go the way of the 'Abbasid Caliphate and 'the New Empire' of Egypt.

When the long military retreat that had started under the walls of Vienna in A.D. 1683 was converted into a rout by the disastrous outcome of the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, both the Sublime

¹ See V. v. 450, and pp. 140-1, above.

² See I. i. 93 and 101; IV. iv. 85 and 422; V. v. 269 and 352; and V. vi. 207.

³ See IV. iv. 422; V. v. 269-70, 352-3, and 463.

⁴ In III. iii. 31-44.

Porte and its increasingly independent lieutenants in the provinces found themselves leaning on a broken reed in their belated reliance on a free Turkish squirearchy and peasantry that were untutored alike in the old Ottoman school of warfare followed by the Pādishāh's now demoralized Slave-Household and in the new Western school that had originally been inspired by an Ottoman ensample. In these straits the distracted rulers of a tottering empire turned, in their desperate search for martial man-power, to the rude but still untarnished valour of barbarian Albanians and Bosniaks.¹ In Continental European Greece they even authorized the enrolment of a militia of Christian Greek highlanders, under native captains, to guard the passes.² And, on the analogy of what happened in other universal states in similar situations in which the process was not checked by the intervention of a third force, we may guess that these and other barbarians would have duly entered into the Ottoman heritage if the Ottoman World had not fallen, at that juncture, under the shadow of the West.³ As a result of this new turn in their fortunes, the 'Osmanlis succeeded in building up a new Western-model Ottoman Army which put the pashas' Albanian house-carls out of business, brought the Kurdish tribes to heel, saved the Turkish core of the Empire from being partitioned by the European Powers, and eventually shepherded their country into the fold of Western political life as an independent Turkish national republic.⁴

The ruling element in the British Rāj in India, like the rulers of the Spanish Empire of the Indies, were peculiar in being a company of pilgrims and sojourners who were neither born nor educated nor superannuated nor buried within the bounds of the universal state that they garrisoned and governed during the prime of their working lives;⁵ and in British India, which, unlike the Spanish Indies, found itself unable to dispense with a standing army, this permanent geographical and social segregation of a West European imperial people from an Indian subject population was a military safeguard, though in some ways a political stumbling-block.

The standing army of the British Rāj in India was composed of three elements: West Europeans from the United Kingdom, Indians from British Indian territory and from the Indian client states, and barbarians recruited mainly from the independent Gurkha states of Nepal and Bhutan and from the autonomous Pathan tribes in the zone between the north-western boundary of British-administered Indian territory and the Indo-Afghan political frontier. The British troops, the Gurkhas, the Pathan *limitanei* in the North-West Frontier militias, and the Indian troops maintained by the client states were organized in separate units,

¹ See IV. iv. 76.

² See IV. iv. 76-78 and V. v. 299-302.

³ For the Westernization of Turkey and the part played in the process by the new Western-model Ottoman Army, see further IX. viii. 234-9.

⁵ In the Spanish Indies there was, of course, a considerable Creole population of Spanish blood, descended from the *conquistadores*, and both there and in British India there was a half-caste population (the *mestizos* and the 'Eurasians', latterly renamed 'Anglo-Indians'). But in both empires power and responsibility remained in the hands of thoroughbred West Europeans born and brought up in the European countries of which these two universal states were political dependencies.

² See V. v. 297-9.

each of which was homogeneous in its personnel;¹ the Hindu and Muslim British Indian troops and the Pathans in the mobile regular army (as distinct from sedentary Pathan militiamen) all served together in the same regiments, though not usually in the same companies or squadrons. From A.D. 1849 onwards, when the British Rāj took over the North-West Frontier of the Panjab from the Sikhs and thereby established direct contact with the Pathans, there was a tendency for the ratio of soldiers of transfrontier barbarian origin in the British Indian Army to increase;² but down to A.D. 1947, when the British authorities withdrew the last British troops from India and handed over the former British Indian Army to the governments of the Indian Union and Pakistan, this increase in the relative numerical strength of the barbarian contingent in the armed forces of the Rāj had not seemed to be preparing the way for an eventual barbarian domination over India such as had threatened to overtake the Ottoman Empire and had actually overtaken the 'Abbasid Caliphate and 'the New Empire' of Egypt.

If in British India this danger had been successfully kept at arm's length, the success may have been due to a combination of causes which were all bound up with the special character of the British Rāj. There were no Gurkha or Pathan units in the British Indian Army that were furnished to the British authorities *en bloc*, under national or tribal commanders of their own, by the Gurkha states or the Pathan tribes themselves. The only units that were permitted that degree of corporate individuality and autonomy were the contingents furnished by the Indian client princes, of whose loyalty the British Indian authorities were sure. The Gurkha and Pathan soldiers enrolled in units of the British Indian Army were recruited, not corporately, but individually, and were commanded, not by leaders drawn from their own community, but by British officers. A further safeguard was that the British troops in India, consisting, as they did, exclusively of soldiers born and bred in the United Kingdom, and being segregated, as they were, from their Indian, Pathan, and Gurkha comrades-in-arms in self-contained units of their own, retained their pristine martial qualities from one generation to another—in contrast to their immediate predecessors the Mughals and other earlier alien empire-builders in India, who, by making India their home and by intermarrying with the native inhabitants, had merged themselves in the mighty mass of the Indian people and, in thus losing their alien identity, had forfeited their ascendancy over their Indian subjects. In A.D. 1952, when these former British counterweights to the menace of a barbarian preponderance in a now divided Indian Army had all been removed, the outlook was still obscure, but it was

¹ After A.D. 1858, when the British Crown took over the administration of British India from the British East India Company, there were no units of British troops in India that were not part of the Royal Army of the United Kingdom. Under the Company's régime the Company had maintained an army of its own which had included British as well as Indian units. The Gurkha and British Indian regular units and the Pathan militias were under British command and had a complement of British officers—though they also had non-British commissioned officers of special grades. The forces maintained by the Indian client states were officered by Indians but were uniform with the British Indian Army in their training and equipment.

² See II. ii. 128, n. 1.

evident that the Pathans had a brighter prospect of capturing the army of Pakistan, and the Gurkhas of capturing the army of Hindu India, than either of these two barbarian peoples—martial though both of them were—had ever had of capturing the army of the British Rāj.

The success of the British Rāj in India in employing with political impunity the military services of barbarians beyond its pale, as well as those of its own Indian subjects, was emulated by the Manchu restorers of a Far Eastern universal state in China. As we have noticed in another context,¹ Chinese and Mongol battalions were brigaded with Manchu battalions in varying numbers and ratios in the Manchu Power's army corps known as 'banners'. Even when the Manchu Government's domain was still confined to territories lying outside the Great Wall, the Chinese members of the community outnumbered the Manchus and Mongols;² and, after their passage of the Wall in A.D. 1644, it was the South Manchurian Chinese contingent in the banners that gave the invaders the man-power requisite for completing the conquest of Intra-mural China. While the Manchus thus succeeded in enlisting Chinese to help them win and hold China for a Manchu régime, they were no less successful in dealing with the equally delicate problem presented by the Mongols, martial barbarians with memories of a great imperial past of their own and with a tincture of alien culture³ that made them no less difficult to assimilate than the intensely cultivated Chinese.

The Manchus attacked their Mongol problem from two directions. On the one hand, in the organization of the Mongol battalions of the banners they anticipated the policy of the British military authorities towards the Gurkhas and Pathans by recruiting their Mongol soldiers individually, and not in tribal *blocs*, and by placing them under the command of Manchu officers. On the other hand, they handled the Mongol tribes on the Steppe as the 'Osmanlis had handled the Kurdish tribes in the Zagros Mountains. Without attempting to destroy their tribal organization, they contented themselves with dividing the tribes up into tribal atoms of a minimum size, and with imposing a strict delimitation of the boundaries between their respective pastoral ranges. The Mongol tribes, thus reduced in size and penned within fixed limits, were allowed to remain autonomous under the rule of their own tribal chiefs, while, to save appearances, these Mongol tribal chieftainships were nominally given the status of 'banners', as the Kurdish tribal chieftainships had been officially classified as Ottoman fiefs in the books of the Pādishāh.⁴ The political success of this Manchu military organization is attested by the fact that, when the Manchu régime in China was liquidated in A.D. 1911, the revolution was not the work of the Manchus' comrades-in-arms in the Chinese and Mongol battalions of the banners.

The success of the Manchus in China and the British in India in

¹ See pp. 128-9, above.

² See Michael, F.: *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China* (Baltimore 1942, Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 71.

³ See II. ii. 237-8; III. iii. 451; V. v. 309 and 348.

⁴ See Michael, op. cit., pp. 96-97. It will be seen that, in post-Didacletianic Roman terminology, these Mongol and Kurdish tribes were *foederati* of the Manchu and the Ottoman Empire respectively.

employing the professional military services of barbarians with political impunity was eclipsed by the Carthaginian architects of a colonial Syriac universal state in the area opened up by Phoenician maritime enterprise in the western basin of the Mediterranean. Though the citizens of Carthage never exempted themselves entirely from serving personally in the field, they did not hesitate, in the heyday of their wealth and power, to enrol Libyans and Iberians—and these not only from among their own subjects, but also from among the untamed barbarians beyond their pale—on a scale which quite dwarfed the Carthaginians' own citizen force. This, on the face of it, perilous policy did, sure enough, bring the Carthaginian Empire, and Carthage herself, to the verge of destruction when, at an hour in which Carthage's prestige was at a low ebb owing to her defeat in the First Romano-Punic War (*gerebatur* 264–241 B.C.), the Carthaginian Government imprudently, though characteristically, exasperated their mercenaries by proposing to interpret their agreed terms of service on lines so niggardly as, in the mercenaries' view, to create a breach of contract. Yet Carthage did succeed in quelling the Great Mutiny of 240–237 B.C.; and this discreditable incident in her military annals apparently did so little permanent damage to her mercenary army's discipline and *moral* that in the next generation the successors of the discomfited mutineers, when led by a captain of genius who inspired them with a personal devotion to himself, all but succeeded in inflicting on Rome the fate that Carthage herself was eventually to suffer at Roman hands.¹

The Consequences of the Enlistment of Barbarians in the post-Diocletianic Roman Army

The problem which was solved by the Carthaginians in the Western Mediterranean, by the Manchus in China, and by the British in India, but which defeated the Ramsids and the 'Abbasids, overtook the Roman Empire likewise in its post-Diocletianic age.

Though, in all ages, able-bodied adult Roman citizens were legally liable to be called up compulsorily for military service, the standing army of the Principate had in fact been recruited by voluntary enlistment; for, though service in the Army was confined to Roman citizens for the legions and to free Roman subjects for the *auxilia*, to the exclusion of both slaves and aliens, the strength of the Army in that age was a very low percentage of the total man-power available in the two eligible categories. This easy state of affairs was brought to an end once for all by Diocletian's military reforms, involving, as they did, an increase in the strength of the Army by perhaps as much as two-thirds, from about 300,000 men to about 500,000.² From that time onwards there was perpetual difficulty in finding suitable recruits in sufficient numbers.³

The civil authorities, whose responsibility it was to produce the men

¹ See V. v. 465–6.

² See p. 323, n. 5, above.

³ Vegetius complains (probably with reference to conditions in the western provinces of the Empire in the fifth century of the Christian Era) of the difficulty of filling the cadres—especially in the legions, to which the *auxilia* were preferred by recruits (see Vegetius, Book I, chap. 5, and Book II, chap. 3, quoted by Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 266).

for their military colleagues,¹ dealt with the Roman citizen-body—which, since the *Constitutio Antoniniana* of A.D. 212, embraced nearly the whole of the native-born free population of the Empire²—by sifting it, for military purposes, into different categories which received differential treatment ranging between the two extremes of compulsion to serve and prohibition to enlist.³ In the conscription of agricultural serfs, which was by far the largest reservoir of citizen man-power at the recruiting authorities' disposal, there were elaborate arrangements—unfortunately frustrated to a large extent by fraud, bribery, and pressure—for distributing the burden equitably between province and province and between estate and estate.⁴ Conscribed serfs, however, were naturally apt to be of poor martial quality, even if they had been forthcoming in sufficient numbers to cover Diocletian's formidable increase in the Army's strength, and the recruiting authorities therefore looked for an additional source of supply. The ban on the enlistment of slaves was not lifted, and it was still in force in Justinian's day (*imperabat* A.D. 527–65).⁵ From Diocletian's reign (*imperabat* A.D. 284–305) onwards, however, all barriers to the recruitment of aliens were removed,⁶ and barbarian alien recruits were now the more highly esteemed the more barbarous they were.⁷

For Roman military purposes an unreclaimed barbarian had the double attraction of bringing with him a native martial tradition and of being a volunteer who had not had the edge taken off his zest for military service through being pressed into it,⁸ as were the majority of the post-Diocletianic recruits of Roman origin.⁹ Even barbarian prisoners-of-war, if distinguished by rank or prowess in their native social environment, were able to bargain with the Roman recruiting authorities, as a condition of enlistment in the Roman Army, that they should start their career as officers;¹⁰ and the number of high officers of barbarian origin in the post-Diocletianic Roman Army indicates either that this privilege of a flying start was frequently secured by barbarian recruits or else that high promotion was frequently earned by men who

¹ See Grosse, R.: *Römische Militärgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der Byzantinischen Themenverfassung* (Berlin 1920, Weidman), p. 158. We may conjecture that this task was assigned to the civil authorities in the post-Diocletianic Roman Empire for the reason that led the Government of the United Kingdom, during the World War of A.D. 1939–45, to assign it to the Ministry of Labour and National Service. Whereas the military authorities were bound to think of their own needs first, the civil authorities might be expected to look at the problem of man-power as a whole, and to do their best to keep the Army up to strength with the least possible detriment to civilian services, such as the production of foodstuffs and the manning of the merchant marine, which, on a comprehensive view, might be seen to be not less essential than military defence itself for the welfare, or even for the survival, of the community.

² See V. vi. 7, n. 4, and p. 156, above.

³ See Grosse, op. cit., pp. 202 and 204–6.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 210–15.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 198.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 200–1.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 200.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 201–2.

⁹ A majority, but not all; for, as late as the sixth century of the Christian Era, in what remained of the Illyrian provinces of the Empire, there was a native Latin-speaking rural population of Roman citizens in which an historic local martial tradition was still sufficiently alive to inspire two Dardanian peasants—the future Emperor Justin I and his brother—to seek their fortunes by coming to Constantinople to enlist (see Grosse, op. cit., p. 203).

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 203.

started as privates.¹ Conversely, the citizen recruit came to be rated so low that in A.D. 440, at a date when, in the West, the Empire was at its last gasp, Roman citizens were freed from all military obligations save for taking part in the manning of city-walls in an emergency.²

The increasingly numerous and important barbarian intake into the post-Diocletianic Roman Army was recruited and organized on two systems, each of which had its own disadvantages and dangers. Besides the barbarian soldiers who enlisted individually in Roman military formations, there were national units, commanded by officers of their own nationality, that were furnished to the Roman Army by autonomous barbarian communities with the status of *foederati*.³ On the face of it, the system of individual enlistment might seem the less hazardous of the two—the more so, in view of the success of the Manchus in China and the British in India in keeping in order the barbarian soldiers whom they enrolled in this way. If the Romans ran into disaster where the British and the Manchus steered clear of it, the explanation of this difference in the outcome perhaps lies in a difference in the extent to which the dilution of regular units with barbarian personnel was carried; and, if, in this delicate matter, the Roman military authorities trespassed beyond the margin of safety, the culprit is to be found in the Emperor Theodosius I (*imperabat* A.D. 378–95).⁴ Theodosius tipped the hazardous balance in the post-Diocletianic Roman Army in the barbarians' favour.⁵ He drafted them into the Roman regular formations in a ratio so high as to produce a break in the Roman military tradition and discipline.⁶ The disastrous consequences are reflected in Vegetius's picture⁷ of the Army going to pieces. The troops can no longer be induced to submit to training,⁸ drill,⁹ or assaults at arms;¹⁰ they are unwilling to carry burdens;¹¹ they are slack in the performance of their military duty in general;¹² and they are unwilling to undertake the hard labour of fortifying camps.¹³ 'The Roman Army had ceased to exist. It had never succumbed to the Germans; it had simply been supplanted by them.'¹⁴

The Roman Army, and consequently the Roman Empire itself, was thus confronted, by Theodosius's ill-judged abandonment of all restrictions on the admission of barbarian recruits, with the imminent threat of a barbarian ascendancy. This doom was not accepted by the Roman

¹ See *ibid.*, p. 196.

² See *ibid.*, p. 202.

³ Strictly, *foederati dediticii* (see Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 206), presumably because, since the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, *dediticii* were the only category of inhabitants of the Roman Empire who did not possess the Roman franchise.

⁴ See Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 262, n. 2.

⁵ See Zosimus: Book IV, chaps. xxx and xxxi, cited by Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

⁶ The effect, according to Zosimus, chap. xxxi, §§ 1–2, was a dissolution of military discipline and a breakdown of the system of registering effectives—with the result that the professed 'deserters' from barbarian tribes beyond the Roman imperial *limes* who had been registered as serving soldiers in the Roman regular army took to going home, sending substitutes to fill their places, and falling into the ranks again whenever it took their fancy.

⁷ Cited as evidence by Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

⁸ Vegetius: Book I, chaps. 20 and 28. Compare Book I, chap. 26, Book II, chaps. 18 and 24, and many other passages.

⁹ *Ibid.*: Book I, chap. 8.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, chaps. 11, 12, and 18.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, chap. 19.

¹² *Ibid.*: Book III, chap. 8.

¹³ *Ibid.*: Book I, chap. 21; Book III, chap. 10.

¹⁴ Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

element in the Army without a struggle; but, while the Roman reaction was ubiquitous, the results were quite different in different sections of the Empire. In the East and Centre the untoward effects of Theodosius's error were reversed in the nick of time, while in the West the vantage surrendered by him to the barbarians was not, in the end, retrieved.

In the East the coming conflict was heralded, before Theodosius's death, by a clash at Philadelphia between Egyptian and barbarian troops which was provoked by the barbarians' intolerable treatment of the civilian population and in which the barbarians suffered more than two hundred casualties;¹ but the crucial trial of strength in the East—in which the utter discomfiture of the barbarians made history by producing a permanent parting of the ways between the fortunes of the eastern and western sections of the Empire²—came in A.D. 400. In the East in that year there was a general civil war between the Roman and barbarian soldiery in which 35,000 Gothic troops were wiped out;³ and the victors confirmed and enhanced the effects of their signal triumph by taking advantage of the breathing-space that they had thereby won for themselves in order to introduce effective measures for precluding, in the East, a recurrence of the barbarian peril. In the East the imperial authorities had the courage thenceforward to dispense with a barbarian instrument whose dangerousness had proved greater than its value. Almost all the surviving names of military officers in the East in the records of the next fifteen years are Graeco-Roman;⁴ and, though this resolute purge of barbarian military man-power may have had adverse short-term military effects, its long-term political result was that the Empire managed, in the East, to stave off for two centuries longer the final catastrophe that now swiftly descended upon the West.⁵

Before the close of the fifth century of the Christian Era the East had tapped a native source of martial man-power by making serviceable Roman soldiers out of the wild highlanders of the Taurus;⁶ and these Isaurian troops showed themselves a match for the barbarians from beyond the pale in the Great Romano-Gothic War of A.D. 537-53.⁷ At the same time the Roman military authorities in the East continued to draw recruits from the general population, even in the least warlike of the eastern provinces. In the documents preserved on Egyptian papyri dating from the sixth and seventh centuries, none of the soldiers there mentioned bear barbarian names,⁸ and, according to a Modern Western scholar who was an eminent authority on the subject, the first mention of *foederati* serving in Egypt was to be found in the chronicle of John of Nikiû, who lived to record the Arab conquest.⁹ By that time

¹ See Zosimus: Book IV, chap. xxx, §§ 4-8, cited by Grosse, op. cit., p. 263.

² The historic importance of this event has been pointed out already in IV. iv. 324.

³ See Grosse, op. cit., p. 264.

⁴ See *ibid.*

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 264-5.

⁶ See IV. iv. 324-5.

⁷ In the Modern Western World the Government of the United Kingdom pursued the same policy with similar success when it enrolled the wild highlanders of Scotland in the British Army after their last outbreak in A.D. 1745.

⁸ See Grosse, op. cit., p. 277.

⁹ The authority for this statement is Grosse, op. cit., p. 281, but the page (p. 531) of Zotenburg's edition of the chronicle of John of Nikiû which he cites as his reference does not exist in Zotenburg's definitive edition: *Chronique de Jean, Evêque de Nikiou*, texte éthiopien publié et traduit par H. Zotenberg (Paris 1883, Imprimerie Nationale),

the *foederati* in the East had been transformed from national contingents furnished by autonomous barbarian communities under native commanders into units of the Roman regular army which were, indeed, still barbarian in their personnel but were of mixed nationality and were under the command of Roman officers.¹ These sixth-century barbarian regulars to whom the name *foederati* now attached were a mobile cavalry force which was the cream of Justinian's army.² In fact, by Justinian's day the Roman Army of the East had learnt the secret of how to employ barbarian troops with military profit³ without political risk. The only non-Romans whom Justinian enrolled were prisoners-of-war⁴ or deserters.⁵ His barbarian troops were relatively few in numbers, but it was they who won his victories for him.⁶

This Roman military recovery in the East was not reproduced in the West. The anti-barbarian reaction that had started in Constantinople in A.D. 400 did indeed have repercussions on the farther side of the Adriatic. It made its influence felt in the assassination of the Vandal generalissimo Stilicho in A.D. 408 and in the ineptly brutal accompanying massacre of the families of barbarian soldiers, domiciled in Italy, by Roman troops.⁷ Moreover, for the next half-century the perilously dictatorial western military office of generalissimo (*magister peditum in praesenti*)⁸ was held by five successive incumbents, from Constantius to

and the reference is presumably to the preliminary edition published in the *Journal Asiatique* in 1879. In the French translation accompanying the definitive edition, it is mentioned (p. 421, chap. cvii) that, when Heraclius in Africa revolted against Phocas, he raised mercenary troops from the barbarians of Tripolitania and Pentapolis and that a strong contingent of these was included in the expeditionary force which marched on Egypt under the command of Nicetas. These barbarian mercenaries are mentioned subsequently on three occasions in the chronicler's account of the ensuing military operations in Egypt (pp. 426-7, chap. cvii; p. 428, chap. cviii; p. 431, chap. cix). Again, in the account of the military operations arising out of the invasion of Egypt by the Arabs, there is a reference to 'toutes les troupes d'Égypte et les troupes auxiliaires' (p. 434, chap. cix). If these are the passages that Grosse has in mind, he is presumably taking it for granted that Nicetas' 'barbarians' and Theodore's 'auxiliaries' were *foederati* in the then current technical meaning of the term.

¹ See Grosse, op. cit., pp. 280-1.

² Ibid., pp. 282-3.

³ One index of the re-establishment of discipline in the Roman Army of the East, after the *dégringolade* following the dilution of the Army with barbarians in the reign of Theodosius I, may be found in the survival, in Justinian's day, of the laborious practice of fortifying camps (as described by the 'Anonymus Köchly', chaps. 26-29 (Köchly, H., and Rüstow, W.: *Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller*, Zweiter Theil, Zweite Abtheilung, pp. 136-47) cited by Grosse, op. cit., p. 302). As Grosse points out (op. cit., pp. 305-6), this survival of the tradition of camp-making in the Roman Army of the sixth century of the Christian Era is the more noteworthy considering that camp-making was an infantry technique, whereas by this time the principal arm of the Roman Army had long since come to be the cavalry.

⁴ e.g. Vandals.

⁵ See Grosse, op. cit., pp. 277-8.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 279-80.

⁷ See Zosimus: Book V, chap. xxxv, §§ 7-8, cited by Grosse, op. cit., p. 265.

⁸ The *magistri militum* of the post-Diocletianic Empire were the commanders of the mobile army (the *Comitatenses*) that Diocletian had called into being. Since the *Comitatenses* were divided into an infantry and a cavalry arm, there was originally a pair of *magistri*—a *magister peditum* and a *magister equitum*—attached to the Emperor, or one pair to each of the emperors at times when the imperial office was in commission. In this college of commanders-in-chief the *magister peditum* ranked senior to his colleague commanding the cavalry (see Grosse, op. cit., p. 183). When an Empire that had been re-united in the hands of Theodosius I was divided again, upon his death, between his sons Arcadius and Honorius, the *magister peditum* at the imperial headquarters (*in praesenti*) in the West came to overshadow his junior colleague the *magister equitum in praesenti* so completely as to become virtually a permanent military dictator within the western emperor's domain (see *ibid.*, pp. 188-9)—a situation which was recognized in

Aëtius inclusive,¹ who were Roman in nationality. When, however, with the accession of Ricimer to the generalissimate in A.D. 456, an army which in the West was still overwhelmingly barbarian in its personnel² found itself once more under the supreme command of an all-powerful barbarian war-lord, the fate of the Empire in the West was sealed,³ and Ricimer's death in A.D. 472 could not prevent his fellow barbarian Odovacer from taking his place and completing his work by making appearances in the West more nearly conform with realities.⁴

The Roman Army's Legacy to the Christian Church

If we now ask ourselves who had been the beneficiaries of the institution of mobile standing armies in universal states, we can answer at once that these military corporations had been apt to make the fortunes of

the practice that grew up of investing him, almost *ex officio*, with the title of *patricius* (see Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 182).

'This dominance of the office of imperial generalissimo was one of the principal factors in the fall of the West Roman Empire; the German *magister militum* eventually supplanted the Emperor. Ricimer laid the foundations of the German supremacy in Italy and thereby prepared the way for Odovacer's usurpation. Theodorici, in the next chapter of history, was, from the Roman standpoint, simply the East Roman Emperor's *magister militum utriusque militiae* [i.e. area commander, in Italy, of both arms of the mobile branch of the Roman Imperial Army]'—(*ibid.*, p. 190).

This development, which worked itself out in the West with such fatal consequences for the Empire, was avoided in the East thanks to precautions taken there by Theodosius I to prevent the concentration of military authority in a single pair of hands. In the first place the two *magistri praesentales* at Constantinople were given equal and coordinate rank with one another, and the command of the mobile troops of both arms at the eastern imperial headquarters was divided equally between them. In the second place, under the co-ordinate commandership-in-chief of the two eastern *praesentales*, the army groups of *Comitatenses* stationed in the eastern and central provinces were divided between three different area commands—per Orientem, per Thraciam, per Illyricum—under the regional command of three subordinate *magistri equitum* who were styled *magistri utriusque militiae* because they were in command of the infantry as well as the cavalry units of the mobile army within their respective areas (see *ibid.*, pp. 185–6). Since the area command per Orientem was still dangerously large, Justinian reduced its size by carving out of it a fourth eastern area command per Armeniam (see *ibid.*, p. 190). This institution of subordinate area commands *utriusque militiae* was not confined to the East. In the West there was, for example, an area command per Gallias. In the West, however, this decentralization did not avail to curb the power of the senior *magister militum praesentalis*.

Though Zosimus lived to see the western provinces of the Roman Empire overtaken by a disaster from which the central and eastern provinces were saved by Theodosius's precautions, the pagan historian professes (in Book IV, chap. xxvii, §§ 3–5) to see no more in the Christian Emperor's statesmanlike division of commands than a wantonly extravagant inflation of the imperial budget for military salaries.

¹ For the career and the significance of Aëtius, see V. v. 471–2.

² See the rhetorical, yet nevertheless revealing, catalogue, given by Sidonius Apollinaris (*Carmen* V, ll. 474–9), of the barbarian peoples represented in the army with which the unhappy emperor Majorian crossed the Alps from Italy into Gaul in A.D. 458.

³ There were, of course, other, and perhaps more potent, causes of the dissolution of the Roman Empire in the West at this juncture. One underlying cause, from which all the rest derive in some measure, was the general social and economic backwardness and feebleness of the western provinces by comparison with those of the Centre and the East. One symptom of this was an unhealthy concentration of such wealth as there was in the West in the hands of great rural landowners who in the fifth century of the Christian Era virtually escaped the control of the imperial authorities and, in particular, defied the efforts of the inland revenue authorities to collect from them the taxes which they alone had the means to pay. (On this point see Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 269.)

⁴ The conformity achieved was far from being complete, for, though Odovacer did depose the puppet-emperor Romulus Augustulus in whose name he had been ruling Italy, he did not venture to assume authority in his own name by naked right of his *de facto* power, but sought and obtained investiture as the vicegerent, in Italy, of the Imperial Government at Constantinople.

the aliens or barbarians who had been enrolled in them. The latter-day Achaemenids' recruitment of a mobile professional force of Greek mercenaries led to the conquest of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander and its partition between a number of Macedonian Greek successor-states. The enrolment of barbarians in the bodyguard of the 'Abbasid Caliphs and in the standing armies of the Roman Empire and 'the New Empire' of Egypt led to the establishment of barbarian rule in the dominions of the Caliphate, in the Egyptian World, and in the western provinces of the Roman Empire. We can also espy cases in which the beneficiary had been an alien secular culture. The Hellenic culture made its entry into the Hittite, Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indic worlds at the heels of the Macedonian *conquistadores*. The creation of a new army on a Western model in the Russian Empire by Peter the Great, and in the Ottoman Empire by Selim III and Mahmud II, led to the progressive Westernization of other sides of Russian and Ottoman life.¹ The enrolment of Italian, Flemish, and West German troops in the Napoleonic army expedited the re-absorption of the debris of a city-state cosmos in Northern Italy, Western Germany, and Flanders, which had differentiated itself from the rest of Western Christendom in the medieval age of Western history,² into a Modern Western body social represented by contemporary French society. It is more surprising to see the mantle of an army descending upon the shoulders of a church—and the more so when the recipient of this military inspiration is a church with an anti-military tradition and *éthos*.

In their conscientious objection to the shedding of blood, and consequently to the performance of military service, the Primitive Christians were at variance with both the Jewish and the Roman tradition.

'In the last resort, the Jew literally drew the sword and forestalled the Messiah. . . . The Christian, on the other hand, was instructed to await the coming of his victorious Christ.'³

In striking contrast to the series of Jewish insurrections against first Seleucid and then Roman rule during the three hundred years running from 166 B.C. to A.D. 135,⁴ the Christians never once rose in armed revolt against their Roman persecutors during the approximately equal period of time that elapsed between the beginning of Jesus' mission and the conclusion of peace and alliance between the Roman Imperial Government and the Church in A.D. 313.⁵ As for service in the Roman Army, this was a stumbling-block for Christians because it involved not only the shedding of blood on active service but also, among other things, the passing and execution of death sentences, the taking of a military oath of unconditional loyalty to the Emperor, the worship of the Emperor's genius and offer of sacrifice to it, and the veneration of military standards as idols.⁶ Service in the Army was, in fact, expressly

¹ The penetration of an alien culture through a military door is examined further in IX. viii. 126–53.

² See III. iii. 344–7 and V. v. 619–42.

³ Harnack, A. von: *Militia Christi: Die christliche Religion und der Soldatenstand in den Ersten Drei Jahrhunderten* (Tübingen 1905, Mohr), p. 9.

⁴ See V. v. 68.

⁵ See Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 46.

declared to be unlawful for Christians by successive Early Christian Fathers—by Origen,¹ by Tertullian,² and even by Lactantius in a work published after the conclusion of the Constantinian peace between the Christian Church and the Roman State.³ In his downright assertion—‘We do not march with the Emperor, not even if he presses us’—Origen retrospectively justified Celsus’s complaint (of which the record has been preserved by Origen himself) that the Christians refuse to perform military service.⁴

It is significant that this ostracism of the Roman Army by the Christian Church broke down, and this through developments in the position and outlook of the Christian community at a time when the Army of the Principate was still being recruited by voluntary enlistment—indeed, more than a hundred years before the issue was raised on the Roman Government’s side through the reintroduction of compulsory military service as a corollary to the expansion of the Army by Diocletian.

Down to about the year A.D. 170, occasions for conflict over this issue were, it would seem, avoided; for down to that time Christian civilians apparently abstained as a matter of course from enlisting in the Army, while, if a pagan serving soldier became a convert, the Church tacitly acquiesced not only in his serving out his term with the colours but in his continuing to perform all acts that the Army expected of him, including those requirements that deterred Christians from enlisting. Possibly the Church justified to herself this laxity on a question of principle on the same ground on which, in this first chapter of her history, she tolerated other social anomalies or enormities in her bosom, such as the continuance of the institution of slavery even when master and slave alike were members of the Christian community. In the Church’s expectation in this age, the time remaining before Christ’s Second Coming was so short that the Christian soldier-convert might just as well pass it under arms as the Christian slave-convert in bondage.⁵

‘The incompatibility [of Christian principles] with the State, the social order, public life and the like, first impinged upon the Christians’ conscience in its full force when the Christians began to suspect and to recognise that they were going still to have to do with these affairs for quite a long time to come, and were also going to incur their share of responsibility for them.’⁶

In the third century of the Christian Era, when the Christians did begin to make their way in rapidly increasing numbers into the politically responsible classes of Roman society—partly by themselves rising in the world, and partly by winning upper-class converts—they answered in practice the question raised for them by the social impor-

¹ *Contra Celsum*, Book VIII, chap. 73 (see Harnack, op. cit., pp. 31, 72, and 104).

² See the passages cited by Harnack, op. cit., pp. 58–68, especially those from the *De Coronâ*.

³ *Institutes*, Book VI, chap. 20, § 16 (see Harnack, op. cit., p. 72).

⁴ See Harnack, op. cit., p. 54.

⁵ For this possible application of the eschatological outlook on life to the delicate case of the soldier-convert, see Harnack, op. cit., pp. 49–50.

⁶ Harnack, op. cit., pp. 50–51. Compare p. 69.

tance of the Roman Army without ever solving it in theory and without waiting for the conversion of the State of which this army was an organ. In Diocletian's army the Christian contingent was already so large, so conspicuous, and so influential that the persecution launched in A.D. 303 was directed against Christianity in the Army in the first instance.¹ The Army was, in fact, the testing ground of the issue between the Imperial Government and the Church.² The strength of the Christians in the Army even in the West, where at the opening of the fourth century the percentage of Christians in the population was very much lower than in the contemporary East, is indicated by Constantine's manifesto in the Church's favour in A.D. 312, on the eve of the critical battle at the Milvian Bridge.³ The future pioneer of Christian monachism, the Egyptian Pachomius, was converted to Christianity as a soldier in the expeditionary force with which Constantine was then marching against Maxentius.⁴ The completeness of the eventual identification of Church and Army in an age when the names 'Christian' and 'Roman' had become virtually synonymous is symbolized in the record that, when, in the fifth century, the flood of barbarian invasion finally engulfed the Upper Danubian *limes*, and the last unit of local *limitanei* dissolved, their commanding officer found alternative service as a bishop.⁵

Still more significant than this breakdown of the Christian Church's original boycott of the Roman Army is the influence of the Army on the Church in the age in which the ban was still in force.

' "War" is one of the fundamental forms of Life, and there are inalienable virtues that find their highest, or at any rate their symbolic, expression in the warrior. . . . Accordingly, no higher religion can do without imagery derived from war, or, in consequence, do without "warriors" [of its own].'⁶

In the Jewish tradition, which the Christian Church had retained as a treasured part of its own heritage when it had parted company with Judaism, war was consecrated both in the literal sense as an indispensable means of realizing the messianic hope and in a symbolic sense in the metaphorical language of the authors of the Books of the Prophets and the Psalms;⁷ and, though the Church dropped the literal application, she retained the symbol.⁸ While, however, the Jewish martial tradition was thus a potent literary influence on the life of the Primitive Christian Church, the Roman martial tradition presented itself to Christians as a living and impressive reality. Baneful and hateful though the Roman Army of the Republic had been to the population of the Hellenic World in the cruel age of the Roman conquests and the still more cruel age of the ensuing Roman civil wars, the Roman Army of the Principate, which lived on its pay instead of lining its pockets by looting,

¹ See Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

² See *ibid.*, p. 82.

³ This point is made by Harnack, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87.

⁴ See Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁵ Eugippius: *Vita Sancti Severini*, chap. iv, § 2, and chap. xx, § 1, cited by Grosse, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-70.

⁶ Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁸ This abandonment, by the Christian Church, of Jewry's literal militancy was perhaps originally sub-conscious, or at any rate tacit. Origen, however, frankly admitted a change of principle, on this point, as between the New Testament dispensation and the Old (see Harnack, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27 and 72).

and which was stationed on the frontiers, to defend Civilization against the barbarians, instead of infesting and devastating the civilized interior, came to win the involuntary respect, admiration, and even affection of Rome's subjects, as an oecumenical institution that ministered to their welfare and that was a legitimate object for their pride.

'Let us observe', wrote Clement of Rome, about the year A.D. 95, in his First Epistle to the Corinthians,¹ 'the conduct of the soldiers who serve our rulers. Think of the orderliness, the pliancy, the submissiveness with which they carry out their orders. Not all of them are legates or tribunes or centurions or options or officers of the grades below these. But each serving soldier in his own unit carries out the commands of the Emperor and the Government.'

In thus commending the discipline of the contemporary Roman Army as an exemplar for his Christian correspondents, Clement was seeking to establish a rule of organization for the Church. Obedience, he was saying, is due from Christians, not only to God, but to their ecclesiastical superiors. 'All Christians are soldiers; but, just for that reason, they have to obey their leaders the presbyters.'² This equation of 'soldier of God' with 'member of the Church' would have seemed a matter of course to Mithraists; for, of the seven grades of initiation in the Mithraic Church, the third from the bottom was *miles*, and it is probable that most initiates never rose higher than that level.³ In the evolution of the Christian Church's military imagery, however, the original equation of 'soldier' had been not with 'convert' but with 'missionary'; and from this equation its author, Saint Paul, had drawn two inferences: the missionary must disencumber himself from the impedimenta of civilian life, and the missionary has the same claim to be supported by his flock as the soldier has to receive his pay out of the contributions of the tax-payer.⁴

'The two military axioms that were adopted by the Christian community in its earliest phase—that the Christian missionary and teacher should receive his maintenance from others, and that on the other hand he should not entangle himself in civilian business life—are in a relation of polarity to one another and just on that account already contain in themselves the germs of a whole hierarchical system.'⁵

Yet, whatever influence the Roman Army may have had on the development of the Church's institutions, the Church owed more in that sphere to the influence of the Roman civil service,⁶ and the Army's example produced its principal effect on the life of the Church in the more elusive but more intimate realm of ideas and ideals. The Roman military imagery that was introduced into the Christian Church's terminology by Saint Paul, and that was adopted and developed by Clement of Rome, was extended by Saint Ignatius, whose letters, written early in the second century of the Christian Era in Greek, bristle

¹ Chap. 37.

² Harnack, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 37-8.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 14-16, citing 1 Tim. i. 18 and 2 Tim. ii. 3.

⁵ Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 17. Compare pp. 17-18.

⁶ See pp. 191-3, above, and pp. 369-70, below.

with transliterated Latin military technical terms.¹ Tertullian (*vivebat circa* A.D. 155–222), who was the son of an army officer, worked out the simile of the *militia Christi* consistently and thoroughly,² and in this he was followed up by his North-West African compatriot Saint Cyprian.³

The Christian initiation-rite of baptism is equated by Cyprian with the military oath (*sacramentum*) required of the recruit upon his enrolment in the Roman Army.⁴ Once enrolled, the Christian soldier must wage his warfare 'in accordance with the regulations' (*νομίμως*).⁵ He must eschew the unpardonable offence of desertion,⁶ and likewise the grave misdemeanour of dereliction of duty.⁷ 'The pay of delinquency is death', as Tertullian translates the phrase in Saint Paul's Epistle to the Romans⁸ which appears as 'the wages of sin' in the Authorized English Version of the Bible. The ritual and moral obligations of the Christian life are equated by Tertullian with military fatigues. In his terminology a fast is a stint of sentry-go (*statio*),⁹ and the Christian duty which is declared in the Gospel according to Saint Matthew to be so well within the compass of human powers is 'the Lord's light pack' (*levem sarcinam Domini*).¹⁰ Moreover, the Christian soldier's faithful performance of his duty is duly recompensed. If 'the pay of sin is death', it must be reckoned on the other side of the account between the spiritual soldier and his heavenly paymaster that 'God's gratuity is life' (*donativum autem Dei vita*).¹¹ And, short of receiving a gratuity, the soldier can look forward to drawing his rations so long as he gives satisfaction to the master with whom he has taken service.¹² 'Your deposits [of deferred pay] are your works, [and you bank them] in order that you may [eventually] draw your receipts on an appropriate scale.'¹³ The Cross is a military standard (*σύσσημον*) which Jesus has raised to inspire his troops.¹⁴ The Christian soldier's general (*imperator*) is Christ,¹⁵ and the soldier must never forget that he is under his general's eye.¹⁶ Thus inspired, led, and disciplined, Christ's army can challenge comparison with Caesar's. If Christians are civilians (*pagani*) from the standpoint of Caesar's army, so are Caesar's

¹ See Harnack, op. cit., pp. 19–20.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 32–33 and 35.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 41.

⁴ See *ibid.*

⁵ 2 Tim. ii. 3–5, cited by Harnack, op. cit., p. 17.

⁶ Ποῖος δὲ κόσμος δέξεται τινα τῶν αὐτομολούντων ἀπ' αὐτοῦ; (1 Clem. ad. Cor., chap. 28). Μήτις ὑμῶν δεσέρτωρ εὐρεθῇ (Ignatius ad. Polycarpum, chap. 6). These passages are printed in Harnack, op. cit., pp. 94–95.

⁷ Δικαῖον οὖν ἐστὶν μὴ λιποτακτεῖν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ (1 Clem. ad. Cor., chap. 21, printed in Harnack, op. cit., p. 94).

⁸ Rom. vi. 23.

⁹ See Harnack, op. cit., pp. 35–36.

¹⁰ Matt. xi. 30, as translated into Latin by Tertullian: *De Monogamiā*, chap. 2 (Harnack, op. cit., p. 36).

¹¹ Rom. vi. 23, as translated into Latin by Tertullian.

¹² Ἀρέσκετε ὡς στρατεύεσθε, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὰ ὀψώνια κομιζέσθε (Ignatius *Ad Polycarpum*, chap. 6, printed in Harnack, op. cit., p. 95).

¹³ Τὰ δεδωμένα ὑμῶν τὰ ἔργα ὑμῶν, ἵνα τὰ ἀκκεπτα ὑμῶν ἀξία κομίσθητε (Ignatius, op. cit., loc. cit.).

¹⁴ Ignatius *Ad Smyrnaeos*, chap. i, cited by Harnack, op. cit., p. 20. (N.B. This phrase occurs in the Septuagint Greek translation of Isaiah v. 26 and xlix. 22, and it therefore seems more likely that Ignatius is here quoting from the Septuagint than that he is employing a Roman military term current in his own day.—A.J.T.)

¹⁵ Cyprian (see Harnack, op. cit., p. 41).

¹⁶ 'Spectat militem suum Christus' (Cyprian, Ep. lviii, ch. 4, cited by Harnack, op. cit., p. 42).

soldiers from the standpoint of Christ's.¹ Justin Martyr (*florebat circa* A.D. 150) goes so far as to claim that the Christians' devotion to their service is greater than the Army's is to theirs.²

With a great Modern Western scholar's aid, enough evidence has now been cited to show that the Roman Army's impress on the Christian Church had cut deep. The mark that it had made had been enduring; and, in virtue of it, a mundane military organization which had finally lost its own identity in wars to the death with Persian and Arab adversaries in the seventh century of the Christian Era was still a living force in the World in A.D. 1952.

2. Civil Services

The Difficulty of Creating a Professional Civil Service

The variety which our survey of imperial standing armies has brought to light in the degree of development of the institutional organization of the universal states in our catalogue makes itself apparent again when we pass to the consideration of imperial civil services.

These vary, in degree of development, between two extremes illustrated by the Achaemenian Empire at the lower end of the scale and by the Ottoman Empire at the upper end. The Achaemenian professional civil service always remained rudimentary. Its most important representatives were the imperial secretaries who were resident at the headquarters of the provincial governors but were independent of the satraps and reported directly to the Central Government. As a further check, the satraps were also kept under observation by itinerant inspectors, expressively nicknamed 'the Emperor's eyes'.³ The need for a central authority to gather together, hold, and manipulate these widely ramifying threads of administrative control seems to have been met, in the organization of the Imperial Court, by the evolution of an officer who was known in Old Persian as 'the Hazarapatiš' and in Greek as 'the Chiliarch', because he had begun by being simply the commander of an inner imperial bodyguard of one thousand men, into an Imperial Chancellor or Minister of State performing some, at any rate, of the functions that, in the Roman Empire, through a parallel process of evolution, came to be performed by the commandant of the Emperor's praetorian guards (*praefectus praetorio*).⁴ While the Achae-

¹ Tertullian: *De Coronâ*, *passim*, cited by Harnack, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-9, who points out that *paganus* is likewise used in the sense of 'civilian' in *Digest*, XLIX. xix. 14.

² See Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

³ The Achaemenian network of imperial communications, which made this system of inspection a practical possibility, has been noticed on p. 82, above.

⁴ See p. 182, n. 3, and p. 183, above, and Junge, P. J.: 'Hazarapatiš: Zur Stellung des Chiliarchen der königlichen Leibgarde im Achämenidenstaat', in *Klio*, vol. xxxiii (Neue Folge, vol. xv) (Leipzig 1940, Dietrich), pp. 13-38. The Hazarapatiš could not have performed his duties without being served by a skilful, organized, and numerous administrative and clerical staff. The scale of his Chancery is indicated by the quantity of the imperial archives. By A.D. 1940 no less than 30,000 clay tablets, inscribed in the Elamite language, had been discovered at Persepolis alone by Modern Western archaeologists (see Junge, *op. cit.*, p. 14, n. 2), and the collection at Susa, the principal seat of the Achaemenian imperial administration, must have been far larger (see *ibid.*, p. 30, n. 3). These bulky, heavy, and brittle records on clay, together with the staff whose duty it was to keep them up to date and to consult them for administrative purposes, must have

menian civil service never developed beyond this point,¹ the Ottoman Government provided for its corresponding administrative needs by doing everything that human ingenuity could devise, and human determination accomplish, to produce a civil service that was to be no mere professional fraternity but a secular equivalent of a religious order, so rigorously segregated, austere disciplined, and potentially 'conditioned' as to be transfigured into a super-human, or sub-human, race—as different from the ordinary run of human kind as a thoroughbred and broken-in horse, hound, or hawk is from the wild life that has been the breeder's and trainer's raw material.²

At divers points between these two extremes we may place the professional civil services that were taken over by the Umayyad Caliphate from the Roman and Sasanian empires and by the Manchus from the Ming; those that were inherited from the pre-imperial past of the empire-building state by the Ts'ing Empire in the Sinic World, the Mongol Empire in the Far Eastern World, and the Spanish Empire of the Indies; those that were modelled in the British Rāj in India, in the Napoleonic Empire, and in the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy on home-grown institutions of the metropolitan countries that were themselves new creations; those that were worked out more or less *ab initio* in the Han Empire, the Roman Empire, and 'the Middle Empire' of Egypt; and those that, like the professional civil service of the Petrine Russian Empire, were fashioned on a last of an alien mould.

The Taking Over of an Existing Civil Service by a Barbarian Conqueror

The taking over of the existing civil service of a conquered polity is an expedient that almost forces itself upon empire-builders when these are barbarians who have won their empire by a sudden stroke and when the conquered polity itself has been a universal state whose imperial civil service has still been a going concern at the time of the conquest. Yet, though, in this situation, the main lines of action may be dictated by circumstances, there will still be some room for the free play of statesmanship. The barbarian empire-builders may be more or less receptive, and the subjugated civil servants more or less pliant; and it is a question of judgment how far the conquering ex-barbarian imperial

remained, year in and year out, in the administrative centre, whichever one it might be, where they had originally been inscribed and deposited; they cannot have accompanied the Emperor and his Court on their seasonal migration between Susa, Babylon, and Ecbatana, or on their occasional state visits to Persepolis (see pp. 205-7, above). Junge conjectures (*ibid.*, p. 33 and p. 34, n. 4) that, besides being responsible for the Imperial Chancery, the Hazarapatiš was invested with the command over the imperial garrisons in the provinces.

¹ The differentiation from one another of the Imperial Household, the Imperial Treasury, and the Imperial Chancery, which was a feature of the subsequent Sasanian régime, was still unknown to the Achaemenidae (see Junge, *op. cit.*, p. 30, n. 4). The Emperor's Bow-Bearer and Lance-Bearer served, no doubt, as his adjutants (see *ibid.*, p. 22), and perhaps as his private secretaries. The post of Cup-Bearer, which came to be frequently, and in the end perhaps exclusively, held by eunuchs, seems to have carried with it the comptrollership of the Corps of Pages and of the whole personnel of the Household (see *ibid.*, pp. 19-21). The Book of Nehemiah indicates how well placed the Cup-Bearer was for winning the Emperor's ear, and there seems to have been a tendency for him to gain in power at the Hazarapatiš's expense (see Junge, *ibid.*, p. 37).

² For the ideal inspiring the creation of the Ottoman Pādīshāh's Slave-Household, see the passage quoted from Lybyer in III. iii. 32-34.

people is to resign itself to taking over the conquered ex-imperial civil service lock, stock, and barrel as a permanent solution for its own problem of having to administer an empire, and how far it shall venture to reject or modify the institution that has so providentially fallen into its hands, for the sake of trying to preserve at any rate the more valuable elements in its own native communal tradition and *éthos*.

The Umayyad princes, on whom the sweeping conquests of the Primitive Muslim Arabs had conferred an unexpected dominion over ex-Roman and ex-Sasanian territories, compelled their Christian and Zoroastrian civil servants in the third generation to substitute Arabic for Greek, Coptic, and Pehlevi as the official language of the public records,¹ without attempting to take over the business of administration themselves; and, though under the ensuing 'Abbasid régime—especially from the ninth century of the Christian Era onwards, when the 'Abbasid Caliphate was declining towards its fall—the process of conversion to Islam became a landslide which carried into the Islamic fold a majority of the population of the Caliphate of all classes and occupations, the residual unconverted Christian minority continued to play a part in the civil service, and especially in the revenue administration, that was out of proportion to its eventual numbers.

In the less abrupt course of the establishment of the Manchu Empire over China, the reciprocal relations of Manchu and Chinese administrative institutions came to be adjusted more subtly.

In the Manchu polity a Chinese-inspired bureaucracy had already prevailed over both the original clan system and the subsequently engrafted feudal system, that had been the Manchus' own communal heritage, in the organization of the Manchu 'banners'² that had been created in A.D. 1601, forty-three years before the Manchus had embarked on the conquest of Intramural China.³ To staff a bureaucratic administration of their newly established banners, the Manchu Central Government commandeered Chinese scholar-serfs from the Manchu feudal lords,⁴ and, if a new element had not entered into the situation thereafter, the Manchu Power might have followed independently the path that the Ottoman Power took when it provided for the government of its empire by building up the Pādishāh's Slave-Household. In the history of the Manchu Empire, however, this embryonic servile civil service never came to maturity; for the Manchu empire-builders soon came to recognize the expediency, and indeed necessity, of taking Chinese civil servants into the Manchu service as free men enjoying the status that was traditionally theirs under an indigenous Chinese régime.⁵

¹ See p. 242, n. 3, above.

² See p. 129, above.

³ See Michael, F.: *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China* (Baltimore 1942, Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 61 and 64.

⁴ See Michael, op. cit., pp. 58 and 68.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 68. While the Manchus took the Chinese into their service on these generous terms at an early date and of their own free choice, the 'Osmanlis did not take the corresponding step of employing Greeks as freemen, unconverted to Islam, until they were constrained by the breakdown of the Pādishāh's Slave-Household and by a turn in the tide of war, in favour of the Western Christian Powers, which for the first time made the Ottoman Government feel the need for diplomacy and consequently appreciate the qualifications of their Greek Christian *ra'îyeh* for negotiating with Western diplomats on their Ottoman masters' behalf (see II. ii. 223-5; III. iii. 47-48; and V. vi. 299).

The epoch-making event that produced this change in the Manchus' attitude and policy towards Chinese litterati was the desertion in A.D. 1618, from the Ming to the Manchu service, of Li Yung-fang, the Chinese commandant of Fushun, a strategic point just inside the Great Wall at its eastern extremity on the coast of the Gulf of Chihli. The possibility of Li's adhesion to their cause promised the Manchus so important an advantage that they offered him admission to their service on terms of equality. He accepted the offer, and this bargain created a precedent by which Li's compatriots benefited from that time onwards.¹ In fact, 'the Chinese forced their standards on the invader'.² In A.D. 1631, thirteen years before the Manchus' passage of the Great Wall, a conference of Manchu feudal lords and high officials decided in favour of adopting the traditional Chinese bureaucratic organization for the central government;³ and the Manchu administrative system was duly Sinified by Prince Dorgon, the son of the founder of the Manchu Power, Nurhachi (*regnabat* A.D. 1618-25), and the younger brother of Nurhachi's successor T'ai Tsung (*regnabat* A.D. 1625-43).⁴

'Feudalism had given the Manchus their first integrating power. The acceptance of bureaucracy in the banner and central administration made them a state. It was the Chinese system, Chinese officials and Chinese ideas that enabled the Manchus to conquer China.'⁵

The tottering Ming régime was given its *coup de grâce*, not by the Sinified Manchu Power beyond the Great Wall which was to succeed, in the event, to the fallen Ming régime's heritage, but by a rebel who had raised his horn in the interior of China. As against the Manchus, Li Tse-chêng, after occupying Peking, had the double advantage of being in possession and being Chinese. In the revolutionary breaks in the history of the Chinese state, native Chinese rebels, no less than barbarian invaders, had found themselves unable to gain possession of the Empire without the use of force,⁶ and for this reason the aspirants to supreme power in times of anarchy, whether barbarians or Chinese, had usually been men who had little to lose and who had had to fight to hold even what they had.⁷ Li Tse-chêng, the extinguisher of the Ming, conformed to the historic type of successful Chinese rebel in being an illiterate proletarian. On the other hand, the *ci-devant* barbarian Manchus were by this time in the second generation of Sinification and, in the process, had become men of substance with something to lose and therefore with a motive for hesitating to put their fortunes to the touch by playing for the greater but more hazardous prize of oecumenical dominion.⁸

In the circumstances, that prize might have remained in the bandit Li Tse-chêng's hands if the issue had depended on him and the

¹ See Michael, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-72.

² *Ibid.*, p. 75. As has been noticed in III. iii. 31, n. 1, Chinese litterati at the Manchu Court were styled 'officials' (*ch'en*), whereas Manchu officials were styled 'slaves' (*nu*). This distinction of nomenclature lasted down to the fall of the Manchu régime in A.D. 1911 (see *ibid.*).

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 78 and 92-93.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 41.

⁸ The Manchu Government had even waited till A.D. 1636 to repudiate the suzerainty of the moribund Ming over their extramural principality (Michael, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 and 103).

Manchus alone. In the history of the antecedent Sinic Civilization, Liu Pang had become the founder of the Han Dynasty through a very similar career. In the crisis of A.D. 1644, however, the issue was decided otherwise by the suffrages of a third party. The Chinese civil service, and the scholar-gentry from whose ranks they were drawn, could not stomach the illiterate usurper, while they felt that there was a future for them under an ex-barbarian Power which had already given practical proof of its esteem for the Confucian culture by Sinifying itself of its own accord.¹ The Manchus crossed the Great Wall with at least the hint of a mandate to make the Empire safe for the Chinese scholar-gentry against the barbarian from within; and, though there proved to be nationalist-minded elements in the South of China which refused to recognize the Manchus' cultural mission and which remained unreconciled to the Manchu domination to the end of the story, the unenthusiastic yet efficacious support of the Chinese cultivated class enabled the Manchus to make themselves masters of China and to hold their prize for more than a quarter of a millennium.

'The Manchu State was growing in the Chinese World at the edge of the Chinese Empire. Its development can only be understood in its relationship to the Chinese Empire, as it was—though a conquering force—still a part of China all the time.'²

At the same time the Manchus did not become Chinese altogether without reservations. While they adopted the Confucian philosophy and educated their young men in it, they interpreted Confucian virtue in military terms³ that would have been more acceptable to the Sinic hereditary feudal nobility of Confucius's day than to Confucius himself or to the latter-day *chün tze* of the Han Age who bore the by then extinct feudal class's historic name, while teaching and practising what they believed to be Confucius's philosophy.⁴ T'ai Tsung warned his Manchus against assimilation to the Chinese civilian way of life.⁵ 'The banners had at first been the Manchu state. Now'—as a consequence of the Manchu Power's momentous act of taking over the Chinese State as a going concern under the administration of the established Chinese professional civil service—the banners 'became a state within a State'.⁶ In this equivocal position they did, however, maintain their existence and retain their identity till the Manchu régime in China fell, in its turn, in A.D. 1911.

Experiments in Recruiting a Civil Service from an Existing Aristocracy

The Manchus and the Primitive Muslim Arabs were exceptional among empire-builders in the scantiness of the indigenous cultural and institutional heritage that they brought with them. Most of their peers had come into the saddle better equipped, and, in addressing themselves to the unfamiliar and formidable task of governing an empire, they had naturally been apt to turn to account as far as possible, for

¹ See Michael, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-14.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 104-6.

³ See Michael, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁵ See pp. 355-6, below.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

this new purpose, the social heritage of the pre-imperial age of their own national history.

The Manchus themselves, as we have seen, had developed the rudiments of a tribal and feudal aristocracy before they embraced the Confucian culture and virtually put themselves in the hands of the Chinese civil service as the price of their acquisition of the Chinese Empire. Longer-established national aristocracies were in existence, by the time of their accession to oecumenical power, among the Persian henchmen of the Achaemenidae and among their Macedonian supplanters; among the clansmen of the Inca Emperors and among their Spanish supplinters; and in the hereditary dominions of the Hapsburg founders of the Danubian Monarchy. There was an incapable aristocracy in Muscovy at the time when Peter the Great took her Westernization in hand, and a highly capable one in the Roman Republic at the date of the foundation of the Principate.

In each of these cases the aristocracy descending from a previous age was drawn upon by the founder or reorganizer of a universal state as material for the building of an oecumenical administrative structure. The motives prompting an identical policy were, however, widely diverse. While Peter the Great tried to dragoon the old-fashioned Muscovite nobility into becoming the cultivated, efficient, and industrious administrators in the contemporary Western style whom he needed urgently in large numbers, Augustus took the politically experienced Roman Senatorial Order into a cautiously regulated partnership with his own new dictatorial régime, not so much because he needed or desired their collaboration as because he judged this policy of appeasement to be a prudent measure of insurance against suffering his adoptive father's fate at the hands of an old governing class whose thirst for power was still unsatiated, and because he realized that, in spite of their shameful and notorious betrayal of their trust during the last 150 years of their government of the Roman body politic, the Senatorial Order had not yet exhausted the credit of an accumulated prestige.

These antithetical problems that confronted respectively Augustus and Peter the Great are the horns of a dilemma that is apt to catch the architect of a universal state who finds himself with an imperial people's pre-imperial aristocracy on his hands. If the aristocracy is capable and experienced, it will probably be resentful of the change in its fortunes that has left it no opening, except the unpalatable service of a dictator, for still exercising those administrative capacities which it has developed through having been in power on its own account before losing its old political supremacy to its new master. Conversely, if the aristocracy is easy-going, the dictator who seeks to make use of its services will probably find that the innocuousness of his tool is offset by the bluntness of its edge. After Peter the Great's attempt to turn Muscovite nobles into Western-style administrators had been tried for two generations,¹ the Petrine Imperial Government gave it up as a bad

¹ Peter and his successors tried to use the Russian nobility in the provincial, as well as the central, administration by enrolling them in colleges of Landrats modelled on those

job¹ and granted the hereditary nobility a conditional exemption from public service in A.D. 1762.² On the other hand, Augustus, who was as anxious to dispense with his *virī senatorii* as Peter was to make use of his *boyars*, had to be content with making them ineligible for the single governorship of Egypt (a province that was a personal conquest of his own, and whose resources were so extensive and so efficiently concentrated in government hands that no Roman emperor could afford to see a Roman senator in control of them). The best part of three centuries was to pass before Augustus's successor Gallienus (*imperabat* A.D. 260-8) could venture, in the equalitarian revolutionary atmosphere of the third century of the Christian Era,³ to set about excluding the senatorial class systematically from key positions of public responsibility and power; and, even then, nearly half a century elapsed before Gallienus's work was completed by Diocletian (*imperabat* A.D. 284-305).⁴

Among the other national aristocracies, mentioned above, whose fortune it was to be called upon to share in the administration of a universal state, the Macedonian, like the Roman, nobility was competent but recalcitrant. In the generation of anarchy in Macedon preceding the accession of Philip II these spirited and turbulent Macedonian rural barons had enjoyed as great a licence as the Polish nobility in the age preceding the Partition of A.D. 1772, and they fiercely resented being called upon to become the devoted humble servants, *more Persico*, of a once constitutional king of their own blood who had formerly been proud to recognize them as his social peers (*ἐταίροι*). They rebelled against this demand even when it was made of them by a legitimate king of the Argead line who had won a position of unique eminence by overthrowing and supplanting the last Achaemenid. Still less willing were the Macedonian nobility to serve a despotic master when their lawful King Alexander was replaced by a batch of noble-born usurpers of the royal title, in whose shoes any other Macedonian noble military adventurer might have found himself standing if the luck of the game, in the scramble for power after Alexander's death, had happened to come his way instead of playing into the hands of his peers the Ptolemies, Antigoni, and Seleuci. In these psychological circumstances it was no wonder that the Seleucids and the Ptolemies had to look for ministers and administrators for their successor-states among the adaptable

that were a going concern in the Baltic Provinces that Peter had conquered from Sweden (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 505).

¹ Peter found himself constrained, by an effective passive resistance, to revoke, after a two years' trial, his edict of A.D. 1714, ordering all landowners and civil servants to send their children, between the ages of ten and fifteen, to his newly founded secular elementary schools. Peter vainly tried to enforce this edict by making a school-leaving certificate a pre-requisite—in the case of all persons subject to the edict—for a licence to marry (see Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 153, and the present Study, III. iii. 282, n. 2). A would-be bridegroom had to satisfy the examiners in arithmetic, geometry, and navigation (see Mettig, op. cit., p. 412).

² See Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), p. 413; Sumner, op. cit., pp. 197-8.

³ For this revolutionary movement and its triumph, see pp. 152-8, above.

⁴ See Grosse, R.: *Römische Militärgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der Byzantinischen Themenverfassung* (Berlin 1920, Weidmann), pp. 4-9. Between Augustus's day and Gallienus's, Septimius Severus (*imperabat* A.D. 193-211) had followed the precedent set by Augustus in Egypt when he enlarged the Roman Empire by adding the new

citizens of the city-states of the Hellenic World rather than among their intractable fellow noblemen from Hellas' Macedonian march.

By contrast, the grandees of Spain were ready enough to serve the Spanish Crown as viceroys and captains-general of the kingdoms of the Indies, even though the crown was worn by foreign Hapsburg and Bourbon heads, while, in the Danubian dominions of the eastern branch of the House of Hapsburg, the nobility of the dynasty's Austrian hereditary dominions was likewise willing to serve an Imperial-Royal-Archiducal master in the task of attempting to knit into a unity the congeries of kingdoms and lands which had been shaken into the lap of the *Caesarea Maiestas* by the shock of the Ottoman victory at Mohacz in A.D. 1526.¹ These Austrian and Spanish aristocrats, however, were as sluggish as they were loyal. In fine, of all the aristocracies to whom Fortune had offered an opportunity for distinguishing themselves by sharing in the administration of a universal state, the Persian *megistânes* and the Inca *orejones* alone had risen to the occasion—and, in rising to it, had redeemed the credit of their caste by acquitting themselves so well that, in the hour of their defeat and humiliation, they extorted a posthumous tribute of praise from the mouths of the very adversaries who had beaten and supplanted them.²

Experiments in Recruiting a Civil Service from Novi Homines

Such pre-imperial aristocracies were the principal, but not the only, national administrative material that empire-builders had brought with them for setting about their oecumenical task. The blue-blooded viceroys whom the Spanish Crown sent out to New Spain and Peru would hardly have succeeded in turning the offspring of the unmanageable *conquistadores* into governable Creoles if they had not had the assistance of middle-class lawyers whose natural ability was fortified by a professional training and tradition. As for the Mongols, they would assuredly have failed to retain, even for one lifetime, their hold on China, Russia, Iran, and 'Irâq if they had not had the good sense to enlist the secretarial services of Nestorian Christian Uighurs whom they took over from their Karâyit and Naiman predecessors in the hegemony of the High Steppe.³ But the most formidably—though, as it turned out, fatally—well equipped of all empire-builders was Ts'in She Hwang-ti.⁴

While the six rival contending states that succumbed to the last king of Ts'in and first emperor of a Sinic universal state were still living under the traditional feudal régime of the Ch'ou dispensation, the corresponding régime in the State of Ts'in had been liquidated by the revolutionary reforms of the Lord of Shang nearly a hundred years before the future First Emperor's accession to the parochial throne of

province of Mesopotamia and enlarged the Roman Army by adding the three new *Legiones Parthicae*. Members of the Senatorial Order were disqualified from holding either the governorship of Mesopotamia or any of these three new legionary commands (see Grosse, op. cit., p. 4).

¹ The Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy was created and kept in being by Ottoman military pressure, as has been noticed in II. ii. 177-88.

² See V. v. 50-52.

³ See II. ii. 237-8; III. iii. 451; V. v. 309 and 348.

⁴ See pp. 169-74, above.

Ts'in in 246 B.C.¹ as King Chêng. In place of the liquidated aristocracy of Ts'in the reformer had installed a professional bureaucracy, and the concentration of power in the royal government's hands as a result of this drastic administrative reorganization was the secret of Ts'in's subsequent advance from strength to strength which culminated in King Chêng's feat of overthrowing all his competitors and thereby making himself master of the entire Sinic World in 230-221 B.C. The cause of Ts'in's dramatic triumph was, however, likewise the cause of the equally dramatic reversal of her fortunes on the morrow of the First Ts'in Emperor's death.

The unimaginatively revolutionary-minded conqueror had committed the fatal blunder of trying to hold his conquests by the use of the same instrument that had won them. Not content with subduing and annexing the six rival states, he deposed their feudal aristocracy as well as their royal houses, and put their administration in the hands of bureaucrats from his own hereditary kingdom of Ts'in, without realizing that he was imposing on his victims a sharper affliction than they could bear. Even in Ts'in a century back, Lord Shang might have failed to carry through his revolution at the local aristocracy's expense if Ts'in had not been a rude and backward march-state where tradition had less strong a hold than in more mellow countries nearer the heart of the Sinic World. The abrupt imposition of the rule of the bureaucracy of Ts'in upon the people of these other countries a hundred years later brought the loss of their independence home to them in a direct personal way. It was a misfortune for the ambitions of Ts'in She Hwang-ti that, owing to Lord Shang's revolutionary service to his royal predecessors, he found himself in possession of the means to carry out the intolerably sweeping administrative revolution which his own successful successor Liu Pang deliberately forbore to emulate on the morrow of the swift undoing of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's revolutionary work.

The builders of two other universal states had drawn, with happier results, upon the practice and personnel of a civil service which the empire-building community had not inherited from the past but had created to meet its own domestic needs at home in the same generation in which the task of imperial administration had descended on its shoulders. This was the means by which the French equipped themselves for administering the Napoleonic Empire in a politically stagnant Central Europe, and the British for reconstructing a derelict Mughal Rāj in India.

The character and achievements of the British Indian civil service can hardly be understood without being looked at against the background of an immediately preceding chapter of administrative history in the United Kingdom.

'The institution of factory inspection by the Act of 1833 was a stage in the development of a new kind of civil service. . . . Bentham's passion for substituting science for custom, his view of administration that it was a

¹ In 246 B.C. according to Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 70; in 247 B.C. according to Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. 1 (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 226.

skilled business, had in this instance results that were wholly satisfactory: under his inspiration England created a staff that brought to its work training and independence; unlike the English Justice of the Peace, the new Civil Servant had knowledge; unlike the French *intendant*, he was not the mere creature of a government. The English people learnt to use educated men on terms that preserved their independence and their self-respect. . . . For the moment, the chief occupation of this educated class was to throw a searchlight on the disorder of the new world. Nobody can study the history of the generation that followed the passing of the first Reform Bill without being struck by the part played by lawyers, doctors, men of science and letters in exposing abuses and devising plans.¹

The new fraternity of middle-class professional administrators which took a passage to India, after having thus made its way peacefully to the front in England, had, in France, to force an outlet for itself by an explosive outbreak of its artificially dammed-back energies.

'The French bourgeoisie of '89 belonged to a class proud of its economic independence and of its social standing. Its members had earned or inherited a competence derived from honest toil. They cherished a self-respect that set them no further from the *aristos* above them than from the *sansculottes* below. Yet they resembled the English aristocracy, and differed from that of their own country, in being a class, not a caste. Their ranks were not fixed, but fluid. There was always an element in them surging up from *roturier* to *bourgeois*, and from *bourgeois* to noble. . . . Hitherto they had been kept out of the government of a country which they enlightened and enriched. But nothing had been able to exclude them from the management of its trade, its agriculture, or its administration. Here they had become apprenticed to political power. Here, during half a century of political outlawry, they had been educating themselves for 1789.'²

The new field of action that the French *bourgeoisie* now opened up for themselves was a bureaucratic public service, which was called for to fill an institutional vacuum created in France by the Revolution itself before the French conquests abroad, which the Revolution set in motion, enlarged this vacuum to embrace Flanders, Italy, and Western Germany and to give a French bureaucracy *in partibus peregrinis* a different function from that which it had recently been called into existence to perform at home.

'The French had long lost the feeling for local autonomy, and the efforts to decentralise the government of the *Ancien Régime* had not had time to fructify before the Revolution supervened. That catastrophe eliminated the aristocracy, sowed hate and jealousy in every village, and prevented any further development of the constitution on the lines laid down by Turgot and Necker. A centralized bureaucracy was a necessity for France, being, as it were, not only a kind of anaesthetic or healing drug, but also the elementary condition for the preservation of all that was precious in the revolutionary movement. Among the lethargic inhabitants of Westphalia the mission of the bureaucracy was not to calm but to excite, not to preserve but to communicate. . . .'³

¹ Hammond, J. L. and Barbara: *The Rise of Modern Industry* (London 1925, Methuen), pp. 256-7.

² Thompson, J. M.: *The French Revolution* (Oxford 1943, Blackwell), p. 26.

³ Fisher, H. A. L.: *Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany* (Oxford 1903, Clarendon Press), pp. 269-70.

'It was not merely by their laws that the French left a permanent mark upon the Duchy [of Berg]. Their administration was a pattern and a precedent. The Prussians, indeed, had done good bureaucratic work in Mark and in Münster before the French occupation, but it was the French who first adequately expounded the arts of finance and administration to the whole region. To the slovenly government of the Bavarians in Berg, the French methods, combining, as they did, strict control with prompt, orderly and intelligent action, and distinguished always for their clear definition and distribution of functions, were related as the railway train is related to the stage coach.'¹

Napoleon was seeking to carry out in a subjugated Central Europe the long overdue administrative reformation that Ts'in She Hwang-ti had tried to impose upon the subjugated states of the Sinic World 'outside the passes', and the great demonic French innovator's tragedy was the same as his Sinic counterpart's. In forcing the pace of revolutionary change without mercy on Human Nature, he defeated his reformatory purpose and brought his own work to grief.

'There has been no greater master in the art of using, driving, and inspiring men. He found great disorder and demoralisation; he created a bureaucracy more competent, active, and enlightened than any which Europe had seen. But, as the Consulate passed into the Empire, and as the growing palsy of despotism spread over France, the quality of the work declined. The best men hated the never-ending wars and saw insanity written in large tokens over their master's schemes. . . . All criticism, all independent political thought, expired. Resolutely closing his eyes to unpleasant facts, Napoleon insisted that his servants should be blind also, and, being despotic and irritable, he was able to exact a constant supply of nutriment for his illusions. The men who spoke the truth and thought justly were dismissed or scolded; and, as compliance came to be rated more highly than ability, the most precious qualities were excised from public life.'²

The Metamorphosis of an Hereditary Aristocracy into a Professional Civil Service

If Napoleon and Ts'in She Hwang-ti deservedly failed in their attempt abruptly to force an alien bureaucracy on their subjects, Augustus and Han Liu Pang well deserved the success that attended their humane and statesmanlike policy of calling a new civil service into existence to answer to the needs of the devastated, disorganized, and weary world for whose welfare each of them found himself responsible. The administrative systems founded by the Hellenic bourgeois and the Sinic peasant saviour of society were perhaps the two finest secular institutions that, down to the time of writing, had yet been fashioned by the wisdom and benevolence of Man; yet, when they are compared with one another, their merits can be seen to be as unequal as their longevity. The Roman imperial administrative system, which went to pieces in the seventh century after its inauguration by Augustus, was not on a par with the Han system which had been founded 150 years earlier and which lasted, with at least a thread of continuity, down to A.D. 1911.

¹ Fisher, op. cit., p. 222.

² Ibid., pp. 374-5.

The defect of the Roman imperial civil service was its reflection of the discord between the old republican senatorial aristocracy and the new imperial dictatorship which an Augustan compromise had glozed over but had not healed. In the Roman imperial civil service under the Principate there were two rigidly segregated hierarchies and two mutually exclusive careers in which the senatorial and the equestrian civil servant went their respective ways. This schism in the heart of the service was, as we have seen, eventually brought to an end in the third century of the Christian Era, not by the achievement of that *concordia ordinum* which the public interest had always required, but by a high-handed elimination of the Senatorial Order from all posts of administrative responsibility. Their discomfiture, however, did not leave their equestrian rivals in enjoyment of a monopoly of the imperial service; for by this time the decay of local civic self-government had so swollen the volume of the imperial service's work¹ that Diocletian found himself compelled to make an inordinate increase in the permanent establishment of the civil service as well as the army; and in a post-Diocletianic Age the entry into the service was open to any Roman citizen possessed of the necessary degree of education, without discrimination between classes. The contrast with the history of the Han imperial civil service² is instructive. The opening of careers to talent, which was not achieved in the Roman Empire till more than three hundred years after the establishment of the Augustan Peace, was inaugurated in the Han Empire by Han Liu Pang himself, within six years of his restoration of order in 202 B.C., in an ordinance, issued in 196 B.C.,³ in which he directed the provincial public authorities to select candidates for the public service on a test of merit, and to send them to the capital for appointment or rejection by the officers of the Central Government.

This new Sinic civil service received its definitive form when Han Liu Pang's successor Han Wuti (*imperabat* 140-87 B.C.) decided that the merit required of candidates should be a proficiency in reproducing the style of the classical literature of the Confucian canon and in interpreting the Confucian philosophy to the satisfaction of the Confucian litterati of the day.⁴ Under the skilful handling of the Han emperors the transition from the old feudal order of the Ch'ou Age to the new bureaucratic order of the Han Age was made so smoothly—notwithstanding the violence of the abortively revolutionary Ts'in interlude—that old names acquired new meanings, and old doctrines new interpretations, by insensible degrees.

"The disappearance of feudalism was rendered possible by the policy of the Han emperors towards a very important and hitherto irreconcilably reactionary class, the *chün tze*. The aristocracy had been virtually destroyed by the revolutionary measures of She Hwang-ti, but they transmitted their ideals and their political outlook to a new class, the scholars and officials of the centralised empire. From this time onwards the *chün tze* cease to be an hereditary nobility distinguished by membership of a

¹ See pp. 59-60 and 166, above.

² See pp. 173-4, above.

³ Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), pp. 274-5, gives a German translation of the text as recorded in the official history of the Prior Han Dynasty.

⁴ See V. v. 418-19, 654-5, and 708.

limited number of clans. The revolution had destroyed the territorial and clan basis of the old aristocracy for ever. The *chün tze*, including many of the old aristocratic families, became a class marked off from the mass of the people by education, and only by education. . . . The very meaning of the old terms became obscure. *Chün tze* had meant the son of a lord, member of a noble clan. Under the new régime it gradually came to mean a gentleman in much the same sense as [that in which] that word is used in modern English—one who had received a polite education.

'The later Han emperors adroitly favoured the new educated class. Themselves of peasant origin, with no trace of divine or noble blood to fortify their claim to the throne, it was of vital importance to the new emperors to discover some principle of legitimacy for their power. Noble blood and divine descent they could not claim; force, upon which the Ts'in had relied, had proved to be a double-edged weapon. The master-stroke of the Han emperors was to enlist in support of the centralised state the very school which had upheld feudalism to the last. . . . Their supreme achievement was to persuade the new scholar class, to whom the Feudal Age was personally unknown, that the doctrines of Confucius could be applied to the new political régime. . . .

'She Hwang-ti tried to destroy the memory of the past; the Han sovereigns, more subtle than he, succeeded in distorting it. The interpretation of the Confucian doctrine which gained currency during the Han Dynasty proved one of the most enduring results of the revolution. The ideal of a centralised state became closely associated with the scholar class and the followers of the Confucian School. Henceforward fissiparous movements are always opposed by the scholars, the very class who had defended ancient feudalism.'¹

The Confucian School of the second century B.C. which was thus tactfully coaxed into partnership with the Han imperial régime would have astonished Confucius himself by the enormity of its intellectual, as well as its political, departure from the founder's own standpoint. The break in scholarly tradition caused by Ts'in She Hwang-ti's burning of the books, and the syncretism in religion produced by the levelling of the former barriers between contending parochial states and by the inclusion of a host of semi-barbarous peoples within the pale of the Sinic Society through their subjugation by force of Ts'in and Han arms, had made of the epimethean philosophy of Confucius a melting-pot for exotic superstitions.² To translate the course of this chapter of Sinic social history into Hellenic terms, we should have to imagine the Emperor Marcus Aurelius making the Stoicism of his day³ into the official philosophy of the Roman civil service,⁴ and this Stoically rigged Roman ship of state being freighted with as heavy a cargo of superstition as Neoplatonism eventually took on board.⁵

To complete this imaginary parallel, however, we must picture the Stoic School in the next chapter of its history, after it has become the

¹ Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), pp. 153-5. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

² See V. v. 549 and 555-6.

³ For the flush of religious feeling that suffused the Stoicism of the second century of the Christian Era, see the passage quoted from Dill in V. v. 550-1.

⁴ Marcus's conscientious abstention from misusing his political power for the purpose of propagating his philosophic faith has been noticed in V. v. 705.

⁵ See V. v. 565-7 and 680-3.

official philosophy of a universal state, deliberately purging its doctrine and practice of the superstitious accretions of the preceding age, and abandoning to its unofficial rival, Neoplatonism, the mission of supplying a demand for a popular religion under a philosophical veneer. In the Sinic World in the course of the last three centuries of the Han régime, the Confucian School did jettison the superstition that it had picked up in its rough passage through a revolutionary last phase of the Sinic Time of Troubles and first phase of the universal state established by Ts'in She Hwang-ti and refounded by Han Liu Pang. Yet, although 'the rather arid doctrines of the Confucian scholars had little appeal for the mass of the people', and in consequence 'the popular religion, which Confucianism had rejected', fell into the hands of 'the principal heterodox philosophy, Taoism',¹ even the dehydrated official philosophy of the Han imperial civil service was a more effective inspiration for a corporate professional way of life than the merely literary archaistic culture that was the shibboleth of a post-Diocletianic Roman civil service.²

A comparable vein of literary archaism was, indeed, carried to perhaps even greater lengths of absurdity by the Confucian School in the Han Age,³ with the same unfortunate effect of cutting off a civil service that plumed itself on this conceit from the realities of contemporary life outside its own charmed circle; but the pedantic canon of literary taste to which the Han imperial civil service had subjected itself was always the handmaid of a rule of conduct which, however pedantic it, too, might be, still gave its followers a social cohesion among themselves, even when they had lost human touch with the rest of Society. This bond of a common traditional ethic was lacking among the Han civil servants' Roman counterparts; and no doubt this was one of the reasons for the difference in the fortunes of these two official corporations during the interregna following the break-up of the universal states whose respective servants they had been.⁴

¹ Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

² See V. vi. 71-81.

³ See V. vi. 81-83.

⁴ This difference is explored further on pp. 370-2, below. While one cause of it was the Roman imperial civil service's lack of a corporate philosophy such as the Han imperial civil service acquired in the shape of a purged Confucianism, another cause was the lack of a spacious fastness, impregnable to barbarian attack, such as the Han imperial civil service found for itself in the South of the Sinic World, where the expansion of the Sinic Civilization during its Time of Troubles had been carried forward, by the united forces of the subsequent universal state, until the conquest of Nan Yüeh (the present Chinese provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung, together with Tongking) by Han Wuti in A.D. 111 brought an expanding Sinic World to the 'natural frontier' of the sea coast (see Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 181). The Yangtse Basin and the Southern Seaboard, unlike the Yellow River Basin, were unpropitious *terrain* for the cavalry of the Eurasian Nomad barbarian invaders of the Sinic World during the post-Han interregnum; and their defeat in A.D. 383 at Fei Shui (see Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 95-97; the date is given as A.D. 387 by Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 257) was a decisive battle which may be compared, in respect of the magnitude of its consequences, to the defeats of the Mongols by the Egyptian Mamlûks in A.D. 1260, 1281, 1299-1300, and 1303 (see I. i. 350), since this battle insured the birth of a Far Eastern Civilization, affiliated to the Sinic, as those insured the birth of an Arabic Civilization affiliated to the Syriac. The Roman Empire embraced no fastness of comparable size that was immune against attack by the same Eurasian Nomad barbarian enemy, and in any case the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire included sedentary peoples—highland Berbers and non-nomadized West Germans—who were less sensitive to the nature of the *terrain* than their more highly specialized Nomad fellow aggressors. In the politico-strategic geography of the Roman

In the art of converting an aristocracy of birth into a professional civil service, both Augustus and Han Liu Pang were to be surpassed by Peter the Great; for the wisdom of hastening slowly, which Han Liu Pang had learnt from the fate of Ts'ing She Hwang-ti's revolutionary handiwork, and Augustus from the fate of Julius Caesar's, was not only learnt by Peter from his own experience but was taken to heart by him in time to retrieve a first false start.

After having discovered, by trial and error, the unwisdom of attempting either to dragoon feudal nobles into becoming professional administrators¹ or to supersede them by a wholesale substitution of *novi homines* and foreigners, Peter set himself in A.D. 1722 gradually to convert the Muscovite nobility into an effective instrument of Russian Imperial administration by instituting an official hierarchy of military and civil ranks, in fourteen grades.

'Through each of these it was necessary to pass, beginning from the bottom, just as it had been Peter's practice to make his guards officers, like himself, start from the ranks. Promotion from grade to grade was to be partly by length of service and partly by exceptional merit. Standing in the state service took precedence of birth, even in the court and social hierarchy. The privileges of the land-owning class—notably those of owning serfs and of being exempt from the poll-tax—were extended hereditarily to all persons, whether Russians or foreigners, who reached the eighth grade, and in the case of the Army and Navy even from the lowest grade.

'Throughout his life Peter picked men for multifarious duties without regard to birth or class, in the interests of recruitment for military or state service. From this time forward the land-owning class began to receive an influx of newcomers, who in the course of the next two generations broadened its composition and changed its complexion. . . . Despite subsequent alterations, the table of ranks had a profound influence on the future. It set the stamp on the hierarchal, bureaucratic ordering of the upper class in military and state service, which during the next two centuries became so prominent a feature of the social structure of Russia. Rank, in the sense of position in the table of ranks, largely displaced birth or wealth in the administrative and social scale.'²

Empire the nearest counterpart to the great southern fastness of the Han Empire was Anatolia; but even Anatolia was constantly overrun by invading and occupying Persian and Arab armies in the seventh century of the Christian Era; and the measure of the break in administrative continuity, even here, is given by the contrast between the Diocletianic administrative organization, as it survived in Anatolia in the reign of Justinian, and the system of local government through army corps districts (*themata*), as it had emerged there within a hundred years of Justinian's death. Only the precincts of Constantinople remained inviolate, and this Constantinopolitan fastness was too small, and too alien in experience and outlook from the exposed and harried countryside, to play the part which the New South of the Sinic World was able to play in the affiliation of a new-born civilization to an extinct one. The administrative continuity between the Roman Empire that foundered in the seventh century of the Christian Era and the ghost of it that was evoked in the eighth century by Leo Syrus was one of form without substance, whereas in the Sinic World 'the flight of the scholars after the fall of Loyang [under the impact of Hiongnu Eurasian Nomad invaders in A.D. 311] brought civilisation into the South, and gave these provinces an importance which they had not possessed in the Han Empire, but which was to grow more and more marked in succeeding ages' (Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 260). Observers of the Sino-Japanese war of A.D. 1931-45 would have been reminded of the similar effect of a similar migration of a Westernized intelligentsia from Peking and the treaty ports into the south-western provinces of contemporary China. See further X. ix. 649-81.

¹ See IX. viii. 554-7.

² Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English

In the judgement of an acute and sensitive Russian student of Russian history,

'La noblesse, cette nouvelle élite infiniment plus large, plus agile, plus capable d'avenir que l'ancienne, était sans doute, avec la nouvelle capitale, le don le plus précieux du tsar [Pierre] à la Russie future. Malgré Lomonossov et d'autres "parvenus" de génie, tout ce que la Russie a produit jusqu'au milieu du siècle suivant de grands hommes et de valeurs culturelles vient de cette classe ou du moins n'a pu éclore que dans le milieu formé par elle. . . . L'ascension culturelle, politique et sociale de la Russie, de Pierre 1^{er} à Alexandre 1^{er}, est l'œuvre de la noblesse.'¹

Experiments in Providing an Education for New Recruits

While the Han Empire and the Roman Empire created their magnificent civil services² out of their own respective social and cultural heritages, Peter the Great and his successors in Russia, when they were in search of administrative support for their enterprise of Westernizing their empire and had found the hereditary Muscovite nobility a broken reed,³ forced the pace in the first stage of the manufacture of their new bureaucratic 'nobility of service' by copying Western institutions and even enlisting Western personnel.⁴ The Cabinet Secretary instituted by Peter on a contemporary Western model⁵ performed for the autocrat of a Westernizing Muscovy the service that an Achaemenian emperor received from his hazarapatiš and a Roman Emperor from his praetorian prefect. The contemporary organization of Western governments likewise suggested the Senate that was established by Peter on the 22nd February, 1711, and was endowed with far-reaching executive powers,⁶ and the Administrative Colleges that were set up in A.D. 1717-18. Most of these colleges started life with Russian presidents and foreign vice-presidents to induct the Russians into new-fangled Western methods of administrative work.⁷ To provide the staff, Swedish prisoners-of-war were roped in, and Russian apprentices were sent to acquire a Prussian training at Königsberg.⁸ In A.D. 1722 the office of Procurator-General was created for the purpose of keeping a 'king's eye'⁹ (to use the Achaemenian term) on both the colleges and the Senate.¹⁰ An historian who was a Westerner himself would like to believe—against the presumptive

Universities Press), pp. 155-6. See also Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 506, and the present Study, III. iii. 282, n. 2. Though the creation of this professional civil service was Peter's personal achievement, he did not have to start entirely from the beginning. For the pre-Petrine rudiments, see Mavor, J.: *An Economic History of Russia*, 2nd ed. (London 1925, Dent, 2 vols.), vol. i. p. 73.

¹ Weidlé, W.: *La Russie Absente et Présente* (Paris 1949, Gallimard), p. 68.

² See V. v. 38-39.

³ See pp. 349-50, above.

⁴ The first wave of immigrant Western bureaucrats consisted of German aristocrats from the Baltic Provinces after the conquest of these from Sweden by Peter the Great (see Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 119). The second wave came from Germany itself during the sixteen years (A.D. 1725-41) immediately following Peter's death (see *ibid.*, p. 192). During Peter's reign, however, there were no non-Russians in the taxation service, the provincial governorships, or the Senate, and very few in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the diplomatic service (see *ibid.*, pp. 204-5).

⁵ See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 497; Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 and 131.

⁶ See Brückner, *op. cit.*, pp. 499-500; Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-5 and 127.

⁷ See Brückner, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-2; Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-7.

⁸ See Brückner, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-2.

⁹ See p. 82, above.

¹⁰ See Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-8.

evidence of contemporary Venetian practice—that this official organization of espionage on the new Westernizing Russian civil service¹ was not likewise inspired by Western models.

Where, as in the Petrine Russian Empire, an imperial civil service is thus called into existence in conscious imitation of alien institutions, the need for special arrangements for the training of personnel is, of course, particularly evident.² At the same time, this need arises in some degree in all the divers situations in which an imperial civil service has to be provided, since it is inherent in the nature of a universal state and in the invariable circumstances of its advent in history.

An oecumenical polity of this type normally takes shape rather suddenly out of a cluster of contending parochial states that have brought a Time of Troubles to its climax and conclusion by an obstinate refusal to adapt themselves to the necessities of a new age. The problems, experience, institutions, and *éthos* of these anachronistic predecessors are manifestly unlikely to be of much use to the new polity that has at last belatedly superseded them. A fledgling universal state nearly always has, in the main, to supply its own needs for itself; and it cannot afford to imitate its parochial forerunners' comfortable habit, in the spacious days of their long-since vanished youth, of waiting upon experience to give them the necessary instruction; for the universal state has been brought into being as a response to the urgent challenge of its parochial predecessors' protracted failure to meet the World's political requirements; its mission is to grapple at once with the troubles of a society on the verge of dissolution; and, if it cannot draw profitably on its predecessors' experience and cannot wait to learn by experience of its own, it must take a leaf out of the book of Utopia³ and must improvise the education of a new type of administrator for a new form of government. Most universal states will be found to have worked out arrangements of some kind for educating the administrators that they need.

In the Incaic, Achaemenian, Roman, and Ottoman empires the Emperor's personal household was both the hub of the wheel of imperial government and the training-school for the administrators required for making the machinery of government work, and in a number of cases this educational function of an imperial household had been catered for by the creation, within it, of the special institution of a corps of pages.

At the Inca Emperor's court at Cuzco there was a regular course of education—with tests and ordeals at successive stages of initiation—in which the young men of the Inca's own imperial clan were brigaded

¹ See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

² Peter the Great sought to meet this need *quam celerrimè* by sending batches of young Russians to be educated abroad from A.D. 1697 onwards. In A.D. 1697–8 he voluntarily performed, himself, a task that he was imposing on his subjects when he went abroad for eighteen months on 'the Great Embassy' in the suite of his Swiss-born ambassador Lefort (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 174–5; Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), pp. 34–41; and the present Study, III. iii. 281 and IX. viii. 556–7).

³ We have seen that Utopias are products of Times of Troubles. They are attempts to arrest the decline of a disintegrating civilization by 'pegging' it at the highest level still attainable. The price of this bid for survival is a sacrifice of plasticity; but, in a chapter of history in which plasticity represents a danger of disintegration rather than an opportunity for growth, rigidity comes to seem a blessing and not a curse (see III. iii. 88–111).

with the sons of the chiefs and notables of the subject peoples.¹ In the Achaemenian Empire 'all Persian boys of noble birth' were 'educated at the Emperor's court (*ἐπὶ ταῖς Βασιλέως θύραις*)',² 'from the age of five to the age of twenty, in three things and three only: riding, shooting, and telling the truth'.³ This Achaemenian method of breaking in noblemen for the public service was copied in the Hellenic kingdom of Macedon, which, on the political map of the Achaemenian world order, was a barbarian principality lying just beyond the pale of the universal state; and the borrowed institution proved its efficacy, to its Persian inventors' detriment, first in the service of the historic Macedonian Monarchy by which the Achaemenian Empire was eventually overthrown, and thereafter in the service of upstart Macedonian successor-states whose domains were carved out of a defunct Achaemenian Empire's carcass. The Petrine Russian Empire, whose relation to the Western World was not unlike Macedon's relation to the Achaemenian Empire, was likewise imitating its neighbours when it instituted a corps of pages.⁴

The Ottoman Court made similar provision for the education of pages in its early days at Brusa,⁵ and it was still treading a well-worn path when Sultan Murād II (*imperabat* A.D. 1421-51) established a school for princes at Adrianople, which was the capital of the Empire in his time;⁶ but his son and successor, Sultan Mehmed II Fātih (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81), struck out a new line of his own when, after the conquest of Constantinople, he built his father's foundation at Adrianople into a new educational edifice, centred in his own palace in the conquered metropolis of Orthodox Christendom, which was not only laid out on a larger scale but was designed for the different purpose of staffing the Ottoman imperial administrative service, no longer with independent-minded princes of the Imperial House and sons of 'Osmanli Muslim noblemen, but with Christian slaves—including renegades and prisoners-of-war from Western Christendom, as well as 'tribute children' levied from the Pādishāh's Orthodox Christian subjects⁷—whose status of servitude, and still more, perhaps, their segregation from their ancestral environment, would make them peculiarly susceptible to the skilful process of 'conditioning' to which they were to be subjected as cadets in the Pādishāh's Slave-Household. This 'peculiar institution' of the Ottoman Empire⁸ has been described in a previous passage of this

¹ See Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), pp. 106 and 112-16; Markham, Sir Clements: *The Incas of Peru* (London 1910, Smith Elder), pp. 128-34 and 142.

² Xenophon: *Expeditio Cyri*, Book I, chap. ix, § 3.

³ Herodotus, Book I, chap. 136. See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, 1st ed. (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 35-36.

⁴ In A.D. 1759, according to Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), p. 83; in A.D. 1730, according to Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London, 1950, English Universities Press), p. 153.

⁵ See Miller, B.: *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror* (Cambridge, Mass. 1941, Harvard University Press), p. 20.

⁶ See Miller, op. cit., p. 22.

⁷ Though the 'tribute children' accounted for less than half the total intake of imperial slaves, they were in a great majority among the élite selected for training and service in the Palace, which was the avenue to subsequent employment in the administrative service instead of employment in the standing army (see Miller, op. cit., p. 75).

⁸ The Ottoman Pādishāh's Slave-Household was a characteristic product of the Eurasian Nomad Society out of which the original nucleus of the Ottoman community had

Study¹ which need not be recapitulated here. At its zenith the Ottoman public slave-education system for entry into the administrative service was a graded pyramidal edifice of nine colleges ranged in four tiers, rising to the Hall of the Imperial Bedchamber at the apex.²

This establishment for training recruits for the administrative branch of the Slave-Household was built on such solid foundations of *esprit de corps*³ that, when in the last quarter of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era the free Muslim subjects of the Empire at last succeeded in forcing an entry into the military branch,⁴ the colleges composing the Palace School managed for another century and a half to keep their doors closed to boys of free birth and to continue to supply the Ottoman civil service with admirably trained slave-administrators.⁵ Even after Sultan Mahmūd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808-39), in his thoroughgoing replacement of obsolete indigenous Ottoman institutions by substitutes of a Western pattern, had swept away the six colleges inside the palace precincts after his destruction of the Janissaries in A.D. 1826,⁶ he spared the Galata Seray, which in Mahmūd's day was the sole survivor of the former three extramural schools;⁷ and an abortive attempt, made by Mahmūd himself in A.D. 1828, to put the Galata Seray on a Western basis was eventually carried through successfully in A.D. 1868.⁸ As a *lycée* recog-

come, but it was a revolutionary innovation in the life of the Orthodox Christian sedentary society on which the Ottoman conquerors had imposed their rule. The Ottoman Sultans Murād II and Mehmed II were not the first Turkish-speaking empire-builders of Eurasian Nomad origin to found schools of public administration. When the Saljūq Turkish barbarian invaders of the dominions of the 'Abbasid Caliphate took over responsibility for carrying on the government of their august protégé-puppet, their gifted Minister of state, the Nizām-al-Mulk, included a division for training in public administration, as well as one for instruction in Islamic theology, in the celebrated *madrasah* which he founded at Baghdad in A.D. 1065-7 (see Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 12). His Nizāmiyah was a resident college (see *ibid.*, p. 16). Was this Saljūq precedent in the minds of the Ottoman Sultans Murād II and Mehmed II (see *ibid.*, p. 20)?

¹ In III. iii. 35-45. Since the publication of that volume of this Study, the Western World's understanding of the Pādishāh's Slave-Household, and of the educational institutions embedded in it by which it had provided for its own self-perpetuation, had been increased by the publication of two works of Western scholarship in addition to those mentioned in vol. iii, p. 32, n. 1. These subsequent published works were Penzer, N. M.: *The Harēm* (London 1936, Harrap); Miller, B.: *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror* (Cambridge, Mass. 1941, Harvard University Press).

² The component institutions of this educational pyramid were, to enumerate them in ascending order: (i) three schools outside the precincts of Mehmed II's Palace at Constantinople, namely Murād II's school at Adrianople; a school in the Galata Seray on the opposite side of the Golden Horn from Istanbul; and Ibrāhīm Pasha's school in Istanbul, near the Hippodrome, which catered for cadets of Bosniak and Albanian origin. These three outside schools were preparatory for (ii) the Great and Small Halls inside the Palace. These, in turn, were preparatory for (iii) three vocational schools inside the Palace: the Hall of the Expeditionary Force (*Seferli Oda*) and the Halls of the Commissariat and the Treasury. The three vocational schools were preparatory for (iv) the Hall of the Imperial Bedchamber (see Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44 and 126).

³ The pages of the Palace School displayed a steady loyalty that was in strong contrast with the turbulence of the Janissaries (see Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 8).

⁴ See III. iii. 45.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 182.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 182.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 80. Compare the present Study, III. iii. 49, n. 4.

⁸ See Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-3; Engelhardt E.: *La Turquie et le Tanzimat*, vol. ii (Paris 1884, Pichon), pp. 12-15; Davison, R. H.: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (thesis submitted to Harvard University for degree of D.Phil., 1st April, 1942, typescript copy in the Harvard University Library). The lines on which the Galata Seray was to be reconstructed were laid down in March 1867 in consultations between Fu'ad Pasha and a French mission, and it was decided that it should be transformed into a secondary school on a Western model in which French was to be the language of instruction. This *lycée*

⁵ See Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

nized by the Ministry of Education in Paris, the Galata Seray came, in the last chapter of the history of the Ottoman Empire, to be once again the *alma mater* of men of mark, not only among the Muslim ruling class of a truncated Turkey, but also among the Orthodox Christian elder statesmen of Turkey's Bulgarian successor-state.

While the Ottoman Pādīshāhs deliberately expanded their personal slave-household into an instrument for the government of a rapidly enlarged empire to the exclusion of the free 'Osmanlis who were the Ottoman imperial people, the Roman emperors, when they found themselves driven to make a similar use of Caesar's slave-household in an administrative emergency arising from the bankruptcy of the Roman republican régime, took steps first to limit and then to reduce the role of the imperial freedmen in the task of world government.

We have already noticed that Augustus reserved for members of the Senatorial Order the posts of highest dignity and heaviest responsibility in the service of the Princeps, quite apart from the senatorial monopoly of the administration of those provinces that the founder of the Principate handed back to the Senate under his system of 'dyarchy'.¹ No imperial freedman was ever appointed to the governorship of a major imperial province or to the command of a legion; and, when members of the Senatorial Order were eventually disqualified from holding these high posts,² it was the Equestrian Order that entered into their heritage. The freedmen's stronghold in the administration of the Roman Empire in the early days of the Principate was the central government, in which five administrative offices in Caesar's household—*ab epistulis*, *a rationibus*, *a libellis*, *a cognitionibus*, and *a studiis*³—had grown into imperial ministries of state;⁴ and even in these posts, which were traditionally the freedmen's preserve, the freedmen became politically impossible as soon as they had impolitically made themselves conspicuous. The scandal caused by the spectacle of Claudius's and Nero's freedmen-ministers exercising inordinate power led, under the Flavian emperors and their successors, to the transfer of one of these key posts after another from the hands of imperial freedmen to those of members of the Equestrian Order,⁵ which was the equal of the Emperor's slave-household in

was to be open to members of all Ottoman communities, and students who were successful in passing the leaving examination were thereby to acquire a right of entry into the Ottoman public service. The text of the Imperial Firman in which this project was given effect will be found in G. M. Young: *Corps de Droit Ottoman* (Oxford 1905-6, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 377-80. The new-model Galata Seray was opened on the 1st September, 1868. Out of the 341 students enrolled, 147 were Muslims, 48 were Armenian Gregorian Monophysite Christians, 36 were Greek Eastern Orthodox Christians, 34 were Bulgar Eastern Orthodox Christians, 34 were Jews, 23 were Roman Catholics of the Latin rite, 19 were Roman Catholics of the Armenian rite. By December 1869 there were 622 students, including 277 Muslims, 91 Gregorian Armenian Christians, 85 Greeks, 65 Roman Catholics of the Latin rite, 40 Bulgars, 29 Jews, 28 Roman Catholic Uniat Armenian Christians, and 7 Protestant Christians. The Armenians and the Bulgars proved to make the best students.

¹ See pp. 340-50, above.

² See p. 350, above.

³ See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. x (Cambridge 1934, University Press), pp. 687-8.

⁴ See V. v. 452-3.

⁵ The first equestrian secretary of state *a rationibus* was appointed by Trajan (*imperator* A.D. 98-117) according to *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. xi (Cambridge 1936, University Press), p. 220.

business ability, and which could be placed in charge of the central administration of the Empire without offence to other free-born Roman citizens.

Thus in the history of the Roman civil service under the Principate the equestrian middle class gained ground at the expense of the slave underworld and the senatorial aristocracy alike. The Equestrian Order's victory over its rivals on either hand was justified by the efficiency and integrity with which the equestrian civil servants performed their official duties, and this redemption of a class which, during the last two centuries of the republican régime, had risen to wealth and power by a predatory exploitation of army contracts, tax-farming, and usury, was perhaps the most remarkable of the Principate's moral triumphs. The British Indian civil servants, whose record during the last four or five generations of the British Rāj, in the service first of the East India Company and afterwards of the Crown, could bear comparison with the record of the Roman equestrian civil servants at their best, were conjured out of much the same unpromising human materials as their Roman counterparts.

The antecedents of these British Indian civil servants likewise were commercial. They had originated as the employees of a private trading organization whose purpose had been pecuniary profit; one of their original incentives for taking employment far from home in an uncongenial climate had been the possibility of making money for themselves by personal trading on the margin of their work for their employers; and, when the break-up of the Mughal Rāj had suddenly transformed the East India Company from a mere commercial concern into the virtual sovereign of the Mughals' largest and most lucrative successor-state, the Company's servants had yielded to the temptation to make illegitimate and inordinate pecuniary profits out of the political power that Fortune had thrust into their hands,¹ with much the same shamelessness and irresponsibility as the Roman equites had shown when they had found a prostrate Hellenic World at their mercy after Rome's victory over Carthage in the Hannibalic War. In the British, as in the Roman, case, this start might have seemed so bad as to be beyond hope of retrieving;² yet in the British, as in the Roman, episode of administrative history a predatory band of harpies was converted in a surprisingly short time into a body of public servants whose incentive was not personal pecuniary

¹ See IV. iv. 511-12. The metamorphosis of the East India Company's servants 'from pettifogging traders . . . into imperialistic swashbucklers and large-scale extortionists' was accomplished between A.D. 1750 and A.D. 1785 (see Spear, T. G. P.: *The Nabobs* (London 1932, Milford), p. 23). 'The transformation of factors into soldiers and statesmen . . . meant that soldiers and officials brought commercial minds to their new duties, in which, if they were not always 2ver-careful of the Company's coffers, they never forgot their own' (ibid., p. 28). In Bengal the European adventurers' reign of terror was at its height from A.D. 1761 to A.D. 1771-2, when it was curbed by Warren Hastings' reforms (see ibid., pp. 32-33).

² In the early years of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era the highest reasonable hope might well have been thought to be the conversion of a piratical Clive into a chicken-livered Jos. Sedley (see IV. iv. 641). At Calcutta, where the transition from a respectable obscurity to a corrupt ascendancy had taken place between A.D. 1756 and 1765, there was a reversion towards respectability under Cornwallis' régime (*pro-consulari munere fungebatur* A.D. 1786-93). The nineteenth-century era of virtuous aloofness was inaugurated by Wellesley (*fungebatur* A.D. 1798-1805). See Spear, op. cit., p. 26.

gain and who had come to make it a point of honour to wield enormous political power without abusing it.¹

This redemption of the character of the British administration in India was due in part to the East India Company's decision to educate their servants for bearing the new political responsibilities that had fallen upon their shoulders. The Company acquired the financial administration of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and the Northern Circars in A.D. 1765; it opened its college in Hertfordshire for probationer-appointees to its administrative service in India in A.D. 1806; and the college played an historic role during the fifty-two years (A.D. 1806-57) for which it performed this function.²

The influence of an educational tradition and environment on the professional *éthos* of a civil service may be no less profound when the aspirants for admission to its ranks are educated in non-official institutions. In the history of the British Indian civil service, this was shown when in A.D. 1853-5, on the eve of the transference of the Government of India from the Company's hands to the Crown's, Parliament's decisions to recruit the service in future by competitive examination and to close the Company's vocational school for cadets opened the door to candidates drawn from the wider field offered by such non-official institutions as the universities of the United Kingdom and the so-called 'public schools' from which the English universities were almost exclusively recruited at that date.

In making this new departure in educational policy for the English contingent in the personnel of a British Indian civil service, Her Britannic Majesty's Government were unconsciously following the precedent set by Han Wuti when he decided to place the education of a Sinic imperial civil service in the hands of the Confucian school of philosophy.³

¹ See V. v. 47-48.

² The East India Company's College was installed in Hertford Castle at its opening in February 1806, but was moved into new buildings at Haileybury in A.D. 1809. There were about 100 students; the length of the course was two years; and the age of admission ranged between 16 and 19. A student obtained admission through a nomination by one of the Directors of the East India Company which assured him not only of a place in the college but of a post in India thereafter. This method of admission was abolished by an Act of Parliament, passed in A.D. 1853, which provided for the future recruitment of the Indian Civil Service by open competitive examination. The first examination of the kind was held in London in A.D. 1855, and the College was closed, by an Act of A.D. 1855, as from the end of the calendar year 1857.

Besides the contribution that it made to the improvement of British administration in India, the College had the distinction of contributing to the advancement of the science of human affairs through the work of Malthus, who was a professor on its staff from A.D. 1806 until his death in A.D. 1834.

³ In the histories of the Confucian and the British Indian civil services the experiments in official and unofficial education of aspirants for admission were made in an inverse order. While the British began by setting up a vocational college and then, on second thoughts, decided to rely, instead, on a traditional system of higher education in non-governmental institutions, Han Wuti entrusted the education of civil servants to the Confucian school of philosophy, and the alternative method of training them in a state college was not introduced until the renaissance of the Han Empire, in the shape of the Sui and T'ang régimes, in the history of a Far Eastern Civilization, affiliated to the Sinic, which arose after the social interregnum following the Han Empire's dissolution. When the political unification of the main body of the Far Eastern World by the short-lived Sui Dynasty had been repeated by the second sovereign, but actual founder, of the T'ang Dynasty, T'ai Tsung, one of his measures for placing his political achievement on enduring foundations was to give his unified empire a unitary civil service of Confucian scholars on the Han model. During the interregnum the Confucian scholar-

The indigenous Indian contingent in the personnel of the British Indian civil service—which always vastly outnumbered the handful of Europeans occupying the key posts at the top—was recruited, both under the Company and under the Crown, from the alumni of Western Christian missionary schools and colleges in India, and of Indian universities built up round them or founded side by side with them, whose curricula and standards were largely governed by those of the universities of the United Kingdom, particularly the University of London.¹ On the whole, it would seem that, the less direct the hand that a government finds it necessary to take in the training of candidates for its civil service, the more satisfactory the results are likely to be. The limits to the possibility of compulsory training and enrolment are illustrated by the experience of Peter the Great and his successors in Russia. Peter himself, as we have seen,² debarred Russian noblemen from contracting a legal marriage without having passed examinations in arithmetic, geometry, and navigation; and in A.D. 1736 a course of compulsory education from the age of seven to the age of twenty was imposed on noblemen's sons, with a series of three examinations in which a failure entailed the penalty of serving in the Army as a common soldier.³ Yet, as we have also seen,⁴ the disappointing experience of two generations of unprofitable coercion led the Russian Imperial Government in A.D. 1762 to grant an unsuccessfully dragged-on hereditary nobility a conditional exemption from compulsory public service.

Our survey of the methods and sources of recruitment of imperial civil services suggests that neither a pre-imperial hereditary nobility nor an imperial slave-household provides the best human materials for the purpose. Neither the attractiveness of the Persian *megistānes* and Inca *orejones* nor the impressiveness of the Ottoman Pādishāh's *qullar* can obscure the manifest truth that the most promising recruiting ground for an imperial civil service is a middle class which has served an apprenticeship in the responsible management of important and intricate non-official business. It was no accident that, in the history of the Roman imperial civil service, the Equestrian Order steadily gained ground at

administrator had survived in a fastness in the South (see p. 357, n. 4, above, and X. ix. 667). But, though the South was united politically with the North under the Sui and T'ang régimes, as it had been under the Han, the remnant of the scholar-administrator class in the South could not be expected suddenly to provide the personnel for staffing the whole of T'ai Tsung's united empire. Like the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II after his conquest of Constantinople, T'ai Tsung filled an awkward vacuum by enlarging an existing imperial college and using it for the training of professional administrators. The new faculty of Confucian studies was instituted by him in A.D. 628, and in A.D. 630 he took action to provide the Confucian cadets for his resuscitated imperial civil service with the requisite means of instruction and examination by giving orders for the preparation of an official standard edition of the Confucian classics and—what was perhaps of still greater practical convenience—an official digest and elucidation of the existing commentaries (see Fung Yu-lan: *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York 1948, Macmillan), p. 266). As it emerged from T'ai Tsung's hands, the imperial college at Si Ngan had a student body of 8,000, of whom 3,260 were residents. T'ai Tsung further increased the Imperial Government's control over its intake of recruits into the imperial civil service by instituting a system of public examinations which was afterwards perfected by the Sung and later dynasties (see Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, pp. 304, 312, and 381-2).

¹ The nature, genesis, and unhappiness of an intelligentsia have been touched upon in V. v. 154-9.

³ See Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

² On p. 350, n. 1, above.

⁴ On p. 350, above.

the expense of the Senatorial Order on the one hand and of the imperial freedmen on the other. Nor, perhaps, again, is it an accident that the Roman 'knight' and the English 'gentleman', drawn, as they both were, from an ex-commercial class fumigated with an aristocratic literary culture, should have to yield the palm to a Chinese scholar-administrator educated in an aristocratic philosophy without any skeleton of a commercial past in the cupboard of his family history.

Who are the Beneficiaries?

If we turn now to consider who had been the principal beneficiaries from the imperial civil services that universal states had called into existence for their own purposes, we shall see that the most obvious benefits had been obtained by these empires' non-barbarian successor-states:¹ the Latin American successors of the Spanish Empire of the Indies; the Central and East European successors of the Napoleonic Empire and the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy; the Soviet Union that had succeeded the Petrine Russian Empire; the two British Dominions—an Indian Union and a Pakistan—that had succeeded the British Indian Rāj; and the indigenous successor-states of the Han Empire in the Yangtse Basin and along the southern seaboard of an expanded Sinic World, where a remnant of the Confucian scholar-administrator class had been able to hibernate until the evocation of a ghost of the Han Empire by the Sui and the T'ang had given this academic Rip van Winkle an opportunity to play his professional part again on the old oecumenical scale in the life of a new Far Eastern Civilization.² A fledgling successor-state that is struggling to establish itself is seldom inhibited by political animosity from taking over from its imperial predecessor a vital administrative technique or even an existing professional personnel that knows how to make the wheels of administration keep on revolving. The British Rāj in India, which was perhaps unique among universal states in having voluntarily liquidated itself, had taken pains during the transitional thirty years 1917-47 to prepare the way for its successors by progressively Indianizing the previously European-manned higher ranks of the Indian civil service, and the Napoleonic French administrators in Central Europe had been equally conscious of having an educational mission, though perhaps not equally aware that it was of the essence of their task to educate their non-French flock to a level of administrative efficiency at which these pupils would be able to do without the services of their blandly self-assured masters.

'If, as Napoleon said, experience is everything in administration, faith also goes for something. The French administrators in Westphalia were not only experienced, but they had faith in their own value. It is only necessary to read the letters of Beugnot or the speeches and circulars of Siméon to see how saturated men can become with the belief in the superiority of the language and civilization of their own country. They

¹ Barbarian hands are seldom gentle and deft enough to make effective use of so subtle and delicate an administrative implement as a professional civil service.

² See p. 357, n. 4, above, and X. ix. 667.

speaking kindly, considerably, condescendingly to the poor Westphalians, explaining everything in the lucid French manner, as a master might expound a beautiful text to a class of stupid and backward boys, now calling attention to a grace of phrase, now to its inner logical coherence, now to its bearing on life. The official letters and documents of this time have all the air of being written by men who regarded themselves as missionaries of Civilisation, and who wish to impart the mysteries of their creed.¹

A characteristic exposition of this condescending outlook is given in the following passage from the pen of an eminent representative of the French missionary-administrator fraternity:

'It was then a position in Europe to be a Frenchman, and it was a great position to represent the Emperor anywhere; save that I should not have abused my office with impunity, I was in Germany what the proconsuls were in Rome. . . . We were at that time under the charm of the Peace of Tilsit, the invincibility of the Emperor had not yet received a wound. I came from Paris, where I had passed my life at his Court, that is to say, in the midst of the memorable works and miracles of his reign. In his councils, I had admired this genius who dominated human thought; I believed that he was born to chain up Fortune, and it seemed to me quite natural that people should be prostrate at his feet. . . . I presented myself in the Grand Duchy [of Berg] under the empire of these ideas. . . . I worked from morn to night with a singular ardour, and astonished the natives of the country, who did not know that the Emperor exerted upon his servants, however distant, the miracle of the Real Presence.'²

This radiation of the demonic influence of Napoleon's personality was as fruitful at long range in raising administrative standards in the Napoleonic Empire's non-French successor-states as it was fatal at short range to the perpetuation of French rule over non-French populations for whom, at close quarters, the upsetting effect of a genially high-handed re-education in the administrator's art decidedly outweighed the stimulus.

While serving the administrative needs of its imperial creators and their successors, a professional civil service may also be performing the historically more important function of propagating a culture. In the minds of Beugnot and his colleagues, their political and cultural missions were manifestly inseparable; and the Western culture that these Napoleonic French missionary-administrators were dispensing, on their own doorstep, to a still semi-medieval Central Europe, was likewise being propagated farther afield, in various forms and divers degrees of maturity, by Spanish administrators in the Central American and Andean worlds; by Austrian administrators among semi-Western Magyars, Croats, and Poles and among Orthodox Christian Rumans, Serbs, and Ukrainians; by Petrine administrators (many of them of Baltic German or other Western origin) in Russian Orthodox Christendom; and by British Indian civil servants (of Indian as well as European

¹ Fisher, H. A. L.: *Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany* (Oxford 1903, Clarendon Press), p. 256.

² Beugnot, Count: *Mémoires*, vol. i, pp. 312-13, as translated in Fisher, op. cit., pp. 191-2 (the original French text will be found on pp. 263-4 in the single-volume 3rd ed.: Paris 1889, Dentu).

blood) among the variegated population of a sub-continent. As for the Confucian scholar-administrators who found asylum in the South after the break-up of the Han Empire, they succeeded—during a social interregnum in which the homeland of the moribund Sinic Civilization in the Yellow River Basin was submerged by the influx of barbarian conquerors and of an alien higher religion—in raising a recently incorporated and hitherto backward southern fringe of the Sinic World in its last phase to a cultural level that could compare with that prevailing in the northern focus of the Sinic Civilization under the Han.

The most important beneficiaries from imperial civil services had, however, been neither successor-states nor secular civilizations but churches. In surveying in an earlier chapter the provincial structure of universal states and its after-effects, we have noticed a number of cases in which the hierarchical organization of a church had been based on that of an empire.¹ This basis was provided by 'the New Empire' of Egypt for the Pan-Egyptiac Church that was organized by Thothmes III under the presidency of the Chief Priest of Amon-Re at Thebes; by the Sasanian Empire for the Zoroastrian Church; and by the Roman Empire for the Catholic Christian Church. The ecclesiastical pyramid reproduced the features of its secular model from base to apex. At the summit, the Chief Priest of Amon-Re at Thebes was created in the image of a Theban Pharaoh; the Zoroastrian Chief Möbadh (Möbadhān Möbadh) in the likeness of a Sasanian Shāhīnshāh; the Pope in the likeness of a post-Diocletianic Roman Emperor.² Secular administrative corporations had, however, performed more intimate services for churches than the mere provision of an organizational last. They had also influenced their outlook and *éthos*, and in some cases these intellectual and moral influences had been conveyed, not merely by example and mimesis, but by the social translation of a personality, in whom they had been incarnate, from the secular to the ecclesiastical sphere.

Three historic figures, who each gave a decisive turn to the development of the Catholic Church in the West, were recruits from the secular Roman imperial public service. Ambrosius (*vivebat circa* A.D. 340-97) was the son of a civil servant who had reached the peak of his profession by attaining the office of praetorian prefect in the Gauls; and the future Saint Ambrose was following in his father's steps as a young and promising governor of the two North Italian provinces of Liguria and Aemilia when in A.D. 374, to his astonishment and consternation, he was dragged out of the rut of an assured official career and was hustled into the episcopal see of Milan by a popular impetus that did not wait to ask his leave. Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator (*vivebat circa* A.D. 490-585) spent his working life on the thankless—and, as his colleague Boethius's fate proved, perilous—task of administering a Roman Italy in the service of a barbarian war-lord. It was only after his retirement from secular public life that Cassiodorus found a creative use for a literary archaism that had been an impediment to his draftsmanship as

¹ See pp. 188-93, above.

² See Toynbee, J. C. M.: 'Catholicism and the Roman Imperial Cult', in *The Month*, vol. clviii, November 1931, pp. 390-2.

a Minister of State. In his latter days he turned a rural property of his in the toe of Italy—the Vivarium, in the district of Squillace—into a monastic settlement that was the complement of Saint Benedict's foundation at Monte Cassino. Saint Benedict's school of monks broken-in, by the love of God, to hard physical labour in the fields¹ could not have done all that it did do for a nascent Western Society if it had not been wedded, at the start, to a Cassiodoran school that was inspired by the same motive to perform the mentally laborious task of copying the Classics and the Fathers.² As for Gregory the Great (*vivebat circa* A.D. 540–604),³ he abandoned the secular public service, after serving as *Praefectus Urbi*, in order to follow Cassiodorus's example by making a monastery out of his ancestral palace in Rome, and he was thereby led, against his expectation and desire, into becoming one of the makers of the Papacy.

After citing the names of these three great luminaries, we may single out, among the lesser lights, two country gentlemen, Gaius Sollius Modestus Apollinaris Sidonius of Auvergne (*vivebat* A.D. 430–83) and Synesius of Cyrene (*vivebat* A.D. 370–415), who were both drawn out of a life of innocent but uncreative literary dilettantism when their local countryside was engulfed in the oecumenical catastrophe of their age. Both of them responded nobly to this personal challenge by taking on their shoulders the burdens, anxieties, and perils of local leadership; and each found that he could best perform an arduous duty, that he would not shirk, by allowing himself to be made bishop of his local community.⁴

Diverse as the origins and histories of these five personalities were, they had four things in common. For all of them except, perhaps, Cassiodorus, their ecclesiastical career went against the grain. Ambrose was aghast at being made a bishop, while Synesius and Sidonius half-whimsically acquiesced in a role which evidently struck them as being, to say the least, incongruous. Gregory was as reluctant to be made seventh deacon, apocrisiarius, and pope, and even to become abbot of his own monastery, as he had been eager to enrol himself as an ordinary monk. The second common feature in these five ecclesiastical careers was that all these *ci-devant* lay notables were constrained, willy-nilly, to employ their secular administrative gifts and experience in the Church's service. In the third place, they found a scope for the use of this mundane faculty in the ecclesiastical field which they had not found in secular life.⁵ And, finally, they eclipsed their own performance as ecclesiastical administrators by their prowess on the spiritual plane.

Thus, when the break-up of the universal state for whose administrative service they had been educated had deprived these Roman *honestiores* of the possibility of following secular public careers, they responded to this formidable challenge by entering the service of the Christian Church and devoting all their powers to assisting in the creation of a new order of society. An instructive contrast is presented

¹ See III. iii. 266.

² *Ibid.*, p. 267.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 267–9.

⁴ Synesius was made metropolitan bishop of the Cyrenaic Pentapolis *circa* A.D. 410; Sidonius was made bishop of Auvergne in A.D. 469 or 470.

⁵ See IV. iv. 55.

by the very different reaction of their Sinic counterparts. Under the same ordeal the Confucian scholar-administrator did not paradoxically save his life by losing it;¹ he kicked obstinately against the pricks;² he put up a stouter fight than the Roman civil servant against overwhelmingly powerful forces of disintegration;³ he declined to confess that 'we have no armour against Fate'; and, if he can be said to have performed any service at all for any church, it was the negative and unintentional service of leaving to Buddhist scholar-monks and Taoist philosopher-medicine-men the thankless task of carrying on a secular administration for the Eurasian Nomad war-lords of the defunct Han Empire's barbarian successor-states.

'The fall of the Han Empire, and the partitions and barbarian invasions which followed, opened the road to Buddhism and effected a religious revolution which was the most significant development in what the historians of Confucian tradition describe as an "Age of Confusion". . . . The northern Tatar dynasts extended their favour to Buddhist monks in the conquered provinces. The Confucian scholars had for the most part fled south when Loyang fell [in A.D. 311]. Those who remained in the North were not favoured by the invaders, who rightly suspected this class of secret loyalty to the Chinese Emperor and hostility to the new conquerors. The new sovereigns, needing the assistance of a literate class, found in the Buddhists and Taoists, who had been the opponents of the orthodox Confucians, a body of scholarly men who were trustworthy and loyal. . . . In A.D. 405⁴ the [Confucian] historians confess that nine out of every ten families in the northern empire had embraced the Buddhist faith. The proportion is significant, for the non-Buddhist tenth fairly represents the educated class of Confucian scholars and Taoist sectaries who alone remained detached from the new religion. . . . A hundred years later, in A.D. 500, it is admitted that the whole of China, North and South alike, was Buddhist. . . . A few Confucian scholars refused for themselves the salvation which their own families, and particularly the women, eagerly embraced.'⁵

For this uncreative obstinacy, the epigoni of the Han imperial civil service had their reward.⁶ Though, by the end of the interregnum between the disappearance of the Sinic and the emergence of an affiliated Far Eastern Civilization, 'the Han civil service based on scholarship was almost forgotten',⁷ the Confucian scholar never abdicated. The tide was running all against him, for

'these melancholy conditions and the apparently incurable anarchy of the times tended to encourage the progress of Buddhism. . . . The doctrines

¹ Matt. x. 39 and xvi. 25; Mark viii. 35; Luke ix. 24; John xii. 25.

² Acts ix. 5 and xxvi. 14.

³ In the last phase of the dissolution of the Han Empire, in A.D. 166, the Confucian civil servants founded an association for combating the pernicious influence of the eunuchs, and thereby drew down upon themselves a crushing counterstroke in A.D. 168, partly because they were not sufficiently adaptable to succeed in co-operating with the fighting service, even in this supreme common cause (see Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-9).

⁴ According to Sir Charles Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Edward Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, p. 250, this religious landslide in the North of a disintegrating Sinic World had already taken place by the year A.D. 381.—A. J. T.

⁵ Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), pp. 275-6.

⁶ Matt. vi. 2, 5, and 16.

⁷ Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

of the new religion offered comfort to men living in a world of violence and instability. To renounce society, abandon possessions, and seek peace in a monastery among the mountains became the fashion among thoughtful men. Those who could not take the extreme step contributed to the building of temples and pagodas and their enrichment with artistic treasures.¹

If, in these psychologically propitious circumstances, Buddhism eventually failed after all to anticipate Christianity's triumphant success in making the future decisively her own, the explanation lies in the Confucian scholar's feat of holding out in a situation in which the Roman civil servant at last despaired of the republic.

The Confucian civil service produced no Buddhist or Taoist equivalent of an Ambrose or a Gregory the Great. So far from giving the Buddhist Church wings to fly with, it sullenly bided its time for clipping the wings that she had.

'Even at the height of Buddhist fervour, the political power remained in the hands of laymen who were Confucian in training, even if Buddhist in sympathy and the practice of daily life.'²

The Confucian scholar's monopoly of a literary culture that was indispensable for the practice of a latter-day Sinic administrative technique, in combination with his cult of a family solidarity which was as close-knit as it was narrow-hearted, armed him with two weapons that enabled him not only to retain his power in the South but actually to recover it in the North by eventually establishing his ascendancy over the epigoni of the barbarian conquerors.³ By the persistent exercise of these prosaic arts at the price of closing his eyes to the vision of an Other World which the disintegration of his own world might have revealed to him, the Confucian scholar lived to achieve in the end his blinkered mundane ambition of reanimating a defunct universal state with which he had come to identify his own existence so completely that he had ceased to be able to imagine the possibility of felicity in any other social setting.

3. *Citizenships*

The Initial Gulf between Subjects and Rulers

Since a universal state usually arises in the first instance⁴ from the forcible unification of a number of contending parochial states at the end of a Time of Troubles in the history of a disintegrating civilization, it is apt to start life with a great gulf fixed between rulers and ruled. On the one side of this sharp political dividing line stands an empire-building community representing the survivors of a dominant minority in a protracted struggle for existence between the rulers of the com-

¹ Fitzgerald, op cit., p. 259.

² Ibid., p. 286.

³ An illuminating study of the Confucian recovery in the North, in which the evidence latent in the official records of the *ci-devant* barbarian To Pa dynasty is extorted by a brilliant use of 'third-degree' statistical methods, will be found in Eberhard, W.: *Das Toba-Reich Nord Chinas* (Leiden 1949, Brill).

⁴ In contrast to the re-establishment of a universal state after a break caused by the intrusion of an alien civilization, as, for example, 'the Middle Empire' of Egypt was re-established in the shape of 'the New Empire,' the Achaemenian Empire in the shape of the Arab Caliphate, and the Maurya Rāj in the shape of the Gupta Rāj.

peting local communities of the preceding age; on the other side lies a conquered population which, in spite of a superiority in numbers that may be very great, finds itself militarily and politically at the mercy of its conquerors. This standard initial political pattern can be detected even in the history of the Ottoman Empire, which afterwards followed the singular course of excluding the free 'Osmanli imperial people themselves from political power in favour of professional slaves recruited from among their subjects and their neighbours. It is also common form—as can be observed in the subsequent history of the Ottoman Empire as well as in the careers of universal states of the standard type—for the effectively enfranchised element in the body politic¹ of a universal state to become, as time goes on, a relatively larger fraction of the total population as a result of the admission of recruits from the subject majority. It had, however, been unusual, in the universal states that had come into existence up to date, for this process to go to the length of completely obliterating the initial division between rulers and ruled by enfranchising politically the whole of the originally subject element.

The Obliteration of the Gulf by the Statesmanship of Han Liu Pang

The outstanding instance in which a comprehensive political enfranchisement had been achieved—and this within a quarter of a century of the foundation of the universal state—was in the Sinic World. In the Sinic universal state established in 230–221 B.C. through the conquest of six other parochial states by their victorious competitor Ts'in, the supremacy of Ts'in was brought to an end when Hsien Yang, the capital of the Ts'in Power, was occupied by Liu Pang in 207 B.C. and was sacked by Hsiang-yü in 206 B.C.² The political enfranchisement of the whole population of a Sinic universal state that had collapsed after Ts'in She Hwang-ti's death and had been restored by Han Liu Pang may be dated from the ordinance of 196 B.C.³ in which the first Han emperor directed that candidates for posts in the imperial civil service should be selected by merit. Though this political act did not, and could not, change at a stroke the fundamental economic and social structure of the Sinic Society, it was, as we have seen, revolutionary in its effects on the political plane. The Sinic Society continued, it is true, to consist of a mass of tax-paying peasantry supporting a small privileged ruling minority, but henceforward the avenue giving entry into the Sinic political paradise was genuinely open to talent, in the sense that admission was no longer confined either by a national restriction to inhabitants of the former state of Ts'in or by a class restriction to scions of the former Sinic hereditary nobility.

The historical explanation of this exceptionally rapid and thoroughgoing political enfranchisement of the originally subject population of a Sinic universal state is to be found in the previous destruction of a

¹ In the Greek terminology of Hellenic political science the meaning of this clumsy English periphrasis is accurately conveyed by the single word *πολίτευμα*.

² See pp. 211–12, above.

³ See p. 355, above

former monopoly of political power in the hands of the Sinic hereditary nobility. This was accomplished, as we have seen, in the State of Ts'in through the reforms introduced by Lord Shang in the fourth century B.C.,¹ and in the rest of the Sinic World after 221 B.C. through still more drastic measures on the part of Ts'in She Hwang-ti.² The sequel indicates that Ts'in She Hwang-ti did his work less effectively than Lord Shang had done his; for there appears to be no record that Han Liu Pang ever had to reckon with attempts on the part of the people of Ts'in to recapture for their state the political dominion over the rest of the Sinic World which, after striving for it for a hundred years, Ts'in had held from 221 B.C. to 207 B.C.—though, if any sense of disappointed imperialism had been alive in the Ts'in people's hearts, it would assuredly have been inflamed by the experience of coming under the rule of a foreign usurper whose home country lay at the farther extremity of the region 'outside the passes', in the borderland between the former territories of Ts'in's conquered rivals Ts'i and Ch'u. The politically dangerous nostalgia for the past that gave Han Liu Pang anxiety was cherished by the dynasties and aristocracies of the former parochial states 'outside the passes' whose hereditary authority their conqueror Ts'in She Hwang-ti had done his utmost to eradicate. To forestall a second outburst, in these quarters, of the political explosion that had shattered the work of Ts'in She Hwang-ti was the main object of Han Liu Pang's carefully planned face-saving policy.

Han Liu Pang's choice of a territory for his own imperial demesne would hardly have fallen on the former parochial domain of Ts'in solely on the ground of the strategic strength of 'the Country within the Passes' unless he had felt the local population to be amenable to his rule; and for this he could hardly have counted on their gratitude to him for his clemency in 207 B.C.—even though this had been thrown into relief by the atrocities committed in Ts'in by Hsiang-yü in the following year. There must be some further explanation of the amenability which the people of Ts'in manifestly displayed in these apparently provocative circumstances, and we may perhaps find the explanation in the political annihilation of the nobility in Ts'in to the profit of the Crown more than a hundred years earlier. This concentration of power in the Crown's hands had made the people of Ts'in a formidably pliant military instrument for the overthrow of all the other parochial states in a war to the death; but it had given the state this military predominance at the cost of depriving it of the political vitality embodied in an experienced and self-conscious aristocracy; and accordingly, when the legitimate hereditary dynasty, in its turn, was extinguished in 207 B.C., the people of Ts'in were left as sheep without a native shepherd, at the mercy of the first competent stranger to arrive on the scene and round them up. The combined effect of Lord Shang's revolutionary work 'inside the passes' and Ts'in She Hwang-ti's outside them would seem to account for Han Liu Pang's success in obliterating, within the span of a single generation, the dividing line between rulers and ruled in the Sinic universal state.

¹ See p. 351, above.

² See p. 352, above.

The Inefficacy of a merely Juridical Enfranchisement

The unifying effect produced by living historical forces, operating over a long period of time, cannot be reproduced by the mere formality of conferring a uniform juridical status. The uniform status of Europeans, Eurasians, and Asiatics under the British Rāj in India, and of Europeans, Creoles, and 'Indians' in the Spanish Empire of the Indies, as subjects, in either case, of one Crown, did not have any appreciable practical effect in diminishing the gulf between rulers and ruled in either of these polities. In the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, on the other hand, the common allegiance of the divers religious and national communities to one dynasty, and the opening of careers in the Emperor-King-Archduke's service to talent, wherever this might be forthcoming among the Hapsburg monarch's motley collection of subjects, might in time have had the same effect as the same cause in the Han Empire, if in the Danubian Monarchy the tendency towards political equality had not been overtaken and reversed in the last chapter of its history by a nationalism, derived from Western Europe, which eventually split the Monarchy into pieces.¹ The classical instance in which an initial gulf between rulers and ruled was successfully obliterated by a gradual merger of a once privileged ruling minority in the mass of its former subjects is to be found in the history of the Roman Empire, and here, too, as we have seen,² the substance of political equality was not communicated by the mere conferment of the juridical status of Roman citizenship. After the promulgation of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* in A.D. 212 all inhabitants of the Roman Empire were Roman citizens with the possible exception of an inconsiderable residue of *dediticii*; yet, after that, it still required the political and social revolution of the third century of the Christian Era to bring the realities of life into conformity with the law, because the effective governing element (*πολίτευμα*) under the Principate had not been coextensive with the Roman citizen body, but had been a narrower oligarchy whose privileges had survived the progressive extension of the status of Roman citizenship to former Roman subjects.

Imperial Citizenships and Ecclesiastical Allegiances

The ultimate beneficiary from the political egalitarianism towards which the Roman Empire was moving in the Age of the Principate and at which it arrived in the time of Diocletian was, of course, the Catholic Christian Church, and this in more than one way.

In the first place, the Catholic Church borrowed the Roman State's master institution of dual citizenship—a constitutional device that had solved the technical and psychological problem of how to enjoy the advantages of membership in an oecumenical community without having to repudiate narrower loyalties or to cut local roots.³ In the Roman Empire under the Principate, which was the political framework within which the Christian Church grew up, all citizens of the world-city of Rome, except a small minority whose ancestral domicile was the

¹ See II. ii. 182-6.

³ See IV. iv. 307-14.

² On pp. 152-8, above.

metropolis itself or its immediate environs, were also citizens of some local municipality that, though within the Roman body politic, was an autonomous city-state with the traditional Hellenic form of city-state self-government and the traditional hold of such a local motherland upon the affections of her children. On this Roman secular model a growing and spreading Christian ecclesiastical community built up an organization and a corporate feeling that was both local and oecumenical. The Church to which a Christian gave his allegiance was both the local Christian community of a particular city-state and the Catholic Christian community in which all these local churches were embraced in virtue of a uniform practice and doctrine and a perpetual intercourse through which they kept in touch and in step with one another.

The Catholic Church became, in another sense, a beneficiary of the Roman Empire in its post-Diocletianic phase when—after the conversion of Constantine to Christianity had been followed by Theodosius's proscription of all non-Christian religions¹ except Judaism—the terms 'Catholic Christian' and 'Roman citizen' became almost interchangeable. The politico-ecclesiastical equation thus established in the Roman Empire towards the close of the fourth century of the Christian Era reappeared in the constitutions of those 'ghosts' of the Roman Empire that were afterwards conjured up in Western and in Orthodox Christendom. In the medieval 'Holy Roman Empire', and even in the modern Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, at least down to the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* of A.D. 1867, it was hardly possible to be a fully approved and privileged subject of the Imperial Crown without at the same time being a Roman Catholic Christian, while in the East Roman Empire and in the Russian Empire, even in its post-Petrine phase, full membership in the political community could hardly be enjoyed without a profession of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. In A.D. 1952 a philological fossil of this once living state of politico-religious affairs was still preserved in the Modern Greek appellation *Rōmyós*, to which an unsophisticated Greek peasant or a hyper-sophisticated cultivator of the vulgar tongue would answer rather than to the artificially revived name *Hellén* with which he would have been indoctrinated at school. Though *Rōmyós*, in the philologist's ear, merely rang a slight change on the Ancient Greek word '*Ῥωμαῖος*', it had long since ceased, on the lips of its Modern Greek users, to mean 'Roman' in the historical sense. It had come to mean an Orthodox Christian whose mother tongue was Modern Greek and whose true fatherland was an ideally still existing East Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople.²

In the convergent histories of the Roman Empire and the Catholic Christian Church, the Roman citizen body and the Christian ecclesiastical community had made their *rapprochement* from entirely different origins in extremely diverse social and cultural milieux; and, though, at an early date in the history of Christianity, they had acquired an outstandingly important common member in the person of Saint Paul, they did not coalesce until the Christian Church was nearly four hundred, and the Roman State more than a thousand, years old. In the histories

¹ See IV. iv. 226-7.

² See pp. 29-31, above.

of the Arab Caliphate and the Sunnī form of Islam, the higher religion that was eventually to be embraced by all but a remnant of the population of the universal state was associated from the outset with the imperial people; and, so far from converging—as the Catholic Christian Church and the Roman citizen body converged, to the point of eventual coalescence—by extending their membership from opposite quarters to include by degrees almost the whole population of the state, the imperial people and the Islamic community ceased to be coextensive as Islam proceeded to convert the Primitive Muslim Arab empire-builders' non-Arab subjects. The revolution that carried the 'Abbasids on to the imperial throne of the Caliphate in place of the Umayyads corresponded, as we have seen,¹ to the revolution in the Roman Empire in the third century of the Christian Era in breaking down a previous political barrier between a dominant minority and a subject majority. Since, however, in the pre-'Abbasid Caliphate, the ruling element had been distinguished from its subjects, not by a secular citizenship to which non-citizens could be admitted by naturalization, but by the incommunicable physical heritage of Arab descent and by a communicable religious allegiance to Islam that did not give a non-Arab convert Arab status,² the effect of the 'Abbasid revolution was to open the way towards egalitarianism in the Caliphate, not by making Arabs as well as Muslims out of an increasing number of the Caliphate's non-Arab subjects, but by substituting the Muslim for the Arab community as the imperial people.³ Thus in the Caliphate, in contrast to the Roman Empire, the political distinction between rulers and ruled was eventually effaced by their merger, not in both a common citizenship and a common religion, but in a common religion alone. In the Caliphate an oecumenical faith had to do duty for an oecumenical citizenship as well.

The role of Islam in the Caliphate in the last phase of the history of the Syriac Civilization recurs in the histories of the Mughal Rāj and the Ottoman Empire, in which Muslim empire-builders imposed universal states on the Hindu World and on Orthodox Christendom respectively. In both these cases, Islam once again served as a unifying and a levelling political force.

In the Ottoman Empire after the death of Suleymān the Magnificent the free Muslim community, who for the best part of two centuries past had been paradoxically excluded from a share in the government, were stimulated by a sense of the incongruity between their profession of Islam and their unfavourable political status into wresting out of the hands of the Pādishāh's infidel-born Slave-Household its monopoly of political power. In the Mughal Rāj, which developed only the rudiments of a counterpart of the 'Osmanlis' 'peculiar institution',⁴ no revolution

¹ On pp. 147–52, above.

² The most that could be communicated to a non-Arab subject of the pre-'Abbasid Caliphate who embraced Islam and sought to associate himself with an Arab patron was a relation of clientship that was an intolerably inferior status compared with that of the Arab imperial people itself.

³ The deposition of the Arabs from their former political supremacy in the Caliphate as a result of the fall of the Umayyads was comparable to the deposition of the people of Ts'in from their supremacy in the Sinic World as a result of the fall of the Ts'in Dynasty.

⁴ See III. iii. 31, n. 1.

was needed in order to merge the Transoxanian Turkī henchmen of the Timurid imperial house with their fellow Muslims who had made their way into India before them or who came in afterwards from Central Asia or Iran to reinforce them.

In the Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mughal Empire alike, Islam also brought recruits to the imperial people in the form of converts from the non-Muslim subject population, but failed to drive rival religions entirely off the field, as Christianity virtually succeeded in superseding its rivals in the Roman Empire; and for this difference in the outcome we can see two reasons. One is that Islam had to contend with higher religions—Zoroastrianism and Orthodox, Monophysite and Nestorian Christianity in the Caliphate; Hinduism in the Mughal Rāj; Orthodox Christianity in the Ottoman Empire—which were all already well established before Islam's advent, whereas Christianity in the Roman Empire had better chances. She was running a neck-and-neck race with coeval higher religions which, like her, had still to establish their positions, while the older religions that were already established in the Hellenic World of that age had no chance of holding their own against any higher religion that might enter the lists against them, since they were worships either of a Non-Human Nature who had been deprived of her prestige by Man's establishment of his mastery over her, or of some parochial human community which had lost its prestige in losing its sovereign independence. Islam's second handicap, by comparison with Christianity, was its honourable obligation, under one of its own articles of faith, to grant toleration to other 'Peoples of the Book' so long as they accepted Muslim political supremacy and gave practical proof of their acceptance of it by paying tribute; and, though, on a strict interpretation of the Islamic Law (*shari'ah*), the Jews and Christians were the only sects that were entitled to claim this status, the same privileges were accorded in practice to both Zoroastrians and Hindus,¹ partly perhaps, owing to an intuitive perception that their faiths, too, were 'higher religions', and partly, no doubt, on account of the sheer political impracticability of proscribing any religion that commanded the allegiance of the solid mass of a numerous subject population—which was the position of Hinduism in the Mughal Rāj in India and of Zoroastrianism in the eastern provinces of the Caliphate down to at least the ninth century of the Christian Era.

While these handicaps were operative in all the three cases under consideration, there was a notable difference in the extent of Islam's success in the conversion of non-Muslim subject populations in the Caliphate on the one hand and in the Mughal and Ottoman empires on the other. In the Caliphate, by the time of the extinction of the last lingering shadow of the 'Abbasid Power by the Mongols in A.D. 1258, the process of conversion had gone so far—particularly during the last two or three centuries, under the spur of successive Eurasian Nomad barbarian invasions—that the non-Muslim residue in the population had been reduced to a numerically insignificant minority.² In the Otto-

¹ See IV. iv. 225-6; V. v. 674, n. 2; and V. vi. 204-5.

² For the process, see, further, Tritton, A. S.: *The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim*

man Empire and the Mughal Rāj the corresponding missionary activity never made a comparable impression on the non-Muslim mass, and in both states the process was arrested in the course of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era by an increase in the vigour and confidence of the reaction of the Orthodox Christian and the Hindu subject population respectively.

The explanation of this marked difference in results is probably to be found in differences on the non-Muslim side in this competition between Islam and rival faiths. Among Islam's rivals in the Caliphate, Zoroastrianism and Orthodox Christianity had forfeited their popular appeal through their adoption by the Sasanian and Roman Imperial governments as established official religions.¹ The Nestorian Christians in the ex-Sasanian provinces and the Monophysite Christians in the ex-Roman provinces were not disposed to resist a change of masters when their former Zoroastrian and Melchite oppressors were deposed by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, though they were slow to adopt Islam themselves in place of faiths which they had originally embraced of their own accord and not under compulsion. This divided religious opposition to Islam in the Caliphate was evidently less difficult to overcome than the united front that Hinduism opposed to it in the Mughal Rāj and Orthodox Christianity in the Ottoman Empire. In the contest between Islam and Orthodox Christianity for the spiritual allegiance of the Ottoman *ra'īyeh* the scales were eventually weighted against Islam by the impact of Western Christendom after the tide of war between the 'Osmanlis and the Western Powers had begun to flow in favour of the West. This change in military fortunes lowered the prestige of Islam in the Orthodox Christians' eyes and inspired them with the new ideal of remoulding themselves in the cultural image of their heterodox Western co-religionists.² The West had impinged on India likewise before Awrangzīb's abandonment of the Islamic tradition of toleration evoked a militant Hindu counter-attack, but in this case Islam's arrest must be ascribed to an error in Mughal statesmanship and not to any influences emanating from Western onlookers who, in India at this date, had not yet acquired prestige by a display of their military strength.

These considerations on oecumenical citizenships, ecclesiastical and secular, conclude our survey of universal states—an institution whose evil genii had been the Ts'ing She Hwang-tis and its good genii the Han Liu Pangs.

Subjects (London 1930, Milford), and Browne, L. E.: *The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia from the Time of Muhammad till the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge 1933, University Press).

¹ For the effect of this on Zoroastrianism, see V. v. 125-6 and 659-61. For the ostracism of the Orthodox Church, as the religion of the Melchites ('Imperialists'), by Syriac and Coptic Christians, see IV. iv. 593, n. 3.

² See IX. viii. 161-5.

VII

UNIVERSAL CHURCHES

A. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF THE RELATION OF UNIVERSAL CHURCHES TO CIVILIZATIONS

(I) CHURCHES AS CANCERS

IN entering now upon our study of universal churches we may find it convenient to start by examining their relation to the social environment in which they arise.

We have seen that a universal church is apt to come to birth during a Time of Troubles following the breakdown of a civilization, and to unfold itself within the political framework of a universal state which is the institutional manifestation of a temporary arrest in a broken-down civilization's decline and fall. Our study of universal states has brought out two facts about them:¹ first that, in so far as their achievements bear fruit, the harvest is apt to be reaped, not by the sowers themselves, but by alien hands; and, second, that, in so far as they become creative in this indirect, second-hand, vicarious way, through the creative acts of their alien beneficiaries, they are creators unintentionally and indeed against their will. Their own primary aim is, not to be creative, but to survive, and the experience of losing their lives in order to find them again in the lives of their beneficiaries does not reconcile them to their fate; it provokes them to recalcitrance and indignation. Our survey in the preceding Part of this Study has shown that the principal beneficiaries of universal states are universal churches; and it is therefore not surprising that the champions of a universal state, at a stage in its history at which its own fortunes are manifestly on the wane, should dislike the spectacle of a universal church within its bosom profiting by services that the universal state is continuing to render without any longer being able to turn them to its own benefit. The church is therefore likely at first sight to wear the appearance of a social cancer; for in this situation and state of mind the universal state's devotees are apt, not merely to observe and resent the fact that the church is increasing while the state decreases,² but to take it for granted that the beneficiary is also a parasite, and that the patent profit which it draws from its host is the cause of the host's malady. This diagnosis is as attractive as it is exacerbating; for it is always easier, both intellectually and morally, to debit one's ills to the account of some outside agency than to ascribe the responsibility to oneself.

In the decline of the Roman Empire an indictment of the Christian Church, which had been mounting up since the firing of the first telling

¹ See Part VI, *passim*, above.

² John iii. 30.

shot by Celsus (*scribebat circa* A.D. 178), came to a head in the West when the Empire was in its death agonies there. An explosion of this hostile feeling was evoked in A.D. 416, in the heart of a 'die-hard' pagan Gallic devotee of Imperial Rome,¹ by the sad sight of desert islands colonized—or, as Rutilius would have expressed it, infested—by Christian monks:

Processu pelagi iam se Capraria tollit.
squalet lucifugis insula plena viris.
ipsi se monachos Graio cognomine dicunt,
quod soli nullo vivere teste volunt. . . .
quaenam perversi rabies tam stulta cerebri,
dum mala formides, nec bona posse pati?²

Rutilius's impersonal hostility towards the monks of Capraia was, however, a less painful feeling than the pang which, before his voyage was over, he was to suffer at the sadder sight of another island that had captivated a fellow countryman and acquaintance of the poet's own.

Adsurgit ponti medio circumflua Gorgon
inter Pisanum Cyraicumque latus.
aversor scopulos, damni monumenta recentis:
perditus hic vivo funere civis erat.
noster enim nuper iuvenis maioribus amplis,
nec censu inferior coniugiove minor,
impulsus furiis, homines terrasque reliquit,
et turpem latebram credulus exul adit.
infelix putat illuvie caelestia pasci,
seque premit laesis saevior ipse deis.
num, rogo, deterior Circaeis secta venenis?
tunc mutabantur corpora, nunc animi.³

Through these lines there breathes the spirit of a still pagan aristocracy in the dissolving western provinces of the Roman Empire who saw the cause of the ruin of the body politic in the abandonment of the traditional worship of the Hellenic pantheon by pagan converts to Christianity and in the suppression of Paganism by the Christian Emperor Theodosius.⁴

This controversy between a sinking Roman Empire and a rising Christian Church raised an issue of such deep and general interest that it had stirred the feelings, not only of contemporaries directly concerned, but of a Posterity contemplating this historical spectacle across a great gulf of time and change. In the statement 'I have described the triumph of Barbarism and Religion',⁵ Gibbon not only sums up the seventy-one chapters of his book in nine words but proclaims himself a partisan of

¹ The most striking of Rutilius Namatianus's expressions of this devotion have been quoted in V. v. 345-7.

² Rutilius Namatianus, C.: *De Reditu Suo*, Book I, ll. 439-42 and 445-6.

³ Rutilius, Book I, ll. 515-26.

⁴ It was, of course, in answer to this pagan thesis that Saint Augustine wrote his *De Civitate Dei* (see V. v. 225, n. 1 and XIII. x. 88-89).

⁵ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lxxi, quoted in the present Study in IV. iv. 58. Cp. Pope: *An Essay on Criticism*, ll. 692-3:

'A second deluge Learning thus o'er-run,
And the Monks finish'd what the Goths begun.'

Celsus and Rutilius; and we can divine that, in his eyes, the cultural peak, as he saw it,¹ of Hellenic history in the Antonine Age stood out clear across an intervening span of sixteen centuries which, for Gibbon, was a cultural trough. Out of the miry clay² of this slough, the generation of Gibbon's grandfather in the Western World had tardily gained a footing on the slopes of another mountain, and from this point of vantage the twin peak was once again visible in all its majesty.³ 'On the morrow of the death of the Emperor Marcus,' we seem to hear Gibbon saying to himself, 'the Roman Empire, as I have described it in its glory,⁴ went into its decline. On the standards of value that I, Gibbon, and my kind in my world share with our kindred spirits in the world of Tacitus and Hadrian, a depreciation of values then set in, and this in every province of life. Religion and Barbarism triumphed, and this lamentable state of affairs continued to prevail for hundreds and hundreds of dreary years, until only the other day, no longer ago than the close of the seventeenth century, a rational civilization began to emerge again.'

This view, which is subtly implicit in Gibbon's work, has been put clearly and sharply⁵ by a twentieth-century Western anthropologist who is a figure of comparable stature in his own field:

'The religion of the Great Mother, with its curious blend of crude savagery with spiritual aspirations, was only one of a multitude of similar Oriental faiths which in the later days of paganism spread over the Roman Empire, and by saturating the European peoples with alien ideals of life gradually undermined the whole fabric of ancient civilisation.

¹ Gibbon's view on this point has been criticized in the present Study, IV. iv. 59-63.

² Psalm xl. 2.

³ The writer owes the following valuable note to his friend and colleague Mr. Martin Wight, who was so kind as to read the draft of Part VII of this Study in typescript:

'This conception of the Middle Ages is discussed, with interesting illustrations, by W. P. Ker in his *The Dark Ages* (Edinburgh 1904, Blackwood), pp. 1-4. He quotes the most explicit and refined statement of the Gibbonian view that I have come across, in a passage from James Cotter Morison (the Victorian biographer of Gibbon, Macaulay and Saint Bernard):

"The Graeco-Roman world had descended into the great hollow which is roughly called the Middle Ages, extending from the fifth to the fifteenth century, a hollow in which many great, beautiful, and heroic things were done and created, but in which knowledge, as we understand it, and as Aristotle understood it, had no place. The revival of learning and the Renaissance are memorable as the first sturdy breasting by Humanity of the hither slope of the great hollow which lies between us and the Ancient World. The modern man, reformed and regenerated by knowledge, looks across it and recognises on the opposite ridge, in the far-shining cities and stately porticoes, in the art, politics and science of Antiquity, many more ties of kinship and sympathy than in the mighty concave between, wherein dwell his Christian ancestry, in the dim light of scholasticism and theology."—J. C. Morison: *The Service of Man: an Essay towards the Religion of the Future* (London 1887, Kegan Paul, Trench), pp. 177-8.'

⁴ e.g. in the opening passage of his work, quoted in the present Study, IV. iv. 58.

⁵ Mr. Martin Wight points out that 'the same conception is artlessly revealed by Dr. Arnold, when discussing his plans for a course of lectures after having been appointed to the Chair of History at Oxford:

"I had thought of trying to do for England what Guizot began so well for France: to start with the year 1400, and make the first year's course comprise the 15th century. My most detailed historical researches happen to have related to that very century, and it gives you the Middle Ages still undecayed, yet with the prospect of daybreak near. I could not bear to plunge myself into the very depths of that noisome cavern, and to have to toil through centuries of dirt and darkness."—Letter to Stanley, 29th September, 1841, in A. P. Stanley: *Life & Correspondence of Thomas Arnold*, 11th edition (London 1880, Murray), vol. ii, p. 239.'

'Greek and Roman society was built on the conception of the subordination of the individual to the community, of the citizen to the state; it set the safety of the commonwealth, as the supreme aim of conduct, above the safety of the individual whether in this world or in a world to come. Trained from infancy in this unselfish ideal, the citizens devoted their lives to the public service and were ready to lay them down for the common good; or, if they shrank from the supreme sacrifice, it never occurred to them that they acted otherwise than basely in preferring their personal existence to the interests of their country. All this was changed by the spread of Oriental religions which inculcated the communion of the soul with God and its eternal salvation as the only objects worth living for, objects in comparison with which the prosperity and even the existence of the state sank into insignificance. The inevitable result of this selfish and immoral doctrine was to withdraw the devotee more and more from the public service, to concentrate his thoughts on his own spiritual emotions, and to breed in him a contempt for the present life which he regarded merely as a probation for a better and an eternal. The saint and the recluse, disdainful of earth and rapt in ecstatic contemplation of heaven, became in popular opinion the highest ideal of humanity, displacing the old ideal of the patriot and hero who, forgetful of self, lives and is ready to die for the good of his country. The earthly city seemed poor and contemptible to men whose eyes beheld the City of God coming in the clouds of heaven.

'Thus the centre of gravity, so to say, was shifted from the present to a future life, and, however much the other world may have gained, there can be little doubt that this one lost heavily by the change. A general disintegration of the body politic set in. The ties of the state and of the family were loosened: the structure of society tended to resolve itself into its individual elements and thereby to relapse into barbarism; for civilisation is only possible through the active cooperation of the citizens and their willingness to subordinate their private interests to the common good. Men refused to defend their country and even to continue their kind. In their anxiety to save their own souls and the souls of others, they were content to leave the material world, which they identified with the principle of evil, to perish around them. This obsession lasted for a thousand years. The revival of Roman Law, of the Aristotelian philosophy, of ancient art and literature at the close of the Middle Ages marked the return of Europe to native ideals of life and conduct, to saner, manlier views of the world. The long halt in the march of civilisation was over. The tide of Oriental invasion had turned at last. It is ebbing still.'¹

¹ Frazer, Sir J. G.: *The Golden Bough: Adonis, Attis, Osiris: Studies in the History of Oriental Religion*, 2nd ed. (London 1907, Macmillan), pp. 251-3. The judgement expressed in this passage is qualified, without being retracted, by the author in the following footnote:

'To prevent misapprehension I will add that the spread of Oriental religions was only one of many causes which contributed to the downfall of ancient civilisation. Among these contributory causes a friend, for whose judgement and learning I entertain the highest respect, counts bad government and a ruinous fiscal system, two of the most powerful agents to blast the prosperity of nations, as may be seen in our own day by the blight which has struck the Turkish Empire. It is probable, too, as my friend thinks, that the rapid diffusion of alien faiths was as much an effect as a cause of widespread intellectual decay. Such unwholesome growths could hardly have fastened upon the Graeco-Roman mind in the days of its full vigour. We may remember the energy with which the Roman Government combated the first outbreak of the Bacchic plague.'

The passage reappears in the third edition of *The Golden Bough*, Part IV: 'Adonis, Attis, Osiris', vol. i, pp. 300-1 (London 1914, Macmillan, preface dated January 1914). The view expressed in it is cited, and accepted without question as a satisfactory state-

It was indeed still ebbing when the present lines were being written on the 4th March, 1948, and, in the act, the present writer was wondering what that gentle scholar would have had to say, if he had been revising *The Golden Bough* for a fourth edition, about some of the ways in which Europe's return 'to native ideals of life and conduct' had manifested itself during the forty-one years that had now passed since the first publication of this provocative passage in A.D. 1907.¹ In the light of the portentous events of this latter-day chapter of Western history, Frazer and his like-minded contemporaries had proved to be the last generation of Western neo-pagans of a rational, unenthusiastic, tolerant school that had first emerged in the Italy of the *Quattrocento* and that had captivated the Transalpine Western World in and after the closing years of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era. By A.D. 1952 they had been swept off the field by demonic, emotional, violent-handed successors who had suddenly emerged, unheralded, out of the unplumbed depths of a secularized Western Society. The words of Frazer had been re-uttered by the voice of Alfred Rosenberg with a different ring. Yet this startling change in the application of a Western neo-pagan doctrine must not blind us to the truth that Rosenberg and Frazer were both propounding an identical Gibbonian thesis.

In dealing with this thesis in an earlier part of this Study,² we have been content to argue that Gibbon was mistaken in his view of the date at which the Hellenic Civilization reached and passed its zenith, and that in truth it had inflicted mortal wounds on itself long before the appearance, above its horizon, of Christianity or any of the other higher religions with which Christianity eventually competed for the conquest of a moribund Hellenic World. It is, indeed, indisputable that the Hellenic achievement of parochial self-government and the Hellenic virtue of parochial patriotism had by that time been discredited and extinguished through being misdirected and misused by their own authors and exponents. When, in the fifth century B.C., the supreme social need of the Hellenic World had come to be the achievement of political unity,³ the characteristic features of Hellenic public life had become the bane, instead of the glory, of the Hellenic Civilization; and, though, even after these parochial patriotisms had brought the Hellenic Society to its breakdown in the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, the Hellenic peoples had continued, for four more terrible centuries, to sacrifice the pursuit of true prosperity and true happiness on the altars of traditional political idols, they had been weaned from this idolatry at last when it had demanded of them the immolation, not merely of 'the good life', but of life itself.

Augustus could never have established his oecumenical peace if the public feeling of the Hellenic Society of his day had not been over-

ment of the truth, in a note on 'the Importance of Palestine in the World of Religion' which appears in the official report on the Census of Palestine in 1931 (Mills, E.: *Census of Palestine, 1931* (Alexandria 1933, Whitehead Morris, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 79).

¹ This passage is not to be found in the sections on Adonis, Attis, Osiris in the first edition of *The Golden Bough*, vol. 1 (London 1890, Macmillan), chap. iii, sections 4, 5, and 6, pp. 278-320.

² In IV. iv. 58-63.

³ See IV. iv. 61-3 and 206-14.

whelmingly in favour of his policy.¹ By Augustus's time there was nobody left in the Hellenic World except the Roman senatorial aristocracy who would still have preferred retaining self-government to getting rid of social disorders, and nobody at all who would still have preferred retaining parochial sovereignty to getting rid of wars. The sufferings that the Hellenic Society had inflicted on itself had produced this revolutionary change in its outlook without the intervention of any external agency. In a post-mortem inquiry into the causes of the death of Hellenism, this reading of Hellenic history, if correct, acquits Christianity and the other higher religions that, in the next chapter of the story, were Christianity's competitors for the spiritual conquest of Hellenic souls. These 'Oriental faiths' were filling a spiritual vacuum, not creating one; and the same verdict emerges from an examination of the role of the Mahāyāna—an 'Occidental faith'² from the Sinic World's geographical standpoint—in the closing chapters of the history of a disintegrating Sinic Civilization.³

The issue, however, is too important to allow us, at this stage of our inquiry, to dismiss it when we have recapitulated our argument that the Frazerian view is in fact confuted by the principal relevant passages of history up to date. This *argumentum ex Clui silentio* is not enough. Higher religions might not have caused the deaths of civilizations in the past, yet this tragedy might still be a possibility. To get to the bottom of the issue, we must carry our inquiry from the macrocosm into the microcosm, from the facts of past history to the abiding characteristics of Human Nature.

Even if Frazer may be wrong in his interpretation of the past historical facts with which he seeks to put his thesis to the proof, we have to ask ourselves whether he may be right, nevertheless, in his contention that the higher religions are essentially and incurably anti-social. When there is a shift in the focus of human interest and energy from the ideals aimed at in the civilizations to those aimed at in the higher religions, is it true that social values, for which the civilizations claim to stand, are bound to suffer? Are spiritual and social values antithetical and inimical to one another? Is the fabric of civilization undermined if the salvation of the individual soul is taken as being the supreme aim of life? Frazer answers these questions in the affirmative; and, if his answer were right, it would mean that human life was a tragedy without a catharsis. The writer of this Study believed that Frazer's answer was not right; for, in his belief, it was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the higher religions and the nature of souls or personalities.

In earlier passages of this Study it has been contended that Man is neither a selfless ant nor an Ishmaelish Cyclops,⁴ but a social animal⁵ in whose nature there is not a Frazerian 'pre-established disharmony'

¹ For the gratitude that Augustus's work evoked in the hearts of his contemporaries see V. v. 648 and 649, n. 1; V. vi. 181, n. 3; and p. 41, with n. 2, above.

² When once we have parted company with sanity by reading emotional connotations of comparative moral and cultural values into the points of the compass, 'Occidental' will serve just as well as 'Oriental' for a term of abuse.

³ See IV. iv. 65-66.

⁵ See I. i. 173, n. 3, and 454, n. 3; III. iii. 223-30.

⁴ See III. iii. 217-22.

between the individual and Society. It would be nearer the truth to say that this supposed antithesis is illusory; for the individual can only express and develop his personality through relations with other personalities, while, conversely, Society is nothing but the common ground between one individual's network of relations and another's, and it has no existence except in the activities of individuals who, for their part, cannot exist except in Society. Nor, again, is there any 'pre-established disharmony' between the individual's relations with his fellow men and his relation with God. In the spiritual vision of Primitive Man there is manifestly a solidarity between the tribesman and his gods¹ which, so far from alienating the human members of a primitive society from one another, is perhaps the strongest of all social bonds between them. The workings of this harmony between Man's duty to God and his duty to his neighbour have been explored and illustrated at the primitive level by Frazer himself, and disintegrating civilizations had borne witness to it when they had sought a new bond for Society in the worship of a deified Caesar. Is the harmony converted into a discord by 'the higher religions,' as Frazer contends? In theory and in practice alike, the answer would appear to be in the negative.

On an *à priori* view (to start from that approach) personalities are not conceivable except as agents of spiritual activity; and the only conceivable scope for spiritual activity lies in relations between spirit and spirit. In seeking God, Man is performing a social act; and, if God's Love has gone into action in This World in the redemption of Mankind by Christ, then Man's efforts to make himself less unlike a God who has created Man in His own image² must include efforts to follow Christ's example in sacrificing himself for the redemption of his fellow men. Seeking and following God in this way that, in a Christian's belief, is God's way, is, in a Christian's eyes, the only true way for a human soul on Earth to seek salvation. The antithesis between trying to save one's own soul by seeking and following God and trying to do one's duty to one's neighbour is therefore false.

'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets.'³

The two activities are indissoluble because 'he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?'⁴ The Christian soul that is truly seeking to save itself by loving God in God's way is as fully social a being as the bee-like Spartan who saves his personal honour by dying for his hive at Thermopylae; only the Christian soul on Earth is enrolled in a different society from the Spartan hive or the Roman Leviathan. He is a citizen, not of a secular commonwealth, but of the Kingdom of God, and therefore his paramount and all-embracing aim is, not to identify himself with the genius of an earthly city, but to attain the highest degree of communion with,

¹ See V. vi. 13.

³ Matt. xxii. 37-40.

² Gen. i. 26 and 27; v. 1; ix. 6.

⁴ 1 John iv. 20.

and likeness to, God Himself; his relations with his fellow men are consequences of, and corollaries to, his relations with God; his standard for his attitude towards his fellows will be his intuition of God's attitude towards Man; and his way of loving his neighbour as God loves Man will be to try to help his neighbour to win what the Christian is seeking for himself—that is, to come into closer communion with God and to become more godlike.

If this is a soul's recognized aim for itself and for its fellow souls in the Christian Church Militant on Earth, then it is evident that under a Christian dispensation God's will *will* be done on Earth as it is in Heaven to an immeasurably greater degree than in a secular mundane society. It is also evident that, in the Church Militant on Earth, the good social aims of the mundane societies will incidentally be achieved very much more successfully than they ever have been or can be achieved in a mundane society which aims at these objects direct, and at nothing higher. In other words, the spiritual progress of individual souls in this life will in fact bring with it much more social progress than could be attained in any other way. It is a paradoxical but profoundly true and important principle of life that the most likely way to reach a goal is to be aiming not at that goal itself but at some more ambitious goal beyond it. This is the meaning of the fable in the Old Testament of Solomon's Choice¹ and of the saying in the New Testament about losing one's life and finding it.²

Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?³

This exposition of the harmony between the conception of Man's duty to God and the conception of his duty to his neighbour has been made in terms of Christianity, but it could be translated into terms of Mithraism or of the worships of Cybele and Isis, which competed with Christianity for the captivation of the Hellenic World, or into terms of the Mahāyāna, which did captivate the Sinic World as Christianity captivated the Hellenic. The essence of Christianity is the essence of the higher religions as a class, though in different eyes these different windows through which God's light shines into Man's soul may differ in the degree of their translucency or in the selection of the rays that they transmit. When we pass from theory to practice, we shall learn most from the histories of Christianity and the Mahāyāna, which went on living and working after their competitors had fallen by the way.

The harmony which Frazer denies is exemplified in practice in the lives of the Christian anchorites—a Saint Antony in his desert in Egypt or a Saint Symeon on his pillar in Syria—in an age when the Roman Empire, and the Hellenic Society embodied in it, were approaching their final dissolution. It is manifest that, in insulating themselves physically from their fellow men, these saints were entering into a far more active relation with a far wider circle than any that would have centred round them if they had remained 'in the World' and had spent their lives in

¹ 1 Kings iii. 5–15.

² Matt. x. 39 and xvi. 25; Mark viii. 35; Luke ix. 24 and xvii. 33; John xii. 25.

³ Browning, R.: *Andrea del Sarto*, ll. 97–98.

some secular occupation. They swayed the world from their retreats to greater effect than the Emperor in the city or than the master of the soldiers in the cantonment, because their personal pursuit of holiness through seeking communion with God was a form of social action that moved their fellow men more powerfully than any secular social service on the military or the political plane. The anchorites were recognized by their contemporaries to be pursuing the highest social aim on behalf of all Mankind with complete single-mindedness and disinterestedness; and this spectacle of their self-realization through self-surrender struck their contemporaries' imaginations and touched their hearts and thereby played its part in the forging of a social bond of a spiritual order which held firm when Society dissolved on the political and economic levels.

'It has sometimes been said that the ascetic ideal of the East Roman was a barren withdrawal from the world of his day; the biography of John the Almsgiver¹ may suggest why it was that the Byzantine in his hour of need turned instinctively for aid and comfort to the ascete in the full assurance of his sympathy and succour. . . . One of the outstanding features of early Byzantine asceticism is its passion for social justice and its championship of the poor and oppressed.'²

The anchorites' concern and travail for the welfare of their fellow men would still have been recognized without question by their contemporaries if the anchorites themselves had never departed from their chosen and approved way of performing the *opus Dei*. But there were occasions on which the anchorites showed their love for Man and their humility towards God by breaking the régime of insulation that they had imposed on themselves and returning to the World to intervene in a secular crisis.

Thus³ in A.D. 475-6 Saint Daniel the Stylite, at the instance of the emissaries of the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople, consented to descend from his pillar at Anaplis, up the Bosphorus, in order to save Orthodoxy from the Monophysite proclivities of the usurping Emperor Basiliscus.⁴ The mere news of the holy man's epiphany in the cathedral church of the Apostles in the Imperial City frightened the Emperor into evacuating his own capital and retreating to the imperial palace at the seventh milestone. It was indeed a crushing indictment of his conduct of public affairs that the report of his people's affliction should have moved the saint to re-emerge from a physical isolation in which, by

¹ John the Almsgiver was Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria from A.D. 611 to A.D. 619. During these years Syria was under Persian military occupation while Egypt was still in Roman hands, and the Patriarch had to cope with an influx of Syrian refugees.

² Dawes, E., and Baynes, N. H.: *Three Byzantine Saints* (Oxford 1948, Blackwell), pp. 198 and 197.

³ An English translation of the original Greek text narrating the following story will be found in Dawes and Baynes, op. cit., pp. 49-59. The anonymous author was one of the Saint's personal attendants.

⁴ Monophysitism versus Orthodoxy was a secular as well as a religious issue at this date, since Monophysitism was becoming the theological expression of the resurgent national consciousness of the non-Hellenic peoples of the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire—particularly the Copts, Syrians, and Armenians—as against the Orthodoxy of the 'Melchite' Greek-speaking supporters of the Roman Imperial régime (see I. i. 91 and 155; II. ii. 76, 286-7, and 374; IV. iv. 325-6 and 593, n. 3; and V. v. 127).

that time, he had been living already for twenty-four years¹ and which was to have lasted unbroken till his death. Working spiritual acts of psychical and physical healing on his way, Saint Daniel led the clergy and people of Constantinople to beard the truant prince in his suburban asylum; and, when the guards refused the crowd admission to the imperial presence, the saint directed the people to follow him in the scriptural symbolic act of shaking the dust of the palace precincts off their garments—which they did with such a thunderous reverberation that most of the guards on duty were moved to desert their imperial master and follow in the stylite's train. In vain the Emperor sent messages after the departing saint to beg him to return to the Hebdomon; in vain he returned to Constantinople himself and besought Daniel to visit him in his palace there. In the end the Emperor was constrained to present himself before the Saint in the Cathedral and prostrate himself at his feet; and a public profession of Orthodoxy was the price that he eventually had to pay in order to save his throne by setting Daniel at liberty to resume his station on his pillar-top.

This was the sole occasion on which Saint Daniel issued from his physical seclusion during a period of forty-two years (A.D. 451-93) which saw the Roman Empire founder in the West while in the East it escaped shipwreck under the spiritual pilotage of the stylite's 'distant control'.

'For three and thirty years (A.D. 460-93) he stood for varying periods on the three columns. . . . During these he was deemed worthy to receive "the prize of his high calling";² he blessed all men, he prayed on behalf of all, he counselled all not to be covetous, he instructed all in the things necessary to salvation, he showed hospitality to all, yet he possessed nothing on Earth beyond the confines of the spot on which the enclosure and religious houses had been built.'³

On the face of it, Saint Daniel's return to the World in order to rescue his fellow men from political oppression is the same story as the return of Purun Baghat⁴ to give warning, to the village below this Hindu hermit's cave, of an impending landslide that would otherwise have engulfed the villagers unawares. The point is, indeed, the same in the legend of the Christian saint and in the Western storyteller's version of a Hindu theme. The historic Christian and the imaginary Hindu hermit each rises to his highest spiritual flight by breaking away, for the love of God and Man, from a settled course of physical withdrawal from the World along which he had been seeking spiritual perfection. Yet, though both responded in the same way to the same illumination, there is a difference between their spiritual histories in the crucial point of the relation of the new light that had dawned on them to their previous spiritual outlook. The Christian saint had been led into his physical retreat from the World by the same love of God and Man that eventually moved him to descend from his pillar, whereas the Hindu sage, when

¹ For the first nine years of these twenty-four, Saint Daniel had immured himself in an ex-pagan temple; for the last fifteen he had marooned himself on the top of a pillar.

² Phil. iii. 14.

³ Dawes and Baynes, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

⁴ Kipling, Rudyard: 'The Miracle of Purun Baghat' in *The Second Jungle Book* (cited in III. iii. 190-1).

he yielded to the impulse of love and pity that sent his feet hastening down the mountainside from the cave to the village, was not fulfilling his philosophy but was flying in its face—and who can say whether he would have brought himself to make this sacrifice 'in real life', if he had been an historical character authentically brought up in a philosophical tradition inherited by Hinduism from a Primitive Buddhist School, instead of having been created, as he was, by the imagination of a Western man of letters brought up in the religious tradition of Christianity?

The truth is that Frazer's strictures, which miss their mark when he directs them against the saints, find a legitimate target in the philosophers, be they of the Indic or of the Hellenic school, who cultivate a detachment in which the withdrawal leads to no return.¹ The Hinayanian, Stoic, and Epicurean ideal of the sage goes astray through casting Man for a superhuman role of godlike self-sufficiency and thereby condemning the adept to seek a way out of an impossible position by restricting himself to a sub-human performance. This philosophy attempts to make of Man, not a saint inspired by God's grace, but a very god in himself; and, since this is too heavy a burden for a human soul to bear, the philosopher cannot make even a pretence of carrying it off unless he lightens his self-imposed load by casting out his God-given feelings of love and pity for the rest of God's creatures.²

It is true that, when we diagnose the causes of the breakdown of the Hellenic and the Indic Civilization, the philosophers, too, must be acquitted. It can be demonstrated that, though they made their appearance earlier than the saints, they too did not appear till after the civilization had dealt itself a mortal wound, and that they too did not make a spiritual vacuum but sought, like the missionaries of the higher religions after them, to fill one that had already been made by a parochial patriotism which had begun by claiming the citizen's entire allegiance and had ended by discrediting the civic virtues through the evil which it had led men to do in their name. If, however, we were to put Philosophy on trial, not for historic sins against Society imputable to her account, but for latent anti-social potentialities in her doctrines, ideals, and *éthos*, we should find her more vulnerable than Religion to Frazer's indictment.³ Philosophy's most insidious offence is to refashion Man's ideal of God in the human sage's image. In place of a homicidal God-the-tribesman she has nothing better than a stony-hearted God-the-isolationist⁴ to offer to souls that have wearied at last of the never-ending holocausts exacted by a hydra-headed idol.

No doubt we should also find that many would-be saints—like the pilgrim in Tolstoy's tale who persisted in his journey to Jerusalem without letting the love of God side-track him, like his companion, into helping a neighbour in need⁵—had sinned against their own ideal by falling into the unsocial practice of the philosophers. To detach oneself spiritually from the World is an easier option than the travail of sharing

¹ See V. vi. 132-48.

² See the passages quoted from Edwyn Bevan in V. vi. 146-7 and 151-2.

³ See further pp. 515-16, below.

⁴ This idea of God is illustrated in the passages of Hellenic and Indic literature that have been quoted in V. vi. 144-6.

⁵ See Tolstoy, Leo: *Two Old Men*.

God's love for the World and participating in His work of transfiguring it; and in the Hellenic World the higher religions found Philosophy already in the field, with an established tradition and prestige, on the wait to captivate souls in whom the flame of divine love was burning low. Many, perhaps a majority, of the aspirants to sainthood fell by the way-side; yet the few who did live up to the Christian ideal in some measure sufficed to secure the survival of a Christian society when Roman hands failed to save an Hellenic Civilization from the final consequences of its own past suicidal acts. It looks as if the spirit of the higher religions, so far from being a social cancer, were the bread of social, as well as spiritual, life.

(II) CHURCHES AS CHRYSALISES

(a) THE GROUNDS FOR THE CHRYSALIS CONCEPT

In the preceding chapter we have joined issue with Celsus and Rutilius and with the exponents of their thesis in our Western World in its modern age. We have contested the view that churches are cancers which eat the living tissues of a civilization away; yet we may still agree with Frazer's dictum, at the close of the passage which we have taken as our text,¹ that the tide of Christianity, which had flowed so strongly in the last phase of Hellenic history, had been ebbing in these latter days, and that the post-Christian Western Society that had emerged was one of the same order as the pre-Christian Hellenic Civilization. This observation opens up a second possible conception of the relation between universal churches and civilizations. On this view the churches present themselves, not as the sinister destroyers of civilizations, but as their useful humble servants. This role is assigned to the Catholic Christian Church—in contrast to the spirit of a gnostic form of Christianity that had gravitated towards the standpoint of the philosophies of Detachment—in a passage from the pen of a Modern Western scholar which has been quoted at a previous point in this Study² without its significant concluding sentence.

'The old civilisation was doomed, but this religious Nihilism puts nothing in its place. To the orthodox Christian, on the other hand, the Church stood, like Aaron, between the dead and the living, as a middle term between the things of the Next World and of This. It was the Body of Christ and therefore eternal; something worth living for and working for. Yet it was in the World as much as the Empire itself. The idea of the Church thus formed an invaluable fixed point, round which a new civilisation could slowly crystallise.'³

On this view, universal churches have their *raison d'être* in keeping the species of society known as civilizations alive by preserving a precious germ of life through the perilous interregnum between the dissolution of one mortal representative of the species and the genesis of another. In this repetitive process of the reproduction of civilizations, which is assumed to have an absolute value as an end in itself, the

¹ See p. 384, above.

² In V. vi. 157.

³ Burkitt, F. C.: *Early Eastern Christianity* (London 1904, Murray), pp. 210-11.

churches are useful and perhaps necessary, but secondary and transitional, phenomena. A church serves as egg, grub, and chrysalis between butterfly and butterfly. The writer of this Study had to confess that he, too, had been satisfied for many years with this rather patronizing view of the churches' role and nature;¹ and he still believed that this conception of churches as chrysalises, unlike the conception of them as cancers, was true as far as it went; but he had come to believe that this was so small and unrepresentative a facet of the whole truth about universal churches as to be utterly misleading if it was mistaken for the whole of which it was in reality a minor part. It may be convenient at this point to explore, by an empirical survey, how far this partial truth—if such indeed it is—will carry us, and then to take the limit reached in this inquiry as a starting-point for seeking a standpoint that will yield a more enlightening perspective.

If we cast our eye over the civilizations that were still alive in A.D. 1952, we shall see that every one of them had in its background some universal church through which it was affiliated to a civilization of an older generation. The Western and Orthodox Christian civilizations and the offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia were affiliated through the Christian Church to the Hellenic Civilization; the Far Eastern Civilization and its offshoot in Korea and Japan were affiliated through the Mahāyāna to the Sinic Civilization; the Hindu Civilization was affiliated through Hinduism to the Indic; the Iranic and the Arabic through Islam to the Syriac. All the eight then extant civilizations had churches for their chrysalises, and the seven then extant fossils of extinct civilizations were all preserved in ecclesiastical integuments. This was true alike of Jewry, a fossil of an extinct Syriac Civilization that had come to be dispersed throughout the World; of the Parsee, Nestorian, and Monophysite fossils of the same extinct Syriac Civilization in South-Western Asia and India; of the Jain fossil of the Indic Civilization in India; of the Hinayanian Buddhist fossils of the Indic Civilization in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia; and of the same civilization's Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist fossils in Tibet, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union.² Even the Buddhist fossils, which were not scattered in diaspora but possessed national homes of their own in physical fastnesses or in 'geopolitical' *intermundia*, might have been ground to powder, long since, by the mighty living civilizations around them, but for the consolidation of their texture by the 'social cement' of a highly and peculiarly institutionalized religion.

¹ In a spiritually sensitive soul, the same interpretation of the historical facts may, of course, breed a mood of melancholia instead of complacency:

'As Classical Civilisation collapsed, Christianity ceased to be the noble faith of Jesus the Christ: it became a religion useful as the social cement of a world in dissolution. As such, it assisted at the rebirth of Western European Civilisation after the Dark Ages. It has endured to be the nominal creed of clever and restless peoples who are ceasing to give even lip-service to its ideals. As to its future, who can prophesy?' (Barnes, E. W.: *The Rise of Christianity* (London 1947, Longmans Green), p. 336).

² In A.D. 1952 the Buriat community still survived in Transbaikalia, though the Calmuck community that had tenanted the pasturelands between the lower reaches of the Volga and the Don since the seventeenth century of the Christian Era (see III. iii. 397) was reported to have been liquidated as a punishment for disloyalty to the Soviet Union at the time of the German invasion during the General War of A.D. 1939-45.

In these fossil communities the chrysalis church had preserved an elsewhere extinct civilization in a state of suspended animation, without having succeeded in inducing a new civilization to germinate within its protective but restrictive sheath. To investigate the process by which a new civilization does affiliate itself to a predecessor through the agency of a church, we must concentrate our attention on the living civilizations. On a synoptic view of the antecedents of these, we shall find ourselves able to analyse the process of transition to them from their predecessors into three phases which, from the standpoint of the chrysalis church, we may label 'conceptive', 'gestative', and 'parturient'.

The conceptive phase of the missionary role of a universal church sets in when the church seizes an opportunity that is offered to it by the secular social environment in which it arises.

This environment is the universal state which a disintegrating civilization throws up, at an advanced stage of its decline, in an effort to arrest the fatal process. By the time when this rally is achieved, and not least in the very act of achieving it, the ailing secular society, partly unintentionally and partly deliberately, has put out of action many of the master institutions of its phase of growth—above all, the parochial states which, while the society was still in health, gave such scope for variety in the exercise of its creative powers, and this not only in the political and economic fields, but in the visual arts, literature, and other provinces of culture. The universal state could not arise until its parochial predecessors had decimated their own ranks by recurrent fratricidal wars, and until the weakened survivors had exhausted their credit of affection and loyalty in the hearts of citizens on whom they had been calling for never-ceasing and ever-increasing sacrifices; and, after establishing itself, it could not secure its position against the threat of a recrudescence of international anarchy without curbing the remnant of parochial sovereignty and sapping the remnant of self-government. In this situation the sorely tried populations that have been united politically at last within the universal state's frontiers find themselves torn between conflicting feelings which they cannot reconcile. Their dominant emotions are a thirst for peace and quiet and a grateful acquiescence in the oecumenical régime that has brought them these long-desired blessings, and this general attitude of mind is the psychological foundation of the parvenu imperial government's rule. But the sense of relief is traversed and tempered by a sense of frustration; for Life cannot preserve itself by bringing itself to a halt; the stream of psychic energy known in the language of a Modern Western school of Psychology as *libido* continues to well up out of its springs in the subconscious depths; and, as the universal state settles down and its subjects begin to recuperate from their exhaustion, while the memory of the preceding Time of Troubles begins to fade, they suffer more and more discomfort from the choking up of the ancient institutional outlets for the flow of the human 'social animal's' life-force.¹

¹ The discomfort is apt to be at its maximum in the universal state's capital city, 'quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque' (Tacitus: *Annals*, Book XV, chap. 44).

This is a psychological need for which the universal state itself does not provide; for its *raison d'être* is the negative one of re-establishing control over destructive forces that have got out of hand; and, so far from being concerned to open up innocuous alternative channels for activity, it tends to look askance at all new manifestations of Life as so many more openings for fresh outbreaks of the demonic spirit of Anarchy. In this situation a nascent universal church may make its own fortune by doing for a stagnant secular society the service that is now its most urgent need; for it can open up new channels for the baulked spiritual energies of Mankind without asking the imperial government's leave and sometimes, still more effectively, in defiance of its veto. In the Roman Empire,

'The victory of Christianity over Paganism . . . furnished the orator with new topics of declamation and the logician with new points of controversy. Above all, it produced a new principle, of which the operation was constantly felt in every part of Society. It stirred the stagnant mass from the inmost depths. It excited all the passions of a stormy democracy in the quiet and listless population of an overgrown empire. The fear of heresy did what the sense of oppression could not do; it changed men, accustomed to be turned over like sheep from tyrant to tyrant, into devoted partisans and obstinate rebels. The tones of an eloquence which had been silent for ages resounded from the pulpit of Gregory. A spirit which had been extinguished on the plains of Philippi revived in Athanasius and Ambrose.'¹

This passage from the pen of a Modern Western historian is as truthful as it is eloquent, but its theme is the second chapter in the story. At this stage the opening of new channels by the Christian Church did indeed release intellectual and political energies that had been dammed back so long that their currents had been flowing in reverse into the Dead Sea of Archaism.² But this chapter followed a previous, and more critical, stage in the encounter between universal church and universal state in which a head-on collision between them had given ordinary men and women a fresh opportunity for making a supreme sacrifice that had been the glory and the tragedy of Society in the age of parochial sovereignty and fratricidal warfare.

The essence of the institution of the parochial state is the custom that calls on its citizens to give their lives for it in war, and this demand is psychologically possible so long as their country fills the whole of their mental horizon and appears to embrace the sum of things human and divine. This pretension of a state to be the Universe, preposterous though it be, only ceases to command assent and obedience when the last of the contending parochial states of a disintegrating society have been annihilated and replaced by a single universal state which, at the beginning, commands the loyalty of no more than that fraction of its population that constitutes the imperial people, and when concurrently the people's religious devotion is transferred from cults with local roots to higher

¹ Macaulay, Lord: 'History', in *Miscellaneous Writings* (London 1860, Longmans Green, 2 vols), vol. i, p. 267. Compare the passage, describing how Religion filled a psychological vacuum in the Achaemenian Empire, that has been quoted from Eduard Meyer in V. vi. 29-33.

² See V. vi. 49-97.

religions with a message for all Humanity.¹ Under the pagan Roman Empire in the Age of the Principate, no one, as we have seen,² except a handful of professional soldiers, recruited by voluntary enlistment, was called upon to die for an oecumenical polity, but the Roman Government itself was unable to prevent civilians of the most 'unmartial' social antecedents from sacrificing their lives as martyrs to the cause of the Christian Church. This state of affairs—so rare up to date in the Age of the Civilizations—in which the object for which men and women were prepared to give their lives was a church and not a state,³ might foreshadow the future relation between Politics and Religion in a coming age that had not yet emerged above the historical horizon of the writer's generation.

Thus, in this 'conceptive' phase of the encounter between a universal church and a universal state, the church receives into itself the energies that the state can neither utilize nor liberate, and creates new channels along which these can find vent. The 'gestative' phase that follows is distinguished by a vast increase in the church's range of creative action. The outlets already found by the church for energies with which the

¹ See Eduard Meyer, loc. cit.

² On pp. 342-4, above.

³ The foregoing account of the conceptive phase of the missionary role of a church has drawn the following comment from Mr. Martin Wight:

'An interesting point emerges here, which the reader would like you to develop. You illustrate the conceptive phase only from Christian history. Does this mean that there is not comparable evidence from the other higher religions?

'Is it correct to say that the characteristic mark of the conceptive phase is *sanguis martyrum semen ecclesiae*? If so, then there are *a priori* reasons for expecting the conceptive phase to have a peculiar importance in the history of Christianity, if not actually to be peculiar to Christianity. 1. Christianity is the only higher religion whose Founder consummated his mission by being himself martyred. Is it also the only one whose Founder emphasised martyrdom as the likely fate and the supreme test of fidelity for his followers?—Anyway, to share the sufferings of Christ has always had a central place in the tradition of Christian devotion (cp. Matt. x. 17-22 and 39, Mark x. 39, John xvi. 2, Rom. viii. 17, Rev. vi. 9-11), and the will-to-martyrdom was probably greater among Early Christians than among the early adherents of other higher religions. 2. Christianity has always made more exclusive claims than the other higher religions (except Islam), and consequently made it peculiarly difficult for the universal state in which it arose to be tolerant towards it (cp. V. vi. 46-47).

'In other places in this Part you refer to what might be evidence for or against an occurrence of the conceptive phase in the other churches. Islam did not grow up within a universal state but conquered one from outside, so that its seed was not the blood of the martyr but the sword of the warrior: the conceptive phase, if any, must therefore have taken a different form (see p. 411, n. 4, below), and the subsequent retroactive persecution by the new church of the residual pre-higher-religion minority was less severe than in the case of Christianity (cp. p. 400, below). The two Indic religions have been inherently tolerant (see pp. 438-9, below). Does this mean that Hinduism established itself without any need of *sanguis martyrum*? As for the Mahāyāna, it permeated the Far Eastern Society with only "occasional bouts of repression" (see p. 405; cp. pp. 541-2). "These persecutions", says C. P. Fitzgerald, "never resembled those so familiar from Western religious history. There were no burnings, no torture or massacre of the faithful. At most the authorities ordered the destruction of some or all of the monasteries, and forced nuns and monks to return to family life, sometimes by the expedient, repugnant to all good Buddhists, of mating the monks and nuns themselves" (*China, A Short Cultural History*, p. 276). Is this a valid generalisation?

'The question is twofold: 1. Has *sanguis martyrum semen ecclesiae* been true on the whole only of Christianity? For if so, it seems to give the conceptive phase a deeper significance for the Christian Church than for the others. 2. If so, what have been the marks of the conceptive phase for the others?

In the opinion of the writer of this Study the answer to the first of these two questions is in the affirmative, while the answer to the second is that, in the histories of the other higher religions, as in the history of Christianity, the essential mark of the conceptive phase is to be found in a transfer of spiritual energy from secular to religious channels.

universal state has been unable to cope are equivalents, as we have seen, of secular institutions and activities which had been creative in a civilization's growth phase but destructive in its Time of Troubles and incompatible with the rest-cure of an oecumenical polity. In the next chapter of the story the secular oecumenical institutions which the universal state has built up go the same way as the secular parochial institutions that they have supplanted. After having come into existence to meet a social need, they become a social incubus by clinging to existence after they have ceased to fulfil their purpose; and at this point the church intervenes again. She uses the achievements and experience of the now declining universal state for building new oecumenical institutions of her own, and draws into her service for this purpose men of mark who have failed to find scope for their genius as public servants of the secular imperial power in its tragi-comic last phase of paralysis and ineptitude.

We have studied this process of spoiling the Egyptians already in our survey of the beneficiaries from imperial installations, currencies, and corporations,¹ and we need not recapitulate our findings. We may pass on now to observe that the new shapes into which the church recasts the borrowed secular institutions prove capable of surviving a social interregnum in which the declining universal state goes to pieces, carrying with it the moribund secular civilization of which it is a political embodiment. What is more, this ability of the church to ride the storm is apprehended intuitively by the mass of Mankind, who by this time have a presentiment of the secular society's doom and are anxiously looking for a raft on which they may take refuge from the sinking ship. The transition to the 'gestative' from the 'conceptive' phase of the church's service as a chrysalis is signalized by a spate of mass-conversions.

The speed and scale of such religious landslides appear, as might be expected, to be proportionate to the degree of the pressure exerted on the disintegrating civilization by the barbarian aggressors who are the church's competitors for this derelict heritage.

In another context² we have already observed that in a moribund Sinic World the Mahāyāna began to make appreciable progress after the collapse of the Han Empire towards the close of the second century of the Christian Era and its replacement in the third century by the indigenous successor-states known as 'the Three Kingdoms'. When, however, in the fourth century of the Christian Era the North was overrun and occupied by Eurasian Nomad war-bands, while the regions south of the watershed between the Yellow River and the Yangtse Basin succeeded in keeping these alien invaders at bay, there was a sudden sharp differentiation in the fortunes of the Mahāyāna in these two now politically differentiated areas. In the North the Mahāyāna now captivated an overwhelming majority of the population—no less than 90 per cent., even according to the testimony of unsympathetic historians of the Confucian School. In the South, where the sense of insecurity was less acute, the new higher religion never succeeded in either absorbing or erasing the old secular culture. Though the strength

¹ On pp. 80-379, above.

² On pp. 370-2, above.

of the hold which the Mahāyāna obtained there too is attested by the devotion to it of so cultivated a ruler as Liang Wuti (*imperabat* A.D. 502-49), the tradition of Confucian scholarship and administration succeeded in maintaining in the South a base of operations from which it eventually reasserted itself throughout the domain of a nascent Far Eastern Society.

In a moribund Hellenic World the sudden mass-conversion of the northern provinces of the Han Empire to the Mahāyāna in the fourth century of the Christian Era had its counterpart in the similar conversion of the western provinces of the Roman Empire to Catholic Christianity in the fifth century, when these provinces were being overrun by Nomadic or Nomadicized barbarians from the Eurasian Steppe and by sedentary barbarians from the North European forests. The religious landslide that was precipitated here at this date by a similar political and social crisis was the more remarkable considering that the Christian Church had won the bulk of its converts in the eastern and central provinces of the Empire during the first three centuries of its history; and, though Constantine's manifesto in favour of Christianity on the eve of the Battle of the Milvian Bridge indicates that, by A.D. 312, Christianity was already a force to be reckoned with in the western regiments of the Imperial Army,¹ it seems not to have become anything more than a minoritarian religion among the civil population in the West till the close of the fourth century. In these backward western provinces at this time the peasantry and gentry were falling more and more under the influence of the great landowners of the Senatorial Order, and these western provincial *virī senatorii* were influenced in their turn by the metropolitan senatorial nobility in Rome, who were 'die-hard' devotees of Paganism.² Among the Gallic Roman grandees and their retainers the revolutionary change of religious outlook within the century that embraces the lifetimes of Rutilius Namatianus and Sidonius Apollinaris is no doubt to be explained by the deeply disquieting effect of the successive waves of barbarian invasion that swept across Gaul between the breach of the Rhine frontier by the Vandals and their comrades in A.D. 406 and the overthrow of the no longer unmitigatedly barbarous Visigoths by the still portentously unreclaimed Franks in A.D. 507.

In a moribund Syriac World in the time of the Caliphate the barbarian pressure that evoked the sharpest anxiety and apprehension was the onset of the Eurasian Nomad Turks, and the exposed area consisted of the provinces of the Caliphate, from Khurāsān to Fāghānah inclusive, that lay to the north-east of the central desert of Iran and of the narrow passage at the Caspian Gates between the north-western edge of the desert and the belt of mountains, forest, jungle, and swamp that extended, on the other side of the fairway, to the shores of the Caspian Sea. In the light of the episodes of Hellenic and Sinic history which we have noticed above, it is not surprising to catch glimpses of mass-

¹ See p. 341, above. N. H. Baynes, in his *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church* (London 1929, Milford), p. 4, estimates that Christianity was professed by perhaps one-tenth of Constantine's subjects at this date.

² See V. vi. 88-89.

conversions to the orthodox Sunnī form of Islam in these outpost provinces of the Caliphate from the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era onwards.

Already in the Umayyad Age, when Khurāsān was still the north-east frontier province of the Caliphate, before the definitive conquest of Transoxania, the local Iranian population had been quick to fraternize with its Arab conquerors in the common interest of fending off the barbarians; and the Iranian clients whom the Arab frontier garrisons enlisted in their ranks seem to have become converts to Islam as a matter of course.¹ After the definitive incorporation of Transoxania in the Caliphate and the subsequent turn of the tide of war in the barbarians' favour under the 'Abbasid régime, the process gathered momentum. The conversion of Sāmān, a member of the local Iranian nobility at Bākh, from Zoroastrianism to Islam, towards the end of the eighth century of the Christian Era,² was the first step towards the establishment of a Samanid successor-state of the 'Abbasids that took over from its nominal suzerains a wardenship of the north-eastern marches which the 'Abbasids themselves had become too feeble to administer effectively any longer from their distant headquarters at Baghdad.³

The example set by Sāmān's conversion to Islam was widely followed by his descendants' subjects,⁴ and, when the Samanids in their turn collapsed after having held the fort for 180 years (A.D. 819-999), and the long-dammed-back flood of barbarian invasion at last broke through, the final stage in the process of conversion went with a run. There were few Zoroastrians left in Khurāsān, and few followers of the Mahāyāna in Transoxania or Afghanistan, by the time when the utterly barbarous Mongols broke in at the heels of the more amenable Turks. This last and most devastating wave of Eurasian Nomad invaders almost obliterated the remnants of the ancient culture in the dominions of the Samanids' Turkish successors the Khwārizm Shāhs; and, if a common Islam, which by that time had superseded the previous sectarian faiths, had not inspired the survivors of the sedentary population between the Jaxartes and the Caspian Gates to present a united front to their alien oppressors, the Syriac Civilization might have perished without a successor. The Iranic Muslim Civilization, which arose out of the ruins of the Syriac Civilization and which succeeded in taking the savage Mongol conquerors captive, unmistakably owed its existence to an Islamic chrysalis.⁵

The conversion to Islam of the Zoroastrian and Buddhist subjects of an empire in which Islam was the hall-mark of the imperial people was not, however, so remarkable as the conversion of the unconquered Zoroastrians of Daylam and Tabaristān, who, in their fastness between the Elburz Range and the Caspian Sea, had preserved their freedom when all the rest of the Sasanian Empire had capitulated to the Primitive

¹ See V. v. 450, and pp. 140-1, above.

² See Arnold, Sir Thomas: *The Preaching of Islam*, 2nd ed. (London 1913, Constable), p. 210.

³ See II. ii. 142.

⁴ According to Arnold, op. cit., p. 214, the decisive date in the conversion of Transoxania to Islam was the reign of the 'Abbasid Caliph Mu'tasim (*imperabat* A.D. 833-42).

⁵ See II. ii. 142, 144-50, and 446-52; and pp. 256-7, above.

Arab Muslim armies.¹ Their retention of their ancestral Zoroastrian faith had been the symbol of the successfulness of their resistance; yet in the course of the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian Era they abandoned Zoroastrianism in favour of Islam on their own initiative. A landmark in this process was the voluntary conversion of the independent prince Karīm b. Shahriyār of the Qābūsi House at the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era; and there were subsequent mass-conversions in Daylam in A.D. 873 and in both Daylam and Tabaristān *circa* A.D. 912.² It is true that these converts in the Caspian Provinces advertised their independence, even in the act of conversion, by adopting Islam in its heretical Zaydī Shi'ite form;³ yet, even so, this act was a striking manifestation of a desire for solidarity with the rest of their society on the part of a people whose traditional parochialism was inspired and abetted by the physical isolation of their habitat.

In a disintegrating Indic World the effacement of Buddhism by Hinduism seems to have been accomplished by insensible degrees and to have been in progress from perhaps as early as the second century B.C. until as late as the seventh century of the Christian Era—even if we leave out of account the survival of Buddhism in Bengal, where, in the Tantric version of the Mahāyāna, it persisted for some six centuries longer, till the rising tide of Hinduism engulfed its rival here too, thanks to the destruction of the Tantric Buddhist culture in Bengal by the Muslim invaders of the Ganges Valley at the close of the twelfth century of the Christian Era. Yet we can date within narrower chronological limits the period in which, in the Indic World as a whole, Hinduism decisively gained the upper hand. This happened under the Guptan Rāj, which provided the Indic World with an effective universal state (an avatar of the Mauryan Rāj) from the last decade of the fourth century till the third quarter of the fifth century of the Christian Era.⁴ It is perhaps no accident that the Guptan 'Indian Summer', in which Hinduism definitively established itself as the universal religion of a disintegrating Indic Society, was also the eve of the Hun and Gurjara Eurasian Nomad barbarian invasions of Hindustan. At any rate it would appear⁵ that Hinduism in North-Western India, like Islam in North-Eastern Iran, Catholic Christianity in Western Europe, and the Mahāyāna in Northern China, gave a new civilization the possibility of coming to birth by holding together the conquered subjects of a fallen universal state and taking their barbarian conquerors captive.

Hinduism in India and the Mahāyāna in the Far East share with one another the honourable distinction of having achieved their sweeping spiritual conquests of human souls without resorting to the use of physical violence to supplement their preaching. By contrast, in both the 'Abbasid Caliphate and the post-Diocletianic Roman Empire the mass-conversions of a majority of the population to the prevailing higher religion were accompanied by manifestations of exasperation with a residual minority whose obstinate loyalty to its ancestral faith was

¹ See II. ii. 446-7.

² See I. i. 354 and II. ii. 448.

³ See I. i. 85, n. 2.

⁴ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

⁵ See I. i. 85.

cheating Mankind of a unity in which it was ardently longing to find strength. In the Caliphate this exasperation vented itself in spasmodic popular outbreaks of persecution;¹ but these were never pressed home—as is witnessed by the fact that the persecuted non-Muslim religious minorities were still in existence *in situ* at the time of writing, not much less than a thousand years after the date at which they had first begun to feel the breeze of Muslim intolerance.

In the Roman Empire Christian intolerance took the grimmer form of a systematic official repression of all non-Christian religions except Judaism; and this policy was persistently enforced till it resulted in the *Gleichschaltung* that was its objective.² It is significant that this sinister departure from the Constantinian *modus vivendi* between Christianity and Paganism was made in A.D. 382, four years after the Roman military disaster at Adrianople,³ and that the author of the new militant policy was Theodosius I, who was striving to save the Empire from immediate dissolution. When the news of the great catastrophe of A.D. 378 reverberated through the Roman World, a panic-stricken population—faced with an imminent prospect of seeing the familiar secular social framework of its life fall in ruins about its ears—instinctively closed its ranks round the standard of an oecumenical religious organization that gave promise of being able to weather the storm; and this flustered majority turned with savage resentment upon a minority of archaic-minded grandees and backward peasants who, as the rest of Mankind saw it, were wantonly thwarting Mankind's one hope of social as well as spiritual salvation.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, the transition to the 'gestative' from the 'conceptive' phase of a church's service as a chrysalis is marked by an increase in the impetus of the flow of vitality without any change in its direction. In both these phases a current of psychic energy that can no longer find vent through the choked or shattered institutional channels of a disintegrating civilization is flowing into alternative channels newly opened for it by the church. In the 'conceptive' phase the church is absorbing energy, released by the atrophy of the disintegrating civilization's previous parochial institutions, for which a universal state has failed to provide an outlet; at the transition from the 'conceptive' to the 'gestative' phase the church goes on to absorb the residual energy of the moribund secular society for which the universal state did provide an outlet until its own collapse. In this second phase the church is freighted with all the heritage and all the potentialities of Mankind; and, carrying with it this inestimably precious cargo, it embarks on its perilous passage across the gulf that opens beneath its feet when the fabric of the dead civilization finally dissolves into a social vacuum.

In the quaint but expressive imagery of Islamic Mythology, we may liken the church, in this heroic phase of its history, to the avatar of the Prophet Muhammad as a ram who sure-footedly crosses the bridge—

¹ See V. v. 678, n. 2, and V. vi. 205. The subject is dealt with in greater detail in Tritton, A. S.: *The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects* (London 1930, Milford), especially chaps. 4 and 9, and in Browne, L. E.: *The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia from the Time of Muhammad till the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge 1933, University Press).

² See IV. iv. 226-7.

³ See IV. iv. 440-3.

narrow as a razor's edge—which is the only avenue of access to Paradise just because it spans the yawning gulf of Hell. Sinners and unbelievers who hazard the dizzy adventure on their own feet infallibly fall into the abyss; the only human souls that find their way across are those which, as a reward for their virtue or for their faith, are permitted to cling to the miraculous ram's fleece in the conveniently portable shape of beatified ticks.¹ When the crossing has been duly accomplished, the 'gestative' phase in the church's missionary service is succeeded by the 'parturient' phase, and at this second transition the tide in the flow of spiritual energy turns and the roles of church and civilization are reversed. In the 'conceptive' phase the church was drawing vitality from an old civilization within whose framework the church had sprung up; in the 'parturient' phase the church gives out vitality to a new civilization that has been conceived in the church's womb. We can watch this creative energy that has been confined within ecclesiastical bounds during the social interregnum flowing out again, under religious auspices, into secular channels on the economic and political, as well as the cultural, plane of social life.

On the economic plane at the time of writing, by far the most impressive existing legacy of a 'parturient' universal church to an emergent civilization was to be seen in the economic prowess of a contemporary Western World. By that date a quarter of a millennium had passed since a new secular society had completed a long-drawn-out process of extricating itself from the chrysalis of the Western Catholic Christian Church, and seven centuries since the first audacious anti-clerical stroke had been struck by the *Stupor Mundi* Frederick II Hohenstaufen.² Yet the marvellous and monstrous apparatus of Western technology, whose mechanical tentacles were now holding the whole globe in their grip, was a monument of the economic genius of an ecclesiastical Frankenstein; for, when the history of this unprecedented and peculiar Western economic achievement was traced back, it turned out to have originated as a by-product of Western Christian monachism.³ The psychological foundation of this mighty material edifice was a belief in the duty and

¹ An inquiry into the origins of this Islamic myth might carry us far afield and give us light on obscure tracts of religious history. The bridge is manifestly the 'Chinvat Bridge' of Zoroastrian Eschatology (see Nyberg, H. S.: *Die Religionen des Alten Iran* (Leipzig 1938, Hinrichs) (Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-Aegyptischen Gesellschaft (E. V.), 43 Band), pp. 179–86). Is the ram the Cyclops' ram under whose belly Odysseus, clinging to the fleece, passed safely out of the mouth of the Cyclops' cave without being detected by the blinded monster's groping hands? And is this the same ram on whose golden fleece Phrixos safely rode the waves of the Hellespont when his sister Hellë fell off in mid-course and gave her name to the waters in which she perished?

² For the historical significance of the Emperor Frederick II, see pp. 440, 446, and 537–9, below, and IX. viii. 394–5.

³ Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'This is true not only on the social level on which you are discussing it. Is it not more profoundly true on the intellectual level? For does not a Modern Western Science rest on the foundations of a Christian theology and take for granted a Christianised World? "The pre-suppositions that go to make up this "Catholic Faith", preserved for many centuries by the religious institutions of Christendom, have as a matter of historical fact been the main or fundamental presuppositions of Natural Science ever since" (Collingwood, R. G.: *An Essay on Metaphysics* (Oxford 1940, Clarendon Press), p. 227. Compare Berdyaev, N.: *The Meaning of History* (London 1936, Bles), p. 117, and Polanyi, M.: *Science, Faith and Society* (London 1946, Oxford University Press). Compare also the quotation from Gilson on p. 514, below, which makes the same point).'

dignity of physical labour; and this attitude—which was a revolutionary departure from the Hellenic contempt for labour as something vulgar and servile¹—would not have established itself if it had not been hallowed through being inculcated in Saint Benedict's Rule as a means, not of conjuring into existence a titanic 'commonwealth of swine',² but of providing for aspirants to citizenship in a 'commonwealth of God' a discipline in the life of This World that would be propitious for their spiritual endeavours. On this immaterial foundation the Benedictine Order planted the agricultural groundwork of Western economic life, and this groundwork gave the Cistercian Order a basis for the industrial superstructure which their silent activity erected over their monastic folds and fields, until the cupidity that this monk-built Tower of Babel aroused in the hearts of its builders' secular neighbours reached a pitch at which they could no longer keep their hands off it. A spoliation of the monasteries was one of the origins of a Modern Western capitalist economy.

When we pass from the economic to the political plane, we see churches calling into existence new 'commonwealths of nations' and providing the statesmen and administrators required for the government of secular polities.

In a different context³ we have watched the Papacy giving a new political form to a Medieval Western Christendom by moulding it into a *Respublica Christiana* that promised to enable Mankind to enjoy simultaneously the benefits of both parochialism and oecumenicalism without having to suffer from the characteristic drawbacks of either of these hitherto antithetical dispensations. In bringing new communities into the comity of Western Christendom with the political status of independent kingdoms, the Papacy was bringing back into the political life of Mankind the multiplicity and variety that had been so fruitful in the growth stage of the antecedent Hellenic Civilization, while the political disunity and dissension that had brought the Hellenic Society to ruin and its political parochialism into disrepute were to be exorcised, in this new attempt to solve an old problem, by a recourse to the oecumenical authority which the Papacy had inherited from the Roman Empire. The secular parochial princes of a Western Christian World were to dwell together in unity⁴ under the presidency of an ecclesiastical shepherd; and, for the exercise of these political responsibilities, the Pope had sanctions at his command which had been lacking in the Delphic Amphictyony. In the eyes of the subjects of a Medieval Western Christian prince, their ruler's title to their obedience rested on the recognition of his legitimacy by the Apostle at Rome, and the power to bind implied the power to loose.⁵

In a previous Part of this Study⁶ we have observed the tragic breakdown of this Medieval Western Christian ecclesiastico-political experiment, and the course of our inquiry will lead us back to this tragedy

¹ See IV. iv. 239-41.

² Plato: *Respublica*, 369B-372D, cited in the present Study in II. i. 193, n. 1, and II. ii. 23, n. 2. See further XII. x. 523, 612, and 604-14.

³ In IV. iv. 351-2, 378-9, and 518-20.

⁵ Matt. xvi. 19 and xviii. 18.

⁴ Ps. cxxxiii. 1.

⁶ In IV. iv. 533-84.

again. At this point we have merely to take note of it as one illustration of the political role of a church in its 'parturient' phase, and to observe the corresponding role played by the Brahman ecclesiastical fraternity in the political articulation of a nascent Hindu Society when the Brahmins conferred legitimacy on Rājput dynasties descended from Hun and Gurjara Eurasian Nomad founders of barbarian successor-states in the former domain of the Guptan Empire by discovering irreproachable genealogies for these casteless interlopers, who could never have passed themselves off as kshatriyas without the aid of the Brahmins' intellectual dexterity and religious prestige.¹

When we pass on to examine the Christian Church's political role in Orthodox Christendom and the Mahāyāna's in the Far East, we see the church's field of activity being circumscribed in both these societies by the evocation of a ghost of the antecedent civilization's universal state—the Sui and T'ang renaissance of the Han Empire in the main body of the Far Eastern Society, and the East Roman renaissance of the Roman Empire in the main body of Orthodox Christendom.² In these circumstances in the Far East the participation of the Mahayanian clergy in secular public life never became more than a passing phase in a particular region. The prospects opened up by their employment in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era as civil servants in the barbarian successor-states of the Han Empire in its northern provinces, in place of Confucian civil servants who were unwilling to serve a barbarian régime,³ were decisively closed when, in A.D. 589, the South of a nascent Far Eastern World was united politically with the North and when, in the next generation, the Confucian scholar-administrators were enticed by T'ang T'ai Tsung out of their southern citadel to take over the administration of an avatar of the oecumenical empire of the Han.⁴ In Orthodox Christendom the Christian Church's field of political activity had promised in the seventh century of the Christian Era to become what it eventually did become in the West; but in the event the Oecumenical Patriarch Sergius (*fungebatur* A.D. 610–38) proved not to have been the harbinger of an Orthodox Christian counterpart of the Medieval Western Papal ascendancy. In Orthodox Christendom this promise failed to materialize owing to the Emperor Leo Syrus's success in organizing the East Roman Empire in the eighth century and to the re-emergence in the ninth century of a classically educated Christian laity capable of conducting a complicated civil administration without the Church's assistance.⁵

In these altered political and cultural circumstances the fate of the Christian Church in Orthodox Christendom was more ironical than that of the Mahāyāna in the Far East. In the Far Eastern Society from T'ang T'ai Tsung's day onwards the Mahāyāna found a new place for itself as one among a number of religions and philosophies existing side by side and catering, without any mutual exclusiveness, for the divers

¹ See Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 407–15.

² See pp. 19–21, above, and X. ix. 16 and 15.

³ See pp. 370–2, above, and X. ix. 20.

⁴ See pp. 370–2, above, and X. ix. 20.

⁵ See IV. iv. 344–6.

spiritual needs of the same public; and, just because the Mahāyāna did offer spiritual sustenance that was not to be obtained either from a vulgar Taoism or from an academic Confucianism, it unobtrusively continued to permeate the life of the Far Eastern Society in spite of occasional bouts of repression to which it was subjected by Gallio-like emperors at the instigation of envious-hearted Confucian counsellors.

The continuing importance of the Mahāyāna in this unofficial guise is attested by the part that it played in the cultural conversion of Korea and Japan to the Far Eastern way of life—a part that bears comparison with the role played by the Christian Church in the attraction of Hungary, Poland, and Scandinavia into the orbit of Western Christendom. A comparable role was played by the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church in planting an offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Civilization in the soil of Russia; but in Orthodox Christian history this achievement was exceptional; for, although, to outward appearance, the Christian Church in the main body of Orthodox Christendom had suffered less than the Mahāyāna in the main body of the Far Eastern World from an Hellenic political and cultural renaissance that lacked the self-assurance and the driving-force of the Sinic renaissance in the Age of the T'ang, it had been manoeuvred, as a consequence, into a more invidious position. It would have been happier for the Church to have been disestablished than to be kept in harness, as she was, as the handmaiden instead of the Egeria of a ghost of the Roman Empire; for, in her new official status of subjection to the East Roman state, the Church brought, not peace, but a sword¹ into the international life of an expanding Orthodox Christendom.

The disastrous effect of the Orthodox Church's constitutional position on the relations between the East Roman Empire and Bulgaria after Bulgaria's conversion has been examined in some detail in another context,² and we have also noticed how the ascendancy, of which the Church was disappointed in Orthodox Christendom in the auspicious hour when the new society was in growth, was thrust upon the Church out of due time and beyond due measure after the Orthodox Christian Civilization had prematurely broken down in consequence of the monstrously disproportionate over-development of a nascent state that had established its own ascendancy over the Church.³ When the main body of a broken-down Orthodox Christian Society found itself constrained, as the penalty for its political failure, to accept an indispensable universal state at alien hands, and Greeks and Bulgars were forced into political parity at last as fellow *ra'iyeh* of an Ottoman shepherd, the Oecumenical Patriarch Gennadius and his successors were invested *de jure* by the statesmanship of Sultan Mehmed Fātih with the political authority that had once devolved *de facto* on the Oecumenical Patriarch Sergius at the Roman Empire's nadir in the days of Heraclius. During the period between the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in A.D. 1453 and the impact of the West at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the main body of Orthodox Christendom survived in a state of suspended animation as a *millet* of

¹ Matt. x. 34; cp. Luke xii. 51.

² In IV. iv. 379-405.

³ See IV. iv. 352-71.

the Ottoman Empire with the Oecumenical Patriarchate as its *millet bashy*.¹ In this rôle the Church was once again serving the Orthodox Christian Civilization as a protective ecclesiastical integument, but this time it was not a chrysalis fostering a germ of new life but a napkin enfolding a buried talent.²

While there was no doubt about the part played by the Christian Church in the West in calling a new commonwealth of parochial states into existence at and after the close of the first chapter of Western history in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, it was still, at the time of writing, a debatable question whether—and, on an affirmative answer, to what extent—the church was also the source of the parliamentary representative institutions which began, in the second chapter of Western history, to take shape in a number of Western parochial states. It had been affirmed and denied that these parochial secular rudiments of representative government had been derived from the regional conferences of bishops or had been copied from the oecumenical constitutions of monastic orders. Whatever the truth might be on this point, an historian might feel more confidence in ascribing an ecclesiastical origin to the institutions of self-government in the city-states of the Medieval Western World;³ for it was certain that on the secular plane the civic self-government that had once been the distinctive political feature of the Hellenic Civilization did not survive the post-Diocletianic Age, and was indeed already wilting as far back as the early days of an Antonine 'Indian Summer'—to judge, among other evidence, by the correspondence that passed between the Younger Pliny and the Emperor Trajan when Pliny was governor of the province of Bithynia. By that date a vitality which was no longer finding a satisfactory outlet in secular civic life was flowing into the self-government of the local Christian communities in the municipal cells composing the Roman body politic;⁴ and, though, in the stress of the social interregnum following the dissolution of the Roman Empire in the West, ecclesiastical institutions of local self-government went the same way as their secular patterns, the authoritarian influence exerted on elections of bishops by the incumbents of neighbouring sees and by the secular arm never wholly eradicated the memory of the historical fact that the election of a bishop was traditionally the prerogative of the clergy and people of the diocese. In so far as the development of local self-government in the city-states of a Medieval Western Christendom was due to the stimulus of memories of a similar dispensation in the past, the creative reminiscence was a recollection of an ecclesiastical self-government in the Roman Imperial Age rather than of a previous secular self-government which had passed its zenith as far back as the beginning of the Hellenic Time of Troubles in the fifth century B.C.

¹ See IX. viii. 184-6.

² Matt. xxv. 14-30; Luke xix. 12-27.

³ This Medieval Western renaissance of the Hellenic institution of the city-state is examined further in X. ix. 645-8.

⁴ This underlying connexion between the two phenomena in Bithynia that caused Pliny the greatest concern—the decay of civic institutions and the spread of Christianity—does not seem to have been apprehended by either the conscientious governor or the level-headed emperor.

When we turn to consider the enlistment of ecclesiastical dignitaries in the service of secular governments as statesmen and administrators, we find a sharp divergence between the course of Western and Hindu history on the one side and Orthodox Christian and Far Eastern history on the other.

In Western Christendom at moments of acute political and social crisis—as, for instance, when the Roman Empire was dissolving there in the fifth century of the Christian Era, or after the collapse of the Carolingian Empire in the ninth century—bishops were sometimes constrained by the importunity of their harassed flocks to take over the political as well as the ecclesiastical government of their dioceses. In the fifth century of the Christian Era this burden was thrust upon the shoulders of Apollinaris Sidonius by his Auvergnat compatriots on the eve of the annexation of Auvergne by the Roman Empire's Visigothic successor-state; and the elected magistrates who governed the city-states of Northern Italy from the eleventh century onwards seem to have been the direct political heirs, not of Carolingian counts, but of the local bishops who had stepped into the breach when an over-centralized Carolingian administration had broken down. On the Italian side of the Alps the only local bishop, apart from the Pope, who retained this temporal authority during the later Middle Ages was the Bishop of Trent, on the outermost fringe of the North Italian city-state cosmos. In the less precocious Transalpine regions of Western Christendom prince-bishoprics survived until far into the Modern Age. Within the shrunken confines of 'the Holy Roman Empire' the ecclesiastical principalities of Trent, Salzburg, Passau, Würzburg, Mainz, Trier, Köln, Münster, and Liège—to mention only a few of the most illustrious—were not swallowed up by their secular neighbours till A.D. 1803; and even in the Kingdom of England, where the development of an effective central government had been brought on at an exceptionally early date by the Danish invasions and by the Norman Conquest, the Bishop Palatine of Durham did not lose the last vestiges of the attributes of temporal sovereignty until A.D. 1836.¹

As the counsellors and ministers of secular rulers, the ecclesiastical dignitaries of Western Christendom had had a longer and more continuous career of political activity than as temporal rulers in their own right. It was not, perhaps, surprising to see the government of a barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire, such as the Visigothic Kingdom in the Iberian Peninsula in the seventh century of the Christian Era, virtually falling into the hands of the local bishops in council. It was more remarkable that, a thousand years later, after the beginning of the Modern Age, when a Transalpine Western Christendom, in the train of a Medieval Italy, had equipped itself with an educated laity, the secular sovereigns of a sixteenth-century England and Castile and a seventeenth-century France should still have been so prone as they were to place their governments in ecclesiastical hands. The bare recital of the names Wolsey, Ximenes, Adrian, Richelieu, Mazarin is enough to remind us of the prominence of ecclesiastics in the political life of the

¹ An Act of Parliament separating the Palatinate jurisdiction from the See of Durham and vesting it in the Crown was passed at Westminster on the 21st June, 1836.

Western World in its Early Modern Age; and the list runs over into a self-consciously secular-minded eighteenth century. In a post-Hapsburg Spain an offshoot of the House of Bourbon burnt its fingers by placing itself in the venturesome hands of a Cardinal Alberoni; in a Bourbon France an archbishop of Toulouse, Étienne-Charles Lomérie de Brienne, was the last prime minister of an expiring *Ancien Régime* before Louis XVI recalled Necker and convened the States-General; and in a post-Bourbon France a Napoleon appointed at his Minister for Foreign Affairs a revolutionary politician who had served his apprenticeship as a bishop under the *Ancien Régime*. A procession of ecclesiastical statesmen that is headed by a fifth-century Roman *vir senatorius* who ended his career as bishop of Auvergne is closed by an eighteenth-century French diplomatist who began his career as bishop of Autun. From the days of Sidonius to those of Talleyrand inclusive, the 'parturient' phase of the Christian Church's service as a chrysalis was drawn out, in Gaul, over a span of more than twelve hundred years.

In the Hindu World the political record of the Brahman Caste was no less impressive. The new commonwealth of parochial states which the Brahmins had conjured up in the eighth century of the Christian Era out of the post-Guptan social interregnum soon fell into a fratricidal warfare, and in the twelfth century this breakdown opened a breach for the entry of successive waves of alien invaders;¹ yet, through all subsequent vicissitudes of Hindu political fortunes, the Brahmins managed to make their services as secular administrators indispensable under the most diverse régimes. When a disintegrating Hindu Civilization entered into its universal state, Brahman agents—from junior clerks upwards to ministers of state—were employed by the Mughal Rāj and the British Rāj in succession. Akbar ruled India through the agency of Mahēsh Dās (*alias* Rājā Bīrbal), and in A.D. 1952 a Kashmīrī Brahman, Jawaharlal Nehru, was serving as the first Prime Minister of the British Rāj's newly established Hindu successor-state.

When we turn to the histories of the Orthodox Christian and Far Eastern civilizations, the picture changes. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom the Oecumenical Patriarch Sergius's effective intervention in secular politics in the reign of the Emperor Heraclius (*imperabat* A.D. 610-41) was, as we have seen, a flash in the pan; thereafter, the Oecumenical Patriarchate went into a political eclipse that lasted for more than eight hundred years; and, even when Mehmed the Conqueror found it convenient to turn this ancient Orthodox Christian ecclesiastical institution to the political account of an alien régime, he entrusted Gennadius with the management, not of the Ottoman Empire itself, but merely of its largest subject community, the *Rûm Milleti*. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era the Ottoman Government did bring itself to employ unconverted Greeks as ministers of state,² and it recruited these Dragomans of the Porte and Dragomans of the Fleet from the Patriarchal coterie in the Phanar at Constantinople; but these Christian Greek Ottoman high officials were invariably laymen. In a nascent Far Eastern Society the Mahayanian clerical administrators

¹ See IV. iv. 99.

² See II. ii. 222-8.

in the service of the barbarian successor-states of the Han Empire in the North played a political part not unlike that of the Catholic Christian bishops in Visigothic Spain; but, unlike their Western Christian counterparts, they had no successors. No Buddhist Richelieu found service with the Ming and no Buddhist Talleyrand with the Manchus.

The picture changes again, however, when we pass from the political to the cultural plane; for a Mahāyāna which was driven out of the Far Eastern political arena so decisively by a resurgent Confucian School of scholar-administrators in the Age of the T'ang reasserted itself in the intellectual field in the Age of the Sung. The five Far Eastern philosophers, culminating in Chu Hsi,¹ who, in the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian Era, created a new system of metaphysics and ethics in the belief that they were rediscovering the original meaning of the Confucian Classics, owed less to the authentic Confucian canon than to a Mahayanian *Weltanschauung* which by their day had so subtly permeated the intellectual atmosphere of the Far Eastern World that it could govern the thought of minds that were set upon ignoring or repudiating it.²

This enduring intellectual potency was part of the heritage of the Mahāyāna from a Primitive Buddhist school of philosophy of which this higher religion was a metamorphosis.³ In contrast to the Mahāyāna, Christianity had started life without any philosophical system of its own, and had subsequently found itself constrained to attempt the *tour de force* of presenting its faith in the alien intellectual terms of the Hellenic schools in order to commend itself to the intellectually cultivated upper stratum of the Hellenic Society.⁴ In Western Christendom this Hellenic intellectual alloy in Christian thought became overwhelmingly dominant after it had been reinforced in the twelfth century by the 'reception' of Aristotelianism into a Western Christian theology;⁵ and, though the Christian Church did make a most effective contribution to intellectual progress in the West by founding and fostering the Western universities,⁶ it was not in the intellectual so much as in the artistic sphere that the cultural influence of Christianity on the Western Civilization made itself felt. In the West, the liturgy of the Christian Church was one of the roots of a secular literature⁷—first in the Latin that was the sacred language of the Church in the domain of the Patriarchate of Rome,⁸ and thereafter in a galaxy of living vernacular tongues that burst out of their Latin swaddling clothes in the twelfth century as buds break into flower in spring.⁹

¹ See II. i. 202-3.

² See, for example, Fung Yu-lan: *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York 1948, Macmillan), pp. 254 and 268. In the present study the Neoconfucian renaissance of the Confucian philosophy is examined further in X. ix. 40-45.

³ See V. v. 133-6.

⁵ See X. ix. 45-48.

⁷ Another root of the secular literature of the Western World was the heroic poetry inspired by the experiences of the Western Christian barbarian invaders of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula (see V. v. 259-61).

⁸ The renaissances of an extinct Hellenic secular literature—in a Latin dress in Western Christendom and in a Greek dress in Orthodox Christendom—are examined further in X. ix. 60-67.

⁹ There was no such flowering of a new vernacular in the main body of Orthodox

(b) THE INADEQUACY OF THE CHRYSALIS CONCEPT

We have now perhaps carried our analysis far enough to warrant the conclusion that, in each of the eight cases that have been the subject of our inquiry so far, a church had in fact served as a chrysalis which had absorbed energy emitted by a disintegrating civilization and then, in the fullness of time, had transmitted this store of energy to another civilization that had germinated in the missionary church's womb. If this conclusion is correct, the conception of a church as a chrysalis is borne out by the phenomena in so far as we have considered them up to this point; but we have still to ask ourselves two questions: First, does the transition from an 'apparented' to an 'affiliated' civilization invariably take place by way of a chrysalis church? And, second, even in a case in which a church has demonstrably served as an instrument for furthering the process of the reproduction of civilizations, does it follow that this service is the be-all and end-all of the church by which it has been rendered? Can we be sure that this is as important an event in the history of the chrysalis church as it manifestly is in the history of the emergent civilization? Its importance for the church itself must be outstanding if we are to be justified in taking this service as the key to the church's historical function and significance. Yet it is conceivable that, in the church's history, this may be a minor episode, if not a major aberration. Evidently our inquiry is not yet at an end. We must carry our analysis further.

If we examine more closely our eight cases in which the transition from an 'apparented' to an 'affiliated' civilization had been made by way of a chrysalis church, we shall see that in all of them the 'affiliated' society had been a civilization of the third generation and the 'apparented' society one of the second generation.¹ The Western Civilization and the Orthodox Christian, both in its main body and in its Russian offshoot, are affiliated to the Hellenic, which in its turn is affiliated to the Minoan. The Iranic and Arabic Muslim civilizations are affiliated to the Syriac, which is affiliated to the Minoan, as the Hellenic is. The Hindu Civilization is affiliated to the Indic, which in its turn is undoubtedly affiliated to the so-called 'Indus Culture', whether this is to rank as a distinctive civilization in its own right, or whether it is to be classified as an offshoot or a colonial version of the Sumeric Civilization.² Moreover, the progress of archaeological discovery, which had brought a not merely buried but also forgotten 'Indus Culture' to light within the lifetime of the writer of this Study, had subsequently verified and vindicated the Sinic tradition that there had been a 'Shang Culture' in the Yellow River Basin before

Christendom; for here the renaissance of Hellenism was as potent, and as blighting, in literature as it was in philosophy (see X. ix. 73-75). The spark of medieval Greek epic poetry that was struck out by the border warfare between the East Roman Empire and the 'Abbasid Caliphate did not kindle a flame; and the heroic poetry of the Russian barbarian invaders of a crumbling Khazar Empire and the Greek and Serb barbarian invaders of a crumbling Ottoman Empire was likewise abortive (see V. v. 252-9, 288-9, and 296-301). Since the Comnenian Age the vernacular literature of Orthodox Christendom had sprung, not from native roots, but from exotic Western slips and cuttings.

¹ See the table in I. i. 131-2.

² See I. i. 104-9.

the rise of a Sinic Civilization there in the Chóu Age;¹ and by the year A.D. 1952 the disinterment of this buried but never forgotten pre-Sinic Shang Culture had been carried far enough to warrant a student of History in concluding that the Far Eastern Civilization, both in its main body in China and in its offshoot in Korea and Japan, resembled its living contemporaries in being a civilization of the third generation—seeing that the Sinic Civilization, to which the Far Eastern was affiliated, had now proved to be affiliated in its turn to an antecedent Shang Culture which could no longer be dismissed as being merely legendary.² This impressive uniformity suggests that the reproduction of civilizations through the agency of chrysalis churches may be a special feature of the transition from civilizations of the second generation to those of the third.

If we test this conclusion by reckoning the generations from the standpoint, not of the 'apparented' and 'affiliated' civilizations, but of the chrysalis churches, we shall find ourselves arriving at the same uniform result; for the four churches—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and the Mahāyāna—which served as chrysalises in the eight cases of reproduction that we are examining, had been, every one of them, the creation of the internal proletariat of a civilization of the second generation. Christianity and the Mahāyāna stood in this relation to a disintegrating Hellenic Society,³ Islam to a disintegrating Syriac Society,⁴ Hinduism to a disintegrating Indic Society. Moreover, in the two churches—namely Christianity and the Mahāyāna—in which the creative spark of life had been derived from a source outside the society by whose internal proletariat the church had been established,⁵ this alien source had likewise been a civilization of the second generation. Christianity had been inspired by the Syriac, and the Mahāyāna by the Indic, Civilization; and the Syriac and Indic societies, like the Hellenic Society within whose social framework Christianity and the Mahāyāna both grew up, were civilizations of the second generation.

Not all civilizations of the second generation, however, had become apparented to civilizations of the third generation through a chrysalis church. The achievement of this by the Indic Society, for instance, had not been emulated by any of its three sister civilizations. The abortive

¹ The place of this Shang Culture in the history of the civilizations is examined further in X. ix. 375, 694, n. 3, and 696, n. 1.

² This confirmation of a Sinic tradition through the disinterment of material remains that the Shang Culture had deposited during the last phase of its history was an archaeological addition to historical knowledge which, in bringing to light a previously unauthenticated 'cycle of Cathay', called for a change in the classification in previous Parts of this Study. In the table in I. i. 131 the Sinic Society should be transferred from the group of societies unrelated to earlier societies (e.g. the Minoan, Sumeric, and Mayan) to the group of 'infra-affiliated' societies (e.g. the Indic, Hittite, Syriac, and Hellenic); in the table on p. 133 in the same context the Sinic Society should be transferred from the second to the fourth line. In II. i. 318-21 the genesis of the Shang Culture, not the genesis of the Sinic Civilization, should be equated with the human response to the physical challenge of the Middle and Lower Yellow River Basin.

³ For the relation of the Mahāyāna to the Hellenic Civilization, see V. v. 134-5, 361-3, 371, and 482-3.

⁴ Islam was given its historic form by the Syriac internal proletariat, though the Arabian social milieu in which the Founder lived and died was a section of the external proletariat of the Hellenic World (see II. ii. 287-8; V. v. 127-8 and 672-8).

⁵ See I. i. 57.

First Syriac, Hittite, and Babylonian societies all passed away without generating successors; and, though the internal proletariat of the Babylonian Society did succeed in creating two higher religions—Judaism and Zoroastrianism—these embryonic universal churches both missed fire through being diverted to serve the militant political purpose of championing the Syriac Civilization, from which they had derived their inspiration, against an intrusive Hellenism.¹ Thus, even in the transition from the civilizations of the second to those of the third generation, the epiphany of a chrysalis church is not an invariable feature; and, if we now extend our survey first backwards in time behind the second generation and then forwards beyond the third generation, we shall find the picture changing. In the affiliation of the Hellenic and Syriac civilizations to the Minoan Civilization, and of the Indic Civilization to the Sumerian or to the Indus Culture, there is no trace of any chrysalis church performing the service which was rendered by Christianity, the Mahāyāna, Hinduism, and Islam in the next chapter of the story, when the Hellenic, Sinic, Indic, and Syriac civilizations in their turn reproduced their kind in a third generation.

In an earlier passage² we have considered the possibility that Orphism might be a vestige of an almost obliterated universal church, emanating from a Minoan internal proletariat, which then would have done for a nascent Hellenic Civilization what Christianity was to do in the next generation for the Orthodox Christian and Western civilizations. But on second thoughts³ we have inclined to the view that Orphism was not a legacy inherited by the Hellenic Society from a Minoan past but was an artificial and somewhat academic product of Hellenism itself in the Achaemenian Age when, on this view, Orphism was self-consciously manufactured by sophisticated Hellenic souls which had been made aware of a spiritual void in their own social heritage by a sudden revelation, through the conductive medium of the Achaemenian Empire, of the spiritual riches of Syriac religion and Indic philosophy.

If we turn from an almost unknown Minoan to a rather less obscure Sumerian history in its disintegration phase, a glimmer of light here enables us just to discern the emergence of the rudiments of a higher religion from an idolatrous worship which the inventors of Agriculture had paid to their own astounding handiwork.⁴ The worship of a god who dies for his worshippers, and of a goddess who is the dying god's mother and also his bride, seems to have been communicated by a disintegrating Sumerian Civilization not only to its Hittite and abortive Syriac successors and to its Egyptian neighbour but to barbarian and primitive peoples beyond the pale of Civilization up to the extreme north-western bounds of the Old World.⁵ This Sumerian worship of

¹ See V. v. 117-26.

² In I. i. 95-100.

³ See V. v. 82-87 and 697-8 and X. ix. 738-40.

⁴ See III. iii. 256-9.

⁵ See I. i. 115, n. 1, and V. v. 149-50. Henri Frankfort, in *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), pp. 286-94, sets out to disprove Sir James Frazer's assumption—which has been followed in the present Study throughout, and especially in V. v. 147-52—that the worships of Tammuz, Adonis, Osiris, and Attis are so many variants of a single religion. To the present writer's mind, Frankfort's

Tammuz and Ishtar had perhaps been the first institutional embodiment of a new spiritual insight that was so deep and significant that it was still to be found at the heart of the higher religions that were living and working in the *Oikoumenê* in the twentieth century of the Christian Era. Ishtar—the goddess who was at the same time ‘virgin, mother and queen’¹—lived for followers of the Mahāyāna in Kwanyin as well as for Christians in Mary, while Tammuz lived in Amitabha as well as in Husayn and in Christ.² The inchoate Sumeric higher religion which was eventually to bear this precious spiritual fruit does not, however, seem to have lent itself in its infancy to the mundane social task of serving as a chrysalis in the transition from a Sumeric to a Hittite or an abortive First Syriac Civilization. When the curtain rises on a Hittite World whose infancy was still obscure to historians in A.D. 1952, we find the gods of the ‘apparented’ Sumeric Society sharing the field with the gods of the north-western barbarians who had brought a new civilization to birth by overrunning the Anatolian provinces of a dissolving Sumeric Empire of the Four Quarters.³ The Anatolian cult of Ishtar had to wait until the Hittite Civilization, in its turn, had gone down to Sheol before the introduction of the Sumeric goddess into the Hellenic World under the name of Cybele by a Hittite contingent of the Hellenic internal proletariat enabled her worshippers to compete with those of Isis, Mithras, and Christ for the privilege—or *corvée*—of providing a chrysalis for the transition from a declining Hellenic Civilization to successor societies of the same species.

In the Egyptiac World, where the Sumeric pair of divinities acclimatized themselves under the names Osiris and Isis, their worshippers did, if Breasted is right,⁴ come within an ace of creating a proletarian church which might have conjured a new civilization out of the social interregnum that followed the break-up of ‘the Middle Empire’. But this denouement, which would have anticipated by a whole generation the performance of the chrysalis role by Christianity, the Mahāyāna, Hinduism, and Islam, was prevented at the last moment by an *union sacrée* between the hitherto mutually antipathetic and hostile religions of the Egyptiac internal proletariat and dominant minority against the alien religion of the intrusive barbarian Hyksos; and, in consequence, the Egyptiac Civilization was able to double the natural term of its life, at the cost of renouncing the possibility of reproducing its kind.

It thus appears that the intervention of a church in the role of chrysalis,

arguments against the Frazerian view are less convincing than those in favour of it, which are summarized as follows by Frankfort himself with admirable candour:

‘One must start by conceding that it is possible to recount a myth of a dying god which contains features common to the myths of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Syria. His story would run like this: The god was killed by an enemy in the guise of a boar (Adonis) or symbolised by the boar (Osiris, Marduk). Moreover, the god’s body floated upon the water, or he was said to have drowned (Osiris, Tammuz), or his blood stained the water of a river (Adonis). His death brought about the stagnation of all natural life; a goddess bewailed him and set out to retrieve him. The god was found and liberated, sometimes with the aid of his son (Osiris, Marduk, Enlil). With his resurrection, Nature, and especially all vegetation, revived. . . . Furthermore, it has been maintained that the names of Osiris and Assur, and the epithet “Asaru” borne by Marduk, may be derived from a common root’ (Frankfort, *op. cit.*, pp. 287 and 293).

¹ Goethe: *Faust*, Part II, ll. 12102–3.

² See V. vi. 276.

³ See V. v. 266.

⁴ See I. i. 140–3 and V. v. 150–2.

which was a normal occurrence in the transition from civilizations of the second generation to their successors in the third generation, had never occurred in the corresponding transition to the second generation from the first. No such phenomenon had attended the exits of either the Sumeric and Egyptiac or the other primary civilizations, namely the Minoan, the Andean, and the Mayan; and, in passing, we may note that, so far as we know, the New World had never given birth to any indigenous higher religion in any chapter of the history of civilizations there.

If we now extend our survey in the opposite direction in Time, and review the latter ends of the civilizations of the third generation, we shall find that in this chapter of the story too, down to the time of writing, there had been no examples, and few auguries, of a repetition of the process of reproduction by way of chrysalis churches. This difference from the preceding chapter was not due to an absence of those circumstances that had been the predisposing conditions when the Christian Church, the Mahāyāna, Hinduism, and Islam had been created by the internal proletariats of disintegrating civilizations of the second generation; for, whatever might be the state of the Western, Iranic Muslim, and Arabic Muslim societies in the twentieth century of the Christian Era,¹ each of the five other surviving civilizations had by that time given unmistakable proof of being in disintegration by having entered into a universal state; yet these five civilizations, between them, had failed to produce a crop of higher religions that could compare with their predecessors' religious harvest at a corresponding stage in their history, and the balance is not redressed if we add to the catalogue the meagre symptoms² in a Western World whose disintegration could not, in A.D. 1952, yet be taken for granted.

Of the rudiments of higher religions that had been thrown up by one or other of the eight civilizations that were still alive in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, some had stultified themselves by going into politics and resorting to violence, while others, which had refrained from stultifying themselves in this way and had persisted in a gentle course, had then after all stultified themselves nevertheless by falling into the trap that had once ensnared the Osirian Church in the Egyptiac World. These persistently gentle religions had carried their practice of non-violence to the point of depriving themselves of their *raison d'être* by becoming reconciled to a dominant minority whose failure to save society had called them into existence to stand in the breach. These miscarriages have come to our notice already in our survey of internal proletariats and their works,³ and in this place we have merely to remind ourselves of episodes that have been touched upon already there.

An outstanding example of self-stultification through resort to force was presented in Hindu history by Sikhism,⁴ a would-be synthesis of Hinduism with Islam which had started by practising fraternity as a corollary to its preaching of monotheism, had gone astray through allow-

¹ The prospects of the Western Civilization are discussed in XII. ix. 406-644.

² See V. v. 188.

³ See V. v. 58-194.

⁴ See V. v. 106.

ing itself to become the sectarian faith of militant founders of a successor-state of the Mughal Rāj, and had come eventually to be little more than the distinctive mark of a community that had virtually become another Hindu caste. The more romantic fate of perishing with the sword that they had misguidedly drawn had been suffered in China under the Manchu Empire by the T'ai P'ing¹ and in the main body of Orthodox Christendom under the Ottoman Empire by the followers of Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn and thereafter by the adherents of a resurgent Imāmī Shi'ism,² while the Bektāshī movement had steered clear of this particular wrong turning, only to sacrifice its oecumenical mission for the sake of becoming, first a regimental badge for the Ottoman Janissary Corps, and afterwards a national heterodoxy for Albanian barbarians³ whose war-bands had just missed their manifest destiny of entering into the heritage of an Ottoman Empire in dissolution.⁴

In the Western World an ideal of social justice had lured a Christian sect into seeking to anticipate God's work by drawing the sword when the militant wing of the Anabaptist movement had seized the Tyrolese city of Brixen in A.D. 1528 and the Westphalian city of Münster in A.D. 1534;⁵ and it was the same impatience to put down the mighty from their seat and to exalt the humble and meek⁶ that had found vent, in a semi-Westernized Russia in A.D. 1917, in a similar recourse to violence in which a band of militant Marxists had seized, not one city, but an empire, and had victoriously maintained their hold on their huge prize against the hostile world in arms to which their Anabaptist forerunners had quickly succumbed. Like a latter-day Mahayanian Buddhism, this latter-day Marxian Communism could neither be classified correctly nor understood aright as anything but a religion; for, though Marxism, too, was a metamorphosis of a philosophy, and though its exponents vehemently denounced and repudiated Religion in general and Christianity in particular, the Marxian myth, faith, and hope all betrayed their Christian origins,⁷ and the Marxian mission to preach the gospel to every creature⁸ ran true to type by stultifying itself, as other once oecumenical-minded religious movements had stultified themselves in their day, when it enlisted in the service of a secular state.

In a previous Part of this Study, written before the General War of A.D. 1939-45,⁹ it has been suggested that, in a Westernizing World which

¹ See V. v. 107.

² See V. v. 111.

³ See V. v. 295.

⁴ See IV. iv. 76-77.

⁵ See V. v. 167 and 170. Mr. Martin Wight points out that, in the history of Western Christendom, 'the first violent Christian social revolutionaries to make a big stir were the Bohemian Taborites of the early fifteenth century, and' that 'the tradition to which they and the Anabaptists belong can be traced back to the Patarines of Milan. It goes back ultimately, perhaps, to such primitive Christian Futurists as the Montanists and the Circumcelliones, whose centre of interest, however, was not social justice on 'This Earth so much as apocalyptic expectation or personal salvation.' Mr. Wight also points out that Reinhold Niebuhr 'has something like' the 'distinction between "violent" and "gentle" reactions in an internal proletariat in his distinction between "hard utopians" and "soft utopians" among Christian sectaries'. See his *Faith and History* (New York 1949, Scribner), pp. 205-13.

⁶ Luke i. 52.

⁷ See V. v. 177-9. For a further discussion of the affiliation of Marxism to Christianity, see Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1933* (London 1934, Milford), p. 121, n. 2, and *Survey, 1934* (1935), p. 355, n. 3, and p. 373.

⁸ Mark xvi. 15.

⁹ See V. v. 179-85.

at that time, on the political plane, was still a house of many mansions, Marxism might be heading towards the prosaic destination that Sikhism, Imāmī Shi'ism, and Bektashism had each already reached in becoming the national religion of a parochial state. By the year A.D. 1952 Mankind had seen the number of Great Powers in the World reduced to no more than two through the cumulative effect of two world wars in one lifetime,

in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum
omnibus humanis esset terrâque marique.¹

Communism, now dominant by force over one of two political spheres between which the World had come to be partitioned, now appeared to be playing for the supreme stakes of world power or downfall; yet in essence its prospects were unchanged; for the compromising subservience to the Soviet Union, into which the Communist Movement had fallen during the inter-war years as a result of its brilliant politico-military success in seizing and holding the Russian Empire by force, had been confirmed and intensified by the outcome of the Second World War. This picture had not been changed in its essence by the capture of China in A.D. 1948-9, which had been another brilliant politico-military success in Communism's career; for this had only harnessed Communism to a second Great Power and thereby given Communism the role of serving as the ideological expression of a temporary coincidence between Chinese and Russian political interests. If the Soviet Union was destined to provide a Westernizing World with its universal state, no doubt Communism would be rewarded for its alliance with the state which, in that event, would be the single surviving Great Power. The Soviet Union's established 'ideology' would then be imposed on the World as its official faith; but, whatever might or might not be the Soviet Union's prospects of attaining world-wide dominion, it could be forecast with confidence, in the light of the historical precedents,² that Communism's reward, if it were ever to be won, would prove to be Dead Sea fruit; for the Human Heart is the only realm on Earth in which a religion can reign, and nothing so surely alienates the Heart as an attempt to force an entry into it by breaking the will with the bludgeon of political coercion.

This completes our tale of the new religions, thrown up by the surviving civilizations, that appeared in A.D. 1952 to have compromised their spiritual prospects by going into politics and resorting to force. The alternative snare, into which the meek are prone to fall, of coming to terms with an unregenerate dominant minority and allowing themselves to be drawn into its ranks and insensibly influenced by its *êthos* appeared, by the same date of observation, to have entangled most of the rest of the nascent new higher religions that might otherwise perhaps have been capable of providing chrysalis churches if the process of the reproduction of civilizations was to repeat itself by that means.

The popular adaptations of the Mahāyāna which had sprung up among the internal proletariat of a Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 836-7, quoted in V. vi. 135 and in XII. ix. 484.

² For these, see V. v. 646-712.

Society during its Time of Troubles¹ had in the subsequent universal state been fused by a severely authoritarian Tokugawa régime into a spiritual amalgam with an exotic Confucianism and an archaistic Shinto;² and in this Japanese syncretism the popular hope of salvation by faith in the power of a compassionate-hearted Amida had been swallowed up in the philosophic self-discipline of a dominant minority and the primitive self-worship of an artificially insulated fraction of Mankind. In the Hindu World an attempt, in the shape of the Brahmō Samāj, at a synthesis between Hinduism and Christianity³ had been diverted, not by the flagrant militancy that had been the bane of the Hindu-Muslim Sikh Khālsā, but by the more insidiously corrupting attractions of an exotic middle-class Western way of life under a British Rāj. In the Western World itself the same ironic spiritual penalty for social virtue had overtaken the non-militant Mennonite and Moravian Anabaptists⁴ and their kindred spirits in the Society of Friends⁵ during the lull between the Wars of Religion and the Wars of Nationality.⁶ In that liberal and utilitarian age the epigoni of Elizabethan and Jacobean saints and martyrs had been captivated by a Georgian and Victorian prosperity and respectability; and the anaesthetic spiritual atmosphere of a bourgeois 'commonwealth of swine'⁷ had stilled the pricks, and thereby blunted the creativity, of an ancestral faith in which the spark of divine fire had first been kindled by tribulation. In the United States the fascinating mirage of a middle-class Earthly Paradise which had been conjured up there at the North and in the West since the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5 seemed to be exerting an effect even on the *anima naturaliter Christiana* of an 'under-privileged' Negro minority, still battered down in the sump of an alien society, whose traditional rendering of the religion which their forefathers had received from their White masters had been inspired by the agonizing experiences of deracination and enslavement.⁸

When we have discounted the prospects of those living higher religions whose adherents had turned either savage or soft, we are left with a couple of heterodox versions of Islam—the Bahā'iyah and the Ahmadiyah⁹—as the only competitors still in the field, midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, for the role of supplying the Western Civilization with a chrysalis church.

These negative findings of our inquiry did not, of course, prove conclusively that History was not going to repeat itself in this case. Within the lifetime of the writer and his readers the rational and comfortable life that had been lived by a privileged minority in the leading countries of the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era had been shown, by the shattering cumulative effect of two world wars in one lifetime, to have been something local, transitory, and exceptional, and not the dawn of a mundane millennium for which its

¹ See V. v. 99-103.

² See V. vi. 88-93.

³ See V. v. 106.

⁴ See V. v. 168-70 and 171-3.

⁵ See V. v. 168 and 172-3.

⁶ For the rhythm of rout-rally-rout in the modern chapter of the history of the Western Civilization, see V. vi. 312-21.

⁷ Plato: *Respublica*, 369B-372D.

⁸ See II. ii. 218-20 and V. v. 191-3.

⁹ See V. v. 174-6.

dazzled beneficiaries had mistaken it. If the advent of prosperity had banked down the fires of religion, the recurrence of adversity might fan them into flame again. And, even apart from the change of outlook which the catastrophes of the twentieth century had brought in their train, it was manifestly still too early to make any confident prophecy about the religious destinies of the Western World. Denizens of that world half-way through that century were not in a position to tell whether the Western Civilization was already in disintegration or was still in growth. Even if it should prove to have already broken down, the one thing certain about its condition was that it had not yet entered into a universal state; and, even if it should prove to have been, at that moment, so far gone in decline as to be on the verge of political unification under a *pax oecumenica*, a comparison with the situation in other societies of the same species at a corresponding stage of their history would suggest that the contemporary observer was most unlikely to be able to foresee the shape of spiritual things to come. In the Hellenic World on the eve of the Augustan Peace, in the lifetime of Cicero (*vivebat* 106-43 B.C.) and Julius Caesar (*vivebat* 100-44 B.C.), who could have cast the horoscope of a still unborn heterodox offshoot of Judaism? And, in the Sinic World in the generation before Ts'ing She Hwang-ti's, who could have guessed the role that was to be played in the last chapter of Sinic history by a Mahayanian church which at that date had still to arise out of a Primitive Buddhist philosophy through an encounter between three occidental civilizations whose very existence was unknown to the Sinic World of the third century B.C.?

In the light of these historical parallels it would have been rash in the twentieth century of the Christian Era to pronounce dogmatically that the Bahā'ī and Ahmadi movements—exotic and insignificant though they might appear to be at this time—were incapable of playing, in a later chapter of Western history, the role of Christianity in Hellenic history and of the Mahāyāna in Sinic. It would have been rasher still to declare that this part would not be played by some religion that, in the sixth decade of the twentieth century, was still unborn. In and after the General War of A.D. 1939-45 the social scourge and personal catastrophe of deracination had smitten the Western World, for the first time in its history, with a violence that was comparable, scale for scale,¹ with its

¹ The mass movements of deportation, flight, and expulsion in the vast areas in Europe, Russia, and China that came under the power of hostile foreign invaders during these years, at one stage or another of the war and its aftermath, were the most conspicuous but perhaps not the most significant features in the picture. We have also to bear in mind that the soldiers in the invading and the liberating armies were separated from their homes and families for years on end as both combatants and prisoners of war. In countries that were bombed without being invaded, there was a vast exodus of children, industrial workers, and civil servants from the cities to the countryside. And even the United States, which was unique among the major belligerents in remaining exempt from the direct devastation produced by military operations, was far from being exempt from the malady of deracination and its psychological effects. Apart from the temporary uprooting of the millions of young Americans who served in the armed forces in Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Pacific, the enormous industrial war effort of the United States was achieved at the cost of a general post of industrial workers over the vast area of the Continental United States, and even the rural population of previously stagnant agricultural areas was drawn into this war-time economic vortex. In 'the Old South', for example, the war of A.D. 1941-5 produced a radical agrarian revolution that was economic, social, and personal at the same time. In this great region in the course

ravages in the Babylonian and Syriac worlds in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B.C. and in the Hellenic World in the last two centuries before the beginning of the Christian Era; and an experience of tribulation which had been so potent in its spiritual effects in each of these other two cases was perhaps unlikely to be altogether barren of similar consequences in the history of the Western Civilization. Yet, even when the wary historian had made these circumspect reservations, he would still have to report that, within his limited range of vision, there was at any rate no positive indication that History was going to repeat itself in this case by producing another generation of civilizations through the agency of another generation of chrysalis churches.

We have now perhaps carried our survey as far as our knowledge and understanding allow in either direction from our point of departure, which was the service rendered by churches as chrysalises in the transition to the eight still living civilizations from their four progenitors. In the perspective which this reconnaissance has opened up for us, one conclusion seems clear. This chrysalis-church mechanism for the reproduction of civilizations had been the exception, not the rule. Though this species of human society that we call 'civilizations' had been in existence, up to date, for no longer than some five or six thousand years, societies of this species had reproduced themselves at least twice over already, and might repeat the performance again for all that a twentieth-century Western student of History could tell; but it was only in the genesis of one out of these successive litters of civilizations that the process of reproduction had taken this particular form. A previous litter had been produced without the aid of chrysalis churches, and there was no reason for supposing that subsequent litters might not be produced without it likewise. Chrysalis churches were evidently not a necessity of life for the species of society known as civilizations; and this observation suggested that, conversely, the species of society known as churches could not have come into existence simply in order to perform this service. While History testified that the four living churches had in fact performed this service on one occasion, it also indicated that this episode in the careers of these churches might have been incidental and perhaps even accidental. If this was the truth, it signified that the historic role of these churches as chrysalises for civilizations told a historian no more than their fabulous role as cancers told him about the essence of their nature, mission, and prospects. In our search for this ultimate objective of our inquiry, we have once again drawn blank. If we are to continue our investigation, we must make a fresh start from quite a different premiss.

of these few years, man-power and horse-power were largely replaced by machine-power, and the less competent or less fortunate of the former inhabitants were uprooted from the land and swept up into the cities. The consequent immediate increase in economic efficiency and productivity was calculable and gratifying; the ultimate psychological and moral costs were obscure and redoubtable.

(III) CHURCHES AS A HIGHER SPECIES OF SOCIETY

(a) A REVISION OF OUR CLASSIFICATION OF SPECIES OF SOCIETY

A Reversal of Roles

In our inquiry into the relation between churches and civilizations up to this point, we have tacitly worked on the assumption that in the interplay between societies of these two species the civilizations had been the protagonists and that the role of the churches, whether usefully subsidiary or obnoxiously corrosive,¹ had, on either interpretation, been secondary and subordinate. Now that our operations on these lines have proved fruitless, let us try the effect of reversing our point of view. Let us open our minds to the possibility that the churches might be the protagonists and that vice versa the histories of the civilizations might have to be envisaged and interpreted in terms, not of their own destinies, but of their effect on the history of Religion.

As our opening operation in this alternative line of inquiry, let us combine our previous tables of higher religions² and civilizations³ into a single conspectus and see what conclusions this visual presentation of our problem yields us on our new working hypothesis.

The order in which the representatives of three species of human society are set out in the resultant new table⁴ is in the first place a chronological one. The primitive societies, as we have noticed in another context,⁵ must be actually older than Mankind itself; for, if the pre-human progenitors of the Human Race had not already become social animals, it is hard to imagine how they could have been transfigured into human beings.⁶ After Man had become human, he continued to live

¹ A third variation on this assumption, in which the role attributed to the churches is ineptly conservative, is examined on pp. 692-700, below.

² See the table in vol. vi, on p. 329.

³ See the tables in vol. i, on pp. 131-3 and 186.

⁴ Table IV, folding out opposite p. 772, below.

⁵ In I. i. 173.

⁶ The original draft of this sentence ran: 'if the pre-human progenitors of the Human Race had not already become social animals, it is hardly conceivable that they could have achieved the still more difficult feat of turning into human beings.' In this form the passage provoked a challenge from Mr. Martin Wight which led the writer to substitute the present text. Mr. Wight's challenge, however, cuts too deep to be parried by any mere change of words; and the writer would not be dealing frankly with his readers if he did not quote it in full and did not attempt to answer it explicitly.

'This', Mr. Wight comments with reference to the original draft, 'is difficult to follow because the reader is not clear what you regard as the specific differentiae of Man. At several places below you use traditional language in this connexion, saying that Man is "made in God's image" (p. 469, below), possesses a "moral faculty" (p. 470), and is the sole vehicle of "spiritual values" (p. 562, below). Such language suggests that Man was created by God, viz. that at some point in the evolutionary biological process (if we accept that hypothesis) God created a creature different in kind from what went before by endowing it with a soul. See in this connexion the "Platonic myth" in C. S. Lewis: *The Problem of Pain* (London 1940, Centenary Press), pp. 65-68. Now, on such a view, the sociality of Sub-Man is irrelevant. To endow a single individual with a soul, i.e. to make him "in God's image", and then to give him "an help meet" (Gen. ii. 20), was quite enough to start the Human Race. Incidentally the quotation from Eduard Meyer in I. i. 173, n. 3, does not seem to clinch the matter. Speech is "the first thing that makes Man human" certainly, and obviously it cannot have been "fashioned" in the "relation of parents to children", in the sense that the languages of hunting, agriculture or ship-

in primitive societies for hundreds of thousands of years before the first civilizations made their appearance; and the first civilizations were considerably older than the first higher religions. Even the rudiments of higher religions did not appear till some of the civilizations of the first generation were already disintegrating, while the rise of fully-fledged higher religions was subsequent to the breakdown of civilizations of the second generation. Thus our series is a chronological sequence; but it is also a genealogical tree; for the primary civilizations must have been derived from the primitive societies through mutations achieved in response to challenges from the physical environment;¹ the first rudiments of higher religions were derived from the primary civilizations through their internal proletariats; the secondary civilizations were derived from the primary civilizations either through the primary civilizations' dominant minorities or through their external proletariats; the fully-fledged higher religions were derived from the secondary civilizations through their internal proletariats;² the tertiary civilizations

building imply wider social groups; but why cannot speech have *begun* within the family? Meyer seems to beg the question.

'But when you speak of Sub-Man as "achieving" the "difficult feat of turning into human beings", you imply something quite different: an evolutionary pulling-onself-up-by-one's-own-bootstraps. The reader is entitled to ask: "Did Man make himself? Or did God create him?" There can be no conflation of the two views that does not give the second an absolute logical and historical priority.'

So clear and so crucial a question required the clearest and frankest answer that the writer could give. His own belief was that there was nothing in the Universe known to Man that had made itself. All things—human and non-human, animate and inanimate—were 'creatures' in the sense that they had been brought into existence, were kept in existence, and were changed or disbanded by a divine Power and a divine Purpose that were not their own and that, though manifested in and through them, were also always and everywhere outside them and always and everywhere independent of them. At the same time the writer believed that the Creator's purpose and method was, at all stages and levels of creation, to take His creatures into partnership with Himself and to give them the utmost opportunity of sharing in His work. This seemed manifest in the Human Nature with which God had endowed His creature Man; and the writer believed that, in this respect, Man was not a 'sport' (in the naturalist's usage of the word) but was, on the contrary, a type of all creation which gave an insight into the character and aim of all God's work. On this view, both the soul in Man and the sociality of Sub-Man would be gifts given by God to a creature that had responded to a challenge from God to embrace a God-given opportunity of becoming more godlike.

As for the writer's use of the traditional language, on which Mr. Wight legitimately lays his finger, he might say, for his readers' information, that his regular and deliberate practice was to continue to employ traditional language unless and until he could find new words that seemed to him to express his meaning more clearly and more exactly. In the writer's day the resources of language were still utterly inadequate.

¹ See II. i. 302-30.

² In virtue of their all thus standing on the same line in the same genealogical table, the fully-fledged higher religions—as distinct from the rudiments of higher religions discernible in such refinements upon a primitive Nature-worship as the cult of Tammuz and Ishtar—might be regarded as being 'philosophically contemporary' with one another. When, however, the dates of their respective epiphanies were entered on a single time-chart, it proved that their common chronological 'locus' was not a single generation or even a single century, but was an aeon of the order of not less than two millennia.

This comparatively wide chronological spread of the age which had seen the higher religions make their appearance on Earth was due to several causes. In the first place the civilizations of the second generation did not all emerge at the same moment. The emergence of the Babylonian, Hittite, and Indic civilizations might be dated tentatively in the fourteenth century B.C., the emergence of the Syriac and the Hellenic in the twelfth century B.C., the emergence of the Sinic in the twelfth or in the eleventh according to our choice between the two variant versions of a traditional Sinic chronology. In the second place the durations of their growth-phases were unequal. The Syriac Civilization broke down after Solomon's death *circa* 937 B.C., the Indic perhaps at some date in the eighth century B.C., the Sinic in 634 B.C., the Hellenic in 431 B.C. In the third place the

were derived from the secondary through higher religions providing chrysalis-churches; and the internal proletariats of disintegrating tertiary civilizations had been creating the rudiments of higher religions of a new generation—rudiments, whose genesis was, at the time of writing, an accomplished fact, though their prospects were still obscure. Let us now apply to this serial order of societies, which is both chronological and genealogical, our new experimental procedure of viewing the histories of civilizations in terms of the histories of higher religions.

On this view, we shall have first of all to revise our previous tacit and uncritical assumptions about the *raison d'être* of civilizations. We shall have to think of the civilizations of the second generation as having come into existence, not in order to perform achievements of their own, and not in order to reproduce their kind in a third generation, but in order to provide an opportunity for fully-fledged higher religions to come to birth; and, since the genesis of these higher religions was a consequence of the breakdowns and disintegrations of the secondary civilizations, we must regard the closing chapters in the secondary civilizations' histories—chapters which, from their standpoint, spell failure—as being their justification for existence and their title to significance. In the same line of thought, we shall have to think of the primary civilizations as having come into existence, in their day, for the same purpose. Unlike their successors in the second generation, these pioneer civilizations failed to fulfil their *raison d'être* directly by bringing higher religions to birth. The rudimentary higher religions that their internal proletariats did create—the worship of Tammuz and Ishtar and the worship of Osiris and Isis—did not come to flower. Yet, in spite of this immediate failure, the primary civilizations accomplished their mission indirectly

disintegrations of the Syriac and the Indic civilizations were protracted by the Hellenic Civilization's forcible intrusion upon them. The disintegration of the Indic Civilization took some 1,500 years (*circa* 725 B.C.—A.D. 775) and that of the Syriac some 2,200 years (937 B.C.—*circa* A.D. 1275), as against the 1,100 years taken by the same process of disintegration in Sinic history (634 B.C.—*circa* A.D. 475) and in Hellenic history (431 B.C.—*circa* A.D. 675).

The total span of the period during which the higher religions were making their epiphanies in the internal proletariat of one or other of these four disintegrating civilizations thus ran from the tenth century B.C. to the thirteenth century of the Christian Era; and, in dating this period, which he labels 'the Axis Age' (*die Achsenzeit*), *circa* 800–200 B.C., Karl Jaspers (*Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (Munich 1949, Piper), p. 19) is excluding from it the epiphanies of Christianity, the Mahāyāna, Hinduism, and Islam. It would be a still greater mistake to try to confine 'the Axis Age' to the single generation (*floruit circa* 500 B.C.) of Confucius, Lao-tse, the Buddha, Deutero-Isaiah, and Pythagoras; for, while it was true that these seers were all contemporary with one another and were also all outstanding representatives of the philosophers and the prophets of the Age of the Disintegration of the Civilizations of the Second Generation, it was not true that they were all representatives of the same phase of the identical experience to which they were all responding; for a merely chronological contemporaneity does not necessarily carry with it the 'philosophic contemporaneity' which consists in living in a corresponding phase of experience and not in living at the same date. Confucius and the Buddha were, perhaps, approximately contemporary with one another in the philosophical as well as in the chronological sense, considering that the Sinic and the Indic Civilization appear to have broken down at dates that were perhaps not more than a hundred years apart. On the other hand the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization had not yet occurred in Pythagoras' day, and the philosophic contemporaries of the Buddha and Confucius in Hellenic history were not their chronological contemporaries Pythagoras and the fathers of Orphism, but a Zeno and an Epicurus who, on a chronological time-chart, were to make their appearance some two hundred years later than their 'philosophic contemporaries' in the Sinic and the Indic World.

by giving birth to secondary civilizations out of whose breakdown and disintegration the fully-fledged higher religions did eventually arise. We were feeling our way towards this revised view of the significance of the histories of the civilizations, and towards this inverted valuation of the growth-chapters and the disintegration-chapters of the story, when we were making our survey of universal states and were discovering that these master-institutions of civilizations in decline were apt to be barren in so far as they worked for themselves and fruitful only in the service of alien beneficiaries.¹ We have now to apply this finding comprehensively to the histories of civilizations from beginning to end.

Revelation through Tribulation

On this showing, the successive rises and falls of the primary and the secondary civilizations are an example of a rhythm—observed in other contexts²—in which the successive revolutions of a wheel carry a vehicle, not on the repetitive circular course that the revolving wheel itself describes, but in a progressive movement towards a goal. And, if we ask ourselves why the descending movement in the revolution of the wheel of Civilization should be the sovereign means of carrying the chariot of Religion forward and upward, we shall find our answer in the truth that Religion is a spiritual activity, and that spiritual progress is subject to a 'law' proclaimed by Aeschylus in the two words *πάθει μάθος*, and by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews in the verse: 'Whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth.'³

If we apply this intuition of the nature of spiritual life to a spiritual endeavour that culminated in the flowering of Christianity and her sister higher religions the Mahāyāna, Islam, and Hinduism, we may discern in the passions of Tammuz and Attis and Adonis and Osiris a foreshadowing of the Passion of Christ, and may find in Christ's Passion a crowning experience in the spiritual travail of legions of human souls in successive failures of the secular enterprise of Civilization.

Christianity itself had arisen out of spiritual travail that was a consequence of the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization; and this was the latest chapter in a longer story; for Christianity had Jewish and Zoroastrian roots, and these roots—altruistically fertile in a stem that had been grafted on to them—had sprung from the earlier breakdown of two other civilizations of the second generation, the Babylonian and the Syriac, which had become locked together, in an embrace that was both deadly and fruitful, in the course of their simultaneous disintegration.⁴ The living waters of Zoroastrianism had flowed into the stream of Judaism—to find their way thence, in the fullness of time, into the river of Christianity⁵—within the framework of an Achaemenian Empire that had provided the Syriac World with its universal state; and Judaism

¹ See Part VI, *passim*, above.

² See IV. iv. 34–38 and V. vi. 324–5.

³ Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 177–8, and Heb. xii. 6, quoted in I. i. 169, n. 1, and in II. i. 298. For the working of this spiritual 'law', see further p. 425, n. 4, below.

⁴ See V. v. 117–22.

⁵ The contributions of Zoroastrianism to Christianity have been touched upon in V. vi. 43–44.

and Zoroastrianism alike had been the spiritual fruit of the tribulation of a preceding Time of Troubles. The kingdoms of Israel and Judah, in which the well-springs of Judaism were to be found, had been two of the many warring parochial states of the Syriac World in its ages of growth and disintegration; and the premature and permanent overthrow of these mundane commonwealths, and extinction of all the political hopes which had been bound up with their existence as independent polities, were the experiences that had brought the religion of Judaism to birth and had evoked the highest expression of its spirit in the elegy of the Suffering Servant that had been indited in the sixth century B.C. during the last throes of a Syriac Time of Troubles, on the eve of the foundation of the Achaemenian Empire by Cyrus.¹

This was not, however, the beginning of the story of progressive spiritual experience of which Christianity was the climax;² for the Judaic root of Christianity had a Mosaic root of its own, and this pre-prophetic phase of religion in Israel and Judah had been the outcome of a previous secular catastrophe, the break-up of 'the New Empire' of Egypt.³ Whether or not there was any truth in the Israelites' tradition that, in the militantly expansive chapter of Egyptiac history following the expulsion of the Hyksos, the Hebrews had been temporarily conscripted into the Egyptiac internal proletariat, it was certain that they had filtered into the Egyptian dominions in Syria as barbarians from the North Arabian Steppe during an age in which Syria was being annexed to a disintegrating Minoan World through a mass-migration of refugees from the Aegean 'Isles of the Sea'.⁴ The Israelites themselves believed that this Egyptiac episode in their history had been preceded by a Sumeric initiation, in which Moses' forefather and forerunner Abraham had received a revelation and a promise from a divinity that was the One True God, and had been led by this divine guidance to extricate himself from the doomed imperial city of Ur, as Christian, in *The Pilgrim's Progress*, fled betimes from the City of Destruction. According to the tradition the enlightenment of Abraham was the first act in God's manifestation of Himself to a Chosen People; and the secular historical background against which this opening of a spiritual drama was set was the break-up of an 'Empire of the Four Quarters' which had been the final embodiment of a disintegrating Sumeric Civilization. Thus the first step in a spiritual progress which was to culminate in Christianity was traditionally associated with the first instance, known to historians, of the collapse of a universal state, which is the supreme catastrophe for a secular civilization.

Though a twentieth-century Western historian did not know whether 'Abraham' and 'Moses' were 'historical characters', the answer to that question was not of capital importance, since it could be taken as certain that their names stood for authentically historical stages of religious experience. The human beings who 'learnt through suffering' in the last agonies of the Sumeric and Egyptiac civilizations were precursors of Prophets of Israel and Judah who were enlightened, in their turn, by

¹ See V. vi. 120-30.

³ See V. vi. 39 and 43.

² See V. v. 119, n. 4.

⁴ See I. i. 92-94 and 100-3 and V. v. 611.

the tribulations of a Babylonian and Syriac Time of Troubles,¹ and all these men of sorrows were precursors of Christ. The successive sufferings through which they won a progressive enlightenment stood out, on a retrospective view, as Stations of the Cross in anticipation of the Crucifixion.²

In this perspective, Christianity could be seen to be the climax of a continuous upward movement of spiritual progress which had not merely survived successive secular catastrophes but had drawn from them its cumulative inspiration. To judge by this momentous historical instance, the circumstances favourable to spiritual and to secular progress are not only different but are antithetical;³ and this 'law'—if we have stumbled here upon a 'law' governing the relations between mundane life and Religion—is not a paradox.⁴ Spiritual and secular ideals are at variance; they are perpetually striving with one another for mastery over human souls; and it is therefore not surprising that souls should be deaf to the call of the Spirit in times of secular prosperity, and sensitive to the neglected whisper of the still small voice⁵ when the vanity of This World is brought home to them by secular catastrophes and when their hearts are softened by the sufferings and sorrows that these catastrophes inflict. When the house that Man has built for himself falls in ruin about his ears and he finds himself standing again in the open at the mercy of the elements, he also finds himself standing again face to face with a God whose perpetual presence is now no longer hidden from Man's eyes by prison walls of Man's own making. If this is the truth, the interregna which punctuate secular history by intervening between the submergence of one civilization and the emergence of a successor may be expected to have, as their counterparts in religious history, not breaches of continuity or pauses in the pulsation of life, but flashes of intense spiritual illumination and bursts of fervent spiritual activity.⁶

The Higher Religions' Consensus and Dissension

On this reading, the history of Religion appears to be unitary and progressive by contrast with the multiplicity and repetitiveness of the

¹ 'The example of Judaism shows that a political catastrophe can actually give a mighty impetus to religious development' (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, 4th ed., vol. i, Part I (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 156).

² See Luke xvi. 16; Acts x. 43 and xxvi. 22; Heb. i. 1-2.

³ On this question see, further, pp. 701-15, below.

⁴ 'Perhaps there lies an historical law here, still incompletely revealed to us, which transcends even the might of Rome and of Christianity. Augustine may have had an intimation of it; for, having said that God brought the great empire into being in order that His revelation might be the more easily comprehended and diffused, he might logically have added that God was now bringing about its dissolution in order that Man, confronted by the contrast between his aspirations and his achievements, might the more fully perceive that inner must precede outer reformation' (Pickman, E. M.: *The Mind of Latin Christendom* (London 1937, Oxford University Press), p. 148).

⁵ 1 Kings xix. 12.

⁶ 'Times of transition, in which the old order is breaking up and new rules of life are taking shape—times in which nothing remains secure—are the very times in which the religious life displays the most intense activity. . . . [The personalities of religious reformers] make their appearance in the greatest numbers and do their work with the greatest effect in times of ferment, in which the life has gone out of the old order and

histories of civilizations; and this contrast in the Time-dimension presents itself in the Space-dimension as well; for Christianity and the other higher religions that, in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, were living side by side, in an *Oikoumenê* which had recently become coextensive with the whole habitable and traversable surface of the planet, had a closer affinity among themselves than coeval civilizations had been apt to have with one another.¹

This affinity was conspicuously close as between Christianity and the Mahāyāna, which shared the same vision of God² as a self-sacrificing saviour, and owed this penetrating common insight into God's nature to a common Syriac inspiration within a common Hellenic framework. While, in an Hellenic universal state provided by the Roman Empire, a proletarian religion sprung from Judaism was being translated into terms of Greek philosophy, the inverse process of converting an Indic philosophy into a proletarian religion was being carried out, at the opposite extremity of a Hellenizing World, in the Kushan successor-state of Bactrian Greek empire-builders who had 'abolished the Hindu Kush';³ and the uniform influence of these convergent experiences on the two religions was manifest eighteen hundred years later. As for Islam and Hinduism, we have noticed in other contexts that they had allowed themselves to be used for the compromising secular purpose of expelling an intrusive

new ideas are seeking to break through' (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, 4th ed., vol. 1, Part I (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 126-7 and 151).

This would appear to be the answer to a question which had been raised by Karl Jaspers in *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (Munich 1949, Piper), pp. 19-42: 'Erster Teil, 1. Die Achsenzeit': Why was it that like-minded philosophies and, at their heels, like-hearted higher religions had made simultaneous epiphanies at three points in the *Oikoumenê*—in the Sinic World, the Indic World, and the Syriac and Hellenic worlds according to the terminology used in the present Study—independently of one another (p. 33)? After rightly rejecting, as inadequate, the suggestion that a new *Weltanschauung* was propagated by commercial intercourse (p. 39), or that it was an identical reaction to the identical experience of antecedent Eurasian Nomad invasions (pp. 37-38), Jaspers points out that each of these epiphanies occurred in a society that was articulated politically into a host of warring parochial states (pp. 23 and 39), and that 'what had begun by being freedom of movement turned in the end into anarchy' (p. 24). An identical spiritual response to the challenge of this identical tragic social experience would be the explanation of the identity of mind and heart in philosophies and religions which made their appearance simultaneously in several societies that were still insulated from one another at the time. This common tragic experience of the failure of a secular civilization would account for the common *êthos* which Jaspers portrays with a masterly touch.

'The new feature of the Axis Age, which displays itself in all three worlds alike, is that Man becomes conscious of the Universe, of himself, and of his own limitations. He realises the awfulness of the World and his own impotence. He asks himself radical questions. Finding himself on the edge of the abyss, he strives for liberation and redemption. While he consciously comprehends his limitations, he sets himself the highest goals. He becomes aware of the Absolute both in the depths of his selfhood and in the clarity of the Transcendent' (p. 20).

¹ The points of likeness and difference between the four higher religions that were alive in this age are examined further, on pp. 716-36, below.

² In theory a bodhisattva was, not a god, but a spiritual athlete who had arrived at the brink of *Nirvāna* where it was within his power at any moment to escape from the sorrowful wheel of existence, of which the motive-power is *libido* and the momentum is *karma*. In an inverted Christian terminology the bodhisattva could be described as a bondsman of immortal life who had won, but had generously forborne to exercise, the right to put on mortality and so to bring to pass the saying that is written: 'Life is swallowed up in victory' (1 Cor. xv. 53-54). In practice, however, the Mahayanian bodhisattvas were worshipped by their devotees as very gods. (See V. vi. 148 and 164, n. 3, and pp. 482-3, below.)

³ See V. v. 139-40, and pp. 471 and 478, below.

Hellenism from the Syriac and from the Indic World respectively; but this was not the last word that remained to be said about them; for, notwithstanding this mundane role of theirs in an encounter between civilizations, they too reflected insights into the nature of God which gave them a distinctive meaning and mission of their own on the spiritual plane. Islam was a reaffirmation of the unity of God against an apparent weakening in Christianity's hold on a vitally important truth which had been won for Mankind by Judaism; Hinduism re-affirmed the personality of God—at any rate on the plane of reality on which God reveals Himself as an object of devotion for a human worshipper—against an apparent denial of the existence of personality in the Primitive Buddhist system of philosophy.¹ An exponent of the Mahāyāna might protest that this denial was no part either of Siddhārtha Gautama's original teaching or of latter-day Mahayanian practice, and an exponent of Christianity might protest that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity was an enunciation of the sociality of God which left the recognition of God's unity intact. Yet, in maintaining that a synthesis of all the essential truths about God was to be found in his own religion, neither the Christian nor the Buddhist would deny that the Muslim and the Hindu were alertly alive to certain aspects of the truth—even if they might appear, in Christian and Mahayanian eyes, to be blind to others.

After agreeing with the follower of the Mahāyāna in this verdict on the rival claims of the Muslim and the Hindu, a Christian might go on to maintain that there was one aspect of the truth that was revealed in Christianity alone.² While Islam, Hinduism, and the Mahāyāna shared with Christianity the vision of God as Man's lord, and the Mahāyāna shared with her the vision of Him as Man's saviour, Christianity was unique (so the Christian might contend) in revealing God to Man as Man's father and brother.³

¹ See V. v. 134-8.

² Cassian, the Christian spiritual pioneer who, after the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era, migrated from his birthplace at the eastern extremity of the Latin-speaking world in the Dobruja (see IV. iv. 326, n. 2) to the western extremity of the Greek-speaking world at Marseilles in order to sow seeds of Egyptian monasticism in the soil of a Gaul that was being relieved of the economic incubus of the Roman Imperial régime at the price of becoming the political prey of barbarian conquerors, depicted the aspiring Christian soul's way of ascent towards the *Visio Beatifica* as a spiritual ladder; and the lower rungs, as described by him, can be identified with the ideals of non-Christian religions that, in the previous generation, had been Christianity's rivals for the captivation of Hellenic souls. 'This ladder roughly reproduces that chronological way by which Augustine climbed: the lower third, with its repudiation of matter and the flesh, is Manichaeism; the middle third, with its hope that, through virtuous living and a concentration on the supersensuous, Man can resume his spiritual nature, is Neoplatonic; the last third, with its indifference to both matter and spirit, provided the joy comes of loving a God whose might is only equalled by His mercy, is Christian. It is this love and joy that is the gift of grace' (Pickman, E. M.: *The Mind of Latin Christendom* (London 1937, Oxford University Press), p. 476).

³ In this divination of the presence of 'a friend behind the phenomena', Christianity had been anticipated by the Stoic school of Hellenic philosophy, but the Stoic's intellectual apprehension of this amazing truth about the relation between God and Man had not the same power as the Christian revelation to move men's hearts. 'Man finds God in helping his neighbour' (*Deus est mortali iuvare mortalem*) has the same meaning as 'God is Love', but the philosopher's prose lacks the fire of the Evangelist's poetry. For this Stoic intuition of the nature of God, see Murray, Gilbert: 'The Stoic Philosophy', in *Essays and Addresses* (London 1921, Allen & Unwin), pp. 99 and 103-4. 'A friend behind the phenomena' is a phrase of Edwyn Bevan's. 'Man's true God is the helping of Man' is quoted from an unnamed Stoic source by Pliny: *Naturalis Historia*, Book II, chap. 7 (5), §18.

So the All-Great were the All-Loving too—
 So through the thunder comes a human voice
 Saying: 'O heart I made, a heart beats here!
 'Face, my hands fashioned, see it in myself!
 'Thou hast no power nor mayst conceive of mine,
 'But love I gave thee, with myself to love,
 'And thou must love me who have died for thee.'¹

This claim that Christianity made to pre-eminence over her sister religions (a claim that was, of course, echoed in counter-claims of theirs) was a crux for an historian brought up in a Christian tradition.

The personal *tour de force* which an historian has to attempt if he is to perform his professional service for his fellow human beings is to correct, by imagination, the bias inherent in the standpoint at which he has been placed by the historical accidents of his birth and upbringing, in order to see and present the flux of human life *sub specie aeternitatis*. But human attempts to see human affairs through God's eyes must always fall infinitely short of success; and, while it is difficult enough for the historian to correct his political bias as a citizen of a state and his cultural bias as a member of a society, the hardest of all the feats of imagination that are required of him is to see beyond the *Weltanschauung* of an ancestral higher religion. If he turns savage against it and tries to break out of its confines by force, the faith of his fathers revenges itself upon him by becoming a veritable prison-house whose magic walls pen the ex-Christian atheist and the still Christian believer together in a common mental captivity which is palpable to a non-Christian looker-on. With this warning to himself and his readers, the writer of this Study will venture to express his personal belief that the four higher religions that were alive in the age in which he was living were four variations on a single theme, and that, if all the four components of this heavenly music of the spheres could be audible on Earth simultaneously, and with equal clarity, to one pair of human ears, the happy hearer would find himself listening, not to a discord, but to a harmony.²

¹ Browning, Robert: *An Epistle containing the Strange Medical Experience of Karshish, the Arab Physician*.

² A searching Christian criticism, not only of this passage, but of the whole of this Part of the present Study, by Mr. Martin Wight has been printed, with its author's consent, as an annex to this chapter on pp. 737-48, below. In the present writer's belief, Mr. Wight's exposition of the historic Christian standpoint regarding the relation between Christianity and the other higher religions was not merely correct; it also appeared to him to go to the heart of the matter; and the writer therefore agreed with Mr. Wight's conclusion that his 'solution of the problem of the relationship between Christianity and the higher religions fails to be in Christian terms' if the interpretation of the word 'Christian' was to be confined, as the Christian Church was, no doubt, historically and juridically entitled to confine it, to the sense in which the word had been used in the Church's own authoritative statements of its position. If the writer were to be asked: 'Do you believe or disbelieve that Christianity or any other higher religion is an exclusive and definitive revelation of Spiritual Truth?' his answer would be: 'I do not believe this. I believe that any such claim is an error which is at the same time a sin. In claiming to possess a monopoly of the Divine Light, a church seems to me to be guilty of hybris. In denying that other religions may be God's chosen and sufficient channels for revealing Himself to some human souls, it seems to me to be guilty of blasphemy. If it is inadmissible to call oneself a Christian without holding these tenets, then I am not entitled to call myself a Christian; I must call myself a Symmachan (see p. 442, below). Symmachus's confession of faith—"The heart of so great a mystery can never be reached

This belief is declared—in terms that, no doubt, betray the inevitable bias and limitations of an hereditary Christian standpoint—in a passage from the pen of a leader of Christian thought and action in the generation of the wars of 1914 and 1939 whose untimely death had been a grievous loss to his contemporaries.

‘All that is noble in the non-Christian systems of thought or conduct or worship is the work of Christ upon them and within them. By the Word of God—that is to say, by Jesus Christ—Isaiah and Plato and Zoroaster and [the] Buddha and Confucius conceived and uttered such truths as they declared. There is only one divine light; and every man in his measure is enlightened by it. Yet . . . each has only a few rays of that light, which needs all the wisdom of all the human traditions to manifest the entire compass of its spectrum.’¹

A Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu who found this Christian formulation unacceptable would confess to the same belief in terms of his own faith if he had reached the same degree of insight as the writer of those words. A Buddhist or a Hindu mystic would report that his Christian or Muslim fellow spiritual pioneer, who had likewise pierced the barriers of time and place and historical accident, had been driven by a still unextinguished demon of Desire into trying to push on beyond the goal of *Nirvāna* in which the Indic pilgrim had entered into his rest, while the Muslim or the Christian pilgrim would report that his Hindu and Buddhist fellow travellers had mistaken a spiritual station for a spiritual terminus. Yet both parties of explorers would bring back to their fellow men an identical report of the first stage, at least, of their journey.²

Dare we discern in this partial consensus of the elect the glimmer of a dawn, heralding a spiritual sunrise? ‘The elders obtained a good report’³ by faith. But such faith—which ‘is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen’⁴—would be ill-inspired if it were to tempt a student of History in the writer’s generation to evade a question that was raised—and this immediately and insistently—by any sanguine forecast of the spiritual future of Mankind on Earth. Why was it that, at least in the Judaistic churches,⁵ Man’s glimpse of the unity of revelation

by following one road only”—is an article in my creed which neither my head nor my heart will allow me to abandon.’

As the writer saw it, Symmachus’s challenge to Ambrose was still awaiting its answer after the passage of more than fifteen and a half centuries. The repressive use of physical force, which had been a Christian Roman Imperial Government’s retort to Symmachus, had, of course, been no answer at all.

¹ Temple, William: *Readings in Saint John’s Gospel*: First Series, chaps i–xii (London 1939, Macmillan), p. 10.

² See V. vi. 171–2, where it has been argued that *Nirvāna* lies on the same road that leads on to the *Civitas Dei*, and V. vi. 143, n. 3, where the reader’s attention has been drawn to the difference between an Hellenic-Indic and a Christian-Islamic kind of mystical experience. This difference is underlined by Mr. Martin Wight in a comment on the original draft of the present passage:

‘There seem to be two kinds of mystic, one of whom attains the annihilation of personality, the other the fulfilment of personality in the Vision of God. They have nothing in common except that both, from the ordinary man’s point of view on the plain, are well above the snow-line. The first kind, in Christian eyes, is pantheistic and heretical, e.g. Eckhart; the second kind is illustrated by Saint John of the Cross. Cp. below, p. 720.’

³ Heb. xi. 2.

⁴ Heb. xi. 1.

⁵ ‘Surely it is a characteristic difference between Hinduism and the religions of the Judaic tradition that Hinduism does *not* make this exclusive claim. Cp. V. vi. 47–48. “Hinduism”, says Radhakrishnan, “seeks the unity of religion not in a common creed

had been confined, hitherto, to a few rare spirits, whereas the ordinary outlook had, unhappily, been the opposite? In the official view of each of the Judaistic higher religions the light that shone through its own private window was the only full light, and all its sister religions were sitting in twilight, if not in darkness; the same standpoint was maintained by each sect of each religion against all its sister sects; and this uniform refusal of diverse denominations and churches to recognize what they had in common and to admit one another's claims gave occasion for the agnostic to blaspheme.

'These professedly higher religions', the agnostic could point out, 'all claim to be complete and final revelations of spiritual truth and prescriptions for the right conduct of life. They all bring forward the same considerations in support of their claims; and, whatever one may think of their arguments, their consensus is so impressive that the most sceptical mind might feel some trepidation at the prospect of having to enter into a disputation with such a troop of advocates of a common thesis. Fortunately, though, for the poor agnostic, the angelic doctors have exempted him from this intellectual ordeal. Withough waiting for their common adversary to put the Devil's case, they have each done the Devil's work for him by repudiating the claims of their brethren. In their animus against one another they have never (*mirabile dictu*) paused to consider that, in refusing recognition to one another's claims, they are each cutting the ground from under his own feet. The truth is that their pretensions are identical; and so they stand or fall together. In electing to fall by their own act, they have stripped themselves of their disguise and exposed themselves in their true colours.

'In their self-inflicted nakedness, they have revealed themselves as being primitive tribal religions, which are exceptional in nothing but the magnitude of their spiritual pretensions and of their geographical domains. Whereas the worship of an Athena Poliûchus or a Fortuna Praenestina had a range of no more than a few miles' radius from the local shrine of the tribal goddess, Christianity and Islam and Hinduism and the Mahâyâna can boast of hundreds of millions of adherents occupying whole continents and overflowing to the opposite shores of oceans. Yet, huge though these latter-day ecclesiastical empires are, they too are still parochial.

'Their parochial patriotism is betrayed in their institutions and in their rites. Is not tribalism inherent in the very notion of a "holy land" or a pilgrimage-resort?¹ How can the presence of a hypothetically infinite

but in a common quest' (*The Hindu View of Life* (London 1927, Allen & Unwin), p. 58). Is the Mahâyâna equally non-exclusive? (cp. below, pp. 438-9).—Martin Wight.

Sir Charles Eliot, in his *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), points out that, 'more than any other religion, [Hinduism] is a quest of truth and not a creed which must necessarily become antiquated' (vol. i, p. xci). This passage also has a bearing on the argument on pp. 438-9, below.

¹ 'The agnostic here runs the risk of misrepresenting his opponents. It is true that the practice of pilgrimage can sink to the superstitious level of supposing that God "makes Himself felt more palpably" in the holy place than elsewhere, but its original and uncorrupted purpose is to acquire merit by making an act of devotion or expiation.'—Martin Wight.

'Catholic pilgrimages are made, not because God is more here than there, but because people—being what human beings are—associate places with deeds and so stir them-

and eternal God be supposed to make itself felt more palpably in Palestine than in Alberta, or in the Hijāz than in Eastern Bengal? Is not this geographical fantasy of the Scribes and Pharisees confuted by the spiritual vision of a poet whose inward eye can see Jacob's ladder pitched between Heaven and Charing Cross, and Christ walking on the water, not of Gennesareth, but of Thames? Is not this poet a true seer in divining that God dwells in no strange land? And what doth it profit a man to make the pilgrimage to Rome or Jerusalem, Mecca or Karbalā, Benares or Bodh Gaya? Is the pilgrim exempt from the psychological law that "caelum, non animum, mutant qui trans mare currunt"?¹ Has not the truth about the virtue of going on pilgrimage been told by Tolstoy in his Tale of *Two Old Men*? Does not God's true servant do God's will if he tarries to play the Good Samaritan in an Ukrainian village better than if he ruthlessly shuts his ears to a human cry of distress and pushes on to witness the magic rekindling of the sacred fire in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre? And what about the provincialism of "the higher religions'" rituals? Does not Christianity proclaim itself to be, not a religion for all Mankind, but merely a local Mediterranean cult, when it insists that its crucial sacrament is only efficacious if it is celebrated with bread and wine? On this point of ritual practice there is a rigid conformity between the divers Christian denominations that wrangle with one another over the nature and the significance of the rite. How can a sacrament that is thus indissolubly associated with the regional diet of *Homo Mediterraneus* be expected to serve as a means of grace for the rice-eating majority of Mankind, in continents where the vine does not grow, and in archipelagos that know no name for bread?²

'The truth is that these would-be world religions are serfs of tribalism, *ascriptae glebae*. The vast majority of their supporters adhere to them for the same primitive reason for which the Athenians adhered to Athena Poliûchus and the Praenestines to Fortuna Praenestina—not because the worshipper has been personally convinced, after a searching and impartial scrutiny of all the alternative religions, that this particular religion is true and right, but because this particular religion happens to be prevalent, short of being officially "established", in the place at which the worshipper happens to have been born, at the date at which his birth happens to have taken place. "Fato Metelli Romae consules fiunt."³

'You, Thomas,' our agnostic might point out *ad hominem*, 'are a Christian of the Orthodox Faith because you happen to have been born at Damascus in the fourth century of the Christian Era; if you had been born there a hundred years later, you would certainly still have been a

selves to greater fervour. Saint Thomas More was as much against an excess in the practice of pilgrimage as Tolstoy was. I do not think your remarks just at this point.'—Comment by a Catholic friend of the writer's.

¹ Horace: *Epistulae*, Book I, Ep. xi, l. 27.

² The writer of this Study vividly remembers how forcibly his own provincialism was borne in upon him when—landing in Japan in the autumn of A.D. 1929, and making his way up country from Nara to Koya San, the Mahayanian Olympus—he found himself compelled to ask for an unobtainable form of food in Portuguese, because, in the Japanese language, there was no indigenous word for 'bread'.

³ Naevius, C.: *Bellum Pœnicum*.

Christian, but probably a Monophysite—while a birthday a hundred years later still in the same birthplace might have changed your faith to Islam and your name to Ahmad. If you are thus born a Muslim at Damascus in the second century of the *Hijrah* you will find yourself a Sunnī; but get yourself born eight hundred years later at Tabriz—or, indeed, no more than three hundred years later, no farther afield than the Lebanon—and you will find yourself an Imāmī Shī'ī. Get yourself born at Amsterdam in A.D. 1500 and you will find yourself a Roman Catholic; wait to be born in the same Dutch city in A.D. 1600 and you will turn out to be a Protestant; but, if the stork who is delivering you to your parents slightly mistakes his direction and deposits you on the right date at the wrong address, you will be born in A.D. 1600 a Roman Catholic still if he has landed you at Antwerp, but a Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist if the bird has gone so far astray as to make Lhasa your birthplace.¹ In fact, as certain also of your own apologists have said (if you will pardon my paraphrase of a celebrated passage in one of your own scriptures):² “Un méridien décide de la vérité.”³

¹ The geographical distribution of the conflicting views on the controversial issue of Predestination versus Free Will in the west of the Roman Empire during the first half of the fifth century of the Christian Era is a striking illustration of an apparent pre-determination of theological tenets by the theologically irrelevant accident of the theologian's domicile.

² Very securely, one may move north from [Africa and] Manichæan and Augustinian fatalism to Italy and prevent grace, to Gaul and grace for merit, to Britain and merit without grace. Was the cause racial instinct, intellectual disposition, maturity of civilisation, climate or mere chance? We do not know' (Pickman, E. M.: *The Mind of Latin Christendom* (London 1937, Oxford University Press), p. 442).

³ Acts xvii. 28.

³ 'On ne voit rien de juste ou d'injuste qui ne change de qualité en changeant de climat. Trois degrés d'élévation du pôle renversent toute la jurisprudence, un méridien décide de la vérité; en peu d'années de possession, les lois fondamentales changent; le droit a ses époques, l'entrée de Saturne au Lion nous marque l'origine d'un tel crime. Plaisante justice qu'une rivière borne! Vérité au delà des Pyrénées, erreur au delà' (Pascal, Blaise: *Pensées*, No. 294 in Léon Brunschvicg's arrangement).

The institution which, in this famous passage, Pascal is discrediting by making an exposure of its geographical relativity is, of course, not Religion, but Law. The same critique can, however, be directed with the same devastating effect against Theology, as indeed it has been directed in other contexts by Pascal himself:

'Pour le choix de la condition et de la patrie, le sort nous le donne. C'est une chose pitoyable de voir tant de Turcs, d'hérétiques, d'infidèles, suivre le train de leurs pères, par cette seule raison qu'ils ont été prévenus chacun que c'est le meilleur' (No. 98).

'On a beau dire, il faut avouer que la religion chrétienne a quelque chose d'étonnant. "C'est parce que vous y êtes né", dira-t-on. Tant s'en faut; je me raidis contre, pour cette raison-là même, de peur que cette prévention ne me suborne. Mais, quoique j'y sois né, je ne laisse pas de le trouver ainsi' (No. 615).

There is an admirable candour and sincerity in this last passage, in which the critic is applying his critique of the geographical relativity of human institutions to his own ancestral faith. An agnostic John Stuart Mill did not have to exercise the same high virtues in making the same point:

'The World, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact: his party, his sect, his church, his class of society; the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and large-minded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects, churches, classes and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact reverse. He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient world of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a Churchman in London would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking' (Mill, J. S.: *On Liberty*, chap. 2 (p. 80 in the Everyman edition)). The writer's attention was drawn to this passage by Mr. Martin Wight.

The Causes of the Dissension and the Prospects of Transcending it

The words that we have put into the mouth of our imaginary *advocatus diaboli* were true to fact, and the facts were surprising, because it was also true that this provincialism, of which the higher religions stood convicted in practice, was the antithesis of the revelation which was their common essence. The higher religions had revealed a new insight into the nature of God which carried with it, as its necessary corollary, a new view of the relations of human beings with one another. If God is One, He cannot be either Athena Poliûchus or Fortuna Praenestina or any other of the innumerable local godlets who had been these two city-goddesses' neighbours and rivals; and He must have 'made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the Earth'.¹ If God is Love, he cannot be 'a man of war',² and the Psalmist errs and sins in singing 'blessed be the Lord my strength which teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight'.³ If God is not contained in any of His creatures, then Man's corporate self-worship of himself is idolatry, even if this worship is paid, not to a parochial and militant Athena Poliûchus, but to an oecumenical and pacificatory Dea Roma. Moreover, the higher religions did not merely stand for these truths; they had put them into action. Their entry into the World had been an epiphany of God and at the same time a liberation of Man. It had freed Man from his previous bondage to his own corporate self.⁴ In the spiritual power of the higher religions, Man had been able to overcome the political barriers between parochial states and even the cultural barriers between parochial civilizations.⁵ How had the churches come to reimpose on their adherents the very bonds from which they had once set them free?

One answer to this perplexing question was perhaps to be found in the fact that the higher religions' ability to convert souls had been limited by Man's inability to learn except through suffering, so that the missionary's labour of love had had to wait upon the conqueror's work of destruction. In doing the Devil's work for the ephemeral aggrandisement of his fatherland and the trivial satisfaction of his own petty personal ambition, the conqueror is doing God's work without either willing or knowing it;⁶ for, in destroying the political liberty of his corporate victims the deified parochial states, he is unintentionally and unconsciously bringing religious liberty to souls that, in the days of their own country's perversely lamented sovereign independence, were fast bound in the misery and iron⁷ of spiritual servitude to a religion of corporate self-worship. When the conqueror strikes down a deified parochial state, his stroke does not simply enlarge the scale of social life by incorporating a statelet into an empire; it simultaneously transmutes the

¹ Acts xvii. 26.² As Moses chants in Exod. xv. 3.³ Ps. cxliv. 1.⁴ On this point see Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, 4th ed., vol. i, Part I (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 155-6.⁵ See V. v. 527-68, *passim*, and V. vi. 1-49, *passim*.⁶'Nun gut, wer bist du denn?'—'Ein Teil von jener Kraft
'Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.'Goethe: *Faust*, II. 1335-6, quoted in II. i. 282.⁷ Ps. cvii. 10.

structure of social life by splitting the primitive social atom and accomplishing, in this blind act of social alchemy, that momentous separation of the Church from the State which gives individual souls their opportunity to 'seek the Lord if haply they might feel after Him and find Him'.¹

When the parochial state has been liquidated by the force of a conqueror's arms, its former citizens are converted on the political plane into subjects of the empire that this conqueror is building; but they are not thereby converted automatically into worshippers of the imperial gods. Superstition or policy or a subtle combination of the two considerations usually deters the victorious war-lord from giving this further turn to his screw. In consequence, the subjects of a parvenu oecumenical régime are apt to find themselves free to follow any religion that they may choose; and, while some of them will now voluntarily abandon the worship of hereditary parochial divinities who have disconcertingly proved to lack either the inclination or the strength to preserve their former temporal power inviolate against the gods and men of the victorious empire,² it is rare for these sheep without a spiritual shepherd to take their religious cue from the turn of political events by voluntarily transferring their ecclesiastical allegiance to the high god of the Imperial Power that has robbed the former parochial states of their political liberty.³ When, for example, Rome conferred freedom of religious choice on Spartan and Athenian souls by converting them from citizen-devotees of a deified Sparta and Athens into Rome's political subjects, their liberated hearts were captivated, not by Divus Caesar or by Dea Roma, but by Cybele, Isis, Mithras, and Christ.

This religious and ecclesiastical effect of a military and political cause was divined by Deutero-Isaiah at a turning-point in history⁴ when Cyrus was setting himself to build into an Achaemenian Empire the political debris of Syriac and Babylonian parochial states which had been previously broken in pieces⁵ by an Assyrian battering-ram. The Judæan prophet was correctly interpreting the political empire-builder's unconscious religious mission in 'the voice of him that crieth in the wilderness: Prepare ye the way of the Lord; make straight in the desert a highway for our God.'⁶ An access to the hearts of Mankind was indeed being opened for Judaism by the flying columns of Cyrus's army that were sweeping up Judah's destroyer, the Neo-Babylonian Empire, into the net of an Achaemenian universal state which was to dwarf, not only this Babylonian successor-state of the Assyrians, but the Assyrian Power itself at its short-lived apogee. Yet the Achaemenian Empire, like every other 'universal state' up to date, had been 'universal' in the psychological sense of being oecumenical-minded without also being universal in the literal sense of having actually inherited the Earth;⁷ for hitherto the military conquerors' salutary achievement of breaking down

¹ Acts xvii. 27.

² See the illuminating passage quoted from Eduard Meyer in V. vi. 30, ll. 15-17, and the references *ibid.* (vol. vi, p. 33, n. 1) to two other passages in which the same author recurs to this theme.

³ See V. vi. 36-38.

⁵ Ps. lxxii. 4.

⁶ Isa. xl. 3.

⁴ See p. 424, above.

⁷ Matt. v. 5.

barriers, far though it had gone if measured by the extreme degree of the previous disunity of Mankind, had never been literally world-wide. During the five or six thousand years that had seen the rises and falls, up to date, of the species of society that we have labelled 'civilizations', even the most devastatingly successful of the would-be world conquerors had fallen ludicrously short of their vainglorious aim. Alexander's Macedonians had refused to cross the Hyphasis and had never seen the Tiber;¹ and the Mongols, who had once marched simultaneously on China and Hungary from opposite gates of the Khāqān's camp, had gained no foothold in India or in Western Christendom and had been repulsed with ignominy from the thresholds of Egypt² and Japan.³

Against this historical background there might be some significance in one feature of a Modern Western secular civilization which was historically unprecedented, though intrinsically superficial. While other civilizations too had burst their bounds and had incorporated into their own body social the domains of neighbouring societies either entire or in part, the Western Civilization had been unique in establishing for itself a literally world-wide dominion. At the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era a society which, till then, had been leading an obscure and undistinguished existence in Ultima Thule, at the extreme north-western corner of the habitable zone of the Old World, had suddenly and surprisingly launched out upon the oceans⁴ and taken in the rear its Orthodox Christian and its Arabic and Iranic Muslim rivals—who had been pressing hard upon Western Christendom overland since the failure of her medieval attempt to expand at their expense across the Mediterranean in 'the Crusades'.⁵

In the course of the four and a half centuries that had passed since the launching of the Western oceanic voyages of discovery down to the time of writing, a post-da Gaman Western Civilization had become as world-wide as the high seas in which it had found its medium of expansion. Along these ubiquitous oceanic waterways it had propagated itself over the entire traversable and habitable surface of the globe, and had drawn into its net all other surviving civilizations as well as all surviving primitive societies. The social and psychological phenomena arising from these encounters between the Western Society and its contemporaries were not, of course, new departures.⁶ They could all be illustrated from the histories of previous encounters of the kind, in which the operations had been on a less than world-wide scale—such, for example, as the impact of the Hellenic Civilization on the Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonian, Hittite, Indic, and Sinic civilizations in the chapter of Hellenic history that had been opened by the conquests of Alexander

¹ This unfulfilled possibility of Hellenic history has been discussed by Livy in a famous passage (Book IX, chap. 16, *ad fin.*, to chap. 19, inclusive). Cp. Tarn, W. W.: *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1948, University Press, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 396–7.

² See I. i. 350 and IV. iv. 446–7.

³ See IV. iv. 93 and V. vi. 310, n. 2.

⁴ See Toynbee, A. J.: 'The Unification of the World and the Change in Historical Perspective' in *Civilisation on Trial* (New York 1948, Oxford University Press), pp. 62–96, and the present Study, IX. viii. 217–18 and XII. ix. 465–72.

⁵ See I. i. 38 and IX. viii. 346–63.

⁶ These phenomena are examined in Part IX, *passim*.

the Great. Such older illustrations were, indeed, more illuminating than the Modern Western instance for a twentieth-century Western historian, since in the earlier cases the end as well as the beginning of the story was already known. The unique feature in the Modern Western case was the prospect that, in a World which had now been brought together on a literally world-wide scale within a Western social framework, the familiar social and economic consequences of unification might make themselves felt in the relations between the living higher religions.

In the histories of other civilizations, as we have seen,¹ the process of unification had translated itself, sooner or later, into a political form; the resultant universal states had developed a high degree of 'conductivity'; and the higher religions had been the principal beneficiaries of this characteristic property of their political hosts. One of the fateful questions that were exercising Western minds in A.D. 1952 was whether, in a Westernizing World, History was going to repeat itself in this respect. This question concerning the prospects of the Western Civilization is examined in a later part of this Study;² and the considerations there submitted need not be anticipated at this point except in so far as to say that, at this date, political unification seemed likely to be the destiny of the Western Society, too, in the near future—without its being possible to forecast whether an identical and perhaps inevitable goal would be reached along the familiar road of internecine fratricidal warfare, culminating in a 'knock-out blow', or by the unprecedented method of co-operation on a constitutional basis inaugurated by peaceful agreement. On either alternative the spiritual atmosphere of a politically unified world would be likely to have much the same effect on higher religions exposed to it.

In cases in which—on a less than world-wide scale, and by the barbarous method of military conquest—the citizens of a throng of parochial states and the children of a number of different civilizations had been brought into political union, the effect on the religious plane had been, as we have observed, to transfer Religion from the field of automatic social heritage to the field of free personal choice. In the language of Natural History, this change in the social environment had given Religion the opportunity to achieve a spiritual mutation which had lifted it, so to speak, out of the Vegetable into the Animal Kingdom. Whereas Primitive Religion had been rooted in the soil of some parochially earth-bound tribe, the higher religions were volatile. As the Roman poet Ennius could look forward to living, after his own physical death, on the lips of every Latin-speaker that recited his poetry,³ so the higher religions could live in every human heart that opened itself to their revelation; and, conversely, for the Soul, Religion could cease to be an accident of birth and become a matter of choice—the most momentous choice that life in This World could present.

¹ In Part VI, *passim*.

² In Part XII. D, *passim*, in vol. ix, pp. 473-560.

³ Nemo me lacrumis decoret, nec funera fletu Faxit. Cur? Volito vivu' per ora virum.

Were similar circumstances likely to produce similar effects in the world-wide society which the Western Civilization had been bringing into being during the most recent chapter of its history? Some effects of the kind were already discernible, for the higher religions had not waited for the political unification of the World, but had started on their missionary journeys again in the wake of the Modern Western pioneer mariners. Saint Paul, who had once sailed two-thirds of the length of the Mediterranean from Caesarea to Puteoli, had taken ship again fifteen hundred years later from an Andalusian port to fulfil a prophecy of his Cordovan contemporary Seneca¹ by crossing the Atlantic and winning a New World for Caesar's pontifical heir at Rome; and in an age in which the caravel had been superseded by the steamship and the aeroplane it could be foreseen² that the other higher religions would emulate the example, set by Irish and Syrian Christian missionaries in the sixth century and by Roman Catholic Christian missionaries in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, of going into all the World and preaching the Gospel to every creature.³

What would be the outcome of a new outburst of simultaneous missionary activities in a single field—this time, on a world-wide range? The histories of the corresponding activities within the less than world-wide frameworks of the Achaemenian, Roman, Kushan, Han, and Gupta empires (to cite only the most conspicuous of the earlier oecumenical mission fields) showed that the outcome might be either of two alternatives. The plurality of higher religions and philosophies might either be reduced to unity by the victory of one of them over all its competitors, as had happened in the Hellenic and Syriac worlds, or alternatively the competing religions might reconcile themselves to living and letting live side by side, as had happened in the Sinic and Indic worlds. The two denouements were not quite so different as would appear on the surface; for, in the cases in which the competition had gone on to the bitter end, the victorious religions had found themselves constrained to purchase their victory at the price of adopting from their discomfited rivals all elements—important or trivial, good or bad—which the souls whose ecclesiastical allegiance had been at stake were obstinately reluctant to give up.⁴ In the pantheon of a triumphant Christianity, the figures of Cybele and Isis reasserted their power in the transfiguration of Mary the mother of Jesus into the Great Mother of God,⁵ and the lineaments of Mithras and Sol Invictus were visible in a militant presentation of Christ. Similarly, in the pantheon of a triumphant Islam, a banished God Incarnate stole back into an empty place in hungry hearts in the guise of a deified 'Ali, while a forbidden idolatry reasserted itself in the Founder's own act of consecrating the fetish-worship of the Black Stone in the Ka'bah at Mecca.

¹ Seneca: *Medea*, ll. 375–9, quoted in II. i. 263, n. 1.

² On this point see pp. 105–8, above.

³ Mark xvi. 15.

⁴ On this point, see further pp. 457, 467, and 716–36, below.

⁵ Eastern Orthodox and Western Catholic Christians did not, of course, admit that the honour paid by them to the Theotókos amounted to the apotheosis from which it was indistinguishable in Muslim, in Eastern Iconoclast Christian, and in Western Protestant Christian eyes (see further pp. 457, 467, and 716–36, below).

'All religions, without exception, in order to overcome the obstacles that retard their progress, have had to come to terms with the forces that they have been combating, and to succumb to some extent to the very evils against which it has been their mission, and indeed their *raison d'être*, to wage war. . . . This law holds good for all the great [ways of life] that have been evolved by Man, and, above all, for Islam. Though Islam came into being in order to give the Arabs a religion and to raise them out of a particularly crass form of idolatry, it was compelled to purchase its triumph at the price of taking political form and substance and turning itself into a theocracy. It was only then, when it had absorbed, in a diluted and modified form, the very elements which, in the beginning, it had been its special mission to suppress, that Islam found itself able to start the work of moral and religious reform in the Arabian Peninsula and in a large part of [the rest of] the medieval world.'

Even the victors in a religious war *à outrance* have found themselves constrained to adopt their defeated adversaries *sub rosa* as members of their own household. Nevertheless, the difference between the two alternative denouements to a competition between higher religions is morally momentous; and the children of a twentieth-century Western Civilization could not be indifferent about the prospects in their own case.

Which of the two alternatives was the more likely to be the destiny of a Westernizing Modern World? In the past, intolerance had gained the mastery where higher religions of Judaic origin had been in the field,² while 'live and let live' had been the rule where the Indic *éthos* had been paramount. Which of these two spirits was going to prevail in a Westernizing World in the coming chapter of its history? The Judaic vein in Christianity and Islam? Or the Indic vein in the Mahāyāna and

¹ Caetani, L.: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. iii (Milan 1914, Hoepli), p. 139. In the Prophet Muhammad's career the classical example of a compromise with the primitive practices of the pre-Islamic 'Times of Ignorance' is his deal with the Quraysh in A.H. 9 (see *ibid.*, pp. 270-3). In exchange for a genuine acceptance of the sovereignty of the Medinese theocracy and a nominal acceptance of Islam, Muhammad assured to the Quraysh the continuance of their profits from their management of the sanctuary of the Ka'bah by incorporating into Islam, virtually intact, the pagan rites of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. In this case the practical consecration of a theoretically execrated pagan past was unusually deliberate.

² The melancholy historical fact that the transition from a pagan parochialism to a Christian universalism was accompanied by a change of religious climate from tolerance to intolerance has been noticed in IV. iv. 226-7. The following comment on the same phenomenon from the pen of Eduard Meyer (*Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1923, Cotta), p. 633) is bitter yet not unjust:

'The accepted basis of association is no longer the natural community based on kinship and neighbourhood, but a unanimity of feeling and of creed which is supposed to proceed from a common conviction—though in reality it often boxes the compass by turning into a merely external assent. This is the outlook which now at once asserts itself everywhere and which has continued to dominate the succeeding millennia. A state which had been the natural outgrowth of the practical conditions of earthly life, and which had provided complete freedom for the individual to think his own thoughts, is now replaced by the ideal of a supernatural church, guided by God, which ruthlessly suppresses and eradicates any departure from orthodoxy—even if it is only a question of a single word. To protect the Church, and to impose her unity on all Mankind, now becomes the most important—and, in the last analysis, the only true—task of the State. There has been no religion in which this fanaticism—this persecution of all heterodox opinions without regard for the consequences and without shrinking from any crime—has been, and remained, so dominant as it has in Christianity in all its manifestations. This is a signally glaring example of the operation of the law that an idea, in translating itself into reality, boxes the compass by turning into its own antithesis.'

Hinduism? The historical precedents suggested that the answer to this question might be determined by the nature of the alien adversaries whom the higher religions would find in their path at this point.

Why did Christianity, which appeared to have taken a decisive new departure from Judaism by recognizing and proclaiming that God is Love, readmit the incongruous Israelitish concept and service of 'the Jealous God' Yahweh¹ without heeding Marcion's prophetically warning voice? This partial spiritual regression, from which Christianity had suffered grievous spiritual damage ever since, was the price that Christianity had had to pay for her victory in her life-and-death struggle with the worship of Caesar.² This religious war had to be fought—and fought to a finish—because Man's corporate worship of Humanity in the shape of an oecumenical commonwealth was the most insidious form of idolatry that the worshippers of the One True God could have encountered. Compromise was impossible—all the more so because this Caesar-worship stood for an ideal that was noble and beneficent within the range of its own lights. The Great Romano-Christian religious war was impossible to avoid, and, once started, it could have no end short of unconditional surrender on the part of one or other belligerent. In this tragic conflict it was in vain for Christians to inscribe 'God is Love' on their war-flag. Love had to cede the high command to Jealousy if defeat was to be inflicted upon Caesar; and the restoration of peace through the Church's victory did not dissolve, but, on the contrary, confirmed, the incongruous association of Yahweh with Christ; for in the hour of victory the intransigence of the Christian martyrs degenerated into the intolerance of Christian persecutors who had picked up from the martyrs' defeated pagan opponents the fatal practice of resorting to physical force as a short cut to victory in religious controversy.³

This early chapter in the history of Christianity was ominous for the spiritual prospects of a twentieth-century Westernizing World, because the worship of Leviathan, on which an infant Christian Church had inflicted a defeat that had appeared to be decisive, had afterwards been conjured back from limbo to haunt both Eastern Orthodox and Western Christendom.⁴ In the Orthodox Christian World a ghost of the Roman Empire had been successfully resuscitated as early as the eighth century of the Christian Era⁵ and had survived the catastrophe which it had brought upon the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the tenth century⁶ to become the master institution of an offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia.⁷ In the Western World an Austrasian Charlemagne's fortunate failure to emulate the political achievement of a Leo Syrus had been eventually frustrated by the sinister emergence of a totalitarian type of state in which the Modern Western genius for organization and mechanization had been enlisted, with diabolic ingenuity, for the purpose of enslaving souls as well as bodies to a degree

¹ See V. vi. 38-49.

² This point has been touched upon already on pp. 75-76, above.

³ See IV. iv. 226-7 and V. vi. 88-9.

⁴ See pp. 445-6 and 478-9, below.

⁵ See IV. iv. 340-53 and X. ix. 15.

⁶ See IV. iv. 377-404 and X. ix. 15.

⁷ See pp. 31-40, above.

which had not been within the power of even the worst-intentioned tyrants at other times and in other societies.

Moreover, these two monstrous growths of resurgent Caesar-worship had cross-fertilized one another. The tradition of autocracy, which Hitler, Mussolini, and Napoleon had ultimately derived—through eighteenth-century Transalpine ‘enlightened monarchs’ and fourteenth-century Italian despots—from the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen,¹ had been conveyed to this official successor of Charlemagne by the political atmosphere of his Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which was a successor-state of Leo Syrus’s East Roman Empire.² In later chapters of the melancholy history of the relations between Western and Orthodox Christendom, this inauspicious loan was repaid with interest, twice over, when first Peter the Great, and after him the Bolsheviki, envenomed the native Byzantine autocratic tradition of Muscovy by doctoring it with the latest brews of Modern Western political alchemy.³

In Western souls at the time of writing, this appalling renaissance of a demon that had afflicted the declining years of the apparented Hellenic Society was ‘projected’ (in the language of the psychologists) upon its contemporary manifestation in the Russian World in the shape of the Soviet Communist régime; but the terror which Russian Communism was inspiring in Western hearts betrayed their awareness that the Western World was also favourable soil for the tares of totalitarianism. It looked as if, in a Modern Westernizing World, the war between God and Caesar might have to be waged once again; and it also looked as if, in that event, the morally honourable yet spiritually perilous role of serving as the church militant would once again fall upon Christianity.

Of the four living higher religions, the Mahāyāna and Hinduism were disqualified for undertaking this grim task by the spirit of tolerance that was a characteristic virtue of each of them, while Islam, which was armed with the necessary intolerance in ample measure, would be seriously embarrassed, in a *jihād* against Leviathan, by its Founder’s *hijrah* from a prophet’s bed of thorns to a prince’s curule chair.⁴ In these circumstances it could be foreseen that, if the battle were joined again between God and Caesar, the Christian Church would again be the protagonist on God’s behalf, and might again have to pay the spiritual price that is exacted by militancy even in just wars waged for good causes. The price paid by Western Christendom for the Primitive Church’s victory in a three-hundred-years’ war against Caesar-worship had been a fourteen-hundred-years-long service of a God who resembled the God of Joshua more closely than the God of Jesus;⁵ and, when at last the archaic image of Yahweh ‘the man of war’⁶ had lost its hold on Western hearts, the

¹ See p. 402, above, and pp. 446 and 537–9, below, and IX. viii. 394–5.

² See pp. 538–9, below, and X. ix. 9–10.

³ This traffic in the diabolically wonder-working talisman of totalitarianism will remind Robert Louis Stevenson’s readers of his story *The Bottle Imp*.

⁴ See III. iii. 466–72, and p. 493, below.

⁵ Mr. Martin Wight comments on this passage: ‘This seems incompatible with the description of the Church, on p. 563, below, as “an incomparably effective institution” for preserving the Christian revelation’. The writer’s answer is that institutions preserve revelations ‘in cold storage’.

⁶ Exod. xv. 3, quoted on p. 433, above.

consequent spiritual vacuum had remained a waste land tenanted only by the barren spirits of scepticism and cynicism.¹ Christians born into the twentieth century of the Christian Era had to reckon with the possibility that a second war with Caesar-worship might cost the Christian Church a second set-back of the kind, before she had recovered from the first. Yet, if they had the faith to believe that, in the end, the revelation of God as Love incarnate in a suffering Christ would turn stony hearts into hearts of flesh,² they might venture to peer into the prospects for Religion in a politically united world that would have been liberated by the Christian revelation from the worship of Yahweh as well as from the worship of Caesar.

A reconciliation, on Christian initiative, between hitherto exclusive-minded religions was not a chimaerical hope to cherish; for Mankind had already had an earnest of its fulfilment in the first chapter of the history of the impact of a Modern Western Christendom upon the rest of the World. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era the Jesuit missionaries had aspired to attract the Hindus and Buddhists and Shintoists and Confucians of India and Japan and China, in their millions, into the fold of the Roman Catholic Christian Church; and they had entered upon the gigantic task that they had set themselves in a spirit of charity which might have blessed their endeavours if they had not eventually been frustrated by the intervention of higher ecclesiastical authorities. Instead of dwelling on the points of difference between the existing religions and philosophies of the non-Christian majority of Mankind and their own Catholic Christian faith, the Jesuits had dwelt on the points of likeness, and, from this angle of spiritual vision, they had been able to approach these alien faiths with sympathy, understanding, and reverence instead of animus, prejudice, and scorn.

This Christian charity was remarkable in an age when Christianity was still glowing with a militancy that had been kindled in the hearts of the Early Christian martyrs, and when, in Western Christendom, this fire had been stirred into a fiercer flame by the recent schism between Catholics and Protestants. It is, indeed, more surprising that the Jesuit missionaries of the Early Modern Age should have been capable of that degree of charity and insight than that the Vatican, at the prompting of rival missionary orders, should have condemned and banned the Jesuit line of approach as a theologically illegitimate condonation of pagan practices and beliefs.³ In the eyes of a latter-day Western Christian historian, looking back on this incident in the Time-perspective of the quarter of a millennium that had since elapsed, those truly Christian-minded early Jesuit missionaries seemed to have been, not out of their reckoning, but before their time. In his outlook, the future lay with the spirit of Matteo Ricci, the Jesuit father who had also been a Confucian litteratus, and whose childlike Christian charity had not been smothered by his formidable intellectual freight of Christian theological and Sinic

¹ See IV. iv. 142-3, 150, 184-5, 225, and 227-8; V. v. 669-72; and V. vi. 316-8.

² Ezek. xi. 19.

³ For the Jesuits' missionary enterprise and its condemnation as being a kind of theological 'appeasement', see I. i. 346; V. v. 365-7, 539, and 700.

philosophical erudition. Charity is the mother of insight, and in A.D. 1952 there was still time for Saint Ambrose, sitting at Father Ricci's feet and praying for the spiritual welfare of a twentieth-century oecumenical commonwealth of literally world-wide extent, to perceive and confess that the moral victor in A.D. 384 had been, not the politically triumphant Christian advocate of intolerance, but his politically defeated pagan opponent.¹ It had been Symmachus, not Ambrose, who had had the last word on a question that had been at issue in their world in the fourth century of the Christian Era, and that was at issue still in the twentieth century throughout a now literally world-wide *Oikoumenê*. Is uniformity or diversity more blessed in the practice and presentation of Religion? Symmachus assuredly divined and proclaimed the truth when he pleaded that 'the heart of so great a mystery can never be reached by following one road only'.²

The Value of Diversity

Uniformity is not possible in Man's approach to the One True God because Human Nature is stamped with the fruitful diversity that is a hall-mark of God's creative work,³ and psychologically diverse human souls need different lenses for seeing, through a glass,⁴ a Beatific Vision in which, if we could see God face to face, we should find that there 'is no variableness, neither shadow of turning'⁵—as we must believe by faith, here and now, since God's ineffable brightness is never revealed, utterly unveiled, to the naked eye of Man's frail spirit in its passage through This World. 'The true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the World',⁶ has to be received by every creature according to the particular lights with which the Creator has endowed it. To enable human souls to receive the divine light is the purpose for which Religion exists, and it could not fulfil this purpose if it did not faithfully reflect the diversity of God's human worshippers. On this showing, it might be surmised that the way of life offered, and the vision of God presented, by each of the living higher religions might prove to correspond to one of the major psychological types whose distinctive lineaments were gradually being brought to light by twentieth-century Western pioneers in a new field of human knowledge.⁷ If each of these religions did not genuinely satisfy some widely experienced human need, it is indeed hardly conceivable that each of them should have succeeded, as each had done, in securing the allegiance of so large a portion of the Human Race. 'Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights',⁸ and, if the followers of the living higher religions were to recognize reciprocally the common

¹ For the contest between Ambrose and Symmachus, see V. vi. 88–89.

² 'Uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande secretum' (Symmachus, Q. Aurelius: *Relatio Tertia*).

³ The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
And God fulfils Himself in many ways,
Lest one good custom should corrupt the World.

Tennyson: *The Passing of Arthur*.

⁴ 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

⁵ James i. 17.

⁶ John i. 9.

⁷ A tentative interpretation of the four living higher religions in terms of the scheme of psychological types propounded by C. G. Jung will be found on pp. 716–36, below.

⁸ James i. 17.

origin of all these gifts of God,¹ they might win a life-giving liberation from the self-stultifying impulse that had moved them to thwart themselves by thwarting one another from fulfilling their common destiny.

This destiny, to which assuredly they had been called if the call had truly come from God, was that they should each go into all the world² without conflicting with one another. Their spiritually regressive political vested interest of serving as tribal religions for regimented continents would then be relinquished in order to free each of them for fulfilling a world-wide mission of revealing God to individual souls which would have chosen this particular communion in the light of their personal needs and capacities instead of having inherited it through the accident of birth. In that hour of reconciliation through enlightenment,

'the wolf . . . shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them'.³

In this light the diversity of the living higher religions would cease to be a moral stumbling-block and would reveal itself as a necessary corollary of the diversity of the Human Psyche. It was a necessity if there was truth in the Christian intuition that God is Love; for Love seeks to draw all men unto Him;⁴ and His desire to beatify all His creatures by bringing them into communion with Himself would perforce remain unfulfilled if one road only were open for approaching the great mystery; for in that case the common goal of all men's endeavours would be attainable only by one arbitrarily favoured fraction of Mankind that happened to be psychologically equipped for following this particular spiritual path. Any such conclusion had been rejected by the Christian Church itself when it had expressed its intuition that God is Love in a doctrine that the door of salvation stands open for all men, including those outside the Christian Church's fold. A Symmachan-minded disciple of C. G. Jung who had retained the Christian vision of God's nature from a Christian upbringing would hold that, if the revelation of the One True God is to be accessible to all men, it has to be diffracted; but in holding this he would be holding, in common with his Christian predecessors and contemporaries, that the different rays that reach and illumine diverse souls are radiations of one light from one source.

'There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal'.⁵

This necessary diffraction of the divine light in its manifestation to diverse souls is a challenge to the recipients, like God's other dispensations to His creatures. It is a stumbling-block for them as well as an

¹ 'Part of the Christian answer to this argument (inasmuch as Christianity makes exclusive claims) is contained in the simile of "veils differing from one another in their degree of opaqueness" which you use below, on p. 461.—Martin Wight.

² Mark xvi. 15.

⁴ John xii. 32.

³ Isa. xi. 6.

⁵ 1 Cor. xii. 4-7.

opportunity; for diversity can breed a destructive discord as well as a creative harmony. The catastrophe that Phaethon brought upon himself by attempting to drive the four-horse chariot of his Father Helios might not have overtaken the unfortunate demigod if the heavenly vehicle had been a one-horse shay. In the relations between the living higher religions in the twentieth century of the Christian Era the heavenly harmony that was audible to the ear of faith was being mocked, as we have seen, by a hideous discord that was the official order of the day; and faint hearts might doubt whether this very present hazard of the ordeal of diversity were indeed worth the bare chance of winning the possible prize. The answer was that the hazardously aspiring unity-in-diversity of a harmony has in it virtue that is not to be found in a safely pedestrian unison. The one-horse shay is a safe form of conveyance just because it is incapable of mounting to the zenith. The quadriga may bear Phaethon heavenward to a height from which a fall spells death; yet, by the same token, it—and no vehicle of lesser power—can carry Helios in triumph from horizon to horizon.

What, midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, were the omens for Man's air-borne religious quest? The last chapter had ended on an inauspiciously discordant note; yet, if any credit could be given to the findings of a tentative reconnaissance into the future, there were grounds for hope that, in the next chapter, the diversity of religions might resolve itself into a harmony in which the unity of Religion would be made manifest. In the light of this prospect, an anxious observer need not be unduly dismayed to see the mettlesome chariot-horses pulling restively against one another. On the longer view that was visible to the eye of faith, it could be forecast that the driver would master his team and that the chariot would continue to mount on the heavenward course that it had been following continuously since before Abraham was.¹

The Role of the Civilizations

If this view of the prospects of Religion were to carry conviction, it would open up a new view of the role of the civilizations. If the movement of the chariot of Religion was continuous in its rise and constant in its direction, the cyclic and recurrent movement of the rises and falls of civilizations might be not only antithetical but subordinate. It might, as we have surmised,² serve its purpose, and find its significance, in promoting the fiery chariot's ascent towards Heaven by periodic revolutions on Earth of 'the sorrowful wheel' of birth-death-birth.

In this perspective the civilizations of the first and second generations might justify their existence,³ but those of the third generation would

¹ John viii. 58.

² On pp. 423-5, above.

³ On this view the rises and falls of the civilizations of the first and second generations would be a valuable, and perhaps indispensable, stage of human experience between the primitive societies and the higher religions; for, if learning comes through suffering, the experience of a civilization would have an educative effect which the experience of a primitive society could not provide. One of the obvious specific differences between civilizations and primitive societies was the immense disparity in the mass and weight of their respective corporate power (see I. i. 148-9). In consequence, there was, for good

cut a disconcertingly poor figure. If civilizations were the handmaids of Religion, and if the Hellenic Civilization had served as a good handmaid to Christianity by bringing this higher religion to birth before that civilization had finally fallen to pieces, then the civilizations of the third generation would appear to be 'vain repetitions' of the heathen.¹ If, so far from its being the historical function of higher religions to minister, as chrysalises, to the cyclic process of the reproduction of civilizations, it was the historical function of civilizations to serve, by their downfalls, as stepping-stones for a progressive process of the revelation of always deeper religious insight,² then the societies of the species called civilizations would have fulfilled their function when once they had brought mature higher religions to birth; and, on this showing, a Western post-Christian secular civilization might at best be a superfluous repetition of the pre-Christian Hellenic Civilization, and at worst a pernicious backsliding from the path of spiritual progress. The one conceivable historical justification for its otherwise inauspicious existence would be the possible future service that it might inadvertently perform for Christianity and her three living sister religions by unintentionally providing them with a mundane meeting-ground on a literally world-wide range,³ by bringing home to them the unity of their own ultimate values and beliefs, and by confronting them all alike with the challenge of a recrudescence of idolatry in the peculiarly vicious form of Man's corporate worship of himself.⁴

Meanwhile, in a secularized Western World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, symptoms of spiritual backsliding were unmistakably manifest. The recrudescence of Leviathan was a religion to which every latter-day Westerner paid some measure of allegiance; and this Modern Western renaissance of the tribal religion of the Hellenic World in its unregenerate days,⁵ before it had been purified from the sin of parochialism in the furnace of suffering, was, of course, sheer idolatry. Communism, which was another of Western Man's latter-day religions, had the merit of being a leaf taken from the book of Christianity, but it was a leaf taken in vain through being torn out and misread;⁶ and Democracy, which was another leaf from the book of Christianity, had also been torn out and, while perhaps not misread, had certainly been half-emptied of meaning by being divorced from its Christian context and being secularized. Perhaps the most ominous symptom of all was that, for a number of generations past, people in the Western World had been living on spiritual capital—clinging to Christian practice without holding Christian beliefs. This was ominous because practice

or evil, an immensely greater 'drive' behind human acts which had a civilization for their social setting; and, in consequence of this in turn, the catastrophes caused by the mismanagement of a civilization's corporate power were likely to make a deeper and more lasting impression on the Soul than their counterparts in primitive life.

¹ Matt. vi. 7.

²

That men may rise on stepping-stones
Of their dead selves to higher things.

Tennyson: *In Memoriam* (quoted in IV. iv. 261).

³ See p. 437, above.

⁴ See pp. 439-41, above; pp. 478-9 and 524-5, below.

⁵ This renaissance is discussed further in X. ix. 7-8.

⁶ See V. v. 581-7, and pp. 534-5, below.

unsupported by belief is a wasting asset, as Western Man in this generation had discovered to his dismay.

If this self-criticism was just, the children of the Western Civilization must revise the whole of their current conception of recent history; and, if they could make the effort of will and imagination to think this ingrained and familiar conception away, they would arrive at a very different picture of the historical retrospect. Westerners of the writer's generation not only took it for granted that the Christian Church had served its turn in bringing a new civilization to birth in the West; they looked upon this new civilization as having been immature so long as it had remained under Christian auspices; and, after having waited with impatience for it to get through its medieval Christian childhood, and having joyfully greeted the repudiation of its Christian origins with which it had celebrated its coming of age,¹ they had focused their attention on the rise of a Modern Western secular way of life. As they followed that rise, from the first premonition of it in the genius of Frederick II Hohenstaufen,² through the renaissance of Hellenic culture in an Italian cradle, to the Transalpine eruption of Democracy and Industrialism under the pagan auspices of a modern scientific technique, they thought of this secular movement as being the great new event in the World which demanded their attention and deserved their admiration. If they could bring themselves to think of it, instead, as being one of the 'vain repetitions' of the heathen—an almost meaningless repetition of something that the Hellenes had done before them, and done supremely well³—then the greatest new event in the historical background of a Modern Western Society would be seen to be a very different one. The greatest new event would then not be the monotonous

¹ See I. i. 34.

² See pp. 402 and 440, above; pp. 537-9, below; and IX. viii. 394-5.

³ In a previous passage of this Study (in II. ii. 355-7) we have noticed the 'family likeness' between the Hellenic Civilization and the abortive Scandinavian Civilization. The Scandinavian, like the Hellenic, was distinguished by a precocious freshness and originality and a precocious clarity and rationalism, and we have ascribed these distinctive qualities, which the two civilizations display in common, to a similarity in the circumstances in which they came to birth. While either was affiliated to an antecedent civilization, the affiliation was, in either case, through the antecedent civilization's external proletariat, and this was a looser link than the alternative form of affiliation through a chrysalis church provided by the antecedent civilization's internal proletariat. In the same context (*ibid.*, pp. 357-60) we went on to observe that this thesis appeared to be borne out by the confusion and obscurity into which Scandinavian minds fell after an abortive pagan Scandinavian Society had been absorbed into the alien body social of Western Christendom and had thereby been condemned to wrestle with the impossible task of reconciling an exotic Helleno-Syriac culture with its own native pagan Scandinavian cultural heritage. The impossibility of this mental *tour de force* is vividly illustrated by the incongruousness of the catalogue of the books in the library of a fourteenth-century Icelandic, Hauk Erlendsson (see *ibid.*, pp. 358-9).

This evidence suggests that, for the flowering of a secular culture, the most favourable field is a civilization of the second generation that is affiliated to a predecessor through barbarian intermediaries, and not a civilization of the third generation that is affiliated to a predecessor through a chrysalis church. If this was the truth, the neo-pagan civilizations of the third generation seemed likely to prove themselves to be a lower form of society than the palaeo-pagan civilizations of the second generation and the first. In that event, a civilization of the second generation that had helped to bring to birth something higher than itself in serving as an overture to a church would prove to have lapsed into bringing to birth something lower than itself if, in the next chapter of the story, the adolescent church were checked, and perhaps even blighted, in its growth by the outbreak of a new secular civilization. (On this point see, further, pp. 533-44, below.)

rise of yet another secular civilization out of the bosom of the Christian Church in the course of these latter centuries; it would still be the Crucifixion and the Crucifixion's spiritual consequences.

On this view, students of History would likewise have to revise the current Western conception of the service of Christianity and the other higher religions as chrysalises. They must conclude that, in assisting civilizations of the second generation to reproduce themselves in a third generation, the higher religions had responded to the call *noblesse oblige* at a cost which, at its lightest, would amount to an unprofitable digression from their own proper path and postponement of their entry upon their own true calling, while at its heaviest it might drag them down to the tragic ending of *Beauchamp's Career*. It would be a supreme tragedy, on the face of it, if a fully-fledged higher religion were to compromise its own future for the sake of bringing a civilization of the third generation to birth, because it would be sacrificing itself to secure the reproduction of a secular institution which was not only intrinsically inferior to its religious chrysalis but was now also superfluous in virtue of the faithful fulfilment, by civilizations of a preceding generation, of their specific mission of giving the higher religions an opportunity of coming to flower. The civilizations would be in the same relation to the higher religions as the primitive societies to the civilizations. When the primitive societies had succeeded in giving birth to civilizations, they had performed their task and exhausted their mandate, and, in the new chapter thereby opened in the history of Mankind, no civilization had ever sacrificed itself for the perversely anachronistic purpose of assisting the surviving primitive societies to reproduce their outmoded kind. Why should higher religions perform unprecedented acts of self-sacrifice in order to bring into the World a new litter of outmoded civilizations? If there were any justification for this folly, it would not be found in reason but in the intuition that 'God hath chosen the foolish things of the World to confound the wise'.¹ A church which stepped aside from its course and forbore to press forward towards its goal, in order to minister to a dying civilization and to nurse an infant civilization in its cradle, might save its life—if it did save it—by losing it for Christ's sake and the Gospel's²—like the pilgrim in Tolstoy's tale³ who won God's grace when he earned his obtusely pharisaical travelling companion's contempt by fulfilling his pilgrimage in the spirit at the sacrifice of the letter.

In submitting to serve as chrysalises for civilizations, the living higher religions might indeed have compromised their own future if it were true that this service was their *raison d'être*. In tiding over the interregna between civilizations of the second and third generation and duly bringing civilizations of a third generation to birth, the living higher religions would then have exhausted their mandates, and, while there might be no reason to expect that the latest crop of civilizations would not eventually go the way of their predecessors, there would be still

¹ 1 Cor. i. 27, quoted in IV. iv. 249 and in V. vi. 150.

² Matt. x. 39 and xvi. 25; Mark viii. 35; Luke ix. 24 and xvii. 33; John xii. 25.

³ *Two Old Men*, cited on p. 391, above.

less reason to expect that the higher religions which had brought them to birth would live to survive, or even witness, their demise. On the hypothesis that higher religions come and go for the convenience of falling and rising civilizations, we should expect to see the civilizations of the third generation providing, as providently as their predecessors, for the propagation of their species by conscripting new religions to serve as new chrysalises for tiding over new interregna and bringing a new generation of civilizations to birth.

Candidates for this *corvée* were in fact, as we have seen, in the field in the shape of rudiments of secondary higher religions that had been created by the internal proletariats of living non-Western civilizations which had latterly been enmeshed in an expanding Western Society's world-encompassing net; but there was no warrant for expecting to see History repeat itself by casting this new batch of religions for this old role if the truth lay, not in the chrysalis theory, but in its converse. If the truth was that Religion is the true end of Man, and that civilizations have their *raison d'être* in ministering to spiritual progress, then, once again, a civilization might break down, but the replacement of one higher religion by another need not be a necessary consequence. So far from that, it might be augured that, if a secularized Western Civilization were to break down in its turn after having swept all its contemporaries into its net, the living higher religions would not only survive but would grow in wisdom and stature as the result of a fresh experience of secular catastrophe. The spiritual insight that they might gain through further suffering might lead them, as we have suggested, to a mutual recognition of their own essential unity in diversity. As for the rudiments of secondary higher religions which were visible in the twentieth century of the Christian Era in the oecumenical landscape, these might be drawn back into the main stream of Mankind's religious life, to make creative contributions to its flow in this reach of the river, or they might drain away into the desert and lose themselves in its sands; but there was no reason—if the assiduous provision of chrysalises were not assumed to be Religion's *raison d'être*—for expecting to see these secondary higher religions supplant Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism as these four living higher religions themselves had supplanted the paganism of Primitive Mankind.

If we now look again at our table, we shall see that the serial order in which the societies are there displayed is not only chronological and genealogical but is also qualitative. In the light of our intervening investigation, the order reveals itself as an ascending scale of values in four degrees:

4. Higher Religions.
3. Secondary Civilizations.
2. Primary Civilizations.
1. Primitive Societies.

In this new value-scale, two of our three familiar species of human society, the higher religions and the primitive societies, reappear, with their identities unchanged, at the top and the bottom of the ladder. The

third species, on the other hand, has lost an identity with which we have credited it since our judgement, at an early stage in this Study, that all civilizations are philosophically equivalent.¹ This judgement is assuredly true as far as it goes; and it has not played us false so long as we have been dealing with the civilizations themselves, in their geneses, growths, breakdowns, and disintegrations, as the ultimate objects of our inquiry. Now, however, that our Study has carried us to a point at which the civilizations in their turn, like the parochial states of the Modern Western World at the outset of our investigation, have ceased to constitute intelligible fields of study for us and have forfeited their historical significance except in so far as they minister to the progress of Religion, we find that, from this more illuminating standpoint, the species itself has lost its specific unity. In our new list of societies arranged in a serial order of ascending value, the primary and secondary civilizations appear as separate categories, differentiated from one another and located on different qualitative levels by the difference in value between their respective contributions to the achievement of bringing the higher religions to flower. As for the civilizations of the third generation, they are now right out of the picture.

(b) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHURCHES' PAST

In coming to the conclusion reached at the close of the preceding chapter, we are merely applying to all eight of the living civilizations a judgement which the children of the Western Civilization in its latest phase had confidently passed upon their own society's seven sisters. In diagnosing the symptoms of breakdown and dissolution in the present state of these seven other civilizations of the third generation, a student of History midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era was not flying in the face of current opinion in the West; for, even after having run into two general wars in one lifetime and having been kept, by the aftermath of the second war, in haunting fear of the advent of a third, Western Man had not yet been cured of his conviction that he was 'not as other men are';² and so he still saw nothing paradoxical or questionable in the proposition that the Western Civilization was the only society of its kind that still had a future. On this Modern Western view, on which a latter-day secularized Western Civilization was the climax of human achievement, the other living civilizations were put out of court automatically, while the extinct civilizations could not hope to be awarded even a posthumous patent of nobility except in so far as their advocates could prove that they had had some hand in making the Western Civilization what it had come to be. In an intellectual milieu in which this was accepted as a reasonable view, there should have been nothing very shocking in the alternative suggestion that a rather larger number of the extinct civilizations had 'made good', and that all eight, instead of seven, of the living civilizations were 'on the shelf'. Yet, even so late in the Western Civilization's day as the year A.D. 1952, this variation on the conventional Western view could hardly

¹ See I. i. 175-7.

² Luke xviii. 11.

be suggested in Western circles without raising an uproar there; for, even if the traditional Western rationalist, in an elegiac mood, were to acquiesce in seeing the Western Civilization deposed from the place of honour in the moving picture of human progress up to date, he would be moved to indignation and mockery at the notion of assigning the vacated place to Religion.

'This mountebank', the affronted Western rationalist would exclaim, 'is trying to pass off, as the last word in wisdom, one of the most naïve of all the commonplaces with which the professional apologists of the so-called "higher religions" have sought to impose upon Mankind ever since an apology was first called for by the simultaneous social triumph and moral bankruptcy of these extraordinary ecclesiastical institutions that the apologists have undertaken to defend. The fallacy in this commonplace has been exposed already a thousand times over in as many years. The trick, whether performed disingenuously or in childish good faith, is, after all, a simple one. You have merely to ascribe to a church the virtues preached in the scriptures attributed to the church's founder, and your church inevitably takes the highest place on the ladder. The trick, however, is as easy to unmask as it is to play. To unmask it you have merely to re-direct the observer's attention from the alleged ideals of the church's founder to the current practice of the church as it can be observed at first hand in the observer's own day. Look around you. Behold Christianity, the Mahāyāna, Islam, and Hinduism not as they claim to be but as they are, and your judgement of relative values will register a very different result. Call the insight of the prophets a flash if you will, so long as you admit that it has been a flash in the pan.'

This line of attack on the living higher religions may be illustrated by quotations from the works of a pioneer Western rationalist of the generation that had seen the end of the Wars of Religion and a latter-day follower of the same school who had lived to see the onset of the Wars of Ideology.

In an appeal addressed by Bayle to his Roman Catholic countrymen and contemporaries, the *déraciné* French philosopher pleads:

'Je voudrais que vous entendissiez ceux qui n'ont d'autre religion que celle de l'équité naturelle. Ils regardent votre conduite comme un argument irréfutable, et lorsqu'ils remontent plus haut et qu'ils considèrent les ravages et les violences sanguinaires que notre religion catholique a commises pendant six ou sept cents ans par tout le monde, ils ne peuvent s'empêcher de dire que Dieu est trop bon essentiellement pour être l'auteur d'une chose aussi pernicieuse que les religions positives; qu'il n'a révélé à l'homme que le droit naturel, mais que des esprits ennemis de notre repos sont venus de nuit semer la zizanie¹ dans le champ de la religion naturelle, par l'établissement de certains cultes particuliers, qu'ils savaient bien qu'ils seraient une sémence éternelle de guerres, de carnages et d'injustices. Ces blasphèmes font horreur à la conscience; mais votre Église en répondra devant Dieu.'²

Frazer, writing more than two hundred years later, can venture to go

¹ Matt. xiii. 25.

² Bayle, P.: *Ce que c'est que la France Toute Catholique sous le Règne de Louis le Grand* (Saint-Omer 1686, Lami).

farther with himself and with his readers. While Bayle professes to be distressed at finding that the perversion of Religion should have given her enemies an occasion to blaspheme, Frazer professes partially to condone the perversion by presenting, in the ironical form of an apologia, a radical criticism of Religion itself. He offers the devastating suggestion that a cynical adulteration of the pure milk of the word may have saved the lives of a flock that would probably have starved if it had been forced to remain for very long on so ethereal a diet.

'Taken altogether, the coincidences of the Christian with the heathen festivals are too close and too numerous to be accidental. They mark the compromise which the Church in the hour of its triumph was compelled to make with its vanquished yet still dangerous rivals. The inflexible Protestantism of the primitive missionaries, with their fiery denunciations of heathendom, had been exchanged for the supple policy, the easy tolerance, the comprehensive charity of shrewd ecclesiastics, who clearly perceived that if Christianity was to conquer the World it could do so only by relaxing the too rigid principles of its Founder, by widening a little the narrow gate which leads to salvation.

'In this respect an instructive parallel might be drawn between the history of Christianity and the history of Buddhism. Both systems were in their origin essentially ethical reforms born of the generous ardour, the lofty aspirations, the tender compassion of their noble Founders, two of those beautiful spirits who appear at rare intervals on Earth like beings come from a better world to support and guide our weak and erring nature.¹ Both preached moral virtue as the means of accomplishing what they regarded as the supreme object of life, the eternal salvation of the individual soul, though by a curious antithesis the one sought that salvation in a blissful eternity, the other in a final release from suffering, in annihilation. But the austere ideals of sanctity which they inculcated were too deeply opposed not only to the frailties but to the natural instincts of Humanity ever to be carried out in practice by more than a small number of disciples, who consistently renounced the ties of the family and the state in order to work out their own salvation in the still seclusion of the cloister. If such faiths were to be nominally accepted by whole nations or even by the World, it was essential that they should first be modified or transformed so as to accord in some measure with the prejudices, the passions, the superstitions of the vulgar. This process of accommodation was carried out in after-ages by followers who, made of less ethereal stuff than their masters, were for that reason the better fitted to mediate between them and the common herd. Thus as time went on the two religions, in exact proportion to their growing popularity, absorbed more and more of those baser elements which they had been instituted for the very purpose of suppressing.

'Such spiritual decadences are inevitable. The World cannot live at the level of its great men. Yet it would be unfair to the generality of our kind to ascribe wholly to their intellectual and moral weakness the gradual

¹ 'The historical reality both of [the] Buddha and of Christ has sometimes been doubted or denied. It would be just as reasonable to question the historical existence of Alexander the Great and Charlemagne on account of the legends which have gathered round them. The great religious movements which have stirred Humanity to its depths and altered the beliefs of nations spring ultimately from the conscious and deliberate efforts of extraordinary minds, not from the blind unconscious cooperation of the multitude. The attempt to explain History without the influence of great men may flatter the vanity of the vulgar, but it will find no favour with the philosophic historian.'

divergence of Buddhism and Christianity from their primitive patterns. For it should never be forgotten that by their glorification of poverty and celibacy both these religions struck straight at the root not merely of civil society but of human existence. The blow was parried by the wisdom or the folly of the vast majority of Mankind, who refused to purchase a chance of saving their souls with the certainty of extinguishing the species.¹

The verdict on the record of the churches which Bayle has presented as an indictment, and Frazer, more insidiously, as a defence, might be put in still stronger terms than those here employed by either of these two distinguished rationalists. The ecclesiastics who had betrayed or fulfilled their trust by bringing the churches back to Earth seemed almost to have gone out of their way to fly in the face of the founders by sinning against their principal precepts as recorded in scriptures that had been canonized by the ecclesiastics themselves. The Christian Church, for example, was open to the charge of having denied Christ by appropriating the priestcraft and pharisaism of the Jews, the polytheism and idolatry of the Greeks, and a championship of vested interests that was the legacy of the Romans; and the outcome might be described as an institution whose practice was the exact inverse of a vision which had seen God as a spirit who was to be worshipped in spirit and in truth² in a communion of saints in which the social schism between classes and states was to be healed by a union of hearts under the reign of Love.³ The Mahāyāna and Hinduism, as they presented themselves in the writer's day, were not less vulnerable to criticism, while of Islam it might be said with sorrow that the Founder himself had betrayed his own ideals in his own lifetime by becoming the successful ruler of an aggressive state.⁴ The final judgement on Religion which a rationalist line of attack implies is Lucretius's judgement on the Universe:

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum; tantâ stat praedita culpâ.⁵

And the immediate answer to both judgements is a suspensive 'Wait and see!'

The weak point in the rationalist argument was, in fact, its blindness to the implications of a Time-scale, recently established by the discoveries of a Modern Western Science, which, in a different context, the rationalist himself had eagerly turned to account as an engine for breaching the curtain-walls of religious orthodoxy.

The rationalist had legitimately pointed out that the seventeenth-century Protestant Christian chronologist Archbishop Ussher's reckoning⁶ that the World had been created at 6.0 p.m. on the evening before the 23rd October, 4004 B.C., Old Style, and the Primitive Christian expectation that the last Trump might sound any day were both incompatible with the evidence that had since come to light about the

¹ Frazer, Sir J. G.: *The Golden Bough: Adonis, Attis, Osiris: Studies in the History of Oriental Religion* 2nd ed. (London 1907, Macmillan), pp. 260-1.

² John iv. 24.

³ 'Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ is all, and in all' (Col. iii. 11).

⁴ See III. iii. 466-72.

⁵ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, ll. 198-9.

⁶ See p. 299, above, and XI. ix. 178.

age of the Earth up to date and about the probable prospects of life on its surface. This planet, though not an old inhabitant of the stellar—or nebular—universe, had been in existence already, it would now appear, for some two thousand million years; Life had already existed on Earth for at least five hundred million years, and perhaps eight hundred million; Human Life had existed for at least six hundred thousand years, and perhaps one million; and the lengths of time during which the Earth's surface had been tenanted by divers orders of living creatures so far were all infinitesimally short compared with the aeons during which the Earth seemed likely to continue to be habitable in the future. These aeons of possible existence ahead of Life on Earth might run into millions of millions of years.¹

This modern scientific Time-scale was brought into action by the ex-Christian Western rationalist against the contemporary Christian Western traditionalist in order to explode a traditional chronology; but the rationalist had failed to perceive that, in allowing himself this line of attack on his adversary, he had implicitly denied himself another line which implied an acceptance of the traditional chronology at its face value. The rationalist found fair game in a chronology which, should the Last Trump sound tomorrow, would have packed the World's history, from beginning to end, within a span of less than six thousand years; yet he was apt in the same breath to assert that there was nothing to be hoped for from a religion that had been in existence now for more than nineteen hundred years without having produced its promised change for the better. This arrow might well transfix the conscience of a traditionalist Christian in whose belief these 1,952 years amounted to nearly one-third of the total life-span of the World up to date; but the rationalist was logically debarred from shooting this shaft unless he first renounced his own Time-perspective and accepted his traditionalist victim's chronological tenets; for, on the rationalist's own reckoning, a period of nineteen or twenty centuries,² so far from being 'a long time',

¹ The figures here given are based on Zeuner, F. E.: *Dating the Past* (London 1946, Methuen), whose estimates for the age of diverse orders of life are higher, as will be seen, than those suggested, on the authority of Sir James Jeans, in I. i. 173, n. 2.

² The age of Christianity up to date would have to be reckoned at something between twenty-one and twenty-two centuries if we were to carry the reckoning back behind the Ministry of Jesus to include the experience of the internal proletariat of the Hellenic World during two preceding centuries of tribulation (see I. i. 40–42 and V. vi. 289). Yet, even if we were to trace the origins of Christianity as far back as the Passions of Kings Agis IV and Cleomenes III of Sparta in the third century B.C. (see V. vi. 376–539), the length of Christianity's life up to date would not have been appreciably increased on the Modern Western scientific Time-scale. The maximum reckoning was approximately the same for Christianity and for the Mahāyāna; for, though the process of the Mahāyāna's evolution was obscure, and it would have been difficult to pick out any single event that might stand for the beginning of it, even symbolically, it seemed clear that this metamorphosis of a primitive Buddhist philosophy had not begun till after the time of the Mauryan Emperor Aśoka (*imperabat* 273–232 B.C.). The origins of Hinduism could be traced back to about the same date if the distinctive note of Hinduism was held to lie in the personal relation between the god and his devotee (see V. v. 138, and p. 427, above). If, however, the criterion was to be the first appearance, not of *Bhakti*, but of a distinctively Hindu theology, the founder of Hinduism would be Śāṅkara (*floruit circa* A.D. 800) and Hinduism would have to be reckoned as being younger even than Islam, which did not come to birth till the beginning of the Prophet Muhammad's ministry *circa* A.D. 609.

Mr. John Lodge comments: 'But the Vedānta, as expounded by Śāṅkara, is based on

was no more than the twinkling of an eye. It was, in fact, so infinitesimally short that, if we offered our rationalist a whole blank folio page and asked him to plot out on it his scientific chronology to scale, he would not find room to make the span of two thousand years visible within that compass even under the lens of the most powerful microscope.

'The history of Man is immensely, incalculably old: the latest discoveries of human remains in deep geological strata in various parts of the World, corroborated by the latest conclusions of Biology, are now sufficient to prove with certainty that Man has existed for hundreds of thousands, and perhaps for millions, of years. Out of this fact there springs a singular thought: The *historical* period, extending over the last five or six thousand years, is virtually a nothing, a flash (*lampe*), when confronted with the incommensurably longer past. Indeed, when we reflect upon the rapidity with which Time flies, and upon the painfully ephemeral nature of our wretched existence, it is not difficult to reach the conviction that even the most remote historical events known to us—the foundation of the Roman Empire, the Battle of Marathon, and, no less than they, the victory of Sesostris, Pharaoh of Egypt, over the Hittites in Syria eighteen centuries before the beginning of the Christian Era—are events of yesterday that are separated from us merely by an interval of time that is infinitesimal by contrast with the boundless vista of our geological past.'

Yet, in defiance of self-consistency, the rationalist did take issue with the traditionalist on a ground that tacitly assumed the validity of the traditional Time-reckoning; and, to a detached observer of this nineteenth-century Western controversy, the points of agreement between the parties would appear more significant than the differences. For both of them it was an axiom that the Church as she was in their day gave the measure of the Church as she ever would be, world without end; and their quarrel arose over the difference in their subsequent value-judgements on the basis of their common factual premiss. In the traditionalist's eyes the Church's supposed immutability in her present shape was a glorious evidence of her divine origin and mission, while in the rationalist's eyes it was a damning confutation of the Church's extravagant claims; but the disputants agreed in their reading of the facts from which they drew these opposing conclusions, and, on the testimony of a Modern Western Science, their common reading was wrong.

The rationalist's error may be likened to the saucy townsman's when

the *Upanishads*, which go back before 500 B.C., and on the Vedic hymns, which go back before 1000 B.C. The so-called "Song of Creation" (*Rigveda* x. 129) is essential Hinduism.' The writer's answer would be that Sankara and his successors relieved Hinduism, in practice, of the incubus of the Indic Scriptures by professing to place these on a pedestal high enough to remove them conveniently out of the way.

¹ Caetani, L.: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. i (Milan 1911, Hoepli), p. xiv.

Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'This passage from Caetani echoes Tacitus's discussion of chronological relativity in his *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, chap. 16, which you cite in V. vi. 80, but in a different connexion. Caetani's "historical period" of five or six thousand years corresponds to Tacitus's historical period of 1,300 years going back to Ulysses and Nestor; Caetani's "modern" period (implied but not mentioned in this passage) would correspond with Tacitus's period of "not much more than 300 years" going back to Demosthenes; and Caetani's "boundless vista of our geological past" corresponds with the *magnum et verus annus* which Tacitus derived from Cicero. J. B. Bury (*The Ancient Greek Historians* (London 1909, Macmillan), p. 254) seems to think that Tacitus was the first person who apprehended the relativity of the historical Time-scale in this way.'

he visits his country cousin and watches him sowing his seed. 'This seed has come to nothing', says the townsman as he inspects the field the day after the sowing and sees nothing there but bare soil; 'this seed has come to nothing', he repeats with still greater assurance when, revisiting the field next spring, he finds stalk and leaf with no grain in the ear. The townsman's egregious error arises from simple ignorance of the time that Life takes to bring her work of creation from seed to harvest.

The Christian traditionalist's error may be likened to the guileless Nubian's when, squatting on the desert bank of the Nile in flood, he watches the mighty brown stream swirl past him on its way from the Abyssinian Highlands to the Mediterranean Sea. The Nubian insists that this muddy mixture is pure water, and you cannot convince him of his error by ocular demonstration; for, if you pass a sample through a filter and show him the clear liquid that comes out, he tells you that this anaemic fluid is no longer water at all. 'You have robbed it', he declares, 'of all the goodness that makes water the life-giving elixir that it is.' In identifying the muddy mixture with water, our Nubian has, of course, come within an ace of arriving at the truth, if more than ninety-nine and a half per cent. of the brew in truth consists of water and less than the half of one per cent. consists of water-borne soil;¹ his error lies in stubbornly asserting that the complement of mud is not an accretion but is the water's very essence.

Our Nubian's stubbornness might relax if his vision could be expanded. Suppose that, instead of being earth-bound on his patch of river-side desert somewhere between the sixth and the first cataract, he could soar up aloft in an aeroplane, survey the basin of the Nile from Lake Tana to Rosetta, and follow from beginning to end the whole course of the natural phenomenon of which he now apprehends no more than a single phase. The truth might then dawn upon his understanding.

The truth is that the life-giving rain from Heaven comes down in such a mighty spate that, when the Monsoon discharges itself against the Abyssinian mountains and turns, on Earth, into a mighty rushing flood, it scours out the rock into gorges and carries away and along with it all manner of debris and flotsam which will fructify the seeds of vegetation if and when the water can deposit this freight as sediment. But the river cannot drop its load till its heaven-sent impetus abates, and on the Nubian stage of its long purificatory pilgrimage it is still flowing so fast that it has not yet rid itself of any of its earthy encumbrance. So it flows past the eyes of the awestricken Nubian onlooker in a thick brown stream, leaving his land unfertilized and barren. Any crop that the poor Nubian reaps is not a gift of the Nile but is a trove from some casual gust of rainfall that has momentarily moistened the dry bed of a tributary wadi.² The hurrying river passes Nubia by. It is only when it reaches the favoured land of Egypt that its pace slackens

¹ 'The maximum silt content by weight usually found in the Nile where it enters Egypt is about 4000 parts per million, and the average from August to October about 1500 parts per million' (Hurst, H. E., and Phillips, P.: *The Nile Basin*, vol. v: 'The Hydrology of the Lake Plateau and Bahr el Jebel' (Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, Physical Department, Paper No. 35 (Cairo 1938, Schindler), p. 19).

² See II. i. 308-9.

enough to allow it to begin to disburden itself. From now onwards, mile by mile, the water converts its suspended alluvium into fertile fields and, in the creative act, progressively liberates itself, until, as it leaves the utmost fringe of the Delta behind it and breasts its way out to sea, it has become once again as clear and transparent as it was when it was falling from the sky on its way to furrow a contaminating yet fructifying Mother Earth. From the steepes of Semyen to the coasts of Cyprus may seem a long road; but all distances are comparative, and the breadth of half a continent is not really long compared to the circumference of the globe; nor is the labour of carrying its freight of earth so far an unduly heavy price for the river to pay for the boon of winning a bed; for, if the teeming water's first mighty impact on the Earth had not ploughed out the *cañon* from which its tardily deposited water-borne spoil derives, who knows whether the flood would ever have made history by turning into the Nile? Who knows whether it might not have surged back, uncreative and unsung, over the wastes of the Ogaden into the abyss of its parent Indian Ocean?

The heart of the matter is the truth to which the Nubian spectator is blind. The truth is that, so long as the alluvium is held in suspense, the alluvium itself remains unfertile and the water remains impure. It is only when the flotsam is able to sink from the intellectual surface of the psychic stream to the well-springs of lowly folk-lore and lofty poetry in the Psyche's intuitive and emotional depths that this sediment can fertilize the Psyche and that, in virtue of this fruitful disentanglement of two fortuitously intermingled elements, the heavenly water of spiritual life can regain its original purity. In the Roman Catholic Church this truth had been perceived by the Modernists;¹ but their insight had drawn down upon their heads the thunderbolt of a Juppiter in Agro Vaticano² who, with his gaze fixed on the Past and averted from the Future, seemed oblivious—though his hand still held the keys—of his previous local avatar in Ianiculo as the genius who had the power to open the door because he had the vision to look before and after.³

¹ 'Evolvi . . . ac mutari dogma non posse solum sed oportere, et modernistae ipsi perfracte affirmant, et ex eorum sententiis aperte consequitur. . . .' (*Litterae Encyclicae SS. D. N. Pii P.P. X: 'Pascendi dominici gregis. . .'* (8th September, 1907)).

² 'Si quis dixerit fieri posse ut dogmatibus ab Ecclesia propositis aliquando secundum progressum scientiae sensus tribuendus sit alius ab eo quem intellexit et intelligit Ecclesia, anathema sit' (Concilium Vaticanum, 1869-70, Sessio III (24 Aprilis, 1870), canones: 4. *De Fide et Ratione*, Canon 3).

³ While the extremeness of the conservatism of the Papacy was manifestly due to the relative vastness and antiquity of the particular Christian ecclesiastical institution that was administered from the Vatican (see pp. 549-50, below), this latter-day Roman Catholic conservatism was in itself only an exaggeration of a trait which had been characteristic of the Christian Church since its infancy and which had persisted in divers degrees in all the denominations between which the Church had come to be divided. Four reasons for this conservatism of Christianity in general, and of Western Christianity in particular, have been suggested by Canon B. H. Streeter:

(i) The Church among the Gentiles was a missionary church which had hardly set to work before it found itself cut off from its base of operations owing to the rejection of Christianity by Jewry. This breach with a contemporary Jewry, which, in a sense, made the Gentile Christian Church's fortune by making it into the Christian Church *sans phrase*, had the further effect of making the Church meticulous in maintaining continuity, on its own account, with a Jewish past from which, on its own view, it derived both credentials and inspiration that it could not afford to lose.

(ii) A Christian tradition had no sooner begun to take shape than it was constrained

The legacy of the Past to the Present was indeed as precious as it was conspicuous. 'Before Abraham was, I am';¹ and, since it was not credible that God should have shown no glimmer of His light to Man before a revelation to 'Abraham' that was the traditional first epiphany of that ray of progressive enlightenment which had culminated in Christianity, students of History must also recognize true gleams of divine light in religious rites and symbols, older than Abraham's day, that had been caught up and carried along in the latter-day Christian stream.²

'The calling of Abraham' itself might be an echo of one of the spiritual experiences of a disintegrating Sumeric Civilization if the spiritual meaning of the story was the establishment of a personal relation between the worshipper and the genius of his household,³ for this is a revelation of God's nature to which the human heart and mind are attuned when the corporate political aspect of Religion—the worship of a deified parochial or universal state—is discredited by the collapse of the mundane society whose will to live is reflected in it.⁴ We have already noticed another fruit of Sumeric spiritual experience which had likewise been garnered by Christianity, though this without recognition of the Sumeric source. The Passion of Christ, as we have seen, had been foreshadowed in a Passion of Tammuz in which the death of one god, made manifest in the *ἐναντὸς δαίμων*,⁵ had been celebrated under the divers names of Adonis, Osiris, Attis, Zagreus, Balder, as the rite had radiated over the face of the Earth. The Queen of

to freeze itself hard in order to save itself from being liquidated by Gnostic and other alien influences (on this point, compare the passage quoted from Bishop E. W. Barnes on p. 465, below).

(iii) In the West, from the fifth century of the Christian Era onwards, the Christian Church was drawn into playing the role of serving as a chrysalis for the genesis of a new Western Christian Civilization out of the moribund body social of an old Hellenic Civilization (on this point see the present volume, pp. 392-419, above).

(iv) In the West, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the Christian Church was drawn into participation in a backward-looking renaissance of the Hellenic Civilization to which the Western Christian Civilization was affiliated (on this point see the present volume, pp. 538-44, below).

The foregoing considerations are set out, under the cross-heading 'The Conservatism of the Church', in an essay on 'Christ the Constructive Revolutionary' on pp. 348-52 of a symposium entitled *The Spirit* (New York 1919, Macmillan).

Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'The conservatism of modern Christianity has another cause which is not mentioned here. As a post-Christian Western Civilization developed out of Western Christendom from the seventeenth century onwards, the Church, rightly fearing the spread of secularism and the reversion to neo-paganism, wrongly identified the Faith with the social system that was passing away. Thus, while conducting an intellectual rearguard action against "liberal", "modernist", and "scientific" errors, it incautiously fell into a posture of political Archaism, supporting feudalism, monarchy, aristocracy, "capitalism", and the *ancien régime* generally, and became the ally and often the tool of political reactionaries who were as anti-Christian as the common "revolutionary" enemy. Hence the unedifying political record of modern Christianity: in the nineteenth century it allied itself with monarchism and aristocracy in order to denounce liberal democracy; in the twentieth century it allies itself with liberal democracy in order to denounce totalitarianism. Thus it had seemed, ever since the French Revolution, [always] to be one political phase behind the times. This, of course, is the gist of the Marxist criticism of Christianity in the Modern World. The Christian answer would perhaps be that, when the Gadarene swine of a disintegrating civilization are engaged in their headlong downward rush, it may well be the Church's responsibility to keep as far as possible to the rear of the herd and direct the eyes of as many as possible backwards up the slope.'

¹ John viii. 58.

² On this point, see further pp. 764-5 and 766-7, below.

³ See V. vi. 39, n. 3.

⁴ See V. v. 529-32 and V. vi. 14-16.

⁵ See III. iii. 256-9.

Heaven who was the virgin mother and spouse of the dying god had been adored as Ishtar, Ashtoreth, Isis, Cybele, Britomartis, and Inanna on her way to being adored as Mary.¹ In the sacrifice of the Mass, Christians were still partaking of the sacrament of all the pagan mysteries.

The travail of Christ Incarnate for the salvation of Mankind had been foreshadowed in the labours of Gilgamesh, Hēraklēs, Prometheus, and the 'culture heroes' of a Sinic mythology,² and the Incarnation had been no stumbling-block to the imagination of an Hellenic World which had added the revolutionary worship of Caesar to a traditional worship of the Olympians. In the Olympians the mundane society that was Christianity's first mission-field was already familiar with the spectacle of divinity in human form—though, through the dark glass of a barbaric Achaean mythology, the many gods into whom the One True God's image was here diffracted showed themselves prone to all human moral infirmities and free merely from all human physical limitations.³ In Divus Augustus the potential converts of the first Christian missionaries had already acknowledged an incarnation of the Godhead in a living human being whose mortal mother was fabled to have been got with child by an immortal sire;⁴ and this divine deed, which must shock the sensibilities of a philosophic soul as a vulgar moral transgression when it was attributed to an Olympian, was to shine, in the self-revelation of a God whose power was love and whose Godhead was as wholly present in the Son as in the Father, as a voluntary evacuation (κένωσις) of His own divinity which was a supreme act of self-sacrifice for the redemption of His fallen creatures.

The tableau of Mother and Child among the gentle cattle in the stable at Bethlehem, which symbolized Christ's act of κένωσις in the imagery of the Christian Faith, had been anticipated in the tableau of a Minoan πότνια θηρῶν surrounded by her *comitatus* of beasts of the field.⁵ The lamb who had been moved to prophesy by the agony of an Egyptiac Time of Troubles had been a prototype of the lamb who was Christ;⁶ and the Sumeric fish-god Ea—incarnate in the fish whose presence had hallowed the tanks of latter-day shrines at Mambij and Ascalon⁷ and Brusa⁸—had been a prototype of the Christ whose epiphany as a fish had been ingeniously explained away as a play upon the initial letters of his style and title in Greek.⁹ The dove that became

¹ See V. v. 81–82 and 148–50, and p. 437, above, and pp. 467, below.

² See V. vi. 266–7.

³ 'Mr. Gladstone, in his essay on "The Place of Ancient Greece in the Providential Order", has a very interesting discussion of the character and attributes of Apollo, seeing in him a precursor of Christ. "In his hands we find numerous functions of such rank and such range that we cannot understand how they could pass to him from Zeus the supreme deity until we remember that they are the very functions assigned by a more real and higher system to the Son of God: the true Instructor, Healer, Deliverer, Judge and Conqueror of Death, in whom the power and majesty of the Godhead were set forth to the World" (Gladstone, W. E.: *Gleanings of Past Years*, vol. vii (London 1879, John Murray), p. 49).—Martin Wight.

⁴ See V. vi. 267–8 and 269, n. 1.

⁵ See III. iii. 260–1.

⁶ See IV. iv. 409–11.

⁷ The temples of Atargatis at Mambij and Ascalon (Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), p. 137).

⁸ The Ulu Jāmy'sy (Great Mosque) at Brusa.

⁹ Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ Ὑιὸς Σωτὴρ = ΙΧΘΥΣ.

the Holy Spirit descending on Jesus at His baptism in Jordan had hovered in ages past round the fane of Aphrodite as Paphos.¹ The stone² on which the Church of Christ was built had made its earliest advent to Rome, not in the first century of the Christian Era, but in 204 B.C. as the baetylus of a Pessinuntine Cybele, and the Roman Catholic Church was not the only surviving religious edifice that rested upon it; it was also embedded in the foundations of the Ka'bah at Mecca.³

Man's worship of forces of Nature, less amenable than stocks and stones, that mocked his audacious efforts to harness and exploit his fellow creatures, had given Man an inkling of the One True God's transcendent power. A sky god and a volcano *jinn* had lent their potency to quicken Israel's overwhelming sense of the omnipotence of the Living God Yahweh;⁴ and an ancestral worship of a Sun in which a maturing Scientific Mind had correctly discerned the physical source of terrestrial energy and life had initiated Constantine into the secret that God's power is the power of love⁵ when he had seen the Cross flame out athwart the Aton.⁶

In their handling of this spoil that had been carried in suspense in the current of Christianity, the traditionalists and the rationalists had played into one another's hands once again. The same historic rites and symbols that the traditionalists had defended tooth and nail, in the forms in which Christianity happened to have adopted them, as essential and inalienable elements of Christian practice and belief, had been denounced by the same Christian controversialists, with reckless inconsistency, in the unmistakably kindred forms in which they were to be found in other faiths and worships. The resemblance was indeed so striking that the Christian traditionalists had been unable to ignore it; but, instead of allowing themselves to apprehend the simple truth that it was a family likeness, they had concocted the ingenious alternative explanation that it was devil's work. The Devil and his angels had put into circulation counterfeit copies of the institutions of the Church in order to mislead Mankind into rejecting the One True Faith.

In thus branding the pagan mysteries as frauds, the Christian traditionalists had delivered themselves into the hands of their ex-Christian rationalist adversaries. The Higher Criticism could demonstrate incontrovertibly that the genetic relation between corresponding rites and symbols was the inverse of what the traditionalists alleged. So far from the pagan forms being counterfeits of the Christian, the Christian could be shown to be derivatives of the pagan; and, therewith, the Christian traditionalists were hoist with their own petard; for they themselves were unescapably 'on record' as having declared these

¹ See V. vi. 362.

² 'Stone' is the authentic meaning of the masculine Greek word *πέτρος*, not 'rock', which is the meaning of the collective feminine *πέτρα*.

³ See V. v. 685-8, and pp. 465 and 466, below.

⁴ See V. vi. 38-45.

⁵ See V. v. 691-4 and V. vi. 24-25.

⁶ This intuition that the divinity embodied in the Sun was identical with a Dead and Risen Christ enabled Constantine to fulfil Ikhnaton's unfulfilled mission of becoming the One True God's oecumenical bishop. Ikhnaton had failed to take the literally crucial step of identifying the Aton with Osiris—perhaps because a nascent Osirian Church had already been blighted by being drawn into an unholy alliance with the barefacedly political religion of Amon-Re (see I. i. 143-5).

elements of religion to be a sham and a delusion in their pagan version, and the words could be taken out of their mouths to pronounce the same judgement on their own holy of holies. On the Christians' own confession, so the neo-pagans could declare, a religion which had adopted and cherished these crude primitive rites and symbols stood convicted of having the lie in its soul.

This was a fair shot¹ in the not illegitimate warfare that the neo-pagans waged against the Christian traditionalists; and in that battle it was also a knock-out blow. From the rigorously exclusive traditionalist Christian standpoint the Higher Criticism's argument was unanswerable. Since the days of the Fathers of the Church, however, there had been other Christians who had acknowledged Christianity's pagan ancestry, and these could still hold the field and turn the argument's edge against its neo-pagan authors. In contrast to the Christian traditionalists, the Christian evolutionists² had started, not from the negative premiss that pre-Christian paganism was false, but from the positive premiss that Christianity was true; and they could therefore accept with impunity a recognition of the truth that the resemblances between Christianity and pre-Christian paganism were due to Christianity's indebtedness to a pagan past. The Christian evolutionist's inference from this would be, not that there was no truth in Christianity, but that the truth which was in Christianity had already been aglow in paganism for ages before it had burst into a Christian flame. The enlightened Christian would not only accept this new perspective without hesitation or embarrassment; he would give glory to a God who 'is' before Abraham 'was', for having revealed some glimmer of His light to Man before Abraham's day.

This was not the last word, however; for, if the Christian evolutionist was in a posture to stand his ground and to return the neo-pagan's fire after the Christian traditionalist's batteries had been silenced, he must be on guard against ranging himself under the Christian traditionalist's standard and thereby nullifying his own Christian victory. Transposing our simile of the flow of a river into terms of a simile of the radiation of light, we must be ever alert to distinguish between the eternal source of light and its transient manifestations. 'No man hath seen God at any time';³ we apprehend God's existence and divine His nature thanks to the Creator's revelation of Himself through His works;⁴ but God's

¹ Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'The reasoning of this paragraph does not carry conviction. Whatever [a] Higher Criticism can demonstrate, it has nothing to say to the question whether the pagan rites are diabolical in origin. The fact that pagan theophagy is historically and anthropologically prior to the Eucharist does not in the least affect the Christian's assertion that pagan theophagy is false while the Eucharist is the real thing. Genetic relationships are irrelevant to teleology—though, of course, most Christians today, and many Christians at all times, would say that these pagan rites were (or are) adumbrations of and preparations for the real thing rather than diabolical counterfeits. The dual interpretation of non-Christian religions either as demonic or as *praeparatio evangelica* goes back to the earliest days of the Church.'

² The word 'evolutionists' is, of course, used in the present context in its generic meaning, without any intention of importing into it the specific associations attaching to its use in hypotheses and controversies precipitated by the Modern Western science of Biology.

³ 1 John iv. 12.

⁴ Mr. Martin Wight justly comments: 'For a Christian, through Christ.' It was the Christian Faith that God had made one unique direct revelation of Himself to Mankind on Earth in the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity as Christ Jesus, and this Christian belief was in contradiction with the statement that has just been quoted from

works are not only windows through which the heavenly light is made visible to the eye of the Human Soul on Earth; they are at the same time veils through which the radiance is dulled to a degree at which the Soul's eye can receive it without being blinded; they are partly opaque as well as partly translucent, and they never reveal to us more than a local aspect of God's omnipresence or a temporary aspect of His eternity.¹ In the rudimentary theology of a North American Indian tribe, these elusive epiphanies of God had been described in the vivid imagery of the primitive imagination:

'Everything, as it moves, now and then, here and there, makes stops. The bird as it flies stops in one place to make its nest, and in another to rest in its flight. A man, when he goes forth, stops when he wills. So the god has stopped. The Sun, which is so bright and beautiful, is one place where he has stopped. The Moon, the stars, the winds he has been with. The trees, the animals, are all where he has stopped, and the Indian thinks of these places and sends his prayers there to reach the place where the god has stopped and to win help and a blessing.'²

This intuition that God's works are God's stopping places had been the inspiration of Goethe's greatest poem³ and Bergson's greatest philosophical work.⁴ The error of idolatry lies in mistaking the creature for the Creator, and the sin of it lies in worshipping the creature in the Creator's stead.⁵ Man has thus idolized the productive and destructive forces in Non-Human Nature—cow and bull, field and mountain, sun and storm—and the corresponding antithetical forces in Man himself: the key roles, gracious or forbidding, in the drama of human life—motherhood, fatherhood, kingship, self-sacrifice—and a Leviathan that is the appalling projection of a demonic corporate human power. Yet any veil through which God's light dimly shines is an intimation of God that is not God Himself, though one veil may differ from another in the degree of its opacity. Moreover there is veil behind veil, and the

the New Testament. Yet, if the Christian Church had apparently revoked the Johannine declaration that 'no man hath seen God at any time', a Christian would not dispute the proposition that 'no man hath seen God at any time except in "the incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ"': he would hold that Christ's human nature, from which His divine nature was never dissociated at any time during its direct revelation to human beings, was one of the works of the God who had incarnated Himself in this human nature as Christ Jesus; and—holding also, as he must, that 'although he be God and man, yet He is not two, but one Christ'—he must hold Christ to be 'inferior to the Father as touching His manhood' while 'equal to the Father as touching His Godhead'. Thus, according to the Christian Faith, God, in Christ incarnate, had revealed Himself 'in association with' one of His works, though not in this case solely 'through' it, since, according to the Christian Faith, this unique revelation was a direct self-revelation of the Godhead.

¹ This is T. S. Eliot's theme in *The Rock*, Chorus X, beginning 'O Light Invisible, we praise Thee! Too bright for mortal vision', with its refrains in the words of the liturgy of the Holy Communion, and with its conclusion:

'And when we have built an altar to the Invisible Light, we may set thereon the little lights for which our bodily vision is made,

'And we thank Thee that darkness reminds us of light.

'O Light Invisible, we give Thee thanks for Thy great glory.'

² Quoted by Fletcher, A. C., in *Reports of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology*, vol. iii, 1880-6 (Cambridge, Mass. 1887, Peabody Museum), p. 276, n. 1.

³ For this theme in Faust, see II. i. 271-98.

⁴ Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan).

⁵ See IV. iv. 261-2.

Soul's approach on Earth towards the Beatific Vision and the Communion of Saints is made by stripping away one revealing-obscuring veil after another, as far as Man's spiritual insight can penetrate and as fast as his Soul's eye can accustom itself to the increase in the degree of the radiance that the removal of each successive veil brings with it.¹ A veil between the Human Soul and God is removed when the creature in which this veil consists is mastered—and, in the act of being mastered, is exorcised—by the Human Intellect; and this is why 'the discovery of new means by which Consciousness is enabled to extend its range of objectives has always been the decisive factor in the history of human development'.²

This is the way of Life; but it is a hard way, because the stepping-stones are stopping-places and the pilgrim's progress is a *tour de force*. The Soul in search of God has 'to make a movement out of something which, by definition, is a halt',³ and she has to see through the ambivalence of windows that are veils. Each veil becomes suffused with light in the act of obstructing the light's passage from its source to the eye. How can we believe that this rose-flushed or that opal-tinted cloud owes its glow and colour to a glory that is not in, but is beyond, the cloud itself? And, even if our minds do become convinced of the truth of this hardly credible proposition, how can our hearts bear to discard a thing of beauty that has been a joy, and at which we have learnt to gaze without being dazzled? Can it not be a joy for ever? Is it not sacrilege to discard it? Is it not madness? Man is prone to idolatry because he is always tempted to play truant from his God-given task of a never-ending search for God by seeking rest in a finite object of worship, and this, in the imagery of a seventeenth-century English poet, was the reason why God 'made a stay' in pouring his blessings on Man when rest alone remained to bestow upon him.

For if I should (said he)
Bestow this jewel also on my creature
He would adore My gifts instead of Me,
And rest in Nature, not the God of Nature;
So both should losers be.⁴

Here is the crux in the way of Man's approach to God; and, because of it, each spiritual step in advance has to be paid for, like all true gains, by a painful sacrifice. We have to throw away a treasure of the highest value so far known to us in order to purchase another treasure whose value, before we have grasped it, we can only take on faith as being higher still.⁵ This Pilgrim's Progress requires an ascetic ruthlessness as

¹ Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'This is the Christian's answer to your assertion above, on pp. 442-3, of the spiritual equivalence of the four higher religions: "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past . . . by the Prophets [and by the pagan precursors], hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son" (Heb. i. 1-2).'

² Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall, & Cox; 1949, Methuen), p. 309. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

³ Bergson, op. cit., p. 251, quoted in III. iii. 235.

⁴ Herbert, George: *The Pilgrimage*.

⁵ 'This is moving and, from the Christian point of view, true. It is the demand which God made on Abraham when He called him to abandon the "other gods" whom his

well as a sanguine hope and valour; and faint souls that flinch from the ordeal seek to justify their failure to themselves by enlarging on the negative aspect of the spiritual feat that is demanded of them, and closing their eyes to the spiritual gain of which this sacrifice is the inexorable price.

'Prometheus, the cultural innovator who stole the fire of the Gods, is the prototype for all time of the daring hero-criminal who challenges the primordial images, the immemorial gods of the Unconscious, in order to place more power—i.e. knowledge—in the hands of Consciousness. . . . The guilt of Prometheus (which is also the guilt of the psychological innovator and pioneer) consists in the fact that he transferred from Heaven (i.e. the realm of primordial images) energy which had been latent in the Unconscious since the World began, bringing it under the control of Consciousness.'¹

Hence the paradox that some of the greatest advances in the Soul's approach to God that have been made, at divers times and places, by saints and seers, have been anathematized as appalling backslidings—and this in good faith—by men of common clay who could not 'make the grade'. An Hellenically cultivated Pompey was dumbfounded at finding no material object of worship whatsoever inside the Holy of Holies of the Temple of Yahweh at Jerusalem when he forced his way in under the stimulus of a curiosity that had been whetted by the provocative self-confidence of a Jewish community's claim to be the only rightly guided worshippers of the One True God. In the next age of Hellenic history a now rather more pious pagan public discovered to its horror that the harmless-looking adherents of a new sect called Christians were 'atheists' who rejected everything that their pagan neighbours held sacred,² while pious Jews, for their part, execrated the Christians as libertines who had betrayed the faith of their fathers by admitting Gentiles into religious communion with Christian Jews and by exempting these uncircumcised proselytes from the duty of observing the Mosaic Law.

This was the historical background against which students of history midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era had to view the state of Christianity and the other living higher religions in their day; and the conclusion to be drawn seemed to be in sharp contradiction with both the rationalist and the traditionalist position. The flotsam scoured out from older strata of religious experience and carried along in suspense in a Christian, Mahayanian, Hindu, or Islamic stream was no evidence that the water with which it was mingled was not the true living water from Heaven; but the water was given a clean bill of health in virtue of the finding that its load of fertilizing mud was only a temporary accretion; and this finding, which disposed of the rationalist's indictment of the muddiness of the stream, was at the same time fatal to the traditionalist's defence of it on the ground that the mud was of the

father Terah served (Joshua xxiv. 2); on Saul before he could become Paul; and on Augustine; and it is the demand which is made, in principle, on the adherent of every other higher (and lower) religion.'—Martin Wight.

¹ Baynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 310 and 316.

² See V. vi. 536, and p. 491, below.

water's essence. The waters dropped by the Monsoon could not have become the Nile without scooping up the Abyssinian silt and carrying it along with them; but it was equally true, and true for the same reason, that the Nile could not be what it was without depositing its load sooner or later and eventually flowing out to sea in a stream as pure as the rain that had originally fallen from Heaven.

A Christian Father, Justin Martyr, writing his *First Apology* in the second century of the Christian Era, had not shrunk from pressing his argument against his pagan adversaries by drawing attention to a parallelism between the virgin births ascribed to Jesus and to Perseus, between the miracles of healing ascribed to Jesus and to Aesculapius, and between the alleged resurrection of Jesus and the apotheosis of Ariadne and the Caesars;¹ and the illuminatingly charitable distinction between the essence of a religious revelation and the accidents of the time and place in which it has come into the World, which a Christian 'evolutionist' might have derived from the polemical argument of a Christian 'fundamentalist', had been drawn by an eminent Modern Western Islamic scholar in an appreciation of the character and career of the Prophet Muhammad.

'Certainly Muhammad was guilty of errors, some of which were involuntary, but others not; besides these, he also perpetrated not a few acts that would be classified by us to-day as common crimes inspired by the basest of human passions; but it will be the task of future generations of historical critics to elucidate how far, in all this, the Prophet's personal responsibility is engaged, and to what extent his acts are, on the contrary, to be regarded as being an impersonal expression of the specific conditions of a society that was still in a primitive stage of development. Our own belief is that the errors and defects discernible in the Prophet, and in the religious system that he created, are to be attributed to the society in which he lived. To this society Muhammad was superior in many respects, but in others he was its native child and, as such, was necessarily a party to all its vices, imperfections and prejudices.'²

The Prophet Muhammad, as we have seen,³ did deliberately compound with a pre-Islamic Arabian paganism, when he consented to adulterate the purity of his 'Religion of Abraham' by alloying it with the

¹ Justin Martyr's standpoint is described by Mr. Martin Wight as follows: 'Justin was the reverse of an "evolutionist"; he was an exclusivist or universalist, believing that the Christian Revelation is exclusively true and makes demands on the entire Human Race. He believed in the demonic character of pagan religion, especially where it imitated the Christian mysteries: see his discussion of the Mithraic mysteries as a diabolical travesty of the Eucharist, *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, ch. 70, and *First Apology*, ch. 66. In the passage that you cite he is not drawing parallels between Christian and pagan miracles; he is arguing with polemical irony: Who are you pagans to sneer at our belief in a virgin birth—what about Perseus? Or to find the miracles of healing incredible—what about Aesculapius? Or to find the Resurrection and Ascension ridiculous—"we propound nothing different from what you believe about those whom you consider to be the sons of Zeus . . . [and], the emperors . . . whom you deem worthy of deification, and on whose behalf you produce somebody to swear that he has seen the burning Caesar ascend to Heaven from the pyre" (*First Apology*, ch. 21). Justin makes the natural and reasonable assumption—for a Christian—that, in so far as pagan myths are true, they foreshadowed and find their fulfilment in Christ, but that, in so far as they described gods who are engaged in every kind of crime and vice, they are the work of the Devil.'

² Caetani, L.: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. iii (Milan 1914, Hoepli), p. 295.

³ On pp. 437-8, above.

local cult of the Black Stone embedded in the wall of the Ka'bah at Mecca and with the regional practice of an annual pilgrimage to this Hijāzī shrine.¹ Yet this conciliatory concession to the prejudices and interests of his stiff-necked clansmen the Banu Quraysh was a venial sin against the Prophet's own Heaven-sent lights which left untarnished the sincerity and strength of will which Muhammad consistently displayed in resisting a perpetual temptation to compromise with the two mortal sins of Polytheism and Idolatry that were rampant not only in the Arabian paganism but also in the Hellenic Christianity of Muhammad's day; and in Christianity likewise, in spite of all the Christian Church's lamentable shortcomings and backslidings, there had always been a tendency for the living waters to defend their purity by refusing to pick up and carry the sullyng soil that they had found in their path.

'The temptation to form tacit alliances with other religious movements, in some ways remarkably similar, must have been strong. Such an alliance would, however, have meant the ultimate repudiation of all that was most characteristic in the teaching of Jesus. Because Christianity refused compromise with other faiths, it survived to become, until practically our own time, the nominal, and not wholly ineffective, religion of Europe. Whether, by re-affirming the teaching of Jesus in its undeviating severity, Christianity can resume its hold on the hearts and minds of men, is a question of great importance as regards the ultimate fate of European Civilisation.'²

How were souls in search of God to disengage the essence of Religion from the accidents? Doubtless Time would show; for the expectation of human life on Earth (supposing that Man did not use his swiftly increasing technological command over Physical Nature to annihilate himself) was unimaginably long, and, in the course of those future aeons, the living waters would assuredly have time to purify themselves, like the Nile in its vastly briefer passage from Lake Tana to the sea. Time would show; but, in the life of the Spirit, operations are never impersonal or automatic; and, if this salutary purification were indeed eventually to be accomplished, this would be the achievement of individual souls. At any moment in its personal pilgrimage through life on Earth, a soul might be challenged by God to discriminate between the silt and the water, between the light and its reflection, by trial and error at the Soul's own peril; 'and narrow is the way which leadeth unto Life, and few there be that find it',³ for, on the spiritual even more conspicuously than on the physical plane, it is impossible to live without living dangerously.

(c) THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HEART AND HEAD

Essence and Accidents

How, in an *Oikoumenē* that was being united on a literally world-wide range within a Western framework, were Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, and Hindus to make further progress in disengaging the essence of Religion from the accidents? The only way open to these fellow seekers after spiritual light was the hard road of spiritual travail along which

¹ See p. 466, below.

² Barnes, E. W.: *The Rise of Christianity* (London 1947, Longmans Green), p. 296, apropos of the eucharistic doctrine expounded in 1 Cor. x. 16-21.

³ Matt. vii. 14.

their predecessors, with God's help, had arrived at the degree of religious enlightenment represented by the living higher religions at the stage in which they found themselves at this crucial moment in Mankind's history. By comparison with the stage embodied in Primitive Paganism, the state of relative enlightenment to which the adherents of the higher religions had attained by a date midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era manifestly represented a marvellous spiritual advance; yet, marvellous though it might be, they had now become aware that they could no longer go on living parasitically on God's past mercies to their forefathers and on their own forefathers' past spiritual endeavours to win a fuller vision of God, and a closer communion with Him, for themselves and for their children. They knew that they could no longer rest on their predecessors' spiritual labours because, in their generation, they were being racked by a conflict between heart and head which they could not leave unresolved with impunity, and which could be resolved only by a fresh spiritual move forward.

As the pilgrims girded themselves to take the hard road again, they might draw some encouragement from divers past successes of Mankind in discarding veils which had served as windows in their time. In default of fuller light, there had been a glimmer of spiritual enlightenment in the faint translucency of Man's vision of God through the animal creation.¹ In the demonic physical energies of untamed wild beasts Man had caught a glimpse of a divine power surpassing Man's own strength; in the hunter's game and in the shepherd's flock he had caught a glimpse of God's beneficence as the giver and sustainer of life; and a primitive worship of God in animal form had lived on to play a leading role in the religion of the Egyptian Civilization. Yet, in the World as it was in A.D. 1952, this dim 'theriomorphic' vision of God, though still a living reality for unsophisticated souls at the lower levels of Hinduism, was on the whole on the wane. In the Christian consciousness the lamb, the dove, and the fish stood, not for literal likenesses of God, but for poetic images of His ineffable nature—just as the rock on which the Church was built according to the Roman Catholic Christian belief was not a literal stone like the stone that had once embodied the Emesan divinity Elagabalus or the stone that still supported the wall of a Meccan Ka'bah.

There were, however, some relics of past stages of enlightenment which might not prove so easy to purge away. The Muslims, who had resolutely rejected all visual representations of God in the physical likeness of living creatures, including 'the human form divine', had not yet summoned up the resolution to break with that older and cruder phase of idolatry which had been embedded in Islam by the founder Muhammad himself—against the grain of his own prophetic mission—when he had given his sanction to the adoration of the Black Stone as part of a compromise with the vested interests of an *ancien régime* at Mecca.² Even the puritanical Wahhābī reformers, who had twice entered Mecca

¹ See p. 461, above.

² This perhaps trivial but hitherto indelible blemish upon the purity of Islam has been noticed on pp. 464–5, above.

as conquerors pledged to purge Islam of idolatrous accretions, had left the Black Stone untouched both in A.D. 1804 and in A.D. 1924. To Christian minds the Muslims' reluctance to part with the Black Stone seemed a quaint anachronism in glaring contradiction with the abhorrence of idolatry and devotion to monotheism that were the twin beacon-lights of Islam; and, conversely, Muslim minds found stumbling-blocks in the idolatry and the polytheism which, as they saw it, were still being practised by Christians, as well as by Buddhists and Hindus. In Muslim eyes the Christians' persistent idolatry betrayed itself in the visual representation of God in the forms of a man, a bird, and an animal, and their persistent polytheism in their doctrine of the Trinity and their cults of the saints, while in a Protestant Christian's eyes the sacrament of the pagan mysteries survived in the Catholic 'Sacrifice of the Mass', and the worship of the Great Mother had been withdrawn from Ishtar, Astarte, Isis, Cybele, and Inanna only to be paid, by Catholic devotees, to the same Mother of God under the name of Mary.¹

Of all the veils through which the vision of God had been transmitted and at the same time obscured, the hardest for Muslims as well as for Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists to discard would be their representation of God to themselves in the likeness of Man.

It might be true that the corporeal version of 'anthropomorphism' was as obsolete as 'theriomorphism' and fetish-worship. The vision of divinity incarnate in the physical likeness of men and women of flesh and blood—a vision that had found its most attractive expression in Hellenic poetry and art—was not accepted by the adherents of any of the higher religions as a revelation of the ultimate nature of God. In terms of Christian theology the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ had been an 'emptying' (*κένωσις*)² of God's own ultimate nature; and God's voluntary act of thus 'emptying' Himself in order to be born a man had been God's supreme self-humiliation and self-sacrifice for Man's sake—a sacrifice entailing but transcending the death on the Cross through which God Incarnate had fulfilled His Mission on Earth. Yet, when Christians sought to know God, their conception of God was still 'anthropomorphic' in being in terms of the feelings, will, and intellect of a human personality—in terms, that is, of elements of conscious human psychic life which they had never encountered at first hand except in association with human bodies. And, when Hindus sought to know God, they eliminated from their conception of God both the physical body and the conscious surface of the Psyche, only, it would seem, to identify deity (*brahman*) with the impersonal subconscious psychic depths (*ātman*) that underlie the personal conscious surface of a human soul.³ This psychic anthropomorphism was perhaps one of the inescapable limitations of Human Nature, since human beings were

¹ See pp. 437 and 457, above, and p. 717, below. Catholic Christians, of course, did not admit the Protestant allegation that their adoration of Mary amounted to the worship of a goddess. According to the Catholic Christian doctrine, Mary was one of God's creatures, and the qualities that Catholics adored in her were gifts to her from her Creator.

² Phil. ii. 7 (R.V.).

³ See pp. 497–8 and 725, with n. 1, below.

incapable of conceiving of God's nature except in images drawn from, and therefore inevitably bounded by, human experience. Yet a necessary limitation might be a potential source of errors into which the Human Spirit need not fall and into which it could not allow itself to fall with impunity.

One of Man's fundamental and perennial errors—an error that is both an intellectual and a moral lapse—is to idolize discoveries of his own making that enhance his power. About half-way through the last millennium B.C., Indic minds had discovered the Subconscious Psyche and Hellenic minds the Reason, and their idolization of these discoveries had been taken over, and carried along down-stream, by Hinduism and Christianity respectively. In the twentieth century of the Christian Era, Western minds, by an experimental method of scientific inquiry which they had forged for themselves in a Modern Age of Western history, had arrived independently at that discovery of the Subconscious which Indic minds had attained by intuition some 2,500 years earlier; and in the year A.D. 1952 a student of History might guess that the Western World, after having followed an Hellenic philosophy hitherto in worshipping a false 'God the Reason', would now veer about and follow an Indic philosophy in worshipping an equally false 'God the Subconscious'. This nascent new religion of the West had been portended in Mr. Aldous Huxley's exposition of a 'Perennial Philosophy',¹ and it was assuredly salutary for Western thinkers to recognize that the Anaxagorean deification of human intelligence, like the Homeric deification of human flesh and blood, was an inadequate representation of the Godhead, and that Indic sages had made momentous discoveries in the spiritual sphere to which Hellenic philosophers and Western scientists had been blind. The mistake that an unnerved Western rationalist might be in danger of making would lie in overlooking the truth that, in identifying the human subconscious psyche with God, the Indic sages had fallen into the same 'perennial error' as the Hellenes who had found God in the human reason or in the human body.

The truth is that Anthropomorphism, even in its most ethereal expressions, is a form of idolatry if idolatry is to be defined as a worship of the creature instead of the Creator;² and this worship of God in the image of Man—unlike the worship of God in an animal or in a stone—is also vitiated by the intellectual error and moral failing of 'the egocentric illusion'. At an earlier point in this Study³ we have observed how this illusion had tempted the representatives of parochial and ephemeral secular societies to imagine that their own particular civilization, in the particular phase in which it had happened to find itself in their day, was the consummation of human history. The same illusion can be detected in Man's anthropomorphic conception of God; and the fallacy in it has been exposed with a devastating finality, apropos of this far

¹ Huxley, A.: *The Perennial Philosophy* (London 1946, Chatto & Windus).

² For this definition, see IV. iv. 261-2. A Christian, of course, would maintain that he was not worshipping a creature in worshipping Christ Jesus, for he would say that in Christ he was worshipping God and not the human nature in which God was incarnate and in which the Christian would see one of God's works of creation.

³ In I. i. 158-64.

more momentous issue, in the satirical verse of the Hellenic philosopher Xenophanes:

'The Aethiopians say that their Gods are snub-nosed and black-skinned, and the Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired. If only oxen and horses had hands and wanted to draw with their hands or to make the works of art that men make, then horses would draw the figures of their Gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and would make their bodies on the model of their own.'¹

There is, no doubt, a sense in which it is true that 'God created Man in His own image'²—though in the same sense this is also true in some measure of each of God's other works of creation, since all are windows that reveal their Creator, besides being veils that conceal Him—but, when Man is tempted by his awareness of his own God-given likeness to his Maker into setting himself up as the measure of all things,³ including the God whose image is dimly revealed through the dark glass of Human Nature,⁴ Man can be acquitted of the sin of *hybris* only on the plea that he labours under an invincible ineptitude. In his continuing search for God, Man is called upon to transcend Anthropomorphism; but, in attempting to respond to this challenge from his Maker, Man is confronted by a crux inherent in the paradoxical ambivalence of Human Nature.

Anthropomorphism seems likely to be harder for Man to transcend than any other form of idolatry because Man is the highest of God's creatures that is known to Man, and therefore, in so far as our knowledge of God Himself is derived from our knowledge of His creation, the image of God that is presented by Man is the least opaque fragment of the glass through which we see God darkly.⁵ Yet, in the act of becoming aware of his position at what appears to be the apex of God's creation, Man is caught between Scylla and Charybdis. He is lost if the relative sublimity of his station turns his head; for, when he allows himself to be overcome by the dizziness of pride, he falls crashing down from his pinnacle; and, in his exposure to this danger, he is less happily placed than his humble servant the dog, who is immune against the sin of pride thanks to an overwhelming awareness of his own inferiority to the mysterious fellow creature that has domesticated him. Yet Man's undoglike capacity to fall is a measure of the height on which God has set him; for Man is the highest of God's creatures known to Man in virtue of his knowledge of good and evil and of his power to choose between them; and he is the best of God's creatures because it is in his

¹ For the original Greek text of this passage, which has been quoted already at the head of the opening chapter of this Study, see I. i. 1, n. 1.

² Gen. i. 27.

³ The dictum is ascribed to the Hellenic philosopher Protagoras.

⁴ This temptation is likely to be particularly insidious in its attack on human souls which believe that God has created in His own image Man alone among all His works; and Mr. Martin Wight points out that this is the traditional Christian doctrine. 'God's creation of Man in His own image means that God created Man with a rational faculty which can reciprocate God's love and with an immortal soul which can be freely dedicated to God's glory; and here is the specific difference between Man and God's other works of creation. These are His handiwork and to that extent "reveal" Him; they are not in any sense "in His image".'

⁵ 1 Cor. xiii. 12. See p. 467, above.

power to be the worst, as well as the best, of them all. This moral faculty is the distinctive feature of Human Nature that makes it a less imperfect image of the Godhead than any other of the works of God. Man's farthest reach in his effort to comprehend God's nature is to attribute to his Creator the moral power with which Man himself is conscious of being endowed; but, in reaching this limit of his powers of comprehension, Man becomes aware of the infinity of the distance by which he still falls short of his spiritual goal; and, whether this crushing experience moves him to humble himself like Job, or to sneer like Mephistopheles, or to hover between the two moods like Pope, he will acknowledge the truth of the words that are put into God's mouth by Deutero-Isaiah:

'My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways My ways, saith the Lord. For, as the Heavens are higher than the Earth, so are My ways higher than your ways, and My thoughts than your thoughts.'¹

This was the challenge that confronted the followers of the historic higher religions in a world in which they had suddenly been brought to close quarters with one another and with a Modern Western Science owing to the rapid spread of a secularized Western Civilization over the whole habitable and traversable surface of the planet. In the year A.D. 1952 the living generation of Mankind did not yet know how they were going to negotiate this next stage of their present 'climbers' pitch';² still less did they know whether they would succeed in scaling it; but they could see that they stood no chance of succeeding unless they could settle their latter-day conflict between Heart and Head, and that therefore a sincere and earnest attempt to recapture a lost spiritual harmony was an indispensable prelude to grappling with the formidable precipice that towered above them.

The Origin of the Conflict

In order to settle a conflict, one must understand how it has arisen, and fortunately the origin of the current conflict between Heart and Head was not obscure. It had been precipitated by the impact of a Modern Western Science on Christianity and the other living higher religions; and this impact had resulted in conflict because it had overtaken the religions at a stage in their course at which they were still carrying along with them, suspended in their rolling stream, the silt that they had picked up in the process of scouring their channels out of the flanks of the archaic mountains on which their head-waters had been discharged by the rain-laden Monsoon.

This was not the first instance of an encounter between Religion and Rationalism that was known to History. At least two previous instances were on record. To recall first the more recent of the two, we may remind ourselves that the four living higher religions had each encountered—and each in this instance succeeded in coming to terms with—an older version of Rationalism in an earlier chapter of each religion's history. The now orthodox theology of each of them had been the

¹ Isa. lv. 8-9.

² For this simile, see II. i. 192-4.

product of an accommodation with an established secular philosophy which the rising religion had found itself unable to reject, or even to ignore, because this school of thought had governed the mental climate, and had commanded the intellectual allegiance, of a cultivated minority in the society that had at that time been the church's mission field. Christian and Islamic theology was a presentation of Christianity and Islam in terms of Hellenic philosophy, and Hindu theology was a presentation of Hinduism in terms of Indic philosophy, while the Mahāyāna was a particular school of Indic philosophy which had exempted itself from the ungrateful task of having to give an intellectual veneer to a parvenue religion by the master-stroke of transforming itself into a religion with a popular appeal, without ceasing to be an esoteric philosophy as well. That was not, however, the first chapter in this story; for the philosophies that were already hard-set static systems of ideas by the time when the rising higher religions had to reckon with them had once been dynamic intellectual movements; and in this youthful stage of life and growth—which was comparable to the growth-stage of a Modern Western Science since its birth in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era—the Hellenic and Indic philosophies had had encounters with the pagan religions which the Hellenic and Indic civilizations had inherited from Primitive Man.¹ There had been a similar encounter between a primitive paganism and a philosophical enlightenment in the Sinic World in a corresponding phase of Sinic history.

At first sight it might look as if these two precedents were reassuring. If Mankind had survived two past encounters between Religion and Rationalism, was not that a good augury for the outcome of a current spiritual conflict? The answer was that in the first of these two previous encounters the current problem had not arisen, while in the second encounter, in which it had arisen, the problem had received an apparent solution which had been so efficacious in keeping the peace in its own time and place that it had survived to become the crux of the problem confronting a twentieth-century Westernizing World.

In the encounter between a dawning philosophy and a traditional paganism there had been no problem of reconciling Heart and Head because there had been no common ground on which the two organs could have come into collision. The pith of Primitive Religion is not belief but action, and the test of conformity is not assent to a theological creed but participation in ritual performances. For the vast majority of the faithful, the correct and alert execution of their ritual duties is the alpha and omega of Religion; primitive religious practice is an end in itself, and it does not occur to the practitioners to look, beyond the rites which they perform, for a truth which these rites convey. The truth is that the rites have no meaning beyond the practical effect which their correct execution is believed to have upon the human performers'

¹ This primitive religious heritage had come to the Hellenic and Indic civilizations through Achaean and Aryan barbarians who had broken into the domains of the antecedent Minoan Civilization and Indus Culture, to which the Hellenic and Indic civilizations were respectively affiliated (see Table IV folding out opposite p. 772, below).

social and physical environment. The so-called 'aetiological myths', which purport to explain a traditional practice's historical origin, are not taken as statements concerning matter of fact that can be labelled 'true' or 'false'; they are taken in the spirit in which, in a more sophisticated state of society, a child takes a fairy-story or a grown-up person takes poetry. Accordingly, when, in this primitive religious setting, philosophers arise who do set out to make a chart of Man's environment in intellectual terms to which the labels 'true' and 'false' apply, no collision occurs so long as the philosopher continues to carry out his hereditary religious duties—and there can be nothing in his philosophy to inhibit him from doing this, because there is nothing in the traditional rites that could be incompatible with any philosophy.

Awkward situations do, no doubt, occasionally arise, as when, in a ritually conservative Athens, the intellectually adventurous Ionian philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (*vivebat* 500–428 B.C.) got into trouble for having made public his opinion that the heavenly bodies were not living gods but inanimate material objects. A more celebrated case was the prosecution, conviction, and judicial murder of Socrates by his Athenian fellow countrymen in 399 B.C. on three charges,¹ of which the second was that Socrates did not pay due worship to the gods who were the official objects of worship at Athens,² and the third was that he paid worship to other divinities who were strange gods.³ Yet it may be doubted whether legal proceedings involving Anaxagoras would have been taken, some twenty years after the Clazomenian philosopher had ceased to reside in Athens, if these had not served the current political purpose of 'smeared' Pericles; and it may equally be doubted whether Socrates would have suffered the death-penalty that Anaxagoras escaped if Socrates' attitude towards religion had been all that his enemies had had against him. Socrates was—and remained to the last—a scrupulous performer of his ritual duties; and, on the religious counts, Aristophanes' malicious caricature of him in *The Clouds* might have remained the limit of the penalty exacted from him, if he had not also been under fire in 399 B.C. on another count—the political charge of 'corrupting the young'—which, significantly, figured first in the indictment. Socrates was the victim, not so much of conservative Athenian religious fanaticism,⁴ as of democratic Athenian resentment over the final defeat of Athens in the long-drawn-out Atheno-Peloponnesian war and democratic Athenian vindictiveness towards a fascist-minded Athenian minority who had seized the opportunity opened to them by the discrediting of the democratic régime through military defeat in order to overthrow the democratic constitution. Socrates' past personal association with Critias, the moving spirit among 'the Thirty Tyrants', was the offence that the restored democratic régime could neither forget nor forgive. It was Politics, not Religion, that cost Socrates his life.

¹ Plato: *Apologia Socratis*, 24 B.

² Θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα (Plato, loc. cit.).

³ ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καίνα (Plato, loc. cit.).

⁴ The part played by 'Zealotism' in the prosecutions at Athens, during and after the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War, of Anaxagoras (? *in absentia* and not *nominatim*), Aspasia, Protagoras, Diagoras, Alcibiades, and Socrates is discussed in IX. viii. 581, n. 3.

Where the issue was not confused, as it was in Socrates' case, by political animus, Philosophy and Primitive Religion encountered one another without colliding. The death of Socrates was an exception to a rule of which the life of Confucius was a classical example. Confucius reconciled a conservative reverence for the traditional rites of primitive Sinic religion with a new moral philosophy of his own making by presenting his personal ideas as the meaning which the rites had been intended to convey. Fortunately for himself, Confucius found no Sinic Critias to be his political pupil in his own lifetime; and—thanks to this failure, which was the great disappointment of his life—he died peacefully in his bed. Confucius's attitude and experience were characteristic of the normal relations between Philosophy and Primitive Religion; but a new situation arose when the higher religions came on the scene.

The higher religions did, indeed, sweep up and carry along with them a heavy freight of traditional rites that happened to be current in the religious milieux in which the new faiths made their first appearance; but this religious flotsam was not, of course, their essence. The distinctive new feature of the higher religions was that they based their claim to allegiance, and their test of conformity, on personal revelations received by their prophets;¹ and these deliveries of the prophets were presented, like the propositions of the philosophers, as statements of fact, to be labelled either 'true' or 'false'. Therewith, Truth became a disputed mental territory; for thenceforward there were two independent authorities—on the one hand prophetic Revelation and on the other hand philosophical or scientific Reason—each of which claimed sovereign jurisdiction over the Intellect's whole field of action; and, when once the hypothesis that the spheres of Revelation and Reason were even partially coincident had been accepted—and both parties did accept this as axiomatic—it became impossible for Reason and Revelation to live and let live on the auspicious precedent of the amicable symbiosis of Reason and Ritual. 'There is a peculiar agony in the paradox that Truth has two forms, each of them indisputable, yet each antagonistic to the other.'² In this new and excruciating situation, there were only two alternative possibilities. Either the two rival exponents of a supposedly one and indivisible Truth must convert their rivalry into a partnership by agreeing that their expositions were mutually consistent, or, finding themselves unable to agree, they must decide the ownership of an apparently unpartitionable disputed territory in an ordeal by battle that would have to be fought out until one or other party had been driven right off the field.

In the encounter between Hellenic and Indic philosophy and Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, and Hindu revelation, the parties did manage to arrive at a peaceful accommodation in which Philosophy tacitly consented to suspend the exercise of rational criticism against the

¹ This was true in some degree—in practice even if not in theory—of the 'Indistic' higher religions as well as the 'Judaistic'. *Ipse dixit* came to be a criterion of truth, not only for the followers of Jesus and Muhammad, but also for the followers of Siddhārtha Gautama and of the philosophic prophets of a post-Buddhaic Hinduism.

² Gosse, E.: *Father and Son*, chap. 5.

deliveries of Revelation in exchange for being allowed to reformulate the prophets' message in the sophists' language.¹

'The reception of the philosophical theology of the Greeks into the Church, so far as it was commensurable with Christianity, and the development of a Christian theology and dogma did not serve only apologetic purposes. The Greek mind was either not able to adapt the Christian faith in another way, or at least this was the specifically Hellenic way of adapting it to their culture. Nothing is so characteristic of the Greeks, says Saint Gregory of Nyssa, one of the outstanding Christian Platonists of the fourth century, as the belief that the essence of Religion lies in the dogma.'²

We need not doubt that this compromise was made in good faith on both sides, but we can see clearly in retrospect that it was not based on any genuine solution of the problem of what the relation is between Truth in the scientific sense and Truth in the prophetic usage of the word. The would-be reconciliation of the two kinds of Truth in terms of a new mental discipline called Theology was no more than verbal, and the formulae that were consecrated in the creeds were doomed to prove impermanent³ because they left the equivocal meaning of Truth still as ambiguous as they had found it. Thus a problem which had first come

¹ As the writer saw it, the achievement of this verbal accommodation accounted for the historical fact, to which Mr. Martin Wight draws attention, that Early Christianity quarrelled with Hellenic philosophy, not 'because of its implicit rationalism, but because of its pagan religious overtones, which culminated when Julian turned Neoplatonism into a pagan substitute for Catholic Christianity'. The writer agreed with Mr. Wight's contention that 'the first seven centuries of Christian history were a contest, not between Reason and Revelation, but between Paganism and Revelation', but he would account for this by submitting that, from the beginning, there had been a latent conflict which had been suppressed without being genuinely resolved and therefore without being permanently eliminated; and, in his eyes, this would be the historical explanation of the fact, pointed out by Mr. Wight, that 'the contest between Reason—in the sense of an emancipated sovereign Reason—and Revelation grew up within the bosom of Christendom. There are hints of it in the histories of Erigena and Abelard, and then it burst forth in the débacle of Christendom with Giordano Bruno, Bacon, Descartes and Hobbes.' The writer of this Study would not dissent from this, but he would agree only on grounds different from Mr. Wight's with Mr. Wight's thesis that 'this Modern Reason seems to be a very particular historical phenomenon: it is only dimly prefigured in the Ionians; its tone of authority and its universalist claims are something quite new, and they betray their origin—it is in fact (like its identical twin-brother Science and its half-brother, by a Jewish mother, Marxism) one of the parricidal offspring of Christianity'. The writer of this Study would agree that a post-Christian Western rationalism had inherited from Christianity a Judaic fanaticism and intolerance in its feelings and its conduct towards its adversaries, but he would not agree that there was any intrinsic difference on the intellectual plane between an uncompromising post-Christian Western rationalism and a pre-Christian Hellenic rationalism which had eventually betrayed its own principles by negotiating a verbal compromise with Christianity. As he saw it, it was in the nature of Rationalism, at all times and places, to follow the argument whithersoever it might lead, without being willing to allow its pursuit of intellectual truth to be arrested by any non-intellectual considerations.

² Jaeger, W.: *Humanism and Theology* (Milwaukee 1943, Marquette University Press), p. 60, citing *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, edited by Jaeger, W., vol. ii (Berlin 1922, Weidmann), p. 271, 19.

³ Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'By "impermanent", do you mean "not universally accepted"? That, of course, they are and probably always will be. But their *permanence* seems to be one of the most remarkable things in the history of the Human Intellect: they are still recited, with whatever differences of superstition or incomprehension, by perhaps a quarter of the Human Race, and the churches have never thought that the basic work of hammering out these formulae needs to be re-done or even revised.' If this was the churches' view, the writer's expectation was that it was likely to be proved untenable in the event.

to light when the now extinct Hellenic and Indic civilizations in their decline had encountered the now still living higher religions in their rise, had been passed on, unsolved, to confront a Westernizing World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era; and this legacy bequeathed to the then living generation by its predecessors was a grievous one. Those predecessors had not only failed to find an intellectual and emotional solution of the problem for themselves;¹ the verbal accommodation which they had handed down to Posterity had made it harder for souls born in a later generation to solve the problem, now that they, in their turn, were faced with it, than it would have been for them if their predecessors had shirked the issue and had refrained from meddling.

The true solution could not be found until it had been recognized that the same word Truth, when used by the philosophers and men of science and when used by the prophets, does not refer to the same realities, but is a homonym for two different forms of experience. Scientific truth and prophetic truth are experiences on different planes, as are scientific truth and ritual observance.

'What kind of a truth is it . . . which is revealed to Faith? It is not truth in the sense of knowing something, but in the sense of a divine-human personal encounter. God does not reveal this and that; He does not reveal a number of truths. He reveals Himself by communicating Himself. It is the secret of His person which He reveals, and the secret of His person is just this, that He is self-communicating will: that God is Love. . . . If it is true that the word of God is the truth, we have first to distinguish between Truth in the singular, which means God, and truths in the plural, which are truths about the World. As God is the Creator . . . and the World is His creation . . . so there are also two kinds of truths: God-truth and world-truths. It is one of the great tragedies of Christian history that this distinction has not been carried through.'²

When this difference had been recognized—and only then—it might begin to be possible for pilgrim souls to feel their way towards an angle of spiritual vision from which the real nature of the relation between these diverse kinds of experience would become apparent.

'Even that which we know by God's revelation, we know only in part.³ It is absolute truth merely in so far as it is God's word; formulated by us as our knowledge, it at once becomes part in the whole weakness and imperfection of our human condition. God's revelation identified with human dogma is the transformation of God-truth into world-truth.'⁴

This verbal reconciliation of scientific truth and prophetic truth in terms of Theology had placed an unnecessary additional stumbling-block in the pilgrim's anyway arduous path; and this theological stumbling-block was a formidable one because it drove Science and Religion into

¹ Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'What would a genuine solution be? They [the creeds] are attempts to make statements about the Incomprehensible within the limits of human language. They have never claimed to be anything but approximations.' The writer's comment on this would be that the Intellect is deluding itself when it imagines that it has arrived at even approximations between incommensurables.

² Brunner, Emil: *Christianity and Civilisation*, first part (London 1948, Nisbet), pp. 37 and 35. Cp. eundem: *The Divine-Human Encounter* (English translation: London 1944, S.C.M. Press), *passim*.

³ 1 Cor. xiii. 9.

⁴ Brunner, op. cit., first part, pp. 41-42.

a conflict in which either combatant found himself constrained to make the desperate choice of surrendering to his opponent ground which he knew to be his own legitimate territory, or else capturing the entire field of Truth for himself and denying his opponent any *locus standi* there at all.

This conflict had been bound to break out sooner or later as a result of the foregoing verbal accommodation; for, when once the truth of Revelation had been formulated verbally in terms of the truth of Science, Science could not forever forbear to criticize a body of doctrine that purported now to be true in the scientific sense; and in fact, since the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, a Modern Western Science had broken the truce with Christian doctrine into which the Hellenic philosophy had entered in the fourth and fifth centuries when it had lent its services for the freezing of Christian orthodoxy in the mould of the creeds. On the other side, Christianity, when once its doctrine had been formulated in rational language, could not forbear, for its part, to claim authority over other provinces of knowledge which were really Reason's legitimate domain; and, when in the seventeenth century a Modern Western Science cast off the spell of Hellenic philosophy and began to break new intellectual ground, the first impulse of the Roman Church was to issue an injunction against the aggression of an awakening Western intellect upon the Church's old Hellenic intellectual ally—as if the geocentric theory of Astronomy, which was an Hellenic endorsement of a Babylonian hypothesis, had been an article of the Christian faith, and Galileo's correction of Ptolemy had been a theological heresy.

Possible Alternative Outcomes

By the year A.D. 1952, this war between Science and Religion in the soul of Western Man had been raging with increasing fury for three hundred years without having yet reached a decision. It could no longer continue to be waged with impunity, and of three conceivable alternative outcomes—the discrediting of Religion, the capitulation of Science, and a peace based, not on a verbal formula, but on a genuine reconciliation of the two points of view—either of the first two would manifestly be disastrous.

Towards the close of the two and a half centuries between the ending of the Wars of Religion and the outbreak of the general war of A.D. 1914-18, the discrediting of Religion might have seemed to be the most probable denouement. By that time the ecclesiastical authorities had come to be in much the same state of mind as the Governments of Great Britain and France after Hitler's destruction of the remnant of Czechoslovakia on the 15th March, 1939. For more than two hundred years the churches had been seeing Science capture from them one province of knowledge after another. Astronomy, Cosmogony, Chronology, Biology, Physics, Psychology had each in turn been reconstructed by Science on revolutionary lines that were incompatible with established religious teaching on these subjects; and no end of these losses was in sight. The conquest of one province, so far from contenting the aggressor, had, each time, led him on to attack another. The appetite

of Science for aggression appeared to be insatiable, and the churches had come to feel that they could no longer afford to practise 'appeasement'. Their only remaining hope of saving themselves from utter rout now lay, as they saw it, in a complete intransigence. They must hoist the signal 'My doctrine, right or wrong', and must refuse to surrender even the shakiest outworks of their Maginot Line. They must not abandon one single further tenet, however unimportant or however indefensible. They must insist that their prophetic truth was Truth in the scientific sense, and that the silt which they had scoured out of the archaic rocks of Primitive Religion was of the essence of their own living waters and was not an extraneous impurity that could and should be dropped.

This 'die-hard' spirit had asserted itself in the course of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era. In the ranks of the Roman Catholic Church it had found expression in the decrees of the Vatican Council of A.D. 1869-70 and in the anathema pronounced against Modernism in A.D. 1907;¹ in the domain of the Protestant Churches of North America it had entrenched itself in 'the Bible Belt'; and this reaction had not been confined to those fractions of Christendom that constituted the home territory of the Western World; for by this time the wave of Westernization was sweeping over the whole face of the planet, and Western Science—which was both the force behind the wave and the rider on its crest—was impinging upon all branches of all the higher religions. Under this ubiquitous pressure the 'Zealot' mood² was manifesting itself in Orthodox as well as in Western Christendom, and it was simultaneously on the war-path in the Islamic World, where the first stirrings of a Westernizing movement under the stimulus of the disastrous ending of the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 had provoked, in retort, the militantly archaistic movements of Wahhabism, Idrismism, Sanusism, and Mahdism in the fastnesses of the Arabian and North African deserts.

This 'die-hard' reaction of the churches to the victorious advance of Science was not unnatural, but it was unfortunate and it was ominous; for it was a symptom, not of self-confidence, but of the loss of it, and indeed the disarray into which their own camp had fallen by this time could not fail to rack the ecclesiastical authorities' nerves. A decay of belief in the churches' doctrines, and a still more deadly loss of faith in their mission and slackening of loyalty to their cause, had revealed itself first within the small circle of a sophisticated minority in the Western World which had been disillusioned by the Wars of Religion.³ By the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this spirit of scepticism and indifference had spread in the West among the masses and had also flowed out of the West into the domains of the other surviving civilizations, where a nineteenth-century French type of Rationalism with an anticlerical tinge was becoming the standard *Weltanschauung* of the

¹ See p. 456, n. 2, above.

² For 'Zealotism' as one of two alternative psychological reactions to the impact of an alien cultural influence, see IX. viii. 580-623.

³ See the references on p. 441, n. 1, above.

Westernizers. In fact, at the opening of the twentieth century it looked as if the higher religions were riding for a fall.

This prospect that the higher religions might irretrievably lose their hold upon the allegiance of Mankind boded evil; for Religion is manifestly one of the essential faculties of Human Nature. No individual human being and no human community is ever without a religion of some kind; and, when people are starved of Religion, the desperate spiritual straits to which they are reduced by being deprived of this necessity of life can fire them to extract grains of religious consolation out of the most unpromising ores. The classical example of this, up to date, was the astonishing metamorphosis by which the religion of the Mahāyāna had been conjured out of the forbiddingly impersonal philosophy that had been the first attempt of the disciples of Siddhārtha Gautama to formulate the message of the Buddha. In a Westernizing World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era the beginnings of a similar metamorphosis of the Western materialist philosophy of Marxism were perhaps discernible in Russian souls that had been deprived of their traditional religious sustenance.

When Buddhism had been converted from a philosophy into a religion, a higher religion had been the happy outcome; but, if the higher religions themselves were to be driven off the field, it was to be feared that lower religions would swiftly occupy the abhorrent vacuum.

In a world on which the higher religions had been losing their hold there were in A.D. 1952 many people who had been finding substitutes for lost higher religions in 'ideologies', and in several countries the converts to these new mundane faiths had been strong enough to seize control of the government and to use the whole power of the state to impose their own doctrine and practice on their fellow countrymen. By these methods Communism had been established in Russia, Fascism in Italy, National Socialism in Germany. But these flagrant examples of the recrudescence of Man's ancient worship of himself in the panoply of his corporate power gave no measure of the actual prevalence of this spiritual malady. The most serious symptom was that, in professedly democratic and professedly Christian countries, whose complacent citizens were congratulating themselves that they were not as other men were,¹ or even as this Fascist or this Communist, four-fifths of the religion of five-sixths of the population in these countries likewise was, in practice, by this time, the primitive pagan worship of the bee-hive by the bee and of the ant-heap by the ant.² This recrudescence of idolatry was not redeemed by being concealed under the fine name of patriotism;³ and, indeed, in this unacknowledged cult of it, its influence was more insidious than in the naked Fascism and Communism at which the

¹ Luke xviii. 11.

² See pp. 439-40 and 445-6, above, and pp. 520-1, below.

³ The termite can idolize the termitery at the cost of condemning its kind to the fate of Lot's wife; but the human soul that idolizes a Corporate Humanity instead of worshipping God condemns itself, not to self-petrification, but to self-destruction. The corporate-self-worshipping human social animal wrecks the fabric of a sociality without which Man cannot survive, in this godless attempt to perfect it. When Man seeks to become a bee in the bee-hive, he turns himself into an Ishmael in the arena, where 'his hand will be against every man, and every man's hand against him' (Gen. xvi. 12).

Christian democratic pharisee pointed his reproving finger, or than in the still franker form in which the same idolatry had been practised in the Hellenic World in the cults of Athena Poliûchus, Tyche Antiocheôn, Fortuna Praenestina, Dea Roma, Divus Caesar.¹

This corporate self-worship was perhaps the most vicious of all the lower religions that were surging in to take the higher religions' vacated place, but it was far from being either the only revenant or the most primitive of these haunting ghosts. In the twentieth century of the Christian Era all the surviving primitive societies and all the hardly less primitive peasantries of the non-Western civilizations—the muzhiks, the ryots, and the coolies who, in their hundreds of millions, amounted to three-quarters of the living generation of Mankind—were being conscripted into the Western Society's swollen internal proletariat;² and, in the light of all the historical precedents, the ancestral religious practices through which this host of humble new recruits would continue to seek satisfaction for their own religious needs seemed likely to find their way into the empty hearts of the proletariat's sophisticated masters.

On this showing, a crushing victory of Science over Religion would be a disaster, for, if Science should succeed in expelling the higher religions from the human heart, she would not be able to prevent the lower religions from taking their place.

'When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest; and, finding none, he saith: I will return unto my house whence I came out. And, when he cometh, he findeth it swept and garnished. Then goeth he and taketh to him seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter in and dwell there; and the last state of that man is worse than the first.'³

The same disastrous set-back would likewise be the nemesis of a crushing victory of Religion over Science; for Reason, as well as Religion, is one of the essential faculties of Human Nature, and the historical precedents indicated that, when a higher religion routs an intellectual enlightenment, it pays the penalty of degenerating into a lower religion. Religion cannot deny scientific truth, or suppress free and disinterested scientific inquiry, with impunity. When Religion commits this crime, the society that is the victim of it becomes petrified; for a civilization that allows itself to be castrated intellectually is allowing itself to be deprived of part of its creative faculty—in which intellectual creativity is an essential element.

In the histories of other civilizations known to latter-day Western students of History, there were notorious examples of this calamity. When the Hellenic philosophy had capitulated to Christianity in the fourth and fifth centuries,⁴ and to Islam in the ninth and tenth centuries, of the Christian Era, and when the Sinic philosophy had capitulated

¹ See I. i. 443-4.

² Luke xi. 24-26; cp. Matt. xii. 43-45.

³ For an explanation of this portent, see the passage quoted from Edwyn Bevan in V. v. 558-9. Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'The passage quoted from Edwyn Bevan simply makes the point that Philosophy capitulated because it was inadequate to human needs, and implies that the capitulation was good and necessary.'

⁴ See V. v. 153-4.

to the primitive religions of a swollen Sinic internal proletariat during the last two centuries B.C.,¹ the victorious religion had in each case paid for its victory by suffering a set-back that had been not merely an intellectual but a moral and a spiritual reverse as well.² In the Western World at the close of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era the triumphantly militant men of science would have laughed to scorn any suggestion that they, in their turn, might be on the eve of making a similar surrender, and the 'die-hard' defenders of the integrity of traditional religion would have been almost equally surprised, in their heart of hearts, to receive tidings of the imminence of this miraculous reversal of roles at this stage of their long losing battle against their aggressive rationalist opponents; yet, only fifty years later, the outlook and temper of the men of science had in fact already changed to an astonishing degree as a result of the shattering experience of two world wars.

During the quarter of a millennium ending in August 1914 the Western man of science—surveying the world around him, believing that he had made it,³ and never doubting that it was very good⁴—had been buoyed up by the naïve conviction that he had only to go on churning out fresh scientific discoveries, and leaving it to his technological and commercial executants to apply these discoveries in any way that might please them, in order to ensure that the World should go on growing better and better. The pace of scientific, technical, and economic progress was accelerating, and no limit was in sight. The scientist's observation of the current phenomena was not incorrect, but his interpretation of them was vitiated by two fundamental errors.

The scientist was mistaken in attributing the relative well-being of the eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Western World to his own intellectual achievements; and he was mistaken in assuming that this

¹ See the passages quoted from Dr. Hu Shih in V. v. 549 and 555-6. Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'In so far as the Sinic philosophy capitulated, was it not rather to the Mahāyāna—at any rate in the long run—than to the primitive religions of the internal proletariat?'

² Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'The examples that you give do not bear out your thesis. (i) It seems rather question-begging to adduce the Hellenic philosophy of the fifth to tenth centuries of the Christian Era as an instance of "an intellectual enlightenment": most people would regard it as an instance of the moribundity of a particular philosophical tradition, reflecting the moribundity of a particular civilization—and this would be consonant with your general view of a philosophy as the expression of a Dominant Minority. "An intellectual enlightenment" usually means a creative phase, like the Ionian philosophy of the sixth-fifth centuries B.C. or the Aufklärung of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era. Actually the three examples that you give are all examples of a philosophy giving up the ghost in the last stages of the decadence of a civilisation—and would it not be natural to regard this as a regular feature of that process, wherein (as you have argued throughout) the higher religion inherits the past and transmits it to the future? (ii) Did Christianity in the fifth century of the Christian Era, and Islam in the tenth, "pay the penalty of degenerating into a lower religion"?'

The writer would accept Mr. Wight's contention that each of the three philosophies cited in this passage had exhausted its creative powers long before the free exercise of its now traditional and conventional mode of thought was suppressed by a higher religion; but he would also contend that in each case the repressive higher religion inflicted—as the historical sequel in each case shows—a deep spiritual injury on itself in the act of suppressing even a moribund intellectual activity.

³ This belief was advertised, as late as A.D. 1936, by an eminent latter-day Western archaeologist, Mr. V. Gordon Childe, in the title of his book *Man Makes Himself* (London 1936, Watts). See p. 541, n. 2, below.

⁴ Gen. i. 13.

recently achieved well-being was going to persist in *saecula saeculorum* and to increase *ad infinitum*. A Modern Western Science had been, not the author, but merely the beneficiary, of the lull between the dying down of the storm of the wars of religion and the rising of the storm of the wars of nationality—a new tempest which had breathed its first ominous gust in the American Revolutionary War, and had blown half a gale in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, before it had burst on the World in its full fury in the general wars of A.D. 1914–18 and A.D. 1939–45.¹ The breathing-space between these two paroxysms in the recent course of Western history had been the achievement, not of eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Western scientists, but of seventeenth-century Western statesmen who had come to the conclusion that the wars of religion were leading nowhere but towards destruction and that this senseless barbarity ought to be stopped. These statesmen had duly brought the wars of religion to an end, but their work had been ephemeral because it had been performed in a cynical spirit, on the strength of a mistaken diagnosis of Human Nature. The spiritual truce that had reigned from the close of the seventeenth century to the opening of the twentieth had been founded on the false assumption that Religion, so far from being one of the essential faculties of the Soul, was a relic of savagery which a civilized society had now learnt, by bitter experience, to discard once for all. The psychic energy released from the baneful service of this supposed anachronism was henceforward to be led into the channels of Science and Technology, where its free flow was expected to prove, not merely harmless, but positively useful.

Before the twentieth century had run half its course, the falsity of these beliefs and expectations about their society's situation and prospects had been demonstrated to Western men of science by the shattering effect of two catastrophic world wars in one lifetime on the society of which they were members and on the intellectual activity which was their own vocation. The scientists had seen their society driven once again along the road leading towards destruction; they had seen their own inventions and abilities conscripted, without their leave being asked, in order to speed the World on this fatal course; and their political impotence and moral responsibility had both been brought home to them, in the last act of the Second World War, by the dropping of the atom-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The discovery of the structure of the atom, which was the supreme achievement, up to date, of Western Science, and the working-out of the 'know-how' for disintegrating atoms on a scale that would produce effectively devastating results, which was the supreme achievement, up to date, of Western Technology, had been used to arm Man with an annihilating weapon before he had got rid of the institution of War; and this appalling application of Physical Science had cut the scientists to the heart and at the same time confronted them with a moral dilemma.²

¹ See IV. iv. 141–85; V. v. 160–1 and 668–72; V. vi. 316–21.

² See, for example, the presidential address on 'The Ethical Dilemma of Science' that was given by Professor A. V. Hill to the British Association on the 3rd September, 1952.

In a world which had not yet got rid of War, atomic research itself, as well as its practical application in the manufacture of annihilating weapons, threatened to be a desperately dangerous occupation for human minds and hands unless and until it were to be brought under the undivided political control of some single world authority. Pending the attainment of this supremely difficult international objective, it would inevitably remain under the political control of individual Great Powers that possessed the secret and that commanded the resources to turn it to military account. Political control of atomic research was thus morally desirable in one form, and practically inevitable in some form or other; but this would mean the end of the liberty to conduct research, and to make public the results of his labours, at his own discretion, which the Modern Western man of science had enjoyed for the last quarter of a millennium. In the seventeenth century, Science had wrested this liberty from the Church, and now, in the twentieth century, she was to forfeit it to the State. The prospect was disconcerting, for the right of free inquiry and publication was Science's palladium. It was the breath of her nostrils; it was the key to her unprecedented performance in the Western World in the Modern Age; and, most important of all, it was a moral principle of which she was the recognized trustee on behalf of Mankind at large, beyond the narrow ranks of the small minority represented by the professional scientific workers.

In this situation, an inclination to capitulate was already revealing itself, midway through the twentieth century, among physical scientists and other intellectual workers in a now battered and disillusioned Western World. Some had been crushed by the adversity which had overtaken their own intellectual avocation; others had had their hearts broken by the tribulations that had overtaken Mankind, their country, their family, and themselves; others had yielded to political pressure or coercion; others had been infected with the 'second childhood' that was rife in a 'Brave New World' around them; while others—and this was the most significant and most dangerous case—lacked the fortitude to bear patiently the spiritual distress of having lost a traditional religion without having gained a new one to take its place.¹ These weaker vessels were seeking an intellectual *Nirvāna* by embracing either another traditional religion, carrying a still heavier load of archaic silt than the faith of their fathers, or else one of the new mundane 'ideologies'. Either of these alternative spiritual refuges offered the fugitive what he was seeking; for he was fleeing from a no longer bearable intellectual liberty and was seeking asylum in a spiritual prison-house.

This failure of nerve was *la trahison des clercs*;² and the error was one both of conduct and of judgement. If *noblesse oblige*, it is unworthy of the intellectual leaders of Mankind not to stand their intellectual ground when they find themselves out in the cold or marooned in the wilderness. Their high intellectual calling cannot be practised if its votaries cannot

¹ In deploring contemporary reversions to traditional religions when these were the fruit, not of conviction, but of distress, the writer would not deny that there were also contemporary reconversions that had the virtues of being disinterested and being sincere.

² Benda, J.: *La Trahison des Clercs* (Paris 1927, Grasset), quoted in IV. iv. 302.

rise to the legendary moral strength of Moses and the bodhisattvas. Moses had not quailed when he had been condemned to wander in the wilderness for forty years in atonement for sins that had been not his own but Israel's, and then to die without being granted more than a Pisgah sight of the Promised Land. The bodhisattvas had become the heroes of the Mahāyāna, and had eclipsed the arhats in the hearts and minds of their devotees,¹ because at the supreme moment when, in virtue of aeons of spiritual effort, they had attained the verge of *Nirvāna* and need only take the last final step in order to enter into their rest,² they had risen to a sublime height of unselfishness in condemning themselves, uncoerced and unprompted, to postpone their release from selfhood for aeons upon aeons more, in order to pilot their fellow beings along the arduous road, leading to salvation from the sorrowful wheel of existence, which the bodhisattvas themselves had travelled, in advance of their flock, to within a hair's breadth of journey's end.³

The heroic self-control of the bodhisattvas was the example which the intellectual leaders of Mankind needed to take to heart in a Westernizing World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, because the hope of finding a second-best Promised Land just round the corner, in the *cañon* of Edom or in the mountains of Moab, was as illusory as the temptation to slink back to the flesh-pots of Egypt was craven-hearted. It was an illusion because Religion, once lost, whether the loss of it has been the loser's fault or no, can never be whistled for, like a dog, to come back obediently to heel at Man's convenience. If the wanderer in the wilderness is eventually to reach the authentic Promised Land, he must have the endurance to stay the course; and, in the West midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, it was uncertain how the men of intellect were going to take their ordeal.

Thus, after three hundred years of spiritual warfare in the West between Science and Religion, it was impossible to guess which way the decision would fall if the outcome was to be a decisive one. Both combatants were in danger of collapsing; and the only prophecy that could be made with any assurance was that, if their discomfiture were not simultaneous, the overthrow of the first to collapse would not spell victory for the momentary survivor. Whichever way the battle might eventually go, the real victor would be a *tertius gaudens* in the shape of a host of primitive religions that were hovering round the battlefield on the wait for an opportunity to reoccupy a spiritual kingdom over which they had reigned unchallenged for hundreds of thousands of years before the advent of either Reason or Revelation.

A Demarcation of Spheres

This threat of a calamitous spiritual regression in the event of a fight to a finish between Science and Religion was an urgent warning of the need for a peace by agreement; but, if the peace was to be lasting, the agreement must be genuine, as had been demonstrated by the sequel to the diplomatic accommodation that had been made—in words but not

¹ See V. vi. 148, and p. 426, n. 2, above.

² Ps. xcvi. 11.

³ See V. vi. 164, n. 3, and p. 426, n. 2, above, and IX. viii. 628 and XII. ix. 633, below.

in deed—between a Christian revelation and an Hellenic philosophy in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era.¹ This untoward precedent indicated that it was not enough that the parties should agree about the facts; their agreement with one another, if there was to be any virtue in it, must also tally with reality.

This last point may be illustrated by picturing a pair of Oklahomans travelling, on the last lap of their first journey to the East, on the Pennsylvania Railroad between Newark and New York. The two provincial travelling companions have different interests in life; one of them is technological-minded, the other political-minded; but both are patriots. As their train cuts its way across the dismal reed-beds of the Jersey marshes, they see out of the coach-window a remarkable engineering enterprise in full swing. A section of the marshes is being filled in to make a site for a new factory or power-station or what-not, and this arresting spectacle moves either spectator to ejaculate the first thought that comes into his head. 'My goodness,' exclaims the Oklahoman technocrat, 'if they go on at this pace they will soon have filled in the Atlantic, and that will teach Joe Stalin what Uncle Sam can do!'—'Good gracious,' exclaims the Oklahoman politician at the same instant, 'if they go on at this pace they will soon have filled in the Atlantic, and

¹ A Catholic friend of the writer's comments: 'The Church never considers any philosophy more than an approximation to the truth, and would discard Aristotle to-morrow if it found a philosophy that went deeper into reality.' The writer would not dispute his friend's contention that this was the Christian Church's theory of the terms on which it had made use of an Hellenic philosophy for the formulation of a Christian theology; he would simply note that, in practice, the Church was still treating this Hellenistic theology as the orthodox, official, and obligatory presentation of the Christian Faith fifteen or sixteen hundred years after the epoch in which Christianity had originally been translated into this Hellenic philosophical language. Notable attempts, made in the Early Modern Age of Western history by missionary members of the Society of Jesus, to retranslate Christianity into the alternative language of a post-Buddhaic Hindu philosophy and a Confucian philosophy had eventually been quashed (see V. v. 365-7). Yet, if the Christian Church, as an institution, thus remained enmeshed in an Hellenistic theology of its own weaving, the greatest of all Western Christian theologians lived, in his personal religious life, to become aware of the limitations of theology through attaining the experience of transcending them.

'Item dixit idem testis, quod, cum dictus Fr. Thomas celebraret Missam in dictâ capellâ S. Nicolai Neapoli, fuit mirâ mutatione commotus, et post ipsam missam non scripsit; neque dictavit aliquid, imo suspendit organa scriptionis in tertiâ parte Summae in Tractatu de Poenitentia: et, dum idem Fr. Raynaldus videret, quod ipse Fr. Thomas cessaverat scribere, dixit ei: Pater, quomodo dimisistis opus tam grande, quod ad laudem Dei et illuminationem mundi coepistis? Cui respondit dictus Fr. Thomas: Non possum. Idem vero Fr. Raynaldus timens, ne propter multum studium aliquam incurrisset amentiam, instabat semper, quod idem Fr. Thomas continuaret scripta, et similiter ipse Fr. Thomas respondit: Raynalde, non possum, quia omnia, quae scripsi, videntur mihi paleae' (Statement by Dominus Bartholomaeus de Capuâ, logotheta et protonotarius regni Siciliae, in the *Processus Inquisitionis Factae super Vitâ, Conversatione, et Miraculis recol. mem. fr. Thomae de Aquino*, printed in *Acta Sanctorum, Martii, Tom. I, pp. 712f-713a*).

'Unde post aliquam horam ivit socius ad Magistrum, et, trahens ipsum per cappam fortiter, quasi a somno contemplationis ipsum ultimo excitavit. Qui suspirans dixit: Raynalde fili, tibi in secreto revelo, prohibens ne in vitâ meâ alicui audeas revelare. Venit finis scripturae meae, quia talia sunt mihi revelata, quod ea, quae scripsi et docui, modica mihi videntur, et ex hoc spero in Deo meo quod, sicut doctrinae, sic cito finis erit et vitae' (Evidence given during the Process by the Prior of the Convent at Benevento, extracted from the life of Saint Thomas by Giulielmus de Thoco, O.P., and printed *ibid.*, p. 674c).

A spirited English version of these two passages, with characteristic comment, will be found in Bridges, Robert: *The Testament of Beauty*, Book I. ll. 465-500, particularly the last seven lines, which literally translate from 'Qui suspirans dixit' to the end.

then what will become of America's security? Why, the Red Army will be able to march on Oklahoma dry-shod! Agreeing about the facts, and never suspecting that their identical reading of them may be wrong, the two unsophisticated wayfarers fall to quarrelling, as their train drives into darkness under the Hudson, over the question whether the imminent abolition of the Atlantic is going to be a good thing or a bad thing. They could have spared themselves their quarrel if they had had the imagination to realize that the marshes and the Ocean were incommensurable, and that the integrity of the Atlantic was no more in danger from those forceful and efficient Yankee engineers with their bulldozers than if they had been little children armed with toy spades and buckets. In transforming a patch of the morass into solid earth the engineers had been doing a creditable job, but they had not been miraculously achieving the impossible. They had, in fact, been doing an economic service to their country without jeopardizing her military security. But Man does not find it easy to imagine what he has not experienced, and we have to bear in mind that our pair of rustic Oklahomans have never set eyes on the Atlantic, not to speak of crossing it. If they had ever sailed on its waters or sounded its depths, it would not have occurred to them to think of the Ocean as an annex to the Jersey marshes.

The application of our parable to a current Western spiritual crisis is, of course, to be found in the suggestion that, if only the men of science and the religious authorities could agree in seeing the facts as they were, instead of agreeing in making an identical mistake about them, they might come to agree over the hitherto controversial question whether the facts were to be welcomed or were to be deplored. Either party might then arrive at a just self-confidence in estimating its own prowess and a just humility in recognizing its own limitations, and this psychological reorientation might enable them both to serve God and Man by overcoming their discord and working together in harmony.¹

Science need abandon neither her belief in her mission to give Man an ever-increasing command over Non-Human Nature nor her confidence in her ability to go on winning successes in her own proper field. It could, indeed, be predicted that, with her marvellous enterprisingness and resourcefulness, she would go on reclaiming, for Man's benefit, one patch after another of Non-Human Nature's sterile and formidable slough, but the date could not be foreseen by which she would have converted the whole of this waste land into productive turnip-fields and remunerative building-lots, and the time would never come when she would have made dry land out of the Ocean. It was at this point that a saving humility—the sovereign prophylactic against the fatal sin of

¹ A belief that there is no ground for a collision between Faith and Science is attributed to the Modernists by Pope Pius X in his encyclical 'Pascendi dominici gregis' of the 8th September, 1907:

'Fides . . . id unice spectat, quod scientia incognoscibile sibi esse profitetur. Hinc diversum utrique pensum: scientia versatur in phaenomenis, ubi nullus fidei locus; fides e contra versatur in divinis, quae scientia penitus ignorat. Unde demum conficitur, inter fidem et scientiam nunquam esse posse discidium: si enim suum quaeque locum teneat, occurrere sibi invicem numquam poterunt, atque ideo nec contradicere.'

hybris—might usefully steal over the giantess's mind while she was rejoicing to run her course.¹

Man's Intellect is always in danger of being dazzled by its own triumphs through overlooking the sobering truth that, by comparison with the Soul, the Intellect has an easy task. The field within which the Intellect makes its conquests is relatively narrow, and the objects with which it deals are relatively tractable. A triumphant Modern Western Science and Technology should reflect and confess that, before the expiration of the Upper Palaeolithic Age, Man's Intellect had already fulfilled the essence of its modest task of making Man 'the lord of Creation' by taking delivery of God's gift to Man of 'dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air and over the cattle and over all the Earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the Earth'.²

'The evidence derived both from a study of fossil remains and from a study of primitive races leads to the conclusion that the evolution of human intellectual capacity early reached a relatively advanced stage. . . . It would seem that the major part of the progress in the evolution of the intellectual faculties had been accomplished far back in Palaeolithic times. Those living races which, with all due reservations and qualifications, may be held to represent in mental and bodily characters Palaeolithic races, differ from Modern European Man rather in disposition than in intellect. And it is important to note that it is in the growth of the Intellect rather than in the growth of the other mental faculties that Modern Man is distinguished from his pre-human ancestor. . . . An inquiry into the forces which we must assume to have been at work shows that intellectual capacity was more favoured in the intermediate stage than after Primitive Society had come into being. . . . Within this period, Man descended to the ground, spread, if not into every continent, at least far over the surface of the World, and came to dominate all other living organisms as no species had ever done before. Clearly he was enabled to achieve this result by his [already attained] intellectual powers and by them alone.'³

From that stage upwards in the ascending and accelerating course of Man's scientific and technological progress, Man had never lacked the necessities of material life; all subsequent additions had been superfluities; and these superfluous increments of material wealth and power had not been blessings in themselves; they had been searching tests of Man's character, proving themselves blessings if he used them for good, and curses if he used them for evil.⁴ Such double-edged material gifts had been challenges to Man's spiritual nature; and the challenge had become more formidable with each fresh scientific and technological advance, because each had added momentum to the material 'drive' that goes into Man's moral acts, whether good or bad. Man's apparently boundless ability in mastering his material environment had thus played, in Man's spiritual life, the part played by Mephistopheles in Faust's;⁵

¹ Ps. xix. 5.

² Gen. i. 26.

³ Carr-Saunders, A. M.: *The Population Problem* (Oxford 1922, Clarendon Press), pp. 405 and 399.

⁴ An admirable presentation of this point will be found in Brunner, Emil: *Christianity and Civilisation*, first part (London 1948, Nisbet), pp. 8-70.

⁵ See II. i. 271-99.

and in this sense only—and it was a negative sense which was at the opposite pole from Marx's—Man's economic progress had been the key to human history.

The truth is that the command over Non-Human Nature, which the Intellect has in its gift, is of almost infinitely less importance to Man than his relations with himself, with his fellow men, and with God. But 'Abstract Reason does not tend to communion, but to unity. In thinking I am related to general truth, to ideas, but not to the Thou of my neighbour';¹ and Man's Intellect would never have had a chance of making Man the palaeolithic Lord of Creation, and never even a possibility of achieving its own existence, if Man's pre-human ancestor had not been endowed with the capacity for becoming a social animal, and if Primitive Man had not risen to this spiritual occasion so far as to school himself in those rudiments of sociality that are the Intellect's indispensable conditions for performing its co-operative and cumulative work.² And, when once Man's Intellect had given him dominion over Non-Human Nature on the face of this planet to a degree that made it certain that Man would be able to keep the Human Race in existence here so long as the physical conditions might continue to allow of the possibility of mammalian life, Man's command over Non-Human Nature ceased, from that time onwards, to have significance apart from providing a test of Man's capacity, and a gauge of his success or failure, in the spiritual field. From that time onwards at any rate, if not from the first moment at which Man's pre-human ancestor had become human, Man's intellectual and technological achievements had been important to him, not in themselves, but only in so far as, by penalizing his moral failures and rewarding his moral successes, they had forced him to face, and grapple with, moral issues which otherwise he might have managed to go on shirking. They had driven him through dry places, seeking rest and finding none,³ as Io was goaded by the ceaseless stings of Hera's gadfly.

Through its unprecedented achievements on its own plane a Modern Western Science had indeed raised moral issues of profound importance, but it had not solved any of these moral problems and had not even made any contribution towards solving any of them, because it had not added anything to Man's knowledge of Man and God, or to his insight into how to deal with either of them. 'The most important questions that Man must answer are those for which scientific knowledge is not enough.'⁴ 'The possession of Reason, of intellectual activity as such, is no guarantee of Truth, Goodness, and true Humanity. The principle of the truly human, of Goodness and Truth, is higher than Reason.'⁵ In spiritual insight and action the higher religions still remained the pioneers; and their unique achievement in this crucial field put them in a light to which a Modern Western Science ought to open its eyes. For

¹ Brunner, *op. cit.*, first part, p. 94.

² This aspect of Man's intellectual life is examined further in X. ix. 697-704.

³ Matt. xii. 43.

⁴ Burgmann, Bishop E. H.: *The Church's Encounter with Civilisation* (London 1948, Longmans), p. 19.

⁵ Brunner, *op. cit.*, first part, p. 69.

a quarter of a millennium, reckoning back from the year A.D. 1952, a Modern Western rationalism had been deriding traditional religion for its reluctance to drop the flotsam of primitive rites and myths that it had still been carrying along in its current,¹ and this attack had been justified in so far as the ecclesiastical authorities had continued to insist on explaining traditional practices, and formulating traditional beliefs, in the antiquated intellectual terms of an ephemeral Hellenic or Indic exposition of Philosophy.² But, in passing this just judgement on the theologian, the rationalist was exposing himself to the stricture of the Gospels:

'Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Or how wilt thou say to thy brother: Let me pull out the mote out of thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye.'³

It was not only the fact that, on the spiritual plane, where one inch gained is of greater consequence for Mankind than a mile gained in supererogatory additions to Man's command over Non-Human Nature, traditional religion was still holding the lead; it was also the fact that, in the latest chapter of Western history, in which a Modern Western Society had placed her destinies in Science's hands, she had been as sensationally unsuccessful in things human and divine as she had been sensationally successful in things material. The exercise of humility that was required of a Modern Western Science was, not to lose confidence in her prowess within her own field, but to recognize the bitter truth that, in spite of all her intellectual achievements—past, present, and future—she was spiritually impotent, and that Socrates had taken the right turning at that critical point in his life at which he had abandoned the study of Physical Science in order to seek communion with the spiritual power that informs and governs the Universe.⁴ The Hel-

¹ See the passage from Butler's *Analogy*, quoted in V. v. 670, n. 3.

² Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'What is the criterion of obsolescence in Philosophy? Plato and Aristotle are the two philosophers who have been drawn upon by Christianity most—are they obsolete? In what sense is the Logos doctrine antiquated, in which the Aeschylean doctrine of *πάθει μᾶθος* is not? If one thinks of a moral or intellectual tradition, not in the physico-geographical terms of a silt-laden river, but in the perhaps more accurate and appropriate biological terms of ontogenesis or of a tree putting on rings, then very little (if anything) is seen as antiquated or ephemeral: everything takes its place in a tradition that steadily develops and becomes richer, the new reflecting back upon and giving fresh meaning to the old. This figure of organic growth is the Biblical one (Eph. iv. 13-16).'

The writer of this Study would agree that Man's intellectual equipment is a cumulative heritage that is perpetually being enriched by a continuing process of growth; and, for this very reason, he would submit that each successive stage of Man's intellectual achievement is as ephemeral as the girth of a tree in any particular year, whereas a flash of spiritual insight, like Aeschylus's perception that learning comes through suffering, is perennial because it is complete and perfect in itself. This point is examined further in X. ix. 697-704.

³ Matt. vii. 3-5; cp. Luke vi. 41-42.

⁴ The story of Socrates' conversion is told by Plato, ostensibly in Socrates' own words, in *Phaedo*, 96-97, quoted in III. iii. 186-7.

'This was the line taken by Socrates; and, after him, the school of Aristippus of Cyrene, and later on the school of Ariston of Chios, took up the position that Philosophy ought to confine itself to Ethics, on the ground that Ethics were both a feasible and a useful field of inquiry, in sharp contrast to a Physical Science which [according to this

lenic philosopher's momentous choice had indeed been approved by a Modern Western Christian man of science:

'La science des choses extérieures ne me consolera pas de l'ignorance de la morale au temps d'affliction; mais la science des mœurs me consolera toujours de l'ignorance des sciences extérieures.'¹

In its pursuit of the audacious task for which it has been equipped and commissioned by its Creator, the Human Intellect is indeed perpetually courting the nemesis that is visited upon the sin of hybris.

'It is as true to-day as ever that the Promethean man who thus disturbs afresh the primordial balance of Nature will have to pay for his impiety. Yet he cannot forswear the principle he serves. . . . Never before in the history of Man has the pride and power of the Intellect as a means of superiority over Nature been so proudly asserted as it is to-day. . . . The development of . . . the Scientific Intellect . . . has, more than any other single cause, served to repress the intuitive science of Antiquity which gave ear to the voice of dreams and which honoured the wisdom that tried to discern naturally revealed truths rather than the capacity to accumulate data.'²

From the same angle of vision, we can see the points in which humility and self-confidence were required of the higher religions. The ecclesiastical authorities ought to be confident about the essence, and humble about the accidents, of the faiths of which they were the momentary trustees.

Religion ought to be prepared to surrender to Science every province of intellectual knowledge, traditionally within Religion's field, to which Science might succeed in establishing a title.³ A just humility would

school of thought] was in the first place incomprehensible, while in the second place it could never be of any use even if it could be brought into focus. Physical Science would always leave us just where we were, even if it were to carry us aloft, higher than Perseus, "above the face of the deep and above the Pleiads", to give us a direct physical vision of the whole Cosmos and the nature of Reality, whatever that may be. This scientific enlightenment would not make us any wiser or juster or braver or better, not to speak of its not endowing us with the blessings of strength and beauty and wealth, which are essential for happiness' (Eusebius: *Præp. Evang.*, xv. lxiii. 7 (p. 854 c), reprinted in von Arnim, J.: *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. i (Leipzig 1905, Teubner), No. 353).

¹ Pascal, Blaise: *Pensées*, No. 67, according to Brunschvicg's arrangement.

² Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall, & Cox; 1949, Methuen), pp. 316, 310, 317. Cp. pp. 485-6 and 631-2.

³ Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'But it is just over this establishment of a title that agreement is so difficult to reach. What is Religion to do when a Freudian or a Behaviourist Psychology asserts a title to the province of Moral Philosophy? The history of the past three centuries has abundantly shown that Science like every other field of human activity—like Religion itself—is inherently encroaching: it tends constantly to transform itself into the autonomous creed "claiming sovereign jurisdiction over the whole field" of which you speak on p. 473 above; and is Religion not to defend its own truths? Surely there is here an ineluctable warfare arising out of the Faustian nature of the Western tradition (if not of Man himself), and at best this warfare can only be keyed down to what von Hügel, who grappled with this problem more profoundly perhaps than any other Modern English philosopher, used to call a "costing and fruitful tension".'

The writer of this Study would agree that there was bound to be a tension between Religion and Science, if only because of Science's empirical method of inquiry by a process of trial and error. It was the intellectual glory of a Modern Western Science that it was always willing to put its successive hypotheses to the test of a free and unfettered examination, and to modify or even abandon any hypothesis that might be impugned by the progress of thought and discovery. This intellectual honesty, which was a point

require Religion to confess that, if it was true that on the spiritual plane Science was impotent, it was also true that on the intellectual plane Religion was a babe who was childishly prone to err.¹ A just moral probity and self-respect would require Religion to refrain from putting any stumbling-block in Science's way when Science was practising her own sovereign virtue of intellectual honesty by following the argument faithfully whithersoever it might lead. And a just self-confidence would require Religion to comprehend and proclaim that she could go on surrendering to Science one province of intellectual knowledge after another without impairing her own essence or diminishing the infinity of the Kingdom of God—any more than the volume of the Atlantic could be diminished by successive achievements of American civil engineers in the progressive reclamation of the Jersey marshes. Religion could afford to lose the marshes so long as she retained the Ocean; and, more than that, she would not only suffer no appreciable loss; she would win an appreciable gain by getting rid of an alien slime which, on her hands, was nothing but an encumbrance and a defilement.

Religion's traditional dominion over intellectual ground had been an historical accident, and this accident had been as detrimental to the true interests of the provisional occupier of the vacant slough as to those of the tardily appearing rightful owner. On the Time-scale of the age of the Human Race the Intellect's achievement of making Man the Lord of Creation had been a relatively recent event. In the practical sphere, as we have observed,² this had not been achieved until the Upper Palaeolithic Age, and in the theoretical sphere it had not been achieved until the emergence of the civilizations of the first generation. Down to

of honour among Western scientists, was perhaps the chief single cause of their astonishing success; and this admirable empirical method of inquiry, which the men of science followed, manifestly absolved the layman from any intellectual obligation to accept a new scientific hypothesis unless and until it had established its title by surviving the ordeal of being put to the proof in an exhaustive debate among the scientists themselves. The history of a Modern Western Science over a span of some three hundred years, reckoning back from the year A.D. 1952, did, however, indicate that the empirical scientific method of inquiry usually resulted in course of time in producing agreed and assured additions to scientific knowledge; and at this stage the layman who, up to this point, had been justified in suspending judgement would no longer be justified in rejecting Science's considered and tested findings.

The heliocentric hypothesis proposed by a Modern Western astronomy was a classic example of a new scientific theory which had established its title after the authorities responsible for the policy of the Christian Church had committed themselves to a rejection of it. They would have been better advised if they had merely suspended judgement until a final verdict had been pronounced in the court of Science, within whose intellectual jurisdiction the trial of this hypothesis unquestionably fell; and it should have been relatively easy for the ecclesiastical authorities to leave the last word to the scientists in an astronomical province of scientific inquiry which was manifestly rather remote from the realm of spiritual affairs. The same principles, however, would apply with no less force in a province in which questions of moral conduct were involved, as they were in Science's new province of Psychology. In an encounter with a new psychological hypothesis, as in an encounter with a new astronomical hypothesis, Religion would be justified in suspending judgement so long as the hypothesis was on trial in the court of Science, but it would not be justified in rejecting Science's considered judgement on any point of scientific fact.

¹ This proposition had been pilloried by the Sacred Office in Rome, in the Decree 'Lamentabili' of the 3rd July, 1907, as the fifth point in a catalogue of errors imputed to the Modernists:

'Cum in deposito fidei veritates tantum revelatae contineantur, nullo sub respectu ad Ecclesiam pertinet iudicium ferre de assertionibus disciplinarum humanarum.'

² See pp. 486-7, above.

those comparatively recent dates the technical and speculative activities over which the Intellect had not yet asserted her mastery had been fumblingly performed by her, blindfold, under the aegis of Religion and in Religion's name. Primitive Man's success or failure in hunting, in agriculture, in navigation, had to be an affair of the Heart in default of the Head; and this responsibility of Primitive Religion in a field that was not Religion's own had been taken over from their predecessors by the higher religions when the heavenly waters of Revelation had descended upon the Earth and scooped up the soil from the *cañons* that they had scoured out to make beds for mighty rivers. If we ask ourselves whether, on balance, Religion had lost or gained, in terms of her own intrinsic values, by subsequently relinquishing to Science the intellectual provinces of Cosmogony, Astronomy, Geology, and Biology, we shall answer unhesitatingly that she had been the spiritual gainer, and that she had been threatened with spiritual loss only in so far as she had been tempted to convert herself from an unintentional trespasser into a wilful usurper by resisting Science's legitimate claims.

Religion had been the gainer by parting with her dominion over these works of God's creation because, for Religion, this is obnoxious lumber. Religion's task is to lead Man towards his true end of worshipping God and entering into communion with Him, and Man is always apt to miss his goal by turning aside to worship the creature, through whom God is both manifested and obscured, instead of worshipping the Creator Himself.¹ When Religion associates the works of God with their Maker as objects of worship, she is encouraging a spiritual infirmity to which Man is prone instead of helping him to overcome it; and, in view of this, she ought humbly to confess that, so far from doing her an injury, Science is doing her a service in wresting from her, even against her will, the intellectual flotsam that ever threatens to defeat Religion's purpose by becoming an object of idolatry.² For the adherents of a traditional Christianity it had always been evident that the Jewish and Christian iconoclasts of the last two centuries B.C. and the first three of the Christian Era, who had been branded as 'atheists' by their contemporaries,³ had in reality been the liberators of Religion from the idolatrously worshipped ritual impedimenta of an Hellenic paganism. On the same showing, the ecclesiastical authorities of a later day ought to recognize with humility that a Modern Western Science was likewise a liberator

¹ See pp. 460-3, above.

² 'We ask . . . why Copernicanism has shaken the Christian Church and theology to such a degree that even in the beginning of the eighteenth century the government of the Canton of Zürich strictly prohibited the discussion of this theory. . . . Copernicanism had this effect because the Church did, and had done for centuries, what it should not have done. The Church had mixed up truth-of-God with world-truth. It had established and dogmatically canonised the Biblical world-picture of Antiquity, which, because of its origin, we call the Babylonian world-picture, with its three storeys: the flat plate of the Earth; above it and on the same axis, so to speak, the Sky or Heaven; below it the Underworld. This ancient world-picture is merely the vessel in which the divine revelation is given to Man, but has itself nothing to do with that revelation. The Church and its theology therefore were forced by Science to withdraw from a realm which was not theirs. Natural Science has helped the Church to understand its own truth and essence better than it had understood them in the course of preceding centuries' (Brunner, E.: *Christianity and Civilisation*, first part (London 1948, Nisbet), p. 83).

³ See V. vi. 536, and p. 463, above.

from the idolatrously worshipped theological impedimenta of the higher religions.

A Christian Church which had taken it so hard when a Modern Western Science had relieved it of the load of an outworn Babylonian astronomy might be expected to feel a far more vehement distress, resentment, and impulse towards contumacy if it were to be summoned to stand and deliver the hard-set theology in which a living original Christian faith had been petrified in the act of being translated into terms of an Hellenic philosophy.¹ Yet this Hellenic philosophical terminology itself bore witness to its own contingency and relativity in its presentation of a doctrine which was a Christian theology's central and distinctive mystery; for the Greek word *πρόσωπα*—correctly rendered in Latin as *personae*—which had been used by the Nicene Fathers² to describe the three persons of a Triune Godhead, signified the masks worn by the actors on an Hellenic stage; and masks are only another name for veils that perform to a consummate degree the veil's ambiguous function of concealing a countenance by reproducing a simulacrum of its features in an alien substance.³ In the year A.D. 1952 it might be augured that, in carving out for itself a new province labelled Psychology, a post-Modern Western Science would be imposing upon Christianity the most painful and at the same time perhaps most beneficent of all its acts of liberation by stripping away from a Christian theology some of those anthropomorphic veils that had proved in the past to be the most tenacious of all the barriers between the Human Soul and its Maker.⁴ In performing for Christianity this excruciating service, Science, so far from depriving the Soul of God, would assuredly prove to have brought the Soul one step nearer towards the infinitely distant goal of the journey back towards its Maker on which every creature is perpetually travelling all the days of its pilgrimage on Earth.⁵

Such were the gains that Science might be expected to continue to confer upon a reluctant Religion as a result of successive extensions of the bounds of Science's own domain. It was only human that the authorities who had inherited a responsibility for the churches' traditional organization should wince and repine at acts of liberation and enlightenment when these were imperiously imposed upon them by a Science which was not under their control; yet it was certain that the Soul's spiritual progress and profit could never be purchased at the cost of any set-back or loss to the Soul's Creator; for Science's enlargement of her intellectual client kingdom can never abate, by one jot or tittle, the absoluteness of God's eminent domain.

The gain to Religion from surrendering provinces that were not legitimately hers could be measured by the loss that she had invariably suffered through reacquiring them. In a twentieth-century Westernizing World there was no serious prospect of Religion's emulating past pyrrhic victories of hers by reasserting her dominion over lost provinces of

¹ See pp. 470-1 and 473-4, above.

² Together with their more frequently used term *ὑποστάσεις*.

³ The role of God's creatures as veils which both reveal and conceal God's countenance has been touched upon on pp. 460-3, above.

⁴ See pp. 469-70, above.

⁵ 'To Him return ye every one' (Qur'ān x. 4).

intellectual theory, such as Astronomy, but there were conspicuous historical examples of Religion's having stultified and sterilized herself by backsliding into politics. In contrast to Primitive Religion, in which the worship of the human ant-heap by human ants had been inextricably entangled with Man's worship of God, the higher religions had shaken themselves free of politics at their birth;¹ for their earthly parents had been prophets who had broken through the barrier of Man's idolatrous corporate self-worship that had intervened between the Soul and God under the previous pagan religious dispensations. This had been the strait gate² through which the prophets had led their followers into a new vista of spiritual life, and its reclosure had invariably had disastrous spiritual consequences. The classic case had been the tragic counter-transfiguration of Muhammad from a prophet without honour in his own country³ into the successful ruler of a rival oasis-state.⁴

This was perhaps the only instance in which a higher religion had been politically debauched by its own founder; but the tragedy of Islam since the *Hijrah*—which Muslims had taken, with characteristic political-mindedness, as the initial date for their distinctive ecclesiastical era⁵—had also been the tragedy of other higher religions at later stages in their careers.⁶ We have seen the same blight overtaking Judaism and Zoroastrianism when they went into political action against the Hellenic conquerors of the Syriac World; overtaking Imāmī Shi'ism when it was mobilized by the Safawis as a mundane weapon against the Ottoman and Uzbeg Powers; overtaking Sikhism when it turned militant against the Mughal Rāj; overtaking a Medieval Western Christianity when it incarnated itself in a *Respublica Christiana*;⁷ and overtaking the modern Protestant variation of the same Western Christianity in so far as it allowed itself to become the established religion of this or that secular parochial successor-state of the abortive ecclesiastical commonwealth of Pope Gregory VII and Pope Innocent III.

Politics was the province of mundane practical affairs in which the higher religions had implicated themselves with the most conspicuously disastrous results; but other provinces could furnish further illustrations. A censorious Christian critic might point out that Islam had been saddled by her founder not only with the political incubus of the Temporal Power but with the social incubus of Polygamy⁸ and the ritual incubus of the adoration of the fetish animating the Black Stone; and a censorious Muslim critic might retort by counter-charges in kind against Christianity and the other living higher religions. If it was true that Polygamy had been picked up by Islam from the social heritage of 'the Times of Ignorance' in a barbarian Arabia, was it not also true that

¹ See p. 433, above.

² Matt. vii. 13; Luke xiii. 24.

³ Matt. xiii. 57; Mark vi. 4; Luke iv. 24; John iv. 44.

⁴ See III. iii. 466-72, and p. 440, above.

⁵ See p. 298, above.

⁶ See V. v. 646-712, *passim*.

⁷ See IV. iv. 512-84.

⁸ An apologist for Islam might reply, in defence, that an unlimited polygamy had been the established practice in the social environment into which the Prophet had happened to be born, and that he had reformed this existing social institution, so far as the weakness of the flesh would allow, by restricting the number of a man's lawful wives to four (making a personal exception for himself, and allowing to everybody any number of concubines). This apology would raise the question whether it is expedient to reform an undesirable custom at the price of consecrating it.

the likewise undesirable social institution of Caste had been picked up by Hinduism from the Indic Civilization,¹ and the idolatrous rite of image-worship² by the Mahāyāna from Hinduism and by Christianity from Hellenism? And (our Muslim critic might add) was not the Eucharist itself, which was the distinctive and fundamental sacrament of the Christian Church, a relic of Man's pre-Christian worship of his domesticated food-supply?³

These stones that lay so ready to the hand of a polemical champion of each of the higher religions, if he chose to put his own glass windows in jeopardy by breaking his neighbour's, were so many mutual danger-signals which ought to move the ecclesiastical authorities in all the churches to show the humility that was required of them; and the requirement was that they should humbly renounce dominion over provinces of practical life, and likewise of intellectual theory, in which Religion had no legitimate title to lay down the law.

A Common Endeavour

If Religion and Science could each acquire humility, and retain self-confidence, in the spheres in which, for each of them, self-confidence and humility were respectively in place, they might then find themselves in a mood that would be propitious for a reconciliation; but a propitious state of feeling, though it is an indispensable condition for successful action, is not an effective substitute for action itself; and, if a reconciliation was to be achieved in deed, the parties must seek it through some joint endeavour.

This psychological truth had been recognized in the past by the parties to the encounters between Christianity and an Hellenic philosophy and between Hinduism and an Indic philosophy. In both these encounters, as we have seen, a conflict had been arrested by the pacificatory act of giving theological expression to religious ritual and myth in philosophical terminology; and the impulse to take action had in itself been well inspired; but, as we have also seen, the particular line of action actually taken had, in both these cases, been an aberration which had failed to bring a true and lasting peace because it had taken its cue from a false diagnosis of the relation between spiritual and intellectual truth. It had proceeded on the mistaken assumption that spiritual truth could

¹ See IV. iv. 229-32.

² The votaries of religions which had admitted the use of images into their liturgy might contend—as, indeed, they had contended—that images could be used as aids to the worship of God without becoming objects of worship in themselves. The iconoclast's reply would be that this was a theoretical possibility which had seldom been achieved in practice.

³ A Christian apologist might reply, in defence, that this antique rite of communion with a god incarnate in material food produced by human labour had been the established practice in the social environment in which Christianity had happened to arise. It had survived there as the fundamental sacrament in the worship of Tammuz and his doubles, Adonis and Osiris, and in the Hellenic mysteries of Zagreus, Triptolemus, and Dionysus. Christianity had etherialized this existing ritual institution, as far as the weakness of the flesh would allow, by transfiguring its originally material meaning into a spiritual one. The abortive higher religions from which this sacrament had been taken over by Christianity had already travelled some distance along this road. And was this not the only known avenue to spiritual enlightenment? Were not Man's highest spiritual ideas all imaginative applications of familiar material facts to the mysterious realities of the Spiritual Universe?

be formulated in intellectual terms. In a twentieth-century Westernizing World the Heart and the Head would be well advised to take warning from this historic failure of a previous attempt of theirs to achieve a reconciliation on erroneous lines.

Even if it were psychologically feasible, by agreement, to discard the classic theology of the four living higher religions and to substitute for it a new-fangled theology expressed in terms, not of an Hellenic or an Indic philosophy, but of a Modern Western Science, a successful achievement of this *tour de force* would merely be a repetition of a previous error which would invite the same nemesis. A scientifically formulated theology (if such could be conceived) would be as unsatisfying and as ephemeral as the philosophically formulated theology that was hanging like a millstone round the necks of Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, and Muslims in the year A.D. 1952. It would be unsatisfying because the language of the Intellect is an inadequate medium for conveying the insight that the Soul acquires when it has been 'caught up to the third heaven' and has 'heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.'¹ It would be ephemeral because it is one of the virtues of the Intellect not to rest on its oars but ever to be striving to increase its knowledge of the Truth on its own level and to re-articulate the whole body of existing intellectual knowledge in the light of each new acquisition. In a Western World the writer's generation had seen the entire *corpus intellectuale* of Modern Western scientific thought subjected to a revolutionary reorganization as a result of the two discoveries of the theory of relativity and the structure of the atom. A theology expressed in terms of some current system of philosophy or science that was bound, *ex officio*, to be superseded,² would stand con-

¹ 2 Cor. xii. 2 and 4.

² In this passage, as elsewhere in this Study, the writer linked Philosophy with Science, because he believed that every system of philosophy was a *Weltanschauung* derived from the body of scientific knowledge current at the time and place at which the particular system of philosophy had been formulated. Believing this, he believed that philosophies changed, and were bound to change, in response to changes in the field of Science. This belief in the dependence of Philosophy on Science is challenged by Mr. Martin Wight. 'Modern Science', he comments, 'proceeds by the elaboration, testing and discarding of hypotheses; Philosophy does no such thing—least of all does Metaphysics. Thus Newton's hypotheses have now been replaced by Einstein's, because the latter explain observed phenomena more satisfactorily; but there is no sense in which Kant has replaced Plato, or Bergson has replaced Anselm. Their relationship with one another is not a relationship of progress and supersession, but of facets of a single truth, soundings in a single ocean, portraits of a single sitter. Your own copious quotation from Plato in this Study is evidence that philosophies are not "bound *ex officio* to be superseded". "The bickerings of philosophic sects are an amusement for the foolish; above these jarrings and creakings of the machine of thought there is a melody sung in unison by the spirits of the spheres, which are the great philosophers. This melody, *philosophia quaedam perennis*, is not a body of truth revealed once for all, but a living thought whose content, never discovered for the first time, is progressively determined and clarified by every genuine thinker" (Collingwood, R. G.: *Speculum Mentis* (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press), p. 13). There is no important sense in which Theology expresses itself in terms of "some current system of science": Paley's God the Watchmaker, Whitehead's God the mathematician, and the Modernist churchman's God the evolutionary force, if they would be examples of what you mean, are not serious or significant contributions to Theology. But the association between Theology and Metaphysics is, of course, extremely close; Theology must always borrow its expression in part from the imperishable armoury of philosophical equipment; and every great theologian, even if he seems as revolutionary as Aquinas *vis-à-vis* Augustine, or Luther *vis-à-vis* Aquinas, or Calvin *vis-à-vis* Luther, or von Hügel *vis-à-vis* official Neo-Thomism, or Karl Barth, *vis-à-vis*

demned to as swift a collapse as the house that a foolish man built upon the sand.¹

What then, should the Heart and Head do to be reconciled in the light of the monumental failure of their previous attempt to build a common platform for themselves in the shape of Theology? Was there any opening in the Westernizing World of A.D. 1952 for a combined operation in a more promising direction? At that date the imagination of Western Man was still obsessed by the mounting triumphs of Physical Science, which had recently been crowned by the supreme intellectual achievement of dissecting the structure of the atom. Yet, if it were true, as has already been suggested in this chapter, that a mile gained in the progress of Man's control over Non-Human Nature is of less importance to him than an inch gained in the enhancement of his capacity to deal with himself and with his fellow men and with God, then it was conceivable that, of all Western Man's achievements in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the feat that would loom largest in retrospect in the epimethean view of Posterity might be the breaking of new ground in the field of insight into Human Nature.

That century was witnessing the ironical spectacle of Man standing appalled in face of his latest intellectual success, and the prospect that was terrifying and dispiriting him had been conjured up, not by anything in his newly won mastery of the atom, but by something in his age-old experience of himself. This experience told him, in accents too forcible to be ignored, that he could not trust himself to refrain from using the 'know-how' of the technique for splitting the atom for his customary purpose of forging a weapon to wield against his fellow men, and his scientific knowledge told him no less plainly that, when a weapon of this unprecedented potency had fallen into an unregenerate Humanity's hands, the wages of the sin of War might be the death of the Race.² Where, in these appalling circumstances, was Man to look for access to the life that is the gift of God?³ A gleam of light might be caught in a passage from the shrewd pen of a contemporary English poet.

No more across the Ocean ships return
Fresh from the ends of Earth, the globe astern,
Homeward for Europe's tiny corner bound,
Tense with the tidings of a world new-found . . .
Yet even so, in spite of every change,
One world remains where Fancy still may range,
Remote, mysterious-sea'd, uncertain-shored,
And only recently by men explored.

Classical Lutheranism, can be seen in retrospect as having taken his place in a melody sung in unison, and as a contributor to *theologia quaedam perennis*.⁴

The writer would agree, of course, that Theology was an expression of Religion in terms of Philosophy, and this was the vice of Theology as he saw it, because he believed, with Collingwood, that Philosophy (like Science) 'is progressively determined and clarified', and therefore also believed that each successive formulation of Philosophy, as well as Science, was ephemeral. The great philosophers had been great in virtue of being also poets and prophets; and it is Plato the poet and prophet, not Plato the philosopher, whose imperishable words are copiously quoted in this Study.

¹ Matt. vii. 24-27; Luke vi. 47-49.

² Rom. vi. 23.

³ Ibid.

A world of phantom shapes, fear-haunted mists,
 Sailed not by seamen but psychologists,
 Without Equator, latitude or Pole,
 The veiled, vague chaos of the human soul.¹

The sudden entry that had been made by the Western scientific mind into this realm of Psychology during the generation in which those lines had been written had been a by-product of two world wars waged with weapons that were capable of producing shattering effects on the Psyche, though their ravages were only the child's play of a pre-atomic Western Science. Thanks to the unprecedented clinical experience provided by these mental derangements that had been inflicted by two collective Western crimes, the Western Intellect had desecrated the subconscious depths of the Psyche and, in the act, had acquired a new conception of itself as a will-o'-the-wisp hovering over the surface of this unplumbed psychic abyss.²

Considering Man's proneness to identify with God Himself any work of God that Man, in the exercise of his puny prowess, has newly discovered or newly mastered,³ it could be augured that the Modern Western scientific mind, after having followed the Hellenic school of philosophy for three Cartesian centuries in mistakenly identifying God with the conscious rational superstructure of the Psyche, might be led astray by its portentous discovery of a psychic underworld into exchanging an Hellenic error for an Indic one and following in turn the Indic school in mistakenly identifying God with the Psyche's subconscious irrational abyss.⁴ Yet it would be as vain for Science to hope to find God in the Subconscious as it would be needless for Religion to fear to lose Him there.

'Behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake, but the Lord was not in the earthquake; and after the earthquake a fire, but the Lord was not in the fire.'⁵

Nor, again, had the Lord ever been in—in the sense of being contained in, and so being identical with—the Earth from which He had given Man his sustenance, or in the Sky from which He had sent him rain, or in the Sun from which He had blessed him with light and warmth, or in the fire that Man had kindled, or in the crop that he had

¹ Skinner, Martyn: *Letters to Malaya, III and IV* (London 1943, Putnam), pp. 41 and 43.

² In making its own discovery of the realm of Psychology a Modern Western Science might prove not to have been the first Western explorer in this field; it might prove to have been merely rediscovering a realm that had already been explored and mapped in the confessional manual of a Medieval Western Christian Church.

³ See pp. 460-3 and 468-9, above, and p. 725, n. 1, below.

⁴ In the exultation of their intellectual conquest of the psychic realm of the Subconscious, the pioneers of the twentieth-century Western school of Psychology were apt to cry

We were the first that ever burst
 Into that silent sea,

without pausing to consider that Indic minds, following an intuitive line of approach, had anticipated them by some twenty-five centuries. See further, p. 725 with n. 1, below.

5 1 Kings xix. 11-12.

raised, or in the flock that he had bred, or in the tribe whose union had been his strength, or in any mansion of Man's own Psyche—either on its conscious surface or in its subconscious depths.

Twentieth-century Western minds were well enough aware that Man's Reason would serve him, with an unmoral impartiality, for good and evil purposes alike; but, in the exhilaration of their new discovery of the Subconscious, they perhaps needed a seventeenth-century mentor to remind them that this infant prodigy was likewise morally ambivalent.

'Le Cœur aime l'Être Universel naturellement et soi-même naturellement, selon qu'il s'y adonne; et il s'adurcit contre l'un ou l'autre à son choix.'¹

The Subconscious is indeed a child, a savage, and a brute beast which is at the same time also wiser, more honest, and less prone to error than the Conscious Self. The Subconscious is one of those statically perfect works of creation that are the Creator's 'stopping places',² whereas the Conscious Human Personality is an infinitely imperfect approximation towards a Being of an incommensurably higher order, who is Himself the maker of both these diverse but inseparable organs of the Human Psyche. Yet even the least ungodlike of God's creatures falls as immeasurably short of the divine stature of its Maker as the broadest span of the Jersey marshes falls short of the breadth of the Atlantic Ocean; and, when the Human Spirit has both caught the light of Human Consciousness and explored the darkness of the Human Psyche's subconscious depths, it is still as far as ever from having beheld the Beatific Vision of a Creator whose infinite being is never confined to any of His momentary stopping places, and whose ubiquitous presence always reveals itself behind and beyond each of His innumerable works.

'Whither shall I go then from Thy spirit? Or whither shall I go then from Thy presence?

'If I climb up into Heaven, Thou art there; if I go down to Hell, Thou art there also.

'If I take the wings of the morning and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea,

'Even there also shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me.

'If I say "Peradventure the darkness shall cover me", then shall my night be turned to day.

'Yea, the darkness is no darkness with Thee, but the night is as clear as the day; the darkness and light to Thee are both alike.'³

If Western minds in the twentieth century of the Christian Era were to have discovered the Subconscious merely to find in it a new object for idolatrous worship,⁴ they would be placing a fresh barrier between themselves and God⁵ instead of seizing a fresh opportunity to draw

¹ Pascal, Blaise: *Pensées*, No. 276, according to Brunschvicg's arrangement.

² See p. 461, above.

³ Ps. cxxxix. 6-11, as in *The Book of Common Prayer*.

⁴ See pp. 460-3 and 468-9, above, and p. 725, n. 1, below.

⁵ The worship of the Subconscious would be an impoverishment of the vision of God as Christus Patiens. An incarnate god identified with the subconscious element in the Human Psyche would lose his full humanity and become non-moral (like the Hindu gods and the Olympians) in becoming impersonal (like the deified forces of Nature and their summation in the perfunctory God of the Philosophers).

nearer to Him. The opportunity was there; for, at each previous discovery or mastery of a formerly unknown or untamed creature which Man had duly recognized as being, not the Creator, but another masterpiece of His handiwork, Man had, in the intellectual act of spiritual liberation, won a possibility of learning more about God as well, and of thereby entering into closer communion with Him. Man had always been thus rewarded for this lawful exercise of a dominion over his fellow creatures which had been conferred on Man by a Godhead who was both their creator and his; and an Alexandrian Hellenic philosopher of the allegorizing school—a Jewish Philo or a Greek Hypatia—might have found an intimation of this truth in the aetiological myth of Jacob's wrestling-match with the *jinn* at Peniel¹ and in the fairy-story of the kidnapping of Proteus on Pharos by Menelaus and his men.²

'With a shout we threw ourselves upon him and pinioned him in our arms; and, sure enough, the old fellow started to play his sly tricks. First of all he turned himself into a lion with bushy mane, and next into a serpent, a leopard and a mighty boar; and, before he had finished, he had changed into drenching water and into the towering foliage of a tree. But all the while we held on like grim death without relaxing, till at last the uncanny old fellow grew tired of it.'³

When Proteus was convinced, at last, that he could not wriggle out, he resumed his original form and gave Menelaus the information that he wanted;⁴ and Jacob's mysterious antagonist likewise gave Jacob the blessing for which Jacob asked when the *jinn* was convinced that his human adversary had the strength to hold him, if he chose, till they were overtaken by the breaking of the day. A Philo might have interpreted the *jinn* as a symbol of Nature's potency, with which Man cannot venture to grapple without risk to his own integrity; an Hypatia might have interpreted Proteus as a symbol of the same Nature's infinite variety; but both, if they had struck out this particular line of interpretation,⁵ would have declared, with one accord, that it was Nature, not the

¹ Gen. xxxii. 24-32.

² *Odyssey*, Book IV, ll. 351-570.

³ *Ibid.*, 454-60.

⁴ The price that Man has to pay for this acquisition of a scientific knowledge of Nature is eloquently appraised by a writer in *The Times Literary Supplement*, 17th August, 1951, p. 514:

'Primitive Man, it is to be supposed, did not feel lonely in his environment: however cruel and terrifying it might sometimes be, it was at least something akin to himself, something he could intuitively understand—could influence and propitiate. But on Modern Man the gates of Eden have closed. The more he knows of the world around him the less he understands it. Nature is no longer kind or unkind, no longer amenable to human persuasion, but a soulless problem in higher mathematics; and there are times when one re-echoes in an even deeper sense Wordsworth's lament:

Great God! I'd rather be
A pagan suckled in a creed outworn—
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn.'

⁵ Philo does not, in fact, take this line in any of the seven passages in which he offers a symbolic interpretation of this episode of the Book of Genesis (chap. xxxii, vv. 24-32), according to the index of passages, cited by him from the Old Testament, that is to be found in vol. vii of Cohn, L., and Wendland, P.: *Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Super-sunt* (Berlin 1896-1926, Reimer, 7 vols.). The passages in question are: *De Ebrietate*, chap. 20 (Cohn and Wendland's edition, vol. ii, p. 185, ll. 11-13); *De Mutatione Nominum*,

God of Nature,¹ that was at grips with the human hero of a philosophic folk-tale. Hypatia would have appealed to the unimpeachable testimony of Proteus' own daughter Eidothea, as evidence that this immortal oracle of exact science was not the Lord God Poseidon, but was merely Poseidon's underling, 'the Old Man of the Sea';² and Philo would have pronounced Jacob to have been in error in inferring, from his antagonist's refusal to reveal his name, that he had 'seen God face to face'.³ Had not Jacob confuted his own conjecture by living to tell the tale and putting it on record that his life had been preserved? For had not God Himself said to Moses: 'Thou canst not see My face, for there shall no man see Me and live'?⁴

*The Fundamental Unity of Truth*⁵

If Science and Religion could seize their opportunity of drawing nearer to God by jointly seeking to comprehend God's protean creature the Psyche in its subconscious depths as well as on its conscious surface, what would be the rewards that they might expect to win if success were to crown such a joint endeavour? In this spiritual adventure the prize would indeed be splendid and the hope indeed be great;⁶ for the Subconscious, not the Intellect,⁷ is the organ through which Man lives his spiritual life for good or evil. It is the fount of Poetry, Music, and the Visual Arts, and the channel through which the Soul is in communion with God when it does not steel itself against God's influence. In this enthralling voyage of spiritual exploration the first objective would be to seek insight into the workings of the Heart; for 'le Cœur a ses raisons que la Raison ne connaît point'.⁸ The second objective would be to explore the nature of the difference between rational truth and intuitive truth, in the belief that each of them is genuine Truth—though each only in its own sphere, and only as far as it goes. The third objective

¹ chap. 2 (vol. iii, p. 159, ll. 7-8); chap. 5 (vol. iii, p. 164, ll. 14-15); chap. 35 (vol. iii, p. 188, l. 24); *De Somniis*, Book I, chap. 14 (vol. iii, p. 222, l. 2); chap. 21 (vol. iii, p. 233, l. 5); *De Praemiis et Poenis*, chap. 8 (vol. v, p. 346, l. 17).

² Herbert, George: *The Pulley*, quoted on p. 462, above.

³ *Odysses*, Book IV, ll. 384-7.

⁴ Gen. xxxii. 29-30.

⁵ Exod. xxxiii. 20.

⁶ Robert Bridges, in *The Testament of Beauty*, Book I, ll. 148-61 and *passim*, has expressed what the writer of this Study is trying to say here.

⁷ Plato: *Phaedo*, 114 c, quoted in V. vi. 168.

⁸ The thesis that Man has become *Homo Sapiens* incidentally to becoming *Homo Faber* has been propounded by Henri Bergson in *L'Évolution Créatrice* (24th ed.: Paris 1921, Alcan), chap. 2, pp. 163-79:

'L'instinct est, par excellence, la faculté d'utiliser un instrument naturel organisé. . . . Mais l'intelligence est la faculté de fabriquer des instruments inorganisés, c'est-à-dire artificiels. . . . Nous tenons l'intelligence humaine pour relative aux nécessités de l'action. Posez l'action, la forme même de l'intelligence s'en déduit. . . . Partons donc de l'action, et posons en principe que l'intelligence vise d'abord à fabriquer. . . . Notre intelligence, telle qu'elle sort des mains de la nature, a pour objet principal le solide inorganisé. . . . Elle est la vie regardant au dehors, s'extériorisant par rapport à elle-même, adoptant en principe, pour les diriger en fait, les démarches de la nature inorganisée. De là son étonnement quand elle se tourne vers le vivant et se trouve en face de l'organisation. Quoi qu'elle fasse alors, elle résout l'organisé en inorganisé, car elle ne saurait, sans renverser sa direction naturelle et sans se tordre sur elle-même, penser la continuité vraie, la mobilité réelle, la compénétration réciproque et, pour tout dire, cette évolution créatrice qui est la vie. . . . L'intelligence est caractérisée par une incompréhension naturelle de la vie.'

⁸ Pascal, Blaise: *Pensées*, No. 277, according to Brunschvicg's arrangement.

would be to seek to strike the underlying rock of fundamental Truth on which rational and intuitive truth alike must be founded. And the final objective, in striving to strike rock-bottom in the psychic cosmos, would be to attain to a fuller vision of God the Dweller in the Innermost. In the present Study we cannot aspire to do more than follow our pair of explorers—if Science and Religion can be imagined as setting out hand in hand—on the first stages of this new quest for the *Visio Beatifica*.¹

The warning, so unfortunately ignored by well-intentioned theologians, that 'it hath not pleased God to give His people salvation in dialectic',² is one of the refrains of the Gospels:

'Jesus said: Suffer little children, and forbid them not, to come unto me; for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven. . . . Verily I say unto you: Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Whosoever, therefore, shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven. And whoso shall receive one such little child in my name, receiveth me. But whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea.'³

From the standpoint of the Reason, the Subconscious is indeed a child-like creature, both in its humble-minded attunedness to God, which the Reason cannot emulate, and in its undisciplined inconsequence, which the Reason cannot approve.

'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth.'⁴

Conversely, in the sight of the Subconscious, the Reason is a heartless pedant who has purchased a miraculous but superfluous command over Nature at the sinful price of betraying the Soul by allowing her primordial vision of God to fade into the light of common day.⁵ 'Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet';⁶ yet what an insignificant fragment of God's creation it is that the Reason manages to catch in the clumsy crab-claws

¹ Mr. Martin Wight comments: "These three objectives of "seeking insight", "exploring the difference between rational truth and intuitive truth", and "seeking the underlying . . . fundamental truth" appear to the reader to be objectives in which, as with all human objectives, the Intellect and the Intuition are equally concerned. If this supposed reconciliation between "Reason" and "the Subconscious" means anything at all, it is a reconciliation that must be purveyed or communicated to Mankind in general in some systematized and stated formulation; such a formulation is the proper work of Reason itself; and it will be open to all the criticisms that you level against Theology."—"Indeed it will", would be the present writer's reply, 'and that is why I have set my face (see pp. 494-5, above) against the precipitation of a new theology through a fresh attempt to formulate in the language of Reason the truths of Poetry and Prophecy. I do not accept your postulate that a reconciliation between Reason and the Subconscious must be communicated by the Reason in some systematized formulation. Plato, for example, scrupulously refrained from attempting this. He yokes Reason and Intuition to his winged chariot side by side, without ever trying to disguise either one of them in any trappings that belong to the other. In my belief it is because he drives this pair of horses in double harness that he succeeds in flying so high. I appeal to Plato's example.'

² Ambrose: *De Fide*, Book I, chap. 5, § 42, quoted in V. v. 564.

³ Matt. xix. 14 and xviii. 3-6; cp. Matt. x. 42; Mark ix. 37 and 42 and x. 14-15; Luke x. 48, xvii. 1-2, and xviii. 16-17.

⁴ John iii. 8.

⁵ Wordsworth: *Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood*.

⁶ Ps. viii. 6.

of its categories within the wavering framework of Space-Time! 'There are more things in Heaven and Earth,' exclaims the Subconscious to the Reason, 'than are dreamt of in your philosophy';¹ and she thanks and praises God for having given to her lowly self the mission of defending what the Reason has abandoned.

'Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast Thou ordained strength because of thine enemies, that Thou mightest still the enemy and the avenger.'²

Yet in truth the Reason is not, of course, the enemy of God, any more than the realm of the Subconscious is, in truth, out of Nature's bounds; for the Reason and the Subconscious alike are God's creatures. Either has its own appointed field and task, and they need not scandalize one another if they cease to trespass.³ Theology, which is the Reason's misguided attempt to state intuitive truth in terms of intellectual truth, is the counterpart of magic, which is a misguided attempt of the Subconscious to usurp the Reason's task of establishing Man's dominion over Non-Human Nature. These reciprocal trespasses are no doubt partly traceable to a hybris which is one of the symptoms of Original Sin, and which can only be kept in check by an unceasing spiritual travail; but there was another cause of confusion which the Reason and the Subconscious, between them, had it in their power to remove by co-operation.

Owing to the poverty of Man's mental equipment up to date, these two departments of the Psyche had been constrained to use one language to express two kinds of truth relating to different aspects, planes, and dimensions of Reality; and here lay the remediable cause of the insoluble and estranging verbal controversies that had arisen between Science and Religion over, for example, the Real Presence of a *Latens Deitas* in the consecrated elements of bread and wine in the rite of the Eucharist and over the Virgin Birth of a God Incarnate who had been conceived by the Holy Ghost. In a Hellenizing World in the first century of the Christian Era there was a traditional usage of words for describing the spiritual experience of the Soul's communion with God in and through the rite of sacramental eating and drinking. The God who

'bringeth forth grass for the cattle and green herb for the service of men, that He may bring food out of the Earth, and wine that maketh glad the heart of Man, and oil to make him a cheerful countenance, and bread to strengthen Man's heart',⁴

was traditionally described as animating these His creatures when they were eaten by Man in a rite in which Man's aim was to commune with his Maker. In the same world in the same age there was another traditional usage of words for describing the spiritual experience of

¹ Shakespeare: *Hamlet*, Act I, scene v, l. 162.

² Ps. viii. 2, as in *The Book of Common Prayer*.

³ A Catholic friend of the writer's comments: 'Science should have its own field to itself and should recognize that the laws which it finds are God's laws and that He can do with them as He wills. While Science and Revealed Truth are on different planes they will not contradict one another; each can safely affirm what is certainly truth in its own sphere with no fear that they will be at variance. In the past, both Science and Religion have exceeded their limits.'

⁴ Ps. civ. 14-15.

encountering a man through whose personality God's light streamed into his fellow men's souls, not darkly, as through a glass,¹ but undimmed, as through an open window. Such a human soul divine (*θεῖος ἄνθρωπος*),² whose appearance in This World had given light to them that sat in darkness and in the shadow of death,³ was traditionally described as being a Son of God by a human mother.⁴

Does not this mythological use of language aptly express the truth of the Heart?⁵ And, if it does so, is not this the most important of the alternative uses to which words can be put? Which is the more significant truth about bread and wine? The spiritual truth that, in the Eucharist, they bring the Soul into communion with God? Or the scientific truth that they keep a physical organism alive in virtue of such-and-such tissue-repairing and such-and-such energy-giving ingredients? And which is the more significant truth about the birth of a new man into the World?⁶ The spiritual truth that, through the tender mercy of our God, the dayspring from on high hath visited us?⁷ Or the scientific truth that an embryo has been conceived in such-and-such a way by sexual intercourse, and has passed through such-and-such physical metamorphoses between conception and birth? In the realm of spiritual values, bread and wine exist for the sake of the Eucharist, not of the food-supply, and conception and birth take place for the sake of the Incarnation, not of man-power. And, if Science, using the same words in a different sense of her own, declares that the spiritual usage of them is, if literally intended, untrue, and, if symbolically intended, unscientific, Religion can have the last word if she is content to retort that, for her, the scientific meaning is trivial and irrelevant. She does not expose her mythological expression of spiritual truth to any damaging scientific attack unless she stakes the perverse theological claim that her truths are true in the scientific sense as well as in the spiritual.⁸

The first step towards a reconciliation between Religion and Science would be a mutual recognition that either of them has a truth of her

¹ 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

² See Bieler, L.: *Θεῖος Ἄνθρωπος* (Vienna 1935-6, Höfels, 2 vols.).

³ Luke i. 79.

⁴ For the myth of the encounter between the Virgin and the Father of her Child, see II. i. 271-2; V. vi. 267-75; and p. 464, above.

⁵ This question appears to the writer to be answered in the affirmative in the following comment by a Catholic friend of his: 'The revealed truths of the Christian Faith are in some respects about things that we could not know [solely by the light of our human intellectual powers]: Grace, the Trinity, Redemption. A full comprehension of these truths is beyond the powers of our intelligence, and part of their meaning can only be understood in the way of analogy. This will continue to be so as long as men are men. Only God can lift us out of the use of images, for that is our way of knowing. We must not forget the poets, who are among the greatest of men; their way is the way of symbolism throughout. The danger of this way is that the image may be mistaken for the reality behind. The right way of meeting this danger is, not to throw the image away, but to use it only as a means.'

⁶ John xvi. 21.

⁷ Luke i. 78.

⁸ 'All religious propositions are symbolic, but come to be taken literally. For literal language and the language of fact are identical. This is everywhere the trap which lies in the path of the religious consciousness. It mistakes its own utterances for literal statements of fact. Its doom is then sealed. For always in the end it turns out that the alleged facts are not facts, but fictions. And the discovery of this, whether by Science, or Philosophy, or merely by Common Sense, is the triumph of Scepticism' (Stace, W. T.: *Time and Eternity* (Princeton 1952, University Press), p. 132).

own which cannot be taken in the sense of the other truth on the strength of the verbal accident that the same language has to be used for conveying these two different meanings. This would be the first step, but it could not be the last, for, if Truth were not reducible to unity, God would not be accessible to Man; and this would be in contradiction with Man's experience.¹ Moses did not see God's face on Mount Sinai, yet he did come down from the mount with the tables of testimony in his hand;² Elijah did not feel God's presence in the wind or in the earthquake, nor did he see it in the fire, yet he did hear the still small voice³ which spoke to him after the fire and the earthquake and the wind had expended themselves. If Truth is ultimately one, and if the diversity of spiritual and scientific truth should prove not to be reducible to unity by the naïve method of trying to interpret one of the two in the sense of the other, the ultimate unity must be sought on some third plane—distinct from both the planes of truth so far known to Mankind.

This hypothetical underlying unitary truth had so far been beyond the range of Man's spiritual vision; and it seemed unlikely that he would even begin to apprehend it till he had advanced much farther than he had progressed so far in his understanding of both the Reason and the Subconscious. At a date which was perhaps less than six thousand years removed from the date of the first emergence of the earliest of the civilizations, Man was still barely on the threshold of his knowledge of himself; and this dark jungle would be harder for Man's intelligence to penetrate than the great open spaces of Non-Human Nature where the Intellect found itself at home⁴ and where in the past it had overrun one province after another in a continual succession of sweeping conquests. Nor, in the field of self-knowledge, would the utmost intellectual prowess avail by itself to bring Man to his objective; for spiritual truth cannot be divined except through spiritual experience, and the dumb Heart cannot express what it has learnt through suffering till the liberating word is uttered by a prophet inspired with the gift of tongues. But neither the revealing experience nor its prophetic interpretation could be whistled for at the convenience of a hard-pressed generation; and, pending the fuller enlightenment which might come to Man in God's time, but which was not at Man's command, a belief in the existence of bed-rock Truth must rest on the faith which 'is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen'.⁵ The grounds for this faith which passes understanding could be indicated in a simile.

Elemental truths might be likened to high buildings whose weight is so crushing that the structure cannot stand without being founded on rock. When, standing on the heights overlooking Sandy Hook, we see on the horizon the sky-line of New York, we can confidently infer from

¹ 'If one sticks to the "commonsense" attitude, of course it seems purely pedantic and sophistical to discuss the relation of poetical to historical truth, but no one can have done more than a trifle of philosophical thought without discovering that there is such a thing as poetic truth, that it is not the same as historical truth, and that the relating of the two is an extremely complicated matter' (William Temple, in a letter quoted in Iremonger, F. A.: *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury* (London 1948, Cumberlege), p. 466).

² Exod. xxxiii. 23 and xxxiv. 29.

⁴ See pp. 500-1, above.

³ 1 Kings xix. 12.

⁵ Heb. xi. 1.

our first glance the presence of rock at the distant sky-scrapers' base. On Manhattan Island the rock on which these giant towers are founded crops out on the surface, visible to the eye when we view the *terrain* at close quarters. But what about the high buildings in Chicago? On the shore of Lake Michigan the visible surface of the Earth is composed, not of solid rock, but of softer substance—alluvium or gravel or clay—yet the buildings there tower up to heights that rival the altitudes of their sisters in New York. What is the secret of the Chicagoan architects' apparent achievement of the impossible feat of building Towers of Babel on the sand? The secret is that these high buildings in Chicago rest, not on the visible surface soil—which would indeed be incapable of supporting them—but on concrete piles which are driven down through softer strata till they strike the rock, at whatever depth it may lie. The depth is variable, for the invisible rock underlying Chicago, like the visible rock that crops out in New York, is capriciously irregular in its configuration, so that one pile may strike it at no more than 20 feet below the surface, and another at no more than 70 feet, while a third may have to probe down no less than 200 feet before finding rest for the sole of its foot.¹ In the imagery of this simile, Truth might be likened to a house of many mansions with a rock-based pile supporting each. The buried pinnacle of rock on which rational truth is founded may be situate not very far below the surface, while spiritual truth may be based on the rock-bottom of an abyss; but, however great the difference in the level may be, the foundations of both kinds of truth alike go down to the rock, and at either level it is the same rock, living yet invisible, that bears the weight on its atlantean shoulders.²

If the eye of Faith could thus divine the presence of a Unitary Truth founded on the rock but buried deep below the surface, how were the Heart and the Head to pursue their common enterprise of striving to reach and grasp this hidden treasure? Two points, at least, could be taken as certain: the characteristic and peculiar gifts of both organs must be brought into play if the quest was to have any prospect of success, and this indispensable co-operation would only be possible in virtue of the constant exercise of a mutual charity; 'for we know in part and we prophesy in part,'³ but 'charity never faileth'.⁴

The relation between the two organs of the Psyche might be likened to that between a human herdsman and a powerful and wayward yet domesticable and serviceable animal. Neither man nor beast can truly afford to do without his fellow creature; for the beast remains an aimless wanderer in the wilderness so long as he does not accept human guidance, while the man remains a puny plaything of Nature so long as he

¹ Gen. viii. 9.

² Mr. Martin Wight justly comments: 'This conclusion, and the simile in which it is expressed, is, of course, at odds with the New Testament, whose writers were compelled to assert that the rock had once for all cropped above the surface on the historical soil (1 Cor. x. 4) and had provided the foundation for the building of the Kingdom of God (Eph. ii. 20)—that the Eternal had once for all irrupted into the temporal, the Meta-historical into the historical—and that the "hypothetical underlying unitary truth", which you project "at present beyond our range of vision" (p. 504, above), had once for all appeared in human flesh: "I am . . . the Truth" (John xiv. 6).' Yet the scientific truth explored by the Reason is, in fact, independent of the spiritual truth revealed in Christ.

³ 1 Cor. xiii. 9.

⁴ 1 Cor. xiii. 8.

does not command the beast's services. How are they to co-operate? They will never succeed so long as either imagines that he can dominate the other by sheer force; for the Subconscious, like some camel, mule, or goat, is merely stung into a maliciously obstinate contrariness by a touch of the whip, while, conversely, if the Subconscious wantonly takes the offensive against the Reason in seeking to overwhelm it by some demonic exertion of its own brute strength, it is apt not to break the Will but to steel it. In the everlasting intercourse between the two members of this indissoluble pair of psychic partners, aggression on either side can produce nothing but a mutual frustration. When Mithras has slain his bull, he still has the carcass on his hands and the murder on his conscience. A better way is indicated in a Zen Mahayanian Buddhist parable of the drama of the Soul that is presented in visual form in divers versions of 'the Ten Oxherding Pictures'.¹ In this encounter between beast and man the victory is won in the end not by Hêraklês' muscles but by Orpheus' music.

Riding on the animal, he leisurely wends his way home;
Enveloped in the evening mist, how tunefully the flute vanishes away!
Singing a ditty, beating time, his heart is filled with a joy indescribable!
That he is now one of those who know, need it be told?²

(d) THE PROMISE OF THE CHURCHES' FUTURE

1. *Man's Fellowship with the One True God*

If a generation born into the twentieth century of the Christian Era might dare to look forward to a day when Heart and Head would have been reconciled by a unison of charity, insight, and faith, they might also hope to persuade Heart and Head to concur in a reading of the significance of the Churches' past; and, if our findings on that point were agreed, they would provide a starting-point for entering on the last stage of our inquiry into the relation between churches and civilizations. After having found that churches are not cancers, and that they are no more than incidentally chrysalises, we have been looking into the alternative possibility that they may be a higher species of society. We cannot give our verdict on this issue without asking ourselves what light the significance of the churches' past may throw on the promise of their future.

In embarking upon this necessary yet hazardously speculative quest, we may take courage from a consideration that has already emerged.³ The chronological 'yardstick' that gives the true measure of the churches' past and future is the Time-scale established by a Modern Western Physical Science; and on this Time-scale the species of human society that we have called the higher religions was, at the time of writing, still extremely young. This meant that, in comparing the value of the higher religions with the value of the civilizations and the primitive societies, students of History midway through the twentieth century of the

¹ See Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro: *The Ten Oxherding Pictures* (Kyoto 1948, Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai).

² Op. cit., English translation of the poem accompanying Picture No. 6 in the first of the two versions of the series that are reproduced in this brochure.

³ On pp. 452-5, above.

Christian Era were entitled, in judging the youngest of the three species, to take account of its potentialities as well as its already harvested achievements. Their inevitably tentative judgement on this basis might be confuted by the future course of events; for of course there was no guarantee in the mere effluxion of Time that promise would be fulfilled in performance. Manifestly, error lay in wait here to ensnare observers born into this generation; yet, considering the circumstances, they must reckon themselves less likely to err by counting chickens before they were hatched than by pronouncing the eggs to be added before there had been time for incubation.

After giving ourselves this encouragement, tempered by this warning, let us ask ourselves what was the feature in a church which differentiated it from both a civilization and a primitive society and which led us to classify churches as a distinct, and higher, species of the genus in which all these three types of society were embraced. The distinguishing mark of churches was not their inclusion of dead and unborn, as well as living, human members, for a membership transcending the living generation was a feature that was common to all species; nor was the distinguishing mark of churches their inclusion of divine as well as human members, for all species of society had in common this feature likewise. The distinguishing mark of the churches was that they all had as a member the One True God—for this feature was shared by the churches with no other species of society but was common to all the churches alike, whether they regarded the personal aspect of the Godhead, through which He enters into a relation of fellowship with His creature Man, as a revelation of His essence or as an avatar, manifested to Man in a form which Man can grasp, of an Ultimate Reality that is beyond Personality. This human fellowship with the One True God, which had been approached in the primitive religions and been attained in the higher religions, gave to these certain vital virtues that were not to be found in either primitive societies or civilizations. It gave power to overcome the discord which was one of the inveterate evils of Human Society; it offered a solution of the problem of the meaning of History; it inspired an ideal of conduct which could be an effectively potent spiritual stimulus for the superhuman effort of making Human Life possible in This World; and it availed to exorcize the peril that was inherent in mimesis when this was oriented, not towards the One True God, but towards one of Man's fellow human creatures.

2. *The Promise of Overcoming Discord*

Discord is inveterate in Human Life because Man is the most awkward of all things in the World that Man is compelled to encounter; and Man has to face Man on two fronts: in the macrocosm as his neighbour and in the microcosm as himself.

'Of all tools used in the shadow of the Moon, men are most apt to get out of order';¹ and the source of this trouble becomes manifest when we put together the two facts that Man is a social animal and that Man is endowed with free will. The combination of these two elements in the

¹ Melville, H.: *Moby Dick*, chap. xlvii.

nature of Man—and both are key-elements in Human Nature—means that in any society consisting exclusively of human members there will be a perpetual conflict of wills; and this human conflict is bound to be more terrible than the blind struggle for life among non-human animals, because 'human passions are always characterised by unlimited and daemonic potencies of which animal life is innocent'.¹ Man is indeed always and everywhere the Faust that has been taken as the type of Western Man by the intuitive genius of Spengler; and, when a Faustian insatiability betrays Man's likeness to his Maker by grasping at infinity, this impact of Man's explosive vein of godlikeness upon his hidebound animal nature must produce some spiritual revolution or enormity² if it is not graced by the miracle of conversion.

Man's conversion is necessary for Man's salvation because his free and insatiable will gives him his spiritual potentiality at the risk of alienating him from God. This risk will not have beset a pre-human social animal not blessed—or cursed—with a spiritual capacity for rising above the level of the Subconscious Psyche; for the Subconscious Psyche enjoys the same effortless harmony with God that its innocence assures to every non-human creature.³ This negatively blissful Yin-state, in which the Psyche 'was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep',⁴ was broken up when human consciousness and personality were created through a Yang-movement in which 'the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters'⁵ 'and God divided the light from the darkness'⁶ 'and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament';⁷ for Man's Conscious Self, which can serve as God's chosen vessel for the achievement of a miraculous spiritual advance if it seeks and finds that harmony with its Creator which the Subconscious possesses *ex officio naturae*, can also condemn itself to a lamentable fall if its awareness of being made in God's image intoxicates it into idolizing itself. This suicidal infatuation (*ἄρνη*) which is the wages of the sin of pride (*ὑβρις*)⁸ is a spiritual aberration to which the Soul is perpetually prone in the unstable spiritual equilibrium which is of the essence of Human personality;⁹ and the Self cannot escape from itself by a spiritual regression into the Yin-state of *Nirvāna*. The recovered Yin-state in which salvation is to be found by Man is the peace, not of nerveless self-annihilation, but of taut-strung harmony. Psyche's task is the *tour de force* of recapturing a childlike virtue after having 'put away childish things'.¹⁰

¹ Niebuhr, R.: *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. i (London 1941, Nisbet), p. 191. Compare p. 268.

² For the 'revolutions' and 'enormities' that are alternative possible disastrous outcomes of putting new wine in old bottles, see IV. iv. 133-7.

³ For this sense in which the Subconscious is nearer to God than the Conscious Self, see pp. 498 and 501-2, above.

⁴ Gen. i. 2.

⁵ Gen. i. 2.

⁶ Gen. i. 4.

⁷ Gen. i. 7.

⁸ See IV. iv. 245-61.

⁹ This inevitable exposure of a 'high-powered' human personality to the risk of a spiritual disaster, from which the 'low-powered' pre-human Subconscious Psyche is exempt, is a spiritual analogue of the perilousness of a road on which mechanically propelled vehicles have replaced horse-carts and wheel barrows (see III. iii. 209-12). The self-discipline that is called for in the Soul if it is to find salvation is the counterpart of the traffic-control that is required in order to make a speedway safe for life and limb.

¹⁰ I Cor. xiii. 11.

'Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven';¹ but the Self has to achieve its childlike reconciliation with God by the manifold exertion of a god-given will to do the will of God and thereby evoke God's grace.

If this is Man's way of salvation he has a rough road to tread; for the mighty act of creation that has made Man *Homo Sapiens* has, by the same stroke, made it mortally hard for Man to become *Homo Concors*, and a social animal that is an accomplished *Homo Faber* must co-operate or perish. The disastrous social consequences of an unresolved moral contradiction which the theologians had called Original Sin were written large on the pages of History.

In virtue of Man's innate sociality, every human society is potentially all-embracing. In a previous context² we have observed that every civilization had demonstrably radiated its influence over all the rest of Mankind; and the feebler radiation of the primitive societies, which is less easy to detect, is not likely to have been less ubiquitous. This constant mutual interpenetration of social influences makes any society unstable and provisional so long as it falls short of being world-wide (as all societies of every species had hitherto fallen short in fact); but here the egocentric pull of every individual human will comes contradictorily and obstructively into play. Down to the year A.D. 1952 no human society had ever yet become literally world-wide on every plane of social activity. A secularized Modern Western Civilization had latterly attained to virtual universality on the economic plane without having achieved any comparable political or cultural success;³ and, after the shattering experience of two world wars in one lifetime, it was uncertain whether an indispensable and perhaps inevitable political unification of the World could come to pass without that grimly familiar 'knock-out blow' that had been the traditional price of oecumenical unity in the histories of civilizations of a less than literally world-wide extent.⁴

In the past this price had always proved prohibitively high; for civilizations which had arrived at political unity by this road had inflicted mortal wounds on themselves in the process; and the unification of a Westernizing World by the familiar method of military force was likely to wreak damage of an unprecedented degree of severity owing to the keying-up of the material 'drive' behind War through the triumphs of a Modern Western Technology.⁵ The relentless advance of Man's command over Non-Human Nature, since the date in the Palaeolithic Age when his technological prowess had made him lord of all creation except himself,⁶ had indeed been steadily accentuating the pressure of its challenge to Man to build for himself a society embracing the entire Human Race. But the ever-increasing urgency of this necessity had been obstinately ignored by the defiant egotism of human wills, and the efforts of civilizations to advance towards the goal of universality had been mocked by their proclivity to fall asunder on the political

¹ Matt. xviii. 3 (see IV. iv. 248-9, and pp. 501-2, above).

² In II. i. 187.

³ See I. i. 35-36.

⁴ This grave question is considered further in XII. ix. 524-36.

⁵ See IV. iv. 141-55.

⁶ See pp. 486-7, above.

plane into sovereign parochial states whose fratricidal warfare had been perhaps the most frequent cause of the breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations up to date.¹ This self-inflicted calamity had overtaken the Western Civilization in its turn in its Modern Age, when the failure of the medieval attempt to establish a Papal *Respublica Christiana* had discredited the ideal of an oecumenical unity resting on the supremacy of the Church over the parochial states,² and when the success of the recent expansion of the West over the rest of the World had relieved the West from the pressure of hostile neighbour societies which had almost mechanically held a Medieval Western Christendom together.³

The truth is that the unity of Mankind cannot be achieved either by stitching together local communities into a pantheon of tribal deities presiding over a terrestrial conglomeration of parochial states, on the pattern of Cyrus's 'Kingdom of the Lands',⁴ or by purging Society of its primitive divine participants and making Humanity itself the Absolute, as had been attempted by Humanists of a Modern Western school.⁵ In another context⁶ we have already taken note of the paradoxical but profound truth that the most likely way to reach a goal is to be aiming not at that goal itself but at some more ambitious goal beyond it. The unity of Mankind can be achieved only as an incidental result of acting on a belief in the unity of God,⁷ and by seeing this unitary terrestrial society *sub specie aeternitatis* as a province of a Commonwealth of God which must be singular, not plural, *ex hypothesi*.⁸

This is the necessary condition because, without a harmony of wills, Society cannot maintain itself even on the most narrowly restricted tribal range, not to speak of its becoming world-wide, and the only society in which there can be a harmony of wills is one in which two or three—or two or three thousand million—are gathered together in God's name with God Himself in the midst of them.⁹ In a society including the One True God as well as His human creatures, God plays a unique part. He is a party to the relation between each human member and Himself; but in virtue of this He is also a party to the relation between each human member and every other human member, and through this participation of God, breathing His own divine love into human souls, human wills can be reconciled.¹⁰

The great gulf fixed¹¹ between 'the open society' of the Commonwealth of God and 'the closed society' that is exemplified not only in primitive societies but in civilizations, and the spiritual leap without which this gulf cannot be crossed, had been pictured by a Modern Western pioneer philosopher in a passage, referred to in an earlier context,¹² which calls for quotation here.

¹ See XII. ix. 441-6.

² See I. i. 33-34.

³ See V. vi. 8.

⁴ See V. vi. 9-16.

⁵ Matt. xviii. 20.

⁶ This reconciliation is not, of course, automatic, and indeed the intervention of the One True God in Man's struggle with himself for the attainment of social unity is a challenge which may evoke in response, not love, but a hate-inspired intolerance (see IV. iv. 222-9, and pp. 430-1, above).

⁷ Luke xvi. 26.

⁸ See IV. iv. 576-84.

⁹ See V. v. 529-34 and V. vi. 15.

¹⁰ On p. 388, above.

¹¹ On this point see further pp. 558-9, below.

¹² In V. vi. 12.

'L'homme [a] été fait pour de très petites sociétés. Que telles aient été les sociétés primitives, on l'admet généralement. Mais il faut ajouter que l'ancien état d'âme subsiste, dissimulé sous des habitudes sans lesquelles il n'[y] aurait pas de civilisation. . . . Le civilisé diffère surtout du primitif par la masse énorme de connaissances et d'habitudes qu'il a puisées, depuis le premier éveil de sa conscience, dans le milieu social où elles se conservaient. Le naturel est en grande partie recouvert par l'acquis; mais il persiste, à peu près immuable, à travers les siècles. . . . Le naturel est indestructible. On a eu tort de dire: "Chassez le naturel, il revient au galop",¹ car le naturel ne se laisse pas chasser. Il est toujours là. . . . Habitudes et connaissances sont loin d'imprégner l'organisme et de se transmettre héréditairement, comme on se l'était imaginé. . . . Refoulé, impuissant, [l'ancien état d'âme] demeure pourtant dans les profondeurs de la conscience. . . . [et] il se maintient en fort bon état, très vivant, dans la société la plus civilisée. . . . Nos sociétés civilisées, si différentes qu'elles soient de la société à laquelle nous étions immédiatement destinés par la nature, présentent d'ailleurs avec elle une ressemblance fondamentale. Ce sont en effet, elles aussi, des sociétés closes. Elles ont beau être très vastes en comparaison des petits groupements auxquels nous étions portés par instinct. . . . elles n'en ont pas moins pour essence de comprendre à chaque moment un certain nombre d'individus, d'exclure les autres. . . . Entre la nation, si grande soit-elle, et l'humanité, il y a toute la distance du fini à l'indéfini, du clos à l'ouvert. . . .

'De la société close à la société ouverte, de la cité à l'humanité, on ne passera jamais par voie d'élargissement. Elles ne sont pas de même essence. . . . La différence entre les deux objets est de nature, et non plus simplement de degré. . . . Qui ne voit que la cohésion sociale est due, en grande partie, à la nécessité pour une société de se défendre contre d'autres, et que c'est d'abord contre tous les autres hommes qu'on aime les hommes avec lesquels on vit? Tel est l'instinct primitif. Il est encore là, heureusement dissimulé sous les apports de la civilisation; mais aujourd'hui encore nous aimons naturellement et directement nos parents et nos concitoyens, tandis que l'amour de l'humanité est indirect et acquis.

'A ceux-là nous allons tout droit, à celle-ci nous ne venons que par un détour; car c'est seulement à travers Dieu, en Dieu, que la religion convie l'homme à aimer le genre humain; comme aussi c'est seulement à travers la Raison, dans la Raison par où nous communions tous, que les philosophes nous font regarder l'humanité pour nous montrer l'éminente dignité de la personne humaine, le droit de tous au respect. Ni dans un cas ni dans l'autre nous n'arrivons à l'humanité par étapes, en traversant la famille et la nation. Il faut que, d'un bond, nous nous soyons transportés plus loin qu'elle et que nous l'ayons atteinte sans l'avoir prise pour fin, en la dépassant. Qu'on parle d'ailleurs le langage de la religion ou celui de la philosophie, qu'il s'agisse d'amour ou de respect, c'est une autre morale, c'est un autre genre d'obligation, qui viennent se superposer à la pression sociale.²

There can be no unity of Mankind without the participation of God; and, conversely, when the heavenly pilot is dropped by an insensately self-confident human crew, Society inevitably falls into a Time of Troubles—as has been testified, with an impressive conviction, by an

¹ 'Naturam expelles furcâ, tamen usque recurret' (Horace: *Epistulae*, Book I, Ep. x, l. 24).

² Bergson, Henri: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 24-25, 27-28, 288, 293, 297.

accomplished and sceptical Modern Western statesman in the light of the political experience of a lifetime ending in the failure of his attempt to engineer the restoration of a pre-Revolutionary *ancien régime*.

'La décadence des empires va toujours de pair avec les progrès de l'incrédulité. La foi religieuse, qui est la première des vertus, est précisément pour cela la plus grande des forces. Elle seule règle l'attaque et rend la résistance invincible. La foi ne peut pas diminuer chez une nation sans entraîner l'affaiblissement de cette dernière; or, la chute des états ne suit pas une progression arithmétique comme la chute des corps, elle ne tarde pas à conduire au néant.'¹

In this prophetic passage, Metternich was foreboding the 'revolution of destruction' which had duly overtaken the Western World in a subsequent generation. The suffering and shame which Western Man had brought upon himself by the sin of 'totalitarianism'² had been a painful revelation of the truth that human beings cannot live without worshipping something. When they repudiate the worship of the One True God, they swiftly relapse into a worship of Leviathan.

3. *The Promise of Revealing a Spiritual Meaning in History*

When Man is out of fellowship with God, he not only lapses into a discord which is at variance with his innate sociality; he is also tormented by a tragic crux which is inherent in his being a social creature, and which therefore presents itself the more sharply, the better he succeeds in living up to the moral requirements of his social nature, so long as he is seeking to play his part in a society of which the One True God is not also a member. This crux is that the social action in which a human being fulfils himself immensely exceeds in its range, in both Time and Space, the limits of an individual's life on Earth. *Ars longa, vita brevis*³ is a truth that is true of all the social activities of *Homo Faber*. This discrepancy is manifest in primitive societies, and it makes itself felt overwhelmingly in civilizations. Even in the most narrow-verged society the ablest, most energetic, and most fortunate individual cannot influence, or even survey, the action in which he is concerned beyond the close-drawn limits of a horizon which embraces no more than a fraction of the human actor's minimum field of action. Thus history, seen solely from the standpoint of each individual human participant in it, is 'a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing'.⁴ But this apparently senseless 'sound and fury' acquires spiritual meaning when Man catches in History a glimpse of the operation of a One True God who is both transcendently infinite and intimately loving, and who has the power and the will to take up His human creatures into His own range of action and mode of existence,⁵ in so far as they respond to His challenging call

¹ Metternich, *Le Prince de: Mémoires*, vol. viii (Paris 1884, Plon-Nourrit), pp. 606-7. This passage, which was written in A.D. 1858, was brought to the notice of the writer of this Study by his friend and colleague Sir Charles Webster.

² The twentieth-century Western totalitarian states were 'enormities' in the sense in which the word has been used in IV. iv. 135.

³ *Ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρὴ, ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς, ἡ δὲ πείρα σφαλὲρ, ἡ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπή* (Hippocrates: *Aphorisms*, i. 1).

⁴ Shakespeare: *The Tragedy of Macbeth*, Act III, scene ii, ll. 22-23.

⁵ The sense in which Man can transcend the dimensions of Space and Time by enter-

to act in This World as partners in His divine work. 'God is not the God of the dead . . . but the God of the living . . . for all live unto Him.'¹ 'For He became man in order that we might be made God.'²

'If it is true that the existence of each individual goes on elsewhere in the Unseen World after he has passed from the stage of This World, there is a curious difference in the value which each individual life here has, according as it is considered in the one or the other of its two contexts. Looked at in its earthly context, it is something which is over in a moment, and counts for almost nothing in comparison with the relatively permanent things on this planet.

Time, like an ever-rolling stream,
Bears all its sons away;
They fly forgotten, as a dream
Dies at the opening day.

Even of our own great-grandfathers few of us know more than the names, and perhaps the place where they mostly lived. England, which abides, is important, but the individual Englishmen are creatures of a day, and perish like summer flies. . . .

'But when we look at the individual life in its other context, the relative importance of things is reversed. Human life may continue on this planet for another million years, but, sooner or later, it must come to an end. From this standpoint it is England which is destined to pass away, and it is the individual whose existence continues for ever. The actor who was on the stage for a brief ten minutes was a transitory appearance, looked at in relation to the play, but the life of the actor goes on long after the play is over.'³

Thus, while a civilization may be a provisionally intelligible field of study,⁴ the Commonwealth of God is the only morally tolerable field of action; and membership in this *Civitas Dei* on Earth is offered to human souls by the higher religions; for, though these divers earthly embodiments of the *Civitas Dei* are, each of them, only partial and imperfect, they do all faithfully represent their original in offering Man membership in a society in which he will find himself in fellowship with God seen through a less dark glass than that which the primitive religions interpose. It was noteworthy that the two 'Indistic' higher religions—committed, though they were, to a philosophy which dismissed the phenomenal life of consciousness and action in This World as an illusion and condemned this illusion as an evil—had nevertheless conceded that an ultimately impersonal Reality manifests itself to Man in personal forms with which he can enter into communion, and they had

ing into communion with God is discussed further—with all diffidence in seeking to approach so great a mystery—on pp. 756–8, below.

¹ Matt. xxii. 32; Mark xii. 27; Luke xx. 38.

² Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνὶ θανάτῳ ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν.—Athanasius: *Oratio de Humana Naturā a Verbo Assumptā et de Eius per Corpus ad Nos Adventu*, chap. liv (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. xxv, col. 192), following Irenaeus: *Contra Haereses*, Book III, chap. xix, § 6: *Εἰ μὴ συννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνήθη μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀθάνατος*.

³ Bevan, Edwyn: *Our Debt to the Past* (London 1932, British Broadcasting Corporation), pp. 10–11. Cf. eundem: *The Kingdom of God and History* (London 1938, Allen & Unwin), p. 57; *Christians in a World at War* (London 1940, S.C.M. Press), pp. 95–96.

⁴ See I. i. 17–50, and pp. 1–2, above.

brought these personal gods and bodhisattvas within Man's reach on Earth in recurrent terrestrial epiphanies (*avatars*). It was also noteworthy that Islam, which shared with Christianity the Judaic vision of an Ultimate Reality that is a Personal God, but parted company with Christianity in reaffirming Judaism's uncompromising insistence on God's 'otherness' from Man and on His undifferentiated unity, had been drawn, after all, into an approach towards the Christian view by Man's deep need for God's fellowship. As Saint Athanasius had divined, God had to come down to Man's level in order to raise Man to His; and a religion which, in vindicating God's unity, had denied the divinity of Christ, had been constrained to find an equivalent for Christ's crucifixion in the martyrdoms of 'Alī, Hasan, and Husayn, and even (in an extreme form of the Shī'ah) to transfigure these human heroes into incarnations of the Godhead.¹

Man's fragmentary and ephemeral participation in terrestrial history is indeed redeemed for him when he can play his part on Earth as the voluntary coadjutor of a God whose mastery of the situation gives a divine value and meaning to Man's otherwise paltry endeavours; and this redemption of History is so precious for Man that, in a secularized Modern Western World, a crypto-Christian philosophy of History had been retained by would-be ex-Christian rationalists.

'Because they put faith in the Bible and the Gospel, in the story of creation and in the announcement of the Kingdom of God, Christians were able to venture on a synthesis of the totality of History. All subsequent attempts of the same kind merely replaced the transcendent end that assured the unity of the mediaeval synthesis by various immanent forces that served as substitutes for God; but the enterprise remained substantially the same, and it was the Christians who first of all conceived it: namely, to provide the totality of History with an intelligible explanation, which shall account for the origin of Humanity and assign its end. . . .

"The whole Cartesian system is based on the idea of an omnipotent God who, in a way, creates Himself and therefore, *a fortiori*, creates the eternal truths, including those of mathematics, creates also the Universe *ex nihilo*, and conserves it by an act of continuous creation, without which all things would lapse back into that nothingness whence His will had drawn them. . . . Consider the case of Leibnitz. What would be left of his system if the properly Christian elements were suppressed? Not even the statement of his own basic problem—that, namely, of the radical origin of things and the creation of the Universe by a free and perfect God. . . . It is a curious fact, and well worth noting, that, if our contemporaries no longer appeal to the *City of God* and the Gospel as Leibnitz did not hesitate to do, it is not in the least because they have escaped their influence. Many of them live by what they choose to forget.'²

4. *The Promise of Inspiring an Effective Ideal of Conduct*

A human being who, in this life, breaks the bounds of Time and Space by entering into communion with God is transfigured, if the communion becomes habitual, from a savage into a saint.

¹ See pp. 718-19, 731-2, and 733-4, below.

² Gilson, E.: *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, English translation (London 1936, Sheed & Ward), pp. 390-1 and 14-17.

'Le sauvage qui est en nous et qui fait notre étoffe première doit être discipliné, policé, civilisé, pour donner un homme. Et l'homme doit être patiemment cultivé pour devenir un sage. Et le sage doit être éprouvé pour devenir un juste. Et le juste doit avoir remplacé sa volonté individuelle par la volonté de Dieu pour devenir un saint. Et cet homme nouveau, ce régénéré, c'est l'homme spirituel, c'est l'homme céleste, dont parlent les Védas comme l'Évangile, et les Mages comme les néo-platoniciens.'¹

Such sainthood is indispensable for the maintenance of societies—even those of the pettiest and simplest and lowest kind—because even the minimum of unselfishness and determination and courage and vision that is required for making social life possible on Earth far exceeds the range of the natural altruism of a social animal.

I will not cease from mental fight,
Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand,
Till we have built Jerusalem
In England's green and pleasant land,²

is a resolution that can be taken only by a soul that, through eyes enlightened by communion with God, sees This World consecrated and illumined by God's indwelling presence. And the courage to abide by this resolution, in the face of disappointment and defeat, can be kindled only by a vision of the invincible action of God which reduces to insignificance the fickle fortunes of a desperate human battlefield.

For while the tired waves, vainly breaking
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creaks and inlets making,
Comes, silent, flooding in, the main.

And not by eastern windows only,
When daylight comes, comes in the light;
In front the Sun climbs slow, how slowly!
But westward, look, the land is bright.³

This ideal of conduct is inspired by the saint's communion with God, and there is no effective alternative stimulus. The ideal of the sage breaks down because it tries to make Man become, not a saint inspired by the grace of a God who is Love, but a very god in himself in virtue of his own spiritual prowess; and for Human Nature this, if it were an attainable goal, would prove an intolerable burden. The moral impracticability of the enterprise is betrayed by the spiritual sterility of the aim. The Stoic or Epicurean philosopher seeks to be an isolationist God Incarnate; the Hinayanian arhat schools himself for the self-annihilation of the Buddha, not for the self-sacrifice of Christ. Such attempts at a withdrawal from the suffering and sorrow of This World without a return cannot bring salvation to Man because they are not truly godlike.⁴

This breakdown of a nobly austere Hellenic and Indic ideal of 'en-

¹ Amiel, H. F.: *Fragments d'un Journal Intime*, new edition by Bouvier, B. (Paris 1927, Stock; Geneva 1927, Georg, 2 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 290-1.

² Blake, William: *Jerusalem*.

³ Clough, Arthur Hugh: *Lines Written on the Bridge of Peschiera*.

⁴ See V. vi. 132-48, and pp. 391-2, above.

lightened self-interest' proclaimed the bankruptcy of its basely self-indulgent Modern Western caricature; and the writing on the wall of this Circaean 'City of Swine' was clear to read even before the outbreak of a Second World War.

'In A.D. 1933 the state of the World already afforded a crushing refutation of the creed of Humanism which had inspired the march of Western Civilisation for more than four hundred years and which had received its definitive formulation in nineteenth-century England in the apotheosis of "Enlightened Self-Interest".

"The enthronement of this nakedly pagan goddess is announced—to take one out of many examples at random—in the following sentence of a pamphlet which was published by the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, and which went into its twelfth edition in A.D. 1850:

"It is curious to observe how, through the wise and beneficent arrangement of Providence, men thus do their greatest service to the public when they are thinking of nothing but their own gain."¹

'While formally ascribing to Divine Providence the ultimate credit for this newly discovered beneficence of the Old Adam, the votaries of Enlightened Self-Interest were unavowedly replacing Christianity by a worship of unregenerate Human Nature. And the lie direct, which, in the name of Deism, is given in this passage to the teachings of the New Testament and to the doctrines of the Christian Church, seemed unanswerable in the particular time and place in which the pamphlet was written and disseminated. In mid-nineteenth-century England the uncompromising denunciations of economic acquisitiveness in the New Testament were reverentially but unhesitatingly explained away as Oriental hyperboles, and the ecclesiastical ban upon usury was openly laughed to scorn as a superstition, because the superiority of the children of This World over the children of Light, in practical wisdom, seemed conclusively demonstrated in the eyes of those in authority in that generation. On the other hand in the year 1933, which saw the failure of the World Economic Conference and the World Disarmament Conference, the nineteenth-century proposition seemed as ludicrous a paradox as the Christian view of life, and of human relations, had seemed in the Western World of A.D. 1850. In Victorian England, as in Periclean Athens and in Medicean Florence, Humanism had seemed sufficient unto itself, because Man was then experiencing the momentary sensation of being triumphantly master of his own fate through the power of his own *ἀρετή* or *virtù* or science, without needing the intervention of God either to chasten or to inspire him. By the year 1933 it was once more manifest that, "when they" were "thinking of nothing but their own gain", men were not only quite incapable of serving the public, but were even impotent to manage their own personal affairs to their own personal advantage. So far from being the great constructive driving-force in social life, the myopic pursuit of selfish personal interest was shown to be doomed, *a priori*, to miss its mark. Self-interest had proved, once more, to be a target of human aims on which direct hits could never be registered. This object of human desires could only be attained incidentally by people who stumbled across it on their road towards a transcendental goal of endeavour; and it followed that, if and when self-interest, private or social, was ever successfully

¹ *Easy Lessons on Money Matters for the Use of Young People*, 12th ed. (London 1850, S.P.C.K.), quoted by J. M. Keynes: *Essays in Persuasion* (London 1931, Macmillan), p. 85.

realised in this fortuitous way, it would turn out to be something with no recognisable likeness to the earthly paradise of *Homo Economicus*.

"Thus, as so often before, the so-called paradoxes of Christianity were proved to be truisms, while the children of This World were numbered once again among "the silly people who do not even know their own silly business". They were, in fact, most ludicrously convicted, in this chapter of history, of having sacrificed their own substantial interests to an academic dream. For the histories of the World Disarmament Conference and the World Economic Conference completed the proof that "Enlightened Self-Interest", so far from being an automatic, self-regulating psychological mechanism for making all things work together for Man's good, was nothing more than an intellectual abstraction which had no counterpart at all in the realm of practical life."¹

The association of the words 'enlightened' and 'self-interest' is, indeed, a *contradictio in adjecto* when 'enlightenment' is taken to mean a blindness to everything supernatural and superhuman in Man's vision of the Universe. In such a *Weltanschauung*, in which the Heavenly Light has been 'blacked out', 'enlightenment' does not lead even to the common-sense conclusion that the interest of the individual is inseparable from 'the greatest good of the greatest number'. Within the narrowing moral horizon of a godless universe, in which piety towards the dead has become inept, and providence for the unborn quixotic, a concern for the living generation of his fellow men also ceases to be within the individual's moral capacity. Thus, paradoxically, pure rationalism applied as a rule of conduct leads to the conclusion that the only 'realistic' course is to abandon Society to the irrational play of Chance; and this philosophy of prosaic despair begets a policy of monochronistic hedonism: 'Let us eat and drink; for to-morrow we die.'² *Brevis hic est fructus homullis*.³

Thus a society whose ever more complicated structure depends for its maintenance upon planning on the grand scale may lose the indispensable minimum of moral virtue at the moment when it has attained the requisite degree of intellectual capacity.⁴ It is, no doubt, emotionally abhorrent, as well as intellectually inept, to make irrevocable sacrifices in the hope of unguaranteed rewards; and, since, in terms of worldly results, every human endeavour may be proved by the event to be so much labour lost, Man would paralyse his powers of action altogether if he were ever to succeed in devaluing to zero the moral reward that is intrinsic in doing right, whatever the material consequences. Action is creation; and this godlike activity is possible for God's creatures only in so far as they surrender their wills to their Maker and thereby consecrate their action to the service of an actor whose plan is not subject to the miscarriages that so often overtake the best laid schemes of mice and men. The surrender of Man's will to God was the first and last commandment of a religion whose Founder had chosen this watchword

¹ Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1933 (London 1934, Milford), pp. 4-5.

² 1 Cor. xv. 32. Cp. Luke xii. 19 and Eccles. ii. 24.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, l. 914.

⁴ See IV. iv. 184-5.

to be its name; and *islām* was offered for love's sake in the prayer of Saint Ignatius Loyola:

'Suscipe, Domine, universam meam libertatem; accipe memoriam, intellectum et voluntatem omnem. Quidquid habeo vel possideo, mihi largitus es; id tibi totum restituo, ac tuæ prorsus voluntati trado gubernandum. Amorem tui solum cum gratiâ tuâ mihi dones, et dives sum satis, nec aliud quidquam ultra posco.'¹

The evaporation of this prayer out of a desiccated heart had deprived a Modern Western *Homo Economicus* of the faculty which his Nazi Western adversary had aptly labelled *Aktionsfähigkeit*. The self-same 'enlightened self-interest' that had given him the technical skill to build a liner or a sky-scraper or a wireless station or an atom bomb plant had robbed him of the moral power to act on the unselfseeking motives, and to take the long views, which his marvellous technique required of him in order to allow it to bear fruit. An eighteenth-century English Whig landowner, who had put his treasure into the founding of a family, would plant avenues which even his grandchildren would not live to see with the eye of the flesh in the glory of the timber's full-grown stature. A twentieth-century Ministry of Agriculture planted soft wood to replace the hard wood that it felled; and, in this greediness for quick returns, it was advertising its disbelief in its own immortality, however loudly it might shout *Le Roi est mort! Vive le Roi!* The business men who had taken over from the landowners the management of a British Conservative Party had restricted the horizon of politics to the range of their own myopic commercial vision. *Après moi le déluge*, if business is booming today.

In June 1936, at a moment when the Western World was faced with a choice between checkmating Italy's aggression against Abyssinia and condemning itself to wage a Second World War, a British statesman-manufacturer who gave the *coup de grâce* to collective security betrayed an utter unawareness of the issue that was at stake. In Neville Chamberlain's eyes at that juncture, Great Britain's stand in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations was not a far-sighted attempt to avert a political catastrophe by upholding a moral principle; it was a perverse freak of pedantry which, by making bad blood between Great Britain and Italy, threatened to check the incipient recovery from the great depression that had afflicted the Western World in the opening years of that decade. This transitory return of economic prosperity was, for Chamberlain, the supreme reality that dominated his field of vision. 'The National Government . . . was able to point to a recovery which

¹ In *The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius*, edited by Rickaby, S. J., Joseph (London 1915, Burns & Oates), p. 209, the original Spanish text is given with the following English translation:

'Tomad, Señor, y recibid toda mi libertad, mi memoria, mi entendimiento, y toda mi voluntad, todo mi haber y mi poseer: vos me lo distes; á vos, Señor, io torno, todo es vuestro, disponed á toda vuestra voluntad. Dadme vuestro amor y gracia, que esta mi basta.'

'Take, O Lord, and receive all my liberty, my memory, my understanding, and all my will, all I have and possess: you have given it to me; to you, O Lord, I return it; all is yours; dispose of it entirely according to your will. Give me your love and grace, because that is enough for me.'

exceeded that of any great industrial nation in the World. . . . All around to-day were signs that the national prosperity was still mounting.' This was the leading note of an after-dinner speech, delivered by Chamberlain on the 10th June, 1936, in which he expressed the opinion that the continuance of economic sanctions against Italy on behalf of her victim, Abyssinia, was 'the very mid-summer of madness',¹ and of another address, delivered on the 27th of the same month, in which the same speaker asked whether a political opponent of his would 'suggest . . . that we should expose our people to the risk of those horrors which so shocked us when they were applied to Abyssinia?'²

The Youth, who daily farther from the East
Must travel, still is Nature's priest,
And by the vision splendid
Is on his way attended;
At length the Man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of common day.³

And, 'where there is no vision, the people perish'.⁴ The epigoni of the paladins push their 'realism' to a point at which 'enlightened self-interest' spells an unheroic self-immolation—in the craven spirit of those Egyptian fallāh-conscripts who, with rifles grounded and bayonets unfixed, used to kneel in orderly ranks with their throats meekly uplifted for the Sudanese Mahdist warrior to cut at his ease.

These poor creatures allowed themselves to be massacred for lack of even that modicum of public spirit that was needful for saving their own skins;⁵ their Mahdist adversary conquered in virtue of a visionary willingness to die for his leader and his faith; and, when this Sudanese strong man armed was overcome physically by a stronger than he,⁶ his vision did not fail him. The 2nd September, 1898, which saw the annihilation of the hosts of the Khalifah of the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad at Omdurman, 'was the last day of Mahdism, and the greatest'.⁷ The virtue of the barbarian who dies fighting for his tribe against hopeless odds—undismayed by the calculation that, on an 'enlightened self-interested' reckoning, he is sacrificing his life in vain—was exhibited on that day by the aged standard-bearer who charged a battalion armed with magazine rifles,⁸ and by the three survivors out of thirty thousand dead who stood facing three thousand victors, with their arms round the staff of their flag, till Death claimed them likewise.⁹ The same spirit was shown thirty-seven years later by the Amhāra when, in A.D. 1935, they ran to meet certain defeat and death at the hands of a Western aggressor

¹ See Toynbee, A. J. and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1935* (London 1936, Milford), vol. ii, pp. 462-4. ² See op. cit., p. 446.

³ Wordsworth: *Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood*.

⁴ Prov. xxix. 18.

⁵ By contrast, it was observed that the Spartans usually came off with comparatively light casualties, just because they went into battle with an exceptionally strong determination to lose their lives rather than survive with dishonour (see the passage quoted from Xenophon in III. iii. 63).

⁶ Luke xi. 21-22; cp. Matt. xii. 29; Mark iii. 27.

⁷ Steevens, G. W.: *With Kitchener to Khartum*, 10th ed. (Edinburgh and London 1898, Blackwood), p. 204.

⁸ See *ibid.*

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 282-3.

whose armoury had been reinforced, since the turn of the century, by the invention of aircraft and of poison-gas.

κείνοι μὲν, γυμνοὶ καὶ βάρβαροι ἄνδρες ἔοντες,
 ὄργανα φρικώδους οὐκ ἐφοβοῦντ' Ἄρεως,
 ἀλλ' αὐτοσχεδίη, ἔτ' ἐλεύθεροι, οὐ τι τρέσαντες,
 εἰς Αἶδην καλῶς μαρνάμενοι κάτεβαν.
 ἡμεῖς δ' οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ καρτεροί, οἱ σοφοί; ἡμῖν
 τῶν αὐτῶν ὀδυνῶν γευσάμενοισι θανεῖν
 μοῖρ', ἀλλ' οὐ θάνατον τὸν Ἀρήϊον· οὐποτε τοῖον
 τοῖς ἐπιρκοῦσιν δῶρον ἔδωκε Θεός.¹

In a Modern Western social milieu in which the *reductio ad absurdum* of an 'enlightened self-interest' seemed to be extinguishing the vision without which Society cannot endure, the writer's generation had lived to see the example of a primitive barbaric virtue inspire a demonic Neo-Paganism. Fascism and Nazism had been formidable, in their brief hour, in so far as they had succeeded in winning the allegiance of good characters and in appealing to the better side of bad characters; and the touch of moral attractiveness, which was their strength, was due to their melodramatic repudiation of the *laissez-faire*, the utilitarianism and the *surtout pas de zèle* that had been the pedestrian principles of a commercial-minded age of Western history. This militant totalitarianism,² aping the tribalism of Primitive Man, had, of course, been only a pathological exaggeration of a parochial patriotism, caught by the West from a resurgent Hellenism³ at the dawn of the Modern Age of Western history,⁴ which, since this renaissance, had gradually come to be perhaps four-fifths of the effective religion of five-sixths of the people of the

¹ These Greek verses were first published in *The Times*, under a letter from the writer of this Study, on the 22nd April, 1936. The following translation, by G. M. Gatherer Hardy, appeared in *The Times*, under a letter from him, on the 25th of the same month:

Without our arms or art, these men could dare
 War's utmost frightfulness, since men they were,
 And, in close fight, to death untrembling passed,
 Still freemen, battling nobly to the last.
 But we, whose science makes us strong and great,
 Are doomed to share the tortures of their fate,
 Yet not their soldier's grave; the gods in scorn
 Withhold that privilege from men forsworn.

² See pp. 439-40, above.

³ See X. ix. 7-8.

⁴ This reversion, in a Modern Western World, to the principal cult of Hellenic paganism had generally carried with it, as its corollary, an avowed or tacit repudiation of Christianity. At certain times and places, however, this Western Neo-Paganism had had the hardihood to try to turn Christianity to its own account by treating it as if it were an ancestral pagan religion which it was convenient to preserve as an integral part of the social heritage of the secular community—as, in the Athenian city-state, the worship of Demeter and Dionysus and All Souls had been associated with the corporate self-worship of Athena Poliûchus as part-and-parcel of a totalitarian communal life in which there was no distinction between Church and State. This had perhaps been the prevalent attitude towards Christianity in Modern Italy during the century immediately preceding the Counter-Reformation; and, in the same spirit, the Modern French bourgeoisie had shown signs, in the nineteenth century, of reverting to a worldly-wise Catholicism from an 'enlightened' anti-clerical agnosticism. This latter-day movement in France was sketched in A.D. 1929 in the following terms, in a private letter to the writer of this Study, by an eminent French student of French life and politics:

'In my opinion, the renaissance of French Catholicism is closely bound up with the evolution of the French bourgeoisie itself. In 1848 the bourgeois took fright at the Revolution. Until then they had been, at bottom, Voltairians (though this did not

Western World.¹ The hold gained by this Neo-Hellenic corporate self-worship on a majority of ex-Christian hearts was due to its power of inspiring its votaries to give their lives on its behalf. Under the ashen deposit of 'enlightened self-interest' this fire lay hidden, yet unextinguished, in the hearts of Neville Chamberlain's countrymen; and Winston Churchill was able to blow it into sudden flame when the Fascist Powers scattered the ashes, to their own undoing, by assault and battery. When, in the summer of A.D. 1940, a Modern Western 'nation of shopkeepers' woke up to find itself with its back to the wall, it upset all Hitler's calculations, and thereby doomed him to ultimate defeat, by emulating the antique virtue of the Sudanese at Omdurman and the Abyssinians at Lake Ashangi.²

This unconsciously far-sighted folly that could move men to die for their country showed that the Modern Western cult of patriotism—whether in the Apollinean democratic or in the Dionysiac totalitarian vein—was in truth a religious revival in the spiritual vacuum left in human hearts by the evaporation of a higher religion. But the tragedy

prevent them from holding that "religion is wanted for the people"). Towards 1848 they began to say to themselves: "The *curé* is the best support of the *gendarme*." Thus they tended to become Catholics out of social apprehension; but these were Catholics without conviction. Their children, brought up in the Church, accepted the Catholic religion in another spirit towards the end of the century. The younger generation was suffering from the excessive individualism of the age; it sought in the Church a moral armour against anarchy. This Catholicism was of a higher kind, but it was not yet really religious; it was a political Catholicism to a large extent. On the eve of the War (that is, since about 1907) a new phase set in. The younger people, tired of pure intellectualism, found vent in action, in sport. They felt the approach of the War and prepared themselves for meeting it. Their Catholicism took the form of an affirmation of faith, of action, of devotion to their country.'

This movement was carried to extremes by the moving spirit of *L'Action Française*, Charles Maurras, who 'explicitly commended the Catholic Church on the ground that it had de-Christianized Christianity and had thus laid the foundations for a Neo-Paganism devoted to the cult of the sovereign national state'. This audacious attempt 'to press a church which was supra-national in the essence of its being into the service of a militant nationalism which claimed an ultimate and absolute value for itself' drew down upon Maurras' head, in January 1914, a condemnation of his journal, together with several books from his pen, by the Second Congregation of the Index at the Vatican; but, in confirming this decree, Pope Pius X forbore to make it public, in deference to representations from eminent French Catholics who had 'welcomed Monsieur Maurras' left-handed benediction of their faith on the calculation that the force of his personality and the charm of his literary style would propagate the faith in certain quarters in France, particularly among the younger generation, where it had little prospect of regaining a footing under any other auspices'. After a delay that was partly due to the dossier's having been temporarily mislaid in the Vatican archives, the decree of January 1914 was confirmed by Pope Pius XI on the 29th December, 1926, and was published early in 1927. (See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1929 (London 1930, Milford), pp. 480-1, 483-4, 487-8).

This exploitation of a Catholic Christianity for pagan political purposes was, of course, only one of a number of diverse movements in the life of a nineteenth-century French Catholicism which was at the same time giving birth to great philosophers, great missionaries, and great saints (see IV. iv. 582).

¹ See p. 478, above.

² Churchill's decision in August 1940 to send powerful reinforcements from the British Isles to the British armies in the Middle East at a moment when the Battle of Britain was at its height in the air, when the victorious German armies were massed along the continental shores of the Channel, and when Great Britain was hourly expecting to be invaded on the ground by an enemy against whom she was momentarily defenceless, was an act of imaginative courage that is worthy to rank with the three great Roman deeds that have been compared with one another in this Study in a passage (III. iii. 269) written about six years before the outbreak of the General War of A.D. 1939-45.

of this Neo-Paganism was that its blinkered idealism only availed to replace its self-sacrificing votary's foot on the lowest rung of a ladder which had been scaled, to the summit, by the martyr, the bodhisattva, and the saint whose lead the neo-pagan's forefathers had once followed. A reinstituted worship of Leviathan is not the happy substitute that Frazer holds it to be¹ for the neglected worship of a One True God.

The only heart in which self-interest is truly 'enlightened', and therefore practically effective as a motive for action, is the heart of the saint who identifies his self-interest with the service of God and who therefore sees the field of action from God's angle of vision. He surveys the field from a height at which the authentic lineaments of the everlasting hills are not obscured by the mirage of uncertainty which pervades the landscape when it is regarded from the pedestrian human level. The saint is not paralysed by a horror of seeking unguaranteed rewards at the cost of irrevocable sacrifices, because he is convinced that the standpoint from which human action appears to be the unprofitable pursuit of a will-o'-the-wisp is one that gives a falsifyingly fragmentary vision of Reality. Such godlike enlightenment inspired the confidence and fortitude that Jesus and Socrates and More displayed when they forbore to embrace opportunities held out to them for saving their lives at the price of compromising the truth which it was their mission to proclaim.

'After this, as the duke of Norfolk and Sir Thomas More chanced to fall in familiar talk together, the duke said unto him: "By the mass, Master More, it is perilous striving with princes. And therefore I would wish you somewhat to incline to the King's pleasure; for by God's body, Master More, *Indignatio principis mors est.*"

"Is that all, my Lord?" quoth he. "Then in good faith is there no more difference between your Grace and me, but that I shall die today and you tomorrow." "²

'When Sir Thomas More had continued a good while in the Tower, my Lady, his wife, obtained license to see him; who, at her first coming, like a simple ignorant woman, and somewhat worldly too, with this manner of salutation bluntly saluted him:

"What the good year, Master More", quoth she, "I marvel that you, that have been always hitherto taken for so wise a man, will now so play the fool to lie here in this close filthy prison, and be content thus to be shut up amongst mice and rats, when you might be abroad at your liberty, and with the favour and goodwill both of the King and his Council, if you would but do as all the bishops and best learned of this realm have done. And, seeing you have at Chelsea a right fair house, your library, your books, your gallery, your garden, your orchard, and all other necessities so handsome about you, where you might in the company of me your wife, your children, and household, be merry, I muse what a God's name you mean here still thus fondly to tarry."

'After he had a while quietly heard her, with a cheerful countenance he said unto her: "I pray thee, good Mistress Alice, tell me one thing."

¹ See the passage quoted on pp. 383-4, above.

² Roper, William: *The Life of Sir Thomas More*, edited by E. V. Hitchcock (Early English Text Society, original series No. 197, London 1935, Oxford University Press), pp. 71-72, as quoted with modernized spelling in R. W. Chambers, *Thomas More* (London 1935, Cape), p. 300.

'“What is that?” quoth she.

'“Is not this house”, quoth he, “as nigh heaven as mine own?”

'To whom she, after her accustomed homely fashion, not liking such talk, answered, “Tilly vally, Tilly vally”.

'“How say you, Mistress Alice”, quoth he, “is it not so?”

'“Bone deus, Bone deus, man, will this gear never be left?” quoth she. . . . So her persuasions moved him but a little.¹

'The time has come', in the words ascribed to Socrates at the close of an address to his judges which was nominally a defence but was actually a refusal of a possible avoidance of the death-penalty, 'the time has come for us to go—I, Socrates, to my death, and you to carry on with your lives. Which of these two destinations is the better? That is a riddle which can be read by God alone.'²

τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ καθανεῖν
τὸ καθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;³

No human being in this life can answer this question in terms that will guarantee to him, as his dividend, the maximum of worldly advantage; but a Socrates can answer it, in terms that will ensure his own condemnation to death, in the strength of his communion with a God from whose love 'nor height nor depth nor any other creature shall be able to separate us'.⁴

In the light of the truth that a goal can often best be reached by aiming, not at it, but at some more ambitious goal beyond it,⁵ we can now see the explanation of the paradox that, by striving single-mindedly to act as good citizens of the *Civitas Dei*, the saints succeed incidentally in saving the situation for social life in This World within the vastly larger framework of their own spiritual field of activity.⁶ Even a mundane law and order can be effectively established on Earth only on the model of a building that 'we have from God—a house not made with hands, eternal in the Heavens'.⁷

5. *The Promise of Exorcizing the Perilousness of Mimesis*

The Achilles' heel in the social anatomy of a civilization is, as we have seen,⁸ its dependence on mimesis as a 'social drill' for ensuring that the rank-and-file of Mankind shall follow their leaders. In the change over from a Yin-state into a Yang-activity which takes place at the genesis of a civilization through a mutation in the character of a primitive society, the rank-and-file transfer their mimesis from the ancestors⁹ to creative human personalities of the living generation;¹⁰ but the avenue

¹ Roper, ed. Hitchcock, pp. 82–84, as quoted with modernized spelling in Chambers, pp. 25–26.

² Plato: *Apology*, 42A.

³ Euripides: *Polyeides*, fragment 2.

⁴ Rom. viii. 39.

⁵ See pp. 388 and 510, above.

⁶ On this point see III. iii. 267–9. The spiritual peril to which a terrestrial embodiment of the *Civitas Dei* exposes itself by such incidental mundane achievements is examined on pp. 545–8, below.

⁷ 2 Cor. v. 1.

⁸ In III. iii. 245–8 and IV. iv. 119–33.

⁹ 'The mass of Mankind plods on, with eyes fixed on the footsteps of the generations that went before, too indifferent or too fearful to raise their glances to judge for themselves whether the path on which they are travelling is the best, or to learn the conditions by which they are surrounded and affected' (Galton, Francis: *Hereditary Genius* (London 1869, Macmillan), p. 197).

¹⁰ See II. i. 192.

thereby opened for a social advance may end in a *ianua leti*,¹ since no human being can be creative except within limits, and even then no more than precariously, and, when an inevitable failure has bred an equally inevitable disillusionment, the discredited leader is apt to resort to force in order to retain an authority that is morally forfeit. In the *Civitas Dei* this peril is exorcized by a fresh transfer of mimesis—this time from the limitedly and precariously creative human personalities who are the ephemeral leaders of mundane civilizations to a God who is the source of all human creativity and whose own divine creativity is infinite.

This mimesis of God can never expose human souls that devote themselves to it to those disappointments and disillusionments that are apt to attend the mimesis of even the most godlike human beings, and that produce, when they do arise, that moral alienation of a restive proletariat from a now merely dominant minority which is one of the symptoms of social decline and fall. The communion between the Soul and the One True God cannot thus degenerate into the bondage of a slave to a despot, for in each of the higher religions, in diverse measure, the vision of God as Power is transfigured by a vision of Him as Love; and the presentation of this Loving God as a Dying God Incarnate is a theodicy which makes the imitation of Christ immune against the tragedy inherent in any mimesis that is directed towards unregenerate human personalities.

In the story of Christ's temptation in the wilderness at the beginning of His Ministry,² and of His Passion at the close of it,³ He is presented in the Gospels as refusing, at the price of the Cross, to exercise a spiritually sterile option of imposing His divine will by an act of power. Let a renegade Dionysus indulge an ungodlike lust for human glory by conquering all the Kingdoms of the World,⁴ and an unedifying animus against his pitifully unsuspecting human persecutor by dealing him, out of the blue, a blasting blow. A divinity who subjugates India and takes his revenge on Pentheus⁵ demonstrates his power of taming men's bodies at the cost of alienating their feelings, while a God who suffers death on the Cross draws all men unto Him.⁶

"The story of the Temptations is, of course, a parable of His spiritual wrestlings. . . . It represents the rejection, under three typical forms, of all existing conceptions of the Messianic task which was to inaugurate the Kingdom of God. Should He use the power with which, as Messiah, He is endowed to satisfy the creature wants of Himself and His human brethren, so fulfilling the hope of a "good time coming" which prophets had presented in the picture of the Messianic Banquet—(cf. e.g. *Isaiah* xxv, 6)? Should He be a Caesar-Christ, winning the kingdoms of the World and the glory of them by establishing an earthly monarchy and ruling from the throne of David in perfect righteousness—(cf. e.g. *Isaiah* ix, 6, 7)? Should He provide irresistible evidence of His divine mission, appearing in the Temple courts upborne by angels, so that doubt would

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book I, l. 1112; Book V, l. 373.

² Matt. iv. 1-11; Mark i. 12-13; Luke iv. 1-13.

³ Matt. xxvii. 53; John xviii. 36; xix. 11.

⁵ See V. vi. 265-6.

⁴ Matt. iv. 8; Luke iv. 5.

⁶ John xii. 32.

be impossible—(cf. e.g. *Daniel* vii, 13, 14 and *Enoch*)? Every one of these conceptions contained truth. When men are obedient to the Kingdom of God and His justice, everyone will have what he needs for food and clothing (*St. Matthew* vi, 33). The Kingdom of God is the realm of perfect justice where God's righteous will is done (*St. Matthew* vi, 10). The authority of Christ is absolute and can claim the support of the hosts of Heaven (*St. Matthew* xxviii, 18; xxvi, 53). Yet, if any or all of these are taken as fully representative of the Kingdom and its inauguration, they have one fatal defect. They all represent ways of securing the outward obedience of men apart from inward loyalty; they are ways of controlling conduct, but not ways of controlling hearts and wills . . . and the Kingdom of God, who is Love, cannot be established in that way.¹

In the imitation of Christ, this God who is Love draws the Soul towards Himself by evoking a love that is a response in kind to His; and because, in this communion of loves, there is no alloy of coercion, a travail in the Soul which begins as an exercise of mimesis bears fruit in a reception of grace, through which the Soul is enabled to partake of the inward spiritual qualities whose outward visible manifestations it has taken as its rule of life. Instead of ending in frustration, disillusionment, and strife, 'imitation' (μίμησις) here flowers into an 'assimilation' (ὁμοίωσις) of Man's nature to God's.² The 'light caught from a leaping flame', which was imparted to Plato's disciples 'by strenuous intellectual communion and intimate personal intercourse' with the Master,³ now reappears as the gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost;⁴ but, instead of being an esoteric initiation within the sanctum of an Academy which none but a properly qualified mathematician may enter,⁵ the pentecostal fire is a grace that God can give to any human soul that truly seeks it.⁶

¹ Temple, William: *Readings in St. John's Gospel*: First Series, Chapters i-xii (London 1939, Macmillan), pp. xxvi-xxvii.

² See Plato, *Theaetetus*, 176A-E, quoted in V. vi. 165, n. 6, and Athanasius, *De Incarnatione*, chap. liv, § 3, quoted on p. 513, n. 2, above.

³ Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341B-E, quoted in III. iii. 245.

⁴ Acts ii. 1-4.

⁵ *Μηδεις ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω* is said to have been inscribed over the entrance to Plato's institute of philosophy at Athens (Tzetzes: *Chiliades*, Book VIII, l. 973).

⁶ See V. vi. 165-6.

B. THE ROLE OF CIVILIZATIONS IN THE LIVES OF CHURCHES

(I) CIVILIZATIONS AS OVERTURES

IF the foregoing inquiry has convinced us that the churches embodying the higher religions are diverse approximate projections on Earth of one and the same *Civitas Dei*, and that the species of society of which this Commonwealth of God is the sole and unique representative is of a spiritually higher order than the species represented by the civilizations, we shall be encouraged to go farther in our experiment¹ of inverting the assumption, on which we have tacitly proceeded in previous Parts of this Study, that, in the relation between churches and civilizations, the civilizations' role is dominant and the churches' role subordinate. Instead of dealing with churches in terms of civilizations, as hitherto, we shall boldly make the new departure of dealing with civilizations in terms of churches. If we are looking for a social cancer, we shall find it, not in a church which supplants a civilization, but in a civilization which supplants a church; and, if we have thought of a church as being a chrysalis through which one civilization reproduces itself in another, we shall now have to think, inversely, of the 'apparented' civilization in this genealogical series as being an overture to the epiphany of a church, and of the 'affiliated' civilization as being a regression from this higher level of spiritual attainment.

This finding answers a question which, in an earlier context,² we have been led to raise through noticing an apparent inconsistency in Plato's reading of one of the riddles of human destiny. Which, we have asked ourselves, are the true catastrophes: the breakdowns of civilizations or their births? Our answer now will be that the birth of a civilization is a catastrophe if it is a regression from a previously established church,³ while the breakdown of a civilization is not a catastrophe if it is the overture to a church's birth.

The second of these two interdependent conclusions is, as will be seen, an application to the life of a civilization as a whole, in all chapters of its history and on all planes of its activity, of a truth that has already impressed itself on us in our study⁴ of the political institution in which a disintegrating civilization is apt to embody itself in the penultimate rally before its final dissolution. We have seen that universal states succeed in being creative in so far as they serve beneficiaries other than themselves, and that the beneficiaries of universal states who have made the most fruitful use of their secular benefactors' services have been the churches. We can now see that, in discharging this creative mission of helping churches to come to birth, universal states are acting not simply on their own account but as representatives and agents of the

¹ See p. 420, above.

² In IV. iv. 585-8.

³ On this point see the passage quoted from Metternich's memoirs on p. 512, above.

⁴ In VI, *passim*, but especially in Parts A and B, on pp. 1-52, above.

civilizations embodied in them; and, while their official mandate—which is to avert, and not merely to postpone, the dissolution of a disintegrating society—may be an inherently impracticable task, they may find compensation for a perhaps inevitable failure here in the magnificent success of enabling a dying civilization to complete the fulfilment of its historical *raison d'être*.

If we take, as a test case for the verification of this thesis, the genesis of the Christian Church, and cite the tenuous yet significant evidence afforded by the transference of words from a secular to a religious meaning and usage, we shall find this philological testimony supporting the view that Christianity is a religious theme with a secular overture, and that this overture consisted, not merely in the Roman political achievement of an Hellenic universal state, but in Hellenism itself, in all its phases and aspects.

The Christian Church is indebted for its very name to the technical term employed, in the city-state of Athens, to denote the general assembly of the citizen-body when it was meeting to transact political, as distinct from judicial, business; but, in thus borrowing the word *ecclesia* (ἐκκλησία), the Church gave it a dual meaning which was no part of the original Attic usage but was the reflection of a new political order, in which Athens and all other surviving city-states of a disintegrating Hellenic World had been incorporated into the Roman Empire without losing their identities as units of local government and life on the municipal level. In Christian usage, *ecclesia* came to mean both a local Christian community¹ and the church universal.

When the Christian Church, local and universal, came to be articulated into the two ecclesiastical classes of 'laity' and 'clergy', and when the 'clergy', in turn, came to be graded into a hierarchy of 'orders' in an ascending scale of dignity and authority, culminating in the 'order' of 'bishops', the requisite terms of ecclesiastical administrative art were likewise borrowed from an existing secular Greek and Latin vocabulary.

The 'laity' of the Christian Church was suggestively designated by an archaic Greek word (λαός) which denoted the people as distinct from those in authority over them, with a connotation of amenability to the word of command. In the vocabulary of the Homeric Epic the word had been used of the naïvely loyal *comitatus* of a barbarian war-lord; in a post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history it had been revived to serve as a technical term for the naïvely submissive labour force on one of the large-scale agricultural estates which the Hellenic conquerors of the Achaemenian Empire had taken over from a dispossessed Persian landed aristocracy.² The ambivalency in the *nuance*, half-heroic and half-servile, which the word had thus come to acquire by the date of the beginning of the Christian Era, aptly fitted the 'laity' of a church which, on its own spiritual plane, was both militant and authoritarian.

By contrast, the 'clergy' took its name from a Greek word (κλήρος)

¹ When the 'outdoor' Hellenic Civilization gave place to the 'indoor' Orthodox and Western Christian civilizations, the word *ecclesia*, in its local meaning, came to be applied, not only to the local Christian community, but to the parochial building in which it assembled for congregational worship.

² For this Persian landed aristocracy, see pp. 123-4, above.

whose general meaning of 'lot' had been specialized in a juridical sense to mean an allotted share of an inherited estate, and in a political sense to mean an allotted share of a conquered territory. This political usage, which had been borrowed from Spartan conquerors in the Peloponnese¹ by Athenian conquerors in the Archipelago and Macedonian conquerors in Egypt and South-Western Asia, had given the word a rather unfortunate connotation by the time when the Christian Church began to work out its ecclesiastical organization. The Church adopted the word, nevertheless, to mean the portion of the Christian community that God had allotted to Himself to serve Him as His professional priesthood.²

As for the 'orders' (*ordines*) of clergy in the Christian ecclesiastical hierarchy, they took their name from the politically privileged classes in the Roman body politic, which were known as *ordines* both collectively and severally (*ordo senatorius*, *ordo equestris*), to distinguish them from the common run of Roman citizens.

The members of the highest order in the Christian hierarchy came to be known as 'overseers' (*ἐπισκόποι*), and the initial preposition, as well as the literal meaning, of this compound Greek word are likewise to be found in the title (*ἐφόροι*) which had been given in the Spartan body politic to the members of a board of supreme executive officers who were appointed by election but were constitutional despots during their term of office.³

The Christian Church's sacred book—taken over from the Jews and eventually augmented by the addition of an exclusively Christian 'New Testament' to supplement and retrospectively reinterpret 'the Old Testament' of Jewish origin—was presented by the Church as its credentials in the belief that this was the authentic Word of God Himself. In so far as the Bible was not referred to as 'the Books' (*τὰ βιβλία*) *par excellence*, it was designated by a term long since current in the vocabulary of the Roman inland revenue. In the fiscal terminology of a post-Hannibalic Roman Commonwealth the word *scriptura* signified the tax payable for the right to graze cattle on the public lands in the devastated areas in the South of Italy, because an entry in the official register, certifying that a would-be grazier had duly paid his tax, was the warrant that authorized him to make use of the public pasturelands. The Greek equivalent of the Latin *scriptura* was *γραφή*, and in a latter-day Kingdom of Greece at the time of writing there was a district in the Southern Pindus, between the plains of Thessaly and the west coast, which was still known as the Agrapha because the agents of an Ottoman inland revenue—and an East Roman inland revenue in an earlier age—

¹ See III. iii. 53, 57, and 68.

² "The following seems to be the sequence of meanings by which the word *κληρος* arrived at this peculiar sense: (i) the lot by which the office was assigned [as in Acts i. 26]; (ii) the office thus assigned by lot [as in Acts i. 17]; (iii) the body of persons holding the office' (Lightfoot, Bishop J. B., in his edition of Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, 7th ed. (London 1882, Macmillan), p. 247). This usage cannot be traced back to the Old Testament; for, though, according to Num. xviii. 20, God is the *κληρονομία* of Aaron, and, according to Deut. xviii. 2, He is the *κληρος* of the Levites, 'the Jewish priesthood is never described conversely as the special "clerus" of Jehovah, while on the other hand the metaphor thus inverted is more than once applied to the whole Israelite people' (Lightfoot, *op. cit.*, p. 246).

³ See III. iii. 56.

had never succeeded even in inscribing in their registers, not to speak of actually collecting, the taxes due from the wild highlanders in this mountain fastness. As for the two 'testaments' of which the Christian scriptures consisted, they were called *διαθήκαι* in Greek and *testamenta* in Latin because they were thought of as being the equivalents of legal instruments in which God had declared to Mankind, in two instalments, His 'will and testament' for the ordering of Human Life on Earth.

The 'training' (*ἀσκησις*) to which a spiritually ambitious *élite* in the Early Christian Church subjected itself took its name from the physical training of athletes for the Olympian and other international athletic contests that were one of the characteristic expressions of the Hellenic culture; and, when, in the fourth century, training to be an anchorite (*ἀναχωρητής*) took the place of training to be a martyr in the psychological warfare of a Christian Church which had now made its peace with the Roman Imperial Government, the action of this new-model Christian athlete, whose ordeal was to endure the solitude of the desert instead of facing the publicity of the criminal court, came to be designated by a Greek term taken from the technical administrative vocabulary of the country that bred the pioneer Christian hermits. In Augustan Egypt 'anachôrêsis' (*ἀναχώρησις*) had meant withdrawal from productive economic activities in protest against the exactions of the taxation-authorities;¹ in Diocletianic Egypt the same word came to mean withdrawal from the World in protest against mundane human wickedness.²

When these solitaries (*μοναχοί*) had the courage to act on the lessons of their spiritual experience, in common-sense defiance of the literal meaning of their name, by subjecting themselves to the spiritual discipline of leading a common life together without surrendering the spiritual freedom won by withdrawal from the rest of the World, this creative contradiction in terms—a society of solitaries—took its Latin name from a word which, in its previous secular use, had combined the two meanings of a quarter sessions and a chamber of commerce.³

When the originally informal proceedings at the periodic meetings of each of the local Christian communities crystallized into a hard-and-fast ritual, this religious 'public service' (*λειτουργία*) took its name from the nominally voluntary *corvées* which, in a democratic Athenian Commonwealth in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., had been euphemistically

¹ 'So early as A.D. 20 we hear of the flight (*anachôrêsis*) of tax-payers' (Bell, H. I.: *Egypt from Alexander the Great to the Arab Conquest* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), p. 77).

² We have observed in an earlier context (on pp. 388-91, above) that this withdrawal of the anchorites was not anti-social either in intention or in effect. The anchorites influenced, aided, and, in great emergencies, sometimes actually governed a tottering Hellenic World with a moral authority which they would never have commanded if they had not proved the sincerity of their disinterestedness by insulating themselves physically from their fellow men.

³ The provinces into which the Roman Commonwealth had organized its subject territories had been mapped out into districts corresponding to the principal cities which each province contained; and it had been customary for the provincial governor to go on circuit round these 'county towns', to transact judicial and other public business. During his stay in each 'county town' he expected the leading Roman citizens, resident in that district, to hold a rendezvous with him there to serve as his assessors in court and to assist and advise him in other ways. This rendezvous was known as a *conventus*, and the name came thence to be applied both to the standing organization of Roman residents in each district and to the geographical area itself.

known by that name in order to glose over the truth that they were virtual surtaxes under the guise of 'benevolences'.

In the Christian liturgy the crucial rite was a Holy Communion in which the worshippers achieved a living experience of their fellowship in and with Christ by partaking together of the 'sacrament' (*sacramentum*) of eating bread and drinking wine. This Christian 'sacrament' took its name from a pagan Roman rite in which a new recruit was 'sworn in' to the fellowship of the Roman Army.¹ The Holy Communion which this common participation in the Christian sacrament consummated took its name from a word which, in the previous mundane usage of both its Greek original (*κοινωνία*) and its Latin translation (*communio*), had signified 'participation' of any kind, but, first and foremost, participation in the membership of a political community, for which the current term was coined, in both languages, out of the same verbal metal (in Greek *κοινόν*; in Latin *commune*).

One of the features of the Christian liturgy was a recurrence of its ritual in both annual and weekly cycles. The Christian liturgical week was modelled on a Jewish prototype; and, though the Christian copy had been differentiated from the Jewish original by making the first day of the week the holy day instead of the seventh, the Christian adaptation still followed the pristine Jewish dispensation in retaining the Jewish name for the eve of the Sabbath. In the Greek Christian vocabulary, Friday continued to be called 'the preparation' (*παρασκευή*)—in accordance with a Jewish usage in which this elliptical term explained itself. In the psychological atmosphere of a post-Exilic Judaism, in which a stateless diasporà maintained its *esprit de corps* by a common devotion to the keeping of the Mosaic Law, 'the preparation' *sans phrase* could mean nothing but 'the preparation for the Sabbath'. By analogy it is evident that the inevitable connotation of the word would be, not a liturgical, but a political one in the psychological atmosphere of a pre-Alexandrine Athenian sovereign city-state whose citizens worshipped their own then still potent corporate political power under the name of Athena Poliúchus. In the usage of Thucydides, writing for an Athenian public for whom politics were the breath of life, and whose political-mindedness was being accentuated in the historian's generation by the military ordeal of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War, the word *παρασκευή* could be used as elliptically as it was afterwards to be used in the Septuagint to convey, just as unmistakably, an entirely different meaning. Thucydides uses the word to signify what a generation of Englishmen, overtaken unawares by a world war in the year A.D. 1914, learnt ruefully to take to heart as 'preparedness' when they found themselves within an ace of defeat owing to their pre-war neglect to emulate the Germans in building up a stock of armaments to stand them in good stead in a fight for their national existence.

The customary preparation for the congregational performance of the Christian liturgy was, in a Western Christian town or village, the ringing

¹ In the Latin-speaking Church the word *sacramentum* was used from the beginning in the two meanings of sacrament and military oath, according to Harnack, A.: *Militia Christi* (Tübingen 1905, Mohr), pp. 33-34.

of a bell; and in a pagan Hellenic walled city this had likewise been a familiar sound with a well-established mental association. Yet a citizen of an Hellenic city-state—if his ghost could walk in some latter-day Western town on a Sunday morning—would never suspect that the sound that was filling the air was a summons to religious worship; for, to his mind, the ringing of a bell would conjure up the utterly different mental vision of a military patrol going its rounds along the city wall to inspect the sentries.

The change of usage from a secular to a religious meaning can be illustrated by other instances. The 'transgression' (*παράβασις*) which had been a term of art in the Attic 'Old Comedy', in the physical meaning of a parade of the chorus from one side of the theatre to the other, had come to mean, in Christian language, a figurative 'side-step' in the spiritual sense of a sin. Edification (*aedificatio*) had similarly come to mean the figurative 'building up' of virtue in the Soul in place of its original meaning of the construction of a material edifice in brick or stone. The Greek word *πνεῦμα*, with its Latin equivalent *spiritus*, had come to mean 'spirit' instead of 'breath', and the Greek word *σωτήρ* to mean a saviour, not of Society, but of the Soul.¹

The evocation of an inspiringly spiritual meaning out of a crassly material one is an example of a process which, in an earlier context,² we have learnt to know as 'etherialization'³ and to recognize as a symptom of growth. Our foregoing survey of the etherialization of the Greek and Latin vocabulary, in the course of its transference from pagan to Christian use,⁴ has been brief, casual, and nothing like exhaustive; yet,

¹ See V. vi. 175-278.

² In III. iii. 174-92.

³ A comic instance of etherialization-under-misapprehension was recounted to the writer of this Study in A.D. 1928 when he was on a visit to the city of Kovno, which was at that time the *de facto* capital of a sovereign independent Republic of Lithuania. Standing on the bank of the Niemen and gazing across the river's broad expanse, he noticed, on the farther shore, a three-story brick building, with a tower at one end, which looked as if it were new and which made a prominent mark in the landscape. 'Oh, that,' said his cicerone, 'is our brand-new national grain elevator. We are proud of its efficiency; but the peasants who come into the city to market from this side of the river venerate it for a droll reason which I will explain. As these peasants never have any occasion to cross the river, they have never seen that building from nearer than this, and from this distance it looks to them like a church, though as a matter of fact it has been built on the most up-to-date American pattern for a grain elevator, and, if its architecture does have an ecclesiastical air, the effect is quite undesigned. The peasants, though, would never think of that. In fact, it would never occur to them that such a large, handsome, and expensive building as this could be put up for any purpose except the glory of God; so, for the peasants, that imposing pile is now "the church of Saint Levatorius". How did they coin the name, you ask me? Well, you see, that name was pretty well inevitable. When the peasants asked what the building was, they were told, of course, "elevator"; and of course they took it for granted that this was the name of the supposed church's patron saint. So they added a Homeric termination (you realize, I hope, that Lithuanian is the best preserved of all the living Indo-European languages) and dropped the initial "e". That makes "Levatorius". And could any saint have a more convincingly appropriate name? Isn't it a saint's first business to give his protégés' souls a helping hand upwards on their way to Heaven—to serve, in fact, as a spiritual "elevator", if it isn't unpardonable blasphemy to describe traditional Christian aspirations in the telling terms of modern economic apparatus?'

⁴ The evidence of language, which testifies to the part played by Christianity in the etherialization of the Hellenic culture, also reveals that, in this work of semantic metabolism, Christianity had been anticipated by Greek philosophy. For example, the 'self-sufficiency' (*αὐτάρκεια*) which, in a pre-Alexandrine Age, had been the economic objective of sovereign city-states, whose governments approached economics from the standpoint of politics and war, thereafter became the moral ideal of a sovereign Stoic

even so, the handful of Greek and Latin words whose history we have been following range so wide and cut so deep in their interpretation of life as to indicate that Hellenism was an authentic *praeparatio evangelii*, and that, in looking for the *raison d'être* of Hellenism in its service as an overture to Christianity, we have at any rate set our feet on a promising line of inquiry. In this perspective it looks as if a civilization that brings a church to birth and perishes in the creative act does not stultify itself by perishing, but, on the contrary, justifies its existence by carrying out its historical mission at the cost of its own life. The egg-shell has to be broken for the chicken to be hatched, and the mould has to be broken in order to disengage the metal casting; but this sacrifice of the means for the accomplishment of the end is not the brand of failure; it is the seal of success. The egg-shell that remains unbroken is the shell of an addled egg which has miscarried in its purpose of bringing a new creature to life; the casting-mould that remains unbroken is the mould that has been scrapped either because its own pattern has proved faulty or because the injected molten metal has proved base. On the same showing, when the life of a civilization has served as the overture, not to the miscarriage of an abortive church,¹ but to the birth of a living church that has 'shot up and thriven'² and 'grown in wisdom and stature',³ the death of the precursor civilization is not a disaster but a triumph. What looks, on first view, like wasteful incompetence or

sage who towered, politically naked and therefore spiritually free, above the ruins of a city-state sovereignty that had collapsed under the blows of Macedonian war-lords (for this moral autarky of the post-Alexandrine school of Greek philosophy, see V. vi. 132-48 and 149-54). We may also remind ourselves that the word 'organ' (*ὄργανον*) had been adapted by Aristotle to mean a mental instead of a physical tool before, in Christian usage, it relapsed into meaning a physical instrument with the special function of making music in church.

¹ The number of abortive churches has, as we have seen, been large by comparison with the number of those that have been born alive and have grown unwarped. The rudimentary churches created by the internal proletariats of the civilizations of the first generation all failed to come to flower (see opposite Table IV, p. 772, below); and, among the four churches that were alive at the time of writing, those two—namely the Christian Church and the Mahāyāna—to which the Hellenic Civilization had served as an overture were survivors of not less than seven competitors—if we enumerate, as their unsuccessful rivals, the worships of Cybele and Isis, Mithraism and Manichaeism, and the popular religion which was a metamorphosis of the Neoplatonic philosophy. If any or all of these five failures had been successes, Hellenism would no doubt have served as an overture to them as effectively as it did in fact perform that service for Christianity and the Mahāyāna.

These five abortive churches had been defeated in a competition to be the chosen vessel for playing a church's authentic role. There had been other churches, as we have also seen, which, with this spiritual opportunity open to them, had committed spiritual suicide by going into politics. Cases in point were the syncretistic Egyptian Church which had owed its foundation, in the reign of Thothmes III, to a Pharaonic act of state, and whose *ex officio* pontiff Hrihor, the Chief Priest of Amon-Re of Thebes, had tried to step into Pharaoh's shoes when the New Kingdom had sunk to its nadir; Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Nestorianism, and Monophysitism, which had allowed themselves to be used by a submerged Syriac Civilization as weapons in its warfare against a dominant Hellenism; and Imāmi Shi'ism and Sikhism, which had invested their spiritual treasure in the perverse political enterprise of founding a mundane empire. Islam alone had partially succeeded in retrieving a false step into which it had been led in its infancy by its Founder. When a church thus sells its birthright for a mess of pottage it can no doubt sterilize a precursor civilization's creative work, and thereby posthumously render that civilization's death of no avail; but, in such an event, the true failure is, not the precursor civilization's dissolution, but the beneficiary church's repudiation of a heritage that has been bequeathed to it at so great a price.

² Herodotus, Book I, chap. 66.

³ Luke ii. 52.

wanton sabotage turns out to have been a *chef-d'œuvre* of the craftsman's art.

In the shipyard, idly talking,
At the ship the workmen stared:
Someone, all their labour balking,
Down her sides had cut deep gashes:
Not a plank was spared.¹

King Olaf, who has come to feast his eyes on the new craft to which his master-builder, Thorberg Skafting, was to have put the finishing touches, is enraged at the havoc and dumbfounded to hear, from the lips of the master himself, that the hand which has laboured all night to do this thing is Thorberg's own. But this at first sight insensate act takes on the very opposite complexion when, before the King's eyes, the craftsman finishes and vindicates his work by chipping and smoothing the cruelly-gashed planking into lines of a fineness that no shipwright has ever before achieved.

Our test case of the relation between the Hellenic Civilization and Christianity has been summed up, with an admirably judicial precision, by an American scholar writing between the two World Wars:

'Because the greatness of Christianity was not temporal but spiritual, its triumph boded ill for the State. Its final victory was only gained in the later fourth century; in the early fifth the western half of the Empire collapsed, and it is undeniable that the victory contributed to that fall. To the Christians the Empire lived in sin and must die before it could be re-born. It is true that many of them mourned the fall and hoped, and even prayed, that it might be averted; on the other hand few troubled to raise a temporal hand to forestall it. Already the cloud of predestination was darkening the bright new teleological sky: the natural wish to save the State into which they have been born must, like other temporal inclinations—to friendship, self-respect and prosperity—be repressed; for God was apparently ordaining otherwise, and men could only submit humbly to His will. On the other hand it is equally impossible to maintain that Christianity was a symptom of decadence. Ambrose, Augustine, and Bossuet were here more nearly right than Gibbon.² For these three said that Rome had come into being in order that out of it Christianity might spring; and this, because it respects the law of cause and effect, is an evolutionary conception at bottom. . . . Ambrose and Augustine had each, in his own way, outgrown Ancient Civilisation as he found it; each had learnt that Man was in fact something more than Antiquity had supposed.'³

(II) CIVILIZATIONS AS REGRESSIONS

We have been trying to see how History looks if we break with our Modern Western habit of viewing the histories of churches in terms of the histories of civilizations and adopt, instead, the inverse standpoint; and this essay in a reorientation of our historical outlook has led us, in the preceding chapter, to think of the civilizations of the second genera-

¹ Longfellow: *The Saga of King Olaf*, xiii: 'The Building of the Long Serpent.'

² See IV. iv. 58-63, and pp. 696-8, below.—A.J.T.

³ Pickman, E. M.: *The Mind of Latin Christendom* (London 1937, Oxford University Press), pp. 133-4.

tion as overtures to the living higher religions, and consequently to regard those civilizations, not as failures branded as such by their breakdown and eventual disintegration, but as successes in virtue of their service in helping these higher religions to come to birth—a service which they were able to perform in the strength of their suffering, and which they might never have had an opportunity of performing if they had not fallen into adversity. On this analogy the civilizations of the third generation are presumably to be thought of as regressions from the higher religions that had arisen out of the preceding civilizations' ruins; for, if the mundane miscarriage of those now defunct civilizations ought to be judged to have been redeemed by its auspicious spiritual sequel, then the mundane achievement of the living civilizations in breaking out of their ecclesiastical chrysalises and setting out to live a new secular life of their own ought likewise to be judged on the criterion of its effect on the life of the Soul; and this effect had manifestly been an adverse one.

If we take, as a test case for the verification of this thesis, the eruption of a Modern Western secular civilization out of a Medieval Western *Respublica Christiana*, we may find it illuminating to begin, on the lines of our inquiry in the preceding chapter, by citing the evidence of words, sounds, and acts that had undergone a change of meaning and usage. The change that we were studying in our review of civilizations as overtures to churches was a change from a secular significance to a religious. In a review of civilizations as regressions from churches, the tell-tale change would be a change from a religious significance to a secular one. In taking note of such changes in the particular case of the transition to a secular Modern Western Civilization from a Medieval Western Christian Commonwealth, it will be convenient as far as possible to survey the fortunes of the same words, sounds, and acts in the order that we have followed in tracing the antecedent transition to Christianity from a pagan Hellenism.

In a secularized Modern Western World the 'cleric', whose designation once proclaimed him to belong to that portion of the Christian community that God had allotted to His own special service, had had to surrender his title to the 'clerk' who in England performed the minor office work in a government department or private business concern, and in America served behind the counter in a store.

The Christian Holy Communion, in which the communicants experienced their fellowship in and with Christ, had been implicated in a struggle for equality of rights which, in itself, had been a legitimate quest for justice, but which, at each successive stage in a history that had now run through many chapters, had been waged in ever grosser terms for an ever more material stake. In Bohemia in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era the battle for equality had been opened on sacramental ground; the issue had been between the laity and the clergy; and the stake had been communion in both kinds, which the Utraquists had demanded for the laity as against a clergy which had come to reserve the cup as a privilege for clerks in holy orders. In Holland and England in the Early Modern Age of Western History, and in the Western World

as a whole after the outbreak of the French Revolution, the battle for equality, which by then had long ceased to be fought at the altar rails, had found a new field in a political arena, where the bourgeoisie now demanded a share in the political power that had been exercised under the *ancien régime* by oligarchies, aristocracies, and monarchies. In the twentieth century the industrial working class of a Western Society that had now become literally world-wide was demanding equality in the distribution of economic wealth of which the lion's share had been appropriated by the middle-class authors of an eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century industrial revolution. In this twentieth-century class-war, which was being fought for an economic stake, the militant movement on the anti-bourgeois side had adopted the name 'Communism' to signify that it was fighting for a 'commune' in which there should be a community of worldly goods. Communion in this kind, not communion in the body and blood of Christ, was the connotation that this Latin word had come to have in secular twentieth-century Western minds. The twentieth-century Communists had travelled far indeed from the battle-ground of their fourteenth-century Utraquist forerunners. And, though, in their obsession with a legitimate struggle for economic justice, they had raised the emotional temperature of a political 'ideology' to a religious heat, the authentic leaf that they had torn out of the book of Christianity¹ was as unedifying out of its context as it was salutary in itself.

The change of values registered in this change in the meaning of a talismanic word was a consequence of perversity among the clergy as well as the laity of Medieval Western Christendom. The vanity of a lust for power, that had betrayed the priesthood into turning the eucharist into an esoteric incantation in a liturgical language which had long since ceased to be the living mother tongue of any of their congregations, was exposed in the meaning that had been given to the unintelligible Latin operative words in the Mass in the vocabulary of an alienated English-speaking Christian people. An epoch-making chapter of psychological as well as linguistic history was summed up in the contemptuously blasphemous distortion of *Hoc est Corpus* into 'hocus-pocus'.

This desecration of the Christian sacrament was advertised in a change in the meaning, not only of gabbled ritual words, but of rhythmic instrumental music. The ringing of a bell, which, in Christian ears, had traditionally been associated with a church bell calling the congregation to worship or announcing to them that the operative act in the Sacrament of the Mass had just been consummated by the officiating priest, had come in a twentieth-century North America to be associated with the matter-of-fact business of everyday life. A tolling bell there now signified the approach of a locomotive that was warning the public to beware, not of losing their souls, but of getting themselves run over; a buzzing bell was associated with the mental alertness of an efficient bell-boy in an hotel, who would present himself expeditiously at the door of Room No. 666 as soon as the momentary occupant had pressed the button that set the right bell ringing in the bell-captain's lair.

¹ See V. v. 581-7, and p. 445, above.

The Greek word (πνευματικός) that had been consecrated by Christianity to signify 'spiritual' had been 'released', in the Modern Western vulgar tongues, from its traditional service of conveying 'the wind' that 'bloweth where it listeth',¹ to provide the missing name for the ingenious new Western invention of imprisoning compressed air within 'pneumatic' rubber tires.

The Latin word 'conversion' had likewise been converted from an otiose religious to a practical secular use. This ancient word still 'rang a bell' in Modern Western minds, but in these latter-day mental bell-rooms its associations were no longer with the conversion of souls; in Western Man's swept and garnished house the word would suggest to an industrialist the conversion of coal or falling water into 'power'; to a financier it would suggest the conversion of the rate of interest on a loan to a lower rate than that originally guaranteed to a confiding investor; while to a police detective it would suggest the misappropriation of funds by a financier who had gone beyond the limits of the considerable discretion that the Law allowed him. In this last-mentioned usage, 'conversion' conveyed its meaning to modern Western minds *sans phrase qualifiante*—a nice point of language which distinctly indicated that funds were the commodity in which Modern Western Man had re-invested the treasure that his Christian forebears had once placed in souls.

In the Christian dispensation, 'conversion' had opened the door for 'salvation', but in a Modern Western secular usage this Latin word, too, had been 'released', like its old companion, from its traditional association with souls to serve more practical purposes. 'Salvage' had come to mean the rescue, not of an erring sinner, but of a foundering ship, and what was 'salved' in a twentieth-century Western World was, not a soul by the spiritual ministrations of a priest whose 'cure' was of that kind, but a body by the physical application of an ointment purchased in a shop, while what was 'saved' was, not the soul that had found its way to Heaven, but the money that had been deposited in the bank.

'Salvator'—the substantive coined by the Latin Christian Father Tertullian, at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era, to represent the Greek word σωτήρ in its application to Christ²—had so far escaped the desecration suffered by the verb from the same Latin root; for, even in ex-Christian Western minds, the predominant association of the word 'Saviour' was still with 'Our Lord'. But in its older Latin rendering, which had been 'conservator', the key word of Christianity had not been spared by sacrilegious hands. In being applied to the 'conservator' of some national museum or public park, or a member of 'The Thames Conservancy Board', the word had been 'converted' to a respectably illicit use; and the American usage of the adjective in the phrases 'a conservative estimate' and 'a conservative figure' could also perhaps pass muster—however great the gulf might be between the caution that was the virtue of a reputable business man and the love that had moved God to become Man in order to become Man's Saviour. It would be difficult, however, to whitewash the political application of the

¹ John iii. 8.

² See V. vi. 374, n. 3.

term which was its most familiar usage in a twentieth-century Western World; for in this context a 'conservative' meant the supporter of a political party whose *raison d'être* was the defence of material vested interests.

As twentieth-century Western students of History watched 'holy day' contracting into 'holiday', and 'the Christmas holidays' bringing with them a commercially profitable boom in retail trade instead of a spiritually regenerating reminder of Man's salvation through God's incarnation, they would realize that they were being carried away by a process of 'dis-etherialization' which was the inverse of what had happened when pagan Hellenic words had been converted to Christian uses; and the same tale was told by the lapse of the word 'news' from meaning 'the good news' (*εὐαγγέλιον*) of the Gospel to meaning the uninspiring output of a commercial newspaper press. In New Mexico the 'know-how' which there had once signified the innocent craft of Zuñi priests¹ had come to signify a lethal technology of atomic warfare that had been worked out at Los Alamos. But words and bell-peals were not the only evidence for the 'conversion' of spiritual treasures into worldly goods by an egocentric Western human nature. This misappropriation was also attested by positive and historic political acts.

'Frederick II had been the ward and pupil of the great Innocent, founder of the Church as a state. He was an intellectual man, and we need not wonder to find in his conception of Empire a reflection of the Church. The whole Italian-Sicilian State which the Popes coveted as their Patrimony of Peter became, as it were, the Patrimony of Augustus for this gifted monarch, who sought to release the secular and intellectual powers that were fused into the spiritual unity of the Church² and to build a new empire based on these.'³

In an earlier part of this Study⁴ we have briefly followed the course of an internecine struggle—waged without compromise between the belligerents and without mercy for a Medieval Western Christian body social that their strife was rending asunder—which a victorious Papacy pushed to the point of 'unconditional surrender'. But this was one of those Pyrrhic victories in which the victor appears, in retrospect, to have been a *felo de se*,⁵ while his victim proves to have been inextirpably hydra-headed.

'Let us grasp the full significance of Frederick's Italian-Roman State: a mighty pan-Italian seignory, which for a short time united in one state Germanic, Roman and Oriental elements—Frederick himself, Emperor of the World, being the Grand Signor or Grand Tyrant thereof, the first and last of these princes to wear the diadem of Rome, whose Caesarhood was not only allied with German kingship like Barbarossa's but with Oriental-Sicilian despotism. Having grasped this, we perceive that all the tyrants of the Renaissance, the Scala and Montefeltre, the Visconti, Borgia,

¹ See Benedict, Ruth: *Patterns of Culture* (Cambridge, Mass. 1934, Riverside Press), p. 96.

² See pp. 402 and 446, above, and IX. viii. 394-5.—A.J.T.

³ Kantorowicz, E.: *Frederick the Second, 1194-1250*, English translation (London 1931, Constable), pp. 561-2.

⁴ In IV. iv. 560-7.

⁵ IV. iv. 567-71.

and Medici, are down to the tiniest features the sons and successors of Frederick II, the diadochi of this "Second Alexander".¹

Nor was this the end of the monstrous proliferation of hydra heads from Frederick's mortal coils; for the North Italian city-state despotisms² that were multiple replicas of Frederick's abortive oecumenical Caesaro-papacy reproduced themselves, in their turn, on the nation-state scale, in the Transalpine and Transmarine outer circle of an Italianized Western World at the opening of the so-called Modern Age of Western history;³ and these epigoni of the diadochi of Frederick the frustrated despoiler of Pope Innocent III were the successful despoilers of Innocent's successors⁴ when a golden opportunity was offered to them by the folly of a Martin V and a Eugenius IV in crowning Innocent IV's pyrrhic victory over Frederick's natural heirs⁵ with a not less pyrrhic victory over the Conciliar Movement.⁶ A scrutiny of the fundamental political and economic institutions of a secular Modern Western Society reveals that these were plunder from the Papal constitution of a Medieval Christian Commonwealth⁷—like the desecrated altars and dislocated drums of columns that had been built into acropolis-walls at Athens and at Ankara, or like the marble shafts, robbed from ruined temples, that supported the roofs of post-Hellenic basilicas and mosques. With silent eloquence these spoils proclaimed the Christian origin of a Western Civilization that had forfeited its title to its Christian name.⁸

If, in this sense, the secular civilization of the Modern Western World was an emanation of the spirit of Frederick II Hohenstaufen, what had been the source of the demonic power in virtue of which a would-be empire-builder who had been frustrated in his own lifetime had succeeded in producing this amazing posthumous effect? The riddle receives its answer when we remind ourselves of the reason why the Emperor Frederick II came so much nearer than his grandfather Frederick I to achieving their dynasty's arch-ambition. The abiding aim of the Hohenstaufen line was, within Ottonian bounds, to make a belated reality of an abortive Carolingian attempt to revive the Roman Empire in Western Christendom as it had been revived in Orthodox Christendom, two generations before Charlemagne's day, by the genius of Leo Syrus. What was it that nerved Frederick I Hohenstaufen to ignore the twin portents of Charlemagne's and Otto I's successive fiascos? What motive impelled him to make a third essay in an enterprise in which his two greatest predecessors had so signally failed? And what was it that gave his grandson the hardihood to renew the struggle in which his

¹ Kantorowicz, op. cit., pp. 493-4.

² See III. iii. 354-7.

³ See III. iii. 300-1, 305, and 357-63; IV. iv. 198-200; and IX. viii. 363 and 395.

⁴ See IV. iv. 576-8.

⁵ See ibid. 566-8.

⁶ See ibid. 571-6.

⁷ See ibid. 539-43. Mr. Martin Wight comments: "The most striking instance of this that I have come across is that the Papacy 'invented', not only diplomacy and international finance, but also the National Debt.

"The system of exchanges adopted in the Middle Ages originated chiefly in the nature of the papal revenues, which, due from all parts of the World, were to be transmitted to the Curia from every separate country; but it is equally worthy of remark that the system of national debt by which we are even now enveloped, and which maintains so important an influence on the operations of commerce, was first fully developed in the States of the Church" (Ranke, *History of the Papacy*, Bk. iv, § 2, *ad init.*).¹

⁸ See I. i. 32-34.

grandfather, in his turn, had been worsted? The grandfather had been inspired by the Caesaro-papal 'absolute' conception of the Imperial prerogative¹ that had been enshrined in the Justinianean *Corpus Iuris*² of a latter-day Constantinopolitan Roman Empire; for, in the Western Christendom of Frederick I's day, this treasure, which had recently been disinterred at Bologna,³ had still been an exciting new discovery.⁴ The grandson was inspired by the more vivid and convincing experience of inheriting the throne of the Sicilian 'successor-state' of an East Roman Empire⁵ in which Leo Syrus and his successors had succeeded⁶ in reasserting the Constantinian Roman Imperial ideal of 'Caesaro-papism' in the 'real life' of public administration, and not just in the lecture rooms of academic professors of a rediscovered Justinianean *Summa*.

It will be seen that the monstrous birth of a Modern Western secular civilization from the womb of a Medieval Western *Respublica Christiana*, which had been made possible by the mistakes and sins of the Medieval Western Church, was made practicable by the renaissance of the Hellenic institution of an 'absolute' state in which Religion had been a department of Politics. It will also be seen that, in Western Christendom, this renaissance of Hellenic political 'absolutism' was not achieved without external aid. Charlemagne's native Western attempt to revive the Roman Empire had been a fortunate failure; Frederick II Hohenstaufen's audacious repetition of Charlemagne's enterprise was a sinister posthumous success because the *Stupor Mundi Occidentalis* was able, in his Sicilian hereditary dominions, to draw upon the credit of East Roman statesmen who had duly performed the feat—an enterprise beyond Charlemagne's powers—of resuscitating the Constantinian Roman Imperial régime.

When a civilization of the third generation breaks its way out of a body ecclesiastic, is a renaissance of the 'apparented' civilization of the second generation the invariable and indispensable means by which this unhappy delivery is accomplished? If we look at the history of the Hindu Civilization, we shall find there no parallel to the resuscitation of an

¹ See IV. iv. 347-50.

² See pp. 265-8, above.

³ After the irruption of the Lombards into Italy in A.D. 568, Bologna had been the north-westernmost outpost of a Constantinopolitan Roman Empire *in extremis* for the best part of two centuries before its incorporation into the body social of Western Christendom through the conquest of the Exarchate of Ravenna by the Lombards in the course of the quarter of a century ending in A.D. 751.

⁴ See IV. iv. 557. The renaissance of a Justinianean Roman law in a Medieval Western Christendom is examined further in X. ix. 30-31.

⁵ Frederick's 'Oriental-Sicilian despotism', as Kantorowicz calls it, was, of course, a 'successor-state', not only of the East Roman Empire, but of the Arab Caliphate as well, since the greater part of the East Roman dominions west of the Straits of Otranto which Frederick's Norman predecessors had conquered in the eleventh century of the Christian Era had previously been reconquered by the East Romans from North-West African Arab *conquistadores* who, in the ninth and tenth centuries, had overrun a Lombard Apulia and an East Roman Sicily (see IV. iv. 343-4, 356-7, and 401-2). In Sicily the descendants of the Arab conquerors had not been dislodged by a Norman military conquest that had deprived them of their political ascendancy in the island; and they exercised a potent cultural influence over their new Western Christian barbarian masters. In its political aspect, this Arab influence was in harmony with the Byzantine, since the imperial tradition of the Caliphate, like that of the East Roman Empire, had descended through a Constantinian, Diocletianic, and Sasanian channel from an Achaemenian fountain-head.

⁶ See IV. iv. 346-7, 352, and 592-693.

'absolute' Hellenic polity which was achieved first in Orthodox Christendom by native political genius, and then in Western Christendom on the strength of a Byzantine *fait accompli*. Hindu history records no corresponding revival of the Empire of the Mauryas or the Empire of the Guptas. When we turn, however, from India to China, and look at the history of the Far Eastern Civilization in its homeland, we do here find an unmistakable and striking counterpart of the Byzantine revival of the Roman Empire in the Sui and T'ang revival of the Empire of the Han.¹

This Far Eastern renaissance of the universal state of an antecedent civilization is, indeed, the classic case; for by comparison even with the East Roman Empire, not to speak of 'the Holy Roman Empire', the Sui and T'ang Empire stands out as a solid success; and this success was due, as we have seen,² to a command of the administrative means required for achieving the political objective. Not only the political tradition but the administrative personnel of the Han Empire had survived the interregnum between the dissolution of the Sinic Civilization and the emergence of its Far Eastern successor. It had found asylum in the great cultural citadel which a disintegrating Sinic Civilization had provided for itself by expanding southwards up to the southern watershed of the Yangtse Basin and over it to the seaboard. The Confucian civil servants who reappeared in strength towards the close of the sixth century of the Christian Era, to administer a politically reunited South and North of China as a resuscitated Sinic universal state, surpassed their eighth-century Byzantine equivalents in cultivation and efficiency, as well as in numbers, in the measure in which the sub-continental citadel of Sinism between the Hwangho-Yangtsekiang watershed and the south coast of China surpassed in extent the ring-wall of the city of Constantinople, which was Hellenism's narrow-verged citadel during the interregnum between the dissolution of the Hellenic Civilization and the emergence of an Orthodox Christendom. As for Charlemagne's abortive 'Holy Roman Empire', the administrative reason for its failure³ was that, in the West in Charlemagne's day, there was not even an exiguous remnant of the former Roman civil service for a would-be empire-builder to enlist.

In the light of this disparity in the amount and in the value of the initial assets in these three different undertakings, it is not surprising that the renaissance of the Sinic Civilization in the Far Eastern World should have gone farther than the renaissance of Hellenism in either a Western or an Orthodox Christendom. For the purposes of our present inquiry it is significant that the civilization of the third generation in whose history the renaissance of its predecessor of the second generation had been carried to the greatest lengths should likewise have been the most successful in its generation in shaking itself free from the trammels of the church which its predecessor had brought to birth.

¹ See pp. 19-21, above.

² On pp. 370-2, above. See further X. ix. 20 and 665-7.

³ There was, of course, an economic reason as well (see II. ii. 345; IV. iv. 322-3 and 490).

The Mahayanian Buddhism that had bidden fair to captivate a moribund Sinic World as thoroughly as a moribund Hellenic World had been captivated by Christianity had reached its zenith in the Far East at the nadir of the post-Sinic interregnum;¹ but it had swiftly declined thereafter to a level of nonentity to which Christianity had never yet sunk either in Orthodox Christendom or in the West.

On this showing, we must conclude that the 'renaissance' of a dead civilization spells a 'regression' from a living higher religion, and that, the farther the revival is pushed, the greater the backsliding will be; but we may still be challenged to show why, even if this inverse variation were to prove to be a 'law' of History, it should be deplored as a catastrophe rather than be applauded as a triumph. Our judgement must indeed seem paradoxical to a Far Eastern Confucian civil servant or to a Western rationalist technician who believed in his heart that 'Man makes Himself'² and that, in Man's competent conduct of Mankind's proper business,³ the episode of the rise and fall of the higher religions had been a disturbing and discreditable interlude.

The reply to this challenge is *Respice finem*; for renaissances, as we shall see when we study them more closely,⁴ are apt to unfold themselves progressively by resuscitating elements of the life of the 'apparented' civilization in a chronological order that is the inverse of their historical sequence in their original appearance. A process of resuscitation which starts with the revival of a universal state that had been the last achievement of the antecedent society's dominant minority goes on to resuscitate the philosophy in which an imperial civil service had been schooled, and thence to resuscitate the styles of politics, architecture, sculpture, and literature that, in the history of the 'apparented' civilization, had been in vogue in earlier ages, until the pageant of a dead civilization's history has been dramatically re-deployed in reverse order on a living civilization's stage. This evocatory exercise of the imagination is manifestly bound to expose those souls that indulge in it to a risk of derangement through being distracted by a pursuit of incompatible ideals.

In Far Eastern history the tension produced by this inner psychic discord had from time to time sought relief in the outward form of a persecution of adherents of the Mahāyāna—or, at any rate, of followers of the Buddhist monastic way of life—by the secular public authorities at the instigation of the champions of Confucianism. The most extensive and persistent of these persecutions had occurred, as might be expected, during the second and less prosperous chapter of the T'ang Dynasty's three-centuries-long tenure of power—at a time when the Confucian scholar-administrators were beginning to feel less secure in the saddle and therefore less inclined to go on tolerating the persistence in their midst of a parvenu alien religious life which was a standing

¹ See Eliot, Sir Charles: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, pp. 251-9.

² *Man Makes Himself* was the title of a book published in A.D. 1936 by a distinguished Western archaeologist, V. G. Childe (see p. 480, n. 3, above).

³ Pope: *An Essay on Man*, Ep. ii, l. 2.

⁴ In Part X, *passim*, in vol. ix.

challenge to the restored Confucian régime. These major persecutions had been inflicted in A.D. 845 and subsequent years.¹ But, even before the evocation of a ghost of the Sinic universal state by the Sui Dynasty in A.D. 589, there had been a persecution of the kind in A.D. 446² in a To Pa Eurasian barbarian 'successor-state' of the defunct Han Empire in Shansi which had sought to disguise its vulgar origin under the archaizing name of 'Wei'. At first sight it is surprising to find the Mahāyāna exciting the hostility of an ex-barbarian Power which had won its certificate of cultural respectability, and thereby made its political fortune, through its own conversion to the Mahāyāna in the preceding chapter of its history.³ On a closer view we can see that the revulsion against the Mahāyāna which declared itself in 'Wei' in A.D. 446 in an act of political coercion was the reverse side of a renaissance of the pre-Buddhist pagan Sinic culture which, in the 'Wei' Principality, reached its climax in the last decade of the fifth century of the Christian Era in the pedantically thoroughgoing Sinomania of the 'Wei' prince Hiao Wên-ti.⁴

In the Western World, in contrast to the course of the corresponding renaissance in Orthodox Christendom and in the Far East alike, the universal state of the antecedent civilization had never been successfully resuscitated; the failure had been most signal when Frederick II Hohenstaufen had drawn upon Leo Syrus's Byzantine achievement in a last attempt at retrieving Charlemagne's Austrasian failure; and, in consequence, the political renaissance here had cut its way back behind the oecumenical last act of Hellenic political history till, in the hands of Frederick II's fourteenth-century Italian diadochi and sixteenth-century Transalpine epigoni, it had arrived at a resuscitation of the parochial patriotism which had been both the strength and the weakness of the Hellenic Civilization at the culmination of its growth and on the eve of its breakdown. 'There is high tension and hard encounter between the Christian Faith and any form of civilization';⁵ and Modern Western Man's attempt to combine an ancestral Christianity with a resuscitated Hellenic idolization of a parochial political community had set up a tension in Western souls which had become all but intolerably high by the middle of the twentieth century.

'Europe's infatuation for the Greeks and Romans dates from the sixteenth century, when she began her great political and military reorganisation. She admired them in all things—even those arts in which the Middle Ages had excelled them—because they taught her how to organise armies, how to wage wars, and how to build up great states.'⁶

From the sixteenth century onwards the West had been seeking all the time to realize simultaneously a pagan Hellenic ideal of political

¹ See Eliot, Sir Charles: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, pp. 267-8, and Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 496-8 and 572.

² See Eliot, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 252, and Franke, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 203-4.

³ See V. v. 356, with n. 6.

⁴ See V. v. 477-8.

⁵ Burgmann, Bishop E. H.: *The Church's Encounter with Civilisation* (London 1948, Longmans), p. 18.

⁶ Ferrero, G.: *Peace and War*, English translation (London 1933, Macmillan): 'Paganism and Christianity', p. 194.

absolutism which, in the course of Hellenic history, had eventually choked the seeds of an Hellenic ideal of individual liberty, and a Christian ideal of individual liberty which was a corollary of a Christian belief in the value of every human soul in the sight of God;¹ and each of these two incompatible movements had been carried to a climax in the French Revolution.²

'We live in a state of permanent disharmony. The family, social life, manners and morals bear the stamp of Christianity; politics and war draw their inspiration from the classic and pagan tradition; law, literature, philosophy, art, and history are subjected to the competing influence of both. . . . What is the State? An end or a means? . . . Paganism and Christianity have each given a clear and definite answer. Paganism said that it was an end; Christianity replied that it was a means.'³

¹ Mr. Martin Wight comments on the original draft of this passage: 'Paganism came nowhere near the combination of political fanaticism and spiritual coercion which is the essence of a Modern Western "totalitarianism", for these are characteristic of a post-Christian Neo-Paganism—of the transfer of the religious "drive" and exclusive claims of Christianity to a debased secular creed, as you suggest on p. 554, below—which is indeed the supreme evidence, up to date, of a civilization of the third generation being a regression. Conversely it is very disputable whether Christianity can make an exclusive claim to the ideal of individual liberty. It certainly provided the milieu in which the Hellenic seed of individual liberty was able to germinate and come to flower in the Western Civilization; but in Eastern Christendom it did the reverse, and provided the milieu for the flowering of the older bulb of sacred monarchy, in which the unbiased reader of the Old and New Testaments and of the Fathers would be much more likely to see the natural political expression of Christianity than he would be likely to see it in any form of individual liberty. Christianity, in fact, seems capable of accommodating itself to any political régime: all that it asserts is that every political régime must be *responsible* to God, or (as Ferrero says) that the state, whether monarchic or democratic, is a means, not an end.'

'Indeed, are you not here evading the question whether "the ideal of individual liberty" is not precisely a feature of Modern Western secular civilization, i.e. of regression? Western Christendom, like Eastern Christendom, knew nothing of "individual liberty" except marginally in the Medieval Western city-state cosmos.'

The writer's answer to Mr. Wight's question would be that, in his belief, the Modern Western—in contrast to the Medieval Western—ideal of individual liberty on the secular plane had been derived from a Christian, not from an Hellenic, source. As he saw it, the Late Modern Western ideals of political and economic liberty were secularized versions of an Early Modern Western ideal of religious liberty for the individual conscience, and this ideal of liberty on the plane of religious practice and conviction had been inspired by the Christian belief in the value of every human soul in the sight of God, inasmuch as this belief could be taken to imply that no human authority—neither a church militant on Earth nor any secular potentate—had a right to intervene between an individual human soul and the God who had created it and had undergone an Incarnation and a Crucifixion for its sake. The writer agreed that this deduction from a universal and unquestioned Christian belief about the relation between human souls and God had not been drawn in Western Christendom before the Early Modern Age and had not been drawn in any of the other Christendoms independently at any time; but he would submit that it was a legitimate deduction and that, whether or not its legitimacy were admitted by other students of History, the deduction had at any rate been made in an Early Modern Western Christendom as a matter of historical fact.

While the writer of this Study thus held that the Modern Western ideal of individual liberty had a Christian root, he would agree that its severance from its Christian root, and its 'counter-transfiguration' into a secular ideal of individual liberty on the political and economic planes, had indeed been symptoms of regression; and in his view this secularized version of a Christian ideal was not only regressive; it was also untenable. In repudiating a religious sanction for individual liberty which had been provided by a Christian belief in the value of each and every soul in the sight of God, a post-Christian Modern Western *homo democraticus* had reduced his pretension to individual liberty *ad absurdum*; for the claims that were now being put forward by this *homunculus* merely in his own right, and no longer in God's name, could not stand against the claims of a totalitarian state to sacrifice the individual liberty of any and every *homunculus* on the altar of an idolized corporate humanity, the great beast-god Leviathan.

² See Ferrero, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

The spiritual weapons, plucked from an Hellenic charnel house, with which Modern Western Man had brought to the ground the Hildebrandine *Respublica Christiana* had been as destructive as the material weapons with which Cromwell's soldiers had once shattered the west window of Winchester Cathedral.

'When ye shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the Prophet, standing where it ought not (let him that readeth understand), then let them that be in Judaea flee to the mountains.'¹

Nevertheless, there is a bow in the cloud.² At Winchester, on the morrow of the Puritan iconoclast's deed, it must have looked as if a mighty work of Medieval Christian art had been utterly destroyed; and in truth it had been damaged beyond all possibility of reinstatement in its inimitable medieval pattern. Yet the broken and scattered fragments were pieced together again, by the piety of a later generation, in a labour of love that—sheer disorder though it might have suggested to the eye of the original artificer—was in truth a new pattern,³ fraught with unpremeditated beauty and letting in unforeseen light in the sight of eyes open to the self-revelation of a God who makes all things new.⁴ A boy once watched, spell-bound, while this miracle of creation conjured out of destruction⁵ was being lit up by the level radiance of a setting summer sun; and a man could catch a glimpse of the spiritual meaning of this visual allegory as he recalled it in his mind's eye in after-life, in the light of his generation's experience of a forty years' wandering in the wilderness. If the same sunlight could thus shine again through the same glass in a new pattern offering a fresh vision, might not the eternal and unchanging incorporeal light of the Beatific Vision again illuminate men's souls in a society that had been broken and remade by the sufferings of a Time of Troubles?

¹ Mark xiii. 14; cp. Matt. xxiv. 15-16.

² Gen. ix. 12-17.

³ See Bergson's exposition of the relativity of the concept of disorder in the passage quoted from *L'Evolution Créatrice*, 24th ed. (Paris 1921, Alcan), pp. 239-55, in V. v. 419, n. 5.

⁴ Rev. xxi. 5.

⁵ The Destroyer's unintentional and unwilling service to the Creator has been illustrated in II. i. 271-99.

C. THE CHALLENGE OF MILITANCY ON EARTH

(I) CAUSES OF REGRESSION

IN the preceding chapter we have observed that a secular civilization that breaks out of a body ecclesiastic is apt to win its way with the aid of elements in the life of an antecedent civilization that it brings back to life; but, if we have seen here how an insurgent civilization takes advantage of its opportunity, we have still to see how the opportunity arises; and evidently this 'beginning of evils'¹ is to be looked for, not in the resourcefulness of the erupting civilization, but in some weak point, or false step, of the church at whose cost the eruption is achieved.

One formidable crux for a church is manifestly inherent in a church's *raison d'être*. A church is militant on Earth for the purpose of winning, or recapturing, This World for the *Civitas Dei* not by extinguishing life on Earth but by transfiguring it;² and this means that a church has to deal with secular as well as spiritual affairs and to organize itself on Earth as an institution, since this was the only method so far discovered by Man for managing mundane human relations on any scale beyond the narrow range of direct personal intercourse between one human being and another.³ The gross institutional integument with which a church thus finds itself compelled to clothe its ethereal nakedness, in order to do God's business in a recalcitrant environment, is as incongruous with a church's spiritual nature as the alien shell that is appropriated by a hermit crab; and it is not surprising to see disaster overtaking a terrestrial outpost of the Communion of Saints which, in This World, cannot do its own proper spiritual work without being drawn into grappling with secular problems and finding itself forced to attack these with institutional tools.

The most celebrated tragedy of the kind is the history of the Hildebrandine Papacy; and in another context⁴ we have observed how Hildebrand was dragged over the precipice by an apparently inevitable concatenation of causes and effects. He would not be a true and loyal servant of God if he did not throw himself, with all his might, into the spiritual task of trying to reclaim the Western Christian clergy from the sexual and financial corruption in which they were wallowing in his day; he could not reform the clergy if he did not effectively organize the Church; he could not effectively organize the Church without vindicating her lawful authority over the clergy in matters ecclesiastical; he could not do this without arriving at a demarcation between the respective jurisdictions of Church and State; and, since the field of the Western Christian clergy's activity in Hildebrand's day included some ground that was indisputably secular, and much ground that was debatable, besides the ground that was admittedly ecclesiastical, Hildebrand was led, by

¹ Thucydides, Book II, chap. 12.

³ See III. iii. 223-30.

² See V. vi. 149-68.

⁴ In IV. iv. 552-4.

a sequence of steps in which each step seemed to be necessitated by the preceding one, from inspiring a spiritual revival in Christian souls to engaging in a conflict with 'the Holy Roman Empire' which carried the Church right into the arena of power politics and was fought out, by force of arms, in successive rounds of ever-increasing intensity and embitterment, over a period of two centuries, with eventual results that were disastrous alike for a Medieval Western Christendom's two master institutions, the Papacy and the Empire, and, worst of all, for Western Christendom itself.

This tragedy of the Hildebrandine Western Church is a prominent, though by no means unparalleled, example of spiritual regression precipitated by a church's becoming entangled in mundane affairs and committed to secular modes of action unintentionally, and indeed against its will, as an incidental consequence of its doing its own business. There is, however, another broad road leading to the same spiritually destructive worldliness which is more frequented, more characteristic, and more insidious. A church incurs the risk of falling into a spiritual regression in the very act of living up to its own standards by striving sincerely to do God's will on Earth. For the will of God is partially expressed in the righteous social aims of the secular mundane societies, and these mundane ideals are apt to be achieved incidentally in a religious society very much more successfully than they ever have been, or can be, achieved in a mundane society which aims at these objects direct, and at nothing higher. This is a necessary consequence of one of the laws of life that we have observed in other contexts¹—the principle that the most likely way to reach a goal is to be aiming, not at that goal itself, but at some more ambitious goal beyond it—and, in the history of the Church Militant on Earth, two classic examples of the working of this law were the achievements of Saint Benedict and of Pope Gregory the Great.²

Both these saintly souls were bent upon the spiritual aim of promoting the monastic way of life in the West, and Gregory was also devoted to the further purpose—as unworldly as the other—of giving light to them that sit in darkness³ by bringing the heathen within the Christian Church's fold. Yet, as a by-product of their spiritual work, these two unworldly men of action performed economic prodigies that were beyond the powers of secular statesmen. Gregory incidentally saved from starvation the urban proletariat of Rome at a moment when the Constantinopolitan Government of an expiring Roman Empire was quite incapable of doing its duty by a derelict imperial city which, at the turn of the sixth and seventh centuries, was an exposed Western outpost of a once oecumenical Power whose frontiers had contracted till its centre of gravity now lay in Anatolia. And Gregory not only responded to the urgent challenge of an immediate economic emergency within the walls of the city that was the seat of his bishopric; in the same power of the same spirit, he and his hero Benedict between them laid, without intending it or knowing it, the firm religious foundations on which the

¹ See pp. 388 and 510, above.

² See III. iii. 265-9 and IV. iv. 184-5.

³ Luke i. 79.

immense edifice of a Medieval and a Modern Western economic life was subsequently erected. This incidental economic handiwork of two single-minded servants of God would be praised by Christian and Marxian historians alike with united voices, albeit with discordant minds. Yet, should these praises become audible to Benedict and Gregory in an Other World, these saints would assuredly recall, with a pang of misgiving, their Master's saying: 'Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you';¹ and their misgiving would certainly turn to anguish if they were enabled to revisit This World and to see with their own eyes the ultimate moral consequences of the eventual economic effects of their immediate spiritual endeavours during their life on Earth.

The disconcerting truth is that the incidental material fruits of the spiritual labours of the *Civitas Dei* on Earth are not only certificates of its spiritual success; they are also snares in which a spiritual athlete who has been touched by the sin of pride, or has perhaps merely rested sluggishly on his oars,² may be trapped more diabolically than an impetuous Hildebrand is ruined by the spiritual disaster of entanglement in politics and war. In the medieval chapter of the Benedictine story, the Cistercian spiritual pioneers who founded their abbeys in a wilderness among the foothills of the Yorkshire Moors could hardly have foreboded that, in sacrificing themselves by seeking out this forbidding material environment, they were imperilling their successors' souls.

Was not the physical hardship of marooning themselves in this bleak landscape almost beyond endurance, even for a mortified monk? Was it not an edifying spiritual exercise to undertake, in faith, the humanly impossible task of making the desert rejoice and blossom as the rose?³ How could they have foreseen that they were giving the initial impetus to a wool industry and a metallurgical industry that would go from strength to strength till, seven hundred years from then, these economic exercises of aspirants to a spiritual prize would make England 'the workshop of the World'? How could they have foreseen that, within only three hundred years, a mounting material wealth that was the almost inevitable reward of spiritual virtue would be tempting their abbots to break their rule, in the spirit and even in the letter, by building massive meat-kitchens in their abbatial quarters as a witness against themselves? Or that, within four hundred years, the discredit brought upon the Order by such conspicuous sins against its professed ideals would be seized upon by a covetous laity as an excuse for despoiling the monasteries as Israel had spoiled the Egyptians? The unfolding tale had taught Posterity that material riches which can be harvested with impunity by saints who neither seek them nor value them nor notice them may be the undoing of clerics of common clay who covet them for their own sake and pursue them to the neglect of their spiritual calling.

'The gulf which appeared between abbot and convent was largely caused by the accumulation of wealth. As time went by, the estates of the

¹ Luke vi. 26.

² For these two alternative ways of incurring nemesis, see IV. iv. 245-61.

³ Isa. xxxv. 1.

monasteries became so enormous that the abbot found himself almost fully occupied in the administration of his lands and in the various responsibilities which this entailed. A similar process of division of estates and duties was taking place at the same time among the monks themselves. . . . Each monastery was divided into what were practically separate departments, each with its own income and its own special responsibilities. The officer in charge of each department was known as an 'obedientiary'. To him certain sources of income were assigned; he had his own household and servants; and the burden of his office was such as to occupy a very large part of his time. . . . Any monk of average intelligence and ability could count on receiving some form of office in due course, and . . . would spend a good many years of his monastic life in the administration of his department. . . .

As Dom David Knowles says: "Save in monasteries such as Winchester, Canterbury and Saint Albans, where strong intellectual or artistic interests existed, business of this kind was the career which absorbed all the talent of the house". . . .¹ For such as had administrative gifts, but were not blessed with any property on which to exert them, the monasteries, with their vast estates, offered much scope."²

Of such it is written that 'he . . . that received seed among the thorns is he that heareth the word; and the care of This World, and the deceitfulness of riches, choke the word, and he becometh unfruitful'.³ Yet the monk who has fallen out of the running in the race for a spiritual crown by degenerating into a successful man of business does not exemplify the most deadly form that spiritual regression can take. The worst temptation that lies in wait for citizens of the *Civitas Dei* in This World is neither to plunge into politics nor to slide into business but to idolize the terrestrial institution in which a Church Militant on Earth is imperfectly though unavoidably embodied. If *corruptio optimi* is *pessima*, an idolized church is the one idol that is more pernicious than the idolized human ant-heap that men worship as Leviathan.⁴

A church is in danger of lapsing into this worst of all forms of idolatry in so far as she lapses into believing herself to be, not merely a depository of truth, but the sole depository of the whole truth in a complete and definitive revelation of it.⁵ For the value of a vessel is proportionate to the value of its contents, and, if the contents are believed to be inestimably precious, the guardians of the vessel may rate so high the adventitious sacrosanctity of a paltry alabaster box that, rather than break it, they may sacrilegiously refrain, when their testing time comes, from using the spikenard for the divine purpose for which it has been entrusted to their keeping by God.⁶ The idolization of an ecclesiastical institution may be the outcome of a laudably prudent determination to preserve a divinely revealed truth by making sure that its earthly integu-

¹ Knowles, Dom David: *The Monastic Order in England, 943-1216* (Cambridge 1940, University Press), p. 438.

² Moorman, J. R. H.: *Church Life in England in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge 1945, University Press), pp. 279-80, 283, 353.

³ Matt. xiii. 22. Cp. Mark iv. 18-19; Luke viii. 14.

⁴ The idolization of institutions has been discussed in IV. iv. 303-423.

⁵ See Niebuhr, Reinhold: *Faith and History* (New York 1949, Scribner), pp. 238-40 and 242.

⁶ Mark xiv. 3-9. Cp. Matt. xxvi. 6-13; Luke vii. 36-50; John xii. 1-9.

ment shall be tough enough to outlast any mundane institution that might jeopardize the revelation by crushing its container. Yet, if the maker of the iron vessel falls down and worships his handiwork when it has duly proved itself more than a match for the colliding vessel of clay, it were better for him that he should never have purchased this material security for his spiritual treasure at so ruinous a moral cost.

A church is prone to set her feet on this easiest and sheerest of all the descents of Avernus when she has suffered some heavy blow, and particularly prone if the stroke has been struck by the members of her own household—who are proverbially a man's most grievous foes,¹ though their intimacy with their victim also makes them his shrewdest critics. The classic exemplar of this perhaps least readily retrievable form of regression had been the Counter-Reformational Tridentine Roman Catholic Church as non-Catholics saw her.² For four hundred years already, down to the time of writing, she had been standing on guard, in a posture that was as rigid as her vigilance was unrelaxing, massively armoured with the helmet of the Papacy and the breastplate of the hierarchy, and continually presenting arms to God in the recurrent rhythm of an exacting liturgy. In justification of her stand, this steel-clad figure could quote Scripture:

'For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of This World, against spiritual wickedness in high places. Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to withstand in the evil day, and, having done all, to stand.'³

The subconscious purpose of this heavy institutional panoply in which the Tridentine Church had encased herself was assuredly a determination to outlast the very toughest of the contemporary secular institutions of This World—above all, the upstart civilizations of the third generation. In the twentieth century of the Christian Era a Catholic critic of the Reformation could argue with force, in the light of four hundred years of Protestant history, that a Protestant impatience of even the lighter equipment of pre-Tridentine Catholicism had been premature. Yet that verdict, even if cogent, would not prove either that the casting off of impedimenta would always be a mistake or that the Tridentine multiplication of them had not also been an error. Institutional armour is possibly an indispensable means of survival for a Church Militant on Earth, but it is none the less certainly a mundane embarrassment which makes the Church Militant by that much spiritually inferior to the Kingdom of Heaven, where 'they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels',⁴ and where each individual catches God's spirit from personal communion with Him, 'like light caught from a leaping flame'.⁵

The awe inspired by the spectacle of Tridentine Catholicism in the heart of a twentieth-century Christian observer of a different persuasion

¹ Matt. x. 36, following Micah vii. 6.

² Catholics, of course, did not admit that their devotion to their church amounted to an idolization of her.

³ Eph. vi. 12-13.

⁴ Mark xii. 25.

⁵ Plato's Letters, No. 7, quoted in III. iii. 245, and on p. 525, above.

was tempered by reminiscences of an Assyrian 'corpse in armour' standing magnificently but not invincibly at bay in the breach at Nineveh in 612 B.C.¹ and of long since extinct giant reptiles which had 'swelled and hardened up to their doom'² by assiduously reinforcing their carapaces, plate upon plate, till they had condemned themselves to stagnate 'awash in pools where water would bear some of their otherwise crushing weight.'³ In the museums of a latter-day Western World the fossilized bones of the dinosaurs and the cap-à-pie steel carapaces of fifteenth-century Western men-at-arms bore concordant witness that 'there is no armour against Fate';⁴ and the same truth was advertised in the spectacle of a derelict Great Wall of China and of desolate termite-built towers of Babel that would surpass the Great Pyramid in massiveness and the Empire State Building in height if translated into human dimensions, scale for scale.⁵

'A social pattern no longer open to change has, in fact, quite unconsciously signed its own death warrant. Just at the very moment when the system seems most perfected, when the structure seems most complete, and when inner peace and harmony seem to give the way of life a kind of perfection, the cracks in the structure make their appearance, the fission becomes evident, and the changes so long resisted precipitate a cataclysm.'⁶

The verdict⁷ upon the idolization of an institution, ecclesiastical or secular, is: 'Whosoever will save his life shall lose it.'⁸

We have now laid our finger on some of the causes of regression from higher religions to vain repetitions of secular civilizations, and in each case we have found that the calamity is precipitated, not by a *saetva necessitas*⁹ or any other external force, but by an 'Original Sin' which is innate in a terrestrial Human Nature.¹⁰

¹ See IV. iv. 484.

² Heard, Gerald: *The Source of Civilisation* (London 1935, Cape), p. 71, quoted in IV. iv. 427.

⁴ Shirley, James: *Death the Leveller*.

³ Heard, op. cit., loc. cit.

⁵ See III. iii. 107-8.

⁶ Tannenbaum, F.: *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (New York 1947, Knopf), pp. 108-9.

⁷ Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'A Roman Catholic critic would reply to you here, in words that you so often quote, "Respicere finem". The whole of the foregoing passage is anticipation: it has not yet come true. Is it not the fact that the Roman Church is incomparably more vigorous and influential in the twentieth century than at any time since the Council of Trent? Whereas in 1870 it inscribed the Infallibility of the Pope among its dogmas, at the apparent nadir of its fortunes, as an act of defiance, in 1950 it was able still further to scandalize a secular Western World by adding the dogma of the Assumption of the Virgin as an act of self-confidence. Is it not equally likely, at the time of writing, that the Roman Church in its Tridentine panoply will be the only Western institution capable of challenging and withstanding the neo-pagan totalitarian Communist state, and is not this borne out by the particular fear and hatred with which Moscow regards the Vatican? If this be so, the figure of the dinosaur's carapace will be less apt than that of a long and successfully sustained siege, and the Tridentine phase of Catholic history may appear in retrospect like the Churchillian phase of British history from the fall of France to D-Day. You prejudice the outcome. "Respicere finem".'

A Catholic friend of the writer's comments on the same passage: 'The odd thing about the post-Tridentine and twentieth-century Catholicism, surely, is its eternal youth—the wonderful sprouting of new orders and congregations of both religious and lay folk: the "Jocists", the Grail, the "Pays de Mission" priests in the banlieue of Paris, the Society of the Divine Word (Pater Schmidt and the Chinese cardinal). Even at the time of the Counter-Reformation itself there had not been such a flourishing of mystics.'

⁸ Luke ix. 24. Cp. Matt. xvi. 25 and x. 39.

⁹ See IV. iv. 7-39.

¹⁰ See IV. iv. 120.

(II) THE BOW IN THE CLOUD

(a) AUGURIES OF SPIRITUAL RECOVERY

If regressions from higher religions are effects of Original Sin, are we driven to conclude that, since Original Sin is reborn into This World at the birth of every new-born child,¹ such regressions are inevitable? If they are, this would mean that the challenge of militancy on Earth was so prohibitively severe² that no church would ever be capable of standing up to it in the long run; and that conclusion, in turn, would drive us back towards the view that the churches are good for nothing better than to serve as ephemeral chrysalises for vainly repetitive civilizations.³ Is this the last word? Before we resign ourselves to a suggestion that God's inflowing light is doomed to be perpetually overwhelmed by an uncomprehending darkness, let us cast our eyes back once again over the series of spiritual illuminations brought into the World by the epiphanies of the higher religions; for these chapters of past spiritual history may prove to be auguries of spiritual recovery from the regressions to which a Church Militant is prone.

We have noticed⁴ that the successive milestones in Man's spiritual advance that are inscribed with the names of Abraham, Moses, the Prophets, and Christ all stand at points where a surveyor of the course of secular civilization would report breaks in the road and breakdowns in the traffic; and the empirical evidence has given us reason to believe that this coincidence of high points in Man's religious history with low points in his secular history may be one of the 'laws' of Man's terrestrial life. If so, we should expect also to find evidence of the working of a converse 'law' that the high points in secular history coincide with low points in religious history, and that the religious achievements that accompany mundane declines and falls are therefore not merely spiritual advances but are also spiritual recoveries. They are, of course, presented as recoveries in the traditional version of the story.

'The call of Abraham', for example, which the recent discoveries of our Modern Western archaeologists have enabled us to locate, in our chart of secular history, as a spiritual accompaniment to the secular catastrophe of the downfall of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, is presented in the Hebrew legend as a sequel—which was God's opening move for the redemption of Mankind from the consequences of the Fall of Adam—to a defiance of God by the self-confident builders of a mundane Tower of Babel.⁵ The mission of Moses which, in the same secular chart, appears as an accompaniment of the comparable secular calamity of the break-up of 'the New Empire' of Egypt, is presented in the legend as a move to rescue God's Chosen People from a spiritually unpropitious enjoyment of the flesh pots of Egypt in her heyday by

¹ 'Ethics, like backbones, come out of non-existence into existence *de novo* in each individual development' (Huxley, Julian: *Evolutionary Ethics*, the Romanes Lecture, 1943, reprinted in Huxley, T. H. and J.: *Evolution and Ethics*, 1893-1943 (London 1947, Pilot Press), p. 107.

² See II. ii. 260.

³ This view has been examined on pp. 392-419, above.

⁴ On pp. 423-5, above; see also pp. 701-2 and 762, below.

⁵ Gen. xii. 1-6, against the background of Gen. xi.

exposing them to the spiritually fortifying experience of hungering and thirsting in the wilderness.¹ The Prophets of Israel and Judah, whose *floruit* is located by the secular historian in the Time of Troubles of a broken-down Syriac Civilization, were moved by a compelling concern (which, in their own belief, was a divine command) to preach to their countrymen a repentance from the spiritual backslidings into which Israel had lapsed when he had broken out of the wilderness into a land flowing with milk and honey which had not yet been blighted by Assyrian militarism. The Ministry of Christ, whose Passion, as a secular historian sees it, is fraught with all the anguish of an Hellenic Time of Troubles, is presented in the Gospels as an intervention of God Himself for the purpose of extending to the whole of Mankind a covenant previously made by God with an Israel whose epigoni in Jesus' generation had alloyed their spiritual heritage with a Pharisaic formalism, a Sadducean materialism, an Herodian opportunism, and a Zealot fanaticism.

On this showing, four blazing outbursts of spiritual illumination had been sequels to spiritual eclipses besides having been accompaniments of mundane disasters, and we may surmise that this sequence of spiritual recoveries had been something more than a happy chapter of accidents. In another context² we have observed that physically hard environments are apt to be the nurseries of mundane achievements, and, on this analogy, it is to be expected that spiritually hard environments will have a correspondingly stimulating effect in the field of religious endeavour. A spiritually hard environment may be defined as being the atmosphere of 'the city of swine'³ in which the Soul's spiritual aspirations are swamped by material well-being. This Circe's magic is too much for the general run of Mankind; and in such adverse spiritual circumstances a majority is apt to find its way, like Odysseus' shipmates, into the sorceress' pigsties. Yet all is not lost; for the miasma of worldly prosperity that stupefies the mass will provoke spiritually sensitive and strenuous souls into an utter defiance of the charms of This World. Even on the relatively low level of barbarian virtue, the fortitude of a single hero may avail, as Odysseus showed, to save the situation; and at the level of the higher religions the failure of the priest is the signal for the prophet.

We have noticed, in passing,⁴ the classic case of the early Christian martyrs who bade defiance to the bourgeois comfort and security of a Trajanic, Hadrianic, and Antonine Age by insisting on sacrificing their lives for a moral punctilio. Their spiritual heroism outraged pagan contemporaries who would fain have made believe that a transient 'Indian Summer' was not October but June, yet were uneasily aware that the Christian martyrs' apparently fantastic *contemptus mundi* was inspired by a devastating insight. The same insight was displayed by Saint Francis of Assisi when he revolted, in disgust and alarm, against the empty life of luxury that his purse-proud father had provided for him,

¹ See II. ii. 24-25.

² In II. ii. 31-73.

³ Plato: *Respublica*, 369B-372D, cited in II. i. 193, n. 1, and II. ii. 23, n. 2.

⁴ In IV. iv. 60-61.

and raised the rebel standard of Holy Poverty against a bourgeois prosperity that, in the Medieval Western Christendom of his day, was still only in its budding infancy. Saint Francis' father was the prototype of the commercially successful Western business man who was to inherit the Earth in the course of the next seven centuries; and, in an epoch in which *Homo Economicus Occidentalis* was thus going from strength to strength, it exasperated him to hear the Franciscan repetition of Saint Gregory's cry: 'Behold, the World that commands our love is fugitive!'¹ Yet, some eight hundred years after Pietro Bernardone's day, the apparently boundless vista of material progress, that had displayed itself as alluringly as ever to a twelfth-century Umbrian clothier's nineteenth-century English and American successors, had been effaced by the grimly different prospect that Saint Gregory had once depicted.

'To-day there is on every side death, on every side grief, on every side desolation; on every side we are being smitten, on every side our cup is being filled with draughts of bitterness. Yet the lusts of the flesh so blind our spirit that even a world that has turned bitter still charms us. We pursue it as it flees from us; we cling to it as it collapses; and, since we cannot arrest its collapse, we are sinking with it while we hold on to it in its fall. Once upon a time this world could hold us by its sheer attractiveness; to-day this poor world is so riddled with such fearful afflictions that the World itself now drives us into the arms of God.'²

Saint Gregory had divined that souls alienated from God by mundane prosperity might be reconciled to God by the agony of seeing an earthly paradise turn to dust and ashes. As the light of common day faded away into the darkness of night, the clouds of glory might shine out again. Was the experience of sixth-century Rome an augury for a twentieth-century world? In the twelfth-century springtime of Western mundane prosperity the vision of Saint Francis had been out of range of the spiritual capacity of *l'homme moyen sensuel*, as the vision of the martyrs Nereus and Achilles had been in the second-century 'Indian Summer' of Hellenism. But might not the pelting blows of mundane adversity avail to strike the scales from off the eyes of the grandchildren of Silas Lapham,³ as dumb sermons in stones had once opened the eyes of Gregory's congregation to the truth which the pastor of their souls was preaching to them among the ruins of Imperial Rome? If the Palaeo-Paganism of the aeon of human history before the epiphany of the higher religions had never been able to extinguish a spark of True Religion that lay smothered in pagan souls,⁴ and if the crashing fall of the civilizations of the second generation had stimulated this long-hidden spiritual fire to burst out into a blazing flame, was it likely that a latter-day Neo-Paganism would be capable of putting out the conflagration?

This 'vain repetition of the heathen'⁵ lacked the stability and the

¹ 'Ecce mundus qui diligitur fugit' (Saint Gregory the Great: 'Sermo Habita ad Populum in Basilicâ Sanctorum Nerei et Achillei, Die Natalis Eorum', in *Homiliae Quadraginta in Evangelia*, No. xxviii (Migne, J.-P.: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. lxxvi, col. 1212), from which other sentences have been quoted in IV. iv. 60-61).

² Saint Gregory, op. cit., partly quoted already in loc. cit.

³ Howells, W. D.: *The Rise of Silas Lapham*, reprinted in 'The World's Classics' series (London 1948, Cumberlege); first published at Boston, Mass., in A.D. 1884.

⁴ See pp. 759-68, below.

⁵ See pp. 446-7, above.

staying-power of its palaeo-pagan prototype, in the measure in which it surpassed a Palaeo-Paganism in driving-force; and in this last respect the difference between these two generations of Paganism was great indeed. The Neo-Paganism was a high-powered enormity¹ charged with the spiritual potency of higher religions whose place this Abomination of Desolation had sought to usurp; and this spiritual force was much greater than that of a pristine pagan Human Nature; for, if it is true that 'human passions are always characterised by unlimited and demonic potencies of which animal life is innocent',² this is true *a fortiori* of human passions reinforced by a powerful higher religious inspiration.

On the morrow of a Second World War, this daemonic goad was threatening to drive a Westernizing World into the supreme public crime and catastrophe of physical self-destruction through a third world war waged with atomic weapons; but this appalling prospect was merely the unveiling of a goal towards which a secularized Western Society had been heading ever since it had erupted out of a medieval *Respublica Christiana*. This terminus of the broad road along which he was travelling had not caught the eye of Modern Western Man during the deceptive interlude of prosperous mundane progress that had begun with the ending of the Western Wars of Religion and had continued until August 1914. Secular-minded Westerners who had lived and died in those halcyon generations had imagined that their utilitarian version of Neo-Paganism, in which all 'enthusiasm' was anathema, was the impregnable essence of their agnostic faith, whereas in reality this low temper was no more than a temporary reaction against the effervescent ferocity of the Wars of Religion. In the Western 'Age of Reason' this ferocity had been driven underground without being eradicated from Western souls; and it was to erupt again, with a force accumulated through a long repression, in the ensuing 'Age of the Wars of Nationality and Ideology'.

After a Second World War a world that was being secularized in the process of being Westernized was faced with a choice between two alternative possibilities. One possibility was that the vicious momentum of a Neo-Paganism that had run away headlong with the bit between its teeth might carry a Westernizing World over the precipice that had been the bourne of all other civilizations known to History; and in that event the flame of Religion might flare up again out of the wreckage as it had once burst out of the ruins of a Hellenized World. The other possibility was that neo-pagan souls might be smitten with a creative contrition, as well as with an unnerving dismay, by the revelation of the destructive powers and impulses which their reactionary religion had evoked in them, and that they might seek salvation—and haply find it—by turning again to the divers higher religions in which their fathers had received partial revelations of the Beatific Vision.³ In the catastrophic event, Man would be relieved of further spiritual responsibility at the cost of

¹ The particular sense in which the word 'enormity' is used in this Study has been defined in IV. iv. 133-7.

² Niebuhr, R.: *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. i (London 1941, Nisbet), p. 191, quoted on p. 508, above.

³ See pp. 442-3, above, and pp. 716-36, below.

physical annihilation; but if he took the alternative and less melodramatic course he would have to abide a bout of those perplexing and tormenting questions that are the salt of spiritual life.

In returning to Religion, would a neo-pagan soul be finding her way back out of the broad way that leadeth to destruction into the narrow way which leadeth unto life?¹ Or would she be merely burying herself in a blind alley? Should she hearken to a voice saying, 'See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil',² and to an oracle declaring 'Except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God'?³ Or should she be influenced by the jibes of Mephistopheles pointing out that, whether or no a man can enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born,⁴ a baby kangaroo is certainly not entering into the Kingdom of God⁵ when it creeps back into the cosy physical *Nirvāna* of its mother's pouch. Was the still small voice luring the Soul into a sluggard's *Faulbett*,⁶ or was it calling it to Eternal Life? That was the fateful question to which Mankind would have to find its answer, if Mankind survived.

(b) POSSIBILITIES OF SPIRITUAL GROWTH

Would a return to Religion be a signal spiritual advance? Or would it be an abject and inept attempt at an impossible evasion of the hard facts of Life as we know it? Our answer to this question will partly depend on our estimate of the possibilities of spiritual growth in This World.

In a previous chapter⁷ we have touched upon the probability (as it appeared to be on the morrow of a Second World War) that the literally world-wide expansion of a secular Modern Western Civilization would translate itself into political form at no distant date through the establishment of a universal state which would fulfil at last the ideal of a polity of this species by embracing the entire habitable and traversable surface of the planet in a commonwealth that would have no physical frontiers because it would have no neighbours. In the same context⁸ we have considered the possibility that, within some such literally oecumenical mundane framework, the respective adherents of the living higher religions might come to recognize that their once rival forms of worship were so many alternative approaches to the One True God along avenues offering divers partial glimpses of an identical Beatific Vision. The differences between the divers religions, and between the divers sects of each religion, which had so long been stumbling-blocks for faith and targets for the sceptic's arrows, might then prove to correspond to differences between divers psychological types of Human Nature which required a diversity of spiritual means and methods if they were to arrive at an identical spiritual goal.⁹ We threw out the idea that, in this light, the historic living churches might eventually give expression to the unity in their diversity by growing together into a single terrestrial

¹ Matt. vii. 13-14. Cp. Luke xiii. 24.

³ John iii. 3.

⁴ John iii. 4.

⁶ Goethe: *Faust*, I. 1692, quoted in II. i. 281.

⁷ On pp. 433-6, above.

⁹ This possibility is discussed on pp. 716-36, below.

² Deut. xxx. 15.

⁵ John iii. 5.

⁸ On pp. 436-42, above.

Church Militant. Supposing that this were to happen, would it mean that the Kingdom of Heaven would then have been established on Earth? In a Westernizing World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, this was an inevitable question, because some kind of earthly paradise was the goal of most of the current secular ideologies. If this question were to be answered in the affirmative, that would, in the writer's belief, be a misconception which would give Mephistopheles an opening for sarcasm and Mankind an occasion for disillusionment. In the writer's belief, however, the true answer was in the negative, and this for several reasons.

One manifest reason was exhibited by the nature of Society and the nature of Man. Society is nothing but the common ground between the fields of action of a number of personalities;¹ and human personality, at any rate as we know it in This World, has an innate capacity for evil as well as for good. This meant, as we have often observed,² that, in any terrestrial society, unless and until terrestrial Human Nature should undergo a moral mutation which would make an essential change in its character, the possibility of evil, as well as of good, would be born into the World afresh with every child, and would never be wholly ruled out as long as that person remained alive. The challenge, ordeal, struggle, and drama of Man's spiritual life repeat themselves in the experience of each single soul—in contrast to the impersonal accumulation and transmission, from one generation to another, of Man's scientific knowledge and technical 'know-how'.³ This was as much as to say that the replacement of a multiplicity of civilizations and a diversity of higher religions by a single Church Militant on Earth would not have purged Human Nature of Original Sin; and this moral limitation on the possibility of perfection in This World had a political implication which limited the possibility still further. So long as Original Sin continued to be an element in terrestrial Human Nature, there would always be work in This World for Caesar to do; and, since the labourer is worthy of his hire,⁴ and thankless tasks command high salaries, there would still be Caesar's things to be rendered to Caesar, as well as God's things to God.⁵ Human Society on Earth would not be able wholly to dispense with institutions; and, since institutions are relations between human beings that extend beyond the narrow range of a direct personal intercourse in which love can make regulation superfluous,⁶ an institution can never be founded entirely on the voluntary basis of the individual's will to make it work. If it is to be a going concern, it must be reinforced by habit and be backed, in the last resort, by the sanction of force. In fact, institutions are perfect reflections of the moral imperfection of Human Nature; and these social products of Original Sin would always have to be administered by a secular arm.

A state of society in which this secular power would be subordinated to the ecclesiastical would be a higher and a happier dispensation than a 'Caesaro-papal' absolute régime in which there would be no dis-

¹ See III. iii. 217-48.

² See X. ix. 697-704, below.

³ Matt. xxii. 21.

⁴ e.g. in IV. iv. 120, and on p. 551, above.

⁵ Luke x. 7. Cp. Matt. x. 10.

⁶ See I. i. 454-5.

inction between the Church and the secular community; but to subordinate the secular power would not be to eliminate it; and, if the Church did seek to eliminate the State altogether, she would be defeating her own highest purposes; for Caesar *gleichgeschaltet* would live on underground in the constitution of his ecclesiastical supplanter, and a prison-house of totalitarianism that had been broken open by the Church's emancipation from the State would be reconstituted through the Church's false step of usurping the State's place instead of being content simply to vindicate her own. In looking into the causes of regression,¹ we have seen the Hildebrandine Church drawn into the arena of power politics—with tragic consequences for Western Christendom as well as for the Church herself—merely through a dispute over the line of demarcation between the ecclesiastical and the secular domain; and we have seen the Tridentine Church exposing herself to a risk of incurring the doom of Lot's wife through putting too much of her treasure into her concern to save her life as a terrestrial institution.²

The historic tragedy that had overtaken a Medieval Western Christian Church as the penalty for fighting Caesar with mundane weapons gave some inkling of the fate that a church would bring upon herself if she were to go to the length of stepping outright into Caesar's blood-empurpled shoes; and so, even if a united and concordant Church Militant were to have won a fully world-wide allegiance and to have entered into the heritage of the last of the civilizations, the Church on Earth would not be a perfect embodiment here on Earth of the Kingdom of Heaven. The Church on Earth would still have sin and sorrow to contend with as well as to profit by as a means of grace in a world where learning comes through suffering, and she might find herself unable, for a long time to come, to divest herself entirely of her historic panoply of ecclesiastical institutions. Some residue of her ancient institutional armaments would remain indispensable to her so long as she had to go on struggling for mundane survival; but a still necessary incubus would none the less inevitably still weigh her down—as

¹ On pp. 545–50, above.

² Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'On p. 549, above, your criticism of the Tridentine Church is that it has encased itself in "institutional armour". But institutional armour is not a weapon peculiar to Caesar: as you say above on p. 545, a church has to act and exist institutionally as well as a secular society. To this extent, therefore, the Church is not "fighting Caesar with his own weapons" in the implied sense of weapons to which she is not herself entitled. But further: the characteristic weapons of the Tridentine Church have been: (i) the tightening up of dogma, from the Creed of Pius IV down to the definition of 1950; (ii) the Holy Office and the Index, for the suppression of heresy; (iii) the founding of new orders [of religious], of whom the Jesuits (though chronologically they are just pre-Tridentine) are the most important. Now, none of these were "Caesar's weapons". Indeed the relationship is exactly the reverse: (ii) and (iii) are weapons which have made such a strong impression on Caesar that in his new totalitarian mood he has set about imitating them for his own purposes, in the shape of secret police, censorship, storm-troopers, and stakhanovites. It is therefore rather a case of Caesar fighting the Church with the Church's weapons (compare what you say above, on p. 554). And, if you reply that the Church had no business to use weapons like the Inquisition and the Index in the first place, that is a point certainly on which Christians will legitimately differ (and I will tend to agree with you); but are not (i) and (iii) the appropriate, indeed the ultimate, weapons of any Church?'

As regards (i), the writer of this Study would refer to what he has said about Theology in previous chapters of this Part.

Christian was oppressed, till an advanced stage of his painful pilgrimage, by the burden of sin that still lay bound upon his back.

A socially victorious Church Militant, contemplating this forbidding prospect, might hear the insidious voice of Mephistopheles whispering 'defeatism' in her ear. 'I suspect you are beginning to realize,' the tempter might insinuate, 'that your victory is an illusion. It could never, of course, have been anything else; for, after all, you had set yourself, hadn't you, an impossible task. "Thy Kingdom come! Thy will be done in Earth as it is in Heaven!" Why, that is the very definition of just what is inherently unattainable. Who lives in Rome must do as Rome does; and in This World, which is Mankind's concentration camp, there are only two alternative practicable courses of action for Man to choose between (a prisoner is lucky to have a choice, even if only between two extremes). Man can either put the whole of his treasure in This World, or can withdraw his last farthing from his terrestrial banking account. Bet your life on This World, and you can throw yourself wholeheartedly into the satisfying enterprise of turning a prison-yard into an earthly paradise; give up This World as a bad job, and you can detach yourself from mundane entanglements with a no less satisfying singleness of mind. In either of these directions there is an open road, but surely you can see that there is no middle course. If you had paid more attention to History, you would have observed that the whole of this very tricky *terrain* had been reconnoitred long ago by earlier pioneers. The way of detachment has been surveyed—yes, and traversed too—by Epicurean, Stoic, and Buddhist philosophers; the trail leading towards an earthly paradise has been blazed by those practical men of action who have discovered the secret of tapping organized collective human power. The facts are public knowledge, yet you have light-heartedly ignored them. What levity! What impudence! You have been just asking for disillusionment. No wonder you are down in the mouth!'

In this Mephistophelian attack on the ideal of a Church Militant on Earth the one true statement is that the topic is familiar ground. We have explored it already¹ in surveying the alternative ways of life—the ways of Archaism, Futurism, Detachment, Transfiguration—that present themselves to souls challenged by the disintegration of a mundane society, and we have discovered that there is no salvation for the Soul in seeking either an earthly paradise or a *Nirvāna*. Salvation is to be sought and found in a transfiguration of This World by an irradiation of the Kingdom of God—an intellectual paradox which is an historical fact. The truth is that This World is neither a kingdom for Leviathan nor an irreclaimable spiritual wilderness, but a province of the Kingdom of God. It is a rebellious province which has been betrayed by the sin of pride into ungratefully and unlawfully declaring its independence and has thereby brought upon itself the self-imposed penalties of misrule and distress; but this act of rebellion has neither invalidated God's sovereignty nor alienated His love, and He is concerned to re-inaugurate His rule—not because He has any need of this insignificant province's products and revenues, but because His compassion for His creatures

¹ In V. vi. 49-168.

makes Him yearn to redeem them from their self-inflicted sin and suffering.

'How think ye? If a man have an hundred sheep, and one of them be gone astray, doth he not leave the ninety and nine, and goeth into the mountains, and seeketh that which is gone astray? And, if so be that he find it, verily I say unto you, he rejoiceth more of that sheep than of the ninety and nine which went not astray. Even so, it is not the will of your Father which is in Heaven that one of these little ones should perish.'¹

The human shepherd has to rescue his lost sheep by an act of power in which the dumb animal plays a purely passive part; but God's human flock has gone astray, not by innocent misadventure, but by a rebellious act of will which a repressive act of power could override but not reverse. Man's rebellion against God can only be extinguished by a conversion of the rebel's heart.

'I say unto you that . . . joy shall be in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons which need no repentance.'²

God's province in This World has to be reclaimed by a divine king who wins the sinner's heart by becoming incarnate and by dying for him on the Cross; and Christ's work has to be followed up by representatives of a Church Militant that is in the World yet not of it.

'The direct identification of the Church, as an organised institution taking its part in the process of history, with the Kingdom of God . . . is just as bad theologically as the view which regards the Church as a mere instrument in preparation for the Kingdom of God. The only wholesome view is one which regards it as being constituted as the Church by the powers of the Kingdom of God within it, and yet as being always composed of people still citizens of This World; so that those powers manifest themselves partially and fitfully, and the historical Church is a mixed body.'³

In mundane history the device of dual citizenship had been a stroke of genius that had made unity in diversity practical politics at the cost of putting an exacting psychological strain on the citizen who had to reconcile his two allegiances. This had been the *arcanum imperii* of the Roman Commonwealth and of every parochial federal state in the Hellenic and in the Western body social. In the divine government of the *Civitas Dei* the same method had been used for the higher purpose of bringing back a dissident province into conformity with God's will through a voluntary return of rebel souls to their pristine allegiance; and the tension was proportionately greater in the souls of God's human agents who, in order to do His will by serving Him in His work of reclamation through love and not through force, had to live, so long as they were on duty in this arduously pacific campaign, as citizens of This World and of the *Civitas Dei* simultaneously.

The citizen of This World who has deliberately repudiated his

¹ Matt. xviii. 12-14.

² Luke xv. 7.

³ William Temple in a letter, written in August 1943, that is quoted in Iremonger, F. A.: *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury* (London 1948, Cumberlege), p. 420.

allegiance to God, or has never been aware of being the lawful subject of a heavenly sovereign, can make the best of This Life under the consoling illusion that he is living in the best of all possible worlds; but the citizen of This World who is loyal to his higher allegiance is bound in consequence to feel—and to suffer through feeling—that, in working for God in This World during a spiritual Time of Troubles that is coeval with terrestrial history, he is living and breathing in an element that is not native to his soul—like a diver working at sea-bottom on the salvaging of a foundered ship, or like the denizen of a Mediterranean *dólina*¹ who, in the fantasy of a Platonic myth, one day finds his way up to the true surface of the Earth.

‘In my belief the Earth is of a vast order of magnitude, and only a tiny fraction of it is accounted for by the habitat of those of us who live between the Straits of Gibraltar and the eastern end of the Black Sea (τοὺς μεχρὶ Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος). We live round this [Mediterranean] sea like ants or frogs round a pond; and no doubt there are many other human societies living in many other similar localities in other parts of the World. All over the World there must be many such *dólinas* of divers forms and sizes, in which water, fog and air have collected. The Earth itself, though, stands clear in that clear sky which contains the stars and which goes by the name of Aether in the standard vocabulary of the astronomers. The *colluvies* that is perpetually collecting in the Earth’s *dólinas* is the Aether’s sediment. We denizens of the *dólinas* imagine, in our ignorance, that we are living on the Earth’s surface, as some denizen of the bottom of the Sea might imagine that he was living on the Sea’s surface and might suppose that the Sea was the Sky because he could see the Sun and the rest of the stars through the water. I am assuming, of course, that he is too sluggish and feeble ever to have been able to reach the surface, emerge, poke his head out of the Sea into our habitat, and behold how much clearer and lovelier this is than his own; I am also assuming that he has never heard of our habitat at second hand. Well, we are in precisely the situation of my imaginary inhabitant of the Sea. Living, as we live, in a *dólina*, we imagine ourselves to be living on the Earth’s surface, and we call the Air the Sky, under the illusion that this Air is the medium—which can only be the Sky—through which the stars are travelling in their courses. The reality, though, is the same in our actual case as in my imaginary one. We are too feeble and sluggish to be capable of making our way out into the stratosphere; but, if anyone *could* reach its upper limit—for instance, by contriving to fly—and could then poke his head out, he would see the counterpart of what fish see here when they poke their heads out of the Sea and behold our habitat. If he had the stamina to endure this beatific vision, he would recognise that these are the true Sky and the true Light and the true Earth.’²

This Platonic conceit is an apt simile of Life on Earth. An earth-bound citizen of This World is the unsuspecting prisoner of his inferior habitat; an involuntary citizen of This World who is at the same time a conscious and active citizen of the *Civitas Dei* is like the fish which has put its head out into the Air or the flying man who has put his head

¹ The Serbo-Croat name for a precipitous-sided depression produced by the decomposition of limestone. The same formation can be seen by an English student of geology, nearer home, in the limestone country in Westmorland, and, farther afield, in the *cenotes* of Yucatan.

² Plato: *Phaedo*, 109.

out into the Aether. The soldier serving in the Church Militant on Earth knows that This World is a spiritual battlefield that is not his spiritual home.

'It is written of Cain that he founded a commonwealth; but Abel—true to the type of the pilgrim and sojourner that he was—did not do the like. For the Commonwealth of the Saints is not of This World, though it does give birth to citizens here in whose persons it performs its pilgrimage until the time of its kingdom shall come—the time when it will gather them all together.'¹

If we adopt this Augustinian Platonic *Weltanschauung* as our own and attempt, in the light of it, to envisage terrestrial history *sub specie aeternitatis*, what significance shall we find in the idea of progress in This World?

In the Age of the Civilizations, progress, in so far as human minds had entertained this idea at all, had often been identified with the progressive improvement of some terrestrial institution: a tribe, a city-state, an empire, a church, a system of knowledge or 'know-how', a school of art, a code of morals. If this conception of the meaning of progress were credible to the pilgrim-citizens on Earth of the *Civitas Dei*, they would indeed be of all men most miserable,² since they are aware that, in a terrestrial life infected with Original Sin, neither souls nor institutions can carry progress to perfection, and are also aware that, whatever may be the ultimate destiny of souls, institutions are earth-bound creations of Man in an imperfect world whose limitations they can never transcend.³ We have seen, in fact, that the idolization of institutions is an intellectual and spiritual error that entails the nemesis of social disaster, and that the self-inflicted penalty for this perversity is the greater, the nobler the institution that is sacrilegiously taken as a substitute for the One True God.⁴ The last word on all institutions had been pronounced in the verdict on one master-institution which the Gospel attributed to Christ: 'And he said unto them: The Sabbath was made for Man, and not Man for the Sabbath.'⁵ Man was not made for the Sabbath or for any other institution because Man was made for God. 'Thou hast made us for Thee, and our heart is unquiet until it finds rest in Thee.'⁶ The touchstone of the value of an institution is whether it helps or hinders Man to find his way back to his Maker, and an institution will become an obstacle to Man's true end of glorifying God and enjoying Him forever if it is taken as being an end in itself instead of being used as the mere means that is all that it truly is.

But, if institutions are means and not ends, what is the significance and the purpose of the social heritage, far transcending the temporal and spatial limits of any single human life on Earth, which institutions

¹ Saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book XV, chap. 1, quoted in V. vi. 366.

² 1 Cor. xv. 19.

³ If the writer of the Book of Revelation had been the denizen, not of a circum-Mediterranean Roman Empire, but of a twentieth-century Westernizing World, his wishful thought in chapter xxi, verse 1, would assuredly have been 'there were no more institutions' instead of 'there was no more sea'.

⁴ See IV. iv. 303-423, and pp. 548-9, above.

⁵ Mark ii. 27.

⁶ 'Fecisti nos ad Te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te' (Saint Augustine: *Confessions*, Book I, chap. 1).

embody, preserve, and transmit? All men of good will feel that it is God's will that, in their transit through This World, they should spend themselves in labouring for other human beings, living in distant places or destined to be born at remote future dates, whom they will never meet in the flesh; their only means of serving these unknown brethren of theirs is to make their mark for good on Man's social heritage by leaving some institution better than they found it; and they not only feel that this terrestrial duty is compatible with their allegiance to the Kingdom of God; they feel that they would be traitors to the *Civitas Dei* if they held back from playing their part in establishing its rule in the form of a terrestrial Society in an imperfect world through which they are making their brief pilgrim-passages. Is there any solution of this apparent contradiction?

A first step towards resolving it is to remind ourselves that in This World, as in the rest of the Kingdom of God, all spiritual reality, and therefore all spiritual value, resides in persons; for this means that a social heritage which alienates souls from God and leads them to disaster, when it is idolized as an end in itself, has a legitimate use and a genuine value in so far as it is dedicated to a beneficent service for individual human beings in their brief lives on Earth. Improvements in this social heritage, which register social 'progress', are to be estimated and valued according to their effect in increasing the possibilities for individual human beings in This World to live good lives. In taking this as the criterion of progress, the adherents of the higher religions will have the suffrages of any pagans who are innocent of Leviathan-worship; but, whereas a good pagan will work for an improvement in material opportunities for individual human beings through an enrichment of the social heritage in terms of mundane values, the pilgrim-citizen on Earth of the Kingdom of God will work to enrich the social heritage in terms of spiritual values in the hope of thereby helping God to create opportunities for souls to come nearer to doing His will during their transits through This World.

Servants of God will be aware that spiritual progress, in this sense, will incidentally bring mundane progress in its train. 'Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.'¹ They will also be aware that, on the principle of Solomon's Choice, the mundane progress that will be made in this incidental way will be far greater than the utmost that could be attained by aiming direct at a mundane goal.² But they will never lose sight of the truth that, in praying for progress in This World in the words 'Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done in Earth as it is in Heaven', they are praying for a progressive increase in the means of grace within the reach of souls during their service in a Church Militant on Earth that will never be a perfect embodiment of the Kingdom of Heaven—though, in this refractory terrestrial province, it is the Kingdom's lawfully commissioned and effectively serving representative. The Lord's Prayer, prayed with this intention, gives an answer, in the form of a spiritual act, to our perplexing question how, if spiritual progress in Time in

¹ Matt. vi. 33. Cp. Luke xii. 31.

² See pp. 388, 510, and 546-8, above.

This World means progress achieved by individual souls during their brief passages through This World to the Other World, there can be at the same time such a thing in This World as spiritual progress taking place over a Time-span far longer than that of individual lives on Earth—a span running into the thousands of years that had been taken by the historical development of the higher religions from the rise of Tammuz-worship and the generation of Abraham to the Christian Era.

This historical evidence for progress did not necessarily invalidate the Christian view that there was no reason to expect any change in unredeemed Human Nature so long as human life on Earth went on. It was conceivable that, till the face of this planet should cease to be physically habitable by Man, the endowment of individual human beings with natural goodness, and their infection with Original Sin, might remain about the same, on the average, as they had always been so far as human knowledge went. The most primitive societies known to Modern Western anthropologists in the life or by report¹ presented examples both of natural goodness and of innate wickedness that were on a spiritual par with those presented in the histories of the highest mundane civilizations and highest religious societies that had yet come into existence. There had been no perceptible variation in the average sample of Human Nature in the past; there was no warrant in the evidence of History for expecting any great variation in the future either for better or for worse. The likewise Christian hope of a spiritually new species of personality, of which the first-fruits² had already been manifested in Christ and in the Saints, might never receive fulfilment in a regeneration of Mankind in the mass—even in the vastly prolonged possible aeon of life on Earth which was the scientific setting of this Christian hope in the minds of latter-day Western philosophers.³ Yet, even if this hope of a future spiritual mutation of terrestrial Human Nature, which was authorized by Christian doctrine and by a post-Christian Western scientific *Weltanschauung* alike, were never to be realized, the past history of religious revelation would still bear witness that an unregenerate Human Nature was nevertheless a field in which there might be spiritual progress in Time extending over an unlimited number of successive generations of Human Life on Earth; for this history bore witness to the opportunity that, in despite of the spiritual imperfection of Human Nature, was offered to souls, by way of the learning that comes through suffering, for attaining to a closer communion with God, and becoming less unlike Him, during their brief individual transits through this mortal life.

What Christ, with the Prophets before Him and the Saints after Him, had bequeathed to the Christian Church, and what the Church, by virtue of having been fashioned into an incomparably effective institution, had succeeded in accumulating, preserving, communicating, and transmitting to successive generations of Christians, was a growing fund of illumination and of grace: 'illumination' in the sense of a

¹ Pater W. Schmidt's views on the religion of Primitive Man are touched upon on pp. 759–68, below.

² 1 Cor. xv. 20; Col. i. 18.

³ See III. iii. 232–5, and p. 453, above.

'revealed discovery' of the true nature of God and the true end of Man in both This World and the Kingdom of Heaven, and 'grace' in the sense of an 'inspired will' to attain to a closer communion with God in the *dóline* of This World. The founders of the other living higher religions, and the followers of their founders, had made their divers contributions, in diverse measure, to the growing spiritual heritage of Mankind on Earth. In this matter of increasing spiritual opportunity for souls in their passages through this earthly life, there was assuredly an inexhaustible possibility of progress in This World.

If we accept this interpretation of the meaning of 'progress', it raises one last question. Were the spiritual opportunities given by Christianity and the other higher religions indispensable conditions for a soul's 'salvation' through a saving conformation of its personal will to God's will in the course of the soul's passage through Life on Earth?

If the answer to this question were in the affirmative, then the innumerable generations of men who had never had access to the illumination and grace conveyed by Christianity and the other higher religions would have been born and have died without a chance of the salvation which is the true end of Man and the true purpose of Life on Earth. Such a sacrifice of past generations for the sake of Posterity might be conceivable, however repugnant, if we believed that the true purpose of Life on Earth was, not the preparation of souls for another life, but the establishment in This World of an ant-like human society whose improvement was an end in itself without regard to the spiritual, or even material, welfare of 'man-power' whose *raison d'être* was to furnish fodder for Mars' war-machine and fuel for Moloch's furnace. If progress were to be taken as meaning the social progress of Leviathan and not the spiritual progress of individual souls, then it would be, perhaps, conceivable that, for the gain and glory of an inhuman body social, innumerable earlier generations should have been doomed to live a lower life in order that a higher life might subsequently be lived by successors who had entered into their labours in order to be sacrificed in their turn on the altar of an idolized collective human power that, on this view, would be the paramount end to which all human lives were, and ought to be, equally subservient. This nightmare view of human destinies might be conceivable on the hypothesis that individual souls existed for the sake of Society, and not for their own sake or for God's, but such a belief is not only repugnant but is inconceivable as well when we are thinking in terms of the history of Religion, in which the progress of individual souls through This World towards God, and not the progress of Society in This World, is the end in which the supreme value is found. Worshipers of the One True God who believed that He had revealed His power to Man as being a self-sacrificing love could not consistently believe that God's method, unfolded in Man's history, of imparting illumination and grace to men on Earth in successive instalments, beginning at a very recent date in the terrestrial history of the Human Race, and even then vouchsafed only gradually in the course of generations and centuries, could have entailed the consequence that the vast majority of souls born into This World so far,

who had had no share in this spiritual opportunity, had, on that account, been spiritually lost.

If we believe that the true end of Man is 'to glorify God and fully to enjoy Him for ever',¹ we must believe that this glorious opportunity of attaining to communion with God and beholding the Beatific Vision had been open to every creature that had ever been raised by God to the spiritual stature of Humanity. A human being may be defined as a personality with a will of its own capable of making moral choices between good and evil, and it was impossible to believe that Man's Creator, who had manifested His power as Love Incarnate, would ever have endowed any human creature with the capacity to alienate himself from God by willing evil without also placing within his reach means of grace sufficient to enable him to reconcile himself with God by willing 'Thy will be done'. God's provision of effective means of salvation for human souls on Earth did not have to wait for God's progressive self-revelation; for the altar dedicated 'to the Unknown God' which caught Saint Paul's eye at Athens had always been visible in every pagan human heart to the eye of a God whose own merciful providence had placed it there.

'God that made the World and all things therein . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the Earth . . . that they should seek the Lord if haply they might feel after Him and find Him—though He be not far from every one of us.'²

The spiritual operation of the grace of an Unknown God on souls ignorantly worshipping Him might be likened to the physical effect of the Gulf Stream on the material life of Man on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe. The genial climate that an ever-flowing Gulf Stream was perpetually bringing with it had made it possible for Primitive Man to work his way along the Atlantic Riviera of the Old World, from Gibraltar to the North Cape, up to latitudes in which, beyond the range of the Gulf Stream's influence, he would have found himself unable to gain any foothold at all; and thereafter, in the medieval phase of Western history, the same still unknown physical benefactor had made it also possible for a life that was not just bare life, but a good life,³ to be lived in the same high latitudes by Man in process of civilization. All these human beneficiaries of the Gulf Stream had lived and died in ignorance of the Gulf Stream's existence, not to speak of its provenance. Yet the denizens of European coastlands that would have been uninhabitable, if they had not been laved by a current making across the Atlantic from the Gulf of Mexico, did not have to wait to benefit from its effect until they had detected its operation and traced it to its source as a consequence of their tardy discovery of the New World. Their ignorance did not impair the effectiveness of the Gulf Stream's operation during the aeons in which they supposed (so far as they thought about their situa-

¹ Answer to Question 1 in the Larger Catechism agreed upon by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster with the Assistance of Commissioners from the Church of Scotland . . . and approved Anno 1648 by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.

² Acts xvii. 24 and 26-27.

³ See Aristotle: *Politics*, Book I, chap. 1, § 8.

tion at all) that they were living at the World's End—in their unawareness of the presence, on the farther side of a temporarily estranging sea, of another hemisphere whose unsuspected radiation, through the medium of the intervening Ocean, was the one thing that, all this time, had been making life possible for them in their northerly habitat. If the goodness of God's creatures reflected the goodness of God Himself, believers in God might feel confident that the children of the age-long 'Days of Ignorance' would be mustered in the Communion of Saints, in fellowship with the heirs of a latter-day Promise, at the time when the Kingdom of God would gather all its pilgrim-citizens together¹—a time which is Now in the Eternity of I AM.²

But, if men on Earth had not had to wait for the recent advent of progressively revealed higher religions in order to become eligible, during their lives on Earth, for being received into the Kingdom of Heaven, then what difference had the advent on Earth of the higher religions really made? The difference—and it was a momentous one—surely was that, under the new dispensation, a soul which did make the best of its spiritual opportunities in This Life would be advancing farther towards communion with God and towards likeness to God under the conditions of life on Earth than had been possible for souls that had not been illuminated, during their pilgrimage on Earth, by the light of the higher religions. A pagan soul, no less than a Christian, Buddhist, Muslim, or Hindu soul, would have ultimate salvation within its reach; but a soul which had been offered, and had opened itself to, the illumination and the grace that the higher religions conveyed, would, while still in This World, be more brightly irradiated with the light of the Other World than a pagan soul that had attained salvation, with God's help, through making the best, in This World, of the narrower opportunity here open to it during its earthly pilgrimage. The soul that had lived on Earth under the new dispensation could attain, while still on Earth, a greater measure of Man's greatest good in This Life than could be attained by any pagan soul in this earthly stage of its existence.

This enlargement of the spiritual opportunity offered to souls for spiritual progress in This World during their transits from birth to death had been the aim, the effect, and the test of the historical progress of Religion in This World as manifested in the epiphany of the higher religions. Their pacific conquests might, and almost certainly would, bring with them incidentally an immeasurable improvement in the material, as well as the spiritual, welfare of individual human beings during their lifetimes on Earth; but a spiritual progress in This World was the boon for which Christians were asking when they prayed 'Thy will be done in Earth as it is in Heaven'; and a salvation that was within reach of all men of goodwill—sons of ignorance as well as witting heirs of the Promise—who made the most of their spiritual opportunities on Earth, however narrow these opportunities might be, was the grace for which Christians were asking when they prayed 'Thy Kingdom come'.

In praying this prayer, they were not asking for a millennial mundane

¹ Saint Augustine, quoted on p. 561, above.

² Exod. iii. 14; John viii. 58.

felicity in an earthly paradise that had been more aptly named 'the City of Swine'¹—though it was certain that even a distant approximation to the establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth would have the incidental effect of ridding terrestrial human life of the ordinary social evils—the scourge of war and the cancer of class-conflict—which, down to the time of writing, had been the bane of Man in Process of Civilization. In praying 'Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done', Christians were asking, not for social welfare, but for spiritual trouble that would remain unabated even if all current social problems were to be solved.

This truth had been made manifest in an apparent paradox in the lives of the Saints. It was notorious that saints suffered from an acute and painful sense of sin with which *l'homme moyen sensuel* was not afflicted, and that this conviction of their own sinfulness was apt to increase *pari passu* with their spiritual progress. The explanation, of course, was not that the Saints were in fact more sinful than ordinary sinners, and not that the Saints simulated—out of over-scrupulosity, affectation, or hypocrisy—a conviction of sinfulness which they did not genuinely feel. Their judgement on themselves was utterly sincere and was also fully justified; for, high though their spiritual performance might tower above the level attained by the rest of Mankind, their standard of spiritual endeavour dwarfed the ordinary human standard to a far higher degree. The gap between ideal and achievement was, indeed, of a different order of magnitude in the Saints and in other human souls on Earth; for, in catching a glimpse on Earth of the Beatific Vision, the Saints had taken the measure by which the highest flights of terrestrial Human Nature fell short of God's perfection. The Saints' superhuman intuition of their own unworthiness of God was the seal of their sainthood and the inspiration of their spiritual prowess; but it was also the source of a spiritual agony which the unsaintly majority of Mankind could never experience.

The Saints were 'the successors of the Christ of the Gospels, who imitate[d], with an originality of their own, though this only imperfectly, what He [had been] to perfection';² and the agony that was their portion had been suffered, *a fortiori*, by their Master.

'Then came to Him the mother of Zebedee's children with her sons, worshipping Him and desiring a certain thing of Him. And He said unto her: What wilt thou? She saith unto Him: Grant that these my two sons may sit, the one on Thy right hand and the other on the left, in Thy kingdom. But Jesus answered and said: Ye know not what ye ask. Are ye able to drink of the cup that I shall drink of, and to be baptised with the baptism that I am baptised with?'³

If God and Man were united in one person, the tension between the two natures would be so ineffably severe that a crucified man would be the only kind of man that an Incarnate God could be. So great is the

¹ Plato: *Respublica*, 369B-372D, cited in II. i. 193, n. 1, and II. ii. 23, n. 2.

² 'Les continuateurs et les imitateurs originaux, mais incomplets, de ce que fut complètement le Christ des Évangiles' (Henri Bergson, in a saying published in Lou Tseng-tsiang, Dom Pierre Célestin: *Ways of Confucius and of Christ* (London 1948, Burns Oates), p. 115).

³ Matt. xx. 20-22; cp. Mark x. 35-38.

cost of 'the creation of a new species composed of one unique individual'.¹ Creation spells agony because learning through suffering is the only means of spiritual transfiguration.

At this cost, can any human being be made a son of God in the course of his passage through a world which is 'une machine à faire des dieux'?² Perhaps the spiritual achievement manifest in a transfigured soul on Earth 'could not have been attained all at once for the aggregate of Mankind'.³ Certainly the transfigured soul's 'desire is with God's help to complete the creation of the Human Species and to make of Humanity what it would have been from the beginning if it had been capable of constituting itself definitively without the help of Man himself'.⁴ But, since Man cannot become what God wills him to be save by willing God's will with a will of his own, we cannot conceive of Man in This World overcoming sin through a mutation of Human Nature that would render the Soul incapable of sinning; for without a capacity for sin there can be no freedom of moral choice and no possibility of learning through suffering; and a creature that could neither choose between right and wrong nor make spiritual progress through the spiritually perilous exercise of moral responsibility would be less, not more, than human and less capable of becoming godlike than Man was as men knew him in their sinful selves. A proneness to sin—*O felix culpa*⁵—was the spiritual price that Life had paid for becoming human, as mortality was the physical price that it had paid for an organic evolution beyond the limitations of the amoeba. The creation of the Human Species would be completed in a terrestrial Communion of Saints who would be free from sin, not because they would be incapable of it, but because each soul, in its passage through This Life, would be co-operating with God, at the cost of sore spiritual travail, in transfiguring its human nature with the help of God's grace; and, since without God's help this spiritual achievement was beyond the power of Man, the means of grace obtained, accumulated, transmitted, and increased in the spiritual warfare of the Church Militant on Earth was the pearl of great price in Man's social heritage—the earnest of a hope, given to Man by God, that Sin, like Death, might be, not expunged, but conquered.

¹ Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 96, quoted in III. iii. 232.

² Bergson, op. cit., p. 343 (the closing words of the book).

³ Bergson, op. cit., p. 97, quoted in III. iii. 232.

⁴ Bergson, op. cit., p. 251, quoted in III. iii. 234.

⁵ 'O mira circa nos tuae pietatis dignatio! O in[a]estimabilis dilectio caritatis! Ut servum redimeres, Filium tradidisti! O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est! O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!'—The 'Exultet' for Holy Saturday in the *Missale Romanum*. The text in use at the time of writing was identical with the earliest version extant, as given in three Gallic sacramentaries that were used by Alcuin (*decessit* A.D. 804). See Duchesne, L.: *Christian Worship, Its Origin and Evolution*, English translation, 2nd ed. (London 1904, S.P.C.K.), pp. 251-6.

ANNEXES

VI. A, ANNEX

TABLE OF TYPES OF ENDINGS OF UNIVERSAL STATES

Type I

(Illustrated in the histories of the Yucatec, Arabic Muslim, Hittite, Central American, Chibcha Andean, Hindu, and main Orthodox Christian civilizations)

Act I: The breakdown of the civilization, precipitating a Time of Troubles.

Act II: The successful invasion of the disintegrating civilization by an alien society before the disintegrating civilization has succeeded in stemming its Time of Troubles by establishing an indigenous universal state.

Act III: One or other of two alternative sequels:

A. A direct incorporation of the social tissue of the invaded civilization into the aggressive civilization's body social (the fate suffered by the Yucatec Civilization at the hands of the Mexic,¹ by the Arabic Muslim at the hands of the Iranic Muslim,² and perhaps also by the Hittite at the hands of the external proletariat of the Minoan World as an incidental effect of a post-Minoan Völkerwanderung³).

B. A utilization—unintended on both sides, yet effective nevertheless—of the aggressive alien civilization's act of aggression in order to provide the invaded society with a universal state of alien workmanship in lieu of one made by its own hands (the *tour de force* achieved by the Central American Civilization, which found its universal state in the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain;⁴ by the Chibcha province of the Andean World,⁵ which found its universal state in the Spanish

¹ See I. i. 123-4; IV. iv. 105-6; V. v. 42 and 89.

² See I. i. 68-72, 119, 124, and 387-8; II. ii. 77 and 392; and IV. iv. 112-13. The Arabic Civilization had, however, latterly re-emerged from the body of the Iranic Civilization, like Jonah from the belly of the whale (see IV. iv. 113-14 and 115), and seemed to be moving, like the Iranic Civilization from which it had extricated itself, towards incorporation into the body social of the Western Civilization.

³ See I. i. 93 and 114; II. ii. 79; IV. iv. 108-12.

⁴ See I. i. 120; IV. iv. 105-6; V. v. 357 and 525.

⁵ The Chibchas' domain lay within the latter-day frontiers of the Latin American Republic of Colombia (see IV. iv. 103). Like their southern neighbours the Karas in what was to become the domain of the Republic of Ecuador, the Chibchas were, culturally as well as geographically, on the fringe of the Andean World. Though by the time of the Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era the Chibchas had become masters of the goldsmith's art, and had even established a monetary currency of gold disks (see Joyce, T. A.: *South American Archaeology* (London 1912, Lee Warner), pp. 40-41 and 24), they appear still to have been ignorant of the much more important art of irrigation (see op. cit., p. 39), which was the economic basis of the Andean Civilization in its birthplace in the valley-bottoms along the Peruvian coast (see I. i. 121, 122, 322-3, and 334; II. ii. 34). The Chibchas revealed their cultural inferiority

Viceroyalty of New Granada; by the Hindu Society, which found its universal state first in the Mughal Rāj and then in the British Rāj;¹ and by the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society, which found its universal state in the Ottoman Empire²).

Act IV: One or other of two alternative sequels to Alternative *B* in Act III:

A. A direct incorporation of the submerged society into the body social of the alien society that has provided it with its universal state, through the break-up of this universal state into 'successor-states' that gain admission to the comity of states into which the incorporating society's body politic is articulated. (At the time of writing this seemed³ to be the destiny of the Central American and Chibcha Andean societies since the conversion of the corresponding portions of the former Spanish Empire into the Republics of Mexico and Colombia. At the same date it looked as if the Hindu Society would go the same way, now that, in A.D. 1947, a Hindu universal state, which had found its second avatar in the British Rāj, had broken up into two 'successor-states'—the Indian Union and Pakistan—both of which had shown their desire to be members of a Western comity of states by remaining within the British Commonwealth and joining the United Nations Organization.)

B. A break-up of the alien universal state—producing a perceptible social interregnum occupied by rudiments of the normal creative achievements of the internal and the external proletariat (the triumph of a universal church and a *Völkerwanderung*), but overtaken and overlaid, before these rudiments have had time to develop, by the incorporation of the mortal remains of the defunct universal state into the body

to their contemporaries in the heart of the Andean World by their persistence in the practice of human sacrifice, after this had been almost completely suppressed within the bounds of the Inca Empire (see Joyce, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–29 and 162)—an indigenous Andean universal state under whose rule the Chibchas, unlike the Karas, had not been brought. In the Chibcha province of the Andean Civilization, as in the rest of its domain, this civilization was already in decline by the time when the Spanish *conquistadores* arrived on the scene; but, while in other parts of the Andean World a universal state had already been established by the Incas, the Chibcha province, like the Central American World, was then still in its Time of Troubles. The Spaniards found the peoples of what was to be Colombia, like those of what was to be Mexico, in the throes of a destructive fratricidal warfare among the local states, with the local principality of Bogotá winning its way towards a regional domination such as was all but achieved in Central America by the Aztec principality of Tenochtitlan (see Joyce, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–17). In both cases, the imminent universal state was provided by the alien invaders after they had overthrown the native militarists on the eve of their final triumph.

¹ See II. ii. 77 and 131; IV. iv. 96–98; V. v. 53, 54, and 304–5.

² See II. ii. 77 and 177; III. iii. 27; IV. iv. 2, 68, 76, and 346, n. 2 (on p. 347); V. v. 105 and 107; V. vi. 298–300.

³ This tentative form of expression seemed advisable in this case in view of the recent re-emergence of the Arabic Muslim Society as a separate social entity after no less than three hundred years of incorporation in the body social of the Islamic Muslim Society under the Ottoman régime (see IV. iv. 113–14). Indeed, the revolution that broke out in Mexico in A.D. 1910 and that was still in progress at the time of writing might prove to have marked the beginning of a similar re-emergence of the Central American Civilization from the body social of the Western Society, into which it had been incorporated by force of Spanish arms at about the time when the 'Osmanlis had been successively conquering 'Irāq, Syria, Egypt, the Yaman, and the Barbary States. Moreover, the upheaval that was already taking place in Mexico might prove to be merely the first of a series which might eventually extend into part or the whole of the domain of the Andean Civilization as well (notwithstanding the contrary view expressed in IV. iv. 80–81).

social of another alien civilization. (This seemed at the time of writing to be the destiny of the Orthodox Christian population that had once constituted the Ottoman Millet-i-Rum. The first step taken by all the Orthodox Christian 'successor-states' of the Ottoman Empire had been to organize themselves on the basis of a Modern Western nationalism and to seek admission to the Western comity of states.)¹

Type II

(Illustrated in the histories of the Andean, Babylonian, Syriac, and Indic civilizations, the Western medieval city-state cosmos, and the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan)

Act I: The breakdown of the civilization, precipitating a Time of Troubles.

Act II: The foundation of an indigenous universal state (the Empire of the Incas in Andean history, the Neo-Babylonian Empire in Babylonian history, the Achaemenian Empire in Syriac history, the Mauryan Empire in Indic history, the Napoleonic Empire in the history of the Western medieval city-state cosmos,² the Tokugawa Shogunate in the history of Japan).

Act III: The overthrow of the indigenous universal state, through the successful intrusion of an alien civilization, before the exhaustion of the rally which the foundation of the indigenous universal state has inaugurated (the overthrow of the Inca Empire by Spanish *conquistadores* from Western Christendom; of the Neo-Babylonian Empire by the Achaemenian agents of the Syriac Civilization; of the Achaemenian and Mauryan Empires by Macedonian conquerors from the Hellenic World; of the Napoleonic Empire by the ferment of Modern Western political ideas of which the French empire-builders themselves were the principal disseminators; of the Tokugawa Empire by the impact of a Western Civilization equipped with the armaments of the Industrial Age).

Act IV: One or other of three alternative sequels:

A. A direct absorption of the invaded society into the intrusive alien society's body social (the fate of the Western medieval city-state cosmos, which was reabsorbed into the main body social of the Western Civilization as a result of the Napoleonic Empire's meteoric rise and fall).

B. A utilization of the aggressive alien civilization's act of aggression in order to replace the invaded society's overthrown indigenous universal state with an alien substitute and thereby allow the universal state phase of the history of the invaded society to complete its course. (The universal state phase of Babylonian history, begun under the indigenous

¹ For this ending of the Ottoman Empire, see IV. iv. 76-78 and 188-9; V. v. 294-302 and 520.

² For this historical function of the Napoleonic Empire, see V. v. 619-42.

Neo-Babylonian Empire, was continued under the alien Achaemenian Empire and was completed under the alien Seleucid Monarchy;¹ the universal state phase of Andean history, begun under the indigenous Empire of the Incas, was completed under the alien Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru.²)

C. Persistent and eventually successful efforts on the part of the invaded civilization to expel the intrusive civilization from the whole of its domain (the eventual expulsion of Hellenism from both the Syriac World and the Indic World).³

Act V: Sequels to the alternative courses *B* and *C* in Act IV:

A. The sequel to Act IV, Alternative *B*, appears to be the incorporation of the invaded society into the body social of an intrusive society that has provided it with a continuation of its indigenous universal state. (The inheritance of the mortal remains of the Babylonian Society was contested between the Syriac and the Hellenic Society, and in this contest the Syriac Society was the victor;⁴ the remains of the Andean Society appeared to have been incorporated into the body social of the Western Society since the conversion of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru into the Republics of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador.⁵)

B. The sequel to Act IV, Alternative *C*, is the reintegration and resumption of the indigenous universal state that has been overthrown before the completion of its course by the irruption of an intrusive alien civilization (the resumption, in the Syriac World, of the Achaemenian Empire in the new shape of the Arab Caliphate;⁶ the resumption, in the Indic World, of the Mauryan Empire in the new shape of the Guptan Empire⁷).

Act VI: The sequel to Act V, Alternative *B*: A break-up, in due course, of the reintegrated indigenous universal state, producing a social interregnum occupied by the normal creative achievements of the internal and external proletariats: the triumph of a universal church and a *Völkerwanderung* (mass-conversions to Islam and inroads of Eurasian, Afrikanian, and Western Christian barbarians at the break-up of the Arab Caliphate;⁸ mass-conversions to Hinduism and inroads of Eurasian barbarians at the break-up of the Guptan Empire⁹).

¹ See V. v. 123 (especially n. 2) and 370.

² See I. i. 120; IV. iv. 79-80 and 103.

³ See I. i. 75-77 and 85-86; II. ii. 285-8 and 371-2; V. v. 125-8; V. vi. 210-11.

⁴ See I. i. 79-81 and V. v. 370.

⁵ See I. i. 119 and V. v. 524-5. At the time of writing this opinion could be no more than tentative, for the reasons given above on p. 570, n. 3. The then still apparently sluggish native peasantry of Bolivia and Peru might prove one day to be charged with the same explosive force that had already erupted from a corresponding social stratum in Mexico.

⁶ See I. i. 76-77. The Achaemenian Empire had an abortive alien heir in the shape of the Seleucid Monarchy, and the Arab Caliphate an abortive indigenous precursor in the shape of the Sasanian Empire.

⁷ See I. i. 85-86. The Mauryan Empire had a succession of abortive alien heirs in the shapes of the Bactrian Greek Empire and the Kushan Empire, and the Guptan Empire an abortive precursor in the Andhra Empire.

⁸ See I. i. 72; V. v. 128 and 242-8.

⁹ See I. i. 85; V. v. 137-8 and 276-9.

Type III

(Illustrated in the histories of the Hellenic, Sinic, Sumeric, and Russian Orthodox Christian civilizations).¹

Act I: The breakdown of the civilization, precipitating a Time of Troubles.

Act II: The foundation of an indigenous universal state (the Roman Empire in Hellenic history, the Ts'in and Han Empire in Sinic history, the Empire of Sumer and Akkad in Sumeric history, the Union of Muscovy and Novgorod in Russian history).

Act III: A collapse of the indigenous universal state as the result of a fresh collapse of the disintegrating society (the collapse of the Roman Empire in the third century of the Christian Era;² the collapse of the Prior Han Dynasty just after the beginning of the Christian Era;³ the downfall of Ur-Engur's (*alias* Ur-Nammu's) dynasty *circa* 2026 or 1962 B.C.;⁴ the bout of anarchy in the early years of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era which is known as 'the Time of Troubles' in the Russian historical tradition⁵).

Act IV: A restoration of the prostrate indigenous universal state by one or other of two alternative means:

A. By self-help (the restoration of the Roman Empire by Illyrian marchmen, of the Han Empire by the Posterior Han Dynasty, of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad by Amorite marchmen).⁶

B. By self-help reinforced by the reception of an alien civilization. (The restoration, by the new dynasty of the Romanovs, of an empire which the House of Rurik had failed to save from collapse, corresponds to the restoration of the Prior Han Empire by the Posterior Han;⁷ the new feature is the subsequent reception of the Western Civilization by Peter the Great in order to enable the restored Russian universal state to hold its own in a Westernizing World.)

Act V: Sequels to the alternative courses *A* and *B* in Act IV:

A. A break-up, in due course, of the restored universal state, producing a social interregnum occupied by the normal creative achievements of the internal and external proletariats: the triumph of a universal church and a *Völkerwanderung* (mass conversions to Christianity and inroads of North European, Eurasian, and Afrasian barbarians at the break-up of the Roman Empire;⁸ mass-conversions to the Mahāyāna and inroads of Eurasian barbarians at the break-up of the Han

¹ It seemed probable, in the light of the information accessible at the time of writing, that the endings of the Minoan and the Mayan universal states likewise conformed to this type, but the evidence was still insufficient to warrant more than a tentative opinion in either case.

² See IV. iv. 8; V. v. 219 and 649-50; V. vi. 207 and 291.

³ See V. vi. 295.

⁴ See V. vi. 297, and the Note on Chronology, x. 171-2 and 212.

⁵ See V. vi. 311.

⁶ For references to previous passages touching on these restorations, see nn. 2, 3, and 4 on this page.

⁷ See V. vi. 311-12.

⁸ See I. i. 41-42 and 62-63; V. v. 80 and 220-2.

Empire;¹ inroads of Eurasian barbarians and Kassites and Hittites at the break-up of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad²).

B. A break-up, in due course, of the restored universal state, producing a perceptible social interregnum, but overtaken and overlaid, before the interregnum has had time to produce its normal phenomena, by a further stage of the progressive incorporation of the dissolving society into the alien society to which it has been deliberately assimilating itself since the restoration of its universal state (the decay and downfall of the Tsardom, after the exhaustion of the tonic of eighteenth-century Western 'enlightened Monarchy', and its prompt replacement by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a vehicle of the nineteenth-century Western social gospel of Marxism).³

Type IV

(Illustrated in the history of the Egyptiac Civilization)

Act I: The breakdown of the civilization, precipitating a Time of Troubles (at some time between the end of the Fourth Egyptiac Dynasty *circa* 2500 B.C. and the fall of the Sixth Dynasty *circa* 2200 B.C.).

Act II: The foundation of an indigenous universal state (the Egyptiac 'Middle Empire').⁴

Act III: A break-up, in due course, of the universal state, producing a social interregnum occupied by the normal creative achievements of the internal and external proletariats: the triumph of a universal church and a Völkerwanderung (mass conversions to the Osirian Church⁵ and the occupation of Lower Egypt by the Hyksos barbarians⁶).

Act IV: A premature termination of the social interregnum, before it has run its normal course, and before the dissolution of the moribund

¹ See I. i. 88; V. v. 140 and 272-4.

² See I. i. 105-6 and 111; V. v. 263-4.

³ The decay of the Tsardom might be dated from the failure of the reforms, carried out in the eighteen-sixties, to bring and keep Russia abreast of the Western World. This failure was brutally but effectively proclaimed in the assassination of the Tsar-Liberator Alexander II in A.D. 1881; and the consequent reversion of the Imperial régime to a policy of repression in the tradition of Tsar Nicholas I was powerless to avert the downfall of the Tsardom in A.D. 1917; but the long impending interregnum had no sooner arrived than it was brought to an end by the establishment of the Soviet régime. In one aspect, this régime unmistakably represented a further step in the process of Westernization. Under the inspiration of a Western 'ideology' the Russian Communists ploughed deep where Peter the Great's hoe had merely scratched the surface of the ground. Peter had been content with Westernizing his professional soldiers and administrators; the Communists set themselves to Westernize the masses by making them literate and training them in a Modern Western industrial technique. At the same time, the policy of the Russian Communists was equivocal. Though Marxism was a Western creed, it was a revolutionary one which, in its Western homelands, was directed against the Western *ancien régime*; and on Russian ground and in Russian hands it might be brought to bear, not merely against the latest phase of the Western Civilization, but against the West as such, in all its manifestations, as the Western Romantic movement had been turned to account, in the nineteenth century, by the Russian Slavophiles (for this ambiguity in the policy and character of Russian Communism, see III. iii. 200-2 and 364-5; V. v. 181-7; and IX. viii. 133-6 and 807-8).

⁴ In the course of the Middle Empire we can descry a slight and transient crisis between the decease of the Twelfth Dynasty and the subsequent series of soldier emperors (see V. vi. 207).

⁵ See I. i. 140-4 and V. v. 149-50.

⁶ See I. i. 105, 106, and 137, and V. v. 266.

society has had time to work itself out, by a sudden fanatical restoration of the indigenous universal state (the Egyptiac 'New Empire').

Act V: The maintenance of the restored universal state—and, with it, of the reanimated civilization—for a term comparable in length to the reanimated civilization's original span of life. (In Egyptiac history, the restored universal state displayed an extraordinary tenacity.¹ When the Eighteenth Dynasty, which had founded 'the New Empire' in the sixteenth century B.C., lost its impetus after a run of more than two hundred years, its task was taken over in the fourteenth century B.C. by a series of soldier emperors² reminiscent of those that, in the history of the original Egyptiac universal state, had taken over the Twelfth Dynasty's task in the eighteenth century B.C. When the régime of the soldier emperors of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties, after having kept 'the New Empire' in being for another two hundred years, was eventually worn out,³ in its turn, by its own superhuman efforts expended in victoriously stemming, first the Hittite assaults upon the dominions of the Empire in Syria,⁴ and then the avalanche of barbarian invaders that descended upon the northern borders of Egypt itself in the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung,⁵ the ecclesiastical power stepped into the breach laid open by the ultimate collapse of the secular power, and thereby tided the restored Egyptiac universal state over a critical moment in its history.⁶ Some three hundred years later, a persistent, and all but successful, attempt to re-establish the restored Egyptiac universal state, up to the frontiers once attained by it under the Eighteenth Dynasty, was made by the Ethiopian marchmen of the Egyptiac World from Napata;⁷ and, in the long series of successive alien dominations over the northern half of the Egyptiac World, for which the failure of the Napatan adventure in the seventh century B.C. opened the way, it proved impossible for any alien invader to keep his seat for long unless he could bring himself to overcome or dissemble his pride as a conqueror and his contempt for the conquered so far as to be willing to sit on the throne of the Pharaohs in the guise and insignia of a legitimate wearer of the Double Crown.⁸ Thus the simulacrum, at least, of the restored Egyptiac universal state—and, with it, the substance of the Egyptiac culture—was maintained until the conversion of both the inhabitants of the Nile Valley and the Roman Imperial Government to the Syro-Hellenic syncretistic religion of Christianity;

¹ See I. i. 137-9.

² See II. ii. 113.

³ See IV. iv. 422.

⁴ See I. i. 113-14; II. ii. 113; and IV. iv. 110-11.

⁵ See I. i. 93 and 100-1; II. ii. 113; IV. iv. 85 and 422; V. v. 237, 269, 290, and 352; and V. vi. 207.

⁶ See II. ii. 116, n. 1; IV. iv. 421 and 515-17; p. 190, n. 1, above; and p. 692, below.

⁷ See II. ii. 116 and V. v. 268.

⁸ The Ptolemies and their successors the Roman Emperors had the intuition to conceive of this policy and the tact to put it into effect; and at Constantinople in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, during the last phase of a Palaeologan restoration of an East Roman Empire which had been a restoration of the Roman Empire, the Egyptiac Double Crown was brought out of a lumber room to lend a show of dignity to a shadow emperor's head (see XIII. x. 51-52). The Assyrians made no attempt at conciliation. The Achaemenidae never succeeded in retrieving the effects of Cambyse's personal breach, in his treatment of a conquered Egypt, of the Dynasty's rule of consideration for the traditional institutions of their subjects (see V. v. 704, n. 2, and 705, n. 2).

and this conversion, through which the dissolution of the Egyptiac Society was at last consummated, was separated by a Time-span of more than two thousand years¹ from the date in the sixteenth century B.C. at which an Egyptiac Society, at that time apparently *in extremis*, had been given its surprising new lease of life by the sudden uprising of Amosis against the Hyksos.)

Type V

(Illustrated in the history of the Far Eastern Civilization in China)

Act I: The breakdown of the civilization, precipitating a Time of Troubles.

Act II: The foundation of a universal state by intrusive barbarians with a tincture of alien culture (the imposition of a universal state on the Far Eastern Society in China through the completion of the conquest of the Sung dominions by the Mongols² in A.D. 1280).

Act III: A sudden fanatical replacement of the semi-alien universal state, before it has run its normal course, by an indigenous universal state (the expulsion of the Mongols from China by the Ming³).

Act IV: The maintenance of the universal state—and, with it, of the civilization—beyond the term at which it might have been expected to give place to an interregnum, through the transfer of the universal state from enfeebled indigenous to vigorous barbarian hands instead of its breaking up and being replaced by a bevy of barbarian successor-states (the transfer of rule over an undivided China from the Ming Dynasty to the Manchus in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era).

Act V: The transformation of the unexpired universal state into one of the parochial states of an alien society (the admission of China to the Western comity of states after the Chinese Revolution of A.D. 1911⁴ and the subsequent transfer of her cultural allegiance from the Western Civilization to the Russian⁵).

¹ See I. i. 139.

² For the tincture of Far Eastern Christian culture which the Mongols had acquired before their conquest of China, see II. ii. 237–8; III. iii. 451; V. v. 309 and 348.

³ See II. ii. 121; V. v. 3–4, 54, and 348.

⁴ As was signified in the symbolism of the flag which the Chinese Republic devised for itself, this successor of the Manchu Empire claimed to be the heir of the latter in its capacity of universal state, though at the same time the Revolution of A.D. 1911, in which the Republic came to birth, was an indigenous Chinese uprising against barbarian rule—partly in the tradition of the uprising against the Mongols which had brought the Ming Dynasty into power four and a half centuries earlier, and partly under the inspiration of the alien political creed of Western nationalism.

⁵ Whether the incorporation of the main body of the Far Eastern Society into the body social of a Communist World was to be the last chapter of its history, or whether it might one day extricate itself again and re-enter on a distinct life of its own, was a question that, at the time of writing, seemed likely to remain inscrutable for a long time to come.

VI. B (i), ANNEX

THE ROLE OF THE BYZANTINE ELEMENT IN MUSCOVY'S HERITAGE

WHILE the writer was revising his draft of the chapter to which this Annex attaches, he had the benefit of comments and criticisms from B. H. Sumner, the Warden of All Souls College, Oxford, and from Prince Dmitri Obolensky, the Reader in Russian and Balkan Medieval History in the University of Oxford, on the question of the degree to which the course of Muscovite History was affected by the influence of the Byzantine element in the Russian Orthodox Christian cultural heritage.

B. H. Sumner's opinion on this question is set out in the following passages of a letter of his, dated the 25th January, 1951, to the writer of this Study:

'I find the build-up and development of the Muscovite state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries very difficult to analyse, but, from what I have read of those two centuries from the Russian side, I should say that the most effective and practical influences in building up centralized administration and government came from autochthonous Russian developments of the semi-feudal conditions of Moscow and the other Russian principalities (shot through with a strong nationalist colouring), combined with some Tatar influence, but with little Byzantine influence. I do not think, for instance, that either Ivan the Great or Ivan the Terrible regarded themselves as successors of the Byzantine emperors, or that they and their civil servants, *boyars*, diplomats, &c., had any idea of "oecumenical" pretensions. It is true that Ivan the Terrible, for instance, claimed to be Tsar "Autocrat", Gosudar, and appointed by God, combining plenitude of power both *vis-à-vis* his subjects and as against any other states, but he never claimed to be the successor of the *Basileus*, or to be "oecumenical" or "Tsar of the Orthodox Christians of the whole World" (that was the expression used by the Patriarch of Constantinople in a letter to Ivan in A.D. 1561, but not by Ivan). I don't think that it could be held that Ivan the Great and Ivan the Terrible and the civilians in Russia held that there had been any *translatio imperii*, or made any claim over all Christians or all Orthodox.

'Such claims, implicitly or explicitly, had appeared from the end of the fifteenth century onwards, bound up with the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, but, at any rate at that time, this idea, which admittedly had its origins in writings of certain monks, continued to be confined to certain ecclesiastical circles in Russia, with occasional echoes from Constantinople. It is striking, I think, that the official historiography of the sixteenth century in Russia, which was built up by the Tsars, does not lean at all towards Byzantium: both in the chronicles and in Russian diplomacy of the time the emphasis is all on the heritage of Kiev, not at all on the heritage of Byzantium. That, of course, was because of the continuous struggle for the Russian western lands against Lithuania-Poland.

'From about A.D. 1470 onwards, for more than a century, Moscow had a whole series of overtures, either from Rome or from the Emperor, or

both, linking together an anti-Turkish alliance, re-union of churches, recognition of Moscow as the heir of the Byzantine Empire, and elevation of the Metropolitan of Moscow to the patriarchal dignity. It is, I think, significant that the Russians in reply were always silent as regards the inheritance of the Byzantine Empire, or coronation of the Tsar as "the Christian Tsar". What the Russians were interested in was their claims against Lithuania-Poland and their struggle for an exit to the Baltic, and not the Balkans or the Ottomans: hence the failure of Western overtures for an anti-Turkish alliance and of Western attempts to win the Russians for this by dangling before them the lure of the Byzantine heritage.

Thus, the conception of Moscow as "the Third Rome", or of Muscovy as the inheritor of the "oecumenical" role of Byzantium, was, in my view, of no practical importance and of very little theoretical or emotional importance among the governing class in Muscovy in the late fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. Its appeal was in the main limited to certain ecclesiastical circles in Muscovy—and, in a sense, to needy Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire in quest of money from Moscow. It is quite true that the idea of Muscovy as the sole possessor of the pure Orthodox Christian faith after the Council of Florence and the capture of Constantinople was a stock-in-trade element in Muscovite national pride during these centuries, and it fostered Muscovite exclusiveness and xenophobia. But this line is not the same as stepping into the shoes of Byzantium by aspiring to an "oecumenical" role.

'Much later, when the Russians had advanced far southwards and were strong enough to challenge the Turks, then the idea of the liberation of the Orthodox, and sometimes that of some form of resurrected Orthodox empire at Constantinople, became prominent, and increasingly so in the nineteenth century. Even so, I think that the influence of the messianic ideas of the Slavophiles and Dostoevsky and their typicalness can be exaggerated, and that the "oecumenical" and messianic elements in Russian nineteenth-century thought ought not to be read back into earlier centuries as being then powerfully creative and proof of a strong and continuous Byzantine heritage.'

In a note communicated to the writer of this Study on the 1st June, 1951, Prince Dmitri Obolensky expresses the same view.

'Neither the successive Russian governments of the sixteenth century nor, on the whole, contemporary Russian writers and historians seem to have taken the theory of "Moscow the Third Rome" very seriously; for the Muscovite rulers from Ivan III onwards, Moscow was much more the "Second Kiev" than the "Third Rome". I would agree here with Humphrey Sumner. Some recent historians have, rightly, it seems to me, "played down" the importance of the theory of "Moscow the Third Rome" in the development of Russian sovereignty. See, for example, G. Olšr: "Gli ultimi Rurikidi e le basi ideologiche della sovranità dello Stato russo", in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, vol. xii, Nos. 3-4 (Rome, 1946), pp. 322-73.'

It will be seen that Sumner and Obolensky agree in making three points: In the first place, the concept of 'Moscow the Third Rome' was an academic idea which was never taken very seriously outside ecclesiastical circles; secondly, the architects of a Muscovite autocracy were indebted to the institutions of the East Roman Empire for little except

certain external forms and ceremonies; thirdly, the statesmen in control of Muscovite policy showed themselves unwilling to sacrifice the interests of their own Russian Orthodox Christendom to those of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom which was sundered from Russia by the double barrier of the Eurasian Steppe and the Black Sea. None of these three points would be contested by the present writer; but he would point out, in his turn, that none of them is incompatible with the thesis that the extinction of the last glimmer of the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1453 had an important and enduring psychological effect on Russian souls,¹ and that this effect consisted in the implantation in them of a feeling that Muscovy, as the now sole surviving Orthodox Christian Power of any consequence, had inherited from the East Roman Empire both the mission of preserving intact the purity of the Orthodox Christian Faith and the high destiny which this onerous mission carried with it *ex officio*.

It will be noticed that Sumner, in the passages quoted above, equates the ideological legacy of the East Roman Empire with a pretension to an oecumenical authority. As the present writer sees it, the idea for which the East Roman Empire had stood, first and foremost, in its own people's minds was the guardianship of Christian Orthodoxy rather than the possession of a title to world-wide dominion. He would, however, go on to contend that, in fact, the second of these two pretensions was logically latent in the first, since it would be difficult for a people to believe that God had singled them out to be the unique heralds of His Truth on Earth without also believing that He had likewise singled them out to be His instruments for propagating this Truth eventually throughout the *Oikoumenê*. It was, for example, an article of orthodox Jewish belief among a politically impotent Jewish diaspora that the extinct Kingdom of David would eventually be restored by the Messiah, not in its historic form as a parochial state, but with a dominion that would be coextensive with the *Oikoumenê*. The writer would therefore take issue with Sumner's contention that the idea of being the sole possessor of the pure Orthodox Faith does not carry with it an aspiration to an oecumenical role; and he would have consulted his friend and mentor further on this point if, by the date when he was revising the present Part of this Study for the press, Humphrey Sumner's friends and fellow historians had not suffered an irreparable loss in this saintly scholar's untimely death.

¹ This psychological effect of the concept of 'the Third Rome' is, however, also questioned by Prince Obolensky:

'I do not wish to minimize the importance of the religious factor in the resistance offered by the seventeenth-century Russian conservatives to the infiltration of Western ideas and customs: some of them at least seem to have regarded Russia as a guardian of the Orthodox faith against the heretical West. But I doubt whether the theory of "Moscow the Third Rome" had much to do with this attitude, except possibly among the "Old Believers". Except in some ecclesiastical, and particularly monastic, circles, this theory does not seem to have made much headway in Russia. . . . [It] does not seem to have been sufficiently accepted to justify the view that future generations of Russians were moved by it to resist the impact of Western culture upon their way of life.'

THE ADMINISTRATIVE GEOGRAPHY OF THE ACHAEMENIAN EMPIRE¹

The Spirit and Policy of the Achaemenian Régime

IN the chapter to which this annex attaches,² we have taken note of the easy-going spirit that was characteristic of the Achaemenian régime.

This *éthos* accounts for the speed and facility with which the Achaemenian Empire was created by Cyrus II and extended by Cambyses II, and for the comparable speed with which it was less easily re-established and farther extended by Darius I. Achaemenian rule was accepted by the stricken peoples of the Syriac and Babylonian worlds because it offered them the 'rest cure' that they needed after their sufferings from the last and worst bout of Assyrian militarism (*saeviebat* 745-609 B.C.),³ from a contemporaneous Eurasian Nomad *Völkerwanderung*, and from the subsequent wars between the fallen Assyrian Power's successor-states; and the widespread *émeute* which broke out in 522 B.C. on receipt of the news of the assassination of the reigning emperor by Darius and his accomplices was an exception that proved the rule of normal acquiescence in the Achaemenian régime. It is true, as we shall see, that the terrible year 522-521 B.C. brought with it a change for the worse in the political *éthos* and structure of the Achaemenian Empire which was never afterwards retrieved. It is also true that, throughout the age of Achaemenian dominion, there were marked differences in the degree of the acquiescence of the divers subject peoples. The Egyptians and the Babylonians—conscious, as they were, of the antiquity of their distinctive cultures and the recentness of their own latest spells of imperial power—persistently felt, and repeatedly acted upon, a hostility towards their Persian masters which was not shared by the Babylonians' former victims the Jews and the Phoenicians.⁴ On the whole, however, the Achaemenian régime met with remarkably little resistance and succeeded in maintaining itself for more than two hundred years at the cost of an impressively slight exertion of force.

This success is largely explained by a policy of *laissez faire* which stood

¹ This amateur essay owes more to Professor Roland G. Kent and Professor George G. Cameron than the writer can easily convey to the reader. It could not have been undertaken at all without the foundation provided by their published work, and the writer might not have had the temerity to print it if these two scholars had not generously spent much time and trouble in reading and commenting on the first draft. While, of course, no responsibility whatsoever attaches to either of them for misstatements of fact and errors of judgement that have still not been eliminated by the writer, with the aid of their comments, in the version here published, the reader would hardly be able to appreciate the magnitude of the writer's debt without seeing with his own eyes the corrections, and better still, the omissions, that were made on the original typescript when it was being revised with these invaluable comments at the writer's elbow.

Before this page was in first proof, the World had lost a great scholar through Professor Kent's death.

² VI. C (ii) (c) 3, pp. 178-9, above.

³ See IV. iv. 473, n. 3.

⁴ See V. v. 123.

out in welcome contrast to the policies of Assyria and of a Neo-Babylonian Empire that had followed in the Assyrians' footsteps.

Ever since Assyria had won her fight for her existence against the Aramaean invaders of Mesopotamia at the turn of the second and the last millennium B.C.,¹ she had not been content simply to rule the territories which she annexed progressively to her ancestral domain; she had sought to assimilate them as well; and the rigour with which she stamped her impress even on her latest, most ephemeral and most outlying territorial acquisitions is attested by the survival there of the *Assyrium nomen* long after it had been forgotten on the sites of Nineveh, Calah, and Asshur itself.² Though the Assyrian records known to Western scholars in the twentieth century of the Christian Era did not bear witness to any extension of a short-lived Assyrian hegemony in South-Eastern Anatolia any farther north-westward than the principality of Khilakku (*Graecè* Kilikia, *Latine* Cilicia) astride the southernmost bend of the River Halys, the Assyrian name must have been associated with the 'White Syrian' inhabitants of the north coast of Anatolia, round the mouths of the rivers Halys, Iris, and Thermodon,³ at the time when, in the course of the seventh century B.C., the Hellenic explorers and colonizers of this coast had pushed that far eastwards.⁴ In this quarter, it is true, the Assyrian name did not survive for long; but in Western parlance in A.D. 1952 it was still current in 'Syria', where the Persians and the Hellenes had successively taken over from the Neo-Babylonian régime the name 'Assyria' to denote a country which had always been vehemently recalcitrant to Assyrian rule, and whose coastline was occupied by peoples bearing the famous names 'Phoenicians' and 'Philistines'.

In Syria, at any rate (though not, as far as was known, in Pontic Cappadocia), one of the means by which the Assyrians had thus succeeded in stamping their name on countries and peoples that execrated their domination and abhorred their culture had been a systematic obliteration of previous political landmarks and substitution of an arbitrarily mapped out network of Assyrian provinces; and, at the opening of the last paroxysm of the *terror Assyriacus*, this administrative engine of 'Assyrianization' had been keyed up by Tiglath-Pileser III (*accessit* 746 B.C.). The twenty-four provinces into which the Assyrian Empire had been articulated within its frontiers as these had stood at Tiglath-Pileser's accession had been redistributed, by 745 B.C., into twice as many departments,⁵ and thereafter additional departments on the new scale had been created *pari passu* with the further expansion of Assyrian rule south-westward into Syria, eastward on to the western rim of the Iranian Plateau, and south-eastward into Babylonia. In instituting and extending this new close-meshed system of local administration, Tiglath-Pileser III and his successors were pursuing the same aim as the post-Revolutionary French conquerors of Northern

¹ See II. ii. 134-5.

² See Herodotus, Book II, chap. 104.

³ See IV. iv. 469-72.

⁴ See IX. viii. 432, n. 2.

⁵ See Forrer, E.: *Die Provinzeinteilung des Assyrischen Reiches* (Leipzig 1920 Hinrichs), pp. 5, 10-11, and 49-50.

Italy, the Low Countries, the Rhineland, and North-Western Germany. The Assyrian Empire, like the Napoleonic Empire, was attempting permanently to assimilate and absorb the annexed territories into its own *body politic*.

This Assyrian policy of assimilation was the background and foil against which an antithetical policy was inaugurated by the Achaemenidae. Cyrus II and his successors sought to reconcile their subjects to their rule by keeping down to a minimum the Achaemenian Imperial Government's interference with existing habits and customs; and, on the plane of administrative geography, this policy took the forms of permitting a maximum amount of local self-government and refraining from more than a minimum amount of change in those *ci-devant* frontiers between sovereign states that had now become boundaries between Achaemenian viceroyalties ('satrapies').¹ So long as their subjects kept the peace and paid their taxes, the Achaemenidae were content to leave them to live as they pleased in other respects; and they were slow to anger, even when they had to deal with inveterate rebels. Herodotus was rightly much impressed by their generosity in reinstating the sons of both the two insurgent Egyptian client princes Inarôs and Amyrtæus on the thrones that their fathers had forfeited—'regardless of the fact that no one had given more trouble than Inarôs and Amyrtæus had to the Persian Imperial Government.'²

This Achaemenian policy of *laissez faire* was, however, to some extent frustrated by the recalcitrance of certain of the beneficiaries. While the unwaveringly loyal Phoenician city-states along the coast of Syria were rewarded by being invested with miniature empires—*imperia Punica in imperio Persico*—astride one of the vital lines of Achaemenian communications,³ the persistently refractory Hellenic city-states along the west coast of Anatolia had to be held through the agency of local despots, acting in the Achaemenian interest, whom their subjects regarded as 'quislings'; and a corresponding discrimination was forced upon the Achaemenian Imperial Government in their policy towards the viceroyalties that were the largest units of regional administration within this universal state. The Neo-Babylonian Empire, which Cyrus had swallowed whole, was subsequently broken up into two taxation districts⁴—one consisting of Babylonia itself and the other of the ex-Assyrian territory that had fallen to the Neo-Babylonian Empire's share when Nabopolassar had partitioned the Assyrian dominions with his Median ally; and Herodotus's gazetteer of Darius I's taxation districts—muddled though it is here and there—brings some skeletons out of an Imperial cupboard which the draftsmen of the official inscriptions had been careful to leave unopened. Herodotus's information makes it evident, as we shall see, that three of the original viceroyalties—an Armenia that had perhaps been taken into partnership by the founder of the Median Empire, a Media that had undoubtedly been taken into

¹ The Old Persian word 'khšathrapāvan' (*Graecé* 'satrapēs') signified 'protector of the kingdom' (Kent, *Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon* (New Haven, Conn. 1950, American Oriental Society), p. 181).

² Herodotus, Book III, chap. 15.

³ See V. v. 123, n. 2.

⁴ See further pp. 657-8, below.

partnership by the founder of the Achaemenian Empire, and a Persia that had become, and still remained, the reigning imperial country—had each been partitioned in Darius I's new division of the Empire into taxation districts; and we may guess that this dissection of these great political units into a larger number of smaller fiscal units had been carried out as a precaution against any repetition of the all but lethal stabs which the usurping scion of the Ariaramnan branch of the Achaemenidae had received from Armenians, Medes, and Persians alike in the anarchic first year of his reign. On the evidence supplied by Herodotus, we can see that, for fiscal purposes, Media had been partitioned into four divisions;¹ Armenia into three;² and Persia into two.³ Conversely, Herodotus reveals that one loyal viceroyalty had been given a territorial reward—though one of dubious value. The rebellious Medes who had been deported to islands in the Persian Gulf and three rebellious Persian tribes, the Yautiyā (*Graecè* Outioi) and the Mačiyā (*Graecè* Mykoi) in Lāristān and the Asagartiyā (Sagartioi) in Kirmān, who had been degraded to the status of subject peoples burdened with a penally heavy tribute, had all been attached to the loyal viceroyalty of Harahvatiš (written Harauvatiš: *Latine* 'Arachosia').⁴ The official lists indicate that the Viceroyalty of Harahvatiš had been further enlarged by the transfer of Zrāka from the Viceroyalty of Parthava, and that the loyal viceroyalty of Bākhtriš (*Latine* Bactria or Bactriana) had been rewarded by being allowed to retain a sub-empire which included not only the administration of Suguda or Sugda (*Latine* Sogdiana), north-east of the Oxus, but a supervision over the Achaemenian Empire's independent allies the Sakā Haumavargā (*Graecè* Sakai Amyrgioi), north-east of the Jaxartes, in Farghānah.⁵

The grounds for these inferences from the information furnished by Herodotus are discussed below, and the conclusions are mentioned, by anticipation, at this point simply to illustrate the historical fact that in certain cases the Achaemenian Imperial Government found itself compelled by *force majeure* to depart from its standing policy of respecting the traditional boundaries between viceroyalties. In the course of the Achaemenian Empire's history, both the areas and the number of the viceroyalties are known to have varied. They might be—and perhaps usually were⁶—larger than taxation districts, or they might be smaller, as was, for example, the viceroyalty of Karkā (*Latine* Caria) that was separated from Yauna (*Latine* Ionia) eventually—perhaps after the suppression of the Ionian Revolt of 499–491 B.C.—if we may draw this inference from the absence of the name Karkā in the three earliest, and its presence in the three latest, of the official lists of countries under Achaemenian sovereignty or suzerainty. On the other hand it is to be

¹ See further pp. 602–4 and 623–32, below.

² See further pp. 604–11 and 660, below.

³ See further pp. 620–3 and 637–41, below.

⁴ See further pp. 602–3 and 637–41, below.

⁵ See further pp. 644–8, below.

⁶ See Junge, P. J.: 'Satrapie und Natio: Reichsverwaltung und Reichspolitik im Staate Dareios' I' (*Klio*, vol. xxxiv (Neue Folge, vol. xvi, Heft 1/2) (Leipzig 1942, Dieterich), pp. 1–55, especially p. 5, n. 5).

presumed that the boundaries of the taxation districts remained relatively constant throughout,¹ since any variation of these would inevitably have thrown into confusion the records, kept in the Imperial Ministry of Finance, which were the key to an effective maintenance of the Imperial taxation system. In the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire the two sets of permanent units must have been these taxation districts and the communes, exercising local self-government, out of which each taxation district was built up.

In his gazetteer of the Achaemenian taxation districts,² Herodotus makes it clear that, in his belief, these had been instituted by Darius I at the beginning of his reign,³ at a date at which he had not yet overstepped the north-west frontier along the coastline of the mainland of Anatolia which he had inherited from his predecessors. Herodotus believed that, within these limits (which included Darius's own conquests in the Indus Basin), the Achaemenian Empire had originally been dissected by Darius into twenty taxation districts, and that two more—'the Isles' and 'the Peoples of Europe as far as Thessaly'—had subsequently been added before the recession of the North-West Frontier as a result of the disastrous outcome of the campaigns of 480–479 B.C. Herodotus was aware that the Achaemenian Empire also embraced one partially tax-paying non-subject principality, Cilicia, which he has included in his list of the twenty taxation districts as his Number 4, and some tax-free countries besides. The chief of these was Pārsa (*Græcè* Persis)⁴—or, more accurately, the remnant of Pārsa whose denizens had retained the privileged status of being the imperial people after the civil war between Persian and Persian in the South-East during the terrible year 522–521 B.C. The other three non-tax-paying peoples known to Herodotus were, all of them, transfrontier allies: the Ethiopians marching with the southern frontier of the Viceroyalty of Egypt; the Arabs whose autonomous territory included a short strip of coast at the south-east corner of the Mediterranean,⁵ and 'the Colchians and adjoining peoples, as far as the Caucasus Range', on the north.⁶

This distinction in status between the imperial people, its allies, and its subjects may perhaps have counted for something on the political plane. Cilicia, for example, is not included in any official Achaemenian list of the peoples of the Empire, and Pārsa is tactfully omitted from the list of tax-paying subject countries in Darius's inscription 'Persepolis *e*' and is still more tactfully differentiated from them in his 'Susa *e*' and in his 'Naqš-i-Rustam *a*'. But on the fiscal plane in any case it looks as

¹ On this see Junge: 'Satrapie' (*ibid.*, pp. 4–5); eundem: 'Hazarapatiš' (*ibid.*, vol. xxxiii (Neue Folge, vol. xv) (Leipzig 1940, Dieterich), pp. 30–38, especially p. 32, n. 1).

² Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 89–97.

³ The text of the Behistan Inscription was not one of the Achaemenian official documents that had come into Herodotus's hands (though a copy of it was in the archives of so remote a community as the Jewish military colony at Elephantine on the southern frontier of the Viceroyalty of Egypt); and Herodotus was not aware of the year of anarchy between Darius's assumption of the Imperial Crown and his effective assertion of his authority throughout the Achaemenian dominions.

⁴ See Herodotus, Book III, chap. 97.

⁵ See *ibid.*, chaps. 4–9.

⁶ These peoples are all entered in the list of non-tax-paying peoples in Book III, chap. 97; but in Book III, chap. 88, the Arabs are declared to be the only free allies of the Empire. Herodotus was unaware of the status of the Amyrgian Sakas.

if the distinction were little more than a formality, considering that the 'free' peoples, including the Persians themselves, were constrained to bring the Emperor annual gifts that were no more voluntary than the 'benevolences' exacted by King Henry VII of England, while on the other side the avowedly tax-paying subjects appear (to judge by the official bas-reliefs) to have paid their taxes, including those discharged in the precious metals, in kind (i.e. in the form of gold and silver vases) and not in coin. Moreover, all parts of the *Oikoumenê* that lay within economic range of the Achaemenian Imperial Government, including distant regions that were completely independent of it politically, were affected economically by the annual non-return journey of appreciable quantities of the precious metals to the Imperial treasuries at Susa, Ecbatana, and Persepolis. This one-way flow persisted for some two centuries, until the accumulated hoards were suddenly thrown into circulation again by Alexander.

The Extant Sources of Information

The information about the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire that was accessible to Western scholars in A.D. 1952 was all derived ultimately from Achaemenian official sources; but it had come through two separate channels: official documents inscribed by the Achaemenian Government itself and facts and figures, doubtless originally emanating from Achaemenian official documents, which had been obtained, and incorporated into his own work, by the Hellenic historian Herodotus. Either of these two sets of statements could be used as a check upon the other; and this was fortunate, since neither authority was satisfactory in and by itself. Herodotus—or the intermediaries through whose hands his information had reached him—had obviously misunderstood, wrongly presented or erroneously emended some of the official material on which the Herodotean account of Achaemenian administrative geography was based; yet, in virtue of being a private person who had ceased to be an Achaemenian subject and who had no official axe to grind, Herodotus had conveyed to his readers information which the Achaemenian Government had taken care not to impart in its official inscriptions. Conversely, these official inscriptions, while they certainly did not tell the whole truth that the Herodotean picture revealed, were presumably free, so far as they went, from the misunderstandings and errors into which Herodotus had fallen.

In Table V, folding out opposite page 772, the names of countries and peoples given in the six official lists are set out on the left-hand side¹ and the corresponding names given by Herodotus on the right-hand side. The interpretation of the information, coming from these divers sources, which has determined the arrangement of the names in this table is explained and discussed in the remainder of the present Annex.

¹ In handling the names given in the six official lists, the present writer has taken for his guides two papers by experts: R. G. Kent's 'Old Persian Texts, IV: The Lists of Provinces', in the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. ii, January–October 1943 (Chicago 1943, University of Chicago Press), pp. 302–7, and G. G. Cameron's 'Darius, Egypt and "the Lands beyond the Sea"', *ibid.*, pp. 307–13. Without these guides, he would have been incapable of embarking on his own present amateur essay.

The official information that had come into Modern Western hands direct consisted of six lists—five inscribed by Darius I and one by Xerxes—of *dahyāva* (countries represented on the throne-bearer reliefs by male figures displaying the characteristic physique, style of hair-dressing, and costume of their respective peoples) over which Darius I and Xerxes claimed to be bearing rule. The documentary monuments in which these lists occurred were Darius I's record of the events of the first year of his reign on the cliff at Behistan, overlooking the Great North-East Road from Babylon via Ecbatana and the Caspian Gates to the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin ('DB'); Darius's inscription *e* at Persepolis ('DPe'); Darius's inscription on the stelae that he erected in Egypt along the ship canal that he dug to connect the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean from Suez via the Wady Tumilat and the Nile ('DZd'); Darius's inscription *e* at Susa ('DSe'); Darius's inscription on his tomb cut into the cliff at Naqš-i-Rustam ('DNa');¹ and Xerxes' inscription *h* at Persepolis ('XPh'). Of these six lists, 'DB', 'DSe', 'DNa', and 'XPh' were inscribed in three languages: Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian; 'DPe' was inscribed in Old Persian only; the inscription on the stelae at Suez was in Egyptian hieroglyphic characters, into which it had been transcribed from Aramaic. Inscription 'DNa' was accompanied by a bas-relief—to which the inscription called the reader's attention—in which the thirty peoples, including the Pārsā, whose names were recited in the list, were delineated, as throne-bearers, in the order of their mention in the list and with their names attached to them;² and this set of figures was repeated at Persepolis in a tripylon dating from the end of Darius I's reign and again in 'the Hall of the Hundred Columns' dating from the end of Xerxes' reign.³

The six lists contain between them thirty-two names, including Pārsa. Twenty-one of the thirty-one names other than Pārsa occur in all six lists (though not in the same order in each list) namely (to cite them in the order of the earliest document, 'DB'): Hūja (written Ūvja), Bābiruš, Athurā, Arabāya, Mudrāya, Sparda, Yauna, Māda, Armina (*alias* Arminiya), Katpatuka, Parthava, Zrāka, Haraiva, Hvārazmīy or Hvārazmiš (written Uvārazmīy or Uvārazmiš), Bākhtriš, Suguda (*alias* Sugda), Gādāra, Saka, Thataguš, Harahvatiš (written Haraувatiš), Maka. Four lists out of the six—i.e. all except 'DB' and 'DPe'—divide one of these twenty-one common units, namely the Sakā, into two groups. 'The

¹ There were four rock-tombs, in all, at Naqš-i-Rustam (see Kent, *Old Persian*, p. 109).

² 'The inscriptions identifying the throne-bearers on DN are mostly illegible; most of those on the other tomb at Naqš-i-Rustam displaying throne-bearers, which may be the tomb of Artaxerxes II or III, are still decipherable.'—Professor Roland G. Kent.

³ See Junge, P. J.: 'Satrapie und Natio', p. 22. According to Junge, *ibid.*, p. 24, this set of figures of throne-bearers was not identical with the set of figures of tax-payers, supplemented by a set of figures of present-bringers, representing the Persian nobility of Hūja (where there was a Persian population in the districts of Parsuwaš, *alias* Parsawaš, and Anšan) and Pārsa and the Median nobility, of which a complete specimen had been preserved in a relief in Darius's apadāna dating from the last years of Darius's reign. According to the same authority (p. 25), the set of figures representing the tax-payers omitted the Sakā Haumavargā, the Hvārazmiš, 'the Sakā beyond the Sea' (i.e. the Scyths in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe), the Dahā and the Thata-gu[?d or v]jiyā.

Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā' (Sakā Haumavargā)¹ are distinguished from 'the Pointed-Hood Sakā'² (Sakā Tigrakhaudā) in 'DSe', 'DNa', and 'XPh', and 'the Sakā of the Marshes' from 'the Sakā of the Plains' in Darius I's Egyptian list 'DZd'.³ Gādāra and 'those in the Sea', both mentioned in all the other five lists, are omitted from 'DZd', whether by inadvertence or through lack of space.⁴ Hiduš, which had evidently not yet been annexed at the date at which 'DB' was inscribed, appears in all five subsequent lists. 'Those beyond the Sea' (i.e. the peoples of Thrace, perhaps also including some of the Nomad Scyths on the north bank of the Lower Danube) are not mentioned in either 'DB' or 'DE', but appear in all four subsequent lists. 'DSe', 'DNa', and 'XPh' all also add Skudra, Putāyā, Kūša, and Karkā.⁵ 'XPh' alone adds the Dahā and the Ākau-fāciyā as well, but none of these three latest lists includes Asagarta,⁶ which is named in 'DPe' only.⁷

¹ 'The hauma-, of course, is identical etymologically with Sanskrit soma-, and the *Avesta* and the *Rigveda* agree as to its use. In the *Avesta* it is the name of a plant, which may have been of the milkweed type, and of the juice which was pressed out from it, the juice then being allowed to ferment and develop intoxicating properties, after which it was used as a drink by the priests—or perhaps by other persons also. There is no identified Indo-European root from which varga can come. The resemblance to Greek *pergon* is unfortunately misleading, since that goes back to a **verg-* with a palatal *g* that gives Iranian *z*, as in Avestan *varəz*, and O.P. *d*, as in *Arta-ward-ia*. The **verg-* in *haumavarga-* must have had a velar or labiovelar *g* at an earlier stage. The *hauma* being a liquid, this *varga-* may mean "pressing out" or "preparing" or "using" or "consuming"—the last word covering "eating and drinking".

'If Greek Aspourgianoī (your p. 644, n. 5) represents Iranian *aspa-vargā*, the latter need not mean "horse-eaters", but might be *kumiz-drinkers*, i.e. drinkers of fermented mare's-milk. Then we could re-establish "hauma-drinking" for *haumavargā*.'—Note by Professor Roland G. Kent.

'Pressing out', which is one of the alternative possible meanings of *varga-* that are suggested above by Professor Kent, might perhaps be used both for milking a mare and for squeezing the juice out of a plant. If this is its meaning, '*aspavargā*' would be an Iranian equivalent of the Homeric Greek *ἰππόμελοι*.—A.J.T.

² The shape of 'the Pointed-Hood Sakā's' distinctive headgear was known from the portrayal of their prince, Skunkha, on Darius's Behistan relief. The twentieth-century English word that would most naturally have been used to describe it was not 'hood' but 'cap'. The word 'hood' has been applied to it in this Study because there seemed to the writer to be indications that the Medieval and Modern Western hood was ultimately derived from the Sakā Tigrakhaudā's head-dress (see XIII. ix. 53–55). The writer did not possess the philological knowledge to be able to judge whether Skunkha's 'khauda' was to be identified with a Western scholar's hood etymologically as well as genetically, or whether this Old Persian word was represented by the New Persian 'khūd', meaning helmet by itself and cock's-comb in the compound 'khūd khurūs'.

³ Though, on the face of it, it seems unlikely that the same Achaemenian emperor Darius should divide the same people into two groups on different lines in different official inscriptions, it cannot be demonstrated that these two formulas for dividing the Sakā into two are equivalent to one another.

⁴ Lack of space is A. T. Olmstead's explanation in his *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), p. 149.

⁵ The plural of the *ethnikon*, standing for the name of the country.

⁶ Asagarta is mentioned four times, and the *ethnikon* Asagartiya twice, in the text of 'DB'.—Professor Roland G. Kent.

⁷ These discrepancies between the contents of the divers official lists enable us to arrange them in the chronological order of their successive redaction with one exception: we are left in doubt about the chronological relation between 'DPe' and 'DZd'. Both these lists are evidently later than 'DB' (on the assumption that the reason why Gādāra and 'those in the Sea', which appear in 'DB', are omitted in 'DZd' is simply lack of space or inadvertence, and not because these two peoples were not yet included in the Achaemenian Empire at the time when 'DZd' was composed). 'DPe' and 'DZd' are also both evidently earlier than 'DSe', 'DNa', and 'XPh'. The chronological relation between 'DZd' and 'DPe' themselves is, however, impossible similarly to establish from the internal evidence, because different items point to opposite conclusions. From the absence in 'DZd' of 'those beyond the Sea', who appear in 'DPe', as they do in all

It is not easy to make out on what principle, if any, the names included in these official lists have been selected. It is clear that they are only a selection from a larger list, since the names of several other countries—e.g. Marguš, Varkāna, the Yautiyā—are mentioned incidentally by Darius in his record of the events of the year 522–521 B.C. in associations which show that Marguš was embraced in the Viceroyalty of Bākhtriš and Varkāna in the Viceroyalty of Parthava, and that the Yautiyā were Persians. In the lists, however, Varkāna is never named, though Haraiva, which would appear to have had the same status as Varkāna within the Viceroyalty and Taxation District Parthava, is named in the lists invariably; and similarly Marguš is never named in the lists, though they invariably name Suguda, which, like Marguš, was a canton within the Viceroyalty and Taxation District Bākhtriš. Moreover, the peoples mentioned in Herodotus's gazetteer of the taxation districts, either by name or as the anonymous neighbours of other peoples who are mentioned by name, amount to seventy-three in all, according to the reckoning adopted in this Annex; and we have to conclude that Herodotus or his intermediary obtained from official Achaemenian sources about twice as many names as are mentioned in the Achaemenian official lists—even when we have allowed for Herodotus's several times repeated error of inserting the same people twice or three times over under different names which he had failed to recognize as being synonymous, and when we have also recognized the possibility that, in naming peoples included in taxation districts with seaboard on the Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Black Sea, the Herodotean list may have supplemented its official source by adding other names that were household words in Hellas.¹

The omission of the name of Cilicia in all six official lists, and the special treatment of Pārsa in three of them,² are features that would suggest in themselves that these lists were intended to be representative of the tax-paying subject population—each name standing either for a single taxation district or for a single viceroyalty³—but this explanation is ruled out by the inclusion of Arabāya, the Kūšiyā, the Ākaufačiyā, and the Sakā Haumavargā, since the Arabs, the African Ethiopians, and

the three latest lists, we might infer that 'DZd' was earlier than 'DPe', if the opposite conclusion were not just as strongly commended by the absence in 'DPe' of the Putāyā and the Kūšiyā, who appear in 'DZd' as they do in all the three latest lists likewise. Two further points of difference both also tell in favour of dating 'DPe' earlier than 'DZd'. 'DPe' mentions the Sakā without distinguishing between two varieties of them, whereas 'DZd' distinguishes two varieties—though we cannot be sure that its distinction between 'the Sakā of the Marshes' and 'the Sakā of the Plains' is identical with the distinction, made in the three latest lists, between 'Sakā Tigrakhaudā' and 'Sakā Haumavargā'. Moreover, the order of the names in 'DPe' indicates that Zrāka is still included in the Viceroyalty of Parthava, whereas the order in 'DZd' indicates that Zrāka has already been detached from Parthava and attached to Harahvatīš.

On this showing, 'DZd' has tentatively been placed after 'DPe' in the Table.

¹ On the other hand, such names as the Outioi in Herodotus's Taxation District No. 14, and the Dadikai and Aparytai in his No. 7, can have reached him only from Achaemenian official sources, though they do not appear in any of the official lists.

² See p. 584' above.

³ Professor G. G. Cameron comments: 'The omission of Cilicia and special treatment of Pārsa indicate to me not a list of tax-paying subjects but simply a list of areas where there was a satrap'. But will not the imperial territory administered by satraps have been co-extensive with the imperial territory inhabited by tax-paying subjects, even though, within this total domain, the respective areas of particular satrapies and particular taxation districts did not coincide?

the Colchians are known from Herodotus, and the Sakā Haumavargā are known from other Hellenic sources,¹ to have been, not tax-paying subjects, but 'gift-bringing' allies. Moreover, while the number of the taxation districts seems unlikely ever to have risen from an original figure of twenty to as many as thirty-two, and the number of the viceroyalties, at its highest, will have fallen short of thirty-two *a fortiori*,² the four taxation districts into which Media had been partitioned on the testimony of Herodotus are all embraced, in all the official lists, under the single name 'Māda', while on the other hand the three components of the single viceroyalty of Bactria—namely the two subject peoples Bākhtriš and Suguda and the allied people known as the Sakā Haumavargā who were brigaded with them—are separately mentioned in all the official lists, each under its own name. The generally accepted view that Suguda was an integral part of the Viceroyalty of Bākhtriš rests on the fact that it is placed immediately after Bākhtriš in all six lists; and the same reasoning suggests that Haraiva was always included in the Viceroyalty of Parthava and that Zrāka was originally also attached to Parthava and was subsequently transferred, at least for a time, to the Viceroyalty of Harahvatiš.³

It is thus evident that the selection of names in the official lists is not the roll-call either of the viceroyalties or of the taxation districts or of either of these two sets of administrative units together with the 'externally associated' allies. At least nine names⁴ out of a total of thirty-two that appear on one or other of the lists are those of countries which never, so far as we know, constituted either separate viceroyalties or even separate taxation districts; and there are at least two taxation districts in the Herodotean gazetteer—Nos. 17 and 19—which are not represented by any of the names in the official lists. None of this, however, is surprising, since we may feel sure that the purpose for which this selection of names was made by Achaemenian officials was not that of enabling twentieth-century Western scholars to reconstruct the Ariaramnan Achaemenian Empire's administrative geography. It is indeed manifest that the positive purpose of the lists, like that of the accompanying visual representations of throne-bearers, is to give the reader and spectator an impression of the Imperial Dynasty's and Imperial People's achievement in conquering and holding an empire of so vast an extent and so variegated a racial and cultural composition. This intention is indicated in 'DB' in the observations in §§ 7–9, which immediately follow the recital of the list and which are recapitulated more briefly in 'DNa', § 4, in the same context. The latter passage continues as follows:

'If you say to yourself: "How manifold were those lands that King Darius possessed", look at the representations of the throne-bearers, and then you will recognise—then verily you will know—that a Persian fight-

¹ See further pp. 644–5, below.

² See further pp. 683–4, below.

³ In both 'DB' and 'DPe' the three names Parthava-Zrāka-Haraiva appear consecutively in this order, and Haraiva is placed immediately after Parthava in 'DSe', 'DNa', and 'XPh', while in 'DZd', conversely, Haraiva is placed immediately before Parthava. On the other hand, Zrāka is placed immediately after Harahvatiš in 'DZd', and immediately before Harahvatiš in 'DSe' and 'DNa'. In 'XPh', Zrāka-Parthava-Haraiva are cited consecutively again in this order.

⁴ Zrāka, Asagarta, Maka, Dahā, Hvārazmiš, Haraiva, Suguda, Thataguš, Putāyā.

ing-man's spear has pressed forward far—then verily you will know that a Persian fighting-man has given battle far from Pārsa.'

In short, the intention of the lists is to convey the fact that is more succinctly expressed in a boast inscribed on the foundation tablets of the apadāna at Persepolis and is reproduced in identical terms in an inscription found *in situ* at Ecbatana: the Achaemenian Empire extends 'from the Sakā who are beyond Suguda to the Kūšiyā, and from Hīduš to Sparda'.¹

At the same time the circumspect compilers of the official lists did not allow their enthusiasm for advertising the extent and variety of the Achaemenian Empire to lead them into mentioning names that might have drawn attention to other facts which would have betrayed a damaging truth. The Ariaramnan branch of the dynasty that proudly reigned over this far-flung empire had learnt by the bitter experience of their anarchic inaugural year 522-521 B.C. that they could not depend on the loyalty of more than a minority even of the two imperial peoples, the Pārsā and the Mādā; and they had accordingly taken the precautions of partitioning them both for fiscal purposes, of degrading dissident Pārsā to the status of tax-paying subjects, and of deporting dissident Mādā to islands in the Persian Gulf. But, the more necessary these political precautions were held to be, the more inexpedient it would have been to draw attention to them; and the very frankness of the account in 'DB' of the rebellion of the Yautiyā Pārsā explains why this name of ill omen does not appear on any of the six official lists, though it is tactlessly included, in the Hellenized form 'Outioi', in Herodotus's recital of the peoples brigaded, in his taxation District No. 14, with the Harahvatiyā (disguised in the terminology of Herodotus's source as 'the Thamanaioi', signifying 'the borderers'). As for the no less tell-tale name 'Asagarta',² the imprudent mention of it in 'DPe' is never afterwards repeated. The official lists do, in fact, skilfully achieve the dual purpose of advertising the grandeur of the Ariaramnan Achaemenian Empire without exposing its seamy side to public view. But, of course, the more successful these lists are in achieving the combination of purposes which they were designed to reconcile, the harder they make it for the historian to wring out of them the truth for which he is seeking.

The information—drawn, at least in part, from Achaemenian official sources, though perhaps only at second or third hand—that has been incorporated by Herodotus into his history, is presented by him in what profess to be three official documents: a gazetteer of Darius's original twenty taxation districts;³ an itinerary of the Achaemenian Empire's Great North-West Road,⁴ associated by Herodotus with a map of the

¹ See Junge: 'Satrapie und Natio', pp. 15-16; Cameron, G. G.: 'Darius, Egypt and "the Lands beyond the Sea"', in *The Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. ii, January-October 1943 (Chicago 1943, University of Chicago Press), pp. 307-13. The present reference is to p. 312, n. 31.

² Its historical associations were known to twentieth-century scholars, thanks to six mentions of it (four times in the place-name form and twice in the ethnic form) in Darius's narrative, in 'DB', of the events of the year 522-521 B.C.—a narrative that was as frank as the official lists of *dahyāva* were discreet.

³ Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 89-96 (see p. 178, above).

⁴ See p. 82, n. 1, above.

World, engraved on a brass plate, which the turn-coat 'quisling', Aristagoras of Miletus, is alleged to have brought with him on a mission to King Cleomenes I of Sparta in the hope of persuading Cleomenes to invade the Achaemenian Empire as a champion of the Imperial Government's malcontent Asian Hellenic subjects;¹ and a field-state of the expeditionary force with which Xerxes crossed the Dardanelles in 480 B.C.² The last two of these three alleged documents may be more or less authentic. A written statement of the order of battle of Darius III Codomannus's army at Gaugamela was, after all, captured on the field by the victors and has been reproduced, on the authority of Alexander's general Aristobûlus, by Arrian in his *Alexander's Expedition*;³ and this order of battle corresponds to a field-state given by Arrian at an earlier point.⁴ On the other hand the so-called gazetteer bears tell-tale marks of being an amateur compilation in which first-rate official information, drawn from more than one official source, has been used but, in being edited, has, here and there, been misinterpreted and also been 'scrambled' (no doubt, unintentionally).

The order in which the twenty taxation districts are placed by Herodotus—to consider this point first—cannot be the original order; for, as our six extant official lists of *dahyāva* testify, an official list drafted in the Imperial Chancery would normally have started, in a recital in which Pārsa was being omitted because it did not pay taxes, by naming Māda and Hūja (Ūvja), the two countries that shared with Pārsa the distinction of constituting the heartland of the Empire.⁵ By contrast, Herodotus's gazetteer starts with Yauna, goes on to Sparda in Yauna's immediate hinterland, and then recites all the other districts with seaboard on the Black Sea or on the Mediterranean—Katpatuka, Cilicia, Syria, and Egypt—before penetrating into the interior of the Empire. Even then this Herodotean gazetteer does not mention Hūja (in Herodotus's terminology, 'the Kissioi'), Bābiruš (in Herodotus's terminology 'Assyria') or Māda until after it has made a flying leap to the Thatagu[?d or v]iyā (*Graecè* Sattagy dai) in the Upper Indus Basin. The concentration of interest on the western seaboard of the Empire, where the Achaemenian dominions overlap with the eastern fringes of the Hellenic World, is likewise displayed in the order in which the gazetteer mentions the peoples embraced in a taxation district extending from the west bank of the Lower Halys to the Asiatic shore of the narrow seas connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean. We may presume that the most important of the cantons in this district was Katpatuka (*Graecè* Kappadokiê), since this is the only one of them that is mentioned in the Achaemenian official lists of *dahyāva*. Yet, instead of starting with the Cappadocians (*alias* 'White Syrians') and proceeding from east to west, the gazetteer, in its enumeration of the peoples in this taxation district, starts with

¹ Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 49–54.

² *Ibid.*, Book VII, chaps. 61–99.

³ Arrian: *Expeditiō Alexandri*, Book III, chap. xi, §§ 3–7.

⁴ In Book III, chap. viii, §§ 3–6.

⁵ Pārsa is placed at the head of all our six extant official lists. Māda is placed second in DZd, DSe, DNa, XPh, and third in DPe. Hūja is placed second in DB and DPe, and third in DZd, DSe, DNa, XPh. The one exception to this general rule of precedence is the placing of Media tenth in DB (i.e. in the place that Media occupies in Herodotus's gazetteer).

the Hellenic communities along the Asiatic shore of the Straits and proceeds thence from west to east till it arrives at the Cappadocians last of all.

It is perhaps conceivable that this drastic departure from the order of precedence observed in lists of *dahyāva* inscribed by the Imperial Government had been made in the provincial chancery of one or other of the three westernmost viceroyalties on the Asiatic mainland—Yauna, Karkā, or Sparda—before the list came into private Hellenic hands; but it would seem more likely that the provincial chanceries would have abode by the Imperial Chancery's practice, and that the violent change of order through which the western lands of the Empire have been given precedence over the heartland will have been the work of a private Hellenic man of letters—whether this was Herodotus himself or was some predecessor of his—who was concerned to adapt the Achaemenian official information that had come into his hands to the requirements of a book which was to be read to and by an Hellenic public and which must therefore present its picture of the Achaemenian Empire in a perspective calculated to commend it, not to Achaemenian, but to Hellenic eyes.

This officious Hellenic literary rearrangement of the official order of precedence of the Achaemenian Empire's lands and peoples has had its nemesis. It has caused Herodotus, or his unofficial Hellenic intermediate source, to lose his way in the maze of the Empire's vast interior as soon as he has had to let go of the alternative guide-rope which he has improvised for himself, after taking his starting-point in Yauna, by following the coastline of the maritime western lands, first north-eastward along the coast of the Black Sea and then south-eastward along the coast of the Mediterranean. Even this cue taken from Physical Geography for the filling of the first six of the twenty spaces in his blank form for a gazetteer of the Achaemenian taxation districts has already led the Hellenic amateur archivist into one error which would have involved him in difficulties in any case. It has led him to assign one of the twenty pigeon-holes at his disposal to the principality of Cilicia; and, though, down to the time of writing, the researches of Modern Western archaeologists had not yet disinterred an official list of Darius's original twenty taxation districts, it could be taken as almost certain that Cilicia was not numbered among the twenty, considering that Cilicia was not included in any of the six already known lists of *dahyāva* and that, on this showing, we must conclude that Cilicia ranked juridically as a sovereign independent state in spite of the political fact that this state happened to be one of the Empire's 'gift-bringing allies'. But the Herodotean gazetteer is vitiated by a far more serious flaw than its abandonment of the official order of precedence and its inclusion of a nominally independent state in the list of imperial taxation districts: it has drawn its information from more than one source, and at least two of its sources reproduce respectively two administrative maps which are not merely different from one another but are actually incompatible and which therefore cannot both be delineations of one and the same network of geographical subdivisions of the imperial domain. In the Herodotean gazetteer there are instances of the same peoples figuring twice over because they have

been attributed to two different taxation districts under two different names which Herodotus has not recognized as being the synonyms that they are in fact; there is at least one instance of the same territories figuring twice over because they have been assigned to two different administrative units which therefore cannot both have figured side by side on one and the same administrative map, though either of them may have figured simultaneously with the other on one of two different maps that will have been in force simultaneously for two different purposes; and there is also at least one instance of the same whole district figuring twice over under two different names. In consequence, Herodotus has found himself left with more names on his hands than he can find room for in his twenty pigeon-holes, and his desperate search for apparently vacant nooks and corners to house the surplus names has misled him into attributing geographically non-contiguous peoples to the same taxation district and, worse still, into introducing districts with overlapping frontiers on to what purports to be the same administrative map.

If we let our eye travel down Herodotus's list of his twenty taxation districts in the order in which he has presented them to us, we shall catch him adding to his embarrassments as he proceeds. After having reduced the number of the pigeon-holes at his disposal from the necessary twenty to nineteen by erroneously assigning one pigeon-hole to Cilicia, he goes on to reduce the number to eighteen by counting in Harahvatiš twice over, through a failure to detect that the Thamanaioi (*alias* Harahvatiyā) who occupy a pigeon-hole in one of his sources are identical with the Paktyes (*alias* Harahvatiyā) to whom he has already just assigned the pigeon-hole which, in another of his sources, the same Harahvatiyā occupy under this different name. A twentieth-century Western scholar could identify the habitat of Herodotus's Paktyes because their name—like that of Herodotus's Dadikai (Tajik) and Aparytai (Afridi)—was still borne by a living people. In the twentieth century of the Christian Era the North-East Iranian people whom foreigners knew as Afghans were still calling themselves 'Pakhtāna', 'Pashtāna', 'Pathān' in the divers dialects of their Iranian language;¹ and this survival of the name locates Herodotus's Paktyes in the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* that is named 'Harahvatiš' (eventually Hellenized as 'Arakhosia, *Latine* Arachosia') in the official lists. But this same Harahvatiš is also represented by Herodotus's 'Thamanaioi', as we can verify by comparing Herodotus's gazetteer of Darius I's taxation districts with his field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force, since the two peoples called Outioi and Mykoi who are grouped with the Thamanaioi in the gazetteer are grouped with the Paktyes in the field-state. It is natural enough that one and the same *dahyāuš* should have been known by three alternative names; for, while 'Harahvatiš' is the name of the country² and 'Paktyes' is the proper name of the people inhabiting it, 'Thamanaioi' is a descriptive title. The sur-

¹ These were the plural forms; the corresponding singular forms 'Pakhtūn' and 'Pashtūn' were still closer to the Greek singular form 'Paktys'.

² The country seems to have taken this name from the river that was its lifeline (see A. V. W. Jackson in *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. i (Cambridge 1922, University Press), p. 321, n. 2; Olmstead, A. T.: *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), p. 46, n. 59).

vival, in a New Persian language, of the word 'dāmān',¹ meaning the skirt of a garment and, by analogy, a 'borderland' or 'march', tells us that 'Thamanaioi' means 'the borderers'; and Harahvatiš had, in fact, been the south-easternmost territory of the Achaemenian Empire until Darius had relegated it to the interior by annexing Sind and the country, corresponding in area approximately to a latter-day Makrān, which (though not named in any of the official lists) is included in Herodotus's gazetteer as his District No. 17, inhabited by Parikanioi and by Asiatic Ethiopians.

Thus, as a result of two mistakes—the assignment of one pigeon-hole (No. 4), instead of none, to the Cilicians, and the assignment of two pigeon-holes (Nos. 13 and 14), instead of one, to Harahvatiš in order superfluously to provide for both of Harahvatiš's two synonyms 'Pak-tyes' and 'Thamanaioi'—Herodotus ran through his twenty pigeon-holes without having disposed of all the names that had been thrust upon him by his divers sources. As we can see from the final shape of the gazetteer as he eventually published it, there were at least four names still on his hands after he had assigned his twentieth and last pigeon-hole to the Indoi. These four names were, first, a second set of Parikanioi, who were distinguished from the set already stowed by him in Pigeon-hole No. 17 by being bracketed, not with Ethiopians, but with Orthokorybantioi; second, these Orthokorybantioi who were bracketed with the still unhoused set of Parikanioi; third, the Armenians; fourth, the Sogdoi.

If Herodotus had only known it, two, at any rate, out of these four surplus names need not have worried him; for these two were already accounted for in the description of his District No. 12 which he had copied from one of his sources: 'the Baktrianoi as far as the Aiglai'. 'Aiglai', like 'Thamanaioi', is a descriptive title, if its meaning is 'allies';² and the people denoted by this title are the Sakā Haumavargā of the official lists who, in the foundation tablets at Persepolis and Ecbatana, are called 'the Sakā who are beyond Suguda',³ i.e. the Sakā inhabiting the upper basin of the River Jaxartes (*alias* Sir Darya), which, at the time of writing, bore the name 'Farghānah'. This surviving name is manifestly derived from that of the Parikanioi whom Herodotus found associated with the Orthokorybantioi; these 'parikanioi' (the Avestan 'pairikās', meaning

¹ In the Kingdom of Afghanistan in the early decades of the nineteenth century there were at least two areas bearing the name 'dāmān', and one of these—the 'Damaun' that 'comprehends all the country between the Salt-range, the Solimauny Mountains, the Indus and Sungur in Upper Sind' (Elphinstone, M.: *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, 2nd ed. (London 1839, Bentley, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 55) may well have been included within the bounds of the Achaemenian *dahyāuś* whose people Herodotus calls 'Thamanaioi' in his description of his Taxation District No. 14. Another 'dāmān' was to be found in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era at the opposite extremity of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, to the north of Kābul, in the direction of the Hindu Kush. The pleasantness of this land, and the unpleasantness of its inhabitants the Tajiks (Herodotus's 'Dadikai'), are described at first hand by Alexander Burnes in *Cabool, A Personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in, that City in the Years 1836, 7 and 8*, 2nd ed. (London 1843, Murray), pp. 146–66, and by Burnes' companion Captain John Wood in *A Journey to the Sources of the River Oxus*, new ed. (London 1872, John Murray), pp. 110–16.

² See further pp. 644–5, below.

³ See p. 590, above.

either 'sorcerers'¹ or 'fairy people' or 'fairy-worshipping people'²) are identical with the 'allies' ('Aiglai') of the Achaemenian Empire who were also officially known as 'Sakā Haumavargā'; the 'Orthokorybantioi', whom Herodotus had found bracketed with the 'Parikanioi' in one of his sources, are 'the Pointed-Hood Sakā' who are bracketed with 'the Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā' in the three latest of the six official lists;³ and the Sogdoi, though not mentioned by name in the description of District No. 12, are included in it by implication, since a district which extended from Bactria as far as a Farghānah which was the habitat of the Empire's Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā allies could not have left the intervening country out, and this intervening country was Sogdiana. The Sogdoi had thus, after all, been provided for, and the Sakan Parikanioi had no right to a place in the gazetteer of taxation districts, since, like the Cilicians, they were, juridically, not tax-paying subjects of the Achaemenian Empire, but gift-bringing sovereign independent allies. In the formula 'as far as the Aiglai' the term 'as far as' was evidently being used in an exclusive, not in an inclusive, sense, and the couple of names 'Parikanioi-Orthokorybantioi' must have come into Herodotus's hands from a list, which like the six extant official lists, was not a gazetteer of taxation districts, but was a selection of *dahyāva* of divers status.

This satisfactory solution of half his residual difficulties must, however, have escaped Herodotus's notice; for the expedient by which he has sought to extricate himself is the unlucky one of stuffing the Parikanioi and Orthokorybantioi into Pigeon-hole No. 10, already assigned to Media, and stuffing the Sogdoi into Pigeon-hole No. 16, already assigned to the Parthoi, Areioi, and Khorasmioi. This desperate remedy has made nonsense of the gazetteer in two several ways: it has resulted in the Sogdoi and the Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā of Farghānah figuring in the gazetteer twice over in different contexts, and it has resulted in the attribution of non-contiguous peoples to the same taxation district. The Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā (who ought not to figure in any taxation district at all) appear in District No. 10 as 'Parikanioi', besides appearing as 'Aiglai' in the description of District No. 12; the Sogdoi appear in District No. 16 *nominatim*, besides being included by implication in District No. 12. On the point of non-contiguity, it is, of course, geographically inadmissible to brigade Sogdiana with Parthia, considering that the intervening territory—Marguš—is known, from the evidence of 'DB', to have been included in Bākhtriš; it is a geographical absurdity to brigade with Media 'the

¹ In the Avestan Iranian language the feminine singular 'pairikā' means 'witch'.—Professor Roland G. Kent.

² See Nyberg, H. S.: *Die Religionen des Alten Iran*, in *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen-Ägyptischen Gesellschaft*, 43. Band (Leipzig 1938, Hinrichs), pp. 297, 314 seqq., 340, 469.

³ In another context—in his field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force—Herodotus catches an echo of the official distinction between the two branches of the Sakā, only to confound them with one another. After giving, in Book VII, chap. 64, a description of 'the Pointed-Hood Sakā'—he calls them 'Skythai wearing stiff upright pointed kyrbasiai'—he goes on to say that these particular Skythai were called Sakai Amyrgioi (i.e. Sakā Haumavargā) by the Persians. Herodotus did not notice that the Orthokorybantioi whom he had brigaded with the Medes in his gazetteer were the same people as 'the Pointed-Hood Sakā' of his field-state.

Pointed-Hood Sakā', who were separated from Media by the whole breadth of the Viceroyalty of Parthava, and *a fortiori* to brigade 'the Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā' with Media, since these were separated from Media not only by the Viceroyalty of Parthava but also by the sub-empire of Bākhtriš beyond that.

After having fallen into these errors as the price of disposing of three out of his four surplus names, Herodotus fell into another error in disposing of Armenia. The process of reasoning that led him to the manifestly erroneous conclusion that the Armenians were brigaded with Southern Afghanistan in one and the same taxation district may perhaps be reconstructed as follows.

As Herodotus was re-examining his divers materials in search of a vacant space in which Armenia could be stowed, we may conjecture that his eye caught, in one of his cahiers, an entry that had been transliterated into Greek 'Paktyikê and Armenioi and the adjoining peoples as far as the Black Sea'; and here (if our guess is right) he fancied that he had found salvation; for 'Paktyikos' is the Greek adjective corresponding to the Greek substantive 'Paktyes'; and the Paktyes already had a pigeon-hole of their own in District No. 13 (duplicating District No. 14, which had also been assigned by Herodotus inadvertently to the Paktyes under their *alias* 'Thamanaioi'). Now that the Armenians had proved to have been included in the same administrative area as the Paktyes, Herodotus's last difficulty will have seemed to him to have been overcome. He had only to replace 'Paktyes' by 'Paktyikê and Armenioi and the adjoining peoples as far as the Black Sea' as the label for his District No. 13, and he would have completed his task of making all the names in his divers cahiers fit into the twenty pigeon-holes at his disposal. At this point it must have escaped his notice that the peoples adjoining the Armenians as far as the Black Sea could be none other than the Moskhoi, Tibarênoi, Makrônes, Mossynoikoi, and Mâres, to whom he had already assigned a separate pigeon-hole of their own (his District No. 19); and furthermore he cannot have been fully alive to the improbability of an apparent solution which was committing him to the thesis that peoples with a frontage on the Black Sea could have been included in the same taxation district as a people whose home lay at the eastern extremity of the Empire.

All the same, when he came to write his introductory note for his gazetteer as he was now presenting it, the awkwardness of this thesis seems to have forced itself upon his attention. The first sentence of the introductory note runs:

'When Darius had set up his vicerealties and had appointed viceroys for them, he assessed taxes that were to be paid to him by single peoples in some cases and in other cases by syndicates in which a people's neighbours were brigaded with it.'

We may guess that this sentence was a correct statement of the truth, and that it was copied out by Herodotus verbatim from one of his sources; but, as he copied the word 'neighbours' (*πλησιοχώρους*), a misgiving must have assailed him. He must have recollected that, in

the gazetteer as he had now edited it, the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia figured in the same district as the Paktyes of Eastern Iran. This must (he would have reassured himself) be correct, since one of his sources (as interpreted by him) had vouched for it; and, besides, he would find himself with the Armenians on his hands again if he were to reject this welcome solution now on second thoughts. All the same, he was bound to feel uncomfortable about a solution of a particular problem that was in flat contradiction with the general statement in one of his sources that all members of a taxation-syndicate were contiguous with one another. He could not leave it at that, considering that he had taken for the label of his Taxation District No. 13 a statement by one of his authorities that the Paktyes (whom he knew of as an East Iranian people) were syndicated with the Armenians and with peoples adjoining the Armenians who had a seaboard on the Black Sea. So Herodotus (if our reconstruction of his process of composition is correct) uneasily took up his pen again and amplified the introductory note by appending the following *contradictio in adjecto*:

'And in other cases he passed over the adjoining peoples and assigned the [non-contiguous] peoples on the farther side of [the peoples that he had passed over] to the same taxation district as the peoples [on the nearer side of them].'

This additional sentence, which makes the introductory note self-contradictory, was, we may suppose, extorted from Herodotus by his own previous manipulation of the contents of a gazetteer that he had compiled, at his peril, from more than one source;¹ but this does not mean that the entry 'Paktyikê and Armenioi and the adjoining peoples as far as the Black Sea' had made nonsense in the original context out of which Herodotus had lifted it in order to substitute it for the entry 'Paktyes', taken from a different source, with which he had mistakenly assumed that an entry opening with the word 'Paktyikê' must be identical. All that was the matter with the entry beginning 'Paktyikê' was that it belonged to the political map of the Achaemenian Empire as this had been organized by Cyrus II after he had ousted Astyages from the throne of Media, and not to the fiscal map of the Empire as this had been organized by Darius I after the anarchic year 522-521 B.C. When it was retransferred to the political map, to which it properly belonged, from the fiscal map, into which Herodotus had mistakenly introduced it, this entry would make sense, as we shall see.²

Administrative Geography and Political History

The coexistence of two different administrative maps of the Achaemenian Empire—one fiscal and the other political—of which Herodotus has thus unwittingly preserved an indication in his gazetteer, throws light on a dark passage in the Empire's political history.

The constant ideal of the Achaemenian régime was to govern as far

¹ A tentative reconstruction of the authentic list of Darius's original twenty taxation districts is presented in Table VI, folding out opposite p. 772, below.

² On pp. 604-11, below.

as possible with the consent of the governed; and, while the originator of this ideal had been the founder of the Empire, Cyrus II, the restorer of the Empire, Darius I, showed—for example, by his policy in Egypt—that he too had taken the founder's ideal to heart. The difference between Darius's position and Cyrus's was one not so much of ideals as of possibilities of putting ideals into practice. The nemesis of Darius's assassination of a reigning emperor who, truly or falsely, had claimed to be Cyrus's son Smerdis had been the outbreak of the widespread *émeute* of 522–521 B.C., and the nemesis of this terrible year had been a grievous and irretrievable blow to the system, which Cyrus had created, fostered, and succeeded in bequeathing to his successors, of governing with the consent of at least a large minority of the governed.

Though Cyrus II's usurpation of Astyages' Median throne had not been either accomplished or maintained without bloodshed, Cyrus seems nevertheless to have managed to achieve the all-important political objective of sparing the Median imperial people's susceptibilities by saving their 'face'. He seems to have been able to avoid creating the impression either that the Medes were being ousted by the Persians or that the House of Cyaxares was being supplanted by the Cyran branch of the House of Achaemenes. He ascended the Median throne as a grandson of Astyages who had been substituted for his grandfather by the suffrages of a preponderant party among the Medes themselves, and he associated his own people—the men of Parsuwaš, Anšan, and Pārsa—with their imperial kinsmen the Medes on a footing, not of superiority, but of strictly equal partnership. The same fundamental policy of conciliation was likewise applied by Cyrus in the far more difficult case of his conquest of the Neo-Babylonian Empire. Thanks to the Babylonian priesthood's quarrel with Nabonidus, Cyrus was able to occupy the throne of Babylon as the Babylonian priesthood's champion and candidate. As for the peoples of Eastern Iran and North-Western India whom Cyrus appears to have brought under his rule between his enthronement in Media *circa* 556–550 B.C.¹ and his attack on the Neo-Babylonian Empire in 539 B.C., the speed and ease with which he established his authority over these vast tracts of territory was perhaps his reward for presenting himself there as a champion of Sedentary Civilization against Nomadism (a cause in which he eventually proved his sincerity by losing his life in its pursuit); for a majority of the sedentary peoples in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and the Indus Basin had suffered cruelly from Eurasian Nomad invasions within living memory.

Cyrus II's policy of governing as far as possible by consent was reflected in the structure of his administrative map. His normal practice seems to have been to respect the territorial integrity of the *ci-devant* empires that he had converted into viceroyalties within a universal state; and, during Cyrus's own reign, the Lydian Empire—where there was an abortive revolt shortly after the original conquest²—seems to have been

¹ The overthrow of Astyages by Cyrus II is dated 550–549 B.C. in the Babylonian Nabonidus-Cyrus Chronicle, 556–555 B.C. in another Babylonian historical document, according to Weissbach, F. H., s.v. 'Kyros', in Pauly-Wissowa: *Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Neue Bearbeitung, Supplementband IV, cols. 1142–3.

² See Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 154–60.

the only one of Cyrus's territorial acquisitions which the conqueror found himself compelled to partition between two separate viceroyalties as the price of maintaining his hold upon it.¹ The former Neo-Babylonian, as well as the former Median, Empire was converted by Cyrus intact into a single viceroyalty; and in the North-East, on the Achaemenian Empire's most dangerous frontier, where the trans-frontier barbarians were the formidable Eurasian Nomads, a Viceroyalty of Bākhtriš that was a sub-empire in itself was either preserved by Cyrus or perhaps actually called into existence by him to serve as the Empire's principal anti-Nomad march.

In Herodotus's gazetteer of Darius's taxation districts the boldly generous Cyran political map has, for the most part, been replaced—and this, of course, correctly—by a cautiously repressive Darian fiscal map reflecting the usurper's reaction to his fearful ordeal in 522–521 B.C.

Darius's assumption of the Imperial Crown had—as we know from Darius's own record—been the signal for a widespread attempt to throw off the Achaemenian yoke (light though this had been so far) and to re-establish the pre-Cyran régimes in empires that Cyrus had deprived of their former sovereign independence. The Medes, for instance, who, in accepting Cyrus II, had been accepting as a legitimate heir to the Median throne a scion of the Cyran branch of the House of Achaemenes whose mother had been a Median princess, could have no such grounds for feeling any loyalty to a pretender, descended from the Ariaramnan branch of the Achaemenidae, who had no Median royal blood in his veins and who had won the imperial throne by assassinating a reigning emperor who had at least professed to be Astyages' great-grandson.

In A.D. 1952 there was no means of knowing for certain whether the Smerdis whom Darius had assassinated had indeed been the authentic son of Cyrus II or whether he had been the impostor that Darius asserts that he was;² and there was also no information about the previous

¹ See pp. 671–3, below.

² The following expert opinion has been given to the writer by Professor Roland G. Kent:

"I accept the account of a true Smerdis, son of Cyrus, and of a false Smerdis, the Magian Gaumāta, for several reasons. (1) The account of Darius himself on the Behistan Rock, and the account by Herodotus, agree in the essentials, though differing in details. (2) If Darius had slain the true Smerdis, son of Cyrus and brother of Cambyses II, and if the fact had been known widely enough to have resulted in the sundry uprisings related by Darius in his inscription, it is hardly conceivable that no hint of this should have come down in the literature, and especially that the inveterate gossip Herodotus, in all his lengthy account of the event, should have given no indication that there was a differing version. (3) Further, if Darius had had to justify his slaying of the real brother of Cambyses, he would have had at hand a much better account to set before the World, and a true account at that, better than what in that case would have been a cock-and-bull story about his having slain an impostor.

"When Darius slew (true or pseudo-) Smerdis, he needed no fanciful story to justify him. All that he had to say was that Smerdis' father had wrongfully deprived his (Darius's) grandfather Arsames of the throne of Persia (or Persis), and that he was avenging the wrong done to his line. Old Arsames was no longer physically able to reassume the sovereignty, so Darius took it for himself. He did not need to invent a pseudo-Smerdis, so why place himself in the position of a liar about the whole matter? Therefore, in view of the concurrent testimony of the Inscription of Behistan and of Herodotus, I believe that the true Smerdis had been murdered previously (unless he had died of natural causes just at that time) and that a Magian named Gaumāta had assumed his place and was presently killed by Darius and his helpers. Note that Darius

relations between the two branches of the House of Achaemenes—perhaps because there had never been a moment at which it had suited either branch to give publicity to facts which, it might be suspected, were to neither branch's credit. Supposing that the Smerdis whom Darius assassinated had been, and been known by Darius to be, the

lists his helpers on the inscription, and that the names agree, with but slight variations, with those given by Herodotus.'

A statement of the case for the contrary thesis that the reigning emperor whom Darius assassinated was the authentic Smerdis, the son of Cyrus II, is presented by A. T. Olmstead in his *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), p. 109, as follows:

'Darius claims that Bardiya [*Graecè* Smerdis], younger brother of Cambyses, was put to death by that brother. Yet there is complete disagreement between our sources as to the time, place, and manner of his murder. Darius puts the episode before the Egyptian expedition of Cambyses, Herodotus during it, and Ctesias after. The official version followed by Herodotus blames a certain Prexaspes for the actual murder, but there was doubt as to whether "Smerdis" was killed while hunting near Susa or was drowned in the Erythraean Sea. After the death of Cambyses, we are expected to believe, Prexaspes publicly recanted his story, informed the people of the secret murder of the "true" Bardiya, and then in repentance committed suicide. Deathbed repentances we all know as frequent devices of the propagandist; after a suicide, the dead man can tell no tales. Furthermore, the "false" Smerdis was false only in claiming to be the son of Cyrus; his actual name *was* Smerdis! The height of absurdity is reached when we are informed that so alike were the "true" and the "false" Smerdis that even the mother and sisters of the "true" Smerdis were deceived! Contemporary Aeschylus had no doubt that Mardos, as he calls him, was a legitimate monarch and that he was slain by the wiles, not of Darius, but of Artaphrenes, one of the "Seven" (Aeschylus, *Persae*, lines 774-7). . . . Last, but far from least, Darius so continuously insists that all his opponents—the "false" Bardiya in particular—are liars that we are convinced he "doth protest too much". It is significant that in Herodotus, Book III, chap. 72, Darius is made to give an elaborate defence of lying.'

The present writer, who was only an amateur in Achaemenian history, was not competent to judge between the authorities on points on which these disagreed with one another. On the issue here in question he would confine himself to recording that, in the first draft of the present passage, he had rashly ventured to opt for the view that Darius's victim had been the authentic Smerdis son of Cyrus II, and that he had been convinced of this as a result of several times rereading 'DB'. The impression made on his mind by Darius's ostensibly frank account of the dramatic events of the first year of his reign had been just the opposite of the impression that Darius himself, in 'DB', is manifestly striving to create. At each repetition of Darius's assertion that he alone is speaking the truth and that each of his rivals is a liar, one reader, at any rate, had come more and more strongly to suspect that Darius must have some portentous lie and crime on his own conscience; and he had actually concluded this now expunged passage in his first draft by quoting the line from Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act III, scene ii, on which Olmstead concludes his statement of the case for the prosecution. (This might, of course, have been a subconscious reminiscence of the passage, quoted above, in Olmstead's book, which the present writer had read several years back.)

On this last point, Professor R. G. Kent, in a note to the present writer, suggests that, in calling his rivals 'liars', Darius is using the word in the technical theological sense of subscribers to a false religious doctrine (i.e. to a religion other than Darius's own worship of Ahuramazda). Evidently this interpretation of the compound substantive 'lie-follower' (O.P. *draujana*) would be possible—though the non-technical translation 'liar', in the plain ordinary meaning of the word, would also be possible—in 'DB', §§ 63 and 64; on the other hand, in § 52 the verb 'he lied' (O.P. *adurujīya*) is used no less than nine times running to stigmatize the pretensions of Darius's defeated rivals. The same verb is used with the same plain meaning in § 11, with reference to the 'false' Smerdis' claim to be the authentic Smerdis; in § 16, with reference to Nidintu-Bel's claim to be Nebuchadrezzar the son of Nabonidus; and in § 49, with reference to the Armenian Arkha son of Haldita's claim to be Nebuchadrezzar the son of Nabonidus. As for § 10, the most natural interpretation of the sentence 'After that the Lie waxed great in the country, both in Persia and in Media and in the other provinces', is surely not that the worship of Ahuramazda receded before the advance of rival religions, but that there was a widespread disposition to accept, at its face value, the 'false' Smerdis' claim to be the true Smerdis, because (in the words of the last sentence but one before this sentence) 'when Cambyses slew Smerdis, it did not become known to the people that Smerdis had been slain'.

rightful owner of the name and in consequence the legitimate heir of Cyrus II, it was conceivable that, from the Ariaramnan branch's standpoint, Darius, in thus assassinating the true Smerdis, would have simply been taking a belated but justifiable revenge for an earlier *coup d'état*, whatever the date and circumstances of this might have been, which had resulted in the deposition of Darius's grandfather Aršāma, and exclusion of his father Vištāspa, from the throne of Pārsa, after Darius's great-grandfather Ariyāramna had ruled in Pārsa and had, perhaps, even exercised a suzerainty over his brother Cyrus I's appanage in Parsuwaš and Anšan as well.¹ This Ariaramnid point of view, however, was not calculated to appeal to the peoples who had acquiesced in the rule of the Cyran branch of the Achaemenidae.

These peoples might not much care whether the emperor whom Darius had murdered was or was not the genuine Smerdis son of Cyrus, or whether Darius had or had not been justified in murdering him, whatever his identity might be. A murder which, in Darius's eyes, would have been primarily an incident in a family quarrel if it was not the exposure and punishment of an imposture, as Darius himself declared it to be, was a sensational piece of news for the Cyran House's former subjects—above all, for those of them who were Medes—because it was conclusive evidence that the Cyran House had now become extinct, without having left any legitimate male heir to succeed to its title. If the Smerdis whom Darius had just murdered was not the authentic son of Cyrus, then either this impostor or Cambyses must previously have taken the authentic Smerdis' life; and, on either of these two alternative possible hypotheses, the Cyran House's subjects now found themselves absolved from their allegiance by the disappearance of the dynasty to which this allegiance had been owed. Unlike the death of Cambyses, the death of Darius's victim, whoever he might have been, had made it certain that there was now no surviving legitimate representative of the imperial line of Astyages and Cyrus II; and evidently this was why, in contrast to the first of these two successive pieces of sensational news, the second was followed by pronunciamientos of insurgents who claimed to be the legitimate representatives of dynasties that Cyrus II had deposed and superseded.

The gruesome fate of all these rivals of Darius's who fell into Darius's hands (as every one of them did, sooner or later) did not deter others from trying their luck in turn. The rendition to Darius of the Elamite pretender Ačina by the Elamites themselves was followed by the *pronunciamiento* of a second pretender to the Elamite throne in the person of Martiya. The overthrow of Nidintu-Bel, the pretender to the throne of Babylon, was followed by the *pronunciamiento* of a second

¹ See Cameron, G. G.: *A History of Early Iran* (Chicago 1936, University of Chicago Press), pp. 212 and 214. In a letter to the present writer, Professor Cameron drew his attention to Sidney Smith's rejection of his thesis that Cyrus I of Anšan was under his brother Ariaramnes of Pārsa's suzerainty (see Smith, S.: *Isaiah, Chapters XL-LV, Literary Criticism and History* (London 1944, Milford), p. 122, n. 31, referring to p. 28). If the case for Cameron's thesis rests on the attribution of the title 'King of Kings' to Ariaramnes in 'AmH', it would, no doubt, be invalidated by Professor R. G. Kent's finding (see p. 622, n. 1 below) that 'AmH' was a forgery made by Artaxerxes II for a political purpose.

pretender, Arkha. The defeat, flight, capture, and execution of the Median pretender Fravartiš was followed by the *pronunciamiento* of a second Median pretender, Ciçantakhma. Moreover, the pretenders in Media, unlike those in Elam, were the leaders of a genuine national revolt, and this national revolt was not confined to the Medes themselves; the other peoples of the former Median Empire—the Northern Asagartiya, the people of Varkāna, the Parthavā, and, above all, the Arminiya—revolted likewise, and the Armenians seem to have given Darius more trouble than the Medes themselves. Most significant of all, Darius's title was disputed by some of his fellow Persians. Martiya, the second insurgent in Elam, was a Persian in nationality,¹ though he claimed to be a scion of the former Elamite royal family; and so was Vahyazdāta, the insurgent in Yautiya, a country which Darius expressly describes as lying within the bounds of Pārsa.²

These facts, for which our authority is Darius himself, make it clear that some Persians, as well as most Medes, believed that the murder committed by Darius, if not a previous murder by some other hand, had extinguished the last legitimate representative of the houses of Cyrus I and Cyaxares which had been united in the persons of Cyrus II and his sons, and that they were therefore now morally free to make their own choice of a ruler, and certainly free from any obligation to accept Darius's claim to be Cyrus II's legitimate successor. This was why the death of Darius's victim in 522 B.C. had the same catastrophic effect as Nero's suicide in A.D. 69. The consequent certainty that now, at any rate, no authentic heir of the legitimate dynasty remained alive opened the flood-gates for an outburst of anarchy.

This is the background against which we have to read the Median portion of Herodotus's gazetteer of Darius's taxation districts. In this gazetteer, as we shall see,³ Media is partitioned into four separate districts. Besides District No. 10, which is duly labelled 'Media' by Herodotus, there is his district No. 11, which appears to cover a strip of territory extending westward, between the Elburz Range and the Central Desert of Iran, from the narrow passage between them that was known as 'the Caspian Gates'. There is also Herodotus's District No. 18, which appears to cover the Basin of Lake Urmīyah, together with the former territory of Assyria to the east of the Tigris (annexed by Media when she had partitioned the Assyrian Empire with her Babylonian ally) and with the former kingdom of Urartu (annexed by Media subsequently). It is probable, too, that Herodotus's District No. 15 likewise is another fragment of Media, consisting of the steppe country round the lower courses of the rivers Aras and Kur, where they join one another before their common debouchure into the Caspian Sea. Finally, we find a detachment of Medes marooned, far from home, in the islands of the Persian Gulf, as one of the peoples included in Herodotus's District No. 14. The Median origin of these *déracinés* is revealed in the field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force, in which their equipment and armament are described as being almost identical with those that the

¹ See 'DB', § 22.

² See 'DB', § 40.

³ On pp. 623–32, below.

Medes wore;¹ and their inclusion in District No. 14 is also significant, since these dissident Medes were interned there next door to the dissident Persian clan called the Yautiyā (Outioi). The south-western quarter of District No. 14 was, in fact, a prison for the most heinous of the Median and Persian offenders against Darius; and, as a further precaution, the prisoners there had been chained to the loyal Harahvatiyā (*alias* Paktyes, *alias* Thamanaioi) in Southern Afghanistan, who had been rewarded for their trustworthiness by being conscripted to serve as jailers.²

Herodotus's gazetteer of Districts Nos. 10, 11, 18, 15, and 14 thus informs us that Darius took the opportunity of his redivision of the Empire for fiscal purposes in order to insure himself against the risk of a fresh national insurrection in Media by breaking Media up for these purposes, besides deporting a portion of the Median people; but there are two other passages in Herodotus's work in which Media is credited with a much wider extension, at any rate towards the north, than can be attributed to the district labelled 'Media' and numbered '10' in the gazetteer of Darius's taxation districts. When Herodotus is indicating³ the region of Media which was the home, according to the Cyrus legend, of the hero's bucolic foster parents, and again when, in quite a different context,⁴ he is discussing the boundaries of 'Europe' and 'Asia', he makes Media march on the north with the country of the Saspeires, and these Saspeires with the Colchians, who have a seaboard on the Black Sea; and these two passages, while in harmony with one another, are incompatible with the administrative geography of the gazetteer; for, in the gazetteer, District No. 18, in which the Saspeires are included, also comprises the Matiēnoi and the Alarodioi, and in A.D. 1952 it could still be discerned that the 'Alarodioi'—Herodotus's rendering of the ethnicon of 'Urartu', which was situated in the basin of Lake Van and along the middle and upper reaches of the valley of the River Aras—and the Matiēnoi, who stamped their name on the basin of Lake Urmīyah, must have lain between the Saspeires—a people who had bequeathed their name to the canton of Isbir in the upper valley of the River Choroq—and the environs of Hamadān, to which the name 'Media' is confined in the gazetteer. This means that, in the two passages now in question, Herodotus is including in Media at least one district which is not included in Media in the gazetteer; and the explanation must be that these passages record the political boundaries of the Viceroyalty of Media as these had been established by Cyrus before Media had been partitioned by Darius for fiscal purposes in consequence of her insurrection in 522–521 B.C. Herodotus is here describing a Viceroyalty of Media which includes Urartu as well as the Basin of Lake Urmīyah between Urartu and the heart of Media round Ecbatana.

We can now also see that these two passages are not the only places in which Herodotus is writing in terms of a political map which is antecedent to—but on paper, at any rate, has not been superseded by—

¹ Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 80.

² See further pp. 622 and 640, below.

³ In Book I, chap. 110.

⁴ In Book IV, chap. 37.

Darius's precautionary partition, for fiscal purposes, of perilously large political units that Cyrus II had left intact. This officially surviving integral Viceroyalty of Media has a counterpart and neighbour in an officially surviving integral Viceroyalty of Armenia, and this is the geographical entity that has found its way into Herodotus's edition of the gazetteer of Darius's taxation districts in the formula 'Paktyikê and Armenioi and the adjoining peoples as far as the Black Sea', which Herodotus has taken for the description of his Taxation District No. 13.

The region to which the name 'Armina' or 'Arminiya' had originally attached seems to have been the country—occupying the upper basin of the Tigris and extending thence farther north-westward into the north-west corner of the basin of the Euphrates, where the two arms of the Upper Euphrates unite—which the Assyrians had called 'Naïri'. The first wave of Assyrian settlers in Naïri—some of whom had been established in the reign of Shalmaneser I in the thirteenth century B.C.—had been submerged by the cataclysm of the Aramaean *Völkerwanderung* out of the North Arabian Steppe at the turn of the second and the last millennium B.C. Thereafter, Asshurnazirpal II had reasserted the Assyrian Crown's authority over dissident descendants of these Assyrian settlers in 882 B.C. and had annexed the Aramaean principality of Bit Zamani in 879 B.C. In this quarter the extension of Assyrian rule had been at its widest *circa* 799 B.C.; thereafter, the whole of Naïri except an isolated enclave round Amedi (*Latinè* Amida, *Arabicè* Diyār Bakr), the former capital of Bit Zamani, had been conquered from Assyria by Urartu; the south-western part of the lost Assyrian domain in Naïri (i.e. the province later known to post-Alexandrine Hellenic geographers as Sophênê) had then been reconquered by Tiglath-Pileser III in 739 B.C.; but the south-eastern part (*Graecè* Arzanênê) had remained a debatable territory;¹ and the eventual beneficiaries from a stubborn, long-drawn-out, and indecisive contest between Assyria and Urartu in this arena had been the Thracian-speaking followers of the Mushkian (i.e. Phrygian) war-lord Gurdi (*Graecè* Gordios).

In 695 B.C., Sennacherib had attempted, without success, to dislodge Gurdi's war-band from Til-Garimmu (*Hebraicè* Togarmah), astride the road leading south-eastward from Sivas in the upper basin of the River Qyzyl Irmağ (*Graecè* Halys) to Malatīyah (*Assyriacè* Meliddu) in the valley of the Tokhma Su (a west-bank affluent of the Upper Euphrates).² Upon the collapse of the Assyrian Power after the death of Asshurbanipal, the Mushkian invaders to whom Gurdi had bequeathed his name swooped down from the north-west towards the heart of Assyria till their path was crossed by Sagartian invaders swooping down from the north-east upon the same objective—if the Kardoukhoi whom Xenophon and his comrades encountered in the tangle of mountains—known to post-Alexandrine Hellenic geographers as Gordyênê—south of the River Bohtān (*Latinè* Centrîtês)³ are to be identified with the descendants of Gurdi's men, and if the latter-day place-name Si'irt

¹ These vicissitudes in the history of Naïri are recorded in Forrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-33 and 84-87.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

³ See Xenophon: *Expediitio Cyri*, Book III, chap. v, § 14—Book IV, chap. iii.

(*Armeniacè* Sghert or Sgherd), borne by a town near the confluence of the River Bohtān with the Eastern Tigris, testified that the north-western branch of the Iranian-speaking Nomad Asagartiyā had once pushed their way that far westward from their previous habitat somewhere to the east or south-east of Lake Urmīyah.¹

The seventh-century Median settlers in the metropolitan territory of Assyria east of the Tigris and the contemporary Phrygian settlers in the region known by the Assyrians as 'Nāiri' and by the Achaemenidae as 'Armina' seem to have met at the south-eastern corner of the Upper Tigris Basin without falling out with one another.² By the time, in or after 585 B.C., when the course of the River Halys, from the point where it emerged from the Kingdom of Cilicia down to its mouth, was accepted by the Median and the Lydian Empire as the frontier between them, 'Armina' must already have been incorporated into the Median Empire; but the simultaneous insurrection of Armina and Māda against Darius in 522 B.C., and the strength of the resistance that the insurgents in Armina offered to Darius's forces, are facts which indicate that the previous relations between Armina and Māda had been friendly; and a clue to the grounds of this friendship is perhaps to be found in the title 'Paktyikē and Armenioi and adjoining peoples as far as the Black Sea' which Herodotus has taken for his description of Darius's thirteenth taxation district—if we are right in seeing in this formula the description, not of any Darian taxation district, but of an integral Viceroyalty of Armenia which, like the integral Viceroyalty of Media, will have been established under the Median imperial régime of Cyaxares and Astyages; will have been maintained as a going concern under the Medo-Persian imperial régime of Cyrus II, Cambyses and a *soi-disant* Smerdis; and will not have been officially abolished by Darius I in being partitioned by him for fiscal purposes.

The formula suggests that the whole of the territory added to the Median Empire by Cyaxares to the west of Urartu, to the east of the Lower Halys, and to the north of a Kingdom of Cilicia which bestrode the middle course of the Halys in the neighbourhood of Mazaka, had been included by Cyaxares in a single viceroyalty; and, if this interpretation is correct, it would mean that Cyaxares had reconciled the Phrygian

¹ This identification is suggested by Herzfeld, E.: 'Zarathustra, Teil I', in *Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran*, Band I (Berlin 1929-30, Reimer), pp. 76-124, on p. 81, n. 1. Professor G. G. Cameron makes the following cautionary comment: 'This interpretation of "Kardoukhoi" as meaning "Gurdi's men", and, even more, the interpretation of Si'irt as being an echo of "Asagartiyā", is really playing with fire. I want more linguistic evidence.'

A derivation of the ethnicon 'Kardoukhoi' and the place-name 'Gordyēnē' from the personal name 'Gurdi (Gordios)' is, indeed, impugned by the appearance of 'the wide-spreading Kurti warriors' in the annals of the Assyrian King Tukulti-Ninurta I, who reigned in the second half of the thirteenth century B.C. (see Luckenbill, D. D.: *Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia* (Chicago 1926-27, University of Chicago Press, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 143, 152, 164, 171), and in the record of the campaign in the accession year of King Tiglath-Pileser I (*regnabat* 1114-1076 B.C.) (see op. cit., vol. i, pp. 222 and 229). If these Kurti were one of the Phrygian hordes that overwhelmed the Empire of Khatti at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C., the personal name of the seventh-century Phrygian war-lord Gurdi will have been derived from the ethnicon 'Kurti', not vice versa, and will have signified 'the Phrygian'.

² So far from clashing, they appear to have amalgamated; for the latter-day Kurds, who perhaps bore Gurdi's name, spoke an Iranian, not a Thracian, dialect.

settlers in Nāiri-Armina to a voluntary acceptance of a Median overlordship by taking them into partnership with the Median imperial people and conferring on them a sub-empire covering the Median Empire's western marches. This would be a counterpart of the policy by which Cyrus II, in his day, appears to have reconciled the Bactrians to a Medo-Persian overlordship; and, in this case as in that, we can see that the two parties were bound to one another by a common interest which constituted a practical guarantee that the paramount Power's generosity would not be abused by the beneficiaries from it. Though the Phrygian invaders of Nāiri-Armina and the Median invaders of Adiabênê might have been competitors in the scramble for the spoils of a defunct Assyrian Empire, they still had an abiding common interest in standing shoulder to shoulder against a surviving common enemy who remained formidable after Assyria had been annihilated.

This abiding common enemy was the Nomad Power which had erupted out of the Great Eurasian Steppe into South-West Asia before the end of the eighth century B.C. If we have been right in thinking that, at some date between 556 B.C.¹ and 539 B.C., Cyrus II took the Bactrians into partnership and entrusted to them the surveillance over their Nomad neighbours the Sakā Haumavargā in Farghānah, we may perhaps now go on to hazard the guess that, in making this settlement of his north-eastern frontier, he was following a precedent that had been provided for him by Cyaxares' settlement of his north-western frontier at some date between 610 and 585 B.C. We may guess that Cyaxares had taken into partnership the Phrygian settlers in the country which the Achaemenian lists of *dahyāva* call 'Armina', and that he had entrusted to them the surveillance over Nomad neighbours of theirs whose tribal name was Paktyes and who had established themselves in the sixth century B.C. within the bend of the Halys, in the country which the Achaemenian lists call 'Katpatuka'.²

If the Paktyes were one of the Eurasian Nomad peoples who, in and after the eighth century B.C., had erupted out of the Great Eurasian Steppe into South-West Asia through the gap between the Pamir Plateau and the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea,³ it would not be

¹ See p. 598, n. 1, above.

² Professor G. G. Cameron makes the following comment: 'This is a fine theory and perhaps makes sense; but I want much more to go on than the name [Paktyikê standing for Paktyes]; I want more proof.'

³ See III. iii. 400-1. In the writer's belief, all the Nomad hordes who had ever invaded South-West Asia had always come through this gap and had never come over or round the Caucasus. He would not, of course, deny that, at times, Nomad peoples in occupation of the Volga-Don steppe had made raids round the eastern end of the Caucasus Range into the Kur-Aras Basin and beyond, but he would deny that this route had ever given passage to permanent migrants. Herodotus's statement, in Book I, chaps. 103-4, that this was the route by which the Cimmerians, with the Scyths at their heels, had broken into South-West Asia (at the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.) was, in the writer's judgement, not derived from any authentic record of the event, but was merely an inference from the fact that, in Herodotus's day, the only extant Scyths known to Herodotus were domiciled in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe. Herodotus was transporting his Scyths from there to Media by, not the shortest, but the shortest practicable, route; but his premiss that the Scyths living in his day on the Black Sea Steppe must have been the Scyths who had invaded South-West Asia two or three centuries earlier was, in the present writer's opinion, erroneous. It was, surely, more likely that, when the Scyths had erupted out of the Central Asian heart of the Eurasian Steppe,

surprising to find Eastern Anatolia subsequently occupied by one wing of a horde whose other wing had occupied Eastern Iran; for, throughout the four thousand years or so of Eurasian Nomad history, each successive wave that broke upon the northern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau tended to split into divergent streams following diverse lines of least resistance. While the left wing of a horde that had mounted the plateau would be inclined to head south-eastward for the plains of the Indus Basin, the right wing of the same horde would be inclined to sweep on westwards, along the corridor between the southern foot of the Elburz Range and the northern edge of the Central Desert of Iran, till it arrived at congenial pasture-lands in the basin of Lake Urmīyah and, beyond that, in the steppe country in the lower basin of the rivers Aras and Kur, adjoining the west coast of the Caspian Sea. From these temporary camping grounds a subsequent horde, following at the first horde's heels, might then drive these forerunners of theirs on again up the Aras Valley, either to entangle themselves in the mountain maze overhanging the south-east corner of the Black Sea¹ or, if they were more fortunate, to travel on still farther westward over the watershed between the basins of the Aras and the Qyzyl Irmağ (Halys) until eventually they debouched into the Anatolian Peninsula. This had been the story of the Sanskrit-speaking Nomad invaders of South-Western Asia in the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C. whose left wing had descended upon the Indus Basin while their right wing had made its appearance in Azerbaijan, Mesopotamia, North Syria, Transcaucasia, and Anatolia under the name Mitanni and perhaps also as the 'mariannu'.² In a subsequent invasion of South-West Asia by Iranian-speaking peoples which had brought the Medes and Persians into Iran, the deployment of the invading war-bands had been remarkably symmetrical.

In this invasion—as its course can be reconstructed by inference from the eventual locations of the participants after they had come to rest—the Persians must have been in the van—in an *échelon* in which the Yautiyā and the Mačiyā formed the advance guard and the Pārsā proper the main body, with the Asagartiyā bringing up the rear—while the Medes, following close behind, must have split the Persian vanguard into a right wing, which was pushed by Median pressure north-west-

they had been split (as in the eleventh century of the Christian Era the Turks, and in the thirteenth century the Mongols, were to be split) by the Caspian Sea into two wings, one of which had made its way between the Caspian and the Pamirs into South-West Asia and India, while the other had made its way between the Caspian and the Urals into the Great Western Bay of the Steppe to the north of the Black Sea.

Professor Cameron queries: 'What drove the Hurri into Mesopotamia [in the seventeenth century B.C.] and later brought Urartu into increasingly bloody contact with Assyria? Must it not have been the pressure of new peoples from across the Caucasus?' The present writer sees no need for this hypothesis. Nomad invaders breaking in via the Caspian Gates and/or non-Nomadic Caucasian highlanders could surely have supplied the driving force, without its being necessary also to postulate a Nomad invasion via Derbend.

¹ In this mountain bunker, lost tribes whose names—Māres, Sannoi, Skythēnoi (Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book IV, chap. vii, § 18, and chap. viii), Sakasēnoi, Taokhoi (*ibid.*, chap. iv, § 18; chap. vi, § 5; chap. vii, §§ 1-14), Sirakes—revealed their provenance from the Eurasian Steppe, rubbed shoulders with others whose names showed that they had found their way into the same blind alley out of Anatolia. This was, for example, the provenance of the Tībarēnoi (from Tabal) and of the Moskhoi (from Phrygia and, before that, from South-Eastern Europe).

² See the Note on Chronology in x. 199-202.

wards, and a left wing which the same Median pressure pushed away towards the south-east. When, in and after the ninth century B.C., first the Assyrian and then the Achæmenian records progressively bring to light the positions in which the divers participants in this Iranian Völkerwanderung had established themselves, we find the Medes in the centre, astride the Great North-East Road leading up from Babylonia on to the Iranian Plateau via Behistan, with the Yautiyā and the Mačiyā at the outer extremity of either flank, the Pārsā between the Yautiyā and the Medes, and the Asagartiyā immediately to the rear of the Pārsā. On the south-east flank the Yautiyā are in North-Eastern Lāristān, the Mačiyā in South-Western Lāristān, the Pārsā in Fars and in Lūristān (Parsuwaš), and the Asagartiyā in Kirmān. On the north-west flank, the right-wing fraction of the Yautiyā can be detected in the latter-day Armenian name Uti (*Graecè* Utênē),¹ which attached to a district between the Qārabāgh and the south bank of the River Kur in Transcaucasia. The right-wing fraction of the Mačiyā (*Graecè* Mykoi) can be detected in the name Mūqān, Mughkān, or Mūghān² which attached to the patch of steppe to the south of the confluence of the rivers Aras and Kur. The right-wing fraction of the Pārsā turn up in Parsua, which was the Assyrian name for a canton in the North-Western Zagros, somewhere to the south-south-east of the basin of Lake Urmīyah,³ while the right-wing fraction of the Asagartiyā (*Assyriacè* Zikirtu) is located in the Assyrian records somewhere to the east or south-east of Lake Urmīyah.

This bifurcation into a westward-riding and a south-eastward-riding column was likewise to be the history of the Turkish-speaking Nomads who were to break upon the Iranian Plateau in the eleventh century of the Christian Era.⁴ It would have been strange if the wave of Iranian-

¹ See Adontz, N.: *Histoire d'Arménie, Les Origines* (Paris 1946, Union Générale Arménienne de Bienfaisance), p. 308. In Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. vii, § 1 (C 508) and § 8 (C 514), these north-western Yautiyā are called Ouitioi.

² See Le Strange, G.: *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge 1905, University Press), pp. 175-6.

³ The evidence for the existence of this north-western Parsua, and for its location somewhere to the north of the Upper Zab [? i.e. the upper course of the Lesser Zab] is set out by Sidney Smith in *Isaiah, Chapters XL-LV, Literary Criticism and History* (London 1944, Milford), pp. 119-20 (notes 24 and 25, referring to p. 28). See also Forrer, op. cit., pp. 89-90, and Adontz, op. cit., pp. 100-3 and 366-9. The name of this Parsua, like the name Madai (Māda, Media), first occurs in the annals of Shalmaneser III. According to König, F. W.: *Altteste Geschichte der Meder und Perser* (Leipzig 1934, Hinrichs), p. 8, Parsua is first heard of in 844 B.C., Madai in 836 B.C. Cp. Cameron, G. G.: *A History of Early Iran* (Chicago 1936, University of Chicago Press), pp. 143-4.

⁴ This instance is also a reminder of the fact (noticed on p. 606, n. 3, above) that the frontier of the Eurasian Steppe between the Pamir Plateau and the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea was not the only sector on which an erupting horde of Eurasian Nomads was apt to fan out in diverse directions in the course of its farther advance. In and after the eleventh century of the Christian Era the fanning out, as far afield as India on the left and Anatolia on the right, of the Turks who had crossed the frontier between the Pamirs and the Caspian was matched by a corresponding dispersion of their brethren who had simultaneously broken out of the heart of the Steppe into its Great Western Bay through the gap between the Caspian and the Urals. Some of these Turkish-speaking invaders of the Western Bay moved north-westward up the Volga towards Great Bulgaria (Qāzān); others moved south-westward into the Kuban; while others, advancing due westward, crossed first the Don and eventually the Carpathians, when a remnant of the Ghuzz (*alias* Cumans) found asylum on the Hungarian Alföld from the pursuing Mongols (see XIII. x. 54-55).

A simultaneous eruption north and south of the Caspian Sea was, indeed, normal.

speaking Nomads—this time Saparda, Cimmerians, Scyths, Paktyes, and Kaspioi (*Latine Caspii*)—who broke upon the same plateau out of the same steppe in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., had not splayed apart in the same two divergent directions; and the word 'Paktyikê' in Herodotus's description of District No. 13 in his gazetteer is not the only piece of evidence that points to this conclusion. The tribal name of a detachment of the Paktyes established in Anatolia may also perhaps be detected in the place-names Paktyê, borne by a town at the neck of the Gallipoli Peninsula before the end of the sixth century B.C.,¹ and Paktyês, borne by a mountain near Ephesus,² and likewise in the personal name 'Paktyas' which, in Herodotus's history,³ is borne by a Lydian whom Cyrus put in charge of Croesus's captured treasure, and who took this opportunity to place himself at the head of a Lydian insurrection against Achaemenian rule. It is also worth noticing that the Kaspioi, whom Herodotus locates in the corridor leading out of Khurāsān into Azerbaijan, as one of the peoples in his District No. 11, and in the lower basin of the rivers Aras and Kur, as one of the peoples in his District No. 15, appear in his field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force in an association which suggests that there must have been another detachment of Kaspioi who, like the other wing of the Paktyes, were established somewhere in Eastern Iran.⁴

On this line of reasoning, we may interpret the 'Paktyikê' in Herodotus's description of District No. 13 of his gazetteer as standing for Paktyes who were not the well-known bearers of the name in Eastern Iran, where it had survived down to the twentieth century of the Christian Era in the form Pakhtūn-Pakhtāna. The Paktyes whom Herodotus had found associated with the Armenians would not be these

In the fifth century of the Christian Era, for example, the Huns were invading the Indian and the European peninsula of Asia at the same moment, while in the seventh century B.C. the westward advance of detachments of Cimmerians and Scyths south of the Caspian into Anatolia was accompanied by a simultaneous westward advance of other detachments of the same two peoples north of the Caspian into the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe (where the passage of a band of Cimmerians, in advance of a pursuing band of Scyths, was attested by the name 'Cimmerian Bosphorus' by which the Straits of Kerch were known in Hellenic parlance).

It will be evident that, when a Nomad horde thus erupted north and south of the Caspian Sea simultaneously, and then fanned out both in the Great Western Bay of the Steppe and in South-West Asia, its extreme right and left wings might eventually come to rest at an enormous distance apart. On the map of the Old World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, for example, the fanning out of the Bashkirds was commemorated by the survival of their name both in the Southern Urals and in South-Western Baluchistan; and in the light of this latter-day parallel it is not surprising to find the Boudinoi, whom Herodotus (Book IV, chaps. 21 and 108) locates within the timbered country north of the steppes east of the River Don (locates, that is, somewhere in the neighbourhood of Bashkiristan), also figuring (in Book I, chap. 101) as one of the tribes of the Medes under the name Boudioi, or again to find established on the banks of the River Kuban the right wing of the Sindoi whose left wing stamped this originally Eurasian Nomad people's name first on the River Indus and eventually on the whole Indian sub-continent.

¹ See Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 36.

² See Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XIV, chap. i, § 13 (C 636), and chap. i, § 39 (C 647).

³ Book I, chaps. 153-6.

⁴ This eastern wing of the Kaspioi is mentioned in Book VII, chapter 67, between the Gandaro-Dadican brigade on the one side and the Sarangian (*Persicê Zrāka*) contingent on the other side. The Persian commanders of the Gandaro-Dadican brigade and of the Caspian contingent are brothers. These Eastern Kaspioi, like the Eastern Paktyes, are described in this context as wearing *sisyrnai* (sheepskin coats). See pp. 635-6, below.

Pactyan denizens of Harahvatiš, to whom Herodotus had allotted both his District No. 13 under their own name and his District No. 14 under the descriptive title 'borderers' (Thamanaioi); the Armenians' Pactyan associates would be a western branch of the Pactyan horde who had established themselves in Eastern Anatolia and who must have been associated with, if not identical with, the intrusive Nomad occupants of the same territory who bore the name Cimmerians'.¹ The Greek adjectival form 'Paktyiké' would be an Hellenic man of letters' rationalization of a plural form of the substantive 'Pakty-' taking the non-Indo-European plural ending in 'k' which was endemic in the region between the Caucasus and Mesopotamia;² and this plural 'Paktuk' would reappear in the second and third syllables of the name 'Katpatuka' which, like the name 'Armina', makes its first appearance in history in the Achaemenian lists of *dahyāva*. 'Katpatuka' would signify 'the Paktyes domiciled in Khatti', as distinguished from their brethren and homonyms who were domiciled in the South-East Iranian *dahyāuš* known as Harahvatiš.

If Cappadocia and the peoples along the north coast of Anatolia between Cappadocia and Colchis, exclusive of Colchis itself, had in truth been thus associated with Nāiri-Armina in a single vicerealty

¹ A remnant of the Cimmerians who had swept westwards as far as the west coast of Anatolia in the seventh century B.C. appears to have survived in Cappadocia, to judge by the fact that the name by which Cappadocia was subsequently known in the Armenian language was Gamir (see Prášek, J. V.: *Geschichte der Meder und Perser* (Gotha 1906, Perthes, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 148).

² The acquisition of a plural ending in 'k' was one of the penalties entailed in settling within this area. This fate overtook the Armenian language and, among other substantives in it, the Armenians' own name for themselves; for 'Haik', as the Armenians called themselves, is the plural of a singular form 'Hay' which would appear to denote an inhabitant of the country, occupying the north-west corner of the Euphrates Basin, which the Hittites had once known as 'Hayasa' and which the Hellenic geographers were later to know as 'Armenia Minor'. Gurdi's war-band, likewise, became known (if there is any substance in our conjecture on p. 604, above) as 'Gordi-k' (*Graecé* Kardoukhoi) in the mountain bunker between the Rivers Bohtān (*Latine* Centrites) and Tigris which brought their south-eastward *trek* to a halt and which came to be known, after them, as 'Gordiyēnē'. The Taokhoi whom Xenophon and his comrades encountered in the highlands in the hinterland of the south-eastern corner of the Black Sea were perhaps a lost tribe of Transcaspian Nomad Dahā who had acquired the same inevitable plural in 'k' after finding their way into this 'living museum' in which so many splinters of broken peoples silted up (though there was also a cape and a town called Taokhē and a canton called Taokhēnē outside the 'k' area, along the coast of Fars (see Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XV, chap. iii, § 3 (C 728), and Ptolemy: *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. iv, §§ 2, 3, and 7)).

The Saparda, who had headed the Eurasian Nomads' seventh-century ride into Anatolia, in the van of the column in which the Paktyes, Cimmerians, Scyths, and Kaspioi followed behind them in échelon, reappeared as Sevordi-k some fourteen centuries later, when *circa* A.D. 750–60 they sacked an outpost which had been established at Bardha'ah by the Arab Muslim conquerors of the Sasanian Empire. The historical evidence bearing on this incident is discussed in Marquart, J.: *Osteuropäische und Ostasiatische Streifzüge* (Leipzig 1903, Dieterich), pp. 36–40, and in Macartney, C. A.: *The Magyars in the Ninth Century* (Cambridge 1930, University Press), pp. 87–90 and 174–6. These Modern Western students of the origins of the Magyars had been led astray by the Byzantine scholar-emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus's erroneous assertion that these survivors of the Saparda who had invaded South-West Asia in the seventh century B.C. were a detachment of the Magyar horde. The form in which Constantine presents the Saparda's name—Σάπαροι ἀσφαλοι—is manifestly a transliteration of an Arabic original 'Sāwardiyah al-asfal', 'the lowland Sāwardiyah' in the plain between the Qārabāgh and the River Kur, as contrasted with 'the highland Sāwardiyah' somewhere else. Mas'ūdi's and Istakhri's description of these descendants of the Saparda as being 'a kind of Armenian' is not so wide of the mark as Constantine's blunder.

by the policy of Cyaxares and Cyrus II, it would follow that Persia and Media were not the only political divisions of the Achaemenian Empire that Darius partitioned in his new fiscal map. Besides dividing Persia into two fragments, one of them now officially tax-paying and the other still nominally exempt, and Media into four fragments, Darius will also have divided Armenia into three by erecting the peoples between the northern boundary of Armenia Proper and the Black Sea coast of Anatolia into a separate taxation district, duly reported by Herodotus as his District No. 19, and by detaching Cappadocia from Armenia, at any rate for fiscal purposes, to constitute a taxation district—Herodotus's District No. 3—in which we find Cappadocia brigaded with a province, administered from Dascylium near the Anatolian coast of the Sea of Marmara, which had already been detached politically from Lydia.¹

We are now perhaps in a position to take the full measure of the grievous change for the worse in the domestic life of the Achaemenian Empire which was the nemesis of Darius's assassination of the reigning emperor and usurpation of the Imperial Crown. Under the Cyran branch of the House of Achaemenes, as under the foregoing Median dynasty, the Empire had (if we have been right in our reconstruction of its history) been securely grounded on the paramountcy of a broad association of imperial peoples—the Medes, the Persians, the Armenians, and eventually also the Bactrians—who were bound to one another by their common enjoyment of a privileged status and their common loyalty to a dynasty by whose generosity this status had been conferred upon them.² A sadly different picture is presented in Herodotus's gazetteer of Darius's taxation districts; for, in spite of the errors and confusions, here and there, that we have been attempting to clear up, Herodotus's gazetteer does bring to light something that none of the six official lists of *dahyāva* betray. As a result of the revolts against Darius's assumption of the Imperial Crown which had broken out in 622 B.C. among the privileged paramount peoples of the Empire as well as among the subject peoples, Darius had found himself constrained to reduce to a dangerously narrow compass the once broad basis of voluntary support on which Cyaxares' and Cyrus II's régime had safely rested. Of the four former imperial peoples, the Bactrians alone had retained their previous position intact. The Persians had been partitioned most invidiously into a still privileged remnant of loyalists in Fars and a batch of dissident communities—the Yautiyā and Mačiyā in Lāristān and the South-Eastern Asagartiyā in Kirmān—who had been degraded to the ranks of their own former subjects. Media had been partitioned, for fiscal purposes, into four fragments—in addition to the

¹ This separate province, known in Hellenic parlance as 'Hellespontine Phrygia', must have been detached politically from Lydia already before the date of Darius's division of the Achaemenian Empire into taxation districts, since Herodotus testifies to its separate existence on the political map, not only in the first decade of the fifth century B.C., at the time of the Ionian Revolt (see Book VI, chap. 33), but already as early as the reign of Cambyses, when the governor of Dascylium, Mitribates, was at loggerheads with the viceroy of Sardis, Oroëtes, who had been Cyrus's appointee (see Book III, chaps. 120 and 126, and the present Annex, p. 671, below).

² On this point, see Herzfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-18.

deportation of the *déracinés* who had been marooned on the islands in the Persian Gulf. Armenia had been partitioned for fiscal purposes into three fragments.

No doubt Darius felt rueful about having to take these precautionary measures. They were a poor substitute for the goodwill that the House of Achaemenes had forfeited in consequence of the extinction of the Cyran branch and the transfer of the crown to the Ariaramnan branch through the assassination of a reigning emperor who had professed himself to be Cyrus's authentic son and Cambyses' legitimate successor. We know that Darius did his utmost retrospectively to justify his acts and to regularize his position. He published his own account of the obscure and controversial events of the year 522-521 B.C. on the cliff-face at Behistan in the three languages of the imperial capitals,¹ and arranged for the distribution of an Aramaic translation of the text, in a portable form, throughout his dominions.² He married two of Cyrus's daughters and one of his granddaughters whose father had admittedly been the genuine Smerdis,³ whether the Smerdis whom Darius had assassinated had been the murderer's subsequent wife's father or an impostor. He also, as his inscriptions and bas-reliefs record, took care to employ Medes as well as Persians in posts of high confidence and responsibility.⁴ In the light of these recorded evidences of Darius's general policy, we could have guessed—even without the help of the direct evidence that we have gleaned from Herodotus—that, in taking his precautions to make it impossible for an integral Persia, integral Media, and integral Armenia ever again to be carried away by an anti-Ariaramnan national movement, as each of these three great sub-empires had been carried away in 522-521 B.C., Darius would have taken pains to avoid any unnecessary provocation.

The straightforward way of guarding against the danger in Media and Armenia would have been simply to abolish the two sub-empires and to break each of them up into a number of smaller viceroyalties; but, as we have seen,⁵ there are indications in Herodotus's work that, on the post-Darian map of the Achaemenian Empire, an integral viceroyalty of Media and an integral viceroyalty of Armenia still survived side by side with the smaller districts into which either of them had been dissected by Darius for fiscal purposes. This coexistence of an old political with a new fiscal map was revealed to us by an examination of inconsistencies in the Herodotean gazetteer which we traced back to a confusion in certain places between the two coexistent maps; and

¹ See V. v. 499, n. 3.

² 'By the favour of Ahuramazda this inscription in other ways I made. In addition, it was in Aryan, and has been made on leather. . . . Afterwards this inscription was sent by me everywhere among the provinces; the people universally were pleased' ('DB', § 70, Professor R. G. Kent's translation in *Old Persian*, p. 132).

A well-thumbed fragment of the Aramaic translation had been retrieved by Modern Western archaeologists from the débris of the loyal Jewish military cantonment at Elephantine (see Hoonacker, A. van: *Une Communauté judéo-Araméenne d'Éléphantine, en Égypte, aux vi^e et v^e siècles av. J.-C.* (London 1915, Milford), p. 32).

³ See Olmstead, A. T.: *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), p. 109.

⁴ See Junge, P. J.: *Dareios I* (Leipzig 1944, Harrassowitz), pp. 129-30, with n. 13 to chap. 5.

⁵ On pp. 603-11, above.

the official preservation of Cyaxares' and Cyrus II's sacrosanct sub-empires is indeed what we should have expected *a priori*, for an official abolition of them would have been flagrantly impolitic. Besides keeping open the wounds unavoidably inflicted on the pride of high-spirited imperial peoples who had constrained Darius to subdue them by force of arms in 522-521 B.C., so drastic a precautionary measure as this would have advertised Darius's lack of confidence in the finality of a victory which had indeed been glorious just because it had been so hardly won. We shall therefore not be surprised to find that Darius officially respected the integrity of the Cyran viceroyalties, but at the same time we must not allow ourselves to be hoodwinked by Darius into imagining that the power of the dangerous viceroyalties was not broken in fact as a result of the partitioning of these particular viceroyalties into a larger number of smaller districts on Darius's new fiscal map.

Darius was not named 'the huckster'¹ for nothing, and his precocious appreciation of the potency of economics and finance in public affairs gave him the cue for solving his political problem of taking precautions without giving provocation by attracting attention to what he was actually doing. Darius was aware of the power of the purse; and he will have perceived that a viceroy—or some insurgent nationalist leader who might have disposed of a viceroy as Darius himself had disposed of Smerdis—would not find it easy to try conclusions with the Imperial Government when the control of revenue within his viceregal boundaries had been transferred from him to several district intendants of finance, each separately and directly responsible to the Imperial Chancery. Of course, in an empire in which most of the provinces were economically backward, and in which a money economy was still in its infancy, the power of the purse was modest if measured by twentieth-century Western standards; yet, combined with the weapon of secret intelligence, which the Central Government will have also acquired by setting up a new financial administrative network independent of the existing political administrative network, the separation of political and fiscal powers would greatly reduce a viceroy's capacity for making mischief. Darius must have perceived that his new network of taxation districts, operating unobtrusively behind the façade of an old network of viceroyalties, would be, *de facto*, the effective engine of imperial administration in a huckster-emperor's hands.

The local variations in the relation of the new fiscal map to the old political map are significant. The policy of breaking up, on the fiscal map, viceroyalties that were politically dangerous was applied, as we shall see, not only to Media and Armenia, but also to 'Babylon-cum-Beyond the River' ('Pahat Babili u Ebir-Nari'),² which was partitioned into the two taxation districts Bābiruš and Athurā, and to West Anatolia,

¹ 'Darius's assessment of tribute and other similar measures of his provoked the Persians into coining the *mot* that Darius was a huckster, Cambyses a despot and Cyrus a father—in allusion to Darius's vice of dealing in a huckster's spirit with all affairs of state, to Cambyses' vices of irritability and contemptuousness, and to Cyrus's virtue of gentleness and to the consequently invariable beneficence of his acts' (Herodotus, Book III, chap. 89).

² See Professor G. G. Cameron's observation quoted on p. 657, n. 3, below.

which was partitioned into the two taxation districts Sparda and Yauna, though in either of these two cases, likewise, the political viceroyalty appears to have been kept intact.¹ By contrast, the loyal Viceroyalty of Harahvatiš was enlarged politically by the addition of Zrāka,² and was still further enlarged on the fiscal map by the attachment to it, for taxing purposes, of the disaffected Persian cantons Asagarta, Yautiyā, and Maka, in Kirmān and Lāristān, to constitute the Herodotean Taxation District No. 14.³ The loyal Viceroyalty of Bākhtriš, again, seems to have been left intact not only on the political map but also on the fiscal map, where it constituted the Herodotean Taxation District No. 12.⁴

It will be seen that Darius's policy was as adroit as any policy could be in the adverse circumstances with which the Ariaramnan usurper had condemned himself to have to contend; yet a sovereign who has acquired the nickname 'huckster' stands convicted of not being loved; and, for all that Darius could do, it was beyond his power, and beyond his successors' power, to put the Achaemenian Empire back on to the broader basis of consent and support on which it had rested in the auspicious Cyran initial chapter of its history. When Darius and Xerxes then proceeded to strain the weakened structure of their régime by embarking on an ambitious forward policy of incorporating the remainder of the Hellenic World, together with its Nomad hinterland on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, it is no wonder that they should have run into a catastrophe.

The Ambiguity of Homonyms

The foregoing general account of the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire must now be supplemented by some consideration of the evidence—partly anticipated in the preceding discussion—which was at the disposal of twentieth-century Western scholars seeking to identify and locate particular countries and peoples named in the extant sources of information, both official and Herodotean. One of the difficulties that beset an investigator in this field was the frequent occurrence of an identical name in more than one place on the map, and it may therefore be useful to face this fertile source of confusion before plunging into details.

The occurrence of these homonyms was confusing in two ways. In the first place it was apt to leave the investigator in doubt as to whether he was confronted with a single people or with two or more distinct and separate peoples bearing such-and-such a name. Cases in point were the uncertainty about the existence of a north-western detachment of Paktyes in Cappadocia (Katpatuka)⁵ and of a south-eastern detachment of Kaspioi in Arachosia (Harahvatiš) or thereabouts.⁶ In the second place it was not always possible, even where the recurrence of a name was not in doubt, to be sure that the recurrence was anything more than

¹ See pp. 657 and 678, below.

² See p. 589, with n. 3, above, and p. 637, below.

³ See pp. 622 and 637, below.

⁵ See pp. 608–10, above.

⁴ See p. 644, below.

⁶ See p. 609, above, and pp. 635–6, below.

a coincidence that was a phonetic accident of no historical significance.¹ In the third place, even if it could be demonstrated—or at least be shown to be probable—that the homonyms really were recurrences of the same name in the same language, it was not always possible to determine the recurrent name's character. On the one hand it might be a genuinely proper name, whose occurrence in different places was evidence that the two or more peoples bearing it were akin to one another and that they had reached their eventual locations from some common original centre of dispersion, however remote from one another might be the regions in which they had respectively come to rest at the end of their divergent migrations. A number of apparent examples of the fission and fanning out of Eurasian Nomad peoples in the course of their eruption out of the Steppe into the regions round about have come to our notice already in our discussion of the geographical distribution of the Paktyes.² We have, however, also already come across names that are manifestly not proper names but are descriptive epithets or labels which bear their meaning on their face and which in some cases are known to have been current side by side with genuine proper names which they had not driven out of currency. A classic example is the multiple nomenclature of one branch of the people whose proper name was Paktyes.³ The south-eastern Paktyes lived, as we know, in a country that bore the proper name Harahvatiš (*Latinè* Arachosia) in virtue of being situated in the basin of a river which in the *Avesta* is called the Harahvaiti.⁴ This *dahyāuš* is called exclusively by the name of the country in the official lists, and this place-name Harahvatiš (*ethnikon* Harahvatiyā) is duly reproduced in the Hellenized form 'Arakhōsia' (*ethnikon* Arakhōtoi) in the works of post-Herodotean Hellenic geographers. In Herodotus's work, on the other hand, the name 'Arakhosia' never occurs. In his field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force, Herodotus calls the people of Arachosia by their national name 'Paktyes',⁵ while in his gazetteer of Darius's taxation districts he calls them by their descriptive label 'thamanaioi', meaning 'borderers'.⁶

It is evident that the same title 'borderers' might have been conferred by the Achaemenian authorities, whether officially or informally, on half a dozen different peoples who would have had nothing in common with one another beyond their geographical location on one or other of

¹ In a cautionary comment, Professor G. G. Cameron recommends a prudent adherence to the hypothesis of a non-significant coincidence unless and until convincing evidence in favour of some other explanation presents itself. 'I feel', he writes, 'that there are passages in which you have leaned too heavily on homonyms. I believe, for example, that many town names go back to such primordial times that any attempt to deduce tribal, ethnic, or linguistic conclusions is hopeless. I am innately suspicious of such things. We thought, for example, that Arbela meant "the Four God City", and so it could have been interpreted in Semitic; but now earlier documents present us with Urbillum, which is by no means so explainable. The name, consequently, is pre-Semitic.' After receiving this wise and kindly caution, the writer of this Annex could not plead that he had not been warned.

² See pp. 606–9, above.

³ See pp. 593–4, above.

⁴ See Jackson, A. V. W., in *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. i (Cambridge 1922, University Press), p. 321, n. 2.

⁵ See Herodotus, Book VII, chaps. 67 and (?) 86 (if 'Paktyes' is to be read here as an emendation for a repetitive 'Kaspioi').

⁶ See Herodotus, Book III, chap. 93

the Achaemenian Empire's far-flung frontiers; and in this case an identical label would have been presumptive evidence, not that the peoples bearing it were akin, but, on the contrary, that they had nothing to do with one another. On a latter-day map of Iran and the regions round about, there were, as we have already noticed,¹ at least two 'dāmāns': one between the eastern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau and the west bank of the Indus, and the other at the southern approaches to the Hindu Kush in the basin of the Kābul River; and there was evidently no reason to suppose that there was any national affinity between these eastern and northern borderers of an Afghan Empire. In the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire the only borderers labelled, in the extant sources, with the word 'dāmān' were the Paktyes of Arachosia; but there was another word signifying 'border' in the Old Persian language which did occur in at least four places on the Achaemenian and Hellenic map of Iran, and this was 'paraitaka'.

One such 'paraitaka' was the first district of Media which Alexander found on his path in his twelve days' march in the spring of 330 B.C. from his winter-quarters in Persis (Pārsa, Fars) to Ecbatana (Hamadān),² and these indications locate this 'paraitaka' in the latter-day province of Ispahan.³ This was evidently the border province of Media over against Persis, and that will have been the country of the Parētakēnoi who are cited by Herodotus in his list⁴ of the tribes of the Medes. This 'paraitaka' between Media and Persis may also be the Partakka or the Partukka mentioned in the Assyrian King Esarhaddon's record of the Assyrian cavalry's operations on the Iranian Plateau, between the Zagros and the Central Desert, in 673 B.C.,⁵ since on the same expedition the Assyrians also raided a country called Patush Arri, and this name is evidently identical with the name of the Pateiskhoreis who were one of the tribes of the Persians according to Strabo.⁶ There was, however, another Median 'paraitaka', known to post-Herodotean Hellenic geographers and likewise included in Media by them,⁷ though not mentioned by Herodotus,⁸ near the intersection of the Great North-West Road and the Great

¹ On p. 594, n. 1, above.

² See Arrian: *Expediitō Alexandri*, Book III, chap. xix, § 2.

³ For this 'paraitaka' at the south-eastern extremity of Media, see further Strabo: *Geographica*, Book II, chap. i, § 26 (C 80); Book XI, chap. xiii, § 6 (C 524); Book XV, chap. ii, § 8 (C 723) and § 14 (C 726); chap. iii, § 6 (C 729); Book XVI, chap. i, § 17 (C 744).

⁴ See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 101.

⁵ See Cameron, G. G.: *A History of Early Iran* (Chicago 1936, University of Chicago Press), pp. 172-4. In spite of the similarity of their names, these two districts are not identical, since they are mentioned side by side (see Luckenbill, D. D.: *Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia* (Chicago 1926-7, University of Chicago Press, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 519, 540, 566).

⁶ See Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XV, chap. iii, § 1 (C 727), cited by Cameron, *ibid.* Esarhaddon's record runs: 'Patush Arra, a district on the border of the salt desert, which lies in the land of the distant Medes, on the edge of Mount Bikni, the lapis lazuli mountain, the soil of whose land not one among the kings my fathers had trodden' (Luckenbill, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 519, 540, [560], 567).

⁷ See, for example, Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xii, § 4 (C 522); Book XV, chap. iii, § 12 (C 732); Book XVI, chap. i, § 2 (C 736) and § 8 (C 739).

⁸ Herodotus's Parētakēnoi cannot have been the inhabitants of this western 'paraitaka', considering that, in his itinerary of the Achaemenian Empire's Great North-West Road in Book V, chaps. 49-54, Herodotus does not assign to Media any of the territory through which this road ran. According to the passage in Book V, chaps. 52-53, the road ran from 'Armenia' through 'Matiēnē' into 'Kissia' (see pp. 629-30, below).

North-East Road.¹ There was a third 'paraitaka' on one of the borders of Sogdiana which cannot be located exactly from Arrian's narrative² of Alexander's operations there, and there was a fourth—the latter-day Sakastênê (Seistan)—astride the lower course of the River Hilmand between Zarangianê (Zrāka) and Arachosia (Harahvatiš).³

Obviously there was no more affinity between the inhabitants of these four 'paraitakas' in an Achaemenian Iran than there was in a Medieval Western Christendom between the inhabitants of the March of Ancona, the March of Brandenburg, Denmark, and Finmark, or between the inhabitants of the County Palatine of Durham, the quarter known as the Pallant within the walls of the city of Chichester, a Kur Pfalz astride the Rhine and an Ober Pfalz at the northern tip of Bavaria.

While 'borderers'—denoted by the synonyms 'parêtakênôî' and 'thamanaioi'—is one of the descriptive labels on the map of the Achaemenian Empire, another is 'pairikās', meaning people practising an objectionably distinctive religion. We have observed already⁴ that this name, *Graecè* 'parikanioi', was one of several descriptive titles of an Iranian-speaking Nomad people, marching with Sogdiana in the upper valley of the Jaxartes (Sir Darya), whose national name had not been preserved. The Achaemenian imperial authorities, who had originally confounded this people with a host of others of their kind under the generic title 'Sakā' signifying 'Eurasian Nomads', appeared to have subsequently distinguished them from other Nomads by calling them alternatively 'Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā' ('Sakā Haumavargā'), in allusion to one of their religious rites, and 'the Allies' (the Herodotean 'Aiglai'), in allusion to their exceptionally favourable juridical relation with the Achaemenian Empire. But this particular people had no monopoly of being in a treaty relation with the Achaemenian Imperial Government or of drinking hauma or, again, of practising an objectionable religion;⁵ and accordingly, when we find another people labelled 'parikanioi' in Herodotus's gazetteer, we cannot infer from the common name that these two peoples had anything in common beyond their common failure to win approval for their respective religions, whatever these may have been. This common label 'pairikās', rendered 'parikanioi' in Greek, was undoubtedly affixed to each of the two peoples to whom Herodotus applies it; for in A.D. 1952 the upper basin of the Sir Darya, which had once been the habitat of 'the Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā', still bore the name 'Fārghānah', while the name of a place called Fārghān, 60 kilometres to the east of Tārum and 120 kilometres to the north of Bandar 'Abbās,⁶ together with the name of the neighbouring Mount Furghun, attested the former presence of people labelled 'parikan' just

¹ See p. 210, n. 3, above.

² See Arrian: *Expediitio Alexandri*, Book IV, chap. xxi and chap. xxii, §§ 1–2.

³ See Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 95, following Isidore of Charax: *Parthian Stations*, chap. 18.

⁴ On pp. 594–5, above.

⁵ For example, the Hellenes who burned their fathers' corpses and the Callatian Indians who ate their fathers' corpses (see Herodotus, Book III, chap. 38) were, no doubt, both alike stigmatized as 'pairikās' by devout Zoroastrian Persians who exposed their fathers' corpses to be devoured by carrion-eating birds and beasts.

⁶ See Herzfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

where we should expect to find 'parikanioi' whom Herodotus presents in his gazetteer as yoke-fellows of the Asiatic Ethiopians in Darius's eighteenth taxation district.¹

A third descriptive epithet that was rife in the Achaemenian Empire, side by side with 'heathens' and 'borderers', was 'highlanders'. 'Ākaufačiyā', which bears this meaning in Old Persian, figures as the name of the people of an Achaemenian *dahyāuš*;² and 'parvatā', which, like 'kaufa', was an Iranian word meaning 'mountain',³ appears in Greek dress in Herodotus's ethnicon 'Aparytai' and in Ptolemy's ethnika 'Parouētai' and 'Parautoi'.⁴ Did one of the pre-Indo-European languages current on the plateaux of Anatolia, Armenia, and Iran have a word meaning 'hill country' which generated the name 'Tabal' in Assyrian records of the ninth, eighth, and seventh centuries B.C.?⁵ In the Assyrian usage of this word there is an ambiguity; for, while it is used generically to signify the whole of the highlands of the Taurus and Antitaurus, it is also used specifically as the proper name for one particular principality in this region which bestrode the upper waters of the rivers of Cilicia in the country afterwards known to Hellenic geographers as Cataonia.⁶ This variety of usage leaves us in doubt as to whether the Tibarēnoi in the Herodotean Taxation District No. 19, towards the eastern end of the Black Sea coast of Anatolia, were just the local highlanders ('people of the tabal'), or whether 'Tibarēnoi', as applied to them, is a proper name which informs us that these were descendants of refugees from the East Central Anatolian principality of Tabal who had taken refuge in this north-eastern fastness from assaults by Moskhoi falling upon them from the west or by Saparda, Paktyes, Cimmerians, and Scyths falling upon them from the east, or both. Similarly we are left in doubt as to whether the Mount Tabor above the headwaters of the River Jordan was named after the Mount Atabyrios in Rhodes by Philistine settlers on the coast on which they stamped their own name; or whether the two mountains are both called 'tabal' simply because 'tabal' means 'mount'. However that may be, it is easier to believe that the 'highlanders' (*Graecè* 'Tapouroi'; *Arabice* 'Tabarī') who gave the name 'Tabaristan' to the country between the Elburz Range and the south coast of the Caspian Sea, bore the same name as the Tibarēnoi of Anatolia because both peoples happened to live in a hill country, than it is to believe that the identity between the two names is evidence that the two peoples had a common ancestry; and the wisest course here is no doubt the third alternative of refraining, in default of positive evidence, from seeing in the resemblance between the two names 'Tibarēnoi' and 'Tapouroi' anything more than an accidental coincidence.

There are at least three other cases in which corresponding doubts arise. Considering that the Iranian word 'dahā' (Sanskrit 'dasā') means 'brigand', how are we to know whether the 'dahā' (*Latine* Dahae, Davi),⁷

¹ See further p. 623, below.

² See p. 647, with n. 5, below.

³ Hence the 'Tubal' of Gen. x. 2.

⁴ See p. 668, below.

⁵ See p. 647, n. 6, below.

⁶ See Forrer, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁷ This ethnicon 'Davi' is implied in the personal name 'Dāvus', representing a Greek Dāos, which is borne by slaves in Latin translations of Attic comedies written in the third century B.C.

whom we find at divers points on our map bear an identical name in virtue of having a common ancestry, or whether they bear it merely as the stigma of a disreputable common profession? Again, considering that the word which appears in Hellenic dress as 'Amardos' or 'Mardos' seems to be merely a rendering of the Old Persian word 'martiya' meaning 'man', how are we to know whether the north-western neighbours of the Tapouroi in the Elburz Range who bore this name, and their homonyms in the North-Western Zagros (the latter-day Mardistan, east of Lake Van) and in Persis, were branches of a single people which had split, like its sister-peoples the Yautiyā, Mačiyā, Pārsā, and Asagartiyā,¹ in the course of travelling across the Iranian Plateau, or whether the only thing that the three bands of 'mardoi' had in common was that, in their common Iranian tongue, they had, all three, elected to style themselves 'the men' *par excellence* in allusion to their common pursuit of the same manly calling of robbery under arms?² In the third place we find ourselves at a loss to tell whether the Yaudheya whose habitat was in the borderland between the Panjab and Rājputāna were akin to the Yautiyā (Outioi) of Lāristān and to the Ouitioi of Transcaucasia, or whether the identity of these names tells us merely that the two peoples who bore them in India and in South-West Asia both took pleasure in calling themselves 'the warriors'.³

After this precautionary reconnaissance of some of the pitfalls graven across a scholar's path by the ambiguity of homonyms, we have now to hazard ourselves on this treacherous ground. The one slightly encouraging feature in a foolhardy enterprise is that there is manifestly some safety in numbers. Where we have only a single name to confront with a single name—for example 'Tapouroi' with 'Tibarēnoi'—the hypothesis of an accidental coincidence is, no doubt, our most prudent recourse. But, where we have a pair of names to confront with a corresponding pair—for example the Greek 'Tibarēnoi' plus 'Moskhoi' with the Assyrian 'Tabal' plus 'Mushki' (the Biblical 'Tubal' plus 'Mesech'), or, again, the Mount 'Tabor' plus River 'Jordan' of Palestine with the Mount 'Atabyrios' of Rhodes plus River 'Iardanos' of Crete—the hypothesis of sheer coincidence would seem less probable; and it would seem decidedly improbable where we have a four-in-hand on either side—as, for example, in the correspondence between the 'Yautiyā (Outioi)' plus 'Mačiyā (Mykoi)' plus 'Asagartiyā (Sagartioi)' plus 'Pārsā (Persai)' of South-Western Iran with the 'Ouitioi' plus 'Mūqān' plus 'Asagartiyā' plus 'Parsua' of North-Western Iran. In this last case, at any rate, we can confidently infer that our four associated pairs of homonyms are less likely to have been the product of Chance than to be the monument of an historical fission of each of four co-migrant peoples into two diverging wings.

¹ See pp. 607–8, above.

² This question is raised by Strabo in Book XI, chap. xiii, § 3 (C 523).

³ For the Yaudheya, see Rapson, E. J., in *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. i, p. 528, and de la Vallée Poussin, L.: *L'Inde aux Temps des Mauryas* (Paris 1930, Boccard), p. 16.

Notes on Names and their Locations

In the following discussion of outstanding questions of interpretation and identification, we shall follow the order in which the names of peoples and countries occurring in our sources have been entered in Table V, attached to this Annex, which folds out opposite p. 772. In each successive line we shall deal first with the Old Persian name in the left-hand column of the table, and shall then consider, in connexion with it, the Herodotean name or names that have been equated with it in the table, before proceeding to deal with the next Old Persian name in the left-hand column.

The *Pārsā* (*Graecè* Persai) who retained the status of a privileged imperial people in the Achaemenian Empire after its reorganization by Darius I were only a fraction of the Persian people. For one thing, they did not include the Nomad rearguard of the *Pārsā* who had become one of the tribes of the Achaemenian Empire's Central Asian Nomad subjects the Pointed-Hood Sakā (*alias* Massagetae); for these dilatory 'Parsiōi' did not mount the northern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau till *circa* 130 B.C.¹ Nor did Darius's *Pārsā* or Herodotus's Persai include the right wing of the *Pārsā*, known to the Assyrians as Parsua, which, in the course of the original Medo-Persian occupation of Western Iran, had settled, together with the right wings of the three companion peoples—Yautiyā, Mačiyā, Asagartiyā—in Ardalan, in Azerbaijan, and still farther north and north-west, in the lower basin of the rivers Aras and Kur. Though a fourfold community of name would appear to testify to a common national origin, these north-western representatives of the four Persian peoples had all, no doubt, long since become Medes in their political feelings—as the north-western Asagartiyā, at any rate, showed by embarking on the forlorn hope of rising in revolt against Darius at the call of a leader claiming to be a descendant of Cyaxares after the revolt in Media Proper had been crushed and after the leader of that revolt had been captured at Ragā (Rayy) and been executed at Ecbatana.² It is more significant that the *Pārsā* (Persai) of our lists do not include even the whole of that portion of the Persian people that had been under the sovereignty of the House of Achaemenes (Hakhāmaniš) since the reign of Achaemenes' son Teispes (Čispiš, *regnabat circa* 675–640 B.C.).

The original patrimony of the House of Achaemenes had been the canton of Parsuwaš or Parsawaš (*Assyriacè* Parsumaš or Parsamaš) in the upper basin of the River Karkhah, to the south of Media and to the north of the plains of Elam (i.e. it had been the latter-day country of Lūristān).³ Parsuwaš is mentioned in the Assyrian records as early as

¹ See Tarn: *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, pp. 292–4.

² See 'DB', §§ 32–33.

³ This location of Parsuwaš, which is Cameron's, has been adopted in this Study, as against the view (advocated by Sidney Smith in his *Isaiah, Chapters XL–LV, Literary Criticism and History* (London 1944, Milford), p. 28) that Parsuwaš was not a separate and distinct country from Pārsa, and was not situated in Lūristān, but was identical with Pārsa and was therefore situated in Fars. On this view the appanage of the Cyran elder branch of Teispes' line was Anšan alone, not Anšan-cum-Parsuwaš, while the appanage of the Ariaramnan younger branch was a Pārsa with which Parsuwaš was identical. In the present writer's amateur judgement, Sidney Smith's identification of Parsuwaš with

815 B.C.,¹ and Achaemenes (*regnabat circa* 700–675 B.C.)² must have been on the throne when Parsuwaš sent a contingent to the army of the anti-Assyrian alliance, headed by Elam, which defeated Sennacherib at Halūlah.³ Achaemenes' successor Teispes is described in later records as 'King of the city of Anšan',⁴ which must have lain somewhere on the border between Parsuwaš, Elam, and Babylonia;⁵ and it appears to have been in Teispes' reign (*circa* 675–640 B.C.) that the Achaemenian Dynasty achieved an immense extension of its dominions by adding to Parsuwaš and Anšan the whole left wing of the Persian group of Iranian peoples on the farther side of Elam in the latter-day provinces of Fars, Lūristān, and Kirmān.⁶ Teispes must have found his opportunity as a *tertius gaudens* during the great Assyro-Elamite war that had broken out in 663 B.C. and that ended, after continuing for about a quarter of a century, in the destruction of Elam and the exhaustion of the Assyrian winners of a Pyrrhic victory.

Teispes divided these expanded dominions between his elder son Cyrus I (*regnabat circa* 640–600 B.C.), to whom he bequeathed the dynasty's patrimony in Parsuwaš and Anšan, and his younger son Ariaramnes, to whom he gave the dynasty's new acquisitions in the South-East. The fortunes of the elder branch of the house were depressed when, after the destruction of Elam, Cyrus I of Anšan was compelled by one of Asshurbanipal's generals to acknowledge Assyria's overlordship and to surrender one of his sons as a hostage;⁷ but thereafter there was a dramatic reversal of fortunes which may have been a

Pārsa was less convincing than Cameron's location of it in Lūristān, and this for two reasons. In the first place a Parsuwaš with which Assyria came into military collision in the early years of the seventh century B.C. seems more likely to have lain in Lūristān than to have lain in Fars, on the farther side of Elam. In the second place it seems unlikely that, when Teispes was dividing his dominions between his two sons, he should have assigned to his younger son Ariaramnes his own hereditary patrimony Parsuwaš—as he will have done if Parsuwaš is identical with Pārsa—and have bequeathed to his elder son Cyrus I nothing more than his new acquisition Anšan. Teispes' partition of his dominions would be less difficult to account for on the view that he assigned to his elder son Cyrus I his own ancestral patrimony Parsuwaš in Lūristān, together with an Anšan that had been the earlier and the nearer of Teispes' two acquisitions, while he assigned to his younger son Ariaramnes his later and more distant acquisition Pārsa. It is geographically possible that Teispes, starting from Lūristān, should have pushed his way into Fars via Anšan in the north-west corner of the lowlands of Elam.

¹ See Cameron: *A History of Early Iran*, p. 179.

² See *ibid.*, p. 179.

³ This battle is dated 692 B.C. by Cameron, *loc. cit.*; 691 by Sidney Smith in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1925, University Press), p. 68.

⁴ See Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

⁵ F. W. König, in his *Älteste Geschichte der Meder und Perser* (Leipzig 1934, Hinrichs), p. 9, locates Anšan somewhere not far from the district of Dêr, which lay in the north-east corner of Babylonia. Sidney Smith, in his *Isaiah, Chapters XL–LV*, p. 121 (note 27, referring to p. 28), identifies Dêr with the latter-day Badrah, just on the 'Irāqī side of the 'Irāqī–Persian frontier, east by south of Baghdad. This location of Anšan would appear to refute decisively Sidney Smith's statement, in *op. cit.*, p. 28, that 'both Parsuwaš and Anšan designate the province round Pasargadae'. In the immediately preceding sentence, Smith testifies that Anšan was 'known to the Babylonians from early Sumerian times'—i.e. from times when 'the province round Pasargadae', *alias* Pārsa, Persis, Fars, was far beyond the horizon of the Land of Shinar. This last point is made by Weissbach in P.-W., *loc. cit.*, col. 1142. See also the present Study, p. 204, above.

⁶ See Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

⁷ See Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 204. Sidney Smith argues, in *Isaiah, Chapters XL–LV* p. 122 (note 31 referring to p. 28), that this would have been *ultra vires* for Cyrus I if he had been already under the suzerainty of his brother Ariaramnes, as Cameron suggests that he was (see p. 601, with n. 1, above).

consequence of the sudden rise of the Median Power upon the collapse of Assyria after Asshurbanipal's death. The crown of Pārsa, which Ariaramnes had inherited from his father Teispes, was certainly never worn by Ariaramnes' grandson Hystaspēs, the father of Darius I;¹ and, since we find a scion of the elder branch of the House of Achaemenes—Cambysēs I (*regnabat circa* 600–559 B.C.), son of Cyrus I and father of Cyrus II—reigning over Pārsa as well as over Parsuwaš, with the title 'King of the City of Anšan', under the suzerainty of King Cyaxares of Media,² it seems possible that the deposition of the Ariaramnan branch of the Achaemenidae may have been a consequence of a Median act of intervention that had restored the Cyran branch's fortunes, though it is also possible that King Ariaramnes' son King Arsāmēs may have retained the throne of Pārsa till he was ejected from it by Cambysēs I's son Cyrus II as one of the moves in this empire-builder's career of self-aggrandizement.³

The only indication in Darius and Xerxes' official lists of *dahyāva* that the Pārsa to which these lists give the place of honour did not include the whole of the Persian territory which had been inherited by the successors of Teispes is the separate mention of Maka in all six lists and of Asagarta as well in 'DPe'. But we should not have known how to interpret the appearance of these two names in the official lists if the key had not been given to us by Herodotus's list of the peoples comprised in his Taxation District No. 14, in which we find not only the south-eastern Mykoi (Mačiyā) and the south-eastern Sagartioi (Asagartiyā), but also the south-eastern Outioi (Yautiyā),⁴ attached to the Thamanaiοi (i.e. the Paktyes in Arachosia)⁵ and to the Sarangai (Zrāka).

¹ 'Cyrus the Great was a great-nephew of Ariaramnes, and a second cousin of Hystaspes father of Darius. I think we must credit Darius's statement that he was the ninth king of the Achaemenian line; and to me the reasonable way to enumerate them is Achaemenes, Teispes, Cyrus I, Cambyses I, Cyrus II, Cambyses II—then, turning to the other line, Ariaramnes, Arsames, Darius. Hystaspes was never King, since both he and his father Arsames were living when Darius won the throne (so DSf, §§ 12–15, and XPf, §§ 20–25), so that only Arsames could bear the royal title.'—Professor Roland G. Kent, in a note to the present writer.

The texts, with English translations, of two inscriptions found at Hamadān (Ecbatana), which purport to have been dictated by King Ariaramnes (AmH) and by his son and successor King Arsames (AsH) respectively, are published in Kent, R. G.: *Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon* (New Haven, Conn. 1950, American Oriental Society), p. 116, with bibliographies on p. 107. See also Kent: 'The Oldest Old Persian Inscriptions', in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. lxvi, No. 3, July–September 1946, pp. 206–12. Kent's conclusion is that 'the inscriptions of Ariaramnes and Arsames were inscribed in the time of Artaxerxes II, to do honour to the royal ancestors of Ariaramnes' line—apparently as a part of anti-Cyrus activity by Artaxerxes'.

² See Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 218, and the present Study, p. 204, above.

³ 'Cyrus II deposed Arsames from his throne, yet not in a bitter struggle, for Arsames retained his life and apparently his liberty, and was still living when his grandson Darius became ruler of the Empire after the death of Cambyses II, son of Cyrus the Great (so in DSf, §§ 12–15, and in XPf, §§ 20–25). Possibly there was some arrangement as to alternate overlordship [cf. Sidney Smith, *Isaiah, Chapters XL–LV*, p. 29.—A. J. T.], which Cyrus unilaterally abrogated—as is usually the case in such matters. Thus it resulted that Hystaspes, son of Arsames, never had a throne of his own, and is never called King in the O.P. inscriptions when Darius mentions him as his father, though Xerxes normally gives the title to his father Darius when he names him in the inscriptions.'—R. G. Kent, in *J.A.O.S.*, vol. lxvi, No. 3, pp. 210–11, following F. H. Weissbach, in P.-W., Supplementband IV, cols. 1132–44, s.v. 'Kyros', who points out in cols. 1141–2 that, in the Babylonian Nabonidus-Cyrus Chronicle, Cyrus II is called 'King of Anšan' shortly before 548 B.C., but 'King of Parsu' in 547 B.C. See also the present Study, p. 204, above. ⁴ See pp. 637–41, below. ⁵ See pp. 593–4, above, and p. 633, below.

Pārsa in the political and constitutional sense of the domain of a privileged Persian imperial people did not, as it emerged from the upheaval of 522–521 B.C., include either Lāristān or Kirmān on the one hand or Lūristān on the other. Not only the disaffected south-eastern Mačiyā, Yautiyā, and Asagartiyā, but also a Parsuwaš that had been the Achaemenian Dynasty's original patrimony, had now been degraded to the ranks of the Empire's tax-paying subjects. While two-thirds of what had formerly been Pārsa had now been attached to Harahvatiš, the whole of the former Parsuwaš had been merged in Hūja (the Viceroyalty of Greater Elam).

As for *Māda*, we should never have known from the non-committal mention of the name in all six official lists that it had been partitioned on the Darian fiscal map into the four fragments that the Herodotean gazetteer reveals to us.

One of these fragments, Herodotus's District No. 10, which he calls 'Media' *par excellence*, appears (as soon as we have stripped away an adventitious pair of remote Sakan peoples)¹ to be confined to the environs of Ecbatana (Hamadān) and to the upland section of the Great North-East Road to the south-west of Hamadān as far as the latter-day town of Kirmānshāh inclusive.

Another fragment of Media seems to be represented by Herodotus's District No. 11, embracing the countries of the *Kaspioi*, *Pausikai*,² *Pantimathoi*, and *Dareitai*. A key to the location of this district is perhaps to be found in the last of these four names, if we are right in interpreting it to mean the people living in the neighbourhood of the Caspian Gates.

'Duvarayā', the locative singular case of the Old Persian word meaning 'door', occurs in 'DB', § 32; and in the New Persian language the compound word 'dar-band' (meaning literally 'door-barrier') came to be the technical term for one of those fortified and garrisoned passes that played so important a part in the administrative as well as the strategic geography of the Ottoman Empire under this name, and of the East Roman Empire under the graecized Latin name 'Kleisoura' (i.e. 'clausura').³ The Caspian Gates commanded one of the only two non-trans-desert roads between the main body of the Achaemenian Empire and its vast outlying territories on the farther side of the Central Desert of Iran. The road through the Caspian Gates from Māda to Parthava circumvented the north-western end of the desert; the road from Kirmān to Arachosia circumvented its south-eastern end; and in 522–521 B.C. both these strategic routes had proved to be of critical importance. The south-eastern route had carried the Yautiyan rebel Vahyaz-dāta's expeditionary force on its daring raid from Pārsa to the basin of the Kābul River; the north-western route would have brought the Median rebel Fravartiš's troops to the support of the insurgents in

¹ See pp. 594–5, above.

² The *Πανσικαὶ καὶ Παντίμαθοι* of A¹ would appear to be the right reading. The *Πανσοὶ καὶ Παντίμαθοι* of S looks like an attempt to rationalize a *Πανσοὶ καὶ Παντίμαθοι* of RV which has arisen from a *Πανσικαὶ Παντίμαθοι* of BCPA² which has arisen from the accidental omission of one of the two consecutive *καὶ*'s of the correct text.

³ See p. 82, n. 3, above.

Hyrkania (Varkāna) and Parthia (Parthava), who had raised the standard of revolt in Fravartīš's name, if they had not, like the North-Western Asagartiyā, waited to rise until after Fravartīš had been crushed.

As it turned out, Darius was able to detach troops to the aid of his father Hystaspes, the Viceroy of Parthava, from Ragā via the Caspian Gates, and this reinforcement decisively turned the tide;¹ but the incident served to illustrate the Caspian Gates' strategic importance, and Darius manifestly took both these lessons to heart. After the flames of rebellion had been stamped out, he made sure of his control over the Kirmān-Arachosia road by attaching Kirmān to the loyal viceroyalty of Harahvatiš. The security of the Caspian Gates must have concerned him equally, and the occurrence of the name Dareitai among the names of the peoples in Herodotus's eleventh district suggests that this district included the Caspian Gates within its boundaries. Ptolemy places 'the Dareitis district' at the north-eastern extremity of Media, to the east of Rhagianê (the district round Ragā, *Graecè* Rhagai), with 'the Ouadas-soi' in between.²

If the Dareitai are to be located at the Caspian Gates, this gives us a clue to the location of the three associated peoples. It is clear that they cannot have lain east of the Caspian Gates, since the immediately adjoining territories in that quarter were Hyrcania and Parthia in District No. 16. They are unlikely to have lain between the Elburz Range and the Caspian Sea, since there is no evidence that the south coast of the Caspian, west of Hyrcania, was ever under Achaemenian rule.³ Therefore they are likely to have lain west of the Caspian Gates; and, if so, we can perhaps detect the imprint of the former presence of the detachment of Kaspioi that is here associated with the Dareitai in the latter-day place-name Qazwin. We may also perhaps detect in Herodotus's Pausikai the Paesici or Pesticae who, in a Roman version of a post-

¹ See 'DB', §§ 35-37.

² See *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. ii, § 6.

³ Professor G. G. Cameron, commenting on this passage, makes the point that, since Hyrcania was undoubtedly embraced in the Achaemenian Empire, it seems unlikely that the rest of the southern shore of the Caspian Sea will have remained independent. Where, he asks, were the Cadusians, if not here? Certainly the Cadusians were to be found in this coastal strip, at its north-western end, to the north of the Gêlai (see p. 631, below). But is there any evidence that the Cadusians were ever the Achaemenidae's subjects, or even their allies? We hear of inconclusive Achaemenian punitive expeditions into Cadusian territory, and of Cadusian troops serving in Achaemenian armies; but, after all, Continental European Greece was likewise invaded by Darius I and Xerxes, and Continental European Greek soldiers of fortune were hired by Xerxes' successors. Have we any warrant for assuming that Achaemenian authority was any more effective in Cadusia than it was in, say, Attica?

No doubt, at first sight it is not easy to give credence to a map in which Gilān and Tabaristān (the latter-day Mazandarān) are depicted as lying outside the frontiers of an empire that encircles them by coming down to the shore of the Caspian on either side of them, round the mouths of the rivers Aras and Kur to the north-west and round the mouth of the River Atrak to the east, besides controlling a corridor of territory, connecting Western Iran with Khurāsān, between the southern face of the Elburz Range and the north-west corner of the Central Desert of Iran. A closer inspection, however, brings out the fact that this strip of territory is a natural fastness, where an invader who has managed to surmount or outflank the southern rampart of mountains will be baffled on the seaward slopes by forests and in the lowlands by jungles and swamps. It is perhaps relevant to recall that the Arab Caliphate, in its day, touched the shore of the Caspian round the mouths of the rivers Aras and Kur, and extended eastwards through the Caspian Gates across the Oxus to Farghānah, without succeeding in bringing Gilān or Tabaristān under its rule (see II. ii. 447-8).

Alexandrine Hellenic gazetteer,¹ are associated with the Amardi, and whom this association would locate somewhere to the north-west of Qazwīn, in the upper part of the basin of the Safid Rud, above the gorge in which it breaks through the Elburz *en route* for the Caspian. This, in turn, would lead us to look for the Pantimathoi, who were the fourth people in this district, somewhere to the west of Qazwīn.

This is where the Assyrian records appear to locate the north-western branch of the Nomad Persian people named Asagartiyā (*Assyriacè* 'Zikirtu' and 'Zakruti'; *Graecè* Sagartioi),² whom Ptolemy likewise locates to the east of the Zagros;³ and it is also just where we should expect to find a remnant of these north-western Asagartiyā surviving after the next eruption of Nomad peoples on to the Iranian Plateau from the Eurasian Steppe had sent a fresh stream of migrants pouring westward through the Caspian Gates into the basin of Lake Urmīyah and beyond it into the basin of the rivers Aras and Kur. The country between the two provinces of Ardan and Qazwīn lay astride the habitual westward route of Eurasian Nomad Völkerwanderungen south of the Caspian Sea, but it was one of the most mountainous sections of this route and was therefore one in which no migrant Nomad people would linger by preference. It would therefore not be surprising to find a batch of Asagartiyā still entrenched here between one batch of Kaspioi just behind them, round Qazwīn, and another batch of Kaspioi just in front of them, to the north of Lake Urmīyah and in the lower valleys of the rivers Aras and Kur.

On a latter-day map, this country between Qazwīn and Ardan was called 'Khamsah', which is the Arabic word for 'five', and we may perhaps venture to identify this name with that of the frontier fortress called 'Panziš' which the Assyrians built somewhere on the border between the independent territory of Asagarta and the Assyrian protectorate called Mannai in the relatively open southern part of the Urmīyah Basin, between the south end of the Lake and Parsua.⁴ If Panziš is an Assyrian version of 'panča', which means 'five' in the Old Persian language, we may perhaps hazard the guess that 'Khamsah' may have been an Arabic translation of a previous local Iranian place-name, and that the five entities commemorated in this place-name may have been five tribes constituting the north-western branch of the Asagartiyā. A Eurasian Nomad horde was apt to be an association of constituent tribes; and hordes thus constituted would sometimes style themselves 'the so many so-and-so'—e.g. 'the ten [tribes of] Uigurs' (*Turcicè* 'Onugur') or whatever the number and the name might be—as a simple way of advertising their strength. The Pañchalas, who are associated with the Kurus in the legendary tradition of an archaic age of Indic history, were believed to have been a confederacy of five tribes who

¹ In Pomponius Mela's *Chorographia*, Book III, chap. v, §§ 39 and 42. They reappear in Pliny's *Historia Naturalis*, Book VI, chap. xvii (xix), § 50.

² See Cameron, *op. cit.*, pp. 149–50; König, *op. cit.*, p. 16; Herzfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 82; Forrer, *op. cit.*, p. 75; and the present Annex, p. 608, above.

³ Ptolemy: *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. ii, § 6.

⁴ For the site of Panziš, see Forrer, *op. cit.*, p. 75; Adontz, *op. cit.*, pp. 102 and 367. 'Panziš, the strong fortress that lies over against the lands of Zikirtu and Andia' (Sargon's record of his eighth campaign (714 B.C.) in Luckenbill, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 150–1).

took their name from their number.¹ If the north-western Asagartiyā did style themselves 'the Five Tribes', the Old Persian word 'panča', meaning 'five', might perhaps account for the first two syllables of an old Persian compound proper name that makes its appearance in Greek dress as 'Pantimathoi'.

If these considerations carry any conviction, they indicate that Herodotus's Eleventh District was a chain of cantons, running west and east from the Asagartiyā in Khamsah through the Kaspioi round Qazwin as far eastward as the Caspian Gates inclusive. It is noteworthy that neither the Herodotean gazetteer nor any of the Achaemenian official lists mention by name the Median district that had for its local capital the city of Ragā, in the neighbourhood of a latter-day Tehran, where the Median pretender Fravartiš had made his last stand.² Ragā will either have been included in the canton of the Kaspioi round Qazwin, or else it will have been left out of the reckoning on account of its being an autonomous temple-state³ like Jerusalem, Comana Cataoniae, and Comana Pontica.

Is another fragment of Media to be detected in Herodotus's District No. 15? This possibility is suggested by the fact that the two names here associated by Herodotus—the *Sakai* and the *Kaspioi*—recur on a post-Alexandrine Hellenic map side by side in the lower basin of the rivers Aras and Kur in two countries called Sakasênê⁴ and Kaspianê. The Sakan contingent in this Herodotean pair of peoples stamped their name on a canton called 'Sakašayana' ('Saka-land') in the province of Utênê,⁵ between the Qārabāgh highlands and the River Kur, whose name, as we have seen, commemorated the former presence of these Sakas' local forerunners, the north-western branch of the Yautiyā. In the field-state of the army assembled by Darius Codomannus at Gaugamela in 331 B.C., Sakesīnai are brigaded with the Albanians, Cadusians, and Medes.⁶ Sakasênê is cited by Strabo in association with Araxênê and with 'Matianê in Media';⁷ and in this context both Sakasênê and Araxênê are described as being 'in Armenia'.⁸

The Armenia which Strabo, or his source, has in mind in this passage is evidently the Great Armenia that had eventually been brought into existence by the progressive expansion of a successor-state of the Seleucid Empire which, after the defeat of Antiochus III by the Romans in 190 B.C., had been founded by Artaxias, Antiochus's viceroy in one of the Seleucid Empire's two Armenian provinces.⁹ Artaxias' Armenian king-

¹ See Keith, A. Berriedale, in *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. i, p. 118. These Pañchalas' Kuru associates were perhaps the left wing of an ex-Eurasian Nomad people whose right wing had given its name to the River Kur in Transcaucasia, to the north-west of Panziš.

² See 'DB', § 32.

³ See Nyberg, H. S.: *Die Religionen des Alten Iran* (Leipzig 1938, Hinrichs), pp. 314 et seqq. and 342.

⁴ The Sakapênê of Ptolemy: *Geographia*, Book V, chap. xiii, § 9.

⁵ See Adontz, op. cit., p. 308. Utênê is Ptolemy's Otênê (see *Geographia*, Book V, chap. xiii, § 9).

⁶ See Arrian: *Expediitio Alexandri*, Book III, chap. viii, § 4.

⁷ See Strabo: *Geographica*, Book II, chap. i, § 14 (C 73); Book XI, chap. vii, § 2 (C 509). Cp. Book XI, chap. xiv, § 4 (C 528).

⁸ Strabo, loc. cit. See also Book XI, chap. viii, § 4 (C 511).

⁹ See *ibid.*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 5 (C 528) and § 15 (C 531).

dom did not acquire an exclusive title to the name 'Armenia' until Artaxias' descendant and successor Tigranes (*regnabat circa* 96-55 B.C.) had annexed the adjoining Armenian successor-state of the Seleucid Empire in the Upper Tigris Basin (*Graecè* Sophênê, *Assyriacè* Nâiri).¹ But in his record of the details of the previous expansion of the kingdom founded by Artaxias, before its culmination in the reign of Tigranes, Strabo mentions² its acquisition from Media of 'the Phaunîtis' (?),³ 'Basoropeda' (Vaspuragan) and Kaspianê. This Kaspianê must be the country of the Kaspioi whom Ptolemy⁴ locates on the western edge of Media, adjoining Armenia (i.e. the Greater Armenia that had come into existence since 190 B.C.); and here the Kaspioi had bequeathed their name to 'the Caspian mountain range' which is Ptolemy's name for the watershed between the basins of lakes Van and Urmîyah along which he locates the boundary between the Armenia and the Media of his day, and at whose southern extremity he locates the meeting-point of Media and Armenia with Assyria.⁵

This ex-Median Kaspianê had also stamped its name on a canton called 'Kasbi-k' (i.e. 'Kaspioi'), which is mentioned by the Armenian historians Agathangelus and Faustus of Byzantium⁶ as having been in existence in the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era near the town of P'aitarakan in the angle between the rivers Aras and Kur just above their confluence. At an earlier date this Kaspianê must have occupied the whole of the steppe country in the lower basin of the rivers Aras and Kur from the northern rim of the basin of Lake Urmîyah on the south to the southern foothills of the Caucasus Range on the north; for in another passage Strabo records that Kaspianê extended north of the River Kur into the South-East Caucasian country called Albania.⁷

Even if it had not been expressly stated by Strabo, in a passage cited above, that Kaspianê had been part of Media before its annexation to Armenia, we could have inferred from the evidence presented by Herodotus that this Kaspianê astride the lower course of the River Aras must have been the home of one of the two or more detachments of the Kaspioi whom he mentions in his work; for Herodotus has no other name than 'Caspian' for the Caspian Sea (in contrast to the usage of the post-Alexandrine Hellenic geographers, who took to calling it 'the Hyrcanian Sea'); this Herodotean usage means that the section of the shore on which Herodotus's informants had access to this sea (and they had not only sailed on it but had coasted all round it, for they had discovered that it was landlocked)⁸ must have been inhabited by people called 'Kaspioi'; and the only Kaspioi on record who unquestionably possessed

¹ See *ibid.*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 15 (C 532).

² See *ibid.*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 5 (C 528).

³ Cp. the 'Phavênê' of Book XI, chap. xiv, § 4 (C 528).

⁴ In his *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. ii, § 5.

⁵ See Book V, chap. xiii, §§ 3 and 4. Cp. § 6.

⁶ See Agathangelus: *A History of Tiridates the Great and of Saint Gregory the Illuminator's Preaching*, chap. 1, French translation, in Langlois, V.: *Collection des Historiens Anciens et Modernes de l'Arménie*, vol. i (Paris 1867, Didot), p. 115, col. 2; Faustus: *An Historical Library*, Book IV, chap. 50, and Book V, chap. 14, French translation, *ibid.*, p. 267, col. 1, and p. 288, col. 2.

⁷ See Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. iv, § 5 (C 502).

⁸ See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 203.

a seaboard on the Caspian Sea were the Kaspioi who had given their name to this once Median Kaspianê on the steppes round the mouth of the River Aras. Herodotus also knew that the River Aras flowed into the Caspian Sea at the end of a course running from west to east.¹ Considering the wildness of the peoples adjoining the Caspian Sea both in and after the Achaemenian Age, it is improbable that Herodotus's sources could have learned of the existence of the sea to which they gave the name 'Caspian', or could have ascertained that the River Aras debouched into it, unless this section of the shore of the Caspian Sea, together with a hinterland inhabited by Kaspioi, had been made accessible to geographers through its having been brought under Achaemenian rule. It seems legitimate to infer that the lower basin of the rivers Aras and Kur, as far as the adjoining section of the Caspian shore, must have been included within the Achaemenian Empire's frontiers; and, if this inference is justified, then this Kaspianê which was next-door neighbour to a Sacasêne seems the obvious location for the Kaspioi who are associated with Sakai in Herodotus's District No. 15.

The westernmost of the divers fragments of Media that figure in Herodotus's gazetteer in his District No. 18, 'the *Matiênoi*, *Saspeires* and *Alarodioi*'; and, as we have observed already,² the habitats of both the Alarodioi and the Saspeires are easy to identify. The Alarodioi are the people of the former Kingdom of Urartu, which extended over the basin of Lake Van and over the upper valleys of the Eastern Euphrates (Murâd Su) and the Aras. The Saspeires are the inhabitants of the canton of Isbir, north of Urartu, in the valley of the River Choroq. It remains to locate the country named after the Matiênoi whom Herodotus associates with the Alarodioi and the Saspeires in the present context.

These easterly Matiênoi must have been a quite separate branch from those who, in the Achaemenian Age, were living within the bend of the Halys near the meeting-point between Cilicia, Cappadocia, and Phrygia;³ and, unlike those Western Matiênoi, the Eastern Matiênoi seem by this time to have been extinct; for, in the field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force, the Eastern Matiênoi do not appear, whereas their homonyms the Western Matiênoi, and their neighbours and associates the Alarodioi and the Saspeires, are all credited with contingents whose equipment is described and whose commanders are named. The Alarodioi and Saspeires are brigaded under a single command and are both paraded in the same sub-Moschian equipment as the Kolkhoi.⁴ In this context the absence of the Eastern Matiênoi from the muster-roll is conspicuous; and this indicates that in 480 B.C. they were no longer in the land of the living. On the other hand the presence of their name in the gazetteer indicates that at this time some country was still called after them.

¹ See Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 40. In all other passages in which Herodotus mentions a river 'Araxes' (i.e. in Book I, chaps. 202 and 205, and in Book III, chap. 36), he is confounding the Aras with the Oxus or the Jaxartes or both.

² See pp. 603-4, above.

³ The evidence for the location of the Western Matiênoi is reviewed in the Note on Chronology in x. 201.

⁴ See Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 79.

If the proper noun 'Matiēnoi' in Herodotus's work stands for a place-name, and not for the name of a living people, in those passages in which Herodotus is not referring to the Western Matiēnoi on the River Halys, this place-name is not always used to denote an area of identical extent. In the description of Darius's Eighteenth Taxation District the name designates only those portions of this district, whatever they may prove to have been, that were not embraced in either Urartu or Isbir. There are other passages, however, in which the region bearing the name of these apparently extinct Eastern Matiēnoi manifestly stands, in Herodotus's mind, for 'a roof of the world' from which a number of the principal rivers of South-West Asia—the Aras, the Diyālah (Gyndes),¹ and the Lesser Zab²—flow out in all directions; and in these passages 'the Matiēnoi' is evidently a comprehensive label for the whole of District No. 18, including the domains of the Alarodioi and the Saspeires.

On the map of the Great North-West Road, which Herodotus or his source had under his eye while he was writing the account of Aristagoras of Miletus's unsuccessful solicitation of Cleomenes I of Sparta on the eve of the Ionian Revolt of 499 B.C.,³ the name 'Matiēnoi' was applied to the ex-Assyrian territories (Mygdonia, Adiabênê, and Chalonitis in the nomenclature of the post-Alexandrine Hellenic geographers) that had been annexed by Media in the Medo-Babylonian partition of Assyria in 610–609 B.C.;⁴ and, since the rest of Herodotus's description of this map

¹ See Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 189 and 202. When, in chap. 202, Herodotus writes that the Araxes and the Gyndes 'flow out of the Matiēnoi', the river represented by his 'Araxes' is manifestly the Aras, though in the same context the same name 'Araxes' means, not the Aras, but the Oxus, when it is described as constituting the frontier between Cyrus's empire and the ranges of the Central Asian Nomad Massagetae, and when it is said to have forty mouths of which only one flows out into the Caspian Sea, while the rest lose themselves in swamps and lagoons (i.e. in the marshy borders of the Sea of Aral).

² See Herodotus, Book V, chap. 52. In this passage, Herodotus mistakenly locates the source of the Greater Zab in his Armenia.

³ See Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 49–54.

⁴ In the detailed description of the Great North-West Road in Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 52–54, the text of the relevant passage in chap. 52, as it had reached the hands of Modern Western scholars, ran as follows:

'In Armenia there are fifteen stages of posting-stations, making 56½ parasangs, and among these stations there is a guard-house. Four navigable rivers flow through this country, which all have to be crossed by ferry: first the Tigris; then a pair that have the same name, though it is not the same river and does not rise from the same source; for the one that comes first in the itinerary rises among the Armenians and the one that comes second among the Matiēnoi. The fourth of these rivers is called the Gyndes (Cyrus once distributed its waters into 360 channels). When one breaks out of this Armenia into the Matienian country, there are four stages; and when one passes out of this country into the Cissian country there are eleven stages, making 42½ parasangs, up to the River Choaspes—likewise navigable—on whose banks stands the city of Susa.'

In this text there were three things that must be wrong. In the first place a figure, giving the number of parasangs in Matiēnê, must have dropped out, for this was the only country in the chart for which this entry was missing, and, in the text as it stood, the aggregate of the numbers of parasangs, given country by country with the exception of Matiēnê, fell short, by 137, of the total number of parasangs given in chap. 53. In the second place, in the text as it stood, the aggregate of the numbers of posting-stages, given country by country, fell short, by 30, of the total number of posting-stages given in chap. 52. In the third place the text as it stood differed from all other known accounts of the boundaries of Armenia in including within them the navigable section of the course of the Greater Zab and *a fortiori* in including any part of the courses of the Lesser Zab and of the Diyālah.

These errors required one addition to the text and one transposition of sentences in order to make the whole description self-consistent and to eliminate the incorrect inclusion in Armenia of the courses of the Diyālah, the lesser Zab, and the lower

agrees with his gazetteer of Darius's taxation districts, it follows that, in the gazetteer as well as on the map, these ex-Assyrian territories were associated, under the name 'Matiênoi', with Urartu and Isbir.¹

This conclusion raises the question of the geographical practicability of this administrative arrangement. What practicable route was there for maintaining communications between this fragment of Assyria and Urartu? And where was the common centre from which these two portions of Taxation District No. 18 could both be administered? The line of communications between the two territories cannot have been via the Great North-West Road; for this road, as Herodotus charts its course, ran north-westwards out of the ex-Assyrian territory embraced in 'the Matiênoi' into Armenia direct, without passing through Urartu *en route*. Nor can the line of communications between this ex-Assyrian territory and Urartu have run to the east of the River Tigris over the highlands of Gordyênê in the angle between the Tigris and the Centrîtês (Bohtân); for, when Xenophon and his comrades took that route in 401 B.C., they found no road; they had to fight every inch of their way across the mountains; and, when they had struggled through to the north bank of the Centrîtês, they found themselves, not in Urartu, but in 'Armenia' (or, more precisely, in Arzanênê).² Nor was there any

reaches of the Greater Zab; and, after these requisite emendations, the corrected text would read:

'In Armenia there are fifteen stages of posting-stations, making 56½ parasangs, and among these stations there is a guard-house. When one breaks out of this Armenia into the Matienian country, there are four [and thirty] stages, [making 137 parasangs]. Four navigable rivers flow through this country, which all have to be crossed by ferry: first the Tigris; then a pair that have the same name, though it is not the same river and does not rise from the same source; for the one that comes first in the itinerary rises among the Armenians and the one that comes second among the Matiênoi. The fourth of these rivers is called the Gyndes (Cyrus once distributed its waters into 360 channels). And when one passes out of this country into the Cissian country there are eleven stages, making 42½ parasangs, up to the River Choaspes—likewise navigable—on whose banks stands the city of Susa.'

On the outward journey from Susa, the road, after passing out of 'Cissia' into 'Matiênê', will have intersected with the Babylon-Ecbatana road (see p. 210, n. 3, above); then crossed first the Diyâlah and next the Lower Zab to Arbela; crossed the Upper Zab to the site of Nineveh on the east bank of the Tigris; and crossed the Tigris at the crossing taken by the former Assyrian military road leading to Naîri (i.e. at or near the site of Nineveh, and not as far north as Bezabde, where in 331 B.C. Alexander was to cross the Tigris in the opposite direction). The road will then have run through Nisibis (giving a wide berth to the Tigris gorge between the Tûr 'Abdîn highlands (Mount Masius), in the angle of the Tigris, and the highlands of Gordyênê on the farther side), and will finally have passed out of the Khabûr Basin into the Upper Tigris Basin—and simultaneously out of Matiênê into Armenia—between the Tûr 'Abdîn on the right hand and Mount Izâlâ on the left. This pass leading out of the Khabûr Basin into the Upper Tigris Basin was one of the positions at which the Armenian insurgents had brought Darius's flying columns to a halt in 522–521 B.C. (see 'DB', §§ 29–30).

The distance by road, as measured on a map that was up to date in A.D. 1952, from Mardin via Diyârbakr, the head-waters of the Western Tigris and Kharpût to the crossing of the Euphrates *en route* from Kharpût to Malatyah worked out at approximately 312½ kilometres, making about 52½ parasangs. Allowing for possible variations in the route and possible inaccuracies in both sets of measurements, this came sufficiently near to Herodotus's figure of 56½ parasangs for the Armenian section of the Great North-West Road to make it likely that the south-eastern terminal of this section was at or near Mardin, considering that the north-western terminal is expressly stated by Herodotus to have been at the crossing of the Euphrates between Armenia and Cilicia.

¹ This group of *dahyâva* reappears in 'the Syspirîtis as far as Kalakhanê and Adiabênê' mentioned in Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. iv, § 8 (C 503), and chap. xiv, § 12 (C 530).

² See Xenophon: *Expeditio Cyri*, Book III, chap. v, § 15; Book IV, chap. iii, especially IV. iii. 1.

other practicable south-and-north route anywhere between the east bank of the Tigris and the crest of the Zagros Range; for the upper valley of the Greater Zab is, not a passage, but a cul-de-sac, as a remnant of the Nestorian Christians were eventually to demonstrate by ensconcing themselves in this fastness.¹

If the former metropolitan territory of Assyria was in truth associated with Urartu in one and the same taxation district on the Darian fiscal map of the Achaemenian Empire, these two territories' practical point of junction and seat of administration must have lain somewhere to the east of the North-Western Zagros in the basin of Lake Urmīyah. From the Urmīyah Basin there were practicable routes leading not only south-westward into Assyria but also westward into the basin of Lake Van and north-westward into the upper valley of the River Aras. The practicability of these lines of communication radiating from the Urmīyah Basin is attested by the long history of the warfare between Assyria and Urartu in this arena. The Assyrian name for this relatively open country was 'Mannai', which might be a contraction of a local name which was subsequently Hellenized as 'Matiēnoi' by Herodotus or his source; and this location of Herodotus's eastern 'Matiēnoi' is confirmed by the reappearance of this name precisely here on the post-Alexandrine Hellenic map of South-West Asia.

We have already noticed² that, in a passage that occurs twice in Strabo's work, a 'Matianē in Media' is associated with Araxēnē and Sakasēnē, and Strabo elsewhere gives further indications which are in consonance both with these and with one another: Matianē is Media Atropatēnē's northern neighbour;³ the northern parts of Media extend from the Caspian Gates and Rhagai (Ragā) as far west as Matianē and Armenia;⁴ the Matianoī, as well as the Medes, march, under the lee of the Parakhoathra Range, with the Kadousioi⁵ (who are located along the west shore of the Caspian Sea, immediately to the north of the Gēlai, i.e. of Gīlān),⁶ while, according to Ptolemy,⁷ Martianē [*sic*]⁸ also marches with the [eastern] flank of Assyria along its whole length, and with the southern border of the Kaspioi who lie in Media.

These fragmentary pieces of evidence, taken together, locate the name 'Matianē' in the basin of Lake Urmīyah; and the lake itself is called 'Lake Martianē' by Ptolemy and 'Lake Mantianē' by Strabo in one passage.⁹ We may conclude that the basin of Lake Urmīyah, as well as

¹ See II. ii. 257-8.

² On p. 626, above.

³ Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xiii, § 2 (C 523).

⁴ Ibid., § 7 (C 525). In this statement Strabo is perhaps following Polybius, Book V, chap. 44, § 9, where the Matianoī are associated with the Kadousioi as two of Media's neighbours on the north.

⁵ See Strabo, *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. viii, § 8 (C 514).

⁶ See *ibid.*, chap. vii, § 1 (C 508), and chap. viii, § 1 (C 510). Pliny identifies the Cadusii with the Gelae or Gaeli in a passage (*Historia Naturalis*, Book VI, chap. xvi (xviii), § 48) in which he mentions them in juxtaposition with the Matieni.

⁷ *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. ii, § 5.

⁸ 'The Old Persian word *martiya* meaning "man", which gives certain other place-names, is an easy source for a change of Mat- to Mart-.'—Note by Professor Roland G. Kent.

⁹ Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 8 (C 529). In this passage, Strabo locates his 'Lake Mantianē' in Armenia, but nevertheless it is clear that he is referring to Lake Urmīyah, since he mentions Lake Van ('Lake Arsēnē, *alias* Lake Thōpītis) in the next

the ex-Assyrian territory that had fallen to Media in the partition of 610-609 B.C., was associated with Urartu and Isbir in the Eighteenth Taxation District; that the administrative capital of the whole district lay somewhere in the Urmīyah Basin; and that on this account the whole of District No. 18 was sometimes called 'the Matiēnoi' for short.

This usage would also be politically convenient, since the name of an extinct people would not awaken any such politically dangerous memories as might still come to life at the sound of the names 'Media' and 'Assyria'. The Eastern Mitanni had, in truth, been dead since the annihilation of their empire by the Hittites and the Assyrians in the fourteenth century B.C. In the last phase of its history this East-Mitannian Empire had been ruled from a capital somewhere in the basin of the River Khabūr in Mesopotamia. The survival of the name in the basin of Lake Urmīyah testified that this had been a previous station of the Mitanni on their westward trek from Central Asia via the Caspian Gates; and it is possible that, after moving their political headquarters down into the Khabūr Basin, they had still retained summer pastures in the Urmīyah Basin, like their Turkish-speaking Eurasian Nomad successors the Black Sheep Türkmens and White Sheep Türkmens in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era. The routes between Mesopotamia and the Urmīyah Basin across Adiabênê were under the control of the Mitanni when, at the height of their power, they exercised a suzerainty not only over Asshur but also over Arrapkha.¹

If we now cast up the total of figures in Euboic talents which Herodotus gives for the four taxation districts into which the Viceroyalty of Media had been carved up, we shall see that Media had been penalized financially as well as politically; for the total comes to 1,000, and this is the figure which, in the Herodotean gazetteer, is the assessment on Babylonia, which was a much more populous and wealthy country in the Achaemenian Age than all four fiscal sections of Media added together. In order to be sure that these two figures were truly comparable, we should have, of course, to be sure, first, that (except for the payments in kind explicitly mentioned in this context) they both of them represented comprehensive valuations of imposts of all kinds, including the costs of maintenance of the Imperial Court and Imperial Standing Army during their alternating periods of residence at Ecbatana and at Babylon, and on this point we are in the dark. Yet, even allowing for this uncertain element in the comparison, it looks as if the Darian assessment on Media had been exceptionally heavy.

sentence. In this passage Strabo says that 'Mantianê' means 'ultramarine blue' (Kyanê); but this is actually the meaning of the Armenian word 'kapoit' which can be detected in the alternative name 'Kapauta' (corrupted into 'Spauta' in the extant text) which Strabo gives to Lake Urmīyah in Book VI, chap. xiii, § 2 (C 523). A comparison of XI. xiv, § 8 (C 529), with I. iii, § 4 (C 49), in which Strabo cites the fifth-century Lydian historian Xanthus's observation of geological phenomena indicating that areas which were now dry land had once been covered by the sea, shows that the 'salt lakes in Armenia and the Matiēnoi and Lower Phrygia' which Xanthus had cited as evidence in support of his thesis must be respectively Lake Van, Lake Urmīyah, and the Tuz Gölü (*Graecè* Tatta) in Central Anatolia.

¹ See Götzke, A.: *Hethiter, Churriter und Assyrer* (Leipzig 1936, Harrassowitz), pp. 98-99 and 116-17. Professor G. G. Cameron equates Arrapkha with the latter-day Kirkūk.

The *dahyāuš* called 'Hūja' (written 'Ūvja') in the official lists and 'Kissioi' by Herodotus included the wild highland northern and north-western hinterland of Elam as well as the ancient seat of civilization in the lowlands; and both the official and the Herodotean name are taken from the hill-country and not from the plains. Hūja reappears in the Greek 'Ouxioi', the Arabic plural Ahwāz, and the New Persian place-name Khūzistān.¹ 'Kissioi' must stand for 'Kassites',² whose rearguard in the Zagros, marching with the south-eastern paraitaka of Media, lived on through the Achaemenian Age to give a rough reception to Antigonus when, after Alexander's death, the Macedonian war-lords were fighting over the division of the Achaemenian Empire's carcass.³ In the absence of any indications to the contrary, we may take it that this Greater Elam, which constituted a single taxation district (the Herodotean District No. 8) on the fiscal map, also constituted, on the political map, a single viceroyalty.

In the South-Eastern Quarter of the Achaemenian Empire, the *Harahvatiš* (written *Harawatiš*; *Graecè* Arakhosia) of the Achaemenian lists is, as we have seen,⁴ the *dahyāuš* whose people Herodotus calls 'Thamanaioi' (signifying 'borderers') in his gazetteer and by their national name 'Paktyes' in his field-state.

Eastward, the Achaemenian Harahvatiš seems to have extended as far as the west bank of the Indus in a region which, in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, was still known as 'the Dāmān' as well as 'the Darajāt'. At least, this seems to be the most convincing interpretation of Herodotus's statements that the city of Kaspattyros and the Paktan country (i.e. Harahvatiš) marched with the northernmost and most warlike of the Indoi, who were sent to collect the gold from the Indian Desert,⁵ and that the city of Kaspattyros and the Paktan country had also been the point of departure from which Scylax of Caryanda and his shipmates had sailed down the Indus, out into the Indian Ocean, and up the Red Sea to an Egyptian port on a voyage of exploration on which they had been dispatched by Darius.⁶ This interpretation of these two statements of Herodotus's is borne out by Eratosthenes' statement⁷ that 'the Arakhōtoi' (i.e. the Viceroyalty of Harahvatiš), as well as the Paropanisadai (i.e. Gādara) to the north of them and the Gedrosians (i.e. Herodotus's Taxation District No. 18) to the south of them, extended eastwards as far as the west bank of the River Indus before Seleucus Nicātor's cession of portions of these provinces to Chandragupta Maurya.

If Herodotus's 'Kaspattyros' is a less accurate Hellenic rendering than Hecataeus's 'Kaspapyros' for this Indus river-port's authentic name, Herzfeld may be right in reconstructing an original Sanskrit name

¹ See Le Strange, G.: *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge 1905, University Press), p. 232, and the present Study, p. 209, n. 3, above.

² It is noteworthy that the two names of the original patrimony of the House of Achaemenes and its Cyran branch in Lūristān and Pusht-i-Kuh—Parsuwaš and Anšan—have both been passed over in the official and in the Herodotean nomenclature alike.

³ This incident has been noticed on p. 210, n. 3, above.

⁴ On pp. 593-4, above.

⁵ See Herodotus, Book III, chap. 102.

⁶ See Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 44.

⁷ Preserved in Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XV, chap. ii, § 9 (C 724).

'Kāśyapa-pura';¹ and, whatever the exact location of this river-port may have been, we may venture to interpret its meaning as 'the Caspians' city', and to see in it the entrepôt between an inland navigation in the Indus Basin and overland caravan routes between the Indus Valley and Eastern Iran via the passes through the Sulaymān Range.

In the early years of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, when English observers were obtaining their first view of the eastern fringes of a then dissolving Afghan Empire, there was a busy seasonal migration through these passes between the Dāmān, along the west bank of the Indus, and both Qandahar² (in what had once been the heart of the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* Harahvatiš) and Kābul (in the former *dahyāuš* Gādāra); and we may guess that, in so conservative a quarter of the *Oikoumenē*, this traffic—in which trade was combined with the seasonal movement of flocks and herds between summer pastures on the Iranian Plateau and winter pastures in the Indus Valley³—had been carried on, year by year, ever since the Achaemenian Age. If the traffic was in truth already active in Darius's day,⁴ this would have been the consideration that prompted 'the Huckster'⁵ to explore the possibility of extending an already flourishing trade-route, on one section of which the goods were already water-borne, from the inland waterways of the Indus system out into the Indian Ocean and round Arabia to the Red Sea ports of the Egyptian province of his empire;⁶ and, if Kaspapyros, wherever its exact site may have been,⁷ was the river-port on which the

¹ See Herzfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

² The place-name 'Qandahar' seems to be neither a survival of the place-name 'Gādāra' nor a derivative from the personal name 'Alexander', but to stand for 'Gondophareia', the city of the Parthian Suren Gondophares (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 471), who was reigning in the first quarter of the first century of the Christian Era (see *ibid.*, pp. 344 and 347).

³ See the descriptions in Elphinstone, M.: *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies*, new ed. (London 1839, Bentley, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 378–88, and vol. ii, pp. 58–59; and Burnes, A.: *Travels into Bokhara* (London 1824, John Murray, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 415–16.

⁴ Tarn, in *op. cit.*, p. 100, n. 3, points out that Darius I obtained ivory from Arachosia according to the inscription from the apadāna at Susa, line 43, and that Darius III Codomannus obtained elephants from it according to Arrian: *Expediitio Alexandri*, Book III, chap. viii, § 6, in the context of § 4.

⁵ Herodotus, Book III, chap. 89, quoted on p. 613, n. 1, above.

⁶ Darius—who, like Peter the Great, had a keen eye for natural resources, communications, commerce, and finance—is likely to have been as much excited as were the British empire-builders in the early nineteenth century of the Christian Era over the prospect of the profits to be made by developing the trade via the Indus waterway between Iran and the Oxus Basin on the one hand and the Indian sub-continent and the Indian Ocean on the other. A notion of the report that will have been submitted to Darius by Scylax may be obtained by reading Alexander Burnes' 'Report of the establishment of an Entrepôt, or Fair, for the Indus Trade', printed as Appendix I to his *Cabool*, 2nd ed. (London 1843, John Murray), on pp. 283–303. In the history of the Achaemenian, as in that of the British, Rāj, military conquest was the sequel to commercial exploration.

⁷ Some light on the probable location of the historic entrepôt named Kaspapyros is thrown by Burnes' discussion, in the report cited just above, of the respective merits of divers alternative possible locations for a projected entrepôt for the Indus trade that was to be established under British auspices. After entering into a comparative consideration of the four entrepôts in the Indus Basin that were currently frequented by the Lohāni Afghan traders—Dera Ismā'il Khan and Dera Ghāzi Khan in the Darajāt (Dāmān) on the west bank of the Indus, Multān near the south-east bank of the Lower Chenab, and Bahawalpur near the south-east bank of the Sutlej, not far above its confluence with the Chenab—and then proceeding also to consider Qalabagh, on the west bank of the Indus, as the northernmost feasible point, and Mithankot, likewise on the

traffic from Gādāra as well as the traffic from Harahvatiš converged,¹ we can see why Hecataeus² called it 'a Gandarian city' and why Herodotus located it in 'the Pactyan country', in spite of its being a Caspian foundation.

Hecataeus³ also describes Kaspapyros as being 'a "shore" or "promontory" (*Graecè* "aktē") of the Scythians', and we have already seen reason⁴ for numbering the *Kaspioi* among the Eurasian Nomad peoples who had broken out of the Steppe and mounted the Iranian Plateau, between the Caspian Sea and the Pamirs, in the eighth or seventh century B.C. While the right wing of these Caspii will have ridden on due west to bequeath their name first to the Caspian Gates and then to the Caspian Sea after they had been brought to a halt in the lower basin of the rivers Aras and Kur against the barriers of the Qarabagh and the Caucasus, the left wing will have swerved leftwards and ridden across Parthava, Haraiva, and Harahvatiš till they were brought to a halt against the barrier of the Sulaymān Mountains.⁵ We shall probably not

west bank just below the confluence between the Indus and the united waters of the five rivers of the Panjab, Burnes opts for Dera Ghāzi Khan.

'It embraces not only the trade of the Punjab and India, of Candahar and Cabool, but of the more remote capitals dependent on them, Herat and Bokhara. . . . From Bombay to Dera Ghazee the water communication is open, and from the Upper Indus the intercourse is equally available. In former times many roads led down upon this town from the west. Time and peace will, in all probability, again open these now forsaken lines; and thus will be concentrated in one point all the desirable means of approach' (op. cit., p. 287).

If ever a fragment of Scylax's report to Darius were to be recovered from the Achaemenian archives at Susa or Persepolis, it would not be surprising to find it anticipating the latter-day English explorer's words.

¹ The itinerary (originally recorded by the surveyors attached to Alexander's expeditionary force) of one route leading from the Caspian Gates to some point on the west bank of the Indus had been preserved in two versions: by Strabo in a couple of passages (*Geographica*, Book XI, chap. viii, § 9 (C 514), and Book XV, chap. viii, § 8 (C 723)) derived from Eratosthenes' work, and by Pliny (*Historia Naturalis*, Book VI, chap. xvi (xxi), §§ 61-62).

This route ran from the Caspian Gates via Hecatompylus in Parthia to Alexandria in Areia (Herat), and thence to Ortospana (Kābul) either direct, over the mountains, through Bactria, or alternatively in a southward loop via Prophthasia in Drangiana and the provincial capital of the Viceroyalty of Arachosia (? Qal'at-i-Gilzai). From Ortospana (Kābul) the route followed the valley of the Kābul River eastwards to the Indus. In both the passages in Strabo's *Geographica*, Ortospana (Kābul) is described as being 'the point of access to the junction of the three roads from Bactria' (*ὁρδὸς πᾶνα ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκ Βάκτρων πρὸς ὁδὸν*), but, of course, this description applies only for a traveller approaching Ortospana (Kābul) by the roundabout southern alternative route, since the direct route through the Bactrian hill-country would have brought the traveller to 'the junction'—i.e. to the twin cities Kāpiša and Kāniš, astride the confluence of the Panjshir and Ghorband tributaries of the Kābul River (see p. 640, with n. 2, below)—on his way to Ortospana.

² As quoted by Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. 'Kaspapyros'.

³ Apud Stephanum.

⁴ On pp. 608-9, above.

⁵ This hypothetical route of the South-Eastern Kaspii in the Völkerwanderung of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. was demonstrably followed by their fellow Sakā the Tūrā in the Völkerwanderung of the second century B.C. In the *Avesta* the Tūrā make their appearance, in company with the Airyā (? Alanoi), Sairimā (Sarmatai), Sāinavās (? Sannoi) and Dahā (Dahai), among the Iranian Nomad peoples on the Central Asian Steppe who gave Zarathustra a good reception when he made his *hijrah* (see Nyberg, op. cit., pp. 237, 249-51, and 297). A district of Khwārizm still bore the name Tūr in the Sasanian Age (see *ibid.*, p. 251). The emergence, after the beginning of the Christian Era, of the legendary Turan patriarch Fryāna's name in the Hellenized form 'Phlianos' in the Hellenic city-state of Olbia on the Black Sea coast of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe indicates that one detachment of the Tūrā had accompanied the Sarmatians in their westward trek north of the Caspian Sea (see *ibid.*, pp. 237 and 251). Another detachment of Tūrā, however, must have mounted the

be far wrong if we locate these Eastern Kaspioi here, between the Eastern Paktyes in the Hilmand Basin to the west of them and the middle course of the River Indus to the east.¹

In the Herodotean field-state—they do not figure in the gazetteer—the Eastern Kaspioi are mentioned immediately after the Gandarioi and the Dadikai, who, in the gazetteer, figure in Taxation District No. 7, and the Caspians' commander is the brother of the commander of the Dadico-Gandarian brigade. On the other hand the Kaspioi are also associated with the Paktyes by being paraded, like these, in the *sisyryna*—the Greek name for the sheepskin or felt top-coat, *Pactyicè* 'pustīn', which in the early nineteenth century was still a distinctive feature in the national costume of the Western Afghans, and which Elphinstone² describes as

'a large cloak of well-tanned sheep-skin with the wool inside, or of soft and pliant grey felt. This garment is worn loose over the shoulders, with the sleeves hanging down, and reaches to the ankles.'

If the reader feels moved to ask how an ex-Central Asian people who had founded a city in the Indus Basin could have persisted, in their torrid new abode, in suffocating themselves under this ancestral article of arctic dress, the writer has a twofold rejoinder to make. He can point out that the Circassian refugees from the North-Western Caucasus who were settled by the Ottoman Government in Transjordan in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era showed a comparable conservatism in clinging to their ancestral costume; and he can quote Elphinstone's authority for the fact that, in the Dāmān in the same century, the *sisyryna* was still part of the Eastern Afghans' winter dress.

'Though their summer dress is nearly the same as that of India . . . and . . . even in winter they wear turbans, . . . at that season they also wear brown and grey woollen great coats and posteens.'³

On this showing, Herodotus's parade of the Eastern Kaspioi in *sisyrynai* is not incompatible with a location which would allow them to have been the founders of the river-port of Kaspā-pyros in the tropical lowlands of the Middle Indus Basin.

Iranian Plateau and then wheeled south-east; for in the 'Abbasid Age the name Tūrān was borne by a canton in Eastern Baluchistan in the neighbourhood of the latter-day Khanate of Qal'at (see Le Strange, *op. cit.*, pp. 331-2), and in the twentieth century of the Christian Era a community of Tūris was still to be found alive among the Sulaymān Mountains in the upper valley of the Kurram River, immediately to the south of the Kābul Valley (Gādāra). These Tūris were said to have formerly been pastoral nomads who migrated twice a year between summer pastures in the Kurram Valley and winter pastures round Qalabagh on the west bank of the Indus north of the Salt Range (see Pennell, T. L.: *Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier* (London 1912, Seeley Service), pp. 55-56). On their way from the Central Asian Steppe to the eastern edge of the Iranian Plateau, the Tūrā had bequeathed their national legend to a school of epic poetry that was to arise in their wake in the former Achaemenian *dahyāuš* Zrāka, on which the name Seistan was stamped by the hoof of the Saka horse *en route* (see V. v. 600-2).

¹ If W. H. Schoff, in his edition of *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (London 1912, Longmans Green), p. 189, is right in deriving the latter-day name 'Kashmir' from an original Sanscrit compound 'Kāsyapa-mata' meaning 'home of the Kāsyapa', we may infer that another detachment of the Eastern Kaspioi lodged itself in Kashmir, and that the name of a forgotten people was posthumously interpreted as the name of a legendary pre-Gautaman Buddha in the hagiography of the Mahāyāna.

² In *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 313.

³ Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 59.

While it thus seems possible that Darius's Harahvatiš may have extended eastward as far as the west bank of the River Indus, it is certain that, on the political map, the Viceroyalty of Harahvatiš in the later years of Darius I's reign extended westward to include *Zrāka*¹ in the latter-day Seistan, and that, on the fiscal map, the taxation district in which Harahvatiš was included (the Herodotean District No. 14) extended south-westward as far as the north-east shore of the Persian Gulf, to include the *Asagartiyā* (Sagartioi) in Kirmān, the *Yautiyā* (Outioi) in North-Eastern Lāristān, the *Mačiyā* (Mykoi) in South-western Lāristān, along the seaboard,² and the Median deportees ('the *déracinés*') on the inshore islands.³

On the evidence, which we have already noticed,⁴ of variations in the order of the names on the official lists, we can conclude that *Zrāka* must have been transferred from the Viceroyalty of Parthava to the Viceroyalty of Harahvatiš between the dates of composition of 'DPe' and 'DZd', and we can discern two considerations, either or both of which may have moved Darius to make this change in the political map. On the one hand it would have the effect of diminishing the territory and population of a viceroyalty whose leading people had demonstrated its hostility to the Ariaramnan branch of the House of Achaemenes in 522-521 B.C., when the Parthians, as well as the Hyrcanians, had risen against their viceroy, Darius's father Hystaspes. In the second place, this transfer would widen the corridor between the loyal Viceroyalty of Harahvatiš and those dissident Persian tribes—the South-Eastern *Asagartiyā* in Kirmān and the South-Eastern *Yautiyā* and *Mačiyā* in Lāristān—whom Darius had attached to Harahvatiš for fiscal purposes after having degraded them to the ranks of his tax-paying subjects from their previously privileged status as constituent clans of the imperial people.

The *South-Eastern Asagartiyā* (Sagartioi) are described in the Herodotean field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force⁵ as being a still culturally conservative Nomad people⁶ who fought only as cavalry and whose master weapon was the lasso. Their language was Persian, and in 480 B.C. they were attached to the Persian infantry in Xerxes' army, but their equipment was betwixt and between the Persian and the Pactyan; and this last piece of Herodotean information suggests that these Sagartians' country must have been Kirmān (O.P. Karmāna; *Latinè* Carmania), which lay immediately to the north-east of Lāristān and Fars,⁷ while it faced *Zrāka* and Harahvatiš across the south-eastern end of the Central Desert of Iran. In the twentieth century of the Christian Era a people who made their livelihood by stock-breeding could not have

¹ See p. 589, with n. 3, above.

² See p. 622, above. In the field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force the Outioi and Mykoi are paraded in Pactyan equipment, but the Outian and Mykan contingents are brigaded with one another under a separate command (see Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 68).

³ See pp. 602 and 623, above.

⁴ On p. 589, above.

⁵ In Book VII, chap. 85.

⁶ They still had a prejudice against metal weapons, except for poignards ('enkheiridia').

⁷ According to Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XV, chap. ii, § 8 (C 723), Carmania marched with the south-eastern paraitaka of Media: i.e. Carmania included the latter-day canton of Yazd, as is expressly stated by Ptolemy: *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. vi, § 2. 'Karmāna is mentioned in DSf, § 35, as a source of gold for Darius's palace at Susa.'—Professor Roland G. Kent.

won a living off a landscape that had come to be a desert punctuated at rare intervals with oases intensively cultivated by irrigation. This desert, however, was at least partly man-made. As recently as the 'Abbasid Age the forests with which the mountains of Kirmān had originally been clothed had not yet all been cut down,¹ and in an earlier age, when the forests were still intact, Kirmān seems likely to have had sufficient rainfall to keep large tracts of the country fit to serve as pasture-land, and its pastoral Sagartian occupants will have been proportionately numerous, prosperous, and powerful.

Though these south-eastern, unlike the north-western, Asagartiyā are not mentioned by name in Darius's inscription on the cliff at Behistan as having taken part in the disorders of 522–521 B.C., the fact that their name is mentioned in only one of the six official lists of *dahyāva*² suggests that they too were in disgrace. We may infer that they had been one of the Persian clans that had taken up arms against Darius under Vahyazdāta's leadership; and, since the force which Vahyazdāta detached to invade Gādāra could hardly have covered the immense distances that it did cover unless it had been mounted, we may guess that the Sagartian horse were the backbone of it.

As for the *Yautiyā*, who were Vahyazdāta's own clan, the measure of their disgrace might be gauged from the fact that their name was passed over in all the official lists; and the reason for this official ostracism was revealed in the creditably frank account of Vahyazdāta's movement which Darius had made public in his Behistan record.³ The truth—and Darius does not attempt here to conceal it—was that Vahyazdāta's challenge to Darius's pretensions was by far the most dangerous of all the crises with which this Ariaramnan pretender to a Cyran imperial crown found himself confronted in that terrible year; for, while the Armenians may have been Darius's most resolute, and the Medes his most powerful, adversaries on a strictly military reckoning, Vahyazdāta was politically by far the most formidable of all Darius's competitors. The Elamites, Margians, Thatagu[? d or v]iyā and Sakā were fighting simply for the recovery of their local independence, while the Babylonians (without their former subjects' goodwill) and the Medes (with their former subjects' active support) were fighting for the re-establishment of their pre-Cyran empires; but none of these non-Persian opponents of Darius's aspired, as Darius himself aspired, to reign without a peer over the whole *Oikoumenē* as the acknowledged legitimate successor of the universal monarch Cyrus II. Vahyazdāta alone challenged Darius in terms of Darius's own pretensions.

Vahyazdāta of Tāravā, like Darius, was a Persian; and so, for that matter, had been Martiya of Kuganakā; but Martiya had aimed at nothing more ambitious than to put himself at the head of a nationalist movement in Elam, and he had accordingly proclaimed himself to be a scion of the Elamite royal family.⁴ In sharp contrast to the modesty of

¹ See, for example, Le Strange, *op. cit.*, pp. 315 and 316.

² In 'DPe'.

³ See 'DB', §§ 40–48.

⁴ See 'DP', §§ 22–23. Martiya's bid for the crown of Elam suggests that he may have been a Persian whose native city, Kuganakā, lay, not in Pārsa (Fars), but in Parsuwaš (Lūristān).

Martiya's pretensions, Vahyazdāta had the audacity to impersonate Cyrus II's son Smerdis himself, whose claim to the imperial throne, were he really still alive, was incontestably paramount over the claim of a usurper descended from the Ariaramnan branch of the Achae-menidae. Vahyazdāta's *pronunciamiento* won the support, not only of his own Yautiyā clansmen, but of a strong enough faction in Pārsa at large, including at least some of the garrison of the imperial palace there, to enable him to establish himself in Pārsa as king; and this *fait accompli* was a dire blow to Darius's cause, considering that Pārsa had been the appanage, not of Cyrus the great-grandfather of the Smerdis whom Vahyazdāta was impersonating, but of Darius's great-grandfather Ariaramnes.

Moreover, Vahyazdāta did not make the mistake of resting on his oars. Like Darius, he promptly sought to vindicate his pretension to legitimacy by vigorously taking the offensive against all who ventured to contest it; and, in his military operations for taking possession of Cyrus II's patrimony, he gave proof of high strategic ability. He made it his first objective to occupy the basin of the Kābul River in Gādāra—a node of strategic routes¹ where, once entrenched, he would have been able at once to cut the communications between Darius's two principal supporters the viceroys of Harahvatiš and Bākhtriš, to establish contact between his own forces and the insurgents in the Panjab (Thataguš),² and perhaps to rekindle the flames of revolt in the Viceroy of Bactria's disaffected canton Marguš, which marched with the disaffected cantons Parthava and Varkāna in Darius's father Hystaspes' viceroyalty of Parthia. The stakes for which Vahyazdāta was playing when he detached a force to occupy the Kābul Basin were nothing less than the establishment of his rule over the whole South-East and whole North-East of the Achaemenian Empire; and, if once this had been achieved, the provinces in the Indus Valley would inevitably also have fallen into his lap. If Vahyazdāta's eastern plan of campaign had succeeded, Darius's cause would have been lost, and Vahyazdāta could have afforded to wait for the news of Darius's death before attempting to settle accounts with the would-be restorer of the Median Empire, Fravartiš.

Vahyazdāta did come within an ace of success, for the Viceroy of Harahvatiš, Vivāna, did not succeed in making contact with Vahyazdāta's expeditionary force until this had reached the pair of twin cities³

¹ See p. 635, n. 1, above.

² Thataguš was in revolt, on the testimony of 'DB', § 21.

³ Kāpišakāniš (written as a single word, like Budapest, without the use of the sign for dividing words that was possessed by the Old Persian script) is the name given to this pair of cities in 'DB', § 45. This is manifestly identical with the Kapisa-Alexandria of the post-Alexandrine Hellenic geographers (see Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, pp. 96-98, 139-40, and 460-2, together with map 3 at the end of the book). Darius has here given us the pre-Hellenic name of the west-bank twin of the east-bank city of Kāpiša. Kāniš will have occupied the site which, in latter-day Pakhtu parlance, was called 'begram', 'the city', *par excellence* (see *ibid.*, p. 462). This pair of cities attained the zenith of its importance in the Kushan Age. Kujula, the founder of the Kushan Empire (see *ibid.*, p. 338), will have taken his surname Kadphises to commemorate his acquisition of a Kāpiša which had lost none of its strategic importance during the five and a half centuries that had passed since Vahyazdāta's cause had been lost, and Darius's won, in a battle at this key point in 522-521 B.C. Kujula Kadphises' second successor

astride the confluence of the Panjshir and Ghorband tributaries of the Kābul River, where the road running north-eastward from the *dahyāuš* of Harahvatiš in the Hilmand Basin via Ghaznah and Kābul (*Graecè* Kôphên, *Sinicè* Ki-pin) divided into three branches¹ threading their way through the Hindu Kush by as many different passes—one road making north-eastwards for the upper valley of the Oxus,² while the other two roads both led by diverse routes to Balkh, the capital of the Viceroyalty of Bactria. Even after Vahyazdāta's expeditionary force had been headed back by Vivāna's pursuing column out of Gādāra into Harahvatiš, the invaders turned and fought a second battle, this time on Arachosian soil, at Gandutava; and, after that, they marched on the capital of the Arachosian viceroyalty, Aršādā,³ itself, and had arrived there before Vivāna was able to catch up with them again and to take them prisoners.

If any man other than Darius himself could claim to have won Cyrus II's imperial crown for the Ariaramnan branch of the Achaemenidae, that man was Vivāna; and Darius showed his recognition of the loyalty of the Eastern Paktyes and their viceroy in the year of his ordeal by extending this viceroyalty's area to include not only Zrāka but also the three disaffected Persian cantons in Kirmān and Lāristān—Asagarta, the Yautiyā, and Maka—and even the Median deportees who had been marooned on the islands in the Persian Gulf off the Maka coast.⁴ Yet it could have been said of the Paktyes who had fought so effectively for Darius in 522–521 B.C., as aptly as it actually was said of the Croats who fought for Francis Joseph in A.D. 1848–9, that the loyalists received from the Emperor as their reward what the rebels received as their punishment;⁵ for the enlargement of the viceroyalty of Harahvatiš was accompanied by an assessment of the corresponding taxation district—No. 14 in the Herodotean gazetteer—at the figure of 600 talents. The exorbitancy of this assessment on a district consisting of little else than steppes, mountains, and deserts is indicated by a comparison with the figure of 700 talents which was Darius's assessment on Egypt. As far as the three disgraced Persian clans and the deported Median offenders were concerned, this assessment was, no doubt, intended to be penal; but, in giving us the aggregate figure, Herodotus leaves us in the dark as to the quota which the loyal Harahvatiš and Zrāka had the honour to be invited to contribute.

As for the *Mačiyā* (Mykoi), their name cannot have been associated

Kanishka's name will have commemorated the future emperor's birth or upbringing in a Kānīš which will have reverted by his day to its pre-Hellenic appellation. Pliny's statement, in his *Historia Naturalis*, Book VI, chap. xxiii (xxv), § 92, that Kāpiša (*Latine* Capisa) had been destroyed by Cyrus I indicates that it was he who had annexed the Kābul Basin (Gādāra) to the Achaemenian Empire.

¹ See the passage of Strabo's *Geographica* cited on p. 635, n. 1, above.

² An account of Captain John Wood's passage of this Pass of Khawak, from the Oxus Basin into the Panjshir Valley, in April 1838, will be found in his *A Journey to the Sources of the Oxus*, new ed. (London 1872, John Murray), pp. 272–5.

³ The Elamite text of 'DB', § 47, informs us that Aršādā was the seat of Vivāna's administration. Tarn, in *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, pp. 94 and 470, locates it in the neighbourhood of the latter-day Qal'at-i-Ghilzai on the River Tarnak, north-east of Qandahar.

⁴ See Herodotus, Book III, chap. 93, and the present Annex, pp. 602 and 623, above.

⁵ See V. v. 293, n. 2, and p. 114, with n. 6, above.

in Ariaramnan Achaemenid minds with such unpleasant memories as the names of the Yautiyā and the Asagartiyā, considering that either they themselves or their country, Maka, are mentioned in every one of the six official lists. At the same time, the Mačiyā cannot have emerged from the ordeal of 522–521 B.C. with an altogether clean bill of political health, or they would not have been sentenced to share with the Yautiyā and Asagartiyā the punishment of being degraded to the status of tax-paying subjects.

The two cantons Yautiyā (Outioi) and Maka (Mykoi) can both be located approximately. Vahyazdāta's native city Tāravā¹ had bequeathed its name to a latter-day Tārum on the eastern edge of Lāristān. The mountain (*kaufa*) called Parga, where he made his last stand,² must be one or other of the twin cities Burk, standing on a hillock like a camel's hump, and Furg, with its castle on a hill, which were still in existence in the 'Abbasid Age.³ Maka (Mykoi) was commemorated in the 'Abbasid Age in the place-name Māhān on the road running north-westward from the port of Huzū, on the Lārī coast opposite Qays Island, to Laghir *en route* for Shīrāz.⁴ In the twentieth century of the Christian Era the name still survived on the Lārī coast itself at Mughan, near the mouth of the Darghaband River, and at Maghu or Mughu farther east, near the Lārī coast's southernmost point.

The islands on which the Median deportees were marooned were presumably those strung along the same coast, of which Kishm was the largest and Hormuz the only one that was eventually to become a famous name. In settling these disaffected Medes here, Darius was, no doubt, consciously achieving two purposes simultaneously. He was interning dangerous ex-rebels in a chain of prisons, provided for him by Nature, where they would be impotent to do any more mischief to his régime; and, in the act, he was confirming the hold of his empire upon one of its frontages on the Indian Ocean by planting penal settlements on islands that were too uninviting to attract voluntary colonists.⁵ The choice of these islands as the places of internment for irreconcilable rebels was all of a piece with the opening up of a continuous water-route from the Indus-port Kaspapyros to the head of the Red Sea, and with the reopening of the canal from the head of the Red Sea to the Mediterranean via the Nile. These three measures must have been so many parts of a comprehensive plan for securing the command of the Indian Ocean and thereby obtaining a water-route round Arabia to supplement

¹ 'DP', § 40.

² 'DP', § 42.

³ See Le Strange, *op. cit.*, p. 292. 'The *Fārs Nāmah* writes the name Purk or Purg' [compare the Greek word 'pyrgos'—A.J.T.] 'and says that its castle was impregnable, being built of stone and very large.'

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 257, n. 1.

⁵ Darius's Median deportees were not the only *déracinés* to be marooned on these islands. For example, Megabyzus, the Persian general who had reconquered Egypt for the Achaemenian Empire after the insurrection led by Inarôs, was exiled by Artaxerxes I to the Persian Gulf, where he was interned in a place called Cyrtae (see Ctesias: *Persica*, Books XIV–XVII, § 71 (40) in J. Gilmore's edition (London 1888, Macmillan), p. 154). In this context, Ctesias uses the same word as Herodotus: '*déraciné*' (*Graecé* 'anáspastos'). The survivors of the sack of Miletus in 494 B.C. were deported, not to the islands, but to the mouth of the River Tigris on the gulf coast of Babylonia (Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 20).

the long and devious land-route between the eastern and western extremities of Darius's empire.¹

The two peoples—*Southern Parikanioi* and *Asiatic Ethiopians*—who, in the Herodotean gazetteer, together constitute Taxation District No. 17, do not either of them figure in any of the official lists, and they are not associated with one another in the Herodotean field-state. The Parikanioi are paraded here in Pactyan equipment under a separate command of their own;² the Asiatic Ethiopians are brigaded with the Indoi.³ The survival of the name 'pairikās' ('heathen')⁴ in the place-name Fārghān 60 kilometres to the east of Tārum and 120 kilometres to the north of Bandar 'Abbās, under the shadow of a Mount Furghun, was evidence, as we have already noticed,⁵ that these Southern Parikanioi were the Outians' (Yautiyā's) immediate neighbours towards the east. Their country will have been the south-eastern extremity of Kirmān and the western part of Makrān; and the eastern part of Makrān, between the Southern Parikanioi and Sind, will have been the country of 'the Asiatic Ethiopians'. We may presume that this district was annexed by Darius at or after the date of his annexation of Sind, as part of his policy of giving his empire a frontage on the Indian Ocean. While he made it a separate administrative unit for fiscal purposes, he will have attached it for political purposes either to the Viceroyalty of Harahvatiš or to Hīduš. In A.D. 1952 the first of these two possibilities seemed the more likely on considerations of geographical convenience, which was all that a historian then had to go upon, in the absence of documentary evidence on the point.

In the South-Eastern Quarter of the Achaemenian Empire the predominant culture was the Pactyan, to judge from the adoption of the Pactyans' equipment by their neighbours and administrative associates the Kaspioi, Outioi, Mykoi, and Parikanioi. On the same test we shall conclude that the Bactrian culture was predominant in the North-East, and that this culture was an offshoot of the Median; for the Bactrians are paraded in a sub-Median equipment,⁶ and this Bactrian equipment

¹ In this enterprising and far-sighted combination of measures, Darius showed a more lively sense of the importance of sea-power in the Indian Ocean for an empire strung out athwart the Middle Eastern land-bridge than was shown in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era by the 'Osmanlis when they gave way in the Indian Ocean to the Portuguese. The counterpart, in the Mediterranean, of the voyage of exploration into the Indian Ocean on which Scylax of Caryanda was sent by Darius was the commission given by him to Dēmocédēs of Crētōn to conduct a squadron on a corresponding voyage of exploration into Dēmocédēs' own native waters. This Mediterranean expedition of Darius's was abortive (see Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 135–8), but it is further evidence of Darius's sea-mindedness; and the story of Sataspes' attempt to circumnavigate Africa from the Mediterranean coast of Egypt via the Straits of Gibraltar (see Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 43) shows—though this enterprise, too, ended in failure—that Darius had bequeathed his sea-sense to his son and successor Xerxes.

² Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 68.

⁴ See p. 595, above.

³ Ibid., chap. 70.

⁵ On p. 617, above.

⁶ See Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 64. According to Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 61, the three distinctive features of the Median equipment were a soft felt cap, trousers, a dagger suspended from a belt and worn on the right thigh, and 'the great bow'. This description exactly corresponds to an equipment portrayed on the Achaemenian bas-reliefs as being worn by one of the two imperial peoples, and from this it follows that the other imperial people's equipment, as portrayed on the bas-reliefs—namely a taka (*Gallicé* toque) instead of a soft tiara ('Phrygian cap'), and an ample robe instead of a riding coat and trousers—must be the national dress of the Persians. Herodotus tells us

is worn by the Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, and Dadicae, while the Areioi are equipped partly Bactrian fashion and partly Median fashion.¹

When we go on to compare the grouping of the north-eastern peoples in viceroyalties and taxation districts with their grouping in military commands, we find that in the North-East, as in the South-East, the military and civilian organizations do not coincide. For example, the inhabitants of Hyrcania (*Varkāna*), who in the Achaemenian Age were, for civil administrative purposes, so subordinate an element in the Viceroyalty and Taxation District of Parthia (*Parthava*) that their name is not mentioned either in the official lists or in the Herodotean gazetteer, though it figures in Darius's narrative of the events of 522-521 B.C., are paraded in the field-state under a separate command and in Median equipment,² in contrast to the Bactrian equipment of the Parthians; and the Sogdians likewise appear here under a separate command, though in every one of the six official lists they are associated with the Bactrians. Conversely the *Sakā Haumavargā* of *Farghānah* are brigaded with the Bactrians in the field-state, though *Farghānah* and *Bactria* were not contiguous (*Sogdiana* lay in between), and though the *Sakā Haumavargā*, who were allies of the Achaemenian Empire, differed in status from the Bactrians, who were tax-paying subjects. The Chorasmians (*Hvārazmiyā*), again, are brigaded with the Parthians, though *Khvārizm* and *Parthia* were insulated from one another territorially by the *Qāra Qum* Desert and by the *Dahā* in *Transcaspia*.

The civil, as well as the military, administrative geography of the North-East Quarter is fairly clear. The Viceroyalty of *Parthava* (*Parthia*)—with which the Herodotean Taxation District No. 16 will have been coextensive—touched the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea in *Varkāna* (*Hyrcania*). To the north it included *Hvārazmiš* (alias *Hvārazmiy*; *Latinè* Chorasmia, *Arabicè* *Khvārizm*), along the lower course of the River Oxus (*Amu Darya*); and the Viceroyalty of *Parthava* must therefore also have included the *Dahā*, whose name—though it is mentioned in the Achaemenian official lists only in 'XPh' was still extant in the 'Abbasid Age in *Dihistan*³ at the western end of *Transcaspia*. *Parthava* (*Parthia*) Proper was approximately coterminous with the latter-day provinces of Western *Khurāsān* and *Kuhistan*; and the viceroyalty extended, east of that, to include *Haraiva* (*Graecè* the *Areioi*, who had bequeathed their name to the city of *Herat*), but not

in Book VII, chaps. 61-62, that, on active service at any rate, the Persians wore the more practical Median dress, and that the *Kissioi* (? i.e. the Persian troops from *Parsuwaš*) did likewise, except for retaining their native headgear the mitre (perhaps this was a *taka* with a low crown). The Bactrians were not armed with the Median 'great bow', but they did wear the Median cap (see *ibid.*, chap. 64). This cap was also worn by all the Eurasian Nomad peoples, from the *Sakā Haumavargā* in *Farghānah* to the Scyths on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, except for the 'Pointed-Hood' *Massagetae*; and we may guess that, whatever may have been the origin of the cap, the wearing of trousers had been taken over by the Medes from the Nomads when they were learning from them the art of riding a war-horse instead of driving him in a chariot.

¹ See Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 66. The *Areioi* are armed with the Median 'great bow', not with the Bactrian 'reed bow', but are equipped like the Bactrians in other respects.

² Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 62.

³ See Le Strange, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-81.

Mārguš (Merv), which belonged to the viceroyalty of Bactria,¹ and *a fortiori* not Suguda (Sogdiana), whatever Herodotus may say.² Finally, on the south-east, the Viceroyalty of Parthava had, as we have seen,³ included Zrāka, on the north-east shore of the Hamun-i-Hilmand, before the transfer of Zrāka to the Viceroyalty of Harahvatiš.

The Viceroyalty of *Bākhtriš* (Bactria)—with which the Herodotean Taxation District No. 12 will have been coextensive—included Bākhtriš Proper and *Suguda* (alias Sugda; the Sogdoi). Bākhtriš Proper, which had bequeathed its name to the city of Balkh, lay between the south bank of the River Oxus (Amu Darya) in the middle section of its course and the northern flank of the Hindu Kush. Suguda (Sogdiana) stretched north-eastwards from the north bank of the Oxus, opposite Bactria, to the south bank of the southern elbow of the River Jaxartes (Sir Darya), where Suguda marched with the Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā's country in Farghānah.⁴ The heart of Sogdiana was the valley of 'the golden river' whose Old Persian name—translated into Greek as 'polytimētos', 'the precious', by the post-Alexandrine Hellenic geographers—had survived, down to the time of writing, as the Zarafshan on whose banks stood the latter-day cities of Samarqand and Bukhārā.

The *Sakā Haumavargā* (Sakai Amyrgioi)⁵ adjoining Suguda in Farghānah⁶ were under the Viceroy of Bactria's supervision, to judge by the fact that they are brigaded with the Bactrians both in Herodotus's field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force and in Arrian's field-state of the army assembled by Darius Codomannus at Gaugamela in 331 B.C.;⁷ but they were the Achaemenian Empire's allies, not its subjects,⁸ and

¹ See 'DB', § 38.

² See pp. 595–6, above.

³ On pp. 589 and 637, above.

⁴ These boundaries are given, on the authority of Eratosthenes, by Strabo in his *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. viii, § 8 (C 514).

⁵ This 'Amyrgioi', to which the Iranian compound epithet 'Hauma-vargā' has been contracted in its rendering into Greek, may be compared with 'Aspourgianoī'—a people located by Strabo (*Geographica*, Book XI, chap. ii, § 11 (C 495), and Book XII, chap. iii, § 29 (C 556)) on the north-east coast of the Black Sea, at the mouth of the River Kuban, whose name, as it appears in Greek, presumably represents an Iranian 'Aspavargā'. If the Old Persian root *vargā-* means 'pressing out' or 'drinking' (see the note by Professor R. G. Kent on p. 587, above), 'Aspavargā' would be a label for a Eurasian Nomad people who milked mares or who drank qumiz. On either of these two conjectural interpretations, 'Aspavargā' and 'Haumavargā' would be complementary terms by which the Sakā would be classified according to the difference of the source from which they extracted their indispensable intoxicant. While the Sakā Aspavargā would be continuing to extract it from mare's milk, the Sakā Haumavargā would have learnt to extract it from a plant growing in the Central Asian highlands into which they had been driven by the pressure of more powerful hordes on the steppes.

See further Rostovtzeff, M.: *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford 1922, Clarendon Press) for the Aspourgianoī (pp. 152 and 160) and for Aspourgos, son of Asandrokhos, who became king of the Kingdom of the Cimmerian Bosphorus towards the end of the last century B.C. (pp. 152–3, 156, 166).

⁶ Sogdiana was bounded on the east by the farther bank of the Jaxartes (i.e. the north-western bank above the southern elbow) as far as the river's sources, according to Ptolemy: *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. xii, § 1.

⁷ See Arrian: *Expedition Alexandri*, Book III, chap. viii, § 3.

⁸ Bessus, the viceroy of Bactria, was in command of 'the Indoi who were next-door neighbours of the Bactrians', besides commanding the Bactrians themselves and the Sogdians. 'Brigaded with Bessus's command were the Sakai—one of the Asiatic Scythian peoples—but, unlike the other three peoples, these Sakai were not subjects of Bessus's, but were serving because they were Darius's Allies' (Arrian, *ibid.*). According to Ctesias, Books X–XI, § 38 (7) in J. Gilmore's edition (London 1888, Macmillan), pp. 135–6, this alliance had been contracted with the Sakā Haumavargā (Sakai Amyrgioi) by Cyrus II.

this status is perhaps described in the name 'Aiglai' by which Herodotus refers to them without recognizing who these 'Aiglai' were; for Herodotus's word 'Aiglai' recurs in Ptolemy's 'Augaloi'¹ and perhaps also in the 'Augasioi' whose name was found by Stephanus in his text of Strabo's *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. viii, § 8 (C 513), where the reading had subsequently come to be 'Attasioi' in the text that had reached the hands of Modern Western scholars. It had been conjectured by Tomaschek that these were three independent attempts to reproduce in Greek an Iranian word 'aogazdáo', which would have been a derivative of the Avestan word 'aogañh', meaning 'strength',² and which might therefore have been coined to designate 'reinforcements', 'auxiliaries', 'allies'. The location of Ptolemy's 'Augaloi', as well as their name, would fit the Achaemenian Empire's Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā allies in Farghānah; for Ptolemy places them 'below' (i.e. south of) the Iatioi (i.e. the Jāts, *alias* Massagetae, *alias* 'Pointed-Hood Sakā') and the Takhoroi (i.e. Tokharoi); and he places these Iatioi and Takhoroi on the northern section of the Jaxartes (i.e. around and down stream from Tashkend).³

As for the *Sakā Tigrakhaudā* (the Pointed-Hood Sakā), whom Herodotus knows by their national name as Massagetae, they were presumably neighbours of the Sakā Haumavargā, since in the official lists 'DB' and 'DPe' the Sakā are mentioned simply as such, without any attempt to draw the distinction between two different kinds of Sakā that is drawn in all four later lists. According to Herodotus⁴ the Massagetae marched with the Achaemenian Empire along the Oxus at the time when Cyrus II made his disastrously unsuccessful attempt to conquer them. Herodotus's description⁵ of the marshes and lagoons in which all branches of 'the Araxes' lose themselves, except for one solitary branch that finds its way to the Caspian Sea, shows that 'Araxes' must mean 'Oxus' in this context; and his description of the denizens of these marshes⁶ corresponds to the label by which, in 'DZd', 'the Sakā of the Marshes' are distinguished from 'the Sakā of the Plains'. There is, however, no evidence that either Herodotus's 'marshmen' or Darius's 'Sakā of the Marshes' are to be identified with the 'Water Sakā'—'Apa Sakā', *Graecè* 'Apasiakai'—whom Polybius⁷ describes as a mounted Nomad people, living between the rivers Oxus and Don, who have to cross the Oxus in order to raid Hyrcania.

¹ Ptolemy: *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. xii, § 4.

² Professor R. G. Kent comments: 'It is very hazardous to see in Greek Aiglai, Augasioi, Augaloi a Grecizing of Avestan aogaz-da—(so properly transcribed), meaning 'strength-giving or -making' (roots dō- and dhē- are phonetically merged into one, dā-, in Iranian). The compound does not actually occur in the *Avesta*, but its form would be certain. If you cite the Avestan word for strength, it should be aogah- (from auges-), which is more perspicuous. The use of ñh for Avestan s > h between vowels is no longer current, as it develops only in certain intervocalic positions, while -h- is its phonetic antecedent even there. In the Greek words the Ai- and the Au- are difficult to equate, even as corrupt borrowings: unless there is some popular etymology to a more familiar word, or to something that seems to make meaning.'

³ These locations for the Sakā Haumavargā, the Sakā Tigrakhaudā, and the Tokharoi are evidently those which they had occupied at the moment when the Tokharoi (*alias* Yuechi) had just been pushed westward out of the country of the Issedones (Wusun).

⁴ See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 201.

⁵ See *ibid.*, chap. 202.

⁶ In loc. cit. Cp. Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. viii, § 7 (C 513).

⁷ See Polybius, Book X, chap. 48.

These Apasiakai are located in what would appear to be the same position—along the Oxus west of Bactria—by Eratosthenes, according to Strabo, if we accept Tarn's emendation of the passage;¹ and here the Apasiakai are associated with the Massagetae. Ptolemy brings the Massagetae south of the Oxus, into Margianê (Marguš).² Darius tells us³ that, in the campaign in which he re-subjected the insurgent Sakā whose prince was Skunkha, he had to cross the sea. We know, from the evidence of the head-dress worn by Skunkha on the Behistan bas-relief, that Skunkha's Sakā were 'the Pointed-Hoods' and not 'the Hauma-(?) drinkers'; and, since Herodotus's and Eratosthenes' location of the Massagetae somewhere along the right bank of the Oxus suggests that the sea which Darius had to cross in order to get at them must have been an arm of the Sea of Aral, we can perhaps locate the south-eastern borders of 'the Pointed-Hood Sakā', *alias* Massagetae, as adjoining the Oxus from a point below the western frontiers of Bactria and Sogdiana to some point as far north-west as the south-eastern extremity of Choras-mia, and their western borders as adjoining the Sea of Aral; but we do not know how far this great confederacy of Nomad peoples extended northwards into the heart of the Eurasian Steppe, or at what point on the course of the Jaxartes, to the north and north-west of the river's southern elbow, they marched with the Sakā Haumavargā. We can, though, be sure that, in addition to the Apa Sakā on the Middle Oxus and the marshmen in the Oxus Delta, there were other Massagetan peoples who, like the Sakā Haumavargā, were 'Sakā of the Plains' in fact, whether or not this latter label is used in 'DZd' to designate the Sakā Haumavargā exclusively.⁴

A link between the North-East Quarter of the Achaemenian Empire and its dominions in the Indus Basin was constituted by the *dahyāuš* which is called *Gādāra* in the Old Persian version, and *Pa-ar-ū-pa-ra-e-*

¹ See Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. viii, § 8 (C 513), as amended by Tarn in *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, p. 91, n. 3, to read: 'And Eratosthenes says that the Apasiakai (*sic*, instead of 'the Arachōtoi') adjoin the Bactrians on the west along the Oxus.'

² See *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. x, § 2.

³ In 'DB', in the tantalizingly mutilated § 74.

⁴ If the Achaemenian imperial authorities found some difficulty in hitting upon labels or nicknames to distinguish 'the Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā' who were their allies from 'the Pointed-Hood Sakā' who were at least nominally their subjects, it is not surprising to find the Hellenic geographers confounding the two kinds of Sakā with one another. After accurately distinguishing 'the Heathen' ('Parikanioi') from 'the Pointed-Hoods' ('Orthokorybantioi') in his gazetteer without realizing that these two outlandish names that he is cramming into one of his four Median taxation districts have anything to do with the Sakā (see pp. 594-5, above), Herodotus falls, in his field-state (Book VII, chap. 64), into the blunder of identifying the Sakā who wear stiff pointed hoods with the Sakā whom the Persians call 'Amyrgioi' (i.e. 'Haumavargā'). On the other hand, Strabo is not conclusively convicted of being guilty of the same blunder when he states that Spitamenes, when Alexander had made Bactria and Sogdiana too hot to hold him, 'sought asylum with the Augasioi (*sic*, following Stephanus, instead of "Attasioi") and the Khorasmioi, who were two of the peoples belonging to the nation of the Massagetai and the Sakai' (*Geographica*, Book XI, chap. viii, § 8 (C 513)). Spitamenes may have taken refuge with the Augasioi (*alias* Sakā Haumavargā of Farghānah) first, and then moved on to the country of the more distant Khorasmioi; and this second asylum would have been safer politically, besides being more remote geographically, than the first, if at this date the Khorasmioi had become 'one of the peoples of the Massagetai' in the sense that they had transferred their allegiance from a declining Achaemenian Power to the formidable Nomad confederacy against which a now decrepit Achaemenian Imperial Government had ceased to be able to protect them.

sa-an-na in the Babylonian version, of the official lists, and *Gandarioi* in Herodotus's catalogue of the peoples in his Taxation District No. 7. The Babylonian synonym for an Old Persian 'Gādāra', which reappears in the post-Alexandrine Hellenic name 'Paropanisus', had been interpreted by Modern Western scholars, in terms of the language of the *Avesta*, as meaning [the country which is] 'beyond' ('para') [the mountain range that is] 'higher than the eagle' ['upāirisaēna'], i.e. the country that is 'trans Hindu Kush'. Since this poetic geographical expression must have been coined by speakers of the Avestan language in which it is couched, it must have designated people who lived on the opposite side of the Hindu Kush from the Oxus Basin, and this locates these 'Para-upāirisaēna' in the basin of the Kābul River. This was the location of Gādāra likewise; and the prima-facie inference from the official equation Gādāra = Para-upāirisaēna in the Achaemenian official lists is that, in the Achaemenian Age—whatever permutations and combinations in the administrative geography of this region may have been inaugurated by the Macedonian conquest¹—the two names were synonyms for an identical administrative area in the Kābul River Basin.² Besides the Gandarioi, however, Herodotus, in his description of his Taxation District No. 7, mentions three other peoples whose homes we still have to locate.

Two of these other three peoples in the Herodotean District No. 7 could be identified through the survival of their names down to the time of writing. Herodotus's *Dadikai* were still on the map as the Tajiks who were to be found in the Kābul River Basin in the Kuh-i-Dāmān, between the Upper Kābul River and the Panjshir River, and in the Kuhistan, between that and the Hindu Kush,³ as well as in the Upper Oxus Valley above Bactria and Sogdiana—on the left bank in Badakhshān and on the right bank in the territory that had been labelled Tajikistan in the administrative geography of the Soviet Union.⁴ Herodotus's *Aparytai* ('highlanders')⁵ were still on the map as the Afridis who were to be found at the eastern end of the Safid Kuh, on the watershed between the Kābul River and the Kurram River, just to the south of the Khyber Pass.⁶

¹ See, for instance, Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

² These 'Paropanisadae', *alias* 'Gandarioi', must be the people described in Arrian's field-state of Darius III Codomannus's army at Gaugamela (III. viii. 3) as 'the Indoi who were next-door neighbours of the Bactrians' and who were brigaded with the Bactrians under Bessus's command (see p. 644, n. 8, above).

³ See Elphinstone, M.: *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, new ed. (London 1839, Bentley, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 408–11; Burnes, A.: *Cabool: A Personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in, that City in the Years 1836, 7 and 8*, 2nd ed. (London 1843, John Murray), pp. 149–51.

⁴ We have no information about the boundary between the Dadikai—in the administrative, as distinct from the ethnic, sense—and Bactria in the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire. Ptolemy's statement (in *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. xii, § 1) that Sogdiana was bounded 'by Bactria and the Caucasian Mountains Proper' not only on the south along the Oxus River and on the west (i.e. by the Bactrian province Margiana), but also on the east, may signify that the Upper Oxus Valley on the north bank, and consequently also on the south bank, was included in Bactria, not in Dadikē.

⁵ According to Herzfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 99, 'parvatā' was one of the Iranian words for 'mountain'. Professor Kent notes that the word 'parvatā', with epenthesis to 'paurvatā—', is extant in Avestan.

⁶ These 'Aparytai' must be the people described in Arrian's field-state (III. viii. 4) as 'the Indians called the highland Indians' who in 331 B.C. were brigaded, not with

Neither of these peoples is named in any of the official lists; but the fourth people included in the Seventh Taxation District according to the Herodotean gazetteer are the *Sattagyđai* who appear in the official lists as the *Thatagu*[? *d* or *v*]iyā; and *Thataguš*, the *dahyāuš* from which this people derive their name, is not so easy to locate. Considering that Para-upārisaēna = Gādāra Proper had immediate next-door neighbours on the north in Bactria, on the west in Areia, and on the south in Arachosia, we are led to look for the *Thataguš* canton of the Herodotean Taxation District No. 7 in the country immediately to the east of Gādāra Proper—i.e. in the Panjab, which adjoined Gādāra across the Indus.¹ Herzfeld points out² that in the Achaemenian bas-reliefs the *Thatagu*[? *d* or *v*]iyā are portrayed in loin-cloths, which indicates that their country lay somewhere on the plains of the Indus Basin, and not up in the highlands of Eastern Iran; and the difficulty of finding a location for *Thataguš* anywhere within the limits of Gādāra to the west of the Indus certainly suggests that the *Thatagu*[? *d* or *v*]iyā must have lived to the east of the Indus—that is to say, on the plains, extending south-eastwards from the east bank of the Indus opposite the mouth of the Kābul River, which were watered by seven streams, from the Indus to the Sutelj's lost south-eastern neighbour inclusive.³

the Gandarians, but with the Arachosians under the satrap of Arachosia's command. In Ptolemy's *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. xviii, Herodotus's 'Aparytai' appear as the 'Parouētai' (*sic*, instead of the reading 'Parsuētai' in the latter-day text) who are the southernmost community of the Paropanisadae (§ 3) and who are presumably the inhabitants of the Parouētan Mountains (the latter-day Safid Kuh) that constitute the boundary between the Paropanisadae and Arachosia, since they also figure (*ibid.*, Book VI, chap. xx, § 3) as the northernmost community in Arachosia. This location on the border would account for their transfer to Arachosia from Gādāra at some date before 331 B.C. Ptolemy's 'Parautoi' (Book VI, chap. xvii, § 3), who are located in Areia next door to the Paropanisadae, are evidently likewise 'highlanders' Hellenized in a slightly different transliteration of the same underlying Iranian word, but their location suggests that their highland home lay in the country of the latter-day Hazaras, on the watershed of the rivers Kābul, Hilmand, and Hari Rud, and not in the Safid Kuh, where the name 'Aparytai-Parouētai-Parautoi' was still borne by the latter-day Afridis.

¹ The only substantial objection to locating *Thataguš* in the Panjab is a financial one. The Panjab must always have been a rich country in virtue of its agricultural and pastoral products, and therefore, if the Herodotean Taxation District No. 7 did include even only a part of the Panjab, it is surprising that it should have been assessed at a lower figure than any other district. Moreover, *Thataguš*, whether a rich country or a poor one, had been in rebellion in 522–521 B.C., and Darius was not the man to let off re-subjugated rebels lightly in their tax-assessments, as he showed by the enormous figure at which he assessed the poverty stricken South-Eastern Asagartiyā, Yautiyā, and Mačiyā. The lowness of the assessment on the Herodotean District No. 7 could perhaps be reconciled with a location of one of its constituent cantons in the wealthy Panjab on the supposition that, if *Thataguš* did lie in the Panjab, it included no more than a fraction of it—e.g. the north-western corner, to the north-west of the Salt Range.

² In *op. cit.*, p. 99.

³ i.e. the Indus, Jhelum, Chenāb, Rāvi, Beas, and Sutelj, together with a former river, south-east of the Sutelj, adjoining the Indian Desert, that had subsequently dried up. This lost river was remembered under divers names: 'Hakrā' and 'Wahindah' (see Smith, V. E.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 92) and 'Sarasvati' (see Rapson, E. J., in *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. i, p. 45). The Panjab is designated accordingly as the land, not of five, but of seven, rivers in the Avestan gazetteer of the Zoroastrian World (*Vendidad*, i. 18), as well as in the *Vedas* (e.g. in *Rigveda*, viii. 24 and 27). The 'Haptā Hindu' of the *Avesta* and the 'Saptā Sindhava' of the *Vedas* are philological equivalents of one another; and Herzfeld, in *loc. cit.*, taking this figure 'seven' as his cue, suggests that the name reproduced in Old Persian as 'Thataguš' may represent a compound, in some Iranian or Sanskrit dialect, of the Indo-European word for 'seven' with some word meaning 'stream'. The identification of the Haptā Hindu of *Vendidad*, i. 18, with the Panjab is corroborated by the

This conclusion will be supported by our finding that, if we do not locate Thataguš here, we shall be left with a vacuum in a piece of territory that can hardly have lain outside the frontiers of an Achaemenian Empire which, before the end of Darius I's reign, had come to include not only the basin of the Kābul River down to the west bank of the Upper Indus but also the Lower Indus Valley as far north as a point where *Hīduš* (Indoi)—the Herodotean Taxation District No. 20—marched with Harahvatiš ('the Pactyan country'). In one of the appendices to his gazetteer, Herodotus¹ tells us, as we have already noticed,² that the northernmost of all the Indoi were next-door neighbours of the city of Kaspatyros and the Pactyan (not the Gandarian) country on the one hand and next-door neighbours of the Indian Desert on the other; and this means that, at the farthest, *Hīduš* (Indoi) cannot have extended farther north than the southern extremity of the Panjab, i.e. than the neighbourhood of the latter-day city of Multān. Darius must have annexed the Lower Indus Valley from this point downwards to the sea as part of his comprehensive plan for opening up through communications by water, via the Indus, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, his Red Sea-Nile canal, and the Eastern Mediterranean, between the eastern and western extremities of his empire.³

The name *Hīduš* (Indoi) means the country of the people known as the Sindhu or Sauvira-Sindhu in Sanskrit literature. These had 'entered India shortly before the Persian period and worked southwards',⁴ and both the date of their arrival and the contemporary occurrence of another people bearing the name Sindoi on the banks of the River Kuban, in the throat of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, suggests that the Indoi in Sind will have been the left wing of a Eurasian Nomad horde whose right wing will have diverged to the north of the Caspian Sea in the course of the Völkerwanderung of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.⁵ In giving their name to the province of Sind and to the

description of it, in this passage of the *Avesta*, as being a region of 'abnormal heat' (see Jackson, A. V. W., in *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. i, p. 324); but, even if the identification of the Achaemenian 'Thataguš', too, with the Panjab were also to carry conviction, the countries called Hapta Hindu and Thataguš might be geographically identical without there being any common element in the etymologies of their names. A different interpretation of 'Thataguš' from Herzfeld's is given by Kent in his *Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*, p. 187:

'Θαταγυ- sb. "Sattagydia", a province of the Persian Empire: Elam. *sa-ad-da-ku-iš*, Akk. *sa-at-ta-gu-iš*, Gk. *Σατταγυδιᾶ* . . . From *Θατα*—"hundred", Av. *sata-*, Skt. *satām*, Gk. *ἑκατόν*, Lt. *centum*, N. Eng. *hundred*, PIE *kn̥to-m*, +*gav-* "cattle": "having hundreds of cattle" (hardly "[Land of] Seven Streams", with Hz. AMI 1.99n., 3.100-2, 8.73, König Ru 1D 63).

The name 'having hundreds of cattle' fits the Panjab as aptly as the name 'Land of Seven Streams', and thus there seems to be no etymological obstacle to the equation Thataguš = Panjab, which is commended by the negative geographical consideration that there is nowhere else where we can locate Thataguš, and by the positive indication that is to be found in the tropical dress in which the Thataguš? d or vīyā are portrayed.

Professor G. G. Cameron comments: 'I find it very difficult to reconcile Thataguš with the Panjab. Must it not rather be on the slopes of the Hindu Kush?' But, if that had been its location, would it not have had to be labelled 'having hundreds of sheep and goats'? And would not its denizens have had to be portrayed, not half-naked, but muffled up in *sisyrnai*?

¹ In Book III, chap. 102.

² On p. 633, above.

³ See p. 634, with n. 6, above.

⁴ Tarn, op. cit., p. 171 based on H. Lüders.

⁵ See p. 608, n. 4, above.

great river by whose united waters this province was traversed, the left wing of the Sindoi will have started a process which was to end in their name being applied to the whole sub-continent embraced within the Sulaymān and Himalaya mountain ranges;¹ and we can already see the beginnings of this progressive extension of the name 'Indian' in Herodotus's usage.

While, in Herodotus's mind, the word 'Indoi' means in the first instance the nation inhabiting Darius's Twentieth Taxation District and living on the banks of 'the river' [Indus],² and while he believes that Sind is the eastern edge of the *Oikoumenē*,³ with nothing to the east of its inhabitants except the Indian Desert that set for them their eastern boundary, he also knows of Indians, living south of the Achaemenian province Hiduś, who were independent of Darius;⁴ he is aware that the Indians consist of many peoples not all speaking the same language;⁵ and, when, both in the gazetteer⁶ and in another context,⁷ he calls the Indians 'by far the largest nation in the World', he is manifestly using the word 'Indians' to cover not merely the Indoi in Sind but all the inhabitants of Sind's vast south-eastern hinterland, where, between the Indian Desert and the Arabian Sea, it passes over into Gujerat and Malwa and Mahārāshtra and the Deccan. On the other hand, Herodotus's location of 'the northernmost of the Indoi' no farther north than the latitudes of 'the Pactyan country' (i.e. Arachosia) and the Indian Desert, and his statement in this context that these were the Indoi who were sent to get from the Desert the gold⁸ in which the Indian taxation district paid its enormous annual contribution to the Achaemenian Imperial Treasury,⁹ show that, unlike the source from which Arrian ultimately obtained his field-state of the army assembled by Darius III Codomannus at Gaugamela a hundred years or so after the date at which Herodotus was writing, Herodotus did not reckon among the Indoi any of the peoples then in occupation of the Indus Basin to the north of Hiduś's northern boundary in the neighbourhood of Multān.¹⁰

In thus excluding from the limits of India Proper the Panjab as well as Gādāra, Herodotus was in agreement with the Sanskrit Scriptures; and there is a piece of evidence which suggests that, without knowing

¹ 'Sanskrit "Sindhu-s" and Old Persian "hi(n)duś" agree absolutely in etymology, as original initial s before a vowel became h in Iranian, and the aspirated voiced stops became voiced non-aspirates in Iranian. This explains the variation between Hind and Sind; "India" is from the Iranian with loss of the initial h.'—Professor R. G. Kent.

² See Herodotus, Book III, chap. 98.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ See Book III, chap. 101.

⁵ See Book III, chap. 98.

⁶ See Book III, chap. 94.

⁷ In Book V, chap. 3.

⁸ See Book III, chap. 102.

⁹ See Book III, chaps. 94-95.

¹⁰ How was it that, at some date between the reigns of the first Darius and the last Darius, the name 'Indoi' came to be applied to the peoples in the basin of the Kābul River whom Herodotus calls 'Aparytai' and 'Gandarioi'? The explanation might be that Hiduś, after its annexation to the Achaemenian Empire by Darius, was attached for political purposes to the *dahyāuś* Gādāra to constitute a single vicerealty, though for fiscal purposes it was erected into a separate taxation district (Herodotus's District No. 20, which appears in his gazetteer as a separate unit from his District No. 7). If Gādāra was united with Hiduś for political purposes, this would account for the extension of the name 'Indoi' to the peoples in the Kābul River Basin, and for their retention of the name even after the rest of the Indus Basin, including the home of the authentic 'Indoi' in Sind, had recovered its independence—as it had before Alexander's descent upon it.

it, he may have been following Vedic authority through a chain of intermediate informants.

In describing the gold-getting Indoi who were the northernmost of all the peoples bearing the name, Herodotus states¹ that these were 'the most warlike of the Indians' and that their culture (*Graecè* 'dáita') was 'approximately the same as that of the Bactrians'. This must be an echo of the usage of the term 'Bāhlika' (i.e. 'Bākhtriś', 'Baktroi') in the Sanskrit Scriptures as a disapprobatory generic name—a counterpart of the Avestan term 'pairikās'—to cover the swarm of Eurasian Nomad peoples and the once sedentary victims of their invasion—including not only the Bactrians Proper (Bhallas), but also the Čibi (*Graecè* Sibai), Malavas (*Graecè* Malloi), Kshudrakas (*Graecè* Oxydrakai),² Madda, Maddava, Madra, Madraka, Bhadra, and what not—who, in the Völkerwanderung of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., had poured out of the Eurasian Steppe into the Panjab and beyond, without troubling to legitimize themselves in Brahman eyes by conforming to the ritual demands of Vedic orthodoxy.³ The national names of these intruders are not mentioned either by Herodotus or in any of the Achaemenian official lists. They have been preserved in Sanskrit and in post-Alexandrine Hellenic literature. But it seems reasonable to surmise that, in the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire, they figure anonymously as the Thatagu[? d or v]iyā (Sattagyđai) together with those northernmost peoples of the Viceroyalty of Hīduś who were more Bactrian than they were Indian in their way of life.⁴

The name of one of these heathen Bāhlika peoples that looms large in Sanskrit literature, and that had been located in the Kābul River Basin by students of Indic history,⁵ is conspicuous by its absence from both the Achaemenian official lists and the Herodotean gazetteer. Where are the Kambojas? In Sanskrit literature they are described as living in a cold country and manufacturing warm clothes from wool and fur, and they are associated with the Yonas (Hellenes) by Açoka Maurya.⁶ These indications point to a location in the Paropanisus; and this is in fact Ptolemy's location⁷ of a people whom he calls 'Tambyzoi' and places on the southern frontier of Bactria, about half-way along. If we may conjecture that 'Tambyzoi' is a corruption of an original 'Kambyzoi', we learn from this passage of Ptolemy's *Geographia* that the national name which appears in Sanskrit as 'Kamboja' was transliterated into Greek on the same system as the personal name which appears in Old

¹ In Book III, chap. 102.

² A rearguard of these Oxydrakai who had made their way to the south-eastern edge of the Panjab is located by Ptolemy (*Geographia*, Book VI, chap. xii, § 4) in the mountains of Sogdiana under the name Oxydrankai.

³ See de la Vallée Poussin, L.: *L'Inde aux Temps des Mauryas* (Paris 1930, Boccard), pp. 12-16; Tarn: *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, pp. 169-71.

⁴ The portrayal of the Thatagu[? d or v]iyā in loin-cloths does not disqualify them from being reckoned among the Bāhlikas, since, as is evident from Elphinstone's account quoted on p. 636, above, of the dress of the nineteenth-century Afghan occupants of the Darajāt, an immigrant Central Asian people on the plains of the Indus Valley might revert to its ancestral dress in the winter even if it had taken to wearing a tropical undress in the summer.

⁵ e.g. by de la Vallée Poussin in op. cit., p. 15.

⁶ See *ibid.*

⁷ In *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. xi, § 6.

Persian as 'Kambūjiya', in Elamite as 'Kan-bu-ši-ja', in Akkadian as 'Kam-bu-zi-ia', and in Greek as 'Kambysēs'.¹

The question remains: Why did Kambūjiya I's father Kūruš I of Parsuwaš and Anšan name his son 'the Kamboja'? And this question raises an antecedent one: Why did Kūruš I's father Čišpiš (*Graecè* Teispes) name his son 'the Kuru'?² It is evident that the personal names that thenceforth alternated in the Cyran, in contrast to the Ariaramnan, branch of the Achaemenidae are taken from the national names of two non-Persian peoples; but it seems improbable that Cambyses I of Parsuwaš-Anšan (*regnabat circa* 600–559 B.C.) can have been named after the Kambojas whom we find subsequently established on the southern flank of the Hindu Kush, and *a fortiori* improbable that Cyrus I of Parsuwaš-Anšan (*regnabat circa* 640–600 B.C.) can have been named after the Kurus whose 'plain', the 'Kuru-kshetra', is located in Sanskrit literature near the north-eastern edge of the Indian Desert, on the divide between the basins of the Indus and the Ganges.³

A clue to the solution of this problem may perhaps be found in the appearance of the same two words 'Kamboja' and 'Kuru' as place-names in Transcaucasia as well as on the Hindu Kush and in the Indian sub-continent. Sanskrit literature had preserved a memory of Uttara-Kurus living beyond the Himalaya;⁴ and at the time of writing the principal left-bank affluent of the River Aras was still called the Kur, while this River Cyrus, as it was likewise called by Hellenic geographers, had a left-bank affluent called by them the Cambyses, which gave the name 'Cambysēnē'⁵ to a north-western tongue of the steppe country, called by them Kaspianē,⁶ in the Lower Kur-Aras Basin. Thus in Transcaucasia the two names Cyrus (Kuru) and Cambyses (Kamboja) were not only both on the map, as they were in India and on its north-west frontier, but were found in immediate juxtaposition, which suggests that in

¹ A Modern Western scholar, Sylvain Lévi, cited by Tarn in op. cit., pp. 138 and 170, had tentatively equated the national name 'Kamboja' with the Paropanisadan place-name Kāpiša, one of the two constituents of the double city Kāpišakāniš (see p. 639, n. 3, above); but Professor R. G. Kent had pointed out to the present writer that in the Elamite usage of the cuneiform script—which, unlike the Old Persian usage, shows nasals before consonants, Old Persian 'Kāpišakāniš' is transcribed 'Qa-ap-pi-iš-ša-qa-nu-iš', in contrast to the Elamite rendering 'Kan-bu-ši-ja' for Old Persian 'Kambūjiya'. This Elamite testimony showed that there was no nasal in the initial syllable of the name Kāpiša, and this discrepancy told against Lévi's equation Kāpiša = Kamboja.

² See Weissbach, F. H., s.v. 'Kyros', in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Neue Bearbeitung, Supplementband IV, col. 1128.

³ There was another 'Kuru Plain' (*Graecè* Kyrou *alias* Kourou *alias* Korou Pedion) in Western Anatolia, round the confluence between the River Hermus and its right-bank tributary the Phrygius, just to the north of the city of Magnesia-under-Sipylus (for the location see Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XIII, chap. iv, § 5 (C 626) and § 13 (C 629); Beloch, K. J.: *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd ed., vol. iv, Part II (Berlin and Leipzig 1927, de Gruyter), pp. 458–61). In Anatolia, as in Hindustan, 'the Kuru Plain' was a battlefield on which the political fate of a sub-continent was repeatedly decided. Kyroupedion was the scene of the overthrow of Lysimachus by Seleucus Nicator in 281 B.C. and of Antiochus III by the Romans in 190 B.C. Kuru-kshetra, between the River Jumna and the lost River Sarasvatī, was the historic battlefield of Pāṇipat, besides being the scene of the legendary war between the Kurus and the Pandus which is the theme of the *Mahābhārata*.

⁴ See Keith, A. Berriedale, in *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. i, p. 118.

⁵ See Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. iv, § 1 (C 501) and § 5 (C 502); chap. xiv, § 4 (C 528).

⁶ See pp. 627–8, above.

Transcaucasia the two peoples who thus stamped their national names on the local landscape must have been closely associated.

It is perhaps almost as unlikely that the Cyran Achaemenidae will have derived their personal names from a pair of peoples in Transcaucasia as it is that they will have derived them from two peoples in and near India. But the occurrence of the two names in Transcaucasia as well as in and near India—and in Transcaucasia at close quarters—indicates that we have here two more names of Eurasian Nomad peoples who took part, and this in one another's company, in the *Völkerwanderung* of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.; and, if, like so many of their fellows, these Kurus and Kambojas split into two wings whose paths diverged so widely, it does not seem unwarrantable to guess that a central detachment of this pair of migrating peoples may have found its way to Lūristān and there have been taken into partnership by Kūruš I's father Čišpiš.

Čišpiš seems to have come, *circa* 670 B.C.,¹ under the suzerainty of a war-lord whom the Assyrian records knew as Kashtaritu (*Persicè* Khšathrita)² and located, at his first appearance, in the Kassite country³ just to the north-east of Parsuwaš. This Khšathrita was the leader of an anti-Assyrian coalition in which Medes and Mannaeans were associated with migrant Eurasian Nomads—Cimmerians and Saparda⁴—and the accommodation of a Kuru-Kamboja detachment of this horde in Parsuwaš may have been part of the arrangement on which Khšathrita and Čišpiš of Parsuwaš came to terms. The settlement of Eurasian Nomad immigrants in Lūristān is attested by the 'animal style' of the local school of bronze-work;⁵ and some such reinforcement of the Achaemenian Power would also account for the sudden vast extension of its domain, at some date during Čišpiš' (*Graecè* Teispes') reign (*regnabat circa* 675–640 B.C.), from Parsuwaš in Lūristān and Anšan in the Pusht-i-Kuh south-eastwards over Pārsa (Fars). Teispes himself, for that matter, was the namesake of the Cimmerian war-lord Teušpu who crossed swords with Teispes' Assyrian contemporary Esarhaddon (*regnabat* 681–668 B.C.),⁶ even if he was not Teušpu himself; and the folk-tale in which the mother of Cyrus I was called 'the bitch'—'Spakō'—according to Herodotus⁷ may reflect the memory of a dynastic marriage between the House of Achaemenes and the House of the Scythian war-lord Išpakai who was riding hard at the Cimmerians' heels.⁸

Whatever may be the correct historical interpretation of these Nomad names in the personal nomenclature of the Achaemenidae from Čišpiš

¹ See Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

² Esarhaddon's Khšathrita was identified by Modern Western scholars with Herodotus's Phraortes (i.e. Fravartiš) on the strength of Darius's statement, in 'DB', § 24, that another Fravartiš, the pretender to the Median throne in 522 B.C., gave himself out to be 'Khšathrita of the House of Uvakhštra (Cyaxares)'. See Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 177, and König, F. W.: *Älteste Geschichte der Meder und Perser* (Leipzig 1934, Hinrichs), p. 30.

³ See Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁴ See Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 178; König, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁵ This point is made by Cameron, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–4, and by König, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁶ See Luckenbill, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 516, 530, 546.

⁷ In Book I, chap. 110.

⁸ See König, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–31; Luckenbill, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 517 and 533.

(Teispes) onwards in the Cyran branch of the house, they must mean that the Cimmerians, the Kurus, the Kambojas, and the Scyths had played some part in Achaemenian history that had been auspicious as well as important.

Having now completed our review of the *dahyāva* to the east of Western Iran, the heartland of the Achaemenian Empire, we have next to survey the *dahyāva* to the west of the heartland. If we take ship at Kaspapyros, sail down the Indus out into the Indian Ocean, and then follow in the wake of Alexander's admiral Nearchus up the Persian Gulf, instead of following in the wake of Darius's admiral Scylax round Arabia, we shall come to port in the *dahyāuš* which is called *Bābiruš* in all the Achaemenian official lists, and *Babylonia* by every Hellenic geographer with the one exception of Herodotus, who, for some private reason of his own, systematically calls Babylonia 'Assyria'¹ (the ninth taxation district in his gazetteer).

In the South-West Quarter of the Achaemenian Empire, on which we have now set foot, the next *dahyāuš* to *Bābiruš* (Babylonia) is the *Asshur* of the Babylonian and *Athurā* of the Old Persian text of the official lists; and both the name and the area covered by it appear in Greek as the *Syroi*—defined as 'the whole of Phoenicia and the so-called Philistine Syria, together with Cyprus'—who constitute Herodotus's Taxation District No. 5.

The name 'Asshur', as applied to this *dahyāuš*, is manifestly the official term which, before the incorporation of the Neo-Babylonian Empire into the Achaemenian Empire, had been used in the Neo-

¹ It is certain that Herodotus does mean Babylonia by 'Assyria'. In the gazetteer, for instance, he writes 'Babylon and the rest of Assyria' in between 'Susa and the rest of the Cissians' country' and 'Ecbatana and the rest of Media' (Book III, chaps. 91-92). 'Assyria' must mean Babylonia here, and so it must likewise in the field-state, where he states that the Assyrian contingent included the Chaldaeans, who were, of course, in occupation of South-Western Babylonia at this date (Book VII, chap. 63). In another place he calls Nabonidus 'king of Assyria' (Book I, chap. 188), and in another he uses 'the Babylonian country' and 'the Assyrian country' as synonyms in consecutive sentences, and explains that he is talking about an official administrative area: a 'satrapy' in the sense of a viceroyalty (Book I, chap. 192). Thus Herodotus's 'Assyria' certainly includes the whole of Babylonia—Book III, chap. 155, is another example of this usage—and there is no evidence that it includes anything besides; for, in a passage describing the down-stream coracle traffic on the River Euphrates, his words 'the Armenians who live above (i.e. up-stream in relation to) the Assyrians' (Book I, chap. 194) can hardly be compelled to yield the meaning that his 'Assyria' was continuous with his Armenia and therefore included Mesopotamia as well as Babylonia. The *dahyāuš* officially styled 'Asshur' in Akkadian and 'Athura' in Old Persian did include Mesopotamia, as we shall see, but this official Assyria, unlike Herodotus's private 'Assyria', did not include Babylonia. It is the *dahyāuš* that Herodotus calls 'the Syroi' (Book III, chap. 91). Herodotus is aware that this, and not Babylonia, is the district that is called Assyria by 'the Barbarians' (i.e. the Orientals). 'The Barbarians', he writes in Book VII, chap. 63, 'used the name "Assyrioi" to mean the people whom the Hellenes called "Syrioi"—and these "Syrioi" are the people whom Herodotus includes in his Fifth Taxation District ('the whole of Phoenicia and the so-called Philistine Syria, together with Cyprus'), not the people of an 'Assyria' which contains Babylon and which is the ninth district in his list.

Why did Herodotus deliberately adopt this private and peculiar usage of the word 'Assyria' to mean Babylonia? His words in Book I, chap. 178, suggest that his intention was to convey the historical truth that, in his day, Babylonia was the sole extant representative of a civilization, common to a still surviving Babylonia and a now extinct Assyria, which Herodotus labels 'Assyriac' (e.g. in Book I, chap. 199), not 'Babylonic', because he is aware that Assyria, before her downfall and annihilation, had been the paramount Power in this society.

Babylonian Empire's administrative geography to designate that part of the defunct Assyrian Empire that had fallen to Babylon's share in the partition of—or scramble for—Assyria's spoils between Babylon, Media,¹ Egypt, and Cilicia; but the exact limits of this Neo-Babylonian dominion labelled 'Assyria' which the Achaemenian Empire had inherited are not easy to ascertain.

We may be sure that the Neo-Babylonian Empire's 'Assyria' did not include the border cantons of Babylonia on the east and north-east—e.g. Gambalu, Dêr, and Kar-Asshur—which Assyria had detached from Babylonia and annexed to herself in and after the reign of Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 746–727 B.C.).² These authentically Babylonian cantons must simply have been 'disannexed', and it is also possible that the Babylonians may have now taken their revenge by annexing to Babylonia cantons higher up the Tigris, in the direction of the City of Asshur, which were as authentically Assyrian as Kar-Asshur and Dêr were Babylonian. But how far up the Tigris had the Neo-Babylonian Empire's writ run? We know from Herodotus's itinerary of the Achaemenian Empire's Great North-West Road³ that neither the section of this highway east of the Tigris, running from Susa to the neighbourhood of Nineveh, nor the section west of the Tigris, running from the neighbourhood of Nineveh to the southern boundary of Armina, somewhere just north-west of Mardin, traversed either Bābiruš or Athurā (*alias* Asshur, *alias* Syria) at any point; and this means that the Median share of the Assyrian Empire must have included, in addition to the metropolitan territory of Assyria east of the Tigris, at least the portion of the Department of Nineveh that lay on the west bank, together with three departments—Tille, Nasibina (i.e. Nisibin), and Izalā—which, on the post-Alexandrine Hellenic map, were embraced in the province labelled with the imported Macedonian name 'Mygdonia'.

This, however, was not the south-western limit of the ex-Assyrian territory west of the Tigris that the Medes had occupied. Though, in 609 B.C., during the Allies' final campaign against the remnant of the Assyrian Army in the neighbourhood of Harrān, Nabopolassar had penetrated (if we are to accept his claim) as far as Izalā and even Urartu, not only these countries but Harrān itself had fallen into Median hands in the event; Harrān had remained in Median hands from *circa* 607–606 B.C. onwards; and it had not been acquired by the Neo-Babylonian Empire *de facto*, whatever the position may have been *de jure* during the intervening half century, till 555 B.C.⁴—that is to say, till Astyages of Media was already so gravely preoccupied with the insubordinateness of Cyrus II of Anšan that Nabonidus of Babylon could venture to eject the Median garrison from Harrān with impunity. Since in the Achaemenian Age the country round Harrān (i.e. the upper basin of the River Balikh) was certainly not included either in Armenia or in Cilicia or in the fragment of a partitioned Media which Herodotus labels 'Matiênê',

¹ See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 106.

² See Forrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–102, with the map of 'the development of Assyria, 745–606.'

³ Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 49–54.

⁴ According to Olmstead, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–37. According to Adontz, *op. cit.*, pp. 283–5 and 296–9, the date of Nabonidus's occupation of Harrān was 553 B.C.

this eleventh-hour acquisition of the Neo-Babylonian Empire's must have been left within the bounds of the Neo-Babylonian province of Asshur by Cyrus II when, after his conquest of the Neo-Babylonian Empire in 539 B.C., he kept it territorially intact as a single viceroyalty within his own universal state.

Wherever the northern boundary of the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* and Darian taxation district called Athurā-Asshur-Syria may have run, we know that—like the Syria of A.D. 1952—it comprised territory to the east as well as territory to the west of the River Euphrates; for the country through which, in 401 B.C., Xenophon and his comrades found themselves marching after they had crossed from the right to the left bank of the Euphrates was still Syria;¹ and, in Arrian's copy of both the field-state and the order of battle of Darius III Codomannus's army at Gaugamela in 331 B.C., the Syrians from Syria 'Between the Rivers' were brigaded with the Syrians from 'the Hollow Syria' under the single command of Mazaeus.² The portion of the province and taxation district labelled Syria-Asshur-Athurā which lay west of the Euphrates was called 'Hollow' by the Hellenes because it was traversed by the northernmost section of the Great Rift Valley which—after breaking southward out of the Taurus at Mar'ash and running up the Orontes Valley, through the Biqā', down the Jordan Valley, and through the Wādī 'Arabah, the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea, and the Danākil Trough—continues up the Valley of the River Hawash in Abyssinia into Kenya Colony along a track punctuated, at this southern, as at the northern, end by lakes. The Babylonian name for the portion of Syria known on this account as 'Hollow Syria' in Greek was 'Beyond the River' (*Babyloniace* Ebir-nari, *Aramaicē* 'Abar-Nahara')³—i.e. beyond the River Euphrates, as distinguished from the portion of Syria 'Between the Rivers' Euphrates and Tigris. The capital of this Achaemenian *dahyāuš* 'Athurā', the province comprising the Neo-Babylonian Empire's eventual share of the Assyrian Empire's spoils, was situated in the portion 'Beyond the River', 15 parasangs (i.e. just over 89 kilometres) to the north-west of the crossing of the Euphrates at Thapsacus.⁴

For the capital of a province astride the western elbow of the Euphrates, this position was well chosen, since it was within easy reach of the more extensive but less populous and less wealthy eastern portion of the *dahyāuš* that lay 'Between the Rivers', while it stood just within the portion, lying 'Beyond the River', which contained the industrially, commercially, and navally important Phoenician city-states with their miniature *imperia in imperio*.⁵ Indeed, the 'Beyond the River' portion of Athurā-Asshur-Syria overshadowed the 'Between the Rivers' portion

¹ See Xenophon: *Expeditio Cyri*, Book I, chap. iv, § 19.

² See Arrian: *Expeditio Alexandri*, Book III, chap. viii, § 6, and chap. xi, § 4.

³ In a letter to the present writer, Professor G. G. Cameron points out that, in the Akkadian text of 'DSF', § 3g, ll. 30–35, 'Ebir-nari' is employed as the translation for 'Kāra hya Athuriya' ('the Assyrian people') of the Old Persian text. Since the passage states that 'the cedar timber, this—a mountain by name of Lebanon—from there was brought; the Assyrian people, it brought it to Babylon' (Professor R. G. Kent's translation in *Old Persian*, p. 144), it is certain that Syria between the west bank of the Euphrates and the eastern shore of the Mediterranean was comprised within the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* labelled 'Athurā'.

⁴ See Xenophon, op. cit., Book I, chap. iv, §§ 10–11.

⁵ See p. 582, above.

to such a degree that in popular, as distinct from official, usage the term 'Beyond the River' was employed as a name for the whole province. This popular usage is followed in private business documents drawn up in Babylonia in the reigns of Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius I¹ and in the Book of Ezra, and eventually even in the Aramaic inscriptions on provincial coins struck *circa* 340 B.C. by the governor of Athurā, Mazaeus,² though we know from the field-state and the order of battle preserved by Arrian that 'Between the Rivers', as well as 'Beyond the River', was included in Mazaeus's province.

In all the Achaemenian official lists Athurā-Asshur is mentioned as a different *dahyāuš* from Bābiruš, but this does not mean that Athurā was from first to last a separate viceroyalty, any more than the mention of Suguda, side by side with Bākhtriš, means that Suguda was not under the Viceroy of Bākhtriš's administration. Athurā is, in fact, placed in immediate juxtaposition to Bābiruš in the three latest of the official lists ('DSe', 'DNa', 'XPh'), as well as in the earliest ('DB'); and this is an indication that Athurā and Bābiruš, like Suguda and Bākhtriš, still constituted a single viceroyalty down to the year in which 'XPh' was inscribed. The Babylonian private documents that mention Athurā under the popular name 'Ebir-nari' inform us in so many words that this *dahyāuš* was under the administration of the Viceroy of Babylon until at least the sixth year of Darius I's reign.³ On the other hand the governor of 'Abar-Nahara' (i.e. Athurā), Tatnai, and the Emperor Darius I corresponded with one another direct, and not via the Viceroy of Bābiruš, according to the Aramaic document embedded in the Book of Ezra (chapter v. 6—chapter vi. 12), whatever the value of this document may or may not be as historical evidence.⁴ Perhaps we may infer that Darius I left the original Viceroyalty of Babylon, which included Athurā as well as Babylonia, still intact on the political map, but dissected it, on his new fiscal map, into two separate taxation districts. Athurā had, however, certainly been separated from Bābiruš for political as well as for fiscal purposes by the time when Xenophon and his comrades traversed Athurā *en route* for Bābiruš in 401 B.C. Indeed, in that year the two provinces were not even conterminous; for, after crossing the River Khabor ('Araxes') just above its confluence with the Euphrates, Cyrus the Younger's expeditionary force, on the next stage of its advance down the left bank of the Euphrates, found itself marching through Arabia (*Persicè* Arabāya) for a distance of 125 parasangs (i.e. about 742½ kilometres) before entering Babylonia⁵ at a point not more

¹ See Leuze, O.: *Die Satrapieneinteilung in Syrien und im Zweistromlande von 520–320* (Halle (Saale) 1935, Niemeyer), pp. 25, 36–37, and 70.

² See Leuze, op. cit., p. 110.

³ See Leuze, op. cit., pp. 36–37 and 70. On the occurrence of the formula *Pahat Babilī u Ebir-nari* in Babylonian texts, Professor G. G. Cameron comments in a letter to the present writer: 'When a Babylonian says "Babylon and Ebir-nari", he can only mean that there was a single administrative unit comprising Babylon and Assyria [i.e. the *dahyāuš* known in Old Persian as Athurā] in official terms.'

⁴ 'It is difficult to regard this . . . as historical, or at any rate as belonging to the period in question. It looks as though it had originally referred to some other episode at some later time' (Oesterley, W. O. E.: *A History of Israel*, vol. ii (Oxford 1932, Clarendon Press), p. 85).

⁵ See Xenophon, op. cit., Book I, chap. v, §§ 1 and 5, and chap. vii, §§ 1 and 14–16.

than about $13\frac{1}{2}$ parasangs (i.e. just over 80 kilometres) to the north-west of 'the Median Wall'.

The *dahyāuš* called *Arabia* in Greek and *Arabāya* in Old Persian, which in 401 B.C. thus extended across the middle course of the Euphrates into the desert and steppe country of South-Eastern Mesopotamia according to Xenophon, also extended, according to Herodotus,¹ to the shore of the Mediterranean at the south-east corner of that sea, along a short stretch of coast between a point south-west of Gaza and a place called Iēnysos. Since the next stretch of the coast, extending from Iēnysos south-westwards, for the distance of a three days' journey, to the north-east corner of Egypt, was, according to Herodotus in the same context, part of Athurā (Syria), it looks as if a corridor of territory had been cut out of Athurā and granted to Arabāya by the Achaemenian Imperial Government expressly in order to give Arabāya an outlet on the Mediterranean; and we can read between Herodotus's lines² that this cession of territory had been a reward for services rendered by the Arabs to Cambyses in assisting his passage across the desert from Syria when he was invading Egypt.

In thus placing their Arab allies in charge of the desert sections of two such vital lines of Imperial communication as the route from Babylonia to Syria up the Euphrates and the route from Syria to Egypt along the Mediterranean coast, the Achaemenian Imperial Government were no doubt moved by the same considerations that had led them to place their Hauma-(?)drinking Sakan allies in charge of their borderland oyer against the Great Eurasian Steppe. They had realized that, in a steppe and desert country, the only effective police force that a sedentary Power could find to perform the task of keeping the local Nomad occupants in order was the local Nomad nation-in-arms itself, and that, if these high-spirited and self-confident Nomads were to be induced to police themselves on the Achaemenian Empire's behalf, they must be given the honourable status of free allies. The Achaemenidae were assuredly wise thus to adopt Nabonidus's fruitful policy of conciliating the Arabs instead of reverting to the Assyrians' sterile policy³ of trying to crush them on a *terrain* on which the Arabs were bound in the long run to have the advantage over the troops of any sedentary Power. The Arabs had to be brought to a halt by diplomacy if not by military operations, since they had been erupting out of Arabia into 'the Fertile Crescent' simultaneously with the Iranian Nomads' eruption out of Central into South-Western Asia in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.⁴ Indeed, the Arabian frontier that Darius had inherited was perhaps little less formidable than the Central Asian one.

We have no information about the boundaries of the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* Arabāya at other points. We know that the temple-state of Jerusalem lay, not in Arabāya, but in Athurā, though Judah had never

¹ See Herodotus, Book III, chap. 5.

² In Book III, chaps. 4-7 and 88.

³ See Abbott, N.: 'Pre-Islamic Arab Queens', pp. 4-5, in *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, vol. lviii, No. 1, January 1941 (Chicago 1941, University of Chicago Press), pp. 1-22, for Arab-Assyrian relations from the reign of Tiglath-Pileser III to that of Asshurbanipal inclusive.

⁴ See III, iii. 423.

been included in the Assyrian Empire, but had been annexed to the Assyrian province of the Neo-Babylonian Empire by Nebuchadnezzar. Presumably Nabonidus had intended to annex Edom likewise to Asshur when he had conquered Edom in 553 B.C.,¹ but here the Arabs were the *tertiū gaudentes*, for, when the remnant of Edom reappears on a post-Alexandrine Hellenic map, this 'Idumaea' lies as far north as the Negeb, in the former territory of the Hebrew tribe of Simeon, while the former territory of Edom in the Wādi 'Arabah, round Petra, has become the domain of 'the Agricultural Arabs' ('the Nabataeans'). We may guess that, in addition to Petra, the oasis of Taymā, in the North-Western Hijāz, which Nabonidus had reached and had liked so well that he had preferred it to Babylon as a residence, had subsequently become part of the Achaemenian Empire's Arabian sphere of influence.

It will be seen that the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* Arabāya embraced at least as much of the North-West Arabian and South-East Mesopotamian Steppe as the Arab phylarchy of the Banu Ghassān, which was in charge of the Roman Empire's Arabian marches on the eve of the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors' eruption out of the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. The status of the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* Arabāya must also have been much the same as that of this Ghassanid phylarchy and its Lakhmid counterpart which performed the equivalent service for the Roman Empire's rival and the Achaemenian Empire's successor the Sasanian Empire.² In all three cases, Arab Nomad peoples whose pastures adjoined the borders of a sedentary Power were recognized by that Power as its autonomous allies in consideration of their undertaking the wardenship of the desert marches. We do not know, however, whether 'the King of the Arabs'³ with whom Cambyses negotiated for his expeditionary force a free passage overland from Syria to Egypt was the ruler merely of a local Arab principality that had supplanted the Edomites at Petra, or whether the same Arab prince's authority also extended south-eastward to Taymā in the Hijāz and perhaps north-eastward, as well, to Hatra in Mesopotamia.

Mudrāya was Egypt; the *Putāyā* appear to have been the Libyans⁴ to the west of Egypt as far as the hinterland of the cluster of Greek city-states on the bulge of Cyrenaica; *Kūša* was the Napatan Kingdom which occupied the south of the Egyptian World.⁵ Herodotus includes the two Hellenic communities *Kyrēnē* and *Barkē*, as well as *the Libyans adjoining Egypt*, in the same taxation district—his Number Six—as Egypt itself, and we may assume that, on the political map, they were likewise brigaded with Egypt in the same viceroyalty. On the other hand Herodotus reckons the Ethiopians who were Egypt's next-door neighbours as gift-bringing allies and not as tax-paying subjects,⁶ and the maintenance of a permanent garrison of professional troops at

¹ See Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

² See p. 131, n. 3, above, and VIII. viii. 50-51.

³ See Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 5 and 7.

⁴ See Cameron, G. G., in the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. ii (Chicago 1943, University of Chicago Press), p. 309.

⁵ See II. ii. 116-17.

⁶ See Book III, chap. 97.

Elephantinê by the Achaemenian Imperial Government¹ is evidence that its control over the Kingdom of Napata was only nominal.

The North-Western Quarter of the Achaemenian Empire—which was probably the quarter that was of least account in Persian eyes before the shocking disaster of 480–479 B.C.—begins with the *dahyāuš* named *Armina* (alias Arminiya; *Graecè* Armenia), which figures in Herodotus's description of his Taxation District No. 13 as one of its three constituent parts. We have already given reasons² for believing that, in the Darian division of a re-established Achaemenian Empire into taxation districts, the Armenian sub-empire was dissected into three districts: Armenia Proper; the strip of country between the northern boundary of Armenia Proper and the south shore of the Black Sea; and a western district consisting of Cappadocia-cum-Dascylitide. And we have suggested that Herodotus has inadvertently preserved the description of a Viceroyalty of Armenia in which all these three taxation districts were comprised thanks to his having mistaken this description of a political unit for a description of one of its three fiscal subdivisions. The taxation district in question was, on this view, confined in reality to Armenia Proper; and this was 'a small country'³ consisting of the Upper Tigris Basin together with the north-west corner of the Upper Euphrates Basin. The boundary between the taxation district consisting of this Armenia Proper and its western neighbour, the taxation district Cappadocia-cum-Dascylitide, will have run to the east of the road from the latter-day city of Sivas (*Graecè* Sebasteia) on the Upper Halys to the latter-day city of Malatīyah (*Graecè* Melitênê, *Assyriacè* Meliddu). The boundary between Armenia Proper and its northern neighbours the coastal peoples will have followed approximately the watershed between the Upper Euphrates Basin and the Black Sea.

What was the boundary between an Achaemenian Armenia and its eastern neighbour Urartu which, on the political map of the Achaemenian Empire, was included in the Viceroyalty of Media⁴ and which, on the Darian fiscal map, was associated, as is recorded in the Herodotean gazetteer,⁵ with the Hyspirītis and with a Matīênê or Matianê which embraced the Median share of Assyria as well as the basin of Lake Urmiyah? Under the Achaemenian régime at as early a date as 401 B.C. the western frontier of Urartu over against Armina already ran rather farther to the east than Urartu's Assyrian adversaries Tiglath-Pileser III and his successors had ever succeeded in pushing this frontier back; for when, in 401 B.C., Xenophon and his comrades, marching northwards, crossed the watershed between the Upper Tigris Basin and the basin of the Eastern Euphrates (Murād Su), and debouched into the valley of the Eastern Euphrates' left-bank affluent the Teleboas (the stream draining the plain of Mush), they found themselves passing out of Armenia, not into Urartu, but into another Armenia called 'the Armenia to the West'.⁶ This valley of the Teleboas and the

¹ See p. 119, with n. 7, above.

² See pp. 604–11, above.

³ Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 5 (C 528).

⁴ See pp. 603–4, above.

⁵ See pp. 628–32, above.

⁶ See Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book IV, chap. iv, § 4.

section of the Eastern Euphrates Valley into which it opened¹ thus lay on the Armenian side of the boundary between Armenia and Urartu in the Achaemenian Age; but in the Assyrian Age they had lain inside the Urartian Kingdom's frontiers. The conquest of this piece of territory by King Menuas of Urartu (*regnabat circa* 828–785 B.C.)² is recorded in an inscription on a stele found near Mush in the village of Trmd.³ We may perhaps infer that during the bout of anarchy in South-West Asia at the turn of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., between the collapse of the Assyrian and the establishment of the Median Power, Gurdi's Mushkian war-band which was then overrunning the former Assyrian territory of Naïri in the Tigris Basin overran the former Urartian territory in the Teleboas Valley as well, and that, when the Medes eventually imposed their rule on the autochthonous Urartians and on the intrusive Mushkians alike, they respected this accomplished fact in settling the boundary between an Urartu which they were incorporating into Media itself and an Armenia which they were making into a sub-empire within a Median Commonwealth.

If the valley of the Teleboas had in fact thus been transferred from Urartu to Armenia at some date between the end of the Assyrian and the beginning of the Median Age, this might prove to be the explanation of two puzzling pieces of nomenclature. In the first place it might explain how the Mushkian (i.e. Phrygian) followers of Gurdi,⁴ who, in their own language, called themselves Haik,⁵ came to be known in the Achaemenian official terminology neither as Haik nor as Mushki nor as Gordians, but as 'Arminiya'. This Old Persian ethnicon of a place-name 'Arminiya' may represent the Urartian word Urmeniuhi-ni which occurs in Menuas' inscription found in the neighbourhood of Mush as the name of one of the conquered local cities which he had rased to the ground; and, in confirming the cession of this Urartian canton called Urmeniuhi-ni to the Mushki intruders who called themselves Haik, the Medes, and the Persians after them, may have labelled these new owners of this transferred piece of Urartian territory with the Urartian local place-name. If this conjecture carried conviction, it might also explain why the *dahyāuš* that is labelled 'Arminiya' or 'Armina' in the Old Persian text of the Achaemenian official lists is labelled 'Ū-ra-aš-tu' (i.e. 'Urartu') in the Babylonian texts. Now that Urartu, save for the one district of Urmeniuhi-ni, had been swallowed up in the *dahyāuš* labelled 'Māda', the Babylonian archivists might have applied the label 'Urartu' to a *dahyāuš* which contained the only piece of ex-Urartian territory that had not lost its identity and that had been labelled with its historic Urartian local name in the Old Persian official nomenclature.⁶

¹ The two districts together constituted the Tarônitis of Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 5 (C 528).

² According to Adontz, *op. cit.*, pp. 185 and 193.

³ See Adontz, *op. cit.*, pp. 153–4 and 221, and Prášek, J. V.: *Geschichte der Meder und Perser* (Gotha 1906, Perthes, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 148.

⁴ See pp. 604–5, above.

⁵ Presumably taking this name from their jumping-off ground in a Hayasa, to the north-west of the north-western elbow of the Western Euphrates (*Turcičê Frat Su*, *alias* Qāra Su), which eventually acquired the name 'Lesser Armenia' (see p. 610, n. 2, above).

⁶ This tentative explanation of the origin of the name 'Arminiya' or 'Armina' is, of

'The Armenia to the West', which Xenophon and his comrades entered in entering the valley of the Teleboas, must in 401 B.C. have been a separate province of the Achaemenian Empire from the 'Armenia' which they had entered when they had left the country of the Kardoukhai behind them in crossing from the south to the north bank of the Centritês (Bohtân); for these two Armenias were under the administration of different viceroys: 'Armenia' under Orontes and Artuchas;¹ 'the Armenia to the West' under Tiribazus.² The portion of 'Armenia' through which they marched from the north bank of the Centritês to the headwaters of the Eastern Tigris was the province which the Assyrians had called Ulluba³ and which the post-Alexandrine Hellenic geographers were to call Arzanânê; and the village, containing a residence for the viceroy, through which they passed *en route*,⁴ will have been the seat of administration for Orontes' and Artuchas' viceroyalty. As for Tiribazus's viceroyalty 'the Armenia to the West', its name indicates that it must have included the westernmost parts of Armenia Proper, and this means that it must have extended westwards from the Tarônitis down the valley of the Eastern Euphrates (*Turcicê Murâd Su*) through Acilisênê⁵ into the extreme north-west corner of the Upper Euphrates Basin, beyond the right bank of the Western Euphrates (*Turcicê Frat Su*, *alias* Qâra Su), which the Hittites had called Hayasa and which, in the Roman Age of Hellenic history, eventually came to be labelled 'Armenia Minor' to indicate that it was the only piece of Armenian territory left outside the 'Armenia Major' which King Artaxias and his successors had united under the sovereignty of their house since 190 B.C.⁶ We may also presume that 'the Armenia to the West', which Tiribazus was administering in 401 B.C., included Sophênê, the

course, highly speculative. One alternative possible derivation for 'Armina' is 'Erimena', the name of the father of the last known king of Urartu, Rusas III (*regnabat* 610-585 B.C. according to Adontz, *op. cit.*, p. 193). Another possible derivation is 'Arumu-ni', meaning the country of the Arameans who had flooded out of the North Arabian Steppe into Nairi at the turn of the second and the last millennium B.C. (see p. 604, above) and whose name had eventually come to the ears of Hellenic explorers of the southern shore of the Black Sea as the 'Armoi' of the *Iliad*, Book II, line 783. This last of our three alternative etymologies for the name 'Armina' is commended by the Upper Tigris Basin's latter-day name 'Diyâr Bakr', which signifies in Arabic the lands occupied by an Arab Nomad tribe called the Bakr which had pushed its way in from Mesopotamia some time before the Muslim Arab conquest of the Upper Tigris Basin (see Le Strange, G.: *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge 1905, University Press), p. 86. On this analogy it might be conjectured that the Upper Tigris Basin had derived its Old Persian name 'Armina', representing an Urartian 'Arumu-ni', from a previous wave of Semitic-speaking Nomad immigrants from the South.

¹ See Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book IV, chap. iii, §§ 3-4.

² See *ibid.*, chap. iv, § 4.

³ See Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book IV, chap. iv, § 2.

⁴ See Forrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-87.

⁵ Strabo makes Acilisênê march with Sophênê along the Antitaurus (i.e. along the watershed between the Upper Tigris Basin and the Upper Euphrates Basin) and also lie between the Taurus and the Euphrates valley bottom ('potamia') above the point where this bends southward (*Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 2 (C 527)). The two indications in this passage can be reconciled if 'the Taurus' here means the Dersim Mountains in the quadrilateral between the two arms of the Euphrates, and if 'the Euphrates' here means the Eastern Euphrates (*Turcicê Murâd Su*). Acilisênê would then be approximately coextensive with the latter-day Turkish vilayet of Kharput. Another passage (*Geographica*, Book XII, chap. iii, § 28 (C 555)), in which Strabo says that Acilisênê is demarcated by the Euphrates from Armenia Minor, would be reconcilable with the previous passage if, in this second passage, 'the Euphrates' means the Western Euphrates (*Turcicê Frat Su*, *alias* Qâra Su).

⁶ See pp. 626-7, above, and 664-6, below.

Armenian canton in the Upper Tigris Basin¹ which lay immediately to the west of Arzanênê.

If these were approximately the bounds of 'the Armenia to the West' which was one of the political divisions of the Achaemenian Empire in 401 B.C., Tiribazus's viceroyalty was perhaps the matrix of an Armenian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire, with its capital at Arsamosata in the lower valley of the Eastern Euphrates, in the neighbourhood of Kharpût, whose King Xerxes² was brought to heel by the Seleucid King Antiochus III *circa* 212 B.C.³ Since Xerxes was subsequently liquidated by his Seleucid conqueror,⁴ it looks as if Xerxes' *ci-devant* kingdom, and Tiribazus's *ci-devant* viceroyalty, survived in an Armenian province of the Seleucid Monarchy—consisting of Acilisênê, Sophênê, Odomantis,⁵ 'and other territories'—whose military governor, Zariadris,⁶ declared his independence after his former Seleucid master Antiochus III's catastrophic defeat by the Romans in 190 B.C.⁷

Zariadris' Armenian successor-state of the Seleucid Empire did not include 'Armenia Minor', to the north-west of the north-western elbow of the Western Euphrates, since we know⁸ that, soon after the year 183 B.C., Armenia Minor was under the rule of a 'satrap' of its own, named Mithradates, whose acts show that, notwithstanding his title, he was an independent prince *de facto*. We do not know whether this *de facto* independence had been acquired by Armenia Minor at the time of the fall of the Achaemenian Empire or at the time of the liquidation of Xerxes of Arsamosata or at the time of Zariadris of Sophênê's secession from the Seleucid Empire in 190 B.C. We do know, however, that Zariadris had a brother military governor of a sister Armenian province of the Seleucid Empire who seceded simultaneously, and that the Armenian province which this colleague of Zariadris' named Artaxias was administering at the time lay on the middle course of the River Aras, in the district where, at some date between 190 and 183 B.C.,⁹ he laid out a new capital which he called Artaxata after his own name.

¹ Strabo, in his *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 2 (C 527), states that Sophênê lay between Mount Masius (i.e. the watershed between the Upper Tigris Basin and the Khabûr Basin) and the Antitaurus (i.e. the watershed between the Upper Tigris Basin and the Upper Euphrates Basin).

² The name of this King Xerxes of Arsamosata was perhaps commemorated in the name of the province called Xerxênê or Deroxênê (the latter-day Dersim) astride the Western Euphrates above Acilisênê and Armenia Minor and below the Caranitis.

³ See Polybius, Book VIII, chap. 23 (25), as interpreted by Edwyn Bevan in *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Edward Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 15–16.

⁴ See Bevan, *ibid.*

⁵ Odomantis is likely, to judge by its Macedonian name, to have lain on the Mesopotamian side of Mount Masius, between an Anthemusias and a Mygdonia which had likewise been named after cantons of the Seleucids' Macedonian homeland.

⁶ The name "Zariadris" obviously contains as its first element Avestan "za'ri-", Sanskrit "hari-", meaning "yellow, gold-coloured, yellow-green". In trying to identify its second element, the -dr- in "Zariadris" makes me think of Avestan "vazra-", Sanskrit "vajra-" (the first element in Old Persian "vazraka", meaning "great"), with Median z = Old Persian d from Indo-European ĝ(h), meaning the club of Indra in Sanskrit, which was the thunderbolt or lightning. So "Zariadris" = "za'ri-vadri-š" or "za'ri-vazri-š", meaning "having (or wielding) the yellow club (the lightning)".—Note by Professor R. G. Kent.

⁷ See Strabo, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 5 (C 528) and § 15 (C 531–2).

⁸ See Bevan, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 123.

⁹ This must be the *terminus ante quem*, if Strabo (*Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 6 (C 528)) is correct in reporting that Artaxias employed Hannibal's services in this piece of town-planning.

If, in Achaemenian parlance, the name 'Armina' or 'Arminiya' had signified, as we have argued that it did, not the former Chaldian Kingdom of Urartu, but its western neighbours Hayasa (*Latinè* Armenia Minor) and Naïri (*Latinè* Acilisênê, Sophênê, and Arzanênê), which, at the moment of the collapse of the Assyrian Empire, had been overrun by Gurdi's war-band of Phrygian-speaking Mushki barbarians, the Haik, it is surprising to find the name Armenia adhering, in 190 B.C., to a district on the course of the Middle Aras which not only lay, as the Teleboas Valley likewise lay, within the former frontiers of the Kingdom of Urartu, but was actually situated in the extreme north-eastern corner of the Kingdom of Urartu's former domain, at the farthest possible remove from the region, adjoining the western and south-western frontiers of Urartu, which had been overrun by Gurdi's war-band at the turn of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. At what date, and in what circumstances, had the name 'Armenia' come, by the year 190 B.C., to extend as far afield as the middle course of the Aras Valley, where at that date Artaxias was administering an Armenian province on the Seleucid Monarchy's behalf, and where, after declaring his independence, he founded the city of Artaxata?

Recollecting that, in the Achaemenian official lists, the Old Persian name 'Armina' is rendered as 'Urartu' in the Babylonian versions of the texts, we might be inclined, on first thoughts, to jump to the conclusion that, when Gurdi's war-band had crossed the north-western elbow of the Western Euphrates (Frat Su, *alias* Qāra Su) towards the close of the seventh century B.C., they had overrun, not only the Assyrian dominions in Naïri and the Teleboas Valley, but the whole of the adjoining Kingdom of Urartu as well, and that, in consequence, Urartu had been brigaded by Median and Persian empire-builders with Naïri and Hayasa to constitute the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* called 'Armina' within a sub-empire that also included both Cappadocia and the strip of country between Armina and the Black Sea, instead of being brigaded with the Urmīyah Basin (Matianê) and Adiabênê to constitute Herodotus's Taxation District No. 18 within a Greater Media. Might not this association be just another of Herodotus's blunders? And would not the identification of Xenophon's 'Armenia' with Urartu, and of Xenophon's 'Armenia to the West' with Naïri plus Hayasa, make sense of Xenophon's data as well as Strabo's? This explanation of the adhesion of the name 'Armina' to the middle course of the River Aras in 190 B.C. would be an attractively simple one, but, on further consideration, we shall see that, after all, it will not fit the facts.

In the first place, Xenophon's 'Armenia', which lay in the Upper Tigris Basin between the north bank of the River Centritês (Bohtān) and the Tigris-Euphrates watershed, can hardly have formed part of the same Achaemenian viceroyalty as Urartu if the Teleboas Valley belonged to a different viceroyalty called 'the Armenia to the West', since the head of the Teleboas Valley is traversed by the only practicable route between the Upper Tigris Basin and the Basin of Lake Van, which had been the former Kingdom of Urartu's nucleus and heart, so that an 'Armenia to the West' that comprised the Teleboas Valley

would virtually have insulated 'Armenia' and Urartu from one another. In the second place the passage (whatever its provenance may be) in which Strabo informs us that, in 190 B.C., the middle valley of the River Aras was already Armenian territory, contains further information which indicates that this was the only part of the former domain of the Kingdom of Urartu that, at this date, was, as yet, Armenian. Strabo not only states explicitly¹ that Armenia had been 'a small country' down to the time of Zariadris' and Artaxias' simultaneous declarations of independence in 190 B.C.; he goes on, in this passage and in a subsequent one,² to give a catalogue of the successive territorial acquisitions by which Artaxias and his successors progressively built up a Kingdom of Armenia Major which, in Strabo's own day, extended from the east bank of the Western Euphrates to the western shore of the Caspian Sea round the debouchure of the rivers Aras and Kur, and from the watershed between the Khabûr and the Tigris along Mount Masius to the south bank of the River Kur and to the farther side of its head-waters.

This progressive aggrandisement of Artaxias' Armenian kingdom was crowned by his descendant Tigranes' annexation of the sister Armenian kingdom of the House of Zariadris;³ but this eventual preponderance of the Artaxiads over the Zariadrids was the cumulative result of a previous progressive expansion of the Artaxiad dominions in other quarters at the expense of divers non-Armenian peoples and states; and, in this context, Strabo gives us three pieces of information which throw light on our present problem. In the first place the Armenian language—i.e. the historic Armenian language, of Indo-European origin, which had been carried from Hayasa to the east side of the Euphrates by Gurdi's Phrygian-speaking Mushki followers whose own name for themselves was 'Haik'—had become the common language of the heterogeneous population of Armenia Major only as a consequence of the political unification of all these peoples under the Artaxiad Crown. In the second place, one of the countries at whose expense the Artaxiads had enlarged their dominions had been Media. In the third place the Median territories which the Artaxiads had annexed to their expanding Kingdom of Armenia Major had been Kaspianê, Phaunitis, and Basoropeda.⁴

Of these three territories which, according to Strabo, had previously belonged to Media, one, namely Basoropeda (*Armeniaccè* Vaspuragan), lay on the east side of the Van Basin in the heart of Urartu and therefore within the limits of the canton which Herodotus calls 'Alarodioi' and which he associates, not with Armenia, but with the Saspeires and the Matiênoi who, together with these Alarodioi, constitute, as we have seen,⁵ his Taxation District No. 18. Another of the three ex-Median districts annexed by the Artaxiads, namely Kaspianê, lay in the Lower Aras-Kur Basin and is assigned by Herodotus, as we have likewise seen,⁶ to his Taxation District No. 15, labelled 'Sakai and Kaspioi'. We must infer that in 190 B.C. both the Lower Aras-Kur Basin and the

¹ In *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xiv, § 5 (C 528).

² *Ibid.*, § 15 (C 531-2).

³ *Ibid.*, § 15 (C 532).

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 5 (C 528).

⁵ On pp. 628-32, above.

⁶ On pp. 626-8, above.

Van Basin were still Median, and not yet Armenian, in the political sense, and *a fortiori* that they were then still non-Armenian-speaking countries, considering that, according to Strabo, the Armenian language made its way there only in the wake of the Artaxiad House's conquests.

The Media to which these two districts thus still belonged in 190 B.C. will have been the Media Atropatênê (the latter-day Azerbaijan) that was one of the Iranian successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire; and we may infer that, in the scramble for possession of the former Achaemenian dominions after the overthrow of the last Darius by Alexander, the territories on which Atropates, the founder of the successor-state that came to be called after him, had succeeded in laying hands had been the Herodotean Taxation District No. 18, save for Adiabênê, together with the Herodotean Taxation District No. 15. Media Atropatênê will have continued to hold the portions of these ex-Achaemenian territories comprised in Kaspianê, Basoropeda (Vas-puragan), and the Phaunîtis until it lost them to a rising Artaxiad Power at some date subsequent to the year 190 B.C. But, like the Basin of Lake Van, which still belonged to Media Atropatênê at that date, the middle valley of the River Aras, which was the nucleus of the Artaxiad Kingdom and which was already Armenian in 190 B.C., had been part of the former Kingdom of Urartu and must therefore likewise have been included in the Herodotean Taxation District No. 18 originally. At what date, then, had this section of the Aras Valley become Armenian instead of Median?

In the absence of any other information on this point, we can only say that there is no evidence to indicate that the transfer had taken place until after the fall of the Achaemenian Empire, while there is one piece of evidence which suggests that the district in the middle valley of the Aras, of which Artaxias was military governor, on behalf of the Seleucid King Antiochus III, in 190 B.C., may have been taken from Media Atropatênê and annexed to Armenia by Antiochus III himself after his liquidation of the Armenian King Xerxes of Arsamosata at some date after his subjugation of Xerxes in 212 B.C. The conqueror, whoever he may have been, who annexed the middle valley of the Aras to Armenia must have arrived there by forcing his way into the Aras Basin up the valley of the Western Euphrates and over the Frat Su (Qāra Su)-Aras watershed; and, if there is any substance in our conjecture¹ that the name of the province called Derxênê (Xerxênê), astride the Western Euphrates immediately above Acilisênê, commemorates Xerxes of Arsamosata's conquest and annexation of this district, we may further infer that Derxênê also marks the limit of Xerxes' conquests in this direction. If so, the middle course of the Aras must have been annexed to Armenia by some successor of Xerxes; and his only successor, down to the year 190 B.C., had been Antiochus III.

On this showing, we may abide by our previous finding that, in the Achaemenian Age, no portion of the former Kingdom of Urartu except the Teleboas Valley (the Tarônîtis) was included in the *dahyāuš* whose Old Persian name was 'Armina', notwithstanding the fact that the

¹ On p. 663, n. 2, above.

official Babylonian rendering of 'Armina' is 'Urartu'; and we may confirm our identification of the Achaemenian 'Armina' with a territory confined to the Upper Tigris Basin and the north-west corner of the Upper Euphrates Basin, corresponding to the Assyrian 'Naïri' together with the Hittite 'Hayasa'.¹

The peoples lying between Armenia Proper and the Black Sea whose country was embraced, on the political map, in the Viceroyalty of Armenia, while it constituted, on the fiscal map, the Herodotean Taxation District No. 19, were, as enumerated by Herodotus in his gazetteer and rearranged in their apparent geographical sequence from east to west, the refugee *Mâres* who had inherited their name from the Hurrian or perhaps Eurasian Nomad 'mariannu'² and were to bequeath it to the latter-day Georgian canton Imerethia in the upper basin of the River Rhion (Phasis); the refugee *Moskhoi* who were to bequeath their name to the latter-day Georgian canton Meskhethi round the headwaters of the River Kur; the *Makrônes* on the northward descent from the watershed on which, in 400 B.C., Xenophon and his comrades were to catch their first glimpse of the Black Sea;³ the *Mossynoikoi* along the seaboard to the west of Trebizond;⁴ and the *Tibarênoi* along the seaboard to the west of the Mossynoikoi.⁵

The Herodotean Taxation District No. 19, which these peoples occupied between them, must have been bounded on the west, like Armina, by the Viceroyalty of Katpatuka, and on the east by 'the Kolkhoi and adjoining peoples as far as the Caucasus Range' who, according to Herodotus,⁶ were 'gift-bringers' and not tax-payers. In 400 B.C. there were Colchians astride the road leading from the country of the Makrônes to Trebizond;⁷ and, if, in the Achaemenian Age, the Colchians occupied the seaboard without a break from this point eastwards to the Caucasus, they must have insulated the Mâres and Moskhoi from the Makrônes, Mossynoikoi, and Tibarênoi—unless the Mâres and Moskhoi were at this time located somewhere farther to the west than the Georgian cantons that were eventually to be called after them.⁸ However that may

¹ In this connexion it is noteworthy that, in the field-state of Xerxes expeditionary force (Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 73), the Armenians are associated, not with the Urartians ('Alarodioi'), but with the Phrygians and other peoples of Central Anatolia. They are equipped like, and are brigaded with, the Phrygians (of whom they are stated, in this passage, to be an offshoot); and the Armeno-Phrygian equipment is described as being a sub-variety of the Paphlagonian. We may guess that the culture represented by this equipment was really Hittite rather than Paphlagonian in origin.

² See the Note on Chronology in x. 200-2.

³ See Xenophon, op. cit., Book IV, chap. vii, § 27, and chap. viii, § 1.

⁴ See *ibid.*, Book V, chap. iv.

⁵ See *ibid.*, Book V, chap. v, §§ 1-3.

⁶ In Book III, chap. 97.

⁷ See Xenophon, op. cit., Book IV, chap. viii, §§ 8-9.

⁸ In Anatolia, as in Iran, the brigading of the national contingents, as described in the field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force, partly cuts across their grouping for civil administrative purposes, as described in the gazetteer of Darius's taxation districts. The two peoples at the two extremities of District No. 19—the Moskhoi and the Tibarênoi—are brigaded under one command; the Makrônes and Mossynoikoi under another; and the Mâres with the Colchians, who were a non-tax-paying people not included within the bounds of the Nineteenth District. To judge by Herodotus's description of their equipment, the Colchians, as well as all the peoples of the Nineteenth District, belonged to the same cultural group as the Saspeires and the Alarodioi. The Tibarênoi, Makrônes, and Mossynoikoi are paraded in Moschian equipment, the Kolkhoi, Alarodioi, and

be, Herodotus's 'Kolkhoi and adjoining peoples as far as the Caucasus Range' seem more likely than the peoples in his Taxation District No. 19 to represent the *Ākaufačiyā* ('the People of the Mountains') whose name appears in 'XPh' alone among the official lists.

The Kingdom called *Cilicia* in Greek and *Khilakku* in Assyrian is left unmentioned in the official lists of *dahyāva* in deference to its juridical status of sovereign independence, though its *de facto* relation to the Achaemenian Empire may be more accurately conveyed by Herodotus in his erroneous inclusion of it among Darius's original twenty taxation districts as his District No. 4.¹

At the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. Khilakku had been merely one of nine or ten petty principalities in South-Eastern Anatolia, between the Upper Euphrates and the Upper Halys, over which the Assyrians had asserted a suzerainty that had been short-lived and at no time very firmly established; but, in the subsequent scramble at the turn of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. for Assyria's derelict dominions, Khilakku had distinguished herself from her neighbours by her Autolycean deftness as 'a snapper-up of unconsidered trifles'² and by the tact—almost equal to the Vicar of Bray's—with which she had succeeded in keeping on good terms with surrounding Great Powers who were on bad terms with one another. The measure of her achievement was that, after having enlarged her original patrimony four- or five-fold, she had succeeded, without having to forfeit any of her territorial gains, in securing a place for herself within the framework of the Achaemenian universal state on the juridical footing of a sovereign independent ally of the Imperial Power.

Three indications of the *tracée* of the Kingdom of Cilicia's expanded frontiers within the Achaemenian imperial framework are to be found in Herodotus's history. This Achaemenian Cilicia marched with the Viceroyalty of Armenia along a navigable section of the River Euphrates where the Great North-West Road crossed the river out of Armenia into Cilicia.³ On the Mediterranean shore—and the once land-locked statelet of Cilicia now had a long and valuable coastline on the Mediterranean—the boundary between Cilicia and the Viceroyalty of Syria was Cape Posidëium (*Arabichè Ras-al-Basit*), that is to say, a point on the coast to the south of the mouth of the River Orontes.⁴ On the Anatolian Plateau, in the region containing the city of Mazaka—where, on a post-Alexandrine Hellenic map, the name 'Cilicia' still attached to one of the provinces of a latter-day Kingdom of Inland Cappadocia—the Kingdom of Cilicia in the Achaemenian Age bestrode the River Halys from a point below the river's exit from the Armenian highlands where it had its source to a point beyond its southward bend where Cilicia gave way on the right bank to the country of the Western Matiënoi and on the left bank to Phrygia.⁵

Saspeires in sub-Moschian equipment. We may guess that the culture represented by this equipment was really Urartian rather than Mushkian in its origin.

¹ See pp. 592-3, above.

² Shakspeare: *The Winter's Tale*, Act IV, scene ii.

³ Herodotus, Book V, chap. 52.

⁴ Book III, chap. 91.

⁵ Book I, chap. 72.

In terms of the political geography of the Assyrian Age, these indications tell us that, to the south, Khilakku had annexed at least six once independent principalities: Tukhāna (*Graecè* Tyana) and Atuna or Tuna (*Graecè* Tynna) between the original Khilakku and the Taurus Range; Tabal (Bit Burutash) in the Antitaurus; Qu'e¹ (*Graecè* Akhaioi);² Sam'al³ in the North Amanus; and Unqi, astride the lower reaches of the River Orontes, where first Antigonos Monophthalmus and then Seleucus Nicâtôr was to choose the site for the capital city of a South-West Asian empire.⁴ To the east, Khilakku must have annexed at least two principalities, for, as we have seen,⁵ the Cilician territory on the west bank of the Euphrates into which the Great North-West Road ran after crossing the river out of Armenia must have been the region round Malatīyah (*Graecè* Melitênê, *Assyriacè* Meliddu), and Khilakku could not have annexed Meliddu without having also annexed at least the intervening south-western part of the principality of Kammanu.⁶

We may also guess that Khilakku had acquired Kummukhu (*Graecè* Commagênê) along the Euphrates immediately to the south of Meliddu and immediately to the north of the river's western elbow, and Gurgum (whose capital Marqasi was to bequeath its name to Mar'ash) between Kummukhu and Sam'al. On the other hand the Babylonians must have managed to lay hands on Carchemish, Arpaddu, and Til Turi between the elbow of the Euphrates and the eastern frontiers of Sam'al and Unqi; for they undoubtedly had access overland, through territory of their own, from the elbow of the Euphrates to their dominions in Ebir-nari. Again, Herodotus's itinerary of the Great North-West Road informs us that Til-Garimmu—a province of Kammanu in the upper basin of the Tokhma Su right-bank tributary of the Euphrates, immediately adjoining Meliddu to the north-west—must also have lain outside the bounds of the Kingdom of Cilicia and must have been included within the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* Katpatuka.

We can be sure of this because Herodotus tells us⁷ that, from the point where the Great North-West Road entered Cilicia after crossing the Euphrates out of Armenia, this road ran through Cilician territory for the distance of only 15½ parasangs (just over 89 kilometres); and, on the assumption that the point of entry into Cilicia was the river-crossing on the road from Kharpūt to Malatīyah, Herodotus's figure yields us

¹ Qu'e, with its well-placed ports and with the largest area of prime agricultural land to be found anywhere in Anatolia west of Lydia and the Dascylitis, was Khilakku's greatest prize.

² Hyp-Akhaioi according to Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 91.

³ The name survived as late as A.H. 163, in the reign (A.D. 775–85) of the 'Abbasid Caliph Mahdī (see Ahmad al-Balādhuri: *Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān*, vol. i, translated by P. K. Hitti (New York 1916, Columbia University Press), pp. 263–4).

⁴ See p. 201, above.

⁵ On p. 629, n. 4, *ad finem*, above.

⁶ While this principality of Kammanu that was Khilakku's eastern neighbour perhaps derived its name from the city of Comana, the latter-day province of the Kingdom of Inland Cappadocia called Chammanênê, in the bend of the Halys where Herodotus locates the Western Matienoi, was possibly called after Prince Kamanā or Kamamas (? *Hebraicè* Haman, *Graecè* Haimôn) of Carchemish, whose father King Aias campaigned in South-East Anatolia in the first half of the eighth century B.C. (see Cavaignac, E.: *Le Problème Hittite* (Paris 1936, Leroux), p. 165; Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, La Renaissance du Livre), pp. 335–6).

⁷ In Book V, chap. 52.

two pieces of information: from the Euphrates crossing the road must have run north-westwards over the Uzun Yaila to Sivas in the upper valley of the Qyzyl İrmâq (Halys), and it must have run out of Cilicia into Cappadocia only a short distance to the north-west of Malatīyah town, that is to say, at the boundary between the former principality of Meliddu and Til-Garimmu.¹ Herodotus's figure of 15½ parasangs allows of no other location for this sector of the frontier between Cilicia and Cappadocia, and *a fortiori* it allows of no other alinement for the Great North-West Road in this stretch; for either of the two alternative routes running westward from Malatīyah via Mazaca (the latter-day Qaysari), in contrast to either of those running north-westward from Malatīyah via Sivas, would carry the road through what must indubitably have been Cilician territory for many times the distance—only 15½ parasangs—that Herodotus gives for this Cilician section. An alinement via Sivas also has two other points in its favour: it would allow for the at first sight surprisingly long distance of 104 parasangs which Herodotus gives for the Cappadocian section of the road from the Cilician-Cappadocian frontier to the crossing of the Halys out of Cappadocia (in the narrower sense) into Phrygia; and it would allow for an alinement through Hattusas (Boghazqal'eh), the site of the former capital of the Hittite Empire, which must once have been the centre from which all roads in Eastern Anatolia radiated.

What were the affinities of the people, called Khilakku in Assyrian and Kilikes in Greek, who had built this miniature empire *circa* 600 B.C.? When the principality of Khilakku makes its first appearance in history at the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. it has Mita's Mushki

¹ Herodotus tells us that, where the road crossed the Cilico-Cappadocian frontier, it ran through a pair of gates and passed by a pair of guard-houses. This description in the Herodotean itinerary of the Great North-West Road is to be interpreted in the light of an eyewitness's account of the security arrangements on the Cilico-Syrian frontier in 401 B.C. At this point in their anabasis, Xenophon and his comrades passed through a pair of gates in a pair of walls extending from the Mediterranean shoreline to the cliffs overhanging it. The north wall was manned by a Cilician garrison, the south wall (in normal times) by an imperial garrison, and there was a no-man's-land, three hundred yards wide, in between (Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book I, chap. iv, §§ 4-5). Evidently this was the layout at road-crossings between autonomous and imperial territory where there was no frontier river to provide a natural insulator such as the Euphrates provided between Cilicia and Armenia, and the Lower Khabûr between Arabāya and Syria. There were gates, for example, between Arabāya and Bābiruṣ (see *ibid.*, chap. v, § 5); and Xenophon's mention of a pair of guard-houses, as well as a pair of gates, on the frontier between Cilicia and Syria suggests that, on the Great North-West Road, the pair of gates mentioned by Herodotus may have been located at the point, a few miles to the north-west of Melitēnē on the more easterly of the two Melitēnē-Sebasteia roads, which is labelled 'praetorium' in the Roman itineraries (see J. G. C. Anderson's map *Asia Minor* (London 1903, John Murray)).

It may be noted, in passing, that Xenophon's account of his itinerary shows that the territory of the 'sovereign independent' Kingdom of Cilicia had been drastically reduced, since the date of Herodotus's official sources, by the Imperial Power which was in theory Cilicia's ally. In 401 B.C. Dana (i.e. Tyana) was already part of an Imperial Viceroyalty of Cappadocia (Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book I, chap. ii, § 20); and this means that the Imperial Government must have detached from Cilicia by this time not only Tyana but the Cilicia astride the River Halys which had been the historical nucleus of the Cilician Kingdom. Moreover, the pair of gates and guard-houses which in 401 B.C. marked the frontier between Cilicia and an Imperial Viceroyalty of Syria stood between the shore of the Mediterranean and the cliffs of the Amanus on the east coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta (*ibid.*, chap. iv, §§ 1-5); and this means that by this time the former principality of Unqi had been transferred from Cilicia to Syria. Thus by 401 B.C. Cilicia had already been reduced to its latter-day limits between the Taurus and the Amanus.

for its neighbours on the south-west in Lycaonia and the ubiquitous Gurdi's Mushki for its neighbours first on the south, in Tyana, in the reign of Tiglath-Pileser III of Assyria (*regnabat* 746-727 B.C.),¹ and then on the north-east in Til-Garimmu, astride the road running south-east via Na'iri to Assyria, in 695 B.C.² Our line of least resistance would be to guess that the Khilakku were Phrygians like their neighbours; and this guess would not conflict with the Hellenic evidence; for, in the earliest appearance of the Kilikes in Hellenic literature, they are located in the south-west corner of Hellespontine Phrygia, at the head of the Gulf of Edremid (Adramyttium), in Thêbê under Mount Plakos. Hector's wife Andromachê was one of them, and her father had been king of this north-western Cilicia till Achilles had killed him and sacked Thêbê.³ It looks as if the Kilikes had been the advance-guard of the Phrygian barbarians who had broken out of South-East Europe into the Hittite World at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. The Kilikes who had settled at Thêbê would be a detachment that had wheeled to the right after their passage from the European to the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles; the Khilakku of Mazaka would be a detachment that had wheeled to the left, marched eastwards along the plain between Dascylium and the Mysian Olympus, and climbed on to the Anatolian Plateau at In Önü, like their Hittite predecessors and like their Galatian successors some fifteen hundred years later.

Herodotus's Taxation District No. 3, which included the *dahyāuš* called *Katpatuka* (Cappadocia), had two peculiarities. The first of these was its size. From the upper basin of the Tokhma Su tributary of the Euphrates and from the upper reaches of the Halys it extended right across Anatolia to the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, and it was broad as well as long, for there is no indication that it embraced less than the whole of Inland Phrygia, and that country extended south-westwards into the upper basin of the River Maeander. The second peculiarity of this taxation district was that it straddled a former international frontier—uniting, as it did, ex-Median territory to the east of the Middle and Lower Halys with ex-Lyidian territory to the west of it.

This feature of Herodotus's District No. 3 was peculiar without being unique, considering that his District No. 14 similarly united Harahvatiš with the three south-eastern cantons of Pārsa; and, even if there had not been this parallel case, there could not have been any doubt about the facts. The administrative union of ex-Lyidian territory to the west of the Halys with the ex-Median *dahyāuš* Katpatuka was attested by the consensus of several different pieces of evidence, positive as well as negative. In the first place it was on record that a territory administered from Dascylium, on or near the south shore of the Sea of Marmara, had been detached from Lydia since Cyrus II's day.⁴ In the second place this ex-Lyidian territory did not appear under any separate and distinctive

¹ See König, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

² See Forrer, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

³ *Iliad*, Book VI, ll. 395-7 and 414-28.

⁴ We know from Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 120, 126, and 127, that Orætes, who had been appointed Viceroy of Sardis (Sparda) by Cyrus II, had a colleague and rival named Mitribates who was governor of 'the province of Dascylium', i.e. the northern and north-eastern parts of the former Lyidian Empire (see p. 611, n. 1, above).

name of its own in any of the official lists of *dahyāva*;¹ and, among all the *dahyāva* named in any of the lists, there is no *dahyāuš* except Katpatuka to which this ex-Lyidian territory could have been attached—as it must have been attached to one or other recognized *dahyāuš* if it was not recognized as a separate one in its own right. The only *dahyāva* on the mainland of Anatolia that are named in any of the lists are Sparda (Sardis), which was the viceroyalty from which the Dascylitis had been detached; 'the Ionians on the mainland', who were insulated from Dascylium by the Viceroyalty of Sardis; Karkā (Caria), which was insulated from Dascylium *a fortiori*; and Katpatuka. The process of exhaustion seems to force upon us the conclusion that, at the dates at which all our six official lists were drawn up, the ex-Lyidian territory whose seat of administration was at Dascylium was attached to the ex-Median *dahyāuš* Katpatuka.

This conclusion, which is thus presented to the investigator by the negative evidence of the official lists taken in conjunction with Herodotus' mention of a separate governorship of Dascylium in the days of Orætes' administration at Sardis, is positively corroborated by Herodotus' description of the third taxation district in his gazetteer; for he describes this district as including, in addition to the Cappadocians (*alias* Syrioi), who lived to the east of the River Halys, five peoples who lived to the west of the Halys: namely the *Paphlagones* immediately to the west of the Lower Halys; the *Mariandynoi* to the west of the Paphlagones, in the hinterland of the Hellenic city Heraclea Pontica; the *Asiatic Thracians*, between the debouchure of the River Sangarius into the Black Sea and the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus; the *Phrygians*, whose domain extended from the southern shore of the Sea of Marmara southwards to the headwaters of the River Maeander and south-eastwards, through Lycaonia, to the north-western face of the Taurus Range; and the *Asiatic Hellespontine Hellenes* along the Anatolian shore of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles. The names of two other peoples in this district—the *Western Matiēnoi* within the southward bend of the River Halys and the enigmatic *Ligyes*—are added in the field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force.²

¹ Arguments against the conjecture that this continental territory may be the *dahyāuš* designated by the label 'those in the Sea' are set out on p. 679, n. 1, below.

² See Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 72, and, for the Western Matiēnoi, also Book I, chap. 72. The evidence about the location of the Western Matiēnoi is examined in the Note on Chronology in x. 201. As for the Ligyes, it is not inconceivable that they might have been the left wing of the Latin-speaking people whose right wing comes into the light of history in the second century B.C. along the French and Italian Riviera and in the North-Western Apennines. The Hittites themselves were an Indo-European-speaking people of the centum group whose language—extant in some of the documents in the Hittite Imperial Archives retrieved at Boghazkal'eh—was considered by Modern Western philologists to have a closer affinity with Latin than with any other Indo-European language. In this connexion it might be noted that the Illyrians—another Indo-European-speaking people of the centum group who on the European side of the Black Sea Straits were at this time wedged in between the Italic and the Thracians—had also made their way into Anatolia, to judge by the name of the Mount Ellurya (i.e. Illyria) which figures in the political geography of the Hittite World in the second millennium B.C. as the scene of a battle between the Hittites and the Gasga in the sixteenth year of Mursil II's reign (see Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, La Renaissance du Livre), p. 122). An immigration of Illyrian peoples into Anatolia is also attested by the name of the Veneti, occupying a strip of the Anatolian coast to the east of the Mariandynoi, whom the field-state of the Trojans' allies in the Second Book of the *Iliad* (ll. 851-5) appears to equate

Another piece of information which confirms the official lists' testimony *ex silentio* that the Dascylitis was at this time united with Katpatuka is Ctesias' statement¹ that, as a prelude to Darius's campaign beyond the Bosphorus against the Scythian horde on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, the Viceroy of Cappadocia was sent on a naval reconnaissance; for the viceroyalty whose viceroy was selected for this mission is likely to have been the north-westernmost viceroyalty in the Achaemenian Empire within the imperial frontiers as these stood before Darius inaugurated the forward movement into Europe.

In the light of the divers pieces of evidence reviewed above, we may perhaps now take it as proven that the Achaemenian viceroyalty designated 'Cappadocia' by Ctesias in this passage embraced the whole of Herodotus's Taxation District No. 3, including the ex-Lyidian territory, to the west of the River Halys, that was administered from Dascylium.² But in the light of Herodotus's description of his Taxation District No. 13—if we have been right in interpreting this as the description of a viceroyalty which has been mistakenly applied by Herodotus to one of this viceroyalty's fiscal subdivisions³—we have now to ask ourselves whether the viceroyalty designated 'Cappadocia' by Ctesias may not have included other taxation districts besides Herodotus's District No. 3. If the formula 'Paktyikê and Armenioi and the adjoining peoples as far as the Black Sea' does in reality designate, not just a taxation district, but a viceroyalty embracing the three taxation districts numbered 13, 3, and 19 in Herodotus's gazetteer, then the viceroyalty in which Herodotus's Taxation District No. 3 was embraced will have united an ex-Lyidian Dascylitis not merely with an ex-Median Cappadocia, but with an ex-Median Armenia as well, and this viceroyalty will have extended eastwards from the eastern shores of the Straits not merely as far as the upper reaches of the Halys but as far as the eastern boundaries of an Achaemenian Armenia over against an Achaemenian Urartu and Adiabênê that were included in Herodotus's Taxation District No. 18 and in the Viceroyalty of Media.⁴ It will, in fact, have included all the country on the Asiatic side of the Straits that had been overrun by Phrygian invaders from Europe between the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the sixth century B.C.

This conclusion that Armenia and Cappadocia-cum-Dascylîtide together constituted a single viceroyalty in Darius's day is not impugned by the appearance of both the names 'Arminiya' and 'Katpatuka' side by side in all our six official lists. We have already noticed⁵ that at least nine of the other *dahyāvā* named in the lists never constituted either separate viceroyalties or even separate taxation districts so far as we know; and, if Modern Western scholars were right in taking the repeated

with the Paphlagonians, and by the name of the city of Dardanus, which was to cling to the straits on whose Asiatic shore this Dardanian settlement had once stood.

¹ See Ctesias: *Persica*, Books XII–XIII, § 47 (16), in J. Gilmore's edition (London 1888, Macmillan), pp. 150–1.

² Professor G. G. Cameron comments: 'Almost—but not quite—I am fully persuaded now that the Greek Dascylium is Katpatuka.'

³ See pp. 604–11, above.

⁴ The *tracée* of these boundaries is discussed on pp. 660–7, above.

⁵ On p. 589, above.

juxtaposition of names of *dahyāva* in the lists—e.g. the juxtaposition of Suguda and Bākhtriš in all six—as evidence that *dahyāva* thus bracketed together were included in one and the same viceroyalty,¹ this would apply to Arminiya and Katpatuka, which are placed next to one another, in that order, in four out of Darius's five lists (namely in 'DB', 'DPe', 'DSe', 'DNa'), while in the fifth Darian list, 'DZd', they appear to have been separated only by the single name 'Yauna'. This is presumptive evidence that, at any rate down to the end of Darius's reign, Arminiya and Katpatuka, like Bākhtriš and Suguda, were combined to constitute a single viceroyalty.²

A viceroyalty of this size proved, however, too unwieldy to be retained intact. In the field-state of Xerxes' expeditionary force the constituent peoples of the Herodotean Taxation District No. 3 alone are already distributed among no less than four separate brigades—one consisting of the Paphlagonians and Western Matiēnoi and a second of the Mariandynoi, Ligyes, and Cappadocians, while the Asiatic Thracian contingent constitutes an independent command and the Phrygians are brigaded with the Armenians of Herodotus's Taxation District No. 13. At least as early as 408 B.C., when Cyrus the Younger was appointed by his father King Darius II to an extensive civil jurisdiction and military command in Anatolia, the original Viceroyalty of Armenia-cum-Cappadocia was broken up; for Cyrus the Younger was made Viceroy of Cappadocia and of 'Great Phrygia' (i.e. Southern Phrygia), but Northern (*alias* 'Hellespontine') Phrygia was not—though Lydia was—included in his sub-empire,³ and we may gather *ex silentio* that Armenia was not included in it either. By 401 B.C. the Viceroyalty of Cappadocia had been compensated for its loss of Armenia and the two Phrygias by having been enlarged, at the expense of the Kingdom of Cilicia, by the addition of the Tyanitis⁴ and therefore also, by implication, of Cilicia-

¹ See p. 589, above.

² Since it is hardly conceivable that the whole of a viceroyalty embracing Armenia can have been administered from Dascylium, at the far western extremity of its domain, we must suppose that Orctes of Sardis' contemporary Mitrabates of Dascylium was, not a viceroy in his own right, but the lieutenant-governor of a viceroy whose seat of administration was more centrally situated. 'Lieutenant-governor' is the literal meaning of the Greek word *ὑπαρχος*, by which Herodotus designates Mitrabates in Book III, chap. 126; and, considering the vagueness of the Hellenic usage of such terms, this interpretation is not invalidated by the use of the same designation in chap. 120 for Orctes, who was certainly a viceroy and not a viceroy's subordinate. Considering that the Dascylitis must have been detached by Cyrus II from Lydia as a precautionary measure to guard against the possibility of a repetition of Paktyas' revolt (see pp. 588-9, above), we should have expected *a priori* to find the Dascylitis not merely detached from a dissident viceroyalty but attached, in order to make assurance doubly sure, to some other viceroyalty on whose loyalty Cyrus II could rely—as we may presume that he could rely on the loyalty of Armenia, in virtue of his being Astyages' heir. Even as it was, Orctes found himself able to liquidate Mitrabates and re-annex the Dascylitis to the Viceroyalty of Sardis (Sparda) during the anarchic year 522-521 B.C. If the Dascylitis had been erected into a separate viceroyalty on its own account, and had not been attached to Armenia besides being detached from Lydia, it would have remained still more helplessly exposed to the risk of aggression by an ambitious viceroy of Sardis.

³ See Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book I, chap. ix, § 7, cited on p. 183, n. 7, above, and in IX. viii. 548, n. 1. Considering that Pharnabazus, the governor of the Dascylitis, was not subordinated to Cyrus the Younger in 408 B.C., we may perhaps infer that Pharnabazus had already, before that, been a viceroy in his own right, and that his father Pharnacēs, who had been governor of the Dascylitis as early as the summer of 430 B.C. (see Thucydides, Book II, chap. 67), had previously enjoyed the same status.

⁴ See Xenophon, *op. cit.*, Book I, chap. ii, § 20.

on-Halys as well. By the same date, Armenia had not merely been detached from Cappadocia but had been partitioned into two separate viceroyalties, as we have seen.¹

The *dahyāuš* called *Sparda* in the official lists is Herodotus's Taxation District No. 2, whose constituent peoples are the *Mysoi*, *Lydoi*, *Lasonioi*, *Kabalioi*, and *Hygennees*.

The Spardiyā—whose name was adopted as the official label for this *dahyāuš* because it had already attached itself to Sardes, the city that was the seat of the local administration in virtue of having once been the capital of a Lydian Empire—were the western vanguard of the host of Eurasian Nomad peoples who had broken out of the Steppe into South-Western Asia between the Caspian Sea and the Pamirs before the end of the eighth century B.C.²

At their first emergence above our historical horizon, we see the Saparda (as the Assyrians called them), already poised on the western rim of the Iranian Plateau, astride the road leading down via Behistan towards Babylonia.³ In the third decade of the seventh century B.C. we find Esarhaddon battling with a coalition of Medes, Saparda, and Cimmerians under the leadership of the barbarian war-lord Kashtaritu (Khšathrita);⁴ and, though Assyria's victory in this round of the struggle was registered in the establishment of three new departments labelled Madai, Bit Kari, and Saparda, these territorial gains had all been lost again before 667 B.C.⁵ The next 150 years or so in the history of the Saparda are a blank; but, after leaving a trace of their westward passage in the course of those years in the Sevordi-k who long afterwards, in the eighth century of the Christian Era, were to assert themselves in Uti, in the angle above the confluence of the rivers Kur and Aras,⁶ the Spardiyā (as they are called in Old Persian) reappear in the Achaemenian official lists of *dahyāva* as the eponyms of a *dahyāuš* named Sparda at the western extremity of Anatolia in the country known in Greek as Lydia.⁷

¹ On p. 662, above.

² See pp. 608-10, above.

³ These Saparda will have been the right wing of the horde, if the same national name is to be detected in the 'Sabadioi' who are located by Ptolemy, *Geographia*, Book VI, chap. xi, § 6, in the south-east corner of Bactria.

⁴ See p. 653, with n. 2, above.

⁵ See Forrer, op. cit., p. 93; König, op. cit., pp. 27 and 37.

⁶ See p. 610, n. 2, above.

⁷ Professor G. G. Cameron comments: 'It is surely only by straining that one can connect the name of the *dahyāuš* Sparda with the Saparda in Media.' Certainly at first sight a mere accidental coincidence might seem to be the most likely explanation of the appearance of the same name in locations as far apart as Western Iran and Western Anatolia at dates separated by as long a Time-interval as 150 years. The writer offers the following reasons for thinking that a more probable explanation is to be found in the migration of a Nomad horde which had carried its name with it. (i) We know that at least one other horde, the Cimmerians, did in fact migrate, within those same 150 years, from Western Iran to Anatolia, carrying its name with it (see p. 610, n. 1, above). (ii) We know that the Saljūq Turks likewise travelled from Western Iran to Anatolia in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, and the Mongols of Hülāgū's horde in the thirteenth century. (iii) We know that in the Aras Basin, which both the Saljūqs and the Mongols traversed *en route*, the name that had made its appearance in the seventh century B.C. in Media as Saparda, and in the sixth century B.C. in Lydia as Spardiyā, was borne in the eighth century of the Christian Era by a then still extant people called Sevordi-k. The writer would submit that facts (i) and (ii) show that his explanation is credible, and that fact (iii) indicates that it is probable.

Sargon claims to have conquered Harhar and to have added Saparda to it in his sixth year (Luckenbill, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 11 and 14). In a list of receipts of tribute

We must conclude that the Spardiyā had invaded Anatolia in company with their previous associates the Cimmerians, and that they had subsequently entered the service of Alyattes King of Lydia (*regnabat circa* 614–557 B.C.) to fight for him against their former comrades. This conjecture would explain not only how their name had come to attach itself first to the capital city of Lydia and eventually to Lydia as a whole, but also how Alyattes had managed to turn the tide in Lydia's favour in her struggle with her Cimmerian assailants and also to make a beginning of the conquest of the Hellenic city-states along the west coast.¹ Alyattes' Spardiyan *foederati* will have supplied Lydia with the redoubtable cavalry who, by 585 B.C., had won for her the dominion of all Anatolia west of the River Halys and of the Kingdom of Cilicia, except for a Lycia that was shielded by mountains² and for a Miletus that could feed itself from overseas. The Achaemenian official use of the name 'Sparda' to designate Lydia must have lived on in popular usage long enough for the Jews to label the diasporā in the Roman province of Asia 'Sephardim' (i.e. 'Saparda') to distinguish them from the 'Ashkenazim' in the Scythian³ wilderness into which some of the more adventurous spirits among the diasporā had been drawn by the commercial openings along the Roman Empire's Continental European frontiers.

The Eurasian Nomad origin of the Saparda, *alias* Spardiyā, gives us a clue to the provenance of one of the peoples located in the Achaemenian *dahyāuš* 'Sparda' by Herodotus. These 'Hygennees' of the gazetteer—who must also be the people whose name has dropped out of the text of the field-state between the Asiatic Thracians and the Kabêlees⁴—are manifestly the left wing of the Sigynnai whom Herodotus locates⁵ somewhere beyond the Danube, in the hinterland of the Veneti at the head of the Adriatic. In this remote north-western settlement the Sigynnai were still advertising their Eurasian Nomad origin by continuing to wear 'Median' (i.e. Sakan) dress. The missing link between these Sigynnai in the Austrian Alps and the Hygennees in South-Western Anatolia is supplied by Strabo's description⁶ of the Siginnoui whom, in company with the Derbikes and the Kaspioi, he locates somewhere in the east-west chain of mountains constituted by the Elburz and the Caucasus.⁷

during his eighth campaign (714 B.C.), Sargon records, as received from Saparda, 'prancing horses, swift mules, camels native to their land, cattle and sheep' (Luckenbill, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 147). This is just the tribute that is to be expected from a Eurasian Nomad horde that has only recently erupted out of the Steppe. On the other hand, Professor Cameron's scepticism would be vindicated if Sargon's Saparda should prove to have been identical with the land of Shepardi which, together with Azalzi, was annexed to Assyria by Tukulti-Ninurta I in the thirteenth century B.C. (Luckenbill, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 152).

¹ See Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 15–16.

² See *ibid.*, chap. 28.

³ According to Prášek, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 115, n. 5, the 'Ashkenaz' in the latter-day text of Gen. x. 3 is a corruption of 'Ashkuz', which is the form in which the *nomen Scythicum* appears in the Assyrian records.

⁴ See Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 76.

⁵ Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xi, § 8 (C 520).

⁷ While Strabo's account of these Siginnoui agrees with Herodotus's account of his Sigynnai in the description of their peculiar breed of horses (see p. 688, below), the independence of Strabo's source is attested, not merely by the difference in geographical location, but also by the difference in the Hellenization of the name; by the labelling of the people's cultural affinity, not as 'Median', but as 'Persian'; and by the mention of

⁶ In Book V, chap. 9.

As for the other peoples mentioned in Herodotus's description of his Taxation District No. 2, the Mysoi, in the highlands between Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia, are convicted, by the survival of their name in the Lower Danube Basin in the form 'Moesi', of having been one of the Phrygian-speaking barbarian peoples who had broken out of South-Eastern Europe into the north-west corner of the Hittite World in the second millennium B.C.

The Kabêlees, whose name reappears on the post-Alexandrine Hellenic map of Anatolia in the names Cabalia and Cibyra, to the north-west of the Lycian Milyas, and who figure on the Hittite map of Anatolia as the principality of Hapalla, must have occupied the country between the south-east border of Lydia and the north-west border of Pisidia. Herodotus associates the Kabêlees (Kabalioi) with the Lydians in calling both of them 'Mēiones',¹ and Strabo supports this association by his statement² that Lydian was one of four languages that were current in the Cibyrâtis. At the same time the Kabêlees also had cultural associations with their eastern neighbours, to judge by Herodotus's parade of both the Kabêlees and the Lasonioi in a Cilician equipment and by the presence of a detachment of Kabêlees at the eastern end of the Pamphylian coast, where there was another city named Cibyra.³

Herodotus's Lasonioi are as enigmatic as his Asiatic Ligyes. If they are not identical with the Kabalioi,⁴ the only space still vacant for them on the map is Pisidia, and the only name of which their name is reminiscent is 'Rasena', which is said to have been the Etruscans' own name for themselves. This conjectural location and conjectural affinity are at any rate not incompatible with one another; for the only section of the coastline of Anatolia from which the Anatolian progenitors of the Etruscans could have taken to the sea was the section between the eastern end of the Greek settlements along the coast of Pamphylia and the northern end of the Phoenician settlements along the coast of Syria.⁵

The *dahyāuš* called the *Yaunā who are on the Mainland* ('Yaunā tyaīy uškahyā') in Official List 'DPe', and, with less precision, the *Yaunā sans phrase* in 'DSe' and 'XPh' and *Yauna* (i.e. the name of the country, not the people) in 'DB' and 'DNa', is coextensive with Herodotus's Taxation District No. 1, constituted by the *Iónes*, *Asiatic Magnêtes*, *Aiolees*,

points that are not mentioned by Herodotus—e.g. that their chariots are four-horse chariots, that the charioteers are women, that the best female charioteer is rewarded by being given licence to practise sexual promiscuity, and that they indulge in cranial deformation. Strabo's testimony to the existence of 'Siginnoi' who were Persian in their culture and who lived somewhere within or immediately adjoining what had once been the domain of the Achaemenian Empire is corroborated by the name of Themistocles' confidential slave Sikinnos (see Herodotus, Book VIII, chaps. 75 and 110), who is described in Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles*, chap. 12, as being 'a Persian by birth', and whom Themistocles employs as his go-between in his secret negotiations with Xerxes in 480 B.C. On the analogy of the latter-day Attic slave-names that were Latinized as 'Davus' and 'Geta', the name 'Sicinnus' would inform us that Themistocles' confidential agent was by birth a member of an ex-Eurasian Nomad people akin to the Getae and the Dahae.

¹ Herodotus, Book VII, chaps. 74 and 77.

² See Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XIII, chap. iv, § 17 (C 631).

³ See *ibid.*, Book XIV, chap. iv, § 2 (C 667).

⁴ Herodotus seems to identify them with the Kabêlees in the field-state (Book VII, chap. 77), though he gives no indication of their being identical when he mentions the Kabalioi and the Lasonioi side by side in the gazetteer (Book III, chap. 90).

⁵ See I. i. 114, n. 3.

Kâres, Lykioi, Milyai, and Pamphyloi (the *Asiatic Dorians* are added in the field-state).¹ All these peoples, including the non-Greek-speaking Carians, Lycians, and Milyans, were Hellenes or sub-Hellenes in culture, and all of them except the Milyai were on the seaboard. The Milyai, who on the post-Alexandrine Hellenic map of Anatolia survive in the immediate hinterland of the Lycian coast and in Western Pisidia,² will have been a refugee remnant of the eponymous people of a country called *Mirâ* which, on the Hittite map of Anatolia, had perhaps extended as far north as the upper course of the Phrygian Cayster in the neighbourhood of *Afyun Qāra Hisār*.³

In the three latest of the official lists—‘DSe’, ‘DNa’, and ‘XPh’—the name *Karkā*, as well as the name *Yauna* or ‘the *Yaunā*’ (*sans phrase*), makes its appearance; and, if the identification of *Karkā* with *Caria* is correct, the introduction of the name signifies that the original *dahyāuš* *Yauna* had been partitioned and that the detached portion, now labelled ‘*Karkā*’, was made up of the last four peoples named in Herodotus’s description of his First Taxation District. The reduced *Yauna* and the new *Karkā*, between them, like the original *Yauna*, will have extended round the Aegean coast of Anatolia and the western half of its Mediterranean coast continuously, all the way from the southern border of the Asiatic Hellespontine Hellenes in the taxation district *Dascylitis-cum-Cappadociā* to the western frontier of the seaboard of the Kingdom of *Cilicia*. The *dahyāuš* known as *Sparda* will thus have been completely landlocked; but there is no evidence that any of the cantons of *Yauna* and *Karkā*, except *Caria Proper* and *Lycia*, were ever under the administration of any other authority than the Viceroy of *Sparda*. In practice, *Sparda*, the whole of a reduced *Yauna*, and at least the *Pamphylian* canton of *Karkā* seem usually to have constituted a single vicerealty; and this association is indicated in the official lists by the immediate juxtaposition to one another of *Sparda* and *Yauna* in ‘DB’, ‘DPe’, ‘DSe’, and ‘DNa’, and their separation only by a single intervening name in ‘DZd’, and ‘XPh’.

Though, even in combination, these three *dahyāva* covered a very small area by comparison with the size of the taxation district *Cappadocia-cum-Dascylitide*, and *a fortiori* with the size of the Vicerealty *Arminiya-plus-Katpatuka*, the ratio between the two Anatolian vicerealties, as measured in human terms of population and wealth, is indicated by Herodotus’s figures. The combined annual assessment of his Taxation Districts Nos. 1 and 2 is 900 *Euboic talents*—200 more than the assessment on *Egypt* and only 100 less than the assessment on *Babylonia*⁴—while the combined annual assessment of Herodotus’s

¹ See Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 93.

² See Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XIII, chap. iv, § 17 (C 631), and Book XIV, chap. iii, § 9 (C 666).

³ See ‘A note on Hittite Sites and Locations on Maps 15–16’, in vol. xi.

⁴ The mercantile and industrial seaboard of the Achaemenian Empire from the Black Sea Straits to the Philistine coast inclusive, together with the Empire’s two great cereal-producing vicerealties, *Egypt* and *Babylonia*, would appear to have been on a markedly higher level of wealth than the peoples of the interior on the Iranian, Armenian, and Anatolian plateaux, if the equipment paraded in the field-state of *Xerxes*’ expeditionary force may be taken as an approximate indication of comparative standards of living, and

three Taxation Districts Nos. 3, 13, and 19 amounts, notwithstanding the enormously greater extent of their aggregate area, to only 1,060 talents in all—that is, to only 160 talents more than the combined figure for Districts Nos. 1 and 2.

The *dahyāuš* called *Those in the Sea* ('tyaiy drayahyā') in 'DB', 'DPe', and 'DSe', and *Those who live in the Sea* ('tya[iy] drayahiyā dārayatiy') in 'XPh', must be identical with *the Isles* (Nêsoi) in the Aegean Archipelago¹ which are mentioned by Herodotus, in an appendix to his

if body armour and metal helmets may be taken as the two criteria of affluence. On this test the western seaboard, Egypt, and Babylonia stand out against the foil of their vast poverty-stricken north-eastern hinterland. It is also noticeable that, among the non-Hellenic peoples of the western seaboard, the specifically Hellenic type of elaborate and costly equipment is gaining ground. It is worn by the Philistines and Phoenicians (Herodotus, VII. 89), as well as by the non-Greek-speaking Cilicians (VII. 91), Lycians (VII. 92), and Carians (VII. 93), and by the Greek-speaking but imperfectly Hellenic Cypriots (VII. 90).

¹ The locative case of the Old Persian word 'draya', 'sea', must mean 'in the Sea' in the sense in which an island is in the sea. It could not mean 'on sea' in the sense in which Boulogne was 'on sea' in virtue, not of being surrounded by the water like an island or floating on the water like a ship, but of standing on the continent, though on the coast of it. When the draftsman wants to describe the continental Yaunā as being situated on the coast, he does this by using the locative, not of the word 'sea', but of the word 'mainland'. He calls them 'Yaunā tyaiy uškahyā' (in 'DPe': see p. 677, above). To convey this meaning through the use of the word 'sea' he would have had to introduce a preposition meaning 'alongside of' or 'near' to govern the substantive. Moreover, the label 'those alongside of the sea', if the draftsman had used it (and as a matter of fact he did not use it), would have been useless as a distinguishing mark; for, whereas the Aegean Archipelago was the only *dahyāuš* in the Achaemenian Empire that lay *in* the sea, there were at least eighteen *dahyāva*, even before the separation of Hellespontine Phrygia from Cappadocia, that were *on* sea in the sense in which Boulogne was on sea. Besides Cappadocia, the viceroyalties or taxation districts or autonomous territories of Sparda together with 'the Yaunā on the Mainland', Karkā, Cilicia, Syria, Arabāya, Egypt, the Coastal Peoples north of Armenia, Colchis, Kaspianē, Parthia-cum-Hyrcaniā, the Pointed-Hood Sakā, Babylonia, Hūja, Pārsa, Harahvatiš-cum-Maka, the Asiatic Ethiopians, and Hīduš all had seaboard on some sea or other: the Sea of Aral, the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean. If it had occurred to Darius to label any of these continental *dahyāva* with a sea-front 'the viceroyalty on the seaside' *par excellence*, the *dahyāuš* on which he would have conferred this title would certainly not have been the Dascylitis-cum-Cappadociā. It would have been Hīduš, the viceroyalty which he himself had added to the Empire for the sake of its seaboard on the Ocean—a seaboard that was invaluable for Darius because the acquisition of it had enabled him to open an oceanic line of communications between the eastern and western extremities of his dominions.

Professor G. G. Cameron comments: 'Your note is by no means convincing. We are scarcely in a position to put ourselves in a draftsman's shoes.' And a chronological point telling against the identification of the *dahyāuš* called 'those in the Sea' with the islands of the Aegean Archipelago has been brought to the writer's attention in the following comments by Professor R. G. Kent:

'Regarding your equation "tyaiy drayahyā = those in the Sea", I note that, while the term occurs in the "DB" list, at the very beginning of Darius's reign, Herodotus says specifically, in Book III, chap. 96, that "as time went on, however, other revenue came in also from islands and from the peoples living in Europe as far as Thessaly". This seems to me to indicate that the twenty districts did not, at the time of Darius's accession, include any significant island element, certainly not enough to have a place in the "DB" list. Therefore I cannot yet abandon the interpretation that George Cameron gave me, possibly starting from our late friend A. T. Olmstead, that "tyaiy drayahyā" means "those by the Sea", namely a section with their capital at Dascylium. As Dascylium seems to be associated with certain lakes (see any classical dictionary s.v. Dascylium or Daskylon), the term "those by the Sea" might not be very inexact after all. Further, the islanders were no very important element in the Persian Empire, as they contributed only 17 triremes to the Persian fleet (Hdt. VII. 95), whereas even the Pamphylians and the Asiatic Dorians each contributed 30, and no other national or territorial unit sent less than 50.'

In answer to this objection of Professor Kent's, the present writer would venture to

gazetteer,¹ as one of the new districts subsequently added to Darius's original twenty. In the field-state, in which the Islanders (Nesiôtai) duly appear among the naval contingents,² they are explicitly described as being Ionians of the same Athenian origin as the Ionians of the Anatolian mainland, and as wearing the Hellenic equipment.

When the five Old Persian texts in the official lists are checked off against one another, it becomes clear³ that, besides Herodotus's literal translation 'the Islanders', 'those in the Sea' have a second synonym in 'the toque-wearing Yaunā' ('Yaunā Takabarā') who figure in 'DNa'—the only one of these five lists in which 'those in the Sea' do not appear. The headgear of the Achaemenids' far western subjects, the Hellenic

recall that, while Herodotus does speak of the tribute from the Aegean islands as being supplementary and subsequent to the tribute assessed by Darius on his original twenty taxation districts, Herodotus also goes on to indicate that Darius embarked on his forward policy in Hellenic waters almost immediately after he had completed the effective reassertion of his authority throughout the Achaemenian Empire. The sequence of events, as Herodotus gives it, is (i) the liquidation of Oroetes the satrap of Sparda, who had been Cyrus's appointee and who had played for his own hand during the interregnum between Cambyses' death and Darius's triumph (III. 126–8); (ii) the deportation of Dēmocédēs from Sardis to Susa (III. 129); (iii) the dispatch of a naval reconnoitring expedition from Sidon, with Dēmocédēs on board, which made a systematic survey of the coasts of the Hellenic World and penetrated as far to the west as Dēmocédēs' homeland Crôtôn on 'the ball' of 'the toe' of Italy before its activities were brought to an end by Dēmocédēs' machinations (III. 136–8); (iv) 'after this, Darius made the first of his annexations of foreign territory, Hellenic or non-Hellenic, by occupying Samos' (III. 139). From this sequence of events in Herodotus's narrative two points seem to emerge: (i) the annexation to the Achaemenian Empire of one important Aegean island, Samos, occurred rather soon after Darius's effective assertion of his sovereignty over Sparda and 'the Yaunā on the mainland' (who must also have been under Oroetes' jurisdiction before his liquidation); (ii) the annexation of Samos was the second move in a deliberate and ambitious plan for a forward policy of maritime expansion in the Hellenic World (see further IX. viii. 433–4), in which the first move had been the dispatch of a naval reconnoitring expedition to Magna Graecia. It seems not improbable that the list of *dahyāva* in 'DB', in which 'those in the Sea' already figure, was not inscribed until after the annexation of Samos. The mighty work at Behistan, where the cliff-face had to be chiselled smooth before the long record was inscribed on it, must, after all, have taken a considerable time to carry out; and, if, by then, Samos was already in Darius's hands, that might have sufficed, in his eyes, to justify the mention, in 'DB', of a new *dahyāva* of which Samos was, in Darius's ambitious intentions, only a first instalment.

As regards Professor Cameron's identification of 'those in the Sea' with the inhabitants of the territory whose capital was Dascylium, the test of its convincingness is, surely, the applicability of this descriptive appellation, not just to Dascylium itself (whether the south shore of the Sea of Marmara or the north-east shore of Lake Manyas was the site of this local administrative centre), but to the whole of the area that the Governor at Dascylium administered. If we are right in thinking that the Dascylitis was part of a viceroyalty embracing Cappadocia and Armenia (see pp. 671–7 above), this will have been one of the most conspicuously 'continental' and 'non-maritime' viceroyalties of the Achaemenian Empire; and, even if the Dascylitis at this date had already constituted a separate viceroyalty confined to Hellespontine Phrygia, the metropolitan area—which was the great plain stretching east and west from the foot of the Mysian Olympus to the east bank of the River Granicus—would have been most unlikely to suggest the descriptive label 'in the Sea', since, although the plain does run parallel to the south shore of the Sea of Marmara, it gives the visual impression of being landlocked because it is secluded from the Marmara by a coastal range of hills. The sea is out of the picture, as the present writer could testify from a first-hand acquaintance with the country. He knew the eastern end of the great plain well, and he had also had two glimpses of the western end—the first between 3.0 and 4.0 p.m. on the 22nd April, 1923, *en route* by train from Izmir (Smyrna) to Bandırma (Panormos) and the second on the evening of the 28th October, 1948, when the view was not good enough for him to catch a bird's-eye view of the landscape *en route* by air from Athens to Istanbul.

¹ See Book III, chap. 96.

² See Book VII, chap. 95.

³ For visual evidence, see the masterly Table II in Kent, R. G.: 'Old Persian Texts IV: the Lists of Provinces', in the *Journal of New Eastern Studies*, vol. ii, January–October 1943 (Chicago 1943, University of Chicago Press), pp. 302–7.

islanders, like the headgear of their far north-eastern subjects the Mas-sagetan Sakā Nomads ('Sakā Tigrakhaudā', 'the Pointed-Hoods'), must have struck the Imperial Authorities as being so quaintly distinctive as to warrant the use of an allusive nickname as an official label. The word 'toque', which was the current French name for the headgear that, in A.D. 1952, was still being worn by members of the legal profession in France and by shepherds and brigands in Baluchistan, informs us that the authentic 'taka' was the fluted outward curving tall hat—a top-hat without a brim—in which the Persians are portrayed on Achaemenian bas-reliefs; but there is evidence that the Aegean Islanders' peculiar headgear, notwithstanding the official designation of it as a 'taka', was not, in fact, this Persian 'stove-pipe' hat, but was the low-crowned or crownless broad-brimmed hat that was known in Greek by the alternative names 'kausia' ('scorcher') and 'petasus' ('wide-awake'). In the Akkadian version of 'DNa' the Old Persian words 'Yaunā Takabarā' are paraphrased in the words 'the Second Ionians who wear shields on their heads'.¹ To post-Alexandrine Athenian eyes the crownless variety of the same headgear, as worn by an impostor dressed up as an Asiatic Macedonian from Seleucia, looked like a mushroom.²

This mushroom-like or shield-like Aegean insular headgear was to have a romantic history in a post-Achaemenian age. From the Archipelago the fashion spread westward to Attica—as is attested by its appearance here and there, on the Elgin Marbles, upon the heads of riders in the Panathenaic procession—and northward to Macedonia, where it became so characteristic a feature of the national dress that—'gorgeously transfigured'³—it established itself as one element in the royal insignia.

'As worn by the kings, it was dyed crimson with the precious juice won by immense labour from the sea, and the diadem was in some way tied round it or under it, its ends hanging loose about the neck. The diadem itself was inwrought with golden thread.'⁴

The sudden replacement of the Achaemenian Empire by a bevy of Macedonian successor-states, founded by officers who had served under King Alexander, ennobled a headgear that had once been the quaint monomark of one of the most outlandish of all the Achaemenian Empire's subject peoples into the sovereign emblem of royalty throughout an *Oikoumenē* extending from the Nile to the Ganges;⁵ and in

¹ '[matu]Ja-ma-nu ša-un-tū ša ma-ġi-na-ta ina qaqqādi-šu-nu na-šū-u.'

² See Plautus: *Trinummus*, Act III, scene iii, ll. 43–44, and Act IV, scene ii, ll. 3 and 9–10. When the sycophant makes his appearance in his Asiatic Macedonian outfit, Charmides exclaims:

Pol, hicquidem fungino generest: capite se totum tegit.

Hilurica facies videtur hominis, eo ornato advenit.

This crownless variety of the 'petasus' is portrayed on coins of King Antimachus, the brother, and King Demetrius II, the son, of King Demetrius the Euthydemid Bactrian Greek conqueror of the Mauryan Empire (see the plate of coin-portraits following p. 539 in Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press)).

³ Bevan, E. R.: *The House of Seleucus*, vol. ii, p. 274.

⁴ Ibid. Cp. Bouché-Leclercq, A.: *Histoire des Séleucides* (Paris 1913, Leroux, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 475.

⁵ This romantic change in the significance of the petasus came to be reflected in a

A.D. 1952, nearly two thousand years after the fall of the last of the post-Alexandrine Macedonian *peritura regna*, the petasus—duly dyed purple and duly girt with a diadem whose ends hung loose in a symmetrical pair of pendant tassels—could still be seen, on state occasions, adorning the heads of the ecclesiastical princes of a Roman Christian Church under the latter-day name of ‘the cardinal’s hat’.

In ‘DPe’ ‘the Yaunā who are on the Mainland’ and ‘those in the Sea’ (described in ‘DNa’ as ‘the shield-shaped-toque-wearing Yaunā’) are distinguished both from one another and from another *dahyāuš* called ‘the Lands that are beyond the Sea (dahyāva tyā para draya)’ with complete clarity in the sequence ‘the Yaunā who are on the Mainland and those in the Sea and the Lands that are beyond the Sea’. This third formula recurs in ‘DSe’ as ‘those who are beyond the Sea (tyaiy para draya),’ and in ‘XPh’ as ‘those who live beyond the Sea (tyaiy para draya dārayatīy),’ while ‘DNa’, which designates ‘those in the Sea’ as ‘the shield-shaped-toque-wearing Yaunā’, designates ‘those beyond the Sea’ as ‘the Sakā beyond the Sea (Sakā tyaiy para draya)’. The Nomads to whom the word ‘Sakā’ in this phrase refers cannot be identified for certain. We cannot tell whether they are the Scyths on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe to the north of the Black Sea or the Getae in the Lower Danube Basin (an advanced guard of the Massa-getae on the Oxus) or the Odrysae in the valley of the River Maritsa (*Graecè* Hebros). Whatever the reference here may be, it is clear that, just as the undifferentiated ‘Sakā’ of ‘DB’ and ‘DPe’ are sorted out in ‘DSe’, ‘DNa’, and ‘XPh’ into ‘Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā’ and ‘Pointed-Hood Sakā’, so, in the same three later lists, the undifferentiated ‘Lands that are beyond the Sea’ of ‘DPe’—which is rendered by Herodotus as ‘the peoples living in Europe as far as Thessaly’¹—are sorted out into an easterly overseas *dahyāuš*, to which ‘DNa’ applies the name ‘Sakā’, and a westerly one which is called ‘Skudra’ in ‘DSe’, ‘DNa’, and ‘XPh’ alike.

The location of this last-mentioned Achaemenian *dahyāuš* is established by the reappearance of its label in Ptolemy’s geography and in Stephanus of Byzantium’s gazetteer as the name of a Macedonian townlet that is just not too obscure to be ignored. Ptolemy² locates this townlet called Skydra in Emathia, and mentions it between Tyrissa and Myeza. The Achaemenian Empire’s loss of all Darius’s Continental European acquisitions except Doriscus³ as a consequence of the disaster of 480—

corresponding change in the connotation of the term by which it had been designated in ‘DNa’. The Old Persian compound word ‘taka-barā’, used in this context to describe a subject people wearing a peculiar national head-dress, was taken over into the Armenian language in the form ‘t’agawor’ to denote the wearer of the ‘taka’ in the different sense of a king’s crown. ‘In Armenian the word “t’agawor” is the usual word for “king” ... The takfūr of Sis is, of course, the Armenian “t’agawor”, Old Iranian [actually, not Old Iranian, but Middle Iranian or Pahlawi, as Professor Kent points out—A.J.T.] “taga-bara”, “crown bearer”’ (Frye, R. N., in the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. x, No. 2, September 1947, pp. 237 and 236). In Ottoman Turkish the same compound word was taken over in the form ‘tekfūr’, and was used in the Armenian, as distinct from the Achaemenian, sense as a technical term to denote the East Roman Emperor. For example, in Turkish the ruin of the East Roman Imperial Palace Blachernae was called ‘Tekfūr Serayī’, and Mount Ganos, on the European shore of the Sea of Marmara, ‘Tekfūr Dağı’.

¹ Herodotus, Book III, chap. 96.

² *Geographia*, Book III, chap. xiii, § 39.

³ See Herodotus, Book VII, chaps. 105-7, cited on p. 120, above.

479 B.C. was to cost Skydra the fulfilment of a manifest destiny. In the choice of Skydra for the seat of administration of a province that was intended soon to include the whole of Continental European Greece, the lieutenants of Darius who were organizing his new Continental European dominions for him showed the same eye for the structure of the military and political geography of the Balkan Peninsula as Ghāzi Evrenòs, the lieutenant of the Ottoman Sultan Murād I (*imperabat* A.D. 1360–89), was to show when he established a powerful Ottoman military colony on the same Emathian plain at Yenijé Vardar,¹ in the neighbourhood of the site of Pella. Emathia, as King Philip Amyntou of Macedon was to demonstrate, afforded a base of operations from which a land power could dominate Continental European Greece in one direction and the Morava Basin in another. If Xerxes had been as successful as either Philip or Murād I in his empire-building enterprise in South-Eastern Europe, an Achaemenian Skydra might have lived to play as great a part in history as a Macedonian Philippi or Philippopolis or as a Roman Lugdunum or Colonia Agrippina.

If we now cast our minds back over this survey of the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire, we can perhaps make out the lineaments of the viceroyalties, as well as the taxation districts, into which it was divided during the period of forty-two years between the disaster of 522–521 B.C. and the disaster of 480–479 B.C. The viceroyalties in this period were large in size and consequently few in number. They were:

I. Greater Media, including Adiabênê, Urartu, the Hyspîrîtis, and the Lower Aras-Kur Basin, as well as Media Proper, and embracing Herodotus's Taxation Districts Nos. 10, 11, 15, and 18.

II. Greater Elam, including Anšan and Parsuwaš, and coextensive with Herodotus's Taxation District No. 8.

III. Harahvatiš, including Zrāka, South-Eastern Pārsa, and Makran as well, and embracing Herodotus's Taxation Districts Nos. 14 and 17.

IV. Parthava, including Gurgān, Dihistān, Khwārizm, and Herat as well, and coextensive with Herodotus's Taxation District No. 16.

V. Bākhtiř, including Suguda and Marguř as well, and coextensive with Herodotus's Taxation District No. 12.

VI. The Indus Basin, consisting of Gādāra and Hīduř, and embracing Herodotus's Taxation Districts Nos. 7 and 20.

VII. Pahat Babili u Ebir-nari, consisting of Bābiruř together with Athurā, and embracing Herodotus's Taxation Districts Nos. 9 and 5.

VIII. Egypt together with Libya, coextensive with Herodotus's Taxation District No. 6.

¹ *Graecè* Yanitzá (see Khalkokondhýlis, 'Laónikos' (i.e. Nikólaos): *De Origine et Rebus Gestis Turcarum*, Book IV, *ad finem*, on p. 218 of I. Bekker's ed. (Bonn. 1843, Weber); Hammer, J. von: *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. i (Paris 1835, Bellizard, Barthès, Dufour et Lowell), pp. 224–5; Gibbons, H. A.: *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1916, Clarendon Press), pp. 146–7; Mordtmann, J. H., s.v. 'Evrenos', in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (London 1927, Luzac), pp. 34–35).

IX. 'Paktyiké and Armenioi and the adjoining peoples as far as the Black Sea', embracing Herodotus's Taxation Districts Nos. 13, 19, and 3.

X. Sardis, together with 'the Yaunā who are on the mainland' and Karkā, embracing Herodotus's Taxation Districts Nos. 1 and 2.

As for 'Those in the Sea' and 'The Lands that are Beyond the Sea', these two titles would seem, like the names of the two Roman provinces Germania Superior and Germania Inferior, to commemorate ambitious programmes of conquest which were frustrated at an early stage, and the title Sakā Tigrakhaudā may be placed in the same category, considering how unlikely it is that Darius I's punitive expedition against Skunkha will have had any lasting results.

The Achaemenian Empire's Historical Background

Our survey of the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire has also brought to light some of the reasons why Cyrus II was able to extend his rule so rapidly and easily over so vast an area and why thereafter Darius and Xerxes, when they set out to add new dominions to Cyrus's bequest, ran up against unforeseen limits which they found themselves unable to pass. The area which Cyrus had conquered and which Darius had resubjugated after a sharp recrudescence of anarchy in 522-521 B.C. was an area in which the hearts of the population had been prepared by previous sufferings for the acceptance of an oecumenical peace at almost any price. From the Indus Basin to 'the Yaunā on the Mainland', and from Egypt to the countries lying under the lee of the Caucasus, the peoples' spirit had been broken by one or other or both of two scourges: the third bout of Assyrian militarism that had been launched by Tiglath-Pileser III in 745 B.C., and the third eruption of aggressive Nomad peoples from the Eurasian Steppe, which had broken upon the eastern frontiers of Assyria and Urartu *circa* 715-714 B.C. The peoples who had come within the range of either the *furor Assyriacus* or the *terror Scythicus* had been schooled to become the Achaemenian Empire's victims or beneficiaries, in whichever of the two alternative lights they might look upon a fate that was mild by comparison with Assyrian cruelty or Cimmerian savagery, however poorly it might compare with idealized memories of a parochial sovereign independence that had long ago ceased to be practical politics. But the expectations of docility which the Achaemenian empire-builders had come to take for granted as a result of their facile successes in a psychologically devastated area were rudely disappointed as soon as they attempted to impose the same oecumenical peace outside the limits within which the Assyrians and the Sakas had ploughed up the ground for them.

Cyrus II himself, for example, paid with his life for his failure to foresee that, when he attacked the Eurasian Nomads on their own *terrain*, he was going to encounter a much more vehement resistance than had been offered to him by neighbouring sedentary peoples for whom their submission to his dominion had brought with it some

security against Nomad raids in compensation for the loss of an illusory national independence. Darius I was lucky to escape with his life when—emboldened, perhaps, by his success in momentarily subduing ‘the Pointed-Hood Sakā’ on the River Oxus and the Aral Sea, who had been Cyrus’s bane—he went on to attack the more distant ‘Sakā beyond the Sea’ on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe. Finally, Xerxes brought upon himself a disaster from which the Achaemenian Empire did not ever completely recover when he tried to deal with the Continental European Hellenes, who had never felt the touch of either the Assyrian or the Scythian lash, as Cyrus had found himself able to deal with ‘the Yaunā on the Mainland’, who had previously been broken in by the Cimmerians and the Spardiyā.¹ In their encounters with unbroken peoples, whether sedentary or Nomad, the Achaemenidae were only successful in so far as they showed a politic generosity. Their Arab neighbours, for instance, to whom they accorded the status of autonomous allies, do not seem to have given them the trouble that these Arabs’ forebears had given to high-handed Assyrian militarists; and ‘the Hauma-(?)drinking Sakā’ of Farghānah, to whom the same status had been accorded by Cyrus II, proved their faithfulness to the alliance by fighting magnificently for the last Darius at Gaugamela in 331 B.C.

The historical importance of the Eurasian Nomad Völkerwanderung of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. is one of the features in the background of the Achaemenian Empire that our survey has thrown into relief.² When Darius boasted that ‘a Persian fighting-man’s spear has pressed forward far’,³ a Massagetan Skunkha might have commented—if his ruthless Achaemenian conqueror had left him life in his body and a tongue in his head—that the Saka fighting-man’s battle-axe had pressed forward farther. The Persians might have caught up and conquered the Sindoi on the shore of an ocean which was to be labelled with the Sindians’ name when Darius’s admiral Scylax sailed on over it to the Red Sea coast of Egypt; but they had never come within striking distance of the Sindians’ right wing on the banks of the Kuban. ‘The peoples to the north of the Caucasus snap their fingers at the Persians down to this day’, as Herodotus wrote at some date during the reign of Xerxes’ successor Artaxerxes I.⁴ Again, the Persians might have caught up and conquered the Thatagu[? d or v]iyā on the cow-pastures of the Panjab, but they had never subjugated the Kuru on their plain between the Sutlej and the Jumna. They might have caught up and conquered the advance-guards of the Scyths, Cimmerians, Paktyes, and Spardiyā in Anatolia, but they had been foiled by the Scyths’ right wing on the steppe to the north of the Black Sea. They might have momentarily imposed their rule on the Odrysi in the Maritsa Basin

¹ The psychological limit to Achaemenian annexations that was set by the physical limits of previous Assyrian and Eurasian Nomad ravages is noticed again in IX. viii. 430–1.

² Professor G. G. Cameron comments: ‘The Völkerwanderung of the eighth and seventh centuries is, I see, to you, as it is to me, a terrific development hitherto insufficiently emphasized.’

³ ‘DNa’, §4, quoted on pp. 589–90, above.

⁴ Herodotus, Book III, chap. 97.

and even on the advance-guard of the Getai in the Lower Danube Basin,¹ but the solitary² lost tribe of the Odrysi on the Hungarian Alföld had remained immune, and 'the Great Horde' of the Getai—the Massagetai whom the Persians called 'the Pointed-Hoods'—quickly shook off an ineffective Persian yoke. The Achaemenian tax-collectors had never come near the Agathyrsoi, and we may guess that they were not able to pester the 'Pointed-Hoods' for more than a few years.

It will be seen that Skunkha could have made a telling retort to Darius, and he could have crowned it by reminding him that, where the Eurasian Nomad invaders in *partibus agricularum* had eventually been brought to heel by sedentary Powers, this had been achieved through the prowess of renegade Nomads who had enlisted in these sedentary Powers' service. If the Lydian Monarchy had broken the force of the Cimmerian horde in Anatolia and had imposed its own rule as far eastward as the River Halys, the Lydians had owed their success to the valour of their mercenary Spardiyā Nomad cavalry;³ and, as for the conquest of the World by the elder branch of the House of Achaemenes, did not the alternating names Kūruš and Kambūjiya, borne by their princes from Cyrus I onwards, testify that their fortune had been made for them by the valour of Kuru and Kamboja Nomad reinforcements?⁴

In order to take the full measure of the impetus of this Eurasian Nomad Völkerwanderung that carried the Achaemenidae into power in South-West Asia, we have to remind ourselves that this was not the only front on which it had erupted. In the opposite hinterland of the Steppe, in the Upper Basin of the Yellow River, it had broken eastwards upon the Chóu Power in 771 B.C.,⁵ more than half a century before it had broken westwards upon Assyria and Urartu. This eruption in the eighth century B.C. was comparable in violence to the eruption in the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C. which had carried the 'mariannu' into Anatolia and Syria and the Mitanni into Anatolia and Mesopotamia, if not into Midian.⁶ On the other hand, in contrast to both these eruptions, the intervening eruption, which had carried the ancestors of the Medes and Persians out of the Eurasian Steppe on to the Iranian Plateau, must have been relatively mild; for their advent left no mark on the Assyrian records; as we have seen,⁷ the Assyrians do not mention them earlier than the third quarter of the ninth century B.C., and then only because the Assyrians themselves have pushed their way up on to the plateau, and not because the Medes and Persians have descended upon the plains. The only trace of Medo-Persian penetration to the west of the Zagros Range before the eve of the overthrow of Assyria

¹ See Herodotus, Book IV, chaps. 92-96.

² Supposing that 'ag-' in the name rendered 'Agathyrsoi' in Ionic Greek may be equated with the Sanskrit 'éka-' meaning 'one'. For the relation between the Agathyrsoi and their namesakes the Odrysi (in the rendering of whose name the d is the Macedonian Greek equivalent of an Ionic Greek th), see III. iii. 425, n. 2.

³ See p. 676, above.

⁴ See pp. 652-4, above.

⁵ See Hirth, F.: *The Ancient History of China* (New York 1908, Columbia University Press), p. 176.

⁶ See the Note on Chronology in x. 201, n. 3.

⁷ On p. 608, n. 3, above.

in the seventh century B.C. is the appearance, in the annals of Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 746–727 B.C.), of the two personal names Kundašpi and Kuštašpi in Kummukhu (Commagênê), between the western elbow of the River Euphrates and the south-east face of the Taurus Range.¹

Can we account for this striking difference in degree of force between the first and third eruptions on the one hand and the second eruption on the other? The explanation may be that, in the Medo-Persian Völkerwanderung, the invading Nomads were not equipped, as they were in the other two Völkerwanderungen, with a potent new weapon. In the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C. it was their chariotry, and in the eighth century B.C. their cavalry, that enabled the Nomad invaders to carry all before them;² but we know of no comparable Nomad military invention in the intervening bout.

To break in the wild horses of the Steppe, and to invent a spoked wheel light enough to be drawn at a gallop yet strong enough not to break, were two *chefs-d'œuvre* of human skill.

The mane that shaketh
For his slave he taketh.³

The breaking-in of chariot-horses was, however, only the first of two great achievements in the Eurasian Nomad's handling of the horse. His second achievement was to breed a horse with a strong enough backbone to carry a rider in battle instead of merely conveying him to the battlefield on wheels.

'When we first meet it in Egypt, very soon after its introduction [by Maryanni Eurasian Nomads], the horse was a small and very lightly built animal which was rarely mounted except by stable boys who rode it bareback to water or who exercised it around the paddock. . . . The early horse was not built for carrying a rider any distance, being little more than a pony. The wooden figure of a mare which is in New York is somewhat sway-backed, with a rather large head ending in a big muzzle, and probably with a very short mane, which in that example has been clipped off. . . . A pair of these little steeds could draw no more than two men at the most, and in mountainous Syria even a single man often had to get out and walk, carrying the chariot on his shoulder. . . . The animal itself and the vehicle which it drew played highly important parts in the unparalleled success of the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos. The latter were probably of Nomadic origin, of whatever race and language stock they may have been. Their animals were probably small and, being weak-backed, were always driven from a chariot; for it is only the Syrian goddess 'Anat who is shown mounted as a rule.'⁴

This passage in a book written by a twentieth-century Western

¹ See König, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

² Professor G. G. Cameron comments: 'I agree with your observation that the rapidity and effectiveness of the Völkerwanderung of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. were due to the riding horse. The Assyrian liver omens (which tell the truth, in contrast to the annals) make it clear that the search for the better riding horse was Esarhaddon's motive for sending parties of men up on to the Iranian plateau as far as Pateiskhoreis [see p. 616, above]. The whole subject is highlighted by the oft repeated Persian claim that the empire "possesses good horses and (i.e. as well as) good men".'

³ Sophocles: *Antigonê*, ll. 350–1, Gilbert Murray's translation.

⁴ Winlock, H. E.: *The Rise and Fall of the Middle Kingdom of Thebes* (New York 1947, Macmillan), pp. 153–5.

scholar, which is actually a description of an Egyptian work of art made on the morrow of the Eurasian Nomad Völkerwanderung of the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C., might have been a paraphrase of either Herodotus's description, written in the fifth century B.C., of a horse still in use among the Sigynnai in the Austrian Alps, or Strabo's description, written or copied round about the beginning of the Christian Era, of a horse still in use among the Siginnoi in the Elburz or the Caucasus; and the correspondence is the more impressive considering that there is no indication in Winlock's book of his being acquainted with either of these two passages of Hellenic literature.

'Their horses', writes Herodotus in his account of the Sigynnai, 'are said to be shaggy all over, with a coat five fingers thick. They are small, with snub muzzles, and cannot carry a rider, but they fly like the wind when yoked to a chariot, and consequently the people of that country are charioteers.'¹

'The Siginnoi', writes Strabo in his account of these, 'have small shaggy ponies (*hipparia*) which cannot carry the weight of a rider, so they yoke them in four-in-hands.'²

Strabo's Siginnoi and Herodotus's Sigynnai were evidently the descendants of participants in the Eurasian Nomad Völkerwanderung of the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C. who had strayed into the fastnesses of the Elburz or Caucasus and the Alps and had survived there as 'living museums' of the chariot-driving conquerors whose wheel-borne fleets had swept across South-West Asia into Egypt some twelve or thirteen hundred years before Herodotus's day and some sixteen or seventeen hundred years before Strabo's.³ It was left for the Spardiya, Paktyes, Cimmerians, Scyths, Kaspioi, and other hordes of the swarming 'Umman Manda' to surpass the feat of their forerunners the Maryanni and Mitanni by breeding horses that a fighting-man could ride; and, after this Sakan light cavalry had gone the way of the Hyksos chariotry, it was left for the Sarmatians to surpass the feat of their forerunners the Cimmerians and the Scyths by breeding 'the great horse' whose backbone could bear the weight, not only of a man, but of a man clad in mail cap-à-pie, in addition to the horse's own hardly less complete suit of armour⁴—a horse which was to carry to victory the Goths at Adrianople in A.D. 378 and the Normans at Hastings in A.D. 1066, besides playing his part, beyond the opposite shore of the Great Eurasian Steppe, in bringing a Sinic Civilization to the ground and rearing a Far Eastern Civilization to replace it. In the Achaemenian Age the cataphract is already in the arena. At Plataea in 479 B.C. he is represented by Masistius,⁵ and at Gaugamela in 331 B.C. by the Sakā

¹ Herodotus, Book V, chap. 9.

² Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XI, chap. xi, § 8 (C. 520).

³ Another surviving remnant of the chariot-driving Eurasian Nomad host that had erupted out of the Steppe in the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C. is perhaps to be detected in the Heniochoi ('Chariot-drivers') who, in the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history, were to be found in the fastness between the north-east shore of the Black Sea and the north-west end of the Caucasus Range (see Strabo: *Geographica*, Book II, chap. iii, § 31 (C. 129); Book XI, chap. ii, § 1 (C. 492) and §§ 12-14 (C. 495-6); Book XI, chap. v, § 6 (C. 506); Book XVII, chap. iii, § 24 (C. 839)).

⁴ See IV. iv. 439, n. 4.

⁵ See Herodotus, Book IX, chap. 22.

Haumavargā in the heavy brigade that contested the field with the Macedonian horse so stubbornly.¹ In 331 B.C., however, the cataphract's great days were still to come. The cavalry of the age were the Ummān Manda light horse who had opened the way for the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire by their wild ride from the heart of the Steppe to the Jumna and the Indus Delta and the Aegean and the Carpathians and beyond the Carpathians into the Hungarian Alföld.

¹ See the account, in Arrian: *Expediitio Alexandri*, Book III, chap. xiii, §§ 2-4, of the opening engagement between Darius's Bactrian and Sakan cavalry and Alexander's mercenary cavalry and Paeonians. In this engagement 'Alexander's troops suffered heavy casualties, not only because they were overborne by the Orientals' superiority in numbers, but because the Sakas and their horses had the advantage of being more efficiently protected by defensive armour'.

MOSCOW'S CHANGES OF FORTUNE AND
THEIR HISTORICAL CAUSES

BOTH the eclipse of Moscow in the early eighteenth century and her recovery of her pristine status of being the capital of All the Russias in the early twentieth century can be explained, at least in part, in terms of the relaxation and reapplication of an external pressure.

Though Moscow had begun her career as an outpost of Russian Orthodox Christendom against the primitive pagan tenants of the north-eastern forests,¹ she had made her political fortune from the fourteenth century onwards as the main bulwark of a remnant of Russian Orthodox Christendom against an aggressive Western Christendom which had advanced eastward, overrunning the White Russian and Ukrainian marches of Russia, till, by the middle of the fifteenth century, the eastern frontier of Poland-Lithuania had come to lie within a short march of Moscow's western gate. The situation thus established had persisted for more than a century and a half. It was not till after the Polish occupation of Moscow itself in A.D. 1610-12² that the tide turned and Muscovy began to liberate Russian Orthodox Christian territory that had been conquered by Poland-Lithuania at earlier dates. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, Poland-Lithuania had become so feeble that the pressure on Russia from that quarter had diminished to vanishing-point, and in consequence Moscow had lost the significance—previously attaching to her as the defender of Russia's march against the Western World—which had been one of the causes of Moscow's both gaining and keeping a position of primacy inside the Russian World itself. During the ninety-two years that elapsed between the removal of the capital of the Russian Empire from Moscow to Saint Petersburg and the completion of the eighteenth-century partition of Poland, the balance of power on Russia's western march tipped more and more heavily in Russia's favour until in A.D. 1795 Russia recovered the last of the Russian Orthodox Christian territories that had been conquered by Western Christian Powers since the fourteenth century, with the sole exception of Eastern Galicia. In this rather exceptional chapter in the history of Russia's politico-military relations with the West along this land-frontier, Moscow's role of serving as guardian of the gate was naturally at a discount,³ and it was probably no accident that this was also the age in which Moscow was at her nadir and Saint Petersburg at her zenith in the domestic history of the Russian body social.

However that may be, there can be no doubt that Moscow's recovery of prestige, which was the necessary prelude to her reattainment of her lost prerogative of serving as the political capital of All the Russias,

¹ See II. ii. 154.

² See II. ii. 157.

³ See II. ii. 158, n. 1.

began from the moment when the pressure of the Western World on Russia once again became formidable. When the Polish Western invaders' feat of occupying Moscow in A.D. 1610-12 was repeated by French Western invaders in A.D. 1812, Moscow once again played the *beau rôle* while Saint Petersburg was enjoying an inglorious security;¹ and thereafter the successive German invasions of Russia in A.D. 1915 and A.D. 1941 indicated to Russian minds that the renewal of Western aggression under Napoleon's leadership had been, not a meaningless curiosity of history, but an earnest of a danger against which any government of Russia would have, in future, to be perpetually on its guard. The Polish and French invaders who in turn had momentarily occupied Moscow, and the German invaders who had only just failed to repeat the exploit, had all made their way into Great Russia along 'the duck walk' of comparatively dry ground between the parallel upper courses of the Dniepr and the Baltic Dvina, and the attractiveness of this narrow passage for Western invaders re-established the strategic importance of Moscow, in view of her situation covering 'the duck walk's' eastern exit.

It will be seen that, at the time when the Bolsheviks retransferred the seat of government from Saint Petersburg to Moscow, the original capital of the Russian Empire offered the same double advantage that had drawn the capital of the Roman Empire away from Rome to the neighbourhood of the Bosphorus in the time of Diocletian and Constantine the Great. In the 'geopolitical' circumstances of the day, Moscow was not only more conveniently situated than Leningrad for serving as the administrative capital of the Soviet Union as a whole; it was at the same time a more convenient point of vantage for simultaneously keeping an eye on that frontier from beyond which the most formidable threat to the Soviet Union's security was now to be apprehended.

A reader who is interested in this 'geopolitical' question may perhaps think it worth while to compare this Annex with II. D (v), vol. ii, pp. 157-8, in which the same vicissitudes in the fortune of Moscow and Saint Petersburg have been rather differently interpreted. When writing that passage in A.D. 1931, the writer did not realize that Moscow had now again become a bulwark of Russia on a once more dangerous western land-frontier, besides continuing to possess the attraction, which she had never ceased to possess, of being the most convenient centre of administration for the interior. What had become obvious to the present writer in A.D. 1952 after a German invader had all but encircled Moscow in the war of A.D. 1939-45 had no doubt been manifest to Lenin and his companions twenty-five years earlier.

¹ See II. ii. 400.

VII. A (i) AND (ii), ANNEX

CHURCHES AS GHOSTS

A 'DIE-HARD' upholder of the thesis that the histories of churches are incidental to the histories of civilizations might still be unwilling to confess defeat, even if he found himself unable to refute our argument that the churches are neither cancers preying upon civilizations nor chrysalises serving them for the reproduction of their kind. He might still fall back on a third hypothesis. If the churches are neither chrysalises nor cancers, may they not be ghosts? In the main stream of this Study we have not checked our course in order to discuss a third possible alternative presentation of churches in terms of civilizations which is even less convincing than the other two; but this explanation of churches as being the ghosts of civilizations perhaps deserves brief consideration in an annex.

The most plausible piece of evidence that can be cited in support of this diagnosis is the last phase in the history of the Egyptiac Civilization. When, in the eleventh century B.C., 'the New Empire' petered out, the Pharaonic Crown was assumed by the Chief Priest of Amon-Re of Thebes;¹ and thereafter, when, in the tenth century, this ecclesiastical continuation of 'the New Empire' collapsed in its turn and the greater part of the Egyptiac World was 'peacefully penetrated' by Libyan barbarians, an uncontaminated remnant of the Egyptiac social heritage was still preserved in four temple-states under the rule of the priests of the local divinities: Amon-Re of Thebes, Ptah of Memphis, Re of Heliopolis, and Horus of Letopolis. These four ecclesiastical principalities were left inviolate by the barbarian squatters who occupied the rest of the Egyptiac Civilization's domain.² What was the source of the prestige that enabled Hrihor to make himself master of the Imperial Throne, and the four local corporations of priests, in the next chapter of the story, to take over the government of their respective cities? If these local ecclesiastical principalities were respected by the incoming barbarians, was that not because they were recognized as being legatees of the Egyptiac culture? And was not Hrihor's political standing due, more specifically, to his ecclesiastical status as Chief Priest of a once local god who had become the High God of an Egyptiac Pantheon because his city had become the capital of an Egyptiac universal state which had been both founded and refounded by local Theban princes?³ Would Hrihor have found himself in a position to step into Pharaoh's shoes⁴ if his ecclesiastical office had not carried with it, *ex officio*, the presidency of a Pan-Egyptiac 'established church' which had been organized by the Emperor Thothmes III some four hundred years before Hrihor's day?⁵

¹ See II. ii. 116, n. 1; IV. iv. 421 and 515-17; and p. 190, above.

² See IV. iv. 422; V. v. 269-70 and 352-3.

³ See pp. 213-15, above.

⁴ The possibility that Hrihor may have usurped the Chief Priest's throne as a step towards usurping Pharaoh's has been noticed on p. 190, n. 1, above.

⁵ See I. i. 145, n. 5; IV. iv. 421; and V. v. 530.

We may go on to observe that the local temple-states, in which the Egyptian culture was preserved, like a fly in amber, from the tenth century B.C. onwards for some fourteen hundred years,¹ had had their counterparts in the derelict domains of other broken-down civilizations. For example, the Hittite Civilization, which suffered a violent death soon after the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C., was still living an ecclesiastical life-in-death in Strabo's day,² some twelve hundred years later, in the twin temple-states which had crystallized round the shrines of the Goddess Ma in the Pontic Cappadocian city of Comana and in its South Cappadocian namesake.³ In the same sense the temple-state at Jerusalem, which was licensed by Cyrus the founder of the Achaemenian Empire and was extinguished by the Edomite usurper Herod the Great, was an ecclesiastical 'ghost' of a secular Syriac parochial state Judah that had been done to death by Nebuchadnezzar.

After the temple-state at Jerusalem, in its turn, had gone the way of the original Kingdom of Judah, Jewry still contrived to preserve its communal identity in diaspora thanks to a corporate religious life that survived the loss of its historic ecclesiastical citadel; and this Jewish achievement will remind us that a temple-state is only one variety of a social phenomenon which, in this Study, we have learnt to think of as a 'fossil'. If we now call to mind other examples of the general phenomenon that is exemplified in a post-Exilic Jewry, we shall observe that a majority of our 'fossils' had been preserved in an ecclesiastical sheath. The Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist fossil of an extinct Indic Civilization was, in fact, still embodied, at the time of writing, in a number of living temple-states: the ecclesiastical principality of the Dalai Lama in Tibet and its satellite temple-states in Mongolia.⁴ The fossil of an extinct Babylonian Civilization that survived in the Mesopotamian city of Harrân down to the time of the 'Abbasid Caliphate preserved its identity by remaining faithful, in a Christian and Muslim environment, to an ancestral pagan religion and astral philosophy.⁵ The Monophysite, Nestorian, and Zoroastrian fossils of an extinct Syriac Civilization managed, like Jewry, to retain their identity in diaspora by maintaining their corporate religious organization.

The existence of temple-states in particular, and 'fossils' in general, does suggest that there are such things as ecclesiastical 'ghosts' of defunct secular societies; and this impression will be reinforced if we

¹ The temple-state of Amon-Re at Thebes did not have so long a life as its three sisters in the Delta. It perished in the struggle for possession of the Egyptian World between Napatan, Assyrian, and Saïte competitors in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. (see IV. iv. 422, n. 3).

² See Strabo: *Geographica*, Book XII, chap. ii, § 3 (C 535), for the South Cappadocian Comana; Book XII, chap. iii, §§ 32-36 (C 557-9), for the Pontic Comana; Book XII, chap. iii, § 31, for the shrine of Men Pharnacis at Cabeira.

³ These two Hittite ecclesiastical principalities were the most remarkable representatives of a group which also included, among others, those ruled by the priests of Cybele at Pessinus and by the priests of Mén at Pontic Cabeira and in the piece of Central Anatolian territory that was eventually converted into the domain of the Seleucid Greek city-state of Antioch-towards-Pisidia (see IV. iv. 312, n. 1).

⁴ The writer did not know whether, in the year A.D. 1952, these temple-states still survived in Outer Mongolia under a Communist régime.

⁵ See IV. iv. 101, n. 1; V. v. 125, n. 1; and IX. viii. 408, n. 5.

turn over the page of an historical atlas of Christendom; for this will show us at a glance that, while ecclesiastical geography is apt to reflect political geography, the political map that an ecclesiastical map reproduces is usually not the map of the political world of the day but a map which, on the political plane, has long since been obsolete. In another context¹ we have already observed that in the ecclesiastical map of a Medieval France the archbishoprics are 'ghosts' of the provinces of the Diocletianic Roman Empire, while the bishoprics are 'ghosts' of the Roman municipalities of Gallia Togata and the independent cantons of Gallia Comata as they had stood on the eve of Julius Caesar's conquests. In the ecclesiastical map of a Medieval Italy the archbishoprics commemorate the competition of Milan and Ravenna with Rome, between the third and the eighth century of the Christian Era, for the distinction of serving as a regional centre of Roman imperial administration, while the bishoprics are ghosts of the municipalities of the Italy of the Emperor Augustus. In the ecclesiastical map of a Medieval East Roman Empire the archbishoprics correspond, not to the army-corps districts (*themata*) which were the units of contemporary provincial organization,² but to the provinces of the Roman Empire in the Age of Justinian.

In this medieval ecclesiastical map of Eastern Orthodox Christendom, what is true of the boundaries of the archbishoprics is not true of the boundaries of the patriarchates; for, as we have noticed elsewhere,³ the lines of demarcation between these major units of medieval ecclesiastical organization do not correspond, as they might be expected to correspond, to those between the major units of political organization in the Roman Empire of either Constantine's or Justinian's day. In contrast to the politically anachronistic boundaries between the bishoprics, the boundaries between the patriarchates turn out to be politically up to date; and, when we look into the historical reason for this anomaly, we find that it was the result of action deliberately taken by the Medieval East Roman Government, which had enlarged the area of its own metropolitan Patriarchate of Constantinople, at the expense of the two neighbouring patriarchates of Antioch and Rome, to make the Patriarchate of Constantinople coincide in area with the Medieval East Roman Empire itself. This modification of traditional ecclesiastical frontiers by political fiat was a characteristic East Roman act of state; for we have seen in another context⁴ that the assertion of the supremacy of the State over the Church was a constant aim of East Roman imperial policy; and, when the East Roman Imperial Government found itself unable to control the Patriarchs of Antioch and Rome because their sees were situated in territories where the East Roman Government's writ did not run, it made the best of what was a bad job from its standpoint by high-handedly annexing to its own tame Patriarchate of Constantinople, whose incumbent was under the Emperor's thumb, those outlying fringes of the ecclesiastical dominions of the Patriarch of Antioch and the Pope of Rome—Western Cilicia

¹ On p. 192, above.

³ On p. 191, above.

² See II. ii. 79-81 and 153-4; and IV. iv. 332.

⁴ In IV. iv. 320-408 and 592-623.

in the one case and Greece, Sicily, and the 'toe' and 'heel' of Italy in the other case—which happened to lie within the East Roman Empire's political frontiers.

This alteration of the boundaries of the patriarchates to serve the East Roman Government's purposes can be seen, on a longer historical perspective, to have been a passing incident in a rivalry between these ecclesiastical Great Powers which was an old story by the time when the East Roman Empire was conjured up in the eighth century of the Christian Era, by the genius of Leo Syrus, and which did not cease when the East Roman Empire perished, at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, at the hands of Western Christian 'crusaders'. In this light we can see that the patriarchates too, like the archbishoprics and the bishoprics, of Christendom are ecclesiastical 'ghosts' of defunct bodies politic. Whereas the bishoprics are ghosts of city-states and cantons, and the archbishoprics are ghosts of Diocletianic Roman provinces, the patriarchates are ghosts of political Great Powers that had contended with one another in the international arena of the Hellenic World in the third and second centuries B.C. before the balance of power had been overthrown by the triumph of the Roman Commonwealth over all its competitors. On this view, the Papacy is the ghost of the Roman state; the Patriarchate of Alexandria is the ghost of a Ptolemaic successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire; the Patriarchate of Antioch is the ghost of a Seleucid successor-state of the same *ci-devant* oecumenical power; the Patriarchate of Constantinople is the ghost of the ephemeral appanage of the Macedonian war-lord Lysimachus, whose realm had once momentarily straddled the Straits and extended from Rhodope to Taurus before it was extinguished in 281 B.C. in the final round of the conflict for the division of the spoils of Darius between the successors of Alexander the Great.

This latter-day re-emergence, in an ecclesiastical guise, of an abortive political successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire which had been snuffed out more than six hundred years before the foundation of Constantinople is a striking exemplification of the thesis that churches are ghosts of defunct secular polities and societies. On the morrow of the Battle of Corupedium a victorious Seleucus Nicator and Ptolemy Lagus would have been astonished to learn that their defeated and slain rival Lysimachus was one day to take the field against them again in a ghostly warfare between the Patriarchates of Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople.¹ The Roman soldiers and statesmen who imposed

¹ Constantinople's success in forcing an entry into the ring of patriarchal sees was a remarkable feat. The patriarchal status of Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch had been established *de facto* already before the parvenue New Rome on the Bosphorus was founded, and all three sees were expressly confirmed in their customary rights, *iure canonico*, by Canon 6 of the Oecumenical Council of Nicaea (*sedebat* A.D. 325). The Oecumenical Council of Constantinople (*sedebat* A.D. 381) declared (Canon 2) that there were five patriarchates in the East. This was the logical 'layout' for an ecclesiastical map of the Roman Empire that was to follow the pattern of the political map (see pp. 191-2, above); for the patriarchal sees of Alexandria and Antioch corresponded respectively to the civil 'dioceses' of Egypt and the Orient, and this gave each of the three other eastern 'dioceses'—Pontus, Asiana, and Thrace—a presumptive title to be the locus of a separate patriarchal see. As it turned out, Constantinople contrived to bring the areas of all these three civil 'dioceses' under her own patriarchal jurisdiction.

Rome's yoke upon the necks of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies would have been no less surprised to see these subjugated Macedonian monarchies come back to life to challenge Rome's supremacy in an ecclesiastical arena. Yet the Eastern Orthodox patriarchates' rejection of the Roman See's claim to supremacy was, *sub specie historiae*, the reopening of an issue that had been closed on the political plane by Scipio's victory at Magnesia and Octavian's victory at Actium.

Does the evidence so far presented suffice to obtain judgement in favour of the advocates of 'the ghost theory' of the relation between churches and civilizations? The Roman instance is the classic example, and it would seem reasonable to take this as our test case. Is not Hildebrand's attempt to build a *Respublica Christiana* on the foundation of the Roman See a true parallel to Hrihor's attempt to sustain a tottering 'New Empire' of Egypt by placing the Pharaonic Crown on the head of the Chief Priest of Amon-Re of Thebes? And is not the subsequent temporal power of the Popes, and of the other prince-bishops in Western Christendom, in their local ecclesiastical principalities, a true parallel to the temporal power of the temple-states of Thebes, Memphis, Heliopolis, and Letopolis after the failure of Hrihor's more ambitious enterprise?¹

This theory is applied to the Papacy by Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury in a celebrated passage:

'If a man consider the originall of this great Ecclesiasticall Dominion, he will easily perceive that the *Papacy* is no other than the *Ghost* of the deceased *Romane Empire*, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof; for so did the Papacy start up on a Sudden out of the Ruines of that Heathen Power.'²

The voices of 'the barefooted fryars . . . singing Vespers in the Temple of Jupiter'³ must indeed have sounded like the ghostly echo of a pagan Roman liturgy when they floated into Gibbon's ears on the evening of the 15th October, 1764,⁴ though, when he harvested the inspiration that had germinated in his mind on that memorable occasion, Gibbon came to adopt, not 'the ghost theory', but 'the cancer theory', of the relation between the Roman Church and the Roman Empire.⁵ 'The ghost-theory', however, was implicit in a phrase of Bossuet's (*vivebat* A.D. 1627-1704) which Gibbon appears to have been consciously echoing⁶ when he summed up *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* by saying that he had 'described the triumph of Barbarism and Religion'.⁷ Bossuet had said: 'Rome, devenue la proie des barbares, a conservé par la religion son ancienne majesté';⁸ and

¹ This parallel has been suggested already in IV. iv. 471, n. 2.

² Hobbes, Th.: *Leviathan*, Part IV, chap. 47.

³ *The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon*, edited by Murray, J. (London 1896, Murray), p. 302, quoted in IV. iv. 59-60.

⁴ See the passage quoted from Pickman on pp. 533, above. ⁵ See XIII. x. 105-107.

⁶ The echo of Bossuet's phrase in Gibbon's has been pointed out by Meissner, P., in *Grundformen der Englischen Geistesgeschichte* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1941, Kohlhammer), p. 8.

⁷ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lxxi, already quoted in I. i. 42 and IV. iv. 58.

⁸ Bossuet, J.-B.: *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, Book III, chap. 1.

Gibbon, in another passage of his work,¹ explicitly made Bossuet's point in his own observation that, 'after the loss of her legions and provinces, the genius and fortune of the popes again restored the supremacy of Rome'. It will be seen that Bossuet's dictum agrees with Hobbes' as a statement of Christian Rome's relation to her pagan predecessor, though these two seventeenth-century Western philosophers are poles apart in the inference that they draw from an identical hypothesis.² What to Hobbes' mind is a damning exposure is to Bossuet's mind a crowning glory; and, in taking this auspicious interpretation for granted, the seventeenth-century bishop is taking his cue from a fifth-century Pope. Preaching in Rome on the festival of the Apostles Peter and Paul, Pope Leo the Great (*pontificali munere fungebatur* A.D. 440-61) called his heroes 'the true founders of the city'.

'It is they who have raised thee to thy present pinnacle of glory, in order that—as a holy family, a chosen people, a priestly as well as a royal city that has become the capital of the World in virtue of being Blessed Peter's Holy See—thou mightest reign over a wider realm in the strength of our divine religion than in the exercise of an earthly dominion. Successive victories have added to thy territories till thou hast extended thy sovereignty far and wide over land and sea; yet the empire that has been made subject to thee by thy prowess in war is not so far flung as the domain that has been brought into thy fold by a Christian Peace.'³

¹ In chap. xlix.

² Mr. Martin Wight notes: 'The ghost theory had a special appeal for English common lawyers, who after the Reformation were apt to regard Canon Law as a malignant form of haunting. The point is made by Charles II's lord chief justice Sir Matthew Hale (*vivebat* A.D. 1609-76), in *The History of the Common Law of England*, chap. v (2nd ed. (London 1739, Walthoe), pp. 71-72):

"Rome, as well Ancient as Modern, pretended a kind of universal Power and Interest; the former by their Victories, which were large, and extended even to Britain itself; and the later upon the Pretence of being Universal Bishop or Vicar-General in all Matters Ecclesiastical; so that, upon Pretence of the former, the Civil Law, and, upon Pretence of the later, the Canon Law was introduc'd, or pretended to some kind of Right, in the Territories of some absolute Princes, and among others here in England."

Bryce makes the same point, with more detachment, in *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (Oxford 1901, Clarendon Press, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 245-6. Cp. Heine, Heinrich: *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland*: "Rom wollte herrschen; 'als seine Legionen gefallen, schickte es Dogmen in die Provinzen'" (*Religion and Philosophy in Germany*, translated by John Snodgrass (London 1882, Trübner), p. 22: "Rome always desired to rule; when her legions fell she sent dogmas into the provinces").

³ 'Isti sunt qui te ad hanc gloriam provexerunt, ut—gens sancta, populus electus, civitas sacerdotalis et regia—per sacram Beati Petri sedem caput Orbis effecta, latius praesideres religione divinā quam dominatione terrenā. Quamvis enim multis aucta victoriis ius imperii terrā marique protuleris, minus tamen est quod tibi bellicus labor subdidit quam quod pax Christiana subiecit.'—Pope Leo the Great: *Sermo lxxxii*, in *Natali Apostolorum Petri et Pauli* (Migne, P.-J.: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. liv (Paris 1846, Migne), cols. 422-3 (quoted in Vogt, J.: *Orbis Romanus* (Tübingen 1929, Mohr), pp. 31-32). In the present Study, on p. 72, above, we have already quoted another passage of the same sermon in which Pope Leo points out the services rendered, not by Christianity to Rome, but by the Roman Empire to the Christian Church. This pair of complementary ideas is anticipated in a passage of a memorial, addressed to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius (*imperabat* A.D. 161-80) by his Christian contemporary and subject, Bishop Melito of Sardis, which is quoted by Eusebius (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, Book IV, chap. xxvi, §§ 7-11). Melito points out that the Church and the Empire are coeval (the propagation of Christianity through the Empire having started in the reign of the founder of the Empire, Augustus); he also suggests that the Empire, even during the first two centuries of its, and the Church's, history, has gained more from the spiritual support of the Church than the Church has gained from the mundane convenience of the *Pax Romana* (see p. 72, n. 1, above).

In this vision of Rome's destiny as it appears to Leo's eagle eye, the Christian 'ghost' of Rome is more robust than its pagan 'original'. Which of these two appearances is the wraith, and which is the creature of flesh and blood? Is Hobbes right in maintaining that Romulus and Remus have made the fortunes of Peter and Paul? Or is Leo right in maintaining that Peter and Paul have saved the situation for Romulus and Remus? This issue was debated in public between a successor of Leo and a servitor of Leviathan during an episode in a conflict between the Papacy and the Kingdom of Italy which had been formally settled by the signature of three agreements at the Papal Palace of the Lateran on the 11th February, 1929,¹ but which smouldered on, and kept on flaring up, because it was an incident in a still undecided battle, on a wider front, between the worship of God and the worship of Man's corporate self.

In a speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies at Rome on the 14th May, 1939,² Benito Mussolini reopened the issue by suggesting that Christianity would never have become a universal religion if the grandeur—and decadence—of Imperial Rome had not given her her opportunity.

'Italy has the singular privilege, of which we ought to be proud, of being the one European nation that is the seat of a universal religion. That religion was born in Palestine, but Rome was the place where it became Catholic. Had it stayed in Palestine, most probably it would have been one of those innumerable sects that flourished in that derelict environment—sects like the Essenes and the Therapeutae, for instance—and most probably, too, it would have flickered out without leaving a trace of its influence. . . .

'It was in Rome that Christianity found its favourable environment. It found it, in the first place, in the lassitude of the governing classes and the consular families, who, in the time of Augustus, had become effete, run to fat and gone sterile; it found it, above all, in the swarming ant-heap of Levantine humanity which was the plague of Rome's social sub-soil—a public for whom a speech like the Sermon on the Mount opened up horizons of revolt and revenge.'³

This offensively patronizing and provocatively controversial parenthesis in a militant political pronouncement drew fire from Pope Pius XI in an address which he gave next day to a deputation from the

¹ For this settlement and its aftermath, see Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1929* (London 1930, Milford), pp. 422–78.

² The text will be found in Mussolini, B.: *Scritti e Discorsi*, vol. vii (Milan 1934, Hoepli), pp. 34–35.

³ 'L'Italia ha il privilegio singolare, di cui dobbiamo andare orgogliosi, di essere l'unica nazione europea che è sede di una religione universale. Questa religione è nata nella Palestina, ma è diventata cattolica a Roma. Se fosse rimasta nella Palestina, molto probabilmente sarebbe stata una delle tante sette che fiorivano in quell'ambiente arroventate, come ad esempio quelle degli Esseni e dei Terapeuti, e molto probabilmente si sarebbe spenta, senza lasciare traccia di sé. . . .

'Il Cristianesimo trova il suo ambiente favorevole in Roma. Lo trova, prima di tutto, nella lassitudine delle classi dirigenti e delle famiglie consolari, che ai tempi di Augusto erano diventate stracche, grasse e sterili, e lo trova, sopra tutto, nel brulicante formicaio dell'umanità levantina che affliggeva il sottosuolo sociale di Roma, e per la quale un discorso come quello della Montagna apriva gli orizzonti della rivolta e della rivendicazione.'

Jesuit College of Mondragone; and, when Mussolini—taken aback by the reception of his ill-considered excursion into the interpretation of history—sought, in the Senate on the 25th May, to improve the defences of an exposed position without overtly surrendering any ground, his elaboration of his thesis led him floundering deeper into the mire and gave his formidable adversary an opening for striking a winning blow. In a letter of the 30th May, 1929, addressed to Cardinal Gasparri, the Pope had the last word.

'Least of all did We expect to be treated to heretical pronouncements on the very essence of Christianity and Catholicism. There has been an attempt to emend them, but this attempt has not been altogether successful, to Our mind. . . . The divine mission to all the nations preceded the calling of Saint Paul; and this was also preceded by the mission of Saint Peter to the Gentiles. Thus the universality of the Church—both by right and in fact—is already there at the very outset of the Church's history and of the Apostles' preaching. Through the work of the Apostles and of their apostolic fellow-labourers, this universality very soon surpassed the limits of the Roman Empire—which, as everybody knows, was very far indeed from being coextensive with the whole World [as] known [to the Ancients]. If all that was intended was a reference to the facility for the diffusion and organisation of the Church that was providentially provided in the organisation of the Roman Empire, all that was necessary was a reference to Dante and Leo the Great—two great Italians who, in a few magnificent words, have stated, in lapidary form, the substance of what has become a commonplace in second-hand restatements by innumerable other voices.'

In this encounter, Pope Pius discomfited Mussolini as signally as Pope Leo had discomfited Attila; and the invocation of the Apostles on Christian Rome's behalf was indeed an argument to which there was no retort. Thomas Hobbes himself, shrewd in argument though he was, had simple-mindedly let the cat out of the bag in a sentence immediately preceding the passage of his *Leviathan* that we have quoted. In defining the period in which the Papists' 'whole Hierarchy or Kingdome of Darknesse may be compared not unfitly to the *Kingdome of Fairies*' by dating it 'from the time that the Bishop of Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for Bishop Universall by pretence of Succession to Saint Peter',² Hobbes has made, in advance, the admission that the Papacy is what it is in virtue of being the heir of the Apostolic Christian Church, and not in virtue of being the ghost of the pagan Roman Empire.

These findings may confirm us in the conclusion, reached in an

¹ 'Men che tutto Ci aspettavamo espressioni ereticali sulla essenza stessa del Cristianesimo e del Cattolicesimo. Si è cercato di rimediare: non Ci sembra con pieno successo. . . . Il mandato divino alle genti universe è anteriore alla chiamata di San Paolo; anteriore a questa il mandato di San Pietro ai gentili; l'universalità si riscontra già di diritto e di fatto agli inizi primi della Chiesa e della predicazione apostolica; questa per opera degli apostoli e degli uomini apostolici ben presto più vasta dell' Impero Romano, che, come è noto, non era di gran lunga tutto il mondo conosciuto; se si voleva soltanto ricordare l'utilità providenzialmente preparata alla diffusione e organizzazione della Chiesa nella organizzazione dell' impero romano, bastava ricordare Dante e Leone Magno, due grandi Italiani, che in poche e magnifiche parole dissero e scolpirono la sostanza di quanto poi innumeri altri ridissero.'

² Hobbes, op. cit., loc. cit.

earlier context,¹ that 'the analogy between Hildebrand's Roman hierocracy and Hrihor's Theban hierocracy breaks down'; and, if our Roman case in point is a fair test case, as we have taken it to be, we may infer that the higher religions cannot be accounted for as being the ghosts of civilizations any better than they can be explained as being their cancers or their chrysalises.

¹ In IV. iv. 517.

VII. A (iii) (a), ANNEX I

SPIRITUAL ACHIEVEMENT AND MATERIAL ACHIEVEMENT: ARE THEY ANTITHETICAL OR INTERDEPENDENT?

IN previous passages¹ we have suggested that the circumstances favourable to spiritual and to secular progress are not only different but are antithetical. This is one of the themes of the Parable of the Sower: 'Some fell among thorns, and the thorns grew up and choked it, and it yielded no fruit';² but we arrived at our conclusion, not intuitively, but empirically, as a result of tracing backwards in time a process of progressive spiritual enlightenment of which Christianity was the latest stage and, in Christian belief, the highest so far reached. We found that each of those preceding stages of spiritual advance had taken place in social circumstances which, like those which saw the birth of Christianity, were marked by a failure of mundane endeavours and by the suffering which such failure entails. When we turn from Christianity to consider the other three living higher religions, we find their histories likewise conforming to our apparent 'law' that spiritual achievement and material achievement are antithetical.

Christianity was born of a disintegrating Hellenic Civilization's experience of suffering at the climax of its Time of Troubles, and it came of age in the social interregnum following the Hellenic Civilization's final dissolution at the break-up of the Roman Empire. The histories of the Mahāyāna, Hinduism, and Islam reveal the same pattern of relation between spiritual and secular life. The Mahāyāna and Hinduism³ both emerged during a period, running from the second century B.C. to the fourth century of the Christian Era, when the Indic World was suffering under an intrusion of the Hellenic Civilization in the form of military invasions by Bactrian Greek war-lords and their Kushan successors. Thereafter, the Mahāyāna captivated Far Eastern hearts during a social interregnum that followed the dissolution of the Sinic Civilization upon the break-up of the Empire of the Posterior Han at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era. As for Islam, it achieved its amazing metamorphosis from being the heresy of a barbarian prophet into being a higher religion in its own right under the Arab Caliphate, which was the second and last phase of a Syriac universal state; and it rose to the occasion in an age when the break-up of the Caliphate was announcing the dissolution of the Syriac Civilization. In the history of Islam at this stage the rise of Christian monasticism and Christian mysticism had its parallel in the dervish movement and in Islamic

¹ On pp. 425 and 551, above. See also pp. 759-68, below.

² Mark iv. 7. Cp. Matt. xiii. 7 and Luke viii. 7.

³ Hinduism, that is, in the sense—to which the use of the term is confined in this Study—of the devotional religion which grew up, beneath the crust of the ritual religion of the Vedas, contemporaneously with the growth of devotional Mahayanian Buddhism beneath the crust of an ascetic Hinayanian Buddhism.

mysticism; and in this case, as in that, an outburst of spiritual life at a moment of mundane catastrophe was the secret of the triumphant religion's success in converting both the human sheep left shepherdless by the disappearance of a secular universal state and the wolf-like invading barbarians.

The same 'law' seems to be exemplified in the history of Zoroastrianism. In another context¹ we have observed that this higher religion forfeited its prospect of becoming a universal church when it was conscripted to serve as the ecclesiastical instrument of a Sasanian State dedicated to the political mission of expelling an intrusive Hellenism from the Syriac World. In the light of this spiritual penalty which Zoroastrianism incurred as the price of obtaining the political patronage of an Imperial Power in the third century of the Christian Era, it is significant that her previous loss of the patronage of an Imperial Power, through the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great in the fourth century B.C., had been followed by a marked increase of intensity in the radiation of her spiritual influence.

'The end of the Persian period by no means saw the end of Parsee [i.e. Zoroastrian] influence on Jewish eschatology. Indeed, on the contrary, from this time onwards the influence becomes much stronger and more forceful and apparently more conscious, in contrast to the previous chapter of history, in which the adoption of Parsee ideas [by Judaism] was generally a more unconscious process. It is a peculiar phenomenon, of which there are many examples, that states and peoples do not exert their cultural and spiritual influence effectively until after their own political collapse. The culture of Ancient Greece was not transmitted to the Ancient World (it would be substantially true to say) until after the independence of the Greek city-states had been decisively abolished by Philip of Macedon; and the culture of Rome was not acquired, in the true sense, by the Germans before Rome's world empire had collapsed under the blows of the Teutons. There seems to be something like a law of Nature that peoples cannot sow, from a full hand, the golden seed of their spiritual treasures until they have renounced, or been compelled to renounce, earthly goods. This is certainly true of the religious ideas of Parseeism, and indeed of Iranian religion in general. These ideas radiate, with an unprecedented penetrative power, all over the domain of an expiring Ancient World when, but only when, the Persian Monarchy has collapsed.'²

It will be noticed that the student of religious history who is the author of the passage just quoted draws attention to our apparent 'law' of antithesis governing the conditions that make respectively for spiritual and for material achievement, but that, in the examples of its working which he cites, he does not confine himself to the field of Religion, but compares the case of Zoroastrianism with secular cultural phenomena which may be classified likewise as being 'spiritual' though they do not fall within the religious sphere of spiritual life. This raises the question whether our 'law', if it is a law for Religion, is likewise a law for spiritual life in a wider sense, in which the term 'spiritual' would cover aesthetic

¹ In V. v. 659-61.

² Gall, A. von: *Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Heidelberg 1926, Winter), pp. 263-4.

and other non-religious cultural experiences and activities. Our 'law' has in fact been propounded, with this wider application, by an exiled Russian Orthodox Christian philosopher-prophet, Nicolas Berdyaev, in pursuance of an idea originally suggested by the German philosopher Oswald Spengler's sharply drawn antithesis between the connotations of the two German words *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*.

'Culture has always proved Life's greatest failure. An antithesis would seem to divide culture from the "life" that Civilisation attempts to realise. When a mighty German state is finally established, Capitalism and Socialism accompany it; and its main efforts are directed to assert its will to world power and organisation. But Goethe, the great idealists and romantics, great philosophy and art, will be missing from this mighty Imperialist and Socialist Germany. They will have been supplanted by technique, which has its repercussions even upon philosophical thought (in the gnosiological currents). Conquest is the method now applied in all spheres at the expense of the integral-intuitive apprehension of Being. The mighty civilisation of the British Empire holds no place for either Shakspeare or Byron, just as Dante and Michelangelo are inconceivable in [the] Modern Italy which erected the ponderous monument to Victor Emmanuel and established Fascism. And herein lies the tragedy of both Culture and Civilisation.'¹

Does a 'law' which has thus suggested itself independently to the minds of divers students of history fit the facts of non-religious spiritual life as unequivocally as it appears to fit the facts of religious experience? In the field of Religion we have noticed a number of signal testimonies to this law's validity without so far having stumbled upon any conflicting evidence. Is this equally true in the field of secular culture? If we extend our empirical survey into this other province of spiritual life, we shall find here that the examples of the working of the law are also striking, but that they are contradicted, in this province, by some no less signal breaches of it.

One of the classic examples of the working of our 'law' in the secular cultural field is cited by Berdyaev in the passage just quoted. In the history of the Modern Western secular culture in Germany it is notorious that the great age of German music, literature, and art falls within the period of political and economic adversity that began for Germany with the Thirty Years War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1618-48) and that ended for her with the foundation of the Second Reich in A.D. 1871. And this classic German instance is not a solitary one. 'The golden day' in which a wave of artistic creativity, set in motion by a Medieval Italian Renaissance, touched New England, in her turn,² after having fructified Germany, was extinguished by the political triumph of winning the Civil War and by the economic triumph of winning the West.

'The law of inverse operation' is likewise illustrated by the history of Persian literature. Just as the religious tendril of the Iranian genius flowered after the fall of the Iranian Empire of the Achaemenidae and withered after the rise of the Iranian Empire of the Sasanidae, so its aesthetic potentiality in the medium of Poetry did not reveal itself until

¹ Berdyaev, N.: *The Meaning of History*, English translation (London 1936, Bles), p. 212.

² See III. iii. 137.

after the fall of the Sasanian Empire had opened an Islamic chapter of Iranian history; and, even then, it had to wait until after the Persian genius had been decisively expelled from the arena of political life. The Islamic Persian literature did not come to flower during an age when the Persians, after their momentary military and political overthrow at the hands of the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors, had come back into political power in the Syriac World, first as henchmen and ministers of the 'Abbasid Caliphs¹ and then as founders and rulers of successor-states of a crumbling 'Abbasid Empire. The Islamic Persian literature—in which the Persian language served as the vehicle for poetry such as had never before been begotten by the Persian artistic genius—came to flower at a moment when the Persian successors of the 'Abbasids were being supplanted by barbarian Turkish war-lords; the patron of Firdawsī was the Turk Mahmūd of Ghaznah; and, under Turkish and Mongol barbarian patronage, Persian literature continued to flourish so long as the Persians remained fast bound in the misery and iron² of political adversity. But, when, nine hundred years after the fall of the Sasanian Empire and five hundred years after the fall of the Samanid march-state in Transoxania,³ a Turkish-speaking dynasty paradoxically re-established a powerful and militant Persian national state, the golden chain of Persian poets broke off short as abruptly as the chain of German composers of music when, two hundred years after Germany's political and economic catastrophe in the Thirty Years War, a materially puissant Prussia-Germany was conjured into existence by Bismarck.⁴

The law of inverse operation can also be seen at work in the aesthetic field in the province of Visual Art, as well as in the provinces of Music and Literature. In another context⁵ we have noticed that, in a latter-day museum at Sparta, the specimens of an original, distinctive, and promising 'pre-Lycurgeoan' Lacedaemonian art are sundered from the specimens of a commonplace 'post-Lycurgeoan' art by a gap corresponding chronologically to the period during which Lacedaemon was a formidable political and military power in the Hellenic World in virtue of her devotion to a 'Lycurgeoan' *agôgê* which deliberately and cold-bloodedly concentrated on producing military efficiency and prowess at the cost of sacrificing every other aim in life. We have also noticed, in the same connexion, that the fifth, fourth, and third centuries B.C., during which the 'Lycurgeoan' régime held Sparta in its grip and inhibited her from indulging her previously manifest artistic genius, were the very centuries in which, in other Hellenic city-states, the visual arts were at their apogee.

This contrast between the artistic promise of 'pre-Lycurgeoan' Sparta and the conspicuousness of Art by its absence in the Sparta of the 'Lycurgeoan' Age has an historical parallel in the contrast between the masterly perceptiveness with which an Upper Palaeolithic Man depicted on the walls of his cave-dwellings the animals that were his game, and

¹ See pp. 148-51, above.

² Ps. cvii. 10.

³ See II. ii. 142.

⁴ The apparent inability of the Persian genius to express itself simultaneously in poetry and in politics has been noticed already in I. i. 360, n. 1, and II. ii. 77, n. 1. Compare I. i. 363, n. 3, and the passage quoted *ibid.*, pp. 393-4, from Mirzā Muḥammad Khan of Qazvin.

⁵ In III. iii. 66-67.

the unimaginativeness of the perfunctory decorations scratched or painted on the pottery of this magnificent primitive artist's Neolithic successor, who not only forged ahead of his aesthetically superior predecessor in the technique of fashioning stones into tools, but also demonstrated his own all-round superiority in economic capability by capping his invention of earthenware with the discovery of agriculture—a revolution in the material conditions of human life which, at the time of writing, still remained unsurpassed by any of the material achievements of any of the civilizations. If the dumb archaeological record that, midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, was the only extant evidence for the transition from the Upper Palaeolithic to the Neolithic way of life were ever to be illuminated by the dawning glimmer of an historical twilight that had revealed something of the inner history of the transition from a 'pre-Lycurgeoan' to a 'Lycurgeoan' Sparta, would it become apparent in the earlier, as in the later, tragedy that the artist's genius had been stifled by a will to power?

These parallels, in the spiritual provinces of Visual Art, Music, and Literature, to our examples of the working of 'the law of inverse operation' in the field of Religion are impressive as far as they go; but an unprejudiced survey reveals that, in the non-religious field of spiritual life, such evidences of the validity of our 'law' are counterbalanced by instances of breaches of it.

The case of Sparta, for example, is offset by the case of Athens; for the Periclean Athens who made herself 'the education of Hellas'¹ in the fifth century B.C. did not have to purchase her artistic and intellectual pre-eminence in the Hellenic World of that age at the price of renouncing the material power which an artistically barren contemporary Sparta was cultivating at the cost of everything else. On the contrary, at the very time when the Athenians were creating their exquisite works of art and literature, they were also building up their material power—and this on a basis far broader than any that the Spartans had ever dreamed of—to a pitch at which Athens, single-handed, proved almost strong enough to impose her dominion upon all the other city-states of Hellas. On this practical, power-building side of their multifarious activity in 'the Classical Age' the Athenians had begun by carrying through the economic revolution of abandoning subsistence-farming in favour of cultivating specialized crops, and manufacturing specialized industrial wares, for export in exchange for imports of foodstuffs for their own consumption at home;² in order to expedite this profitable new foreign commerce they had built up a merchant marine; and, on the twofold foundation of their newly acquired wealth and maritime experience, they had founded a navy which, as a weapon of war, outclassed the Spartan phalanx in subtlety as notably as in range. The potency of the Athenian Navy in the fifth century B.C. is expounded as follows by an anonymous Athenian student of public affairs whose observation of the Athenian democracy of his day was as keen as his dislike of it:

'[The] accidents [of geography] have played into the hands of Athenian

¹ A phrase attributed to Pericles himself by Thucydides, Book II, chap. 41.

² See I. i. 24-25; II. ii. 36-42; and III. iii. 122.

sea-power. The subjects of a land-power can club together a number of small communities and then go into action [against the paramount power] with concentrated forces; the subjects of a sea-power, in so far as they are islanders, are not in a position to bring their communities together in a physical union; they are insulated from one another by salt water; the paramount power rules the waves; and, even if the islanders could manage to slip through the blockade and concentrate their forces on a single island, they would [simply] die of hunger. As for Athens' subject communities on the mainland, the big ones are kept in subjection by intimidation and the small ones really by a [latent] economic sanction, since there is no community [in the world] that can do without imports and exports, and these will be denied to any community that does not show itself amenable to the rulers of the sea. And then the rulers of the sea can [count on being able to] do something that the rulers of land empires can do [only] occasionally: they can devastate the territory of their superiors in military strength. They can coast along an enemy shoreline where the enemy is either not on the spot at all, or anyway not in strength, and then, on the approach of [substantial] enemy forces, they can retire on board ship and stand out into the offing—tactics which condemn the enemy's relieving land-force (ὁ πεζὴ παραβοηθῶν) to have the worst of it. Then the rulers of the sea can make a naval expedition to any distance you like from their home base, while a land-power's range of action from its home base is limited to a few days' journey (marching overland being a slow business, and the ration-carrying capacity of a land-force being limited to not more than a few days' supply). Moreover, a land-force must either have friendly country to traverse or must fight its way through, whereas a naval force [is master of the initiative]: where it finds itself in superior strength it can disembark a landing-party; in the contrary event it is under no compulsion to try a landing at that particular point; it can [just] go coasting along till it reaches either friendly country or an enemy in inferior strength.¹

The versatility of the Athenians of the Periclean Age in simultaneously cultivating diverse capacities of human nature is eulogized, as a distinctive quality which is the secret of their greatness, in the Thucydidean version of a famous Periclean speech:

'We cultivate the Arts without extravagance and the Intellect without effeminacy. . . . Our politicians do not neglect their private affairs, and the rest of us devote ourselves to business without losing touch with politics. We are unique in regarding men who take no part in politics as being not merely unambitious but unprofitable; and we are all sound judges, if not creative statesmen, in public affairs. . . . In short, I maintain that the Commonwealth of Athens is the School of Hellas and that the individual Athenian will never meet his equal for gallantry, self-reliance, adaptability, versatility, and distinction, in whatever situation he may find himself. The proof that this is no empty boast, but is sober reality, is afforded by the power of our country, which is the fruit of our national character.'²

This simultaneous pre-eminence in artistic and material prowess, which is characteristic of Periclean Athens—though not of Sparta or

¹ Auctor Atheniensis Anonymus: *Institutions of Athens* (edited by Kalinka, E.: Berlin and Leipzig 1913, Teubner), chap. ii, §§ 2-5.

² Thucydides, Book II, chap. xl, §§ 1-2, and chap. xli, §§ 1-2.

Persia or Germany in any age—had had parallels in a Modern Western World in both seventeenth-century Holland and seventeenth-century France. The apogee of Dutch painting and Dutch scholarship had been contemporaneous with the apogee of Dutch commerce and Dutch naval, military, and political power; and in the twentieth century of the Christian Era France looked back to the reign of Louis Quatorze as 'le Grand Siècle' because in that age she had performed the twin feats of only just failing to impose her dominion upon all the other countries of the West and completely succeeding in making herself 'the education of Europe' thanks to the simultaneous brilliance of her achievements in the Arts. Thereafter, when Great Britain was harvesting the lion's share of the political and economic fruits of Holland's pyrrhic victory over Louis XIV's France, the consequent expansion of British commercial and naval power was accompanied in the realm of Literature by the achievement of a minor 'Augustan Age'; and the classic prototype of all 'Augustan ages', in which a Latin literature had come to its finest flower, had been contemporary with a reprieve which had been won by a Roman political genius for a disintegrating Hellenic Civilization through the establishment of an Augustan Peace.

If, with these conspicuous breaches of our 'law' in mind, we now re-examine the passage, quoted above, in which Berdyaev propounds this 'law' as one that governs the ebb and flow of secular culture, we shall find flaws in the particular pieces of evidence that he cites in support of his thesis.

If, in his citation of English history, Berdyaev had argued his case in terms of Music, he could have pointed out that, in the musical province of secular cultural life, A.D. 1688 was as inauspicious a date in England's history as A.D. 1871 in Germany's, and he could have inferred that a Modern Western bourgeoisie was apt to bury its musical talent as soon as it began to make money in business. Even in this province, however, the English example only partially bears out a 'law of inverse operation' to which the German example conforms with exactitude; for, while it is true of English, as of German, history that music 'slumped' when business began to boom, it is not true, in the English case, that music did not begin to blossom until the country's economic and political life had been overtaken by adversity. The *floruit* of German classical music, whose *terminus ante quem* is A.D. 1871, has also a *terminus post quem* in A.D. 1648; for, as we have noticed, this *floruit* is exactly coincident in duration with the 'trough' in the curve of Germany's political and economic fortunes between the Thirty Years War and the foundation of the Second Reich. On the other hand the musical talent of the English bourgeoisie, which ceased to be cultivated when 'the Glorious Revolution' of A.D. 1688 was followed by a steep and steady rise in British commercial prosperity and naval power, was already being cultivated with ardour in the Elizabethan Age—in which the English were enjoying an intoxicating spell of naval and commercial power—without having to wait for the doldrums of the seventeenth century in order to come into its own.¹

¹ Mr. Martin Wight notes: 'French music partially bears out the law of inverse

Thus, in English history, even Music only partially bears out our 'law', while Poetry—which is the secular art that Berdyaev singles out for citing in his English illustration of his thesis—yields perhaps more evidence against his argument than in favour of it. Berdyaev's contention that 'the mighty civilisation of the British Empire holds no place for either Shakspeare or Byron' is, no doubt, borne out, as far as Byron is concerned, by the portentous spectacle of the eclipse that overtook the muse of Byron's older contemporary Wordsworth after the post-Napoleonic triumph of a British Industrial Revolution. If Byron (*vivebat* A.D. 1788–1824)—or, for that matter, Shelley (*vivebat* A.D. 1792–1822) or Keats (*vivebat* A.D. 1795–1821)—had lived to the same ripe old age as Wordsworth (*vivebat* A.D. 1770–1850), Wordsworth's history suggests that these younger contemporaries of his likewise might have found the spiritual climate of a Victorian England adverse to their poetic genius. On the other hand, Shakspeare's life-span was, of course, coeval with the Elizabethan Age, and this chronological correspondence is no mere coincidence, for the poet was neither hostile nor indifferent to the political and economic triumphs of his countrymen in his lifetime; the excitement of sighting opportunity, and the exultation of rising to the occasion, which was the stimulus of the Elizabethan English pirate and merchant adventurer, was likewise the inspiration of the Elizabethan English playwright and man of letters. The same fire coursed through all Elizabethan English veins; and this feature of an Elizabethan Age of English history reappears in a Victorian Age. Tennyson and Browning were children of the Victorian Age in the same significant sense in which Shakspeare was a child of the Elizabethan; and the last decade of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, in which the resurgence of Germany's material power was celebrated by the death of the last of the German classical composers of music,¹ saw the recession of Victorian England's material power portended by the deaths² of the two most characteristic of the Victorian English poets.³

operation: it reached its greatest heights (as did French painting) during the first fifty years of the régime of the Third Republic [i.e. during a half-century in which, on the military and political plane, France was under the shadow of the catastrophe of A.D. 1870–1]. Martin Cooper's recent book on *French Music* (London 1951, Oxford University Press) bears the sub-title "From the Death of Berlioz to the Death of Fauré" (A.D. 1869–1924), which is the richest and most varied period in the history of French music. It may be noticed that this is an example of Music's flourishing in a period which, on the plane of practical affairs, was one of *political* decline but of *economic* prosperity. In France, at any rate, the bourgeoisie proved to be as good a patron of the Arts as the Crown had once been.

Mr. John Lodge comments on Mr. Martin Wight's note: 'I think that this is a matter of opinion. Bizet (*vivebat* A.D. 1838–1875) died young but was a composer of genius as well as charm, and Berlioz (*vivebat* A.D. 1803–1869) is to French music what Hugo and Delacroix are to French poetry and French [visual] art. He is their greatest romantic. If you prefer the French Impressionists and Post-Impressionists in painting, you will probably prefer their contemporaries in music.' ¹ Brahms died in A.D. 1897.

² Tennyson died in A.D. 1892, Browning in A.D. 1889.

³ Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'In this application of the law of inverse operation to the history of English poetry, the argument is open to two criticisms: (i) It assumes the comparability and literary-historical equivalence of all the poets that you mention, and (ii) those that you mention are arbitrarily selected. The main massifs in the poetic range do roughly coincide with periods of political power: Spenser, Shakspeare, Donne, with the Elizabethan-Jacobean expansion; Milton with the Cromwellian epoch (if one regards him, like Clarendon, as a personal example of Withdrawal-and-Return, writing his masterpiece in a retirement from politics during the Restoration doldrums); Dryden

Nor, in the provinces of Poetry and the Visual Arts, is our 'law' borne out by Italian history any more convincingly than it is by English history. It is true, as Berdyaev points out, that a Cavourian Italy, like a Bismarckian Germany, blindly buried what survived of her artistic talent in her obsession with the pursuit of material power; but the two arts of which Dante and Michelangelo were respectively masters neither survived in Italy to wilt at the advent of the Risorgimento nor waited in Italy to blossom until the Italians had tasted the political and economic adversity that began to overtake them at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era. The *floruit* of the Italian school of Western Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture was coeval with the age in which the city-states of Northern and Central Italy were successful in maintaining their political independence and in making their country the workshop and emporium of the World;¹ and in a Late Medieval Italy, as in an Elizabethan and in a Victorian England, the contemporaneity of the blossoming of these arts with the achievement of material power was not just a chronological coincidence. Here, too, there was an inner psychological connexion between these two diverse manifestations of *virtù*. To find an Italian illustration of the working of our 'law' in the secular field, Berdyaev would have had to surrender Poetry and the Visual Arts and take his stand on Music; for here the Italian pattern is in truth the same as the German. A golden chain which begins with Palestrina (*vivebat* A.D. 1526-94) and ends with Verdi (*vivebat* A.D. 1813-1901) does exactly span the political and economic 'trough' in Italian history which extends from Charles VIII's crossing of the Alps in A.D. 1494² to Victor Emmanuel's entry into Rome in A.D. 1870. The zenith of the Italian Opera coincides in date with the nadir of Italian wealth and power, and this synchronism is too suggestively reminiscent of its German counterpart for us to be able to dismiss it as a freak of Chance.

What is the upshot of the foregoing survey? It has already made two things clear. In the first place, our 'law' that spiritual achievement and material achievement are antithetical proves not to have equal validity in all cultural provinces. Its manifest operation in the field of Religion was the clue which originally led us to formulate it; and we can now see that we might also have arrived at it by another road if our starting-

and Pope with the age of William and Marlborough (but in the later Augustan Age we lack a poetic peak to correspond to Chatham: Gray scarcely fills the bill, though Johnson, whose genius was not poetic, would exactly fill it); and the Romantics, from their conventional beginning with the publication of *Lyrical Ballads* in 1798 down to their dim 'Georgian' swan-song with Rupert Brooke dying at Scyros in 1915, with the post-Napoleonic *Pax Britannica*. But most critics would judge that the general level of poetical genius in this series *descends*, running transversely to the ascending line of political power: they would see the Elizabethans as a Golden Age and Tennyson in terms of a Silver Age. And by common consent the two highest poetical peaks, Shakespeare and Milton, come at the beginning of the range. So perhaps one gets the law of inverse operation working within the limits of a broad coincidence of poetical and political achievement.

'It is worth noting that there is a fairly considerable massif, whose chief peaks are Yeats and Eliot, rising out of the waste land of Britain's loss of Great Power status in the twentieth century—fairly considerable, but not big enough in relation to the whole range to show a poetical efflorescence succeeding or coinciding with a collapse of political power.'

¹ See III. iii. 342.

² See *ibid.*

point had been, not Religion, but Music. If, however, our starting-point had been Poetry, the Persian and German exemplifications of the working of the 'law' would have been offset by the Attic, Italian, French, and English breaches of it; while, if we had started with a survey of the social conditions in which the Visual Arts have blossomed and wilted, we might have been led, by the evidence in this field, to formulate the precisely contrary 'law' that spiritual achievement and material achievement are, not antithetical, but interdependent; for the consensus of the Attic, Italian, and Dutch evidence in this sense would probably have weighed more heavily in our estimation than the contrary evidence from Sparta and from the Stone Age. Can we bring any order out of the apparent confusion into which our well-tried empirical method of inquiry might appear to have led us in this instance?

One conclusion that is suggested by the facts now before us is that there is an intrinsic incompatibility between the quest of the Beatific Vision, which is the goal of Religion, and the pursuit of material power in any of its forms. Another conclusion is that the secular vein of spiritual activity is a middle term between Religion on the one hand and the pursuit of material power on the other. When we dissect this secular spiritual activity into its diverse expressions in Music, Poetry, and Visual Art, we find that Music is apt to obey the same 'law' of ebb and flow as Religion, and Visual Art the same 'law' as the pursuit of power, while Poetry behaves equivocally—reacting in German and Persian history like Music and Religion, and in Attic, Italian, French, and English history like Visual Art and the pursuit of power. These tentative conclusions seem warrantable; for the truth is that Human Life on Earth is lived in two societies simultaneously—the Ergastulum of Leviathan and the Commonwealth of God¹—and each of these ways of life has its own spiritual dynamic: the inspiration of the Grace of God and the stimulus of the Pride of Life.² The evidence suggests that Visual Art is apt to respond to the Pride of Life more readily than to a Grace of which the price is material adversity; that those adverse conditions of material life that are propitious for Religion are also propitious for Music; and that Poetry, in contrast to both her sister arts, is a turn-coat chameleon, who can take colour from the stimulus of Pride as readily as from the inspiration of Grace.

The classic case in which Poetry had followed the course of Religion in first blossoming at the breath of mundane adversity and then wilting at the breath of mundane prosperity was presented by the Islamic chapter of Persian history; and in this case it was manifest that Poetry had drawn its inspiration from a religious source. 'The close connexion between Poetry and Belles Lettres on the one hand and Sufi-ism and Mysticism on the other, at any rate in Persia, is obvious, so that the extinction of the one necessarily involves the extinction of the other.'³

¹ See V. vi. 149-68 and 365-9; and pp. 558-61, above.

² 'Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui' (St. Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book XIV, chap. 28).

³ Letter, dated the 24th May, 1911, from Mirzā Muhammad Khan of Qazwīn to Professor E. G. Browne, quoted in I. i. 394 (cp. loc. cit., p. 363, n. 3).

After the forcible conversion of Persia from the Sunnah to the Shī'ah by the Safawis, the triumphant Shī'i divines waged a relentless war against the dervish monasteries, and Poetry as well as Mysticism was eradicated in the destruction of a religious institution in which Mysticism and Poetry alike had found a spiritual home.

We may also cite one conspicuous case in which the course of Religion had been followed by Visual Art. A classical Hellenic art which had gone into decline at the onset of the second bout of an Hellenic Time of Troubles at the turn of the third and second centuries B.C.¹ had been eventually discarded—by an latter-day generation of Hellenes whose experience of suffering had sickened them of the Pride of Life—in favour of a revolutionary Byzantine art whose aim was not to portray the body but to minister to Religion by expressing the Soul.²

Note by MARTIN WIGHT on VII. A (iii) (a), Annex I

SPIRITUAL AND MATERIAL ACHIEVEMENT: THE LAW OF INVERSE OPERATION IN ITALIAN VISUAL ART

I think your generalization about the *floruit* of Italian art is so broad as to be inaccurate: it requires closer analysis.

The four great poets come squarely at the beginning and at the end of the political independence of the city-states: Dante and Petrarch in the fourteenth century, when Italy finally emancipated itself from the remains of Imperial and Papal political control; Ariosto (*vivebat* A.D. 1474–1533) and Tasso (*vivebat* A.D. 1544–95) in the sixteenth century, when Italy fell under Spanish control. The fifteenth century, which was the political heyday of the city-states, produced no great poet. Here there is something of inverse operation.

It is also visible in Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture. These ascended steadily up to the High Renaissance in the two generations after the collapse of the city-state cosmos in A.D. 1494, and the supreme artists lived through or were stimulated by the 'invasion of the barbarians'. Botticelli was deeply influenced by Savonarola and experienced the destruction of Florence as a Great Power. Raphael, whose life has fewest political *rappports*, was summoned to Rome by Julius II, the last pope under whom the Papal States played the role of a Great Power. Leonardo was in the service of Lodovico Sforza, under whom Milan lost its Great Power status, and he ended his life in the service of the French conqueror. Michelangelo's life was interwoven with the collapse of the Papacy as a temporal Great Power, and he was practically the last engineer of the fortifications of republican Florence before the city was finally reduced to being a satellite of Spain through the Medici restoration of A.D. 1530. Venetian art ascended from the Bellini through Giorgione (*vivebat* A.D. 1475?–1510) to its peak in Titian (*vivebat circa* 1485–1576) and Tintoretto (*vivebat* 1518–94), while Venice lost her Great Power status in the twin battles on land and sea of Agnadello and Diù

¹ See V. vi. 287–91.

² See IV. iv. 54–55.

in 1508; and Berenson sees the political catastrophe as a challenge by responding to which the Venetian artistic tradition was etherialized and carried to its greatest heights.

'But even while such pictures [as the early works of Titian] were being painted, the spirit of the Italian Renaissance was proving inadequate to Life. . . . Life began to show a sterner and more sober face than for a brief moment it had seemed to wear. Men became conscious that the passions for knowledge, for glory, and for personal advancement were not at the bottom of all the problems that Life presented. Florence and Rome discovered this suddenly, and with a shock. In the presence of Michelangelo's sculptures in San Lorenzo, or of his "Last Judgement", we still hear the cry of anguish that went up as the inexorable truth dawned upon them. But Venice, although humiliated by the League of Cambrai, impoverished by the Turk, and by the change in the routes of commerce, was not crushed, as was the rest of Italy, under the heels of Spanish infantry, nor so drained of resource as not to have some wealth still flowing into her coffers [an example of the golden mean of the stimulus of blows?]. Life grew soberer and sterner, but it was still amply worth the living, although the relish of a little stoicism and of earnest thought no longer seemed out of place. The spirit of the Renaissance had found its way to Venice slowly; it was even more slow to depart.

'We therefore find that towards the middle of the sixteenth century, when elsewhere in Italy painting was trying to adapt itself to the hypocrisy of a Church whose chief reason for surviving as an institution was that it helped Spain to subject the World to tyranny, and when portraits were already exhibiting the fascinating youths of an earlier generation turned into obsequious and elegant courtiers—in Venice painting kept true to the ripened and more reflective spirit which succeeded to the most glowing decades of the Renaissance. . . .

'It is scarcely to be wondered at that the Venetian artist, in whom we first find the expression of the new feelings, should have been one who by wide travel had been brought into contact with the miseries of Italy in a way not possible for those who remained sheltered in Venice. Lorenzo Lotto, when he is most himself, does not paint the triumph of Man over his environment, but in his altar-pieces, and even more in his portraits, he shows us people in want of the consolations of religion, of sober thought, of friendship and affection. They look out from his canvases as if begging for sympathy.

'But real expression for the new order of things was not to be found by one like Lotto, sensitive of feeling and born in the heyday of the Renaissance, to whom the new must have come as a disappointment. It had to come from one who had not been brought in personal contact with the woes of the rest of Italy, from one less conscious of his environment, one like Titian who was readier to receive the patronage of the new master than to feel an oppression which did not touch him personally; or it had to come from one like Tintoretto, born to the new order of things and not having to outlive a disappointment before adapting himself to it.'¹

Thus, while superficially there seems to be a broad contemporaneity between the blossoming of Italian art and the achievement of material power by the city-states, if it is examined more closely a different relationship is seen. There is a time-lag between the political zenith and

¹ Berenson, Bernhard: *The Italian Painters of the Renaissance*, revised ed. (London 1932, Oxford University Press), pp. 31-33.

the artistic zenith. The supreme artistic achievements of the High Renaissance are an after-glow of the political Golden Age of the city-states whose passing Guicciardini laments at the beginning of his history, or like the shower of stars emitted by a rocket when it reaches the highest point of its trajectory, Michelangelo and Titian being the two brightest and most long-lasting—just as El Greco was a still more delayed coruscation of the East Roman Empire (cp. IV. iv. 360–1).

There are two other striking examples of such inverse operation in the history of European Visual Art. One is provided by Spanish painting: Velasquez is to the decline of the Spanish Monarchy as Titian is to the decline of Venice, or as Michelangelo to the decline of Florence and Papal Rome. The other is a more important example. The only movement in European painting which can be compared with the Italian Renaissance, in the richness of its variety within a coherent tradition and in its profusion of great artists, is the French painting of the nineteenth century; and this appears as a 'compensation' for the post-Napoleonic political decline of France. 'Impressionism' was first used as the name of a school in A.D. 1863, and the *floruit* of the great Impressionists and Post-Impressionists was in the generation and a half between 1871 and 1914.

Against these three examples of inverse operation can be put the Dutch school, which, as you say above (p. 707), had its apogee in Rembrandt contemporaneously with the apogee of Dutch power, and the British school, which, if we roughly identify it with Reynolds, Gainsborough, Constable, and Turner, runs from A.D. 1723 when Reynolds was born to 1851 when Turner died,¹ and coincides closely enough with British political supremacy.

Perhaps the Flemish Renaissance could be pressed into service on the side of the examples of inverse operation, and seen as having the same relation to the independent Burgundian Power as the Italian Renaissance has to the Italian city-states, with Bruegel in the role of Michelangelo or Titian. 'The whole school provided, in fact, a kind of Gothic swan-song with Pieter Brueghel [*sic*] as its final climax.'² The German Renaissance is more difficult to fit into the pattern; and Rubens escapes through the net altogether. But perhaps enough has been said to suggest that there is at least as much inverse operation as interdependence in the case of the Visual Arts, and that the Visual Arts are therefore not less ambiguous than Poetry in this respect.

However, three last points need to be made. (i) This is only a cursory survey of European painting. To discover a 'law' of the Visual Arts that could claim any validity one would have to examine the art of at least the Byzantine World, Persia, India, and China as well. And probably the findings would be equally ambiguous. For example, 'it is noticeable that, throughout Indian history, architecture and sculpture have followed the moving centres of political power'.³ Similarly the Mughal

¹ Mr. John Lodge comments: 'I would add Hogarth (*vivebat* A.D. 1697–1764), and so cover the period more completely.'

² Newton, Eric: *European Painting and Sculpture* (London 1941, Pelican Books), p. 92.

³ John Irwin in *Indian Art, essays . . .* edited by Sir Richard Winstedt (London 1947, Faber), p. 92.

Empire at its zenith produced a great school of painting; on the other hand, Rajput painting seems to have been stimulated by the decentralization of art patronage that accompanied the decline of the Mughal Rāj, and flowered in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

(ii) The danger of seeking to define the relationship between artistic and material achievement is that the political environment, which is only a conditioning factor, becomes subtly exaggerated into the determinant. For example, were the French Impressionists a response to a challenge of the political decline of France, or a development of the inspiration of Constable and Turner? An art historian would prefer the latter explanation. El Greco was born in Crete, worked in Venice perhaps as Titian's pupil, and settled in Spain when Philip II was at the height of his power. Is he to be treated as a late coruscation of the East Roman Empire, as an apprentice of the Venetian school at its zenith, or as the artistic epiphenomenon of the Spanish political apogee? Or was he an inspired vagrant who cross-fertilized schools like a wandering bee? Most art historians would regard him as an isolated figure who cross-fertilized only his own genius and whose influence was not fully felt until the French Post-Impressionists. With Rubens, again, was not the inspiration that he gained from the Italian masters when he was in Mantua more important than the political régime of the archduke Albert and archduchess Isabella in Flanders which enabled him to develop the inspiration, so that he must properly be described in terms of an international baroque movement? It seems that individual genius in art is more closely conditioned by artistic tradition than artistic tradition itself is conditioned by the political and social environment. The ultimate truth about artistic activity, as about all spiritual activity, is in terms of the wind blowing where it listeth and 'light caught from a leaping flame'.

(iii) The concept of 'inverse operation' needs to be analysed with much more precision before it can be really useful. At least three different kinds of inverse operation are seen from your discussion. (a) There is the time-lag or 'after-glow', when an artistic tradition has been established during a period of political prosperity, but produces its supreme achievements after political prosperity has ended. The Italian Renaissance is the classic example. (b) There is what might be called, by contrast, the 'radiant morning', when an outburst of artistic genius accompanies the beginnings of political power, but the artistic level sinks as material power expands. I have suggested that English poetry illustrates this.¹ (c) There is simple compensation, when an artistic efflorescence comes after the loss of material power, and the artistic tradition has not in any notable way been established earlier. The classic examples are German or Italian music.

Can we say that (a) tends to be illustrated by the Visual Arts, (b) by Poetry, and (c) by Music? It looks as if a tradition in the Visual Arts ascends slowly to its highest point and then falls sheer away, while a tradition in Poetry scales its highest point in about a generation and then descends gradually away. But this would be a generalization from far too few examples, and every example changes its shape, like Proteus,

¹ See p. 708, n. 3, above.

when you try to pin it down and classify it. For instance, the great German poetical efflorescence coincides with the musical efflorescence and seems therefore to illustrate (c) rather than (b). But on second thoughts they can both be made to illustrate (b). For it is inaccurate to regard the period from 1648 to 1871 as a continuous undifferentiated nadir of material adversity for Germany. From 1740 onwards the prostrate giant was stirring and preparing himself for 1871, and we could if we chose regard Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, and Hölderlin as the expression of the political renaissance of Germany, just as we regard the Elizabethan poets as the expression of the English *Befreiungskrieg* against Spain. The same is true of Music, for did not Bach, the first of the supreme masters, regard it as the climax of his career when in 1747 he was summoned to visit Frederick the Great at Potsdam?

It is this protean quality of our paradigms, rather than their insufficient quantity,¹ which makes an inquiry of the kind pursued in this Annex so unsatisfactory to the social scientist, who requires scientific precision and seeks firm laws in dealing with human history. But it seems to me that spiritual and artistic activity is intrinsically not susceptible to treatment by the scientific method, and that the 'laws' which you discuss do not aim to be demonstrable and universally valid, but are of a quite different character. Their aim is to refine the appreciation of a relationship between spiritual facts and their material contexts, not to demonstrate a causal connexion; their method is qualitative, not quantitative; and they are apprehended, not by the scientific mind, but by something much more like the aesthetic sensitivity of the critic—of which the quotation from Berenson above is an example.

¹ Mr. John Lodge comments: 'There is so much that has had to be passed over. How about Camoens in relation to Portuguese voyaging and its consequences, and Cervantes, Lope de Vega and Calderón in the Spanish picture? How about Pushkin and Tchaikovsky (not to mention Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and others) in the story of Russia?'

HIGHER RELIGIONS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES

IN the main stream of this Study¹ we have struck upon the probability that each of the higher religions might satisfy some widely experienced human need, and the possibility that each of them might correspond and minister to one of the psychological types into which Human Nature appears to be differentiated. These vistas of which we have caught a glimpse in passing are perhaps worth exploring further.

We may begin with a point on which we touched in an earlier passage of the same chapter.² Each of the higher religions had been apt to lay stress on some particular aspect of God's relation to Man, or of the individual soul's relation to the religious community, or of the religious community's relation to the political; and, even when it had not repudiated the complementary antithetical aspects in theory, it had been apt to ignore them in practice owing to the difficulty of bringing opposite poles together into a single harmonious *Weltanschauung* and way of life. When this insistence on one aspect, to the depreciation of others, had been carried far, it had been apt to evoke a counter-insistence on opposing aspects which could not be suppressed with impunity because they, too, had a truth and value which Human Nature could not afford to sacrifice. The counter-movement might take the form either of a new current within the old religion or of a new religion altogether; and, when it declared itself, it was apt to 'compensate' for the previous depreciation of the aspect which it was championing by unduly emphasizing this aspect in its turn—thereby laying itself open to a reaction against itself in the original direction against which it had set its own face.

The difficulty of reconciling the two poles of an antithesis cannot in fact be solved by holding to the one and despising the other;³ and a man is constrained to serve two masters as best he may, when he cannot dispense with either. On the plane of Religion the feminine epiphany of the Godhead as the Great Mother is difficult to reconcile with Its masculine epiphany as the Father of gods and men. The forbidding aspect of God as a jealous aloof judge is difficult to reconcile with the consoling aspect of God as a loving intimate saviour. The aspect of worship as a social act performed by a congregation, under the leadership of a priest who is a necessary mediator between the laity and God because he has a monopoly of the power to celebrate the liturgy, is difficult to reconcile with the aspect of worship as a direct communion between the individual soul and God, in a 'flight of the alone to the Alone'⁴ without witnesses or intermediaries. The primitive undifferentiated identity of the religious with the secular community is difficult

¹ On pp. 442-3, above.

² On pp. 426-9, above.

³ Luke xvi. 13; cp. Matt. vi. 24.

⁴ *Φύγη μόνου προς μόνον*.—Plotinus: *Enneades*, VI. ix. 11 (the closing words of the whole Corpus Plotinianum as arranged by Porphyry).

to reconcile with the separation of Church from State which was a specific characteristic of the higher religions.¹ These psychological difficulties had left their mark on the history of the higher religions' relation with one another.

The victory of Christianity in its competition with Isis-worship and Cybele-worship for the allegiance of the internal proletariat of a disintegrating Hellenic Society had not availed permanently to suppress altogether an Isiaco-Cybelene vision of a triune godhead in which the first of the three persons had worn a feminine aspect.² In the victorious Christian presentation of the Trinity the genius of Motherhood had not only been deposed from the first place; it had been ejected from the Godhead altogether in the doctrine of an Incarnation in which the Second Person of the Trinity was held to have been born of a human mother at the cost of deliberately divesting Himself of His divine power and glory.³ But a Trinity in which even the Third Person, as well as the First and the Second, had been reduced to masculine form had left the Psyche baulked of all means of satisfaction for its persistent and imperious impulse to pay worship to a principle of Motherhood which was both the primal and the dominant experience of every child born into the World; and the Great Mother had no sooner been thrust down from Heaven to Earth than She was raised again from Earth to Heaven in the transfiguration of Mary the human mother of Jesus of Nazareth into a Great Mother of God (*Theotókos*) capable of filling the intolerable vacuum that had been created by the previous deposition of Isis and Cybele. Yet this had not been the end of the story; for an antimatriarchal feeling that had once asserted itself in the replacement of an Isiac or Cybelene by a Christian presentation of the Trinity had eventually reasserted itself in an Islamic, Iconoclast, and Protestant series of revolts against 'Mariolatry'; and the Protestant attack on what looked, to Protestant eyes, like an avatar of Isis-worship and Cybele-worship within the bosom of a Western Christian Church had evoked in its turn, in Catholic Western Christian hearts, a more fervent devotion to the threatened person of Our Lady which had found expression in the successive promulgations of the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption.

The forbidding aspect of God, as Power, which had been presented in the Mosaic matrix of Judaism, had not been ousted completely or permanently by the consoling aspect of God as Love which had been presented in the Christian revelation. Islam had broken with Christianity in order to reinstate Yahweh under the name of Allah; and, in the Christian scheme itself, the lineaments of Yahweh were recognizable not only in the First Person of the Trinity, who had become Man's Father without having ceased to be his Lord, but also in the Second Person, who had become Man's judge as well as Man's saviour. This aspect of Christ as the Almighty Judge (*pantokrátor*) had been emphasized by the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the stern and melancholy bearded figure which was the latter-day conventional representation of

¹ See pp. 433-5, above.

² See pp. 437, 457-8, and 467 above.

³ 'Εαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν — Phil. ii. 7.

Christ in this role in Orthodox iconography bore no recognizable resemblance to the mild and gracious likeness of Orpheus in which the Primitive Church had depicted her conception of the Good Shepherd on the walls of the Catacombs. In a Western Christian Church the same Judaizing reversion from emphasis on God's loving intimacy with Man to emphasis on God's formidable transcendence had asserted itself, at a later stage, in the Protestant Reformation; and, when the enforcement of the political regulation *Cuius Regio Eius Religio*¹ had deprived Western Christians of the opportunity of making a personal choice between Catholicism and Protestantism, and had made Religion in Western Christendom depend again upon the accident of the subject's birth-place, the craving for a return to a more Judaic view of God, which had been debarred from expressing itself any longer through the channel of Protestantism in a France in which Catholicism had succeeded in re-establishing itself as the religion of the state, had found satisfaction on French soil in Jansenism, which was the nearest approach to Calvinism that could be contrived within a Catholic framework.²

Thus, where the intimate aspect of God's relation to Man had been to the fore, the transcendent aspect had persistently reasserted its claim to due consideration; but, in obedience to the same 'law' of psychological compensation, the converse tendency had likewise been persistently at work where the transcendent aspect had been dominant. The Christian revelation of God incarnate in Jesus Christ had not been the first intimation to Jewish souls of the truth that God is Love. The Mosaic presentation of Yahweh as a Jealous God, readily moved to anger, had been supplemented by the Prophetic presentation of Him as abounding in mercy and loving-kindness seven hundred years before the Christian Gospel was first preached; and this pre-Christian Judaism had even relaxed the rigidity of its monotheism so far as to associate with its One and Indivisible God a Word³ and a Wisdom which—when personified on the excuse that the one was merely an utterance and the other merely an attribute—had come near to anticipating the Second and Third Persons of the Christian Trinity in Unity. It is noteworthy that the same craving to give expression to the intimate aspect of God's relation with Man should have asserted itself in Islam, which had originally stood for an uncompromising reversion to a Jewish monotheism from a Christian 'polytheism'.

The orthodox Islamic Sunnah had no sooner established itself than it was challenged by a Shi'ah which had found new suffering saviours incarnate in the persons of 'Alī, Hasan, and Husayn and which was carried by enthusiasts to the extreme of identifying 'Alī with God. The

¹ See V. v. 646-712.

² 'Can it be wholly by chance that, whereas Cassian advocated free will, frequent communion and holy dissimulation, the Jesuits of the seventeenth century did likewise; and that, whereas Augustine and Prosper of Aquitaine disapproved of free will and of holy dissimulation, the Jansenists did likewise? And may not this coincidence betray two natural dispositions of mind rather than mere attachment to two traditional schools of thought?' (Pickman, E. M.: *The Mind of Latin Christendom* (London 1937, Oxford University Press), p. 481, n. 78). For the significance of Jansenism, see further XI, ix. 304.

³ See the passages in Eduard Meyer's *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* cited in V. v. 539, n. 4, and in V. vi. 270, n. 3.

strength and ubiquity of the demand for a divine saviour in human form in an Islamic World that was officially dedicated to the dogmas of unitarianism and transcendence is indicated by the persistent revival of Shi'ism after persistent attempts to repress it in almost every province of Dār-al-Islām; and, when, in the early years of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, the political regulation *Cuius Regio Eius Religio* was imposed in the Iranic Muslim World, a generation before its imposition in Western Christendom, in consequence of a personal clash between Ismā'il Shah Safawī and Sultan Selīm I 'Osmanlı,' the same thing happened in sixteenth-century Turkey as in seventeenth-century France. When Muslims were deprived of the opportunity of making a personal choice between the Sunnah and the Shi'ah owing to the official establishment of Sunnism as the religion of the Ottoman Empire and Shi'ism as the religion of the Safawī Empire, the craving for a God Incarnate found satisfaction on Ottoman soil in the Bektashi Order of Dervishes and in the Qyzyl Bāsh village communities that were affiliated to it.² Bektashism was a crypto-Shi'ism which discreetly refrained from advertising its religious beliefs and from translating them into political action in favour of the Safawī cause; and the Ottoman Government found it politic tacitly to tolerate this politically innocuous version of Shi'ism, because it realized that this was the smallest ration of an indispensable spiritual vitamin, lacking in the Sunnah, to which the spiritually starved subjects of a Sunni Government could safely be reduced without danger of a political explosion. It was notorious that Bektashism was the regimental religion of the Janissaries, and it has been estimated that, under the Later Ottoman Empire, more than half of the Turkish-speaking Muslim population was addicted to crypto-Shi'ism in some form.³

The pre-emergence in Judaism, and re-emergence in Islam, of the intimate aspect of God's relation to Man which is prominent in Christianity is not, however, so remarkable as the assertion of this intimate aspect in Buddhism, where the apparently ubiquitous and perpetual human craving for an expression of it actually availed to bring about the *tour de force* of conjuring the Mahāyāna—a consoling popular religion offering salvation by faith in a bodhisattva⁴—out of the forbidding Primitive Buddhist philosophy of the Hīnayāna.⁵

If we pass now from the question of God's relation to Man to the tension between congregational and individual worship, we shall encounter, in this different field, the same spectacle of a tug-of-war between two antithetical but equally importunate spiritual needs. The 'priestcraft' and 'ritualism' which Primitive Christianity had rejected in reaction to a priest-ridden and law-bound Judaism had conspicuously

¹ See I. i. 382-400.

² See Birge, J. K.: *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London 1937, Luzac).

³ See IV. iv. 68-69 and V. v. 111 and 295, in the present Study; and Birge, op. cit., pp. 13-15.

⁴ See V. v. 133-6, 552; and V. vi. 20.

⁵ See V. v. 133-4; V. vi. 18 and 142-3. In these contexts it has been pointed out that we have no warrant for assuming that the tenets of the Hīnayānian philosophy reproduce the personal beliefs of the Buddha, Siddhārtha Gautama, himself, about the Soul and God.

reasserted itself in both the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Catholic Christian Church; and in the Protestant Western Christian Church—which, on this issue, had originally been a reversion, not to Judaism, but to Primitive Christianity—it had again reasserted itself in Episcopalianism in general and in Anglo-Catholicism in particular. A priesthood and ritual reminiscent of those of the Orthodox and Catholic Christian churches had likewise been conjured by the Mahāyāna out of the simple fellowship of the Primitive Buddhist monastic community. Yet the institutional form of worship had never been exempt from challenge by the personal form that was its antithesis. Both Islam and Protestantism stood, in general, like Primitive Christianity, for a reversion from 'priestcraft' to a direct personal communion between the individual soul and God; and this perennial need, which had asserted itself as Protestantism in a Western Christendom, had similarly asserted itself in a Russian Orthodox Christendom in divers dissenting sects.¹

Finally, if we glance at the vicissitudes in the relation between Church and State, we shall observe that, on this issue, Islam had stood for a reversion from Christianity to a 'totalitarian' paganism of the Hellenic type; and we shall also observe that, by contrast with a Western Christendom, an Eastern Orthodox Christendom, in its re-subjection of the Church to the State,² as in its re-minting of the image of Christ in the likeness of the First Person of the Trinity, had moved in the same direction as Islam, though without having had quite that courage of its convictions which had been one of Islam's virtues. The same tendency had eventually overtaken the Western Church in its turn since the failure of the Medieval Papacy to achieve the Hildebrandine ideal of a *Respublica Christiana* in which a commonwealth of parochial secular states was to find its unity under the auspices of the Apostle at Rome;³ and it was significant that, in a Modern Western Christendom, this re-subjection of the Church to the State had not been confined to Protestant countries in which the supreme ecclesiastical power had been transferred, since the Reformation, from the Pope to the secular sovereign of a parochial principality. Catholic sovereigns had been as Orthodox-minded as their Protestant cousins in the keenness of their appetite to arrogate to themselves as many of the Pope's ecclesiastical prerogatives as they might find themselves able to filch without putting themselves outside the pale of the Catholic Communion.⁴

Thus the tension produced by the separation of the Church from the State at the birth of the higher religions had persistently sought relief in a remerging of the Church into an undifferentiated 'totalitarian' social order of the primitive kind. Yet the tendency to separation had no less persistently reasserted itself. In Islam it had been reasserted in the Shī'ah; and in a Safawī and post-Safawī Persian Empire, in which the Shī'ah had been converted into the established religion of a state by a *tour de force*, the secular authorities had never succeeded in taming the *mujtahids*—not even those who were resident at Qum, under the Persian

¹ For these Russian Orthodox Christian Non-conformists, see II. ii. 222.

² See IV. iv. 320-408 and 592-623.

³ See IV. iv. 512-84.

⁴ See IV. iv. 578.

Government's nose,¹ not to speak of their still more authoritative brethren who laid down the law for the Persian Government's subjects from fastnesses in the Shī'ī holy cities of 'Irāq which had been beyond the range of the Persian Government's arm since A.D. 1546, when Suleymān the Magnificent had carried the Ottoman frontier right down to the head of the Persian Gulf.² This latent power, exercised on critical occasions, of not only defying but coercing the otherwise omnipotent secular authorities was characteristic, not only of the *mujtahids* in and on the margin of a Shī'ī Persian Empire, but of the anchorites in Orthodox Christian states.³ Even in the realm of the Sunnah, the Commander of the Faithful, omnipotent though he had been in secular affairs, had had to defer, in matters of religion, to a consensus (*ijmā'*) of the doctors of the religious law (*Shari'ah*);⁴ and, in Protestant countries in which the secular sovereign had succeeded in acquiring the ecclesiastical prerogatives of an East Roman Emperor in Orthodox Christendom, the inevitable Shī'ah had presented itself in the shape of nonconformist 'free churches'.

This ebb and flow in which, in the history of the higher religions, antithetical features of religious life had asserted and reasserted themselves against one another in divers fields, without any of them ever either succeeding in permanently suppressing their opposites or succumbing to being permanently suppressed for their own part, might throw some light on the relations between the elemental practices and beliefs of the higher religions and the permanent needs of the Human Psyche.

The historical phenomena suggested that the distinctive spiritual stance of each of the higher religions must have been so oriented as to give some of the more important of these permanent psychic needs their due satisfaction, but that, just because each single religion had been thus effectively oriented towards satisfying certain particular needs, any single religion would inevitably prove not to be sufficiently catholic to be able to meet all the Psyche's permanent needs without making a tacit confession of its own congenital limitations by the impressively humble act of borrowing from one or more of the other historic higher religions some of the elements that inevitably would be lacking in the debtor religion's own spiritual gamut. In thus receiving from abroad elements overlooked in, because antithetical to, its own distinctively limited standpoint, a religion would be found guilty of inconsistency and self-stultification only in the verdict of a judge who took seriously the claim—officially filed by each of the Judaistic higher religions—that it alone was a uniquely complete and all-sufficient revelation of the Truth and vehicle of Salvation for all human souls on Earth, and that any other so-called 'religions' that might have had the hardihood to file

¹ In Persia in A.D. 1924 the *mujtahids* of Qum had prevented the dictator Rizā Khān Pahlawi from following his Ottoman Turkish contemporary Mustafā Kemāl's example by proclaiming a republic (see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (Oxford 1927, University Press), p. 537).

² See I. i. 390.

³ See pp. 388-90, above.

⁴ A crucial case in which the Grand Muftī Sheykh Jemālī is reported to have prevailed over the formidable Ottoman Pādishāh Selim the Grim, has been noticed in V. v. 706, n. 1, and in V. vi. 204, n. 1.

an identical claim were debased coins, which a rash soul would accept at their face value at its mortal peril since in these other currencies the best part of Religion's essential gold content had been replaced by an alloy.¹ It would be more just, as well as more merciful, to judge the attitude of each religion towards its fellows, not by its official professions, but by its practical conduct, and, on this practical criterion, a receptivity that was inconsistent with a pretension to self-sufficiency was to be taken as a sign of grace because it would be a sign of a practical humility underlying a verbal parade of hybris.

It might further be inferred from this historic receptivity of each of the higher religions to the diversely distinctive genius of each of the other representatives of its species that a claim to catholicity, which, when filed by any single higher religion, was tacitly refuted by the record of its own syncretistic practice, might be valid if it were to be filed on behalf, not of any single higher religion exclusively, but of all the higher religions collectively. A salutary impulse, in the hearts of some, at least, of the adherents of each higher religion, to win access to this catholic revelation of the Truth and catholic means of Salvation, that were to be found in all the higher religions taken together, would then account for those constant psychological tensions in the bosom of the body social and in the secret places of the individual soul which, in the institutional history of Religion, had been reflected in the constant antithetical tendencies that have been coming to our notice in this Annex.

If these tensions and conflicts are thus to be diagnosed as symptoms of a struggle to achieve a catholicity in Religion which was not to be found in the distinctive standpoint of any single one of the historic higher religions, the question then arises whether the limitations displayed by each of the higher religions were merely unfortunate historical accidents, or whether the historic orientation of each religion, from which each religion's distinctive limitations had manifestly arisen, was the inevitable adaptation of a human institution to some intrinsic and fundamental feature in the pattern of Human Nature. Some light on the answer to this question might perhaps be obtained by a confrontation of the phenomena which we have just been considering in the history of Religion with certain apparently analogous phenomena in the structure of the Psyche that had been brought to light in one of the leading schools of a post-Modern Western science of Psychology. If, in the light of these religious phenomena, we look at the chart of psychological types which had been plotted out by the pioneer explorer C. G. Jung,² can we tentatively discern any correspondences between these permanent types of psychic orientation and the historic orientations of the living higher religions, and (to push our analysis a stage further) between the sub-varieties of the psychological types and the orientations of the sects into which each of the higher religions had come to be divided?

¹ A Catholic friend of the writer's comments: 'A Catholic believes that there is a lot of good in other religions, but he does also believe that there are elements in the Catholic Faith which are necessary for all men: Redemption and the Sacraments.'

² See Jung, C. G.: *Psychological Types*, English translation, new impression (London n.d., Kegan Paul), *passim*, but especially pp. 412-517; Wickes, F. G.: *The Inner World of Man* (New York 1938, Holt), pp. 56-64.

Jung distinguishes two antithetical attitudes and four diverse faculties¹ of the Psyche which occur in a variety of combinations—though not all the mathematically conceivable combinations are possible in real life. The two attitudes are an 'introversion' towards the inner world of the Psyche (the microcosm) and an 'extraversion' towards the outer world of Objective Reality (the macrocosm). The four faculties are thinking, feeling, sensation,² and intuition.³ Both the attitudes and all the four faculties are to be found in the psychological 'make-up' of every human being; the psychological differences between individuals which stamp them as representatives of different psychological types arise, not from the presence or absence of this or that psychological element (all the six elements being present in every psyche), but from differences in these omnipresent elements' relative strength and degree of development. Thus the 'introvert' and 'extravert' types are those in which respectively 'introversion' and 'extraversion' is the dominant attitude but not the exclusive one, since the subordinate attitude is not eliminated but is merely repressed into the Subconscious; and similarly, in a classification by faculties instead of by attitudes, the thinking, feeling, sensory,⁴ and intuitive types are those in which the faculty from which the type is named is the predominant one in the sense of being the faculty of which the Consciousness is the most clearly aware and over which the Will has the greatest power of control. The faculties that are subordinated in each type are not eliminated in that type; if they cannot be taken into the service of the predominant faculty as its auxiliaries, they are repressed into the Subconscious, where they lead an outlaw's life of their own beyond the range of the Consciousness and the Will—hovering as qāzāqs on the fringe of the Great Khān's realm⁵ and awaiting their opportunity to take their revenge (if the repression is unduly severe) by breaking out into disconcerting revolts against the ascendancy of a consciously organized and deliberately directed upper level of the Psyche.

The four faculties range themselves in two pairs:

"Thinking and feeling are rational—controlled by judgement and proceeding in accordance with logical steps. . . . Intuition and sensation, on the other hand, are essentially irrational [even] in their differentiated [i.e. in their conscious] form. They do not proceed by logical steps, but their conclusions seem to come of themselves without the intervention of the intermediary processes. Intuition suddenly finds itself at the end of the road, but has no idea of how it got there; whereas sensation finds itself sitting firmly upon an established fact, without any concern as to the implications of that fact or its relation to past and future—it simply *is* a fact."⁶

¹ The word 'faculty' is used here in place of Jung's own word 'function'.

² In this Jungian terminology, 'sensation' means an uncritical and unorganized apprehension of brute facts in isolation from one another.

³ A Catholic friend of the writer's comments: 'If we remember the story of Martha and Mary, we have there in simple form the two different kinds of soul: extravert and introvert. If we examine the first disciples, we find the various types.'

⁴ 'Sensory' is used here as the adjective corresponding to the substantive 'sensation' in Jung's meaning of this latter word.

⁵ See V. v. 282-4.

⁶ Wickes, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

This grouping of the faculties is the limiting factor in the articulation of the main psychological types into sub-types. For while the predominant faculty always has one auxiliary which is likewise on the level of Consciousness, so that the main types defined by predominant faculties fall into sub-types defined by their auxiliaries, it is not practically possible for the dominant faculty to associate with itself, as its auxiliary, every one of the three other faculties. It cannot enter into this relation with the sister faculty belonging to the same pair as itself (the discriminating rational or the perceptive irrational pair, as the case may be). This sister faculty is condemned, *ex officio affinitatis*, to be repressed into the Subconscious, because the Consciousness cannot serve two masters simultaneously, even when one of them is under the other's command, if they have an identical *modus operandi* but make use of it for incompatible purposes;¹ and for this reason the predominant faculty's choice of auxiliary faculties is confined to one between the two faculties of the opposite pair—either of which is a possible junior partner for the predominant faculty, because it operates in a different psychic style, so that there is no possibility of a clash between the two associates. This means that each main type is articulated in practice into only two sub-types and not into the mathematically conceivable three.

In the light of this summary exposition of the Jungian classification of psychological types we may perhaps tentatively draw the equations, set out on the accompanying table,² between types and religions.

In the classification by attitudes the four living higher religions seemed to range themselves clearly into an 'introvert' and an 'extravert' pair on the criterion of their respective readings of the nature of Ultimate Reality. In the eyes of the two religions of Indic origin, Hinduism and Buddhism, Ultimate Reality—the *Brahman* of the Hindu theology and the *Nirvāṇa* of the Buddhist—was impersonal and the approach to it was to be found by the conscious personality in turning inwards to remerge itself in the Subconscious. By contrast, in the eyes of the two religions of Judaic origin, Christianity and Islam, the Ultimate Reality was a Personal God, and the approach to Him was to be found by the human soul in turning outwards to enter into a communion with God which would prove to be, not a relinquishment of personality, but the human personality's *raison d'être* and consummation.

When we come to the classification by faculties we find that, unlike the classification by attitudes, it cuts across the grouping of the religions according to their historical origins, Indic and Judaic; for the rationally discriminating pair of faculties was represented by Hinduism and Christianity, and the irrationally perceptive pair by Islam and Buddhism. The predominant faculty in Hinduism was thinking; for its mainspring was a thought (inherited by Hinduism from the Indic school of philosophy) which was perhaps the most difficult that was conceivable for the Rational Human Intellect. This key-thought of Hinduism was the comprehension, by the Consciousness, of its psychic antithesis the Subconscious, and the realization that this subconscious underworld of the consciously individual soul was, not merely impersonal, but supra-

¹ This point is explained by Jung in op. cit., p. 515. ² Table VII, facing p. 772.

personal.¹ By contrast, the predominance in Christianity of the faculty of feeling was proclaimed in the three words 'God is Love',² which were the heart of the Christian revelation. The predominance in Islam of the faculty of 'sensation', in the Jungian meaning of an uncritical apprehension of matters of fact, was no less clearly displayed in the Islamic confession of faith—'There is no god but *the* God, and Muhammad is The Apostle of *the* God'—and in the Islamic commandments to observe the five hours of prayer and to make the pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of the Hijāz. The predominance in Buddhism of the faculty of intuition was intimated in the sudden flash of enlightenment in the soul of the Founder in which his way of salvation had first revealed itself and which the followers of the Zen school of the Mahāyāna strove to recapture. In that supreme moment of his vigil under the Bōdhi Tree, there had burst upon the Buddha's soul a perception that Desire is the fuel of Pain, and that the extinction of Desire is the means of self-release from the Sorrowful Wheel of Existence into a peace that passeth all understanding: the haven of *Nirvāna*.

To follow out our interpretation of the higher religions in terms of psychological types, we have also to consider the sub-types and to take note of the faculties that, in each type and sub-type, are not even taken into partnership with the predominant faculty as auxiliaries, but are repressed into the Subconscious.

In Hinduism one of the predominant thinking faculty's two auxiliaries was the faculty of sensation, which here found expression in ritual; and, since the stimulation of thought by sensation in the service of an 'introvert' religion was an elsewhere unfamiliar phenomenon,³ this combination of these two faculties with the 'introvert' attitude in Hinduism accounted for the impression—made on non-Hindu observers—of an incongruity between the etherially sophisticated conceptions of the Hindu theology and the crassly primitive rites that were practised by the esoterically instructed adepts as well as by the ignorant masses. The truth, no doubt, was that, for the Hindu adept, an external rite had an inner meaning that eluded the mental eye of the non-Hindu critic.

The other auxiliary faculty in Hinduism was intuition; and the partnership between intuition and thought in an 'introvert' religion had borne fruit in the psychological exercise and experience of Hindu mysticism (*yoga*). Mysticism and ritualism might appear to stand at opposite poles; yet, if this had been the gamut of Hinduism's spiritual capacity, it would still have been so inadequate a response to Man's

¹ In the language of the Indic school of philosophy this truth was conveyed in the proposition that the *Ātman* (Soul) was identical with *Brahman* (Ultimate Reality). If this proposition was to be taken, *au pied de la lettre*, as signifying a complete equation of 'God' with the 'Collective' Subconscious underlying the 'Personal' Subconscious that underlies the Conscious Personality (in terms of Jung's psychology), the Indic philosophers and their disciples the Hindu theologians had assuredly gone beyond the evidence, and, in the belief of the writer of this Study, their guess had also missed the mark on an issue which was the supreme question in the quest for religious truth. On this point see pp. 468-9 and 497-8, above.

² 1 John iv. 8 and 16.
³ The stimulation of thought by sensation in the service of an 'extrovert' and secular intellectual pursuit had, of course, been the driving force behind a Modern Western scientific activity.

spiritual needs that it never could have won and retained the allegiance of a quarter of the Human Race.

One crying need of Human Nature—which had been amply satisfied in Christianity, Islam, and the Mahayanian sub-type of Buddhism—is Man's craving for a personal God with whom he, as another personality, can establish a relation; and in Hinduism this universal and importunate human demand had been met by the worship of Vishnu in his innumerable avatars in human form.¹ In this 'extraverted' worship of the Ultimate Reality in personal epiphanies, Hinduism might be said to be making a concession to Human Nature at the price of doing some violence to its own genius, if its mainspring was correctly described as an 'introverted' intellectual comprehension of the impersonal underworld underlying a Human Consciousness. There were, however, other aspects of the worships of Vishnu and of Shiva in which they showed themselves true to Hindu type; for an unsophisticated Hindu could find 'sensational' satisfaction in the liturgies of the Shaiva and Vaishnava churches, while an esoterically instructed Hindu would understand that even the personalities of the Gods were 'in the last analysis' ephemeral and illusory phenomena, and that their significance lay in symbolizing in myriad guises an intuitively perceived rotation of the Wheel of Existence, in which *Maya* was ever arising out of *Brahman*, and ever sinking back into It again—like the misty exhalations which the Sun's lust is ever drawing up out of the Ocean in order ever to be letting them drop down again to Earth in the falling rain, to run back to the Ocean in the flowing rivers.²

Thus Hinduism, which was dedicated to 'introverted' thought, had widened the range of its psychological appeal by making the most of the partnership of Hindu thought with both sensation and intuition. The faculty for which Hinduism had found no recognized place was thought's incompatible sister, feeling. It was true that, inasmuch as no fundamental faculty of the Psyche can ever be completely and permanently banished, the faculty of feeling had forced its way up again from the subconscious on to the conscious level of Hindu religious life. In the worships of Shiva and Vishnu there was an emotional element in the personal relation between the worshipper and his God which, on the worshipper's side, took the form of personal devotion (*bhakti*)³ and on the God's side was expressed in his sexual passion for his female consort (*sakti*). This emotional element was manifestly akin to the feeling which was the leading note in Christianity and also in the Shi'i form of Islam and in the Mahayanian form of Buddhism,⁴ though,

¹ The two gods Vishnu and Shiva had been the product of a syncretism of a host of more or less like-natured local divinities, and the two syntheses in which the Hindu conception of *Brahman* in a personal epiphany had thus been polarized were readily reducible to unity on Hindu lines of thought, since creation and destruction are the two alternating beats of a single rhythm of phenomenal life. If the worshippers of Shiva and Vishnu had nevertheless been content to see their respective deities live and let live, they had been practising the tolerance which was characteristic of the Hindu religious ethos (see V. vi. 47-49, and the anecdote quoted from Radhakrishnan by Wight on p. 746, below).

² Compare Charon's simile in the passage of Lucian quoted in V. vi. 133.

³ See V. v. 135-8.

⁴ Read, for example, the *Tiruvāṇṇam* ('Sacred Utterance') of the Tamil poet, saint,

by comparison with these other expressions of it, some of its expressions in Hinduism looked crudely archaic to non-Hindu eyes and felt repulsively sensual to non-Hindu susceptibilities.

An apparent absence of love and absence of zeal for righteousness were the negative aspects of Hinduism that were apt to strike non-Hindu observers the most painfully.¹ They would recall the opening colloquy between Arjuna and Krishna in the *Bhagavadgītā*, in which, on a battlefield before battle is joined, the human hero confides to the god his heart-rending doubt whether Man can be justified, even in 'a good cause', in doing such evil as to fight and slay his fellow human beings; and they would be shocked by the coldness of Krishna's metaphysical solution for Arjuna's moral problem.

'Your words are wise, Arjuna, but your sorrow is for nothing. . . . That Reality which pervades the Universe is indestructible. No one has power to change the Changeless. Bodies are said to die, but That which possesses the body is eternal. It cannot be limited or destroyed. Therefore you must fight.

'Some say this Ātman
Is slain, and others
Call It the slayer:
They know nothing.
How can It slay
Or who shall slay It?'²

To non-Hindu observers, whose approach to Religion was not an essentially intellectual one, Krishna's academic exposition of the Sub-conscious as being the Ultimate Reality would seem so irrelevant to Arjuna's pressing practical problem of conduct that it might be suspect of being deliberately evasive,³ were it not notorious that Hindu minds

and sage Mānikka-Vācagar, which has been translated into English by G. U. Pope (Oxford 1900, University Press). An appreciation of the *Tiruvācagam* will be found in Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 215-19. 'It is not, like the Baghavad-Gītā, an exposition by the Deity, but an outpouring of the Soul to the Deity. . . . The remarkable feature . . . is the personal tie which connects the Soul with God. . . . Not only its outline but its details strikingly resemble the records of devout Christian lives in Europe.'

¹ See V. vi. 145-6 and 151-2.

² *Bhagavadgītā*, ii, English translation by Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood (London 1947, Phoenix Press), pp. 40-41. The first sentence here quoted immediately precedes the last sentence quoted, from Barnett's English translation, in V. vi. 146.

³ A Hindu philosopher who was familiar with the Christian Gospels might perhaps aptly reply that Krishna's exposition was, not deliberately evasive, but deliberately shocking; that, in this point of psychological construction, it resembled the parables of the Importunate Widow, the Talents, the Unjust Steward, the Labourers in the Vineyard, and the Prodigal Son; and that the motive for presenting a lesson in this vein was the same in the Hindu genre of edifying religious literature as in the Christian genre: namely, the mystification of philistines on whom the lesson would be lost in any case in any presentation of it. Manifestly the parables above mentioned would be above the head of a catechumen who could see no more in the first and in the second than a comparison of God Almighty with an unjust human judge and with a hard employer; no more in the third than a recommendation to the faithful to enter into a conspiracy with their employers' debtors for defrauding their employers of their due; and no more in the fourth and the fifth than a penalization of industry and virtue in the interests of sloth and vice. These shocking features in these parables are so many traps to catch the philistine, because, while it is true that they are shocking, it is at the same time true that they are irrelevant to the point which it is the purpose of the parable to make. On

were utterly sincere in their belief that Man's spiritual nourishment was to be found in an intellectual stone and not in moral bread¹ (to give their Christian names to Hindu values). The non-Hindu reader of the *Bhagavadgītā* would suffer the same moral shock when he turned from the classic Hindu religious poem to gaze upon a visual presentation of Shiva dancing the rhythmic ebb and flow of the phenomenal aspect of the Cosmos. In one of these masterpieces of the Tamil bronze-caster's art the naïve non-Hindu spectator would marvel at the virtuosity with which the snake-like swarm of writhing arms and legs was weaving a pattern for which the whirling Wheel of Existence had provided a frame, till he would be horrified by noticing the contrast between the misery of the trampled human figure on whose back one gracefully dancing divine foot was poised,² and the unconcerned serenity of the divine countenance. If that bronze could speak, its utterance could be nothing but

'I am indifferent to all born things; there is none whom I hate, none whom I love.'³

When we pass from Hinduism to Christianity, we find that the here predominant feeling faculty's pair of auxiliaries is the same as the thinking faculty's pair in the Hindu *Weltanschauung*, and that, here again, the auxiliary faculty of sensation finds expression in ritual. In the congregational rite of the Eucharist the Christian worshipper achieved an experience of entering into communion with a God who was Love. This association, in Christianity, of the two faculties of feeling and sensation in the service of an 'extravert' religion accounted for the impression—made on non-Christian observers—of an incongruity between the etherially sublime feelings that united with his worshippers a God who had become man and had suffered death on the Cross, and the strangely primitive rite in which this communion was consummated. What had Christ to do with Tammuz, or Christ's body and blood with the corn and wine that were deified because they were the material food of *Homo Agricola*?⁴ The answer was that, in Christian hearts for whom God was Love, the ritual of a primitive food-god had become a vehicle for Christian feeling.

In Christianity, as in Hinduism, the other auxiliary faculty was the same lines a Hindu exegete of the *Bhagavadgītā* might submit that the undeniable shockingness of Krishna's solution for Arjuna's moral problem is irrelevant to the metaphysical truth which it is the purpose of the poem to expound.

¹ Matt. vii. 9; Luke xi. 11.

² "This theme . . . shows Siva, usually surrounded by a halo of flames, performing his dance of regeneration at Tillai, the mythical centre of the Universe. The demon he crushes beneath his feet symbolises Evil" (John Irwin in *Indian Art*, essays by H. G. Rawlinson, K. de B. Codrington, J. V. S. Wilkinson, and John Irwin, edited by Sir Richard Winstedt (London 1947, Faber), p. 102). I do not know whether this is the accepted interpretation or whether it is an etherializing gloss by an abashed Hindu theologian. If it is the right interpretation, then the figure of Siva Nataraja illustrates, not the predominant thinking faculty in Hinduism, but the faculty of feeling pushing its way up (see p. 726, above). I suppose the faculty of feeling is represented by the desire—which I do not think you mention in this Annex—for atonement, for redemption from sin, which is one of the basic religious impulses, if not the basic one.—Martin Wight.

³ *Bhagavadgītā*, ix. 29, Barnett's translation, quoted in V. vi. 146.

⁴ A partial answer to this vexed question has been attempted on pp. 457 and 494, above.

intuition; and, in Christianity likewise, the partnership of intuition with the predominant faculty had borne fruit in mysticism—though in an ‘extravert’ religion for whose followers the Ultimate Reality was a Personal God the mystic’s goal had been a Beatific Vision in which the human party to the encounter would retain the personality without which he would be unable to glory in God—in contrast to the Hindu mystic’s goal of a Beatific Union in which the personality would be merged in an impersonal reality transcending it.¹ Yet neither the ‘extravert’ mystical nor the ‘extravert’ sacramental way of communion adequately met the spiritual needs of ‘introverted’ Christian souls; and, in psychological terms, this explained why the Protestant movement in a Western Christian Church had parted company with the Western Catholics as well as with their Eastern Orthodox co-religionists on the issue of the method and mode of communion between God and Man.

In the Jungian terminology, Protestantism was an attempt to provide, within a Christian framework, for the psychological needs of ‘feeling introverts’ by doing some violence to the genius of a religion which, in its classic form, appealed specifically to ‘feeling extraverts’. In the Protestant’s experience the real presence of Christ was to be found neither in the Beatific Vision nor in the rite of the Eucharist, but in the overwhelming spiritual event of a sudden ineffable change in the Christian’s heart which certified its own authenticity by carrying with it a conviction that the sinner was saved. Yet even this *tour de force* of leading a Protestant canal out of the river of Catholic and Orthodox Christian tradition had not availed to bring the living waters of Christianity within the reach of every soul that was athirst. Introversion could never be complete in a religion for which the Ultimate Reality was a personal God; and the Protestantism that had succeeded in giving a limited expression to the ‘introvert’ attitude was as much at a loss as every other form of Christianity in its dealings with the faculty of thought. A Hindu observer of Christianity could hardly fail to be struck by the repression here of a thinking faculty which in Hinduism was dominant; and the Hindu critic would not be much impressed when, in reply, the Christian apologist pointed to an historic chain of mighty Christian thinkers extending from the author of the Fourth Gospel to Saint Thomas Aquinas.

‘It is true’, our Hindu would retort, ‘that, when you drive Nature out with a pitch-fork she will insist on coming back sooner or later.’² You have already suggested to me that the feeling faculty, which is repressed in Hinduism, has reasserted itself in the archaic form in which it presents itself in *bhakti*; and I readily concede that in Christianity the repressed faculty of thinking has re-asserted itself likewise. Considering that the earliest Christian mission-field happened to be the domain of an Hellenic Society which was almost as intellectual as its Indic contemporary, and further considering how prone you Hellenistic Westerners

¹ This distinction between the respective goals of mysticism in the ‘extravert’ and the ‘introvert’ philosophies and religions has been touched upon by anticipation in V. vi. 143, n. 3, and on p. 429, above.

² ‘Naturam expelles furcâ, tamen usque recurret.’ (Horace: *Epistulae*, Book I, Ep. x. l. 24).

and Byzantines have been to fall under the spell of an ancestral Hellenic mode of thought, what else could Christian Evangelists and Christian Fathers do but make an attempt at translating the Christian mythology into the language of the Hellenic school of philosophy? I am not surprised at the attempt, but I am also not impressed by the achievement. In the great Gothic cathedral, of which your Christian *Weltanschauung* reminds me, a re-intruding Intellect has advertised its presence in the ingeniously intricate tracery of the windows and in the gorgeously coloured glass; but the tracery does not fulfil any architectural function; if the whole of it were removed, the roof and the tower would still rest securely, as now, on the massive masonry of irrational walls and columns; and, as for the stained glass, if you were to remove that too, why, you would be letting in the sunshine in all its glory to put to shame the 'dim religious light'¹ now cast by the few discreetly selected rays which the glass admits—and tones down in their transit.

'To drop parables and use plain language', our Hindu exegete might proceed, 'I feel little respect for the Christian application of thought to Christianity because your Christian thinkers do not dare to have the courage of their convictions. The characteristic virtue of thought is to follow the argument whithersoever it may lead; if thought flinches from fulfilling this first commandment of intellectual honesty, it commits a stultifying sin against its own nature; and this is the moral infirmity by which your Christian thinking is invalidated. Your imposing *Summa Theologiae* is confined within the prison-walls of a mythology which your hearts have dictated to your heads; and in matters of religion Christianity allows the Intellect to operate only under a perpetual edict serving notice "Thus far and no farther". What is the World to think of a Christian intelligence that consents to work under conditions that make nonsense of the Intellect's essential function? Your Christian moral sensibilities are excruciated, you say, in the *Bhagavadgītā*, by Sri Krishna's intellectual liquidation of Arjuna's moral scruples. But is not the ruthless trenchancy of the poem's reasoning, which to you is repugnant, the best evidence of its intellectual integrity? If you are morally shocked by Krishna, I am intellectually unconvinced by Aquinas; and I am proud—however high your Christian judgement may rate the moral price—that my Hinduism does not sacrifice honest thinking to prejudiced sentiment.'

This mutual misunderstanding between two higher religions in which the thinking faculty and the feeling faculty were respectively predominant was perhaps inevitable on the showing of the Jungian psychology. These two 'rational' faculties were at odds with one another because they were using the same discriminatory *modus operandi* at cross-purposes. To conclude our inquiry we have still to review the two other higher religions, in which the 'irrational' perceptive faculties, sensation and intuition, were predominant, and in which thinking and feeling were auxiliary.

In Islam, in which the predominant faculty was an apprehension of matters of fact which Jung had labelled 'sensation', the thinking faculty

¹ Milton: *Il Penseroso*.

had played a more responsible part than in Christianity—not in the sense that Islamic theologians could be held to have surpassed their Christian confrères in intellectual prowess, but because in Islam the Intellect had enjoyed the advantage of doing its work as a junior partner of the predominant faculty and not as an unauthorized intruder. In building the Founder's modest legacy of isolated and unorganized tenets and commandments into the vast and solid structure of the *Shari'ah*, the Sunnī theologians had, it is true, laboured under the same restrictive building regulations as their Christian brother masons. They had been constrained to make use of the materials handed out to them, and to take these materials as they had found them, however inappropriate these might have been for use in an intellectual structure. But they had profited by the paucity of the *disjecta membra* that they had inherited from the Prophet—like the architects of the Ka'bah, who had had a free hand to build all the rest of their fane in whatever material and whatever style might suit them best, so long as they duly embedded in it, undesecrated by the chisel, one single uncouth but sacrosanct Black Stone, whereas the Christian theologians, under instructions to elicit a law of logic out of the law of Love, might be likened on our analogy to builders who had found themselves furnished with the fruit of the Tree of Life in quantities sufficient for building a Tower of Babel if only fruit-pulp were a practicable building material.

While the Sunnī *Shari'ah* was a monument of the thinking faculty's service as an auxiliary to the matter-of-fact sensory faculty in Islam, the feeling faculty, which here had been the other auxiliary, had expressed itself in the Shi'ah—'the sect' *par excellence*, which had broken away from the Sunnah in order to minister to an elemental human need that the Sunnah could not satisfy.

Though orthodox Islam shared with Christianity the 'extravert' vision of Ultimate Reality as a personal God, the significant aspect of the divine personality was not the same in the sight of the two religions. If a Sunnī Muslim were called upon to describe God in three words, he would be constrained to write, not 'God is Love', but 'God is Power'. But this hard fact of God's power is no satisfying substitute for the warm feeling of God's love; and, if the eruption of Islam in reaction to Christianity was evidence that God's aspect as Power could not be depreciated with impunity, the break-away of the Shi'ah from the Sunnah within the bosom of Islam was an illustration of the nemesis incurred by depreciating God's aspect as Love. The portrait of the One True God that had been painted by Muhammad belied the conventional epithets that had followed His name into the Qur'ān like echoes from the New Testament and from the Prophets of Judah and Israel. The God to whose love Muhammad had paid lip-service by calling him 'the Merciful, the Compassionate' (*ar-Rahmān, ar-Rahīm*) had been depicted by Him as aloof and arbitrary and vindictive; and accordingly Muslim hearts that had been athirst for Love had found in an intimately human 'Alī what they had been unable to find in an inhumanly transcendent Allah.

For Shi'is, 'Alī had the pathos of the incarnate saviour who 'came unto

his own, and his own received him not';¹ and the Passion of 'Alī's martyred son Husayn was annually commemorated in the Shī'ī World with an emotion that reminded a Christian spectator of the traditional Christian feeling about the Passion of Christ. Indeed, as we have seen,² there were Shī'ī extremists who, in their unavowed esoteric doctrine, identified 'Alī with God and ascribed the same divinity to his physical descendants the Imāms;³ and these outright 'Alī-worshippers would have no consciousness of blasphemy in applying to their God Incarnate the context of the verse from the Gospel according to Saint John that we have quoted above as expressing the feelings of the more moderate followers of the Shī'ah. The extremists would assert of 'Alī that 'the World was made by Him',⁴ and they would arrogate to themselves the daring claim that, 'as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name'.⁵

Yet, while the Shī'ah offered the Muslim an intimate instead of a forbidding epiphany of a personal God, both sects of Islam would have repressed the faculty of intuition and the attitude of 'introversion' if these two ubiquitous elements in 'the make-up' of the Human Psyche had not risen in revolt and forced their way back into the conscious life of Islam, in defiance of a system in which there was no acknowledged room for them. 'Islamic mysticism', like 'Christian philosophy', was virtually a *contradictio in adjecto*. Yet, just as the Religion of Love had managed to find a place for a magnificent intellectual construction that had no organic function in the Christian scheme of things, so the Religion of Matter of Fact had contrived to harbour a school of mysticism which could bear comparison with its Christian counterpart—though no doubt, in both Hindu and Mahayanian eyes, this Christian and Islamic *yoga* would seem to be all but stultified by an apparently wilful refusal to see through a Judaic hallucination (as the Beatific Vision would seem to be in Indic eyes) of a personal God masquerading as the Ultimate Reality.

In Buddhism the same two sister discriminatory faculties that served as alternative auxiliaries in Islam had lent their services to a predominant perceptive faculty which in this case was not sensation but intuition. The thinking faculty co-operated with intuition in the Hīnayāna, and the feeling faculty in the Mahāyāna. The Hīnayāna was a school of practical philosophy, in which the Buddha's intuition that conscious life is pain, and that therefore pain cannot be cured except by extinguishing conscious life, had been followed up by thinking out an uncompromisingly ascetic course of self-mortification for bringing the adept to his goal of *Nirvāṇa*. In the Mahāyāna the alternative auxiliary faculty of feeling had entered into a paradoxical partnership with the Buddha's master-intuition that Desire is the root of all evil and that the last enemy that shall be destroyed is, not Death, but Life.⁶

¹ John i. 11.

² On p. 718, above.

³ This combination of the two concepts of Incarnation and Metempsychosis seemed as alien from the Judaistic *Weltanschauung* of Islam as it was native to the Indic *Weltanschauung* of Hinduism and Buddhism. It was reminiscent of the avatars of Vishnu and of the Buddha in his Mahayanian metamorphosis.

⁴ John i. 10.

⁵ John i. 12.

⁶ 1 Cor. xv. 26.

The Mahayanian Buddhist had substituted for the arhat, whom his Hinayanian co-religionist revered and followed as his guide towards his goal of *Nirvāna*, a bodhisattva who deserved and received the Mahayanian Buddhist's love because the bodhisattva had 'so loved the World'¹ that, though he had already won his own way to the goal of human endeavours and was free to enter into his rest,² he had deliberately made the sacrifice of postponing his self-extinction for an indefinite time to come, in order that whosoever believeth in him³ should learn from him how to follow in his footsteps. On these lines the alchemy of Love had transmuted a negative fellowship, in which the arhat followed the Buddha's lead towards the goal of *Nirvāna*, into a positive fellowship in which the faithful—including the mundane masses as well as a cloistered *élite*—could look forward to being with their bodhisattva in Paradise.⁴ In theory, Amitabha's Paradise was a transient experience, like Christ's Millennium in the Christian eschatology; and, considering that *Nirvāna* was still the official goal of the bodhisattva and his followers alike, and this on the strength of the Buddha's key-intuition that life is pain, it was difficult for an outsider to understand how this paradise could be a paradise at all, and not rather a purgatory. The outsider could only register the fact that, for Mahayanian Buddhist hearts, the Mahayanian Paradise was a virtual equivalent of the Christian Heaven.

An 'introverted' intuitive religion might thus paradoxically accommodate Love, but it could give no official scope for 'extraversion' and no official value to matter of fact. Yet in Buddhism, as in the other living higher religions, Human Nature had rebelliously asserted its need to find some vent for all its divers faculties and attitudes. 'Extraversion' requires a manifestation of Ultimate Reality in a personal form; the sensory faculty requires a tangible object to apprehend (the Black Stone, the wood of the True Cross, the blood of Saint Januarius); and the Primitive Buddhist Community lost no time in providing for both these requirements. The breath was hardly out of the Buddha's body before his disciples were disputing over the possession of his mortal remains with a view to treasuring as sacred relics these material *débris* of a soul that had successfully remerged itself in *Nirvāna*; and the thus beatified human founder of the Buddhist Community had been transfigured by Hinayanian piety into a superhuman being long before the historical personality of Siddhārtha Gautama, the Sakya prince of the sub-Himalayan city-state of Kapilavastu, had been eclipsed, in the Mahayanian imagination, by other avatars, past and future, of an ever-recurrent Buddha, which better satisfied the human need for an epiphany of a personal God because they were untrammelled by intractable historical associations.

In the Mahayanian apotheosis of the Bodhisattva Amitabha, as in the Shi'ite apotheosis of the Caliph 'Alī, an *anima naturaliter Christiana in partibus peregrinis* was offered an equivalent of the Second Person of the Christian Trinity, while a metamorphosis of the Bodhisattva Avalokita into the Goddess of Mercy, Kwanyin, had provided the Far

¹ John iii. 16.

³ John iii. 16.

² Ps. xcvi. 11.

⁴ Luke xxiii. 43.

Eastern moiety of Mankind with the spiritual consolation which, in the other half of the Old World, had been offered by the Great Mother in her divers avatars. Moreover, these very gods that had been discovered by, or revealed to, the Mahayanian Church were worshipped by her in liturgies that resembled those of Orthodox and Catholic Christianity with a verisimilitude that startled the Early Modern Western Christian missionaries.¹

Our psychological interpretation of the four living higher religions, cursory and superficial though it has been, perhaps warrants us in drawing conclusions that may be summarized as follows. In the Human Psyche there are divers faculties and attitudes that are, all alike, importunate in seeking vent. These are all to be found in every individual human being, but this in different combinations and different relative strengths which display themselves in a variety of psychological types. There is not, and cannot be, any psychological type in which all the psychological elements can have full play at the conscious level; in every type there are, and are bound to be, some elements that are repressed into the Subconscious, and in every type the repressed elements seize, and are bound to seize, every opportunity of flooding back, unbidden, into Consciousness. These psychic phenomena prove to have been reflected in Religion. Each of the living higher religions, and each of their principal sects, had been attuned to some particular psychological type or sub-type;² and each religion was ever seeking, like the psychological type which it served, to achieve the impossible feat of ministering to the whole gamut of the Psyche's elemental needs for expression. The feat was impossible because there was not, and could not be, any spiritual organ capable of playing a psychic diapason; and therefore any existing higher religion that aspired to become *the* Universal Religion was doomed to disappointment, while any that claimed already to be *the* Universal Religion must be unaware of its own intrinsic limitations. The heavenly music that would satisfy every need of the Soul was not inaudible on Earth, but it was never audible in a solo; it could be heard only in a symphony. The divers higher religions must resign themselves to playing limited parts, and must school themselves to playing these parts in harmony, in order, between them, to fulfil their common purpose of enabling every human being of every psychological type to enter into communion with God the Ultimate Reality.

¹ See p. 460, n. 1, above, for the two alternative traditional Christian explanations of this likeness.

² A Catholic friend of the writer's comments: 'Should the Christian Faith really penetrate into the East, I am confident that aspects of it which are almost dormant in the West will flourish exceedingly. Let us suppose that the other three higher religions had not arisen, and that the Christian message had reached the East: I presume that the human beings there, being, as they are, of a different stamp to the extraverted Westerners, would have received the message *secundum modum recipientis*. They would have stressed some elements which remain almost unstressed in the West. This is even evident in the two approaches to Christian doctrine followed respectively by the Catholic and by the Orthodox Church, the one tending more to devotion through the humanity of Christ, the other more to devotion through the wisdom of God. I think it is a matter of more and less, not of [an exclusive choice between] either the one thing or the other.'

This conclusion that none of the living higher religions was superfluous left open the question of their relative value. 'One star differeth from another star in glory.'¹ An orchestra would not be capable of playing a symphony at all if there were not a conductor and a first violin. In the orchestra of Religion, does one psychic faculty count for more than another? Our answer to this question will be determined by our view of the nature and destiny of Man. If the true end of Man is to glorify God and fully to enjoy Him for ever, Man's master-faculty must be the one through which God is accessible to him, and this inestimably precious conductive faculty is not the Intellect, which is the distinctive organ of *Homo Sapiens*. Man enters into communion with God through the faculty of feeling which *Homo Peccator sed Capax Dei* shares with other living creatures. On this showing, the most valuable instruments in the orchestra of Religion would be those that played the music of Love; and, on an order of merit determined by that criterion, Christianity would head the list because, in Christianity, feeling was the predominant faculty, while the Shi'ah and the Mahāyāna would be next to Christianity in glory because, in each of them, feeling was the predominant faculty's auxiliary.

On this finding, Hinduism would stand at the bottom of our list; and the non-Hindu critic might even go so far as to suggest that the Intellect, which is at a discount when it is 'introverted' for service as the predominant faculty in a higher religion, is more profitably employed when it is 'extraverted' for secular purposes. Let the Intellect occupy itself in begetting Science, which is generated by a union of 'extraverted' thought with the faculty that apprehends matters of fact, and in begetting Philosophy, which is generated by a union of 'extraverted' thought with intuition. Yet it would be open to Hinduism to retort that, when she was weighed in the balance and found wanting² by a unanimous verdict of Christianity, the Shi'ah and the Mahāyāna, the judgement must be held to be invalidated by the patent intellectual incompetence and emotional prejudice of this self-constituted jury. What, for instance, would the Sunnah and the Hīnayāna have to say? And does the last word lie with a living God or with a brooding Brahman?

Meanwhile, at the time of writing, midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, Hinduism was to be found, not at the rear of the procession of living higher religions, but in its van, in virtue of a characteristically Hindu spirit of spontaneous charity towards all revelations—past, present, and to come—which was the first spiritual requirement in an age in which the whole of Mankind had been united in a single Great Society through 'the annihilation of distance' by a Western technology.

'In a restless and disordered world which is unbelieving to an extent which we have all too little realised, where sinister superstitions are setting forth their rival claims to the allegiance of men, we cannot afford to waver in our determination that the whole of Humanity shall remain a united people, where Muslim and Christian, Buddhist and Hindu shall stand together bound by a common devotion not to something

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 41.

² Dan. v. 27.

behind but to something ahead, not to a racial past or a geographical unit, but to a great dream of a world society with a universal religion of which the historical faiths are but branches. We must recognise humbly the partial and defective character of our isolated traditions, and seek their source in the generic tradition from which they all have sprung. . . . In their wide environment, religions are assisting each other to find their own souls and grow to their full stature. . . . We are slowly realising that believers with different opinions and convictions are necessary to each other to work out the larger synthesis which alone can give the spiritual basis to a world brought together into intimate oneness by Man's mechanical ingenuity.¹

¹ Radhakrishnan, S.: *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, 2nd edition (Oxford 1940, University Press), pp. 347-8.

THE CRUX FOR AN HISTORIAN BROUGHT UP IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION

By MARTIN WIGHT

THE Christian critic will read the whole of this Part with sympathy and admiration, above all for the comprehensive charity with which you endeavour to see all the Higher Religions *sub specie aeternitatis*.¹ But he may well have misgivings about your main arguments, and believe that you do not maintain the full tension inherent in the Christian problem of comparative religion. It is convenient to sum up some criticisms at this point.

1. Your description of Christianity is philosophical rather than historico-theological, 'Hellenic' rather than 'Hebraic'. You define Christianity in terms of the assertion that 'God is Love',² or as 'unique in revealing God to Man as Man's father and brother'.³ But this is only true as far as it goes, and it does not go far enough. The central declaration of Christianity is not that God *is* something, but that God *has done* something; it is Hebraic first and Hellenic second; its uniqueness is primarily historico-theological, and only consequentially theologico-philosophical. God *has done* something in history; He has acted *in history* to show the meaning of history. If the Gospels say anything, they say this; and, since it is the common theme of the Synoptics and of St. John, perhaps the greatest modern Anglican commentary on St. John's Gospel may be quoted on the point:

'Modern study of the Fourth Gospel has pressed upon the Church the problem of historicity; the author of the Fourth Gospel, however, with greater theological insight, presses upon his readers the far more important, far more disturbing, problem of History itself and of its meaning. Confronted by the flesh of Jesus, the son of man, he demands that men should remember what He had said (xiv. 26), nay more, that they should eat His flesh and drink His blood (vi. 52-6). Jesus—Son of Man—words—flesh—blood! It is difficult to imagine language that fixes attention more steadily upon the importance of History. But, with equal conviction, the Evangelist refuses to permit his readers to rest even upon this important and particular history. *It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing*. Only in relation to Spirit and Truth are the words of Jesus significant (vi. 63); only in relation to His Word is this speech able to be understood (viii. 43). It therefore follows necessarily that His words, His actual words, require for their understanding the interpretation that the Spirit of Truth alone is able to provide (xiv. 26). In Himself, as a product of the evolution of history, the Son of Man is merely—a son of man (viii. 54); and His words and actions, if they be thought of merely

¹ On p. 428, above.

² e.g. on pp. 439 and 443, and in VII. A (iii) (a), Annex II, 'Higher Religions and Psychological Types', p. 725, above.

³ On p. 427, above.

as historical episodes, are trivial and meaningless (vii. 16-18). This is the witness of the author of the Fourth Gospel: a witness thrust like a dagger straight into the heart of the "World" in so far as the World is regarded as existing of itself and in its own right; plunged like a dagger into the heart of History, if History contains within itself its own evident, analysable, and describable meaning. . . .

"The modern reader must by an effort of historical imagination first endeavour to place himself in the position of those for whom the gospel was originally written. Only he must not rest until this position is found to be charged with universal significance, until he stands here naturally because it is his inevitable position as a man. He must not rest until he stands where the Jews once stood and did not apprehend, and where Abraham and Isaiah once stood and did apprehend; until he stands confronted, not by the evolution of History, not even by the development of the Church, but by the Last Hour; until, that is to say, he stands confronted by the Truth, until the present time is confronted by eternity, and until the present place is met by the meaning of History—in fact, until he stands before God."¹

The Christian reader misses, in your account of Christianity, this insistence upon its springing from a unique and particular historical event which is charged with eschatological significance, and upon its therefore providing, alone among the Higher Religions except Islam, and far more fully than Islam, an answer to the question of the meaning of History.

2. It follows upon this that the Christian critic may think that you misrepresent the relationship between Christianity and Judaism, and consequently misrepresent Judaism itself. (a) Christianity did not 'break decisively with Judaism by recognizing and proclaiming that God is Love',² but by declaring that the promise of that Love, already contained in Judaism, was now fulfilled. 'L'abîme qu'il y a entre l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament, c'est l'abîme qu'il y a entre l'annonce de quelque chose et la réalité de cette chose.'³ It is curious to see you, side by side with your sympathetic treatment of Abraham, Moses, and the Prophets as the Judaic *praeparatio evangelica*, consistently identifying Judaism with Yahweh-religion, and emphasizing the Judaic God's jealousy⁴ and 'Power.'⁵ As regards the primitive religion of Yahweh, moreover, surely its important feature is not its inferiority in relation to Judaism and Christianity, but its superiority to the de-based Canaanitish religions by which it was surrounded; not that it was only a partial revelation of the True God, but that it was indeed His revelation of Himself to the unpromising and backsliding people that he had chosen for His purposes. (b) Similarly, while Christianity did not 'break decisively' with Judaism in apprehending that God is Love, neither did it 'break decisively' in abandoning the apprehension that God is jealous—which simply means that His love makes exclusive

¹ Hoskyns, Edwyn Clement: *The Fourth Gospel*, edited by F. N. Davey, 2nd ed. (London 1947, Faber), pp. 58 and 49.

² p. 439, the first draft.

³ Daniélou, Jean: *Le Mystère de l'Avent* (Paris 1948, Éditions du Seuil), p. 13.

⁴ p. 439.

⁵ VII. A (iii) (a), Annex II, 'Higher Religions and Psychological Types', p. 717, above.

claims. As there is more love in the Jewish conception of God than you allow, so is there more jealousy in the Christian conception. When you speak of the 'readmittance of the incongruous Israelitish concept' of a jealous God into Christianity,¹ and even of 'a fourteen-hundred-years-long' perversion of Christianity by the same concept,² though this again appears to be contradicted or corrected,³ you are misrepresenting the Christian doctrine of God. For God's love is not a mere benevolence: it is a love that is identical with Holiness and Justice. This of course involves the human mind in paradox and great intellectual tension. It is only necessary here to point out that Jesus spoke of a God Whose response to obdurate evil is not only long-suffering but is also very terrible, and that the concept of the Wrath of God runs right through the New Testament.⁴ Indeed the Love of God as it is shown throughout the Bible, for here there is no disagreement between the Old Testament and the New, is not an undemanding benignity, but something perhaps more like the condition of 'being in love'—a love that makes exclusive claims upon its object. 'O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not.'⁵ 'No man cometh unto the Father, but by me.'⁶ 'Neither is there salvation in any other; for there is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved.'⁷ The description of Christianity is falsified if this intrinsic exclusiveness and 'jealousy' in it is slurred over. (c) Where Christianity does seem to 'break decisively' with Judaism is not in its proclamation of Love, nor in its exclusiveness, but in its universality. It was not simply, as you say,⁸ 'an intervention of God Himself to redeem the Jews of Jesus' day'. In the Synoptic tradition no less than in John there is a clear refusal to limit the sphere of the call of God.⁹ The Old Israel which was limited to the seed of Abraham is superseded by the New Israel which embraces all who will repent and believe: the nature of the Christian Revelation is such that its promise and its claims are universal. But here again the discontinuity with Judaism is only superficial, for Judaism, inasmuch as it was an abortive Higher Religion, was also potentially universalist, and the Prophets had foretold the bringing of God's salvation to the Gentiles.¹⁰

3. The apparent under-estimation of the exclusiveness and universality of Christianity (the Christian critic might continue) throws your comparison of Christianity with the other Higher Religions out of focus. The inquiry necessarily begins from the assumption of the comparability of the Higher Religions, but the assumption is not sufficiently re-examined in the course of the discussion. It is only in the last two paragraphs of the Annex 'Higher Religions and Psychological

¹ p. 439.

² p. 440.

³ On p. 563, above.

⁴ e.g. Matt. iii. 7-8. Cp. Luke iii. 7-8, Rom. i. 18, Eph. v. 6, Col. iii. 6, 1 Thess. i. 10, Rev. xiv. 19.

⁵ Matt. xxiii. 37. Cp. Luke xiii. 34.

⁶ Acts iv. 12.

⁷ John xiv. 6.

⁸ On p. 552, above, in the first draft.

⁹ e.g. Matt. viii. 11. Cp. Luke xiii. 29, Matt. xiii. 37-38, John x. 16.

¹⁰ e.g. Isa. xlii. 6, xlix. 6, lii. 15, lvi. 8; Mic. iv. 2.

'Types' that there are signs that you might want to discard it. Thus you seem to exaggerate the similarity of the Higher Religions' aims and contents: to exaggerate the unity of the species at the expense of the differences between its representatives. At the outset you attribute to all of them the same kind of exclusive claims,¹ though later you admit that the two Indic religions are not exclusive, or are 'exclusive' in a quite different way;² nor do you distinguish with any consistency between the prophetic or Judaic religions on the one hand and the non-prophetic or Indic on the other,³ though the distinction is implicitly made in VII. A (iii) (b), on p. 453, n. 2. The reader may well feel that the comparative study of the Higher Religions never gets under way. Is there not a fundamental difference between the two Higher Religions of the Indic tradition, which are pantheistic, immanentist, non-historical, world-denying, and the two Higher Religions of the Judaic tradition, which are prophetic, transcendentalist, historical, and world-affirming?

But there is a methodological criticism that perhaps goes deeper. Your limitation of the discussion to the four Higher Religions that at present partition the World between them is really as arbitrary as it would be to limit your comparison of civilizations to the contemporary representatives of the species. It hinders your attempt to see the existing Higher Religions *sub specie aeternitatis*, because it commits you to assuming a finality about them which, in view of the many potential or abortive Higher Religions which have come into being in the past and either died or survived only as fossils, is manifestly illusory. There is no reason *a priori* to suppose that the 'fully-fledged Higher Religions . . . derived from the secondary civilizations'⁴ are the collective final term in the history of Religion. Nor is any evidence or argument produced for your assertion that it is their 'destiny . . . that they should all become world-wide without conflicting with one another'⁵ except for the theory that they correspond to Jung's psychological types; and this (fascinating, illuminating, and important as it is) cannot be more than a 'rationalization' of a particular historical constellation.

The 'illusion of finality' is most apparent when you argue⁶ that 'if these religions did not genuinely satisfy some widely experienced human need' it is hardly conceivable that they should each have secured so wide an allegiance. This assumes, first, that the apprehension of human spiritual needs remains constant, and secondly, that the means of satisfying them are all equivalent, whereas the history of Religion shows that the apprehension of spiritual needs undergoes progressive development, and adherence to any one of the Higher Religions implicitly denies the adequacy of the means of satisfying those needs which are offered by the Primitive Religions. Your argument that prevalence indicates value could have been used in the Roman Empire to show the superiority of Paganism to Christianity, as you yourself suggest when you say in another connexion that the contemporary observer is 'most unlikely to be able to foresee the spiritual shape of things to come'.⁷ Was Jung's

¹ p. 430, above.

³ e.g. on p. 473, above, and in 'Holy Writ', on p. 750, below.

⁴ On. p. 421, above.

⁶ p. 443, above.

² pp. 438 and 440, above.

⁵ p. 443, below.

⁵ p. 443, the first draft.

⁷ p. 418, above.

typology applicable within the Roman Empire under the Antonines? If not, then his types do not have permanent validity. If yes, then the contemporary division of the World between the four existing Higher Religions does not have permanent validity. Indeed, it is surely plain that the present constellation of Higher Religions is due not to psychological typology but to that much wider thing (in which psychological typology may play its part) which we can only call cultural history. The psychological theory could only be upheld if it could be shown that there is a numerical predominance of each psychological type in the region of the World where its 'corresponding' Higher Religion has the ascendancy, and for this there is no evidence whatever. It is just as likely that the Higher Religions mould psychology as that 'each of them may correspond and minister to one of the psychological types into which Human Nature appears to be differentiated',¹ or, in a word, as that psychology determines the Higher Religions.

4. You admit the concept of a *praeparatio evangelica* throughout in your interpretation of Judaism, and in your account of Paganism,² though you only use the phrase itself twice, I think, *en passant*.³ But from the Christian point of view it is the fundamental principle for explaining the relationship between Christianity and other religions, and for reconciling their truths and insight with the exclusive claims of the Christian Revelation, and the Christian critic may wish that you had developed it more thoroughly. It is expressed in the quotation from Temple,⁴ and it could be expressed in the very fine metaphor of the veils which you use in a different connexion.⁵ (It is magnificently stated in the passage from Bevan's *Jerusalem under the High Priests* which you quote in V. vi. 132: a passage which not only states the purpose and scope of the *praeparatio*, but also emphasizes the uniqueness and transcendence of That which was prepared for). The *praeparatio evangelica* was recognized from the earliest days of the Church, especially by St. Paul, when he preached at Athens,⁶ and in his acknowledgement of the validity of Natural Law among the Gentiles.⁷ In the second century A.D. the conception was elaborated, first of all, of course, to explain the relations between Christianity and Judaism, by St. Irenaeus in answer to Marcion, but also, more tentatively, to explain the relations between Christianity and Paganism, by St. Justin and Clement of Alexandria. 'Nous trouvons chez ces deux hommes l'idée que, dans les philosophies païennes, il y a une certaine présence du Verbe, du *Logos*, une certaine lumière divine qui éclaire les hommes et leur communique la part de vérité qu'il y a en eux.'⁸ Perhaps this French writer whom I have quoted, a Jesuit who besides being a Patristic scholar is profoundly concerned with the theology of missionary activity, may be quoted

¹ VII. A (iii) (a), Annex II, 'Higher Religions and Psychological Types', p. 716, above.

² On pp. 458-60, above.

³ On p. 532, above, and in VII. C (ii) (a), Annex, 'The Prehistoric Background', p. 766, n. 3, below.

⁴ On p. 429, above.

⁵ On pp. 461-3, above.

⁶ Acts xvii. 22-31.

⁷ Rom. ii. 14-15.

⁸ Daniélou, Jean: *Le Mystère de l'Avent* (Paris 1948, Éditions du Seuil), p. 10.

further for a modern liberal Catholic statement of the conception of the *praeparatio evangelica* as the Christian doctrine of comparative religion:

'Il est très frappant de voir que les premiers chrétiens se sont trouvés, vis-à-vis du monde dans lequel ils étaient, exactement dans la situation dans laquelle se trouvent nos missionnaires en pays païens: une petite minorité d'hommes apportant un message étranger dans un monde qui leur était totalement fermé et hostile. Par exemple quand saint Paul pour la première fois est allé à Athènes et a commencé à prêcher l'Évangile sur l'Aréopage, il se trouvait dans la même situation que les premiers missionnaires qui sont allés en Chine ou au Japon et qui ont parlé aux sages de là-bas. . . .

'L'angoisse qui oppresse certaines âmes aujourd'hui, consiste à se demander si le christianisme n'est pas dépassé, s'il n'est pas vieilli. Ceci ne concerne que certaines structures tout extérieures du christianisme, mais non son essence: le christianisme est, et restera toujours, jeunesse du monde, parce qu'il est précisément chronologiquement au terme du développement de l'Histoire. Et la vraie relation du christianisme avec toutes les autres religions, c'est justement que ces religions à son égard sont antérieures, sont périmées. Je ne dis pas qu'elles sont fausses en tous points: le judaïsme n'est pas faux, le bouddhisme n'est pas faux, les civilisations fétichistes ne sont pas fausses; elles sont vieilles, c'est-à-dire que, par rapport au christianisme, elles sont dans un état d'antériorité chronologique et, en quelque sorte, des survivances; le christianisme, qui les achève, est apparu et désormais tout ce qu'il y a de bon en elles est accompli dans le christianisme. Entre le christianisme et elles, nous avons la juxtaposition dans l'espace de choses qui sont historiquement successives et c'est un fait curieux que ce rapport de simultanéité entre des réalités entre lesquelles le rapport essentiel est un rapport de succession.'¹

I think the Christian critic might point to two places where your emphasis is different, and implies the spiritual equivalence of the four Higher Religions rather than the *praeparatio evangelica*. You describe Matteo Ricci as having sought 'a reconciliation, on Christian initiative, between hitherto exclusive-minded religions'.² But the above passage from Daniélou is the authentic position of Matteo Ricci, who 'approached these alien faiths with sympathy, understanding and reverence', not because he thought that they were as good as Christianity, but because he saw them in the way in which St. Paul saw the Law, as 'our school-master to bring us unto Christ'.³ Christian charity will always enjoin respect for the genuine agnosticism of a Symmachus,⁴ but belief in the Christian Revelation is not compatible with an acceptance of Symmachus's position, and, although you infer the contrary, there would surely be no difference between St. Ambrose and Father Ricci on that point. Again, the resemblance between the sacraments and rituals of Christianity and Paganism cannot be adequately described for the Christian by 'the simple truth that it is a family likeness',⁵ which once more implies spiritual equivalence.

'Ce que nous rencontrons là, c'est cette espèce de sacramentalisme universel qui est à la fois une sorte d'intuition profonde du sens sacré des

¹ Daniélou, op. cit., pp. 10 and 21-22.

³ Gal. iii. 24.

⁴ p. 442, above.

² p. 441, above.

⁵ p. 459, above.

choses et en même temps qui ne donne pas la grâce, qui la signifie seulement. C'est une sorte de pierre d'attente, d'appel. . . . Que fera le christianisme? Créera-t-il des rites distincts de ceux des autres religions? Pas du tout. Le christianisme prendra tous ces gestes sacrés de toutes les religions, mais il les chargera de la grâce du Christ. Alors cette eau du Gange, dans la mesure où elle devient le baptême, devient le moyen de la régénération surnaturelle des hommes. C'est bien le même repas, mais ce pain qui aura été brisé n'est pas seulement un symbole, effectivement il nous fait communier à la réalité même de Jésus-Christ. Alors nous voyons très bien ce qui se ressemble et ce qui est différent. C'est presque pareil et c'est totalement différent. C'est pareil quant au geste mais c'est différent parce qu'il y a toute la différence entre la figure et la réalité, entre le geste qui est un geste d'attente et le don. Et c'est là l'essentiel du christianisme: le don par Dieu de la grâce divine et de la vie divine.¹

5. But there has always been a tension in the relationship of Christianity with other religions: a tension between apprehending them as a *praeparatio evangelica* and apprehending them as obstacles to the spreading of the Gospel. This tension reflects the inherent ambiguity of other religions, which are at the same time both 'precursors' and 'adversaries'; and it springs from the essential nature of a revelation which is at once exclusive and universal, which proclaims itself as Truth among partial truths and falsehoods, which makes absolute claims and knows (in a sense) that they will be rejected, which is a light shining in a darkness that has not comprehended it.

'Some speak grudgingly or fault-findingly about the heights of the non-Christian religions and are inclined to lay all stress on their horrible depths. Others assiduously emphasise the heights of these religions but remain largely silent about the dark sides. Both, therefore, have a distorted view of these religions, not so much because they unduly vituperate or unduly praise them (although they certainly do so), but because they have a distorted view of Man, whose nature is angelic and satanic. We must honestly recognise the angel as well as the demon in Man, wherever we find him, in Christendom, in Hinduism, in China or anywhere else.'²

You describe the 'diabolical' theory of Paganism as an 'ingenious hypothesis' of 'Early Modern Western Christian missionaries'.³ But it goes back at least to St. Paul, who saw Paganism as bondage to τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου.⁴ You imply that it is a perverse 'hypothesis'. Perverse and uncharitable, of course, its application can be and often has been, but it originates in spiritual insight into the intrinsically demonic potentialities of Paganism. What St. Paul describes in Rom. i. 20-25 is part of the experience of every missionary: that other religions are not only foreshadowings of Christianity, but also genuine autonomous idolatries, manifestations of the forces of spiritual evil that Christ came to vanquish.⁵ Consequently Christian missionary thought has always moved

¹ Daniélou, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

² Kraemer, Hendrik: *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* (London 1938, published for the International Missionary Council by the Edinburgh House Press), p. 286.

³ VII. A (iii) (a), Annex II, 'Higher Religions and Psychological Types', in the first draft; cp. p. 459, above.

⁴ Gal. iv. 3 and 9; Col. ii. 8.

⁵ Matt. xii. 29, Luke x. 18, John xii. 31, xvi. 11. Cp. Col. i. 13, ii. 15, 1 John iii. 8.

between two poles, an emphasis on the similarities in Paganism to Christianity, and an emphasis on the radical otherness of Christianity. The first view is perhaps represented most clearly today by Roman Catholics like Daniélou, who are in the tradition of Matteo Ricci, while the 'radical' view has its classic modern expression in the book already quoted of Kraemer's, a Calvinist scholar who has had long missionary experience in the Far East. The two views are complementary: there is not contradiction between them, but a necessary tension. Therefore

'le rapport du christianisme aux autres religions . . . est d'une part historique, c'est-à-dire qu'il y a entre le christianisme et les autres religions une relation "chronologique", dans la mesure où il représente ce à quoi tout le reste aboutit; mais c'est en même temps une relation "dramatique", c'est-à-dire que, s'il est vrai que le christianisme achève, il faut dire aussi qu'il détruit et que, par conséquent, les religions païennes d'une part s'épanouissent en lui, et d'autre part meurent pour lui faire place.'¹

The 'dramatic' relationship becomes most apparent at the point where another religion rejects its vocation of being a precursor of Christianity and passes over into the attitude of an adversary, as the Jews themselves did when confronted with Jesus Christ. This is how Daniélou sees the ultimate opposition between the Syriac tradition and the Indic tradition:

'Bouddha a été l'un des grands précurseurs du Christ et sera son dernier adversaire. Bouddha, représentant éminent de la religion cosmique, prébiblique, est à la fois celui qui dans les profondeurs du passé a préparé mystérieusement l'Inde à recevoir Jésus-Christ, en faisant l'éducation de son âme, et c'est encore lui qui dans le drame spirituel suprême du monde, quand Israël lui-même "sera intégré",² disputera l'âme de l'Inde au Christ, en opposant à l'universalisme chrétien l'universalisme de la religion cosmique, qui est ce qui lui ressemble le plus, la caricature de la catholicité, le syncrétisme.'³

Perhaps the most that can be said about the history of this tension in the Christian attitude to other religions is that, as Christianity has become less concerned with primitive religions of the kind that it superseded in the Roman Empire and has become more concerned with the other Higher Religions, so its emphasis has shifted from apprehension of the demonic character of other religions to recognition of their *prae-paratio evangelica*. But this, once again, has taken place within the abiding framework of tension, of a 'dramatic' relationship, because these spring from the very nature of spiritual life and of Christianity itself. Now, as always, Christianity comes not only to fulfil, but also to purge.

'When the word "approach" is taken in the sense of Christianity as a total religious system approaching the non-Christian religions as total religious systems, there is only difference and antithesis, and this must be so because they are radically different. To minimise this results in a weakening and blurring of the true character of Christianity. Wilamowitz in his . . . book on *The Faith of the Greeks* mentions as one of the principal reasons of the victory of Christianity in the Ancient World the fact that it rejected all other gods and proclaimed the absolute monarchy of the

¹ Daniélou, op. cit., p. 9.

² Rom. xi. 51.

³ Daniélou, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

One Living God; in other words, that it remained true to its essential nature. To remain true to its essential character is also to-day the unbreakable law of Christianity.¹

Let it be added that for a Christian to speak of the demonic potentialities of other religions does not preclude recognition of the possibility of demonic perversion of Christianity itself: it implies it. The Christian will be grateful for your insistence that 'the intransigence of the Christian martyrs degenerated into the intolerance of Christian persecutors',² and will confess the spiritual truth in your criticisms of Christianity,³ even when he disagrees with the way in which they are formulated. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. For the Christian, the discussion of the relations between Christianity and the other Higher Religions has to start from its recognition that Christians, more than anyone else, are under judgement.

'The only valid and indestructible foundation of missions is the apostolic consciousness of joyful obedience to God's Will as manifested in the revelation in Christ, and our gratitude for this divine gift. All questions of superiority in the field of cultural experience or psychological religious experience are irrelevant in this context. No pretensions whatever, derived from presumably superior ethical or religious or cultural elements, have anything to do with the apostolic claim and obligation of Christianity. Its only foundation is the objective and plain reality of God's revelation in Christ, and therefore, speaking fundamentally, it is quite immaterial whether the World asks for it or not. The only way to become wholly purged from all kinds of superiority-feeling is, not the direct pursuit of a sympathetic or generous spirit towards other cultural experiences, however praiseworthy and valuable this may be, but the radically apostolic attitude; for this presupposes the not less radical humility that issues from the fact that all men of all civilisations (the "Christian" included) are, in the light of God's revelation, forlorn sinners and rebellious children of God.'⁴

6. For these reasons the Christian critic will, I think, be dissatisfied with your handling of 'the crux for an historian brought up in the Christian tradition', and will hold that your solution of the problem of the relationship between Christianity and the other Higher Religions fails to be in Christian terms. He will be able to accept neither your premiss of the spiritual equivalence of the Higher Religions derived from the secondary civilizations nor the conclusion, to which it inevitably leads, that they have a common destiny.⁵ He will note that in due course you qualify your assumption by tentatively suggesting a spiritual deficiency in the Indic religions which has led to an apparently inconsistent assimilation to Christianity;⁶ but it will seem to him that in the end, with your argument of the 'harmony' or 'symphony' of the Higher Religions,⁷ you yourself capitulate to a Hindu mode of thought.

¹ Kraemer, op. cit., pp. 300-1.

² On p. 439, above.

³ Kraemer, op. cit., p. 300.

⁴ On pp. 440-1 and 452, above.

⁵ pp. 442-3, above.

⁶ VII. A (iii) (d) 3, Annex, 'Immortality and Karma', p. 758, below; VII. A (iii) (a), Annex II, 'Higher Religions and Psychological Types', pp. 719, 725, n. 1, and 735, above; cp. V. vi. 45-47.

⁷ p. 428, above, and VII. A (iii) (a), Annex II, 'Higher Religions and Psychological Types', p. 735.

'Hinduism is wholly free from the strange obsession of the Semitic faiths that the acceptance of a particular religious metaphysic is necessary for salvation. . . . The main note of Hinduism is one of respect and good will for other creeds. When a worshipper of Viṣṇu had a feeling in his heart against a worshipper of Śiva and he bowed before the image of Viṣṇu, the face of the image divided itself in half and Śiva appeared on one side and Viṣṇu on the other, and the two smiling as one face on the bigoted worshipper told him that Viṣṇu and Śiva were one. . . .

'To obliterate every other religion than one's own is a sort of bolshevism in religion which we must try to prevent. We can do so only if we accept something like the Hindu solution, which seeks the unity of religion not in a common creed but in a common quest. Let us believe in a unity of spirit and not of organisation, a unity which secures ample liberty not only for every individual but for every type of organised life which has proved itself effective. For almost all historical forms of life and thought can claim the sanction of experience and so the authority of God. The World would be a much poorer thing if one creed absorbed the rest. God wills a rich harmony and not a colourless uniformity. The comprehensive and synthetic spirit of Hinduism has made it a mighty forest with a thousand waving arms each fulfilling its function and all directed by the spirit of God. Each thing in its place and all associated in the divine concert making with their various voices and even dissonances, as Heraclitus would say, the most exquisite harmony should be our ideal.'¹

This is the same position that you finally arrive at, in words very similar to your own.² Nor will the Christian critic be touched by the argument which governs your discussion throughout, and is at once its starting-point and its conclusion, that 'each religion is ever seeking, like the psychological type which it serves, to achieve the impossible feat of ministering to the whole gamut of the Psyche's elemental needs for expression. The feat is impossible because there is not, and cannot be, any spiritual organ capable of playing a psychic diapason; and therefore any existing higher religion that aspires to become *the* Universal Religion is doomed to disappointment'.³ He will reject this psychological relativism, first, because of the methodological doubts which I have suggested above; secondly, because it attributes an established scientific validity to a typological theory which is only one (and not the most widely accepted) among many, and which is at best no more than the intuitive schematizing of a great psychological artist; and, thirdly, because the evidence which you abundantly provide suggests that each Higher Religion in fact attains considerable success, by its internal development and articulation, in 'ministering to the whole gamut of the Psyche's [hypothetical] elemental needs for expression'. But he will reject it also for the *a priori* reason that the Christian Revelation is nonsense if there is only an 'arbitrarily favoured fraction of Mankind that happens to be psychologically equipped'⁴ for the acceptance of the Gospel.

'We Catholics do not quarrel with the methods of the religious historian,

¹ Radhakrishnan, S.: *The Hindu View of Life* (London 1927, Allen & Unwin), pp. 37 and 58-59.

² Cp. Clement Webb's criticism of Hinduism, quoted *ibid.*, p. 48.

³ VII. A (iii) (a), Annex II, 'Higher Religions and Psychological Types', p. 734, above, transposed from the past tense into the present.

⁴ p. 443, above.

so long as he keeps within his proper limits, within the limits of historical data and proved historical fact, and so long as he does not claim in his classification of religious types to pass decisive judgment upon the essential nature of the religious structure which he has under examination. We Catholics acknowledge readily, without any shame, nay with pride, that Catholicism cannot be identified simply and wholly with primitive Christianity, nor even with the Gospel of Christ, in the same way that the great oak cannot be identified with the tiny acorn. There is no mechanical identity, but an organic identity. And we go further and say that thousands of years hence Catholicism will probably be even richer, more luxuriant, more manifold in dogma, morals, law and worship than the Catholicism of the present day. A religious historian of the fifth millennium A.D. will without difficulty discover in Catholicism conceptions and forms and practices which derive from India, China and Japan, and he will have to recognise a far more obvious "complex of opposites". It is quite true, Catholicism is a union of contraries. But contraries are not contradictories. Wherever there is life, there you must have conflict and contrariety. . . . All peoples, each with their special aptitudes, are her [the Catholic Church's] children, and all bring their gifts into the sanctuary. The elasticity, freshness of mind and sense of form of the Roman combine with the penetration, profundity and inwardness of the German, and with the sobriety, discretion and good sense of the Anglo-Saxon. The piety and modesty of the Chinaman unite with the subtlety and depth of the Indian, and with the practicality and initiative of the American. It is unity in fullness, fullness in unity. The individual life of men and peoples—the most precious thing in the World and unique in character—flows with its rich and sparkling waters in all the innumerable courses and channels dug by missionaries in far lands; and those countless tributaries flow into the Church, and, purified in the Holy Spirit by its infallible teaching, merge into a single mighty stream, into one great flood which flows through all Humanity, fertilizing and purifying as it goes. That is the true conception of the Catholic Church.¹

The difference between this passage and the quotation from Radhakrishnan above, which is so close to your own view, is the difference between Catholicism and syncretism. Karl Adam is a Roman Catholic; Protestants see the development of the Church in federal rather than unitary terms as the propagation of autonomous and self-propagating indigenous churches.² Indeed, the reason why Protestants of the Reformed tradition would hesitate to accept the quotation from Karl Adam with the substitution of 'Christianity' for 'Catholicism' is because of the belief that the Roman Catholic theory of the development of doctrine compromises the purity of the original *κήρυγμα* and that Roman Catholicism already goes too far in the direction of syncretism.³ But this issue between the Roman Catholic Church, the members of the World Council of Churches, and the Moscow Patriarchate, which together compose the Christian World today (which is also an issue *within* each church, as it was between Matteo Ricci and Clement XI, who finally condemned his methods) is nothing compared with their common distance from your

¹ Adam, Karl: *The Spirit of Catholicism*, translated by Dom Justin McCann, O.S.B., (London 1929, Sheed & Ward), pp. 2 and 146.

² Cp. the writings of K. S. Latourette and Kraemer, op. cit., pp. 405-27.

³ Cp. Kraemer, op. cit., pp. 403-4.

own conclusion. For it is a debate within the common ground of conviction that the Church (however defined, and whatever its proper methods) is in the World to redeem it and that its *raison d'être* is to convert all nations. Paul's doctrine of the gathering of the Gentiles¹ is only a development of Christ's own declaration of the oecumenical character of His mission, and is foreshadowed, in simpler terms, by the Prophets' vision of an ultimate day in which all the World will acknowledge the God of Israel.

'And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and He will teach us of His ways, and we will walk in His paths: for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. . . . In that day shall there be an altar to the Lord in the midst of the land of Egypt, and a pillar at the border thereof to the Lord. And it shall be for a sign and for a witness unto the Lord of hosts in the land of Egypt: for they shall cry unto the Lord because of the oppressors, and He shall send them a saviour, and a great one, and He shall deliver them. And the Lord shall be known to Egypt, and the Egyptians shall know the Lord in that day, and shall do sacrifice and oblation; yea, they shall vow a vow unto the Lord, and perform it. And the Lord shall smite Egypt: He shall smite and heal it: and they shall return even to the Lord, and He shall be intreated of them, and shall heal them. In that day, shall there be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria, and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt, and the Egyptian into Assyria, and the Egyptians shall serve with the Assyrians. In that day shall Israel be the third with Egypt and with Assyria, even a blessing in the midst of the land: Whom the Lord of hosts shall bless, saying, Blessed be Egypt my people, and Assyria, the work of my hands, and Israel mine inheritance.'²

But, while he will disagree with so much that you say, the Christian critic will be deeply grateful to you for this Part, because it will appear to him that, just as you have abandoned your original judgement that all civilizations are philosophically equivalent and have found that 'civilizations . . . have ceased to constitute intelligible fields of study for us and have forfeited their historical significance except in so far as they minister to the progress of Religion',³ so the suppressed logic of your argument (rather than the weight of your evidence) drives on towards discarding your assumption that all higher religions are spiritually equivalent, and to the conclusion that the higher religions in their turn cease to be intelligible fields of study and forfeit their historical significance except in so far as they are related to Christianity.

¹ e.g. Gal. iii. 28, Eph. i. 10, ii. 11-14, Col. iii. 11.

² Isa. ii. 2-3 (cp. Mic. iv. 1-2), xix. 19-25.

³ p. 449, above.

VII. A (iii) (c), ANNEX

HOLY WRIT

THE recentness of the epiphany of the higher religions was advertised by the importance of the role that Holy Writ played in their life; for writing and reading were highly sophisticated media of mental intercourse, inasmuch as they were devices which reduced to a minimum the element of physical action entailed.

When Faust¹ substitutes 'Deed' for 'Word' in the opening verse of the Gospel according to Saint John in which the Evangelist declares what 'was in the beginning', the audacious reviser is showing himself a good historian; for a lively form of action is the natural means by which Man communicates his wishes, feelings, and thoughts to his fellows; and, in the progressive development of the semantic art, we may guess that a choric mime preceded a choric drama in which physical action was accompanied by intelligible words, as we know that words chanted by a choir as an accompaniment to dramatic action preceded words sung or recited by an individual prophet or bard to a listening audience. This living word disengaged from corporate physical action must have seemed a poor substitute at first, before the gradual exploration of its latent potentialities; and, if the sounding word that lives on the speaker's lips and in the hearer's ear would seem a bloodless medium of intercourse to the ecstatic participant in a Bacchic chorus, he would feel, *a fortiori*, that the silent word engraved, inscribed, or printed on stone, potsherd, parchment, or paper was too jejune to be taken seriously. The art of writing had, however, been coeval with the species of Society that we have called 'civilizations', at any rate in the Old World; and the possession of 'household books', sacred or profane, had been characteristic of Old World civilizations of all generations later than the first—though the inanimate means of preserving these literary treasures, which had always been available since they had first been brought into existence, had been spurned, through long ages, in favour of a living transmission of 'Homer' from rhapsode to rhapsode, and of the Qur'ān from *hāfiẓ* to *hāfiẓ*, 'not in tables of stone but in fleshy tables of the heart'.²

These 'household books' had been of two kinds. There had been epics inspired by the experience of barbarians belonging to the external proletariat of an antecedent civilization,³ and there had been sacred books inspired by the different experience of an antecedent civilization's internal proletariat. The Bible and the Qur'ān were classic examples of the Sacred Book, and 'Homer', the Mahabharata, and the Icelandic Saga of the Epic. Usually the Epic had been in the ascendant in a civilization that had been affiliated to a predecessor through a barbarian heroic age, and the Sacred Book in a civilization that had been affiliated to a predecessor through a church. Broadly speaking, 'Homer' had held in Hellenic life the place that the Bible had held in the lives of Western

¹ Goethe: *Faust*, Part I, ll. 1224-37.

² 2 Cor. iii. 3.

³ See V. v. 194-337, *passim*.

and Orthodox Christendom. Like the Bible, the Homeric Epic had been taken for granted, had been treasured as a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰετῆς*,¹ had been consulted as an oracle, had been quoted for emotional and aesthetic effect, and had been constantly reinterpreted, to suit the needs of different ages, till meanings had been read into it that would have been unintelligible to its makers. But this distinction between two classes of Civilization differentiated by different types of 'household book' was not clear-cut. In Western Christendom, for example, there had been an abortive Teutonic Epic which might conceivably have lived to play the part of 'Homer' if the Bible had not eclipsed it at the dawn of Western history,² while in the Indic World the epic poetry of the barbarian Aryas had not indeed been eclipsed, but been decidedly outshone, by a sacred book, in the shape of the Vedas, of which the nucleus, at any rate, had been bequeathed to the Indic Society by the same barbarians.

Barbarian sacred books, however, were as rare as religious epics; and this was no accident; for the normal association of sacred books with higher religions derived from a characteristic of higher religions that was one of their distinguishing features. The higher religions had been founded and developed by personalities that had become historic through impressing themselves on the imagination of Posterity; and the medium through which they had made this personal impression on disciples who had never seen them in the flesh had been a message enshrined in a sacred book preserved 'in the tables of the heart' if not on paper.³

¹ Thucydides, Book I, chap. 22.

² See I. i. 449, n. 2, and II. ii. 320-1.

³ As the writer of this Study saw it, the Mahāyāna had been conjured out of the philosophy of the Buddha by the lives and works of Aśvaghoṣa, Nagarjuna, and Vasubandhu (see Eliot, Sir Ch.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Edward Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 82-89), while the post-Buddhaic and anti-Buddhaic Hinduism which was one of the four principal living higher religions in the writer's day had been inspired from the same source in the life and works of Śaṅkara (see Eliot, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 206-11). The conformity in this respect between the Buddhaistic and the Judaistic higher religions, which had struck the writer's eye, was queried by Mr. Martin Wright in the following comment:

'Surely neither Hinduism nor the Mahāyāna was founded by an historic personality, and neither was a sacred book which enshrines such a personality's message. Is there not a radical difference between the two higher religions of the Judaic tradition, which are prophetic religions, with historical founders and sacred books *sensu stricto*, and on the other hand the two higher religions of the Indic tradition, which are non-historical and non-prophetic (except in the indirect degree in which the Mahāyāna derives from the Hīnayāna), and whose sacred literature is heterogeneous?

'The following distinctions seem to me, if they are not very wide of the mark, to belong to your exposition:

(i) Hinduism: sacred literature of the barbarian epic kind, as you say;

(ii) Hīnayāna: The Pali Canon, at least in *The Discourses of the Buddha* and perhaps *The Book of the Great Decease*, is analogous to the Gospels in being the record of an historic personality; but, since you classify Gautama as a philosopher, not a prophet, perhaps one should say analogous to the Platonic and Xenophontic record of Socrates and to the Confucian *Analects*;

(iii) Mahāyāna: the Sanskrit Canon, in so far as I can grasp its nature, consists in a tiny kernel of historic and prophetic record (such kernel as can be found in the lives of the Buddha), if one is to think of the Buddha as having been posthumously transmogrified from a philosopher into a prophet in the development from the Hīnayāna into the Mahāyāna, surrounded by a vast pulpy fruit of devotional and theologico-philosophical writings in the *Sūtras* and related documents. Would it be a fair comparison to say that the Mahayanian sacred literature resembles the Christian Patristic writings divorced from the Old and New Testaments?

The writer would agree that in the two Buddhaistic higher religions, as compared with the two Judaistic, the part played by historical personalities and by scriptures purporting to enshrine their personal teaching was not of the same overwhelming

Such sacred books had not established their authority without a struggle, however great might have been the prestige of the prophets whose messages they had embodied; for they had never found the domain of Religion untenanted. A traditional corporate liturgy, operated by a priesthood, had always been before them in the field, and, in so far as they had succeeded in winning their way against such time-honoured rites and securely vested interests, they had triumphed through managing to meet some importunate unsatisfied social need.

One emergency that had made the fortune of sacred books had been the social calamity of deracination. 'Displaced persons', whether they be refugees or deportees, are physically prevented by their geographical removal from continuing to worship at their ancestral shrines; and, since the due celebration of a rite at the proper place may be as essential to the religious efficacy of the proceedings as the performance of the proper gestures and the utterance of the proper words, the members of an exiled community may find themselves debarred from perpetuating the liturgy that has been their traditional means of communion with their god and with one another. In exile, this communion will have become more than ever precious, since it will be the sole remaining sustenance of a communal life which has lost its roots in a soil that the exiles can no longer call their own; and there will be a proportionately strong incentive to find some new medium of religious communion to replace the liturgy that has been abandoned perforce. In this desperate emergency a sacred book recorded in the tables of the heart—or even in the less durable, but hardly less portable medium of ink and paper—may save the situation by taking the lost liturgy's place.

The classic example of this enforced replacement of a liturgy by a book is, of course, the ritual revolution which was Jewry's response to the ordeal of being dispersed abroad among the Gentiles. In the Jewish communities of the Diasporà the priest offering sacrifices at the altar in the Temple at Jerusalem had to be supplanted by a reader reciting from the books of the Law and the Prophets on a reading-stand in the synagogue; and after the destruction of the Temple and the Roman Government's ban on the residence of Jews in Aelia Capitolina—the Hellenic city founded by Hadrian on the site where Jerusalem had stood—the Diasporà's form of worship was the sole form surviving. This triumph of the Torah in the Jewish Diasporà is manifestly an example of the same stimulating effect of new ground that we have observed already in another context,¹ where we have noticed how the Hellenic and Teutonic Epic and the Scandinavian Saga all flowered overseas—in Ionia, in Britain, and in Iceland—after a migration on board ship which had given the diction of poetry an opportunity to shake itself free from the trammels of an earth-bound ritual in order to become a

importance as it was in Christianity and Islam. On the other hand, he would maintain that the resemblance in this respect between the two pairs of living higher religions became not merely apparent but significant when they were viewed against the foil of antecedent primitive religions in which the alpha and the omega of piety consisted in the corporate performance of traditional rites, and in which neither scriptures nor historical personalities played any part at all.

¹ In II. ii. 92-96.

vehicle for expressing experiences that were, not corporate and repetitive, but personal and unique.

Another emergency that had made the fortune of a sacred book had been a revolutionary change in the direction of mimesis—a revolution precipitated, not by external forces driving a community into physical exile, but by a voluntary and deliberate transfer of allegiance from an ancestral tradition preserved by a priesthood to a revelation proclaimed by a prophet. If the formidable authority conferred on the priests by their custody of tradition is to be challenged, the challenge can be delivered only by the word of God Himself as revealed in His prophet's message; for, if that message is once recognized to be authentic, it must override the rulings of priests who are not God's spokesmen but merely His ministers; and, though the winged words of God's living human spokesman will be likely to have both a greater virtue¹ and a greater effect than any written testament, dumb scripture has one decisive posthumous advantage over the living voice. Scripture can attain a longevity which, at second hand, will multiply a hundredfold the brief life-span of the prophet whose message this frozen echo perpetuates. Holy Writ that purports to enshrine prophetic revelation is thus a *malleus presbyterorum* that is a literal godsend to rebels against sacerdotal authority. The followers of the Prophets of Israel and Judah and of Zarathustra made effective use of this weapon against the priests of their day; the Scribes and Pharisees used it against the Sadducees; the Protestant Reformers used it against the Papal Church.

This revolutionary attack in the name of Holy Writ had been met by the priests with varying degrees of success in different cases. The Jewish priesthood was eventually worsted by a combination of adverse circumstances: the Babylonish Captivity; the permanent preponderance of the Diaspora over a reconstituted temple-state at Jerusalem; the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans and consequent cessation of the Hierosolymitan liturgy of sacrifice; and, above all, the gradual change of outlook and *êthos* in Jewry from a communal towards an individual relation to God. On the other hand the Magi signally defeated Zarathustra by playing upon his too simple-minded followers the confidence-trick which the English King Richard II sought to play upon a rebel peasantry when he cried 'I will be your leader!'; and, by an equally skilful use of similar tactics, the Brahmans had managed to survive the epiphanies of a long series of sacred books, from the Vedas onwards. The error of short-sighted priests who had clumsily ensured the prophets' triumph by ill-advisedly putting them to death had been retrieved by those priests' far-sighted children, who had contrived to sterilize the martyrs' spiritual legacies by building their sepulchres;² and the efficacy of this stratagem had been so great that it had proved able to weather even a

¹ 'The main force in promoting higher spirituality or morality among men has been the apparition of prophetic souls whose teaching cannot be accounted for by what went before them, and who appear by their commanding influence to drive men by a new impulse in a new direction. The new impulse is, perhaps, never afterwards wholly exhausted or lost. But it becomes merged in the general channel with other currents, and, though it adds something to the whole, it tends to become less and less distinctive' (Gore, Charles: *The Philosophy of the Good Life* (Everyman edition), p. 58).

² Matt. xxiii. 29-31; Luke xi. 47-48.

scathing exposure. They 'say: If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets.'¹ The priest had drawn the sting of the prophet's message when, under the cloak of a feigned repentance, he had constituted himself the official interpreter of the prophetic books.

The tale of sacred books whose fortunes had been made either by the accident of physical exile or by the act of spiritual revolt had subsequently been increased by the working of the motive of emulation; for an established sacred book is an impressive instrument of power which confers on its possessors an enviable prestige in the estimation of parvenus who have no Scriptures of their own to pit against it; and the obvious remedy for a new religion is to put itself on equal terms with its seniors by producing a distinctive sacred book of its own. The Primitive Christian Church created the Bible by adding the New Testament to an Old Testament that was its scriptural heritage from Jewry. The children of the Arabs of 'the Days of Ignorance' could hold up their heads in face of the Jewish and Christian 'People of the Book' when they had received the Qur'ān from the divinely inspired lips of their own prophet Muhammad. The Sikhs challenged the Qur'ān by compiling the Granth; Joseph Smith challenged the Bible by producing the Book of Mormon, and Mary Baker Eddy by publishing *Science and Health*.²

Thus emulation, revolt, and exile had all played their part in providing opportunities for Holy Writ to assert its authority at the expense of 'priestcraft'. This conflict between priest and book was one expression of a more fundamental antagonism between the incubus of a traditional collectivism and the aspiration of an individual soul to enter into personal communion with God, and on this showing the future might appear to lie with Holy Writ—though this tentative judgement might be discounted as a Jewish, Protestant, Muslim, and Sikh aberration by Catholic Christian champions of sacerdotalism. In any event, experience indicated that priestcraft was not likely to be driven off the field either quickly or easily, considering the ability that it had already shown in quoting scripture to its purpose.

'The established religion [always] appeals to [the sacred books]. It declares their contents to be everlasting and sacrosanct; but in reality it is the Establishment, and not the Scriptures, that determines, at its own discretion, the content of its doctrine. What is in agreement with the Establishment's position is deduced from the text of the sacred book; everything else is twisted round and very often interpreted into the very opposite of its original meaning, or else is simply ignored; and woe to him who should venture to appeal to this [original meaning] or to declare

¹ Matt. xxiii. 30.

² Mr. Martin Wight notes: 'And the same process appears to have occurred, not deliberately but subconsciously, in Marxian Communism as it has developed into a religion, so that the writings of Marx and Engels have come to occupy the place of the Old Testament in Christian holy writ, the writings of Lenin (in whose life the Marxian meaning of History became incarnate, as the Christian meaning of History became incarnate in the Life and Passion of Christ) have become the counterpart of the Gospels, and the writings of Stalin have come to resemble the Pauline Epistles—the principal authorised interpretation of the historical revelation, which shallow and mistaken critics regard, in either case, as having been a perversion, but which was, in either case, a formulation and fulfilment.'

it to be binding. The last word lies, not with the sacred book, but with the tradition that the Church has created and now embodies. The Vedic hymns (to take one example) contain not a word about Brahma, not a word about Shiva, and very little about Vishnu; the Bible contains not a word about the fundamental doctrines of the Catholic Church: about the commanding position of the priesthood and the Papacy, about the cult of the Saints, the worship of the Host, the sacraments, Purgatory, confession, and so on.¹ Conversely the Holy Scriptures include books that have nothing in the world to do with Religion: historical works, sagas and romances; collections of erotic poetry like the Song of Songs; and sceptical philosophical works like *Qoheleth*, which are transformed into revelations of religious mysteries by master-strokes of ecclesiastical interpretation. Paradoxical though this may sound, it can positively be maintained that, for any fully developed religion, the contents of its sacred books are virtually a matter of complete indifference: any book in the world may become a sacred book through some freak of Chance.²

This cynically written passage would appear, on consideration, to be neither so paradoxical nor so shocking as it might seem at first sight; for, while it was true that the original meaning of Holy Writ always might be, and sometimes had been, misinterpreted to suit the institutional interests of a church that was hypocritically professing a scrupulous respect for the divine revelation of which it claimed to be the divinely appointed trustee, it was also true that the reading of new

¹ Hindu and Christian apologists would, no doubt, retort to this sweeping assertion by copious citations of Holy Writ as a warrant for their practices and beliefs.—A.J.T.

² Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. i, Part II, 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 60.

Mr. Martin Wight comments: 'This is a fascinating quotation, but, if you end on this Voltairean note and implicitly commit yourself to an acceptance of Chance as the determining factor, you will seem once again to swing the balance too far and to speak inconsistently with what you say elsewhere. The reader may legitimately feel that you cannot be both as sceptical and anti-providential in your historical conclusion about the Christian Scriptures and as Christian as, in general, you are throughout this Part.' To this the writer would reply that a feeling which might be legitimate for his reader might at the same time be, for the writer, an illegitimate temptation to evade an ordeal which he had been challenged to encounter and to endure. *Sentio et exorcior*; but the painfulness of a tension between unreconciled dictates of Heart and Head gives Dipsychus no warrant for evading the pain by opting exclusively for one or other of these two conflicting masters, so long as the price of thus cutting the knot is the deliberate sacrifice of sincere convictions. So far from that, the natural human impulse to find and apply an anaesthetic, without counting the cost, might be a temptation that ought to be strenuously resisted. The bodhisattva who refrains from fading out into *Nirvāṇa* when this is at last within his reach may be doing better than the arhat who recognizes and pursues no other goal than that of entering into his rest, if the bodhisattva's motive for thus deliberately tarrying in the painful realm of mental strife is a sincere desire to continue to play one creature's tiny part in a common search for 'the glorious liberty' in quest of which 'the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now' (Rom. viii. 21-22). The war between Heart and Head by which the writer's generation in a Westernizing World was being ravaged seemed to him to be a tribulation which that generation must expect to continue to endure all the days of its brief life on Earth. Its vocation seemed to him to be, not to seek release from this ordeal, but to play a manful part in serving God by humbly helping Him to turn His creatures' tribulation to account for His own creative purposes. The tribulation of being vouchsafed no more than a Pisgah sight of the Promised Land was visited by the Lord upon Moses and was accepted by Moses at the Lord's hand without repining; and this last trial was the consummation of a lifetime of toil and frustration. Yet this servant of the Lord who thus died without ever crossing the Jordan had not lived in vain on that account; for he had lived to play his part, through forty years of wandering in the Wilderness, in finding a way for Israel to reach the borders of a Promised Land from the providentially opened doors of a House of Bondage.

meanings into old words was one of the Human Spirit's well-tried and well-justified methods of gaining fresh spiritual insight; and thus a Holy Writ which had originated as an imperfect vehicle for commemorating the inspired message of a dead prophet, and had survived to be perverted into an effective instrument for promoting the mundane interests of a living church, might come to serve, in a third chapter of the story, as an organ for expressing new inspirations in the souls of the prophet's followers in latter days when prophet and church in turn had passed away.

IMMORTALITY AND KARMA

If, as has been suggested in a previous passage,¹ History wins meaning and value for Man in so far as Man co-operates in History with God, this meaning and value of History must be found in some mode of being which transcends that of Human Life on Earth; for, while God is master of History, as of all things, God's life, in which Man shares by co-operating with Him, is not confined to the dimensions of Time and Space. God's infinity is not just ubiquity, nor His eternity just everlastingness; and, on these analogies, the immortality attained by Man in virtue of a relation with God cannot be just Human Life disengaged from Space and prolonged in Time *in saecula saeculorum*. Time and Space had been shown by a Modern Western Science to be each unthinkable apart from the other; for they had been proved to be no more than abstractions from a Reality which included both these theoretical components in so far as it could be said to include either. The bearing of this recent Western philosophic insight upon human destiny had been anticipated by an Epicurean school of Hellenic philosophy through an empirical observation of the trajectories of human lives in their passage through This World.

Praeterea gigni pariter cum corpore et unâ
 crescere sentimus pariterque senescere mentem.
 nam velut infirmo pueri teneroque vagantur
 corpore, sic animi sequitur sententia tenvis.
 inde, ubi robustis adolevit viribus aetas,
 consilium quoque maius et auctor est animi vis.
 post, ubi iam validis quassatum est viribus aevi
 corpus, et obtusis ceciderunt viribus artus,
 claudicat ingenium, delirat lingua, labat mens,
 omnia deficiunt et uno tempore desunt.²

Whether the life-curve is thus carried to its natural term of a death ushered in by a gradual decay of physical and psychic faculties, or whether it is broken off short by a premature death through accident, it is inconceivable that this curve can be prolonged after death in the Time-dimension in which it has been either completed or interrupted in the course of life.

Nor can Man's immortality be retrieved in the Time-dimension by equating it with the lasting difference which is made to the whole social future of Mankind on Earth by even the shortest life of the most insignificant personality. No doubt every human life-trajectory does have this enduring effect, just as the motion of a single atom or electron affects the equilibrium of the whole physical universe. But this so-called 'impersonal immortality' is no redemption of Man's role in terrestrial history; it is the heart of the nightmare of Human Life on Earth without the

¹ On pp. 512-13, above.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 445-54.

fellowship of God; and the nightmare would not be dispelled even if we were warranted in inverting the poet's melancholy reflexion that

The evil that men do lives after them;
the good is oft interrèd with their bones.¹

If our acts in This Life are the stuff of which our immortality is made, this is in virtue of their influence, not on human affairs on Earth, but on the relation between the human actor and God, and we must believe that in God's sight the spiritual balance-sheet of a human life on Earth is, for good or evil, of equal moment whether that life has been socially significant or insignificant and whether it has been long or short.

For such my faith or fondness—which you will—
This strange conviction would possess me still:
That by heroic act or generous deed,
Agony, abnegation, loving heed,
Our mortal nature could from Time be freed,
And suddenly outsoar, while still on Earth,
Its long, low drag of days between the grave and birth,
And touch a plane of life transcending Time's,
As a dull-ticking clock suddenly chimes.

.
Free of Time's trammel, clear of Earth and Skies,
In that immortal instant will they rise,
And with a loftiness of being live
Beyond the summits happiness can give:
Fulfilled, though stricken; absolute, though bound;
Effaced on Earth, and yet, beyond it, found;
Traceless, and yet with more than fame renowned.²

The sum of the spiritual values, positive and negative, that arise from the acts of a human being in his passage through Life on Earth had been designated *Karma* ('the product of action') by philosophers of the Indic school, and they had perceived that the spiritual plane on which *Karma* waxes and wanes must be in a different dimension altogether from the dimensions of Space and Time. It would follow that *Karma*, once generated, would have an existence of its own that would not be affected by the death on Earth of the personality from whose earthly acts it had sprung; and this Indic vision might give Judaic souls an insight into the nature of an immortality which is not in Time but is both 'now' and 'always', if the two parties did not disagree in their judgement of the implications.

In the sight of Judaically oriented souls, immortality was bound to seem an inestimable boon, even though the Soul's hope of Heaven might be haunted by a fear of Hell; for the hope of Heaven was a hope of communion with God in the Beatific Vision. In the sight of Indically oriented souls, immortality would be an intolerable burden, even if they did not believe, as they did believe, that a debit balance of *Karma* would condemn the vehicle of it to return to the sorrowful treadmill of birth-

¹ Shakspeare: *Julius Caesar*, Act III, scene ii, ll. 38-39.

² Skinner, Martyn: *Letters to Malaya*, v (London 1947, Putnam), pp. 74 and 76.

death-birth. A liberating purgatory had been desired by compassionate Buddhist hearts as wistfully as by their Christian counterparts; but the immortality from which Buddhist arhats sought liberation was not just an immortality in Hell; it was immortality itself—against which the arhat would consistently repine even if it were the immortality of Heaven. Can Man release himself from immortality, as the Buddha believed and taught, by dissolving *Karma* into *Nirvāna*? *Nirvāna* resembles its opposite, the quintessence of personality, in being indifferent to Space and Time, but this not through rising above them into communion with the personality of God, but through sinking below them into the abyss of Subconsciousness. Supposing that *Nirvāna* were attainable by the Buddha's prescription, would the attainment of it be the highest good for Man or the worst catastrophe?

The answer to this last question would depend on whether it were felt that a retention of Consciousness was worth its price of pain, or were felt that a release from pain was worth its price of oblivion. Was the Wheel of Existence merely an infernal machine for tormenting Ixion by revolutions that were vain repetitions? Or was it the wheel of a chariot of fire on which a human being might ascend to Heaven if he could bear the ordeal? The choice between alternative answers would turn on whether the Ultimate Reality was, or was not, believed to be a personal Living God. One answer had been given by Judaism, the other by an Indic school of philosophy; and so sharp a contradiction on a point of such supreme importance might have cleft an unbridgeable schism between the Judaic and the Indic pair of higher religions, if Hinduism and the Mahāyāna had not crossed the gulf, on their own initiative, to the Muslim-Christian side in defiance of their own philosophical first principles.

VII. C (ii) (a), ANNEX

THE PREHISTORIC BACKGROUND TO THE HISTORY OF THE HIGHER RELIGIONS

In the present Part of this Study we have been investigating the historical role of the higher religions, and we have seen that their epiphany had been a very recent event on the Time-scale of History that had been revealed by the discoveries of Modern Western geologists and astronomers.¹ This stage of Mankind's religious experience was the latest chapter of what must have been a very long story. Were any of the previous chapters accessible to latter-day Western students of History?

The Hebrew tradition that had been inherited by the higher religions of Judaic origin gave an account of Man's religious history that purported to carry the story right back to the origins of the Human Race. According to this account 'the Call of Abraham', with which the history of the Judaistic higher religions opened, had not created a relation between God and Man that had never existed before; it had re-created a relation that had once existed between God and Abraham's forefather, the first man Adam, but had been broken by Adam's fall. On this view the genesis of the higher religions presented itself as a 'palingenesia': a rebirth of something old which might also be the birth of something new.² In the Pauline Christian version of the Jewish plot of the drama of Man's spiritual history 'it is written: The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit.'³

When a Modern Western Rationalism had asserted its independence of the Christian tradition, one of its first acts had been to reject, as a figment of imagination, this picture of an original communion between Primitive Man and a One True God. The existence of the God of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus was held to be an illusion, and the belief that this illusion had already captivated Primitive Man was held to be an anachronism. The adherents of the higher religions, it was suggested, had sought to lend authority to a theological invention of their own by naively presenting it as being the revival of a primordial revelation; but, in the higher critic's eye, this hypothesis of a primitive monotheism was as unsubstantial as it was facile; for, while the Modern Western scholar would not doubt that Primitive Man's theological ideas, if he had any, were illusory, he would consider it impossible to ascertain which of the innumerable illusions lying in wait for Primitive Man was the one into which he had happened to fall in the first flight of his infantile fancy. This archaic Modern Western scepticism had been shaken by the subsequent progress of anthropological research. By the time of writing, some light had been thrown on Primitive Man's religion by a study of the religion of the least sophisticated human societies still surviving. This evidence had to be used with great caution, since neither the facts nor the inferences

¹ See pp. 452-4, above.

² See V. v. 27, n. 2, and V. vi. 172-3.

³ 1 Cor. xv. 45.

to be drawn from them were by any means beyond dispute. Yet, as far as the evidence went, it did not conflict with the Hebrew legend and seemed, indeed, to bear it out.

The evidence up to date indicated two things: that there was a remarkable measure of uniformity in the practices and beliefs of the least sophisticated surviving societies, and that this distinctive common element in their religion was spiritually higher (in terms of the spiritual standards of the higher religions) than the religion of other uncivilized societies that were the superiors of these unsophisticated peoples in technology and in social organization.

The measure of uniformity was remarkable because, at the time when the evidence was collected by Modern Western anthropologists, the unsophisticated peoples were scattered, far apart from one another, over the face of the Earth, in holes and corners that had been left to them by materially more efficient competitors who had been driving them from pillar to post. If ever there had been a time when these societies had been in geographical contact with one another, that contact must have been broken several thousand, and perhaps several hundred thousand, years ago. Therefore the points of likeness between their respective religions could not have been the result of any direct borrowings by one of these societies from another. They could only have been the result either of some wave of cultural influence, radiating from one or more of the civilizations, which had reached and affected all these unsophisticated societies alike¹ at dates subsequent to their dispersion, or else of some primitive cultural heritage, once common to all Mankind, which each of the unsophisticated societies had sluggishly or simple-mindedly retained for itself after its more enterprising neighbours had discarded it.²

As between these two possible explanations, the hypothesis of a relatively recent cultural radiation from an identic external source had been favoured by Mrs. N. K. Chadwick in an attempt to account for a common theme in modern oral literature whose 'distribution . . . follows a great arc on the periphery of the Eastern Hemisphere, stretching from the Chathams in South Polynesia, round Siberia to Russia, and including the mountain masses and backward districts of Central Asia'.³ The alternative hypothesis of isolated local survivals of an original common human heritage had been favoured by Father W. Schmidt as the explanation of a similar common theme in the religion of societies of a still less sophisticated and even more widely scattered stratum: the Pygmies and Pygmoids in the mountains and forests of the extreme South and South-East of Asia and the adjacent islands; the Blackfellows in the extreme South-East of Australia and their neighbours the Tasmanians; the Negrillos in the impenetrable primeval forest of Tropical Africa and the Bushmen in the Kalahari Desert; the Samoyeds, Kamchadals, Koryaks,

¹ See II. i. 187 and V. v. 197.

² "These tribes have, apparently, never departed from the original state in which Man is contained by Nature as an animal is contained by the law of its species . . . and . . . their attitude towards the so-called boons of Civilisation is usually that of polite but adamant refusal' (Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall, & Cox; 1949, Methuen), pp. 250-2).

³ Chadwick, N. K.: *Poetry and Prophecy* (Cambridge 1942, University Press), p. 94; cp. pp. xiv-xvi.

and Ainu in Northern Asia; the Algonkins in the extreme North-East of North America and on the prairies; the Californian Indians in the narrow corner of the west coast of North America between the Rocky Mountains and the Sea; and the denizens of Tierra del Fuego, the bleak antarctic tip of South America.¹

'No later culture can boast of a distribution which encircles the whole Earth so completely. But, if it is clear that, wherever remnants of the primitive peoples are still discoverable over this huge area, they show belief in a Supreme Being, then it is likewise manifest that such a belief is an essential property of this, the most ancient of human cultures, which must have been deeply and strongly rooted in it at the very dawn of Time, before the individual groups had separated from one another.'²

It will be seen that the difference between Father Schmidt's and Mrs. Chadwick's explanation of the presence of a common theme in the cultures of unsophisticated peoples whose latter-day habitats were widely scattered was not an irreconcilable one; for, though Mrs. Chadwick warns us 'to abandon the assumption that the culture of the most backward communities of the present day bears any relationship to that of truly "primitive" or Early Man',³ she agrees with Father Schmidt in finding that 'the farther back we can carry our researches, the higher the culture becomes and the more the immediate sources of these cultures tend to converge';⁴ and it is evident that, while this might be because the spiritually higher features in the cultures of the unsophisticated peoples had a common origin in influences recently radiated by the civilizations, these common features might have an alternative origin in a common heritage which the unsophisticated societies had retained from the dawn of human history. Whatever the source of this unsophisticated culture might be, our two Modern Western authorities concur in esteeming it to be a spiritual treasure of great price.

'In Asia, in Polynesia, even in Africa,' Mrs. Chadwick testifies, 'Man's chief intellectual pre-occupations and speculations are with spiritual adventure. . . . These spiritual adventures are the journeys which we take in our minds into the past, the hidden or distant present, and the future. The lonely pioneering of the Soul in these spheres and the defeat or success of its quest forms the principal theme in the oral literature of the Old World. . . .

'The more immediate objects of these journeys are many and various. . . . But undoubtedly everywhere the principal *motifs* are the rescue of souls from hostile spirits and the securing of the water of life and the herb of healing. Directly or indirectly the quest for immortality is the most outstanding *motif* both in Asia and in Polynesia. . . .

'This quest of immortality, the effort of men and women to master matter by spirit, is the chief intellectual pre-occupation of the men and women outside the sphere of Civilisation to-day.'⁵

¹ Schmidt, Father W.: *The Origin and Growth of Religion*, English translation by Rose, H. J. (London 1921, Methuen), pp. 252-3.

² Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-1. Cp. Baynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-2 and 457-8.

³ Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p. xv. The same point has been made in the present Study, II. i. 185-7 and V. v. 197.

⁴ Chadwick, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-94.

From this spectacle of contemporary Man's still unfaded intimations of immortality in the least unchildlike of the living human societies, Father Schmidt draws an inference—in which Mrs. Chadwick would perhaps hesitate to follow him—regarding the spiritual activities of Primeval Mankind.

'Primaevial Man was far from being [a] sluggish dreamer . . . standing in stupid astonishment and fright at the world that was so new to him. The pre-historic tools and weapons and those of the ethnologically oldest peoples of to-day are alone enough to show that he was a vigorous and daring man of action. . . . He grasped the conception of cause and effect, and then adapted that to the relationship of means to end. His means, to effect the ends he desired, were his tools, which he invented and used. Now all this sufficed to lead him to a real religion, to the recognition of a supreme Personal Being; for he was able to apply these same mental powers to the contemplation of the Universe as a whole.'¹

Father Schmidt's inference reinstates, in terms of a Modern Western science, the picture of the spiritual condition of Primeval Man that is presented in mythological terms in the Book of Genesis. Supposing that we entertain Father Schmidt's thesis provisionally for the sake of the argument, shall we find the rest of the spiritual drama working out 'in modern dress' on the lines of the Biblical plot? Are there explanations, in our sophisticated terms, of Primeval Man's fall from a state of innocence and of Fallen Man's access to redemption through the grace of God? Perhaps the most promising approach to these questions will be to apply to the history of Primitive Man an empirically attested 'law' of the working of Human Nature which has already served us as a key to an understanding of the history of Man in process of Civilization.

In the history of Western Man we have seen that a rise in spiritual standards thanks to the influence of a higher religion can incidentally produce a consequent rise in material well-being, and that this incidental mundane effect of spiritual progress exposes Man to a temptation to which he readily succumbs. The material harvest of spiritual travail is apt to divert Man's energies from spiritual into material channels; and thus a spiritual regression may be the result of a material advance which a previous spiritual advance has brought in its train.² Conversely, in the histories of civilizations which had broken down and disintegrated through transferring their treasure from the Commonwealth of God to the Commonwealth of Swine, we have seen that Man's disillusioning experience of losing his life through setting his heart upon saving it had opened Man's eyes to the vanity of This World and reopened his ears to God's word, which had been uttered to him at this stage through higher religions.³ Both the need and the opportunity for the epiphany of the higher religions had sprung from the failures of Fallen Man's mundane civilizations of the first and second generations, and Man's subsequent abandonment of his allegiance to a saving higher religion in order to go a whoring after a mundane civilization of the third generation wore the

¹ Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-6.

² See pp. 546-8, above.

³ See pp. 425, 551-2, and 701-2, above.

aspect of a second Fall. Did this fall of a Sophisticated Man throw light on a Primeval Man's fall and its sequel?

The history of Primitive Man could be tentatively reconstructed on the analogy of the history of Man in Australia since the advent there of the pioneers of a Western way of life. Primeval Man's state on the morrow of his becoming human could be inferred from the state in which the first White settlers in Australia had found their Black predecessors.

"These Black People were intimately related to the land over which they roamed. In its sacred places were the spirits of their ancestors and the ancient heroes of their myths. Their own spirits lived in it before they were born. Even the animals and birds and fruits of the Earth had their spirits also, and a close affinity was maintained with this spirit world by long-established sacred rites and ceremonies. Spirits, land, and people were one close-knit community, and each needed the other for life to be possible and complete."¹

These unsophisticated souls had hardly been tempted to throw over their unselfconscious communion with God in order to worship their own achievements; for, when their Modern Western destroyers broke in upon them at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the Australian Blackfellows, in their hitherto secluded corner of the World, were still living in the Palaeolithic Age. Their domicile at this date testifies, however, that, in thus still remaining in a relative state of innocent inefficiency, they had been exceptions to the general run of Mankind. Long before the Westerners' violation of the Blackfellows' ultimate sanctuary, other societies had already outstripped the Blackfellows in material achievement sufficiently far to have driven them, by stages, into the precarious asylum where a globe-encompassing Western Civilization eventually hunted them down and finished them off.

"The Black Man . . . was controlled by Nature. He functioned as a part of it. He dared not disturb it. It lived in him. The Civilised Man, on the other hand, set out to exploit Nature. . . . The Australian version of the Garden of Eden in which the Black Man lived naked and unashamed had no appeal to the White. The White Man had eaten of the Tree of Knowledge and had changed completely his attitude to the World of Nature and of Man. As he clothed and adorned his body with the garments of Civilisation, he unclothed his mind and will of all customary restraints and sacred sanctions. At length the will to power in Man stood forth naked and unashamed. . . . More and more he freed himself from all guidance from Nature until, in an illusion of freedom, he stood over against Nature, using it for his purposes and subduing it to his will. This led to the point where Civilised Man no longer meets God at all on the ground of Nature. God is ignored: Civilised Man is confident that 'he has no need of that hypothesis.' This, in effect, makes Man his own God."²

This regress-in-progress of a Modern Western Man is a repetition of the story of this Western Man's forerunners, the majority of Mankind, who,

¹ Burgmann, Bishop E. H.: *The Church's Encounter with Civilisation* (London 1948, Longmans), p. 8.

² Burgmann, op. cit., pp. 16 and 15.

for good or evil, had left the Blackfellows behind in embarking on the course of material achievement that was to culminate in the rises—and falls—of civilizations. Modern Western archaeological research had rediscovered an early sign of the times in the replacement of a Palaeolithic Man, cultivating a gift for expressing himself in Visual Art without being ambitious to improve upon his rudimentary tools, by an aesthetically insensitive Neolithic Man¹ producing a crop of revolutionary technical inventions which had not only been epoch-making in their day but had not been surpassed in importance by any subsequent material achievements of Neolithic Man's successors up to date.² In view of the affinity between the aesthetic and the religious faculty of the Human Psyche,³ we might expect this impoverishment of Man's aesthetic life, which was the price of the Neolithic technological revolution, to be found associated with a religious regression; and this expectation is borne out—if we accept Father Schmidt's divination of the former religion of Primeval Man from the present religion of the least sophisticated and efficient of the extant human societies—by the contrast between the relatively aetherial spiritual activities, beliefs, and aspirations of these 'backward' peoples, as described by Father Schmidt and Mrs. Chadwick, and the crass paganism of societies that had forged far ahead of them in the race for wealth and power.

In another context⁴ we have noticed Man's proneness to abandon the worship of God for the worship of some work of God which Man has newly discovered or newly mastered. In the work from which we have been quoting, Father Schmidt has laid bare, with a master's hand, the inner relation between divers forms of material achievement and the forms of idolatry that in his day were to be found in association with each of them in living societies which, by mundane standards, had raised themselves high above the level of the 'backward' worshippers of a Supreme Being. In this place it would be superfluous to recapitulate Father Schmidt's survey, but we may notice, in passing, the principal directions that these religious aberrations proved to have taken. In the rank jungle-growth of idolatry we can distinguish two main types. When Man begins to gain control over his non-human environment, he takes to worshipping fellow creatures that he has harnessed for his own immediate service, especially for supplying himself with food. The hunter's worship of his game breeds totemism; the husbandman's worship of his crop breeds the religion of the *ἐνιαυτός δαίμων*.⁵ As Man gains in knowledge, he begins to worship more remote, pervasive, and abstract forces of Nature which appear to him to exercise an ultimate control over the creatures that can be directly harnessed to Man's service; and these path-finding hypotheses—correct or erroneous—of the burgeoning Scientific Mind breed worships of a Weather, a Nile, and a Sun that manifestly decide the fortunes of the pastures and the fields, and a worship of stars whose courses apparently determine the course of terrestrial events. These idolatrous cults of cosmic forces are intellectually sophis-

¹ See III. iii. 160, and pp. 704-5, above.

³ See VII. A (iii) (a), Annex I, pp. 701-11, above.

⁴ On pp. 460-4, above.

² See III. iii. 158-9.

⁵ See III. iii. 256-9.

ticated versions of a primitive idolatrous worship of particular non-human creatures; but, as Man gains in power, he transfers his devotion to a different, and a more sinister, idol when he begins to worship the collective organization of human activities through which he mobilizes his Science and Technology for the subjugation of the Material Universe. The original style of Man's corporate self-worship is parochial: he begins by worshipping a personification of his tribe (Athênê Poliûchus or Fortuna Praenestina) and the genii of his household (the Hebrew Tera-phim and the Latin Lares et Penates). The ultimate style is oecumenical: he ends by worshipping a mundane human saviour with the sword¹ who is the god incarnate of a universal state.

These two types of idolatry that are spiritual by-products of Man's mundane success both have the same inauspicious effect of putting Man out of communion with the One True God by diverting Man's devotion from the Creator to the creature and screening the Beatific Vision behind an idolized creation;² and the short history of Man's mundane progress up to date had already shown, a number of times over, that the demoralizing spiritual effect of this idolatry was Man's Achilles' Heel. If Man's progress in technology, science, and social organization accounted for the geneses and growths of civilizations, his concomitant spiritual infirmity accounted for their breakdowns and disintegrations; and, if this had been the end of the story, human life on Earth would indeed have been 'nasty, brutish and short'.³ Happily for Man, God's providence had offered him grace to find a cure for his spiritual sickness in the very direness of its consequences and to re-enter, as a spiritual adult, schooled by the creative experience of suffering, into a communion with his Maker which he had once enjoyed as a spiritual child in the primeval chapter of the history of the Human Race. In the higher religions that had sprung from the civilizations' catastrophes, Man had been re-endowed with the spiritual treasure that he had possessed (if Father Schmidt's thesis was the truth) in the days of his primeval inefficiency and had then jettisoned in his self-centred scramble up the treacherous ladder of material progress.

If this interpretation of the historical background of the higher religions commended itself, it suggested two reflections: the Devil had lost one throw in his perennial wager with God,⁴ but the Devil had not so lost heart as to have given up the game.

The Devil's defeat in a round which had opened with the fall of Pri-

¹ See V. vi. 178-213.

² Mr. Martin Wight notes: 'These types of idolatry have a correspondence with the three covenants of the Judaic-Christian tradition. (i) Nature-worship corresponds with the covenant with Noah, which survived in its pure and pristine form to greet Abraham in the person of Melchisedek the priest-king offering bread and wine (Gen. xiv. 18), but whose corruption and perversion was seen in the Canaanitish idolatry which the Prophets of Israel combatted and in the paganism which St. Paul denounced in Rom. i. 21-25. (ii) Parochial corporate self-worship corresponds with the betrayal and denial of the covenant with Abraham, which had conferred a particular destiny and responsibility on the archetype of all chosen peoples. (iii) Oecumenical corporate self-worship corresponds with the betrayal and denial of the final covenant with the Human Race, revealed by Christ and sealed by His body and blood. This third type of idolatry corresponds, then, theologically to the New Testament doctrine of Antichrist.'

³ Hobbes, Thomas: *Leviathan*, Part I, chap. 13.

⁴ See II. i. 271-99.

meval Man and had ended in the epiphany of the higher religions was attested by the difference in spiritual stature between the Innocent and the Saint. The saintly soul that was the spiritual flower of the higher religions was not, perhaps, in closer communion with God than the innocent soul that, on Father Schmidt's hypothesis, had been the spiritual flower of the primeval dispensation; but, if Christianity was right in holding that a spiritually creative suffering was a human experience in which God Himself had participated in virtue of His incarnation,¹ then the Saint's communion with God, though no closer than the Innocent's, was nevertheless a communion on less unequal terms; and, if in this sense sainthood was the higher form of spiritual attainment, the Devil's defeat in this round was registered in the reflection that the mortified idolator could never have been transfigured into a saint who was a more enlightened and effective servant of God than the Innocent if that primeval worshipper of the One True God had not lost his innocence through lapsing into idolatry.

'All spiritual knowledge "goes in circles", that is to say that it has to do with re-birth, which is itself a return to the beginning on a different psychic level.'²

The measure of the Devil's defeat in this particular encounter with God was given by the fact that the higher religions had not only brought it within Man's reach to re-enter into communion with God on a higher spiritual level than any that had been accessible to Man in his days of innocence; the higher religions had even spoiled the Egyptians by gleaning a harvest from the jungle-growth of Man's idolatrous days of ignorance.³ Yet we have also to recognize and take to heart the no less manifest fact that the severity of these reverses had not driven the Devil to withdraw from the field. At the time of writing, the living higher religions were being challenged by insurrections of civilizations of a third generation which had armed themselves for revolt by evoking potent ideas and institutions from the graves of their dead pagan predecessors.⁴ A fresh advance, of unprecedented swiftness and perhaps unprecedented vigour, in Man's mastery of the Material Universe had launched idolatry on the war-path again; and, in this formidable recrudescence of a once transcended error, Man's corporate self-worship, which was the more pernicious of the two main lines of religious aberration, now had the whole field to itself.

The other type of idolatry, in which Nature had been substituted for

¹ A Christian theologian might object to this attempt at a statement of the Christian belief on this point on the ground that God does not have experiences because God is Being; whereas experience signifies a process of becoming. Yet the same theologian must hold that the Christ 'who suffered' was 'perfect God and perfect man . . . who, although He be God and man, yet He is not two, but one Christ'; and, on these premisses, it is hard for a layman to see how a theologian could assert, without taking, in the act, either a Nestorian or a Eutychian departure from the line of Catholic Christian orthodoxy, that God had not participated in the human experience of suffering when, in the exercise of His almighty power, He had chosen to become incarnate.

² Layard, J.: *The Lady of the Hare: A Study of the Healing Power of Dreams* (London 1944, Faber), p. 185.

³ For the pagan *praeparatio evangelica*, see pp. 457-60, above.

⁴ See pp. 539-41, above, and X. ix, *passim*.

God, had borne a fearful crop of wickedness and benightedness in its time; but its reign had been transitory; for Man's progress in the mastery of his environment, which had first brought this type of idolatry into existence, had subsequently swept it out of existence again. A natural phenomenon that Man has deified on an impulse of wonder and gratitude, when he has first succeeded in coaxing it into performing some highly valued service, cannot retain its divinity in his clearer-seeing eyes after it has been thoroughly broken in and domesticated by successive advances in Technology; and the vaster and more elusive forces of Nature that even a latter-day Western Man could hardly aspire to manipulate by his technological 'know-how' had likewise forfeited their illusory divinity as they had become intelligible to Man's scientific understanding. In the darkness before the dawn of the higher religions, Paganism had culminated in the worship, not of the corn-god or the sun-god, but of the man-god Caesar—the incarnate symbol of Man's terrible collective power—and the transformation of Nature from an object of worship into an object of exploitation and investigation had left Man facing the single question: 'Which is God? God or Man?'

The message of the higher religions had been that Man, like Nature, is not God but is God's creature; and this message had won Man's ear at the moment when the collapse of a man-made mundane civilization had been demonstrating to Man the limitations of his power through the first-hand evidence of a painful and humbling experience. But this lesson was readily forgotten when the mundane welfare that was a by-product of spiritual regeneration tempted the Heirs of the Promise to reinvest their treasure in This World. In the second Fall of Man there had been no recurrence of Nature-worship, but, for this very reason, a recurrent Man-worship, unchecked and unbalanced, this time, by the claims of any competing idols, was now raging in men's souls with an unprecedented virulence.¹ The Neo-Pagan man-worshipper believed Man to be, not Nature's co-divinity, but Nature's lord the One True God, and, being in this degree more impious than his pristine pagan forerunner, he was in the same degree more lonely—in a loneliness which aggravated itself by driving him into an ever more frantic pursuit of the idolatry that was the cause of it.

'Wandering, as they are, in the wilderness of distracted minds, . . . people everywhere feel insecure. They are no longer rooted anywhere. There is intense and widespread loneliness, . . . [and] they seek comradeship anywhere at any price. The day of the tribe returns. . . . Man is seeking for some strong tribal body, with its tribal leader, to relieve him of the responsibility of making personal decisions . . . and the modern tribe is larger than in the days of old. Now it can be a nation, or the people of a continent, or of continents. In the Western World it represents the retreat of a people who have lost the guidance and support of a higher faith. This emotional regression is a very serious matter in a highly rationalised and artificial environment.'²

¹ The resurgence of Caesar-worship in the Orthodox Christian and Western worlds has been touched upon on pp. 439-40 and 537-9, above.

² Burgmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

In this Neo-Pagan worship of a collective Humanity, the higher religions were being confronted with a repetition of the challenge to which they had responded victoriously in the first chapter of their history; and the struggle upon which they were entering in a twentieth-century Westernizing World, threatened to be a sharper ordeal than any to which they had ever before been subjected.

TABLE II. *Philosophies*


<i>Civilization</i>	<i>Philosophy</i>
Egyptiac	Atonism (abortive)
Andean	Viracochaism (abortive)
Sinic	Confucianism
	Moism
	Taoism
Syriac	Zervanism (abortive)
Indic	Hinayanian Buddhism
	Jainism
Western	Cartesianism
	Hegelianism ¹
Hellenic	Platonism
	Stoicism
	Epicureanism
	Pyrrhonism
Babylonic	Astrology

¹ Hegelianism confined to the field of social affairs = Marxism; Marxism transplanted from the Western World to Russia = Leninism.

TABLE III. *Higher Religions*

<i>Civilization</i>	<i>Higher Religion</i>	<i>Source of Inspiration</i>
Sumeric	Tammuz-worship	indigenous
Egyptiac	Osiris-worship	alien (?) (Sumeric [?])
Sinic	The Mahāyāna	alien (Indo-Helleno-Syriac)
	Neotaoism	indigenous but imitative (of the Mahāyāna)
Indic	Hinduism	indigenous
Syriac	Islam	indigenous
Hellenic	Christianity	alien (Syriac)
	Mithraism	alien (Syriac)
	Manichaeism	alien (Syriac)
	The Mahāyāna	alien (Indic)
	Isis-worship	alien (Egyptiac)
	Cybele-worship	alien (Hittite)
	Neoplatonism	indigenous (<i>ci-devant</i> philosophy)
Babylonic	Judaism	alien (Syriac)
	Zoroastrianism	alien (Syriac)
Western	Bahaism	alien (Iranic)
	The Ahmadiyah	alien (Iranic)
Orthodox Christian (main body)	Imāmī Shi'ism	alien (Iranic)
	Bedreddinism	semi-alien (Iranic tincture)
Orthodox Christian (in Russia)	Sectarianism	indigenous
	Revivalist Protestantism	alien (Western)
Far Eastern (main body)	Catholicism	alien (Western)
	T'ai'p'ing	semi-alien (Western tincture)
Far Eastern (in Japan)	Jōdo	semi-alien (from Far Eastern, main body)
	Jōdo Shinshū	indigenous (from Jōdo)
	Nichirenism	indigenous
	Zen	semi-alien (from Far Eastern, main body)
Hindu	Kabirism and Sikhism	semi-alien (Islamic tincture)
	Brahmō Samāj	semi-alien (Western tincture)

TABLE VIII. *A Diagram to illustrate the Relation between Higher Religions and Psychological Types*



The Objectives of Divers Historic Weltanschauungen

Heaven is the objective of a Zoroastrian-Jewish-Muslim-Christian *Weltanschauung*.

Nirvāna is the objective of an Indic and an Hellenic *Weltanschauung*.

The City of Swine is the objective of a Materialist *Weltanschauung*.

Hell is the objective of a Satanist *Weltanschauung*.

(in serial order)

2. PRIMARY CIVILIZATIONS

Egyptiac Andean Mayan Sumeric Indus Culture Minoan Shang Culture

(created, adapted, or adopted by internal proletariats of primary civilizations)

The Worship of Tammuz and Ishtar
(? created by the internal proletariat of the
Sumeric Civilization)

(derived from the primary civilizations)

(b) through their external proletariats

Babylonian
(from Sumerian)

Mexic
(from Mayan)

Abortive First Syriac F
(from Sumeric)

Indic
(from Indus
Culture)

Syriac Hellenic
(from Minoan)

Sinic
(from Shang
Culture)

(created, adapted, or adopted by internal proletariats of secondary civilizations)

Hinduism
(created by the
internal proletariat
of the Indic
Civilization)

Islam
(created by the
internal proletariat
of the Syriac
Civilization)

*Isis-
Worship* *Cybele-
Worship* *Mithraism* *Christianity* *Manichaeism*
 (created by the internal proletariat of the Hellenic Civilization)

Neoplatonism
(adapted by the
Hellenic internal
proletariat from
one of the philo-
sophies of the
Hellenic dominant
minority)

The Mahāyāna
(adapted by the
Hellenic internal
proletariat from
one of the philo-
sophies of the
Indic dominant
minority, and
adopted by the
Sinic internal
proletariat)


Neotaoism
(adapted by the
Sinic internal
proletariat from
one of the philo-
sophies of the
Sinic dominant
minority)

(derived from secondary civilizations through chrysalis churches constructed by their internal proletariats)

Hindu
(derived from
Indic through
Hinduism)

Iranic Arabic
 {
 (derived from
 Syriac through
Islam)

Abortive Far
Eastern
Christian
(derived from
Hellenic and
Syriac through
Christianity)

Western Christian	Orthodox Christian	Orthodox Christian in Russia
		
(derived from Hellenic through <i>Christianity</i>)		

Abortive Far
Western
Christian
(derived from
Hellenic through
its external pro-
letariat and through
Christianity)

Abortive
Scandinavian
(derived from
Hellenic through
its external pro-
letariat)

Far Eastern in
Far Eastern Korea and Japan
(derived from Sinic through the
Mahāyāna)

*Kabirism Sikhism Brahmō
Samaj*
(created by the internal
proletariat of the Hindu
Civilization)

Baha'ism The Ahmadiyah
(created by the Iranic wing
of the internal proletariat
of the Western Civilization)

Bedreddinism
(created by the
internal proletariat
of the main body
of the Orthodox
Christian Civiliza-
tion)

*Russian Orthodox
Christian Sects*
(created by the
internal proletariat
of the Orthodox
Christian Civilization
in Russia)

The T'ai'ping
(created by the
internal proletariat
of the Far Eastern
Civilization in
China)

Jōdo Zen
(adapted by the
internal proletariat
of the Far Eastern
Civilization in
Japan from the
Mahāyāna)

Jōdo Shinshū *Hokke (alias Nichirenism)*
(created by the
internal proletariat
of the Far Eastern
Civilization in
Japan)




TABLE V. *A Tentative Concordance of the Herodotean Gazetteer and the Official Lists of Countries and Peoples of the Achaemenian Empire*

ACHAEMENIAN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS								HERODOTUS				
Name of Country and/or People	Probable Status of Country or People	I. DB	II. DPe	III. DZd	IV. DSe	V. DNa	VI. XPh	Names of Countries and/or Peoples	Alleged Status of Countries or Peoples	HERODOTUS		
										III. 89-97 Herodotean Taxation District	V. 49-54 Itinerary of North-West Road	VII. 61-99 Field-state of Xerxes' Army
<i>The Heartland</i>								<i>The Heartland</i>				
Pārsa; the Pārsā	imperial people	1	1	1	1	1	1	Persai [originally including	imperial people taxpayers	present
								Outioi (<i>Persicē</i> Yautiyā) and Mykoi (<i>Persicē</i> Mačiyā)]		14	..	present
Māda; the Mādā	taxpayers	10	3	2	2	2	2	Agbatana and the rest of Media [and the Parikanioi and Orthokorybantioi]	"	10	..	present
								Kaspioi, Pausikai, Pantimathoi, Dareitai	"	11
								Sakai, Kaspioi	"	15
Hūja (written Ūvja); the Hūjiyā (written Ūvjiyā)	"	2	2	3	3	3	3	Matiēnoi, Šaspeires, Alarodioi	"	18	M. only traversed	S., A. only present
								Sousa and the rest of the country of the Kissioi	"	8		
<i>The South-East</i>								<i>The South-East</i>				
Harahvatiš (written Harauvatiš); the Harahvatiyā (written Harauvatiyā)	"	22	22	8	10	10	4	Thamanaioi (<i>alias</i> Paktyes) and	"	14	..	Paktyes + Kaspioi
Zrāka	"	14	16	9	9	9	6	Sarangai and	"	14	..	present
Asagarta; the Asagartiyā	"	..	14	Sagartioi and Outioi and	"	14	..	present
Maka; the Mačiyā	"	23	26	23	12	29	20	Mykoi	"	14	..	present
		The inhabitants of the islands in the Persian Gulf, colonized by the so-called <i>déracinés</i>	"	14	..	present
		Parikanioi and Asiatic Aithiopes	"	17	..	present
<i>The North-East</i>								<i>The North-East</i>				
Parthava; the Parthavā	"	13	15	5	4	4	7	Parthoi and	"	16	..	present
The Dahā	"	25		"
Hvārazmiš (written Ūvārazmiš); the Hvārazmiyā (written Ūvārazmiyā)	"	16	20	11	8	8	11	Khorasmioi [and Sogdoi] and	"	16	..	present
Haraiva	"	15	17	4	5	5	8	Areioi	"	16	..	present
Bākhtriš	"	17	18	6	6	6	9	Baktrianoi as far as the Aiglai [i.e. implicitly including the Sogdoi]	"	12	..	Baktrioi
Suguda, <i>alias</i> Sugda	"	18	19	7	7	7	10	[Sogdoi wrongly transferred from 12 to 16]	"	16	..	present
The Sakā ¹ (Haumavargā)	allies	24	25	12B.	15	14	26	Sakai Amyrgioi (VII. 64), <i>alias</i> Parikanioi	"	10	..	Sakai Amyrgioi
The Sakā (Tigrakhaudā)	taxpayers			12A.	16	15	27	Sakai wearing stiff pointed Kyrbasiai (VII. 64), <i>alias</i> Orthokorybantioi	"	10	..	confused with Sakai Amyrgioi
<i>The Indus Basin</i>								<i>The Indus Basin</i>				
Gādāra; ² the Gādāriyā ³	"	19	24	..	13	12	22	Gandarioi	"	7	..	present
								Dadikai	"	7	..	present
Thataguš; the Thatagu[? d or v]iyā	"	21	21	10	11	11	14	Aparytai	"	7
Hīdus; the Hīduyā	"	..	23	24	14	13	23	Sattagy dai	"	7
<i>The South-West</i>								<i>The South-West</i>				
Bābiruš; the Bābiruviyā	"	3	4	13	17	16	12	Babylon and the rest of Assyria	"	9	..	present
Athurā; the Athuriyā	"	4	6	18	18	17	13	The whole of Phoinikē and the so-called Philistine Syria and Cyprus	"	5	..	present
Arabāya; the Arabāyā	allies	5	5	21	19	18	21	Arabioi	allies	present
Mudrāya; the Mudrāyā	taxpayers	6	7	19	20	19	16	Egypt and	taxpayers	6	..	present
The Putāyā	"	20	28	27	30	Libyes, Kyrēnē, Barkē	"	6	..	L. only present
Kūša; the Kūšiyā	allies	22	29	28	32	Aithiopes marching with Egypt	allies	present
<i>The North-West</i>								<i>The North-West</i>				
Armina, ⁴ <i>alias</i> Arminiya; the Arminiya	taxpayers	11	8	14	21	20	5	[Paktyikē and] Armenioi and [the adjoining peoples as far as the Black Sea]	taxpayers	13	A. only	A. only
		Moskhoi, Tibarēnoi, Makrōnes, Mossynioi, Māres (<i>alias</i> the adjoining peoples [i.e. adjoining Armenia] as far as the Black Sea)	"	19 [+13]	..	present
Ākaufaka; the Ākaufačiyā	allies	29	Kolkhoi, and the adjoining peoples as far as Mount Kaukasis	allies	K. only
		Kilikies	taxpayers	4	traversed	present
Katpatuka	taxpayers	12	9	16	22	21	24	Syrioi (<i>alias</i> Kappadokai, <i>alias</i> Paktyikē), Paphlagonēs, Mariandynoi, Asiatic Thrākes, Phryges, Hellespontine Hellenes	"	3 [+13]	K., Ph. only	present + Ligyes and Matiēnoi
Sparda; the Spardiyā	"	8	10	17	23	22	15	Mysoi, Lydoi, Lasonioi, Kabalioi (<i>alias</i> Kabēlees), Hygennees	"	2	Lydoi only	present
The Yaunā on the mainland ⁵ (place-name Yauna)	"	9	11	15	24	23	17	Iōnes, Asiatic Magnētes, Aiolees, Kāres, Lykioi, Milyai, Pamphyloi	"	1	Ephesus	I., Ai., K., L., M., P. + Asiatic Dōrieēs
The Karkā	"	30	30	31		"
Those in the Sea (<i>alias</i> 'the hatted Yaunā') ⁶	"	7	12	..	25	26	18	Isles	"	Islanders
Those beyond the Sea (<i>alias</i> 'the Sakā beyond the Sea') ⁷	"	..	13	..	26	24	19		"
Skudra	"	27	25	28	The inhabitants of Europe as far as Thessaly	"


¹ *Babylonicē* Gi-mi-ri.² *Babylonicē* Pa-ar-ū-pa-ra-e-sa-an-na.³ Gādārayā, the spelling actually found, is perhaps incorrect.⁴ *Babylonicē* Ū-ra-aš-tu.⁵ 'On the mainland' is added only in 'DPe'.⁶ 'Yaunā takabarā' in 'DNa' in the Old Persian version. 'Ia-ma-nu wearing shields on their heads' in the Babylonian version.⁷ In 'DNa'.

TABLE VI. *A Tentative Reconstruction of Darius's Original Dissection of the Achaemenian Empire into Twenty Taxation Districts*
(following the geographical order adopted in the Concordance, Table V, above)

Location of District	Number in New Order	Number of Herodotus's Gazetteer	Names of Peoples and/or Countries in Herodotus's Presentation	Names of Countries or Peoples in the Official Lists
Southern Media: latter-day Hamadān, Kirmānshāh, Ispahān	1	10	'Agbatana and the rest of Media'	Māda
Central Media: Tabriz, Khamsah, Ardalān (?), Qazwin, Caspian Gates	2	11	Kaspioi, Parthakai, Pantimathoi, Dareitai	
North-Eastern Media: lower basin of rivers Aras and Kur	3	15	Sakai, Kaspioi	
North-Western Media: portion of 'Irāq to the north-east of the Jabal Hamrīn; basins of lakes Urmīyah and Van; upper valleys of rivers Aras, Choroq, Frāt (<i>alias</i> Qāra) Su, Murād Su; middle valley of Kur (?)	4	18	Matiēnoi, Saspeires, Alarodioi	
Khūzistān, Bakhtiyāri-land, Lūristān	5	8	'Sousa and the rest of the country of the Kissioi'	Hūja
Southern Afghanistan, the Darajāt, Kirmān, Lāristān	6	14+13	Thamanaioi (14), <i>alias</i> 'the Pactyan country' (13), Sagartioi, Outioi, Mykoi, <i>déracinés</i> planted in islands in Persian Gulf	Harahvatiš, Asagarta, Maka
Persian and Pākistānī Baluchistān	7	17	Parikanioi and Asiatic Aithiopes	Parthava, Haraiva, Zrāka, Var-kāna, Dahā, Hvārazmīš
Khurāsān, Herāt, Seistan, Gūrgān (Astarābād), Western Transcaspia, Khwārizm (Khiva)	8	16+14	Parthoi, Areioi, Sarangai (14), Khorasmioi	
Upper basin of River Oxus (Amu Darya) and basin of River Zarafshān, as far to the north-east as the southward elbow of River Jaxartes (Syr Darya), together with Merv oasis	9	12+16	'the Baktrianoi as far as the Aiglai' [implicitly including the Sogdoi (16)]	Bākhtriš, Suguda, Marguš
Oxus Delta and steppes to the north-east of Lower Oxus and astride Middle Oxus	10	10	Orthokorybantioi	Sakā Tigrakhaudā
Kābul River basin and Northern Panjab	11	7	Gandarioi, Dadikai, Aparytai, Sattagy dai	Gādāra, Thataguš
Southern Panjab, Multān, Bahawalpur, Sind	12	20	Indoi	Hiduš
'Iraq as far to the north-east as the Jabal Hamrīn	13	9	'Babylon and the rest of Assyria'	Bābiruš
Mesopotamia (the Jazīrah), Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Cyprus	14	5	'The Whole of Phoinikē and the so-called Philistine Syria and Cyprus'	Athurā
Egypt and Cyrenaica	15	6	Egypt, Libyes, Kyrēnē, Barkē	Mudrāya, Putāyā
Upper Tigris basin and north-west corner of Euphrates basin	16	13	Armenioi	Arminiya
Eastern section of Black Sea seaboard of Anatolia	17	19+13	Moskhoi, Tibarēnoi, Makrōnes, Mossynoikoi, Māres, <i>alias</i> 'the adjoining peoples as far as the Black Sea' (13)	
Northern and Central Anatolia, extending as far to the north-west as the Anatolian shores of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmara, and Dardanelles, as far to the south-west as the headwaters of the River Maeander, and as far to the south-east as Lycaonia	18	3+13	{ Syrioi, <i>alias</i> 'the Pactyan country' (13) [i.e. Kappadokiē], Paphlagonēs, Mariandynoi, Asiatic Thrākes, Phryges, Hellespontine Hellenes	Katpatuka
South-Western Anatolia, excluding the seaboard	19	2	Mysoi, Lydoi, Lasonioi, Kabalioi, <i>alias</i> Kabēlees, Hygenees	Sparda
The western and south-western seaboard of Anatolia	20	1	Iōnes, Asiatic Magnētes, Aiolees, Kāres, Asiatic Dōriees, Lykioi, Milyai, Pamphyloi	'The Yaunā on the Mainland', Karkā
Districts Subsequently Added				
The Aegean Archipelago (intended to expand over maritime transmarine Hellas, as far to the west as Magna Graecia and Sicily)	21	..	Isles	'Those in the Sea', <i>alias</i> 'the hatted Yaunā'
Thrace, the Maritsa basin and the Lower Danube basin	22	..	'The inhabitants of Europe as far as Thessaly'	{ 'Those beyond the Sea', <i>alias</i> 'the Sakā beyond the Sea'
Macedonia (intended to expand over Continental European Greece)	23			
Countries Externally Associated with the Achaemenian Empire				
Farghānah	..	10	Sakai Amyrgioi	Sakā Haumavargā
North-western Arabia, touching the south-east corner of the Mediterranean Sea and bestriding the Euphrates between Syria and 'Irāq	Arabioi	Arabāya
Nubia and the Eastern Sūdān	Aithiopes marching with Egypt	Kūša
Western Transcaucasia	'The Kolkhoi, and the adjoining peoples as far as Mount Kaukasis'	The Ākaufačiyā
South-eastern Anatolia, from the country astride the River Qyzyl Irmāq, just above its southward elbow, as far to the east as the right bank of the Euphrates and as far to the south as Cape Basit on the coast of Syria to the south of the mouth of the Orontes	..	4	Kilikies	—

TABLE VII. *Correspondences between Higher Religions and Psychological Types*

<i>Religion</i>	<i>Predominant Attitude</i>	<i>Predominant Faculty</i>	<i>Auxiliary Faculties</i>	<i>Religious Expression of Unrepressed Psychic Elements</i>	<i>Repressed Attitude</i>	<i>Repressed Faculty</i>	<i>Religious Expression of Repressed Psychic Elements</i>
Hinduism	Introversion	Thinking	{ Sensation Intuition	{ Hindu Ritual Hindu Mysticism	Extraversion	Feeling	{ Extraversion has found a limited expression in the worship of personal epiphanies of an impersonal Ultimate Reality (the avatars of Vishnu); feeling has found expression in the worshipper's devotion to the god of his choice (<i>bhakti</i>).
Christianity	Extraversion	Feeling	{ Sensation Intuition	{ The Eucharist Christian Mysticism	Introversion	Thinking	{ Introversion has found an incomplete expression in the Protestant's psychological experience of 'being saved'; thinking has found a limited expression in Christian theology.
Islam	Extraversion	Sensation	{ Thinking Feeling	{ The Sunnah The Shī'ah	Introversion	Intuition	{ Introversion has found a limited expression, but intuition has found a full expression, in Islamic Mysticism.
Buddhism	Introversion	Intuition	{ Thinking Feeling	{ The Hīnayāna The Mahāyāna	Extraversion	Sensation	{ Extraversion has found expression in the Mahayanian metamorphosis of bodhisattvas into personal gods; sensation, in the fetish worship of relics.



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A STUDY OF HISTORY

BY

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*Director of Studies in the Royal Institute
of International Affairs
Research Professor of International History
in the University of London
(both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)*

But at my back I always hear
Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near.

ANDREW MARVELL

ποιεῖν τι δεῖ ἅς γόνυ χλωρόν.

THEOCRITUS: *Κυνίσκος* *Ἔρως*, l. 70

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

SOLOON

My times are in Thy hand.

Ps. xxxi. 15, in the A.V.

But Thou art the same, and Thy
years shall have no end.

Ps. cii. 27, in the A.V.

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VIII

HEROIC AGES

A. THE GENESIS OF A *LIMES*

IN the two preceding Parts of this Study we have been concerned with universal states established by would-be saviours arising in the Dominant Minority¹ and with universal churches created by the Internal Proletariat.² Our subject in the present Part is the character of the so-called 'heroic ages' that are episodes in the brief lives of barbarian war-bands.

In another context³ we have already acquainted ourselves with the conditions under which such 'heroic ages' are generated. We have seen how, when a growing civilization breaks down through the deterioration of an attractively creative into an odiously dominant minority, one of the effects of this sinister change in the broken-down society's leadership is the estrangement of its former proselytes in the once primitive societies round about, which the civilization in its growth stage was influencing in divers degrees by the effect of its cultural radiation. The ex-proselytes' attitude changes from an admiration expressing itself in mimesis to a hostility breaking out into warfare; and we have seen⁴ that this warfare between a disintegrating civilization and its alienated external proletariat may have one or other of two alternative outcomes.

On a front on which the local *terrain* offers the aggressive civilization the possibility of advancing, at the militant barbarians' expense, up to a 'natural frontier' in the shape of some unnavigated sea or untraversed desert or unsurmounted mountain range, the barbarians, thus caught in a confined space and compelled to fight with their backs to the wall, may be decisively subjugated or annihilated. But, on fronts where the accidents of the *terrain* do not thus conspire with the prowess and policy of the civilization to bring a definitive victory within its grasp, geography is apt to militate in the barbarians' favour; for, where the retreating barbarian has open to him, in his rear, an unlimited field of manœuvre, the shifting battle front is bound, sooner or later, to arrive at a line at which the aggressive civilization's military superiority—however great this may have been initially, and however much it may have been increased through the dearly purchased experience of fratricidal warfare⁵—will be neutralized at last by the increasing handicap of the ever lengthening distance of the front from the aggressor's base of operations.

Along this line, when it is reached, a war of movement will change into a static war without having resulted in any military decision; and, since both belligerents will still be in the field, the Dominant Minority and the External Proletariat will find themselves at this stage in stationary positions in which they will be living side by side, as the former creative

¹ Part VI.

² In V. v. 203-8.

³ Part VII.

⁴ In V. v. 194-210.

⁵ See III. iii. 150-1.

minority and its prospective proselytes were living before the breakdown of the civilization set them at variance with one another. This semblance of a return to a happier previous situation is, however, superficial; for, though the military front has now become stationary, the psychological relation between the parties on either side of it has not reverted from a barren mutual hostility to the previous creative interplay of attraction and mimesis, and there has been no restoration, either, of the geographical conditions under which this cultural intercourse once took place. In its growth stage the civilization gradually shaded off into a surrounding barbarism across a broad threshold which offered the outsider an easy access to an inviting vista within. The change from friendship to hostility transformed this conductive cultural threshold (*limen*) into an insulating military front; and the stabilization of this front, so far from mitigating its sharpness, turns out to have severely accentuated it. The fluid front of a running warfare is neither so definite nor so impassable a barrier as is the military frontier (*limes*) into which the fluid front crystallizes when the stage of stationary warfare is reached.¹ The contrast in configuration and character between an original *limen*-zone and an eventual *limes*-line is the geographical expression of the conditions that generate an heroic age.

An heroic age is, in fact, the social and psychological consequence of the crystallization of a *limes*, and our purpose in this Part is to trace this sequence of events by our customary empirical method of investigation. A necessary background to this undertaking is, of course, a survey of the barbarian war-bands that had breasted divers sectors of the *limites* of divers universal states during the history of Man in Process of Civilization up to date. A survey of this kind has already been attempted in a previous Part.² In that place a considerable muster of barbarian war-bands has been reviewed, and, in passing, we have also there taken note of their distinctive achievements in the two fields of sectarian religion and epic poetry. In our present inquiry this foregoing survey can be drawn upon for purposes of illustration without having to be recapitulated.

¹ See V. v. 208. Ibn Khaldūn defines the frontier of an empire as the line at which the imperial government's authority peters out. 'A dynasty is much more powerful at its seat of government than it is at the extremities of its empire.' He compares the loss of energy in the radiation of its power to the gradual dying away of rays of light streaming out from some central point, or of the circular ripples which spread over the surface of a piece of water when one strikes it (*Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. 1, p. 332).

² In V. v. 210-337.

B. A SOCIAL BARRAGE

IF the cultural *limen* of a growing civilization is aptly described as the hospitable threshold of an ever open door, the military *limes* of a disintegrating civilization can no less aptly be likened to a forbidding barrage astride a no longer open valley. A threshold is an unassuming piece of work, in which the human architect has been content to take advantage of a suitable surface and gradient that have been provided for him by Nature; a barrage is the imposing monument of a human skill and power that have set Nature at defiance; yet the magnificent barrage is as precarious as the humble threshold is secure; for the defiance of Nature is a *tour de force* on which Man cannot venture with impunity.

"The Arab-Muslim tradition relates that once upon a time there was to be seen in the Yaman a colossal work of hydraulic engineering known as the dam or dyke of Ma'rib, where the waters descending from the eastern mountains of the Yaman collected in an immense reservoir and thence irrigated a great tract of country, giving life to an intensive system of cultivation and thereby supporting a dense population. After a time, the tradition goes on to relate, this dam broke, and in breaking devastated everything and cast the inhabitants of the country into a state of such dire distress that many tribes were compelled to emigrate."¹

In the Islamic historical tradition this story—true or legendary—of the literal building and breaking of a barrage has served to account for the initial impulse behind an Arab *Völkerwanderung* that eventually swept out of the Arabian Peninsula with an impetus which carried it across the Tien Shan and the Pyrenees. Translated from this literal rendering into a simile, it becomes the story of every *limes* of every universal state.

"With the internal condition of the exterior barbarians the [sovereign of the universal state] has no concern; but the barrier or pale, whether of masonry or of armed men, obviously exerts a pressure of its own. It acts effectively as a dam against which weight accumulates, and so creates a point of pressure for those outside. In the end the barrier breaks, and with the inundation a new situation is created in which new tribal units are broken up, new individuals awake to self-assertion, and a new redistribution of ownership takes place."²

Is this social catastrophe of the bursting of a military dam an inevitable tragedy or an avoidable one? If we are to find the answer to this insistent question, we must analyse the social and psychological effects of the military barrage-builder's imperious interference with the natural course of relations between a civilization and its external proletariat.

The first effect of erecting a barrage is, of course, to create a reservoir

¹ Caetani, L.: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. i (Milan 1911, Hoepli), p. 266.

² Teggart, F. J.: *The Processes of History* (New Haven, Conn. 1918, Yale University Press), pp. 97-98.

up-stream above this artificial obstruction to the normal drainage down the valley bottom; and this effect is inexorable even if we can imagine it to have been unintended and unforeseen. The erection of the barrage thus produces a striking differentiation in the physiography of the drainage basin which was non-existent in the antecedent state of Nature. The intervention of the barrage now transforms the valley immediately above it from dry land into a lake with an area that is determined by the height of the barrage's brim. Up to this level the now pent-up waters of the catchment basin will fill the upper portion of the valley and its lateral ravines, but the resultant reservoir, at its maximum, will have only a limited extent. It can never cover more than a fraction even of its own catchment basin, since it is beyond the builder's power to raise a barrage, sited far down the valley, to the altitude of the head waters of the downflowing streams; and, even if these waters could have been dammed back right up to their head, there would still have remained a vast unsubmerged hinterland. This new and sharp distinction between a now submerged tract immediately above the barrage and a region at the back of beyond which is still left high and dry has already come to our notice in the social application of our hydrographic simile.

In a previous context¹ we have observed the contrast between the revolutionary effect of a *limes* on the life of barbarians within point-blank range of it and the undisturbed torpidity of primitive peoples in a more distant hinterland. The Hyperborean Slavs continued placidly to lead their primitive life in the secluded Pripet Marshes throughout the span of two millennia which first saw the Achæan barbarians convulsed by their proximity to the European land-frontier of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' in the basin of the Aegean Sea, and then saw the Teuton barbarians going through the same experience in their turn, some eighteen hundred years later, as a result of their proximity to the European land-frontier which the Roman Empire drew across the breadth of the Continent between the North Sea and the Black Sea.² The Achæans and the Teutons were convulsed because they each happened to be engulfed in a reservoir created by the erection of a *limes*; the Slavs remained undisturbed because, on both occasions, their physically water-logged habitat happened to be left culturally high and dry.³

¹ In II. ii. 315-22.

² The weakness of this frontier, owing to its inordinate length, has been pointed out in V. v. 591-5.

³ This illuminating conception of the contrast between a social 'reservoir', whose barbarian denizens are decisively affected by the proximity of the *limes* that has dammed back the waters of life, and a more distant hinterland, whose barbarian denizens remain 'unregenerate' because the social influence of the *limes* is ineffective at that longer range, was first expounded by Owen Lattimore in *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 36-42. The particular instance that gave Lattimore his insight into this generic feature in the human geography of *limites* was the classic case of the Great Wall of China, and the particular stage in the cycle of frontier history at which he first observed and recorded the phenomenon is one at which the 'reservoir' is no longer the undesired menace that it is in the estimation of the *limes*-building Imperial Power, but has become the invaluable *arcenum imperii* of a barbarian successor-state of the empire for whose defence the *limes* was originally constructed.

The barbarian war-lord from a 'reservoir' area who has succeeded in breaking through a *limes* and usurping Caesar's throne finds himself beset by two anxieties: the conquered ex-subjects of the overthrown universal state may revolt against their parvenu barbarian masters; and the 'unregenerate' barbarians in the more distant hinterland and on the

Why are the barbarians in the 'reservoir' area so disturbingly affected by the proximity of a military frontier which is at the same time a cultural barrage? And what is the source of a subsequent access of energy which has enabled them invariably to break through the *limes* sooner or later as a matter of historical fact, whether this break-through is inevitable or is avoidable as a matter of theory? We may find answers to these questions if we follow out our simile in terms of its local Sinic geographical setting.

Let us suppose the imaginary dam that symbolizes a *limes* in our simile to have been built astride some high valley in the region actually traversed by the Great Wall within the latter-day Chinese provinces of Shensi and Shansi. What is the ultimate source of that formidable body of water that we see pressing, in ever increasing volume, upon the dam's up-stream face? Though this water must all manifestly have come downstream from above the dam on the last stage of its journey, the ultimate source of the greater part of it cannot lie in this direction; for the distance between the dam and the headwaters is not very great, and beyond the headwaters there stretches away the boundless Mongolian Plateau, with a dry steppe on its rim and a drier desert at its heart. If this parched region above the dam had been the sole source of the reservoir's water-supply, the present head of water could never have accumulated; and we know, as a matter of fact, that the main source of supply is to be found, not above the dam, but below it: not on the Mongolian Plateau but in the Pacific Ocean.

We also know that water cannot perform the salmon's feat of forcing a passage upstream and vaulting over a weir; and this means that not one drop of the copious supply that has nevertheless succeeded in making its way out of the Pacific into the reservoir can have travelled over the ground in liquid form. In order to rise from sea level to the reservoir's altitude this water must have been transformed by the heat of the Sun from liquid into vapour, been spirited by an east wind over plain and mountain in a volatile cloud, and then been condensed by cold air into rain falling into the catchment basin. Through thus first losing its liquidity and then regaining it, the migrant water deftly turns an adverse

farther side of 'the reservoir' may be tempted by the ease and brilliance of the 'reservoir' barbarians' success to emulate their achievement by pouring through the breach at their heels and trying to snatch a share in the spoils of a derelict world. In these circumstances the ruler of a barbarian successor-state in *partibus civilium* is confronted with the dual task of keeping 'unregenerate' barbarian competitors out and keeping restive civilized subjects down. For both purposes he relies on the military man-power of his comrades who have stayed behind in the reservoir instead of following him through the breach; and these intact reserves of an invading war-band are admirably fitted for performing both duties, since they have retained enough of their pristine barbarian military virtue to be more than a match for a civilized subject population, while they have acquired a sufficient tincture of the culture of their civilized neighbours and subjects to be more than a match for their 'unregenerate' barbarian neighbours and rivals.

In *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York 1940, American Geographical Society), pp. 247-51, Lattimore has developed this concept of a 'reservoir' zone abutting on the outer face of a *limes* by showing that there is a corresponding zone in the rear of a *limes* in which a sub-society of frontiersmen differentiates itself, under the influence of the immediate proximity of the barbarians, from the main body of the civilization which the *limes* both protects and confines. The frontiersmen of the marches and the barbarians of the 'reservoir' zone tend to approximate culturally to one another and eventually to fraternize against both the civilized population of the interior and the 'unregenerate' barbarians in the outer darkness beyond the farther limits of the reservoir. (On this point, see also the present Study, V. v. 459-80, and pp. 14-15, below).

law of gravity to its own advantage; but, like human migrants who take advantage of an estranging sea by temporarily transforming themselves from landlubbers into seamen, the water has to pay a price for its ingeniously contrived passage. The cultural elements of their social heritage that the seafarers take with them on board ship prove to have suffered 'a sea change' by the time when they are landed in the emigrants' new overseas place of settlement;¹ and the physical elements with which the flying water is impregnated suffer a comparable 'sky change' as a result of their journey. The tincture of sea salt is left behind in the process of evaporation which starts the flying water on its travels, and a tincture of rock salt is acquired when the streams begotten by the precipitated rain scour out the ravines in their descent into the reservoir.

The water has accomplished its miraculous aerial voyage, but it is now a different brew from what it originally was; and this physical phenomenon is an accurate and illuminating simile of the psychic phenomenon of the filling of the reservoir of barbarian energy, dammed back by a military *limes*, with the water of life that psychologists call *libido*. The psychic energy that accumulates in the reservoir till its remorseless mounting pressure eventually bursts the barrage is derived only in an inconsiderable measure from the transfrontier barbarians' own exiguous primitive social heritage; the bulk of it is drawn from the vast stores of the civilization which the barrage has been built to protect. This is the source of supply that swells the head of water in the reservoir to a mass that eventually proves too much for the barrage's powers of resistance; and it is one of the ironies of History that the water which then pours through the breach should originally have been supplied by the very region which the cataclysm now devastates. Why has this water returned in a sudden destructive flood and not in a perennial fertilizing stream? The answer is to be found partly in the erection of the *limes* barrage, which has been an audacious human act of interference with the ordinary course of Nature, and partly in the transformation which the migrant psychic energy has undergone in the course of its journey from the cultivated world within the *limes* to the barbarian reservoir beyond it—a transformation that has been Nature's device for surmounting an obstacle which Man has placed in her path.

Some such transformation of psychic energy is, no doubt, the price of every transfer of culture from one society to another; but the degree and the character of the transformation vary with the circumstances in which the transfer takes place.² The psychic transformation is at its minimum when the society that is the transmitting agent is a civilization in process of growth and the receiving reagent is a primitive society in a socially static Yin-state; it is at its maximum when both parties are civilizations and both are in disintegration. The case with which we are concerned in this Part manifestly lies somewhere between these two extremes; for a civilization which is transmitting psychic energy to its external proletariat is a civilization that is in process of disintegration *ex hypothesi*, while on the other hand the barbarians in 'the reservoir' beyond the *limes* are ex-primitives whose psychic resistance to the cultural radiation of the

¹ See II. ii. 84-100.

² See pp. 481-629, below.

adjoining civilization is prompted, not by the positive motive of being up in arms in defence of an alternative civilization of their own, but only by the negative motive of hostility to an alien culture which, in its breakdown, has lost the original savour that once made it attractive to the estranged barbarians' proselyte ancestors.

How is a transformation of psychic energy brought about in any of these diverse degrees? The transforming process is the decomposition of a culture and its recomposition in a new pattern in which the constant component elements will have entered into new relations with one another, even if none of the original elements have been eliminated and no fresh elements have been added. In other contexts¹ we have compared the social radiation of culture to the physical radiation of light, and we shall be reverting to this simile and working out some of its implications in the next Part after this,² in which we shall be concerned with encounters in which all parties are societies of the species here called 'civilizations'. In this place we need merely remind ourselves of three radiational 'laws'.

The first law is that an integral culture ray, like an integral light ray, is diffracted into a spectrum of its component elements in the course of penetrating a recalcitrant object—the degree of this diffraction being proportionate to the degree of the resistance that is encountered.

The second law is that the diffraction of a culture may also occur, without any impact on an alien and recalcitrant body social, and indeed at a stage before the emission of the migrant ray by the emitting society, if, before the time of emission, this society has already broken down and begun to disintegrate. The cohesion and the diffraction of the component elements of a culture are, in fact, the respective symptoms of social health and growth and of social sickness and disintegration. A growing civilization can be defined as one in which the components of its culture—an economic element, a political element, and a third which may be called the cultural element *par excellence*—are in harmony with one another; and, on the same principle, a disintegrating civilization can be defined as one in which these same elements have fallen into discord.

Our third law is that the velocity and the penetrative power of an integral culture ray are averages of the diverse velocities and penetrative powers which its economic, political, and cultural components respectively display when, as a result of diffraction, they each travel independently of the others. In isolation the economic ray is the swiftest and most penetrating, the political ray comes next to it in degree, while the cultural ray is surpassed by both its companions on both criteria. The speed and penetrative power of an isolated political ray, as well as those of an isolated economic ray, are higher than those of an integral ray, whereas the speed and penetrative power of an isolated cultural ray are lower than those of an integral ray in which it is borne on the wings of its two sisters. This is one reason why the diffraction of a culture ray is a social disaster; for the social values of the three elements, as we find when we assess them, are exactly inverse to their capacities for covering distance and for making their way into foreign bodies.

¹ In III. iii. 151-2 and V. v. 199-201.

² On pp. 481-629, below.

In the social intercourse between a disintegrating civilization and its alienated external proletariat across a military *limes*, the diffracted radiation of the civilization suffers a woeful impoverishment in the course of its arduous journey; for the respective states of the two parties conspire with the artificial barrier between them virtually to eliminate all relations except those of war and trade, and, of these two, it is war that plays the predominant role.¹

It is true that the passage of a barbarian personnel through the *limes* into the civilization's domain, first as prisoners of war, then as hostages, next as mercenaries, and finally as conquerors,² is reflected on the economic plane in a counter-flow of money—through the diverse channels of loot, military pay, and subsidies—out of the world within the *limes* into the barbarian 'reservoir' outside; and this money eventually flows back to its source in payment for goods purchased by its barbarian recipients from marchmen-merchants who venture out beyond the *limes* to peddle the wares of Civilization. There have been situations in which a community of transfrontier barbarians has come in this way to play an appreciable part in the domestic economy of the society on which they have been preying. A classic example is the apparent economic effect of the subsidies paid by the Constantinopolitan Roman Imperial Government to Attila (*dominabatur*, A.D. 434–53), the war-lord of a confederacy of Hun Nomad war-bands cantoned in the Hungarian Alföld. This remittance of money in specie from the Imperial Treasury at Constantinople to Attila's *ordu* beyond the *limes* seems to have operated as a roundabout way of transferring purchasing power from the agrarian interests in the Empire, whose taxes provided the means of payment, to the manufacturing and commercial interests, which earned profits by making and marketing goods for purchase by the Huns with the money that they had exacted.³ This commercial intercourse across a military *limes* is, however, apt to be discouraged and restricted by the imperial authorities because the manifest profitableness of the transfrontier trade to the traders on both sides is a plain and pointed indication that, in the social situation created by the erection of a *limes*, the marchmen just inside the barrage may acquire a common interest with the barbarians just outside it in the exploitation of the marchmen's fellow citizens in the interior of the world which the *limes* is intended to protect; and, since a common interest might assert itself in concerted action between marchmen and barbarians which would be a deadly danger to the fenced-in civilization,

'an imperial boundary . . . has in fact a double function: it serves not only to keep the outsiders from getting in but to prevent the insiders from getting out . . . It was necessary to restrict Chinese enterprise beyond the Great Wall . . . because Chinese who ventured too far beyond the Great Wall became a liability to the state; the business in which they engaged,

¹ See V. v. 202–3 and 208–9.

² See V. v. 459–60, and Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 445–6.

³ An illuminating and entertaining analysis of this three-cornered economic relationship will be found in Thompson, E. A.: *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 184–97.

whether farming or trade, contributed more to the barbarian community than it did to the Chinese community. They passed out of the Chinese orbit . . . [and] Chinese who left the Chinese orbit and accommodated themselves to an un-Chinese economic and social order inevitably began either to adhere to barbarian rulers or to practise barbarian forms of rule themselves—to the disadvantage of China.¹

These considerations move an imperial government to restrict the flow of trade between their own marchmen and the transfrontier barbarians; and such trade as there is tends to confine itself to an exchange of imperial specie in barbarian hands for two classes of imperial products: luxuries for the barbarian war-lords and their lieutenants and weapons both for them and for the rank-and-file of their followers.² The trade across the *limes* is, in fact, sickly as well as precarious, while border warfare flourishes perennially because Mars is master of the situation in which a disintegrating civilization and an alienated external proletariat face one another across a static military frontier.

Under these sinister auspices, such selective mimesis of the Dominant Minority by the External Proletariat as does occur takes place on the barbarians' initiative because the barbarians are politically free.

'The needs and motives of the cisfrontier society and state must make concessions to those of the transfrontier peoples. The very act of drawing a boundary is an acknowledgement that the peoples excluded are not under control and cannot be ruled by command.'³

The barbarians show their initiative by transmuting those culture elements that they do accept from the cisfrontier civilization. The lines which this transmutation follows are determined partly by an hostility to the transmitting civilization which makes the barbarian recipients of its cultural radiation disinclined to adopt what they borrow in a form that would stamp it as being a loan from this distasteful source; but this negative motive of aversion is reinforced by a positive incentive to turn a loan to practical account by adapting it to suit the needs of local barbarian life in 'the reservoir'.

The adaptations thus prompted by xenophobia and by utilitarianism go to different lengths in different fields of activity. The cultural products of a psychic energy flowing into a transfrontier barbarian society out of a civilization within the *limes* are modified in the process in some cases only to an extent that does not wholly disguise their exotic origin, while

¹ Lattimore, O.: *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York 1940, American Geographical Society), pp. 240 and 242. See also Thompson, op. cit., pp. 174-6, and the present Study, V. v. 471-6.

² Classic instances are the Roman weapons of the Imperial Age that have been found by Modern Western archaeologists in graves and hoards in the North European hinterland of the Continental European Roman frontier, and the Greek luxury goods (some of them manufactured especially to suit the taste of this particular barbarian market) that have been found in tombs of the Scythian Age in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe. In the social structure of the Hun Power in the Hungarian Alföld in Attila's day the importation of luxury goods was as important from the political point of view as the importation of arms from the military; for the effectiveness of Attila's authority depended on the loyalty of his lieutenants, and his ability to retain their loyalty was dependent, in its turn, on his being able to put them in possession of luxuries which were symbols of wealth and honour in Nomad eyes (see Thompson, op. cit., especially pp. 170-1 and 176-7).

³ Lattimore, op. cit., p. 243.

in other cases the transmutation goes so far as to be equivalent to an original act of creation through which the barbarians make the borrowed psychic raw materials completely their own spiritual property. Examples both of recognizable adaptations and of virtually new creations have been given already in a previous survey which need not be recapitulated. In this place we need only remind ourselves that the 'reservoir' barbarians are apt to borrow the higher religion of an adjoining civilization in the form of a heresy¹ and the Caesarism of an adjoining universal state in the form of 'an irresponsible type of kingship, resting not upon tribal or national law . . . but upon military prestige,' . . . in which 'the king and his *comitatus* form the nucleus of the organism',² while the barbarians' capacity for original creation is displayed in heroic poetry³ and in a pantheon that is the Olympian counterpart of the human *comitatus* of a barbarian war-lord.⁴

These creative achievements of a barbarian society beyond the pale of a disintegrating civilization are impressive; yet the cunningly re-minted metal still bears a tell-tale mark of its alien origin. The cultural

¹ See V. v. 227-9, for the Arianism of the East Teuton barbarian converts to Christianity beyond the Continental European frontier of the Roman Empire; p. 230 for the distinctive ecclesiastical practices of the Celtic barbarian converts to Christianity in the British Isles; p. 230 for the original presentation of Islam as a special revelation of the truths of Judaism and Christianity for the benefit of the Arab barbarians beyond the Syrian frontier of the Roman Empire; p. 250 for the adoption of Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity by the barbarians beyond the pale of the Syriac World in Central Asia; pp. 251-2 for the hold won by the heretical Shi'i version of Islam over the Berber, Iranian, and Arab barbarian neighbours of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in North-West Africa, in the fastnesses between the Elburz Range and the south coast of the Caspian Sea, and in Hasi; p. 295 for the conversion of the Bosniak barbarians first to Bogomilism and then to Islam in preference either to Eastern Orthodox or to Western Catholic Christianity; p. 295 for the Bektashism of the Albanian barbarian converts to Islam on the fringe of the Ottoman Empire; and pp. 295-6 for the dissident Islamic Puritanism of the Wahhābi, Idrisi, Mahdist, and Sanūsī Arab barbarians adjoining the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire in Arabia, the Eastern Sudan, and the hinterland of Cyrenaica.

² Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 391 and 377; compare eundem: *The Origin of the English Nation* (Cambridge 1907, University Press), pp. 295-300. See also the present Study, V. vi. 4, n. 4, and 228-34.

³ See V. v. 233 and 237-8 for the Homeric Epic of the Achaean barbarians beyond the Continental European frontier of 'the thalassocracy of Minos'; p. 233 for the Saga of the Scandinavian barbarian neighbours of an infant Western Christendom; p. 233 for the Epic of the Teuton barbarians beyond the Continental frontiers of the Roman Empire; pp. 233-4 and 265 (together with V. v. 596-606) for the Epic of the Aryas beyond the north-eastern frontiers of the Sumeric Empire of the Four Quarters and the north-western frontiers of the domain of the Indus Culture; p. 234 for the heroic poetry of the Arab barbarians beyond the Syrian frontier of the Roman Empire and the 'Irāqi frontier of the Sasanian Empire; pp. 253-8 for the Greek Epic of the East Roman Akritai beyond the Anatolian frontier of the 'Abbasid Caliphate; pp. 259-60 for the French Epic of the Frank barbarians beyond the Pyrenean frontier of the Umayyad Caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula; pp. 288-9 for the Epic of the Russian barbarians beyond the north-west frontier of the Golden Horde; pp. 296-9 for the Greek and Serb heroic poetry of barbarians on the European fringes of the Ottoman Empire; p. 310 for the heroic poetry of the Mongol barbarians beyond the Central Asian frontiers of the Ming and Manchu Empires; p. 325 for the heroic poetry of the Bosniak barbarians beyond the south-east frontier of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy.

⁴ See V. v. 230-3 for barbarian pantheons in general; p. 232 for the pantheons of the Achaeans, the Scandinavians, and the Aryas; p. 233 for the pantheon of the continental Teuton barbarians beyond the European frontiers of the Roman Empire; and pp. 328-32 for the religious teaching of the prophets who arose, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era, among North American Indians whose traditional way of life was being destroyed by the impact of invaders from the European side of the Atlantic. These American Indian barbarian religions were noteworthy, as we have observed, in being gospels of non-violence in response to the aggression of the Indians' European assailants.

products of the transfrontier barbarian are scarred by that 'schism in the soul' which the malady of social disintegration brings with it as its counterpart and concomitant.¹ In the psychological revolution which coins Barbarism out of Primitive Human Nature, the traditional harmony of Primitive Life in its static Yin-state is disrupted into a tension between the two poles of a more sophisticated individualism and a likewise more sophisticated sense of unity.

¹ See V. v. 376-568 and vi. 1-168.

C. THE ACCUMULATION OF PRESSURE

'The Wreckful Siege of Battering Days'

THE *limes* that lies open between the domain of a growing civilization and the homelands of its barbarian proselytes is like a gentle tree-clad slope on which the roots preserve the soil from erosion, so that the descending waters seep through gradually without scouring out gullies and pouring down them in torrents. This landscape is weather-proof, and it is consequently an insurance against a cataclysm so long as it is not convulsed through the civilization's breaking down. By contrast, a static military frontier between a disintegrating civilization and its alienated external proletariat is intrinsically impermanent. The barrage is doomed to burst sooner or later. Premonitions of its ultimate fate are to be found in the avalanches of barbarian counter-invasion which are apt to descend on a civilization in the course of its history, before the establishment of its universal state, on fronts where its representatives have first extended its bounds by force at the adjoining barbarians' expense and have then broken off their offensive without having arrived at a 'natural' frontier.¹

The social barrage created by the establishment of a *limes* is subject to the same law of Nature as the physical barrage created by the construction of a dam. When Man's obstruction of such a natural drainage system has brought into existence two artificially separated bodies of water at two different levels, this human interference with Nature provokes on Nature's side an impulse to correct it. The water piled up above the dam seeks to regain a common level with the water below the barrier, and the degree of the consequent pressure is determined by the quotient of the difference in height between the two levels and the mass of the water held at the higher level of the two. In the structure of a physical dam the engineer introduces safety-valves in the form of sluices which can be opened, to whatever the necessary extent may be, whenever the pressure of the head of water in the reservoir threatens to exceed the limits of the dam's capacity to resist it; and this obvious device for safeguarding the dam against catastrophe by providing for a regulated release of the pent-up waters is not overlooked by the political engineers of a military *limes*, as we shall see. In this case, however, the attempted remedy merely precipitates the cataclysm that it is designed to forestall, for the social and psychological materials of which a *limes* is constructed are so frail and friable that, if once this sandstone masonry is breached, the outpouring waters of barbarian energy quickly sweep the whole structure away. In the maintenance of a social barrage the relief of pressure by a regulated release of water is, in fact, impracticable; there can be no discharge from the reservoir without the barrage being destroyed; and, since, from the moment when the barrage is erected, the head of water above it keeps on accumulating inexorably *ex hypothesi* through the transfer of energy from the civilization below the barrage

¹ For examples of such barbarian avalanches, see V. v. 209, n. 3.

and its transformation into barbarian energy in the reservoir above, sooner or later the time is bound to come when breaking-point will have been reached, and at that juncture a catastrophe will inevitably occur.

The day of doom may be postponed by attempts to strengthen the structure of the barrage as an alternative to the impracticable expedient of piercing it with sluices; but this cruder countermeasure can at best put off the evil day without being equal to averting it; for, as we shall also see, each arithmetical increase in the pressure of transferred and transformed energy upon the *limes* increases the cost of proportionately reinforcing the barrage by a geometrical progression. In this race between attack and defence, the attack cannot fail to win in the long run; and thus, on a static *limes*, Time works inexorably on the barbarian's side, as we have observed already by anticipation.¹ This 'law' also signifies, however, that it does take time for barbarians barred out by a *limes* to achieve their inevitable eventual break-through into the long-coveted domain of a disintegrating civilization which looks to them like an earthly paradise so long as 'distance lends enchantment to the view'.² 'A long period of "education", in which a semi-civilized people has been profoundly affected from without by the influence of a civilized people,'³ is the necessary prelude⁴ to the 'heroic age' in which the barbarians have their fling when a sagging and tottering *limes* at last collapses.

The Impracticability of a Policy of Non-Intercourse

Thus the erection of a *limes* sets in motion a play of social forces which is bound to end disastrously for the builders; and, for them, the only way of avoiding ultimate disaster would be to preclude this fatal course of events by insulating completely from one another the two incompatible societies whose respective domains the *limes* artificially demarcates. A policy of non-intercourse is, indeed, the counsel of perfection in the mind of any imperial government that is burdened with the responsibility for keeping a *limes* in being. In practice, however, an arbitrarily drawn military barrier can never perfectly or permanently produce the effect of a 'natural' frontier provided by some untraversed

¹ In V. v. 209.

² Campbell, Thomas: *Pleasures of Hope*, Part I, l. 7.

³ Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, p. 458.

⁴ Apropos of the Serb heroic age at the climax of an Orthodox Christian Time of Troubles, after the collapse of the Bulgarian and East Roman Empires and before the imposition of a *Pax Ottomanica*, Chadwick points out in op. cit., on p. 448, that, 'here again . . . , as in the Teutonic and Cumbrian heroic ages, we have the case of a semi-civilized and "juvenile" nation exposed for a long period to the influence of a civilized but decaying empire'. Chadwick has, in fact, established an historical 'law' to the effect that the precipitation of an heroic age is normally the cumulative effect of the radiation of a decaying civilization into a primitive society over a period of time that is to be measured, not in years, but in generations. Since the publication of Chadwick's *The Heroic Age* in A.D. 1912 it had, however, been demonstrated by Hitler that a diabolically perverse process of mis-education can artificially produce the same psychological effect in a community that has advanced as far along the path of civilization as pre-Nazi Germany, and that, under these artificial conditions, the process of barbarization can be so greatly speeded up as to be 'telescoped' into the span of a single generation. The deliberate uprooting of the boys and youths of Nazi Germany from the habit, expectation, and love of a settled life by the systematic application of Modern Western methods of mass-suggestion had evoked a caricature of an heroic age by a process of 'speeding-up' that was a counterpart, on the psychological plane, of the visual effect produced by speeding up the display of a film.

sea or desert or mountain-range, because the wardens of the *limes* find themselves unable effectively to control either the transfrontier barbarians or the cisfrontier marchmen.

'The very fact that the "barbarians" of the excluded territory are always described as aggressive raiders, attackers and invaders shows that geographical limits that appear "natural" and inevitable to one society are not necessarily regarded as geographical obstacles by other societies, which may in fact treat them as merely political obstacles.'¹

And, conversely,

'While the general policy of the [universal] state seeks to establish the limit at which its interests can remain centripetal, and to prevent excessive expansion from passing over into centrifugal dispersion, this policy is resisted and evaded by the particular interests of traders, would-be colonisers, ambitious political and military careerists, and so forth, who see opportunities for themselves across the border. Thus there grows up a nexus of border interests which resents and works against the central interest.'²

A striking illustration of this tendency among the marchmen of a universal state to make common cause with the barbarians beyond the pale is afforded by the history of the relations between the Roman Empire and the Hun Eurasian Nomads who broke out of the heart of the Eurasian Steppe towards the end of the third quarter of the fourth century of the Christian Era and established themselves on the Hungarian Alföld.³ Though the Huns were unusually ferocious barbarians from the back of beyond, and though their ascendancy along the European *limes* of the Roman Empire was ephemeral, a record of three notable cases of fraternization had survived among the fragmentary remnants of the contemporary accounts of this brief episode. Attila's secretary of state was a Pannonian subject of the Roman Empire named Orestes, whose son Romulus Augustulus was to make his name by the facile achievement of being the last Roman Emperor in the West.⁴ The renegade Greek business man from Viminacium whom the Greek historian and Roman diplomatist Priscus encountered in Attila's *ordu* on the Alföld in A.D. 449 has already come to our notice.⁵ This adventurous Greek was not even a marchman by birth. He had migrated to Viminacium, on the Danubian *limes* of the Empire, from the interior of the Hellenic World before being deported beyond the pale when his adopted city was captured by the Huns in A.D. 441. The third member of the trio is 'Eustace, a merchant of Apamea', who, 'about the year A.D. 484, long after Attila was dead, is found accompanying a band of Hun marauders in the role of their chief adviser on a plundering expedition against Persia'.⁶

The Hun Power in Europe came and went too quickly for this fraterni-

¹ Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, p. 239.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 243-4.

³ The occupation of the Alföld by the Western Huns is dated tentatively on the morrow of the Battle of Adrianople (*commisum* A.D. 378) by Thompson, E. A.: *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), p. 26.

⁴ 'Orestes Pannonius, qui eo tempore quando Attila ad Italiam venit se illi iunxit, et eius notarius factus fuerat' (Anonymus Valesianus, chap. 38, quoted by Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 163).

⁵ In V. v. 473-4.

⁶ Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 175, quoting Zachariah of Mytilene, p. 152.

zation between the aggressive barbarians and the renegade children of the civilization that was their victim to produce any lasting historical effect. It is, however, significant that it should have gone to such lengths in so short a time between parties which, at their first encounter, had been poles apart in their respective ways of life; and, in cases in which the barbarian Power with whom the renegades had thrown in their lot had been built on more durable foundations, this unholy alliance had sometimes begotten noteworthy political offspring. The residuary continental European successor-state of the Roman Empire in the West was born of a partnership between Frankish *laeti* and Gallic bishops and landlords who were the local representatives of the Roman Senatorial Order. The Manchu Empire, which provided the main body of the Far Eastern Society with a second instalment of its universal state, was born of a similar partnership between Manchu transfrontier barbarians and Chinese marchmen settled beyond the Great Wall but within the Willow Palisade.¹

Thus the existence of a *limes* always in practice generates social intercourse—and this in both directions—between the parties whom the barrier is designed to insulate from one another. In this intercourse, as we have seen,² war predominates over trade; and war is a relation which is technologically educative in spite of being psychologically estranging. A universal state cannot hold the transfrontier barbarians in check along the line of the *limes* without fighting them, and it cannot fight them without involuntarily training them in its own superior way of doing this sinister work. The art of war radiates more rapidly and penetratingly than any other branch of technique; in the outflow of exports, weapons are apt to arrive earlier and make their way farther afield than non-lethal tools;³ and the imported weapons of an adjoining civilization are copied by barbarian artificers with an adroitness that is proportionate to the eagerness of the demand in the local barbarian market.

The Eurasian Nomad barbarians 'could not arm themselves at all for purposes of large-scale offensive operations without the assistance of imported weapons. . . . Even the Mongols of the twelfth century—a military nation if ever there was one—had to import their weapons, chiefly from China and Khurasan.'⁴ On the North-West Frontier of the British Indian Empire from about A.D. 1890 onwards 'the influx of rifles and ammunition into tribal territory . . . completely changed the nature of border warfare';⁵ and, while the transfrontier Pathans' and Balūchīs' earliest source of supply of up-to-date Western small-arms was systematic robbery from the British Indian troops on the other side of the line, 'there would . . . have been small cause for apprehension, had it not been for the enormous growth of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf, which, both at Bushire and [at] Muscat, was at first in the hands of British

¹ See VI. vii. 128-9 and 332.

² On pp. 8-9, above.

³ 'We may refer in particular to the Roman helmets and the large number of Roman swords and shield-bosses found in deposits on the east side of the province of Slesvig—a district remote from the Roman frontiers' (Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 444-5).

⁴ Thompson, E. A.: *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 173 and 172.

⁵ Davies, C.C.: *The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), p. 176.

traders'¹—a striking example of the tendency for the private interests of the empire's subjects in doing business with the transfrontier barbarians to militate against the public interest of the imperial government in keeping the barbarians at bay. 'When these methods failed, there still remained the Kohat rifle factory, owned by Pathans, and situated in the strip of independent territory which separates Peshawar from Kohat.'² 'The possession of arms of precision has also produced a change in Pathan tactics, for, with the exception of certain *ghāzi* rushes, there has been a tendency for the recklessness which characterized the earlier struggles to disappear.'³

The Barbarians' Exploitation of their Civilized Neighbours' Weapons

The transfrontier barbarian is not, however, content simply to practise the superior tactics which he has learnt from an adjoining civilization without proceeding to adapt them to the local *terrain*. *Ex hypothesi* he already has the initial advantage of being at home in a theatre of military operations in which his opponent is a stranger, since the *limes* is situated in barbarian territory which the civilization has occupied, up to this line, by force of arms in an aggressive previous chapter of its history. When the barbarian combines his hereditary mastery of the local situation with a creative adaptation of borrowed weapons and tactics, superior to his own, to suit the local conditions of warfare, he becomes formidable indeed. His best opportunities for putting his civilized adversary at this military disadvantage arise where the local *terrain* displays some strongly pronounced physical characteristic which is unfamiliar and adverse to the civilized belligerent and yet at the same time lends itself to the employment, with adroit modifications, of weapons and tactics that have been borrowed from him by his barbarian antagonist.

For example, on the maritime frontiers of the Carolingian Empire and the Kingdom of Wessex the Scandinavian pirates turned to such good account a technique of shipbuilding and seamanship which they had acquired, perhaps, from the Frisian maritime marchmen of a nascent Western Christendom that they captured the command of the sea and, with it, the initiative in the offensive warfare which they proceeded to wage along the coasts and up the rivers of the Western Christian countries that were their victims.⁴ When, in pushing up the rivers of the British Isles and France, the Scandinavian raiders reached the limit beyond which they could not make their way farther by water even in their shallow and slender dragon-ships, they exchanged one borrowed weapon for another and continued their aggressive campaign on horseback instead of on ship-board, since the invaded countries were stocked with horses for them to seize and they had mastered the Frankish art⁵ of cavalry-fighting as well as the Frisian art of navigation. The Cossack barbarians proved equally ubiquitous and elusive in their attacks on the steppe-empire of the Golden Horde when these river-pirates, lurking on islands among cataracts where the Nomad was out of his element, added

¹ Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

² *Ibid.*, p. 176.

³ Frankish by adoption, Sarmatian by origin (see IV. iv. 439-45).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See II. ii. 344-6.

a second string to their bow by also mastering the Tatar art of horsemanship.¹ Conversely the Saka Nomad barbarian invaders of an Hellenic empire in India in the second and the last century B.C. added a second string to their bow by exchanging the saddle for the deck in order to take advantage of the waterways offered to an invader by the River Indus and its tributaries.²

The militarily decisive employment of the horse by sedentary barbarians beyond the frontier of a Nomad steppe-empire had had counterparts in cases of the more usual type in which the Nomad had been the representative of Barbarism and the husbandman the representative of Civilization. The original domestication of the horse appears to have been achieved by Aryan Nomad barbarians from the Transcaspiian fringe of the Great Eurasian Steppe who mounted the Iranian Plateau and broke across it, in the eighteenth or the seventeenth century B.C.,³ into the domain of an Empire of Sumer and Akkad that had been reconstituted by Hammurabi. At this tempestuous first entry of the war-horse upon the stage of History the new-fangled animate weapon makes its appearance, not as a cavalryman's mount, but as a charioteer's tractor; and the two-wheeled battle-car, drawn by a pair of draught-animals under the yoke, is shown by the archaeological evidence to have been a weapon which the Aryan Nomad barbarians had borrowed from the Sumeric Society against which these invaders eventually employed it with such deadly effect.

'In the . . . Early Dynastic reliefs from Ur and Kafajah, and on the famous inlaid "standard" from the royal tombs of Ur, . . . ass-drawn chariots are shown in great detail, with solid wheels made of two half-discs dowelled together against the hub . . . It looks . . . as if the battle-car was an invention of Early Dynastic Sumer and that its use was adopted, with other technological devices such as metallurgy and the shaft-hole axe . . . , by the Indo-Europeans on the northerly fringes of the Kingdom of Sumer and Akkad soon after 2000 B.C., [and was] given added speed and lightness by the use of horses and the invention of the spoked wheel.'⁴

On the Syrian *limes* of the Roman Empire the ground had been prepared for the titanic irruption of the transfrontier Arab Nomad barbarians in the seventh century of the Christian Era by the recent introduction of the war-horse into the Arabian Peninsula some sixteen or seventeen centuries after its arrival in the adjoining 'Fertile Crescent' from its place of origin somewhere in Central Asia.⁵ The less dramatic, yet also momentous, irruption of the Berber Nomad barbarians across the Empire's North-West African *limes* in the preceding century had been a similar consequence of the recent introduction of the camel from Arabia into North Africa.⁶

¹ See II. ii. 154-7 and V. v. 282-4.

² See Tarn, W.W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 320, 322, and 328-30.

³ See the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 167-212, below.

⁴ Piggott, Stuart: *Prehistoric India* (London 1950, Pelican), pp. 274 and 276.

⁵ i.e. at about the beginning of the Christian Era, according to Caetani, L.: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. i (Milan 1911, Hoepli), p. 346.

⁶ See Gautier, E.F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 165-79.

The most dramatic case in the history of the war-horse in which this weapon had been turned by a barbarian against the civilization from which he had acquired it was to be found in the New World, where the horse had been unknown till it had been imported by post-Columbian Western Christian intruders from the European side of the Atlantic. Owing to this lack of a domesticated animal which, in the Old World, had been the making of the Nomad stock-breeder's way of life, the Great Plains of the Mississippi Basin,¹ which would have been a herdsman's paradise, had remained the hunting-grounds of tribes who followed their game laboriously on foot over these great open spaces. The belated advent of the horse in this ideal horse-country had effects on the life of the immigrant and the life of the native which, while in both cases revolutionary, were different in every other respect. The introduction of the horse on to the plains of Texas, Venezuela, and Argentina made Nomad stock-breeders out of the descendants of 150 generations of husbandmen;² the same potent technological revolution made mobile mounted war-bands out of the Indian hunting-tribes on the Great Plains of North America beyond the northern frontier of the Spanish viceroyalty of New Spain³ and beyond the western frontier of the English colonies that eventually became the United States. In this case the borrowed weapon, mated with a local *terrain* that was ideal for its employment, did not give the transfrontier barbarian the ultimate victory against an adversary equipped with the far more potent weapons of Industrialism; but it did enable him to postpone the day of his final discomfiture and to inflict one signal disaster on the aggressive civilization in the last chapter of this North American frontier's history.⁴

While the nineteenth century of the Christian Era saw the prairie Indian of North America turn one of the European intruder's weapons against its original owner by disputing the possession of the Plains with the aid of the horse, the eighteenth century had already seen the forest Indian turn the European musket to account in a new-fangled warfare of sniping and ambushes which, with the screening forest as the Indian sharp-shooter's confederate, had proved more than a match for the tactics of the Potsdam parade ground, whose close formation, precise evolutions, and steady volleys—designed for polite hostilities on European battle-fields—courted destruction when unimaginatively employed against adversaries who had mated the European musket with the American forest.⁵ In days before the invention of fire-arms, correspond-

¹ See Webb, W.P.: *The Great Plains* (New York 1931, Ginn).

² See II. i. 255-6.

³ The enterprisingness of the nineteenth-century Apaches and Comanches in mounting on horse-back is in piquant contrast to the conservatism of their Spanish antagonists, whom the turn of the century found still using the lance and shield and even the bow-and-arrows—apart from an *élite* armed with fire-locks of a sixteenth-century pattern (see III. iii. 136, n. 1).

⁴ The history of the Indian frontier of the United States is examined further on pp. 630-50, below.

⁵ In thus turning to account the military potentialities of the North American forest the Indians merely postponed the date of their extermination at the hands of their assailants from beyond the Atlantic. If, before the Europeans' advent, they had managed to turn the forest's economic potentialities to account by cutting it down and replacing it by a populous agricultural country-side, they might not merely have postponed their

ing adaptations of the current weapons of an aggressive civilization to the opportunities offered by forest warfare had enabled the barbarian denizens of the Russian forests to bend, without breaking, before the blast of repeated explosions of Nomad aggression from the Eurasian Steppe, and to survive the ephemeral dominions of successive Nomad lords of the Steppe's Great Western Bay, from the Royal Scythians to the Golden Horde.¹ A similar response to a comparable challenge had enabled the barbarian denizens of the Transrhenane forests of Northern Europe to save a still-forest-clad Germany from the Roman conquest that had overtaken an already partially cleared and cultivated Gaul by inflicting on the Romans a decisively deterrent disaster in the Teutoburgerwald in A.D. 9.

The Barbarians' Exploitation of their Native Terrain

The line along which the military frontier between the Roman Empire and the Continental North European Barbarians consequently came to rest for the next four centuries carries its own explanation on the face of it in terms of *terrain* and tactics. It was the line beyond which a forest that had reigned here since the end of the latest bout of glaciation was still decisively preponderant over the works of *Homo Agricola* which had opened the way for the march of the Roman legions from the Mediterranean up to the Rhine and the Danube. This line, however, also happened, as we have observed,² to be the longest alinement that could have been found for a Roman military frontier across Continental Europe by a surveyor perversely seeking to draw the frontier out to the maximum possible length; and, even if the *tracée* had been drawn, not from the mouth of the Rhine to the burdensomely distant mouth of the Danube, but along the shortest line between the Baltic and the Black Sea or between the North Sea and the Adriatic, we may surmise that, in the long run, this hypothetical shortest practicable Roman *limes* in Continental Europe would have suffered the fate that actually overtook the long-drawn-out historic line between Batavia and the Dobruja; for, while it is evident that the burden of maintaining a *limes* varies in weight in proportion to the frontier's length, the fatal weakness of a *limes* is not its length but its stationariness and rigidity, and this weakness, being intrinsic, is irremediable.

On the local anti-barbarian frontiers of the still surviving parochial states of a Westernizing World which, at the time of writing, embraced all but a fraction of the total habitable and traversable surface of the planet, two of the recalcitrant barbarian's faithful non-human allies had already been outmanœuvred by a Modern Western industrial technique. The Forest had long since fallen a victim to cold steel, while the Steppe, from its parkland fringe to its desert heart, had been penetrated by the petrol-driven internal combustion engine of the aeroplane and the terrestrial motor vehicle travelling on the treads of a revolving belt over

doom but have averted it at the price of losing their political independence (see II. ii. 277-8). A thickly settled Central American and Andean peasantry did survive a Spanish conquest.

¹ See V. v. 281-9.

² In V. v. 591-5.

terrain where wheels could no longer convey it. The barbarian's mountain ally, however, had proved a harder nut to crack, and the nineteenth-century Russian feat of taming the Caucasus and twentieth-century French feat of taming the Atlas and the Rif had not yet been emulated by any corresponding domestication of either the western or the eastern rim of the Iranian Plateau. At this date the serried tiers of the Zagros Range, astride a theoretical Perso-Turkish and Perso-'Irāqī frontier, were still serving as fastnesses for wild Kurds, Lūrs, Bakhti-yārīs, and the motley wild highlanders of Fars, while the Sulaymān Range and its ramifications were performing the same service for wild Pathans and Balūchīs who were hardly conscious of a theoretical Indo-Afghan frontier that had been drawn across the map of their homelands in A.D. 1893 and had been inherited in A.D. 1947 from a British Indian Empire by a Pakistan that was one of its three successor-states.

This highlander rear-guard of a Barbarism which, in a ubiquitously Westernizing World, was now fighting with its back to the same advancing wall that it was confronting, had been displaying, in its latest forlorn hopes, an impressive ingenuity in turning to its own advantage, on its own *terrain*, some of the latter-day devices of an industrial Western military technique. By this *tour de force* the Rifī highlanders astride the theoretical boundary between the Spanish and French zones of Morocco had inflicted on the Spaniards at Anwāl in the summer of A.D. 1921 a disaster¹ comparable to the annihilation of Varus's three legions by the Cherusci and their neighbours in the Teutoburgerwald in A.D. 9, and had left their mark on History by making the Romanesque structure of French Power in North-West Africa rock on its foundations in the summer of A.D. 1925. By the same sleight of hand the Mahsūds of Waziristan had baffled repeated British attempts to subdue them during the ninety-eight years that had elapsed between A.D. 1849, when the British had inherited this anti-barbarian frontier from the Sikhs as a penalty for having annexed the Sikh Rāj, and A.D. 1947, when the British had disencumbered themselves of a still unsolved Indian North-West Frontier problem by bequeathing this unwelcome legacy to a fully self-governing Dominion of Pakistan.

In the trial of strength in A.D. 1925 between the Rifī barbarian warlord 'Abd-al-Karīm and the great French soldier and administrator Marshal Lyautey,

'the prospective scene of operations, like the adjoining parts of the Spanish Zone, was an arid treeless country, covered with a thorny undergrowth, broken up by ravines, and cursed with a scanty water-supply; and this was almost an ideal *terrain* for the Rifī forces, who were thoroughly at home in their native environment and at the same time had adopted such elements in the Western art of war as could be employed there to good purpose. Every Rifī fighting-man was an adept at taking cover, and, notwithstanding the brokenness of the country, he was disconcertingly mobile, since he lived in the open and carried no impedimenta except a handful of food, in the hood of his cloak, and his rifle and ammunition. With rifles, machine-guns, and small-arms ammunition the Rifīs had

¹ For details see Toynbee, A.J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 115-16.

supplied themselves abundantly at the Spaniards' expense; and, although the captured Spanish artillery was clumsily served and there was no air force on the Rifī side, these were luxuries and not necessities under the local conditions. On the other hand the Rifī High Command had not only captured but [had] learnt to utilise field telephones, and by means of these they were able to keep in touch with their widely scattered and constantly moving units, and to execute concerted manoeuvres over as wide a field as their opponents. They appear to have established district depots of rifles and ammunition, to which the tribesmen could be called up at short notice, fitted out, and then dispatched to any point where they were needed. The bulk of their forces was extremely fluid—the men being perpetually called up in relays and perpetually released (as far as the course of the campaign allowed) to work in the fields. Every tribe, however, appears to have been required to supply a permanent contingent, and the tribal levies were stiffened by a small standing army of regulars¹ (mostly drawn from 'Abd-al-Karīm's own tribe, the Banu Wuryāghal of Ajdir) who were uniformly trained and equipped and were in receipt of pay and rations—in consideration of which they had to hand over their booty to the Government.

'The Rifī tactics (which were directed by 'Abd-al-Karīm's brother, Mahammad, the mining engineer, as Commander-in-Chief) were to send forward a screen of irregulars who filtered through the enemy's line and raised the tribes in his rear—if necessary by coercion. By this means the Rifī army grew like a snowball as it advanced, each tribe whose territory became the scene of fighting being called out *en masse*. The tendency towards desultoriness and incoherence, which was to be looked for in an army recruited in this way, was guarded against by placing all the tribal contingents under the command of regulars, but the main body of the regular troops was carefully husbanded and kept in reserve. Advancing behind the screen of tribesmen they dug themselves in, provided a support upon which the skirmishers could fall back, and resisted enemy counter-attacks in hand-to-hand fighting,² with a tenacity which reminded their French adversaries of European warfare.'³

Through this skilful adaptation of tactics to *terrain* the Rifī offensive in the summer of A.D. 1925 came within an ace of cutting the corridor, traversed by a railway, which linked the effectively occupied part of the French Zone of Morocco, along the Atlantic seaboard, with the main body of French North-West Africa in Algeria and Tunisia, and which thereby insulated the still unsubdued Rifis astride the boundary between the French and Spanish zones of Morocco from the likewise still unsubdued *tache de Taza*, immediately south of the French corridor, and from the much larger unsubdued area, farther south again, in the fastnesses of the Atlas. The threat to the corridor at the crisis of the campaign may be said, without exaggeration, to have put in jeopardy the

¹ Estimated at from 6,000 to 10,000 men (*Foreign Affairs of New York*, January 1926).

² 'Marshal Lyautey has found himself in the presence, not indeed of highly scientific armies, but of a remarkable infantry, which is the equal of any infantry in the World in courage, character and marksmanship' (M. Painlevé in the French Chamber, 9th July, 1925). For accounts of the military organization and tactics of the Rifī forces, see *The Times*, 10th May, 1925; *Le Temps*, 21st and 23rd May, and 22nd June; three articles by M. Réginald Kann in *Le Temps*, 7th, 9th, and 13th August; and an article by Signor Luciano Magrini in the *Corriere della Sera*, 30th August.

³ Toynbee, *Survey*, 1925, vol. i, pp. 135-6.

whole French position in the Maghrib; for if the Rifis had broken through they might have raised the Atlas tribes, and such an extension of hostilities would have immeasurably increased the strain on French military resources.

Interests of comparable magnitude were at stake for the British Rāj in India in the trial of strength between the Mahsūd barbarians and the armed forces of the British Indian Empire in the Waziristan campaign of A.D. 1919-20; for, if in this contest the Mahsūds had got the better of the Great Power whom they were audaciously defying, the conflagration might have spread through the length and breadth of the unsubdued country astride the theoretical Indo-Afghan frontier. In this campaign likewise the barbarian belligerent's strength lay in his skilful adaptation of Modern Western arms and tactics to a *terrain* that was unpropitious for their use on the lines that were orthodox for their Western inventors.

'The elaborate and costly equipment which had been invented on the European battlefields of the General War [of A.D. 1914-1918], in operations on level ground between two highly organised armies, was very much less effective when employed against parties of tribesmen lurking in a tangle of mountains.'¹

On the other hand,

'as a fighting man the Wazīr and the Mahsūd, always more particularly the latter, when in his own country, may be classed very high. Agile and enduring, he is possessed on his own hillsides of an astonishing mobility, which is intensified by complete disregard of impedimenta, as well as by a natural hardness that greatly simplifies all supply problems. His skill with the small-bore rifle is considerable, and is only surpassed by a great capacity to exploit the slightest weakness shown by his enemy. Disregard of methods of security on the one hand, a too slavish routine in their enforcement on the other, miscalculations as to time and space, all these faults have been repeatedly penalized by the Mahsūd and Wazīr. The tribesman is gifted with untiring patience and vigilance in observing an enemy when the latter is on the move, a characteristic which makes it extremely difficult to outflank or to surprise him. He is an expert in the attack of detached posts and in the surprise of small parties. This skill may be enhanced by the employment of ruses which can justly be stigmatized as closely akin to treachery.'²

In order to defeat, even inconclusively, transfrontier barbarians who have attained the degree of military *expertise* shown by the Mahsūds in A.D. 1919 and by the Rifis in A.D. 1925, the Power behind the threatened *limes* has to exert an effort that—measured in terms either of manpower or of equipment or of money—is quite disproportionate to the modest challenge from its gadfly opponents to which this ponderous counter-attack is the irreducible minimum of response.

'The maximum fighting strength of the Mahsūds was estimated at 16,000 and that of the Wana Wazīrs (who did not follow the example of

¹ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 557.

² de Wateville, H.: *Waziristan, 1919-1920* (London 1925, Constable), p. 23. Evidence bearing out this appreciation will be found *passim*. There are striking examples on pp. 130, 156, 207-9, and 213. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

the Tochi Wazirs in submitting) at 7,000; but the effective number of combatants was limited by the number of efficient breach-loading rifles at their disposal, and this was estimated at not more than 8,000 in the case of the Mahsûds and 3,000 in that of the Wana Wazirs. Moreover, the number of small-bore rifles burning smokeless powder which the recalcitrant tribesmen possessed was estimated (even after their capture in May 1919) at not more than 3,500 in all, and this limited the size of the tribal force which would be under arms at any given moment, since throughout the campaign the tribesmen rigidly refrained, in daylight operations, from using rifles burning black powder, in order not to reveal their positions to the enemy. The largest force ever actually assembled at one moment was believed to have numbered 4,500, but this number was quite exceptional.¹

'On the other side the Indian Expeditionary Force numbered 29,256 combatants and 34,987 non-combatants on the 13th November, 1919, and rose to an eventual daily average of 41,800 combatants and 37,900 non-combatants approximately . . . [But] less than a fifth of the total force, and hardly more than a fifth of the combatants, could be included in the Striking Force, which consisted on the 8th November of 8,500 combatants, 6,500 followers, 1,400 horses and equipment animals, and 7,300 transport animals'.²

The four years of arduous fighting between the forces of the British Indian Empire and the barbarians of Waziristan in A.D. 1919-23 were the significantly paradoxical consequence of a Third Anglo-Afghan War in which the barbarian belligerent had been defeated in a nine-days' campaign (9th-17th May, 1919). The Afghan aggressors' performance had been as ignominious as the British victors' had been brilliant;³ but this relatively easy victory over a vulnerably organized barbarian principality⁴ had to be purchased by the civilized belligerent at the cost of a disproportionate effort of the same relative order of magnitude that was afterwards to be exacted by the harder task of chastising the elusive Mahsûds. On the Afghan side the concentration of regular troops at the end of April 1919 was estimated by the British military intelligence at a total figure of not more than 35,260 sabres and rifles,⁵ while on the Indian side 'at one time the strength of the force employed trans-Indus amounted to 340,000 men and 158,000 animals, and it will readily be understood that the maintenance of these numbers with depleted means of transportation was a problem of considerable difficulty'.⁶ The difficulties were increased by an epidemic of cholera and a heat wave,⁷ and by

¹ See de Watteville, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.—A.J.T.

² Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 556-7, following de Watteville, *op. cit.*

³ A brief account of this war will be found in Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923* (London 1925, Milford), pp. 376-84.

⁴ In terms of the barbarian reservoir beyond the *limes* of the Roman Empire on the European Continent the war-bands of Waziristan might be compared with those of the Transrhene German tribes that annihilated Varus's army in A.D. 9, whereas the principality of Afghanistan might be compared with the Bohemian principality of Maroboduus, which was saved from Roman attack in A.D. 6 by the outbreak of a Pannonian revolt, or with the Transylvanian principality of Decebalus, which was conquered by the Romans in A.D. 101-6.

⁵ Dispatch, dated the 1st November, 1919, from General Sir C. C. Monro, Commander-in-Chief in India (printed as Second Supplement to the *London Gazette* of the 12th March, 1920), §§ 20-21.

⁶ Monro, *op. cit.*, § 5.

⁷ See *ibid.*, §§ 16-17.

the size of the theatre of operations. This problem of geographical scale was given prominence in the report of the British Commander-in-Chief.

'During the course of the war our troops were engaged on a front extending along the whole length of the Afghan frontier from Chitral on the north-east to Seistan on the south-west, a total distance of about 1,000 miles; indeed, the fighting front may be said to have extended still further, for our line of communication defence troops on the 300 miles of road between Robat and Rui Khaf were kept constantly on their guard against raids from across the border and were at one time directly threatened by a small Afghan force which was detached from Herat towards the Persian frontier. Never before have simultaneous operations been undertaken on the frontier of India which have covered so wide an extent of front.'¹

The ascertained maximum trans-Indus British strength of 340,000, unlike the estimated Afghan strength of 35,260, included, of course, non-combatants, and the Afghans were thought to have been counting in A.D. 1919 on raising the unsubdued barbarians, on either side of the theoretical Indo-Afghan frontier, whose total strength in a *levée en masse* was estimated at approximately 120,000 rifles. Yet, even if Amānallāh had not been disappointed in this hope (as in A.D. 1925 'Abd-al-Karīm was to be disappointed in his similar hope of raising the tribesmen of the Atlas), and if the forces of the British Indian Empire had had to meet a combined force of 150,000 Afghan regular and tribal irregular barbarian fighting-men, their maximum total number of men employed trans-Indus would still have been more than double the total number of their adversaries; and, if the ratio of non-combatants to combatants in General Monro's force in the spring of A.D. 1919 was the same, or thereabouts, as it was in the expeditionary force that was operating in Waziristan later in the same year,² this immense mobilization of manpower would only have enabled the British Indian Empire to meet the Afghan regular army and tribal levy with a combatant strength that, if the tribesmen had actually risen *en masse*, would have been no more than just equal to the barbarian enemy's combined total.

The most significant point about this disparity between the efforts respectively required of the British and of their opponents on the North-West frontier of India in A.D. 1919 was that the disparity had recently begun to increase, as is revealed by a comparison of the Waziristan campaigns of A.D. 1917 and A.D. 1919 with their predecessors in the series.

'In spite of the ease with which the campaign of 1917 was brought to its conclusion, certain facts were already becoming patent. Whereas in 1860 a single brigade had marched right through Waziristan without grave hindrance, and whereas in 1894 and 1901 widely separated columns were employed with impunity, yet for many years it was beginning to be believed that an invader of Waziristan must employ greater forces and observe greater precautions. Further, just as the Mahsūds were acquiring more rifles of range and precision firing smokeless powder, and also exhibiting greater skill in their use, so the invader was ever inclined to

¹ Monro, *op. cit.*, § 27.

² See pp. 22-23, above.

resort to more scientific equipment and more impedimenta. In addition, public opinion now demanded more comforts for the troops, while a fresh difficulty was accruing out of the increasing number of medical units accompanying any expedition. Circumstances were thus all tending to complicate the transport problem and to augment the size of supply trains. Yet the lines of communication were unquestionably becoming more vulnerable than they were before the tribesmen possessed modern weapons. It was still necessary to employ long convoys of primitive pack transport; even in 1919 motor transport was impracticable above the lower valleys.¹

The same tale is told by the history of the Roman Imperial Army, which had, as we have seen,² to be progressively increased in numerical strength to offset the progressive increase in the military efficiency of the transfrontier barbarians whom it was its duty to hold at bay. When, early in the third century of the Empire's existence, Septimius Severus (*imperabat* A.D. 193-211) added three new legions³ to the thirty that had been maintained since A.D. 83⁴ for the defence of the static frontiers that had been first marked out by Augustus (*imperabat* 31 B.C.-A.D. 14), the consequent additional strain on the Empire's man-power and revenue was not very serious; but it was quite another matter when, early in the fourth century of the Empire's existence, Diocletian (*imperabat* A.D. 284-304) found himself compelled to raise the Army's strength again, and this time from about 300,000 men to about 500,000.

The Besieged Civilization's Inability to Redress the Balance by Recourse to Organization and Technique

In an economically complex civilization with a money economy, any increase in the numerical strength of a regular standing army entails a corresponding increase in the pressure of taxation upon national income. The diversion of an intolerably large, and still insatiably growing, proportion of a dwindling national income to meet rising costs of public services is the most conspicuous of the social maladies that were the death of the Roman Empire in the West in the fifth century and in the Centre and East in the seventh century of the Christian Era; and, while one cause of this cancerous growth of the fiscal burden on the backs of the Roman Imperial Government's subjects was an increase in the personnel of the Imperial Civil Service to fill an administrative vacuum arising from the progressive decay of local self-government,⁵ a second cause—which would probably turn out to have been by far the more potent of the two, if all the relevant figures were known to us—was the increase in the man-power of the Imperial Army which was required in order to meet the increase in the transfrontier barbarians' military efficiency. We do know that, in the annual budgets of the British Rāj in India during the last century of its existence, the cost of defence (which, in practice, meant the defence of the North-West Frontier) was an item that absorbed a disconcerting proportion of the revenue.⁶

¹ de Watteville, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

² In VI. vii. 156; 321, n. 2; and 323, n. 5.

³ See VI. vii. 321, n. 2.

⁴ See VI. vii. 156.

⁵ See VI. vii. 59-60 and 166.

⁶ "The most striking feature on the expenditure side of the central budget is the very

Thus, if the chronic warfare between the defenders and assailants of a *limes* is waged in terms of competitive staying power, the defence is bound to collapse sooner or later, since, so far as it is able to hold its own, it can achieve this only by exerting an effort which becomes more and more disproportionate to the effort exacted from its increasingly efficient barbarian adversaries.¹ In this situation there are two obvious courses to which the defence may resort in the hope of arresting, by one means or the other, this progressive deterioration of its own position. It can mobilize for the defence of the *limes* either its own capacity for organization and technique, in which a civilization is superior to its barbarian neighbours almost *ex hypothesi*, or its barbarian adversaries' capacity for taking military advantage of the local *terrain* through which the *limes* runs. These two policies of elaborating its own organization and armaments and of recruiting barbarian man-power are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and a harassed Power behind a *limes* had usually resorted to both in its desperate search for some means of reversing the accelerating inclination of the scales of war in its barbarian opponents' favour which is the inexorable effect of the passage of Time on a frontier where the civilized party is content to remain passive.

In the last struggle for life of an Hellenic Civilization which had never been technical-minded and which had long since lost any faint proclivities in this direction that it might occasionally have displayed in earlier chapters of its history, it was not technique but organization that was called into play by Diocletian in his heroic attempt to solve a problem of defence which had been shown to have become a question of life and death for the Roman Empire by the break-through of the trans-frontier barbarians into the interior of the Empire on all fronts during the anarchic years A.D. 235-84.

Diocletian's solution was to reorganize completely the Roman Imperial system of defence which had been left unchanged in principle during the three centuries that had elapsed since its original institution by Augustus. Augustus's first concern had been to give the Hellenic

high proportion of the expenditure on defence, which, under a scheme introduced in 1928-29, has been stabilised for a period of 4 years at Rs. 55 crores per year. This figure is over 60 per cent. of the total central revenues, and nearly a third of the total net central and provincial revenues of the country taken together' (*Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, presented May 1930, vol. i (London 1930, H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 3568), § 413, p. 362).

¹ The difference in the degree of the effort required from a civilized army and from a barbarian war-band in order to produce an equal quantum of military effect was once expressed in quaintly concrete financial terms by a correspondent of the present writer's in a comparison between the respective performances of the British Army and the Hijāzi Army against the Turkish Army in the General War of A.D. 1914-18. 'From first to last, the military operations of the Hijāzi Army accounted for 65,000 Turkish troops at the cost of less than £100 per head of subsidy, whereas, in the British Army's operations against the Turks, each Turkish casualty or prisoner cost from £1,500 to £2,000' (Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 283, n. 2).

Ibn Khaldūn (*Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron Mc.G. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 92-94), propounds, as a general 'law', a tendency for the burden of taxation in an empire to grow heavier with the lapse of time, but (thinking, as he does, exclusively in terms of empires founded by Nomad barbarians) he attributes this tendency to increasing demands of the imperial government for defraying rising costs of living incurred by the ruling elements. He makes no mention in this passage of rising costs of imperial defence.

World the maximum opportunity of recuperating from the exhaustion produced by a hundred years of social revolution ranking into civil war, and one of his measures for attaining this end had been to reduce to a minimum the swollen armies that had been mobilized for this fratricidal warfare in the last paroxysm of an Hellenic Time of Troubles. Apart from a modest personal body-guard, he had provided in his permanent military establishment for nothing in the nature of a reserve. His troops of the line barely sufficed to demarcate the Imperial frontiers; they were, in fact, little more than a police-cordon; and, for the security of the interior of the Empire, the Augustan régime relied, in lieu of an adequate provision for defence, on the superiority of its professional army over the transfrontier barbarians in military quality and on the awe inspired by Roman power, which might be expected to deter the barbarians from putting the Imperial defences to any serious practical test.¹ By Diocletian's day this hazardously economical security system had long since gone bankrupt; for the military efficiency which the barbarians had been progressively acquiring in the school which the *limes* afforded had eventually given them both the nerve and the skill to break through the cordon confining them; and in such an emergency the Imperial Government's only means of repairing one breach was to risk another by denuding some distant sector of the frontier that happened at the moment to be quiescent. Though the Romans held the interior lines and could avail themselves of easy and rapid water-transport across the maritime heart of their empire for shuttling troops from one breached frontier to another, the system was radically unsound, and Diocletian reformed it by taking a cue which Septimius Severus had given to his successors when he had placed one of his three new legions in reserve at Albano. Diocletian organized a reserve which amounted in numbers to perhaps not much less than two-fifths of the total strength of a military establishment that was perhaps larger by two-thirds than the Severan;² the best units in the Army were assigned to this new force;³ and it was designed to be as mobile as the raiding barbarian war-bands which it was its task to overtake, bring to battle, and destroy.⁴

From the scientific standpoint of a professional soldier, this Diocletianic system of substituting defence in depth for linear defence by organizing a mobile reserve in support of the front line represents a notable advance in the art of war; and it was no doubt partly owing to this military reform that the Empire—which had seemed to be in the throes of dissolution during the half century immediately preceding Diocletian's accession—actually held out for a hundred years longer in the West and for three hundred years longer in the East and Centre. Yet, though the civilian population might find the conditions of the Diocletianic Age a relief from those of the foregoing bout of anarchy, they would have been happy indeed to exchange them for those of the militarily archaic Augustan Principate.

¹ 'The greatness of the Roman People has propagated an awe of them beyond the Rhine and beyond the Empire's established limits' (Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. xxix, § 3, apropos of the relation of a transfrontier Teuton community, the Mattiaci, to the Roman Empire in the writer's day).

² See VI. vii. 323, n. 5.

³ See VI. vii. 322.

⁴ See VI. vii. 323.

The truth is that Diocletian's professionally admirable military reorganization dealt the civilian population a double blow. On the one hand the belated provision of a numerically sufficient mobile reserve accounted for that huge increase in the total military establishment which had, as we have seen,¹ to be paid for by the higher taxation of a lower national income. On the other hand the concentration of the *élite* of the Army in the mobile reserve still further lowered the *moral*, as well as the efficiency, of the cordon-troops (now explicitly called *limitanei*, to distinguish them invidiously from the *comitatenses* serving in the Emperor's counter-war-band); the last pretence of the Army's being able to hold the barbarians at the *limes* was now virtually abandoned; and it came to be taken for granted that the war-zone, in the warfare between the Roman Imperial Army and its barbarian adversaries, was no longer the *glacis* on the barbarians' side of the *limes*, and no longer even the marches of the Empire in the *limes'* immediate rear, but territories in the interior that were the Empire's economic and cultural vitals. The scientifically impeccable watchword of 'defence in depth' was, in fact, a euphemism for glozing over the humiliating and disastrous fact that the civilian producer of the national income, after he had been fleeced once by the Imperial inland revenue authorities to pay for a vast increase in the Imperial military establishment, was now exposed to the additional affliction of being fleeced for a second time by barbarian raiders whom the Diocletianic new-model army could not, after all, prevent from ravaging the Empire's heartlands.²

This attempt to solve the problem of defence by an improvement in organization, which was such a brilliant failure in the military history of the Diocletianic Roman Empire, had brought in better returns to Powers burdened with anti-barbarian frontiers in a Modern Western World. General Sir C. C. Monro's lightning victory over the Afghans in A.D. 1919 was a triumph of organization in a sudden emergency; Marshal Lyautey's gradual pacification of the Atlas highlands between A.D. 1907 and A.D. 1934³ was a still more signal triumph of organization applied to the deliberate execution of a long-term plan; and these are merely two illustrations out of a multitude lying ready to the historian's hand. In the policy of Modern Western imperial governments, however, the resort to organization as a means of redressing an unfavourably inclining balance in the defence of a *limes* was overshadowed by the resort to technique in an age when Western technology was advancing at an unprecedented pace into a previously undreamed-of wonderland of scientific discovery and practical 'know-how'.

In such circumstances the Western parties to the conflict between Civilization and Barbarism might well feel confident of being able to set so hot a pace in the progressive application of technology to border warfare that their barbarian competitors would find themselves run off their

¹ On p. 25, above.

² This is the burden of Zosimus's critique of the Diocletianic reorganization of the Roman system of imperial defence (see VI. vii. 320, n. 6).

³ Marshal Lyautey himself retired in A.D. 1925, nine years before his work was completed by his successors; but the credit for the whole achievement morally belongs to him.

feet. If the barbarian had shown himself able to procure from abroad and even passably imitate at home a relatively simple product of the Modern Western technique, such as an up-to-date breach-loading rifle, was it not the obvious retort for his Western adversary to raise the technological level of competition in armaments from small-arms to artillery, from fire-arms to the aeroplane, and—in terms of the release of atomic energy—from the non-fissile to the fissile type of explosive for the manufacture of bombs? For, even if the barbarian could procure aeroplanes from abroad and could learn to become as skilful an air-pilot as he had already become a marksman, it was hardly conceivable that he could provide for the servicing of aeroplanes, not to speak of installing the plant for manufacturing them, and it was virtually out of the question for him to procure atom bombs from abroad, and quite out of the question for him to acquire and apply the 'know-how' of manufacturing them and detonating them. When Western Man had crowned a century of scientific achievement by discovering how to harness atomic energy to the service of War, it looked indeed as if it now lay in his power (if he could reconcile this with his conscience) literally to annihilate the last surviving rearguards of Barbarism in their last remaining pockets of unsubdued territory—always supposing that these condemned barbarian prisoners of a ubiquitous industrial Western Civilization were not reprieved, after all, by seeing the Western masters of the World destroy one another first in an atomic fratricidal warfare.

This thesis that technique is a winning card in Civilization's hand is forcefully presented in a passage from the pen of a brilliant observer of a campaign in which a Modern Western Power overthrew a barbarian opponent on his own ground by bringing into action against him the Western technique of the Pre-Atomic Age.

'Halfa is nearly four hundred miles from the Atbara; yet it was the decisive point of the campaign; for in Halfa was being forged the deadliest weapon that Britain has ever used against Mahdism—the Sudan Military Railway. In the existence of the railway lay all the difference between the extempore, amateur scrambles of Wolseley's campaign and the machine-like precision of Kitchener's. When Civilisation fights with Barbarism it must fight with civilised weapons; for with his own arts on his own ground the barbarian is almost certain to be the better man. To go into the Sudan without complete transport and certain communications is as near madness as to go with spears and shields. Time has been on the Sirdar's side, whereas it was dead against Lord Wolseley; and of that, as of every point in his game, the Sirdar has known how to ensure the full advantage. There was fine marching and fine fighting in the campaign of the Atbara; the campaign would have failed without them; but without the railway there could never have been any campaign at all. The battle of the Atbara was won in the workshops of Wady Halfa.'¹

By thus availing himself of a modern Western technology's earliest achievement in the field of mechanical transport, a British general who had been trained as a military engineer was able, in A.D. 1898, to reconquer, in little more than six months, an Eastern Sudan whose war-

¹ Steevens, G. W.: *With Kitchener to Khartum* (Edinburgh and London 1898, Blackwood), chap. 3, *ad init.*, pp. 22–23.

like barbarian denizens, in A.D. 1881-5, had thrown off a sixty-years-old Egyptian domination and had signally defeated the hazardously amateur efforts which Egypt's British conquerors had made at the eleventh hour to salvage a crumbling Egyptian régime without having time to employ those scientific methods by which Kitchener was subsequently to retrieve his predecessors' disastrous failures. This victory of a British-built railway over the Madhist barbarians of the Eastern Sudan in A.D. 1898 had been anticipated by the victory of a Russian-built railway over the Türkmen barbarians of Transcaspia in A.D. 1873-86,¹ and that triumph of Western technique in the hands of Orthodox Christian converts to a Western technological civilization was still more impressive than its subsequent emulation by the countrymen of George Stevenson, who might have been expected to be the first in the field in any application of a technical device that was an English invention.

A generation later, when this Western feat of harnessing steam-power had been eclipsed by the more extraordinary feat of harnessing atomic energy, it was a temptation for Western minds to assume that the problem of anti-barbarian frontiers had now been solved decisively by the progress of Western technology up to date. At the time of writing, however, atomic energy had not yet been used for the destruction of either Barbarism or Civilization; and the recent experience of Western Powers in trying to offset their barbarian opponents' skill in adapting the use of Modern Western weapons and tactics to the local *terrain* by bringing into action, on their own side, additional Modern Western weapons, of ever more elaborate kinds, had demonstrated that the elaboration of technique, like the elaboration of organization, carried with it certain inherent drawbacks in addition to the untoward social effect of its crushingly heavy cost to the tax-payer and the untoward educational effect of its initiation of the barbarian into the ever more formidable tricks of his civilized adversary's trade.² These inherent drawbacks to an elaboration of technique might go far towards neutralizing even the military effect of this expedient for redressing the balance of power between Civilization and Barbarism along a static *limes*.

These limitations upon the effectiveness of Technology as one of Civilization's weapons against Barbarism are illustrated by the history of the Waziristan campaign of A.D. 1919-20. At the opening of these operations 'the efficiency of the troops in India had sunk to a lamentably low ebb,'³ and 'it became manifest, soon after the expedition set out, that there was no alternative but to rely on a liberal employment of artillery and on a lavish expenditure of ammunition and of engineer stores to counterbalance the initial lack of skill displayed by the troops'.⁴ In this campaign, in the end, 'the aeroplane, the howitzer, the gun, and the

¹ See V. v. 323, n. 3, and p. 139, below.

² 'The development of any strategic perception or of a more far-seeing or reasoned leading among the frontier tribes is perhaps improbable. On the other hand, should any such tendencies creep into their conduct of war, and should the tribesmen ever, by any chance, be supported by skilled advice, or find themselves in the possession of efficient artillery, numerous machine guns or stocks of grenades and analogous adjuncts of war, the prospect of entering on a campaign of this nature without highly trained troops is not alluring' (de Watteville, *op. cit.*, p. 210).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

grenade' duly 'redressed the balance'¹ which had been inclined in the Mahsūd barbarian's favour by his superiority to the British Indian soldier in individual prowess as a fighting-man using a Modern Western rifle on his own intractable ground. But the British expeditionary force's dependence on an elaborate equipment proved a source of weakness in two respects. In the first place, 'under conditions where the capacity of the transport constitutes a dominant factor, the greater the skill and mobility of the troops, the smaller the amount of stores and of transport required, and the greater the resultant freedom of action in the conduct of the operations.'² The British expeditionary force's dependence on equipment tied it by the leg,³ and in the second place the military advantage purchased at this high cost in loss of mobility was at a minimum on this *terrain*. 'The tactical methods permissible in the great struggle in Flanders' did not 'turn out appropriate to the nature of Indian mountain warfare'.⁴

'Where large masses can be used, where artillery and high explosive predominate, certain tactical processes of a rather crude nature can be employed, and the training of the individual can remain more elementary. . . . But on the Indian frontier the case is very different. In mountain warfare, as it still remains in spite of all progress achieved in modern military equipment, numbers will rarely be present, while the enemy is particularly expert in the use of ground and of the rifle. Those who attack such a formidable fighting man, over *terrain* of his own choosing, must be able to compete with him individually on more or less level terms. Otherwise the handicap becomes too great. . . . The soldier required for frontier warfare must be trained for the end in view.'⁵ . . . The incidents of the campaign of 1919-20 . . . prove in the most unmistakable fashion the value, or rather the absolute necessity, of a very high standard of individual training among all combatant troops employed in a mountain expedition.⁶

The Barbarians' Military Elusiveness and Economic Parasitism

The technique which thus proved to be no adequate substitute for personal skill and prowess on the civilized belligerent's side had a further drawback that was still more disconcerting: its hammer-blows were apt to beat the air⁷ without inflicting any decisive damage on a target which was as elusive and intangible as the armaments brought to bear against it were unwieldy.

While, at the time of writing, it seemed possible, as has been suggested,⁸ that the recent Western invention of the atom bomb might prove physically capable of eliminating once for all a pocket of unsubdued Barbarism, even in trackless mountain country, by literally annihilating all life within the recalcitrant area, it was perhaps doubtful whether even this tremendous weapon, however ruthlessly employed,

¹ Ibid., p. 208.

² See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 557-8.

³ Ibid., p. 209.

⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

⁵ de Watteville, op. cit., p. 209.

⁶ Ibid., p. 208.

⁷ The civilized belligerent's difficulty in deciding upon his military objective—not to speak of attaining it when it has been fixed—is touched upon in de Watteville, op. cit., pp. 89 and 166.

⁸ On p. 30, above.

could exterminate the Nomad barbarians of Arabia and the Sahara who were still eluding effective control by the sedentary Powers that were their nominal sovereigns. The taming of these Afrasian Nomads had been facilitated, as we have seen,¹ by the pre-atomic Western invention of mechanically driven vehicles whose caterpillar tracks could carry them over mud and sand; but the Nomad denizen of the Steppe enjoyed a social advantage in his contest with a sedentary antagonist which could not be impaired by any technical change in the conditions of warfare on his *terrain*. In the past, this Nomad type of transfrontier barbarian had notoriously been the most difficult for the Power behind the *limes* to cope with, because he was unhampered by the possession of immovable property, so that his civilized assailant had no definite objective at which to aim and no power of bringing this mobile enemy to battle by threatening some fixed asset of his which he could not afford to leave undefended. The classical exposition of this invincible elusiveness of the Nomad is given in Herodotus's account of the Achaemenian empire-builder Darius the Great's unsuccessful attempt to incorporate in his dominions the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe by subduing its Scythian rangers of that day. After marching and counter-marching over the face of the Steppe without coming any nearer to bringing the Scythians to battle,

'Darius sent a despatch-rider to the King of the Scythians, Idanthysrus, with the following message: "You are a queer fellow! I cannot understand why you keep perpetually on the run when you have two alternatives. If you consider yourself a match for my force, for God's sake stop this dodging, stand your ground, and fight; but, if you know in your heart that you are outclassed, then, if that is the position, again I say: for God's sake stop trekking, bring me offerings of earth and water as acknowledgments that I am your lord and master, and then we can start talking." Idanthysrus's answer to this overture was as follows: "Master Persian, I will put my cards on the table. Never in my life have I run away from anybody out of fear—never in the past, and not now from you. What you have found me doing now is exactly what I habitually do in peace-time; I have made no change. And now I will explain, too, why I do not promptly give you battle. The reason is that we possess neither cities that we might be afraid of your capturing nor plantations that we might be afraid of your cutting down, so there is nothing to push us into fighting a pitched battle with you. But, if you really have to be in such a hurry to seek a decision, let me tell you that we do have tombs in which our ancestors lie buried. Now, just you find those tombs and try to desecrate them, and then you will discover whether we shall fight you for those tombs or not. Short of that, we shall not engage you unless we see reason for doing so."²

While the Nomad herdsman on the Steppe thus provides a classical illustration of the transfrontier barbarian's elusiveness, the sedentary highlander barbarian's way of life neutralizes the effect of the elaborate weapons of Civilization to a hardly lesser degree by the same retort of denying them an adequate target. It is true that the sedentary barbarian

¹ On p. 19, above.

² Herodotus: Book IV, chaps. 126-7.

has given some vulnerable hostages to Fortune. The Power behind the *limes* may retaliate for the wild highlander's raids into imperial territory by destroying the offending war-band's villages and burning its crops; and in the Air Age the champions of Civilization could take these punitive measures without having to follow the toilsome and risky traditional course of marching an expeditionary force on foot into the highlander's fastness. They could send over a few aircraft to do, in a few minutes, without hazard to themselves, a stint of destruction that might have cost a ground-force weeks of fighting and hundreds of casualties; yet nothing is gained by any improvement in the technical means of executing a military operation when the operation itself is intrinsically futile in the sense of being ineffective for producing its intended political result; and punitive measures against even a sedentary transfrontier barbarian are apt to achieve the very opposite of their purpose—which is to turn a brigand into a good neighbour.

Depriving the barbarian of one season's crop is an ineffectual measure of coercion so long as the barbarian himself lives to raise another crop next year (as he will, unless the work of destruction is repeated annually); and burning or bombing his house is likewise ineffectual when he is capable of rebuilding this crude structure of wattle and daub, or of unhewn stones plastered over with mud, with his own hands in one winter, during spare months in which he can neither work in the fields nor go on the war-path.¹ This capacity of his for quickly repairing, by self-help, any material damage inflicted on him by the fortunes of war is one example of a general social 'law' that we have encountered in another context.² In warfare between antagonists that are not on an equality in their level of civilization, the more highly civilized belligerent is apt to win victories that are pyrrhic because they leave the victor exhausted, while his less highly civilized opponent is apt to suffer defeats that are

¹ As the writer was penning these lines, he was having a vivid recollection of two meetings of his with a Turkish peasant in a village in Western Anatolia. When this kindly Turk first gave the writer hospitality in his house in the winter of A.D. 1920-1, the house and the whole village were intact, and, when the same host gave the same guest hospitality for the second time in the spring of A.D. 1923, he again had a house in which to receive a visitor, and this house was again surrounded by a cluster of other simple houses of the kind. If the visitor had not happened to know that, since his previous visit, the whole village had been rased to the ground in the last phase of the Graeco-Turkish war of A.D. 1919-22, he would never have guessed that the house in which he was being received on this second occasion was not physically the same house that had given him a night's shelter before. The change that was manifest even to a foreigner's eye was not the loss and replacement of the house but the difference in the spirits of its owner. On the first occasion the Turkish householder had been patently depressed by the experience of living under enemy occupation—the village being at that time on the Greek side of a Graeco-Turkish military front. On the second occasion, which was after the eventual Greek débâcle, the village was free and the householder's spirits were high. 'All is well now, you see', he said. 'Those Greek soldiers are not here any longer. Yes, they burnt the village before they left, and my house with the rest—the house in which I had the pleasure of entertaining you last time you were passing this way. But, you see, we all built new houses for ourselves last winter, and now we have done our spring sowing, so the damage has been repaired and—we are also free men once more.'

The material standard of life in this West Anatolian Turkish village, which seemed primitive to a West European eye, would have seemed lordly to a contemporary Kurd from Dersim or Mahsūd from Waziristan; and thus the ability of this Turkish village community to reconstruct the material basis of its life in a single season gives the measure of the Kurd's and the Pathan's capacity for economic recuperation on their own lower economic level.

² In IV. iv. 393-4.

inconclusive because of the recuperative power that is Nature's compensation for the handicap of backwardness in organization.

The operation of this law as between the East Roman Empire and Bulgaria in the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era proved to be the key to the subsequent collapse of the victor and revival of his victim, and we noticed in this connexion how, in the General War of A.D. 1914-18 and its immediate sequel, a highly organized Germany remained prostrate owing to the exhausting effect of her barren victories long after a relatively primitive Turkey and Russia had managed to take the field again notwithstanding their recent shattering defeats. The same 'law' can be seen at work in the warfare between transfrontier barbarians and the Power behind the *times*. So long as the people themselves are not physically annihilated—and a transfrontier barbarian has the proverbial nine lives of a cat—the barbarian belligerent cannot be brought to heel by destroying his rudimentary and readily replaceable property. So far from being an effective sanction, this punitive destruction of property has the effect of confirming him in the predatory way of life from which it is intended to deter him; for if the barbarian is exasperated—and, still more, if he is both exasperated and starved through being deprived by hostile military action of the product of even the modicum of peaceful handiwork that he has still been carrying on side by side with a guerrilla warfare that has already become his major occupation—the double pressure of necessity and resentment will move him more than ever to look for his livelihood to the deeds of war instead of to the works of peace.

A consciousness of this 'boomerang' effect of punitive action perplexed the British guardians of the North-West Frontier of India during the last chapter of their stewardship.

'In common with all other peoples in a similar stage of social development, the Mahsûds possessed no organic centres, the destruction of which could so far impair their economic or social welfare as would infallibly bring them to their knees. Makin, one of their main centres of population, in addition to countless other villages, had been devastated during previous campaigns by way of punitive retaliation, yet such measures had never effectually put an end to their perennial acts of brigandage. Fines had been levied, but the tribesmen had continued to retrieve such losses by plundering their weaker neighbours. Rifles had been confiscated (!), yet in the end this measure seemed only to encourage further thefts and murders in order to replace the (not numerous) surrendered weapons. There is a point beyond which reprisals cannot be carried without provoking undue exasperation or else bringing the subjects of this treatment to partial starvation, unless, indeed, the regular forces imitate the Germans when they methodically drove the Hottentots into the Omaheke Desert—there to die of thirst. But on the [North-West] Frontier [of India], even apart from the ethical side of the question, such action is not practicable. . . . The success of any punitive expedition is best gauged by the permanence of the moral impression which it leaves on the uncivilised mind. . . . In the case of the Mahsûds, punitive expeditions had failed to cause the desired moral impression for any length of time.'

¹ de Watteville, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

The ineffectiveness of the expedient of destroying a recalcitrant barbarian's property was indeed demonstrated afresh in the Waziristan campaign of A.D. 1919-20 when a British column at last reached the Mahsūd 'town' of Kaniguram at the cost of nearly twelve weeks' marching and fighting.

'Previous history . . . lends colour to the belief that the Mahsūds were convinced that the Striking Force had now nearly achieved its worst; it might still destroy Kaniguram, but must then retire. These things had happened before, and in any case would not very deeply affect any but the inhabitants of the place itself. The rifles would thus remain, while raiding and looting would eventually make good the losses incurred by the tribesmen during the campaign.'¹

'Much the same difficulty was to be experienced at Wana as had been encountered at Kaniguram. . . . The destruction of towers and of principal houses belonging to those sections [of the Wana Wazirs] known to be hostile was then taken in hand. But such measures did not appear to accelerate the rate of payment of the fine or of surrender of rifles. . . . Moreover, the majority of the more distant tribal sections, inhabiting districts bordering on Afghanistan, are virtually nomads owning no landed property, no dwellings, nor crops. They wander among the mountains of Waziristan and can take refuge across the Afghan border if hard pressed. The problem of bringing these people to submission seemed insoluble.'²

The fact is that punitive measures defeat their own object by accentuating an already prevalent tendency in the transfrontier barbarian's social evolution which is precisely what has made him such an awkward neighbour.³ If the transfrontier barbarian had remained an unmodified primitive man living in the static Yin-state in which the genuinely primitive societies were found as far back in Time as the existing evidence carried a twentieth-century Western historian's knowledge of them, a decidedly greater proportion of his total energies would have been devoted to the arts of peace and a correspondingly greater coercive effect would have been produced upon him by the punitive destruction of the products of his pacific labours. The tragedy of a *ci-devant* primitive society's moral alienation from an adjoining civilization by which it has previously been attracted is that the consequent deterioration of their relation from one of progressive cultural radiation-and-mimesis to one of chronic hostilities leads the barbarian to neglect his former peaceful avocations in order to specialize in the art of border warfare—first in self-defence, in order to save himself from subjugation or annihilation at the hands of a civilization that has turned savage, and later—when his growth in military efficiency on his own *terrain* has gradually reversed the balance of military advantage in his favour—as an alternative means of making his livelihood. To plough and reap vicariously with sword and spear⁴ is more lucrative for the barbarian now that a civilization which has been thrown on the defensive can be mulcted of its wealth by way of either loot or subsidies, and this is also more congenial to him now that the

¹ Ibid., p. 165.

² Ibid., pp. 175-6.

³ This distinctive social evolution of the transfrontier barbarian has been touched upon by anticipation, in V. v. 230-3, apropos of its reflection in the field of religion.

⁴ See Gilbert Murray's translation of the song of Hybrias—an heir of barbarian Greek conquerors of a Minoan Crete—in III. iii. 87, n. 1.

barbarian has become a warrior first and foremost and has remained only secondarily a husbandman. The barbarian adjoining a *limes* thus ceases to be economically self-supporting and becomes an economic parasite on the civilization on the other side of the military front.¹

A classical illustration of this characteristic economic regression of the estranged barbarian proselyte of a disintegrating civilization is afforded by Tacitus's description of the German denizens of the barbarian 'reservoir' adjoining the Continental European *limes* of the Roman

¹ While this economic retrogression of the barbarian in a 'reservoir' dammed back by a *limes* is one of the general effects of the erection of a *limes* in any physical environment, the effect naturally varies in degree in proportion to the extent of the difference between the regions segregated from one another by the *limes* in point of relative economic attractiveness or unattractiveness. Evidently the 'reservoir' barbarian will be the more prone to seek his livelihood by plundering his civilized neighbour's garden than to seek it by cultivating his own wilderness, the more forbidding the wilderness is, and the more smiling the garden. A case in point is the poverty of the Pathan highlands by comparison with the adjoining lowlands of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan (see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. 1 (London 1927, Milford), pp. 546-7).

This point is of some importance, because one of the considerations that are apt to decide an empire-builder to draw his *limes* along a particular line, short of having reached 'a natural frontier', is that, along this line, he has found himself at the limit of the area that he can reckon on being able to exploit economically, with profit to himself, by means of the economic technique of which he is master—at whatever stage of technological 'know-how' he may happen to be at the time when he is choosing the line for his *limes*. This last qualification has to be added because a country-side that is economically profitable for a society at one level of economic technique may be economically unprofitable for a society at another level. For the Romans round about the beginning of the Christian Era it was economically unprofitable to saddle themselves either with North European territories in which the post-glacial forest still had the upper hand over a primitive agriculturist's attempts to clear it, or with an Arabian desert which the sedentary husbandman could never hope to dispute with the stock-breeding Nomad. Accordingly the Romans drew their European *limes* just short of the coal-deposits in the Ruhr, and their Syrian *limes* short of the oil-deposits in Arabia.

The Romans did not live to regret this economic blindness of theirs, since their empire came and went before the technique for turning coal and mineral oil to economic account was discovered by the latter-day children of a Western Civilization sprung from the Roman Empire's ruins. On the other hand, there were Modern Western Governments that had had the provoking experience of seeing territories in which they had lightheartedly disinterested themselves, in the belief that they were valueless, turn out to be of inestimable economic value in terms of new technological discoveries. The Powers more or less interested in a latter-day Arabia had no sooner completed the delimitation of frontiers in that peninsula after the General War of A.D. 1914-18 than they were made aware, by the subsequent pioneer work of Western oil-prospectors, that the sub-soil of the deserts which they had been dividing between them by drawing imaginary straight lines on a small-scale non-geological map was oozing with oil. An equally undreamed-of wealth of oil had likewise belatedly been discovered to underlie the surface of lands in the eastern part of the State of Oklahoma that had become the property of Indians descended from 'the five civilized nations' who had been relegated there since A.D. 1825 in the belief that, for the White Man, this was the least desirable piece of country within the whole vast area of the United States. In A.D. 1952 there was a strange irony in the contrast between the respective current economic values of these oil-lands in Oklahoma, to which 'the five nations' had been deported, and the cotton-lands in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, from which they had been evicted. A similar reflection was suggested at the same date in England by the grass-clad solitudes that had replaced, on the Downs, the cultivation which the Roman had once found there in an age when the forest-clad plains of Britain were as inaccessible to the Celtic husbandman as the forest-clad plains of North America were to the Indian hunter at the time of the arrival of the White Man in the New World.

On the morrow of a latter-day Western discovery of the technique of splitting the atom of one particular chemical element, it looked as if a revaluation of the planet's wealth in terms of uranium instead of gold might produce even more sensational surprises; and such surprises were bound to evoke correspondingly poignant regrets in the hearts of the makers of frontiers in a politically divided society embracing the entire surface of the globe.

Empire at a date by which this *limes* had been in existence for about a century and a half and had therefore had time to produce a *limes*' typical social effects. Tacitus affirms¹ that cattle is the Germans' sole form of wealth; but the relative unimportance of agriculture in the German economy of that day, which is implied in this and other passages of the Roman observer's work, cannot have been due to ignorance or even to inexperience.

'Archaeological investigation has now proved that the cultivation of cereals in the North of Europe goes back to the Stone Age. Of still greater importance is the discovery of the representation of a plough with two oxen among the rock-carvings at Tegneby in Bohuslän, which date from the Bronze Age. However sceptical one may feel towards the dates fixed by archaeologists, this discovery shows without doubt that a highly developed system of agriculture was practised in Sweden before the beginning of the Christian Era. Some other explanation of the accounts given by Caesar and Tacitus must therefore be found. What the true explanation is has been clearly shown by a careful examination of the various passages in which these writers refer to the subject.² The growth of the military spirit had led to a neglect of agriculture, as both writers³ expressly state.'⁴

This interpretation of the unimportance of agriculture 'in the economy of those Germans who were within range of Roman observation in Tacitus's day as being evidence, not of an infantile economic backwardness, but of a recent economic relapse from a higher pristine

¹ Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. 5.

² 'During the intervals between bouts of war, [the Germans] spend a little of their time in hunting, but most of it in doing nothing. They give themselves up to sleeping and eating, and it is precisely the bravest and most warlike of them that are the most idle. They leave it to the women, the old men, and the unfit members of the family to look after the home, the household, and the fields, while the warriors laze. It is a curious incongruity in their character that they should so love sloth and at the same time so hate tranquility' (Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. 15).

³ Whereas Tacitus attributes this neglect of agriculture to the Germans in general, without distinguishing in this matter between one Teutonic people and another, Caesar (*Bellum Gallicum*, Book IV, chap. 1; cp. Book VI, chap. 22) attributes it to the Suebi in particular. The method, here ascribed by Caesar to the Suebi, of moving their quarters every year and never cultivating the same piece of land a second time was reminiscent of the primitive agriculture which Modern Western observers had seen practised by Mayas in Yucatan (see II. ii. 418) and by Bantu peoples in Tropical Africa (see II. ii. 26-7). The Suebi were more remote from the Roman *limes* than the kindred Teutonic peoples to the west of them, and the explanation of their slovenliness in agriculture as being an effect of the *limes* is proportionately less convincing. At the same time, the hypothesis that they were recent initiates into the art of agriculture is untenable, in view of the fact that agriculture was long since well established among their northern neighbours in Scandinavia and their north-eastern neighbours in Estonia. A possible alternative explanation is suggested by a passage in Strabo (*Geographica*, Book VII, chap. i, § 3, p. C 291) in which this Hellenic observer in the next generation after Caesar's ascribes to the Suebi a way of life which is not that of primitive cultivators but is that of the Eurasian Nomad stock-breeders. In Caesar's and Strabo's day the Suebi lived in a region between the south-eastern corner of the Baltic Sea and the north-western shore of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe which, in the subsequent map of Western Christendom, was to be occupied by Lithuania and Poland; and the local Polish and Lithuanian variety of a Western culture was to be markedly affected by the radiation of cultural influences from an adjoining Nomadic World. Might not the Suebi have previously succumbed, in the same habitat, to the same influences from the same quarter?—A.J.T.

⁴ Chadwick, H. M.: *The Origin of the English Nation* (Cambridge 1907, University Press), pp. 286-7. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

state, is confirmed by Tacitus's own observation that the Ests (Aestii)—who were living then, as now, on the eastern seaboard of the Baltic—'cultivate cereals and the other fruits of the Earth with an assiduity that stands out in contrast to the typical German sloth'.¹ The habitat of these virtuous Estonian husbandmen lay to the north-east of the Teutonic peoples' domain and was thus at a farther remove from the birthplace of agriculture somewhere in South-Western Asia. In travelling from Asia into Europe round the head of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, which was the western tip of Nomad's Land, the technique of agriculture could have reached Estonia only by way of Germany, and the German peoples who had passed the art on to the Ests must once have been not less good husbandmen than the Ests still were when they were observed by Tacitus's informants. When we ask ourselves why Tacitus's Ests should have retained their hold on agriculture while Tacitus's Germans had lost theirs, the obvious answer is that, by comparison with Tacitus's Germans, the Ests were remote, not only from the South-East Asian birthplace of the ancient invention of agriculture, but also from the Central European location of a recently established *limes* of the Roman Empire. While the Germans adjoining this *limes* had had their lives turned upside-down by the experience of living at close quarters with it, the Ests had been left still high and dry on the farther side of the 'reservoir' which the erection of the *limes* had created. The Ests were still industriously practising agriculture for the same reason that explains why the Suebi, Goths, and Swedes were still remaining loyal to a patriarchal form of kingship, in contrast to the political instability which the south-western Germans in the recently created 'reservoir' had been exhibiting when they had abandoned this same traditional form of government, first for an Hellenic-inspired oligarchy and latterly for the likewise Hellenic-inspired dictatorship of a war-lord backed by his war-band.²

Moreover, there is evidence that these north-eastern Germans out of range of the Roman *limes* had preserved not only their pristine political institutions but also the pristine devotion to agriculture that was characteristic of their eastern neighbours the Ests in Tacitus's time. When, some three or four hundred years later, the Germans in 'the reservoir' adjoining the Roman *limes* at last broke through the dam and flooded Gaul and Britain, the social and economic devastation which was the first effect of this cataclysm was followed, after the human flood waters had soaked into the social soil, by an economic advance that was the reward of a new agricultural technique, and this new technique had been introduced by the barbarian invaders. The Frankish and

¹ Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. 45, § 4.

² For the survival of a primitive patriarchal monarchy among the Teutonic peoples out of range of the Roman *limes*, see Dawson, Christopher: *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), pp. 79–81, as well as the present Study, V. v. 213, n. 1—citing Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 298–9 (a passage which is based on Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. 44)—and V. vi. 230–2. The interpretation of the war-lord in the barbarian 'reservoir' as a counterpart of the Caesar on the other side of a *limes* will be found in V. vi. 4, n. 4, and on p. 10, above. The general contrast between the revolution that overtakes the transfrontier barbarians of 'the reservoir' and the still undisturbed life of the transreservoir barbarians in a Hyperborean 'back of beyond' has been noticed in II. ii. 315–22, and on p. 4, above.

English war-bands brought with them into Northern Gaul and Eastern Britain the potent mould-board plough which, in the course of the Dark and Middle Ages, was to bring to fruition the latent fertility of heavy North European soils which had been impervious to the light plough used by Celts and Romans. Though, at the time of writing, Archaeology had not yet detected exactly when or where in Northern Europe this revolutionary technological invention had been made, it was manifest that it could not have been introduced into the former north-western provinces of the Roman Empire by transfrontier German invaders in the fifth century of the Christian Era unless these economically regressive barbarians had been able to learn—or re-learn—its use from north-eastern neighbours of theirs whose remoteness from a subversive Roman *limes* had permitted them still to follow their traditional way of life in an age in which the Germans in 'the reservoir' had been demoralized by the military frontier's proximity.

A people that was still giving hostages to Fortune by still leading the pristine agricultural sedentary life of the Ests and Swedes of Tacitus's day would evidently be more amenable than the elusive barbarians in 'the reservoir' to the punitive action of a 'civilized' Power employing ponderous weapons; but the Power behind a *limes* has no quarrel with Hyperboreans who are not only innocent of offence against its imperial peace but are also insulated from any direct contact with its armed forces by 'the reservoir' that lies between the *limes* and 'the back of beyond'. The denizens of 'the reservoir' are the barbarians with whom the Power behind the *limes* is in a state of chronic war, and in this warfare the economic regression that is the reverse side of the 'reservoir' barbarians' militarization is the trump card in their hand. Thanks to this economic relapse, they have little material wealth to lose; and, having little to lose by war with the neighbouring civilization, they have little to fear from the continuance of hostilities, or indeed from their intensification.

The Self-Defeat of a Policy of Setting a Thief to Catch a Thief

This striking inequality in the material consequences of border warfare for the two belligerents is reflected in a great and growing inequality between them in *moral*. For the children of a disintegrating civilization that is standing on the defensive—at any rate for a demilitarized majority of them in the interior, as distinct from a barbarized minority in the marches—the interminable border warfare with the barbarians beyond the *limes* spells the burden of an ever-increasing financial charge and the anxiety of a never solved military and political problem. For the barbarian belligerent, on the other hand, the same warfare has the very opposite psychological associations. For him it is not a burden but an opportunity, not an anxiety but an exhilaration. A contest that is always harassing for the civilized party—and utterly devastating for him when he finds himself no nearer to being within sight of the end of it after he has mobilized all his resources of organization and technique—is the very breath of life for the militarized barbarian. This great and always

increasing inequality in 'psychological armament' makes the discomfiture of the civilized belligerent inevitable sooner or later.¹

In this situation it is not surprising that the party who is both author and victim of the *limes* should not resign himself to his doom without trying a last expedient. If his own resources have proved disappointingly inefficacious for redressing a balance that has been remorselessly inclining against him, might he not be able to avert an otherwise manifest destiny by enlisting his barbarian adversary's disastrously demonstrated prowess in a tottering civilization's defence? If Brennus insolently threw his sword into the scale of Barbarism, why should not the scale of Civilization be saved, at the eleventh hour, from kicking the beam by deftly inserting into it the swords of a legendary Gallic barbarian's living Teuton, Sarmatian, Hun, and Arab counterparts?

This subtle policy of setting a thief to catch a thief might seem, indeed, to have everything to recommend it. The barbarian warrior is the citizen soldier's superior in the art of border warfare because the barbarian is fighting here on his own familiar ground; and he has come to be also the citizen-soldier's superior in personal prowess because he has acquired a zest for the profession of arms which his adversary has lost. This better military material can be purchased at a very much lower cost to the citizen-taxpayer;² and this cheap conversion of an enemy warrior into a friendly mercenary will doubly relieve the pressure on the *limes* by reducing *pari passu* both the power of the 'reservoir' barbarian to take the offensive and his incentive for going on the war-path. His power will

¹ This difference in attitude towards the ordeal of War likewise comes to light between parties who are sundered from one another by a less deep and less sharply cut psychological gulf than that which divides the transfrontier barbarians from the Power behind the *limes*.

In the summer of A.D. 1914, for example, the outbreak of war in Europe was taken more tragically by the peoples of the West than it was by the Serbs—though the Serbs had only just emerged from two successive Balkan Wars and were being called upon, this time, to face, not just Turkey or Bulgaria, but the overwhelmingly superior power of Austria-Hungary. Yet the Serbs were less dismayed by the prospect of this third war against enormous odds than they were exhilarated by the hope of this time being able—at the price of a holocaust—to complete the achievement of their national aspirations.

The same spirit had been displayed repeatedly by the Poles, who were culturally much closer akin than the Serbs were to the Western Europeans. During the Peace Conference of A.D. 1919 a friend of the writer's, Mr. Laurence Hammond, who was in Paris for the occasion as the special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, was talking one day about the peace settlement to a member of the Polish Delegation with a baffling sense that they were speaking at cross purposes. His Polish interlocutor must have had the same feeling; for, in the middle of the conversation, he remarked on this to the following effect: 'The truth is that you and I are approaching these questions from entirely different points of view. For you Westerners, as I have realized, the war that we have just been through has been a hideous and disastrous break in the peace which you have come to think of as being the normal condition of civilized life; and, in your ideas about a peace settlement, the paramount consideration in your minds is to avoid anything that might threaten to involve you in another catastrophe of the kind. If you could not persuade yourselves that this last war was "a war to end war", you would hardly be able to face the future. We Poles look at things quite differently. For us, War, not Peace, is the normal condition of life. We have been through many wars before this last one, and we expect to have to go through many more; but this does not dismay us, and it certainly does not deter us from pressing our national claims. If we get what we are asking for, I agree that this may well involve us in future wars with our neighbours; but, for us, that is all in the day's work. No doubt we shall again find ourselves at war; no doubt we shall again suffer catastrophes that would seem crushing to you English and French; and no doubt, in the next chapter of the story after that, there will still be a Poland on the map.'

² See p. 26, n. 1, above.

be reduced because his forces will now be divided (and every enlisted barbarian will count twice over in this redistribution of man-power, since he will be leaving one warrior the less to Barbarism in bringing one soldier the more to Civilization). At the same time the unenlisted barbarian's temptation to plunder his civilized neighbours will be appreciably diminished. Economic distress in a poverty-stricken and hitherto over-populated 'reservoir' will be mitigated by an outflow of man-power into the imperial forces on the other side of the *limes* and a consequent inflow of remittances from these mercenary barbarian soldiers' pay (a payment for services rendered which is decidedly preferable, from the Imperial Power's point of view, to the humiliating subsidies or plunderings that are the only too familiar alternative ways of effecting a transfer of purchasing-power which, in some form or other, is inevitable). If nevertheless an insatiable cupidity should entice the non-enlisted barbarian warriors into reverting to their traditional malpractices, they will now find themselves confronted, no longer by citizen-soldiers with no stomach for fighting, but by barbarian mercenaries who may be expected to give a good account of themselves—not only because they enjoy fighting and thirst for the fame that is the non-material reward of barbarian military prowess, but also because they will now have property of their own, on the civilized side of the *limes*, to defend against the covetous hands of their still predatory kinsmen from beyond the pale.

This impressive consensus of considerations had frequently led the rulers of universal states both to enlist transfrontier barbarian soldiers in their standing armies and to plant transfrontier barbarian settlers on the imperial side of the *limes*, in the marches or even in the interior. These would-be measures of imperial defence have been examined in other contexts,¹ and the details need not be recapitulated here. In this place we need only recall our previous finding² that this alluring expedient for averting a collapse of the *limes* actually precipitates the catastrophe which it is designed to forestall, and we may proceed to inquire into the explanation of this apparent paradox.

Part of the explanation is, of course, to be found in the consideration that, in taking the barbarians into its service, the Power behind the *limes* is also taking them into its confidence and is thereby subjecting them to an intensive course of instruction in a military and political 'know-how' which they can afterwards employ, if they choose, to their own profit at their teachers' expense.

'It can be said of the Roman, Chinese, and British Indian empires alike that the method that worked best was one of enlisting the services of the very tribes that were supposedly excluded by the boundary, thus turning them about so that they faced away from the boundary instead of toward it. . . . Nevertheless, it was a method that haunted the imperial state responsible for it, because it created a sword of two edges capable of striking outward when held in a strong hand but of cutting inward when the hand weakened. From border societies of this kind, linked with boundary-maintaining empires, were drawn the "barbarian auxiliaries"

¹ In V. v. 459–80, especially pp. 460 and 464, and VI. vii. 335–8. See also Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), p. 445.

² On pp. 12–13, above.

of Rome and the "tributary barbarians" of China; from a similar society the British Empire in India recruits both regular troops and tribal levies. From the same societies came invaders and conquerors of both Rome and China; and the people of the same kind with whom the British now¹ deal are as dangerous as they are useful.²

This last point is pertinently illustrated by a feature of the Waziristan campaign of A.D. 1919-20.

'The presence in Waziristan of not less than eighteen hundred fighting men—consisting of deserters from the two militia forces and ex-soldiers of the Indian Regular Army—who had received some form of British training had familiarised the tribesmen with the most modern tactics in rifle-fighting, and they now possessed sufficient stocks of ammunition to employ these tactics effectively.'³

In the history of the Roman Empire's long-drawn-out struggle to arrest an inexorable inclination of the scales in the transfrontier barbarians' favour, a comparable policy of enlisting barbarians to keep their fellow barbarians at bay similarly defeated itself—if we are to believe a hostile critic of the Emperor Theodosius I's administration—by initiating the barbarians into the Roman art of war and at the same time apprising them of the Roman Empire's weakness.

'In the Roman forces, discipline was now at an end, and all distinction between Roman and barbarian had broken down. The troops of both categories were all completely intermingled with one another in the ranks; for even the register of the soldiers borne on the strength of the military units was now no longer being kept up to date. The [barbarian] deserters [from the transfrontier barbarian war-bands to the Roman Imperial Army] thus found themselves free, after having been enrolled in Roman formations, to go home again and send off substitutes to take their place until, at their own good time, they might choose to resume their personal service under the Romans. This extreme disorganization that was thus now prevalent in the Roman military formations was no secret to the barbarians, since—with the door thrown wide open, as it had been, for intercourse—the deserters were able to give them full intelligence. The barbarians' conclusion was that the Roman body politic was being so grossly mismanaged as positively to invite attack.'⁴

When such well-instructed mercenaries change sides *en masse*, it is no wonder that they are often able to give the *coup de grâce* to a tottering Power behind the *lines*, which has enlisted their services as a last resort. But we have still to explain why they should be moved, as they so frequently are, to turn against their employers. When once they have been taken into the Imperial Power's service, does not their personal interest coincide with their professional duty? The regular pay that they are now drawing from the Imperial Treasury is both more lucrative and more secure than the plunder that they used to snatch at the risk of their lives in occasional raids; the rich land assigned to them by the Imperial

¹ This passage was written in or before A.D. 1940.—A.J.T.

² Lattimore, O.: *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York 1940, American Geographical Society), pp. 245-6.

³ Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 557.

⁴ Zosimus: *Historiae*, Book IV, chap. xxxi, §§ 1-3.

authorities inside the *limes* is an equally advantageous exchange for the wretched land beyond the pale that was too poor to keep them alive if they did not eke out its scanty produce by lifting crops and cattle, on the civilized side of the *limes*, which are now theirs to enjoy by right. Does not this change in their fortunes give them a stake in the survival of the empire thanks to whose patronage the change has come about? If they turn against the masters whom they have contracted to serve on such favourable terms as these, are they not virtually inviting their kinsmen who have stayed beyond the pale to scramble with them for benefits that remain their own monopoly so long as they keep the *limes* inviolate? Why, then, turn traitor? *Cui bono*?

The single answer to all these questions is that, in turning against the empire which he has been hired to defend, the barbarian mercenary is indeed acting against his own material interests, but that in doing this he is not doing anything peculiar. Man seldom behaves primarily as *homo economicus*, and the behaviour of a transfrontier barbarian in the service of the Power behind the *limes* is determined by an impulse that is stronger than any economic considerations. The governing factor in the situation is that the barbarian beyond the pale has long since become estranged from a broken-down neighbouring civilization. This moral breach between the two parties cannot be mended by a business deal—however profitable to both sides the bargain may be. An unreconciled estrangement will prevent the barbarian who has enlisted in the Imperial Government's service from being assimilated to the culture of the society which he has contracted to defend by force of arms; and, if enlistment will not lead to assimilation, the policy of enlistment cannot succeed.

The truth is that, in enlisting the barbarian in its service, the Power behind the *limes* is attempting, under altogether unpropitious psychological conditions, to recapture the relation between Barbarism and Civilization that prevailed in days when the civilization had not yet broken down and the *limes* had not yet come into existence. The defence of the civilization by an inner ring of barbarians against an outer ring of barbarians was something that happened of itself, without any contract between the parties, so long as a growing civilization was attracting the barbarians by its charm. Under these psychological conditions an inner ring of barbarians served spontaneously both as a conductor through which the civilization radiated its cultural influence into barbarian societies at a farther remove and as a buffer which absorbed the shocks of these outer barbarians' attempts to take by force¹ a cultural kingdom which, in its heyday, had for them the fascination of the Kingdom of Heaven. In these happy psychological circumstances the inner barbarian proselytes of one day became the cultural converts of the next, while today's outer barbarian assailants became tomorrow's inner barbarian proselytes. The growing civilization progressively extended its borders through the successive assimilation of one ring after another of its barbarian neighbours—a very different story from the subsequent history of a broken-down civilization's expansion by force, up to the

¹ Matt. xi. 12.

limit to which sheer force could carry it, at the expense of barbarians whom it has ceased to charm.

The reason why, after the breakdown of the civilization and the erection of the *limes*, the enlisted barbarians do not remain loyal is that, in the mercenary barbarian's soul, his business contract with his civilized employer is not underwritten by any desire to share in the civilization which he has undertaken to defend in return for a material *quid pro quo*. The direction of the current of mimesis has indeed, as we have seen,¹ long since been reversed, and, so far from Civilization's retaining any prestige in the barbarian's eyes, it is the barbarian who now enjoys prestige in the eyes of the representative of Civilization.

'Early Roman history has been described as the history of ordinary people doing extraordinary things. In the Later Empire it took an extraordinary man to do anything at all, except carry on a routine, and, as the Empire had for centuries devoted itself to the breeding and training of ordinary men, the extraordinary men of its last ages—Stilicho, Aëtius, and their like—were increasingly drawn from the Barbarian World.'²

While Stilicho was a barbarian, and an exceptionally loyal one, in the Roman Imperial service, Aëtius was a barbarized Roman marchman;³ and it was not only in the Roman Empire *in extremis* that this assimilation of the marchman to the barbarian occurred. On the Central Asian *limes* of the Han Empire and its avatars, 'in entering "un-Chinese" *terrain* the Chinese had to modify or abandon their Chinese economy, thus weakening their attachment to other Chinese'.⁴ This reversal of the direction of the current of mimesis is fatal for a policy of enlisting Barbarism in Civilization's defence. In these psychological circumstances a corps of barbarian *foederati* will never turn into a unit of the Imperial Regular Army; it will remain an unassimilated barbarian war-band retaining its own weapons and tactics, taking its orders from its own war-lord, feeling its own *esprit de corps*, nursing its own ambitions. In the same circumstances a settlement of barbarian *laeti*⁵ will never turn into a civil community of imperial citizens; it will remain an unassimilated *imperium in imperio* which, short of being annihilated, will find its political destiny sooner or later in becoming the nucleus of a dissident successor-state. In short, the policy of hiring barbarians to keep their kinsmen out is foredoomed to failure; and, as this expedient is the last forlorn hope of the tottering Power behind the *limes*, its failure is immediately followed by the *limes'* collapse.

¹ In V. v. 459-80, and on pp. 14-15, above.

² Collingwood, R. G., in Collingwood, R. G., and Myres, J. N. L.: *Roman Britain and the English Settlements*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press), p. 307.

³ See the passage quoted from Lot in V. v. 472.

⁴ Lattimore, O.: *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York 1940, American Geographical Society), pp. 243-4. Cp. the passage already quoted on p. 14, above.

⁵ See VII. vi. 138-9.

D. THE CATACLYSM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A Reversal of Roles

WHEN a barrage bursts, the whole body of water that has been gradually accumulating in the reservoir above the dam runs violently down a steep place into the sea¹ in the twinkling of an eye, and this sudden release of a long-pent-up and ever-mounting force produces a threefold catastrophe. In the first place the flood destroys the works of Man in the cultivated lands below the broken barrage. In the second place the potentially life-giving water that has made this devastating passage pours into the sea and becomes lost in the sea-water's saline mass, without ever having served Man for his human purposes of irrigation or navigation or the generation of hydraulic power. In the third place the discharge of the accumulated waters empties the artificial lake above the barrage and leaves its margin high and dry, and this flight of the waters from above the dam dooms the exotic vegetation which had found an unexpected possibility of life at the stored-up water's edge to wither away without propagating its kind on a mountain-side that has now relapsed into its pristine barrenness. In short, the waters which fructified so long as the barrage held, make havoc everywhere, in the lands that they lay bare as well as in those that they submerge, so soon as the bursting of the barrage releases them from the control which the existence of the barrage had imposed upon them.

This episode in Man's contest with Physical Nature is an apt simile of what happens in Man's struggle with Human Nature, in his neighbours and in himself, upon the collapse of the military barrage of a *limes*. The resulting social cataclysm is a calamity for all concerned; but in the human, as in the physical, disaster the incidence of the devastation is unequal, and in this case likewise the distribution of the damage is the reverse of what might have been expected *a priori*. There is, in fact, here a paradoxical reversal of roles.² So long as the representatives of a disintegrating civilization were successful in saving a tottering *limes* from collapse, the tribulation which it cost them to perform this *tour de force* was progressively aggravated, as we have seen,³ out of all proportion to the progressive increase in the pressure exerted by the transfrontier barbarians. On the other hand, now that the disaster, so long dreaded and so long averted by the Power behind the *limes*, has at last duly descended upon the doomed civilization's devoted head, the principal sufferers are no longer the ex-subjects of the defunct universal state, over whose fields and cities the deluge of barbarian invasion now rolls unchecked, but the ostensibly triumphant barbarians themselves. The hour of their triumph, for which they have thirsted so long, proves to be

¹ Matt. viii. 32; Mark v. 13; Luke viii. 33.

² The play of this ironical motif in human affairs—for which Aristotle coined the term *περιπέτεια*—has been discussed in IV. iv. 245–61.

³ On pp. 12, 25–26, and 39–40, above.

the occasion of a discomfiture which neither they nor their defeated adversaries had foreseen.

The Demoralization of the Barbarian Conquerors

What is the explanation of this apparent paradox? The answer is that the *limes*, whose resistance the transfrontier barbarian has been seeking all the time to overcome, has served, not only as the bulwark of Civilization that its builders and defenders had intended it to provide against an outer Barbarism, but also as a providential safeguard for the aggressive barbarian himself against demonically self-destructive psychological forces within his own bosom.

We have seen¹ that the proximity of a *limes* induces a malaise among the transfrontier barbarians within range of it because their previously primitive economy and institutions are disintegrated by a rain of psychic energy, generated by the civilization within the *limes*, that is wafted across a barrier which is an obstacle to the fuller and more fruitful intercourse characteristic of the relations between a growing civilization and the primitive proselytes beyond its open and inviting *limen*. We have also seen² that, so long as the barbarian is confined beyond the pale, he succeeds in transmuting some, at least, of this disturbing influx of alien psychic energy into cultural products—political, artistic, and religious—which are partly adaptations of institutions created by the civilization from which the intrusive cultural influence comes, and partly new creations of the barbarian's own. This capacity for adaptation and even creation, that is thus displayed by the barbarian while he is still beyond the pale, is a symptom that the psychological disturbance to which he is being exposed is being kept within bounds within which it can produce a partially stimulating and not wholly demoralizing effect; and this saving curb is provided by the existence of the very *limes* which the barbarian is bent on destroying; for the *limes*, so long as it holds, supplies a substitute, in some measure, for the indispensable discipline of which Primitive Man is deprived when the breaking of his cake of primitive custom³ converts him into a transfrontier barbarian. This discipline is partly imposed on him externally; for, so long as the perennial border warfare continues, the barbarian belligerent, whether his role be that of raider, hostage, or mercenary, is being trained continually perforce in a stern yet at the same time instructive military school; but the *limes* disciplines him most effectively in the psychological sense of giving him tasks to perform, objectives to reach, and difficulties to contend with that call forth his highest powers and constantly keep his efforts up to the mark.

When the sudden collapse of the *limes* sweeps this safeguard away, the nascent creative powers that have been evoked in the transfrontier barbarian by the challenge of the *limes* are daunted and defeated by being called upon, suddenly and prematurely, to perform new tasks that are altogether too great and too difficult for them to cope with; and in this hour of bewilderment, when there is no more spirit in them,⁴ these frail

¹ On pp. 4-9 and 35-39, above.

³ See the phrase quoted from Bagehot in II. i. 192.

² On pp. 9-11, above.

⁴ 2 Chron. ix. 4.

shoots of tender wheat are quickly stifled by the tares in the spiritual field of the barbarian's soul—his *abandon*¹ and his ferocity—which find boundless opportunities for luxuriant growth now that the former raider and mercenary has entered into his long-coveted kingdom. If the trans-frontier barbarian is a more brutal, as well as a more sophisticated, being than his ancestor the primitive tribesman, the latter-day barbarian who has broken through the *limes* and carved a successor-state out of the derelict domain of a defunct universal state becomes differentiated from his already barbarian predecessor beyond the pale in the same two senses in a still higher degree. As soon as the barbarian has left no-man's-land behind him and set foot in a ruined world which is for him an earthly paradise, his malaise rankles into demoralization. This demonic revolution in the barbarian's soul is illustrated by the spiritual catastrophe which overtook the Scandinavians when they overran the Carolingian Empire.² When, in the Viking Age, they tore their life up from its static primitive roots and launched it into pure adventure, the price of an excessive liberation was a fatal loss of balance.³

'When the King's hall was transplanted into a foreign country and his luck plucked out of the fields and grazing grounds surrounding his manor, life necessarily became a round of battles and drinking feasts.'⁴

In this exotic environment the barbarian's previously manifest vices become flagrant, and his previously latent vices become manifest.

For example, the tendency towards parasitism,⁵ revealed in the barbarian's loss of grip upon the economic arts of peace through which his primitive forebears earned their livelihood,⁶ is kept in check, so long as the *limes* stands, by the parasite's finding himself compelled to pay by fighting—either as a raider or as a mercenary set to catch the thief that his brother has continued to be—for the living that he has ceased to earn by productive labour. But this last shred of economic respectability falls from the barbarian's shoulders when his eventual acquisition of provinces which he has plundered or policed in the past gives him an effortless command over the wreckage of a civilization which, for him, still amounts to fabulous wealth. Hybrias the unchallenged master of a prostrate Minoan serfdom is a more odious parasite than Hybrias' father, who had to snatch his booty or draw his pay from imperial Minos' store at the cost of putting his own life in jeopardy.

Again, the tendency towards sloth which the transfrontier barbarian already displays is, beyond the pale, likewise confined, as Tacitus

¹ The passive way of behaviour, produced by schism in the soul, which we have called *abandon* (alias *ἀπαρτία*), has been discussed in V. v. 377 and 399-403.

² See II. ii. 340-60.

³ See Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 vols. in 2), vols. ii-iii, pp. 304-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

⁵ A hermit-crab, which is the arch-parasite, is the antithesis of a chrysalis; and this contrast gives the measure of the gulf between the barrenness of the External Proletariat and the creativity of the Internal Proletariat—considering that the role of chrysalis bridging the transition to an affiliated from an apparent civilization, which had sometimes been played by churches created by internal proletariats, proves not to have been more than an incidental deviation from a higher religion's true calling (see VII. vii. 392-419).

⁶ See pp. 35-38, above.

observed,¹ to bouts of idleness spent in consuming a windfall acquired in the warrior's latest raid or latest term of mercenary service; and the idler takes it for granted all the time that he will have to go on the war-path again as soon as his momentary gains have been spent—whereas the barbarian master of a successor-state feels himself dispensed from living from hand to mouth and joyfully lapses into vegetating as a boorish sybarite, with no forebodings of a day of judgement on which the strong man² who has thus heedlessly laid aside his arms may be despoiled of his ill-gotten goods by a stronger than he—as the Vandals were overtaken by a Roman *revanche* and the Visigoths by the swoop of fellow barbarian Arab raiders who had not yet had time, since their passage of the Roman Empire's Syrian *limes*, to tread the barbarian conqueror's demoralizing road all the way to its miserable journey's end. The alternative route to the same dismal goal is the even less romantic path that was trodden by the Kassites and the Merovingians, who were denied the comparatively honourable exit of a violent death in order to be sentenced in the bankruptcy court of History when they had run through the wasting assets of a civilization which had already gone into disintegration before they had arrived on the scene to speed the course of its ruin by making a bonfire out of a dead society's derelict social heritage.

In whichever of these two alternative ways they meet their end,³ the barbarians in *partibus civilium* cast themselves, as we have observed by anticipation,⁴ for the sordid role of vultures feeding on carrion or maggots crawling in a carcass; and it has been noticed by Ibn Khaldūn that they are apt to display a most unheroic prudence in keeping at a safe distance from their dying victim's body until the life has so far gone out of him that there is no danger any longer of his being able to offer any resistance.

'[The future founders of a successor-state] give way to baseless fears whenever they hear talk of the [flourishing] state of the existing empire and of the vast resources that it has at its command. This is enough to deter them from attacking it, and so their chief is obliged to have patience and to bide his time. But, when the empire has fallen into complete decadence, as invariably happens, and when its military and financial strength has suffered mortal injuries, this chief is rewarded for having waited so long by now finding himself able to take advantage of the opportunity of conquering the empire. . . . When the will of God has made itself manifest, and the old empire is on the point of collapse, after having reached the term of its existence, and has become disorganised in all its parts, its feebleness and exhaustion attract its adversary's notice. . . . Encouraged by this discovery, the people of the new empire prepare with one accord to open the attack; the imaginary dangers that had shaken their resolution up to that moment now disappear, the period of waiting comes to an end, and the conquest is accomplished by force of arms.'⁵

¹ In the passage quoted on p. 37, n. 2, above.

² Luke xi. 21–22; cp. Matt. xii. 29; Mark iii. 27.

³ These alternative endings of the barbarians' adventures have been touched upon in I. i. 58–59 and in IV. iv. 484–6, and are surveyed at greater length at the close of the present chapter.

⁴ In I. i. 62.

⁵ Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863–8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 134–5.

As examples of this circumspect method of 'conquering' a moribund universal state, Ibn Khaldūn cites the eviction of the Umayyads by the 'Abbasids; the supplanting of the 'Abbasids in their turn by the Tabarī 'Alids in Daylam and by the Daylamīs in the two 'Irāqs and in Fars; the eviction of the 'Abbasids' local successors in Egypt by the Katāma Berbers ('the Fātimids'), of the Ghaznawids by the Saljūq Turks, and of the last of the 'Abbasids and their supplanters east of the Euphrates by the Mongols, who, as he points out, took forty years (A.D. 1220-60) to build their empire up; the eviction of the Far Western Umayyads' successors by the Lamtūna Berbers (the Murābits), of the Lamtūna by the Masmūda (the Muwāhhids), and of the Masmūda by the Zanāta (the Marinids).¹ After presenting his readers with this survey, Ibn Khaldūn anticipates a pious Muslim's objection that the Primitive Muslim Arabs' conquest of the Romans and the Sasanidae was a genuine—and tremendous—feat of arms, and he concedes that this is a miraculous exception of the kind that proves a rule. A more sceptical student of this at first sight astonishing achievement may be inclined to question whether Ibn Khaldūn need have feared that it might seem to invalidate his thesis; for, when all allowance has been made for the *élan* of a Khālid b. Walid, a satisfactory and sufficient explanation of the rapidity and ease of the Arab conquests is to be found in the fact that, immediately before the Arabs' eruption, the Roman and Sasanian empires had bled one another white and fought one another to a standstill in the internecine wars of A.D. 572-91 and A.D. 603-28, and that the Monophysite Christian subjects of the Roman Empire south of the Taurus were at least as deeply alienated from their 'Melchite' Orthodox Christian rulers as the Nestorian Christian subjects of the Sasanian Empire in 'Irāq were from their Zoroastrian rulers.

If the parasitism and the idleness already displayed by the barbarian while still beyond the pale are apt to luxuriate as soon as the collapse of a moribund universal state's last powers of resistance removes the last check on this cautiously predatory scavenger's perpetual temptation to take his ease, other vices, previously latent, become flagrantly manifest in the barbarian as soon as he brings upon himself, by breaking through the *limes*, the fantastic experience of 'Alice through the Looking Glass'. The origin of this revolting array of moral disorders is to be found in a sudden emancipation for which the victim-beneficiary is morally unprepared. Liberation from the restraint imposed by the existence of the *limes*, and of the Power behind it, is as demoralizing for the barbarian as, in the would-be civilized society that he overruns, is an adolescent's escape from the control of parents and pedagogues before the creature has acquired the will or power to attempt to control itself.

"The qualities exhibited by these societies, virtues and defects alike, are clearly those of adolescence. . . . The characteristic feature . . . is emancipation—social, political, and religious—from the bonds of tribal law. . . . The characteristics of heroic ages in general are those neither of infancy nor of maturity. . . . The typical man of the Heroic Age is to be compared rather with a youth. . . . For a true analogy we must turn to

¹ Ibid., pp. 135-7.

the case of a youth who has outgrown both the ideas and the control of his parents—such a case as may be found among the sons of unsophisticated parents who through outside influence, at school or elsewhere, have acquired knowledge which places them in a position of superiority to their surroundings.¹

The latent weakness of the abruptly emancipated adolescent comes out conspicuously on the social and political plane. As we have noticed already,²

'in social organisation the distinguishing feature of the Heroic Age is in the nature of a revolt or emancipation from those tribal obligations and ideas by which the society of primitive peoples is everywhere governed. The same remark applies in principle to political organisation: the princes of the Heroic Age appear to have freed themselves to a large extent from any public control on the part of the tribe or community. The changes which we have noted in Religion have a similar tendency. Tribal ideas give way to universalism both in the cult of higher powers and in the conception of immortality; and in both the Teutonic and Greek heroic ages these changes seem to be associated with a weakening in the force of Religion. . . . It will be seen that the emancipation of which we are speaking is partly of an intellectual character. This applies both to Religion and to those ideas which govern social relations. On the other hand it is also partly in the nature of a freedom from outside control, both in social relations and in government. The force formerly exercised by the kindred is now largely transferred to the *comitatus*, a body of chosen adherents pledged to personal loyalty to their chief. So also, in government, the council of the tribe or community has come to be nothing more than a *comitatus* or court. The result of the change is that the man who possesses a *comitatus* becomes largely free from the control of his kindred, while the chief similarly becomes free from control within his community.'³

The Bankruptcy of a Fallen Civilized Empire's Barbarian Successor-states.

On the barbarian's native heath beyond the pale, this social and political revolution wears the aspect of an act of creation opportunely filling a vacuum produced by the disintegration of primitive institutions under the corroding influence of the civilization behind the *limes*; and in this relatively simple social environment the new régime duly serves its turn well enough sometimes to move the statesmen of the adjoining universal state to utilize it for their own purpose of transforming a no-man's-land into a glacis for a *Festung-Oikoumené*. The capacity of a barbarian war-lord and his *comitatus* to perform, on occasion, the service of providing a buffer-state for a universal state in the last phase of its history was demonstrated in the histories of the Ghassanid Arab principality, covering the Syrian desert frontier of the Roman Empire,⁴

¹ Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 442-4.

² On pp. 10 and 38, above.

³ Chadwick, op. cit., p. 443.

⁴ 'L'empereur leur conféra le titre de patrice, qui les hissait au sommet de la hiérarchie byzantine. Il créa pour eux la dignité de *phylarche* ou commandant des tribus. C'était rattacher au phylarcat gassanide tous les Bédouins, placés sous la mouvance plus ou moins directe de l'empire, en Syrie et dans les déserts limitrophes. Représentants officiels de César auprès de leurs compatriotes, les émirs assumaient la surveillance du *limes*, de la frontière syro-palestinienne. Ils devaient favoriser la pénétration de l'in-

and its counterpart and adversary the Lakhmid Arab principality, covering the 'Irāqī desert frontier of the Sasanian Empire, during the last hundred years before both these buffer-states were swept away by the Primitive Muslim Arabs' onslaught¹ on the imperial Powers whom the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids had served so well for so long.² The same tale is told by the history of the Salian Frankish guardians of the Roman Empire's Lower Rhenish frontier during the century following their plantation in Toxandria as *dediticii* by the Emperor Julian in A.D. 358;³ and the principality of Afghanistan served the British Indian Empire in a similar capacity during the forty years A.D. 1879-1919.

fluence romaine, derrière la ligne de fortins et de castella, tendue depuis le Nord de la Palmyrène jusque vers Aila, pour protéger les agglomérations de sédentaires. Cette institution du phylarcat gassanide, mécanisme souple et peu coûteux, fut une des plus heureuses inspirations de la pénétration pacifique. Elle garantissait à la fois la sécurité des frontières, le prestige de l'Empire, tout en ménageant l'amour-propre ombrageux des Bédouins' (Lammens, S.J., Père H.: *La Mecque à la Veille de l'Hégire* (Bayrūt 1924, Imprimerie Catholique), p. 244).

¹ The Muslim Arab conquerors found the two Christian march states themselves less difficult to liquidate than the historic feud between them. In the civil war between 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah which followed close on the heels of the conquest (see the present chapter, p. 64, below), 'Alī, from his capital at Kūfah, was playing the prince of Hīrah's traditional part, and Mu'āwiyah, from his capital at Damascus, the Ghassanid phylarch's (see VI. vii. 131, n. 3).

² The Roman Empire's Ghassanid Arab march was organized by the Emperor Justinian circa A.D. 530-1, and, according to Lammens, op. cit., pp. 244-5, this initiative on the Roman Imperial Government's part led the Sasanian Imperial Government to confer a corresponding status on its own Arab protégés and political agents, the Lakhmids. This change in the Lakhmids' position seems to have been formal rather than substantial, since, *de facto*, the Lakhmids had already been serving as the wardens of the Sasanids' desert march, and this going concern was no doubt the model which Justinian had before his eyes when he created his own Ghassanid phylarchy. According to de Lacy O'Leary, *Arabia before Muhammad* (London 1927, Kegan Paul), p. 155, the Lakhmids had been the Sasanids' Arab agents since the time of the second Sasanian emperor, Shapur I (*accessit* A.D. 241). During the decadence of the foregoing Parthian Arsacid régime which the Persian Sasanidae had now swept away, there had been an infiltration of Nomad Arabs, not only into the North Mesopotamian Steppe, but into the cultivated lands in 'Irāq, and the newly established Sasanian Power found itself confronted with the task of reducing these interlopers to order. When Shapur I inherited this formidable task from his father Ardashir I, the founder of the Sasanian Empire, he forbore to carry out to the bitter end the policy of subjugating these recalcitrant Arabs within his frontiers by force of arms, and resorted to the alternative policy of indirect rule through an Arab deputy—a compromise which vindicated the Sasanian Imperial Government's suzerainty without depriving the Arabs of their autonomy. The deputy whom Shapur I appointed was the Lakhmid 'Amr b. 'Adī, and this appointment was the origin of the Sasanian Arab march with its administrative centre at Hīrah. This Sasanian march, like its Roman counterpart, was still in existence at the time of the Muslim Arab conquest, though the Lakhmid dynasty had been deposed by the Sasanian Emperor Khusrū II Parwiz. According to O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 160-1, the last of the Lakhmid princes of Hīrah, a Nu'man, fled to the desert, for fear of the Sasanian Government's hostility, in A.D. 605, and returned and was put to death by Parwiz circa A.D. 620 [*sic*]. After putting Nu'man to death, Parwiz replaced him on the throne of Hīrah by Iyas of the tribe of Tayy, and then, after Iyas' death, annexed Hīrah, in A.D. 614 [*sic*], to the territories under the Sasanian Crown's direct administration. According to Christensen, A.: *Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin & Munkegaard), p. 447, the date at which Nu'man was put to death by Parwiz was some time between A.D. 595 and A.D. 604.

³ Though Salian Frankish war-bands under Merovingian leadership began, as early as the fifth decade of the fifth century, to encroach upon Roman Imperial domain-lands in Northern Gaul beyond the limits of the territory originally assigned to them by the Roman authorities, another Salian war-lord, Clogio, was defeated by Aëtius at Vicus Helena (Helesmes) in an attempt to seize Cambrai. The diplomatic Roman victor rewarded the defeated Salians for their misdemeanours by allowing them to retain the conquests that they had made up to that point, and by raising their status from that of *dediticii* (who, at least in theory, were required to do their military service for the Empire as regular soldiers enrolled in units of the Imperial Army) to the status of

These examples show that a barbarian military monarchy may prove equal to the task of holding the wardenship of a march, against its fellow barbarians beyond the pale, under a universal state's auspices. But the fates of the successor-states established by barbarian conquerors in the interior of an extinct universal state's former domain show still more clearly that this equivocal achievement of a jejune barbarian political genius is quite unequal to the task of bearing burdens and solving problems that are thrown upon it because they have proved too much for the statesmanship of an oecumenical Power that has been heir to the cumulative political experience of an entire civilization. How, indeed, could a challenge that has defeated the efforts of even a broken-down civilization be expected to receive a victorious response from barbarian interlopers? If the god Helios himself had lost command of his fiery steeds, the catastrophic outcome of a mortal Phaethon's audacious endeavour to stay the hazardous course would have been doubly inevitable.

A barbarian successor-state blindly goes into business on the strength of the dishonoured credits of a universal state that has already gone into bankruptcy; and these boons in office hasten the advent of their inevitable doom by a self-betrayal through the outbreak, under stress of a moral ordeal, of something fatally false within;¹ for a polity based solely on a gang of armed desperados' fickle loyalty to an irresponsible military leader,² while it may be adequate for the organization of a raid or, at a pinch, for the administration and defence of a march, is morally unfit for the government of a community that has made even an unsuccessful attempt at civilization.³ It is far more unfit than would have been the unsophisticated yet respectable primitive rule of custom interpreted by the living elders of the tribe⁴ into whose swept and gar-

foederati (whose privilege it was to serve in national units of their own). Under this new arrangement the Salians duly fought on the Roman side against Attila at the Campus Mauriacus in A.D. 451: *quondam milites Romani, tunc vero iam in numero auxiliarium exquisiti* (Jordanes: *Getica*, 191). After Aëtius's death in A.D. 454 Clogio took Cambrai and advanced to the Somme, but the Imperial Government's authority was once again established over the *foederati* in Gaul by the Emperor Majorian (*imperabat* A.D. 457-61), and thereafter the Salians continued, at least formally, to recognize the authority of Aegidius, Majorian's *magister militum per Gallias*, who held on at Soissons after Majorian's assassination. It was not till A.D. 486/7, when Merovech's grandson Clovis (Chlodovech) attacked and overthrew Aegidius's successor Syagrius, that the Merovingian buffer-state of the Roman Empire openly asserted its independence (see Schmidt, L.: 'Aus den Anfängen des Salfränkischen Königtums', in *Klio*, vol. xxxiv, pp. 306-27).

¹ Meredith, George, quoted in IV. iv. 120 and VI. vii. 46.

² 'Irresponsible power, uncontrolled by any settled traditions of ordered freedom, will often assert itself or defend itself by savage cruelty. The catalogue of such enormities is too long and monotonous to be told in detail' (Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), p. 133, introducing an anthology of Merovingian atrocities).

³ The failure of the barbarian successor-states of a fallen civilized empire to carry out their self-imposed mandate is the more signal, considering that they are apt, at their inauguration, to be presented with the invaluable unearned asset of a fund of good will in the hearts of their newly acquired civilized subjects. These ex-citizens of a fallen universal state are so utterly disillusioned with the decadent imperial régime from whose incompetence and corruption they and their forebears have suffered for many generations past, that they are inclined to greet even a barbarian alternative régime as a welcome alleviation. See Orosius: *Historiae Adversum Paganos*, Book VII, chap. xli, § 7, and Salvian: *De Gubernatione Dei*, Book V, §§ 21-22 and 36-37, quoted by E. M. Pickman in *The Mind of Latin Christendom* (London 1937, Oxford University Press), pp. 273-4.

+ See II. i. 191-2.

nished house¹ this gangster-constitution has forced its entry since the radiation of a disintegrating civilization has perverted that decadent society's once primitive neighbours into bands of adolescent barbarians.²

When these barbarian war-bands have entered into their kingdom in the former domain of a fallen universal state, the dissolution of the primitive kin-group in the barbarian *comitatus* is swiftly followed by the dissolution of the *comitatus* itself in the alien subject population.

"The Arabs who have settled in . . . regions which afford rich pastures for their flocks, and which provide everything required for making life agreeable, have allowed the purity of their race to be corrupted by marriages with foreign families. This has been the history of the Lakhm, the Judhām, the Ghassān, the Tayy, the Khuzā'ah, the Ayyad and the other tribes descended from Himyar and Kahlan. . . . The Caliph Umar said: 'Learn your genealogies, and do not be like the Nabataeans [settled Arabs] of As-Sawād [the alluvial plain of 'Irāq]; when one asks one of them where he comes from, he answers: *From such and such a village*.'" But the Arabs established in fertile countries with fat pastures found themselves in contact with other peoples, and this led to an intermingling of race and blood. Indeed, from the first days of Islam, people began to name the [interloping Arab] tribes after the countries of which they were in occupation. People spoke, for example, of the *jund* [cantonment] of Qinnasrīn, the *jund* of Damascus, the *jund* of the 'Awāsim. The same usage made its way into Andalusia. The Arabs had not, as a matter of fact, renounced the custom of calling themselves by the name of the tribe to which they belonged; they were merely adopting an additional surname, in order to make it easier for their war-lords to distinguish them. Thereafter, [however,] they mixed with the inhabitants of the towns—people mostly of foreign race—and in this way they lost their purity of blood entirely. From that time onwards, family ties became so weak among them that they lost their sense of nationality. . . . Next, the tribes themselves became extinct, and their liquidation brought with it the disappearance of all *esprit de corps*.³

The Restraining Influences of Aidōs, Nemesis, and Hilm.

The barbarian trespassers in *partibus civilium* have, in fact, condemned themselves to suffer a moral breakdown as an inevitable consequence of their own adventurous act.⁴ Yet they do not yield to their

¹ Matt. xii. 44; Luke xi. 25.

² The moral inferiority of the adolescent barbarian to his primitive predecessor has been pointed out by H. G. Wells in *The Outline of History* (London 1920, Cassell), p. 298, in a passage which is a fine example of his intuitive genius. (In order to transpose this passage into the terminology of the present Study, Wells' term 'barbarism' has, of course, to be construed as 'primitive life', and his term 'savage' as 'primitive'.)

³ It is frequently said that Europe in the sixth and seventh centuries relapsed into barbarism, but that does not express the reality of the case very well. Barbarism is a social order of an elementary type, orderly within its limits; the state of Europe beneath its political fragmentation was a social disorder. Its *moral* was not that of a kraal, but that of a slum. In a savage kraal a savage knows that he belongs to a community, and lives and acts accordingly; in a slum the individual neither knows of, nor acts in relation to, any greater being.

⁴ Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 272-3.

⁵ Ibn Khaldūn traces the stages of this demoralization with a masterly hand, and with a wealth of illustrations from the histories of Arab and Berber barbarian interlopers, in op. cit., vol. i, especially pp. 292-7 and 342-59.

self-decreed doom without a spiritual struggle that has left its traces in their literary records of myth and ritual and standards of conduct.

The barbarians' ubiquitous master-myth describes the hero's victorious fight with a monster for the acquisition of a treasure which the unearthly enemy is withholding from Mankind in order to devour it or to hoard it for his own bestial satisfaction. This is the common *motif* of the tales of Beowulf's fight with Grendel and Grendel's mother; Siegfried's fight with the dragon; Perseus' feat of slaying and decapitating a gorgon the sight of whose head would have turned him to stone if he had not skillfully avoided setting eyes on it, and his subsequent feat of winning Andromeda for his bride by slaying the sea-monster who was threatening to devour her. The *motif* reappears in Jason's outmanœuvring of the serpent-guardian of the Golden Fleece and in Hēraklēs' kidnapping of Cerberus. This myth looks like a projection, on to the outer world, of a psychological struggle, in the barbarian's own soul, for the rescue of Man's supreme spiritual treasure, his rational will, from a demonic spiritual force released in the abyss of the unconscious depths of the Psyche by the shattering experience of passing, at one step, from a familiar no-man's-land outside the *limes* into the enchanted world laid open by the barrier's collapse. The myth may indeed be a translation into literary narrative of a ritual act of exorcism in which a militarily triumphant but spiritually afflicted barbarian has attempted to find a practical remedy for his devastating psychological malady.¹

In the emergence of special standards of conduct applicable to the peculiar circumstances of an heroic age we can see a further attempt, from another line of approach, to set moral bounds to the ravages of a demon that has been let loose in the souls of the barbarian lords and masters of a prostrate civilization by the fall of the material barrier of the *limes*. Conspicuous examples are the Achaeans' Homeric *Aidōs* and *Nemesis* ('Shame' and 'Indignation') and the Umayyads' historic *Hilm* (a studied Self-Restraint).

'The great characteristic of [*Aidōs* and *Nemesis*], as of Honour generally, is that they only come into operation when a man is free: when there is no compulsion. If you take people . . . who have broken away from all their old sanctions and select among them some strong and turbulent chief who fears no one, you will first think that such a man is free to do whatever enters his head. And then, as a matter of fact, you find that, amid his lawlessness, there will crop up some possible action which somehow makes him feel uncomfortable. If he has done it, he "rues" the deed and is haunted by it. If he has not done it, he "shrinks" from doing it. And this, not because anyone forces him, nor yet because any particular result will accrue to him afterwards, but simply because he feels *aidōs*. . . .²

'*Aidōs* is what you feel about an act of your own; *Nemesis* is what you

¹ This fascinating subject has been explored by Gustav Hübener in a series of studies: *England und die Gesittungsgrundlage der Europäischen Frühgeschichte* (Frankfurt am Main 1930); 'Der Heroische Exorzismus der Nordischen Rasse und der Winckelried-sagenkreis am Vierwaldstättersee', in *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*, 1931; 'Beowulf and German Exorcism', in *Review of English Studies*, vol. xi, No. 42, 1935; 'Beowulf's "Seax", the Saxons, and an Indian Exorcism', *ibid.*, vol. xii, No. 48, 1936.

² It will be seen that, in H. G. Wells's terms (see the passage quoted on p. 53, n. 2, above), *Aidōs* is essentially a virtue of 'a slum' in which 'the individual neither knows of, nor acts in relation to, any greater being.'—A.J.T.

feel for the act of another. Or, most often, it is what you imagine that others will feel about you. . . . But suppose no one sees. The act, as you know well, remains *νέμεσις*—a thing to feel *nemesis* about: only there is no one there to feel it. Yet, if you yourself dislike what you have done, and feel *aidós* for it, you inevitably are conscious that somebody or something dislikes or disapproves of you. . . . The Earth, Water, and Air [are] full of living eyes: of *theoi*, of *daimones*, of *kéres*. . . . And it is they who have seen you and are wroth with you for the thing which you have done.¹

In a post-Minoan heroic age, as depicted in the Homeric Epic, the actions that evoke feelings of *Aidós* and *Nemesis* are those implying cowardice, lying, and perjury, lack of reverence, and cruelty or treachery towards the helpless.²

Apart from any question of wrong acts done to them, there are certain classes of people more *αἰδοῖοι*, objects of *aidós*, than others. There are people in whose presence a man feels shame, self-consciousness, awe, a sense keener than usual of the importance of behaving well. And what sort of people chiefly excite this *aidós*? Of course there are kings, elders and sages, princes and ambassadors: *αἰδοῖοι βασιλῆες, γέροντες*, and the like: all of them people for whom you naturally feel reverence, and whose good or bad opinion is important in the World. Yet . . . you will find that it is not these people, but quite others, who are most deeply charged, as it were, with *Aidós*—before whom you feel still more keenly conscious of your unworthiness, and whose good or ill opinion weighs somehow inexplicably more in the last account: the disinherited of the Earth, the injured, the helpless, and, among them the most utterly helpless of all, the dead.³

In contrast to *Aidós* and *Nemesis*, which enter into all aspects of social life, *Hilm* is a *vertu des politiques*.⁴ Before the inauguration of Islam the practice of *Hilm* had been learnt by Abu Sufyān, the father of a Mu'āwīyah who was to found the Umayyad Power, in the school of the mercantile republic of Mecca:⁵ a cultural as well as physical oasis in the desert of Arab barbarism where the rudiments of city-state life had been propagated by a radiation of Syriac and Hellenic influences which, at earlier dates, had produced more brilliant fruits of the kind at Palmyra and at Petra.⁶ Abu Sufyān's son the Caliph Mu'āwīyah I claimed that *Hilm* was an Umayyad family virtue,⁷ and Mu'āwīyah himself came to figure as the classical exponent of it.⁸ One of Mu'āwīyah's dicta was that '*Hilm* would be universal if everyone had Abu Sufyān for his ancestor'.⁹ But 'the qualities which, when found in combination, the Arabs designated by the name of *Hilm*' were 'as rarely met with as

¹ Murray, Gilbert: *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press), pp. 83–84.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 85–87.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 87–88.

⁴ Lammens, S.J., Père H.: *Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia Ier* (Bayrūt 1908, Imprimerie Catholique; Paris 1908, Geuthner), p. 81, n. 2. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

⁵ See Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁶ See I. i. 74, n. 4, and II. ii. 9–12.

⁷ See Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 88, n. 3.

⁸ See Lammens, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–67. A monograph entitled *The Hilm of Mu'awīyah* is one of the lost works of the Classical Arabic Literature (Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 89), but Lammens has collected anecdotes on the subject, from surviving works, in *op. cit.* pp. 91–103.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 88, n. 3.

they were highly prized among a passionate people whose temperament was a bundle of nerves—nerves almost showing through the skin and reacting to the slightest external shock'.¹

Hilm is neither patience nor moderation nor clemency nor long-suffering nor self-possession nor maturity of character. It merely borrows from each of these qualities certain external traits, to an extent just sufficient to take in an observer who is not on the alert. The product of these superficial loans is a virtue that is specifically Arab.²

Hilm is thus something more sophisticated than *Aidōs* and *Nemesis*, and consequently also something less attractive. *Hilm* is emphatically not an expression of humility; its aim is rather to humiliate an adversary: to confound him by presenting the contrast of one's own superiority; to surprise him by displaying the dignity and calm of one's own attitude'.³ The practice of *Hilm* is not incompatible with inward feelings of resentment, animus, and vindictiveness.⁴ *Hilm* is not within the competence of anyone who is not rich and powerful, and it presupposes not only the possession of power but the possibility of abusing it in order to injure one's neighbour without having to fear the consequences of one's action.⁵

'In the desert, every true "gentleman" must have in his moral coach-house (*remise*)—or, as we are tempted to say, in his moral stable (*écurie*)—two steeds to choose between at his pleasure. On the one, he makes a parade of clemency. The other—and this is the one which he prefers to mount—allows him to show himself in his true colours. . . .⁶

'At bottom, *Hilm*, like most Arab qualities, is a virtue for bravado and display, with more ostentation in it than real substance: one form of Nomad stoicism—a stoicism tinged with pharisaism. Among a theatrical people that is the devitalised heir of a race which has been initiated into civilisation at a very early date, but which has since relapsed into the state of nature, a reputation for *Hilm* can be acquired at the cheap price of an elegant gesture or a sonorous *mot*: it does not pre-suppose a serious spiritual struggle against angry passions, against pride, or against the desire for vengeance. It can be combined with brutality in daily life . . .⁷

'In reality *Hilm* (as Ahnaf has remarked with profound insight) was not so much a virtue as an attitude—a prudent opportunism serving as a safeguard against abuses of authority, which are always regrettable, under a régime which in principle was democratic; opportune above all in an anarchic *milieu*, such as the Arab Society was, where every act of violence remorselessly provoked a retaliation. It was no feeling of humanity, but a fear of the *thar* (*émeute*), that inspired the Badawī with a horror of bloodshed. And thus the virtue of *Hilm* was revealed to him by the disagreeableness of the consequences of a passionate word or gesture. From this point of view, *Hilm* was something that could not be ignored by the chiefs, who were obliged by their situation to maintain an equilibrium between the elements of disorder that were rife within the bosom of the tribe. Given the parliamentary institutions [of the Arab heroic age], *Hilm* became, for the depositary of [political] power, a virtue of the first order. . . .⁸

¹ Lammens, op. cit., p. 69.

² Ibid., p. 68.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 72 and 79.

⁴ Ibid., p. 81.

⁵ Ibid., p. 67.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 69.

⁷ Ibid., p. 76.

⁸ Ibid., p. 87.

'*Hilm*, as practised by [Mu'āwiyah's Umayyad successors], facilitated their task of giving the Arabs a political education; it sweetened for their pupils the bitterness of having to sacrifice the anarchic liberty of the Desert in favour of sovereigns who were condescending enough to draw a velvet glove over the iron hand with which they ruled their empire.'¹

These acute characterizations of the nature of *Hilm*, *Aidós*, and *Nemesis* from the masterly hands of sensitive students of the surviving records show how nicely adapted these standards of conduct are to the peculiar political, social, and psychological circumstances of the Heroic Age; and, if, as we have intimated already, the Heroic Age is intrinsically 'a transient phase',² the surest sign of its advent and its recession are the epiphany and the eclipse of ideals that are its specific attendant moral luminaries. Stars whose faint but precious glimmer through the evening twilight has been the only consolation for the setting of the Sun cease to be visible in the darkness before dawn,

'and then, at long last, shall those spirits go their way to Olympus from the wide-wayed Earth, with their beautiful faces veiled in white raiment, seeking the company of the immortals and leaving behind them the company of men—even the spirits of Shame and Indignation.'³

As *Aidós* and *Nemesis* thus fade from view, their disappearance draws a cry of despair from the weary watcher of the skies. 'Pain and grief are the portion that shall be left for mortal men, and there shall be no defence against the evil day.'⁴ Hesiod is harrowed by his illusory conviction—which it never occurs to him to doubt—that the withdrawal of the glimmering light that has sustained the children of the Dark Age through their vigil is a portent of the onset of an unmitigated and perpetual night; and he has no inkling that, on the contrary, this extinguishing of beacons is a harbinger of the return of day. The truth is that *Aidós* and *Nemesis* reascend into Heaven as soon as the imperceptible emergence of a nascent new civilization has made their sojourn on Earth superfluous by bringing into currency other virtues that are socially more constructive though aesthetically they may be less attractive. The Iron Age into which Hesiod lamented that he had been born, because it was the age that had seen *Aidós* and *Nemesis* shake the dust of this Earth from off their feet, was in fact the age in which a living Hellenic Civilization was arising out of a dead Minoan Civilization's ruins; and the 'Abbasids, who had no use for the *Hilm* that had been their Umayyad predecessors' *arcanum imperii*, were the statesmen who set the seal on the Umayyads' *tour de force* of profiting by the obliteration of the Syrian *limes* of the Roman Empire through the demonic outbreak of the Primitive Muslim Arabs in order to inaugurate a Syriac universal state that had been prematurely overthrown, a thousand years before, by Alexander the Great.⁵

'With the 'Abbasids, *Hilm* will lose its value in the sphere of government, to become a virtue of private life. After the destruction of the former

¹ Ibid., p. 103.

² Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), p. 442.

³ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 197-200.

⁴ Ibid., ll. 200-1.

⁵ See I. i. 77.

Arab supremacy and Arab society . . . , absolutism, now firmly established from one end of the Islamic World to the other, no longer felt the necessity of resorting to *Hilm* in order to overcome the recalcitrance of a public opinion which, thenceforward, was condemned to silence. . . . In undermining, at its foundations, the organisation of the former Arab Society, and in forcing all necks to bow beneath the dead level of despotism, the 'Abbasid régime was to obtain more decisive results than the lectures (*mercuriales*) delivered [by Umayyad governors] from the tribunes at Kūfah and Basrah.¹

It was significant that, in order to ensure the salvaging of the Syriac Civilization from the chaos of a post-Hellenic Arab heroic age, there had to be a change of political régime, and that the barbaric turbulence of the Arab war-bands could be reduced to order only at the price of also suppressing their aristocratic freedom; for the Primitive Muslim Arabs had been perhaps the most gifted of all barbarian warriors, and the Umayyads of all barbarian statesmen, that had so far flitted across the stage of History. Umayyad statesmanship had achieved the unparalleled feat of transforming an Arab barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire in Syria into an avatar of the universal state that had originally been provided for the Syriac Civilization, eleven hundred years before, by the Empire of the Achaemenidae. This was an achievement of which the Umayyads' Ghassanid forerunners had never dreamed, and to which the Ghassanids' Palmyrene predecessors had aspired with disastrous consequences for themselves. Yet the raw material of Arab barbarism proved so intractable even to the Umayyad genius² that an Umayyad David's work had to be completed by an 'Abbasid Solomon. The exacting, though misguided, task of evoking, in a nascent Far Eastern and noscent Western Christian Society, a ghost of the antecedent civilization's universal state was likewise beyond the interloping barbarians' powers. It is not surprising that, before this task could be taken in hand

¹ Lammens, S.J., Père H.: *Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia I^{er}* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), pp. 106 and 86-87. For the anti-aristocratic egalitarianism of the despotic 'Abbasid régime, see the present Study, VI. vii. 149-52.

² 'Quand on étudie les origines et l'organisation de l'Empire Arabe, on ne tarde pas à découvrir l'inconsistance de la base appuyant cette énorme machine; la contradiction perpétuelle entre la grandeur de l'entreprise et l'impropriété des moyens destinés à la faire aboutir: véritable tare originelle, dont les effets n'ont pas cessé de se faire sentir . . . Il faut tenir compte de la matière ingrate sur laquelle opéra le grand calife [Mu'awiyah], de la résistance opposée à son action par l'irréductible individualisme des Arabes. Il parvint non seulement à les discipliner; mais il les transforma en conquérants, capables de dominer des peuples supérieurs à eux par l'intelligence et par la civilisation. . . . Pour comprendre à quoi aurait abouti entre leurs mains la direction de l'Islam sans l'intervention des Omayyades [the Umayyads], il suffit de considérer la situation de l'Iraq et des provinces orientales au moment où elles échurent en partage à Mu'awiyah. Dans les métropoles, Kūfah et Basrah, le meurtre, le vol et l'incendie étaient des faits quotidiens. 'Umar et 'Uthmān avaient dû renoncer à y établir un semblant d'ordre. La voix de 'Alī n'arriva pas à dominer le tumulte. Impuissant à se faire respecter, il échoua dans la tentative d'imposer son prestige de gendre du Prophète, son ancienneté dans l'Islam, qu'il ne cessait de mettre en avant; traîné à la remorque des bandes arabes dont il était le chef nominal, fréquemment abandonné, parfois menacé de mort. Sans l'intervention des Omayyades et de leurs énergiques représentants—les Ziyād, les 'Ubaydallāh, les Hajjāj, les Khālid al-Qasrī—tout l'Empire Musulman se fût transformé, comme l'Iraq, en un champ-clos où les Arabes seraient venus vider leurs mesquines querelles de tribus (Lammens, S.J., Le Père H.: *Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia I^{er}* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), pp. 273, 274, and 278). [The transliteration of the Arabic proper names has been brought into line with the usage followed in this Study.—A.J.T.]

in Western Christendom, the *fainéant* Merovingian epigoni of Clovis had to make way for the Carolingians. It is more remarkable that, in the Far East, the epigoni of the Eurasian Nomad barbarian interlopers, who had been so receptive in their attitude towards the legacy of the Sinic culture,¹ should have had likewise to make way for the sedentary barbarian To Pa, and these still more receptive barbarians,² in their turn, for successor-states which were harbingers of the imperial Sui and T'ang.

The Outbreak of an Invincible Criminality

The demon who takes possession of the barbarian's soul as soon as the barbarian's foot has crossed the fallen *limes* is indeed difficult to exorcise, because he contrives to pervert the very virtues with which his victim has armed himself in order to keep the demon at bay.

'Just as the athlete of asceticism strives to outdo himself because he has lost the sane measure of social intercourse, so the viking is tempted to overshoot his own mark: his honour becomes more exacting and often roars like a rapacious beast that never knows when it has had its fill.'³

When the barbarian's own peculiar virtue of *Aidós* thus treacherously ministers to the frenzy which it is its mission to curb, the barbarian has lost his desperate battle with himself, and his moral discomfiture is advertised in an orgy of violence which eventually cures itself by the drastic remedy of devouring its authors.

To employ the terminology of the post-Hellenic Arab heroic age, *Hilm* is worsted—and is bound to be worsted—sooner or later by its antithesis and adversary *Jahl*. While the literal meaning of this Arabic word is 'ignorance', it has a connotation of 'passionateness (*emportement*), violence, and a brutality which, among the Arabs, was sometimes confused with virility'.⁴ The nick-name *Abu Jahl* means, not 'the ignorant', but 'the impetuous' or 'the emotional (*le passionné*)'.⁵

'In its usage as conveying the antithesis of *Hilm*, *Jahl* incarnates all the faults deriving from rusticity and from lack of *savoir-vivre*, all the passionateness (*l'emportement*) of youth, all the excesses committed by brute force when it escapes from the control of the Reason. The *jāhil* is the enemy of the peace-lovers or peace-makers,⁶ he is destitute of the strict idea of justice,⁷ he is the victim of pleasure, and allows himself to be captivated by the seductive charms of women.⁸ He is also the unreflective character, the *impotens sui* of the Latins—incapable of mastering the angry passions. *Jahl* is . . . the roughness of the manners of the Desert, the absence of restraint in language, an obliviousness of decorum. It is *Jahl* that betrays its addict into violations of the code of honour laid down in the customs of the Desert, and into failures to live up to the *convenances* of social inter-

¹ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 40-41.

² For an example of the Sinophilism of the To Pa, see V. v. 477-8. A masterly treatment of the subject will be found in Eberhard, W.: *Das Toba-Reich Nord-Chinas* (Leiden 1949, Brill).

³ Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 vols. in 2), vols. ii-iii, p. 305.

⁴ Ibid., p. 85.

⁵ *Qur'ān*, xxxiii. 72.

⁶ Lammens, op. cit., p. 84.

⁷ *Qur'ān*, xxv. 64.

⁸ *Qur'ān*, xii. 33; xxviii. 55.

course, the laws of hospitality, the duties of friendship, and, in short, "the new spirit", inaugurated by Islam, to which . . . the Badu never succeeded in conforming.¹

Indeed, the Badawī frankly looked back to the *ḡhīlīyah* as 'the good old times when people were able to live without constraint, "without suspecting the existence of Muhammad"'.² In the social and psychological landscape of the Arab heroic age the *ḡhīl* and the *halīm* were complementary characterizations which, between them, provided a temperamental classification for the whole of Mankind;³ but the issue of the struggle between the two temperaments was a foregone conclusion, since the weights in the respective scales were utterly unequal. Not only did the *juhalā* outnumber the *hulamā*, and this by an overwhelming majority; the most deadly weakness of the exponents of *Hilm* was not their numerical inferiority but their lack of genuine belief in, and sincere devotion to, their own principle. *Hilm*, as we have seen,⁴ 'was not so much a virtue as an attitude'. For Mu'āwīyah himself, who was the *halīm* par excellence,

'*Hilm* was something that appealed to the ambition of this man of genius, not as an end, but as a means: not so much as a moral quality perfecting [the character of] the individual as for its utility as an instrument of government.'⁵

When the *halīm* himself is *ḡhīl* at heart, it is evident that an attitude thus struck, without conviction, by a sceptically sophisticated minority has no prospect of prevailing.

The works of a *ḡhīl* that *Hilm* has failed to chasten and that *Aidōs* and *Nemesis* have been impotent to abash have left scars which are the barbarian's authentic marks in the record of history. His characteristic brutality declares itself at his first break-through. The classic example is the obliteration of urban life in Transoxania and Khurāsān by the Mongols when they burst out of the heart of the Eurasian Steppe; but the same wanton delight in destruction, and the same desperate fear of further visitations that a first experience of these horrors has inspired in their victims, are attested hardly less emphatically by the archaeological evidence from the Hellenic World of the third century of the Christian Era. In the walls built on the morrow of the disaster round the citadel of Ankara,⁶ across the agora at Athens and round the cities of Gaul, to provide shelter within a shrunken *enceinte* for a decimated population, the stones cry out⁷ as they are wrenched from their original emplacements—tomb-stone and altar and column-drum—and are piled together in an alinement that cuts across the previous lay-out of the city as ruthlessly as if the hands that have thrown up these hasty defences had been those of the barbarian destroyer himself.⁸ Still more shocking

¹ Lammens, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

² *Ibid.*, p. 83, quoting Ahtal, 321. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 82, quoting Al-Mubarrad: *Kamil*, 425. 9.

⁴ In the passage quoted, on p. 56, above, from Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁶ See V. vi. 206, with n. 4.

⁷ Hab. ii. 11; Luke xix. 40.

⁸ A few days before writing these lines in London on the 17th December, 1948, the writer had revisited the citadel of Ankara and had seen for the first time the so-called

than the tempestuous storming of Dexippus's Athens by the Goths is the deliberate burning of Xerxes' apadāna at Persepolis by the Macedonians; for, while it is true that Alexander did not put the inhabitants to the sword, but, on the contrary, doled out the *largesse* which it had been customary for an Achaemenian emperor to distribute when he visited his dynasty's homeland,¹ the destruction of a noble work of architecture is an inexcusable act of vandalism in a barbarian whose conversion to Hellenism estops, for him, the Gothic plea of invincible ignorance.

Such wholesale atrocities are the overtures to individual crimes of violence that are the outstanding features of the Heroic Age both in history and in legend. The demoralized barbarian society in which these dark deeds are perpetrated is so familiar with their performance and so obtuse to their horror² that the bards whose task it is to immortalize the memory of the war-lords do not hesitate to saddle their heroes and heroines with sins of which they have been innocent in real life, when a blackening of their characters can heighten the artistic merit of the story.³ This readiness to magnify a character's artistic interest at the cost of his moral reputation might incline the latter-day critic to discount the evidence of legend unsupported by independent historical testimony, were it not that almost every enormity celebrated in epic and saga is accredited by historically recorded parallels for which the evidence is impeccable.

For example, the legendary murder of Priam King of Troy by Achilles' son Pyrrhus is accredited by the historical murder of Atahualpa, the last Imperial Inca, by his Spanish barbarian conqueror Pizarro, and of Husayn, the last emperor of the Safawi House, by his Afghan barbarian

¹ 'Valerian' city-wall at Athens cutting across an agora that had been excavated, since his last visit to Athens in A.D. 1921, by American archaeological enterprise. A striking visual impression of the extremeness of the disparity in size between the areas enclosed within the Valerian Wall and within the antecedent Hadrianic Wall, respectively, is given in the map facing p. 376 of E. P. Blegen's 'News Items from Athens' in the *American Journal of Archaeology*, vol. 1, No. 3, July-September, 1946.

² See VI. vii. 209.

³ The extent of the barbarians' capacity for the moral digestion of their war-lords' crimes can be measured by the length of the rope that was given by the Franks to the Merovingians.

The arbitrary and even savage assertion of their power . . . never for generations seems to have weakened the hold of the Merovingian race on the mass of their subjects, whether Frank or Roman. The Merovingian family had some secret spell which guarded them and gave them a longer permanence than was conceded to other conquering German tribes. The Visigoths had the evil custom of murdering their kings. If Frank kings were murdered, it was by the will of some rival of their house. The appeal of Guntram, in the church at Orleans in A.D. 585, that his house should be guarded from violence and extinction, as the sole defenders of the people, was powerful and probably effective. It was a startling appeal for loyalty from a family stained with all the crimes of Pelopid legend. It seemed like setting wolves to guard the fold. And yet this would not represent the facts and sentiment of the time. . . . The conquests of Childebert and Clovis had made a wandering band of warriors masters of Gaul and Western Germany, and shed new lustre on the line of Francion and Merovechus. These exploits, chanted round the watch-fires, invested the ruling house with an imaginative halo, which is the surest power of kingship' (Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), pp. 121-2).

³ For instances of such uncomplimentary poetic fiction, see Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 156-7. For the tendency of 'heroic' tradition to part company with historical fact in the interests of art for art's sake, see the present Study, V. v. 607-14.

jailor Ashraf. The criminality of the Afghans during their seven years' occupation of the Safawī imperial capital, Ispahan, was peculiarly cold-blooded.¹ When Husayn Shāh Safawī was murdered by the barbarians in A.D. 1729, he had not only been their captive since his capitulation to their first war-lord Mīr Mahmūd on the 21st October, 1722; he had lived to see the previous extermination of his household and his family.

'In A.D. 1723 [Mahmūd] put to death in cold blood some three hundred of the nobles and chief citizens, and followed up this bloody deed with the murder of about two hundred children of their families. He also killed some three thousand of the deposed Shah's bodyguard, together with many other persons whose sentiments he mistrusted or whose influence he feared.'²

On the 7th February, 1725, Mahmūd went on to murder all surviving members of the imperial family except Husayn himself and two of his younger children—a crime which was overtaken by poetic justice when, on the 22nd April following, Mahmūd in his turn was assassinated by his own cousin Ashraf for the prize of an usurped Iranian imperial crown.³

The murder of a defenceless defeated prince is the highest rung on a descending ladder of barbarian criminality. At the next level below this in the inferno of the Heroic Age we behold the barbarian war-band murdering, not an enemy prince, but their own leader—in violation of the personal duty of the retainer to his chief which is the most sacred obligation in the barbarian moral code. This offence is so outrageous in the eyes even of a barbarian bard and his audience that it might be difficult to find a legendary counterpart of the historic murder of the Caliph 'Uthmān by a soldiery who had been thrown off their balance by the intoxication of victory.⁴ At the next level below this we see a drunken Alexander murdering a drunken Cleitus who can boast of having saved his slayer-leader's life at the battle of the Granicus—and this in the presence of Hellenes whose already decadent civilization still shines so bright by contrast with a Macedonian barbarism that it makes these horrified witnesses look like demi-gods.⁵ From the murder of a foster-kinsman⁶ comrade-in-arms it is a short step downwards in the progressive demoralization of the Heroic Age to the murder of a kinsman by blood.

'Instances of the slaying of kinsmen seem to have been by no means uncommon in the Heroic Age. In *Beowulf* the spokesman of the Danish kings, Unferth, is said to have killed his brothers, and, though the fact

¹ See Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 130-3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 130.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 131.

⁴ The closest parallel is perhaps to be found in the mutiny of an Indian Sepoy Army against the British employers under whose military leadership they had achieved the conquest of a sub-continent within the Time-span of half a century.

⁵ During the first phase of the drunken altercation between Alexander and Cleitus that was to have this dreadful denouement, Alexander himself turned to two non-Macedonian Greek guests of his and asked them: 'How do Hellenes in Macedonian company look to you? Don't you feel like demigods among beasts?' (Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*, chap. 51).

⁶ Cleitus was the brother of Alexander's foster-mother Lānicē.

was a reproach to him, it apparently did not prevent him from holding an important office at court. In the same poem we hear of dissensions within the Swedish royal family, which ended in death for both Onela and Eanmund. According to the legends preserved in *Ynglingatal*, this family had had a very bad record for such quarrels in the past. Among the Goths we have the case of Eormenric [Hermanaric], who put his nephews Embrica and Fritla to death. And it is by no means only in poetry or tradition that we meet with such cases; historians also furnish numerous examples. Thus, according to Gregory of Tours,¹ the Burgundian King Hilperic was killed by his brother Gundobad, while Sigismund, son of the latter, had his own son, Sigiric, put to death.² The Thuringian King Irminfrith slew his brother Berhthari;³ the Frankish King Sigiberht was murdered by the orders of his son Hlothric.⁴ Clovis is said to have put to death a number of his relatives, while his sons and grandsons were repeatedly involved in deadly strife.⁵ In view of such evidence we must conclude that the primitive sanctity of the family was giving way in the Heroic Age.⁶

The Merovingian evidence is, indeed, lavish.

"The faithlessness attributed to the Franks in ancient writers reached its height in the relations of the Frank kings even with their nearest kin. Clovis by treachery and ruthlessness had swept from his path rivals probably equally treacherous at Cologne and Cambrai. His sons and grandsons, in insidious attacks on one another and shameless perfidy, almost improved on his example. . . . To this strange race, crime and perfidy were the most natural things in the world, and their mean avidity seems to have been equal to their treachery. Brothers as they were, proud of their blood and race, they appear to have regarded sworn alliances as only made for convenience and to be broken at pleasure. They were like wild animals, watching one another in mutual fear, and always ready to spring. Among a race so faithless, perfidy was often the only means of safety. The crimes of the second generation make perhaps even a darker tale than those of the first.'⁷

In the sinister light of Teutonic barbarian legend and history, the Achæan barbarian tale of the curse on the House of Atreus falls into social and psychological perspective. Both its agonizing crescendo movement and its merciful *finale* become comprehensible. The progressive heightening of the horror, from the ghastly banquet of Thyestes, through the murder of a husband by his unfaithful wife, to the slaying of a mother by her distracted son, follows the rhythm of the Heroic Age as the iniquity of the fathers is visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation⁸—not because they have been condemned to suffer by the fiat of a god whose wrath they have provoked by hating him, but because they have been robbed of the moral raiment of primitive custom by the radiation of a decadent civilization and then have run

¹ Gregorius Turonensis: *Historia Francorum*, Book II, chap. 28.

² See *ibid.*, Book III, chap. 5.

³ See *ibid.*, Book III, chap. 4.

⁴ See *ibid.*, Book II, chap. 40.

⁵ 'In some cases the deed was certainly done by the relative's own hand. Such was the case with Lothair and the sons of Chlodomer (Gregory of Tours, *op. cit.*, Book III, chap. 18).'

⁶ Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 346-7.

⁷ Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), pp. 281-3.

⁸ Exod. xx. 5.

wild to wander naked in the moral wilderness left by this neighbour society's collapse. The lifting of the curse after its operation has come to an intolerable climax is one of the first-fruits of the banning of the post-Minoan Heroic Age by the beneficent Attic genius of a nascent Hellenic Civilization¹ at the dawn following a darkness which an epimethean Hesiod had mistaken for eternal night.²

When the members of a barbarian war-lord's kin-group turn their murderous hands against one another, it is not surprising to see a dead leader's royal brood exterminated by the hands of impious alien usurpers in the next chapter of the story—as the family of Alexander was liquidated by Cassander, and the grandson of Muhammad by the Umayyads.³ A slaughtered Husayn received the posthumous recompense of being idealized as a martyr whose etherialized blood mingled with his father's⁴ to become the seed of a Shi'i Church; but Olympias, Roxana, and the child Alexander IV did not even find a pagan bard to make poetry of their painful deaths.

Such mass-murders are mere incidents in civil strife within the bosom of barbarian communities that are highly enough organized to be capable of it. Long and deadly civil wars were the immediate sequel to swift and facile conquests of derelict worlds in the heroic ages of the Western Christian Spanish conquerors of the Aztecs and the Incas, the Hellenized Macedonian conquerors of the Achaemenidae, the subsequent Hellenic conquerors of the Mauryan Empire in India,⁵ and the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of the Romans and the Sasanidae—Arabs who, to damn them with faint praise, had been perhaps the least barbarous of all barbarians up to date. These episodes need not be recapitulated here, since they have been surveyed already, in a different context,⁶ as examples of the militarist's 'burden of Nineveh'. In this place we need only point to the manifest conclusion that 'every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation, and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand'.⁷

The Dêbâcle of an Ephemeral Barbarian Ascendancy

A sensationally sudden fall from an apparent omnipotence to an unmistakable impotence is, indeed, the characteristic fate of an Heroic-Age

¹ The sovereign virtue of Hellenism was the moderation that is exemplified in the judgement given by the Athenian jurors and their presiding Goddess Athena at the dénouement of Aeschylus's Atreidan trilogy; and it is significant that the psychological talisman through which Hellenism succeeded in overcoming the demonic spirit of a post-Minoan heroic age was likewise the key to the exorcism of a post-Hellenic heroic age by the nascent civilization of a Western Christendom. In this chapter of history, 'moderation . . . is the outstanding virtue of the chivalrous type that succeeded the heroic type of the earlier ages' (Menéndez Pidal, Ramón: *The Cid and his Spain*, English translation (London 1934, John Murray), p. 422).

² See p. 57, above.
³ In justice to the Umayyads it should not be forgotten that Husayn brought his death upon himself by his own folly. The Umayyad Government would have given a fortune to see him die in his bed as their pensioner, like his elder brother Hasan after his abdication from the succession to their father 'Alī (the allegation that Hasan met his death, not by disease, but by poison, has been dismissed as non-proven by Lammens, S.J., *Le Père H.: Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia I^{er}* (Paris, 1908, Geuthner), pp. 149–53).

⁴ 'Alī's assassin was a fellow Arab, but, so far from being an agent of Mu'awiyah's, he was a Kharijite.

⁵ See I. i. 86.

⁶ In IV. iv. 484–6.

⁷ Matt. xii. 25. Cp. Mark iii. 24–25; Luke xi. 17.

barbarian Power. Striking historical examples of this play of the ironic law of *περίτρεψις* are the eclipse of the Western Huns after the death of Attila, the eclipse of the Vandals after the death of Genseric, the eclipse of the Ostrogoths after the death of Theodoric, and the eclipse of the Serbs after the death of Stephen Dushan. These well-attested instances lend credibility to the tradition that the wave of Achaean conquest likewise broke and collapsed immediately after engulfing Troy, and that a murdered Agamemnon was the last Pan-Achaean war-lord. The same fate sometimes overtakes the legacies even of those more constructive empire-builders who sweep away decadent barbarian principalities in order to clear the ground for the appearance of the first green shoots of a new civilization. The eclipse of the Timurids after the death of Timur Lenk and the eclipse of the Carolingians after the death of Charlemagne were as abrupt and complete as those of any sheerly barbarian Power.

The Huns under Attila had terrorized Europe from its Baltic to its Mediterranean coast; the Vandals under Genseric had similarly terrorized the Mediterranean from its African to its European shores; the Ostrogoths under Theodoric had been masters of Italy; the Serbs under Stephen Dushan had dominated the Balkan Peninsula; the Achaeans under Agamemnon are reputed to have held a 'thalassocracy' in the Aegean which they had wrested from the Minoans or from the Minoan World's Mycenaean marchmen. The sudden paralysis of the energies that had been manifesting themselves in these exhibitions of power is to be explained by the utter incapacity of the barbarians for creating stable and enduring political institutions. Their political potency hangs on the thread of the single life of some war-lord of genius; and, as soon as this thread snaps, they relapse into anarchy. Sometimes the war-lord himself reveals the limitations of his own political sense by ineptly providing in his testament for the partition of his dominions among his heirs, and it was this that was the bane of the Merovingians and the Carolingians in succession. The testator's apologia would be that, if he did not make provision for an orderly division in his will, his kindred would assuredly take the law into their own violent hands by fighting one another for the prize of his inheritance; and such forebodings are borne out by a host of historical instances. Sometimes, again, a barbarian principality may fall to pieces owing to the death or unduly prolonged absence of the war-lord on some too ambitiously distant or difficult military adventure. This is the situation depicted in the opening books of the *Odyssey*. In the twentieth year of the interregnum arising from the absence of Odysseus, every budding squire in the realm is already playing the king;¹ and the comparable break-up of the Scandinavian barbarian principality of Kiev in the twelfth century of the Christian Era² authenticates the verisimilitude of the Homeric picture presented in the *Telemacheia* without encouraging us to believe in the happy ending which the poet's plot requires him to give to his story.

¹ A catalogue of 108 suitors for the hand of Penelope from the several isles of Odysseus' kingdom is given by Telemachus in *Odyssey*, Book XVI, ll. 245-55.

² See Kliutschewskij, W. [Kluchewski, V.]: *Geschichte Russlands*, vol. I (Berlin 1925, Obelisk-Verlag), pp. 191-2.

In real life the divided house does fall; and an identical denouement is produced by three variations on one theme. The barbarian successor-state of a moribund universal state may be laid low by a counter-blow from its expiring victim; or it may meet the same violent death at the hands of fellow barbarians; or it may languish in impotence, after coming to the end of its prodigal feast on carrion flesh, till it is swept off the stage of History to make way either for the re-entry of an old civilization or for the entry of a new one. A scrutiny of our table of barbarian war-bands¹ yields the following catalogue of instances of these alternative evil ends.

A *revanche* on the part of a civilization so far gone in the downward course of its decline as to have been unable to prevent the barbarians from breaking in, yet not so far gone as to be incapable of hitting back, is rare at the final relapse, when a universal state is breaking up, but less uncommon in the earlier chapter of the story in which the establishment of a universal state is evoked by a Time of Troubles rising to its climax.

The most signal examples of the crushing of a barbarian invader by a moribund civilization are to be found in Egyptian history. The Egyptian Society actually rose, like Osiris, from the dead, to confound the apparently triumphant barbarian successors of 'the Middle Empire', when the Hyksos were expelled from the Delta, and their survivors were pursued and subjugated, in their Syrian asylum, by a fresh breed of Theban empire-builders who brought the Egyptian universal state to life again in the form of 'the New Empire'.² Moreover, this *revanche* upon the Hyksos, in which 'the New Empire' came to birth, is matched by the feat on which, some four hundred years later, this resuscitated Egyptian universal state expended its last expiring energies. The decisive victory of 'the New Empire' of Egypt over the Achaeans and the other 'peoples of the sea' in the first decade of the twelfth century B.C. brought the barbarians to a dead halt at the threshold of the invaded Egyptian World's heartland in the Lower Nile Valley; and the lesson was so severe that, though the survivors of the foiled barbarian war-bands were able to encamp on 'the New Empire's' South Syrian glaxis, we have no evidence of their ever having ventured to attack the Delta again.

Ramses III's triumph over 'the peoples of the sea' has a counterpart in Hellenic history in Justinian's successive triumphs over the Vandals and the Ostrogoths; and in this case the audacious barbarian invaders paid the price of annihilation for a sensational temporary success. The Roman Imperial Government in the West had failed to prevent the Vandals from crossing the Straits of Gibraltar and seizing transmarine

¹ Reproduced in the present volume, on pp. 734-5, from vol. vi, pp. 330-1, above.

² The expulsion of the Hyksos from the Delta in the sixteenth century B.C. had a second-century echo in the reaction at that date against the Ptolemaic Macedonian domination. These two Egyptian revolts against barbarian rule were animated by an identical spirit of 'Zealotism', though their fortunes differed in the respective degrees of their outward success. On the later occasion the Egyptian 'Zealots' had to acquiesce in leaving the Ptolemies on their shaken throne and to content themselves with extorting from them far-reaching concessions to Egyptian sentiment. If, in the next chapter of the story, the Ptolemaic Kingdom of Egypt had not been incorporated into an Hellenic universal state in the shape of the Roman Empire, the Coptic triumph over Hellenism in the *Kulturkampf* of the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era might have come five or six hundred years sooner than it did.

Roman dominions in North-West Africa which ought to have been the Empire's impregnable citadel against barbarian invaders from the north of Continental Europe;¹ and subsequently the Imperial Government at Constantinople had been constrained to divert the Ostrogoths from harrying the European suburbs of the new imperial capital by actually inviting them to invade Italy and occupy Rome. In the blood feud between the Romans and these two Teutonic barbarian war-bands the vindictiveness of the injured empire's eventual counter-blow was proportionate to the painfulness of its previous humiliations. This chastisement of the Vandals and the Ostrogoths by Justinian has Ottoman parallels in Mehmed 'Alī Pasha's chastisement of the Wahhābīs and Sultan Mahmūd II's chastisement of the Kurds—with the difference that these Ottoman 'Herodians'² overthrew their barbarian adversaries with the aid of a Western military technique imparted by French and Prussian instructors, whereas Justinian mobilized the martial virtue of his home-grown Isaurian barbarians and the military equipment of the Sarmatian Nomads³ for his victorious counter-offensive against the epigoni of Genseric and Theodoric.

There is a longer list of barbarian invaders of a civilization in its Time of Troubles who have been evicted or annihilated by the founders of the affiliated civilization's universal state, or by those founders' forerunners. This retribution was exacted from the Gutæan invaders of Sumer and Akkad by Utu-khegal of Erech, the forerunner of Ur-Engur's (*alias* Ur-Nammu's) Sumeric 'Empire of the Four Quarters', and from the Scythian invaders of South-Western Asia by the Median forerunners of the Achaemenian Empire. We may place in the same general category the eviction of the Afghan invaders of Iran by Nādir Shāh, and the eviction of the Mongol invaders of China by the Ming in revenge for the intolerable service which these Eurasian Nomad barbarians had performed for the main body of the Far Eastern Civilization in imposing on it a universal state which it had failed to provide for itself. The Serb barbarians who aspired to perform the same service for the main body of Orthodox Christendom were overthrown, without ever having set foot within the imperial city of Constantinople, by 'Osmanli competitors whose Spartan discipline assured their victory over the unruly epigoni of Stephen Dushan.

The premature timing of an offensive, which was the undoing of the Serbs, the Scyths, and the Gutæans, had twice been similarly fatal to Celtic barbarian trespassers. The Continental Celts who, on the morrow of the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization, overwhelmed the perilously exposed Etruscan advance-guard of Hellenism in the Po Basin, and who subsequently thrust their way across Gaul into the Iberian Peninsula and across the Balkan Peninsula into the heart of Anatolia, were successively brought to book by the Roman builders of an Hellenic universal state.⁴ The Insular Celts who attempted to create a Far

¹ See X. ix. 658, n. 3, and 659-62.

² For the use of this term in this study, see pp. 580-623, below.

³ See the passage quoted from Procopius in III. iii. 163.

⁴ See II. ii. 279-82.

Western Christian alternative to a nascent Romanesque Western Christian Civilization found themselves constrained, like their Scandinavian counterparts, to acquiesce in being assimilated to the more puissant rival culture.¹ The grimmer fate that might have been theirs if they had shown themselves recalcitrant is indicated by the chastisement that the unconscionable Continental Saxon barbarians did incur at the hands of a Carolingian Power which had not brushed aside the effete barbarism of its Merovingian predecessors in order to open the way for an unseasonable Saxon repetition of the Teutonic *Völkerwanderung* that had weltered, four hundred years earlier, over the western provinces of the Roman Empire.

The fratricidal warfare, through which the barbarians save Civilization the trouble of having to put them down by ridding the World of one another, is perhaps the only beneficent form of 'genocide'.² By this salutary method of progressive elimination the number of the competing Macedonian barbarian successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire was eventually reduced to three through the overthrow of Antigonos at Ipsus³ and of Lysimachus at Corupedium; and, by the same process, the trio of Turkish and Tungus barbarian successor-states of the Sinic universal state was reduced to unity within 120 years of the fall of the régime of the United Tsin,⁴ and the 'heptarchy' of English barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire in Britain was eventually converted into a 'dyarchy' in which the whole island, except for Wales, was partitioned between a Wessex that had entered into the heritage of Mercia and a Lothian that had taken its Scottish conquerors captive.⁵ In the Continental European arena of a post-Hellenic barbarian *Völkerwanderung* the Burgundian squatters on the left bank of the Rhine were almost exterminated by the Western Huns—before the Hun Power, in its turn, was broken by a revolt of its satellite Teuton war-bands after Attila's death—and a Burgundian remnant which had found asylum in Savoy was subsequently subjugated there by the Merovingian Franks.⁶ The Visigoths evicted the Vandals and Alans from the Iberian

¹ The histories of the abortive Far Western Christian and abortive Scandinavian civilizations have been sketched in II. ii. 322–60.

² Instances have been cited, by anticipation, in I. i. 58 and in IV. iv. 486.

³ In spite of this disaster, in which the first Antigonos met his death, his grandson and namesake did, of course, succeed in securing for his house the throne of one of the three surviving Macedonian polities; but the Macedonian homeland, which thus became Antigonos Gonatas' domain, was a modest prize compared with Antigonos Monophthalmus's abortive Asiatic empire.

⁴ Upon the collapse, at the turn of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era, of the Sinic imperial régime of 'the United Tsin', which had momentarily re-established the Sinic universal state in A.D. 280, after a century of disunion, three barbarian war-bands carved successor-states out of the northern fringes of the former imperial dominions: the Southern Hiongnu and the To Pa in Shansi, and the Sienpi in Liaotung. The Hiongnu principality of 'Pei Han' came into collision with the To Pa in A.D. 312 (within a year of the sack of the eastern imperial capital, Loyang, by these Hiongnu in A.D. 311). In A.D. 318 'Pei Han' broke up (two years after the sack of the western imperial capital, Ch'ang-ngan, by these Hiongnu in A.D. 316). In A.D. 338 the Hiongnu principality was reconstituted, under the name of 'Chao', only to be conquered in A.D. 352 by 'Yen', the Sienpi principality in Liaotung. 'Yen', in its turn, was conquered in A.D. 436 by 'Wei'—the classical name that had been assumed by the victorious principality of the Tungus To Pa (see Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920–1, Geuthner, 4 vols.), vol. i, pp. 306–23).

⁵ See II. ii. 190–3.

⁶ In A.D. 413 the main body of the Burgundians had settled, by agreement with the

Peninsula before they were themselves evicted by the Franks from Gaul, and they subsequently subjugated the Sueves in Galicia before being driven, by their own Arab conquerors, into the adjoining mountain fastness of Asturias. The Arabs, on their way to conquering all but a fragment of the Iberian Peninsula from their Visigothic fellow barbarians, subjugated in North-West Africa the Berber barbarians who had plagued both the Romans and the Vandals with impunity.

The 'face' which the Roman Empire had lost when Odovacer broke the rules of the political game in a disintegrating universal state¹ by deposing Romulus Augustulus, the puppet emperor in the West, and undisguisedly taking the reins of government into his own hands, was recovered, without any military exertion on the Constantinopolitan Imperial Government's part, when the tactless Scirian barbarian war-lord Odovacer was treacherously murdered by the faithless Ostrogothic barbarian war-lord Theodoric. Odovacer had opened the gates of an impregnable Ravenna to his hereditary enemy in consideration of a solemn undertaking, on Theodoric's part, to share the possession of Italy with Odovacer on equal terms. Theodoric's murderous breach of faith is characteristic of the methods by which the barbarian 'heroes' snatch an ephemeral dominion from one another; and retribution overtook this crime when Theodoric's ill-gotten dominion over Italy was wrested from his epigoni by the Constantinopolitan Imperial Government that had instigated Theodoric himself to move on to Italy from Illyricum. In reconquering Italy from the Ostrogoths at the cost of disastrously depleting the man-power of Illyricum and the wealth of the Oriental provinces of the Empire, Justinian was unwittingly working, not for himself nor for his heirs, but for the Lombard war-lord Alboin, who was the ultimate beneficiary of the Great Romano-Gothic War of A.D. 537-53. Before posthumously avenging the extermination of the Ostrogoths by making an easy entry into a devastated Italy, Alboin, in concert with the Avars, had exterminated the Ostrogoths' kinsmen the Gepidae, who had been the principal beneficiaries of the previous extermination of the Avars' fellow Nomads the Western Huns.

This auspicious proclivity of the barbarians for liquidating one another is likewise illustrated in the histories of the break-up of the Arab Caliphate and the break-up of the Khazar Empire in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe. When the collapse of the Far Western Umayyad Caliphate created a political vacuum in Andalusia which sucked in Berber Muslim barbarians from Africa and Frankish Christian barbarians from Europe, the Murābit Lamtūna Berber inter-

Roman authorities, on the left bank of the middle Rhine, round Worms. In A.D. 437 these Burgundians were attacked and crushed by the Huns at the instigation of the Roman war-lord Aëtius. In thus serving as the Romans' executioners the Huns were taking a vicarious revenge for a severe reverse that they had suffered in A.D. 430 at the hands of a trans-Rhenane rearguard of the Burgundians in the mountainous country between Rhine, Main, and Neckar. This obscure concatenation of inter-barbarian conflicts is elucidated by E. A. Thompson: *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 65-67. The Burgundians who settled in Savoy in A.D. 443 were survivors of the disaster of A.D. 437. This Burgundy on the Rhône was conquered by the Merovingians in A.D. 532.

¹ The role of a universal state, in the last chapter of its history, as a source of legitimization for its *de facto* successors has been examined in VI. vii. 12-16.

lopers were overthrown, as we have seen,¹ by the Muwahhid Masmūda, and the Masmūda by the Marinid Zanāta. On the frontier of a disintegrating 'Abbasid Caliphate over against the Eurasian Steppe, a Turkish wave of Nomad barbarian invaders was similarly pursued and submerged by a following Mongol wave, while the survivors of a fountained Khazar Empire lived to witness, from their asylum in the mountain fastnesses of the Crimea, the transformation of the Khazars' own former imperial domain in the Eurasian Steppe's Great Western Bay into a maelström where successive waves of Magyar, Pecheneg, Ghuzz, Cuman, and Mongol Nomad barbarian invaders, breaking westward out of the depths of the vast steppe-ocean, were shattered by their impact on one another. At the Far Eastern extremity of the Old World the Khitan Nomad invaders of a disintegrating China were evicted by the Kin highlanders from Manchuria, as the Lamtūna Nomads were supplanted in the Maghrib and Andalusia by the Masmūda highlanders from the Atlas; and the Kin, in their turn, suffered at the Mongols' hands the retribution that was meted out to the Masmūda by the Zanāta.

The ignominious fate of lingering on to be snuffed out eventually, unregretted, by scavenger-harbingers of a resurgent civilization was reserved for the Kassite squatters in Babylonia; the Merovingian and Lombard interlopers in Roman Gaul and Italy; the Umayyad successors of the Romans *trans Taurum* and of the Sasanidae; the Libyan squatters in the homeland of 'the New Empire' of Egypt; the Chaghatāy Mongol Eurasian Nomad overlords of Transoxania; the Mongol Il-Khans of Hūlāgū's line who had liquidated the Turkish successor-states of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, and the remnant of the 'Abbasid Power itself, in Iran and 'Irāq; and the 'Parthian' Eurasian Nomad Parni who, in their day, had wrested the same territories from the weakening grasp of the epigoni of Seleucus Nicator. The Kassites were cleared away by native representatives of a nascent Babylonian Civilization, the Merovingians and the Lombard successors of Alboin by the Carolingians, the Umayyads by the 'Abbasids, the Libyans by the Deltaic Egyptian Pharaohs of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty with the aid of Carian and Ionian 'brazen men from the sea'; the Chaghatāy Mongols by Timur Lenk, the Il-Khans by a litter of ephemeral successor-states, the 'Parthian' Arsacidae by the Sasanidae from Fars. The Arsacids, Umayyads, Lombards, and Chaghatāy Mongols partially retrieved the humiliation of their exit by fighting a losing battle against their suppressors; and the survivors of the 'Abbasids' Umayyad victims who succeeded in re-establishing an Umayyad Caliphate in miniature in Andalusia, beyond their Khurāsānī adversaries' reach, were emulating the spirit of that uncharacteristically stiff-necked minority among the descendants of the Libyan squatters in Egypt who preferred to trek up the Nile into the Sudanese Gazīrah rather than submit to the rule of the apostles of an archaizing Egyptian reaction.² A majority of the Libyan trespassers in Egypt preferred, like the Kassites and the Merovingians, to die 'the cow's death' that, in the

¹ On p. 49, above.

² This incident has been touched upon in VI. vii. 118-19.

barbarian's own eyes, is the worst disgrace that he can bring upon himself.

The only barbarians who had escaped all these alternative evil ends were those whose incursion into the domain of a disintegrating civilization beyond a fallen *limes* had been accompanied by their conversion to some still vigorous civilization in their rear. The Macedonians, for example, were Greek-speaking barbarians¹ who had been exposed to the radiation of the Hellenic Civilization, created by the Greek city-states round the shores of the Aegean, for many generations before the date of Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont. The deliberate Hellenization of Macedonia by Alexander's father Philip was the prelude to the Macedonians' conquest of the Achaemenian Empire as apostles of Hellenism; and, though, as we have seen, the Achaemenian Empire's Macedonian successor-states all, in different ways, displayed the political instability that is characteristic of principalities set up by barbarian war-bands, these *peritura regna* did, nevertheless, succeed in performing one piece of creative work in sowing seeds of Hellenism on Oriental ground that were subsequently harvested by the Roman Empire. This Macedonian story had been repeated in the cultural history of the Asturian and Pyrenaean barbarians who had emulated the Macedonians' feat of overrunning the domains of several disintegrating civilizations.² The Visigoth refugees in Asturias and their Basque neighbours in the Western Pyrenees started life imbued with a tincture of a then already nascent Western Christian Civilization; and this tincture was successively reinforced in the ninth century of the Christian Era, when the southern foothills of the Central and Eastern Pyrenees were conquered from the Umayyads by the Carolingians, and in the eleventh century, when Leonese and Castilian war-bands began to encroach in earnest on the indigenous successor-states of an Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate.

'When in A.D. 1002 Northern Spain eventually emancipated herself from Islam, she applied herself to the task of restoring her weakened links with the rest of Europe. The liturgy, clergy, monasteries, handwriting—all her institutions and customs—were reformed in the time of the Cid and brought into line with the standards prevailing in Western Europe. This great change was helped forward by the influx of knights, clerics, burghers and settlers from beyond the Pyrenees, who filled the places of those inhabitants of Castile and Leon who had moved southwards.'³

In a similar way the Scandinavian barbarian intruders on the forest fringes of the Khazar Empire in the Dniepr Basin were salvaged by their conversion to Eastern Orthodox Christianity; the Cossack barbarians who followed the Russian rivers out of the Forest into the Steppe and ventured to beard the epigoni of the Golden Horde on the Eurasian

¹ See III. iii. 477-89.

² The Macedonians overran the domains of the Hittite, Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indic civilizations; the Spaniards overran the domains of the Syriac Civilization in the Iberian Peninsula and of the Central American and Andean civilizations in the New World.

³ Menéndez Pidal, Ramón: *The Cid and His Spain*, English translation (London 1934, Murray), p. 452. See also the present Study, V. v. 242, n. 4.

Nomads' own element were incorporated into the universal state which was provided for the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom by Muscovy; and the Serb and the Rumeliot and Maniot Greek barbarian carvers of successor-states out of the carcass of the Ottoman Empire were converted in the act, *more Macedonico*, to the secular civilization of a Modern Western World.¹

These instances of salvation through conversion, rare though they are, show that even the barbarian interloper on the domain of a moribund civilization is not inexorably doomed.

¹ See II. ii. 181-6.

E. DICHTUNG UND WAHRHEIT

(I) A PHANTASY OF HEROISM

IF there is truth in the picture presented in the preceding chapter, the verdict on the Heroic Age can only be a severe one. The mildest judgement will convict it of having been a futile escapade, while sterner judges will denounce it as a criminal outrage.

The verdict of futility was once pronounced, in tragic circumstances, by a conquered barbarian war-lord whose previous station and subsequent personal experiences entitled him to speak on this point with unchallengeable authority. In A.D. 534 Gelimir, the ex-king of an ephemeral Vandal barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire in North-West Africa, could not forget, while he was dragging his feet through the streets of Constantinople in a Roman triumphal procession to celebrate his own overthrow, that he was the fifth successor of a Genseric who had conquered Carthage less than a hundred years back¹ and had sacked Rome herself in A.D. 455.

"The prisoners led in triumph were Gelimir himself, with a purple robe of some sort draped round his shoulders, and the whole of his family, together with the very tallest and physically handsomest of the Vandal rank-and-file. When Gelimir had arrived at the Hippodrome and beheld the Emperor enthroned on a lofty tribune, with the people standing on either side of him, and when, as he took in the scene, he realised the extremity of his own plight, he did not relieve his feelings by weeping or groaning aloud, but repeated over and over again a phrase from the Hebrew scriptures: "Vanity of vanities; all is vanity."² When he reached the Emperor's tribune they stripped him of his purple and forced him to fall on his face and grovel in adoration of Justinian's imperial majesty (*προσκυνεῖν Ἰουστινιανὸν βασιλέα*).³

If the unhappy Gelimir had been further humiliated on that day by being made to carry a placard epitomizing his experience, the Roman official epigrammatist commissioned to compose the headline could not have done better than to anticipate three lines written by a latter-day Western poet:

Sown in the Moon shall with the Moon decay,
Loved in the Moon shall die at touch of day;
And spring be cold, and roses ashen grey.⁴

And the same stark verdict of futility likewise makes itself heard through the mellow poetry of a Victorian man of letters who had lived on to feel the frost of a neo-barbarian age.

Follow the path of those fair warriors, the tall Goths
from the day when they led their blue-eyed families

¹ The Vandals had conquered Carthage in A.D. 439, only ten years after their passage, in A.D. 429, from Spain to Africa.

² Eccl. i. 2.

³ Procopius: *A History of the Wars of Justinian*, Book IV, chap. 9, cited in IV. iv. 389.

⁴ Gilbert Murray, on the title-page of *Moonseed*, by Rosalind Murray (London 1911, Sidgwick and Jackson).

off Vistula's cold pasture-lands, their murky home
 by the amber-strewn foreshore of the Baltic sea,
 and, in the incontaminat vigor of manliness
 feeling their rumour'd way to an unknown promised land,
 tore at the ravel'd fringes of the purple power,
 and trampling its wide skirts, defeating its armies,
 slaying its Emperor, and burning his cities,
 sack'd Athens and Rome; until supplanting Caesar
 they ruled the world where Romans reigned before:—
 Yet from those three long centuries of rapin and blood,
 inhumanity of heart and wanton cruelty of hand,
 ther is little left. . . . Those Goths wer strong but to destroy;
 they neither wrote nor wrought, thought not nor created;
 but, since the field was rank with tares and mildew'd wheat,
 their scything won some praise: Else have they left no trace.¹

This measured judgement, which is the ripe fruit of a still undisturbed detachment from the realities of the Heroic Age, could not have been delivered by an Hellenic poet who was bitterly conscious of still living in a moral slum made by barbarian successors of 'the thalassocracy of Minos'. Criminality, and not mere futility, is the burden of Hesiod's indictment against a post-Minoan heroic age that, in his day, was still haunting a nascent Hellenic Civilization; and, if he had been required to give his black picture a 'caption', we may guess that he would have quoted from the *Odyssey*² the goddess Athena's comment on Zeus's tale of Aegisthus.

καὶ λίην κείνός γε εἰκότι κείται δλέθρῳ
 ὥς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι.³

Hesiod's own judgement on the barbarians is indeed a merciless one:

'And Father Zeus made yet a third race of mortal men—a Race of Bronze, in no wise like unto the Silver, fashioned from ash-stems,⁴ mighty and terrible. Their delight was in the grievous deeds of Ares and in the trespasses of Pride (*ὑβρίες*). No bread ever passed their lips, but their hearts in their breasts were strong as adamant, and none might approach them. Great was their strength and unconquerable were the arms which grew from their shoulders upon their stalwart frames. Of bronze were their panoplies, of bronze their houses, and with bronze they tilled the land (dark iron was not yet). These were brought low by their own hands and went their way to the mouldering house of chilly Hades, nameless. For all their mighty valour, Death took them in his dark grip, and they left the bright light of the Sun.'⁵

In Posterity's judgement on the overflowing measure of suffering which the barbarians bring upon themselves by their own criminal

¹ Bridges, Robert: *The Testament of Beauty* (Oxford 1929, Clarendon Press), Book I, ll. 535-55.

² All too [fearfully] befitting is the doom that has laid that monster low; thus perish any other wretch who dares such deeds as those.' The second of these two lines was quoted by Scipio Aemilianus when, in his camp beleaguering Numantia, he received intelligence of the violent end which Tiberius Gracchus had met at Rome (Plutarch: *Life of Tiberius Gracchus*, chap. 21).

⁴ Ash was the wood from which spear-shafts were made.—A.J.T.

⁵ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 143-55.

follies,¹ this passage in Hesiod's poem might have stood as the last word, had not the poet himself run on as follows:

'Now when this race also had been covered by Earth, yet a fourth race was made, again, upon the face of the All-Mother, by Zeus son of Cronos—a better race and more righteous, the divine race of men heroic (*ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος*), who are called demigods (*ἡμίθεοι*), a race that was aforetime upon the boundless Earth. These were destroyed by evil War and dread Battle—some below Seven-Gate Thebes in the land of Cadmus, as they fought for the flocks of Oedipus, while others were carried for destruction to Troy in ships over the great gulf of the sea, for the sake of Helen of the lovely hair. There verily they met their end and vanished in the embrace of Death; yet a few there were that were granted a life and a dwelling-place, apart from Mankind, by Zeus son of Cronos, who made them to abide at the ends of the Earth. So there they abide, with hearts free from care, in the Isles of the Blessed beside the deep eddies of Ocean Stream—happy heroes, for whom a harvest honey-sweet, thrice ripening every year, is yielded by fruitful fields.'²

What is the relation of this passage to the one that immediately precedes it, and indeed to the whole catalogue of races in which it is imbedded? This episode breaks the sequence of the catalogue in two respects. In the first place the race here passed in review, unlike the preceding races of gold, silver, and bronze and the succeeding race of iron, is not identified with any metal, and, in the second place, all the other four races are made to follow one another in a declining order of merit which is symbolized in the descending gradation of the metals from gold to iron through silver and bronze. Moreover, the destinies of the three preceding races after death are consonant with the tenour of their lives on Earth. The Race of Gold 'became good spirits (*δαίμονες . . . ἑσθλοί*) by the will of great Zeus—spirits *above* the ground, guardians of mortal men, givers of wealth (for they had gotten even that prerogative of kings).'³ The inferior Race of Silver still 'gained among mortals the name of blessed ones *beneath* the ground—second in glory; and yet, even so, they too are attended with honour'.⁴ When we come, however, to the Race of Bronze, we find, as we have seen, that their fate after death is passed over in a grimly ominous silence. In a catalogue woven on this pattern, we should expect to find the next race condemned, after death, to suffer, at the lightest, the torments of the damned in the House of Hades; yet, so far from that, we find at least a chosen few of them transported after death, not to Hell, but to Elysium—where they live, above ground, the very life that had been lived by the Race of Gold before tasting of a death which these supremely favoured heroes are, it would seem, to be spared.

Manifestly the insertion of a Race of Heroes between the Race of Bronze and the Race of Iron is an afterthought. Both in form and in substance the passages describing the races of these two baser metals

¹ σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν.—*Odyssey*, Book I, l. 34.

² Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 156–73, following Rzach, A.: *Hesiodi Carmina*, editio altera (Leipzig 1908, Teubner), in existing ll. 169–90 as a later variant for ll. 172–3.

³ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 122–6, following Rzach in existing ll. 124–5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ll. 141–2.

ought to stand in immediate juxtaposition to one another. If we do bring them together by allowing the episode of the heroes to drop out, the poem then runs smooth, with no perceptible hiatus at the point where we have excised the incongruous parenthesis. The parenthetic heroes break the poem's sequence, symmetry, and sense; and this discord must have grated as painfully on the aesthetic sensibilities of the poet as it grates on ours. What moved the poet to make this clumsy insertion at this cost to his work of art? The answer must be that the picture, here presented, of a Race of Heroes was so vividly impressed on the imagination of the poet and his public that some place had to be found for it in any catalogue of the successive ages in their vista of past history; and the irony of the poet's predicament is that this massacre of a work of art for the sake of paying tribute to an historical reminiscence turns out really to have been an unnecessary atrocity. It was unnecessary because the Race of Heroes was already ensconced in the original catalogue under the sign of the third metal of the four. In other words, the Race of Heroes is identical with the Race of Bronze; and the insertion describing the heroes is thus, in truth, not an indispensable supplement, but a superfluous doublet.

The identity of the two races becomes transparent as soon as we compare the two passages. In the first place the Heroes' unnamed metal must, in fact, be bronze, since iron only comes in with their successors, while their brazen predecessors have already superseded the earlier races of silver and gold; and in truth the Homeric Epic is corroborated by the researches of Modern Western archaeologists in setting the Achaean heroes of a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* in the technological environment of the Bronze Age. In the second place the ascription of the responsibility for the destruction of the Heroes to the ostensibly impersonal demonic forces of 'War' and 'Battle' is manifestly a euphemistic periphrasis for the poet's previous brutal statement of the truth that the Race of Bronze 'were brought low by their own hands'. The nameless fratricidal struggles in which the brazen men liquidate themselves are none other than the wars in which the Heroes are destroyed at the gates of Thebes and under the walls of Troy—and therewith the curtain falls on the war-ridden lives, not only of the Men of Bronze, but likewise of the Heroes with the exception of a privileged élite. The majority of the Heroes, who 'met their end' in warfare 'and vanished in the embrace of Death', are the self-same brazen warriors who 'left the bright light of the Sun' and 'went their way to the mouldering house of chilly Hades, nameless', when 'Death took them in his dark grip'. If we leave out of account Menelaus and the handful of other fortunate Heroes whom Zeus, in his sovereign caprice, has elected to transport to Elysium, the deeds and sufferings and destinies of the two races, as described by the poet in these passages, prove, on examination, to be the same.

This discovery is surprising, because the impression made on our minds by the two passages, before we thus analyse them, is one not of identity but of contrast; and the difference, as well as the likeness, is indeed a reality; but, in distinction from the likeness, which is a likeness

of statements about alleged matters of fact, the difference is a difference of aesthetic and emotional atmosphere. The Race of Bronze and the Race of Heroes are the same people seen through different mental glasses: a lens of faint yet authentic historical reminiscence and a lens of vivid but hallucinatory poetic imagination. A single race has, in fact, been portrayed by the poet twice over in two pictures which he has been constrained to present side by side because he is afflicted—or endowed—with an astigmatic vision which he is unable to reduce to a single focus.

How has this dual vision arisen? An answer to this riddle is suggested by a literary phenomenon which we have already had occasion to notice in another context.¹ We have observed that an historical personage or event that happens also to become a character or topic of 'heroic' poetry or saga acquires, in this 'other world' of the barbarian poetic imagination, a life of its own whose career, as it develops, is apt to part company with the statically authentic historical facts of 'real life' until sometimes the original identity of the two pictures is almost entirely obscured—as can be verified in cases in which the historical truth or falsehood of the barbarian poet's picture can be gauged by comparison with the prosaic statements of some historian, belonging to a neighbouring civilization, who is, himself, a contemporary of the facts that he has put on record. On this analogy we may perhaps explain the puzzling dittography in our Hesiodic catalogue of the successive races of men by concluding that, in this canto, the poet has played for us the historian's part as well as his own. In his grim delineation of the Race of Bronze he has given us, in advance, the prose version of his immediately following poetic idyll of a Race of Heroes—a fantasy in which the sordid historical facts have undergone their characteristic metamorphosis in the radio-active medium of a Homeric poetical tradition to which Hesiod is the heir.

It would be an error, of course, to suppose that our conscientious Hesiod is deliberately laying a glossy coat of moral whitewash over his heroes' crude historical criminality. His presentation of the damning truth side by side with an ideal picture is evidence of his naïve good faith; and, indeed, we have noticed above² that the barbarian bard who has posthumously made a Hesiod his dupe is quite as ready to paint his picture darker than the reality of his living model as he is to paint it lighter. The notorious creation, in the *Nibelungenlied*, of an imaginary paladin, Dietrich of Bern, out of an historical Theodoric who, 'in real life', won Verona by his treacherous murder of Odovacer, is offset by the transformation of respectable historical characters into villains. The Classical School of Serb 'heroic' poetry, which made the counterpart of an imaginary chivalrous Dietrich out of the historical traitor Marko Kraljević, simultaneously made the counterpart of an authentic dastardly Theodoric out of the historical paladin Vuk Branković.³ The epic poet's concern is, not for his heroes' and heroines' moral reputation, but for his poetry's aesthetic merit; and even in this endeavour, professionally in earnest though he is, he is at the same time entirely unselfconscious.

This admirable unselfconsciousness is one of the secrets of the epic poet's dazzling artistic success; and this triumph of a barbarian art is

¹ In V. v. 607-14.

² On p. 61, above.

³ See V. v. 609.

the solitary creative achievement amid the welter of catastrophic failures which a barbarian war-band brings upon itself when it steps across a fallen *limes* to make a moral slum out of the social ruins among which it squats. In politics, in religion, and in all the other fields in which the barbarians have shown rudimentary signs of possessing creative power so long as they have been pent back behind the *limes*-barrage,¹ these rudiments of creativity are blighted, as we have seen,² by the demoralization that overtakes the barbarians when the collapse of the *limes* spills them out of Limbo into the Promised Land. In the slum of a barbarian successor-state the barbarian's embryonic gift for poetry is the only one of his potentialities that comes to flower; and this bud blossoms so wonderfully that it lends the waste-land the illusory appearance of a paradise. The barbarian bard's magically successful art casts over the barbarian war-lord's commonplace misconduct and failure 'in real life' a glamour that deludes a captivated Posterity—as our physical vision is enraptured by the iridescent colours that radiate, in patterns of inimitable harmony, over the surface of a broken piece of Roman glass or of a puddle of oil that has collected in a pot-hole from the leaking sump of some limping car.³

In social terms the Heroic Age is a great folly, and an even greater crime; but in emotional terms it is a great experience: the thrilling experience of breaking through a barrier which has baffled the barbarian invaders' forebears for many generations past, and bursting out into an apparently boundless world that offers what seem to be infinite possibilities. With one glorious exception, all these possibilities turn out, as we have seen, to be Dead Sea fruit; the barbarian war-lords and warriors throw away their splendid opportunities in crimes and follies that swiftly revenge themselves; yet this sensational completeness of the barbarians' misconduct and failure on the social and political planes paradoxically ministers to the success of their bards' creative work; for in art, in illuminating antithesis to 'practical life', there is more to be made out of failure than out of success.⁴

The exhilaration generated by the experience of the *Völkerwanderung*

¹ See pp. 9-10, above.

² On pp. 46-47, above.

³ To be transfigured by this poetic glamour in the imagination of contemporaries and epigoni was the supreme ambition of the barbarian war-lord—the one prize accessible to him that, in his disillusioned eyes, still shone like gold against the drab foil of a material power and wealth which had been proved mockingly unrewarding by a bitter experience of tasting their fruits and finding them dust and ashes. The poet's tenure of the keys of the war-lord's hall of fame, which was the only heaven to which the war-lord aspired, conferred on the poet a potential political 'pull' which the sophisticated war-lord Mu'awiyah had the acumen to appreciate and the adroitness to turn to his own account (see Lammens, S.J., *Le Père H.: Études sur le Règne du Calife Mo'awia I^{er}* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), pp. 252-66).

⁴ On this point see V. v. 607-14. This truth is illustrated, not only by the choice of themes in the primary epic poetry that is evoked by a barbarian *Völkerwanderung*, but also by the history of the secondary epic poetry in which a sophisticated civilization proclaims its admiration for a barbarian art by trying its hand at an artificial reproduction of the barbarian poet's genre. Like the original epic, the literary epic is apt to be the swan-song of an age that is petering out in disillusionment and failure—as has been pointed out by C. M. Bowra in *From Virgil to Milton* (London 1945, Macmillan), pp. 28-32. This creative potentiality of failure, which had thus proved itself a gold mine for poets who worked it as a vein of inspiration, was also, of course, one of the mysteries that had been revealed in the higher religions through the passions of the Prophets and the Saints.

—an exhilaration that breaks down into demoralization in the intoxicated souls of the barbarian men of action—inspires the barbarian poet serenely to transmute the memory of his heroes' wickedness and ineptitude into a song that will live on Posterity's lips. In the enchanted realm of a poetry that thus magically transfigures the sordid crimes and follies by which it is evoked, the barbarian *conquistadores* achieve vicariously the success that eludes their grasp in real life; and herein the bard does the hero an even greater service than Horace avers.¹ He does not merely preserve his subject's memory; he actually creates his character by making dead history blossom into immortal romance; and, while the effect, as often as not, on his hero's moral reputation may be to present him as a blacker villain than he has actually shown himself to be while he has been rollicking, in flesh and blood, across the stage of History, one invariable result of the poet's artistic alchemy is to enhance immeasurably the aesthetic attractiveness of the historical lay figure that he has taken as his cobbler's last. Thanks to the barbarian poet's wizardry the squalid realities of the barbarian warrior's slum exhale a phantasy of heroism that long outlives its ephemeral source in the sump of authentic history.

This pearl of Barbarism is appreciated and appropriated by a Posterity that has little use for anything else in the barbarian's otherwise uninviting legacy; and the barbarian bard, in the posthumous literary life that is thus conferred on him by the canonization of his works, slyly avenges his discreditable comrades the barbarian war-lord and warrior by investing them with an unmerited reputation through an artistic conjuring trick. The fascination exercised by heroic poetry over its latter-day admirers deludes them, as we have observed,² into mistaking an Heroic Age which is the changeling child of a poet's imagination for the very different historical reality by which the poet's creative activity has been called into play. The poet's magic touch conjures a 'light that never was, on sea or land',³ out of the baleful glare of a conflagration kindled by the barbarian incendiaries of a devastated world; and this theatrical lighting makes a slum look like Valhalla.

The earliest victim of this illusion is, as we have seen,⁴ the poet of a Dark Age which is 'the Heroic Age's' sequel. As is manifest in retrospect, this later age has no need to be ashamed of a darkness which signifies that the barbarian incendiaries' bonfire has at last burnt itself out; and, though, after the expiry of that ghastly artificial illumination, a bed of ashes smothers the surface of the flame-seared ground, the Dark Age proves to be as creative as 'the Heroic Age' has been destructive. When the fire is extinct and the clamour hushed, the Spirit moves again upon the face of the waters; and, in the fullness of time, new life duly arises from the abyss to clothe the fertile ash-field with shoots of tender green. The poetry of Hesiod is one of these harbingers of a returning spring-time; yet this honest chanticleer of the darkness before dawn is still so blindly infatuated with a poetry inspired by an act of nocturnal

¹ Horace: *Carmina*, Book IV, Ode ix.

² On p. 78, above.

³ Wordsworth, William: *Elegiac Stanzas suggested by a Picture of Peele Castle in a Storm*.

⁴ On p. 57, above.

incendiarism that he takes on faith, as gospel truth, an imaginary Homeric picture of a Race of Heroes and is consequently betrayed into despairing of the age of promise into which he himself has been born—without realizing that any age of history that is experienced 'in real life' is bound to seem desperately inferior to an Heroic Age whose idyllic beauty has never had any existence outside a barbarian poet's imagination.

Hesiod's illusion seems strange, considering that, in his picture of the Race of Bronze, he has preserved for us, side by side with his confiding reproduction of an Homeric fantasy, a merciless portrait of the barbarian as he really is. Yet, even without this clue, the heroic myth can be exploded by detonating the internal evidence. The Heroes turn out, as we have perceived, to live the evil lives and die the cruel deaths of the Race of Bronze, and Valhalla turns out likewise to be a slum when we switch off all the artificial lights and scrutinize dispassionately, in the sober light of day, this poetic idealization of the riotous feasting and turbulent fighting that, between them, make up the historical barbarians' daily round and common task. The warriors who qualify for admission to Valhalla by losing their lives in battle are in truth identical with the demons against whom they are called upon to exercise their prowess as members of Odin's ghostly war-band; and, in perishing from off the face of the Earth by mutual destruction, the Vikings have already done their best to relieve the World of a pandemonium of their own making by staging a *ragnarök* with an ending that is a happy one from every point of view except their own. In the Aesir's mythical last stand, Odin and his divine *comitatus* are *Doppelgänger* of the overwhelming powers of darkness to which they are fabled to succumb; for this heroic forlorn hope is the cunning sagaman's version of Odin's 'Wild Ride'—a tempestuous rout of unbridled passion that brings doom on any unhappy mortal who happens to be caught in its hideous blast.

The hallucination to which a Hesiod succumbs in the archaic prelude to a nascent civilization can also take in a sceptical historian in the sophisticated intellectual environment of a civilization that has reached, and perhaps passed, its maturity—as is attested by the following passage which Gibbon has allowed himself to write in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*:

"The sublime Longinus, who . . . in the court of a Syrian queen preserved the spirit of ancient Athens, observes and laments [the] degeneracy of his contemporaries, which debased their sentiments, enervated their courage, and depressed their talents. "In the same manner," says he, "as some children always remain pigmies, whose infant limbs have been too closely confined; thus our tender minds, fettered by the prejudices and habits of a just servitude, are unable to expand themselves,¹ or to attain that well-proportioned greatness which we admire in the Ancients, who, living under a popular government, wrote with the same freedom as they acted." This diminutive stature of Mankind, if we pur-

¹ ὡς περ οὖν, εἴ γε . . . τοῦτο πιστὸν ἀκούειν, τὰ γλωττόκομα, ἐν οἷς οἱ πνευμαῖοι καλούμενοι δὲ νῆανι τρέφονται, οὐ μόνον κωλύει τῶν ἐγκεκλεισμένων τὰς αὐξήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ σκωραῖοι [?] διὰ τὸν περικείμενον τοῖς σώμασι δεσμόν, οὕτως, ἅπασαν δουλείαν, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ψυχῆς γλωττόκομον καὶ κοινὸν ἂν τις ἀποφῆναιτο δεσμοπῆριον.—Longinus [?]: Περὶ Ὑψους, chap. xliv, § 5.

sue the metaphor, was daily sinking below the old standard, and the Roman World was indeed peopled by a race of pigmies, when the fierce giants of the North broke in and mended the puny breed. They restored a manly spirit of freedom; and, after the revolution of ten centuries, freedom became the happy parent of taste and science.¹

After this awe-inspiring exhibition of the barbarian poet-conjurer's power to hoax a giant eighteenth-century intellect, we can hardly be surprised to see a nineteenth-century philosopher-mountebank launching his myth of a salutarily barbarian 'Nordic Race' whose blood—unique in this among all brews of human ichor—acts as an infallible elixir of youth when it is injected into the veins of an 'effete' society.² Yet we may still be cut to the heart as we watch the lively French aristocrat's political *jeu d'esprit* being keyed up into a racial myth by the criminal prophets of a demonic German Neobarbarism that surpasses in wickedness the original Barbarism which it seeks to revive in the measure in which a wilful apostate from a higher religious faith surpasses in perversity the invincibly ignorant heathen.³

(II) A GENUINE HUMBLE SERVICE

While the criminality of a barbarian *Völkerwanderung* can thus work posthumous moral havoc on the strength of its brilliant poetic masquerade as an idyllic heroism, there have also been occasions on which an unbridled barbarian interloper has performed a humble service for Posterity that proves, in retrospect, to have been of genuine value. At the transition from the civilizations of the first generation to those of the second, the interloping barbarian war-bands that established themselves in a dying civilization's former domain did in some cases provide a link between the defunct civilization and its newborn successor, as, in the subsequent transition from the civilizations of the second generation to those of the third, a link was provided by chrysalis-churches created by the secondary civilizations' internal proletariats.⁴ The Syriac and Hellenic civilizations, for instance, were thus linked with an antecedent Minoan Civilization through this Minoan Society's external proletariat, and the Hittite Civilization stood in the same historical relation to an antecedent Sumeric Civilization, the Indic Civilization to an antecedent Indus Culture (supposing that this Indus Culture were to turn out to have been independent of the Sumeric Civilization), and the Sinic Civilization to an antecedent Shang Culture (supposing that the progress of archaeological research were to confirm this Shang Culture's title to rank as a full-blown civilization of the first generation).

The modesty of the service that these particular barbarian war-bands

¹ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. ii, *ad fin.*

² The fallacy of ascribing to societies a senescence that is a property of individual living organisms has been criticized in IV. iv. 7-13.

³ Count de Gobineau's fantasy and its consequences in real life have been touched upon in II. i. 216-19.

⁴ See the table of primitive societies, civilizations, and higher religions, arranged in serial order, facing p. 47 of volume vii.

performed is brought out by our comparison of it with the role of the chrysalis-churches. While the Internal Proletariat that builds the churches, like the External Proletariat that breeds the war-bands, is the offspring of a psychological secession from a disintegrating civilization, and while neither branch of the Proletariat carries this repudiation of its former cultural allegiance so far as to make no use at all of the Dominant Minority's cultural heritage in creating the rudiments of a new culture with a distinctive character of its own, the Internal Proletariat is apt to make a much greater success than the External Proletariat ever makes of the cultural enterprise of 'spoiling the Egyptians'. In the higher religions which had been the Internal Proletariat's *chefs-d'œuvre*, the cultural spoils of a disintegrating civilization had been transmuted into new creations to a far greater extent, and with a far more telling effect, than in the new social and political institutions, the new religions, or even the new poetry of the barbarians beyond the pale; and this difference in degree of cultural assimilative power could be gauged by the difference in the strength of the link between a successor civilization and its predecessor when this link had been supplied by a chrysalis-church and when it had been supplied by a barbarian war-band.

For example, the Orthodox Christian and the Western Civilization, which were affiliated to the antecedent Hellenic Civilization through the Christian Church, had always been on far more intimate terms with their Hellenic predecessor than the Hellenic Civilization ever had been with a Minoan predecessor with which it had been affiliated solely through the Achaean barbarians. Through this non-conductive barbarian medium the Hellenic Civilization's reception of the antecedent Minoan Civilization's posthumous radiation of its cultural influence had been so faint and fragmentary that, in contrast to the Christian civilizations' intimacy with an antecedent Hellenism, the Hellenic Civilization gave the impression of being oblivious of its Minoan predecessor. It was, indeed, so little conscious of its Minoan antecedents that it might almost be mistaken—as its two 'Hellenistic' Christian successors never could be—for one of those civilizations of the earliest generation that had had no previous civilization at all in their cultural background. The Hellenic Society's living cultural heritage from the Achaean barbarians included no institutions of Minoan or post-Minoan origin, and no authentic contemporary records of any periods of the antecedent civilization's history. The sole fount of Hellenic knowledge of a pre-Hellenic past was the Homeric Epic; and, for the history of an antecedent civilization, the poetry bequeathed by barbarians is a doubly deceptive source of information. In general the barbarian poet creates his work of art by taking unlimited liberties with the record of authentic facts;¹ and, in particular, this intuitive artistic criterion governing the poet's treatment of his subject leads him to ignore the moribund civilization whose death agonies have precipitated the barbarian *Völkerwanderung* as a matter of historical fact, but whose tragedy is incomprehensible to barbarian minds.² Eschewing such intractable matter, the barbarian bard presents the barbarian Heroic Age *in vacuo*, with no more than a casual reference,

¹ See V. v. 607-14, and pp. 77-79, above.

² See V. v. 610-14.

here and there, to the mighty carcass on which the bard's vulture-heroes have gathered together to make their carrion feasts.


On this showing, the service with which we have credited the Achaeans and the other barbarians of their generation who played the same transmissive role might seem at first sight to dwindle almost to vanishing-point. What did it really amount to? Its reality becomes evident when we compare the destinies of those civilizations of the second generation that were affiliated to predecessors by this tenuous barbarian link with the destinies of the rest of the secondary civilizations. As we have observed in previous contexts,¹ any secondary civilizations that were not affiliated to their primary predecessors through these predecessors' external proletariats were affiliated to them through their dominant minorities; and these were the only two alternative lines of affiliation in this chapter of history, since no chrysalis-churches came out of the rudimentary higher religions—a worship of Tammuz and Ishtar and a worship of Osiris and Isis—that had been created or adopted by some of the primary civilizations' internal proletariats. Secondary civilizations affiliated through external proletariats and secondary civilizations affiliated through dominant minorities are the only civilizations of this generation that are known to us; and, when we compare these two types, we observe a difference in their destinies corresponding to a difference in their characters.

In character these two types of secondary civilization stand at opposite poles. Whereas those secondary civilizations that were affiliated through external proletariats were connected with their predecessors by a link that is so tenuous that it hardly serves to distinguish them from civilizations of the primary class that had no predecessors at all of their own social species, the rest of the secondary civilizations, which were affiliated through dominant minorities, were, on the other hand, so closely welded thereby to their predecessors of the first generation that we have found ourselves wondering whether we ought not to treat their histories as mere epilogues to those of the antecedent civilizations instead of according them the status of separate civilizations with histories of their own.² Whichever of the two possible answers to this question may be the nearer to the truth, there is no ambiguity about the destinies of these 'supra-affiliated secondary civilizations' or 'dead trunks of primary civilizations'—to give the societies of this type their two alternative labels. There were three known examples of the type—the Babylonian Civilization, affiliated to the Sumerian Civilization, and the Yucatec and Mexic civilizations, affiliated to the Mayan—and none of these three 'supra-affiliated secondary civilizations' had come to serve, in its disintegration, as the chrysalis of any living higher religion. All the living higher religions had been created by the internal proletariats of other civilizations of the second generation—the Syriac Civilization, the Hellenic, the Indic, the Sinic—whose own affiliation with their predecessors of the first generation had run, not through the Dominant Minority, but through the External Proletariat.

¹ In I. i. 115-18 and 131-2, and VII. vii. 421, above.

² This question has been raised in I. i. 117-18 and 133-6.

If we call to mind, in this connexion, our conclusion, reached in the preceding Part of this Study,¹ that our serial order of chronologically successive types of society is at the same time an ascending order of value, in which the higher religions would be the highest term so far attained, we shall now observe that the barbarian chrysalises of civilizations of the second generation would have to their credit the honour of having participated in the higher religions' procreation. They would have been, so to speak, the higher religions' 'grandparents';² for the higher religions that had come to flower had all been created by the internal proletariats of civilizations of the second generation which had been affiliated with their own predecessors of the first generation through barbarian war-bands. These contributions of these barbarians to the geneses of the higher religions can be conveyed most simply and clearly in the form of genealogical tables.



If the failures of the civilizations of the first generation to produce full-fledged higher religions had been followed only by the geneses of secondary civilizations affiliated to their primary predecessors solely through these predecessors' dominant minorities, the actual subsequent sterility of all the secondary civilizations of this type suggests that a second opportunity for the creation of higher religions might then never have presented itself. The actual recurrence of the opportunity, and the flowering, in this second spring, of Christianity, Islam, the Mahāyāna, and Hinduism, seem to have been historical consequences of the geneses of other secondary civilizations that were affiliated with their primary predecessors through barbarians; and these barbarian foster-parents of the Syriac, Hellenic, and Indic civilizations would thus appear to have played a positive, and perhaps indispensable, part in Mankind's gradual and laborious advance towards the goal of human endeavours.

Yet, when we have taken due note of this service and estimated it at its full value, we shall find ourselves still rating it as a modest one on a comparative view. Our conclusion that the role of serving as a cultural chrysalis is the highest to which any barbarian war-band had ever

¹ See VII. vii. 448-9.

² For the sake of brevity, we may perhaps allow ourselves here the perilous licence of describing a process of social growth in terms of the procreation of organic life—without forgetting that, in truth, societies are not living organisms (see III. iii. 219-23 and IV. iv. 11-12).

attained presents a significant contrast to our conclusion¹ that a church, when it had played the same role, had been digressing from its proper course on a charitable errand which, at the best, would delay, and, at the worst, might frustrate, the accomplishment of the church's own proper spiritual mission. If this role is a *pis-aller* for a performer that plays it so admirably as a church does play the chrysalis-role when it charitably condescends to it, the very much less effective performance of the same part by a barbarian war-band cannot be rated as being anything more than modestly meritorious. And even this slight compensation for the enormous social havoc that every barbarian war-band had worked had been paid only by a tiny minority of the war-bands that had made their devastating cyclone-passages through history.

Even at the transition from the first to the second generation of civilizations the barbarians bred by the primary civilizations' disintegration did not by any means always play even the moderately creative part of fostering a secondary civilization's birth.

The Hyksos barbarians who assembled their forces in Palestine and the Philistine and Achaean barbarian foster-fathers of the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations produced, for example, the very opposite of a creative effect in their impacts on the Egyptiac World. In these Nilotic escapades, so far from promoting the genesis of a new civilization, the barbarians performed the most untoward miracle of galvanizing a moribund civilization into a long protracted life-in-death by goading it into a fanatically archaistic reaction against their provocative trespasses. The Hyksos' successful invasion of the Egyptiac World from an Asian no-man's-land² blighted any creative potentialities that might have been latent in an embryonic Osirian Church by driving the internal proletariat into the arms of the dominant minority in an *union sacrée* which achieved the forcible expulsion of the interloping barbarians at the cost of sterilizing a nascent higher religion;³ and the Philistines' and Achaeans' unsuccessful attempt to invade the Egyptiac World some four hundred years after the eviction of the Hyksos had a comparably maleficent effect on the course of Egyptiac history. By evoking Ramses III's *tour de force* of flinging them back from the coast of the Delta, 'the Sea Peoples' not only provoked the Egyptiac Society into expending the last reserves of its already depleted energy; they inflicted on their victim a still graver injury by rekindling in him a fanaticism that kept the patient anaemically alive at a moment when the senile Egyptiac body social was being offered a second chance of a merciful release from life through the natural decay of 'the New Empire'. The inopportune intervention of the Hyksos had already doubled the term of the Egyptiac Society's penal servitude in the prison-house of a universal state by conjuring up 'the New Empire' to repeat the course which 'the Middle Empire' had by then already run. The equally inopportune intervention of 'the Sea Peoples' cheated the prisoner of the belated discharge that he might have expected to

¹ In VII. vii. 447-8.

² Alternative views on the Hyksos' provenance are noticed in the note on Chronology in x. 167-212.

³ See I. i. 143-5.

receive after the expiry of the second instalment of his life-in-death sentence.¹

On this showing, we may put down to the barbarians' account the difference between the sequels to Egyptiac and Sumeric history. While the provocativeness of the Hyksos and the turbulence of 'the Sea Peoples' deterred a moribund Egyptiac society from duly dying and thereby leaving the field free for a successor to take its place, the Sumeric Society was more fortunate in being afflicted on its deathbed with less stimulating barbarian parasites. The Mitanni barbarians, *en route* from the Eurasian Steppe to Syria, seem to have passed the Land of Shinar by, and the raid in which the Hittite barbarians sacked Babylon seems to have been as brief as it was devastating. The maggots that fastened on the carcass of a moribund Sumeric Society were the sluggish Kassites, whose intrusion did not arouse sufficient antagonism to arrest the process of nature. Unimpeded by the Kassite incubus, the transformation of a moribund Sumeric Society into a nascent Babylonian Society, through the agency of the Sumeric dominant minority, is gradually accomplished before our eyes; and this spectacle raises the question whether the Egyptiac Society might not have succeeded in similarly making way for a new society of the 'supra-affiliated' type exemplified in the Babylonian Civilization, if only, at the psychologically favourable moment, when 'the Middle Empire' was *in extremis*, the Egyptiac World had had the good fortune to be invaded, not, as was its actual fate, by the perversely stimulating Hyksos, but by those Kassite-like Libyans who eventually drifted in, after 'the Sea Peoples' had come and gone, so uneventfully that their intrusion failed to produce the usual bout of militant Egyptiac xenophobia.

If the inauspicious influence of the Hyksos and 'the Sea Peoples' on the course of Egyptiac history has to be set against the merit with which the barbarians of the first breed are to be credited for their service as foster-parents of creative secondary civilizations, what verdict are we to pass on those barbarians of the second breed who were part of the offspring of the secondary civilizations in their disintegration? While the internal proletariats of the creative secondary civilizations were bringing the living higher religions to birth, a fresh litter of barbarian war-bands was being spawned by the external proletariats of secondary civilizations of both the creative and the uncreative type. If we are right in regarding the epiphany of the higher religions as being the highest reach of Mankind's progress so far, we shall have to pass the same verdict on the second crop of barbarian war-bands that we have passed on the third crop of secular civilizations. Our verdict on these tertiary civilizations that broke out of chrysalis-churches has been that, at the best, they were 'vain repetitions of the heathen'² and, at the worst, pernicious backslidings from the ideals and endeavours of the higher religions for which the creative secondary civilizations had served as chrysalises.³ In fostering the birth of the higher religions, those chrysalis-civilizations of the

¹ This recurrent galvanization of a moribund Egyptiac Society into renewed bouts of life-in-death by repeated blows from alien assailants has been noticed in VI. vii. 49-50.

² Matt. vi. 7.

³ See VII. vii. 445.

second generation had fulfilled the highest mission of which their species was capable, and had thereby rendered superfluous any further reproduction of their kind. On the same line of reasoning, any further reproduction of barbarian war-bands must be pronounced to be superfluous after one litter of war-bands had fulfilled the highest mission open to their kind by fostering the birth of the chrysalis-civilizations.

This anticipatory judgement by analogy is confirmed by the evidence of the secondary barbarians' actual histories; for these barbarians of the second breed had had no opportunity of performing even the modestly creative role of their predecessors the barbarian foster-fathers of the Syriac, Hellenic, and Indic civilizations. The secondary barbarians whose genesis had been coeval with the epiphany of the living higher religions had faded out ingloriously in the presence of these great lights.¹ The dayspring from on high

restinxit stellas, exortus ut aetherius sol.²

If this is our verdict on the barbarians of the second breed, what are we to say of the barbarians of a third breed that had been generated by the disintegration of civilizations of the third generation? At the time of writing it looked, as we have already observed,³ as if these latter-day barbarians were all fated to be swept off the board by the irresistibly superior military force of a mechanically armed Western Civilization whose own doom likewise might be heralded by the military triumph of a technology in which a Modern Western Man had wilfully put his treasure. In a Westernizing World in the Age of the World Wars the formidable barbarism—and this was formidable indeed—was an archaistic Neobarbarism that was menacing a hard-pressed society, not from outside, but from within.⁴

This Modern Western Neobarbarism has come to our attention in another context.⁵ Our subject in the present Part of this Study has been the less sinister Barbarism that is a perversion, not of a civilization in decay, but of a primitive society whose traditional way of life has been broken up by a decadent civilization's impact; and the conclusion that we have reached is that a barbarian war-band spawned by a disintegrating civilization's external proletariat, like a universal state constructed by a dominant minority, achieves its highest possible destiny in meeting a fate that we should have accounted a supreme disaster if it had overtaken any of the higher religions. Whereas a church puts its mission in jeopardy by serving as a chrysalis, a war-band, like a universal state, fulfills its mission by immolating itself as a Phoenix in order that a new and higher life may spring from its quickening ashes.⁶ The barbarian war-bands that had 'made history' were those few that had died in giving birth to civilizations that had died in their turn to give birth to higher religions; for in the higher religions God had revealed to Mankind—through a glass, darkly⁷—a gleam of the light of His countenance.⁸

¹ On this point, see I. i. 58-62 and 449, n. 2.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, l. 1044.

³ See V. v. 334-7.

⁴ For this role of a universal state, see VI. vii. 53-55.

⁵ I Cor. xiii. 12.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ In V. v. 332-4.

⁸ Psalm iv. 6; xlv. 3; lxxxix. 15; xc. 8.

IX

CONTACTS BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS IN SPACE

(*Encounters between Contemporaries*)

A. AN EXPANSION OF THE FIELD OF STUDY

(I) THE SELF-TRANSCENDENCE OF CIVILIZATIONS

IN the three immediately preceding parts of this book¹ we have followed up our general study of the problem, nature, and process of the disintegrations of civilizations by making particular studies of the institutions created by each of the three factions into which the body social of a disintegrating civilization splits up. We have studied successively the universal states, the universal churches, and the barbarian war-bands that are the characteristic creations of the dominant minorities and the internal and external proletariats of societies that have convicted themselves of having broken down by falling into schism; and the conclusion of these three supplementary historical inquiries would have brought us to the end of our study of History itself if our initial working hypothesis that civilizations are intelligible fields of study² had proved to hold good for a study of all phases of their histories.

Actually we have found that a civilization can be studied intelligibly in isolation so long as we are considering its genesis, its growth, or its breakdown. Indeed, the historical evidence that has presented itself in our empirical survey of breakdowns has seemed to warrant the conclusion that the breakdown of a civilization is invariably due to some inward failure of self-determination and never due to blows delivered by external agencies.³ After passing, however, from our study of breakdowns to our study of disintegrations, we have found ourselves unable to understand this last phase of a broken-down civilization's history without extending our mental range of vision, beyond the bounds of the disintegrating civilization itself, to take account of the impact of external forces.⁴ Even if we ignore the tell-tale label that we have affixed to the barbarians beyond a disintegrating civilization's *limes*, and decide to treat this 'External Proletariat' as an integral part of the society on which it preys—on the ground that the barbarian is not so much an alien as an alienated proselyte from a primitive way of life⁵—we cannot deny the alien origin of those elements in an internal proletariat that have been incorporated through conquests at the expense of an alien civilization, and cannot overlook the importance of the part that has been

¹ Parts VI–VIII.

² The considerations that have led us to work on this hypothesis up to this point have been set out in I. i. 17–50.

³ See IV. iv, *passim*.

⁴ See V. v. 339–40.

⁵ See V. v. 194–210 and VIII, *passim*.

played by creative inspirations from this alien source in the geneses of some of those higher religions that the Internal Proletariat has brought to birth.¹

Thus the history of a single civilization ceases to be intelligible in isolation when it enters its disintegration-phase; and this discovery that our initial working hypothesis is not valid for the study of all historical situations has been confirmed by our subsequent investigations into universal states, universal churches, and heroic ages; for each of these investigations has carried us beyond the limits, in both Space and Time, of the particular civilizations whose declines and falls have generated the institutions that we have been investigating. Our conclusion has been that the barbarians bred by the disintegration of one civilization have made a mark on history in so far as they have succeeded in fostering the birth of another civilization which eventually, after breaking down and disintegrating in its turn, has ministered to the rise of one of the higher religions by providing a framework for it in the shape of a universal state. Universal states, like barbarian war-bands, have made their mark by unintentionally and unconsciously working, not for themselves, but for other beneficiaries; and these beneficiaries have all been alien in the sense of being foreign to the particular civilization in the history of whose disintegration the particular universal state has been an episode. The higher religions have proved to be new societies of a different species from the civilizations under the aegis of whose universal states they have made their epiphanies; and, in so far as universal states have not made their mark by performing services for universal churches, they have made it by performing them for barbarians or for alien civilizations.

These alien civilizations, like the barbarians beyond the pale, have been certified as being alien by the simple and obvious geographical fact that their places of origin have lain outside the frontiers of the universal state on whose domain they have eventually trespassed and whose installations and institutions they have taken over. Yet some—and these not the least notable—of the higher religions that have made their epiphany inside those frontiers have been no less alien on that account, for their adherents have felt themselves, and been felt by their pagan neighbours, to be 'in but not of' the disintegrating society within whose body social, in its universal state, the religion has made its first appearance; and, as we have just reminded ourselves, this aloofness, where it has displayed itself, has been a psychological expression of the historical fact that the source of the religion's creative inspiration has been alien to the tradition of the society within whose universal state the new religion has first presented itself to Mankind. The Roman Empire provided an Hellenic-made cradle for a Syriac-inspired Christianity, while the Kushan barbarian successor-state of the Bactrian Greek Empire provided a likewise Hellenic-made cradle for an Indic-inspired Mahāyāna; and, though it is true, on the other hand, that, unlike Christianity and the Mahāyāna, Islam and Hinduism each drew its inspiration from a civilization that provided it with its political cradle as

¹ See I. i. 57 and V. v. 359-63.

well, it is also true that, in the geneses of these two higher religions likewise, there had been a previous chapter in which more than one civilization had been concerned. A Syriac-inspired Islam and its Syriac-made cradle the Caliphate were Syriac reactions on the religious and on the political plane to a foregoing intrusion of Hellenism on the Syriac World; and a subsequent intrusion of Hellenism on the Indic World had similarly evoked both an Indic-inspired Hinduism and its Indic-made cradle the Guptan Empire. It thus appears that the genesis of each of the higher religions that were still alive in the twentieth century of the Christian Era becomes intelligible only when we expand our field of study from the ambit of a single civilization to embrace encounters between two civilizations or more.¹

(II) BIRTHPLACES OF RELIGIONS IN MEETINGPLACES OF CIVILIZATIONS

The importance of the part played in the geneses of higher religions by encounters between different civilizations is indicated by one of the commonplaces of historical geography which is as remarkable as it is familiar. When we mark down the birthplaces of the higher religions on a map, we find them clustering in and round two relatively small patches² of the total land-surface of the Old World—on the one hand the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and on the other hand Syria (in the broad sense in which this term had been used, in the vocabulary of physical geography, to cover an area bounded by the North Arabian Steppe, the Mediterranean Sea, and the southern escarpments of the Anatolian and Armenian plateaux).³ The Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was the birthplace of the Mahāyāna in the form in which this religion spread from there over the Far Eastern World; and, before that, it had been the birthplace of Zoroastrianism—as appeared to be generally agreed among Modern Western scholars, however widely they might differ in their dating of the epiphany of the Prophet Zarathustra. In Syria, Christianity acquired at Antioch the form in which it spread from there over the Hellenic World as a new religion, after having made its first appearance, as a variety of Pharisaic Judaism, in Galilee. Judaism itself and the sister religion of the Samaritans arose in Southern Syria, in the hill country between the Mediterranean coastal plain and the Jordan cañon. The Monothelete Christianity of the Maronites and the Hākim-worshipping Shi'ism of

¹ This conclusion has been anticipated in V. v. 372-6. The same point is made in a letter, dated the 16th December, 1950, and published in *The New York Times* of the 20th December, 1950, from Professor Th. H. von Laue of Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, in which this Western historian contends that the current competition between rival cultures and ideologies in a coalescing *Oikoumenē* cannot be made intelligible to students of History in the United States if their field of study is confined to the history of their own Western Civilization.

² See xi, maps 21 A and B.

³ It will be seen that Syria, in this physical sense of the term, is approximately coterminous with the combined area of four successor-states of the Ottoman Empire—Syria, Transjordan, the Lebanon, and Palestine—that were carved out in the peace-settlement following the General War of A.D. 1914-18. After the close of the General War of A.D. 1939-45, Palestine was partitioned *de facto* between a new Jewish state which took the name 'Israel', a Transjordan which re-named itself 'Jordan', and an Egypt which made a lodgment in the south-west corner of the partitioned territory.

the Druses both came to birth in Central Syria—the Druse Church in the fastnesses of Mount Hermon and the Maronite Church in those of the Lebanon.

This geographical concentration of the birthplaces of higher religions becomes still more conspicuous when we extend our horizon to take in regions adjacent to the two core-areas. Both the Nestorian and the Monophysite variety of the Syriac version of a Hellenized Christianity took shape in and round Urfa-Edessa, in the Mesopotamian prolongation of Syria towards the East between the North Arabian Steppe and Mount Masius, while the Hijāzī prolongation of Syria towards the South, along the highlands between the Red Sea coastal plain and the steppes of the Najd, saw the birth, at Mecca and Medina, of a Christian heresy which became the new religion of Islam. The Shī'ī heretical form of Islam, like the Manichaean heretical form of Zoroastrianism,¹ was born on the eastern shore of the North Arabian Steppe, in a borderland between 'the Desert' and 'the Sown' in which the radiation of religious influences from Syria and the Hijāz through the conductive medium of the Steppe impinged upon the Euphratean marches of 'Irāq. When we similarly extend the radius of our observation of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, we locate the birthplace of the Mahāyāna, in its first appearance as a variation on the philosophy of Primitive Buddhism, in the adjacent Basin of the Indus; the birthplace of this Primitive Buddhism in the Middle Ganges Basin, and the birthplace of a post-Buddhaic Hinduism in the same quarter of the Indian Sub-Continent.

What is the explanation of these remarkable facts? When we look into the characteristics of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and Syria and compare them with one another, we perceive a feature, prominent in both, which accounts for their historic role in the geneses of higher religions and makes it clear that the likeness between their histories had been the outcome, not of some freakish play of Chance, but of an underlying likeness between their geographical locations.

This prominent common feature of Syria and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin is the capacity, with which each of them had been endowed by Nature, for serving as a 'roundabout' where traffic coming in from any point of the compass could be switched to any other point of the compass in any number of alternative combinations and permutations.² On the Syrian 'roundabout', routes converged from the Nile Basin, from the Mediterranean, from Anatolia with its South-East European continental hinterland, from the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, and from an Arabian Steppe which, in the purview of human geography, may be regarded as 'a waterless sea' in virtue of its sea-like cultural conductivity.³ On the Central Asian 'roundabout', similarly, routes converged from the Tigris-Euphrates Basin via the Iranian Plateau, from India through the passes over the Hindu Kush, from the Far East via the Tarim Basin, and from an adjacent Eurasian Steppe that had taken the place, and inherited

¹ See V. v. 575-80.

² This function of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin in the human geography of the Old World has been noticed in V. v. 131-40.

³ This analogy between the Steppe and the Sea has been noticed in I. i. 64; III. iii. 7-8, 278, n. 1, 391-4, and 399.

the conductivity, of a now desiccated 'Second Mediterranean' whose former presence there was attested by its fragmentary survival in the Caspian, the Sea of Aral, and Lake Balkash.

The role for which Nature had thus designed these two potential traffic-centres had actually, as we know, been played by each of them again and again during the five or six thousand years that had passed since the emergence of the earliest civilizations. Syria had been the scene of encounters between the Sumeric and Egyptiac civilizations before the dissolution of the Sumeric Civilization in the seventeenth century B.C.; between the Egyptiac, abortive First Syriac, Hittite, and Minoan civilizations from the sixteenth to the twelfth century B.C.; between the Syriac, Babylonian, Egyptiac, and Hellenic civilizations and a fossil remnant of the Hittite Civilization from the twelfth century B.C. to the seventh century of the Christian Era; between the Syriac, Orthodox Christian, and Western Christian civilizations from the seventh to the thirteenth century of the Christian Era; and between the Arabic, Iranian, and Western since the thirteenth century, while the Nomadic Civilization of the Afrasian and Eurasian steppes has been an additional party to all these encounters.¹ The corresponding record of Central Asia's geographical service as a cultural meeting-point would also be impressive if Syria's record were not so extraordinary. The Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been the scene of encounters between the Syriac and Indic civilizations from the sixth century B.C. to the eighth century of the Christian Era; between the Syriac, Indic, Hellenic, and Sinic from the fourth century B.C. to the fifth century of the Christian Era; and between the Syriac Civilization, the main body of the Far Eastern Civilization, and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist fossil of a by-then-extinct Indic Civilization from the fifth century of the Christian Era to the thirteenth.

These series of encounters between divers civilizations on Syrian and on Central Asian ground, which had borne spiritual fruit in the births of higher religions, had been registered on the political plane in the repeated inclusion of each of these two peculiarly 'numiniferous' regions in universal states, or in other empires performing similar social functions, that had been thrown up by these colliding civilizations in the course of their histories.

Syria appears to have been included alternately in the Sumeric 'Empire of the Four Quarters' and in the Egyptiac 'Middle Empire' from the twenty-first to the seventeenth century B.C.; in the seventeenth century it formed part of a Hyksos successor-state of 'the Empire of the Four Quarters' which had flooded over the derelict domain of 'the Middle Empire' and had established its headquarters in the Nile Delta; from the sixteenth to the fourteenth century B.C. it was included in 'the New Empire' of Egypt; in the thirteenth century B.C. it was partitioned between this 'New Empire' of Egypt and the Hittite Power; in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. it was incorporated progressively into the Assyrian Empire, and in the sixth century it was annexed in its

¹ These encounters between a number of civilizations on Syrian ground have been noticed, in passing, in V. v. 117-18 and 488.

entirety (including the southern principalities of Judah, Edom, and Moab, which had just escaped falling under the Assyrian yoke) to a Neo-Babylonian Empire which, in the course of the same century, was swallowed up, entire, in the vaster empire of the Achaemenidae. From the fourth to the second century B.C. Syria was a bone of contention between the Achaemenids' Seleucid and Ptolemaic successor-states; but in the last century B.C. it was politically reunited, without being liberated from alien rule, through being annexed to the Roman Empire, and thereafter it continued to form part of the Roman imperial body politic for seven hundred years—till, in the seventh century of the Christian Era, its conquest from the Roman Empire by the Primitive Muslim Arabs resulted in its inclusion, without any interval of independence, in a Caliphate which was a revival of the Achaemenian Empire. Upon the breakdown of the 'Abbasid imperial régime in the tenth century of the Christian Era, Syria became once more a bone of contention between successor-states. The harpies in this chapter of Syrian history were the Katāma Berbers (masquerading as a 'Fātimid' Caliphate), the East Roman Empire, the Western Christian Crusaders, and an Ayyubid Power whose Cairene Mamlūk successors succeeded, before the close of the thirteenth century, in reuniting the whole of Syria under their rule—to remain under it throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, until, in the sixteenth century, the Cairene Mamlūks' dominions were swallowed up, entire, in the vaster empire of the 'Osmanlis. The Ottoman régime in Syria lasted for four hundred years (A.D. 1516–1918)—till the break-up of the Ottoman Empire's Asiatic dominions as a result of the General War of A.D. 1914–18.

This summary recapitulation of Syria's political history brings out the fact that, over a span of four thousand years—from the twenty-first century B.C. to the twentieth century of the Christian Era—the usual political fate of Syria had been to find herself included in the dominions of some universal state. Even when one of these oecumenical empires embracing Syria had broken up, Syria's destiny, as often as not, had been immediately to be annexed entire to some other empire of the kind—as she was taken over from the Neo-Babylonian Empire by the Achaemenian Empire, from the Roman Empire by the Arab Caliphate, and from the Egyptian Mamlūk Power by the Ottoman Empire. Even at times when Syria had not been included as a whole within the frontiers of some single empire, her most frequent alternative fate had been to be partitioned between two empires embracing other regions besides their portions of Syrian territory. In the course of the last four thousand years, reckoning back from the twentieth century of the Christian Era, Syria had been partitioned in this way between an Egyptiac 'Middle Empire' and a Sumeric 'Empire of the Four Quarters'; between an Egyptiac 'New Empire' and a Hittite Power with its political centre of gravity in East Central Anatolia; between an African Ptolemaic and an Asiatic Seleucid successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire; and between an African 'Fātimid' Caliphate and an Anatolian East Roman Empire.

The intervals during which Syria had been under the sovereignty of

local Syrian states had been few and far between; indeed, there were no more than four historical instances of this political dispensation: during an interregnum between the evaporation of 'the New Empire' of Egypt in the twelfth century B.C. and the final onset of Assyria in the eighth century;¹ during the shorter period of relief from external pressure between the collapse of the Seleucid Power in the second century B.C. and the Romans' entry into the Seleucids' heritage in the last century B.C.;² during the bout of anarchy which intervened between the collapse of the 'Fātimid' and East Roman Powers in the eleventh century of the Christian Era and the establishment of the Cairene Mamlūk Power in the thirteenth century; and since the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire in South-West Asia in and after the General War of A.D. 1914-18. During each of these exceptional periods, Syria had been in the hands of a number of parochial sovereign states; yet, though these local principalities had been governed from Syrian capitals, their rulers had, for the most part, been recent arrivals from abroad—Philistines, Greeks, Crusaders, or Zionists from the European shores of the Mediterranean; Hebrews or Arabs from the North Arabian Steppe; and Kurds from the Zagros—and, under the rule of these intrusive *mulūk-at-tawā'if*, the political and cultural atmosphere in Syria had still been redolent of an oecumenical régime that had been the Syrians' normal experience in most of the chapters in their history.

The degree to which Syria's political history had been dominated by her geographical location at a meeting-point of natural thoroughfares was the more impressive, considering that Syria's physical structure was inimical to the imperialism to which Syria had usually been subject, while it was favourable to the *Kleinstaaterei* in which she had so seldom been free to indulge. Syria was not only bounded by 'natural frontiers' that demarcated her *vis-à-vis* the regions round about; she was also articulated internally, like Greece, into a multitude of small physically self-contained 'pockets' and 'perches', and a number of the 'perches'—for instance, the Jabal 'Āmil, the Lebanon, the Jabal Ansariyah, the Jabal Hawrān and Mount Gerizim—had served as fastnesses for fossilized politico-religious communities:³ Imāmī Shi'is, Maronite Monothelites, 'Alī-worshipping Nusayris, Hākim-worshipping Druses, and dissidently Yahweh-worshipping Samaritans. If Syria's geographical location had insulated her from the outer world, as Nature had insulated New Guinea, instead of exposing her, like the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, to the play of external influences and pressures from all quarters of the compass, her physiography, with its strongly pronounced internal articulation within clearly defined 'natural frontiers', would have imposed on her, as her normal régime, a political decentralization which the political effects of her location had precluded on all but four occasions in her history during the last four thousand years.

This Syrian pattern of political history recurs in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin. Whether it was the Median or the Persian successor-state of the

¹ See IV. iv. 473, n. 3.

² Tacitus's remark on this point has been quoted in V. v. 390, n. 3.

³ See I. i. 362; II. ii. 55-57; and V. v. 118 and 125, n. 1.

Assyrian Empire that salvaged this borderland from a Scythian Nomad domination in the sixth century B.C.,¹ the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin comes into the full light of history as part of the oecumenical empire of the Achaemenidae,² and it failed in an attempt to assert its independence when the Achaemenian régime was overthrown by Alexander the Great. A prowess acquired in holding the north-east frontier of the Syriac World against the Eurasian Nomads did not avail the Bactrian and Sogdian border barons in their gallant struggle against the Macedonian invader. After two campaigns they found themselves compelled to capitulate on terms;³ and, after Alexander's death, their country passed into the hands of the Achaemenids' Seleucid successors. The political independence for which the native Iranian population had fought in 330-328 B.C. was attained by the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin only some ninety years later, and, even then, it was not won by native hands and was not long-lived.

In the third quarter of the third century B.C. the Greek garrisons in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin—finding themselves cut off from the main body of the Seleucid Empire by the intrusion of the Nomad Parni from the Transcaspian Steppe into Parthia, on the north-eastern edge of the Iranian Plateau astride the Great North-East Road from Babylonia⁴—erected a Seleucid province into an independent local Greek principality of their own;⁵ but, after two generations, these local Greek princes of Bactria deliberately remerged the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin in a vaster body politic by crossing the Hindu Kush *circa* 183 B.C. and annexing the north-western territories of the Mauryan Empire in India;⁶ and, though the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin became a separate political entity again for a season when, less than half a century after the Bactrian Greeks' conquest of North-Western India, their home territory on the north-west side of the Hindu Kush was overrun by Saka and Kushan Nomad invaders,⁷ the Kushans eventually followed the example of their Greek predecessors by crossing the Hindu Kush in their turn and annexing North-Western India to their Central Asian dominions in the course of the first century of the Christian Era.⁸ This political reunion of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin with the Indus and Ganges basins under a Kushan Rāj was followed up, during the reign of the Kushan empire-builder Kanishka (*regnabat circa* A.D. 78-123), by the annexation of the Tarim Basin⁹—an eastward prolongation of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin which had been under the Sinic rule of the Prior Han Dynasty from 101 B.C. to A.D. 16, and had been reconquered by the Posterior Han between A.D. 73 and A.D. 102.¹⁰ During the second century of the Christian Era the Tarim Basin seems to have been a debatable territory between the Kushan and the Posterior Han Power.¹¹

As for the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin itself, it relapsed into local indepen-

¹ See II. ii. 138.

² See II. ii. 139.

³ See II. ii. 139-40.

⁴ For this road, see VI. vii. 200.

⁵ See II. ii. 143 and 371. The transition from province to principality seems to have been a gradual one (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 72-74).

⁶ See I. i. 86 and II. ii. 371-2.

⁷ See II. ii. 141, n. 2, and 372, and V. v. 133, n. 1.

⁸ See V. v. 133, n. 1.

⁹ See V. v. 144-5.

¹⁰ See V. v. 142-4.

¹¹ See II. ii. 373 and V. v. 145 and 363, n. 1.

dence after the decay of the Kushan Power in the third century of the Christian Era; but, after its Kushan masters had been submerged, at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries, by an Ephthalite Hun wave of Eurasian Nomad invaders, and the Ephthalites had succumbed, in the sixth century, to a following wave of Turks,¹ the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was incorporated, once again, into a universal state through its annexation, in the eighth century, to the Arab Caliphate;² and thereafter the set pattern of its political history continued to repeat itself. After passing through the hands of the Sāmānid, Saljūq, Qāra Qitay, and Kwārizmī successors of the 'Abbasids, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was engulfed in the Mongol Empire in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era;³ and, after the liberator, Timur Lenk, had been betrayed by a demonic militarism into a dispersal of his energies which lost him his chance of making Transoxania the headquarters of a universal state embracing all the shores of the Eurasian Steppe,⁴ the opportunity which Timur had failed to seize in the fourteenth century for Transoxania was successfully seized in the nineteenth century by a Muscovite Power which had provided a disintegrating Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom with its universal state.

At the time of writing, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin formed part of the dominions of the Russian Empire's successor the U.S.S.R., and the links of steel with which Soviet Central Asia had been bound to the Soviet territories on the opposite shores of the Eurasian Steppe by the construction of the Transcaspian, Orenburg-Tashkend, and 'Turk-Sib' railways⁵ were constantly being reinforced through a progressive industrialization of the Central Asian Soviet Republics on a plan designed to integrate them, economically as well as politically, with the rest of the Soviet Union.

It will be seen that, since the sixth century B.C., the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been included successively in four full-blown universal states—the Achaemenian Empire, the Arab Caliphate, the Mongol Empire, and the Russian Empire—and in three other empires—the Seleucid, the Bactrian Greek, and the Kushan—which had performed the social and cultural functions of universal states, even if they did not qualify technically for being given the title. The adjoining Tarim Basin, which prolonged the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin towards the east, had been included successively in three universal states—the Han Empire, the Mongol Empire, and the Manchu Empire—as well as in the Kushan dominions. Syria had been included in no less than eight universal states—the Sumeric 'Empire of the Four Quarters', 'the Middle Empire' and 'the New Empire' of Egypt, the Neo-Babylonian Empire, the Achaemenian Empire, the Roman Empire, the Arab Caliphate, and the Ottoman Empire—without counting in the Hyksos, Hittite, Assyrian, Seleucid, 'Fātimid', East Roman, and Mamlūk episodes in Syrian political history. This political record was so much evidence of encounters between a

¹ See II. ii. 141, n. 2.

² See II. ii. 141 and 375-84.

⁴ See II. ii. 146-8 and IV. iv. 491-501.

⁵ The first two of these three railways had been built before the Revolution of A.D. 1917.

³ See II. ii. 142.

number of different civilizations on Syrian and Central Asian ground; and this exceptionally active intercourse between civilizations in these two areas explains the extraordinary concentration, within their limits, of birthplaces of higher religions.

(III) A CLASSIFICATION OF TYPES OF CONTACT BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS

On the strength of this testimony from the histories of Syria and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin we may venture to propound a 'law' to the effect that, for a study of higher religions, the minimum intelligible field must be larger than the domain of any single civilization, since it must be a field in which two or more civilizations have encountered one another. Our next step will be to take a wider survey of those encounters that, in certain historic instances, have had the effect of bringing higher religions to birth; but, before embarking on this survey, we must define more closely the type of encounter with which we are immediately concerned.

The encounters here in question are contacts in the Space-dimension between civilizations which, *ex hypothesi*, must be contemporaries in order to be able to meet one another face to face at some particular place on the Earth's surface; but this contact in the Space-dimension between contemporaries is not the only form of contact between different civilizations that has come to our notice in this Study. We have also come across contacts in the medium, not of Space, but of Time.

One kind of contact between civilizations in the Time-dimension is the relation between two civilizations of different generations which we have labelled 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation'.¹ In this relation the two parties overlap with one another in the Time-dimension, as contemporary civilizations overlap with one another in the Space-dimension when they meet on common geographical ground. After the body social of a disintegrating civilization has split up into a dominant minority and a proletariat, the embryo of a new civilization may be germinating in the womb of the Internal Proletariat while the Dominant Minority is still fighting a stubborn losing battle to keep the old civilization alive; and in this way two civilizations that are not of the same generation will overlap in Time—as contemporary civilizations with mutually exclusive geographical habitats will overlap in Space when part of the domain of one of them is annexed, whether by conquest or by peaceful penetration, to the domain of another.

The relation of Apparentation-and-Affiliation is by definition, as will be evident, a relation in the Time-dimension which can only arise when each of the parties is in one particular phase of its history: the phase of disintegration in the apparented society's case and, in the affiliated society's, the phase of pre-natal gestation. In other words, this is a relation between two civilizations which, at the time when they are establishing it, are as remote from one another in terms of their respective current stages of existence as any two civilizations can ever be.

¹ See I. i. 44.

There is, however, another kind of contact in the Time-dimension that an affiliated civilization can make, in after life, with a by now extinct civilization to which the living civilization is already related in virtue of an original contact made when the still living civilization was in embryo and the now dead civilization was *in extremis*. This original contact in the form of Apparentation-and-Affiliation will have started the younger civilization in life with a stock of practices and ideas derived from the older civilization's cultural heritage; and, on the strength of the memories of the older civilization which have thus become embedded in the younger civilization's own cultural tradition, the younger civilization can evoke its elder's ghost after the younger civilization has come to birth and the elder has passed out of existence.

Such an encounter between a living civilization and the ghost of a dead predecessor is manifestly different in kind from the previous relation between the same living civilization when it was in the embryo stage and the same predecessor when it was still alive, though moribund. The difference may be compared with that between an adult Hamlet's encounter with his father's ghost and an infant Hamlet's relation with the same father in the flesh. The relation between the child and his living father has more life in it than the relation between the grown man and his dead father's apparition; for in the earlier relation both parties are alive and there is therefore a reciprocal action of each on the other, whereas, in the encounter between man and ghost, the man alone is capable of being affected by the experience, since the apparition with which an adult Hamlet holds converse is not in truth another living personality, but is a 'projection' or 'objectivization' of feelings and ideas, latent in Hamlet's own psyche, that have been recalled by his own memory and clothed with life by his own imagination. Hamlet conversing with the ghost is like a ventriloquist in colloquy with his lay figure; a single party is actually playing simultaneously both the parts in what purports to be a dialogue between two actors. Yet, though in this sense the 'renaissance' of an extinct culture in the life of a living civilization is no more than the simulation of a genuine encounter between one living civilization and another, there is also a sense in which it can be a more intimate communion than the relation of Apparentation-and-Affiliation between one civilization that is already senile, though still alive, and another that, though already alive, is still in embryo.

In the relation of Apparentation-and-Affiliation the extent of the difference in age between the two living parties severely limits their capacity for appreciating one another's point of view and profiting by one another's experience. There are many treasures of experience in a moribund civilization's storehouse which an embryonic civilization finds valueless, because it finds them incomprehensible; but, if the prestige of the elder civilization in the younger civilization's eyes avails to induce the younger to take up into its own tradition this apparently useless lumber from its elder's cultural heritage, this act of blind faith may eventually earn its reward. 'When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but, when I became a man,

I put away childish things.¹ When the younger civilization has come of age in its turn, it will have become capable of understanding, by analogy from adult experience of its own, the adult experience of its now dead predecessor which was incomprehensible to it in a previous chapter of its history in which the elder civilization was still alive, but the younger was not yet grown to man's estate. Though, no doubt, an experience of life can be imparted more vividly to a receptive recipient through living contact in the flesh with the subject of that experience than through a recollection derived at second hand from the subject's literary remains at a date when their author is dead, the receptivity of the recipient is a condition *sine qua non* for the success of any experiment in the transmission of cultural treasure; and a recipient who has grown to be receptive will be capable of deriving more cultural benefit from a 'renaissance' of the culture of a predecessor who is long since dead than the same recipient will have found himself able to derive, in his own uncomprehending infancy, from his elder when he was still present in the flesh.²

A point thus put in general terms is perhaps easier to apprehend in a concrete illustration taken from the history of the Western Civilization's relations with Hellenism. In Western cultural history the generations that had understood Hellenism best, and had made the most of it for the benefit of their own Western Society, had not been those that had been contemporary with Hellenism in the last days of its life; they had been the later generations that had cast their eyes back to a long since dead Hellenic World across a span of time which the West had turned to account for accumulating an experience of its own, akin to the stored-up experience of its Hellenic predecessor. The possession of this adult yardstick had enabled an Erasmus to appreciate and appropriate the treasures of a Classical Greek and Latin literature that had been virtually a closed book to a Gregory of Tours—though the Western Christian chronicler had been the contemporary of a Latin poet Venantius Fortunatus who had been linked by a continuous chain of poetic tradition with the Virgilian Age. In the strength of the same ripe Western experience a Gibbon was able to savour the Hellenic culture of the Antonine Age with a surer taste and a keener zest than a Gregory the Great;³ though, in the generation in which this Pope had been nursing an infant Western Civilization through its first convulsions,⁴ the City of Rome had still been living under the sovereignty of the same Roman Imperial Government that had once been directed by the enlightened mind of a

¹ I Cor. xiii. 11.

² See further X. ix. 124-30.

³ 'Je ne déteste pas de généraliser la notion de moderne et de donner ce nom à certain mode d'existence, au lieu d'en faire un pur synonyme de *contemporain*. Il y a dans l'histoire des moments et des lieux où nous pourrions nous introduire, nous modernes, sans troubler excessivement l'harmonie de ces temps-là, et sans y paraître des objets infiniment curieux, infiniment visibles, des êtres choquants, dissonants, inassimilables. Où notre entrée ferait le moins de sensation, là nous sommes presque chez nous. Il est clair que la Rome de Trajan et que l'Alexandrie des Ptolémées nous absorberaient plus facilement que bien des localités moins reculées dans le temps, mais plus spécialisées dans un seul type de mœurs et entièrement consacrées à une seule race, à une seule culture et à un seul système de vie' (Valéry, Paul: 'La Crise de l'Esprit', in *Variété* (Paris 1924, Gallimard, éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française), pp. 18-19).

⁴ See III. iii. 267-9.

Hadrian, a Pius, and a Marcus. For the same reason the fathers of the American and French revolutions were able to draw on political experiences of Republican Rome, of the Lycian and Achaean confederacies, and of Periclean Athens, which had remained beyond the political horizon of a Dante or a Rienzi.¹

The children of a growing Western Civilization had, in fact, met with the experience that awaits travellers setting out south-westwards from the spot where Caesarea Mazaca nestles at the foot of Mount Argæus. In the early stages of their journey the wayfarers are still too close to the foothills, and too low down in the plain, to be able to see the mighty peak; and, in their eyes at this stage, the soaring volcano is fallaciously represented by the last and lowest waves of its petrified lava-flow. It is not till the caravan has made its passage of the salt-flats and has begun to climb the flank of the South Cappadocian Plateau that Argæus begins to reveal his stature, in its majesty, to the travellers' view. From that vantage point they see him, across the intervening hollows, in better

¹ This widening of a Western mental horizon in one direction had, of course, to be paid for by its contraction in another. The Early Modern Western Humanists' aesthetic appreciation of the Hellenic literature of the Periclean Age made them aliens in the intellectual realm of the Late Medieval Western Schoolmen in which their fathers had been freemen born. The Late Modern Western rationalist orientation of Gibbon's and Bury's intellects inhibited their imaginations from entering into the feelings of souls born into a post-Hellenic interregnum and an Early Medieval Western 'Dark Age' which these eminent Late Modern Western historians had, perhaps perversely, made it their life-work to study and interpret.

This eclipse of insight by rationalism is manifest in Bury's dogmatic rejection of a contemporary account of the way in which the Emperor Heraclius spent his time on the eve of a bold and perilous enterprise that was going to decide, not merely the Emperor's fate, but the fates of the Empire and the Church as well.

'The winter before his departure [on his daring counter-offensive campaign of A.D. 622] was spent by Heraclius in retirement. He was probably engaged in studying strategy and geography and planning his first campaign. Those who look upon him as an inspired enthusiast would like to see in this retirement the imperative need of communion with his own soul and with God; they suppose that he was like John the Baptist, or that, like Jesus, he retired to a mountain to pray. To support this idea they can appeal to George of Pisidia, who, speaking of this retreat, says that the Emperor "imitated Elias of old", and uses many other expressions which may be interpreted in a similar manner. It is probable that Heraclius was fain to possess his soul in silence for a few months; but it is hazardous to press the theological word-painting of a poetical ecclesiastic into the service of the theory that Heraclius was a semi-prophetic enthusiast with a naturally weak will. When George of Pisidia mentions in another place (*Heracliad*, Book II, ll. 120 and 136 seqq.) that the Emperor studied treatises on tactics and rehearsed plans of battle, we feel that we are on surer ground. The *Strategikon* of [the Emperor] Maurice, doubtless, was constantly in his hands' (Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Later Roman Empire* (London 1889, Macmillan), 2 vols., vol. II, pp. 224-5).

In this passage the Late Modern historian-rationalist lays himself open to the censure of a post-Modern historian-philosopher.

'Historical inquiry reveals to the historian the powers of his own mind. Since all he can know historically is thoughts that he can re-think for himself, the fact of his coming to know them shows him that his mind is able (or, by the very effort of studying them, has become able) to think in these ways. And conversely, whenever he finds certain historical matters unintelligible, he has discovered a limitation of his own mind; he has discovered that there are certain ways in which he is not, or no longer, or not yet, able to think. Certain historians, sometimes whole generations of historians, find in certain periods of history nothing intelligible, and call them 'dark ages'; but such phrases tell us nothing about those ages themselves, though they tell us a great deal about the persons who use them, namely that they are unable to re-think the thoughts which were fundamental to their life. It has been said that *die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*; and it is true, but in a sense not always recognized. It is the historian himself who stands at the bar of judgement, and there reveals his own mind in its strength and weakness, its virtues and its vices' (Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), pp. 218-19).

perspective than was possible for them at the earlier stage in their journey when their road was actually traversing the mountains' spurs and when the peak was therefore towering sheer above them—so close that it was still invisible.

There is thus a clear distinction to be drawn between the relation of 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation' and another form of contact in the Time-dimension between an adult living civilization and a dead civilization whose cultural legacy the living civilization appropriates for its own use and profit by the creative act of recollection that is known as a 'renaissance'. The phenomenon of 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation' has been sufficiently examined already in our study of the disintegrations of civilizations and of the resulting universal states, universal churches, and heroic ages.¹ The phenomenon of a 'renaissance', in which an affiliated civilization evokes its predecessor's 'ghost', requires further consideration, as it has been noticed here only incidentally so far. Accordingly our study, in the present Part, of encounters between contemporaries will be followed in the next Part by a study of contacts in the Time-dimension in the particular form of 'renaissances'.

Before we proceed with our present inquiry into encounters between contemporaries in the Space-dimension, we have, however, still to elucidate one point and to take note of another.

The point to be elucidated is the relation of Archaism—one of the symptoms of the malady of schism in the Soul which we have examined in a previous Part of this Study²—to Apparentation-and-Affiliation on the one hand and to renaissances on the other. In terms of renaissances, Archaism might perhaps be described as being a kind of renaissance in which the commerce between the living and the dead is transacted, not between two different civilizations representing two different generations of their species of society, but between two different phases in the history of one and the same civilization.³ While Archaism thus has in common with renaissances the feature of being the evocation of a ghost, it differs from renaissances and resembles Apparentation-and-Affiliation in being a relation between parties whose respective experiences and outlooks are, not similar, but diverse.

The other point that we have to consider before proceeding with the inquiry that is the subject of the present Part of this Study is a compound form of contact in which an encounter between two contemporaries that are, both of them, affiliated to the same dead predecessor leads to a renaissance, in the life of one of these two living civilizations, of an element in the dead civilization's cultural legacy which has been preserved 'in cold storage' in the tradition of the other living civilization and has been imparted by this 'carrier' to her contemporary and sister

¹ See V-VIII of the present Study, *passim*.

² In V. vi. 49-97.

³ In this aspect in which it appears to be a kind of renaissance, Archaism is the counterpart, in the field of relations in the Time-dimension, of those encounters between a 'fossil' and the body social that has precipitated it, or between a creative minority and an uncreative rank-and-file, which, in the field of relations in the Space-dimension, may be described as being a kind of encounter between contemporaries in which the parties are representatives, not of two different contemporary civilizations, but of two different contemporary elements in the body social of one and the same society (see pp. 109-10, below).

through their contact with one another in the Space-dimension. A classical example of this rather complicated concatenation of contacts in divers dimensions is the part played in the 'renaissance' of the Hellenic culture in the life of the Western Civilization in its Modern Age by the Western Civilization's contact with the main body of the sister civilization of Orthodox Christendom.

The importance of the Byzantine contribution to this Western achievement must not, it is true, be over-estimated; for the West's own native tradition was fraught, like the Byzantine tradition, with the cultural heritage of a Hellenism which was the common cultural background of both these affiliated civilizations; and, no doubt, the Western Society, as it came to maturity, would have conjured a renaissance of Hellenism out of its own tradition in any event, even if it had never come into contact with its Byzantine sister. A Western renaissance of Hellenism from the native Western tradition was in fact already taking place on Western ground in Northern and Central Italy¹—the precocious nursery-garden of the Western Civilization in its modern phase²—before the medieval encounter between the Western and Byzantine worlds took the cultural form of conveying a knowledge of the Classical Greek language, and the texts of works of Hellenic literature written in Greek, to Italy from Constantinople. This conveyance of intellectual treasure did not, indeed, take place till the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, when the encounter between the two sister civilizations was already four hundred years old and had produced such a bitter estrangement that the Byzantine peoples were by then already acquiescing in an Ottoman domination over the main body of Orthodox Christendom as a less unpleasant fate than the Western domination which was the practical alternative then confronting all Orthodox Christians except the Russians. Thus the fifteenth-century intellectual commerce between Constantinople and Italy did not originate the Western renaissance of Hellenism. Yet, though it did not originate it, it did enrich it—and this to an extent that greatly heightened its potency.

The sample of the Hellenic cultural heritage that had been carried in the native Western tradition was merely the jejune secondhand version of it in the Latin language; and, if the West had been able to draw only on these Greekless cultural resources of its own, the Western renaissance of Hellenism would have been a revocation of the *Magnus Annus* without its quickening spring. The Western scholar-necromancers who were

¹ As has been pointed out in IV. iv. 275, n. 2, it was no accident that this native Western renaissance of Hellenism occurred in a province of the Medieval Western Christian World that had previously forged ahead of the main body of Western Christendom by making successful responses to local challenges.

² See I. i. 19. The cultural revolution in Transalpine Europe at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, which had come to be called 'the Renaissance', had been, in reality, not an evocation of a ghost of the dead Hellenic culture, but a reception of a contemporary variation of the Western culture that had arisen in Northern Italy and that had by that time forged so far ahead of the contemporary Transalpine version of the same Western culture as to have become virtually a distinct civilization. This sixteenth-century reception of a contemporary Italian culture in the Transalpine provinces of the Western World had acquired its misnomer 'renaissance' because the Italian culture which was received at this time beyond the Alps had recently enriched itself through a local Italian renaissance of Hellenism—first in its Latin dress and thereafter in its original Greek embodiment (see IV. iv. 275, n. 1).

striving to evoke a ghost of Hellenism to inspire a Modern Western way of life would hardly have produced the profound effect that they did produce on Western history if the dingy changeling Latin dress in which Hellenism had re-emerged from a Western store-cupboard had not been supplemented by the authentic original garments of a dazzling Greek texture which the West acquired from Byzantium at the eleventh hour. The passive service which Byzantium thus performed for the West as the 'carrier' of a treasure which the West did not merely take over but succeeded in turning to profitable account had been estimated in the following terms by a Modern Western humanist man of letters:

'The Byzantines had grave limitations for the work of *transmissio*. But they had the wisdom and the humility to see what their duty was, and the constancy of mind to do it. They did preserve the old literature, though they could not understand its value. They believed it was beautiful even if they could not see the beauty. They believed it was full of wisdom and virtue and the search for truth and for some forgotten thing called freedom. And, though they understood neither the drama, nor the poetry, nor the philosophy, nor even the history, they did at least copy letter by letter the great books, which were destined, when they met with readers capable of comprehending them, to bring about the rebirth of Civilization.'

If the Byzantine Greek scholars could have risen from the dead to read this Western judgement on their work, no doubt they would have been both surprised and incensed at finding themselves commended as conscientious players of the part of a servant who, in the Parable of the Talents,² is denounced by his master as 'slothful' and 'wicked'. They would have pointed out that, even if the five talents originally entrusted to them to invest did eventually pass into the hands of an acquisitive Western fellow servant of theirs who had received a beggarly single talent as his own original allocation, the implication that they had allowed those five talents to lie idle while they were in their keeping was refuted by patent historical facts. How could the Byzantines be accused of having laid up their legacy from Hellenism in a napkin or of having hidden it in the earth, when the renaissances which they had actually conjured out of it were commemorated by such eloquent monuments? Did not the Byzantine ivory-carving of the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian Era bear witness to a renaissance, at least in miniature, of an Hellenic art of sculpture in bas-relief? Was not the legislation of the Macedonian Dynasty inspired by a Justinianean Hellenic *Corpus Iuris*? And was not the establishment of the East Roman Empire by Leo Syrus the revival of a Constantinian Hellenic universal state? In the light of these artistic, juristic, and political Byzantine achievements,³ was it fair to convict the Byzantines, on an exclusively literary test, of having failed to bring about a rebirth of Civilization?

But, even (our Byzantine apologists might have gone on to protest) if this Western indictment could have been proved against them, a culpable omission, on their own part, to turn the talents entrusted to

¹ Murray, Gilbert: *Greek Studies* (Oxford 1946, University Press), pp. 104-5.

² Matt. xxv. 14-30; Luke xix. 12-26.

³ A critique, from a Western standpoint, of these renaissances of Hellenism in Orthodox Christendom will be found in IV. iv. 363, n. 1.

them to due account would not have automatically pilloried them in the role of serving as 'carriers' of these talents for eventual transfer to their Western neighbours. To have existed for the benefit of the West was not (the Byzantines would insist) the Orthodox Christian Civilization's *raison d'être*.¹ To minister to the West's convenience was not an object that any good Byzantines had ever intended to work for; and, if it should turn out that Fate had played them the malicious trick of having set them to work for the West inadvertently, either by transmitting to the West the Byzantine legacy of Hellenism or by shielding the West against direct assaults on the Arab Caliphate's part from the Caliphate's South-West Asian base of operations,² this would be, for them, a cause of more acute *chagrin* than any other incident in their tragic history.

To such Byzantine protests, however, a Westerner could make a maliciously telling retort by demurely putting on record his sincere testimonial to the benefits which the West had in fact received from the main body of Orthodox Christendom both as a military shield against the Arab Caliphate and as a cultural 'carrier' of Hellenism; and he could point out both that, in the appraisal of benefits, the beneficiary necessarily has the last word, and that the West's own estimate of the benefits that she had received from Byzantium would not be invalidated by a Byzantine *affidavit* that the benefaction had been inadvertent or even contrary to intent. It was a plain matter of historical fact that a Western World which had been endeavouring to profit by the single talent of Hellenic treasure that had been its own meagre trust fund had been suddenly and enormously enriched in the fifteenth century by a delivery from Byzantine into Western hands of the five talents that had been the original portion of the more generously endowed sister society. It was also (the Westerner would add) a matter of historical fact that the transfer had been justified in the event by the cultural productivity which the West had achieved after its cultural working capital had been thus augmented by this transfer of an unexpended balance in the Orthodox Christian Society's cultural deposit account.

Whatever the final verdict might be on this cultural controversy between Byzantium and the West, it was manifest that the episode out of which it had arisen had been a concatenation of contacts between three civilizations in two dimensions. An historical plot of this complicated pattern is not likely to present itself frequently, yet the particular performance on which our attention has been fixed up to this point was not the only one known to History. The role of serving as a cultural 'carrier', which Byzantium had performed for the West in transmitting to her the legacy of Hellenism in its original Greek embodiment, had likewise been performed—through the transmission of comparable cultural treasures—by the Arabic Muslim Civilization for the Ottoman province of an Iranic Muslim World, and by the main body of the Far Eastern Society for an offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan.

When, in the course of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era,

¹ For this naïvely egocentric conventional Western view of the East Roman Empire's historical role, see I. i. 156, with n. 1.

² See I. i. 156, with n. 1, and II. ii. 367-8.

almost the whole of the Arabic World, with the one notable exception of Morocco, was progressively annexed by the 'Osmanlis,' the cultural effect was to transmit to the Ottoman province of the Iranic World, in the original classical Arabic form,² a legacy from a common Syriac past which this Iranic sister civilization had inherited in a Persian dress in its own native tradition.³ It will be seen that this concatenation of cultural contacts between the Iranic Muslim, Arabic Muslim, and Syriac civilizations is formally parallel to the contemporary interplay between the Western Christian, Orthodox Christian, and Hellenic civilizations, though these two outwardly similar cultural episodes not only took place in quite different political circumstances, but also produced substantially different cultural effects, owing to a difference in relative degree of vitality between cultural treasures that were transmitted respectively by the Egyptians to the 'Osmanlis and by the Byzantines to the Italians.⁴ The cultural treasure that the 'Osmanlis received via Cairo from a dead Syriac culture's Islamic last phase consisted mainly of desiccated classical Islamic theology; and a corresponding legacy of desiccated classical Confucian philosophy, from the treasure-house of a dead Sinic Society, was all the Sinic treasure that was obtained in the Tokugawa Age by a Japanese offshoot of the affiliated Far Eastern Civilization via the main body of the same Far Eastern Civilization in contemporary China.

These three episodes are examples of a compound type of contact between civilizations which may be distinguished, as such, from other kinds; but we shall find it more convenient to deal with these episodes analytically, under the two heads of 'encounters between contemporaries' and 'renaissances', than to reserve them for separate study; and we may now embark on our survey of 'encounters between contemporaries' without further preliminaries.

¹ See I. i. 348. Syria was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1516, and Egypt (carrying with it the Hijāz) in A.D. 1517. Algeria was acquired in A.D. 1516-18 (see pp. 220-1, below), 'Irāq in A.D. 1534, and Tunisia (definitively) in A.D. 1574. The conquest of the Yaman was completed in A.D. 1570. See further X. ix. 37-38.

² See I. i. 395-6.

³ See I. i. 71.

⁴ See I. i. 396.

B. A SURVEY OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATIONS

(I) A PLAN OF OPERATIONS

IN setting out to make a survey of encounters between contemporary civilizations, we are confronted, as we were in attempting our original survey of the societies between whom these encounters take place,¹ with a formidably intricate maze of history; and now, as then, we shall be well advised to look, before plunging into the thicket, for a favourable point of entry. In our present enterprise this preliminary reconnaissance is perhaps even more necessary than we found it to be on the earlier occasion, since there is a considerably larger number of trees in the wood which we have now to explore.

The number of civilizations that we originally located on our cultural map was only twenty-one;² and, even if the progress of archaeological discovery were to warrant us in regarding the Indus Culture as a separate society from the Sumeric Civilization³ and the Shang Culture as a civilization antecedent to the Sinic, this change in our reckoning would raise our total muster of civilizations only to twenty-three.

These twenty-one or twenty-three civilizations fall into two groups—one originating in the Old World and the other in the New World—if we classify them by their birthplaces; and either of these geographical groups is distributed chronologically between more generations than one—the actual number of generations up to date being two in the New World and three in the Old World. In the earliest generation of the Old-World series there are in any case four societies—the Egyptian, the Sumeric, the Minoan, and either the Sinic or else the Shang, if we assign the Sinic to the second generation, instead of the first, on the strength of the twentieth-century archaeologists' achievement of disinterring an antecedent Shang Culture—and the number rises to five if we are to regard the Indus Culture as a distinct society and not as a mere variety of the Sumeric Civilization. In the second generation of the same series there are in any case five societies—the Hellenic, the Syriac, the Hittite, the Babylonian, and the Indic—and possibly six, if the Sinic Society is to be classified as being a civilization with a predecessor. In the third generation there are eight societies:⁴ the Western, the main body of Orthodox Christendom, an offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia, the Iranian Muslim, the Arabic Muslim, the Hindu, the main body of the Far Eastern Society in China, and an offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in Korea and Japan. In the New-World series there are two societies in the first generation—the Andean and the Mayan—and two in the second: the Yucatec and the Mexic.

¹ See I. i. 51-129.

² See I. i. 133.

³ Alternatively, the Indus Culture might be regarded as a mere 'colonial' variation on the Sumeric (see I. i. 107-8).

⁴ A criticism of this count has been made by Prince Dmitri Obolensky (see pp. 669-70 and 671, below).

Manifestly the possible number of geographical encounters between contemporary civilizations will have been restricted by the geographical segregation of the civilizations on our list into two groups and by the chronological segregation of the societies belonging to either geographical group into different generations. Nevertheless, the total number of encounters between civilizations that have been one another's contemporaries is notably larger than the total number of civilizations of all generations in both geographical groups taken together. This at first sight perhaps surprising arithmetical fact is accounted for by several considerations.

In the first place it is possible for contemporary civilizations to have more than one encounter with one another in the course of their histories, and this possibility had been actually fulfilled not infrequently. For example, the encounter between the Western, Orthodox Christian, and Islamic societies, which was such a prominent *motif* in current history at the time of writing, had been preceded by an encounter between the same three parties during the so-called 'medieval' phase of Western history; and this earlier encounter will prove to be a separate story (though we shall find, as might be expected, that the two stories have a connecting link).

The number of encounters between contemporary civilizations had been further increased by chronological overlaps between the life-spans of Old-World civilizations belonging to different generations. The Egyptian Civilization, for instance, was galvanized, as we have seen, by the successive impacts of Hyksos, 'Sea Peoples', Assyrians, Persians, and Macedonians into going on living so long beyond its normal expectation of life that it encountered as contemporaries, not only two civilizations of its own generation—the Sumeric and the Minoan—but also four civilizations of the next generation: the Babylonian, Hittite, Syriac, and Hellenic.

Again, the civilizations belonging to this second generation in the Old-World series did not all come to birth or all go into dissolution at exactly the same date. The Babylonian, Indic, and Hittite civilizations seemed to have emerged from a post-Sumeric interregnum in the fourteenth century B.C.; the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations emerged from a post-Minoan interregnum in the twelfth century B.C.; and the emergence of the Sinic Civilization might have to be dated as late as the ninth or the eighth century B.C. if it proved to have been preceded by a distinctively separate Shang Culture whose universal state had gone into dissolution in either the twelfth or the eleventh century B.C., according to our choice between two alternative traditional Sinic chronologies. The dates at which these six Old-World civilizations of the second generation went into dissolution were still farther removed from one another than the dates of their births. While the Hittite Civilization was overwhelmed as early as the twelfth millennium B.C. by the very *Völkerwanderung* that preceded the Hellenic and the Syriac Society's emergence, the Babylonian Society did not go into dissolution till the first century of the Christian Era, the Sinic Society not till the second century of the same era, and the Hellenic Society not till the fourth

century. As for the Syriac and Indic societies, they lived on, like the Egyptian, beyond their normal expectation of life, and this for the same reason. The course of their disintegration was interrupted by the impact of an alien society, and this interruption, in which the intruder was the Hellenic Society in both cases, prolonged the life of the Indic Society into the fifth century of the Christian Era and the life of the Syriac Society into the tenth century.¹ In consequence, the Syriac Society encountered as contemporaries not only one civilization of an older generation than its own—the Egyptian—and other civilizations of its own generation—the Hellenic, Babylonian, and Indic—but also some of the civilizations of the succeeding generation—the Western Christian, the Orthodox Christian both in its main body and in its Russian offshoot, the Hindu, and the main body of the Far Eastern Society.

Moreover, some of the debris of disintegrating civilizations of the second generation in the Old World had been preserved, as we have seen, in a 'fossilized' state. The oldest example was the fossil of the Hittite Civilization which had survived, after that society's premature extinction, astride the Taurus and Antitaurus mountain ranges in South-Eastern Anatolia and Northern Syria. These fossil remains of the Hittite Society were eventually absorbed into the bodies social of the Syriac and Hellenic societies, but other extinct civilizations had left fossils that were still extant at the time of writing. The Jews and Parsees and the Nestorian, Monophysite, and Monothelete Christians were fossils of the Syriac Civilization deposited in two strata representing two stages in an encounter between the Syriac Society and Hellenism in the course of the Syriac Society's disintegration, while the Hinayanian Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia were similar fossils representing corresponding stages in the parallel history of an Indic Society whose disintegration had likewise been interrupted and retarded by an encounter with the same Hellenic intruder.

These fossils had survived to encounter, as contemporaries, civilizations that had not emerged until after the death of those civilizations by which the fossils themselves had been precipitated. The fossil of the Hittite Civilization, for instance, had lingered on to encounter the Syriac, Babylonian, and Hellenic civilizations; the Jewish relic of the Syriac Civilization had encountered the Arabic Muslim, Iranian Muslim, Orthodox Christian, and Western civilizations; the Parsees had encountered the Hindu, Iranian Muslim, and Western civilizations; the Nestorians had encountered not only the same three civilizations as the Parsees, but the Arabic Muslim and Far Eastern civilizations and the Tantric Mahayanian fossil of the Indic Civilization as well; the Monophysites had encountered the Arabic Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Western, and Hindu civilizations; the Monotheletes, the Arabic Muslim, Orthodox Christian, and Western; the Hinayanian relics of the Indic Civilization

¹ Reckoning the interregnum following the break-up of a restored Syriac universal state to have begun, in the domain of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, with the Fātimid Katāma Berbers' occupation of Egypt in A.D. 969, and, in the domain of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate, with the break-up of the Umayyad realm into indigenous parochial successor-states in the early years of the eleventh century of the Christian Era.

had encountered the Hindu, Far Eastern, Western, and Arabic; the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhists had encountered the Hindu, Far Eastern, Western, and Iranic.

This long list of multiple collisions and contacts does not tell the whole tale of encounters to which a 'fossil' had been one of the parties. In the histories of the Syriac and the Indic Civilization, for example, in which fossils had been deposited during the lifetime of the society in strata representing stages in an encounter between this society and an intrusive Hellenism, the divers fossil forms that the victimized society had assumed under the impact of an alien social force had in either case had subsequent encounters with a later form that the same society had assumed in the act of eventually ejecting the alien intruder. The Jewish and Parsee fossils and the Nestorian, Monophysite, and Monothelete Christian fossils of the Syriac Society all encountered the Syriac Society itself in its last phase under the régime of an Islamic Caliphate that was a post-Hellenic resumption of the Achaemenian Empire. Similarly, the Hinayanian Buddhist and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist fossils of the Indic Society encountered the Indic Society itself in its corresponding last phase under the régime of a Hindu Guptan Empire that was a post-Hellenic resumption of the Empire of the Mauryas.

In these two cases we see an encounter between contemporaries taking place within the bosom of a single society between different sub-societies into which this society has articulated itself, and this 'internal' type of encounter is not represented solely by cases in which one of the parties to it is a fossil. In studying the growths of civilizations, we have found¹ that the regular social process through which a growing society advances from one stage in its growth to another is a compound movement in which a creative individual or minority first withdraws from the common life of the society, then works out, in seclusion, a solution for some problem with which the society as a whole is confronted, and finally re-enters into communion with the rest of the society in order to help it forward on its road by imparting to it the results of the creative work which the temporarily secluded individual or minority has accomplished during the interval between withdrawal and return. Manifestly the impact of the returning creative individual or minority on the uncreative rank-and-file of the society within whose bosom the process of withdrawal-and-return occurs is another form of encounter between contemporaries in which the parties are all members of a single civilization. Cases in point, which have come to our attention already,² are the 'Ionization' of the Hellenic Society, in the transition from a first to a second chapter of its growth, through the impact of a temporarily secluded Ionian creative minority on the rest of the Hellenic body social; the 'Atticization' of the same Hellenic Society, in the transition from the second to a third chapter of its growth, by the similar impact of a likewise temporarily secluded Athenian creative minority; the 'Italianization' of the Western Society, in the transition from a second to a third chapter of its growth, by the impact of a temporarily secluded North Italian creative minority; and the 'Anglicization' of the same Western

¹ In III. iii. 248-377.

² In III. iii. 336-63.

Society, in the transition from the third to a fourth chapter of its growth, by the impact of a temporarily secluded English creative minority.

Such encounters within the bosom of a single society are authentic instances of the phenomenon of contact between contemporaries, whether the internal articulation of the society which makes this type of encounter possible has been produced by the withdrawal of a creative individual or minority or by the precipitation of a fossil. We have also still to take note of a further set of encounters between contemporaries of the more usual kind, in which the parties to the encounters are different civilizations and not merely different representatives of a single civilization.

The last factor that had multiplied the number of geographical encounters between different contemporary societies had been the fusion of the New-World with the Old-World group as a result of the conquest of the Ocean by the Western Christian Civilization in the 'modern' chapter of its history (*currebat circa* A.D. 1475-1875). The impact of this Old-World society on the Mexic, Yucatec, and Andean societies across the Atlantic had been the first notable case, if not the first known case, of 'inter-hemispheric' contact.¹

This achievement of the Modern Western Civilization is an historical landmark; and it may give us a clue to finding our point of entry into the historical maze that we have undertaken to explore.

When, in the course of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, West European mariners mastered the technique of oceanic navigation, they thereby won a means of physical access to all the inhabited and habitable lands on the face of the planet; and their conquest of the Ocean had in fact resulted, by the time of writing, in the establishment of contact between a Western Society that had originated on the North Atlantic seaboard of the Old World and all other living societies—not excluding those primitive societies that, before Western explorers tracked them down, had been secluded in a virtual isolation in such natural fastnesses as the tropical forests in the heart of Africa, Borneo, and New Guinea, the jungle-clad mountains in the borderland between India, China, and Tibet, and the uninviting extremities of Asia and South America: an Arctic North-Eastern Siberia and an Antarctic Tierra del Fuego.² In the lives of all these other living societies the impact of the West had come to be the paramount social force and 'the Western Question' had come to be the fateful issue. As the Western pressure on them had increased—and, so far, it had been increasing in a geometrical progression of growing severity—their lives had been turned upside down; and it was not only the frail social fabric of the surviving primi-

¹ The possibility that, in a pre-Columbian Age, the Plains Indians of North America had already borrowed the composite bow from an Old-World Eurasian Nomad Society is noticed on p. 638, below.

² These holes and corners in the *Oikoumenê*—which had afforded an asylum for a rearguard of primitive Mankind because their inaccessibility or unattractiveness had exempted them from invasion by any of the civilizations before the literally world-wide expansion of a Modern Western representative of this aggressive parvenue species of human society—had also served as preserves for religious practices and beliefs which might perhaps prove to be relics of a purer, as well as older, religion than the idolatry to which Man in Process of Civilization had succumbed before the eventual epiphany of the historic higher religions (see VII. vii. 759-68).

tive societies that had been pulverized; the living non-Western civilizations had been convulsed, and even the petrified fossils of a previous generation of civilizations had been corroded, by this literally world-wide revolution of Western origin. The Western Society alone had appeared at first to remain unaffected, in its own life, by the havoc that it was thus making of the rest of the World; but, within the lifetime of the writer of this Study, one of the encounters between the West and its contemporaries had come to darken the horizon of the Western Society itself.

The dominating role in Western affairs that had thus come to be played by a collision between the West and a foreign body social was a novel feature in recent Western history; and the date at which this new situation had arisen could be established with some precision by a reading of the index of power politics. From the failure of the second Ottoman assault on Vienna in A.D. 1683 to the defeat of Germany in the General War of A.D. 1939-45, the West as a whole had been so overwhelmingly superior in power to the rest of the World in the aggregate¹ that the fluctuations in a balance of power between Great Powers that were all either Western or Westernized in their culture had been the most important military, political, and economic phenomena in the World during that quarter of a millennium.² Throughout that period the Western Powers virtually had nobody to reckon with outside their own circle, and, on the material plane, the destiny of all Mankind outside that circle was therefore determined, in that age, by the course of the mutual relations between those Western Powers. This Western monopoly of power in the World came to an end, however, when, after the war of A.D. 1939-45, Germany's bid for world domination, which had been the previous *Leitmotiv* in the play of power politics, gave place to the new *Leitmotiv* of a competition for the same prize between the United States and the Soviet Union. In itself, of course, this reversal of the relation between the two principal victors in a war in which their principal adversary had suffered a crushing defeat was an incident in the play of political dynamics that, so far from being unusual, might have been predicted as almost inevitable in the light of past precedents. A drastic change in the balance was always apt to be reflected in a correspondingly drastic change in the constellation of political forces. If, however, we go beyond this rather superficial consideration of the formal dynamics of the Balance of Power to take account of the characters of

¹ See III. iii. 200.

² In I. i. 33-34 it has been pointed out that, in this age, the Western Society had become so sure of its own predominance in the World that it had ceased to have any collective name of its own in its own vocabulary. The West now no longer felt a need to distinguish itself by a proper name from other societies which it no longer regarded as its equals. When all the members of all the living non-Western societies were confounded together in Western minds under the negative label 'Natives', the correlative term on Western lips could only be 'civilized people'—with the implication that there could be no such thing as Civilization in any non-Western way of life. This Modern Western identification of Civilization with Western Civilization was a secularized version of the Primitive Western Christian proposition: 'Nemini salus . . . nisi in Ecclesiâ' (Cyprianus, Th. C.: Ep. iv, chap. 4. Cp. *De Catholicæ Ecclesiæ Unitate*, chap. 6: 'Habere non potest Deum patrem qui Ecclesiam non habet matrem.'—'Salus', inquit [Cyprianus], 'extra Ecclesiam non est'—Saint Augustine: *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, Book IV, chap. xvii (29)).

the *dramatis personae*, we shall see that, in one vital point, the realignment of political forces in and after A.D. 1945 was different in kind from any previous alinement since the Ottoman Empire's fall out of the race for world power in A.D. 1683. After 1945, for the first time since 1683 in the histories of the West and of the World, one of the protagonists in power politics was once again a Power of a non-Western complexion.

There was, it is true, an ambiguity, that has come to our notice in previous contexts,¹ in the relation of both the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology to the Western Civilization.

The Soviet Union was the political heir of a Petrine Russian Empire which had become a voluntary convert to the Western way of life at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and had participated thereafter in the Western game of power politics as a proselyte admitted on a tacit understanding that he would abide by the accepted Western rules. Communism, again, was in origin, like Liberalism² and Fascism, one of the secular ideologies that had arisen in the Modern West as substitutes for a Christianity which the West had, in effect, discarded. And thus, from one point of view, the competition which, since A.D. 1945, had arisen between the Soviet Union and the United States for hegemony in the World, and between Communism and Liberalism for the ideological allegiance of Mankind, might still be regarded as a domestic issue within the household of a Western Society that had opened its doors to admit a Russian apostate from the civilization of Orthodox Christendom to become an adopted member of the Western family.

From another point of view, however, the Soviet Union could be looked upon, like its Petrine predecessor, as a Russian Orthodox Christian universal state clinging to life in a Western dress which it had been led to adopt, not by any positive desire to change its cultural allegiance, but by its very will to go on living a distinctive life of its own in an *Oikoumenê* whose cultural climate had latterly become so bleakly Westernized that life on Earth was now no longer possible without some measure of adaptation to Western ways. From the same angle of vision, Communism could be looked upon as an ideological substitute, not for Western, but for Orthodox, Christianity, in ex-Orthodox Christian hearts that had become so far Westernized that they had ceased to find their ancestral religion tenable without having lost the traditional Russian repugnance towards accepting any faith that was held orthodox in the West. On this interpretation the failure of Liberalism, in the long run, to win the Russians' allegiance would be accounted for by its being branded as a secular Modern Western Society's orthodox ideology,³ while the victory of Communism in Russia would be accounted for by its being signalized as a secular Modern Western creed which was a revolutionary

¹ See III. iii. 200-2 and 363-5.

² Using the term, not in the narrower sense in which, in the nineteenth-century party politics of the United Kingdom, it had stood for the opposite of 'Conservatism', but in the wider meaning of the Modern Western way of life which was called 'Capitalism' by its critics and 'Free Enterprise' by its advocates.

³ From the standpoint of Christianity, of course, Liberalism, as well as Communism and Fascism, was a heresy.

critique of the orthodox secular Modern Western way of life and was therefore an abominable heresy in orthodox secular Modern Western eyes. On this showing, Communism would be an ideally convenient and attractive faith for Russians whose only recourse was to fight the Modern West with its own weapons in a conflict between contending civilizations in which the Russians were still determined not to lay down their arms, but in which none but Modern Western weapons were any longer of any avail.

At the time of writing, each of these two alternative interpretations of the spirit of Soviet Communism and the role of the Soviet Union manifestly expressed some measure of the truth, and at the same time it was still impossible to forecast whether the Westernizing or the anti-Western tendency would ultimately prevail in Russian life. Short of that, however, it was unquestionable that a sharp re-accentuation of the anti-Western tendency in Russian feeling and thought had been one consequence of the Russian Communist Revolution of A.D. 1917, and that, in view of the potency of this phobia in the Russian Communist *éthos*, the emergence of the Soviet Union from the General War of A.D. 1939-45 as one of two rival World Powers had reintroduced a cultural conflict into a political arena which, for some 250 years past, had been reserved for domestic political quarrels between Powers that had, all alike, been of one Modern Western cultural complexion.

At the time of writing, this duel on the political plane between the Soviet Union and the United States and on the cultural plane between Communism and Liberalism was beclouding the whole social horizon of the living generation of Mankind. Yet this concentration of the World's attention and apprehension on this particular encounter between two contemporary civilizations was in no sense presumptive evidence that the Russo-Western conflict would continue to occupy the whole field. In re-engaging in their struggle against Westernization after having apparently long since given up the battle for lost, the Russians were setting an example which had already been followed by the Chinese and which might well be followed, in time, by the Japanese, Hindus, and Muslims, and even by societies that had become so deeply dyed with a Western colour as the main body of Orthodox Christendom in South-Eastern Europe and the three submerged pre-Columbian civilizations in the New World. The reopening of the particular issue between the West and Russia had, in fact, incidentally reopened the general issue between the West and the non-Western majority of Mankind.

These considerations suggest that a scrutiny of the encounters between the Modern West and the other living civilizations might prove a convenient point of departure for embarking on a survey of the whole field of encounters between contemporaries. The next set of encounters that would present itself for examination on this plan of operations would be the encounters of the non-Western living civilizations with one another. And, when we had thus completed our review of encounters between all civilizations still alive, the obvious next step—if our plan had justified itself by its results so far—would be to single out, among civilizations

now extinct, those which, at some stage in their history, had made on their neighbours an impact comparable to the West's impact on its contemporaries—even though, in these earlier cases, the action might not have been literally world-wide. On these lines we might find ourselves able to work our way into the heart of the thicket, break up the tangled *terrain* into manageable tracts, and piece together a general map of the landscape by surveying each tract in turn—without committing ourselves to examining every single encounter between contemporary civilizations that had found its way into our inventory.¹

If we follow this plan by starting operations with the set of encounters to which the Modern Western Society had been a party, there is, however, still one preliminary point to be settled. We have still to determine the date at which the 'modern' chapter of Western history begins.

Non-Western observers would date its beginning from the moment when the first Western ships made a landfall on their coasts; for, in non-Western eyes, *Homo Occidentalis*, like Life itself according to one Modern Western scientific hypothesis,² was a creature of marine origin. Far Eastern scholars, for example, when they set eyes on their first specimens of Western humanity in the Age of the Ming, labelled the new arrivals 'South Sea Barbarians' on the evidence of their immediate geographical provenance and their apparent level of culture. In this and other encounters the ubiquitous Modern Western mariners went through a series of rapid metamorphoses in their human victims' bewildered eyes. At their first landing, they looked like harmless marine animalculae of a previously unknown breed; soon they revealed themselves, by their aggressive behaviour, to be savage sea-monsters; and finally they proved to be predatory amphibians who, unhappily for Mankind, were as mobile on dry land as in their own element. This marine epiphany of a Protean carnivore marks the beginning of the Modern Age of Western history from a non-Western point of view; and this chronological reckoning in the objective terms of the Modern West's impact on the rest of the World tallies closely with the Modern West's own dating of its genesis in the subjective terms of a psychological break, in Modern Western souls, with the Modern West's own past.

From the Modern West's own point of view, its modernity had begun at the moment when Western Man had thanked, not God, but himself that he was as different a being from his 'medieval' predecessor as the Pharisee claimed to be from the publican in the parable.³ The cultural pharisaism of the Modern Western peoples on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe dated, like their technological conquest of the Ocean, from the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, and we can name the objective revolutionary event which had brought about this subjective revolution in an ocean-faring Western Man's mind. The Western peoples on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe who, in the sixteenth century, launched out on the face of the deep and made their way as far

¹ For example, the encounters, enumerated on pp. 108-9, above, in which one of the parties had been a 'fossil', are not all examined in IX 3 (ii), below.

² This hypothesis was, of course, a version, couched in a Modern Western scientific idiom, of the Hellenic myth of the genesis of the goddess of procreation, Aphrodite, from the foam of the sea.

³ Luke xviii. 11.

and wide as its waters could carry them took the same contemptuous view of their own fifteenth-century ancestors as the fifteenth-century Italians had taken of these Transalpine and Transmediterranean Western contemporaries of theirs when they had stigmatized them as 'barbarians';¹ and the sixteenth-century Spaniards, Portuguese, French, English, and Dutch had in fact taken over this point of view from its Italian originators. They had taken it over as part of their reception of a local Italian form of the Western culture that had differentiated itself during the later Middle Ages.² It was in virtue of this Italianization that these sixteenth-century Westerners beyond the bounds of Italy had become conscious of a breach of cultural continuity between themselves and their own immediate local predecessors, and this conversion of the non-Italian Western peoples to the Italians' way of life had likewise occurred at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.³

Our criteria thus agree in supporting the traditional dating of the emergence of the Modern Western World in the last quarter of the fifteenth century.⁴ The Italianization of a 'barbarian' majority of the Western Society, the converts' repudiation of their pre-Italianate past, and the conquest of the Ocean by the Italianized Western peoples on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe all occurred in this generation. On this showing, we need not hesitate to accept this date as marking the emergence of a Modern Western Society that had proceeded to make an

¹ See III. iii. 299-310.

² On pp. 109-10, above, we have already noticed that this impact of Northern Italy on the rest of Western Christendom at the transition from the 'medieval' to the 'modern' age of Western history is an instance of the 'internal' type of encounter within the bosom of a single civilization.

³ See V. vi. 340-1.

⁴ On the subjective criterion of feeling, the Italians, of course, had been 'modern' since at least the thirteenth century, and the Flemings since at least the fourteenth; but, for the purpose of the present enterprise of making a survey of encounters between civilizations that have been one another's contemporaries, it would be a mistake to include the Italians' encounters with their non-Western neighbours among the Modern West's encounters on the strength of this subjective criterion alone. In the expansion of the Modern West over the face of the whole World since the last quarter of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, Italy had played little part beyond Genoa's somewhat passive role as the birthplace of Columbus. While the Western peoples along the European seaboard of the Atlantic were opening up new worlds across the Ocean, the Italians were content to remain landlocked within the shores of the Mediterranean and, within these relatively narrow maritime confines, to play out the last rounds of a game which had already become a losing one by the time when, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the West European peoples had snatched victory for the West out of defeat in her relations with her neighbours by turning their backs on a familiar Mediterranean and committing themselves to a previously untamed Atlantic. At this turning-point in Western history the Atlantic Western peoples were moved to abandon the Mediterranean, and the Italians to cling to it, not merely by the divergent influences of their respective geographical locations, but also—and this perhaps more imperatively—by the historical fact that, in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Italians—thanks precisely to their precocious achievement of modernity in this last phase of the 'medieval' chapter of Western history—had succeeded in entering into the labours of their Transalpine and Transmediterranean fellow Western Christians—Catalans, Aragonese, Navarrese, Castilians, Normans, French, English, Germans—whose partners they had been in the aggressive expansion of a Medieval Western Christendom across the Mediterranean at the expense of the East Roman Empire and the successor-states of the 'Abbasid and Andalusian Umayyad caliphates. Details of this transformation of Crusader principalities into Venetian, Genoese, and Florentine colonial empires will be found in III. iii. 347, n. 1. This Italian epilogue to the history of the medieval encounter between the Western, Syriac, and Orthodox Christian societies dragged on till as late as A.D. 1797, when the termination of Venetian rule over the Ionian Islands liquidated the last remnant of the last Italian colonial empire in the Levant.

impact on all the rest of Mankind. In the light of this chronological conclusion, however, we may prognosticate that, however well this literally world-wide impact of the West may serve our turn as a 'bull-dozer' for forcing an entry into the historical jungle of intertwined cultural entanglements which we have set ourselves to explore, it will be of less avail for our purpose when we pass on from this preliminary survey of the facts to our ulterior enterprises of attempting to analyse, first the plot of the play,¹ and then the process of psychological action and reaction in the relations between the actors.²

In these two inquiries, Time is of the essence of the problem, since the psychological reverberations of collisions between contemporary societies do not produce their ultimate social effects until they have travelled down below the upper surface of the Psyche—over which the conscious Will and Intellect skate as swiftly as water-spiders on the surface of an unfathomable tarn—and have stirred the obstinately slow-moving depths of the underlying abyss of the Subconscious. However quickly the conscious element in the psyche of a human being whose social environment has been disturbed by the impact of alien cultural influences may succeed in adjusting its thought and action to the new social predicament that the impact has produced, this superficial re-orientation is not effective in itself, since the Intellect alone moves nothing,³ while the Will is only effective to the degree in which it succeeds in inducing the Subconscious Reservoir of the Psyche to lend itself to the Will's aim by suffering the Will to draw upon this amorphous yet exclusive source of psychic energy and to put it to work by canalizing it into a deliberate effort to attain some definite objective. The pace at which the subconscious element in the Psyche habitually moves is thus not merely the limiting, but the governing, factor in the determination of the time that an encounter between two contemporary civilizations will take, from first to last, to work itself out; and the usual Time-scale of the workings of the Subconscious in this province of the realm of social life had been of a much higher order of magnitude than the 450 years which, at the time of writing, was the utmost length of time during which the impact of the Modern West had so far been making itself felt in the life of any of its contemporaries.

The relative shortness of a span of not more than four and a half centuries in this particular social and psychological context becomes manifest as soon as we turn our attention from the set of encounters in which a living Modern Western Society had been engaged with other living societies to encounters in which a living historian could feel confident that he was in a position to know the whole story because the parties to these encounters were none of them any longer alive.

If we measure off the history of the impact of the Modern West on its contemporaries, down to the time of writing, against the history of the impact of the Hellenic Civilization, in the corresponding chapter of its history, on the Hittite, Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonian, Indic, and Sinitic

¹ In Part IX C, below.

² In Part IX D, below.

³ Διάνοια δ' αὐτῇ οὐδὲν κινεῖ.—Aristotle: *Ethica Nicomachea*, Z, 2 (p. 1139 A), quoted in III. iii. 231, n. 1.

societies, and if, for purposes of this chronological comparison, we equate, as we reasonably may,¹ Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont in 334 B.C. with Columbus's crossing of the Atlantic in A.D. 1492, the four and a half centuries that bring us down to the year A.D. 1952 in the Modern Western record will bring us, in the equivalent 'Modern Hellenic' record, to the year A.D. 126; and this date is only a few years later than the probable date of the correspondence on the question of policy towards the Christians which passed between the Younger Pliny and the Emperor Trajan when Pliny was serving as the Emperor's special high commissioner in the Roman imperial province of Bithynia and Pontus.

In a Hellenizing World early in the second century of the Christian Era the Christian Church loomed no larger, in the sight of an Hellenically educated dominant minority, than the Bahā'ī and Ahmadi sects² were figuring in the sight of the corresponding class in a Westernizing World mid-way through the twentieth century. In a generation in which the supremacy of a sceptical philosophy was 'palpable and audible' on the intellectual surface of Hellenic life, what rational Hellenes could have divined that, in a subconscious psychic abyss below the seemingly well-founded basis of his own philosophical *Weltanschauung*, a 'determination' was 'slowly maturing' in the hearts of the people of his world 'to put themselves under the authority of a new dogma',³ and that this slow long-term spiritual tendency was moving, with a current as powerful as it was imperceptible, towards a triumph of Christianity over Hellenism within two hundred years of Pliny's and Trajan's day? This historical parallel—and it is a legitimate one—indicates how utterly the future might be hidden in A.D. 1952 from the mental vision of a Western student of the impact of the West on the World who happened to have been born only four hundred years after the beginning of this set of encounters between living civilizations.

Moreover, our parallel between a Modern Western and an analogous Hellenic impact on a contemporary world gives us the further indication that, in reckoning the Modern Western impact to have been at work for some four hundred and fifty years down to the time of writing, we have been operating with a figure that represents a maximum and is considerably higher than the average.

It was only in the impact of Western Christendom on the indigenous civilizations of the New World that the equivalent of Alexander's conquest of the Achaemenian Empire had occurred at a corresponding date in the Time-chart of Western history. The Spaniards' conquest of

¹ The parallel holds good in subjective, as well as in objective, terms. Objectively, Alexander's march from the Hellespont to the Hydaspes is comparable in scale with da Gama's voyage from Lisbon to India and with Columbus's from Palos to the New World; subjectively, the post-Alexandrine Hellenes took the reception of an Attic version of Hellenism in Macedonia, and the Atticized Macedonians' conquest of the Achaemenian Empire, as marking the beginning of a new era in Hellenic history as definitely as the Western peoples of the Atlantic seaboard of Europe felt their own Modern Age to be marked off from its 'medieval' predecessor by their reception of Italian culture and their conquest of the Ocean (see V. vi. 339 and 342, and VI. vii. 299-300).

² See V. v. 174-6.

³ Bevan, Edwin Robert: *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford 1913, Clarendon Press), pp. 140-1, quoted in V. v. 558.

Mexico and the rest of Central America in and after A.D. 1521, and of the Inca Empire and the rest of the Andean World in and after A.D. 1533, had corresponded in its date, as well as in the crude violence of its physical force and the shattering subversiveness of its psychological effect, to the conquest of the Egyptian, Syriac, and Babylonian worlds by Alexander's Macedonians. In the World as a whole, however, the maritime expansion of the Modern West had had to pay for its ubiquity by being slower in taking political and cultural effect than the overland expansion of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism. While the comparatively fragile civilizations of the New World had been overwhelmed at the first onset of the militant landing-parties from ocean-going Spanish ships, not one single province of one single non-Western civilization in the Old World had been conquered, *more Alexandrino*, by Western force of arms before the campaigns (*gerebantur* A.D. 1757-60) which had resulted in the British East India Company's acquiring a virtual sovereignty over Bengal and Bihar, and it had not been till the launching of a British offensive against the Marāthās on all Indian fronts in A.D. 1803 that any Modern Western empire-builders on non-Western ground east of the Atlantic had made lightning conquests on the scale of Alexander of Macedon's sweep from the Hellespont to the Caspian Gates in 334-330 B.C. or Demetrius of Bactria's sweep over Northern India in 183 B.C.

Furthermore, when we pass on from the spectacle of the forcible imposition of an alien civilization through acts of military conquest to consider the voluntary reception of it through a process of cultural conversion, we find that, in this field, the duration of the process down to the year A.D. 1952 had been, in the Old World, not 450 years, but some 250 at the longest.

The attempts of Western intruders in the Early Modern Age of Western history to propagate an integrally Christian Western culture *in partibus Orientis* had, in the end, all been signally defeated, after apparently promising starts, by outbursts of xenophobia in the mission fields that had been as decisive as they had been vehement. The Japanese had put an end to a Western Christian cultural penetration between A.D. 1614 and A.D. 1638;¹ the contemporary Abyssinians had taken parallel action in the fourth decade of the seventeenth century;² the Chinese had taken it at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.³ It had not been till the last quarter of the seventeenth century that the West had begun to make peaceful cultural conquests that, by A.D. 1952, had proved themselves more durable, at least, than the sixteenth-century fiascos, unwarrantable though it would still have been to assume that they were to prove permanent.

The version of the Modern Western culture that had thus at last begun to make headway in the Old World, some two hundred years after the Western conquest of the Ocean, was not the full-blooded Western Christian Civilization which the Abyssinians, Japanese, and Chinese had rejected after making trial of it; it was a secular abstract from it,⁴

¹ See II. ii. 366, n. 2; V. v. 365; and pp. 316-24, below.

² See II. ii. 366.

³ See V. v. 365-7, and pp. 316-24, below.

⁴ As the present writer sees it, an elimination of Religion, not an introduction of

strained off in a cynically negative spirit by a late-seventeenth-century generation of Westerners who had become alienated from Christianity itself in their revulsion from Wars of Religion which, in the domestic life of Western Christendom for 150 years past, had been running an ever more devastating yet never any more conclusive course;¹ and, since an exotic potion is the less hard to swallow, the thinner and more tasteless the brew,² it is no surprise—and also assuredly no accident—that the generation which witnessed this spiritual revolution in the bosom of the Western World should also have witnessed a revulsion in the feelings of Orthodox Christian peoples towards the Western culture.

In the fifteenth century, Orthodox Christians had acquiesced in the political domination of the Muslim 'Osmanlis as a less odious alternative than a reception of the Western Christian way of life in the then current religious terms of acknowledging the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Pope. Towards the close of the seventeenth century the descendants of these same Orthodox Christians eagerly inscribed themselves as pupils in a new-model Western school in which Technology had been substituted for Theology as the obligatory principal subject. This revolution in the Orthodox Christian attitude towards the West in response to the West's own revolutionary revaluation of traditional Western spiritual

Science, was the essence of the seventeenth-century Western cultural revolution. The scientific outlook, in itself, was not at that time a novelty in the Western Society's spiritual constitution. It had been an ingredient in the Western *Weltanschauung* ever since the twelfth-century Aristotelian renaissance (see X. ix. 45-48). What was new was the elevation of Science from a subordinate position, in which it had been made to serve as Religion's handmaid, to the throne from which Religion had now been ignominiously ejected; and this revolutionary rise in Science's prestige in Western eyes, and revolutionary liberation of Science in the West from traditional religious checks and balances, were the innovations that now gave the Western Civilization its new *éthos* and its new penetrative power in its impacts on alien bodies social.

This would be the present writer's commentary on the following striking passage in one of Professor Herbert Butterfield's works:

'The seventeenth century . . . did not merely bring a new factor into history in the way we often assume—one that must just be added, so to speak, to the other permanent factors. The new factor immediately began to elbow at the other ones, pushing them out of their places, and, indeed, began immediately to seek control of the rest, as the apostles of the new movement had declared their intention of doing from the very start. The result was the emergence of a kind of Western Civilization which when transmitted to Japan operates on tradition there as it operates on tradition here—dissolving it and having eyes for nothing save a future of brave new worlds . . . When we speak of Western Civilization being carried to an Oriental country like Japan in recent generations, we do not mean Graeco-Roman philosophy and humanist ideals, we do not mean the Christianising of Japan, we mean the science, the modes of thought and all that apparatus of civilisation which were beginning to change the face of the West in the latter half of the seventeenth century . . . It was a civilisation that could cut itself away from the Graeco-Roman heritage in general, away from Christianity itself—only too confident in its power to exist independent of anything of the kind. We know now that what was emerging towards the end of the seventeenth century was a civilisation exhilaratingly new perhaps, but strange as Nineveh and Babylon. That is why, since the rise of Christianity, there is no landmark in history that is worthy to be compared with this.' (Butterfield, H.: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London, 1949, Bell), pp. 174, 163, 174).

Why was it that this secularized version of the Western culture had the corrosive effect on the lives of assaulted societies to which Professor Butterfield draws attention in this passage? As the writer of this Study sees it, this corrosiveness was due not to the addition of a new ingredient but to the excision of an old one. In breaking away from the religious core of a fissile Western Civilization, this secular technological flake became a less uninviting and at the same time a more deadly bait for any alien society to which it might be proffered (see further, pp. 530-42, below).

¹ See IV. iv. 142-3, 150, 184, 227-8, and 643-5; V. v. 669-71; and V. vi. 316-17.

² See pp. 514-21, below.

values would assuredly have produced some equivalent of the Petrine Revolution in Russia, even if the personal genius of Peter the Great¹ had not happened to make its dramatic epiphany on the imperial throne of Muscovy at that historic moment.

The voluntary reception of a secularized form of the Western culture by the Muscovite and Ottoman Orthodox Christians towards the close of the seventeenth century was, however, only the harbinger of a movement in which the other non-Western societies of the Old World took their time over following suit.

In the Islamic Society, for example, such trifling symptoms as a Dutch-inspired passing craze for growing tulips during the chapter of Ottoman history that had consequently won the name of 'the Tulip Period' (*circa* A.D. 1718-36),² and an Italian touch in the decoration of mosques built in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era in Constantinople, were the only portents of Westernization until the shock of defeat at the hands of a recently Westernized Orthodox Christian Power in the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 inspired Sultan Selim III (*imperabat* A.D. 1789-1807) to attempt the serious and controversial enterprise of radically Westernizing the Ottoman military system.³ Thus in Ottoman history the question of Westernization did not become a live issue till the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era, and the failure of Sultan Selim's first essay was followed by nearly a century and a half of reluctant half-measures and disappointing set-backs before the Ottoman Turkish people were moved, by the supreme shock of defeat in the General War of A.D. 1914-18 and its political and military aftermath, to commit themselves at long last to a whole-hearted adoption of the Westernization policy as the manifest only alternative to national extinction.

The Ottoman Turks who thus lagged so far behind their Serb and Greek Orthodox Christian subjects in taking the path of Westernization were, however, in the vanguard of the Muslim travellers along this cultural road, and were abreast, if not ahead, of the pioneer Westernizers in all other non-Western societies in the Old World with the one exception of Orthodox Christendom. In the Hindu Society the Bengalis began to open their minds to the reception of the Western Civilization before the close of the eighteenth century as a result of their experience of Western rule from A.D. 1757 onwards, but in this they were at least a generation ahead of any other Hindu people, and the Westernization of the Hindu Society as a whole did not set in until after the political reunification of India under a Western *rāj* in the course of the nineteenth century. As for the Far Eastern Society, the reception of the Western Civilization did not begin before the fifth decade of the nineteenth century in China, and not before the sixth decade of the same century in Japan. In the year A.D. 1952 the re-opening of Japan's doors to the West in A.D. 1854, after a lock-out that had lasted for 216 years (A.D. 1638-1854), was not yet a century old.

The relative lowliness of these figures in the chronology of the living

¹ See III. iii. 278-83.

² See III. iii. 48 and V. vi. 221.

³ See V. vi. 299.

non-Western civilizations' encounters with the Modern West up to date comes out when we turn to consider the chronology of the cultural relations between a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization and its contemporaries.

At the time of writing in the twentieth century of the Christian Era this encounter between the World and Hellenism was manifestly long since over, so that it was possible for the historian to follow the whole story of it from beginning to end and to ascertain how long it had taken for each of the divers consequences of the encounter to work itself out; and, when the twentieth-century observer felt his way back into the past in quest of the latest discernible cultural interactions between Hellenism and other civilizations, he did not have to probe deeper than the twelfth century of the Christian Era in order to strike the historical evidence for which he was prospecting. In that century both the Far Eastern World in the last days of the Northern Sung Dynasty in China and of 'the Cloistered Emperors' in Japan¹ and the Syriac World in the last days of the successor-states of a foundered Umayyad Caliphate in Andalusia and a foundered 'Abbasid Caliphate in South-Western Asia and Egypt were still reacting to the impact of Hellenism with a vigour that leaves no room for doubt. In the Far East in that age the visual arts were still being inspired by the abiding influence of an Hellenic art which, traveling at the heels of an Alexander of Macedon and a Demetrius of Bactria, had continued, long after these Hellenic conquerors' empires had passed away, to radiate into regions where the earth had never been shaken by the tramp of the Phalanx; and in the Syriac World of the same age an Hellenic philosophy and science that had come to maturity in the mind of Alexander's preceptor Aristotle were working in Oriental minds through the medium of the Arabic language with a creatively stimulating effect which Hellenism had never been able to exert, at this deep cultural level, during a previous millennium of Hellenic military and political domination² under which the minds of the Hellenic rulers' non-Hellenic subjects had been prejudiced against the reception of the intellectual fruits of the Hellenic genius by a resentment at the presence in their midst of an alien intruder who had thrust his civilization upon them by force of arms.

Thus in the Syriac as well as in the Far Eastern World the influence of Hellenism in the twelfth century of the Christian Era was still not only vigorous but also fruitful; and this important last phase in the history of the encounter between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and these two other civilizations was working itself out some fifteen hundred years after Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont in the year 334 B.C. had inaugurated this episode in the story of Hellenic-Syriac relations, and some 1,350 years after Demetrius's passage of the Hindu Kush in 183 B.C. had started a train of historical developments that had resulted in the transit of Greek art, in the service of the Mahāyāna, from the

¹ See IV. iv. 94 and V. vi. 303.

² The Time-span between Alexander's conquest of the Achaemenian Empire in the fourth century B.C. and the Primitive Muslim Arabs' liquidation of Roman rule south of the Taurus in the seventh century of the Christian Era.

banks of the Jumna to the banks of the Yellow River. To arrive at corresponding stages in the uncompleted histories of the encounters between the Modern West and its living contemporaries, a twentieth-century student of contacts between civilizations would have to cast forward into the Future some 1,200 years beyond his own day, considering that the history of a contact between the Modern West and Orthodox Christendom, which had begun in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, would run into the thirty-second century if it were to attain the Time-span of 1,500 years that had been the duration of the encounter between Hellenism and the Syriac Civilization, while the history of a contact between the Modern West and Japan which, in the writer's generation, was still less than a hundred years old, would run into the same thirty-second century if it was to have the 1,350 years' duration of the encounter between Hellenism and the Indic Civilization.

On the index of this Time-scale we can estimate the measure of a twentieth-century observer's inability to foresee the ultimate psychological effects of the impacts of the Modern Western Civilization upon its living contemporaries, when we consider how much of what this same twentieth-century observer did know about the ultimate psychological effects of the corresponding impacts of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism would have been unknown to him if, instead of his being able to watch the whole story unfolding itself over a Time-span of a minimum length of 1,350 years and a maximum of 1,500, the accident of his own position in the chronological series had confronted him with the mental iron curtain of the human mind's ignorance of the Future at a date not much farther removed than two and a half centuries from the beginning of this fifteen-hundred-years-long tale.

If latter-day students of History had been thus compelled to confine their historical vision of the impact of Hellenism within this narrow chronological compass of one quarter of a millennium, then, in that imaginary situation—as they could see, in the light of the knowledge which they actually commanded—not only the last phase but all other really momentous incidents in the story would have been still lying beyond their range of historical vision. On a range as short as 250 years the beginning, as well as the end, of the influence of Hellenic philosophy and science on Arabic philosophy and science, and of Hellenic art on Chinese and Japanese art, would still have been hidden below their historical horizon, and so would the final liquidation of Hellenic rule on Syriac ground by Arab force of arms in the seventh century of the Christian Era, which, as we have seen, was the psychologically requisite prelude to a hearty reception of Greek thought in Arabic dress by Syriac minds. On these thus imaginarily blinkered latter-day observers' side of the close confines of their field of vision, they would just have caught a glimpse of the earliest violent Oriental reactions against an Hellenic political domination—the infiltration of the Parni into Parthia in the third century B.C.; the more militant anti-Hellenic insurrections in Egypt and Judaea in the second century B.C.; and the subsequent collapse of the Seleucid Power—without having been able to guess either that, in the last century B.C., Rome was going to consolidate the political

heritage of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies west of the Euphrates or that, after Syria and Egypt had thus been retained under Hellenic rule for a further 700 years as provinces of the Roman Empire, Roman rule south of the Taurus would eventually be liquidated in its turn by a feat of Arab arms as abruptly as the Achaemenian Empire had been liquidated by a feat of Macedonian arms at the inauguration of this historical episode, a thousand years back.

More than that, these chronologically handicapped Western students of History would have remained uninitiated into the most important of all the consequences that the impact of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism was to bring in its train; for they would have had hardly an inkling of the religious response which, at the point in the story where an imaginary mental iron curtain cut their vista off, the Orientals were about to make to an Hellenic military challenge. What observer—Greek or Jew, Barbarian, Scythian, bond or free¹—could have guessed, if he had been born into a Hellenizing World no later than 250 years after Alexander's passage of the Hellespont, that the intellectual influence of Hellenic thought on Oriental minds was to be long anticipated in date, and utterly eclipsed in importance as measured by its effect on the terrestrial destiny of Mankind, by a spiritual influence of Oriental religion on Hellenic souls? How could any observer have foreseen, from so premature a chronological station, that there would be, not only a change of plane, from the political to the cultural level, and a change of *êthos*, from violence to gentleness, in the encounter between the Hellenes and their Oriental victims, but also a reversal in the roles of the actors—a reversal in which the initiative would pass from the Hellenic to the Oriental side?

This turning of the tables in the subsequent history of the relations between victors who had won their battle, and vanquished who had lost theirs, on the material plane of physical force was a more marvellous victory than any ever won by an Alexander of Macedon or a Demetrius of Bactria or a S'ad b. abî Waqqās or an 'Amr b. al-'Ās, just because it was not gained over adversaries in a counter-offensive, stimulated by a thirst for a *revanche*, after the pattern of the 'holy war' in which Amosis expelled the Hyksos from the Delta or the Ming the Mongols from China-within-the-Wall. The Oriental evangelists of the higher religions succeeded in taking their Hellenic military conquerors spiritually captive because they approached them, not with animus, as enemies to be overthrown, but with love, as souls to be saved. Alexander of Macedon's military conquest of the Achaemenian Empire and Demetrius of Bactria's pounce upon the Maurya Rāj received this rejoinder in a language that ignored the argument of the sword when Kanishka was converted to the Mahāyāna some two and a half centuries after Demetrius's military exploit, and Constantine to Christianity some six and a half centuries after Alexander's similar triumph over Darius. To translate the story from personal into institutional terms, we may say that the Catholic Mahāyāna was the Indic Society's reply to the Bactrian Greek and Kushan empires, and the Catholic Christian Church the Syriac

¹ Col. iii. 11.

Society's reply to the Seleucid and Roman empires. These universal churches were the new works of creation that were generated by the impacts of Hellenism on the Indic and Syriac worlds; and the average of the lengths of time that the *peripeteia* took to work itself out from Demetrius's day to Kanishka's and from Alexander's to Constantine's was, as will be noticed, just about twice as long as the longest contact, up to date, between the Modern West and any of its living contemporaries.

The course of the past and therefore known encounters between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and its Syriac and Indic sisters did not warrant any presumption that the still untransacted future passages in the encounters of the Modern West with other living civilizations would follow the same course or anything like it. There were, however, two expectations which this historical parallel might perhaps legitimately suggest. The first was that the two hundred and fifty years during which the Modern West had been making its impact, up to date, on Orthodox Christendom were likely to prove in retrospect to be a small instalment of the whole story by comparison with the length of the instalments which, at that date, were still due to follow. The second legitimate expectation, in the light of the Hellenic precedent, was that, however widely the denouement of the play in which the Modern West was the protagonist might differ from that of the Hellenic drama in substance, it was likely at least to resemble it in the subjective point of being an outcome that would have been utterly surprising to a spectator whose ticket had actually admitted him to witness the performance of only the first act. The astonishment that a miraculous 'pre-view' of the dramatic situation in the thirty-second century would have produced in the mind of a twentieth-century observer of an historical drama entitled 'the World and the West' might be augured by imagining what the feelings of the Hellenic philosopher-historian Poseidonius of Apamea (*vivebat circa* 135-51 B.C.) would have been if he could have foreseen the state of the relations between the Syriac Civilization and Hellenism in the successive generations of Constantine (*imperabat* A.D. 306-337), Mu'āwīyah (*imperabat* A.D. 661-680), and Avicenna (*vivebat* A.D. 980-1037).

On this showing, a twentieth-century student of human affairs might expect to find the history of the encounters between the Modern West and its contemporaries comparatively unilluminating, for the same reason that had condemned the domestic history of the Western Civilization to be comparatively unilluminating for a study of the species of societies of which it was one representative.¹ An imperfect specimen is manifestly not the best choice for the purposes of scientific observation and research; and, in the science of human affairs, there is this blemish of imperfection in any historical episode in which less than the whole story is within the historian's knowledge. Thus, while twentieth-century Western students of History might hope that the set of encounters in which the Modern West had been the hero—or the villain—might offer them a convenient starting-point for a survey of episodes of this category, they could not count on this still unfinished story's proving equally serviceable to them thereafter in the subsequent stages of their inquiry.

¹ See I. i. 36-37.

When we pass on from a preliminary attempt to assemble the relevant facts to our ulterior enterprise of trying to interpret them, our standby will prove to be the parallel set of encounters between a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization and its contemporaries in which a twentieth-century student did know the whole story as it had unfolded itself, from beginning to end, over periods of time of a vastly greater order of magnitude than 250, or even 450, years.

The Time-span of fifteen hundred years over which the history of the Hellenic-Syriac encounter extends, from the Hellenic conquest of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great to the Syriac reception of Greek thought in Arabic dress, will be shown by our survey to be a performance of unusual length; but we shall be able to draw upon the histories of other encounters which, though considerably shorter than that, had nevertheless likewise been illuminatingly longer than the encounters between the West and other living civilizations up to date. The encounter between the Syriac and Babylonian civilizations, for example, occupied some nine or ten centuries if we reckon that it began with Assurnazirpal's assault on Syria in 876 B.C.¹ and ended with the absorption of the mortal remains of the Babylonian Society into the still living tissues of the Syriac body social² in the first century of the Christian Era.³ Again, the encounter between a Medieval Western Christendom, an Eastern Orthodox Christendom, and the Syriac World occupied some seven or eight centuries if we date its beginning in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, when the Western Christendom launched a general offensive against its two neighbours on a front extending from Compostella to Edessa, and date its end at A.D. 1797, when the liquidation of the Venetian régime in the Ionian Islands liberated the last remnant of a subject Orthodox Christian population from the domination of the Medieval Western Crusaders' Italian successors.⁴

The social and psychological phenomena arising from these relatively long-drawn-out encounters will illuminate our study in later divisions of this Part. Our first task, however, is to carry out the operation of surveying the facts on the plan which we have now worked out.

¹ See IV. iv. 473, n. 3.

² See I. i. 79-80 and 119; II. ii. 138; IV. iv. 471; V. v. 94, 122-3, and 370.

³ At the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N.J., in June 1952, the writer learnt from Professor O. Neugebauer that the series of cuneiform documents disinterred in Babylonia by Modern Western archaeologists, which had formerly included no documents of any date later than the last century B.C., had now been extended chronologically by a recent discovery of documents of the first century of the Christian Era.

⁴ See p. 115, n. 4, above. The terminal date would be, not A.D. 1797, but A.D. 1945, if, in view of the implication of the Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom, as well as the main body, in the medieval encounter between an Orthodox Christendom and her Western sister, we were to reckon the episode as still not being closed so long as, on the continental front between a Russian Orthodox Christendom and the Western World, a remnant of Orthodox or ex-Orthodox Uniate Ukrainians and White Russians still remained under Polish rule. In the following survey, however, the encounter between the Medieval Western Christendom and the Russian offshoot of an Eastern Orthodox Christendom is dealt with as a separate episode from the Medieval Western Christendom's encounter with the main body of its Orthodox Christian sister society.

(II) OPERATIONS ACCORDING TO PLAN

(a) ENCOUNTERS WITH THE MODERN WESTERN CIVILIZATION

1. *The Modern West and Russia.*¹*Russia's 'Western Question'*

If the opening of the 'modern' chapter of Western history is to be dated at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era,² and the establishment of a Russian Orthodox Christian universal state in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century—which saw the political unification of Russian Orthodox Christendom through the incorporation of the Republic of Novgorod into the Grand Duchy of Muscovy³—this outstanding political event in the history of the Orthodox Christian Society in Russia just anticipated the impact on Russia of the Western Civilization in its 'modern' form, and the subsequent chapter in the history of Russia's 'Western Question' was all transacted while Russia was in her universal state phase.

This 'Western Question' was already familiar to Russian minds in an older shape; for Russia's encounter with the West in and after the sixteenth century was not her first contact with her Western neighbour and sister. A previous contact, in the Medieval Age of Western history, which is examined separately below,⁴ had resulted, in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era, in the establishment of Western Christian Polish and Lithuanian rule over large stretches of the original patrimony of Russian Orthodox Christendom, including, besides the entire domains of the White Russian and Ukrainian peoples, a western fringe of Great Russian territory round Smolensk;⁵ and the Moscow which, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had recently become the capital of a Russian universal state had come, before that, to be the frontier fortress of an independent remnant of Russian Orthodox Christendom against a Western Christendom which had made those sweeping encroachments on her sister society's ground. This previous encounter of Russia's with a Medieval Western Christendom had an aftermath in the history of Russia's subsequent relations with the Modern West.

In the course of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the Western Civilization's hold over the Russian populations in Poland-Lithuania was strengthened by the cumulative cultural consequences of the political union of the Kingdom of Lithuania with the Kingdom of Poland, which was consummated in A.D. 1569,⁶ and the ecclesiastical union of a large part of the Russian Orthodox Christian community in Poland-Lithuania with the Roman Catholic Church, which took place in A.D. 1594-6. In the detached fragment of a Russian Orthodox Christendom that was thus clamped on to the Western World by these two institutional bonds, the Western culture, in a Polish dilution of its

¹ See xi, maps 49 and 65.² See pp. 114-16, above.³ See IV. iv. 88; V. v. 312; and VI. vii. 32, with Prince D. Obolensky's comment in n. 2.⁴ On pp. 356-7 and pp. 398-403, below.⁵ See II. ii. 172 and 175-6.⁶ See II. ii. 175.

modern distillation, succeeded—largely thanks to the missionary activities of the Jesuits—in captivating the local land-owning aristocracy which had originally been Ukrainian, White Russian, or Lithuanian in nationality and Orthodox Christian or pagan in religion. While the ex-Orthodox peasantry who came under the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Papacy as a result of the ecclesiastical union of A.D. 1594–6 became members of a Uniate church which was allowed to retain most of its traditional rites and discipline, many members of the ex-Orthodox nobility travelled the whole length of the ecclesiastical road to Westernization by becoming Roman Catholics of the Latin Rite.

At the same time the political sovereignty over ex-Russian territories in which the Modern Western Civilization was gaining these converts was one of the stakes in a fluctuating military contest between a Russian universal state and a succession of Continental European Western Powers. In another connexion it has already been pointed out¹ that, at the moment when an ownerless East Roman Imperial mantle was falling about a Muscovite Grand Duke's shoulders as a consequence of the capture of Constantinople by the 'Osmanlis' in A.D. 1453, the Russian recipients of this ideological legacy from 'the Second Rome' were so exactly preoccupied with the immediate task of arresting the advance of a Western aggressor who was already at their gates, and with the ulterior aspiration of eventually liberating the adjacent Russian Orthodox Christian populations which had fallen under a Western domination, that they were deaf to sly Western suggestions that they should assert their title to their East Roman Imperial heritage by challenging an Ottoman domination over non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples² who were sundered from Muscovy by the double barrier of the Eurasian Steppe³ and the Black Sea. Meanwhile, at the western approaches to

¹ See the citation from Obolensky and the quotation from Sumner in VI. vii. 37, n. 1.

² On the agenda of Muscovite statesmen the first business was to challenge the Western domination over Russian Orthodox Christians in White Russia and the Ukraine. An undertaking to abstain from any form of oppression of Orthodox Christians under Lithuanian and Polish rule was obtained from Poland-Lithuania by Muscovy in A.D. 1686 and was followed up by active Muscovite intervention on these Orthodox Christians' behalf in A.D. 1718–25 (see Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), pp. 32–33; eundem: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), pp. 181 and 183). A corresponding undertaking from the Ottoman Porte was sought by Muscovite diplomacy at Carlowitz in A.D. 1698–9 and at Constantinople in A.D. 1699–1700 (see eundem, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, p. 32), but in this field the objective was not attained till A.D. 1774. The first manifesto in which Russia declared herself the champion of the Ottoman Christians and called upon them to take up arms in a common struggle against the 'Osmanlis' was Peter the Great's proclamation of March 1711 (see *ibid.*, p. 46), and Peter's ill-starred invasion of Moldavia in the same year was the first appearance of a Russian army within the confines of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom. On this occasion 'a Russian army entered Moldavia and Russian cavalry watered their horses in the Danube . . . for the first time for more than seven centuries' (*ibid.*, p. 39). In A.D. 969–72, when the pagan Russian war-lord Svyatoslav had passed that way, the valley of the Pruth had not yet been colonized by an Orthodox Christian population.

³ Sumner points out (in *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 27, and 79) that, so long as the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe remained a Nomad's land, regular armies could not operate across it without risk of disaster, though it was a highly conducive medium for raids by the Crimean Tatar horse (see *ibid.*, p. 15, n. 3). Galitsin's two attempts, in A.D. 1697 and A.D. 1699, to invade the Crimea across the Steppe ended as unsuccessfully (see *ibid.*, p. 15) as the Ottoman attempt in A.D. 1569 to seize and hold the Don-Volga portage (see the present Study, II. ii. 445, and pp. 225–7, below). When Peter the Great invaded

Moscow, the 'irrepressible conflict' between Muscovy and the West over the allegiance of White Russia and the Ukraine went on for some five hundred years, reckoning from the middle of the fifteenth century, which saw the high tide of Lithuania's expansion at the Russian Orthodox Christendom's expense,¹ down to the close of the General War of A.D. 1939-45, when the annexation of Eastern Galicia to the Soviet Union brought back under Russian rule the last still unrecaptured residue of the Russian Orthodox Christian territories that had been conquered for the West in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by Polish and Lithuanian arms.²

Channels of Western Cultural Radiation into Russia.

The military and political victory which Russia thus eventually obtained over the West on this Continental European front was offset on the cultural plane by the consequent propagation of Modern Western influences from these semi-Westernized tracts of originally Russian ground into a Muscovy which had exposed herself to this Western cultural contamination by wresting one after another of the infected territories out of the hands of their Western conquerors and uniting them politically with a Muscovite citadel of Russian Orthodox Christendom which had never fallen under Western rule. The most important single event in this long-drawn-out process was Muscovy's acquisition, in A.D. 1667,³ of Kiev, the Ukrainian city which had been a pre-Muscovite Russia's political and cultural capital, and which, under Polish rule, had latterly become a powerful transmitting-station for Western cultural influences. Under a Polono-Jesuit dispensation at Kiev, even the Orthodox Christian clergy who had rejected the ecclesiastical union of A.D. 1594-6 had nevertheless been deeply affected by the culture and *éthos* of a Tridentine Roman Church; and, after the transfer of Kiev from Polish to Muscovite sovereignty, Peter the Great found

Moldavia in A.D. 1711, he marched, not via the direct route across the Steppe, but via a roundabout route through the Polish Ukraine; and in A.D. 1739 Münich followed the same roundabout route with success, after having been foiled in A.D. 1738 in an attempt to invade Moldavia by the steppe-route (see Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 39, n. 3). The Steppe remained an obstacle to regular military operations until it had been colonized by a sedentary agricultural population, and this colonization did not begin till the plantation, in A.D. 1754, of a 'New Serbia' between the Dniepr and the Bug, and did not get under way, full swing, till after the Russo-Turkish peace-settlement of A.D. 1774.

¹ See II, ii. 172 and 175-6.

² After the War of A.D. 1939-45 the Soviet Union completed the political unification, within her frontiers, of the entire geographical domain of the Ukrainian people by further acquiring Carpatho-Ruthenia: a territory, adjoining Eastern Galicia and likewise inhabited by Ukrainians, which had been attached to Czechoslovakia since the peace settlement after the War of A.D. 1914-18, and to Hungary before that. These Transcarpathian Ukrainians were sundered from the main body of their nation by the barrier of the mountains, and there was no evidence that Carpatho-Ruthenia had ever been associated politically with the rest of the Ukraine in any previous chapter of Ukrainian history.

³ In the Muscovite-Polish Peace Treaty of Andrusovo, concluded in A.D. 1667, it was agreed that Kiev, which was at that moment in Muscovite hands, should remain under Muscovite occupation for two years longer, notwithstanding the fact that the city lay on the west bank of the River Dniepr, which, by the terms of the Treaty, was to be the permanent frontier between the two contracting parties. The Muscovites, however, did not ever evacuate Kiev, and Poland renounced her claim to it in A.D. 1686 (see Allen, W. E. D.: *The Ukraine, A History* (Cambridge 1940, University Press), pp. 158 and 176).

pliant instruments among this Western-minded Kievan Orthodox clergy¹ for carrying through the measures² by which he succeeded in bringing a less tractable Muscovite Orthodox Church into line with his own Westernizing policy.

This originally Russian but latterly semi-Westernized debatable territory on the continental borderland between Muscovy and the Western World had not, however, been the principal field in which the encounter between Russia and the Western Civilization in its modern form had been taking place down to the time of writing on the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1939-45. For one thing, the Polish reflexion of the Modern Western culture was too dim—even when the rustic mirror had been polished up by skilful and assiduous Jesuit hands—to impress itself deeply on Muscovite Russian souls after the political annexation of this border to an expanding Muscovite Empire; and, when the process of Muscovite political expansion overland towards the West had gone on to embrace East European territories whose culture was completely Western in origin, the cultural effect of this political association had likewise been slight. During the hundred years (A.D. 1815-1915) for which 'Congress Poland', for example, had been linked politically with 'All the Russias' under the sovereignty of the Romanovs, Warsaw had exerted little more cultural influence on Moscow and St. Petersburg than Moscow and St. Petersburg had exerted during the same years on Warsaw.³ In the crucial encounter between Russia and the Modern West the principals on the Western side had never, so far, been the relatively backward representatives of the Modern Western Civilization who were Russia's immediate continental neighbours in Eastern Europe; they had been those maritime peoples on the European shores of the Atlantic who, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had taken over from the North Italians the leadership of the Western World and had initiated its successive enterprises in the modern chapter of its history.

This latterly dominant group of maritime Western countries had come to include not only those in Western Europe, but also Russia's immediate maritime neighbours along the east coast of the Baltic, from Courland to Finland inclusive, who all came under Russian sovereignty in the course of the eighteenth century; but, though, from the time of Peter the Great down to the Russian Communist Revolution of A.D. 1917, the German barons and bourgeoisie of the Baltic provinces exercised an influence on Russian life which was out of proportion to their numbers, the influence of the West European peoples counted for much more, and this influence did not merely filter into Russia through Kiev

¹ See Platonov, S.: *Histoire de la Russie des Origines à 1918* (Paris 1929, Payot), pp. 648-50. Cp. Kliutschewskij, W. [Klučevskij, V.]: *Geschichte Russlands* (Berlin 1925-6, Obelisk-Verlag, 4 vols.), vol. iv, p. 175.

² See III. iii. 283, n. 2.

³ This nineteenth-century experience threw some light on the cultural prospects of a latter-day political situation in which the western limits of Russia's political ascendancy, after having receded, between the First and the Second World War, to the line along which it had run in the years A.D. 1793-5, stood once again on native Western ground—and this time as far westward as a line running from a westerly point on the southern shore of the Baltic Sea to an easterly point on the northern flank of the Austrian Alps (see p. 142, n. 6, below).

and Riga; it was also conveyed direct through ports of entry which the Russian Imperial Government deliberately opened to receive it.

The earliest of these Russian water-gates for the direct reception of the Modern Western Civilization was the mouth of the Northern Dvina on the coast of the White Sea, which was reached by an English ship in A.D. 1553, some eleven years after the first Portuguese landfall on the coast of Japan.¹ The Muscovite Government responded by founding the port-town of Archangel there in A.D. 1584, and the Westerners who entered Russia by this route established an inland outpost in 'the Sloboda'² on the threshold of Moscow. The direct intercourse between Western Europe and Russia via the White Sea was thus inaugurated on the initiative of the West European mariners in the course of their sixteenth-century conquest of the Ocean, but the intensity of the influence of the Modern Western Civilization on Russia was keyed up to a higher pitch when, in the opening years of the eighteenth century, the circuitous maritime route between Russia and Western Europe via Archangel was short-circuited, on Russian initiative, by the foundation of St. Petersburg,³ and when the field within which this alien influence was allowed to exert itself in the interior of the Russian World was simultaneously expanded from the narrow limits of 'the Sloboda' to embrace the entire domain of an empire which, in Peter's day, already stretched all the way from the Baltic to the Pacific.

Alternative Russian Responses to the Challenge of Western Technology

In an intercourse between Russia and the Modern West which, by the time of writing, had been active for some 250 years at this high pitch of intensity, and, in a lower key, for some two hundred years before that, the plot of the drama was dictated by a perpetual interplay between the demonic technological prowess of the Modern Western World and a no less demonic determination in Russian souls to preserve Russia's independence against all comers. The Russians had their hearts thus set on the independence of their society because their minds were convinced of the uniqueness of Russia's destiny; and this Russian conviction was something more than the common egocentric illusion that afflicts all societies and individuals in some degree.⁴ The Russians' peculiar sense of destiny had found expression, as we have seen,⁵ in a belief that the mantle of Constantinople had fallen on Moscow's shoulders; and the pretensions of Constantinople—'the Second Rome'—had been greater than those of Rome herself; for the pagan Roman Empire had believed in itself merely on the matter-of-fact mundane ground that Rome had been the ultimate victor in a competition be-

¹ The first English landfall on the White Sea coast of Russia and the first Portuguese landfall on the coast of Japan were, both alike, unintentional achievements of ships that had been driven out of their course by bad weather.

² This Western Christian equivalent of a ghetto in pre-Petrine Muscovy has been noticed in II. ii. 230-2 and III. iii. 280-2. 'By the time of Peter's boyhood there may have been some three thousand foreigners in all in Muscovy—almost entirely Protestant.'—Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 12.

³ See II. ii. 157-8; V. vi. 343; and VI. vii. 221-2.

⁴ For this illusion, see I. i. 157-64.

⁵ In VI. vii. 31-40.

tween the Great Powers of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World for providing a disintegrating society with a universal state, whereas the Christian Roman Empire had fortified its Roman self-confidence with the transcendental Christian faith that the Orthodox Church had inherited from Jewry the spiritual privilege of being God's 'Chosen People'.

Moscow's assumption of the role of a unique repository and citadel of Orthodoxy had been a cumulative process, beginning with the consolidation of an effective political power through the political unification of a still independent remnant of Russian Orthodox Christendom in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century¹ and culminating in the acquisition of an imposing ecclesiastical authority through the establishment of an autocephalous Patriarchate of Moscow in A.D. 1589;² and this century, which saw Muscovy thus fortified and consecrated, was also the century that saw the Muscovite remnant of Russian independence, in a domain already much reduced by Medieval Western encroachments, threatened more seriously than ever before by a Modern Western World armed with an unprecedented and unrivalled technological equipment. An impregnable Muscovite self-assurance thus found itself assailed by an irresistible Western material force, and this uncanny encounter presented to Russian souls a challenge to which they made three diverse responses.

One Russian response was a totalitarian 'Zealot' reaction which found its typical exponents in 'the Old Believers'. These fanatics broke with the official Muscovite Church and State over the question whether the traditional Muscovite version of Orthodox Christian ritual and discipline should or should not be brought into line with seventeenth-century Greek practice.³ They obstinately refused to change one jot or tittle of their own parochial Muscovite custom; and the intransigence thus displayed in a family quarrel within the bosom of the Orthodox Church declared itself, *a fortiori*, against a policy of adopting anything at all from a schismatic Western World.⁴ They were unwilling to adopt even a Western technology in which the faint virus of a Western spiritual tradition was certified, on the Western exporters' label, to have been thoroughly sterilized. 'The Old Believers' would not harbour this professedly innocuous alien technology even for the laudable purpose of safeguarding Holy Russia's independence by fighting a formidable assailant with his own lethal weapons.

This totalitarian 'Zealot' reaction in Russia to the pressure of a Modern Western World was as sincere as it was logical. Trusting, as they did, wholly in God and not in Man, the Russian 'Zealots' were willing to stake the existence of their Russian Orthodox Christendom on their belief that God would faithfully save His people so long as they loyally kept His law; but they never came within sight of winning the power to put their belief to a practical test; for they remained an impotent minority which, when the moment came for action, was always

¹ See VI. vii. 31.

² See VI. vii. 34-35.

³ See VI. vii. 36-38.

⁴ See Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 17.

brushed aside—not because the majority did not share the ‘Zealots’ zeal for Russia’s independence, but because they did not believe that their common aim could be attained solely through faith without works. The making of Russia’s policy towards the Modern West never came into the ‘Zealots’ hands; yet, though their reaction was repressed, it was not without effect as a subterranean influence when the exponents of an alternative policy were in the saddle. For example, ‘the Slavophil Movement’ which was one of the nineteenth-century cultural phenomena of the ‘Herodian’ Petrine régime, and which could be explained, in these ‘Herodian’ terms, as a Russian variation on the contemporary Romantic Movement in the West, revealed itself at the same time, from another standpoint, as being a muted expression of the native Russian ‘Zealot’ hostility to the Western culture—a hostility which, in an age when a Westernizing tendency was in the ascendant in Russia, found itself compelled to masquerade in some Western garb or other,¹ and therefore fastened upon an archaizing Western movement which was a native Western criticism of a latter-day industrial Western way of life.²

The thorough-going ‘Herodianism’ which was at the opposite extreme of the psychological gamut from the totalitarian ‘Zealotism’ of ‘the Old Believers’ was first translated from aspiration into act by the genius of the Russian ‘Zealots’ bugbear Peter the Great.³ The Petrine policy was to convert the Russian Empire from a Russian Orthodox Christian universal state into one of the parochial states of a Modern Western World, in which the Russian people was to take its place as one among a number of Western and Westernized nations. This policy sought to save Russia’s political independence and cultural autonomy, in a world in which the Modern Western way of life was the rule, by gaining admission for Russia to membership in a Westerners’ club in which eighteenth-century enlightened monarchs did not carry their indulgence in ‘the sport of kings’ beyond the point of exercising their forces ‘by temperate and undecisive contests’.⁴ The modesty and practicality of these aims, which were the objective merits of the policy, were also, however, its inherent subjective weaknesses; for, from the Russian standpoint, the Petrine policy could be denounced as a pursuit of certain means towards Russian ends at the cost of sacrificing the very ends which these means presupposed, and in virtue of which alone they were of any value or sig-

¹ See VI. vii. 38–39.

² For this aspect of the Modern Western Romantic Movement, see V. vi. 60.

³ Sumner points out that one of the evidences of Peter’s genius, and secrets of his success, is to be found in the fact that, in his Westernizing reforms, he was giving practical effect to a Westernizing tendency which was already in the air in Muscovy by the time when he came into power. ‘The greatness of Peter lies in the fact that to a large extent he gave shape to needs and aspirations growing within Muscovite Society of the late seventeenth century’ (*Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 3). Peter’s father Alexis (*imperabat* A.D. 1645–76) had already gone far enough in this direction to be branded by ‘the Old Believers’ as Anti-christ (see *ibid.*, p. 19) before he was relieved of this invidious identification by the transfer of the epithet to his still more objectionable son (see *ibid.*, p. 66, and the present Study, III. iii. 281). ‘It is tragically ironic that [Prince V. v. Galitsin, one of the principal ministers of Peter’s half-sister Sophia during her regency (*currebat* A.D. 1682–9)], whose ideas were so close to Peter’s, had no share whatever in carrying into effect Peter’s reforms’ (*ibid.*, p. 26).

⁴ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xxxviii, *ad fin.*, quoted in IV. iv. 148.

nificance in Russian eyes. In acquiescing in the Petrine policy the Russians were, in fact, resigning themselves to being, after all, 'like all the nations',¹ and were implicitly renouncing Moscow's pretension to the unique destiny of being the citadel of Orthodoxy: the one society in the World that was pregnant with the future hopes of Mankind. This implication did not prevent Peter's policy from being tried in Russia—and this over a period of more than two hundred years—but it did prevent it from ever winning the Russian people's wholehearted support; and the long-suppressed insistence on the uniqueness of Russia's destiny reasserted itself in a Communist Russian reaction to the Modern West which found its opportunity in the Petrine reaction's failure.

Russian Communism was an attempt to reconcile this irrepressible Russian sense of destiny with the ineluctable necessity of coping with the Modern West's technological prowess if Russia was to have any destiny at all.² The Communist solution for Russia's perennial 'Western Question' was to harness the horse-power of the West's redoubtable technique to the chariot of Russia's incomparable destiny, instead of either subordinating Russia's destiny, as the 'Herodians' were ready to subordinate it, to the exigencies of Westernization, or leaving it, as the 'Zealots' were ready to leave it, in the hands of God; and, of all the three Russian answers to 'the Western Question', this was the only one that appeared to offer any chance of reconciling Russian faith with Western facts. This Russian Communist policy was, however, based on an implicit assumption that it was practically possible to appropriate one element in an alien culture without having to adopt the rest of it, and this postulate that a culture is not indivisible remained to be proved.³ Meanwhile, it was impugned by the significant fact that, in making this very assumption, the Russian Communists were already following a Western lead. Their belief that cultural and political phenomena could all be reduced to economic terms, and that economic facts alone were realities and not illusions, was taken by them on faith from the Western philosopher-prophet Karl Marx; and, in seeking to rationalize the content of the Modern Western Civilization by discarding the element of liberal idealism and retaining nothing but an economic materialism, Marx had only been going one step farther along a road on which his liberal predecessors had entered when, in a revulsion from the Western Wars of Religion, they had sought to jettison the religious element in the Western tradition, while still retaining a secularized liberalism as an idealistic counter-weight to a banalistic technology.

The adoption of a Western ideology of any kind was indeed a paradoxical way of reasserting, against the Modern Western World, Russia's pretension to be the heir to a unique destiny; and this paradox was a striking testimony to the strength—frankly recognized in the Petrine 'Herodian' movement—of a current, carrying Russia in a Western direction, which had not ceased to make its flow felt beneath the surface

¹ 1 Sam. viii. 5 and 20.

² In virtue of thus striving to reconcile two conflicting exigencies which were both imperious, Russian Communism had in it an intrinsic ambivalence which is examined further on pp. 607–8, below.

³ This question is discussed on pp. 542–64, below.

when the Petrine régime had been discredited and liquidated. The substitution of a Marxian ideology derived from the West for an Orthodox Christianity derived from Byzantium, as the true faith of which Russia was the hallowed repository, was a paradox that was at the same time an inevitable corollary of the militant reaction towards Western pressure for which Russian Communism stood.

Lenin and his successors divined that a policy of fighting the West with its own weapons could not hope to succeed if the weapons in question were conceived of in exclusively material terms; for, while Technology was the spear-head of the Modern West's assault on the rest of the contemporary world, the assailants might not have penetrated farther than the outer defences of their neighbours' castles if they had delivered their attack with material weapons alone. The secret of the Modern Western Civilization's amazing success in propagating itself to the ends of the Earth during the last 250 years before the Russian Communist Revolution of A.D. 1917 had lain in a masterly co-operation of the spiritual with the temporal arm. The breaches blown by the blast of a Modern Western technology had opened a passage for the spirit of a Modern Western Liberalism; and the voluntary capitulation of alien souls, *imprimis* Peter the Great's, to the charm of the Modern Western secular culture had done more to make its fortune in the World than all the military conquests of a Cortés, Pizarro, Clive, or Wellesley. The latter-day leaders of the militant Russian reaction against the West well understood that, if Russia was to reassert against the West her own claim to be the child of Destiny, it would not be enough for her to make herself the equal of the West in the mastery of the contemporary Western technique; she must also be the champion of a faith that could contend on equal terms with a Modern Western Liberalism; and she must not be content simply to preserve in its pristine purity, within a Holy Russian citadel, the distinctive faith to which she was to dedicate herself; she must enter into active competition with the Western faith of Liberalism in that literally world-wide mission-field which the Modern West had created by knitting together the whole habitable and traversable surface of the Earth in a Western-manufactured net-work of communications and commerce. Russia must compete with the West for the spiritual allegiance of all the living societies that were neither Western nor Russian in their native cultural tradition, and—not content even with that—she must have the supreme audacity to carry the war into the enemy's camp by preaching the Russian faith in the West's own homeland.

Granting the necessity of the strategy outlined in these general terms for a Russia who was bent on reasserting herself, the particular faith to which a spiritually militant Russia was to attempt to convert the World still remained to be found, and this was the point at which the ascendancy of the Modern Western culture in the contemporary world revealed its strength by driving the Russians into the paradoxical course on which, after Lenin's death, the policy of the Soviet Union was set in consequence of Stalin's victory over Trotsky. Stalin's appropriation of the international flag of Marxism to serve as a new banner for Russian nationalism was a paradox because it was as illogical as it was statesman-

like. In logic the question was not an open one at all. The one faith that a militant Russia could logically pit against a Modern Western Liberalism was the traditional Russian version of Orthodox Christianity, since Russia's claim to be the sole surviving repository of a perfect Christian Orthodoxy constituted her title to be 'the Third Rome' who was 'the Heir of the Promise'. To throw over Orthodox Christianity was to throw away the credentials on which the whole of her pretension to uniqueness rested. Mated with any faith other than this traditional one—and, above all, when the substituted novel faith was a creed whose 'chosen People' was, not the Russian nation, but an international proletariat—the pretension was deprived of even that shadow of historical justification with which it was covered in the setting of its original associations. On the other hand the idea that Russia should attempt to compete for the spiritual allegiance of Mankind against a Modern Western Liberalism in the name of a traditional Orthodox Christianity had only to be formulated in order to put itself out of court by the glaring obviousness of its impracticability. Manifestly that cock would not fight in a twentieth-century oecumenical cockpit. By that date the World was already so far Westernized that the one hope of challenging the prevailing liberal Western ideological orthodoxy lay in pitting against it an ideological heresy that was likewise of Western origin; and for this militant Russian purpose the Marxian ideology was particularly well suited¹ in two ways.

In the first place Marxism was a Western 'futurist' criticism of a latter-day industrial form of Modern Western life which the Western Romantic Movement had attacked from an 'archaistic' angle;² and a twentieth-century Russian Communist adaptation of this Western vein of Futurism promised to be a more effective move than a nineteenth-century Russian Slavophil adaptation of Romanticism had proved to be, since Futurism was intrinsically a more positive line of attack than Archaism was against an established dispensation. Marxism was thus a telling ideological weapon for a militant Russia to adopt for use on a world-wide spiritual arena; and, in the second place, it was likely to minister to Russia's other purpose—which was a prior need—of holding her own against the West in the mastery of a Modern Western technology; for Marxism exalted the economic factor in life above all others and would therefore be an apt instrument for serving its Russian users' purpose in the domestic field, where their task was to drive a traditionally un-economic-minded Russian people into catching up with their Western contemporaries, by forced marches, in a technological race in which the Westerners had a long start and in which the stakes of the event were life and death. These practical arguments in favour of substituting Marxism for Orthodox Christianity³ as the faith to which

¹ The Russians' adoption of the Marxian Western heresy as their weapon for assailing the Western orthodoxy of the age may be compared with the Safawis' adoption of Imāmi Shi'ism as their weapon for assailing the Sunnism that was the orthodox version of Islam in the Iranic World of Shah Ismā'il's generation (see I. i. 359-65). The choice of weapon was in both cases adroit without being cynical, because in both cases the motive was subconscious.

² For Archaism and Futurism, see V. vi. 49-132.

³ This adoption of an alien atheistic and materialist philosophy as a psychological substitute for a native religion had a precedent in the hardly less strange transformation

Russia was to pin her pretension to be the heir to a unique destiny outweighed the academic consideration that the pretension itself logically fell to the ground with the repudiation of its traditional religious foundation, while the flagrancy of this betrayal of tradition and logic at the dictation of *raison d'état* showed how near the Modern Western Civilization had already come to captivating the contemporary world, Russia included, by the time when the Russian Communists raised their horn.

The Race between the West's Technological Advance and Russia's Technological Westernization

The practical choice between the three theoretically alternative Russian reactions to the aggression of the Modern West was not, of course, ever decided by an academic debate¹ in the style of the discussion of the respective merits of Democracy, Oligarchy, and Monarchy which Herodotus puts into the mouths of Darius and his fellow assassins in the political vacuum which they had created by their success in murdering Smerdis.² The Russian choice was made, for the most part, unreflectively and unselfconsciously, from hand to mouth, in improvised responses to successive Western challenges in the crude form of aggressive military attacks, and, on this analysis, the encounter between Russia and the Modern West presented itself as a drama in which, down to the time of writing, one plot had been recurring in successive performances. The initial event in this recurrent plot was a sensational Western military success at Russia's expense which was patently accounted for by the West's technological superiority at the time; the second event was an effort on Russia's part to save her independence by mastering the technique of the West up to the contemporary level at which it had vindicated itself in Western hands so dangerously from Russia's standpoint; the third event was a fresh ordeal by battle in which Russia demonstrated, by successfully repulsing another Western attack, that she had achieved her own latest technological objective; the fourth event was a sensational fresh advance in Western technology which rang up the curtain for a fresh performance of the drama by confronting Russia, all over again, with a problem which, in the outgoing act, she had solved *ad hoc* without (as now appeared) having succeeded in solving it permanently.³

In Russian history⁴ the first performance of this repetitive drama was

of a Primitive Buddhist philosophy into the Mahāyāna in the course of its passage from India to the Far East.

¹ The nearest approach to this was the Marxian theological warfare—in which texts from Marx's, Engels', and Lenin's canonical works were hurled from both sides as missile weapons—that was an accompaniment of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, after Lenin's death, for control over the Soviet Government.

² See Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 80–83.

³ See Annex I, pp. 674–5, below.

⁴ While the Russo-Western heat was the classical instance of a race between the Modern West's technological advance and a contemporary non-Western society's technological Westernization, Russia was not the only non-Western society in this age that was goaded into running this race by a recurring threat from a perpetually advancing Western competitor.

"The greatest danger to the independent strength and freedom of initiative of a nation like China (or Turkey) which is making an effort to adapt itself to the standards of the West is that it thereby admits, at least by implication, the superior authority of the

opened by the first establishment of contact between Russia and the Modern West at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era and was closed in 1812 by the victory of a Russia that had been Westernized by Peter the Great over a Napoleon who was the greatest Modern Western soldier up to date.

At the beginning of this performance the Russians were hardly yet aware of the existence of 'the Western Question'; and, on the strength of the political union of Novgorod with Muscovy, and of a casual adoption of a few military applications of the Modern Western technology of the day, such as the use of fire-arms, Tsar Ivan IV rashly provoked his Western neighbours by attempting to win for his united Russia a broader frontage on the Baltic coast through the conquest of the intervening marches of the Western World. A facile initial success against the already disintegrating régime of the Teutonic Order in the Baltic Provinces brought Ivan into collision with Sweden and Lithuania, and the ensuing trial of strength demonstrated the West's contemporary military superiority over Russia. So far from succeeding in extending Russia's frontage on the Baltic, Ivan found himself compelled to cede to Sweden even the strip of coastline at the head of the Gulf of Finland which the Muscovite Empire had inherited from the Republic of Novgorod; this discomfiture of Muscovy in the war of A.D. 1558-83 was followed by the Polono-Lithuanian occupation of Moscow in A.D. 1610-12;¹ and, though, as between Russia and Poland-Lithuania, the eventual balance of territorial gains and losses in this round of warfare was in Russia's favour,² it was not to her advantage in her account with Sweden,³ while the true measure of the relative strengths of Russia and her Western adversaries was given, not by any fluctuations in frontiers, but by the constant ability of sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century Western armies to defeat contemporary Russian armies in the field.

This alarming experience of the inadequacy of native Russian military

West; with the result that, by the time it has mastered Westernization as a thing complete in itself, the West proper, whose Westernism is a living force informed with growth and activity, has progressed spontaneously to a further point—with the result that the nation striving for adaptation, having once admitted the authority of the alien standard, finds itself still chronologically in arrears and accordingly restricted in the faculty of initiative. Even in a nation like Japan, where the process of Westernizing was less an adaptation than a transformation, a genuine phenomenon of rebirth, the effects of this chronological handicap can very definitely be traced' (Lattimore, Owen: *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 154-5).

¹ See II. ii. 176.

² In A.D. 1654 the Ukrainian Cossacks (see II. ii. 154-7) transferred their nominal allegiance from Poland to Muscovy; in A.D. 1667 Muscovy acquired Smolensk and Kiev from Poland-Lithuania by the Peace Treaty of Andrusovo; in A.D. 1686 these territorial terms were confirmed in an 'Eternal Peace' between the two Powers.

³ The terms of the Russo-Swedish peace treaty concluded at Stolbovo in A.D. 1617 re-enacted those of the treaty of A.D. 1583 by reinstating Sweden in the possession of even the strip of originally Russian coastline, at the head of the Gulf of Finland, which Russia had momentarily recovered from Sweden in the peace treaty concluded at Tyavzhin in A.D. 1595, so that Russia found herself once again completely barred out from access to the Baltic Sea. Even the distant English toyed, in A.D. 1612-13, with a project for the acquisition of at least the north of Russia by the British Crown which was submitted by a Scottish soldier, Captain Thomas Chamberlain, who had served in a force of West European mercenaries sent in A.D. 1609 by the Swedish Government to the Tsar Vasilii Shuiski (see Lubimenko, Inna: 'A Project for the Acquisition of Russia by James I', in *The English Historical Review*, vol. xxix (London 1914, Longmans Green), pp. 246-56).

technique in warfare with Russia's Modern Western neighbours was a challenge which found its response in the Petrine 'Herodian' revolution.¹ Peter the Great's first objective was to Westernize Russia's armed forces, on sea and land, up to the contemporary Western standard of efficiency; to achieve this, he had also to Westernize Russian technology and public administration; this in turn required provision for the higher education of experts and officials up to the Western standard of the day; and Peter, being a man of genius and vision, extended these minimum necessary measures to embrace a comprehensive Westernization of a diluted Muscovite nobility.² The success of this Petrine policy was foreshadowed by Peter's own victory, in A.D. 1709, over a rash Swedish invader of the Ukraine,³ and was demonstrated, eighty-seven years after Peter's death, when, in A.D. 1812, the Petrine Russian Empire brought to the ground a French aggressor who had proved more than a match for all his Western continental adversaries during the preceding fifteen years, and who was invading Russia at the head of the united military forces of Continental Western Europe.

The Napoleonic French Grand Army was a Western military instrument of a vastly higher calibre than the Polish expeditionary force which, two hundred years earlier, had anticipated the French in the fatal feat of momentarily occupying Moscow; and, after dividing with Great Britain the honours of overthrowing Napoleon, Petrine Russia emerged from this ordeal as the leading continental Power and pushed her western continental frontiers so far westward as to include within them the native Western province of 'Congress Poland'. The post-Napoleonic era saw a superficially Westernized Russia standing on a pinnacle of apparent ascendancy; yet this appearance was already an illusion; for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of A.D. 1793-1815 were the last Western wars on the grand scale that were fought with the pre-industrial Western technique. By A.D. 1812 the Industrial Revolution was already in full swing in England; and, though, in the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853-6), Russia was still able to fight her Western adversaries on more or less equal technological terms thanks to the conservatism of contemporary French and British professional military minds, in the seventh decade of the nineteenth century the American Civil War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1861-5) and a Bismarckian Prussia's three wars of aggression (*gerebantur* A.D. 1864, 1866, 1870-1) saw the new industrial technique at last duly applied to warfare by Western Powers;⁴ and in the nineteenth century, as in the sixteenth century, Russia was caught napping by a sudden sensational advance in her Western neighbours' military technique.

¹ A summary of Peter the Great's work has been given in III. iii. 278-83.

² See VI. vii. 358, 360, and 361.

³ Peter's decisive victory over Charles XII in A.D. 1709 at Poltava, which had been preceded by the conquest of Ingermanland, Narva, and Dorpat in A.D. 1701-4, was followed in A.D. 1710 by the conquest of Karelia, Estland, Livland, and Riga. Peter's recognition that, in acquiring for Muscovy this frontage on the Baltic Sea, he had achieved for her in his twenty-one-years-long war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1700-21) what Ivan IV had been seeking to achieve for her in his twenty-six-years-long war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1558-83) was expressed in the pageantry of his triumphal entry into Moscow after the conclusion of peace in A.D. 1721 (see Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, p. 202).

⁴ See IV. iv. 151-2.

Once again, Russia rather casually adopted a few elements of the new Western technical apparatus. In employing, for example, the device of conquering a desert by building a railway, the Russians in Transcaspia¹ were ahead of the British in the Sudan; but, when, in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904-5, a still no more than Petrine Russia pitted her eighteenth-century Western armaments against the nineteenth-century western armaments of a Post-Tokugawan Japan, she proved to be a colossus with feet of clay; and, when, undeterred by this warning, she ventured, ten years later, to measure her strength against Germany's in the General War of A.D. 1914-18, the colossus collapsed. This shattering experience of the inadequacy of the Petrine dispensation for enabling Russia to hold her own in an industrialized world was the challenge to which the Communist Marxian revolution was the response. The Petrine régime had been all but overwhelmed by the abortive revolution of A.D. 1905, which had been the Russian people's reaction to the Petrine Russian Empire's defeat by Japan. The utter disaster of A.D. 1914-18, and its remorseless revelation of the extreme industrial backwardness which had made it inevitable, brought the Bolsheviks into power and at the same time determined their programme.

This programme was presented by Stalin in uncompromisingly drastic language in a speech on the tasks of business executives delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Managers of Socialist Industry on the 4th February, 1931,² in the early days of his inter-war drive to raise the technological efficiency of the Soviet Union to a new level.

'The main thing is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master technique, to master the science of production . . . It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo a bit . . . No! . . . On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. . . . To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind; and those who fall behind get beaten. . . .'

The imperative necessity for these superhuman exertions which he was demanding of the people of the Soviet Union was driven home in Stalin's next words in this speech by an appeal to the lessons of Russian history.

'One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beating she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—for her backwardness: for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity. . . .

'Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist system of economy We are fifty or a

¹ See V. v. 323, n. 3, and p. 30, above.

² English text in Stalin, Joseph: *Leninism* (London 1940, Allen and Unwin), pp. 359-67.

hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us.¹

On the 4th May, 1935, when the urgency of Stalin's technological programme had been pointed by Hitler's advent to power in Germany and by his overt rearmament of the Third Reich, Stalin drove his argument home in an address delivered in the Kremlin to the graduates from the Red Army academies.¹

'We inherited from the past a technically backward, impoverished, and ruined country. Ruined by four years of imperialist war, and ruined again by three years of civil war, a country with a semi-literate population, with a low technical level, with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms—such was the country we inherited from the past. The task was to transfer this country from mediaeval darkness to modern industry and mechanised agriculture. . . . The question that confronted us was: *Either* we solve this problem in the shortest possible time, and consolidate Socialism in our country, *or* we do not solve it, in which case our country—weak technically and unenlightened in the cultural sense—will lose its independence and become a stake in the game of the imperialist powers.'

The dose of Westernization that was administered to Russia by the Bolsheviks differed from Peter's dose in its application. The provinces of Russian life which it affected were a smaller part of the total field; for, whereas Peter had set out to Westernize almost everything in the life of a diluted and expanded Muscovite nobility, the Bolsheviks rigidly confined their attentions to the province of technology, where they started an intensive course of industrialization, and the province of ideology, in which they sought to substitute a Marxian for a Christian orthodoxy. Yet, if they did not range as widely as Peter over the surface of Russian life, they made up for this by digging down far deeper below the surface within the limited area to which they restricted their operations; and in this difference in their Westernizing tactics they were faithfully reflecting a change which had overtaken Western life itself, between Peter the Great's generation and theirs, as a result of the eruption of the two elemental forces of Industrialism and Democracy.²

The drive imparted by these forces had made mass-action a condition of efficiency; and this portentous new 'totalitarianism', which was as foreign to the bourgeois as it had been to the aristocratic native Western tradition, was accepted wholeheartedly, and imposed without qualms, by Russian Communists whose assumption of a Marxian heretical Western costume could not erase from their Russian hearts and minds the impress of deeply ingrained Orthodox Christian political habits, however vehemently their Marxian wills might have repudiated the Orthodox Christian tradition. As heirs, *malgré eux*, of an Orthodox Christian cultural heritage, they could not find the principle of 'totalitarianism' either unfamiliar or shocking; for, in evoking a ghost of the Roman Empire and subjecting the Orthodox Church to this resuscitated Hellenic universal state, the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society

¹ English text in Stalin, *op. cit.*, pp. 540-5.

² See IV. iv. 141-85.

had forged a despotic institution of high potency;¹ and in the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom a comparable engine of despotism—'heavy as frost and deep almost as life'²—had been constructed, since the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, in Muscovy and her successor the Petrine Russian Empire—a Russian state of which the Soviet Union was the heir.³

The second bout in the dramatic encounter between Russia and the Modern West accomplished its repetition of the plot of the play within a much shorter span of time than the first bout had taken to illustrate the same *motif*. An interval of no less than two centuries had separated the Polish military occupation of Moscow in A.D. 1610–12, which had been the ultimate stimulus of the Petrine Revolution, from the defeat of Napoleon in A.D. 1812 which had been its final vindication, while there was an interval of no more than thirty years between the German victory over a Petrine Russia in A.D. 1915, which was the genesis of the Soviet régime, and the Soviet Union's victory over Germany in A.D. 1945, by which the Communist Revolution was vindicated in its generation.

This acceleration—which was perhaps to be explained as one of the effects of a Western process of mechanization on the life of a Westernizing World—was as evident in the sequel to the second performance of the Russo-Western tragedy as it was in this second performance's consummation. After her triumph in A.D. 1812 the Petrine Russian Empire had at any rate enjoyed half a century free from care before it had become apparent that the Western World had for the second time stolen a march on Russia by making an advance in technology that had once again revolutionized the art of war. In A.D. 1945, the duration of the Soviet Government's rest-cure in a fool's paradise was limited, by a rocket-swift *Zeitgeist*, to a period of ninety days. Germany had capitulated on the 8th May, 1945; on the 6th August of the same year the first atomic bomb was dropped by the Americans on Japan; and, from that latter date onwards till the time of writing, Russia was again in the presence of the same problem that had confronted her after the disaster of A.D. 1915 and the disaster of A.D. 1610–12. In the never-ending technological race between Russia and her Western sister, the West had again forged ahead of Russia so far as to leave her militarily at the mercy of her Western contemporaries unless and until she could catch up again with her formidable competitors for the third time, as she had succeeded in catching up with them twice before.

The Soviet Union's Encounter with the United States

While this technico-military issue was still on the knees of the Gods, it was already apparent on the political plane that, if the empire which the Grand Duke Ivan III of Muscovy had brought into being by annexing Novgorod to his dominions in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century was to be diagnosed as a Russian universal state, this polity had been kept alive beyond its natural expectation of life by the galvanic effect of the impact of the Modern West, as an expiring 'Middle

¹ See IV. iv. 320–408 and X. ix. 15.

² Wordsworth: *Ode on Intimations of Immortality*.

³ See pp. 676–8, below.

Empire' of Egypt had been reanimated by the impact of the Hyksos, and an expiring 'New Empire' by the impact of 'the Sea Peoples'.

On the analogy of the histories of universal states which had run their course without this being appreciably affected by the play of external forces, the Muscovite Russian Empire might have been expected to have lapsed into anarchy, achieved a recovery, and eventually collapsed irretrievably about four hundred years from the date of its original establishment; and symptoms of all these three characteristic experiences in a universal state's normal history duly present themselves in this Russian case. The temporary lapse into anarchy is represented by the rough passage which the Russians themselves had named 'the Time of Troubles' (*instabat* A.D. 1604-12);¹ the recovery by the rally under the new régime of the Romanov Dynasty;² and the eventual collapse by the adversity into which the Romanov Empire fell in the course of the thirty-six years beginning with the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in A.D. 1881 and ending with the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in A.D. 1917.³ If the tragedy had played itself out to the end in conformity with the conventional plot, this last act would have seen the empire that had been founded by Ivan III and been enlarged by his successors fall to pieces into a number of parochial successor-states of barbarian or indigenous origin; and, after the Bolshevik Revolution of A.D. 1917, there were symptoms of this characteristic denouement likewise. At this stage, however, the tendency for events to take their typical course was overborne by a more powerful current making for the rehabilitation of the foundered universal state in a new shape.

Between A.D. 1917 and A.D. 1922⁴ all the momentarily dislocated fragments of the former Russian Empire, except a splinter of Transcaucasia⁵ and a belt of border territories on the Empire's western fringe, whose populations were Westerners in their culture, were reintegrated under the rule of a single indigenous successor-state which assumed, on the 30th December, 1922, the title of a 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'; and thereafter, as a result of the outcome of the General War of A.D. 1939-45, the Soviet Union not only recovered the lost western dominions of the Romanov Empire but imposed its political ascendancy over Continental European territories still farther to the west, up to a line which the Romanov Empire had never approached—not even at the zenith of its military and political power in A.D. 1814-15.⁶

¹ See I. i. 53, n. 2; II. ii. 157 and 176; IV. iv. 90 and 91-92; V. v. 311, n. 2; V. vi. 195, n. 2, and 311.

² See V. vi. 312.

³ See V. vi. 311, n. 3.

⁴ On the 14th November, 1922, the reunification of the non-Western territories formerly embraced in the Russian Empire was completed by the merger of the Far Eastern Republic in the Socialist Federal Soviet Republic of Great Russia.

⁵ Consisting of the districts of Qars and Ardahan and a portion of the district of Batum (excluding the port and town of Batum itself), which had been definitively retroceded to Turkey in A.D. 1921.

⁶ In A.D. 1945 the western frontier of the Soviet Union itself still embraced less territory inhabited by Westerners than had been included within the western frontier of the Romanov Empire in A.D. 1914; for, while the Soviet Union had now reannexed to Russia the three inter-war republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Soviet Lithuania overlapped with no more than the north-eastern corner of the former Romanov dominion of 'Congress Poland', and only a fraction of the former Romanov dominion of Finland—the Karelian Isthmus—had been reannexed from the inter-war Finnish Republic. On

This Phoenix-like resurrection of a Romanov Empire in the shape of the Soviet Union with its glacies of satellite states was the response of an obstinately persisting Russian will to independence in face of a menace of extinction which had never been more acute than when, on the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1914-18, a prostrate Russia's recent Western or Westernized allies—France, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan—had followed suit to her recent Western adversary Germany in invading her by force of arms in military operations which, in Russian eyes, were not acquitted of being aggressive in virtue of their being professedly undertaken with the object of putting back a non-Communist Russian régime into the saddle. The cumulative effect of the German military invasion of Russia in and after A.D. 1915, the inter-ally military invasion of Russia in and after A.D. 1918, and the renewed German military invasion of Russia in and after A.D. 1940 had been to conjure back into being a Russian polity which was not merely an unseasonable avatar of a time-expired Russian universal state but was one of two super-great Powers in a Westernizing World, now co-extensive with the whole surface of the planet, in whose political articulation the number of Powers of the highest calibre had been reduced to two from eight in the course of thirty-one years (A.D. 1914-45) as a result of two world wars in one life-time.

What were to be the Soviet Union's role and fate in the next chapter of the history of Russia's encounter with the West? The geographical configuration of human affairs on the morrow of the World War of A.D. 1939-45 might appear to portend the approach of a climax in the history, not only of the Russian and the Western civilizations, but of a species of society—Civilization itself—which, by that date, had been in existence for some five or six thousand years and whose living representatives were civilizations of the third generation.

The Soviet Union and the United States, whose gigantic forms now, between them, overshadowed the political landscape, and whose rival championship of two competing ideologies was gathering the whole of Mankind into two opposing spiritual camps, displayed a resemblance to one another which was not confined to the external point of their common pre-eminence over all their contemporaries in their order of material magnitude; they also possessed in common the more intimate feature of being planted, both alike, on culturally new ground, and of experiencing the stimulus which the conquest of new ground is apt to bring with it.¹

the other hand the Soviet Union had compensated itself for its comparative moderation in reannexing populations of Western culture by establishing its political ascendancy over a team of satellite Western states whose territories covered, between them, not only the unannexed major part of Finland, but the whole of Continental Eastern Europe between the new western frontier of the Soviet Union and a line running approximately south and north from the northern flank of the Austrian Alps to the southern shore of the Baltic Sea. Within this area, in A.D. 1952, the Soviet Union was effectively dominant over a post-war Poland covering the whole area in which a majority of the population was Polish in nationality, as well as a strip of formerly German-inhabited territory between the Polish-inhabited area and the Oder-Neisse line; over a zone of Germany, west of the Oder, surrounding Berlin; over a zone of Austria, surrounding Vienna; and over Czechoslovakia and Hungary, besides Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. At that date it remained to be seen whether the Soviet Union would succeed in reasserting its ascendancy over a dissident Communist Yugoslavia and in bringing a compliant Communist régime into power in Greece.

¹ See II. ii. 73-100.

The territory of the United States had been culturally virgin soil, save for a fringe of the Mexic Civilization's former cultural domain in the upper basin of the Rio Grande, before trans-oceanic colonists from Western Europe had begun to take possession of it in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era; and the territory of the Soviet Union and its satellites¹ was comparatively new ground likewise. Apart from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and Transcaucasia, hardly any of it had ever been occupied by any sedentary civilization before the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era; the Russian occupation of the Donetz, Don, Lower Volga, Urals, and Siberia had not begun till the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, when Muscovy had embarked on an eastward and south-eastward expansion overland that was not incomparable in scale with the contemporary expansion of the maritime peoples of Western Europe overseas; and, as one consequence of the intensive industrialization of the Soviet Union, the centre of gravity of its economic life had latterly been shifting more and more out of the original homeland of the Russian Civilization in the North-East European forests into these recently occupied territories which had been Nomad's land or Primitive Man's preserve before Russian enterprise had opened them up as fresh fields for the cultivation of a different way of life.

While the Soviet Union and the United States were both thus laid out on recently virgin soil, they confronted one another across a belt of territories embracing all the rest of the domains, in the Old World, of all the living civilizations of Old-World origin and the entire domains of all these living civilizations' predecessors of earlier generations. This political and ideological no-man's-land enveloped the Old World's Soviet heartland like an immense crescent-shaped festoon with its extremities in the high latitudes of Northern Japan and Scandinavia and with its bow sagging down below the Equator in Indonesia.² This zone contained the Japanese offshoot and the Chinese main body of the Far Eastern Civilization; the Tantric Mahayanian fossils of the extinct Indic Civilization in Mongolia and Tibet; the Hinayanian fossils of the same extinct civilization in Cambodia, Siam, Burma, and Ceylon; the Hindu Civilization; the Islamic Civilization from its eastern outposts in the Southern Philippines and Western China to its western outposts on the Atlantic coast of Africa; the main body of Orthodox Christendom in South-Eastern Europe; and the European homeland of the Western Civilization.

Each of the mansions occupied by these divers bodies social had a continental back door accessible from the Soviet heartland of the Old World and a maritime front door accessible from the Americas across the Ocean. They were thus all open to simultaneous and competitive penetration by the two colossi that were bestriding a post-Hitlerian World; and, impotent though their tenants were to hold their own, should occasion arise, against either of their two gigantic neighbours, their existence was nevertheless the key to the balance of political power, since this balance could hardly fail to incline decisively in favour of the

¹ See xi, map. 49.

² See XII. ix. 488-9, and xi, map 65.

giant, whichever of the two it might be, who should succeed in drawing into his own camp a majority of these denizens of an intervening no-man's-land whose bodies were to be the prizes of a political and ideological tug-o'-war.

On the precedent of comparable conjunctures in the histories of other civilizations, this political situation in a Westernizing World on the morrow of a Second World War might be read to mean that the Western Civilization had now arrived at a stage in a losing battle against disintegration at which it was on the eve of entering into a universal state, and that a third world war was the crushingly heavy price that Destiny was going to exact for the barren opportunity of achieving this abortive rally.¹ Whatever may have been the current expectations of the rulers of the Soviet Union and their subjects, there were certainly many people in the Western World at this time who were fatalistically foreboding a third world war in which the United States and the Soviet Union would be the respective principals, and from which a literally world-wide universal state would arise through the elimination, *vi et armis*, of one or other of these two remaining Great Powers. If that was in truth Mankind's unescapable destiny, this would mean that the Bolsheviks had achieved their *tour de force* of resuscitating the Russian Empire at the cost of condemning it to hazard its existence on a venture that must issue in either world power or downfall. As a result of a third world war, should this calamity overtake Mankind, it would seem that the Soviet Union must either win the invidiously brilliant distinction of providing a reluctant Western World with an alien universal state such as the 'Osmanlis had imposed on the main body of Orthodox Christendom, and the Mughals and their British successors on the Hindu World, or alternatively suffer a disaster that would undo the work of Stalin and Lenin and Peter and Ivan III alike by pulverizing this vast body politic into fragments smaller than the fifteenth-century Grand Duchy of Moscow and Republic of Novgorod whose union had been the Russian Empire's genesis.

Was one or other of these extreme alternative denouements inevitable? At the time of writing, it would have been wilful blindness to ignore the signs pointing to a third world war as the line of least resistance for a world whose ability to be master of its own destiny was manifestly at this time an open question. At the same time it would have been wanton 'defeatism' to discount other, perhaps not less convincing, signs of the times which suggested that a shatteringly Wagnerian overture might resolve itself into a prosaically Benthamite anticlimax.

While it was certain, in the minds of Western observers, that the Americans' sense of destiny would never tempt them to take the initiative in going to war with the Soviet Union, there was no warrant for assuming, on the other hand, that the Russians' sense of destiny would betray the inveterately cautious and deliberate Muscovite political chess-players into rushing in where their impulsive American opponents feared to tread. Even if the Soviet Government were one day to convince itself that, in a perpetually recurring race for the goal of technological

¹ These prospects are discussed in XII. ix. 524-36.

efficiency, it had caught up with the United States, as it had once succeeded in catching up with Germany, this reassuring conviction would not necessarily move the Russians to take the offensive. An offensive war against an encompassing world of hostile infidels was not commended either by Soviet mythology or by Russian experience. Marxism had appropriated the Jewish myth of an inoffensive Chosen People which, in a war that it has never sought, is to win a miraculous victory against overwhelming odds over a coalition of enemies who have brought their doom upon themselves by banding together in the pride of their hearts to make an unprovoked assault on Zion.¹ The Russian people had thrice experienced the exultation of snatching victory out of defeat in fighting on their own ground against apparently irresistible Western invaders of Holy Russia, while they had also more than once experienced the humiliation of being checked, or defeated outright, on foreign soil by opponents who were not the Russians' match in numbers or resources—as they had been checked by the Turks in Rumelia in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1877–8,² and defeated by the Japanese in Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904–5. These considerations suggested that the twentieth-century tension between the Soviet Union and the United States was not bound to result in war in the nineteen-fifties, but might alternatively relax without catastrophe, as the nineteenth-century tension between the Russian Empire and the British Empire had relaxed in the eighteen-eighties.

If this unapocalyptic denouement were in fact to come to pass, the Russian Empire founded by Ivan III and resuscitated by Lenin might be expected to survive at a mezzanine altitude of political eminence. This messianic 'Third Rome' would then find her level as a polity of far lower stature than the alien universal state of a forcibly united Western World which she would have had to become if she was to have escaped destruction in the event of a third world war; but on the other hand she would then stand out head and shoulders above the ordinary parochial states of a politically still divided Western World, instead of joining their ranks in the modest role of an undistinguished recruit for which Muscovy had been cast by Peter the Great, and into which the Soviet Union had appeared to be lapsing in the nineteen-thirties.³ In a Westernizing World, in which other kingdoms and lands, outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union herself and her involuntary satellites, had found security against their fear of Soviet attack and Communist penetration by voluntarily entering into a free political association with the United States and with one another to the extent required for effective common defence and common pursuit of material and spiritual welfare, the Soviet Union might be expected to play something like the role which the Parthian and Kushan Powers had played in the Transeuphratean continental hinterland of a Hellenizing World⁴ when a ring of maritime countries encircling the Mediterranean had been gathered together under the aegis of Rome in a *Pax Augusta*.⁵

¹ For the Marxist version of this apocalyptic Jewish myth, see V. v. 183.

² See XII. ix. 512–13.

³ See V. v. 183–8.

⁴ See XII. ix. 528–9.

⁵ For the role of the Mediterranean in the human geography of the Roman Empire, see VI. vii. 81, ns. 1, 2, 3, and 4, and X. ix. 657–62.

The Modern Western Civilization, like the Hellenic, had started life as a maritime society and had expanded by seamanship before laying iron rails on land; and, in an age when a world that had thus been Westernized through the conductive medium of the high seas was crystallizing politically round the ocean-girt island of North America, it was hardly to be expected that this process would extend very far beyond the maritime fringes of the Old World into its land-locked heartland, any more than it was to be expected that a land power centred on Moscow would ever be able to establish its dominion over the isles of the sea. These geographical considerations suggested that, if the habitable and traversable surface of the planet were to be unequally divided between the whale and the bear in proportions that would leave to the bear an inalienable residue of intractably continental territory, the two monsters might settle down side by side to live and let live; and, in an age of low political and high technological tension, such as this common-sense division of the World might be expected to inaugurate, it could be forecast that the practical compromises between free enterprise and regimentation covered by the rival ideological labels 'Liberalism' and 'Communism' would gradually become less unlike one another *de facto*,¹ as the rulers of Moscow began to be less tyrannically obsessed by fear, while the Western peoples continued to purchase further instalments of technological efficiency² and social justice at the inevitable cost of further self-imposed restrictions on the freedom of individuals to take undue advantage of their neighbours.

In this unsensationally happy event the historical role of the Communist ideology and the Soviet Union might prove in retrospect, from a Western standpoint, to have been that of the Mephistophelian spirit

Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.³

An abortive Russian challenge to the captivation of the World by a secularized Modern Western Civilization might turn out to have redounded to the benefit of the vast depressed proletarian majority of Mankind—the proletarian civilizations and the proletarian lower orders in a Westernizing World whose Western makers and managers had once reigned, as oecumenical 'lords of creation', over a host of 'Natives'⁴ and 'Poor Whites' amounting to an overwhelming majority of the living generation of Mankind.

In the economically unified but morally still divided world of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the primitive peasantry of Eastern Europe, Russia, Japan, China, Indo-China, Indonesia, India, South-West Asia, Egypt, Tropical Africa, and Latin America,⁵ and even the urban industrial 'working class' in North America and Western Europe, were living, on the material plane, on a level shockingly far below the contemporary level of the North American and West European bourgeoisie; and this evil of provocative inequality between sectional

¹ On this point, see V. v. 188.

² Mechanization exacts its price in regimentation, as has been noticed in III. iii. 209-12. See further XII. ix. 563-77.

³ Goethe: *Faust*, II. 1335-6, quoted in II. i. 282.

⁴ See I. i. 151-3.

⁵ See Annex I, pp. 684-90, below.

classes, like the twin evil of discord between parochial states, had been a malady by which Civilization had been afflicted since the first emergence of this species of society. Hitherto, Civilization's marvellous material and spiritual fruits had been branded with the mark of Cain; for hitherto they had been the monopoly of a privileged minority whose exclusive enjoyment of them was a practical repudiation of the human social creature's inalienable obligation to be his brother's keeper. The obligation was inalienable because sub-Man had succeeded in becoming human only in virtue of having become a social animal first,¹ and this sociality was so essential an element in Human Life that the energy and genius of even the most active and most gifted individual human being would always have remained barren if it had not been brought to harvest by the co-operative labours of the strong man's weaker brethren.

A privileged minority's refusal to recognise this elemental truth and act upon it had been one cause of the breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations in the course of the first five or six thousand years in the history of societies of this species; but, in a world that had been unified by the technological prowess of a civilization of the third generation, 'the cornucopia of the engineer', 'shaken over all the Earth' and 'scattering everywhere an endowment of previously unpossessed and unimagined capacities and powers',² had estopped the privileged minority's traditional plea that the fruits of Civilization, if they were to be enjoyed at all, must be the monopoly of a small fraction of Mankind because the productive powers of Civilization were unequal to the task of producing enough of these luxuries for distribution to all. By the middle of the twentieth century of the Christian Era an Industrial Revolution that, by this date, had been gathering momentum for more than 150 years had brought within sight a prospect of distributing the fruits of Civilization far more widely, at any rate, than had ever been imagined in the most utopian dreams in the past—however severely it might tax Nature's resources and Man's resourcefulness if Mankind were to set itself the task of raising the Asiatic coolie's material standard of living to the level already attained by a West European working class, not to speak of a North American bourgeoisie. Short of attempting forthwith to fulfil such counsels of perfection, there was manifestly a huge interim payment on account of social justice which a privileged minority already had it in its power to make, if it also had the will; and this was the *gravamen* of a Marxian indictment of 'Capitalism' which had been taken as the text for a Russian denunciation of a secularized Modern Western way of life.

In thus denouncing the children of a Modern Western 'ascendancy' for their failure to pay a moral debt up to the progressively expanding limits of their capacity to discharge it, Communism was proclaiming in a challengingly loud un-Christian voice a commandment of Christ's which, on the Christian Church's lips, had sunk to a discreetly inaudible whisper repeated by churchmen under their breath; and, if Marxism was nevertheless a heresy from a truly Christian point of view, this was because, like most other heresies in their day, it had taken up arms on behalf of one grievously neglected Christian truth to the still

¹ See I. i. 173.

² Sir Alfred Ewing, quoted in III. iii. 211.

more grievous neglect of this one Christian truth's Christian setting. Through the militancy and the animus of its ideological offensive, Communism had deprived itself of any prospect of reconverting a privileged minority in the Western World to the social gospel of Christianity in an anti-Christian dress; but, in the act of thus spiking its own guns, it had reopened for Christianity a prospect of reconverting ex-Christian Western souls to the Christian gospel in its integrity, including its social implications. In 'the cold war' which seemed likely to settle the World's fate in the current chapter of the World's history, the decisive weight in the scales would be the sufferings of the vast 'under-privileged'¹ majority of the living generation of Mankind, and this multitude of suffering human beings might be expected to throw in its lot with whichever of the two Powers that were now competing for its allegiance gave practical proof that it was carrying out the social gospel of Christianity *de facto*.

In these circumstances, self-interest would counsel a privileged minority among a dominant Western fraction of Mankind to discard the drill-sergeant's rod and take up Orpheus' lyre.² This change of external insignia, however, would be morally sterile so long as the motive for it was one of policy alone; for the Thracian wizard's instrument cannot exert its magic charm unless its music is a genuine expression of the feelings in the player's heart. To achieve its purpose, a calculated policy of philanthropy would have to be caught up and carried away by a spontaneous outburst of love; and, if the grace of God were to bring about this miracle in ex-Christian Western hearts genuinely smitten with contrition, and not merely with a self-interested alarm, by the hammer strokes of a Communist challenge, then an encounter between the Modern Western World and Russia, which had already changed the course of Russian history by prolonging the life-span of a time-expired Russian universal state, might also change the course of Modern Western history by rejuvenating a body social in which the familiar symptoms of disintegration had already made their appearance. If this encounter were to have this outcome, this might prove to be the opening of a wholly new chapter in the history of Mankind.

¹ This term 'under-privileged' was current in an American middle-class vocabulary at this time as a euphemistic substitute for the stark word 'unprivileged'. In American mouths 'under-privileged' was a less unpalatable term, because it suggested that the difference of level was not very great; that its elimination was already on the agenda; and that 'privilege' itself was, not an abuse which ought to be abolished, but an objective which could and should be attained by Everyman. 'Under-privileged' was, however, a flagrantly illogical term, considering that the conferment of a favoured minority's privileges on members of a depressed class must still leave a residual depressed majority on an implicitly unacceptable lower level or, alternatively, must abolish 'privilege' itself if the whole, or even only a majority, of this hitherto depressed majority were to be brought up to a hitherto privileged minority's standard. A 'privilege' that is shared by everybody, or even only by a majority, is a *contradictio in adjecto*, and a psychologist would perhaps have deduced from this revealingly illogical American euphemism the existence of an unresolved conflict in the souls of middle-class Americans between a natural human desire to retain the relatively high standard of living which they were now enjoying as members of an invidiously privileged minority and a conscience which must reproach itself so long as this stigma of privilege was associated with a standard which, in bourgeois American eyes, was justifiable for middle-class Americans in virtue of its being a natural and normal human right that, by implication, must be Everyman's due.

² See IV. iv. 123-4 and 131.

2. *The Modern West and the Main Body of Orthodox Christendom**The difference between the Ottoman Orthodox Christian and the Muscovite Reaction to the West*

The reception of the Modern Western culture in the main body of Orthodox Christendom was coeval with its reception in Russia. In both these Orthodox Christian bodies social, this Westernizing movement set in towards the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era. In both cases the movement was a sharp and sudden revulsion from a long-sustained and apparently hard-set attitude of hostility towards a Western World and Western way of life which Orthodox Christians had learnt to detest through a previous experience of the West in an encounter with it in the medieval chapter of its history; and, in both cases again, one cause of this seventeenth-century psychological revolution in Orthodox Christian souls was a no less sharp and sudden antecedent psychological change in the West itself—the inversion of an intolerant religious fanaticism into a cynical irreligious tolerance which reflected a profound disillusionment in Western souls with the inconclusive political and devastating moral consequences of the Early Modern Western domestic Wars of Religion. On the political plane, however, these two contemporary and psychologically similar Orthodox Christian Westernizing movements followed very different courses.

This difference was due to a diversity in the political situation in which the two sister societies found themselves at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the modern impact of the West on both of them began. At that time, either society was in its universal state; but, whereas the Russian Orthodox Christian universal state was an indigenous one that had been brought into being by the Muscovite Grand Duke Ivan III's annexation of Novgorod to Muscovy in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century, the main body of Orthodox Christendom had had its universal state imposed on it by alien Ottoman hands about a hundred years earlier;¹ and this difference in the origin and character of the two universal states led the two societies to give different political answers to the same 'Western Question'. The seventeenth-century Russian Westernizing movement was evoked, as we have seen,² primarily by a fear that an indigenous Russian universal state might be overthrown by Western Powers who had demonstrated their military superiority in the Wars of A.D. 1558–1617; the seventeenth-century Serb and Greek Westernizing movements were evoked not by a fear but by a hope that an alien Ottoman Empire might be overthrown by Western Powers who were demonstrating their military superiority over the 'Osmanlis in the War of A.D. 1682–99. In Russia a Westernizing movement designed to salvage the independence of an existing Russian state was launched from above downwards by a cultural revolutionary who was at the same time the Tsar and who used his sovereign power to impose Westernization on his subjects willy nilly; in the Ottoman Empire, Westernizing move-

¹ The Ottoman dominion over the main body of Orthodox Christendom was effectively established in A.D. 1371–2, when the 'Osmanlis conquered Macedonia (see III. iii. 26).

² On pp. 132–4, above.

ments that ultimately aspired to recapture political independence for Serbs, Greeks, and other subject Orthodox Christian peoples by undermining and subverting an existing Ottoman Power were launched from below upwards, not by princes performing acts of state, but through the private enterprise of non-sovereign individuals and communities.

The Ottoman Greek Orthodox Christian Phobia of the West

It may be convenient first to examine the seventeenth-century cultural reorientation of Serb and Greek souls from an Ottoman towards a Western *qiblah*; then to trace the course of the consequent Westernizing movement on the cultural, social, and political planes; and finally to consider the eventual effect of Westernization on the relations between these non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples and a Modern Western World whose impact had turned their lives also upside down.

The seventeenth-century revolution in the attitude of Orthodox Christians towards the West signified an even greater change in Serb and Greek than in Russian hearts if the respective degrees of their previous hostility towards the West can be gauged by the respective lengths to which they had shown themselves willing to go in sacrificing their other interests to an overriding determination not to submit to Western ascendancy in its medieval form of an assertion of Papal supremacy on the ecclesiastical plane. While the Russian 'Zealots' had egged on the Greek 'Zealots' to repudiate the ecclesiastical union of the Eastern Orthodox with the Roman Church that had been achieved on paper at Florence in A.D. 1439, this anti-Western intransigence of theirs had cost them no appreciable sacrifice, since they had not been confronted, as the Greeks had been in this crisis, with the grim prospect of having to pay forthwith for their strict ecclesiastical virtue at the exorbitant political price of forfeiting the last shreds of their independence to a Turkish Muslim conqueror. In the years A.D. 1453-61, which saw Greek rule at Constantinople, in the Morea, and at Trebizond extinguished by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror, the Tatar tide was already ebbing from the steppe-coast of Muscovy, while, on her opposite frontier, the Lithuanian tide was no longer advancing.¹ Thus the Russians, unlike the Greeks and Serbs, had not been compelled to choose between the Pope's tiara and the Prophet's turban;² and, if the Russians nevertheless found it psychologically difficult to reverse their

¹ It had reached its high-water mark in A.D. 1449, and it began to recede in A.D. 1494 (see Spruner, K. von, and Menke, Th.: *Hand-Atlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neuere Zeit*, 3rd ed. (Gotha 1880, Perthes), plates 69 and 70).

² See the passage, in Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lxviii, that has been cited in I. i. 29 and IV. iv. 71. *Κρείττονόν ἐστιν εἶδέναι ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πόλει τὸ φακόλιον βασιλεῖον Τούρκων ἢ κάλυπτραν Λατινικῆν*, is the original Greek of the exclamation ascribed to the Grand Duke Loukas Notarás by the Greek historian Dhoúkas: *Historia Byzantina*, ed. by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1834, Weber), p. 264. The corresponding popular catchword was *κρείττον εὐπεσεῖν εἰς χεῖρας Τούρκων ἢ Φράγκων*, *ibid.*, p. 291. As early as the twelfth century the same preference in face of the same choice had been indicated by the Oecumenical Patriarch Michael Ankhíalos (*fungebatur* A.D. 1169-1177) in a passage quoted by Every, G.: *The Byzantine Patriarchate, 451-1204* (London 1947, S.P.C.K.), pp. 182-3. The vehemence of the Orthodox Christians' anti-Western feeling in the fifteenth century is indicated by the fact that such 'slogans' were current in Constantinople in A.D. 1453 when Mehmed the Conqueror was at the gates.

attitude towards the West two hundred years later, it must have been still more difficult for their contemporary Greek and Serb co-religionists to recede from a stand against the West which they had maintained at the cost of subjection to Ottoman rule.

The traditional phobia of the West in Greek Orthodox Christian souls did, indeed, die hard. It cost the life of the Westernizing Cretan Greek Oecumenical Patriarch Cyril Loukakis (*vivebat* A.D. 1572-1638; *munere patriarchali oecumenico fungebatur* A.D. 1620-38), and, some five generations later, it was still strong enough to frustrate the intellectual labours of the Westernizing Greek humanist Evyénios Voulgharis (*vivebat* A.D. 1716-1806).

*The Defeat of Cyril Loukakis*¹

Loukakis paid with his life for being the Orthodox Christian pioneer in a first attempt to establish communion between the Orthodox Christian and the Protestant churches; and his fatal failure to carry his own church with him in this ecclesiastical manœuvre is the more remarkable, considering that Loukakis' strategic aim was to establish an Orthodox-Protestant common front against a Roman Catholicism which, in Orthodox Christian eyes in Loukakis' day, was still the classic version of a Western schismatic Christianity.

While Loukakis had been mentally prepared for his role as a Westernizer by having received a Western education on Western ground,² his policy of Westernization in the particular form of an entente with Calvinism was the outcome of a mission to Poland-Lithuania on which he was sent in A.D. 1596 by his kinsman and patron Meletios Pighás, the Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria and at that time also Acting Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. The occasion of this mission was the ecclesiastical crisis precipitated by the move, in A.D. 1594, for a union of the Orthodox Church in Poland-Lithuania with the Roman Church³ on the terms agreed at Florence in A.D. 1439. One motive for this move was the political problem that would have been created for the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania by the transfer of these Orthodox Christian subjects of a Western state from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, under which they had remained hitherto, to that of the autocephalous Patriarchate of Moscow,⁴ newly established in A.D. 1589,⁵ which styled itself 'the Patriarchate of all Russia', and whose incumbent was a political subject of the Tsar of Muscovy.⁶

¹ See Meyer, Ph., s.v. 'Lukaris, Kyrillos', in Herzog, J. J., and Hauck, A.: *Realencyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, vol. xi (Leipzig 1902, Hinrichs), pp. 682-90; Rheniérís, M.: *Κύριλλος Λούκαρις, ὁ Οἰκουμένικὸς Πατριάρχης* (Athens 1859, Mavrommátis); Pichler, A.: *Der Patriarch Cyrillus Lukaris und seine Zeit* (Munich 1862, Lentner (Stahl)); Mettetal, A.: *Études Historiques sur le Patriarche Cyrille Lucar* (Strasbourg 1869, Silbermann). Two hundred and sixteen documents concerning Loukakis' life and tenets will be found in Legrand, E.: *Bibliographie Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages Publiés par des Grecs au Dix-septième Siècle* (Paris 1894-1903, Picard (vols. i-iv) and Maisonneuve (vol. v)), vol. iv, pp. 175-521.

² See p. 171, below.

³ See p. 128, above.

⁴ See Pichler, A.: *Der Patriarch Cyrillus Lukaris und seine Zeit* (Munich 1862, Lentner), p. 54.

⁵ See VI. vii. 34-35.

⁶ The distance of Russia from Constantinople had made it possible (see pp. 676-7, below) for Russian princes to accept, without having to fear any awkward political consequences in practice, an ecclesiastical jurisdiction which was felt to be an intolerable political

Loúkaris was posted in A.D. 1596 to the rectorship of the Orthodox monastery at Vilna in order to act as Meletios's unofficial observer,¹ and he was Meletios's official exarch in Poland from July 1599 to March 1601.² He was present³ at the anti-Uniate Orthodox synod at Brest in A.D. 1596,⁴ and at a joint synod of the Orthodox and Protestant churches of Poland-Lithuania which opened at Vilna on the 15th May, 1599.⁵ This attempt at an Orthodox-Protestant union on Polish-Lithuanian soil broke down, in spite of the incentive of a common menace in the shape of the Counter-Reformation, owing to an insistence, on the Orthodox side, that the Protestants should accept the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical supremacy;⁶ yet this diplomatic failure neither checked Loúkaris' ecclesiastical career nor deterred him from his subsequent Calvinizing course.

In A.D. 1602, before he had turned thirty, Loúkaris succeeded Meletios as Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria;⁷ he became Acting Oecumenical Patriarch in A.D. 1612,⁸ and Oecumenical Patriarch in A.D. 1620;⁹ and the hostility that he drew upon himself by his courage in using this eminent position as a vantage point for the pursuit of a revolutionary policy made his career stormy and his end tragic. Between his enthronement in A.D. 1620 and his execution in A.D. 1638 he experienced vicissitudes of

menace (see IV. iv. 377-83) by a Khan of Bulgaria whose dominions lay at Constantinople's doors. The fact that in constitutional theory they were acknowledging the political sovereignty of a foreign potentate in accepting the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of an Oecumenical Patriarch who was that foreign potentate's subject and minister did not deter the Russians from declaring themselves the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical subjects by receiving a Greek candidate of the Patriarch's as Metropolitan of Kiev in A.D. 1039 (see pp. 399-400, below), though at that date the Oecumenical Patriarch's sovereign lord was the Emperor of an East Roman Empire which, to outward appearance, was then still at the zenith of its power (actually it had already brought both itself and the whole Orthodox Christian body social to ruin, through an internecine war with Bulgaria in A.D. 977-1019). *A fortiori*, in subsequent chapters of history, the Russians had not to fear that the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction over their church might be used as an effective political lever either by the impotent Palaiológhe or by the infidel 'Osmanlis.

A new situation, however, was created in the North by the political partition of Russian Orthodox Christendom between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy and by the subsequent secession of the Metropolitanate of Moscow from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in A.D. 1441 (see pp. 398, below) and the establishment of an autocephalous Patriarchate of Moscow in A.D. 1589 with a pretension to exercise jurisdiction over All Russia; and this new situation was analogous to that which had arisen in the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the ninth and tenth centuries as a result of the conversion of Bulgaria to Orthodox Christianity. If the Orthodox Christian Russian populations under Polish and Lithuanian sovereignty were to be transferred from the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the new Patriarch of Moscow's, the King of Poland-Lithuania and his Orthodox Christian subjects of Russian nationality would then find themselves, *vis-à-vis* the Tsar of Muscovy, in the position in which the Khan of Bulgaria had found himself *vis-à-vis* the East Roman Emperor. The Orthodox Christian provinces of a sixteenth-century Poland-Lithuania lay as dangerously near to Moscow as a ninth-century Bulgaria had lain to Constantinople; and a powerful Orthodox Tsar of Muscovy who had the Patriarch of Moscow under his thumb might use the Patriarch of Moscow's pretension to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Russian Orthodox Christians who were Polish and Lithuanian subjects as an effective instrument for political interference in the affairs of a neighbouring state which he had strong motives for undermining and dominating if he could.

¹ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 685; Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 56; Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

² See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³ See Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁵ See Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁷ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 685; Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 67; Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁸ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁹ On the 4th November, 1620, according to Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 687. Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 63, and Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 25, give the year as 1621.

⁴ See p. 128, above.

⁶ See Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

fortune¹ that were as sharp as the tribulations of his predecessor Photius and were due to the same cause as these. The similarity between the careers of these two distinguished incumbents of the Oecumenical Patriarchate is indeed striking.² Both patriarchs ventured to engage in ecclesiastical warfare with the Roman Church;³ each of them was ultimately at the mercy of an autocratic temporal sovereign to whom he was doubly accountable as a subject who was at the same time also a public servant *ex officio muneris patriarchalis*; and each, in his dealings both with his Roman ecclesiastical adversaries and with his Constantinopolitan sovereign lord, was betrayed by an opposition within the ranks of his own Orthodox Christian community which played into his alien enemies' hands.

The revolutionary feature in Loukaris' policy was not, of course, his anti-Roman stand. In this he was faithfully interpreting the contemporary feelings of an overwhelming majority of his co-religionists under Ottoman rule, and even his opponents within his own flock must have secretly admired his boldness in defying Rome and have felt ashamed, in their heart of hearts, of the timidity or self-interest that deterred them from showing the same spirit. Nor had the Ottoman Government any quarrel with Loukaris on this account, for in Ottoman minds in this age the Roman Church was identified with the Hapsburg Power, which was the Ottoman Power's Western arch-enemy both on the Danubian and on the Mediterranean front.⁴ The revolutionary policy that was Loukaris' unpardonable offence in the eyes of his Orthodox critics was his desire for an entente with the Western Protestant secessionists from the ranks of his and their Western Roman Catholic adversaries.⁵ In these 'Zealot'

¹ Loukaris was banished in February 1623 (Pichler, op. cit., p. 123) and reinstated in 1624 (p. 124); banished in October 1633 and quickly reinstated (p. 162); banished in March 1634 and reinstated in June 1634 (p. 162); banished in March 1635 and reinstated in July 1636 (pp. 162-3).

² Photius's career has been touched upon in IV. iv. 606-7.

³ In this connexion it should be mentioned that Pichler, one of the authorities cited in this chapter, was a Roman Catholic.

⁴ This traditional Ottoman hostility to Catholicism was a serious impediment to the Constantinopolitan Jesuits who ultimately got rid of Loukaris by persuading the Sultan to have him executed. The first Jesuit mission in Constantinople established itself in A.D. 1583-6 (Pichler, op. cit., p. 116). In A.D. 1609 a second Jesuit mission was introduced under the auspices of the French (Pichler, op. cit., p. 117), who were *personae gratae* to the 'Osmanlis as being Roman Catholics who were nevertheless enemies of the Hapsburgs. In A.D. 1628 the Jesuits were actually expelled by the Porte, at the instance of the English and Venetian Ambassadors (Pichler, op. cit., p. 134; Rhenieris, op. cit., p. 49), in the storm raised by the Ottoman authorities' seizure, at the Jesuits' instigation, of a Greek printing press that had been brought to Constantinople from England in June 1627 by Nikódimos Metaxás (see p. 164, n. 1, below). Nevertheless, the Jesuits contrived, not only to find their way back to Constantinople, but to have a hand in the taking of Loukaris' life (see von Hammer, J.: *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, French translation, vol. ix (Paris 1837, Bellizard, Barthès, Dufour, et Lowell), p. 306).

A pro-Loukaran pamphlet, published in A.D. 1633 as an appendix to a polemical work against the Society of Jesus, and dealing with the Jesuits' intrigues against Loukaris at Constantinople in A.D. 1627 and 1628, is cited in Legrand, E.: *Bibliographie Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages publiés par des Grecs au Dix-Septième Siècle*, vol. iii (Paris 1895, Picard), No. 706, pp. 87-88.

⁵ Both the place and the time of Loukaris' first attraction towards Western Protestant ideas are obscure. He was, of course, in political relations with Polish Protestants during his sojourn in Poland-Lithuania during the years A.D. 1596-1601 (see p. 152, above), but, as we have seen, in this episode of history a common opposition to Roman Catholicism did not avail to bring the Orthodox and Protestant Christian communities in Poland into communion with one another. Loukaris is alleged by some authorities to

Orthodox eyes the Protestants' merit of being anti-Roman was quite eclipsed by their crime of being still Western and therefore still, from an Orthodox standpoint, schismatic; and, in the intricate encounter between Loukakis, the Constantinopolitan Jesuits, the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Government, the Orthodox opposition and the Pādishāh were as blind as the Jesuits were clear-sighted.

The unscrupulousness of the representations through which the Jesuits cajoled the Sultan into putting Loukakis to death was all of a piece with their discernment in divining that, in seeking to redress the balance between Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Roman Catholicism by attracting Protestantism into the Orthodox scale, Loukakis had conjured up a threat to the Tridentine Roman Church which might become deadly if its author were to be allowed an opportunity of putting this revolutionary Orthodox strategy into effect.¹ On the other hand, Sultan Murād IV, in allowing himself to be persuaded to order the execution of Loukakis in June 1638,² was less well advised than his imperial predecessor the East Roman Emperor Basil I had been when he had disposed of Photius by reinstating him, in A.D. 877, on his

have visited Wittenberg and Geneva (Pichler, op. cit., p. 62) and even France and England (Mettetal, op. cit., p. 23); and Pichler accepts the visits to Wittenberg and Geneva as authentic, and conjectures that Loukakis paid these two visits after his mission in Poland, though he finds no evidence that Loukakis ever travelled farther west than Geneva (op. cit., p. 65). Meyer, on the other hand, believes (op. cit., p. 685) that the alleged visits to Wittenberg and Geneva are also apocryphal, and that Loukakis never visited any of the Protestant centres in Western Christendom at any date—either after his mission in Poland-Lithuania or during his previous sojourn in Venice and Padua. He points out that there is no mention of any such visits in the original historical sources, and that the legend of a visit to Geneva, in particular, is refuted by the absence of any reference to it in a letter, recommending Leger to Loukakis, that was written to Loukakis by the Genevan theologians in A.D. 1628.

The earliest indubitably authentic record of Loukakis' inclination towards Protestantism is in a letter written by Loukakis himself, on the 6th September, 1618, to M. A. de Dominis, in which he writes of his having made a three years' study—presumably at Constantinople—of Protestant theological works (the relevant passage from this letter is quoted by Meyer, op. cit., p. 685, from Legrand, E.: *Bibliographie Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages Publiés par de Grecs au XVII^e Siècle*, vol. iv (Paris 1896, Picard), pp. 333-40). Loukakis does not say which three years these were; but Meyer points out that on the 4th June, 1613, he was finding it necessary to defend himself publicly against a charge of Lutheranism.

¹ As Acting Oecumenical Patriarch, Loukakis paid two visits, one in A.D. 1613 and the second in A.D. 1616 (Pichler, op. cit., pp. 75 and 87) to Wallachia, an autonomous Orthodox Christian principality under Ottoman suzerainty whose population was under the Oecumenical Patriarchate's ecclesiastical jurisdiction. On his second visit he exhorted the people of the city and see of Tergovishte, and the prince of Wallachia, Radul, to resist Roman Catholic propaganda (Pichler, op. cit., pp. 88 and 90). After his installation on the Oecumenical Throne in A.D. 1620, Loukakis issued an encyclical forbidding his ecclesiastical subjects to have intercourse with Roman Catholics (Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 31). The Jesuits' retort to this was to put up a rival candidate for the Patriarchal Throne, and to bring about the first of Loukakis' successive banishments by persuading the Ottoman Government to relegate him to Rhodes on the insinuation that he had been intriguing with the Tuscan Government. Thereupon the Jesuits duly secured their own candidate's installation, but Loukakis then obtained his first reinstatement through the exertions of the English Ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe—after the anti-patriarch had been compelled to retire to Mount Athos, in spite of the French Ambassador's efforts to keep him in office (Rheniérís, op. cit., pp. 31-36). In A.D. 1625 Loukakis was approached by the Vatican with an offer of its protection if he would publicly accept the decisions of the Council of Florence and denounce Protestantism (Pichler, op. cit., p. 125; Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 38). Loukakis left this overture unanswered (Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 40).

² See Pichler, op. cit., p. 177; Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 65.

patriarchal throne on the understanding that the policy which the re-installed patriarch would carry out thereafter would be his master's and not his own. The Sultan had not the Orthodox Opposition's excuse for letting himself be led into playing the Jesuits' game, for there were no traditional religious animosities or scruples to deter a Sunni Muslim potentate from combating a Roman Catholic form of infidelity by unleashing against it a Calvinist form of infidelity whose doctrine and ethos had a marked affinity with those of Islam itself; and indeed in Hungary, for a hundred years and more, it had been an axiom of Ottoman policy to champion a liberated Protestant minority against their former Hapsburg Catholic oppressors.

Loukari's enemies contrived nevertheless to infuriate the Sultan with the Patriarch by suggesting to Murād that Loukari was politically responsible for the piratical enterprises of his ecclesiastical subjects, the Don Cossacks, against the Ottoman Empire.¹ In A.D. 1615 the Don Cossacks had made their first naval raid into the Bosphorus;² and in A.D. 1638, on the eve of Sultan Murād IV's departure from Constantinople on an Heraclian campaign to recover Asiatic Ottoman provinces that had been overrun by the Persians, the news arrived that the Don Cossacks had seized the strategically important Ottoman fortress of Azov by a *coup de main*.³ Murād was struggling to retrieve the Ottoman Empire from the anarchy into which it had lapsed since the death of Suleymān the Magnificent,⁴ and he was a man of demonic temperament. In his exasperation at this unexpected and untimely military diversion at a moment when it was imperative for him to concentrate all his strength against the Safawī Power, he yielded impulsively to an insidious suggestion that the Oecumenical Patriarch should be made the scapegoat for a Cossack escapade which was not only out of the Patriarch's control *de facto* but was also beyond the limits of his responsibility *de jure*.⁵

The action on Loukari's part that evoked the opposition to him among his own Orthodox co-religionists was his *rapprochement* with the Protestants with a view to a Protestant-Orthodox ecclesiastical union. Loukari proposed to base this union on the two parties' common

¹ For the Cossacks, see II. ii. 155-7. For the seventeenth-century eruption of the Don Cossacks into the Black Sea, see III. iii. 418 and 428.

² See Allen, W. E. D.: *The Ukraine, A History* (Cambridge 1940, University Press), p. 93.

³ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁴ See V. vi. 207-8.

⁵ Sultan Murād would have become aware of Loukari's innocence if he had paused to take account of the difference between his respective jurisdictions and responsibilities as Oecumenical Patriarch and as millet-bāshī of the Ottoman Millet-i-Rūm. As the *ex officio* political head of all Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule, including those who were not within the Oecumenical Patriarchate's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the Oecumenical Patriarch was in truth responsible to the Sultan for their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand the Oecumenical Patriarch could not reasonably be held accountable politically for the acts of Orthodox Christians who, like the Don Cossacks, were not Ottoman subjects, even though they might be under the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Since the establishment of an autocephalous Patriarchate of Moscow in A.D. 1589 and the union of a majority of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania with the Roman Church in A.D. 1594-6, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction which the Oecumenical Patriarch had previously exercised over the whole of Russian Orthodox Christendom had contracted almost to vanishing point. It was unlucky for Loukari that the remnant of his Russian flock happened to include Don Cossacks who made themselves obnoxious to Sultan Murād at a critical moment in Murād's as well as in Loukari's career.

acceptance of the Scriptures and the Fathers and to safeguard this existing basis by a mutual undertaking to make no innovations;¹ and in A.D. 1627 proposals to this effect—with the additional stipulation that either party should retain its own existing rites,² provided that these were not contrary to religion—are said to have been laid before the Calvinist doctors at Geneva by Mitrophánis Kritópoulos,³ a disciple of Loukárís' who had been sent by Loukárís to England on an invitation from Abbott, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and had spent seven years (A.D. 1617–24) in the Protestant universities of Oxford and Helmstädt.⁴ In A.D. 1629 a *Confessio* was published in Loukárís' name in Western Christendom;⁵ and, after this had been denounced by Catholics as a forgery,⁶ Loukárís is said to have made a public declaration that he was the author of it.⁷ The cardinal points in Loukárís' *Confessio* were the Calvinist doctrines of justification by faith and the non-infallibility of the Church, with a consequent rejection of the Church's pretension to have the last word in the interpretation of the Scriptures.⁸

Meanwhile, the tide had already turned against Loukárís' policy of an Orthodox-Calvinist common front. The Genevan doctors—if the story that Mitrophánis Kritópoulos made proposals to them is true—had proved unwilling to commit themselves without having first obtained

¹ See Mettetal, op. cit., p. 45.

² This mutual toleration of diverse rites was presumably inspired by the statesmanlike provisions, on this point, of the Orthodox-Roman Catholic Union of Florence in A.D. 1439.

³ See Mettetal, op. cit., pp. 76–77. The Roman Catholic authority, Pichler, op. cit., pp. 97–98, admits that Mitrophánis Kritópoulos visited Geneva in October 1627, but discounts, as apocryphal, the story that on this occasion he brought with him formal proposals for union. Kritópoulos certainly took sides against Loukárís at a later stage. He signed the acts of the Synod of Constantinople that condemned Loukárís in A.D. 1638 (Meyer, op. cit., p. 689).

⁴ See Pichler, op. cit., pp. 92–94; Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 24.

⁵ Particulars of two Latin editions, four French editions, and one English and Latin edition of Loukárís' *Confessio*, all published in Western Christendom in A.D. 1629, will be found in Legrand, E.: *Bibliothèque Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages Publiés par des Grecs au Dix-Septième Siècle*, vol. i (Paris 1894, Picard), pp. 267–72. According to Meyer, op. cit., p. 688, a German edition was also published in the same year.

⁶ It is certain, nevertheless, that the *Confessio* is an authentic work of the Oecumenical Patriarch in whose name it was published. On p. 8 of one of the two Latin editions of A.D. 1629 (Legrand's No. 189) there appears, over the signature 'Cornelius Haga, Confoederatorum Belgic. Provinciarum pro tempore apud Portam Ottomanici Imperatoris Orator', the declaration: 'Descripta fuit haec copia ex autographo, quod propria Reverendissimi Domini Patriarchae Cyrilli manu, quam optime cognosco, scriptum penes me manet, et, per me facta collatione, eum cum hoc ipso de verbo ad verbum convenire, attestor.' The Dutch Ambassador to the Porte might perhaps have written this in error or in bad faith. There is, however, a Greek edition of the *Confessio*, published at Geneva in A.D. 1633 by Jean de Tournes (No. 224 in Legrand, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 315–21), which was printed from a manuscript original in Loukárís' hand and bearing his signature. This original manuscript was afterwards preserved in the public library at Geneva, and a facsimile of the first sheet of it will be found in Legrand, op. cit., vol. cit., facing p. 318. In Legrand's judgement (ibid., p. 318) the handwriting is identical with that of other manuscripts known to be from Loukárís' hand. There was an autograph signed copy of the Greek text at Geneva in the same bundle as the original, and another autograph signed copy at Leyden, in A.D. 1894, when this volume of Legrand's was published.

⁷ See the Latin preface to the Geneva edition of the Greek text, quoted in Legrand, op. cit., vol. i, p. 316; Pichler, op. cit., pp. 150 and 153.

⁸ See Pichler, op. cit., pp. 183–9; Mettetal, op. cit., p. 87. In general the *Confessio* was an exposition of Calvinism in traditional Orthodox Christian theological terms (Meyer, op. cit., p. 688).

the agreement of their co-religionists in Switzerland, Germany, Holland, and England,¹ while on the Orthodox side Yerasimos—Loukari's successor on the patriarchal throne of Alexandria, which, of all Orthodox sees on Ottoman soil, was second only to the Oecumenical Patriarchate itself in dignity and influence—had immediately come out in public as the leader of a militant opposition.² Yerasimos was given his opportunity by an overture from the Dutch Ambassador at Constantinople, who in A.D. 1628 had brought from Geneva a Piedmontese Calvinist theologian, Anton Leger, to propagate Calvinism among the Ottoman Orthodox from a post of vantage as the Ambassador's chaplain.³ This overture from the Calvinist side was rebuffed by Yerasimos in a public pronouncement on the 8th July, 1629.⁴ The Patriarch of Alexandria rejected the plea for an Orthodox-Protestant common front against Roman Catholicism and denounced the translation of the Bible into the vernacular⁵ on the ground that God's revelation was intentionally obscure and that it was more important to ensure that the faithful should remain Orthodox than that the Scriptures should be made intelligible.⁶ 'The seamless robe of Christ . . . would be torn into a thousand pieces by the Occidentals.'⁷ A castigation of 'the *Confessio* circulated in Cyril the Patriarch of Constantinople's name', by John Matthew Karyophyllis, the Orthodox Archbishop of Qōniyeh, was published at Rome in Latin in A.D. 1631 and in Greek, in two versions, in A.D. 1632, and this polemic was dedicated by its Orthodox author to Pope Urban VIII.⁸

This counter-attack on Loukari within his own camp when he was alive and in occupation of the Oecumenical Throne was vigorously followed up after his final disgrace and death. On the 27th September, 1639, the dead Oecumenical Patriarch was anathematized⁹ by a synod which had been convened at Constantinople by Cyril Kōndaris, the Orthodox Bishop of Bercea,¹⁰ and which was attended by three Patriarchs, including Loukari's disciple Mitrophānis Kritópoulos—now Patriarch of Alexandria.¹¹ This act was confirmed by a Graeco-Russian synod convened at Jassy, under the presidency of the Oecumenical Patriarch

¹ See Mettetal, op. cit., p. 77.

² For this opposition, see Meyer, op. cit., p. 688.

³ See Meyer, op. cit., p. 688; Pichler, op. cit., p. 143; Rheniérís, op. cit., pp. 51–52. Leger stayed at Constantinople till A.D. 1636.

⁴ See Meyer, op. cit., p. 689; Pichler, op. cit., p. 144; Mettetal, op. cit., p. 78.

⁵ The Elzevir edition of the Greek text of the Gospels was translated from the Attic *κοινή* into the Modern Greek *δημοτική* on Loukari's orders at Leger's instance (Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 53), though it did not reach Constantinople from Geneva, where it had been published in A.D. 1638, till after Loukari's death (Meyer, op. cit., p. 688). This was perhaps the first shot fired in a Modern Greek cultural civil war on the issue raised by Linguistic Archaism (see V. vi. 68–71).

⁶ See Pichler, op. cit., pp. 145–6. It is significant that similar sentiments had once been expressed by Loukari. In a letter of the 30th May, 1612, to a Dutch correspondent, J. Uytenbogaert (Wetenbogaert), he had declared that the ruin of Greek education by the Turks had brought with it one benefit, at any rate: it had safeguarded the Greeks against heresy (Pichler, op. cit., p. 72).

⁷ Quoted in Mettetal, op. cit., p. 79.

⁸ See Legrand, op. cit., vol. i, No. 209 (pp. 288–9) and Nos. 216–17 (pp. 304–6).

⁹ See Pichler, op. cit., pp. 217 and 226; Mettetal, op. cit., p. 102. Meyer, op. cit., p. 689, gives the date of the Synod's findings as A.D. 1638.

¹⁰ See Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 59; Pichler, op. cit., p. 215. Kōndaris was an alumnus of the Jesuit College founded at Galata in A.D. 1601 (Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 19).

¹¹ See Pichler, op. cit., p. 216; Meyer, op. cit., p. 689.

Parthenios's legates, in A.D. 1642,¹ and thereafter by a synod convened at Jerusalem in A.D. 1672² which was bitterly anti-Calvinist in its pronouncements³ but was not widely representative of Orthodoxy in its membership, since, apart from two Russian monks, it was not attended by any fathers not belonging to the hierarchy of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem itself.⁴ The final blow was struck at a synod held in Constantinople in A.D. 1691.⁵

If Loukari had succeeded in persuading his Orthodox flock and his Calvinist friends to enter into an ecclesiastical union with one another under the presidency of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, he would have anticipated, by nearly three hundred years, Stalin's feat of appropriating a Western heresy to serve as a new weapon against the prevailing Western orthodoxy of the day. And who can say what the consequences might have been if, instead of putting Loukari to death, Sultan Murād had had the wit to follow up a traditionally philo-Protestant Ottoman policy by taking a philo-Protestant Oecumenical Patriarch under his imperial patronage? In its predestinarianism and in its rejection of 'priestcraft' and 'image-worship'—two traditional Christian institutions that were Orthodox as well as Catholic—Calvinism had a decidedly greater affinity with Islam than with Orthodox Christianity;⁶ and, if the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire had gone Calvinist in doctrine and ethos as a sequel to a *mariage de convenance* with the Calvinist churches of Western Europe, the intellectual and moral gulf between the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim subjects of the Pādishāh would have been appreciably diminished—instead of being accentuated, as it actually was, when, in the next chapter of the story, the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire succumbed to the attraction of the Modern Western culture in its latter-day secular form. If Cyril Loukari had had

¹ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 689; Rhenieris, *op. cit.*, p. 73. The Greek text of the decree of this synod, condemning the *Confessio*, was published at Jassy on the 20th December, 1642 (Old Style) (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, No. 708, p. 89), and was republished, together with a Latin translation, in A.D. 1643, by Sebastien Cramoisy, Printer to the King of France (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. i, No. 337, pp. 450-1). The *Confessio* itself, together with the texts of both the Bishop of Bercea's and the Oecumenical Patriarch's synodal strictures, all in both Greek and Latin, was published in A.D. 1645 (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, No. 372, p. 14).

The Synod of Jassy is erroneously dated, not A.D. 1642, but A.D. 1644, by N. Jorga: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. iv (Gotha 1911, Perthes), p. 30. Mettetal, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-4, records a synod held at Constantinople in A.D. 1643 at the instance of Basil Prince of Moldavia and attended by the Metropolitan of Kiev. As this Synod of Constantinople is not mentioned by any of the other authorities, it is possible that it is an erroneous description of the synod actually held in A.D. 1642 at Jassy—unless the participants in the proceedings at Jassy subsequently adjourned to Constantinople.

² For this synod of Jerusalem see Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-5; Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 106; Rhenieris, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Anti-Western though it was, it was nevertheless a by-product of a Western religious controversy. In a dispute about Loukari between the French Huguenots and Port Royal, the Huguenots had boasted that the Orthodox Church was Calvinist, and the French Ambassador at Constantinople, de Nointel, had asked the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Dositheos, for an explanation. The synod of Jerusalem implied, in its findings, that Loukari was not the author of the *Confessio* attributed to him (Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 230). A pair of polemics against Calvinism by Meletios Syrigos, one of the two patriarchal legates at Jassy in A.D. 1642, and by Dositheos, were published at Bucarest in A.D. 1690 (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, No. 632, pp. 458-473).

³ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

⁴ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

⁵ See Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 689.

⁶ On this point see Arnold, T. W.: *The Preaching of Islam*, 2nd ed. (London 1913, Constable), p. 163.

his way, it is conceivable that the trial of strength between the Ottoman Power and the Danubian Hapsburg Power in A.D. 1682-3 might have ended in the discomfiture of Roman Catholicism by the united forces of an Islam and an Orthodoxy that had made contact with one another across a Calvinist bridge.

This possible outcome of Loukakis' policy was ruled out by the combined effects of Jesuit ability, Ottoman blindness, and Orthodox fanaticism. By what lengths Loukakis actually fell short of winning over a majority of his Orthodox co-religionists to his Calvinizing policy it is difficult to judge,¹ but it is significant that the 'Zealot' spirit which defeated a Loukakis in the early decades of the seventeenth century was still strong enough in the middle decades of the eighteenth century to baffle a Voulgcharis.

The Frustration of Evyénios Voulgcharis

Evyénios Voulgcharis² (*vivebat* A.D. 1716-1806) was a Greek philosopher-educationalist whose impeccable Orthodoxy³ did not atone, in contemporary ecclesiastical Greek Orthodox eyes, for his offences of advocating religious toleration and educational reform and cultivating contemporary Western philosophy. On these accounts, Voulgcharis was driven from pillar to post. The hostility of the conservative headmaster of a rival school at Yánnina forced him to relinquish his own school there and retreat to Kózhani. An opportunity that had been opened to him by the foundation of a new academy on Mount Athos was closed, after he had taught there for six years, by the dissolution of the academy at the instance of the ex-Oecumenical Patriarch Cyril, who, unfortunately for Voulgcharis, was then living in retirement on the Holy Mountain; and, after he had had the further disappointment of being forced out of a post to which he had been appointed at the Patriarchal Academy in Constantinople, Voulgcharis accepted, in A.D. 1775, an invitation from a Petrine

¹ Evidence suggesting that Loukakis' following among his own flock was not inconsiderable is presented by Sir Thomas Arnold in *op. cit.*, pp. 163-4. He points out that Loukakis' *Confessio* was adopted by a synod of his Orthodox supporters (*cp. Pichler, op. cit.*, pp. 181 and 228); argues that the very vigour of the opposition, and vehemence of their denunciations, testify to a fear on their part that Loukakis' party might win the day; and discounts, as tendentious, the picture of Loukakis, drawn by his Orthodox opponents, as an isolated figure playing a lone hand (for this picture, see Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 211 and 227, and Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 101). On the other hand, Mettetal (*op. cit.*, p. 91) estimates that the *Confessio* was received by the Greeks with apathy, and Loukakis himself once wrote, in a letter to David le Leu de Wilhelm, a Dutch statesman with whom he was in correspondence in the years A.D. 1618-20: 'Io se puotesse riformare la mia chiesa, lo farei molto volentieri, ma Iddio sa che tractatur de impossibili' (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 326, Doc. 109).

² For Voulgcharis' career, see Thereianós, D.: *Adhamándios Korais* (Trieste 1889-1890, Austrian Lloyd Press, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 64, and Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864* (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.), vol. v, pp. 284-5.

³ Voulgcharis gave evidence of his Orthodox piety in publishing for one of the Phanariot Princes of the House of Ghika, Gregory II (*in Moldaviá fungebatur* A.D. 1764-6 *et* A.D. 1774-7; *in Wallachiá* A.D. 1768-74), an edition of the *Eúpebérra* of Vryénios—a Byzantine work vindicating the authenticity of miracles—and in eschewing, out of a religious scruple, the new-fangled use of the word 'Έλλην' in the sense of an adherent of the living Orthodox Christian Modern Greek nationality in lieu of its traditional usage in the sense of an adherent of the dead pagan Hellenic Civilization (Thereianós, D.: *Adhamándios Korais* (Trieste 1889-90, Austrian Lloyd Press, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 73-75 and 66).

Russian Imperial Government which appreciated his qualifications and turned them to good account by making him bishop of the new See of Slavonia and Kherson in territory recently acquired by Russia from the Ottoman Empire in the northern hinterland of the Black Sea.

Voûlgharis' Zealot Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical persecutors were not even content with having thus hounded him out of the domain of Greek Orthodox Christendom. In A.D. 1798 the Greek press at Constantinople published a counterblast, by the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Anthimos, to a tract written by Voûlgharis in favour of religious toleration, and this eighteenth-century fulmination still breathed the authentic spirit of fifteenth-century Orthodox fanaticism. The Patriarch told his readers that

'when the last emperors of Constantinople began to subject the Oriental Church to Papal thralldom, the particular favour of Heaven raised up the Othoman Empire to protect the Greeks against heresy, to be a barrier against the political power of the Western nations, and to be the champion of the Orthodox Church.'¹

The Revolution in the Ottoman Orthodox Christians' Attitude towards the West

This classic exposition of a traditional 'Zealot' thesis was, however, no more than a parting shot in a losing cultural battle which had taken its decisive turn more than a hundred years before the close of the eighteenth century.² In the cultural tug-of-war, for the captivation of Greek, Serb, and Rumanian Orthodox Christian souls, between the Ottoman masters of these *ra'îyeh* and their Western neighbours, the West had won before the seventeenth century was over. The date of this transfer of the Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh*'s cultural allegiance can be established, within rather narrow limits, by the at first sight superficial, yet nevertheless psychologically significant, index of changes in fashions of dress, and this sartorial testimony is corroborated by evidence in the religious field. At the same date, conversions of Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* to Islam virtually ceased, and unconverted Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* for the first time showed a preference for Hapsburg over Ottoman rule.

In the seventh decade of the seventeenth century, Ottomanization was still the goal of the *ra'îyeh*'s social ambition, as was observed by the

¹ Finlay, op. cit., vol. cit., loc. cit.

² The waning power of the Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy, which had still just availed to frustrate Voûlgharis, proved impotent against his intellectual successor Koraïs, though the life-times of these two Greek apostles of the Western culture overlapped. Koraïs, too, in his day, had to defend himself against charges of impiety according to a letter published in Koraïs, Adhamándios: *Ἀπάνθισμα Ἐπιστολῶν* (Athens 1839, Rhállis), p. 216; and, from the clerical standpoint, these charges could perhaps be substantiated on the testimony of Koraïs' own written words. 'Rebuild your schools not only before your country houses but before your churches', he wrote to the Chioti on the morrow of the catastrophe of A.D. 1822 (letter of the 12th October, 1822, in *Ἀπάνθισμα*, pp. 45-47). 'Monastic estates (*μετόχια*) are an incentive to idleness and ought to be abolished' (the same letter, in *Ἀπάνθισμα*, p. 49). In a letter of the 4th July, 1823, on the constitution of the new Greek national state, Koraïs prescribes that the ecclesiastical authorities ought to be elected by the laity and to be debarred from participation in politics (*Ἀπάνθισμα*, p. 257)—a French Revolutionary theory that was utterly subversive of the established Ottoman institution of the Millet-i-Rûm. Voûlgharis had been censured and thwarted for offences that bore no comparison with these enormities.

shrewd secretary of the English Embassy at Constantinople, Sir Paul Rycaut:

'It is worth a wise man's observation how gladly the Greeks and Armenian Christians imitate the Turkish habit, and come as near to it as they dare; and how proud they are when they are privileged upon some extraordinary occasion to appear without their Christian distinction.'¹

On the other hand, Demetrius Cantemir, the Ruman grandee who was appointed Prince of Moldavia by the Porte in November 1710² and deserted to Peter the Great when the Tsar invaded Moldavia in 1711,³ is represented in a contemporary portrait wearing a bag wig, coat and waistcoat, and rapier; and, though in this portrait Cantemir's Ottoman antecedents are still betrayed by a turban superimposed on his wig and by a dagger thrust into his girdle to supplement the rapier at his hip,⁴ these relics of Ottomanism no longer figure in the frontispiece to an English translation, published in 1734-5, of Cantemir's history of the Ottoman Empire.⁵ Nor were there any tell-tale Ottoman accessories in the portraits, painted at Pest or Vienna somewhat later in the eighteenth century, to judge by the cut of the coats and the style of the wigs, which, on the 5th-6th September, 1921, the writer of this Study saw still hanging on the panelled walls of houses in the South-West Macedonian Greek townlet of Shátishta to commemorate the overland trade with the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy and Saxony that was opened up in the eighteenth century by more than one enterprising Rumeliot Greek Orthodox Christian community.⁶

These changes in style of dress were, of course, outward visible signs of corresponding changes in cast of mind. Demetrius Cantemir, for example, could read and write Latin, Italian, and French, as well as his Rumanian mother tongue, the Modern and Attic Greek and the Old Slavonic that were his Orthodox Christian cultural heritage, and the Turkish, Persian, and Arabic that were his cultural stock in trade as an Ottoman officer of state; and, after his desertion to the Russian camp, he added the Russian language to his repertory.⁷ His history of the Ottoman Empire, written in Latin and published in French and English simultaneously, was perhaps the first to be presented by an Ottoman subject in the Western manner. The Rumanian Cantemir's older Greek contemporary Alexander Mavrogordáto,⁸ who was appointed in A.D.

¹ Rycaut, Sir P.: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey and Brome), p. 82. The sixteenth-century Greek Orthodox Christian residents in the centres of business in Western Christendom 'wore the dress and assumed the manners of Turks; for they found that in Western Europe they were more respected in the character of Ottoman subjects than as schismatic Greeks' (Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece, B.C. 146-A.D. 1864*, vol. v (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press), pp. 156-7).

² See Jorga, N.: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. iv (Gotha 1911, Perthes), p. 304.

³ See II. ii. 225, n. 1.

⁴ See Jorga, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 363-4.

⁵ Cantemir, Demetrius: *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire*, written originally in Latin, translated into English from the author's own manuscript—'communicated to the translator by his son, Prince Antiochus Cantemir, Minister Plenipotentiary from the Czarina to his present Majesty King George'—by N. Tindal, M.A., Vicar of Great Waltham in Essex (London 1734-5, Knapton, 2 parts).

⁶ For this overland trade, see pp. 180-2, below.

⁷ See Jorga, op. cit., vol. cit., loc. cit.; Tindal's translation of Cantemir, op. cit., part ii, p. 460.

⁸ See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 242; Jorga, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 283.

1673 to be the second incumbent of the recently created office of Dragoman of the Porte¹ and who eventually extricated the Ottoman Empire from the disastrous war of A.D. 1682-99 by negotiating the peace settlement of Carlowitz, likewise knew Latin, Italian, and French as well as Greek, 'Slav',² Turkish, Persian, and Arabic, and likewise won the freedom of a Modern Western republic of letters.³

The Phanariot Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman public service⁴ continued to study the classical languages and literatures of the Islamic culture down to the eve of the Greek national uprising of A.D. 1821, and this not merely on account of their utility, but for the sake of their prestige and their intrinsic attractiveness.

'The Phanariots were attentive to education and applied themselves to literary studies, especially the Turkish language, as being superior to others,'

writes one of the fathers of the Greek Revolution in his memoirs.⁵ But the qualification which gave the seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Phanariots their value in the eyes of their Turkish employers was their familiarity, not with Ottoman, but with Western life and letters in an age in which the Ottoman Government had to find competent representatives to negotiate diplomatically with Western Powers whom it could no longer simply defeat in the field⁶—in striking contrast to the Sultans' attitude in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, when they had conscripted an *élite* of their Orthodox Christian subjects into their Slave-Household in order to fit them, by a totalitarian Ottoman education, to govern the Ottoman Empire as professional administrators and to extend its bounds as professional soldiers.⁷

The generation which saw the Ottoman Government begin to appreciate in their Orthodox Christian subjects a familiarity with the Modern West, which these *ra'īyeh* would not have acquired if they had been transformed into *qallar*, was likewise the generation which saw the virtual end of a process of voluntary conversion of Orthodox Christian *ra'īyeh* to Islam that had been in progress since the fourteenth century and had been one of the secrets of the 'Osmanlis' amazing political success. Even the Orthodox Christian 'tribute children' who were educated to be the rulers of the Ottoman Empire became Muslims—as they invariably did—by choice and not by compulsion;⁸ and in general the Ottoman régime in the Orthodox Christian World was as scrupulous as the Umayyad régime had been in the Syriac World in

¹ This office had been created by the Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü in A.D. 1669.

² This vague term 'Slav' might mean either the ninth-century Macedonian Slav dialect which had become the liturgical language of the Slavonic-speaking and Rumanian-speaking Orthodox Christian peoples under the name of 'Old Slavonic', or it might mean one of the living vernacular Slav languages, e.g. Serbo-Croat.

³ Mavrogordato's contribution to Western literature was a treatise on the seventeenth-century Western scientific discovery of the circulation of the blood (see p. 137, n. 8, below).

⁴ See II. ii. 222-8.

⁵ Khrysanthópoulos, Ph.: *Απομνημονεύματα περί της 'Ελληνικής 'Επανάστασης* (Athens 1899, Sakellarios, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 37.

⁶ On this point, see II. ii. 224.

⁷ The classical Ottoman system of education has been described in III. iii. 22-50.

⁸ See III. iii. 37, n. 1.

abiding by the Prophet Muhammad's injunction that non-Muslim 'People of the Book' were to be allowed to practise their ancestral religions under Muslim rule in consideration of the payment of a surtax.¹ After the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a Western Christian who had spent twenty-two years in captivity in Ottoman hands testified that the 'Osmanlis' 'compelled no one to renounce his faith';² and, in the judgement of a judicious Modern Western student of the history of the Greeks under Ottoman rule,

'we find that many Greeks of high talent and moral character were so sensible of the superiority of the Mohammadans that, even when they escaped being drafted into the Sultan's household as tribute-children, they voluntarily embraced the faith of Mahomet. The moral superiority of Ottoman society must be allowed to have had as much weight in causing these conversions, which were numerous in the fifteenth century, as the personal ambition of individuals.'³

'Towards the middle of the seventeenth century . . . the number of [Greek] renegades from among the middle and lower orders of society is said to have been more considerable than at any other time.'⁴ In Crete, the last Greek Orthodox Christian country to be acquired by the 'Osmanlis, the conquest achieved in the long-drawn-out Veneto-Ottoman War of Candia (*gerebatur* A.D. 1645-69) was followed by conversions⁵ which, in both their spontaneity and their numbers, were as impressive as any recorded in the heyday of the Ottoman Power; and the Greeks were not alone among the Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh* in continuing to be susceptible to the attractions of Islam down to this date. A community of Bulgar Orthodox Christian highlanders in the Rhodope, who came to be known, after their apostasy, as Pomaks, were converted to Islam between A.D. 1656 and A.D. 1661; and among the Albanians the proportion of Muslims in the population seems to have risen from not more than 10 per cent. to more than 50 per cent. between A.D. 1610 and the close of the seventeenth century.⁶

While the descendants of these seventeenth-century Albanian converts betrayed mental reservations by adopting Islam in the crypto-Shi'i form of Bektashism,⁷ the descendants of the contemporary Pomak and

¹ See the evidence presented in V. vi. 203-5. It is also noteworthy that, after the seizure, on the 4th January, 1628, by the Janissaries, at the Jesuits' instigation, of a printing-press which had been brought to Constantinople from England in A.D. 1627 by Nikódimos Metaxás, the Sheykh-el-Islám gave the opinion that Christian subjects of the Porte had a right to publish controversial religious literature. It must be added that this ruling did not secure the restitution of the press, though it did secure the temporary banishment of the Jesuits. (For this incident, see Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-34; Rheniétis, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-8). During the remainder of the seventeenth century the only *ra'iyyeh* permitted to have a printing press at Constantinople were the Jews. As late as A.D. 1698 the Armenians were stopped from using a press which they had imported from Venice. The first press for printing Turkish (of course, in the Arabic Alphabet) was established in Constantinople in A.D. 1727 by the Grand Vizier Ibráhím, who was a Hungarian renegade (Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-8).

² Auctor Anonymus: *Turchicae Spuriitiae Suggillatio et Confutatio* (Paris 1514, Badius), fol. xvii (a) in the edition of 1516, quoted in Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

³ Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 29.

⁴ Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 165, citing Scheffler, J.: *Türcken-Schrift: von der Ursachen der Türkischen Ueberziehung und der Zertretung des Volches Gottes* (1664), §§ 53-6, and Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 118-19.

⁵ For details, see Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 153 and 201-5.

⁶ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-92, especially p. 180.

⁷ See V. v. 295.

Cretan converts displayed the zeal for which their kind are notorious, and survived to give proof of their sincerity in the twentieth century of the Christian Era by choosing to lose their ancestral homes and settle among their Turkish-speaking co-religionists in Anatolia rather than avoid exile by re-embracing the faith of their forefathers whose mother tongue they had never ceased to speak. The seventeenth-century mass conversions of Albanians and Rhodopæan Bulgars, however, unlike those of contemporary Cretans, occurred in new circumstances which portended a change. They appear to have been to a large extent the psychological reaction to a disillusionment experienced by Christian barbarians in fastnesses who had found their 'Osmanli masters still too strong for them when they had prematurely attempted to shake off the Ottoman yoke by force during the temporary lapse of the Ottoman Empire between the death of Suleymān the Magnificent in A.D. 1566 and the advent of the saviour Mehmed Köprülü to power in A.D. 1656.¹ Thereafter, conversions virtually ceased.

'In the eighteenth century, when the condition of the Christians was worse than at any other period, we find hardly any mention of conversions at all, and the Turks themselves are represented as utterly indifferent to the progress of their religion and considerably infected with scepticism and unbelief.'²

The Revolution in the West's Attitude towards Orthodox Christianity

The sufferings of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Porte in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era were due, not to religious persecution—as is witnessed by the fact that in this age the Porte's Muslim subjects suffered equally—but to the misgovernment of the Ottoman Empire during its final lapse towards dissolution after the rally that had been led by the House of Köprülü.³ By contrast, the religious scepticism and unbelief that infected Western Christendom in the same generation was accompanied by an advance in administrative efficiency and a dawn of political enlightenment. The consequent new Western outlook revealed itself in a sudden conversion of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy from a Spanish-minded Roman Catholic intolerance towards its Protestant subjects and its Orthodox Christian neighbours to a standard of religious toleration that could compare not unfavourably with the Islamic standard of a contemporary Ottoman régime; and this moral revolution in Hapsburg counsels evoked a political revolution in Protestant and Orthodox hearts.

'The Calvinists of Hungary and Transylvania and the Unitarians of the latter country' had 'long preferred to submit to the Turks rather than fall into the hands of the fanatical House of Hapsburg, and,' as late as the

¹ The insurgent Rhodopæan Bulgars were subjugated and converted by the Grand Vizier Mehmed Köprülü (*fungebatur* A.D. 1656-61). Apostasies of Roman Catholic (not Orthodox) Albanians on the rebound from two unsuccessful insurrections in the fourth and fifth decades of the seventeenth century are noticed in Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-9. While some of these Catholic apostates opted for Islam, others opted for Orthodoxy. The Orthodox Christian Albanian warriors who seized the fastness of Suli in the last quarter of the seventeenth century succeeded in holding their own till they were overpowered by 'Ali Pasha of Yánnina in A.D. 1803.

² Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

³ See V. vi. 208-9 and 299-300.

seventh decade of the seventeenth century, 'the Protestants of Silesia' looked with longing eyes towards Turkey, and would gladly have purchased religious freedom at the price of submission to the Muslim rule.¹²

The Silesian Protestants' pro-Ottoman proclivities evoked the following lament from a Western observer in a book published in A.D. 1664:

'I hear with great astonishment and consternation that it is not only among the common people that remarks like these go the round: "Life under the Turks is not so bad either; one has only to give a ducat per head, and one would be free"; item, "The Turk leaves religion free; one would recover possession of the churches"; and the like. I also hear that others, who ought to have known better, take pleasure in such talk and rejoice at the thought of their own undoing (*über ihr eigen Unglück frolocken*).'¹³

The extent of the Danubian Hapsburg Government's change of policy, if not of heart, within the next twenty-five years is revealed in their dealings with the Serbs¹⁴ when, in the first rebound from the failure of Ottoman arms to take Vienna in the siege of A.D. 1682-3, Hapsburg armies broke into the domain of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom and, momentarily penetrating as far south-eastward as Old Serbia, succeeded in A.D. 1689 in occupying Peć, the seat of an autocephalous Serb Patriarchate that had been re-established in A.D. 1557 by the Porte at the instance of a Serb-born Grand Vizier, Mehmed Sököllü.¹⁵

The first reaction of the Ottoman Pādīshāh's Orthodox Christian subjects to the advent of these new schismatic Western Christian Crusaders was apprehensive and hostile.

'The most striking feature of the appeals to Russia from the Balkan Orthodox is that they were directed quite as much against Catholic Austria as against Muslim Turkey—which did not seek proselytes. The [orthodox] Metropolitan of Skoplje [Ūsküb], who made his way to Moscow in A.D. 1687, inveighed against the dangers of Austrian domination and the ill-treatment of refugee Serbian bishops in Hungary. He was followed next year by Isaiah, Archimandrite of St. Paul's Monastery on Athos, imploring Russia to save the Orthodox from Latin as well as Muslim conquerors, and bringing appeals for help not only from Constantinople and Sherban Cantacuzene, hospodar of Wallachia, but as well from Arsenius [Arsenije III] Krnojević, the Serbian Patriarch of Peć [Ipek].'¹⁶

Thereafter, however, a touch of adversity brought home to Franks and Serbs alike the expediency of making common cause. When the tide of war turned again in the 'Osmanlis' favour, as it quickly did, the reign-

¹² Silesia had come under Hapsburg rule in A.D. 1526, together with the rest of the Bohemian crown lands (see II. ii. 179). It remained under Hapsburg rule till all but a fragment of it was conquered by Frederick the Great in the War of the Austrian Succession (*gerebatur* A.D. 1740-8).—A.J.T.

¹³ Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-6.

¹⁴ Scheffler, *op. cit.*, § 48, quoted in Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 156, n. 1.

¹⁵ The following account is based on Hadrovics, L.: *L'Eglise Serbe sous la Domination Turque* (Paris 1947, Presses Universitaires de France), pp. 135-46.

¹⁶ See III. iii. 40, n. 1, and IV. iv. 622, n. 6.

¹⁷ Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), p. 34.

ing Patriarch Arsenije III committed himself to the Hapsburg cause by encouraging the Serb and Albanian Orthodox Christians under his ecclesiastical jurisdiction to enlist under the Hapsburg flag; and on the 6th April, 1690, on the advice of Thomas Raspassani—a Franciscan friar who was vicar of the vacant Roman Catholic episcopal see of Scupi (Skoplje, Ŭsküb)—the Emperor Leopold published a proclamation to all Christian peoples formerly subject to the Hungarian Crown, and to all other Christian peoples now under Ottoman rule, declaring his intention to liberate them, inviting them to take up arms in his cause, and promising them, after liberation, entire religious liberty and a juridical status in accordance with their desires, including the rights of freely electing a prince of their own and of paying no other taxes than those that had been in force before the Ottoman conquest.¹ This proclamation was accompanied by a personal letter of the same date from the Emperor to the Serb Patriarch.

Later in the same year, when, under continuing Ottoman pressure, the Hapsburg armies were compelled to fall back on the Danube, the Patriarch Arsenije evacuated the abandoned territory with them at the head of some seventy thousand or more Serb Orthodox Christian refugees,² and a meeting of Serb prelates and lay notables, held at Belgrade, offered their political allegiance to the Hapsburg Crown on condition that in Serb-inhabited territories enumerated by them—some of which were at that moment in Hapsburg, and others in Ottoman, hands—the Hapsburg Government should guarantee to the Serb community the enjoyment of a communal autonomy under the presidency of an archbishop of Serb descent and mother-tongue and of the Greek Orthodox Christian rite who was to be elected by a mixed ecclesiastical and lay assembly. This offer of Serb allegiance, on the basis of these Serb stipulations, was accepted by the Emperor Leopold in a diploma of the 21st August, 1690, followed up by letters patent of the 20th August, 1691, and a confirmatory diploma of the 4th March, 1695.

In this political bargain between the Hapsburg Monarchy and the Serb refugees in territory under Hapsburg rule, what the Serbs were demanding and the Monarchy was granting in substance was that an Orthodox Christian people under the dominion, and in the territory, of a Western Power should continue to enjoy a non-territorial communal autonomy on the temporal as well as the ecclesiastical plane which it had previously enjoyed as a *millet* of the Ottoman Empire,³ but which was at variance with the Modern Western political principle of territorial

¹ This indiscriminating appeal by a representative of one Christian denomination to representatives of all Christian denominations was a new departure in Western history, and it is significant that the cue thus given in A.D. 1690 by a Catholic Hapsburg Emperor was followed by an Orthodox Romanov Emperor in A.D. 1711. In the proclamation to the Ottoman Christians which Peter the Great issued in March 1711, on the eve of his invasion of Moldavia (see p. 127, n. 3, above), the Tsar, like his Caesarean Majesty, 'came forward avowedly as the liberator of the Christians, Catholic as well as Orthodox' (Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 46). A professedly 'enlightened' Russia that had entered the field as Austria's competitor in a race for the acquisition of the Ottoman Empire's heritage in South-East Europe was under double pressure not to fall below a Hapsburg standard of religious toleration.

² Hadrovics estimates the number at 70,000–100,000 in *op. cit.*, p. 140, n. 1.

³ For this Ottoman institution, see pp. 184–6, below.

sovereignty. In virtue of thus bringing themselves, in despite of their own traditions, to be as liberal as their Ottoman adversaries had been towards an Orthodox Christian people for whose allegiance they were now competing, the Hapsburgs succeeded in winning the refugee Serbs' loyalty;¹ and, in the sequel, these Serb Orthodox Christian subjects of the Hapsburg Monarchy living in Hungary and in the *Militärgrenzen*² under their traditional Ottoman communal constitution became the psychologically conductive medium through which the Modern Western culture penetrated the Serb people as a whole.

Channels of Western Cultural Penetration into an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom

What were the geographical channels through which this Modern Western cultural influence seeped into the main body of Orthodox Christendom?

The oldest channel was the fraction of Orthodox Christian territory remaining under Venetian rule in the Levant, which played the same part in the relations between the main body of Orthodox Christendom and the Modern West as was played in the relations between a Russian Orthodox Christendom and the Modern West by the Russian Orthodox Christian territories under the sovereignty of Poland-Lithuania.³ Crete, for example, by the date of the fall of Candia in A.D. 1669, had been under Venetian rule for more than 450 years⁴—a length of tenure which, in the records of Modern Western colonial empires down to the year A.D. 1952, had been surpassed only by Portugal, and this only in her possessions in and off the west coast of Africa.⁵ During the Early Modern chapter that was the last chapter in the history of Venetian rule in Crete, the strength of the Modern Western cultural influence on the local Greek Orthodox Christian population was revealed by their production of a literature in the contemporary Western vein in a Modern Greek linguistic dress; and it is significant that not only the Italianate Modern Greek painter *Dhómnikos Theotokópoulos*, *alias* 'El Greco' (*vivebat* A.D. 1541–1614),⁶ but the Calvinistic Modern Greek Oecumenical Patriarch *Kýrillos Loukárís* (*vivebat* A.D. 1572–1638), was born in Crete as a Venetian subject.⁷

The cutting off of this Cretan line of cultural communications be-

¹ On the other hand, as late as A.D. 1698, George Kastríótis, an envoy from the Hospodar of Wallachia to Moscow, was writing to Mazepa, the Hetman of the Ukraine, who was at this date in the Muscovite camp: 'We all pray with tears for the Sovereign Monarch [Peter the Great] to save us from the Papists and Jesuits, who rage against the Orthodox more than against the Turks and Jews . . . The secular war may finish some time, but the Jesuit war never.' This extract from Kastríótis' letter is quoted by Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1950, Blackwell), p. 34.

² For these *Militärgrenzen*, see V. v. 462–3 and VI. vii. 117.

³ See pp. 128–9, above.

⁴ The effective occupation of Crete by the Venetians had begun in A.D. 1212.

⁵ The Portuguese had discovered the Cape Verde Islands in A.D. 1456 and Angola in A.D. 1484. The Spanish as well as the Portuguese colonial empire would, of course, have to be dated back a hundred years earlier than that if the Azores, Madeira, and the Canaries were to be reckoned as colonial acquisitions and not as extensions of Portugal's and Spain's metropolitan territories.

⁶ See IV. iv. 360–1.

⁷ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 37; Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

tween Greek Orthodox Christendom and the Modern West through the Ottoman conquest of Crete in A.D. 1645-69 was partially offset by the Venetian conquest of the Morea in A.D. 1684-99, which brought under Venetian rule a larger Greek Orthodox Christian population than had been lost to Venice in her successive forfeitures of territory to the Ottoman Empire between A.D. 1463 and A.D. 1669.¹ Though these Venetian acquisitions in Continental Greece were reconquered by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1715, an ephemeral political episode had lasting cultural effects² because the Venetian Signoria had experienced, between A.D. 1669 and A.D. 1684, the same rather sudden change of heart that overtook the Hapsburg Monarchy in the same generation. The grievances of Venice's Moreot subjects during their thirty years' experience of Venetian rule at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not religious but fiscal and economic.³ Orthodox Christian pupils were free to attend the schools and colleges founded by the Venetians in the Morea⁴ during an occupation of the peninsula which, so long as it lasted, made it impossible for an obscurantist Oecumenical Patriarch, as well as for his more tolerant master the Ottoman Pādīshāh, to exercise his jurisdiction over the Moreots; and the Moreot Greek municipal institutions, which were so important a factor in the Greek uprising of A.D. 1821 and in the subsequent establishment of an independent Greek national state on a Western pattern, were in part a legacy of a system of municipal government that had been introduced into the Morea during this Venetian occupation on the model of the contemporary régime in the North Italian city-states under Venetian hegemony, though they were also in part a gradual and undesigned product of the Ottoman practice of tax-farming.⁵

After the Morea and Tinos had gone the same way in A.D. 1715 as Crete in A.D. 1669 and Cyprus in A.D. 1571 and Negrepont in A.D. 1474, a remnant of Greek Orthodox Christian population still remained under Venetian rule in the Ionian Islands. The Ionian Islanders, who were subject to a culturally alien political domination from the twelfth and

¹ See IV. iv. 279.

² This Venetian occupation of the Morea, and the contemporary and subsequent Hapsburg occupation of Serbia, have been cited in another context (in V. v. 637-8) as examples of ephemeral intrusions, on the part of Modern Western empires, which had been followed, after an equally ephemeral restoration of an *ancien régime*, by the establishment, in the same territory, of a parochial national state on the Modern Western pattern.

³ See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 208-9. According to Sakellarios, M. V.: *Ἡ Πελοπόννησος κατὰ τὴν Δευτέραν Τουρκοκρατίαν (1715-1821)* (Athens 1939, Byzantinisch-Neugriechischen Jahrbücher), pp. 121-2, the Venetians had killed Moreot Greek commerce and, though they had encouraged agriculture in the Morea, they had prohibited the export of the produce (except for wine) to foreign markets. Their financial policy in the Morea had created a currency famine there (see *ibid.*, p. 126). After the Ottoman reconquest of the Morea in A.D. 1715, the trade of the country was thrown open to all nations, and production in the Morea increased (see *ibid.*, pp. 124-5). These financial and economic considerations explain why it was that in A.D. 1715 the Greek Orthodox Christian population of the Morea sided with the Turks against the Venetians (see *ibid.*, p. 41). At the same time, Leondári was the only place in the Morea where the Turkish reconquest in A.D. 1715 was followed by conversions to Islam in appreciable numbers (see *ibid.*, p. 117)—in contrast to the religious sequel to the Turkish conquest of Candia in A.D. 1669 (see p. 164, above).

⁴ See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 212.

⁵ See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 197-9.

thirteenth centuries¹ to A.D. 1864,² were unique in being the only Greek Orthodox Christians to be visited with an almost unbroken succession of Western masters;³ and the Venetian landowners who constituted the Western 'ascendancy' here were likewise unique, for their part, in having become converts from their ancestral Roman Catholic Christianity to the Orthodoxy of the local Greek peasantry without having become apostates from their ancestral Western culture, and in having learnt to communicate with their agricultural labourers, tenants, body servants, and mistresses in the local Romaic Greek vernacular without having abandoned their traditional use of Italian as the exclusive language of polite society and exclusive linguistic medium for education and literary composition. The death-knell of this remote outpost of a Western *ancien régime* was sounded by the French Revolution; yet, before the merger of an old Ionian landowning aristocracy in a new democratic Greek nation was expedited by the union of the Heptanese with the Kingdom of Greece in A.D. 1864, these seven diminutive plots of common ground between the two Christendoms had given birth to two islanders who each played an eminent part in the transmission of a Modern Western culture to an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom. The first of the two was the Corfiot Greek Westernizing philosopher-educationalist Evelyénios Voulgharis (*vivebat* A.D. 1716-1806),⁴ who was born a Venetian subject. The second was the Zantiot Italian aristocrat-poetaster Count Dionisio Salomone (*vivebat* A.D. 1798-1857), who died under a British protectorate after having won fame in the West, as well as in a Greek Orthodox Christendom, as the great Greek poet Dhionýsios Solomós.⁵

Even in the Early Modern Age of religious faith and fanaticism, Venice had been appreciably less intolerant than most contemporary Western states,⁶ either Catholic or Protestant. The Signoria was no friend of the Society of Jesus; at the University of Padua, which served the Venetian dominions, there was a relative freedom of philosophical thought;⁷ it had become customary for Cretans to seek a higher education there;⁸ and colleges for Greek students were founded at both Padua and Venice between A.D. 1590 and A.D. 1642.⁹ Cyril Loukárís' kinsman

¹ Corfú was seized by the Genoese pirate Vetrano in A.D. 1199 and by the Venetians in A.D. 1206, but was recovered in A.D. 1214, and held till A.D. 1259, by the Epirot Greek successor-state of the East Roman Empire, before being permanently annexed to Western Christendom by Manfred of Sicily. Cefalonia and Zante were seized by the Sicilian Normans *circa* A.D. 1185.

² The date at which Great Britain renounced her protectorate and allowed the Ionian Islanders to fulfil their desire for union with the Kingdom of Greece.

³ This succession was technically broken during the years A.D. 1800-7, when the Ionian Islanders were autonomous under a Russo-Ottoman protectorate. In the heyday of the Ottoman Power the 'Osmanlis had succeeded occasionally in occupying some of the islands temporarily without ever managing to confirm their hold.

⁴ See pp. 160-1, above.

⁵ See pp. 679-80, below.

⁶ Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 4, points out the significance of this fact in the present context.

⁷ 'Padua fell under the rule of Venice from A.D. 1404, and Venice was the most successfully anti-clerical state in Europe both at this time and for long afterwards. The freedom of thought enjoyed by Padua attracted the ablest men, not only from the whole of the Italian Peninsula, but also from the rest of Europe—William Hervey . . . being a conspicuous example of this' (Butterfield, H.: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London 1949, Bell), p. 43). See also Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁸ See Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁹ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

and patron Meletios Pighás, the Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria, had studied in Venice, but had been debarred from taking a degree by his refusal to subscribe to Roman Catholic doctrine and recognize Papal supremacy, and had acquired in consequence a strong animus against the Roman Church.¹ Meletios nevertheless sent Loukárís, in his turn, to Venice for his education at the age of twelve;² and, after spending four years there, Loukárís went on to spend seven further years as a student at Padua.³ Loukárís' younger contemporary and outstanding opponent Meletios Sýrighos (*natus* A.D. 1585) was likewise a Cretan and likewise an alumnus of the University of Padua, where he studied mathematics, physics, and medicine;⁴ but the privilege of studying in the Venetian University of Padua was not confined to Greek Orthodox Christians who were Venetian subjects. At Padua Loukárís made friends with his fellow student Nikiphóros Korydhalléfs of Athens,⁵ who in A.D. 1624, after Loukárís had become Oecumenical Patriarch, was to open at Constantinople a school of a Calvinist complexion⁶ and was to be anathematized, like Loukárís himself, after Loukárís' final fall and death.⁷ The Chiot Alexander Mavrogordáto, too, studied medicine at Padua⁸ like the Cretan Sýrighos, though, like the Athenian Korydhalléfs, he was an Ottoman subject.

Another channel through which Modern Western influence flowed into the main body of Orthodox Christendom was the Western diplomatic corps at Constantinople, which became a force there during the eclipse of the Ottoman Power after the death of Suleymán the Magnificent in A.D. 1566. During the Thirty Years' War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1618-48) Constantinople, like Berne during the general War of A.D. 1914-18 and Lisbon during the general war of A.D. 1939-45, was a theatre of diplomatic hostilities on militarily neutral ground, and the diplomatic contest that centred on the person of Cyril Loukárís has been described as a repercussion of the contemporary struggle between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in the West.⁹ The Dutch, English, Swedish, and Venetian ambassadors were in league, at the time when Loukárís ascended the Oecumenical Throne, against their Hapsburg and French confrères,¹⁰ and Loukárís' intimacy with the Protestant diplomatic circles in his see brought him not only local Western political patronage but widespread Western cultural contacts—as is testified by his correspondence with the Dutch theologian Uytenbogaert and the Dutch statesman David le Leu de Wilhem.

¹ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

² See Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 45 and 49.

³ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁴ Korydhalléfs was anathematized by the Constantinopolitan Orthodox Church for objecting to the use of the Greek word *μερροίωσις* as a translation of the Latin word *transsubstantiatio* (Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 221).

⁵ The monument of Alexander Mavrogordáto's studies at Padua was a Herveian treatise in Latin on the circulation of the blood: *Pneumaticum Instrumentum Circulandi Sanguinis, sive de Motu et Usu Pulmonum Dissertatio Philosophico-medica, Autore Alexandro Mavrogordato Constantinopolitano, Philosophiae et Medicinae Doctore* (Bologna 1664, Typographia Ferroniana). Another edition was published at Frankfurt in A.D. 1665 by T. M. Goetz (See Legrand, E.: *Bibliographie Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages Publiés par des Grecs au Dix-Septième Siècle*, vol. ii (Paris 1894, Picard), pp. 189-193).

⁶ See Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁷ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

⁸ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁹ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

¹⁰ See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

Thereafter, when the rally of the Ottoman Power under the leadership of the House of Köprülü was followed by a final lapse into dissolution, the classic Ottoman political principle of non-territorial autonomy for all communities in the Empire, not excluding resident aliens,¹ enabled the embassies of Western Powers in Constantinople to erect themselves into miniature *imperia in imperio* reigning, not only over their own nationals in Ottoman territory, but also over Ottoman subjects who were their official protégés. The germs of these Western protectorates can be detected in some of the provisions of the capitulations granted to England by the Porte in September 1675,² and in the Hapsburg-Ottoman capitulatory treaty of the 27th July, 1718.³ In the capitulations granted to France in May 1740 these germs blossomed into a provision authorizing the French Ambassador to maintain fifteen Ottoman subjects as his servants free from taxation.⁴ After the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, which was a milestone in the course of the Ottoman Empire's decline, this privilege of exercising a protectorate over Ottoman subjects was extended to other capitulatory Powers, and the Porte presented each embassy with a certain number of blank 'certificates of denaturalization' (as the Ottoman term *berā'at* might be interpreted in this context), which the ambassadors were then free to bestow upon Ottoman subjects of their own choice.⁵

The Western embassies were more successful in abusing this privilege⁶ than the Porte was in its belated attempts to restrict its scope.⁷ The consequence was that an appreciable number of Greek Orthodox Christian and other Ottoman subjects came to participate in the fiscal privileges that gave the nationals of capitulatory Powers a decisive advantage over non-privileged Ottoman subjects in the now increasingly important trade between the Ottoman Empire and the West;⁸ and this made Ottoman subjects engaged in foreign trade so eager to obtain the official protection of foreign governments that, shortly before the year 1824,⁹ the Ottoman Government sought to reduce this incentive by granting 'most favoured foreign nation treatment' to Ottoman subjects trading with foreign countries who were not the official protégés of foreign embassies.¹⁰

¹ This principle and the institutions in which it was embodied are examined on pp. 184-6, below.

² Arts. 28, 45, and 59.

³ Art. 5.

⁴ Art. 47. In the same instrument the incipient rights of protectorate already secured by England and the Hapsburg Monarchy were conferred on France likewise in Arts. 13, 43, 45, 46, and 50.

⁵ See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 107.

⁶ See d'Ohsson, I. M.: *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1788-1824, Didot, 7 vols.), vol. vii, pp. 506-8.

⁷ Such attempts were made in the Anglo-Turkish peace treaty of the 6th January, 1809, Art. 9, and in the American-Turkish commercial treaty of the 7th May, 1830, Art. 5.

⁸ See d'Ohsson, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, pp. 235 and 239.

⁹ i.e., shortly before the publication of the last volume of d'Ohsson's work in that year.

¹⁰ See d'Ohsson, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 509. The two principal benefits thereby extended to non-protected Ottoman subjects were the issue of certificates of privilege and the limitation of the rate of customs duties payable by them to the 3 per cent. *ad valorem* which was at that time the maximum rate payable by the nationals and the Ottoman protégés of the capitulatory Powers. The first instrument in which a definite rate of customs duty *ad valorem* was fixed by mutual agreement would appear to have been the

This was a striking inversion of a stipulation in the Franco-Turkish capitulatory treaty of February, 1535,¹ that French merchants were to pay no higher duties than Ottoman subjects. That treaty was the archetype of all instruments, bilateral or unilateral, conferring capitulatory privileges in the Ottoman Empire on Modern Western Powers and their nationals; and Ottoman subjects had indeed profited at the expense of Westerners, in the competition for the profits of the maritime trade in the Mediterranean, as a result of the political union of the main body of Orthodox Christendom with the greater part of the Arabic World under Ottoman rule at the beginning of the Modern Age of Western history.

The first commercial effect of this political revolution in the Levant had been to strike a deadly blow at the commerce of Venice,² Genoa, and the other North Italian communities that had been progressively wresting the maritime commerce of the Mediterranean out of Greek hands since the eleventh century of the Christian Era; and, though the Greeks too had been hard hit, economically as well as politically, by the Ottoman conquest,³ while all participants in the Mediterranean maritime trade had suffered alike from a conquest of the Ocean by West European peoples who had thereby turned the Mediterranean into a backwater,⁴ the Greek subjects of the Porte found themselves, as a result of the Ottoman conquest, in a stronger position for competing with the Franks in the Mediterranean trade, even before they came to benefit from the commercial privileges which the Modern Western Great Powers were granted by the Porte from A.D. 1673 onwards.⁵ The maritime trade via the Mediterranean, on which the 'Osmanlis' Greek subjects thus secured and maintained a hold, was another channel through which Western cultural influences seeped into the main body of Orthodox Christendom,⁶ and the cultural intercourse became more active as the Mediterranean came back to commercial life at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁷ Colonies of Ottoman Greek merchants were to be found in

capitulations granted to France on the 5th June, 1673. In this instrument, Additional Article 5, it is laid down that import and export duties payable by French merchants are to be reduced from 5 per cent., at which they had previously stood, to 3 per cent.

¹ Article 3.

² In the eighteenth century the Greek subjects of Venice in the Ionian Islands preferred to trade under the Ottoman flag (Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, p. 128).

³ The greatest single economic blow that was dealt to the Greeks by their Ottoman conquerors was the settlement of Sephardi Jewish refugees from the Iberian Peninsula in the chief commercial centres of the Ottoman Empire—e.g. Salonica, Adrianople, Constantinople—to fill an economic vacuum created by the expulsion of the major part of the former Greek population of these cities (see II. ii. 245-6).

⁴ Chios, for example, was hit by this diversion of the main channel of world trade (Argenti, P. P.: *Chios Vineta* (Cambridge, 1941, University Press), pp. xli-xlii). From the sixteenth century to circa A.D. 1791 the Chioti's main economic activities were agriculture and manufactures, not commerce (David, C. E., French Vice-Consul at Chios: Dispatch dated 14th June, 1824 = Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Correspondance Consulaire de Scio, 1812-25 D., No. 39bis enclosing 'Mémoire sur Scio': printed in Argenti, P. P.: *The Massacres of Chios described in Contemporary Diplomatic Documents* (London 1932, Lane), pp. 52-95, especially p. 67).

⁵ For this date, see p. 172, n. 10, above.

⁶ The Chioti, for example, went to the West first in order to do business, but afterwards also in order to obtain a Western education (David, *op. cit.*, p. 78).

⁷ The Mediterranean did not, of course, recover the position that it had held before the Oceanic Age; the Ocean continued to be the principal medium of communication for a World that had been united by the Oceanic enterprise of West European peoples;

the Mediterranean ports of Western Christendom as early as the sixteenth century;¹ and the notable increase in the trade between the Ottoman Empire and a geographically expanding Western World which declared itself towards the end of the eighteenth century was marked by the establishment of Greek commercial colonies in London, Liverpool, Manchester, and New York as well as in Venice, Leghorn, Marseilles, and Trieste.² These Greek settlements *in partibus Occidentalium* came to act like lenses which focused the cultural influence of the West and transmitted it to the Levant in concentrated rays of a high degree of potency.

The economic and consequent cultural opportunities opened up to Greek Ottoman subjects by this revival of maritime trade between the Levant and the West via the Mediterranean were made the most of by a few maritime Ottoman communities that enjoyed some measure of local autonomy, whether by charter or by custom or merely by oversight.³ The outstanding chartered communities were the mastic-growing island of Chios, the olive-growing peninsula of Ayvalyq (Kydhoniés),⁴ and the two continental Greek portlets of Ghalaxidhi⁵ on the Gulf of Corinth and Trikeri⁶ commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Volo. Among the communities that benefited by custom or oversight were the previously derelict Aegean islands Hýdhra⁷ and Pétses,⁸ off the coast of the Argolid, which were colonized in the eighteenth century by Orthodox Christian

but in the course of the eighteenth century the Mediterranean did begin to change from being a mere backwater in an Oceanic system of waterways into becoming a through-route between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean which had the advantage of being a short cut. This rehabilitation of the Mediterranean was consummated by the opening of the Suez Canal in A.D. 1869 (see IV. iv. 23), but the process had begun at least a hundred years before that. One cause of it was the progressive establishment of British rule in India, beginning with Bengal, which led the British to search for a shorter and quicker route between England and India than the Oceanic route via the Cape of Good Hope (see Hoskins, H. L.: *British Routes to India* (London 1928, Longmans Green)). A second cause was the opening up of a new continental hinterland to the Mediterranean through the replacement of Nomadism by the sedentary civilization of Russian Orthodox Christendom in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe along the north coast of the Black Sea as a consequence of the Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 (see III. iii. 428). A third cause was the Westernization of Egypt, which was initiated by the French military invasion in A.D. 1798.

¹ See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 156.

² The Chioti, for example, who appear to have had no permanent commercial establishments abroad before A.D. 1780, began to settle in Western and Russian maritime and commercial entrepôts from about that date onwards. Two members of the Ralli family can be traced as far back as A.D. 1780 in Leghorn; and there was an Averino at Taganrog by A.D. 1795; a Zarakhani and a Zizinia at the same Russian port in A.D. 1805; a Kapparis at Theodosia and a Rhodhokanakis at Genoa by the same year; an Argenti, a Psykhas, and a Ralli at Amsterdam by A.D. 1810; a Galatti and a Psykhas at Ismā'il by the same year; and an Argenti at Marseilles by A.D. 1818 (Argenti, *The Massacres of Chios*, p. xxiv, n. 1). After the catastrophe of A.D. 1822, Chiot refugees founded further colonies in Constantinople, Egypt, the new dominions of Russia along the north coast of the Black Sea, Leghorn, Trieste, Vienna, Marseilles, Paris, London, Liverpool, Manchester, and the United States of America (ibid., pp. xxiii-xxiv; cp. *Chius Vincita*, p. cxviii). Chiot emigrants seem to have been quicker than other Greek emigrants to adapt themselves to the Western way of life (*Chius Vincita*, p. cxxi). Committees for raising funds for education in Chios were organized by the Chiot diaspora in Trieste, Leghorn, Marseilles, Paris, London, Liverpool, and Manchester (ibid., p. ccxvi).

³ See II. ii. 262.

⁴ For Ayvalyq, see II, ii. 40, n. 1.

⁵ See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 281, and vol. vi, p. 167.

⁶ See Finlay, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 167.

⁷ See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 283, and vol. vi, pp. 30-33 and 168.

⁸ See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 283, and vol. vi, p. 33.

Albanians from the Morea, and Kásos¹ and Psarà,² in the Sporades, which were colonized in the same age by Orthodox Christian Greeks.³

The attraction of these barren islands, and of the stony peninsula of Ayvalyq, was a hope of escaping the increasing fiscal oppression under which the Orthodox Christian settlers on these uninviting spots had been suffering in their previous homes in an age when a declining Ottoman Power was no longer able to protect its subjects against its agents. The colonist-islanders—who had to fling themselves on the sea as their only alternative to starvation—found favour with an Ottoman Government that in this age was eager to foster a native maritime population both as a counter-move in the commercial field to Western encroachments on Ottoman commerce and as a reservoir in the military field for the man-power of an Ottoman Navy on the Modern Western model.

The Qapudān Pasha Hüseyn Jezayrli, who as Grand Admiral was *ex officio* governor of the Archipelago and the Mani,⁴ had no fewer than

¹ See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 166.

² See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 281, and vol. vi, p. 167.

³ The autonomy enjoyed by these maritime Ottoman Greek communities that turned it to commercial account was shared by a number of highland communities, most of which also adjoined the sea. We may notice the Mání in the Morea; Sphakià in Crete; and Khimárrha, the Armatoli of Pindus and the Agrapha, the Elefterokhória, Mount Athos, the Pelion Zagorà and the Dhervenkohória in Rumili. Of these all but the Mání, Sphakià, and Khimárrha were officially recognized by the Porte.

The Mání was independent *de facto* till A.D. 1670, the year after the Ottoman conquest of Candia (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 116-17); in that year it was compelled to receive Ottoman garrisons and to pay kharāj; in A.D. 1685 it made a pact with Venice through which it secured autonomy under Venetian rule (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 205). After the Ottoman reconquest of the Morea in A.D. 1715, the Maniots retained their autonomy but were compelled to resume payment of kharāj. They joined the Russians when these invaded the Morea in A.D. 1770 (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 252-3), and reacknowledged the sovereignty of the Porte in A.D. 1777. In A.D. 1803-4 they were again brought to heel by the Ottoman authorities after they had flirted with the French (Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-7). In A.D. 1821 their chieftain Petrobey gave the signal for the Greek national uprising by attacking the Ottoman garrison of Mistrà.

Sphakià was compelled to pay kharāj in A.D. 1770 (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. xii and 263). Its autonomy was respected in practice by the Porte thereafter (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 4).

The Khimarrhiots made the living that they could not wring out of the rocks of Acroceranus by serving as mercenaries in the armies of Venice and Naples (see Mozart's *Così fan Tutti*, *lusum* A.D. 1790).

The Armatoli have been noticed already in another context in V. v. 297-8.

The Elefterokhória were three confederations of villages on the Peninsula of Khalkidhiki which governed themselves and collected their own taxes under the superintendence of an Ottoman resident backed by a token military force (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 202).

Mount Athos ('the Holy Mountain') was an autonomous federal republic of Orthodox Christian monasteries, including representatives of most of the Orthodox Christian nationalities, though the Greeks had a great preponderance. Here too the Porte was represented merely by a resident (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, pp. 203-4).

The Zagorà (*Slavice* 'Among the Mountains') was a cluster of densely populated Greek Orthodox Christian villages running up the western flank of Mount Pelion overlooking the Plain of Thessaly. Its autonomy was recognized by the Porte and administered by elective magistrates (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, pp. 200-1).

The Dhervenkohória were five Albanian Orthodox Christian villages, mustering two thousand fighting men, who were commissioned by the Porte to police the overland route between Rumili and the Morea over Mount Cithaeron and Mount Geraneia (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 30).

⁴ The Qapudān Pasha administered this governorship through the agency of his Phanariot Greek Orthodox Christian secretary the Dragoman of the Fleet (see d'Ohsson, I. M.: *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1788-1824, 7 vols.), vol. vii (Paris 1824, Didot), p. 431, and Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 242). The Mani had been separated administratively from the Morea, and been added to the Qapudān Pasha's domain, after

two hundred Hydhrriot sailors serving on board his flagship in A.D. 1797, and this service won for Hýdhra valuable privileges. In A.D. 1802 the Qapudān Pasha appointed a native Hydhrriot Christian governor, and the taxes payable by the island to the Porte were commuted for a contingent of 250 men to the fleet and a gratuity to the Qapudān Pasha and his staff.¹ The same boons of local self-government and light taxation were granted to Pétses, Kásos, and Psarà on the same considerations. Under these exceptionally favourable conditions the four islands and the two continental portlets developed a merchant marine which earned high, though short-lived, profits during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (*gerebantur* A.D. 1792-1815), when the Ottoman flag was the only neutral flag left in the Mediterranean; and the lion's share of the trade carried on under this flag was secured by this handful of Ottoman Orthodox Christian maritime communities.² This windfall from a storm in the neighbouring Western World ceased to drop into these Ottoman Greek mariners' hands as soon as the Western peoples emerged from their Napoleonic bout of fratricidal warfare;³ and the unemployment, distress, and discontent arising from the rapid decline in the volume of their commercial business after A.D. 1815 made these communities ready,

A.D. 1777, when it had reacknowledged the sovereignty of the Porte, which had been in abeyance there since the Russian descent on the Morea in A.D. 1770 (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 265-6).

¹ See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 283, and vol. vi, pp. 32-33.

² See Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-15. In this lucrative but ephemeral Ottoman Greek trade the Chiots found a leading role to play. About the year A.D. 1780 their manufactures—of which the most valuable was a silk industry inherited from the period of Genoese rule—had succumbed to Western industrial competition; but, after the outbreak of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the West, Chiot capitalists financed the Hydhrriot, Petsiot, and Psariot merchant marine that was earning profits by carrying grain, oil, and other produce of the Ottoman Empire from Anatolia, Salonica, and Egypt to the ports of the Napoleonic French Empire. The Chiots then established business houses at Marseilles, Trieste, and Leghorn (see p. 179, n. 2, above) to correspond with their houses at Constantinople, Salonica, and above all at Smyrna, where Chiot enterprise had made an entrepôt for the exchange of Western manufactures with the products of the interior of Anatolia. After the annexation of Croatia to the French Empire in A.D. 1809, the Chiots took part, from their commercial bases in Salonica and Smyrna, in an overland trade which the French proceeded to open up via Bosnia with the Ottoman World. From Constantinople, Chiot merchants exported cloth to Austria. Chiots made her fortune in twenty years (David, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-70).

Even the hitherto almost exclusively agrarian Ottoman Greek community in the Morea shared in this temporary commercial prosperity. When the liquidation of the Venetian dominion over the Morea in A.D. 1715 had been followed by the collapse of the local Venetian commercial supremacy, the Venetian commercial heritage in the Morea had been captured, not by the Moreot Greeks, but by the French (see Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-8). The cereals exported from the Morea had all been shipped to Marseilles, while the current crop had been shipped to Great Britain and Holland (*ibid.*, pp. 128 and 210). There is no record of Greek merchants participating in the trade of the Morea before the foundation of a commercial company by Benáki of Kalamáta in A.D. 1761 (*ibid.*, pp. 128-9). The French traders in the Morea were, however, ruined by the abortive Greek Christian insurrection and retaliatory Albanian Muslim barbarian conquest in A.D. 1770-9 (*ibid.*, p. 216); what remained of the eighteenth-century trade through a French channel was paralysed by the outbreak of the French Revolution (*ibid.*, p. 212); and, when the Napoleonic Wars offered their golden opportunity to neutral Ottoman carriers, Moreot landowners, Turkish as well as Greek, stepped into the ruined French merchants' shoes (*ibid.*, pp. 211, 218, and 244).

³ This commercial stagnation after A.D. 1815 made itself felt in Chios as well as in the seafaring Greek islands (David, *op. cit.*, p. 71). Yet the trade between Chios and the West nevertheless remained so important that the catastrophe of A.D. 1822 was reported by the Hapsburg Internuncio at Constantinople to have been severely felt in many towns in Germany, France, Italy, and England (Argenti, P. P.: *The Massacres of Chios*, pp. xv-xvi and 127).

in A.D. 1821, to join in a Greek national insurrection—inspired by Western political ideas—which held out hopes for them of replacing the dwindling profits of trade by the spoils of buccaneering.¹

In the Westernization of the main body of Orthodox Christendom through the maritime channel, a particularly important part was played by the Greek island of Chios, which had been under Western rule for just about two and a half centuries by the date of its annexation to the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1566,² and which retained both its Western political constitution³ and its Western cultural complexion⁴ under

¹ Statistics of the number of families, and the number of ships of a tonnage of over a hundred tons, to be found at Hýdhra, Pétses, Kásoi, Psará, Ghalaxídhí, and Tríkeri in A.D. 1821, on the eve of the Greek uprising of that year, are given in Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 167.

² Chios fell into the hands of a piratical Genoese family, the Zaccaria, in the reign of the East Roman Emperor Andronicus II Palaiológos (*imperabat* A.D. 1282–1328). During the last 220 years before the Ottoman conquest the Western masters of Chios were a Genoese chartered company, the Maona, which had obtained possession of the island in A.D. 1346 after its liberation from the Zaccaria in A.D. 1329.

³ The Chiois twice secured the restoration of their traditional institutions of self-government after an Ottoman military occupation, because the 'Osmanlis had the wit to realize that the economic prosperity of the island, which was so profitable for the Ottoman treasury, might evaporate if the islanders were no longer to be allowed to manage their own affairs in their own way.

After the original annexation in A.D. 1566, a Chiot deputation, led by the 'Latin' (i.e. Roman Catholic) bishop, and including one representative each of the Greek Church, the Greek merchants, the Latin merchants, and the Greek nobility, obtained from the Porte in A.D. 1567, through the good offices of the Qapudân Pasha Piale, who had been the Porte's instrument in annexing Chios to the Ottoman Empire in the preceding year, a charter reconferring self-government on the islanders and exempting them from the *devrîshmé* (the recurrent levy of children for the Pādîshāh's Slave-Household) and from other ills to which the unprivileged *ra'iyeh* were subject (Argenti: *Chios Vineta*, pp. cxxvii–clix). This charter of A.D. 1567 was followed in A.D. 1578 by another which was still more favourable, particularly in the matter of taxation (*ibid.*, p. clix). More than a hundred years later, in A.D. 1696, after the Ottoman reconquest of Chios on the 21st February, 1695, from the Venetians, who had occupied the island on the 12th September, 1694, the Sultan expressly reconfirmed the island's constitutional privileges at the intercession of Alexander Mavrogordato (*ibid.*, pp. clxxiv–v).

Chios appears to have enjoyed greater security under Ottoman than under Genoese rule, and to have found it less difficult to obtain redress for its grievances from the suzerain Power (Argenti: *Chios Vineta*, p. cxxiii).

One effect of the restoration of the island's local autonomy under Ottoman auspices was to transfer political power in the island from a 'Latin' Roman Catholic minority of Genoese origin to a Greek Orthodox Christian majority—or at any rate to an aristocratic minority of this majority. By the terms of their capitulation to the Genoese conqueror Simone Vignoso on the 12th September, 1346, the Greek inhabitants of Chios had transferred their allegiance from the Imperial Government at Constantinople to the Republic of Genoa on the conditions (among others) that they should be allowed to retain their ancestral religion and customs, including the right to elect their own Metropolitan, and the existing privileges of their nobility (Argenti: *Chios Vineta*, p. xlii, n. 2); but all political power had passed into the hands of the Genoese Government and the chartered company (maona, *Arabice* ma'awnah) which had financed the conquest. After the extinction of this Genoese régime by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1566, the Greek Orthodox Christian Chiois were admitted to office in the government of the island (Argenti: *Chios Vineta*, p. cxxii), and they eventually gained a preponderant voice in it. By A.D. 1760, Chios was being governed by an Orthodox Christian oligarchy. On the board of dhimoyérondes, two places out of five were reserved for the Greek nobility, one place for the Greek plebeians, and two places for the Latins (*ibid.*, pp. clxxx–clxxxi).

The 'Latin' minority in Chios lost ground politically, not only in consequence of the Ottoman annexation in A.D. 1566, which deprived it of a political ascendancy that it had been enjoying for more than two hundred years by that date, but also in consequence of the Florentine expedition against Chios in A.D. 1599 and the Venetian occupation of the island in A.D. 1694–5 (see Argenti, P. P.: *The Expedition of the Florentines to Chios*, [Cont. on next page.

⁴ See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 79–80.

Ottoman sovereignty. An experience and ability in business, and a familiarity with the West which was both a cause and a consequence of this economic success, qualified the Chiots for serving the Porte in its dealings with Western neighbours with whom it no longer found itself able to settle its accounts by sheer force of arms; and it was no accident that the first two incumbents of the office of Dragoman of the Porte, Panayiotákis Nikoússios (*fungebatur* A.D. 1669-73)¹ and Alexander Mavrogordáto (*fungebatur* A.D. 1673-99)² were both connected with Chios.³ Alexander Mavrogordáto's father was a Chiot silk-merchant, and his maternal grandfather had made a fortune as a wholesale purveyor of beef to the Palace and the public markets at Constantinople.

Thereafter, Chios produced the scholar-publicist Adhamándios Korais⁴ (*vivebat* A.D. 1748-1833), who, in a Greek Orthodox Christian Westernizing movement that sprang from below upwards, is the symbolic figure corresponding to the autocrat-technician Peter the Great in a Russian Orthodox Christian Westernizing movement that was imposed from above downwards.

Korais' father was a Chiot who had settled at Smyrna, a continental Anatolian port, commanding a magnificent hinterland, where Western merchants had been the commercial pioneers and Western influences counted for more than they did at Constantinople at the time. In the new Greek community, of divers local origins, that had been called into existence at Smyrna by the economic opportunities created there by Western enterprise, Korais' father rose to be a churchwarden, an alderman (*δημόγερος*), and Prime Warden of the Smyrniot Guild of Chiot Merchants (*Πρωτομαγίστωρ τῆς τῶν Χίων Ἐμπορίας Συντεχνίας*); and, though he was himself a business man of no education, his wife was

1599 (London 1934, Lane); eundem: *The Occupation of Chios by the Venetians, 1694* (London 1935, Lane), which brought upon the Chiot 'Latin' community an odium and a mistrust, in their Ottoman suzerains' feelings towards them, from which their Greek Orthodox Christian fellow islanders remained exempt. After the Ottoman reoccupation in A.D. 1695 the 'Latin' Chiots were condemned to the galleys and their property was distributed by the Ottoman authorities among the Orthodox Chiots, who had been plundered by the Venetians. At the same time the Sultan ordered all Orthodox Chiots who had been forcibly converted to Roman Catholicism by the Venetians to return to Orthodoxy. The French Ambassador at Constantinople secured from the Porte a revocation of the sentence on the 'Latins' to serve in the galleys, on condition that they publicly renounced Roman Catholicism and embraced Orthodoxy (Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Venetians*, pp. xcii-xciii); but from A.D. 1695 to A.D. 1720 the Latin community in Chios was excluded, by fiat of the Porte, from participation in the local administration (Argenti: *Chius Vincita*, p. cci). Their subsequent recovery of their political rights seems to have been due to a further intervention on the part of the French Ambassador at Constantinople (see Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 238).

The mastic-growing villages in the south of the island were placed by the Porte under a special régime. They were exempt from *kharāj* but had to deliver 25,000 oqas of mastic gum to the Porte annually free of charge, and to sell the rest of the crop to the Porte at the price of 2½ kurush for the oqa (Argenti: *Chius Vincita*, pp. cclxxi-ii).

¹ See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. xi; Jorga, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 281; Zolotàs, G. I.: *Ἱστορία τῆς Χίου*, vol. iii, Part I (Athens 1926, Sakellarios), pp. 441-2.

² See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 242; Jorga, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 283; Zolotàs, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, Part I, pp. 424-39; Part II (Athens 1928, Sakellarios), pp. 730-44.

³ Panayiotákis was educated at Chios, but appears to have been of Rumeliot, not of Chiot, origin.

⁴ This surname is presumably a Greek version of an Arabic *qarrā'*, signifying 'an accomplished reader [of the Scriptures]'. The corresponding Hebrew word *qarā'im* (plural) had been adopted as a name by a sect of anti-Talmudist Jews who prided themselves on being 'readers [of the Law and the Prophets as opposed to the commentators upon them]' (see II. ii. 411).

a schoolmaster's daughter, and he had an ancestor, Andónios Koraïs, who had been a doctor of medicine, had travelled to Paris, and had published literary works in Western Europe in the last quarter of the seventeenth century.¹

The money made by Adhamándios Koraïs' father in business at Smyrna enabled Adhamándios to emulate their Chiot ancestor's career. In A.D. 1782 he went to the University of Montpellier² to study medicine there; in A.D. 1788 he went on to Paris; and, after imbibing there the Modern Western enthusiasm for the Ancient Greek classical literature, and witnessing the irruption of Democracy into Modern Western life through the French Revolution, he settled in Paris for good and devoted the forty-five years of his sojourn there (A.D. 1788-1833) to the service of his countrymen in the Levant both as a scholar and as a publicist. As a scholar he laboured to make the Ancient Greek classics accessible to his Modern Greek contemporaries by editing them with introductions and notes in a version of the Modern Greek language which he sought to fashion into a vehicle for conveying the Modern Western culture.³ As a publicist he laboured to guide his compatriots in their endeavours to translate into political terms a latter-day aspiration to adopt the Modern Western way of life.⁴

Koraïs was alive to the importance of the part in the Modern Greek Westernizing movement that the Chiots had it in them to play, as he showed in a letter written by him from Paris on the 4th July, 1823, to Prince Alexander Mavrogordáto, a contemporary Greek statesman who, like Koraïs, was of Chiot origin, in virtue of being a descendant of the celebrated seventeenth-century Dragoman of the Porte. This Phanariot contemporary of Koraïs had thrown in his lot with the Greek insurgents against Ottoman rule who had been fighting since A.D. 1821 to carve a Greek national state, on a post-Revolutionary Modern Western pattern, out of Ottoman territory in the Morea and Rumelia; and in this enterprise he was given the following advice by his Parisian mentor:

'It is essential that in your arduous task you should obtain the support of worthy collaborators, and it will be difficult for you to find them except among the Chiots—not that they are intellectually superior to other

¹ In seeking their education in the West, Andónios Koraïs and Alexander Mavrogordáto (see p. 171, above) had been following an unbroken Chiot tradition dating from the Genoese age of Chian history. At Rome a scholarship for Chiot students had been founded by Allatius at the College of Saint Athanasius (a Roman Catholic College for Greeks). Emmanuel Timoni, the Chiot discoverer of vaccination, had studied at Padua shortly before A.D. 1691. In A.D. 1773 the Peter Schilizzi hospital in Chios was founded by a Chiot who had studied medicine in Florence and who modelled his foundation in his native Greek island on a hospital in his Italian *alma mater*. The practice of going to Italy for their education remained common among Chiots until the catastrophe of A.D. 1822. This was one of the reasons why the Chiots were distinguished from other Ottoman Greeks by their greater familiarity with the West (Argenti, *Chios Vincita*, p. cxx), and why in the eighteenth century Chios was the educational centre for the Greeks of Constantinople, Smyrna, and Egypt (Argenti, *The Massacres of Chios*, p. xxiv).

² Montpellier was the university that served the hinterland of the port of Marseilles, to which it stood more or less in the relation of Padua to Venice.

³ The Modern Greek language problem has been touched upon in V. vi. 68-70.

⁴ For Adhamándios Koraïs' antecedents and career, see Thereianós, D.: *Adhamándios Koraïs* (Trieste 1889-90, Austrian Lloyd Press, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 89-90; Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 285-6.

Greeks,¹ but because they have proved, by their achievements in administering their township under the yoke of slavery, how fit they are to contribute to the common work for Hellas when they are free. They have achieved concord and they possess what Aristotle calls "the eye that comes from experience". They are the right people to inspire their brother Hellenes with their own concord and to share with them the fruits of their own experience.²

Besides the Chiots and other maritime Greeks under Ottoman and Venetian rule and the *ra'îyeh* under the protection of Western embassies at Constantinople, there were Greek and Vlach communities under Ottoman rule in Rumelia that served as carriers of the Modern Western culture into the main body of Orthodox Christendom by taking advantage of commercial opportunities opened up by Hapsburg military successes at the Ottoman Empire's expense. Though the Hapsburg armies' momentary incursion into Serbia in A.D. 1689 was followed by longer-lasting occupations of the Lower Morava Basin in A.D. 1718-39 and in A.D. 1788-92, no Serb Orthodox Christian territory south of the Save and Danube was permanently incorporated into the Hapsburg Monarchy. At the same time, these ephemeral military and political *actes de présence* of the Hapsburg Power in Serbia, and, still more, its permanent establishment in the ex-Ottoman portion of Hungary, just across the river from Belgrade, had the economic effect of stimulating an overland trade between Central Europe and the Levant; and, though, in the nineteenth-century chapter of this story, the linking of Vienna and Budapest with Constantinople and Salonica was a work of Austrian enterprise,³ the initiative in opening this overland trade-route up had been taken in the eighteenth century by Rumeliot Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte who transported their merchandise on the backs of pack-animals.⁴

These eighteenth-century Rumeliot trading ventures along the overland route were family businesses in which the heads of a business at its Rumelian headquarters were in partnership with kinsmen stationed at Budapest, Vienna, and Leipzig as the family firm's representatives at the trade's Western terminals. This business organization based on kinship was a key to commercial success which was at the same time a potent conductor of Modern Western culture into Rumeliot Orthodox Christian homes. The Rumelian terminals and headquarters of the trade were apt to be fastnesses that were less handicapped than favoured

¹ Cyril Loukaris, in his day, had been disgusted at the ignorance of Koréssi and other Chiots (Metzetal, op. cit., p. 96).—A.J.T.

² Korais, A.: *Ἀπάνθισμα Ἐπιστολῶν* (Athens 1839, Rallis), pp. 258-9. A much larger collection of Korais' letters has been published by N. M. Dhamalás (Athens 1885-6, Perris, 3 vols.).

³ The linking up of Constantinople with Austria-Hungary by a continuous permanent way was accomplished between the years A.D. 1872 and A.D. 1888. Salonica, and eventually Athens, were linked up with the Belgrade-Constantinople line by a branch which diverged from it at Nish.

⁴ At Shátishta, in South-Western Macedonia, on the 5th-6th September, 1921, the writer of this Study met an old man who, as a boy, had accompanied his father on one of the last of the overland caravan-expeditions between Shátishta and Central Europe before the pack-animal trade was killed by the building of the Oriental Railway. From start to finish, this overland voyage on foot had kept the merchant-adventurers on the road for many months at a stretch (see II. ii. 262).

by their physical inaccessibility in an age when, for the subjects of a disintegrating Ottoman Empire, the condition *sine qua non*, if they were to have any chance of economic prosperity, was the enjoyment of some exceptional relief from the prevalent pressure of Ottoman misgovernment.¹ The Westernization of a Rumeliot fastness is vividly portrayed in an account of a visit paid on the 23rd–24th December, 1801, by a British traveller to the industrial village of Ambelákia, which had struck him as being

'one of the most extraordinary places in all Turkey, because, being situate in the most secluded spot of the whole empire, and where no one would look for the haunts of active industry, it carries on an extensive commerce, the effects of which were once severely felt by our own manufacturers in Britain. . . .

'The town consists of four hundred houses, as it were hanging upon this side of Mount Ossa, above the Pass of Tempe;² it contains no Turkish inhabitants, and enjoys a state of freedom forcibly contrasted with the condition of other places in the same neighbourhood, although not exempted from imposts.

'We might almost have imagined ourselves to be in Germany. The inhabitants are many of them from that country; and they are a thriving healthy-looking people. They wear the eastern dress, but they have introduced many foreign manners and customs among those of Greece. Some German merchants, upon our arrival, sent to us the last *Frankfort Gazette*; and soon afterwards they paid us a visit. As we intended to pass the night here, we accompanied them to see their staple manufactory for dying cotton thread of a red colour, which not only supports and enriches the inhabitants, but has given rise to a commerce so considerable that whole caravans are laden with this cotton for the markets of Pest, Vienna, Leipsic, Dresden, etc.; and hardly a day passes without some exports being made, which are carried even to Hamburgh. . . .

'About this time the merchants of Ampelákia began to feel the effect of the preference given to English cotton thread in the German markets; and it was a subject of their complaint. "They foresaw," they said, "that the superior skill of the English manufacturers, and their being enabled to undersell every other competitor upon the Continent, would ultimately prove the ruin of their establishment." This, no doubt, is owing to the improvement adopted in Great Britain of spinning cotton thread in mills, by means of engines that are worked by steam, which has caused such a considerable reduction in its price—all the thread made at Ampelákia being spun by manual labour. The beautiful red tincture of the Turkish cotton will, however, long maintain its pristine celebrity. It has never been perfectly imitated in England. The English cotton thread is much finer, but it has not the tenacity of that which is manufactured in Turkey; neither is its colour so durable.

'The whole population of Ampelákia, amounting to four thousand souls, including even the children, is occupied in the preparation of this single article of commerce; the males in dyeing the wool, and the females in spinning the thread. . . . Although but a village, Ampelákia contains

¹ See the passage quoted from Rycaut's book in II. ii. 265, n. 2.

² On the 2nd September, 1921, the writer of this Study managed to catch one glimpse of Ambelákia from the window of a railway carriage as he was travelling by train through the Vale of Tempe on a section of the line between Athens and Salonica that had been built after the annexation of Southern Macedonia to the Kingdom of Greece as a result of the Balkan Wars of A.D. 1912–13.—A.J.T.

twenty-four fabrics for dyeing only. Two thousand five hundred bales of cotton (each bale weighing two hundred and fifty pounds) are annually dyed here, the principal produce of the manufacture being sent to Vienna.¹

The Reception of a Modern Western Culture by the Ottoman Orthodox Christians and its Political Consequences

The Modern Western influence that radiated into the main body of Orthodox Christendom through these overland and maritime channels was playing upon a society which was living at the time under a universal state imposed by an alien Power, and in these circumstances the course of the Orthodox Christian Westernizing movement, evoked by this radiation of the Western culture in its modern form, was different from that of the contemporary process in a Russian Orthodox Christendom that was overtaken by the impact of the Modern West in a universal state which had been made by, and remained in, native Russian hands. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom, unlike Russia, the attempt to adopt a Modern Western way of life was made on the educational plane first and on the political plane afterwards, instead of *vice versa*. The academic work of an Adhamándios Koraïs in his sanctum at Paris, and of a Vuk Karadžić in his sanctum at Vienna, preceded the insurrections of a Qāra George and a Miloš Obrenović in the Shumadiya and a Petrobey in the Mani against Ottoman rule, whereas, in a Russia ruled by a Russian autocrat, Peter the Great was not the disciple but the forerunner of a Westernizing school of Modern Russian men of letters.

The measure of the extent of the seventeenth-century revolution in the Greek attitude towards the culture of the West is given by the contrast between the disdain for Latin barbarism that had been felt or affected by Byzantine intellectuals of the school of Photius, Psellus, and Anna Comnena and the cult of 'Enlightened Europe'² that was practised and preached by Koraïs.

¹ Clarke, E. D.: *Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia and Africa*, Part II, Section iii (London 1816, Cadell and Davies), pp. 281 and 285-8, cited in II. ii. 26, n. 4. See also Beaujour, F.: *Tableau du Commerce de la Grèce* (Paris 1800, Renouard, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 272-5.

² 'Ambélakia par son activité ressemble plutôt à un bourg de Hollande qu'à un village de Turquie. Ce village répand par son industrie le mouvement et la vie dans tout le pays d'alentour, et il donne naissance à un commerce immense qui lie l'Allemagne à la Grèce par mille fils. Sa population, qui a triplé depuis quinze ans, est aujourd'hui de quatre mille âmes; et toute cette population vit dans les teintureries, comme un essaim d'abeilles vit dans une ruche. On ne connaît point dans ce village les vices ni les soucis qu'engendre l'oisiveté. Les cœurs des Ambélakiotes sont purs et leurs visages contents. La servitude qui flétrit à leurs pieds les campagnes qu'arrose le Pénée n'est point montée sur leurs coteaux: aucun Turk ne peut habiter ni séjourner parmi eux, et ils se gouvernent comme leurs ancêtres par leurs *protoyeros* et par leurs propres magistrats. Deux fois les farouches Musulmans de Larisse, jaloux de leur aisance et de leur bonheur, ont tenté d'escalader leurs montagnes et de piller leurs maisons; et deux fois ils ont été repoussés par des mains qui ont soudain quitté la navette pour s'armer du mousquet.

Tous les bras, même ceux des enfants, sont employés dans les teintureries d'Ambélakia; et, tandis que les hommes teignent le coton, les femmes le filent et le préparent...

'Il y a à Ambélakia vingt-quatre fabriques, où l'on teint chaque année deux mille cinq cents balles de coton, de cent okes la balle. Ces deux mille cinq cents balles passent toutes en Allemagne, et sont distribuées à Pest, Vienne, Leipsik, Dresde, Anspach et Bareuth. Les marchands ambélakiotes ont des comptoirs dans toutes ces villes, et ils y débitent le coton aux manufacturiers allemands.'

² 'Enlightened Europe'—*Φωτισμένη Ευρώπη*—is one of Koraïs' key phrases. See, for example, his use of it in a letter of the 8th November, 1810, to the Chiot community at

'Europe,'¹ wrote Korais from Paris on the 8th November, 1810, to his compatriots the Chiot settlers at Smyrna, 'used to despise us as an uneducated nation, unworthy of our splendid forefathers. . . . But now, since you true sons of Hellas have thought of adorning Chios with scientific learning, and the people of Kydhoniës [Ayvalyq] have done the same in their town, and the people of Constantinople have been moved to acquire knowledge, the Westerners have begun to take an interest in us and to study our movements—our enemies in order to denounce these as the lifeless convulsions of corpses, our friends in order to encourage them as the struggles against Death of a people raised from the dead. . . .

'What we have learnt hitherto is good, and we ought to be grateful to those who taught it, since they taught everything they knew. But the present state of Hellas demands something better, more systematic, more profound, more useful; and this, without doubt, is to be found in the learning of Europe, which many of our intellectual heroes have acquired not long since [a list of names follows], and which many priests and deacons as well as many laymen are seeking to acquire to-day for the profit and glory of Hellas by travelling in Europe.'²

In his unwearingly enthusiastic advocacy of education on Modern Western lines, Korais—more fortunate than Voulgcharis in his generation—was preaching to the just converted;³ and, among Greek and Serb

Smyrna (Korais, A.: *Ἀπάνθισμα Ἐπιστολῶν* (Athens 1839, Rallis), p. 30), and in another of the 17th June, 1824, addressed to the Rumeliot Greek brigand-patriot Odhysséfs (ibid., p. 15). In Korais' parlance, 'Enlightened Europe' means the secularized society of the contemporary Western World.

¹ It is noteworthy that Korais uses the word 'Europe' in the cultural sense as a synonym for 'the West', to the exclusion of the geographically European portion of the domain of Orthodox Christendom.

² *Ἀπάνθισμα*, pp. 33 and 39.

³ Many schools and colleges were founded on Ottoman territory by the private enterprise of Greek Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh*—both individuals and communities—between the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era and the Greek uprising of A.D. 1821. Schools had been founded before the close of the eighteenth century at Aretsi in Bithynia and at Mesolonghi—a Rumelian Venice inhabited by Greek fishermen who gained their livelihood from lagoons at the mouth of the Aspropótamo (Achelous) which also screened them from undue interference on the part of their Ottoman masters (Sathas, K.: *Τουρκοκρατουμένη Ἑλλάς* (Athens 1869, Koromilas), pp. 459–60). In the Morea, schools were founded at Vytina and other places between A.D. 1800 and A.D. 1821 (Khrysanthópoulos, Ph.: *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* (Athens 1899, Sakellarios, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 5)—perhaps partly under the inspiration of the college at Tripolitsa, and the schools elsewhere, that had been maintained by the Venetians during their occupation of the Morea at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see p. 169, above). A fuller account of the new schools founded in the Morea from A.D. 1781 onwards will be found in Sakellarios, op. cit., pp. 252–3. The most distinguished of the Moreot schools, in this scholar's judgement, was the school at Dhimitsina (ibid., p. 147). The Morea, however, was not in the van of the contemporary Greek educational movement (ibid., pp. 146 and 253); and the foundation and support of the schools in the Morea was largely the work of Moreot business men living abroad (ibid., p. 147). Benefactions to Greek schools at Yánnina evoked from Korais in Paris a letter of the 29th March, 1803, in which he congratulated the donor Kaplánís and, in doing so, urged him to 'set apart an annual sum . . . for buying the most important new books published in [Western] Europe', and to 'leave no stone unturned to provide two teachers, one of French and one of Latin, or at least one teacher of Latin, which is almost as essential as Greek' (*Ἀπάνθισμα*, p. 213). A college for the teaching of a Western curriculum was founded at Chios in A.D. 1809, under a headmaster who had been in France (David, op. cit., p. 77). The founding of a school at Smyrna by the Chiot community there, on the model of schools already established at Chios and Kydhoniës, was likewise the occasion of Korais' letter of the 8th November, 1810, cited on p. 182, n. 2, above. At Kydhoniës a college was founded in 1813 (Finlay, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 179), while at Athens in 1812 a 'Philomuse Society' was organized for the purpose of financing the education of Greeks in the West (Finlay, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 98). On the 21st November, 1816, Korais wrote from Paris to the trustees of the Greek secondary school at Chios: 'Set up a printing press. In France and Germany I know of humble villages which have been transformed

Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh* alike, the newly acquired taste for a secular Modern Western culture excited an ambition to shake off an Ottoman yoke with a view to enjoying political freedom in accordance with some Modern Western ideal. In the political circumstances in which they found themselves, this was a formidable undertaking; for the Ottoman millet-system, under which they had been living since the reign of Sultan Mehmed II Fâthî (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81), was at the opposite pole of the institutional gamut from the constitution of a secular Modern Western state, either in its pre-Revolutionary pattern of Enlightened Monarchy or in its post-Revolutionary pattern of Parliamentary Democracy.

The Ottoman Millet-System of Communal Autonomy

Though the constitution of the Sultan's Slave-Household was 'totalitarian' to the last degree,¹ the very efficiency that this total suppression of the individual *qul*'s personal liberty had instilled, in the institution's heyday, into a tiny Ottoman governing minority had made it possible for this handful of rulers to allow the great majority of their subjects to enjoy a far-reaching communal autonomy. While monopolizing the control of armed forces, police, criminal justice, and finance, the Porte was eager to save itself trouble by leaving other public business in the hands of autonomous communities whose heads were appointed by the Pādishāh and were personally responsible to him for the good behaviour of their flocks.²

This Ottoman communal autonomy had to be on a non-territorial basis—not so much for the sake of safeguarding the political security of an Ottoman Power which felt itself, in its prime, to be impregnable, as because, in consequence of a series of social catastrophes,³ the divers communities under Ottoman rule had come to be geographically intermingled with one another and at the same time economically differenti-

into splendid cities as soon as they had received the divine gift of printing' (*Apánthisma*, pp. 214-15). In a letter written on the 12th October, 1822, to the Chiois, to encourage them in their task of reconstruction after the catastrophe of A.D. 1822, he told them that 'the true ornaments of churches are ecclesiastics adorned with education and nobility of life . . . and for such ornaments you must look, not to expensive edifices and marbles, golden manuals, and other works of men's hands, in which God does not make his dwelling-place, but to secondary schools, libraries, printing, and all the other instruments of enlightenment and education' (*Apánthisma*, p. 46). After the establishment of the nucleus of an independent Greek national state, we find Korais, true to his principles, writing from Paris on the 5th January, 1828, to President Capodistrias about books for the nation, partly the gift of the brothers Zosimádhēs, which had been purchased in Western Europe and dispatched to Návplia by Korais (*Apánthisma*, pp. 265-8. See further pp. 269-70 for a letter of the 1st March, 1829, to the same correspondent on the same subject).

¹ See the sketch of it in III. iii. 22-30.

² This responsibility was brought home to the millet-bāshī of the Millet-i-Rûm by Sultan Murād IV when he put the Oecumenical Patriarch Cyril Loukari to death on the 26th June, 1638, for having failed to prevent the Don Cossacks from seizing Azov (see pp. 156, above), and again by Sultan Mahmūd II when he put to death the Oecumenical Patriarch Gregory on Easter Day the 22nd April, 1821, for having failed to prevent the Moreots from rebelling against the Porte. From the Ottoman constitutional standpoint the execution of Gregory was a warrantable exercise of severity, since the Moreots, unlike the Don Cossacks, were Ottoman subjects for whom the Oecumenical Patriarch was responsible politically as well as ecclesiastically.

³ Chief among them being the disintegration of the main body of Orthodox Christendom and the recurrent irruptions of Eurasian Nomads into both South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor.

ated, till it had become hard to say whether they were nationalities, occupational groups, or social classes. Though the Jews and the Roman Catholics of the Latin Rite were perhaps the only communities of Ottoman subjects that were entirely divorced from the cultivation of the soil, the other communities likewise tended to become adepts in some particular profession or craft¹—which any of their adherents might practise anywhere within the Ottoman frontiers—besides constituting one element in the local peasantry of some particular region. The Greeks, Vlachs, and Armenians, for example, like the Jews and the Latins, were ubiquitous as men of business; the Greeks were also ubiquitous as sailors and the Albanians as masons and latterly also as mercenary soldiers, while the Vlachs had a wide range as shepherds, and the Bulgars as military grooms and market gardeners.² The Ottoman system of communal autonomy was admirably framed to meet this 'geosocial' situation;³ for the division of powers between the autonomous communities and the Imperial Government was not territorial but functional. On the one hand the communities did not share with the Porte any of the four above-mentioned prerogatives of sovereignty, even in districts in which their adherents happened to constitute a majority of the local population; on the other hand the measure of self-government delegated to them by the Porte was exercised by their communal authorities throughout the Empire—with whose dominions the domain of each autonomous community was thus in fact coterminous.

This network of autonomies—all coterminous with Ottoman sovereignty and with one another—embraced all the Empire's inhabitants; for, though the term 'millet' technically applied to non-Muslim *ra'īyeh* only, a similar autonomy was enjoyed by the community of free Muslim Ottoman subjects and also by the communities of resident aliens together with their Ottoman protégés. The responsible headship of an autonomous community was conferred—or imposed—by the Porte *ex officio* on some appropriate ecclesiastical dignitary, if such was to be found. The head of the free Ottoman Muslim community, for example, was the Sheykh-el-Islām ('Grand Mufti') of Constantinople; the head of the Ottoman Orthodox Christian community (Greek, Bulgar, Serb, Ruman, Albanian, Georgian, Qāramānly, and Arab, without distinction) was the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople; the head of the Ottoman Gregorian (Armenian Monophysite) Christian community was the Gregorian Patriarch of Constantinople; and so on. These Muslim, Christian, and Jewish prelates (for the Jews, too, were organized in an ecclesiastical corporation) were compelled by the Porte to accept political responsibility for co-religionists who were Ottoman subjects, even when these were not members of their own ecclesiastical flock. The Oecumenical Patriarch, for instance, as millet-bāshy of the Millet-i-

¹ Professional specialization is apt to be a retort to social penalization (see II. ii. 208–12).

² See II. ii. 223.

³ The situation was, of course, one of the familiar features of universal states, and the Ottoman millet-system was built on foundations that had been laid successively by the Achaemenian and Sasanian Empires and the Arab Caliphate in their efforts to cope with previous presentations of the same political problem. The wealth of the historical experience which the Ottoman millet-system thus incorporated was, no doubt, one of the secrets of its long-continuing success.

Rûm, was responsible politically to the Porte for Ottoman subjects who were the spiritual subjects of the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical peers the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, the Archbishop of Ochrida, and the President of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus, as well as for Ottoman subjects who were the spiritual subjects of the Oecumenical Patriarchate itself; and, when the Gregorian Bishop of Brusa was raised to the rank of Patriarch by Sultan Mehmed II Fâtih in A.D. 1461, he had to pay for this ecclesiastical aggrandisement by submitting to be saddled with political responsibility for Christian *ra'îyeh* who were not only outside his ecclesiastical jurisdiction but were not even of the same communion.¹ The role played by these ecclesiastical millet-bâshys of autonomous communities of Ottoman subjects was played by the ambassadors of foreign Powers in the government of their own nationals and protégés resident in the Ottoman Empire, and by the Pâdishâh himself in the government of a Slave-Household that was his corporate instrument for exercising his sovereign powers.²

It will be seen that the Ottoman Millet-i-Rûm, just because its constitution was so well adapted to the social circumstances of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the Ottoman Age, was utterly unlike any secular Modern Western political institution; and, as soon as the Westernization of the 'Osmanlis' Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* reached a point at which it awakened political ambitions in their hearts, they were faced with the question how they were to pass from this utterly un-Western régime to some form of Modern Western political life.

¹ See Steen de Jehay, F. van den: *De la Situation Légale des Sujets Ottomans Non-Musulmans* (Brussels 1906, Schepens), p. 62. In A.D. 1461 the newly created Gregorian Patriarch was, in fact, made millet-bâshy of all non-Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* in the Ottoman Empire. Thereafter, in course of time, his political responsibility gradually came to be restricted to Gregorian Christian Ottoman subjects by the Porte's progressive recognition *de facto*, though not in every case *de jure*, of the communal autonomy of the Jacobite Monophysites, the Nestorians, the Roman Catholics of divers rites (Latins and Uniate ex-Monothelite Maronites, ex-Nestorian Chaldeans, ex-Jacobites, and ex-Gregorians), and eventually also the Protestants. The patriarchal vicars of the Latin rite, who administered the Latin Roman Catholic Ottoman community from A.D. 1599 onwards (Steen de Jehay, *op. cit.*, p. 308), were exceptional among the Ottoman millet-bâshys in being non-Ottoman subjects appointed by an ecclesiastical authority, the Pope, who was not an Ottoman subject either and whose see lay outside the Ottoman Empire's frontiers. The Gregorian, like the Roman Catholic, subjects of the Porte were spiritual subjects of an ecclesiastical authority who was not an Ottoman subject—in this case the Gregorian Catholicos of Echmiazin, whose see was under Safawî Shi'î Muslim sovereignty from A.D. 1501-2 onwards (see I. i. 371) and was ceded by Persia to Russia in A.D. 1828. The Catholicos, however, was impotent to give to the Gregorian Patriarch of Constantinople the support and protection which the Constantinopolitan Patriarchal Vicar of the Latin rite could be sure of receiving from the Vatican.

² Though the *ci-devant* Christians from whom the Pâdishâh's Slave-Household was recruited invariably became converts to Islam before being commissioned (see III. iii. 37, n. 1), the act of religious conversion did not depress these individually disciplined and dedicated, and therefore politically all-powerful, Ottoman Muslim public slaves to a political parity with their politically powerless free Muslim co-religionists. The Pâdishâh's Household in its heyday was virtually an autonomous community in itself, and Sultan Bayezid II (*imperabat* A.D. 1481-1512) gave them the privilege of being exempted from the jurisdiction of the *shari'* courts and being judged exclusively by their own officers (Lybyer, A. H.: *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass. 1913, Harvard University Press), p. 116). The Seyyids (i.e. recognized claimants to descent from the Prophet Muhammad) likewise virtually constituted a separate autonomous community of their own under the headship of the Nakib el-Eshraf (Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-7; Rycaut, Sir Paul: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey and Brome), pp. 110-11). See further, X. ix. 37.

The Fiasco of the Phanariots' 'Great Idea'

In the course of the century ending in A.D. 1821 the Phanariot Greek entourage of the Oecumenical Patriarchate came to transmute their old dream of resuscitating the East Roman ghost of the Roman Empire¹ into a new dream of solving 'the Western Question' on the political plane by converting the Ottoman Empire, as Peter the Great had converted the Russian Empire, into a replica of such contemporary Western multinational 'enlightened monarchies' as the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Sardinia; and this ambitious Phanariot Greek political aspiration was fostered by an encouraging series of progressive political successes.

In making the Oecumenical Patriarch *ex officio* millet-bāshī of all the Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh* of an expanding Ottoman Empire, Sultan Mehmed II Fātih and Sultan Selīm I Yawūz had given this Constantinopolitan prelate political authority over Orthodox Christian peoples that had never been under the rule of any Constantinopolitan emperor since the Arab conquest of Syria and Egypt in the seventh century of the Christian Era;² and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the political power of the Phanar had been farther extended by the action of their free Muslim fellow subjects. During the hundred years following the death, in A.D. 1566, of Suleymān the Magnificent the free Muslims had compelled the Pādishāh's Slave-Household to take them into partnership in the government of the Ottoman Empire, and they had followed up this political victory over the *ci-devant* Christian *qullar* by taking the Greek *ra'iyyeh*, in their turn, into partnership with themselves.

The creation of the offices of Dragoman of the Porte and Dragoman of the Fleet, in order to employ Ottoman Greek ability in the Ottoman service for redressing an adverse balance in the struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Western Powers, had been followed in the eighteenth century by measures in favour of the Greeks at the expense of non-Greek Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh* who had openly taken sides with the 'Osmanlis' Hapsburg and Russian adversaries. During the 110 years between the Ruman Prince Demetrius Cantemir's desertion to the Russian camp in A.D. 1711 and the Greek Prince Hypsilanti's crossing of the Pruth in A.D. 1821, the Porte consistently appointed Phanariot Greek instead of Ruman princes to the thronelets of Wallachia and Moldavia.³ In A.D. 1737, after the Serb Patriarch Arsenije IV had followed the precedent, set in A.D. 1690 by his predecessor Arsenije III,⁴ of inciting his flock to take up arms against the Porte in the Hapsburg cause and subsequently seeking asylum in Hapsburg territory, the Porte appointed a Greek to the vacant patriarchal throne of Peć;⁵ and in A.D. 1766 the Porte suppressed both the Serb Patriarchate of Peć and the West Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ochrida⁶ and placed the non-Greek flocks of both these hitherto ecclesiastically autonomous Orthodox Christian churches under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of a Greek

¹ See VI. vii. 29-31.

² See II. ii. 225, n. 1.

³ See Hadrovica, L.: *L'Église Serbe sous la Domination Turque* (Paris 1947, Presse Universitaires de France), p. 153.

⁴ On this point, see IV. iv. 622.

⁵ See pp. 166-8, above.

⁶ See IV. iv. 622, n. 6.

Oecumenical Patriarch who, as millet-bāshy of the Millet-i-Rûm, was already politically responsible for them. The dependence on the Phanariots into which the Porte had fallen by the close of the eighteenth century for the conduct of ever more important diplomatic dealings with ever more potent Western Powers is illustrated by the fact that, when in A.D. 1793 the Porte established permanent diplomatic missions in Paris, Vienna, London, and Berlin, it could find no Muslim 'Osmanlis competent to serve as ambassadors, and was compelled to appoint Greek Christian chargés d'affaires.¹

Between A.D. 1766 and A.D. 1821 the Phanariot Greeks might have fancied that they had within their reach an ascendancy in the Ottoman Empire of the kind that the contemporary King-Emperor Joseph II had been working to secure for the Germans in the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy. By this time, however, the Phanariots' apparently promising political position had actually been undermined by repercussions of revolutionary Western political events. In the first place, Enlightened Monarchy—the one Modern Western political institution to which it was practically possible for the Phanariots to accommodate themselves—had been abruptly supplanted by Nationalism as the dominant political ideal in the West itself,² and in the second place the non-Greek Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* of the Ottoman Empire foresaw no satisfaction for their own awakening national aspirations in the exchange of a Turkish Muslim for a Phanariot Greek ascendancy—as the Rumanian population of the Danubian Principalities showed when, after 110 years' local experience of Phanariot Greek rule, they made a fiasco of Hypsi-landi's raid by turning a deaf ear to the Greek invader's summons to them to rally to him as fellow members of an Ottoman Orthodox

¹ See d'Ohsson, I. M.: *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1788-1824, 7 vols.), vol. vii (Didot), p. 573.

² The victory of the ideal of Nationalism over the ideal of Enlightened Monarchy in Ottoman Orthodox Christian souls is reflected in the writings of Koraïs, who was as ardently nationalist as he was anti-Phanariot and anti-Byzantine.

In a letter addressed to a Greek National Delegation in London, he cites the authority of Franklin, Washington, Jefferson, and Bentham, and quotes one of Franklin's sayings (*Apánthisma*, pp. 20-25). In a letter of the 4th July, 1823, addressed to Alexander Mavrogordáto, on the new constitution of the infant Greek national state, he writes: 'Persuade our countrymen to adopt the institutions of the Anglo-Americans [i.e. the people of the United States] (*ibid.*, p. 255), and in the same letter he conveys his hostility to the Phanariots, though this without discourtesy to his correspondent, through a topical application of the text 'Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?' (*ibid.*, p. 254).

Koraïs' political convictions worked together with his linguistic and literary ideals to make him execrate the East Roman Empire.

'The yoke of the Romans, the Graeco-Roman Emperors and the Turks weighed each more heavily than the last upon the Hellenes', he wrote in a letter of the 10th January, 1822, addressed to the leaders of the Greek national uprising (*Apánthisma*, p. 4), and in his letter of the 12th October, 1822, to the Chiois he declared that, 'if the Graeco-Roman Emperors had given to the education of the race a small part of the attention that they gave to multiplying churches and monasteries, they would not have betrayed the race to other rulers far worse deluded than they were. For all the evils that we have suffered from the maniac Muslims we are indebted to those material-minded and fleshly Christian Emperors. Now that our turn has come, let us show ourselves wiser and truer Christians than they did, and learn by the misfortunes which they suffered in their generation and bequeathed to us.' (*Apánthisma*, pp. 46-47).

'That macarone Phrantzís! Reading three or four pages of him was enough to make my gout worse! C'est une horreur! And then we are surprised that the Graeco-Roman Empire fell!' (*Apánthisma*, p. 133).

Christian community that was to liberate itself from the Ottoman yoke by taking up arms under Phanariot Greek leadership.¹

The Disruption of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom by a Modern Western Nationalism

This frustration of the Phanariots' 'Great Idea' was an intimation that a multi-national Orthodox Christian Millet-i-Rûm which had set its heart on adopting a Modern Western way of life on the political as well as on the educational plane would now have to sort itself out into a patchwork of parochial Greek, Ruman, Serb, Bulgar, Albanian, and Georgian national states—on the pattern of France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and Great Britain—in each of which a particular language, instead of a particular religion, would be the shibboleth uniting 'fellow countrymen' and distinguishing them from 'foreigners', even though these 'foreigners' might be Christians of the same Orthodox Faith who, under the Ottoman dispensation, had been fellow members, *ex officio religionis*, of the same empire-wide Millet-i-Rûm.

At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the makings of this exotic Modern Western pattern in the linguistic and political map of the Ottoman Empire were exiguous. Within the Ottoman frontiers at that date there were few districts whose population was even approximately homogeneous in linguistic nationality, and few which possessed even the rudiments of local statehood. Ottoman Orthodox Christian autonomous territories could almost be counted on the fingers of one hand: the two Rumanian principalities Wallachia and Moldavia² and the four Georgian principalities Gurjel, Mingrelia, Imeretia, and Abkhazia would exhaust the list. The only other materials for building Orthodox Christian national states out of the ruins of a disintegrating Ottoman Empire were single communities—like the Greek and Moreot Albanian islands and portlets noticed above³—which enjoyed some measure of autonomy by charter, custom, or inadvertence, and barbarian fastnesses—like the Mani, the Agrapha,⁴ the Shumadiya, and Montenegro—which had either never effectively been brought under Ottoman rule or had effectively succeeded in casting it off.⁵ The enduring political effects of ephemeral eighteenth-century occupations of the Lower Morava Basin by the Hapsburgs and of the Morea by the Venetians declared themselves in the nineteenth century when these areas became the nuclei of a Serb and a Greek national state.⁶

Bulgarian and Albanian national states⁷ were slower in making their

¹ This Rumanian reaction to Hypsilandi's adventure, and its decisive effect on the Greek adventurer's fortunes, have been noticed in II. ii. 227.

² The adjoining principality of Transylvania had likewise been under Ottoman suzerainty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Ottoman Power had been at its apogee; but the Rumanian Orthodox Christian and Uniate element in the population of Transylvania was not one of the politically enfranchised Transylvanian 'nations', though in numbers it may already have been equal to the Magyars, Szekels, and Saxons put together.

³ On pp. 174-5.

⁴ See p. 175, n. 3, above.

⁵ The nuclei of the Greek successor-state of the Ottoman Empire have been enumerated, by anticipation, in II. ii. 261-2.

⁶ See V. v. 637-8.

⁷ In Albania, by the time when she recovered her independence, the Orthodox Christian element in the population had dwindled to a minority confined to the South.

appearance, and, when they did appear, they owed their foundation to the action of foreign Powers. The Bulgarian successor-state of the Ottoman Empire was brought to birth in A.D. 1877 by Russia and the Albanian in A.D. 1913 by the Hapsburg Monarchy and Italy. Moreover, all these ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian national states came into existence piecemeal, and the labour of winning a fragmentary autonomy or independence had to be followed up by the further labour of bringing the fragments together.¹ Moldavia had to be united with Wallachia, Montenegro with Serbia, Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria, an autonomous Samos and an autonomous Crete with a nuclear Kingdom of Greece; and the process of redistributing Ottoman territory into national domains had to be completed by a dismemberment of Macedonia—the most recalcitrant of all Ottoman territories to this painfully protracted process of partition, just because Macedonia had been the quintessence of the Ottoman Empire on the Rumelian side of the Straits.

This radical reconstruction of the political map of Ottoman Orthodox Christendom, in order to make it conform to a revolutionary Modern Western pattern, spelled misery for millions of human beings over a period of four or five generations beginning at the outbreak of the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768–74 and ending only in the breathing-space between the First and the Second World War; and the suffering inflicted became more widespread and concurrently more intense as the procrustean operation was successively performed upon territories and populations that were less and less amenable to being reorganized politically on a basis of nationality in the Modern Western understanding of the idea.² Even the Morea, as it was in A.D. 1821, could not be made as Greek as a contemporary France was French without exterminating a previously dominant Ottoman Muslim minority, amounting to about 10 per cent. of the total population of the eyālet,³ by a barbarous combination of eviction and massacre.

*κλαίνε μανούλαις γιὰ παιδιά, γυναῖκες γιὰ τοὺς ἄντρες,
κλαίει καὶ μιὰ χανούμισσα γιὰ τὸ μοναχογιό της.⁴*

This exultantly savage Orthodox Christian Greek Moreot paean on the destruction of the tyrannical Muslim Albanian Moreot township of Lála in June 1821⁵ is characteristic of the inhuman spirit that inspired the partition of the Ottoman Empire during the next hundred years. In a world in which the existing communities were geographically intermingled and economically interdependent, an indigenous millet system of communal organization, which had faithfully reflected this Ottoman

The Centre had become predominantly Muslim (see pp. 164–5, above), while the North had remained predominantly Roman Catholic.

¹ The apprenticeship which many of these fragments had to serve under Ottoman suzerainty, as the price of being stamped with the seal of legitimacy by the Porte, has been noticed in VI. vii. 16–17.

² See II. ii. 227–8.

³ See pp. 681–3, below.

⁴ *Οἱ Λαλιώτισσες*, in Politis, N. G.: *Ἐκλογαὶ ἀπὸ τὰ Τραγούδια τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Λαοῦ* (Athens 1914, Estia), p. 18: 'Mothers weep for children, wives for their husbands, and a lady [khanum] weeps for her only son.'

⁵ On the 31st May, 1912, the ruins of Lála were still lying desolate when the writer of this Study walked past them that morning en route from Olympia to Dhírvri.

society's structure, could not be rejected in favour of an exotic ideology of Nationalism, which reflected the quite alien structure of a Late Modern Western Society, without precipitating an Ishmaelistic struggle for existence.¹ In preaching to the hitherto widely dispersed speakers of each of the interwoven languages of the Ottoman Empire that they had a hitherto unheard-of sacred right to possess a sovereign independent linguistically homogeneous national state of their own on the pattern of a France or a Spain, the Ottoman Orthodox Christian apostles of a novel Western political creed were, in effect, inciting their brethren to make a virtue of evicting or massacring their neighbours for the crime of having inherited a different mother tongue; and, in the name of an alien ideal which had thus been imported in an evil hour, the shot-silk fabric of a seamless Ottoman robe was remorselessly plucked to pieces by cruel hands, and the broken threads of each diverse national hue were then roughly rewoven into so many separate rags to make a patchwork coat of many colours in which the only note of uniformity was a monotonously pervasive stain of blood.² A crescendo of atrocities and tragedies came to its climax in the wholesale deportation of an Armenian minority in the eastern vilayets in A.D. 1915 by order of a 'New 'Osmanli' government of the day, and the wholesale flight of a Greek Orthodox Christian

¹ Gen. xvi. 12.

² This morally devastating effect of the impact of a Modern Western Nationalism upon an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom during this dark century of ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian history was aggravated by the vein of Archaism with which the intrusive Western ideology had been charged, before export, by a Western Romantic Movement. A partition of Macedonia between Bulgarian, Turkish, Greek, Albanian, and Serbian national successor-states of the Ottoman Empire would have been difficult enough to achieve without fearful injustices and atrocities, even if each of the interested nationalities had scrupulously limited its claims to territories in which a majority of the living generation of the inhabitants genuinely wished to be included in the claimant nationality's inchoate national state. The conflict between rival national claims, and the malice, hatred, and all uncharitableness envenoming the feelings of the ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian peoples towards one another, were, however, further accentuated by an Archaism which, instead of being content to take the living map as the basis for its territorial claims, insisted upon basing these on some perhaps quite ephemeral past state of the map in which the political domination, as distinct from the national domain, of this or that people had been at its maximum extent. The Serbs, for example, would claim the frontiers of the fourteenth-century empire of Stephen Dushan; the Bulgars would claim the frontiers of the tenth-century empires of Samuel and Symeon; the Greeks would claim the frontiers of the eleventh-century empire of Basil the Bulgar-slayer (*Βουλγαροκτόνος*)—and this not as a multi-national empire in which the Greeks were merely to exercise an ascendancy, but as a Greek national state that was to be as Greek as France was French.

The Ottoman Turks themselves, when the Turkish diaspora in Macedonia caught the infection of an archaistic Western Nationalism from their insurgent Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh*, toyed with the conceit of seeking an ultra-archaistic compensation for a Rumili which could never be saved for a Turkish national state, though it had been the heart of an Ottoman Empire. Academic-minded Turkish archaist-nationalists cast back to a pre-Islamic and pre-sedentary chapter in the history of a Eurasian Nomad minority of their forebears (see p. 262, n. 1, below). They consoled themselves for the loss of Rumili by conjuring up the vision of Qyzyl Elmā: a legendary Garden of Eden, in which a primeval Turkish people had eaten of the magic fruit of the Red Apple tree long before Ertoghul's fugitive war-band had been blown out of the Steppe by a Mongol explosion. Were not at least two-thirds of the Turkish-speaking portion of Mankind still to be found in Eurasia outside an Ottoman Turkey's frontiers? One of the most signal evidences of Ghāzi Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk's political genius was his clear recognition that a visionary pursuit of this mirage of a Yeni Tûrân beyond the eastern limits of an Ottoman Turkish national home in Anatolia was bound to bring Turkey into a disastrous headlong collision with a Russia who had not indicated any relaxation of her hold upon the Crimea, the Volga Basin, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in styling herself 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' instead of 'the Russian Empire'.

minority from Western Anatolia in A.D. 1922 after the débâcle of invading Greek armies that had avenged Mehmed Fâtiḥ's conquest of Constantinople by overrunning the cradle of the Ottoman Power. It was only after these supreme catastrophes that the sufferings of 'displaced persons' were mitigated by the beneficent intervention of the League of Nations, and the national feud between Greeks and Turks was brought to an end by the statesmanship of Elefthérios Venizélos and Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk.¹

Orthodox Christian national states that had come into existence in these untoward circumstances and on this petty scale could not, of course, indulge, like a Westernizing Russian Empire, in the ambition of playing, *vis-à-vis* the Modern West, the role of the East Roman Empire *vis-à-vis* a Medieval Western Christendom. Their feeble energies were absorbed in local disputes over small parcels of territory, and, though the territorial aspirations of the Serb and Rumanian national successor-states of the Ottoman Empire were partly responsible for the break-up of one great Modern Western state, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy,² the bitterest animosities of these politically reanimated Orthodox Christian peoples were those which they harboured against one another. Even if the emergence of this cluster of Orthodox Christian national states in South-Eastern Europe had been forestalled by a successful realization of the Phanariots' 'Great Idea', a reconstituted East Roman Empire could never have challenged the West on its own account, supposing that its makers had conceived the ambition; for it could never even have come into existence, or kept itself in existence after being set up, unless it had been established by Russian force of arms and been maintained as Russia's satellite. This did not come to pass, though the Empress Catherine II of Russia played with the idea³ after her great victory over the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74. In the event the petty national states into which the Ottoman Millet-i-Rûm eventually sorted itself out in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries found themselves in an international situation not unlike that of their predecessors during the centuries immediately preceding the establishment of a *Pax Ottomanica* in the main body of Orthodox Christendom. In that age the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, and Rumans had been confronted with a choice between domination by their Medieval Western fellow Christians and domination by the 'Osmanlis. In a post-Ottoman Age the alternatives that confronted them were incorporation into a secular Modern Western body social and subjection, first to a Petrine, and thereafter to a Communist, Russia.

Russia's Competition with the West for the Ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christians' Allegiance

In A.D. 1952 a majority of these non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples were actually under Russia's military and political control. Georgia was one of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union; Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania were satellites of the Soviet Union. The

¹ See VI. vii 30-31.

² See II. ii. 177-88.

³ See II. ii. 225, n 2.

only two non-Russian Orthodox Christian countries which at this date were not in Russia's clutches were Greece—where the Russians had eventually been worsted in an undeclared war-after-the-war between the Soviet Union and the United States in which the combatants on the two sides had been Greek proxies of the foreign belligerents—and Yugoslavia, which had thrown off a post-war Russian hegemony without having been overtly molested up to date; and even Yugoslavia, whose rulers had not repudiated Communism in repudiating their allegiance to Moscow, had found herself, like Greece, unable to keep Russia at bay out of her own resources, without drawing upon American aid. At the same time it was significant that, save for the single case of Georgia,¹ this Russian domination over non-Russian Orthodox Christian countries had been established only since the end of the General War of A.D. 1939-45; that even an indirect exercise of Russian power was everywhere odious to all but a small minority of Communists who were governing these countries with Russian backing as the Soviet Government's agents; that the Yugoslav Communists had already rebelled against the hegemony of their Russian comrades; and that this recalcitrance against a Russian ascendancy was an old story which could be illustrated from the history of Russia's relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia in the nineteenth century, at dates long previous to the metamorphosis of the Russian Empire into the Soviet Union.

On the morrow of the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1877-8, for example, Russia had looked forward, with a not unreasonable confidence, to exercising a paramount political influence over a Serbia whom she had just rescued from a single-handed struggle with Turkey, over a Rumania to whom she had just presented the Dobruja, and, above all, over a Bulgaria whom she had just brought into existence *ex nihilo* through the sheer force of Russian arms. Yet, in the sequel, Bulgaria shook off Russia's tutelage at the first opportunity, Serbia veered back for a generation (A.D. 1881-1903) into the political orbit of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and Rumania—forgetting the acquisition of the Dobruja and only remembering that, in exchange for this piece of Ottoman territory, Russia had forced her to retrocede the fraction of Bessarabia that had been

¹ The United Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, which was the largest and most important of the Georgian states, placed itself under Russian suzerainty in A.D. 1783; was annexed by Russia at the turn of the years A.D. 1800 and A.D. 1801 (the exact date is variously given as either the 18th December, 1800, or the 18th January, 1801); and was finally subdued, after a last rebellion, in A.D. 1812. The Principality of Mingrelia was annexed by Russia in A.D. 1803 and the Principality of Imeretia in A.D. 1804-10. Persia renounced in Russia's favour all claims over Kartli-Kakheti, Mingrelia, Imeretia, and Abkhazia in the Russo-Persian peace treaty concluded at Gulistan in A.D. 1813. Turkey recognized Russian sovereignty over Kartli-Kakheti, Mingrelia, and Imeretia, and also over Gurii, in the Russo-Turkish peace treaty concluded at Adrianople on the 14th September, 1829, Art. 4. In the same article Turkey ceded to Russia the town of Akhaltsik and the fort of Akhalkalak. Details will be found in W. E. D. Allen: 'The Caucasus', in *The Baltic and Caucasian States* (London 1923, Hodder and Stoughton), pp. 195-9, and in the same author's *A History of the Georgian People* (London 1932, Regan Paul), pp. 210-18.

The Russian annexation of Georgia at the beginning of the nineteenth century, like the French conquest of Corsica in A.D. 1768, had the unforeseen effect of providing a political genius born in the annexed territory with a field for his abilities and ambitions which would have been closed to him if his obscure and secluded homeland had not been swallowed up by an acquisitive Great Power. No more would have been heard of Stalin as a Georgian priest than of Napoleon as a Corsican patriot.

presented to Rumania by the victors in the Crimean war¹—came to look upon Russia, instead of Turkey, as her national bugbear.²

This anti-Russian feeling in non-Russian Orthodox Christian countries might seem at first sight surprising at a time when Orthodox Christianity was still the established religion of a Russian state that claimed to be the heir of the East Roman Empire. In the ninth-century Macedonian Slav dialect known as 'Old Slavonic' the Russian, Rumanian,³ Bulgarian, and Serbian Orthodox churches had a common liturgical language, while the Russian, Bulgar, and Serb peoples were also more intimately linked by the kinship between their living Slav vernaculars. Why did 'Pan-Slavism' and 'Pan-Orthodoxy' prove of so little avail to Russia in her dealings with the Slavonic-speaking and other

¹ Bessarabia—the slice of territory between the Rivers Dniestr and Pruth—had been divided under the Ottoman régime into two parts: the Bujăq, on the Black Sea Coast, which was under Nomad occupation and Ottoman administration, and an inland part which was cultivated by a Rumanian and Ukrainian peasantry and was an integral portion of the autonomous principality of Moldavia. In A.D. 1812, Russia had compelled the Porte to cede both parts of Bessarabia to her as the price of peace at the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1807–12 (Russo-Turkish peace treaty concluded at Bucarest on the 28th May, 1812, Art. 4).

² This substitution of Russia for Turkey as the principal foreign object of the Rumanian people's dislike and apprehension was a natural consequence of this particular Orthodox Christian nation's situation and history. Situated, as they were, in the fairway of Russia's overland avenue for the invasion of Rumelia, the Rumanians had been the first Ottoman Orthodox Christian people to have a first-hand experience of a Russian 'liberating' army; and they had also been the only Ottoman Orthodox Christian people that had escaped the experience of being subject to a local Muslim 'ascendancy'. The treaties under which the two Ruman principalities Wallachia and Moldavia had originally submitted to Ottoman suzerainty had provided that they should be exempt from colonization by Muslims and should continue to be governed by Christian princes; and consequently the misgovernment and oppression from which they had suffered under an Ottoman dispensation had been inflicted on them first by Ruman Orthodox Christian and later by Greek Orthodox Christian, but never directly by Turkish Muslim, hands. In these circumstances it is not surprising that in A.D. 1711, when a Russian army made its appearance in the Lower Danube Basin for the first time since Svyatoslav's retreat in A.D. 971 or 972 (see p. 127, n. 2, above), the Rumanians should have shown reserve, whereas the Montenegrins and Herzegovinians rose in arms at the arrival, not of a Russian army, but of a mere inflammatory scrap of Russian paper in the shape of a proclamation. It is true that in A.D. 1711 the Hospodar of Moldavia, Demetrius Cantemir, did throw in his lot with the Russians (see p. 162, above), and that there was a party in favour of the same policy in the more distant, as well as more important, principality of Wallachia; but the Hospodar of Wallachia, Constantine Brăncoveanu, refused to commit himself and eventually came down on the side of his Ottoman suzerain, and in this policy he seems to have had behind him a majority of the Wallachian boyars. 'As one of them said: "It is dangerous to declare for Russia until the Tsar's army crosses the Danube. Who knows, moreover, whether Wallachia in the power of the Russians will be happier than under the dominion of the Turks?"' After the battle on the Pruth, one of Brăncoveanu's [Brăncoveanu's] close adherents wrote in praise of his wisdom in 'awaiting the decision of a battle in which it has finally been seen that, beneath German clothes, the Muscovites are still Muscovites'. Here in two nutshell is summed up the reason for Peter's failure to win Wallachia' (Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), p. 44, where the reader will find the references to the sources of the two dicta quoted above).

³ In the Rumanian principalities, 'Old Slavonic' continued to be the sole current liturgical language of the Orthodox Christian Church down to A.D. 1679, when the Metropolitan of Moldavia, Dositheos, published at Jassy a translation of the Liturgy into Rumanian. The Bible likewise was translated into Rumanian in A.D. 1688. The introduction of the Rumanian version of the Liturgy encountered opposition, and in the reign of Prince Constantine Brăncoveanu of Wallachia (*junegatur* A.D. 1688–1714) there was a reaction in favour of the 'Old Slavonic' classical language. Thereafter, Greek ousted 'Old Slavonic' as the language of higher secular education in the principalities, while 'Rumanian remained the language of the Liturgy' (Jorga, N.: *Geschichte der Rumänen und ihrer Kultur* (Hermannstadt [Sibiu] 1929, Krafft und Drotleff), pp. 233–4 and 239–40).

Orthodox Christian peoples to whom she repeatedly gave such effective help in their struggles to extricate themselves from Ottoman toils?

The answer appears to be that the Ottoman Orthodox Christians had already fallen under the spell of the Modern Western Civilization before Russia had offered herself to be their champion and redeemer, and that Russia was attractive to them—in so far as she did attract them at all—neither because she was Slav nor because she was Orthodox but because she was a pioneer in a cultural enterprise of 'winning the West' which was the goal of their own ambitions. The closer their acquaintance with Russia, the more alive the non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples became to the superficiality of a Petrine Russia's Western veneer. 'Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tatar!'¹ However much these former *ra'iyyeh* might be indebted to Russia for their liberation from an Ottoman yoke, it was natural that they should take advantage of their newly gained liberty by going straight to the Western fountain-head instead of being content to receive the living waters of the West through a mud-choked Russian channel. This is perhaps the explanation of the apparent paradox that the prestige of Russia in Greek, Ruman, Serb, and Bulgar eyes diminished in proportion as Russia became a more familiar figure and a more potent presence in these South-East European Orthodox Christian peoples' lives.

Russian influence over them was, in fact, at its apogee in the generation immediately following the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768–74. The decisive victory over a once irresistible Ottoman Power that had been won in this war by Russia thanks to her adoption of a Modern Western military technique was as thrilling for the 'Osmanlis' *ra'iyyeh* as it was disconcerting to the 'Osmanlis themselves; and, though the Russian naval expeditionary force in the Mediterranean had done the Moreot Greeks a poor service by irresponsibly inciting them to revolt without being able to give them effective aid against the avalanche of Albanian Muslim barbarians whom the 'Osmanlis let loose upon them in retaliation,² the moral effect of this unfortunate Greek experience of Russian intervention was more than offset by the Russians' naval and military successes in the war and by the vigour of their political exploitation of the terms of peace.

The peace treaty concluded at Kuchük Qaynarja on the 21st July, 1774, stipulated (Art. 11) that Russia was to have the same treatment, rights, and status in the Ottoman dominions as were enjoyed at the time by France and Great Britain, just as if the terms of the French and British capitulations then in force had been incorporated in the treaty *verbatim*, and it was provided in the same article that Russian consulates, on the same footing as the French and British consulates, might be established at any place in Ottoman territory. In the subsequent Russo-Turkish commercial treaty of the 21st June, 1783, it was expressly agreed³

¹ 'It will take the Russians a long time to shake off from themselves the habits and way of thought inherited from a barbarous ancestry. *Grattes le Russe et vous trouverez le Tartare, ça c'est une insulte aux Tartares.* This is a hackneyed expression; however, it is a true one' (Burnaby, F.: *A Ride to Khiva* [in A.D. 1875] (London 1877, Cassell), p. 82).

² See V. v. 294. Details will be found in Sakellarios, op. cit. pp. 162–204.

³ In Arts. 50, 51, and 54.

that Russian consuls should have the right, already enjoyed by the representatives of other capitulatory Powers,¹ of maintaining tax-free and otherwise privileged Ottoman servants. Russia made it her policy to exploit these treaty rights by using Greek Ottoman subjects as her instruments. Ottoman Greeks, selected by Russian consuls in the Ottoman Empire, were sent to Russia to be educated at the Russian Government's expense,² and from A.D. 1818 onwards Greeks were appointed to Russian consulships.³ Ships belonging to Orthodox Christian Ottoman subjects were licensed by the Russian authorities to trade under the Russian flag⁴—a favour which gave the first impetus to the boom in Greek shipping that reached its peak during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.⁵

In the generation immediately preceding the Greek national uprising of A.D. 1821 the new maritime cities founded by the Russian Government on the north coast of the Black Sea,⁶ after the acquisition of this seaboard by Russia in the Russo-Turkish wars of A.D. 1768–74 and A.D. 1787–92, played an important role in the emancipation of the Greeks as clinics in which Greek *ra'iyeh* were inoculated with a revolutionary Western political ferment. The trade through these newly founded ports which sprang up between their Russian continental hinterland and the Ottoman shores of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean not only brought Ottoman Greek shipping into their harbours but attracted permanent Greek residents; and the Greek commercial colony at Odessa gave birth in A.D. 1814 to 'the Society of Friends' (*Φιλική Εταιρεία*), a Greek nationalist secret society which set itself to conduct an underground propaganda in Greek-inhabited Ottoman territories. The Greeks serving as Russian consuls in the Ottoman Empire

'were all initiated into the *Etaireia ton Philikon* and acted as missionaries themselves, and their propaganda found acceptance among the rest of the Greeks and won their confidence, because everybody believed that Russia was inextricably involved in these activities and that she would take part in the Greek conflict.'⁷

These words were written in retrospect by Photákos Khrysanthópoulos, who played his part in the subsequent Greek War of Independence as aide-de-camp to Kolokotrónis; and the story of Photákos's early life is a personal illustration of the stimulus imparted to Ottoman Greeks by contact with Russia in this generation.

Photákos, as he records in his memoirs,⁸ was the son, born in A.D. 1798, of a Moreot Greek Orthodox Christian priest. His native village was Maghoulaná in the interior of the peninsula, and he received a Greek primary education there before going on to the recently founded Greek higher school at Vytína. By this date the Moreot Greeks were becoming political-minded.

¹ See pp. 172–3, above.

² See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 267.

³ See Khrysanthópoulos, Ph.: *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* (Athens 1899, Sakellarios, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 16.

⁴ See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 280–1.

⁵ See pp. 175–7, above.

⁶ Kherson was founded in A.D. 1778, Nikolayev in A.D. 1789, Odessa in A.D. 1792.

⁷ Khrysanthópoulos, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 16.

⁸ Khrysanthópoulos, *op. cit.*, Introduction, vol. i, pp. ix–xiii.

'It was customary for all the inhabitants of a village or a small country-town to meet after the end of divine service. They came out of church, stopped in the churchyard, and talked together there; and, if the more intelligent among them happened to have heard any foreign news—perhaps about a war between the Westerners (Φράγκοι) and the Turks—they used to tell it, and everybody was pleased, above all when it was Russia that had won a battle. When that happened, they used to join with the priest in a prayer to God to give our co-religionists strength to overthrow our enemies the Turks.'¹

At Vytína in this atmosphere the young Photákos imbibed political ideas which made his father anxious to get the boy out of the country for fear that he might fall foul of the Turks; and so, in A.D. 1813, Photákos was taken, with other young Moreot Greeks, to Russia by a Moreot business man, established there, who had been back in the Morea on a visit. In Russia Photákos went into business in the inland Bessarabian town of Kishinyóv, but, hearing of the existence of the Philikí Etaireía, he migrated to Odessa and was initiated. In A.D. 1820 he was sent by the society as their emissary to the Morea to pass the word that the 25th March, 1821, was to be 'the day'. His expenses were paid by a rich Odessan Greek business man, and he sailed from Odessa to Hýdhra on board an Hydriot ship.

Photákos' account of the effect of life in Russia on himself and his compatriots is as convincing as it is vivid:

'The Greeks . . . always longed to go to Russia. There we could work and earn our bread and after a time forget our fear and cease to be *ra íyeh* of the Turks. We could cleanse ourselves inside and outside, realise that we were human beings, walk with a confident step, and catch the new atmosphere from one another. We could hear the bells of the churches ringing freely; we could go to their churches and give thanks in the liturgy of our religion with a devotion that came from the heart. And, when we had taken our fill of all these blessings, we could begin to consider how to liberate our parents, brothers, and relatives and our beloved country, so that she too might recover her splendour, like Russia.

'This terrible mental cancer prayed upon our lives, and we could never conclude our reflections without our eyes being clouded with tears. Why should we be slaves of the Turks, the most barbarous nation in the World? This weeping and lamentation of ours, and all our other miseries, filled every place where Greeks were gathered together. Equality, fraternity, loyalty, and mutual affection were general among us, and after the day's work we were continually meeting in our leisure hours and discussing the liberation of our country. Everyone sent his savings to his birthplace, to his parents and other relatives; and he sent his native commune and the village church a few books, a little lamp, or a little bell. And so we continued for the present. There in Russia our national consciousness grew, and our hearts burnt unquenchably within us. Had Russia not been there, or had she been another nation with another religion, it is questionable whether we should have secured our liberation or preserved our nationality. Where else, indeed, should we have brought our embryonic liberty to birth?'²

¹ Khrysanthópoulos, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 35; *cp.* p. 15.

² Khrysanthópoulos, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 16-18.

In Russia, on this new ground so lately won from Nomadism for the agriculture, commerce, and industry of a sedentary civilization, Ottoman Greek immigrants at the opening of the nineteenth century experienced the exhilaration of breathing fresh air; but, if Phôtakos is a faithful interpreter of their state of mind, they were still unaware of the source of the life-giving breeze. Though they were inhaling it within the expanding borders of a Russian Orthodox Christendom, its provenance was not Russia and its ozone was not Orthodoxy. The mighty rushing wind that was sweeping out of the Russian forests across the Ukrainian steppes and over the sea to Greece had not been raised by any local atmospheric conditions; it had come from afar, and a scientific inquirer bent on tracing it back to its origin would have had to make a pilgrimage from Odessa northwards overland to Riga, and from Riga westwards overseas, to find the distant source of this spiritual elixir in Holland and Britain and America. The atmosphere in early nineteenth-century Russia that inspired the Ottoman Greeks was a Western atmosphere to which Russia was merely giving passage; and in succumbing to this atmosphere they were opting, even if unconsciously, not for Russia, but for the West.

3. *The Modern West and the Hindu World*¹

Likenesses and Differences in the Situations of a Hindu Society under British Rule and an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom

The circumstances in which the Hindu World encountered the Modern West were in some points remarkably similar to those in which the main body of Orthodox Christendom underwent the same experience. The Hindu World, too, had entered into its universal state by the time when the impact of the Modern Western Civilization upon it began to make itself felt there;² in India, as in the non-Russian part of Orthodox Christendom, this universal state had been imposed by alien empire-builders who were children of the Iranic Muslim Civilization; and in

¹ See xi, maps 52A and 53.

² If we are right in our view that a universal state was imposed on the Hindu World by alien hands in the form of the Timurid Mughal Empire, and also right in equating the effective establishment of the Mughal Rāj with Akbar's conquest of Gujerāt in A.D. 1572, this event in Hindu history did not occur till seventy-four years after the first landfall of Western ocean-faring mariners on the west coast of the sub-continent; but da Gama's arrival at Calicut in A.D. 1498 did not produce the sensation in India that it produced in Venice and in Egypt, where it was immediately realized that the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope by Portuguese ships was a threat to all parties commercially interested in the traditional short route between India and Western Europe via the Indian Ocean and the Levant. The continental-minded Central Asian Muslim conquerors of the interior of the Indian sub-continent were as insensitive to landfalls on the coast as they were sensitive to passages of the Hindu Kush; and, though their latest representative, the Timurid Mughal empire-builder Bābur, crossed the Hindu Kush only six years, and descended from Kābul upon the Panjab only twenty-one years, after da Gama had arrived in India by sea, there is no mention of the Portuguese explorer's feat in the memoirs of the Central Asian soldier. Even in the eyes of Bābur's grandson Akbar, the founder of the Mughal Rāj, the handful of Westerners squatting on sufferance in one or two ports on the fringes of his enormous realm were still little more than objects of curiosity as the pedlars of ingenious toys and the missionaries of an interesting religion. Indeed, the impact of the West on Mughal India hardly began to make itself felt seriously before the Mughal power had begun to go into decline after the death of Awrangzib in A.D. 1707.

Mughal India, as in Ottoman Orthodox Christendom, the subjects of these Muslim rulers were feeling the attraction of their masters' alien culture at the time when the Modern West appeared above their horizon, but subsequently transferred their cultural allegiance to this later-risen star as the West manifestly increased and the Islamic Society manifestly decreased in potency. These striking points of similarity between the two situations throw into relief, however, certain not less striking points of difference.

For example, when the Ottoman Orthodox Christians made the cultural change of front in which they turned away from the Ottoman toward the Modern Western way of life, they had to overcome a traditional antipathy to the West which had become ingrained in the hearts of their ancestors as a result of an unfortunate experience of the West in a previous encounter with it in its medieval phase. By contrast, the Hindus, in their corresponding cultural reorientation, had no such unhappy memories to live down; for the encounter between the Hindu World and the West that began on the day when da Gama made his landfall at Calicut was virtually the first contact that had ever occurred between these two societies.

Moreover, this difference in the antecedents is overshadowed by a still more important difference in the sequel. In the history of a non-Russian Orthodox Christendom the alien universal state which this society brought upon itself¹ remained in the hands of its original Iranic Muslim founders until it went into dissolution after reaching its natural term. An Ottoman Empire which fell on evil days before the close of the sixteenth century, when its classical régime of government through the Pādishāh's Slave-Household broke down after the death of Suleymān the Magnificent, was restored in the course of the seventeenth century when, under the leadership of the House of Köprülü, the free Muslim community in the Empire took over the reins of government² and secured effective assistance in its formidable task by taking the Phanariot leaders of a subject Orthodox Christian community into a junior partnership with itself.³ The Mughal Empire achieved no corresponding recovery from the similar anarchy into which it fell after the death of Awrangzib, and, while the Hindu, like the Orthodox Christian, universal state lived out its life to the term of its natural expectation and likewise remained to the end in alien hands, there was in this case a transfer of control from one pair of alien hands to another.

The empire which the Timurid war-lords' feeble successors failed to hold together was reconstituted by British business men who stepped into Akbar's shoes when they became aware that the framework of law and order in India, without which no Westerners could carry on their trade there, was going to be restored by the French if the British did not

¹ The subjugation of the main body of Orthodox Christendom by the 'Osmanlis is accounted for by the contemporary native historians Dhoúkas and Phrantzls as being God's judgement on His Orthodox Christian people for their sins; and this verdict may be accepted by an historian who does not believe that the Orthodox Christians were in any special sense God's Chosen People if the particular sins for which the Orthodox Christians had to pay this price may be identified with the two political vices of autocracy and factiousness.

² See V. vi. 208-9.

³ See II. ii. 222-8; III. iii. 47-48; V. v. 154-5; and pp. 162-3, above.

forestall these rivals by doing the work themselves. Thus the Westernization of the Hindu World entered on its critical stage in a period in which India was under Western rule, and in consequence the reception of the Modern Western culture was initiated in India, as in Russia, from above downwards, and not from below upwards, as in an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom.

The Reception of a Modern Western Culture and its Political Consequences

In this situation the Brahman and Banya castes of the Hindu Society, between them, succeeded in playing the part in Hindu history for which, in non-Russian Orthodox Christian history, the Phanariot Greeks made an unsuccessful bid. Under all political régimes in India, one of the prerogatives of the Brahmans had been to serve as ministers of state. They had played this part in the Indic World before playing it in an affiliated Hindu Society; and, after the breakdown of the Hindu Civilization in the twelfth century of the Christian Era¹ and the subsequent progressive intrusion of Iranic Muslim invaders into a disintegrating Hindu Society's domain,² these alien intruders found it convenient, if not indispensable, to follow in this point the practice of the Hindu states which they were supplanting. Brahman ministers and minor officials in the service of Muslim rulers made this alien rule less odious than it would otherwise have been to the Hindu majority of these Indian Muslim princes' subjects, because these Brahman intermediaries understood how to handle their fellow Hindus and at the same time enjoyed a prestige in their eyes which reconciled the rank-and-file to following the dominant caste's lead in accommodating themselves to an irksome alien political yoke. In making this use of the Brahmans the Mughal Rāj followed the precedent of the parochial Indian Muslim states whose former dominions it had united under its own rule, and the British Rāj, in its turn, followed the precedent of the Mughal Rāj,³ while British economic enterprise in India, both public and private, opened up corresponding opportunities for the Banyas.

As a consequence of the transfer of the government of India to British hands, the policy of the British régime in making English, instead of Persian, the official language of the Indian imperial administration, and giving Western literature a preference over Persian and Sanskrit literature as a medium of Indian higher education,⁴ had as great an effect on Hindu cultural history as was made upon Russian cultural history by the Westernizing policy of Peter the Great. In the Hindu, as in the Russian, Society, Western letters, and, with them, a vaneer of Western life, came into vogue among the dominant classes through the fiat of an autocratic oecumenical government and not through the personal initiative of private individuals, which was the agency through which the *ra'īyeh* of the Ottoman Porte had made themselves acquainted with the Modern

¹ See IV. iv. 99-100.

² See xi, maps 44 and 45.

³ In enlisting the services of Hindus in the administration of British India, the British authorities did not deliberately give the Brahmans any special preference, but the Brahmans' hereditary ascendancy in the Hindu Society enabled them once again to secure the lion's share of the opportunity for themselves.

⁴ For these measures, see V. v. 516, n. 1 and VI. vii. 243.

Western culture. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Porte appointed Phanariot Greeks to posts of high responsibility and influence in the Ottoman public service because these Phanariots were already familiar with a Western World with which the Porte now found itself constrained to transact business. In the nineteenth century, high-caste Hindus went in for a Western education because a British régime in India had ruled that a familiarity with the English language and literature should be the key to entry into the British Indian public service.

While the Westernization of India thus proceeded from above downwards on lines originally laid down by a British Rāj primarily for its own administrative purposes, the process did not remain confined within limits that would have sufficed for the supply of minor civil servants to 'the Serkār' and subordinate clerks to private British business houses. The governmental and commercial life of India could not be put upon a Western basis without introducing a Western leaven into Indian life over a wider range. The Westernization of Indian business and government called into existence in India two Western liberal professions, the University Faculty and the Bar; and in a Westernized Indian business activity based on private enterprise the most profitable openings could not be made a monopoly for European British subjects, as the highest positions in the Indian Civil Service were reserved for them in effect down to A.D. 1917. In these circumstances the Hindu community showed its ability by successfully turning its administrative, legal, and commercial talents to account under the exotic conditions set by a Western commercial and political ascendancy; and, long before the transfer of the government of India from English to Indian hands in the course of the thirty years A.D. 1917-47, there had grown up in India a new class of Westernized Hindu lawyers, business men, and industrialists as well as Westernized Indian members of the Imperial public service.

It was inevitable that this new element in the Hindu Society, whose distinctive characteristic was its Western education, should aspire, as in Ottoman Orthodox Christendom the Phanariot Greeks had aspired in their day, to take over the oecumenical empire under which they were living from the alien hands by which it had been built, and to turn it into one of the parochial states of a Westernizing World on the constitutional pattern prevalent at the time at which this political ambition took conscious shape. At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Phanariots had dreamed an already anachronistic dream of turning the Ottoman Empire into an eighteenth-century Western enlightened monarchy.¹ At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Westernizing political leaders of the Hindu World paid homage to a change in Western political ideals by setting themselves the far more difficult task of turning the British Indian Empire into a democratic Western national state.

At a date less than five years after the completion of the transfer of the Government of India from English to Indian hands on the 15th August, 1947, it was still far too early to attempt to forecast the outcome of this momentous political enterprise; but it was already possible to say that

¹ See VI. vii. 29-31, and pp. 187-9, above.

Hindu statesmanship had been more successful than foreign well-wishers could have dared to hope in its efforts to salvage as much as possible of the political unity that had been perhaps the most precious British gift to an Indian sub-continent.

As the transfer of political power had become imminent, this political unity had come into danger of being disrupted by two fissures in Indian political life which had been politically more or less innocuous so long as the Rāj had been held in British hands. One of these fissures was the geographical division of India between territories of two political categories: the British Indian provinces and the autonomous Indian principalities that were in treaty relations with the British Government. The other was the non-territorial division of India between two geographically intermingled communities, the Hindus and the Indian Muslims, and the further subdivision of the Hindu community, likewise on non-territorial lines, into a number of castes, ranging from Brahmans to 'Untouchables'. These two lines of division cut across one another, and they were also of different age and unequal gravity. The geographical division between provinces and principalities was an accidental legacy of the history of the British conquest of India in the course of a hundred years beginning with the British occupation of Bengal at as recent a date as A.D. 1757-60. On the other hand the communal division of the people of India into a Hindu and a Muslim millet was as old as the Iranic Muslim conquest of Hindustan towards the close of the twelfth century of the Christian Era,¹ while the communal sub-division of the Hindu millet into castes was a legacy from the history of the antecedent Indic Civilization. It was not surprising that the Government of the Indian Union that came into existence on the 15th August, 1947, should have dealt more successfully with the problem of the princes than with the problems of the Muslim millet and the Depressed Classes; it was, however, remarkable that the existence of these two communal problems should not have worked greater havoc than it did work at this critical moment in Indian history.

By the year A.D. 1952 the Central Government of the Indian Union had already imposed its authority, by a show of force, on the Deccani state of Hyderabad, which was by far the largest, most populous, and most powerful of all the autonomous principalities inherited by the Indian Union from the British Rāj within the frontiers with which the Union had emerged as a fully self-governing state member of the British Commonwealth of Nations; and it was actively engaged in carrying out a *Gleichschaltung* of the rest. This merger of the existing principalities in the new Union was not inequitable—whatever the princes' legal rights might be—since Indians who were subjects of ex-client princes of a former British Rāj had as strong a moral claim as Indians who had been subjects of the British Rāj itself to share in the self-government which the former British rulers of India had conceded to the Indian people; and the change seemed unlikely to cause any serious regrets or to provoke any dangerous reactions, since there were few principalities, if any, in which a majority of the inhabitants might have been expected to opt

¹ See IV. iv. 99.

for a continuance of the *ancien régime*. On the other hand the Hindu leaders had been less successful in dealing with their Indian Muslim counterparts, since it had been beyond their power to coerce them, and had proved beyond their ability to persuade them, into renouncing their demand that a separate Muslim successor-state of the British Indian Empire should be constituted out of territories in which the Muslims were in a majority over the Hindus.

The Indian Muslims' motive in insisting upon the creation of Pakistan was a fear arising from a consciousness of weakness. They had not forgotten how, in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the Mughal Rāj had failed to maintain by the sword a dominion over India which the sword alone had won, and they were aware that, by the same arbitrament, the greater part of the Mughals' former domain would have become the prize of Marāthā and Sikh Hindu successor-states if British military intervention had not given the course of Indian political history a dramatically different turn by re-establishing an oecumenical government of India under British auspices. The Indian Muslims realized that, but for this, they would not only have lost their former dominion over the Hindus but would have paid for their harshness in the exercise of it by suffering a reversal of roles in which it would have been their turn to taste the tribulations of 'under dog'. They also knew that, although they had been fortunate enough to escape from a perilous pass with no worse a fate than to find themselves placed on a political parity with the Hindus under the rule of a third party, they had again allowed themselves to be outstripped by the Hindus in a phase of the perennial conflict between these two Indian communities in which a British arbiter had decreed that the pen should be substituted for the sword as the weapon to be employed in a trial of strength in which the destinies of the two parties were as seriously at stake as if this new-fangled academic competition had not replaced the old-fashioned ordeal by battle.

On the morrow of the British occupation of Bengal in A.D. 1757-60 the Bengali Hindus who had thereby come under British rule had promptly divined that a mastery of Modern Western arts would be the key to success in a world that was passing under Western control and was being remoulded to a Western pattern; and, by the date of the transfer of power in India in A.D. 1947, the Panjabi Hindus likewise had been profiting for all but a hundred years from the opportunities for Westernization that had been afforded to them by the British conquest of their country in the fifth decade of the nineteenth century. By comparison, the Indian Muslims—handicapped by an intellectual inertia that was the legacy of a former military and political ascendancy, and demoralized, instead of being stimulated, by the shock of their military and political débacle—had been slow in taking their cue in a race in which the victory would fall to the most successful Indian adepts in the alien technique of Modern Western life; and, though in the course of the nineteenth century the Indian Muslims did wake up and start to run, they were too late to have been able to make up for lost time by the date in the twentieth century when they were confronted with the prospect of having to compete with the Hindus once again, as in the eighteenth

century, without there being an all-powerful British arbiter to hold the ring and to guarantee the weaker party against the appalling risk of being made to pay the uttermost penalty for incompetence.

For these reasons the Indian Muslims insisted in A.D. 1947 on having a separate successor-state of their own, and the consequent partition of the former British Indian Empire between the two new Dominions of India and Pakistan threatened to reproduce, on a sub-continental scale, the tragic consequences that had followed from the partition of the Ottoman Empire during the century beginning with the Greek uprising in A.D. 1821. In a twentieth-century British India, as in a nineteenth-century Ottoman Orthodox Christendom, the attempt to sort out geographically intermingled millets into territorially separate and severally self-contained national states led to the drawing of frontiers that were execrable from the administrative and economic points of view; even at this price, huge minorities were left on the wrong sides of the new dividing lines; there was a panic flight of millions of refugees who abandoned their homes and property, were harried by embittered adversaries in the course of a terrible trek, and arrived destitute in the unfamiliar country in which they had to start life again among unknown co-religionists; and there was one section of the border between India and Pakistan where even this calamity was eclipsed by the still greater evil of an undeclared war for the possession of the autonomous principality of Kashmir, whose Muslim population was under the rule of a Hindu dynasty. By the year A.D. 1952, however, effective efforts had been made by Indian statesmen, both at Delhi and at Karachi, to save India from following this dreadful Ottoman course to the bitter end. The still un-uprooted minorities on both sides of the line had been sufficiently reassured to bring the flow of refugees to a halt; the dispute over Kashmir had been referred to the United Nations Organization for settlement by conciliation; and, while this task had proved to be a depressingly baffling one, it was, on the other hand, encouraging to observe that the political malady of Nationalism, which had split India into two, did not here show any signs of carrying its disintegrating effect farther, as it had carried it in the Ottoman Empire, by impelling the divers nationalities embraced within each of the two principal millets to demand separate territorial sovereignties in their turn.

In the Ottoman Empire, as we have seen, the several nationalities comprised in the Orthodox Christian Millet-i-Rûm had broken away simultaneously from their Muslim masters and from one another, and the Muslims themselves had eventually followed this unfortunate example by developing separate Turkish, Arab, Albanian, and Kurdish national consciousnesses. In a twentieth-century India the potentialities of disruption were at least as great within the bosom of the Hindu and the Muslim community alike. The Bengali Muslim differed from the Panjabi Muslim as greatly as the Bengali Hindu differed from the Panjabi Hindu or Sikh; and in the Hindu World there were linguistic barriers far sharper than those dividing the Northern Indian speakers of divers dialects of the same Aryan language. The Dravidian languages of the South were members of an entirely different family. Yet, notwith-

standing the existence of these latent incentives to disruption, a politically emancipated Hindu community was not showing violent fissiparous tendencies on lines of nationality any more than on lines of caste. Thus, at the time of writing, Indian prospects were, on the whole, encouraging from a short-term political point of view; and, if the impact of the Modern West did still threaten the Hindu World with serious perils, these were to be looked for not so much on the political surface of life as in its economic subsoil and its spiritual depths, and were perhaps likely there to take some time in coming to a head.

The Gulf between a Hindu and a Post-Christian Western Weltanschauung

The obvious special perils of Westernization which the Hindu World had to apprehend were two. In the first place the Hindu and the Western Civilization had hardly any common cultural background and were strikingly alien from one another in *ethos* in this age. In the second place the Hindus who had mastered the intellectual content of an exotic Modern Western culture with a virtuosity that rivalled the performance of the Phanariots were a tiny minority perched on the backs of a vast majority of ignorant and destitute peasants as precariously as, in the constitution of the Human Psyche, the Consciousness hovers over the abyss of the Subconscious. By the date of India's attainment of political independence as a state member of a comity of Western and Westernizing nations, the radiation of the Western culture into the Hindu World had affected only the top layer of the society. Yet there was no ground for expecting to see the process of Western cultural penetration come to a stop at that level, while there were strong grounds for forecasting that, when it began to leaven the peasant mass beneath, it would also begin there to produce novel and revolutionary effects.

The cultural gulf between the Hindu Society and the Modern Western Society at the time when the top layer of the Hindu Society had begun to be appreciably affected by Western influence had been wider than that between the Russian Orthodox Christian, Ottoman Orthodox Christian, Ottoman Muslim, and Modern Western societies whose encounters with one another we have surveyed in previous sections of this chapter.

Differentiated though these four societies had been by the diversity of their individual experiences and achievements, they had retained nevertheless an affinity with one another in virtue of a common cultural heritage derived from a single pair of antecedent civilizations, the Hellenic and the Syriac.¹ By contrast, the Hindu Society was not related either to the Western or to the Iranian Muslim Society by any comparable degree of kinship; for, though a tincture of both the Hellenic and the Syriac culture could be traced in the veins of the Hindu body social too, the dilution was in both cases weak.² Moreover, the difference

¹ See pp. 90-91, below.

² The western fringe of the domain of the Hindu Civilization's predecessor the Indic Society had been annexed by Cyrus II and by Darius I to an Achaemenian Empire which had served as the Syriac Society's universal state (see VI. vii. 63, 634, and 649), and the transmission of some measure of Syriac cultural influence from the Indic Society to the Hindu was attested by the Syriac provenance of the Kharōṣṭhi Alphabet

in *êthos* between the Hindu *Weltanschauung* and the Western *Weltanschauung* in the Late Modern version in which this first began to make an impression on Hindu souls was no mere diversity; it was an outright antithesis; for by the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era the Modern West, as we have seen,¹ had fabricated a secular version of its cultural heritage from which Religion was eliminated in order to give primacy to Technology, whereas the Hindu Society, like its Indic predecessor, was and remained religious to the core—so much so, indeed, as to be open to the charge of ‘religiosity’ if, as that pejorative word implies, there can in truth be such a thing as an excessive concentration of psychic energy on a spiritual activity which is Man’s most important pursuit.²

This antithesis between a passionately religious and a deliberately secular outlook on life cut deeper than any diversity of vein between one religion and another; and in this point the Hindu, the Islamic, and the Early Modern Western Christian cultures were more in sympathy with one another than any one of them was with the secular culture of the West in its late modern phase. Though the religion of the Hindu World was of Indic provenance, while the religions of the Islamic and Early Modern Western Christian worlds were derived from Judaism, this diversity of historical origins was of less moment than the consensus of all three societies in taking it for granted that Religion—whatever the orthodox presentation of it might be held to be—was the mainspring and meaning of Man’s existence. On the strength of this common belief, it had been possible for Hindus to become converts to Islam and to Roman Catholic Christianity without subjecting themselves to an intolerable spiritual tension. The Muslims of Eastern Bengal and the Roman Catholics of Goa were living evidence of this; for both these communities were descended from Hindu converts with only a slight admixture of Central Asian blood in the one case and West European blood in the other.

This proven ability of Hindus to make their way on to alien cultural ground by a religious approach was significant, because, if religiosity was the Hindu Civilization’s chief distinguishing mark, its next most conspicuous feature was aloofness. This characteristic aloofness was, no doubt, overcome in the intellectual compartment of their spiritual life by those Hindus who, from the latter part of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era onwards, acquired a secular Modern Western education and thereby qualified for playing a part in the reconstruction of the political and economic sides of Indian life on a Modern Western basis;

(see V. v. 500). The Hellenic culture had bitten deeper into Indic life; it shared the credit for the genesis of the Mahāyāna, as was attested by the Hellenic element in the style of Mahāyāna Buddhist art (see III. iii. 131 and 247, n. 2; V. v. 134, 196, and 481). This Hellenistic art, however, had become an heirloom, not of the Hindu World, but of the Far East, for the Indic Society had succeeded in expelling this intrusive Hellenic element from its own body social before going into dissolution, and the religion of Hinduism, which had been the symbol and the agent of this anti-Hellenic reaction in Indic souls, had also served as the chrysalis for incubating the Indic Society’s Hindu successor.

¹ On p. 118, with n. 9, above.

² This vein of religiosity in the Indic and Hindu civilization has been noticed in III. iii. 384-5.

but the recruits of this unhappy intelligentsia performed a valuable social service as cultural intermediaries between the Hindu and the Modern Western World at the cost of a schism in their souls which did not afflict either the Bengali Muslim or the Goanese Roman Catholic descendants of apostates from the Hindu, but not from the religious, outlook on life. This Hindu intelligentsia bred by the British Rāj remained aloof in their hearts from the secular Modern Western way of life with which their minds had become familiar; and this discord produced a deep-seated spiritual malaise in Hindu souls¹ which could not be cured by the political panacea of obtaining full self-government for an Indian national state organized on a contemporary Western pattern. Indeed, the relaxation of a political tension might actually bring the spiritual tension to a head by leaving a Westernizing Hindu intellect *tête-à-tête* with an unconscionably religious Hindu soul, without any further possibility of avoiding a painful searching of heart through finding a scapegoat in an English interloper whose alien régime might plausibly be held responsible for all Indian ills, psychological as well as political.

The Aloofness of a Reformed British Civil Service in India

The unyielding spiritual aloofness of Western-educated Hindu minds would in any case have been a formidable problem both for the human beings whose Hindu souls were being racked by an unresolved discord and for the Hindu Society in which these inharmonious 'intellectuals' were called upon to take the lead in an age of Hindu history in which a collision between the Hindu and the secular Modern Western culture was the dominant event in social as well as personal life. The situation had been aggravated, however, by the mischance that this unmitigated spiritual aloofness on the Hindu side had been matched by an accentuated spiritual aloofness in the souls of the Western rulers with whom the Hindu intelligentsia had to do business under the régime of the British Rāj. Between the year A.D. 1786, in which Cornwallis assumed the

¹ The spiritual malaise which is the occupational disease of an intelligentsia has been noticed in V. v. 154-9, and is examined further on pp. 338-43, below. The sharpness of the psychological tension in twentieth-century Hindu souls that had been Westernized intellectually while remaining Hindu in feeling, intuition, and sensation (to use C. G. Jung's categories) may be gauged from the testimony of nineteenth-century Russian souls in which the gulf between a traditional way of life and an exotic Western *Weltanschauung* was much less wide, and the tension therefore proportionately less severe. Unhappy though they were in almost everything else, the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia were fortunate in being gifted with a power of artistic expression and in being moved to use this gift as a vent for relieving their spiritual malaise by discharging their feelings in works of literature. This literary secretion from a culturally sick body social was a pearl of great price for the historian as well as for the psychologist and the man of letters. Out of the vast wealth of evidence which it offered to the student of encounters between contemporaries of diverse culture, we may file here one passage culled from the memoirs of Alexander Herzen (*vivebat* A.D. 1812-70), the natural son of a Russian nobleman by a girl from Stuttgart:

'In Russia men exposed to the influence of this mighty Western movement became original, but not historical, figures. Foreigners at home, foreigners in other lands, idle spectators, spoilt for Russia by Western prejudices and for the West by Russian habits, they were a sort of intellectual superfluity and were lost in artificial life, in sensual pleasure, and in unbearable egoism' (Herzen, Alexander: *My Past and Thoughts*, translated from the Russian by Constance Garnett (London 1924, Chatto and Windus, 6 vols.), vol. i, p. 94).

governor-generalship of British India with a mandate to reform the administration,¹ and the year A.D. 1858, which saw the completion of the transfer of British political authority in India from the East India Company to the Crown, there was a profound, and on the whole untoward, change in the attitude of the European-born British ruling class in India towards their Indian-born fellow subjects.

In the eighteenth century the English in India, like their predecessors the Mughals and the Portuguese, had followed unselfconsciously the custom of the country, not excluding the custom of abusing power, but they had also likewise been on familiar terms of personal intercourse with the Indians whom they unscrupulously cheated and oppressed. In the course of the nineteenth century they achieved a notable moral rally. The intoxication with suddenly acquired power and the demoralization by suddenly opened facilities for illicit personal enrichment which had disgraced the first generation of English rulers in Bengal were successfully overcome by a new ideal of moral integrity, which required the English civil servant in India to look upon his power as a public responsibility and not as a personal opportunity. The stages in this moral redemption of the British Rāj in India by British consciences can be followed from the India Act of A.D. 1784 to the introduction, in A.D. 1855,² of a competitive examination as the gate of entry into the Indian Civil Service;³ but *pari passu* we can also follow the waning of personal familiarity between English residents in India and their Indian neighbours, until the all too humanly Indianized English 'nabob' has changed, out of recognition, into the professionally irreproachable and personally unapproachable English civil servant who said goodbye in A.D. 1947 to an India to whom he had dedicated his working life without making her his home.

In the eighteenth century, after the decay of the Mughal Rāj had gone far enough to break down the containing walls of the factories in which Western merchants had hitherto been living in isolation⁴ like their counterparts in the Sloboda at Moscow before the days of Peter the Great,⁵ the English who went to India in divers capacities—in the service of the East India Company, in the service of Indian princes, or as free-lance military and political adventurers hoping to carve out successor-states of the Mughal Empire on their own account⁶—were all of

¹ A second date which was fateful for the future course of relations between Indians and English was the year A.D. 1799, which saw Wellesley initiate a systematic conquest of India by British arms. While the British occupation of Bengal in A.D. 1757–60 might perhaps not inaccurately be described as an act of empire-building by inadvertence, this description certainly would not apply to the British conquest of the rest of the sub-continent during the fifty years A.D. 1799–1849. This military programme was deliberately taken in hand in A.D. 1799 with an eye to forestalling a re-entry of the French into India, and it was deliberately carried forward after A.D. 1814 in order to round off a British Rāj with which the French were thereafter no longer in a position to interfere.

² See Blunt, Sir E.: *The Indian Civil Service* (London 1937, Faber), p. 46.

³ The British Indian Civil Service has been noticed in this Study, in other contexts, in V. v. 47–48 and VI. vii. 364–5.

⁴ See Spear, T. G. P.: *The Nabobs: A Study of the Social Life of the English in Eighteenth-Century India* (London 1932, Milford), p. 22.

⁵ See p. 130, above.

⁶ See Compton, H. E.: *A Particular Account of the European Military Adventurers of Hindustan, 1784–1803* (London 1892 (1st ed.) and 1896 (2nd ed.), Fisher Unwin); Grey, C., and Garrett, H. L. O.: *European Adventurers in Northern India, 1785–1849* (Lahore 1929, Punjab Government Press).

one mind in looking forward to making themselves at home in the country, as other foreign conquerors of India had done before them. In this Indianizing movement the free-lance adventurers went the fastest and the farthest.¹ For example, Claude Martin (*vivebat* A.D. 1735-1800), a French soldier of fortune who, after the fall of Pondicherry in A.D. 1761, had taken military service first with the British and then with the Nawāb of Oudh,² 'was nearly as Indianized as the Nawāb was Europeanized'.³ At Lucknow, Martin had four concubines and a household of eunuchs and slaves; but he combined this Mughal pomp and luxury with a cosmopolitan culture, for he also had 4,000 Western books (Latin, French, Italian, and English), a collection of Persian and Sanskrit manuscripts, and a hundred oil paintings, including works by Zoffany and the two Daniells.⁴ Among the English servants of the British East India Company in Martin's generation the ideal of emulating in India the career of the London city merchant who became an English country squire was replaced, after the Company's victory over a Mughal nawāb at the Battle of Plassey (*commisum* A.D. 1757), by the ideal of becoming a 'nabob'.⁵

Instead of continuing to marry Goan Portuguese Christian wives, the Company's English servants now took, like Martin, to keeping zenanas *alla Moresca*.⁶ Till *circa* A.D. 1800 there was no prejudice, in this Anglo-Indian society, against 'natural children', and these would be sent to England for their education if not too dark 'to escape detection'.⁷ The Indian mothers of these well-beloved children were sometimes married in lawful wedlock by the children's English fathers. The English servants of the East India Company who went the fastest and the farthest in this direction were the collectors—a new class of civil servants, stationed not in Calcutta but throughout the country-side, which had been called into existence in A.D. 1772⁸ as a consequence of the Company's acquisition, in A.D. 1765, of the financial administration of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and the Northern Circars.⁹ These widely scattered English representatives of the Company came under the social influence of the Bengali nawābs and zamīndārs among whom they were living, and they transmitted this current of Indian cultural radiation to other English people in India.¹⁰ The English in India took to learning Persian;¹¹ and, through this sympathetic medium of intercourse, they made Indian friends. They found Muslim princes more congenial than Marāthās;¹² but, besides the Muslim country gentry, their friends included cultivated Indian official colleagues of theirs, some of whom were Hindus,¹³ and Hastings'¹⁴ own personal circle of Indian friends was knit by such genuine ties of feeling that, twenty years after he had left India, the survivors continued to make affectionate inquiries after him.¹⁵

This easy and intimate cosmopolitan eighteenth-century Anglo-

¹ See Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

⁴ See VI. vii. 365.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 136.

⁶ Governor of Bengal, A.D. 1772; Governor-General of British India, A.D. 1774-85.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 135-6.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 83-85.

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 32 and 37.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 31.

¹¹ See Spear, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

¹² See *ibid.*, p. 136.

¹³ See *ibid.*, p. 136.

¹⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 136.

Indian life startled a twentieth-century English student of History by its manifest freedom from subsequently erected barriers to social intercourse between English people and Indians when scenes from it were brought before his eye in contemporary pictures by John Zoffany (*vivebat* A.D. 1735–1810) and other English artists of the day.¹ This historical spectacle was startling because the genial 'cosmopolitanism' to which it bore witness had been swiftly superseded and permanently replaced by a bleaker social climate. This counter-movement, which first declared itself in symptoms that might have been discounted as trivial, eventually spread to the vital sphere of personal relations. The substitution of Western for Oriental military music in the Company's forces at Madras in A.D. 1767² was followed, after Hastings' recall in A.D. 1785, by the banning of Oriental music in the social life of the English community in India.³ Arrack went the same way;⁴ and the habit of nargilah-smoking, which had replaced pipe-smoking *circa* A.D. 1754–5, declined after A.D. 1773.⁵ By A.D. 1827 it had come to be regarded as extremely bad taste for an English lady in India to wear Indian ornaments,⁶ and, before the turn of the century, the contemporary Western styles of Hellenistic 'classical' architecture and gardening were already being applied in British India *tels quels*.⁷ The exclusion of half-castes from the British Indian public service in A.D. 1792⁸ by Cornwallis (*fungebatur* A.D. 1786–93) was a graver portent which foreshadowed Wellesley's deliberate creation of a social distance between English and Indians. Wellesley (*fungebatur* A.D. 1798–1805) adopted a hectoring tone in his dealings with Indians, and he stopped the practice of inviting Indians and half-castes to official parties.⁹

'Race prejudice at the beginning of the [eighteenth] century was instinctive, and disappeared with time and better acquaintance; at the end it was doctrinal, and precluded the acquaintance which might have removed it.'¹⁰

¹ See, for example, Zoffany's picture (in which Claude Martin figures) of Colonel Mordaunt's cock match at Lucknow, A.D. 1786, painted for Warren Hastings, and his portrait group of the Palmer family, probably also painted at the same place in the same year. 'Major William Palmer is looking at his wife, the Bibi Fā'iz Bakhsh, who is seated on his right with her three children. The Bibi's sister is on Palmer's left, and three women attendants complete the group' (*Catalogue of Exhibition of Art, chiefly from the Dominions of India and Pakistan* (London 1947–8, Royal Academy of Arts)). These two pictures bear witness to the familiarity of the relations between the late-eighteenth-century English in India and their Indian contemporaries in private life; and this unselfconscious practice of doing in India as India does was followed by them in affairs of state as well. Zoffany's picture of a durbār (Plate No. 4. in the *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, vol. xcvi, No. 4820, of the 5th May, 1950, illustrating Sir W. Foster's paper on 'British Artists in India' on pp. 518–25 of the same issue) portrays Warren Hastings and his English staff seated cross-legged on the ground, transacting business with a Mughal potentate bolstered on a carpet. While the other Englishmen betray some signs of physical discomfort, Hastings is manifestly at his ease.

² See Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 34.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 36 and 98. On the other hand the cult of cleanliness, which the eighteenth-century Englishman in India had acquired from his Indian contemporaries, was transmitted by him to his twentieth-century compatriots in Great Britain (see *ibid.*, p. 146).

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 142.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 63.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 34 and 50–51.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 138.

¹⁰ Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 144. The spirit of the pre-Wellesley phase of Anglo-Indian relations died hardest at Bombay, where the commercial interests and activities of the English community continued to overshadow the field of government and administration (see *ibid.*, pp. 134–5). At Bombay (and likewise at Surat) the course of events was evolu-

Why was it that the former free-and-easy personal relations died away so unluckily in an age when the loss of their beneficent influence on Anglo-Indian relations could least well be afforded? No doubt the change was due to the combined operation of a number of different causes.

In the first place the latter-day English official in the Indian Civil Service might fairly plead that his unfortunate aloofness from the Indians whom he governed was the inevitable price of his precious moral integrity in the discharge of a public trusteeship. How could a man be expected to act professionally like a god without also retaining the airs of a god in private life? Another, and less estimable, cause of the change of attitude was perhaps the pride inspired by conquest; for by A.D. 1849, and indeed by A.D. 1803, the military and political power of the English in India had become sensationally stronger than it had been in A.D. 1786, not to speak of A.D. 1757.¹ The operation of these two causes had been analysed acutely by a twentieth-century English student of the history of Indo-British social and cultural relations.

'As the [eighteenth] century drew to its close, a change in the social atmosphere gradually came about. The frequency of . . . "reciprocal entertainments" decreased, the formation of intimate friendships with Indians ceased. . . . The higher posts of the Government were filled with appointments from England; its designs became more imperial and its attitude more haughty and aloof. The gulf which Mussulman nawābs and English *bons viveurs*, diplomatic pandits and English scholars had for a time bridged over began ominously to widen again. . . . A "superiority complex" was forming which regarded India not only as a country whose institutions were bad and people corrupted, but one which was by its nature incapable of ever becoming any better . . .

'It is one of the ironies of Indo-European relations in India that the purging of the administration coincided with the widening of the racial gulf.² . . . The days of corrupt Company officials, of illegotten fortunes, of oppression of ryots, of zenanas and of illicit sexual connexions, were also the days when Englishmen were interested in Indian culture, wrote Persian verses, and foregathered with pandits and maulvis and nawābs

tionary, not revolutionary (see *ibid.*, p. 75). English and Indian business men went on meeting on equal terms, and, between the English and the Parsees, social relations were intimate (see *ibid.*, pp. 72, 74-75, and 127). No doubt Bombay benefited from the stimulus of being India's maritime march in an Oceanic age of history (see II. ii. 133). All the same, on the 25th September, 1929, the writer of this Study was reproved at Bombay by his English hosts there for having made the *faux pas* of taking an omnibus. It was explained to him that, in Bombay, it was beneath an Englishman's dignity to ride in a public conveyance. He ought to have ridden solitary in a cab.

¹ Spear points out (in *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33 and 130) that 'the period of cosmopolitan intercourse' between English and Indians in India, which can be equated approximately with the term of Warren Hastings' governor-generalship (*fungebat* A.D. 1774-85), was also the period in which there was a balance of political power between the British East India Company and the Indian successor-states of the Mughal Rāj. Wellesley (*fungebat* A.D. 1798-1805), during whose governor-generalship first Tipu Sahib and then the Marāthās were overthrown, and who introduced a viceregal splendour into the governor-general's *mise-en-scène* (see Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 65), was also the moving spirit in the deliberate adoption of a pointed attitude of haughty aloofness towards the English conquerors' Indian subjects on the part of an alien English dominant minority.

² The earliest recorded complaints of British race-feeling in India come from James Skinner (*vivebat* A.D. 1778-1841), a military adventurer with Indian blood in his veins who went over from the Marāthā to the British service on the eve of the British assault on the Marāthās in A.D. 1803 (Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 13).

on terms of social equality and personal friendship. The tragedy of Cornwallis . . . was that in uprooting the acknowledged evils of corruption he upset the social balance without which mutual understanding was impossible. . . . Cornwallis . . . made a new governing class by his exclusion of all Indians from the higher governmental posts. Corruption was stamped out at the cost of equality and cooperation. In his own mind, as in the commonly accepted view, there was a necessary connexion between the two measures; "Every native of Hindustan", he said, "I verily believe, is corrupt". . . . He thought English corruption could be solved by reasonable salaries, and did not stop to consider that the advantage of Indian goodwill made it at least worth trying as a remedy for Indian corruption also. He never thought of creating an Indian imperial bureaucracy on the model of Akbar's mansabdars, which by special training, proper salaries and the encouragement of equal treatment, promotion and honours, might have been bound to the Company as the Moghul officials were bound to the Emperor.¹

A third cause of estrangement was the speeding-up of communications between India and England as a consequence of certain early nineteenth-century achievements of Modern Western technology. The reopening and the subsequent improvement of the short route between Western Europe and India via Egypt—first by portage on camel-back between Alexandria and Suez from sailing-ship to sailing-ship, then by steam instead of sail and by railway instead of camel caravan, and finally by the opening of the Suez Canal in A.D. 1869²—made it feasible for English people to travel to and fro between England and India so quickly and frequently that an English civil servant or business man posted in India could now bring out an English wife to join him,³ and could go on to bring up his children in England without completely breaking up his family life, especially after the linking up of India with England by telegraph in A.D. 1865. Thanks to the doubtful blessing of these technological miracles, the latter-day English employee in India contrived to do his work there as a pilgrim and a sojourner who remained psychologically domiciled in a home on English ground.⁴

The three so far enumerated causes of latter-day English aloofness from the Indians among whom the English in India worked were all of the Englishman's making; but there was perhaps a fourth cause, and one more potent than the rest, of which the Englishman in India was the victim and not the originator. An Indian who had experienced and

¹ Spear, T. G. P.: *The Nabobs: A Study of the Social Life of the English in Eighteenth-Century India* (London 1932, Milford), pp. 136, 137, 145, and 137.

² See Hoskins, H. L.: *British Routes to India* (London 1928, Longmans Green), p. 383.

³ According to Spear, op. cit., pp. 140-2, the social self-insulation of the English in India was promoted by the increase in the number of English women in India—and also by the increase in the number of evangelical Protestant English missionaries, whose attitude towards 'the heathen' was bigoted.

⁴ While the technological revolution in means of communication was the new factor that made this attitude of aloofness come to prevail among Englishmen serving in India in all capacities, the psychological change had been initiated, while the sailing ship was still in its heyday, by the soldiers of the Royal British Army as soon as units of this force had begun to be posted in India. The Royal troops 'inaugurated the conception of service in India as a temporary vocation undertaken with a view to retirement in England' (Spear, op. cit., p. 31), whereas the officers of the newly raised Company troops 'in civil life conformed to their Anglo-Indian environments' (ibid., p. 30).

resented the latter-day English resident's aloofness might feel more charitably towards this originally self-invited (and eventually also self-dismissed) intruder if he were to recollect that, for perhaps as long as three thousand years before the advent of the English in India, the sub-continent had been saddled with the institution of Caste; that the Hindu Society had accentuated a trait which it had inherited from its Indic predecessor; and that after the departure of the English, as before their arrival, the people of India were still afflicting themselves with a social evil of their own making. Looked at in the long perspective of Indian history, the aloofness which the English in India developed during the hundred and fifty years of their *rāj* could be diagnosed as being a mild attack of the chronic Indian psychological malady of caste-mindedness. It was perhaps not altogether surprising or altogether inexcusable that, in the course of their sojourn in India, the English should have been affected in their turn by an age-old sub-continental atmosphere.¹

The Unsolved Problem of a Rising Pressure of Population

While the aggravating effect of a latter-day English aloofness on the spiritual discord in intellectually Westernized Hindu souls might be

¹ This fourth possible explanation of the aloofness to which the English in India gradually succumbed might account for the striking difference, in their attitude towards 'natives', between the latter-day English in India and their Dutch contemporaries in Indonesia. In Insular India the personal relations between the Dutch and the Javanese were still, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, much what the relations between the English and the Hindus in Continental India had been in the eighteenth century. Down to the moment of the liquidation of the Dutch Empire in Indonesia by the Japanese conquest in A.D. 1942, the Dutch were still bringing up in Java children of undiluted Dutch blood, and at the same time intermarrying with the Javanese and reckoning the issue of mixed marriages as Europeans. Why, in Java, did no refrigeration of the psychological atmosphere occur, considering that the first three of the four possible causes of the change in British India were all operative in Netherlands India likewise? Might not the answer be that in Indonesia the fourth of the causes that we have enumerated was not at work, and that this difference in the situation made all the difference to the course of events? A difference in the cultural environment had not always existed, for, from the fifth to the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, Indonesia had been an overseas colonial extension of the Hindu World; but, between the decline and fall of the Hindu Indonesian Empire of Majapahit during the hundred years ending in A.D. 1518 and the arrival of the Dutch in A.D. 1595, Indonesia was captured from the Hindu Society by the Arabic Muslim Society, and in A.D. 1952 the only living monument of the Hindu Age in the Archipelago was the persisting Hinduism of the inhabitants of the little island of Bali. Thus, since before the beginning of the Dutch *Rāj* in Indonesia, the prevailing religion in the Archipelago had come to be Islam; and, of all the living higher religions, Islam—standing, as it did, for equality between all loyal Muslim subjects of a single sovereign Lord God—was the most inimical, in practice as well as in theory, to the institution of Caste. Perhaps, therefore, it was no accident that in an Indonesia where Islam held the field the Dutch should have remained immune from the caste spirit in an age when the English were succumbing to it in a Continental India where Islam had never succeeded in gaining the allegiance of a majority of the population and had recently also suffered a political eclipse.

In another context (in II. i. 211–27), we have observed that, in the matter of race feeling, Roman Catholic Western Christians had, on the whole, come nearer than Protestant Western Christians to approaching the Islamic standard, though in most other respects Protestantism had more affinity with Islam than Roman Catholicism had. An unfortunate inspiration from the Old Testament appears to account for the badness of the record of the Dutch settlers in South Africa and the English settlers in North America, by comparison with the French Canadians, in their behaviour towards the 'Canaanites' whom they found in the land. A common Protestantism, however, cannot explain either the diversity of Dutch Protestant behaviour in South Africa and in Indonesia or the diversity of English Protestant behaviour in India in the eighteenth and in the twentieth century.

relieved by the termination of the British Rāj, the ameliorative effect of British administration on the condition and expectations of the Indian peasantry was a British legacy which might prove to be a mill-stone round the necks of the British civil servants' Hindu successors in the government of India.

Under a *Pax Britannica* that had been maintained for more than a hundred years, the natural resources of the sub-continent had been eked out in divers ways: by the building of a net-work of railways which made it possible for surplus food-supplies in one area to be transported to another area where there was a shortage; by the irrigation of previously uncultivated areas in the Panjab; and, above all, by an able and conscientious administration. By the time of the departure of their English rulers in A.D. 1947, the Indian peasantry, uneducated though they still were in the academic sense, had perhaps become just sufficiently alive to the material achievements of a scientifically developed Modern Western technology and the political ideals of a Christian-hearted Modern Western democracy¹ to begin to question both the justice and the inevitability of their own ancestral indigence. They had begun to feel dimly that they too had a right to share in those amenities of Civilization which in the past had been the monopoly of a small minority in India as elsewhere, and at the same time to imagine vaguely that the magic cornucopia of Science could perform, 'in real life', the legendary miracle of the loaves and fishes, if only a ruling minority chose to use it for this beneficent purpose.

At the same time an Indian peasantry that was beginning to dream these dreams had been doing its worst to prevent their realization by continuing, as in the past, to breed heedlessly up to the limits of subsistence on a meagre customary standard of living, with the result that the addition to India's food supply which had been wrung out of a previously unutilized margin of resources by British administrative enterprise had mainly gone, not towards improving the Indian peasant's individual lot, but towards increasing the peasantry's numbers. Under British rule the population of India had risen from about 206,000,000 in A.D. 1872 to 338,119,154 in A.D. 1931 and 388,997,955 in A.D. 1941; at the time of the transfer of power from English to Indian hands, this human flood was still rising; and by the same date the possibilities of increasing India's capacity to contain a mounting volume of inhabitants had been to a large extent used up. How were the Hindu successors of the British to handle a political legacy which already allowed no margin at all for incompetence or folly in the administration of the stewardship which they had now taken over?

The traditional cure for 'over-population', not only in the Hindu World but in the economy of other civilizations too in a pre-democratic age, was to allow famine, pestilence, civil disorder, and war to reduce the population again to a figure at which the survivors would once more find themselves able to lead their traditional life on their customary low standard; and horrifying instances of drastic reductions of population

¹ See Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de La Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 304-5, quoted in this Study in I. i. 9 and IV. iv. 156.

by methods of barbarism were indeed on record. For example, the population of 'Irāq, after having been built up by perhaps more than three thousand years of careful husbandry, had been cut down again by the last two Romano-Persian wars and thereafter by the Mongol invasion;¹ North-West Africa, whose scientific cultivation the Carthaginians had begun, the Romans had completed, and the Primitive Muslim Arabs had spared, had eventually been devastated by the barbarian Arab Banu Hilāl and Banu Sulaym;² and the population of China had been reduced, if the official census figures were to be believed, from 9,069,154 to 2,900,000 families within the short term of ten years (A.D. 754-64) by the destructive effects of An Lu Shan's rebellion against the T'ang régime.³ In the latest chapter of Indian history before the transfer of power, Mahatma Gandhi, in his single-minded quest of independence for an India struggling to be free, had willed for her the same Malthusian end, without willing the necessary barbaric means.

Gandhi had divined that the achievement of mere political liberation from British rule might be an illusory emancipation if India still remained entangled in the economic tendrils of a Westernized World; and he unerringly laid his axe to this economic banyan tree's technological root in launching his campaign for the abandonment of the use of machine-made cotton goods by the people of India in favour of home-spun; but his countrymen's unwillingness to follow his lead on this crucial point was a sign of the times,⁴ for it brought into prominence the fact that by this date India was implicated economically in the life of the Western World no longer merely as a purchaser from abroad of the products of a Western mechanized industry, but now also by the far more compromising bond of having learnt to manufacture such products for herself with Indian hands that had mastered a Western technique. Moreover, even if Gandhi had succeeded in putting out of business the Hindu textile manufacturers of Ahmadabad and Bombay, the effect would have been to precipitate in India an economic, social, and political crisis which could never have been left for Nature to solve in her own brutal way by either a British civil service or by its Western-educated Hindu successors.

If and when this still undischarged but also still unexorcized storm-cloud on a politically free India's horizon did burst in a tornado-blast, the Hindu statesmen responsible for the government of India in that day would be constrained by the moral atmosphere of a Westernizing World to strive for some relatively humane and constructive solution. They would find themselves confronted with an Indian peasantry that had caught just enough of the Modern Western spirit to be unwilling this time to acquiesce tamely in a peasantry's traditional tribulations; they would have to reckon with an oecumenical public conscience⁵

¹ See IV. iv. 42-43. ² See III. iii. 322-4, 445-6, and 473-4, and V. v. 247.

³ See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 308.

⁴ See III. iii. 190-1 and 202-4.

⁵ This conscience had proclaimed a conviction of responsibility for being the keeper of the vast peasant majority of Mankind when, at the close of the general war of A.D. 1939-45, the authorities of the victorious United Nations had taken account of the whole population of the World, including the rice-eating as well as the wheat-eating peoples, in administering the distribution of the then available food supplies.

which no parochial government could any longer afford to ignore; and, most compelling influence of all, the voice of this conscience would also be speaking to them from within their own partially Westernized souls.

For these reasons it could be prophesied with some confidence that the Western-minded statesmen of a Hindu Rāj would have to grapple one day with the problem of a depressed Indian peasantry. It could not, however, be taken for granted that they would find themselves able to solve this inexorable problem by Modern Western political methods; and, should a Western panacea prove to be of no avail in a crisis which, for India, would be one of life and death, a rival Russian panacea would inevitably force its way on to India's national agenda; for a Communist Russia, like a Westernizing India, had inherited the problem of a depressed peasantry from her native cultural past, and, unlike India, she had already responded to this challenge on lines that she had worked out for herself. These Communist lines might be too ruthless and too revolutionary for either the Indian peasantry or the Indian intelligentsia to be able to follow them with any zest; but, as an alternative to the still grimmer fate of decimation, a Communist solution of the peasantry problem might demand consideration, *faute de mieux*, and this might bring a politically emancipated India face to face with the ideology of a Soviet Union with whom India—unlike China and the Islamic World and Eastern Europe—was not, or at any rate not yet, in immediate geographical contact.¹

4. *The Modern West and the Islamic World*

The Encirclement of the Islamic World by the West, Russia, and Tibet

At the opening of the modern chapter of Western history, two sister Islamic societies, standing back to back, blocked all the overland lines of access from the contemporary domains of the Western and the Russian Society to other parts of the Old World.

Though the Arabic Muslim Civilization had not inherited the Atlantic seaboard of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula, at the close of the fifteenth century it was still holding an Atlantic seaboard in Africa extending from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Senegal. Western Christendom thus still remained insulated from Tropical Africa overland, while waves of Arab influence were breaking upon the Dark Continent not only along its north coast in the Sudan out of the dry sea of the Sahara, but also along its east coast, the Sāhil, out of the Indian Ocean.² That ocean had indeed become an Arab lake, to

¹ The bearing of Russia's Communist solution of the problem of a depressed peasantry on the destinies of all the non-Russian societies, including India, that were likewise saddled with this problem and had still to solve it, is discussed on pp. 684–9, below. The possibility that the Soviet Union and India might eventually become immediate neighbours as a consequence of the partition of British India between the Indian Union and Pakistan is discussed on pp. 690–1, below.

² One wave of Arab influence also broke—to the eventual undoing of the Arabs themselves—upon another then still-dark continent lying not to the south but to the north of the Arabic Muslim World. The lateen sail (see Perry, J. H.: *Europe and a Wider World* (London 1949, Hutchinson), pp. 22–24) and the art of navigating the high seas by taking astronomical bearings (see Prestage, E.: *The Portuguese Pioneers* (London 1938, Black), p. 315) were both conveyed by Arab hands from the Indian Ocean, where

which the Venetian trading partners of the Egyptian middlemen had no access, while Arab shipping was not only plying up and down the Indian Ocean's African shore from Suez to Sofala, but had also found its way across to Indonesia, captured the archipelago from Hinduism for Islam, and pushed on eastwards to plant an outpost in the Western Pacific by converting the pagan Malay inhabitants of the southernmost of the Philippines—whom the Spanish ocean-going mariners duly recognized as 'Moors' when they came upon them in the sixteenth century in a circumnavigation of the globe from east to west.

At the close of the fifteenth century the Iranic Muslim Civilization held what seemed to be an even stronger strategic position *vis-à-vis* both Western Christendom and Russia. The 'Osmanli empire-builders' programme of bringing the whole of the main body of Orthodox Christendom under Iranic Muslim rule had been duly completed by Sultan Mehmed II Fātih (*imperabat* A.D. 1451–81) through the conquest of Constantinople, the Morea, Qāramān, and Trebizond. The same reign had seen the Black Sea turned into an Ottoman Lake in A.D. 1475 through the seizure of the Genoese colonies Caffa and Tana in the Crimea¹ and the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty over a Crimean Tatar successor-state of Chingis Khan's son Jūji's Mongol horde, whose sedentary subjects in the peninsula and nomad subjects in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe were the 'Osmanlis' fellow Muslims and fellow Turks. Adjoining the Khanate of the Crimea on the east, the sister Khanate of Āstrakhān commanded the mouth of the Volga, while the Khanate of Qāzān, whose likewise Turkish-speaking Muslim inhabitants had once been known as 'the White Bulgars', commanded the confluence of the Volga with the Kama and thereby blocked the way from Muscovy both down the Volga and across the southern Urals. Behind this front extending from the Qazanlys' western frontier on the Volga to the 'Osmanlis' western frontier on the Adriatic, the Iranic Muslim World extended south-eastwards over Bashkiristan and Qāzāqistan and the Tarim Basin to the north-western Chinese provinces of Kansu and Shensi, and over Iran and Hindustan to Bengal and the Deccan.

This massive Islamic road-block was a challenge which evoked a proportionately energetic response from pioneer communities in the two blockaded Christian societies.

In Western Christendom the peoples of the Atlantic seaboard invented in the fifteenth century a new type of ocean-going sailing-ship, three-masted and square-rigged, with a sprinkling first of lateen and later of fore-and-aft sails, which was capable of keeping the sea for months on end without putting into port and which earned, by its unprecedented performance, the distinction of being known as 'the ship' *par excellence* for the next three and a half centuries.² In such

they had been invented, to the maritime peoples on the Mediterranean and Atlantic seabords of Western Christendom.

¹ See II. ii. 445.

² This sudden swift advance in the arts of ship-building and navigation in Western Christendom in the fifteenth century, and the period of relative stagnation that followed until the nineteenth century brought another sudden swift advance, are reviewed in XI. ix. 364–74.

vessels, Portuguese mariners, who had made their trial runs in deep-sea navigation by discovering Madeira *circa* A.D. 1420 and the Azores in A.D. 1432, succeeded in outflanking the Arab seafront on the Atlantic by rounding Cape Verde in A.D. 1445, reaching the Equator in A.D. 1471, rounding the Cape of Good Hope in A.D. 1487-8, landing at Calicut, on the west coast of India, in A.D. 1498, seizing command of the Straits of Malacca in A.D. 1511, and pushing on into the Western Pacific to show their flag at Canton in A.D. 1516 and on the coast of Japan in A.D. 1542-3.¹ In a flash the Portuguese had snatched out of Arab hands the thalassocracy of the Indian Ocean; and, though the Portuguese afterwards lost all but a remnant of their naval and commercial empire in the East to Dutch, English, and French Western rivals of theirs, the Arabs were never able to win their lost thalassocracy back.² The blockade of Western Christendom by an Arabic World that had outflanked it overland in Africa had not only been broken; it had been inverted into a maritime blockade of the Arabic World by Western Christendom through the Westerners' newly acquired command of a ubiquitous Ocean.³

While these eastward-faring Portuguese pioneers in a sudden overseas expansion of the Western World were thus outflanking an Arabic Muslim World on the south, eastward-faring Cossack river-boatmen were as suddenly and sweepingly extending the borders of the Russian World by outflanking an Iranic Muslim World on the north. The way was opened for them by the Muscovite Tsar Ivan IV when he conquered Qāzān in A.D. 1552; for Qāzān had been the Iranic World's north-eastern bastion, and after its fall there was no obstacle except forest and frost, which were the Nomad-fighting Cossacks' familiar allies, to prevent these pioneers of a Russian Orthodox Christendom from passing the Urals and rapidly working their way eastwards along the Siberian waterways until they were brought to a halt by stumbling in A.D. 1638⁴ on the Pacific Ocean and then, on the 24th March, 1652, on the north-eastern marches of the Manchu Empire.⁵ In reaching these new frontiers an expanding Russian World had outflanked not only the Iranic Muslim World but the whole of the Eurasian Steppe⁶—a waterless inland sea which Timur Lenk had neglected to turn into an Iranic 'lake' when the opportunity for extending his empire round all its coasts had presented itself to him in the fourteenth century.⁷ The Iranic World now had to pay the penalty for Timur's lack of vision. Before Timur's day a nascent Iranic Muslim Civilization had succeeded in capturing the Turkish-speaking western half of a latter-day Eurasian Nomad World through

¹ See p. 313, n. 2, below.

² The one successful counter-stroke which the Arabs did achieve against the Portuguese in their decline was their ejection of this first wave of Western intruders not only from Maskat (*circa* A.D. 1648) and from the rest of 'Umān, but also from the east coast of Africa, as far south as Zanzibar inclusive, in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era; but this was only an ephemeral Arab recovery in the interval between two waves of Western expansion. In the nineteenth century the Westerners easily defeated the Arabs in the competition between them for the opening up of the interior of the African continent.

³ See VII. vii. 435 and XII. ix. 469-70.

⁴ See II. ii. 157 and V. v. 206-7.

⁵ See Ravenstein, E. G.: *The Russians on the Amur* (London 1861, Trübner), p. 21.

⁶ The Cossacks' emulation of the exploits of the Portuguese has been noticed in III. iii. 19; IV. iv. 497-8; and V. v. 315-16.

⁷ See IV. iv. 491-501.

the conversion of the three western appanages of the Mongol Empire to the Sunnī form of Islam;¹ and, on the eve of the Russian conquest of Western Siberia, this victory of the Iranic Civilization in this quarter had been rounded off by the conversion of the Khanate of Sibir; but the Iranic Civilization never went on to capture the Mongol-speaking eastern half of Eurasia on the farther side of the Zungarian Gap; and in A.D. 1576-7 the Mongols—followed by the Calmucks *circa* A.D. 1620—abandoned a primitive paganism, not, like their western cousins, for Islam, but for the Tantric Mahayanian form of Buddhism which had been preserved in a Tibetan fastness by a fossil of an extinct Indic Civilization.²

Thus, in the course of little more than a century reckoning from the date of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror's death in A.D. 1481, an Islamic World into which the Iranic and Arabic societies had coalesced since the conquest of Syria and Egypt by Sultan Selīm I in A.D. 1516-17³ had been not only outflanked on two sides but completely encircled by the pioneering enterprise of Portuguese sailors, Cossack backwoodsmen, and Lama missionaries. By the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the noose was round the victim's neck; and, what was more, he had by then already been foiled in divers attempts to break out of the toils. This failure was a signal one in view of his possession of the interior lines (the one advantage that had not only been left to him, but had been weighted still more heavily in his favour by his opponents' far-flung encircling operations); and he was now inexorably condemned to die by strangulation whenever an alien executioner might choose to draw the fatal bow-string tight. Yet the suddenness with which the Islamic World had been caught in this potential stranglehold was not so extraordinary as the length of the time that was still to elapse before either the Muslims' adversaries or the Muslims themselves were to become sufficiently alive to the situation to be moved to take action—on the Western and the Russian side, action to pounce upon an apparently helpless prey, and, on the Muslim side, action to escape from apparently desperate straits.

The Postponement of the Crisis

The Islamic World's Western and Russian adversaries were slow to close in upon their quarry, even when they seemed to have it at their mercy; and, when they did venture, their timidity and procrastination were justified in the event by a succession of discouraging military experiences. In the Ottoman recoil from the disastrous outcome of the second Ottoman siege of Vienna in A.D. 1682-3, which marked the visible turn of the tide in the warfare between the Islamic World and the West on a Danubian front, the Hapsburg counter-offensive was repelled in A.D. 1689 and again in A.D. 1738-9—this second time, definitively. When the Venetians took the opportunity of the Ottoman

¹ These were Jūi's portion on the steppe between the Altai and the Carpathians; Chaghatay's portion astride the Zungarian Gap; and Hūlāgū's portion in Iran and Irāq.

² See III. iii. 451; IV. iv. 497; V. v. 137 and 309-10.

³ See I. i. 387-8, and xi, maps 50 and 51.

Power's momentary collapse to conquer the Morea in and after A.D. 1684, they were made to pay for their temerity by losing in A.D. 1715 not only this ephemeral acquisition but their ancient possession the Island of Tinos into the bargain. Peter the Great took the same opportunity to capture the fortress-port of Azov in A.D. 1696; but, when he was emboldened by this success to invade Moldavia in A.D. 1711, at a moment when he had relieved himself of pressure from Sweden by his sensational victory over Charles XII at Poltava in A.D. 1709, he had to surrender the precious maritime outlet that he had won for Russia in an inner recess of an inland sea that was still a Turkish lake, as the price of being allowed to escape annihilation in Moldavia at the hands of an Ottoman army that had caught the rash invader in its grip. The first Muslim populations of any appreciable size to pass under Western rule were those in Java, which the Dutch acquired in A.D. 1600-84,¹ and Bengal, which the British acquired in A.D. 1757-60; but these were two outlying enclaves on the Islamic World's extreme south-eastern edge; and, when the British, after having conquered all the rest of India east of the Indus Valley, proceeded in A.D. 1838 to trench on the core of Dār-al-Islām by invading Afghanistan, they suffered a disaster there which took the Western aggressors aback and changed the course of history.

In A.D. 1952 the greater part of this core, from Afghanistan to Egypt and from Turkey to the Yaman, was free from alien political rule or even control. By that date Egypt, Jordan, the Lebanon, Syria, and 'Irāq had all re-emerged from beneath the flood of British and French imperialism which had submerged them successively in A.D. 1882 and in the course of the General War of A.D. 1914-18, and the residual threat to the integrity and independence of the heart of the Arabic World was now coming, not from the Western Powers, but from the Zionists. The homeland of the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia had likewise emerged intact from an attempt to carve a Greek empire out of it in A.D. 1919-22. In A.D. 1952 the two principal exceptions to the freedom from alien rule which was being enjoyed for the most part by the core of Dār-al-Islām were the Far West of the Arabic Muslim World in North-West Africa, which had fallen into the hands of France, and the Far East of the Iranic Muslim World in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, which had fallen into the hands of Russia. Elsewhere, Dār-al-Islām had merely been shorn of outlying fringes in India, Indonesia, and Rumelia and of imperfectly reclaimed hinterlands—such as the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe and its adjuncts the Crimea and the Caucasus, which Russia had acquired since A.D. 1774, and the interior of Tropical Africa, which the West European Powers had partitioned among themselves since A.D. 1880.² The slowness of the Modern Western World's advance at the Islamic World's expense can be measured by its history in the Maghrib.

In the past, this Mediterranean island, cut off, as it was, from both the

¹ By A.D. 1684 the Dutch had become masters of Western Java and paramount in the rest of the island; but it was not till A.D. 1830 that the whole of Java was brought under effective Dutch rule.

² A possible relation of cause and effect between the success of the Islamic World in preserving its independence in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era and the ill success of the contemporary Panislamic Movement is discussed on pp. 692-5, below.

Nile Valley and the Western Sudan by the dry sea of the Sahara, had been apt to experience the same fortunes as the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily, with which it was in closer touch across the waters of the Western Mediterranean; and, when, at the dawn of a Modern Age of Western history, the union of Aragon with Castile in A.D. 1479 was followed by the Spanish conquest of Granada in A.D. 1492 and by the rounding off of the Aragonese insular empire in Sardinia and Sicily through the Spanish conquest of Naples in A.D. 1503, it might have been expected that the North-West African countries opening on to the Mediterranean would now fall to Spain, and the Atlantic coast of Morocco to Portugal. The Portuguese had, indeed, begun to carve out a transmarine Algarve on the Moroccan side of the Straits of Gibraltar in A.D. 1415-71, and the Spaniards followed suit by holding Tripoli from A.D. 1510 to A.D. 1551 and imposing their suzerainty on the Hafsid princes of Tunisia from A.D. 1535 to A.D. 1574; but these prizes were snatched by the 'Osmanlis out of the Spaniards' hands after the Ottoman corsair Ürûj Barbarossa of Lesbos¹ had audaciously driven a wedge between the Spaniards and the Portuguese by establishing himself in Algeria in A.D. 1516-18.² All that eventually remained of this abortive Spanish empire in the Maghrib was a tenuous chain of *presidios* clinging to peninsulas and islets along the rocky shore of the Moroccan Rif; and the incipient Portuguese empire along the Atlantic coast was excised by the Moroccans single-handed, without Ottoman aid. When King Sebastian of Portugal set out to complete the Portuguese conquest of Morocco in A.D. 1578, the royal invader and his army paid for their aggression with their lives, and Portugal with the loss of her independence for sixty years.³

Thereafter, until after the opening of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the Barbary Corsairs—unconquered by the Franks and unamenable to the Porte—preyed on the shipping of all Western Christian maritime Powers whose governments did not submit to paying them an annual tribute. It was not till A.D. 1803-5 that the Tripolitaniens were chastised by the United States, and not till A.D. 1816 that an international squadron commanded by Lord Exmouth made it clear to the rulers of all the Barbary States that their piracy would no longer be tolerated by Western Christian Powers who now at last had their hands free from the Napoleonic Wars. The definitive Western Christian conquest of the Far West of the Islamic World did not begin till the French landed at Algiers in A.D. 1830 to find there for France a substitute for the empire which she had not succeeded in imposing on Europe; and 104 years were to elapse between this first French landing on the North-West African coast and the submission to France of the last unsubdued tribes in the Atlas in A.D. 1934. A spectator of the Spanish landing at Goletta in A.D. 1535 who had supposed himself to be witnessing the political annexation of the Maghrib to Western Christendom would have been just four hundred years out of his reckoning.

¹ It is perhaps not fanciful to suggest that Barbarossa's prowess at sea was an inheritance from the age-old Greek inhabitants and medieval Italian masters of his native island.

² See I. i. 348; p. 104-5, above; X. ix. 37-38.

³ Portugal was engulfed in the Spanish Monarchy from A.D. 1581 to A.D. 1640.

Why had both the West and Russia been so slow in taking the offensive against an hereditary enemy at their gates? And why, after they had at last tasted blood, had they not managed to devour more than the extremities of this Tityos's carcase? In a list of reasons for the Islamic World's rather surprising reprieve we may include the initial self-confidence with which the Muslims had been inspired by the memory of extraordinary previous achievements; the subsequent tactical victories that masked their strategical defeat in their attempts to break out of the toils of Western and Russian encirclement; the long-lasting effect of these impressive Muslim successes in inducing the Westerners to take the Muslims at their own valuation; the leading Modern Western peoples' loss of interest in the Mediterranean for some three hundred years after their conquest of the Ocean towards the close of the fifteenth century; and the mutual frustration of the rival competitors for the spoils of the Islamic World after the Western Powers and Russia had at last become aware that the once formidable titan now lay at their mercy.

The Muslims' initial self-confidence was indeed well-founded; for both the sister Islamic societies had done mighty deeds in their infancy. In the thirteenth century of the Christian Era the Arabic Muslim Society had performed in real life the infant Héraklès' legendary feat of strangling, each with a single hand, the two snakes sent by his persecutress Hera to devour the babe in his cradle. This Herculean prowess had been displayed by the Arabic Muslim Society in saving itself from the peril of being overwhelmed by a hostile combination between two formidable Christian aggressors when in A.D. 1260 the Far Eastern Christians, with the united forces of a Eurasian Nomadism at their back, had pushed across the Euphrates into Syria as far as Damascus, while the Western Christian Crusaders were still holding a bridgehead on the Syrian coast no farther away than Acre.¹ This thirteenth-century Arabic Muslim prodigy of self-preservation was matched in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by the Iranic Muslim Society's not less remarkable aggressive feat of conquering the main body of Orthodox Christendom. With these achievements to their credit, the Muslims took it for granted that they were invincible; and their consequent *moral* and prestige long continued to compensate for their increasing technological inferiority to their Modern Western and Westernizing adversaries.

This prestige and *moral* were buoyed up by the Muslims' subsequent tactical victories in their strategically unsuccessful attempts to break out of a ring that had been run round them by their Christian neighbours;² for the superficial successes immediately made their mark, while the underlying failures long escaped notice.

In the Mediterranean, for example, the 'Osmanlis' sixteenth-century

¹ See II. ii. 238 and 451, and p. 355, below.

² The history of the Islamic World's long-drawn-out struggle with the Western Powers and Russia from the sixteenth century onwards had much in common with the history of Germany's struggle with the same adversaries in the first and second world wars; and indeed in the First World War Germany and Turkey were in the same camp. The Muslims, like the Germans, won battle after battle without being able to save themselves by these victories from eventually losing the war.

success in defeating Spain's attempt to gain possession of the Maghrib,¹ and the Barbary Corsairs' subsequent thalassocracy in the Mediterranean on sufferance from Western maritime Powers pre-occupied with Oceanic enterprises, obscured the 'Osmanlis' far more significant failure to break through to the coast of the Atlantic and compete with the Western Christian Powers for possession of the Americas.² The 'Osmanlis' capture of Rhodes from the Knights of Saint John in A.D. 1522 was likewise more sensational, though less significant, than their subsequent inability to expel the Knights from their new naval base on the Island of Malta.

The 'Osmanlis did break through to the Indian Ocean after their conquest of Egypt in A.D. 1517; and their subsequent defeats by the Portuguese off Diu in A.D. 1538³ and in Abyssinia in A.D. 1542-3⁴ were more momentous than either their victory in the same year A.D. 1538 off Preveza or their reverse in A.D. 1571 at Lepanto in an unprofitable struggle with the Mediterranean Western maritime Powers for the command of a land-locked sea whose narrow outlet into the Atlantic was out of the 'Osmanlis' reach. If, instead of having to submit to being bottled up in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf as tightly as in the Mediterranean, Ottoman sea-power had been able to retrieve the recent failure of Egyptian sea-power to sweep the Indian Ocean clear of the Portuguese intruders, the 'Osmanlis might have become the heirs of the Indian Muslim princes of Gujerāt and have anticipated the descendants of their ancient enemy Timur Lenk in becoming the Turkish Muslim founders of an Indian universal state. This historic Ottoman failure in the Indian Ocean attracted less attention, however, than either the subsequent feats of other Muslim Powers on the Indian mainland⁵ or the 'Osmanlis' own antecedent feat of swallowing up an Egyptian Mamlūk Empire which had been the leading Power in the Arabic World for a quarter of a millennium.

This amalgamation of the Mamlūk with the Ottoman Empire was indeed a conspicuous alteration of the political map. Yet the 'Osmanlis' acquisition of the Egyptian portage between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, which gave them the strategic advantage of holding the interior lines in a contest in the Indian Ocean with the Portuguese circumnavigators of Africa, proved barren after all when the 'Osmanlis failed nevertheless to wrest the command of the Indian Ocean out of Portuguese hands. Nor did the concentration of Islamic forces through the union of Egypt and other Arabic countries with the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century make up for the fatal disruption of the Iranic World, at the beginning of the same century, through the sudden rise of a militantly anti-Ottoman Safawī Shi'ite Power in the Iranic World's heart.⁶ In the ensuing struggle in the Indian Ocean between the

¹ See p. 221, above.

² See II. ii. 445.

³ In A.D. 1565 the Muslim conquest of the Indian sub-continent was completed by the Deccanese Muslim Powers' feat of overthrowing and partitioning the Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar (see V. v. 515, with n. 1). In A.D. 1572 the Muslim power in India was concentrated into an omenical rāj through the Timurid Mughal prince Akbar's conquest of Gujerāt in that year.

⁴ See II. ii. 444-5.

⁵ See II. ii. 365-6 and 445.

⁶ See I. i. 366-88.

'Osmanlis and the Portuguese, the Portuguese partly owed their victory to a schism in the Iranic Muslim camp which enabled the Portuguese to win the 'Osmanlis' Safawī enemies for their allies instead of finding themselves confronted with a united Iranic World.

On the Danubian front, likewise, the 'Osmanlis' strategic reverse in A.D. 1529, when they failed to capture Vienna and thereby failed to crack the still tender carapace of a new-born Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy,¹ was eclipsed in the eyes of contemporaries by the preceding overthrow of Hungary in A.D. 1526 in the last round of a Hungaro-Ottoman Hundred Years' War. Contemporary Western observers shuddered to see a Western Christian kingdom go the way of its Orthodox Christian neighbours. Yet the carving of a new pashalyq of Buda out of Western Christendom's south-eastern flank, which was all that the Ottoman Empire eventually gained from the Battle of Mohacz, was a trifling advantage by comparison with the adverse effect of the other consequences of this battle on Ottoman prospects of farther expansion in this quarter. The severity of the disaster that had overtaken Hungary stimulated the Western World to provide itself with a Danubian Hapsburg carapace which, in the next chapter of the story, proved strong enough, in the two ordeals of A.D. 1529 and A.D. 1682-3, to resist the heaviest blows that Ottoman armies could deliver at this distance from their base of operations.

Vienna, like Tabriz, was just too far beyond the 'Osmanlis' effective range to go the way of Buda and Erzinjan; and it was noteworthy how small a quota of the Western World's total energies had to be mobilized in order to hold the 'Osmanlis at bay in the Burgenland. The personal union, under the House of Hapsburg, of an unconquered remnant of the territories of the Hungarian Crown of Saint Stephen with the territories of the Bohemian Crown and with the Hapsburgs' own hereditary possessions in south-eastern Germany sufficed to bring the 'Osmanlis to a halt on the eastern glacis of Vienna;² and the West European countries proved able with impunity to ignore the Ottoman peril while they were harvesting the opportunities which their conquest of the Ocean had brought within their grasp, and were contending with one another for possession of these trans-oceanic spoils.

The political schism between the Hapsburg Power and France and religious schism between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, which rent Western Christendom in the sixteenth century, were proportionately no less devastating than the contemporary breach in the Iranic Muslim World between a Sunnī Ottoman and a Shi'ite Safawī Power; and a sixteenth-century France might have been as valuable an ally for the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean as a sixteenth-century Safawī Empire was for Portugal in the Indian Ocean. The French Mediterranean naval port of Toulon did harbour an Ottoman fleet in the winter of A.D. 1543-4; yet Toulon never became an Ottoman counterpart of the Portuguese base at Ormuz; and in the Mediterranean, as on the Danube, the Hapsburg Power managed to keep the 'Osmanlis in check notwithstanding the diversions made by its Western Christian rivals in

¹ See II. ii. 179 and V. v. 325.

² See II. ii. 179.

its rear. This ability of the Modern Western World to fight off with one hand the Islamic World's efforts to break out, while the members of the Western body politic were warring all the time with one another, gives the true measure of the Western World's superiority over the Islamic World in strength even in an age in which the Ottoman Power stood at its zenith.

The least noticed, but not least signal, of all these sixteenth-century Ottoman strategic reverses was a failure to undo a master-move in a Russian encircling movement. The year A.D. 1569¹ witnessed the discomfiture of an Ottoman expeditionary force which had been sent via the Crimea to break a recently acquired Muscovite hold on the line of the Lower Volga² and to bring this vital waterway within the Ottoman Empire's reach by digging a canal from the nearest point on the Don to connect the Volga with the Black Sea. This abortive Ottoman thrust into the Eurasian Steppe was an attempt to reverse a previous change in the political map which had been to the 'Osmanlis' serious disadvantage. Since the opening of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era the 'Osmanlis had suddenly and unexpectedly been cut off from access overland, both south and north of the Caspian, to their Sunnī co-religionists in Central Asia and India. South of the Caspian, the road had been blocked by the establishment of a Safawī Empire extending from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf; north of the Caspian, it had been blocked by two successive Russian forward moves.³ The year A.D. 1502 saw the eviction of the last of the epigoni of Chingis Khan's son Jūji from the sarāy (*Russicè* Tsaritzyn) on the bank of the Middle Volga.⁴ Thereafter, in A.D. 1552-4, the Muscovites had conquered not only this Mongol horde's successor-state of Qāzān, commanding the confluence of the Volga with the Kama,⁵ but also its successor-state of Āstrakhān, commanding the Volga's mouth. If the 'Osmanlis had succeeded in ejecting the Muscovites from the line of the Lower Volga in A.D. 1569, they would have cleared for themselves a path over the Eurasian Steppe north of the Caspian along which they could have joined hands with their Uzbek Turkish co-religionists who had recently conquered the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin from the Timurids,⁶ and with the Khans of Sibir,

¹ See Inalcik, H.: *The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)* (Ankara 1948, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi), and the present Study, I. i. 374, n. 2, and II. ii. 445.

² In the General War of A.D. 1939-45, the line of the Lower Volga was the scene of one of the decisive battles of history (*commisum* 22 Nov. 1942-2 Feb. 1943). The outcome of the military operations in the same theatre in A.D. 1569, which was perhaps of equal importance, was consummated without any direct clash of arms between the Russian forces and the alien invader. In A.D. 1569 the Grand Vizier Mehmed Sököllü's grand design of reopening the severed communications between the Ottoman Empire and the Sunnī Muslim Turkish states of Central Asia by opening up a Don-Volga inland waterway between the Black Sea and the Caspian was frustrated, without any need for military intervention on Muscovy's part, by the ill will and bad faith of the Khan of the Crimea and by the insubordination of the Janissaries, whose Rumelian souls revolted against a prospect of having to pass the winter in a clime that was far bleaker than an Azarbaijanian Qārabāgh (see I. i. 386).

³ See I. i. 398.

⁴ Sarāy stood on the left bank of the Volga, in the angle of its westward bend adjoining the eastward bend of the Don. On the opposite bank in A.D. 1556 the Russians built a fort called Tsaritzyn which became famous in A.D. 1942-3 under the name of Stalingrad.

⁵ See p. 217, above.

⁶ See I. i. 371-5. Requests received by the Porte from the Khans of Khiva (Khawā-rizm), Bukhārā, and Samarqand for Ottoman action to reopen the pilgrimage route, via

whose horde on the Great Northern Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, in the Tobol Basin east of the Ural Mountains, was converted to Sunnism¹ on the morrow of the 'Osmanlis' abortive expedition to the Volga and on the eve of the Cossacks' subsequent successful passage of the Urals.

If, in A.D. 1569, the 'Osmanlis had attained their military objective, three important political results would have followed. The Sunnī Muslim World, which had been split asunder by the eruption of Imāmī Shi'ism in Iran, would have been reunited along a corridor to the north of the Caspian; the resurgent Shi'i Power would have been encircled and possibly crushed; and the threat to which the Islamic World's north-eastern flank had been exposed by the Russian conquest of Qāzān in A.D. 1552 would have been neutralized, since the Cossacks' passage of the Urals in A.D. 1586 would have been forestalled by the erection of an effective Islamic barrier across the next stage of their eastward path. The Cossacks' fire-arms would not have been able to make the short work that they did make of the Siberian Tatars' resistance if the Tatar archers had been reinforced by Ottoman matchlock-men who could have fought the Cossacks on equal terms.²

In the event, the reverse suffered by the 'Osmanlis on the Don-Volga Steppe in A.D. 1569 not only left the way open for the Cossacks to pour over the Urals into Siberia; it gave the signal for them to perform, before the close of the sixteenth century, the more audacious feat of sealing the severance of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe from its heartland east of the Caspian by bounding forward from the line of the Dniepr to the lines of the Don, the Terek, and the Yaik.³ This triple Cossack reinforcement of a Muscovite breakwater along the line of the Lower Volga that had held firm against the 'Osmanlis created a system of defence in depth that was too strong to be breached by the Nomads. The last of all the eruptions of Eurasian Nomadism did sweep across the Yaik and the Volga in A.D. 1616; but it was halted at the line of the Don and never reached the line of the Dniepr;⁴ and the Nomads who rode out on this forlorn hope were not Turkish-speaking proselytes of an Iranic Muslim Civilization but Mongol-speaking Calmuck neophytes of a Tantric Mahayanian Church which had survived as a fossil in a Tibetan fastness.

It will be seen that the failure of the Ottoman attempt to break into the heart of the Eurasian Steppe in A.D. 1569 was fraught with the gravest consequences for the Islamic World; but the significance of this Ottoman reverse was obscured by the continuance, for at least 160 years there-

Ästrakhān, from Central Asia to Mecca, which the Russian occupation of Ästrakhān had closed, appear to have weighed with the Porte in the taking of its decision to launch the adventurous expedition of A.D. 1569 (see Inalcik, *op. cit.*, pp. 68 and 73). The Porte was sensitive to such appeals because its prestige in a Sunnī Muslim World was bound up with its title to the guardianship of the Two Holy Cities of the Hijāz, which it had taken over from the Mamlūk Sultan of Egypt when it had extinguished the Mamlūk Power in A.D. 1517.

² A trial of strength in Western Siberia in the last quarter of the sixteenth century between 'Osmanlis and Muscovites, both equipped with fire-arms of Modern Western origin, would have been a counterpart of the similar contest that actually took place between Ottoman and Portuguese matchlock-men in Abyssinia in A.D. 1542-3 (see II. ii. 365-6 and 445).

³ See II. ii. 157 and V. v. 314-15.

⁴ See V. v. 315.

after, of Crimean Tatar slave-raids into Muscovite territory. In a book published in A.D. 1668 an English observer, Sir Paul Rycout, estimated that, at the time when he was making his observations, the average annual import of slaves from Krim Tatar to Constantinople was at least twenty-thousand head.¹ Russia continued to suffer from this scourge throughout the reign of Peter the Great, and an effective Russian *lines* in the Ukraine was not constructed till A.D. 1730-4, in the reign of the Empress Anna.² Though these slave-raids were of no military importance,³ they sustained the illusion that the Ottoman Empire was on the offensive, and Muscovy on the defensive, for more than a century and a half after the roles had been reversed in fact.

This mirage of an unimpaired Islamic military power long continued to bemuse, not only the Muslims themselves, but also their Western adversaries. The continuing prestige of the Islamic Civilization in Western eyes is attested by the continuance into the eighteenth century of conversions to Islam among Western Christians who were neither victims of the Barbary slave-raiders nor prisoners of war, but were voluntary entrants into the Ottoman service.⁴ The non-converted Western Christian employee of the Porte was a rare figure before the nineteenth century and cut a poor figure during the first half of it;⁵ and,

¹ Rycout, Sir Paul: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey and Brome), p. 81, cited in III. iii. 35, n. 3.

² See Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), p. 15, n. 3.

³ For their social and religious importance see the passage quoted from Rycout's book, loc. cit., in V. v. 110.

⁴ In Egypt in A.D. 1801, one of the commanders of the Ottoman forces cooperating with the British expeditionary force against the French was a renegade whose original name had been Campbell (Walsh, T.: *Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt* (London 1803, Cadell and Davies), p. 66). The sensational 'conversion' of the French general Menou to Islam during the French occupation of Egypt in A.D. 1798-1801 was almost certainly insincere.

⁵ The outstanding eighteenth-century representative of his kind was the French military officer Baron de Tott, who was employed by the Porte, during the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, to fortify the Dardanelles in the Western style of the day after a Russian fleet from the Baltic had confounded all Turkish notions of geography by appearing in the Mediterranean and destroying the Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Cheshme (*commisum* 7 July, A.D. 1770). The allegation that de Tott became a convert to Islam is denied by his English translator (*Memoirs of the Baron de Tott on the Turks and the Tartars*, translated from the French by an English gentleman at Paris under the immediate inspection of the Baron (London 1785, Jarvis, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. xvii-xxiv):

'Mr. de Tott has stated to the translator the impracticability of the Turks receiving any essential permanent instructions from the Europeans, on this . . . principle, viz. that, the instant their instructor becomes a Mahometan, he is looked upon as a fellow subject and is reduced to a level with themselves, besides the contempt naturally attending a forced conversion; and, if he remains a Christian, he has insuperable obstacles to overcome, even with the unusual and improbable protection and firmness of a Sultan Mustapha. Amongst others, the famous Mr. de Bonneval, whose history made so much noise at the beginning of this century, may be rated as an example of the truth of this observation. No Christian can ever be more respectably situated than Mr. de Tott; yet even his regulations produced only a momentary effect, and are already fallen into decay' (*ibid.*, pp. xx-xxi).

The translator supports Baron de Tott's contention by going on to report two anecdotes related to him by the Baron himself. Incidentally the Baron testified 'that he had never received a farthing from the Porte, nor any other appointment than that of his own Court' (*ibid.*, p. xxi).

Sixty-five years or so later, the position of Frankish employees in the Ottoman service was still what it had been in de Tott's day, on the testimony of the famous Prussian soldier Helmuth von Moltke, who served an apprenticeship in the Ottoman Empire in the years A.D. 1835-1839 as a member of a Prussian military mission to the Porte. Von Moltke records that at this date the Ottoman high command could not venture to outrage

even after the renegade had ceased to be the typical Western employee in Dār-al-Islām, a Western homage to the attractiveness of the Islamic culture which had formerly taken the radical form of religious conversion to the Islamic Faith was still paid in the superficial, yet nevertheless psychologically significant, form of the wearing of Islamic dress by Western Christian travellers in the Islamic World, as well as by Western Christian residents there. While this change of costume had the effect of serving as a practical precaution against the danger of arousing a Muslim population's latent fanaticism by flaunting Frankish clothes which, in early nineteenth-century Muslim eyes, were still the badge of Unbelief,¹ the primary motive was never this utilitarian one, but was always a sense of admiration;² and this hard-dying homage of the Modern West to Islam did not cease till it extinguished itself by losing its sincerity and evaporating into an affectation³ that is amusingly satirized in Kinglake's portrait⁴ of the English aristocrat, Lady Hester Stanhope (*vivebat* A.D. 1776-1839), theatrically aping the part of a sultan's mother⁵ in her dilapidated mansion in the Lebanon.

These psychological causes of the postponement, for some two hundred years, of a doom to which the Islamic World had been inexorably condemned before the sixteenth century was over, were reinforced by an economic cause and a political one.

The economic cause was the commercial stagnation of the Mediterranean Sea for some three hundred years after the conquest of the Ocean by the West European peoples at the close of the fifteenth century. In its

the Muslim feelings of even its Western-trained troops by ordering them to present arms to officers who were gyaours, even when these gyaour officers were, like von Moltke and his colleagues (and also like de Tott in his day), the servants of a foreign sovereign and not of the Pādishāh. 'We', von Moltke writes, 'were highly distinguished individual representatives of an abysmally low-rated category. . . . As for Franks who offer their services to the Turks for pay, these naturally find themselves in an immeasurably poorer position; and the natural result is that (with a few most honourable exceptions) the only Franks who contrive to endure it are of the kind that is prepared to submit to every sort of humiliation. People offer themselves as teachers in Turkey who have been bad pupils at home' (Moltke, H. von: *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten der Türkei* (Berlin 1841, Mittler), p. 414).

¹ According to a report from Col. Campbell to Sir John Bowring, incorporated in the latter's *Report on Egypt and Candia* dated the 27th March, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 190, Frankish clothes were by that date commanding respect instead of exciting contempt in Egypt. In Damascus, on the other hand, Frankish clothes were still not to be seen (Bowring, J.: *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria*, dated the 17th July, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 92).

² Perhaps the most remarkable of all Modern Western sartorial tributes to the abiding prestige of a decadent Islamic Civilization was the nineteenth-century and twentieth-century French and British practice of dressing even European troops in uniforms of an Islamic style. The Maghribi fez, jacket, and baggy trousers of the French *zouave* (*suw-wār*) had their counterpart in the turban worn by the English officer in a British Indian cavalry regiment—a headgear which proclaimed the British Rāj to be the Mughal Rāj's heir.

³ See Clot-Bey, A. B.; *Aperçu Général sur L'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin et Masson, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 150-1.

⁴ Kinglake, A. W.: *Eothen* (1st ed., 1844), chap. 8.

⁵ The wife of an Ottoman sultan came into power if and when her son succeeded her husband on the imperial throne; and an Herodotus would have noted with amusement that the accident of becoming a widow, for which a woman was penalized in the Hindu World by being sent to the funeral pyre to be burnt alive, and in the Western World by being sent to the dower house to die of *ennui* there, was rewarded in the Islamic World by the enjoyment, as a widowed mother, of a status and a licence never accorded to a wife during her husband's lifetime.

preoccupation with the task of opening up for itself this vaster and more lucrative field of enterprise,¹ the West was content to abandon the Levant to Ottoman Greek mariners² and the Western Mediterranean to Barbary pirates³ till, as a result of its very success in acquiring an oecumenical empire by exploiting its command of oceanic routes, it had built up in India and the Far East such substantial interests that the re-opening of a direct route between India and Western Europe now became a matter of importance to West European governments and men of business.

The chief landmark in the history of this change in the Western attitude towards the Mediterranean was the British East India Company's acquisition of a virtual sovereignty over Bengal in A.D. 1757-60. Thenceforward the finding of a short cut between a rapidly expanding British Rāj in India and this renascent Indian Empire's new metropolis in the British Isles became a more and more earnestly pursued object of British policy,⁴ and, in an age of Western ascendancy, this renewed Western interest in the Mediterranean⁵ spelled Western military and political intervention in the life of the Islamic countries possessing Mediterranean seaboard or situated on the land-bridge between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In the fifteenth century the Western peoples' main inducement to seek an oceanic route, however circuitous, from Western Europe to India had been the Western Powers' inability to control a short route via the Mediterranean and the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf, because this route was bestridden by Islamic Powers whom the West was not then strong enough to coerce. In the eighteenth century, Egypt and Syria were still in the hands of their former Mamlūk Muslim masters' Ottoman Muslim conquerors and successors, but by this date the 'Osmanlis were no longer capable of defending their empire against Western or Westernizing aggressors, and the Western Powers could therefore now have, for the taking, a Mediterranean route between India and Western Europe which would not only be shorter than the Cape route but would also be as fully at their command in the military and political circumstances of the day—always supposing that the alien competitors for the Islamic World's spoils could agree with one another over the division of them.

As it turned out, this essential condition of agreement was never attained, and the diplomatic and military energy expended in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by each of the Powers on thwarting its

¹ The West European peoples' preoccupation with the Ocean and indifference to the Mediterranean in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries is comparable to the American people's preoccupation with their own continent and indifference to Europe in the nineteenth century.

² See pp. 173-7, above.

³ See p. 221, above.

⁴ See Hoskins, H. L.: *British Routes to India* (London 1928, Longmans Green).

⁵ The British had shown an interest in the Western Mediterranean since the beginning of the eighteenth century. They had acquired Gibraltar in A.D. 1704, campaigned in Catalonia in A.D. 1704-12, and held Minorca from A.D. 1708 to A.D. 1782. The conflict between Great Britain and France which led to these results was, however, a war of the Spanish, not the Mughal or the Ottoman, succession; and, even after Malta had come into British hands in A.D. 1798 in the Napoleonic round of the Anglo-French duel, another generation was to pass before a through-route between England and India via the Mediterranean was to be established by the spanning of the gap between Malta and Suez in the direct British line of communications between England and India.

rivals' designs on the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire would probably have sufficed to prolong the Ottoman Empire's life for the hundred years and more by which it actually exceeded its natural expectation, even if the 'Osmanlis themselves had never made the attempt to save their house from destruction by reconstructing it in a Modern Western style under the spur of shocking military defeats.

Though the discomfiture by British arms of a moribund Mughal Empire's local viceroy in Bengal might do little to upset Islamic complacency, and might be regarded in the West mainly as an incident in a struggle over India between Great Britain and France, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Russia in the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 was taken everywhere as a portent; and, when in A.D. 1798 the French descended upon the Ottoman dominion of Egypt, and overcame all resistance there with ease,¹ as a step towards reopening in India a contest with their British rivals which had been decided there against France in the Seven Years' War, even shrewd observers took it for granted that they would live to see the Ottoman Empire partitioned between France, Russia, Great Britain, and the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy. Yet this expectation, natural though it was at the time, was not fulfilled in the event; for the only parts of the Ottoman Empire, within its frontiers of A.D. 1768, which were in the possession of any of those foreign Powers in A.D. 1952 were the territories adjoining the north and east coasts of the Black Sea, from Bessarabia to Batum inclusive, which had fallen to Russia; Cyprus, which had fallen to Great Britain; and Tunisia and Algeria, which had fallen to France. As for the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, which had held Bosnia-Herzegovina from A.D. 1878 to A.D. 1918 and the sanjāq of Novipazār from A.D. 1879 to A.D. 1908, she had voluntarily evacuated Novipazār and had lost Bosnia-Herzegovina in the act of losing her own existence.² The lion's share of the Ottoman Empire of A.D. 1768, from Bosnia to the Yaman and from Tripolitania³ to Moldavia inclusive, had passed into the hands, not of alien Great Powers, but of Orthodox Christian and Muslim successor-states, of which the largest in area—apart from a mostly arid Sa'ūdī Arabia—was a Turkish Republic stretching from Adrianople to Mount Ararat.

This remarkable triumph of the nineteenth-century Western political ideal of Nationalism on alien ground could hardly, however, have been achieved by the feeble and discordant efforts of the surprisingly liberated local peoples if the surrounding Great Powers had not thrust this prize into their hands by frustrating one another and thereby creating a political vacuum which, when the maintenance of Ottoman sovereignty

¹ See IV. iv. 458-60.

² The occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in and after A.D. 1878, and annexation of this occupied Ottoman territory in A.D. 1908, had, indeed, been nails driven into the Hapsburg Monarchy's coffin by its own statesmen's hands, since these Hapsburg acts of aggression against a moribund Ottoman Empire had had the effect of bringing the Monarchy into a head-on collision with a youthful Serb nationalism.

³ A 'Libya' consisting of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fazzān, which had been conquered from the Ottoman Empire by Italy in A.D. 1911-12, and from Italy by Great Britain in the general war of A.D. 1939-45, had attained independence on the 24th December, 1951.

proved no longer possible, all the Powers alike preferred to see occupied by local successor-states rather than by any of the Great Powers' own number.

The suzerainty of the Porte over Egypt, for example, was prolonged, after all, from A.D. 1798 to A.D. 1924 thanks in the first place to the military intervention of Great Britain in A.D. 1801—when British and British Indian expeditionary forces cooperated with an Ottoman expeditionary force in compelling the French invaders to capitulate—and in the second place to the diplomatic intervention of all the Great Powers of the day except France in A.D. 1840-1, when they compelled the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, Mehmed 'Ali, not only to evacuate all Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire but also to reacknowledge the suzerainty of the Porte over the African Ottoman territories that were being left in his hands, in consideration of his receiving from the Porte a grant of the governorship of Egypt for himself and his heirs, and a grant of the governorship of the Sudan for himself for life. In the next chapter of Egyptian history the occupation of Egypt by Great Britain in A.D. 1882 ended, not, as might have been expected, in the replacement of Ottoman suzerainty by British sovereignty, but, like the French occupation of A.D. 1798-1801, in an eventual evacuation—though in this chapter of the story the Western occupation lasted fifty-four years (A.D. 1882-1936) instead of three, and was followed, not by a reassertion of Ottoman suzerainty, but by a general recognition of Egyptian independence.

In a different quarter, all but an outermost fringe of the Ottoman dominions in Rumelia and Anatolia was saved from falling into Russia's hands by the diplomatic action of the other Powers in A.D. 1839 and A.D. 1878, and by the military intervention of three of them—France, Great Britain, and Sardinia—on the Ottoman Empire's behalf in the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853-5); and Russia took an appropriate diplomatic revenge when, in A.D. 1921, a nascent Soviet Union helped a nascent Turkish Republic to save itself from an Anglo-Greek attack which was already being hampered by the hostility of France and Italy to any further augmentation of their British ally's power at Turkey's expense. Thanks to the stalemate of power politics in this long-drawn-out game of chess, the Ottoman heritage in Anatolia and Rumelia was preserved for eventual distribution between a Turkish Republic and the Ottoman Empire's South-East European successor-states.

The independence of Afghanistan, likewise, was preserved, not only by the valour of the Afghans in the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars, but by a rivalry between Great Britain and Russia which moved the British to bolster up Afghanistan as a buffer-state between India and Russia rather than to risk driving the Afghans into Russia's arms by attempting the completion of a conquest which would have been not beyond Great Britain's power, in spite of all Afghan efforts to resist it, if the rival Russian Empire had not loomed up over the British Indian horizon.

As for Persia and the Asiatic Arab successor-states of the Ottoman Empire outside the Arabian Peninsula, their experience of Russian and Western imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had been,

down to the year A.D. 1952, much the same as Egypt's. They had managed, after all, to preserve their independence after having been perilously caught in the toils. In A.D. 1952 Persia was still independent, within frontiers that were approximately those with which she had emerged from the Russo-Persian peace-settlement of A.D. 1828, though in A.D. 1907 she had been subjected, without being consulted, to the beginnings of a partition by the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement of that year. Her unity had been restored in A.D. 1917, when the Russian as well as the 'neutral' and the British zone of Persia had fallen into the British lion's maw as a result of Russia's collapse in the First World War;¹ and her independence had been restored in A.D. 1921 when the Soviet Union—seeking to protect her 'soft under-belly' by turning Persia, as well as Turkey, into a buffer against British attack—constrained Great Britain to withdraw her troops from Persian soil by a show of force on Persia's Caspian coast. As a result of the Ottoman Empire's dissolution in the First World War, 'Irāq, Transjordan, and Palestine had fallen into the hands of Great Britain, and Syria and the Lebanon into the hands of France; yet, in the sequel, none of these Arab countries had gone the way that India and the Maghrib had gone during the hundred years ending in A.D. 1914. All of them except Palestine had, after all, secured at least a temporary independence as Arab national states—the French mandated territories owing to the action of Great Britain on their behalf during the Second World War—and the Palestinian Arabs had lost their country neither to Great Britain nor to Russia but to the Zionists.

Thus the rivalries between Great Britain and France, between Great Britain and Russia, and between Russia and the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy had preserved the political independence of the core of the Islamic World within limits that have been indicated.² Each Power had taken its turn in preventing its rivals from appropriating the heritage of the Islamic Powers and their successor-states; but the Muslim peoples had not been entirely passive beneficiaries of this favourable equilibrium of alien political forces; for, though the military and political reverses which they had suffered in and after A.D. 1768 had not put an end to their political independence, the shock of successive disasters had nevertheless brought into play the compelling motive of self-preservation, and this spur had driven the Muslim peoples to enter reluctantly upon a course of Westernization in which it had proved impossible to call a halt when once the momentous initial step had been taken.

The Muslim Peoples' Military Approach to the Western Question

The clues to an understanding of the Muslim peoples' approach to 'the Western Question' are to be found in three circumstances. At the time when the impact of the Modern West became the dominant problem in their lives, the Muslim peoples—like the Russians and unlike the Ottoman Orthodox Christians at the corresponding crises in their histories—were still politically their own masters; they were also the heirs of a great military tradition which was the warrant of the Islamic

¹ The short title by which the General War of A.D. 1914-18 was coming to be known by the time of writing.

² See p. 230, above.

Civilization's value in its children's own eyes; and the sudden demonstration of their latter-day military decadence by the unanswerable logic of defeat in ordeal by battle¹ was as surprising to them as it was humiliating.

The Muslims' complacency over their historic military prowess was so deeply ingrained in their souls that the lesson implicit in the turn of the military tide in their Western adversaries' favour in A.D. 1683 had not yet made any appreciable impression on them by the time when, little short of a hundred years later, this lesson was on the point of being more sharply driven home. When, after the outbreak of war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in A.D. 1768, it was common knowledge in Western Europe that the Russians were intending to bring into action a navy in the Modern Western style of that day which they had built up in the Baltic, the Porte declined to believe in the physical possibility of navigating ships from the Baltic into the Mediterranean till a Russian squadron duly turned up in the Levant to the consternation of an adversary who was so obstinately unprepared to cope with it.² Even after this painfully revealing Ottoman experience in the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, the Egyptian Mamlûks could not be persuaded that they stood in any danger from their 'Osmanli conquerors' latter-day Western pupils in the art of war. When the Mamlûk war-lord Murâd Bey was warned by the Venetian business man Rosetti, the *doyen* of the Frankish community in Egypt, that Napoleon's seizure of Malta might be the prelude to a descent on Egypt, Murâd Bey burst out laughing at the absurdity of such an idea;³ and, on the very eve of the catastrophe, the governor of Alexandria was equally impervious to a still more urgent warning given him by a landing-party from Nelson's fleet.⁴

The shock of the denouement was proportionately severe;⁵ yet the Mamlûks' humiliation in A.D. 1798 was not so painful as the 'Osmanlis' in A.D. 1774, for the Russians at whose hands the 'Osmanlis had suffered their defeat were not even Franks; they were creatures of the same clay as the 'Osmanlis' Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh*,⁶ and their country was known to the 'Osmanlis, not as a formidable military Power, but as the happy hunting-ground of the 'Osmanlis' slave-raiding Krim Tatar

¹ The dramatic exposure of the decadence of the Egyptian Mamlûks by a French infantry whose equipment and training were originally derived from those of the Ottoman Janissaries in their prime has been noticed in IV. iv. 454-61.

² 'Whilst the weakness of the government compelled it to shut its eyes to the excesses of a licentious soldiery, the ministers strove to conceal the naval war which threatened the Empire. No Russian vessel had ever made its appearance at Constantinople. The Russians, therefore, have no ships; or, if by chance they have any, what does that signify to the Turks, since there is no communication between the Baltic and the Archipelago? The Danes, the Swedes, whose flags are known to the Turks, could not overturn that argument in their minds; maps spread out before their eyes had no more effect; and the Divan was not yet persuaded of the possibility of the fact when they received intelligence of the siege of Coron, the invasion of the Morea, and of the appearance of twelve of the enemy's line-of-battle ships' (de Tott, Baron: *Memoirs on the Turks and the Tartars*, English translation (London 1785, Jarvis, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 14-15).

³ Clot-Bey, A. B.: *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin et Masson, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 163.

⁴ See the passage quoted in IV. iv. 458-60 from Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmân al-Jabarti: *ʿAjāʾib-al-Athār fī-t-Tarājim wa'l-Akhbār*.

⁵ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 164.

⁶ See III. iii. 48.

vassals. Yet Muscovy had now signally defeated the Ottoman Empire in the field by means of a borrowed Frankish military technique. In fact, this Russian victory over Ottoman arms was a Frankish victory at second-hand; and, to produce such an effective result through such an incompetent agency, Frankish military methods must be potent indeed. By starting this train of thought in dismayed Ottoman minds, the victorious Empress Catherine II prepared the ground in Turkey for the military reforms of Sultan Selim III, while in Egypt a victorious Napoleon was in the same sense the forerunner of Mehmed 'Ali.¹

In the Ottoman World at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as in the Russian World at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the aftermath of defeat by a Modern Western war-machine was a Westernizing movement from above downwards, beginning with a remodelling of the armed forces.

'Ce ne sont jamais les peuples qui font les civilisations, ce sont de grandes individualités qui les imposent presque toujours par la lutte et par la violence',

wrote Clot Bey,² the French physician whom Mehmed 'Ali took into his service in A.D. 1825 with a mandate to make provision on Western lines for the health of the Pasha of Egypt's new Westernized army;³ and, though a generalization from Mehmed 'Ali's career does not hold good for all the instances of Westernizing revolutions within an historian's purview, the French director of Mehmed 'Ali's military medical service was entirely correct in declaring in A.D. 1840:

'C'est l'armée et les nombreux appendices qui s'y rattachent qui ont donné à l'Égypte l'impulsion civilisatrice qui l'entraîne aujourd'hui . . .⁴ Tout était à faire, et tout a commencé à être fait à la suite de l'organisation militaire.'⁵

In the Ottoman Empire, as in Russia, this Westernization from above and from a military point of departure cast military officers for the role of liberal revolutionaries. The successful revolt of the 'Young 'Osmanli' Committee of Union and Progress in A.D. 1908 against the autocracy of Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd II is the counterpart, in point of personnel, of the abortive revolt of the Decembrists against the autocracy of Tsar Nicholas I in A.D. 1825. The leaders of the Decembrists were mostly Guards officers,⁶ recruited from the Russian nobility,⁷ who had served

¹ See Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 165.

² Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 167.

³ See Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 369-70.

⁴ Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 167.

⁵ Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 199; *cp.* p. 200. Sir John Bowring expresses an identical opinion in his *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes), p. 49.

⁶ In thus once again attempting to play a dominant and decisive role in Petrine Russia's political life, the officers of the Imperial Guard were not, in A.D. 1825, taking a new departure. 'For exactly a hundred years from Peter's death' in A.D. 1725, the Guards had 'decided either the accession or the maintenance on the throne of every empress or emperor' (Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London

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⁷ See *Le Monde Slave*, Nouvelle Série, 2me Année, No. 12, Décembre, 1925 (Paris 1925, Alcan): 'Centenaire des Décabristes', p. 334. Paul Pestel, the leader of the moderate Southern Group, was a free-thinking Protestant of German origin, whose mother had lived at the Saxon Court at Dresden (*ibid.*, pp. 360, 369, and 370).

in the Russian army of occupation in France after the overthrow of Napoleon¹ and were impressed, not so much by the legend of the French Revolution, as by the constitutional monarchy which had been inaugurated under their eyes in a post-Napoleonic France.² The ring-leaders in the 'Young 'Osmanli' revolution of A.D. 1908 were likewise mostly military officers³ who—in a generation which 'Abd-al-Hamid's censorship had done its worst to starve of Western intellectual food for fear of this infecting them with 'dangerous thought'—had enjoyed almost a monopoly of licensed access to contemporary Western sources of knowledge and inspiration, because even an 'Abd-al-Hamid had perceived that without Western-educated officers he could not have a Westernized army, and that without a Westernized army he would soon find himself an autocrat without an empire.

No doubt the tyrant's intention was that the Western studies of his military cadets should be strictly confined to technical military manuals, but it proved beyond the wit of a secret police to ensure that intelligent and idealistic-minded young men should pick nothing but this stony fruit from the tree of Modern Western knowledge when a wicket-gate into a Western intellectual paradise had once been opened to them.⁴ A twentieth-century Ottoman, like a nineteenth-century Russian, autocracy was indeed in a dilemma from which it could not escape. If it was to insure itself against a danger of being conquered by militarily efficient neighbours, it must win military efficiency for itself by providing itself

1950, English Universities Press), p. 137; cp. eundem: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), p. 9). The two new phenomena in A.D. 1825, were, first, that on this occasion the Russian Imperial Guard—duly keeping abreast of the movement of Western political ideas—were taking action on behalf, no longer of enlightened autocracy, but of parliamentary constitutional monarchy (see p. 351, n. 3, below), and, second, that this time—for the first time in a hundred years—their intervention in politics was unsuccessful. From first to last, Peter's new-model Imperial Guard had been the spear-head of the Westernization movement in Russia which Peter had inaugurated.

"The Guards were drawn from the landowning families, but they served for life and had been brought up in the full spate of Peter's reforms. They had grown to manhood unhabituated to the traditional Muscovite ways, and were, for the most part, ardent supporters and admirers of their creator . . . Peter used the Guards more and more frequently on all manner of extraordinary, non-military missions, notably to bring to book those in high authority. . . . In the latter part of the reign . . . [they] became something like *missi dominici*. . . . Their official appellation, "compellers", speaks volumes. In earlier years Peter used them in the Army to compel other troops to discipline; now in his closing years he used them in government to compel authorities, high and low alike, to behave themselves and carry out the law. They were, as it were, a personal extension of Peter's own thunderclap will" (Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, pp. 36-71).

¹ See Masaryk, T. G.: *The Spirit of Russia*, English translation (London 1919, Allen and Unwin, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 97. The political education of at least two officers of the younger generation who played leading parts in the Turkish Revolution of A.D. 1908—Enver Bey and Fethi Bey Okyar—was likewise completed by a period of service in the Western World; but in both these Turkish military careers the sojourn in the West came after, not before, the revolution at home. Enver served as Turkish military attaché in Berlin between the revolution of A.D. 1908 and the suppression of the counter-revolution of A.D. 1909; Fethi served in A.D. 1909 as Turkish military attaché in Paris.

² See *Le Monde Slave*, loc. cit., pp. 378-9.

³ Among these, Enver and Jemāl won immediate celebrity, but Mustafā Kemāl and Fethi lived to earn a deservedly greater reputation as leaders of the far more fruitful Turkish national movement of A.D. 1919, while the brain of the conspiracy that came to a head in A.D. 1908 was not a soldier at all but was the Salonican telegraph clerk Tal'at.

⁴ Muslim 'Osmanlis had begun to read Western newspapers since the morrow of the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 (Jorga, N.: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (Gotha 1908-13, Perthes, 5 vols.), vol. v, p. 44).

with fighting forces on the Modern Western pattern; but it could not do this without exposing itself to the alternative danger of being destroyed, not by foreign conquest, but by domestic revolution, through the reception of subversive Western political ideas by the professionally Western-trained military officers on whose technical proficiency the military quality of the autocracy's fighting forces depended. This dilemma explains the emergence, in both Russian and Ottoman history, of a characteristic figure—the liberal revolutionary military officer—which was a natural phenomenon in a social no-man's-land between two conflicting cultures, however paradoxical it might appear to be in Western eyes accustomed to a middle-class social order in which 'Liberalism' and 'Militarism' were mutually exclusive conceptions.

Up to this point we have been noticing similarities in the courses taken by the Westernizing movement on Islamic and on Russian ground; but there was at least one point of capital importance in which the two movements differed sharply. Peter the Great divined, with the insight of genius, that a policy of Westernization must be 'all or nothing'. He saw that, in order to make a success of it, he must press on without a pause when once he had embarked on it, and must apply it to all departments of life, whatever his particular starting-point might have been. Accordingly Peter—setting out, like his Ottoman counterparts, from a military point of departure, and being prompted in the first instance, as they were prompted, by the motive of self-preservation—never thought of coming to a halt at the limits of the military sphere (if any such limits could be drawn in the internal economy of a society which, in seeking to Westernize its fighting forces, was seeking by definition to equip them with technical resources of civilian provenance). Peter forged straight ahead from his narrower towards his wider objective;¹ and, though, as we have seen,² the Petrine régime in Russia never succeeded in Westernizing more than the urban superstructure of life and ultimately paid the penalty for its failure to leaven the rural mass³ by forfeiting its mandate to Communism, this arrest of its cultural offensive short of its comprehensive goal was due perhaps not so much to failure of vision or to inadequacy of agenda as to lack of sufficient driving-power. In Turkey, on the other hand, for a century and a half, from the outbreak of the Great Russo-Turkish War in A.D. 1768 till after the close of the First World War in A.D. 1918, the converts *à contre cœur* to a policy of Westernizing the Ottoman fighting forces continued, in despite of successive painful exposures of their fallacy, to hug the illusion that, in

¹ See p. 138, above.

² On p. 140, above.

³ Peter's 'efforts to improve agriculture were intermittent, sporadic and ineffectual' (Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, p. 161), though agriculture was the almost exclusive source of Petrine Russia's wealth, on which such heavy new calls were being made by the high-speed Westernization of the fighting forces, administration, and industry. Moreover, 'so far from attempting to alter serfdom as the basis of the state, Peter clamped it down more firmly on the peasantry' (ibid., p. 151; cp. pp. 157-8). In consequence, the Russian peasantry never came to feel that the Russian State was their affair (see Weidlé, W.: *La Russie Absente et Présente* (Paris 1949, Gallimard), pp. 163-4); and, though, in the last days of the Petrine régime, the peasantry was courted belatedly by the governing class and its agents as well as by the Intelligentsia—Rasputin, as well as Tolstoy, went into peasant dress—the peasantry rejected impartially both the Petrine governing class and an Intelligentsia which had been moved to secede from it by a sentimental cult of 'the People' (see ibid., pp. 110-12 and 183-4).

adopting elements from an alien culture, it was possible to pick and choose—as though a culture were not an organic way of life which must be taken or left as a whole.¹

During that century and a half the prevalent ideal in Ottoman hearts was to adopt the alien culture of the Modern Western World to the minimum extent required for immediate self-preservation, and it took Ottoman minds five generations to learn that the practicable minimum was nothing less than the ideal maximum. The judgement on all the successive doses of Westernization that the 'Osmanlis administered to themselves, with wry faces, in the course of that age of their history is the damning verdict: 'Each time too little and too late';² and this verdict is said to have been pronounced by the post-Mahmudian 'Osmanli reformer-statesman Mustafā Mehmed Reshīd Pasha (*vivebat* A.D. 1802(?)–58), at the beginning of his career, in the following words:

'Le malheur, c'est qu'il faut nous hâter, et qui ne connaît l'indolence du Musulman et ses insurmontables préjugés! Indolence et préjugés, voilà nos plus grands ennemis. Ce sont eux qui arrêtent notre marche, et nous devrions courir.'³

It was not till A.D. 1919, when this persistent impolicy threatened to deprive the Ottoman Turks of their Turkish homeland, after having already lost them their non-Turkish subject territories, that Mustafā Kemāl and his companions committed themselves and their countrymen unreservedly to the policy of whole-hearted Westernization on which Peter the Great had launched out unhesitatingly as soon as he had become master of Russia's destinies.

This long-pursued Ottoman practice of 'staggering' the process of Westernization, which cost the 'Osmanlis so dear before they eventually threw it over, was the reflexion of a negative inertia and repugnance rather than the expression of any positive policy. At the same time the tragedy of the Ottoman Sultan Selīm III and the tragi-comedy of the Afghan King Amānallāh suggest that the Islamic Westernizers might have run the risk of bringing on themselves other serious setbacks if they had been quicker to abandon the tactics of 'hastening slowly' along a treacherous westward road. While a Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk found himself strong enough, in the fifth generation of an Ottoman Westernizing movement, to venture deliberately to flout Islamic custom by tearing the veils off Muslim women's faces and compelling the men to wear hats with brims in which it was impossible for them to perform their prayer-drill,⁴ his Ottoman predecessor and his Afghan contemporary both came to grief through attempting, in the first generation, to emulate the calculated provocativeness of Peter the Great. When Peter inaugurated his Westernization campaign by shaving Muscovite beards, this psychological *Blitzkrieg* justified its audacity by breaking the spirit of the conservative opposition without giving them time to go into action

¹ On this question see pp. 542–64, below.

² See II. ii. 186–7 and III. iii. 47.

³ Reshīd Pasha, as quoted by Engelhardt, E.: *La Turquie et le Tanzimāt* (Paris 1882–4, Cotillon [et Pichon, successeur], 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 325.

⁴ See V. vi. 102–3.

against the impious futurist innovator. But, when Selim III put his new model army into uniforms in the Western style, and when Amānallāh brought back from London 1,001 ready-made suits of Western civilian clothes and clad in these the 1,001 members of a Great National Assembly (*Loe Jirga*) of conservative-minded Afghan tribal notables in October 1928,¹ the Afghan imitator of Peter paid for his audacity with his throne,² and the 'Osmanli with his life.

In the Ottoman World down to the time of writing, a still unconcluded drama of Westernization had so far run through four acts. The first act was the abortive attempt to Westernize the Ottoman fighting forces that was made by Sultan Selim III (*imperabat* A.D. 1789-1807). The second act was an abortive attempt to instil a tincture of Western Civilization into Ottoman civil life as a corollary of the successful Westernization of the fighting forces in Turkey by Sultan Mahmūd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808-39) and in Egypt by Mehmed 'Alī (*proconsulari munere fungebatur* A.D. 1805-49). Both these two great Ottoman Turkish Westernizers performed wonders, yet the impetus that they gave to an Ottoman Westernizing movement did not outlive its authors for longer than a single generation, and the subsequent collapse of their work was due, not solely to the incapacity of their epigoni, but also to an inherent weakness in the work itself; for, though Mahmūd, as well as Mehmed 'Alī, had perceived that it was impossible to Westernize his fighting forces effectively without setting them in a Westernized framework of civilian life, not even Mehmed 'Alī had carried this ancillary process of Westernization in the civilian sphere deep enough, or far enough afield, to provide sufficiently solid civilian foundations for an ambitious military superstructure, and the eventual result of this discrepancy was a financial, military, and political collapse which overtook Turkey and Egypt simultaneously at the turn of the eighth and ninth decades of the nineteenth century. In Turkey this unhappy ending of the second act was followed by the opening of a third act in A.D. 1908, when the Committee of Union and Progress was brought into power by a military revolution which compelled Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd II to reinstate the constitution which he had accepted on the 23rd December, 1876, and suspended on the 14th February, 1878. This third act, in its turn, ended disastrously for Turkey in seven years of war (A.D. 1911-18) which left her not only militarily prostrate but actually in danger of political annihilation. Yet a situation which might have been the end of the play was followed, after all, by a fourth act, opening in A.D. 1919, in which the Ottoman Turkish people, under the leadership of Ghāzi Mustafā Kemāl, abandoned the now hopeless task of saving the Ottoman Empire in order to concentrate their efforts on the new objective of salvaging out of the wreckage a Turkish nation-state whose survival was to be ensured by a radical reconstruction on a Western basis. At the time of writing, this notable enterprise had been carried successfully through its first stage.

¹ See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1928 (London 1929, Milford), p. 205.

² For Amānallāh's career, see V. v. 333 and V. vi. 234.

The Salvaging of an Ottoman Society by Selīm III, Mehmed 'Alī, and Mahmūd II

Selīm III's pioneer adventure in the Westernization of Turkey had an ominous overture in Krim Tatar during the brief interval of nine years between the renunciation of Ottoman suzerainty over the Khanate in the Russo-Turkish Peace Treaty of Küçük Qaynarja (*pactum* A.D. 1774)¹ and the annexation of the Khanate by Russia in A.D. 1783. Khan Shāhīn Girāy (*regebat* A.D. 1777-83), finding himself left at the mercy of a victorious Russian Empire that was his immediate neighbour, was quicker than his ex-suzerain the Porte to discern, and act upon, the signs of the times. He set himself forthwith to Westernize his army; but, before this pathetic attempt to retrieve a desperate situation was crushed by Russia's heavy hand, it had evoked a reactionary domestic insurrection and had burdened the Khanate with a crushing load of national debt—two portents of troubles that were to overtake Turkey likewise in her subsequent pilgrimage towards the same Western goal.²

In Turkey, Western military experts were employed by the Porte in the war with the Hapsburg Monarchy and Russia that broke out in A.D. 1788;³ but the first comprehensive attempt to remodel the Ottoman army and navy was not made till after the accession of Selīm III in A.D. 1789 and the restoration of peace in A.D. 1792. The Ottoman Navy was reorganized by French hands; Selīm's new-model army, the Nizām-i-Jedīd, was inaugurated in 1793.⁴ The tragic end of this enlightened experiment demonstrated that, in the political strategy of military Westernization in the Ottoman World, an indispensable opening move was to get rid of the classical regular army represented in Turkey by the Pādishāh's Slave-Household and in Egypt by the Mamlūks; for, while, by Selīm III's day, more than a century had passed since a Janissary Corps which had once been the best infantry in the World had ceased to be of any avail in war against the Ottoman Empire's foreign enemies, the reformer-sultan's fate showed that the Janissaries still held their own sovereign's life in their hands and that the living generation had no more scruple than their seventeenth-century predecessors had had against murdering a Pādishāh when his policy seemed to them to threaten their vested interests.

In the next act of the Ottoman drama, this lesson was taken to heart by Selīm III's cousin and all but immediate successor, Mahmūd II, and in Egypt by Mehmed 'Alī. Mahmūd managed to extirpate the Janissaries in A.D. 1826, eighteen years after he had been placed on his perilous throne,⁵ and Mehmed 'Alī the Egyptian Mamlūks in A.D. 1811, six years after he had contrived to be appointed Pasha of Egypt,⁶ as Peter had

¹ The eventual frustration of a sly Ottoman attempt to reacquire this suzerainty by reserving the Sultan's jurisdiction over the Crimea in his capacity as Caliph has been noticed in VI. vii. 23, with n. 4.

² See Jorga, N.: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (Gotha 1908-13, Perthes, 5 vols.), vol. v, pp. 13 and 22.

³ See Jorga, op. cit., vol. v, p. 54.

⁴ See Jorga, op. cit., vol. v, p. 117.

⁵ See III. iii. 49-50.

⁶ See III. iii. 31 and 50.

extirpated the Streltsy¹ in A.D. 1698-9,² ten years after his own advent to effective power; and, while Mehmed 'Alī did not have to exercise such patience as Mahmūd in waiting for his opportunity to put his drones to death, he did show extreme caution and tact in taking the steps by which he gradually built up a counterpart in Egypt of Selim III's abortive Nizām-i-Jedid.

By the time of his elevation to the viceroyalty of Egypt in A.D. 1805, Mehmed 'Alī was in a position to profit by Egyptian experience during the four years that had passed since his second appearance on the scene in A.D. 1801 as an officer in the Ottoman expeditionary force which had arrived in Egypt in that year.³ The French Army that had conquered Egypt in A.D. 1798 and occupied it thereafter during the years A.D. 1798-1801 had made a still deeper impression on the Muslim soldiers who had encountered them than had been made on the Porte by the Western-trained Russian army and navy that had defeated the Ottoman fighting forces in A.D. 1768-74. Even the Mamlūks, in their lair in Upper Egypt, had attempted to drill their troops French-fashion;⁴ the Mamlūk warlord Husayn Bey al-Afranji went so far as to raise a troop of Egyptian Christian soldiers, with French drums to keep them in step;⁵ and Muhammad al-Alfī likewise had a unit of French-drilled troops, whose evolutions Mehmed 'Alī used, in A.D. 1806, to watch through field glasses.⁶ The classically educated and conservative-minded *qul* Khosrev

¹ 'The Streltsy, part palace guard, part standing army and police force, organised in twenty-two regiments, each about a thousand strong, and stationed mainly in Moscow, were more addicted to armed outbursts than fitted for serious military operations. . . . They were a hereditary, privileged force, recruited for the most part from the townsfolk, partly engaged in trade and handicrafts, living apart in their own quarters, an incalculable hotbed of superstition, pride, reaction, and religious dissent' (Sumner: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, p. 13).

² See III. iii. 282, n. 1. While Peter had been absent from Russia on his Western tour of A.D. 1697-8, the Streltsy had tried to play the same trick as the Janissaries succeeded in playing on Selim III. Deserters from the Streltsy regiments stationed in the provinces had marched on Moscow with the programme of wiping out Peter's German partisans and dethroning the Tsar in favour of his elder sister Sophia, who had been in power as regent between the anti-Petrine revolution of May 1682 (when Peter's adherents had once already been massacred) and the pro-Petrine revolution of A.D. 1689. This *Putsch* was crushed by Peter's Scottish right-hand-man Gordon before Peter had had time to return to Moscow from Vienna, where the news of the revolt had found him. On his return he took savage punitive measures against the rebels; the Streltsy Corps itself was disbanded; and the survivors were forbidden to bear arms (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 257-66). While Peter was justified, from his own standpoint, in destroying a long since useless corps which had tried to deprive him of his throne and would not have hesitated to take his life, the Streltsy, on their side, had had grounds for mistrusting Peter's intentions towards them. Between his effective advent to power in A.D. 1689 and his two campaigns against the Ottoman fortress of Azov, he had advertised their incompetence by pitting them against his new Western-trained regiments in manoeuvres (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 110); he was suspect of having used the two Azov campaigns of A.D. 1695 and A.D. 1696 as opportunities for decimating them (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 252), as the Ottoman statesmen of the House of Köprülü had been suspected of prolonging the War of Candia in order to reduce the numbers of the Janissaries (see III. iii. 49, n. 4); and, on the eve of his departure from Russia in A.D. 1697, he had banished them from Moscow (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 249).

³ Mehmed 'Alī had volunteered for service in Egypt in A.D. 1798, and had duly served in the first Turkish expeditionary force that had suffered disaster at Aboukir on the 25th July, 1799.

⁴ See Jabartī, Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-: *'Ajā'ib-al-Āthār fi't-Tarājim wa'l-Akhbār*, French translation: *Merveilles Biographiques et Historiques* (Cairo 1888-96, Imprimerie Nationale; Paris 1888-96, Leroux, 9 vols.), vol. vii, p. 128. Cp. vol. viii, p. 46.

⁵ See Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 253.

⁶ See Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. viii, p. 46.

Pasha, who was the first viceroy of Egypt under the restored Ottoman régime after the capitulation of the French in A.D. 1801, set to work next year to provide himself with the rudiments of a Nizām-i-Jedid by recruiting Sudanese pilgrims *en route* through Egypt; dressing these in uniforms of a French cut; requisitioning black slaves from private owners; giving these, too, a military training; and also requisitioning white slaves, whom he equipped like Mamlūks but placed under the command of French officers with a stiffening in the ranks of as many French deserters as he could enlist.¹ This experiment had as unhappy an ending as Khosrev's master Sultan Selim III's; for, when Khosrev led his new-model army against the unpaid and consequently mutinous Albanian mercenary troops of the Ottoman army of reoccupation, he not only failed to dislodge the mutineers from the citadel of Cairo, but was driven by them out of the capital and barely succeeded in escaping from Egypt alive.²

These turbulent Albanian barbarians, who had arrived in Egypt in the Ottoman expeditionary force of A.D. 1801 with Mehmed 'Ali as their second in command,³ required more delicate handling than the degenerate Egyptian Mamlūks and Janissaries.⁴ In A.D. 1806 Mehmed 'Ali had to quell a mutiny of Albanian troops to whom he owed arrears of pay.⁵ In A.D. 1813 he ventured with impunity to impose a fatigue of Western drill, twice a week, on the expeditionary force that was at that time in training for an assault upon the Wahhābis in the Hijāz;⁶ but a more systematic attempt that he made in A.D. 1815 to impose not only Western drill but also Western uniforms on his Albanian and Turkish troops provoked a mutiny at Cairo⁷ in the spirit of the *émeutes* against Khan Shāhin Girāy and Sultan Selim; Mehmed 'Ali could count himself fortunate in managing to bribe the mutineers into a return to discipline⁸ before he had suffered Selim's fate; and this lesson taught the canny Rumeliot to outmanœuvre his wild men instead of hazarding a second frontal attack on their susceptibilities.

¹ See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 112.

² See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, pp. 163 and 167. The Albanian mutineers pillaged Khosrev Pasha's house in Cairo, but the Pasha's harem was defended by eighteen French soldiers in his service, who kept the mutineers out till all the women had been evacuated (*ibid.*, p. 166).

³ Their commander, Tāhir, was not only an Albanian himself but had little or no command of any language except his Albanian mother tongue. He frequented the [?Bektashi] dervishes in Cairo and attended their religious exercises (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 181). A few weeks after he had driven Khosrev Pasha out of Cairo and out of Egypt, Tāhir met his death in a clash between his Albanians and the Egyptian Janissaries, and this left the way clear for his second-in-command, Mehmed 'Ali, to make himself absolute master of Egypt in the course of the twenty years A.D. 1803-23 by successively playing off the Mamlūks against the Janissaries, the 'Ulamā against the Delis, and finally Joseph Sève's French-trained Sudanese regular troops against the Albanians.

⁴ The Egyptian Janissaries were so degenerate by this date that Mehmed 'Ali did not find it necessary to pay them the left-handed compliment of massacring them. Their spirit had already been broken by the humiliation of falling under the ascendancy of the Mamlūks whom it was their hereditary duty to hold in check (see IV. iv. 453-4).

⁵ See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. viii, pp. 17-18.

⁶ See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, p. 11. The local representatives of the Western Powers were invited to watch these manoeuvres (*ibid.*, p. 29).

⁷ See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, pp. 122-31; Clot-Bey, A. B.: *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin et Masson, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. lxvii.

⁸ See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, p. 131. Mehmed 'Ali did succeed in the same year in persuading the commander and the rank-and-file of one regiment of Delis to wear the new Western uniforms (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 132).

In A.D. 1819 Mehmed 'Alī hired an unemployed Napoleonic French soldier, Joseph Sève; posted him at Aswān, at the southern extremity of Upper Egypt, out of the Albanians' sight and mind;¹ set him to work there on giving one thousand recruits a three years' training;² persuaded him to become a nominal convert to Islam under the name of Suleymān;³ took a leaf out of his own unfortunate predecessor Khosrev Pasha's book by going on, between January, 1823, and June, 1824, to furnish Sève with thirty thousand Sudanese negro slave-recruits who had been captured in the campaigns of conquest in the Upper Basin of the Nile that had been started in A.D. 1820;⁴ and then gradually replaced these black troops by still more docile and far less expensive Egyptian peasant conscripts.⁵ *Pari passu* with the formation of this new-model army in the Western style, Mehmed 'Alī disbanded his dangerous Albanian and Turkish irregular troops by such gradual stages that their sting was drawn before their eyes were opened to the ruse that the Pasha had been playing on them.⁶

Correspondingly acute difficulties were encountered and overcome by Sultan Mahmūd II in building up his new-model army in Turkey—an

¹ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. lxxviii.

² See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 202. The core of this new-model army was a body of three or four hundred young Mamlūks who had saved their lives by capitulating and becoming Mehmed 'Alī's property (Vingtrinier, A.: *Soliman-Pasha* (Paris 1886, Firmin-Didot), p. 101). Sève succeeded in disciplining these turbulent and murderous troops by winning their devotion through showing himself completely fearless in face of an attempt to take his life on the parade-ground (ibid., pp. 102-4; Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes), p. 50). These reclaimed Mamlūks provided a corps of officers for the new-model army when the rank-and-file was expanded by drafts of Sudanese negro slave-recruits and Egyptian peasant conscripts (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 203).

³ See Vingtrinier, op. cit., p. 105. Clot-Bey distinguished himself by refusing to apostatize (ibid., p. 105).

⁴ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 203; Vingtrinier, op. cit., pp. 114 and 117.

⁵ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 204, and also Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes), p. 49, with the story, ibid., p. 50, of Colonel Sève's handling of his three hundred Mamlūks. Mehmed 'Alī's original plan had been to recruit Negro slaves in order to avoid the necessity of conscripting Egyptian peasants, but this servile military material proved too expensive (Bowring, op. cit., p. 16). These Sudanese slave-recruits 'were strong and docile enough, submitted patiently to military discipline, and learnt their drill; but they refused to be kept alive' (Dodwell, H.: *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge 1931, University Press), p. 64). According to a dispatch of the 8th February, 1824 (F.O. 78/126) from the British Consul-General in Egypt, Henry Salt, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 65, some 20,000 of them were thought to have been collected and sent up to Aswān by A.D. 1824, but in that year not 3,000 remained alive. It was on the advice of the French Consul-General Drovetti that Mehmed 'Alī had recourse to the conscription of Egyptian fallāhīn as an alternative source of military man-power (according to Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 82, 7,000 had been conscripted in A.D. 1814 for the war against the Wahhābīs in the Hijāz). About 30,000 of these conscripts were sent to Sève at Aswān. 'Salt, who visited the training camp with Mehmed 'Alī in 1824, thought the Pasha had reason to be delighted with and proud of his new army' (Dodwell, op. cit., p. 65).

⁶ See the report, dated the 3rd February, 1838, by an English mechanic employed in Egypt, in Bowring, op. cit., pp. 198-9. The Albanians did revolt again in Cairo in A.D. 1823, but on this occasion Khosrev Pasha's defeat by them twenty years earlier, in A.D. 1803, was avenged by a successor of Khosrev's who had been their second-in-command at that time. In A.D. 1823 six regiments of Mehmed 'Alī Pasha's French-trained Sudanese regular troops made short work of the Albanian mutineers. After Sève had marched his twenty-five thousand new-model troops from Aswān to within four leagues of Cairo, the Albanians submitted to the choice, offered them by Mehmed 'Alī, of either entering the new regular army or leaving Egypt. The revolt of the Albanians against the employment of French officers had been doubly dangerous because it had been accompanied by a revolt of the fallāhīn against conscription; but, after the Albanians' collapse, the fallāhīn, too, became submissive (Vingtrinier, op. cit., pp. 123 and 127).

enterprise on which he embarked on the 16th June, 1826, literally on the morrow of the destruction of the Janissaries.¹ The nucleus of his new force was provided by remnants of divers corps that had been created or reorganized on Western lines by Selim III; but the officers of these corps did not suffice for an expanded army in the Western style, even when they were reinforced by officers borrowed from Mehmed 'Ali and by a few Western renegade officers for the cavalry, artillery, and engineers.² As for the rank-and-file, it had to be recruited by force in the teeth of conservative resistance. In Bosnia, Mahmūd's local recruiting officer was mobbed, and the new Western-style uniforms were torn to pieces.³ The pressed men had to be brought to barracks in chains and kept under guard after their arrival.⁴ The least unsatisfactory recruits were boys from the poorer classes of the Muslim community whose families had no traditional associations with the Janissaries,⁵ and many of these boy recruits were not more than thirteen years old.⁶ The privates were quicker in mastering Western drill than the high command was in mastering the Western art of war.⁷

When Mehmed 'Ali won a free hand, he carried through to completion his policy of Westernizing his armed forces. Under the general superintendence of Colonel Sève as Chief of Staff,⁸ a training school for infantry officers, directed by a Piedmontese *ci-devant* Napoleonic officer, Bolognini, was opened at Damietta,⁹ and an artillery school at Turah under a Portuguese director, Segueria.¹⁰ A regular cavalry force was not organized till after Mehmed 'Ali's son, Ibrāhīm Pasha, had seen the French cavalry in the Morea,¹¹ when they were replacing his own troops on the eve of his evacuation, under *force majeure*, after the destruction of the Egyptian and Turkish fleets at Navarino by a combined Anglo-Franco-Russian naval force. Thereafter a cavalry school was opened at Gizah, in a palace formerly belonging to the Mamlūk war-lord Murād Bey, under the direction of a French officer, Varin.¹² In the army as a whole, the contemporary French military organization was copied exactly (except that Turkish was retained as the language for the words of command).¹³ The French system of discipline was introduced, and was

¹ See Bastelberger, J. M.: *Die militärischen Reformen unter Mahmūd II, dem Retter des Osmanischen Reiches* (Gotha 1874, Perthes), pp. 109 and 128.

² See Bastelberger, op. cit., pp. 127-9. In the artillery the renegades were the only scientifically trained officers (ibid., p. 142).

³ See ibid., pp. 126-7.

⁴ See ibid., pp. 126-7.

⁵ See ibid., pp. 139-40. The new Turkish, like the new Egyptian, army was governed by the French *règlements* (ibid., p. 139).

⁶ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 204.

⁷ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 207.

⁸ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. lxxxii, and vol. ii, p. 205. In the new-model Turkish army the cavalry proved more difficult to train *alla Franca* than the infantry. The Turks particularly disliked the Western style of horsemanship. A Westernized Turkish cavalry was produced in the end thanks to the work of their Western instructors and to the personal concern of Sultan Mahmūd, who was particularly interested in this arm (Bastelberger, op. cit., pp. 129-30 and 141-2).

⁹ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 206; cp. Bowring, op. cit., pp. 52-53. In Ibrāhīm Pasha's army of occupation in Syria, the cavalry were not so well drilled as the infantry, according to the British Consul-General in Egypt, Colonel Patrick Campbell, in a report on Syria in A.D. 1837, printed in J. Bowring's *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria*, dated the 17th July, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 128.

¹⁰ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 208.

¹¹ See ibid., p. 134.

¹² See ibid., pp. 127, 139, and 173.

¹³ See Bowring, op. cit., p. 49.

administered according to the French military penal code¹ (except that the traditional Egyptian punishment of the *bastinado* was not abolished).²

The Egyptian new-model army was also made to march to French military music;³ but in the psychologically significant and politically delicate matter of military dress Mehmed 'Ali—taught by his unfortunate experience in A.D. 1815⁴—showed more prudence than Sultan Mahmūd II in making a judicious compromise. Mahmūd put his new-model army into a completely Western military costume from the neck downwards, and thereby brought into odium his entire programme of reform by identifying it in Muslim minds with hateful Western clothes⁵

¹ A new-model navy was created for Mehmed 'Ali by French naval officers on parallel lines:

'The naval code adopted in Egypt is that of France, whose introduction must be traced to the number of French sea-officers who have entered the Egyptian Navy, and many of them obtained elevated command. Very essential services have indeed been rendered to the Egyptian Marine by French naval officers, especially by Cérisy Bey, who had for many years charge of the arsenal at Alexandria, and Besson Bey, who was second in command in the Fleet' (Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia*, dated the 27th March, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 54).

Mehmed 'Ali's first-hand observation of the potency of sea-power in the campaigns in and around Egypt during the years A.D. 1799–1807 had made him alive to the value of a navy in the Modern Western style for a nineteenth-century ruler of Egypt, and he started work on building one up for himself in A.D. 1808, immediately after his repulse of the British invasion of Egypt in A.D. 1807 and seven years before his abortive first attempt in A.D. 1815–16 to create a new-model army. After buying Western warships at second hand, Mehmed 'Ali obtained in A.D. 1821 the French Government's permission to have two frigates and one brig built for him at Marseilles (Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 66 and 223). 'A little later he made a dock at Alexandria and began to build on his own account, employing French shipwrights to control the work' (ibid.). His naval dockyard at Alexandria, on the other hand, was not started till A.D. 1828 (ibid.), when he was beginning to replace his original Western-model navy which he had lost at Navarino. A French expert from the naval dockyard at Toulon, Cérisy, was put in charge of the dockyard at Alexandria in A.D. 1829 (ibid.). A line-of-battle ship of one hundred guns was launched on the 3rd January, 1831 (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 222–5). By A.D. 1833 Mehmed 'Ali had 6 ships of the line, ranging in scale of armament from 84 to 110 guns, and 7 frigates, and, by A.D. 1837, 8 ships of the line, with one more under construction. The number of hands employed in the arsenal at Alexandria rose to over 3,000 under the direction of 60 Westerners, and the naval school at Ras-al-Tin had a strength of 1,200 cadets (Dodwell, op. cit., p. 223). In A.D. 1839 Mehmed 'Ali's navy was still being managed for him by Frenchmen, but Mehmed Bey, who was the controller of the dockyard at that time, had been educated in England (Bowring: *Report on Egypt and Candia*, pp. 33–34).

² See Clot-Bey, op. cit., p. 212; cp. Bowring, op. cit., pp. 52–3.

³ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 81.

⁴ See p. 241, above. In Egypt the style and cut of Frankish military uniforms had offended the aesthetic susceptibilities, not only of the Rumeliot soldiery who had been ordered to assume this alien garb, but also of the native Egyptian civilian spectators. Jabarti, for example, comments (in op. cit., vol. ix, p. 140) on the ugliness of the new uniforms, and laments, in this context, over the disappearance of a traditional decorum and good taste.

⁵ In the uniform of Mahmūd's Westernized Turkish Army by A.D. 1839 the loose native *shalwar* had been replaced by tight Western pantaloons for all ranks, while the officers had also been put into Western military frock-coats (Bastelberger, op. cit., pp. 202–3). These affectations drew criticism from Mehmed 'Ali's son and right-hand-man Ibrahim Pasha, who was the leading exponent of the rival Egyptian school of Ottoman Westernizers:

'The Porte have taken Civilisation by the wrong side. It is not by giving epaulettes and tight trousers to a nation that you begin the task of regeneration. Instead of beginning by their dress—and dress will never make a straight man of one who is lame—they should endeavour to enlighten the minds of their people. Look at us: we have schools of every description; we send our young men to be educated in Europe. We are also Turks, but we defer to the opinions of those who are capable of directing our own, whereas no regard is paid by the Porte to advice that is not their own. Their men would make very good soldiers, but their officers . . . ! The only man they had, capable of conducting their affairs, is the late Grand Vizier, Reshid Pasha. . . . You see the treatment

—though, in deference to the symbolic significance with which headgear, above all other articles of dress, was traditionally charged in the Islamic World, he did draw the line at forcing a Western form of military hat on to his soldiers' heads. In the army, as in the civil service, Mahmūd effaced former invidious distinctions by replacing the studied diversity of the traditional Islamic headgear by the egalitarian uniformity of the non-Western fez,¹ but a hundred more years were to pass before Mahmūd's successor, Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk, could venture in Turkey to impose upon all male Ottoman subjects the brimmed hat which, in Muslim eyes, was the Frankish gyaour's characteristic mark of the beast.² In the new-model Egyptian army, Mehmed 'Ali likewise abolished the turban,³ and even went to the Petrine length of forbidding the wearing of beards;⁴ but the uniform which he devised for his troops was modelled, not on Western military uniforms, but on the more congenial contemporary dress of Rumeliot Turkish Muslim civilians.⁵ All the same, Mehmed 'Ali found it advisable to grant high rates of pay to senior officers, as an antidote to the repugnance which was aroused in Turkish souls by even the moderately Western style of the new-model army in Egypt.⁶

In Mahmūd's Turkish army the officers were paid less and the privates more.⁷ In Egypt a Turkish officer enjoyed a rarity value, as the native Egyptians did not prove to make good officers,⁸ while they did provide an abundant supply of conscript private soldiers. The Egyptian peasant conscript was perhaps better off in the Army than in his village.⁹ The Egyptian troops were well fed¹⁰ and were pronounced by a Western observer to fare no worse than their contemporary fellow soldiers in the

which he experienced at their hands' (Memorandum of M. Alexander Pisani's report of his interview with Ibrāhīm Pasha at Kyutahiyeh, dated the 10th March, 1833 [?], enclosed in F.O. 78/209, Canning to Palmerston, [H.] 12, 7th March, 1832, quoted in Bailey, F. E.: *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853* (Cambridge, Mass. 1942, Harvard University Press), p. 172, n. 153).

¹ The non-Western origin of the fez, which was its merit in Muslim eyes, did not make it a specifically Islamic head-dress. It was an ancient Mediterranean article of apparel—identical with the Roman freedman's pileus—and it had been taken over by Arabic-speaking Mediterranean Muslims without ever having been abandoned by Greek-speaking Mediterranean Orthodox Christians.

² See p. 237, above, and V. vi. 102-3. Among Egyptian Muslims in Mehmed 'Ali's day the feeling against hats—and especially against hats with brims—was so strong that the expression 'I will take the hat' was used with the meaning 'I will stick at nothing' (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 362).

³ The date of this negative revolution in Egyptian military headgear was about A.D. 1823 (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 362). A hundred and twenty-four years later, the turban was still part of the full-dress uniform of the last British officers to serve in Indian cavalry regiments (see p. 228, n. 2, above).

⁴ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 368. Beards were still highly prized by the Egyptian peasantry, and the story of a peasant conscript's grievance against a village headman (*shaykh-al-balad*) who had caused the conscript's beard to be shaved will be found *ibid.*, p. 369.

⁵ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 363. No doubt the moral of an unwillingly conscripted Egyptian fallāh-soldier was raised by the exhilarating experience of finding himself clad in the dress of the imperial people with whom, in civil life, he could never have ventured to equate himself.

⁶ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 211.

⁷ See Bowring, J.: *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria*, dated the 17th July, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 27.

⁸ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 214.

⁹ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 248.

¹⁰ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., p. 209.

West;¹ and their behaviour to their civilian fellow Egyptians (though not their behaviour to the foreign Arabic-speaking civilian population of Syria) was exemplary by contrast with the excesses of their predecessors the Mamlūks, Janissaries, Delis, and Albanian mercenaries.² Broken in to Western military discipline and led by Rumeliot Turkish and Albanian commanders, they developed a martial spirit,³ of which they gave proof in the Morea in A.D. 1825, when they broke the resistance of insurgent Greek highlanders who were still formidable even after they had turned their arms against one another, and at Nisib on the 24th June, 1839, which was perhaps the first occasion since the Battle of Kadesh (*commissum circa* 1288 B.C.) in which the peasantry of the Lower Nile Valley had defeated in the field the peasantry of the Anatolian Plateau.⁴ This military service in Mehmed 'Ali's army reawakened in Egyptian souls a national consciousness which had been stifled ever since the Primitive Arab Muslim conquerors of Egypt in the seventh century of the Christian Era had snatched out of Egyptian hands the political fruits of an eight-hundred-years-long Egyptian struggle against Hellenism.⁵

Though Mehmed 'Ali thus gave the first impulse to a latter-day Egyptian nationalist movement on a Modern Western pattern,⁶ and, at the height of his power in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, was in direct or indirect control of all the Arab countries east of Cyrenaica and west of 'Irāq and the Hadhramawt, over an area extending from the Libyan desert to the Persian Gulf, this Rumeliot Turk⁷ was neither an

¹ See Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia*, dated the 27th March, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 52.

² See Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 228 and 256.

³ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 212.

⁴ An afterwards eminent Prussian officer who was a spectator of the Battle of Nisib from the Turkish side formed a low opinion of both the belligerent armies. 'Hāfiz Pasha's army', writes Hellmuth von Moltke (*Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei* (Berlin 1841, Mittler), pp. 405-6), 'was undoubtedly the best trained, best disciplined and best practised army, and at the same time the army with the worst moral, that the Porte had ever put into the field.' In the campaign of A.D. 1839 the Qōniyeh and Qaysari corps remained passive and thereby allowed Ibrāhīm Pasha to withdraw his garrisons from Cilicia and concentrate them on the battlefield (ibid., p. 384); and, immediately after the rout of the Turkish army at Nisib, the retreating Turkish regular troops were attacked by their Kurdish fellow soldiers (ibid., p. 397), who had been kidnapped to make good the losses in the Turkish ranks and who had had to be treated like prisoners of war by their Turkish officers, with whom these non-Turkish-speaking recruits were unable to communicate (ibid., pp. 382-3). While the new-model Western-trained Turkish regulars were melting away, the old-fashioned feudal cavalry (*sipāhīs*) held together (ibid., p. 398). The moral of Ibrāhīm's Egyptian regulars was equally low (ibid., p. 383). Two Egyptian battalions deserted to the Turks on the very day of the Turkish defeat (ibid., p. 398). Nevertheless, Ibrāhīm won the day—though he could muster hardly more than half the Turkish army's strength—thanks to his superiority in artillery and in ability to manœuvre (ibid., p. 382).

⁵ The anti-Macedonian Egyptian nationalist movement of the second century B.C., like the anti-Turkish Egyptian nationalist movement of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, was brought to life by the military prowess of a native Egyptian new-model army raised and trained by alien rulers (see V. v. 68).

⁶ According to Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 468-9, the Arabs already hated the Ottoman domination.

⁷ Mehmed 'Ali was born in A.D. 1769 at Kavála (*Kaβála*, the phonetic equivalent of the Attic Greek word *κεφαλή*) in the Macedonian dialect of Ancient Greek), the port of the Eastern Macedonian tobacco-growing plains watered by the lower course of the River Struma (Strymon) and by its right-bank affluent the Anghista (Angitēs). In the fourteenth century of the Christian Era the city of Serrhes (Siris) in the Struma plain had become a stronghold, first of the Serb and then of the 'Osmanli conquerors of the

Egyptian nor a Pan-Arab nationalist;¹ he was an Ottoman patriot whose ambition was, not to destroy the Ottoman Empire by carving out of its Arab provinces a successor-state for himself and his heirs, but to rejuvenate the Ottoman Empire² by a process of Westernization which was to be achieved through a fruitful marriage of his own genius with the economic resources of Egypt. If his march on Constantinople had not been halted by the intervention of Russia in A.D. 1833 and of Russia, Great Britain, the Hapsburg Monarchy, and Prussia in A.D. 1839, he might have become the Shogun of a Westernizing Ottoman Empire in which an efficiently managed Egypt would have served, as it had once served in Augustus's Roman Empire, to provide an enlightened dictator with the material means for carrying out his policy.³ In an Ottoman Empire under Mehmed 'Ali's administration, the rehabilitation of this derelict eldorado in the Nile Valley might have offset the loss, in A.D. 1774, of a still undeveloped eldorado in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, as Carthage had been compensated for the loss of her Sicilian dominion in the First Romano-Carthaginian War by Hamilcar Barca's acquisition for her of a greater empire in the Iberian Peninsula.

Unhappily, not only for Mehmed 'Ali's personal ambitions, but for the interests of the Islamic World, the Rumeliot viceroy of Egypt, like the Barcide viceroy of Spain, was thwarted by the jealousy of lesser men⁴ in the capital of the tottering empire whose fortunes he was effectively retrieving by constructive labours far afield; and an alliance between Mehmed 'Ali's personal rivals at Constantinople and a concert of foreign Powers who had combined to frustrate the Levantine ambitions of his patroness France proved a more effective force, in the international crisis of A.D. 1839, than the public feeling in Turkey, and in the Islamic World at large, in Mehmed 'Ali's favour.⁵

derelict European provinces of an East Roman Empire that had been shattered by Western Christian military adventurers in A.D. 1204. The fertile districts of Serres and Drama had been planted thickly with 'Osmanli settlers by Sultan Murād I; and Mehmed 'Ali, with his blond hair and beard and light chestnut-coloured eyes (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. lxxv), might well have been a scion of this stock, though, according to one account of his ancestry, his family were recent arrivals in Macedonia from Anatolia and were of Albanian origin. Mehmed 'Ali himself had started life in the local tobacco trade (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. lix) before enlisting as a volunteer in the Ottoman expeditionary force that was sent to Egypt in A.D. 1799. Mehmed 'Ali's first wife, who, like her husband, was a Rumeliot, is said to have influenced him (Bowring, op. cit., p. 148).

¹ According to Prokesch-Osten, Count A.: *Mehmed Ali, Vizekönig von Aegypten, aus meinem Tagebuche, 1826-1841* (Vienna 1877, Braumüller), pp. 62-63, Mehmed 'Ali did not want to found an Arab empire, though in such an enterprise he would have had the support of Arab public feeling (cp. Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, p. 7).

² This is the opinion of A. B. Clot, the French director of Mehmed 'Ali's army medical service (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 476), and also of a contemporary Austrian diplomatic observer, Count A. Prokesch-Osten (see op. cit., pp. 15 and 120).

³ See pp. 696-8, below.

⁴ Mehmed 'Ali's arch-enemies at Constantinople in the crisis of A.D. 1839-41 were the conservative Grand Vizier Khosrev Pasha, who was not only opposed on principle to Mehmed 'Ali's policy of Westernization but bore him a personal grudge for his share in Khosrev's humiliating expulsion from Egypt in A.D. 1803, and a rival Westernizer in the person of the French-educated Reshid Pasha, who was transferred from the Ottoman Embassy in Paris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Constantinople on the 24th January, 1838, by the Khosrev whom he afterwards supplanted (Prokesch-Osten, op. cit., pp. 70 and 134).

⁵ On this point, Prokesch-Osten's testimony deserves consideration, though it must be discounted to some extent in view of this witness's personal bias as an advocate (op. cit., p. 105) of the policy of working for a reconciliation between Mehmed 'Ali and Sultan

By the fiat of the Powers, Mehmed 'Ali was confined, in the settlement of A.D. 1840-1, to the governorship of the Ottoman possessions in the Nile Valley;¹ yet, though the Ottoman World was thus disappointed of its hopes of political reunion under the auspices of a man of genius, it had at least escaped the complete dissolution that had threatened it in and after A.D. 1774;² and the imposition of peace in A.D. 1840-1 at the cost of a permanent political division between Turkey and Egypt did relieve the crushing pressure of an armed truce under which the two Ottoman Powers had been keeping costly Westernized armies mobilized on a remote frontier for six years (A.D. 1833-9) since the Turco-Egyptian War of A.D. 1831-3.³ The security of Turkey was increased by the terms of a protocol of the 13th July, 1841, in which all the Great Powers of the day agreed with Turkey that the Straits between the Aegean and the Black Sea should be closed to non-Turkish warships of all flags in peacetime. Thereafter, in the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853-6), Turkey had France, Great Britain, and Sardinia for her allies, instead of having

Mahmūd II's successor Sultan 'Abd-al-Mejīd (*imperabat* A.D. 1839-61). According to Prokesch-Osten, Mehmed 'Ali was a convinced Muslim (p. 15); he reckoned, in the crisis of A.D. 1839, that Muslim opinion would rally to his support because he had shown greater independence than had been shown by the Porte in dealing with the Franks (p. 80); and the hopes of the Muslim World were in fact centred on him (p. 121). Whatever may have been the feelings of the Islamic World at large, those of some of his Turkish fellow countrymen were made manifest in the action of the Turkish fleet, which, on the outbreak of war, sailed from the Bosphorus to Alexandria and placed itself at Mehmed 'Ali's disposal. Prokesch-Osten reports that after the Turkish fleet's arrival at Alexandria on the 17th July, 1839, Mehmed 'Ali gave the officers an address in which his theme was the need for fraternal unity among Muslims and the consequent duty of loyalty to Sultan 'Abd-al-Mejīd (p. 102). On the same occasion he is said to have expressed a wish to come to Constantinople in order to reorganize the Ottoman Empire (p. 103). On the evidence of the same authority, Turkish public opinion in Constantinople in A.D. 1839 was overwhelmingly on the side of Mehmed 'Ali and against his adversary the Grand Vizier Khosrev; and the partisans of the Viceroy of Egypt included the Sultan's mother (pp. 111-12). When Khosrev appealed for a second time to the Powers, other Turkish grandees were moved to indignation (pp. 117 and 119).

¹ The Pādishāh's two firmans of the 13th February, 1841, conferred the Pashalyq of Egypt on Mehmed 'Ali and his heirs (on terms that were strictly defined), and the governorship of Mehmed 'Ali's own conquests in the Sudan on Mehmed 'Ali himself for life.

² It has already been noticed, on pp. 230-41, above, that the portions of Dār-al-Islām that had come under non-Muslim rule between A.D. 1774 and A.D. 1952 were a remarkably small fraction of the whole. The immediate threat to the Ottoman Empire's existence on the morrow of the signature of the Russo-Turkish peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarja came from the pullulation of incipient parochial successor-states; and, among these, the states set up by militant outlying barbarians, such as the Montenegrins, the Serbs of the Shumadiya, the Maniots, the Kurds, and the Wahhābīs, were less menacing than those set up in the metropolitan provinces by insubordinate Ottoman Muslim war-lords such as Paşvanoghlu of Viddin and 'Ali of Yannina in Rumelia, and the Qāra 'Osmānoghlu and a host of lesser dere beys in an Anatolia whose Muslim Turkish population had never quite forgotten the days before the Ottoman conquest of the non-Ottoman Turkish successor-states of the Saljūqs (see II. ii. 150-4). These Ottoman war-lords built up their power by hiring war-bands of Muslim barbarian mercenaries—Albanians, Bosniaks, and Maghribīs—and they were a greater menace than the recalcitrant tribesmen in Rumelia, Arabia, and Kurdistan because there were no national limits to the war-lords' capacity for territorial expansion at the expense of the authority of the Porte. By A.D. 1840-1 these internal dangers had been weathered by the Ottoman Empire at the cost of having been constrained to recognize the autonomy of Mehmed 'Ali in the Nile Valley and of a Serbian principality in the Lower Morava Valley and the independence of a Kingdom of Greece within modest frontiers. The Turkish new-model army, inefficient though it still was had succeeded in reimposing the Porte's authority on the Kurds, while the Wahhābīs had been temporarily crushed by Mehmed 'Ali on the Porte's behalf (see IV. iv. 76-78).

³ This point is made by Moltke, *op. cit.*, pp. 381 and 401.

to fight Russia again single-handed, and in the ensuing peace-settlement of Paris she was formally admitted into the Western comity of nations.

The Collapse in Turkey and Egypt at the Beginning of the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century

Thus the dose of Westernization that had been administered by Ottoman statesmanship to Turkey and Egypt since A.D. 1774 had enabled both these Ottoman polities by the middle of the nineteenth century to surmount the crisis into which the Ottoman World had been plunged by the Russo-Turkish War that had broken out in A.D. 1768. Yet, towards the turn of the eighth and ninth decades of the nineteenth century, both Mahmūd II's Turkey and Mehmed 'Ali's Egypt collapsed. Why was it that, within twenty years of the signature of the Peace Treaty of Paris in A.D. 1856, both Turkey and Egypt had fallen into adversity again?

One cause of this simultaneous collapse of the two temporarily rejuvenated Ottoman Powers was the cumulative effect of a strain imposed by the maintenance of professional fighting forces on a Western pattern in a society whose life had not yet been Westernized through and through. The consequent increase in government expenditure was not balanced by any increase of a comparable order of magnitude in the national income through a Westernization of methods of economic production; so far from that, the productivity of the peasantry was reduced by the devastating effects on work, health, and morals of the introduction of the recently invented Modern Western institution of military conscription;¹ and in Egypt, where Mehmed 'Ali had embarked on an ambitious programme of industrial as well as agricultural development that had not been emulated in Turkey by Sultan Mahmūd, a chartered accountant's balance sheet would probably have shown that these enterprises were running at a loss.² A growing gap between public expenditure and

¹ See IV. iv. 150-2.

² Arguments on both sides of the question whether Mehmed 'Ali's attempt to industrialize Egypt was justified economically are set out by Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 278-9. The adverse judgements in Bowring's report should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt in view of Prokesch-Osten's insinuation (*op. cit.*, pp. 82-83) that the British did not relish the competition of Egyptian manufactures with theirs in the markets of the Islamic World. Yet Bowring was probably correct in stating (*op. cit.*, p. 15) that the population of Egypt was impoverished by the monopolies through which Mehmed 'Ali's Government attempted to make its economic enterprises pay their way. He also states (*op. cit.*, p. 29) that the cotton textile and other Egyptian governmental industries were compelled to sell their product to the consumer at an unremunerative price in order to compete with imported Western goods which were free to enter Egypt subject to payment of duty at the rate of 3 per cent. *ad valorem* (the maximum chargeable under the current terms of the Ottoman Capitulations). Bowring declares that the effective maximum was still lower than this. If Bowring is correct on this point too, that would, of course, tell against Prokesch-Osten's view that Egyptian industries were regarded, in British eyes, as a serious menace to British exports. All the same, we know for a fact that the British Government had in mind Mehmed 'Ali's policy of state-promoted industrialization fortified by monopolies when it negotiated with the Porte the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty of the 16th August, 1838, in which the maximum of 3 per cent. *ad valorem* for Ottoman import duties was confirmed. The terms of this treaty were, of course, applicable to all Ottoman territories, including Egypt; but the Egyptian, unlike the Turkish, Government managed to abandon its monopolies in form without ceasing to enjoy them in effect (see Moseley, P. E.: *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934, Harvard University Press), p. 101; Bailey, F. E.: *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, A Study in*

revenue was momentarily bridged by the Turkish and Egyptian Governments' fatal discovery of the nineteenth-century Western money market. Loans contracted, with the light-heartedness of ignorance, on exorbitant terms for non-reproductive purposes brought both governments to bankruptcy within two or three decades.

A second cause of collapse was the burden of holding down territories in which a majority of the population was disaffected. Turkey had inherited from her own past the problem of Rumelia; she had reimposed on herself the burden of Ottoman Kurdistan by re-establishing her authority there in A.D. 1835-50,¹ and the burden of the Asiatic Arab provinces by suppressing the 'Irāqī Mamlūks in A.D. 1831² and by availing herself of the support of four Great Powers to recover Syria from Mehmed 'Alī in A.D. 1840 and the Hijāz in A.D. 1845. As for Mehmed 'Alī, he had deliberately saddled Egypt with a new empire which was as intractable as it was unremunerative by overthrowing the Wahhābī Power in Arabia in A.D. 1810-18 and embarking on the conquest of the Sudan in A.D. 1820. Sultan Selīm I, the Ottoman conqueror of Syria and Egypt in the heyday of Ottoman power, had never attempted this foolhardy feat of launching out on to the Afrasian Steppe; and, though Egypt was relieved of her Arabian commitment by the revolt of the Najd *circa* A.D. 1830³ and the subsequent re-establishment of Turkey's in place of Egypt's suzerainty over the Hijāz, Mehmed 'Alī's successors at Cairo continued to push their southern and south-western frontiers forward into the heart of Africa till the Egyptian Government's Silesian representative Emin Pasha had carried the Egyptian flag to Uganda in A.D. 1877, four years before the whole house of cards was brought tumbling down in A.D. 1881-5 by the insurrection of the Sudanese Mahdī Muhammad Ahmad.⁴

The most serious of all these Ottoman problems of disaffected populations was Turkey's problem in Rumelia, where she had to deal, not, like Egypt in the Sudan, with Nomads and primitive peoples in an outlying hinterland, but with a subject Orthodox Christian majority geographically intermingled with a dominant Turkish minority which had likewise been at home in Rumelia since the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era.

After the turn of the tide in A.D. 1683 in the perennial warfare between the 'Osmanlis and the Western Powers, the destinies of the Ottoman Empire depended above all on the ability of the Turkish 'ascendancy' in Rumelia to conciliate its Orthodox Christian fellow countrymen and fellow subjects of the Porte. The Orthodox Christian peoples' greater dislike for Frankish than for Ottoman rule had made the Ottoman Empire's fortune in the days of its rise,⁵ and, now that it had passed its zenith, its decline might at least have been retarded if Ottoman Orthodox

Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853 (Cambridge, Mass., 1942, Harvard University Press), p. 124, n. 109).

¹ See Longrigg, S. H.: *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq* (Oxford 1925, Clarendon Press), pp. 284-8.

² See Longrigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-76.

³ See V. vi. 233, with n. 5.

⁴ See V. v. 295, with n. 1.

⁵ See pp. 151-2, above.

Christians could have been induced to join with Ottoman Muslims in a common anti-Frankish front.

On the morrow of the turn of the tide, the possibility of establishing some such common front was greater than at any later date, since at that time the Modern West was only just beginning to exert its attraction on Ottoman Orthodox Christian souls,¹ and the Grand Vizier Mustafâ Köprülü was not slow in seeing and seizing this opportunity. In A.D. 1691, only eight years after the Ottoman retreat from before the walls of Vienna and three years after the Hapsburg armies' incursion into Kosovo, he promulgated the first charter of constitutional rights for the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. But the Nizâm-i Jedîd of A.D. 1691 did not go far enough, even on paper, to rally the *ra'îyeh* with conviction to the support of their discomfited Ottoman masters, and, even as far as it went, it remained largely a dead letter owing to a decadent Imperial Government's loss of effective control over the provinces. By the time when that control had been recovered in the course of the reign of Sultan Mahmûd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808-39), the price of the *ra'îyeh*'s loyalty to the Porte had risen sharply. By that time the *ra'îyeh* had become hardened cultural converts to the secular civilization of the Modern West; this civilization had given birth to the political ideals of the year 1789; and, in the Western World itself, the unifying ideal of Parliamentary Democracy had been pressed into the service of the disruptive ideal of Nationalism.²

Thus, in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the political atmosphere of a Modern Western World into which the 'Osmanlis as well as their *ra'îyeh* were now being irresistibly attracted was less auspicious than it had been in the seventeenth century for an Ottoman attempt to win the *ra'îyeh*'s loyalty. A sincere, enlightened, and energetic attempt to attain this difficult objective was made, nevertheless, by the Ottoman 'ascendancy' during its years of grace between the settlement of the Egyptian question in A.D. 1841 and the outbreak, in A.D. 1875,³ of a local revolt of the *ra'îyeh* in Bosnia which precipitated the break-up of the Ottoman Empire in Rumelia within the next three years.

The monuments of constructive Ottoman statesmanship during this critical period are the Westernizing constitutional reforms—known collectively as the Tanzîmât—which were inaugurated by Sultan 'Abd-al-Mejîd's promulgation of the Khatt-i-Sherîf-i-Gülkhâne on the 3rd November, 1839,⁴ and were crowned by Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II's promulgation of a short-lived constitution on the 23rd December, 1876.

¹ See pp. 161-5, above.

² See IV. iv. 156-85.

³ The revolt in Bosnia in July 1875 had been preceded by two years (A.D. 1873-5) of famine and financial collapse, so that the spell of political fine weather which had begun in A.D. 1841 virtually came to an end at the death of Mehmed Emin 'Âli Pasha in A.D. 1871. See Davison, Roderic H.: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (thesis submitted to Harvard University for the degree of Ph.D., 1st April, 1942), p. 298. [The author had kindly permitted the writer of this Study to read and cite a typescript copy of this work which was deposited in the library of Harvard University. In May 1952 Dr. Davison's book was in process of revision with a view to publication.]

⁴ The Khatt of the 3rd November, 1839, was reaffirmed in another Khatt of the 18th February, 1856, which was incorporated in Article 9 of the Paris Peace Treaty of the 30th March, 1856. The points of likeness and difference between these two charters are pointed out by Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

Sultan Mahmūd II's life-work had been to rid the Ottoman Empire of the usurpers—Janissaries in the capital, dere beys in Anatolia and Rumelia, and tribal chiefs in Arabia, Kurdistan, and Albania—who had stridden into the political vacuum created by the decay of the Pādishāh's Slave-Household since the later decades of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era. The immediate effect of Mahmūd's successful execution of this task had been a concentration in the Sultan's hands of an autocratic power which he had used mainly for Westernizing the Army, on the lines indicated above, to the neglect of corresponding reforms in the civilian sphere. The common aim of the liberal Westernizing Ottoman Turkish Muslim statesmen of the post-Mahmudian Age was to carry out Mahmūd's still unaccomplished work by converting the Ottoman Empire into a *Rechtsstaat*¹ whose subjects of all religions and nationalities would be secured so full a measure of equality before the law, according to the standards attained in the enlightened Western states of the day, that the *ra'īyeh* would lose their desire to secede for the purpose of founding or joining separate national states of their own.

This policy was progressively put into effect by four eminent statesmen in three successive stages. The author of the Khatt of A.D. 1839 was Mustafā Mehmed Reshīd Pasha² (*vivebat* A.D. 1802(?)–58), a critic of Sultan Mahmūd who had gained his own experience in diplomacy—in London and Paris as well as at Kyutahīyeh and Constantinople—during the years A.D. 1833–9.³ After the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853–6), Reshīd's work was carried on by his two pupils and critics Mehmed Emīn 'Alī Pasha (*vivebat* A.D. 1815–71) and Mehmed Kecheji-zāde Fu'ād Pasha (*vivebat* A.D. 1815–69)—a pair of Ottoman statesmen who were honourably distinguished by their exemplary cooperation with one another in practising the art of hastening slowly. Under the auspices of 'Alī and Fu'ād, Midhat Pasha (*vivebat* A.D. 1822–84) performed marvellous pioneer work in applying the ideals of the Tanzīmāt to the problems of Ottoman provincial administration; but, when, after the deaths of his pair of predecessors, Midhat took over their responsibilities at the centre of government, he failed to show their tact and judgement in grappling with a more formidable crisis in Ottoman affairs than they had ever been required to face.

Midhat⁴ was the son of an Ottoman official of Pomak origin⁵ and perhaps also of Bektāshī proclivities.⁶ He was born at Ruschuk and grew up at Lofcha (Loveč), Viddin, and Constantinople.⁷ He entered the Ottoman public service at the age of fourteen in A.D. 1836,⁸ but found

¹ See Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 185–6.

² The Khatt of the 3rd November, 1839, was to a large extent a reproduction of a memorandum communicated by Reshīd to Palmerston on the 12th August, 1839 (Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 185–6 and 271–6).

³ See Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

⁴ For Midhat's career see Davison, *op. cit.*; Babinger, *Fr.*, s.v. 'Midhat Pasha', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iii (Leyden 1936, Brill), pp. 481–2; [Antoine, Louis] 'Léouzon-le-Duc': *Midhat Pasha* (Paris 1877, Dentu); Midhat, 'Alī Haydar [Midhat Pasha's son]: *The Life of Midhat Pasha* (London 1903, John Murray); eundem: *Midhat Pasha: Hayāt-i-Siyāsīyesi, Khidmāti, Menfā Hayātī* (Constantinople, A. H. 1325 = A.D. 1909, Hilāl Press, 2 vols.).

⁵ See Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

⁶ See Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 197; Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

⁷ See Babinger, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

⁸ See Babinger, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

an opportunity later in his career, in A.D. 1858, of spending six months in the West and visiting Vienna, Paris, Brussels, and London.¹ Midhat made his mark in the field of provincial administration, where Sultan Mahmūd II had cleared the ground by sweeping away the host of local usurpers who had been on the verge of carving the Ottoman Empire into successor-states, but had left to his own heirs on the Ottoman imperial throne the task of building up a new system of local government, on Western lines, through which the Porte could exercise and maintain its recaptured authority over the Sultan's hereditary dominions. In successive tenures of provincial governorships in different quarters of the Ottoman Empire, including not only Rumelia but 'Irāq, Midhat worked out, and applied with conspicuous personal success, a dual policy which was taken by the Porte as the basis for a general reorganization of Ottoman provincial administration. With one hand he took action to make the Ottoman régime not only tolerable but attractive to Ottoman subjects of all communities by fostering mixed provincial councils,² mixed schools, technical education, and public works, especially for the improvement of communications. With the other hand he was equally vigorous in suppressing Pan Slavism and other forms of separatism and in maintaining law and order.³

Midhat came to the front in A.D. 1854, when he was entrusted with the task of restoring order in a Rumelia where repercussions of the Crimean War were making themselves felt among the Slav Orthodox Christian majority of the local population.⁴ He distinguished himself there by his success in suppressing unrest and brigandage and in settling Circassian refugees from the Russian conquest of the North-Western Caucasus.⁵ After returning to the Grand Council of the Empire at Constantinople, which he had already served as its Second Secretary, and winning the esteem of the representatives of Turkey's allies,⁶ he was appointed in A.D. 1857 to be governor of Viddin and Silistria;⁷ and thereafter, after visiting Western Europe⁸ and serving the Grand Council as its First Secretary,⁹ he served during the years A.D. 1861-3 as governor of a special province comprising the three Rumelian districts of Nish, Üsküb, and Prizren¹⁰—a delicate task, since the Orthodox Christians in the local population were Serb fellow tribesmen of the people of the adjoining autonomous principality of Serbia and independent statelet of Montenegro. In this special province Midhat worked for the establishment of genuinely representative institutions of local self-government, for a just redistribution of taxation, and for material improvements that would benefit the inhabitants without distinction of religion or nationality.¹¹ His success here led to his being commissioned to advise and assist

¹ See Babinger, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.; Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 197; Antoine, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 and 38.

² These had been envisaged in the Khatt of A.D. 1839 (Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28).

³ See Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-201.

⁴ See Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

⁵ See Antoine, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 22.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 26; Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

⁸ See above.

⁹ See Antoine, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 30; Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 189; Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

¹¹ See Antoine, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-34.

Fu'ad and 'Ali Pashas in the drafting of a standard law¹ to regulate the administration of provinces (*vilāyets*) on the lines of his own practice,² and then being appointed, in A.D. 1864, to apply this new law in another special province composed of the three Rumelian districts of Nish, Viddin, and Silistria.³ In this province in three years (A.D. 1864-7) Midhat built 3,000 kilometres of roads, 1,400 bridges, and three polytechnics: one at Nish, one at Ruschuk, and one at Sofia.⁴

Since A.D. 1858, Midhat had had the advantage of knowing something of the West as well as Turkey at first hand,⁵ and he was opposed to mechanical imitations not suited to local conditions.⁶ Perhaps his chief strength was his courage in acting on his own initiative.⁷ But his virtues, signal though they were, were pitted against formidable adverse forces. Though his policy of translating the classical Ottoman millet system into Modern Western terms was the most humane and enlightened programme that could have been devised for improving the lot of a mixed population of diverse creeds and nationalities, this aim did not appeal to the Rumeliot Orthodox Christians of his generation, whose hearts were already set on becoming citizens of national states of a type represented in embryo by the contemporary Kingdom of Greece and Principality of Serbia; and in these disruptive ambitions they were encouraged by Russia, who was eager to go on fishing in troubled Rumelian waters. Moreover, this attitude of the disaffected *ra'iyyeh* and their foreign instigators was largely justified by an unwillingness on the part of the Muslim 'ascendancy' in Rumelia to waive its historic privileges, and on the part of the conservatives at the Porte to commit themselves sincerely and wholeheartedly to a policy of transforming the Ottoman Empire into a commonwealth genuinely guaranteeing full equality before the law, in the Modern Western sense of that ideal, to all its subjects without religious discrimination.

The constitutional issue thus raised in nineteenth-century Turkey by the scandal of a traditional discrimination against a non-Muslim majority in the population of Rumelia gave rise to a corresponding issue within the bosom of the ruling community itself; for the Muslim, including the Turkish Muslim, subjects of the Porte, as well as the *ra'iyyeh*, were sufferers from a misgovernment that had its root in the Ottoman practice of Islamic political theory.⁸ As the point was put by Midhat Pasha himself:

'In the past our ruling idea was to satisfy Europe in Turkey in order to keep Turkey in Europe. To-day our aspirations and our labours to achieve reform spring from an impulse within ourselves, from thoughts that are our own, and from an activity that is native to our country.'⁹

¹ This law of the Vilāyets was promulgated in November 1864, and was revised in A.D. 1867 and A.D. 1870. By A.D. 1868 the whole of the Ottoman Empire except 'Irāq and the Yaman had been reorganized into provinces on the new pattern (Davison, op. cit., pp. 189-90, 203, and 206; Kramers, J. H., s.v. 'Tanzimāt [-i-Khayriyyeh]', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iv (Leyden 1934, Brill), p. 659).

² See Antoine, op. cit., p. 35.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴ See Antoine, op. cit., p. 57.

⁵ This point is emphasized by Davison in op. cit., p. v.

⁶ Midhat Pasha, quoted by Antoine, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 39.

⁸ See p. 253, above.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 44.

Accordingly, the outbreak in A.D. 1875 of an insurrection of the Serb Orthodox Christians in Herzegovina, where there was acute tension between the local *ra'iyyeh* and a local Muslim 'ascendancy' consisting of ex-Bogomil native Slav landlords, raised the question of constitutional government for Turkish Muslim Ottoman subjects as well as the question of political independence for Rumeliot Orthodox Christians still under Ottoman rule, and, when, in this crisis, Midhat, instead of being sent to Herzegovina by the Porte, was appointed in August 1875 to be, for the second time, Minister of Justice, he resigned in November 1875 and went into opposition. He was marked out for becoming the leader of the 'New 'Osmanlis';¹ for in A.D. 1867 he had been recalled from his Danubian province to Constantinople² to be President of a new Imperial Council of State³ (*fungebatur* A.D. 1868-9) and, since then, he had been governor of the provinces of Baghdad⁴ (*fungebatur* A.D. 1869-72) and Salonica⁵ (*fungebatur* October 1873-February 1874) and—for a spell of three months (1st August-19th October, 1872)—Grand Vizier.⁶

In the movement for constitutional government on Western lines that was now coming to a head within the bosom of the Ottoman Turkish community,⁷ an agitation was started on the 7th May, 1876, by the Muslim theological students ('softas')⁸ in Constantinople, and during

¹ The origins of the 'New 'Osmanlis' (*Turcîd* 'Yeni 'Osmanlılar', mistranslated into French as 'Jeunes Turcs', according to Davison, op. cit., p. 277) are obscure (ibid., p. 279). The fathers of the movement were men of letters not employed in the Ottoman government service (pp. 217-18)—Ibrâhîm Shînâsî (pp. 230-5), Nâmyq Kemâl (pp. 235-41), Ziyâ (pp. 243-8), and the 'Zealot'-minded Central Asian Turk 'Ali Su'âvî (pp. 250-2)—who were, all alike, independent publicists, language reformers, and patriots, but in other respects were very diverse (p. 253). Their first revolt was against the classical Ottoman Turkish literary style, which was remote from the living language of the day, but by A.D. 1865 they were already advocating constitutional government for Turkey in the Western style (p. 280), and in A.D. 1867 they joined with three pashas in publishing a criticism of the withdrawal of the Ottoman garrisons from Serbia and thereby incurred the displeasure of 'Ali Pasha (pp. 215-16 and 238). There was, indeed, an abortive conspiracy in A.D. 1867 against 'Ali and Fu'âd's régime (p. 282). In consequence, Nâmyq Kemâl, Ziyâ, and 'Ali Su'âvî had to flee to Paris, whither Shînâsî had preceded them in A.D. 1864 on a second visit (Shînâsî had been sent there for the first time in A.D. 1843 at the age of seventeen by Sultan 'Abd-al-Mejîd and had taken part there in the revolution of A.D. 1848 before coming home in A.D. 1851). The four 'New 'Osmanli' leaders were unable to return to Turkey till after the death of 'Ali Pasha in A.D. 1871. Nâmyq Kemâl was banished from Constantinople to Cyprus on account of the sensation created by the production, in A.D. 1873, of his patriotic play *Vâtân, yahud Silistere* (pp. 392-6).

² See Antoine, op. cit., p. 74.

³ This Council of State, which was created by dividing the existing Grand Council of the Empire (alias 'Tanzimât Council') into a Council of State and a High Court of Justice (see Kramers, J. H., s.v. 'Tanzimât [-i-Khayriyyeh]', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iv (Leyden 1934, Brill), p. 657), was duly organized on a model that was French except in one crucial point in which there was no analogy between the political circumstances in the France and in the Turkey of Midhat's day. In the Turkey of A.D. 1867 the seats on the Council had to be distributed between the different communities of which the population of the Ottoman Empire was composed, and the non-Muslim communities were flagrantly under-represented (according to Davison, op. cit., pp. 303-4, they were given 13 seats out of 50; according to Antoine, op. cit., p. 75, they were given 3 seats out of 16).

⁴ See Antoine, op. cit., pp. 80-81. In his governorship of Baghdad, Midhat achieved results second only to those achieved by him in the Danube Province in A.D. 1864-7.

⁵ See ibid., p. 88.

⁶ See ibid., p. 88.

⁷ The Turkish community had been alienated from the existing régime by the famine of A.D. 1873-4, which had been worst in the Turkish-inhabited areas of the Empire, e.g. in Central Anatolia (Davison, op. cit., pp. 401-2).

⁸ See Davison, op. cit., pp. 432-3; Midhat, 'Ali Haydar [Midhat Pasha's son]: *The Life of Midhat Pasha* (London 1903, John Murray), p. 81. Since the extirpation of the

the night of the 29th–30th May the reigning sultan 'Abd-al-'Aziz was deposed on the strength of a *fatwā* (legal opinion)¹ rendered by the revolutionary clerics² leader Khayrallah, whose followers' demonstrations on the 10th and 11th May had prevailed upon the intimidated Sultan to appoint him Sheykh-el-Islām (chief of the Islamic religious jurisconsults in the Ottoman Empire). From that date Midhat was virtually in power—though it was not till the 18th December, 1876, that he became Grand Vizier for the second time—and a constitution was duly promulgated by Sultan 'Abd-al-'Aziz's second successor³ Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd on the 23rd December of the same year; but this gleam of light had no sooner shone out than it was eclipsed by a deluge of disasters.

The Herzegovinian insurgents had been neither pacified nor suppressed; Montenegro and Serbia had gone to war with Turkey on their behalf; a conference of representatives of the Powers which had assembled in Constantinople to try to restore peace ignored the new Ottoman Constitution and failed to fulfil its own mission; the victory of Russia in a new Russo-Turkish war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1877–8) cut down the Ottoman dominions in Rumelia to a remnant that was no longer permanently tenable, even after the Great Bulgaria of the original Russo-Turkish peace treaty of San Stefano (*pactum* 3rd March, 1878) had been pared down and split in two by the terms of the revisionary peace treaty of Berlin (*pactum* 13th July, 1878); the administration of six sources of public revenue from indirect taxation was handed over by the Ottoman Government to an international council of foreign bondholders on the 20th December, 1881; and, meanwhile, Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd had established his autocratic control over what remained of the Ottoman Empire's territory and sovereignty by dismissing the undiplomatic constitutionalist Midhat Pasha from office on the 5th February, 1877, and suspending the constitution itself on the 14th February, 1878. After a cat-and-mouse persecution, the Ottoman protagonist of a Modern Western constitutionalism was tried and convicted in May

Janissaries in A.D. 1826 the softas had taken over the Janissaries' traditional role of serving as the principal political 'pressure group' in the capital of the Empire. (In a sense, the 'Ulema were the Janissaries' heirs by right of conquest; for their secession from the camp of reaction to the camp of reform had been the decisive change in the Ottoman domestic political situation which had made it possible for Sultan Mahmūd II to succeed in an enterprise which had proved too difficult for his predecessor Sultan Selim III). In A.D. 1853 the softas had agitated for war against Russia, and in A.D. 1876 it was again their anti-Russian feeling that moved them to support the constitutionalists (Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 430–1). They were brought into the constitutionalist camp by a leading 'ālim, Khayrallah Efendi (*ibid.*, p. 426).

¹ See Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 436; Midhat, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

² To minds attuned to Modern Western social and constitutional history, the spectacle of clerics taking the lead in a movement for political reform on liberal lines would perhaps be still more surprising than to see military officers playing this part. The liberalism of these nineteenth-century Ottoman 'khojas' had the same origin as the liberalism of their contemporaries in the Ottoman Army. Their profession required that they should be educated; and an education in the traditional Islamic theology and literature enlarged the mind, even though it did not lead so directly to Western 'dangerous thoughts' as the technical education of the new-model Ottoman military officers.

³ On the authority of another *fatwā* from the Sheykh-el-Islām, Khayrallah, 'Abd-al-'Aziz's successor Murād V had been replaced in his turn, on the 31st August, 1876, on the ground that he was mentally deranged, by his astutely perverse-minded brother 'Abd-al-Hamīd II.

1881 on a preposterous charge of having murdered the deposed Sultan 'Abd-al-'Azīz¹ and was banished to Tā'if in the Hijāz to be murdered there by 'Abd-al-Hamīd's orders.²

Simultaneously, Egypt was overwhelmed by a comparable concatenation of catastrophes. In A.D. 1876 she paid the penalty for her rulers' financial improvidence by forfeiting her financial autonomy to an international *Caisse de la Dette*, and in A.D. 1882 an Egyptian nationalist movement, whose programme was to rescue Egypt from the financial control of foreign creditors by bringing the incompetent Turkish autocracy of the Khedive under the constitutional control of the Egyptian people, was crushed by the armed intervention of a single foreign Power. The leader of the Egyptian nationalists, Ahmad 'Arābī Pasha, suffered Midhat Pasha's political fate of being dismissed from office, tried, convicted, and sent into exile,³ and the British expeditionary force remained in occupation in Egypt. Its presence there enabled the British Government to bring the finances—and, with them, the administration—of Egypt under its own paramount control, but did not avail to save the Sudan, south of Wādī Halfah, from being lost to Egypt through the insurrection of the Mahdī Muhammad Ahmad in A.D. 1881-5.

It will be seen that the ingredients of the cup of wrath were the same for both Egypt and Turkey, but they were mixed in different brews which had diverse effects on the patients in the next chapters of their histories.

In Turkey's catastrophe the insurrection of a disaffected Rumeliot subject population was the occasion of the other tribulations, whereas in Egypt's catastrophe the insurrection in the Sudan was their consequence. In Egypt the troubles began with the imposition of foreign financial control, whereas in Turkey a partial loss of financial sovereignty was the aftermath of insurrection and war. As for the Egyptian nationalist movement of which 'Arābī Pasha was at least the nominal leader, it was comparable to the contemporary nationalist movements among the Rumeliot Orthodox Christians inasmuch as, like these, it was a revolt of a non-Turkish subject population against a local Turkish 'ascendancy'. The revolt in Egypt was initiated by Arab officers of an Egyptian Army which was still officered predominantly by Turks and Albanians. At the same time, this movement headed by 'Arābī at Cairo in A.D. 1882 resembled the movement led by Midhat at Constantinople in A.D. 1876 in expressing, not a will to secede, but a demand, emanating from the Muslim people of the country, for the replacement of an inefficient autocracy by a parliamentary constitutional régime of the contemporary Western pattern.

The Failure of the Arabs to Respond to a Continuing Challenge of Western Aggression

Both constitutional movements were suppressed; but their suppression was accomplished by different means in the two cases, and this

¹ See Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 482.

² Babinger, *loc. cit.*, gives the date of the crime as the 30th April, 1883; other authorities give divers dates (e.g. the 8th May and the 8th July) in A.D. 1884.

³ 'Arābī was banished for life to Ceylon, but was allowed to return to Egypt in A.D. 1901.

difference drove the two countries along divergent political courses. In Turkey the 'New 'Osmanlis' were suppressed by Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid without recourse to foreign aid, with the result that, for the next thirty-one years (A.D. 1877-1908), Turkey was under the yoke of a native autocrat. In Egypt, 'Arābi and his partisans were crushed by the armed intervention of a Western Power, with the result that for the next fifty-four years (A.D. 1882-1936) Egypt was under foreign military occupation. In other words, in this next chapter of Ottoman history Turkey went through China's experience while Egypt went through India's. Turkey, like China, preserved for herself the blessing of freedom to make her own mistakes at the price of having to endure the unmitigated consequences of them, whereas Egypt was afflicted with the blight of being managed, rehabilitated, and shielded by alien hands at the cost of being debarred, so long as this benevolently stifling unsought tutelage lasted, from learning through the suffering that had been found to be Man's one effective school of practical wisdom.

Thus Egypt had escaped from an uncongenial Turkish domination only to become a pawn on the chessboard of Western power politics. This nineteenth-century Egyptian experience was shared by other Arab countries outside the bounds of the desert and highland fastnesses of the Arabian Peninsula itself; and a retrospect of this chapter of these Arab countries' history would lend colour to the view that their weakness had been ruthlessly exploited by Modern Western politicians to solve Western problems at the Arabs' expense.

France, for example,¹ had embarked in A.D. 1830 on the conquest of Algeria in compensation for the collapse of a Napoleonic Empire in Europe; in A.D. 1881 she had imposed a French protectorate on Tunisia, with Bismarck's blessing, in compensation for her defeat in the Franco-German War of A.D. 1870-1; in A.D. 1907-12 she had proceeded, with Great Britain's blessing, to impose a French protectorate on Morocco in compensation for her blunder, in A.D. 1882, in missing her opportunity to go into partnership with Great Britain in the occupation and control of Egypt; and in A.D. 1920 she had attacked and conquered Syria, with a mandate from the League of Nations, in compensation for having been attacked and all but conquered, herself, by Germany in the General War of A.D. 1914-18. Italy's attack on the Ottoman Arab provinces in Libya in A.D. 1911, with the connivance of the other Great Powers, had likewise been delivered in compensation for the shortness of the measure which Italy had received in the partition of Tropical Africa between European Powers during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

On the same cynical principle of making the defenceless pay, the Zionists on the 14th May, 1948, had set up a state of Israel in Palestine by force of arms in a war that had resulted in more than half a million Palestinian Arabs losing their homes, in compensation for atrocities committed against Jews in A.D. 1933-45, not in the Levant, but in Europe, and not by Arabs, but by Germans.² The French in A.D. 1920 could defend their act of aggression with a show of legality by exhibiting

¹ See X. ix. 11.

² See pp. 288-92, below—especially p. 290, nn. 1 and 3.

a licence from the League of Nations to violate the rights of the Arab people of Syria because other members of the League were feeling sympathy with France over her sufferings at Germany's hands in the First World War, and because Great Britain, in particular, was grateful to France for having taken the brunt of the German attack on the Western allies, was uneasy in her conscience over having exercised her option to leave unratified a treaty, guaranteeing France in Europe, which she had signed on the 28th June, 1919, and was anxious to obtain the acquiescence of France in British ambitions at the expense of the Arab peoples of Palestine and 'Irāq. By a similar operation of psychological forces the Zionists obtained a retrospective condonation from the United Nations Organization for their violation of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine¹ because the Western World as a whole was feeling sympathy with the Jews over their sufferings at Germany's hands during the Second World War and the six years preceding its outbreak, and because Westerners were ashamed that such atrocities should have been committed by a Western nation. The United States and the Soviet Union in A.D. 1948, like Great Britain in 1920, had an additional motive for condoning an act of injustice against an Arab people. In A.D. 1948 the United States and the Soviet Union were competing for Jewish goodwill in a 'cold war' which by that time they were waging with one another, as the Allied and Associated Powers had been competing with Germany for Jewish goodwill in the First World War at the time when the British Government had issued the Balfour Declaration and the American, French, and Italian Governments had adhered to it.

An impartial non-Western observer's verdict would assuredly have been that, however grievously the Western peoples might have sinned against one another and against the Jewish stranger in their midst, and however desirable it might be that they should make atonement at their own expense, there was neither merit nor justice in their compensating their victims at the expense of innocent third parties. As against Zionist and Western aggressors, the Arabs had an unanswerable moral case; but, with the exception of the ex-Ottoman Maghribīs,² they could be criticized for their improvidence in having severed their political connexion with their Turkish fellow subjects of an Ottoman Pādishāh when they were as impotent to defend themselves unaided against aggression as they had been proved to be by the uniform sequel in the histories of Egypt, Palestine, the Lebanon, Syria, and 'Irāq; and they could be blamed much more severely for their moral failure in not having taken any serious steps to put their own house in order when, in the next chapter of the story, they had become masters of their own house at last.

¹ This was the moral implication of the admission of the State of Israel to membership in the United Nations on the 11th May, 1949, three days before the first anniversary of the Zionists' original act of aggression.

² The Moroccans had always consistently played a lone hand, but the Algerines, Tunisians, and Tripolitarians, whose local 'Osmanli rulers had virtually ignored the suzerainty of the Porte in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had followed their rulers from A.D. 1830 onwards in seeking to strengthen their links with the Ottoman Empire as a safeguard against the danger of Western imperialism which had been suddenly and startlingly brought to their attention by the French occupation of Algiers (see p. 230, above).

This stricture applied in particular to Egypt after the British recognition of her independence, subject only to four reservations, on the 28th February, 1922;¹ to 'Irāq after the coming into force of the Anglo-'Irāqī treaty of the 30th June, 1930, through the admission of 'Irāq to membership in the League of Nations on the 3rd October, 1932; and to Syria and the Lebanon after the rendition by the French of their Levantine mandates on the 3rd January, 1944. From those dates onwards, the ruling class in the principal Arab countries had been substantially free to grapple with domestic problems—economic, social, and political—and its failure to address itself to this urgent task was a more grievous sin against the Arabic Society, and a more dangerous threat to its survival, than the blackest deeds of alien aggressors. This internal weakness was the cause of the Arab League's egregious failure in A.D. 1948-9 to hold its own on the battlefield, and even to maintain a united political front, against an infant Israeli state which, on paper, was outmatched in strength singly by each of the Arab states nominally banded together against it. The 'displacement' of the Arab population of the greater part of Palestine was an Arab calamity that was the consequence of a Jewish offence; the other Arab peoples' impotence to save their Palestinian brethren from this fate was an Arab humiliation that the Arabs had brought upon themselves.

The military and political weakness exhibited by the Arab states under this test was a reflection of their social rottenness; this underlying evil was the responsibility of the ruling class; and this class could not plausibly plead, as an excuse for their sin of omission, that the task of social salvage was beyond their strength, considering the results achieved by the efforts of their counterparts in Turkey in the same generation. In Turkey and the ex-Ottoman Arab countries the twentieth-century ruling class was the heir of one and the same social heritage; and the social transformation that had been accomplished in Turkey in the quarter of a century opening in A.D. 1923 set a standard for these Arab countries which was as peremptory as it was reasonable. What Turkey had managed to achieve in her poverty was not too much to expect of Egypt, with her wealth in cotton, or of 'Irāq, with her wealth in oil; and the presence here of these material resources offering ways and means, which a Turkish statesmanship might have envied, for carrying out a programme of social reform made the perpetuation in these Arab countries of gross economic inequalities between an affluent minority and an indigent mass far more invidious and explosive than it would have been if their latent riches had not been discovered and tapped. The one plea open to the ex-Ottoman Arab ruling class was that its *moral* had been atrophied by a long bout of Western tutelage; but, except perhaps in the case of Egypt, which had been under British occupation for fifty-four years, this plea was conclusively rebutted by chronology, since

¹ In A.D. 1952—between the date in A.D. 1949 when this passage had been written and the date at which it was being revised in galley proof—a *coup d'état* had been made in Egypt by a group of military officers, headed by General Najib (Gallo-Aegyptiacē Neguib). In the autumn of A.D. 1952 it was not yet possible to forecast the prospects of the radical and comprehensive programme for national regeneration which had been launched in Egypt by this revolutionary new régime.

all the states members of the Arab League that disputed the establishment of the state of Israel in A.D. 1948 were *ex hypothesi* then already independent, and none of these except Egypt had come under Western control before the final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1914-18), so that none of them except Egypt had been under Western tutelage for a longer spell than a quarter of a century.

The Failure of a Turkish Committee of Union and Progress to Maintain the Ottoman Empire

In Turkey, as we have noted, the drama of Westernization ran into a third and a fourth act which had no parallel in contemporary Arab history.

The third act opened in Turkey on the 22nd-24th July, 1908, when on three consecutive days a hitherto subterranean Committee of Union and Progress raised the standard of revolt against 'Abd-al-Hamīd's autocracy in the Macedonian garrison town of Resna, proclaimed at Salonica the re-establishment of the constitution of A.D. 1876, and compelled Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd at Constantinople to ratify their revolutionary act. This attempt on the part of a second generation of 'New 'Osmanlis' to save the Ottoman Empire's existence by transforming it into a parliamentary constitutional state on a Western pattern was no more successful than the first; and this time it became manifest that the failure was due to an intrinsic flaw in the policy, for this time, when 'Abd-al-Hamīd tried to repeat the counter-revolution which he had accomplished in A.D. 1877, he did not recover his autocratic power but forfeited his throne. From the deposition of 'Abd-al-Hamīd in A.D. 1909 to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1918, the responsibility for Turkey's fortunes was on the heads of the Unionists.

The fatal weakness of the 'New 'Osmanlis' programme was that, in a multi-national empire whose peoples had been captivated by the Western political ideal of Nationalism, 'union' and 'progress' were incompatible objectives; and, when the pressure of events forced the party into making a choice, they sacrificed an attainable progress to the forlorn hope of still saving an untenable union. A twentieth-century Ottoman Empire stood no better a chance than a twentieth-century Hapsburg Monarchy of being converted into a Switzerland writ large; and the fraternization between members of long discordant millets in the first moment of excitement and relief at a sudden unexpected release from the common yoke of 'Abd-al-Hamīd's tyranny was proved by its brevity to be a political mirage. On second thoughts the members of the non-Muslim communities reverted to a disbelief, born of melancholy experience, in the possibility of their ever being admitted to any genuine equality under the Ottoman flag with their Turkish masters; and, even if they had been convinced that this miracle would come to pass, it may be doubted whether, when it came to the point, they would have been willing to sacrifice to an ideal of Ottoman fraternity their hopes of being eventually re-united with their already independent brethren in separate national states of their own. By A.D. 1908 these feelings had come to be shared

with the non-Muslim Greek, Serb, Bulgar, and Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire by the non-Turkish Muslim Arabs, Albanians, and Kurds. In these circumstances the Empire could be held together only by *force majeure*, and, to hold it by force, an Hamidian tyranny would have to be reimposed by the Turks alone on all their non-Turkish fellow Ottomans, Muslims as well as Christians.

Desperate though it was, this *tour de force* was nevertheless attempted by the Committee of Union and Progress, and a folly which cannot be condoned can at least be explained.

In the first place the Ottoman Empire was still in being, and few imperial peoples had ever had the strength of mind, which the British were to show in A.D. 1947, to give up an untenable empire voluntarily without waiting for it to be wrested from them. The Committee of Union and Progress spent seven of their ten years of grace in waging ruinous wars against irresistible aggressors: a war with Italy (*gerebatur* A.D. 1911-13) which failed to save Tripolitania and Cyrenaica; a war with the Balkan States (*gerebatur* A.D. 1912-13) which failed to save anything in Rumelia beyond the western suburbs of Adrianople; and a war with the Powers of the Entente (*gerebatur* A.D. 1914-18) which dealt the Ottoman Empire its *coup de grâce* after having been wantonly undertaken in the ill-conceived hope that, with Germany's aid, this military adventure might compensate Turkey for her losses in Rumelia by enabling her to recover Egypt and other ex-Ottoman Arab territories in Africa and to win territories inhabited by non-Ottoman Turkish peoples in the Russian Empire which had never been under Ottoman rule.¹

A second reason why the Committee of Union and Progress sacrificed the national interests of the Turkish people in a losing battle to maintain the Ottoman Empire was that the strength of the party was drawn from the Macedonian remnant of the Rumeliot Turkish 'ascendancy'. The party headquarters were at Salonica;² the backing in the Army, which made the revolution of A.D. 1908 practicable, came from officers of the Macedonian garrison; and an anxiety for the preservation of Ottoman sovereignty over Macedonia determined the date of the *pronunciamiento*—for Tal'at's and Enver's revolution in A.D. 1908 was precipitated, like the abortive revolutions of Midhat Pasha at Constantinople in A.D. 1876

¹ The Pan-Turanian idea (see p. 191, n. 2, above), which was taken up by 'the Young Turks' (as 'the New Osmanlis' may be styled without inaccuracy in this context) during the Russo-Turkish war of A.D. 1914-18, and for which Enver Pasha eventually gave his life on a battlefield in Soviet Russian Central Asia, had originated as a *jeu d'esprit* in the mind of an imaginative French Consul-General at Salonica, who had coined a 'Pan-Turanianism' on the analogy of an already current 'Pan-Germanism' and 'Pan-Slavism' (see Cahun, Léon: *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie* (Paris 1896, Colin)).

² Salonica was well qualified for serving as a centre for a Westernizing Turkish political movement at this stage of Ottoman history. It was free from the incubus of the classical Ottoman régime which was still weighing heavily on Constantinople. It was the regional capital of the remnant of Rumelia, whose Turkish inhabitants were the most energetic and progressive element in the Turkish population of the Ottoman Empire. The Salonican Turks were linked, through the Dönme, with their Sephardi Jewish fellow townsmen, who had been kept in touch with the Modern Western World by their Spanish origin and their commercial interests (see II. ii. 246-7). And, finally, Salonica, like Constantinople, had been linked up with Continental Western Europe by rail. The writer remembers the impression made on him, on his first visit to Salonica in June 1912, as his ship approached the quay, by the sight of Hungarian, Austrian, and German railway wagons standing there.

and 'Arābī Pasha at Cairo in A.D. 1882, by a fear that the overthrow of a native autocracy might be anticipated by a foreign intervention to which Macedonia seemed to be more imminently exposed in A.D. 1908 than any other outlying part of the Ottoman Empire of that date.

The Success of Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk in Creating a Turkish National State

On the 23rd July, 1919, when Mustafā Kemāl repeated at Erzerum the *pronunciamiento* made by Enver and Niazi at Resna on the 22nd July, 1908, the prospects for Turkey appeared, on a superficial view, to have changed radically to her disadvantage. The Pādīshāh whom a mutinous officer was defying in A.D. 1919 was not, like 'Abd-al-Hamīd, an autocrat fighting for his own hand; he was a puppet in the hands of a victorious coalition of foreign Powers which had just overthrown not only Turkey but her mighty ally Germany; and the spur which had goaded Mustafā Kemāl into hoisting his revolutionary colours was not the menace of foreign aggression against an outlying territory where the Turkish element in the population was in a minority; it was the accomplished fact of a Greek invasion—sponsored by Great Britain, France, and the United States—of a predominantly Turkish Anatolia. As it turned out, however, these grim circumstances were so many blessings in disguise, since they inspired the Rumeliot leaders of a new Turkish Westernizing movement with the strength of mind at last to have the full courage of their convictions, and moved the mass of the Turkish people in Anatolia for the first time readily to follow a revolutionary westward lead as the only remaining chance of saving themselves from a now imminent threat of annihilation. This intellectual and emotional revolution fired a new-born Turkish nation to a high pitch of heroism and a degree of psychic and social malleability that proved more than a match for the adversities by which this spirit had been evoked. The heroism displayed itself in a decisive victory in a battle for national survival against apparently hopeless odds in the years A.D. 1919-22; the malleability in a still more hardy won success in a long-drawn-out struggle for national regeneration.

The new ideas and aims of Mustafā Kemāl and his companions were proclaimed in a 'National Pact' that was adopted on the 28th January, 1920, by the Ottoman Parliament at Constantinople. The key-note—and the strength—of the new policy was a resolve to abandon wild-goose chases and to concentrate on the whole-hearted pursuit of practicable objectives; and the ability to take this resolve was a priceless gain which the Turkish Nationalists owed to their 'New 'Osmanlı' predecessors' staggering losses. To renounce the ambition of recovering sovereignty over ex-Ottoman territories inhabited by a majority of Arabs or a majority of Orthodox Christians that had already been lost by A.D. 1920 was less difficult than it had been to abandon the will to retain sovereignty over those territories while they were still, however precariously, in Turkey's possession. To dismiss the Pan-Turanian dream of a compensatory empire to be carved out of Turkish territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia at Russia's expense was likewise less difficult

now that Turkey and Russia were no longer at war with one another but were companions in defeat, with the consequence in Russia that the fallen Tsardom had been replaced by a Communist régime which, like the Turkish National Movement in A.D. 1920, was a target of Western hostility and was accordingly disposed to make common cause with the Turkish Nationalists in their parallel struggle for existence. In this new situation the Turkish Nationalists resolutely turned away from a visionary Pan-Turanian future as well as from an irretrievable Ottoman past, and addressed themselves to the task of carving a Turkish national successor-state of the Ottoman Empire out of Ottoman territories with a Turkish majority in their population, with a view to building up the life of this new Turkish nation on completely Western foundations.

It will be seen that this programme was a Turkish counterpart of programmes that the ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian peoples had been carrying out by degrees for more than a hundred years past; and this likeness was not accidental; it was due to a deliberate adoption, by the leaders of the new Turkish National Movement, of a policy which, within their own lifetimes, had served their Orthodox Christian neighbours well at Turkey's expense. This spectacle had made a vivid impression on the imagination of the Turkish Nationalist leaders because they had seen it at close quarters; for the moving spirits in the Nationalist Movement were ex-Unionists who, like the moving spirits on the Committee of Union and Progress during the years A.D. 1908-18, were Macedonian Turks. Mustafâ Kemâl—whose beard, if he had worn one, would have been as blond as Mehmed 'Alî's—came from Salonica; Fethî came from Üsküb; but, in and after A.D. 1919, these Rumeliot Turkish nationalists showed their mettle by refusing to allow their policy to be governed by a nostalgia for a Macedonian fatherland that Tal'at and Enver had failed to save. They eschewed the perversity of the Macedonian Turkish Unionists who had sacrificed Turkey in a vain attempt to save Macedonia, and the even greater perversity of the Macedonian Bulgar nationalist refugees who had sacrificed Bulgaria in a vain attempt to reconquer Macedonia from a Bulgarian base of operations. Mustafâ Kemâl and his Macedonian Turkish nationalist companions stoically turned their backs on a beloved Rumelian homeland, which had once been the heart of the Ottoman Empire, in order to bring to life a new Turkish nation in an outlandish Anatolia¹ whose

¹ The strength and persistence of these Rumeliot 'Turkish exiles' homesickness was borne in upon the writer of this Study on the 11th November, 1948, when, on the west bank of the River Jeyhân, in the lowlands of Cilicia, in the south-eastern corner of Anatolia, he was spending a day with the ex-Rumeliot Turkish owner and operator of an orange plantation. This alert, progressive, and sanguine-minded Cilician planter was justifiably proud of the wealth that his brother and he had conjured, within the past twenty-five years, out of ground that had been out of cultivation when it had been assigned to his family in compensation for the estates that they had forfeited in their native Thessaly as a result of the exchange of populations that had followed the Graeco-Turkish War of A.D. 1919-22. His heart was in the future of a new Westernizing Turkey-in-Asia, and he was particularly enthusiastic about the economic potentialities that he was doing so much personally to develop in his own new home in Cilicia. Yet, when the writer happened to mention that he had once visited Yenisehr (*Graecè* Lárissa), his Cilician Turkish host's family's Thessalian native town, the forward-looking pioneer enthusiast for a new Turkey's Cilician California was suddenly transformed into a backward-looking scion of a Rumeliot Ottoman Turkish Muslim 'ascendancy'. He

people—Turks and Muslims though they were—had been, not the Ottoman Turks' fellow conquerors, but the fellow victims of a Rumeliot Ottoman Turkish 'ascendancy's' conquered Orthodox Christian subjects in Europe.¹

Thus, in setting out to create a new Turkish national state in Anatolia, Mustafâ Kemâl and his companions were faithfully following the example of their Greek and Serb fellow Rumeliots who had founded a new Greek and new Serb national state in two outlying tracts of the Balkan Peninsula a hundred years earlier; and, in the same vein, they were using the Modern Western magic formula of Nationalism to conjure back into political consciousness a people that had been lying dormant for centuries under an Ottoman domination. In Anatolia the ground had been prepared for this by the imposition of military conscription on all male Muslim Ottoman subjects since the reign of Sultan Mahmûd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808–39); but of course Mahmûd had had no more intention of fostering a Turkish nationalism than Mehmed 'Alî had had of fostering an Egyptian nationalism when he had introduced this Modern Western military institution into his dominions.

In the fourth act of the drama in Turkey—an act which was not staged till a hundred and thirty years after the play had been opened there by the accession of Sultan Selim III—the Islamic World was the scene of an adventure in Westernization which, in the crucial points of audacity, speed, comprehensiveness, and wholeheartedness, could challenge comparison with Peter the Great's work in Russia and with the Meiji Revolution in Japan. Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk saw that his first objective—which was to defeat the Greeks' attempt to conquer by force of arms a vital part of the Turkish national patrimony in Anatolia—was no more

began eagerly to inquire what the English traveller had thought of the landmarks of the Thessalian exile's childhood in Yenisehr—first and foremost, the local mosques.

¹ The 'Osmanlis, starting from the north-west corner of the Anatolian Plateau, had built up their power by north-westward conquests at the expense of Orthodox Christian principalities in the Balkan Peninsula before turning their arms south-eastward against Turkish principalities in Anatolia (see II. ii. 150–4); and they had met with the more stubborn resistance from Turks who chafed under a yoke imposed by kinsmen and coreligionists still more restlessly than the Orthodox Christians repined at a, for them, alien Ottoman rule. After defeating at Nicopolis in A.D. 1396 the Western Christian Crusaders who had come to his European Orthodox Christian victims' aid, the Ottoman Sultan Bâyezid I had been defeated at Ankara in A.D. 1402 by his Anatolian Muslim Turkish victims' Transoxanian Turkish Muslim champion Timûr. The dethroned Anatolian Turkish princes' appeal to Timûr had been made by them, and entertained by him, in the name of a Pan-Turkish and Pan-Islamic solidarity against an Ottoman Turkish conqueror who had impiously ignored the bond of a common religion and nationality; and, though the Ottoman Empire managed to recover from an all but mortal blow struck by Central Asian Turkish hands, and succeeded in reimposing its yoke on Anatolian Turkish necks, the Ottoman Pâdishâh's Anatolian Turkish Muslim, like his Rumeliot Orthodox Christian, subjects remained disaffected at heart—as they showed on the religious plane by their readiness to fall away from the Sunni orthodoxy of their 'Osmanli masters to the heresies of Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dîn and Shah Ismâ'il and Hajji Bektash (see I. i. 365 and 382–3; IV. iv. 68–69; V. v. 111 and 295; and V. v. 662–5) and on the political plane by the re-emergence of the long-suppressed Anatolian Turkish principalities in the form of embryonic successor-states of the Ottoman Empire on the morrow of the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768–74. On the eve of the repression of Bektashism by Sultan Mahmûd II in A.D. 1826 (see p. 267, n. 3, below), there are estimated to have been seven million Bektashis in the Ottoman Empire, mostly in Anatolia (Birge, J. K.: *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London 1937, Luzac), p. 15). The 'Alevi peasantry of Anatolia had a consciousness of affinity with the Christians (ibid., p. 210).

than a necessary military preliminary to a social and cultural enterprise, and that, if he were to allow an exhausted Turkish people to take a victory in the field as an excuse for resting on their oars, the extinction of Turkey would have been postponed without having been permanently averted. He therefore did not wait for a military decision in the Graeco-Turkish War of A.D. 1919-22 in choosing his moment for launching his Westernization programme. He launched it while the Turks were still fighting with their backs to the wall, and he followed up the return of peace without a pause by bending all the strength of his demonic will-power to the waging of a 'total war' of social and cultural transformation. A Turk of that generation might have found it hard to say whether the military war-years A.D. 1911-22 or the cultural war-years A.D. 1922-8 were the more severe of these two ordeals.

The range and speed of the campaign of Westernization in Turkey during the seven years opening with the year A.D. 1922 can be indicated by mentioning four revolutionary changes that were carried through within that brief span of time. Those seven years in Turkey saw the disestablishment of Islam and secularization of the national life;¹ the social emancipation of women;² the transfer of Turkey's intellectual affiliations from the Islamic to the Western cultural tradition through the substitution of the Latin for the Arabic Alphabet as the medium for conveying the Ottoman Turkish language;³ and the apprenticing of Turkish hands to the mysteries of a Modern Western technology, industry, and commerce. In this Study it would be out of proportion to embark on any detailed account of these changes in Turkey, or to attempt to give even a catalogue of the corresponding contemporary changes in other Islamic countries. We must content ourselves with taking a glance at the revolutions in the two fields of Religion and Economics.

In Turkey and other Islamic countries in the second quarter of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the psychological effects of the process of secularization were more disturbing than they had been in the Western World 250 years earlier, and this for two reasons. In the first place, in the Islamic World the change did not arise spontaneously from within but was forced upon the Islamic Society, with a vehemence proportionate to the obstinacy and pertinacity of the resistance to it, by the cumulative effects of an encounter with an alien civilization. In the second place, the change was not foreshadowed and facilitated in the Islamic World, as it had been in Western Christendom, by a traditional distinction between the institutions of Church and State and between a religious and a secular side of life. The texture of Islamic life was a seamless web in which it was hard to distinguish threads that could be labelled specifically 'religious' and still harder to pluck such threads out without tearing the whole fabric to pieces.

For these two reasons the *bouleversement* caused by secularization in

¹ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 1-81; Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1928 (London 1929, Milford), pp. 206-13.

² See Toynbee and Boulter, *Survey*, 1928, pp. 200-2.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 216-34, and the present Study, V. vi. 67-68.

Islamic countries was extreme, and its most shattering effects were in the sphere of private life. The extrication of the Turkish state from the toils of Islam—revolutionary though this process of disestablishment was¹—did not create acute personal problems of the kind that were presented to the intelligentsia by the elimination of Islam from education, and to the peasantry by the suppression of Islamic religious orders in Turkey through three administrative decrees of the 2nd September, 1925. The religious and cultural life of the Turkish peasantry in Anatolia had drawn its nourishment from the affiliation of villages to dervish religious houses;² and the sudden spiritual vacuum which the suppression of the religious orders produced throughout the Anatolian country-side³ was not adequately filled by the gradual spread of primary education through the arduous process of building village schools and training village schoolmasters.

As for the economic revolution, the Turkish Nationalists were confronted here with the double task of industrializing an agricultural country and employing as their instrument for accomplishing this revolutionary change a community that had previously lived aloof from precisely those activities that were the distinctive features of the Modern Western way of life. Under a millet system⁴ that had articulated the population of the Ottoman Empire into geographically intermingled communities which, in Western terms, were a cross between nationalities and occupational groups, the members of the Muslim millet had been peasants, soldiers, clerics, and civil servants, but had left it to the members of the Orthodox Christian, the Gregorian Monophysite Christian, and the Jewish millet to supply the requisite complement of shopkeepers, merchants, and artisans; and the lines of this established division of labour had still been followed in the earlier stages of the process of Westernization. The pursuit of an exotic Frankish technology had been left to the *ra'iyyeh*, while a Muslim intelligentsia had concentrated its efforts on mastering the Modern Western arts of war, medicine, law, and administration. Hence in A.D. 1922, when all but a fraction of the Greek and Armenian minority in Turkey fled the country and was eventually replaced by Turks expatriated from ex-Ottoman territories in Rumelia, Turkey found herself suddenly deprived, by her own volition, of the inadequate force of native Western-trained technicians that she had hitherto possessed⁵—and this at a moment when her nationalist

¹ The successive abolitions of the Sultanate and the Caliphate in Turkey have been noticed in this Study in VI. vii. 24–25. Some account of subsequent measures by which the process was carried to completion in Turkey between the years A.D. 1924 and A.D. 1928 will be found in Toynbee and Boulter, *Survey of International Affairs, 1928*, pp. 206–8.

² For the importance of this network of relations, see Birge, J. K.: *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London 1937, Luzac), esp. pp. 57–58, p. 64, n. 4, and pp. 211–12.

³ The first blow at the religious orders had been struck by Sultan Mahmūd II. After his destruction of the Janissaries in A.D. 1826, he started a general inquisition into, and proscription of, the Bektashi Order, with which the Janissary Corps, as well as the Anatolian peasantry, had been affiliated (Birge, op. cit., p. 77). Bektashism survived underground; began to publish literature openly in A.D. 1869, in the liberal atmosphere created by the 'New 'Osmanli' movement; went underground again under the autocratic régime of 'Abd-al-Hamid (A.D. 1877–1908); and came out into the open again between A.D. 1908 and A.D. 1925 (Birge, op. cit., pp. 78–81).

⁴ See pp. 184–6, above.

⁵ In Smyrna in April 1923, on the morrow of the catastrophe which had precipitated

leaders were giving the word for a forced march towards the ambitious goal of a thorough-going Westernization of Turkish economic life.

Mustafâ Kemâl met this crisis by the 'kill-or-cure' expedient of teaching the child to swim by throwing it into water where it was out of its depth, and there was perhaps no department of his all-embracing programme of Westernization in which the value and efficacy of the Rumeliot dictator's personal driving-force were more signally vindicated by the experience of the next quarter of a century. In the autumn of A.D. 1948, when the Republic of Turkey was celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of its establishment on the 29th October, 1923, the Turkish people's success in acquiring the technical keys to Modern Western Man's material power could be measured most pertinently by the extent to which the simplest forms of characteristically Modern Western skill had become familiar to the masses. Statistics of mechanics and foremen were more significant in this context than statistics of engineers and managers; and, on this test, the Turks in A.D. 1952 had no reason to be dissatisfied with their achievement so long as they were comparing it with their own past deficiency in this field and not with the target set them, for their future exertions, by the contemporary achievements of the Soviet Union and the Western World.¹

Russia's Competition with the West for an Ascendancy over the Islamic World

The whole-heartedness and effectiveness of the Westernizing movement in Turkey in its fourth bout might, in itself, have been taken as presumptive evidence that, by the middle of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the Western way of life had made permanent converts, not only of the Ottoman Turks, but of all other Muslim peoples, apart from a minority—amounting perhaps to 25 million out of a total of probably more than 250 million Muslims alive at this time²—who, willy nilly, were then following the Communist way of life as citizens

a wholesale exodus from Turkey of the Greek and Armenian *ra'iyeh*, the writer of this Study had successive interviews with the managers of the two railways of which Smyrna was the terminus, and was informed by each of his interlocutors that, at the moment of the catastrophe, he had lost overnight 90 per cent. of his personnel and had had to keep his trains running, as best he could, with an intake, all in one moment, of that overwhelmingly high percentage of unskilled labour. The explanation was that these two railways in Turkey had been built, owned, and managed by a French and a British private company, and had each recruited almost the whole of its staff, apart from a tiny Frankish contingent, from non-Turkish natives of the country. The sudden exodus of the *ra'iyeh* thus put these two railways in a quandary from which they might have failed to extricate themselves if they had not been assisted by the military engineers of the Turkish Army—whose technical training was the outstanding exception to the rule, still prevailing at the time, that to be a Turk and a Muslim was synonymous with being innocent of all acquaintance with Modern Western technique.

¹ The writer and his wife spent the month of November 1948 in Turkey as guests of the Turkish Government, and during a week out of this month they were travelling by road from Ankara to Adana via Yozgat, Chorum, Merzifun, Amasyeh, Toqat, Sivas, Qaysari, and Niğdeh. They were impressed by the number and resourcefulness of the lorry-drivers whom they passed on the road, and by the keenness of both the instructors and the pupils at the provincial polytechnic at Niğdeh. If Midhat Pasha could have returned to life to see that sight, he would assuredly have felt that his own life-work had not been in vain.

² The total Muslim population of the World was estimated to have been 242 millions in A.D. 1929 according to Massignon, L.: *Annuaire du Monde Musulman*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1930, Leroux), pp. 479–80.

of the Soviet Union. Though the Ottoman Turks were now truculently reckoning themselves as Europeans and dissociating their country from the Middle East, their fellow Muslims were testifying, by their flattering imitations of Atatürk's radical Westernizing policy, that Turkey's prestige had never stood higher in their eyes.¹ In short, in the Islamic World it had come to seem likely that the people's vote would now be cast for Westernization in so far as the question of cultural allegiance remained a matter of free choice; but it was clear that the issue would depend, not entirely on the will of the people directly concerned, but partly also on a trial of strength between a Western and a Russian World which encircled the Islamic World between them.

The tension of this Russo-Occidental tug-of-war for ascendancy over the Islamic World had been heightened since A.D. 1774 by a progressive enhancement of the Islamic World's importance in two respects—as a source of key commodities and as a channel of key communications.

The Islamic World embraced the homelands of three out of the four primary civilizations of the Old World; and the agricultural wealth which those now extinct societies had once wrested from the previously intractable valleys of the Lower Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Indus had been increased in Egypt and the Panjab, and been partially restored in 'Irāq, by the application of Modern Western methods of water-control. The principal addition, however, to the Islamic World's economic resources had been made by the discovery and economic utilization of subterranean deposits of mineral oil in regions which had never been of any outstanding agricultural value. The natural 'gushers', which, in a pre-Islamic Age, had been turned to religious account by Zoroastrian piety to keep alight a perpetual flame in honour of the holiness of Fire, had been noted in A.D. 1723 by the prospector's eye of Peter the Great as a potential economic asset;² and, though some 150 years had still to pass before an intuition of genius was confirmed by a commercial exploitation of the Baku oil field, the fresh discoveries, which followed in rapid succession during the next hundred years after that, showed that Baku was only one link in a golden chain stretching north-westwards to Grozhny and south-eastwards through 'Irāqī Kurdistan and Persian Bakhtiariistan and the Bahrayn Islands into once reputedly valueless peninsular Arabian territories which uninformed early-twentieth-century Western diplomats had carved up on the map as light-heartedly as uninformed nineteenth-century American politicians had paid off the remnants of American Indian peoples deported from Georgia with apportionments of then reputedly valueless land well

¹ The shock given to Indian Muslim susceptibilities, in particular, by the Turkish Republic's abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate on the 3rd March, 1924, had not permanently alienated the non-Turkish Muslims from Turkey. Its effects had been quickly obliterated by the *éclat* of a success that had justified Atatürk's impious audacity in the event; and the very disdain with which the Turks, in this chapter of their history, were inclined to treat their fellow Muslims perhaps increased these poor relations' respect for their now pointedly distant Turkish kinsfolk. The Arabs of Syria and 'Irāq, who were the Turks' nearest Muslim neighbours, could not forget that they had been under Turkish rule for four hundred years before the Ottoman Empire had gone into dissolution in A.D. 1918, and that, in the next chapter of Islamic history, the defeated Turks had maintained their independence while the 'liberated' Arabs had merely exchanged one alien master for another.

² See II. ii. 278-9.

beyond the Mississippi.¹ By the middle of the twentieth century the oil fields of Kuwayt and Sa'ūdī Arabia had begun to take the shine out of the cotton fields of Egypt as it had been taken out of the cotton fields of Georgia by the oil fields of Oklahoma; and Russia, Great Britain, France, and—last but not least—the United States had already appropriated all but the North Persian slice of a fabulously rich Middle Eastern oil-cake.

The geographical results of this scramble for oil had produced a tense political situation, since Russia's slice of the cake in the Caucasus and the Western Powers' slices in Persia and the Arab countries were within point-blank range of one another, while the British and French slices had come to be only less important in the economy of Western Europe than the Russian slice was in the economy of the Soviet Union.²

This tension was increased by the revival of the Islamic World's importance as a node of oecumenical communications. The shortest routes between Russia and a circum-Atlantic Western World on the one side and India, South-East Asia, Indonesia, China, and Japan on the other side all traversed Islamic ground, waters, or air; and on the route-map, as on the oil-map, the Soviet Union and the Western Powers were at dangerously close quarters. In A.D. 1952, American, British, French, and Dutch routes from the Atlantic via the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific were flanked on the north-east by Russian outposts in Bulgaria, Transcaucasia, and Transcaspia, while 'the soft under-belly' of the Soviet Union in the Ukraine and the Caucasus could be commanded, at still closer range, from the south by enemy outposts in a Turkey and a Greece over which the President of the United States had declared a virtual protectorate on the 12th March, 1947, and in a Persia whose name had been added to those of Greece and Turkey in this context by the American Secretary of State on the 17th March, 1949. A Baku oil field which supplied the needs of the greater part of the Volga Basin via the Caspian Sea lay within a few miles of the Russo-Persian frontier.

The military and political awkwardness of this geographical situation had been accentuated by a shift in Russia's centre of gravity since the end of the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768–74 which had been comparable in magnitude to the shift in the United States' centre of gravity

¹ This incident in the history of the United States has been noticed above on p. 36, n. 2.

² In A.D. 1951—between the date in A.D. 1949 when this passage had been written and the date in A.D. 1952 when it was being revised for the press—the mounting pressure of Persian national feeling had achieved the expulsion of the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company from the oil-field in Bakhtiariastan and from the refineries and wharves at 'Abbādān. This outcome of a local collision between the Westernizing political ideology of an Islamic people and the economic enterprise of a Western people in this province of Dār-al-Islām had thrown into Russia's lap two fine gift-parcels of unearned politico-military increment. In depriving Great Britain of the oil from the South Persian field it had diminished, to that extent, the Atlantic Community's economic, financial, and military power; and, in depriving Persia of the royalties on an alien Western commercial company's profits, it had dried up the previously richest source of Persian public revenue and national income and had thereby aggravated the economic and social ills from which Persia was already suffering. Considering the invidious width of the gulf, in Persia, between the respective standards of living of a tiny dominant minority and a miserable agricultural proletariat, this fresh turn of an economic screw in Persia could hardly fail to bring grist to the political mill of Communism.

since her declaration of her independence in A.D. 1776. Within that period of a century and three-quarters, the replacement of hunters by farmers and industrial workers between the Appalachian Mountains and the Pacific coast of North America had been emulated in the Old World in the replacement of Nomads and wild highlanders by farmers and industrial workers in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe and in the Caucasus; and this *ci-devant* north-western fringe of the Islamic World, which had been economically all but virgin soil before its annexation by Russia between the years A.D. 1774 and A.D. 1864, had since become the Soviet Union's economic heart. This rapid conjuring into existence of a new world opening on to the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea, with the whole of the Soviet Union for its hinterland, had created—or, in more accurate terms, re-created—a question concerning the control of the Straits leading out of the Black Sea into the Aegean which had been dormant so long as the Black Sea had been an 'Ottoman lake'; and the coincidence in date between Russia's acquisition of a coastline on the Black Sea and the Western Powers' re-opening of the short route between the Western World and India had started a political game of naughts and crosses¹ in which Russia found herself perpetually being thwarted by a Western player who in one round might call herself the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, in another round Great Britain, in another Germany, and in another the United States, but who betrayed a consistently Western identity by persisting, through all these metamorphoses, in making moves that kept Russia in check.

On the 12th March, 1947, when President Truman gave Russia notice that the United States had taken over the Western player's role, the game had become an exasperating one from a Russian standpoint, since Russia's objective remained unattained while her stake in the game had been steadily increasing in value. In A.D. 1774 the Empress Catherine had reasonably expected to live to take the short and logical steps from Azov to Constantinople and Gallipoli; yet in A.D. 1947 these keys to Russia's Pontic front-door were still in non-Russian hands; and, though since A.D. 1944 the Russian Army had been astride the Balkan Range, on Constantinople's Bulgarian threshold,² Soviet statesmen could hardly forget that other Russian armies had pushed their way still closer to Constantinople in A.D. 1829 and A.D. 1878 without having managed on either occasion to seize a prize that had then lain so nearly within their grasp. Meanwhile, the vulnerability of Russia's new vital organs in the Ukraine and the Caucasus to attack by Western Sea Powers enjoying a right of way into the Black Sea had been demonstrated on three occasions: in the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853–6); in A.D. 1878, when the exposure of a victorious Russian army's Pontic flank to the

¹ Compare the power game known as 'Lengthways and crossways' (*tsung-hêng*) which was played between the contending parochial states of a Sinic World in the last phase of their fratricidal warfare with one another (see Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin 1930, de Gruyter), p. 193).

² The Soviet Union had compelled Bulgaria to transfer her allegiance to her from Germany on the 9th September, 1944, when Russian troops had entered Bulgaria from the Dobruja.

possibility of an attack by the British Navy had enabled the Western Powers to convert the Treaty of San Stefano into the Treaty of Berlin; and in A.D. 1918-20, when the Western Powers had prolonged the resistance in Russia to the establishment of the Bolshevik régime by conveying munitions, via the Straits, to the 'White' Russian armies of Generals Denikin and Wrangel. On each of these occasions, British sea power had been able to attack or threaten Russia at a vital point thanks to a command of the passage through the Straits; and, when President Truman enunciated his doctrine in A.D. 1947, the Soviet Government must have had these precedents in mind—even though they might hope that, if occasion arose, the passage of the Straits could now be denied to the American Navy by a Soviet Air Force operating from Bulgarian bases.

In these circumstances the future of the Islamic World, as well as that of a non-Russian Orthodox Christendom, remained unpredictable at the time of writing.

5. *The Modern West and the Jews*

The Peculiarities of the Western Province of a Jewish Diaspora's Domain

Whatever might be the ultimate general verdict of Mankind on the Western Civilization in the modern chapter of its history, it was already manifest mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, some 450 years after the beginning of this epoch, that Modern Western Man had branded himself with two particular marks of lasting infamy by the commission of two crimes that were indelibly inscribed on his record. One of these crimes was the shipping of Negro slaves from Africa to labour on plantations in the New World;¹ the other was the

¹ The encounter between the white-skinned founders of the Western Society and the dark-skinned members of primitive societies whom these Whites had conscripted by force into the Western Society's ranks during the modern chapter of Western history had a generic affinity with the encounters between the representatives of different civilizations that are the subject of the present Part of this Study, and not least with the encounter between Western Christendom and Jewry.

Like the feelings of Gentile Westerners about the Jews in their midst, the feelings of White Westerners about the Negroes in their midst were associated with an awareness of certain differences in physique between a dominant majority and a penalized minority, but there was conclusive evidence that these feelings of antipathy were not in either case an automatic psychic reaction to a visual perception of distinctive physical traits. The feelings aroused in a Western Gentile psyche by the sight of an Armenoid nose on the face of a Jew were not aroused by the sight of a nose of the same configuration on the face of a Turk (and this physiognomy was common among the Turks as well as among the Jews, since it had been communicated to the population of Palestine by Indo-European-speaking Hittite immigrants from Anatolia and not by Semitic-speaking Israelite immigrants from Arabia). This showed that the Western Gentile's antipathy towards the Jew was excited, not by a physical difference, but by social and cultural differences which had come to be symbolized by a physical difference when the Western Gentile encountered the Armenoid physiognomy in a Jew, though the same physiognomy could be encountered by the same Westerner without producing on him the same psychological effect when he met it in a Turkish representative of an Iranic Muslim Society towards which the Western World's attitude was different from its attitude towards Jewry. The evidence likewise showed that the White Westerner's antipathy towards the Negro was not an automatic effect of a physical difference in pigmentation and in odour. A White inhabitant of the Southern States of the United States who would have objected to the propinquity of one of his Negro fellow citizens as a fellow passenger in a pullman car felt no repugnance at being waited upon by a Negro attendant in the same car at equally close quarters; the Negro physique

extermination of a Jewish diaspora in the European homeland of Western Christendom; and these two atrocities had one horrifying common feature. In both of them a primaevial wickedness and cruelty that were innate in Human Nature had been mated with a capacity for planning and execution that could have been exhibited only by a technologically mature civilization; and this shocking combination of technological maturity with moral depravity distinguished these cold-blooded Modern Western crimes from the outrages committed by Primitive Man, which, humanly sinful though they too were, still had in them something of the innocence of a predatory Pre-Human Nature as exhibited in the tiger or the shark.¹

It was, of course, true that the responsibility for these two revolting Modern Western crimes was not shared in equal proportions by all members of the Modern Western Society. The Judas share of the crime against the African Negroes lay on the heads of the English and their colonists on the eastern seaboard of North America; the Judas share of the crime against the Jews lay on the heads of the Spaniards, Portuguese, and Germans. Yet these direst criminals had, after all, been eminent exponents of the Western Civilization of their day; and their overwhelming guilt was a salutarily terrifying reminder of the truth that Civilization was no permanent transfiguration of the essence of Human Nature, but was merely a brittle 'cake of custom'² precariously plastered over the crater of a live spiritual volcano, where it was at the mercy of perennial eruptions of Original Sin. In the casting up of the Western Society's final account, it was conceivable, no doubt, that these particular English, American, Spanish, Portuguese, and German entries on the debit side might be more than balanced by other entries to Western Man's credit; but it could already be forecast that the eventual summing-up would give no warrant for the pharisaical complacency to which Modern Western Man had been prone—especially during the quarter of a millennium between the end of the Modern Western Wars of Religion and the outbreak of the First World War.

The tragic outcome of the encounter between the Western World and Jewry—a tragedy which eventually numbered the Palestinian Arabs

was not offensive to a White Southerner in a Negro whose profession stamped him as a menial; and there were Whites who would have been shocked to see lawful wedlock made legal between persons of different colour without being shocked at seeing White men cohabiting with coloured concubines.

This evidence shows that in the relation between White Westerners and Negroes, as in the relation between Gentile Westerners and Jews, the stumbling-block was a difference, not of race, but of social standing and of culture. All the same, the encounter between the Modern West and the Negroes falls outside the scope of the present Part of this Study, since, at the time when the Negroes were smitten by the Western World's impact, they were not the representatives of a civilization (in the sense in which the term is used in this work), but were still in the primitive state of culture; and even this primitive social heritage was lost by those Negroes who were shipped to the New World as slaves. The history of the relations between Negroes and White Westerners is thus part of the domestic history of the Western World. It has been touched upon in II. ii. 218–20 and in V. v. 153 and 168.

¹ 'Funded civilisation' makes 'the savage of Civilisation more terrible than the savage of Barbarism' (Meadows, T. T.: *The Chinese and their Rebellions . . . , to which is added An Essay on Civilisation and its Present State in the East and West* (London 1856, Smith Elder), p. 518).

² Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th ed. (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 27 and 35, quoted in II. i. 192.

among its innocent victims—was the consequence of an interplay between Original Sin and a particular conjunction of social circumstances, and the first step towards an understanding of the tragedy was to inquire how far these circumstances accounted for it.

Jewry, in the form in which it collided with Western Christendom, was certainly an exceptional social phenomenon, but it was also certainly not unique. Jewry was exceptional in being a fossilized relic of a civilization that was extinct in every other shape.¹ The Syriac parochial state of Judah, from which Jewry was derived, had been one of a number of Hebrew, Phoenician, Aramaean, and Philistine communities into which a Syriac Society had articulated itself in its growth stage; but, whereas Judah's sister communities, including her next-of-kin, Israel, had lost their identity, as well as their statehood, as a result of fatal injuries which the Syriac Society had sustained from successive collisions with its Babylonian and Hellenic neighbours, the same challenges had stimulated the Jews to create for themselves a new mode of corporate existence in which they managed to survive the loss of their state and their country by preserving their identity as a diaspora among an alien majority and under alien rule. This exceptionally successful Jewish reaction to a challenge to which most Syriac communities had succumbed was not, however, unique; for the Jewish diaspora in the Islamic and the Christian World had an historical counterpart in the Parsee diaspora in India, which was another fossilized relic of the same extinct Syriac Society.

The Parsees were survivors of Iranian converts to the Syriac Civilization who had given the Syriac Society a universal state in the shape of the Achaemenian Empire; the Parsee, like the Jewish, community was the monument of a victorious will to outlive the loss of state and country; and the Parsees, too, had suffered this loss as a result of successive collisions between the Syriac World and neighbouring societies. Like the Jews during the three centuries ending in A.D. 135, the Parsees' Zoroastrian Iranian forefathers had sacrificed themselves in an unsuccessful attempt to eject an intrusive Hellenism by force from a conquered Syriac World; and the penalty for failure, which had been inflicted on the Jews in the first and second centuries of the Christian Era by the Hellenic Civilization's Roman champions, had been inflicted on the Zoroastrian Iranians in the seventh century by Primitive Muslim Arab barbarian invaders of the Roman and Sasanian empires who were completing the Zoroastrian Iranians' uncompleted task by liberating the Syriac World west of the Euphrates from an Hellenic ascendancy that by this date had persisted there for nearly a thousand years. In these similar crises in their history the Jews and the Parsees had preserved their identity by the same creative feat of improvising new institutions and specializing in new activities. They had found in the elaboration of their heritage of religious law a new social cement to replace a political bond that had perished with their state, and they had survived the disastrous economic consequences of being uprooted from the land of their fathers by developing, in the land of their exile, a special skill in

¹ For this phenomenon of 'fossilization', see I. i. 35, 51, and 90-92.

commerce and other urban business in lieu of a husbandry which these landless refugees were no longer able to pursue.¹

Nor were these Jewish and Parsee diasporas the only fossils that an extinct Syriac Society had left behind it; for, before the Primitive Muslim Arabs succeeded in carrying out the task of ejecting Hellenism in which the Jews and the Zoroastrians had failed, a second series of abortive attempts to attain the same objective had been made by champions of a submerged Syriac Society within the bosom of the Christian Church; this second unsuccessful Syriac counter-offensive in its turn had precipitated a number of 'fossils in diaspora' in the shape of the Nestorian and Monophysite Christian Churches; and these scattered Christian communities, like their Jewish and Parsee forerunners, had preserved their identity through a devotion to distinctive religious rites and a proficiency in commerce and finance. Nor, again, was the Syriac Society the only civilization in which communities that had lost their statehood and had been uprooted from the soil had succeeded in surviving through a combination of ecclesiastical discipline with business enterprise. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom under an alien Ottoman régime, a subjugated Greek Orthodox Christian community had been partially uprooted from the soil, and these Greek Orthodox Christian *déracinés* had responded to this ordeal by accommodating themselves to changes in their economic activities and their social organization on lines which carried them far along the road towards becoming a diaspora of the same type as the Gregorian Armenian, Jacobite Syrian, and Coptic Egyptian Monophysites and the pre-Christian stratum of Syriac 'fossils' represented by the Jews and the Parsees.

Indeed, the millet system of the Ottoman Empire² was merely a systematically organized version of a communal structure of society which had grown up spontaneously in the Syriac World after the Syriac peoples had been inextricably intermingled with one another by the malice of an Assyrian militarism that had not been content to pulverize its victims but had scattered the survivors abroad in order to make sure that they should never find a chance of retrieving their political fortunes. The consequent rearticulation of Society into a network of geographically intermingled oecumenical communities in place of a patchwork of geographically segregated parochial states had been inherited from the Syriac Society by its Iranic and Arabic Muslim successors and had subsequently been imposed by 'Osmanli Iranic Muslim empire-builders on a prostrate Orthodox Christendom which they had subjugated by the employment of Assyrian methods of barbarism.

In this historical perspective it is manifest that the Jewish diaspora encountered by a Western Christendom, so far from being a unique social phenomenon, was one among a number of surviving representatives of a long established and widely distributed species of community. This species had come to be the standard type in the Syriac World after the culminating paroxysm of Assyrian militarism; it had always been the

¹ For examples of the stimulus of penalizations on the economic and other planes, see II. ii. 208-59.

² For an account of this system of communal organization, see pp. 184-6, above.

standard type in the two Islamic societies that were the Syriac Society's offspring, and it had also been the standard type in the main body of Orthodox Christendom during the period of the Ottoman régime. The area over which the Jewish diaspora had spread itself included, of course, the domains of the Islamic societies as well as those of the Christendoms, and, if we think of this area as being the oecumenical domain of the Jewish 'millet' and look at it, through Jewish eyes, as a unity, we shall perceive that—at least in the Early Modern Age, before the Ottoman Orthodox Christians had transferred their cultural allegiance from their 'Osmanli masters to their Western neighbours—the millet system which was exemplified in the social organization of the Jewish diaspora was the standard type of social structure in three out of the five provinces of Jewry's empire. Of the remaining two provinces we can leave the Russian Orthodox Christian province out of the reckoning; for there were hardly any Jews in Russian Orthodox Christendom outside 'the Jewish Pale' of the Russian Empire, and, while it was true that a majority of the Jewish population of the World was concentrated in 'the Pale' before its devastation in the first and second world wars, the Pale had to be reckoned as falling within the Western and not the Russian Christian province of a Jewish *Oikoumenê*, since the Jewish diaspora in the Pale had originated in Western Christendom and had drifted into this originally Russian territory¹ in the wake of medieval Polish and Lithuanian Western Christian conquerors.² In effect, therefore, the millet system of social organization was the rule in three out of four effectively occupied provinces of Jewry's oecumenical empire, and was exceptional in the Western Christian province alone.

This conclusion raises the question whether the peculiar social setting of the tragic encounter between Jewry and Western Christendom may not be found to consist in peculiarities on the Western at least as much as on the Jewish side; and, when we put this question, we can see that the course of Western history was indeed peculiar in at least three respects that are all relevant to the history of Jewish-Occidental relations. In the first place the Western Society articulated itself into a patchwork of geographically segregated communities each occupying exclusively a separate local territory of its own, instead of articulating itself into a network of geographically intermingled communities on the pattern prevailing in the other provinces of the Jewish World. In the second place the Western Society transformed itself in the course of its history from an ultra-rural society of peasants and landlords³ into an ultra-urban society

¹ The history of this western fringe of Russian Orthodox Christendom, which had been overrun by Western Christian conquerors in the fourteenth century and had been reannexed to the unconquered core of Russia between A.D. 1772 and A.D. 1945, has been touched upon on pp. 126-9, above, and is dealt with again on pp. 398-400, below.

² See II. ii. 241-2. Dr. James Parkes here makes the comment that the Jewish community in the Pale was not wholly of West European provenance. There were elements in it that had come from the opposite side of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe; and these elements included Qara'im as well as orthodox Talmudists from the Crimea who were believed to be of Khazar origin (see II. ii. 410-1).

³ Christopher Dawson points out, in *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed and Ward), pp. 56-57, that the Western Christian peasant's life and work were restored to honour in this age by a rustic Benedictine monasticism. See also the present Study, III. iii. 266.

of artisans and bourgeois. In the third place this nationalist-minded and middle-class-minded latter-day Western Society emerged surprisingly and suddenly, at the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, from the relative obscurity of the medieval chapter of its history and came rapidly to overshadow all the rest of the traversable and habitable surface of the planet. Each of these three peculiar features of Western life and history made its effect on the fortunes of that unlucky fraction of a Jewish diaspora that happened to have wandered into this Western *Ultima Thule* of a pre-da Gaman World whose centre-point was, not Portugal, but Farghānah.

The Persecution of the Peninsular Jews under a Visigothic Catholic Christian Régime

The inner connexion between Antisemitism and the Western Christian ideal of a homogeneous community embracing all the inhabitants of a particular territory reveals itself clearly in the history of the Jewish diaspora in the Iberian Peninsula.

Though the ideal of homogeneity was inherited by Western Christendom from a converted Hellenic World whose inhabitants had latterly come to be uniformly Roman in their political status and uniformly Christian in their religion, apart from the Jews,¹ the conquest of the lion's share of a dissolving Catholic Christian Roman Empire's western provinces by Arian Christian Teutonic barbarian war-bands reopened the question of a nascent Western Society's future social structure by introducing the germs of a millet system into it. The conquerors cherished their Teutonic communal law and their Arian communal religion as distinctive badges which served to mark them off from their Catholic Roman subjects,² and another social effect of the conquest was a hardening of the distinction between freemen and slaves, which had been softened by a vein of humanity in the Roman Law of the Imperial Age. In the Roman Empire's Teutonic barbarian successor-states the servile element in the population came to be marked off from the free element more sharply than before, through changes for the worse in both their treatment and their status.³ Here were the rudiments of a society articulated along horizontal instead of vertical lines into geographically intermingled but socially segregated communities on the millet pattern. In a society of this structure a Jewish diaspora would not strike a jarring note; and in fact there is no evidence of any serious collision between the Jewish diaspora in the Iberian Peninsula and the successor-state of the Roman Empire that had been established there by the Visigoths so long as the Western Christian body social in the Visigothic dominions

¹ A toleration of the Jewish diaspora which went against the grain of Judaic intolerance in the ethos of Christianity was part of the Christian Roman Empire's political heritage from an antecedent pagan régime. The pagan Roman authorities' forbearance towards Judaism had been a surprising exception to their general rule of repressing Greek and Oriental missionary religions. Judaism had aggravated the Dionysiac and Christian offence of making proselytes by lending itself to a political militancy of which both Bacchus-worship and Christianity were innocent. Yet a pagan Roman Government had accorded to the Jews a religious toleration which it had denied to the Bacchantes (see II. ii. 216) and to the Christians.

² See V. v. 227-9 and VI. vii. 286-8.

³ For one local manifestation of this general tendency, see Ziegler, A. K.: *Church and State in Visigothic Spain* (Washington, D.C. 1930, Catholic University of America), pp. 170-6.

continued to be internally articulated on horizontal lines into a Gothic Arian millet and a Roman Catholic millet that was sharply divided in its turn into a free and a servile social stratum.

In the course of the sixth and seventh centuries, however, the gulf between the slave and the free community in Visigothia was diminished, and the gulf between the Roman and the Gothic community was completely bridged, by the cumulative results of a series of local measures¹ which reflected an oecumenical tendency in the Western Christendom of that age to revert from an embryonic millet system to the Hellenic tradition of social homogeneity;² and, *pari passu* with this *Gleichschaltung* of the Christian communities, a tension arose in Visigothia between a more and more thoroughly unified Christian people and a consequently more and more conspicuously peculiar Jewish millet. The accentuation of this tension is registered in a series of anti-Jewish enactments of a Judaically fanatical ferocity³ that presents a painful contrast to the simultaneously increasing humanity of the contemporary legislation for protecting slaves

¹ The first notable breach in the barrier between Roman and Visigoth was the abrogation in the reign of King Leovigild (*regnabat* A.D. 568-86) of a law, forbidding inter-marriage between Romans and barbarians under pain of death, which had been enacted originally from the Roman side in A.D. 375 in a constitution of the Emperors Valentinian and Valens and had been incorporated in A.D. 506 into the Visigothic King Alaric II's *Lex Romana Visigothorum*, alias *Breviarium Alarici* (Ziegler, *op. cit.*, p. 23). The crucial step was the conversion of King Recared (*regnabat* A.D. 586-601) from Arianism to Catholicism in A.D. 587. The Visigothic community followed their king's lead, and the consequent union of Goths and Romans took institutional shape in a series of eighteen national councils, held at Toledo between the years A.D. 589 and 701 inclusive (*ibid.*, p. 35), in which a minority of laymen co-operated with a majority of bishops and other clerics in enacting canons that did not deal exclusively with ecclesiastical affairs. The final step was taken by King Receswinth (*regnabat* A.D. 649-72) when in A.D. 654 he abrogated simultaneously the barbarian law under which his Gothic subjects had been living and the Roman Law under which his Roman subjects had been living, and gave exclusive legal currency in his dominions to a new *Liber Iudiciorum* (alias *Forum Iudicum*), in which Roman and barbarian elements were blended (*ibid.*, pp. 62-64, and the present Study, VI. vii. 288). In this new law of the land, which was binding on all the King's subjects, the Roman element was predominant (Ziegler, *op. cit.*, p. 75).

² The decisive steps in this direction were taken by statesmen who were not Visigoths. The first step, which was the most decisive of all, was the Salian Frank war-lord Clovis's conversion from paganism to Catholic Christianity in A.D. 496; the next was the destruction of the Arian barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire in Africa and Italy by the Emperor Justinian in A.D. 533-52; the third was the conversion of the English from paganism to Catholic Christianity by Gregory the Great's missionaries in and after A.D. 597. If the Gothic, Burgundian, and Vandal instead of the Frankish and English Teutonic barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire had set the pattern for the subsequent development of the structure of the Western Society, Western Christendom might have become, like the Islamic Society, a hierarchy of millets or, like the Hindu Society, a hierarchy of castes in which the Arian war-bands would have been the *Kshatriyas* and a Catholic clergy the *Brahmans*.

³ Before the beginning of the progressive amalgamation of the Christian communities in the Visigothic Kingdom, the life of the Jewish diaspora there had been governed by the terms of Alaric II's *Lex Romana Visigothorum*. Under this code, Jews were forbidden to attempt to convert Christians to Judaism, to marry Christians, and to buy Christian slaves; they were excluded from military and civil office without being exempted from onerous public duties (*munera*); and they were forbidden to build new synagogues. They were permitted, however, to keep existing synagogues in repair and to practise their religion; they were exempted from the transaction of fiscal or other public business on the sabbath day; and they were allowed a considerable measure of communal autonomy. 'The authority of Jewish superiors was acknowledged not only in what concerned their own religion but also in civil matters. Jews might, if they wished, have recourse to their own elders for arbitration' (Ziegler, *op. cit.*, p. 187, following *L.R.V.* ii. 1, 10). Thereafter, the position of the Jews in Visigothia deteriorated (though an ever more savage anti-Jewish legislation seems largely to have remained a dead letter owing to the venality of the public authorities, including the Crown and the Episcopate, and the

against their masters¹ and *pauperes* against *potentiores*.² 'The maltreatment of the Jews in the Visigothic Kingdom was the unfortunate result of the union between Church and State.'³

Though the wealth of the Peninsular Jews and the venality of their Christian oppressors made the anti-Jewish policy of the Visigothic Kingdom 'ridiculously ineffective',⁴ it is not surprising that the Visigothic Crown's Jewish subjects should have retorted to Egica's

Jews' command of the resources for paying the necessary bribes). In A.D. 589 the First Council of Toledo, at King Recared's request, reaffirmed anti-Jewish provisions of the *Lex Romana Visigothorum* that had fallen into disuse (Ziegler, op. cit., p. 189). King Sisebut (*regnabat* A.D. 612-21) gave the Jews a choice between conversion to Christianity and banishment from the kingdom (Ziegler, op. cit., p. 190, following Isidore of Seville, *Historia Gothorum*, 60, and *Continuatio Isidori*, 15), but in this he was acting independently of the Church, and the Fourth Council of Toledo (*sedebat* A.D. 633) forbade further compulsory conversions, though it did not allow Jews already compulsorily converted to relapse (*ibid.*, pp. 190 and 191). The Sixth Council (*sedebat* A.D. 638) commended King Chintila (*regnabat* A.D. 636-40) for having forbidden unconverted Jews to remain in the kingdom and took steps of its own to ensure the effective execution of the King's ruling (*ibid.*, p. 192). King Receswinth (*regnabat* A.D. 649-72) attacked the Jews in his royal message (*tomus*) to the Eighth Council (*sedebat* A.D. 653); and, when the Eighth Council declined to go beyond the limits of the Fourth Council's anti-Jewish measures, Receswinth widened the breach between Christendom and Jewry in his kingdom by promulgating intolerable anti-Jewish legislation of his own in the very year A.D. 654 in which he completed the closing of the breach between his Roman and his Gothic Catholic Christian subjects by bringing them under a common law. Receswinth prohibited the practice of the Jewish religion under pain of death (Ziegler, op. cit., p. 193, following *Leges Visigothorum*, xii. 2. 12, 16, 17). King Erwig (*regnabat* A.D. 680-7) promulgated twenty-eight laws against the Jews (*L.V.* xii. 3. 1-28), which were endorsed by the Twelfth Council (*sedebat* A.D. 681); and the third of these laid it down that they must abjure Judaism within a year under pain—not, now, of death, but of exile and forfeiture of property (Ziegler, op. cit., pp. 194-5). King Egica (*regnabat* A.D. 687-702) tried to cut the root of the economic power which had enabled the Jews largely to elude the previous legislation against them by playing upon the Christian authorities' venality. He increased the special taxes payable by the Jews and at the same time forbade unconverted Jews to transact commercial business with Christians or to engage in foreign trade, and required them to sell to the fiscus any real property that they had acquired from Christians (Ziegler, op. cit., p. 195, following *L.V.* xii. 2. 18). The Sixteenth Council (*sedebat* A.D. 693) approved Egica's legislation (Ziegler, op. cit., p. 195).

In this sordid Visigothic tale there is a hidden vein of tragic irony; for, though the vice of fanaticism acquired the new name of 'bigotry' from the conspicuousness of the Visigoths' practice of it, these Teutonic barbarians were not in fact the first 'bigots' known to history. The abuse of political power for the inhuman purpose of imposing on a subject minority a choice between the abandonment of its ancestral religion and the extreme penalty of banishment or even death had been practised by the Jews against their Gentile neighbours in Syria seven hundred years before they themselves had been confronted with the same choice by the Visigoths in the Iberian Peninsula. The earliest known instance of 'bigotry' is the compulsory conversion of the conquered Gentiles of Galilee to Judaism by their Maccabean Jewish conqueror Alexander Jannaeus in the first quarter of the last century B.C. (see II. ii. 73, and V. vi. 478 and 499, n. 1); and the Maccabean temper was inherited by Christendom from a Jewry that came to be the principal victim of this Jewish vein in the Christian religion. Jewish 'Maccabaeanism' was not, of course, the sole source of Christian 'Antisemitism', for 'Antisemitism' had been rife in a pre-Christian Hellenic World, at Alexandria and elsewhere, from the second century B.C. onwards (see Marcus, R.: *Antisemitism in the Hellenistic World* (New York 1946, Conference on Jewish Relations)); but the combination of a fanatical religious intolerance with an antipathy arising from social and economic grievances was an aggravation of pre-Christian 'Antisemitism' into which Christianity was betrayed by the Judaic, not the Hellenic, element in its ethos.

¹ See Ziegler, op. cit., pp. 176-9.

² See *ibid.*, p. 169.

³ Ziegler, op. cit., p. 197. The honesty of this verdict delivered by a Modern Western scholar who was also a priest of the Roman Catholic Church was as impressive as it was creditable to the author; and Father Ziegler's honesty is equalled by his acumen. He points out that the Catholic Visigothia of A.D. 587-711 was not, as has sometimes been supposed, a hierarchy, but was an Erastian state, and that a partnership which was a boon to the commonwealth was a doubtful blessing for the Church (*ibid.*, pp. 126-33).

⁴ Ziegler, op. cit., p. 198.

legislation by conspiring with their co-religionists in North-West Africa to procure the intervention of the Arabs. The detection of the conspiracy by the Visigothic government in A.D. 694¹ and the consequent reprisals² neither gave the Peninsular Jews the *coup de grâce* nor saved the Visigothic Kingdom from destruction after the Arabs' hands had been freed for a farther westward advance by their definitive conquest of Carthage from her Roman defenders in A.D. 698; and the Peninsular Jews survived to see their intuition justified by five hundred years' experience of a Muslim régime (*vigebat* A.D. 711-1212) under which an autonomous diaspora was not a peculiar people.

The Respite for the Peninsular Jews under Andalusian and Ottoman Muslim Régimes

The social effect of the Arab conquest of the Iberian Peninsula was indeed to make the Jewish community at home there again by re-establishing the horizontally articulated structure of society that had prevailed there before the conversion of the Visigoths from Arian to Catholic Christianity. The metropolitan territory of the Umayyad Arab Caliphate was Syria, where the millet system of communal organization had been endemic since the Achaemenian Age; and, before the Primitive Muslim Arabs had broken through the Roman *limes*, this indigenous way of life had already reasserted itself in both Syria and Egypt. The fifth century of the Christian Era, which had seen the unity of the Christian society fractured in the western provinces of the Roman Empire by the imposition of an Arian barbarian 'ascendancy' on a Catholic Roman subject population, had seen it fractured simultaneously in the eastern provinces by the secession of a Monophysite Syriac submerged population from a Catholic Roman 'ascendancy'; and, when in the seventh century this 'Melchite' régime, as it was nicknamed by the Imperialists' disaffected Monophysite Christian subjects, was replaced by a Muslim barbarian 'ascendancy', the Umayyad Arab Muslim successor-state of the Roman Empire reproduced, point for point, the social structure of the Empire's 'Teutonic Arian successor-states in the West before their annihilation or conversion.³ The Arab conquest

¹ See Ziegler, *op. cit.*, pp. 121 and 195-6.

² The Seventeenth Council of Toledo (*sedebat* A.D. 694) was specially convened by King Egica to deal with this emergency, and it rose to the occasion. By the eighth canon of this council, 'all the Jews were declared enslaved to Christian masters, who were to see to it that no Jewish rites were practised. Their goods were confiscated to the fiscus, and their children after attaining the age of seven were to be taken from them and reared as Christians'. The Jews of Septimania were exempted from this sentence at Egica's request (*ibid.*, p. 196).

³ There was perhaps a possibility that the Arab Muslim conquerors of Syria and Egypt might have followed the path of the Visigothic Arian Christian conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula to the length of eventually adopting the Christianity of their subjects in place of their own distinctive religion. Islam (as would have become evident in that event) had originated in an Arab barbarian prophet's attempt to provide his own people with a counterpart of the Christianity of their neighbours, and Muhammadanism might have shared the fate of Arius's Christian heresy. The Umayyad beneficiaries of Muhammad's political genius were (save for 'Umar II) as luke-warm in their allegiance to their official faith as they were susceptible to the culture of the Monophysite Arab ex-wardens of the Roman Empire's Syrian *limes*, whose fraternization with the Umayyads had helped to make the usurping dynasty's fortunes. If some Umayyad caliph had abandoned Islam for Monophysite Christianity, the last chapter of Syriac history might have taken the same turn as the first chapter of Western history in the Iberian Peninsula.

of the Iberian Peninsula brought the conquerors' institutions in its train; and thus, after the Visigoths' downfall in A.D. 711, the social organization of the Iberian Peninsula reverted to what it had been before the Visigoths' conversion to Catholicism in A.D. 587. A Catholic Christian population again found itself subject to a barbarian 'ascendancy' with a distinctive communal religion and law of its own; and the substitution of Muslim Arabs for Arian Christian Goths in the top layer of a now again horizontally articulated society was wholly to the Peninsular Jews' advantage, since the Jewish survivors and the Arab liberators of a Syriac Society whose civilization was their common heritage were drawn towards one another by a cultural affinity of which there was no more than a trace in the relations between the Jews and the Arian Christians.

The well-being enjoyed by the Jewish diaspora in the Peninsula under a Muslim régime did not outlive the Peninsular Muslim Power's collapse; for the Medieval Catholic Christian barbarian conquerors of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate's domain were dedicated to that ideal of a homogeneous Catholic Christian commonwealth that had governed the policy of the Visigothic barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire during the years A.D. 587-711, and, unlike seventh-century Visigothia, fifteenth-century Spain and Portugal conscientiously carried this fanatical policy of *Gleichschaltung* into effect. Between A.D. 1391 and A.D. 1497 the Jewish diaspora in the Peninsula was compelled either to go into exile or to profess conversion to Catholic Christianity.¹

In the extremity to which they were thus reduced by the abrogation of the millet system in a province of Dār-al-Islām that had been annexed to a Medieval Western Christendom, some of the Peninsular Jews were saved by being given asylum in an Orthodox Christian World where the millet system had recently been introduced by Ottoman Muslim conquerors.² In the commercial centres of an oecumenical empire in which the rest of Society was organized on the same communal lines, a refugee Peninsular Jewish diaspora enjoyed a further spell of well-being³ until, some four centuries after their transplantation, Rumelia, where the social climate had been genial for the Jews in the heyday of the Ottoman régime, was overtaken by the inclement social conditions that had already frozen the Jews out of the Iberian Peninsula. The Salonican Sephardim were threatened with catastrophe when the non-Jewish millets of the Ottoman Empire, including eventually the *ci-devant* Muslim 'ascendancy' itself, became converts to the political ideology of the Western World in the virulently extreme form of Modern Western Nationalism.⁴

The Causes of the Western Christians' Ill-treatment of the Jews

The amenity of being a normal, not a peculiar, social phenomenon was not the only benefit accruing to an autonomous Jewish diaspora under

¹ See II. ii. 244.

² Others found asylum in Holland and at Leghorn (see II. ii. 244, and p. 286, below), and others again in North-West Africa.

³ See II. ii. 244-7.

⁴ The conversion of the ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian and Muslim peoples to Modern Western Nationalism has been dealt with on pp. 189-92 and 263-8, above.

Muslim rule. In Dār-al-Islām the Jews' liberty to live their communal life in their own way was not precariously dependent on a fortunate absence of friction thanks to the congruity of this way of life with the Islamic social environment; it was positively guaranteed by stipulations of the Islamic Law. The Prophet Muhammad himself had expressly laid it down in the Qur'ān that Jews and Christians were to be allowed to go on practising their own religions under the protection of the Islamic state if they submitted to Muslim rule and agreed to pay a differential tax;¹ and, on the morrow of the Peninsular Jews' settlement in the Ottoman Empire, these texts of Islamic holy writ had duly saved the lives of the Ottoman Pādishāh's Christian subjects when their citation by the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, at the suggestion of the Sheykh-el-Islām, had deterred Sultan Selīm I the Grim from taking a leaf out of their Spanish Catholic Majesties' book by unlawfully confronting his non-Jewish *ra'īyeh* with the inhuman choice between conversion to Islam and death.²

This toleration of 'the People of the Book', which was secured *de jure* for Jews and Christians in Dār-al-Islām, was, of course, accorded *de facto* to Jews in Christendom as a rule;³ and indeed it would have been almost prohibitively illogical and invidious for the adherents of a younger religion to proscribe the practice of an older religion which, according to the innovators' own doctrine, had likewise been revealed to Mankind by the One True God to prepare the way for the definitive revelation which the younger religion claimed to embody.⁴ By a fortunate chance⁵ the toleration of 'the People of the Book' had been expressly enjoined in the scriptures of an Islam whose adherents might otherwise perhaps have been tempted into intolerance by their religion's militant and domineering *éthos*. Conversely it might perhaps have been expected *a priori* that the absence of any corresponding injunction in the New Testament would have been more than made good by the gentle and unaggressive *éthos* of Christianity. The New Testament had nothing to say about matters of public policy because the Primitive Christians, unlike the Primitive Muslims, were the submissive subjects and not the

¹ See II. ii. 245; IV. iv. 225-6 and 630; and V. v. 674, n. 2.

² See V. v. 706, n. 1, and V. vi. 204-5.

³ The *de facto* toleration accorded to the Jews in Christendom was accorded in Dār-al-Islām to the Zoroastrians and the Hindus through a tacit conferment on them of the status expressly guaranteed to the Jews and the Christians by the Qur'ān.

⁴ This chronological consideration explains why it was that the Christians tolerated Judaism but not Islam, whereas the Muslims tolerated both Judaism and Christianity. Dr. James Parkes here notes that the Christian, as well as the Islamic, Church found a juridical basis for the toleration that it practised. While the Christian Church held that the divine authority previously attaching to Judaism had been entirely abrogated by the Incarnation, it nevertheless discovered two grounds for conceding that the Jews in Christendom's midst had a right to a continuing survival. In their latter-day distressed condition they were serving as witnesses to the heinousness of the crime of deicide, and their survival was guaranteed by St. Paul's assurance that Jewry would be converted in the fullness of time (see, for example, Rom. x. and xi). In making these findings, Theology was playing the beau rôle of serving as the handmaid of Mercy and Loving-kindness.

⁵ The inclusion of any particular ruling in the Medinese *sūrahs* of the Qur'ān must be held to be a matter of chance, since these *sūrahs* were a collection of *ad hoc* rulings elicited by the day-to-day business that came on to Muhammad's agenda in his political rôle of *podestà* (to give him the title that this imported dictator would have borne if Medina had been a Medieval Italian city-state).

masterful rulers of a state.¹ Why was it that the Christians, when they eventually came into political power, distinguished themselves so disadvantageously from their Muslim contemporaries by abusing this power in their behaviour towards the Jews?

One reason was that in the New Testament the Gospel of Love was accompanied by a polemical attack on the Pharisees and was consummated by the story of the Passion of Christ; for these two particular ingredients in Christianity's holy writ could be taken by a latter-day Christian, who had the perverse will so to believe, as evidence that he was warranted by the New Testament itself in refusing to give the Jews the benefit of a Christian's general obligation to love and cherish his fellow human beings. In persuading the Roman authorities to put the founder of the Christian Church to death, the Jews in Christian eyes had committed a capital offence which was also an unspeakable impiety on the assumption that the Jews were grievously mistaken in rejecting the Christians' claim that the crucified Jesus was an incarnation of the God-head. Thus, by a tragically ironical *peripeteia*, a Passion which, according to the Christian Church's theology, was a supreme act of self-sacrifice, willed, out of love for Mankind, by a God incarnate in a man who was a Jew, could be taken by professing Christians as a justification for persecuting latter-day kinsmen of Jesus' murderers who were consequently kinsmen of Jesus himself; and the animus shown by the Evangelists in recording a controversy between Jesus and the Pharisees which was a family quarrel within the bosom of Jewry, and indeed within the bosom of Pharisaism itself, could incite Jesus' latter-day Gentile adherents to condemn their professed Master's own religion and community, root and branch.

An historian, observing this deadly recoil on Jewish heads of the shedding of Jesus' blood, might come to the cynical conclusion that, in gently submitting to be put to death, at his Jewish fellow countrymen's instigation, by the Roman authorities, Jesus had involuntarily done his own people immeasurably greater harm than they had subsequently suffered at Muhammad's Gentile hands when this militant prophet had provided for his landless Meccan followers at Medina by instigating the massacre and spoliation of the Jewish husbandmen in the Medinese oasis. To appear as the embarrassing victims of the Founder of Islam was a much less damaging entry in the record of a Jewish diaspora at the mercy of a Muslim or a Christian majority than to appear as the execrable murderers of the Founder of Christianity. And, after all, had not Muhammad made some considerable amends to the rest of Jewry for a crime committed by him against the single Jewish community of the Banu Qurayzah in the single oasis of Yathrib (*trucidati* A.D. 627) when, on the occasion of his subsequent conquest of the North Arabian Jewish oasis of Khaybar (*captum* A.D. 629), he had given Judaism an abiding legal guarantee of toleration under Muslim rule by a less maleficent exercise of the same political power that he had misused in dooming the Medinese Jews to destruction?

However that might be, it was attested by History that the *êthos* of

¹ On this point, see III. iii. 466-72.

Christianity had not availed to avert from the heads of the Jewish diaspora in Western Christendom the catastrophic effects of a provincial Western Christian political outlook in which a millet looked like an offensive anomaly. This peculiar inhospitality of Western Christendom to the Jewish strangers in its midst was aggravated by the peculiar course of Western Christendom's economic and social development.

The birthplace of the western Society was an outlying tract of the Hellenic World where the Hellenic Civilization had broken down at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era because, on this recently and superficially Hellenized ground, the urban culture of Hellenism had failed to strike root. The superstructure of urban life that had been erected in the western provinces of the Roman Empire on primitive agricultural foundations had proved to be an incubus instead of a stimulus;¹ and, after this exotic Roman-built superstructure had collapsed under its own weight, the West sank back to the same low economic level at which it had lain before Hellenism had attempted to seed itself beyond the Appennines or across the Tyrrhene Sea. This peculiar economic handicap with which the Western Society started life had two consequences which, between them, were bound to make trouble. In the first place a nascent Western Christendom was invaded by a Jewish diaspora from an urban Syriac World which found an opening for making a livelihood in the West by providing a rustic society with that minimum of commercial experience, skill, and organization without which even Ruritania could not live, but which Ruritania at that early stage of her development was incompetent to provide out of her own resources.² In the second place the Western Christian Gentiles' very ineptitude in business affairs inspired them with a compelling and abiding ambition to become their own Jews by mastering Jewry's arts—for their encounter with the Jewish diaspora, and the spectacle of the wealth and power that these aliens gained through the performance of an indispensable social service, was one of the experiences that made the Western Christians of the Dark Age aware of their economic backwardness and eager to overcome it.

In the course of ages a more and more demonic concentration of Western Gentile will-power on this Jewish economic objective came to reap a sensational reward. By the twentieth century of the Christian Era even the East European rear-guard of the Western peoples' column of route in their long march towards the goal of economic efficiency was going through a metamorphosis that had been achieved a thousand years earlier by the North Italian and Flemish pioneers in a Western economic and social movement that might be called with equal appropriateness either 'Judaization' or 'modernization'. In Western history the sign of the attainment of this social modernity was the emergence of a Gentile bourgeoisie whose field of economic enterprise was the same as the Jewish diaspora's; and the advent in the West of this modern Gentile bourgeoisie made for a quarrel there between Gentile and Jew by making the Jew seem superfluous to the Gentile and the Gentile seem insatiable to the Jew. As soon as the Gentile felt that he was competent to do the

¹ See III. iii. 99-100.

² See II. ii. 241.

Jew's work, he coveted the Jew's place for himself in addition to his own; and the Jew, on his side, was resentful at the prospect of being frozen out of his original niche in an expanding Western economic edifice. At a stage at which agriculture had been the staple industry of an infant Western Society, the Western Gentiles had taken advantage of a majority's brute power of numbers to monopolize the ownership and occupation of the land and had profited doubly by that economic injustice to the Jews when this penalized minority—duly responding to the challenge of penalization¹—had made good the Western Society's most serious economic deficiency by making something of such modest opportunities for commerce as were to be found in a backward agrarian economy. And now the Western Gentiles were bent on driving out of the commercial as well as the agricultural field a Jewish diaspora which had done the Western World the twofold service of building the West's once exiguous commerce up into a lucrative business and thereby teaching their Gentile neighbours the tricks of a valuable trade.

The Plot of the Jewish Tragedy in a Western Christendom

This economic quarrel between Jews and Western Gentiles ran through three acts. In the first act—classically performed in seventh-century Visigothia—the Jews were as unpopular as they were indispensable, but the ill-treatment which they incurred through their unpopularity was usually kept within bounds by the incapacity of their Gentile persecutors to fill their places. At this stage the worst that happened to the Jews as a rule was to be compelled to hand over to the Gentiles—by way of bribes, surtaxes, fines, and other euphemisms for robbery—a substantial portion of the wealth that was perpetually accumulating in the Jews' hands owing to the pre-eminence of their ability in the pursuits of trade and finance on which a Gentile majority had constrained them to concentrate their energies. The second act opened, in one Western country after another, as soon as a nascent Gentile bourgeoisie had acquired sufficient experience, skill, and capital of its own to feel itself capable of usurping the local Jews' place; for at that stage—as was demonstrated not only in thirteenth-century England and in fifteenth-century Spain but in twentieth-century Poland and Hungary—the Gentile bourgeois might be tempted to use the power conferred by numbers in order to rid themselves by force of long-established Jewish predecessors whom they might not have found it so easy to defeat in peaceful and honest economic competition. This second act—which was as discreditable to the Gentiles as it was tragic for the Jews—was followed by a third act in Western countries where the local representatives of a now well-established Gentile bourgeoisie had become such past masters in Jewish economic arts that their traditional fear of succumbing to Jewish competition no longer constrained them to forgo the economic advantage of re-enlisting Jewish ability in the service of their national economy.

Modern Western countries in which the Gentile bourgeoisie had arrived at this degree of professional self-confidence found it to their

¹ See II. ii. 209.

interest to give political asylum and economic opportunity to Jewish outcasts from economically more backward Western countries that were still in the violently anti-Jewish second stage of Western relations with Jewry. In this spirit the Tuscan Government allowed crypto-Jewish refugees from Spain and Portugal to settle at Leghorn in and after A.D. 1593;¹ Holland had already opened her doors to Portuguese crypto-Jewish refugees since A.D. 1579;² and England, which in the seventeenth century was following hard on Holland's heels in a race for primacy in the West's now world-wide trade, ventured from A.D. 1655 onwards to readmit a Jewish diaspora which she had expelled in A.D. 1290 when a nascent Gentile English bourgeoisie had been ruthlessly elbowing its way into Jewry's ancient preserves.

A Mirage of Enfranchisement

The economic enfranchisement of the Jews which followed the Modern Western Gentile bourgeoisie's attainment of its own economic maturity was accompanied by a social and political enfranchisement which was a consequence of the contemporary religious and ideological revolutions in Western Christendom. The outbreak of the Protestant Reformation early in the sixteenth century broke the united Christian front with which the Jewish diaspora in the West had been faced since the conversion to Catholicism of the last surviving local Arian 'ascendancy' towards the end of the seventh century;³ and, though the modern fracture in the Western body ecclesiastic conformed to the peculiar structure of the Western Society in breaking on vertical and not on horizontal lines, it nevertheless brought the Jewish diaspora substantial relief. In seventeenth-century Holland and England, for example, the Jews were given a welcome not only because they had become useful partners instead of formidable competitors in a competent local Gentile bourgeoisie's eyes but also because they were the victims of these Protestant Christians' Catholic Christian enemies. And, when, towards the close of the seventeenth century, the Catholic and Protestant peoples of a Gentile Western World tacitly agreed to drop the religious bone of contention which had been at least the ostensible object of their Wars of Religion, the re-establishment of peace between previously contending Christian sects this time brought the Jews a further measure of relief from Christian pressure instead of the turn of the screw which the Jews had experienced in Visigothia after the ending of the feud there between Arian and Catholic Christians in A.D. 587.

¹ See II. ii. 244. In planting Peninsular Jewish refugees in Leghorn the Florentines were moved by the same combination of economic with political considerations that had already led the 'Osmanlis to plant them in Constantinople and Salonica. The 'Osmanlis wanted these Jewish immigrants to take the bread out of the mouths of their Greek *ra'iyeh*; the Florentines wanted the Jewish settlers at Leghorn to take it out of the mouths of the Pisans, whom the Florentines had finally conquered and crushed in A.D. 1509. The Florentine conquerors of Pisa, like the Ottoman conquerors of Rumelia, were concerned not merely to promote the economic welfare of their recently acquired empire but to find some way of doing this without thereby creating an opportunity for their conquered rivals to recapture a commercial prosperity which had been the source of their former political and military power.

² See *ibid.*
³ The Lombards were not converted to a fully orthodox form of Catholicism till A.D. 698 (see Lot, F: *Les Invasions Germaniques* (Paris 1935, Payot), p. 283).

The reason for this difference in the consequences for the Jews lay, of course, in the difference in the spirit in which the Christians patched up their quarrels on these two historic occasions. In sixth-century Visigothia the peace of the Church had been restored through a conversion of the Arians to Catholicism which had left the Jews in the invidious position of being the only surviving dissenters; in a seventeenth-century Western World ecclesiastical peace was restored by a tacit agreement to continue to differ without continuing to take this religious difference to heart; and a growing indifference to religious issues, which was both the cause and the consequence of the damping of a Judaic flame of religious fanaticism in the relations between Christian and Christian, inevitably had its effect on the traditional attitude of the Christian towards the Jew. The diversion of Gentile hearts and minds from applied theology to applied science towards the close of the seventeenth century was duly followed at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the official emancipation of the Jews on the social and the political as well as the economic plane. On the European Continent this beneficent practical application of the Ideas of 1775 and 1789 was propagated from Revolutionary France into Germany and Italy by the Napoleonic Empire; in the New World it was propagated by the revolutions in which the American colonies of Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal successively achieved their independence. By A.D. 1914 the official emancipation of the Jews on all planes of human activity was a long since accomplished fact in all provinces of the Modern Western World outside the former territories of the extinct United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania—which, except for Poznan, West Prussia, and Galicia, had been included since A.D. 1815 in 'the Jewish Pale' of the Russian Empire.

Thus, on the eve of the First World War, 'the Jewish problem' in the Western World might have been thought to have found a solution in a fusion of the Jewish and Christian communities with one another through a union that had been a voluntary act on both sides instead of having been imposed forcibly on the weaker by the stronger party. In a bourgeois and secular Modern Western Society in which the now all-important field of business activity had been reopened to the Jews on equal terms with the Gentiles, while Religion had sunk into being a matter of secondary importance or no importance at all, why should not the individual Jew become socially uniform with the individual Gentile by evolving into a Western bourgeois of the Jewish religious denomination or of no religious belief or allegiance of any kind? In the Western World in the course of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era the process of assimilation on this basis did in fact go very far, and it was conceivable that it might have ended in a complete obliteration of the historic communal distinction between Jews and Western Christians if the process had not been cut short through the sudden and unexpected seizure of the Western World by a fresh paroxysm of trouble as severe as the previous bout from which it had emerged towards the close of the seventeenth century.¹ Nineteenth-century Western hopes of solving

¹ See V. vi. 315-16.

the Jewish problem, like nineteenth-century Western hopes of abolishing the institution of War, proved in retrospect¹ to have been a delusion; and a tragedy which had momentarily looked as if it were a play in three acts then entered on a fourth act which was more horrifying than any of its three predecessors and which afforded no glimpse of any prospect of finality.

The Fate of the European Jews and the Palestinian Arabs, A.D. 1933-48

The peculiar horror of this fourth act lay in the unprecedented wickedness of the malefactors and unprecedented sufferings of both innocent Jewish victims and an innocent Arab third party.

On the Gentile actors' side the German persecution of the Jews in Continental Europe in the years A.D. 1933-45 was far more shocking than the Spanish and Portuguese persecution of the Jews in the Iberian Peninsula in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. While both persecutions had been prompted by economic motives that had been given a less disreputable and less self-interested appearance by being cloaked under a show of idealism, the medieval Peninsular Christians' profession of zeal for their religion was not so insincere as the modern German Neo-Pagans' profession of zeal for the idolatrous worship of their tribe—as was shown by the fact that the Spaniards and Portuguese did genuinely enfranchise any Jews who conformed to the practice of Western Christianity, whereas the German National Socialists' racial tribalism left a Jew no avenue of escape from being the 'non-Aryan' that Nature was alleged to have made him. The medieval Iberian Christians, again, were naively practising their traditional religion according to their benighted understanding of its precepts, whereas the modern German Nazis had deliberately repudiated the humanitarianism that had been the cardinal virtue in the moral code of a post-Christian Modern Western Enlightenment.

The full measure of the Nazis' depravity is not given in the bare statistical statement—appalling though these figures are—that, within a period of no more than twelve years, they reduced the Jewish population of Continental Europe, west of the Soviet Union, from about 6½ million to about 1½ million² by a process of mass-extermiation which

¹ See IV. iv. 141-55.

² In A.D. 1952 it was not possible to give exact figures based on accurate statistics, and it seemed improbable that the necessary information would ever be obtainable. According to *The Jewish Year Book, 1947* (London 1948, Jewish Chronicle), pp. 298-9, the Jewish population of Germany and the Continental European countries occupied by Germany in the Second World War—not including the occupied parts of the Soviet Union—was 1,181,600 in April 1946. *The American Jewish Year Book, 1945-6* (Philadelphia 1945, Jewish Publication Society of America) does not attempt to estimate the post-war figures; but vol. xli of the same series, covering the year 1939-40 and published in 1939, gives, on p. 585, figures amounting to a total of 6,484,499 for the Jewish population of the same area. On this showing, the Jews in the area appear to have been 5,302,899 fewer in 1946 than they had been in 1939; and this figure comes close to the estimate of a drop from 6½ millions to 1½ millions in the same area between the same dates, which is given by the Board of Deputies of British Jews in *The Jews in Europe, their Martyrdom and their Future* (London 1945, Woburn House), p. 38.

In these calculations there were several possible sources of error. The areas in question for A.D. 1939-40 and for A.D. 1946 might not be exactly coterminous; and, in order

was so unprecedentedly systematic and cold-blooded that the new word 'genocide' had to be coined to describe what was in effect a new crime. In the operation of the destructor-plants in which the Nazis' victims were asphyxiated, the maniacal sadism of the men and women in command was less appalling than the criminal docility of the hundreds and thousands of subordinates who duly carried out their monstrous instructions, and the moral cowardice of the German public, who took good care to avoid acquainting themselves with the atrocities that their husbands, sons, and brothers, and even their sisters, wives, and daughters, were committing in their name. The moral nadir to which German souls sank under the Nazi dispensation is revealed, not only in these murders and physical tortures that were perpetrated by German hands, but also in the odious precept and example through which pastors and masters who were shamefully betraying their trust taught Gentile German school-children to make life unbearable for their Jewish schoolfellows by the industrious infliction of studied unkindness.

This moral downfall of one of the leading nations of a Modern Western World in the second quarter of the twentieth century of the Christian Era shook the foundations of the régime of secular enlightenment on which the West had been subsisting for a quarter of a millennium. It showed that the gain won by discarding a Judaic Christian fanaticism in the reaction against the savagery of the Early Modern Western Wars of Religion had been outweighed by the loss suffered through the simultaneous smothering of a likewise Judaic Christian love. After this modern German exhibition of the volcanic potentialities of an undomesticated Original Sin, it was impossible to retain Modern Western Man's latter-day dogmatic belief in the inevitable progress of a secularized Western Civilization and in the self-perfectibility of a graceless Human Nature. But the Nazi Gentiles' fall was less tragic than the Zionist Jews'. On the morrow of a persecution in Europe in which they had been the victims of the worst atrocities ever known to have been suffered by Jews or indeed by any other human beings, the Jews' immediate reaction to their own experience was to become persecutors in their turn for the first time since A.D. 135—and this at the first opportunity that had since arisen for them to inflict on other human beings who had done the Jews no injury, but who happened to be weaker than they were, some of the wrongs and sufferings that had been inflicted on the Jews by their many successive Western Gentile persecutors during the intervening seventeen centuries. In A.D. 1948 some 684,000 out of some 859,000 Arab inhabitants of the territory in Palestine which the Zionist Jews

to estimate from the figure for the drop in the Jewish population the figure for the number of Jews who had been done to death, a statistician would have on the one hand to add an unknown number for the losses of the Jewish population in the German-occupied territories of the Soviet Union, and on the other hand to allow for a number of survivors who, by April 1946, had already migrated from Germany and the ex-German-occupied countries since VE-Day. Allowing for these unknown quantities, it might be estimated that at least five million Continental European Jews had been done to death by the Nazis from first to last. In Dr. James Parkes' opinion—communicated to the writer on the 28th February, 1951, in a comment on this footnote—an estimate of six million, in round numbers, would be nearer the mark for the figure by which the Jewish population of Continental Europe, including the Soviet Union, had been reduced since the outbreak of the War of A.D. 1939-45.

conquered by force of arms in that year lost their homes and property¹ and became destitute 'displaced persons'.²

If the heinousness of sin is to be measured by the degree to which the sinner is sinning against the light that God has vouchsafed to him, the Jews had even less excuse in A.D. 1948 for evicting Palestinian Arabs from their homes than Nebuchadnezzar and Titus and Hadrian and the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition had had for uprooting, persecuting, and exterminating Jews in Palestine and elsewhere at divers times in the past. In A.D. 1948 the Jews knew, from personal experience, what they were doing; and it was their supreme tragedy that the lesson learnt by them from their encounter with the Nazi German Gentiles should have been not to eschew but to imitate some of the evil deeds that the Nazis had committed against the Jews.³ On the Day of Judgement the gravest

¹ The figure 859,000 is the estimate of the total non-Jewish population, on the 31st December, 1946, of the territory subsequently occupied by Israel within the boundaries of the 1st May, 1949, which is given in the *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, Part I, *The Final Report and Appendices* (Lake Success, N.Y. 1949, United Nations), p. 22, col. 2. In the same place the total number of refugees from Israeli-held territory at the date of the Report is estimated at 726,000, on the reckoning that the non-Jewish population then still in Israel amounted to 133,000. The figure of 684,000 refugees, given on page 289, above, is based on a reckoning by Dr. James Parkes that, by January 1951, the number of the non-Jewish population in Israel had risen to about 175,000—presumably in consequence of a repatriation of some 42,000 of the Palestinian Arab 'displaced persons'.

² While the direct responsibility for this calamity that overtook the Palestinian Arabs in A.D. 1948 was on the heads of the Zionist Jews who seized a *Lebensraum* for themselves in Palestine by force of arms in that year, a heavy load of indirect, yet irrefutable, responsibility was on the heads of the people of the United Kingdom; for the Jews would not have had in A.D. 1948 the opportunity to conquer an Arab country in which they had amounted to no more than an inconsiderable minority in A.D. 1918 if, during the intervening thirty years, the power of the United Kingdom had not been exerted continuously to make possible the entry of Jewish immigrants into Palestine contrary to the will, in despite of the protests, and without regard to the forebodings of Arab inhabitants of the country who in A.D. 1948 were duly to become the victims of this long pursued British policy. See further pp. 303-6, below.

³ The cold-blooded systematic 'genocide' of several millions of human beings in extermination camps, which had been the worst of the Nazis' crimes against the Jews, had no parallel at all in the Jews' ill-treatment of the Palestinian Arabs. The evil deeds committed by the Zionist Jews against the Palestinian Arabs that were comparable to crimes committed against the Jews by the Nazis were the massacre of men, women, and children at Dayr Yāsīn on the 9th April, 1948, which precipitated a flight of the Arab population, in large numbers, from districts within range of the Jewish armed forces, and the subsequent deliberate expulsion of the Arab population from districts conquered by the Jewish armed forces between the 15th May, 1948, and the end of that year—e.g. from 'Akkā in May, from Lydda and Ramla in July, and from Beersheba and Western Galilee in October. When Nazareth was captured in July, most of the population seems to have been allowed to stay. On the other hand, the Arabs who were expelled from 'Akkā in May included refugees from Haifa, and those who were expelled from Lydda and Ramla in July included refugees from Jaffa, in addition to the local Arab population. The massacre and the expulsions, between them, were responsible for the exile of all those Palestinian Arab 'displaced persons' (to use the current euphemism), from the territory conquered by the Israelis, who fled from or were driven from this territory after the 9th April, 1948. The expulsions seem to have accounted for about 284,000 out of the total of about 684,000 Palestinian Arabs who became 'displaced persons' from first to last, including those who had already been evacuated by the British mandatory authorities or had already fled on their own initiative or had already lost their homes as a result of military operations between the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine in December 1947 and the massacre of the 9th April, 1948.

The Arab blood shed on the 9th April, 1948, at Dayr Yāsīn was on the heads of Irgun; the expulsions after the 15th May, 1948, were on the heads of all Israel.

If, on behalf of Israel, it were to be pleaded that these Jewish outrages in A.D. 1948, even reckoned *pro rata*, were dwarfed in quantity, as well as in heinousness, by the Nazi atrocities in A.D. 1933-45, it would have to be taken into account, on the other side,

crime standing to the German National Socialists' account might be, not that they had exterminated a majority of the Western Jews, but that they had caused the surviving remnant of Jewry to stumble. The Jews in Europe in A.D. 1933-45 had been the vicarious victims of the Germans' resentment over their military defeat at the hands of their Western fellow Gentiles in the war of A.D. 1914-18; the Arabs in Palestine in A.D. 1948 became in their turn the vicarious victims of the European Jews' indignation over the 'genocide' committed upon them by their Gentile fellow Westerners in A.D. 1933-45. This impulse to become a party to the guilt of a stronger neighbour by inflicting on an innocent weaker neighbour the very sufferings that the original victim had experienced at his stronger neighbour's hands was perhaps the most perverse of all the base propensities of Human Nature;¹ for it was a wanton endeavour to keep in perpetual motion the sorrowful wheel of *Karma*² to which Adam-Ixion was bound and from which only Love and Mercy could ever release him.

The tidal wave that overwhelmed the Palestinian Arabs in A.D. 1948 was a backwash from an upheaval in the relations between Gentiles and Jews in Western longitudes beyond the Palestinian Arabs' horizon;³ and its catastrophic effect on these innocent strangers' fortunes was a consequence of the third of the three peculiarities that have been attributed in an earlier passage of this chapter to the Modern Western Civilization.⁴ In a Modern Western Society that had come to overshadow all the rest of Mankind, even an imperfectly and precariously emancipated Jewish diaspora in the West had become a power in the World through becoming an effective force in the political life of potent Western countries; and, in consequence, the West's unsolved domestic Jewish problem had become fraught with perils for non-Western and non-Jewish peoples who had nothing to do with this Western problem except for being in the Westerners' power. The contemporary unsolved domestic Jewish problem of the Islamic World in the Yaman and the Maghrib was without effect on the fortunes of any third party because in the twentieth century the Islamic Society was impotent to discharge its own debts at any third party's expense; but in that age there was no power on Earth strong enough to say nay to the Western Society when the Western

that the Jews had had much more experience than the Germans had had of the sufferings that they were inflicting. If the Nazis were debarred from filing the plea that they knew not what they did, the Israelis were debarred *a fortiori*.

¹ This was, of course, a propensity of Human Nature under all veneers, and not just of Human Nature under the veneer of Judaism or Germanism. Historic examples of it in which the perpetrators had been non-German Gentiles were the French acts of aggression against the Italians in A.D. 1494 and against the Syrians in A.D. 1920. In inflicting a sixty-five years' war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1494-1559) on Italy the French were taking their revenge for a hundred years' war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1337-1451) that had previously been inflicted on France not by the Italians but by the English. In invading and occupying Syria in A.D. 1920 the French were taking their revenge for an occupation of French soil in A.D. 1914 in which the invaders had been not the Syrians but the Germans.

² See V. v. 427-9 and 432-3.

³ In A.D. 1948 the Palestinian Arabs might aptly have applied to the calamity that overtook them in that year the words that had fallen so quaintly from Neville Chamberlain's lips on the 27th September, 1938. 'How horrible, fantastic, incredible' it must have seemed to them that they should have lost their homes 'because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom' they knew 'nothing'.

⁴ See p. 277, above.

victors in the War of A.D. 1939-45 chose to compensate the Western Jews for the crimes committed against them by a defeated Western belligerent at the expense, not of the guilty West, but of an innocent non-Western people. In its impotence to resist this injustice the rest of Mankind could only marvel at Western Man's attempt to obtain absolution for a Western sin by imposing a proportionate penance on strangers who were not implicated in the guilt.

Causes of the Failure of Enfranchisement

This fourth act of the drama in which the Modern West and Jewry were the dramatis personae was indeed in all respects so disconcertingly tragic that the historian cannot refrain from seeking to discover the points at which an apparently promising third act had gone wrong.

One vulnerable point was, of course, the survival of a psychological barrier between Western Gentiles and Jews after the juridical barrier between them had been officially removed. In a nineteenth-century *soi-disant* Liberal Western World there was still an invisible ghetto within which the Western Gentile continued to confine the Jew, and the Jew, on his side, continued to segregate himself from the Western Gentile. The nominally emancipated Jew found himself still being excluded—unavowedly yet effectually—from social opportunities and amenities by his Gentile professed fellow members in an officially united society, while the Gentile found himself still faced by a free-masonry—likewise as effectual as it was unavowed—among Jews who were eager to claim, without being willing to accord, the benefits that ought to have accrued equally to all members of both these two *ci-devant* millets as a result of their official *Gleichschaltung*. In fact, either party continued to observe a double standard of behaviour—a higher standard for dealing with members of its own crypto-community and a lower standard for dealing with nominal fellow citizens on the other side of a supposedly no longer existent social pale—and this new coat of hypocrisy embalming the old vice of inequity made either party more contemptible, as well as less formidable, in the other's eyes and thereby made the situation more exasperating, as well as less onerous, for both parties.

This immediate aftermath of Jewish emancipation in the West was ironically disappointing; and, though a substantial improvement in relations had in fact nevertheless been secured, the precariousness of this was revealed by the recrudescence of Antisemitism in a nineteenth-century and a twentieth-century Western World wherever there was any appreciably rapid increase in the numerical ratio of the Jewish to the Gentile ingredient in the local population. This tendency was discernible by the year A.D. 1914 in London and in New York as a result of Jewish immigration since A.D. 1881 from the former dominions of the extinct United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania under pressure of Russian-instigated persecution;¹ and after A.D. 1918 it became virulent in

¹ 'In a couple of decades the Jewish population of the United States rose from less than a quarter of a million to more than a million; that of England from less than a hundred thousand to nearly a quarter of a million; while France, Holland, and Germany each received between twenty and twenty-five thousand of these refugees. The new-

German Austria and the German Reich as a result of further Jewish immigration from Galicia, 'Congress Poland', and the more easterly provinces of 'the Pale' during the First World War.¹

These symptoms revealed a state of affairs that was not only disappointing but dangerous, yet a warrantable disappointment and apprehension gave no reasonable grounds for despondency; for it was one of the well-recognized limitations of Human Nature that human souls should take time in adjusting themselves emotionally to innovations which the Reason had endorsed by a stroke of the legislator's pen; and, if the Jewish problem in the Western World could have been insulated from its contemporary Western ideological setting, Time would have been on the side of an eventual solution of the problem *de facto* when once it had been solved *de jure*—as was shown by the progressive increase in the frequency of intermarriage between Western Gentiles and Jews, which was an approximate current index of the progress towards a *de facto* solution that was being achieved. Unhappily this beneficent process of assimilation between individual Western Gentiles and Jews, which offered the best hope of a solution of the Jewish problem in the peculiar ideological environment of the Western social tradition, was overtaken and upset by the eruption of a Modern Western Nationalism and by the social devastation which this ideological catastrophe brought in its train.

Modern Western Nationalism attacked the Jewish diaspora in the Western World on two flanks simultaneously. It led the Western Jews by its attractiveness and at the same time drove them by its pressure to invent a Jewish nationalism *alla Franca*² which might be described as a collective form of Westernization in contrast to the individual form associated with a pre-nationalistic Liberal Western dispensation.³ Like the Westernizing ideal of turning the individual Jew into a Western bourgeois of Jewish religion, the alternative Westernizing ideal of turn-comers were unlike any Jews whom the West had seen for centuries . . . and their great numbers, coupled with the suspicion of their neighbours, intensified their clannishness and the difficulty of the simplest political, social, and economic assimilation' (Parkes, J.: *The Jewish Problem in the Modern World*, 1st American ed. (New York 1946, Oxford University Press), pp. 67-68).

¹ The Antisemitism displayed by Gentiles in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania after A.D. 1918 was not, of course, due to a change in numerical ratios, for in these countries migration had relieved the pressure of Jewish numbers on Gentile susceptibilities in proportion to the increase of the same pressure in Austria, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. The explanation of the inter-war phenomena in Eastern Europe was not statistical but historical. In A.D. 1918 the Western countries west of 'the Pale' were all in Stage Three, at which a now well-established Western Gentile bourgeoisie had felt themselves able to grant the Jews a *de jure* (albeit precarious) emancipation. By contrast, the Western Gentile bourgeoisie in Poland and Hungary at that date were still in the militant Stage Two, in which they were aspiring to become their own Jews and were seeking to clear an economic *Lebensraum* for themselves by elbowing the Jews out of their way, while the Westernizing Gentile population of Rumania (at least in the Regat, as distinct from Transylvania) was still in Stage One, at which the Jewish practitioners of the higher arts of economic life were as obnoxious to the Gentiles as they were indispensable to them. In German Austria and Germany a fear of falling back out of Stage Three into Stage One, as a result of the economic catastrophe precipitated there by the First World War, no doubt partly accounted for the virulence of the recrudescence of Antisemitism in those two economically advanced Western countries by comparison with the relative mildness of the contemporary symptoms in the United Kingdom and the United States.

² This convenient Italian phrase signified 'in the Western style' in Ottoman parlance.

³ See II. ii. 212-214.

ing the oecumenical Jewish millet into a parochial nation (concentrated, Western-fashion, within the frontiers of a national territory with an exclusively and homogeneously Jewish population) was evidence that the emancipation of a Western Jewry in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era had been genuine enough to expose the Western Jews, for the first time in the history of their relations with their Gentile neighbours, to the influence of current Western ideas and ideals. At the same time, Zionism, on the testimony of Theodor Herzl himself, was also evidence of an anxiety, in nineteenth-century Western Jewish souls, lest the avenue of individual assimilation, which had previously been opened up to Western Jews by the advent of a Modern Western Gentile Liberalism, might be closed to them again by the onset of a Modern Gentile Nationalism that was treading hard on Liberalism's heels.¹

The last quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era witnessed a recrudescence of Antisemitism in the Western World that was as ominous as it was unexpected. In point of numbers the greatest blow dealt to a Western Jewry in this generation was the instigation of pogroms in 'the Pale' by a Russian Tsardom *in extremis* which resorted to this base expedient in and after A.D. 1881² in the futile hope of diverting the hostility of its Gentile subjects from its own head on to the heads of their Jewish neighbours.³ Yet this fresh outbreak of persecution in the backward eastern fringes of the Western World on the initiative of a non-Western régime was not so alarming a portent as the contemporary symptoms in Germany and France. The first explosion of Antisemitism in a latter-day Germany (*saeviebat* A.D. 1873-96) was a flash in the pan.⁴ The Dreyfus Affair (*saeviebat* A.D. 1894-1906), to which a Liberal France succumbed in the hour of her demoralization after her defeat by Germany in A.D. 1870-1, was more deeply disturbing.⁵ The spectacle of anti-Jewish demonstrations in Paris at the time when the battle over the Dreyfus case was being fought out in France was the experience that converted the Austrian Jewish journalist Theodor Herzl from being an ardent assimilationist into becoming the Apostle of Zionism.⁶

It is perhaps no accident that a nineteenth-century Jewish Zionism and a twentieth-century German Neo-Antisemitism should have arisen successively in the same geographical zone of the Western World, and that this locus should have been the German-speaking territories of the Austrian Empire just west of the domains of the Hungarian Crown of St. Stephen and the former United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania. This Austrian zone lay sufficiently far to the west for its Jewish inhabitants to be subject to infection by current Western ideologies—including Nationalism as well as Liberalism—in a Modern Western Liberal Age, and sufficiently far to the east for its Gentile inhabitants to be no less subject

¹ See IV. iv. 163.

² See Parkes, *op. cit.*, chap. 4, especially pp. 62-66.

³ See Parkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-44.

⁴ See Parkes, *op. cit.*, p. 89. In a comment on the first draft of the present chapter of this Study, the same Western Christian Gentile student of Jewish history put in the following words the dilemma with which the Jewish diaspora in the West found itself confronted in Herzl's generation: 'Western nationalism fundamentally made Jewish assimilation impossible. The tragedy was implicit in the Jews' position, not in the Jews' choice of Nationalism. Whichever line they adopted offered them a tragic solution.'

⁵ See p. 292, above.

⁶ See Parkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-39.

to infection by pre-Liberal Western ideologies still persisting among the backward Gentile populations of the adjoining 'Pale' after the dawn of Liberalism farther west; and the notion that the Western Jews might win for themselves, by adopting Western Nationalism, an asylum which they might prove not to have secured through a conversion to Western Liberalism would naturally present itself to the minds of Austrian Jews whose nineteenth-century status of individual emancipation was threatened by the simultaneous onsets of a Modern Gentile Nationalism from Western Europe and a Medieval Gentile Antisemitism from 'the Pale'.¹

Inherent Consequences of the Captivation of the Jews by a Modern Western Gentile Nationalism

A Modern Western Gentile Nationalism, with its medieval objective of self-imposed ghettos for all peoples, was an exaggeration, amounting to a caricature, of the traditional Western ideal of the homogeneous single-community parochial state; but, in this archaic Modern Western ideology's North American and West European birthplaces, its devastating effects were mitigated by the circumstance that in these countries Nationalism was virtually a consecration of the existing state of the map. In France and other Western countries on both shores of the Atlantic towards the close of the eighteenth century, the populations actually were distributed in locally homogeneous blocks approximately corresponding to the territories of existing sovereign states; and, though, as the mania of Nationalism progressively travelled eastwards—infecting first the eastern parts of the Western World and thereafter the domains of divers living non-Western societies—it was successively attacking countries where the contemporary cartographical facts were more and more sharply at variance with the nationalistic ideal, it was not till it attacked the Western Jewish diaspora that it came to affect a community whose contemporary geographical distribution and political allegiance afforded Nationalism no vestige whatsoever of a basis in the realm of existing facts.

The alien converts to this Modern Western Nationalism whose predicament came nearest to being like that of the Jews were the Armenians; yet even the Armenians differed from the Jews in having continuously preserved, into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a remnant of an ancestral territory in which they were still the local cultivators of the soil. While the latter-day Jewish and Armenian diasporas were remarkably similar to one another in geographical distribution, economic occupation, communal organization, and psychological attitude, there was no element in a latter-day Jewry corresponding to the autochthonous Armenian peasantry of Van, Erivan, and the Qārabagh; and, in the light of the consequences of the impact of Nationalism on the Armenians, this difference in the situation of the Armenian and the Jewish people in the twentieth century had a bearing on Jewry's prospects. In the fortunes

¹ The Antisemitic Christian-Social leader Karl Lueger was elected Burgomaster of Vienna in October 1895, and was allowed by the Emperor Francis Joseph to assume office in March 1897 after he had been re-elected no less than four times against the Emperor's veto.—Parkes, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

of the Armenian diaspora the impact of Nationalism had spelled tragedy; for the adoption of the Western ideal of Nationalism by an Armenian diaspora that was everywhere in a minority had threatened the non-Armenian majority among whom they were dispersed with the alternative calamities of subjugation or eviction, and this menaced majority had safeguarded its own future by the barbarous method of wiping the Armenian diaspora off the map in the successive massacres and deportations of which the Armenians were the victims in the Ottoman Empire between A.D. 1896 and A.D. 1922. In this catastrophe which their conversion to Nationalism had brought upon them, the Armenian people were saved from complete extinction thanks to their having preserved a parcel of territory in which they had never ceased to constitute a majority of the local population; and the generation that saw the destruction of the Armenian diaspora in Turkey also saw the establishment of a miniature Armenian national state in the shape of the Republic of Erivan within the framework of the Soviet Union.

This Armenian experience illustrated a simple law of Nationalism which was manifest to historians though it had been ignored by nationalists. The destructiveness of Nationalism was proportionate to the degree of the discrepancy between the ideal of Nationalism and the local state of existing geographical and political facts. Even in the *ci-devant* British colonies in North America, where the discrepancy was at a minimum at the date of the Revolutionary War, it was nevertheless sufficiently serious to make itself grievously felt in the expulsion of the United Empire Loyalists.¹ The enormously greater devastation caused by the impact of Nationalism on the Armenians was proportionate to the enormously greater degree of the discrepancy in that case. What was to be the outcome of the impact of Nationalism on the Jews, in whose case the discrepancy was at its maximum? By the time when Zionism was inaugurated in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, more than seventeen hundred years had passed since the last date at which there had been any territory continuously inhabited by a compact Jewish agricultural population corresponding to the Armenian peasantry in the neighbourhood of Erivan. The Jews had had no living homeland of the kind since A.D. 135, when the last roots of Jewry in Judaea had been pulled out of the soil by the Romans.² What practical applications of the Modern Western ideal of Nationalism were open to a people in this historical plight?

In theory, Jewish nationalists *alla Franca* had a choice between two alternatives. Their objective of providing Jewry with a country which would be 'as Jewish as England' was 'English'³ could be attained either by colonizing some no-man's-land in 'the great open spaces', which had

¹ See IV. iv. 165-7.

² Dr. James Parkes comments:

'When the last roots of Jewry were pulled up in the hills of Judaea, substantial communities remained across the Jordan, around the fringes and in the plains, and a relatively compact and by that time more numerous Jewish community in Galilee was almost untouched. The Galilean patriarchate exercised certain political and religious powers over Jews elsewhere right up to A.D. 435. This is the date of the disappearance of anything which could be called a Jewish government [in Palestine].'

³ A phrase quoted by Sir W. Churchill in his memorandum of the 3rd June, 1922.

been opened up through Western pioneering enterprise, or alternatively by supplanting the Gentile inhabitants of such parts of Palestine as had been inhabited by Jews before A.D. 135. The second of these two alternative possible programmes was beset with difficulties, moral as well as material. It required the eviction of an existing population which, by the year A.D. 1897, when Theodor Herzl inaugurated the Zionist Movement, must be reckoned to have been at home in Palestine for more than seventeen and a half centuries, since the most recent drastic change in the composition of the population of Palestine had taken place as far back as the morrow of the suppression, in A.D. 135,¹ of the last Jewish insurrection against the Roman Imperial Government, when there had been a systematic colonization of the previously Jewish-inhabited districts of Palestine by Gentile settlers from other parts of the Roman Empire.²

Even if it were to be assumed—though this assumption would be unwarrantable—that the subsequent population included no elements that had been there before the second century of the Christian Era, this latter-day population's tenancy of its Palestinian home would still have been longer, by at least a hundred years, than the previous tenancy of the same parts of Palestine by the Children of Israel and Judah—on the assumption that these too had not incorporated any elements from an earlier population—even at the longest reckoning of the interval between the entry of the Israelites in the course of a post-Minoan Völkerwanderung in the days of the New Empire of Egypt and the eviction of the Jews by the Romans in A.D. 70 and A.D. 135.³ A similar

¹ The subsequent change that had followed the Primitive Muslim Arab conquest of Palestine in A.D. 636–7 had been not only much less abrupt but also probably smaller even in the aggregate. The Arabs who had seeped into Palestine gradually in the course of the next 1,260 years had made Palestine a wholly Arabic-speaking country by converting much more than by supplanting the pre-existing population.

² See Spruner, K., and Menke, Th.: *Atlas Antiquus*, 3rd ed. (Gotha 1862, Perthes), Plate No. xxvi, the central map: 'Syria Phoenice, Syria Palaestina Provinciae ab Aerae Christianae Anno 70 usque ad Diocletiani Tempus.'

³ Dr. James Parkes comments:

'I do not believe that the argument about changes of tenancy is valid. There is no moment in Palestinian history when, over the whole or a large part of the country, there was a sudden change of population. Many who think of themselves as Arabs to-day had ancestors who had been at one time heathen or "Canaanites", and later Jews, and then, probably, Christians (after Justinian). There is an unchanging core of indefinable size, and there are accretions of every century. Certainly there were far more Jews in the country for at least a century after the Arab conquest than there were "Arabs" or "Muslims"; and, when the majority became Muslim and Arabic-speaking, it is probable that more were ex-Jews and ex-Christians than newly-arrived "Arabs", though there must have been a considerable number of the latter, especially after good government passed and allowed increasing badawi encroachment.'

This comment, with which the writer of this Study entirely agreed (see p. 297, n. 1, above), moved him to add a comment of his own. In his personal opinion the title of the population of Palestine or any other country to be left in the undisturbed possession of their homes rested on the human rights of the living generation, and its validity did not depend on the production of evidence proving that the living generation's ancestors had been *in situ* for this or that number of centuries. If, however, the question of the legitimacy of the title of the non-Jewish population inhabiting Palestine during the half century A.D. 1897–1948 were to be argued on the (in the writer's opinion) more academic ground of length of ancestral tenure, then evidently the historical facts cited by Dr. Parkes in his comment and agreed with him by the present writer would make the pre-Zionist population's title overwhelmingly strong; for, on this showing, the living generation of this population were the descendants, heirs, and representatives not merely of the Arabs who had seeped in since the conquest of Palestine by the Primitive Muslim

eviction of the population by which Palestine was inhabited at the close of the nineteenth century, and by which it continued to be inhabited down to the year A.D. 1948, could be achieved only by an act of military aggression, at the existing population's expense, such as had been committed by the wild tribesmen of Israel and Judah when they had originally broken into Palestine from the Arabian Desert, and by the Minoan Philistines and Western Christian Crusaders when they had broken in from the Mediterranean seaboard. Such aggression would be militarily and politically difficult to commit so long as Palestine remained within the Ottoman Empire and until Zionism obtained the backing of a preponderant group of Western Powers; and, under all military and political conditions, it would be morally difficult to defend in a world in which the progress of technology was making the scourge of war so prohibitively severe that aggression was coming to be recognized for the crime that it always had been. It would likewise be morally difficult for Zionists to justify in the eyes, not only of the Gentiles, but also of the traditionally orthodox Jews of the quietist school known as *Agudath Israel*.¹

Inherent Consequences of Zionism's Departure from a Traditional Jewish Practice of Political Quietism

While a confident expectation of the eventual return of a surviving diaspora of Jewry and a vanished diaspora of Israel to their previous homes in Palestine was a fundamental tenet of orthodox Judaism which had inspired the Jewish diaspora to preserve its communal identity over a period of 1,762 years, reckoning back from the inauguration of the Zionist Movement in A.D. 1897 to the suppression of Bar Kōkabā's messianic insurrection in A.D. 135, the sixty generations of Jews in diaspora that had come and gone in the course of that flow of Time had persisted in leaving it to Almighty God to carry out on His, and not on His Chosen's People's, initiative a restoration that all schools of orthodox Judaism alike held to be an act that was God's prerogative. This persistent practice of all post-Hadrianic Jews—orthodox, heretical, agnostic, and anti-religious—had been consecrated by *Agudath Israel* in their belief that any fresh recourse to a human initiative for the purpose of bringing the restoration to pass would be an impious usurpation of God's prerogative by human hands.

In taking this view the *Agudath* appear to have been a minority among the orthodox, and the *Mizrachi* who embraced Zionism without admitting that this was incompatible with orthodoxy could argue that a post-Hadrianic practice of refraining from taking political action for bringing about the return had been merely prompted by manifest ex-

Arabs in A.D. 636-7, and not merely of the Hellenic or Hellenizing Gentile colonists who had been planted in Palestine in the second century of the Christian Era, but of the Jews and the Israelites themselves and of the Israelites' incorporated Canaanite predecessors right back to the Mesolithic Natufian fathers of agriculture and the Middle Palaeolithic Carmelite cross-breeds between *Homo Sapiens* and *Homo Neandertalensis* (see Albright, W. F.: *The Archaeology of Palestine* (London 1949, Penguin), pp. 59 and 55).

¹ The attitude of *Agudath Israel* and the difference between its negative-minded non-violence and the positive-minded non-violence of Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's response to the challenge of the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, have been noticed in V. v. 76, 588-9, and 617, n. 2, and V. vi. 128.

pediency without being enjoined by any generally accepted article of Jewish belief. Against the practice of the 1,762 years running back from A.D. 1897 to A.D. 135 they could adduce the contrary practice of the 674 years running back from A.D. 135 to 539 B.C., during which the Jews, after having first hailed as their messiah their Gentile liberator Cyrus the Achaemenid, had risen again and again, at the call of successive native Theudas and Judases, on the then forlorn hope of restoring an extinguished kingdom of David by force of Jewish arms. The orthodox Jewish converts to a Herzlian Zionism could also argue that, while a policy of quietism might, in adverse circumstances, be expedient, a policy of activism could never be impious, since another fundamental tenet of Judaism was a belief that God works within History and not outside it, and gives effect to His will in human affairs by acting through divinely inspired human agents. Yet, however cogent the *Mizrachi's* reply to the *Agudath* might be, there were difficulties in their position likewise.

These difficulties did not arise in regard to those Gentile militarists and empire-builders who, in Jewish belief, had been historic agents of the Almighty God of Israel; for, if these Gentiles had indeed played this role, they had been signally unaware of the mission which they were carrying out. The Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian, Seleucid, and Roman warlords, whose crushing military superiority might appear, to an unenlightened eye, to be the natural explanation of Israel's and Judah's calamities, remained naïvely ignorant of the bizarre fact that, in the sight of Jewish seers, they had been the unintentional and unconscious agents of a One True God¹ who had been employing them, without deigning to make them privy to His counsels, to punish His Chosen People for their sins with an eye to forgiving and restoring this Chosen People when a sufficient experience of suffering should have brought forth fruits meet for repentance² in Jewish hearts. There was no moral ambiguity or ambivalence in the role of an unintentional and unconscious agent of God's act of forgiveness and restoration, for which a Gentile Cyrus had been cast by a Jewish prophet;³ but what about the subsequent Jewish *soi-disant* messiahs who had claimed the allegiance of their fellow Jews on the pretension that they were the Lord's Anointed? How were their fellow Jews to discern whether these professed executors of God's will were truly inspired? And, even if they were not cynically fraudulent impostors, could they be acquitted of being presumptuously arrogant visionaries? Could they be held innocent of having taken the divine law into their own human hands? And was not this an act of presumption which was also an act of impiety? Was not the Lord's repudiation of their claim and disapproval of their action patently signified in the heaviness of the disasters which He had invariably allowed them to bring upon themselves and upon their deluded followers? And, if this had been God's judgement on the Theudas and Judases, who had never dreamed of disbelieving in God, and who had been prompted by a sincere though misguided desire to put God's will

¹ See V. vi. 123-6.

² Deutero-Isaiah xlv. 28 and xlv. 1-4.

³ Matt. iii. 8; cp. Luke iii. 8.

into effect by hastening the advent of a messianic kingdom which God had promised to Judah through His prophets, how was a God-fearing Jewry to reconcile itself with a secular Zionist movement that numbered agnostics among its leaders, and whose programme had been inspired, not by the messianic visions of post-Exilic Jewish prophets, but by the blue-prints of a Western Gentile Nationalism whose prophets had been a King Louis XI of France, a King Henry VII of England, and the Florentine publicist Niccolò Machiavelli?¹

These theological and moral difficulties in the ideology of Zionism were matched by its political awkwardness; for, in deliberately departing from the political quietism that had been Jewry's consistent practice for some sixty generations ending in A.D. 1897, it had abandoned a traditional Jewish attitude that had made Jewry's survival in diaspora possible by inspiring the Jews with an unquenchable hope without confronting the Jews' Gentile successors in Palestine with a standing menace. So long as the Jewish diaspora was content bona fide to leave the future of Palestine in the hands of God, the existing Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the Promised Land could afford to do likewise; and, when the orthodox Jewish doctrine of an eventual repatriation of Jewry to Palestine through an act of God was thus accompanied by a traditional Jewish practice of political quietism, the doctrine—like a derivative Christian doctrine of the Second Coming of Christ—could be interpreted in crude Machiavellian or Marxian terms as a psychological device, not for bringing to pass a 'far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves',² but for maintaining, *en attendant ad infinitum*, the social cohesion of a mundane community in diaspora.³ A worldly-minded member of the relatively prosperous latter-day Jewish diaspora in the Western World west of 'the Pale' might accordingly endorse, on grounds of present communal self-interest, a traditional belief which an unworldly-minded member of a still unemancipated Jewry in 'the Pale' would cherish as a corollary of his trust in God and his intuition that the true end of Man is to glorify and enjoy God for ever.

It will be seen that *Agudath Israel's* religious scruples and the Palestinian Arabs' political anxieties alike could have been reconciled with a latter-day Jewish nationalism *alla Franca* if the Zionists had decided to seek a site for the Jewish national state of their dreams, not in Palestine, but in some no-man's-land. In the first chapter of the history of Zionism this issue was an open question which was hotly contested. It was not till an offer of a site in East Africa had been made by the British Government on the 14th August, 1903, and been declined by the Seventh Zionist Congress in A.D. 1905⁴ that the die was irrevocably cast in favour of identifying the goal of latter-day Jewish nationalist en-

¹ See II. ii. 252-4 and V. vi. 216.

² Tennyson: *In Memoriam*, Conclusion, Stanza xxxvi.

³ A deeper and more convincing psychological interpretation of the Jewish and the Christian hope might be that both doctrines were myths, formulated in collective terms, of a spiritual pilgrim's progress through which it was open to the souls of individual human beings to return, with God's help, from an exile in the wilderness of Original Sin to a lost paradise of voluntary concordance with the will of their Creator.

⁴ See Sokolow, N.: *History of Zionism, 1600-1918* (London 1919, Longmans Green, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 296-7; Stein, L.: *Zionism* (London 1925, Benn), pp. 94-95.

deavours with the Palestinian *qiblah* of the traditional Jewish religious hope. This fateful decision was not dictated *a priori* by the orthodox Jewish tradition. In the hyper-orthodox eyes of *Agudath Israel*, a Political Zionism that had selected the historical Zion as its objective had indeed, as we have seen, thereby rendered itself guilty of impiety. The preference for Palestine over East Africa was prompted by the spirit of the exotic Gentile ideology to which the Zionist Jews had succumbed; for the *éthos* of this Modern Western Nationalism was inveterately archaistic,¹ and, in opting for Palestine in A.D. 1903-5, the Zionists were acting under the inspiration of a Western Gentile Romantic Movement which had previously captivated the Gentile peoples round about them.²

Archaism, as we have seen in another context,³ is always a perilous pursuit, but it is most perilous of all when it is taken up by members of a community that is a fossil relic of a dead civilization, since the Past to which the archaists have it in their power to cast back in such a case may be more sharply at variance with present realities than even the remotest past state of a society belonging to the living generation of the species. A Western-inspired archaism carried the twentieth-century Zionist faction of a Jewish diaspora back to the aims and *éthos* of the generation of Joshua; and the consequent replacement of the traditional Jewish hope of an eventual restoration of Israel to Palestine on God's initiative, through the agency of a divinely inspired Messiah, by a Zionist Movement, working to establish a Jewish national state in Palestine on Jewry's initiative by mundane political and military means, had the same explosive effect as the contemporary replacement of the traditional Christian hope of an eventual millennium to be inaugurated at the Second Coming of Christ by a Communist Movement working to establish a mundane new dispensation by means of a world revolution.

'When ye shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the Prophet, standing where it ought not (let him that readeth understand), then let them that be in Judaea flee to the mountains. . . . For in those days shall be affliction, such as was not from the beginning of the creation which God created unto this time.'⁴

The Effects of the First World War on the Destiny of Palestine

The calamities which inexorably overtook the Jews in Continental Europe and the Arabs in Palestine in the twentieth century of the Christian Era were indeed implicit in the decision taken in the nineteenth century by a section of the Jewish diaspora in the West when they adopted a programme of collective Westernization on the lines of the archaistically oriented Modern Western ideal of Nationalism. Yet the rise of a Zionist Movement whose objective was a Jewish national state in Palestine would not in itself have been capable of producing

¹ The influence of this vein of Archaism in aggravating a Modern Western Nationalism's devastating effect on the lives of its Ottoman Orthodox Christian converts has been noticed on p. 191, n. 2, above.

² 'Zionism, in defiance of common-sense but in obedience to a deep-seated instinct, declared itself once and for all a movement concerned wholly and solely with Palestine' (Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 95).

³ In V. vi. 49-97.

⁴ Mark xiii. 14 and 19; Matt. xxiv. 15 and 21; Dan. xi. 31 and xii. 11.

these tragic effects if a Gentile Western Society had not fallen into a succession of world wars, precipitated by the indigenous nationalism of the Gentile Western peoples, for which neither Arabs nor Jews were responsible. The outbreak of the First World War struck the fatal spark that ignited a fortuitously laid train of gunpowder.

The first link in a concatenation of inauspicious events was the break-up of the Ottoman Empire in Asia as a consequence of its intervention in the war of A.D. 1914-18 on what proved to be the losing side. Under the Ottoman dispensation the Arab population of Palestine had been insured against becoming the victims of Zionist ambitions to their detriment thanks to the fact that the Muslim majority of the Palestinian Arabs was part of the dominant Muslim community in an empire whose integrity in Asia had hitherto been preserved substantially intact by an interplay between the Ottoman Muslims' collective strength and an international balance of power.¹ Ever since the political control of Palestine had passed out of Christian into Muslim hands as a result of the Primitive Muslim Arab conquest in the seventh century of the Christian Era, Jews had been free to resort to, and reside in, Palestine for the purpose of religious exercises and studies; and since A.D. 1882 the Ottoman Government had allowed the Zionists to found agricultural settlements in the Palestinian country-side on a scale that was modest enough to avoid the provocation of any alarm or resentment among the Arab inhabitants of the country.² This Ottoman safeguard to the rights and interests of the Palestinian Arabs was removed by the overthrow of the Ottoman imperial régime.

The antecedent overthrow of the Romanov imperial régime in Russia—likewise in consequence of defeat in the war of A.D. 1914-18—had already removed another of the Palestinian Arabs' safeguards; for, down to A.D. 1914, the Russian people had continued to follow in large numbers the traditional Christian practice—long since almost obsolete in the West—of going on pilgrimage to the Holy Land, and the Russian Imperial Government—which had identified itself with the Antisemitism of the Western or semi-Westernized Christian majority in the population of the former United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania since the lion's share of this vast area had become 'the Jewish Pale' of the Russian Empire—had been intransigent in vetoing any inclination on the part of its Western allies to grant satisfaction to Zionist aspirations in Palestine,

¹ This Ottoman insurance policy had cost the Muslim majority of the Palestinian Arabs an expensive premium in the shape of military conscription into an Ottoman Army in which the rate of mortality—from disease even more than from hostilities—had been cruelly high. The Palestinian Arabs' subsequent fate suggested that it had been worth their while to pay even this price for the preservation of their existence.

² The flow of Jewish emigration from 'the Pale' into Palestine between A.D. 1882 and A.D. 1914 was a mere trickle compared to 'the immense stream which flowed into the expanding centres of the World's industry [in the Western countries]' (Parkes, J.: *The Jewish Problem in the Modern World*, 1st American ed. (New York 1946, Oxford University Press), p. 66). By the time of the outbreak of war in A.D. 1914, there were fifty-nine Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine with an aggregate population of twelve or thirteen thousand. (See the list in Nawratzki, K.: *Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas* (Munich 1914, Reinhardt), Anlage 18. The figures of inhabitants given in this table add up to only 10,105, but the figures for seven settlements are missing.) The total Jewish population of Palestine at the same date numbered about 80,000, out of about 750,000 Palestinians of all faiths.

on the ground that the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish national state would desecrate a Holy Land which still meant to Russians all that it had once meant to other Christians likewise. The Tsardom fell on the 12th March, 1917; the Balfour Declaration was issued on the 2nd November of the same year.

Another political factor which the First World War brought into play was a competition between the belligerents in courting the sympathy of Jewry. To win Jewish support—and, still more, to avert Jewish hostility—was an object of great moment to both sides; for, imperfect though the psychological emancipation of the Jewish diaspora in the West may still have been at this date, their economic and political emancipation had already gone far enough to give Jewry's suffrages a substantial and perhaps decisive weight in a trembling Western balance of international power. The Jews were now an appreciable force in the domestic political life of the Central and the Western European Powers alike, and of the United States to a still greater degree; and the feelings of the American Jewish community loomed large in the calculations of European belligerents who had come to realize that the United States would have the last word to speak in a European conflict and that this American last word might be influenced appreciably by the views of Jewish American citizens.

In the course of the thirty-six years ending in A.D. 1917 the Jews throughout the World had come, with good reason, to look upon Russia as being Jewry's 'Enemy Number One', and, in the First World War, Germany, as the protagonist on the anti-Russian side whose victorious arms had liberated a large part of 'the Pale' from an Antisemitic Russian rule, stood to gain those world-wide Jewish sympathies which the West European Powers stood to lose as Russia's allies. After the German Army had pushed the Russian Army back in A.D. 1915 to a line approximating to the Russo-Polish political frontier of A.D. 1793, the German General Staff gave American Jewish journalists opportunities of seeing with their own eyes how the Russians had found vent for their rage at their shattering defeat at German hands by discharging it on an innocent and defenceless Jewish population in the territory that they had been forced to evacuate. For the West European Powers—and for the United States likewise, as soon as she became their co-belligerent—it was a matter of urgency to outmatch this card which Germany had acquired through conquering 'the Pale', and a trump card had been placed in their hands by a British conquest of Palestine which put it in their power to offer satisfaction to Zionist aspirations. The Western Powers were tantalizingly inhibited from playing this Palestinian card so long as they had any hope of keeping their Antisemitic Russian partner in the firing-line; and it is no wonder that the Balfour Declaration was published as soon as the last Western hopes of further Russian military collaboration had expired.

Great Britain's Responsibility for the Catastrophe in Palestine

In taking a measure so well calculated to help them to win a war in which they were fighting for their lives, it is comprehensible that the

Western Powers should not have looked ahead beyond the hoped-for achievement of victory. They were less blameworthy for making dubious commitments concerning Palestine to Jews and Arabs while the First World War was still being fought than they were for shirking their consequent duty, in the subsequent interval of peace, to face the equivocal situation which they had created in Palestine under the stress of a world war and to liquidate it at the earliest possible date with the least possible injury and injustice to the parties to whom their war-time commitments had been made. The Western Power that bore the lion's share of the responsibility for the inter-war failure to retrieve the position in Palestine was Great Britain, who, first as Occupying Power and then as Mandatory, was conducting the administration of Palestine from A.D. 1917 to A.D. 1948.

Throughout those crucial thirty years the British attitude—common to all parties and adopted by successive ministries—was one of culpably wilful blindness.¹ The Palestine which the British had conquered from the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1917-18 was a province of an Ottoman World in which mixed populations had been exploding, with a fearful cost in human suffering, ever since the extermination of the Muslim diaspora in the Morea by Greek Orthodox Christian insurgents in A.D. 1821.² Even British statesmen who were ignorant of nineteenth-century Ottoman history could not be unaware of the fate that had overtaken the Armenian diaspora in Anatolia in A.D. 1915; and, after that portent in this adjacent Ottoman territory had failed to deter the British from embarking in Palestine on the deliberate creation of a new explosive mixture of mutually incompatible national ingredients, the fate that overtook the Greek diaspora in Anatolia in A.D. 1922 might still have counselled them to reconsider the Balfour Declaration before it was too late. A third warning was given them by the explosion that inevitably followed in Palestine itself in A.D. 1929. Yet, in spite of these awful object lessons, British statesmanship doggedly kept Palestine headed for manifest disaster while the local situation went from bad to worse until it got completely out of hand as a result of the advent of the Nazis to power in Germany, their unprecedentedly inhuman persecution of the Jews in the Reich, and the extension of this campaign of 'genocide' to the rest of Continental Europe after the outbreak of a Second World War in A.D. 1939.

From first to last, there was never a practicable plan in British minds for peacefully stabilizing the explosively unstable situation in Palestine which Britain had deliberately created. The British Government did not attempt to stabilize even the respective numbers of the Arab and Jewish elements in the population until the Jewish minority had been allowed to become so large—'approaching a third of the entire population of the country'³—that there was no longer any chance of its being willing to remain a minority in a bi-national state and no longer any possibility of such a state, if ever constituted on paper, finding it possible to govern itself through the Western institution of majority rule.⁴

¹ See p. 290, n. 2, above.

² See pp. 190-2, above.

³ United Kingdom Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 6019 of the 17th May, 1939, para. 6.

⁴ See p. 305, n. 4, below.

Though the Mandatory Power's official apologists might offer juridical proofs that British promises to Jews and Arabs in respect of Palestine were not formally incompatible, it would have been difficult to argue that the undeniably incompatible expectations which had been engendered by these British promises in Jewish and in Arab minds were not legitimate inferences, on their part, from the British declarations.¹ Whatever an official British spokesman might say, or the Jewish Agency profess, during the earlier phases of the mandatory régime, it was psychologically impossible to promise the establishment in Palestine of 'a national home' for the Jewish people—specifically including the facilitation of Jewish immigration and the encouragement of close settlement by Jews on the land—without encouraging Zionists to look forward to the establishment there of a Jewish national state, notwithstanding the stipulation in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate that the rights and position of other sections of the population should not be prejudiced, and likewise impossible to promise 'the development of self-governing institutions'² to a country in which the Arab element in the population was in an overwhelming majority, at the time when the mandate was conferred and the terms of the mandate were worked out,³ without encouraging Palestinian Arabs to look forward to the establishment in Palestine of an Arab national state, notwithstanding the stipulation in the Mandate, as well as in the Balfour Declaration, requiring the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish 'national home'.

The object lesson of Turco-Greek and Turco-Armenian relations during a century culminating in the two catastrophes of A.D. 1915 and A.D. 1922 confuted in advance the Mandatory Power's official pious belief that the mandatory régime would somehow miraculously save Great Britain's honour by engendering one day a self-governing bi-national Arab-Jewish Palestinian state.⁴ In a memorandum of the 3rd

¹ In the United Kingdom Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 6019 of the 17th May, 1939, para. 3, the Mandatory Power confessed that 'the Royal Commission [of A.D. 1936-7] and previous commissions of enquiry' had 'drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression "a national home for the Jewish people", and that they had "found in this ambiguity and in the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews."'

² Mandate for Palestine, Article 2.

³ The mandate for Palestine was conferred on Great Britain on the 25th April, 1920, by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers during the Conference of San Remo; the final text of the instrument in which the mandate was embodied was dated the 24th July, 1922; the mandate officially came into force on the 29th September, 1923. According to a census taken by the Mandatory Power on the 23rd October, 1922, there were in Palestine on that date 671,098 Arabs (including Matāwīlāh, Druses, and Christians, as well as Sunnis), 83,794 Jews, and 2,290 others (Samaritans, Bahā'īs, Hindus, Sikhs) in a total population of 757,182 (Palestine Government: *Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922*, p. 58). On this showing, the Arab majority in the population of Palestine amounted to nearly 90 per cent. of the whole at the date when the second article of the Mandate for Palestine was drafted.

⁴ At as late a date as the 17th May, 1939, when the hands of the clock of History were indicating the approach of the eleventh hour, the United Kingdom Government were still declaring that, apart from their specific obligation under the Mandate 'to secure the development of self-governing institutions in Palestine', 'they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under mandatory tutelage'. Yet, in the same paragraph of the same state paper (Cmd. 6019 of 1939, para. 8), they found themselves constrained to confess that, while they desired 'to see established ultimately an independent Palestine state . . . in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews', could 'share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each' would be 'secured', they

June, 1922, Sir Winston Churchill, as British Secretary of State for the Colonies, had the hardihood to commit himself to the opinion that the Balfour Declaration did 'not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews'. The harsh truth was that, in issuing the Balfour Declaration and subsequently undertaking a mandate for Palestine in which its terms were embodied, Great Britain was condemning one or other of the two communities concerned to suffer a fearful catastrophe in the same breath in which she was undertaking to make herself responsible 'for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion'.

In the light of sensational events in adjacent Ottoman territories it could be predicted with assurance after A.D. 1915, and with double assurance after A.D. 1922, that the mandatory régime in Palestine would end in the death or eviction or subjugation of hundreds of thousands of human beings. The only open question was whether these non-divinely predestined victims were to be Arab or Jewish men, women, and children; and the denouement in A.D. 1948-9 bore out the contentions made in the Arab reply to the Churchill memorandum of A.D. 1922. It was incontestable that, during the thirty years ending in the terminal date of the British mandatory régime in A.D. 1948, the three hundred thousand Jewish immigrants introduced into Palestine in the course of that period entered the country 'by the might of England against the will of the people, who' were 'convinced that these' had 'come to strangle them';¹ and the event proved that this British action did in truth mean the Palestinian Arabs' 'extinction sooner or later', in spite of the clear undertaking in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate that nothing should be done that might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

Germany's and the United States' Responsibility for the Catastrophe in Palestine

The perversely predestined catastrophe in Palestine in A.D. 1948 was precipitated by three events. The first of these was the rise of the Jewish

were 'unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine' would 'eventually take' and (para. 10(v)) were making 'no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature'.

¹ According to the United Kingdom Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 6019 of the 17th May, 1939, para. 6, more than 300,000 Jews had immigrated into Palestine by that date since the publication of the Churchill memorandum of the 3rd June, 1922, and the population of the Jewish national home had risen to some 450,000 (nearly a third of the total population of the country). According to the Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract, 1943* (Jerusalem 1944, Government Printing Press), p. 3, the period 1922 to 1942 saw a total increase of 400,618 in the Jewish population of Palestine, from 83,790 to 484,408 (29.9 per cent. of the total population of the country), and, of these 400,618 additional Jewish souls, no less than 305,803 were immigrants and no more than 94,815 were the fruit of natural increase. The total increase in the number of the Palestinian Muslims during the same period was 406,115; of these, no less than 386,100 were the fruit of natural increase (thanks to the cessation of Ottoman military conscription and the improvement in public health under a British mandatory régime); and, of the 20,015 souls, out of these 406,115, that were added to the Muslim population of Palestine during these years from sources other than natural increase, no more than 10,315 were immigrants; for 9,700 of them were inhabitants of districts transferred to Palestine from the Lebanon and Syria in A.D. 1923.

community in the United States, subsequently to the Jewish influx from the Russian Pale in and after A.D. 1881,¹ to a degree of economic and political power in American life at which the Jewish vote had become a force in the arena of American domestic politics for whose support the two party machines must eagerly compete, and which therefore neither of them could afford to alienate. The second decisive event was the 'genocide' of the Jewish diaspora in Continental Europe at German Gentile hands in A.D. 1933-45; the third was the outbreak of 'a cold war' between the Soviet Union and the United States after the overthrow of Fascism by the united efforts of Western Parliamentary Democracy and Communism in the Second World War. None of these events had any intrinsic connexion with the issue between Jews and Arabs in Palestine,² yet, between them, they had an effect that was as decisive as it was untoward and inequitable on the course of this act in the tragedy.

There was neither justice nor expediency in the exaction from Palestinian Arabs of compensation due to European Jews for crimes committed against them by Western Gentiles. Justice required that the debt to Continental European Jewry which the Western World had incurred through the criminality of a Western nation should be assumed by a defeated Germany's victorious Western adversaries; and expediency pointed in the same direction as justice; for the victorious Western countries between them did possess the capacity—for which Palestine's resources were quite inadequate—of absorbing the European Jewish survivors of the *Furor Teutonicus* without seriously deranging their own domestic social equilibrium. On the 15th December, 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization duly urged each of its members to receive its fair share of non-repatriable persons for permanent resettlement in its territory at the earliest possible time,³ but this resolution was not welcomed either by the Jewish diaspora in the United States or by the Zionists. The American Jews may have been moved partly by the self-regarding consideration that even a moderate further increase in their own numbers might prejudice their already delicate relations with their Gentile fellow citizens, and the makers of Zionist policy partly by a callous determination to turn the personal tribulations of European Jewry to account for the promotion of Zionist political aims in Palestine. Whatever the mixture of Jewish motives may have been, Jewry made it clear that it had set its heart on a Jewish national state in Palestine as an asylum for the remnant of the European diaspora; and thereupon the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, and the United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations Organization, vied with one another in contending for Jewish support by displaying a competitive zeal for furthering the fulfilment of

¹ See pp. 292 and 294, above.

² The rise and character of the National Socialist Movement in Germany and the inauguration and terms of the Mandate in Palestine were, of course, indirectly connected with one another in the sense that both the Mandate and National Socialism were outcomes of the defeat of the Quadruple Alliance in the First World War; but this rather tenuous ultimate common origin was the only relation between them.

³ United Nations: *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, 23rd October-15th December, 1946* (Lake Success 1947, U.N.O.), Resolution No. 62(1), para. (e), on p. 98.

Jewish aspirations, as Great Britain and Germany had contended for Jewish support in the likewise critical years A.D. 1915-17.

Realpolitik—in the twofold form of a competition for the winning of Jewish support both in the international struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the domestic struggle between the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States—was not, of course, the only motive that moved America to relieve Great Britain unceremoniously of as much of the blood-guiltiness for the tragedy in Palestine as she could manage at this late hour to transfer from the ex-Mandatory Power's head on to her own.¹ The American approach to the Palestinian problem was, on the whole, less Machiavellian than it was Quixotic.² While the Arab victims of the Palestinian tragedy were invisible to most American eyes, the Jewish victims of the European tragedy were brought alive to Gentile American imaginations by the prominence in the United States of a Jewish diaspora which had no Arab counterpart there; and this vivid realization of the European Jews' sufferings smote Gentile American consciences—mainly, no doubt, because those sufferings had been inflicted by the American Gentiles' German *soi-disant* fellow Christians, and partly perhaps also because the American Gentiles were uneasily aware of a repressed yet unconscionable vein of Antisemitism in their own hearts.

President Truman's personal susceptibility to this popular American confusion of mind and mixture of motives might go far to explain presidential interventions in the Palestinian imbroglio which would have been utterly cynical if they had not been partially innocent-minded. The Missourian politician-philanthropist's eagerness to combine expediency with charity by assisting the wronged and suffering Jews would appear to have been untempered by any sensitive awareness that he was thereby abetting the infliction of wrongs and sufferings on the Arabs; and his excursions into the stricken field in Palestine reminded a reader of the *Fioretti di San Francesco* of the tragi-comic exploit there attributed to the impetuously tender-hearted Brother Juniper, who, according to the revealing tale, was so effectively moved by a report of the alimentary needs of an invalid that he rushed, knife in hand, into a wood full of unoffending pigs, and straightway cut off a live pig's trotter to provide his ailing fellow human being with the dish that his soul desired, without noticing that he was leaving the mutilated animal writhing in agony and without pausing to reflect that his innocent victim was not either the invalid's property or his own.³ It must be added that the American repetition of this story included a sequel that was not to be found in the Italian original. In the *Fioretti* there is no indication that the sufferings of the victim of a holy man's impulsive charity excited any human pity—

¹ For a British observer, this spectacle had the grim humour of the denouement of R. L. Stevenson's fantasia *The Bottle Imp*, in which the vial of wrath is eventually carried off unconcernedly by the mate of an American ship.

² This characteristically 'Anglo-Saxon' attitude of combining an unavowed yet patent Machiavellianism with a suspect yet sincere Quixotry was displayed as grotesquely by the British in and after the First World War as by the Americans after the Second World War in the Palestinian policy of these two great English-speaking peoples.

³ *Fioretti di San Francesco d'Assisi*: 'Vita di Frate Ginepro', cap. 1: 'Come Frate Ginepro tagliò il Piede ad uno Porco solo per darlo a uno Infermo'.

for, when the owner of the unfortunate animal did eventually slaughter it, he was concerned, not to put a suffering creature out of its misery, but to atone, by making a feast for Brother Juniper and his brethren, for his own ungodly indignation at the damage done to his property—whereas, in the annals of the United Nations Organization, it is recorded that the United States Government took the initiative in relieving the plight of some 684,000 Palestinian Arab 'displaced persons' by providing half the total sum that was estimated to be necessary for purposes of first aid to these human victims of 'Anglo-Saxon attitudes'.

The Retrospect and the Outlook

The consequent situation in Palestine was fraught with geographical, historical, and psychological paradoxes. The one substantial piece of Palestinian territory west of Jordan which the Zionist State of Israel had not engulfed by the time in A.D. 1949 when Jewish-Arab hostilities in Palestine were suspended was the Hill Country of Ephraim, which had been the historic Israel's first Palestinian foothold and their Samaritan legatees' last Palestinian stronghold. The core of the Zionist State's territory was the *ci-devant* land of the Philistines in the Shephelah, which had never before been colonized by an Israelite or Jewish population and which, during the thirteen centuries for which Philistines and Israelites had lived in Palestine side by side,¹ had not even been united politically with Ephraim or Judah save for a few brief periods, at long intervals, of Philistine rule over Israel or Jewish rule over Philistia. On its two flanks the Zionist Philistia Rediviva was reaching inland with its left arm into 'Galilee of the Gentiles', which had been forcibly converted to Judaism less than a century before the beginning of the Christian Era, and with its right arm into the Negeb in the track of the Philistines' Cherethite fellow invaders who had anticipated the Zionists in heading for 'Aqabah'.² In A.D. 1949, as in A.D. 135 and A.D. 70 and 586 B.C. and 721 B.C. and 732 B.C., a Palestinian community, uprooted from its native soil by a military and political tornado, was facing the challenge of being scattered abroad among the nations in order to show whether it would have the spirit to preserve its identity in diaspora like Judah or would vanish like Israel; but these twentieth-century Palestinian *déracinés* were Gentiles, not Jews, while the invaders who had uprooted them were Jews, not Gentiles. These geographical and historical paradoxes were the effects of a psychological paradox that far surpassed them.

The paradox of Zionism was that, in its demonic effort to build a community that was to be utterly Jewish, it was working as effectively for the assimilation of Jewry to a Western Gentile World as the individual Jew who opted for becoming a Western bourgeois 'of Jewish religion' or a Western bourgeois agnostic. The historic Jewry was the diaspora, and the distinctively Jewish *éthos* and institutions—a meticulous devotion to the Mosaic Law and a consummate virtuosity in commerce and finance—were those which the diaspora, in the course of ages, had

¹ i.e. from an early date in the twelfth century B.C. to A.D. 135.

² See VI. vii. 102, n. 1, and p. 358, n. 1, below.

wrought into social talismans endowing this geographically scattered community with a magic capacity for survival. For good or for evil, by the common consent of all first-hand witnesses, including Gentiles who were fascinated by it and Jews who were repelled by it, this masterly adaptation to a diasporan environment was the essence of 'Jewishness' in the universally accepted historical meaning of the term. Latter-day Jewish Westernizers of the Liberal and the Zionist school alike were breaking with this historic Jewish past; and Zionism's significant difference from Liberalism lay in making the breach more drastic.

In deserting the diaspora individually in order to lose himself in the ranks of a Modern Western Gentile urban bourgeoisie, the Liberal Jew was assimilating himself to a Gentile social milieu that had previously gone far, on its side, to assimilate itself socially and psychologically to the Jewish diaspora; in deserting the diaspora collectively in order to build up a new nation, closely settled on the land, on the trail of the Modern Western Protestant Christian pioneers who had created the United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, the Zionists were assimilating themselves to a Gentile social milieu which had no counterpart in the life of a post-Exilic Jewry, and whose own inspiration from the Old Testament was derived, not from Isaiah any more than it was from Deutero-Isaiah, but from the Books of Joshua and Exodus.¹

The Zionists' audacious aim was to invert, in a new life of their own making, all the distinctively Jewish characteristics enshrined in the diaspora's traditional life. They set out defiantly and enthusiastically to turn themselves into manual labourers instead of brain workers, country-folk instead of city-dwellers, producers instead of middlemen, agriculturists instead of financiers, warriors instead of shopkeepers, terrorists instead of martyrs, aggressively spirited Semites instead of peaceably abject non-Aryans; and this Nietzschean revaluation of all traditional Jewish values, for destruction as well as for construction, for evil as well as for good, was directed towards the horizon-filling narrow-hearted aim of making themselves sons of a latter-day Eretz Israel in Palestine that was to be 'as Jewish as' England 'was English',² instead of remaining the

¹ The sanction derived by Bible-Christian supplanters of American Indians, African Bantu, and Australian Blackfellows from the Israelites' biblically recorded conviction that God had instigated them to exterminate the Canaanites has been noticed in II. i. 211-27. We may now go on to observe that the divers Neo-Canaanites victimized by the divers Neo-Israelites were not all equally tractable. Fortune perhaps rather than foresight had provided the British Israelite invaders of North America and Australia with local Canaanites who were sufficiently feeble and few to allow of their being rapidly reduced to a residue which could be parked in reservations. The South African Dutch Israelites' Bantu Canaanites, the British Israelites' 'Wild Irish' Canaanites, and the Prussian Israelites' Polish Canaanites could not be disposed of either so expeditiously or so conveniently as the North American Indians and the Australian Blackfellows. The Bantu's primitive feebleness in culture was made up for by their strength in numbers, and the numerical weakness of the Poles and the Irish by their inheritance of a high culture. The Zionist Israelites' Arab Canaanites combined the cultural strength of the Irish and the Poles with the numerical strength of the Bantu. The Palestinian Arabs were heirs of the Arabic Civilization and members of an Arabic-speaking society whose geographical domain stretched away beyond the bounds of Palestine as far as Mosul, Morocco, Zanzibar, and Java. The Arabs would, in fact, be almost as difficult to wipe off the map as the Chinese or the Hindus.

² A phrase quoted by Sir Winston Churchill in his memorandum of the 3rd June, 1922 (see p. 296, n. 3, above).

step-sons of a New York, London, Manchester, and Frankfort that were not more Jewish than Bombay was Parsee or Ispahan Armenian.

Within the thirty years A.D. 1918-48 the Zionist pioneers in Palestine duly achieved this almost incredible *tour de force* of minting a fresh type of Jew in whom the child of the diasporà was no longer recognizable. The image and superscription on this new human coinage was not Hillel's but Caesar's. The Janus-figure—part American farmer-technician, part Nazi *sicarius*—was of a characteristically Western stamp. Yet, while a collective Westernization in a Modern Western nationalist mould was the Zionists' triumphantly achieved objective, the lode-stone that had drawn them so forcefully to the Westernizing goal that they had reached through a feat of left-handed self-transfiguration was 'the real presence' of the Holy Land. To judge by the unquestionable potency of this psychological factor in enabling the Zionist pioneers to accomplish what they did accomplish in Palestine in this generation, we may surmise that the annals of Zionism would have been less dynamic, and the entries against its name in the Book of Judgement less deeply scored on both sides of the account, if the scene of Zionist exploits had been an East African Arcadia and not a Palestinian Phlegra. Yet this mystical feeling for an historical Eretz Israel, which inspired the Zionist pioneers with the spiritual power to move mountains, was entirely derived from a diasporan orthodox theology that convicted the Zionists of an importunity which verged upon impiety in their attempt to take out of God's hands the fulfilment of God's promise to restore Israel to Palestine on God's own initiative.

What judgement on the secular Zionist substitute for the diasporà's religious hope would be delivered by the mind of an orthodox Jewish devotee while he was wailing at the retaining-wall of an annihilated Temple as a testimony of Israel's contrition and as an appeal to God to hasten the promised time when He would show a penitent Israel his mercy by restoring Israel to Palestine in God's own way? And what action would a Zionist Israeli Ministry of the Interior instruct its police to take against a Jew who persisted in wailing after Israel had been restored by force of Zionist human arms? Would this traditional Jewish religious rite be proscribed by Zionist political authorities as a provocative act of high treason—constructively a pro-Arab demonstration—against the accomplished fact of a profanely man-made Palestinian Zionist State?¹

The practical achievement of the Zionist Movement's political aims had in fact brought a new Jewish problem on to the stage of history. The familiar issue between Jew and Gentile would be duplicated henceforth by an at first sight novel issue between an old-fashioned Syriac-minded Jewish diasporà in the United States and a new-fangled Western-minded Jewish nation in Palestine. The metamorphosis which Zionism had induced in its adherents clinched the demonstration—already implicit in the un-Jewishness of the *éthos* of the surviving 'Jews in Fastnesses'²—that Jewishness, in the accepted historical meaning of the

¹ A prudent Jewish wailer would stay on the Jordanian side of the line by which Jerusalem was now partitioned.

² See II. ii. 402-12.

term, was not the indelible brand of a particular physico-psychic race but was the plastic impress of a particular psychological response to a particular social challenge. Within the span of a single generation the different response to a different challenge that had been made by the Zionist pioneers in Palestine had produced a striking differentiation of *êthos* and type;¹ and this was not, after all, a unique occurrence. In a neighbouring province of the Ottoman World in the course of the century that had elapsed between the establishment of a Greek national state in A.D. 1821-29 and the extermination of the Ottoman Greek diasporà in A.D. 1922, the 'Yunāni' citizens of a new Westernizing Kingdom of Greece had likewise become noticeably differentiated from their former fellow members of a Millet-i-Rûm who had continued to be *ra'îyeh* of the Porte. In the measure in which the citizens of a Zionist Israeli state succeeded in assimilating themselves collectively to contemporary American and German Gentiles, they would become progressively alienated from the members of a Western Jewish diasporà from which the Zionist Israel had sprung. The issue arising from this estrangement between a traditional Jewry and its changeling offspring might prove to be a difficult one, since, even after its extermination in Continental Europe, the diasporà remained several times more numerous, and many times more wealthy, than a Palestinian Israeli nation could ever hope to become. Indeed, for as far as could be seen ahead, the financial and political sympathy and support of the Jewish diasporà in the United States would continue to be a Palestinian Israel's life-line; and it remained to be seen for how long a time these generous foreign subscribers to Israel, who, besides being Jews, were also American citizens, would remain content to submit to 'taxation without representation'.

In its diminutiveness, its fanaticism, and its Ishmaelitish enmity with its neighbours the new Zionist Israel in Palestine was a reproduction of the Modern Western national state that, in its faithfulness, verged on being a parody; and it was a misfortune, for both Jewry and the World, that this statelet—begotten of so much idealism, self-sacrifice, crime, injustice, and suffering—should have seen the light at a moment when it might be hoped that the species of community of which this was the youngest member was at last approaching its eclipse. This hope could be cherished mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era because a Modern Western Nationalism was an archaistic throw-back to a rustic parochial past state of the Western Society which was being stamped as an untenable anachronism, at the very time when it was being revived, by the simultaneous flowering of a Modern Western technology which was expanding the range of Western life in all its aspects from a parochial to an oecumenical scale.²

On the morrow of a Second World War the existing national states, from the smallest to the largest, were striving—with a futile obstinacy which they might have spared themselves if they had taken to heart the object lesson once contrived by King Canute—to keep at bay the ocean

¹ See Simon, E.: 'What Price Israel's "Normalcy"?' in *Commentary*, April 1949 (New York 1949, American Jewish Committee).

² See IV. iv. 169 and 179-80.

of oecumenicalism that the roaring gale of technological progress was driving against their frail and tortuous dykes. They were piling exchange-controls on customs-barriers, immigration-restrictions on exchange-controls, and police-cordons on immigration-restrictions, without a prospect of being able to do more than vexatiously delay the irresistible progress of a tide that was carrying human affairs towards world unity. The antiquated patch-work of ghetto-like nation-states, which the airman still saw flickering below him on the face of a rapidly coalescing World, was assuredly destined to be submerged under a flood whose surface would show the shot-silk sheen of communities—scattered Jewish-fashion—that had come to be geographically intermingled without losing their distinctive identities. In a World that had been unified by Western technology in spite of itself, the institutional future seemed likely to lie far less with the Western institution of the national state than with the Syriac institution of the millet; and, while the architects of a constitution for the World might find useful ideas for the construction of their basement in the work of the fathers of the Constitution of the United States, the classic organization of the millet system in the Ottoman Empire by the genius of Mehmed the Conqueror might prove to be a more fruitful source of inspiration for the design of the living-rooms in this promised house of many mansions.¹

6. *The Modern West and the Far Eastern and Indigenous American Civilizations*

The Perils of Ignorance

The living civilizations whose encounters with the Modern West we have been surveying up to this point have all been societies that were within close range of the Western Society's radiation; and all of them had already had experience of the Western Society before they began to be affected by the impact of the Western culture in its modern phase. The Jewish diaspora had been geographically intermingled with the Western body social since Western Christendom's first emergence out of a post-Hellenic social interregnum, and even the Hindu World had been brought into touch with the West through Muslim intermediaries before the Modern Western pioneers of oceanic navigation established a direct contact with the Hindus by outflanking the Islamic World on the south through their circumnavigation of Africa. By contrast, the existence of the West was still quite unknown to the Transatlantic civilizations in the New World, and all but unknown to the Far Eastern civilizations in China and Japan, down to the moment when the Modern Western pioneer navigators impinged on these more remote societies likewise in the course of an oceanic exploration of the surface of the planet which took barely half a century (*circa* A.D. 1492–1542)² to range almost as widely as the ubiquitous Ocean itself.

¹ A comment by Dr. James Parkes on this judgement of the present writer's will be found on pp. 706–7, below.

² Japan, which was the last new world to be discovered by the Western oceanic pioneers during their half-century of world-wide exploration, was reached by the Portuguese in A.D. 1542–3. The *Teppo-ki*, a chronicle written in Satsuma between the years A.D. 1596 and A.D. 1614, gives the 23rd September, 1543, as the date of the first

This ignorance explains the reason for the apparently paradoxical fact that the remoter civilizations showed, at the first encounter, a greater readiness to open their arms to the Modern West than was shown at the time by the Modern West's better informed next-door neighbours. For the Far East and for the New World the Modern West had the attractiveness of novelty; and the curiosity which the advent of the Western 'Martians' aroused there was not tempered by any pre-existing hostility or even suspicion. On the other hand in Jewish, Eastern Orthodox Christian, and Muslim hearts and minds the dominant reaction to the impact of the Modern West was not an innocently unsuspecting curiosity but a sceptically watchful aversion implanted by lively and painful memories of a previous encounter with the same Western Christendom in the medieval phase of its history.¹ These neighbours of the West remembered her, since the time of the Crusades, as a militantly aggressive society whose aggressiveness had been aggravated by a fanatical zeal to impose on all Mankind her local Western version of Christianity. Accordingly, all these neighbours of the West continued to keep her at arm's length so long as the fire of fanaticism was still showing its baleful red light over the Western horizon.

The first effect of the internal explosion which fractured the medieval unity of the Western Christian Church in the second generation of the modern phase of Western history was to raise still higher the already high temperature of the Western religious furnace; and, while Catholic and Protestant Modern Western Christians were directing part of their fire against one another in the Early Modern Western Wars of Religion, this fratricidal strife still left an ample margin of Western bigotry to spare for indulging a still unabated intolerance towards non-Western religious faiths. The neighbouring societies accordingly bided their time till the inconclusive destructiveness of the Western Wars of Religion had reduced the temperature of Western fanaticism by evoking a revulsion against Religion itself in Western hearts and minds; and, as we have seen, the reception of the Modern Western culture by Jews, Orthodox Christians, and Muslims did not begin until this alien Western way of life was able to offer itself to them in a secularized form—with Technology enthroned in Religion's former place at the apex of the Western pyramid of values—as the result of a momentous spiritual revolution within the bosom of the Western Society itself during the later decades of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era. Less prudence in dealing with the importunate Western stranger at the gate was shown by the Far Eastern and indigenous American civilizations. So far from waiting for the abatement of a Western religious fanaticism of which they had not been forewarned by any past experience of it, they laid themselves open to the impact of the West in its Early Modern phase, when its traditional religious aggressiveness was still in the ascendant.

In the first half of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, when the ocean-faring Westerners first appeared above their horizon, these four

Portuguese landfall in Japan (Boxer, C. R.: *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951, University of California Press), pp. 23 and 26).

¹ See pp. 277-80, above, and 346-403, below.

relatively remote societies were all in a more or less unhealthy social condition. All, so far as the latter-day historian can judge, were by then already in decline, and some of them had already travelled far along the road towards disintegration. The Japanese and Central American societies were both at the climax of the second paroxysm of a Time of Troubles which portended the imminence of a universal state; the Andean and Chinese civilizations were both already in the universal state phase. The Incaic Empire, when Pizarro smote it, was in what might be described in Hellenic terminology as a 'post-Trajanic' condition of lassitude due to a bout of over-exertion. In annexing the domain of the Karas in Ecuador to the Empire of the Incas in Peru, the Emperor Tupac Yupanqui (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1448-82) had taxed the Andean Society's resources and had bequeathed to his successor Huayna Capac an intractable legacy of political unrest which eventually played into the hands of the Spanish aggressors from the other side of the planet.¹ As for the Chinese Society of that date, it was still farther gone than the Andean in the stage of its social decay. An alien universal state imposed by the Mongols had been overthrown by a 'Zealot'-minded indigenous reaction, and the resulting Ming régime in its turn had already passed its zenith by the time when the Modern Western ocean-farers made their first landfall on China's southern coast.

Thus the Far Eastern and the American pair of civilizations were both in poor condition for coping with the West in its still bigoted Early Modern phase; yet, in the event, the two stories took sharply different turns. The American civilizations were as unsuccessful as the Far Eastern civilizations were successful in mastering a formidably difficult situation.

The Fate and Future of the Indigenous American Civilizations

The Spanish conquerors of the Central American and Andean worlds immediately overwhelmed their ill-equipped and unsuspecting victims by force of arms, as the contemporary Dutch and English pioneers of Arctic exploration were able to club to death whole droves of puffins and penguins which were incapable of resisting their human assailants and yet made no move to escape them because this was their first encounter with Mankind and they had therefore still to learn by cruel experience that Man was the most murderous wild beast on the face of the planet. At this first impact the indigenous American societies were submerged. The alien invaders virtually exterminated those elements in the population that were the depositories of the indigenous cultures; they substituted for them an alien dominant minority by sowing the conquered territories thick with urban colonies of Spanish settlers;² and they reduced the rural population to the status of an internal proletariat of the victorious Western Christian Society by putting their labour at the disposal of Spanish economico-religious *entrepreneurs* on the understanding that these planter-missionaries would make it part of their business to convert their human flocks to the Roman Catholic form of

¹ See V. vi. 193.

² See VI. vii. 135.

Christianity.¹ The Spaniards' suppression of the indigenous civilizations of the Americas was in fact a barbaric counterpart of the Macedonians' suppression of the indigenous civilizations of Egypt and South-Western Asia after the domain of the Achaemenian Empire had been conquered for Hellenism by Alexander the Great.

In either case it looked, during the first chapter of the story, as if the culture of the subjugated society had been, not just temporarily overlaid, but permanently obliterated. In the Hellenic instance, however, the later chapters of the story show the submerged Oriental cultures surprisingly reasserting themselves after the lapse of many centuries and eventually expelling the intrusive Hellenic Civilization by force of arms in a *Blitzkrieg* in which the feats of Alexander's Macedonians were emulated, after the passage of a millennium, by the Primitive Muslim Arabs. In another cycle of history an Arabic Muslim Society that had been overwhelmed by the Ottoman arms of Sultan Selim the Grim, in the same generation that had seen the Spanish conquest of the Americas, subsequently succeeded in shaking off the ascendancy of an Iranic Muslim culture, which the Ottoman conquest had carried with it, after a bondage that had lasted for the shorter yet still impressive term of four hundred years.² These other instances, in which the whole story was known to a twentieth-century Western historian, would counsel him to beware of jumping to the conclusion that the apparent annihilation of the Central American and Andean civilizations by the Modern West at its first impact was the whole story of these two encounters.

Even if the fully unfolded tales of the encounter between the Arabic and the Iranic Civilization and the encounter between the Hellenic Civilization and its Oriental contemporaries had not stood on record in the twentieth-century Western historian's archives, the history of Mexico since A.D. 1910 might have suggested to him that the indigenous civilizations of the Americas might reassert themselves, not, perhaps, as separate cultures, yet at least as distinctive variations on a Modern Western cultural theme.³ In the present writer's generation this possibility was already discernible; but it was then still so embryonic that, even if it could be surmised that a second chapter in the history of the encounters between the Modern West and the indigenous civilizations of the Americas would eventually unfold itself, the twentieth-century historian must resign himself to leaving the writing of this story to Posterity while he turned his own attention away from speculations about the ultimate fate of the submerged Central American and Andean worlds to the more profitable study of an already current second chapter in the history of the encounters between the Modern West and the two Far Eastern civilizations.

Chinese and Japanese Reactions to the Impact of an Early Modern West

Unlike the Central American and Andean societies, the Chinese and Japanese societies succeeded in holding their own against the West in its Early Modern Phase. Instead of being overwhelmed, they survived the

¹ The institution of the *encomienda* has been touched upon in VI. vii. 145.

² See IV. iv. 113-14.

³ See IV. iv. 79-81.

deadly peril, to which they were exposed by their initial ignorance, of surrendering to the attractiveness of a strange presence of which they knew no evil. They managed with impunity to weigh the Western Civilization in the balance, find it wanting, make up their minds to cast it out, and muster the necessary force for putting into effect a considered policy of virtual non-intercourse. The sequel, however, had revealed, by the time of writing mid-way through the twentieth century, that this mastery which the Far East had displayed at its first encounter with the West was not the whole story but was merely the first chapter of it.

In breaking off relations with the West in the form in which the West had presented itself to them in its Early Modern phase, the Chinese and Japanese had not disposed of 'the Western Question' once for all; for the West did not remain rooted to the spot on which it had been standing at the moment when the Far East had dismissed it. The West proceeded thereafter to put itself through the spiritual revolution that opened a new chapter in Modern Western history at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and, in now substituting Technology for Religion as the highest value, in Western estimation, in the Western cultural scale, it reopened 'the Western Question' for Far Eastern hermit kingdoms with an importunity to which they could not be for long impervious. In abandoning its traditional insistence that aliens must become converts to some Western form of religion as a condition *sine qua non* for being given the freedom of the Western Society, the West was jettisoning the bigotry that had previously made it appear repulsively menacing in Far Eastern eyes, while, conversely, in placing its treasure henceforward in Technology and diverting its psychic energy to this field from its repellent traditional aim of converting Mankind to Western Christianity by force, the West was launching itself on a course of technological progress that was rapidly to eclipse its own or any other society's previous achievements in this line; and a Western technological superiority which, at the earlier encounter, had struck Far Eastern observers of it as being formidably attractive was now raised to successive higher degrees of potency until the Far Eastern peoples, like their Hindu, Muslim, and Orthodox Christian contemporaries, found themselves confronted with a choice between mastering this superlative Western technology or succumbing to it.

From this point onwards the experience of the Far Eastern societies in their dealings with the West was the same as that of the other living non-Western civilizations; the distinctive feature in the Far Eastern case was that this encounter with the Modern West in its latter-day secularized form was the Far East's second meeting with the Modern West, and not its first; and, for a student of encounters between civilizations, it is interesting to study the points of likeness and difference between these two successive collisions of the same pair of Far Eastern civilizations with a Western Society which, in the interval between the two acts, had deliberately withdrawn its treasure from Religion and re-invested it in mundane values.

In this Far Eastern drama the Chinese and Japanese dramatis personae behaved alike in some ways and in other ways diversely. A striking point

of likeness was that in the second act the reception of a secularized Modern Western culture was initiated in both China and Japan from below upwards, in spite of the fact that in the middle of the nineteenth century, which was the time when this movement started in both societies, either of them was embodied politically in an indigenous universal state—China in the Manchu Empire and Japan in the Tokugawa Shogunate. The failure of both the Ch'ing régime in China and the Tokugawa régime in Japan to take the lead in initiating the process of Westernization at this stage stands out in contrast to the course of events in the corresponding chapters of Russian and Ottoman history, in which the reception of a secularized version of the culture of the Modern West was imposed on the people from above downwards by their rulers, instead of being forced upon the rulers by the peoples from below upwards. Thus at the opening of this chapter the histories of China and Japan followed an identical distinctive course. On the other hand the nineteenth-century Japanese Westernizing movement quickly parted company with the contemporary movement in China by changing over into the Petrine Russian rhythm; and the sixteenth-century Westernizing movements in the two Far Eastern societies had taken different courses from the outset. In their tentatively accorded and subsequently revoked reception of a still unsecularized Modern Western culture, the initiative had come from above downwards in a Chinese Society that was then already embodied in a universal state and from below upwards in a Japanese Society that was then still being racked by the last and worst paroxysm of a Time of Troubles.

The charts of the two Far Eastern societies' respective reactions to the Modern West will also be found to differ in their general conformation when we plot them out over a span of four centuries extending from the date of initial contact in the first half of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era down to the time of writing mid-way through the twentieth century. The Chinese curve comes out relatively smooth and the Japanese curve relatively jagged. By comparison with the corresponding Chinese reactions, the two successive receptions of the Modern Western culture in Japan, and the intervening rejection there of the earlier of the two versions in which this culture successively presented itself, all went to extremes, and the two successive reversals of policy—from reception to rejection in the seventeenth century and from rejection to reception in the nineteenth century—were relatively abrupt. The Chinese never went so far as the Japanese in surrendering themselves to the Modern Western culture on either occasion¹ or in insulating themselves from contact with the West in the intervening stage of anti-Western xeno-

¹ In the earlier of the two encounters the Japanese were far more receptive of an Early Modern Western culture than the Chinese were, whereas the Westerners in that age were far more receptive of the Chinese culture than they were of the Japanese (Boxer, C. R.: *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951, University of California Press), pp. 208-9). In A.D. 1547 ordinary Japanese householders in the principality of Satsuma on the Island of Kyushu were literally opening their doors to the Portuguese by inviting them into their homes as guests (*ibid.*, p. 209). On the other hand in A.D. 1613 a Portuguese Jesuit belonging to the China mission, in a letter to General Aquaviva, gave it as his opinion that the Japanese members of the Society of Jesus, though virtuous, were not so *Aportuguesados* as the Chinese members (*ibid.*, p. 219).

phobia; and the reversals of policy that were decreed in Japan by the fiat of a dictator or by the verdict of a revolution were allowed in China to work themselves out more gradually and more spontaneously.

Though in both Far Eastern societies the Early Modern Western Christian missionaries made converts who eventually proved their sincerity in the hour of trial by sacrificing their lives rather than obey an omnipotent government's command to renounce their exotic adopted new faith, the dominant motives in both societies for tentatively embracing the Early Modern Western Christian culture were not religious but secular. In the sixteenth century both the Chinese Imperial Court at Peking and the Japanese parochial princelings on the Island of Kyushu put up with a religious propaganda which they found boringly unconvincing and distastefully bigoted¹ for the sake of material benefits which the Roman Catholic Christian missionaries had it in their power to bestow either directly, through their own personal attainments in the field of profane knowledge, or indirectly through their influence over their lay fellow Westerners.

In this chapter of the story the Chinese Imperial Court's cultivation of the Jesuits was less utilitarian or more frivolous—in whichever of the two lights we may prefer to regard it—than the contemporary cultivation of them in Japan. In Chinese minds the dominant incentive was curiosity; and, though, in their curiosity about sixteenth-century Western fire-arms, the Chinese as well as the Japanese had practical considerations in view, the Ming régime's desire to fortify its tottering authority by equipping itself with these new-fangled weapons was far less intense than the eagerness of contemporary Japanese war-lords to master a new military technique which might play a decisive part in the desperate final round of the struggle between them for the prize of becoming the founder of a Japanese universal state.²

Nor did the Ming or Manchu Imperial Government see in the development of trade through Western middlemen³ those dazzling prospects of

¹ The Western Roman Catholic Christian missionaries alienated the Japanese by their intolerance (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. ii (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), p. 65), and the political awkwardness of this Early Modern Western religious ethos is conjectured, by one Late Modern Western historian, to have been Hideyoshi's main motive in proscribing them (*ibid.*, p. 378). In Hideyoshi's decree of the 25th July, 1587, banishing the Jesuits from Japan, the continued sojourn of non-missionary Western visitors was expressly authorized (Boxer, C. R.: *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951, University of California Press), pp. 147-8).

² The first service sought by the Japanese from the castaways of A.D. 1542-3 (Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 406), who were their first Portuguese visitors, was to teach the Japanese armourers how to make arquebuses (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. ii (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), pp. 33-34). By the beginning of the last quarter of the sixteenth century, Prince Otomo of the principality of Bungo in Kyushu, who became a convert to Christianity in A.D. 1578 (*ibid.*, pp. 77 and 102), was in possession of fire-arms, including artillery (*ibid.*, p. 98). The manufacture, as well as the use, of small arms established itself in Japan very rapidly, but artillery did not come to play as important a part in Japanese as in Western warfare, and the art of cannon-founding did not make much headway in Japan (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 and 206-7).

³ The business that the Portuguese new-comers found for themselves in the Far East was an exchange, not of Western commodities for Far Eastern, but of Chinese for Japanese. The Portuguese trade with Japan was based on the Portuguese settlements in Fukien and Kwangtung, where the Portuguese merchants purchased silk goods for export to Japan with Japanese silver (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 92 and 109-10). The English and the Spaniards failed to elbow their way into the Japan trade because they failed to

commercial profits that excited Japanese cupidity.¹ Towards the close of the sixteenth century it looked as if the adoption by the Japanese of the contemporary Western art of war and their engagement in commerce with Western traders might draw Japan at this stage out of the ambit of the Far Eastern Society into the ambit of a Western Society which had made itself ubiquitous by conquering the Ocean. Before the advent of the Western ocean-farers in the Far East, the Japanese had already taken to the sea in a counter-stroke to the abortive attempts of the Mongols to invade Japan in A.D. 1274 and in A.D. 1281.² The Japanese had been making piratical descents on the coasts of China since A.D. 1369,³ and, when, after

win a footing in China (*ibid.*, pp. 300-1). After the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Portuguese shippers began to feel the competition of the Japanese and Chinese, who by this time had taken to shipping Chinese silk to Japan in Japanese and Chinese bottoms. Japanese ocean-faring ships are known to have been licensed for overseas trade by Hideyoshi as early as A.D. 1592 (*ibid.*, pp. 261-2), and, during the forty years or so during which such licences continued to be issued, 182 voyages were made—mostly to Indo-China, though there were also many sailings to Manila (30 between A.D. 1604 and A.D. 1616) (*ibid.*, pp. 263-4). These Japanese 'red-seal' ships were originally required by Japanese law to carry Portuguese pilots, but they soon learnt to navigate for themselves as far as Malacca (*ibid.*, p. 265). In the art of ship-building, however, the Japanese remained inferior to the Portuguese, Chinese, and Koreans (*ibid.*, pp. 266-7). In A.D. 1612 the Japanese imported 5,000 quintals of Chinese silk from China and Manila in Japanese bottoms, while in the same year only 1,300 quintals were imported into Japan in the Portuguese Great Ship (*ibid.*, p. 296). By this time the Portuguese—and likewise the interloping Dutch—were also feeling the effects of an increasing Chinese competition in the silk trade between China and Japan (*ibid.*, pp. 299-300). After the suppression, in A.D. 1633-6, of Japan's overseas trade in Japanese bottoms by the Tokugawa régime, and the permanent interdiction of Portuguese trade with Japan by the decree of the 5th July, 1639, Japan's trade with China was carried on by the Chinese and the Dutch till it was eventually killed by the establishment of a native silk industry in Japan (*ibid.*, pp. 288-9).

¹ In the principality of Hirado in Kyushu Christianity was favoured on commercial considerations (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 54), and, in general, the reception with which the Christian missionaries met at Japanese hands varied in accordance with Japanese estimates of the prestige of the missionaries in the eyes of the Portuguese merchants (*ibid.*, p. 60; Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 104). The parochial princelings competed with one another in trying to attract missionaries with a view to attracting trade (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 82-83). This was also one potent motive for conversions, and apostasy followed when trade did not (*ibid.*, p. 87). The daimyo of Hirado subsequently welcomed the Protestant Dutch and English traders who arrived in the wake of the Portuguese, because he preferred Western trade unencumbered with Western religion (*ibid.*, pp. 470-1). Fear of losing Portuguese trade deterred Hideyoshi from pressing the execution of his edict of the 25th July, 1587, ordering Christian missionaries to leave Japan but allowing Portuguese business men to stay (*ibid.*, pp. 243 and 252). Hideyoshi's successor, Tokugawa Ieyasu, appointed Hideyoshi's Jesuit interpreter Father João Rodriguez as his own commercial agent at Nagasaki for trading there on his account with the annual Portuguese ship (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 182).

In A.D. 1599 Ieyasu tried to attract Spanish trade to Japan en route from the Philippines to Mexico, and to obtain the services of Spanish shipwrights and miners (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 458-9), but the Spaniards did not care to take up the commercial openings offered to them in the Kwanto (*ibid.*, p. 463). In a treaty concluded on the 4th July, 1610, with an ex-governor-general of the Philippines who had been shipwrecked on the coast of Japan in the preceding year, Ieyasu conceded far-reaching Spanish demands as his *quid pro quo* for obtaining the services of Spanish technicians. His aims were to develop Japan's foreign trade, build up a Japanese merchant marine, and exploit Japan's mineral resources (*ibid.*, pp. 478-80). The offensive in breaking off commercial relations between Japan and the West was taken on the Western and not on the Japanese side. Circa A.D. 1614 the Japanese, together with all other foreigners, were forbidden to trade with the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain (*ibid.*, p. 603), and Japanese efforts to obtain a relaxation of this veto were unsuccessful (*ibid.*, p. 606). This previous rebuff of the Japanese by the Spaniards may go far to explain the anti-Spanish measures taken by the Bakufu in A.D. 1624 (see p. 323, n. 3, below).

² See IV. iv. 93.

³ See Southill, W. E.: *China and the West* (Oxford 1925, University Press), pp. 75-76. This scourge of Japanese piracy at China's expense continued to grow worse as, in Japan, the Time of Troubles approached its climax. The worst years of all were A.D.

the suppression of Japanese piracy by Hideyoshi,¹ Japanese seamen followed the example of the Western new-comers by taking to trade,² they rapidly extended the range of their maritime activities over the Pacific as far afield as the Straits of Malacca in one direction³ and the Spanish Viceroyalty of Mexico in another.⁴

The converse side of the picture was that, by the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a Japan whose political unification by indigenous military force was then still incomplete and insecure had come to be perilously exposed to the danger of having political unity imposed on her from abroad at the eleventh hour, as it had been imposed on the Central American World, at the ruthless hands of alien *conquistadores*. The Spanish conquest of the Philippines in A.D. 1565-71, the union of the Portuguese with the Spanish Crown in A.D. 1581, and the Dutch conquest of Formosa in A.D. 1624 were object lessons of the fate which might befall another group of West Pacific islands with which the Portuguese had been in contact since the fifteen-forties.⁵ By contrast,

1552-6. The business became international; for the Japanese pirates enlisted Chinese, Korean, Annamite, Malay, and Portuguese recruits. A key role was played by Chinese collaborationists (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-5).

¹ The last raid by Japanese pirates on China was made in A.D. 1588 (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 256). Thereafter, unemployed Japanese adventurers offered the Spanish authorities at Manila Japanese aid for an invasion of China, and the Spaniards did take Japanese mercenaries with them when they invaded Cambodia in A.D. 1595 (*ibid.*, pp. 259-61).

² While Japanese pirates had been raiding China, other Japanese had been flouting the Ming Imperial Government's will in another way by trading with the Chinese. This trade had been started in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era by Japanese Zen Buddhist monasteries, and had afterwards been taken up by lay daimyo (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-50 and 253).

³ A Japanese colony established itself at Manila between A.D. 1593 and A.D. 1614 (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 302), and during the first quarter of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era similar colonies of Japanese traders and mercenaries made their appearance at divers points in South-West Asia (*ibid.*, pp. 296-7).

⁴ There were Japanese traders in Mexico in A.D. 1597 (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. ii (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), p. 292). Japanese traders were doing business all over the Pacific by the time when they were suddenly prohibited from engaging in foreign trade by the non-intercourse ordinance of the 23rd June, 1636 (*ibid.*, p. 691).

⁵ As early as A.D. 1596 the Japanese had been put on their guard against Spanish imperialism by some unwary remarks from the lips of the pilot-major of a wrecked Spanish ship, the *San Felipe*. In explanation of the enormous extent of the Spanish Crown's possessions—as displayed on a map of the World which he had shown to his Japanese interlocutors with an eye to overawing them—the imprudent Spaniard had declared that Spain's first move towards getting possession of any non-Western country on which she had political designs was to send missionaries to promote the formation of a native Christian party there which would serve, when the time came, as a spear-head for Spanish aggression (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-6)—and this fate might indeed have overtaken Japan (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. ii (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), p. 437) if the political unification of Japan under an indigenous dictatorship in A.D. 1590 had not been confirmed by the results of the Battle of Sekigehara on the 21st October, 1600, and the Battle of Osaka on the 3rd June, 1615; for, after the personal union of the Portuguese with the Spanish Crown in A.D. 1581, the Spanish Franciscan friars in the Philippines had taken the offensive against the Portuguese Crown's ecclesiastical *padroado* in Asia (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-6), and had entered the Japan mission field in rivalry with the Portuguese Jesuits with Hideyoshi's good will (*ibid.*, pp. 160-2), though in A.D. 1583 the Italian provincial of the Portuguese Jesuit mission in Japan, Valignano, had pleaded for the exclusion of other Catholic Christian religious orders from Japan and had had his request granted both by King Philip and by the Vatican (in a bull of the 21st January, 1585) (*ibid.*, pp. 156-60).

Hideyoshi's motives in welcoming the Franciscans had been to introduce a counterpoise to the influence of the Jesuits and to bring down the price of Chinese goods in Japan by stimulating a Spanish competition with the Portuguese middlemen in the trade between Japan and China; but the Japanese dictator had not reckoned with the Spanish Franciscans' fanatical temper. To the Jesuits' dismay—though not to their

the vast sub-continent of China had nothing more to fear from the advent of Western pirates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than she had found to fear from the activities of Japanese pirates in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.¹ For China, such still unmechanized Early Modern Western sea-raiders, however annoying they might be, were not potential conquerors; the dangers that gave serious cause for anxiety to a Chinese Imperial Government in this age were the possibilities of domestic revolt and of overland invasion from the Eurasian Steppe beyond the Great Wall or from the Manchurian forests beyond the Willow Palisade; and, after an enfeebled indigenous Ming Dynasty had been duly supplanted by a vigorous semi-barbarian Manchu Dynasty in the course of the seventeenth century, a recurrence of the conjuncture of invasion and revolt which had brought the Manchus into the saddle did not present itself on the Chinese political horizon within the next two hundred years.²

surprise, for Valignano had predicted this in A.D. 1583 (*ibid.*, p. 158)—the Spanish friars recklessly applied in Japan the drastic methods of propaganda which they had used with success in missions to primitive peoples (*ibid.*, p. 162). They ministered to the poor (*ibid.*, p. 233), whom the Jesuits in Japan had neglected (*ibid.*, p. 228), and they avowedly aimed at nothing less than a mass conversion of the Japanese people to Christianity (*ibid.*, p. 231). In short, the Spanish friars' tactlessness opened the new Japanese central government's eyes to the reality of the Spanish peril to Japan's independence, and Ieyasu put the Spanish lay residents in Japan and their associates the Franciscan missionaries under surveillance on the receipt of information that a Spanish expedition was on its way from Mexico for the conquest of the Moluccas (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 463). In A.D. 1612 the Spaniards started making a survey of the Japanese coasts, and Ieyasu's English mentor Will Adams did not miss his opportunity of improving the occasion by enlarging on the implications for Japanese security that were to be seen in this Spanish move (*ibid.*, p. 489). The moral was pointed by the detection of an intrigue between officials of Ieyasu's administration and Spanish agents in A.D. 1612-13 (*ibid.*, p. 492).

A domestic *Pax Tokugawica* in Japan had indeed been so hardly won that the Bakufu was naturally on the alert to foresee and parry all possible threats to its preservation. On the eve of the promulgation of the decree of the 27th January, 1614 (see p. 323, n. 3, below), the Jesuit Father Carvalho gave it as his opinion that the Bakufu was afraid of some Christian daimyo's attempting to wrest the supreme power in Japan out of Tokugawa hands with Spanish support (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 311). The Japanese political authorities' chief misgiving about Christianity—and this misgiving was felt by the daimyo as well as by the Bakufu—was that its claim on the allegiance of its Japanese converts might be a challenge to the claims of feudal loyalty—though in the event, when the converts' steadfastness was put to the test by persecution, the percentage of samurai converts who remained faithful was much lower than the percentage of non-samurai converts, who had no feudal ties to make competing claims upon them (*ibid.*, pp. 338-9 and 362). Japanese converts to Christianity were not the only potentially subversive elements in a hardly pacified Japan at which the Bakufu looked askance. It was also afraid of the lordless (i.e. unemployed) samurai, the so-called *ronin*; and this fear seems to have been the motive for the ban in A.D. 1621 upon foreign enlistment (*ibid.*, p. 269), and for the ban in A.D. 1633-6 upon overseas trade in Japanese bottoms (*ibid.*, p. 372).

¹ The behaviour of the Portuguese was on a par with that of the Japanese pirates in Chinese estimation (Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, a Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 471). On this account the Portuguese were corralled in a walled-off settlement at Macao in A.D. 1557 (*ibid.*, p. 474), and the only Chinese port opened to Western traders was Canton—by contrast with the Chinese treatment of the earlier Arab, Persian, and Malay commercial travellers from overseas who, unlike the Western barbarians, had been considered sufficiently civilized to be allowed to circulate throughout China without restrictions (*ibid.*, p. 470). It is significant that Matteo Ricci, who was a missionary and not a trader and who had taken the trouble to make himself an adept in the Sinitic literary culture, was allowed by the Emperor to reside in Peking in spite of opposition from the Board of Rites (*ibid.*, pp. 475-6).

² In the great war between the Manchu Far Eastern universal state and the steppe empire of the Zungars in the sixth decade of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the political stake was the fate of Zungaria only, and not the fate of China (see III. iii. 19).

This difference in the geographico-political situations of China and Japan in the Early Modern Age of Western oceanic expansion goes far towards explaining why it was that in China the repression of Roman Catholic Christianity was postponed till the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era and was the outcome, not of any apprehensive calculations in the field of power politics, but of an academic controversy over a point of theological terminology¹—in contrast to the comparative promptness and ruthlessness of the suppression of Roman Catholic Christianity in Japan, and the final cutting of all but one solitary Dutch thread in the nexus between Japan and the Western World of the day. The succession of blows delivered by a newly established Japanese Central Government began with Hideyoshi's ordinance of the 25th July, 1587, decreeing the banishment from Japan of Western Christian missionaries,² and culminated in the ordinances of A.D. 1636 and 1639,³ forbidding Japanese subjects to

¹ See V. v. 365-7 and 539, and V. vi. 23-24.

² See Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. ii (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), p. 243; Boxer, op. cit., pp. 147-8. It is significant that Hideyoshi should have fired this first shot in his anti-Western campaign as early as A.D. 1587; for, though his subjugation, in that year, of the principality of Satsuma on the island of Kyushu had brought him within sight of his goal of imposing a *pax oecumenica* on the Japanese World, his establishment of a Japanese universal state was not actually completed before his conquest of the Kwantō in A.D. 1590 (see Murdoch, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 222-234 and 258; Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), pp. 402-3).

³ See Murdoch, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 636 and 664; Boxer, op. cit., pp. 372 and 384. The first martyrdoms were inflicted on the 5th February, 1597, when, as a retort to the threat implied in the pilot-major of the *San Felipe's* indiscreet avowal, twenty-six Christians (consisting of six Western-born Franciscans and twenty Japanese converts) were put to death (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 280 and 295; Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 413; Boxer, op. cit., p. 166). The extirpation of Christianity in Japan began in A.D. 1612 (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 487; Sansom, op. cit., pp. 416-17). After Hideyoshi's successor Tokugawa Ieyasu had received an unfavourable report on Christianity from an investigator whom he had commissioned to inquire into it (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 499), an edict ordering the suppression of Christianity in Japan was issued by him on the 27th January, 1614 (*ibid.*, p. 503; Boxer, op. cit., pp. 317-19). This decree required all Japanese subjects to enrol themselves in one or other of the Japanese Mahayanian Buddhist churches, and the Buddhist priests were made responsible for keeping watch over their parishioners' orthodoxy (Boxer, op. cit., pp. 318-19). The prospect of persecution evoked an outburst of religious fervour in the Christian community at Nagasaki in May, 1614 (*ibid.*, pp. 323-4). Yet, though 47 Western fathers (27 of them Jesuits) and more than 100 Japanese Jesuit lay brothers (*dojoku*) disobeyed the order for their banishment in the decree of A.D. 1614 by staying on in Japan *sub rosa* (*ibid.*, p. 327), no single foreigner was put to death in Japan on account of his religion so long as Ieyasu (*obit* A.D. 1616) remained alive (*ibid.*, p. 331). In A.D. 1617 one Western Dominican and one Western Augustinian in Japan courted martyrdom, for the sake of sharing the Japanese Christian martyrs' fate (*ibid.*, pp. 332-3). Some Western priests remained in hiding in Japan for twenty years (*ibid.*, p. 336). From A.D. 1613 to A.D. 1618 the Japanese authorities turned a blind eye to violations of the ban on Christianity (*ibid.*, pp. 331-2), and, in particular, Hasegawa Gonroku, who from A.D. 1615 to A.D. 1626 was governor of Nagasaki, the centre of the Christian community in Japan, did his utmost to avoid having to make martyrs (*ibid.*, pp. 345-6). When martyrdoms were inflicted, the authorities did not prevent the Christians from making mass-demonstrations of their feelings (*ibid.*, pp. 342-3). According to Murdoch (op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 618-23), there was a crescendo of martyrdoms during the years A.D. 1617-22. The return, probably in A.D. 1622, of an emissary, Ibi Masayoshi, who had been sent by the Bakufu to inspect the Westerners' European homeland (*ibid.*, p. 624), was followed in A.D. 1624-5 by edicts expelling all Spaniards from Japan and forbidding Japanese subjects to trade with any foreign country, particularly with Spain, Mexico, and the Philippines (*ibid.*, p. 626; Boxer, op. cit., p. 439, n. 1). The systematic enforcement of the decree of A.D. 1614 by methods of 'frightfulness' did not begin till after the accession of Iemitsu to the Shogunate in A.D. 1623 (Boxer, op. cit., p. 362). The years A.D. 1626-36 witnessed the apostasy of the great

continue to travel abroad and Portuguese subjects to continue to reside in Japan.¹

Chinese and Japanese Reactions to the Impact of a Late Modern West

In Japan, as in China, the eventual abandonment of a self-imposed insulation from contact with the West was initiated from below upwards, and was inspired by a hunger to taste the forbidden fruits of Modern Western scientific knowledge before this disinterested intellectual quest was conscripted into the service of a political movement for mastering the practical applications of the knowledge through which the Westerners had latterly been acquiring an unprecedented economic and military power. Like the early seventeenth-century Japanese de-

majority of the Western Catholic missionaries' Japanese converts (*ibid.*, p. 360), who in A.D. 1614 had numbered some 300,000 out of a total population of some 20,000,000 (*ibid.*, pp. 230 and 320-1).

The ordinance of the 23rd June, 1636, reaffirmed and made absolute, under pain of death, ordinances of A.D. 1633-4 forbidding even licensed Japanese ships to continue to engage in foreign trade without special permits, and debarring Japanese residents abroad from returning home; and the new decree also forbade Portuguese residents and their issue to continue to reside in Japan or to return thither (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 636). The Bakufu set itself to make the veto on foreign trade effective by prescribing a maximum tonnage for Japanese merchant ships and laying down specifications for their construction (*ibid.*, p. 695). On the 22nd October, 1636, Portuguese residents and their property were duly deported, and thenceforth Portuguese trade with Japan had to be conducted under close restrictions (*ibid.*, p. 637). The final step was precipitated by an insurrection—provoked by the tyranny of a local daimyo—which broke out on the 17th December, 1637, on the Shimebara Peninsula in Kyushu and which was not suppressed till the insurgents' stronghold, Hara Castle, was stormed by the Bakufu's forces on the 12th April, 1638. Thirty-seven thousand Japanese Christians are said to have re-emerged, joined the insurgents, and lost their lives in this affair (Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 432; Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 361). The decree of the 5th July, 1639, forbidding all intercourse with the Portuguese, was promulgated in consequence (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 384; Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 664). Portuguese ships arriving in Japan in A.D. 1639 were refused admittance (*ibid.*, p. 664). On the 6th July, 1640, a Portuguese expostulatory embassy arrived at Nagasaki (*ibid.*, p. 665). On the 3rd August, 1640, the four Portuguese ambassadors and fifty-seven of their companions were put to death, while thirteen survivors were sent back to Macao to convey to the Portuguese authorities a message from the Japanese Government: 'Let them think no more of us, as if we were no longer in the World' (*ibid.*, p. 667).

It did not prove so easy to extirpate the remnant of the native Catholic Christian community in Japan. One effect of the persecution was to disperse the community from North-Western Kyushu, where it had originally been concentrated (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 322), to north-eastern districts of the Main Island to which the Western missionaries had never penetrated (*ibid.*, pp. 335 and 358). The last martyrdoms were inflicted in A.D. 1856, and the last punishments, short of death, in A.D. 1867. Even after the Westernizing revolution of A.D. 1868, the new régime posted notices declaring: 'The evil sect of Christians is forbidden as heretofore'. The ordinance of A.D. 1614 was never formally rescinded, but after A.D. 1873 the notices were withdrawn, and the Japanese Christians then in prison on account of their religion were released and indemnified, because the new régime had come to realize that this was a condition *sine qua non* for obtaining the Western Powers' consent to a modification of the capitulatory treaties (Sansom, G. B.: *The Western World and Japan* (London 1950, Cresset Press), pp. 408-10). By this time the remnant of a Japanese Catholic Christendom had been holding out under severe persecution for longer than a quarter of a millennium.

¹ For the expulsion from Japan of all Westerners except the Dutch between A.D. 1614 and A.D. 1638, see II. ii. 366, n. 2. For the humiliations inflicted on the Dutch ghetto-dwellers on the islet of Deshima from A.D. 1641 to A.D. 1858, see II. ii. 232-3. The methods of 'frightfulness' by which the Japanese eliminated the Western residents and the Japanese converts to Western Christianity in their midst, and deterred the West, for more than two centuries to come, from making any further attempts to break down Japan's self-imposed isolation, had their counterpart in the contemporary conduct of Westerners in at least one recently Western-occupied adjacent Far Eastern country. In A.D. 1602, and again in A.D. 1639, the Spaniards provided for the security of their dominion over Manila by massacring the Chinese residents there (Soothill, W. E.: *China and the West* (Oxford, 1925, University Press), p. 84).

votes to a Roman Catholic Western Christianity, the early nineteenth-century Japanese devotees to a Modern Western secular science demonstrated their sincerity by exposing themselves to the risk of meeting the tragic ends that eventually overtook them, at a moment of darkness before dawn, in the proscriptions of A.D. 1840 and A.D. 1850.¹

The Tokugawa régime signaled the last years of its existence by banning all Dutch studies outside the field of medicine;² and, from the Bakufu's standpoint, the only thing wrong about this repressive policy was its impracticability. Yet this welling up of a disinterested intellectual curiosity concerning the achievements of a Modern Western science was an indirect outcome of the Bakufu's own cultural policy. In their anxiety to conserve their arduously attained achievement of freezing Japanese life into immobility on the once feverishly agitated military and political planes, the Tokugawa had wisely looked for alternative vents for unabated Japanese energies, and they had encouraged the pursuit of learning as one innocuous outlet. The mental discipline that they had favoured had been the cultivation of a Neoconfucianism which was the legacy of the intellectual renaissance of the Sung Age in China;³ but it proved impossible for a reactionary régime in Japan at the

¹ See Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), p. 563. During the hundred years preceding the crisis of A.D. 1853-68, both private and official circles in Japan were torn in two between feelings of curiosity and feelings of xenophobia as a result of their gradually increasing awareness of a renewal of pressure on Japan from the Western World (including Russia under her Petrine régime); and the conflict between these incompatible Japanese psychological reactions expressed itself in an inconsequent jumble of 'Zealot' and 'Herodian' gestures.

The Japanese physicians who had mastered the secrets of Dutch medical science incurred the jealousy of their Chinese-trained colleagues (*ibid.*, p. 559), whose feelings towards them were much like those of the Egyptian physicians at the court of the Achaemenian Emperor Darius I when they were put out of countenance by the superiority of their interloping Hellenic confrère Dēmocédēs (Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 129-32). In A.D. 1784 a Japanese named Tanuma was assassinated on account of his proclivity to intercourse with Westerners (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 505); and, perhaps in reaction to a series of descents on the Japanese coasts by Russian and British ships in the course of the years A.D. 1804-11 (*ibid.*, pp. 511-22), a number of precautionary measures were taken by the Bakufu. During the years A.D. 1809-17 the Dutch ghetto on Deshima was marooned (*ibid.*, p. 523). In A.D. 1824 the standing orders for the expulsion of foreigners landing in Japan were renewed (*ibid.*, p. 528). In A.D. 1829 von Siebold (see p. 326, n. 1, below) was banished from Japan on a charge of having obtained possession of Japanese maps and other documents (*ibid.*, p. 558). An embassy from the Dutch Crown was rebuffed in A.D. 1844 (*ibid.*, p. 530).

On the other hand in A.D. 1786 the Bakufu began to explore the island of Yezo (Hokkaido) with a view to forestalling an apprehended Russian encroachment there (*ibid.*, p. 513). In A.D. 1809 they ordered the Japanese interpreters in Nagasaki to add to their repertory of foreign languages, hitherto confined to Dutch, by learning English and Russian (*ibid.*, p. 548). Between A.D. 1809 and A.D. 1817 the Dutch agent on Deshima compiled a Dutch-Japanese lexicon at the Bakufu's request (*ibid.*, p. 550). The apprehensions aroused in Japan by the spectacle of China's helplessness in the Sino-British war of A.D. 1839-42 moved the Bakufu to tolerate the activities of Takashima and his disciple Sakuma, who devoted their lives to mastering the contemporary Western technology of gunnery with an eye to the defence of Japan's coasts against Western naval attack. Yet the 'Zealots' managed to have Takashima imprisoned and prevented from continuing his work until after Commodore Perry's first visitation in A.D. 1853 (Sansom, G. B.: *The Western World and Japan* (London 1950, Cresset Press), pp. 262-72). During the years A.D. 1851-8 the Bakufu winked at commercial intercourse between the Japanese fief of Satsuma and France via the Luchu Islands, which were a dependency of Satsuma *de facto* (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 534).

² See Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 564-5.

³ See Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 97-100; Sansom, G.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), pp. 470 and 492-3; eudem: *The Western World and Japan* (London 1950, Cresset Press), pp. 195-8 and 218-20.

turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to permit its subjects to supplement their authorized cultivation of a conservative vein of indigenous thought by making a strictly utilitarian study of Modern Western medicine without thereby opening a passage for the mighty flood of Modern Western knowledge in its entirety,¹ as it was to prove impossible for the Ottoman autocrat 'Abd-al-Hamīd II at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to allow his military cadets to make a strictly utilitarian study of the Modern Western art of war without exposing the old order to the risk of being swept away by an influx of the political Ideas of 1789.²

While the inspiration of the nineteenth-century Japanese Westernization movement from below upwards thus came from Modern Western secular scientific thought, the inspiration of the corresponding and contemporary movement in China came from Modern Western Protestant Christianity, whose missionaries accompanied the British and American salesmen of the wares of an industrialized West,³ as in the sixteenth century the missionaries of a Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity had accompanied the Portuguese pioneers of Early Modern

¹ An embargo on the translation of Western books into Japanese had been lifted in A.D. 1720 (Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, p. 214; Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), p. 498); and, in this matter of cultural policy, some latitude was allowed by the Bakufu to its feudatories. While a reactionary Shintōism was being inculcated in Mito, Dutch learning was being cultivated in Sakura (ibid., pp. 457-8).

In the fief of Yonezawa, Western medicine was introduced by the Daimyo Uyesugi half a century before the advent of Commodore Perry (ibid., p. 391). In A.D. 1771 Sugita Gempaku, a Japanese physician in a daimyo's service, was excited by coming across some Dutch works on anatomy (ibid., p. 543). Sugita and two other Japanese physicians thereupon agreed with one another to learn Dutch; and they puzzled out the meaning of a Dutch anatomy book by using the diagrams as clues (ibid., p. 544; Sansom, op. cit., p. 217) with the patience and ingenuity which nineteenth-century Western scholars were to employ, two or three generations later, in deciphering cuneiform. Thereafter, several Japanese doctors obtained instruction, circa A.D. 1775, from a Swedish resident on Deshima named Thunberg (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 540 and 545) and then from Isaac Titsingh, who was in charge of the Dutch factory on Deshima at divers times ranging from A.D. 1779 to A.D. 1785 (Sansom, op. cit., p. 218). A German scientist, P. J. von Siebold, who was in Japan during the years A.D. 1823-9, was visited at Nagasaki by students from all over the country who, after returning to their homes, used to submit to their Western instructor medical dissertations written in Japanese (ibid., pp. 262 and 274; Murdoch, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 552).

Meanwhile, Japanese curiosity concerning Western thought had not remained confined to the field of medical studies. An interest in mathematics, astronomy, and cartography, which had begun to show itself in Japan as early as A.D. 1684, had led to a study there of learned works by Jesuit fathers in Chinese (ibid., pp. 553-4); and this wider range of interest was stimulated by Titsingh, who studied Japanese literature, established personal relations with members of the Japanese governing class, and kept up a correspondence with them (ibid., pp. 502-4 and 507)—an intimacy which would hardly have been possible in the years A.D. 1690-2, when the German traveller Engelbrecht Kaempfer found that it was the policy of the Bakufu to prevent the Dutch from learning Japanese, though they failed to prevent Kaempfer from transmitting an intellectual current in the opposite direction by giving his Japanese attendant instruction in the Dutch language and in contemporary Western medicine (ibid., pp. 539 and 542). At Yedo, 'down-town' and 'up-town' clubs for the study of Western learning had sprung up during the first half of the nineteenth century, and by A.D. 1850 fifty-two Dutch works had been translated into Japanese by Takano Nagohide, *alias* Choei (ibid., pp. 559-60). Both Takano and his friend and confederate Watanabe Noboru, *alias* Kwazan, were eventually harried by persecution into committing suicide (Sansom, op. cit., pp. 273-80).

² See pp. 234-6, above.

³ Morrison, the first Protestant missionary to work in China, landed at Canton in A.D. 1802 (Soothill, W. E.: *China and the West* (Oxford 1925, University Press), p. 98).

Western commercial enterprise in the Far East. In another context¹ we have noticed that the T'ai'ping politico-religious insurrectionary movement, which came near to overthrowing the Manchu régime in the sixth and seventh decades of the nineteenth century,² was not merely a 'Zealot' indigenous revolt against the tincture of an exotic Far Western Christian culture in the tradition of a semi-barbarian Manchu 'ascendancy', but was also, in another aspect, a translation of Protestant Western Christianity into indigenous Far Eastern terms.³ Thereafter, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Chinese initiators of a movement for secular political reform were likewise influenced by Protestant Western missionaries;⁴ Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Kuomintang, was the son of a Protestant Christian father;⁵ and another Protestant Christian Chinese family played a paramount part in the Kuomintang's subsequent history in the persons of Madame Sun Yat-sen, her sister Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and their brother T. V. Soong.

Thus, from the outset, the nineteenth-century Chinese Westernizing movement differed from its Japanese counterpart in having a Protestant Christian instead of a secular scientific Western inspiration; and the two movements also rapidly diverged on the political plane. Both movements were confronted with the formidable task of having to liquidate and replace a well-established indigenous oecumenical régime which had demonstrated its unfitness to survive by showing itself insensitive to the imperative need for coping with the impact of an irresistibly powerful secularized Modern Western Civilization; but in this political emergency the Japanese Westernizers were more alert, more prompt, and more efficient than the Chinese. Within fifteen years of the first appearance of Commodore Perry's squadron in Japanese territorial waters in A.D. 1853, the Japanese Westernizers had not only overthrown a Tokugawa régime that had failed to rise to the urgent occasion; they

¹ See V. v. 107, 111, and 117.

² At their flood tide the T'ai'ping managed to push an advance-guard of seven thousand men to within twenty miles of Tientsin (Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 569).

³ 'The T'ai'ping movement... was primarily a religious revival and only secondarily a revolt against the Manchus' (Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 566). The T'ai'ping were friendly to the West, and it was their policy to throw the whole of China open to the Westerners instead of keeping them confined to the Treaty Ports (ibid., pp. 570-1); yet the French and British had no sooner imposed their own terms on the Manchu Imperial Government at Peking in the wars of A.D. 1857-60 than they perversely supplied the conservative Manchus with the military means of suppressing a spontaneous Chinese Westernizing movement which the Imperial Government had proved unable to crush out of its own resources (ibid., pp. 571-2). It will be seen that this decisive Franco-British intervention in China in favour of the Imperial Government and against the T'ai'ping in the seventh decade of the nineteenth century was in this respect analogous to the similarly decisive intervention of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and the Hapsburg Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire in favour of Sultan Mahmūd II and against Mehmed 'Ali in A.D. 1839-41. The frustration of the T'ai'ping movement was a tragic episode in the history of the encounter between China and the Modern West; for the author of the movement, the Hakka Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, was making a second attempt at the enterprise—previously attempted by the Jesuits without ultimate success—of initiating China into the Modern Western culture in its Christian entirety and not just in a technological abstract. In itself, Hung's attempt was the more promising of the two, since it emanated, not from alien missionaries, but from a Chinese prophet, and proceeded, not from above downwards, but from below upwards.

⁴ For the influence of the missionaries Allen and Richard in that generation, see Soothill, op. cit., p. 173.

⁵ See Soothill, op. cit., p. 175.

had achieved the far more difficult feat of installing in its place a new régime capable of putting into operation a comprehensive Westernizing movement from above downwards. The Chinese took 118 years to accomplish even the negative political result that the Japanese achieved in fifteen. The arrival of Lord Macartney's Embassy at Peking in A.D. 1793 was no less illuminating a demonstration of the formidably enhanced potency of the Western Civilization than the arrival of Commodore Perry's squadron in Yedo Bay sixty years later; yet in China the overthrow of the *ancien régime* did not follow till A.D. 1911, and the discarded universal state was then replaced, not by any effective new Westernizing political order, but by a familiar anarchy which the Kuomintang lamentably failed to overcome during the quarter of a century (A.D. 1923-48) which this twentieth-century Chinese Westernizing movement had at its disposal for showing whether it was capable of living up to its professed ideals and carrying out its declared programme.¹

Since the nineteenth-century shock that jolted both Far Eastern peoples out of their ruts was the impact of new high-powered Western armaments carried by British warships in the war of A.D. 1839-42 and by American warships in the visitations of A.D. 1853-4, a nineteenth-century Japan's flying start over a nineteenth-century China in a race towards the goal of political and economic Westernization can be measured by the degree of Japan's military superiority over China during the fifty years running from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war of A.D. 1894-5. During that half-century China was militarily at Japan's mercy; and, though, in the last round of this struggle, an effective conquest of the whole of China proved to be beyond Japan's resources, it was equally evident that, if the Japanese war-machine had not been shattered in the Second World War by the United States, the Chinese

¹ A comparison, which is as illuminating as it is objective, between the Chinese and the Japanese response to the identical challenge presented to both branches of the Far Eastern Society by the impact of a Late Modern Western Civilization is made by Hu Shih in *The Chinese Renaissance: The Haskell Lectures, 1933* (Chicago 1934, University Press), chap. 1. The Chinese philosopher's conclusion is that 'there are various types of cultural response, of which the Japanese type may be called one of "centralized control", and the Chinese type one of "diffused penetration and permeation"' (ibid., p. 27). In seeking to account for Japan's relative success, by comparison with the relative failure of China's corresponding contemporary efforts, in responding to the challenge from the West in the first chapter of an episode that was common to the history of both countries, Hu Shih puts his finger (ibid., p. 5) on three assets that Japan possessed, and China lacked, at the time. The first of these was an old, experienced, and powerful aristocratic ruling class; the second was a military tradition, kept alive in that class, which gave Japan the spirit to hold her own in the arena of a militaristic Western World (in contrast to the prevailing tradition in China, where the military virtues had remained under a cloud ever since they had been discredited by the paroxysm of militarism by which an antecedent Sinic Civilization had been convulsed during a Time of Troubles ending in the establishment of a Sinic universal state by Ts'ing She Hwang-ti). The third Japanese asset to which Hu Shih draws attention is the fact that, by the time of the cultural revolution in Japan in and after the seventh decade of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the Imperial Dynasty had already been reigning without governing for at least a thousand years, and had thereby automatically acquired a cumulative aura of venerability which was not tarnished by any of the odium that is inevitably incurred by political authorities who wield effective power. Hence, when, in A.D. 1868, the Japanese Imperial House was brought out of cold storage, it was admirably 'suited to be made into a constitutional monarchy after the European pattern' (ibid., p. 19). Hu Shih gives interesting illustrations of the disadvantage at which China found herself in this age, by comparison with Japan, for want of these three political instruments for dealing with the impact of the West (ibid., pp. 5-23).

would never have been able, unaided, to wrest back out of the Japanese invaders' hands the captured ports, industrial areas, and railroads that were the keys to the Westernization of China and that were vital to China's economy in the ratio of their rarity in China at this date.

Moreover, Japan's facile, albeit inconclusive, victories over China were the cheapest of the trophies with which a latter-day Japanese militarism adorned a triumphal progress that carried it, within a span of fifty years, to its ironical goal of an utter military and political disaster without precedent in Japanese history. Between A.D. 1894 and A.D. 1945 Japan extracted military dividends from a process of technological Westernization with a virtuosity that eclipsed the achievements of Petrine Russia between her victory in the Great Northern War of A.D. 1701-21 and her defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904-5. In this trial of strength at the opening of the twentieth century of the Christian Era between one non-Western people that, by that date, had been in process of Westernization for more than two hundred years and another non-Western people that had been treading the same road for less than half a century, a victorious Japan won recognition as a Great Power in the Western comity of states, as a victorious Russia had won the same recognition, some two hundred years earlier, in her trial of strength with the Sweden of King Charles XII. Thereafter, Japan achieved the *tour de force* of making herself one of the three leading naval Powers in a twentieth-century world in which naval strength was a function of industrial potency in terms of a Western industrial technique; and her final fling was to smite the United States Navy in Pearl Harbour and overrun all the colonial possessions of the Western Powers in South-East Asia, from the Philippines to Malaya and Sumatra inclusive, in the course of a suicidal leap into the jaws of disaster.

These jaws were the common destination at which a Japanese hare and a Chinese tortoise had arrived simultaneously by the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. At that date Japan was still lying passive under a foreign military occupation to which she had submitted by an act of unconditional surrender, while China, after she had robbed herself of the benefits of her liberation from the scourge of Japanese militarism by subjecting her tormented body social to the self-inflicted flagellation of a fresh civil war, had promptly proceeded to rob herself of the benefits of domestic pacification under the iron hand of a victorious Communist régime¹ by embroiling herself in a new foreign war in which she was not the victim but the aggressor, and in which she was fighting, not Japan, but those Western Powers that had so recently extricated her from Japan's clutches. Japan's plight was without precedent in the annals of an archipelago which had never before been invaded with success since the arrival of the Japanese people's own ancestors from overseas before the dawn of recorded Japanese history. China's plight might look at first sight more familiar, considering how many times in the course of her long history a bout of anarchy had ended

¹ The Chinese Communists won their decisive military victories over the Kuomintang in the autumn and early winter of A.D. 1948. The Communist People's Republic of China was inaugurated on the 30th September, 1949.

at last in a dictatorial reimposition of domestic peace through the triumph of a revolutionary régime. Even the alien origin of her new Communist rulers' ideology had its precedents in the tincture of Protestant Western Christianity in the T'ai'ping and the coating of post-Christian Western Liberalism on the Kuomintang. Yet China's plight likewise was novel at least in the points that, in embarking on a foreign war in Korea against the Western Community of Nations after having fought a culminating Chinese civil war in which the belligerents had been the Communists and the Kuomintang, China had become successively a battlefield and a belligerent in a world-wide conflict between two contending ideologies which were both of non-Chinese provenance.

The Unsolved Problem of a Rising Pressure of Population

What was the explanation of this uniformly disastrous ending of the first phase of the second encounter between these two Far Eastern societies and the Modern West? In both China and Japan the disaster had its root in a common Asiatic and East European unsolved problem which has come to our attention already in our survey of the encounter between the Modern West and the Hindu World.¹ What was to be the effect of the Western Civilization's impact on economically still primitive peasant populations which had been accustomed for ages to breed up to the limits of bare subsistence at a level only just above the starvation line, and which were now being inoculated with a novel discontent through a dawning awareness of the possibilities opened up by the progress of Western technology for an improvement in the conditions of human life—but this without having yet begun to face the hard fact that these possibilities could become practical opportunities for them only at the price of an economic, a social, and, above all, a psychological revolution? In order to tap the bounty of Amalthea's horn, these hide-bound peasants would have to revolutionize their traditional methods of land-utilization and systems of land-tenure and to regulate the number of their births. Here were conflicting ideals whose conflict was bound to breed disasters so long as it remained unresolved; and a disaster which, mid-way through the twentieth century, was still in the offing for India, had by then already overtaken the two contemporary societies in the Far East.

The operation of this factor in the history of Japan since the Meiji Revolution of A.D. 1868 was particularly conspicuous. The complete military and political stabilization and partial economic stabilization of Japanese life under the Tokugawa dispensation had been possible because there was a basis of demographic stability underpinning them. During the Tokugawa period the population of Japan had been kept stationary artificially by divers means.² When the Tokugawa régime was liquidated, an unnaturally frozen Japanese body social thawed out;

¹ See pp. 213-16, above, and pp. 684-9, below.

² From circa A.D. 1725 to circa A.D. 1850 the figure was always something between twenty-eight and thirty millions according to Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 458. By the middle of the eighteenth century, infanticide and abortion had become regular practices among the Japanese peasantry, and they do not appear to have been eradicated by being officially prohibited, as they were in A.D. 1767 (*ibid.*, p. 508).

there was a general release of pent-up social forces, in the field of family life as well as in the fields of economics, politics, and war; and the silent lapse of the previous restrictions on the increase of population proved in the event to be a more revolutionary change than the political and economic revolutions which caught the World's attention at the time.

Unlike the contemporary changes on the political and economic planes, the resumption in Japan of unrestricted breeding was not an effect of any Western influence but was a reversion to the traditional *mores* of a primitive peasant society which had been put under restraint, by a psychological *tour de force*, in the glacial atmosphere of the Tokugawa Age. The contemporary technological Westernization of Japan did, however, accentuate the practical effect of this relapse into a primitive habit by lowering a death-rate whose height, in societies not equipped with Modern Western preventive medicine and public hygiene, had normally moderated the effects of a high birth-rate on the movement of population. The consequent net increase of the population in Japan after the Meiji Revolution was comparable to its net increase in India after the establishment there of the British Rāj; and in Japan the resulting pressure of population on the means of subsistence made itself felt still more quickly and more acutely owing to the complete absence there of any reserves of cultivable land, the dearth of raw materials for industry (a dearth which was specially stringent in respect of coal and iron-ore), and the people's traditionally higher average standard of living and consequently higher expectations in an era of Westernization.¹

A Westernizing Japan might not have been so hard beset by these economic embarrassments if she had not drawn back at the last moment from taking the plunge at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era. If Japan had made her entry into the comity of Western nations at that date, she would doubtless have acquired a substantial share of the then still virgin lands in the South Seas and along the western coasts of the Americas that were subsequently occupied by settlers from Spain and from the British Isles during the lost two centuries and a quarter of Japan's self-imposed insulation. The once untenanted terrestrial paradises that had meanwhile become California and New South Wales would have been ideal colonizing grounds for a Japanese people that was so 'allergic' to alien climates that it found Hokkaido forbiddingly arctic and Formosa forbiddingly tropical. By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, when the ocean-faring Western peoples had had nearly four hundred years' grace for exploring and occupying the face of the planet without serious competition from any other society, these options were no longer open to a tardily awakened Japanese Sleeping Beauty. For a Japan who, in abandoning the Tokugawan limitation of births, had condemned herself to a choice between expanding in some form or exploding, the only two alternative forms of expansion that were practical politics in the Meiji Era were either to persuade the rest of the World to trade with her or to conquer additional territory, resources, and markets by force of arms

¹ For the increase of the economic pressure on the life of the Japanese peasantry after A.D. 1868, see Sansom, *op. cit.*, pp. 506 *seqq.*

from existing owners who were militarily too weak to defend their property against a militarily Westernized Japan's aggression.

Between A.D. 1868 and A.D. 1931 Japanese foreign policy oscillated uneasily between these two cardinal points of her political compass. The Japanese Liberals counted on the maintenance and expansion of a market for the relatively cheap products of efficiently managed Japanese textile and other light industries among vast peasant populations in Asia and Africa who were acquiring an appetite for the facilities and amenities of the Modern Western way of life but who could not afford the price of West European and North American manufactures. The Japanese militarists pointed to the remorselessly accelerating rise of a ubiquitous tide of Economic Nationalism,¹ and pressed upon their countrymen the alternative policy of military conquest with the arguments that the only markets that Japan could be sure of retaining in an ever more nationalist-minded world were markets under her own political control, and that even controlled markets would not solve Japan's economic problem unless they were supplemented by controlled sources of food-supply and raw materials. The gradual effect of a world-wide accentuation of Nationalism in converting the Japanese people to the Japanese militarists' doctrine was clinched by the terrible experience of the devastating economic blizzard which descended on Wall Street in the autumn of A.D. 1929 and then swept on over the rest of the World.

When the Japanese militarists launched their campaign of aggression at Mukden on the night of the 18th-19th September, 1931, they were condemning Mankind to the torment of a Second World War within eight years of this date, and condemning their own country, in particular, to the additional disaster of seeing that torment culminate within fourteen years in the national calamity of an utter military defeat. In the Second World War Japan was not only justly defeated in her desperate attempt to solve her latter-day economic problem by an unbridled career of military conquest; she was also justly deprived of all the conquests at the expense of weaker peoples that she had made through an unscrupulous militarism since A.D. 1894. Yet this just and auspicious frustration of Japan's unprincipled policy of trying to solve her economic problem by means of military aggression was a negative achievement which had prevented the consummation of a crime without alleviating the pressure that had moved the criminal to commit his wicked acts; and, at a date some six or seven years after 'V-J. Day', a positive solution of Japan's economic problem seemed to be as far off as ever—though a Japanese student of history might perhaps find some hope and consolation in the strange new fact that, as an ironical consequence of the United States' crushing victory, the responsibility for solving this insistent Japanese problem by some means or other had been transferred from Japanese to American shoulders.

In Chinese history the latest illustration of a primitive peasantry's

¹ The turn of the tide during the decade A.D. 1861-71—the very time when Japan was making her belated entry into a Westernizing World—has been noticed in IV. iv. 174. The chief threat to Japan's exports came, not from the Western industrial countries, but from the progressive industrialization of non-Western countries that, like India, were beginning to follow Japan's example.

habitual tendency to breed up to the limits of subsistence had been manifested during the *floruit* of the Manchu régime from the closing decades of the seventeenth century to the opening decades of the nineteenth. In the subsequent period of attempted Westernization the Chinese had never approached a level of military efficiency on Western lines at which they would have had it in their power to emulate Japan's abortive attempt to carve out an empire for herself with the sword at the expense of her neighbours. The worst that, down to A.D. 1950, the Chinese had been able to achieve through an imperfect mastery of Western military apparatus had been to employ it for enhancing the lethal effect of civil war, which in China was the traditional remedy for an excessive increase in population; and, although the Chinese Communist armies that had been launched in A.D. 1950 against the Americans and their allies in a Korean arena had fought with an efficiency and a resoluteness which the West had never encountered before in Chinese troops, they had failed, notwithstanding their superiority in numbers and their supplies of Russian equipment, to drive their Western opponents out of South Korea. In A.D. 1952 it did not look as if China, even under a Communist régime, had much prospect of being more successful than Japan had been if she were to set out, as Japan had done, to conquer a *Lebensraum* for herself by force of arms. It was all the more fortunate for China that she had inherited from her latest semi-barbarian conquerors, the Manchus, the last substantial unoccupied reserve of land in the temperate zone of the Northern Hemisphere.

Since the removal in A.D. 1878¹ of the last restrictions on Chinese immigration into the great open spaces of Manchuria beyond the Willow Palisade, with their vast resources in arable land, minerals, and timber, the Chinese population of 'the Three Eastern Provinces' had risen to the figure of approximately forty million within three generations; and this mass migration—which had changed the demographic map of the World as markedly as the Russian colonization of the Black Sea Steppes and Siberia or the West European colonization of the Americas and the South Seas—had been stimulated by the scourges of civil war, pestilence, and famine in the densely populated adjoining intramural Chinese provinces of Chihli, Shantung, and Hopei. In the alternating current of Chinese history, adversity had indeed been as potent a force as prosperity for promoting the constant expansion of the

¹ The establishment of the Manchu Empire in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era had brought the thinly populated steppes and forest-clad highlands of Manchuria under the same sovereignty as the densely Chinese-inhabited agricultural regions in the small area outside the Great Wall but inside the Willow Palisade and in the vast area inside the Great Wall, and under this dispensation there had been an unrestricted flow of Chinese immigration into the Manchurian country beyond the Willow Palisade. This immigration had been prohibited in A.D. 1776 by a decree of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung with an eye to conserving the Manchurian reservoir of barbarian man-power which was the source of the Manchus' military and political ascendancy in the Far Eastern World. This prohibition had proved ineffective, and, early in the reign of Tao Kuang (*imperabat* A.D. 1821-51), the Manchu Imperial Government had reversed Ch'ien Lung's policy in Southern Manchuria by legalizing the sale of land in that area to Chinese purchasers. Heilungkiang, the northernmost and most extensive of the Manchurian provinces of the Manchu Empire, was officially opened to Chinese immigration in A.D. 1878, and Kirin a few years earlier (Young, C. W.: *Chinese Colonisation and the Development of Manchuria* (Honolulu 1929, Institute of Pacific Relations), pp. 8-10).

Chinese people over an ever widening area; and this Chinese expansion, unlike its puny Japanese counterpart, was not restricted by any climatic limitations. While the Northern Chinese peasants had been schooled by the hard winters of their native provinces to lead a farmer's life on the land in the rigorous climate of Manchuria, the Southern Chinese had been acclimatized by a fifteen-hundred-years-long sojourn in the sultry Yangtse Basin and on the sub-tropical shores of the China Sea for leading a business man's life in the cities of Indo-China, Siam, Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya, where in the twentieth century of the Christian Era at least one new South-East Asian Chinese province could be seen taking shape through a traditional process of peaceful penetration.

Yet, in spite of their opportunity and capacity for relieving the pressure of population in China by both the constructive expedient of urban and rural colonization in diverse physical climates, ranging from the tropical to the arctic, and the destructive expedient of chronic civil war, the Chinese mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era were being defeated almost as signally as the Japanese by the problem of coping with the fertility of a primitive peasantry in the social and psychological climate of a Westernizing World; and in China, unlike either Japan or India at this date, a problem which had so far found no solution on the lines of a Western-inspired Democracy was being forcibly taken in hand by a Russian-inspired Communism. In A.D. 1948-9 a Kuomintang movement which had been discredited by the rapidity of its change of front from a revolutionary championship of reform to a reactionary defence of vested interests had been swept away by a Communism propagated by native Chinese Communist force of arms; and three years later, at the moment when this volume was being sent to the press, the Communist régime in China appeared to be securely in the saddle.

A Communist Russia's Chinese Fifth Column

It remained to be seen whether a Chinese peasantry whose disillusionment with the Kuomintang had been a decisive though imponderable factor in turning the scales would find an effective remedy for its ills in the Communist prescription or would relish the prescribed regimen even if it were to prove capable of producing its promised effect; but it was already clear that the military and ideological conquest of China by Communism in A.D. 1949 was the latest move in a Russian assault on the main body of the Far Eastern Society which by that date had been in progress for some three hundred years—though this was the first operation in which the Russian strategists had commanded the services of a Chinese 'fifth column'.

In the second quarter of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, when the Japanese were breaking off their tentative relations with an Early Modern Western Christendom and when Manchu empire-builders who had already passed the Willow Palisade were preparing to make their passage through the Great Wall, the Manchus were taken in the rear by Cossack pioneers of an expanding Russian Orthodox Christendom who had burst into the Upper Basin of the Amur River after

successively outflanking Dār-al-Islām and the Eurasian Steppe. As soon as the Manchus had broken at least the overt resistance of Southern China, where their usurpation had been stubbornly contested, they turned upon these audacious Cossack trespassers on the Manchurian pasture-lands that were the reservoir of Manchu barbarian man-power, and drove the intruders back to a line which the Imperial Russian Government found itself compelled to accept *de jure* as the frontier between the two Powers and to respect *de facto* for a hundred and sixty-eight years following the conclusion, at Nerchinsk, of the Russo-Manchu peace treaty of A.D. 1689.

This treaty provided for the maintenance of an authorized channel for overland trade between the two empires, and of a Russian embassy and church at Peking; but, throughout the next two centuries, the impact of Russia on China overland was felt only faintly by comparison with the maritime impact of the Portuguese and their more aggressive British and French successors. The concessions exacted from China by the maritime Western Powers as the victors' spoils in the wars of A.D. 1839-42 and A.D. 1857-60 cut Chinese sensibilities to the quick; but, when, in A.D. 1857, Russia righted the balance of competitive aggression at China's expense by compelling the Manchu Imperial Government to cede to Russia their title to all the territory that the peace settlement of A.D. 1689 had assigned to the Manchu Empire on the left bank of the Amur and the right bank of the Ussuri, neither the Chinese people nor even their Manchu masters were sensibly affected by the loss of these then still empty border territories; and they seem hardly to have noticed the construction of the new Russian port of Vladivostok in an all but ice-free natural harbour at the south-western extremity of these ceded Manchu territories, within a stone's throw of the north-east corner of Korea. The Chinese did not become apprehensively aware of Russia's advancing shadow till A.D. 1897, when the Russian Navy occupied Port Arthur as Russia's prize in a scramble between the Powers of the Western World for the seizure of naval bases on China's coasts, and A.D. 1900, when, taking advantage of the imbroglio with the maritime Western Powers in which China had been involved by a 'Zealot' movement culminating in the xenophobe Boxer Rebellion, the Russian Army swooped upon Manchuria and planted itself—in the footprints of the Manchus on the eve of the Manchu conquest of Intramural China 250 years back—at the threshold of Shanhaikwan, the vital passage between the mountains and the sea which was Intramural China's Thermopylae.

The sequel to this Russian seizure of Manchuria in A.D. 1897-1900, like the sequel to the preceding Japanese victory over China in A.D. 1894-5, was to demonstrate the vanity of Militarism. It was in vain that the Russians sought to consolidate their territorial gains in the Far East, and to prepare the way for extending them farther, by pressing a new-fangled Western mechanical invention into the service of the archaic crime of military aggression. The Russian-built railway linking Vladivostok and Port Arthur with St. Petersburg notably surpassed the North American transcontinental railways in its length, and

challenged comparison with them in the rapidity of its construction;¹ yet, in performing this feat, the Russian railway engineers were working unwittingly for the Japanese. The South Manchurian section of the Russian-built railway-system was transferred to Japanese hands in the peace-settlement following the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904-5; and, a generation later, Russia was compelled to advertise her then still unretrieved military inferiority to Japan in the Far Eastern zone of contact between the two Powers by agreeing to the forced sale to Japan, at a derisory price, of the trunk line of the Russian transcontinental railway within the frontiers of the newly conquered Japanese puppet state of 'Manchukuo'.² When Japanese militarism, in its turn, met with its nemesis at American hands, Russia was enabled—as an incidental consequence of American prowess in naval warfare and in atomic physics—to take her revenge for forty-three years of humiliation³ by rounding up the once redoubtable Japanese Kwantung Army in a lightning campaign of twenty-five days.⁴ But there was no evidence that in A.D. 1945 Russia could have defeated Japan in Manchuria if she had had to depend solely on her own military strength; and, in the sequel, the sensational resumption of a Russian advance beyond the limits of Manchuria which had been checked in A.D. 1904-5 by Japanese arms was accomplished, without any direct Russian military action at all, through the operation of Russian ideas and ideals on Chinese minds and hearts.

In spite of the establishment of a Russian Orthodox Christian mission at Peking since A.D. 1689, Russian Orthodox Christianity had never gained in China any influence comparable to that of a Modern Western Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. So long as the competition between the West and Russia for the spiritual conquest of Chinese souls was conducted on a common Christian basis, the preponderance of the Western spiritual influence was overwhelming. But the balance of impinging alien spiritual forces in the Chinese arena changed when the substitution of Liberalism for Christianity as the gospel of the West was followed by the substitution of Communism for Christianity as the gospel of Russia. Communism could plausibly claim to offer a more practically relevant remedy than Liberalism for the ills of a society that

¹ Except for the loop round the southern end of Lake Baikal, which was not built till A.D. 1905, the through-connexion linking Vladivostok and Port Arthur via Manchuria with the previous rail-head of the Russian railway-system at Chelyabinsk in Western Siberia was achieved within the decennium A.D. 1892-1902.

² The sale was finally transacted on the 23rd March, 1935, after negotiations that it had taken the best part of a year to carry through to completion.

³ The writer of this Study realized how extreme this Russian humiliation was when, on the 24th November, 1929, in the course of a visit to Port Arthur under Japanese rule, he was taken by his Japanese cicerone to see the Japanese officers' club there. This had been the Russian officers' club before the fall of Port Arthur on the 2nd January, 1905, and, as a memorial of their victory, the Japanese inheritors of the establishment had kept all the Russian appointments exactly as they had found them. One feature that vividly impressed itself on the writer's memory was a room decorated with a series of coloured prints depicting Russian victories in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1877-8. In A.D. 1929 the Japanese occupants of the building manifestly relished the irony of this display, and, no doubt, in A.D. 1945 the Russians equally savoured the pleasure of taking their club over again from interloping tenants who had not dreamed that their conscientious care-taking was to be, after all, for the benefit of the original owners.

⁴ 9th August to 2nd September, 1945.

was being worsted by the problem of a peasantry whose expectations had been heightened while its habits remained unchanged; and by A.D. 1952 the programme of the Chinese Communist leaders had not yet been discredited by a discrepancy between profession and practice which had already destroyed the credit of the Kuomintang.

Thus in China, as in other living non-Western societies, the middle years of the twentieth century of the Christian Era witnessed the delivery of a Russian challenge to the influence of a Modern Western Civilization which had appeared to have the whole World at its feet before the outbreak of the First World War in A.D. 1914.

7. Characteristics of the Encounters between the Modern West and its Contemporaries up to date

We have now surveyed at least the principal examples of encounters with the Modern Western Civilization up to the points at which these still continuing dramas had arrived by the time of writing, and, in the process, we have also taken note of a number of encounters, since the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, between living non-Western civilizations. Neither of these fields has been covered in our survey completely. There are encounters which involved the Modern West, and contemporary encounters to which the Modern West was not a party, that have not been included in our review.¹ Yet

¹ In the field of encounters to which the Modern West was a party, we have cited the Zoroastrian diaspora in India as an historical counterpart of the Jewish diaspora in the West without entering into the history of the relations between the Parsees and the Modern Western World since the establishment of direct intercourse between the West and India in A.D. 1498; and we have not taken any account of the Modern Western World's relations with the surviving Nestorian, Monophysite, and ex-Monothelite Christian fossils of an extinct Syriac Society, which, like the Zoroastrian and Jewish fossils deposited in a previous chapter of history, were products of a long-continuing collision and conflict between the Syriac Civilization and Hellenism. By the middle of the twentieth century the Nestorian Assyrians of 'Iraq, the Zagros, and Malabar, the Monophysite Gregorian Armenians, Jacobite Syrians, and Coptic Egyptians and Abyssinians, and the ex-Monothelite Maronites of the Lebanon, had all yielded to the impact of the Modern Western Civilization in some degree. Every one of these fossil Oriental churches had lost converts to Tridentine Roman Catholic and to Protestant Western Christianity (though the seventeenth-century Malabari Nestorian converts to Roman Catholicism had transferred their allegiance, in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, to the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch); and in all of them likewise the unconverted majorities had come under the influence of a secularized Modern Western culture. The same secular Modern Western influence had also made itself felt on the Hinayanian Buddhist relics of an extinct Indic culture in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia, and in Ceylon there had been conversions from Hinayanian Buddhism to both Roman Catholic and Protestant Western Christianity.

In the economic unification of the World on a Modern Western basis by Modern Western enterprise the economic resources of insular and continental South-East Asia—beginning with spices and passing on to rice, rubber, tin, teak, coffee, and quinine—had come to play an outstandingly important part, and the opportunities thus opened up under Western auspices had drawn into South-East Asia an inflow of Chinese and Hindu and Hadhramawti Arab business men and industrial workers. By the time of writing, the Hinayanian Buddhist populations of the South-East Asian mainland and the Sunni Muslim and Protestant and Roman Catholic Christian populations of the Malayan Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, Celebes, and the Philippines were feeling this convergent pressure from the giant societies on either side of them, and an historian could foresee a resolution of this multiple interplay of cultural forces into the simpler but more formidable issue of the locus of the future line of demarcation between a Chinese and a Hindu Society in a South-East Asia where the indigenous populations would have been submerged after the elimination of their ephemeral Western masters or protectors.

There had been other encounters since the close of the fifteenth century between

the evidence that we have examined in the preceding chapters is perhaps sufficient to allow us to draw some general conclusions from it.

The most significant of the conclusions that suggest themselves is that the word 'modern' in the term 'Modern Western Civilization' can, without inaccuracy, be given a more precise and concrete connotation by being translated 'middle-class'. Western communities became 'modern', in the accepted Modern Western meaning of the word, just as soon as they had succeeded in producing a bourgeoisie that was both numerous enough and competent enough to become the predominant element in Society.¹ We think of the new chapter of Western history that opened at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as being 'modern' *par excellence* because, for the next four centuries and more, until the opening of a 'post-Modern Age' at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the middle class was in the saddle in the larger and more prominent part of the Western World as a whole. Yet, throughout this so-called 'Modern Age', there were fringes of the Western World—in Eastern Europe, Southern Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and Latin America—that had never completely ceased to be 'medieval' in terms of this qualitative and not merely chronological test, while conversely, by the same test, the abortive city-state cosmos in Central and Northern Italy, Western Germany, the Low Countries, and the Hansa Towns was already 'modern' in the Later Middle Ages.

This definition of the Modern Western culture as being a phase of Western cultural development that is distinguished by the ascendancy of the middle class throws light on the conditions under which, before the advent in the West of a post-Modern Age marked by the rise of an industrial urban working class, any alien recipients of this Modern Western culture would be likely to be successful in making it their own. During the currency of the Modern Age of Western history the ability of aliens to become Westerners would be proportionate to their capacity for entering into the middle-class Western way of life.

This tentative conclusion is manifestly borne out by the facts when we test it by reference to cases of Westernization from below upwards. In the indigenous social structure of Greek Orthodox Christian, Chinese, and Japanese life, for example, there were elements that had some affinity with the middle-class element in the impinging Western Society; and the Westernization of the Greeks and the Chinese was undoubtedly facilitated, governed, and limited by the pace and extent of their progress

living non-Western civilizations to which the Modern West had not been a party even temporarily or indirectly. While the impact of the Modern West had affected the relations of the ex-Monothelite, Monophysite, and Nestorian Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire with their Muslim neighbours, and the relations of the Parsees and 'Saint Thomas's Christians' in India with their Hindu neighbours, there had been no Western intervention in the sixteenth-century competition between Sunni Islam and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhism of Tibet for the conversion of still pagan Nomads on the Eurasian Steppe, none in the eighteenth-century collision between the Lamas' Calmuck converts and the Chinese main body of the Far Eastern Society, and none in the nineteenth-century collision between this indigenous Far Eastern culture and the Far Eastern outposts of the Islamic World in the Tarim Basin, the North-Western Chinese provinces of Kansu and Shensi, and the South-Western Chinese province of Yunnan.

¹ i.e. to become the *πολίτευμα*, as this predominant element was conveniently designated in the technical terminology of Hellenic political science (see VI. vii. 373, n. 1).

in developing these existing rudiments into a full-blown middle class in the Modern Western sense.¹ In these two Westernizing movements from below upwards the progress was gradual and was frequently checked by set-backs, but, as far as it went, it did result in the formation of a genuine middle class in these originally non-Western social milieux. On the other hand in cases in which the process of Westernization proceeded from above downwards—and Japan, as we have seen,² changed over to this alternative approach after the Meiji Revolution—the autocrats who set themselves to Westernize their subjects by fiat did not think of waiting for an unforced process of social evolution to provide them with authentic middle-class agents of indigenous origin for the execution of their Westernizing policy; and, since it was manifestly impracticable even for the most energetic autocrat to carry out a Westernizing policy single-handed, and even for autocrats who were Western conquerors of a non-Western society to propagate their alien way of life solely through the agency of Western-born administrators and missionaries without enlisting the aid of native converts, the high-handed apostles of Westernization from above downwards were constrained in every case to provide themselves with an artificial substitute for a home-grown middle class by manufacturing an intelligentsia.

The intelligentsias³ thus called into existence in Russia, the Islamic and Hindu worlds, and Japan in response to the ubiquitous challenge of the impact of the Modern West were, of course, successfully imbued by their makers with a genuine tincture of middle-class qualities—as was demonstrated by their partial success in inducting into a middle-class Modern Western way of life the non-Western societies from which they had been recruited. The Russian case suggests, however, that even this partial success might be only provisional and ephemeral. In Russia, as we have seen,⁴ Peter the Great's policy of adopting the Modern Western way of life in its orthodox middle-class form had been violently repudiated 228 years after Peter's effective advent to power in A.D. 1689. It had been supplanted in A.D. 1917 by the alternative policy of pressing forward with the acquisition and application of a Modern Western technology as an instrument for combating the orthodox middle-class Western ideology of Liberalism in the name of the heretical anti-bourgeois Western ideology of Marxism. This Marxian heresy had become the creed of a Russian intelligentsia which had originally been called into existence by the Petrine Tsardom to carry out the mission of bringing Russia into the middle-class Western fold; and, for at least three generations before the explosion on the political surface of life in the second Russian revolution of A.D. 1917, an anti-bourgeois animus in the hearts of a nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia had been finding a literary vent in the works of Russian writers.⁵ The wider significance of this chapter of Russian history lay in the fact that the

¹ In Japan, however, the commercial and industrial leaders of the Meiji Era were recruited, not from the commercial class of the Tokugawa Era, but from the Samurai, according to Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 501.

² On pp. 327–8, above.

⁴ On pp. 133–6, above.

³ See V. v. 154–9.

⁵ See, for example, pp. 699–701, below.

movement for Westernization from above downwards had been started in Russia a hundred years earlier than in the Islamic, Hindu, and Japanese worlds; for this chronological datum suggested that the latest turn of events in Russia might be an augury of one of the possibilities that were lying in wait for those other non-Western worlds in chapters of their histories that were still in the future at a date mid-way through the twentieth century. The possibility that these other histories in their turn might eventually take a Russian course was, indeed, something more than a mere theoretical induction from the Russian historical precedent. It was also implicit in an affinity between the Far Eastern, Hindu, and Islamic intelligentsias and the Russian intelligentsia that was already a matter of observable fact.

In the light of this anti-bourgeois turn which the Russian intelligentsia had already taken and towards which the other intelligentsias might be tending, it is perhaps worth pausing to look into the likenesses and the differences between the non-Western intelligentsias and the Western middle class whose role they had been commissioned to play in a non-Western social environment.

One important common characteristic of the Western middle class and the latter-day non-Western intelligentsias was their common provenance from beyond the original pale of the societies in which they had succeeded eventually in establishing themselves. In studying the encounter between the Western Society and the Jewish diaspora in its midst,¹ we have observed that the Western Society when it first emerged in the Dark Ages, like the surviving non-Western societies when they first collided with the West in its modern phase, was an agrarian society in whose life the urban pursuits of industry, commerce, and finance were exotic and were originally practised—in so far as they were practised at all—by an alien Jewish diaspora, until a Gentile Western middle class was called into being by the Western Gentiles' aspiration to be their own Jews. The abiding affinity of the Western middle class with a diaspora of the type represented by Western Jewry—a community uprooted from the soil and addicted to peculiarly urban occupations—was demonstrated, long after the Gentile Western middle class had captured from the country-folk the key position of being the dominant element in Society, by the alacrity and ease with which the Armenian Gregorian and Greek Orthodox Christian diasporas in the Ottoman World, and the Parsee diaspora in India, acclimatized themselves to the way of life of a Modern Western middle-class society. Conversely the Parsee or Armenian or Greek Westernized business man who came to work in New York or London and to sleep in Connecticut or Sussex appeared hardly more alien in the local farmer's eyes than the 'Anglo-Saxon' business man who shuttled to and fro in the same suburban trains between the same dormitories and offices. In a twentieth-century American or English farmer's sight, all his urban middle-class contemporaries—the Westernized and the native Western alike—were still as exotic as a Cordovan or Tarragonese Jew had once been in the eyes of a sixth-century peasant in Visigothia.

This quaintly invidious appearance of being 'pariahs in power' in the

¹ On pp. 276 and 284-6, above.

eyes of unuprooted cultivators of the soil was not the only point of likeness between the Modern Western middle class and the contemporary intelligentsias. Another point in common between them was that both had won their eventual dominance by revolting against their original employers. In Holland, Great Britain, the United States, France, and other Western countries the middle class had successively come into power by stepping into the shoes of enlightened monarchies whose patronage had inadvertently made the middle class's fortune. In non-Western polities in the Late Modern Age of Western history the intelligentsia had likewise come into power by successfully revolting against Westernizing autocrats who had been, not the inadvertent makers of their fortunes, but the deliberate authors of their existence.¹

These points of likeness between intelligentsias called into existence in non-Western societies by Westernizing autocrats and a Western middle class whose role these intelligentsias were called upon to play are offset by at least one signal difference. The middle class that made itself paramount in the Western World in the Modern Age of Western history was an indigenous element in the society that it eventually came to dominate, in spite of its having had no place in that society's original social order. The history of the gradual and arduous ascent of this Western middle class from the lowly outskirts of the Western social hierarchy to its centre and summit was the history of the Western

¹ If we take a synoptic view of this common episode in the histories of Petrine Russia, a latter-day Ottoman Empire, and the British Rāj in India, we shall see that the revolt of the intelligentsia not only occurred in all three cases but came to a head in each case after the lapse of approximately the same span of time, reckoning from the initial dates of the respective Westernizing movements. In Russia the abortive Decembrist Revolution of A.D. 1825, which was the Russian intelligentsia's declaration of war on the Petrine Tsardom, broke out 136 years after Peter's effective advent to power in A.D. 1689. In India political 'unrest' began to reveal itself in Bengal towards the close of the nineteenth century, rather less than 140 years after the British occupation of Bengal in A.D. 1757-60. In the Ottoman Empire the Committee of Union and Progress overthrew Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II in A.D. 1908, 134 years after the Porte had first been impelled, by the shock of defeat in the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, to begin training its Muslim subjects in appreciable numbers in a Modern Western art of war which had so signally demonstrated its efficacy at the Turks' expense when it had been employed against them even by Russian novices in the use of Western technology.

At this point we need not take up the question, raised in XI. ix. 187, below, whether the remarkable uniformity in the length of the time that it took for the revolt of the intelligentsia to come to a head in these three cases was a fortuitous coincidence or was the uniform effect of the operation of some constant psychological 'law'. We will merely note, in passing, that the argument in favour of the second of these two alternative possible explanations is supported by the reappearance of the same Time-span in a fourth case which, if not exactly parallel, is at least analogous. There was an interval of 138 years between the 'Osmanlis' defeat before the Walls of Vienna in A.D. 1683, which moved them to continue and extend the experiment of employing Phanariot Greek Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte in responsible positions in the Ottoman public service, and the Greek uprising of A.D. 1821, which took place partly under Phanariot leadership. The parallel is not exact, because the Phanariots were not an intelligentsia which the Porte had called into existence; they were an embryonic Greek counterpart of the contemporary Western middle class who had made their fortunes by their own private enterprise and, in the process, had already acquired a familiarity with the West and its ways which opened a door for their entry into the Ottoman public service as soon as the Porte found itself obliged to negotiate with Western Powers to whom it was no longer strong enough to dictate. In these circumstances, Phanariots had already been appointed to key posts in the Ottoman service in the generation preceding the Ottoman catastrophe of A.D. 1683. The 138 years running from A.D. 1683 to 1821 were, however, those during which the Porte was so dependent on its Phanariot servants' knowledge of the Western World that the period may be described as a distinctively Phanariot Age of Ottoman administrative history.

Society's own spontaneous self-development. By contrast, the artificially manufactured intelligentsias suffered from the double handicap of being both *novi homines* and exotics. They would never even have come into existence, and would certainly never have come into power, if the non-Western societies on to whose stems they were grafted had not collided with a Modern Western World that was so far superior to these other societies in potency that they found themselves confronted with a choice between Westernizing and going under. The non-Western intelligentsias, unlike the Western middle class, were products and symptoms of their societies' discomfiture in encounters with a Western World which had been raised, by the rise of an indigenous middle class, to a height of prosperity and power at which it was more than a match for all its contemporaries. In short, the Western middle class stood for strength, whereas the Westernizing intelligentsias spelled weakness.

The intelligentsias, for their part, were sensitively aware of this invidious difference between themselves and the Western middle class; for the task of coping with this aggressive adversary was the intelligentsias' *raison d'être*, and they were condemned to spend themselves in this distressingly unequal contest on behalf of members of their own household from whom they had inevitably been alienated in the act of being trained to perform a social service that was as exotic from the standpoint of their native cultural tradition as it was vital in a world over which the West had cast its shadow. Their intuition of the thanklessness of their task conspired with an unavowed but inexorable nervous strain arising from the inherent contradictions in their social situation to breed in the intelligentsias a smouldering hatred of a Western middle class which was both their sire and their bane, their cynosure and their bugbear; and their excruciatingly ambivalent attitude towards this pirate sun, whose captivated planets they were, is poignantly conveyed in Catullus's elegiac couplet:

Odi et amo: quare id faciam, fortasse requiris.
nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior.¹

These two lines of Latin poetry enunciated the inexhaustible theme of a nineteenth-century Westernizing Russian literature whose masterpieces ran to many volumes; and this testament of a Russian intelligentsia that had been able to relieve its own malaise by the masterly exercise of a singular gift for self-expression faithfully mirrored the experience of other intelligentsias, sentenced to the same Psyche's task, whose unuttered woes might have been ignored if they had not found Russian spokesmen.

The intensity of an alien intelligentsia's hatred of the Western middle class gave the measure of that intelligentsia's foreboding of its own inability to emulate Western middle-class achievements. The classic instance, up to date, in which this embittering prescience had been justified by the event was the Russian intelligentsia's catastrophic failure, after the first of the two Russian revolutions in A.D. 1917, to carry out its fantastic mandate to transform the wreck of the Petrine Tsardom into a

¹ Catullus, Q.V.: *Carmina*, No. lxxxv.

parliamentary constitutional state in the nineteenth-century Western style. The Kerensky régime was a fiasco because it was saddled with the impracticable task of making bricks without straw. The Modern Western political system of responsible parliamentary government had been the creation of a middle class which had been sufficiently competent, experienced, prosperous, and numerous to come into political power when the time was ripe for it. In the social structure of the Russia of A.D. 1917 there was no corresponding element, and the Petrine Russian intelligentsia's inability to take a robust Western middle class's massive responsibilities on its own lean shoulders was demonstrated by its speedy collapse under the crushing weight of this unnatural burden. In this classic Russian instance, however, in which the action had been carried farther, midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, than in the history of any other encounter with the Modern West, the sequel had been no less quick in showing that an intelligentsia's failure to emulate the peculiar political achievement of the Western middle class was no evidence of inability to build any political structure of any kind. In Russia the same year A.D. 1917 that witnessed Kerensky's swift failure also witnessed Lenin's enduring success.

In Russia, before the year A.D. 1917 ran out, Lenin founded a polity of an original type which, in contrast to Kerensky's abortive essay in a conventional Western parliamentary régime, was constructed, not in obedience to *a priori* theory, but with a practical eye for dealing with an actual situation. As we have noticed in another context,¹ Lenin's objective was to repeat, and thereby salvage, Peter the Great's achievement of saving Russia from succumbing to the aggression of a technologically superior Western World by driving the Russian people to catch up with the vanguard of contemporary Western technological progress. Lenin faced the hard fact that this painful forced march could be exacted from an already exhausted people only by the discipline of the drill-sergeant's rod; and the particular form of dictatorial régime that he devised for his particular purpose took account of the momentary social exigencies of a Modern Western technology in its twentieth-century phase, besides conforming to a more general and enduring historical 'law' which decreed that the material gains of a revolutionary advance must always be paid for by losses of corresponding magnitude in the currency of liberty.

Lenin's political device for engineering a revolutionary Russian advance on a twentieth-century Western technological front was a personal dictatorship underpinned by the unanimous support of a unique political party that was to merit and retain its monopoly of power by the discrimination with which it selected its recruits, the fanaticism with which it indoctrinated its novices, and the discipline which it imposed on its full-fledged members. In its embodiment of this idea and these ideals, Lenin's All-Union Communist Party was not, of course, entirely without precedent. In Iranic Muslim history it had been anticipated in the Slave-Household of the Ottoman Pādīshāh,² in the Qyzylbash fraternity of devotees of the Safawīs,³ and in a Sikh Khālsā that had been

¹ On pp. 139-41, above.

² See III. iii. 31-47.

³ See I. i. 366-8 and V. v. 661-5.

called into being in a subjugated Hindu World by a decision to fight a Mughal ascendancy with its own weapons.¹ In these older Hindu and Islamic fraternities the *ethos* of the Russian heresiarch's Communist Party is already unmistakably discernible. Lenin's claim to originality rests on his independence in reinventing this formidable political instrument for himself and on his priority in applying it to the special purpose of enabling a non-Western society to hold its own against the Modern West by mastering the latest devices of a Modern Western technology without embracing the ideology that was the current Modern Western norm of orthodoxy.

The effectiveness with which this purpose was served by the Leninian single-party type of dictatorial régime was indicated by the frequency with which it was consciously imitated or inadvertently reproduced in the contemporary political history of other non-Western societies that were traditionally hostile to Russia but found themselves in the same predicament in a world in which 'the Western Question' had come to be ubiquitous.

In the Kuomintang régime established at Canton by Sun Yat-sen in A.D. 1921 a tincture of Russian Communism was deliberately introduced by the Chinese philosopher-statesman in A.D. 1923;² and, in the subsequent history of the Kuomintang National Government of China, the Leninian form of political constitution—a personal dictatorship supported by a unique party—significantly survived the breach which opened in A.D. 1927 between the Kuomintang and a Chinese Communist Party which had sought to take advantage of its affiliation to the Kuomintang in order to gain control of the National Government from within.³ Though the Chinese Communists' rival pretensions were based on a claim to be genuine exponents of a Leninism which was admittedly diluted with Liberalism in the Kuomintang's ideology, the Kuomintang did not demonstrate the sincerity of its unfeigned eagerness to dissociate itself from Communism by repudiating the Leninian element in its own constitution and doctrine. The exigencies of a common predicament constrained a now bitterly anti-Russian Chinese ex-revolutionary party to continue to handle 'the Western Question' according to the inevitable Russian political prescription. From A.D. 1927 to A.D. 1949, when the Chinese Communists swept the Kuomintang off the Chinese political chess-board, the pious assurance in the Kuomintang's creed that 'the period of tutelage', which was the second of the three stages of revolution prescribed by Sun Yat-sen, was to be followed in due course by an unrestrictedly democratic dispensation was still just

¹ See V. v. 665–8.

² On returning to Canton in the summer of A.D. 1923 after a temporary loss of his foothold there in A.D. 1922, Sun Yat-sen brought with him as his political adviser a representative of the Soviet Government at Moscow, Michael Borodin (see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. II (London 1928, Milford), p. 311). The members of the Chinese Communist Party, which had been formed *circa* A.D. 1920 (see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926 (London 1928, Milford), p. 240, n. 1), were admitted to membership in the Kuomintang at the beginning of A.D. 1924 (see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927 (London 1929, Milford), p. 333).

³ The Chinese Communist Party fell foul of the right wing of the Kuomintang at Nanchang in March 1927 and of the left wing of the Kuomintang at Hankow in June 1927 (see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927 (London 1929, Milford), pp. 331–65).

as far from fulfilment¹ as the even more pious assurance in the Russian Marxist book of revelation that 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' was to fade out at long last through a withering away of the state itself.

The adoption of the Leninian type of polity in China was not so remarkable, however, as its adoption in Turkey; for, by the time when, on the morrow of the First World War, Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk established his revolutionary dictatorship *more Russico*, Russia had been Turkey's traditional 'Enemy Number One' for 150 years past, and a Russian provenance would have been enough in itself to discredit any idea or institution in Turkish eyes if this strong initial prejudice had not been overridden by some ineluctable necessity. The reason why patriotic-minded Turks were willing to take a lesson from Russia in this case was that their chastening experience of defeat in the First World War at the hands of technologically superior Western Powers had made the Turks, like the Russians, acutely aware that they must put themselves through a Westernizing technological revolution if they wished to survive; and the Turks, like the Russians, perceived that they could not carry out this revolutionary social manoeuvre unless they fell into the Leninian political formation of a *comitatus* at the heels of a dictator. Turkey's happy issue out of an urgently necessary revolution that had been accomplished at this temporary cost was declared when, on the 14th May, 1950, a party which by that date had been monopolizing political power in the country for twenty-seven years peacefully gave way to an opposition party by which it had been defeated in a genuinely free parliamentary general election.

Both the Turks and the Chinese could go to school in a Russian political academy without 'loss of face', since, like the Russians, they were heirs of non-Western cultures at bay against the Modern West, while, in their grim common race against Time to find a solution for an ubiquitous 'Western Question', it was manifest that the Russians were considerably ahead of all their fellow runners. A more impressive tribute (though it was a left-handed compliment) was paid to the Russian intelligentsia's political genius during the inter-war years in a mimesis of the Leninian polity in two great Western countries—Italy and Germany—where the local representatives of the Western middle class had failed to display the political ability of their brethren on the Atlantic seaboard without being their inferiors in an aptitude for technology that was the distinctive characteristic of Modern Western Man.

In Germany and Italy the Fascist and National Socialist imitations of the Communist Russian totalitarian state had run headlong into disaster within the lifetimes of their makers. In China a Kuomintang régime—in which a Leninian combine of dictator and *comitatus* had been incongruously overlaid with an appliqué-work of Western liberal political motifs—had been ousted in A.D. 1949 by a Communist régime which claimed to be a faithful Chinese copy of an original Russian new model. In Russia this original Leninian polity had survived the tremendous

¹ See, for example, the passage of the Government Organization Law, promulgated at Nanking on the 3rd October, 1928, which is quoted in *Survey of International Affairs*, 1928 (London 1929, Milford), p. 389.

ordeal of a Second World War to emerge as a rallying-point for all the forces still in the field against the ascendancy of the West over the World, and as the mighty antagonist of the United States if a devastating twentieth-century competition for world power were ever to be carried into a fatal final round. In Turkey, in contrast to Italy and Germany, a dictator who had introduced the Leninian polity there as a Russian means to a non-Communist end had died in his bed and had transmitted his dictatorship to a less demonic successor; and this successor and his partisans had afterwards demonstrated the sincerity of their conversion to the parliamentary democratic political ideals of the West by relinquishing office in obedience to the verdict of a parliamentary election in which they had not misused their power in order to 'rig' the results in their own favour, contrary to the will of the electorate.

This bewildering diversity of the mid-twentieth-century political landscape in non-Western or ex-Western provinces of a West-ridden World was one of many indications that the drama of the Modern West's encounter with the other living civilizations was then still in an early act even on the political plane of action, and *a fortiori* far from its denouement at deeper levels; and this conclusion would suggest that our survey of encounters with the Modern Western Civilization up to date had yielded all the illumination that it was capable of yielding at the time of writing. If a twentieth-century observer was to carry his study of encounters between civilizations farther, he must turn away from the spectacle of an uncompleted drama, in which the Modern Western Civilization was the protagonist, to consider the histories of other encounters in which the whole story lay within his ken because the play had here already been played out to a finish.

(b) ENCOUNTERS WITH MEDIEVAL WESTERN CHRISTENDOM

1. *The Flow and Ebb of the Crusades*¹

Ex hypothesi the whole story of the encounters between a Medieval Western Christendom and its neighbours was known to the writer of this Study and his contemporaries, since this story must have come to an end before the beginning of the subsequent story in which a Modern Western Society was the principal character. These two successive stories of encounters in which the Western Civilization was involved had at least one feature in common: in both episodes the Westerners had been the aggressors. In these two successive outbreaks, however, the Western aggressors had followed different paths with different consequences. In their modern outbreak, as we have seen, they had taken ship from the Atlantic seaboard of Western Europe and had found their way over the Ocean to all quarters of the globe; in their medieval outbreak—for which a convenient short title was 'the Crusades' in the broadest usage of the word²—they had taken ship from the Mediterranean seaboard of Western Europe for the Levant, or ridden out across the open eastern land-frontier of their Western Christian

¹ See xi, map. 41.

² See I. i. 38 and V. v. 242-4.

World into the adjoining domains of Orthodox Christendom in South-East Europe and in Russia. In conquering the World through mastering the Ocean, the Modern Westerners had been pioneers in an oecumenical adventure of which the issue was still hidden in the future mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era. On the other hand in invading Dār-al-Islām and Orthodox Christendom the Medieval Western Christians had been treading in the Hellenic footprints of Alexander the Great and Titus Quinctius Flamininus on well-worn tracks that had led them to the source of their religion at Jerusalem and the source of their secular culture at Athens.¹

The medieval outbreak of the Western Society in the eleventh century of the Christian Era was as surprisingly abrupt as its modern outbreak at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the eventual collapse of the medieval Western adventure came as swiftly as its initial success. An intelligent observer from India, China, or Japan who had made his way to the other end of the Old World in the fifth or sixth decade of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era would have been as unlikely to foresee that the Western intruders were on the verge of being expelled from both 'Dār-al-Islām'² and 'Romania'³ as he would have been—had he arrived on the scene three hundred years earlier—to foresee that these same two worlds were at that date on the verge of being attacked and overrun by the hitherto apparently backward and ineffective natives of the far western extremity of the cultivated visitor's *Oikoumenē*.

As soon as he had learnt to distinguish the two Hellenistic Christian societies from a Hellenising Syriac Society⁴ which was in process of conversion from the Monophysite and Nestorian Christian heresies and Zoroastrianism to the all but Christian heresy of Islam,⁵ our imaginary tenth-century Far Eastern observer would probably have come to the conclusion that, of these three local competitors for the command of the Mediterranean Sea and its hinterlands, Orthodox Christendom had the best prospects and Western Christendom the worst.

On the divers tests of the competing societies' comparative standing in wealth, education, administrative efficiency, and success in war, Orthodox Christendom would assuredly have come out at the top of our mid-tenth-century observer's list, and Western Christendom at the bottom. Western Christendom in that generation was an agrarian society in which urban life was exotic⁶ and coin a rare currency, whereas in contemporary Orthodox Christendom there was a money economy based on an efficient and prosperous commerce and industry.⁷ In Western Christendom the clergy alone was literate, whereas in Orthodox Christendom there was a lay governing class that was not merely literate but was educated in the high culture of an extinct Hellenic Society to which both the Christendoms were affiliated.⁸ On the political plane,

¹ See I. i. 19 and X. ix. 100-1.

² The derelict domain of the Caliphate.

³ The derelict domain of the East Roman Empire.

⁴ See p. 408, with n. 5, below.

⁵ For this Christian aspect of Islam, see the quotation from Nöldeke and Schwally in V. v. 230, n. 4. For the replacement of Monophysite and Nestorian Christianity by Islam in the Syriac World, see xi, maps 38 and 39.

⁶ See pp. 276 and 284-6, above.

⁷ See IV. iv. 344.

⁸ See IV. iv. 345-6.

Western Christendom was living in a state of anarchy into which it had been plunged by the speedy failure of the semi-barbarian war-lord Charlemagne's over-ambitious attempt to erect a replica of the Roman Empire on this unpropitious *terrain*, whereas in Orthodox Christendom the revival of the Roman Empire by Leo Syrus, two generations before Charlemagne's day, had proved itself a success by a record—now more than two hundred years long—of survival, consolidation, and expansion.¹ During the second quarter of the tenth century this nascent East Roman Empire had begun reconquering from Dār-al-Islām territories south-east of the Taurus which a moribund Roman Empire had lost in the seventh century to Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors.² By the same test the fortunes of the Syriac World must be judged to be now on the wane; yet, even on this crude and imperfect criterion of ordeal by battle, the Syriac Society was not yet so far gone in its decline as to have lost the upper hand in its contest with the barbarous Christians of the West.

After the tide of Muslim conquest had begun to recede on land, it had continued for a time to advance at sea, and Orthodox Christendom as well as Western Christendom had been roughly handled in the ninth century by Maghribī Muslim buccaneers. They had wrested Crete out of the East Roman Empire's grasp in A.D. 823 and Sicily in A.D. 840–902; in A.D. 904, under the leadership of an East Roman renegade, Leo of Tripoli, they had swooped down upon Salonica, the metropolis of the East Roman Empire's surviving possessions in Continental European Greece; and in A.D. 949 they inflicted a disastrous defeat on an East Roman expeditionary force that had been commissioned to recapture a lost command of the Aegean Sea by driving the Maghribī Muslims out of their provocative Cretan outpost. The East Romans, however, did not acquiesce in this defeat, and they duly reconquered Crete in a second expedition in A.D. 961. No similar act of self-help is recorded to the credit of the Western Christians in the annals of their victimization by the Maghribī Muslims during the same period of Mediterranean naval history.

The eighth-century Carolingians' modest military achievements of expelling the Arab garrisons from Septimania³ and establishing a Frankish march in the southern foothills of the Eastern Pyrenees⁴ had been more than offset in the ninth century, after the Carolingian Empire's collapse, by the Maghribī buccaneers' audacious seizure of commanding points in ex-Carolingian territory. Andalusian Muslim raiders had appeared again in Septimania in A.D. 841.⁵ Garde Freynet (Fraxinetum), overhanging the coast of Provence, had been occupied *circa* A.D. 891–4,⁶ and an equally well placed stronghold at the mouth of the Garigliano *circa* A.D. 885; and the Muslim aggressors had not allowed themselves to be confined to their beach-heads; they had almost suc-

¹ See IV. iv. 340–4.

² See IV. iv. 399.

³ The date of the Frankish conquest of Narbonne was A.D. 751, according to Lévy-Provençal, E.: *Histoire de l'Espagne Musulmane*, vol. i (Cairo 1941, Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire), p. 46.

⁴ Gerona seceded to the Franks in A.D. 785 (*ibid.*, p. 91); Barcelona was conquered by them in A.D. 801 (*ibid.*, pp. 123 and 125–7).

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 148.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 386.

ceeded in cutting Western Christendom in two by pushing inland from the Riviera and infesting the Alpine passes;¹ and between A.D. 840 and A.D. 876 they had come equally near to driving a wedge between Western and Orthodox Christendom by conquering the Lombard country in the lowlands of Apulia after they had gained a foothold in the intervening East Roman island of Sicily. The consummation of this Muslim conquest of Apulia had been averted only because its imminence had moved the East Roman Government to intervene there in A.D. 876;² but, for the local Western Christian population of Southern Italy, the consequence had been, not liberation, but merely the substitution of alien East Roman Orthodox Christian for alien Maghribī Muslim masters. Western Christendom's narrow escape from losing Provence and the Western Christian parts of Italy to the Maghribī Muslims³ in the ninth and tenth centuries was due, not to Western Christian, but to East Roman, prowess.⁴

On this showing, a mid-tenth-century Far Eastern observer of Far Western affairs could hardly have failed to forecast that, in this outlandish group of barely distinguishable yet mutually antipathetic local societies, the future lay with Orthodox Christendom, and that, whatever might be the destiny of the Syriac World, Western Christendom at any rate had no prospect of emerging from an impotence and obscurity that were the inevitable penalties of a benighted inefficiency. There can be little doubt that our observer would have been astonished at the actual event if he could have lived on to witness it.

A more penetrating vision than could be expected of any contemporary observer, alien or local, might perhaps have caught glimpses of the realities underlying the deceptive appearances of the mid-tenth-century scene in the environs of the Mediterranean. The deadly hidden weaknesses of Orthodox Christendom, which were so soon to be brought to light and were to become so glaringly evident in retrospect, have been analysed in this Study already in another context.⁵ As for the Syriac World, it had been enjoying a spell of delusive well-being in a belated 'Indian Summer' under a universal state which had been reconstituted

¹ The Muslims of Freynet had raided San Gall in A.D. 939 (*ibid.*, p. 387).

² See IV. iv. 343-4.

³ During the years A.D. 880-915 the Maghribī Muslim raiders were ranging at will over Central Italy as far inland as the upper valley of the Tiber (Gay, J.: *L'Italie Méridionale et l'Empire Byzantin, 867-1071* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing), p. 159).

⁴ The Maghribī Muslim stronghold at the mouth of the Garigliano was smoked out in A.D. 915 by a combined effort of all the Western Christian communities in Central and Southern Italy under East Roman leadership, and this signal public service confirmed the East Roman Empire's recently established hegemony over all Western Christian Italy south of the duchies of Rome and Spoleto (Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 162). In A.D. 931 and A.D. 942 the East Roman Navy made two unsuccessful attempts to help Hugh of Provence, who was connected by marriage with the East Roman imperial house of the day, to smoke the Muslims out of Garde Freynet (Schaube, A.: *Handelsgeschichte der Romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge* (Munich and Berlin 1906, Oldenbourg), p. 98). Thereafter a Western Christendom that had rallied under the auspices of the Saxon wardens of its north-eastern marches (see II. ii. 167-8) did succeed in A.D. 973 in clearing the Maghribī Muslims out of both Garde Freynet and the Alpine passes by its own efforts (Schaube, *op. cit.*, pp. 98 and 69). Yet, even after that, the Muslims demonstrated that they still retained their naval command of the Western Mediterranean by sacking Barcelona on the 7th July, 985 (Schaube, *op. cit.*, p. 103; Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 435), as they had sacked Genoa in A.D. 935 (Schaube, *op. cit.*, p. 63).

⁵ See IV. iv. 320-408.

in the shape of the Caliphate, after an Hellenic intrusion which had lasted for a thousand years, by latter-day Arab restorers of a prematurely overthrown Achaemenian Empire.¹ In the tenth century of the Christian Era the truth was that the Syriac Society was nearing the end of an abnormally prolonged old age, while a still adolescent Orthodox Christendom was in the more tragic plight of being already stricken with a mortal disease beneath the surface. Western Christendom had escaped this fate thanks to the failure of Charlemagne's attempt to emulate Leo Syrus's feat by saddling her with the incubus of a revival of the Roman Empire; and in the tenth century this apparently feeble and ineffective Western Society actually possessed hidden springs of vitality which were soon to well out in titanic activities on every plane of life.

A discerning observer's eye might have noticed that a Western Christian Society which had offered such slight resistance to its Muslim assailants from the Mediterranean had been valiantly and successfully fighting for its life against contemporary pagan Scandinavian assailants from the North Sea² and Magyar assailants from the Eurasian Steppe; and even against the Muslims the West had not been in retreat all along the line. The humiliating helplessness of Charlemagne's Frankish epigoni in Italy and Provence was balanced in the Iberian Peninsula by a gradual and inconspicuous but continuous and well-consolidated advance to the credit of the heirs of the Visigoths. By the second decade of the tenth century of the Christian Era, which saw the Muslim Power in the Peninsula raised by the Cordovan Umayyad Caliph 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III An-Nāsir (*imperabat* A.D. 912-61) to a zenith at which it continued to stand until its sudden collapse in A.D. 1009, the remnant of the Kingdom of Visigothia which had survived in the mountain-fastnesses of Cantabria and Asturia had reoccupied all but the headwaters of the basin of the Douro and, on the west coast, had pushed on beyond into the valley of the Mondego;³ and, though 'Abd-ar-Rahmān and his

¹ This aspect of the Arab Caliphate as a resumption of the Achaemenian Empire has been noticed in I. i. 76-77.

² See II. ii. 194-202.

³ The Arabs had relaxed their hold on the north-west corner of the Iberian Peninsula while they had been making the attempt to conquer Aquitaine from the Franks which had ended so disastrously in A.D. 732 (see Lévy-Provencal, *op. cit.*, p. 49), and the Berber colonists of this region had then been weakened first by a series of unsuccessful revolts against their Arab overlords and afterwards by a re-exodus *en masse* to North-West Africa during a five-years' famine circa A.D. 750-5 (*ibid.*, pp. 37 and 50). In consequence, King Alfonso I of Asturia (*regnabat* A.D. 739-57) was able to reoccupy the whole of the Douro (Duero) Basin from Osma downwards (*ibid.*, pp. 49-50). Oporto, at the mouth of the Douro, was conquered in A.D. 868 (*ibid.*, p. 223), and Coimbra, at the mouth of the Mondego, in A.D. 878 (*ibid.*, p. 224). King Alfonso II (*regnabat* A.D. 791-842) had actually occupied Lisbon from A.D. 799 to 808/9 (*ibid.*, p. 122). Garcia I (*regnabat* A.D. 910-14) transferred the capital of Asturia from Oviedo—the refugee Pelayo's fastness between the Asturian mountains and the north coast—to León at the mountains' southern foot (*ibid.*, p. 305), which the Muslims had retaken in A.D. 846 but had failed to hold (*ibid.*, p. 144); and in A.D. 913, three years before the opening of 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III's counter-offensive, Ordoño II had raided Evora (*ibid.*, p. 305) from his Galician appanage. Alfonso III (*regnabat* A.D. 866-910) had consolidated Asturia's gains by repopulating the devastated marches with Christian (*musta'rib*) refugees from territories under Muslim rule (*ibid.*, p. 228); but Asturia still remained open to invasion from Andalusia round the north-east corner of the Guadarrama mountain range so long as the headwaters of the Douro remained in Muslim hands—and, till after the collapse of the Muslim power in the Peninsula in A.D. 1009, San Esteban de Gormaz and Osma remained the farthest outposts of the Asturian Kingdom towards

no less puissant successor the dictator Abu 'Āmir Muhammad Al-Mansūr (*dominabatur* A.D. 981-1002) found themselves able to raid the Asturian kingdom and its diminutive independent Christian neighbours, Navarre and Aragon, at will and to compel them to acknowledge Andalusia's hegemony, neither of these great Andalusian Muslim soldiers and statesmen succeeded in permanently reoccupying, not to speak of recolonizing, any of the country that had been recovered by Visigothia's Asturian successor-state in the course of the century and a half preceding 'Abd-ar-Rahmān's accession.

This retransfer of a remote and uninviting corner of the Iberian Peninsula from Muslim to Western Christian hands, and its still more significant retention in Christian hands throughout the ordeal of A.D. 916-1009, passed almost unnoticed at the time, but, in retrospect, the failure of An-Nāsir and Al-Mansūr to complete a Muslim conquest of the Peninsula, which had been all but completed, some two hundred years before An-Nāsir resumed the task, by the first Arab *conquistador* Mūsā b. Nusayr, could be seen to have signified the turn of a tide which in the following century was to carry the Western Crusaders from the Douro to the Jordan and beyond; and the shrine of St. James at Compostela, in this out-of-the-way province which was the first fragment of Dār-al-Islām to fall into Western Christian hands, was already becoming second only to Jerusalem itself in attractiveness as a goal for Western Christian pilgrims.²

These entries on the credit side of a tenth-century Western Christendom's military account are not insignificant, but they are less significant than their accompaniments on the cultural plane. In France and England the Scandinavian invaders were not only brought to a halt, but those of them who were not ejected from the invaded territories were so wholeheartedly captivated by a Western Christian culture which they had failed to wipe out that they became its champions instead of its assailants.³ In the same century this Western Christian Civilization showed itself worthy of its new proselytes' devotion by taking the first step towards putting its own house in order. The spiritual citadel of Early Medieval Western Christendom was monasticism, and the tenth-century Cluniac rejuvenation of the Benedictine way of monastic life was the archetype of all subsequent Western social reforms, religious and secular.

These unobtrusive signs of fresh life in a tenth-century Western Christendom are impressive when we bring them to light; yet, even when they have been given all their due, they seem hardly adequate to account for the amazing outburst of energy in an eleventh-century Western Christendom—an outburst in which the outbreak of aggression against the two neighbouring societies was one of the less creative and less estimable episodes. At the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries

the South-East (*ibid.*, p. 228). Towards the North-East, Pampeluna, which had shaken off the Arab yoke in A.D. 798 (*ibid.*, p. 123), had become the principal city of the independent Basque Christian Kingdom of Navarre.

¹ This was the year in which 'Abd-ar-Rahmān opened his offensive against the Asturian Christians according to Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

² Compostela had been a pilgrimage resort since the ninth century (*ibid.*, p. 441). When Al-Mansūr raided it in A.D. 997, he spared the tomb of the Apostle St. James (*ibid.*, pp. 440 and 442).

³ See II. ii. 201-2.

the Western Christian Civilization followed up its feat of captivating the Scandinavian interlopers in Normandy and the Danelaw, and matched the Orthodox Christian Civilization's contemporary feat of converting the Scandinavian makers of Russia, by bringing within its fold the Scandinavian war-bands in their native lairs, as well as the continental barbarians of Hungary and Poland.¹ In the eleventh century the fundamental Cluniac reform of Western monastic life was followed up by the more ambitious Hildebrandine reform of the whole constitution and discipline of the Western Church, while the obscure conquest of the north-western corner of the Iberian Peninsula was followed up by a sensational forward movement along the entire length of the Mediterranean. In the Iberian Peninsula the eleventh-century Western Christian *conquistadores* established their ascendancy over the Cordovan Umayyad Caliphate's successor-states by conquering Toledo. In the Central Mediterranean they overran the East Roman Empire's dominions in Southern Italy and went on to conquer Sicily from Muslim intruders on Greek Orthodox Christian ground whom the East Roman Government had first failed to keep out and afterwards failed to eject. In the Levant, where they were operating at the opposite extremity of the Mediterranean Basin from their West European base, the Western Crusaders eclipsed in one expedition all the conquests, at the expense of the 'Abbasid Caliphate's successor-states, which it had taken the East Romans a century and a half (A.D. 927-1071) to win and one campaign to lose, by carving out, in and after 'the First Crusade' (*gerebatur* A.D. 1095-9), a chain of Western Christian principalities extending continuously from Antioch and Edessa through Tripoli to Jerusalem.²

¹ See II. ii. 168 and IV. iv. 378-9.

² In this eleventh-century forward movement the Normans and the North Italian maritime city-states Venice, Pisa, and Genoa were active on all three fronts; the Northern French, other than the Normans, made an appearance on the Iberian front (see V. v. 242, n. 4) and turned out in force to take part in the First Crusade; the Southern French likewise went into action on the Syrian front, but not (see Schaubé, *op. cit.*, p. 100) on either the Iberian or the Central Mediterranean front, though these two theatres of operations lay at their door.

On the Iberian front the Western Christians' eleventh-century successes were mostly achieved between A.D. 1009, when the Cordovan Muslim power collapsed, and A.D. 1086, when the Murābit Muslim Berber barbarians from Africa made their first passage of the Straits of Gibraltar in response to an appeal from some of the Cordovan Caliphate's successor-states for help against their Western Christian barbarian assailants from Europe. The most important permanent Western Christian advance in the Peninsula in this chapter of history was the conquest of Toledo in A.D. 1085 by King Alfonso VI of Castile; but, far beyond the limits of the conquered territories, the Western Christian frontiersmen exerted their power over the Peninsular Muslim *mulūk-at-tawā'id* of the day by raiding their dominions, compelling them to purchase immunity from raids by paying tribute, and even establishing permanent cantonments of Western Christian war-bands in Muslim territory. García Jimenes' cantonment at Aledo (A.D. 1085-92) may be compared with the fifth-century settlements of Visigoths and Burgundians in the Roman dominions in Gaul, and the Cid's and his heirs' 'protectorate' (*gerebatur* A.D. 1086-92 and 1094-1102) over the Muslim principality of Valencia with the fifth-century domination of Ricimer over the Roman Imperial Government at Ravenna.

On the Central Mediterranean front the Pisans and Genoese were the first to move. The sack of Genoa by the Maghribi Muslims in A.D. 935 was avenged when the Muslims were driven out of Sardinia in A.D. 1016 by the combined efforts of the Genoese and the Pisans and when the Pisans raided Bona in the Maghrib in A.D. 1034 (Schaubé, *op. cit.*, p. 50). From A.D. 1040 onwards the naval operations of the two North-West Italian maritime republics on this front were followed up by the conquests of the Normans on land—though a Pisan attack on Palermo in A.D. 1063 failed for lack of concerted action

The eventual collapse of the Medieval Western Christian ascendancy in the Mediterranean Basin that had thus been imposed at one amazing swoop would have been no less surprising to a Far Eastern observer re-surveying the scene 150 years after the First Crusade and 300 years after the time, half-way through the tenth century, when the fortunes of Western Christendom had been at their nadir.

In reckoning up the profits and losses of a century and a half of incessant strife, our imaginary mid-thirteenth-century observer would have noted that, in their distant and exposed outposts in Syria, the Western Christian aggressors had lost all their conquests except a few bridgeheads within three-quarters of a century. The territorial spoils of the First Crusade (*gerebatur* A.D. 1095-9) had neither been preserved by the Second Crusade (*gerebatur* A.D. 1146-9) nor recovered by the Third (*gerebatur* A.D. 1187¹-92), which was the most fiercely contested of these three successive trials of strength between Western aggressors and an Islamic World at bay; and the virtuosity of Frederick II Hohenstaufen's accommodation with the Ayyūbid Kāmil in A.D. 1228-9² could

on the Normans' part, while, conversely, a single-handed Norman attack against Palermo and Girgenti in A.D. 1064 was likewise a failure, with the consequence that Palermo was able to hold out against the Normans till A.D. 1072 (Chalandon, *F. Histoire de la Domination Normande en Italie et en Sicile* (Paris 1907, Picard, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 203, 204, and 207-8; Schaube, *op. cit.*, p. 50). The Pisans and Genoese did not succeed in expelling the Muslims from Corsica till A.D. 1091 (see V. v. 244 and 622, n. 3).

Along the Mediterranean coast of the Iberian Peninsula the sack of Barcelona by the Muslims in A.D. 985 was avenged in the conquest of Almería by the Genoese in A.D. 1046 and in the joint Genoese-Catalan expedition against Tortosa in A.D. 1092-3 (Schaube, *op. cit.*, p. 64). The final demonstration that the 'thalassocracy' of the Western Mediterranean Basin had now passed from the Maghribi Muslims to the Western Christians was given by the sensational success of the Pisan naval expedition against Mahdiyyah in A.D. 1087. The principality of Mahdiyyah was compelled to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Pope and to open its doors to Pisan and Genoese traders. The local prince Tamim's son was carried away captive to Pisa, where he settled down to serve as town crier (Schaube, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51)—as Perseus the last king of Macedon's son Alexander had settled down in his Roman captivity to serve as town clerk in the rural Latin colony Alba Fucensis.

¹ Reckoning the war as beginning with Saladin's assault on the Kingdom of Jerusalem in A.D. 1187, rather than with the Western Christian counter-attack in A.D. 1189.

² Frederick's first move was to make an alliance with Kāmil, whose dominions were at the moment confined to Egypt, against Kāmil's brother Mu'azzam, the prince of Damascus, whose Syrian dominions were the target of Frederick's prospective territorial claims. This astute step was unexpectedly countered by the unforeseen accident of Mu'azzam's death, which robbed Kāmil's alliance with Frederick of its original value in Kāmil's calculations and at the same time gave Kāmil a personal interest in the Syrian portion of the Ayyūbid dominions, which had now passed into his hands. Notwithstanding this unpropitious change in the situation, Frederick succeeded in persuading Kāmil to cede to him Jerusalem (minus the Haram-ash-Sharif), Bethlehem, and Nazareth, together with one corridor of territory connecting Bethlehem and Jerusalem, and another connecting Nazareth, with the surviving bridgeheads of the Kingdom of Jerusalem along the Syrian coast. This remarkable diplomatic achievement was mainly due to the moderation shown by both parties in contenting themselves with the satisfaction of their minimum desiderata. Kāmil was content to retain the principal Islamic holy place in Palestine, without seeking to drive the Franks into the sea, while Frederick was content to recover the principal Christian holy places in Palestine without seeking once again to insulate the Asiatic from the African domain of Dār-al-Islām. A contributory cause of the settlement of A.D. 1228-9 was Frederick's ability and readiness to come on to the other party's ground. Frederick personally conducted in Arabic his negotiations with Kāmil's envoy Fakhr-ad-Din, and he fraternized with the local Muslims throughout his stay in the Levant (see Kantorowicz, *E.: Frederick the Second, 1194-1250* (London 1931, Constable), pp. 176-99).

If the Western Christians had been sincere in their profession that the liberation of the Christian holy places in Palestine was the objective of their military expeditions to the Levant, they would have been constrained to admit that, after their decisive and

not conceal the hard fact that in Syria the invaders had failed—in spite of the opening offered to them by the decay of the 'Fātimid' Shī'ī Anticaliphate before the rise of the 'Abbasid Sunnī Caliphate's vigorous Ayyūbid successor-state—to achieve their strategic objective of insulating the Asiatic from the African and Iberian provinces of Dār-al-Islām. They had also failed to exploit an opportunity in Ifrīkiyah of insulating the Muslim citadel in Egypt from Maghrib-al-Aqsā and Andalusia during the lull between the recession of the 'Fātimid' wave of Berber invaders from Eastern Kabylia and the onrush of a mightier wave of Muwahhid Berber invaders from the Atlas.¹ The bridgeheads that the Norman kingdom of Sicily had begun to establish along the coasts of Tunisia and Tripolitania in A.D. 1134 had all been swept away again by A.D. 1158.

In the Iberian Peninsula, on the other hand, all that was left of the former Islamic domain by the middle of the thirteenth century was an enclave round Granada; and this was not the only front on which Western Christendom had been recouping herself for her losses in Syria. The vigour of the resistance that the Third Crusade had encountered in colliding with the rejuvenated Sunnī Muslim Power which Saladin had taken over and built up had moved the Crusaders to seek alternative satisfaction for their cupidity at the expense of a less truculent victim. The lead which the Normans had given by conquering East Roman Italy (A.D. 1040–81) and going on to attack the broader East Roman dominions east of the Adriatic (A.D. 1081–5 and 1185–91) had been followed up by Richard Coeur-de-Lion when he had seized the East Roman island of Cyprus in A.D. 1191, and by the captains of the Fourth Crusade when they had allowed their course to be diverted from its original objective in Syria to Constantinople in A.D. 1203. Mid-way through the thirteenth century a French emperor was reigning at Constantinople, a French marquis at Bodonitsa, a French duke at Athens, and a French prince in the Morea, while there were few Greek islands in the Aegean that had not fallen into Italian hands. Yet these unseemly conquests at a sister Christian society's expense were not the chief ground for hope in the minds of Western Crusaders of the generation of St. Louis. They were less concerned to console themselves with Orthodox Christian spoils for reverses at Muslim hands than to retrieve these reverses with the aid of Nestorian Christian allies.

The forgotten Nestorian Christendom of the Far East had dramatically appeared above the Western Crusaders' eastern horizon in the

definitive military defeat by Saladin, their objective had been reattained for them by Frederick's diplomacy on terms which were guaranteed by the auspicious fact that on this occasion they had been voluntarily conceded by the local Muslim Power. Jerusalem was indeed soon wrested again out of Frankish hands by force of arms; but this time the assailants were not the *Terre d'Outre Mer's* Ayyūbid neighbours but the remote Khwarizmian wardens of Dār-al-Islām's north-eastern march, who were hurled into the Ayyūbid and Frankish dominions in Syria in A.D. 1243–4 by the irresistible impetus of their headlong flight before the face of the pursuing Mongols.

¹ This opportunity was particularly favourable for a Frankish barbarian invader, since, after the successful defection of the Sanhāja Berbers of Western Kabylia from the Fātimids in A.D. 1045, Ifrīkiyah had been devastated by the barbarian Nomad Arab Banu Hilāl and Banu Sulaym, who had been unleashed against the Sanhāja by the Fātimids (see Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 368–9).

train of the Mongol Eurasian Nomad world-conquerors. There were Nestorian Uighur Turkish secretaries in the Mongols' service who had won their masters' gratitude and confidence by meeting a sudden need for clerks' work which had arisen from the Mongols' lightning-swift acquisition of an oecumenical empire,¹ while on the other hand the Muslims whom the Mongols had been subjugating in rapidly increasing numbers since their invasion of the Khwārizm Shah's dominions in A.D. 1220 had fallen foul of pagan rulers whose regulations were irreconcilable with the ritual prescriptions of the *Sharī'ah*.² Might not the Western Christians and the Far Eastern Christians manage, by a joint effort, to convert the Mongols to Christianity and then enlist their invincible converts in a common anti-Muslim crusade which would have the finality of a war of annihilation? The Mongols, as they had already demonstrated, had the will and the power to commit 'genocide'. How, then, could the Muslims escape extermination if they were encircled by ruthless Christian assailants attacking them simultaneously on a continental as well as a maritime front?

The seriousness with which these hopes were taken in a mid-thirteenth-century Western Christendom was indicated by the missions to the Mongol Khāqān's court at Qāraqorum on which Friar Giovanni di Piano Carpini was dispatched by Pope Innocent IV in A.D. 1246 and Friar William of Rubruck by Saint Louis in A.D. 1253.³ Yet this Christian grand design for the extirpation of Islam proved to be a castle in the air. The critical years in which the opportunity came and went were A.D. 1258-62. In A.D. 1258 the Mongols dealt Islam a stunning blow by taking and sacking Baghdad and putting an end to the Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate; in A.D. 1260 they crossed the Euphrates under a Nestorian Christian commander and occupied Damascus, within not much more than a hundred miles of the Western Crusaders' still-surviving bridgehead at Acre.⁴ At that moment the converging Christian forces were within an ace of joining hands;⁵ but the junction was never made, though Mongol armies crossed the Euphrates once again, in A.D. 1281,⁶ before the Western bridgehead at Acre was pinched out by the Ayyūbids' Mamlūk successors in A.D. 1291.

Meanwhile, the liquidation of the French conquests in the former domain of the East Roman Empire, which had begun on the very morrow of the Franco-Venetian sack of Constantinople in A.D. 1204, had suddenly gathered momentum. In A.D. 1259 the Greek Orthodox Christian Emperor of Nicaea, Michael Palaiolōghos, had overthrown and captured Prince

¹ See II. ii. 238.

² See VI. vii. 257 and X. ix. 36.

³ See II. ii. 451.

⁴ This is the approximate distance by the shortest of the several alternative practicable routes, which runs (in the direction Acre-Damascus) via Rāmāh, Safad, and the Bridge of Jacob's Daughters spanning the Jordan between the Sea of Galilee and Lake Banyas, whence it travels on to Damascus through Qunaytirah. This shortest route is an arduous one, since it clammers over the southernmost spurs of both Lebanon and Antilebanon, but the easiest alternative route—running south-eastward from Acre through the Vale of Esdraelon, crossing the Jordan below the Sea of Galilee instead of above it, and then turning north-north-eastward—is about half as long again. A description of these and other alternative routes between Acre and Damascus is given by Sir George Adam Smith in *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (London 1904, Hodder and Stoughton), pp. 426-8.

⁵ See II. ii. 238 and 451, and p. 222, above.

⁶ See I. i. 350.

William II of the Morea at the Battle of Pelagonia; in A.D. 1261 he evicted the French from Constantinople; and in A.D. 1262 he extorted from his Moreot French captive the cession of three fortresses in the Morea¹ as the price of his release. In thus progressively driving the French out of the territories that they had stolen from the East Roman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula, the Nicaean Greek Orthodox Christians were working, not for themselves, but for their more effective Ottoman Turkish Muslim successors.² Michael Palaiolōghos, the Nicaean conqueror of Constantinople, was the forerunner of her subsequent Brusan conqueror Mehmed Fātih; and the Greek Orthodox Christian dynasty of which Michael was the founder spent a considerable part of its constantly dwindling resources for 170 years (A.D. 1262-1432) out of its 194 years-long tenure of power (A.D. 1259-1453) in doggedly reconquering the Morea, foot by foot, from its interloping Western Christian masters. The din of arms clashing in this parochial inter-Christian strife echoed so loudly from the flanks of Mount Erymanthus that both the bands of Moreot Christian combatants were deaf to the thunder of an Ottoman battle-axe staving in the gates of the Hexamli. The reconquest of the Morea was completed by Constantine Dhrāghasis as Greek prince of the Morea in A.D. 1432, twenty-one years before he died in Constantinople at Saint Romanus's Gate as the last of the East Roman Emperors. As both prince and emperor, he had served in effect as the Pādishāh's bailiff, and the Ottoman conqueror duly followed up his occupation of Constantinople by taking over a reconquered Morea from a slaughtered Constantine's brothers Thomas and Demetrius in A.D. 1460.

Thus, of all the territorial gains at the expense of Dār-al-Islām and Romania that the Western Crusaders had made in the basin of the Mediterranean from the eleventh century to the thirteenth, the only substantial portions that remained in Western hands at the close of the fifteenth century were Sicily, Calabria, Apulia, and Andalusia. These exiguous fruits of such arduous labour were, however, supplemented by some eleventh-hour acquisitions on a Russian Orthodox Christian front. The crusading energies that had been diverted at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries from Syria to Romania, as an easier option than a front on which the adversary to be faced was now the redoubtable Ayyūbid Power, were soon re-diverted again from a Romania whose native Greek Orthodox Christians had been stung by the outrage of A.D. 1204 into a desperate resistance culminating in a spirited counter-attack. As the Crusaders' conquests in Romania melted away in their turn, the Western Christian military adventurers began to despair of an indomitable Mediterranean and to seek fairer fortunes in a more amenable Baltic.

The Teutonic Knights, who decamped at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries from Syria to the Vistula via Transylvania,³ carved out a new Baltic domain for themselves at the expense of pagan Prussians, Letts, and Ests; but the main effect of their operations in this East European theatre was indirect. They made little headway against either their pagan Lithuanian or their Western Christian Polish neigh-

¹ Monemvasia, Maina (Mani), Mistrá.

² See III. iii. 27.

³ See II. ii. 172.

bours, but the military prowess which they unintentionally inspired in these intended victims of theirs, by forcing them to fight for their lives, found an outlet in the fourteenth century in extensive Polish and Lithuanian conquests at the expense of a Russian Orthodox Christendom which had fallen into disunity in the twelfth century and had been ground to powder by the impact of the Mongols in the thirteenth.¹ This Western Christian encroachment on a Russian Orthodox Christendom's domain survived, as we have seen,² into the Modern Age of Western history after the liquidation of all the Medieval Western Christian conquests east of the Ionian Islands in a Greek Orthodox Christendom.

If we ask ourselves why it was that a Medieval Western Christendom's lasting gains of territory from the Crusades amounted only to such disproportionately small returns for so gigantic an expenditure of effort, we shall find more than one answer to our question.

One obvious explanation of the ultimate defeat of the Crusades lies in the excessive dispersion of the Western aggressors' energies. They attacked their neighbours on no less than five fronts—in the Iberian Peninsula, in South Italy, in the Balkan Peninsula, in Syria, and in the Continental European borderland between Western Christendom and Russia—and it is not surprising that they should have failed to obtain any decisive results from this improvident use of a limited fund of surplus Western energy which might have carried their offensive forward to some permanently tenable 'natural frontier' if it had been concentrated steadily on any single front out of the five.

If the French Crusaders, for example, had concentrated their efforts on reinforcing an Iberian front that lay at France's doors, Western Christendom might have reached the natural frontier of the Sahara, not in the twentieth century, but in the thirteenth, instead of halting for a quarter of a millennium—from the fifth decade of the thirteenth century to A.D. 1492—at the foothills of the Sierra Nevada and then for more than four centuries thereafter at the Straits of Gibraltar, which in all previous ages had been a bridge and not a barrier between the Iberian Peninsula and the Maghrib. The impetus of Western Christian aggression against the Maghribī province of Dār-al-Islām was weakened by the division of Western Christian forces between an Iberian and an Apulian front; yet, even so, if the Normans who headed for Apulia instead of León had concentrated thenceforward on this single new enterprise, they might perhaps still have reached a Saharan natural frontier on this Central Mediterranean front likewise, via Sicily and Tunisia. Instead, they dispersed their energies once again by invading the Transadriatic dominions of the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1081 before they had completed their conquest of Sicily, and then riding off on the First Crusade to carve out a Syrian principality for themselves round Antioch.³

¹ See II. ii. 172-3, and p. 399, below.

² On p. 126, above.

³ The fantastically far-flung enterprise in Asia, in which Bohemond indulged in A.D. 1097, had been anticipated in A.D. 1073-4 by a compatriot of his surnamed Russell, who had attempted to take advantage of the crushing defeat of the East Romans by the Saljuqs at Melazkert (Manzikert) in A.D. 1071 in order to carve out a Norman principality in the East Roman Empire's Armeniac army-corps district in North-Eastern Anatolia (see further, p. 389, n. 1, below).

Thereafter, when the Normans did tardily embark on the conquest of Ifrīqīyah in A.D. 1134, they allowed themselves to be diverted from carrying this African enterprise through to completion by being drawn into a great war with the East Roman Empire (*gerebatur* A.D. 1147–56) which was as exhausting as it was inconclusive.

The Levantine front that was opened up in the First Crusade had to compete with the demands of the already active fronts in the Central and the Western Mediterranean, yet the residue of Western Christian military effort that could be mobilized for action in Syria might still perhaps have sufficed to establish a tenable frontier in this distant theatre of operations if the Crusaders had been prudent enough to refrain from straying across the Euphrates and resolute enough to push forward to the fringe of the North Arabian Steppe all along the line from the right bank of the Euphrates to the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah. They did succeed in reaching this natural frontier at its southern end, and thereby momentarily insulating Cairo from Damascus, and Mecca from both, by planting outposts of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at Aylah and Karak;¹ but these strategically momentous acquisitions remained as precarious as they were provocative so long as the left flank of the Western intruders' Transjordanian salient remained open to counter-attack from Dār-al-Islām's vast unconquered Asiatic interior. This deadly gap in the defences of the Terre d'Outre Mer could have been closed at the outset by the leaders of the First Crusade if, instead of crossing the Euphrates to seize an untenable Edessa, they had expended an equal amount of energy on occupying the key position of Aleppo between Antioch and the Syrian bank of the Euphrates and on securing all the crossings of the Euphrates between the southern spurs of the Antitaurus and the northern fringe of the North Arabian Steppe; for, had they thus sealed Syria off at the northern end, as they afterwards duly sealed it off at the southern end by occupying Karak and 'Aqabah, they could then have reduced Hamah, Homs, and Damascus at their leisure; and this strategy would have driven between a Sunni Muslim Caliphate in 'Irāq and a Shī'ī Muslim Anticaliphate in Egypt a wedge of Frankish territory that might have been proof against any Muslim blow that could have been struck at it from either side.

In the event, the Crusaders' neglect of the natural frontier offered by the elbow of the Euphrates² was to deliver them into the hands of a re-

¹ In pushing inland from the southern end of the Shephelah across the Negeb towards the Red Sea, the Crusaders were following in the tracks of the Cherethites and anticipating the strategy of the Zionists (see VI. vii. 102, n. 1, and p. 309, above). In building their Transjordanian castle at Karak, they were establishing themselves astride an historic 'King's Highway' which had latterly become the main pilgrimage-road to Mecca from the Asiatic provinces of Dār-al-Islām (see VI. vii. 101–2).

² The fecklessness of the Crusaders in neglecting this natural line of defence stands out in glaring contrast to the prudence shown by their Mamlūk successors and their Roman predecessors in profiting by it. Along the line of the Middle Euphrates the Mamlūks held at bay a Mongol Empire which extended across the Continent from the Euphrates to the Pacific at the time when the Mamlūks made the river into the moat of their 'Fortress Egypt'. In the long history of the eastern frontier of the Roman Empire, Pompey's prudence in 64 B.C. in making the Middle Euphrates the limit of his new Roman province of Syria was vindicated by the disaster that overtook Crassus at Carrhae in 54 B.C. and by the difficulties in which Trajan involved himself in A.D. 114–17 (see Lepper, F. A.: *Trajan's Parthian War* (London 1948, Cumberlege), pp. 95–96) when

juvenated Sunnī Muslim Power which the challenge of the Crusades called into existence. This new Power's first base of operations was 'Irāq, whose irrigation-system, which was the source of its agricultural productivity, had not yet been wrecked by Mongol barbarian invaders;¹ and the first in the series of warrior-statesmen who built this Power up was Zengī (*dominabatur* A.D. 1127-46), who was appointed in A.D. 1127 by the Saljūq Imperial Government to be atābeg (count) of the metropolitan province of a shrunken 'Abbasid Caliphate which the Saljūqs had liberated from the domination of the Shī'ī Buwayhids in A.D. 1055.² Within a year of his installation at Baghdad, Zengī won for himself a dominion of his own by annexing Mosul and the Jazīrah; and he immediately followed up these conquests on the east side of the Euphrates by crossing the river and releasing the stalwart outpost city of Aleppo from its encirclement by the Frankish principalities of Edessa and Antioch. Edessa, now encircled in its turn, fell to Zengī in A.D. 1144; Zengī's son and successor Nūr-ad-Dīn (*dominabatur* A.D. 1146-74) was able to hold his ground west of the Euphrates against the Second Crusade (*gerebatur* A.D. 1146-9), and Nūr-ad-Dīn's subsequent annexation of Damascus in A.D. 1154 provided his lieutenant Shīrkūh and Shīrkūh's nephew, colleague, and successor Saladin with a base of operations for breaking through the screen of Frankish outposts between Karak and 'Aqabah in order to compete with Amalric King of Jerusalem for the conquest of Egypt from a decrepit Fātimid Shī'ī régime.

Three successive pairs of rival expeditions (*gesta* A.D. 1163-4, 1167, 1168-9) ended in Egypt's remaining in Saladin's hands. The Western intruders' Terre d'Outre Mer then found itself enveloped by its Sunnī Muslim adversaries, and this encirclement spelled the doom of the Frankish Power in Syria; but Saladin was too good a strategist to strike before he had consolidated his now commanding position. In A.D. 1171 he extinguished the Fātimid Anticaliphate and restored *de jure* the sovereignty of an 'Abbasid Caliphate at Baghdad over an Egypt whose resources were at Saladin's own disposal *de facto*. Thereafter he rounded off his empire by first annexing Tripolitania, the Eastern Sudan, and the Yaman (A.D. 1172-4) and then, after the death of his overlord Nūr-ad-Dīn, making himself master of everything between the eastern borders of the Frankish principalities in Syria and the western foothills of the Zagros in Kurdistan (A.D. 1174-86).³ When he struck at the Franks at last in A.D. 1187 the result was a foregone conclusion. The Third Crusade could not save the Terre d'Outre Mer from being reduced to a few bridgeheads along the Syrian coast.

he attempted to move the frontier forward perhaps as far as to the head of the Persian Gulf. No permanent annexation of Asiatic territory east of the Euphrates was made by the Roman Imperial Government till A.D. 194-9, when the Parthian Power was *in extremis*, and on this occasion the frontier was moved forward no farther than to the line of the Euphrates' eastern tributary the Khabūr.

¹ For the *coup de grâce* which the Mongols dealt to the Syriac Civilization by wrecking the irrigation-system of 'Irāq in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, see IV, iv.

⁴³

² See I. i. 356.

³ Saladin conquered Eastern Syria, south of Aleppo, in A.D. 1174; established his suzerainty over Aleppo in A.D. 1176; conquered the Jazīrah and annexed Aleppo in A.D. 1182-3; and established his suzerainty over Mosul in A.D. 1186.

The characteristically short-sighted counter-move of the leaders of the Fourth Crusade to Saladin's conclusive defeat of the Third Crusade in Syria was, as we have seen, to commit a now hard-pressed Western Christendom to yet a fourth Mediterranean front in the domain of the East Roman Empire; and here the disastrous effects of the Western aggressors' persistent dispersion of their energies made themselves felt more signally and more swiftly than in any other theatre. A Frankish host that was strong enough to deal the East Roman Empire an irretrievable blow by storming and sacking its sacrosanct and hitherto impregnable capital had not the strength to seize more than a handful of the fragments into which the shattered empire broke up, and even these meagre pickings slipped, one by one, out of the covetous Frankish hand that had clutched them. A Monferratine 'Kingdom of Salonica' lasted no longer than eighteen years (A.D. 1204-22), and a French 'empire' at Constantinople no longer than fifty-seven (A.D. 1204-61), while the French Principality of the Morea melted away less rapidly, but not less inexorably, from A.D. 1262 onwards.¹ The Italian city-states alone showed a capacity for retaining and increasing their share of the spoils that the Fourth Crusade had picked up from the wreckage of a wantonly shattered East Roman Empire.

A second explanation of the failure of the Crusades is to be found in the disappointment of the Crusaders' fond hope that a heaven-sent 'Prester John' would miraculously redress in Christendom's favour a balance which Saladin's genius had inclined so heavily to the advantage of the Crusaders' Muslim adversaries. In the event, the Mongol world-conquerors did not become converts to a Christianity of either the Roman or the Nestorian persuasion. The Roman Catholic archbishopric that was founded in A.D. 1294 by John of Montecorvino in the Mongol Khāqāns' southern capital at Khanbalyq (Peking),² on the inner side of the Great Wall, expired in the course of the fourteenth century³ as obscurely as the Norse settlements in Greenland. The prize of converting the last still pagan Eurasian Nomads was eventually divided between Islam and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhism of Tibet,⁴ and in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries Islam found other new worlds besides to conquer in Yunnan, the Deccan, Indonesia, the Sudan, Western Anatolia, and Rumelia.

The event thus exposed the vanity of a thirteenth-century Western Christian dream that Islam might be stamped out by an enveloping centripetal reflux of the western and eastern arcs of a Christian wave which had previously been receding centrifugally in all directions under the pressure of a following Islamic wave's advance.⁵ The visionary

¹ See p. 356, above.

² See Moule, A. C.: *Christians in China before the Year 1550* (London 1930, S.P.C.K.), p. 172. For Qubilāy's transfer of the Mongol imperial capital to Peking from Qāraqorum, see II. ii. 121.

³ See Moule, op. cit., p. 197. The last archbishop of this see, which had been moved from Khanbalyq to Zaitun (Ch'üan-chou, near Amoy), was murdered somewhere in Central Asia in A.D. 1362.

⁴ See pp. 218-19 and p. 337, n. 1, above.

⁵ The succession of concentric waves in which Judaism, Christianity, and Islam spread over the face of the World, one after another, from an identical centre of dispersion in a 'Greater Syria' embracing Palestine and the Hijāz has been noticed in II. ii. 234-5 and 285-8, and is depicted in xi, map 6.

thirteenth-century Western observers who had dreamed this dream had not been mistaken in their intuition that, in the domain of Islam on which the Crusaders were trespassing, a mighty institution was passing away; their mistake had lain in identifying this moribund institution with the religion that had been revealed to Mankind through the Prophet Muhammad. The institution that was actually *in extremis* in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era was a Syriac Civilization whose disintegration had been retarded by an intrusion of Hellenism and whose universal state, originally embodied in the Achaemenian Empire, had been re-established by Muslim Arab empire-builders a thousand years after the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great.

Islam might indeed have died out if it had never outgrown its original function of providing a distinctive heretical religious badge for Arab war-bands that had accidentally reconstituted a Syriac universal state in the shape of the Caliphate as a by-product of the barbarian successor-state that they had been bent on carving out of the Roman Empire.¹ It would in fact have died out if the Umayyads, like their Visigothic contemporaries and victims,² had elected to abandon their distinctive barbarian heresy in favour of their Christian subjects' orthodoxy. In that event the *ci-devant* Muslim Umayyad Arab conquerors of Syria would have become converts to the Monophysite form of Christianity, like their predecessors the *ci-devant* pagan Ghassanid Arab wardens of the Roman Empire's Syrian desert marches.³ This possibility had passed away when the replacement of the Umayyad dynasty by the 'Abbasids had transferred the ascendancy in the Caliphate from the Arabs to their Khurāsānī clients and had substituted the profession of Islam for the possession of an Arab pedigree as the qualification for membership in a dominant minority. From that time onwards the spiritual gifts and intellectual abilities of all peoples in a politically reunited Syriac World had contributed to build Islam up into an oecumenical higher religion which could compete with Christianity on the strength of the elements that it had borrowed from it; and, in the next and last chapter of Syriac history, this enriched Islam had begun to make mass-conversions among a now dissolving Caliphate's Christian and Zoroastrian subjects, not only by virtue of its intrinsic spiritual merits, but for the sake of the enduring social order which Islam promised to provide for a world that was appalled at the prospect of losing the oecumenical framework which had hitherto been provided for it by the political institution of the Caliphate.⁴

The future of Islam had thus been assured before an already tottering Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate finally succumbed to a *coup de grâce* from the Mongols. So far from threatening Islam with destruction, the invasions of the Caliphate's derelict domain by the Crusaders from one side and by the Mongols from the other were the finishing touches in the making of Islam's fortune; for, when the Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate foundered, and all that was left of the old fabric of the Syriac Society went down with it, Islam did not die, but lived on to offer refuge to the shipwrecked

¹ See V. v. 127-8, 230, and 673-8.

² See p. 280, n. 3, above.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ See V. v. 678; VII. vii. 398-400; and xi, maps 38 and 39.

children of a lost civilization. Islam not only captivated the savage Mongol conquerors of the Caliphate; she served as a chrysalis for bringing to birth two new societies to take the place of a Syriac Society that had finally dissolved in the post-'Abbasid interregnum; and the emergence of the Iranic and Arabic Muslim civilizations set the seal on the discomfiture of the Western Christian Crusaders.

In the first place these nascent societies, in the vigour of their early youth, created war machines with which the Crusaders could not compete. In another context¹ we have taken note of the overthrow of Saint Louis' disorderly knights by a trained and disciplined Egyptian Mamlūk cavalry at Mansūrah in A.D. 1250.² The still better trained and disciplined Ottoman Janissary infantry, which overthrew the Mamlūks in A.D. 1516-17,³ had the upper hand over their Western Christian adversaries from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth, when their military ascendancy was tardily wrested from them by Western troops who conquered them by at last successfully imitating them.⁴ But sheer military superiority was not the whole explanation of the two new-born Islamic civilizations' triumph over the West; for the Iranic Muslim Civilization, at any rate, gained the day by its superior attractiveness as much as by its superior strength. When, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Greek Orthodox Christians who could no longer look forward to remaining their own masters found themselves still free to choose between a Frankish and an Ottoman domination, they opted for the 'Osmanlis';⁵ and a minority among them that was willing to contract out of an onerous political servitude by abandoning a traditional religious allegiance showed less repugnance towards becoming converts to Islam than towards staying within the Christian fold at the price of becoming ecclesiastical subjects of the Pope. While the Greeks' historic choice was partly determined by the negative motive of resentment at the overbearing behaviour by which the Franks had made themselves odious in Greek eyes, some credit must also be given to the positive attraction exerted by the Ottoman way of life, in view of the significant fact that, in the golden age of Ottoman history, the Christian renegades who 'turned Turk' were not exclusively Orthodox Christians who had found themselves caught between an Ottoman and a Frankish mill-stone, but were also recruited from among Western Christians who were not under any corresponding pressure to change their religious allegiance against their inclinations.

In spite of the strength and attractiveness of the 'Osmanlis, the Franks might perhaps have retained permanent possession of at least a remnant of their acquisitions in the former domain of the East Roman Empire if the late Medieval Western cosmos of city-states, of which the North and Central Italian city-states were the foremost representatives, had succeeded in assimilating to itself the relatively backward feudal mass of a Medieval Western Christian body social. The Italians were condemned by an inexorable fiat of geography to live and move and have their being in the Mediterranean; they had invested heavily in commerce and

¹ See IV. iv. 431-65.

² See IV. iv. 450-2.

³ See III. iii. 31-47.

⁴ See IV. iv. 448-9.

⁵ See pp. 151-2, above.

sovereignty in the Levant; and, though they were at least as unpopular as the French, Catalan, and Navarrese Franks among Orthodox Christians who could not avoid encountering them, they were at any rate more efficient than their Transalpine and Transmarine coreligionists—as was demonstrated by the accumulation in Venetian, Genoese, and Florentine hands of an ever increasing proportion of the constantly diminishing Frankish assets in the Levant in the course of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries.¹

If the Italian city-states had been backed by a Western World in which their own order of society had prevailed, they might perhaps have proved strong enough, with this solid support in their rear, to save the situation for Western Christendom on its Mediterranean front; but, as we have noticed in another context,² the ninth decade of the fourteenth century saw the end of any prospect that the Western World as a whole might find its way to modernization through a mass-conversion to the city-state dispensation which had made the fortunes of the precociously modern Italians and Flemings. In the event, the feudal mass of a Medieval Western Christendom modernized itself, not by reminting its kingdoms into city-states, but by adapting to the kingdom-state scale of political operations³ the efficient administrative apparatus which late medieval North Italian despots had imported from the East Roman Empire via its Sicilian successor-state;⁴ and the Modern Western World that was actually called into existence crystalized, not round the Mediterranean city-states of Italy, but round the Atlantic kingdoms and commonwealths of Portugal, Spain, France, England, and Holland. A Venice, Genoa, and Florence that had thus lost their lead within their native Western Christendom had, *a fortiori*, lost their chance of heading a united Western resistance to the progress of the 'Osmanlis in the Levant, while the Atlantic countries that had won the lead and acquired the power were too eagerly preoccupied with the conquest of the Ocean to be willing to spend much energy on stemming the 'Osmanlis' advance in a Mediterranean that had dwindled into being a backwater.

These considerations, between them, perhaps go some way towards accounting for the Crusaders' eventual failure. Our findings may be summed up in the verdict that the Medieval Western Christian competitors for dominion over the Mediterranean Basin were neither strong enough to subdue their neighbours nor cultivated enough to captivate them. The second of these two judgements needs to be tested further by noticing what the Medieval Western Christians and their neighbours thought and felt about one another, and what, if any, cultural commerce was transacted between them.

2. *The Medieval West and the Syriac World*⁵

When the Medieval Western Christians launched their assault on the Syriac World in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, they found its inhabitants divided in their communal allegiance between Islam and

¹ See III. iii. 347, n. 1, and pp. 168–70 and 177–8, above. ² See III. iii. 347–50.

³ See III. iii. 300–1, 305, and 357–63; IV. iv. 198–200; and p. 395, below.

⁴ See III. iii. 354–6; IV. iv. 198; VII. vii. 537–8; and p. 395, below.

⁵ See xi, map 41.

the divers ecclesiastical communities that had occupied, between them, the stage of Syriac history before the Primitive Muslim Arabs had liquidated the Roman Empire south of the Taurus and had united politically under their own rule all Cis-Tauran Syriac territories, from the Pamirs to the Iberian Peninsula, that had been under Achaemenian and Carthaginian sovereignty at the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.¹ The relations established by the Western Christian Crusaders with surviving pre-Muslim Syriac communities with which they came into contact were more intimate than their relations with their Muslim contemporaries; and we may infer that the Crusades might have had longer abiding cultural effects of greater historical importance supposing that these Medieval Western wars of aggression had been waged in an earlier age in which the pre-Muslim communities had, all told, still embraced an overwhelming majority of the constituents of the Syriac Society.

In the seventh century of the Christian Era—at the moment when the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors had burst out of the Arabian Peninsula—Syria, Egypt, and Armenia had been predominantly Monophysite, 'Irāq predominantly Nestorian, the Iranian Plateau predominantly Zoroastrian, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin predominantly Mahayanian Buddhist, and North-West Africa and the Iberian Peninsula predominantly Western Catholic Christian, though some of these competing religious communities had been gaining ground at their neighbours' expense. The Monophysites, for example, had not only reduced the Catholic Christians in Egypt and Syria to a mere minority of 'Melchites' who owed their survival there to the official support of the Roman Imperial Government, but had also been encroaching on the Nestorians' domain east of the Khabūr and the Euphrates,² while the Nestorians,

¹ The reintegration of a pre-Alexandrine Achaemenian Empire in a post-Roman Arab Caliphate has been noticed in I. i. 76-77.

² Between A.D. 457 and A.D. 486 a Nestorian Christianity which had been declared heretical by the Catholic Church at the Council of Ephesus in A.D. 431 succeeded in capturing the Christian Church in the Sasanian Empire (see O'Leary, de L.: *How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs* (London 1948, Kegan Paul), pp. 58-59), thanks to its enjoyment of two advantages. Its official proscription in the Roman Empire certified its political innocuousness from the standpoint of the Sasanian Imperial Government, while the community of language between the Syriac-speaking Nestorian Christian refugees from the Roman dominions in Mesopotamia and Syria and the Syriac-speaking population of the Sasanian dominions in 'Irāq gave the Nestorians an easy entry into this important mission-field. The same two advantages were, however, enjoyed by the Syriac-speaking Monophysites, in their turn, after their doctrine had been declared heretical at the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451; and, in the sequel, they, too, succeeded in forcing an entry into the Sasanian Empire at the Nestorians' heels. Beth Arsham, on the threshold of the Nestorian Catholicos's see of Seleucia-on-Tigris, had a Monophysite bishop, She'mon, circa A.D. 503-48 (O'Leary, op. cit., p. 88). Adiabene was won for Monophysitism by Ahudemme, who was Bishop of Takrit, circa A.D. 559-75 (O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 90-91); and from A.D. 640 onwards the Monophysite Church in the ex-Sasanian dominions, then in process of being conquered by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, provided itself with a supreme pontiff entitled 'maphrian' (ibid., p. 91). On the other hand, when the Lakhmid Arab warden of the Sasanian Empire's anti-Roman marches, Nu'man V, was converted from paganism to Christianity towards the close of the sixth century of the Christian Era, he adopted, not Monophysitism, but the Nestorian faith of the Syriac-speaking sedentary population of his capital city, Hīrah (ibid., pp. 67-68 and 184-5). In making this choice, Nu'man may have been influenced by the consideration that the rival Ghassānid wardens of the Roman Empire's anti-Sasanian marches had opted for Monophysitism in A.D. 543, when the Ghassānid prince Harith b. Jabalah had obtained, through the offices of the Empress Theodora, the appointment of a Monophysite bishop to the see of Bostra (ibid., p. 86).

for their part, had been gaining ground at the Zoroastrians' expense on the Iranian Plateau, and the Zoroastrians at the Buddhists' expense in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin.

The sudden and rapid conquest of these vast territories by the Primitive Muslim Arabs had not at first made any appreciable difference to the religious and cultural complexion of the Syriac World. Islam had appeared on the scene as the distinctive religion of a handful of barbarian invaders;¹ and, even when an 'Abbasid had been substituted for an Umayyad régime as a result of the overthrow of the Umayyad Dynasty's Syrian Arab war-bands by Khurāsānī Iranian marchmen converts to Islam, the effect had been merely to replace one dominant minority by another.² A widespread conversion to Islam of the subject populations of the Caliphate, beyond the circle of the dominant minority's slaves, freedmen, and clients, apparently did not begin until after the 'Abbasid Caliphate had been smitten in the reign of Mu'tasim (*imperabat* A.D. 833-42) by the first of the successive strokes that punctuated its long-drawn-out death-agony, and this propagation of Islam did not gather momentum until, in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, the 'Abbasids' derelict dominions were invaded simultaneously by Saljūq Turkish Eurasian Nomad barbarians overland from the east and by Frankish barbarians overseas from Western Christendom.

During a social interregnum in which the Syriac Society was in dissolution while its daughter societies, the Arabic and Iranic Muslim civilizations, were still unborn, the non-Muslim populations that had been living since the seventh century of the Christian Era under an Islamic Caliphate's political aegis were being drawn towards a spontaneous conversion to Islam by a hope of finding in the solidarity of a common religious allegiance a social framework that would be more durable than the universal state whose once imposing structure was now falling about their ears, and at the same time they were being pushed forcibly along the same road by pressure—bursting out into increasingly frequent bouts of persecution—from a Muslim dominant minority that had been stung, by the humiliating and disquieting spectacle of barbarians overrunning Dār-al-Islām, into abandoning the toleration that it had been accustomed to extend, not only to the scripturally accredited 'People of the Book', but also by analogy to other cultivated non-Muslim communities such as the Zoroastrians, the Hindus, and even the Harrānī devotees of an elsewhere extinct Helleno-Babylonian paganism.³ In a crisis in which a Frankish and a Eurasian Nomad barbarian aggressor eventually all but joined hands in Syria for the purpose of dealing

¹ See III. iii. 277; V. v. 230 and 676; and p. 10, n. 1, above.

² See VI. vii. 140-1 and 329.

³ For the customary Islamic liberality in extending to the adherents of all higher religions the toleration accorded in the Qur'ān to 'the People of the Book', see IV. iv. 225-6 and V. v. 674, n. 2. For the fossil of the Babylonian Civilization that survived at Harrān down to the post-Syriac social interregnum, see IV. iv. 101, n. 1; V. v. 125, n. 1; and Seton Lloyd: 'Recent Survey of Remains at Harran', in *The Times*, 21st March, 1951, and 29th January, 1952. The part played by the Harrānīs in the self-Hellenization of the Syriac World in the 'Abbasid Age is noticed in the present Study on p. 408, n. 5, below.

Islam its death-blow,¹ Muslim public opinion became impatient of unconverted Unbelievers in the Muslim community's midst.

Owing to this conjunction of psychological and social circumstances, the Monophysite, Nestorian, and Zoroastrian communities in Dār-al-Islām suffered, in the course of some three centuries ending *circa* A.D. 1275, the fate which had overtaken the 'Melchite' Catholic community in the Roman dominions south of the Taurus in the course of the two centuries between the convocation of the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451 and the Arab conquest. In that earlier age of Syriac history a Catholic Christian community which had previously embraced almost the entire population of Syria and Egypt had dwindled into a minority as a result of a mass-secession to Monophysitism. Some four hundred years later the Monophysites and the other pre-Muslim ecclesiastical communities in the vast area that had been united politically in the meantime by the prowess of Muslim Arab conquerors were reduced in their turn, by mass-conversions to Islam, from being local majorities of the population of the now derelict domain of the Caliphate to being mere residual minorities like the 'Melchites'. As for Buddhism in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and Western Catholic Christianity in the Maghrib, they both disappeared altogether from regions which had once played a leading part in the lives of the Mahāyāna and of the Western Christian Church, and it may be conjectured that Western Christianity would have had the same fate in Andalusia as in the Maghrib if its extinction there had not been forestalled by the Western Christian transfrontier barbarians' victory over the rival Muslim barbarians from the Sahara and the Atlas in their contest for possession of the spoils of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate; for, during the five centuries of Muslim ascendancy in the Peninsula, the backward native provincial Christians had shown themselves highly susceptible to the attractions of their Arab Muslim masters' superior Syriac culture.²

¹ See pp. 354-5, above.

² In the Islamic community in Andalusia the descendants of native Iberian converts (*muxalladūn*) probably far outnumbered the descendants of Berber, and *a fortiori* those of Arab, immigrants. There were mass-conversions on the morrow of the conquest, and the Muslims of Saragossa and Toledo, in particular, appear to have been mostly of native origin (Lévy-Provençal, E.: *Histoire de L'Espagne Musulmane*, vol. i (Cairo 1944, Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire), pp. 53 and 111). There were even converts to Islam who came not from the subject population but from the independent Iberian Christian principalities. The Banu Qasi of Tudela, whose representative Mūsā b. Mūsā seized Barcelona in A.D. 856 (*ibid.*, p. 220), were a converted Aragonese Gothic family (*ibid.*, pp. 109-10) who had Basque kinsmen and allies (*ibid.*, pp. 151-2), and the native origin of the family was proclaimed in the names of two of this Mūsā's four sons, Lope and Fortun, while the names of the other two, Mutarrif and Ismā'il, were tributes to the family's conversion (*ibid.*, p. 226). The rebel 'Abd-ar-Rahmān b. al-Jilliqī ('the Galician's son'), who ruled an independent principality at Badajoz, in defiance of Cordova, *circa* A.D. 875-930 (*ibid.*, pp. 207-10 and 209), was manifestly likewise a Christian convert from beyond the border. The subject Christian origin of some of the leading Muslim families in Andalusia was similarly recorded in their family names: e.g. the Banu Angelino and Banu Sabarico of Seville, and the Banu'l-Longo, Banu Qabtūrus, and Ibn-al-Qutiyyah ('son of the Goth') (*ibid.*, p. 54). One of the rebels with whom 'Abd-ar-Rahmān had to contend, Muhammad b. Ardabulish (*ibid.*, p. 287), advertised in his father's Sarmatian Christian name 'Ardaburius' his family's descent from one of the pre-Visigothic Alan barbarian invaders of the Peninsula who must have stayed behind when the main body of his fellow tribesmen had crossed to Africa with their Vandal comrades. Though the Banu Hajjāj of Seville did not proclaim their Christian origin in their nomenclature, they are thought by Lévy-Provençal (*ibid.*, pp. 251-2)

Thus, at the very time when the Western Christian Crusaders were establishing their ephemeral foothold on the Mediterranean fringes of the African and Asiatic domains of a moribund Syriac Society, the non-Muslim communities in the Syriac World were being confronted with a choice between conversion to Islam and persistent loyalty to their traditional religious allegiances at the enhanced price of an isolation and a persecution which they had not previously been called upon to endure. In these untoward circumstances the majority embraced Islam, and the pre-Islamic ecclesiastical communities of the Syriac World became almost extinct save for a few 'fossils in fastnesses': the Zoroastrians in the oases of Yazd and Kirmān; the Nestorian Christians in the highlands of the Zagros; the Syriac-speaking 'Jacobite' Monophysite Christians in the highlands of the Tūr 'Abdīn; the Armenian 'Gregorian' Monophysite Christians in the highlands between the Cappadocian Plateau and the lowlands of Cilicia and Commagene;¹ the Maronite Monothelite Christians in the Lebanon; the Coptic Monophysite Christians in Upper Egypt, Nubia, and Abyssinia. Of these hardy survivors of a pre-Islamic age of Syriac history, only the Armenians and the Maronites came into direct contact with the Western Christian Crusaders, and both these communities were as strongly attracted by the Medieval Western Christian culture as the Medieval Western Christian subjects of a Muslim 'ascendancy' in Andalusia were attracted by the Syriac culture of their Arab conquerors.

to have been descended from Goths who had taken sides with Tāriq b. Ziyād in A.D. 711. Abu 'Amir Al-Mansūr's second successor in the Cordovan dictatorship, 'Abd-ar-Rahmān, was surnamed Sanchuelo (*ibid.*, p. 469).

The Iberian subjects of the Arab rulers of Cordova who did not adopt their masters' religion were nevertheless apt, like the converts, to take Arab names. The Christian count of the Christian community at Cordova, who was entrusted by the Umayyad amir Hakam I (*imperabat* A.D. 796-822) in A.D. 805 with the command of the slave corps and then in A.D. 818 with the collection of newly imposed taxes, was named Rabi' son of Teodulfo (*ibid.*, pp. 116-17). A Christian bishop, Rabi' b. Zayd, whose Christian name was Recemundo, was employed by 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III to obtain *objets d'art* for him from Syria or Constantinople (*ibid.*, p. 373) and was sent by him in A.D. 955 on an embassy to Otto I at Frankfort, where he met Bishop Liutprand of Cremona and persuaded him to write his *Antapodosis* (*ibid.*, p. 388). This adoption of Arab names was a symptom of the proclivity towards the Arab culture which won for the Andalusian Arabs' Iberian Christian subjects the nickname *musta'ribūn* ('Arabizers'), as a synonym for *mu'āhidūn* or *mu'āhadūn* ('contractual clients').

The cultural bonds between Christian subjects and Muslim masters in Andalusia were linguistic. A vernacular Romance *koiné*, which was spoken by 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III (*ibid.*, p. 285), is thought by Lévy-Provençal (*ibid.*, p. 55) to have been the most widely current language among the Andalusian Muslims (compare the currency of the local Romaic Greek vernaculars among members of the Ottoman Muslim ascendancy in the Morea (see p. 683, below) and the Venetian ascendancy in the Ionian Islands (see p. 170, above) in the early years of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era). Conversely, the *musta'ribūn* took pride and pleasure in talking Arabic, composing Arabic poetry, and producing versions of Arabic literary forms in the medium of their native Romance.

The relation between the two communities was so intimate, and the atmosphere of toleration so strong, that there was at least one notorious case of counter-conversion to Christianity from Islam. The rebel 'Umar b. Hafsūn and his wife turned Christian in A.D. 899 (*ibid.*, p. 265), and their eldest son and their daughter Argentea followed their example, while the three other sons remained Muslims (*ibid.*, p. 293). After 'Umar's last son had been compelled by 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III to surrender the fortress of Bobastro on the 19th January, 928, Argentea went into a convent. She provoked martyrdom on the 13th May, 937 (*ibid.*, p. 296).

¹ Known, in the terminology of Assyrian political geography, as Tabal—'the Highlands' *par excellence*.

The Armenians who encountered the Crusaders after ensconcing themselves in the fastnesses of the Taurus and the Antitaurus in the eleventh century of the Christian Era were refugees from the North, like the Hittites who had found refuge in the same region in the twelfth century B.C. The invading 'Sea Peoples' and Phrygians, who in that age had overwhelmed a Hittite Power whose capital had crowned Boghazqal'eh in East Central Anatolia, had their counterparts in the eleventh century of the Christian Era in the East Roman Imperial Government and the Saljūq Turkish Eurasian Nomads. In its expansion at the expense of a disintegrating 'Abbasid Caliphate the East Roman Empire illiberally and unwisely extinguished the recently won independence of the Caliphate's Armenian successor-states in the highlands on the watershed between the basins of the Euphrates and the Aras, and thereby deprived itself of potential Armenian buffer-states against a Nomad invasion of Anatolia along the customary route up the Aras and down the Upper Euphrates' northern branch (*Turcicè* Frat Su, *alias* Qāra Su). Gaghiik II, the last king of Ani, the foremost of these Armenian principalities, was compelled by the East Roman Government to cede his dominions to them in A.D. 1045,¹ after Senekherim, the last king of Vaspurakan—the most easterly of the Armenian principalities and therefore the most dangerously exposed of them all—had voluntarily ceded his dominions to the East Roman Emperor Basil II in A.D. 1021 under the menace of the onset of the Saljūq wave.² The East Romans were so far from being able to defend their newly acquired Armenian marches against their Saljūq assailants that they lost not only these but the heart of their ancestral dominions in Anatolia as well. After a spell of less than twenty years under East Roman rule, Ani was sacked by the Saljūqs in A.D. 1064;³ and the crushing defeat which the East Romans suffered at Saljūq hands at Melazkerd in A.D. 1071 opened the way for the Saljūqs' permanent conquest of Sivas, Qaysari, and Qōñiyeh and their temporary occupation of Nicaea almost within sight of the Sea of Marmara.

This collapse of the East Roman Empire in Anatolia gave the Armenians an opportunity to compensate themselves for their lost homelands by carving out a new realm in a different quarter. The East Roman Government had unintentionally prepared the ground for this by planting Armenian wardens of the marches at strategic points commanding the passes through the Taurus and the Amanus after the East Roman conquest of Cilicia and Antioch from the successors of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in and after A.D. 964,⁴ and by assigning domains, inside the previous East Roman frontiers, to the Armenian kings whose dominions they had annexed in the eleventh century. Sivas had been assigned to Senekherim, the ex-king of Vaspurakan, in A.D. 1021,⁵ and the army-corps district of Lykandos, in the mountains between Cappadocia, Commagene, and Cilicia, to Gaghiik, the ex-king of Ani, in A.D. 1045.⁶ The Armenians' bitterness against an East Roman Empire that had deprived them of their political independence in their homelands

¹ See de Morgan, J.: *Histoire du Peuple Arménien* (Paris 1919, Berger-Levrault), pp. 151-2.

² See de Morgan, op. cit., p. 149.

³ See de Morgan, op. cit., p. 156.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 162-3 and 165-6.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 149.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 152.

was aggravated by the ill-treatment to which they were subsequently subjected in exile on East Roman soil; they seized their first chance of shaking off a hated yoke; and the East Roman military disaster of A.D. 1071 was followed in A.D. 1080 by the establishment of an independent Armenian principality in the mountains overhanging the Cilician Plain.¹ In A.D. 1097, in the reign of Prince Constantine I (*dominabatur* A.D. 1095-9), the son and successor of the founder, Rupen (*dominabatur* A.D. 1080-95), these recently liberated Armenians in the Taurus fraternized with the warriors of the First Crusade during their passage through Cilicia to lay siege to Antioch; and this fraternization made the new-born Armenian principality's fortune, besides being of substantial assistance to the Western Christian adventurers in the Levant.

Refugee Armenians and errant Crusaders were, indeed, drawn together by the powerful bond of a common enmity towards both the Orthodox Christians and the Muslims, between whom the Crusaders and the Armenians both found themselves caught in a vice, and it was a godsend for either party to be able to join hands with the other. With the Crusaders' help, Constantine's successor Thoros I (*dominabatur* A.D. 1099-1129) was able to descend from his mountains and to conquer the fertile Cilician plain, and this conquest not only increased the Armenian principality's strength but gave it a coastline which brought it into direct relations with a Western Christendom that had just wrested the 'thalassocracy' of the Mediterranean out of Maghribi Muslim and East Roman Orthodox Christian hands.² The Armenians were willing converts to the contemporary Western Christian culture. Constantine I married his daughter to Count Jocelyn of Edessa and his niece (the daughter of his brother and successor Thoros) to Baldwin the brother of Godfrey of Bouillon.³ Prince Leo II (*dominabatur* A.D. 1187-96) decided that the Cilician Armenian principality could no longer afford to remain in the comparative isolation to which it was still condemned by its lack of any legitimate political status and by the ecclesiastical gulf which insulated the Gregorian Monophysite Church from both the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Catholic Christian communion. Prince Leo determined to purchase his recognition as a legitimate king from one or other of these two preponderant Christendoms by paying the price of ecclesiastical union; and, after a half-hearted attempt at union with his unloved Orthodox Christian neighbours, he eventually achieved union with the more distant and less odious Latins. The terms were agreed between Prince Leo and the Vatican in A.D. 1196, and at Tarsus in A.D. 1199 the Armenian prince was crowned king (*regnabat* A.D. 1199-1219 as King Leo I) by a Uniate Armenian catholicos in the presence of a representative of the Pope.⁴

This formal admission of a Cilician Armenia to membership in the body social and ecclesiastical of Western Christendom gave an impetus to the Westernization of King Leo's realm. The Armenian Kingdom accepted the institutions of Western feudalism in adopting the Assizes of Antioch, and an educated minority of laymen, as well as the Uniate

¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 162 and 166.

³ See de Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

² See p. 352, above.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 187-93.

clergy, became conversant with the Latin and French languages. In fact, the Cilician Kingdom of Armenia became an integral part of the Western Terre d'Outre Mer in the Levant,¹ and it was the last of the Continental Crusader principalities to succumb to an Islamic counter-attack. After the Egyptian Mamlûks had deprived the Crusaders of their last continental bridgehead south-east of the Amanus by capturing Acre in A.D. 1291, Cilician Armenia continued to hold out for the best part of a century before it, too, lost its political independence through the Mamlûks' capture of its capital city, Sis, in A.D. 1375 from its last king, Leo V de Lusignan (*regnabat* A.D. 1374-5).²

After the fall of the Cilician Armenian kingdom, the local Armenian communities themselves survived in their highland fastnesses for another five centuries and more, under successive Mamlûk, Dhu'lqadrî, and Ottoman régimes, till they were wiped out in the terrible deportations of A.D. 1915; but the loss of their political independence had cut them off from their access to the sea and, in consequence, also from their contact with Western Christendom. By contrast, the Maronites, whose Lebanese fastness had been embraced in the domain of the Syrian Crusader principalities and who, like the Cilician Armenians, had entered into an ecclesiastical union with the Western Church, were able, thanks to their proximity to one of the shores of the Mediterranean, to keep in touch with the Western World throughout the five centuries that intervened between the fall of Acre in A.D. 1291 and the revival of Western interest in the Levant towards the close of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era. The Maronites' earliest link with the Modern Western World was through France, who won over them in the nineteenth century a political influence which she forfeited in the twentieth century through an injudicious exercise of a mandatory authority over the Lebanon during the years A.D. 1920-44. The Maronites established a second link with the Modern West through the United States; and, at the time of writing, the French Catholic and American Protestant universities at Bayrût were living monuments of a

¹ This Francophilism of the Armenian 'displaced persons' who had carved out for themselves a successor-state of the East Roman Empire in Cilicia was shared by contemporary Armenian communities settled in territories then still under East Roman rule. In A.D. 1189, when Frederick Barbarossa was on the march, through East Roman territory, from the Danube to the Dardanelles, the Armenians at Philippopolis and Prousinos fraternized with his army—in contrast to their Orthodox Christian neighbours, who evacuated their homes on the Western Crusaders' approach (see Nikfias Khoniâtis, *Khroniki Dhiytisis* (Bonn 1835, Weber), pp. 527 and 534); and, after the overthrow of the East Roman régime by the Western perpetrators of the so-called 'Fourth Crusade' in A.D. 1204, the Armenians of the Troad, like their Latin neighbours at Pighaf (Bigha), invited the newly elected Latin Emperor, Baldwin of Flanders, to come over into Opsikion to help them, and raised some troops of horse to serve with him when he arrived (*ibid.*, pp. 795-6 and 814; Villehardouin, Geoffroi de: *Conquête de Constantinople*, chap. 69, § 310, third edition of N. de Wailly's text and translation (Paris 1882, Didot), pp. 184 and 191). When the Crusaders found themselves compelled to evacuate their conquests on the Anatolian side of the Dardanelles, these Armenians emigrated with them *en masse* to the number of about twenty thousand, including the women and children, with their movable property loaded in wagons (Villehardouin, chap. 87, § 380, p. 226). They were all massacred by the local Greek population in Thrace (*ibid.*, chap. 87, § 385, p. 228).

Nikfias Khoniâtis notes (p. 527) several points of Christian ecclesiastical practice in which the Armenians took the same line as the Western Christians in common disagreement with the Eastern Orthodox Church.

² See de Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

mutual attraction between the Maronites and the Western World which had persisted since the Age of the Crusades without a break.

The Crusaders' relations with the Maronites of the Lebanon and the Armenians of Cilicia were manifestly more intimate than their relations with the Muslims who, during the period of the Crusades, became the majority instead of a minority in the population of a disintegrating Syriac World; yet, considering that Muslims and Christians ranked officially as 'unbelievers' in one another's eyes, and that the champions of these two fanatically exclusive-minded Judaic religions were chronically at war, we may marvel at the degree of the mutual respect which their fighting-men came to feel for one another, and at the amount and the importance of the cultural nourishment which a Medieval Western Christendom imbibed through a Syriac channel in which the spirit and technique of an Arabic poetry were conveyed to them in a Romance language by Provençal troubadours, and the ideas of an Hellenic philosophy in the Arabic language by Muslim scholars.

In the realm of the sword the sympathy between the warriors in the two opposing camps arose from the surprising discovery of an unexpected affinity. On the battlefields of Andalusia the Andalusian Muslims and the transfrontier Christian barbarians who were their coinhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula sometimes felt a closer kinship with one another than the Iberian Christians could feel with their coreligionists from beyond the Pyrenees, or the Iberian Muslims with their coreligionists from the Sahara and the Atlas, when they were each enjoying the doubtful blessing of being reinforced by these officially laudable but practically awkward allies. On the battlefields of Syria the Turkish barbarians who had become converts to Islam in the act of overrunning the dominions of the Caliphate were not unsympathetic adversaries for Western Christian knights who, in degree of civilization, were still not far above the level of their own barbarian predecessors who had become converts to Christianity in the act of overrunning the Roman Empire some six centuries earlier. In the Turkish ghāzis the Crusaders were meeting their barbarian predecessors' counterparts—and the Normans their own counterparts, considering that these 'Hagarenes', who were the spear-head of the Frankish offensive in the Mediterranean in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, were as recent converts from Barbarism as the Saljūqs.

In the realm of the pen the Crusaders' temporary conquests in Syria, and still more their lasting conquests in Sicily and Andalusia, at the expense of Dār-al-Islām became so many transmitting stations through which the spiritual treasures in the storehouse of a moribund Syriac World were communicated to a Medieval Western Christendom.¹ The

¹ The successive stages in the process of transmission in Andalusia could be distinguished in the surviving historical record. The first stage was the marriage of Christian princesses from the independent barbarian Christian principalities in the North-West of the Iberian Peninsula by Umayyad amirs and caliphs and by 'Amirid dictators before the collapse of the Andalusian Muslim power in A.D. 1009. The second stage was the employment of transfrontier barbarian Christian mercenaries by Andalusian Muslim governments. The third stage—for which the second opened the way—was the conquest of Andalusia by the Peninsular barbarian Christian principalities. The fourth stage was the migration of musta'rib Christians from the still independent Andalusian Muslim principalities into the expanded Peninsular Christian Kingdoms. The fifth stage was the

genial atmosphere of religious tolerance and intellectual curiosity, which temporarily captivated the Western Christian conquerors of Palermo and Toledo in virtue of its shining contrast to their own traditional fanaticism, was native to an Early Islam;² but the cultural treasures

radiation of the *musta'rib* culture of the Andalusian Caliphate's Peninsular Christian successor-states into the Transpyrenean heart of Western Christendom.

The Cordovan Umayyad Caliph 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III (*natus* A.D. 891) had a Christian mother and grandmother (Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 284), and his predecessor 'Abdallah (*imperabat* A.D. 888-912) may have owed his blondness to Christian maternal ancestresses (*ibid.*, p. 231), though 'Abd-ar-Rahmān I, the founder of the Andalusian Umayyad line, must have owed his (*ibid.*, p. 98) to his Nafzah Berber mother (*ibid.*, p. 67). The dictator Al-Mansūr married Abarca, the daughter of Sancho Garcés II of Navarre (who paid a state visit to his son-in-law at Cordova in A.D. 992), and also a daughter of Bermudo II of León, who returned to León and took the veil after her Cordovan Muslim husband's death (*ibid.*, pp. 437-8). The Andalusian Muslim practice of employing transfrontier Christian mercenaries can be traced at least as far back as the reign of the Umayyad amir Hakam I (*imperabat* A.D. 796-822), whose favourite guards were a band of 150 Narbonne prisoners of war (*ibid.*, p. 133). Al-Mansūr (*dominabatur* A.D. 981-1002) substituted Christian and Maghribi Berber Muslim mercenaries for the six Andalusian Arab junds which had originated in *vexillationes* brought to Andalusia in A.D. 741 by Balj b. Bishr al Qusayri (*ibid.*, pp. 427 and 32-33) from the Arab junds cantoned along the desert coast of Syria and in Palestine and Egypt (see VI. vii. 130-1). The conquest of Andalusia (all save one fastness round Granada) by the Peninsular barbarian Christian principalities between A.D. 1085 and A.D. 1248 exposed them to the radiation of the culture of their new Muslim subjects in the annexed territories, and the transplantation of *musta'rib* Christians into the interior of the Andalusian Caliphate's Christian successor-states carried the Andalusian culture, through the agency of these Arabizing Christian immigrants, into the North-West of the Peninsula, where the original Arab and Berber Muslim invaders had failed to maintain themselves. The Transpyrenean Frankish pilgrims to Compostela and volunteers in the armies of the Peninsular Christian conquerors of Andalusia played their part as carriers, in their turn, by importing a Peninsular *musta'rib* culture into regions of Western Christendom, north of the Loire, to which the eighth-century Arab raiders had never penetrated.

² As witness—to cite one document from the file of evidence—the following testimony from a party of eighth-century English pilgrims to the Christian Holy Land.

'At the time [of his arrival at Emesa *circa* A.D. 723], Willibald had with him seven of his fellow-countrymen, making a party of eight, including Willibald himself. They had no sooner arrived than the heathen Saracens, finding that a party of unknown foreigners had made their appearance in the city, arrested them and kept them under detention, as they did not know their nationality and did suspect them of being spies. They brought them, under detention, before an elderly man of substance to be inspected by him and to have their provenance identified. This elderly man interrogated them—asking them where they came from and what was their business. They replied by giving him a circumstantial account of the reason for their journey, going right back to the beginning; and to this the elder's reply was: "I have often seen people from those parts of the World—fellow-countrymen of these people—coming here; they intend no mischief; all that they want is to fulfil their law."

'Then they left the court and proceeded to Government House, to ask for a transit visa to Jerusalem, but they had no sooner presented themselves than the governor declared them to be spies and gave orders for them to be thrown into prison until he had had time to obtain instructions about their case from the King. After they had thus found themselves in prison, the marvellous dispensation of Almighty God—who, with His fatherly care, has everywhere deigned to cover his children with his shield and preserve them unharmed among missiles and engines of war, among savages and fighting-men, in prison and among hordes of miscreants—moved a man who was in business there to bestir himself, out of charity and for his soul's salvation, to ransom them and secure their release from prison, in order that they might be free to go wherever they might wish. In this he was unsuccessful, but on the other hand he had luncheon and dinner sent in for them every day; and on Wednesdays and Saturdays he used to send his son to the prison to escort them to the public baths and return them to prison again, while on Sundays he used to take them to church through the bazaars, to give them the opportunity of seeing anything that might take their fancy among the goods on sale there, and to give himself the opportunity of buying for them, out of his own pocket, whatever might suit their taste. The townspeople's curiosity was aroused by the party to such a degree that they soon fell into the habit of coming there regularly to look at them (they were young and handsome and well dressed).

'After that, while they were serving their time in prison, a man from Spain came and

which, in this propitious environment, Western minds consented to receive from Muslim and Jewish hands during the next two hundred years were of Hellenic as well as Syriac origin. The Syriac Society was not the creator, but was merely the carrier, of authentic and apocryphal works of the Hellenic philosopher Aristotle which were made accessible to twelfth-century Western schoolmen by being translated into Latin out of Arabic versions in which they had been preserved thanks to the labours of Syriac scholars who had been assiduously translating the corpus of Hellenic philosophy, mathematics, physical science, and medicine into Syriac from the original Greek since the fourth century of the Christian Era¹ and into Arabic, both from the earlier Syriac versions and also from the original Greek, since the ninth century.²

In mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, in contrast to philosophy and terrestrial physical science, the Syriac-speaking Nestorian Christian pupils of the Hellenes and the Arabic-speaking Muslim pupils of these Nestorian Christians had not only preserved and mastered the achievements of their Hellenic predecessors but had also taken lessons in an Indic school and had gone on to achieve original work of their own based on these Hellenic and Indic foundations. In these fields a Medieval Western Christendom took over from contemporary Muslim men of

talked to them in the prison. He made detailed inquiries as to who they were and what their native country was; and they gave him full and consecutive information about their journey. This Spaniard had a brother in the King's palace who was one of the King of the Saracens' chamberlains. So, when the governor who was consigning them to prison came to the palace, the Spaniard who had been talking to them in the prison, and the master-mariner in whose ship they had made their passage from Cyprus, presented themselves together before the King of the Saracens, whose title is *Amir al-Mu'minin*. After their case had come up for consideration, the Spaniard informed his brother of everything that the Englishmen had told him in the prison, and asked him to pass on the information to the King and to do what he could for them. Eventually all three of them together had an audience of the King and informed him *seriatim* of all the facts in the prisoners' case. The King asked them what country they came from, and they said: "The West, where the Sun sets, is these people's home, and we do not know of any country farther west than that or of anything but open sea in that direction". Addressing himself to the deputation, the King replied: "Why do we have to punish them? They have committed no offence against us. Give them their visas and let them go." Other people under detention in prison had to pay a fee, but in their case this was remitted' (*Hodoeporicon Sancti Willibaldi*, in Tobler, T., and Molinier, A. [edd.]: *Itinera Hierosolymitana et Descriptiones Terrae Sanctae Bellis Sacris Anteriora et Latina Lingua Exarata* (Geneva 1879-85, Fich, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 258-60).

The spirit of tolerance that is illustrated in this narrative was imported by the Primitive Muslim Arabs from Syria into Andalusia. In A.D. 785, when 'Abd-ar-Rahmān I wanted to enlarge the Mosque at Cordova, he did not confiscate, but bought, the half of the site that till then had been left to the Christians (Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 95). In the sixth decade of the ninth century of the Christian Era, when there was an outburst of fanatical fervour in the Christian community at Cordova, it proved as difficult to force the hand of the Umayyad authorities into bestowing the crown of martyrdom as it had been to force the Roman authorities' hand in similar circumstances seven or six centuries earlier (Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-67). There was a statue of the Virgin Mary over the Bridge Gate of the Umayyad city of Cordova (Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 371), and a statue of a woman was even placed over the gate of 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III's summer palace at Madinat-az-Zahrah, on which work was started on the 19th November, 936. This second statue was removed in A.D. 1190—in an age of adversity in which a pristine tolerance was fighting a losing battle in Muslim hearts against rising feelings of resentment and apprehension (see pp. 365-6, above)—by order of the Muwahhid Berber 'liberator' of Andalusia, Ya'qūb Al-Mansūr (*ibid.*).

¹ See O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 51, and p. 408, n. 5, below.

² See Sweetman, J. W.: *Islam and Christian Theology*, Part I, vol. i (London 1945, Lutterworth Press), pp. 84-93; O'Leary, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-75; and the present Study, p. 408, n. 5. The renaissance of an Hellenic philosophy and science in a Medieval Western Christendom through an Arabic medium is examined further in X. ix. 45-47, below.

science the results of the Muslims' own researches as well as the classical Hellenic body of knowledge which the Syriac Society had preserved in an Arabic dress and the system of mathematical notation which it had acquired in India;¹ and, when we raise our eyes from the intellectual to the poetic plane, we shall see that, at this high level, the treasure that was acquired by a Medieval Western Christendom from the Andalusian Muslim representatives of a dying Syriac culture was a native Arab achievement which was to inspire all the subsequent achievements of a Western school of poetry down to the close of the Western Civilization's Modern Age—if it is true that the ideas and ideals, as well as the versification and rhyming, of this Western school's Provençal troubadour pioneers can be traced back to an Andalusian Muslim source.²

At the time of writing in the twentieth century of the Christian Era the body of mathematical, astronomical, and medical science which had proved so stimulating to Medieval Western minds when they had received it from the Muslim epigoni of the Nestorian pupils of the Greeks had long since been superseded in the Western World by a series of original Western discoveries which had transformed Man's vision of the Physical Universe, and a Western poetic tradition that had survived the transition from a Medieval to a Modern Age was being battered by the more violent break that the advent of a post-Modern Age had brought with it; yet, in the revolutionary dawn of this new chapter of Western history, the impact of a moribund Syriac Civilization on the youthfully impressionable imagination of a Medieval Western Christendom was still being proclaimed, with the silent eloquence of a visual testimony, in the realm of Architecture by 'Gothic' buildings which—in confutation of the misleading nickname that had been conferred on them by eighteenth-century Western antiquaries—bore on their face a patent certificate of the derivation of this Medieval Western style from models still extant in the ruins of Armenian churches at Ani and of Saljūq caravanserais on desert roads in Anatolia.

In the twentieth century the cities of Western Europe were still dominated by 'Gothic' cathedrals which had superseded their Romanesque predecessors as the result of a Medieval Western architectural revolution precipitated by the architectural impact of the Syriac World. But these medieval 'Gothic' ecclesiastical monuments of Syriac influence in the European homeland of an expanding Modern Western World's domain were not such impressive evidence—profoundly impressive though they were—as the modern Neo-Gothic 'sky-scrapers' which held their own on the sky-line of a twentieth-century New York against streamlined Towers of Babel, or as the Neo-Gothic halls and libraries and dormitories of contemporary American universities at Princeton, New Haven, and Chicago. An invading Syriac architecture's

¹ The names of the Transoxanian poet-philosopher-theologian-physician Abu 'Alī b. Sīnā (*vivebat* A.D. 980–1037) and the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd (*vivebat* A.D. 1126–98) became household words in a Medieval Western Christendom in the outlandish distortions 'Avicenna' and 'Averroes'.

² The arguments for this derivation of the troubadours' art are set out by Christopher Dawson in an illuminating essay on 'The Origins of the Romantic Tradition' in his *Mediaeval Religion* (London 1934, Sheed and Ward), pp. 123–54.

achievement of supplanting the Romanesque style on its native Western ground in the medieval chapter of Western history was assuredly surpassed by the *tour de force* of its latter-day return to the charge in a Modern Western 'Gothic Revival' that was its successful revenge upon an ephemeral Modern Western Classical Renaissance.¹

3. *The Medieval West and Greek Orthodox Christendom*²

While lesser Christian communities, such as the Lebanese Monothelites or the Cilician Armenian Monophysites, could reconcile themselves, albeit with a pang, to union with one of the two principal surviving Christian Churches as an alternative to the still bleaker doom of extinction, the adherents of the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Catholic Church found it more difficult to come to terms with one another than with their Muslim neighbours.

This discord between the Medieval Western Christians and their Eastern Orthodox Christian contemporaries was a consequence of the historical fact that the Hellenic Civilization had given birth to two daughter societies; for, on the morrow of their simultaneous emergence towards the close of the seventh century of the Christian Era, some five hundred years before the final breach between them in the tragic years A.D. 1182-1204,³ these two Hellenistic Christian civilizations had already begun to be alienated from one another by a diversity in *êthos* and by a conflict of interests. In the course of the next five centuries the diversity in *êthos* was progressively accentuated by differences between the two sister societies' respective experiences in successive chapters of their separate histories, while the conflict of interests came to a head in a competition for political and cultural predominance in South-Eastern Europe and Southern Italy. This struggle for power was embittered by the two competing societies' rival claims each to be the sole legitimate heir of a Christian universal church, a Roman Empire, and an Hellenic Civilization which, in the last chapter of its history, had embodied itself in the Roman Empire as its universal state; for these competing ideological pretensions were ultimately irreconcilable.

The political conflict was apt to be masked under the form of ecclesiastical controversies in which questions of ritual practice and of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and discipline played a more prominent part than questions of theological doctrine.⁴ For example, when in the eighth century the Roman See took sides, in a quarrel in Eastern Orthodox Christendom over image-worship, against the iconoclastic policy of the East Roman Imperial Government, it was declaring, on behalf of the people of the *Ducatus Romanus*, the Exarchate of Ravenna, and other

¹ For the archaistic revival of the 'Gothic' medieval style of architecture in the Modern West, see V. vi. 60. For the Modern Western Classical Renaissance in the realm of Architecture, see X. ix. 83-86.

² See xi, maps 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41.

³ The three atrocious acts that made the breach flagrant and irreparable were the massacre of Frankish residents in the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1182, the sack of Salonica by an avenging Norman expeditionary force in A.D. 1185, and the sack of Constantinople by a Franco-Venetian expeditionary force in A.D. 1204 ('the Fourth Crusade').

⁴ In Eastern Orthodox Christendom 'popular interest veered from theological to liturgical issues . . . as early as the sixth century' (Every, G.: *The Byzantine Patriarchate, 451-1204* (London 1947, S.P.C.K.), p. 27).

then still surviving fragments of the Roman Empire in Central Italy, a political decision to look beyond the Alps, to Austrasia, for a desperately needed military protection against their aggressive Lombard neighbours which they had failed to obtain from a Transadriatic Imperial Power at Constantinople.¹ When Pope Nicholas I refused in A.D. 862 to recognize Photius and went on in A.D. 863 to have him condemned by a Roman synod,² and when Photius retorted by having Nicholas condemned by a Constantinopolitan synod of A.D. 867,³ the two prelates were playing ecclesiastical cards in a political game in which the stakes were the future allegiance of the hitherto pagan peoples of South-Eastern Europe between Adrianople and Vienna.⁴ When, mid-way through the eleventh century, a movement for standardizing ritual usages in the domain of the Roman See, which had been initiated in A.D. 1045 by Pope Gregory VI's appointment of Hildebrand to be his *capellanus*,⁵ collided with a corresponding movement inaugurated in the domain of the Oecumenical Patriarchate by Michael Cerularius after his accession to the throne of the Constantinopolitan See in A.D. 1043, a liturgical conflict which caused the schism of A.D. 1054 was at the same time a political contest for the allegiance of ecclesiastical subjects of the Papacy in Southern Italy who were political subjects of the East Roman Empire.⁶

Though, in each of these three successive collisions, the ecclesiastical controversy masked a clash of political interests and was loaded with psychological charges of ideological animus and cultural antipathy, no one on either side on any of the three occasions seems to have been deliberately working for a breach. On the two first occasions of the three, the Papacy was tempted to exploit an opportunity for advancing its own interests which had been thrown in its way through its having been invited by one of two factions in Eastern Orthodox Christendom to intervene in a domestic quarrel within the bosom of the Eastern Orthodox Church;⁷ and on both occasions the ecclesiastical controversy

¹ See IV. iv. 337 and 594-5.

² See Dvornik, F.: *The Photian Schism* (Cambridge 1948, University Press), pp. 93-98.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 120-1.

⁴ See IV. iv. 379-81 and 605-10.

⁵ See IV. iv. 529 and 536.

⁶ See Runciman, S.: *A History of the Crusades*, vol. i (Cambridge 1951, University Press), p. 96, and the present Study, IV. iv. 612-14. As Runciman puts it, 'the dispute was over usages; and it therefore raised the problem of the ecclesiastical frontier in Italy, a problem made more acute by the invasion of the Normans, themselves members of the Latin Church'. This was, however, only an incidental result of a policy of *Gleichschaltung* which had been aimed by Cerularius, not at the Lombard Catholic Christians in Southern Italy, who had been allowed to continue to follow the Latin rite and to remain under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Roman See after they had come under the East Roman Empire's rule at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries (see IV. iv. 343-4 and 610-11), but at the recently annexed Gregorian Monophysite Christians in Armenia. 'His original motive was to absorb more easily the churches of the newly occupied Armenian provinces . . . But his policy affected also the Latin churches in Byzantine Italy and those that existed in Constantinople itself for the benefit of merchants, pilgrims, and soldiers of the Varangian Guard' (Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 96).

⁷ One of the most illuminating of the new lights in Dvornik's *The Photian Schism* is his exposition of the importance of the part played in the collision of A.D. 862-80 between Photius and the Roman See by a struggle between two factions within the Constantinopolitan Church. It was only human that the Roman See should have attempted to profit by the situation, but this was always a dangerous game for the Vatican to play in a Constantinopolitan ecclesiastical arena; for, though in domestic ecclesiastical controversies in the East Roman Empire it was an obvious recourse for a faction to appeal

between East and West was eventually composed on the basis of a tacit compromise over the underlying political conflict. When the eighth-century controversy between the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate and the Roman See was settled by the Constantinopolitan Church's repudiations of Iconoclasm in A.D. 787 and A.D. 842, the East Roman Imperial Government was acquiescing in the loss of its political sovereignty over the Ducatus Romanus and the Exarchate of Ravenna, while the Roman See was acquiescing in the loss of its ecclesiastical sovereignty over the 'toe' and 'heel' of Italy, as well as over Sicily and the Praetorian Prefecture of Illyricum. When the ninth-century controversy was settled in A.D. 879-80, the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate was acquiescing in the loss of its mission-field in Moravia, and the Roman See in the defeat of its hopes of acquiring jurisdiction over Bulgaria.

The reconciliation between the Roman and the Constantinopolitan Church in A.D. 879-88 would become easier to understand if it should prove that, contrary to the traditional reading of the historical evidence, the Photian Synod of Constantinople in A.D. 867 did not, after all, either explicitly denounce the Western Church for having interpolated the *filioque* clause in the Creed¹ or explicitly deny the Roman See's primacy over other patriarchal churches.² However that may be, there appears to be no doubt that in A.D. 1054 the ecclesiastical combatants on both sides exercised some self-restraint in refraining from aggravating a new breach by making theological denunciations against one another. The bull excommunicating the Oecumenical Patriarch Michael Cerularius and his advisers, which the departing Papal legates left on the altar of St. Sophia at Constantinople in that unhappy year, expressly admitted the orthodoxy of the Byzantine Church,³ and the Constantinopolitan synod convened by Cerularius condemned, in its counterblast, the bull, the interpolation of the *filioque* clause in the creed, and the persecution of married clergy without expressly attaching to the Roman Church the responsibility for these offences.⁴ In whatever ratios the responsibility for the breach in A.D. 1054 is to be apportioned between the Oecumenical Patriarch and the three Papal legates, it is clear that it was deplored by a majority on both sides. Occurring, as it did, at a moment when the Vatican and the East Roman Government had a common political interest in checking the conquests of the Normans in Southern Italy at the

to the Vatican when their opponents had outmanoeuvred them on the home front by securing the support of the East Roman Imperial Government, the warring Byzantine ecclesiastical factions were apt to close their ranks when their dissension manifestly threatened to jeopardize some vital East Roman interest. Ignatius, for example, who owed his reinstatement on the Patriarchal throne at Constantinople to the Roman See's intervention on his behalf, proved as unwilling as his deposed rival Photius had been to resign Bulgaria to the Roman See's jurisdiction (Dvornik, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-8); and a reconciliation between Ignatians and Photians *circa* A.D. 876 (Dvornik, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-71) prepared the way for the reconciliation in A.D. 879-80 between the Roman See and a Constantinopolitan Church that was now reunited under the presidency of a Photius who had been reinstated on the Patriarchal throne. Such experiences taught Eastern Orthodox Christendom that its domestic dissensions were an aggressive-minded Roman See's temptations and opportunities; and the feud between Photians and Ignatians, as well as the subsequent feud between Nicolaitans and Euthymians (see IV. iv. 598-9), was solemnly consigned to oblivion at synods held in Constantinople in A.D. 920 and A.D. 991 (Dvornik, *op. cit.*, p. 434).

¹ See Dvornik, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-3.

² See Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 123-9.

⁴ See *ibid.*

expense of both these Powers, the ecclesiastical breach was deprecated by both of them for political reasons; and on both sides, for the next 150 years, responsible churchmen did their best at least to prevent the breach from widening, in so far as they were unable to ignore its existence.

'The churches of Alexandria and Jerusalem had taken no part in the episode. The Patriarch of Antioch, Peter III, definitely thought that Cerularius had been unnecessarily difficult. His church had continued to commemorate the Pope's name in its diptychs, and he saw no reason why that practice should cease . . . He could not support the standardization of ritual and usage; for his diocese contained churches where a Syrian liturgy was in use, and many of them lay beyond the political frontiers of the Empire. He could not have enforced uniformity there, even had he desired it. He kept himself outside of the quarrel.'¹

The nearest neighbour to Western Christendom among the Eastern Orthodox Churches that, in the eleventh century, were independent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople was the autonomous Archbishopric of Ochrida,² and at some date between A.D. 1090 and A.D. 1095, with an eye to the current negotiations on the eve of the First Crusade, the incumbent of this see, Archbishop Theophylact, published a treatise minimizing the seriousness of the differences in ritual and theology between the Eastern Orthodox Churches and the Roman Church.³ At the turn of the years A.D. 1097-8, when the Crusaders were threatened with famine under the walls of Antioch, the reigning Patriarch of Jerusalem, Symeon II, who had published a temperately worded treatise against the Latin rite, provisioned the Crusading Army from Cyprus, where he was a refugee; and this practical demonstration of goodwill was reciprocated in the policy followed by Adhemar, Bishop of Le Puy, Pope Urban II's legate *auprès* the Crusaders.⁴ After the capture of Antioch by the Crusaders on the 3rd June, 1098, 'the Patriarch John was released from his prison and replaced on the patriarchal throne. John was a Greek, who disliked the Latin rite; but he was the legitimate patriarch of a see still in full communion with Rome. Adhemar was certainly not going to offend against legitimacy and local sentiment by ignoring his rights.'⁵ No doubt he would have gone on to reinstate Symeon on the patriarchal throne of Jerusalem if he and Symeon had lived to see the capture of Jerusalem in A.D. 1099.

The spirit shown by the Papal legate⁶ and the Patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch during the First Crusade was not confined to ecclesiastics.

¹ Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

² See IV. iv. 394, n. 1.

³ See Every, *op. cit.*, p. 177; Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

⁴ See Runciman, S.: 'Adhemar of Le Puy and the Eastern Churches', in *Actes du VI^e Congrès International d'Études Byzantines*, vol. i (Paris 1951).

⁵ Runciman: *A History of the Crusades*, vol. i, p. 237.

⁶ Adhemar's goodwill shines by contrast with the rancour shown, 130 years earlier, by Bishop Liutprand of Cremona, in his report to the West Roman Emperor Otto II on his diplomatic mission to Constantinople in A.D. 968-9. In discussing the meaning of a prophecy in the third-century Christian Father Hippolytus's *De Antichristo*, Liutprand rejects with vigour the Byzantine interpretation, current in his day, that Hippolytus was foreshadowing an *union sacrée* of Eastern Orthodox and Western Catholic Christendom against Islam in Africa, and offers, as his own, the alternative interpretation of a joint victory of Otto I and Otto II over Nikiphóros Phokás (Liutprand of Cremona: *Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*, chaps. 40-41).

The reigning East Roman Emperor Alexius I Comnenus, on whom the passage of the First Crusade through his dominions inflicted extreme political anxiety and personal discomfort,¹ is credited by his daughter the historian Anna Comnena with a scrupulous reluctance, even under severe provocation, to authorize his troops to shed their Western fellow Christians' blood. The Emperor, as Anna presents him, is determined to avoid 'civil war' between the representatives of the two branches of the Christian community,² and, when the clash becomes unavoidable, he instructs his archers to aim at the Franks' horses in order to break their charge without taking Christian lives.³ Later on, Alexius instructs the governor-general of Durazzo to cite the moral obligation deriving from a common Christianity as his ground for responding favourably to Bohemond's overtures for the restoration of a peace which Bohemond himself has treacherously broken.⁴ Again, one of the motives attributed to Alexius by Anna for his policy of sending East Roman forces to convoy the Crusaders across Anatolia is a concern to save fellow Christians from being cut to pieces by the Turks.⁵ Anna's husband Nikiphóros Vryénnios, whose *Histories* she continued after his death, records that his father-in-law, in his campaign, before his accession to the imperial throne, against the Norman military adventurer Russell, who was trying to carve a principality for himself out of the East Roman Empire's Armeniac army-corps district,⁶ took pains to capture Russell's rebel Frankish troopers alive, because he had a scruple against killing enemies who were his fellow Christians.⁷

In the history of the Comnenian Dynasty's relations with the Frankish trespassers on Orthodox Christian ground, the wry-faced forbearance practised by the Emperor Alexius I (*imperabat* A.D. 1081-1118) was to be transformed, in the attitude of his grandson and second successor the Emperor Manuel I (*imperabat* A.D. 1143-80), into a positive passion for Frankish comrades and customs;⁸ and in the twelfth century, as in the eleventh, there were clerics on both sides, as well as secular statesmen on the East Roman side, who were concerned to avert a breach between the two Christendoms. Though at Antioch, under the rule of the Norman Bohemond, who was an implacable enemy of the East Roman Empire, the invading Latin clergy began, on the morrow of Bishop Adhemar's death on the 1st August, 1098, to oust the Greek clergy from the diocese, and drove the reinstated Greek Patriarch John first into resigning and then into emigrating within two years of the Latin occupation,⁹ the Latin successors of the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem, Symeon II, justified their claim to be his legitimate heirs by their good treatment of Eastern Orthodox Christian residents and pilgrims in their patriarchate, and here, under this liberal dispensation, intercommunion between Latins and Eastern Orthodox seems to have been common in the twelfth

¹ See pp. 390-2, below.

² See Anna Comnena: *Alexiad*, edited by Reifferscheid, A. (Leipzig 1884, Teubner, 2 vols.), Book X, chap. 9.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ See *Alexiad*, Book XIII, chap. 9.

⁵ See *Alexiad*, Book XIV, chap. 2.

⁶ See p. 357, n. 3, above, and p. 389, n. 1, below.

⁷ See Vryénnios, N.: *Historiae*, ed. by Meineke, A. (Bonn 1836, Weber), p. 85.

⁸ See pp. 392-3, below.

⁹ See Every, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-3.

century.¹ Circa A.D. 1107-11, in a letter instructing the Benedictine community in Constantinople not to yield to the Oecumenical Patriarch's exhortations to them to conform to the Eastern Orthodox rite, the Abbot of Monte Cassino, Bruno of Asti, qualified his insistence on the distinction between the two rites by reminding his correspondents 'that, although the customs of the churches are distinct, nevertheless there is one faith, indissolubly united to the head, that is Christ, and that He Himself is one and remains the same in His body'.²

In A.D. 1190, after the massacre of the Franks in the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1182 and the Norman sack of Salonica in A.D. 1185, the Eastern Orthodox titular Patriarch of Antioch, Theodore Balsamon, ruled, in answer to an inquiry from the Eastern Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria, whose church had been accustomed to give communion to Latin prisoners-of-war held by the Muslim rulers of Egypt, that 'no Latins should be communicated with unless they first declare that they will abstain from their doctrines and customs and be in subjection to the canons, and be made like unto the Orthodox'.³ Yet, even after the sack of Constantinople in A.D. 1204 in 'the Fourth Crusade', the Metropolitan of Ochrida Dhimitrios Khomatinós (*fungebatur* A.D. 1207-22) noted⁴ that Balsamon's opinion was criticized by many Eastern Orthodox authorities 'as showing too great harshness and bitterness, and an unjustifiable tone, in blaming the Latin forms and customs, "because all this", they said, "has never been decreed synodically, nor have they ever been rejected as heretics, but both eat with us and pray with us"'.⁵

According to Runciman,⁶ while the schism dates from A.D. 1100 in the Church of Antioch, in the Church of Jerusalem it dates only from some time after (though not long after) A.D. 1187, and in the Church of Constantinople only from A.D. 1204, 'when the Frankish conquerors appointed a Latin patriarch, ignoring the legitimate patriarch, John Camaterus'.

Why was it, then, that a breach between the two Christendoms, which had been staved off for the best part of five hundred years by the efforts of clerics and laymen of good will on both sides, came to pass, after all, in the years A.D. 1182-1204, and thereafter widened until in the fifteenth century the Eastern Orthodox Christians eventually opted for submission to a Muslim Ottoman Pādishāh's political dominion in preference to accepting a Western Christian Pope's ecclesiastical supremacy?⁶ In the last act of this tragedy the immediate stumbling-blocks were

¹ See Every, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-62. First-hand evidence of this is to be found in the Russian Abbot Daniel's description of the celebration of Easter at Jerusalem in A.D. 1107 (see the English translation of his narrative (London 1888, *Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society*), pp. 74-82). Daniel was allowed by King Baldwin ('he knew me and liked me, being a man of great kindness and humility') to place his lamp on the Holy Sepulchre, in the name of All Russia, to be kindled by the Holy Light. He was allowed to place it on the tomb itself, beside the lamp of the Greeks and the lamp of the Monastery of St. Sabbas, whereas the Franks' lamps were merely suspended above and did not take light on this occasion.

² Migne: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. clxvi, cols. 1085-90, cited by Every, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-8.

³ Migne: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. cxxxviii, col. 967, cited by Every, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

⁴ See Migne: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. cxix, cols. 956-60, cited *ibid.*

⁵ 'Adhemar of Le Puy and the Eastern Churches', p. 331.

⁶ See pp. 151-2, above.

manifestly Western Christendom's obstinate insistence on dictating terms of ecclesiastical union that stamped Eastern Orthodox Christendom as her inferior, and her no less persistent unwillingness to sweeten this bitter pill by guaranteeing to the East Roman Imperial Government, as a *quid pro quo*, that effective military aid would in fact be forthcoming from the West if the East Roman political authorities were unexpectedly to succeed in inducing their clergy and people to follow their own heroic example in resigning themselves to the acceptance of such humiliating ecclesiastical conditions. The ultimate cause of the catastrophe is, however, perhaps to be found in a progressive divergence between the two cultures, in points of *êthos* and way of life, which had begun to show itself seven hundred, or even a thousand, years earlier, and which is illustrated on the ecclesiastical plane by the differentiation between the Greek and Latin rites; for this diversity stimulated an antipathy that increased *pari passu* with it. An aggravating circumstance was the sudden, unexpected, and sensational reversal of the two sister Christian societies' relative strengths and prospects in the eleventh century.¹

One of the consequences of this political and economic *peripeteia* was that, from that time onwards, either party presented an insufferable appearance in the other party's eyes. In the sight of the Eastern Orthodox Christians the Franks were now parvenus who were cynically exploiting a superiority in brute force which had been undeservedly conferred upon them by a preposterous latter-day freak of Fortune. In the sight of the Western Christians the Byzantines were now mandarins whose overweening pretensions were neither justified by merit nor backed by force. To the Franks it seemed as monstrous that the Byzantines should expect them to feel honoured at being given the opportunity of pulling Greek chestnuts out of a Turkish fire as it seemed monstrous to the Byzantines that the Franks should take advantage of the exhaustion of an East Roman Empire which had spent its strength in bearing the brunt of a battle in a common cause against a Muslim aggressor who was a menace to Eastern and Western Christendom alike.

From the Eastern Orthodox Christian standpoint the eleventh-century reversal of the relation between the two Christendoms was an inexcusable practical joke which a Byzantine pedant's literary conceit might debit euphemistically to Clio, the pagan Hellenic Muse of History, as an ingenious way out of the blasphemy of ascribing to the presumably Orthodox God of Constantine and Justinian and Basil the Bulgar-Slayer a *gaffe* which was not only supremely unjust but was also in excruciatingly bad taste. In the preceding age the spectacle of a Western Christendom wallowing in a poverty and an impotence which were the wages of a sinful inclination towards Barbarism had been not unpleasing for a Byzantine statesman or scholar to contemplate. The contrast between his Latin poor relation's misery and his own comparative state of blessedness in This Life had given him the same sense of satisfaction and self-assurance that either breed of Christian would have felt in that epoch when he imagined himself in the Life to Come leaning over the

¹ See pp. 351-2, above.

balustrade of Heaven and feasting his eyes on the tortures of damned personal acquaintances in Hell.

As an early-eleventh-century Byzantine student of history might have seen it, his Latin contemporaries were then justly still being punished for the sins of forefathers who, in the fifth century of the Christian Era, had committed the moral and aesthetic solecism of parting company with their fellow Orthodox Christians and fellow Roman citizens in the Greek-speaking core of an Hellenic World embodied in the Roman Empire, in order to fraternize with North European barbarians by whom the Latin-speaking western fringes of the Roman Empire were being overrun. From the Byzantine point of view the fifth-century breakdown in those Latin-speaking provinces had revealed culpable incompetence in so far as it had been involuntary, as well as culpable disloyalty in so far as it had been the expression of a preference for chastisement by barbarian warlords' whips to chastisement by imperial tax-collectors' scorpions. Yet, in the sequel, the tribulation which the Latin secessionists from Civilization had brought upon themselves—and had duly continued to bring upon themselves in the ludicrously disastrous aftermath of Charlemagne's naïvely presumptuous usurpation of the Roman Imperial Crown—was a punishment that had gratifyingly fitted their crime, while on the other hand their secession, offensive though it might be, had not inflicted any appreciable material damage upon the intact Greek core of Romania and Christendom. Indeed, if the implicit offence to Byzantium's *amour propre* and the impalpable damage to her prestige could legitimately be discounted, she might consider that she was positively the gainer in being relieved of responsibility for a backward Latin fringe that had never been more than an excrescence on the body social of the Hellenic Society and had latterly become not merely an excrescence but an incubus.

This imaginary early-eleventh-century Byzantine appreciation of the relations between Eastern Orthodox Christendom and the West up to date would have required a painfully drastic revision before the century was over. A comfortable attitude of meritorious and unchallengeable superiority could now no longer plausibly be maintained towards once poor relations who, overnight, had become *nouveaux riches*; and the worst of it was that, all along, these Latin barbarians beyond the Byzantine earthly paradise's pale had been in possession of one ecclesiastical and cultural asset whose supreme value the East Romans could not dispute without impugning the title on which they based their own claim to be the exclusive Heirs of the Promise of Hellenism and Christianity.

The Old Rome on the banks of the Tiber might be held to have forfeited her political primacy to a New Rome, set on the shores of a mightier stream, whose geographically manifest destiny to become the capital of the World had been fulfilled by the historic act, and consecrated by the immense authority, of the first Christian Roman Emperor. Yet neither Constantine's august genius nor Poseidon's masterly creation of the Bosphorus by a god's mighty trident-stroke¹ could undo the historic fact that the site of the Old Rome, however woefully devastated

¹ See II. i. 325-6.

it might be in terms of human power and pride,¹ was eternally hallowed by the presence of the mortal remains of the two arch-apostles, Peter and Paul, who had come to Rome to be martyred there owing to the accident that this demi-Hellenic Central Italian town happened to be the political capital of the World in the Apostles day.² The numinous mana of a Rome that was the sepulchre of Peter and Paul had retained all the potency bequeathed by this second pair of discordant founders when the volatile political power of the pagan Rome of Romulus and Remus had ebbed away to Nicomedia and Constantinople and Milan and Ravenna and Trier and Aachen. On the political plane a medieval Rome had been degraded from being *caput mundi* to becoming a derelict frontier-post on the borderline between two rival Christendoms; but in the course of the eighth century of the Christian Era this ruin that had become a political liability had passed out of East Roman into Frankish hands, and in consequence the earthly representative of the Prince of the Apostles had become the President of a Western Christian commonwealth instead of remaining an East Roman subject. The Eastern Patriarchates might wince at being required to recognize the Papacy's supremacy, but it was difficult for them to deny that the Pope was at any rate *primus inter pares* in the light of the Papacy's indisputably decisive role in determining the acts of oecumenical councils, culminating in the Council of Calchedon, whose findings were the foundations of Eastern Orthodox, as well as Western Catholic, theology.

Nor was the Papacy's eminence merely an echo of ancient history; it was also a portentous living fact, as the East Roman Imperial Government had discovered through a costly experiment on the occasion of the controversy over images in the eighth century. The Vatican had then proved no longer amenable to the harsh political discipline which the Emperor Justinian I had applied to Popes Silverius and Vigilius and the Emperor Constans II to Pope Martin I,³ and thereafter the East Roman Imperial Government showed its flair for political realities by steadily insisting, sometimes in the teeth of opposition on the part of at least one faction in the Eastern Orthodox Church, upon treating the Papacy with the tactful consideration which it was only politic to show to a Great Power.⁴ The East Roman Government constantly pursued this conciliatory policy towards the Vatican from the time of the conflict between Pope Nicholas I and the Oecumenical Patriarch Photius (*flagrabat* A.D. 862⁵-80⁶) down to the capture of Constantinople by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1453;⁷ but, though the policy was never abandoned, the fateful

¹ See the passage quoted from a sermon of Gregory the Great's in IV. iv. 60-61 and VII. vii. 553.

² 'Non est a Graecis Romanus vilis tenendus locus quia recessit inde imperator Constantinus, verum eo magis colendus, venerandus, adorandus quia venerunt illuc Apostoli, doctores sancti, Petrus et Paulus' (Liutprand of Cremona: *Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*, chap. lxii).

³ See IV. iv. 337. The East Roman Government ought to have taken warning from the failure of its attempt in A.D. 693 to deal with Pope Sergius I as it had dealt with Pope Martin I in A.D. 653.

⁴ See Dvornik, F.: *The Photian Schism* (Cambridge 1948, University Press), pp. 94-95.

⁵ See *ibid.*, chap. 6, pp. 159-201.

⁷ No particularly remarkable statesmanship was required to inspire the eleventh-hour attempts of the later Palaiologhi to come to terms with the Vatican at the price of

breach between the Oecumenical Patriarch and the Vatican in A.D. 1054 marked the beginning of the end of its effectiveness. Down to that date the East Roman Imperial Government had usually proved strong enough to impose its philopapal will on an antipapal faction in the Eastern Orthodox Church; from Cerularius's day onwards this faction in the Eastern Orthodox Church usually proved strong enough, when it chose, to repudiate and thereby nullify successive ententes between the East Roman Imperial Government and the Papacy.¹

The more and more fanatically intransigent opposition to an ecclesiastical reunion with Rome which was displayed by the clergy and people of Eastern Orthodox Christendom after the final breach in A.D. 1182-1204 was the effect, not only of a reversal of fortune, but also of an increasing cultural antipathy which was reciprocated by a contemporaneous increase in the corresponding hostile feelings on the Western Christian side. In Byzantine eyes the Franks were impertinent, unmannerly, and truculent; in Frankish eyes the Byzantines were pretentious, pedantic, and perfidious. Out of the copious medieval Greek and Latin literature illustrating the Franks' and Byzantines' unedifying mutual dislike and hostility, we must be content in this place to cite a few illuminating passages from one representative spokesman on either side. As evidence of the Franks' prejudice against the Byzantines we may quote a report² by the Lombard bishop Liutprand of Cremona (*vivebat circa* A.D. 920-72) on a diplomatic mission to the East Roman Imperial Court at Constantinople which he had carried out on behalf of his Saxon master the West Roman Emperor Otto II in A.D. 968-9, when the East Roman Empire was at its zenith.³ As evidence of the Byzantine

acknowledging the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Papacy over the Eastern Orthodox Churches. The breach of all diplomatic precedent that was committed by the Emperor John Palaiologhōs I in A.D. 1369, when he paid a personal visit to Pope Urban V at Rome as a suppliant, was prompted by the no less unprecedented change for the worse in the military and political situation of a precariously restored East Roman Empire since the reduction of Constantinople to an enclave, entirely surrounded by Ottoman territory, as a result of Sultan Murād I's conquest of Adrianople in A.D. 1361. The Emperor Manuel Palaiologhōs's visit to the Courts of France and England in A.D. 1400-2 was similarly prompted by the permanent blockade to which Constantinople had been subjected by Sultan Bāyezid I since A.D. 1391, and the Emperor John Palaiologhōs II's visit to Italy in A.D. 1437-9, which bore fruit in the negotiation of the ecclesiastical Union of Florence, by a lively fear of a repetition of the abortive siege of Constantinople by Sultan Murād II in A.D. 1422. On the other hand, when the founder of the dynasty, the Emperor Michael Palaiologhōs, had negotiated the first of the series of ecclesiastical unions in A.D. 1274 (see IV. iv. 615-16), the antecedent event that had prompted him had not been a disaster, but had been the brilliant success of his capture of Constantinople from the last of the usurping Latin emperors in A.D. 1261. Michael's concern was, not to retrieve a misfortune, but to forestall a *revanche*; and, in taking so momentous a step before being forced to take it by accomplished facts, he was showing vision as well as courage of the highest order.

¹ For the change in the Balance of Power between the East Roman Imperial Government and the Orthodox Church, to the Church's advantage, in and after the eleventh century of the Christian Era, see IV. iv. 612-23.

² *Liutprandi Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*.

³ This was not Liutprand's only excursion on to Orthodox Christian ground. One of his earliest undertakings as a young man had been a mission to Constantinople in A.D. 949 (*imperante Constantino VII Porphyrogenito*) on behalf of the North Italian prince Berengar of Ivrea (*Liutprandi Opera*, edited by Becker, J.: 3rd ed. (Hanover and Leipzig 1915, Hahn), p. viii), and he may also have been a member of the mission sent to Constantinople by Otto II in A.D. 971 (*ibid.*, p. xii). A brief and, on the whole, courteous account of the mission of A.D. 949 is given by Liutprand in his history of his own times (*Antapodosis*, Book VI, chaps. 3-10).

prejudice against the Franks, we may quote the Greek princess-historian Anna Comnena's history of the reign of her father the East Roman Emperor Alexius I (*imperabat* A.D. 1081-1118), who became disagreeably well acquainted with the Franks through having to cope first with the Normans' attempt to conquer the East Roman Empire in the war of A.D. 1081-5 and then with the Crusaders' transit across his dominions in A.D. 1096-7—a visitation which caused the Emperor more anxiety than the Normans' previous undisguised aggression, since the foiled but impenitent Norman aggressors were now claiming readmittance, in the company of a host of adventurers recruited from other Western Christian barbarian tribes, in the novel and unconvincing guise of the East Romans' allies and champions.

Bishop Liutprand's official anxieties and adversities in the difficult diplomatic task with which he had been entrusted were aggravated by his personal disgust with all the incidental details of daily life in the Orthodox Christendom of his day. The palace assigned to him was so inconsiderately exposed to the elements that it was always either too hot or too cold.¹ What hateful quarters!² And they were so far from the Emperor's palace—to which he was made to walk, and was not allowed to ride—that he always arrived out of breath.³ In these odious apartments the Ambassador and his suite were kept insulated by security police.⁴ Even his Greek-speaking dragoman was not allowed out to buy provisions, and he had to send to market a cook who knew no Greek and who was shamelessly cheated over the purchases which he was forced to make by dumb-show.⁵ The pitch and gypsum with which the Greek wine provided for him was doctored made it undrinkable,⁶ and drinking-water could not be had except for cash.⁷ As for the food, it was as horrid as the wine and as scarce and expensive⁸ as the water. The Lombard bishop could not stomach the highly seasoned fare that was served to him at the East Roman imperial table;⁹ but he also disdained the plain Greek biscuit (*paximádhi*) which was all that the poverty-stricken eunuch-bishop of Lefkádha had to offer him¹⁰ ('in the whole of Greece', Liutprand declares, 'I have not found one single hospitable bishop').¹¹ In the hateful quarters in the capital the officer responsible for providing Liutprand and his party with their daily subsistence allowance was a devil.¹² The beds, too, were stone-hard, without mattress or pillow.¹³ The Emperor's procession to celebrate the opening of a new regnal year was tawdry.¹⁴ In short, every one of the Ambassador's 120 days¹⁵ in the New Rome was a torment;¹⁶ and, after taking a school-boy's revenge on his hosts by scrawling a screed of abusive Latin hexameters on the walls and table,¹⁷ he rejoiced to see the last of 'that once opulent and flourishing but now famine-stricken, perjured, lying, deceitful, rapacious, covetous, miserly, empty-headed city'¹⁸—only to suffer a further martyrdom on a

¹ *Legatio*, chap. 1.

⁴ Chaps. 1, 26, and 29.

⁷ Chap. 1.

¹⁰ Chap. 63.

¹⁴ Chaps. 9-10.

¹⁶ Chaps. 1 and 46.

¹⁸ Chap. 58.

² *Ibid.*, chaps. 13, 19, and 24.

⁵ Chap. 46.

⁸ Chaps. 34 and 44.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Chap. 1.

¹⁵ 4th June to 2nd October, A.D. 968.

¹⁷ Chap. 57.

³ Chap. 1.

⁶ Chaps. 1 and 13.

⁹ Chaps. 20 and 32.

¹³ Chap. 13.

seven-weeks' journey¹ overland from Constantinople to Lepanto² in which he had to pay an exorbitant price to his courier (*dhiastōstis*) for the hire of pack-horses which the Imperial Government had omitted to provide.³

Equally exasperating—and this to both parties—were the chronic disputes over childish points of protocol which exacerbated Byzantino-Frankish relations for centuries. Liutprand was indignant with the Emperor Nikiphóros's brother, the Kouropalátis and Grand Logothete Leo, for referring to Liutprand's own master, Otto, not as 'emperor' (*Βασιλεύς*) but as 'king' (*ῥῆξ*),⁴ while Nikiphóros spoke with displeasure of Otto's 'intolerable, unmentionable' presumption in styling himself 'emperor'.⁵ The East Roman Imperial Court was still more incensed when a mission arrived from the Pope of the day⁶ bearing a letter addressed to 'the Emperor of the Greeks'.⁷ Questions of precedence proved as painful as questions of style and title. After having been seated fifteen places away from the Emperor at one banquet,⁸ Liutprand left the room when, at another banquet, he found himself placed below a Bulgar envoy 'with his head cropped like a Hungarian and a brass chain doing duty for a belt'. Kouropalátis Leo and First Secretary Simeon ran after the retreating Ambassador shouting at him that the Bulgarian envoy enjoyed precedence over all other foreign ambassadors by treaty right, and that the present envoy, in spite of his cropped head, unwashed body, and brass chain, was nevertheless a patrician and must therefore take precedence over a bishop—particularly over a bishop who was also a Frank. They would not allow Liutprand to come back, but dismissed him to take his dinner in the servants' hall;⁹ and another time, on a hunting party, they dismissed him from the imperial park for his breach of etiquette in wearing a cap instead of a hat in the Emperor's presence.¹⁰ Before the ambassador's departure from Constantinople, the imperial authorities gave him a further lesson in the low esteem in which they held the Franks by compulsorily repurchasing from him five purple robes of state which Liutprand had bought during his stay in Constantinople but which the authorities now declared to be of the category scheduled as 'too good for export' (*κωλυόμενα*).¹¹

Liutprand's conversations with the Emperor Nikiphóros and his ministers were enlivened on both sides by sallies that were occasionally pointed but more often merely vituperative.¹² Liutprand's own most telling shot was that 'it was the Greeks who bred heresies, and the Westerners who killed them';¹³ and at a state banquet on the 7th June, 968, the inflammatory word 'Romans' kindled into flame the perpetually

¹ 2nd October to 20th November, A.D. 968.

² Chap. 57.

³ Chap. 2.

⁴ Chap. 25.

⁵ Chap. 58.

⁶ Chaps. 47 and 50.

⁷ Chap. 47. When the East Roman officials took Liutprand to task over this, he gave them, according to his own account, the following malicious explanation: 'The Pope, in his noble simplicity, was intending to pay the Emperor a compliment, and not to insult him, by giving him this title. We are well aware that Constantine the Emperor of the Romans came here with the Roman Army and founded this city that is named after him; but, since you have changed your language, your manners and customs, and your dress, His Holiness inferred that you disliked being called Romans as much as you disliked wearing Roman clothes' (chap. 51).

⁸ Chap. 11.

⁹ Chap. 19.

¹⁰ Chap. 37.

¹¹ Chaps. 53–55.

¹² See, for example, chaps. 37, 45, and 53.

¹³ Chap. 22.

smouldering resentment between the representatives of the two Christendoms.

'Nikiphóros refused to give me a chance of replying to him, and added insultingly: "You are not Romans; you are Lombards!" He wanted to go on, and motioned to me to be silent, but I lost my temper and took the floor. "It is a notorious historical fact," I declared, "that Romulus, after whom the Romans are called, was a fratricide and a son of a whore—born, I mean, out of lawful wedlock—and that he set up an Alsatia for defaulting debtors, fugitive slaves, murderers, and perpetrators of other capital offences. He harboured these criminals, collected a crowd of them, and called them "Romans". This is the fine aristocracy from which your emperors, or κοσμοκράτορες as you call them, are descended. But we—and by "us" I mean us Lombards, Saxons, Frenchmen, Lorrainers, Bavarians, Swabians, Burgundians—we despise the Romans so utterly that, when we lose our tempers with our enemies, the one word "Roman!" is all that we have to utter, because, in our parlance, this single bad name embraces the whole gamut of meanness, cowardice, avarice, decadence, untruthfulness and all the other vices.'

Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh,² and, in provoking Liutprand into losing his temper, Nikiphóros had stung his Latin guest into proclaiming his sense of solidarity with his Teutonic-speaking fellow Westerners in a common antipathy against all 'Romans'. In a later and more genial conversation at the imperial dinner table, Nikiphóros used the word 'Franks' to include Latins as well as Teutons;³ and this usage had been justified in advance by Liutprand's revealing outburst. Though Liutprand was a Latin of the Latins in his intellectual culture—being as well versed as any Western scholar of his day in the Latin version of the classical Hellenic literature—a common Hellenic cultural background had not bred in Liutprand's heart any feeling of affinity with the contemporary Greek heirs of the same Hellenic heritage. Between this tenth-century Italian and these tenth-century Greeks a great emotional gulf was already fixed, whereas there was no gulf of the kind between Liutprand and his Saxon employers—whose kinsman he instinctively felt himself to be, in virtue of his own Lombard descent and Teutonic name, though his intrusive barbarian ancestors had not taken long to make themselves at home in Italy by forgetting how to speak their original Teutonic mother tongue. From the Byzantine standpoint this incurably barbarian-hearted Latin was a renegade from the Hellenic culture into which he had been initiated (even though only at second hand); and, at the first audience given to Liutprand by Niki-

¹ Chap. 12. The contempt which Liutprand professed to feel for 'Romans' was felt by the East Roman Court for the City of Rome, in contrast to Constantinople. "Look here", they said: "This fatuous, vulgar Pope of yours is ignorant of the historic fact that His Sacred Majesty Constantine transferred the imperial sceptre from Rome to this city—and, with it, all the Senate and the whole of the Roman Army—and left at Rome nothing but vile bodies: creatures such as fishermen, pimps, fowlers, bastards, proletarians and slaves!" (ibid., chap. 51). Presumably they forgot, in making this *extempore* exposition of the Byzantine case, that one of the fishermen whom Constantine had left behind in the Old Rome had been no less a person than the Prince of the Apostles. Presumably, too, this crushing retort did not occur to Liutprand either; for, if he had thought of it, he would certainly have put it on record.

² Matt. xii. 34.

³ See *Legatio*, chap. 33.

phóros, the Emperor did not hesitate to accuse the Ambassador of having been sent by his Saxon employer Otto as a spy.¹

Liutprand took his revenge by painting a verbal portrait of the Emperor—in a document that would never reach Nikiphóros's eyes and in a language that he did not understand—which was as unflattering as malice could make it.

"The man is a freak, a dwarf, with a great fat head and little mole's eyes. He is disfigured by a stubby, broad, thick, piebald beard sprouting from a neck as thin as my finger. He has a porcine mop of bristly hair, and he is as black as a nigger—"the sort of fellow you would not care to meet after dark".² He is pot-bellied, lean in the backside, too long in the thigh for so short a man, but also too spindly in the shanks. His heels stick out as far as his toes. He wears an old shabby linen uniform, dirty and faded with age, and women's shoes (*sicyoniis calceamentis*). He has a wagging tongue, a foxy character, and the unscrupulous untruthfulness of a Ulysses."³

This portrait is a recognizable caricature of authentic descriptions and pictures of Nikiphóros;⁴ and it is also true that the Emperor's own countrymen, as well as the Lombard stranger, were apt to fall foul of him.⁵ His tragic death, in the year following Liutprand's encounter with him, through a conspiracy between his wife and a paramour who had been her husband's trusted comrade-in-arms, was a reflection upon the character of the victim as well as upon that of his murderers. Yet the Western bishop's utter failure to detect the magnificent soldier and the blue-blooded aristocrat beneath this East Roman Emperor's plain and unattractive exterior gives the measure of the blinding animus against all things Byzantine by which Liutprand was obsessed, while the measure of the Byzantine Society's superiority over the contemporary Franks in cultivation is given by the contrast between Liutprand's crudely virulent caricature of Nikiphóros and the objective and discriminating verbal portrait, from the hand of the East Roman historian-princess Anna Comnena,⁶ of the Norman adventurer Bohemond, a blond beast whose pugnacity, treacherousness, and ambition had given far more trouble to Anna's father and hero the East Roman Emperor Alexius I than the East Roman Emperor Nikiphóros II's brusqueness had ever given to Liutprand's master the West Roman Emperor Otto. A minute description of the physique of this corporeally magnificent specimen of Nordic Man—"whose build reproduced the proportions of the canon of Polycleitus"—is prefaced by Anna with a generous encomium.

¹ Chap. 4.

² Chap. 3: cp. chaps. 10, 23, 28, and 40.

³ See Hahn, ad loc., n. 5 on p. 177 of his edition of Liutprand's works.

⁴ The difference in character between the aggressive soldier Nikiphóros and the gentle scholar Constantine Porphyrogenitus was pointed out to Liutprand by the imperial officials when he complained that the permission to export robes of state of the first quality, which was now being refused to him when he was a bishop and an ambassador representing an emperor, had been granted to him on his previous mission to Constantinople in Constantine Porphyrogenitus's reign, when Liutprand had been merely a deacon and an envoy representing a prince (chap. 55).

⁶ In her *Alexiad*, ed. by Reifferscheid, A. (Leipzig 1884, Teubner, 2 vols.), Book XIII, chap. 10.

² Juvenal: *Satire V*, ll. 53–54.

'The like of him was not to be seen in all Romania. There was not a barbarian or a Hellene there who could measure up to him. He was not only a marvel to behold; he was a legendary figure whose mere description took your breath away.'

The sting in the Byzantine authoress' picture of this Frankish human tiger lies in the tail.

'Nature had given an outlet through his heroic nostrils for the mighty spirit boiling up from his heart—for it must be confessed that there was something attractive about the man's countenance, though the effect of this was marred by the intimidating impression which the whole ensemble conspired to convey. The mercilessness of a beast of prey was writ large over the whole man in every limb of his body; it was betrayed by something about his look, in combination with the mightiness of his frame, and also by his laugh, which smote other people's ears like a lion's roar. His spiritual and physical complexion was such that ferocity and lust were always rampant in him, and both these passions were perpetually seeking vent in war. His intelligence was versatile, unscrupulous, and slippery; and in verbal encounters he was completely master of his words and never gave his adversary a handle in shaping his answers.'¹

¹ The aversion with which Bohemond's character inspired Anna, in despite of her admiration for the magnificence of his physique, was the usual feeling evoked by the Normans in the hearts of their East Roman victims. The hatred which they aroused was indeed, in general, so bitter that the Byzantine historians delighted to confound them with the Muslims under the generic opprobrious nickname 'children of Hagar'. Yet there was at least one Norman adventurer who, unlike Bohemond, succeeded in winning the affection, as well as the admiration, of the East Romans on whom he imposed himself.

Russell was a Norman soldier of fortune who had served with the Emperor Romanos Diogenēs in A.D. 1071 in the campaign against the Saljuqs that had ended at Melazkerd (Attaleiātis; *Historia*, ed. by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1853, Weber), p. 148). The collapse of the East Roman army and administration in Anatolia tempted the Norman adventurer to play for his own hand. He collected a band of Frankish men-at-arms; ensconced himself in the Armeniac army corps district in North-Eastern Anatolia; was taken prisoner by the Turks and was ransomed by his wife (Attaleiātis, op. cit., p. 193); but was eventually taken prisoner by them for the second time through the treachery of a Turkish warlord named Tutākh, who, after having given Russell a safe-conduct, secretly sold him to Alexius Comnenus, who had been sent by the Emperor Michael VII Dhōukas (*imperator* A.D. 1071-8) to capture Russell by fair means or foul (Attaleiātis, op. cit., pp. 199-200 and 206; Vryēnnios, *Historiae*, pp. 85-87). Tutākh duly seized Russell and handed him over to Alexius in exchange for hostages whom Tutākh was to hold pending the payment of his stipulated price (Vryēnnios, op. cit., p. 87). But neither Alexius nor the Emperor Michael—who had preferred, as Attaleiātis puts it (op. cit., p. 199), to see the East Roman Empire in the hands of the Turks rather than to see one piece of East Roman territory defended against the Turks by this Latin soldier—had reckoned with the local popularity that Russell had acquired. When Alexius called a meeting of the local notables at Amasia to ask them to advance him the money to pay Tutākh's price for Russell, against a promise of a refund from the Imperial Treasury, there was an uproar. 'They shouted that Russell had never done them any harm, and they tried to snatch him from the house where he was under arrest, and to set him at liberty' (Vryēnnios, op. cit., p. 89). Alexius extricated himself from these straits by 'a trick that was as humane as it was clever'. He induced Russell to go into collusion with him in making a show of putting out Russell's eyes. The executioner went through the motions; Russell acted his part by duly bellowing and groaning; and, when he was displayed to the people of Amasia next morning as a blind man with a bandage over his eyes, 'this comedy effectively quelled the disturbance' (ibid., pp. 90-91). However, on the road to Constantinople with his prisoner, Alexius got into trouble with his cousin Theodore Dhokeianós, at whose country house the party stopped to break their journey, 'for having blinded such a fine fellow, and one who might have done so much to retrieve East Roman fortunes'. Alexius amused himself by keeping his cousin mystified till after luncheon, when he made him take the bandage off from Russell's eyes. Theodore was overjoyed to find that, after all, Russell's eyesight was undamaged, and he congratulated Alexius on the adroitness of his play-acting (ibid., pp. 92-93).

It is manifest that Russell had won the sympathies, not only of a provincial Greek

This fascinating delineation of one of the arch-Franks of Anna's day¹ is almost equalled in vividness by a panorama of Frankdom in the mass which she introduces as an overture to her account of the descent of the First Crusade upon Orthodox Christendom.

'Intelligence of the approach of innumerable Frankish armies gave the Emperor Alexius considerable anxiety. He was only too familiar with the Franks' uncontrollable² impetuosity,³ fickleness of mind⁴ and suggestibility, and with the other inveterate characteristics, primary and secondary, of the Western Barbarians (*Κελτοί*). He was likewise familiar with the insatiable covetousness that has made these barbarians a by-word for the light-heartedness with which they take any excuse for tearing up treaties. This was the Franks' standing reputation, and it was completely confirmed by their acts. . . . The event proved to be even more portentous and more fearful than the anticipations. It turned out that the entire West, including all the tribes of the barbarians living between the west coast of the Adriatic and the Straits of Gibraltar, had started a mass migration⁵ and was on the march, bag and baggage, for Asia through the intervening parts of Europe.'⁶

The most sorely trying of the afflictions which the Emperor Alexius suffered from the passage of the First Crusade was the unlimited call which these unwelcome and obtusely inconsiderate visitors made upon the precious time of a hard-worked administrator.

'From crack of dawn, or at least from sunrise, Alexius made it his practice to sit on the imperial throne⁷ and to let it be known that every Western Barbarian who desired an audience with him could have unrestricted access to his presence every day in the week. His motives were the immediate one of wishing to give them the opportunity of presenting their requests and the ulterior one of using the divers opportunities that con-

Orthodox population that was already alienated from the East Roman imperial régime, but of the two sophisticated Byzantine men of letters who recorded the story; and this episode in the history of Graeco-Frankish relations shows that it was not impossible for personal charm to outweigh cultural antipathy.

¹ The same capacity for seeing the light as well as the shadow in the figure presented by an alien enemy is shown by Anna in her tale of the Latin fighting priest. Though the combatancy of the Latin priests is shocking to her, she feels, and conveys, the pathos of this warrior-cleric's death in battle (*Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 8).

² Cp. *Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 5, *ad fin.*: 'The Western Barbarians make the impression of being always hot-headed and vehement and of becoming utterly irrepressible when once they have committed themselves to an adventure.'

³ Cp. *ibid.*, Book X, chap. 6: 'When the impulse seizes them to embark on a raid, they throw reason to the winds and become quite unbridled.'

⁴ Cp. *ibid.*, Book X, chap. 11: 'The Emperor was aware of the Latins' proneness to change their minds.'

⁵ The innumerable Frankish host was appropriately preceded in its advance by a likewise innumerable swarm of locusts (*Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 5).

⁶ *Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 5.

⁷ At one of Alexius's conferences with the leaders of the Crusade 'a Frankish baron had the audacity to seat himself on the Emperor's camp stool. The Emperor put up with this without saying a word—being familiar, as he was, with the overbearingness of the Latin character—but Count Baldwin came up, seized the fellow by the hand, and pulled him off the chair—with the admonition that, as the Crusaders had now become the Emperor's liegemen, it was incumbent on them to observe the custom of the country, which barred the Emperor's subjects from sitting down in the imperial presence, even when the Emperor himself was seated. 'The baron answered Baldwin never a word; but, transfixing the Emperor with a savage stare, he muttered to himself in his own vernacular: "That just shows what a boor the man is! Fancy his monopolising the right to a chair with so many famous captains on their feet all round him!"' (*Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 10).

versation with them would offer to him for influencing them in the direction of his own policy. These Western Barbarian barons have some awkward national characteristics—an impudence,¹ an impetuosity, a covetousness, a lack of self-control in indulging any lust that seizes them, and, last but not least, a garrulousness—for which they hold the World's record; and they showed a typical lack of discipline in their abuse of the Emperor's accessibility.

Each baron brought with him into the imperial presence as many retainers as he fancied, and one followed at another's heels, and a third at the second's heels, in a continuous queue. Worse still, when they held the floor they did not set themselves any time-limit for their talk, such as the Attic orators used to have to observe. Each Tom, Dick, and Harry took just as much time as he chose for his talk with the Emperor. Being what they were—with their inordinately wagging tongues and their entire lack of respect for the Emperor, lack of sense of time, and lack of sensitivity to the indignation of the officials in attendance—they none of them thought of leaving any time over for those behind them in the queue; they just went on talking and making demands interminably.

'The volubility and mercenariness and banality of the Western Barbarians' talk are, of course, notorious to all students of national characters; but first-hand experience has given a more thorough education in the Western Barbarians' character to those who have had the misfortune to be present on these occasions. When dusk descended on the proceedings, the unfortunate Emperor—who had laboured through the live-long day without a chance of breaking his fast—would rise from his throne and make a motion in the direction of his private apartments; but even this broad hint did not avail to extricate him from being pestered by the Barbarians. They would go on jockeying for priority with one another—and this game was played not only by those who were still left in the queue; those who had already had their audience during the day would now keep on coming back and bringing up one pretext after another for speaking to the Emperor again, while the poor man was being kept on his feet and was having to put up with this babel of chatter from the swarm of barbarians thronging round him. The affability with which this one devoted victim kept on responding to the interpellations of the multitude was a sight to see, and the unseasonable chatter had no end to it; for, whenever one of the chamberlains tried to shut the barbarians up, he would find himself shut up, instead, by the Emperor, who was aware of the Franks' proneness to lose their tempers² and was afraid of some trifling provocation producing an explosion that might inflict the gravest injury on the Roman Empire.

'The scene was really most extraordinary. The Emperor would stand as stalwartly as if he were a wrought-metal statue made of, say, bronze or wrought iron, and he would maintain this posture till any hour in the night—sometimes from dusk till midnight, sometimes till the third cock-crow, sometimes almost till the Sun's beams became distinctly visible again. The courtiers could none of them stay the course; they used to withdraw for a rest and then return to the presence thoroughly out of temper. None of the Emperor's lords in waiting could compete with him in standing for that length of time without a change of position. All of

¹ If an equivalent of the American word 'brash' had existed in Anna's Romaic Greek mother tongue, she would have been sorely tempted to blot her Classical Neo-Attic copy-book by breaking out, at this point, into the living language of her day.

² 'Experience proved them to be chronically stiff-necked and sour-tempered' (*Alexiad*, Book XIV, chap. 2).

them would keep on shifting their weight from one leg to the other, while one would sink into a sitting posture, another would droop his head on one side and rest it on his shoulder, and a third would lean against the wall. The Emperor alone made no concessions whatever to this extremity of physical fatigue. It is really impossible to do justice in words to his endurance. In these conversazioni of his with the million, each of his interlocutors chattered to excess. It was like the endless jackdaw monologue of the Homeric Thersites.¹ And when one interlocutor withdrew he would yield the floor to another, and the second to a third, and so on and so on. These interlocutors of the Emperor's had only to stand at intervals, whereas the Emperor had to stay on his feet interminably—till the first cockcrow, or even the second. And then, after the briefest interlude of repose, at the return of sunrise he would be on his throne again, with another day of hard labour and ordeals—perhaps twice as severe as the last—following at the heels of the labours of the preceding night.²

The gout to which Alexius was a martyr is ascribed by his daughter to the effects of these stances with the importunate Western Barbarians rather than to an injury to his knee-cap which the Emperor had sustained during a game of polo.³

A mutual antipathy of this intensity, which eventually exploded into hideous action in the atrocities of A.D. 1182 and 1185 and 1204, might have been expected to rule out any possibility of mutual cultural influence; yet the Crusades did bear fruit in Franco-Byzantine, as well as Franco-Armenian and Franco-Muslim, interchanges of cultural goods.

After acquiring from the Muslims in the twelfth century of the Christian Era the philosophical and scientific abstract from the corpus of Hellenic literature that had been translated by Oriental hands from the original Greek into Syriac and Arabic,⁴ the Medieval Western Christians tardily completed their Hellenic literary repertory by acquiring the originals of all the surviving works of Hellenic literature in Ancient Greek from the Medieval Greek Orthodox Christian carriers of this precious cargo on the very eve of the extinction of the political independence of the last enclaves of the East Roman Empire in an Orthodox Christendom that was being united politically at last under a *Pax Ottomanica*. This literary debt of the West to Orthodox Christendom⁵ is more notorious, but less remarkable, than the Medieval Greek Orthodox Christians' cultural debt to the, in their eyes, still 'barbarian' Medieval Western intruders.

It is one of the surprises of History that the romantic vein in the way of life of Frankish knights and barons whose prosaic barbarism had proved such a plague to the East Roman Emperor Alexius I Comnenus

¹ *Iliad*, Book II, l. 212.

² See *ibid.*

³ *Alexiad*, Book XIV, chap. 4.

⁴ See pp. 371-3, above.

⁵ Whether the Western school of painting can be said to be indebted for its inspiration to Byzantine Art is a more debatable question. The response that a Byzantine challenge evoked from Giotto and his successors was, not to imitate the Byzantine hieratic style, but to break away from it into a naturalistic style that was its antithesis. If a Western debt was ever incurred in the artistic commerce between the West and Byzantium, the Byzantine painter to whose account this debt must be credited is the Cretan Dhómínikos Theotókópoulos 'El Greco' (see IV, iv. 360-1), whose shattering Byzantine impact on a, by his time, mature and already over-ripe naturalistic Modern Western style began to produce its effects some three hundred years and more after the Byzantine artist-revolutionary's death in A.D. 1614.

in A.D. 1096 should have come to exercise a powerful attraction on his grandson and second successor Manuel (*imperabat* A.D. 1143–80);¹ and it is still more noteworthy that, when, after this Francophil East Roman Emperor's death, a Francophobe reaction among the Empire's Greek Orthodox Christian subjects precipitated the Empire's second and, this time, irretrievable, collapse, the thirteenth-century Frankish conquerors of Constantinople and the Morea should have done their Greek victims the same unintentional but signal literary service that the contemporary Mongol conquerors of China likewise inadvertently performed for the Chinese. In China the temporary dethronement of the Confucian litterati under a barbarian-administered régime² gave a belated opportunity for a submerged popular literature in the living vernacular language to rise to the surface of Chinese social life, where it had never been allowed to make this shocking display of its vitality under the culturally repressive rule of Confucian-minded Chinese civil servants who were incurably devoted slaves of the Sinic literary classics.³ In a barbarian-ridden Orthodox Christendom the same cause produced the same effect on a minor scale; and the new genres of popular literature—the drama and the novel—that came to flower in China in the Yüan Age had their counterparts in Medieval Greece under Frankish rule in the flowering of a popular lyric and epic poetry that had already been foreshadowed in the epic of the ninth-century East Roman borderer-barbarians who had broken into the domain of a disintegrating 'Abbasid Caliphate,⁴ and that was to be echoed in the ballads of the nineteenth-century Greek *ra'īyeh* brigand-patriot insurgents against the domination of a disintegrating Ottoman Empire.⁵

Since the twelfth century of the Christian Era the Franks, in their homelands in Western Christendom, had been breaking out of the chrysalis of a traditional literary style, conveyed in the vehicle of the Latin language, which was the Western literary heritage from an antecedent Hellenic culture, and had been expressing themselves in new forms in the French, Provençal, Tuscan, Castilian, High German,

¹ Manuel, in his infatuation with Frankish chivalry, threw to the winds all the well-considered traditional East Roman scientific military doctrine of equipment and tactics—to which his admiring historian John Kinnamos pays lip-service (*Historiae*, edited by Meineke, A. (Bonn 1836, Weber), pp. 168–9). Though East Roman professional soldiers were critical of the Frankish knights' excessive weight of body armour, which reduced their chargers' speed, as well as of their lack of discipline (Kinnamos, *op. cit.*, p. 73), Manuel celebrated his accession to the imperial throne by converting the East Roman cavalry from Avar horse-archers with round targets into Frankish lancers with kite-shaped shields (*ibid.*, p. 125; cp. Khoniátis, Nikitas: *Khroniki Dhiyisis*, edited by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1835, Weber), p. 254), and he could seldom resist the temptation to exchange the role of an East Roman general for that of a Frankish champion charging recklessly into the blue. Kinnamos records (*op. cit.*, p. 192) that he had been incredulous of the reports of Manuel's personal deeds of prowess till he had witnessed some of them with his own eyes. One of the happiest events in Manuel's life must have been his participation, at Antioch in A.D. 1159, in a grand tournament, described by Nikitas (*op. cit.*, pp. 141–4), on the occasion of his state visit as the local Norman prince's feudal overlord.

² The Mongols' audacious attempt to administer the Middle Kingdom through the agency of barbarian officials imported from Dār-al-Islām and Western Christendom has been touched upon in V. v. 349–51.

³ The Archaism that had already fastened upon the Sinic literature before the days of Confucius has been noticed in V. vi. 82–83.

⁴ See V. v. 252–9.

⁵ See V. v. 297–8.

and other living local Western vernaculars of the day; and the Romaic Greek language is indebted for its principal literary monument dating from the fourteenth century to an anonymous Moreot Frankish poet of the third or fourth generation after the Frankish conquest, who wrote *The Chronicle of the Morea* in the living Greek that was the author's mother tongue, as unselfconsciously as he would have written it in French if he had happened to have been born and brought up in the land of his forefathers in the domain of the Langue d'Oil instead of overseas in a Greek-speaking colonial annex of Medieval Western Christendom.

Had this Moreot-bred chronicler been a clerk of native Moreot and not of exotic Frankish lineage, it would have been far more difficult for him—paradoxical though this may sound—to use the same living Romaic Greek tongue as a vehicle for literary composition; for, in the Byzantine cultural environment, he would have been drilled so rigorously in the Attic masterpieces and Neo-Attic conceits of a classical Greek literature that he would have become morally incapable of using his living mother tongue for any purpose higher than the vulgar demands of practical daily life. The Moreot Frankish author of *The Chronicle of the Morea* was also a cultivated man in his own tradition, as the internal evidence of his poem reveals. The subject in which this Western clerk was learned was, however, not Ancient Greek literature but Medieval French feudal law,¹ while his classical Hellenic language was not Attic Greek but Latin; and the freedom, which was this Moreot Frank's birthright, from the Byzantine incubus of an Attic Greek literary education enabled an alien enemy to endow the Romaic Greek language with a chronicle in the native accentual verse which local Greek hands afterwards supplemented and revised.

The most momentous of all the gifts exchanged between a Medieval Western Christendom and a contemporary Eastern Orthodox Christendom was the political institution of the absolute authoritarian state, which in Orthodox Christendom had been successfully disinterred from the sepulchre of a dead Hellenic past by the genius of Leo Syrus some two generations before Charlemagne made his abortive attempt in the West to perform the same *tour de force* of political necromancy. This perversely effective Orthodox Christian revival of an institution that had been a disintegrating Hellenic Society's last desperate political resort had been communicated to the West as a going concern in the Western successor-state which eleventh-century Norman swords had carved out of the East Roman Empire's former dominions in Apulia and Sicily;² and a Byzantine ideal of autocracy, which had been no more than a curiosity of Medieval Western institutional history so long as it had been confined to one recently acquired and still outlandish frontier province of Western Christendom, became a cynosure of all Western eyes—whether they beheld it with admiration or with aversion—when

¹ See *The Chronicle of Morea*, ed. by Schmitt, J. (London 1904, Methuen), pp. xxxviii–xlvi.

² In Sicily the local Norman usurpers of the East Roman dominion over the island had been preceded by Maghribi Muslims who had brought with them an administrative technique that had been taken over from the Roman Empire by the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of Syria, Egypt, and North-West Africa.

it was embodied in the person of a Frederick II Hohenstaufen who, besides being a King of Sicily, was a West Roman Emperor and a man of genius. Before the close of the thirteenth century a Byzantine autocracy which the Sicilian *Stupor Mundi* had failed to acclimatize in the West on an oecumenical scale was being successfully practised in miniature by local despots of North and Central Italian city-states;¹ and before the close of the fifteenth century this balefully efficient exotic institution was being propagated from Italy into the Transalpine and Transmarine provinces of Western Christendom,² to compete for their allegiance with an indigenous medieval system of government under which a measure of political liberty had been secured for at least a privileged minority of the population through a division of political powers between feudal monarchies and representative parliaments.

In subsequent chapters of Western history a long-drawn-out struggle between two opposing political ideals, which appeared, in the eighteenth century, to be coming to a peaceful end in a rapprochement between an enlightened form of autocracy and an aristocratic form of parliamentarism, became acute again in the twentieth century, when a parliamentarism that had changed its aim to the new objective of becoming a vehicle for Democracy found itself challenged, in the heart of the Modern Western World, by an autocracy that had thrown to the winds both its eighteenth-century watchword of 'enlightenment' and its nineteenth-century watchword of 'legitimacy' in order to catch a semi-educated public in the snare of an unscrupulous propaganda and to turn this insidiously bridled and blinkered Leviathan into a pliant instrument for a cold-blooded policy of imperialism through military aggression. It was no accident that an inter-war Fascist régime in Italy and National-Socialist régime in Germany should have borrowed their political technique and organization from a recently established Communist régime in a Russia where 'the political concepts embodied in the ancient Muscovite state' had been 'of Byzantine provenance'.³

This surprisingly active and many-sided cultural commerce between a Medieval Western and a contemporary Eastern Orthodox Christendom proved impotent, however, in the end to overcome the antipathy between the rival sister societies; and, when a broken-down Orthodox Christian Civilization reached a point in its disintegration at which the only freedom of manoeuvre left to its hard-pressed epigoni was a liberty still to choose between 'turning Frank' and 'turning Turk', the Orthodox Christian converts to the Iranic Muslim Civilization of the empire-building 'Osmanlis' were, as we have already observed,⁵ both more

¹ The impulse given to the establishment of local despotisms in Northern and Central Italy by the Emperor Frederick II's prestige has been noticed, in another context, in VII. vii. 537-8. See further X. ix. 13.

² See III. iii. 300-1, 305, and 357-63; IV. iv. 198-200; and p. 363, above.

³ Weidle, W.: *La Russie Absente et Présente* (Paris 1949, Gallimard), p. 73, quoted on p. 677, below.

⁴ Some two hundred years before the emergence of the Ottoman Turkish polity, the Saljiq Turkish way of life had exercised an attraction on some of the Greek Orthodox Christian victims of these barbarian invaders of the heartland of the East Roman Empire in Central Anatolia. The military disaster at Melazkerd in A.D. 1071 proved irretrievable

[Note continued on next page.]

⁵ See pp. 151-2, above.

numerous and more effective than the converts to the contemporary Western way of life—even in its attractively precocious North Italian version.

The eminent Greek Orthodox Christian renegade to Islam, Khass Murād Palaiológhos Pasha, son of Vitus, who, as Beglerbey of Rumili, was killed in the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II Fātih's service in the decisive battle fought by the 'Osmanlis at Beyburt in A.D. 1473 against the Āq Qōdyūnlū Türkmens,¹ sacrificed his life to greater purpose than his elder kinsman the Uniate Constantine Palaiológhos Dhrágasis, who, as East Roman Emperor, was killed at Constantinople in A.D. 1453 in a hopeless attempt to save a dispossessed Imperial City from resuming the role for which Geography had designed her by becoming the capital of an Ottoman Empire whose broad dominions had encompassed this anomalously surviving metropolitan enclave of East Roman territory on every side since A.D. 1360–1. Köse Mikhāl 'Abdallah, the apostate ancestor of Khass Murād Palaiológhos Pasha's superior officer 'Ali Bey Mikhāloghlu, had likewise been wiser in his generation, when he abandoned Orthodox Christianity for Islam in order to become one of the hereditary grantees of a rising Ottoman polity,² than Khass Murād's

because the Turks who were overrunning Anatolia found collaborators among the East Roman provincial population (Michael Attaleiātis: *Historia*, ed. by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1853, Weber), pp. 306 and 307). In the second generation of the post-Melazkerd era, when the Emperor John Comnenus (*imperabat* A.D. 1118–43) was reconquering a corridor of territory in the southern highlands of Anatolia, where the *terrain* was less advantageous to the Saljūq light cavalry than it was on the central plateau, he found that the Christian islanders in Bey Shehir Lake were on such friendly terms with their Turkish overlords at Qōniyeh that they resisted by force of arms the Emperor's summons to them to evacuate the islands and migrate into Turkish territory. 'Their intercourse with the Turks of Qōniyeh had resulted not only in a firm mutual friendship, but in the adoption by the Christians of the Turkish way of life in many respects, and they were so friendly with their Turkish neighbours that they regarded the East Romans as their enemies. Habit, ingrained by passage of Time, is indeed stronger than race or religion' (Nikitas Khoniātis: *Khroniki Dhiylisis*, ed. by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1835, Weber), p. 50; cp. John Kinnamos: *Historiae*, ed. by Meineke, A. (Bonn 1836, Weber), p. 22). John's own nephew and namesake had deserted on the field of battle to the Danishmends and had subsequently become a convert to Islam and had married the daughter of the Sultan of Qōniyeh (Nikitas, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–49). Kinnamos (*op. cit.*, p. 56) reports the death in action, in the reign of the Emperor Manuel (*imperabat* A.D. 1143–80), of a Turkish commander of East Roman origin named Gavrás.

The Greek-speaking islanders whom the East Roman Emperor John Comnenus evicted from the islands in Bey Shehir Lake in the twelfth century of the Christian Era were not the last Christian inhabitants of these islands to fraternize with the Turks. When the writer and his wife visited Bey Shehir on the 15th November, 1948, they were told that the islands were then inhabited by the descendants of Cossack refugees to whom the Ottoman Government had given asylum there from the hostility of a Muscovite Imperial Government.

² Before the organization of the Pādīshāh's slave-household in and after the reign of Sultan Murād I (*imperabat* A.D. 1360–89), the first two generations of Ottoman empire-builders had buttressed the rising dynasty's power by the creation of a small number of hereditary grantees, whose interests they sought to attach to those of the House of 'Osmān by endowing these privileged families with large estates and with important public offices that were heritable *de facto* if not *de jure*. These primitive aristocratic foundations of a familiar conventional type were quickly overlaid by 'the peculiar institution' which was to make the Ottoman Empire's military and political fortunes; yet, although the *arcanum imperii* of the classic Ottoman servile state was its implacable proscription of the aristocratic principle of heredity, we know of five houses of grantees—representing the House of 'Osmān's first essay in the construction of an Ottoman πολιτεύμα—which were already so strongly entrenched by Sultan Murād I's day that they managed to survive the adverse change of political and social climate from an aristocratic to a servile régime.

These five families were the Mikhāloghlu, whose hereditary estates were scattered

and 'Ali Bey's contemporary the Greek historian Dhoúkas, who had abandoned Orthodox Christianity for Roman Catholicism in order to take service with the Genoese despots of one of the Latin *regna peritura*¹ in the Levant—the petty principality, established in Mytilene by the Gattilusi in A.D. 1355, that was extinguished by the Ottoman Pādishāh Mehmed II Fātih in A.D. 1462.²

through Eastern Thrace and Bulgaria and whose hereditary public office was the commandership-in-chief of the pre-Janissary light infantry known as Aqynjys (see Babinger, Fr., s.v. 'Mikhāl-Oghlu', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iii (Leyden 1936, Brill), pp. 493–5); the Evrenōsoghlu, who were entrusted with the Ottoman conquest of Western Thrace and Macedonia, remained prominent in Ottoman public life down to A.D. 1488, and retained their hereditary estates round Yenije Vardar down to the nineteenth century of the Christian Era (see Mordtmann, J. H., s.v. 'Evrenos', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (Leyden 1927, Brill), pp. 34–35); the Malqochoghlu, *alias* Malqojoghlu (see Babinger, loc. cit., p. 494; Mordtmann, loc. cit., p. 34); the Turakhānoghlu, who were entrusted with the Ottoman conquest of the Frankish principalities in Continental European Greece and whose hereditary estates lay round Yenishahr (Lárisa), the capital of Great Vlachia (see Babinger, Fr., s.v. 'Turakhān Beg', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iv (Leyden 1934, Brill), pp. 876–8); and the Chenderililer, who held the key office of Grand Vizier for four successive generations between A.D. 1386 and A.D. 1499—notwithstanding the deadly offence given to Sultan Mehmed II Fātih which proved fatal to the third Chenderili Grand Vizier, Khalil (see Giese, F., s.v. 'Cenderil', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. i (Leyden 1913, Brill), pp. 833–4).

Of these five privileged houses of hereditary Ottoman grandees, no less than three appear to have been of Orthodox Christian origin. Köse Mikhāl 'Abdallah, the founder and eponym of the Mikhāloghlu, was said to have been the renegade local Greek Orthodox Christian lord of Chirmenikia (*Turcicé* Khirmenjik) at the southern foot of the Mysian Olympus, near Edrenos (Babinger, loc. cit., p. 493). The town of Mikhālyi, situated at a strategic point between Brusa and the Dardanelles, perhaps derives its name from this family (Babinger, loc. cit., p. 495). Ghāzi Evrenōs Bey, the founder and eponym of the Evrenōsoghlu, was said to have been a *ci-devant* Orthodox Christian retainer of the Turkish Muslim Emir of Qarasy, who entered the service of the Ottoman Emir Orkhān's son Suleymān after Orkhān's conquest of Qarasy in A.D. 1336. As for the Malqochoghlu, they would appear to have been renegade Serb Orthodox Christians if 'Malqoch' is really a Turkish travesty of 'Marković'.

¹ Virgil: *Georgics*, Book II, l. 498.

² Greek Orthodox Christians who opted in the fourteenth or fifteenth century of the Christian Era for embracing Islam in preference to accepting union with the Western Christian Church on Western terms could justify their choice by pointing to their own and their ancestors' experience of the comparative humanity of the Muslims by comparison with the Franks. In the East Roman historian Nikitas Khoniātis' *Khronikē Dhiyisis* the appalling accounts of the sack of Salonica by the Sicilian Normans in A.D. 1185 (pp. 385–98 of the edition published at Bonn in 1835 by Weber) and of the sack of Constantinople by the so-called 'Crusaders' in A.D. 1203–4 (*ibid.*, pp. 710–70) stand out in glaring contrast to the description (*ibid.*, pp. 653–7) of the Saljūq prince Kay Khusrū's chivalrous treatment of the East Roman civilians whom he carried away captive in a raid on the West Anatolian dominions of the East Roman Empire during the reign of the Emperor Alexius III Angelus (*imperabat* A.D. 1195–1203). Kay Khusrū's kindness to his prisoners during the campaign, and the favourableness of the conditions on which he subsequently settled them in his own dominions in the neighbourhood of Aq Shehir (the *ci-devant* Philomelium), 'not only prevented the prisoners themselves from feeling any nostalgia for their native land but also attracted to Philomelium many East Roman settlers who had not been carried away captive by the Turks, on the strength of reports of the good treatment that their kinsmen and fellow countrymen had received at the Turks' hands. The truth was that in the [East] Roman World, by our day, the springs of Christian virtue had dried up, the truths [of Religion] had ceased to be taken seriously, and arbitrary injustice had run riot until the natural affections of the majority of the population had been chilled to a degree at which entire Hellenic [i.e. 'Greek', not 'pagan'] communities voluntarily opted for finding new homes among the barbarians and rejoiced to get away from their native land' (*ibid.*, p. 657). In another passage (*ibid.*, pp. 762–3) the same East Roman observer expressly draws the contrast between the conduct of the Western Crusaders when they captured Constantinople in A.D. 1203–4 and that of the Muslims when they had recaptured Jerusalem in A.D. 1187 from its Western Christian conquerors. 'The Children of Ishmael did not behave like that; indeed, far from it, they showed the most exemplary humanity and clemency to the

4. *The Medieval West and Kievan Russia*¹

The animosity against Western Christendom, which moved Greek Orthodox Christians in the fifteenth century to opt for falling under an Ottoman in preference to a Frankish domination, was common to these fifteenth-century Greeks and their Russian contemporaries; and indeed, before the century was over, the Muscovites had become the protagonists in Eastern Orthodox Christendom's struggle to preserve its ecclesiastical independence against Western encroachments. One of the signatories, on the Orthodox side, of the Act of Union concluded at Florence in A.D. 1439 had been Isidore, the Greek Metropolitan of Moscow; but, in A.D. 1441, when, after his return to Moscow, Isidore attempted to honour his signature within his diocese, the Grand Duke Basil II expelled this Greek betrayer of Orthodoxy, as Isidore appeared to be in Muscovite eyes,² and seized the opportunity to secure in A.D. 1448³ the election, by the Muscovite hierarchy, of an anti-unionist metropolitan of Russian nationality in Isidore's place. At the same time the Muscovite metropolitan see repudiated its allegiance to the Oecumenical Patriarchate;⁴ and, when in A.D. 1453 Constantinople had been duly requited for her apostasy in A.D. 1439 by succumbing to the 'Osmanlis, Moscow 'the Third Rome' remained, as we have seen,⁵ in Muscovite estimation, the sole surviving citadel of Orthodoxy that was both impeccable and independent.

Thus, within five hundred years of Russia's conversion, the Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom had come to be at least as zealous as the main body was by this date in its resistance to Western ecclesiastical aggression. But this identical position in which the Russians and the Greeks were both entrenched in the fifteenth century had been reached by them along separate roads at different dates. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when Graeco-Frankish relations were already becoming strained in spite of statesmanlike efforts on both sides to keep the peace,⁶ Russo-Frankish relations were becoming closer and more friendly. The estrangement of the Russians from the West, which had gone to more than Greek lengths before the end of the fifteenth century, dated no farther back than the thirteenth century; and the reason why the break between Russia and the West was thus delayed is evident. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when White Russia and the

[Western] kinsmen [of the sackers of Constantinople] after they [i.e. the Muslims] had taken Jerusalem by force of arms. They did not violate the Latins' womenfolk, they did not choke the Holy Sepulchre with corpses. . . . All that they did [to the Latins of Jerusalem] was to allow them to go their way in peace on payment of ransoms which they assessed at a few gold pieces per head—leaving all the rest of the Latins' property to its owners, even in cases where their wealth was as abundant as the sands of the sea. This was how the adversaries of Christ treated Latins who from their standpoint were infidels. They chivalrously forbore to put them to the sword or subject them to the divers torments of fire, famine, persecution, denudation, tribulation, oppression—or any of the other atrocities which those professedly Christian co-religionists of ours committed against us, as we have recorded in outline, without their having any provocation on our part to bring up against us.'

¹ See xi, maps 41, 42, and 43.

² See Platonov, S.: *Histoire de la Russie* (Paris 1929, Payot), pp. 166–7.

³ See Halecki, O.: 'Les Trois Romes', in *Le Flambeau*, 31^e année, No. 3 (Brussels 1948), p. 281.

⁴ See Platonov, op. cit., loc. cit.

⁶ See pp. 376–80, above.

⁵ In VI. vii. 31–40.

Ukraine were being progressively subjugated by the Lithuanians and the Poles, Russian Orthodox Christendom was being hit, for the first time, by a wave of Western aggression¹ which had struck the main body of Orthodox Christendom some two or three hundred years earlier, when the Normans had invaded the East Roman Empire's dominions in Southern Italy. In the Russian case, as in the Greek, the estrangement from the West was the consequence of an unhappy first-hand experience of unpleasant Western behaviour.

Russia's earliest relations with Western Christendom had been, like Bulgaria's, a consequence of her reception of Christianity at the hands of the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople; for, though, as we have seen,² Russia—insulated, as she was, from the East Roman Empire by the two-fold barrier of the Black Sea and the Steppe—could afford to take less seriously the political subordination to the East Roman Empire's sovereignty which was the juridical consequence of becoming an ecclesiastical subject of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate, this political corollary of adhesion to the Constantinopolitan Church was sufficiently awkward, even for the comparatively distant Russians, to make them, too, like the Bulgarians, explore the alternative possibility of entering the fold of Western Christendom. Olga, the first Russian royal proselyte, sent a mission in A.D. 959 to Otto I to ask him for a bishop³ after she had received baptism at Greek hands; and, though Otto's candidate Adalbert did not reach Kiev before Olga's deposition by her pagan son Svyatoslav,⁴ her grandson Vladimir, when, at Kherson in A.D. 989, he was bringing Russia once for all into the Eastern Orthodox Christian communion, sought to reinsure himself by receiving a visit from a papal envoy.⁵ Vladimir afterwards gave facilities to St. Bruno for a mission to the Pechenegs on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe;⁶ and five embassies from Rome to Russia, and two embassies to Rome from Kiev, in Vladimir's reign alone, are mentioned in the Russian chronicles.⁷

In the event, Russia not only adhered, as Bulgaria had finally adhered, to Eastern Orthodox Christendom; she also voluntarily accepted the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, to which Bulgaria submitted only under *force majeure*. The first Greek metropolitan of Kiev, Theóemptos, ascended his throne in A.D. 1039 as the Oecumenical Patriarch's subordinate,⁸ and thereafter, till the Kievan period of Russian history was brought to an end, mid-way through the thirteenth century, by the Mongol conquest, all but two of the metropolitans of Kiev, and about half the bishops of the Russian dioceses, were of Greek nationality.⁹ There were, it is true, some symptoms of Russian restiveness under this Greek ascendancy. Whatever may be the significance of the fifty years' interval between the conversion of Vladimir

¹ See II. ii. 172-3, and p. 357, above.

² On p. 152, n. 6, above. See, further, pp. 676-7, below.

³ See Vernadsky, G.: *Kievan Russia* (New Haven 1948, Yale University Press), p. 41, and Dvornik, F.: *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe* (London 1949, Polish Research Centre), p. 68.

⁴ See Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 65.

⁵ See Prince D. Obolensky, in a note to the writer.

⁶ See Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 79.

⁷ See Dvornik, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

⁸ See Dvornik, op. cit., pp. 201-2.

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 152 and 350.

at Kherson in A.D. 989 and the arrival at Kiev of the first Greek metropolitan as a representative of the Oecumenical Patriarch,¹ the Romano-Russian war of A.D. 1043-6 is described by the Byzantine historian Psellus² as 'a revolt of the Russians' that was provoked by their 'hatred of the hegemony of the Romans'.³ In A.D. 1051 and again in A.D. 1145-7 unsuccessful attempts were made in Russia to throw off the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate's ecclesiastical control.⁴ Yet, though in the Kievan period Russia already 'formed a distinct socio-political body of her own',⁵ it is nevertheless true that, 'culturally, Russia may be thought of in this period as the northern frontier of Byzantium'.⁶ The conversion of Russia to the Byzantine culture is exemplified in her reception of East Roman law⁷ and of Byzantine literature,⁸ and its fruits are apparent in her precocity.⁹ Like the contemporary Greek World, and unlike the contemporary Frankish World, Kievan Russia was an urban society with a money economy and with a lay, as well as a clerical, educated class.¹⁰

'There is a noticeably greater similarity between Kievan Russia and Byzantine and Classical Antiquity than between Russia and Feudal Europe. Only, in this connexion, one would think—in addition to the Byzantine Empire—not of the Roman Empire but of Republican Rome and the Greek democracies. . . . In this period there was a basic difference in economic and political development between Russia and [Western] Europe.'¹¹

This difference, however, did not prevent a Byzantine Kievan Russia and an Early Medieval Western Christendom from entering into economic, political, and cultural relations with one another. The contemporaneous conversion of Russia to Orthodox Christianity and of Hungary, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries to Western Christianity at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries not only made the old waterway between the Russian and Swedish provinces of a former pagan Scandinavian World into a channel of communication between the two Christendoms; it also established a long land-frontier between them running from the northern slopes of the Carpathians to the southern edge of a persisting pocket of paganism in the hinterland of the south-

¹ Prince Obolensky notes: 'The Byzantine and the Russian sources are curiously silent on the status and organization of the Russian Church during the fifty years that followed Vladimir's conversion. This has led a number of historians to conclude that the Russian Church was not directly subordinated to the Patriarchate of Constantinople until A.D. 1037-9, and to suppose that, before that date, it was either subject to Ochrida or to Rome, or was autocephalous. My own view is that these different theories are not convincing, and that circumstantial evidence and the testimony of later sources strongly suggest that Vladimir's Church was from the beginning subject to the authority of Constantinople. But it seems quite probable that Vladimir used his considerable military resources and political power as bargaining counters in his unsuccessful attempt to manage his own ecclesiastical affairs.'

² See Psellus, Michael: *Chronographia*, chap. 91 (p. 129 in C. Sathas' edition (London 1899, Methuen)).

³ *Τὸ βάρβαρον . . . τοῦτο φύλον ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν τὸν πάντα χρόνον λυτὰ τε καὶ μέμνη.*

⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵ Vernadsky, op. cit., pp. 82 and 218-19.

⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

⁷ See Vernadsky, op. cit., pp. 168, 171, and 292-4.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 80 and 271-5, and the present Study, X. ix. 715-17.

⁹ See Dvornik, op. cit., pp. 236-40.

¹⁰ See Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 280.

¹¹ Vernadsky, op. cit., pp. 212 and 213.

east corner of the Baltic Sea; and the debatable territory between Russia and Poland round Przemyśl and Czervień, which Vladímir had conquered from the Poles in A.D. 981,¹ became one of the principal avenues for a two-way traffic.

On the economic plane a Russian overland trade with Western Christendom was stimulated by the progressive economic adversity which overtook the East Roman Empire from A.D. 1071 onwards. In the days of the Empire's prosperity the Russians had sent an annual flotilla to trade with Constantinople as the next best thing to a military conquest of her that they had failed to achieve; but, when, as a result of the Saljūq Turkish barbarian invaders' decisive victory at Melazkerd, the East Roman Empire lost command of the food-producing areas in the interior of Anatolia, and, when, as a result of the Romano-Venetian commercial treaty of A.D. 1082, the Venetians, emulated by their Italian competitors, wrested the maritime trade of the Levant out of Greek hands and diverted it to Western ports, the Russians found it more profitable to divert their own trading activities from an impoverished Constantinople to a prospering West.² A German record of customs receipts testifies that Russian traders were entering East Francia overland from the east as early as A.D. 903-6.³ From the eleventh century to the thirteenth—when the overland trade route between the West and Russia was superseded by a water route via the Baltic, Riga, and Novgorod—Regensburg was the main Western terminal of a traffic whose main Russian terminal was Kiev via Smolensk (which, in this age, had a greater volume of trade with Germany than either Novgorod or Pskov).⁴ The transfer of Russian trade from the East Roman Empire to Germany was still further stimulated by the disaster that overtook Constantinople in A.D. 1204.⁵

On the political plane the desire of Kievan Russia to entertain relations with Western Christendom may be gauged from the number of royal marriages contracted between members of the House of Rurik and members of the royal families of Western Christendom. Imperial marriages with East Roman princesses were, no doubt, more highly prized.⁶ The Emperor Basil II's offer of his daughter Anna's hand in A.D. 988 was the bait which induced Vladímir I to send military help to Basil against the rebel Bárdas Phokás⁷ and then to receive baptism; and the King Solomon of the Kievan state, Vladímir Monomákh (*principatum gerebat* A.D. 1113-25), derived his surname from his Greek mother, whose family had been made illustrious by the Emperor Constantine

¹ See Dvornik, *op. cit.*, p. 90, and Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

² See Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

³ See Dvornik, F.: 'The Kiev State and its Relations with Western Europe', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th series, vol. xxix (London 1947, R. H. S.), pp. 27-46. The present reference is to p. 42.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 42; eundem, *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe*, p. 248; Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-9.

⁵ See Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶ It is noteworthy that there were no marriages between Rurikids and members of any Bulgarian imperial family, though, according to Prince D. Obolensky, in a note to the present writer, the Bulgarian clergy had contributed to the conversion of Russia, and though, thereafter, Bulgaria played an important part as a cultural intermediary between Byzantium and Russia (Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 324).

⁷ See Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

Monomákhos (*imperabat* A.D. 1042-54). Yet, in default of Greek imperial marriages, Frankish royal marriages were sedulously sought after by Russian princes. Vladímir I obtained the hands of a Polish and a Swedish princess for his two sons, and married his three daughters to a king of Hungary and two kings of Poland. Yaroslav obtained the hands of a Polish and two German princesses for his sons, and married his daughters to kings of Norway, France, and Hungary. Vsevolod's daughter Eupraxia (*Francicè* Praxedis) married first the Margrave of the East Frankish Nordmark, Henry of Stade, and then the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV (an unhappy marriage, from which she retired to Kiev in A.D. 1095). Vladímir Monomákh married Gytha, the daughter of King Harold of England. Vladímir and Isyaslav, the sons of Yaroslav, married their daughters to kings of Poland and Hungary. Vladímir Monomákh obtained the hand of a Swedish princess for his son and married his daughters to a king of Hungary and two kings of Denmark.¹

The footprints of peddlars, brides, and bridegrooms were followed by pilgrims and monks. In the early twelfth century the shrines of Kiev were visited by Western pilgrims, and before the close of the century a church and monastery had been built there by Irish monks from Regensburg.² These religious wayfarers brought with them cults of saints and translations of books, and, in this cultural commerce between a Kievan Russia and an Early Medieval Western Christendom, the principal intermediary was Bohemia,³ where a Methodian Slavonic tradition that had been persecuted by the Franks and betrayed by the Vatican had managed to survive⁴ till the close of the eleventh century.⁵ Old Slavonic translations, made in Bohemia, of Latin lives of the Saints found their way into Russia along the overland commercial route, and popularity was achieved in Russia by a late-eleventh-century prayer, translated into Old Slavonic out of an original Latin text, invoking Saints Magnus, Cnut, Olaf, Alban, Botolph, Martin, Victor, Linus, Anacletus, Clement, Leo, Cyril and Methodius, Wenceslas and Adalbert.⁶

'Russia was never more conscious of her common interests with Western Europe⁷ than in the period between the eleventh and thirteenth

¹ These marriages between Rurikids and Frankish royalties are noted by Dvornik in 'The Kiev State and its Relations with Western Europe', p. 41.

² See Dvornik, 'The Kiev State', p. 40.

³ See Dvornik, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

⁵ The Slavonic-rite monastery of Sázava, near Prague, was not suppressed till A.D. 1096.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 38.

⁷ One historical fact that has been cited (e.g. by Prince D. Obolensky in 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage', *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. i (Oxford 1950, Clarendon Press), pp. 53-54) as evidence of Russian sympathy for the West—and this apropos of a Western misadventure at Greek Orthodox Christendom's expense—is the institution in Russian Orthodox Christendom, soon after A.D. 1091 (see Dvornik, 'The Kiev State', p. 40), of an annual feast in honour of 'the translation' of the relics of St. Nicholas (who eventually became the patron saint of Christmas Day in the Western World) from their original resting place at Myra, in Lycia, to Bari, in Apulia. In instituting this feast, the Russian Church was following in the footsteps of the Papacy, which had instituted a feast in A.D. 1089 to commemorate the same event in Western Christendom. No corresponding feast was instituted by any of the Greek Orthodox Churches—and, indeed, it would have been surprising if this 'translation' had found its way into a Greek liturgical calendar, considering that the Bariot mariners who had brought the relics home with them in A.D.

centuries.¹ It is the more remarkable, and the more tragic, that, between the thirteenth century and the fifteenth, a Western aggressiveness that had already alienated the main body of Orthodox Christendom should have contrived also to dissipate this accumulated fund of Russian goodwill.

(c) ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS OF THE FIRST
TWO GENERATIONS

1. *Encounters with the Post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization*²

Likenesses and Differences between the Post-Alexandrine Hellenic and the Modern Western Eruption

In a post-Alexandrine Hellenic view of Hellenic history the generation of Alexander the Great marked a break with the past and the beginning of a new era as sharply as, in a Modern Western view of Western history, the transition to a 'modern' from a 'medieval' age was marked by a conjuncture of striking new departures on divers planes of activity at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era.³

In both these new chapters of history the most obvious ground for a hybriatic depreciation of the achievements of the past by comparison with present experiences and expectations was the consciousness of a sudden immense increase in power, including both a power over other human beings, manifested in military conquests, and a power over Physical Nature, manifested in geographical explorations and scientific discoveries. The Macedonian *conquistadores*' feat of overthrowing the Achaemenidae was as exhilarating as the Spanish *conquistadores*' feat of overthrowing the Incas. If a handful of military adventurers could thus shatter, at one blow, a universal state that had come to seem part of the permanent order of Nature, the society out of whose bosom these adventurers had issued forth might account herself, in virtue of their demonstration of her prowess, to be the potential mistress of all the rest of Mankind. But this enhanced sense of military and political power was not the whole, and indeed not the essence, of a new experience which expressed itself in the feeling that a new era had begun. If either a Hellenic of the third century B.C. or a Westerner of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era had been asked to describe the sensations by which

1087 had 'succeeded in carrying them off by a mixture of cunning and violence' (Obolensky, loc. cit.).

The Russian liturgical office composed for the celebration of the new festival certainly takes the Western side, to judge by the following passages: 'The city of Bari rejoices, and with it the whole Universe exults. . . . Like a star thy relics have gone from the East to the West . . . and the city of Bari has received divine grace by thy presence If now the country of Myra is silent, the whole World, enlightened by the holy worker of miracles, invokes him with songs of praise.'

One explanation of this unequivocally pro-Bariot Russian line in a dispute in which the Bariots were flagrantly in the wrong is perhaps to be found in the fact that Bari was a familiar, and Myra an unfamiliar, place to Russians of that generation. Till the Norman conquest in A.D. 1071 Bari, as well as Myra, had been a city of the East Roman Empire, and a garrison of Russian troops had been posted at Bari in A.D. 1066 (see Dvornik, *ibid.*).

¹ Dvornik, 'The Kiev State', p. 45.

² See xi, maps 24, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32.

³ These two unofficial new eras have been noticed in V. vi. 340-2 and VI. vii. 300.

his consciousness of a new era was sustained, he would probably have given less weight to his sense of an enhancement of his society's material power than to his sense of an expansion of its mental horizon. In the sensation produced by the discovery 'in real life' of a hitherto fabulous India to which the Macedonians made their way by opening up a continent, and the Portuguese by mastering the Ocean, the sense of power arising from the successful performance of a mighty feat of exploration was accompanied and qualified, on both occasions, by a sense of wonder at the revelation of a marvellous alien world endowed with a mysteriously inimitable skill and wisdom. In the sensation produced in the Hellenic World by the scientific discoveries of an Aristotle or a Theophrastus, and in the Western World by the 'renaissance' of the Hellenic culture, the sense of power arising from a notable addition to knowledge and understanding was likewise accompanied and qualified by a sense of impotence in face of the reminder of Man's relative ignorance which every addition to Man's understanding of the Universe is apt to bring with it.

This comparison of the Hellenic World's experience in and after the generation of Alexander the Great with the Western World's experience at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era might offend the *amour propre* of post-Modern Western readers who had not yet emancipated themselves from the Modern Western World's irrational belief in its own uniqueness. But, before deciding to dismiss the suggested parallel as an unwarranted impertinence, Western believers in the incomparability of their own society would be well advised to put themselves on the alert against the distorting effects of 'the egocentric illusion' on a historian's perspective,¹ and, in a chastened frame of mind, to give a dispassionate consideration to the facts.

Even on the crudely simple test of the comparative extent of the areas over which the Modern Western Civilization and the post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization respectively succeeded in radiating their influence, it might be observed that Hellenism had anticipated the West in pushing its way to the extremities of the Old World—as far as Ceylon and Japan and Britain—and that, if Alexander had lived to be so tormented by his thirst for finding new worlds to conquer as to have been stimulated into forestalling the fifteenth-century Portuguese invention of ocean-going sailing ships, he might have forestalled the Spanish discovery of the Americas only to find that no civilization had yet emerged there above the dead level of primitive social life. If future research into the chronology of the indigenous American civilizations were to confirm the probability that the genesis of the earliest of them was posterior to Alexander's day, then the post-Alexandrine Hellenic Society would prove to have anticipated the Modern Western Society in having achieved the feat of making an impact on all existing contemporary societies of its own species; and, when we call the roll of these two supremely aggressive civilizations' respective victims, we find that their numbers are approximately equal. The post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization was encountered by the Syriac, the Hittite, the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the

¹ See I. i. 157-64.

Indic, and the Sinic; the Modern Western Civilization by the Orthodox Christian, the Islamic, the Hindu, and the Far Eastern. Even if we multiply the number of the Modern West's victims by adding the Jews to the list and by distinguishing an Iranic from an Arabic Muslim society, and Russian and Japanese branches from the respective main bodies of the Orthodox Christian and Far Eastern societies, we shall only have brought the number of the Modern West's victims up to eight, as against the six victims of the Modern West's post-Alexandrine Hellenic rival.

On this showing, we may venture to conclude that our comparison is a legitimate one, but, in vindicating it, we must also take note of one important difference. In studying the impact of the Modern West on its contemporaries, we have found occasion to distinguish between an Early Modern Age, in which the West was radiating out its culture in its full-blooded entirety, including the religious element that was its essence, and a Late Modern Age, in which the West was radiating out a secular extract from its culture, from which the religious element had been eliminated.¹ There is no corresponding division of chapters in the post-Alexandrine history of the radiation of Hellenism; for, by comparison with the Western Civilization, Hellenism was precocious. The Western Civilization did not secularize its *Weltanschauung* till the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, a thousand years after its entry on to the stage of History through its emergence from a post-Hellenic social interregnum. The corresponding *Aufklärung* in the Hellenic World took place towards the close of the fifth century B.C., not more than seven hundred years after a post-Minoan social interregnum had brought an Hellenic Civilization to birth. Thus, by Alexander's day, this Hellenic *Aufklärung* was already a hundred years old, and there was no first chapter of post-Alexandrine Hellenic history in which Hellenism was propagated in its original integrity. The Attic drama that was presented to Parthians and Spaniards was not the communal religious rite that was celebrated in the theatre of Dionysus at Athens at annual festivals that were red-letter days in the local Attic ecclesiastical calendar; it was a commercial performance staged by a vagrant international dramatic artists' guild trading under the name *Διονύσιον Τεχνίται*.²

One of the possible reasons for the Hellenic Civilization's comparative precocity in bursting out of the intellectual swaddling clothes of traditional religion is the apparent poverty of the Hellenic Society's religious heritage from the antecedent Minoan Society³ by comparison with the richness of the Christian heritage bequeathed to the Western Society by a Hellenism which had been converted to Christianity on its death-bed.⁴ In Hellenic history the comparative insignificance of a religious legacy, which, in Western history, was to act as both a powerful

¹ See pp. 118-19 and 316-24, above.

² See IV. iv. 243; V. v. 201, n. 1, and 481; and p. 518, below.

³ The question whether Orphism is or is not to be regarded as a legacy to the Hellenic Society from the religious experience of a disintegrated Minoan Society has been discussed in I. i. 95-100 and in V. v. 84-7. See further X. ix. 738-40.

⁴ In a previous context (VII. vii. 420-3) we have come to the conclusion that the heritage of a higher religion is a feature that distinguishes the civilizations of the third generation, as a sub-species, from those of the second generation and the first.

stimulus and a heavy incubus, can be seen to have had a twofold effect. On the one hand it allowed Rationalism to raise its head more easily, and therefore more early, than it was to prove possible for Rationalism to triumph in Western Christendom; but on the other hand an intellectually enlightened Hellenic World never showed itself so prone as a secularized Late Modern Western World to intellectual hybris.

The Western pioneer rationalists' successive experiences of being first embittered by the length and arduousness of their struggle with a formidably entrenched Western Christian Church, and then intoxicated by the apparent completeness of their eventual victory, bred in them a temper expressed in the Voltairian war-cry 'Écrasez l'Infâme'; and this unenlightened spirit of intolerance, which a Modern Western Enlightenment had caught from the Judaic religion against whose dominion it had revolted, made a self-emancipated West equally unwilling to give credence, credit, or quarter to 'the imposture' of Muhammad or to any other of the living higher religions with which it was being brought into contact by the world-wide activities of its mariners, traders, and empire-builders. In this temper the Late Modern Western rationalist intellect did not hesitate to banish Religion itself from its mental kingdom of spiritual forces and values as a superfluous, illusory, and morbid excrescence on the healthy tissue of the rational human animal's social and cultural life; but the earlier victory of the Hellenic Enlightenment over a less tenacious religious conservatism had a different sequel.

In this Hellenic spiritual passage of arms a disgust at the light-hearted immorality of the shameless barbarian pantheon of Olympus, and a revulsion from the spiritually deeper, but also darker, stratum of Hellenic religious life that was tapped by the 'chthonic' cults of blood and soil, were quickly overborne by an unsatisfied hunger for spiritual bread which had already begun to torment Hellenic souls before the fifth-century *Aufklärung* had deprived them of even the stony substitute which was all that had been doled out to them by the parsimony of History. When the triumphal progress of their military and intellectual conquests brought the post-Alexandrine Hellenes into contact with full-blooded non-Hellenic religions whose spiritual value and efficacy seemed to be guaranteed by their manifestly assured command of their votaries' voluntary allegiance, the emotion that this spectacle evoked in Hellenic hearts had more in it of a wistful envy for the privileged possessors of a spiritual pearl of great price¹ than of a contemptuous pity for the dupes of an unscrupulously fraudulent priestcraft. Even the syncretistic religious cults devised by coldly calculating post-Alexandrine Hellenic statesmen—such as Ptolemy Sôtér's attempt to bring his Egyptian and Hellenic subjects together on common religious ground through his manufacture of the hybrid divinity Sarapis,² or Augustus's institution of Caesar-worship to serve as the religious cement for a Roman-built Hellenic universal state³—were tributes to their Hellenic subjects' horror of a religious vacuum, besides being designs for taking advantage of their non-Hellenic subjects' religiosity.

This receptive attitude of the post-Alexandrine Hellenic conquerors

¹ See V. v. 545-9.

² See V. v. 689-91.

³ See V. v. 648-50.

towards the religions of societies which Hellenism had taken captive on the intellectual as well as on the military plane was one cause of the momentous religious consequences of an aggressive Hellenic Civilization's impact on six societies of the same species. We must take the measure of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism's flow and ebb if we are to see its religious consequences in their historical setting.

The Flow and Ebb of Post-Alexandrine Hellenism

In a process of penetration that resulted in a temporary Hellenization of the World, the entering wedge thrust in by Alexander the Great and his Macedonian and Roman successors was the death-dealing point of the sarissa and the pilum, and the first objective of these Hellenic military aggressors was the economic exploitation of their victims. Yet their profession of the nobler aim of propagating the achievements and ideals of the Hellenic culture was something more than a specious camouflage for the pursuit of a sordid self-interest by methods of barbarism. This profession was also partially sincere, and the warrant of its sincerity was the extent of its translation from words into facts.

The Hellenic conquerors' master-instrument for the fulfilment of their promise to impart the spiritual wealth of the Hellenic culture in exchange for appropriating a share of the material wealth of the populations whom they had conquered was the institution, *in partibus Orientalium et Barbarorum*, of Hellenic city-states, created *ex nihilo* by a politically omnipotent Hellenic war-lord's fiat, out of which a nucleus of privileged Hellenic citizen-colonists was to radiate the light of Hellenism among the subject native peasantry of the surrounding country-side from whom the intrusive landlord-missionaries drew their rents. A policy that had been inaugurated on the grand scale by Alexander the Great himself was pursued thereafter, for some four and a half centuries, by Alexander's Macedonian and Roman successors down to the Emperor Hadrian.¹

Even in Egypt, where the economic exploitation of the indigenous population was more efficient and more overt than in any other land on which Hellenism had imposed itself by conquest,² and where 'the natives', on their side, had been wont, since the Hyksos' conquest of Egypt not much less than fourteen hundred years before Alexander's day, to reject the culture of successive alien conquerors with a demonic animosity,³ at least a veneer of the Hellenic city-state dispensation was laid over the granite rock-bottom of a petrified Egyptian body social before the end of the story of the encounter between these two dramatically diverse civilizations. In their anxiety not to diminish the Egyptian milch-cow's scientifically managed yield, Alexander's narrow-hearted Ptolemaic successors deliberately forbore, in Egypt, from further foundations of Hellenic city-states after they had added Ptolemais to Alexandria and to a pre-Alexandrine Naucratis; and the unimaginative Roman successors of the Ptolemies had no other aim in Egypt than to maintain the yield which the Ptolemies had taught them to extract; yet, in the third century of the Christian Era, in an age in which the spread

¹ See VI. vii. 111 and 132-5. ² See pp. 696-8, below. ³ See VI. vii. 49-50.

of the Hellenic city-state dispensation was coming to a halt in other provinces of an Hellenic universal state, the immemorially ancient cantons ('nomes') of Egypt were being superficially converted into the simulacra of self-governing municipalities equipped with the amenities of Hellenic urban life.¹ Outside Egypt, in their Asiatic possessions, even the Ptolemies had vied with their Seleucid neighbours and rivals in showing themselves worthy heirs of their common master Alexander—as was witnessed by a chain of Hellenic city-states, strung along the Transjordanian stretch of 'the King's Highway'² from Gadara to a Rabbath Ammon masquerading as Philadelphia,³ which were eventually taken over by the Seleucidae from their Ptolemaic founders, and by the Romans from the Seleucidae.

This more or less benevolently despotic propagation of the Hellenic culture by Hellenic conquerors is not, however, so remarkable as its spontaneous adoption by non-Hellenes who were under no external compulsion to open their hearts and minds to it. A Philadelphia and an Adrianople, whose names commemorate their foundation by some Macedonian or Roman potentate, are less eloquent monuments of the Hellenic culture's intrinsic attractiveness than a Nicomedia and a Nicaea, whose names commemorate their foundation by the Philhellene descendants of a barbarian prince of Bithynia who had thrown off the yoke of the Achaemenidae, had escaped being conquered by Alexander, and had successfully resisted the imperialism of the Seleucidae. In the Antonine Indian Summer of Hellenic history, these post-Alexandrine Hellenic city-states that owed their existence to the unconstrained Philhellenism of *ci-devant* barbarians could proudly point to the achievements of an Arrian of Nicomedia⁴ and a Dio of Prusa as evidence that they were making as great a contribution to Hellenic life and letters in that generation as Antioch or Alexandria, not to speak of Chaeronea or Athens.

Thus, in the event, the post-Alexandrine Hellenic culture made peaceful conquests of ground which had not been won for it by Macedonian or Roman soldiers, while in other regions, over which the tide of Hellenic military conquest had once flowed victoriously, the ebb of Hellenism in this repellantly aggressive guise was followed by a politically liberated non-Hellenic population's voluntary reception, on their own initiative, of an Hellenic culture to whose aesthetic and intellectual attractions they had remained impervious so long as this alien *Weltanschauung* had been made odious to them by being associated with their forcible subjection to a distasteful alien rule. The cultivation of Hellenic art in the Kushan successor-state of a Bactrian Greek empire astride the Hindu Kush in the last century B.C. and the first century of the Christian Era, and the cultivation of Hellenic science and philosophy in the Sasanian and 'Abbasid successor-states of a Seleucid Greek Empire in Irāq and Iran,⁵ had, like the cereal crops of Egypt, to wait for

¹ See VI. vii. 50, and pp. 443-4 and 586, below.

² See VI. vii. 100-2.

³ After the liquidation of Hellenic rule south of the Taurus by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, a previously Ammonite 'Philadelphia' reverted to the name 'Amman'.

⁴ See V. v. 38.

⁵ It is significant that, although the self-Hellenization of the Syriac World east of the Euphrates did not reach its zenith until after the beginning of the 'Abbasid Age, and

its harvest till the subsidence of a fructifying but overwhelming flood had allowed the fertilized fields to show their faces again to the Sun.

The extent to which the military conquests of Hellenic war-lords, imposing though these were, were outranged, in the Time-dimension as well as in the Space-dimension, by the pacific radiation of the Hellenic culture is revealed by a comparative survey of the expansion of Hellenism on these two different planes.

Though the energy, man-power, and technique which the Hellenic Society diverted to the military conquest of its neighbours was a mere residue left over from the military resources that it was generating and expending in the chronic pursuit of fratricidal civil wars,¹ the first im-

although the 'Abbasid Caliphate embraced Syria and Egypt as well as 'Irāq, Iran, and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, the sources from which the Syriac-speaking and Arabic-speaking Hellenists of the 'Abbasid Age drew their draughts of Hellenic culture were not Alexandria or Antioch or any other focus of Hellenism in Syriac territories west of the Euphrates which had been under Hellenic rule for nearly a thousand years, but were Jund-i-Shāpūr in Khuzistan, on the south-eastern fringe of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, and the oasis of Merv on the south-western fringe of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin (see O'Leary, *de L.: How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs* (London 1948, Kegan Paul), pp. 95, 96, 117, and 155). A political explanation of this apparent cultural paradox may be found in the fact that in Margiana and Susiana Hellenic rule had lasted less than two hundred years, instead of more than nine hundred, and had long since ceased to be remembered, and by the same token ceased to be resented, by the sixth century of the Christian Era, when Khusrū Anushirwan (*imperabat* A.D. 531-79) founded at Jund-i-Shāpūr a school of Hellenic medicine and philosophy on the pattern of the school of Alexandria.

Jund-i-Shāpūr was selected by Anushirwan for this purpose because it had been an Hellenic city and a home of Aristotelian studies; but its Greek population had been the monument of an Hellenic military defeat, not of an Hellenic victory. They had been prisoners-of-war and civilian deportees who had been planted there by the Sasanian Emperor Shāpūr I (*imperabat* A.D. 241-72) after his capture of the Roman Emperor Valerian and conquest of the Syrian metropolis Antioch-on-Orontes in A.D. 260—in contrast to the former Greek population of the by then no doubt already extinct Hellenic city-state Seleucia-on-Eulaeus (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 18), which, like all cities of that name, had been founded by the Seleucidae, and whose Greek citizens, in their day, had been, not 'displaced persons', but an 'ascendancy' dominating the native inhabitants of the *ci-devant* Achaemenian imperial city of Susa. The deportees who had brought the study of Aristotle to Jund-i-Shāpūr from Antioch-on-Orontes in the third century of the Christian Era had presumably been Greek-speaking, or at any rate bilingual; but, whatever the original standing of the Greek language at Jund-i-Shāpūr may have been, Syriac came to prevail there as the linguistic medium for Science as well as for the affairs of everyday life (see O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 71).

It is also significant that, in the self-Hellenization of the Syriac World in the 'Abbasid Age, an important part was played by the fossilized remnant of an elsewhere extinct Babylonian culture that survived at Harrān in North-Western Mesopotamia (see Sweetman, J. W.: *Islam and Christian Theology*, Part I, vol. I (London 1945, Lutterworth Press), pp. 84-85; O'Leary, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-5). One of the most eminent of the ninth-century translators of Greek works into Arabic was the Harrānī Thābit b. Qurrah, who was excommunicated and banished by the pagan high priest of Harrān but nevertheless remained faithful to his ancestral religion—though his loyalty to it cost him his post of physician to the Caliph Qāhir (*imperabat* A.D. 932-4). The Harrānis were particularly well qualified for serving as interpreters of Hellenism to the Syriac World because a very strong tincture of Hellenism had been infused into their own Babylonian culture (see Sweetman, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85; O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 172). This syncretism was the fruit of an attitude of receptivity towards the Hellenic culture; and this receptivity, in its turn, was the fruit of an *entente cordiale* between the Babylonian subjects and the Macedonian destroyers of the Achaemenian Empire. The religious and intellectual leaders of the Babylonian Society had seen in Alexander the Great a liberator from an alien yoke which had become an agency for the encroachment of the Syriac language and culture upon the Babylonian Society's domain (see V. v. 94 and 123); and, under a subsequent easy-going Seleucid régime, the peasantry of Babylonia had not been alienated by being made the victims of a Ptolemaic exploitation.

¹ See III. iii. 138-40 and 149-50, and p. 437, below.

pact of the Alexandrine Hellenic war-machine was shattering, and in the sequel its final recoil was delayed no less than twice by a fresh career of conquest which disappointed the hopes of adversaries who had rashly ventured to try conclusions again with an aggressor whose martial energy had delusively appeared to be flagging.

The overwhelming psychological effect produced by Alexander's astonishing feat of overthrowing the Achaemenian Empire in five years¹ is attested by the passivity of the conquered populations during the fratricidal wars for the division of the spoils which Alexander's Macedonian successors continued to wage against one another for forty years (321-281 B.C.) after Alexander's death² with the same impunity as the Arab conquerors of the Roman and Sasanian empires a thousand years later, after the death of the Caliph 'Uthmān, and the Spanish conquerors of the Andean Empire of the Incas in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era.³ This diversion of the conquerors' efforts to the task of self-destruction did, indeed, save the independence of the former provinces of the Achaemenian Empire, from Bithynia to Azerbaijan inclusive, which had happened to lie beyond striking distance of Alexander's left wing on his march from the Hellespont to the Caspian Gates; but, of all the territories that Alexander had overrun, the Indus Valley alone escaped from his successors' grasp; and this was an ex-Achaemenian territory which had thrown off the Achaemenian yoke long before Alexander's advent. No appreciable portion of Alexander's conquests that had been acquired by him direct from the Achaemenian Empire was lost by his successors till the Parnian Nomads from Transcaspia took possession of the Seleucids' province Parthia about half way through the third century B.C.;⁴ and, after that, *circa* 183 B.C., the ruler of a Greek principality in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, whose communications with the heart of the Hellenic World had been cut by the Parnians' intrusion, was nevertheless able to muster the military strength to cross the Hindu Kush and overrun the vast domain of a broken-down Mauryan Empire, from the Panjab to Sind and Bengal.

This stroke might have added the whole of India to the territories under Hellenic rule, if the new prize had not evoked a new round of fratricidal wars for the division of the spoils between Greek and Greek. Yet neither the conquest of the Bactrian Greek conqueror of India's base of operations north-west of the Hindu Kush in 168-7 B.C. by a rival Greek war-lord who was perhaps the leader of a Seleucid expeditionary force⁵ nor the subsequent conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin

¹ See II. ii. 139.

² See XI. ix. 260-71.

³ The proneness of alien conquerors of universal states to turn their arms against one another has been noticed in IV. iv. 484-6.

⁴ Perhaps the only exception was the fringe of ex-Achaemenian territory along the eastern edge of the Iranian Plateau which Seleucus I Nicator ceded, *circa* 303 B.C., together with his claims to the already lost Indus Basin, to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta, in exchange for five hundred war-elephants for use in Seleucus's wars against his Macedonian rivals (see Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 119; Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 100).

⁵ For this account of Eucratidas, see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 186-216.

by the Yuechi Nomads between 141 and 128 B.C.¹ prevented the Greeks from clinging to part of Demetrius's Indian conquests. Greek rule lingered on south-east of the Hindu Kush till after 32 B.C.² and thus perhaps just overlapped in time with the establishment of an Hellenic universal state round the coasts of the Mediterranean in the shape of the Roman Empire. In conquering a Carthaginian Empire which had successfully foiled the efforts of all previous Hellenic aggressors to break into the Syriac Society's colonial domain in the western basin of the Mediterranean, the Romans had emulated in the west the eastward conquests of Alexander the Great and Demetrius; and, when the Romans subsequently marched eastward in turn in Alexander's footsteps, they brought the Orientals' first military counter-offensive to a halt in the last century B.C. and postponed the final liquidation of Hellenic rule south-east of Taurus for another seven hundred years.

Before the tide of war was thus turned again in the Hellenic Society's favour by Roman force of arms, the Oriental counter-offensive had gone far. A westward expansion of the Parthian Power from the Caspian Gates to the east bank of the Middle Euphrates, which was maintained against successive Seleucid attempts to push the Parthians back between 140 and 129 B.C., had ham-strung the Seleucid Power by depriving it of its granary in Babylonia. The surviving remnant of a Macedonian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire whose rule had once extended from the Aegean to the Pamirs was snuffed out when the Seleucid capital, Antioch-on-Orontes, was occupied in 83 B.C. by Tigranes, the king of the Seleucid Power's parvenu Armenian successor-state. In 87-86 B.C. the soldiers of Mithradates Eupator, the king of the Achaemenian Empire's never conquered Pontic Cappadocian successor-state, had carried Oriental arms as far into Continental European Greece as the Achaemenid Emperor Xerxes had penetrated in 480-479 B.C.³ And these territorial gains by independent Oriental Powers at the Hellenic Powers' expense, extensive though they had been, had not been so ominous as the internal revolts of previously passive subject Oriental populations. As early as the turn of the third and second centuries B.C. the Ptolemaic Power had been shaken in its Egyptian citadel by the mutinousness of Egyptian fallāhīn whom the Ptolemaic Government had rashly converted from peasants into soldiers at a crisis in one of the fratricidal wars between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid Greek empires; and thereafter, in 166 B.C., the hillmen of Judaea had successfully revolted against a Seleucid régime which had annexed the Ptolemies' Syrian possessions at the opening of the century without taking over the Ptolemies' prudent policy of cultural *laissez-faire*.⁴

This wave of Oriental militancy was broken by a counter-wave of Roman conquest and empire-building in the East. Between 74 and 62 B.C. successive Roman expeditionary forces led by Lucullus and Pompey subjugated successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire in Northern and North-Eastern Anatolia, from Bithynia to Pontus inclusive, which

¹ See Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

² See *ibid.*, p. 343.

³ See I. i. 76, n. 1.

⁴ This native insurrection against Ptolemaic and Seleucid rule in Egypt and Judaea in the second century B.C. has been noticed in V. v. 68.

had never been conquered by Alexander or by any of his Macedonian successors; Antioch-on-Orontes, with the rest of the former metropolitan territory of the Seleucid Monarchy in Northern Syria, was wrested out of Tigranes' hands; and the line of the Middle Euphrates¹ was selected by Pompey to serve as the eastern military and political frontier of an Hellenic World which had now been taken under Rome's aegis. When the chill shadow of Roman military power thus descended on the ex-Achaemenian territories west of Euphrates, an Egyptian peasantry who had been taking advantage of the relaxation of the Ptolemies' grip were sufficiently sensitive to this fresh change in the local political climate to relapse into their customary sullen submissiveness for the next five centuries, till the Monophysite Movement gave them their opportunity, in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era, to resume their revolt against Hellenism by defying a Roman régime which was then at last beginning to go the way of its Ptolemaic predecessor. The Jews, who were perhaps more passionate, though not more fanatical or more stubborn, than their Egyptian fellow victims, wilfully blinded themselves to the signs of the times² and brought destruction upon their metropolitan community in Judaea by three times challenging the Romans to ordeal by battle between A.D. 66 and A.D. 135.³

Nor did the Roman counter-offensive against the independent Oriental Powers come to a permanent standstill at the Pompeian line along the Middle Euphrates, notwithstanding Crassus's disastrous failure in 53 B.C. to conquer the Parthian Empire of the Arsacidae, and Trajan's all but disastrous repetition of Crassus's ambitious enterprise in A.D. 114-17. Augustus's more modest forward move of asserting Rome's suzerainty over Armenia in 20 B.C. had more lasting effects, and the obstinate unwillingness of the Arsacidae and their Sasanid successors to reconcile themselves to this unpalatable *fait accompli* beyond their northern borders eventually provoked successive eastward advances of a Roman frontier which Trajan's successor Hadrian had withdrawn again to Pompey's Euphratean line from Trajan's outposts at the foot of the Zagros and the head of the Persian Gulf. The southern frontier of Rome's Armenian protectorate was progressively screened against attack or infiltration from a base of hostile operations in Babylonia by Marcus Aurelius's annexation of Osrhoene in A.D. 166 and Septimius Severus's annexation of the rest of Northern Mesopotamia, up to the line of the River Khabūr, in A.D. 194-9. Even after these cumulative failures to stand up to Rome had cost the Arsacids their throne in A.D. 224, and after the ensuing bout of anarchy by which the Roman Empire was convulsed between A.D. 235 and A.D. 284 had given the Arsacids' militant Sasanid successors a unique opportunity to show their mettle, the first trial of strength between an old Roman and a new Sasanian Power ended humiliatingly for the Sasanidae in a further eastward extension of the cordon of Roman territory along the southern frontier of Armenia through the annexation to the Roman Empire of five districts east of the Tigris in A.D. 296.

Indeed, during the four centuries of its existence, the Sasanian Power

¹ See p. 358, n. 2, above.

² See V. v. 390, n. 3.

³ See V. v. 68.

showed itself impotent to fulfil its *raison d'être* by completing a liquidation of Hellenic rule in the former domain of the Achaemenian Empire which the Sasanids' Arsacid predecessors had so nearly accomplished in the second century B.C. The Sasanids' permanent achievements went no farther than the recovery of the five districts east of Tigris and the Mesopotamian frontier fortress of Nisibis in A.D. 363 and the acquisition of the lion's share of Armenia when, *circa* A.D. 387-90,¹ the Roman Imperial Government freed its hands for grappling with a threat to its existence on the Danube by consenting to the partition of this long-disputed buffer-state beyond the Euphrates. Even the last and most devastating of the Romano-Persian wars (*gerebatur* A.D. 603-28) ended in a peace of exhaustion on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*; and, in bleeding his empire white for the sake of seeing his outposts temporarily occupy Calchedon and Tripolitania, Khusrū II Parwiz was merely opening the door and showing the way to Arab *tertiū gaudentes*.

These Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors performed the last act in the drama of the Syriac World's encounter with Hellenism on the military and political plane by finally liquidating Roman rule in Syria and Egypt and reconstituting in twelve campaigns (*gerebantur* A.D. 632-43) the Syriac universal state which it had taken Alexander five campaigns (*gerebantur* 334-330 B.C.) to destroy.² Thus the end of an Hellenic military ascendancy which had endured for 973 years in the ex-Achaemenian provinces west of the Euphrates was as swift and conclusive as its original imposition had been. But the spectacle on this military plane gives only a superficial and misleading impression of the true course of the encounter; for, as we have already observed, Alexander and his Macedonian and Roman successors, in compelling their Oriental victims to submit to the force of Hellenic arms, had provoked them into steeling their hearts and minds against the reception of the Hellenic culture; and, after these Hellenic men of war had done their obstructive work, an Hippocrates and an Aristotle had still to wait patiently for centuries on the threshold of a closed academic door which no military weapon could prise open to give them entry. The Syriac World did not begin to show a spontaneous interest in Hellenic science and philosophy till it had begun to shake itself loose from Hellenic domination by providing itself with a Christianity of its own in the shape of the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies and with a literary medium of its own in the shape of the Syriac language; and the door thus at last set ajar was not opened wide till after the Arabs had pushed the Romans back beyond the Taurus and had brought with them the Arabic language as an alternative medium to the Syriac. If any credit is to be given to any men-at-arms for the belated self-Hellenization of Syriac minds, we must conclude that the military pioneers who cleared the way for these minds' reception of

¹ According to Christensen, A.: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin and Munksgaard), p. 248, the partition was carried out early in the reign of Vahram IV (*regnabat* either A.D. 388-99 or A.D. 386-97). According to J. B. Bury, in his *editio minor* of Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. iii (London 1901, Methuen), p. 504, the negotiator of the partition on the Roman side was Theodosius I (*imperabat* A.D. 379-95).

² See II. ii. 139 and IV. iv. 485, n. 3.

the Hellenic culture were not an Alexander or a Pompey but were a Khālid b. al-Walid and a S'ad b. abī Waqqās.

The success of the Nestorian and Monophysite movements in achieving by non-military means, before the advent of the Muslim Arab warriors, so much more for the liberation of the Syriac World than had ever been accomplished by the Maccabees or the Sasanidae, is an exemplification, in the experience of the Hellenic Society's victims, of a fundamental law governing the histories of encounters between societies which has been put in classical form, in terms of Hellenic experience, in Horace's celebrated epigram *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes intulit agresti Latio*.¹ Hellenes and Orientals alike achieved cultural conquests as a result of having fallen into military and political adversity; and the Hellenization of the Latin-speaking barbarians of Central Italy through the gentle influence of conquered Greek city-states in Campania and Magna Graecia was not the earliest instance of this phenomenon in Hellenic history. The Greek-speaking barbarians of Macedonia and Epirus were being Hellenized in the same age through the forcible incorporation of a Chalcidicē and an Ambracia into their Homerically adolescent bodies politic;² and, more than two hundred years earlier than that, the forcible incorporation of the Greek city-states along the western seaboard of Anatolia into the barbarian kingdom of Lydia had made a Philhellene out of a Croesus who had come to the throne at Sardis as the leader of an anti-Hellenic party.³

In the Hellenic Civilization's encounter with its Syriac sister society the fitful imposition of Carthaginian rule upon Greek city-states in Western Sicily over a period of a century and a half, beginning with the launching of the great Carthaginian offensive in 409 B.C. and ending in the outbreak of the First Romano-Punic War in 263 B.C., probably did more to Hellenize the Syriac Society's colonial domain in the western basin of the Mediterranean than the subsequent Hellenic conquest and colonization of the Carthaginian Empire by the Hellenic Civilization's Roman converts. In Anatolia in the last century B.C. a Mithradates Eupator, who emulated Xerxes in boasting of a Persian pedigree as well as in carrying his arms into European Greece, was at the same time proud to account himself a Philhellene; and the source of the Hellenism which had captivated this Oriental war-lord of a Pontic Cappadocia that had escaped Macedonian conquest was not an imperial Pella or Antioch; it was a subject Sinope which had been annexed by Eupator's grandfather Pharnaces *circa* 183 B.C. and had been chosen by Eupator himself to be the maritime Greek capital of his motley dominions⁴ in place of a

¹ Horace: *Epistulae*, Book II, Ep. i, ll. 156-7.

² See III. iii. 477-89.

³ See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 92.

⁴ The Pontic Greek city-state that was thus forcibly honoured by Persian sovereigns of the Cappadocian hinterland, who belonged to the post-Alexandrine dynasty founded by the ex-satrap Ariarathes, had previously been paid the same two-edged compliment by Datames, the moving spirit in the revolt of the western satraps against the Achaemenian Imperial Government in 367 B.C. Before embarking on this abortive attempt to carve out a Cappadocian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire for himself, the ambitious Carian empire-builder had occupied Sinope and made it the capital of his ephemeral principality (see Olmstead, A. T.: *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), p. 412).

landlocked native city of Amasia¹ that was hallowed by the rock-cut tombs of Eupator's Persian ancestors. Nor was the cultural radiation of this subjugated colonial Greek city-state Sinope confined within the frontiers of the Oriental kingdom which had incorporated Sinope in its body politic. Across the breadth of Pontic Cappadocia the hinterland of Sinope expanded inland into the adjoining sister Cappadocian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire in the interior of Eastern Anatolia; and by the fourth century of the Christian Era the cumulative cultural effect of an Hellenic influence which since Augustus's day had been playing upon Cappadocia, not only from Sinope, but from a more powerful though still more distant transmitting station at Ephesus,² had inspired descendants of Persian feudal barons planted in Cappadocia in the Achaemenian Age³ to become the Attic-educated Cappadocian Fathers of an Eastern Orthodox Christian Church.

These instances of cultural attraction exercised on barbarian, Syriac, and Hittite hinterlands by politically subjugated maritime Hellenic city-states give the same evidence as the role subsequently played by the Hellenic deportee-settlement at Jund-i-Shāpūr in the self-Hellenization of the Syriac World after the final liquidation of Hellenic rule on Syriac ground. They testify to the operation of a social 'law' to the effect that, in cultural encounters between contemporaries, the sensitiveness of the receptivity of the heirs of an assaulted culture to the influence of an impinging culture is apt to be in inverse ratio to the degree to which the representatives of the impinging culture yield to the temptation of trying to force an entry.

This law is likewise revealed in the history of the radiation of Hellenic art, which travelled farther afield than Hellenic science or philosophy, and much farther afield than Hellenic arms. An Hellenic Kingdom of Macedon whose soldiers once marched eastward as far as the Panjab never succeeded in permanently establishing its dominion over the headwaters of its domestic rivers Axios and Strymon; yet the image and superscription of coins minted in the Lower Strymon Basin by Philip the son of Amyntas in the fourth century B.C. had made their way before the beginning of the Christian Era not only across the watershed between Strymon and Danube but right across the Continent and over the Channel into Britain.⁴ Some four hundred years after Philip's day, the peacefully triumphal north-westward progress of his coin-types was overtaken in Britain by the advance of the military frontier of a Roman-built Hellenic universal state; but in the opposite direction the radiation

¹ The writer of this Study spent the night of the 7th November, 1948, in Amasia and visited the royal tombs *en route* for the summit of the citadel.

² See the passage in Strabo's *Geographica*, Book XII, chap. ii, § 10 (C 540), quoted in IV. iv. 21, n. 2. The expanding commercial and cultural hinterlands of rival ports behave like the expanding basins of rival rivers. Like a river, a port will capture territory from a competitor by pushing back the commercial watershed and thereby diverting the flow of trade from its rival to itself; but, unlike a river basin, in which the flow of water is in one direction only—from the headwaters to the sea—the hinterland of a port is the field of a two-way commercial and cultural traffic with an upward flow from coast to watershed as well as a downward flow from watershed to coast.

³ See VI. vii. 123-4.

⁴ See V. v. 196-8 and 482. The Philippan prototype did, however, 'suffer a sea change' in the course of its journey to a British Ultima Thule.

of Hellenic art far outshot the farthest reconnaissance of Alexander's or even Demetrius's expeditionary force. After travelling eastward, in the wake of Hellenic arms, from the Aegean to Gandhara, on the watershed between the Oxus and the Indus, and establishing a new base of pacific operations here under the aegis of Kushan barbarian successors of Bactrian Greek war-lords, Hellenic art made a further and still longer journey eastward from this second starting-point into a Sinic World into which neither Greek nor Roman armies had ever penetrated, to become the inspiration of the new art of a nascent Far Eastern Civilization.¹

The Epiphany of Higher Religions

The peaceful penetration of the Hellenic culture into regions never trodden by Hellenic conquerors even at the high tide of Hellenic military expansion teaches the same lesson as Hellenism's posthumous artistic and intellectual triumphs after the ebb of its dominion from territories that Hellenic war-lords had once overrun and subjugated; and this Hellenic lesson is illuminating for the general study of encounters between civilizations that are one another's contemporaries. That light was visible to students of history in the generation of the writer of this Study owing to the accident of their happening in this Hellenic case to know the whole story—in contrast to the state of their knowledge of current encounters with the Modern Western Civilization, in which a flood of detailed information out of all proportion to the meagre surviving records of Hellenic history was abruptly cut short, in the middle of the story, by the iron curtain of Man's insuperable ignorance of a still uncreated future.

Whether the impotence of force in the cultural commerce between contemporaries was one day to be illustrated in Modern Western history as it had already been revealed in post-Alexandrine Hellenic history was a question that was still enigmatic in A.D. 1952; and this negative result of a study of the encounters between his own society and its contemporaries served to remind the Modern Western student of History that those historical events that for him were the least remote, the best documented, the most alive, and the most familiar were also therefore the least illuminating for the purpose of his ultimate inquiry into the general course and character of human affairs.² The more remote and less fully documented history of encounters with an Hellenic Society, which had become extinct not much less than thirteen hundred years before the mid-twentieth-century student's day, promised to teach him more about the comparative effects, in encounters between contemporaries, of the alternative tempers of violence and gentleness, and *a fortiori* more about the outcome of such encounters on the religious plane.

To a twentieth-century Western historian, looking back from his historical vantage-point upon the long since completed history of encounters with a post-Alexandrine Hellenism, it was evident that by his day the spontaneous reception of Hellenic art in a fifth-century Sinic

¹ See III. iii. 131 and 247, n. 2, and V. v. 134-5, 196, and 482-3.

² This point has already been noticed in I. i. 36-37, and on p. 346 above.

World and of Hellenic science and philosophy in a ninth-century Syriac World had gone the same way as the feats of Macedonian and Roman arms during the last four centuries B.C. The artistic and intellectual, like the military and political, transactions between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and its contemporaries were by this time a closed account that was having no continuing effect on transactions in the twentieth-century observer's own age; but this was not to say that the life of Mankind in the twentieth century of the Christian Era was not being influenced at all by any effects of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism's impact on the world of its day. The continuing operation of this impact was proclaimed in a twentieth-century world by the allegiance of an overwhelming majority of the living generation of Mankind to one or other of four living religions—Christianity, Islam, the Mahāyāna, and Hinduism—whose historical epiphanies could be traced back to episodes in a now extinct Hellenism's encounters with now extinct Oriental civilizations; and, if the future course of human affairs were to vindicate an intuition¹ that the 'universal churches' embodying the 'higher religions' were not merely the latest type of human society that had made its appearance up to date but were also an apter vehicle than either civilizations or primitive societies for helping human beings to make their pilgrim's progress towards the goal of human endeavours, it would follow that the encounters with a post-Alexandrine Hellenism shed a light which the encounters with a Modern Western Civilization did not shed upon the main theme of any general study of History.

When we surveyed the religious effects of the literally world-wide impact of a Modern Western Civilization, we met with little evidence here of the genesis of new higher religions comparable to those engendered by the virtually world-wide impact of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism. In the history of encounters with the Modern Western Civilization up to date, new higher religions, if discernible at all, proved to be conspicuously rare and rudimentary;² and we did not find any warrant for allowing ourselves to guess that this apparent religious barrenness of a Modern Western internal proletariat might be an illusion, arising from the prematurity of our date of observation, which might be dispelled by contrary evidence in still unwritten chapters of the story.³ On this showing, we must conclude that, if the encounters between our own Western Civilization and its contemporaries had been the only instances known to us of encounters between contemporaries, we should have remained ignorant of the most enduring and most significant of all the effects which such encounters had once produced; and we must also admit the possibility that the darkness of our understanding of History would not be appreciably lightened even if we could live to read the remaining chapters of the Modern Western story, and if the information at Posterity's disposal in these still outstanding chapters should prove to be as abundant as in the chapters already in print. By contrast, our fragmentary record of the story of encounters with a post-Alexandrine Hellenism initiates us into the epiphany of a band of higher religions⁴—

¹ See VII. vii. 420-3.

³ See VII. vii. 414-19.

² See V. v. 174-6.

⁴ See V. v. 81-82, and xi, map 29.

the worship of Isis, the worships of Cybele and Iuppiter Dolichenus, Mithraism and Christianity and Islam, the Mahāyāna and Hinduism—which incidentally bear witness to Hellenism's encounters with a petrified Egyptian, a fossilized Hittite, a Syriac, and an Indic Civilization, though the revelation that is these higher religions' message is concerned, not with the final cause of the species of human society called 'civilizations', but with the will of God and with the goal of human endeavours.

The ecclesiastical institutions in which these higher religions had come to be embodied had behaved like all human institutions in competing with one another; and, in this competition, all but the four last on our list had ostensibly succumbed; but in truth these apparently extinguished competitors were still living on in the life of victors who had triumphed over them by taking over from them their distinctive sparks of truth and life. For those who had eyes to see, a Mithraic vein was discernible in the catholic tradition of a triumphant Mahāyāna, and a Mithraic, Isiac, and Cybeline vein in the catholic tradition of a triumphant Christianity. Unlike the military, political, intellectual, and artistic offspring of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism's encounters with contemporary societies of its own species, the higher religions that had made their epiphany in the course of those encounters were thus all still alive and at work in a twentieth-century world that had been unified on the technological plane by the ubiquitous expansion of a secular Modern Western culture.

2. *Encounters with the Pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization*¹

The Hellenic Society's Offensive in the Mediterranean Basin

The drama in which a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Society was the protagonist was performed in the same Mediterranean theatre that, some eighteen hundred years later, was to be the scene of a play in which a Medieval Western Christendom was to take the principal part; and in both performances there were three actors on the stage. The two rivals of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenism were the sister Syriac Society and the fossilized remnant of a prematurely shattered Hittite Society which had preserved its existence in the fastnesses of the Taurus. In the competition between these three parties for the dominion of the Mediterranean Basin the Syriac Civilization was represented by the Phoenicians and the Hittite by seafarers who, in the overseas territories in which they won a footing, became known in Greek as Tyrrhenians and in Latin as Etruscans to their Hellenic adversaries.²

In this three-cornered contest, which opened in the eighth century B.C., the prizes were the shores of the Western Basin of the Mediterranean, whose culturally backward native inhabitants were no match for any of the three rival intruding societies; the shores of the Black Sea opening on to the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, which gave access in turn to the arable belt of Black Earth along the Steppe's north-western fringe; and the long-since intensively cultivated land of

¹ See xi, maps 18, 19, 20, 21.

² See I. i. 114 and II. ii. 85-86.

Egypt, where a civilization that had suffered the doom of Tithonus¹ had reached by this time a stage of decrepitude in its state of living death at which it could no longer keep one aggressive alien neighbour at bay without enlisting the services of another to bolster up its own failing strength.

In the struggle for these prizes the pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization enjoyed several notable advantages over both its competitors.

Its most manifest advantage was geographical. The Hellenic base of operations in the Aegean was closer to the Western Mediterranean, and much closer to the Black Sea, than the Etruscan and Phoenician bases at the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean were to either of these two undeveloped maritime outlets for the Levant. Indeed, the Aegean homeland of Hellenism lay right across the sea-route to the Black Sea from the coasts of Cilicia and Syria, and it also commanded and threatened the right flank of the Etruscan and Phoenician sea-route to the West, whereas the Hellenes themselves could row straight from the Aegean into the Dardanelles and could make an easy coasting voyage from Corinth to Syracuse round the head of the Ionian Sea across the Straits of Otranto, without in either venture running the risk of being intercepted and attacked by their rivals.

The pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Society's second advantage in this competition lay in the head of population which it had accumulated as the result of a victory of the Lowlands over the Highlands in the preceding chapter of Hellenic history;² for the consequent pressure of population on the means of subsistence in Hellas gave the Hellenes' expansion an explosive force and stimulated them to follow up the establishment of trading posts overseas by making this new world into a Magna Graecia through a rapid and intensive settlement of Hellenic agricultural colonists on the land. Our scanty evidence gives the impression that neither the Etruscans nor the Phoenicians had a comparable amount of man-power to dispose of in this age; and it is at any rate clear that neither of them in fact emulated the Hellenes' achievement of making a new world their own by colonizing it. The cautious Phoenicians kept within the narrow bounds of their coastal trading-posts till the Carthaginians belatedly broke with Phoenician tradition by imposing their rule on the native population of their North-West African hinterland about half-way through the fifth century B.C.³ The rash Etruscan settlers on the west coast of Italy pushed on into the interior across the Apennines and into the Po Basin until lack of man-power brought their advance to a halt at the southern foot of the Alps and there drew down upon them the avalanche of a Celtic barbarian counter-attack.⁴

The third advantage enjoyed by the Hellenes was, like the first, a

¹ See VI. vii. 47-52.

² See I. i. 24-25 and III. iii. 120-1.

³ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, Part I (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 681-2.

⁴ See II. ii. 85 and II. ii. 276, 280, and 345. In terms of the overseas expansion of a Modern Western World, the Greek settlements in Magna Graecia and Sicily may be compared to the English settlements along the Atlantic seaboard of North America; the Phoenician posts at key points in the Western Mediterranean to the Portuguese posts at key points in the Indian Ocean; and the Etruscan conquests in Italy to the Spanish conquests in Central and South America.

corollary of their geographical situation. The opening of the competition between Etruscans, Phoenicians, and Hellenes in the Mediterranean in the eighth century B.C. happened to coincide in date with the inauguration by the Assyrian war-lord Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 746-727 B.C.) of the last and most devastating offensive in the third bout of Assyrian militarism in South-Western Asia;¹ and the homelands of the Phoenicians and Etruscans in Syria and South-Eastern Anatolia were immediately exposed to the full fury of an Assyrian tornado which left the homeland of the Hellenes in the Aegean unscathed. The surviving Hittite principalities astride the Taurus in South-Eastern Anatolia were annexed to the Assyrian dominions by Sargon (*regnabat* 722-705 B.C.); and, after the Aramaean principalities in the interior of Syria had been ground to powder, the maritime Phoenician city-states in their turn were scarified by the Assyrian harrow. Sidon was annexed to the Assyrian dominions in 677 B.C. and its former territory was converted into an Assyrian province.² The Isle of Tyre was besieged by the Assyrians in 674-668 B.C.,³ and was probably annexed after the suppression of a rebellion in 639-7 B.C. in the former Tyrian territory on the mainland.⁴ Of the four metropolitan Phoenician city-states, only Byblus and Aradus retained their independence;⁵ and their two conquered sisters were not compensated economically for their political subjugation by finding themselves incorporated into a continental empire that extended eastwards from the coast of Syria into the interior of South-Western Asia over the crest of Zagros on to the western rim of the Iranian Plateau. Asshur's South-West Asia, like Napoleon's and like Hitler's Europe, was too severely damaged in the making, too short-lived, and too incessantly mobilized for war ever to harvest the potential economic fruits of a violently enforced political unification.

Considering these handicaps, it is remarkable that the Phoenicians and Etruscans should have done as well as they did in their maritime competition with the Hellenes. In the race for the Black Sea the geographical advantage was indeed so overwhelmingly on the Hellenes' side that here their competitors were decisively defeated. Traces of a Phoenician settlement on the island of Thasos off the north shore of the Aegean,⁶ and traces of Tyrrhenian settlements on the island of Lemnos, off the Aegean entrance to the Dardanelles, and at two points, inside the Dardanelles, on the Asiatic coast of the Sea of Marmara,⁷ are evidence of a struggle in this arena which ended in a decisive and definitive Hellenic victory. The Black Sea became an Hellenic lake; and, in

¹ See IV. iv. 475-6.

² See Forrer, E.: *Die Provinzeinteilung des Assyrischen Reiches* (Leipzig 1920, Hinrichs), p. 65.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 66.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 67.

⁶ Tales of ancient Phoenician settlements in the Hellenic Society's eventual domain were, of course, commonplaces of Hellenic legend, and, in so far as they were to be credited at all, they were perhaps in most cases to be interpreted as echoes, in a post-Minoan folk-memory, of Minoan enterprise in an age before the dawn of Hellenic history and long before the intrusion of any authentic Phoenicians into Hellenic waters. In Thasos, on the other hand, the genuineness of the tale of a Phoenician settlement seemed to be attested by the attachment of the Semitic name Cabeiri ('the Great [Gods]') to divinities worshipped in an historic Thasian cult.

⁷ See I. i. 114, n. 3, and I. i. 411-15.

the period of quiescence on the Steppe after the eruption of the Cimmerian and Scythian Nomads at the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.,¹ the Hellenic masters of the Black Sea and the Scythian masters of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe² entered into a profitable commercial partnership in which the cereal harvests raised by the Scythians' sedentary subjects on the Black Earth were exported overseas to feed Hellenic urban populations in the Aegean in exchange for luxury goods of Hellenic manufacture designed to suit the Royal Scythians' taste.³

In the Western Mediterranean, where the balance of geographical advantage was less heavily weighted in the Hellenes' favour, the struggle lasted longer and went through many more vicissitudes before it ended, here too, in an Hellenic victory.

In the first round in the eighth century B.C. both the Etruscans and the Phoenicians managed to forge ahead of the Hellenes, in spite of the greater distance of their Levantine bases from the western scene of operations and in defiance of the ever impending Hellenic threat to the right flank of their long-drawn-out line of maritime communications, where the route ran between Libya and Crete. The Etruscans must have slipped through the Straits of Messina to establish themselves along the west coast of Italy between the mouths of the Tiber and the Arno before the Hellenes had closed the Straits by planting the toe of Italy on one side and the western seaboard of Sicily on the other with a serried array of colonial Greek city-states. The Phoenicians succeeded in resisting all Hellenic attempts to wrest out of Phoenician hands a command of the wider maritime passage westward between Cape Bon and the western tip of Sicily, which Phoenician pioneers had brought under their control by planting a Sicilian outpost at Motye⁴ over against North-West African outposts at Utica and Carthage. In the ensuing phases of the struggle the overseas Phoenicians and the overseas Tyrrhenians alike achieved a self-sufficiency that neutralized the advantage enjoyed by the Hellenes in holding the interior lines and discounted the loss that the Levantine seafarers suffered when the harrowing of their parent societies in South-West Asia by the Assyrians deprived them of all prospect of receiving any appreciable further reinforcements from home.

The balance of advantage continued nevertheless to incline so heavily in the Hellenes' favour that, throughout the seventh century B.C. and the first half of the sixth, they went from strength to strength. The

¹ See III. iii. 410 and VI. vii. 580-689.

² For the Scythian empire based on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, see III. iii. 25, n. 8, and 428-30.

³ See III. iii. 429. In the long history of a Medieval Western Christendom's expansion over the Mediterranean Basin and its backwaters, the trade between the Greek settlements on the north shore of the Black Sea and the Royal Scythians had its counterpart in a trade between Venetian and Genoese settlements on the same coast and the Golden Horde. During the first phase of the Mamlūk régime in Egypt, when the Mamlūks were importing their slave-successors from the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe and not, as in the second phase, from the Caucasus, the Venetians were the principal carriers of this valuable human freight.

⁴ They also planted two further posts, beyond the north-western corner of the island, at Panormus (Palermo) and Soloeis, towards the western end of the north coast.

colonization of Cyrenaica in and after *circa* 639 B.C.¹ gave them a command of the Libyan as well as the Cretan flank of the sea-passage between the Levant and the Western Mediterranean which might have proved a decisive factor in the struggle if the overseas Phoenicians and Etruscans had not already learnt to dispense with support from their original bases of operations. The foundation in 580 B.C., on the grand scale, of the new colonial Greek city-state Akragas (*Latine* Agrigentum) filled the last gap in a chain of Greek settlements along the south coast of Sicily which thenceforth stretched without a break from Syracuse to a Selinûs that had been planted in 628 B.C. on the threshold of the Phoenician outpost at the island's western tip. The foundation *circa* 600 B.C. of Massilia (Marseilles)—on the brink of the nearest natural harbour to the delta of the Rhône that was out of range of the choking discharge of the delta-building silt—gave the Hellenes the command of the most magnificent of all the natural avenues leading from the shores of the Mediterranean into the interior of Europe.² The accidental discovery, *circa* 638 B.C.,³ by the Samian merchant-adventurer Colaeus, of the 'at that time still virgin market'⁴ of Tartessus (Tarshish), on the Iberian shore of the Mediterranean's estuary into the Atlantic beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, promised to give the Hellenes a monopoly of trade with a source of mineral wealth that was a dazzling reward for their being some three-quarters of a century behind the Phoenician founders of Gades (Cadiz) in the long race from the Levant to the Pillars of Hercules.

Even in the shorter race for Egypt, which was the one goal out of the three for which the maritime competitors were contending where the advantage of geographical proximity did not lie with the Hellenes, the seventh century saw the Hellenes carry off the prize. The Hellenes outstripped their rivals here likewise, in spite of their geographical handicap, because they were in a position to supply a now fanatically xenophobe Egyptian Society with the one service that it was still willing perforce to purchase from alien hands. An Egypt that was up in arms against an atrocious Assyrian conqueror required alien mercenary troops to help it to shake off a yoke which it was too feeble to shake off

¹ If we follow Eusebius in dating the foundation of Cyrene itself *circa* 631 B.C., the first Theraean landing on the Libyan islet of Platea will have been made *circa* 639 B.C. according to the chronology given by Herodotus in Book IV, chaps. 156-8.

² The avenue from Marseilles up the courses of the Rhône and the Saône led direct to a gap between the Jura and the Vosges that gave access to the upper valleys of both the Rhine and the Danube (see II. ii. 330). The only other river-route from the Mediterranean into the interior of Europe that could remotely compare with the Rhône Valley avenue was the route up the Vardar (*Graecè* Axios) and down the Morava (*Latine* Margus) to the south bank of the Middle Danube above the Iron Gates, adjoining the north-east corner of the Alföld. This route, which, in the first generation of Alexander's successors, was to be provided, by Cassander's insight, with an adequate port through his foundation of Thessalonica, was inadequately served in the pre-Alexandrine Age by the more securely but less conveniently situated Greek colonial settlements at Olynthus and Methone. Compared with the open roads up the valleys of the Rhône and the Vardar, the Alpine portages into the Danube Basin from the head of the Adriatic were arduous, though they were sufficiently convenient to make the successive fortunes of Aquileia, Venice, and Trieste.

³ The date was a few months after the Theraeans' first landing on the Libyan island of Platea.

⁴ Τὸ δὲ ἐμπόριον τοῦτο ἦν ἀκήρατον τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.—Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 152.

by its own exertions; and a role which the Egyptians' Anatolian and Syrian fellow victims of Assyrian militarism were powerless to play, even if they had had the will, was left to Ionian and Carian 'brazen men' from the sea whom the Pharaoh-Liberator Psammetichus I (*regnabat* 663/655-610 B.C.¹) enlisted for the task of expelling the Assyrian garrisons from the Lower Nile Valley in the years 658-651 B.C.²

Towards the middle of the sixth century B.C. it looked as if the Hellenes had not only won their maritime competition for the Mediterranean Basin with the Etruscans and Phoenicians but were now also in a fair way to inheriting the Assyrians' continental empire in Egypt and South-West Asia. *Circa* 696 B.C., nearly half a century before Psammetichus's Hellenic mercenaries turned the Assyrians out of Egypt, Sennacherib had been incensed by an audacious insurrection of interloping Hellenic 'brazen men' from the sea on the Cilician³ coast of his dominions; and it looks as if the Assyrian Empire's Neo-Babylonian successor-state followed the example of its Egyptian successor-state in hiring Hellenic fighting-men, if we may assume that other Hellenic soldiers of fortune served in Nebuchadnezzar's bodyguard besides a Lesbian Antimenidas whose name and record happen to have been saved from oblivion by the accident of his having been a brother of the poet Alcaeus.

The Syriac Society's Political Consolidation for Self-Defence

This employment of Hellenic troops in a South-West Asian Empire whose native Chaldaean warriors were far better military material than the drones of Libyan descent, who were doing duty for a native military caste in a contemporary Egypt,⁴ was an augury of a future Hellenic ascendancy over a fallen Assyrian Empire's former domain; and indeed the Hellenes' footing in Egypt and South-West Asia on the eve of the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire was not less favourable than their footing there on the eve of the Achaemenian Empire's fall some two hundred years later, when Hellenic mercenaries were not only once more the mainstay of a once more precariously independent Egypt, but were also being employed by loyal as well as by rebel Persian provincial governors and even by the Achaemenian Emperor himself. In the fourth

¹ Psammetichus was installed as vassal prince of Lower Egypt by Assurbanipal in 663 B.C. and had established his authority over Thebes by 655 B.C.

² See IV. iv. 21 and 476, and V. v. 463.

³ In Sennacherib's day the name 'Cilicia' had not yet been extended to the plain of Adana (Qu'e) and the rock-bound coast to the east of it, but was still confined to the inland province Khilakku, north of the Taurus, round the city eventually named Caesarea Mazaca (i.e. the district of the post-Alexandrine Kingdom of Inland Cappadocia that was still officially known as Cilicia after the name had shifted, in the popular usage, to the country south of the mountains). This shift in the popular application of the name was the consequence of a change in political geography which followed Assyria's collapse. After having been an Assyrian protectorate and even an Assyrian province (Forrer, E.: *Die Provinzeinteilung des Assyrischen Reiches* (Leipzig 1920, Hinrichs), pp. 74 and 82), the principality of Khilakku not only recovered its independence but proceeded to expand to the coast of the Mediterranean by annexing Qu'e (Forrer, loc. cit., and the present Study, VI. vii. 668), as, some seventeen hundred years later, the same desirable lowland country was annexed by a refugee Armenian principality which had established itself in the highlands adjoining the Cappadocian Cilicia on the east (see p. 369, above).

⁴ See IV. iv. 422.

century B.C. the Hellenes duly achieved their manifest destiny; but in the sixth century this destiny, imminent though it then already appeared to be, was abruptly postponed for two hundred years by a sudden turn of the wheel of Fortune.

The employment of Greek mercenaries by the Neo-Babylonian warlord Nebuchadnezzar becomes comprehensible when we remind ourselves that the warlike spirit of the Chaldaean tribesmen—as well as the tincture of Assyrian militarism which even the sedentary rural and urban population of Babylonia had perhaps momentarily acquired from the harsh experience of a hundred-years-long struggle for life against an atrocious Assyrian aggressor¹—was rapidly evaporating under the depressing influence of a new anxiety. The Babylonians' agonizing Assyrian nightmare had promptly returned in the new guise of a threat of being encircled and eventually engulfed by the Median hordes who had been the Babylonians' allies in a common struggle against Assyrian enemies of the Human Race. When, *circa* 550 B.C., this Median cloud, banked on Zagros, that was now overhanging South-West Asia, was swollen to still more menacing dimensions by a sudden transfer of the hegemony over the restless tribes of Iran from the Medes to the Persians, the stricken peoples that had been enjoying a spell of uneasy freedom and peace since the downfall of the Assyrian Power were confronted with a choice between two new candidates for oecumenical dominion. If they were to stem the threatening deluge of Persian conquest from the Iranian Plateau, they must open the sluices to an infiltration of Hellenic mercenary man-power from the Mediterranean.

Either of the two candidates for taking the Assyrians' vacant place had something less uninviting than an Assyrian tyranny to offer. The Persians promised to a convalescent world the rest-cure of an oecumenical peace whose easy-going semi-barbarian conservators would be more inclined to adopt their subjects' institutions and ideas² than to impose their own.³ The Hellenes promised to the patient the shock-treatment of rejuvenation through the impact of an adolescent society whose zest for adventure had not yet been quenched by any taste of the South-West Asian peoples' crushing experience of passing under an Assyrian harrow. At this turning-point in the history of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Society's relations with its neighbours, the ghost of an Asshur who in his lifetime had inadvertently played the Hellenes' game by paralysing their Levantine competitors for the thalassocracy of the Mediterranean, tipped the balance of choice against the Hellenic candidate for Asshur's political heritage by moving the victimized peoples, whose memories the Assyrian spectre haunted, to opt for a political sedative in preference to a political stimulant.⁴

¹ See IV. iv. 476-80.

² The receptivity of the Persian builders of the Achaemenian Empire has been noticed in V. v. 443.

³ See VI. vii. 580-689. The forbearance shown by the Achaemenidae in refraining from making use of their political power for the propagation of a Zoroastrianism to which they themselves had become converts has been noticed in V. v. 704-5.

⁴ The majority of these peoples acquiesced in the sedative merely as a *pis aller*, as was demonstrated in the event by the general insurrection of most of the subject peoples east of Euphrates in the year of anarchy following the assassination of the Emperor

In this political atmosphere the Hellenes' sixth-century prospects in Egypt and South-West Asia were blotted out within the twenty years or so that elapsed between Cyrus's conquest of the Lydian Empire *circa* 547 B.C. and Cambyses' conquest of Egypt *circa* 525 B.C.¹ Cyrus's stroke, which substituted an outlandish Persian for a familiar Lydian suzerainty over the Hellenic city-states along the western seaboard of Anatolia, was the sharper as well as the more surprising of the two; but Cambyses' conquest of Egypt dealt the Hellenes a further double blow; for, besides depreciating the military prestige of 'brazen men' who had failed to earn their keep by preserving Egypt's independence, it placed Greek commercial interests in Egypt at the mercy of Persian goodwill. Moreover, these reverses that the rapid establishment of an Achaemenian Empire inflicted on the Hellenes were accentuated by the no less signal and sudden benefits which the same swift transformation of the political scene conferred upon the Syrophoenicians.

To the peoples of Syria the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire brought not merely a rest-cure but a liberation and an opportunity; for Syria, unlike either Egypt or Babylonia, had obtained no respite from Assyria's fall. She had become the prey of a Neo-Babylonian successor-state of the Assyrian Empire; and her new conquerors, into whose souls the iron of Assyrian militarism had entered, had taken a vicarious revenge for their sufferings at a now slain Asshur's hands by treating their former fellow victims in Syria with an Assyrian harshness. Indeed, those few Syrian communities that had survived the Assyrian whips had been subjected by the Babylonians to a chastisement with scorpions. The fate of being carried into captivity, which Judah had escaped when Sennacherib had unsuccessfully laid siege to Jerusalem in 700 B.C., had overtaken her when Jerusalem had fallen to Nebuchadnezzar in the successive Babylonian sieges of 597 and 586 B.C.; and the Babylonian siege of 586-573 B.C. had proved a worse catastrophe for Tyre than the Assyrian siege of 674-668. The destruction of the Neo-Babylonian Empire by Cyrus gave the Babylonians' Syrian subjects a relief that their neighbours had been enjoying since the destruction of Assyria; and in this long-delayed reversal of Syrian fortunes the Phoenician experience was even more dramatic than the Jewish.

While the Jews were allowed by the new Persian rulers of the Syriac World to return home from their Babylonian exile and to reconstruct Judah in the modest form of an autonomous temple-state, the four Syrophoenician cities were given, not merely autonomy for themselves, but a dominion, under Achaemenian suzerainty, over other Syrian communities² that placed them on at least a par, in both extent of territory

Cambyses' successor on the Achaemenian imperial throne, and by the repeated subsequent revolts of both the Babylonians and the Egyptians against Achaemenian rule. On the whole, however, the Persians managed first to establish and afterwards to maintain their empire without evoking anything like the resistance from the subject peoples that these Persian subjects' ancestors had once offered to their Persian rulers' Assyrian predecessors. The Persians profited by the Assyrians' ferocity, which had broken the South-West Asian peoples' spirit before the Persians came on the scene, as well as by the comparatively unprovocative mildness of their own Achaemenian régime.

¹ These are A. T. Olmstead's dates in his *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), pp. 37 and 88.

² See V. v. 123, n. 2.

and quantity of population, with the most powerful of the independent city-states of a contemporary Hellenic World: an Athens, an Akragas, a Syracuse, and perhaps even a Sparta. Moreover, the political benefits thus bestowed on the Syrophoenicians were matched by their economic gains from an Achaemenian new order. The Syrophoenicians now found themselves partners in a commonwealth which stretched away inland from the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean into the interior of South-West Asia not merely up to the eastern slopes of the Zagros, like the Assyrian Empire, or up to the Zagros' western foot-hills, like the closer-cropped Neo-Babylonian Empire, but as far as the almost fabulously distant north-eastern outposts of *Homo Agricola* in Khwārizm¹ and Farghānah,² on the dry shore of the Great Eurasian Steppe. Under a stable and pacific Achaemenian régime this vast area had become the Syrophoenicians' continental economic hinterland; and, with the united forces of the Achaemenian Empire behind them, they could hope to win a comparable opening for their maritime trade by recovering the lion's share in the commerce of the Mediterranean which the Hellenes had captured from them while the Assyrians and Babylonians had been attacking them from the landward side. In Phoenician, as in Jewish, eyes the Achaemenian Empire was a heaven-sent instrument for the reinstatement of a chosen people in its rightful place in the sun; and it might be anticipated that, if archaeological enterprise were one day to bring to light a Tyrian counterpart of Deutero-Isaiah's tract, the Tyrian worshipper of Melkart would prove, like the Jewish worshipper of Yahweh, to have hailed Cyrus as the Lord's Anointed.

The Jews never had occasion to use the Achaemenian Empire as the instrument of an anti-Hellenic national policy, for the temple-state of Jerusalem, in its secluded inland fastness, did not come into collision with Hellenism till about 160 years after the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great; but the Achaemenian Empire did perform this service for the Syrophoenicians. In political partnership with the Persians they were able at last once again to face on equal, and more than equal, terms the Hellenic competitors who had been pushing them from pillar to post for the past 150 years. For the Phoenicians in their struggle with the Hellenes, union was the key to strength; and this strength through union, which had come to the Syrophoenicians as a Persian windfall, had already been acquired by their Libyphoenician colonists through Punic self-help.

Instead of waiting, like their cousins on the Syrian seaboard, for a semi-barbarian empire-builder to save them, the colonial Phoenician communities in the Western Mediterranean had saved themselves by accepting the leadership of one of their own number, Carthage, and by entering into an alliance with the Etruscans, whose field of enterprise did not overlap with theirs and who were likewise under pressure from the Hellenes' continuing westward expansion. This expansion had not ended with the Rhodians' foundation of Akragas in 580 B.C. The Phocaeans had followed up their foundation of Massilia by planting

¹ The land of the Chorasians (Hvārazmīy).

² The land of the Paricarians (Pairikās).

a chain of posts along the east coast of the Iberian Peninsula and, *circa* 566 B.C.,¹ a colony at Alalia on the east coast of Corsica which served a twofold purpose by providing both a port of call *en route* for Massilia and a naval base for blockading Etruria. The foundation of Akragas had, however, been immediately followed by the first signal Hellenic reverse at Phoenician hands. An attempt, led by the Cnidian adventurer Pentathlus, to push the Phoenicians out of their all-important foothold at the western tip of Sicily by planting an Hellenic settlement at the strategic point Lilybaeum, commanding the harbour of Motye, was defeated—apparently without Carthaginian aid²—by the combined efforts of the Sicilian Phoenicians and the local natives;³ and, when the surviving Cnidian adventurers succeeded in establishing themselves on the uninviting Lipari islands in lieu of the Sicilian vantage-point which they had failed to win, they found themselves harried here by the Etruscans.

Lilybaeum's destiny was to become, not an Hellenic city-state, but a Carthaginian fortress; for the Carthaginian empire-builders' first step was to establish their hegemony over their fellow Phoenician settlers on the coasts of Sicily, North-West Africa, and the Iberian Peninsula before going into partnership with the Etruscans. The Hellenes' two maritime rivals were soon confronted with a formidable new Hellenic threat by a backwash from the empire-building activities of Cyrus. After conquering Lydia, Cyrus summoned the Continental Asiatic Greek communities that had been under Lydian suzerainty to transfer their allegiance to him, and the Phocaeans—though they had previously refused the offer of a new home in Tarshish⁴—responded to the Persian challenge by migrating *en masse* to their existing Corsican settlement at Alalia.⁵ Here they made themselves so intolerable to Etruscans and Carthaginians alike as to provoke within five years a Tyrrheno-Carthaginian joint attack in which the Phocaeans won a battle⁶ but lost the war owing to the crippling casualties suffered by their navy. The surviving victors had to evacuate Corsica and make a new home for themselves at Velia, far down the west coast of Italy.⁷ Meanwhile the majority of the Ionians, who, unlike the stalwart minority of the Phocaeans, had stayed at home and had been constrained to submit to a Persian suzerainty, had been discussing

¹ i.e. twenty years before the Phocaeans migrated to Alalia *en masse* (Herodotus, Book I, chap. 165).

² See Dunbabin, T. J.: *The Western Greeks* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), p. 332.

³ There is no reason to suppose that these 'Elymi' were not of the same origin and nationality as their diversely named native neighbours the 'Sicans' and 'Sicels'. Each swarm of Greek settlers in Sicily found a local name for the native population on whose territory it was trespassing. The name 'Elymi' may have been coined for the natives of North-Eastern Sicily by some Cnidian or Rhodian Greek settler at Selinus or Akragas whose nearest non-Greek-speaking neighbours at home had been the Lycian 'Solymi'.

⁴ See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 163.

⁵ The resolute migrants were a minority. A majority succumbed to homesickness and turned back to regain their Asiatic home at the price of submitting to a Persian yoke (Herodotus, Book I, chap. 165).

⁶ The date of this decisive naval battle at Alalia is usually taken to have been *circa* 535 B.C.; but, if Cyrus conquered Lydia in 547 B.C. (see Olmstead, A. T.: *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), p. 40), and if his summons to the Continental Asiatic Greeks and the consequent migration of the Phocaeans to Corsica followed immediately after, this would indicate *circa* 541–540 B.C. as the date of the Battle of Alalia.

⁷ See Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 164–7.

a project submitted by Bias of Priene for escaping from their new subjection by migrating *en masse* to Sardinia,¹ and this suggestion was revived some fifty years later, during the last agonies of the Ionian Revolt of 499-493 B.C., by the irresponsible-minded Milesian insurgent leader Aristagoras;² but, even at the date when Bias first mooted the idea, the Hellenes had probably already been forestalled in Sardinia by the Carthaginians.

We know that the Carthaginian empire-builders concentrated their efforts on the conquest of Sardinia as soon as they had made sure of their hold upon the original Phoenician establishments in Western Sicily; and, though the dates of the successive stages in the execution of their grand design are obscure,³ the terms of the Carthagino-Roman treaty of *circa* 508 B.C.⁴ suggest that the structure of the Carthaginian Empire was by then already complete. By the terms of the Carthagino-Etruscan alliance that had borne fruit in the allies' lucrative defeat at Alalia, Sardinia had probably been included in a Carthaginian, and Corsica in an Etruscan, sphere of influence;⁵ and, after securing a sufficiently firm grip on the coasts of Sardinia to be able to rule out any possibility of a Greek settlement there, the Carthaginian empire-builders turned westward. They occupied the Balearic Islands; crushed the Kingdom of Tarshish;⁶ wiped out the Phoenician Gades' Hellenic rival Mainakê, the south-westernmost Phocaeen outpost on the south-east coast of the Iberian Peninsula in the neighbourhood of Malaga;⁷ and drew a wooden curtain across the southern half of the Western Mediterranean from Cape Nao to Cape Bon through the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, and the West Sicilian bridgehead of the Carthaginian dominions. In this 'Punic Main' and its Iberian and North-West African hinterlands, Hellenic shipping was thenceforth forbidden to ply and Hellenic wares could not be marketed except through Punic middlemen;⁸ and this barred zone remained effectively closed to Hellenic commerce for a quarter of a millennium,⁹ till the Punic monopoly was eventually broken by force of

¹ See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 170.

² See Herodotus, Book V, chap. 124.

³ Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-3, tentatively dates the establishment of Carthaginian rule in Western Sicily before the fall of Tyre in 573 B.C.; but Orosius, *Adversum Paganos*, Book IV, chap. vi, §§ 6-9, who is the only surviving Hellenic author to give any indication of a date, assigns not only the operations in Sicily but also the first operations in Sardinia 'temporibus Cyri Persarum regis'.

⁴ See Polybius, Book III, chap. 2.

⁵ See Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

⁶ See Carpenter, Rhys: *The Greeks in Spain* (Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 1925, Bryn Mawr College), pp. 31-32; Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

⁷ See Carpenter, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

⁸ See Karstedt, U.: *Geschichte der Karthager von 218-146* (Berlin 1913, Weidmann), pp. 71-73.

⁹ The exclusion of the Hellenes by Carthaginian force of arms from a once lucrative field of Phocaeen enterprise in the South-Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic was accepted by the Hellenic World as an accomplished fact with a resignation that expressed itself in a symbolic usage of the phrase 'Pillars of Hercules' to signify the limit of what was attainable by human endeavour. By Pindar's day this piece of symbolism had already become proverbial, though Pindar (*vivebat circa* 522-450 B.C.) had been born before the erection of the Carthaginian 'wooden curtain' had been completed. The third of Pindar's Olympian Odes—written to celebrate a victory gained at the Olympian Games in 476 B.C. by Thérôn, the despot of Akragas, who had shared with Hiero of Syracuse the distinction of defeating the Carthaginian attempt to conquer Sicily in 480 B.C.—ends with the celebrated words: 'And now Thérôn in his achievements has arrived at the limit. He has completed the long voyage from his home port

Roman arms in a struggle that took two generations (*gerebatur* 263-201 B.C.) to reach its final decision.

A simultaneous Etruscan endeavour to harvest the fruits of the Battle of Alalia by making an Etruscan *mare clausum* out of the Tyrrhene Sea was not carried to a similarly successful conclusion. An Etruscan attempt to conquer the Hellenes' Campanian outpost, Cumae, was defeated in 524 B.C.; and, though the Etruscans nevertheless managed to retain a footing in Campania thereafter, their prospects of asserting their hegemony south of the Tiber were blighted by Rome's successful revolt against an Etruscan domination *circa* 508 B.C. Yet, even so, the total setback suffered by the Hellenes in the Western Mediterranean in the course of the generation following the Battle of Alalia was severe, and the disastrous failure of a last attempt to turn the tide again compelled them to recognize the hard fact that Carthaginian statesmanship had brought their westward advance to a halt against an insurmountable military barrier. When the Spartan King Cleomenes I's brother Dorieus tried, *circa* 514-512 B.C.,¹ to emulate in Africa the achievement of the founders of Selinûs and Akragas in Sicily by extending the belt of continuous Hellenic settlement from Cyrenaica into Tripolitania on the threshold of the cluster of Libyphoenician communities in Tunisia, the Carthaginians turned this Hellenic interloper out; and, when, *circa* 511-508 B.C., Dorieus tried, as an alternative, to emulate the Cnidian Pentathlus's supremely provocative attempt to wrest the western tip of Sicily out of the hands of the Carthaginians and their local Phoenician and Elymian subjects by establishing a Greek settlement at Eryx, the Spartan adventurer met his Cnidian predecessor's fate.²

Thus, before the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., the expansion of the Hellenic World had been arrested in all directions by political combinations on the grand scale between the threatened members of competing societies; and it might now have been expected that the hitherto mobile eastern and western frontiers between an Hellenic and a Syriac World would settle down along the lines that Achaemenian and Carthaginian empire-builders had so firmly drawn. There seemed no reason why the former victims of Hellenic aggression should not remain content with their decisive success in bringing this aggression to a halt, or why the Hellenes, on their side, should not succeed in adapting themselves to this adverse change in their political fortunes by carrying through an economic revolution towards which a sixth-century Athens

to the Pillars of Hercules. What lies beyond is out of reach for sage and fool alike, and I am not the man to commit the folly of seeking to attain the unattainable.'

This despondent Hellenic *Ne plus ultra* was, of course, much to the taste of the Carthaginians, whom it left in unchallenged possession of their exclusive commercial empire. After the Carthaginian monopoly of 'the barred zone' had been finally broken by the Romans through their victory in the Hannibalic War, seventeen more centuries were to pass before a Western Christendom, at the dawn of the Modern Age of its history, was to cap the Phocaean explorer Colaeus's feat of discovering Tarshish by making the transit of the Atlantic from Tarshish to the Antilles. This discovery of a New World, by which Modern Western Man was so lavishly rewarded for his audacity in defying a Pindaric veto, was characteristically commemorated by the minting of Spanish coins displaying the two Pillars of Hercules crossed by a scroll on which the exultant counter-motto *Plus Ultra* was defiantly inscribed; and this image and superscription ultimately gave birth to the United States dollar sign \$ (see XII. ix. 643, with n. 3).

¹ See Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

² See *ibid.*, p. 354.

had already shown the way by deliberately changing over from an 'extensive' economy of mixed farming for subsistence to an 'intensive' economy of specialized production for exchange against imports of raw materials and foodstuffs. A solution for the general Hellenic problem of pressure of population that had been worked out locally in one Hellenic city-state, which had happened to let slip her opportunity of joining in the seventh-century race for virgin lands to colonize overseas, offered an opportune means of economic salvation for a Hellas whose geographical expansion had been arrested in the course of the sixth century B.C. by the success of her rivals' political counter-measures.¹

The Achaemenian Empire's Counter-Offensive

Evidently there were elements in the situation at the close of the sixth century B.C. on both sides that told in favour of a stabilization of the equilibrium between Hellenic and Syriac forces in which a sixth-century struggle between the two societies had resulted; yet, in the event, this equilibrium was upset almost as soon as the fifth century B.C. had entered on its course. How was the historian to account for this surprisingly unhappy denouement? An Hellenic student of human affairs would have found the cause of the calamity in some act of hybris, and a Modern Western inquirer might accept this Hellenic explanation in terms of Human Nature without leaving out of account the contributory effect of a fatality in the geographical setting of this tragedy.

The human cause of the renewal of the conflict between the Hellenes and their neighbours in the fifth century B.C. was an error in Achaemenian statesmanship; and this error was a miscalculation into which empire-builders are prone to fall when they have made sensationally wide and rapid conquests over populations that have proved easy game because their spirit has already been broken by previous harrowing experiences. In such circumstances the successful empire-builders are apt to attribute their success entirely to their own prowess, without recognizing their debt to forerunners whose ruthless ploughshares have broken the soil before the eventual empire-builders' arrival on the scene to reap their easy harvest; and an overweening self-confidence bred by this mistaken belief in their own invincibility then leads the successful empire-builders on to court disaster by rashly attacking still unbroken peoples whose spirit and capacity for resistance take them by surprise. This is the story of the disaster suffered in Afghanistan in A.D. 1838-42² by British conquerors of the derelict domain of a broken-down Mughal Rāj in India who had light-heartedly assumed that the unscathed highlanders of Eastern Iran would submit to them as tamely as the stricken population of a sub-continent whose demoralizing experience of five centuries of alien rule had been crowned by the agony of a century of anarchy.³ The same unpleasant surprise awaited Alexander the Great when, after his swift and easy conquest of the passive main body of the Achaemenian Empire west of the Caspian Gates, he set himself to subjugate the barons

¹ See I. i. 24-25; II. ii. 38-42; and III. iii. 122; IV. iv. 200-14; IX. xi. 387.

² This British disaster in Afghanistan has been touched upon on pp. 220 and 231, above.

³ See xi, maps 44, 45, 52, 52A, 53.

of Khurāsān and Transoxania, whose spirit had been kept alive by their active service as wardens of the Syriac World's north-eastern marches over against the Eurasian Steppe.¹

The winning of the voluntary allegiance of these spirited Iranian marchmen was the one great political achievement of the Achaemenian empire-builders outside the limits of the broad field within which the ground had been prepared for them by the ruthlessness of their Assyrian forerunners; and here too the Achaemenidae were assisted in their political task by local anxieties springing from painful recollections. The sedentary Iranian peoples to the north-east of the Caspian Gates had felt the full fury of a Cimmerian and Scythian Eurasian Nomad storm which had broken over South-West Asia at the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. in waves of invasion that had flowed on as far westward as Lydia and Palestine. The Iranian, like the Phoenician, marchmen of the Achaemenian Empire appreciated the support that they stood to gain from membership in this gigantic oecumenical polity for the waging of their perpetual warfare against their traditional enemies.² But, when Cyrus pushed on beyond 'the Sown' into 'the Desert' to attack the formidable Central Asian Nomads on their own ground, these Massagetae inflicted on him a disaster that cost him his life; and his third successor Darius was lucky to escape with his life when, some seventeen years later,³ he essayed the rather less hopeless task of bringing to heel a Scythian Nomad adversary whose freedom of manoeuvre was limited by the relatively narrow confines of the Scythians' domain in the Steppe's Great Western Bay. Cyrus's first successor, Cambyses, brought a similar catastrophe on himself when he tried to round off his facile conquest of an Asshur-haunted Egypt by invading an unscathed Ethiopia; but the supreme Achaemenian miscalculation was made by Darius and his successor Xerxes when they attempted to conquer an Hellenic World which Cyrus had been content to contain within what looked at first sight like 'a natural frontier'.⁴

Probably Cyrus had imagined that he was bequeathing to his successors a definitive north-west frontier when he had completed his conquest of the Lydian dominions by subjugating the Asiatic Greek communities that had previously acknowledged Lydia's suzerainty. Yet Apollo's warning to King Croesus of Lydia that, if he crossed the River Halys, he would destroy a Great Power⁵ might have been addressed to Croesus's conqueror Cyrus with no less prescience on a rather longer view; for, in conquering the Lydian Empire, Cyrus was unwittingly bequeathing to his successors an entanglement with the Hellenic World which was eventually to be the death of the Achaemenian Empire.

¹ See II. ii. 140.

² See II. ii. 138. In a year of insurrection (522-521 B.C.) in which most of the peoples between the Caspian Gates and the Euphrates attempted to throw off a not very onerous Achaemenian yoke, the Bactrian marchmen did not succumb to the temptation.

³ Cyrus's campaign against the Massagetae is dated 530 B.C., and Darius's campaign against the Scyths 513 B.C., by A. T. Olmstead: *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), pp. 87 and 147-8.

⁴ The psychological limit to Achaemenian annexations that was set by the physical limits of previous Assyrian and Eurasian Nomad ravages has been noticed in VI. vii. 684-5.

⁵ Herodotus, Book I, chap. 53.

The Achaemenids' Assyrian predecessors, who had been so recklessly aggressive in other quarters,¹ had refrained from trying to carry their north-westward advance beyond the south-eastern fringe of the central desert of Anatolia; and this was not only a genuine natural frontier; it was also a cultural watershed dividing East Anatolian survivors of a broken-down Hittite Civilization over whom the Assyrians had extended their rule² from West Anatolian backwoodsmen of an Hellenic World³ which was still in the full vigour of its youth. This Central Anatolian line of demarcation between two diverse worlds had, however, been overrun during the death agonies of Assyria by barbarian Völkerwanderungen in both directions. An eastward-travelling wave of Phrygian barbarians from a no-man's-land between the Assyrian Empire and Lydia had surged up the Halys Valley into the upper basin of the Euphrates to break against the Dersim⁴ Highlands and wash round their south-western foot-hills into the upper basin of the Tigris,⁵ while a westward-travelling wave of Cimmerian and Scythian Nomad invaders from the Eurasian Steppe had burst through the Caspian Gates

¹ See IV. iv. 476-80.

² While there seems to be no doubt that the south-eastern edge of the Central Anatolian Desert constituted the north-west frontier of the Assyrian Empire in the sector between the Taurus and the Halys, there is some uncertainty about the extent of the Assyrian dominions towards the north. According to E. Forrer: *Die Provinzenteilung des Assyrischen Reiches* (Leipzig 1920, Hinrichs), pp. 74 and 77, the principality of Kammanu—which appears to correspond to the Hellenic geographers' Southern Comana, and not to their Chamanênê (see VI. vii. 669, n. 6)—had belonged, before its annexation by Sargon in 712 B.C., to the Kasku, whom we may identify with the Gasga barbarian denizens of the wooded mountains between the Anatolian Plateau and the Black Sea coast who, in the second millennium B.C., had given such trouble to the Hittites even at the height of their power. A prince of Kasku is recorded (see Forrer, op. cit., p. 74) to have paid tribute to Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 746-727 B.C.); and this indication that Assyrian suzerainty in Eastern Anatolia may have extended northwards towards the mouths of the Halys (Qyzyl Irmâq) and the Iris (Yeshil Irmâq) is supported by the fact that the Cappadocians were called 'Syrians' by the Greeks who settled at Sinope, Amisus, and other points along this coast in and after the eighth century B.C. (see, for example, Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 72 and 76; Book III, chap. 90; Book V, chap. 49; Book VII, chap. 72). The Greek name 'Syria', like the Persian name 'Athura', originally meant simply 'the Assyrian Empire'. The Greeks called the inhabitants of the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean 'Syrians' because their country had once been under Assyrian rule, and, on this analogy, the application of the name 'White Syrians' to the inhabitants of the southern seaboard of the Black Sea would imply that Assyrian rule had once extended to this coast likewise (see VI. vii. 581).

Whether Pontic Cappadocia as well as Inland Cappadocia was or was not included in the Assyrian Empire, it is certain that the Hittite Civilization of Inland Cappadocia had long since made itself at home in Pontic Cappadocia as well by the time when Augustus's contemporary, the Hellenic geographer Strabo of Amasia, wrote his description of a country that was his homeland. This cultural reclamation of the once barbarian inhabitants of the Pontic Cappadocian country is likely to have taken place at a time when the two Cappadocias were united politically under one sovereignty; and, if they were not united in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. as provinces or dependencies of the Assyrian Empire, we may conjecture that the radiation of the Hittite Civilization into Pontus began under the Achaemenian régime, after Inland Cappadocia had been detached from the autonomous principality of Cilicia (of which this Inland Cappadocia was the original nucleus) and had been united with Pontic Cappadocia to form a single Cappadocian viceroyalty (see VI. vii. 674).

³ The focus of the Hellenic Civilization was the basin of the Aegean Sea, and the radiation of Hellenism grew progressively fainter at each successive farther remove from the Aegean coast of the continent into the interior on both the Asiatic and the European side. An eighth-century traveller from Phocaea or Smyrna up the valley of the Hermus would have found the light dwindling in Lydia and fading out in Phrygia, as a contemporary traveller from Olynthus or Methônê up the valley of the Axios would have found it gradually diminishing as he passed through Macedonia and Paeonia into Dardania.

⁴ *Gracê* Dêrxênê or Xêrxênê (see VI. vii. 666).

⁵ See VI. vii. 604-5.

and broken into Anatolia from Azerbaijan by travelling up the Araxes and down the Halys.¹

This double deluge of Barbarism had obliterated the old Anatolian landmarks, and the two Powers, Lydia and Media, which had then risen to greatness by sharing the honour of bringing the turbulent flood waters under control, had fallen into conflict with one another over the division between them of Anatolian territories that they had delivered from a barbarian domination. An inconclusive contest had ended in 585 B.C. in a partition of the peninsula along the line of the Lower Halys;² and, after Croesus had been tempted by the news of Media's fall to upset this Medo-Lyidian settlement by crossing the Halys in order to lay hands on formerly Median territory in North-Eastern Anatolia, which Cyrus regarded as being his own lawful property by right of his claim to be his deposed grandfather King Cyaxares of Media's legitimate successor, the Persian empire-builder sought to solve an Anatolian frontier problem which he had inherited from his Median predecessors by a wholesale annexation of the Lydian Empire and its dependencies that carried the north-west frontier of the Achaemenian Empire forward from the east bank of the River Halys to the eastern shores of the Black Sea Straits and the Aegean Sea.

If, in making this sweeping westward advance, Cyrus imagined that he was replacing an artificial frontier by a natural one, he was acting under a misapprehension which was mercilessly exposed by the sequel; for the salt sea—which had once poured in to isolate an 'Asia' from a 'Europe' when the God Poseidon's dramatic trident-stroke had cleft an originally unbroken continent in twain from the mouths of the Aegean Sea to the head of the Sea of Azov—had, by Cyrus's day, long since ceased to be 'estranging'.³ An element whose challenging inroad had stimulated primitive pioneers in the art of seamanship to become the creators of the Minoan Civilization⁴ had lost its primeval terrors for post-Minoan Hellenic mariners who had ventured out of a land-locked Aegean into the Mediterranean and on out of the Mediterranean into the Atlantic. For the Hellenes of the sixth century B.C., the once estranging Aegean had become a 'tunny pond' linking, instead of sundering, the 'Asiatic' and 'European' halves of Hellas as, in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the 'European' and 'American' halves of a Modern Western World were linked together by a 'herring pond' which had once been an impassable gulf. And even the island-studded Aegean, with its chain of submerged mountains lifting their peaks above sea-level to offer a timid wayfarer alternative rows of stepping stones, was not so easy for landmen to cross as the river-like straits at the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles.

Cyrus's third successor Darius had no sooner completed his re-

¹ See VI. vii. 606-10 and 675-6.

² The river line which thus served as a political frontier from 585 to 547 B.C. was to play the same role again some eighteen or nineteen centuries later when, from circa A.D. 1243 to circa A.D. 1335, it formed the frontier between the Mongol Il-Khans of Iran and 'Iraq and their vassals the Saljūq Sultans of Rūm and these Saljūqs' local successors.

³ See the lines from Matthew Arnold's poem *Isolation*, quoted in II. i. 326.

⁴ See the lines from Horace's *Odes*, Book I, Ode 3, quoted in II. i. 327.

organization of the Achaemenian Empire after the Year of Insurrection than he took the short step from the Continental Asiatic Greek headland of Mycalé on to the adjacent island of Samos;¹ and, after that, he threw a bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, as easily as across the Danube, in laying his line of communications for his campaign against the Scyths in 513 B.C. The ill-success of this excursion into the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe did not deter Darius from enlarging his foothold on the European side of the Straits next year, when he extended his suzerainty westward as far as Mount Olympus. In the same year 512 B.C. his viceroy in Egypt encroached on the Hellenic World from another quarter by annexing Cyrenaica. In 510-505 B.C.² Achaemenian diplomacy made an attempt to cast its imperial net over Athens, and in 500 B.C. the emperor's viceroy in Lydia made an abortive expedition against the Aegean island of Naxos. It might almost have seemed as if Darius were annexing the Hellenic World in a fit of absentmindedness if there had not been a hint of something more like a grand design in his dispatch of a reconnoitring expedition as far afield as Magna Graecia³ even before his occupation of Samos, and in the interest that he showed (if Herodotus is to be believed)⁴ in a scheme for the occupation of Sardinia that was dangled before him by the Milesian adventurer Histiaeus. However that may be, Darius made no secret of his resolve to extinguish what remained of Hellenic independence after the year 499 B.C., when the dispatch of a naval expeditionary force by a still independent Athens and a still independent Eretria had given the signal for an insurrection of the Achaemenian Empire's Hellenic subjects which spread from the west coast of Anatolia to the Bosphorus in one direction and to Cyprus in the other.⁵

Though the immediate occasion of this formidable outbreak had been a personal quarrel between the Persian and the Greek commander of the abortive naval expedition against Naxos in the preceding year, the underlying cause was the irksomeness of even the easy-going Achaemenian régime to an Asiatic maritime people who, unlike the Ionians' unsuccessful Syrophenician competitors for the economic dominion of the Mediterranean, had never had their spirit broken on the chariot-wheel of Assyrian militarism. Sober reason should have reminded Darius that, though the Continental Asiatic Hellenes had not been crushed by the Assyrians, they had at any rate been partially broken in to political servitude by their previous experience of a Lydian suzerainty which had never been imposed on their European kinsmen, and that in his own day these rebellious Ionian subjects of his were the least warlike of all contemporary Hellenes. If a subject Ionia had nevertheless proved to

¹ See Herodotus, Book III, chap. 139.

² See Olmstead, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-2.

³ See the story of Darius's Crotoniate Greek physician Democédès in Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 129-38.

⁴ See Herodotus, Book V, chap. 106, and Book VI, chap. 2.

⁵ The revolt was not confined to Asiatic Hellenes whose mother tongue happened to be Greek. The non-Greek-speaking Carian insurgents gave the Persians more trouble than all their Greek-speaking comrades-in-arms (Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 117-21). On the other hand the Cypriots, whose mother tongue was Greek but who were not yet more than semi-Hellenic in their culture, were reconquered by the Persians with comparative ease (Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 108-16).

be a hornet's nest, an Achaemenian empire-builder could not reasonably expect to make an easy conquest of other Hellenic peoples who had never yet lost their independence; but Reason was eclipsed by Anger in the soul of an emperor who had taken the provocation offered him in 499 B.C. as an unpardonable defiance of his pretensions to world-dominion; the eclipse of Reason left the blinded autocrat at the mercy of Hybris; and Hybris betrayed him into the fatal decision to resort to his predecessor Cyrus's dubious policy of cutting his way out of an exasperating geographical entanglement.

Cyrus had got rid of an unsatisfactory river-frontier with Lydia by extending his dominion over the domain of the Lydian Empire; Darius would get rid of an unsatisfactory sea-frontier with an independent remnant of Hellas by bringing the whole of Hellas, in her turn, under his oecumenical sovereignty. After the last embers of Hellenic revolt in Asia had been stamped out in 493 B.C., Darius immediately started operations against Hellas-in-Europe. The year 492 B.C. saw Mardonius's abortive expedition against Continental European Greece along the north shore of the Aegean; the year 490 B.C. saw Datis' and Artaphernes' likewise abortive expedition across the Aegean to Marathon. Thereafter Darius's energies were diverted, for the rest of his life, to the task of suppressing a revolt in Egypt; but the reverses of 492 and 490 B.C. did not move him to reconsider his designs against Hellas; he bequeathed them, unabated, to his successor Xerxes; and Xerxes' dutiful execution of his father's political testament led him into the historic disasters of 480-479 B.C. at Salamis, Plataea, and Mycalé.

The Aftermath on the Political Plane

In retorting to the revolt of his Hellenic subjects in Asia by resolving to conquer their kinsmen and accomplices in Europe, Darius had converted a seven-years-long insurrection (*flagrabit* 499-493 B.C.) into a fifty-one-years-long war (*gerebatur* 499-449 B.C.); for the trial of strength with a still independent Hellas to which Darius had committed the Achaemenian Empire did not end with the failure in 479 B.C. of Xerxes' invasion of Europe. Before peace could be restored the Achaemenidae had to reconcile themselves to the loss of the western seaboard of Anatolia from Lycia to the Bosphorus inclusive, in addition to the loss of their Transhellespontine outposts in Europe, while the Athenians had to recognize their inability permanently to detach Pamphylia, Cyprus, and Egypt as well from the Achaemenian Empire. These disillusioning experiences on both sides did at last beget a peace settlement which was as statesmanlike in its objective of re-establishing peace on terms that would not prove intolerable for either party as it was ingenious in translating this enlightened aim into practical provisions for bilateral demilitarization;¹ and for a few years after the negotiation of the

¹ A masterly elucidation of the terms of the Atheno-Achaemenian peace settlement of 450/449 B.C. by H. T. Wade-Gery will be found in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, special volume: 'Athenian Studies Presented to William Scott Ferguson' (Cambridge, Mass. 1940, Harvard University Press), pp. 121-56. A cynic might point out that the high contracting parties came to terms with one another at the expense of the Asiatic Hellenes whose aspirations to political independence had been the original cause

Athens-Achaemenian treaty of 450/449 B.C. it looked as if this act of statesmanship might have succeeded in restoring a general equilibrium between the Syriac and Hellenic worlds that had been momentarily attained towards the close of the sixth century B.C., after the Carthaginians had finished rounding off their empire and before Darius had begun to extend the bounds of his.

The destruction of this sixth-century equilibrium in the Aegean and the Levant through the outbreak of the Hellenic-Persian War of 499-449 B.C. had been followed by corresponding upheavals in the Western Mediterranean. A Carthaginian attack on the Hellenes in Sicily which had been delivered in the year of Xerxes' attack on Continental European Greece¹ had ended there in an even greater catastrophe for the aggressor; and Hiero's victory over the Carthaginians had set his hands free to inflict an equally signal defeat on the Etruscans when, six years later, these allies of Carthage belatedly delivered a fresh attack on the Campanian outpost of the Hellenic World at Cumae.² Thus in the Western Mediterranean peace had been restored a quarter of a century before its restoration in the Levant in 449 B.C. But an equilibrium that had eventually been re-established in all quarters was upset once again before the fifth century had run its course, and this time the disturbing factor was not any fresh Persian or Carthaginian act of aggression against Hellas, but the outbreak in 431 B.C. of a fratricidal war between Hellene and Hellene which spelled the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization.³

This warfare within the bosom of the Hellenic Society, which dragged on from 431 B.C. until a settlement was dictated in 338 B.C. to the city-states of Continental European Hellas by King Philip of Macedon, upset the equilibrium between the Hellenic World and its neighbours in divers ways.

In the first place it presented both the Carthaginians and the Achaemenidae with an irresistible temptation to take advantage of their Hellenic rivals' apparently suicidal mania. After the crippling of the power of Athens through the disaster that overtook the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily in 413 B.C., the Carthaginians broke a seventy-years-long truce with their independent Hellenic neighbours by trying their hand in 409-406 B.C. at a conquest of the whole of Sicily, including Syracuse, which the Athenians had just failed to achieve, while the Achaemenidae began to take cautious steps for the recovery of the Asiatic Greek territories which they had lost in 479 B.C. and had been compelled to renounce thirty years later. In this new counter-offensive the Carthaginians were less successful than the Persians. In Sicily after the Carthaginian breach of the peace in 409 B.C. the struggle swayed to of the war. So far from leaving the Asiatic Hellenes independent, the treaty of 450/449 B.C. appears to have left them defenceless against their former masters the Achaemenidae as well as against their present masters the Athenians by providing for the dismantling of their fortifications.

¹ The scanty surviving evidence leaves it an open question whether these two simultaneous attacks on the Hellenic World in 480 B.C. were concerted, or whether their simultaneity was fortuitous.

² For the previous attack in 524 B.C., see p. 429, above.

³ There was a relation of historical effect and cause between the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization in 431 B.C. and the successful repulse of Xerxes' attack on Hellas in 480-479 B.C. (see pp. 522-5, below).

and for 168 years, during which the Carthaginians always just failed to take Syracuse and the Hellenes to take Lilybaeum, till the Carthaginian wooden curtain across the south-western quarter of the Mediterranean was battered in by Roman rams in the first Romano-Punic War (*gerebatur* 263-241 B.C.). In the Aegean and the Levant, on the other hand, the Achaemenian Imperial Government had the satisfaction in 386 B.C. of dictating to the warring states of Continental European Greece 'the Emperor's Peace' in a communiqué announcing that His Imperial Majesty Artaxerxes II was vindicating the historic rights of his house by resuming possession of all Hellenic territories on the Asiatic mainland, together with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus.

At that moment the Achaemenian Empire might have been thought to have achieved by diplomacy all that Darius the Great had dreamed of achieving by force, for the communiqué went on to decree that all other Hellenic communities except the ancient Athenian possessions of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros were to have their independence restored to them by the fiat of the Imperial Court at Susa. Appearances, however, were deceptive; for another effect of the long-drawn-out fratricidal warfare in Hellas was to make the Hellenes past masters in the art of war at the cost of ruining everything that had once made Hellenic life worth living; and the Achaemenian and Carthaginian empires were swept away as soon as the new Hellenic weapons forged at this prohibitive price were turned by Macedonian and Roman war-lords against the Hellenic World's hereditary enemies.¹

The Aftermath on the Cultural Plane

Thus the military and political aggression of the Hellenic Society against its neighbours, which the victims of it had succeeded in arresting in the sixth century B.C., was resumed in and after the fourth century B.C. in a wider arena which has already been surveyed in an earlier chapter;² but there was also a cultural plane of action on which enduring pacific conquests were made by the Hellenic Civilization before, as well as after, the generation of Alexander the Great.

The natives of Sicily, who did their utmost to resist by force of arms the interloping Greek colonists' aggressive attempts to evict or subjugate them, were at the same time voluntarily adopting the language, religion, and art of their Greek assailants.³ The never conquered Elymi, as well as the Sican subjects of Akragas and Sicel subjects of Syracuse, took to speaking Greek, calling their hereditary divinities by Hellenic names, and honouring them by building them temples in the Hellenic style of architecture. A notable Sicel convert to the Hellenic culture was Ducetius, the defeated patriot leader in the Sicels' last stand against Syracusan imperialism.⁴ Even in the 'barred zone' behind a Carthaginian 'wooden curtain', where no Hellenic ships might sail nor Hellenic merchants set foot on land to do business direct with the Carthaginians' African and Iberian native subjects, the militant Carthaginian middle-

¹ See III. iii. 150, and p. 409, above.

² On pp. 403-18, above.

³ See, for example, Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, pp. 177, 191-3, and 334-5.

⁴ See V. vi. 235-6, and p. 587, below.

man, who exploited a monopoly won through force of arms by pocketing as large a share of the commercial profits as the trade would bear, found himself constrained to eke out his own Punic poverty of creative power and artistic sensibility by importing the attractive manufactures of the independent Hellenic communities in Sicily to supply the economic demand of the Carthaginian Empire and its vast commercial hinterland; and, however successful the Libyphoenician might be as a business man in fleeing both the natives and the Hellenes between whom he had forcibly interposed himself, it was beyond his power—and no doubt equally beyond the range of his imagination—to think of preventing the native peoples under his control from being influenced by the artistry of Hellenic wares which the Punic importer was compelled to peddle because his own industries were incapable of emulating them.

An Hellenic culture, whose radiation thus triumphantly succeeded in penetrating 'the wooden curtain' that screened the Carthaginian Empire, made relatively easy conquests in a contemporary Achaemenian Empire where the régime was much less restrictive and the population much more cultivated. The Hellenization of Lydia, which had been given an impetus by the incorporation of the Continental Asiatic Hellenes into the Lydian Empire in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., had gone so far by 401 B.C.—sixty-seven years before Alexander's crossing of the Dardanelles—that in that year a Lydian, who, by assuming a Boeotian accent, had successfully passed himself off as a Hellene in order to enlist in an expeditionary force of Hellenic soldiers of fortune, was able to sustain his part so well that he might have remained undetected by his comrades-in-arms if his pierced ears had not eventually betrayed him to Hellenic eyes sharpened by danger;¹ and between the turn of the century and 334 B.C. the Syrophoenicians capitulated on the cultural plane to the Hellenic style of art, though the persistence on the economic and political planes of their hostility to their hereditary enemy was to be demonstrated in 332 B.C. by the desperate military resistance which Alexander was to encounter at Tyre. But a pre-Alexandrine Hellenism's most fruitful cultural conquests were not made in either of the two great Syriac empires whose establishment in the sixth century B.C. had arrested the Hellenic World's military, political, and commercial expansion. The historic event in the propagation of Hellenism in this age was the Hellenization of the Etruscans and other originally non-Hellenic peoples on the western seaboard of Italy.

The Etruscans had no sooner settled in Italy than they began to be appreciably affected by the culture of an Hellenic World which lay between this transmarine Etruria and an Anatolian homeland with which the colonial Etruscans must soon have lost touch—to judge by the absence of any convincing indication of their place of origin in those echoes of a colonial Etruscan tradition which the historian's ear could catch in the surviving works of Hellenic antiquarians. After the military struggle between Etruscans and Hellenes for the command of

¹ See Xenophon, *Expeditio Cyri*, Book III, chap. i, §§ 26–32. Already in 480 B.C. the equipment of the Lydian contingent in Xerxes' expeditionary force had been almost identical with the Hellenic equipment of the day (Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 74).

the Tyrrhene Sea had ended on a basis of *uti possidetis* as a result of the Etruscans' naval defeat off Cumae in 474 B.C., the reception of the Hellenic culture in Etruria was so catholic and so rapid that the Etruscans had become Hellenes by adoption before they fell under the rule of Roman empire-builders who acquired much of their own Hellenism at second hand from their Etruscan neighbours and eventual subjects.¹

The Hellenization of Rome—in the first instance perhaps mainly through Etruscan intermediaries and latterly also through a direct intercourse, of ever increasing intimacy, between Romans and Greeks—was, of course, the most important cultural conquest that the Hellenes ever achieved at any stage of their history either before or after the generation of Alexander; for the Romans, whatever their origin,² took up a task which had proved to be beyond the power of the Etruscan settlers on the West Italian coast to the north of them and the Greek settlers on the West Italian coast to the south of them and the Massilian pioneers of Hellenism at the mouth of the Rhône. After the Italic Greeks had succumbed to an Oscan and the Etruscans to a Celtic barbarian counter-offensive, the Romans carried a Latinized Hellenism into the Abruzzi and over the Appennines and the Po and the Alps till they had planted it right across the Continental European hinterland of the Mediterranean, from the delta of the Danube to the mouths of the Rhine and, across the Straits of Dover, in Britain.³

3. *Encounters with the Syriac Civilization*⁴

In the sinister history of Assyrian militarism the principal episode, as we have already observed, was a domestic conflict between the Assyrian march and the Babylonian interior of a Babylonian World; for this fratricidal struggle ruined the Babylonian Society before ending in a Pyrrhic victory for a short-lived Neo-Babylonian Empire.⁵ We have also observed, however, that this disastrous militarism had been generated by the grim ordeal of a life-and-death struggle which had been forced upon Assyria in the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C. by aggressive Aramaean pioneers of a nascent Syriac Civilization⁶ whose north-eastward expansion was a belated backwash from a *Völkerwanderung* precipitated by

¹ The acceleration in the process of the Hellenization of Etruria between the sixth and the fourth century B.C. is graphically recorded in the wall-paintings in Etruscan tombs at Caere (Cervetri). On the other hand, in their depiction of the torments inflicted on the damned in Hell, the Etruscan painters betray an un-Hellenic vein of sadism in the Etruscan ethos which was incidentally communicated to the Roman pupils in an Etruscan school of Hellenism, and which reappears even in a latter-day Tuscan Dante's *Divina Commedia*. The origin of this sinister streak in the Etruscan tradition is a mystery. It makes the impression of being of non-Hellenic provenance (though the torments of the damned do figure in Hellenic art and legend); and it is a matter of recorded history that the institution of gladiatorial shows, which was perhaps the most atrocious of all the cruel practices that the Romans learnt from Etruscan instructors, was so abhorrent to Greek feelings that it never gained any foothold in Greek communities under Roman rule. The inference is that this Etruscan sadism was an element in the Etruscans' Anatolian heritage which was too near to the heart of their tradition for the counter-influence of Hellenism to be able to eliminate it. Yet, if the origin of Etruscan sadism may be Anatolian, it can hardly be Hittite; for, to judge by the surviving corpus of Hittite legislation, the Hittite Civilization was as humane as the Hellenic.

² See pp. 702-5, below.

³ See II. ii. 160-4 and V. v. 213-15.

⁴ See xi, maps 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 31.

⁵ See II. ii. 135-7 and IV. iv. 476-84.

⁶ See II. ii. 134-5.

the collapse of 'the New Empire' of Egypt in South-West Asia and the overthrow of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' in the Aegean. Thus a collision with an alien society had been the occasion of an Assyrian transgression that was eventually fatal to the society of which the Assyrians themselves were members. The Syriac Civilization was not the only alien society that was to cross the path of the Assyrians before these rabid Babylonian militarists had bled themselves to death. The Assyrians also bore down upon the remnants of an already broken Hittite Society astride the Taurus, and upon an Egyptian Society that had continued to survive in the Nile Valley in a petrified state after repelling 'the Sea Peoples' from the coasts of the Delta at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. But, in the history of these three encounters with a Babylonian Civilization represented first by Assyria and, after Assyria's self-annihilation, by Babylonia, the reactions of the Babylonian World's Syriac neighbours were of outstanding historical importance; and the outcome of this interplay between the Syriac and the Babylonian Civilization is an impressive illustration of the truth that 'the meek shall inherit the Earth'.¹

In a drama which opened in the tenth century B.C. with an Aramaean military offensive against Assyria, the close of this first act left the Aramaeans prostrate and the Assyrians triumphant. In the course of the ninth century B.C. the territories in Mesopotamia and the Upper Tigris Basin that had previously been overrun by Aramaean tribes were conquered by the Assyrians and converted into provinces of an Assyrian Empire. But the very thoroughness with which the subjugated Aramaeans were incorporated into an Assyrian body politic gave them an opening in the second act of the play for a peaceful penetration of the Babylonian body social which these foiled aggressors had never achieved so long as they had been on the war-path; and in this second act the Aramaeans' cultural conquest of their military conquerors proceeded *pari passu* with the extension of the Assyrians' domination over the Syriac World.

Between the accession of Tiglath-Pileser III in 746 B.C. and the annihilation of the last Assyrian army at Harrān in 610-609 B.C. an expanding Assyrian Power followed up its victory over the Aramaean peoples east of the Middle Euphrates by extending its operations to the west bank of the river and subduing all the Aramaean, Phoenician, and Hebrew communities in the homeland of the Syriac Civilization except the single Philistine city-state of Gaza and a still precariously independent Hebrew principality of Judah.² The Assyrian empire-builders sought to make their hold on their new conquests permanent by forcibly redistributing the conquered populations;³ and, although in the event this inhuman Assyrian practice failed to achieve its perpetrators' political purpose, it made its mark on History by assisting the Assyrians' victims

¹ Matt. v. 5.

² When a Judah that had just escaped falling into Assyrian hands in 700 B.C. was carried away captive in 597 and 586 B.C. by the Assyrians' Babylonian heirs, the only provinces of the Syriac World that still remained unscathed by Babylonian militarism were the Phoenicians' colonial domain in the Western basin of the Mediterranean, which was insulated by the Sea, and Arabia Felix (the Yaman), which was insulated by Arabian deserts (the Najd and the Hijāz).

³ See VI. vii. 111-12 and 114-17.

to win a cultural victory which the Assyrian aggressors had not foreseen and which the broken Syriac peoples had not sought.

The 'displaced persons' whom the Assyrians deported from a conquered Syria to their dominions east of Euphrates reinforced the previously conquered Aramaean representatives of the Syriac Civilization in Mesopotamia; this reinforcement gave an impetus to the pacific cultural encroachments which the Mesopotamian Aramaeans had already been beginning to make upon the Babylonian Civilization's domain; and, before Assyria's fall, a thus potentially intensified eastward-streaming radiation of the Syriac culture had produced signal effects that were never to be undone. By the end of the seventh century B.C. the Syriac culture had not only made a lodgement within the Babylonian body social; its influence had penetrated beyond the Babylonian World's easternmost outposts into a no-man's-land tenanted by Iranian barbarians, to compete there with the influence of the Babylonian culture itself for the conversion of these receptive barbarians' souls; and in the sixth century B.C. a third act of the play was opened by a dramatic reversal, through Iranian intervention, of the relations in which the Syriac and Babylonian societies had stood to one another since the ninth century, when the Assyrians had established their military and political ascendancy over the Aramaeans. The liquidation of the Neo-Babylonian Empire by the Achaemenid empire-builder Cyrus in 539-538 B.C. did not merely liberate the Jews and the Syrophoenicians from a Babylonian yoke; it actually raised them, as we have seen,¹ to the status of privileged partners of the new Persian masters of South-Western Asia; and this change in the Syriac peoples' political fortunes had latent cultural corollaries which revealed themselves in the sequel.

Achaemenids who, on the political plane, had sought to insure their régime against any risk of a revival of the liquidated Neo-Babylonian Empire by pursuing an anti-Babylonian policy of putting down the mighty from their seat and exalting the humble and meek² had at the same time started their imperial career on the cultural plane as still unquestioning proselytes of the Babylonian Civilization. The imperial archives at the newly created imperial residence Persepolis in Persis, as well as those at the ancient capital city Susa in Elam, were recorded, *more Babylonico*, on clay tablets in cuneiform characters in the Elamite language; and the same Babylonian script was employed in the trilingual inscriptions on imperial monuments—such as Darius I's record, on the rock at Behistan, of his acts in the Year of Insurrection—for the conveyance of all three imperial languages—Elamite for Susa, Akkadian for Babylon, and Medo-Persian for Ecbatana and Persepolis—in which these Achaemenian imperial inscriptions were presented. To convey the Iranian imperial people's previously unwritten Medo-Persian mother tongue, a special version of the cuneiform script was expressly devised.³

These early Achaemenian measures in the domain of language and writing signified a Persian reception of the Babylonian culture which the Persian heirs of the Neo-Babylonian Empire doubtless took as a matter of course; but the rival Syriac culture revealed its competitive power of

¹ On pp. 425-6, above. ² Luke i. 52. ³ See V. v. 123, n. 2, and VI. vii. 247.

counter-attraction in the no less significant Achaemenian act of state by which the Aramaic language and alphabet were given official currency in all Achaemenian territories west of the Euphrates,¹ including Egypt and Anatolia, where Aramaic was not indigenous even as a vernacular, as well as Syria, where Aramaic was already replacing a Canaanite language that had been the vernacular of Phoenicia and Judaea; and this propagation of the Aramaic language and alphabet through Persian agency among the Persians' non-Aramaean subjects in the West was the prelude to a reception of the Syriac culture in an Aramaic medium by the Persians themselves. An Iranian people that had entered on its imperial career in the sixth century B.C. under the spell of the Babylonian culture had already transferred its cultural allegiance from the Babylonian to the Syriac Civilization before the Achaemenian Empire was overthrown by Alexander. The faultiness of the later Achaemenian inscriptions in Persian cuneiform suggests that the version of a Babylonian script which the Persians had invented for their own use had never gained popular currency;² and in the post-Achaemenian Age the Iranians were writing their Middle Persian mother tongue in the Aramaic Alphabet and were even using Aramaic words written in the Aramaic Alphabet as ideograms to stand for their Iranian synonyms.³

The post-Achaemenian Age that thus saw the Syriac Society consummate its captivation of once barbarian Iranians who had taken their first lesson in civilization from Babylonian instructors was an age of Hellenic military and political ascendancy in South-West Asia and Egypt; and the same age also saw the same Syriac Society achieve the still greater triumphs of defeating the Hellenic Society in a competition for the cultural conversion of the Babylonian and Egyptian worlds, and dividing the honours with its Hellenic rival in a contemporary struggle for winning the cultural allegiance of the débris of a broken Hittite Society astride the Taurus. It was assuredly no accident that the Syriac Society's most substantial successes in the peaceful penetration of neighbouring worlds should have been gained after the fall of an Achaemenian Power which had patronized the Syriac culture because it had been the political patron of the Syriac peoples. The antagonism which the Achaemenian régime had evoked in Babylonian and Egyptian souls had checked the spontaneous reception of the Syriac culture in these two worlds more effectively than the Achaemenian Government's official patronage could ever promote it; and, when this compromising political association was brought to an end by the liquidation of the Achaemenian Empire, the Syriac Civilization found its opportunities for cultural conquest enhanced under an Hellenic political régime which did not show its Syriac subjects any embarrassing favours.

The victory of the Syriac over the Hellenic culture in Babylonia under a post-Achaemenian Hellenic régime was notable because, of all the Achaemenids' former subjects, the Babylonians were the most readily inclined to welcome their new Hellenic rulers as deliverers from an odious Achaemenian yoke.⁴ Yet, under a philobabylonian Seleucid

¹ See V. v. 123, n. 2, and 499, and VI. vii. 248-9.

² See I. i. 80 and 81, n. 3.

³ See V. v. 123, n. 2.

⁴ See V. v. 94 and 347.

régime, a handful of Babylonian scholars and astronomers who fraternized with their Greek confrères in a joint pursuit of esoteric common intellectual interests weighed as dust in the balance against the tens and hundreds of thousands of their compatriots who were taking to speaking Aramaic instead of Akkadian and writing, if literate, in the Alphabet instead of in cuneiform. This eviction of the native Babylonian script and language by more convenient Aramaic substitutes for them was a process which had begun in the Babylonian World in the days of the Assyrian Empire;¹ and it was completed by the simultaneous extinction of cuneiform and Akkadian in the first century of the Christian Era, under the rule of the Seleucids' barbarian Arsacid successors.²

In Assyria and Babylonia, as in Palestine and Phoenicia, the spread of the Aramaic tongue—which in the Babylonian World was a carrier of the Syriac culture—was facilitated by a kinship between the intrusive language and the sister Semitic native language that it was replacing; and in Babylonia the invading Syriac culture enjoyed, after its reception in Iran, the further advantage of encircling its victim. In Egypt, on the other hand, an invading Syriac culture whose homeland was still nearer to Egypt than it was to Babylonia, and whose competition with Hellenism for the cultural conquest of Egypt was not handicapped by any Egyptian counterpart of a Babylonian philhellenism, was at the same time at a relative disadvantage in being unable to overwhelm its victim by an encircling movement and unable to coax him into conversion by offering him, as the vehicle of the new culture that he was being invited to adopt, a language that had a manifest affinity with his own. On this linguistic ground the Syriac culture's Hellenic competitor was, of course, at an equal disadvantage in Egypt; but, when we proceed with our comparison of the two rival missionary cultures' respective strengths and weaknesses in Egypt as contrasted with Babylonia, we perceive that an Egypt that was not appreciably closer than Babylonia was to Syria and Mesopotamia was within far shorter range and easier reach than Babylonia was of the homeland of Hellenism in the Aegean Basin; and we also observe that Hellenism was in a position to employ against Egypt the manœuvre of encirclement that was being employed by the Syriac culture against Babylonia, since Egypt was exposed to a convergent radiation of Hellenic influence from the rapidly Hellenized city-states of Philistia on the east as well as from the colonial Greek city-states of Cyrenaica on her western flank.

The militant Egyptian reaction against Hellenic rule which declared itself at the turn of the third and second centuries B.C. retarded the Hellenization of Egypt without benefiting Hellenism's Syriac rival, since the xenophobia that had come to be the dominant vein in the Egyptian ethos by that date was too rabid to draw nice distinctions between the peculiar horrors of Phoenician, Jewish, and Greek pariahs; and, when in the third century of the Christian Era the native body social of an Egypt under Roman rule had been superficially assimilated to a genuinely Greek Alexandria and Ptolemais by being given a veneer

¹ See I. i. 79.

² See p. 125, n. 3, correcting I. i. 79-80 and II. ii. 138.

of what purported to be Hellenic municipal institutions,¹ it might have seemed as if, whatever the ultimate destinies of Hellenism in Egypt might be, Hellenism's Syriac competitor, at any rate, was now here out of the running. Nor were these prospects materially changed by the contemporary conversion of Egypt to Christianity; for the oecumenical Catholicism that was the original form in which an Hellenic-Syriac higher religion was received in Egypt was conveyed in the media of the Greek language and Hellenic philosophy. The victory in Egypt which was eventually gained over Hellenism after all by a Syriac Civilization whose prospects had long since apparently dwindled to vanishing-point was the consequence of a common movement in the Egyptiac and Syriac worlds to declare their independence of Hellenism in the arena of Christian theological controversy by seceding from a Hellenizing Catholic Church to a Monophysitism which could be made the symbol and instrument of an anti-Hellenic reversion to the traditions of a native culture.

This movement started in Egypt when the stubbornly un-Hellenized and covertly anti-Hellenic rural mass of the Egyptian people ran away with a Monophysitism that had first been conceived in the polemical minds of Alexandrian Greek clerics as an incident in a theological warfare between Alexandria and Constantinople which was a reflection of the rivalry between these two competing focuses of a Christian Hellenic culture. Before the close of the fifth century of the Christian Era the native Egyptians had converted this family quarrel within the bosom of the Hellenic World into a new expression of the Egyptiac World's seven-hundred-years-old quarrel with a domineering Hellenism. But in the fifth century of the Christian Era, as in the seventh century B.C., a petrified Egyptiac Society lacked the strength to evict an alien oppressor without the support of an alien ally; and this indispensable alien aid, which the Saïte Pharaohs had obtained by enlisting the military services of Ionian and Carian 'Brazen men from the Sea', was found by the fifth-century Egyptian fathers of a Coptic Monophysite Church in an ecclesiastical alliance with Syriac fellow Monophysites in the Asiatic dominions of the Roman Empire south-east of the Amanus Range.

This fraternization between a submerged Syriac and a submerged Egyptiac Society on the religious basis of a common Monophysitism confronted a moribund Hellenic 'ascendancy' with a mass-opposition in its Oriental dominions which it failed either to repress or to appease; and the sixth-century Syrian champion of Monophysitism, Ya'qūb bar Addai, had virtually undone the Hellenizing work of Alexander the Great and his Macedonian and Roman successors before the seventh-century Muslim Arab barbarian invaders gave the Roman imperial régime in Syria and Egypt its *coup de grâce*. In thus shaking itself free at last from a long endured Hellenic yoke the Egyptiac Society was not, however, recovering its ancient cultural independence; it was escaping from a superficial Hellenization at the price of allowing itself to be absorbed into the body social of a Syriac Civilization that was no less alien to it than the Hellenic; and the Egyptiac World did not elude its fate by eschewing the reception of the latter-day Syriac versions of an

¹ See VI. vii. 50, and p. 408, above, and p. 586, below.

Aramaic language and alphabet that had been the Syriac Society's instruments for picking Babylonian locks. The Egyptians used their own living vernacular language as their literary vehicle for a Monophysite Christian liturgy and theology, and they took the Greek and not the Syriac Alphabet as the basis for the new script that they invented to convey their new Coptic ecclesiastical language; but the Syriac Civilization needed no linguistic key to open the door into an Egyptian World which was now associated with the Syriac Society by the intimate fellowship of sharing a common Monophysite faith that was menaced by a common 'Melchite' Hellenic adversary. The Egyptian Society had already merged its long jealously preserved identity in the Syriac body social before the Roman régime in Egypt was liquidated by the Arabs; and this captivation of Egypt by the Syriac culture which the Monophysite movement had brought about was already complete before a majority of the people of Egypt underwent a further religious conversion from Monophysite Christianity to Islam and exchanged their ancestral Coptic mother tongue for Arabic.¹

In the competition between the Syriac and Hellenic societies for the assimilation of the debris of a ruined Hittite Society astride the Taurus, a partition of the prize was dictated by Geography. An Achaemenian fiat could not avail to give the Aramaic language any effective currency in the former domain of the Lydian Empire in Western Anatolia, which was within point-blank range of the radiation of the Hellenic culture from its Aegean focus; and even in Cappadocia, where a convergent Hellenic radiation from Sinope and Ephesus was countered by the proximity of an Aramaic-speaking Syria and Mesopotamia and by the introduction, under the Achaemenian régime, of an Iranian feudal aristocracy and a Zoroastrian clergy, the final victory of Hellenism was demonstrated, as we have seen,² by the Hellenism of the fourth-century Cappadocian Fathers of the Orthodox Church. South of Taurus on the other hand—or at any rate east of Amanus, in Northern Syria—the absorption of the local Hittite communities into a Syriac body social was

¹ In Syria, Mesopotamia, and 'Irāq, where at the time of the Arab conquest the current vernacular and literary language was the derivative of Aramaic known as Syriac, the Arabic language in and after the seventh century of the Christian Era enjoyed the same advantage as had been enjoyed by the Aramaic language in its own antecedent conquest of 'the Fertile Crescent'. The transition from a Semitic Syriac to a likewise Semitic Arabic was as easy as the transition to a Semitic Aramaic from a likewise Semitic Canaanite and Akkadian. A Syriac-speaking 'Fertile Crescent' had, however, like a Coptic-speaking Egypt, already shaken itself free from Hellenism by embracing the anti-Hellenic Nestorian and Monophysite forms of Christianity before its military conquest by the Arabs and its subsequent linguistic conquest by Arabic. The role of the Arabs, their language, and their faith in helping to liberate a submerged Syriac World from the incubus of an intrusive Hellenism was subsidiary everywhere except in the Phoenicians' former colonial domain round the Western Mediterranean. In North-West Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, the Balearic Islands, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, the Arabic language and Islam were the instruments by which a Hellenism that, except in Sicily, was here clad in a Latin dress was evicted or submerged in the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era. It is true that in North-West Africa a 'native' cultural reaction against an Hellenic 'ascendancy' had found a religious expression, three hundred years before the advent of Islam, in the fourth-century revolt of Donatism against Catholicism. But Donatism had never succeeded in winning the decisive victory over Catholicism in North-West Africa that Monophysitism had won over Catholicism in Egypt and Syria, and the mission of defeating Hellenism in the religious arena was thus left in North-West Africa for Islam to execute.

² On p. 475, above.

merely delayed,¹ without being permanently averted, when in the post-Alexandrine Age this region was intensively planted with Greek colonists by Antigonos Monophthalmus and Seleucus Nicator and Nicator's Seleucid successors. The mass-secession of the rural population of Syria from a Hellenizing Catholic Christianity to an anti-Hellenic Monophysitism in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era made manifest the startling truth that an Antioch which had been founded as a base for Hellenic military and political power and as a transmitting station for the Hellenic culture was still, in the ninth century of her brilliant life, a closely invested Hellenic enclave in the midst of a beleaguering Syriac country-side whose passive siege of the intrusive alien imperial city had been invisibly maintained below the surface of a dispensation in which Hellenism had fancied itself to be dominant.

The vastness of these pacific conquests which were achieved by the Syriac culture during an age of Hellenic ascendancy between the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire and the establishment of the Arab Caliphate stands out in striking contrast to the frustration of contemporary Syriac attempts to evict an Hellenic 'ascendancy' by force of arms. The Romans' crushing defeat of a Maccabaeian and Zealot Jewish advance-guard's forlorn hope west of Euphrates is less impressive than their equal success in preventing an Arsacid and Sasanid Iranian main body of the militant Syriac opponents of Hellenism from making any permanent reconquests west of Iran and 'Irāq.² Khusrū Parwīz's Persian cavalry who forced their way as far west as Calchedon in Asia and Tripoli in Africa during the last and most devastating of the Romano-Persian wars (*gerebatur* A.D. 603-28) made no more lasting gains of territory than Pacorus's Parthian cavalry who had ranged over Syria in 51-50 and again in 40-38 B.C. A militancy which was thus so ineffective on its own plane did, however, make history on the religious plane by perversely distracting two higher religions from their oecumenical mission of bringing human souls into a closer communion with God in order to enlist these churches as combatants in the trivial mundane military enterprise of liberating a subjugated Syriac Society's domain from the incubus of an interloping Hellenic 'ascendancy'³—as the Nestorian and Monophysite forms of Christianity were subsequently diverted from the service of Christianity's authentic spiritual purpose to the role of being used as weapons by the Syriac Civilization in a mortal combat with Hellenism in an ecclesiastical arena.

In a twentieth-century Westernizing World a Jewish and a Zoroastrian Church whose origins could be traced back to the experiences of the internal proletariat of a disintegrating Babylonian Civilization⁴ were still in existence side by side with four younger religions of the same species—Christianity, Islam, the Mahāyāna, and Hinduism—which had been brought to birth by similar experiences in the history of a disintegrating Hellenic Society. All six religions were still on the map, and all six had once made their epiphany in the World during the decline and

¹ It had begun as early as the fourteenth century B.C. (see p. 506, n. 2, below).

² See pp. 412-13, above.

³ See V. v. 124-7.

⁴ See V. v. 120-2

fall of one of the civilizations of the second generation.¹ In the course of their subsequent histories, however, the post-Hellenic and the post-Babylonian group of higher religions had travelled along such widely divergent lines that, if the record of their origins had been lost, their specific affinity with one another might have been difficult to recognize. While the four post-Hellenic religions had duly continued to fulfil their promise of preaching a gospel to all Mankind, Zoroastrianism and Judaism had found compensation for their mundane failure to liberate a subjugated Syriac Society from an Hellenic 'ascendancy' in their spiritually still more devastating subsequent mundane success in converting themselves into a 'social cement' possessing the astonishing property of being able to hold together a fossilized community in diasporá.²

This parochial mundane task was as remote as any function could well be from the oecumenical otherworldly mission with which Judaism and Zoroastrianism, no less than their sister higher religions, had originally been charged; and on this showing the two post-Babylonian higher religions must be judged to have committed the sin or suffered the calamity of throwing away or losing their high spiritual birthright. The parallel history of the Nestorian and Monophysite forms of Christianity, which likewise eventually converted themselves into a 'social cement' for giving cohesion to fossilized communities in diasporá, indicates that the common aberration into which these two Syriacising Christian churches and the two post-Babylonian higher religions fell was not the fore-ordained consequence of some original and intrinsic spiritual flaw in their doctrine, precept, and ethos, but was the penalty for their historic error of allowing themselves to be caught in political entanglements; for all the Christian churches did not go the Monophysite and Nestorian way. When the Nestorian and Monophysite offshoots of Christianity took the fatal Jewish and Zoroastrian wrong turning, the main body of the Christian Church did not make the same mistake of allowing a mundane quarrel between Monophysites and 'Melchites' to distract it irrevocably from the pursuit of its oecumenical otherworldly purpose.

4. *Encounters with the Egyptiac Civilization in the Age of 'the New Empire'*³

In a drama in which the Egyptiac Civilization was the protagonist, the opening gambit was the same as in the tragedy of the Babylonian Civilization, with the Egyptiac Society anticipating the Babylonian Society's role, and the Hyksos barbarian invaders of Syria and Egypt setting in motion a tragic train of events by giving the same provocation to Egyptiac marchmen in the Thebaid as the Aramaean barbarian invaders of Mesopotamia were to give to the Assyrian wardens of the northern marches of the Babylonian World. In both tragedies a hard-pressed civilization responded to the challenge of barbarian aggression

¹ The sequence of divers species of the genus Human Society is set out in Table IV in VII. vii, facing p. 772.

² See pp. 274-5, above.

³ See xi, map 14.

by succumbing to a militarism that had originally been foreign to its nature;¹ and in both, likewise, this militarism was eventually fatal to its addicts as well as to their victims.

The temporary inundation of Egypt by the Hyksos in the seventeenth century B.C., like the tide of Aramaean aggression against Assyria in the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C., was a backwash from a cataclysm produced by the dissolution of a neighbouring universal state. We have observed that the Aramaean assailants of Assyria were the extreme right wing of a host of Aramaean and Hebrew barbarians from the North Arabian Steppe whose main body had been drawn into a political vacuum in Syria arising from the collapse there of an Egyptian imperial régime in the fourteenth century B.C. In a different context² we have also noticed that the Hyksos conquerors of Egypt were the Canaanite counterparts of a host of Aryan Eurasian Nomad barbarians who in the eighteenth or the seventeenth century B.C. had poured into the derelict Mesopotamian, Anatolian, and Syrian domains of a Sumeric universal state that had fallen into decrepitude immediately after its ephemeral restoration by Hammurabi (*imperabat* 1792-1750 or 1728-1686 B.C.).³ The Aramaeans' challenge to Assyria provoked, as we have seen, an Assyrian assault in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. upon a Syriac Civilization, affiliated to the Minoan, which had arisen meanwhile in the former Syrian domain of 'the New Empire' of Egypt which the Mesopotamian Aramaeans' kinsmen had invaded from the east. The Hyksos' challenge to the Thebaid similarly provoked an Egyptian assault in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries B.C.⁴ upon an abortive First Syriac Civilization which—but for the Hyksos' transgression against the Egyptian World and the Theban liberators' *revanche*—might have taken its place, side by side with the Hittite and the Babylonian Society, as one of the civilizations of the second generation which the disintegration of the Sumeric Civilization had brought to birth.⁵

In following up their liberation of Egypt from the Hyksos by their conquest of their defeated Hyksos adversaries' Syrian base of operations, the Theban militarists of the Eighteenth Pharaonic Dynasty not only prevented a Syriac Civilization affiliated to the Sumeric from coming to birth; they also brought the Egyptian World into contact with the two

¹ In spite of the standing temptation to succumb to militarism by which Assyria was beset in her exposed position as an outpost—first of the Sumeric World and then of its Babylonian successor—the first appearance of the Assyrians on the stage of History was in the guise of peaceful men of business whose commercial colonies in Eastern Anatolia in the third millennium B.C. had to be rescued from ill-treatment at the hands of a native ruler by military action on the part of the Akkadian militarist Sargon of Agade (see I. i. 110, with n. 3). It required the two successive challenges of a Mitannian and an Aramaean oppression to convert the Assyrian traders of the third millennium into the Assyrian warriors of the last. In a pacific-minded Egyptian World the wardens of the southern marches over against the barbarians of the Upper Nile Valley had always been exceptions to the general rule of the Egyptian *ethos*; and this explains why 'the Old Kingdom', 'the Middle Empire', and 'the New Empire' in turn all owed their forcible establishment to the military prowess of southern empire-builders (see II. ii. 112). The violence of the xenophobia evoked in Egyptian souls by the Hyksos domination enabled the Theban liberators of Lower Egypt from the Hyksos yoke temporarily to communicate the traditional militarism of the Thebaid to the rest of the Egyptian World.

² See the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 167-212, below.

³ See V. vi. 198-9.

⁴ In II. ii. 388-91.

⁵ See II. ii. 388-91.

post-Sumeric civilizations that did succeed in establishing themselves. The contact with a nascent Babylonian World did not evoke any appreciable reaction, since the Babylonian march-state, Assyria, had as much as she could do from the seventeenth to the fourteenth century B.C. in saving herself from being overwhelmed by a successor-state of the defunct Empire of Sumer and Akkad which had been established in Mesopotamia by the Aryan Eurasian Nomad barbarian Mitannians,¹ while the interior of the Babylonian World was lying torpid under the sluggish rule of the highlander barbarian Kassites. On the other hand, in impinging on a nascent Hittite Society that was taking shape in the Empire of Sumer and Akkad's former East Anatolian domain, the Theban builders of an Egyptian Empire in South-West Asia involved the Egyptian Society in a hundred years' war (*gerebatur circa* 1370-1278 B.C.) for supremacy in South-West Asia which, like the latter-day Romano-Persian contest for the same elusive prize, was as exhausting to both combatants as it was inconclusive in its political results.

In this case, as in that, a barbarian onlooker was the *tertius gaudens*; and, when an avalanche of mass-migration set in motion by the death-agonies of a moribund Minoan World descended upon the Hittite Empire and the Egyptian Empire in succession, the Hittites suffered at the Sea Peoples' hands what was to be the Persians' fate, and the Egyptians what was to be the Romans', at the hands of the Arabs. The Hittite Power was annihilated, while the Egyptian Imperial Government just succeeded, by a supreme effort, in saving the homeland of the Egyptian Civilization in the Nile Valley at the price of abandoning the residue of its former dominions in Syria.²

¹ See the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 199-201.

² In the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. the Hittite Power was in contact, not only with 'the New Empire' of Egypt in Syria, but with an Achaean Power along the south-west coast of Anatolia. An exhaustive treatment of the relations between the Hittites and the Achaeans, in the light of all the evidence known to Modern Western scholars at the time, will be found in C. Schachermeyr's *Hethiter und Achäer* (Leipzig 1935, Harrassowitz). Schachermeyr marshals convincing arguments in favour of the tentative conclusion that the Achaean Power which figures in the archives of the Hittite imperial capital Boghazkal'eh was identical with the Power whose imperial capital was Mycenae and whose 'thalassocracy' in the Aegean in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. was the prize of a victorious assault upon an antecedent Minoan 'thalassocracy' whose imperial capital had been Cnossos.

In contrast to the hostility which was the usual relation between Khatti and Egypt during the hundred years ending in the peace settlement of 1278 B.C., the contemporary relations between Khatti and the Achaean 'thalassocracy' seem usually to have been friendly. When the Hittite Emperor Muršiliš II was suffering from an illness in the fourth year of a reign which approximately coincided with the third quarter of the fourteenth century, 'the god of Akhkhayawa' was one of three divinities who were brought to his bedside to heal him; and this evidence of mutual goodwill is the more remarkable considering that by that date the Achaean Power had already crossed the Hittite Power's political path by establishing a bridgehead on the mainland of Anatolia in Millawanda (Schachermeyr, op. cit., p. 44; Götte, A.: 'Die Annalen des Muršiliš', in *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-Ägyptischen Gesellschaft*, 38. Band (Leipzig 1933, Hinrichs), p. 37)—a locality adjoining Luḫka which appears, on the evidence of place-names mentioned in the Hittite documents (Schachermeyr, op. cit., p. 67), to have lain in South-Western Caria, even if we do not identify the name Millawanda itself with the Miletus of the Hellenic geographer's gazetteer.

The delicate situation arising out of this encroachment by the sea-power on the land-power's element seems to have been handled on both sides with sufficient tact to prevent it from resulting in a war when, at some subsequent date which may have been before the end of Muršiliš II's reign (ibid., p. 45), a Hittite subject named Piamaradu took refuge in Millawanda with seven thousand adherents, and gave his two daughters in marriage

If this were the whole story of the encounters with the Egyptian Civilization in the age of 'the New Empire', it would have little significance for the student of History; but in this instance a familiar tale of aggression, revenge, and mutual exhaustion is redeemed by one flash of revelation in a single soul. As far as we know, Ikhnaton was the first of the sons of Man to apprehend the unity and universality of God;¹ and this Pischah-sight unfolded itself to the eyes of the seer from the eminence of an imperial throne which, under its oecumenical dominion, had brought the Egyptian World into association with an alien civilization in Syria² and with a primitive culture in the Upper Nile Valley.

'The lands of Syria and Nubia and the land of Egypt—Thou putteth every man in his place and Thou suppliest their needs. . . . Thou art lord of them all, who wearie himself on their behalf; the lord of every land, who ariseth from them. . . . All far-off peoples—Thou makest that whereon they live.'³

If the philosopher Ikhnaton had not also been the Emperor Amenhotep IV, he might never have beheld a vision which an oecumenical autocrat's

to two Achaean subjects who were then holding Millawanda on their sovereign's behalf. When representations from the Court of Khatti to the Court of Akkhiyawa on the subject of Pamaradu's future met with a reply which the Court of Khatti felt to be unsatisfactory, the Hittite Emperor put himself politically in the wrong by invading Millawanda without gaining his object of laying hands on Pamaradu. The Hittite refugee and his adherents avoided capture by taking ship from Millawanda to some adjacent overseas portion of the King of Akkhiyawa's dominions, from which they threatened to make descents upon the Hittite coasts. Thereupon the Hittite Emperor wrote a further letter to the Achaean King, apologizing for his occupation of Millawanda and requesting him either to banish Pamaradu from his dominions altogether or, as an alternative, to intern him somewhere in the metropolitan territories of the Achaean Empire where he would be at a greater distance from the Hittite Empire's frontiers.

This fragment of Hittite-Achaean diplomatic correspondence (summarized *ibid.*, pp. 30-33) that had been retrieved by Modern Western archaeologists threw a flicker of light on an Hellenic legend that had been noticed by Thucydides in the introduction (Book I, chap. 9) to his history of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. According to this story the Peloponnesus derived its name from an Anatolian adventurer named Pelops, who had won the principality of Pisa for himself by a piece of sharp practice and had afterwards secured a footing at Mycenae by giving his daughter in marriage to the reigning Perseid King Sthenelus. On the strength of this family alliance, Pelops' son Atreus had managed to succeed his nephew Eurystheus—Sthenelus's son and Pelops' grandson—on the throne of Mycenae. In this Hellenic legend the Hittite Emperor Muršiliš II figures as Myrtilus, the prince of Pisa's charioteer, whom Pelops first induced to betray his master and then liquidated by pushing him over a cliff into the sea. Does Pelops derive his own name from the Hittite Empire's frontier province Palā? And is Atreus a legendary ghost of the historical Achaean buccaneer Attarissiya, who made himself a nuisance to the Hittite Empire in the reigns of Tutkhaliya IV (*imperial circa 1260-1230 B.C.*) and Arnuwanda (*imperial circa 1230-1215 B.C.*) by driving the Emperor's feudatory Madduwattaš out of his fief and by making a descent upon Cyprus (*ibid.*, pp. 41 and 46; Götzte, A: 'Madduwattaš,' in *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-Aegyptischen Gesellschaft (E.V.)*, 32. Jahrgang (Leipzig 1927, Hinrichs), pp. 11, 15-17, and 39)?

The present footnote replaces V. v. 237, n. 7.

¹ See I. i. 145-6 and V. v. 695.

² The century immediately preceding Ikhnaton's accession to the Egyptian imperial throne had seen an influx into Egypt of foreigners of all races from all quarters—first in military, then in civil, employments. Imported foreign slaves had risen in the Egyptian social scale to a level above that of the native Egyptian peasantry, and the Egyptians with whom these immigrants had intermingled had been adopting Syrian and Mycenaean manners and customs and cults (see Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), pp. 186-93). The Imperial House set an example when Thothmes IV married a daughter of King Artatama of Mitanni; and there were at least two more royal marriages between the Egyptian and the Mitannian dynasty (Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-2). This was the historical background to Ikhnaton's new departures in the realms of religion, the visual arts, and literature.

³ Ikhnaton's hymn to the Aton (Sun-Disk), quoted in V. vi. 11-12.

political vantage-point could bring within his ken, even though his political authority might be impotent to impose upon the rank-and-file of his subjects the chillingly intellectual and at the same time disturbingly revolutionary theology and liturgy in which the imperial recluse sought to communicate his personal religious experience to an intimate circle of courtier-initiates.¹

5. *Tares and Wheat*

Our survey of encounters between contemporaries has made us aware that the only fruitful results of these encounters are the works of peace, and most mournfully aware that these creatively peaceful interchanges of ideas and ideals are rare indeed by comparison with the frequency of the stultifying and disastrous conflicts that are apt to arise when two or more diverse cultures come into contact with one another.

If we scan once more the panorama of encounters between civilizations of the second generation, we shall observe in the intercourse between the Indic and the Sinic civilization one instance of a peaceful interchange which seems as fruitful as at first sight it seems free from the blight of violence. The Mahāyāna was transmitted to the Sinic from the Indic World without the two societies ever falling into war with one another, and the peacefulness of the intercourse that produced this historic effect was advertised in the traffic of Buddhist missionaries *en route* from India to China, and Buddhist pilgrims *en route* from China to India, which found its way to and fro by both the sea-route via the Straits of Malacca and the land-route via the Tarim Basin from the fourth to the seventh century of the Christian Era.

During this age of peaceful religious intercourse the only incident remotely resembling a passage of arms between a Chinese and an Indian Great Power was one highly creditable act of intervention on the Chinese side in Indian circumstances that forced Chinese hands. On the morrow of the death of an Hellenic Justinian's Indic counterpart Harsha (*imperabat* A.D. 606-47)² at the close of the last phase of the disintegration of the Indic Society, an envoy from the T'ang Emperor T'ai Tsung who happened at that moment to be on his way to the dead Indic emperor's court retorted to an Indian usurper's murderous attack upon his mission by evacuating his people from Hindustan to Tibet, enlisting Tibetan and Nepalese reinforcements, and re-entering India *manu militari* without yielding to the temptation to which this Chinese warrior-statesman's Bactrian Greek predecessor Demetrius had succumbed in the second century B.C. Instead of taking advantage of the anarchy into which India had fallen after the disappearance from the scene of the last upholder of a crumbling Indic universal state, the enterprising representative of the T'ang Power in the seventh century of the Christian Era exhibited a political disinterestedness that was as remarkable as his military efficiency. After occupying the last Indic emperor's derelict

¹ Ikhnaton's failure to impose his Aton-worship in the Egyptian World has been discussed in V. v. 695-6. An authoritative discussion of it is now to be found in Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), pp. 206-235.

² See V. vi. 209, n. 3.

dominions in a lightning campaign, capturing the usurper, and restoring order, the ambassador was content to evacuate India for the second time, and this time under no compulsion, with his trouble-making prisoner in his train as the only trophy of a beneficent military triumph.¹

This politico-military episode in the history of the relations between a Far Eastern and an Indic Power is on the same high moral level as the contemporary religious activities of Chinese pilgrims and Indian missionaries; yet our idyllic picture of a pacific encounter between two civilizations resulting in the transmission of the Mahāyāna to the Far East is incomplete and to that extent misleading; for the opening up of the overland route between India and China via the Tarim Basin—which was in use earlier than the maritime route and, till after the seventh century, was also always the more regularly frequented of the two—was the work, not of the Indic and Sinic societies themselves, but of the Bactrian Greek pioneers of an intrusive Hellenic Society and these Greeks' Kushan barbarian successors; and the establishment of an overland line of communications between the Indic and the Sinic World by Bactrian Greek and Kushan hands was an incidental result of military aggression on the Bactrian Greeks' part against the Mauryan Empire at a moment when it was impotent to defend itself, and on the Kushans' part against the Han Empire's domain in the Tarim Basin in a militarily opportune hour after the Prior Han Dynasty had lost their grip and before the Posterior Han had mustered the strength to vindicate their title to their predecessors' lost dominion.

If we are in search of an instance of a spiritually fruitful encounter between contemporaries in which there is no evidence at all of any concomitant military conflict, we shall have to look farther back into the past than the age of the civilizations of the second generation to a time before the Egyptiac Civilization had been galvanized by the shock of the Hyksos invasion into an unnatural prolongation of an already completed term of life.² In the preceding age, from the turn of the twenty-second and twenty-first centuries to the turn of the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries B.C., an Egyptiac universal state in the shape of 'the Middle Empire' and a Sumeric universal state in the shape of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad had been living side by side with one another,³ and alternating in the exercise of an hegemony over the Syrian land-bridge between their homelands, without, so far as is known, ever falling into a clash of arms. This apparently peaceful contact between the Egyptiac and Sumeric societies during their last rally before their final dissolu-

¹ See Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 352-3; Eliot, Sir C.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, p. 260.

² This effect of the impact of the Hyksos on the course of Egyptiac history has been discussed in I. i. 136-46.

³ In reckoning that the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, from its first foundation by Ur-Engur (*alias* Ur-Nammu) of Ur down to its decay after the death of Hammurabi, began and ended at approximately the same dates as a 'Middle Empire' of Egypt which was founded by a Mentuhotep and was overthrown by the Hyksos, we are adopting a revised estimate of Sumeric chronology which places all the principal dates of Sumeric history 155 years later according to Sidney Smith, or 219 years later according to W. F. Albright, than they were placed by Eduard Meyer in the light of the scantier archaeological evidence at his command (see the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 167-212).

tion was, however, apparently also sterile; and we have to look still farther back than this to find a transaction between these two civilizations of the first generation that was not merely untarnished by violence but was productive of spiritual effects comparable to the transmission of the Mahāyāna from India to the Far East.

In the investigation of so early a chapter in the histories of civilizations the knowledge gradually accumulated by the progress of Modern Western archaeological discovery still left the twentieth-century historian groping in an historical twilight in which all outlines remained uncertain and all movements elusive; yet, subject to this caution, we may recall here our tentative finding¹ that the worship of Isis and Osiris, which came to play so vital a part in Egyptiac spiritual life after the Egyptiac Society's breakdown, was not the original expression of an indigenous spiritual experience but was a gift from a disintegrating Sumeric World² where the heart-rending yet heart-consoling figures of the Sorrowing Wife or Mother and her Suffering Husband or Son had made their earliest epiphany under the names Ishtar and Tammuz. If it be indeed true that a worship which was the harbinger of all other higher religions was transmitted from the society in which it had first arisen to the children of a contemporary civilization without the sinister strife and bloodshed by which so many of the subsequent encounters between contemporaries were to be marred, we may have caught here one glimpse of a bow in the cloud that lowers over the histories of those contacts between civilizations in which the parties to the encounter have met one another in the flesh.

¹ In V. v. 81-82 and 147-52.

² If the worship of Ishtar and Tammuz was in truth a response to the challenge of social disintegration, its epiphany in the Sumeric World, and *a fortiori* its radiation from the Sumeric World into the Egyptiac World, cannot have taken place earlier, at the earliest, than a date mid-way through the third millennium B.C. If so, this was not the first encounter between these two civilizations of which there was a record. Material evidence, brought to light by twentieth-century Western archaeologists, testified that several elements of Sumeric technology and artistic style, perhaps even including the happy thought of revolutionizing the art of writing by eliciting phonemes out of pictograms, had been conveyed from Shinar to Egypt in the closing centuries of an Egyptiac Late Predynastic Age, at some date during the second half of the fourth millennium B.C. (see Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), pp. 37-38, and the present Study, X. ix. 682-92). The worship of Ishtar and Tammuz will have come to Egypt from Shinar in the same age as these material culture-elements, if we are to believe that the East Deltaic group of Egyptiac divinities, in which Osiris makes his first appearance, took shape in the Predynastic Age as early as the Nagada II period, circa 3500 B.C. (see Scharff, A.: *Die Ausbreitung des Osiriskultes in der Frühzeit und während des Alten Reiches* (Munich 1948, Biederstein), p. 17), and that the worship of Osiris spread from Busiris to Heliopolis in the age of the First and Second Dynasties (ibid., p. 19). The earliest extant inscriptions of the Pyramid Texts, which are our earliest evidence for the practice of Osiris-worship, are on monuments of the Fifth and Sixth Dynasties (ibid., p. 16).

C. THE DRAMA OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARIES (STRUCTURE, CHARACTERS, AND PLOT)

(I) CONCATENATIONS OF ENCOUNTERS

THE foregoing survey of encounters between contemporaries has made it apparent that these are dramas in which the number of the *dramatis personae* is apt to be greater than the minimum cast of two figures. Encounters tête-à-tête, like the spiritual commerce between the Sumeric and the Egyptiac Civilization which may have carried the rudiments of a higher religion from the banks of the Euphrates to the banks of the Nile,¹ seem to be less frequent than encounters between three parties, such as the triangular contests for command of the Mediterranean Basin between the Phoenicians, Etruscans, and Hellenes of a pre-Alexandrine Age² and between the Medieval Westerners, the Eastern Orthodox Christians, and the Monophysite Christian and Muslim representatives of a Syriac Society in a belated last chapter of its history.³

A not less frequent and perhaps more characteristic type of encounter is a contest between a protagonist and a deuteragonist for physical and spiritual dominion over weaker competitors. The second of the two triangular contests for the military, political, and commercial control of the Mediterranean Basin turned into a competition between the Franks and the 'Osmanlis for the subjugation and conversion of Eastern Orthodox Christians whose failure to hold their own against their two potently aggressive neighbours had left them no freedom except to make an unpalatable choice between these two alternative alien ways of life;⁴ but usually the destiny of more than one wilting society seems to be at stake in such struggles for possession of souls. The Syriac Society wrestled with the post-Alexandrine Hellenic Society for the conversion of the Babylonian and Egyptiac societies as well as for the conversion of the fossilized remnants of a Hittite Society that lay directly in the fairway between the homelands of the two rivals;⁵ and, in a latter-day world that had been unified on the technological and economic plane on a literally oecumenical scale by the Modern Western feat of mastering the Ocean, the Russian offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Society had armed itself with the weapons of a Modern Western technique in order to challenge the Western Society's influence over all the other living civilizations and primitive societies.⁶

We may now go on to observe that these dramatic encounters between contemporaries are complex not merely in the point of being apt to bring a considerable number of characters on to the stage but also in the further point of being implicated with one another like the successive tragedies in an Attic trilogy. The discovery that encounters between contemporaries may present themselves, not singly, but in concatena-

¹ See pp. 452-3, above.

² See pp. 346-403, above.

³ See pp. 442-6, above.

⁴ See p. 151, with n. 2, and pp. 395-7, above.

⁵ See pp. 126-49, above.

⁶ See pp. 418-39, above.

tions, was made in the fifth century B.C. by the pre-Alexandrine Hellenic historian Herodotus when he set himself the ambitious task of giving an illuminating account of the then still recent military and political conflict between the Achaemenian Empire and the independent Hellenic city-states in Continental European Greece. Herodotus's artistic genius divined that, in order to make his story intelligible, he must place it in the setting of its historical antecedents; in viewing it from this angle, he perceived that the Graeco-Persian conflict which had been his original theme was the latest episode in a succession of collisions of the same character; and this insight led him to the discovery that such encounters between contemporaries are apt to occur, not in isolation, but in series, and that these series are not fortuitous, but are the product of psychological 'chain-reactions' which a post-Modern Western student of History might compare with the physical 'chain-reactions' artificially produced by the inauspicious ingenuity of latter-day Western men of science.

In the spiritual field of encounters between human beings which was the pre-Alexandrine Hellenic historian's concern, Herodotus worked out a psychological formula to explain how one encounter could thus give rise to another.¹ In a situation in which two or more societies have come into contact with one another, one party takes an initiative which, from another party's standpoint, is an act of aggression. This challenge confronts the assaulted party with a choice between acquiescing and reacting, and, if he acquiesces, or again if he reacts merely to the extent required in order to re-establish the equilibrium which his neighbour's wanton act of aggression has upset, this failure to hold his own or, in the alternative denouement, this successful act of self-defence will bring to a close not only this particular drama but, with it, the whole of the action which his adversary's original act of aggression has started. A concatenation of encounters in which one tragedy generates another arises when the original victim of aggression is not content simply to redress a balance which the original aggressor has disturbed, but proceeds to pass over into a counter-offensive in which he despoils his discomfited adversary of the ugly role of aggressor in order to clothe himself in his turn in this deadly shirt of Nessus.

This demonic impulse to put oneself in the wrong is one of the fatal fruits of Original Sin in Human Nature;

For Old Sin loves, when comes the hour again,
To bring forth New.²

The 'new sin' of indulging in a retaliation disproportionate to the provocation for it is at least as grievous an act of hybris, and as infallible a means of incurring the penalty that hybris invariably brings in its train, as the 'old sin' of unprovoked aggression, by which it has been brought forth; and the penalty is the starting of a chain-reaction which, once set in motion, is inordinately difficult to arrest.

¹ Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 1-4.

² Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 763-6, Gilbert Murray's translation, quoted in IV. iv. 256.

We may profit by Herodotus's discovery of concatenations of encounters and accept the psychological formula in which he finds the explanation of this historical phenomenon¹ without having to accept, as integral parts of it, either his personal reconstruction of the particular series of encounters leading up to the Helleno-Achaemenian War of 499-449 B.C.² or his depiction of the chain-reaction of *hybris* in the naïve

¹ It will be noticed that the repetitive action which generates a concatenation of encounters according to the Herodotean formula is the same rhythm that in this Study (III. iii. 112-27) has been detected in the process of the internal growth of a civilization. In both processes the motive power is provided by the recurrent upsetting of an equilibrium which is repeatedly re-established only to be upset each time once again; and, if we translate the language of mechanics into terms more appropriate to a phenomenon which is not a physical movement of inanimate objects but is a psychological reaction of living creatures, we shall find ourselves describing each of our two sets of recurrent reactions in identical terms as a series of challenges which succeed one another because a successful response to one challenge gives rise to a fresh challenge which in its turn evokes a further challenge through having been faced and met successfully. There is thus a generic affinity between the encounter-rhythm and the growth-rhythm; but, when we pursue our comparative analysis of them in greater detail, we also become aware of differences that distinguish them from one another. In the encounter-rhythm the identity of both the challenger and the challenged party changes from round to round *ex hypothesi*, since the upsetting of a re-established equilibrium, which produces a repetition of the movement, is here always due to the initiative of the party which has been the recipient and not the author of the challenge in the previous round, whereas in the growth-rhythm the role of recipient is played by the same party in round after round, and it is this continuity in the identity of the challengee that gives the growth-rhythm its specific character of cumulativeness within the generic form of repetitiveness. The ethical complexion of the challenge that evokes each fresh round is also different in the two rhythms; for an initiative that in the growth-rhythm is an act of God or Satan (see I. i. 271-99) is in the encounter-rhythm an act of human *hybris*.

² We shall agree with Herodotus in seeing in the conflict between the Hellenes and the Achaemenidae in the fifth century B.C. the continuation of an older conflict between the Hellenes and the Phoenicians. In fact, we shall see these two conflicts as successive phases in the course of a single encounter; and we shall therefore reject Herodotus's insertion of two intervening links at this point in the chain. According to Herodotus the encounter between the Hellenes and the Phoenicians was followed by one between the Hellenes and the Colchians and another between the Hellenes and the Trojans before the Persians took up the cudgels in an imaginary feud between an Hellenic 'Europe' and an Oriental 'Asia'. We may agree with Herodotus that the establishment of an Hellenic ascendancy over the backward peoples round the coasts of the Black Sea, which is commemorated in the Hellenic legend of the voyage of the Argonauts, must have been later in date than the beginning of the competition between Hellenes and Phoenicians, since the Hellenes did not secure their monopoly of maritime activity in the Black Sea until after they had defeated the Phoenician and Tyrrhenian attempts to compete with them for the command of the entrance to the Dardanelles (see pp. 420-1, above); but we cannot agree that the Phoenicians and the Colchians ever had any notion that they were fighting their respective battles with the Hellenes in a common Asiatic cause. And, as for Herodotus's interpolation of 'the Trojan War' between the date of the Hellenes' penetration into the Black Sea, which does not seem to have begun till after the opening of the seventh century B.C., and the date of the Lydian conquest of the Continental Asiatic Hellenes, which Herodotus treats as a prelude to the Persian assault on Hellas, this only shows how wildly wide of the mark were the endeavours of fifth-century Hellenic rationalists to transmute legend into history. In so far as the Hellenic legend of 'the Trojan War' is a travesty of any authentic historical event, it preserves the memory of a *Völkerwanderung* in the Aegean area which had accompanied the dissolution of a Minoan Society and preceded the rise of an Hellenic and a Syriac Society out of the wreckage of a shattered Minoan World. The competition between the Hellenic Society and the Phoenician representatives of the sister Syriac Civilization did not begin till at least four hundred years after the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* had come to a close.

The Modern Western archaeologists' feat of disinterring a Minoan Civilization of which the Hellenes had been almost oblivious gave a twentieth-century Western historian an overwhelming advantage over Herodotus when it was a question of trying to reconstruct the history of the late second millennium and the early last millennium B.C. But Herodotus's errors in his reconstruction of links in a concatenation of encounters which he could reconstruct only by guesswork in the absence of records did not, of course, impugn his presentation of oecumenical history as a concatenation of encounters

imagery of the manners and customs of the Heroic Age¹ or his presentation of this chronic conflict as a feud between 'Asia' and 'Europe';² and, if we do find ourselves convinced that the Herodotean analysis of the psychological causation of concatenations is valid, we can apply the formula on our own account to the encounter between the Achaemenian Empire and the Continental European Hellenes and see how far it may carry us from this point of departure in establishing associations between encounters which, in our foregoing survey, we have provisionally studied separately, as so many self-contained dramas, and not as inter-related episodes strung together on one continuous thread.

In our own reconstruction of the concatenation in which the Helleno-Achaemenian War of 499-449 B.C. is one of the links, we may follow Herodotus to the extent of finding the starting-point of the action in a contest between the Phoenicians and the Hellenes for the command of the Mediterranean Basin; but, on our own previous interpretation of this encounter, we shall find the 'beginning of evils' in the Hellenes' aggressive attempt, in and after the last quarter of the seventh century B.C., to add to their own lion's share of the spoils of a new world by making provocative encroachments on the Phoenicians' preserves in Andalusia, Western Sicily, and Tripolitania. The reaction which this act of Hellenic aggression evoked on the Phoenicians' part resulted, as we have seen, after a hundred years of strife, in the restoration of equilibrium through the establishment of a Carthaginian and an Achaemenian Empire each commanding a collective power to keep the uncoordinated aggression of the mutually independent Hellenic communities of the day within bounds on both the western and the eastern front of the Mediterranean arena.⁴ The fatal act of counter-hybris which upset a re-established balance and thereby set the stage for the performance of a further tragedy was Darius's decision to seek a solution for the problem of the Achaemenian Empire's awkward north-west frontier by setting

between representatives of diverse and conflicting civilizations. So far from that, these mistakes about matters of fact which for Herodotus were unknown and unknowable threw into relief the brilliance of an intuition which could divine one of the major rhythms of History from such imperfect evidence as the information at Herodotus's command.

¹ It is not till he comes, in Book I, chapter 6, to record the subjugation of the Continental Asiatic Hellenes by Croesus King of Lydia in the sixth century B.C. that Herodotus begins to depict encounters between Hellenes and non-Hellenes in the colours of so-called 'civilized' life. Down to that point he deals in terms of the barbarian manners and customs of the Heroic Age. In the first four incidents in his concatenation the aggressive act of provocation takes the form of the abduction of a princess. The Phoenicians start the feud by abducting an Hellenic Io; the Hellenes retaliate by abducting a Phoenician Europa; the Hellenes then cross the line between retaliation and provocation, to become aggressors in their turn, by abducting a Colchian Medea, and the Trojans retaliate by abducting an Hellenic Helen. After failing to obtain amends for this retaliatory injury, the Hellenes then commit a second act of hybris, fraught with far graver consequences than their first, by resorting to war to avenge an abduction which they could have well afforded to ignore 'since it was obvious that these women would not have got themselves abducted if they had not so desired'. The act of military aggression which the Hellenes committed against the Asiatics in attacking and destroying Troy placed Hellas in a permanent state of war with Asia in the opinion ascribed by Herodotus to latter-day Persian champions of the Asiatic cause. This Herodotean account of pre-Croesean history is, of course, a prose version of the traditional Hellenic epic vein of poetry.

² See Annex: "Asia" and "Europe": Facts and Fantasies, on pp. 708-29, below.

³ See Thucydides, Book II, chap. 12.

⁴ See pp. 421-9, above.

out to compel the still independent part of the Hellenic World to submit to an Achaemenian domination.¹ The sensational defeat of this act of counter-hybris did not prevent it from making history; for its failure to attain its own objective was only the first instalment of the penalty that it drew down upon the heads of its perpetrators. The ultimate nemesis of Darius's aberration was Philip of Macedon's decision to turn the tables by conquering the Achaemenian Empire; and Alexander the Great, who was as sensationally successful as Xerxes had been sensationally unsuccessful in executing his father's political testament, opened the first act in a new drama which forged the second link in this tragic concatenation.

The destruction of the Achaemenian Empire in the fourth century B.C. by Alexander and of the Carthaginian Empire in the third century B.C. by Rome gave the Hellenic Society a dominion over its neighbours which far exceeded the most ambitious dreams of sixth-century Hellenic adventurers who had sailed as traders to Tartessus or served as mercenaries at Pelusium or Babylon. In the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history the Hellenes were masters not only of the Libyphoenician and Etruscan colonial domains of the Syriac and fossil Hittite societies in the Western Mediterranean but of these two societies' homelands in the Levant and of the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indic worlds into the bargain. This portentous career of post-Alexandrine Hellenic aggression duly evoked a reaction on its Oriental victims' part; and the eventual success of this reaction tardily restored a long-upset equilibrium when, a thousand years after Alexander's passage of the Dardanelles, the undoing of his work was at last completed by the Primitive Muslim Arabs' feat of liberating, in lightning campaigns of an all but Alexandrine swiftness, all *ci-devant* Syriac territories, from Syria to the Iberian Peninsula inclusive, that at the opening of the seventh century of the Christian Era had still been under the rule of the Roman Empire and its Visigothic successor-state.

The re-establishment of a Syriac universal state in the shape of an Arab Caliphate which embraced under its single sovereignty the former domains of both the Carthaginian and the Achaemenian Empire² promised in the second decade of the eighth century of the Christian Era to terminate a concatenation of encounters, at a stage at which not more than two links in the melancholy chain had yet been forged, by reproducing the stabilization that had been momentarily achieved in the last quarter of the sixth century B.C. through the rise of the Carthaginian and Achaemenian Powers. Indeed, the prospects of stability were decidedly more promising this time than they had been on the earlier occasion, since the Caliphate was stronger in its unity than the Achaemenian and Carthaginian empires had been in their mutual independence, while the two nascent Hellenistic civilizations of Western and Eastern Orthodox Christendom were less capable of challenging the alien oecumenical Power that had set bounds to their domains than the Hellenic Civilization had been in the vigour of its sixth-century adolescence. This second chance of bringing the momentum of strife to a halt by jettisoning the

¹ See pp. 430-5, above.

² See I. i. 76-77.

burden of *karma*¹ from which this momentum derived its impetus was, however, once again thrown away by wanton acts of counter-hybris.

Like their Persian predecessors, the Arab avengers of a Syriac Society that had been the victim of Hellenic aggression were not content with their historically legitimate achievement of at last completing the eviction of an aggressor from alien territories on which he had trespassed by force of arms. They proceeded to repeat Darius's error of passing over into a counter-offensive without having the excuse of finding themselves saddled with an untenable frontier that must be moved forward if it was not to be set back. The pressure of physical geography that impelled Darius and Xerxes to seek a natural frontier by embracing European as well as Asiatic Greece in their dominions did not constrain the Arabs to pass the natural frontier of the Taurus in order to lay siege to Constantinople in A.D. 673-7 and again in A.D. 717 or the natural frontier of the Pyrenees in order to invade Gaul in A.D. 732 or the natural frontier of the western basin of the Mediterranean Sea in order to conquer Crete and Sicily and overrun Apulia and seize bridgeheads along the Mediterranean coast of Western Christendom between the mouth of the Rhône and the mouth of the Garigliano in the ninth century of the Christian Era.² These wanton acts of Muslim aggression against Eastern Orthodox and Western Christendom in the eighth and ninth centuries incurred their nemesis in the shape of East Roman and Frankish acts of retaliation in the tenth and eleventh centuries; and, though the East Roman counter-offensive broke off as a consequence of the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization, the Western Crusades went to lengths at which they forged a third link in an Herodotean concatenation of tragic encounters.³

This explosive expansion of a Medieval Western Christendom whose latent energies had been fired by the spark of Muslim aggression in the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era evoked the reaction that was to be expected on the part of its victims. The cumulative efforts of Zengī, Nūr-ad-Dīn, Saladin, and the Ayyubids' Mamlūk slave-successors evicted the Frankish intruders from Syria, and the 'Osmanlis completed the Greek Orthodox Christians' unfinished work of evicting them from Romania as well. When the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81) had accomplished his life-work, a thrice-upset equilibrium had been restored for the third time in this concatenation of historical tragedies, and a third chance of breaking the chain had presented itself; but, this time once again, the opportunity was lost through a wanton act of counter-hybris.

While the Ottoman conqueror of Constantinople had been content to bring together within the political framework of an Ottoman universal state the *disiecta membra* of the main body of Orthodox Christendom,

¹ The Indic conception of *Karma* has been touched upon in V. v. 432-3.

² See pp. 348-9, above.

³ One effect of this concatenation between the Syriac Society's successive encounters with the Hellenic Society in its pre-Alexandrine and in its post-Alexandrine phase and with the two Hellenistic Christian societies was to produce 'Sicilian Cycles' that are the theme of one of Freeman's most illuminating essays (Freeman, E. A.: *Historical Essays*, 3rd ser., 2nd ed. (London 1892, Macmillan), pp. 434-42).

his successors Selim the Grim and Suleymān the Magnificent recklessly overstepped the limits within which their wiser predecessor had found a fruitful field for constructive statesmanship. They annexed the domain of the Arabic Muslim Civilization from Syria to the Yaman and from 'Irāq to Algeria inclusive; and they opened an attack upon the homeland of Western Christendom on both a Danubian and a Western Mediterranean front. This Ottoman Muslim aggression against Western Christendom at the opening of the modern chapter of its history had the same explosively stimulating effect as the Arab Muslim aggression against the same Western Christian Society at the opening of the medieval chapter of its history and the Achaemenian aggression against European Greece in the fifth century B.C. The Ottoman sieges of Vienna in A.D. 1529 and A.D. 1682-3 ended in the same sensational failure as the Arab sieges of Constantinople in A.D. 673-7 and A.D. 717 and as the Persian descents upon European Greece in 490 and 480 B.C. But the envelopment of Western Christendom by the horns of the Ottoman crescent nevertheless came near enough to success to do the Westerners the invaluable unintended service of compelling them to cut losses which they had already incurred through the failure of the Crusades and to divert their energies from continuing to fight a lost battle for command of a Mediterranean cul-de-sac to embarking on a conquest of the Ocean which was to give them the dominion over the whole face of the planet.

The consequent world-wide expansion of the Modern Western Civilization forged a fourth link in the Herodotean concatenation of encounters; but at the time of writing it was impossible to foretell whether this self-extending chain of tragedies was to be terminated as a tetralogy, with a modern satyr play for its finale, or whether it was to be prolonged beyond a fourth episode; for at the time of writing the fourth link in the chain was still in process of being heated in the furnace and hammered out on the anvil of the malign artificer Hephaestus. On the analogy of the three preceding dramas in the series it was no doubt to be expected that the unprecedentedly far-ranging and violent explosion of the Modern West, which had opened the current play, would evoke a reaction of comparable range and force; and mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era a would-be reader of the signs of the times might be tempted to cast Russia for the part of organizer of the resistance movement against an arch-aggressor which had been played in previous episodes by the 'Osmanlis and Umayyads and Achaemenidae. A twentieth-century historian, on the other hand, would be less inclined to hazard such conjectures about the future than to be grateful that the accident of his own date of birth should have enabled him to observe, as matters of accomplished fact, three links in the Herodotean concatenation which had been added to the chain between Herodotus's day and his own.

Now that we have followed up the Herodotean concatenation, link by link, from the three-cornered contest between the Phoenicians, Etruscans, and pre-Alexandrine Hellenes for the command of the Mediterranean Basin down to the high-powered impact of the Modern West on all other living societies on the face of the planet, this guiding thread

will enable us to discern at least one other chain-reaction of the same kind which was originally set in motion by a backwash from one of the waves of barbarian invasion that flooded over the derelict domain of a moribund Sumeric Civilization in the eighteenth or the seventeenth century B.C.

In other contexts we have already noticed that the Aryan Nomad barbarian invaders who broke out of the Eurasian Steppe and over the Iranian Plateau into the Mesopotamian and Syrian provinces of 'the Empire of the Four Quarters' in the course of a post-Sumeric Völkerwanderung had Semitic-speaking contemporaries and counterparts in Palestine who engulfed the Delta province of 'the Middle Empire' of Egypt.¹ The deceptive facility with which the Hyksos established their dominion over the Egyptiac Society in this initial act of aggression gave no inkling of the demonic violence of the Egyptiac reaction with which they were to be expelled, a hundred years or so later, from the Nile Valley and to be pursued subsequently into Syria and Mesopotamia by Theban wardens of the Egyptiac World's southern marches whose latent militarism had been aroused by the Asian barbarians' impact. But the drama which had opened with the Hyksos' unprovoked assault on the Egyptiac Society, and had found its denouement in this effective Egyptiac counter-stroke and in the consequent encounters between an Egyptiac Society that had thus been galvanized into new life and the Hittite and Babylonian successors of the Sumeric Society, might have been expected thereafter to peter out, without having sown fresh dragon-tooth seeds of *karma*, when 'the New Empire' of Egypt fell into decay and was overrun in its turn by barbarian invaders. At this juncture, however, History repeated itself; for the Aramaic invaders of a dissolving Egyptiac New Empire's domain in Syria swept on into Mesopotamia and surged up against Assyria, as the previous Hyksos invaders of a dissolving Egyptiac Middle Empire's Asian domain had swept on into the Nile Valley and surged up against the Thebaid; and this recurrence of an untoward constellation of historical circumstances generated a concatenation of encounters by begetting a second tragedy in which the motif of the preceding drama reproduced itself on a larger scale and with greater violence.

The backwash from a barbarian flood that had been engulfing the domain of a neighbouring society infuriated the Assyrian wardens of the Babylonian World's northern marches as it had infuriated the Theban wardens of the southern marches of the Egyptiac World;² and on this occasion, as on that, the sins of barbarian aggressors who had aroused so formidable a latent force were not visited solely on the heads of these aggressors' children; for the Assyrian militarists who had been goaded into counter-aggression by a provocative challenge from outlying Aramaean members of a nascent Syriac Society fell upon all their neighbours indiscriminately, without sparing either the unoffending members of the Syriac Society west of the Euphrates or the surviving fragments of an already shattered Hittite Society astride the Taurus or even their

¹ See I. i. 105; p. 448, above, and the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 197-208.

² See II. ii. 133-5, and pp. 439-40, above.

own kinsmen in the interior of a Babylonian World of which the Assyrian marchmen themselves were members and which it was their historic mission not to attack but to defend.

It will be seen that this 'Hyksos-Aramaean' or 'Theban-Assyrian' concatenation of two encounters overlapped in the Time-dimension with the Herodotean concatenation whose fourth link was still in process of being forged in the twentieth century of the Christian Era; and, though the two chains cannot be reduced to a single series, they also cannot be wholly disentangled from one another.

In the first of the four successive tragedies in the Herodotean tetralogy the outcome of a drama that had the Western Mediterranean Basin for its theatre was influenced, as we have noticed,¹ by the course of a contemporary drama, performed in the South-West Asian 'Fertile Crescent', which was the second of the two tragedies in the Theban-Assyrian series. The *furor Assyriacus* first undesignedly handicapped the Phoenicians and Tyrrhenians in their maritime competition with the Hellenes by harrying their continental homelands in the Levant, and then likewise undesignedly helped them to retrieve their position in the Mediterranean *vis-à-vis* the Hellenes by preparing the ground in South-West Asia and Egypt for the rapid establishment of an Achaemenian Empire that was to give the Syrophoenicians a powerful backing. The Assyrians had made the Achaemenian Empire's fortune, before the Achaemenidae had been heard of, by provoking the consolidation of a Median successor-state whose Assyrian spoils Cyrus the Achaemenid took over, and they had also facilitated the Achaemenian empire-builders' subsequent task by breaking, for their benefit, the spirit of the peoples of South-West Asia and Egypt.

Thereafter, this Assyro-Persian second link in a Theban-Assyrian chain became inseparably intertwined with the Perso-Macedonian second link in the Herodotean chain; for the encounters with the Babylonian Civilization that had been forced upon its Hittite, Syriac, and Egyptian neighbours by successive explosions of Assyrian militarism in the ninth, eighth, and seventh centuries B.C. had brought the Assyrians' victims into intimate relations with one another as well as with the Babylonian World; and this fusion of divers cultures that had been a by-product of the *furor Assyriacus* was extended and intensified when the impact of Hellenic militarism in and after the generation of Alexander the Great brought the Indic and the Sinic Society into contact both with Hellenism and with the four societies that had already been broken up by an Assyrian hammer and thrown together into an Achaemenian melting-pot. In the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic and Oriental history the progressive penetration of the Babylonian, Hittite, and Egyptian societies by the Syriac culture, which had been taking place first under Assyrian assault and battery and latterly under an Achaemenian *agis*, was overtaken and challenged by the ubiquitous radiation of the Hellenic culture in the train of Macedonian and Roman *conquistadores*. For a thousand years, running from Alexander's passage of the Dardanelles to the final liquidation of an Alexander's and a Scipio's

¹ On pp. 421 and 424-6, above.

work by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, the Syriac and Hellenic Civilizations were competing for the conversion of Babylonian, Hittite, and Egyptian souls;¹ and this competition, which was one of the major incidents in both Syriac and Hellenic history, is a common episode in which our two concatenations of encounters are inseparably implicated with one another.

If Herodotus had happened to be born into the post-Alexandrine instead of the pre-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history, his unrivalled genius for finding a clue to the tangled skein which is every oecumenical historian's raw material would assuredly have led him to take this post-Alexandrine *Kulturkampf*, in preference to a pre-Alexandrine military conflict between the Achaemenian Empire and the city-states of European Greece, as the point of departure for his own reconstruction of a history of Mankind which presented itself to his eyes as a concatenation of encounters between the divers civilizations in which the Spirit of Man had expressed itself. And indeed this brilliant Hellenic discoverer of the historical phenomenon of concatenations could have found no better vantage-point if the chance that so capriciously allots the time and place of each individual's birth had condemned Herodotus to be born into a twentieth-century Western World; for, in the perspective of an observer posted in that society in that age, the story of the post-Alexandrine competition between the Syriac culture and Hellenism for the conversion of souls still manifested itself to be the stem from which all living branches of human history had ramified.

A Hellenism which in the fourth century B.C. had launched out on a new career of expansion had not passed away till it had made an impact on every other living civilization in the Old World; one response to the challenge of these impacts had been the epiphany of the higher religions; these higher religions had served as chrysalises from which all the old-world civilizations of the third generation had emerged; and one of these tertiary civilizations, in the modern chapter of its history, had brought all other living civilizations into contact with one another by spreading its own tentacles all round the globe. In fact, the histories of all the higher religions and all the civilizations except the Mayan and the Sumerian and the Indus Culture and the Shang Culture could have been housed by an imaginary twentieth-century Herodotus in the authentic Herodotus's capacious house of many mansions; and, in taking a concatenation of encounters as the ground plan for his masterpiece of literary architecture, Herodotus was showing a penetrating insight into the structure of an oecumenical historian's subject-matter; for these encounters between societies that are one another's contemporaries are evidently extremely prehensile; they readily interlock; and the two intertwined concatenations that we have traced out have proved to embrace, between them, the greater part of post-primitive human history down, not merely to the fifth century B.C., but to the twentieth century of the Christian Era.

¹ See pp. 442-6, above.

(II) ROLES, REACTIONS, AND DENOUEMENTS

(a) AGENTS AND REAGENTS

Our survey of encounters between civilizations that are one another's contemporaries, and of the concatenations in which these encounters are apt to interlock, has already brought to light a diversity in the roles played by the actors in these social dramas. In each play, and indeed in each act of any one of them, there is a party that precipitates the encounter by taking the initiative and there is another party that reacts to this assault by endeavouring to shake off the ascendancy which the seizure of the initiative has placed in his assailant's hands.

It is no doubt conceivable that the original agent's initiative may be so disconcerting, or his intrinsic strength, vigour, and efficiency so predominant, that the assaulted party may be subjugated or even annihilated without ever having succeeded in offering any resistance whatsoever. Within the five or six thousand years during which the species of human society known as civilizations had been in existence down to the time of writing, a number of primitive societies had suffered the fate of annihilation at the hands of representatives of this younger and more potent variety of their kind;¹ but examples of this decisively simple outcome of an encounter between contemporaries would have been hard to find in instances in which both the parties were civilizations. Societies of this younger type were insured against a doom to which primitive societies were prone to succumb by the relatively considerable size of their areas and populations,² in which civilizations even of the lowest physical calibre far outstripped primitive societies of the largest order of physical magnitude.³ The normal fate of the bodies social of civilizations that had been prostrated by the impact of aggressive contemporaries had been, not extermination, but subjugation; and the historical evidence showed

¹ See I. i. 148-9.

² See *ibid.*

³ In the post-Columbian history of the New World the comparative density of the agricultural population in the domains of the Central American and Andean societies was no doubt one of the reasons why these 'Indians' survived the fearful experience of the Spanish conquest and domination, when the sparse population of hunters in North America was supplanted by the agricultural colonists who streamed across the Atlantic to create the United States. It is noteworthy that the north-western outposts of a subjugated Central American Society in New Mexico managed to survive the conquest of their country by the United States no less successfully than their kinsmen across the border managed to live on under the régimes of the Viceroyalty of New Spain and its successor-state the Republic of Mexico. Even the culturally more backward agricultural peoples of Southern Appalachia survived the ordeal of being deported from their homes in the south-eastern section of the United States and being deposited in reservations beyond the Mississippi which were eventually engulfed in the State of Oklahoma (see p. 36, n. 1, above).

At the same time, the survival of the scions of the Andean and Central American civilizations and the disappearance of the primitive societies of North America cannot be accounted for wholly by the differences between these peoples of the New World, in the matter of their comparative levels of culture and comparative densities of population, at the time of their subjugation by their conquerors from the other side of the Atlantic. We have already noticed in another context (in II. i. 211-27) that there was an historic difference between the respective attitudes of the Catholic and the Protestant conquerors of the 'Indians' towards their victims. The victims of the Protestant conquerors had the misfortune to be reckoned as 'Natives' by a New Israel whose preoccupation with the historical books of the Old Testament had infected them with a race-feeling that remained foreign to the outlook of the Castilian successors of the Cid and Sertorius—cruel and rapacious though these *conquistadores* were.

that it would be rash to assume, in any instance in which both parties were still alive, that the subjugation of one of them by the other was the end of the story, however desperate the subjugated party's initial discomfiture and discouragement.

A striking example of a subjugation that had every appearance of being definitive was the prostration of the Mexic and Andean societies after the military overthrow of the Aztec and Inca Powers by the Castilian pioneers of one of the civilizations of the Old World.¹ Yet the judgement, hazarded in an earlier passage of this Study,² that these two subjugated civilizations of the New World might be considered to have been completely incorporated into the Western Christian body social by the time of writing, might have to be suspended in the light of the surprisingly different denouement that had eventually declared itself in certain comparable cases.

An Arabic Muslim Civilization which had been swallowed up by an Iranic Muslim Civilization in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era had unexpectedly re-emerged in the nineteenth century, after a three-hundred-years-long living death in the belly of the whale,³ to reassert itself by taking an individual path of its own towards the goal of Westernization. The Oriental societies that had lain inert for more than a hundred years, after their Achaemenian house of many mansions had suddenly been brought tumbling about their ears by the blast of an apparently superhuman Alexander's thunderbolt, had lived on to give a counter-shock to their Hellenic conquerors by proving after all to have been, not permanently paralysed, but merely temporarily stunned; and this trick, that was played on the Ptolemies by their Egyptiac subjects and on the Seleucidae by the Jews at and after the turn of the third and second centuries B.C., was likewise played on British rulers of India in the twentieth century of the Christian Era by Indian subjects whose nineteenth-century acquiescence in a British Rāj was proved by their twentieth-century reaction against the same British régime to have been no more than a temporary psychological effect of eighteenth-century political and social tribulations. On the evidence of these three other cases it would have been more prudent in the Central American case to refrain from pre-judging the question whether the Mexican Revolution of A.D. 1910 would prove in the event to have inaugurated the last stage in the Westernization of a subjugated Central American Civilization or the first stage in a reaction of the submerged society which—to judge by the history of the Oriental reactions to the impact of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism—might be none the less vigorous and effective in the long run for having been so long delayed owing to the severity of the shock that had been administered four hundred years before by an alien aggressor's sudden stunning blow.

The truth would appear to be that Life, so long as even a spark of it survives, is irreconcilable with permanent passivity; and on this showing we may expect that there will always be more than one act in the drama of any encounter between societies in which both parties are civilizations,

¹ See IV. iv. 79-81 and V. v. 90-93.

² In IV. iv. 81.

³ See IV. iv. 113-14.

and in which the party that suffers assault will therefore *ex hypothesi* have been proof against the conclusive fate of annihilation. Even when the assaulted party's life has been reduced by the severity of its experience to a state of 'living death', the original act of aggression by which the encounter has been precipitated will stimulate the victim to react in some way sooner or later. In terms that have become familiar in this Study, an encounter between civilizations that are one another's contemporaries may be described as being one terrestrial manifestation of the cosmic action of Challenge-and-Response;¹ and the particular response which this particular challenge evokes will bring into play the dramatic motif of *peripeteia* or 'the reversal of roles,'² since the reaction, however feeble it may be, will, as far as it goes, be an endeavour on the victim's part to wrest the initiative out of the assailant's hands.

These terms 'assailant' and 'victim' are not very happily chosen; for, while they have the practical merit of conveying the diversity in the character of the roles in the drama of an encounter between contemporaries, they import a connotation of violence, wickedness, and suffering which are not inherent in this dramatic situation, however few of the encounters known to History might in fact have been entirely gentle, innocent, and innocuous. However that may be, the ethically colourless terms 'agent' and 'reagent' seem preferable to the prejudicial terms 'assailant' and 'victim' for designating two characters in our drama for which we need to find distinctive names in order to bring out the distinction between the parts which these characters play. Now that we have identified the roles and have labelled the characters, we can go on to survey the principal alternative possible types of reaction and the principal alternative possible denouements in encounters of this kind.

(b) ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE REACTIONS

In surveying the alternative types of reaction it may be convenient to begin with those that are retorts in kind to the action by which they have been evoked, and to pass the rest in review in an ascending order of the degree of their difference in character from the challenges to which they are responses.

The most conspicuous form of a retort in kind is a reply to force by force which is one of the commonest of the motifs that have presented themselves in our survey of historic encounters.³

For example, the Hindu and Orthodox Christian victims of aggressive Iranic Muslim militarism retorted by turning militant themselves and showing their teeth to their oppressors. This was the Sikhs' and the Marāthās' retort to the Mughals and the hajduks' and the klephts' retort⁴ to the 'Osmanlis. Even a moribund Syriac World and its nascent Arabic successor summoned up the military spirit to evict the Crusaders from all except their Andalusian and Sicilian conquests at the expense of Dār-al-Islām; and the apparently unwarlike Greek Orthodox Christians were stung by the outrage of the Fourth Crusade into embarking on the

¹ See II. i. 271-99.

² See IV. iv. 245-61.

³ On pp. 106-453, *passim*, above, where some account will be found of all the episodes cited below in the present chapter.

⁴ See V. v. 296-302.

perilous adventure of a resistance movement which succeeded in recapturing Constantinople from the Frankish usurpers within fifty-seven years of the date of their seizure of the Imperial City, and in evicting them from their last foothold in the Morea before the Moreot Greeks forfeited to the 'Osmanlis the liberty that they had recovered from the Franks by the strength of their own right arms.

In an encounter between the Hellenes and their Oriental contemporaries, the Arsacidae, the Sasanidae, and the Primitive Muslim Arabs in turn successfully ventured to try conclusions with a Macedonian military machine that had won a reputation for invincibility by overthrowing the Achaemenian Empire and with a Roman military machine that had captured this reputation from the Macedonians by overthrowing Macedonia itself. The Modern Western Powers retorted effectively to their long-victorious Ottoman assailants' superiority in military technique by mastering the tricks of their adversaries' trade; and Russian autocrats twice over made the same retort to technologically superior Modern Western militarists. A Muscovy that had all but succumbed to Polish aggression in the seventeenth century succeeded in foiling Swedish aggression in the eighteenth century and French aggression in the nineteenth century thanks to Peter the Great's effective adoption of the Modern Western military technique of the day; and a post-Petrine Russia that had collapsed in the World War of A.D. 1914-18 under the impact of a German war-machine driven by the power of twentieth-century Western Industrialism succeeded in triumphantly repelling a second and more formidable German attack in the World War of A.D. 1939-45 thanks to Stalin's effective industrialization of the Soviet Union during an inter-war breathing-space.

Between the date of the military collapse of Germany in A.D. 1945 and the moment in the autumn of A.D. 1949 when these lines were written, Russia was believed by Western observers to have made a third retort in kind to a third challenge from the West in the same field of technological warfare by mastering the 'know-how' of manufacturing an atomic bomb which had been discovered in the United States in time for use in A.D. 1945 in dealing a 'knock-out blow' to Japan. The Japanese had committed the folly of courting destruction by wantonly attacking the United States in A.D. 1941 because they had grossly overestimated their own relative military strength; this inept miscalculation was the nemesis of deceptively facile Japanese victories over technologically backward Russian and Chinese opponents in the course of the preceding fifty years; and these victories had been rewards for the shrewdness of Japanese Elder Statesmen when they had met a challenge of Western military superiority in the third quarter of the nineteenth century by a response which had shot ahead of Peter the Great's and had anticipated Stalin's.

Such illustrations of retorts in kind on the military plane are the traditional classic examples of this rather unimaginative type of response to the challenge of an encounter; but on closer examination some of these cases prove to be not quite the strict observances of the *lex talionis* that at first sight they might seem to be.

The Modern Western Powers, for example, did not simply take the

Ottoman art of war as they found it; they proceeded to make notable improvements on it at the very time when the 'Osmanlis themselves were losing their grip on an instrument that had been of their own invention.¹ The 'Osmanlis had achieved their previous victories over the Westerners and the Mamlüks, and the Mamlüks their own previous victories over the Westerners and the Mongols, not just by pitting pugnacity against pugnacity, but by bringing a creative faculty into action against opponents who had lapsed into resting on their oars. The Mamlüks had worsted the Western cataphracts and the Eurasian horse-archers by creating a cavalry that was both heavy-armed and disciplined,² and the 'Osmanlis had worsted the Mamlüks by out-trumping a disciplined cavalry with the new weapon of a disciplined infantry.³ The horse-archer and the cataphract were thus eventually driven off the field by Mamlük and Ottoman war-machines which triumphed over them in virtue of being not simply retorts in kind but in some sense new devices of superior efficacy; and the two thenceforth obsolete types of cavalry that had held the field for so many centuries had originally won their entry into it as likewise new and likewise superior inventions in virtue of which the Arsacidae had managed to defeat a disciplined infantry of the Macedonian and Roman schools.⁴

A Communist Russia, too, was not content simply to master the military technique of a Germany and a United States who were her successive Western enemies. While with one hand she was retorting in kind to Germany by harnessing Industrialism to War and retorting in kind to the United States by equipping herself with atomic weapons, her other hand was busy all the time with the creation of a new form of warfare in which the old-fashioned method of fighting by physical force of arms was to be replaced by a spiritual combat in which the battlefield would be the Psyche, the troops would be emotions and ideas, and the master weapon would be a propaganda inspired by an 'ideology' whose captivating power might prove more potent for the achievement of war-aims than even the explosive power of a bomb charged with devastatingly fissile matter.

In inventing 'the cold war' the Russians might prove to have succeeded in wresting at last out of Western hands an initiative which the West had won and maintained in a perennial competition with Russia on the military plane by first adopting an Ottoman military technique and then improving this borrowed art out of all recognition by enlisting in its service an Industrial Revolution and a mastery of atomic energy. It was true that 'the cold war' was not created by the Russians *ex nihilo*, but, like every other human invention, was partly inspired by one of Mankind's previous achievements. The instrument of propaganda, which Communism brought into action as a new weapon in the arena of mundane power politics, had first been fashioned by the missionaries of the higher religions for the more etherial purpose of converting souls. In any deconsecrated society—post-Christian, post-Muslim, or post-Mahayanian—this once religious art was at *Homo Obcaecatus*'s disposal for

¹ See III. iii. 46-47.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 450-2.

³ See IV. iv. 447-50.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 439-45.

baser uses; and *Homo Obcaecatus Occidentalis* had actually anticipated *Homo Obcaecatus Russicus* in thus bringing propaganda down to earth. A Modern Western society of shopkeepers had turned the religious art of propaganda to account for the commercial advertisement of a mechanized industry's wares; but it had been left by the Modern Westerners to their Russian contemporaries to hit upon the new idea of applying the missionary's methods of influencing his public to the mischievous business of politics instead of to the sordid business of economics; and, when thus suddenly faced with a systematically propagated Communist 'ideology', the West found itself momentarily at a loss for a reply.

While the Communist propaganda could hardly improve on the practice of contemporary Western commercial advertising in the lavishness of its outlay or in the painstakingness of its 'market research', it did show itself capable of reawakening a long dormant enthusiasm in spiritually starved post-Christian Western souls that were so hungry for the bread without which Man shall not live that they recklessly swallowed the word which Communism gave them, without pausing to ask whether this was God's¹ word or Antichrist's. The Marxian Gospel was able to evoke this enthusiastic response because it speciously professed to offer to Man a matchless opportunity for satisfying a desire which was the deepest and noblest motive in Human Nature. Man is spiritually frustrated if he cannot invest his petty transient personal life with abiding spiritual significance by devoting it to some cause that manifestly transcends it in spiritual value; and Communism proffered to Man an objective that might seem worthier than any that had been visible on his mental horizon since the latter-day eclipse of Christianity. Communism called upon post-Christian Man to cure himself of a childish nostalgia for a justly discredited otherworldly utopia by transferring his allegiance from a non-existent God to a very present Human Race to whose service he could devote all his adult powers by working for the attainment of an Earthly Paradise. In an oecumenical struggle between a Communist Russia and a secularized Modern Western Society for the allegiance of the rest of Mankind the apologists for a dampingly prosaic secular Modern Western way of life might find themselves hard put to it to 'sell' their unconvincing apotheosis of the self-interested individual human being in competition with this captivating Communist cult of the colossal idol of Collective Humanity.

It is evident that, in inventing a post-Christian 'ideological' warfare as a reply to a post-Christian warfare waged by physical force, a Communist Russia had crossed the indeterminate borderline between a retort in kind and a retort which was telling in virtue of its difference in character from the challenge to which it was a response. 'The cold war' was a response on the plane of propaganda to a challenge on the plane of physical armaments, and this was not the first response on a non-military plane that the old-fashioned military challenge had ever evoked.

In an encounter between a Syriac and a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Society we have already seen the Phoenicians make an effective non-military retort to the military aggression of an expanding Hellenic World

¹ Matt. iv. 4; Luke iv. 4.

that had enjoyed the two decisive military advantages of holding the interior lines and commanding a superiority in numbers. The hard-pressed Phoenicians had saved themselves from military disaster by resorting to the non-military counter-measure of political combination on a grand scale, and we have observed that this Phoenician manoeuvre of changing the ground of competition proved effective because the Hellenes were unable or unwilling to emulate the Phoenicians' statesman-like moves on the new ground on to which they had been drawn by the Phoenicians' counter-initiative. While the sixth-century Libyphoenician city-states purchased security by acquiescing in the hegemony of Carthage, and the sixth-century Syrophoenician city-states by acquiescing in the hegemony of the Achaemenidae, the contemporary Hellenic city-states forfeited their previous military ascendancy over their Phoenician rivals by failing to bring themselves, for their part, to pay the inexorable price of a political union that was now the key to strength on the new terms of competition which the Phoenicians' initiative had set.

A similarly effective political response to a military challenge was made by Russian Orthodox Christendom after the Tatars' facile subjugation of a House of Rurik which had fallen a prey to these Eurasian Nomad aggressors largely because it had been divided against itself.¹ How were the subjugated Russians ever to shake off the yoke of a steppe-empire which commanded all the Nomad military man-power of the great open spaces between Russia and Khwārizm? Their only hope of liberation lay in achieving a concentration of Russian political power that would be a match for the military power of Juji's enormous province of Chingis Khan's universal state; and this retort to a challenge on one plane by a response on another was duly accomplished by a line of Muscovite empire-builders who were so grimly intent on their patriotic purpose that they did not shrink from achieving it at the all but prohibitive price of bringing the Medusa head of a defunct Byzantine autocracy out of a chamber of horrors in the museum of Russia's Orthodox Christian cultural heritage.

Such retorts on the political plane to assaults on the military plane may be supplemented by 'geopolitical' manoeuvres. After the Phoenician rivals of the pre-Alexandrine Hellenes had managed to bring their adversaries' aggression to a halt by concentrating their own political forces under the hegemony of two imperial Powers, these Carthaginian and Achaemenian empires attempted to crush the foiled Hellenic aggressors by simultaneous enveloping movements. A Russia which had retorted to the aggression of the Tatars by acquiescing in the autocracy of a Muscovite Third Rome proceeded to turn the northern flank of a Eurasian Nomad World—and of an Islamic Society which by that time had incorporated into itself the western half of Chingis Khan's gigantic ranch—by carrying her eastern frontier forward from the River Moskva to the Pacific Ocean; and a simultaneous envelopment of Dār-al-Islām on the south was the contemporary Western World's retort to an Otto-

¹ Between A.D. 1055 and A.D. 1228 there had been eighty fratricidal wars in Russia between rival Rurikid princes (Vernadsky, G.: *Kievan Russia* (New Haven 1948, Yale University Press), p. 316).

man frontal attack on Western Christendom in the basins of the Danube and the Mediterranean.

Both these anti-Islamic encircling movements were executed in a novel element in which the encircled adversary found himself at a disadvantage. The Cossacks foiled the Nomads by learning how to thread their way through woods, which these steppe-rangers dared not enter, along waterways that the Nomads had learnt to cross but not to navigate.¹ The Portuguese out-trumped 'Osmanlis' who in Mediterranean waters, as well as on continental ground, had established a military ascendancy over their Western Christian adversaries. The Portuguese wrested from Nature the secret of how to navigate an Ocean that had hitherto successfully defied Man's efforts to master it;² and, in thus shifting the ground of the competition between the Islamic World and the West from the field of military armaments and tactics on land and on land-locked seas to the field of oceanic ship-building³ and seamanship, they snatched the initiative out of Ottoman hands. An Ottoman navy that knew how to meet its Western opponents on equal terms in the Mediterranean found itself swept off the Indian Ocean by ocean-faring Westerners whose mastery of their own element decisively tipped the scales against the 'Osmanlis' geopolitical advantage of here holding the interior lines.⁴

¹ The exception that had proved the rule of the Eurasian Nomads' unenterprising indifference to the possibility of utilizing rivers as means of communication had been the use made of the waterways of the Indus and its tributaries in the second and the last century B.C. by Saka conquerors of a Bactrian Greek Empire who had perhaps first taken to the water in their previous haunts along the banks of the Middle Oxus and the Lower Jaxartes (see V. v. 603).

² The ultimate failure of the Scandinavians to bring the New World into continuous communication with the Old World by a North Atlantic route which they had come within an ace of opening up has been noticed in II. ii. 438-43.

³ The swiftness of the evolution of an ocean-worthy type of ship on the Atlantic seaboard of Western Christendom in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era is discussed in XI. ix. 364-8.

⁴ The Portuguese achievement of learning how to navigate the Ocean was, of course, not merely a decisive event in an encounter between the West and the Islamic World; it was an epoch-making event in human history, because it made Man master of a medium of communication that was sufficiently conductive, and near enough to being ubiquitous, to knit the entire habitable surface of the planet together into a home for an oecumenical society embracing the whole of Mankind. At the time of writing in the first century of a post-Modern Age of Western history, the social unification of the World which had been brought about by the Portuguese invention of an ocean-faring sailing-ship had found new instruments in the aeroplane and the broadcasting station; but, however high the latter-day conquests of the ether and the air might rank in the honours' list of scientific inventions, it was manifest that they could not compare with the conquest of the Ocean in point of social importance. As means to the social end of knitting the whole of Mankind into a single society, aerial navigation and wireless communication merely served to draw closer a world-encompassing net which Man's conquest of the Ocean had long since flung round the globe. The decisive step in the unification of the World had been the invention of the type of ocean-going sailing-vessel that came to be known as 'the ship' *par excellence*, and Henry the Navigator and his companions had not only required no successors; they had also had no predecessors; for the enduring unification of the whole surface of the globe, which was the fruit of their work, was a social achievement whose consequences in its own sphere differed in a degree that virtually amounted to a difference in kind from the effects of the fitful inter-communication between the civilizations of the Old World that had resulted in earlier ages from the achievements of Minoan pioneers in the navigation of inland seas and of Nomad pioneers in the taming of horses. A discussion of the historical significance of the replacement of Bābur's steppe-ranging horse by da Gama's ocean-faring ship as the sovereign instrument of human intercourse, at and after the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, will be found in Toynbee, A. J.: *Civilization on Trial* (London 1948, Cumberlege), pp. 62-96: 'The Unification of the World and the Change in Historical Perspective'.

The Modern Western Christian mariners who thus foiled the Ottoman militarists by taking to the Ocean did not entirely break away from the *modus operandi* of the adversaries to whom they were making their novel retort; for, though commerce was the principal quest of the new-fangled Portuguese ocean-faring ships, and though the Manchester School of nineteenth-century English political philosophy may not have been altogether mistaken in idealizing commerce as the beneficently pacific world-unifying activity of Modern Western Man,¹ the progeny of the Crusaders had not undergone so miraculous a change of heart as to have become proof against the temptation of running their predatory ancestral pursuits of piracy and empire-building in double harness with the respectably lawful occasions of their ocean voyages. A less dubious example of a pacific encircling movement in reply to a military frontal attack is the encirclement of the Babylonian World by the Syriac Society in the Achaemenian Age as a result of a cultural conversion of Iranian barbarians who had become the rulers of a universal state.

The missionaries of the Syriac culture who had thus defeated their Babylonian conquerors in a competition for the captivation of Iranian souls had not made the long overland trek from 'the Land beyond the River' to the lands beyond the Zagros as military or even as merchant adventurers; they were 'displaced persons' who had been deported by Assyrian and Babylonian war-lords with the object of making it once for all impossible for them to re-establish their beloved Israel's or Judah's shattered military and political power; and their conquerors' calculation had proved correct as far as it had gone; for neither the Assyrian nor the Neo-Babylonian imperial régime had ever been challenged thereafter by any armed uprising of these deportees. The reaction by which the Babylonian militarists' Syriac victims eventually wrested the initiative out of their oppressors' hands had been quite beyond the oppressors' purview because it was on a wholly non-military plane. The oppressors had so utterly failed to reckon with the possibility of any retort on the cultural plane from victims whom they were effectively rendering militarily and politically impotent that with their own hands they had planted them in a cultural mission-field which these exiles would never have visited if they had not been posted there by force against their will.

In thus exerting itself to impress its cultural influence on the Gentiles among whom it had been scattered abroad, a Syriac diaspora in 'the cities of the Medes'² and in Babylonia was being moved by a concern to preserve a communal identity that the oppressor had intended to destroy by uprooting these deportees from their national home. In the histories of the Jewish and other *déracinés*, the same concern for self-preservation *in partibus peregrinorum* was, however, more apt to express itself in the antithetical policy of self-isolation, since a scattered and physically impotent minority might more reasonably hope for success in the limited task of defending its own cultural heritage against contamination through the influence of the surrounding Gentile majority than in the ambitiously offensive-defensive cultural strategy of seeking to ensure its own sur-

¹ See IV. iv. 181-4 for a critique of the Manchester School's outlook.

² 2 Kings xvii. 6 and xviii. 11.

vival by converting an alien majority to the minority's peculiar way of life. Self-isolation in reply to molestation is another variety of the type of reaction that operates on a different plane from the action to which it is a rejoinder; and this policy of 'isolationism' presents itself in its simplest form when it is practised, not as a *tour de force* by a diaspora without a home of its own, but as a line of least resistance by a society whose habitat happens to be a physical fastness.

An insular Japanese Society, that was eventually to be driven into responding by a compromising retort in kind to the irresistible importunity of an industrialized nineteenth-century Western Civilization, had once successfully met the less potent impact of a pre-industrial West by insulating itself within the then still effective natural frontiers of its coastline; and this retort of physical self-isolation which a seventeenth-century Japan was able to make to Portuguese intruders on the strength of her insularity was made to the same unwelcome strangers by a contemporary Abyssinia¹ on the strength of her precipitous *cañons* and her impregnable *ambas*. The lesser highland fastnesses of Sasūn and the Tur-'Abdīn enabled a Gregorian Armenian and a Jacobite Syrian fragment of the same Monophysite fossil of an extinct Syriac Society to have recourse to the same policy;² and a plateau of Tibet which dwarfed the plateau of Abyssinia provided an all but inaccessible highland fastness for a Tantric Mahayanian fossil of an extinct Indic Society;³ but none of these resorts to a physical isolationism that was Man's occasional unearned increment from Nature's geographical caprice could compare in historical interest and importance with the psychological isolationism which was a diaspora's retort to the same challenge of a threat to its survival; for a diaspora had to face this threat in geographical circumstances in which, so far from being peculiarly sheltered by some natural rampart or some natural moat, it was peculiarly at the mercy of its neighbours through having been artificially deprived of the home of its own which had been a normal community's patrimony.

While isolationism of either the physical or the psychological type is a conspicuous instance of a retort that is dissimilar in character to the act of aggression which has provoked it, this elusive retort to molestation is a strictly negative way of seeking to capture the initiative by carrying the encounter on to new ground; and, wherever this negative reaction has met with any measure of success, it will usually be found to have been accompanied by other reactions which have likewise differed in kind from the original act of aggression but which have been, in themselves, of a positive order. In the life of a diaspora its psychological self-isolation from the surrounding Gentile majority would be psychologically intolerable if this daily ordeal were not felt to be a necessary negative means to the supremely desirable positive end of safeguarding a precious cultural heritage; and an obstinately peculiar people that was militarily and politically at the surrounding majority's mercy would also be unable to hold its own in the pursuit of this aim of cultural survival if it did not at the same time develop on the economic plane a special efficiency in the exploitation of such economic opportunities as had been left open to

¹ See II. ii. 365-7.

² See II. ii. 258.

³ See II. ii. 405, n. 1.

it by the surrounding majority's inadvertence. An almost uncanny aptitude for economic specialization and a meticulous observance of jots and tittles of a traditional law are indeed a diaspora's two main positive devices for providing itself with artificial substitutes for the loaves and fishes and the *lares et penates* that are the natural birthright of unuprooted communities.¹

The device of economic specialization, which is one element in a diaspora's response to the supreme challenge of having been uprooted from its home, may also be hit upon by an unuprooted society that has not been deprived of its home but has merely been debarred from continuing to enlarge its bounds. In other contexts² we have noticed how, when the Hellenes were prevented by the establishment of the Carthaginian and Achaemenian empires from continuing to provide for an increasing population by enlarging the geographical domain of a traditional subsistence economy, they responded by developing a new-fangled economy of specialized production for export, in exchange for imported food-supplies, that enabled them to find a livelihood for a larger population within now stationary geographical limits.

The device of replying to force by a retort on the cultural plane, which is the second string to a diaspora's bow, has likewise also been practised by societies that have been hard hit by the impact of an alien Power without having been reduced to a diaspora's desperate straits. The Orthodox Christian *ra'īyeh* of the 'Osmanlis and the Hindu *ra'īyeh* of the Mughals both alike succeeded in turning the tables on these victorious men of the sword by a militarily impotent penman's intellectual counter-stroke. The Muslim conquerors of India and Orthodox Christendom allowed the mirage of their own past military triumphs to keep them blinded to the realities of a subsequent chapter of history in which their kingdom was being divided and given to the Franks, till their dethronement by these new amphibious lords of Sea and Land was already an accomplished fact. The *ra'īyeh*, whose one surviving weapon was the nimbleness of their wits, foresaw the coming triumph of the West in time once again to adapt themselves to a new order. A mental flexibility that they had once displayed in mastering the arts of their Turkish conquerors' Islamic Civilization now served them equally well in another timely transfer of their cultural allegiance. This manoeuvre of the Brahmins and the Phanariots—which might be described as a 'mental encirclement' to distinguish it from the geographical encirclement of the same slumbering Islamic World by Portuguese mariners and Cossack backwoodsmen—was a far more effective retort to a Mughal and an Ottoman military domination than the unimaginative reply to force with force which was made by the Marāthās and the klephts.

A Chiot and Bengali intelligentsia's virtuosity in taking the cultural impress of successive alien ascendancies was, on the other hand, a less telling retort to a military conqueror than a Syriac diaspora's feat of impressing its own culture on the Medes and Persians. This Syriac cultural feat of assimilating politically dominant barbarians was emu-

¹ See II. ii. 208-59, and pp. 272-313, above.

² In I. i. 24-26; III. iii. 139-40 and 197; and pp. 429-30, above.

lated by the main body of the Far Eastern Society when it successively assimilated the Khitan, the Kin, and the Manchus; but the Far Eastern culture failed to work the same magic with Mongol barbarians whose barbarism had been fortified with a tincture of the Far Western Christian culture before they had crossed the Great Wall; and the Far Eastern Civilization had never, down to the time of writing, achieved any cultural conquest at all comparable to the Syriac Society's culminating cultural achievement of eventually assimilating the entire body social of a Babylonian Civilization that had originally forced this long-drawn-out encounter upon Syriac victims of an Assyrian militarism.¹ This cultural *revanche* for a military conquest which the Syriac Civilization consummated at a far advanced stage of its own decline and fall was perhaps not, however, so extraordinary a triumph as a posthumous pacific retort to a belated Syriac *coup de force* that was made by the Syriac Society's perennial rival, Hellenism. After a moribund Hellenic Society had received its death-blow from Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors who had swept away the last vestiges of Roman rule over rightfully Syriac territory, Hellenism retorted, as we have seen, in the 'Abbasid Age, by winning an entry for Hellenic philosophy and science into a society that had previously shown itself indifferent to all facets of the Hellenic culture. This posthumous radiation of an abstract of Hellenism produced an afterglow of Hellenic intellectual activity in an Arabic medium that was as brilliant as the colours cast upon a cloud-banked eastern sky by a sun whose disk has already disappeared from view below a darkening western horizon.

All these non-violent responses to the challenge of force that have so far been passed in review are, of course, eclipsed by the supremely pacific and at the same time supremely positive response of creating a higher religion. The impact of an Hellenic Society on its Oriental contemporaries was answered in this fashion by the epiphany of Cybele-worship, Isis-worship, Mithraism, Christianity, and the Mahāyāna in the bosom of an Hellenic internal proletariat in which the children of the conquered Oriental societies had been forcibly enrolled. A military impact of the Babylonian Society on the Syriac evoked the epiphany of Judaism and Zoroastrianism; and the Turkish conquests of a Hindu and

¹ The measure of the difference is given by the survival in China, down to the twentieth century of the Christian Era, of an Islam that had been introduced in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by Muslim military colonists in the service of the Mongol conquerors. These enclaves of Muslim population in China had so far successfully resisted assimilation, though they were geographically isolated from the main body of Dār-al-Islām. One of the secrets of this Chinese Muslim diaspora's success in preserving its identity was no doubt its tact in falling in with traditional Chinese ways in trivial matters of external observance which would have been shockingly conspicuous to non-Chinese Muslim eyes. In the mosque of a Muslim village near Peking which the writer of this Study visited in December 1929 the Arabic texts on the walls were written vertically, Chinese-fashion, instead of being written horizontally from right to left; and the roof-ridges were bestridden by the same figurines of mock-ferocious guardian genii that would have been found there if the building had been a Buddhist or a Taoist temple and not the shrine of a religion which banned 'graven images'. Before the fall of the imperial régime in China, the Chinese Muslims had even reconciled themselves to honouring the reigning emperor in the customary Chinese fashion by setting up tablets in his honour in their places of worship. They had persuaded themselves that this was merely the outward visible sign of a harmless civil rite, and was not 'the abomination of desolation' (see Broomhall, M.: *Islam in China* (London 1910, Morgan and Scott), p. 186).

an Orthodox Christian world were likewise answered on the religious plane by the gospels of Nanak and Bedr-ed-Din. This religious type of response, however, carries us beyond the limits of our present inquiry into the divers ways in which one civilization may respond to a challenge delivered by another; for, when an encounter between two civilizations thus gives occasion for a higher religion to make its appearance on the stage of History, the entry of this new actor signifies the opening of a fresh play with a different cast and plot.

If, on this account, we leave the epiphanies of higher religions out of our reckoning in reviewing the alternative possible reactions to an initiative taken by one of the characters in a play in which the dramatis personae are civilizations, we can perhaps arrive at the following conclusions concerning the relative efficacy of divers types of reaction as alternative methods of wresting the initiative out of the original agent's hands. We may conclude that the least effective reply is the retort in kind, particularly when it is a retort to force by force; that the negative retort of isolationism is less effective than positive retorts on either the economic or the cultural plane; and that, of the divers alternative possible cultural retorts, a pliant receptivity to the culture of a militarily or politically dominant aggressor is of less avail than the resilient spirit that turns the tables on the military conqueror by taking him culturally captive.

(c) ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE DENOUEMENTS

Among the divers variations on the plot of the drama of an encounter between contemporaries, the swiftest and simplest denouement is an outright repulse of the original agent's attempt to induce or compel the reagent to become a convert to the agent's way of life.

This was the outcome of the encounter between the Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Society and the Western Society in its still would-be Christian 'Early Modern' phase. After giving the intrusive culture a trial, the Japanese decided not to allow themselves to be captivated by it, and they gave effect to their decision by expelling the Portuguese traders, suppressing the Japanese converts to a post-Tridentine Catholic Western Christianity, and almost completely insulating Japan from further contact with the Western World.

This is a classic case of the offer and rejection of an alien culture, because the heralds of the Early Modern Western Christian Civilization in Japan lacked the power to impose their way of life by force or even to offer any forcible resistance to their forcible repulse by the Japanese authorities. When a Medieval Western Christian Civilization was repelled by the Muslims and Orthodox Christians, an Islamic Civilization by the Orthodox Christians and Hindus, and a Babylonian Civilization by the Syriac peoples, the reagent who was thus reasserting himself on the cultural plane was retorting to an assault on the original agent's part which had been, not merely violent, but, on the plane of violence, victorious. The Crusaders, 'Osmanlis, Mughals, Assyrians, and Babylonians had made their impact as military aggressors, not as merchants or missionaries; and we have seen that, when the Crusaders' Medieval

Western Christian culture was rejected by Ayyubids and Lascarids, and the Turkish empire-builders' Islamic culture by hajduks and klephts and Marāthās, the rejection took the form of a retort to force by force. We have also seen that the rejection of the Islamic culture by the Phana-riots and the Brahmans took the alternative form of a pacific transfer of cultural allegiance; and that the Syriac victims of Assyrian militarism triumphantly turned the tables on their conquerors without ever having it in their power to fight this cultural battle by force of arms.

While these encounters thus display a wide diversity in the matter of the use of force, they resemble one another in all ending in the same denouement. An encounter between Japan and the West in which the Japanese retorted by force to pacific Western overtures, and an encounter between the Syriac Society and the Babylonian World in which an Assyrian militarism was foiled by its Syriac victims' 'non-violent non-resistance', both ended alike in the rejection of the intrusive culture by the party on which it had impinged.

In a case in which the act of rejection had been consummated, whether by violent or by non-violent measures on the molested society's part, the historian would be justified in concluding that the incident was thereby closed if the societies concerned were extinct by the historian's own day; but, if they were then still alive, he would be better advised to keep an open mind in the light of other passages of history which justified the proverb that 'where there is life there is hope'. An Orthodox Christendom and an Islamic Society that had rejected the Western Civilization in its medieval phase, and a Japanese Society that had subsequently rejected it in its early modern phase, all afterwards fell under its spell when it offered itself for sale in a deconsecrated form in which a lucrative technology had been substituted for a redoubtable Christianity as the pearl of great price which a buyer was invited to acquire. So long as the parties remained alive, it could never be taken for granted that the repulse of an agent's advances was definitive, since History testified that an apparently conclusive rejection had sometimes been followed by a sensational volte-face; and the same caution was advisable in regard to denouements of the antithetical type in which the agent's advances had been so successful that they had resulted, to all appearance, in the cultural conversion of the party to whom they had been addressed; for History also testified that an acceptance, as well as a rejection, of cultural overtures might prove not to have been definitive. Here, again, the historian could not pronounce a confident judgement except in cases where none of the parties to the encounter was any longer alive.

On this test it could be declared with confidence by a Modern Western student of History that a long since extinct Syriac Society had definitively succeeded in assimilating a long since extinct Egyptian Society by converting it to the Monophysite variety of Christianity in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era and to Islam between the ninth century and the thirteenth; and there could likewise be no doubt about an extinct Hellenic Society's success in assimilating an extinct Hittite Society's Etruscan offshoot and Cappadocian main body. A nineteenth-century Western observer might have felt an equal confidence in reckoning

as permanent acquisitions of the Western World the territorial gains that a Medieval Western Christendom had made at Dār-al-Islām's and Orthodox Christendom's expense in the Iberian Peninsula, Sicily, and Southern Italy; but this sanguine Victorian's twentieth-century epigoni might be deterred from endorsing their grandfather's verdict on the outcome of an episode in the medieval chapter of Western history by their own experience of witnessing the reopening of a nineteenth-century issue on which their grandfather's verdict would probably have been no less self-assured. In the nineteenth century of the Christian Era it had looked as if the main body of Orthodox Christendom had made up its mind to cast in its lot with the West, and this Orthodox Christian act of conversion to a secular Modern Western culture seemed to be finally confirmed when, after the World War of A.D. 1914-18, the Ottoman Turks decided at last to follow in their former subjects' footsteps without hesitations or reservations. Yet, at the very moment when the Westernization of the Turks, Albanians, Bulgars, Rumans, Serbs, and Greeks might have been thought to be assured, Russia stepped into the arena to contest the West's cultural conquest of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom's former domain by proclaiming there the gospel of Communism as an alternative ideal to the contemporary Modern Western way of life.

At the time of writing, it was still impossible for an observer to forecast the outcome of this Russian attempt in South-Eastern Europe and Turkey to reverse a process of Westernization that had gone so far as to have come to appear irrevocable before Russia delivered her challenge. But an historian could lay his finger on cases in which a similar process of cultural conversion had in fact been challenged and reversed at a stage at which it had been at least as far advanced.

In a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World, for instance, the dominance of Hellenism seemed in the third century B.C. to be as secure as the dominance of a secular Modern Western culture seemed to be in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era; and on the eve of the first eruption of fanatical Hellenophobia in Egypt *circa* 210 B.C.¹ even an intelligent and perceptive onlooker might have committed himself to the prophecy that the Hittite, Syriac, Egyptiac, and Babylonian worlds, which Hellenism had already subjugated on the political plane, were destined to be converted to the Hellenic culture no less thoroughly than the Hittite Society's already Hellenized Etruscan offshoot. Even if our observer had lived to witness, not only the successive anti-Hellenic outbreaks in Egypt at the turn of the third and second centuries B.C., but also the fateful outbreak in Judaea in 166 B.C., he would probably have been less deeply impressed by these portents of an adverse turn in a cultural tide that had been flowing previously in Hellenism's favour than by the sensational further expansion of the Hellenes' political dominion in 183 B.C., when Demetrius of Bactria achieved at one lightning stroke an Hellenic conquest of India that had proved beyond the range of Alexander the Great.

In this case, however, our acquaintance with the eight-hundred-years-

¹ See V. v. 68.

long subsequent course of an encounter between Hellenism and its Oriental contemporaries informs us that, of all the vast non-Hellenic territories—extending eastward from a Phrygian penumbra of Hellas in Anatolia to the heart of an Indic World in the Jumna-Ganges Duab—which had been conquered by Hellenic arms within 150 years of Alexander's crossing of the Dardanelles, the only fraction that was Hellenized irrevocably in the ultimate event was the fragment of a long since shattered Hittite World that lay to the west of Amanus and Antitaurus. East of that line, which ran at so short a remove to the east of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenism's eastern cultural frontier in the Central Anatolian Desert, the gospel of Hellenism had been decisively rejected everywhere before this cultural defeat was clinched in the seventh century of the Christian Era by the military exploits of the Primitive Muslim Arabs. The denouement of this long-drawn-out drama was the tardy and gradual but ultimately complete and conclusive reversal of a process of Hellenization which had looked irresistible in its heyday.

This dramatic cultural contest between the Hellenic Civilization and its Oriental contemporaries shared the stage of history with another drama in which the same dramatis personae were engaged in the unfolding of a different plot. In the tragedy in which a post-Alexandrine Hellenism was the protagonist the issue was the question whether the Hellenic culture was to be irrevocably accepted or eventually rejected by Oriental societies that had been conquered by Hellenic force of arms, and the denouement was an ultimate expurgation of Hellenism from non-Hellenic souls which had seemed for a time to have been decisively captivated by its charm. In a simultaneously performed mystery play the dramatic theme was not a contest but was an act of creation, and the protagonist was a new-born society of a different species from the civilizations of the second generation whose encounter with one another was the occasion of this protagonist's epiphany. The denouement of this other drama was the entry of a higher religion into the World. The Hellenic Civilization's encounter with the Syriac Civilization gave birth to Christianity, and its encounter with the Indic Civilization gave birth to the Mahāyāna.

The relation between these two plays that were being performed on one stage simultaneously was an ironical one. From the standpoint of the tragedy of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism the nativity play of Christianity and the Mahāyāna was an irrelevant interlude, while from the standpoint of the nativity play the last act in the Hellenic tragedy was an irrelevant epilogue.

The Hellenic tragedy was not concerned with the contemporary epiphany of new societies of a higher order than the Hellenic Civilization and its Oriental adversaries. So long as these new-born higher religions devoted themselves whole-heartedly to their mission of bringing human souls on Earth into a more intimate communion with God than had ever before been within their reach, the religions were above the battle that the civilizations were fighting. It was only in so far as these religions could be tempted into neglecting their Father's business for the pursuit of mundane objectives that they could be enlisted as

gladiators in the conflicting civilizations' arena; and, in so far as they did succumb to this temptation, they were making themselves useful for mundane purposes at the price of selling their heavenly birthright. We have seen Zoroastrianism and Judaism thus miss their true destiny by lending themselves to the mundane enterprise of helping to expel an intrusive Hellenism from Syriac ground. Christianity was guilty of the same spiritually disastrous deviation into a political career when it put on the armour of Nestorius and Eutyches in order to go into action against Hellenism as the champion of a resurgent Syriac culture; and, in the last act of the Hellenic tragedy, Islam was deliberately converted by its own founder from a revelation of God to Arab barbarian souls into an anti-Hellenic engine of physical warfare. In the parallel contest between the Hellenic Civilization and the Indic, Hinduism threw itself with an almost Muhammadan whole-heartedness into an anti-Hellenic cultural campaign in which a Tantric avatar of the Mahāyāna had already half-heartedly implicated itself.

From the standpoint of Civilization, these churches, in thus going into politics, were meritoriously justifying their existence by 'making history', since they were playing a decisive part in an Oriental counter-offensive against Hellenism which was the crowning act in the tragedy of the Hellenes' cultural conflict with the Orientals. Thanks to the intervention of Islam, a Syriac universal state that had been established by the Achaemenidae and had been overthrown by Alexander was re-established in the shape of the Caliphate; thanks to the intervention of Hinduism, an Indic universal state that had been established by the Mauryas and had been swept away by Demetrius of Bactria was re-established by the Guptas. These political achievements of Hinduism and Islam were the conclusive evidences of an intrusive Hellenism's final discomfiture and were on that account events of supreme historical importance from the mundane standpoint of an historical drama in which the *dramatis personae* were civilizations. On the other hand, from the otherworldly standpoint of a mystery play the outcome of a cultural conflict between Hellenism and the contemporary Oriental civilizations was a matter of spiritual indifference. The gospel of Christianity and the Mahāyāna was addressed, not to societies, but to souls; and any soul in any social environment was a potential convert to the way of salvation,¹ whatever might be the colour of the cultural veneer that this soul had casually acquired through the chances and changes of mundane social history.

It will be seen that our religious and our secular drama are written in two different languages which each defy translation into the other. From the religious standpoint of the preachers of spiritual salvation the secular drama is a vanity of vanities;² from the secular standpoint of the parties to an encounter between civilizations the religious drama is unto the Jews a stumbling-block and unto the Greeks foolishness.³

¹ Acts xvi. 17.² Eccl. i. 2.³ 1 Cor. i. 23.

D. THE PROCESSES OF RADIATION AND RECEPTION

(I) THE DIFFUSION OF CULTURE

IF the drama of encounters between contemporaries moves a spectator to inquire into the processes through which the *dramatis personae* produce their social and psychological effects on one another, his first observation will be that such encounters may occur without any such effects following from them. If the original agent's overture meets with a sheer rebuff on the reagent's part, their encounter will have come and gone without any intercourse between them arising from it at all; and, if the overture takes the form of a violent assault to which the reagent replies by a retort in kind, then the interaction may be energetic without appreciably transcending the physical plane that is the field of interaction between inanimate objects. No doubt, in a collision in which the colliding 'bodies' are not stocks or stones but are human beings, we may be sure that—at any rate in cases in which both parties are civilizations—there will always be some spiritual, as well as physical, consequence, and that this transmission of spiritual influences will also always be in some measure reciprocal.¹ In another context we have observed that War—even war between a civilization and its transfrontier barbarians across the estranging barrier of a *limes*—is a social relation through which the parties produce spiritual as well as physical effects on one another.² But manifestly the spiritual intercourse that arises from encounters between civilizations can be studied most profitably in cases in which the original agent's initiative results in a successful penetration of the assaulted party's spiritual defences—whether the ultimate denouement be a complete and lasting assimilation of this assaulted party by the assailant or whether it be an eventual expurgation of the intrusive culture from the assaulted party's temporarily infected body social, either with or without a previous act of creation on the religious plane.³

Spiritual intercourse has a *modus operandi* of its own. When one civilization does succeed in exerting a cultural influence on the life of a contemporary society, this spiritual event is accomplished through a process of give and take which may be called 'cultural radiation' on the agent's part and 'cultural reception' on the reagent's in terms borrowed from the language of the Modern Western science of Physics. In the language used in this Study for conveying the Soul's obscure intuition of the mysteries of Life, 'cultural radiation' may be described as being a challenge presented to a civilization by one of its neighbours, and 'cultural reception' as being a particular orientation of the challenged party's faculty of mimesis.⁴ A mimesis that, in the internal life of a

¹ See pp. 465-6, above.

² See VIII, especially pp. 13-19 and 39-44, above.

³ These alternative possible denouements of encounters between contemporaries have been surveyed on pp. 476-80, above.

⁴ The Human Psyche's ability to vary the orientation of its mimesis is one manifesta-

society, is directed backwards towards ancestral guardians of tradition when the society is stagnant, and forwards towards living pioneers when the society is on the move,¹ is directed outwards towards an alien way of life in a society that has fallen under a neighbouring civilization's ascendancy.²

tion of a general versatility which is characteristic of Human Nature and is perhaps its most distinctive gift.

'Heredity with the human individual comes more and more to mean, not (as in the case of animals) the predisposition or capacity to act or react in certain definite ways, but the general capacity of experience, the capacity to *learn* or acquire in the individual life the power to act in an indefinite number of ways. In the human inheritance general educability takes the place of definite specific hereditary functions. . . . In other words, the inheritance of Mind supersedes the organic inheritance more and more. . . . Nothing shows more clearly the revolution which the appearance of Mind has wrought than this far-reaching transformation which it has effected in the methods and procedure of Organic Evolution. On the animal plane structure still largely determines function, but on the human plane mental plasticity so dominates everything else in the inheritance that the importance of structure is completely dwarfed, and it appears as a subordinate factor in the total human situation' (Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd ed. (London 1927, Macmillan), p. 261).

¹ See II. i. 192.

² An amusing example of the reorientation of the faculty of mimesis in response to the influence of a potentially radio-active alien culture is presented in the following experience of a Western archaeologist who was travelling in an out-of-the-way rural district of Anatolia about the year A.D. 1924, approximately half-way through the first phase of the totalitarian Westernizing revolution that was being carried out at the time in Turkey under the leadership of Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk.

The purpose of the archaeologist's journey in Anatolia was to enlarge, by fresh discoveries, the corpus of Greek inscriptions, dating from the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history, that was being built up by Modern Western scholarship. Since a high proportion of the Anatolian Greek inscriptions that had already been brought to light had been discovered on sites that had been holy ground at the time when the inscriptions had been set up there, a pioneer archaeologist's first objective in a previously unexplored locality was to identify the site on which the chief local temple or shrine had stood in the Hellenic Age of Anatolian history; and the vicissitudes of archaeological field-work had demonstrated that the key to the identification of the local holy places of the Hellenic Age was to be found in the continuity of Anatolian religious history. In an Anatolian town or village the local indwelling *numen* had been apt to abide in the same spot through successive metamorphoses of nomenclature, liturgical language, ritual, myth, and theology; and accordingly the spot that was holy ground in the Islamic phase of Anatolian religion would be a promising site to explore for the purpose of unearthing Greek dedicatory inscriptions. Since, in the never more than superficially Islamicized rural districts of Anatolia, the principal numinous object was still often a sacred tree, the archaeologist from whose lips the writer heard the story that he is about to recite had made it a rule of thumb to start operations in any Anatolian village that he was visiting for the first time by asking to be shown the sacred tree, and in previous campaigns he had had no difficulty in eliciting this information, since, in the pre-Kemalian Age, the local sacred tree had been the pride of every Anatolian village that had been fortunate enough to possess one of these highly charged batteries of numinous power. When the writer's friend made this usual opening gambit of his in one village some five years after the date of the Kemalian Revolution's outbreak, he was therefore surprised to be met by the assembled male population with a unanimous denial of the existence of any sacred tree in their village. The explanation of this unexpected answer was soon forthcoming, however; for, after the visitor's ceremonial public reception by the villagers *en masse*, the younger men took their leave, and, as soon as the coast was clear, the elders took the stranger aside and whispered to him furtively: 'Of course, we have a sacred tree really, and, now that those young fellows are out of the way, we shall be delighted to take you to see it.' The Western visitor then realized that the old men's lips had been sealed in the presence of young men who, unlike their elders, had become sufficiently Western-minded to feel that a sacred tree was a shameful relic of Antiquity on which a Western visitor must not be allowed to set eyes. The now secretly initiated visitor of course wished nothing better than to put himself in the old men's hands, and they duly led him through the village to a spot where, sure enough, there stood a tree whose exuberant holiness was proclaimed by the luxuriance of the votive offerings of rags with which every twig was adorned. While the archaeologist was looking at this beacon with all the eagerness of a hound that has just caught the scent, the village policeman—who was not only a member of the younger generation but was also the official

Every living human society, like every living individual human being, is all the time emitting waves of spiritual radiation which travel outwards through Space and onwards through Time till they impinge on other societies or other individuals whom they happen to strike. Conversely, every society, like every individual, is also all the time being bombarded by 'rays' or 'projectiles' of spiritual radiation emanating from other societies or individuals, and is all the time either repelling this rain of spiritual missiles or, in so far as its defences are penetrated, is being affected by these influences from outside.¹

The children of a new era in the history of Mankind that had been inaugurated by the founders of the higher religions were familiar with the truth that the spiritual influence of a prophet might continue to make its effect on human souls long after the prophet's death and far away from the physically circumscribed scene of his activity during his own brief life-time. In a Modern Western city of London in which the writer of this Study was putting these words on paper in the year 1949 of the Christian Era at a point on the surface of the globe that was more than two thousand miles distant from Nazareth as the plane flies, no living resident, among all the millions then congregated there, was exerting an influence on his contemporaries and neighbours that could in any way be compared with the spiritual effect that was being produced by Jesus of Nazareth in London at that moment. If, in the same year, the writer had made the journey from his home in London to the heart of Tropical Africa, he could have verified the truth that societies as well as souls can be spiritually radioactive; for in A.D. 1949 he could have picked up in the Bahr-al-Ghazal or even on the Gold Coast the cultural radiation of an Egyptiac Civilization that had been extinct, at the longest reckoning of its life-span, since the fifth century of the Christian Era, and that had never during its lifetime succeeded in extending its political domain into Tropical Africa farther south than the Jazirah between the White and Blue Niles.²

This continuing radiation of an extinct Egyptiac culture, in competition with a living Western culture, in regions that had been beyond the Egyptiac Society's geographical horizon during its lifetime, is a counterpart in the Spiritual Universe of a phenomenon observed in the Physical Universe by Modern Western astronomers whose calculations showed that, by the time when the light emitted by a star had reached the eyes of observers on our planet in the course of an almost unimaginably long passage through Time and Space, the star which had thus now at last become visible might be no longer in existence and might indeed have

representative, in *partibus agricularum*, of Ankara's new Westernizing ideology—came running up and, perceiving, to his chagrin, that he had not been in time to prevent the confrontation of the Western observer with the tell-tale rag-bedecked branches, began, as soon as he came within hailing distance, to shout: 'Do not touch them! Danger of infection! Microbe! Microbe!'

The story here breaks off, without going on to tell whether in this case the identification of the sacred tree was rewarded with the discovery of an epigraphical treasure-trove.

¹ The impact of the civilizations on the primitive societies has been noticed in I. i. 149, and the impact of the 'unrelated' civilizations on the 'related' civilizations in II. i. 184-7. The question whether the apparently 'unrelated' civilizations themselves may not have been brought to birth by responses to human, as well as physical, challenges has been raised in II. i. 335-8.

² See II. ii. 116-17.

been annihilated many aeons ago. In our own study of human history¹ we have similarly had to reckon with the probability that the Egyptian Civilization and the other representatives of the first generation of this species of society had radiated their cultural influence abroad so vigorously that every then still surviving *ci-devant* primitive society in the World had already been adulterated through being affected by this influence in some degree before the genesis of the civilizations of the second generation in the second millennium B.C.

In the view of one twentieth-century Western scholar, this world-wide radiation of the civilizations of the first generation was the source of certain impressively lofty religious activities and ideas that were common to a number of primitive societies still surviving in this century of the Christian Era in physically secluded nooks and corners so remote from one another that it was impossible to suppose that there could have been any direct give-and-take between these widely dispersed societies since their arrival in their respective latter-day habitats. Another twentieth-century Western scholar sought to account for the same cultural phenomenon of the presence of common features in the religion of scattered surviving representatives of Primitive Man by the suggestion that the hypothetical culture-wave which was presumed to have left this uniform impress on them might not have emanated from any civilization even of the first generation, but might have been carried to the ends of the Earth by the primitive migrants themselves as an integral and vital part of a common spiritual heritage from ancestors of sub-human origin who had been transfigured into human beings by this divine illumination of their souls.²

Whatever the true answer might be to a question concerning the history of Religion which was as elusive as it was momentous, it was an indisputable matter of fact that, in more recent times, religious practices, institutions, and beliefs had travelled far in Space-Time over the habitable surface of this planet. In the present Part of this Study we have surveyed the diffusion of the Syriac and Hellenic cultures over the Old World, and the diffusion of the Modern Western culture round the globe.³ The writer of this Study had, in April 1923, the rare good fortune to catch one of these Modern Western culture-waves in the act of reaching one of its successive destinations. In that month of that year he arrived at Ankara at the same moment as 'the Ideas of 1789', and enjoyed the experience—quite invaluable for an historian—of seeing these spiritual potencies, which in their Western birthplace had long since become savourless through familiarity, still produce their primordial stimulating effect with all the vividness of novelty. At Ankara A.D. 1923 an observer could recapture an experience which his great-grandfather might have enjoyed in Paris 134 years earlier;⁴ and, if one of his

¹ In II. i. 187; V. v. 197; and VII. vii. 760-1.

² The question at issue between Father W. Schmidt and Mrs. N. K. Chadwick has been examined in VII. vii. 760-1.

³ See pp. 439-47, 403-18, and 126-346, above.

⁴ The distance from Paris to Ankara, which it had thus taken 'the Ideas of 1789' 134 years to travel, had been covered by the writer's body in five days, travelling by rail. 'Our echoes roll from soul to soul and grow for ever and for ever', but the persistence and pervasiveness of the diffusion of culture-waves is matched by the slowness of their

rather more remote ancestors had visited Uppsala on the eve of the conversion of Sweden to Christianity, this Frank living at the close of the first millennium of the Christian Era might have caught still alive in Ultima Thule a body of religious ritual and myth which had been launched into the World from a cradle in the Land of Shinar perhaps no less than 3,500 years back.

In other contexts we have observed the phenomenon of 'living museums' where, on the outer edge of the domain of a culture that has been geographically expansive, the culture has been 'frozen' in a phase that has subsequently become obsolete at and round the centre from which the successive waves of this culture's radiation have been emitted.¹ We have likewise watched the first embryo of a higher religion—the worship of a Suffering Son and of his Sorrowing Mother—travelling from its Sumeric source in the Land of Shinar into Egypt via Syria and into Scandinavia via Anatolia in the era of the civilizations of the first generation;² and, in the oecumenical history of a later age, we have watched successive waves of Judaic and Indic religion washing round and breaking over the fastness-plateaux of Abyssinia and Tibet.³

This social phenomenon of culture-waves can be illustrated from the history of secular institutions as well as from the history of Religion.⁴

One remarkable instance is the re-emergence in the New World, in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, of a monopolist 'thalassocracy' which, in its original embodiment in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean, had met a violent death before the close of the third century B.C. The Carthaginian Empire was so peculiar an institution⁵ that the possibility of its recurrence would have been ruled out in advance by any student of History who had not lived late enough to be cognizant of the creation of the Castilian Empire of the Indies in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era.

The sixth-century Carthaginian empire-builders had fenced off the southern waters of the Western Mediterranean with a 'wooden wall' stretching from the coast of Tripolitania to the coast of Spain; and, behind this maritime anticipation of a latter-day continental 'iron curtain', the Libyphoenicians had monopolized, on their own terms, the foreign trade of a huge hinterland with enormous undeveloped economic potentialities. The profits which the Carthaginian 'thalassocrats' managed to draw from this method of turning naval power to commercial account were, as we have seen,⁶ so lucrative that the profiteers never put themselves to the trouble of developing industries of their own to supply the economic demand of their effectively 'cornered' market. They found it more convenient to rely on their insulating sea-power in order to exploit Hellenic producers as well as Iberian and African consumers. They bought cheap from the Hellenes and sold dear to the natives; and this business brought them fabulously high returns until their monopoly was

pace. The communication of feelings and ideas, or even institutions and techniques, from psyche to psyche takes very much longer than the transportation of human bodies and other physical objects from station to station.

¹ See V. v. 81-82 and 147-52, and p. 453, above.

² See II. ii. 257, 365, and 402-7.

³ See pp. 426-9 and 437-8, above.

⁴ See III. iii. 135-9.

⁵ See V. v. 196-7.

⁶ On pp. 437-8, above.

broken, after a three-hundred-years-long run, by a fresh shift, on which they had not reckoned, in a balance of naval power on which they had remained content to depend entirely for the maintenance of their system. In the sixth century B.C. the Carthaginians had wrested the naval command of the Western Mediterranean out of Hellenic hands by uniting the naval forces of all the Libyphoenician city-states under a Carthaginian hegemony, and in the third century B.C. they forfeited this vital 'thalassocracy' to a Roman adversary who had overtrumped the Carthaginian sea-power by uniting under a Roman hegemony the naval forces of Magna Graecia. This West Mediterranean drama of the establishment, abuse, and overthrow of a monopolist 'thalassocracy' was re-performed in the Caribbean when the Spaniards adopted there the Carthaginians' myopically selfish policy and afterwards duly suffered at French and Dutch and British hands the Carthaginians' Roman fate.

The Spanish avatar of a peculiar Carthaginian institution is not more extraordinary than the reincarnation of a post-Alexandrine Parthian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire in a Medieval Western Christian successor-state of the Roman Empire.¹

'The Holy Roman Empire's' affinity with the Parthian Empire is manifested in a combination of peculiar features that are salient in both dispensations. Both régimes were decentralized on a feudal system in which a *pādishāh's* juridical suzerainty over his feudatory *mulūk-at-tawā'if*² was in practice so ineffective that power continually ebbed away from the heart of the body politic into the limbs, without any compensatory return-flow, until the commonwealth eventually died of this inability to maintain a healthy circulation of its life-blood. In both empires the feudal organization of an agrarian society was picturesquely diversified by a sprinkling of urban enclaves representing two other social orders which were as alien to one another as each of them was to the body social in which both were embedded like the currants and sultanas in a nineteenth-century English plum cake. Industry and commerce were concentrated within the walls of constitutionally governed city-states, while a way of life more ancient than either the city-state or the feudal régime was represented by temple-states ruled by priests as vicegerents for a presiding deity.

If the dignitaries of the Parthian Empire could have been recalled to life in order to compare notes with their medieval Western 'opposite numbers', Mithradates I (*regnabat circa 171-138/7 B.C.*) would have recognized in Otto I's (*regnabat A.D. 936-73*)³ achievement of partially

¹ See Debevoise, N. C.: *A Political History of Parthia* (Chicago 1938, Chicago University Press), pp. xxxviii-xxxix.

² In the constitutional terminology of Islamic scholars who had salvaged some tradition of the Parthian Age of Syriac history, the *mulūk-at-tawā'if* ('kings of shreds and patches') was the technical name for the feudatories of a Parthian King of Kings who was entitled to style himself *Pādishāh* ('Foot King') because his foot was officially planted on his vassals' necks.

³ Mithradates I and Otto I both began their reigns as kings of kingdoms beyond the mountains, and both ended their reigns as emperors of empires bestriding the mountains. Otto made his first descent upon Italy in A.D. 951, but he was not crowned emperor by the Pope at Rome till A.D. 962. The corresponding dates in Mithradates' career are his first descent upon Babylonia in 141 B.C. and his decisive victory over Antiochus Sidētēs in 129 B.C.

reconstituting the Carolingian Empire by reuniting Italy and Burgundy with Germany a repetition of the Arsacid empire-builder's own achievement of partially reconstituting the Achaemenian Empire by reuniting Media and Babylonia with Khurāsān. Artavasdes and Frederick II Hohenstaufen would have condoled with one another over their tragic common experience of a personal failure that had entailed the extinction of the defeated pādishāh's dynasty and the liquidation of the body politic which he had striven in vain to preserve. The parochial princelings of Fars and Brandenburg would have congratulated one another on the assiduity with which they had taken advantage of their imperial suzerains' accumulating embarrassments in order gradually to convert a status of vassalage into a *de facto* independence that was sovereignty in everything except the name. The citizens of Seleucia-on-Tigris and Seleucia-on-Eulaeus would have agreed with the burghers of Augsburg and Cologne that eternal vigilance was the palladium of their precarious civic liberties. The chief priest of the temple of Anahita at Ecbatana (Hamadan) or of the Zoroastrian fire-altar Ādhur-Gushnasp at Ganjak¹ would have been astonished to meet his double in the person of a prince-bishop of Salzburg or of Trier. And a Parthian cataphract, confronted with a Medieval Western knight, would have spent blissful hours in discussing the comparative merits of the two iron-clad horsemen's chargers, coats of mail, shields, and lance-shafts.

The cataphract is an element in this migratory cultural complex which enables us to catch the cultural wave in the act of travelling through Space-Time from the Iran of the second century B.C. to the Germany of the eleventh century of the Christian Era. The Parthian man-at-arms, portrayed in a graffito at Dura,² who reappears in Far Eastern figurines of the T'ang Age (A.D. 618-907) and in the Bayeux Tapestry, won his decisive battle against a phalanx of heavy-armed infantry not only in Media in 129 B.C. but at Adrianople in A.D. 378 and at Hastings in A.D. 1066.³

It would be superfluous to draw further on the wealth of historical examples of the phenomenon of the diffusion of culture in order to demonstrate its reality and its importance to a generation whose life was being overshadowed by the overwhelming *fait accompli* of a diffusion of the Modern Western culture on a literally world-wide scale. In any attempt to estimate the part played by the diffusion of culture in human affairs the difficulty lies not in proving that such a process as diffusion takes place but in ascertaining whether any particular apparent instance of the phenomenon is a genuine instance or not.

This difficulty arises from the ever present possibility that the event or institution or aptitude or idea whose origin we are seeking to trace may have been produced, not by the radiation of some past achievement

¹ See Christensen, A.: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin and Munksgaard), p. 161.

² See IV. iv. 439, n. 4.

³ This diffraction of a human observer's vision of a single event into a number of instances corresponding to different positions of the same event in Space-Time is the inevitable penalty of the observer's own inescapable handicap of being himself a creature of the Space-Time field in which he is taking his observations (see IV. iv. 445, with n. 10).

from abroad, but by a fresh act of creation here and now. The phenomenon of diffusion does not account in itself for the existence of the objects that are transmitted; on the contrary, there would be nothing to be either radiated or received if some original act of creation had not previously occurred; and an act that has been performed once may be repeated time and again. We have therefore to be perpetually on our guard against falling into the error of invoking the process of diffusion to account for some resemblance or identity between two social situations at different positions in Time-Space when the true cause of this resemblance or identity may be the uniformity of Human Nature, and its consequent capacity to repeat an original act of creation in response to the recurrence of a challenge, without there having been any transmission of influence from the party which made this response on an earlier occasion to the party which has made an identical response to an identical challenge on a later occasion in virtue of an independent reaction of the same Human Nature to the same circumstances.

For example, the indisputable fact that in the twentieth century of the Christian Era all surviving non-Western civilizations had been deeply penetrated and intimately affected by the radiation of the Modern Western culture was no proof that these civilizations themselves were merely so many deposits left by some earlier ubiquitous wave of cultural radiation, and were not original products of so many independent responses to so many separate challenges. In a previous context¹ we have come to the conclusion that, when due account has been taken of the part played in the geneses of the civilizations by the diffusion of culture-elements, either singly or in complexes, the decisive act by which each civilization has been brought to birth proves in every case to have been an act of new creation, and not an act of receiving some ready-made gift from abroad; and, on the strength of this survey of the evidence, we have combated² the thesis of a diffusionist school of contemporary British archaeologists who believed, not only that a latter-day Modern Western Civilization's feat of radiating its culture all round the globe had been anticipated by a likewise ubiquitous radiation of the Egyptian culture, but also that the spread of this migratory Egyptian culture fully accounted for the existence of all other civilizations known to History—which, on this showing, would not be entitled to rank as separate civilizations at all, but would be described with greater accuracy as being merely so many versions of a single Civilization, to be written with a capital 'C', which had been brought to birth by a unique act of original creation in the Lower Nile Valley in the fourth millennium B.C.

In any particular case of a similarity or an identity between two or more social situations presenting themselves at different positions in Space-Time, a cautiously empirical student of History will beware of committing himself to an *a priori* aetiology based on the demonstrably fallacious assumption that all such similarities or identities must be effects of some single exclusively operative cause; he will approach each presentation of this historical problem with an open mind on the question whether the case in point is an effect of the diffusion of culture or

¹ In II. i. 299-338.

² In II. i. 424-40.

whether it is an effect of the uniformity of Human Nature. He will be prepared to find both these causes contributing to produce the result in varying proportions; and he will treat each case as an individual problem on its own merits.

There are, for example, positive grounds for our suggestion that the Castilian avatar, in the New World, of a Carthaginian Empire in the Old World and the Hohenstaufen avatar, astride the Alps, of an Arsacid Empire bestriding the Zagros are two cases of correspondences that are to be regarded as results of the diffusion of culture, and not as products of the uniformity of Human Nature. These grounds are that, in either case, the complex of culture-elements that is common to the histories of two different societies does not present itself in the same historical setting in its two separate appearances on the stage.

The Carthaginian Empire was, as we have seen, a Libyphoenician response to an Hellenic challenge in a contest between Phoenicians, Hellenes, and Etruscans for the command of the Western Basin of the Mediterranean; and this maritime competition in the Mediterranean between three parties in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B.C. has its recognizable historical counterpart in a similar struggle between the Crusaders, the East Romans, and the Muslims in the same natural 'naumachia' in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era. The Western Christian 'thalassocracy' in which we have seen an avatar of the Carthaginian 'thalassocracy' does not, however, make its appearance either in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era or in the Mediterranean, where we should expect to find it appearing if its striking similarity to the Carthaginian 'thalassocracy' had been an effect of the uniformity of Human Nature producing an identical, though independent, response to a separate, but identical, challenge. The Castilian 'thalassocracy' presents itself as late as the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and as far away as the Basin of the Caribbean, on the farther side of the Atlantic; and in this different time and place the parts of the play are performed by a different cast of actors. The contest for the command of the Spanish Main was not a further round in the fight between the Crusaders, East Romans, and Muslims who had been competing for command of the Mediterranean in the Medieval Age of Western history; it was a domestic brawl between divers members of the Western Christian family; and in the last act the Castilian monopoly of the New World succumbed to simultaneous but unconcerted attacks on the part of Dutch, English, and French buccaneers—in contrast to the concentration of the naval strength of Magna Graecia under Roman hegemony which was required in order to break the Carthaginian monopoly of the Maghrib in the last act of a West Mediterranean drama in which both the stage and the cast were the same in the third century B.C. as they had been in the eighth.

Thus the Carthaginian and Castilian 'thalassocracies' are analogous to one another in their institutional form without being analogous to one another in their historical roles; and their non-correspondence in point of roles suggests that their correspondence in point of form is unlikely to have been an outcome of the uniformity of Human Nature; for, though

this uniformity can and does generate uniform effects in cases between which there is no historical connexion, it produces this result by returning identical responses to challenges that, though separately delivered at two different positions in Time-Space, are identical in character. We have just seen, however, that the challenges by which the Carthaginian and the Castilian 'thalassocracy' were evoked were not identical in character with one another. In this case, accordingly, the hypothesis of the diffusion of a culture-complex would seem to hold the field as the more convincing explanation for a similarity between two institutions occurring at different positions in Space-Time.

The same explanation for the morphological correspondence between the Holy Roman Empire and the Parthian Empire commends itself for the same reason. In spite of their remarkable similarity in structure and *êthos*, these two politico-social dispensations played widely different roles in the respective histories of the Western and the Syriac Society. The Parthian Empire was a Syriac response to the violent challenge presented by the conquest of the Syriac World by Hellenic force of arms, whereas the Holy Roman Empire was a Western response to a peaceful challenge from an alien civilization which was not the sister, but was the parent, of Western Christendom. In attempting to reconstitute the Carolingian Empire, Otto I was seeking to achieve a second rebirth of the Roman world-order with the object of saving the life of an adolescent civilization which was in less deadly danger from assaults at the hands of external enemies than from its own inconscionable barbarism. On the other hand, in attempting to reconstitute the Achaemenian Empire, Mithradates I was seeking to re-establish a prematurely shattered Syriac universal state with the object of saving the life of a middle-aged civilization whose domain had been overrun by alien conquerors. The respective roles played by the Arsacid Empire and the Holy Roman Empire in Syriac and in Western history are in fact so widely different that, in this case again, the process of the diffusion of culture seems more likely than the operation of the uniformity of Human Nature to have been the cause of the striking morphological resemblance between these two régimes.

On the other hand, uniformity rather than diffusion may best explain the similarity of the Hittite régime in Eastern Anatolia in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. to the Arsacid régime east of the Euphrates in the last two centuries B.C. and the first two centuries of the Christian Era and to the Holy Roman Empire in Central Europe in the Medieval Age of Western history; for it seems highly improbable that the Arsacid dispensation's unquestionable resemblance to the Hittite dispensation can have been the effect of a culture-wave travelling from a thirteenth-century Cappadocia to a second-century Khurāsān. We have ample evidence concerning the radiation of culture in South-West Asia during the last two millennia B.C., and this evidence shows that the prevailing set of the cultural current throughout that period was, not from Cappadocia to the Tigris-Euphrates Basin and Iran, but from the Tigris-Euphrates Basin and Iran to Cappadocia. The Sumerian and Akkadian languages and their cuneiform script, the Sumerian science of divination,

the worship of Ishtar, the tale of Gilgamesh,¹ the Assyrian style of art, the religion founded by Zarathustra, the Achaemenian feudal system,² all travelled this royal road in this north-westward direction. The only counter-wave that we can catch in the act of travelling in the opposite direction—from the Hittite to the Babylonian World—is a style of domestic architecture which was borrowed in the seventh century B.C. from the Refugee Hittite communities in Northern Syria by the Assyrians under the name of *bit-hilani* ('the house with windows').³

The introduction of the Hittite hieroglyphic script from Cappadocia into Syria is not another case in point; for, though the invention of a new script of this type in the second millennium B.C., as an alternative to taking over the Sumerian cuneiform script ready-made, had been a remarkable feat of creativity in its day, the syllabic phonetic as well as the ideographic technique of writing had been superseded in Syria by the Ugaritic and Phoenician alphabets by the time when the Refugee Hittites brought their hieroglyphic script into Syria with them from the north-western side of the Taurus; and there is no evidence that either this script or the Indo-European language⁴ conveyed in it was adopted by any of the non-Hittite inhabitants of Syria in the last millennium B.C., while there is impressive evidence of the use of the Aramaean language and alphabet in the Refugee Hittite communities.

On this showing, we shall be chary of trying to explain the correspondence between the Hittite Empire and the Arsacid and Holy Roman empires as an effect of the process of culture-diffusion, which is a possible explanation of the resemblance that the Arsacid and Holy Roman empires bear to one another; and, *a fortiori*, the similarity of *ethos* between 'the New Empire' that established itself in Egypt in the sixteenth century B.C. and the Ming régime that established itself in China in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era is to be explained as an outcome of independent identical responses to separate identical challenges, considering that there is no evidence and no likelihood of any direct culture-radiation from the Egyptian World of the second millennium B.C. to the Far Eastern World of the second millennium of the Christian Era, while there is a manifest similarity between the challenges to which 'the New Empire' and the Ming Empire were responses. The Mongol conquerors who were expelled from Intramural China by the Ming resembled the Hyksos conquerors who were expelled from Lower Egypt by Amosis in being barbarians imbued with a tincture of an alien civilization; and it was this blend of Barbarism with an alien higher culture that aroused in the hearts of the barbarians' cultivated victims the fanatically 'Zealot' temper which was the spirit of 'the New Empire' of Egypt and the Ming Empire alike.⁵

Another case in which culture-diffusion cannot be the explanation of

¹ See I. i. 112.

² See VI. vii. 123-4.

³ See Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, La Renaissance du Livre), p. 330.

⁴ The language conveyed in the Hittite hieroglyphic script had proved to be a third language of the Hittite family, distinct from, though closely akin to, both 'the language of Nysa', which was the official language of Khatti, and the 'Luvian' language current in the mountainous hinterland of the Mediterranean seaboard of Anatolia.

⁵ On this point see V. v. 348-53.

a far-reaching similarity between two social dispensations that lie far apart from one another in the Time-dimension is one in which the later embodiment of an identical dispensation occurred *in situ* in a physical environment whose features were so strongly marked and so static within the chronological limits of the whole period in question that in this case a local uniformity of Physical Nature co-operated with a general uniformity of Human Nature to evoke an identic, though independent, response to a separate, but identic, challenge. The common geographical field of these successive identic responses to an identic challenge from both the physical and the human environment was Continental European Greece; the two periods in which the same drama was performed on the same stage ran respectively from the seventeenth to the twelfth century B.C. and from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century of the Christian Era; and in both these two periods of Continental European Greece's history an identic sequence of events occurred.

First the country was conquered by invaders from overseas who brought with them an exotic culture: Minoan invaders from Crete in the seventeenth century B.C.¹ and French and Venetian invaders from Western Christendom in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era. These invaders adapted their tactics to the physical structure of the invaded country by making artificial fortresses out of some of the natural fortresses in which the landscape abounded. The sites that they were apt to select among the almost innumerable sites at their disposal were those which commanded the rare cultivable plains or the rarer passes leading from one plain to another or, best of all, both a plain and a pass communicating with the next plain in locations where Nature offered to a castle-builder with an eagle eye the possibility of making this economy of precious man-power. An Achaean Menelaion perched on the bluffs overhanging the River Eurotas opposite the site of the town of Sparta was as good a vantage point as a Frankish Mistrà for commanding the vale of Hollow Lacedaemon which lay between these two castles; but Mistrà was a better-chosen site than the Menelaion because a garrison posted there could control not only the Sparta plain but also the Lacedaemonian mouth of the Langádha Pass that gave a passage from Lacedaemon into Messenia. In the Frankish Age William de Villehardouin's castle at Mistrà² had its complement in Geoffrey de Villehardouin's castle at Kalamáta commanding the Messenian mouth of the Langádha Pass as well as the southern bay of the Messenian plain, while in the Mycenaean Age an Achaean Menelaion and a Frankish Mistrà had their respective counterparts in the Argolid at Tiryns and Mycenaë.

A physical environment which thus made it easy for invaders to establish their control over the principal plains and passes also made it difficult for them to penetrate the surrounding wilderness of mountains, and in these encompassing highlands they found themselves compelled

¹ See I. i. 94, with n. 1.

² William's personal choice of the site of Mistrà in A.D. 1248, and the subsequent building of the castle of Passavant on his council's advice, are recorded in *The Chronicle of the Morea*, ll. 2985-3007, on pp. 200-1 of J. Schmitt's edition (London 1904, Methuen).

to leave the native population unsubdued *de facto*.¹ The invaders had, in fact, to content themselves with the skeleton occupation of the country which they had achieved at the first stroke,² and they were not even left in undisturbed occupation of these restricted territorial acquisitions; for the very success of the original invaders' feat of arms tempted other, still harder, adventurers, following in their wake, to emulate their prowess by wresting their conquests from them.

In the second millennium of the Christian Era the Burgundian French lords of a medieval Frankish Duchy of Athens were exterminated by Catalan interlopers, the Catalans were superseded by Florentines, the Florentines were ousted by 'Osmanlis; in the second millennium

¹ While Mistra controlled Hollow Lacedaemon and the pass leading from it to Kalomáta in Messenia, Mistra and Passavant, between them, contained the unsubdued highlands of the Southern Taygetus, which, at the time of the Frankish conquest of the Morea, were occupied by a tribe of untamed Slav barbarians, the Melingi. These Slav wild highlanders had managed to maintain their independence here after the East Roman Government's re-establishment of its authority over the rest of the Morea in the reign of the Emperor Basil I (*imperabat* A.D. 866-886). It is noteworthy that the same highland fastness played the same role in at least two other passages of history. It was tenanted by the Albanian Muslim Varduniots from A.D. 1715, when the 'Osmanlis reconquered the Morea from the Venetians, until the Greek Christian uprising in the Morea in A.D. 1821 (see p. 494, below); and in the Archaic Age of Hellenic history it was tenanted by a band of Minyae—survivors from the cataclysm of a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*—whom a rising city-state of Sparta found it difficult to reduce to submission (see Herodotus, Book IV, chaps. 145-8).

² The conquerors' one chance of extending and consolidating their first hold lay in the possibility of obtaining reinforcements of their own kith and kin; and we happen to have indications that the Pelopid and the Champenois princes of the Morea alike felt a lively concern about this.

In the *Odyssey* (Book IV, ll. 171-7) Menelaus the Pelopid prince of Sparta is represented as saying to the son of an Odysseus who had been Menelaus's companion-in-arms on the Achaean expedition against Troy:

'I had it in mind, if your father had turned up, to bestow on him tokens of my affection beyond anything that I would have done for any other of the Argives—if only Zeus the all-seeing dweller on Olympus had granted the two of us a happy return across the salt sea in the swift ships. Why, I would have established a fort (*νάσσα πόλιν*) for him here in Argos and have built a home here for him: I would have brought him from Ithaca with his property and his child and his war-band (*πᾶσιν λαοίοις*); I would have gutted for him one of the [native] forts in the [unsubdued] hinterland of my own dominions (*μὴν πόλιν ἐξ ἀλαπάξας | αὐτὰ περικαυδόνων, ἀνάσσονται δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῶ*).

This Homeric strophe has its antistrophe in *The Chronicle of the Morea* (ll. 1847-66, on pp. 124-7 of J. Schmitt's edition) in the account there of Prince William de Champ-litte's investiture of Geoffrey de Villehardouin with the fief of Kalamáta and Arkadhía as a reward for Geoffrey's friendly act in parting company with his Frankish fellow conquerors of Constantinople and Salonica in order to throw in his lot with the Frankish adventurers in the Morea. After William has invested Geoffrey and duly received his homage in return, the prince addresses his new vassal (*ibid.*, ll. 1870-2) as follows:

'Now that you hold your fief under my overlordship, it is meet and right that you should be my true liege in all things, and that I, for my part, should trust all my fortunes in your hands.'

An identical picture of the relations between a Moreot prince and his vassal is drawn by the Homeric Menelaus:

'Had we been here together, how often we should have enjoyed one another's company! Nothing till the fall of Death's black curtain would have parted us—nothing short of this would have stopped us showing, and enjoying, our mutual affection' (*Odyssey*, Book IV, ll. 178-80).

Menelaus was not called upon to say in what quarter of his principality's dissident hinterland he would have planted Odysseus and his Cephallenians; but we know the approximate limits of Geoffrey's fief, and it is a curious coincidence that this medieval Frankish lordship should have been approximately co-extensive with the territory held by a Neleid Nestor and his Minyans, together with the seven forts that, in the *Iliad* (Book IX, ll. 149-53), Agamemnon is represented as offering to bestow on Achilles as an inducement to the offended leader of the Myrmidons to stop sulking when his hard-pressed companions-in-arms are in such sore need of his help.

B.C. the Minoan lords of the Argolid were superseded by Achaeans, and the Achaeans by Pelopids who—if Modern Western Hittitology were to rehabilitate Hellenic legend—might prove to have made their way to the Morea from an Anatolian homeland in the neighbourhood of the cradle of the Ottoman Power.¹ While the castles built by the original invaders thus repeatedly changed hands, the feudal régime of which these castles were the physical embodiments persisted through these successive changes of ownership; but a monotonously unedifying game of grab came at last to a catastrophic end in both performances of the play. In both cases the unsubdued native highlanders were gradually reinforced by the infiltration of barbarians from the interior of the Balkan Peninsula, and in the last act the interloping feudal régime was successfully assailed and overwhelmed by a resurgence of the indigenous population. In the Morea in A.D. 1821 the Ottoman Turkish Muslim epigoni of the Villehardouins were exterminated by the united forces of native Moreot Orthodox Christian Greeks and immigrant Orthodox Christian Albanians who had seeped into the Morea since the fourteenth century;² in the same arena at some date in the course of the twelfth century B.C. the Pelopid epigoni of the seventeenth-century Minoan invaders of the Argolid were overwhelmed by an avalanche of barbarians speaking the North-West dialect of the Ancient Greek language.

This combination of correspondences between the history of Continental European Greece in the second millennium B.C. and the history of the same country in the second millennium of the Christian Era is so remarkable that we may find ourselves wondering after all whether the Pelopids may not have emitted some wave of cultural radiation which the Villehardouins managed to pick up across a twenty-four-centuries-wide Time-interval; and the sheer length of this interval—redoubtable though it be when measured on the Time-scale of the histories of civilizations—might not, perhaps, be an insuperable obstacle to the entertainment of this fantasy. The consideration that makes its entertainment impossible, and compels us in this case to explain the correspondences as effects of the uniformity of Physical and Human Nature, is the gigantic historical fact that this Time-interval of twenty-four centuries between the overthrow of the Pelopids and the arrival of the Villehardouins was occupied in Continental European Greece by the histories of the Hellenic Civilization and its Orthodox Christian successor. Both these intervening cultures used the enduring physical landscape of Continental European Greece for their own purposes; but these purposes were different from the common purpose of the feudal lords who dominated the same country both before and after. A landscape on which a feudal régime was founded by Achaean and Frankish castle-builders was utilized with equal success by the political architects of the Hellenic Civilization for the entirely different purpose of creating a galaxy of city-states. Between the pre-Hellenic and the post-Byzantine feudal régime in Continental European Greece there is a *vitai pausa*³ that pre-

¹ See p. 449, n. 2, above.

² See V. v. 293-4.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, l. 860.

cludes all possibility of any historical connexion between these two identic feudal dispensations on the same site.

This is perhaps as far as we can carry our investigation of the part played in human history by the process of culture-diffusion, and we may now go on to inquire into the divers conditions in which culture-rays are transmitted from one body social to another.

(II) THE DIFFRACTION OF CULTURE

Culture-Patterns and their Instability

There are alternative possible conditions in which culture-rays may be transmitted because there are alternative possible states in which a culture may present itself, whether we happen to be observing it in process of radiation from one body social to another or in its birthplace in the bosom of the body social that is its source. The state of the radiating body at any given moment, whichever of the alternative states this may be, will determine the state of the culture-rays that this body is emitting at the time. If the emitting body's state changes, the state of the rays emanating from it will change correspondingly. In fact, the texture of a culture-ray will always faithfully reproduce the fabric of the society that is its source,¹ unless and until the ray, in its passage through Space-Time, comes to be affected by another social force as a result of impinging upon a foreign body.

The instability of the fabric of a culture is something intrinsic in the nature of Culture itself, for it arises from the fact that Human Life expresses and fulfils itself in a diversity of constituent activities; and this primordial plurality of Life cannot be reduced to unity by the crude procrustean operation of eliminating all these activities save one, since Humanity cannot renounce any of them without ceasing to be human. The unity of purpose and direction that is a necessary condition of spiritual health and is indeed the distinctive characteristic of a healthily growing human society is achieved, not by eliminating any of the indispensable elements of human culture, but by co-ordinating all these elements in a harmony such as is maintained by the various instruments in an orchestra when the musicians are playing a symphony under the leadership of a conductor.

'What has happened in the great art-styles happens also in cultures as a whole. All the miscellaneous behaviour directed towards getting a living, mating, warring, and worshipping the gods is made over into consistent patterns in accordance with unconscious canons of choice that develop within the culture. Some cultures, like some periods of art, fail of such integration, and about many others we know too little to understand the motives that actuate them. But cultures at every level of complexity, even the simplest, have achieved it. Such cultures are more or less successful attainments of integrated behaviour, and the marvel is that there can be so many of these possible configurations.'²

¹ This point has been noticed already in III. iii. 152 and V. v. 199.

² Benedict, Ruth: *Patterns of Culture* (London 1935, Routledge), p. 48.

This dictum of one of the leading Western anthropologists of the day was being borne out during the lifetime of the writer of this Study by the progress of the sociologists' investigation into the ways of life of societies in process of civilization, side by side with the anthropologists' work on societies of the primitive species. In both these two new provinces which Modern Western Science had been carving out for itself in the realm of Human Affairs,¹ it was becoming clearer year by year that a society's culture—whether, at the time of observation, the society happened to be stationary on the primitive level or in motion in the movement known as civilization²—was normally a unity in the sense that the normal relation between all the diverse emotions and ideas and institutions and aptitudes constituting its social stock-in-trade was a condition of interdependence. An inquirer who set out to follow up in the life of any society the relations of any indigenous culture-element (as contrasted with an alien element acquired from abroad) would find these relations ramifying so widely that this single element would prove to have links—and these sometimes in unexpected directions and of a surprising kind—with almost all the other elements in this particular culture-pattern. Such an analysis would reveal connexions between things which at first sight might appear to have nothing whatsoever to do with one another; and, if the course of History performed the equivalent of a laboratory experiment by removing or modifying any single feature in the pattern, this local change would show itself capable of producing a disturbance of the entire social structure, even though the feature in question might have appeared insignificant before the importance of its role in the whole organization had been vindicated by this practical test.³

This interdependence which is so characteristic a quality of a culture in its normal state is, of course, conspicuous when salient features of a culture-pattern are taken as the illustrations of it. It could be illustrated strikingly, for example, by tracing the ramifications of the two master-institutions of the Western Civilization of the writer's day: that Modern Western Democracy and Modern Western Industrialism⁴ which had been the principal engines through whose potentially reciprocating action an aggressive society had been producing its profoundly subversive effects upon the lives of its contemporaries. In order to understand the nature and genesis of these two imposing and formidable features of the Modern Western way of life, the student would have to make himself familiar with the whole history of the Western Civilization since the Dark Age, and this not merely in its political and economic aspects. He would not be able fully to comprehend the work of a Ford or a Singer without knowing something about the work of a Calvin and a Benedict and running a sensitive finger along the chain of historical development

¹ See XI. ix. 185-9.

² This contingent and therefore merely provisional definition of the difference between a primitive society and a civilization, in terms of an observable difference in their respective attitudes towards life at the time of observation, has been offered in II. i. 192-5.

³ The interdependence of the divers elements in a culture-pattern is illustrated by the effects of a successful assault upon the social life of the assaulted party (see pp. 530-63, below).

⁴ See IV. iv. 137-98.

that linked the at first sight mutually incongruous activities of these quaintly diverse personalities at different points far apart in Time-Space. Nor would he be able fully to comprehend Modern Western parliamentary government or political propaganda or ideology without knowing something about Western Christian monastic orders and papal congregations and theology. The truth is that every indigenous culture-element in the life of a society arises within, and in relation to, the whole of that society's social structure, and finds its own proper place and special function in the structure upon coming to maturity.

This normal integration of the indispensable constituent activities of Human Life into one or other of the divers alternative possible culture-patterns—each oriented to some particular activity or complex of activities which gives the culture its distinctive character by playing the dominant part in the co-ordination of its life—is the explanation of that qualitative difference between one culture and another which is discernible in a review of the primitive societies and is conspicuous in a review of the civilizations. In a previous context¹ we have observed that in the histories of the civilizations a progressive qualitative differentiation is one of the characteristics of growth;² but we have also found that growth is not an automatic process but is the hard-won reward of an effort that makes a continual and exacting demand on the growing individual's or growing society's will-power, since it has to be perpetually renewed in a series of responses to challenges in which a successful response to one challenge always evokes a fresh challenge, with the consequence that every solution of one problem brings with it the presentation of another.³ This means that the abiding efficacy of a culture-pattern can never be taken for granted with impunity; for a particular culture-pattern is the imprint of a solution of a particular human problem; and, if spiritual

¹ In III. iii. 377-90.

² The choices through which a society acquires its individual character may, of course, be negative as well as positive. In Hellenic history, for example, the aesthetic penchant that is the salient feature of the obverse face of the Hellenic culture has its negative counterpart on the reverse side in the Hellenic Society's neglect to turn to practical account the Alexandrian scientist Hero's invention of the steam-engine—though improvements in the means of communication might have been expected to be at a premium in a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World in which there had been a sudden vast increase in the material scale of Hellenic life as a result of the Macedonians' conquest of the Achaemenian Empire. Even if the failure to apply Hero's invention in the inventor's own generation could be explained as an effect of the political anarchy that was afflicting the Hellenic World in the third century B.C., it would still have to be explained why, after the political unification of the Mediterranean Basin under a *Pax Romana*, steam traction was never applied to the maritime transport of grain from Alexandria to Puteoli or to the overland transport of troops, officials, and mails over the network of imperial roads—considering that the maintenance of an indispensable *Pax Romana* depended on the efficiency of the imperial régime in providing facilities for long-distance traffic.

It is equally significant that the Far Eastern Society showed a similar indifference to the practical potentialities of the Far Eastern inventions of printing, gunpowder, and the mariner's compass—all of which were subsequently turned to such epoch-making practical account, for both good and evil, by Western *entrepreneurs* who might never have succeeded in inventing for themselves these original creations of the Far Eastern genius.

The fact that these inventions were never developed in China in the dynamic style which characterised their effect on the culture of the West ought to be recognised as proof that the genius of Chinese Civilisation chose not to develop in the channels which appeared obvious to the West, but sought by preference other media for the highest expression of the powers of Man' (Lattimore, Owen: *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 168-9).

³ See III. iii. 112-27.

health is to be preserved and social growth is to be maintained, solution must follow solution as one problem gives rise to another. The impulse to perpetuate a traditional culture-pattern that has done good service to Society in its day can defeat its own purpose, as we have seen,¹ by producing either an enormity or a revolution. A culture-pattern can be kept in being only by being continually adapted to meet the manifold requirements of ever-changing circumstances; and the intrinsic difficulty of this indispensable task is so formidably great that it is not surprising to find that culture-patterns are precarious structures which are perpetually in danger of breaking up.

When a culture-pattern does break up for one reason or another, the divers constituent activities that have been co-ordinated with one another so long as the pattern has lasted now fall apart and go their separate ways along respective lines of least resistance that at best produce a spiritual chaos and, at worst, a spiritual discord which declares itself in the forms of schism in the Body Social² and schism in the Soul.³ In previous contexts⁴ we have noticed in passing what the principal component elements of a culture are. At the present point in our Study it will be convenient to carry our analysis a stage farther.

If we venture, at our peril, to illuminate an obscure subject of inquiry with the borrowed light of a simile, we may perhaps not inaptly liken an integrated culture to a flint that has been compacted by the age-long pressure of enormous forces, and the disintegration of a culture to the work of a demonic flint-knapper who is master of the knack of splitting one flake after another off the core of the stone on which he is exerting his uncanny sleight of hand. In the knapping of a culture the outermost and most easily detachable flake is the economic side of Human Life, which may be defined as the field in which Man exerts his power over Non-Human Nature. The next flake, and also the next most easy to detach, is the political side of Life, which may be defined as the field in which Man exerts his power over his fellow human beings. When these two superficial layers of Life have been split off, a cultural core remains; and this core may be defined, in terms of Life, as the heart of a culture where the Soul participates in God's creative work by grappling with its first and last adversary the Self⁵—a more formidable adversary than either its human neighbour or its physical environment, because this domestic adversary is identical with the Soul against which it contends. The field of cultural action, in this narrower and stricter usage of the term, is not, of course, confined within the bounds of the Self, since Man is a social animal who cannot be himself without being at the same time in communion with other spirits.⁶ In the cultural heart, as well as on the political surface, of Human Life, Man encounters not only his Creator but his fellow human beings; but his intercourse with his fellows on the cultural plane takes place on a moral level high above the cañon-

¹ In IV. iv. 133-7.

² See V. v. 376-568 and vi. 1-175.

³ In III. iii. 151-2; IV. iv. 57; and V. v. 199-201.

⁵ 'The essential strategies in the war of Good against Evil are conducted within the intimate interior of personalities' (Butterfield, *Herbert: Christianity and History* (London 1949, Bell), p. 91).

² See V. v. 35-376.

⁶ On this point, see III. iii. 223-30.

floor of politics. On the cultural plane coercion is of no avail; for the only form of power that can here be employed with effect is the power of spiritual attraction through which one soul moves another by love and not by force.¹

This essence of a culture which remains after the political and economic integuments of the core have been flaked off proves, however, to be fissile in its turn in our satanic flint-knapper's hands. By a supreme *tour de force* of his calamitous 'know-how' this mythical impersonation of Original Sin is able to disintegrate the very core of cultural life by splitting off from it successively a linguistic, an intellectual, and an artistic flake until the religious nucleus of the core is exposed. This religious quintessence of a culture is perhaps proof against disintegration, but it is not proof against stultification through being isolated from all the other activities of Life and thereby being inhibited from exercising the pervasive influence which Religion is able to exercise in a healthily integrated body social.

The social and spiritual effects of the knapping of a linguistic flake from a cultural core have been noticed already in this Study in our survey of the careers of languages which have been set free to travel far and wide as *lingue franche* because they have been divorced from their original function of serving as mother tongues.² The knapping of an intellectual flake comprising the technological, scientific, and philosophical substance of a culture for which a *lingua franca* serves as a vehicle, but not comprehending the culture's artistic flake or its religious quintessence, has likewise come to our notice by forcing itself upon our attention in two historic instances: the intellectual abstract of the Modern Western Christian culture that ran like wildfire round the globe, after it had been knapped off by Western Man's own hands towards the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era,³ and the intellectual abstract of the Hellenic culture that eventually captivated the Syriac

¹ 'If Christianity fights in the World it does not (when churches are in their right mind) wage war on actual flesh and blood. . . . For this reason the historian . . . in the last resort . . . sees human history as a pilgrimage of all Mankind, and human achievement as a grand co-operative endeavour, in which whigs and Tories complement one another, both equally necessary to the picture' (Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 91).

² See V. v. 483-527.

³ See pp. 118-19 and 314, above, and 516-18, below. Assuredly it was no accident that a Western Christian culture which, in its integrity, had been violently rejected earlier in the seventeenth century by the Japanese, was eagerly accepted before the close of the same century by the Greek, Serb, and Russian Orthodox Christians in the secularized version of it that had been produced in the meantime as a result of a Western reaction against the Western temper that had discharged itself in the Western Wars of Religion. It is also assuredly no accident that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Venetian university of Padua should have been the alma mater both of Modern Western pioneer men of science in the fields of medical and physiological research and of Venetian and Ottoman Greek Orthodox Christian pioneer Westernizers. The precocity of the Venetian régime in adopting a policy of religious toleration before this had yet become the general rule in the Western World made it possible in Padua at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the Protestant Englishman William Hervey [Harvey] to carry out the research that resulted in his discovery of the circulation of the blood, and for the Orthodox Greeks Cyril Loukakis and Alexander Mavrogordáto to give themselves a Western university education. The intellectual impact of Hervey's discovery on Mavrogordáto's mind has been noticed already in this Study on p. 163, n. 3, and p. 171, n. 8. For the part played by the University of Padua in the seventeenth-century Western scientific revolution, see Butterfield, Herbert: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London 1949, Bell), pp. 41-44.

World after it had been knapped off by Hellenic Man's own hands in the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history.¹ The artistic flake is the most difficult of all to knap off from the religious nucleus of a culture's core; for Art serves Religion, as Language serves Thought, by affording it a vehicle; and we have seen Hellenic Art renew its youth and recover its creativity by entering into the service of the Mahāyāna.² Yet even Art can be divorced from its religious source of inspiration at the price of lapsing into either a sordid vulgarity or a repulsive barbarism.³

In a twentieth-century Western World the secularization of both Art and Thought, which had been perpetrated progressively by Western hands in the course of a quarter of a millennium, had come to be taken so entirely for granted that the abnormality of this act of cultural self-mutilation was now hardly perceptible to any Western eyes that were not doubly enlightened by the gift of genius and by the experience of penalization. In that age of Western history a distinguished Negro American singer felt the thrill of making a surprising discovery when he came to realize that the primitive culture of his African ancestors, of which a musical echo had survived the shock of enslavement and transplantation to a New World, was spiritually akin to all the non-Western higher cultures, and to the pristine higher culture of the Western World itself, in virtue of its having preserved a spiritual integrity which a Late Modern Western secularized culture had deliberately abandoned.

'Years ago, I would not have said—as I do now—that I am *proud* to be a Negro. I did not know that there was anything to be proud about. Since then I have made many discoveries.

'They began when I was still a student. I came in contact with Russians at college. I heard them sing their native songs and was struck by their likeness to Negro music. What was wrong with our despised music if it was akin to the revered Russian? Had we a value that had been passed by? Were the outcast Negroes, who were struggling to assimilate fragments of the unsympathetic cultures of the West, really akin to the great cultures of the East? It was a fascinating thought.

'I began to make experiments. I found that I—a Negro—could sing Russian songs like a native. I, who had to make the greatest effort to master French and German, spoke Russian in six months with a perfect accent, and am now finding it almost as easy to master Chinese. I discovered that this was because the African languages—thought to be primitive because monosyllabic—had exactly the same basic structure as Chinese. I found that Chinese poems which cannot be rendered in English would translate perfectly into African. I found the African way of thinking in symbols was also the way of the great Chinese thinkers. I found that scientists had been puzzled by the strange similarity between ancient African and Chinese art. I found that I, who lacked feeling for the English language later than Shakespeare, met Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Tolstoi, Lao-tsze, and Confucius on common ground. I understood them. I found myself completely at home with their compatriots.

'Now there is an important thought here. With the coming of the Renaissance something happened to Europe. Before then the art, the

¹ See pp. 405-6, above.

² See III. iii. 131 and 247, n. 2, and V. v. 134-5 and 482-3.

³ The portents of vulgarity and barbarism in Art have been noticed in V. v. 480-3.

literature, the music were akin to Asiatic cultures. With the Renaissance, Reason and Intellect were placed above Intuition and Feeling. The result has been a race which conquered Nature and now rules the World. But the art of that race has paid the price. As Science has advanced, the art standards of the West have steadily declined. Intellectualised art grows tenuous, sterile.

"This is a serious thought. To what end does the West rule the World if all art dies? Jesus, the Eastern, was right. "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole World and lose his own soul?"¹

In this intuition of the malady which a Late Modern Western Society had inflicted on itself, Paul Robeson was putting his finger on the difference between an integrated and a disintegrated culture, and he had perceived that the structural and the spiritual disintegration of culture are two aspects of a single process. Some of the phenomena of culture-disintegration within the bosom of a single society have been examined in this Study already;² we have now to inquire how the difference between the two diverse possible states of a culture affects the transmission of culture-rays from one body social to another, and here we have to distinguish between several different possible cultural situations in which an encounter between contemporaries may take place. Both parties to the encounter may be in a state of integration, or both in a state of disintegration, or one in the one state and the other in the other state, at the time when the encounter takes place, and we shall find that the difference between these several diverse sets of circumstances is apt to be reflected in a corresponding difference in the outcome in the different cases. We shall also find that, whatever may be the respective states of the two colliding cultures at the time when their encounter occurs, the collision itself is apt to produce a disruptive effect of its own on both the structure of the impinging culture-missile and the fabric of the smitten body social if this collision results, not in a repulse of the attack, but in a penetration of the assaulted party's defences.

The Conduciveness of Cultural Disintegration to Cultural Intercourse

When the impinging culture is in a state of integration, and *a fortiori* when the state of the smitten body social is the same, the outcome of the collision is apt to be one or other of two opposite extremes. The impinging culture will either rebound from the surface of the smitten body without having succeeded in penetrating it at all, or it will penetrate it with such effect as to succeed in assimilating it. In the light of our simile of the flint, this extreme diversity of the two possible results can be seen to arise from a proportionately extreme variability in the temper and conduct of the party that is taking the initiative. This original agent in the encounter may deliver to his neighbour the unknapped flint that he holds in his hand either by hurling it at him as a missile or by offering it to him as a gift. If he employs his philosopher's stone as an offensive weapon, its mass and weight may bruise his victim's body or even crack his skull, but the very size of the unknapped flint and the roundness of

¹ Robeson, Paul, in *The Daily Herald*, 5th January, 1935, p. 8, cols. 5-6.

² In V. v and vi.

its contours in its pristine state make it unlikely that it will pierce the bone and lodge itself in the brain like David's pebble; and the unlikelihood of this happening will be the greater if the assaulted body social's fabric is also in an integrated state; for in this state it will present a compact and close-grained front capable of withstanding the impact even of a missile that has been artificially sharpened to a deadly point; and an assaulted body social that is clothed in this spiritual armour may prove in consequence to be sufficiently master of the situation to be able to reject any alien culture-element which it does not feel itself able to metabolize and assimilate. 'No reception without metabolism' is a healthily integrated society's war-cry in answer to the challenge of a cultural assault; and it would be difficult to find an instance of the successful penetration of a healthily integrated society by an assailant on any terms that were not of the assaulted party's own choosing.

Even when it is sufficiently master of the situation arising from an encounter to dictate its own terms, an integrated civilization does not readily accept a culture-element from an alien civilization; and, on the rare occasions when it allows itself to be receptive, the source of the alien culture-element that it does then receive will be found to be a radioactive civilization that is already in disintegration more often than one that is still in the recipient's own state of cultural integrity. This is, of course, what we should expect in the light of our observation that the state of a radioactive body social's fabric is reproduced in the texture of the culture-rays emitted by it at the time;¹ for this means that a ray emanating from an already disintegrated body social will have been decomposed before issuing from its source, and *a fortiori* before impinging on its target, so that the recipient will have found the preliminary task of splitting the impinging integral ray into its constituent elemental rays already performed for him, and will find the subsequent task of selection proportionately facilitated, whereas he will have to carry out both these successive tasks for himself if he is to give admittance to any culture-elements emanating from a radioactive society that is still in a state of integration and that is therefore still emitting its radiation in an integral form.

As a classic example of the rare phenomenon of the transmission of a culture-element from one integral body social to another, we may cite the reception of the special Calabrian variety of Eastern Orthodox Christian monasticism by Western Christendom at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era,² when the model monastery established at Grottaferrata by a Basilian Saint Nilus on an invitation from the Holy See became one of the sources of inspiration for an already active indigenous Western Cluniac movement towards a reform of the monastic life in the Western Christian World. A contemporary second example of the same phenomenon is the reception at Venice of the Byzantine visual arts of architecture and mosaic in the building and decoration of Saint Mark's—though in this case the metabolism and assimilation of the imported culture-elements was less

¹ See p. 495, above.

² See IV. iv. 357 and 600.

thorough-going than the spiritual metamorphosis through which an inspiration from Calabria was taken to heart at Cluny.

The local acclimatization of a Byzantine style of architecture in a Western cultural environment at Venice in the tenth and eleventh centuries dwindles, of course, into a mere curiosity of history by comparison with the creation, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, of a new Western style that was at once distinctive and oecumenical when a traditional Western Romanesque architecture gave birth to a revolutionary 'Gothic' architecture sired by an Armenian school whose masterpieces had caught the imagination of Western Crusaders; and we may compare this effect of an alien inspiration on the history of architecture in Western Christendom with the effect produced on the history of the Hellenic art of sculpture in the round in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. by the impact of an Egyptian style on the imagination of Hellenic mercenary soldiers and commercial travellers in the Nile Valley. We must note, however, that, while, in our two last-cited examples, as in our two first, the recipient societies were both still in a state of integration at the time as far as we can see, the radioactive societies in these two last cases were neither of them likewise in the same state. In contrast to the Orthodox Christian Society at the time when a monastic and an architectural inspiration were accepted from it by a contemporary Western Christendom, the societies that had produced the Armenian style of architecture and the Egyptian style of sculpture were, both of them, not merely in course of disintegration, as, for instance, the Syriac and the Indic Society were at the time when elements derived from them were perhaps adopted, metabolized, and assimilated by a still integrated contemporary Hellenic Society which was creating 'a fancy religion' for itself in the shape of Orphism.¹ At the dates here in question, the Armenian and Egyptian societies were both in a pathological after-state of petrification, and this was the condition in which they exerted their profound cultural influence on an integral Western Christian and an integral Hellenic Society respectively. The radioactive Armenian community was one fragment of a Monophysite 'fossil' of an already extinct Syriac Society;² the radioactive Egyptian Society was a 'Tithonus'.³

With this clue in our hands, we may now be able to discern the reason why the Absolute Monarchy that was the master-institution in the political life of Eastern Orthodox Christendom was first rejected, and afterwards accepted, by a Western Christian sister society. On these two occasions the institution in question was the same, and on both occasions Western Christendom was in the same state of integration. The difference between the two situations, which may account for the difference between the two Western reactions to the impact of the same Byzantine culture-arrow, was a difference in the state of the radioactive Orthodox Christian Society on the first occasion and on the second. At the time when the Western World rejected the attempt of the Saxon 'Holy Roman Emperors' Otto II and Otto III (*imperabant* A.D. 973-1002) to acclimatize the Byzantine absolute authoritarian state on Western soil,

¹ See V. v. 84-87 and X. ix. 738-40.

² See I. i. 35.

³ See VI. vii. 47-52.

the Orthodox Christian Society was still in a state of integration in which the divers elements constituting its culture-pattern were so closely knit together that it would have been difficult for another society to accept any one of these alien Orthodox Christian culture-elements without exposing itself to the risk of seeing its own distinctive indigenous culture-pattern obliterated by the descent of a cultural avalanche which would be precipitated by the movement of a single boulder in a moraine where the boulders were bound all to stand or fall together. On the other hand, by the time when the Byzantine absolute authoritarian state was taken over by the Western architects of a Norman successor-state of the East Roman Empire in Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily in order to be transmitted through the agency of Frederick II Hohenstaufen to his immediate heirs, the parochial North Italian despots of the Late Medieval Age of Western history—and, in their version of it, to become the inspiration of the absolute monarchies of an Early Modern Western World¹—the Orthodox Christian Society from which this now acceptable exotic institution was derived was already in a state of disintegration; and this meant that a culture-element which, in the same society's antecedent state, had been inextricably interwoven with all the other constituent elements in an integrated culture-pattern was now an isolated piece of casual wreckage which could be picked up and appropriated without its necessarily bringing in its train the other ship's timbers to which this plank had been clamped before the blows of wind and wave had prised asunder what the shipwright's art had joined together.

These instances indicate that an integrated body social which comes under a bombardment of cultural radiation emanating from another society is apt to reject any element originating in this alien source which it is not able to take on its own terms; and this means that its resistance is likely to be particularly stubborn when the alien culture-ray that impinges on the assaulted body social's close-grained fabric is not an elemental one but is an integral shaft which is demanding to be taken or left as a whole, without picking or choosing.

There are, it is true, historic examples of the gracious spectacle of the voluntary reception of an integral culture that has been offered by a neighbour as a gift instead of being inflicted by an aggressor on a victim. In the growth-stage of the history of the Hellenic Civilization we can observe Hellenism being accepted by *ci-devant* primitive peoples on the expanding fringes of the Hellenic World of the day—Lydians and Phrygians in the hinterland of Continental Asiatic Greece; Aetolians and Epirotes and Macedonians in the hinterland of Continental European Greece; and Sicels, Messapians, Calabrians, Apulians, and Latins in a new world west of the Straits of Otranto. Hellenism also achieved the miracle of winning the allegiance of representatives of a society of its own species. The Etruscan transmarine pioneers of the Hittite Civilization became converts to the Hellenic Civilization before the close of its pre-Alexandrine Age, while in the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history the cradle of the Hittite Society in Eastern Anatolia was likewise

¹ See VII. vii. 537-9 and X. ix. 97-103.

gradually Hellenized in the course of six or seven centuries ending in the generation of the Cappadocian Fathers of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The bloodless triumphs of Hellenism over primitive peoples were emulated by Orthodox Christendom when it successively converted the Georgians, the Alans, the barbarian Slav intruders into the Balkan Peninsula, the Bulgars, and the Russians; and they were emulated by Western Christendom when it converted the Frankish barbarians in the fifth century of the Christian Era, the English in the sixth, the Frisians, Hessians, Bavarians, and Thuringians in the eighth,¹ and the Poles, Magyars, and Croats at the turn of the tenth and the eleventh. Western Christendom also won the allegiance of two societies of its own species; and, whatever may be our assessment of the roles respectively played by the physical force of coercion and by the spiritual force of attraction in a Latin Christendom's capture of the Far Western Christendom of 'the Celtic Fringe',² it is indisputable that the Scandinavian World was captivated by a process of entirely peaceful penetration.³

This list of voluntary conversions is not unimpressive as far as it goes;⁴ but, if we are to see the historic examples of this social phenomenon in true proportion, we must remind ourselves of three considerations that take some of the light out of this at first sight rather idyllic picture. One of these second thoughts is that the number of known instances of this happy denouement of an encounter between contemporaries was very small by comparison with the total number of known instances of such encounters; another consideration is that a majority of the peoples known to have voluntarily adopted an alien culture in its integral form had been either primitives or barbarians in the penumbra of a civilization; and it has also to be noted that, in the rare cases in which the integral culture of a civilization had been adopted unreservedly by representatives of a society of its own species, these relatively highly cultivated converts all proved to have been in some abnormally weak position, of one kind or another, at the time when their conversion took place.

The Etruscans, for example, were an overseas outpost of a continental society who had been cut off from the main body of their kith and kin by their Hellenic competitors' feat of planting themselves astride all the maritime lines of communication between the west coast of Italy and the south coast of Anatolia; and the subsequent conversion of the Etruscans to Hellenism thus occurred in 'geopolitical' circumstances in which the converts' only alternative to accepting Hellenism was to succumb to it. Moreover, by comparison with their Hellenic contemporaries, the Etruscans laboured from the outset under the handicap of being the children of a society which had been prematurely shattered by the blast of a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*. The crippling effect of this peculiar

¹ See II. ii. 336.

² See II. ii. 322-40.

³ See II. ii. 340-60.

⁴ It would be rash to attempt to extend it by including in it any of the cases of the reception of the Modern Western culture by contemporary non-Western societies; for none of these current encounters with the Modern West had yet worked itself out to its denouement at the time of writing, and therefore at that date it was impossible to be sure that even the most sensational apparent instance of successful Westernization would not prove in the event to have been delusively ephemeral.

calamity must be presumed to have played its part in moving the Etruscans to adopt an alien culture in place of their Hittite social heritage—unless we have the hardihood to commit ourselves to the paradoxical alternative recourse of writing off as a mere coincidence the remarkable fact that the continental survivors of a shattered Hittite Society appear, side by side with their transmarine colonists in Etruria, in the strikingly short muster role of representatives of civilizations that had voluntarily adopted an integral alien culture in its entirety. Indeed, in this list they appear twice over; for in another context¹ we have already observed that the Hellenization of the Continental Refugee Hittites on the north-west flanks of Taurus and Antitaurus in the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history had been anticipated by the progressive captivity of their fellow refugees on the south-eastern flanks of the same mountain fastnesses by the Syriac culture through the agency of the Aramaic language and alphabet.²

The crippling effect of the disaster by which the Hittite Society was overtaken at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. has a counterpart in the history of one branch of one of the two nascent civilizations that were successfully absorbed by an adolescent Latin Western Christendom. The Celtic Christians in Britain had had their spirit broken by an avalanche of pagan English barbarian invasion before they tardily and reluctantly accepted the Latin Christian culture in the act of acknowledging the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Roman See. On the other hand the Britons' disheartening experience, which may have predisposed them to renounce their ambition to bring to flower a distinctive culture of their own, was not shared by Irish Celtic Christians who had divided the spoils of a derelict Roman province in Britain with the pagan barbarian English invaders from the Continent; and the prelude to the voluntary incorporation of a pagan Scandinavian World into the body social of a Latin Western Christendom was a fresh barbarian *Völkerwanderung* in which the Vikings took the offensive with such formidable effect that the victimized society which was eventually to captivate these assailants had first to fight for its existence with its back to the wall.

This encounter between 'the heroes of Asgard' and 'the Apostle at Rome' would seem to be a clear case of the voluntary reception of an integral alien civilization by representatives of another society of the same species in circumstances in which the act of cultural conversion cannot be accounted for by any antecedent trauma in the converted society's psychic history. But a unique event, however notable in itself, goes to prove the rule to which it is an exception rather than the rule of which it would remain the solitary instance if rules could ever be estab-

¹ See pp. 445-6, above.

² The long-continuing cultural intercourse between Hittites and Aramaeans that eventually resulted in the reception of a Syriac culture by the Hittite communities south-east of Taurus and Antitaurus had begun as early as the fourteenth century B.C., when Northern Syria had been invaded simultaneously by the Hittites from the Anatolian Plateau and by the Aramaeans from the North Arabian Steppe; but the archaeological evidence for the Syriac culture's establishment of its ascendancy over the Hittite culture in this region does not begin to present itself before the turn of the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. (see Cavaignac, E.: *Le Problème Hittite* (Paris 1936, Leroux), p. 166).

lished legitimately on the strength of a single exemplification. In the field of encounters between contemporaries in which both parties are societies of the species that we have labelled 'civilizations', and even in the wider field in which the 'agent's' role is played by a civilization and the 're-agent's' role by a primitive or semi-primitive society, an Orpheus captivating all fellow creatures within earshot by the enchanting harmony of his heavenly music¹ is a rare figure by comparison with a Charlemagne forcibly baptizing the captives of his bow and spear or an Awrangzib morally alienating intended victims who have proved more than a match for him on the battlefield. The rule at which we thus arrive inductively proves to be that normally an encounter between contemporaries is culturally sterile even when one party, and *a fortiori* when either party, is in a healthy state of cultural integration; and the historical evidence likewise bears out the converse 'law' that a state of cultural disintegration is favourable to cultural intercourse,² and most favourable of all when it is the state of both parties to the encounter and when on both sides it has gone to extremes.³

This will be found to have been the social setting of most of the encounters, surveyed in earlier chapters of this Part,⁴ which have taken the dramatic form of action evoking reaction and thereby producing a *peripeteia*. In terms of our simile of the flint it is easy to see that, when the knapper has split the stone by striking off flakes from the core, and when he has chipped his flakes into slim sharp arrow heads, these tooled fragments will travel faster and farther, and will lodge themselves deeper in their target when shot from a bow, than the unsplit stone when hurled by hand. The radiation of a radioactive body social is, in fact, more apt to make an impression on an alien body on which it impinges if the emitting body is in disintegration than if it is still in its state of pristine integrity; and, if we may infer that successfully radioactive societies will be found to be already in disintegration as a rule, we shall have laid our finger on at least one of the reasons why the process of radiation-and-reception is apt to work itself out piecemeal over a protracted Time-span; for in previous contexts⁵ we have already noticed that the divers constituent elements of a culture have different specific velocities, ranges, and penetrative powers when they are in process of transmission from an emitting to a receiving body social, and that each 'arrow' (if we think in terms of Palaeolithic technology) or each elemental ray (if we think in terms of Modern Western optics) will take its own natural course as soon

¹ See IV. iv. 124-6 and 131-2, and V. v. 210-13 and 231.

² We have already stumbled on this 'law' at an earlier point in this Study (in III. iii. 128-54), where we have been led to formulate it as an explanation of the empirically demonstrable fact that the increasing command over a human environment which is registered in the geographical expansion of a civilization at the expense of neighbouring societies proves, not only not to be a criterion of social growth, but to be, perhaps more often that not, a symptom of social disintegration.

³ In IV. iv. 115-19 we have already come to the conclusion that there is no known instance of a civilization's breaking down and disintegrating in which the cause of the breakdown can be demonstrated to have been a blow struck by some other party and not some suicidal act on the part of the broken-down society itself. If this conclusion holds good in cases in which the aggressor society has been a civilization, it applies *a fortiori* to cases in which the domain of a universal state has been overrun by transfrontier barbarians—as we have observed in I. i. 58-60 and in Part VIII, *passim*, above.

⁴ On pp. 106-453, above.

⁵ In III. iii. 152; IV. iv. 57; and V. v. 199-200.

as it has been released from its wedlock with the core in the unsplit stone or with the rest of the elemental rays in an integral ray of white light.

Decomposition through Diffraction

This piecemeal transmission of the constituent elements of a culture cannot, however, be explained solely as an effect of a previous structural disintegration of the radioactive body whose fabric, whatever its state may happen to be, is reproduced in the texture of its effluent culture-rays, nor again solely as an effect of the receiving body social's being likewise in a state of structural disintegration—and therefore being more readily susceptible to penetration by an intrusive alien culture—at the time when it is exposed to the radioactive culture's impact. In the knapping of the flint or the diffraction of the ray of white light—which-ever of the two similes we may prefer to employ—there must also be some other cause at work; for, if a spontaneous antecedent disintegration of the culture-pattern of one party or both parties to the encounter were the only possible cause of this phenomenon of knapping or diffraction, it would be impossible to understand why a culture should not be transmitted integrally and instantaneously in cases, like that of the conversion of the Scandinavians to the Latin Christian culture, in which the culture-pattern of both the parties to the transaction was in an integral state at the time when the act of conversion took place. Both in this case, however, and in that of the conversion of the Etruscans to Hellenism—an episode in which the Hellenic party, at any rate, was still in a state of cultural integration, whatever may have been the state of the Etruscans at the time—we find that, as a matter of historical fact, the migratory culture was transmitted, as in other cases, piecemeal and not all at one delivery, with the consequence that, in these cases likewise, the process of transmission took an appreciable time to work itself out. We must conclude that, in such cases at any rate, some other cause must have been operative; and, if we can identify this other cause, we shall have to allow for the possibility that it may have played some part likewise in those other piecemeal and protracted transmissions of culture in which the disintegrated state of the culture-pattern of the two parties, or of one of them, is the explanation that first leaps to the eye.

A further pursuit of our optical simile may help us to bring to light this latent other cause of the decomposition of culture in the course of its transmission. In the Physical Universe our occasional perception of the diverse elemental colours of the spectrum, which in white light are fused together into so perfect a unity that they are not only inextricable but are indistinguishable, is not the effect of a decomposition of light that has taken place in the body of the Sun before the ray which we perceive in this decomposed state has left its solar source and has impinged on this planet. The reason why, in human visual experience, white light is the normal epiphany of light and the colour-gamut of the spectrum is an exceptional spectacle is because the light that reaches us is in fact emitted from the Sun in rays that are originally integral. The colour-gamut of the spectrum becomes visible to us only when an integral shaft

of sunlight happens to strike a terrestrial target of a particular consistency—a shower of rain or a block of crystal—at a particular angle at which the ray is able to penetrate this particular material obstacle to its farther advance at the cost of being diffracted into its constituent elements by the resistance of the foreign body. The shock of the integral ray's impact from this angle on a target of this texture shakes the precariously integrated bundle of elemental rays apart into a 'spectrum' that is so called because, in it, each primary colour is sorted out from all the rest, with the result that each of the constituents of the original ray of sunlight becomes visible in and by itself at the price of the effacement of the white light that had been the visual effect of the elemental rays' now dissolved association.

If we retranspose our perilously illuminating physical simile into human terms, we shall find no difficulty in seeing why, in the realm of human encounters, the phenomenon of culture-diffraction should be produced by the shock inflicted on a body social by the impact of an alien culture-ray. The intrusion of any alien cultural element into the life of any society, in whatever state of life it may happen to be at the time, is manifestly a dangerously disruptive, and therefore a painfully harassing, experience for the reason that a state of integration is, as we have seen, the normal condition of a healthy cultural life, so that even a society which has already spontaneously fallen into disintegration, and has perhaps since travelled far along this road, before being smitten by the alien culture-ray's impact, will shrink from exposing itself wantonly to this foreign complication of a domestic situation that has already got out of hand. In fact, an assaulted society will never welcome its assailant's culture with open arms or promptly abandon its own indigenous social heritage wholesale in order to substitute for it the importunately obtrusive alien culture-pattern all of a piece in an instantaneous act of deliberate self-transformation. The victim's immediate impulse (though, as we shall see,¹ not always his last, as well as first, resort) will be to put up an anxiously obstinate resistance, fight a succession of rear-guard actions, and swallow the exotic potion that is being forced down his throat in a series of minimum doses, in the reluctant spirit of a child compelled to take nasty medicine. Nothing but a course of disagreeable and disillusioning experience will teach this recalcitrant patient—if he ever learns the lesson at all—that he has chosen the most unpleasant and most inexpedient way of responding to a challenge which he cannot elude.

A classical example of this initial negative reaction of the victim of a cultural assault is the long-drawn-out first chapter in the Ottoman Turks' response to the challenge of the turn in the tide of their perennial warfare with the Western World. As we have seen,² they allowed the best part of a century to pass without taking any drastic steps after they had been warned of their danger by their signally disastrous defeat in the Great Turco-Frankish War of A.D. 1682-99; and, when they were stung into action at last by the still more disastrous and much more humiliating experience of being defeated by a Westernizing Orthodox Christian Power in the Great Turco-Russian War of A.D. 1768-74, they

¹ On pp. 580-623, below.

² On pp. 232-8, above. See also p. 557, n. 4, below.

stultified their own efforts for the best part of another century and a half by clinging to the impracticable policy of attempting to adopt the Modern Western art of war without simultaneously accepting any of those non-military Modern Western institutions that were in fact the indispensable conditions of Modern Western military efficiency. It required a third shock—the military invasion of their Anatolian homeland by their own *ci-devant ra'iyeh*, the Moreot and Rumelian Greeks, in A.D. 1919—to induce the Turks at last to follow a leader who put it to them that their only chance of survival now lay in embracing the Modern Western Civilization with enthusiasm and remoulding their way of life to fit this alien culture-pattern without reservations. Atatürk addressed his saving message to his countrymen with assurance and authority because he had taken the measure of a disintegrating society's defencelessness against cultural aggression. When the living target of culture-arrows has lost the natural armour constituted by a closely integrated social fabric, its skin will offer an opening at every pore for an arrow-head to insert itself, and the naked body will find itself exposed to penetration on terms that will be of its assailant's setting, and not of its own.

In the first stage, however, of a disintegrating society's encounter with a radioactive alien culture the negative reaction of the eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Ottoman Turkish conservatives seems to be the rule. As further illustrations of this prevalent initial attitude we may cite the reluctance notoriously shown by the statesmen of a Roman Commonwealth in a post-Hannibalic Age to make annexations of territory belonging to the domains of any of the Hellenic Civilization's Oriental neighbours, though these domains were then lying at the mercy of a Roman Power which had succeeded in overthrowing its sole really formidable competitor. *A fortiori*, these post-Hannibalic Roman statesmen were chary of bringing those alien worlds within Rome's own walls by opening her gates to the importation, manumission, and enfranchisement of Oriental slaves, and they were particularly vigilant to repress or, as a *pis aller*, to sterilize, any immigrant Oriental religions, or at all events never to license them without having first done their best to denature them by insisting that they should not present themselves for admission till they had clothed themselves in an Hellenic wedding-garment.¹

A Hittite worship of Cybele, an Egyptian worship of Isis, an Iranian Syriac Mithraism, and a Palestinian Syriac Christianity all duly commended themselves to the main body of the Hellenic Society within the frontiers of the Roman Empire by assuming in their outward show the appealingly familiar style of Hellenic visual art, and even the Far Eastern outposts of Hellenism in Bactria and India that had been isolated by the rise of an intervening Arsacid Power and had fallen under Kushan rule were prospective converts of sufficient importance to make it worth while for an Indic Mahāyāna to resort to the same device of visual Hellenization in order to catch the eye of an Hellenic diaspora. West of Euphrates the Syriac missionary religion Christianity and the Babylonian missionary religion Astrology carried the propitiatory process of self-

¹ Matt. xxii. 11-14.

Hellenization a stage farther by translating their ideas and ideals into terms of Hellenic science and philosophy¹ instead of being content merely to lay a veneer of Hellenism over their visual surface; and it is significant that, in the competition between Oriental religions for the conversion of the main body of the Hellenic World in the Imperial Age, the victory should eventually have been won by the competitor that had gone to the greatest lengths in Hellenizing itself and thereby turning the flank of the resistance which even a disintegrating Hellenic Society was still prone to offer to the reception of any alien culture-element that was conspicuously exotic.

Without seeking to anticipate the eventual answer to the enigmatic question whether, at the time of writing, the Western Civilization was already in disintegration or was still in course of growth, we may cite, as evidence relevant to our present inquiry, the unquestionable fact that in the Late Modern and the Early post-Modern Age of Western history a Roman reluctance to incorporate culturally alien territories or to open the gates to immigrant alien bodies or ideas had been displayed by the governments of two Western Great Powers.

The Hapsburg Monarchy was actually led to make the great refusal of its manifest destiny, and thereby condemn itself to an eventual catastrophic liquidation, by its reluctance to add to the numbers of the ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christians under Hapsburg rule when once the Roman Church had reached the limits of its power to transmute Eastern Orthodox Christians into Roman Catholics through the alchemy of the statesmanlike institution of uniate churches. Just two hundred years before the dissolution of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy in A.D. 1918, it had looked, on the morrow of the peace-settlement of Passarowitz, as if the whole of the Rumeliot main body of Ottoman Orthodox Christendom were on the point of passing under Hapsburg rule; yet Viennese statesmanship acquiesced in A.D. 1739 in the retrocession to Turkey of the Serbian and Wallachian portions of the Ottoman territory acquired by the Monarchy in A.D. 1718; it let slip its opportunity of retrieving this loss in A.D. 1788-91;² and thereafter at the eleventh hour, when a Hapsburg Monarchy that had suffered humiliating defeats at Serb as well as Russian hands in the opening phase of the General War of A.D. 1914-18 was taken up for an unearned and unsolicited ride in the cab of a momentarily victorious Hohenzollern ally's triumphal steam-roller, the governments at Vienna and Budapest were gravely embarrassed by the ironical brilliance of a temporary political situation in which the disposal of Montenegro, Serbia, and Rumania momentarily lay in the hands of the Central Powers. To leave these conquered ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian enemy states independent would mean stultifying the conqueror's victory by leaving in existence so many transfrontier bases of operations for a resumption of pre-war irredentist nationalist movements among the Hapsburg Monarchy's own Yugoslav and Rumanian subjects. On the other hand, to annex the conquered territories would mean undermining the political hegemony of a German and a Magyar 'ascendancy' in what might prove to be

¹ See V. v. 367 and 539, and VII. vii. 470-6.

² See II. ii. 180.

a more dangerous way by changing the Monarchy's internal balance of national forces to the subject nationalities' advantage. During the years A.D. 1915-18 Austro-Hungarian statesmanship was tormented by the nightmare of this insoluble problem till it was put out of its agony by the merciful hand of Death.

The General War of A.D. 1914-18, which precipitated the dissolution of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, brought the United States face to face with the problem that had eventually defeated Hapsburg statesmanship.

During the hundred years ending in A.D. 1914 an ever more rapidly mounting flood of immigration from the Old World had provided the American people with the copious reinforcements of its man-power that were required for the achievement of its titanic enterprise of mastering a virgin island of almost continental dimensions; but the blithely indiscriminate welcome that had been given to this inflow of immigration into North America during the first chapter of the story had begun to be qualified by some disquiet in American hearts, and consequent reservation in American minds, when, at about the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the composition of the inpouring stream had rather suddenly changed and had at the same time given premonitory indications of further, still more radical, changes that might be expected at no distant future date if the flood-waters were not promptly brought under rigorous governmental control. The first spate of nineteenth-century immigrants had come for the most part from those North-West European countries whose colonists had peopled the Atlantic seaboard of North America before its attainment of political independence; but in the years A.D. 1880-93 a tributary stream had begun to flow from Italy, the Hapsburg Monarchy, and the Russian Empire, and in the years A.D. 1898-1914, in which the total volume of immigration was at its maximum, this parvenu and outlandish South and East European contingent greatly outnumbered the dwindling rear-guard of a familiar and acceptable North-West European column of route.¹

The distinctive difference between these two diverse streams of latter-day immigration that moved the American people to adopt a discriminatory attitude was not, of course, the mere difference in their geographical provenance, but was the difference in their cultural complexion which this difference of provenance implied. A significant negative common characteristic of all units in the new contingent was the non-Western origin of their native cultural traditions;² and this pacific invasion of the

¹ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924 (London 1926, Milford), pp. 88-89.

² Within the boundaries of all the three states in the Old World from which the bulk of this new contingent of immigrants into the United States was drawn there were, of course, populations that were Western in their culture; but the majority even of these were representatives of the Roman Catholic branch of the Western Christian family, and not of the Protestant branch that had been predominant in the United States so far, and a majority of the Italian Roman Catholic immigrants in those years were Neapolitans and Sicilians, who still remained crypto-Byzantines even after a nine hundred years' experience of an association with Western Christendom into which they had been conscripted originally by a Norman military conquest. The immigrants from the Danubian Hapsburg and the Russian Empire included undisguised Byzantines, as well as Jews.

United States by non-Western immigrants whose exotic character was partially concealed under the misleading meaningless label 'European' was already threatening to attract reinforcements from other regions of the Old World whose inhabitants' 'un-American way of life' was advertised by an arbitrary convention that labelled these other non-Western peoples 'Asiatics'.¹

This new threat which the old institution of immigration had thus come to present to the integrity of the American people's native Western way of life led the United States to follow up the enactment of a Chinese Exclusion Law on the 6th May, 1882,² and the establishment of an 'Asiatic Barred Zone' in an act of the 5th February, 1917,³ by passing the two momentous general Immigration Restriction Acts that came into force respectively on the 3rd June, 1921, and on the 1st July, 1924.⁴ The Act of 1924 was designed not merely to restrict the total number of immigrants but to discriminate, within this total, in favour of applicants from North-West European countries.⁵ The annual quotas assigned to countries from which a restricted flow of immigration was still permitted were governed by a formula that would tell against applicants of South and East European provenance; the immigration of Orientals was banned altogether;⁶ and the Senate at Washington insisted⁷ on confirming the application of this Oriental Exclusion Clause in the Immigration Act of A.D. 1924 to applicants from Japan, in lieu of 'the Gentleman's Agreement' that had governed the entry of Japanese nationals into the United States since A.D. 1907.⁸

By the year A.D. 1952⁹—by when it had become manifest in retrospect that this change in United States immigration policy after the First World War had played an appreciable part in the genesis of the Second—the American people had succeeded at this price in checking the cultural adulteration with which their body social had been threatened through an influx of culturally alien immigrants, only to discover, like the Romans before them, that the relatively easy recourse of physically excluding alien bodies left them still face to face with the more baffling problem of contending with alien 'dangerous' thoughts that had a knack of making their way through the most efficiently drawn official 'sanitary cordon' without requiring the services of any physical carrier. 'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth.'¹⁰ If the twentieth-century American policy of excluding, restricting, and 'screening' would-be immigrants, and re-educating and assimilating the applicants who had qualified for admission, was a counterpart of the post-Hannibalic Roman policy of regulating the importation and manumission of

¹ The unreality of the conventional partition of the Old World into a 'Europe' and an 'Asia' is exposed on pp. 708–29, below.

² See Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 93–97.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 147.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 135–8.

⁶ The quota system introduced in the Act of A.D. 1924 was retained, while the discrimination on racial grounds, embodied in legislation hitherto in force, was abandoned in form, but not in substance, in the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, which was passed in the Senate at Washington, by a vote overriding President Truman's veto, on the 27th June, 1952.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 90, n. 1.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 97–99.

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 148–59.

¹⁰ John iii. 8.

slaves and confining the social and political enfranchisement of freedmen within limitations, the Psyche's task of resisting the propagation of Oriental religions, which defeated Roman statesmanship in a five-hundred-years-long 'cold war' of attrition,¹ had its counterpart in a spiritual conflict between 'the American way of life' and the Russified *ci-devant* Western heresy of Communism which, on the morrow of a Second World War, was being waged in the bosom of the United States. The non-military hostilities on this American home front in the rear of the Bureau of Immigration's elaborately fortified *limes* were even showing signs of taking forms that were familiar in the corresponding passages of spiritual arms in the Imperial Age of Hellenic history.

The initial negative reaction on the victim's part which we have been observing in these American, Austro-Hungarian, Roman, and Ottoman instances of it explains why an impinging alien culture is always diffracted in the process of reception and is never swallowed whole at one gulp even in those rare encounters between two integral cultures in which the process finds its smoothest and quickest passage; and the assaulted party's defensive posture suggests another reason why, when the divers elemental rays have thus been shaken loose from one another, they prove, as they go their separate ways thenceforward, to have different speeds, ranges, and penetrative powers. Their difference in degree of prowess in these various respects is not due exclusively to a specific difference in their intrinsic carrying-power; it is also to some extent proportional to the difference in the degree of the resistance that each of them evokes in the psyche of the party that is their unwilling target.

Inverse Selection through Transmission

This further insight into the cause of the manifest differentiation in the elemental culture-rays' carrying power enables us, at the next step, to detect the cause of one of the 'laws' governing the process of cultural radiation-and-reception which we have already seen at work. This 'law' runs to the effect that the carrying-power of a culture-element is proportional to the degree of its triviality and superficiality in the spiritual hierarchy of cultural values.² It is a sinister law because it means that a culture, when it goes into disintegration, has to pay for an enhancement of the vigour of its radioactivity by reconciling itself to a deterioration in the quality of the elements that it is transmitting. We may put the point in terms of a homely simile by saying that the same amount of butter is spread wider by the simple expedient of being spread thinner, and by reminding ourselves that skim milk is more digestible than cream for a rice-fed Cantonese or Japanese child that is being introduced for the first time in its life to a novel diet of dairy-produce.

While the unwilling victim of cultural aggression will diffract an impinging shaft of cultural radiation by repelling as many of its con-

¹ The opening date of this Romano-Oriental 'cold war' may be found in the Senate's persecution of the Bacchantes in 186 B.C., and its closing date in Galerius's abandonment, in A.D. 311, of the Diocletianic persecution of the Christians (see II. ii. 215-16).

² See V. v. 200.

stituent elemental rays as he finds it possible to repel in the first round of the encounter, the elements that he will be least reluctant to admit, if a total rejection of the aggressive alien culture proves to be beyond his power, will be those elements that seem to him the least difficult or least undesirable to assimilate;¹ and, when he finds himself driven to give admittance to partially intractable elements under the pressure of sheer *force majeure* for the sake of self-preservation—as, for instance, when he has to face the necessity of mastering in some measure a militarily superior assailant's art of war—he will try to confine his reception of these more or less intractable elements to a minimum.² For this reason the process of culture-diffusion not only produces the phenomenon of culture-diffraction but also differentiates between the divers elements in the culture-spectrum of a diffracted culture-ray by selecting for the speediest and farthest transmission those elements that are of the lowest cultural value—a perverse operation of the principle of natural selection that awards a premium of efficacy to spiritual cheapness.

We have already observed³ that, as soon as the divers constituent elemental rays, or constituent flakes and core, of an impinging culture have been released from their pristine association with one another, the latent intrinsic difference between their respective carrying-powers comes into play—whether the cause of their disentanglement happens to be their impact on a diffracting target or happens to be the antecedent disintegration of the culture-pattern of the radioactive body social from which they have emanated. In this situation, in whatever way it may have arisen, the economic elemental ray or arrow manifests the highest carrying-power, the political arrow the next highest, and the untooled residual core of the impinging culture the lowest carrying-power of all. When this culture-core is split up in its turn by the successive detach-

¹ The operation of this 'law' is, of course, most conspicuously manifest on the economic plane. Materials that have a world-wide currency as objects of value—e.g. jewels, gold, amber, jade, ivory, purple dye, spices, silk—may become objects of trade in the commerce between one society and another without carrying with them any infection of cultural influence or indeed any awareness of their original provenance (the *locus classicus* for this culturally uncompromising form of commerce is the account of the transit of offerings from the land of 'the Hyperboreans' to the Island of Delos, given by Herodotus in Book IV, chap. 33); and even treasures in the shape of works of art or specie may pass physically from hand to hand without any concomitant transmission of the culture displayed in the image and superscription on a coin or in the modelling and decoration of a vase. Perhaps the most non-conductive of all treasures are pieces of loot such as the emerald table which was taken by the Umayyad conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula from Visigoths who, in their day, had taken it from a pillaged Rome (see Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xxxi), or the seven-branched golden candlestick which was first carried off from the Temple of Jerusalem to Rome to figure in Titus's triumphal procession and to be portrayed on a bas-relief on his commemorative arch, and was then carried off from Rome to Carthage when Rome was sacked by the Vandals in A.D. 455 (Gibbon, op. cit., chap. xxxvi). Valuable materials and precious objects are received from alien hands with less reluctance than weapons, weapons less reluctantly than non-lethal tools, treasures and tools less reluctantly than staple commodities, and commodities of all kinds less reluctantly than economic services—which are manifestly more compromising than material goods because, unlike these, they cannot be accepted by one society from another without personal contact with the alien hands by which they are being furnished.

² When this negative reaction takes the form of hiring alien mercenary soldiers in preference to educating a native personnel in an alien military technique, the attempt to keep an alien culture at arm's length is apt to defeat itself (see pp. 730–2, below).

³ In III. iii. 152; IV. iv. 57; and V. v. 200.

ment of linguistic, intellectual, and artistic flakes from the core's religious nucleus, the respective intrinsic carrying-powers of these three cultural flakes prove to be different likewise; and here again the premium on spiritual cheapness prevails. The linguistic flake displays a higher carrying-power than the intellectual, and the intellectual than the artistic, while the religious nucleus of the culture-core has a lower carrying-power than the detached cultural arrowheads.

This 'law' to the effect that the carrying-power of a culture-element is in inverse ratio to its spiritual value has a corollary, propounded in an earlier context,¹ which reads that the carrying-power of an integral culture-ray or unsplit philosopher's stone is equal to the average of the respective intrinsic carrying-powers of its constituent elements. While the political, as well as the economic, arrow in isolation proves to have a higher carrying-power than the integral flint before the flakes have been split off, the residual core displays a lower intrinsic carrying-power in isolation than it enjoys when the more expeditious flakes are still attached to it. In virtue of the same law, the carrying-power of the isolated religious nucleus of the culture-core proves to be lower than that of the total core when still unsplit, while on the other hand the carrying-powers of the artistic, intellectual, and linguistic flakes prove all to be higher in isolation than the carrying-power of the core before these superficial components have been detached from the religious nucleus.

Our 'law' and its corollary could both be illustrated from the history of the radiation of the Western culture in the Modern Age.² In the writer's generation the diffusion of this Western culture on the political as well as on the economic plane was already virtually world-wide, whereas on the cultural plane its influence beyond the borders of its homeland in the Western World itself was then still exotic and superficial, though by that date it had been radioactive for not less than four and a half centuries.³ Moreover, the form in which this Modern Western culture—as distinct from Western economic and political technique—had won its world-wide ascendancy, such as it was, had been a utilitarian secular abstract consisting of a linguistic and an intellectual flake which had served as ammunition for a Western Hercules' bow after having been detached from the religious nucleus and from a still undetached artistic flake of an integral Western Christian culture's core.⁴

It was in this superficial form of a parcel of techniques, *lingue franche*, and sciences that the Western culture had been adopted towards the end of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era by Peter the Great in Russia after it had been rejected in its integral unsecularized form at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Hideyoshi and Ieyasu in Japan; and its subsequent rejection in China likewise in the very generation in which it was being adopted in Russia was a consequence of the disastrous success achieved by the Franciscan missionaries of a Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity in China in foiling their broader-minded and farther-sighted Jesuit colleagues' attempt to avert

¹ In V. v. 203.

² See xi, map 66.

³ This point has been noticed already in I. i. 30–31. See also Halecki, O.: *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London 1950, Sheed and Ward), p. 60.

⁴ See pp. 314 and 499–500, above.

in China the fate which had already cut short the propagation of an integral Western Christian culture in Japan; for the Jesuit missionaries' policy in China had been to offer this integral Christian form of the Western way of life to Chinese minds and hearts in the most anodyne version that could be devised by Christian representatives of the Modern Western Civilization who were not prepared to follow their agnostic contemporaries' lead so far as to take the plunge into the unfathomably deep waters of secularization.¹

The utilitarian secular abstract of the Modern Western culture which did succeed in captivating eventually to some degree not only the Russian, Serb, and Greek Orthodox Christians but also most of the rest of Mankind, including the Japanese and Chinese themselves in the next round of their continuing encounter with the West,² had found a readier market abroad in a smoothly 'processed' French decoction than in its racier but rougher English rawness;³ and it had made its way farthest, by the time of writing, not at the esoteric depth of its revolutionary intellectual reinterpretation of the nature of the Physical Universe, nor even at the less abstruse level to which the gospel of

¹ This defeat of the Jesuit missionaries in China has been noticed in V. v. 365-7 and 539, and V. vi. 23-24.

² In the mental vision of the writer of this Study the city of Shanghai stood, ever since he had first set eyes on it in A.D. 1929, as the concrete symbol of the soullessness of this repulsively deconsecrated form in which the Western Civilization had made its latter-day conquest of the non-Western World. In this product of Western commerce on Far Eastern ground a horrified Western observer could see a sight which was not to be seen at the time on Western ground in either hemisphere. Here was a great city, conjured up by Western enterprise and constructed and administered in the post-Modern Western style, which was charged with all the dynamic material energy that was coursing through the veins of a contemporary Chicago or Berlin or London or Paris, without at the same time trailing even one wisp of the cloud of pristine Western Christian spiritual glory that made the contemporary spiritual atmosphere of these American and European Western cities still just possible for a human soul to breathe.

³ See III. iii. 369-71. This 'processing' role that was played by France in the Late Modern Age of Western history from the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onwards is depicted with an admirable sureness of touch in the following passage from the pen of a twentieth-century French historian:—

'Puisque nous ne pouvons nous retenir, en suivant le cheminement des idées, de nous émerveiller quelquefois de leurs routes imprévues, étonnons-nous encore de la promptitude, de la facilité avec laquelle la France accepte le rôle que les circonstances lui imposent. Cette puissance qui paraît au nord, et qui menace son hégémonie, non seulement elle l'accepte, mais elle la sert. À sa propre activité créatrice, elle ajoute une activité nouvelle: elle va introduire les valeurs nordiques sur les marchés latins. Empressée, elle jouera le rôle d'introduitrice de la pensée britannique auprès de sa clientèle italienne, espagnole, portugaise. Quelquefois même, elles l'interposera entre le nord et le nord, de telle sorte qu'une œuvre venue de Londres passera par Paris avant d'aller franchir le Rhin. Mais, beaucoup plus souvent, elle transmettra non seulement ses productions, mais les productions anglaises, et ensuite les productions germaniques, à Rome, à Madrid, à Lisbonne. Elle les transmettra, non pas comme un simple courrier, indifférent à ce qu'il transporte; au contraire, elle fera leur toilette; elle les accommodera "aux usages communs de l'Europe": c'est-à-dire au goût qui règne en Europe par son fait, au goût français. Ces Anglais ne sont pas clairs, il faut les décanter; ils n'obéissent pas aux lois de la logique formelle, il faut introduire de l'ordre dans leurs idées; ils sont diffus, il faut les abréger; ils sont grossiers, il faut les affiner. Elle se met à l'œuvre, change, coupe, retaille les habits, met sur les visages de la poudre et du rouge. Les personnages qu'elle présente au monde, après son travail, sont encore exotiques, mais à peine: juste assez pour plaire sans effaroucher. Elle connaît ses mérites; elle connaît le goût de son public et dès lors elle prend en mains, avec ses propres intérêts, ceux de l'Angleterre, et ceux de l'Europe. Les traducteurs qu'elle emploie se haussent en dignité; leur tâche n'est plus celle d'un simple manœuvre qui vise à la fidélité servile; ils deviennent des créateurs, en second; à tout le moins des plénipotentiaires' (Hazard, P.: *La Crise de la Conscience Européenne (1680-1715)* (Paris 1935, Boivin), pp. 73-74).

Modern Western Science had been adroitly pumped up by a series of talented popularizers, from Fontenelle¹ to Wells, but on a linguistic *terrain* which was the most superficial of all its layers. The English language, for example, had latterly won its competition with the French by gaining currency in India, China, and Japan as a *lingua franca* serving as a medium of intercourse for the pedestrian practical purposes of trade and politics² before the non-Western societies that had taken to using this Western linguistic medium for these purposes had come to be more than slightly affected by the rest of the Western culture—above all, its Christian religious nucleus—of which the English language and the other Western vernaculars were potential vehicles.

These illustrations of our 'law' from the history of the diffusion of the Modern Western culture have their counterparts in Hellenic and Far Eastern history. We have seen³ that a Syriac World which had not proved receptive to the Hellenic culture in its integral form was captivated eventually, in the 'Abbasid Age, by an intellectual flake of Hellenism in which its science and philosophy were presented apart from its art and religion. In an earlier phase of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism's radioactivity the art of the Attic drama had acquired a carrying-power when a cosmopolitan association of artistes had treated it, as French publicists were to treat the British constitution, by plucking it out of its native ground in the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus under the shadow of the acropolis of Athens in order to take it on tour and 'produce' it with a virtuosity that Parthians and Celtiberians could appreciate.⁴ Artistic flakes of a Far Eastern culture which had similarly been detached from their spiritual core likewise captivated a nascent Iranic Muslim Society in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Christian Era, and a Modern Western Society from the eighteenth century onwards, without any simultaneous radiation of a Confucian philosophy and a Mahayanian religion that were the original settings from which these fashionably superficial *chinoiseries* had been detached in order to be made exportable at the price of being made meaningless.

We may go on to observe that, on every plane, a recipient society finds it easier to take and use a radiating society's ready-made products, material or spiritual, than to master the techniques, habits, feelings, and thoughts that have to be acquired and appropriated if the recipient is to become, in his turn, a producer of these alien cultural commodities as well as a mere consumer of them. The cultural commodities that have the greatest carrying power of all are lethal tools; but a Pathan trans-frontier barbarian in the no-man's-land beyond the North-West Frontier of the British Indian Empire during the century ending in A.D. 1947⁵ would acquire a taste for a Modern Western rifle, and a skill in

¹ An illuminating sketch of the eighteenth-century French popularizers of the seventeenth-century Western Scientific Revolution will be found in Butterfield, H.: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London 1949, Bell), pp. 143-58.

² See V. v. 506-12.

³ See IV. iv. 243; V. v. 201, n. 1, and 481; and p. 405, above.

⁴ The special case of culture-diffusion across a *limes* between a universal state and the barbarians beyond its pale, of which the history of the North-West Frontier of the British Indian Empire is a classical example, has been examined in Part VIII, *passim*, above.

using it, long before he learnt how to manufacture such a rifle for himself, and long indeed before he began to make creative improvements of his own upon the alien pattern in which the rifle had first come into his hands ready-made—in contrast to the circumstances of the original genesis of the rifle in its place of origin in the Western World, where the production and the use and the improvement of the weapon had all been inseparably bound up with one another in the process of the rifle's evolution.

Following this contrast up, we shall find that, while the Pathan might take with lightning rapidity and astonishing success to a rifle or a sewing-machine or a gramophone, and might even teach himself, under the stimulus of intense desire, to manufacture a remarkably exact copy of a complicated contemporary Western weapon of precision with the simple tools that were the sum of his scanty native metallurgical resources, the same masterly Pathan marksman and gunsmith would show vastly less aptitude for appropriating any of those Western political institutions that were part of the secret of the British Rāj's military ascendancy over the transfrontier barbarian. It was easier for the barbarian to submit temporarily under duress to British political dictation than to take even the first toddling step towards mastering the British political art of parliamentary government; and the culture which was the creative inspiration of all the Western Society's political and military and technological achievements was quite beyond the Pathan's ken even in the secularized form, divorced from its religious heart, in which this Western culture had been at the disposal of non-Western importers since the close of the seventeenth century.

For instance, our nineteenth-century Pathan knew nothing of the long and arduous history of a sustained and organized intellectual endeavour that had created Modern Western Science, and nothing either of the tragic irony with which an acquisitive-minded Western Society's lust to wring material profits out of the disinterested labours of Western intellectual pioneers had brought in its train its grimly appropriate nemesis in the shape of the fascinating Victorian invention of a breech-loading rifle which was the earnest of far more deadly future masterpieces of a Modern Western *Homo Faber's* 'Applied Science'. While the Pathan succeeded in becoming a modest profit-sharer in the dividends of this prostitution of a new science to an old barbarism to which the Pathan and the Frank were, both alike, still morally enslaved in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the Pathan was utterly ignorant of the history of that Western moral progress which—feeble and rudimentary though it might be found to be when measured by the standards of the Saints—had nevertheless succeeded, at the cost of a struggle still more arduous and protracted than the assault of Western Science on Physical Nature, in enabling some of the Western peoples gradually and partially to transmute the Old Adam of government by force into a new covenant of government by consent,¹ and thereby to keep Man's hope of mundane

¹ This faint Late Modern Western emanation of the spirit of the Kingdom of God in the political slum of the Kingdom's refractory secular province was sometimes identified by latter-day Western idealists, naively but in all good faith, with the spirit

salvation alive by opening up a possibility that lethal weapons which were so much more dangerous in Frankish than in Pactyan hands might, in the event, be banned by a Modern Western Democracy's crypto-Christian conscience, instead of being recklessly misused in the Ishmaelistic warfare which the still unredeemedly barbarous Pathan was prone to wage with the deadliest weapons that he knew how to employ.

It was still more disconcerting to see the self-same selection of Western culture-elements that had been made in all innocence by the untutored Pathan being made likewise by a sophisticated Chinese whose high state of indigenous culture, at the time in his history when he encountered the Late Modern West, debarred him from pleading the mitigating circumstances that could be pleaded on behalf of his East Iranian barbarian contemporary.

'There is . . . in the process of Westernisation in China a play of fashion which often appears irresponsible to Westerners, because random and unconvinced. Western standards, far from being considered admirable in themselves, are all suspect and feared as "soulless", because inimical to the spirit of China. Accordingly there appears to be, very often, in the course of adaptation to Western standards, a difficulty in distinguishing between the mechanics of any given process and the spirit that informs the process. In this way attempts are often made to take over a method without adopting the spirit of the society in which the method was originally developed, and of which it was the natural fruit. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this type of contradiction is to be found in the adoption on a large scale of Western armaments with the minimum adoption of the Western style in warfare. In the same way, when there is a question of handing over to Chinese control any enterprise originally developed by foreigners, the least of the difficulties is that of training a technical staff. The true crisis comes when, with the full assertion of Chinese control, a standard of enterprise and responsible direction based on adaptation is substituted for one based on assertion.'¹

These illustrations of the working of our 'law' that the carrying-power of a detached culture-element in process of radiation is apt to be in inverse ratio to its spiritual value point to a conclusion at which we have arrived by a different road in an earlier context.² The transmission of the superficial elements of a culture, in isolation from the essence of the radioactive culture's core, is as precarious as it is facile, whereas the

of Christianity itself. This tragi-comically erroneous identification, which was one of the characteristic illusions of Western men of good will in the writer's age, led a distinguished contemporary and friend of the writer's, who, like the writer, paid his first visit to Shanghai in A.D. 1929, to indulge in the unwarranted and unfulfilled expectation that the British complexion of the municipal administration of the International Settlement in the soulless city would serve to educate the Chinese World of the day in both the practice and the principles of Modern Western ethics by initiating Chinese politicians into the neo-pagan mysteries of Modern Western constitutional government. This Modern Western political idealist showed himself to be a true prophet in divining and proclaiming the truth that the Western institution of parliamentary government was built on a rock of ethical principle. The reason why his hopes for China were disappointed was because he had failed to bear in mind the more fundamental truth that the Western World's political morality was a moon which shone only with a borrowed and reflected light, and that the sun of Christianity, which was the ultimate source of this pale political illumination, was a luminary whose radiance was, not political, but religious.

¹ Lattimore, Owen: *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 153-4.

² In V. v. 201.

religious quintessence of a radioactive culture, which penetrates an alien body social only with extreme difficulty, and even then at an extremely slow pace, is capable, if and when it does work its way into this alien body's heart, of producing a spiritually deeper effect on the recipient society's life than the sum of all the radioactive society's merely artistic or intellectual or linguistic or political or economic radiation when these superficial elements are transmitted apart from the religious life-blood of the migrant culture's heart.

E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARIES

(I) AFTERMATHS OF UNSUCCESSFUL ASSAULTS

(a) EFFECTS ON THE FORTUNES OF THE ASSAULTED PARTY

THE effect of an encounter between contemporaries on the life of both parties is apt to be a disturbing one—and this even for a party which, at the time of the encounter, is not yet in process of disintegration but is still in growth. Even in the least untoward possible circumstances the psychological shock produced by a collision between conflicting civilizations may have consequences of a gravity that is illustrated by the fates of two societies which, while still in growth, had each repelled a formidable assault triumphantly.

The Hellenic Society, as we have seen, reacted magnificently to its ordeal in the years 480–479 B.C. It succeeded in repulsing an onslaught delivered by a Syriac Society whose forces were united at the time under the oecumenical sovereignty of the Achaemenian Empire; and the first perceptible social effect of this military and political triumph was to give Hellenism a stimulus to which it responded by bursting into flower in every field of activity.

‘The vastness of the forces employed in the expedition of Xerxes King of Persia against Hellas cast the shadow of a terrible danger over the Hellenic Society. The stakes for which the Hellenes were called upon to fight were slavery or freedom, while the fact that the Hellenic communities in Asia had already been enslaved created a presumption in every mind that the communities in Hellas itself would experience the same fate. When, however, the war resulted, contrary to expectation, in its amazing issue, the inhabitants of Hellas found themselves not only relieved from the dangers which had threatened them but possessed, in addition, of honour and glory, while every Hellenic community was filled with such affluence that the whole World was astonished at the completeness with which the situation had been reversed. During the half-century that followed this epoch, Hellas made vast strides in prosperity. . . . In the forefront of all, Athens achieved such triumphs of glory and prowess that her name won almost world-wide renown.’¹

Yet, within less than fifty years of the momentous encounter whose cultural outcome was this Attic flowering of Hellenism, the political outcome of the same encounter came to a climax in a disaster which Hellas first failed to avert and then failed to retrieve; and the root of her post-Salaminian political disaster was the same sudden brilliant emergence of Athens which had likewise been the root of the post-Salaminian outburst of Hellenic cultural achievement.

In other contexts² we have noticed that, in the age of Hellenic history preceding the Achaemenids’ epoch-making attempt to incorporate the

¹ Diodorus of Agrigum: *A Library of Universal History*, Book XII, chaps. 1–2¹, quoted in full in II. ii. 109.

² See, for instance, I. i. 24–25 and III. iii. 122.

whole of the Hellenic World into their oecumenical empire, Hellas had accomplished an economic revolution through which she had enabled herself to maintain a growing population within a no-longer expanding domain by substituting a new economic régime of specialization and interdependence for an old one in which each single Hellenic city-state, and indeed each single village within each civic territory, had been living as an economically autonomous unit providing for its own subsistence by producing at home all the staple products that it required. In this economic revolution in Hellas in the sixth century B.C., Athens had played a decisively creative part;¹ but the resulting new economic régime of interdependence could not be maintained unless it could be housed within the framework of a new political régime of the same order, while on the other hand it could not with impunity be allowed to collapse for lack of being reinforced by its requisite political complement, since this new economic régime of interdependence had no sooner been achieved than it had become indispensable to Hellas in virtue of its being her sole practicable response to the challenge of finding her aggressive geographical expansion brought to a halt by a successful resistance on the part of her neighbours and competitors in the Mediterranean Basin.² Before the close of the sixth century B.C. some form of political unification to match the accomplished fact of economic interdependence had thus become the Hellenic World's most urgent social need; and during the half century ending in the ordeal of 480-479 B.C. it had looked as if the solution of this common Hellenic problem would be found for Hellas—if it was to be found by any Hellenic community—not by the Athens of Solon and Peisistratus but by the Sparta of Chilon and Cleomenes I.

During those fifty years Sparta had been giving a promising lead towards political unification by helping the economically progressive Continental European Greek city-states in the neighbourhood of the Isthmus of Corinth to throw off the despotic governments that had been the Hellenic economic revolution's local political concomitants, and then bringing the communities that had thus been liberated from a domestic tyranny into an easy-going political association with the liberator Power. The Achaemenian Empire's lowering threat to engulf European Greece could perhaps be converted into a blessing in disguise for Hellas if the imperative requirements of self-defence in an impending military struggle against a gigantic alien aggressor were to impel her children to achieve the political unification which her economic transformation was now imperatively demanding; and, incidentally, Hellas' immediate crying need might prove a heaven-sent opportunity for Sparta, if she could rise to the occasion by uniting under her military and political leadership the whole of the still unsubjugated European half of the Hellenic World, as she had already united European Greece's Peloponnesian extremity. Unhappily, in this crisis with which Hellas was confronted by Darius's fateful resolve to bring European as well as Asiatic Greece under Achaemenian rule,³ Sparta left it to Athens to play the

¹ See II. ii. 38-42.

² See pp. 430-5, above.

³ See pp. 423-9, above.

beau rôle;¹ and, in consequence, the Hellenic World's exhilarating experience in 480-479 B.C. of a deadly danger triumphantly surmounted not only failed, after all, to bring with it for her the boon of political unification under the universally accepted hegemony of a single Hellenic Power,² but actually placed athwart her path towards unification an obstacle which her children failed thereafter to surmount.

¹ The sublimity of Leonidas' and his three hundred fellow Lacedaemonians' personal self-sacrifice in their forlorn hope at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. was more than offset, in Sparta's moral account with Hellas, by the political selfishness and strategic fatuousness of the Lacedaemonian Government's contemporary public policy. A Power which, in the crisis of 490 B.C., had ignominiously failed to put in an appearance on the battlefield of Marathon until after the Achaemenian expeditionary force had been repulsed by the Athenians and Plataeans single-handed, ran true to form in the greater crisis of 480 B.C., when Sparta refused to stake the whole of her magnificent infantry on trying to hold the pass of Tempe, or even the pass of Thermopylae, in concert with Athens' magnificent navy. The example shown to Hellas at Thermopylae by Leonidas and his token force was the soldiers' deed and not their Government's. While Leonidas and his companions were sacrificing their lives, the Lacedaemonian Government's one idea was to look after the parochial interests of Laconia and her Peloponnesian neighbours by fortifying the Isthmus of Corinth; and, in compromising their country's honour by staking her existence on this poor-spirited plan, they do not appear to have reflected that, in thus abandoning Attica as well as the central and northern sections of Continental European Greece, they were virtually inviting the Athenians to capitulate to the invader and were thereby doing their worst to deprive themselves of the assistance of the Athenian Navy, without which the Peloponnese would have been indefensible. If, after the Persians' break-through at Thermopylae, the Athenians had shown the same uninspired common sense as was shown by the Thebans, the Athenian Navy would either have gone out of action or would have changed sides, and in either of these events the Peloponnesians' Isthmian wall would have been outflanked by the naval operations of an irresistibly superior enemy sea-power without any need for the land-troops of the Achaemenian expeditionary force to attempt to storm the Isthmus by a frontal attack. The situation was saved for the Peloponnese, as well as for Hellas as a whole, by the Athenians' decision, in this supreme emergency, to emulate the heroism of a Spartan Leonidas whose own Government had failed to catch the hero's inspiration. By summoning up the fortitude to keep the sea after the enemy's occupation of their country and devastation of their city, the Athenians won for Hellas her decisive naval victory at Salamis.

Even after Athens had thus saved the Peloponnese at Salamis in 480 B.C., the Lacedaemonian Government managed nevertheless to come within an ace of losing the war for Hellas after all in 479 B.C. by threatening to 'miss the bus' for Plataea as they had previously 'missed the bus' for Marathon; and, in the event, the Hellenic victory at Plataea, like the Hellenic feat of arms at Thermopylae, was a soldiers' battle and not an achievement of generalship or statesmanship, as far as the Lacedaemonians were concerned. Moreover, the Lacedaemonian soldier's magnificent faithfulness to his traditional standards of military honour and prowess was offset after the Battle of Plataea, once again, by disgraceful conduct in high places. The Lacedaemonian Government's cowardice after Thermopylae was eclipsed after Plataea by the treachery of the Lacedaemonian commander under whose official auspices the victory had been won. When it came, in the next phase of the war, to carrying the hostilities into Achaemenian territory for the purpose of liberating those Hellenic communities that had been under Achaemenian rule before 480 B.C., the Spartan Regent Pausanias demonstrated his own imperviousness to the inspiration of his uncle King Leonidas by surrendering unconditionally to the temptation of allowing himself to be dazzled by a signally defeated Achaemenian Imperial Majesty's tinsel sheen of pomp and circumstance. In the act of disgracing himself by losing his head and becoming a renegade, Pausanias lost for his country the leadership in the war for the liberation of the Asiatic Hellenes from an Achaemenian yoke.

² The indispensability of a centralization of leadership in the hands of a single Power, as a condition for the achievement of political unity, must have been impressed on Hellenic minds in the generation of the Great Helleno-Persian War by a then still painfully recent Hellenic experience. Less than fifty years before 480 B.C. a long-sustained Hellenic campaign of aggression against the Hellenes' Phoenician competitors in the Western Mediterranean had been effectively arrested by a union of the Libyphoenician city-states under the hegemony of Carthage (see pp. 426-9, above). The opportunity that the Carthaginians had thus seized when the challenge of Hellenic aggression had presented it was now being offered by the challenge of Achaemenian aggression to

Instead of leaving Sparta the unchallenged leader of a Pan-Hellenic confederacy, the ordeal of 480-479 B.C. liberated Asiatic Greece from Achaemenian rule only to leave the Hellenic World as a whole formidably divided in its political allegiance between a Sparta who had not discredited herself so seriously as to forfeit the goodwill of her pre-war Peloponnesian allies and an Athens who had not distinguished herself so irresistibly as to overcome the repugnance of her post-war insular and Asiatic satellites to their exchange of a Persian domination for an Athenian hegemony. This division of Hellas into two mutually hostile camps was a consequence of the impact of her encounter with the Achaemenian Empire on her problem of transcending her own political parochialism; and this domestic outcome of her victorious repulse of Darius's and Xerxes' assault proved in retrospect to have been a fatal turning-point in her history when she met with the fall that overtakes every house that remains stubbornly divided against itself.¹ The opposing camps eventually drifted into the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, and the outbreak of that war signified the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization.

The plight of political polarization that was the portentous price of the Hellenic Society's victory in its military encounter with a Syriac universal state in the shape of the Achaemenian Empire was likewise the fate by which the Hellenic World's successor, Orthodox Christendom, was overtaken in the sequel to this civilization's still more amazing victory, in the hour of its own birth, over a Syriac universal state that had been re-established in the seventh century of the Christian Era in the shape of the Arab Caliphate.² On the morrow of the defeat of the Arabs' attempt to take Constantinople in A.D. 673-7, an Orthodox Christendom which had purchased by this victory the possibility of coming to life came within an ace of committing suicide when an Anatolic and an Armeniac army corps threatened to engage in a fratricidal struggle for supremacy which would have been as fatal for Orthodox Christendom as the struggle between Sparta and Athens had been for Hellas.

Orthodox Christendom was saved from this fate by the genius of her Emperors Leo III and his son Constantine V;³ by the *union sacrée* which was forced upon her Anatolic and Armeniac rival champions when the Arab offensive was resumed in A.D. 716-18; and by the abiding and compelling memory of a Roman Empire which had been the master institution of an antecedent Hellenic Society in the last phase of its history. The hold of this memory upon Orthodox Christian hearts and minds made it possible for Leo and Constantine to persuade the two rival army corps to liquidate their feud by agreeing with one accord to merge themselves in a unitary East Roman Empire that made an irresistible appeal to their imagination and their loyalty by presenting itself as a Rome risen from the dead.⁴ The raising of a ghost, however, is not a means of salvation that can ever be embraced with impunity; and,

Sparta in the Hellenic World in the next chapter of the story of the encounter between a Syriac and a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization.

¹ Matt. xii. 25; Luke xi. 17.

² The historical relation between the Arab Caliphate and the Achaemenian Empire has been tentatively elucidated in I. i. 76-77.

³ See IV. iv. 341-2.

⁴ See II. ii. 368 and III. iii. 276.

in saddling an infant Orthodox Christendom with the incubus of an absolute authoritarian state, Leo Syrus merely postponed her fall without averting it. He saved her from ruining herself in a fratricidal struggle between an Anatolic and an Armeniac army corps in the eighth century of the Christian Era by giving an unfortunate turn to her political development; and this perversion brought its nemesis when, some 250 years later, the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization duly declared itself in the outbreak of a more terrible fratricidal struggle between an East Roman Empire and Patriarchate on the one side and a Bulgarian Empire and Patriarchate on the other.¹

If an Orthodox Christian and an Hellenic Society thus each alike eventually succumbed to untoward after-effects of an encounter with an aggressive contemporary after the aggressor had been triumphantly repelled by Hellas in her youth and by Orthodox Christendom in her infancy, we shall not be surprised to find at least as unhappy an effect following from the discomfiture of aggressors by civilizations that have been already in process of disintegration by the time when they have been overtaken by these critical encounters.

We have already taken note of the price for success in arresting Hellenic aggression that was exacted by History from the Libyphoenician colonies of a Syriac Society which had broken down, some four hundred years before, on the morrow of the generation of King Solomon.² The price was a spiritually impoverishing régime of self-insulation behind 'a wooden curtain'.³ We have also observed⁴ that the 'hermit empire' which was established in the sixth century B.C. round the Western Basin of the Mediterranean by Carthage had an avatar in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era on the farther side of the Atlantic Ocean round the Spanish Main; and we can now go on to observe that this Spanish reproduction of a perverse Carthaginian institution was the price exacted by History from the Castilians, in their world and age, for their emulation of the Carthaginian feat of arresting the expansion of Hellenism; for, at this same price, the Spaniards in their turn succeeded in arresting the intrusion of their Dutch, English, and French West European neighbours and rivals into the Americas.

In a Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Society an Early Modern Western Christendom's attempt to penetrate this alien body social through the peaceful influence of traders and missionaries at the moment of the final paroxysm of a Japanese Time of Troubles was successfully quashed by drastic Japanese counter-measures on the morrow of the establishment of a Japanese universal state; and this Japanese success in expelling and excluding the Portuguese intruders, and in eradicating or driving underground the Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity which the Jesuits had been planting in a Japanese mission-field, was purchased, like the abortive contemporary Spanish attempt to keep the Spaniards' fellow West European maritime rivals

¹ The chain of historical cause and effect leading from the establishment of the East Roman Empire by Leo III and Constantine V in A.D. 717-75 to the outbreak of the Great Romano-Bulgarian War in A.D. 977 has been traced in II. ii. 368-9 and in IV. iv. 320-408.

² See pp. 428-9 and 437-8, above.

³ See I. i. 82 and IV. iv. 67-68.

⁴ On pp. 485-6, above.

out of the Americas, at the price of putting a stop to all Japanese activities beyond the coasts of the Japanese Archipelago and converting a politically united Japan into an hermetically sealed Far Eastern counterpart of the less effectually closed Castilian Empire of the Indies.¹

These Japanese, Spanish, and Libyphoenician examples of the spiritual toll exacted by History from an assaulted society for its success in repulsing its assailant's attack are all dwarfed by the enormity of the latter end of an Egyptiac Civilization which paid for its success in fending off its Hittite assailants in the thirteenth century B.C., and in arresting the avalanche of a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries, by incurring the doom of Tithonus.²

If we now take a synoptic view of the passages of history which we have cited as illustrations in our present inquiry, our survey may suggest certain tentative findings. Without impugning our conclusion, reached in an earlier Part of this Study,³ that the coroner's verdict on the 'deaths' of civilizations proves invariably to be 'suicide' and not 'murder' in cases in which there is sufficient evidence to warrant a judgement, our present investigation seems to indicate that an assault, even when successfully repulsed, has a seriously disturbing effect on the assaulted party's domestic life, and that this disturbance presents a challenge which—whether prohibitively severe or not—had in fact proved too much for the parties that had been exposed to it in all cases within the knowledge of historians in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era. In the cases in which the victorious assaulted society had been still in its growth-stage at the time of the assault, its failure to respond successfully to the consequent challenge had resulted in its breaking down, while, in the cases in which, at the time, it had already been in disintegration, the penalty of failure to meet the same consequent challenge had been a spiritual catalepsy and a symptomatic social petrification to which the Libyphoenicians, the Creoles, and the Japanese had each succumbed for a spell, and the Egyptiac Society for all the rest of an unnaturally prolonged life-span.

(b) EFFECTS ON THE FORTUNES OF THE ASSAILANT

If we now go on to examine the aftermaths of unsuccessful assaults in the subsequent histories of the foiled assailants, we shall find that the consequent challenges have proved severe *a fortiori*.

The Hittites, for example, were, as we have seen, left so desperately weak by their over-exertion in their eventually unsuccessful attempt to conquer the Egyptian Crown's Asiatic possessions in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. that they were subsequently submerged by the wave of a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* which the Egyptiac World just managed to roll back from the coast of the Delta—with the consequence that a Hittite Society, which had been still in growth at the time when it

¹ See pp. 316-24, above. The Dutch trading settlement marooned on the islet of Deshima, which was the solitary unsevered link between Japan and the rest of the World during the Tokugawa Age of Japanese history, has been noticed in II. ii. 232-4.

² See I. i. 136-46; IV. iv. 84-6; and VI. vii. 49-50.

³ In IV. iv. 115-19.

succumbed, survived only in the fragmentary form of a cluster of fossil communities astride the Taurus, whereas the Egyptiac Society survived geographically intact in its posthumous state of life-in-death. The aftermath of the Siceliot Greeks' abortive aggression against their Phoenician and Etruscan competitors took the milder form of a political paralysis which did not cripple their artistic and intellectual activities.

As we have noticed in another context,¹ the exigencies of a long-drawn-out losing battle against the counter-offensive of a Libyphoenician World, that had effectively united its own forces under a Carthaginian single command, constrained the hard-pressed Siceliots to sacrifice their cherished local city-state sovereignties and liberties by allowing themselves to be brigaded under the yokes of military despotisms; but the Siceliots in the fifth, fourth, and third centuries B.C., like the Italians in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era,² condemned themselves to have the worst of both worlds by failing to go beyond half-measures. Instead of emulating their Libyphoenician antagonists' rewarding sixth-century achievement of an enduring political unity under the hegemony of a single one of their number, the Siceliots never achieved more than local and temporary consolidations of political and military power which deprived them of the boons of national independence and domestic freedom without sufficing to recapture for them the upper hand in their conflict with the Carthaginian Empire; and in the last chapter of the story, when they were within an ace of being totally subjugated by the remorseless advance of this semi-Hellenized Syriac counter-aggressor, they were saved only at the cost of having to exchange the ineffective rule of their home-grown parochial despots for the potent dominion of a Hellenized barbarian Great Power. Rome not only stemmed the Carthaginian attack on the Hellenic World; she banished this Carthaginian peril once for all by breaking through a 'wooden curtain' that had proved impenetrable for over 250 years, and sweeping the Carthaginian Empire off the map. In the Romano-Punic Wars the Romans attained an Hellenic objective which had always eluded the Siceliot Greek despots' aim, in virtue of a Roman genius for empire-building that utterly outranged the shorter-sighted political vision of the Deinomenidae and Dionysii.

If the aftermath of an unsuccessful assault on a contemporary society proved to be as serious as this for a Hittite and an Hellenic World which were both still in process of growth at the time of their fateful encounters with an Egyptian neighbour in the one case and with a Libyphoenician neighbour in the other, it is not surprising to find disaster overtaking the main body of a Syriac World which had tried and failed to make itself mistress of Hellas at a stage of Syriac history at which the disintegration of a broken-down society had arrived at its *ultima ratio*, a universal state. In an earlier chapter of this Part of our Study³ we have watched the Achaemenian hybris that had inveigled Darius the First into his decision to annex European Greece duly bringing its nemesis in the overthrow of Darius the Last by Alexander of Macedon.

¹ In III. iii. 357, n. 1.

² On pp. 430-7, above.

³ See III. iii. 354-7.

(II) AFTERMATHS OF SUCCESSFUL ASSAULTS

(a) EFFECTS ON THE BODY SOCIAL

1. *Symptoms in the Social Life of the Assailant*

We have observed¹ that, in encounters between contemporaries in which 'the agent's' impact on 'the reagent' has resulted in a successful penetration of the assaulted body social by the assailant's cultural radiation, the two parties to the encounter usually prove to have been already in process of disintegration by the time when the interaction between them had begun; and we have also observed² that one of the criteria of disintegration is the schism of the body social of a disintegrating society into a minority that has come to be merely dominant instead of being creative and a proletariat that has come to be morally alienated from *ci-devant* leaders who have turned into changeling masters. This social schism is likely to have occurred already in the body social of a society whose cultural radiation is successfully penetrating the body social of one of its neighbours; and the social symptom that is the most signal consequence of this always untoward and often undesired social success is an aggravation of the problem which the secession of an internal proletariat presents to a dominant minority in any case. A proletariat is intrinsically an awkward element in a society, even when it is a purely home-grown product; but its awkwardness is sharply accentuated if its numerical strength is reinforced, and its cultural complexion is variegated, by an intake of alien man-power; and this is the penalty which a successfully aggressive society is bound to pay—and the revenge which its successfully assaulted victim is able to take.

In a previous chapter of this Part³ we have noticed the efforts of Roman, Hapsburg, and American statesmanship to stem this insidious counterflow of cultural influence; but our earlier survey of the growth and composition of an Hellenic and a Western internal proletariat⁴ is a commentary on the futility of attempting to arrest the subtle progress of a culture-ray by placing athwart its path the coarse-grained fabric of a political bulkhead. *Iam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes*⁵ would have been as true a verdict on the efficacy of the Hapsburg Imperial-Royal Government's phobia in A.D. 1915-18 against further annexations of Orthodox-Christian-inhabited territories, or on the efficacy of the United States immigration restriction acts of A.D. 1921 and A.D. 1924 and A.D. 1952, as it was on the efficacy of Augustus's reluctance to increase the relative strength of the Oriental element in the population and the culture of the Roman Empire by salvaging for a post-Alexandrine Hellenism her lost Oriental dominions east of Euphrates.

In a Modern Western World that had made itself literally world-wide by radiating its influence over the whole habitable surface of the Earth, not only the Orontes but the Ganges and the Yangtse had discharged into the Thames and the Hudson, while the Danube had performed the

¹ On p. 507, above.² In V. v. 58-104.³ On pp. 510-14, above.⁴ See V. v. 58-82 and 152-94.⁵ Juvenal: *Satires*, No. III, l. 62, quoted in V. v. 67.

more sensational miracle of reversing the direction of its flow in order to deposit a cultural alluvium of Ruman and Serb and Bulgar and Greek proselytes up-stream in a Viennese melting-pot. *Si testimonium requiris*, was not the evidence printed *in extenso* and made public in the telephone directories of Vienna¹ and Paris and London and New York and Chicago and a host of lesser cities in the European and American provinces of a Western Society's homeland? And did not these endless columns of close print, bristling with outlandish non-Western surnames, attest the advent, in a twentieth-century Westernizing World, of the blight of promiscuity² that had been demoralizing a Hellenizing World in Juvenal's day?

The social price that a successfully aggressive civilization has to pay is a seepage of its alien victims' exotic culture into the lifestream of the aggressor society's internal proletariat and a proportionate widening of the moral gulf that already yawns between this alienated proletariat and a would-be dominant minority.

2. *Symptoms in the Social Life of the Assaulted Party*

(a) *'One Man's Meat is Another Man's Poison'*

The effects of a successful assault on the body social of the assaulted party are more complex, without being less pernicious, than the corresponding effects on the body social of the victim's victorious assailant. On the one hand we shall find that a culture-element which has been harmless or actually beneficial in the body social in which it is at home is apt to produce novel and devastating effects in an alien body in which it has lodged itself as an exotic and isolated intruder. On the other hand we shall find that, when once an isolated exotic culture-element has thus succeeded in forcing an entry into the life of an assaulted society, and in holding its ground in this occupied alien territory, it tends to draw in after it other elements of the same provenance with which the lone pioneer element has been associated in its and their original common home. It will be convenient to examine the working of these two apparent 'laws' of cultural radiation-and-reception in the order in which we have just introduced them; and, in considering first the 'law' that a culture-element which has been harmless at home is apt to work havoc if it is isolated and exported, we may begin by observing that the operation of this law is familiar to us in the realms of Physical Life and Inanimate Nature.

It is, for example, one of the common experiences of every-day physical life that this or that individual human being may have a digestive system that is peculiar in being 'allergic' to foods that are standing dishes in his society's staple diet; and, in the intercourse between one society and another, it is notorious that alcoholic drinks which may have a comparatively innocuous effect upon members of a society in which the use of alcohol is customary may prove deadly when introduced into a society in which strong drink has previously been unknown. In a Westernizing World this had been the effect of the spirituous liquors

¹ See VI. vii. 235, n. 1.

² See V. v. 439-568.

imported by Western Christian traders on the health of the native peoples of West Africa and North America; and what had been true of the 'fire-water' that was 'the Paleface's' familiar spirit had been likewise true of the infectious diseases that were his commonplace maladies. A whooping-cough that was a mild complaint when it attacked a Western child, and no worse than an unpleasant ordeal when it attacked a Western adult, might decimate or even exterminate the population of a Polynesian island never previously exposed to attack by a germ whose chosen vessel had been Western Man; and in the writer's generation the operation of the same law in the realm of Inanimate Nature had been shown up in a ghastly light by a horrifying practical application of post-Modern Western Man's intellectually magnificent theoretical feat of discerning the structure of the Atom. The discovery of 'the know-how' for manufacturing atomic bombs and the consequent employment of these unprecedentedly potent weapons in a world war had brought home even to the least scientifically instructed mind of the day the terrifying potentialities of a physical element which was harmlessly or even usefully inert so long as the electron-components of its atoms were duly gravitating round their atomic nucleus in the pattern of atomic structure that had been normal in the physical 'make-up' of this planet during the aeon in which it had been serving as a home for living creatures. The fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had demonstrated that a hitherto innocuous substance might become explosive to a degree that would be lethal for all life within range when human ingenuity had learnt the trick of stripping an atom's sun-like nucleus of the electrons that were its planet-like satellites. The disastrous human consequences of this audacious technological feat had been foreshadowed in the Hellenic myths of the unleashing of Aeolus's wind-bag¹ and the opening of Pandora's box.²

In this latter-day atomic exposition of our law the explanation of this law's working was manifest. The latent physical energy, of a deadly potency, that was released through the splitting of an atom, had been kept in store in the intact structure of the integral atom through being neutralized there by an equilibrium of forces that was an expression, in terms of force, of the atom's structural pattern. It will be seen that, in the integral atom, the destructive potentialities of the constituents had been held in check by an inanimate equivalent of the sociality which was the working constitution of Physical as well as Spiritual Life. This relation of interdependence and consequent reciprocal obligation between the cells composing a living body and the organism constituted by these components was indeed the elixir of Life—as was demonstrated by the deadliness of the cancer by which a living organism was afflicted whenever any of its cells sought to live just for and by themselves without regard to the social reciprocity which was the necessary condition of survival for body and cells alike.

This law governing the cells' relations with the whole organism and with one another was also operative in their relations with foreign

¹ *Odyssey*, Book X, ll. 19-55.

² *Hesiod: Works and Days*, ll. 42-105, especially ll. 83-104.

organic substances, whether dead or alive. The unlucky individual for whom his neighbours' meat was poison was plagued with this personal infirmity owing to some peculiarity in the chemical composition of his body's gastric juices which produced a dyspeptic chemical reaction when these juices encountered the particular food to which this particular individual was 'allergic'—in contrast to the eupeptic reaction produced in a normal stomach by an encounter between exactly the same food and a battery of gastric juices of the standard brew. In the more fateful battles between a living organism's defence-force of soldier-cells and the hostile intrusive germs whose invasion was diagnosed by medical practitioners as one of the recognized diseases, the reason why an identical disease was sometimes apt to be more serious for adults than for children, or vice versa, was presumably because, at different ages, the assaulted organism's defensive equipment for opposing the attack of an identical aggressor would vary according to the stage of life in which the victim of the attack happened to be caught by his assailant, with the consequence that the transitions from one age to another would be accompanied by variations in the relative strength of the combatants in this warfare between bacteria and phagocytes.

On the same view of an ailing human body as the battlefield of two opposing armies, we can also see why the effects of an identical disease on different victims should differ in the degree of their severity when the difference between the victims was not the difference in age between children and adults within the bosom of the same society but the difference in experience and expectation between members of a society in which the disease in question had long been endemic and members of another society which had hitherto been exempt from this particular malady. In a society in which a disease was rife, the white corpuscles in the body of every living human being would have been stimulated, exercised, and trained by their experience of repeated past encounters with a perennial invader to be perpetually on the alert for a fresh attack, and to meet this attack, when it came, with a vigour and skill inspired by an awareness of a familiar enemy's special points of strength and weakness. By contrast, the identically constituted white corpuscles in the bodies of members of a society which this identical disease was visiting for the first time would be apt to succumb to an unfamiliar aggressor whose attack would have taken them by surprise and whose armaments and tactics would have been novel to them.

It will now have become apparent that our 'law' to the effect that 'one man's meat is another man's poison' represents, in the province of external relations between one individual or society and another, the local operation of a law of wider currency which we have already observed in action in the province of an individual's or society's internal affairs.¹ In studying what happens in the domestic life of a society when a fresh dynamic force asserts itself—or a fresh creative movement starts—from within, we have seen that this new event is bound to be a challenge to the existing pattern of culture-elements which is the basis of the society's present state of health, and that this challenge cannot be ignored

¹ See IV. iv. 133-7.

with impunity. In the new situation that the new event has produced, social health can be preserved only through an adjustment of the old pattern to accommodate the new feature, and this adjustment is tantamount to a replacement of the old pattern by a new one, or, in other words, to a thorough-going reconstruction of this particular social universe.¹

The penalty for ignoring the necessity of making this adjustment, or for seeking to evade it, is either a revolution, in which the new-born dynamic force shatters a traditional culture-pattern that has proved too rigid to afford it accommodation, or else an enormity engendered by the introduction of the new force's demonic driving-power into the structure of an obstinately rigid culture-pattern whose fabric has proved tough enough to withstand the new force's unprecedentedly powerful pressure. It will be seen that the encounter between a new culture-element and an old culture-pattern is always governed by the same law, whether the new element happens to emerge from within or to impinge from outside. In both these variations on a dramatic situation which is the same in both cases in the last analysis, the introduction of the new element condemns the old pattern, *ipso facto*, to undergo a change either in its structure or in its working; and, except in so far as this inexorable summons of new life is effectively met by an evolutionary adjustment of the culture-pattern's structure, the potentially creative and life-giving visitant will actually deal deadly destruction. Its admonition is: 'See, I have set before thee this day Life and Good, and Death and Evil';² αἰτία ἐλομένων Θεὸς ἀναίτιος.³

In the present place we are concerned with the situation in which the challenging visitant for whom accommodation has to be found if he is not to turn a sleepy heaven into a lively hell is an alien intruder who has taken the kingdom by force;⁴ and, unlike the new-born babe who subverts the kingdom from within, the dark invader is an adult who, before Fate cast him for his present cruel role of a miserable *déraciné* and a militant 'displaced person', has enjoyed a previous existence as the comfortable law-abiding citizen of another kingdom where he has been an Israel and not an Ishmael.

Sociality is a facile virtue for an autochthonous son of the soil who possesses a legal domicile as his birthright and who has been brought up into a social system of reciprocal rights and duties which, when the budding citizen was at his formative age, was a going concern hallowed by tradition and tested by experience. This fortunate son of the house finds himself born into a social milieu where he has a *raison d'être* for his existence and a legitimate outlet for his energies in so far as these are directed to socially valuable aims, while, in so far as his aims are socially undesirable, they are prevented from running amok by a salutary system of constitutional checks and balances. But, when Fate transfigures a

¹ In II. i. 277-99 we have noticed the service performed by the Devil in constraining God to resume His work of creation, and thus enabling God to break the deadlock that is the nemesis of the perfection of His workmanship. ² Deut. xxx. 15.

³ 'The choice is the chooser's responsibility; God is not responsible' (Plato: *Respublica*, Book X, 617 E), quoted previously in IV. iv. 465.

⁴ Matt. xi. 12; cp. Luke xvi. 16.

Minoan Rhadamanthus into a Philistine Goliath, or an inoffensive Jewish denizen of the Pale, whose heart and head have been dedicated to the interpretation and observance of the Mosaic Law, into a Zionist *sicarius* blessing the Lord his strength, which teacheth his hands to war and his fingers to fight,¹ this demoralizing metamorphosis brings bane to the Holy Land; and a simile taken from two episodes in the history of Palestine may help us to understand how it is possible for a culture-element that has played the good citizen's part in the culture-pattern in which it is at home to behave like an outlaw² when it has been uprooted from its native soil, been divorced from its former associates, and been driven into exile in a strange and hostile land. The isolated vagrant culture-element plays havoc in the foreign body where it lodges because the diffraction that has sundered it from its native setting has, at one stroke, deprived it of its previous *raison d'être* and released it from the discipline of its previous counterweights and antidotes.

Examples of this devastating play of an expatriated culture-element invading an alien social milieu have already come to our notice in our survey of encounters between contemporaries in a previous portion of this Part.³

We have noticed, for instance, some of the tragedies that had been inflicted in the course of fourteen centuries on divers non-Western societies by the impact of the Western World's peculiar political institution. The essential feature of the Western political ideology had been its insistence on taking as its principle of political association the physical accident of geographical propinquity, instead of finding the basis for a sense of political solidarity in a spiritual affinity of the kind that is both reflected in and fostered by a community of religious observances and beliefs. At the genesis of a Western Christian Society out of a post-Hellenic social interregnum we have seen⁴ the emergence of this distinctively Western political ideal in Visigothia in the sixth and seventh centuries of the Christian Era make life impossible for a local Jewish diaspora when this incompatible Gentile ideal collided with the system of non-territorial autonomy within an ecclesiastical framework that the Jewish diaspora had inherited from its Syriac past. In contrast to the new Western ideology of political, social, and cultural *Gleichschaltung* within the arbitrarily drawn frontiers of some barbarian successor-state

¹ Psalm cxliv. i.

² 'Individuals who have become severed from their background are restless, unsatisfied, often desperate creatures, pursued by stinging, reckless impulses. . . . The individual who has been prised away from his collective background usually manifests symptoms parallel to those found among migrating hordes. The recklessness which so easily spreads throughout an unorganized, migrating mass is a terrifying one. A gold-rush, an invading or retreating army in a foreign land, an exodus of people in the mass—all have certain characteristics in common, namely a dangerous lowering of responsibility towards human life and property and a sub-human, unthinking urgency which, like a river in spate, tends to overrun and destroy everything in its path. Man is not the only animal prone to moods of recklessness: all migrating animals moving in vast hordes, as, for instance, the lemmings of the Arctic Circle, salmon, locusts, caterpillars, and, to a certain degree, migratory birds and mammals when moving *en masse*, are inspired by an almost suicidal recklessness quite foreign to their normal adapted character' (Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul: A Research into the Unconscious from Schizophrenic Dreams and Drawings* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall & Cox; 1949, Methuen), p. 460).

³ See pp. 106-453, above.

⁴ On pp. 277-80, above.

of the Roman Empire, the Syriac millet system was, as we have observed, a practical solution, worked out in response to experience, for the problem presented to statesmanship by the geographical intermingling of different communities with one another. In ignoring the problem and attempting to iron the local Jewish millet out of existence by subjecting its members to political, economic, and psychological pressure of an inhuman degree of severity, the rulers of Visigothia inflicted anguish on the Jews at the price of disgrace and eventual disaster for the bigot Power itself.

The havoc worked by a nascent Western political ideology in a seventh-century Visigothia began to afflict the World outside the narrow West European homeland of Western Christendom after the opening of the Modern Age of Western history, when a puissant wave of Modern Western cultural influence carried with it into one quarter after another of the habitable surface of the planet a peculiar Western political ideology which was now keyed-up to an unprecedented pitch of fanatical intensity by the impact of the new spirit of Democracy upon the old Western institution of Territorial Sovereignty embodied in parochial states.¹

For anyone who happened to have been born and brought up in Western Europe since the eruption of this Modern Western Democracy, the concept of Territorial Nationality was, no doubt, something self-evident. Every West European would be familiar with his own nation, and he would have little difficulty in defining it as being the population of a continuous and clearly demarcated block of territory whose inhabitants were united by the common possession of a distinctive social heritage and by a common membership in a single sovereign independent body politic in which this social heritage had found its political expression. In the social heritage of a West European nation a common national language was apt to be one of the salient distinctive features; and, though this linguistic expression of nationality was not to be found in every West European nation's cultural 'make-up', it counted for much, when it was present (as it usually was), in the evocation and the maintenance of a nation's political consciousness.

All this was taken for granted by West Europeans, simply because, in Western Europe, national heritages, including national languages, happened for the most part to be distributed geographically in separate and severally self-contained blocks, on the pattern of a patchwork quilt, with the consequence that the local political allegiances of the peoples of Western Europe had crystallized, in the course of West European history, in this geographical formation. The political life of Western Europe had set hard on this locally not unnatural and, on the whole, not unsatisfactory basis before another combination of historical causes had happened to give these now national-minded peoples of Western Europe a temporary ascendancy over the rest of the World; and these two chains of historical development combined to invest a latter-day West European political institution with an imposing prestige in alien social milieux where this institution was not indigenous. These alien

¹ See IV. iv. 156-67.

peoples admired, or at any rate envied, the Modern West Europeans' political success, and they assumed that the distinctive West European political ideology of Nationalism had been the cause of it. The West European institution of the Parochial National State was taken by these politically less successful proselytes for a talisman that would automatically confer political efficiency and power on any people who appropriated it; and, with this simple-minded expectation, they hastened to adopt this West European Nationalism without pausing to consider whether the effect that it had produced in its native environment was likely to be reproduced in an alien social setting.

This line of reasoning and action, of course, was not only naïve but was fallacious on more than one account. In the first place the West European social setting which had given birth to the political ideal of Territorial Nationalism was a peculiar local milieu which was an exception, not the rule, in the World as a whole. In Western Europe, where this Territorial Nationalism had originated, it was a natural dispensation in the sense that there it had been a spontaneous growth answering on the political plane to the underlying local pattern of human geography. In the second place the West European peoples had never been pedantic or fanatical in pushing this native and locally natural political ideal of theirs to extremes. The common sense of the West European peoples, as well as the abnormality of the West European social milieu, was one of the keys to an explanation of the contrast between the comparative innocuousness of the principle of Territorial Nationality in its West European home and the havoc that it worked when it was recklessly introduced into alien social milieux by proselytes who were condemned to be doctrinaires because they were following an exotic political theory whose practical application had never come within the range of their own ancestral experience. Since the linguistic aspect of West European Nationalism was the feature that leapt to an alien eye, the pedantry of these doctrinaire nationalists *in partibus alienis* fastened upon this, and, in doing so, made a most unfortunate departure from traditional West European native practice by finding the criterion of Nationality in the shibboleth of Language.

We have indeed observed already in another context¹ that Modern Western Nationalism was comparatively innocuous in its West European birthplace, where, for the most part, it took the political map as it found it, and was content to utilize the existing parochial states, within their established frontiers, as its crucibles for the decoction of its intoxicating political brew of psychic energy. Its noxious potentialities revealed themselves on alien ground where, so far from consecrating the frontiers which it found on the map, this aggressive exotic political ideology denounced them in the name of the explosive academic proposition that all persons who happened to be speakers of this or that vernacular language had a natural right to be united politically with one another in a single sovereign independent national state and therefore had a moral obligation to sacrifice their own and their neighbours' welfare, happiness, and life itself in the pursuit of this pedantic political

¹ In IV. iv. 185-90.

programme. This linguistic interpretation—or caricature—of the West European ideology of Nationalism was never taken *au pied de la lettre* in the West European countries themselves, since here the external bond provided by community of speech was always recognized as being merely one among divers outward signs of an inward sense of political solidarity springing from common political experiences, institutions, and ideals.

The national unity of the French nation, or the British nation, for instance, was not disrupted by the diversity of the French or English mother tongue of a majority of the citizens from the Celtic mother tongue of a minority in Brittany or Wales; and the centuries-old political association of the French-speaking inhabitants of the Val d'Aosta with the Italian-speaking inhabitants of Piedmont under the common rule of the House of Savoy¹ moved the Aostans on the morrow of the Second World War to opt in favour of continuing to be citizens of a defeated Italy, which they felt to be their mother country, in preference to becoming citizens of a France who had come out on the winning side and who was now appealing to them to join her on the strength of their common possession of the same mother tongue. Next door to the Val d'Aosta, in Switzerland, Western Europe offered the spectacle of a nation which had as lively a sense of national solidarity and individuality as any other nation in the Western World, and had preserved its national independence against all comers by showing an unwavering determination to defend it in arms, if necessary, by a *levée en masse*, though these diversely German, French, and Italian-speaking Swiss patriots had not any distinctive national language of their own to serve as an audible symbol of their distinctive national feeling. Switzerland was too hard a nut for Linguistic Nationalism to crack; and the golden opportunities for this travesty of a West European political idea to do its devil's work presented themselves, beyond the confines of Nationalism's West European birthplace, in regions where political inexperience gave political pedantry a free hand.

We have seen² how, in the course of the hundred years ending in A.D. 1918, Linguistic Nationalism disrupted a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy which had been a marchmen's supra-national *union sacrée* symbolized in a common allegiance to a dynasty charged with an oecumenical mission to defend Western Christendom against Ottoman aggression. The revolutionary revision of the political map of Central Europe which swept the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy away bestowed, in the act, the doubtful blessing of an ephemeral political liberation on the submerged peoples of a *ci-devant* United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania which had been partitioned between the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov empires in the course of the last three decades of the eighteenth century. Poland-Lithuania had been the Hapsburg Monarchy's neighbour and counterpart to the north of the Carpathians, where its mission had been to hold Western Christendom's fourteenth-century conquests of Russian Orthodox Christian territory against the counter-attacks of an unconquered interior of Russia whose formerly divided peoples had made it possible to redress the balance of

¹ See IV. iv. 285.

² In II. ii. 182-6.

power between themselves and their aggressive Western neighbours by submitting to a unification of their parochial principalities into a Muscovite Russian universal state.¹ The Polish-Lithuanian United Kingdom which had once performed this anti-Muscovite task for Western Christendom had been, like the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, an *union sacrée* of marchmen which transcended the parochial loyalties of its component peoples; but these peoples had no sooner regained their political liberty through the outcome of the First World War than the demon of Linguistic Nationalism, which had made its sinister epiphany in the World during the period of their political eclipse, entered into them and drove them to perpetrate, within twenty years, the act of political suicide which it had taken the peoples of the Hapsburg Monarchy a hundred years to accomplish.

After the collapse in A.D. 1918 of all the three East European Powers that had partitioned Poland-Lithuania in A.D. 1772-95, a melagomaniacally imperialistic Polish aspiration to re-establish the frontiers of A.D. 1772² as park-walls for a privileged Polish nation's *Lebensraum* provoked a passionate resistance on the part of myopically parochial-minded Lithuanians and Ukrainians who had been the Poles' partners and not the Poles' subjects in the supra-national commonwealth that had been constituted in A.D. 1569 by the Treaty of Lublin.³ In the carving out of an inter-war political map of Eastern Europe the Lithuanians succeeded in establishing a short-lived independence at the cost of losing to the Poles, by force of arms, the Jewish city and White Russian 'corridor' of Vilna, while the Uniate Catholic Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and the Orthodox Christian Ukrainians of Volhynia were annexed to an inter-war Poland, by the same ephemerally victorious Polish force of arms, as subject and penalized minorities. Through the deadly feuds engendered by these tragic *coups de force* that compromised the future of both Eastern Europe and the Western Civilization in the critical years A.D. 1918-21, the evil spirit of Linguistic Nationalism prepared the way first for a fresh partition of the historic patrimony of Poland-Lithuania in A.D. 1939 between a Third German Reich and a Muscovy disguised as a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and then for the establishment in A.D. 1945 of a Russian ascendancy over the whole of this demon-ridden area.

¹ See II. ii. 157-8 and 174-7; and pp. 126-8, 398-9, and 403, above.

² The Polish thesis that a nation which had come out on the winning side in the World War of A.D. 1914-18 was entitled to the frontiers of A.D. 1772 would have made a contemporary Englishman first rub his eyes and then burst out laughing when a consultation of Spruner-Menke's historical atlas had reminded him that in A.D. 1772 one of the frontiers of the British Empire ran along the thalweg of the Mississippi. Yet, on the fantastic principle of Linguistic Nationalism, the Englishman's title was a better one than his Polish contemporary's, since in A.D. 1918 the Englishman's mother tongue was current in the United States not merely up to the line of the Mississippi but right across North America up to the Pacific coast, whereas the Pole's mother tongue was current in A.D. 1918 in less than half the area that, in A.D. 1772, had been included within the frontiers of the United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania. In A.D. 1918 the larger part of this area was occupied by populations whose mother tongues were Lithuanian, White Russian, and Ukrainian, and these populations were duly claiming the right to possess sovereign states of their own, embracing the territories in which their respective languages were prevalent. The indisputability of Great Britain's linguistic title to reannex the United States was Linguistic Nationalism's *reductio ad absurdum*.

³ See II. ii. 175.

This havoc worked by a Modern West European refinement of a traditional Western ideology in the East European marches of the Western World was not so tragic as the devastating effect of the same Western virus of Nationalism in an Ottoman body politic, since neither the fatuously licensed anarchy that had been the bane of an eighteenth-century Poland-Lithuania nor the fitfully enlightened monarchy that had been the palladium of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy could compare with the Ottoman millet system in point of value as an alternative solution for a common problem of finding a practicable political constitution for a commonwealth consisting of geographically intermingled communities which bore a greater resemblance to the trades and professions than to the territorially segregated nationalities of Western Europe. The Procrustean methods of barbarism by which the Ottoman millets were wrenched and hacked into the exotic shape of sovereign independent national states *alla Franca*, in the course of a century that opened with the extermination of the Moreot Muslims in A.D. 1821 and closed with the eviction of the Anatolian Orthodox Christians in A.D. 1922, have been noticed in a previous passage of this Part¹ which need not be recapitulated here. In this place we have merely to point out that the no less shocking cruelties that accompanied the partition of a British Indian Empire into the two mutually hostile states of India and Pakistan,² and a British mandated territory of Palestine into the two mutually hostile states of Jordan and Israel,³ on the morrow of a Second World War, were likewise examples of the destructively explosive effect of the Western ideology of Nationalism in social milieux in which geographically intermingled communities had previously been enabled to live together in virtue of being organized in millets.

The National State was not, of course, the only Modern Western political institution that had insinuated itself into the life of contemporary non-Western societies; the Enlightened Monarchy that had eventually been worsted by Linguistic Nationalism in the Danubian dominions of the Hapsburgs was another Western political institution that had also been a Western export in its day; and the secular-minded *Weltanschauung* which this Late Modern Western form of autocracy had brought in its train had anticipated the subsequent ravages of Nationalism in the subversiveness of the effects that it had produced when it had run amok in a post-Petrine Russia.

"The influence of the West upon Russia was absolutely paradoxical; it did not graft Western criteria upon the Russian spirit. On the contrary its influence let loose violent, Dionysiac, dynamic, and sometimes demoniac forces. Spirits were unshackled and revealed a dynamic force unknown in the period before Peter. The limitless aspirations of the Faustian Man of the West, the man who belongs to modern history, in Russia revealed themselves in an entirely peculiar way, in their own distinctive manner, and found expression in the creations of Dostoyevsky's genius. The Russia which had been inherited from the past, the Russia of the nobility, of the merchant class and the shop-keepers, which the period of empire had kept in being, came into conflict with the Russia of the

¹ On pp. 189-92, above.

² See pp. 290-2, above.

³ See p. 204, above.

intelligentsia,¹ which was revolutionary and social-revolutionary in spirit, which aspired after the infinite and sought the City which is to come. This clash let loose dynamic forces and led to explosions. At the time when, in the West, enlightenment and culture were establishing a sort of order in accordance with fixed standards—although, of course, a relative order—in Russia enlightenment and culture overthrew standards, obliterated boundaries, and evoked a revolutionary dynamic.²

In another context³ we have taken a glance at the history of the Late Modern Western institution of Enlightened Monarchy which was to produce these demonically explosive effects when it was let loose in Russia without the accompaniment of those salutary checks and balances that had kept this dispensation in order in the Western World; and we have traced the origins of this secular form of Western autocracy back to an ideology with which a Medieval Western Christendom was indoctrinated by the Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen. In the same context we have seen that this necromantic medieval renaissance, on Western ground, of a post-Constantinian Hellenic ideal of autocracy was not a feat of Western sorcery. The spirit of Caesaropapism that captivated Frederick II's soul was not a *revenant* evoked from Western Christendom's own dead Hellenic past; it was an intruder breaking in from the living world of an Orthodox Christian Society that was Western Christendom's contemporary and sister; and the magician who had succeeded in reanimating this Late Hellenic autocracy in Orthodox Christendom was not the thirteenth-century Swabian prince of an East Roman Empire's Apulo-Sicilian successor-state, but was the East Roman Empire's own eighth-century founder, Leo Syrus. Leo's effective revival of Justinian's autocracy was a Byzantine culture-element which made its way into a thirteenth-century Western Christendom via Sicily and Apulia; and, coming, as it did, in isolation from its Byzantine cultural setting into an alien body social organized on a different cultural pattern, it produced in *partibus Occidentis* an explosive effect which it had never produced in an Eastern Orthodox Christian World.

The crux lay in the impossibility of making room in a thirteenth-century Western World for this intrusive Byzantine ghost of a latter-day Hellenic institution without pushing to the wall a Hildebrandine Papal hierocracy which, by Frederick II Hohenstaufen's day, was not merely a going concern in the West but had come to be Western Christendom's master institution. In an earlier Part of this Study⁴ we have already had occasion to watch the tragic spectacle of the self-destruction of the Medieval Western Christian order of society through a war to the knife between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy that was precipitated by the *Stupor Mundi's* attempt to bewitch the Western World of his day with his Byzantine political enormity. In the present place we need only remind ourselves that this thirteenth-century internecine struggle had had a twelfth-century overture, and that a conflict in which the

¹ The origins, ethos, and significance of this unhappy social product of encounters between contemporaries have been examined in this Study in V. v. 154-9.—A.J.T.

² Berdyaev, N.: *The Origin of Russian Communism* (London 1937, Bles), pp. 98-99.

³ In VII. vii. 537-9. See further X. ix. 9-14.

⁴ In IV. iv. 537, 540, and 560-7.

Papacy had joined forces with the North Italian city-states to resist Frederick II's grandfather and namesake had been precipitated by Barbarossa's own impolitic adoption of the same exotic ideal of autocracy when this revolutionary departure from the native practice of the feudal monarchies of Barbarossa's own world had been suggested to a restlessly ambitious Medieval Western mind by the impressive image of a Late Roman Emperor's prerogatives in the mirror of a recently disinterred Justinianean *Corpus Iuris*.¹

The destructive potentialities that culture-elements are apt to display when they have been torn out of their original framework and been introduced into an alien social milieu are also illustrated by examples on the economic plane which are as striking as the political episodes that we have just been surveying. An observer of human affairs in the twentieth century of the Christian Era could not look around him without perceiving that the malaise that met his eyes everywhere had been produced by the radiation of Modern Western economic techniques as well as Modern Western political institutions. The demoralizing effect of an imported Western Industrialism was particularly conspicuous in South-East Asia, where an exotic industrial revolution, speeded-up by the forced draught of importunate Western economic enterprise, had produced a geographical mixture of socially still unannealed communities in the process of gathering the human fuel for its economic furnace.

'Everywhere in the Modern World economic forces have strained the relations between Capital and Labour, Industry and Agriculture, Town and Country; but in the Modern East the strain is greater because of a corresponding cleavage along racial lines. . . . The foreign Oriental is not merely a buffer between European and native but a barrier between the native and the Modern World. The cult of efficiency merely built up a monumental Western skyscraper on Eastern soil, with the natives in the basement; all inhabited the same country, but the building was of a different world, the Modern World to which the native had no access. In this plural economy competition is much keener than in the Western World. "There is materialism, rationalism, individualism, and a concentration on economic ends, far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous Western lands; a total absorption in the exchange and market, a capitalist world with the business concern as subject, far more typical of Capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called capitalist countries, which have grown slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots."² . . . Thus, although these several dependencies have in appearance been remodelled along Western lines, they have in fact been remodelled as economic systems, for production and not for social life. The mediaeval state has, quite suddenly, been converted into a modern factory.'³

An intrusive exotic culture-element's potency for working havoc is raised to its maximum when this cultural arrowhead is not only detached from its original setting and launched as a free lance into an alien body

¹ See VI. vii. 265-8; VII. vii. 538-9; and X. ix. 9.

² Boeke, Dr. J. H.: 'De Economische Theorie der Dualistische Samenleving', in *De Economist*, 1935, p. 781.

³ Furnivall, J. S.: *Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia* (New York 1941, Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), pp. 42-44. The picture drawn in outline in the passage just quoted is amplified *ibid.*, pp. 61-63.

social but is also transferred, in the act, from one plane of human activity to another. The devastating effect of a Modern Western industrialism imported into the economic life of South-East Asia was not so severe, subversive though it was, as the effect of a Eurasian Nomad Pastoralism imported into the life of a sedentary society and diverted in this alien milieu from its proper economic function of tending live-stock to the incongruous political enterprise of improvising a régime for the government of human beings. The policy of treating a conquered sedentary population as human sheep to be shepherded with the aid of marvellously trained human sheep-dogs, which is an obviously natural recourse for a Nomad empire-builder in *partibus agrorum*, is, of course, a grotesquely preposterous outrage in the eyes of this pastor's sedentary victims; and for this reason the lives of such Nomad empires on cultivated ground had, as we have seen,¹ usually been short.

The relative longevity of the Ottoman Empire is the exception that proves this rule;² and the 'Osmanli Turkish Eurasian Nomad conquerors of the main body of Orthodox Christendom succeeded in obtaining this exceptionally long lease of their human sheep-run partly because, in this case, the conversion of a pastoral economic technique into an instrument of government was carried out with a rare vision and skill by shepherd-kings who were also men of genius,³ and partly because the sedentary society whose domain the Ottoman patriarchs happened to overrun had previously fallen into such a desperate state of anarchy, and had proved so hopelessly incompetent to put its own house in order, that this grievously sick main body of Orthodox Christendom was constrained to purchase peace even at the almost prohibitively high price of submitting to a *Pax Ottomanica*.⁴ The exorbitancy of the price can be measured by the intensity of the odium which the 'Osmanlis incurred by their inhuman performance of an indispensable social service.⁵

(β) 'One Thing Leads to Another'

Our second 'law' of cultural radiation-and-reception⁶ is the tendency of a culture-pattern that has established itself in an emitting body social to reassert itself in a receiving body social through a reassemblage and reunion there of constituent culture-elements that have come to be divorced from one another in the process of transmission. This *nisus* towards reintegration has to contend with the opposing tendency of an assaulted society to resist the penetration of alien culture-elements and to admit them, if it must, only in the smallest possible quantities and at the slowest possible rate.⁷ Accordingly, even when some single intrusive alien element has succeeded in opening a way for its original associates to follow and rejoin it, the tension between the pioneer trespasser's constant pull and the invaded body social's no less constant resistance constrains the pathfinder's old comrades, in bringing up their reinforcements, to travel in Indian file, to make their entry one by one,

¹ In III. iii. pp. 23-25.

² See *ibid.*, p. 26.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 27-50.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

⁵ See V. v. 348.

⁶ See p. 530, above.

⁷ See pp. 508-21, above.

and therefore to make it, as the pathfinder element has made it in advance, each in isolation from its pristine cultural context.

As we watch this arduous process of infiltration making a headway that carries it to the bitter end of introducing the whole besieging host of Midian inside a beleaguered Israel's defences, the astonishing aspect of this excruciating miracle is not, of course, the needle's obstructiveness of the camel's importunity; it is the camel's feat of negotiating his passage piecemeal through the needle's eye.¹ The assaulted body social's resistance to the painful and disruptive intrusion of alien culture-elements can be taken as a matter of course. What requires explanation is the invariably recurring failure of the defence at each successive repetition of the attack, when the defence has achieved the initial tactical success of compelling the assailant to disperse his forces and to dribble them into action one by one instead of throwing in all of them simultaneously *en masse*. When the assailant has thus been constrained to deploy his troops in an order—or disorder—which is the most uneconomical way of using his strength according to the classical theory of war, how is it that one dribble after another actually succeeds in forcing its way through the breach? What is the stimulus that gives each assaulting soldier in his turn the hardihood to engage in single combat and the prowess to win his isolated way through to his, and his comrades', common objective? And whence comes the prodigious discipline that prompts soldiers who have had to break the ranks in the act of delivering their assault to perform the *tour de force* of falling once more into their original formation when their *élan* has carried them all successively into the enemy's castle-yard through a crevice in the curtain-wall that is too narrow to give entry to more than one soldier at a time?

The explanation of this miracle would appear to be that the two alternative possible states—a state of integration and a state of disaggregation—in which any given set of culture-elements may be found,² are not on a par with one another in point of naturalness, normality, and healthiness. If an integral ray of cultural radiation that has been diffracted into its constituent elements in process of transmission from one body social to another shows a tendency to reconstitute itself into its original pattern after it has achieved the penetration of an obstacle which it has had to penetrate piecemeal, does not this tendency towards reintegration signify that the relatively complex state in which the primary culture-elements constitute an integrated pattern is in some sense more natural, more normal, and more healthy than the relatively simple state in which each of the primary culture-elements goes its own separate way without there being any mutual relation of reciprocity and interdependence between any one element and the rest?

If a mutual attraction towards combining to constitute a culture-pattern is a natural property of culture-elements which normally holds its own against a counter-tendency towards a spontaneous dissolution of their partnership,³ this would account for a tendency to recombine when the partnership has been dissolved forcibly by the disruptive process of diffraction, and we should have put our finger here upon an

¹ Matt. xix. 24.

² See pp. 495-501, above.

³ See p. 498, above.

explanation of the impulse that moves the elemental rays of a diffracted integral ray of cultural radiation to follow one another through any breach in the defences of an assaulted body social into which any one of their number has once pushed its way, and to reassociate with one another in their original formation when they have completed their re-assemblage on the farther side of a cultural Maginot Line which they have carried by means of a succession of individual assaults.

If this gregarious instinct that thus seems to be inherent in the nature of a primary culture-element is as deep-seated and as dynamic as the evidence indicates, this in turn would explain an apparent paradox in the assaulted party's usual reaction to the aggressor's attack. The usual course of an encounter between contemporaries in which the assailant's forlorn hope has once made a lodgement within the assaulted party's defences is a mechanical resolution of the opposing forces at work in the tension between the intrusive elements' successful efforts in a winning battle to rejoin one another and the invaded society's unsuccessful efforts in a losing battle to keep each and all of the intrusive elements at arm's length; and this ineffectual kicking against the pricks in a struggle of which the outcome is a foregone conclusion defeats the recalcitrant victim's intentions and falsifies his expectations¹ by producing the untoward result of ensuring that his inevitable sufferings shall be of a maximum severity. It ensures, in fact, that the agonizing social and spiritual cancer started by the successful lodgement of the first single pioneer intrusive culture-element shall take, when once started, the longest possible time to run its dreadful course; and that, throughout this maximum Time-span, the devastating process of cultural invasion shall be perpetually extending its range and accentuating its effect in the invaded society's tormented body social.²

At first thoughts an observer of this strange tragedy might perhaps have expected that the painfulness of the initial experience of invasion by an exotic culture-element would have provided its own remedy by impelling the patient to make sure that this initial invasion should have

¹ See III. iii. 152.

² This latter rule is subject to exceptions which may occur if and when, after the act of cultural penetration has taken place, but before it has made any considerable progress, the impinging society disintegrates to a degree at which it becomes impotent to carry its cultural invasion of the assaulted alien body social any farther. If this situation arises, it offers to the aggressor society's victim a chance of giving a distinctive turn of its own to those elements of the exotic culture that have succeeded in making a lodgement in its body by that time. Classical cases in point are the histories of the Russian branch of an Orthodox Christendom and the Japanese branch of the Far Eastern Civilization. The Russian and Japanese converts to these two civilizations had been mere barbarians at the time of their conversion, and might therefore have been expected *a priori* to be more docile in their adoption of the invading exotic way of life than, for example, the Celtic or the Scandinavian converts to the Western Christian Civilization, who, before their conversion, had created at least the rudiments of distinctive civilizations of their own. Russian and Japanese history took a different turn from this because the main bodies of the Orthodox Christian and the Far Eastern Society broke down and went into disintegration at a time when their branches—which had struck root in the ground of Russia and Japan like the drooping branches of a banyan tree—were still tender shoots. The Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom and the Japanese branch of the Far Eastern Civilization did duly show their solidarity with their parent stems to the extent of following them into decline; but they went on to assert a distinctive cultural individuality of their own by the dismal process of going through a disintegrating civilization's normal experiences of a Time of Troubles and a universal state on independent lines.

no sequel. When a child has burnt its fingers, we should expect it to stop playing with fire. Why was it, then, that, in the classical examples presented by those encounters with the West which all the living non-Western societies had been experiencing in the Modern Age of Western history, every victim of the Modern Western Civilization's cultural radioactivity which had once allowed some importunate Western technique, institution, or idea to gain a foothold within the non-Western victim's defences should invariably have gone on to give admission to one further Western culture-element after another, in spite of the suffering and loss that this piecemeal reception of alien elements had brought with it from the start? The truth in all these cases is, of course, that the victim was not courting a maximum experience of torment deliberately, but was incurring it through *force majeure*. In falling back from one position to another, he was not making a masterly retreat according to plan; he was helplessly 'on the run'.

Assaulted societies are not always blind to the consequences that are likely to follow from allowing even the most apparently trivial and innocuous exotic culture-element to make an entry. We have already taken note¹ of certain historic encounters in which an assaulted society has succeeded in repulsing its assailant's attack without having given him a chance of making even a temporary lodgement; and an uncompromising policy of self-insulation that has won these rare victories has also been tried in many other cases where it has proved a failure. This policy is the practical expression of a spirit of 'Zealotism' which is, as we shall see,² one of the alternative possible psychological responses to the challenge of a cultural assault; and, while a 'Zealot's' characteristic *ethos* is emotional and intuitive, there have also been 'Zealots' who have been led to adopt a policy of isolationism by a train of reasoning from an empirical discovery of the truth that cultural intercourse is governed by the social law that 'one thing leads to another'. A classic case of this rationalist variety of 'Zealotism' is the severance of relations between Japan and the Western World that was gradually carried through, after careful investigation and mature reflexion at every stage, by Hideyoshi and his Tokugawan successors in the course of the fifty-one years ending in A.D. 1638. It is more surprising to find a similar awareness of the inherent interdependence of all the divers elements in an intrusive alien culture-pattern leading, by a similar train of reasoning, to a similar conclusion in the mind of an old-fashioned ruler of a secluded and backward Arab country.

The rationalist 'Zealot's' state of mind is piquantly illustrated by a conversation which took place in the nineteen-twenties between the Zaydī Imām Yahyā of San'ā and a British envoy whose mission was to persuade the Imām to restore peacefully a portion of the British Aden Protectorate which he had occupied during the World War of A.D. 1914-18 and had refused to evacuate thereafter, notwithstanding the defeat of his Ottoman overlords. In a final interview with the Imām, after it had become apparent that the mission would not attain its object, the British envoy, wishing to give the conversation another turn, complimented

¹ On pp. 476-7, above.

² On pp. 581-2, below.

the Imām upon the soldierly appearance of his new-model army. Seeing that the Imām took the compliment in good part, he went on:

'And I suppose you will be adopting other Western institutions as well?'

'I think not,' said the Imām with a smile.

'Oh, really? That interests me. And may I venture to ask your reasons?'

'Well, I don't think I should like other Western institutions,' said the Imām.

'Indeed? And what institutions, for example?'

'Well, there are parliaments,' said the Imām. 'I like to be the Government myself. I might find a parliament tiresome.'

'Why, as for that,' said the Englishman, 'I can assure you that responsible parliamentary representative government is not an indispensable part of the apparatus of our Western Civilization. Look at Italy. She has given that up, and she is one of the great Western Powers.'

'Well, then there is alcohol,' said the Imām. 'I don't want to see that introduced into my country, where at present it is happily almost unknown.'

'Very natural,' said the Englishman; 'but, if it comes to that, I can assure you that alcohol is not an indispensable adjunct of Western Civilization either. Look at America. She has given up that, and she too is one of the great Western Powers.'

'Well, anyhow,' said the Imām, with another smile which seemed to intimate that the conversation was at an end, 'I don't like parliaments and alcohol *and that kind of thing*.'

The Englishman could not make out whether there was any suggestion of humour in the parting smile with which the Imām's last words were uttered; but, however that might be, those words went to the heart of the matter and showed that the inquiry about possible further Western innovations at San'ā had been more pertinent than the Imām might have cared to admit. Those words indicated, in fact, that the Imām, viewing the Western Civilization from a great way off, saw it, in that distant perspective, as something one and indivisible and recognized certain features of it which to a Westerner's eye would appear to have nothing whatever to do with one another—the West's addiction to alcoholic beverages and its addiction to parliamentary institutions—as being organically related parts of that indivisible whole.

The moral of this story is that, in manifesting the perspicacity of his intellectual insight, the Imām Yahyā had implicitly indicted the infirmity of his purpose. In revealing his cognizance of the social 'law' that, in cultural intercourse, 'one thing leads to another', he had tacitly admitted that, in weak-mindedly abandoning his own principles to the extent of adopting even just the rudiments of a Western military technique, he had already introduced into the life of his people the thin end of a wedge which in time would inexorably cleave their close-compacted traditional Islamic Civilization asunder. He had started a cultural revolution which would leave the Yamanites, in the end, with no alternative but to cover their nakedness with a complete ready-made outfit of Western clothes.

If the Imām had met his Hindu contemporary the Mahatma Gandhi, that is what he would have been told by a Hindu statesman-saint who could have spoken with the double authority of genius and experience.

The moral which the Imām Yahyā had failed or refused to draw had been duly drawn by Gandhi, with his seer's eye, from his own divination of the inherent tendency of diffracted culture-elements to reassemble in their pristine formation. Gandhi had understood that an assaulted society which intended to strive in earnest for the preservation of its cultural integrity could not afford to make one single concession to its assailant—not even the clever-seeming feint of yielding so far as to adopt the aggressor's military technique with a view to thus enabling itself to mount a counter-offensive on less unequal terms. Such purposive feigned retreats were apt, the Mahatma perceived, to degenerate into routs that were as genuine as they were involuntary; and accordingly Gandhi exhorted the Hindu Society of his day to cut the threads binding it to the Western World by renouncing, not only the importation from Great Britain, but also, even more firmly, the still more gravely compromising manufacture in India, of machine-made cotton yarn and cotton cloth.¹

In calling upon his fellow Hindus to revert to spinning and weaving their cotton by hand, Gandhi was indeed showing them the way to extricate themselves from the visible meshes of a Western economic spider's web; but this Gandhian policy of total economic divorce from the West was based on two assumptions which must both be justified in the event if the policy was to achieve its aim; and neither of these assumptions actually proved able to stand this searching test of experience. The first assumption was that the Hindus of Gandhi's generation would be prepared to make the economic sacrifices demanded by the Gandhian prescription for purchasing immunity from a Western cultural virus, and on this point the Hindu prophet failed to carry his people with him. The Hindu masses could not bear to condemn themselves to a self-imposed depression of their material standard of living below its present abysmal nadir, while the Hindu textile manufacturers at Bombay and at Gandhi's second home, Ahmadabad, would not forgo the profits which they were earning by the mass-production of cheap cotton goods. Since the party funds of the Indian Congress were largely provided by free-will offerings of a fraction of these profits of Indian industry *alla Franca*, Gandhi's policy was virtually doomed to defeat;² but, even if Gandhi had not been disappointed in his high expectations of his countrymen's economic disinterestedness, his policy would still have been brought to naught by the falsity of its second implicit assumption, which was not a miscalculation of the assaulted society's moral capacity, but was a misapprehension of the intrusive alien culture's spiritual quality.

The error in Gandhi's diagnosis here was that in this context he was allowing himself to see nothing more in the Late Modern Western Civilization than the secular social structure, with Technology substituted for Religion as the key-stone of the social arch, which the West in Gandhi's day self-complacently proclaimed itself to be. If the cultural radiation, emanating from the West, that was bombarding India in Gandhi's day had been in truth exclusively technological in its texture,

¹ See III. iii. 190.

² See III. iii. 203.

then Gandhi's policy of rendering the Hindu body social totally impervious to penetration by technological culture-rays of Western provenance might have proved an effective solution of the Hindu Society's Western problem, supposing that Gandhi had been successful in securing his people's effective support in this campaign. The baffling feature to which Gandhi seems—to judge by his policy—to have been blind in his scrutiny of contemporary Western cultural phenomena was the political and spiritual corona that was playing round the fringe of a self-eclipsed cultural sun's perversely darkened disk. This irrepressible *khvarenah*¹ continued to bear visual witness to the truth that spiritual suicide is not an easy crime to commit;² and it is the more strange that Gandhi, of all men, should have been blind to this portent, seeing that these clouds of Western glory had demonstrated their radioactive potency *ad hominem* by gathering round the Hindu prophet's own head and illuminating his own heart.

Gandhi's masterly use of contemporary Western methods of political organization, publicity, and propaganda³ to serve his campaign against the compromising use of Western methods of economic production might perhaps be dismissed as one of the ironic curiosities of history; but an open-eyed and candid-minded observer, Occidental or Hindu, could hardly refuse to take seriously the manifest conquest of Gandhi's soul by the undying spirit of a Christianity which had been repudiated by a majority of its Late Modern Western carriers. The spiritual event that had liberated Gandhi's creative 'soul-force' was an encounter, in the sanctuary of this sublime Hindu soul, between the spirit of Hinduism and the spirit of the Christian Gospel embodied in the life of the Society of Friends.⁴ A cultural barrage designed to keep out the power-loom was no obstacle to the entry of the Inner Light; and the captivation of Gandhi's soul by an alien culture on the religious plane was as decisive as it was auspicious.

The truth is that, if once the besieged have permitted even one isolated member of the besiegers' storming column to force his way inside their enceinte, their only remaining chance of saving their fortress from ultimately falling is to take the intruder prisoner before any of his eagerly following comrades-in-arms have had time to rejoin and re-

¹ 'Hallowed by the halo of the *Khvarenah*' might perhaps be the common meaning of the Hittite word *kouirwanas* denoting a client prince of a Hittite emperor who styled himself 'the Sun' (see Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, La Renaissance du Livre), p. 187), the Greek words *κόραως* and *Κόραως* (*Macedonici Kópaos*: see I. i. 409, n. 1), and the Persian word *κάραως*, which, according to Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book I, chap. iv, § 3, was the official title borne by Cyrus the Younger as viceroy of an Anatolian military district of the Achaemenian Empire (See VI. vii. 183, n. 7, and VI. vii. 673-4). Did this Persian title survive in the family name of the House of Kārēn, which, under the Arsacid and Sasanid régimes, ranked as the second family in the Empire after the reigning dynasty itself? And, if Kārēn stands for *κάραως*, does Sūrēn stand for *seren* (*Graece rūpaos*), the title given to 'the Lords of the Philistines' in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament? (See Macalister, R. A. S.: *The Philistines* (London 1913, Milford), p. 79).

² 'Just as the corona asserts the fact that the Sun is not actually engulfed but only darkened, so there are certain marginal events or intuitions which inform the individual, temporarily engulfed by the Unconscious, that the light of Consciousness will emerge again' (Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall & Cox; 1949, Methuen), p. 557).

³ See III. iii. 203.

⁴ See III. iii. 190-1 and V. v. 190.

inforce the audacious pioneer. An intrusive alien culture-element cannot easily be purged of its dangerous capacity for attracting to itself other elements, of the same provenance, with which it was associated in its original cultural setting. The rash recipient's only chance of demagnetizing his formidable acquisition is to metabolize and assimilate it to a degree at which it becomes amenable to being worked into his native cultural pattern as an enrichment and not a dissolvent of the prevailing harmony. If the intrusive alien element succeeds in defeating the operations of its host's digestive system by retaining its magnetic alien quality after lodgement, the unhappy host will find himself condemned to look on helplessly while the defiantly intrusive culture-element behaves in his body social like a loose electron disintegrating an atom or like a cuckoo's egg laid in a hedge-sparrow's nest.¹

The changeling chick into which this alien egg hatches out provides for the satisfaction of its own inordinate appetite by insisting on its foster parents' making this the first call on their energies, at the expense of their duty to their own brood; and the ruthless interloper makes room in the diminutive nest for its own disproportionately expanding body by throwing its foster-brothers out, one by one, until a nest which the parent hedge-sparrows have built for the rearing of their own young has been turned by the presence of the intruder into an incubator for propagating the absentee parent cuckoos' species through the hoodwinked and brow-beaten hedge-sparrows' misguided ministrations. At this far-gone stage in the lamentable game the parent hedge-sparrows are constrained to acquiesce in the servitude of foster-parenthood as the one mission in life still open to them—even though their one foster-chick happens to be the murderer of their own progeny.

In general terms of encounters between civilizations, this is to say that, when the assaulted party has failed to prevent even one single pioneer element of the aggressively radioactive culture from making a lodgement in his body social, and when he has furthermore failed to isolate and sterilize this alien entering wedge by metabolizing and assimilating it, his only chance of social survival lies in making a psychological *volte face*. He may still be able to save himself alive by abandoning the 'Zealot' attitude of tooth-and-nail opposition to an irresistible invader's inexorable advance and adopting, instead, the 'Herodian's' opposite tactics² of learning to fight a militarily superior adversary with his own weapons, as a prelude to winning his goodwill by welcoming him with open arms. In the particular terms of the encounter between the 'Osmanlis and the Late Modern West the moral would be that Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd's grudging policy of Westernization at a minimum was never practical politics when once the invading Western culture had forced its way through the Porte and entrenched itself in the Ottoman Imperial Government's war department,³ whereas Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk's whole-hearted policy of Westernization to a maximum⁴ offered the 'Osmanlis a just practicable way of salvation even when adopted as a last resort at the eleventh hour.

¹ See the instances cited in V. vi. 106-7.

² See pp. 234-6, above.

² See pp. 582-4, below.

⁴ See pp. 263-8, above.

The Ottoman and the Russian Society's experiences in their encounters with a Late Modern Western Civilization afford classical illustrations of the inefficacy of the principle of homoeopathic medicine when the virus to which the patient is trying to make himself immune is a cultural infection. Peter the Great in Russia, Mehmed 'Ali in Egypt, and Mahmūd II in Turkey each in turn began by setting himself the limited objective of Westernizing his fighting forces in order to be able to hold his own militarily and diplomatically in a Westernizing World; and in each case the act of self-inoculation with a serum extracted from the contemporary Western art of war, so far from conferring the hoped-for immunity, started a galloping consumption. In Mehmed 'Ali's Egypt the potency of a Westernized army's contagious cultural effect in promoting the Westernization of the rest of the body social was recognized in retrospect by an able British observer when Mehmed 'Ali had been master of Egypt for a third of a century.

'At an early period of his military career, Mahomet Ali saw enough to convince him of the superiority of European tactics over those of the East; for he was himself engaged against the French Army in Egypt, and conceived a high opinion of the value of martial science. But the introduction of Western organisation into the armies of the Levant brought with it other important results; for the appliances of mechanical art, of education, of medical knowledge, and a general system of dependence and subordination, were the needful companions of the new state of things. The transfer of the military power from unruly and undisciplined hordes to a body of troops regularly trained through the various grades of obedience and discipline was in itself the establishment of a principle of order which spread over the whole surface of Society.¹

In Egypt, Turkey, and Russia alike the sequel to the Westernization of the fighting forces from above downwards by an autocrat's fiat demonstrated that this new departure in the military field could not be followed out effectively to its own intendedly limited objective unless it were also followed up and supported by a series of further new departures, in the same Westernizing direction, in other departments of social life.

A fighting force of the genuine Late Modern Western quality could not be brought into being without provision for the professional training of a corps of officers in accordance with the Western standard of the day,² and it could not be kept in being without provision for a medical

¹ Bowring, John: *Report on Egypt and Candia* dated the 27th March, 1839, and addressed to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Palmerston (London 1840, Clowes & Clowes), p. 49. This British visitor's judgement was confirmed by the contemporary testimony of the French physician A. B. Clot, who had spent fifteen years of his working life in Mehmed 'Ali's service (see his *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin and Masson, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. vi). Clot Bey's dictum (*ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 199) that in Egypt, as Mehmed 'Ali found it, 'tout était à faire, et tout a commencé à être fait à la suite de l'organisation militaire', has been quoted already on p. 234, above. In the same passage, Clot Bey credits his Rumeliot Turkish employer's new model army *alla Franca* with the two particular achievements of having created order in Egypt and having inspired the native Egyptians with a national consciousness.

² In Mehmed 'Ali's new-model army there was a systematic provision for the general education of the conscripts in the ranks during their period of service (Bowring, J.: *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria*, dated the 17th July, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 109), as well as a preparatory system of professional education for officer-cadets.

service to look after the physical welfare of the rank-and-file of a standing army or navy living at close quarters under unnatural conditions.¹ It proved impossible, however, as we have seen,² to confine the Western education of military and naval officers in a non-Western society to a professionally indispensable minimum of technical instruction when their autocratic master was so unintelligent as to be able to delude himself, first, into imagining that it would be within his power thus to blinker the mental vision of his cadets and then into flattering himself that the robot human product of his fancy would have been capable—had it been possible for him to produce it in real life—of fulfilling its professional mission of holding its own against the less illiberally educated officers' corps of Western or Westernizing neighbours.

We have noticed the nemesis by which Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II's delusion was overtaken and confuted in A.D. 1908 when a political revolution that cost him his throne was led by junior officers who had acquired their 'dangerous thoughts' at this fatuously unenlightened Ottoman despot's painfully sterilized military academy. It is more surprising to find military officers leading abortive political revolutionary movements in Egypt in A.D. 1879-82 and in Russia in A.D. 1825,³ considering that 'Abd-al-Hamid's delusion had not ever clouded the clearer spirits of a Mehmed 'Ali or a Peter. So far from seeking to confine the Western education of their subjects to a strictly technical minimum training of naval and military cadets, these two Herodian-minded men of genius were tempted to plunge out of their depth in the abuse of their autocratic power by exerting it for the opposite purpose of driving their subjects into a Western course of education on a front that they were perpetually extending;⁴ and this progressive widening of their

¹ Hellmuth von Moltke, when attached to Hâfiz Pasha's Turkish army in A.D. 1839, was struck by the magnitude of the rate of sickness among the troops, notwithstanding the excellence of their conditions of life (*Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839* (Berlin, Posen, & Bromberg 1841, Mittler), p. 301). He estimated this army's average peace-time losses by death from sickness at 33½ per cent. for all arms (*ibid.*, pp. 350-1) and at 50 per cent. for the infantry (*ibid.*, p. 382).

² On pp. 232-8, above.

³ See pp. 234-5, above. In the issue of *Le Monde Slave* for December 1925 (Nouvelle Série, 2^{me} Année, No. 12, Paris 1925, Alcan), which is devoted to 'le Centenaire des Décabristes', it is pointed out (p. 345) that the Decembrists were the last military conspirators and the first political theorists in the history of Petrine Russia. In the eighteenth century there had been five Russian palace revolutions (in A.D. 1725, 1730, 1740, 1741, 1761), all led by guards officers recruited from the nobility, and the revolution of A.D. 1801 had been of the same character (*ibid.*, p. 335). The Decembrists, whose abortive revolution in December 1825 marked the sociological transition in Russia to a revolutionary movement of a new type, were representatives of the fifth of the eight generations spanning the period between the date of Peter the Great's death and the year A.D. 1925 (*ibid.*, p. 334). Perhaps one reason why the abortive liberal revolution of A.D. 1825 in Russia had military officers for its leaders, notwithstanding the impulse given by Peter the Great, a hundred years before the Decembrists' day, to civilian as well as military education on Western lines, was that, as a result of the part which Russia was forced, by French aggression, to play in the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian military officers of that generation had been brought into more direct personal touch with the West than the majority of their Russian contemporaries of the same Western-educated class in civilian life. The effect on the Decembrists' outlook that was produced by their service abroad on Western ground, where the contrast between the Western World and a superficially Westernized Russia made its impression on their minds with all the sharpness of a first-hand experience, is noticed in the study here cited (*Le Monde Slave*, num. cit., pp. 336, 338, 351, and 376). The effect was particularly strong in the case of those Russian officers who took part in the occupation of Paris in A.D. 1814.

⁴ Mehmed 'Ali, like Peter, used the moral pull of his own personal example, as well

educational programme is the more remarkable considering that it was dictated to them by their practical experience in the pursuit of educational aims which, in intention, were strictly, and indeed narrowly, utilitarian from first to last.

Both Peter and Mehmed 'Alī were led towards their ambitious Herodian educational objective along two convergent routes. On the one hand they both realized that, in order to secure an intake of military and naval cadets equipped with a general cultivation in the Western style as a background for their technical training in a Western art, they must create a reservoir of boys endowed with a preparatory education on these non-technical Western lines. On the other hand they both also realized that, however effective an education they might succeed in providing in their naval and military cadet schools and in the civilian preparatory schools leading up to them, these new institutions by themselves would not avail to produce and maintain those fighting forces of a Western pattern and standard that were the practical object of their educational endeavours. Such fighting forces required auxiliary services which in turn required a special technically trained personnel; this expensively elaborate establishment could not be kept up without an expansion of the public revenue; the revenue could not be expanded without a rise in the taxable income of the community; production could not be increased without technical improvements in agriculture and industry;¹ none of these requirements could be met without providing a further personnel of Western-educated civil servants and economic experts; and the requisite intake of civilian cadets could only be secured by furnishing the general preparatory education *alla Franca* which was likewise a necessary condition for ensuring a supply of naval and military cadets of the proper quality.

In Mehmed 'Alī's Egypt the Westernization of education 'was in origin the natural corollary to the reform of the Army'.² The infantry, cavalry, and artillery schools under Western commandants, which we have noticed in an earlier chapter of this Part,³ were supplemented by engineering

as the physical push of political coercion, as a means of moving his subjects to take the Westward road. The celebrated initiative shown by Peter in mastering one branch of contemporary Western technology after another has been noticed in an earlier passage of this Study (in III. iii. 279-80) and needs no further exposition here. Mehmed 'Alī, who had grown up without being educated even in the Islamic culture that was his own social heritage, and who never mastered any other language beyond his native Turkish, picked up an acquaintance with the contemporary Western Civilization by taking opportunities of talking to Frankish visitors, learnt to read at the age of forty-five, and studied the histories of Alexander the Great and Napoleon (Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. lxxvii). Moreover, this Ottoman apostle of Westernization was more fortunate than his Muscovite counterpart in finding an enthusiastic disciple, and not a sullen opponent, in his eldest son and heir. Ibrāhīm Pasha was energetic, orderly minded, and Petrine in his practice of sharing the hardships of his soldiers on campaign (*ibid.*, p. lxxxiii). He had been educated to read and write Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, and he was versed in Islamic history (*ibid.*, p. lxxx). He gave a lead to his officers in schooling himself in the Western art of war (*ibid.*, p. lxxx), and also showed a practical interest in the improvement of Egyptian agriculture on Western lines (*ibid.*, p. lxxxiv). Another of Mehmed 'Alī's sons, Sa'id, learnt to speak French fluently and received a mathematical education as the basis for his professional training as a naval officer (*ibid.*, p. lxxxv).

¹ Mehmed 'Alī's policy of Westernization on the economic plane has been touched upon on p. 249, above.

² Dodwell, H.: *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge 1931, University Press), p. 237.

³ On pp. 243-4, above.

and naval schools¹ and were reinforced by the establishment, in the citadel of Cairo, of a mathematical and drawing school under an Italian master² and a cannon foundry under a Turkish manager, Edhem Bey, whose intellectual and administrative gifts won high praise from the Duke of Ragusa (*alias* A. F. L. V. de Marmont, the Napoleonic French marshal);³ and the technical training of personnel for Mehmed 'Ali's fighting forces and their auxiliary services was underpinned by the introduction of a system of general education *alla Franca* in Egypt itself and was at the same time improved in quality by arrangements for enabling an *élite* of the students to pursue courses of Western study on Western ground.

As early in Mehmed 'Ali's reign as A.D. 1812, a school was opened in Cairo by his director of the supply of materials, Muhammad Efendi Tubbāl.⁴ In A.D. 1816 the Pasha himself opened a school of engineering and surveying in his own palace with eighty Egyptian students and with Western instructors and instruments.⁵ In A.D. 1833 a polytechnic was founded, as a preparatory school for the military cadet colleges, with two French, two Armenian, and six Muslim instructors;⁶ primary schools were founded at Cairo and Alexandria to feed the polytechnic; several local schools were also established in each provincial *müdirlik*; and these educational establishments at divers levels were so many rungs in a ladder leading up to the public service.⁷ The year A.D. 1836 saw the inauguration of a French-inspired Council of Education (*Majlis-al-Ma'arif*) administering fifty elementary and secondary schools distributed over the country. The pupils of these schools were recruited by conscription⁸ and the secondary schools were organized on military lines;⁹ but, on the other side of the account, these schoolboy-conscripts enjoyed the advantage of drawing pay and rations from the Government.¹⁰

In reply to a questionnaire drafted by Bowring when he was collecting materials for the report which he submitted to Lord Palmerston in A.D. 1839, Mukhtar Bey, an official in Mehmed 'Ali's service, made a return of the number of pupils receiving instruction at the time in non-military special schools in the Pasha's dominions. According to this statement there were then 300 pupils in the medical school, 120 in the veterinary

¹ See Dodwell, H.: *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge 1931, University Press), p. 238. Native Egyptians were not accepted as candidates for entry into the cadet schools at Cairo and Alexandria (Kramers, J. H.: s.v. 'Khediv', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (London 1927, Luzac), p. 952).

² See Dodwell, op. cit., p. 238.

³ See Clot, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 206-7. The same highly qualified foreign observer also praised Mehmed 'Ali's small-arms factories, which were organized on a French model (*ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 277-8).

⁴ See Jabarti, Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-: *Ajā'ib-al-Āthār fi't-Tarājim wa'l Akhbār* (French translation, Paris 1888-96, Leroux, 9 vols.), vol. viii, p. 373.

⁵ See Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 192. Jabarti records (in op. cit., vol. ix, on p. 207) that, in opening his first school, Mehmed 'Ali had been acting on the suggestion of a Muslim traveller, linguist, and man of science named Hasan Darwish al-Mawsili, who made the welfare of the poorer students his particular personal concern. A master was brought from Turkey to teach pupils whose mother tongue was not Arabic.

⁶ See Dodwell, op. cit., p. 238. Three of the Muslim instructors had been educated in France, and three in England.

⁷ See *ibid.*

⁸ See Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, p. 135.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 128.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 126.

school, 225 in the polytechnic, 150 in the school of Western languages, 150 in the school of music, 50 in the school of agriculture, 20 in the school of midwifery, and 300 in the school of book-keeping. The numbers of students in the schools of agriculture and midwifery were to be increased—in the latter school from 20 to 100.¹ This systematic network of special and general educational institutions on Western lines² was eventually completed in A.D. 1867.³ The extent and the limits of this progressive broadening of a Westernizing educational system that had been introduced originally for the particular technical purpose of creating a new-model army go far to explain, between them, both the subsequent rise of a nationalist movement in the ranks of a callow Egyptian intelligentsia and the failure of this movement, at its first outbreak under 'Arābī's leadership, owing to its inability at this stage to enlist the support of the illiterate masses of the peasantry, from whom the intelligentsia had become culturally alienated in the act of imbibing the tincture of Western culture that was the intelligentsia's distinctive hall-mark and *raison d'être*.³

Side by side with this development of education *alla Franca* in Egypt itself, Mehmed 'Alī and his successors maintained, from A.D. 1826 to *circa* A.D. 1870, an Egyptian Scientific Mission (*Al-Ba'that-al-'Ilmiyah*) in Paris.⁴ The first batch of students to benefit by this scheme, who were sent to Paris in A.D. 1826,⁵ were placed under the superintendence of Jomard, the French official commissioner for the publication of the discoveries of the Napoleonic Institut d'Égypte. There were forty-four of them,⁶ all native Egyptians;⁶ and they were followed in the years A.D. 1827–33 by other batches, amounting to about sixty students in all,⁷ consisting likewise mostly of fallāhīn.⁸ One hundred and fourteen students, in all, had been sent from Egypt to Paris by A.D. 1840, the date of publication of Clot Bey's book.⁹

The same educational policies were pursued with greater violence in Petrine Russia.¹⁰ Like Mehmed 'Alī, Peter found it impossible to start

¹ See Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, p. 194.

² The particular Western lines followed in Egypt were the French (Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 125).

³ See Kramers, *ibid.*, p. 952.

⁴ These were not actually the first Egyptian Muslim students to go to the West. They had predecessors who had already studied in Italy and France; and one of these, 'Uthmān Efendi Nūr-ad-Dīn, who had been appointed head of a college at Qasr-al-'Ayn, founded a staff school at Khānqāh in A.D. 1826 (Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 312).

⁵ See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 313. Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 203, gives the number as forty-five on the authority of a dispatch of the 4th April, 1826, from Salt, the British Consul-General in Egypt at the time (F.O. 78/147); but Clot's figure is more worthy of credence, since he gives the details. Eleven of the students in this batch were trained in administration and diplomacy, 8 in navigation, military engineering, and gunnery; 2 in medicine and surgery; 5 in agriculture, mining, and natural history; 4 in chemistry; 4 in hydraulics and metallurgy; 3 in engraving and lithography; 1 in translation; and 1 in architecture, while 5 went back to Egypt without having qualified in any discipline.

⁶ See Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

⁷ The batch sent to Paris in A.D. 1833 was twelve strong (Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 140).

⁸ See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 313. Out of these later batches of Egyptian students sent to Paris, forty students were allocated to mechanical arts and twelve to pharmacy and medicine.

⁹ See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 313. Besides the students at Paris, there were at this time also Egyptian apprentices in France at Elboeuf and at Rheims (Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 42).

¹⁰ Education by force was the key-note of Petrine educational policy (see Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im 18. Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), p. 80).

the process of Westernization without importing Western experts;¹ but Peter's ambition likewise² was to replace these aliens as soon as possible by Western-trained subjects of his own; and in Russia, as in Egypt, the education of native officers for Westernized fighting services was reinforced by a training of native technicians for Westernized auxiliary services. A school of navigation, for example, was opened at Moscow in A.D. 1701, under the direction of a Scottish mathematician from Aberdeen named Farquharson, whose Russian pupils were recruited from children of all classes;³ and a technical education was forced upon all male members of the Russian nobility by an edict of A.D. 1714 forbidding them to marry till they had passed an examination in geometry, arithmetic, and navigation.⁴ In A.D. 1736 compulsory education, between the ages of seven and twenty, was imposed on all noblemen's sons, and these aristocratic educational conscripts were subjected to a series of three examinations, with compulsory service in the ranks of the Army as the penalty for failing to pass.⁵ A corps of pages was founded in A.D. 1730⁶ and a cadet corps in A.D. 1731,⁷ and garrison schools were started in A.D. 1732.⁷ Schools for non-Christian subjects of the Russian Empire were founded at Astrakhan in A.D. 1732 and at Qazān in A.D. 1735.⁸ The University of Moscow was opened in A.D. 1755;⁸ and a commission for the promotion of elementary education was appointed in A.D. 1778, with a Hungarian Serb *savant*, Yanković, as its moving spirit.⁹

This progressive widening of the range of a new-fangled Western system of education at home was accompanied in Peter's Russia, as in Mehmed 'Ali's Egypt, by an effort to improve this exotic education's quality through sending an *élite* of the students to school in the West.¹⁰

¹ During 'the Great Embassy' of A.D. 1697-98, 'at least 750 men were recruited for service in Russia. Most of them were Dutchmen, but there were also a good number of Italians, Slavs, and Greeks from the Adriatic lands, skilled in the building and handling of galleys' (Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 35; cp. p. 89). A small team of English master-shipwrights were given specially favourable treatment (*ibid.*, p. 90). A Norwegian sea-captain named Cruys, who was persuaded in A.D. 1698 to transfer from the Dutch to the Russian service, rose to be an admiral in the Russian Baltic fleet (*ibid.*, p. 36). The employment of Westerners (other than those who became Russian subjects as a result of the conquest of the Baltic provinces in A.D. 1710) was, however, mostly confined to the technical field. Not only the higher posts in the fighting services, but also those in business and industry, were normally reserved for Russian subjects, and 'no instance is known of any establishment started in Peter's reign from imported capital' (*ibid.*, pp. 167-8).

² For Mehmed 'Ali's policy on this point, see p. 603, n. 1, below.

³ See Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 78; Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 and 152.

⁴ See Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 153; Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 412, followed in III. iii. 282, n. 2.

⁵ See Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

⁶ A.D. 1730 was the date according to Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 153; A.D. 1759 according to Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁷ See Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 84.

¹⁰ In Muscovy, as in the Ottoman Empire, this was a revolutionary departure from traditional practice. In general the only missions on which Muscovite subjects had been allowed to go abroad before Peter's reign had been embassies, pilgrimages, and theological studies in Eastern Orthodox Christian foreign countries. When Peter's early seventeenth-century predecessor Boris Godunov (*imperabat* A.D. 1598-1605) had tried to break with this tradition by sending five students to Lübeck, six to France, and four to England, only one of these fifteen doves had returned to the Muscovite ark. Of the four

Fifty young Russian noblemen were sent to the West for technical instruction a few months ahead of Peter's own departure on his grand tour as a technological apprentice in A.D. 1697;¹ and more than a hundred Russian students were expatriated in that year.² Students of the languages of the Islamic World were sent to Persia in A.D. 1716; and the first Russian naval students to go to Western countries were a batch sent abroad in A.D. 1719.³ These early Petrine Russian students abroad were unwilling pupils;⁴ but their recalcitrance was countered by exacting instructions and by the prospect of seeing their estates confiscated by the Tsar if they did not bring home satisfactory evidence that they had performed the tasks laid upon them.⁵ Peter maintained a strict control over these student-conscripts during their period of foreign service,⁶ and in Holland he appointed a resident inspector to look after them.⁷ On the other hand he rewarded Russian technological students who had made a success of their tour of study abroad by providing them, on their return to Russia, with capital to enable them to set up for themselves in business.⁸ These eighteenth-century Russian students in Western countries, like their nineteenth-century Egyptian counterparts, came under the general influence of the contemporary Western culture in the process of acquiring their Western technological training.⁹ The learning of Western languages, for example, initiated them into a new world of Western manners, morals, and letters;¹⁰ and Peter himself took a broad enough view of his utilitarian purpose to include the Western arts of painting and architecture among the subjects that his Russian students were sent to study abroad at first hand.¹¹

In the educational, as in the technological, field, Peter's utilitarian bent¹² never relaxed.

'To the end of his life Peter looked on education as a training for some specific form of state service: if men went abroad to learn economics, it was for the sake of his new tariff; if they were trained in languages, it was

sent to England, one became a clergyman of the English Episcopalian Protestant Church, another became an official of the English Government in Ireland, and a third became an East India merchant. In the reign of Peter's precursor the first Romanov Tsar, Michael (*imperabat* A.D. 1613-45), there had been a strong reaction in Muscovy towards the traditional anti-Western attitude. When Prince Khvorostinin had expressed a preference for Western culture, he had been compelled to recant; the Polish-educated son of Prince Ordin-Nashchokin had fled to the West from the intolerably anti-Western atmosphere of the Holy Russia of his day, and an official ban had been placed on foreign travel, in the manner of contemporary Japan (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 169-72).

¹ See Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 174.

² See *ibid.*, p. 175; Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), pp. 34-41.

³ See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

⁴ See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 176. Brückner cites a diary (preserved in manuscript at Qazán) which had been kept by one of them—a member of the Tolstoy family, who was fifty-two years old at the time of his compulsory expatriation as a student of Western technology (*ibid.*, p. 177). The spectacle of the Western World seen at first hand struck Tolstoy with amazement (*ibid.*, p. 192).

⁵ See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 175, followed in III. iii. 282, n. 2.

⁶ See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 184.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 174.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 189.

¹⁰ See Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹² See pp. 674-5, below.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 181.

in order to act as translators or to serve as diplomats. . . . Just as in Russia the foreigners played mainly a rather narrow technical, training rôle,¹ so . . . the Russians whom Peter sent to the West were assigned almost exclusively to technical training.²

This invincible narrowness of Peter's own educational outlook would have prevented the achievement even of Peter's utilitarian educational purposes if the operation of our 'law' that 'one thing leads to another' had not run away with Peter's educational policy after his death.

'In his own lifetime . . . going to school in the West . . . neither led to the results he desired nor had much immediate effect upon Russian culture. His own intensely practical bent and his coarse heavy-handedness caused him to treat his subjects far too much like inanimate objects upon which could be rapidly imposed a new impress or novel tasks . . . [Yet] this . . . aspect of his Westernisation . . . was perhaps in its ultimate influence the most far-reaching of his innovations . . . [for,] within the next two generations . . . , very different results began to flow from Peter's peremptory insistence on training abroad. Among many of the upper class a taste for foreign travel rapidly developed, once it was no longer obligatory and no longer to be spent in antipathetic apprenticeship to navigation or gunnery. From such travel, and from Peter's opening of the door to foreign books and foreign ideas, modern Russian literature and culture were born.'³

The vigour with which an exotic Western culture was introduced through these primarily utilitarian educational channels by Peter the Great into Muscovy and by Mehmed 'Ali into Egypt makes the parallel measures in Mahmūd II's Turkey seem feeble and desultory by comparison; yet here too we can observe the same progressive expansion of a new-fangled educational system *alla Franca* from a narrowly naval and military nucleus.⁴ Mahmūd II's unsuccessful forerunner Selim III (*imperabat* A.D. 1789-1807) had given a new impetus to a military engineering school founded by 'Abd-al-Hamid I (*imperabat* A.D. 1773-89) by reorganizing it under French and British management.⁵ Selim had also opened a school of navigation;⁶ and one of the professors at Mahmūd II's military engineering school, who was the son of a *khoja* of Jewish origin, became a pioneer translator of Western technological works into Turkish.⁷ Though an Imperial Military School

¹ See p. 551, n. 1, above.—A.J.T.

² Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 152 and 205.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁴ See Davison, R. H.: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (thesis submitted to Harvard University for the degree of Ph.D., 1st April, 1942), p. 98, cited here, by permission of the author, while in process of revision for possible publication.

⁵ See Kramers, J. H., s.v. 'Selim III', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iv (London 1934, Luzac), p. 220. 'The Westernising movement did not spring fully armed from the head of Selim III. Mahmūd I (*imperabat* A.D. 1730-54) employed the Comte de Bonneval to reorganise the Corps of Bombardiers on Western lines. Under Mustafā III (*imperabat* A.D. 1757-73) Baron de Tott did the same for the Artillery and taught at the newly established School of Naval Engineering. Nor should Halil Hamid Pasha in the next reign be forgotten: he opened a School of Military Engineering and strove vigorously to modernise the Army until 'Abd-al-Hamid I (*imperabat* A.D. 1773-89) began to suspect him of preparing a *coup d'état*'—G. L. Lewis in *The Listener*, 4th December, 1952, p. 934.

⁶ See Kramers, *ibid.*

⁷ See Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

was founded in Turkey in A.D. 1830,¹ it was said² that the only manual of instruction possessed by Mahmūd II's new-model Turkish army as late as *circa* A.D. 1835 was an elementary handbook with the title *L'École du Soldat* which had been bought by Khosrev Pasha from a French corporal named Gaillard; but a polytechnic for officers under the management of three French instructors was opened *circa* A.D. 1846;³ and this step was followed up by the opening of an agricultural school in A.D. 1848⁴ and a veterinary school in A.D. 1850.⁴ The opening, in the same year 1850, of a school for training civil servants in the mosque of the Vālideh Sūltān in Istanbul followed up Mahmūd II's foundation of schools for the same purpose in the mosques of Sultan Ahmed and Sultan Suleymān.⁴ A scheme for secular primary education in Turkey was approved on paper in A.D. 1846, but the first effective steps in this direction were not taken till some twenty years later,⁵ and then only at French instigation.

In the history of the Westernization of the Ottoman and Russian worlds the waves of Western cultural influence that were sent coursing through the veins of the Westernizing society's body social by an Herodian-minded autocrat's initial measures for the limited purpose of providing himself with an officers' corps trained in the contemporary Western art of war were reinforced by waves of comparable potency arising from parallel measures, likewise inspired by the example of contemporary Western practice, for looking after the health of the troops and crews of standing armies and navies modelled on a Western pattern.

In Russia the organization of public hygiene, which Peter had first approached from a naval and military standpoint,⁶ had progressed far beyond its narrow original limits by the end of Peter's reign. An Imperial Medical Chancery was established in Russia in A.D. 1725;⁷ precautionary measures were taken against the plague;⁷ and, when this scourge attacked Moscow in A.D. 1773, the public health service demonstrated its efficiency.⁸ In A.D. 1764 the Empress Catherine II set a personal example in the field of preventive medicine by submitting to vaccination.⁹

In Egypt, Mehmed 'Ali's approach to the exotic Western institution of public hygiene was the same as Peter's in Russia. His motives in introducing Western medicine into his dominions were a concern for the health of his new-model army¹⁰ and a terror of the plague.¹¹ He was

¹ See Engelhardt, E.: *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris 1882-4, Cotillon & Pichon [successeur], 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 8, n. 1.

² See Rosen, G.: *Geschichte der Türkei von dem Siege der Reform im Jahre 1826 bis zum Pariser Tractat vom Jahre 1856* (Leipzig 1856, Hirzel, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 232.

³ See Engelhardt, op. cit., vol. i, p. 82.

⁴ See Engelhardt, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 8, n. 1.

⁵ See Engelhardt, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 296.

⁶ See Mettig, op. cit., p. 266. The first hospital in Russia was a military one founded by Peter the Great (see Sumner, op. cit., p. 206).

⁷ See Mettig, op. cit., p. 266.

⁸ See op. cit., p. 92.

⁹ See op. cit., p. 94. The officiant on this occasion was an English doctor. Russian doctors did not rise to taking equal rank with foreigners till after the beginning of the nineteenth century (*ibid.*, p. 91), and Russians were originally debarred altogether from practising as apothecaries (p. 90).

¹⁰ See Clot, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 369.

¹¹ As early in his reign as A.D. 1812—thirteen years before the arrival of the French

fortunate in being served by a French medical officer, Dr. A. B. Clot, who was not only competent but was also imaginative, public spirited, and courageous. In the course of his fifteen years' service in Egypt, Clot succeeded in propagating his new-fangled and unwelcome organization of public hygiene *alla Franca* from its first narrow lodgement in Suleymān Pasha's cantonments into the remotest corners of native Egyptian civil life.

With five years' study of medicine in his native France behind him,¹ Clot arrived in Egypt in A.D. 1825² to organize a medical service for the Egyptian Army, and managed to secure the adoption of the French Army's health regulations and the establishment of a *conseil de santé* on the same French military pattern.³ He showed his imagination in arranging that the officers of his medical corps should wear exactly the same uniforms as the combatant officers of corresponding rank,⁴ and his courage in insisting that Christian members of the corps should be given the same status as their Muslim colleagues;⁵ but the great achievement in his career was his victory in a struggle to break out of the narrow confines of the barrack square into the vast virgin field of native Egyptian civil life.

Against a violent opposition—inspired by a general spirit of Islamic conservatism and a particular Islamic prejudice against the practical study of anatomy by the experimental method of dissection—Clot succeeded in persuading Mehmed 'Alī to found a medical school.⁶ The school was opened in A.D. 1827⁷ with a hundred Egyptian pupils, who were maintained and paid by the Government, and with seven Western professors of divers nationalities.⁸ A midwives' school, a maternity hospital, a pharmaceutical school, a preparatory school, and a school for learning French⁹ were attached to the medical school itself,¹⁰ and the two last-mentioned subsidiary institutions for providing Egyptian medical students with a general education on Western lines were manifestly indispensable adjuncts to the undertaking, since, to begin with, the teaching had to be given through interpreters.¹¹ Twelve of the original batch of pupils were sent on to Paris, where they were examined (in French) by the Academy of Medicine and were given the degree of doctor of medicine by the medical faculty of the university.¹² The popular

physician Clot in Egypt to organize a public health service for him—Mehmed 'Alī set up a quarantine control at the port of Alexandria, on the advice of resident Western physicians in private practice there, after receipt of the news that the plague had broken out in Constantinople (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. viii, p. 341). Early in A.D. 1813 the Pasha, without lifting his outlandish quarantine, reinforced it by the more familiar traditional Islamic preventive measure of giving orders for the liturgical reading aloud of Al-Bukhārī's theological works in the Mosque of Al-Azhar; but after three days the 'ulamā broke off the recitation out of laziness (*ibid.*, vol. ix, p. 9). The Grand Qādi of Egypt declared his official approval of the quarantine (*ibid.*, p. 19), but the troops paid no attention to it (*ibid.*, p. 22).

¹ See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 373.

² See *ibid.*, p. 375.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 383-4.

⁴ French, Italian, Spanish, German (*ibid.*, p. 391). These Frankish professors were required, as part of their duties, to attend at the hospitals (Bowring, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-5).

⁵ The French professors in this school taught mathematics, history, and geography, as well as their mother tongue (Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 134).

⁶ See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 385-7.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 384.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 370.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 376.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 384.

¹¹ See *ibid.*, p. 388.

prejudice against dissection was successfully overcome;¹ but the military discipline, to which Clot's medical students were subject, had to be rigorously enforced;² and, like his colleague and compatriot the French soldier Sève (*alias* Suleymān Pasha), this intrepid French medical officer risked his life in doing his duty.³

Clot had his reward when his medical school was transferred from its original site at Abu Za'bal to the Qasr-al-'Ayn Palace in Cairo,⁴ and when he was allowed to turn the former military hospital on the Ezbekīyeh Square in Cairo into a civilian hospital in the Western style⁵ and to transfer to it the patients languishing in an old-fashioned *mārastān* that had been founded by the Mamluk Sultan Qalā'ūn (*dominabatur* A.D. 1279-90).⁶ By the year A.D. 1840 (the date of publication of Clot's book) the Ezbekīyeh civilian hospital had seven hundred beds (divided in equal numbers between the men's and the women's wards), with additional provision for maternity cases and for lunatics, while there were now eighteen hundred beds in the Cairo military hospital, which had been transferred to Qasr-al-'Ayn.⁷ Side by side with these medical establishments in and around Cairo, Alexandria had been equipped by the same date with an *intendance de santé*, a naval hospital containing 1,200-1,500 beds, and a military hospital containing 500-600 beds.⁸ Clot's original maternity hospital, which remained at Abu Za'bal, had a French directress, recruited from the maternity hospital of Paris, and a staff of Sudanese and Abyssinian midwives.⁹ Madame Gault taught her apprentices the French language as well as the Western midwife's art, and the negro women, as well as the Amhāras, proved to be intelligent.¹⁰ A new maternity hospital, with a school of midwifery attached to it, was afterwards opened in Cairo.¹¹

One of the most valuable fruits of Clot Bey's labours was the translation into Arabic, and publication in Egypt, of Western medical works;¹² and this indefatigable propagator of Western culture in Dār-al-Islām through a medical channel had full justification for claiming that

'L'École de médecine a été déjà et sera toujours un foyer de lumières rayonnant sur toute la population.'¹³

A traditional Islamic fanaticism and superstition had been successfully eradicated from the souls of Clot Bey's medical students;¹⁴ and by A.D.

¹ See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 385.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 385 and 389.
³ One of Clot Bey's pupils attempted to assassinate him (*ibid.*, pp. 388-9). The attempt made on Sève's life by the recruits whom he was training has been recorded on p. 242, n. 2, above.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 396.

⁵ See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 282.

⁶ See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 393. A pagan Sudanese or a Monophysite Christian Abyssinian would be free from the prejudice that inhibited a Muslim Egyptian woman of that generation from qualifying for a profession which was likewise still without honour in contemporary Western eyes that had less excuse for looking down upon it, considering that by this time they were already aware of its practical utility.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 393 and 394, n. 2.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 397.

⁹ This claim of Clot's that Western medicine was breaking down religious barriers in Egypt was endorsed by Bowring in *op. cit.*, p. 141. The introduction, into a traditional Islamic social milieu, of Western medicine for the benefit of human beings probably had to contend with a more stubborn opposition than the contemporaneous introduction of the Western veterinary art, since, in a department of medicine in which the

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 394, n. 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 397-8.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 397-8.

1840 it was already possible for this benevolent Western Lucifer to observe that

'Ces progrès intellectuels portés dans les familles y fructifient peu à peu, et de là se répandent parmi leurs compatriotes.'¹

Clot Bey's claim that the Western art of medicine had proved in Egypt to be a particularly potent vehicle for the radiation of the Western culture is borne out by a piquant illustration preserved in the dossier of an official British observer who was visiting Egypt about the time when Clot was sending his book to the press. In his report submitted to Lord Palmerston on the 27th March, 1839, Sir John Bowring mentions that

'There is a hospital at Alexandria, for the special use of the Navy—though sometimes a few persons are admitted, on an order of the governor, who are not employed in the public service, and a department of the hospital has lately been applied to the reception of pregnant women, whose acceptance of the aid of Frank medical men is one of the most remarkable evidences of the growth of a more tolerant and enlightened spirit.'²

The presence of a lying-in ward within the precincts of a naval hospital seems as incongruous to Western minds imprisoned in their own preconceived order of ideas as the initiation of a liberal political revolution by subaltern military officers; yet in this case, as in that, a combination of circumstances that would have been bizarre on native Western ground turns out to have been natural and normal in a non-Western social milieu that was in process of being penetrated by Western cultural influences. The master-link in a chain of social cause and effect leading inevitably to a result that is surprising only at first sight is duly pointed out in a report on the medical schools in Mehmed 'Ali's Egypt, from the pen of Clot Bey himself, which is incorporated in Bowring's general report to Palmerston.

'In commencing the great work of reformatations that he determined upon, Mahomet Ali made offers to European officers of every rank and department; a general military organisation was introduced; and then, as a matter of course, a medical service was created for the preservation of the Egyptian forces.'³

The key here provided by Clot makes it easy for us to solve the riddle that is presented at first sight by the presence of a lying-in ward in a naval

beneficiaries were animals, the Islamic prejudice against the dissection of human bodies did not arise, while on the other hand Muslim minds were predisposed in its favour by a humane Islamic tradition (which put contemporary Western practice to shame) of showing mercy to non-human living creatures. Veterinary surgeons were introduced by Mehmed 'Ali into Egypt from the West in A.D. 1827, and a veterinary school, originally located at Rosetta, was afterwards transferred to Abu Za'bal, where it was placed on the same footing as Clot Bey's medical school there. The head of this veterinary school, who was a Frenchman named Hamont, won Mehmed 'Ali's heart by improving the quality of the Pasha's stud. The course of study at the school extended over five years; and here, as in the medical school, one of the fruits of Westernization was the translation into Arabic, and publication in Egypt, of the principal Western scientific works on the subject (Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 407-14).

¹ Ibid., pp. 397-8.

² Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes & Clowes), pp. 55-56. Cp. p. 141, n. *

³ Clot Bey in Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 139. This passage from Clot's pen is reproduced in paraphrase by Bowring in his own report on p. 138.

hospital at Alexandria in A.D. 1839. In an earlier chapter of this Part,¹ we have already noticed that Mehmed 'Ali had been quick to learn, from his experience in the Napoleonic Wars, the lesson that, in the contemporary play of Western power politics, sea power was a supremely potent instrument of policy. Upon his acquisition of the Pashalyq of Egypt, he had promptly translated observation into action by equipping himself with a navy of the contemporary Western pattern; and, after losing the best part of his newly acquired fleet at Navarino in A.D. 1827, he had turned a disaster to good account by setting himself to re-create his navy on a sounder basis than before. At this second essay, he had no longer been content just to buy up ready-made Western warships and to hire ready-trained Western naval officers. He had decided to establish at Alexandria a naval arsenal in which warships designed on Western lines by Egyptian naval architects and built by Egyptian artificers were to be commanded and navigated by Egyptian naval officers and manned by Egyptian crews. This was Mehmed 'Ali's ultimate objective when he founded his arsenal at Alexandria in A.D. 1829; but so ambitious a goal as this was manifestly impossible to attain at one bound. The new Egyptian naval arsenal could not become a going concern without receiving at least a first impetus from the hands of imported Western naval officers, naval architects, and shipwrights. Accordingly, negotiations were opened for enlisting the services of a fresh batch of Western naval experts. But these Western technicians who were still indispensable agents for the execution of Mehmed 'Ali's purpose in this field were unwilling to accept the Pasha's invitation to take up employment in Egypt, even on attractive financial terms, unless they could bring their families with them; and they were unwilling to expose their wives and children to the plagues of Egypt without being assured of having Western physicians on the spot to look after their health.

No doctors, no arsenal! The instalment of a Western medical staff was a condition *sine qua non* if the Pasha was to be successful in enticing the indispensable Western naval experts to accept his offers. A proper complement of Western physicians therefore accompanied the imported Western technicians and their families, gave adequate attention to their Frankish clientele's health, and found themselves with energy still to spare and time still on their hands. Like the Franks that they were, these under-employed physicians were not content, as a contemporary 'Osmanli might have been, to accept this golden opportunity of indulging in *keyf alla Turca*. The restlessness which was the curse or blessing of the Frankish *ethos* impelled them to keep themselves busy on something; and the obvious next 'other business' on their agenda, when they had done all that they could for a handful of Frankish residents, was to try to meet the most urgent medical needs of the native population. In any mammalian society the most constant demand for medical aid is that presented by maternity cases; and thus the idea of opening a lying-in ward in their naval hospital, so far from being far-fetched, was the all but inevitable first step in the quite inevitable enlargement of the range of these imported Frankish physicians' practice.

¹ On p. 244, n. 1, above.

How one thing led to another in the thoughts and actions of these Western medical practitioners in *partibus Agarenorum* has now been explained; but it is none the less amazing that, through the unforeseen and unsolicited agency of Franks imported into Egypt to tend their own kind, a Macedonian Turkish Pasha's determination to provide himself with a navy on the Western model should have revolutionized the social life of the native population of the country by breaking down one of the strongest of all traditional Islamic tabus. Within the living memory of the Muslims and the Franks of Mehmed 'Ali's and Clot's generation, the best-beloved of the wives of a theoretically autocratic Ottoman Pādīshāh had been debarred by an inexorable Islamic sense of propriety from receiving, even if she were sick unto death, any more intimate ministrations from an infidel Western physician than the reading of the pulse on the wrist of a timidly exposed hand,¹ while the rest of the patient's sorely ailing body was condemned to remain decently invisible and unsuccoured behind the bed-curtains. The selfsame Frankish doctor, practising in Dār-al-Islām, might have had, within the normal span of a professional career, both of the two bewilderingly irreconcilable experiences of being thus constrained to fumble in the dark and of being invited to assist an accouchement with the sovereign scientific disregard for a traditional prudery that he would have been expected to show in ministering to one of his own Frankish countrywomen. And this revolution in Egyptian Muslim behaviour in one of the most intimate of all medical affairs had taken place within the brief Time-span of, at the longest, slightly less than forty-one years, reckoning back from the date of Bowring's submission of his report to the date of Napoleon's landing in Egypt,² or a mere fifteen years if we take Dr. Clot's instead of General Buonaparte's arrival in Egypt as our *terminus post quem*.

¹ See Penzer, N. M.: *The Harēm* (London 1936, Harrap), p. 133.

² The traditional Islamic habit of keeping middle-class and upper-class urban women in seclusion had been battered by French blows from outside before a spontaneous impulse to take advantage of proffered Frankish medical facilities made it begin to crumble from within. A lively fear of the plague, and a proportionately strong determination to take preventive measures of public hygiene, had moved the French Army which had occupied Egypt in A.D. 1798 to violate the sanctity of a haram which had previously been the Muslim householder's castle (see Jabarti, Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-: *'Ajā'ib-al-Athār fi't-Tarājīm wa'l Akhbār* (French translation: Paris 1888-96, Leroux, 9 vols.), vol. vi, p. 276). The houses of Muslim families in Cairo were forcibly entered and disinfected by the French in systematic domiciliary visits (*ibid.*, p. 155), and the Chief Medical Officer of the French forces distributed a tract on smallpox to the members of the diwān (*ibid.*, p. 268). This body was an advisory council of native Egyptian notables, originally nominated by Napoleon himself, which had been instituted to serve as a link between the French occupying authorities and the Egyptian people. The diwān had at first been composed of mayors, merchants, and 'ulamā in equal numbers (see *Correspondance, Bulletins, et Ordres du Jour de Napoléon*, vol. iv: *Expédition d'Égypte* (Paris, no date, Méricaut), p. 198). It was afterwards reorganized to consist of 'ulamā exclusively (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 259).

The insurrection in Cairo against an alien military régime provoked the French into going farther. When, in the course of suppressing this revolt, they took the suburb of Būlāq by storm, the French soldiers seized Egyptian Muslim women and taught them to adopt the Western dress and manners of the day. The sequel confirmed the truth of a dictum of the Attic poet Menander that is quoted by Saint Paul in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. xv, verse 33: 'Evil communications corrupt good manners.' Egyptian Muslim women who had not been abducted by *force majeure* began to be corrupted by the gallantry of the French soldiers and by the manners of the French women who had accompanied the French expeditionary force (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 305). Many Muslim women were voluntarily given by their fathers or other legal

This illustration shows that, when once an assaulted society's outer defences have been penetrated by an aggressively radioactive alien culture's rays, our law that 'one thing leads to another' may operate at almost break-neck speed.

(b) RESPONSES OF THE SOUL

1. *Dehumanization*

In turning our attention from the social to the psychological consequences of encounters between contemporaries, we shall still find it convenient to give separate consideration to the respective effects on the parties playing the antithetical roles of 'agent' and 'reagent'; and here again it will be best to examine the effect on the 'agent' first, since the terms of the psychological relation between our two dramatis personae are set by the party that has been the first to seize the initiative and that has thereby gained an initial ascendancy over his fellow performer.

The representatives of an aggressively radioactive civilization that has been successful in penetrating an alien body social are prone to succumb to the hybris of the Pharisee who thanks God that he is not as other men are.¹ Indeed, a dominant minority is apt to look down on the recruits conscripted into its internal proletariat from a subjugated alien body social as infra-human 'under-dogs'. The nemesis attending this particular vein of hybris is peculiarly ironical. In treating as an 'under-dog' the fellow human creature who happens to be momentarily at his mercy, the implicitly self-designated 'top-dog' is unconsciously reaffirming a truth to which he is intending to give the lie. The truth is that all souls are equal in the sight of their Creator; and the only result achieved by a human being who seeks to rob his fellows of their humanity is to divest himself of his own. A human being's title to say *homo sum* is contingent, as Chremês knew, upon his also saying and feeling 'humani nihil a me alienum puto';² and 'inhumanity' is a double-edged word for describing behaviour that has a twofold effect. It is impossible for a human being to commit the sin of denying the humanity of other human souls without incurring, in the act, the penalty of dehumanizing himself. This is the besetting sin of the party that happens to be in the ascendant in an encounter between contemporaries in which the assaulted body social has been successfully penetrated by the aggressor society's attack. All manifestations of inhumanity are not, however, equally heinous. In this *descensus ad inferos* there are different degrees.

The least inhuman form of inhumanity is apt to be displayed by

guardians to French soldiers in lawful wedlock, in return for a nominal conversion to Islam on the French bridegroom's part; and these Muslim wives of Frankish husbands learnt their husbands' alien ways (*ibid.*). On the other hand, an 'ālim's daughter suffered the death penalty, with her father's consent, at the hands of the French authorities for having miscondacted herself with French soldiers (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 44); and other Muslim women likewise paid with their lives for having committed the same offence (*ibid.*, p. 45). Other Muslim women, again, who had managed to commit this misdemeanour with impunity, were afterwards married off by their families to unsuspecting soldiers of the Turkish army which took over the occupation of Egypt after the French army's capitulation (*ibid.*, p. 51).

¹ Luke xviii. 11.

² Terence: *Hautimorumenos*, l. 77 (Act I, scene i, l. 25).

representatives of a successfully aggressive civilization in whose culture-pattern Religion is, and is felt and recognized to be, the governing and orienting element. In a society which has not secularized its life by breaking its way out of a religious chrysalis, the denial of 'under-dog's' humanity will take the form of an assertion of his religious nullity. A dominant Christendom will stigmatize him as an unbaptized heathen; a dominant Islamic Society, as an uncircumcised unbeliever. In thus trusting in themselves that they are righteous, and despising others,¹ on account of a difference in ecclesiastical allegiance, these Christians and Muslims are manifestly guilty of hybris; yet, in recognizing that 'under-dog', too, has a religion of a kind, albeit one that is erroneous and perverse, 'top-dog' is implicitly admitting that 'under-dog' is, after all, a human soul; and this means that the gulf fixed is not a permanently impassable one when the distinction between sheep and goats has been drawn in terms of religious practice and belief. A soul that has demonstrated its capacity for Religion by following even a religion that the Pharisee rejects as false and bad has at any rate thereby proved itself capable of conversion to the alternative religion that the Pharisee regards as being exclusively true and good. The ugly line dividing the human family into a superior and an inferior fraction could be obliterated eventually through the progressive conversion of the whole of heathendom to the Pharisee's persuasion; and, according to the tenets of most of the higher religions, including those of the Buddhaic as well as the Judaic school, this is not just a theoretical possibility; it is a practical goal which the true believer must do his utmost to help the Church to attain, in the pious expectation that these missionary labours will not be in vain.

This potential universality of the Church was symbolized, in the visual art of a Western Christendom in its Medieval Age, in the convention by which one of the three Magi came to be portrayed as a Negro;² and, in the practice of an Early Modern Western Christendom which had forced its presence upon all other living human societies by its feat of mastering the art of oceanic navigation, the same sense of the Church's universality had shown its sincerity in action in the readiness of the Spanish and Portuguese *conquistadores* to go to all lengths of social intercourse, including intermarriage, with bona fide converts to a Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity, without any longer taking account either of a transcended difference of religion or of an abiding difference of language or race.³ The Spanish conquerors of Peru and the Philippines were so much more eagerly concerned to impart their Christian religion than to propagate their Castilian language that they endowed the native languages of the conquered peoples with the means of resisting the spread of Castilian at their expense by developing these languages into vehicles for literary expression in order to convey the Catholic Western Christian liturgy and literature to populations that spoke these languages as their mother tongues.⁴

¹ Luke xviii. 9.

² See II. i. 224.

³ See II. i. 224.

⁴ In V. v. 523-4 we have already noticed that the Incas' policy of promoting the use of the Quichua language as the *lingua franca* of an Andean universal state was taken over

The readiness of the Early Modern Roman Catholic Christian agents in the diffusion of a Western culture to intermarry with their converts was impressively attested in the twentieth century of the Christian Era by the physical evidence of the mixture of blood in the contemporary populations of all *ci-devant* or subsisting dominions of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in which there had been an indigenous population of any considerable density at the time of the original conquest. A racial amalgam including cross-breeds of every degree from an all but pure West European strain to an all but pure indigenous race of the pre-Columbian or pre-da Gaman stock was at this date characteristic of the populations of the successor-states of the former Spanish Empire of the Indies, from Mexico to Bolivia and Paraguay inclusive; and it was likewise characteristic of Brazil, Portuguese West and East Africa, Goa,¹ and those coastal districts of Ceylon that had been annexed to an expanding Western Christendom by Portuguese conquerors before they had been wrested out of Portuguese hands by the Dutch, and out of Dutch hands by the British.

In thus demonstrating the sincerity of their religious convictions by receiving into their society all alien converts to their faith, the Spanish and Portuguese pioneers of an expanding Early Modern Christendom

and carried farther by the Catholic Christian hierarchy in the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru. The corresponding ecclesiastical policy of using native languages, in preference to Castilian, as vehicles for the propagation of Christianity in the Philippine Islands is noticed by Wyndham, H. A.: *Problems of Imperial Trusteeship: Native Education* (London 1933, Milford), pp. 103-4. In their single-minded determination to carry out their religious mission of instructing the Filipinos in the Tridentine Catholic Christian Faith, the missionary orders in the Philippines persistently and successfully flouted the Spanish Crown's order—originally given in A.D. 1550 by Charles V and reiterated in 1636, 1770, 1772, 1774, and 1792—that the language of religious instruction for Filipinos should be Castilian (Wyndham, loc. cit., following Blair, E. H., and Robertson, J. A.: *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1893* (Cleveland, Ohio 1903-9, Clark, 55 vols.), vol. xxix, p. 265; vol. xxxv, p. 310; vol. xxxvii, p. 104; vol. xxxviii, p. 211; vol. xlv, pp. 184-6, 221, 222; vol. l, p. 15).

¹ In A.D. 1952 it seemed probable that, of the three West European Powers between whose empires the whole of Continental India had been partitioned five years back, Portugal would be the last to lose her surviving Continental Indian possessions, in spite of the fact that in this age Portugal was militarily and politically very much weaker than either Great Britain or France. The ground for this expectation was that the decisive factor determining the political future of Asiatic countries that had been under Western rule was the will of their inhabitants. The British had been led to evacuate India in A.D. 1947 by a recognition of, and respect for, a will to political independence among their former Indian fellow subjects which had been steadily growing in intensity, and had at the same time been captivating an ever larger proportion of the population of British India, over a period of more than half a century. In A.D. 1952 it looked as if the population of the enclaves of French-ruled territory in India would opt for a political *Gleichschaltung* with the majority of their fellow Indians, who by that date had become citizens of a fully self-governing and potentially independent Indian Union. Already in A.D. 1949 the population of Chandernagore had voted for entry into the Indian Union in virtue of an agreement, concluded between the Indian Union and France in A.D. 1948, that plebiscites should be held in Pondicherry, Mahé, Chandernagore, Karikal, and Yanam. The contemporary population of Portuguese India was hardly distinguishable in race from the inhabitants of the rest of the sub-continent, since the Portuguese blood that had been infused into the veins of the Goanese in the course of some four and a half centuries was no more than a tincture. This tincture, however, was significant, not in virtue of its physical strength, but because it was an outward visible sign of an inward spiritual union which the Portuguese conquerors of Goa had consummated with a conquered native Indian population that had embraced the conquerors' religion. In A.D. 1952 it remained to be seen whether the community of religion that was a voluntary bond between Goa and Portugal might not prove morally stronger than the community of race and the geographical contiguity that would tend to attract the tiny territory of Goa towards the mighty mass of an encompassing India.

had been anticipated by the Muslims, who, from the outset, had intermarried with their converts, without regard to differences of race. The Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of the Sasanian Empire and Transoxania were not deterred from mingling their blood with the blood of their converted Persian and Turkish subjects by their consciousness of the physical difference between these Northerners' unattractive rudeness¹ and the comely swarthinness of their own noble Arab breed;² and in a later age a ruddy-cheeked and auburn-haired Ottoman Turkish Muslim empire-builder who had accentuated the peculiarities of his pristine Turkish physique by intermarriage with Orthodox Christian and Western Christian renegades of European provenance would demonstrate his abiding loyalty to his adopted Islamic faith by also intermarrying, not only with his unattractively swarthy Arabic-speaking Muslim subjects, but even with the repulsively black-skinned and frizzle-haired Sudanese, when once these uncouth barbarians had redeemed their physical and cultural defects in the 'Osmanli's eyes by embracing the true faith of Islam.³

The Islamic Society had also inherited, from a precept enshrined and consecrated in texts of the Qur'ān by the Prophet Muhammad himself, a recognition that there were certain non-Islamic religions which, in spite of their inadequacy by comparison with Islam, were authentic partial revelations of divine truth and goodness. In the pre-Islamic 'Days of Ignorance', these broken lights⁴ of God's countenance⁵ had been, in Muhammad's eyes, the brightest lights shining in an uncomprehending darkness;⁶ and, on this view, they would have continued to be the best means yet vouchsafed by God to Man for his salvation if they had not been superseded in the fullness of time by a complete and definitive revelation in the shape of Islam. The affinity with Islam that was to be recognized in Judaism and Christianity as two morning stars preceding and heralding an Islamic sunrise was acknowledged in the Islamic ecclesiastical vocabulary by the bestowal of the name 'People of the Book' (*Ahl-al-Kitāb*) on communities possessing a Tōrah and a Gospel which, in the Prophet Muhammad's theophany, were divinely revealed prefaces to the Qur'ān; and this Islamic recognition of the validity of the Jewish and Christian faiths up to the limits of their imperfect spiritual illumination carried with it a political corollary. The Islamic *Shari'ah* declared that, when once any non-Muslims who were 'People of the Book' had submitted to Muslim rule and had agreed to pay a surtax to the Islamic state in token of their submission and in return for a Muslim guarantee of their security, this transaction conferred on these *dhimmi's* a right to be protected by the Muslim 'ascendancy' without being required to renounce their inherited non-Muslim faith.⁷

¹ The Arabs' use of the term *hamrā'* as a depreciatory epithet for their northerly subjects is noticed by Al-Balādhuri in his *Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān* (see the English translation published by the Columbia University Press, vol. i (1916) p. 441, and Part II (1924), p. 251).

² See II. i. 226.

³ Tennyson: *In Memoriam*, Invocation, stanza 5.

⁴ Job xxix. 24 and Psalm iv. 6.

⁵ See II. ii. 245; IV. iv. 225-6; V. v. 674-5; and V. vi. 204-5.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 226-7.

⁷ John i. 5.

A privilege which had perhaps been confined originally to the Jews and Christians and Sabians was tacitly extended, in the event, to cover not only the Zoroastrians¹ but also even the polytheistic and idolatrous Hindus; so that in practice the Muslims came to recognize that the adherents of all other higher religions had a moral claim to be tolerated by the followers of Islam on the implicit ground that they too, in their degree, had been recipients of revelation from the One True God. This treatment *de facto* as 'People of the Book', which the Zoroastrians and Hindus enjoyed in Dār-al-Islām, was accorded to the Jews in Christendom;² for, though the status was not recognized *de jure* in the canon law of the Christian Church, it was no more possible for Christianity than it was for Islam to cut the ground of its own moral claims to theological validity from under its own feet by proscribing another higher religion which was not only older than it was, but was its forerunner according to its own contention.³

The positive attitude, manifested in this Islamic concept of 'People of the Book', towards another religion that can be recognized as being spiritually akin to one's own, has its antithesis in a negative attitude manifested in the Christian concepts of 'schismatics' and 'heretics'. From this antithetical negative standpoint the spiritual affinity with the Church that is displayed by a community which is nevertheless beyond the Church's pale is not a merit carrying a title to toleration; it is a perversity calling for extirpation by physical force if persuasion cannot wean these lost souls away from their provocative sin against the light. An Islam which had succeeded in rising to a spiritually higher level in its attitude towards non-Islamic 'People of the Book' descended to the prevailing Christian level in its attitude towards enemies that were men of its own house.⁴ The feud within the bosom of Islam between a usually dominant majority which eulogized its own version of the True Faith by calling it 'the Beaten Track (*Sunnah*)', while it denigrated its usually down-trodden minoritarian opponents' version by calling it 'the Sect (*Shi'ah*)', came to display all the rancour, violence, and cruelty that, in a pre-Islamic Christendom, had been displayed in the successive feuds between Catholics and Gnostics, Trinitarians and Arians, Christolatrists and Nestorians, Melchites and Monophysites; and Christendom, for its part, remained blind to the import of the disaster that had been the penalty of a fratricidal civil war when a Christian house divided against itself by the Melchite-Monophysite feud had fallen⁵ at one blow from a Muslim sword. If this lesson had been read and taken to heart by the Christians of the seventh century of their era, Christians of subsequent centuries might not have had the face to revive the Christian scandals of

¹ See the Qur'ān, Surah xxii. 17, quoted in V. v. 674, n. 2.

² See pp. 272-313, above.

³ The historical and theological relation of Christianity to Judaism explains why the Christian Church never extended its tacit toleration of Judaism to an Islam which was in one aspect a post-Christian reversion to Judaism from Christianity. In the Christian view the tolerance morally due to a truly though imperfectly inspired pre-Christian approximation towards Christianity could not properly be extended to a perverse back-sliding from the Christian summit of religious attainment.

⁴ Micah vii. 6; Matt. x. 21 and 35-36; Mark xiii. 12; and Luke xxi. 16.

⁵ Matt. xii. 25; Mark iii. 24-25; and Luke xi. 17.

a pre-Islamic age of Christian history in the latter-day feuds between Eastern Orthodox Christians and Western Catholics and between Roman Catholics and Protestants within the fold of a Western Church which, in contemporary Eastern Orthodox eyes, was uniformly schismatic in its Protestant as well as in its Roman aberration.

Apart from this stiff-necked refusal to admit that their professed principles of toleration were applicable to their family quarrels, the followers of higher religions of Judaic origin could not always bring themselves to apply these principles in practice to the believers in other Judaic faiths. The Western Christian barbarian conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula gave the subjugated Jews, as well as the subjugated Muslims, a choice in which the grim three proffered options of annihilation, expulsion, and conversion to Christianity were substituted for Christendom's traditional offer, to the Jews in her midst, of toleration at the price of penalization;¹ and, when the progeny of the Jews who had chosen to profess conversion in Spain in preference to exile, or who had been constrained to profess conversion in Portugal as the only way left open to them there of escaping death, came to prosper in the Christian community which they had thus entered under duress, the envy of their non-Semitic compatriots and co-religionists found vent in witch-hunts whose victims forfeited their property and were put to death by the fiendishly cruel torment of burning them alive if they were convicted of having remained crypto-Jews or having secretly embraced some heretical form of Christianity.

We have still to take note of the greatest intellectual and moral inconsistency of all in the conduct of 'top-dog' towards 'under-dog' when 'top-dog's' denial of 'under-dog's' humanity has taken the form of asserting his religious nullity. The free passage from one ecclesiastical allegiance to another, as a sequel to becoming convinced of the spiritual superiority of the religion to which the spiritual pilgrim's loyalty is being transferred, had always been 'a one-way street' under the ecclesiastical by-laws of the dominant religious party. In Islamic customary practice, for example, a meritorious conversion that was rewarded with the guerdon of a genuinely unreserved admission into the bosom of the Islamic body social took on the polar aspect of an abominable apostasy whose inexorable penalty was death if ever it was a question of a Muslim seeing the light in some other religion, and following this new light that he saw to the non-Islamic goal to which it led. Inconsistency, injustice, and intolerance are the inevitable fruits of inhumanity in all its forms; yet the relative innocuousness of inhumanity in the form of religious discrimination becomes apparent when we observe the noxiousness of its effects in the lower forms to which it is capable of descending.

The next least noxious form of 'top-dog's' denial of 'under-dog's' humanity is an assertion of 'under-dog's' cultural nullity in a society that has broken out of a traditional religious chrysalis and has translated

¹ See II. ii. 244. This threefold choice was the ultimatum presented to the Castilian Jews in A.D. 1391 and A.D. 1492. The choice placed before the Portuguese Jews in A.D. 1497 was one between the two harsher alternatives only; they were not given the option of going into exile (see II. ii. 247, n. 3-).

its values into secular terms. In the history of the cultural aggression of the civilizations of the second generation, this was the connotation of the distinction drawn by members of an Hellenic Society between 'Hellenes' and 'Barbarians',¹ and by members of a Sinic Society between their cultivated selves and the miserable 'E' who still languished in outer darkness on the fringes of a Sinic World which, in Sinic belief, was the unique treasure-house of 'Civilization' with a capital 'C'. In a Late Modern Western World this cultural dichotomy of Mankind into 'civilized people' and 'barbarians' had found exponents in the French, who had half-consciously revived or half-spontaneously re-conceived this Hellenic concept in working out their relations with the North American Indians in the eighteenth century, with the Maghribis and Annamese in the nineteenth century, and with the Negro peoples of the French African Empire south of the Sahara in the twentieth century of the Christian Era. In the same Late Modern Age of Western history the same attitude had been adopted by the Dutch in their relations with the Malay peoples of Indonesia. In the Cape Province of South Africa, Cecil Rhodes had sought to kindle the same cultural ideal in the hearts of his Dutch-speaking and English-speaking fellow

¹ In the Hellenic usage of this pair of antithetical terms the dichotomy of Mankind for which the terms stood in the fifth century B.C. and in all subsequent ages of Hellenic history except the last age of all was a distinction between people who led and people who did not lead the Hellenic way of life as this was lived in whatever the age might be. In this established classical usage of the terms the criterion by which a human being or community was numbered either among the Hellenic sheep or among the barbarian goats was cultural, not religious or linguistic.

The Aetolian, Epirot, Macedonian, and Paeonian Greek-speaking barbarians in Continental European Greece to the west of the Ozolian Locris and to the west and north of Thessaly were not accepted as Hellenes in this prevailing cultural sense until the post-Alexandrine Age, and it was not till the penultimate phase of Hellenic history, in which the Hellenic World was united politically in a universal state established by Latin-speaking empire-builders, that the most northerly of these barbarians with a Greek mother tongue—the Agriānes and Dentheletae round the headwaters of the rivers Strymon (Struma) and Oescus (Isker)—were brought within the fold of the Hellenic culture by its latter-day non-Greek-speaking Roman propagators whose forebears had graduated as masters of Hellenic arts in the generation of Titus Quinctius Flamininus in the early years of the second century B.C. On the other hand there were non-Greek-speaking peoples—first and foremost the Carians and the Lycians at the south-east corner of the Aegean Basin—who had been Hellenes in the cultural sense since the earliest date at which a distinctively Hellenic culture had been discernible. This non-conterminousness of the area in which the Greek language was spoken and the area in which the Hellenic way of life was lived has already been noticed in other contexts (see III. iii. 478; V. v. 484; and pp. 412–14, above).

In origin, however, the term 'barbaros' was an onomatopoeic word signifying the speaker of a language that sounded like gibberish to ears attuned to Greek, and it still bears the linguistic meaning suggested by its etymology in the Homeric phrase *Kāpes βαρβαρόφωνοι* (*Iliad*, Book II, l. 867). The term 'Hellen', again, originally denoted, not a follower of the Greek way of life, but a citizen of some one of a number of political communities that enjoyed the privilege of membership in a local religious association of the friends, neighbours, and patrons ('Amphictyones') of a pair of shrines in the central segment of European Greece: the temple of the Anthelan Artemis at Thermopylae and the temple of the Pythian Apollo at Delphi. It is noteworthy that, in the last phase of Hellenic history, the antithesis between Hellenic and Barbarian reacquired the religious connotation that had been the word 'Hellen's' original significance. The Greek-writing Early Christian Fathers' self-consciously defiant laudatory use of the word 'barbarian' to denote a Jewish and Christian religious revelation that was to supersede the Hellenic philosophy proved to be too bizarre a *tour de force* to establish itself; but, after the official conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity, the term 'Hellenic' eventually came to signify, in Christian Greek parlance, a crank whose notion of loyalty to the Hellenic culture took the perversely religious form of clinging to some pre-Christian form of Paganism.

Whites when he had coined his slogan 'Equal rights for every civilized man south of the Zambesi'.¹

In South Africa this spark of idealism had been smothered, after the establishment of the Union in A.D. 1910, by the eruption of a narrow-hearted and violent-minded Afrikaner Dutch Nationalism which, not content with waging a fratricidal linguistic warfare against the English-speaking members of a dominant minority of West European provenance, was also bent on asserting its ascendancy over its South African fellow countrymen of Bantu, Indonesian, and Indian origin in the name of a superiority to which the Afrikaner laid claim on the score neither of his Early Modern Western culture nor of his Calvinist religion but of his Nordic race. The French, on the other hand, had gone to impressive lengths in giving political effect to their cultural convictions.²

Even in the Maghrib—where, as in South Africa, public policy was constrained to accommodate itself to the ambivalently hostile feelings of a dominant minority of West European origin that was fearful of being swamped by a native majority which it not only feared but also despised—the acquisition of full French citizenship had been open since A.D. 1865 to native Algerian subjects of the Islamic faith on condition of their acquiescing in the jurisdiction of the French civil law which the status of full French citizenship automatically imposed on its recipients. It is true that the French 'ascendancy's' insistence on the maintenance of this condition ensured, as it was intended to ensure, that the number of Maghribi French subjects applying for full French citizenship should

¹ When challenged to define his phrase 'civilized man' in the course of the debate on the third reading of the Glen Grey Bill in the Cape of Good Hope House of Assembly, Rhodes is reported to have responded by declaring on the 9th August, 1894, that he meant 'a man, whether Black or White, who has sufficient education to write his name, has some property, or works—in fact is not a loafer' (see McDonald, J. G.: *Rhodes, A Life* (London 1927, Philip Allen), p. 171). In his speech during the debate on the second reading of the Glen Grey Bill, Rhodes is reported to have said: 'We fail utterly when we put natives on an equality with ourselves. . . . What we may expect after a hundred years of civilization, I do not know. If I may venture a comparison, I would compare the natives generally, with regard to European Civilization, to fellow-tribesmen of the Druids, and just suppose that they were come to life after the two thousand years which have elapsed since their existence. That is the position' ('Vindex': *Cecil Rhodes, His Political Life and Speeches, 1881-1900* (London 1900, Chapman & Hall), p. 379).

Neither of these passages is to be found in the Cape of Good Hope 'Hansard' entitled *Debates in the House of Assembly in the First Session of the Ninth Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope*, 17th May to 18th August, 1894 (Cape Town 1894, 'Cape Times' Printing Works), in which the context of the words reported by 'Vindex' appears on p. 364, col. 2, as part of Rhodes' speech of the 26th July [not the 30th July, which is the date given by 'Vindex'] on the second reading, while the debate on the third reading is reported there on pp. 464, col. 2, to 470, col. 1. But this non-appearance of Rhodes' alleged words in 'Hansard' does not, of course, constitute a disproof of their authenticity.

In his speech in the House of Representatives on the 26th July, 1894, as reported in 'Hansard', Rhodes is represented as saying that 'he had based all his replies on the understanding that, in so far as brains, the Natives were different' (p. 369, col. 1). This apparent profession of a belief in the existence of insurmountable intellectual differences correlated with physical differences seems to be in contradiction with a reference (reported on a lower line of the same column) to 'this barbarian or this gentleman who had just emerged from barbarism' and with an earlier statement (reported on p. 367, col. 1) that Rhodes 'thought they might first allow those children just emerged from barbarism to manage their own local affairs'. In the adjourned debate on the second reading of the Bill on the 2nd August, he is represented in 'Hansard' (p. 418, col. 1) as talking of 'the second stage of the Natives—that was, when they were emerging from pure barbarism, as compared with the third stage, when they were, apart from colour, apparently the same as the Whites'. This last-quoted passage has a decidedly French or Roman flavour.

² See II. i. 225.

be negligibly small, since a submission to the French civil law was incompatible with the retention of an Islamic 'personal statute' which few Maghribi Muslims in that age were willing to renounce. The opposition of the West European colonists in French North-West Africa proved powerful enough, during the interval between the two world wars, to prevent the passage through the parliament in Paris of legislation for enabling an *élite* of culturally *évolués* Muslim native Algerian French subjects to acquire full French citizenship without their any longer being required to sacrifice their Islamic 'personal statute'¹ as the purchase price of this political privilege; and it was not till the 7th March, 1944, that the Algerian Muslims were granted exemption from having to fulfil this, for them, all but prohibitive condition in virtue of an ordinance adopted on that date by the French Committee of National Liberation.²

This ordinance conferred full French citizenship, without forfeiture of Islamic 'personal statute', on Algerian Muslim French subjects falling within certain specified categories,³ and provided for their registration on the same electoral lists as their non-Muslim fellow citizens, while all other Algerian Muslim adult males were enrolled in electoral colleges empowered to elect two-fifths of the members of the Algerian General Assembly and departmental and municipal councils, except in those municipalities in which the Muslims constituted less than two-fifths of the local population—where proportionate reductions in their communal representation were to be made. The ordinance of the 7th March, 1944, also proclaimed the abolition of all discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims in Algeria; and the quota of Muslim seats on Algerian public bodies was raised from 40 per cent. to 50 per cent. by the terms of the French Constitution promulgated on the 27th October, 1946, though this concession to Algerian Muslim French subjects was offset by the simultaneous doubling of the numbers of the non-Muslim French electors in Algeria as an automatic consequence of the enfranchisement of female non-Muslim (but not female Muslim) French nationals. Thereafter, the Statute of Algeria, passed by the Parliament in Paris on the 1st September, 1947, transformed the former Financial Delegations in Algeria into a Financial Assembly in

¹ See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1937*, vol. i (London 1938, Milford), pp. 496-7 and 511-27. This abortive French inter-war legislation had a notable precedent in the Roman practice of allowing Jewish Roman subjects to become Roman citizens without renouncing the observance of the Law of Moses. The Jews of the Roman Empire were accorded this politic exceptional privilege by the Roman Imperial Government because—like the Muslim, and unlike the Jewish, indigenous French subjects in the Maghrib—the Jews, alone among the multifarious subjects of Rome, had shown themselves unwilling to purchase the political treasure of citizenship at the religious price of renouncing their hereditary 'personal statute' (Toynbee, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 496, n. 1, and p. 497, n. 5).

² See Kirk, George: *The Middle East in the War* (London 1953, Cumberlege), Part III (viii) (e), p. 422, in the *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946*.

³ The members of these categories amounted to at least 60,000 persons in all, as against the 7,817 Algerian Muslims who had possessed French citizenship in A.D. 1936. There were, however, about 400,000 non-Muslim French citizens entitled to vote in the national parliamentary elections in the three Algerian Departments of France (Kirk, op. cit., p. 422), while, according to the Algerian census of the 8th March, 1936, the total number of French citizens of European origin in the three Algerian Departments at that date had amounted to not more than 978,297 out of a total population, in these three Departments, of 6,592,033 (Toynbee and Boulter, op. cit., p. 491, n. 1, and p. 493).

which French citizens and French subjects were to be represented in equal numbers; but the last word remained, as before, with the Governor-General.

Meanwhile in Tropical Africa, where French public policy did not have to contend with the pride and fear of European colonists, it had been carried by this time to its logical conclusion in individual cases which were as striking as they were rare.

The sincerity of the French in acting on their ideal of opening all political and social doors in France and the French Empire to anyone who had successfully graduated in the French version of a Late Modern Western culture was demonstrated, within the present writer's lifetime, by an incident which, in vindicating the honour of France, had an appreciable effect on the outcome of the World War of A.D. 1939-45. In the phase of this war that followed the fall of France in June 1940, it was a question of great moment whether Marshal Pétain's Government at Vichy or the Free French Movement temporarily based on Great Britain would succeed in rallying to its cause the strategically and economically important French territories beyond the limits of a temporarily prostrate European France. At this critical juncture the Governor of the Chad Province of French Equatorial Africa was a French citizen of Negro African race, Monsieur Félix Eboué; this Negro African Frenchman by cultural adoption duly exercised the political responsibility attaching to his post in the French public service by opting in favour of General de Gaulle; and the moral effect of his lead on the hearts and minds of his European French colleagues as well as his African French kith and kin produced the momentous political result of giving the Free French Movement its first foothold in the French Empire in Africa.

This French example shows that the cultural as well as the religious criterion for drawing the inhuman distinction between 'top-dog' and 'under-dog' is a form of denying 'under-dog's' humanity that does not fix an impassable gulf between the two fractions into which it artificially divides the human family. On the acid test of 'top-dog's' reaction to the question of intermarriage with his alleged inferiors on the other side of his arbitrarily drawn dividing line, the response of French agnostics in Africa and Dutch Protestants in Indonesia¹ was no less positive than that of Portuguese Catholics at Goa and Creole Catholics in Mexico; and, in both cases alike, this transcendence of a sexual tabu was proved to be a genuine fruit of humane feeling, and not just a surrender to the demon of physical incontinence, by the favourableness of the social status accorded to the children born of these unions, including those begotten out of lawful wedlock. At the same time, it is evident that this

¹ The contrast between the relative liberalism of the Dutch in Indonesia and the extreme inhumanity of their kinsmen in South Africa in their attitude towards 'under-dog' is a striking example of the variability in the character of the local responses to a challenge in diverse local circumstances. The same contrast was illustrated at the same date by a similar difference in the attitudes of British temporary resident officials and British would-be permanent settlers in Kenya; and we have already observed that even the French, Spanish, and Italian settlers in French North-West Africa were not saved by the comparative humanity of their Catholic and Roman traditions from lapsing into an Afrikaner-like attitude towards the Muslim indigenous Algerian population upon whose homeland this immigrant West European minority had intruded.

right of way across an inhuman gulf will not be guaranteed in such explicit terms by a cultural as it will be by a religious passport.

The right to exchange one higher religion for another was ensured in theory—however flagrantly this theory might be flouted in practice—in virtue of the convention that a soul's allegiance even to the church into which it had been born had been contracted, not by the involuntary physical experience of birth, but by a voluntary act of spiritual affiance. A male child born of Muslim parents obtained its initiation into membership of the Islamic Church by undergoing the rite of circumcision at puberty, while a daughter as well as a son of Christian parents obtained her initiation into membership of the Christian Church by a rite of baptism in which the voluntariness of the declarations and undertakings by which this physical rite was accompanied was signified in the appointment of godparents to speak on the infant's behalf words implying an exercise of free will that was not practicable for a human being till she had arrived at the years of discretion. In contrast to this theory that an ancestral religion is adopted by a personal act of free choice, it is impossible even to pretend that the way of life in which a child is educated is not inculcated as a habit before the pupil has had a chance of saying 'yes' or 'no' to it; and a culture which has thus *ex hypothesi* been imposed must be presumed to be less easy to change than a religion that has *ex hypothesi* been chosen. On this showing, the patently involuntary 'Barbarian' was a less promising subject for conversion than the reputedly deliberate 'Unbeliever'. The decisive downward step, however, in 'top-dog's' *descensus Averni* is not the change from 'Unbeliever' to 'Barbarian', but the change from 'Barbarian' to 'Native', in the definition of the stigma by means of which the oppressor seeks to rob his victim of an inalienable humanity.

In stigmatizing the members of an alien society as 'Natives' of their homes, 'top-dog' is denying their humanity by asserting their political and economic nullity. While admitting the indisputable fact that he has found them already in possession at the time of his own appearance on the scene, he is making this admission without conceding that these 'Natives' mere priority of occupation gives them any title, either legal or moral, as against himself. By designating them as 'Natives' *sans phrase*, he is implicitly assimilating them to the non-human fauna and flora of a virgin 'New World' that has been waiting for its predatory and acquisitive latest human discoverers to enter in and take possession in virtue of a right of 'eminent domain' over a 'Promised Land' deemed to be in the gift of some war-goddess of Private Enterprise. On these premises the fauna and flora of the wilderness may be regarded by the human pioneer in one or other of two alternative lights. Either he may treat them as vermin and weeds to be extirpated in order to clear the ground for stocking it with cattle or cultivating it for crops, or alternatively he may treat them as valuable natural resources to be carefully conserved and efficiently exploited. The pioneer's choice of economic policy will be determined partly by his estimate of the value of the natural environment and partly by his own temperament; but, whatever the policy that he may elect to adopt, and whatever the considerations

or feelings by which he may be prompted, he will be acting in any event on the assumption that he is morally at liberty to pursue his own best interests as he sees them, without being called upon to treat the 'Natives' as anything but wolves to be exterminated or sheep to be shorn.

In previous contexts¹ we have found the classical practitioners of this abominable social philosophy in those Eurasian Nomad hordes that had succeeded occasionally in establishing their rule over conquered sedentary populations. In their treatment of militarily routed fellow human beings as if they were either game or livestock, the Ottoman empire-builders were both as ruthlessly and as sublimely logical as the French empire-builders were in their treatment of their subjects as barbarians; and, while it was true that unemancipated French subjects were vastly better off than the Ottoman *ra'iyyeh*, it was also true that a human domestic animal which an 'Osmanli shepherd of men had successfully trained into becoming an efficient human sheep-dog found open to his talents an even more brilliant career than awaited the African *évolué* when he succeeded in becoming a French official or man of letters.

This parallel brings out the fact that, even when 'under-dog' is stigmatized as a 'Native', it is not impossible for him, within 'top-dog's' repressive social system, to cross the line dividing the human chattel from the man of property. The American Negro colonists of Liberia, whose African forebears had been not merely subjugated but uprooted, enslaved, and deported across the Atlantic, had raised themselves to the status of honorary Lords of Creation by acquiring unuprooted African 'Native' subjects of their own in the hinterland of the strip of West African coast on which these Negro American freedmen had been installed in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era by White American philanthropists. Subjugated Scottish Highlanders who had been treated as 'Natives' by their more recently disembarked Sassenach fellow islanders within two hundred years of the time of writing, and subjugated Maoris who had received the same treatment from the still more recent West European settlers in New Zealand within a hundred years of the same date, had succeeded in the meantime in transforming themselves *en masse* from 'Natives' into joint heirs of their own expropriated kingdoms.²

If it is thus possible for people to raise themselves from the depressed status of an effectively subjugated 'Native' population, this feat of self-emancipation is less difficult for people on whose necks this inhuman yoke has not yet been firmly fixed. In the social etiquette of the Modern Western World there was a tacit convention that 'Natives' had to be recognized as being human after all if and when they succeeded in acquiring the economic technique, or, *a fortiori*, the military armaments, that were the credentials of a Modern Western Great Power. 'Natives' and 'Powers' were mutually exclusive concepts for Modern Western minds, and the exigency of this Modern Western way of thinking promptly liberated a post-Petrine Russia from the stigma of the opprobrious

¹ See, for example, I. i. 151-2 and III. iii. 22-50.

² See II. i. 237, 238, and 466, and V. v. 322-3 for the transformation of the Highlanders, and V. v. 322 for the similar transformation of the Maoris.

brious epithet, whereas the Russians' Orthodox Christian co-religionists who were the 'Osmanlis' *ra'iyeh* continued to be known as 'Native Christians' in Western Christian parlance till they succeeded, in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era, in carving out sovereign independent successor-states for themselves. In virtue of the same principle of Western power politics the Japanese ceased to be 'Natives' after the inauguration of the Meiji Era in A.D. 1868, while the Chinese continued to be 'Natives' until they gradually extricated themselves from the same status *pari passu* with the progressive abrogation of 'the Unequal Treaties' after the First World War.

In the Late Modern Age of Western history the English-speaking Protestant West European pioneers of the Western Society's expansion overseas had been the worst offenders in committing the Nomad empire-builders' sin of making 'Natives' out of alien human souls; and, in this repetition of an old crime by a new criminal, the most sinister feature had been the English-speaking peoples' proneness to go over the edge of a further downward step¹ to which the 'Osmanlis' had never descended. These West European 'Lords of Creation' had been apt to clinch their assertion of their victims' political and economic nullity by going on to stigmatize these 'Natives' as the spawn of 'inferior races'.²

¹ This moral lapse had recorded itself in a linguistic medium in the discrepancies between the literal meaning of the phrase 'the English-speaking peoples', the connotation of the term in its users' minds, and the actual current usage of it. The connotation was that the cream of the common heritage of the peoples speaking this West European vernacular as their mother-tongue was not a mere community of speech but was a community of political ideals and achievements—above all, parliamentary government, civil liberty, and a respect for human personality which was the moral foundation of these social institutions. On the other hand, the actual current usage belied this connotation by tacitly leaving outside the English-speaking family circle those English-speaking citizens of the United States whose physique denounced them as being Negroes of African provenance.

² The Protestant background of a Modern Western race-feeling has been examined in II. i. 211–27. In this context it has been pointed out that, though this moral and intellectual aberration was inspired by an interpretation of the Pentateuch (ibid., pp. 211–12), this latter-day Protestant Western Christian reading of the Hebrew Scriptures had no warrant in the traditional attitude of the Jews, whose consciousness of being distinct from, and superior to, the rest of Mankind was founded on a belief that they were a 'Chosen People' in virtue of an historic Covenant made with Abraham by the One True God, and not on a belief that they were scions of an aboriginally and indefeasibly superior physical race (ibid., pp. 246–7). The recognition that their enjoyment of their privilege was contingent on their keeping their part of a contract between themselves and God helped the Jews to resist their perpetual temptation to succumb to the sin of hybris (as Kipling realized when he wrote the fourth stanza of his *Recessional*), while the substitution of the optional physical rite of circumcision for the involuntary physical imprint of race as the outward visible sign of membership in the Jewish Church made it possible for Jewry to admit *ci-devant* Gentiles as proselytes. The Jews themselves never fell into their Protestant Western Christian parodists' error of ascribing a rigidly racial significance to the historic distinction between 'the seed of Abraham' and 'the Goyyim' till the Zionists caught this psychic infection from their Nazi persecutors.

The true forerunners of the latter-day Western racials were not the 'Semitic' strangers in their midst whose traditional attitude towards the Gentiles was misrepresented in this Gentile caricature of it. The first authentic racials known to history were those Aryan barbarian speakers of an Indo-European language who had broken into the domains of the Sumeric Civilization in South-West Asia and the Indus Culture in North-West India in the second quarter of the second millennium B.C. The curse of Racism was inflicted on India by this Aryan *Völkerwanderung* for the same reason that explains its infliction on North America by the African Negro slave-trade. Both these great wrongs perpetrated by the strong against the weak had the social effect of suddenly bringing human beings of conspicuously diverse physique into intimate physical contact with one another in political and economic circumstances in which the representatives of one of the races were dominant, while the representatives of the other

Of the four stigmata with which 'under-dog' had been branded by 'top-dog', this stigma of racial inferiority was the most malignant, and this for three reasons.¹ In the first place it was an assertion of 'under-dog's' nullity as a human being without any qualification, whereas the appellations 'Heathen', 'Barbarian', and 'Native', libellous and injurious though they might be, were merely denials of this or that human quality and refusals of this or that corresponding human right.² In the second place this racial dichotomy of Mankind differed from all the religious, cultural, and politico-economic dichotomies alike in fixing a gulf that was an impassable one³—at least in the belief of the

race were at this racially alien 'ascendancy's' mercy. Thus, in hailing the Aryas as their authorities for a policy of persecuting 'non-Aryans' on the score of their racial diversity from the Indo-European-speaking barbarians of Western Europe, the Nazis showed themselves better students of History than those Pilgrim Fathers who had cited the Israelites as their authorities for exterminating the 'Canaanite' Natives of a New World (see II. i. 211-12 and 465-7).

Those English pioneers of Western Christendom's expansion overseas whose ships carried them to India instead of North America virtually adopted the institution of caste which a Hindu Society had inherited from its Indic predecessor (see pp. 207-13, above). If they had been asked to justify themselves by showing reason why they should not suffer the same condemnation as the Nazis, the last generation of the English 'ascendancy' in India would perhaps have pleaded that they had not embraced a doctrine of Racialism deliberately and selfconsciously, but had merely succumbed insensibly and involuntarily to the effects of an Indian social atmosphere that had proved too potent for them to resist; and this line of defence might have secured them their acquittal if the Indian descendants of previous Muslim conquerors of the Hindu World had not confuted their English successors' specious plea by the accomplished fact of their Muslim sires' intermarriage with their Hindu converts. This Indian Muslim feat of breaking the bonds of caste was a conclusive proof that an endemic Hindu Racialism had no power to prevail, even on its own Indian ground, over the humanity of the votaries of a Judaic religion that preached the brotherhood of Man as a corollary of its belief in a common fatherhood of God which was all men's birthright. The Arab, Turkish, and Afghan Muslim conquerors of India had all been Whites, and the Turks and Afghans had been of the same fair variety of the breed as India's English invaders from Western Europe and her Aryan invaders from the Eurasian Steppe. On this showing, English Christian virtue ought not to have been worsted by a challenge to which Afghan Muslim virtue had responded with a sincerity which an impartial English Christian observer was bound to admire. Moreover, the nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Englishman in India ought to have found his Christian virtue come more easily to him considering that he was only a pilgrim sojourning in India as in a strange country (Heb. xi. 13 and 9) where he had no intention of finding a permanent home for himself and his offspring. The challenge presented by the geographical intermingling of peoples of conspicuously diverse race was more formidable for the White citizen of the United States, and far more formidable for the White citizens of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, or Kenya, where the Whites, instead of constituting, as in the United States, an overwhelming majority of the population, were heavily outnumbered by the Negro 'Natives'. It will be appreciated that the Indian Muslims had always been in the predicament of these White settlers in Black Africa.

¹ The second and third of these points have been noticed already in II. i. 223-4.

² The inhuman treatment of 'barbarians' by Modern Western masters of the art of oceanic navigation is censured in a passage written by an English hand in the first generation of the Late Modern Age of Western history:

'The greatest invention that I know of in later ages has been that of the loadstone . . . The vast continents of China, the East and West Indies, the long extent and coasts of Africa, with the numberless islands belonging to them, have been hereby introduced into our acquaintance and our maps, and great increases of wealth and luxury, but none of knowledge, brought among us, further than the extent and situation of the country, the customs and manners of so many original nations which we call barbarous, and I am sure have treated them as if we hardly esteemed them to be a part of Mankind' (Temple, Sir William, in 'An Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning', first published in A.D. 1690 in the second volume of the author's *Miscellanea*).

³ A passionate desire to engrave in indelible letters the gulf which divided them from barbarian aggressors who seemed like veritable human ogres explains the East Romans' choice of the word *Ἀγαρηνοί* ('Children of Hagar') to be their standing term of abuse for the Normans. This spitefully chosen nickname accomplished two vindictive purposes

• racialists' who had so deftly dug it along an alinement that left the diggers comfortably ensconced, on the right side of the invidious dividing line, in a Nordicized Abraham's bosom.² In the third place the racial stigma differed from the religious and cultural stigmata (though in this respect it resembled the politico-economic stigma) in singling out for its criterion of distinction between one hypothetical kind of human being and another the most superficial, trivial, and insignificant aspect of Human Nature that could have been selected for this inauspicious purpose.

If the inhuman line between human sheep and human goats is to be drawn at all, the religious and cultural tests have at any rate the most to be said for them both intellectually and morally; for the most important and significant manifestation of the spirit of a spiritual creature is assuredly his religion and, next to his religion, his secular culture, whereas the curve of his nose, the proportions of his skull, the strength of the pigmentation under his skin, the shape of a segment of his hair, or any other physical accident of his spiritual constitution and character that we may care to name, tells us nothing about anything that concerns a man's relations with his fellow men, himself, and God. No doubt the racist will retort hotly that this is a caricature of his point of view, inasmuch as it ignores his conviction that these physical characteristics are outward visible signs of an inward spiritual grace in himself and

at one stroke. It exposed the hollowness of the Normans' profession of Christianity by assimilating them to the Muslim 'unbelievers'; and it branded their shame upon them ineffaceably by proclaiming it to be an inborn quality of their race.

¹ 'Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?' (Jer. xiii. 23) was the text on which the Late Modern Western racialists founded their doctrine (see II. i. 209); but, in the writer's day, this reed-staff threatened to pierce the hand that leant upon it (2 Kings xviii. 21), by turning out to be an open question and not the rhetorical question that it had been assumed to be by the militant doctrinaires who had put their trust in it. The social history of the United States had shown that neither legislation nor the public feeling of a dominant majority could prevent individual human beings of diverse race from mating—even when the physical diversity was conspicuous—in a population in which these diverse races were geographically intermingled. The result in the United States had been a blending of races in which the gulf between the local representatives of a 'pure' Negro race and a 'pure' White race had been bridged by intermediate shades of every degree of colour from 'near-Negro' to 'near-White'; and it was notorious that appreciable numbers of 'near-Whites' were perpetually 'passing', without detection, out of the 'under-privileged' into the unpenalized caste of North American Society. Meanwhile, those citizens of the United States whose tincture of pigmentation was still too strong to allow them to 'pass' were at any rate able to assimilate themselves physically to their White fellow citizens to some extent by artificially uncurling their hair (see II. i. 228); and, at the moment of writing, it was being rumoured that some enterprising man of science had discovered a trick for bleaching Negro skins by reducing the strength of their pigmentation to the quantity present in skins popularly described as 'White'.

This application of Science to the social purpose of producing a physical metamorphosis, which was a question of such lively interest for Negro citizens of the United States, mattered less to Negro citizens of France, who did not feel the same urge to 'pass' physically because it was open to them, as we have seen, to arrive socially by a cultural avenue along which they would not find their progress impeded by any racial barrier. The openness of this French road is illustrated in the story of an impromptu repartee which Dumas *père* is reported to have made to an unsuccessful contemporary French man of letters who had rashly given vent to his envy of the dusky star by saying to Dumas, in the presence of witnesses: 'On dit que monsieur est nègre!'—'Vous avez raison', the great man instantly replied: 'Mon père était nègre; mon grand-père était sînge; ma famille a commencé où la vôtre a terminé!' It is perhaps questionable whether this French colloquy is authentic or legendary, but it is certain that Booker Washington could not have ventured, even on the north side of the Mason and Dixon line, to make the equivalent repartee to a White fellow traveller in an American pullman car.

² Luke xvi. 22-26.

absence of this grace in other breeds which on this account he stigmatizes as inferior. It is indeed a fundamental and indispensable doctrine of the false religion of Racialism that the racial characteristics discernible in our human bodily physique are supposed to be correlated—and this permanently and precisely—with hypothetical racial characteristics of a psychic order;¹ but this dogma was a bare postulate which had never been borne out by any scientific demonstration down to the time of writing; and the burden of proof had still to be discharged by the credulous before the task of disproof need be shouldered by the sceptics.

If the conventional classification of physical races by differences in strengths of pigmentation were adopted, provisionally and without prejudice, for the sake of the argument, it would be found, as we have ascertained in another context,² that, even within the relatively short Time-span of five or six thousand years during which the species of human society known as civilizations had been in existence up to date, contributions to civilizations had been made by people of all colours except the Black. Within the period of less than half that length which had seen the epiphany of the higher religions, contributions to the spiritual life of these best-inspired activities of the spirit of Man had also been made by people of all colours except the Black and the Red;³ and a twentieth-century racialist who sought to justify his superstition by drawing attention to the comparative spiritual sterility of the Red and Black races so far could be confronted by a contemporary geographer-sociologist with evidence that the same sterility had been displayed, within the same brief periods, by certain representatives of the allegedly superior Brown, Yellow, and White races whose other representatives had been demonstrating their spiritual prowess.

In the Westernizing World of the twentieth century of the Christian Era there were still Brown, Yellow, and White, as well as Red and Black, 'Natives' and 'Barbarians'. In this place we need not reproduce our previous inventory of them.⁴ We need only remark that the then fast-dwindling pockets of Raw Whites in the Rif, the Atlas, Albania, the Caucasus, Kurdistan, and North-Eastern Iran, who had not yet emulated their former peers, the *ci-devant* 'Wild Highlanders' and 'Wild Irish' in a Celtic Fringe of the British Isles, by catching a cultural infection from their neighbours, were a less disconcerting spectacle for the representatives of Civilization in this age than the recently formed patches of Mean Whites in the United States,⁵ the Union of South Africa, and other countries overseas which had been added to the domain of the Western Civilization in its Late Modern Age by English-speaking colonists from Western Europe. These Mean Whites were an alarming phenomenon, because, unlike the Raw Whites, they were not laggard barbarians but

¹ The unprovenness of this doctrine has been exposed in II. i. 208-9.

² See the tables in II. i. 232 and 239.

³ In II. i. 232-3, nn. 6 and 7, it has been pointed out that the so-called 'Red Race' and 'Yellow Race' were misnomers for arbitrarily dissociated fractions of a single-Mongolo-American Race distinguished, not by the colour of the skin, but by the texture of the hair and the set of the eyes.

⁴ In II. i. 236.

⁵ See II. i. 466-7 and II. ii. 309-13.

were the lapsed successors of predecessors who had been bearers of the Western culture of their day. Yet the lapsed Whites of Appalachia were not so terrifying a portent as the apostate Whites who had risen up in the writer's generation within the European homeland of the Western Civilization to preach and practise those perverse Neo-Pagan religions Fascism and National Socialism in which a Western White Man had deliberately repudiated a Western Christian spiritual heritage by reverting, like the Communist heirs of an Orthodox Christian spiritual heritage, to an idolatrous worship of Collective Humanity.¹

2. Zealotism and Herodianism

A Pair of Polar Standpoints

In the preceding chapter we have found that, in an encounter between contemporaries in which an impact of an aggressively radioactive culture on an alien body social has resulted in the penetration of the assaulted party's defences by the attacking forces, the inhumanity which is the dominant party's characteristic response to the spiritual ordeal of finding alien souls at his mercy is a single-track *descensus Avernii* in which the only perceptible diversification of an essentially uniform reaction's character is produced by the passage to some lower step in the one-way traffic down this sinister stairway. When we turn to examine the response of the party at bay against an inhuman enemy within its battered gates, we are confronted with an apparent contrast; for the victim of a successful assault seems to have a choice between two alternative possible reactions which look at first sight as if they were not merely diverse but antithetical.

For minds educated in a Christian tradition, the most familiar historical embodiments of these two psychological poles are the opposite attitudes towards Hellenism, and contrary policies for coping with it, of two Jewish parties in the Palestinian province of the Syriac World in the time of Christ that appear in the New Testament under the names 'Zealots' and 'Herodians'. This example has the triple advantage of being not only familiar but momentous, because the historic collision between Hellenism and Jewry released the dynamic spirit of Christianity, and not only momentous but illuminating, because these two Jewish antithetical reactions to a pressure exerted by Hellenism were so sharply pronounced that they can be used as indicators for detecting and sorting out other instances of the same psychological phenomena in other passages of the histories of encounters between contemporaries.

In that age, Hellenism was pressing hard upon Jewry on every plane of social activity—not only in economics and in politics, but also in art, ethics, and philosophy. No Jew could escape or ignore, turn where he would, the question of becoming or not becoming a Hellene. It was a question by which every Jew in that age was inevitably obsessed. The only choice open to him was an apparent choice between alternative ways of meeting this single insistent challenge; and this was the issue over which the 'Zealots' and the 'Herodians' parted company to strike

¹ See V. v. 334-7.

out separate paths for themselves in what might appear to be diametrically opposite directions.

The Zealot faction was recruited from people whose impulse, in face of attacks delivered by a stronger and more energetic aggressive alien civilization, was to take the manifestly negative line of trying to fend off the formidable aggressor. The harder Hellenism pressed them, the harder they strove, on their side, to keep themselves clear of Hellenism and all its works, ways, feelings, and ideas; and their method of avoiding contamination was to retreat into the spiritual fastness of their own Jewish heritage, lock themselves up within this psychic *donjon*, close their ranks, maintain an unbroken and unbending front, and find their inspiration, their ideal, and their acid test in the loyalty and sincerity of their observance of every jot and tittle of a traditional Jewish law.

The faith by which the Zealots were animated was a conviction that, if they were thus meticulously conscientious in abiding by their ancestral tradition and observing the whole of it and nothing else, without ever again yielding to the temptation to go a whoring after other gods,¹ they would be rewarded by being given grace to draw from the jealously guarded source of their own spiritual life a supernatural strength that would enable them to repel the alien aggressors—no matter how overwhelming the aggressors' superiority over the Zealots in material power might appear to be on a matter-of-fact view.² The Zealot's posture was that of a tortoise who has withdrawn his head and feet into his shell, or of a hedgehog who has tucked away his tender snout and pads inside the prickly ball, with its *chevaux-de-frise* of spines all pointing outwards, into which the shy animal has curled himself up as his retort to the approach of a dangerous enemy.³ (The Zealot's sardonically observant

¹ Judges ii. 17. Cp. Exod. xxxiv. 15-16; Lev. xvii. 7; Deut. xxxi. 16.

² This fundamental article of the Zealot's faith has been given a classical expression in 2 Macc. viii. 36, in the confession here put into the mouth of the Seleucid King Antiochus IV's general Nicānōr after the disastrous repulse of his expedition against Jerusalem circa 165 B.C. 'He was fain to confess, now, that the Jews had God Himself for their protector, and, would they but keep His laws, there was no conquering them!' (*The Old Testament newly translated from the Latin Vulgate* by Mgr. Ronald A. Knox, vol. ii (London 1949, Burns, Oates, & Washbourne), p. 1518). The original Greek runs: κατήγγελλεν ὑπέρμαχον [τον Θεόν] ἔχειν τοὺς Ἰουδαίους καὶ διὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἀτρώτους εἶναι τοὺς Ἰουδαίους διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προτεταγμένοις νόμοις.

³ This characterization of Zealotism as a negatively defensive reaction to an apprehension of danger is borne out by celebrated episodes in the domestic histories of the Hellenic and the Western Civilization.

The conflict between traditional Hellenic religion—or superstition—and the rationalist intellectual enlightenment of the fifth century B.C. produced explosions of Zealotism in Athenian souls subjected to unwontedly severe psychological stresses and strains by the great Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. and by the great plague which in 430-429 B.C. and again in 427 B.C., ravaged a city overcrowded by refugees from an invaded country-side. This Athenian wave of Zealot feeling manifested itself in a series of prosecutions of prominent 'intellectuals' on charges of offences against Attic religious orthodoxy (see VII. vii. 472). The series began with the prosecutions of the resident aliens Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (? *in absentia* and not *nominatim*) and Aspasia of Miletus (perhaps both as moves in the temporarily successful political campaign against Pericles, which led to his fall in 430 B.C.), and it was continued in the throng of prosecutions in and after 415 B.C., when, besides the judicial proceedings against the alien philosophers Protagoras of Abdera and Diagoras of Melos, the native Athenian aristocrat-politician Alcibiades was prosecuted on the same charge of having profaned the Eleusinian Mysteries, and a regular witch-hunt was set on foot to find human scapegoats to atone for the mutilation of the Hermae. The climax and conclusion of the series was the prosecution of Socrates in 399 B.C. (See Seeck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 47-48; Adcock, F. E., in

Herodian rival would, no doubt, have been more inclined to describe his foolish brother's attitude as that of an ostrich who has buried her head in the sand). The Zealot's watchwords were *Debout les morts!*¹ and 'Upon this rock I will build My Church and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against It'.²

The anti-Zealot Herodian faction was recruited from the servants, supporters, and admirers of an opportunist statesman whose Idumaean provenance worked together with his personal genius to enable this son of a recently incorporated *ci-devant* Gentile province of a Seleucid Hellenic Monarchy's Maccabaeian Jewish successor-state to take a fresher and less prejudiced view of Jewry's Hellenic problem than was open to contemporary Judaeian Jews, whose line of vision had been so heavily depressed by the crushing incubus of a long accumulated cultural heritage that their horizon was confined within the patch of ancestral ground to which their feet were rooted.³ Herod the Great's

The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. v (Cambridge 1927, University Press), pp. 477-8; Nilsson, M. P.: *Greek Popular Religion* (New York 1940, Columbia University Press), p. 122).

In the legal proceedings involving Anaxagoras and Aspasia and in the trial of Socrates, popular feeling was no doubt exploited for political purposes. This motive in the prosecution of Socrates has been noticed already in the present Study in VII. vii. 472; and, in recording Diopithea's motion for the prosecution of 'disbelievers in the supernatural and teachers of theories about the heavenly bodies', Plutarch, in his *Pericles*, chap. 32, states that Diopithea was 'gunning for' (*ἀντιπεδοῦμενος* *εἰς*) Pericles by exploiting the feeling against [Pericles' friend and protégé] Anaxagoras. But *cherchez la politique* is not an adequate explanation of the outburst in 415 B.C. 'On this occasion a real religious hysteria broke out, for these events took place just before the great fleet sailed for Syracuse' (Nilsson, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.).

These manifestations of Zealotism at Athens during the Atheno-Peloponnesian War on the eve of the expedition against Syracuse had their counterparts at Rome during the Hannibalic War on the morrow of the Roman disaster at Cannae. When, at this juncture, two Vestal Virgins were found guilty of having broken the tabu against their indulging in sexual intercourse, one of them was punished by being buried alive, while the other only escaped this fate by an anticipatory suicide. One of the seducers, who was a pontifical clerk (*scriba pontificis*), was beaten to death by the Pontifex Maximus in person. But these savage punishments of members of the Roman official religious establishment who had been convicted of a ritual offence are not so horrifying as the propitiation of an angry Roman Pantheon by the gruesome rite of burying alive in the Forum Boarium four innocent aliens: a male and female Greek and a male and female Gaul (see Fowler, W. Warde: *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London 1911, Macmillan), pp. 319-20).

In the Early Modern Age of Western history an Athenian Zealot reaction against a rationalist enlightenment that had culminated in the judicial murder of Socrates had its counterpart in A.D. 1600 in the judicial murder of Giordano Bruno by a death which was as cruel as the deaths inflicted on their victims by Etruscan-minded pagan Roman ecclesiastical authorities in the panic following the catastrophe at Cannae.

¹ The heroically absurd word of command by which, according to a legend of the World War of A.D. 1914-18, a French subaltern, turned Tertullian-minded by the exaltation of despair, had conjured up into action again the no longer living effectives required for repelling an irresistible German assault on a trench which the Frenchman had been ordered to hold at all costs.

² Matt. xvi. 18.

³ It is no accident that the Idumaean Jewish statesman who offered to the Jews of his day a mundane solution of their Hellenic problem should have shared with the Galilaean Jewish Saviour who offered to them the insight to sublimate the same problem on to the spiritual plane the one common characteristic of being the offspring of new ground beyond the limits of a hard-baked Judaea. The cultural background of 'Galilee of the Gentiles' has been indicated in II. ii. 73-74 and in V. vi. 477-8 and 499. The policy of Herod the Great has been touched upon in V. vi. 123. This ex-Gentile statesman who forcibly kept a post-Alexandrine Palestinian Jewry out of trouble during his lifetime by compelling them to allow him to manage their affairs is 'the opposite number' of an ex-Jewish statesman who rehabilitated a nineteenth-century British Conservative Party by inducing them to place the management of their affairs in his hands. If Herod showed

prescription for Jewry's problem of coping with Hellenism was, first, to take the objective measure of this alien social force's irresistibly superior power with a sober eye, and then to learn and borrow from Hellenism every Hellenic accomplishment that it might prove necessary for the Jews to acquire for the judicious and practicable purpose of equipping themselves for holding their own, and even contriving to lead a more or less comfortable life, in the Hellenizing World that was their inescapable new social environment.

In a Zealot's eyes this Herodianism was a compromise that was as dangerous as it was impious and cowardly; but the Herodians could argue plausibly on behalf of their policy that it was preferable to the Zealots' impulse in every respect that was of any practical consequence. It was positive instead of being negative, and was therefore free to be active instead of condemning itself to be passive, whereas the Zealot line was hopelessly passive in spirit, however violently it might simulate activity in its foolhardy physical exercises. More than that, the Herodians could represent that, in following their own line, they were exhibiting a greater moral courage than any to which the Zealots could lay claim, since the attitude which the Zealots denounced as an Herodian opportunism was in truth simply the realism of minds strong enough to look facts in the face without flinching, to take these indisputable facts as they were, and to frame a straightforward policy on this firm basis.

Hellenism, the Herodians would say, was a hard fact which had successfully intruded itself into Jewry's social universe, and from which there was no possibility of escape. The Zealots' attitude of uncompromising non-recognition of the presence and power of this triumphant alien force was an attitude of moral cowardice entailing an impolicy of impossibilism that courted certain defeat. The one effective way for Jewry to cope with Hellenism was for the Jews to take to heart the manifest limitations of their own power; to recognize that their social universe could never be the same again since the emergence of Hellenism above the Syriac World's horizon; and to grasp, and act upon, the truth that Hellenism could be fought successfully only by the adoption of Hellenic weapons. According to the Herodian exposition of the case, the real choice lay between a voluntary Hellenization of Jewish life to whatever extent might be found necessary in the course of an empirical solution of the Hellenic problem *ambulando*, and an irresponsible Zealot impulse to ride for a fall in which Judaism would succumb to Hellenism altogether—with nothing to show for such a stupidly purposeless sacrifice beyond the poor consolation of having managed to make the mock-heroic Zealot gesture of shaking an infantile fist in an unimpressed Destiny's face. The Herodian's watchwords were *Fas est et ab hoste doceri*¹ and 'when you are in Rome, do as Rome does'. And, if a Zealot had been shocked by the Herodian's impiety into putting to him the searching question, 'Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit

himself less adroit than Disraeli in proving unable to carry out his policy without resorting to the crude expedient of repression, this was because, of these two audacious political acrobats, the ex-Gentile had committed himself to performing the greater *tour de force*.

¹ Ovid: *Metamorphoses*, Book IV, l. 428.

unto his stature?',¹ the Herodian would have replied without hesitation that he, for one, could answer that question in the affirmative—an answer indicating that, in spite of his air of rationalism, the Herodian, like the Zealot, was actuated by a faith which, in its Herodian vein, was perilously akin to hybris.

*A Survey of Zealot and Herodian Reactions*²

We cannot listen to the Herodian's and the Zealot's competitive expositions of their cases without being moved to ask ourselves two questions. How do these melodramatically contradictory attitudes stand to one another in fact? And does either of them prove to be an effective retort to the successful penetration of an assaulted body social by the cultural radiation of an aggressive alien society which is the common challenge evoking both these ostensibly opposite responses? It would be premature, however, to take up either of these questions before making a wider survey of the field of our present inquiry; for the two psychological reactions which we have just identified in the attitudes, and labelled with the names, of two factions which disputed between them the protagonist's role on the stage of Palestinian Jewish politics during the hundred years ending in A.D. 70 can, of course, be detected in many other passages of history; and these other manifestations of them may be expected to throw further light on their respective characters and on their mutual relations.

In the history of the Jews' encounter with Hellenism—to look no farther afield than this episode, for the moment—the phenomenon of Herodianism is already discernible by a date that anticipates Herod the Great's seizure of power in the Hasmonaeen Jewish principality in Palestine by at least a century and a half. Even if we reject as unhistorical the legendary account of the Septuagint's translation of the Jewish scriptures from the Hebrew and Aramaic into the Greek by a Ptolemaic royal command in the reign of Philadelphus (*regnabat* 283–245 B.C.),³ we can trace the beginnings of a voluntary self-Hellenization of the immigrant Jewish community in Alexandria right back to the infancy of this melting-pot city on the morrow of its founder's death; and even in the comparatively secluded hill-country of Judaea the High Priest Joshua-Jason, who is the archetype of the Herodian school of statesmanship, was busy as early as the fourth decade of the second century B.C. on his devil's work (as it appeared in Zealot eyes) of seducing his younger colleagues in the Jewish hierarchy into an indecently naked exposure of their bodies in an Hellenic palaestra and a shockingly vulgar screening of their heads under the broad brim of an Hellenic *petasus*.⁴ The *damnatio memoriae* through which Jason's Herodian escapade has been immortalized in the

¹ Matt. vi. 27.

² Much of the evidence cited in the following survey has already been presented in this Study in other contexts, especially in Part IX B, in the present volume, and in V. v. 58–712 and V. vi. 1–132, as well as in V. vi. 213–42. In the present chapter, references are given to the relevant passages in Part V but not to those in Part IX B.

³ According to Edwin Bevan, in *A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty* (London 1927, Methuen), p. 112, 'the translation of the Old Testament was made, bit by bit, in Egypt during the last three centuries before the Christian Era'.

⁴ See V. vi. 103–5, with the passage quoted from 2 Macc. iv. 7–17 on p. 104, n. 1.

Second Book of Maccabees is a revealing exhibition of the animus that Herodian policies arouse in Zealot hearts; and this provocation in high places at Jerusalem duly evoked a 'Zealot' reaction at least five generations before these anti-Hellenic Jewish fanatics had eventually acquired their historic soubriquet from a zeal for the Lord¹ which had long since eaten them up.²

Nor was Jewish Zealotism crushed out of existence by the military and political catastrophe of A.D. 70, nor even by its conclusive repetition in A.D. 135;³ for the gentle vein of Jewish Zealotism, consecrated in the legends of the old scribe Eleazar and of the Seven Brethren and their Mother,⁴ which had declared itself before the alternative violent vein had found vent in the militancy of the Maccabees, came into its own at last when Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai responded to the tremendous challenge of the fall of Jerusalem under the assaults of Titus's storming columns by endowing Jewry with an inertly rigid institutional framework and a passively obstinate psychological habitus that enabled it to preserve its distinctive communal life in the frail clay tenement of a politically impotent diaspora.⁵

Jewry, however, was not the only Syriac community, nor the Syriac Society the only Oriental Civilization, to be divided against itself into an Herodian and a Zealot camp by the challenge of having to react to the impact of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism in one way or other. The Maccabaeian-tempered Zealot insurrections of non-Jewish Syrian plantation-slaves in Sicily in the latter decades of the second century B.C.⁶ were balanced at Rome, in the ensuing Imperial Age, by the Herodian flow of a stream of Syriac freedmen-converts to Hellenism which was satirized by a contemporary spokesman of an Hellenic dominant minority, in a celebrated phrase, as a noisome and unnatural discharge of the Orontes into the Tiber.⁷ Conversely, the Herodianism of a more well-to-do and more sophisticated stratum of the Syriac Society, which an Hellenic dominant minority was prepared to take into social partnership with itself on terms of virtual equality, was balanced by the conscription of other Syriac higher religions, besides Judaism, for the spiritually irrelevant and desecrating Zealot fatigue duty of serving as instruments for the waging of a secular cultural warfare. Zoroastrianism,⁸ Nestorianism and Monophysitism,⁹ and Islam¹⁰ all, in turn, followed Judaism's lead in making this spiritually disastrous deviation from Religion's true path. Yet the last three of these perverted religious movements all eventually made some subsequent atonement for their Zealot aberration by the Herodian act of translating into their Syriac and Arabic liturgical languages the classical works of Hellenic philosophy and science; and the Oriental manuscripts which survived in twentieth-century Western libraries to bear witness to the Herodian

¹ 2 Kings x. 16.

² Psalm lxix. 9, quoted in John ii. 17. Cp. Psalm cxix. 139.

³ See V. v. 68.

⁴ 2 Macc. vi. 18-vii. 42, cited in V. v. 72.

⁵ See V. v. 75-76.

⁶ See V. v. 69-72 and V. vi. 238-9.

⁷ Juvenal: *Satires*, No. III, ll. 60-80, quoted in V. v. 67.

⁸ See V. v. 125-6 and 659-61.

⁹ See V. v. 127-8.

¹⁰ See V. v. 673-9.

life-work of these assiduous translators would count for more in a judicious historian's estimation than the legend that the Caliph 'Umar had given orders for the burning of the books in the library at Alexandria.¹

In this pharos from which, by 'Umar's day, an Hellenic intellectual light had been streaming out into an encompassing Oriental darkness for a thousand years, the way had been prepared for the Syriac intellectual Herodians of the 'Abbasid Age by a Jewish Philo² and a Christian Clement and Origen.³ And even a stubborn Iranian rear-guard of the Syriac World's anti-Hellenic battle-order, which was not called upon to face the fire of Hellenism at the murderously point-blank range at which this artillery was discharged against a devoted Jewish vanguard, had to suffer first the annoyance of seeing a militantly Zealot anti-Hellenic Zoroastrian Church's domestic competitor, Mithraism, take an Herodian path into a mission field in *partibus Hellenicis*, where Zoroastrianism had made itself too odious to gain an entry, and then the humiliation of seeing the Zoroastrian True Faith itself sacrilegiously 'processed' for export to the Hellenic World by the ingeniously Herodian-minded heresiarch Mani.⁴

When we turn to consider the reactions to Hellenism in the other Oriental societies that had shared the Syriac World's experience of being subdued by Hellenic arms in and after the generation of Alexander the Great, we find the outburst of Jewish Zealotism in Judaea in the fourth decade of the second century B.C. being anticipated in the last decade of the third century B.C. by a Zealot *émeute* in Egypt,⁵ while the swift failure of Joshua-Jason's audacious Herodian attempt to Hellenize the priesthood of the Temple of Yahweh at Jerusalem was balanced in the Egyptiac World by the eventual success of a gradual movement towards converting the metropoleis of the Egyptian nomes into simulacra of Hellenic municipalities which began with the enrolment of young native Egyptian notables as Hellenic gymnasiasts.⁶ In a post-Alexandrine Babylonia a dwindling band of astronomer-priests, who were fighting a losing battle to preserve a more and more esoteric native cultural heritage against an invading Syriac culture's progressive encroachments, were so zealously bent on eluding the contaminating touch of the Syriac aggressor who was delivering this frontal attack that they inadvertently leaned over backwards into an Herodian Philhellenism;⁷ and it was no accident that in a later act of this play with three dramatis personae a fossilized remnant of the Babylonian Society which had managed to keep its head above the encompassing Syriac flood-waters on an unsubmerged Mesopotamian islet at Harrān should have taken a hand in the intellectual conversion of the Syriac Society to Hellenism in the 'Abbasid Age.⁸ In an Indic World which had been forced into an intimate contact with Hellenism by the Bactrian Greek war-lord Demetrius's invasion of

¹ See V. vi. 111-12.

² See V. v. 366-7 and 539.

² See V. v. 539-40.

⁴ An appreciation of the respective relations in which Mithraism and Manichaeism stood to Hellenism has been offered in V. v. 575-8.

⁵ See V. v. 68.

⁶ See VI. vii. 50, and pp. 408 and 443-4, above.

⁷ See V. v. 94 and 123, n. 2.

⁸ The work of the Harrāni Thābit b. Qurra has been noticed on p. 408, n. 5, above.

the Mauryan Empire's domain *circa* 183 B.C., we can likewise observe symptoms of our two familiar alternative psychological reactions in the Herodian Philhellenism of a Mahayanian Buddhist religious art¹ and in the anti-Hellenic vein in a Zealot-minded Hinduism.

This survey of the psychological reactions in the societies which encountered an aggressive post-Alexandrine Hellenism would be incomplete if we failed to notice one figure whose attitude cannot be accounted for adequately unless we are prepared sometimes to find the Herodian and the Zealot nature both incarnate in the same person. Mithradates VI Eupator, the Iranian-descended king of a successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire on the Hittite soil of Pontic Cappadocia,² presented an attractively Herodian countenance to the eyes of European as well as Asiatic Hellenes who welcomed him in 88 B.C. as their deliverer from a barbarous Roman yoke; yet the same war-lord wore the opposite appearance of an anti-Hellenic Zealot to the Cyzicenes who closed their city's gates against him in 74 B.C. and greeted the Roman general Lucullus as their saviour from the doom of falling under the alien yoke of an Oriental despot. The cultural ambivalence of this North-East Anatolian actor on a post-Alexandrine Hellenic stage is reminiscent of the enigma presented, in the pre-Alexandrine chapter of the same Hellenic story, by a Ducetius³ who, after having made his name as the unsuccessfully gallant Zealot leader of his Sicel fellow barbarians in the last round of their losing battle against Hellenic imperialism, lived to return to Sicily from an exile in the heart of the Hellenic World on the Herodian errand of founding in his homeland a new commonwealth in which Greek colonists and Sicel natives were to fraternize with one another in virtue of the natives' voluntary adoption of the intruders' alien culture.

If we pass on now to glance at the psychological reactions manifested in the societies that encountered a Medieval Western Christendom, we shall find the most thorough-going practitioners of Herodianism known to History up to date in those *ci-devant* pagan Scandinavian barbarian invaders who, as a result of one of the earliest and most signal of all Western cultural victories, became the Norman exponents and propagators of a Medieval Western Christian way of life. The Normans proceeded to embrace not only the religion but the language and the poetry of the Romance-speaking Western Christian native population of the successor-state that they had carved for themselves out of a Gallic province of the Carolingian Empire. When the French-named Norman minstrel Taillefer lifted up his voice to inspire his fellow knights as they were riding into battle at Hastings, he did not recite to them the *Völsungasaga* in Norse but chanted to them the Song of Roland in French;⁴ and, before William the Norman Conqueror of England high-handedly promoted the growth of a nascent Western Christian Civilization by a military act of self-aggrandizement which brought a backward and isolated province of Western Christendom under the influence of the metropolitan culture of the West in the most progressive of its

¹ See V. v. 58 and 540.

² See V. vi. 235-6.

³ See V. v. 69.

⁴ See II. ii. 201.

contemporary versions, other Norman military adventurers had embarked on the enterprise of enlarging the bounds of the Western Christian World in the opposite quarter through conquests at the expense of Orthodox Christendom and Dār-al-Islām in Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily.

The readiness of the Scandinavians to divert their psychic energy from the creative task of building up a promisingly precocious civilization of their own to the Herodian pursuit of adopting some alien civilization over whose native representatives they had established their military ascendancy was displayed in the adhesion of Scandinavian converts to other cultures besides that of Western Christendom, and in the conversion, not only of a vanguard that had planted itself within the domains of the civilizations to whose attractions it succumbed, but also of a rear-guard that received these alien culture-rays either in some barbarian no-man's-land or in the Vikings' Scandinavian home. The adoption of the Western Christian Civilization by the Scandinavian settlers in Normandy and the Danelaw, the influence of Byzantine and Islamic art and institutions on the Norman conquerors of Sicily, and the tincture of Far Western Christian Celtic culture that was acquired by the Ostmen in Ireland, and by the Norse colonists in the Western Isles, Iceland, and Greenland, are not such remarkable exhibitions of Herodianism—remarkable though they are—as the eventual conversion of the Scandinavian communities in and beyond the Celtic Fringe and in Scandinavia itself to the Western Christian culture, or as the adoption of the Orthodox Christian culture by the Russian Scandinavian conquerors of Slav barbarians in the basins of the Dniepr and the Neva.¹

In the encounters between the representatives of a nascent Scandinavian Civilization and their culturally alien neighbours, this Herodian tide had no difficulty in sweeping off their feet the 'die-hard' Zealot champions of an indigenous Scandinavian culture, though this original creation of the Scandinavian genius had a value which was worth preserving and a charm which might have been expected to inspire a more enthusiastic defence, while the victorious alien cultures had no physical force of their own, beyond the right arms of their Scandinavian converts, to pit against the spiritually abashed but militarily undefeated Berserkers. When we turn to survey the psychological reactions evoked by the impact of Medieval Western Christendom on the Syriac World and on the main body and the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom, we find the balance between Zealotism and Herodianism rather less uneven here.

In the Syriac World a predominantly Zealot reaction against Medieval Western Christian aggression, which came to a head in an *union sacrée* of Dār-al-Islām against the lodgements made in Syria by the Crusaders,² was set off to some extent by the Norman-minded Herodianism of the Cilician Armenian Monophysite Christian converts to a contemporary Western Christian way of life. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom a likewise predominantly Zealot reaction expressed itself, as we have seen, in an execration of the Normans as 'Children of Hagar' and in a refusal to accept ecclesiastical union with the Western Christian

¹ These conversions of divers Scandinavian communities to divers alien cultures have been noticed in II. ii. 348-55.

² See V. v. 354, and pp. 353-6 above.

Church at the price of acknowledging the Papacy's supremacy over the Eastern Orthodox Churches, even though the manifest price of non-acceptance was the doom of falling under Ottoman Turkish Muslim rule; yet this demonically Zealot Orthodox Christian antipathy towards an aggressive sister Christian civilization was tempered, in a few East Roman hearts and minds, by an Herodian appreciation, not only of the expediency of an unpalatable ecclesiastical union, but of the nobility of the Western ideal of chivalry and the fertility of the audacious Western innovation of employing the currently spoken vulgar tongue as a vehicle for literature.¹

In the victorious revolt of Orthodox Christian Zealotism against an ecclesiastical union under Papal supremacy in accordance with the terms agreed at the Council of Florence in A.D. 1439, the Orthodox Church in Russia took the lead among the sundry national churches within the Orthodox communion in the resistance to Western ecclesiastical aggression, while the simultaneous Western political aggression against Russian Orthodox Christendom in the shape of sweeping Polish and Lithuanian conquests of derelict Russian territory, after the Mongols' catastrophic impact on Russia in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era had reduced her to military and political impotence, was countered in Muscovy by a political manifestation of Zealotism in the shape of an absolute authoritarian state in which an East Roman tradition and ideal of autocracy were re-embodied in new institutions that were original creations of the Russian political genius. Yet this Zealot seedling of Byzantine autocracy at Moscow, which had originally been called into existence as a windbreak against the icy blast of a Mongol Eurasian Nomad domination before being used to defend an unsubjugated remnant of Russian Orthodox Christendom against the predatory eastern marchmen of a Late Medieval Western Christian World, could not claim to be a more characteristic Russian response to the challenge of Western pressure in this age than the Herodian seedling of Medieval Western civic liberty which was bedded out contemporaneously at Novgorod.²

It is true that the *Gleichschaltung* of Novgorod's Western-inspired institutions and outlook, through the forcible incorporation of this *ci-devant* sovereign city-state into the dominions of a Muscovite 'Third Rome' in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, gave the Zealot answer a definitive victory over the Herodian answer to an insistent Western question in all parts of Holy Russia that had

¹ This contemporary Western example was the genial influence that encouraged the buried living waters of a rudimentary vernacular Greek literature to ooze up into the open through cracks in the ice-cap of a Byzantine classicism and to breed a native school of drama *alla Franca* in Crete in the course of the long-maintained Venetian political dominion over this Greek Orthodox Christian island (see pp. 392-4, above, and X. ix. 73-74).

² The voluntary entry of a Russian Orthodox Christian Novgorod into the commercial and cultural comity of a Medieval Western city-state cosmos is a more conspicuous, though more ephemeral, example of the cultural metamorphosis that is likewise exemplified in the history of the city-states founded on the coasts and adjoining waterways of Ireland by Ostmen who were kinsmen and contemporaries of Novgorod's original Scandinavian founders. In this context we may remind ourselves of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic city-state cosmos's success in winning the cultural allegiance of the colonial city-states founded by the Hellenes' Libyphoenician and Etruscan commercial and political rivals in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean.

succeeded in keeping themselves politically inviolate from the stain of subjection to an alien Western rule; yet, even after the fall of Novgorod, Herodianism maintained an ascendancy over Zealotism during the next three centuries in those Russian Orthodox Christian territories that had been incorporated into the Western Christian kingdoms of Poland and Lithuania. On the ecclesiastical plane this Herodian proclivity revealed itself in a widespread—though not unchallenged and never all-embracing—acceptance of union with the Roman Church, on the terms agreed in A.D. 1439, by the Polish and Lithuanian Crowns' *ci-devant* Orthodox Christian subjects;¹ on the secular cultural plane the same vein of Herodianism found expression in a spontaneous progressive self-Polonization of the Orthodox and Uniate White Russian and Ukrainian, as well as the Latin Catholic White Russian and Lithuanian, nobility and gentry in the dominions of a Polish-Lithuanian United Kingdom.

Our pair of antithetical psychological reactions can also be detected in the histories of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom's and a Hindu World's respective encounters with an aggressive Iranic Muslim Civilization.

In the main body of Orthodox Christendom under the *Pax Ottomanica*, a majority of the *ra'īyeh* belonging to the Millet-i-Rûm still clung to an ancestral religion whose ecclesiastical independence they had chosen to preserve at the price of submitting to an alien political régime; yet this Zealotism was partially offset, even on the religious plane, by the Herodianism of a minority who, from the fourteenth down to the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, were lured into apostasy from Christianity to Islam by tempting social advantages and dazzling political prizes that were the rich rewards for conversion to the religion of an Ottoman 'ascendancy'. A political ambition, that had sometimes prompted Orthodox Christian parents to welcome the conscription of their children into the Pādishāh's Slave-Household,² became a far stronger incentive to Herodianism in the hearts of Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte when, in the course of the seventeenth century, new exigencies created by the rising pressure of the Western Christian Powers upon the Ottoman Empire moved the Porte to create new-fangled high offices of state to be held by Orthodox Christian *ra'īyeh* without their being called upon either to renounce their ancestral faith or to forfeit their personal freedom.³ Meanwhile, the rank-and-file of the Millet-i-Rûm, who, short of becoming free Muslims or Ottoman public slaves, did not enter the Ottoman public service even as unconverted freemen, had long since

¹ This comparative success of the Uniate movement among the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Western Catholic Polish and Lithuanian Crowns, by contrast with its signal failure among the Orthodox Christian subjects of an Orthodox Christian East Roman Empire, was remarkable, considering that the Ukrainian and White Russian converts to Uniatism lacked the political incentive which, in Greek Orthodox Christendom, had moved a sagacious Michael Palaiológos to action as early as A.D. 1261 and had become so obviously urgent there by A.D. 1439 that it could then be ignored there only by a Zealot's wilfully blind eyes. In Greek Orthodox Christendom the choice was one between ecclesiastical union with Rome and subjection to an alien political yoke, whereas the converts to Uniatism among the Orthodox subjects of Poland and Lithuania could not imagine that they were purchasing their escape from a political calamity that had already long since overtaken them.

² See III. iii. 37, n. 1.

³ See II. ii. 224-5.

succumbed to Herodianism in much larger numbers in the more trivial, yet nevertheless significant, ways of learning to talk their Ottoman masters' language¹ and to ape their dress.

The story of the Hindus' psychological reaction to the rule of an Iranic Muslim 'ascendancy' runs on much the same lines. While a vast majority of the Hindu *ra'îyeh* of the Timurid Mughal Muslim emperors of India and their Afghan and Turkish Muslim forerunners emulated the Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* of the 'Osmanlis in zealously resisting the temptation presented by potent social and political inducements to apostatize, there were local mass-conversions to Islam—particularly among the socially depressed *ci-devant* pagan converts to Hinduism in Eastern Bengal—that would appear to have been on a greater scale, not only absolutely but also relatively to the total head of population in question in either case, than the corresponding local mass-conversions to Islam among the Albanian, the Epirot and Cretan Greek, and the Pomak Bulgar Orthodox Christians and among the Bosniak Bogomils. Moreover, the Brahmans showed the same alacrity as the Phanariots in entering a Muslim Power's public service as unconverted freemen, and the same facility in adopting their Muslim masters' language² and dress.

The history of an Iranic Muslim Society's impact on the Orthodox Christian and Hindu worlds also offers us two examples of psychological ambivalence. The new religions founded by Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dîn Simâvî in a fifteenth-century Western Anatolia³ and by Guru Nanak in a fifteenth-century Panjab⁴ were ostensibly expressions of a radical Herodianism; for both prophets proclaimed the fraternity and equality, on their own new common spiritual ground, of all their converts, whatever their divers religious antecedents; and the common ground on which, according to Nanak's revelation, the traditional divisions between Hindus and Muslims and between members of different Hindu castes were no longer valid was an article of Nanak's faith that was not of Hindu but of Islamic provenance. Like all converts to Islam, all converts to Sikhism became one another's brethren and peers in virtue of their having all alike given their allegiance to one Lord whom they had been taught to worship as the sole True Living God; and this tenet was so fundamental that Sikhism might be described with no less truth than brevity as an Herodian response to the impact of an Islamic monotheism upon the Hindu consciousness. Yet these intellectually convincing grounds for classifying Sikhism and Bedreddinism as expressions of Herodianism would have seemed academically irrelevant to the Mughal Emperors Jahangîr and Awrangzîb, and to the Ottoman Emperor Mehmed I, when they were encountering their Sikh and Bedreddinî *ra'îyeh* on the battlefield in armed rebellion against an Islamic 'ascendancy'; and, if these Iranic Muslim potentates had been required to employ the psychological terminology of this Study, we may feel sure that they would have entered the names of Har Govind, Govind Singh, Bedr-ed-Dîn, and Mustafâ Börklüje in the Zealot, not the Herodian, column of our present inventory.

¹ See V. v. 514-22.

² See V. v. 111 and 537.

³ See V. v. 514-22.

⁴ See V. v. 106 and 665-8.

When we come to the encounters with the Modern Western Civilization which had overtaken all the contemporaries of this potently expansive society, we see the offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in Japan reacting to the impact of the West with vigour along both the two alternative lines.

The strength of the Herodian current in Japan was demonstrated more impressively by its persistence in adversity than by its exuberance before it fell on evil days. The eager curiosity that inspired a facile adoption of the Western weapons, dress,¹ and religion imported by Portuguese traders and missionaries during the honeymoon period, when Japan was making her first acquaintance with the West in the latter decades of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, was justified by the silent heroism of this dubious wisdom's children² when, after the Tokugawa régime had ordered its subjects, under pain of death as the penalty for disobedience, to break off relations with the West and to renounce the imported Western religion,³ a remnant of Japanese crypto-Christians remained secretly loyal to their proscribed alien faith for more than two hundred years—as became apparent when, after the Meiji Revolution in A.D. 1868, it became possible for them at last, in the ninth or tenth generation, to come out into the open again.

This second outburst of Herodianism in Japan in the middle decades of the nineteenth century was also, as we have seen, partly the work of other heroes who had risked and lost their lives in a non-religious Herodian cause by secretly studying Modern Western Science in a Dutch medium without waiting for the fall of an intolerantly Zealot-minded Tokugawa Shogunate. In the rediscovered light of these long-hidden candles⁴ the Meiji Revolution in its day looked like a deferred but definitive triumph of an Herodianism which had been the predominant vein in the original Japanese response to the challenge of the West; yet, in this second bout, as in the first, the experience of half a century was to put a Zealot face on the reality behind Herodian first appearances—with the implication, for an historian's long-sighted eye, that the Tokugawa period, in which Zealotism had been in the ascendant, had, after all, been something more than an irrelevant interlude in a Japanese psychological drama in which Herodianism was the 'secular' trend (in the economists' technical use of the word).

The strength of the Zealot current in Japan had been indicated from the outset by the assiduity with which the Japanese had equipped themselves for holding their own against the formidable Western strangers by the ostensibly Herodian feat of learning how to make, as well as use, new-fangled Western fire-arms; and it was significant that the Tokugawa Government, when it set itself to sever relations between Japan and the West, cannily refrained from following up its veto on Western commodities and Western religion by renouncing the employment of Western weapons. This statesmanlike disregard for logic was justified by the sequel; for the Tokugawa eventually forfeited a political ascendancy founded on military force when their military impotence to prevent

¹ See V. vi. 102.

² See V. v. 365.

³ Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 35.

⁴ Matt. v. 15; Mark iv. 21; Luke viii. 16 and xi. 33.

Commodore Perry's squadron from entering Yedo Bay in A.D. 1853 made it alarmingly manifest to the Japanese public that, in the course of 215 years of deliberate self-isolation, the Bakufu had allowed its stationary seventeenth-century Western armaments to be left so far behind by the never-ceasing and ever-accelerating progress of Western military technique that the régime had at last become altogether incompetent to live up to its acknowledged *raison d'être* of keeping the West at arm's length from the sacrosanct Land of the Gods. Between A.D. 1853 and A.D. 1868 this public zeal in Japan for an effective fulfilment of the Tokugawa's neglected Zealot mission displayed itself not only in a growing insubordination towards the authority of this now discredited indigenous régime but in a rising wave of xenophobia, foaming over into physical assaults, against Western intruders whom, in the meanwhile, the Bakufu had been constrained by Western political pressure to readmit within its precincts; and the revolution in which a thus patently irreclaimable Tokugawa régime was ruthlessly liquidated was the work of descendants of Kyushuan pupils of the Portuguese who had made up their minds to repeat their sixteenth-century ancestors' achievement of mastering Destiny by acquiring the superior military technique of the West in its most up-to-date form.

While this Japanese revolution can be presented as a triumph for Herodianism in the accurate statements that its economic programme was a thorough-going adoption of the material technique of the contemporary Western World and that its political programme was the entry of Japan into the contemporary Western comity of nations, the same revolution can be presented simultaneously as a triumph for Zealotism in the likewise accurate statements that the intention inspiring the technological revolution was to turn Japan into a Great Power of the contemporary Western standard, and that she was resigning herself to the necessity of entering the arena of Western power politics because she had come to realize that this was the only condition on which she could continue to hold her own against the West on the face of a planet that had now been magnetized by Western arts into a single indivisible field of force. The latent Zealotism of the strategy behind the Herodianism of Japan's tactics during the three-quarters of a century ending in A.D. 1945 was indeed divulged as early as A.D. 1882 in the official organization of the State Shintō, in which a resuscitated pre-Buddhaic paganism¹ was utilized as a vehicle for the deification of a living Japanese people, community, and state through the symbolism of an archaic cult of an Imperial Dynasty that was reputed to be the divine offspring of the Sun

¹ The origins of this archaistic Neo-Shintō movement can be traced back to the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, and its antecedents to the fifteenth century (see V. vi. 90, with n. 4). It was always suspect to the Tokugawa on account of its potentialities for serving as the ideology for an alternative régime based on a revival of the latent prestige of the Imperial Dynasty (see *ibid.*, p. 91, n. 3). The Tokugawa régime had sought to parry this threat to its stability by patronizing rival religions and philosophical movements. It had favoured the Mahāyāna and had encouraged an archaistic revival, not of Shintō, but of Confucianism (see *ibid.*, pp. 90-91, and Murdoch, J.: *A History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), p. 97). In promoting the propagation in Japan of a Neoconfucian Movement that had originated in contemporary China, the Bakufu was employing Herodian tactics for attaining its Zealot strategic objective.

Goddess and that offered its hereditary collective divinity for worship here and now in the epiphany of a god perpetually incarnate in the person of the reigning Emperor.¹

It will be seen that, during the four hundred years ending in A.D. 1952, the Japanese psychological reaction to the ordeal of encountering the West had been ambivalent through and through.

The ultimately Zealot motive underlying a superficially Herodian-looking policy that has here been ascribed to the Japanese in and after the Meiji Revolution of A.D. 1868 was ascribed to the contemporary Chinese, on the morrow of the consummation of the Kuomintang Revolution in China in the third decade of the twentieth century, by a learned and acute student of Far Eastern history who was inclined at that date to take current Japanese Herodianism at its face value, or at any rate to judge that the latter-day Japanese importers of Western cultural wares were deceiving themselves in so far as they seriously expected to succeed, by the sophisticated means of a nicely calculated and strictly regulated dole of cultural rations, in eluding our empirically established social 'law' that, when once a society's defences have been penetrated by the radiation of an intrusive alien culture, 'one thing leads to another' inexorably until, willy nilly, the assaulted party has to resign himself to adopting the assailant's way of life *in toto*.

'The first approach of the West was resisted in Japan, as in China; but, when Perry demonstrated that the West "amounted to something", the effect approximated to a revelation, and was so accepted. . . . It is China, on the contrary, which has endeavoured to use the weapons of the West to preserve itself from the West. . . . The whole history of Chinese relations with the West implies an underlying instinctive playing for time, in the hope that the West would exhaust itself and China be able to assert once more the superiority of which the Chinese are morally convinced.'²

Twenty years after the publication of the book from which these passages are quoted, at a moment when Japan was under Western military occupation and China was under the rule of an indigenous Communist régime, it was manifestly rash to make a more than tentative and provisional estimate of the 'secular' psychological trend in either of these two provinces of the Far Eastern World; but it was nevertheless possible to observe unmistakable symptoms of both Herodianism and Zealotism in this episode of Chinese history, and also to notice certain likenesses and differences between the Chinese and the corresponding Japanese episode in respect of both the interplay and the relative strengths of the two alternative reactions.

The light-hearted adoption of current Western fashions by late-sixteenth-century and early-seventeenth-century Japanese barons and their retainers had its counterpart in the frivolous curiosity in regard to astronomical instruments and other toys of Modern Western Science that the Jesuit guests at the Imperial Court in Peking had the wit to arouse in the minds of Ming and Manchu emperors and Confucian literati; yet

¹ See V. v. 707, n. 2, and V. vi. 93.

² Lattimore, O.: *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 85-88.

in China, as in Japan, the interest in Western fire-arms was both more serious and more sinister; and in China, as in Japan, again, adversity, in the severe form of official persecution, demonstrated the sincerity of the Herodianism of converts who became martyrs to their alien Christian faith,¹ while the eventual obsolescence of the ban on the profession of Christianity brought to light the persistence of Herodianism on the religious plane in China likewise when a fresh harvest of converts was reaped there by nineteenth-century successors of the proscribed Early Modern Western Christian missionaries.

This second wave of Herodianism was transmitted, in China too, from the religious plane, on which it first made its reappearance, to the secular planes of education and business. Mission-educated Chinese converts to Protestantism completed their studies in the universities of the United States, and penurious Chinese emigrants established themselves in force as efficient and prosperous Westernizing business men in a number of South-East Asian countries—the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Indo-China, and Burma—that had fallen under Western rule and had in consequence been incorporated into a Westernizing World on the economic plane as well as the political.² This Chinese commercial diasporá, as well as the Chinese *alumni* of Western educational campuses on both Chinese and Western ground, had played a part, out of proportion to their numbers, in an Herodian political movement—Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang—which had attempted in the second quarter of the twentieth century of the Christian Era to emulate the achievement of the Japanese authors of a Meiji Revolution who had succeeded in obtaining admittance for their country into the contemporary comity of Western states on a footing of equality with the original members of the club.

On the other hand, a Zealotism that had gained the upper hand in Japan eventually—in the fourth decade of the seventeenth century—had declared itself in China promptly at the beginning of the history of Chinese intercourse with the West. Ming emperors who had welcomed Western apostles of Christianity to their imperial capital had anticipated the Tokugawa Government's tardy precaution of confining the Dutch remnant of a Western commercial community in Japan to the islet of Deshima; for the Chinese imperial authorities had never permitted Western traders of any nation to reside on Chinese soil outside the confines of the Portuguese settlement at Macao and the mudbank of Shamen in the West River off the water-front at Canton, which was made to serve the purpose of a convict hulk for the internment of Western traders of all nations during their strictly limited and regulated seasonal visits. Even after the jealously locked, barred, and bolted gates of a Chinese Earthly Paradise had been blown in by British naval broadsides in the Sino-British 'Opium War' of A.D. 1839-42, a humiliatingly defeated Chinese Government still managed, in the ensuing peace settlement, to prevent the now inevitable enlargement of the resident Western

¹ The Battle of the Rites and its tragic outcome have been noticed in V. v. 366-7 and 539.

² The Chinese diasporá in Siam should be added to this list, notwithstanding Siam's success in preserving her political independence down to the time of writing.

traders' 'pale' from being extended beyond half a dozen specified 'treaty ports'. Missionaries of the Christian religion were the only Westerners who were then granted the privilege of travelling and residing at will throughout the length and breadth of Chinese territory; and the progressive increase in the number of Western treaty ports and in the weight of Western influence in China in the course of the last six decades of the nineteenth century provoked a cumulative resentment in Chinese hearts which culminated in demonic eruptions of militant xenophobia.

The Boxer Rising of A.D. 1900, like the sporadic outbreaks of Zealotism in Japan during the years A.D. 1853-68, was directed in the first place against a decadent indigenous régime whose dubious title to legitimacy was now challenged on the score of its manifest incompetence to resist the encroachments of Western intruders who were the rebels' ultimate target. An incurable inability to carry out the Zealots' anti-Western requirements was the offence that cost the Manchu imperial régime in China its life in A.D. 1911, as it had been the cause of the Tokugawa Shogunate's downfall in Japan in A.D. 1867-8. The Manchu Dynasty's doom had been sealed by its supreme and unpardonable offence of having owed its reprieve, eleven years back, to the bayonets of the alien international expeditionary force that had raised the Boxers' siege of the Legation Quarter in Peking; and the execution done by the Western sword with which the Boxers had perished¹ in A.D. 1900, and the T'ai-p'ing before them in A.D. 1864,² like those militant Jewish followers of Theudas and Judas who had once ventured to try conclusions with the Romans,³ did not deter a third generation of Chinese Zealots in A.D. 1925 from rushing into a fresh campaign of militancy which, in the teeth of all the forbidding precedents, was to justify itself by its success in bringing about the progressive abolition of 'the Unequal Treaties'.

Moreover, the ambivalence which we have found pervading all phases and aspects of the Japanese psychological reaction to the impact of the Modern West was discernible in the Chinese arena likewise in at least two movements. We have just now classified the T'ai-p'ing as a Zealot revolt against a semi-alien Manchu imperial régime which, in Zealot Chinese eyes, had forfeited any mandate to which it might have been able to claim title through its failure to prevent the unceremonious pioneers of a wholly alien Western World from breaking their way into the Middle Kingdom's sacrosanct precincts by force of arms. But such an account of the T'ai-p'ing would be misleadingly incomplete if we did not go on to remind ourselves that the inspiration of its founder Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's mountain-moving faith had come, not from the Confucian Classics, which he had studied without showing the ability required to qualify as a litteratus, but from tracts compiled by a Chinese convert of a Protestant Western Christian missionary;⁴ and the Western manufacture of the spring that thus released this Chinese prophet-pretender's

¹ Matt. xxvi. 52.

² A Manchu régime whose old-fashioned troops had signally failed to suppress the T'ai-p'ing had owed its salvation in this crisis to a new-model force organized and led for it by a Western mercenary soldier who consequently came to be known among his compatriots as 'Chinese Gordon'.

³ Acts. v. 36-37.

⁴ See V. v. 107, n. 1.

energies requires us to enter his name in the Herodian column of our inventory as well.

This recourse to the device of double entry was also the only adequate method of classifying the more recent phenomenon of Chinese Communism; for, while this movement, too, had an indisputable claim to a place in the Zealot column on the score of its implacable enmity towards its Herodian contemporary and rival the Kuomintang, the subtly pervasive taint of Herodianism also betrayed itself in the war-gear of a Chinese anti-Western movement that had borrowed the ideology of Communism from a Russian armoury; for Russia was not herself the artificer of the Marxian thunderbolt, but had imported this ideological weapon for her own use from the forge of a nineteenth-century Western heresiarch before re-exporting it to China for employment on the local anti-Western front in a 'cold war' that was then coming to be waged on an oecumenical scale.

In the psychological reactions of the pre-Columbian civilizations in the Americas to the appalling advent of militarily irresistible aggressors from a previously quite unheard-of and all but undreamed-of alien world overseas, the Zealot heroism of the Inca 'die-hards', who held out in an Andean mountain-fastness for thirty years after the Empire of the Four Quarters had fallen before the horse-hoofs and the fire-arms of the Spanish *conquistadores*,¹ flared up again, more than three hundred years later, in the insurrection of a pretender to the tragically inspiring name of Tupac Amaru in A.D. 1780-3;² but this vein of Zealotism in an overwhelmed Andean cosmos was balanced in the original Tupac Amaru's generation, on the morrow of the conquest, by the Herodianism of half-breed children of Spanish *conquistadores* and Inca mothers. The work of the half-breed Jesuit Father Blas Valera perished in manuscript, before publication, in the siege of Cadiz by the English in A.D. 1596,³ but the work of his fellow half-breed Garcilaso de la Vega⁴ (*vivebat* A.D. 1540-1616) was preserved to be the principal repertory of the Incas' traditions about themselves in the libraries of these Andean empire-builders' Western supplanters. This soldier-historian had gathered his ancestral traditions in his Quichuan mother-tongue from the survivors of the last generation of antediluvian Inca grandes before he left his Andean fatherland for ever at the age of twenty to serve on European battlefields as an officer in the Spanish Army; but he survived thirty years of military service to set down on paper in Castilian at Cordova in his riper years the oral information that he had garnered in Quichuan at Cuzco in his boyhood.

This evanescent Herodianism of a handful of half-breeds belonging to a single generation in the sixteenth century is a less impressive instance of the Herodian psychological reaction in the Andean World than the subsequent miracle of the adoption of the current Western Civilization in a Catholic Christian medium by the Guaraní transfrontier barbarians

¹ See V. vi. 213.

² See I. i. 120, n. 1.

³ See Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 12, n. 3.

⁴ A note of Garcilaso de la Vega's career will be found *ibid.*, p. 12.

in Paraguay *en masse*. In the Paraguayan 'reductions' the spell-binding charm of the Jesuits' Orphean music worked the magic of securing a truce to the ferocity which these Western Christian culture-heroes' temporarily docile Guaraní converts, pupils, and protégés had displayed, before this interlude, as barbarian invaders of the Andean World, and which they were to display again as cannon-fodder in the international and civil wars of the Latin-American successor-states of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires. This summer of unwonted peace and prosperity between two bouts of frantic militarism lasted in Paraguay for the best part of two centuries (*circa* A.D. 1580-1773) and was terminated only by the Spanish Crown's wanton crime of liquidating an idyllic hierocracy.¹

When we turn our eyes from the Andes to Central America, we find there an illustration of the Herodian reaction in the readiness with which a subjugated indigenous peasantry in the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain embraced a version of a Tridentine Catholic Christianity in which the natives' Castilian religious instructors discreetly overlooked the infusion of a reassuring alloy of their converts' pristine paganism. On the northern fringes of the same Mexic World the antithetical ethos of Zealotism displayed itself in the gentle persistence with which an indigenous religion and way of life were treasured by the Pueblo and other agricultural sedentary communities that had been ceded by the Republic of Mexico to the United States in A.D. 1848; while, still farther afield, among the Nomadic hunting tribes of North America, the same Zealot spirit gave birth to new indigenous religions² under the agonizing ordeal of an assault by which these most unhappy of all American victims of aggression from overseas were being deprived, not merely of political freedom, but of the possibility of continuing to lead an ancestral way of life that had depended on a freedom to range over their now stolen hunting grounds.³

In the psychological reactions in the Central American World we also find examples of the phenomenon of ambivalence. The revolution that broke out in Mexico in A.D. 1910 might look, on the surface, like a social conflict in which the line of division between the combatant parties conformed to the conventional Western pattern of the day; yet a more penetrating eye would discern that these Mexican laymen, peasants, and workers in revolt against prelates, landlords, and employers who were largely of West European and North American provenance were also Zealot champions of a submerged Mexic culture against the ascendancy of an alien civilization that had originated in the Old World. In a neighbouring section of the same continent in an earlier generation the savage military resistance offered to the encroachments of White Men from overseas by Apaches, Comanches, and other Indian denizens of the Great Plains who had learnt from their assailants the Eurasian art of

¹ For the work of the Jesuits in Paraguay, see Cunninghame Graham, R. B.: *A Vanished Arcadia*, 2nd ed. (London 1924, Heinemann), and O'Neill, G.: *Golden Years on the Paraguay* (London 1934, Burns, Oates, & Washbourne).

² See V. v. 328-32.

³ The contrast in ethos between the Plains Indians and the Pueblos is brought out by Ruth Benedict in *Patterns of Culture* (Cambridge, Mass. 1931, The Riverside Press), pp. 78-95. The resistance of the Plains Indians is examined on pp. 630-50, below.

horsemanship was likewise impossible to describe adequately without calling these fierce warriors both Zealots, in virtue of their recalcitrance to their White executioners' lethal designs, and Herodians, in virtue of their receptivity in borrowing from their adversaries an imported animate weapon which was providentially apt for use in a hitherto horseless 'Centaur's' paradise'.

In the psychological reactions of the Jewish fossil of an extinct Syriac Civilization to an encompassing and oppressive Western Christendom among which this Jewry was dispersed, we shall find a classical illustration of Zealotism in the meticulous observance of the Mosaic Law by orthodox Jews who had faithfully followed Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's admonitions to seek in the practice of this social drill their palladium for preserving their distinctive communal identity in diaspora; and in the same field we shall also find a classical illustration of Herodianism in the whole-heartedness and the virtuosity with which all the Jews in the West—Ritualists, Liberals, and Zionists alike—participated in the secular activities of the Western Gentile World on the economic plane.

In a Late Modern Western World in which the walls of the ghetto had fallen at the sound of a Revolutionary French trumpet, a latter-day Liberal School of Jews seized the opening thus offered to them for carrying their Herodianism beyond the economic plane on to the political and the personal. When once the pungent elixir of Rabbinical Judaism had been volatilized in the Jewish Liberal's Late Modern Western intellectual crucible to a degree of insipidity at which a Jewish citizen of the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, or the United States could be described as 'a Dutchman, Frenchman, Englishman, or American of Jewish religion' not less accurately than his Gentile fellow Liberal and fellow countryman could be given the corresponding label of a Dutchman or what-not of such-and-such a Christian denomination, it became comparatively easy, in the intellectual and emotional environment of an ex-Christian Liberal World, for latter-day Jewish Herodians to carry the process of assimilation to the further stage of abandoning even their formal membership in a Jewish community and intermarrying with neighbours and fellow citizens of Gentile origin. What sense was there, for a Liberal's rational mind, in a Mosaic ban that debarred Jews from *connubium* with Gentiles with whom all Jews in diaspora must always practise *commercium* in order to earn their daily bread?

The effort of breaking with traditional Jewish habit and prejudice which was entailed in such a defiance of a Mosaic tabu on mixed marriages might come easiest when the parties could meet and mate on a common ground of ex-Jewish and ex-Christian religious agnosticism; but an ex-Jew who had gone that far would no longer find it very difficult to pay a tribute to conventionality at a cheap rate by submitting to the formality of a baptism that would purchase for him a nominal membership in one of the less unfashionable of the Christian churches of the day. The anti-clockwise pilgrim's progress of the Jewish Herodian in a Late Modern Western World had illustrated the facility with which 'one thing leads to another' by going to these lengths before an outraged Moses was vindicated and avenged by a maniac Hitler who provided

himself with pariahs for penalization *more Visigothico* by routing out these 'non-Aryans' from the Gentile communities into which they had passed so adroitly, in order to thrust them back against their will into their deliberately abandoned invidious traditional role of being 'a peculiar people'.

At the time of writing on the morrow of a Second World War, both the Herodian 'non-Aryan' and the Zealot Ritualist survivors of the Jewish diaspora in the Western World had lost the lead in a Western Jewry to a Zionist movement that differed from both these other diasporan reactions alike in displaying an ambivalent affinity with both of them simultaneously.¹

The Zionists' deliberate and enthusiastic recultivation of a distinctively separate Jewish consciousness stamped them with the authentic hall-mark of Zealotism. Yet these Zionist Neo-Zealots were anathema to diasporan devotees of the Ritualistic Zealot tradition inaugurated by Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai, in whose eyes the Zionists were guilty of flagrant impiety in presuming to bring about on their own initiative a physical return of the Jewish people to Palestine which it was God's prerogative to accomplish at His own good time according to *Agudath Israel's* hyper-orthodox belief. And, even when the Zionists had partially attained their objective *manu militari*, the Jewish Ritualists' joy at having lived to see the Mosaic Law reconstituted in a reconquered Eretz Israel must have been damped by the observation—to which no sharp-sighted lover of this Law could blind himself—that the Zionists had been moved to re-enact the Torah by the same cynical motive of making religious formalities serve secular purposes as had animated the 'non-Aryan' candidates for Christian baptism.

On the other hand, in the Assimilationist Jews' estimation, the Zionists' Herodian loss of their ancestral Jewish faith was a common experience that did not avail to atone for a Zealot vein in Zionism which, in the Assimilationists' eyes, was deplorably retrograde. The Assimilationists could not bear the Zionists' relapse into their common ancestors' irrational Zealot belief that the Jews were 'a peculiar people'. Yet an orthodox Jewish polemical theologian, or even a neutral Gentile scientific observer, who chose to charge the Zionists with being guilty of the same crime of 'Assimilationism' as those avowed Assimilationists who gloried in the name, would not have found it difficult to secure a conviction.

The truth was that, while the professed Assimilationists were seeking to assimilate themselves individually to their individual Gentile neighbours, the Zionists were unavowedly aiming at the same objective of assimilation in the more radical form of a corporate transformation of the Jewish community into the likeness of 'all the nations'² of a Western or Westernizing World in which a latter-day Jewry found itself living. The Zionist prisoner in the dock would, no doubt, protest that his aim, in parting company with the non-violent Jewish Zealots of Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's school, was not to arrive by a better alternative road at the goal of assimilation which was his Liberal Jewish contemporary's Herodian

¹ See II. ii. 252-4.

² 1 Sam. viii. 5 and 20.

objective, but was, on the contrary, to reinvigorate a tame non-violent rendering of the theme of Jewish Zealotism by reverting to the militancy of those Theudas and Judases who had come so promisingly near to success in the glorious years A.D. 66-70, 115-17, and 132-5.¹ But, even if this hypothetical plea of our imaginary Zionist defendant had not been open in A.D. 1952 to being impugned by a damningly odious comparison of it with the speculations of some irreclaimable contemporary German chauvinist on Germany's chances in a third world war, it would have been confuted by the evidence of the historic *sicarii* themselves, if Jewish Zealots of the classical period could have been raised from the dead to be placed in the witness-box by the counsel for the prosecution.

We may be sure that these inexpugnably authoritative witnesses, so far from being grateful to the Zionist in the dock for having cited them as his revered exemplars, would have scornfully dissociated themselves from him after pointing out to the Court that the Zionist's ideology did not vindicate but bewrayed him. In basing the Jewish people's title to the soil of Eretz Israel on the physical ground that they were a master race in virtue of having Abraham for their father,² the Zionist was unwittingly testifying that he had been ensnared by the lure of a post-Modern Western Gentile Racialism in which a Late Modern Western Gentile Nationalism had denounced itself, through the self-exposure of a self-caricature, as being the naked Neo-Paganism that it was. In pursuit of this inveterate Gentile idolatry in the particularly sinister form of Man's self-worship of a human herd, the Zionist Jewish addict to a pagan cult of 'blood and soil' had abandoned his fathers' faith that the Jews were a chosen people in virtue of God's grace in having condescended to make a covenant with Abraham and his seed in which the Lord's choice of Israel was conditional upon Israel's continuing to obey the Lord's commandments. In thus leaving God's will and Israel's conduct out of his reckoning, the Zionist was parting with the spiritual ground which was the only sure basis for the Jews' title to the soil of the Holy Land just because this orthodox version of the traditional Jewish faith compelled the faithful who adhered to it to recognize, with fear and trembling, that their privilege was contingent upon their keeping faith with their Maker and Chooser. What surer way of losing Jewry's title could the Zionists have devised than to deviate, in the blindness of a pagan hybris, into the delusion that a revocable grant from Almighty God was an inalienable birthright automatically transmitted through the physical medium of an Abrahamic blood-stream?

It will be seen that Zionism betrayed its ambivalence by laying itself open to simultaneous charges of Herodianism and Zealotism which, unfortunately for the Zionists, did not cancel one another out.

The psychological reactions in the Islamic World to the aggression of a Late Modern Western Civilization were strikingly reminiscent of the reactions to Hellenic aggression in Jewry during the two centuries ending in A.D. 135.

The insurrections of Jewish militant fanatics embattled on the desert fringes of Palestine against Idumaeen tetrarchs and Roman procurators

¹ See V. v. 68.

² Matt. iii. 9.

who had been invested by Caesar with the stewardship of the former dominions of Herod the Great had their counterpart in the fanatical outbreaks of the Wahhābī, Idrīsī, Mahdist, and Sanūsī Muslim puritans¹ who sallied out of their fastnesses in the Najd, 'Asīr, Kordofan, and the desert hinterland of Cyrenaica on the forlorn hope of overthrowing an Ottoman régime which, in their censorious eyes, had proved itself unworthy of its pretension to be the heir of the Caliphate. As these Islamic Zealots saw it, the Pādishāh had aggravated a heinous first offence of losing the military and political initiative to his infidel Western adversaries by committing the unpardonable second offence of allowing the Ottoman body politic to become a channel for the infection of the heart of Dār-al-Islām with the triumphant infidel's contaminating influence. In this light, nineteenth-century Ottoman sultans and pashas cut the same odious figure as the Herods and Pilates had once cut in the sight of leaders of a Zealot Jewish resistance movement; and the lamentable spectacle of the Theudases and Judases falling suicidally upon devouring Roman swords was duly reproduced in the execution done by Modern Western weapons when the Najdī Wahhābīs were smitten by Ibrāhīm Pasha, the Sudanese Mahdists by Kitchener,² the Libyan Sanūsīs by Graziani,³ and the Maghribī patriot leaders, an 'Abd-al-Qādir in Algeria and an 'Abd-al-Karīm in the Moroccan Rif,⁴ by Bugeaud⁵ and by Boichut. Only the Pathan highlanders⁶ in an East Iranian no-man's-land between a now independent Pakistan and a still independent Afghanistan had succeeded, down to the time of writing, in emulating in a latter-day Dār-al-Islām the Arsacids' and Sasanids' feat of thwarting all Roman attempts to recapture for Hellenism an 'Irāq and a Western Iran that Arsacid arms had salvaged for Zoroastrianism from the Hellenic domination of the Romans' Seleucid predecessors.

These latter-day Islamic reproductions of Zealot Jewish prototypes were balanced, in the same chapter of Islamic history, by avatars of the Herodians' eponymous Idumaeen hero, the great son of Antipater himself, in the titanic Herodian figures of a Mehmed 'Alī Pasha (thrown into relief by his reactionary grandson and successor 'Abbās I), a Sultan Mahmūd II, and a Ghāzi Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk who, in his own lifetime, was successfully imitated in Persia by a Rizā Shāh Pahlawī and was unsuccessfully parodied in Afghanistan by an Amānallāh;⁷ and we have already observed that Rizā Shāh's and Atatürk's radical Herodian reforms⁸ had been anticipated by an abortive Westernizing revolution in Persia in A.D. 1906 and in Turkey in A.D. 1908.⁹

¹ See V. v. 294-5 and 324, and V. vi. 227.

² See Theobald, A. B.: *The Mahdiyya, A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899* (London 1951, Longmans, Green); Trimmingham, J. S.: *Islam in the Sudan* (London 1949, Oxford University Press).

³ An account of the warfare in Libya between the Sanūsīs and the Italians during the years A.D. 1911-32 will be found in Evans-Pritchard, E. E.: *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford 1949, University Press), chaps. 5-7.

⁴ See V. vi. 227.

⁵ 'Abd-al-Qādir's surrender was actually received by Bugeaud's lieutenant Lamoignon.

⁶ See V. v. 305-8 and 332-3, and V. vi. 228.

⁷ See V. v. 333.

⁸ The imposition of Western dress in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan has been noticed in V. vi. 102-3, and the imposition of the Latin Alphabet in Turkey *ibid.*, on pp. 112-13.

⁹ The temporarily successful constitutionalist revolution in Turkey in A.D. 1908 was,

On the other hand the Islamic Society may be credited with originality in having given birth to two nobly tragic martyrs to Herodianism in the persons of an imaginatively prescient Sultan Selim III and a beneficently efficient Midhat Pasha, while the doubtful honour of producing such oddly compounded monsters as Zealot-drones, for which it might be hard to find a precedent in Syriac history, was shared by the Islamic Society with the Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom, where the massacre of the Janissaries by Selim III's cousin and avenger Mahmūd II, and the massacre of the Mamlūks by Mehmed 'Alī, had been anticipated in the massacre of the Streltsy by Peter the Great.

There was, however, a residual tinge of Zealotism even in Mehmed 'Alī's aggressively Herodian *éthos*,¹ and in the writer's day the Islamic World had produced an unmistakably ambivalent culture-hero in the kingly person of an 'Abd-al-'Azīz b. 'Abd-ar-Rahmān Āl Sa'ūd,² the restorer of the fortunes of his house and sect who proved himself a successor of his Wāhhābī Zealot forebears when he purged the Haramayn in the Hijāz of the taint of idolatrous corruption after his conquest and annexation of the Islamic Holy Land, but went on to prove himself also a successor of those same primitive Wāhhābī Zealots' Herodian Ottoman bugbears when he set himself to consolidate the political independence of a salvaged Arabia by coaxing his turbulent and fanatical tribesmen to exchange the nomadic shepherd's leisure for the labours of a sedentary husbandry in oases whose productivity Ibn Sa'ūd did not hesitate to multiply by resorting to the unhallowed Western technique of boring artesian wells. When the Badu had thus been broken in to an Herodian revolution in their way of life, it was less difficult for their Janus-faced patriarch to provide himself with the financial sinews of war or welfare by earning royalties from leases granted, with his now semi-domesticated Badawī subjects' acquiescence, to American *entrepreneurs* who were thirsting to tap the liquid mineral wealth of an Arabian desert's subsoil by probing it, not now for water, but for oil.

In the reaction to the West in the Hindu World the Islamic Zealotism of Wāhhābī, Idrīsī, Mahdist, and Sanūsī puritans had its psychological counterpart in a Zealot revival of an orgiastic Kali-worship and recultivation of a desiccated Vedic lore, while the Brahmans' Zealot-minded anxiety to elude the ritual contamination that they would have incurred through eating and drinking in the company of their British 'fellow

as we have seen, the work of a 'New 'Osmanli' movement which had made its first abortive attempt to turn the Ottoman Empire into a parliamentary constitutional state *alla Franca* as early as the third quarter of the nineteenth century. A recent Western student of this episode of Ottoman history had summed up his appreciation of the policy of Nāmyq Kemāl, one of the leading 'New 'Osmanli' publicists of the pioneer generation, by putting it that 'his aim was to regenerate the state by borrowing from the West the means to oppose to the West a stronger and more united nation' (Davison, R. H.: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (thesis submitted to Harvard University for the degree of Ph.D., 1st April, 1942), p. 241 of the typescript copy in Harvard University Library, quoted here by permission). This sentence puts in a nutshell the objective that is the common goal of all Herodians.

¹ In his *Report on Egypt and Candia* of the 27th March, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 30, Sir John Bowring records the Egyptians' confident belief that they had now learnt enough from their Frank instructors in Western technique to be able to afford to dispense with their costly services—though, in Bowring's own opinion, experience had proved the contrary (cp. *ibid.*, pp. 48 and 151).

² See V. v. 333-4.

Aryans¹ was amusingly reminiscent of the Pharisees' similar embarrassments in their unavoidable contacts with their uncircumcized Roman lords and masters. Yet these ritualistic scruples did not deter Brahmans from deliberately setting foot within an unclean British lion's den in order to serve the new alien rulers of India as administrators, in the footsteps of those Brahmans of earlier generations who had served the now fallen Muslim predecessors of the British in the same capacity. The British empire-builders' Brahman coadjutors equipped themselves for this Herodian profession of their choice by learning English² with the same industry and virtuosity that their fathers had shown in learning Persian.³

In this post-Mughal phase of the Hindu Society's experience of alien political domination, Brahmans, as well as Kshatriyas, extended the breadth of their front on their Herodian line of march by also taking service in the professional armies, on a Western model, that were raised, in and after the later decades of the eighteenth century, by a variegated pack of Hindu, Muslim, and Western adventurers who were now contending with one another in a competition to carve successor-states out of the carcass of a defunct Timurid Mughal Empire. When a combination of two complementary reductive processes—destruction and absorption—had duly reduced these inchoate Westernizing military forces on Indian ground first to the two surviving military establishments of a British East India Company and a Sikh war-lord Ranjit Singh, and finally to one sole surviving British Indian Army, as a result of a hundred years of costly experimentation in 'the survival of the fittest', this Western-organized, Western-trained, and Western-officered Indian military machine fed by voluntary enlistment kept open a wide vent for Hindu Herodian proclivities—at first mainly among the so-called 'martial races' of the North-West,⁴ but eventually also among Hindus of all castes and quarters whom a Western education had qualified and inspired to become candidates for officer-cadetships in an Indian Army when the cadre of officers was deliberately and rapidly 'Indianized' in the last phase of the British régime. The strength and volume of a Hindu Herodian movement that had been gathering momentum for the best part of two hundred years, as its triple stream swept forward down a military, an

¹ The mirage of a common physical stock to which latter-day Hindus and latter-day Europeans alike could trace back their descent had been conjured up by the unwarranted inference that the existence of 'an Aryan race' was implied in the authentic discovery of an *Ursprache* from which all the latter-day languages of an 'Indo-European' family were genuinely derived. In India under a British Rāj, this mistaken physiological induction from a correct linguistic premiss was not taken sufficiently seriously to move either the Brahman to sit at table with the Englishman or the Englishman to elect the Brahman to membership in his club. It was left for the Nazi fellow countrymen of Bopp to exploit the Aryan racial myth as an instrument of torture for use in their persecution of the Jews long after it had become manifest to scholars that there was little or no correspondence between the family-trees of languages and the genealogies of races. Such a mischievous use does not appear ever to have been made of the analogous legend of a common origin of the Spartans and the Jews that was invented to serve current political purposes in the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history.

² See V. v. 507.

³ The Brahmans' linguistic prowess was the more praiseworthy inasmuch as most of them remained unaware that these graceless alien tongues which they were mastering from a utilitarian motive were akin to the sacred Sanskrit in which they themselves were zealous litterati.

⁴ See II. ii. 128, n. 1.

administrative, and also an industrial channel, was demonstrated in and after the summer of A.D. 1947, when the management of an Indian Union was successfully taken over from British hands by an efficient working party of Hindu statesmen, staff officers, and business men.

In previous contexts attention has been drawn to the ambivalence of the reaction of a Mahatma Gandhi whose conduct of his Zealot campaign for a radical severance of the economic threads implicating the Hindu Society in a Western way of life revealed this Hindu Janus's Herodian counter-face in both the Quaker-minded gentleness and the publicity-conscious efficiency with which the Gandhian political strategy of non-violent non-co-operation was put into action. In this place we have only to make the one further observation that a similar ambivalence revealed itself in the *éthos* of a would-be Zealot Arya Samāj,¹ which, though founded for the purpose of providing a corrective to the Brahmō Samāj's out-and-out Herodianism,² was itself open to the damaging charge that it had derived its own anti-Herodian inspiration from an Herodian sensitiveness to the exotic influence of a Western Romantic Movement.

The psychological reaction to the impact of the Modern West in the main body of Orthodox Christendom has come to our notice in the sullen retreat of a Zealotism that had still been murderously militant when, in A.D. 1638, it had compassed Cyril Loukari's death in retribution for his Herodian crime of Calvinism. Thereafter, the Greek Orthodox hierarchy still showed their teeth in occasional rear-guard actions. Their frustration of Evyénios Voulgcharis' eighteenth-century pioneer educational work advertised their disapproval of Herodianism even when this obnoxious outlook was confined to the intellectual plane, while their subsequent obstruction of the educational activities of nineteenth-century American Protestant missionaries betrayed a perhaps less unreasonable suspicion that in this case an educational programme might have the conversion of souls as its covert ulterior object. Their last losing battle in a Zealot cause was fought in opposition to the plans adopted by an Herodian-minded post-Mahmudian Ottoman Porte for reforming the constitution of the Millet-i-Rûm by giving the laity as well as the clergy a place on its governing body and by introducing into its organization the latter-day Western constitutional devices of representative government by election and of parliamentary control over public finance.

At the same time there was also an Herodian vein in the cultural evolution of an Ottoman Greek Orthodox Christian oligarchy in this age; for, in the course of two hundred years ending in the nineteenth-century last stands of clerical Greek 'die-hards', a ring of Phanariot Greek families³ had secured something like a monopoly of the patronage in the making of appointments to the higher posts in the Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy throughout the Ottoman dominions thanks to the wealth and power which these Phanariots had won for themselves by entering the Ottoman public service under unprecedentedly favourable new conditions that had been offered to them since the middle of the seventeenth century; and the professional asset which had purchased for the Phanariots

¹ See V. vi. 94.

² See V. v. 106.

³ See II. ii. 222-8.

from their Ottoman masters these unwontedly attractive terms of employment had been the Herodian familiarity with the languages, manners, and customs of a contemporary schismatic Western Christendom which these Greek Orthodox Christian Brahmans had not disdained to acquire for the sake of the increasingly lucrative profits that they found themselves able to earn by serving as middlemen in the commerce between an Ottoman World and the Occidental 'Children of Hagar'. When these enterprising seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Greek Orthodox Christian merchants had once set their feet on this Herodian Broadway,¹ it was not surprising that the rank-and-file of a nineteenth-century Ottoman Millet-i-Rûm should have followed the Phanariots' lead to Broadway's terminus by indulging in the more hazardous Herodian conceit of sorting themselves out, in imitation of the Western fashion of the day, into a patchwork of territorially segregated linguistically homogeneous sovereign national states.

In the Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom the psychological reactions to the impact of the Modern West surpassed the contemporary reactions in the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the lengths to which they ran in both directions. In the irreligiously prophetic figure of Peter the Great,² Russia produced the archetype of all the high-handed autocrats who were to impose their Herodianism 'from above downwards' on their fellow creatures in other societies that were likewise confronted with a ubiquitous and inescapable 'Western Question', while in the opposite swing of her psychological pendulum the same Russia reproduced Jewry's uncompromising Pharisees in her Old Believers³ and Jewry's desperate Theudases and Judases in her Cossack

¹ Matt. vii. 13.

² See III. iii. 278-83. Peter's Herodian figure cast its Zealot shadow in the shape of his son, heir, opponent, and victim, Alexei.

³ See V. vi. 120-1. Some two hundred different sects of dissenters (*raskolniki*) were generated (see Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im 18. Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), pp. 161-72) in the last chapter of the pre-Petrine phase of Russian history by the liturgical reforms of the Romaicizing Patriarch of Moscow, Nikôn (*pontificali munere fungebatur* A.D. 1652-58 *de facto* and 1652-66 *de jure*). Though the issue over which they had parted company with the officially Orthodox Russian Church of the day was their indignation at an assimilation of current Russian liturgical practice, not to a schismatic Western Roman Catholicism or Protestantism, but to the contemporary Greek version of Russia's own cherished Orthodoxy, many of the dissenting Russian sects eventually also took a Wahhâbi-like stand against Western innovations; and their Zealot puritanism was apt to fasten upon such spiritually neutral 'Yankee notions' as the cultivation of the Italian style of church music and religious painting, the smoking of tobacco, the drinking of tea, and the wearing of Western clothes (*ibid.*, p. 162; Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 281). This Francophobia was common ground between the dissenters and their Nikonite bugbears (see Brückner, *op. cit.*, pp. 96 and 212), and it was particularly violently excited by Western innovations in dress (see the present Study, III. iii. 283, n. 1, and V. vi. 102)—even when these innovations were recognized as being merely what they were, and did not give rise to such horrifying misapprehensions as the mistaking of wig-stands for idols which led, at Astrakhan in A.D. 1705, to an armed insurrection in which the unfortunate bewigged Western officers in Tsar Peter's garrison there were massacred (see Brückner, *op. cit.*, pp. 287 and 289; Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 66). This detestation of Western dress was shared with the dissenters by their own detested adversaries the patriarchs. The wearing of Western clothes was forbidden by Nikôn himself (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 19), and this ban of Nikôn's was repeated by the Patriarch Joachim (*fungebatur* A.D. 1674-90) in a testament (*redactum* A.D. 1690) in which he also called for the rasing of all churches erected by non-Orthodox Christians on Russian soil as a practical way of acting on his general warning against 'Latins, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Tatars' (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 97).

militant Zealots Stenka Razin and Pugachev,¹ whose 'die-hard' deaths put to shame Peter's drone-like Zealot victims the Streltsy.

Even a pre-Petrine Imperial Government that had already taken the first steps to equip itself with Western armaments proved able to inflict on Razin (*erupit* A.D. 1667-71) the fate that was to overtake Pugachev, when he dared to measure his strength against the post-Petrine army of the Empress Catherine, and was likewise to overtake the Wakhābīs when they provoked the Ottoman punitive expedition that was eventually launched against them by Mehmed 'Alī. Yet the Petrine régime of Catherine and her successors, whose flagrant Herodianism stamped them in the Old Believers' eyes with so indubitable a mark of the Beast as to certify their satanic *archégetés* Peter's identity with Antichrist,² harboured a lingering residue of Zealotism which betrayed itself in this régime's ecclesiastical policy towards the Uniate element in the Ukrainian and White Russian population that was reunited with a still aggressively 'holy' Muscovite Russia as a result of the three successive partitions of Poland-Lithuania between the years A.D. 1772 and A.D. 1795. Though in theory the ecclesiastical allegiance of their new subjects ought to have been a matter of studied indifference to an Occidentally enlightened late-eighteenth-century Russian Imperial Government, the statesmen at St. Petersburg nevertheless departed from their professed principle of religious toleration by abusing their political power in compelling the Orthodox Church's Ukrainian and White Russian Uniate lost sheep to return to Orthodoxy by entering a Muscovite ecclesiastical fold—for all the world as if these Voltairian martinets were not quite incredulous of the Orthodox superstition that an ecclesiastical association with the schismatic Western Church of Rome was a murrain from which these infected stragglers from the flock must be decontaminated by being re-dipped in Orthodoxy's sterilizing chrism.

In our gallery of Janus-faced heads, we have long since observed that Lenin's bust has no rival except Gandhi's for the distinction of being labelled as the most perfect specimen in the collection. In the vehemence of their anti-Western Zealotism, even the fifteenth-century Russian Orthodox Christian prelates who led the fanatical Orthodox opposition against the Union of Florence were surpassed by the twentieth-century Russian Communist opponents of a secularist Liberalism which had come to be the prevalent Western ideology of the age; yet the Bolsheviks' Zealot indictment of a contemporary Western way of life was uttered in the name of a Western-made Marxian ideology in obedience to which the Bolsheviks subjected Russia to an Herodian regimen that made Antichrist Peter's Herodianism seem mild by comparison when the Russian soil whose surface Peter's horse-drawn iron-shod plough had turned was cloven to its depths by Stalin's power-driven adamant blade. In this place we have only to add that the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophiles had anticipated the Bolsheviks in their ambivalence by drawing their inspiration for a would-be Zealot criticism of the current

¹ See V. v. 104 and V. vi. 227.

² See Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 274-9; Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), pp. 65-66.

Western way of life from an Herodian acquaintance with a Western Romantic Movement which was likewise to inspire the Zealot-meant gestures of a Hindu Arya Samāj.

A no less equivocal interplay of Zealot and Herodian *motifs* accounts for the fineness of the water of those pearls of literary art that were secreted in a nineteenth-century Russia's morbidly Westernizing body social. The elusive riddle of an Herodian-Zealot Russian literature holds a Western reader fascinated as he finds himself sinking below its seemingly familiar aesthetic surface into the disquietingly alien underworld of its spiritual depths; and this magic is no monopoly of 'the inspired dog' Dostoyevski's mantic genius. It also animates the rarefied atmosphere and subdued colours of the exquisite psychological landscapes painted by the naturalized Parisian Turgenev. We feel it as we admire the masterly portraiture with which, in the character of Bazarov, he creates the Janus-faced archetype of the Bolshevik's forerunner the Nihilist.¹

Our tale of Zealots and Herodians would still be incomplete if we neglected to round up a few stray goats and sheep from Cain's and Abel's meeting-ground on the fringes of the Great Eurasian Steppe. An Herodianism that cost the crypto-Hellenist Scythian Nomad prince Scyles his life at his Zealot tribesmen's hands in the fifth century B.C.² was practised with impunity in the same Great Western Bay of the Steppe in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era by overt converts to Orthodox Christianity among the Lamaistic Mahayanian Calmuck Nomad subjects of a Petrine Russian Empire,³ and likewise by the Sinomane prince of 'Wei' Hiao Wên-ti (*regnabat* A.D. 490-9), though this aggressive Herodian autocrat asked for trouble by going out of his way to impose his policy of Sinification upon his *ci-devant* Nomad To Pa fellow tribesmen in the successor-state which his and their barbarian forebears had carved out for themselves from a defunct Sinic universal state's carcass.⁴ Conversely, we find the lure of the Nomadic life evoking an Herodian response in the heart of an Hellenic representative of the Sedentary World in the fifth century of the Christian Era and in the hearts of Chinese representatives of the same world in the seventeenth century. The renegade Greek captive who had transformed himself into a Hun warrior by the time when he ran into the Constantinopolitan envoy Priscus in Attila's camp was matched, as we have seen,⁵ by Chinese settlers who transformed themselves into Manchu 'bannermen' in Southern Manchuria. In the gamut of the husbandman's and business man's psychological reactions to the impact of Eurasian shepherd-kings, these two instances of a thorough-going Scythophil Herodianism have their antitheses in two outbreaks of a Scythophobe Zealotism that went to no less extreme lengths. The Zealot reaction which threw the Mongols out of a conquered China in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era⁶

¹ The 'Nihilism' which in Russia was a premonitory symptom of the characteristic malady of an intelligentsia has been noticed in V. v. 157. A sensitive appreciation of this phenomenon will be found in Weidlé, W.: *La Russie Absente et Présente* (Paris 1949, Gallimard), pp. 119-21.

² See II. ii. 372, n. 3; III. iii. 281, n. 2, and 429, n. 1.

⁴ See V. v. 477-8.

⁵ In V. v. 409-10.

³ See III. iii. 429, n. 1.

⁶ See V. v. 348-51.

had been anticipated in the sixteenth century B.C. by a Zealot reaction of a no less demonic vehemence which had thrown the Hyksos out of a conquered Lower Egypt.¹

These antithetical 'Zealot' and 'Herodian' types of psychological reaction which we have found declaring themselves so conspicuously in encounters between contemporary representatives of different civilizations may also be expected, in virtue of the psychic uniformity of Human Nature, to be discernible and identifiable in other encounters in which the parties represent, not different civilizations, but merely different communities within a single world, or different individuals within a single community; and, before we bring this survey to a close, it may be as well to put this *a priori* expectation to at least one empirical test.

After the schism between the Catholic core of a Western Christendom and the Protestant flake that split off from it in the Early Modern chapter of Western history, there were characteristic manifestations of both Zealotism and Herodianism in the psychological reactions of the Catholic party to this Western family quarrel.

We can trace the Zealot vein in the ecclesiastical sphere in a cult of Papal autocracy, as an end in itself, which was inaugurated at the Council of Constance (*sedebat* A.D. 1414-18) by Pope Martin V² and was carried to its climax at the Vatican Council (*sedebat* A.D. 1869-70) by Pope Pius IX.³ The same rise of emotional temperature in a Zealot furnace can be read on the gauge of ecclesiastical discipline in the difference between the relentless severity of a Spanish Inquisition and the relative mildness with which the repression of heresy had been conducted by the Roman Church before the Spanish Inquisition had come to dominate this field of Catholic action, while, in the intellectual field, we can observe a comparable difference between the Vatican's Herodian open-mindedness towards a fifteenth-century Italian Renaissance of Hellenism and the obscurantism of its resistance to a seventeenth-century indigenous Western scientific revolution.⁴ On the political plane, too, this Zealot vein in the Modern Western Catholic Christian reaction to the challenge of Protestantism declared itself in the Spanish Crown's attempt to insulate its Empire of the Indies by immuring this hermit kingdom behind a wooden wall of Castilian sea-power.

On the other hand we see Herodianism asserting itself in a Late Modern Catholic social environment in the tacit relaxation, in an eighteenth-century Italy, of the seventeenth-century Papal ban on an empirical study of Physical Science without regard for the authority of Holy Church's doctor of secular theology, Saint Aristotle, while, in a France where Protestantism had been suppressed by Counter-Reformatory zeal, we see an Herodian crypto-Protestant-mindedness reasserting itself in the successive guises of an abortive Augustinian Jansenism and of a triumphant rationalist agnosticism which followed up its conquest of France by eventually conquering all the Catholic as well as Protestant

¹ See V. v. 351-2.

² See IV. iv. 573-4.

³ See IV. iv. 638.

⁴ This scientific revolution was not only a new departure; it was a move in a different direction from that of the foregoing Renaissance of Hellenic culture (see the passage quoted from Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Western Science, 1300-1800*, in X. ix. 67-68).

provinces of a Late Modern Western World.¹ In a French Revolution in which the ideas of the eighteenth-century French rationalist philosophers went into action on the political plane, a *ci-devant* Catholic France adopted from her *ci-devant* Protestant neighbours, Great Britain and the United States, the modernized Medieval Western institution of a parliamentary national state; and, in this elegantly rounded French version,² an unattractively angular Anglo-Saxon political attitude was eventually adopted—at least in outward show—even by such old-fashioned Catholic countries as Spain, Portugal, the Latin-American successor-states of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, and a *gleichgeschaltet* Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

The Zealot vein in the Catholic reaction to the eruption of Protestantism in the Modern Western World had its counterpart in the contemporary Zealotism of the Safawī Qyzylbash devotees³ whose swords achieved the trowel's work of building a new city of refuge, in the heart of an encompassing and indignant Sunnī Iranic Muslim World, for a long repressed and scattered Shī'ah, while the antithetical Herodian vein can be detected in Nādir Shāh's unsuccessful attempt⁴ to redirect a latter-day Shī'ī Persia into the Sunnah's beaten track.

A Meeting of Extremes

If we now proceed to take stock of the impressions left on our minds by the spectacle that we have just been watching, we may find that these impressions are confused and that our minds are correspondingly bewildered. As we took the salute from the mixed force under review, the Zealot and the Herodian components of these motley troops both made a parade, as they presented arms in passing the saluting point, of the distinguishing marks blazoned on their respective accoutrements. In the conspicuousness of these badges and the emphasis of these gestures alike, they were insisting with one accord upon their diversity from one another; yet this unanimous assertion of theirs was being contradicted all the time by the evidence of our own observant eyes; for the most striking of all the impressions made upon us was our observation—as frequently repeated as it was perpetually surprising—that the classical examples of either one of the two types turned out, as often as not, to be also classical examples of the other type of soldier under arms for the defence of an assaulted society.

The list of these Janus-figures that we have been jotting down so assiduously turns out, on inspection, to be a veritable roll of celebrities. It includes King Mithradates Eupator; the Sicel patriot Ducetius; the Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn of Simān; Guru Nanak the founder of the Sikh Church (who had a likewise Janus-faced forerunner in the poet-prophet Kabīr);⁵ all the Japanese statesmen who had been wrestling with the

¹ See X. ix. 304-5.

² The role of France in Late Modern Western history as an interpreter of English ideas which were peptonized by being 'processed' in a French mill has been noticed in III. iii. 369-71; IV. iv. 200, n. 1; and on p. 517, above.

³ See I. i. 366-7 and V. v. 661-5.

⁵ See IV. iv. 231; V. v. 106, 537, and 668.

⁴ See I. i. 399.

Western Question for the past four hundred years; Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, the father of the T'ai'ping movement in a nineteenth-century China, and the twentieth-century Chinese apostles of Communism; the authors of the revolution in Mexico that broke out in A.D. 1910; 'the Horse Indians' on the Great Plains of North America; the Zionists; King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Āl Sa'ūd; the Arya Samāj; Mahatma Gandhi; the Slavophiles; the Bolsheviks; and the creators of a nineteenth-century Russian literature. This dubious array of caprine Zealot sheep and ovine Herodian goats may well make us sceptical of the authenticity of either of the two *soi-disant* diverse breeds that are both alike represented in the ambiguous physiognomy of each of these Protean creatures; and we may be moved to ask: Then were those contradictory-sounding Zealot and Herodian slogans 'Antichrist!' and 'Die-hard!' insincerely rhetorical exclamations? And was that dumb-show of mutual antipathy and opposition a sly piece of play-acting in which the actors were in collusion to deceive us?

Our Zealot and Herodian demonstrators' now suspect sincerity can hardly be vindicated unless the alleged antithesis between their two ideologies, which both schools unanimously call upon us to recognize, proves to be guaranteed by some objective distinguishing mark in the nature of a finger-print or a shibboleth; but none of the marks borne by the representatives of either party will prove, on examination, to be either party's distinctive livery.

There is, for example, a distinction, empirically traceable in our foregoing survey, between movements from above downwards and movements from below upwards; and, if we were to make our first test of this possible differentia between Zealots and Herodians by applying it to the classic case that we have taken as our prototype, a first glance at the relations between Herod the Great and the Jewish Zealots of his day might tempt us to jump to the conclusion that Herodianism could be distinguished from Zealotism as a policy imposed from above downwards on a passion surging up from below.

This criterion might seem accurately to distinguish a common characteristic of Herod and his forerunner Joshua-Jason from a common characteristic of the Maccabees and the Pharisees. It might also appear to hold good as between Herod's Hellenizing patrician contemporaries and counterparts in the Philistine and Phoenician city-states and their anti-Hellenic kinsmen the insurgent Syrian slaves in Sicily; and, again, as between an insurgent Egyptian peasantry and the Egyptian notables in the *métropoleis* of the nomes who proclaimed themselves philhellenes by enrolling themselves as gymnasiasts. A latter-day series of anti-Hellenic Zealot movements flying religious colours—a Nestorian and a Monophysite Christianity and a more militantly Zealot Islam—all also duly respond to our test by patently revealing themselves to be eruptions from below upwards. Our criterion fails us, however, when we apply the same test to Zoroastrianism; for here we find an anti-Hellenic Zealot movement—likewise flying religious colours—that did not erupt from below upwards but was, on the contrary, imposed from above downwards by Zealot-minded Arsacid and Sasanid autocrats who 'established'

a Zoroastrian Church as the official religious organization in their dominions. And, if this Zoroastrian Zealot movement from above downwards thus proves recalcitrant to our test, we shall find our tentative criterion doubly discredited when we light upon the inverse intractable phenomenon of an Herodian movement from below upwards. Yet we are bound thus to characterize the peaceful penetration of the upper levels of the Hellenic Society by freedmen successors of insurgent slaves who had failed to throw off an Hellenic yoke, and by latter-day missionaries of Cybele-worship, Isis-worship, Mithraism, and Manichaeism who commended their Oriental religious wares to an Hellenic public by putting them into an Hellenic dress.

If we pass from the field of the encounter between Hellenism and its contemporaries to the other plots on our map, we shall meet with the same experience. In an encounter between a nascent Western Christendom and the Scandinavians, an Herodian response in the Scandinavian World to the Western Christian challenge duly took the form of a movement from above downwards in the kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, but could not take effect otherwise than from below upwards in the anarchic political environment of Iceland. In the encounter between a Medieval Western Christendom and a Russian Orthodox Christendom, again, our criterion holds good as between the Hanseaticizing patrician Herodians in the city-state of Novgorod, or the Polonizing Ukrainian and White Russian nobles in the kingdoms of Poland and Lithuania, and the anti-Uniate Zealot Ukrainian and White Russian Orthodox Christian subjects of the Polish and Lithuanian Crowns. But what are we to make of the Ukrainian and White Russian Uniates? Are we not confronted here with an Herodian movement rising from below upwards? And what of those Muscovite autocrats who patronized the Orthodox Christian Church? Are they not unmistakable counterparts of the Zealot Arsacid and Sasanid patrons of Zoroastrianism? And does not this affinity identify them for us as being likewise Zealots working from above downwards?

The farther we proceed, the more frequently our tentative criterion fails us. The Phanariot and Brahman ministers of Muslim empire-builders, who were Herodians duly transmitting the adopted language, dress, and other external insignia of an alien Muslim culture to the lower castes of their societies from above downwards, are counterbalanced by members of those very lower orders who propagated the same Herodian movement from below upwards in the more radical act of becoming converts to Islam. In a Far Eastern World under pressure from the Modern West, an Herodianism duly working from above downwards at the Chinese Imperial Court under the Ming and Manchu régimes and in the Meiji Revolution in Japan is counterbalanced by the spectacle of a Zealotism likewise working from above downwards in Japan under the Tokugawa régime and returning to the charge in the same direction, even after the Meiji Revolution, in the subsequent establishment of Neo-Shintō as a state religion, while in the same Far Eastern World the reactions to Western pressure that come up from below are more frequently Herodian than Zealot in character. The Zealot eruption of the

Boxers is counterbalanced here by the Herodianism of the seventeenth-century Japanese and eighteenth-century Chinese Catholic Christian martyrs; and similar well-springs of Herodianism rising from below can be detected in the subterranean heroism of Japanese crypto-Christians and secret students of Western learning in defiance of the Bakufu, in the recrudescence of conversions to Christianity in nineteenth-century Japan and China alike, and in the emergence of the Kuomintang. In the submerged indigenous societies in the Americas the aristocratic Herodianism of a Garcilaso de La Vega is counterbalanced by the Herodian mass-conversions of Andean, Paraguayan, and Mexican peasantries to a Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity.

If we go on to apply our test to the encounter between the Modern West and the Islamic World, we shall find it at first sight appearing to answer better here. An Herodianism imposing itself from above downwards is represented by antitypes of King Herod the Great in the persons of Sultans Selīm III and Mahmūd II,¹ Mehmed 'Alī Pasha and Midhat Pasha, President Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk, Rizā Shāh Pahlawī, and King Amānallāh; and this imposing array of Herodian statesmen operating from above is confronted by a no less imposing array of Zealot insurgents erupting from below: the explosive Wāhhābī, Idrīsī, Mahdist, and Sanūsī fanatics on the Afrasian Steppe; the romantic patriots 'Abd-al-Qādir and 'Abd-al-Karīm in the Maghrib; the untamed Pathan barbarians in the highlands of Eastern Iran. Yet here, too, we find phenomena that do not conform to our experimental pattern; for those 'Zealot-drones' the Janissaries and Mamlūks were incubuses weighing upon Society from above, not jacks-in-the-box bursting the lid by springing up from below.

In the Hindu Society's reactions to the Modern West the downward-working Herodianism of a British Serkār's Brahman clerks and the upward-working Zealotism of a resurgent Kali-worship and a Neo-Vedism conform to our test only to be offset by the anomalously upward-working Herodianism of a British Indian Army's recruits and a Brahmō Samāj's converts. In a latter-day Ottoman Orthodox Christendom the Herodianism *de haut en bas* displayed by Westernizing Phanariot Ottoman Ministers of State is offset by the Zealotism *de haut en bas* of an anti-schismatic Phanariot Orthodox Christian hierarchy, while Greek, Serb, Bulgar, and Ruman nationalists *alla Franca* anticipate a Chinese Kuomintang in propagating Herodianism from below upwards. In Russia the classic contrast between Peter the Great's Herodianism from above downwards and the Zealotism from below upwards displayed by obstinate Old Believers and explosive Cossack insurgents is blurred by the anomalous spectacle of a Zealotism from above downwards which reasserted itself in the repression of Ukrainian and White Russian Uniatism by an eighteenth-century Petrine Russian Imperial Government after Peter the Great had crushed an earlier manifestation of the

¹ 'Reform in Turkey, as in Russia (until the mid-nineteenth century), came from above, because the rulers were more revolutionary than their conservative subjects' (Bailey, F. E.: *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853* (Cambridge, Mass. 1942, Harvard University Press), p. 223).

same anomalous phenomenon of a Zealotism in high places in the act of ridding Russia of the incubus of those Zealot-drones the Streltsy.

In the encounters between Cain and Abel along the borderline between the Desert and the Sown the Herodianism from above downwards practised by Scythian, Calmuck, and To Pa khans who cultivated the Sedentary World's alien way of life within the shelter of city walls, and the Zealotism from below upwards that was displayed by the sedentary subjects of Eurasian Nomad empire-builders in demonic revolts against hated alien masters, are counterbalanced by a Zealotism from above downwards through which these harshly oppressive sons of Abel incurred their sedentary subjects' implacable hatred, and by the Herodianism from below upwards that moved Greek and Chinese renegades from the ranks of a sedentary society to take service in the armies of Hun and Manchu Nomad invaders of the fields and cities of the Children of Cain.

When we glance, in conclusion, at our two instances of encounters between two conflicting ideals within the bosom of a single society, we shall find our tentative identifications of Zealotism with movements from below upwards and of Herodianism with movements from above downwards only partially corresponding with the facts here likewise. In the encounter between a resurgent Shi'ah and an encompassing Sunni World, Zealotism, it is true, duly erupts from below in the explosion of Ismā'il Shah Safawī's Qyzybashys, while Herodianism likewise conforms to pattern by emanating from above downwards in Nādir Shāh's unsuccessful attempt to undo Shah Ismā'il's work by an exercise of his own autocratic power. On the other hand, in the history of the psychological reactions of a Tridentine Roman Catholic Church that had been thrown on to the defensive by the shock of the Protestant Reformation, the Vatican's eighteenth-century latitudinarianism *vis-à-vis* a Late Modern Western scientific revolution was an exhibition of Herodianism from above downwards that was as exceptional as it was belated. The Vatican's characteristic reaction was the Zealotism from above downwards exhibited in a burning of Giordano Bruno which was one of the sensational sequels to the Spanish Inquisition's investiture with the supreme command in the Roman Church's perennial holy war against heresy; and the same Zealot spirit moved the Papacy, from the pontificate of Martin V to the pontificate of Pius IX, persistently to subordinate other considerations to the obsessive over-riding aim of preserving and augmenting its own autocratic control over the Roman Church's government. Conversely, the most impressive manifestation of Herodianism in this domestic scene in Western Christendom's modern life was a crypto-Protestant movement which had rocketed up from below—driven aloft, like a jet-plane, by the successive explosions of Jansenism, Voltairianism, and Jacobinism.

Now that an empirically observed difference between movements rising from below upwards and movements descending from above downwards has proved, on trial, not to furnish us with a satisfactory criterion for distinguishing Zealots and Herodians from one another, let us see whether a likewise empirically observed difference between violent and gentle responses to challenges will serve our purpose any better.

A priori this might seem improbable, since our study of schism in the body social,¹ which was the context in which this antithesis between the spirits of Violence and Gentleness first came to our notice, has shown us both spirits manifesting themselves indiscriminately in the responses of Proletariat and Dominant Minority alike to the challenge of disintegration. Yet, if we apply this criterion in turn to our prototype case, at first sight it does seem to be valid, as we register the contrast in temper between Zealot Theudas and Judases, who were spoiling for a fight with Roman masters of the World, and a Herod who earned his title to be acclaimed as great in statesmanship by his determination to restrain his ineptly fanatical Jewish subjects from indulging their mad impulse to challenge Rome's omnipotence. On this showing, we might tentatively identify Zealotism with the violent and Herodianism with the non-violent vein in an assaulted society's feeling towards its alien assailant; but these provisional identifications also will not stand the test of further confrontation with the facts.

In the classic case in point, for instance, a suggestion that Herod's studious appeasement of Rome certified this appeaser to be a man of peace would have been received with bitterly derisive laughter by *sicarii* whose childish schemes for resorting to violence against Herod's Roman overlords had been anticipated by the better calculated violence with which Herod had nipped such 'dangerous thoughts' in the bud. We have lighted here upon a political dilemma that faces every Herodian potentate. The stronger his conviction of the necessity of coming to terms with an alien civilization of decisively superior potency, the greater will be his sense of the urgency of insisting that his subjects shall fall in with his policy; and, if this policy is ever placed in jeopardy of being frustrated by violent manifestations of Zealotism on their side, he will deem it the lesser evil to meet violence with violence in his struggle to save his Herodian statesmanship from being frustrated by the Zealots in his own household, rather than to shrink from repressing these wild men by force at the cost of allowing them to sweep him into a desperate insurrection against a paramount alien Power. He can take no other line if he is not to be untrue to himself, for the penalty of capitulation to the Zealots would be not merely the negation of the weakling ruler's own Herodian policy; it would also be the death of the community for whose welfare he is politically responsible.

Our prototype-episode also brings to light another point in which our tentative equations of Herodianism with Gentleness and of Zealotism with Violence both break down. Any Herodian statesman who is in earnest will be concerned not only to save his policy from being sabotaged by Zealot violence but also to ensure that it shall not be frustrated by Zealot passive resistance.² A lively awareness of this second, more insidious, danger in Herod's lucid mind gave his ruthless will the signal to chastise awkward Pharisees³ as well as froward *sicarii*; and the states-

¹ In V. v. 35-376.

² The non-violent vein in the Zealot Jewish opposition to a post-Alexandrine Hellenism has been noticed in V. v. 72-73.

³ The *ethos* of the Pharisees has been noticed in V. v. 73, n. 4.

manlike consistency with which Herod thus meted out chastisement to Pharisees and *sicarii* alike will remind us that Zealots are no more invariably violent than Herodians are invariably gentle. In the encounter between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and its Oriental contemporaries the violent Zealotism inherited by the Jewish *sicarii* from Maccabee fore-runners and likewise displayed in the Maccabaeon Age by insurgent peasants in Egypt and plantation-slaves in Sicily—not to speak of the latter-day violence of Zoroastrian Sasanidae and of Primitive Muslim Arabs who gave a by then senile Hellenic ‘ascendancy’ its *coup de grâce*—divided the allegiance of Zealotism’s devotees with the gentle fanaticism of the Pharisees, Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai, and the Nestorian and Monophysite Christian Hellenophobes, while, on the other side, Herod the Great was not the only Herodian reagent to the impact of Hellenism who was drawn into using violence by the exigencies of a policy of appeasement. This statesman’s dilemma, which did not beset the non-violently Herodian Egyptian gymnasiasts, freedmen *novi homines*, and missionaries of Cybele-worship, Isis-worship, Mithraism, and Manichaeism, inexorably led other Oriental client princes besides the Herods into taking repressive measures against their own subjects in pursuance of a pacific policy *vis-à-vis* the Roman Imperial Government which invested these appeasers, in their victims’ eyes, with all the Satanic attributes of the powers of darkness.

Our classic test case of the encounter between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and its Oriental contemporaries thus indicates that an empirically observed distinction between veins of Violence and Gentleness does not, in fact, provide us with an objective differentia for distinguishing between Zealots and Herodians; and this indication will be confirmed by an extension of our field of vision.

The Hellenic spectacle of a Herod the Great being drawn into a domestic policy of repression in defence of a foreign policy of appeasement is reproduced in the political careers of Herodian potentates in the histories of other encounters between the representatives of conflicting cultures. This was likewise the tragic destiny of the Varangian war-lord Vladímir the Great,¹ the Norwegian King Ólaf Tryggvason,² the Kuomintang Government of a Chinese Republic, Mehmed ‘Alí Pasha, Sultan Mahmūd II, President Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk, Rizā Shāh Pahlawī, King Amānallāh of Afghanistan, the leaders of Greek, Serb, Bulgar, and Ruman Orthodox Christian militant nationalist movements, Tsar Peter the Great,³ the Sinomane To Pa Prince Hiao Wên-ti, Nādir Shāh, and a Jacobin Committee of Public Safety that set up a Reign of Terror in a Revolutionary Paris.

The successfully violent Herodian potentates in this catalogue of successes and failures would have sought to justify their crimes by insisting that it was not only better to succeed like a Vladímir and an Atatürk than

¹ See II. ii. 352.

² See *ibid.*

³ Peter was a believer in the use of violence in dealing with his Zealot-minded subjects, not merely for the negative purpose of suppressing revolts against his policy of Westernization, but also for the positive purposes of forcing down their throats a Western system of education and a Western industrial technique (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 514–16).

to fail like an Olaf and an Amānallāh, but was also better to make even an unsuccessful attempt than to show oneself, like Selīm III, 'too proud to fight',¹ or to make, like Scyles, a futilely craven attempt to evade an unescapable issue, or to be manœuvred, like Midhat, into 'missing the bus'.² And these impenitently high-handed Herodian advocates of force who had been rewarded by success for having the courage of their convictions would not have accepted Selīm's Frankish historical adviser's plea that this 'Osmanli Herodian's Norman counterpart Rollo had been able to induce his Scandinavian warriors to follow his Herodian lead without having to take them by the scruff of the neck, or Scyles' shaman *clairvoyant's* plea that Scyles' bloodily terminated crypto-Hellenic life within the walls of Borysthene had been justified posthumously by his latter-day Calmuck counterparts' adroitness in 'getting by' with their conversion to a Petrine Russian Orthodox Christian culture within the precincts of Stavropol. The triumphantly violent champions of Herodianism would have dismissed this Calmuck and this Norman episode as being exceptions which proved their own robust rule, and they would have despised the tolerantly latitudinarian Popes of an eighteenth-century school as traitors to the august office whose traditional prerogatives these Laodiceans were thus permitting to go by default. Nor would the red-handed Herodians have been impressed by non-violent Phanariot ministers of an Ottoman Porte or non-violent Brahman ministers of a Mughal and a British Rāj; for they would have pointed out that these Herodian-minded civil servants were non-violent by necessity and not by choice, since their masters always withheld from them the exercise of the power of the sword.

If, in the teeth of these testimonies and arguments, we still sought to vindicate our tentative identification of Herodianism with Non-Violence, we could, of course, present a counter-list of non-violent Herodians, including the nineteenth-century Jewish Assimilationists in the Western World; the whole of the Jewish diaspora—and all other diasporas at all times in all places—on the economic plane; the Andean and the Mexican converts to a Roman Catholic Christianity, ranging from the aristocrat Garcilaso de la Vega to the primitive Guaranís; the Japanese and Chinese converts to the same religious faith who died for it as martyrs or lived for it in the catacombs; the Japanese pagan martyrs who paid with their lives for their secret study of a secular Late Modern Western Science; and the Jansenist and Voltairian apostles of a Modern Western *Weltanschauung* who waged their 'cold war' of aggression against an apprehensively Zealot-minded Tridentine Roman Catholicism with the Orphic weapon of propaganda. This list, however, would remain inconclusive even if it could be lengthened *ad infinitum*; for, if once we have conceded that Herodianism is apt to find itself drawn into violence by the exigencies of its own aims when its exponents are political potentates, we have implicitly conceded that the spirit of Non-Violence cannot be a distinctive characteristic of the Herodian ethos.

¹ Woodrow Wilson on the 10th May, 1915.

² Neville Chamberlain on the 5th April, 1940, referring to Hitler, who was to make Chamberlain's taunt recoil on its author's own head before the month was out.

Conversely, we shall find, if we complete our application of this test to our array of exponents of Zealotism, that the Oriental Zealot reactions against a post-Alexandrine Hellenism are not peculiar in displaying non-violent as well as violent manifestations. The split in Jewish Zealot ranks between *sicarii* and Pharisees, and in servile Zealot ranks between slave insurgents and freedmen *arrivistes*, is reproduced in a Russian Orthodox Christendom in the split between the violence of Stenka Razin or Pugachev and the non-violence of the Old Believers, and in an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom in the contrast between the martial spirit of Maniot and Montenegrin wild highlanders and the tameness of a conservative-minded Greek Orthodox hierarchy. On the northern fringes of a submerged Central American World the same parting of the ways is proclaimed in the piquant juxtaposition of pugnaciously Zealot 'Horse Indians' and pacifically Zealot Pueblos; and the hunter peoples of North America who were engulfed by a tidal wave of immigration from the Old World, that was rolling westwards, with irresistible force, from the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, were likewise divided between pacifists and believers in resistance. If we apply the same test to the Jewish diaspora in the Western World, we find here, of course, that the non-violent Zealotism of the Ritualist disciples of Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai had been a far older and far more widespread response to the challenge of an encompassing alien culture than the recrudescence of the spirit of the *sicarii* among a rabid minority of the Zionist settlers in Palestine.

These instances suffice to demonstrate conclusively that Violence is no more characteristic of Zealotism than Gentleness is; and this inference cannot be cancelled by citing other instances in which the men of violence in the Zealot ranks do not appear to be counterbalanced by the presence of any men of peace. It might be difficult, for example, to cite any non-violent Islamic Zealots to neutralize the cumulative impression made on an observer's mind by the militancy of Wahhābīs, Idrīsīs, Mahdists, Sanūsīs, Pathans, and Maghribīs, whose retort to Frankish honey-thieves was to burst furiously out of their plundered hive like bees eager to give their lives for the sake of lodging their stings in an insufferable aggressor's flesh. In the Far Eastern World, again, the violent Zealotism of the Ming, the Tokugawa, and the Boxers appears to hold the field unchallenged by the contrary example of any alternative non-violent school. Yet these obvious exceptions will not avail to rehabilitate a decisively discredited rule.

Perhaps the clearest proof that Violence is no distinctively Zealot spirit is presented by the spectacle of the professional soldiers' impartially indiscriminate distribution of their forces, of both higher and lower quality, between the Zealot and Herodian camps. The most highly distinguished of the professional soldiers begotten from encounters between diverse civilizations had, indeed, been Herodians and not Zealots. Peter the Great, Nādir Shāh, Mehmed 'Alī, Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk, and Rizā Shāh Pahlawī were conspicuous representatives of the Herodian category. By contrast, the most conspicuous professional soldiers whom we have come across in the Zealot hive are the discredibly

drone-like latter-day Streltsy, Mamlûks, and Janissaries. To find Zealot professional soldiers worthy to compare with the most eminent of their Herodian brothers-in-arms, we must call up those stalwart Illyrian soldier-emperors¹ who showed their mettle in leading the last counter-attack of a demoralized Hellenism against a triumphant Christianity, and those indomitable Spartiate 'Peers'² who defended, with their backs to the wall, 'the peculiar institution' of a culturally dissident Hellenic city-state which had deliberately parted company with the main body of the Hellenic Society in order to march straight into a spiritual desert of Militarism at the very moment when the rest of Hellas was emerging out of darkness into light. Yet the height of heroism to which a Spartiate Leonidas rose gives the measure of the depth of demoralization to which his nephew Pausanias sank; and, moreover, if we expand the Zealot contingent in our muster of professional soldiers by bringing up reinforcements that are of dubious quality, we shall be bound, in equity, to dilute the Herodian contingent likewise by calling up those barbarian mercenaries who had been enlisted in the professional military defence of Civilization on the anti-barbarian frontiers of so many oecumenical empires.³

Our now manifest failure in our repeated search for a valid criterion for distinguishing Zealots and Herodians from one another suggests that this quest may be a wild goose chase and prompts us to make a fresh attack on our problem from a different quarter. Instead of taking as our point of departure a professed antithesis and antagonism for which we have no better evidence than the two parties' own concordant, but perhaps collusive, protestations, let us take the Janus-faced ambivalence of many of the most impressive of the soldiers on parade, which is a fact open to observation by the spectator with his own unprejudiced eyes, in the teeth of the troops' unsupported and perhaps not disinterested assertions. If we now remind ourselves of the nature of the emergency that has brought both Zealots and Herodians into action, we shall see that this ambivalent appearance, so far from being surprising, is actually just what we should expect. For both parties alike are engaged in the desperate enterprise of counter-attacking an alien enemy force that has lodged itself within the gates of their assaulted city. The common objective of both the Zealot and the Herodian defenders of their common home is to retrieve this perilous situation; and, in so far as they may be taking different lines, these are merely different tactical approaches to an identical strategic objective.

Moreover, it is manifest that neither warrior can hope to achieve a common practical purpose if he insists on pushing his own tactical theory to the extremity of its logical conclusions. A Coroebus, accoutred in the arms of a fallen foeman,⁴ who carried his *ruse de guerre* to the point of falling in, shoulder to shoulder, with his slain adversary's combatant comrades in the enemy assaulting column, would be reducing his Herodianism *ad absurdum* by assisting in the capture of a Troy that he had taken up arms to save from falling; and in real life we do not

¹ See V. vi. 207.

² See III. iii. 50-79.

³ See V. v. 461-6, and pp. 40-41, above. ⁴ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book II, ll. 383-401.

find historical instances of Herodians thus stultifying themselves by a suicidal self-caricature. Even those Herodian potentates who have gone farthest in imposing an aggressive enemy civilization's culture on their subjects on the technological, economic, social, and intellectual planes have usually gone to these unwelcome lengths with the object of thereby preserving intact at least the continuity and independence of the commonwealth for whose government they have been responsible, while non-violent Herodians whose policy has not been dictated to them by any political responsibilities have usually been aiming at the preservation of some other element in their own assaulted cultural heritage—for instance, an ancestral religion or, at a minimum, the bare memory of the submerged society's former existence through the registration of an entry, such as Garcilaso de la Vega made, in the records of the victorious aggressor society by whose act the victim society has been sent to join the shades in Sheol.

On the other side of an imaginary line dividing an Herodian from a Zealot track, those devoted Jewish and Red Indian violent Zealots whose scruples have inhibited them from carrying on their 'holy war' on the Sabbath Day¹ or from conducting it with the White Man's weapons² have condemned their own cause to defeat by these sublimely unpractical sacrifices on the altar of superstition. By contrast, every practical-minded Zealot has made concessions to Herodianism, while every practical-minded Herodian has seasoned his own Laodicean philosophy with a grain of Zealot salt. On this showing, the Zealot and Herodian standpoints look, not so much like two isolated peaks sundered by an impassable gulf, as like the upper and lower ranges of the gamut of a musical instrument in which the interval between this instrument's two acoustical extremes is bridged by a continuous gradation of intermediate notes, and on which the highest and lowest notes of all are seldom or never struck by any player who is an even barely competent performer.

Thus a Zealot who has the common sense and the strength of mind to refuse to bring his principle to grief by being guilty of a suicidally pedantic loyalty to it will find himself perforce stepping one pace forward from his own bridgehead on to the bridge that spans the gulf between his own and his Herodian twin brother's standpoint; but 'la distance n'y fait rien; il n'y a que le premier pas qui coûte';³ and, when once this first step has been taken, the insidiously potent law that 'one thing leads to another' will guide our Zealot pilgrim's feet into the way, not of peace,⁴ but of progressive compromise, until it has carried him, *pedetemptim et gradatim*,⁵ right over the keystone of Chinvat's arch on to the approaches towards an Herodian bridgehead on the farther side of an insensibly traversed intervening space.

This self-defeat of Zealotism in its tug-of-war with Herodianism on a

¹ See V. v. 33x, n. 1.

² See *ibid.*

³ The Marquise du Defland (*vivebat* A.D. 1739–1823) in a letter of the 7th July, 1763, to d'Alembert, apropos of the legend that Saint Denis had no sooner been beheaded than he picked up his head in his hands and proceeded to carry it for a distance of two leagues (*The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations* (London 1941, Oxford University Press), p. 562, col. b).

⁴ Luke i. 79.

⁵ Cicero: *Ad Familiares*, Book IX, Letter xiv, § 7.

hazardous pitch dizzily overhanging a deadly gulf calls up an image that has haunted our imagination once before. We have had a pre-view of this play in looking on at the awesomely ironic pageant of the self-defeat of Archaism,¹ and in seeing this dumb show translated into a play in which the dramatis personae have all been divers impersonations of a Protean 'saviour with the time-machine'.² In the plot of that psychological drama the way in which Archaism defeats itself is by passing over into Futurism; and we can now see that Zealotism is the psychological equivalent of Archaism, and Herodianism of Futurism, in a situation in which the internal challenge of social disintegration has been replaced—or reinforced—by the external challenge of an alien enemy within the gates of the challenged society's cultural citadel.

Nor is this the only memory of previous intuitions that we recollect, as the spectacle of the metamorphosis of Zealotism into Herodianism passes before our eyes. The examples, cited at the close of our foregoing survey, of psychological reactions along recognizably Zealot and Herodian lines in the domestic histories of civilizations are reminders that we have also already come across other equivalents of Zealotism and Herodianism in studying the intractability of institutions in the course of our inquiry into the reasons why civilizations break down.³ We have watched this intractability asserting itself by frustrating Man's attempts to adjust his existing institutions to meet a new situation produced by the genesis of new dynamic forces or creative movements within a society's bosom, and we have seen that this frustration may take either of the two alternative courses of precipitating revolutions or engendering enormities. We can now see that these crises arising from the emergence of newly created forces welling up from within are analogous to the crises produced by the impact of newly encountered forces impinging from outside, and that the enormities in which a civilization comes to grief are fruits of Zealotism, while the revolutions which are the alternative penalty for maladjustment are no less characteristic fruits of the antithetical Herodian response to the same challenge.

The Ineffectiveness of the Zealot-Herodian Response

If we have been right in our verdict that the ostensible contrast between Zealotism and Herodianism masks a family likeness, and that these two psychological reactions to the intrusion of an alien culture are, in truth, merely two variations on an identical theme, we should expect to find this affinity of character translating itself into a similarity of effect; and, sure enough, we do find the unmasked resemblance between Zealotism and Herodianism betraying itself in nothing so patently as in their common failure.

The ineffectiveness of this Zealot-Herodian response to the challenge of a cultural assault is manifest in the historic case that we have taken as our prototype. In Jewry's encounter with a post-Alexandrine Hellenism, neither variant of the assaulted society's defensive reaction availed to achieve the common purpose of finding a solution for Jewry's Hellenic problem that would be practicable and at the same time tolerable.

¹ See V. vi. 94-97.

² See V. vi. 213-42.

³ See IV. iv. 133-245.

Herod the Great and his school of Herodian *politiques* failed to persuade or compel their Zealot-minded compatriots to acquiesce in a political autonomy under Roman hegemony which would have given the Palestinian Jewish community a chance of coming to terms with Hellenism without losing its own communal identity in its ancestral home, while the Zealots succeeded in sabotaging this Herodian policy, only to bring the Palestinian Jewish community to the destruction which the Herodians had foreseen and foretold as being inevitable if the Zealots should once succeed in taking the bit between their teeth. The catastrophes of A.D. 70 and A.D. 135 proclaimed the bankruptcy of Herodianism in closing the door on the possibility of a cultural compromise between Judaism and Hellenism, and at the same time exposed the folly of Zealotism by turning a Jerusalem that, in the Zealots' dreams, was to have been the sacrosanct capital of a Messianic Jewish state into the forbidden city Aelia Capitolina, whose pagan precincts were placed out of bounds for all heirs of the Covenant of Circumcision.¹ Thereafter, any Jew who wished to share in the good things of Hellenic life had to purchase his freedom of the Hellenic cosmopolis by making a clean cut with his own Jewish cultural heritage, in the fashion set by the Alexandrian Jewish Platonist philosopher Philo's nephew the Roman citizen and civil servant Tiberius Alexander, while the only way left open for maintaining a distinctive Jewish communal life was Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's forlorn hope of ritualism-in-diaspora.

It would be superfluous to call up again the rest of our muster of Zealots and Herodians to demonstrate that the same pair of psychological reactions resulted in the same failure in all other encounters between an assaulted society and an assailant culture in which the tragedy had already been played out to its conclusion by the time of writing; for these repetitions of Jewry's classic experience stand on record in this work in our foregoing survey of encounters between contemporaries.² In this place we need only observe that the ineffectiveness of the Zealot-Herodian reaction has been registered implicitly *a priori* in our identification of Zealotism with an Archaism that breeds enormities, and of Herodianism with a Futurism that precipitates revolutions, since revolutions are confounded with enormities, and futurists with archaists, in the common grave of their uniform failure.

The nature of the corresponding failure of Zealotism and Herodianism may be probed to its spiritual essence, below its social surface, by an intellect that does not disdain the immemorably ancient symbolism in which the subconscious depths of the Soul express intellectually ineffable spiritual truths. A poetic imagery in which the spirit reveals itself in the physical disguise of water has already given us an insight into the 'conductivity' of a universal state;³ for, when we liken an oecumenical empire to the Ocean into which all Earth's rivers discharge, we find that this apparently still and dead expanse of salt water is in constant and creative motion, and that the rivers, which appear so mobile and lively by contrast, would soon cease to flow if their sources were not perpetually being fed by the life-giving rain that is perpetually being distilled from the

¹ Acts vii. 8.

² On pp. 346-453, above.

³ See VI. vii. 60-61.

surface-water of the Sea as it perpetually ascends into Heaven. In our subsequent study of the spiritual influences derived by transfrontier barbarians from their proximity to the body social of a civilization on the other side of the *limes* of a universal state, we have found our insight in a simile¹ in which we have likened this *limes* to a dam that first converts the upper basin of a mountain torrent into a reservoir and then brings the accumulated waters down in spate when the barrage collapses at last under a pressure that has mounted to the breaking-point.

In terms of the same expressive imagery, we may liken the Zealot-Herodian reaction to the *riposte* contrived by a pixie whose Lake of the Woods, inviolate hitherto since the beginning of Time, has suddenly and unexpectedly been sullied by the keel, and ruffled by the paddle, of an audacious backwoodsman's canoe. What apotropaic use will this outraged pixie's fury and dismay move her to make of her superhuman magic power in order to checkmate the sacrilegious human intruder? If her defensive psychological reaction takes a Zealot turn, the Lady of the Lake will render her waters unnavigable by freezing them solid, while, if it takes an Herodian turn, she will render navigation impossible by the alternative retort of draining her lake-bed dry. Whether the sacrosanct water is frozen or whether it is drained away, it will have been made equally impervious to the passage of a man-made vessel. Yet, in working either miracle, the luckless nymph will have betrayed her sub-human *naïveté*; for, in her single-minded anxiety to put the boatman out of action, she has lost sight of the devastatingly simple truth that Man's sophisticated and hazardous art of navigation² comes considerably less easy to him than the human biped's natural method of locomotion. A lake that has been closed to navigation by being either drained or frozen can be traversed by a land-lubber dry-shod. In short, the nymph will have reacted to the human intruder in a way that will have defeated her intentions by serving his purposes. So far from effectively arresting the invader's progress, her magic *tour de force* will have appreciably facilitated it.

3. *Evangelism*

Was this uniform self-defeat of Zealotism and Herodianism the last word that the oracles of History and Mythology had to speak when asked for light on the spiritual consequences of encounters? If it were indeed the last, then the outlook for Mankind would be forbidding, for then we might be driven to the conclusion that our present enterprise of Civilization was an impracticable attempt to climb an unscalable pitch.³

This great enterprise was initiated, as we may recollect,⁴ by a new departure in which Human Nature's powers of imagination, intrepidity, and versatility proved a match for the difficulties besetting the change of orientation which Mankind managed to achieve at that momentous stage in human history. A Primitive Man, who had long since been brought to a halt by an Epimethean direction of his faculty of mimesis

¹ See pp. 3-11, above.

² See II. i. 326-7.

³ This simile of the climber's pitch has been propounded in II. i. 192-5.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 192.

towards his stick-in-the-mud elders and ancestors, now reliberated his Promethean *élan*¹ by redirecting this same socially indispensable faculty towards creative personalities who offered themselves to him as path-finding pioneers. How far, a latter-day inquirer was bound to ask himself, was this new move going to carry these primitive culture-heroes' epigoni? And, when its momentum had been exhausted, would they be able to draw upon a hidden store of psychic energy by repeating the creative stroke with which Moses had once conjured the water out of the rock?² If the answer to this last question were to be in the negative, it would be a bad look-out for a half-baked Man-in-Process-of-Civilization; and this was why, for him, an archaistic Zealotism's and a futuristic Herodianism's common curse of ineffectiveness was, in itself, so disquieting an omen.

The omen was disquieting because the Zealot-Herodian reaction in particular, like the Archaist-Futurist reaction in general, was manifestly an unsuccessful attempt to re-perform the miraculous act by which a creative minority of Primitive Mankind had once succeeded in passing over from the Yin-state of an apparently hard-set stagnation into the Yang-movement of an astounding renewal of progress. In that successfully negotiated transition from Primitive Life to Civilization the adoption of the forward-looking attitude had released a creative energy strong enough to overcome the backward-looking attitude's inertia; but, in the Archaist-Futurist and Zealot-Herodian reactions of a Civilization in trouble, neither of the two formally antithetical component attitudes was proving to have any virtue in it. Was this the end of the story?

Perhaps the true answer to this anxious question was that this might well be the end if the whole story was comprised in the history of Civilization, but not if Man's attempt at Civilization was no more than one chapter in the story of a perennial encounter between Man and God. In the myth of the Flood as recounted in the Book of Genesis, the sequel to a cataclysm in which Adam's brood had been all but annihilated by their outraged Maker was God's proclamation of an 'everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is upon the Earth'. The Creator's promise to Noah and his salvaged crew was that 'the waters shall no more become a flood to destroy all flesh';³ the token of this covenant was the bow set and seen in the cloud; and indeed we have discovered, in the act of registering the equal failure of Archaism and Futurism, and, likewise, of Enormities and Revolutions, that, in either of those two apparently inescapable dilemmas, there is a third possibility which offers a hard-pressed Theseus a chance of escaping imminent destruction by boldly vaulting between the terrible horns on which a Minotaur has been seeking to impale his puny human antagonist.

When Life is challenged by the emergence of some new dynamic force or creative movement from within, the living individual or society is not thereby condemned to make the futile choice between breaking down by perpetrating an enormity and breaking down by detonating a revolution; there also lies open a middle way of salvation in which a mutual adjust-

¹ See III. iii. 114.

² Exod. xvii. 1-7.

³ Gen. ix. 8-17.

ment between the old order and the new departure can arrive at a harmony on a higher level which is another name for growth.¹ And similarly, when Life is challenged by a breakdown that has become an accomplished fact, an individual or society that is striving to recapture from Fate the initiative in its fight for life is not condemned to make the no less futile choice between the two inherently impracticable escapades of attempting to jump clear of the Present up the Time-stream into a lost Past and attempting to jump clear down the Time-stream into an unattained Future;² for, here too, there lies open the middle way of a withdrawal through a movement of Detachment followed by a return that reveals itself in a Transfiguration.³ In the prosaic language of a nascent post-Modern Western science of Psychology,

'In every conflict a dynamic opposition occurs, and in this opposition some elements transcend from one side to the other and *vice versa*. Through this reciprocal action . . . a new condition is reached which was not a predictable outcome of the conflict.'⁴

Is this divine act of new creation performed likewise when the encounter between Man and God achieves itself in a collision between two diverse human societies, and when the pair of equally barren psychological reactions in the souls of the children of the assaulted society are the two that we have now learnt to know as Zealotism and Herodianism? As we stand on the marge of the Pool of Bethesda⁵ and watch a savage Zealot seeking to save the sacred water from a dominant Gentile's polluting touch by freezing it, while a ruthless Herodian is seeking simultaneously to secure the same ritual satisfaction by draining the precious water away, our eyes turn towards the surrounding porches to gaze pityingly upon that 'great multitude of impotent folk—of blind, halt, withered'—whom we see lying there 'waiting for the moving of the water'.

The Zealot's and the Herodian's feelings remain stonily unmoved by this spectacle of their afflicted fellow human beings' piteous plight and sore need for healing. These two rival self-appointed champions of Jewry are both so inhumanly intent on the waging of their cultural war with Hellenism in accordance with their respective tactics that, in the service of an alleged military necessity, they neither of them feel any compunction as they deprive their own forefather Abraham's suffering children of their last ebbing hope of salvation. Will this unmerciful pair of pedants succeed, between them, in consummating their futile atrocity before the season arrives for the angel to go down into the pool and trouble the water with the miraculously transfiguring effect, for the sufferer who then first steps in, of making him whole of whatsoever disease he has had? No answer to our question is to be expected from combatants in a cultural war who are totally preoccupied with the conduct of their Lilliputian hostilities; but, above the un-Homeric hubbub

¹ See IV. iv. 133.

² See V. v. 383-90.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 390-7.

⁴ Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall & Cox; 1949, Methuen), p. 320. Compare the present Study, II. i. 300-1.

⁵ John v. 2-9.

of a Judaeo-Hellenic Battle of Frogs and Mice, let us hear also what Saint Paul saith:¹

'Is He the God of the Jews only? Is He not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also;² for there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek; for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon Him.³ For by one spirit are we all baptised into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free.⁴ There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus⁵—where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ is all and in all.⁶

The blessing vouchsafed to Saint Paul and his fellow evangelists is:

'He that shall lose his life for My sake and the Gospel's, the same shall save it.'⁷

In Paul, Judaism did lose its life in so far as, for some two hundred years and more before Paul's day, Judaism had been living for the ideal of preserving its own ancestral Syriac way of life against penetration by the masterfully intrusive alien culture of Hellenism. Paul was born and brought up in a Gentile Tarsus as a Pharisee—a cultural 'isolationist'⁸—and at the same time and place he received a Greek education and found himself a Roman citizen. The Zealot and the Herodian path thus both lay open in front of him, and as a young man he opted for Zealotism.

¹ In the Tarsian evangelist's heavenly Christian strains we can catch echoes of the lovely pagan music of a Mantuan poet who, like Paul, had been a Roman citizen. Paul's discernment that 'there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek' had been anticipated, almost phrase for phrase and rhythm for rhythm, in a Virgilian Dido's *Tros Tyrisque mihi nullo discrimine agetur* (*Aeneid*, Book I, l. 574), while Aeneas' *Paribus se legibus ambae invictae gentes aeterna in foedera mittant* (*Aeneid*, Book XII, ll. 190-1) foreshadows Paul's 'By one spirit are we all baptised into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles'. Virgil's poem is, in truth, the pagan gospel of the cult of an Occumenical Collective Humanity—Mankind incorporated into one universal body politic under the aegis of a Dea Roma and under the auspices of a Divus Caesar—and it was no accident that a spiritual war to the death with this noblest of all avatars of the most vicious of all forms of idolatry should have been the earliest ordeal of an infant Christian Church.

With an eye to the particular theme of the present chapter of this Study, we may notice, in passing, that Virgil was aware of the spiritual truth that a declaration of the common bankruptcy of Herodianism and Zealotism is, in the same breath, the revelation of a saving middle way. When the inevitable detection of Coroebus's Herodian ruse of putting on the armour of a slain and despoiled antagonist has been followed by the slaying of Coroebus himself and those other comrades of Aeneas who have followed Coroebus's example (*Aeneid*, Book II, ll. 424-9), the mythical Dardanian prototype of a mundane Roman saviour of Society is restrained, by the intervention of the Gods, from acting on a suicidal impulse to find his alternative to an Herodian's abortive stratagem in a Zealot's heroic death. When the epiphany of Venus has been frustrated by the obstinacy of Anchises, and the hero sprung from the union of the goddess and the mortal reverts, in desperation, to his Zealot watchword *Moriamur et in media arma ruamus* (l. 353) in his cry *Arma, viri, ferite arma: vocat lux ultima victos* (l. 668), the Man of Destiny's heart is lifted, at this critical moment, above an ephemeral battle by the sudden miracle of the child Iulus's transfiguration (ll. 681-4). The tongue of fire that sits upon Iulus's head, and the *khvarenah* that plays about his locks and temples, are Virgilian counterparts of the tongues of fire that crown the heads of Christ's apostles on the Day of Pentecost (Acts ii. 3), and of the sheen of Christ's own face and raiment in the manifestation of His divinity on the mountain (Matt. xvii. 2; Mark ix. 3; Luke ix. 29).

² Rom. iii. 29.

³ Rom. x. 12.

⁴ 1 Cor. xii. 13.

⁵ Gal. iii. 28.

⁶ Col. iii. 11.

⁷ Mark viii. 35. Cp. Matt. x. 39 and xvi. 25; Luke ix. 24 and xvii. 33; John xii. 25.

⁸ See V. v. 73, n. 4.

But, when he was plucked out of this perverse initial Zealot course by his vision on the road from Jerusalem to Damascus, Paul did not then perforce become an Herodian. He did not then find himself confined to a choice between one or other of these two barrenly defensive and uncreative lines of action; there was revealed to him a creative way which transcended them both.

Paul traversed the Roman Empire preaching neither Judaism versus Hellenism nor Hellenism versus Judaism, but a new way of life—Christianity—which drew, without prejudice, upon the spiritual wealth of both those two contending cultures and offered itself, with an impartially benignant hospitality, to any member of either of those two societies—or of any other civilization within the oecumenical theatre of the Evangelist's spiritual operations. No cultural frontier could stand in this Gospel's way; for the Christian Church was not just a new society of the same species as the civilizations whose encounters with one another we have been investigating in the present Part of this Study; it was a society of a different species, distinguished by a new revelation of the nature of God and of the character of Man's relation to Him. The creatively dramatic *peripeteia*, or 'reversal of the situation', which followed from the encounter between Jewry and Hellenism, was thus not achieved in any episode among the vicissitudes of alternating victory and defeat in these two civilizations' long-drawn-out duel; it was manifested in the transcending of both these civilizations by a newly revealed higher religion that had made its epiphany 'above the battle' which Judaism and Hellenism were fighting with one another.

At the date at which these present words were being written, the Syriac and the Hellenic Civilization alike had long since passed out of existence, and even the Jewish relic of the Syriac Society was extant only in the shape of a social fossil; but the Christian Church, born of a creative response to the challenge which the encounter between those two now extinct civilizations had once presented to their children, was then still the outstanding spiritual force in the oecumenical mission-field of a Westernizing Latter-day World; and, in the light of the first nineteen centuries of Christianity's earthly pilgrimage, a twentieth-century historian might venture to predict that Christianity's transfiguring effect on the World up to date would be outshone by its continuing operation in the future.

A Christian-bred historian, however, would be a traitor to the genius of his ancestral faith if, in allowing himself to think this serenely sanguine thought, he were also to allow the abominable and desolating idol of a corporately worshipped Self to resume possession of his soul in the sacrilegious guise of a chauvinism on behalf of one finite revelation of God's infinite light, merely because the Judaeo-Hellenic facet of a terrestrial lamp's dark glass¹ happened, as a fortuitous consequence of his time and place of birth, to be more familiar to him personally than Christianity's Indo-Hellenic counterpart. To guard against the sin of both heart and head that a Christian would be committing most grievously against God's Divine Majesty, provoking most justly God's wrath

¹ 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

and indignation¹ against the sinner, if he should refuse to honour any manifestation whatsoever of the one and indivisible Divine Light, the Christian-bred student of God's dealings with Man will remind himself that a post-Alexandrine Hellenism, after forcing an entry into a Hittite, an Egyptian, and a Babylonian, as well as a Syriac, World in the fourth century B.C., had proceeded, in the second century B.C., to push its way into an Indic World likewise, and that, out of this Indo-Hellenic encounter, a higher religion akin to Christianity had made its epiphany.

The Mahāyāna transfigured the self-regardingly Self-dispelling *askēsis* of the Hinayanian arhat into the unselfishly Self-detaining evangelism of the Mahayanian bodhisattva.² A philosophy that had offered the spiritual athlete (on condition of his proving able to stay the arduous course) his salvation through the achievement of a complete detachment from both himself and his fellow living creatures, was transformed into a religion whose ideal figure was not the sage attaining *Nirvāṇa* for himself but the saviour of his fellows who, for their sakes, had made the supreme personal sacrifice, not of suffering the pains of a voluntarily accepted death, but of enduring the pains of a voluntarily protracted existence, in order to guide the feet of others into the way of peace³ at the price of postponing, *in saecula saeculorum*, this Buddha-Saint's own entry into his hard-won rest.⁴

At the time of writing, half-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, Christianity and the Mahāyāna were the two great living witnesses⁵ to the spiritual significance of the social phenomenon of encounters between civilizations—a phenomenon that had been recurring with an ever greater frequency and at an ever higher potency since the species of societies called civilizations had made its first appearance some five or six thousand years ago. Humanly speaking, it was a creative response to the challenge of one of these encounters that had brought to birth Christianity and the Mahāyāna and Islam and Hinduism.

In an age in which the entire habitable and traversable face of the planet had been roped in by far-reaching Western hands to constitute thenceforth a single common arena, common exercise-ground, and, perhaps one day, common home for a united human family, it might be predicted that, in the next chapter of a henceforth oecumenical human history, the four higher religions sprung from the ruins of civilizations of the second generation were destined to have an intimate spiritual encounter with one another; and, whatever the outcome of this great imminent spiritual event might prove to be, it was evidently likely to inaugurate a new era in human life in This World.

The goal of Man's spiritual endeavours in an unborn age beyond the historian's horizon might be divined by an understanding heart⁶ from a reading⁷ of the words that the Tarsian Jewish apostle of Christianity

¹ The General Confession in the Order of the Administration of the Lord's Supper, or Holy Communion, in the Book of Common Prayer according to the Use of the Church of England.

² See V. v. 133-6 and 552; V. vi. 148 and 164, n. 3; and XII. ix. 632-5.

³ Luke i. 79.

⁴ See V. v. 370-2.

⁵ Matt. xxiv. 15; Mark xiii. 14.

⁶ Psalm xcvi. 11.

⁷ 1 Kings iii. 9.

in partibus Gentilium is reported to have uttered in an impromptu address¹ to an Athenian audience on the Areopagus.

'God that made the World and all things therein . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the Earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him—though He be not far from every one of us; for in Him we live and move and have our being, as certain also of your own poets have said:² "For we are also his offspring".'

¹ Acts xvii. 22-31.

² Aratus's *Phaenomena*, l. 5, echoed in Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus, l. 4 (see V. vi. 11, n. 2).—A.J.T.

VIII. C, ANNEX

THE TEMPORARY HALT OF THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION'S FRONTIER IN NORTH AMERICA AT THE EDGE OF THE GREAT PLAINS

THE occupation of North America by a Western Civilization which had originated on the other side of the Atlantic had been one of the greatest feats of expansion known to History down to the time of writing. This gigantic enterprise had been carried out within a period of less than four hundred years, reckoning from A.D. 1519, the year in which Cortés and his companions had made, in Mexico, the first permanent lodgement of West European invaders on Continental North American ground, to A.D. 1890, the year in which the internal frontier of agricultural settlement within the expanded political boundaries of the United States had been wiped out by the completion of the effective occupation and settlement of the whole national territory. Within those 371 years the whole of North America had in fact been occupied up to its natural frontiers—the Pacific coast and the southern edge of the Esquimaux' preserve in the Arctic Zone¹—by conquerors and colonists who had landed at divers points on the Atlantic coast from A.D. 1519 onwards.

The magnitude of this achievement of the pioneers of the Western Civilization in North America may be measured by comparing it with the same civilization's previous expansion in the Old World. Starting from its original patrimony—those derelict western provinces of the Roman Empire in which the North European and Eurasian barbarian invaders had been converted to Latin Christianity without being subsequently conquered either by the Arab Caliphate or by the East Roman Empire—the Western Civilization, during its Dark Ages and Middle Ages, had taken more than six hundred years, reckoning from the opening of Charlemagne's counter-offensive against the pagan Saxons in A.D. 772 to the conversion of the pagan Lithuanians to Latin Christianity in A.D. 1386, to occupy the northern zone of Western Europe from the northern fringes of the Rhine Basin and the Upper Danube Basin up to the southern fringe of the Arctic Zone. Before that, the Hellenic Civilization's occupation of Western Europe, from the Appennines up to a natural frontier provided by the shores of the Atlantic and an artificial *limes* drawn along the Rhine-Danube river line,² had taken a quarter of a millennium, reckoning from the beginning of the Roman advance into the Po Basin after the close of the First Romano-Punic War in 241 B.C. down to Augustus's decision, after the Roman military disasters of A.D. 6–9 at the hands of the Pannonians and the Cherusci, to abandon his attempt to carry the frontier forward to the line of the Elbe. In this post-Alexandrine Hellenic and in the subsequent Medieval Western expansion of a civilization into European territory previously

¹ See III. iii. 4–7.

² See 'The Rhine-Danube Frontier of the Roman Empire', in V. v. 591–5.

occupied by barbarians or by primitive peoples, the area occupied had in either case been trifling by comparison with the area in North America, within the natural frontiers indicated above, that was occupied by the Western Civilization between A.D. 1519 and A.D. 1890.

Moreover, the major part of this Western achievement in North America that was consummated in A.D. 1890 had been accomplished within the last 127 years out of the total span of 371 by the people of the United States within the middle transcontinental zone of North America over which the United States' political domain had expanded. The eventual area of the Continental United States west of the Appalachian and Alleghany Mountains had been occupied and settled since the end of the Seven Years War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1756-63).

The American people's spectacular contribution to the total result was, of course, matched, and was also, no doubt, at least partly accounted for, by the unusual advantages which the United States had enjoyed during this expansive period. She had, in fact, succeeded in having the best of both worlds for a hundred years and more. She had managed to remain economically 'in' the Old World after having extricated herself from being politically 'of' it.

Between A.D. 1763 and A.D. 1820 the whole of North America had been liberated from European political entanglements as a result of the elimination of French rule from Canada and the Mississippi Basin in the Seven Years War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1756-63), the elimination of British rule from the Thirteen Colonies and Florida in the Revolutionary War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1775-83), the Louisiana Purchase completed in A.D. 1803, the acquisition of Florida from Spain by the United States in A.D. 1819, the liquidation of Spanish rule in Mexico in A.D. 1820, and, above all, Great Britain's policy of drawing a cordon of sea-power round the Continental European bases of the other Great Powers of the day. If the British Navy had not made it impracticable for Napoleon to take delivery of Louisiana after he had extorted from the Spanish Government a retrocession of the title deeds, President Jefferson would not have found the purchase so easy to negotiate. This British benefaction to the United States had been incidental and undesigned; but, after the close of the Anglo-American War of A.D. 1812-14 and the final overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo, it had become a standing rule of British policy that Great Britain should keep clear of Continental European entanglements inside her naval cordon and should at the same time keep on good terms, outside it, with the United States, which, in the nineteenth century, was the only naval Power in the World that could have threatened Great Britain's strategic position from the rear; and in these circumstances the maintenance of Canada's political association with the United Kingdom had not, during the century ending in A.D. 1914, threatened to entangle North America in European conflicts.

Meanwhile, during the same century ending in A.D. 1914, a United States who had thus escaped from European political entanglements had been able still to draw on European economic resources—both on European population in the shape of immigrants and on European capital in the shape of loans transferred through the importation of

European manufactures—to assist her in pushing forward her western frontier of effective occupation and settlement from the line of the Appalachians and the Alleghanies, along which it had run in A.D. 1763, right across North America to the Pacific Coast within little more than 125 years. During the same period the effectiveness of Western economic resources—whether imported from Europe or produced in North America itself—had been vastly enhanced by the Industrial Revolution in Technology, which had given Western Man an unprecedented command over the rest of terrestrial creation, human and non-human alike.

In these nineteenth-century circumstances the conquest of North America by the people of the United States, impressive though it had been, could not be regarded as an inexplicable miracle. The remarkable feature in the story was not that the American people should have won the West, but that their puissant westward advance should have been checked, even temporarily, by any section of the pre-Columbian population of North America whose habitat had lain athwart the pioneers' path. The distinction of having made this exceptional and remarkable stand belonged to the Plains Indians.

"The Plains Indians constituted for a much longer time than we realise the most effectual barrier ever set up by a native American population against European invaders in a temperate zone. For two and a half centuries they maintained themselves with great fortitude against the Spanish, English, French, Mexican, Texan, and American invaders, withstanding missionaries, whisky, disease, gunpowder, and lead."¹

It was not, perhaps, so surprising that the Plains Indians should have maintained themselves from A.D. 1535 to A.D. 1848 against the Spaniards and their Mexican successors; for, apart from the notable invention of firearms, the equipment of Early Modern Western Man—particularly in means of transportation, which were of vital importance on the Great Plains—was not more efficient than the equipment of the Romans had been; and the epigoni of the Spanish conquerors of Mexico were more backward in their technology than most of their contemporaries in other parts of an expanded Western World.² It was more noteworthy that for more than fifty years—from about A.D. 1821 till the eighteen-seventies—the eastern edge of the Great Plains should have set a limit to the westward advance of the agricultural frontier of the United States.

Between A.D. 1763, when French rule had been eliminated from the Mississippi Basin, and A.D. 1821, when Missouri had been admitted to statehood in the United States, the westward-flowing tide of American agricultural settlement, when once it had gathered sufficient head to force its way over the barrier of the Appalachian Mountains, had found no halting place at the line of the River Mississippi, which had been the western political frontier of the United States for the first twenty years (A.D. 1783-1803) after the end of the Revolutionary War. The Mississippi, like the Rhine and the Danube, had indeed been designed by Nature to serve human purposes not as a *limes* but as an artery of inland

¹ Webb, W. P.: *The Great Plains* (New York 1931, Ginn), p. 48. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the author and the publishers.

² See the example noticed in III. iii. 136, n. 1.

water communications, and the advancing host of migrant farmers had taken the passage of the great river in its stride.¹ Missouri had been settled between A.D. 1815 and A.D. 1819, and the town of Independence, near the north-western corner of the new state, had been founded in A.D. 1827.² At the western boundary of Missouri, however, the pioneers of an agricultural civilization had reached a limit that, in contrast to the Western Waters which had floated them on their way by providing them with a ready-made means of transportation, proved to be a really formidable obstacle to their farther westward progress. They had reached the end of the timbered country and the beginning of a treeless steppe;³ and at this line their advance was checked.

During the half-century following the year A.D. 1821, in which Missouri was admitted to statehood, the American farmers and planters completed their occupation of the timbered country in the Mississippi Basin by bringing under cultivation Arkansas, Eastern Texas, Wisconsin, and Eastern Minnesota; and within the same period they also brought under cultivation the Great Eastern Bay of the treeless prairie, which penetrated the timbered country in a salient extending eastwards across Iowa and over the greater part of Illinois.⁴ During the second half of the period they began to nibble at the fringe of the Great Plains themselves in Kansas; but the American pioneers on the Great Plains were not the farmers; they were the cattlemen who made their first drive northward from the south-western corner of Texas to the Missourian section of the borderline between woodland and prairie in A.D. 1866;⁵ it was not till the eighteen-seventies that the American farmers began to conquer the Great Plains for the plough on the grand scale; the resistance of the Plains Indians was not completely overcome till A.D. 1876; and in that year Chief Sitting Bull's war-band of Sioux, hardly more than four months before their surrender on the 31st October, inflicted on the United States Army the most severe reverse that it ever suffered at Indian hands when, on the 25th June, they wiped out Custer's attacking force of 265 men.⁶

What is the explanation of these exceptional powers of resistance—displayed by the Great Plains and their pre-Columbian human occupants—to which the history of the United States as well as Mexico bears witness? The prime cause is to be found in the physical intractability of the *terrain* itself to cultivation by a sedentary society not yet equipped with the appropriate tools that were eventually to be forged by a Late

¹ See Paxson, F. L.: *History of the American Frontier, 1763-1893* (Boston 1924, Houghton Mifflin), chaps. 21-24. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

² See Billington, R. A.: *Westward Expansion, A History of the American Frontier* (New York 1949, Macmillan), pp. 467 and 468.

³ See the map in Webb, *op. cit.*, between pp. 4 and 5.

⁴ This salient of the North American prairie was a counterpart of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe—extending, between the southern limit of the Russian forests and the north shore of the Black Sea, up to the eastern foothills of the Carpathians—which a southward-flowing tide of Russian peasant pioneers had been bringing under cultivation since A.D. 1774, simultaneously with the American farmers' and planters' westward advance up to the eastern edge of the timberless zone of North America.

⁵ See further pp. 648-9, below.

⁶ See Billington, R. A.: *Westward Expansion, A History of the American Frontier* (New York 1949, Macmillan), p. 666.

Modern Western Industrial Revolution; and a secondary cause is to be found in the mistakes committed by the pioneers of the Western Civilization in dealing with the Plains Indians after these pioneers had made their first contacts with them. West European Man in North America duly repeated the classical mistake, examined in the Part of this Study to which the present Annex attaches, which, on other frontiers between a civilization and barbarians, had eventually given the barbarians the victory; and it is not inconceivable that History might have followed the same course in North America as in the Old World if the southern edge of the Great Plains, where these impinged on Mexico, had not been forcibly taken over from Mexico by the United States in A.D. 1846-48¹ and if thereafter the conquest of the Great Plains for agriculture had not been made possible for the American farmer by the invention and mass-production of new-fangled tools for dealing with unprecedented agricultural problems.

In a pre-industrial age of Western history the settlement and cultivation of the Great Plains by Spanish *encomienderos* with their Mexican peons or by planters from the South-Eastern United States with their Negro slaves or by farmers from the North-Eastern United States with their own hands was precluded by the absence of timber and the dearth of water near the surface. The Spanish explorers who reconnoitred the Great Plains from both the south-west and the south-east in A.D. 1535-41, and at least two American explorers who reconnoitred them in the second decade of the nineteenth century, were unanimous in declaring that this country was an irreclaimable desert. Hugh M. Brackenridge, in his *Journal of a Voyage up the River Missouri*, published in A.D. 1816, wrote that, from a point six hundred miles above the debouchure of the Missouri into the Mississippi, the country

'becomes more dreary and desert till it reaches the Rocky Mountains, and can never have any other inhabitants than the few that may exist at certain stations along the river. . . . It combines within its frightful and extensive territory the Steppes of Tartary and the moving sands of the African deserts.'²

Thereafter Major Stephen H. Long, in his report on an expedition into the Plains that he had made in A.D. 1820, committed himself to the statement that,

'In regard to this extensive section of country, I do not hesitate in giving the opinion that it is almost wholly unfit for cultivation, and of course uninhabitable by a people depending on agriculture for their subsistence.'²

A twentieth-century American historian comments that 'Major Long not only failed to unlock the secrets of the Far West; he set up a psycho-

¹ In thus annexing from Mexico the southern extremity of the Great Plains, which had been under Mexican sovereignty *de jure* but not *de facto*, the United States was doing for Mexico the same unintended and unwelcome yet nonetheless valuable service that Russia did for Persia when she conquered and annexed Transcaspia and Transoxania between A.D. 1863 and A.D. 1886. While Russia thereby relieved Persia from raids by Türkmens and Uzbeks, the United States relieved Mexico from raids by Comanches and Apaches.

² Quoted by Paxson in *op. cit.*, p. 216.

logical barrier that kept others from disproving his falsehoods'.¹ 'The tradition of the Great American Desert was at its height in the decade between 1850 and 1860.'² 'Until after the Civil War the impression persisted that the farming frontier could never invade that inhospitable region.'³ Yet, as a later passage in Billington's book testifies, Brackenridge's and Long's appreciation of the Great Plains was not incorrect in the technological circumstances of the time at which it was made. It was falsified only when the technique of the Industrial Revolution was brought to the baffled farmers' assistance.

'The Plains were opened to pioneers during the eighteen-seventies not by adventurous trailblazers but by inventors toiling over drafting boards, labourers sweating over whirring machines, and production managers struggling with the complexities of assembly-lines; for those were the men who applied the techniques of the Industrial Revolution to the unique problems of America's last frontier. Their success made expansion possible.'⁴

The inventions that eventually conquered the Great Plains for the plough were the railroad, barbed wire for fencing in a treeless landscape, machinery for drilling deep wells instead of digging shallow wells, windmills for raising water from these deep wells automatically instead of by human muscle-power, and ingenious and complicated new agricultural implements.⁵

'The Industrial Revolution freed American farmers from Time-shackles which had bound them since land was first tilled.'⁶

And the tale of this technological triumph is recapitulated in a comparison between two sets of figures.

'407,000,000 acres were occupied and 189,000,000 improved between A.D. 1607 and A.D. 1870; 430,000,000 acres peopled and 225,000,000 placed under cultivation between A.D. 1870 and A.D. 1900.'⁷

Meanwhile, between A.D. 1519 and the eighteen-sixties, the pioneers of the Western Civilization in North America who had reached the edge of the Great Plains had made, as has been noted already, a classical mistake which, in the Old World, had repeatedly enabled barbarians to turn the tables on their assailants; and the same mistake had been committed by the Spanish Government in Mexico and by the United States Government in turn. This mistake had been to allow themselves, when once they had given provocation to neighbouring primitive societies by starting an aggressive advance into their country, to be deterred, upon reaching the edge of an apparently forbidding tract of *terrain*,⁸ from proceeding with their occupation, in the teeth of this local obstacle, until their advance had brought them to a natural frontier with no potential transfrontier barbarians beyond it. In the Old World such rashly unsustained and inconclusive advances into the domains of the

¹ Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 452-3.

² Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 159. Cp. pp. 147 and 152-160.

³ Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 688. Cp. Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁵ See Billington, *op. cit.*, chap. 34; Webb, *op. cit.*, chaps. 7 and 8.

⁶ Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 695.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 703.

⁸ See p. 36, n. 1, above.

primitive societies had been apt to cost a half-heartedly aggressive civilization dear. The more catastrophic of the two alternative possible consequences had been the prompt precipitation of an avalanche of barbarian counter-invasion;¹ the less immediately disastrous alternative had been the establishment of an artificial *limes* along the outer edge of the intractable *terrain*; but in the long run this alternative had been no less fatal than the other, since the fundamental 'law' of the *limes* had proved to be that the passage of Time tells in the barbarians' favour. This 'law' duly asserted itself in North America when Spain and the United States made successive attempts to establish a permanent artificial *limes* along the edge of the Great Plains.

The policy of drawing a would-be permanent artificial *limes* at the edge of the Great Plains was inaugurated by the Spaniards after a series of four discouraging reconnaissances from Mexico and Florida into the heart of North America² within the six years A.D. 1535-41.³ One of the liabilities of the Mexic Civilization which its Spanish conquerors had taken over perforce was a chronic feud between the warlike hunting tribes on the Plains and the northernmost outposts of a pre-Columbian sedentary agricultural society.⁴ In A.D. 1593, little more than half a century after the Spaniards' first encounters with the Plains Indians, they suffered their first serious reverse at their hands.⁵ The policy of peaceful penetration and conversion through the activities of Roman Catholic Christian missionaries, feebly supported by military force, which proved successful in dealing both with the sedentary agricultural pueblos in New Mexico⁶ and with the primitive food-gathering tribes in California, was of no avail with the Plains Indians. A mission planted on the San Saba River, in the Apache country, in A.D. 1757 was wiped out by the Apaches in A.D. 1758.⁷

The Spanish authorities' reaction to this disaster was to adopt, in A.D. 1772, a recommendation, made by the Marquess de Rubí after an official inspection of the frontier zone in A.D. 1766-7, that, in order to set limits to the raids of the Plains Indians into New Spain, a *limes*, in the form of a chain of fifteen forts, should be drawn from coast to coast along a line which—everywhere except in its easternmost sector, where it was drawn through San Antonio, Texas, to Bahia del Espiritu Santo on the shore of the Gulf of Mexico—ran to the south-west of the Rio Grande, well within the future frontier between Mexico and the United States that was to be established by the peace settlement of A.D. 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase of A.D. 1853.⁸ When this Augustan policy

¹ See p. 12, above. Instances of this historical phenomenon have been noted in V. v. 209, n. 3.

² Brief accounts of the expeditions of Cabeza de Vaca, Marcos de Niza, Coronado, and de Soto will be found in Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-114.

³ These four Spanish incursions overland, like the five Norse incursions from Greenland into the north-eastern fringes of Continental North America (see II. ii. 292-3), were all made on the morrow of the original settlement and were never thereafter followed up. The Norse incursions were all made within forty years of the Norse colonization of Greenland in A.D. 985-6, the Spanish incursions all within twenty-two years of Cortés' landing in Mexico in A.D. 1519.

⁴ See Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 124.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 129-31, with the map on p. 119.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 121.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 127-9.

likewise proved a failure, the Spanish authorities in A.D. 1777-8 planned, but never carried out, an assault upon the Apaches, with the assistance of the Comanches, on the lines of Marcus Aurelius's attempt—abandoned after his death by Commodus—to subjugate, and incorporate into the Roman Empire, the domains of the Quadi and Marcomanni beyond the Augustan *limes* along the middle course of the Danube.¹

'One would judge that, with experience, the task of conquest and occupation would grow lighter; but, on the contrary, it became heavier, and eventually impossible. . . .²

'As late as A.D. 1842, George W. Kendall, a member of the Santa Fé expedition, records that, as far south as Durango, the miserable inhabitants remained within their walled towns out of fear of the raiding Apaches. At the end of the Spanish régime the Plains Indians were more powerful, far richer, and in control of more territory than they were at the beginning of it. The problem of subduing them had to be solved by another race.'³

Indeed, in the light of the usual denouement in the histories of anti-barbarian *limites*, it does not seem fanciful to imagine that, if the United States had not forcibly taken the problem out of Mexican hands in A.D. 1846-8, the year A.D. 1952 might have seen Mexico being ruled by the descendants of Apache and Comanche barbarian *conquistadores*, since it is hard to discern any indigenous social force within Mexico itself which would have been powerful enough to keep these now formidable transfrontier barbarians at bay after the fall, in A.D. 1820, of a Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain that had provided the Mexic World with its universal state.

How was it that, in the course of the three centuries of Spanish rule over the Mexic World, the Plains Indians had become a serious danger to the sedentary society whose domain adjoined the southern edge of theirs, instead of remaining the mere nuisance to the north-westernmost Mexic agricultural pueblos that they had been before the Spaniards' advent? The answer to this question is that these barbarians in this one section of North America had rendered themselves formidable by the means by which so many of their counterparts in the Old World had made their fortunes. They had adopted one of the weapons introduced by their assailants and had adapted this weapon to their own *terrain* with a local efficiency which the wardens of the intrusive civilization's *limes* had proved unable to emulate. The Spanish authorities' task on the frontier of the Mexic World over against the Great Plains had become 'eventually impossible owing to the fact that the Indians learned to use horses';⁴ and, in the chapter of the present Study to which this Annex attaches,⁵ we have observed⁶ that this was a repetition, in North America, of the Arab barbarian Nomads' adoption of the same animate weapon, on the eve of the Primitive Muslim Arab conquests, from the civilizations occupying the adjoining 'Fertile Crescent'; of the Berber barbarian Nomads' previous adoption of the camel from Arabia via Egypt; and of the Arya barbarian Nomads' earlier adoption of the chariot from

¹ See V. v. 593.

² Ibid., p. 138.

³ See pp. 15-19, above.

⁴ Webb, op. cit., p. 98.

⁵ Ibid., p. 98.

⁶ On pp. 17-18, above.

the Sumeric World on the eve of their descent upon the Indus Basin and South-West Asia in the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C.

In order to appreciate the revolutionary increase in the Plains Indians' power which was the consequence of their acquisition of the horse from Spanish trespassers on the southern fringe of their domain, it must be borne in mind that the Great Plains were a North American equivalent of the Great Eurasian Steppe. The North American prairie extended north-north-westwards, in the same general direction as the Rocky Mountains which bounded it on the west, from the north coast of the Gulf of Mexico, between the east bank of the Lower Rio Grande and the western limit of the timbered eastern half of Texas, right into the southern sections of what were eventually to be the two Canadian provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan; and this huge expanse of open grass-land shared with the Eurasian and Afrasian steppes the property of having a higher social 'conductivity' than any other physical medium of human intercourse except the Sea. Before the introduction of the horse, this conductivity of the prairie had made it possible for eleven Nomad hunting tribes¹ to make their living there, but at the same time the poverty of their pre-equine equipment had set narrow limits to their exploitation of the prairie's latent resources for human purposes.

The Plains Indians might never have been able to make themselves at home on the Plains at all if, in a pre-Columbian Age, the conductivity of the Plains had not propagated two implements all over the Plains when once the diffusion of these implements had carried them to the Plains' north-western edge. One of these instruments was a domesticated animal: the sled-dog,² presumably borrowed originally from the Esquimaux, which had provided the Plains Indians with a means of transportation. The other implement was the composite bow:³ a potent weapon which had presumably come to the North American Plains from as far afield as the Great Eurasian Steppe, where it had been one of the characteristic weapons of the Eurasian Nomad herdsmen. The possession of these two implements had enabled the eleven tribes to make a living on the Great Plains by hunting the two great herds of buffalo with which they shared this habitat; but, while the composite bow was an effective weapon for warfare as well as for hunting, the dog-sled, transferred to a grass-surface from an ice-surface, was an inadequate means of transportation. In the horse, which spread over the Plains from the south-east as the sled-dog and the composite bow had spread over them from the north-west,⁴ the Plains Indians suddenly acquired a means of transportation that was ideal for their habitat, and, in the act, they as suddenly became for the first time fully masters of the prairie for the twin purposes of hunting the buffalo and making war on their fellow men.

'The student of social origins and institutions would like to put his finger on the exact spot where the Spanish explorer's horses (mares and stallions, for gelding was not then practised) broke their tethers and rushed away into the wild country. Perhaps the horses were stamped by Indians

¹ See the maps in Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 50 and 51.

² See Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 52 and 57.

³ See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

⁴ See Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

or by herds of buffalo; but it is more than likely that some were set free because they became too poor or footsore or crippled to be of further use to their masters. It is not remarkable that horses escaped; but it is remarkable that they survived, multiplied, and spread over the region west of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. Not only did they spread as beasts of burden for the Plains Indians, but they grew wild in vast herds, proving that they had found a natural home. It is generally accepted by anthropologists that these herds originated from the horses lost or abandoned by de Soto about A.D. 1541. Whether they came from de Soto's horses or from those of Coronado or from other explorers is not material; we know that the Kiowa and Missouri Indians were mounted by A.D. 1682; [the Kiowa-Apache, by A.D. 1684;]¹ the Pawnee, by A.D. 1700; the Comanche by A.D. 1714; the Plains Cree and Arikara by A.D. 1738; the Assiniboin, Crow, Mandan, Snake, and Teton, by A.D. 1742; and the most northern tribe, the Sarsi, by A.D. 1784.²

'It was indeed a momentous event when a Plains Indian, half afraid and uncertain, threw his leg for the first time across the back of a Spanish horse and found himself borne along over the grassy plain with an ease and speed he had never dreamed possible of attaining. . . . From that time, slowly and by degrees, he worked out his technique. . . . His world was enlarged and beautified, and his courage, never lacking, expanded with his horizon and his power. God save his enemies!'³

The Plains Indians' Mexican enemies were saved by falling into the hands of the Americans instead of the Apaches. In the sweeping annexations, made by the United States in A.D. 1848, of vast tracts of juridically Mexican territory in which Mexican sovereignty had been effective only at a few widely scattered points, the victorious aggressor Power was inadvertently taking over responsibility for an anti-barbarian frontier, along the southern edge of the Great Plains, which the Republic of Mexico's predecessor, the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain, had inherited, some three hundred years and more before that date, from the Aztec builders of a Mexic universal state whose work the Spaniards had completed. Meanwhile, on the eastern edge of the Great Plains, adjoining the wooded eastern section of North America that had been effectively occupied by American planters and farmers, the United States had already committed itself to the very policy of establishing a permanent *limes*, over against the Plains Indians, which by this time had been discredited on the southern edge of the Plains by the failure of a corresponding Spanish experiment there;⁴ and, while this American repetition of a Spanish mistake was in train, Jefferson Davis capped de Soto's or Coronado's feat of presenting the Plains Indians with the horse that had once made the fortune of the Arabs by doing his best to endow them with the further gift of the camel, which had once made the fortune of the Berbers.⁵

¹ Ibid., p. 117.

² Ibid., pp. 56-57.

³ Ibid., pp. 115-16.

⁴ Accounts of the United States Government's attempt to establish a permanent *limes* along the eastern edge of the Great Plains between A.D. 1823 and A.D. 1840, and of the breakdown of this policy between A.D. 1851 and A.D. 1861, will be found in Paxson, op. cit., chaps. 31 and 46; in Billington, op. cit., pp. 468-73 and 653-4; and in Macleod, W. C.: *The American Indian Frontier* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), chaps. 30 and 31.

⁵ A brief account of this entertaining incident will be found in Webb, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

Under the influence of the picture of the Plains as an inhospitable desert which had been given currency, in the course of the first two decades of the nineteenth century, in a series of reports by American explorers, culminating in Major Long's report on his expedition in A.D. 1820,¹ a proposal had been made in A.D. 1823 by John C. Calhoun, at that time Secretary of War at Washington, for permanently segregating, within the political domain of the United States, an area that was still to be left open for settlement by American farmers from an area that was henceforth to be reserved for occupation by the Indian peoples. The dividing line was to be drawn approximately at the ninety-fifth meridian, which coincided more or less with the borderline between the eastern woodlands and the western prairie. Indian peoples living east of this line—including 'the five civilised nations' in the South-Eastern United States—were to be induced or compelled to move to the west of the line in consideration of their being guaranteed the permanent possession of new lands there, while the Plains Indians were to be induced to make room for these Indian newcomers from the East in consideration of their being guaranteed the permanent occupation of the rest of their hunting-grounds west of the line. The security of title with which the Indians of both provenances were thus to be invested was to be the first step towards reclaiming them for Civilization.

'The great object to be accomplished,' wrote President Monroe in recommending Calhoun's proposal to Congress on the 27th January, 1825, 'is the removal of these tribes to the territory designated . . . conveying to each tribe a good title to an adequate portion of land . . . by providing . . . a system of internal government . . . and, by the regular progress of improvement and civilisation, prevent . . . degeneracy.'²

This proposal was duly carried out in the course of the next fifteen years.

'The approval of Congress was given. A group of treaties made with the western Indians in A.D. 1825 gave a sort of pledge that was followed up by specific laws of 1828 and 1830, in which the policy of [Indian] colonisation was described as an accepted thing. In A.D. 1832 Congress recognised its responsibility to the [Indian] emigrants and created a Bureau of Indian Affairs in the War Department, under a Commissioner whose duty was to care for the Indian wards. Two years later, the great charter of the frontier Indians was enacted in the Indian Intercourse Act, which forbade any White person, without licence from the Indian Commissioner, to set foot in the Indian Country. . . . Schools were promised, to teach the Indians letters and trades. In some cases blacksmiths and other artisans were to be maintained by the United States. There was a serious attempt to carry out the suggestion that, once the tribes had been shifted to their final place of residence, they must be lifted to a higher scale of civilization by the Government of the United States. . . . By the end of A.D. 1840 most of the tribes had been removed to the frontier, the Indian Country was solid, and the administrative details of the arrangement were complete. The American citizen, by his own enactment, no longer possessed a right to advance his settlements towards the West.'³

¹ See pp. 634-5, above.

² Paxson, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-8 and 284.

³ Quoted in Paxson, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

The military implications of this would-be permanent political settlement were clearly recognized. A chain of forts had been built along the western border of the area already settled by American farmers as early as A.D. 1816-27.¹

'The Secretary of War in A.D. 1837 recommended "a chain of permanent fortresses . . . and a competent organisation of the militia of the frontier states" as the best means of maintaining the peace. . . . The commander of the army in the West, General E. P. Gaines, recommended in A.D. 1838 that the cordon of military posts along the Border be built of stone, to outlast the century at least. . . . [Actually,] while the Indian frontier lasted, the defence of the frontier settlements was entrusted to moving bodies of United States troops, to a regiment of mounted dragoons that were enlisted early in the 'thirties, and to the militia.'²

This policy of freezing the western frontier of American agricultural settlement along the borderline between the woodlands and the prairie was maintained for more than thirty years. The first inroad upon it was made in A.D. 1851, when the Sioux and other Plains Indians were cajoled by the United States authorities into consenting, in negotiations conducted that summer at Fort Laramie, to a limitation of their ranges within the area that had previously been guaranteed to them as their permanent domain;³ and 'in the summer of A.D. 1854 the first land office in the Indian Country was opened across the Border from Missouri, to retail to settlers the tribal lands that had been dedicated to perpetual Indian use'.⁴ Yet, 'as late as A.D. 1853, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs' had 'reported that there was no serious encroachment of squatters upon the lands of his wards west of Iowa and Missouri';⁵ and the policy that had been inaugurated by the United States Secretary of War, J. C. Calhoun, in A.D. 1823 was still being pursued by one of his successors, Jefferson Davis, in A.D. 1853-7.⁶

The first premiss on which Davis founded his policy for the frontier was the assumption, traditional in the United States since the eighteenth century, that the Great Plains were irreclaimable. He referred to them as 'that unpopulated desert . . . which, I believe, is, the most of it, to be unpopulated for ever'.⁷ From this first premiss it followed that there could be no question of abandoning President Monroe's policy of maintaining a permanent military frontier between the American planters' and farmers' country in the woodlands to the east of the hundredth meridian and the Indian hunting-tribes' country on the prairie to the west of the same line. The technical military innovations which Davis advocated were all concerned merely with the location of the *lines* and the disposition, type, and equipment of the troops by whom it was to be held. He proposed to replace the existing chain of numerous small and scattered American military posts, thrown out into the fringe of a prairie on which the frontier of American agricultural settlement had not caught up with them, by a small number of strong garrisons that were to be located much farther to the rear, within the already settled and

¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 213-14.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 424-6.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 424.

⁴ Quoted in Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 284-5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 426.

⁷ See Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-6.

cultivated area. The forward zone, from which the existing posts were to be withdrawn, was to be dominated intermittently by sending out strong patrolling expeditions into it during the season when there would be grass there to provide fodder for cavalry horses and baggage animals.

In recording Davis' proposals, Webb points out¹ 'that Davis was advocating a policy very similar to that proposed by Rubí in his report advocating a reorganisation of the Spanish policy on the southern border of the Great Plains'. A student of the frontier policy of the Roman Empire will discern in Davis' proposal the familiar transition from an Augustan policy of holding a single continuous brittle forward line to a Diocletianic policy of defence in depth through a war of movement, with provision for more adequate reserves than the Augustan system had allowed.² The inference is that, by a date at which the United States' *limes* along the eastern edge of the Great Plains had been in existence for some thirty years, the defence, here too, was beginning to be subjected to a strain through the operation of the 'law' that, on a stationary military frontier between a civilization and barbarians, Time tells in the barbarians' favour; and the increases in both the cost and the difficulty of maintaining the American *limes* were, in fact, the grounds explicitly put forward by Davis himself for the technical changes that he was suggesting. He had found that the existing 'garrisons were small and weak, and the soldiers poorly paid and dispirited'.³ The inability of troops dispersed among numerous small forward posts 'to pursue and punish' offending Indian war-bands, which had been committing depredations almost under their noses, had 'tended to bring into disrepute the power and energy of the United States'.⁴

The truth was that, by the eighteen-fifties, the Plains Indians had made themselves into fighting men whose efficiency was formidable not merely for a Republic of Mexico, but even for a Power of the contemporary calibre of the United States; for, in mounting the Spaniard's horse, the Plains Indian had not left the Scythian's composite bow lying idle on the ground. He had converted himself not merely into an expert horseman but into an expert horse-archer in the Parthian style; and the horse-archer who had thus been reborn in the New World was more than a match for the dragoon from the West European extremity of the Old World whose weapon—a pair of horse-pistols—had given the most recent demonstration of its inefficiency at Waterloo. When, in the eighteen-twenties, the American pioneers in Eastern Texas came within close enough range of the western plains to provoke Comanche raids upon them,

'in most respects the Indian had the best of it. In the first place the Texan carried at most three shots; the Comanche carried twoscore or more arrows. It took the Texan a minute to reload his weapon; the Indian could in that time ride three hundred yards and discharge twenty arrows. The Texan had to dismount in order to use his rifle effectively at all, and it was his most reliable weapon; the Indian remained mounted throughout the combat.'⁵

¹ Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 196, n. 1.

² See pp. 26–28, above.

³ Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

⁴ Jefferson Davis, quoted *ibid.*, p. 195.

⁵ Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 169. Cp. Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 410 and 652.

An officer of the United States Army, in a book published as late as A.D. 1866,¹ still found it necessary to explain to his readers that 'the modern schools of military science are but illy suited to carrying on a warfare with the wild tribes of the Plains' and that the horse-Indians' 'tactics are such as to render the old system almost wholly impotent'.

It is true that the Industrial Revolution, which was eventually to provide the American farmer with the appropriate tools for bringing the prairie under the plough, first came to the American soldier's rescue by providing him with an appropriate weapon for fighting the prairie Indian horse-archer. The six-shooter revolver invented by Samuel Colt of Boston was in use among the Texan Rangers before A.D. 1840.²

'The six-shooter . . . stands as the first mechanical adaptation made by the American people when they emerged from the timber and met a set of new needs in the open country of the Great Plains. It enabled the White Man to fight the Plains Indian on horseback.'³

Yet the equipment of American cavalrymen with the revolver was not the end of the armaments race between the Plains Indian and the West European invaders of North America which had begun when the Indian had acquired the Spanish cavalryman's horse; for the transfer of the military ascendancy from the Indian to the American horseman, which was the first effect of the advent of the revolver, was only temporary.

'The revolver . . . multiplied every soldier by six and produced such an inspiring moral effect on the troops, and so entirely depressing an effect on the Indians, that the fights became simply chases—the soldiers attacking, with perfect surety of success, ten or twenty times their numbers. [But] after some years the Indians began to obtain and use revolvers, and the fighting became more equal. It remained, however, for the breech-loading rifle and metallic cartridges to transform the Plains Indian from an insignificant, scarcely dangerous, adversary into as magnificent a soldier as the World can show. Already a perfect horseman, and accustomed all his life to the use of arms on horseback, all [that] he needed was an accurate weapon which could be easily and rapidly loaded while at full speed.'⁴

This passage, recording the personal experience of an American officer who had himself seen active service on the Indian frontier in the last chapter of this frontier's history, brings out the point that, down to the eve of the date at which the Plains Indians were crushed and corralled once for all by their American adversaries, their military efficiency and prowess continued to increase in a geometrical progression through their practice of the transfrontier barbarians' master-art of borrowing the enemy civilization's weapons and then turning them to better account by adapting their use to the nature of a local *terrain* on which the barbarian is at home while the pioneer of the intrusive civilization is out of his element there. The book from which this passage has been quoted was published in A.D. 1882, some six years after the campaigning season

¹ Marcy, R. B.: *Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border* (New York 1866, Harper), pp. 67 ff., quoted in Webb, op. cit., p. 196, n. 1.

² See Webb, op. cit., p. 173.

³ Webb, op. cit., p. 179.

⁴ Dodge, Colonel R. I.: *Our Wild Indians* (Hartford, Conn. 1882, Worthington), pp. 450-1, quoted in Webb, op. cit., p. 175, n. 2.

of A.D. 1876, which had been signalized, in the annals of the warfare between the United States and the Sioux, both by the final débâcle of this barbarian war-band and by its previous infliction on the United States Army of the most grievous reverse ever suffered by United States troops at Indian hands.¹ The explanation of Sitting Bull's swan-song victory over Custer is made clear by Colonel Dodge:²

'That he [the American soldier] can still contend with the Indian on anything like equal terms is his highest commendation; for the Indian is his superior in every soldierlike quality except subordination to discipline and indomitable courage.'

If this verdict on the comparative military qualities of the United States Army and the Plains Indians in the eighteen-seventies is as just an appreciation as it would have been, supposing that it had been pronounced, apropos of the Roman Army and the Goths, by Ammianus Marcellinus, it does indeed go far towards explaining how it came to pass that in A.D. 1876 the United States Army suffered, in miniature, a disaster as deadly as the Roman catastrophe at Adrianople in A.D. 378; but we have then still to find the explanation of the extreme difference between the respective sequels to two episodes of military history that appear to run parallel up to this point. The victory of the Goths at Adrianople on the 9th August, 378, was the prelude to a sweeping barbarian conquest of half the Roman Empire, whereas the victory of the Sioux on the Little Big Horn on the 25th June, 1876, was the prelude to a decisive collapse of the barbarian victors.³ The explanation of this diversity in the outcome is not to be found simply in an industrialized Western Society's fertility in spawning ever more lethal new-fangled mechanical weapons, considering that each new weapon of the kind was successively acquired, and turned to still better account on barbarian *terrain*, by the Western Civilization's Indian opponents on the North American Great Plains. The ultimate reason why the transfrontier barbarian who had triumphed over the Roman Empire in the Old World and had worsted the Spanish Empire and its Mexican successor-state in North America was eventually overwhelmed in North America by the United States was not because of the superiority of the American people in mechanical equipment but because of their numbers and, perhaps even more, their enterprise.

Before the last round in the warfare between the Americans and the Plains Indians was fought out to a decisive conclusion in the Americans' favour in the course of the years A.D. 1861-76, the Plains Indians had been outmanœuvred in advance through being encircled by their American assailants, as the Eurasian Nomad herdsmen who were crushed by the Russians and the Manchus in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era had previously been encircled by these two sedentary Powers when the Russian and Manchu outposts had collided with one another in the seventeenth century in the Amur

¹ See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 666.

² Quoted in Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 175, n. 2.

³ The details of the last convulsions of Indian resistance on the Plains between A.D. 1876 and A.D. 1890 will be found in Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 666-7. The accompanying religious phenomena have been noticed in the present study in V. v. 329-32.

Basin.¹ And, like the seventeenth-century Russo-Manchu feat of encircling the Eurasian Nomads, the nineteenth-century American feat of encircling the North American Plains Indians was achieved with no better weapons than de Soto's or Coronado's, and with no better means of transportation than Alexander's, Caesar's, or Napoleon's.

Like the contemporary South African pioneers who were trekking northward across the Orange River into the heart of Africa, the American pioneers who traversed the Great Plains of North America in the course of the years A.D. 1821-49 were armed only with non-repeating fire-arms, and were equipped, at the best, with 'covered wagons' of the kind in which the Goths had made their transit from the Baltic to the Black Sea coast of the Eurasian Continent in the early centuries of the Christian Era, and the Philistines' theirs from the Aegean coast of Anatolia to the eastern approaches to Egypt in the early years of the twelfth century B.C. Indeed, the nineteenth-century American pioneers reckoned it a triumph when they succeeded in finding a way for the passage of these immemorially old 'houses on wheels' which not only made the journey physically practicable for children, women, sick persons, and household goods, as well as for able-bodied men, but also made it possible to protect the caravans against attack by Indians behind the rampart of a wagon-lager.² In some of the earliest of their treks across the Plains into the Far West, the American pioneers failed to manœuvre their wagons through the mountains and were compelled to finish the journey with pack-horses. In the summer of A.D. 1856 a party of five hundred men, women, and children actually made their way over the twelve hundred miles of trail from Iowa City to Salt Lake City pushing a hundred two-wheeled hand-carts!³

The trans-Plains pioneers were no doubt eventually assisted in arriving at their jumping-off places at the western edge of the eastern timbered country by the gradual development of mechanical transportation, in the shape of river-steamships and railroads, in their rear. Yet the first sod was not turned for the construction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad till A.D. 1828,⁴ seven years after the first wagon caravans had made their way across the Plains from Missouri to Santa Fé; the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad did not reach the Ohio River till A.D. 1852; and 'it was five years more before there was a continuation west of the Ohio to Cincinnati and St. Louis'.⁵ Thus the trans-Plains West had already been won by the pioneers before railhead had reached their jumping-off places on the western border of the State of Missouri at the eastern edge of the prairie. Work on a transcontinental railroad was not started till A.D. 1863—when, significantly, the first start was made at the Far Western end, from west to east, and not from east to west at the westernmost railhead in the Mississippi Basin—and the through-track from coast to coast was not completed till May 1869, in the year following the campaigning season in which the United States Army had broken the back of the Plains Indians' resistance.

¹ See III. iii. 19.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 542-3.

³ See Paxson, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

⁴ See Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 463-4 and 525.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 405.

What was it that moved the American people, without waiting for the weapons and tools that the Industrial Revolution was forging for them, thus to encircle the Plains Indians by breaking out of the United States Government's artificial *limes* along the western verge of the timbered country and pushing across the prairie and over the mountains to a natural frontier at the Pacific coast? For half a century and more, running from about A.D. 1820, the American people believed, as unquestioningly as the United States Government, that the Great Plains were permanently irreclaimable for agriculture. What prompted the people to reply to the challenge of this apparent barrier across their path by making a response that, unlike their Government's response, was positive, not negative? While the Government was trying to establish a permanent military frontier along the eastern edge of the Plains, pioneer American traders, farmers, and miners were pushing their adventurous way right across the Plains in the hope of finding—not on them, but beyond them—a fresh land of promise which would equal, and perhaps surpass, the timbered eastern section of the United States which by this time they had already colonized.

This daring leap of the American pioneers across the prairie in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era is reminiscent of the leap across the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe that was made in the tenth century by missionaries from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin who converted Great Bulgaria to Islam and by rival missionaries from Constantinople who converted Russia to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. But the driving force that gave an irresistible impetus to the American pioneers' trek across two-thirds of the breadth of the great North American island from the western edge of the eastern timbered country all the way to the Pacific coast was not that concern for the salvation of souls which had previously carried the Jesuit missionaries to California from Mexico; it was the mounting pressure of an American population, east of the *limes*, that was now being reinforced by the rapidly increasing population of a nineteenth-century Western Europe.

"The whole population of the United States rose from 9,638,453 in A.D. 1820 to 17,069,453 in A.D. 1840. Of this increase of almost seven and a half millions, more than four millions were to be found in the states and territories west of the Appalachian Mountains. The total western population was about 6,300,000, . . . and this total was nearly 200 per cent more than it had been in A.D. 1820. The whole United States increased about 80 per cent in twenty years. The eastern states, even with the help of their frontier elements, increased only some sixty per cent in the same period."¹

The pressure of this potent head of population mounting up against the inner face of the United States Government's *limes* was the force that catapulted the pioneers—by sheer muscle-power without mechanical aids—right across the Plains to the western mountains, and, over these, to the Pacific, between the years A.D. 1821 and 1849.

This abundance of man-power, working together with a contemporary release of the United States from political and military entanglements

¹ Paxson, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-7.

overseas, perhaps suffices to explain the contrast between the Americans' triumphant nineteenth-century response to the challenge of the Great Plains and the Spaniards' previous dismal failure. Even after the Spaniards had established themselves in Texas, on the opposite fringe of the Great Plains to New Mexico, in A.D. 1716-18,¹

'if a Spaniard wanted to go from San Antonio [in Texas] to Santa Fé [in New Mexico], he did not make a direct journey across the Great Plains: he took the Camino Real, went south to Durango, then turned west and north and skirted the mountains until he came to Santa Fé. He went hundreds of miles out of the direct way, thus avoiding the open Plains country.'²

In the event, a trail across the Great Plains to Santa Fé in New Mexico from the timbered eastern section of North America was opened up, not from Texas, but from Missouri.

The news that Mexico had thrown off Spanish sovereignty in A.D. 1820 was promptly followed up by the arrival at Santa Fé, in A.D. 1821, of no fewer than three rival American caravans, racing one another to be the first in the New Mexican market;³ and the arrival of a single great organized American caravan from Independence, Missouri, was an annual event at Santa Fé during the years A.D. 1830-44.⁴ The American occupation of Oregon, which had been begun by seamen sailing round Cape Horn, was confirmed by a north-westward overland trek across the Great Plains which was first achieved in A.D. 1832⁵ and which was consummated in A.D. 1843, when for the first time wagons went all the way.⁶ The first overland trek from Kansas to California was made in A.D. 1841,⁷ and in A.D. 1844 wagons went all the way on this trail likewise.⁸ The Mormons made their trek from Iowa to Utah, right across the middle zone of the Plains, in A.D. 1847, and in A.D. 1849 the 'Gold Rush' to California was made overland across the Plains, as well as by the more circuitous maritime route round Cape Horn. The first coach travelled from Tipton, Missouri, to San Francisco on the 15th September-10th October, 1858.⁹

These divers transits of the Great Plains from the Eastern United States to the Rocky Mountains, and beyond these to the Pacific Coast, between A.D. 1821 and A.D. 1859,¹⁰ all occurred during a period when, as we have observed, it was the United States Government's official policy to maintain, *more Hispanico*, a permanent *límite* along the borderline, east of Meridian 98°, between the woodland and the prairie; and there was an inconsistency between policy and practice that was fraught with eventual trouble; for these widely ramifying and rapidly multiplying American trespasses on the hunting grounds of the Plains Indians were provocative, and 'the discovery of gold in the Pike's Peak country touched off the inevitable conflict. A hundred thousand miners crossed the Plains in

¹ See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

² Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 86. See the maps in Paxson, *op. cit.*, p. 307, and in Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

³ See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 462.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 513-14.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 563-4.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 635-6.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 463.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 524-6.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 564.

¹⁰ See the map in Webb, *op. cit.*, on p. 148.

1859, elbowed their way into Cheyenne and Arapaho lands, and drove the Indians from their homes. Resentment bred of those outrages was infectious,¹ and the sequel was the series of wars between the Plains Indians and the United States Army which went on from A.D. 1861 to A.D. 1876. These wars ended, as we have seen, in the Indians being defeated on the battlefield and being corralled in reservations; in other words, they ended in the abandonment, after a forty years' trial, of the policy of maintaining a *limes* at the eastern edge of the Great Plains. But the denouement which thus liquidated the United States' *limes* along the eastern edge of the prairie was, of course, the opposite of the classical denouement along artificial *limites* between civilizations and barbarians. The catastrophe that eventually turned the *limes* here into a superfluous anachronism was not the collapse of the Power that had established it; it was the crushing of the transfrontier barbarians against whom it had been designed as a defence for the society that had been domiciled on the inner side of it.

The United States' Army's victory over the Plains Indians in the warfare of A.D. 1861-76 was conclusive because, by this time, the Army's military striking power was being reinforced by the impetus of an expanding population that was now pressing in upon the Great Plains from the Far West as well as from the East. The military decision was clinched on the economic plane by the extermination, between A.D. 1867 and A.D. 1883, of the game on which the Plains Indians had lived as parasites. The discovery in A.D. 1871 of a profitable commercial use for buffalo hides led to an annual slaughter, at the rate of three million victims a year, over the years 1872-4; the Great Southern Herd was extinct by A.D. 1878, the Great Northern Herd by A.D. 1883; and by A.D. 1903 no more than thirty-four living specimens were to be found of a species which had probably been represented on the Plains by about thirteen million head before the advent of the rifle.² This destruction of the non-human, as well as the human, fauna that had tenanted the Great Plains hitherto left the American people in command of the solitude that they had made; but the eviction of the previous pre-Columbian tenants had not settled the question how the new occupants of Transatlantic provenance would utilize their tardily acquired prairie estate.

The American farmer was not to bring the Great Plains under the plough till he had followed up the United States' Army's conclusive victory over the Plains Indian Nomad hunting tribes by fighting, on the morrow of the overt Civil War of A.D. 1861-5, an undeclared civil war in which the opposing parties were neither the North versus the South nor the farmer versus the planter but the sedentary tiller of the ground versus the Nomad keeper of livestock.³ After farmer Cain had rid himself of hunter Nimrod,⁴ he had still to settle accounts with herdsman Abel; and in North America, as in the Old World, the struggle for life between Cain and Abel was as savage as the stakes were high. Even before the Plains Indian and the buffalo had disappeared from the scene, the contest for possession of the Great Plains of North America

¹ Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 654.

² Gen. iv. 2.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 667-8.

⁴ Gen. x. 9.

was already being fought out between an American farmer with the traditions of some six to ten thousand years of husbandry behind him and an American avatar of the Eurasian Nomad herdsman who, in A.D. 1866, sprang fully armed from the dragon's-tooth seed which the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5 had sown in the pastures of the Nueces Valley at the southernmost extremity of the Great Plains on the Gulf Coast of Western Texas.

This economic and social conflict between an American Cain, branded with the mark of his Transatlantic provenance, and an American Abel, who had made a dramatic second epiphany in a New World, lasted four times as long as the military Civil War to which it was an epilogue; for, though the American farmer, with the aid of the American industrialist, succeeded in making an effective lodgement on the Great Plains in the course of the eighteen-seventies, the American cowboy had anticipated him by spreading all over the Plains between A.D. 1866 and A.D. 1880,¹ and it was not till after the speculative boom of A.D. 1880-5 in the cattle industry had precipitated the crash of A.D. 1885-7,² and till after the shepherd had made a half-hearted attempt to elbow his way in,³ that the farmer found himself relieved of his competitor the herdsman thanks to Abel's follies and misfortunes rather than to Cain's own prowess. Even then, when the farmer's successive human rivals in the fight for possession of the Great Plains of North America had all passed away, Cain's acquisition of the disputed territory was by no means assured; for the Indian hunter, Texan cowboy, and Far Western shepherd had none of them been such formidable adversaries as Physical Nature was to show herself to be; and in A.D. 1952 it still remained to be seen whether the Great Plains would prove permanently amenable to Cain's high-handed attempt, with the aid of his offspring Tubal-Cain the artificer,⁴ to annex these dry grasslands to Ceres' empire.

Whatever the ultimate destiny of Agriculture on the Great Plains might be, there was no indication in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era that Cain's discomfited pastoral rival was likely to try conclusions with him here again. In the economic and social history of the United States the rise and fall of 'the Cattle Kingdom' had been no more than a brilliant flash in the trigger-pan;⁵ yet, for a student of the geneses of civilizations, the amply recorded history of an abortive pastoral civilization in North America which had come and gone between A.D. 1866 and A.D. 1887 was an episode of surpassing interest in so far as it provided authentic materials for reconstructing, by analogy, the lost history of the genesis, round about the turn of the third and second millennia B.C., of a pastoral civilization on the Eurasian Steppe which had had a subsequent life-span of some four thousand years' duration—in the course of which it had produced momentous effects on the histories of all its sedentary neighbours.

In the abortive yet none the less illuminating nineteenth-century

¹ See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 679.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 683-6.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 687.

⁴ Gen. iv. 22.

⁵ Accounts of this episode in the history of the United States will be found in Paxson, *op. cit.*, chap. 56; Webb, *op. cit.*, chap. 6; Billington, *op. cit.*, chap. 33.

North American instance an historian could watch the process by which, in the Nueces Valley, a composite society, in which human beings, horses, and cattle were co-operating with one another, under human management, to make a living off an uncultivated grassland,¹ came into existence as an economic and social appendage to a neighbouring sedentary agricultural society² and then suddenly made what was tantamount to a declaration of economic and social independence by taking the whole vast prairie for its realm³ and claiming to deal, on terms of equality, with agricultural neighbours to whose economy 'the Cattle Kingdom' had previously been subsidiary. This significant passage of history on the southernmost sector of the borderland between the eastern woodland and the western prairie in North America offered an insight into the process through which some sector of the borderland between the Desert and the Sown in the Old World—perhaps the fringes of the oasis 'of Anau in Transcaspia—had once given birth to a Nomad pastoral society which had then proceeded to propagate itself over the entire Eurasian Steppe—as rapidly, for all that we know, as the nineteenth-century North American 'Cattle Kingdom' spread northwards over the Great Plains from the Nueces Valley into Canada between A.D. 1866 and A.D. 1880.

Even the fratricidal warfare between Cain and Abel, which had played so large a part in the histories of the civilizations of the Old World for not much less than four thousand years, was rekindled in North America during the twenty years for which the North American 'Cattle Kingdom' lasted; and in the New World, as in the Old World, Cain took upon his head the guilt of playing the part of the aggressor. As recently as A.D. 1865 the farmers of Western Missouri had, at least in sympathy if not in action,⁴ been on the same side as the cowboys of South-Western Texas in a fierce civil war between a Southern Confederacy and a Union from which it was striving to secede. Yet in A.D. 1866, when the Texan cowboys, on the first of their annual northward cattle-drives, were bearing down upon railhead at Sedalia, within the limits of cultivation in Western Missouri, they were attacked and robbed by 'embattled farmers' who, the year before, had been, at least in spirit, their fellow Confederates.⁵ 'Ferocious Plains Indians . . . were to be preferred to the Missourians';⁶ for the feud between South and North on the political surface of life did not avail, even in the year following the date of the Confederacy's overthrow, to maintain the solidarity of the South against the disruptive effect of a more ancient feud between Cain and Abel that had suddenly erupted from a source deep down in the abyss of a Collective Subconscious Psyche with a violence almost equal to that of the still more ancient feud between Cain and Nimrod.

¹ See III. iii. 10 and 13-14 for this feature in the organization of the Nomad pastoral societies of the Old World.

² Cp. III. iii. 10-11.

³ Cp. III. iii. 11-13.

⁴ Missouri was one of the border slave-states that had failed to secede from the Union in A.D. 1861; but the hearts of perhaps a majority of her population had been on the Southern side throughout the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5.

⁵ See Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-19; Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 673-5.

⁶ Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

VIII. D, ANNEX

'THE MONSTROUS REGIMENT OF WOMEN'¹

THE Heroic Age might have been expected to be a masculine age *par excellence*. Does not the evidence convict it of having been an age of brute force? And, when force is given a free rein, what chance can women have of holding their own against the physically dominant sex? This *a priori* logic is confuted by the facts; for the facts show that this Heroic Age of unbridled adolescent barbarism can challenge comparison with a Matriarchal Age of primitive agriculture and with a Shorthand-typist Age of elderly business organization as an age in which women were in the ascendant. Let us survey these paradoxical facts before we try to discover the explanation of them.

In the Heroic Age the great catastrophes are apt to be women's work, even when the woman's role is ostensibly passive. If Alboin's unsatisfied desire for Rosamund was the cause of the extermination of the Gepidae, it is credible that the sacking of Troy was provoked by the satisfaction of Paris' desire for Helen,² and that Haethcyn brought disaster on himself by carrying off a Swedish Queen.³ More commonly the women are undisguisedly the mischief-makers whose malice drives the heroes into slaying one another. The legendary quarrel at Worms between Brunhild and Kriemhild, which eventually discharged itself in the slaughter in Etzel's Danubian hall, has its Icelandic counterpart in Hallgerda's quarrel with Bergthora which eventually resulted in Njal's house being burnt over his head; and, though, in the saga as well as in the epic, the maker's art has spun fiction out of fact, we may assume that the fiction has commended itself because it is true to life.⁴ It is indeed all of one piece with the authentic incidents of the historical quarrel between the legendary Brunhild's nobly ferocious namesake⁵ and her basely ferocious enemy Fredegund, which cost the Merovingian successor-state of the Roman Empire forty years of civil war.⁶

¹ *The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women* is the title of a pamphlet published by John Knox in A.D. 1558.

² The legendary Trojan War is presented by Herodotus (Book I, chap. 5) as the first round in a thenceforth perennial warfare between Hellenes and Orientals which is the plot of his historical drama, while the Rape of Helen, which was the Trojan War's legendary cause, was, according to him (Book I, chaps. 1-4), the fourth of a series of incidents of the kind, in which Io, Europa, and Medea had been Helen's predecessors (see pp. 454-7, above). The Orientals had started this series of abductions by carrying off Io, but the Hellenes had been the first to commit the criminal folly of making an abduction a *casus belli*. 'To abduct women was a crime, but to take their abduction seriously enough to insist on reprisals was a folly, since it was obvious that these women would not have got themselves abducted if they had not so desired' (Book I, chap. 4). In this satirical introduction to a work of genius the sophisticated Hellenic historian has wittily travestied one of the traditional motifs of a post-Minoan 'heroic' saga.

³ Beowulf, ll. 2930 ff., cited by H. M. Chadwick in *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), p. 337.

⁴ See I. i. 449-50.

⁵ An appreciation of the historical Brunhild's character will be found in Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), pp. 172-3 and 232-4.

⁶ For the causes of the quarrel between Brunhild and Fredegund, to which this forty-years' war was the sequel, see p. 654, below.

'It is well to bear in mind the story of the war between the Angli and the Warni, a war which owed its origin to Radiger's repudiation of his marriage contract with the English King's sister. . . . This story comes, not from a poem, but from the work of a strictly contemporary Roman historian. . . . In the story of Radiger we see how a young princess was able to gather together a huge army and bring about a sanguinary struggle between two nations on account of an insult offered to her by a neighbouring king. Again, Paulus Diaconus¹ states that the war between the Heruli and the Langobardi was due to the murder of the Herulian King's brother by a Langobardic princess. Even if this story is untrue, it is significant enough that it should obtain credit. . . . According to Gregory of Tours² the overthrow of the Burgundian kingdom [in Savoy] was due to the instigation of Hrothhild, who implored her sons to exact vengeance for the murder of her parents—a case not unlike the Norse version of the story of Hamdhir and Sörlí. Hildeberht's invasion of Spain was undertaken in answer to messages from his sister Hlothhild, who had been ill-treated by her husband, the Visigothic King Amalaric.³ The dissensions which eventually brought about the downfall of the Thuringian kingdom had their origin in the proud and jealous character of Amalaberga, the wife of Irminfrith.⁴ Unless we are prepared to shut our eyes to the plain evidence of History, we are bound to recognise that the personal feelings of queens and princesses were among the very strongest of the factors by which the politics of the Heroic Age were governed.⁵

These words ring as true to Macedonian barbarian life in a post-Achaemenian heroic age as to Teutonic barbarian life in a post-Hellenic heroic age.

'It was in the character and action of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic queens that the Macedonian blood and tradition showed itself. Both dynasties exhibit a series of strong-willed, masculine, unscrupulous women of the same type as those who fought and intrigued for power in the old Macedonian Kingdom. The last Cleopatra of Egypt is the best known to us, but she was only a type of her class. There was no relegation of queens and princesses to the obscurity of a harem. They mingled in the political game as openly as the men. It was in the political sphere, rather than in that of sensual indulgence, that their passions lay and their crimes found a motive. Sometimes they went at the head of armies. . . . It is only in the intensity and recklessness with which they pursue their ends that we see any trace of womanhood left in them.'⁶

The influence of women over men in the Heroic Age had not, of course, been exhibited solely in the crudely malevolent practice of goading the men into fratricidal strife. No women had left deeper marks on history than Alexander's mother Olympias and Mu'awiyah's mother Hind, and these two viragos had immortalized themselves, not by their recorded deeds of passion and violence,⁷ but by their life-long moral

¹ See his *Historia Langobardorum*, Book I, chap. 20.

² See his *Historia Francorum*, Book III, chap. 6.

³ See *ibid.*, Book III, chap. 10.

⁴ Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-8 and 372.

⁵ See *ibid.*, Book III, chap. 4.

⁶ Bevan, E. R.; *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Edward Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 279-80.

⁷ Hind is reported to have bitten the liver of her slain enemy Hamzah's corpse on the battlefield of Uhud (Margoliouth, D. S.: *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam* (New York 1905, Putnam), p. 306). As for the deeds of Olympias, the charge-sheet was graven on

ascendancy over their redoubtable sons—an ascendancy that was not impaired by their separation from the husbands to whom these sons had been born by them. Mu'āwiyah always delighted in speaking of himself as 'the son of Hind', and used to put his mother at the head of the list when he was enumerating the glories of his family;¹ and Alexander, for his part, was at heart his mother's son, who had cloven to Olympias when her estrangement from Philip had come to an open breach—a resolution of psychological forces which is aptly symbolized in the myth that the hero was begotten on his mother, not by his legitimate human father, but by an imperious heavenly sire.²

After Alexander's premature death, Olympias entered the arena of Macedonian cut-throat politics as a principal and duly met her own death at the hands of as ruthless a criminal as herself in the person of Cassander. Zenobia, the widow of Odenathus prince of Palmyra, and 'Ā'ishah, the widow of the Prophet Muhammad and the daughter of his first *khalīfah* Abu Bakr, embarked on similar ventures without being made to pay for failure with their lives. Zenobia's life was spared by her grim conqueror Aurelian,³ even after she had repeated her attempt to carve a Palmyrene Arab barbarian successor-state out of the Roman Empire;⁴ and 'Ā'ishah was left in peace by her chivalrous conqueror 'Alī after he had defeated her in the one signal victory in his otherwise disappointing career.⁵ The death of the Seleucid Emperor Antiochus II, 'the god', was the signal for his rival widows, a Seleucid Laodice at Ephesus and a Lagid Berenice at Antioch, to plunge the Asiatic Macedonian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire into civil strife which festered into an international war between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic Powers when Berenice's brother Ptolemy III Euergetes of Egypt took up arms to avenge his sister's death after she had been assassinated through the treachery of a trusted physician who was secretly in Laodice's service.⁶ The Merovingian successor-state of the Roman Empire in Gaul was similarly plunged into a civil war—which dragged on for forty years⁷—by two rival queens who did not wait for

the hearts of two men—Philip and Antipater—who, on this subject, found Alexander infatuatedly blind.

¹ Lammens, S. J., *Le Père H. : Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'āwīa Ier* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), p. 69. Cf. eundem: *La Mecque à la Veille de l'Hégire* (Bayrūt 1924, Imprimerie Catholique), p. 170. The spirit which captivated Hind's son is exemplified in her bearing towards Muhammad at the *levée* at which she found herself constrained to declare her allegiance to the conqueror after the capitulation of Mecca (see Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 390), and in her trading venture, financed with money borrowed from the public treasury by leave of the Caliph 'Umar, after she had been divorced by her husband Abu Sufyān (see Lammens, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-70).

² See V. vi. 267-8.

³ Aurelian's death-warrant was addressed, not to Zenobia, but to her male academician Longinus.

⁴ The successor-state that Zenobia did momentarily establish at her first attempt was an abortive anticipation of the Ghassanid phylarchy on the Roman Empire's Syrian *limes*, and of Muhammad's oasis-principality of Medina whose capital was transferred by Mu'āwiyah to Damascus (see I. i. 74; II. ii. 11; VI. vii. 131 and 208-9).

⁵ At the Battle of the Camel (*commisum* 9 Dec., A.D. 656) it was not 'Ā'ishah, but her male confederates Talhah and Zubayr, who lost their lives.

⁶ See Bevan, E. R.: *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 181-3.

⁷ See Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), p. 174.

their husbands to be removed from the arena by assassination before taking into their own hands the pursuit of a quarrel which for them was a personal blood-feud.

Fredegund of Neustria had a grievance against her paramour Chilperic that was comparable to the grievance of Laodice of Ephesus against her husband Antiochus—though not indeed a grievance of equal magnitude, since Laodice was not only Antiochus's wedded wife but was also his half-sister, whereas Fredegund was a maidservant who was her master's concubine. Chilperic dismissed his concubine Fredegund, besides repudiating his lawful wife Audovera, in order to contract a politically advantageous marriage with Galswintha, the daughter of Athanagild King of the Visigoths and the sister of Chilperic's brother Sigiberht's wife, Queen Brunhild of Austrasia.¹ Chilperic's and Antiochus's second marriages had the same motive and the same denouement in the literal sense of the word. In the sequel in either case the fickle king's first love prevailed over *raison d'état*, but Galswintha was more unfortunate than Berenice; for the Lagid queen survived her desertion by her Seleucid husband, to seize and hold half his inheritance before she met her violent end, whereas Galswintha's life was taken by Fredegund with Chilperic's connivance—a complicity that was flagrantly advertised when Chilperic rewarded his former concubine for the murder of his royal sister-in-law's royal sister by taking the bondwoman-murderess to wife. The blood-feud thus ignited between Brunhild and Fredegund was inflamed when Brunhild's husband Sigiberht was treacherously stabbed to death (with poisoned daggers) by agents of Fredegund in the hour of his victory, while he was being saluted by his brother Chilperic's Neustrian warriors as their king,² and it was exacerbated still further when, nine years later,³ Chilperic in his turn was assassinated by an unknown hand whose stab was never brought home to its instigator. Fredegund died in her bed;⁴ Brunhild was done to death sixteen years later⁵ by Fredegund's son Chlothar II under tortures⁶ which Olympias was spared in her judicial murder by Cassander.

These militant queens were not always content to leave even the physical fighting entirely to their male proxies. The fight in which 'Ā'ishah's warriors were worsted by 'Alī's acquired its name 'the Battle of the Camel' from 'Ā'ishah's personal presence on the field in her curtained camel-howdah 'wie ein Kriegsheiligtum';⁷ and Berenice the rival of Laodice literally took up arms at a crisis in her fortunes, when Laodice's partisans in Antioch had succeeded in kidnapping Berenice's infant son, whose claim to the Seleucid crown was the indispensable cloak under which his mother, like her rival, was fighting for her own hand.

'In this extremity Berenice showed the spirit of a lioness. The child was

¹ For the antithesis between Austrasia and Neustria, see II. ii. 167.

² See Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 133 and 182. Sigiberht's end was a reproduction, 'in real life', of Siegfried's legendary death—for which a legendary King Gunther mourned as hypocritically as Queen Galswintha's authentic murder was mourned by an historical King Chilperic.

³ Sigiberht was assassinated in A.D. 575, Chilperic in A.D. 584.

⁴ In A.D. 597.

⁵ In A.D. 613.

⁶ See Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 211 and 232.

⁷ Becker, C. H.: *Islamstudien*, vol. i (Leipzig 1924, Quelle and Meyer), p. 101.

believed to have been carried to a certain house. Berenice instantly mounted a chariot, took in her own hand a spear, and galloped to the spot. On the way, Caeneus [Laodice's leading partisan at Antioch] met her. The Queen aimed her spear at him. It missed. Nothing daunted, Berenice followed it with a stone, which brought her enemy down.¹

This historical episode lends colour to a legendary scene; for Brunhild likewise, in her assault-at-arms with Gunther, in which the female combatant's hand and the male combatant's life are the stakes, follows up with a stone's throw a spear-cast that has failed to kill.²

The evidence that we have now reviewed is perhaps sufficient to demonstrate that the Heroic Age is the age of opportunity for Goneril and Regan. Aristotle notices that 'most of the military and warlike breeds of men are under the regiment of women';³ but he does not discover for us the explanation of these facts that he has observed, for he records this observation incidentally to a discussion of the reason why gynaeocracy—'the regiment of women'—prevailed likewise at Sparta under the Lycurgean *agôgê* in its decadence, and his solution for this problem of Spartan psychology—a solution that is as convincing as it is acute⁴—is manifestly inapplicable to 'the regiment of women' over barbarian warriors in the Heroic Age.

To explain this peculiar phenomenon at Sparta, Aristotle puts his finger on the peculiar severity of the discipline to which the male half of the Spartiate community was subjected. As he points out, the authors and administrators of the *agôgê* had neglected—or had tried in vain—to impose on the Spartiate women a way of life that they had succeeded in imposing on the men with all too complete a success—with the result that the Spartiate women were at an advantage, in their dealings with the men, thanks to their own unrestricted enjoyment of a liberty, and even a licence, which were rigorously denied to their fathers, brothers, and husbands. Manifestly this explanation is as inapplicable to the barbarians as it is convincing apropos of the Spartans; for, in this matter of libertarianism, the barbarian warrior labours under no handicap whatsoever *vis-à-vis* his mother, sister, or wife. As we have already observed in the chapter to which this Annex attaches, the life of the barbarian warrior squatting in his moral slum⁵ inside a fallen *limes* is as

¹ Bevan, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 182. Berenice's presence of mind and physical prowess did not avail to enable her to recover possession of her child's body, alive or dead; but they did avail to win her such a preponderance of popular sympathy among the citizens of Antioch that the slain Caeneus' fellow municipal magistrates, who had been his accomplices in kidnapping Berenice's child on Laodice's behalf, found themselves constrained to exhibit a child to the people as the infant king.

² We are not, of course, suggesting that the assault-at-arms between Brunhild and Gunther, described in the *Nibelungenlied*, was an historical event. In the legendary Brunhild we have, not a poetic reminiscence of an historical personage, but a poetic transformation of a goddess into a human heroine. The legendary Brunhild, as her name bears witness, was originally a war-goddess clad in a coat of mail; and this origin, which is no longer discernible in the High German *Nibelungenlied*, is still manifest in the Norse *Volsungar Saga*.

³ Aristotle: *Politics*, Book II, chap. vi, § 6 (1269 B, 24-27). He notes, as exceptions to this 'law', 'the Celts and others who openly practise and approve homosexuality.' This subsidiary law of Aristotle's had been further illustrated, since Aristotle's own day, by the *mores* of the Egyptian Mamlûks.

⁴ See the present Study, III. iii. 75.

⁵ See the passage quoted from H. G. Wells in VIII D, on p. 53, n. 2.

lawless as the Spartiate 'peer's' life is regular (so long, at least, as the Spartiate 'peer' is held fast within the *cadres* of his mess in peace-time and his unit on active service). The explanation of the 'regiment' of women over the barbarian war-band must therefore lie in some non-Spartan direction. There are perhaps two lines of explanation, one sociological and the other psychological.

The sociological explanation is to be found in the fact that the Heroic Age is a social interregnum in which the traditional habits of Primitive Life in its latter-day Yin-state¹ have been broken up, while no new 'cake of custom' had yet been baked by a nascent civilization or nascent higher religion. In this unusual and ephemeral social situation a temporary social vacuum is filled by an individualism so absolute that it overrides even the intrinsic differences in nature between the sexes. This individualism does, of course, tell against women as well as in their favour. In the brutal anarchy of the Primitive Muslim Arab heroic age the normal inferiority of women to men in sheer physical strength did expose the women to the scourge of outright physical ill-treatment—at any rate among the Qurayshite lords of creation, whose standard of behaviour towards women had previously, in the pre-Islamic 'Days of Ignorance', already been conspicuously lower, not only than that of their sedentary neighbours at Medina, but even than the standard of their Nomad contemporaries.² Again, it can hardly be an accidental coincidence that the Macedonian, Merovingian, and Primitive Muslim Arab heroic ages should, all alike, be infamous for the facility with which the heroes divorced their wives—a wrong which was not righted by the corresponding facility with which the discarded women were able to obtain successive husbands. It is all the more remarkable to find this unbridled individualism bearing, in the political field, fruits hardly distinguishable from those of a doctrinaire feminism that is altogether beyond the emotional range and the intellectual horizon of the women and men of the Heroic Age,³ and to see these openings for the exercise of political power presenting themselves to Umayyad Qurayshī princesses,⁴ as well as to their Macedonian forerunners and their Merovingian sisters.

In the Heroic Age the state appears to have been regarded as little more than the property of an individual—or rather, perhaps, of a family, which itself was intimately connected with a number of other families in similar positions. . . . It is worth noticing what is recorded in *Beowulf* on an occasion of great emergency. Hygelac, King of the Geatas, lost his life in the disastrous expedition against the Frisians and left an only son, Heardred, who seems to have been scarcely more than a child. *Beowulf* escaped from the slaughter; and, on his return, "Hygd offered him the treasury and the government, the rings and the throne. She trusted not that her child would be able to hold his patrimony against foreign

¹ See II. i. 191-5.

² See Lammens, S.J., *Le Père H.: Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia Ier* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), pp. 314-24.

³ 'Le féminisme, il faut bien en convenir, ne rencontrait pas à cette époque des partisans en Arabie, même dans les rangs du beau sexe' (Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 316).

⁴ See Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 329. Under the subsequent 'Abbasid régime, princesses lost the prestige and power that had been theirs under the Umayyad dispensation.

nations, now that Hygelac was dead."¹ There is no reference to any action on the part of the council or court; but the queen offers the throne to the late king's nephew. The whole passage seems to indicate that the throne, with all its rights, was regarded very much like any ordinary family property. Its disposition is arranged by the family itself, without any notion of responsibility to others; and the members of the court are not taken into account any more than the servants in a private household. It may perhaps be argued that court poets would be apt to exaggerate the power of the royal family, and consequently that the picture of its authority given here is misleading. Yet Amalaswintha, who was a contemporary of Hygelac, appears to have acted on her own authority when she associated Theodahath, the nephew of Theodric, in the sovereignty with herself after her son's death.²

In the legend of a post-Minoan heroic age that was current in an Hellenic World, the succession of the interloping Pelopidae to the preceding Perseid holders of the lordship of Mycenae was traditionally accounted for, as Thucydides points out,³ by the fact that the mother of the last Perseid king, Eurystheus, was the sister of the first Pelopid king, Atreus. On the strength of this relationship on the female side, Eurystheus, when he took his departure from Mycenae on a campaign against Athens from which he was never to return, was reputed to have left his castle and his kingdom in Atreus' charge; and the queen was the living hinge on whom politics turned in the lordship of Ithaca likewise, as the story is told in the *Odyssey*.

Though, even according to the unexacting standards of the Heroic Age, the Cephallenian *pallikaria* have got shockingly out of hand as a result of the twenty years' absence of their lawful king Odysseus, they have not the audacity to liquidate Odysseus' lordship by formally reducing their lost king's son and heir, Telemachus, to a station on an equality with their own, until the lost king's queen, Penelope, shall have consented to leave her missing husband's house in order to marry one of these lordlings' own number; and, though it is assumed that, if she does contract a second marriage, she will return for this purpose to the house of her father Icarius, to be given away for a second time from there, it is also assumed that, in the choice of her new husband from among her 108 suitors,⁴ the last word will lie, not with her father, but with her herself. 'Send your mother away and make her marry the man whom her father chooses and whom she prefers' is the course that is proposed to Telemachus by Antinous, parleying as spokesman for all the suitors.⁵ The implication seems to be that, so long as the missing king's living queen remains mistress of her absent husband's house, her loyalty to him—or even merely to his memory, if he should prove to be dead—effectively preserves the royal prerogative for Odysseus himself, should he live to return, or for his son Telemachus, should he live to grow to man's estate. So long as Penelope can contrive to continue to avoid mak-

¹ *Beowulf*, vv. 2369 ff.

² Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 336-7 and 371-2.

³ See Thucydides, Book I, chap. 9.

⁴ The number counted up by Telemachus in *Odyssey*, Book XVI, ll. 245-55.

⁵ *Odyssey*, Book II, ll. 113-14, as translated by E. V. Rieu (London 1945, Penguin Books), p. 37.

ing the operative change in the *status quo adhuc*, all that her exasperated suitors can do is to continue, for their part, to exercise an indirect pressure on their queen and her son by wasting the substance of Odysseus' estate. They do not venture positively to coerce the queen into marrying again against her will, notwithstanding their resentful impatience with her interminable procrastination.

'The regiment of women' which these episodes reveal is a feature of the Heroic Age which fades away as the age itself passes.

'In the earliest records [of English history] which we possess, women of high rank seem to hold a very important and influential position. This feature is often ascribed to Southern and Christian influence; but, if so, it is not a little remarkable that it is much more prominent in the seventh century than in the eighth or ninth. Thus we find Eanflæd, the wife of Oswio, pursuing a very independent line of action within half a century of the conversion, while Cynwise, the wife of the heathen king Penda, would seem to have been acting as regent in her husband's absence, perhaps like Hygd the wife of Hygelac. Above all, Seaxburg, the wife of the convert Coenwalh, is said to have occupied the throne herself after his death. Bede's account of Saint Aethelthryth shows that queens had estates and retinues of their own; and this custom also must go back to heathen times, for the first reference that we have to Bamborough, the chief residence of the Northumbrian kings, is the statement that it was given by the heathen king Aethelfrith to his wife Bebbe.'¹

The evidence that we have considered so far suggests that 'the regiment of women' in the Heroic Age is the product of an individualism that is temporarily let loose by the breaking of a cake of primitive custom. But this explanation is still only a negative one. It indicates the favourableness of the opportunity that the Heroic Age offers to women, without explaining the women's success in turning this opportunity to account. A positive explanation is suggested by the reflection that, in the deadly game which the criminal barbarian successors of a decadent civilization have condemned themselves to play against one another, the trump card is not, after all, the sheer physical force in which the male barbarian has the advantage over his female opponent as a rule—notwithstanding the exceptional physical prowess of a legendary Brunhild and an historical Berenice. If the triumphant barbarians' fratricidal conflicts were really nothing but trials of physical strength, these jousts would be morally as innocent as the fights between rival bulls for supremacy in the herd; but even the triumphant barbarian is branded as being still recognizably human by the mark of an unexpunged Original Sin; and the fate of many a barbarian hero—or villain—of legend or history proclaims that, in a struggle for existence between sinful human beings, even when the competitors are barbarian-bred, mere physical strength by itself weighs light in the scales against demonic psychological forces. The winning cards in the barbarians' internecine struggle for existence among themselves are the energy, persistence, vindictiveness, and implacability that spring from a perversion of will-power, and the cunning and treachery that are hatched by a prostitution of intellectual ability. These are moral

¹ Chadwick, H. M.: *The Origin of the English Nation* (Cambridge 1907, University Press), pp. 314-15.

and mental qualities with which sinful Human Nature is as richly endowed in the female as in the male; and the masculine victims of a Kriemhild, a Fredegund, a Cleopatra, and a Rosamund might aptly echo the Pauline cry of distress:

'We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of This World, against spiritual wickedness in high places.'¹

The Cleopatra whose wickedness most aptly illustrates this text is not the notorious daughter of Ptolemy XI Auletes who was the last Macedonian queen to seize and lose a throne (though in her, too, a formidable vein of barbarian female ruthlessness lurked beneath a sophisticated 'make-up' of decadent Hellenic charm); the prime virago of the name² is the Cleopatra who was the daughter of Ptolemy VI Philometor and was by turns the wife of three male incumbents of the throne of the Seleucidae,³ Alexander Balas and the brothers Demetrius II Nicâtor and Antiochus VII Sidêtês; for this Cleopatra was the veritable 'Erinyes of the House of Seleucus'.⁴

Cleopatra ran amok when her incompetent second husband Demetrius, turning up again in Syria from a ten years' captivity (140/139-129 B.C.) in Parthia, lost no time in demonstrating, by making as deplorable a failure of his second reign as he had made of his first, that there was nothing new about him beyond the outlandish Parthian beard which advertised that, as a captive of the barbarians, he had not even been able to resist the temptation to 'go native'. When the restored Demetrius tried to make war on his brother-in-law Ptolemy VII Euergetes II and then suffered yet another resounding military defeat at the hands of a pretender to his own throne whom Ptolemy had unleashed against him as the simplest way of settling accounts, Cleopatra took the law into her own hands. She shut the gates of Ptolemais in her fugitive husband's face; and, when Demetrius was slaughtered on board ship in the harbour of Tyre, by orders of the governor, in an attempt to take sanctuary in the temple of Melkart, the suspicion that the governor was acting on Queen Cleopatra's instructions was warranted by her unquestioned responsibility for the subsequent assassination of her elder son Demetrius when he proclaimed himself his father's successor without submitting to his mother's tutelage. Cleopatra thereupon mounted the throne herself with her younger son Antiochus VIII 'Grypus' as her associate; and, when 'Grypus' began to show signs of restiveness in the role of his mother's puppet, Cleopatra attempted to make away with him in his turn, and, this time, lost her own life as the penalty for failing to take his. Her designs had been

¹ Eph. vi. 12.

² This originally Seleucid family name was introduced into the House of Lâgus by Cleopatra, daughter of Antiochus III, who was married to Ptolemy V Epiphanes and governed the Ptolemaic dominions as regent for her son Ptolemy VI Philometor from the time of her husband's death until she died herself, still occupying the seat of power.

³ This identification of her through her Seleucid marriages serves to distinguish her from her mother and namesake, who was the daughter, by the Seleucid Cleopatra, of Ptolemy V Epiphanes, and who married successively her brothers Ptolemy VI Philometor and Ptolemy VII Euergetes II, and also from a sister and namesake who, like their mother, was married to Ptolemy VII Euergetes II and who seized control of the Ptolemaic Government after Euergetes II's death.

⁴ Bevan, E. R.: *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 212.

betrayed to her intended victim by traitors in her own household; and, when she offered 'Grypus' a poisoned cup, he forced her to drink the lethal draught herself.¹

Gepid Rosamund died the same death as Macedonian Cleopatra; but Rosamund's paramour and fellow murderer Helmechis was less lucky than Cleopatra's son and fellow sovereign Antiochus. Helmechis had received no information in advance to prepare him for the emergency, and he swallowed half the potion which Rosamund had offered to him before he realized that it was poisoned—though he did realize this just in time to make 'Grypus's' effective retort of forcing the rest of the poison down the viper lady's throat; so Helmechis merely compelled his murderess-mistress to share with him a death which overtook him according to her plan, whereas Antiochus VIII 'Grypus' outlived his mother to spend the rest of his reign, no longer incommoded by her leading-strings, in fighting an inconclusive civil war with his half-brother and first-cousin Antiochus IX Cyzicenus, the son whom Cleopatra had born to her third husband, 'Grypus's' uncle, Antiochus VII Sidëtês.

Rosamund's career, which thus had the same ending as Cleopatra's, is an epitome of the Heroic Age which illustrates almost every aspect of barbarian criminality.

In the first act, as we have noticed,² Rosamund undergoes Helen's legendary experience of being the passive, and perhaps innocent, cause of the extermination of a people and the slaying of its king—with the miserable difference that, in Rosamund's historical tragedy, the exterminated people are her own countrymen, the slain king is her own father, and her personal fate is the excruciating one of being taken to wife by her father's slayer, as the prize of a successful act of bloodthirsty aggression to which the Lombard king Alboin has been prompted by his unsatisfied desire to possess the Gepid King Cunimund's daughter.

The second act shows Rosamund, some seven years later, in residence with her husband in his palace at Verona: the capital of a successor-state of the Roman Empire in Italy which Alboin has been carving out for himself since his destruction of Rosamund's race on a Central European battlefield. In an inauspicious hour, Alboin, being already the worse for drink, sends for the drinking-cup which has been made for him out of Cunimund's skull, and tells his cup-bearer to offer it to the queen with an invitation 'to drink merrily with her father'. Rosamund duly drinks from the skull without visible demur, and inwardly determines on a revenge which, in the third act, she duly executes.

In this third act Rosamund incites King Alboin's foster-brother and armour-bearer Helmechis to conspire with her for the compassing of Alboin's death. She lures her chosen instrument with the offer of her own hand and the prospect of entering into her husband's and his master's heritage—for it is assumed that the Lombard crown will pass with its murdered owner's Gepid queen, even if the queen is, by proxy,

¹ This last chapter in Cleopatra's life is recounted by E. R. Bevan in *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 250-2.

² On p. 651, above.

the king's murderess. Helmechis succumbs to his temptress, but makes the enlistment of Alboin's chamberlain Peredeo a condition of his own participation; and, when Rosamund proceeds to approach Peredeo, the chamberlain rejects the queen's overture. Peredeo's negative loyalty to Alboin puts Rosamund in a quandary. Her murderous machinations have been brought to a halt, and her own life is now at the mercy of an unresponsive confidant; but in this crisis she succeeds in turning the tables on the chamberlain by a move in which she exhibits a shamelessness which is as remarkable as her presence of mind. Peredeo's loyalty to Alboin has not gone to the positive length of leading him to warn the King of the conspiracy which the chamberlain has refused to join; and, without giving Peredeo time to have any saving second thoughts, Rosamund effectively compromises her potential *delator* by taking the place of one of her ladies-in-waiting with whom the King's chamberlain has a *liaison*, and confronting Peredeo with the *fait accompli* of having unwittingly seduced the King's wife. It is now no longer Rosamund, but Peredeo, who is in danger of being denounced to Alboin; his peril ensures his treason, and in the last scene of this third act of the drama—a scene in which King Alboin, like King Malcolm, is murdered in his bed—it is apparently Peredeo, not Helmechis, who plays Macbeth's part. Perhaps Helmechis has found himself unable to summon up the hardihood—which assuredly would not have failed Rosamund had she been either of her masculine accomplices—to break a twofold tabu by personally taking the life of a foster-kinsman who is at the same time his lord.¹

The fourth act shows us Rosamund's deed of vengeance duly accomplished, but Helmechis disappointed of the political prize that was to have been half his reward for lending himself to the execution of his royal temptress's criminal plot. The crime has proved too shocking to be condoned even by barbarian consciences; and, instead of mounting together the murdered Alboin's throne, Rosamund and Helmechis have had to flee together for their lives. They have been given asylum by the Constantinopolitan viceroy of Italy, who has found it easier to ship Alboin's murderers, with Alboin's treasure in their baggage, from Verona to the viceroy's water-girt fastness-capital at Ravenna than to withstand a living Alboin's prowess in wresting from the Roman Empire a recently recovered dominion which it is the viceroy's duty to defend. In the astonishing transformation scene now staged in Fortune's kaleidoscope the initiative is thrown into the viceroy's hands, and he proves himself as brilliant in intrigue as he has been contemptible in war. The achievement of her revenge has left Rosamund still unsatisfied; for her vindictiveness has been alloyed with ambition, and her dream of ruling at Verona with Helmechis as her consort-puppet, which was in her mind when she offered the wretch her hand in exchange for her first husband's death, has been shattered by the Lombards' disconcerting

¹ When Alexander did slay his foster-kinsman Cleitus, there was at least only one tabu violated, since in this case the foster-victim was the King's retainer, while the King himself played the foster-murderer's part; and, besides that, the Macedonian counterpart of the Lombard crime was committed, not premeditatedly in cold blood, but at a moment when both men were drunk and when neither of them was *compos mentis*.

squeamishness. To find herself married to Helmechis as her fellow refugee at Ravenna is a predicament for which she has not bargained; and the viceroy is as quick to espy and attack the barbarian virago's *côté faible* as Rosamund herself has been to get Helmechis and Peredeo into her toils. 'Why not,' whispers the viceroy to the virago—'Why not repeat your exploit of murdering a husband and thereby put yourself in a position to marry me? Though unfortunately I cannot reinstate you in your late husband's kingdom, which I have failed to prevent his carving out and which you have failed to seize for yourself, I can at any rate make you vicereine of what Alboin has left to me of Roman Italy.' The temptress, thus tempted in her turn, readily swallows her tempter's bait and thereby meets her death, as has been narrated, in the process of carrying out the viceroy's sly suggestion.

On learning that Rosamund, as well as Helmechis, was dead, the viceroy must have breathed a sigh of relief, for manifestly a lady who had successfully made away with two husbands would not have scrupled to mete the same measure to a third, had she lived to take this into her head. Lucky Longinus! He had escaped the lady and inherited her treasure. A Lombard hoard in which the spoils of the Gepidae had been augmented by the plunder of the richer half of Italy was something worth having. The unfortunate Gepids' involuntary contribution could fairly be booked by the Imperial Auditor-General as interest due on capital that had been levied by Alboin in Italy without its lawful Roman owners' leave. Like the good civil servant that he may well have been, the viceroy Longinus duly remitted Rosamund's treasure from Ravenna to Constantinople, where it was as utterly out of reach of itching barbarian hands as was the treasure of the Nibelungs after Hagen had sunk it in the Rhine.¹

The ironical or censorious spectator who views the tragedy of Rosamund from the ivory tower of some place and time far removed from the moral slum of the Heroic Age—though not on that account immune from other exhibitions of Original Sin—will be better advised to apply to the daughter of Cunimund the more charitable verdict that has been pronounced by a Christian historian on Philometor's daughter Cleopatra.

'From her girlhood she had been treated as a thing whose heart did not come into consideration, a mere piece in the political game. What wonder that she became a politician whose heart was dead?'²

If we ask ourselves whether these women who exercise their 'monstrous regiment' in the inferno of the Heroic Age are heroines or villainesses or victims or elusive participants in all three roles, we shall arrive at no clear-cut answer to our question. Unquestionably, on the other hand, this tragic moral ambivalence makes them ideal subjects for poetry; and it is no accident that, in the epic legacy of a post-Minoan heroic age, one of the favourite *genres* should have been 'catalogues of

¹ The story of Rosamund is recounted by Thomas Hodgkin in *Italy and her Invaders*, vol. v, Book VI (Oxford 1895, Clarendon Press), pp. 134-40 and 168-73. On p. 168, Hodgkin notes that, in the sagas of the Lombards, 'women had already played a leading part'.

² Bevan, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 250.

women' in which the recital of one legendary virago's crimes and sufferings called up the legend of another representative of her kind, in an almost endless chain of poetic reminiscences.¹ The historic women whose grim lives echo through this poetry would have smiled, with wry countenances, could they have foreknown that a reminiscence of a reminiscence would one day evoke *A Dream of Fair Women* in the imagination of a Victorian poet. They would have felt decidedly more at home in the atmosphere of the third scene in the first act of *Macbeth*.

¹ The epic formula ἢ οἷη ('or such as was'), by which each link in this tragic chain was attached to its predecessor, generated the nicknamed *HOIAI* for catalogues of this type. The fragments of two collections of the kind—the *HOIAI*, *alias KATAΛΟΓΟΣ*, and the *METAAI HOIAI*—will be found in Aloisius Rzach's edition of the works of Hesiod, to whom the authorship of this poetry came to be ascribed (*Hesiodi Carmina recensuit Aloisius Rzach, editio altera* (Leipzig 1908, Teubner), pp. 131-87). A longer specimen is embedded in *Odyssey*, Book XI, ll. 225-332.

VIII E (I), ANNEX

OPTICAL ILLUSIONS IN HESIOD'S VISTA OF HISTORY

IN A Dark Age that is pregnant with a new civilization a speculative mind is both stirred by the quickening of its social environment and cramped by the cribbedness of its historical horizon.

This lowness in the degree of historical visibility, with which an intellectual worker in a Dark Age is condemned to contend, handicapped the superlative genius of Ibn Khaldūn in his study of the rises and falls of empires; for all the empires of which the great Maghribī historian-philosopher had any substantial knowledge belonged to the particular—and peculiar—class of empires founded by Nomads.¹ Even the Baghdādī 'Abbasid and Cordovan Umayyad caliphates were derivatives of a Damascene Arab Nomad successor-state of the Roman Empire; and, in Ibn Khaldūn's vista, this antecedent non-Nomadic universal state was barely visible. The authentic sources of Roman history were not accessible to the Maghribī scholar; and the inductions on which he bases his historical 'laws' are thus perforce drawn almost exclusively from the histories of a Caliphate originating in the Primitive Muslim Arab *Völkerwanderung* and of this Caliphate's Berber, Arab, Turkish, and Mongol Nomad successor-states. A similar limitation of historical outlook betrayed the author of the Hesiodic catalogue of races into falling a victim to a series of optical illusions.

We have already noticed² that Hesiod is fantastically out of his reckoning in his attempt to take his own generation's historical bearings. From his Epimethean standpoint he has mistaken the expectant darkness before dawn for an eternal night of unrelieved gloom.³ We have also noticed⁴ that his vision has played him false even when it has been directed towards the past age lying nearest to his own. His astigmatism has diffracted the social interregnum immediately following the dissolution of the Minoan Civilization into a mirage of two separate ages—an Age of Bronze and a subsequent Age of Heroes—which, in reality, are merely diverse aspects of a single episode of history. But Hesiod's mental vision has not only played him this trick of diffracting one age into the semblance of two; it has also led him into the contrary error of 'telescoping' two, or perhaps even three, ages into the semblance of one.

The Race of Gold, as Hesiod depicts it,⁵ may be interpreted as standing, in the first instance, for 'the thalassocracy of Minos'—the imposing universal state which is the earliest form in which the Minoan Civilization will have made an enduring mark on the imagination of its Achæan

¹ This point has been noticed in III. iii. 24.

² On pp. 57 and 79-80, above.

³ This illusion of an Hellenic poet in the eighth century B.C. has its counterpart in Western history in the expectation—widely current in Western Christendom at and after the opening of the eleventh century of the Christian Era—that the end of the World was at hand (see I. i. 171, n. 1).

⁴ In VIII. (i) *passim*, above.

⁵ In *Works and Days*, ll. 109-26.

barbarian successors whose epic poetry is Hesiod's *Book of Genesis*. On this interpretation the Race of Silver, who are the Golden Men's epigoni, will stand for these same Minoan 'thalassocrats' in the subsequent *dégringolade* which results in their being swept away to leave the field to a barbarian Race of Bronze. The Silver Men's contemptible combination of babyishness with aggressiveness and godlessness accords with this reading of the passage, while, on the same interpretation, the, at first sight, surprising meed of honour that is paid to them retrospectively, after their unceremonious liquidation, is explicable, not as a tribute to virtues with which the Race of Silver is not credited, but as a protest against atrocities, perpetrated by an interloping Race of Bronze, which make the liquidated Silver Men's viciousness look amiable by comparison.

While this is undoubtedly one component of Hesiod's picture of the Race of Gold, it can hardly be the only one; for a vista of a civilization that sees no farther back than the heyday of its universal state is, of course, a drastically foreshortened view; and we may guess that, on a different plane of vision, Hesiod's races of Gold and Silver cover, between them, the whole history of the Minoan Civilization from start to finish—the Race of Gold standing for a Minoan age of growth, and the Race of Silver for a Minoan age of disintegration.

On this interpretation, Hesiod's Race of Gold and Race of Iron, which, in the poet's vista, seem to stand out at the two poles of his graduated series of morally deteriorating phases of society, prove really to be two instances of an identical phase, which feels like an age of iron to a poet born into the growth-phase of the Hellenic Civilization, but looks golden to him when he is viewing the growth-phase of the alien and mysterious Minoan Civilization through the kindly mist of a tradition that has been mellowed by the passage of the centuries.

Yet the posthumous glitter of the growth-phase and of the Indian Summer of the Minoan Civilization does not account for all the elements in the life of the Race of Gold, as Hesiod describes it. A feature to which the poet gives prominence¹ is the Golden Men's effortless enjoyment of an abundant food-supply which the soil produces for them of its own accord without exacting from them any agricultural labour; and, though this may be no more than a naïve barbarian observer's impression of the mysteriously organized life of an urban population whose industry commands supplies of food which it has not produced for itself, it may also be a genuine recollection of a food-gathering phase of human economy—antecedent to the birth of the Minoan or any other civilization—in which Primitive Man, after his arduous feat of becoming fully human, had rested for a season from his labours in a static Yin-state.² This is the interpretation of the Hesiodic *ἐνὶ Κρόνου βίος* that was current among latter-day Hellenic men of letters—though the likewise Hesiodic myth of Cronos's overthrow by his usurper-son Zeus³ looks more like a reminiscence of the replacement of a fallen Minoan

¹ In *Works and Days*, ll. 116–19.

² See II. i. 192–5 and 290–3, and IV. iv. 585–8.

³ See *Theogony*, ll. 71–73.

'thalassocracy' by one of its Achaean barbarian successor-states.¹ In an age in which this food-gathering economy had been observed in the life by Modern Western anthropologists who had tracked down the last of the food-gatherers in the fastnesses where they had sought shelter from the disturbing impact of the parvenu civilizations, these latter-day observers had been able to ascertain that this régime of casual labour was indeed a life of relatively low psychological tension by comparison with the organized and disciplined life of the husbandman, the shepherd, and the industrial worker; but, just because of this, it had proved not to be a life of material plenty or comfort.

On this analysis, Hesiod's Golden Age dissolves into three ages, one of which turns out to be identical with an Iron Age that is not, after all, the dead end that Hesiod felt it to be, but is the dayspring that, in retrospect, looks like gold. On the other hand, Hesiod's Bronze Age and Heroic Age lose their separate identities and melt into a single age for which Hesiod's sombre picture of the Iron Age would serve as an apt description.

¹ See I. i. 96 and III. iii. 113-14.

IX. B (I), ANNEX

THE RELATIVITY OF THE UNIT OF CLASSIFICATION TO THE OBJECT OF STUDY

THE ground on which some twenty-one or twenty-three units have been treated in this book as so many distinct representatives of a species of society that we have labelled 'civilizations' is our finding that each of them constitutes, in itself, an intelligible field of study.¹ Whereas the parochial communities into which most of these civilizations were articulated at some stages of their histories prove to have shared their main historical experiences with most of the other parochial communities comprised within the same society, so that the history of any single parochial community is intelligible only in the setting of the history of the whole society in whose life it has been a participant, the history of each of these larger social units, the civilizations, proves, by contrast, to be more or less intelligible in itself, because each civilization, in so far as it has met with the typical specific experiences of the species of which it is one representative, will be found to have met with them in circumstances, in places, and at dates that were peculiar to its own history, so that these episodes can be studied and comprehended in isolation from the corresponding experiences in the histories of other civilizations.

It is true that, where we have a pair of civilizations—for instance the Muslim pair or the Christian pair—in which the two sister civilizations are both affiliated to one and the same antecedent society, each of the two may prove to have emerged at approximately the same date from the intervening social interregnum; but, thereafter, even when the two sister civilizations are conjuring up 'renaissances' of elements in the life of their dead common parent, we shall find² that they are each apt to revive different elements of this common heritage in response to different challenges, and we have already found that their histories are apt to follow equally independent and distinctive courses in other respects.

For example, the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society broke down, on our interpretation of its history, at a date signalized by the outbreak of the Great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977-1019, i.e. at a date before the Russian offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Society had yet been planted out. This means that the breakdown of this Russian Orthodox Christendom, whatever date we may assign to it, must, *ex hypothesi*, have been later than the date of the breakdown of the main body of Orthodox Christendom, and must therefore have occurred in different circumstances, as well as in a different geographical theatre; and, when we go on to ask ourselves about the breakdown of the sister Western Christian Civilization, we shall find ourselves unable, on the historical evidence forthcoming midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, to certify that, by that date, the experience of breakdown had yet overtaken a long since broken-down Orthodox Christendom's Western sister. It was certain, at any rate, in the year

¹ See I. i. 17-50, cited on p. 88, above.

² In X. ix. 1-166.

A.D. 1952 that the Western Society had not yet entered into a universal state, whereas by that date each of the two Orthodox Christian societies had not only entered into a universal state of its own but had already passed out of this again—if we are right in seeing the universal state of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the Ottoman Empire and the universal state of the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in the Muscovite Empire.

If these historical findings are correct, they warrant our practice of treating our twenty-one or twenty-three units as so many distinct representatives of one and the same species of society for the purpose of studying some, at least, of this species' specific experiences. We have found, for instance, that this practice has justified itself, by proving to answer to the historical facts, in our study of the geneses, growths, and breakdowns of civilizations and in our study of encounters between contemporaries, and we shall find it justifying itself again, on the same empirical test, when we come to study the renaissances of elements of the cultures of antecedent civilizations. Moreover, in our study of institutions generated in the course of the disintegrations of civilizations, we have found that each of our units can be treated as an intelligible field in itself for a study of the universal states established by dominant minorities¹ and a study of the war-bands mustered by the transfrontier barbarians.² On the other hand we have found that, in studying the recruitment of internal proletariats and the epiphanies of higher religions within their bosom in the histories of the disintegrations of civilizations of the second generation, the confines of a single civilization no longer afford us an intelligible field of study for the purpose here in view. For this purpose, we have had to expand our historical horizon by taking cognizance of contacts or encounters between two or more civilizations that have been one another's contemporaries.

In finding this we are, of course, simply finding—as we should indeed have expected *a priori*—that the range of the intelligible field of historical study is not the same for all purposes but varies in accordance with the nature of the object that is being studied in each case. Each different historical object will be found to have a specific field of its own, with a specific range that is the optimum for the study of this particular object; and all that we are claiming for the twenty-one or twenty-three units with which we have operated in Parts I–VI and in Part VIII of this Study, as well as in the present Part IX, and with which we shall operate again in Part X, is that these prove to be intelligible fields for the study of the geneses, growths, and breakdowns of civilizations, for the study of universal states and barbarian war-bands, for the study of encounters between contemporaries, and for the study of renaissances. We do claim that, for these purposes, it is both correct and illuminating to treat these units as so many distinct members of one and the same species of society; but, in claiming this, we are not claiming that our units are necessarily all on a par with one another in other respects.

Supposing, for example, that we were studying, not the experiences of civilizations, but their heritages from the Past, then manifestly, for

¹ See VI. vii. 1–379.

² See pp. 1–87, above.

the purpose of that study, the relation between the three 'Hellenistic' Christian civilizations or between the two 'Syriatic' Muslim civilizations or between the two 'Sinistic' Far Eastern civilizations would not be found to be on a par with the relation between, let us say, a 'Syriatic' Iranic Muslim civilization and an 'Indistic' Hindu civilization that had collided with one another, without coalescing, in India. For the particular purpose of studying heritages, we should begin by sorting out the mutual relations between our twenty-one or twenty-three units into two distinct classes: one class of relations in virtue of which the members of a pair or a trio of societies might be called one another's 'sisters', in virtue of their being affiliated, alike, to one and the same antecedent civilization, and another class of relations in which the parties were not linked with one another by any common heritage derived from one identical predecessor. In studying the heritages of the civilizations of the third generation, we should have to take account, not only of the antecedent civilizations to which they were affiliated, but also of the churches that had served them as their chrysalises; and, for this purpose, we might find ourselves reducing the number of our units in this generation from eight to two, namely one great society—comprising the three Christian and the two Muslim civilizations—which had derived its religious inspiration and acquired its moral *éthos* mainly from Judaism, and a second great society, comprising the Hindu Civilization and the two Far Eastern civilizations, whose religious inspiration and moral *éthos* could be traced back in some part to Buddhism. The spiritual affinity between the Judaistic Muslim hero the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad and his adversary the Judaistic Christian hero General Charles George Gordon would leap to the eye of a Buddhist monk or a Confucian philosopher, while conversely a Muslim or a Christian observer would perceive the spiritual affinity between an Indistic Hindu sanyasi and an Indistic Japanese practitioner of the Zen discipline of Mahayanian Buddhism.

These considerations seemed to the writer of this Study to suggest the answer to a pertinent and trenchant criticism, by Prince Dmitri Obolensky, of the writer's classification of the main body of Orthodox Christendom, the offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia, and the Western Society as three separate civilizations.

'The picture we shall have of Byzantium and the Mediaeval West,' Prince Obolensky writes in his critique of this classification, 'will be of two different but closely interwoven halves of one Graeco-Roman Christian and European civilisation.' Neither half, on this reading, was in any real sense a self-contained unit or a fully "intelligible field of historical study", at least until the fifteenth century. . . . From the eighteenth cen-

¹ The same view of the relation between these two Christendoms was expressed by B. H. Sumner, the late Warden of All Souls College, Oxford, in a letter of the 25th January, 1951, to the writer of this Study:

'Where I differ, with great hesitation, from you is in regarding Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom as [being] sufficiently close to each other to be grouped together. I look upon them as, on the whole, one Christendom, or one "West", with two facets.'

B. H. Sumner's view is expounded in a paper on 'Russia and Europe' in *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. ii (Oxford 1951, Clarendon Press), pp. 1-16.—A.J.T.

ture. . . . Russia's Byzantine heritage, overlaid with influences from the contemporary West, ceased to be the primary source of Russian culture, and the "intelligible field" of Russian history in this period should be widened to include the greater part of Europe. In any case the realm of Byzantine Civilisation, which in geographico-cultural terms can, both in mediaeval and [in] modern times, be largely described as Eastern Europe, was never a self-contained unit, but should be regarded as an integral part of European Christendom.¹

In so far as Prince Obolensky's criterion, in this paper, for his classification of civilizations is the presence or absence, in their heritages, of common legacies from antecedent civilizations, the writer of this Study would not only agree that, for this purpose, three of the units which, in this Study, have been distinguished from one another for a different purpose could and should be treated as so many parts of a single more comprehensive unit; he would go on to submit that, for the purpose of classifying societies by their heritages, if the criterion of unity or separateness is to be their participation or their non-participation in a dual heritage from both Hellenism on the one hand and Christianity on the other, then the ambit of Prince Obolensky's 'one Graeco-Roman Christian and European Civilization' must be extended, as has been suggested above, to include the present writer's two Muslim civilizations as well—considering that Islam originated as a Christian heresy² and that thereafter, in the 'Abbasid Age, Islam followed Christianity's example in receiving into itself the heritage of Hellenism in the two intellectual provinces of Philosophy and Science³ and worked out for itself a Hellenistic Islamic theology on the pattern of the Hellenistic Christian theology previously worked out by the Greek Fathers of the Christian Church. The Muslims cannot be ruled out of membership in a society for which the certificate of membership is a participation in both the Christian and the Hellenic heritage; and, though their inclusion requires the abandonment of Prince Obolensky's geographical limitation of his Graeco-Roman Christian Civilization to the confines of Europe, this limitation cannot in any case be maintained unless Orthodox Christendom, as well as Dār-al-Islām, is excluded, considering that the cradle of the Orthodox Christian Civilization lay on the Asiatic side of the Black Sea Straits, in Asia Minor.⁴ Indeed, even Western Christendom could hardly be claimed as a product of Europe, considering the importance, in its life and thought, of the influence of Latin Fathers whose home was North-West Africa.

On the other hand, for the purposes of studying the geneses, growths, and breakdowns of civilizations and the histories of universal states, barbarian war-bands, encounters between contemporaries and renaissances, a unitary Helleno-Christian 'great society' is not, in the present writer's view, an effective or an illuminating unit for the conduct of intellectual operations. These seven lines of study can be pursued, in his view, with better chances of success if, for these purposes, an Helleno-

¹ Obolensky, D.: 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage', in *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. i (Oxford 1950, Clarendon Press), pp. 53 and 56.

² See V. v. 230, n. 4, and p. 347, above.

³ See p. 408, with n. 5, above.

⁴ See I. i. 63-64; II. ii. 79; and p. 726-7, below.

Christian monolith is dissected into five separate civilizations. These smaller units seemed to the writer to be indicated for these purposes because an empirical inquiry showed—so it appeared to him—that, in so far as these experiences had been met with in the histories of these five units up to date, each unit had had its own separate experience of genesis, growth, and breakdown, had generated its own separate universal states and war-bands, had had its own separate encounters with contemporaries, and had evoked its own separate renaissances, whereas he could not recall a single case in which any of these experiences had been shared by all the five units in question. So far from that, it appeared to him that the experience of passing through a universal state, which had already overtaken the two Orthodox Christian civilizations, had not yet overtaken the Western Civilization or either of the two Muslim civilizations. If this diagnosis was correct, it seemed to follow that the study of universal states could not be illuminated, but could only be obscured, by operating with the Helleno-Christian civilizations as the single unit that would be the key to a successful intellectual operation when the objects of study were, not experiences, but heritages.

It seemed to the writer that the five smaller units were decidedly more efficient keys than the single monolithic unit when the object of study was the historical phenomenon of encounters in the Space-dimension between civilizations that were contemporary with one another. The frequency and intimacy of the encounters between the three non-Muslim Helleno-Christian societies had been taken by Prince Obolensky as a sign that in truth these were, not three societies, but one society. In the second of the two passages quoted above he adduces the penetration of Russia by cultural influences radiating from the Modern West as evidence that, in this chapter of history at least, Russia and the West ought to be regarded as being provinces of one single cultural realm, and in the sequel to the first passage of the two he similarly adduces the penetration of a Medieval Western Christendom by cultural influences radiating from Byzantium as evidence that Byzantium and the Medieval West ought to be regarded as being 'two different but closely interwoven halves of one Graeco-Roman Christian and European civilization.'

'If,' he continues, 'we were inclined to doubt the truth of this interpretation, we have only to think how much will remain unintelligible in the mediaeval history of Western and Central Europe unless we consider the Byzantine contributions to its culture: Anglo-Saxon scholarship of the eighth century, the Carolingian art of the ninth, Otto III's restoration of the Roman Empire, the growth of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, the cultural aftermath of the Crusades, the Italian Renaissance, these and other important events of European history cannot be understood without reference to Eastern Europe. The Basilica of St. Mark in Venice, the Art of Giotto and El Greco, are these not eloquent signs of how much the Western World owed to the genius of Byzantium?'

Indisputably they are; but are they not also signs that the body social which was the recipient of this cultural radiation was a separate and a different entity from the body by which the radiation was emitted?

¹ Obolensky, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

For, when we turn our attention from the impact of Byzantium on the Medieval West to the impact of the Modern West on its contemporaries, we find parallels to all the phenomena cited by Prince Obolensky from the history of the encounter between Byzantium and the Medieval West in the relations between the Modern West and three Buddhist societies—the Hindu, the Far Eastern in China, and the Far Eastern in Korea and Japan—which neither Prince Obolensky nor any other student of history would be likely to classify, in virtue of these relations, as being so many subdivisions of a single all-embracing civilization in which the Western Civilization was likewise to be reckoned as being included.

The inspiration of eighth-century Anglo-Saxon scholarship and ninth-century Carolingian art by the genius of Byzantium has its counterpart in the inspiration of nineteenth-century Bengali scholarship and twentieth-century Bengali art by the genius of the Modern West. Otto III's restoration of the Roman Empire in Byzantine dress has its counterpart in the restoration of the Mughal Rāj in Western dress by the British East India Company. The establishment of a Norman successor-state of the East Roman Empire in Sicily is matched by the establishment, in A.D. 1947, of three Asian successor-states of the British Rāj in India: Pakistan, the Indian Union, and Burma. The cultural aftermath of the Crusades in Western Christendom has its counterpart in the cultural aftermath, in the Ottoman Muslim World, of the 'Osmanlis' likewise temporarily victorious *jihāds* against the Christendoms (if we may allow ourselves to cite this one example from the history of the relations between the Modern West and an Islamic Civilization that shared with the West its Hellenic-Christian heritage). The Byzantine contribution to the Italian renaissance of an Hellenic literary culture consisted in initiating the fifteenth-century Italian humanists into the Greek originals of Roman copyists' Latin imitations through which the Italian Humanists had previously been cultivating Hellenism at second hand;¹ and, in the history of the impact of the Modern West upon the Hindu World, this Byzantine service to the Italian Humanists has its counterpart in the initiation of nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Hindu pandits into a scientific study of Sanskrit by the Western pioneers in the science of the comparative study of the Indo-European languages. The imprint of Byzantium on the Basilica of St. Mark in Venice has its counterpart in the imprint of the Italian Renaissance on the Taj Mahall at Agra. The Byzantine *motifs* in the art of Giotto and El Greco have their counterparts in the Western *motifs* in the art of a twentieth-century Japan.

On this showing, the evidences of the penetration of Western Christendom by the radiation of Byzantine cultural influences would seem, in the present writer's eyes, to indicate, not that Byzantium and the Medieval West were provinces of one and the same cultural realm, but rather that they were two distinct societies whose relations were on a par with those between a Modern Western Society and its contemporaries in India and the Far East.

¹ See IV. iv. 275, n. 1, and 363, n. 1; and X. ix. 63.

As the present writer saw it, however, the lesson to be learnt from Prince Obolensky's critique of the writer's classification of civilizations was not that either the writer's own classification or Prince Obolensky's alternative classification was right or wrong in any absolute or universal sense. The lesson appeared to be that all such classifications, analyses, and dissections were keys which were useful in so far as they served the practical purpose of opening locks. Any one of them would have been proved to be a genuine key if it did effectively unlock a door; and some of these keys were good for opening more doors than one; but there did not seem to be any master key that rendered all its fellow keys superfluous by unlocking all doors alike; and therefore a resourceful researcher who had been moved by his curiosity to explore the wonderland of History would keep on adding to the bunch of keys on his key-ring. Whenever he ran into a closed door barring the way to further progress in his intellectual quest, his first recourse would be to try whether any of the keys already on his ring would turn this next door's lock; but, if none of them proved to fit, he would neither try to force the door nor despair of succeeding in opening it, but would set about casting a new key to fit a lock that had been proved by experiment to be one of a novel structure.

IX. B (ii) (a) 1, ANNEX I

THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION IN THE WESTERNIZATION OF RUSSIA

THE part played in the Westernization of Russia by a spontaneous response to the appeal of the Modern Western culture, as contrasted with a reluctant capitulation to a recognized necessity of adopting Western weapons for the purpose of keeping the West at bay, is underlined in the following note by Prince D. Obolensky:

'I would say that to describe the relations between Russia and the Modern West solely, or mainly, in terms of a technological race between a rapidly expanding Western military and economic technique and a Russian resistance to the resultant menace of military conquest or cultural absorption would be to paint only part of the picture. It is, of course, true that Peter's reforms were primarily dictated by military considerations and by Russia's need, in order to maintain and improve her military and political status as a great European power, to "catch up" with the economically more advanced West. Moreover, I would agree, up to a point, that the Westernizing movement among the educated minority of the Orthodox population of Western Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries found its *raison d'être* in the policy of resisting encroachments of the West (i.e. of the Roman Catholic Church) by adopting Western weapons (i.e. from Catholicism and Protestantism). But . . . I would say that this Westernising movement, not only in the Ukraine but in Muscovy as well, was due just as much to a genuine belief held by some of its leaders in the superiority of the contemporary Western culture, and to their desire to imitate Western habits and institutions because they were good in themselves. This is surely true of such outstanding statesmen and diplomatists of the second half of the seventeenth century as Ordin-Nashchokin and Prince V. Galitsin, who pursued a policy of "selective Westernisation".'

On the other hand it is surely also true that Peter the Great himself, spiritual 'changeling' though he was in his native Muscovite cultural environment, was an *anima naturaliter Occidentalis* only in the narrowly limited sense of having a gift and a passion for the contemporary Western World's technology. We have noticed in another context¹ that this technological approach of his was distasteful to cultivated Westerners of that age—for example, Bishop Burnet and King William III—who had not been broken in to a future Industrial Age of Western Civilization in which this exotic young barbarian man of genius was already living by anticipation; and, though Peter's genius was so great that he soon became aware of the necessity of broadening his approach if he was to succeed in attaining his primary technological objective, his spontaneous appetite for the non-technological elements in the Western Civilization always remained comparatively feeble except in so far as it was whetted by a partially enlightened view of the requirements of a technological utilitarianism.

¹ In III. iii. 279.

Within the province of Technology, Peter did give proof, as soon as military necessity allowed, of a spontaneous impulse to extend the range of his Westernizing policy from the manufacture of Western weapons to the manufacture of Western non-military commodities.

'Between A.D. 1695 and A.D. 1709 nearly three-quarters of the new manufactories were state works, and nearly all of them were designed for military and naval needs. Between 1710 and 1725 the picture changes, as the needs of war become rather less absorbing. The new works in his later years were far less concentrated on military needs; silk, velvet, and ribbon manufactories were started; china, glass, and brickworks made their appearance. A number of the state factories were handed over to private operation, and Peter pressed forward the opening of new works by individuals or companies, granting them important exemptions and privileges'.¹

In thus becoming less exclusively military, Peter's Westernizing activities did not, however, become less utilitarian—as is shown by the persistent utilitarianism of his educational policy;² and, though, here too, the scope of the Westernizing movement in Russia broadened rapidly after Peter's death, this subsequent progress of Russia's cultural Westernization beyond the limits of military or even civil utilitarian requirements seems to have been due, not so much to a Russian 'desire to imitate Western habits and institutions because they were good in themselves', as to the operation of a cultural 'law'³ that, in any encounter between contemporaries, a single element of a radioactive alien culture, when once admitted into a recipient society's body social, tends to draw in after it other elements of the same alien culture-pattern.

¹ Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 166.

² See pp. 554-7, above.

³ Examined on pp. 542-64, above.

THE BYZANTINE INSPIRATION OF THE
RUSSIAN POLITICAL ÊTHOS

IN the first draft of the chapter to which this Annex attaches, the writer assumed that the autocratic régime that was built up in Muscovy in and after the fourteenth century of the Christian Era had drawn its inspiration from the Byzantine political tradition; but the comments on this draft which he received from B. H. Sumner¹ and from Prince D. Obolensky convinced him that the Muscovite political institutions which took shape during the period of Mongol ascendancy over Eastern Russia were, for the most part, home-grown responses to the challenge of pressure from alien civilizations on two fronts: from a Eurasian Nomad Society on the south-east and from a Western Christian Society on the north-west. At the same time the historical evidence still seemed to the writer to indicate that the political climate of a Russian Orthodox Christendom, in which a home-grown Muscovite autocracy had found so favourable an environment for establishing itself, had been predominantly Byzantine in its origin.

One consequence of the supremacy which a resuscitated Imperial Régime had established over the Orthodox Christian Church within the frontiers of the East Roman Empire in the course of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries of the Christian Era² had been that, when a hitherto independent pagan state received Christianity from the East Roman Church, it could not place itself under the ecclesiastical authority of the Oecumenical Patriarch at Constantinople without thereby implicitly acknowledging the political sovereignty of the Oecumenical Patriarch's secular lord and master the East Roman Emperor.³ This political implication of conversion to Orthodox Christianity was, as we have seen, the cause of a war to the death between the East Roman Empire and a converted Bulgaria that was responsible for the breakdown of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the very generation in which Russia was entering the Orthodox Christian fold. This juridical consequence of conversion was in practice much less serious for the Russians than it had been for the Bulgarians, because Russia, instead of lying, as Bulgaria lay, on Byzantium's threshold, was insulated from the East Roman Empire by the double barrier of the Black Sea and the Eurasian Steppe;⁴ and the princes of Kiev and her successor-states, including Muscovy, appear to have acquiesced, with only a few symptoms of restiveness, in the East Roman Empire's pretension to a political supremacy over the Oecumenical Patriarchate's Russian ecclesiastical subjects throughout the period of more than four centuries' length that elapsed between the enthronement of Theóemptos, the first Greek Metropolitan of Kiev, in A.D. 1039 and the extinction of the last remnants of the East Roman Empire by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1453-61.⁵

¹ See VI. vii. 577-9.² See IV. iv. 592-612.³ See IV. iv. 377.⁴ See p. 152, n. 6, above.⁵ See pp. 399-400, above.

'The fourteenth-century rulers of Muscovy', Prince Obolensky observes in a note on the present writer's first draft, 'continued to acknowledge, at least in theory, the quasi-religious sovereignty of the Byzantine Emperors, whose oecumenical authority and legislative power were still recognised in Russia in the fifteenth century: thus, for example, the Emperor John VI Cantacuzenus wrote to the Grand Prince Symeon of Moscow (*fungebatur* A.D. 1340-53): "Yes, the Empire of the Romans and the most holy and great Church of God are, *as you have written*, the source of all piety and the school of law and sanctification". And the Grand Prince Basil II of Moscow (*fungebatur* A.D. 1425-62), writing to the Emperor after the Council of Florence, calls him "the pious and holy autocrat of the whole Universe".'

Considering that the juridical sovereignty of the East Roman Empire was thus acknowledged by Russian princes, including the latter-day Grand Dukes of Muscovy, over a Time-span of more than four centuries, it is hardly credible that the political *éthos*, as distinct from the administrative institutions, of a Russian Orthodox Christendom should not have been deeply influenced by the political *éthos* of 'the Second Rome'; and W. Weidle is surely right in stating, in his brilliant *Russie Absente et Présente*,¹ that 'les conceptions politiques investies dans l'ancien État moscovite étaient de provenance byzantine'.

By contrast, the *éthos*, as well as the institutional structure, of a post-Muscovite Petrine autocracy in Russia was manifestly derived from a contemporary Western World, and the writer would agree with Prince Obolensky's view 'that Peter's "enlightened autocracy" owes far more to contemporary Western models than to any Byzantine prototype', and that 'Peter's ecclesiastical reform, which led to the partial subjection of the Russian Church to the Imperial power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and to the breakdown of that relationship between the spiritual and temporal powers which Medieval Russia had inherited from Byzantium, was based on Western Lutheran, not East Roman, models.' The writer of this Study would, however, go on to point out that this seventeenth-century Western 'enlightened autocracy' proves, on a scrutiny of its origins, not to have been a native Western product; for its lineage can be traced back through the Late Medieval North Italian despots to the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Sicily, Frederick II Hohenstaufen; through Frederick to the Norman founders of a Sicilian and Apulian successor-state of the East Roman Empire; and through them to the East Roman Empire itself.²

The writer would also venture to suggest an amendment to Prince Obolensky's view that 'the notion of a purely secular state, regarded as the source of all authority and legislation and the ultimate object of men's loyalty, and in which the clergy are no more than civil servants whose very spiritual authority is delegated to them by the Government, would, from the Byzantine view-point, have seemed a strange aberration.' On the writer's interpretation of the Byzantine *Weltanschauung*, it would indeed have seemed to a Byzantine critic strangely naïve, inelegant, and impolitic, to the point of being shocking, for an East Roman

¹ Paris 1949, Gallimard, p. 73, quoted on p. 395, above.

² See III. iii. 300-1, 305, and 354-63; IV. iv. 198-200; and pp. 363 and 395, above.

statesman to claim in so many words—as a Western Frederick II and his eventual Lutheran successors were to stake their claim—that the Secular Power was the source of spiritual as well as temporal authority; but assuredly it would also have seemed, in Byzantine eyes, no less strangely incompetent and irresponsible for the secular Power to refrain from exercising *de facto* an effective control over the Church which, until the East Roman Empire fell on evil days, was always within an East Roman Emperor's grasp so long as he took care not to commit the gross Frankish Frederician indiscretion of publicly laying claim to this 'totalitarian' authority *de jure*.

THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES IN THE SOUL OF SOLOMÓS¹

THE career of the conventional Italian poet Dionisio Salomone, who became the original Greek poet Dhionýsios Solomós, is one of the curiosities of the history of the transmission of culture. His genius found its opportunity for making its literary fortune thanks to the lucky accident of his being the bastard son, by a Zantiot Greek servant-girl, of a Zantiot landowner—Venetian in culture and origin, though Orthodox in religion—who, on his death-bed, married Dionisio's mother and left Dionisio and his brother handsome shares of his estate. At the age of ten, Dionisio was sent by his guardian to Italy for his education, and he remained there for ten years on end (A.D. 1808–18), first at Venice, then at Cremona, and finally at the Venetian university of Padua. During these years in Italy he received a thorough schooling in Italian and Latin literature; made friends with Monti, Manzoni, and other Italian men of letters; and became a disciple of the Western Romantic movement. After his return to Zante he joined an aristocratic Italianate literary circle there whose parlour-game was the extemporization of sonnets in Italian on some given subject or given set of line-endings; and there seemed no reason why he should not end his days in this conventionally cultivated obscurity.

Solomós found his true *métier* when, after the outbreak of the Ottoman Greek insurrection in A.D. 1821, a Mesolonghiot patriot-publicist, Spiridhòn Trikoúpis, visited him in Zante at his country villa in A.D. 1822 and invited him to become the Dante of a Greek Parnassus. 'I don't know Greek', Solomós replied, meaning that he had never been taught the Byzantine ecclesiastical Attic *koiné*. 'The language which you imbibed with your mother's milk is Greek', Trikoúpis retorted, meaning that Solomós could have communicated with his low-born mother in no other tongue than her Zantiot Romaïc Greek patois. Thereupon Solomós sprang into fame by composing in this mother tongue of his, in Italian metres, Western poetry, first in Byron's vein and later in Schiller's. Thanks to his being a Heptanesian aristocrat, Solomós was a highly cultivated man who did speak one of the dialects of living Greek as his mother tongue without knowing the dead language. In the early nineteenth century the Ionian Islands were perhaps the only place in Greek Orthodox Christendom where this could have happened, and the composition of Western poetry in living Greek—without murdering the language by trying to transform it into a resurrected Attic—was Solomós' inestimably valuable service to a new Greek nation that was seeking to enter the Western comity.

Solomós' work suffered, nevertheless, from another form of pedantry that was likewise inimical to poetry. His method of composing a Romaïc Greek poem was to take Italian notes, expand these into Greek

¹ See Jenkins, R.: *Dionysius Solomós* (Cambridge 1940, University Press).

prose, and then hammer this prose into verse! And in his latter years, when his mental vigour was on the decline, he relapsed into writing his poetry in the Italian which, in spite of his Romaic Greek *tours de force*, was, from first to last, his natural medium of literary expression. Moreover, his invincible native Westernism, which made him so effective a psychopompus for Greek souls seeking initiation into the Western culture, also inhibited him from going out to meet his Ottoman fellow Greek Orthodox Christians in deed as well as in word. When, on the eve of the fall of Mesolónghi, just across the water, the cannonade bombarded his ears in his peaceful villa on Zante, he suffered anguish but did not seek relief by going to the front in defiance of British regulations; and, though he lived on for a quarter of a century after a fragment of the Ottoman Empire had been transformed into a sovereign independent Kingdom of Greece with its capital at Athens, he preferred to end his days at Corfu under a British régime.

'In the days when I was young', wrote the Moreot klepht Kolokotronis, who had taken refuge on Zante in A.D. 1806, 'Zante seemed as far away as the ends of the Earth do now. What America is to us now—that is pretty well what Zante was to them [i.e. to the *fin-de-siècle* Moreot Ottoman Greeks]. When they went to Zante, they called it "going to the Western World" ("Phrangia").'¹ Solomòs' career testifies that, in the feelings of a Zantiot aristocrat who was younger than Kolokotronis by the span of a whole generation, an adjacent ex-Ottoman Morea was still the *alter orbis* that an adjacent ex-Venetian Zante had been to the Moreot klepht in days before Solomòs was born.

¹ Kolokotronis, Th: *Διήγησις Συμβάντων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Φυλῆς, 1770-1836* (Athens 1889, Estia, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 49, quoted in V. v. 301.

IX. B (ii) (a) 2, ANNEX II

THE MOREA ON THE EVE OF THE UPRISING
OF A.D. 1821

In A.D. 1821 the eyālet of the Morea did not include the Mani, which, since A.D. 1776, had been under the jurisdiction, not of the Vālī of the Morea, but of the Qapudān Pasha. On the eve of the uprising of A.D. 1821 the population of the eyālet, excluding the Mani from the reckoning, is estimated to have been about 400,000, of whom about 360,000 were Greek and Albanian Orthodox Christians and about 40,000 were Turkish and Albanian Muslims.¹ The Turkish Muslim Moreots were concentrated in the towns: Corinth, Návplia, Mistrà, Monemvasía, Kóron, Navaríno, Arkadhía, Pátras, Phanári, Leondári, Gastúni, Módhon. The populations of Návplia, Kóron, Módhon, and Navaríno were exclusively Muslim; those of Tripolítsa and Corinth were mixed in approximately equal proportions. Except in these two last-mentioned towns, the Christians, where there was a Christian element in the urban population, lived in separate quarters from the Muslims.²

At the same date about three-quarters of the agricultural land in the Morea is estimated to have been in the hands of the Muslim 10 per cent. of the population, and only one quarter in the hands of the Christian 90 per cent.: 41·7 per cent. of the land was accounted for by Imperial Ottoman fiefs, which were, of course, conferred on Muslim fiefcees; another 25 per cent. was accounted for by Muslim privately owned real estate; and the remaining 33·3 per cent. by Christian privately owned real estate.³ The Muslim, as well as the Christian, estates were, however, cultivated by Christian tenants and hired labourers, who were at liberty to change their employers;⁴ and the Christians, including labourers and tenants as well as freeholders, are estimated to have received 87·5 per cent. of the annual value of the agricultural produce, as against 12·5 per cent. received by the Muslims, who thus took only about 25 per cent. more than what would have fallen to them under a strictly proportional allocation.⁵

It will be seen that the economic conditions in the Morea between A.D. 1715 and A.D. 1821 were not seriously inequitable, and during the same century the administrative arrangements were remarkably favourable to the Orthodox Christian population or (it would be more accurate to say) to an Orthodox Christian oligarchy.⁶ A system of local self-government, dating from the preceding period of Venetian occupation, had been maintained in the Morea after the Ottoman reconquest; and this self-government was not confined to the communes but extended to the departments (*Turcicè qazās*; *Graecè ἐπαρχίαι*) and to the province (*Turcicè eyālet*) as a whole.⁷ In each commune the aldermen (*Turcicè*

¹ See Sakellarios, M. V.: *Ἡ Πελοπόννησος κατὰ τὴν Δευτέραν Τουρκοκρατίαν, 1715-1821* (Athens 1939, Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher), p. 226.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 118-19.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 49.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 51.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 53.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 95.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 87.

khōja-bāshys; *Graecè* δημογέροντες) were elected annually,¹ and these in turn elected the Christian members (*Graecè* προεστῶτες) of the council of the voyevoda of the department, who in their turn, again, collectively constituted a provincial assembly which elected the two Christian members (*Graecè* μωραγιάνιδες) of the vāli's permanent council of five members including, besides the two Christian deputies, two Muslims and one Christian dragoman.² Moreover, the Greek Orthodox Christian community in the Morea had two or three political agents (vekils) accredited to the Porte at Constantinople.³

'It can be said that [the departmental προεστῶτες] shared the administrative power with the voyevoda and the judicial with the qādi. They concentrated so much power in their hands that they were able fearlessly to hold their own against the Turkish authorities on their own level. Without their assent, no taxation could be imposed either for local or for general purposes. They were able to refuse to carry out orders of the voyevoda's if they considered these inexpedient. . . . If there were complaints against the voyevoda, and they had the qādi's concurrence, they could proceed at once to depose the voyevoda, subject only to referring their action retrospectively to the vezir [i.e. the vāli].'⁴

Sakellarios concludes⁵ that 'the προεστῶτες were the real rulers of their department'. A Moreot Greek Orthodox Christian born in A.D. 1798 saw the Ottoman régime in the Morea in its last phase in a more jaundiced light that does not necessarily give a more objective picture:

'The people appointed on their own initiative a headman (πρωτόγερος) or crier to carry out the general purposes of the commune and to give notice in the evening of any corvée on behalf either of the commune or of the Government. This notice was cried in the following terms: "Oyez! Oyez! to-morrow no one is to go about his own private business, because we are going to do so and so". Anyone who ignored the notice suffered for it; his neighbours wrecked his house; and, if he complained to the Government, the Government paid no attention—unless it were to punish him for insubordination . . .

'In every large village, and sometimes in small ones, they had an alderman (γέροντας) or two aldermen, according to the size of the population, who, in collaboration with the priests, assessed the taxes imposed on the commune among its individual members in accordance with their means . . .

'Whenever the potentate chose to oppress a town or a family, he would send a government official straight away and would demand whatever he chose, and the inhabitants, as I have said, would assess among themselves what was required, whether it was a money payment or some form of corvée, through the agency of the aldermen. The Turks had to allow their ra'īyeh all these rights in order that they might prosper and be at the Turks' disposal as slaves. On this account they looked after our well-being, and everyone among the ra'īyeh had some important Turk for a patron, while the whole commune in each town and village likewise had

¹ See Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 89–92; *cp.* Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864* (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.), vol. vi, p. 25.

³ See Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, p. 94; Finlay, vol. vi, p. 25.

⁴ Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 91.

some powerful patron for its own special preservation and protection. In the large towns, however, things were rather better, owing to their more advanced development.¹

At the same time there was complete religious toleration in the Morea;² by the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the behaviour of the Moreot Muslims towards their Christian fellow Moreots had become less harsh,³ and the Muslim Moreot minority was becoming assimilated in its culture to the Christian majority. The Moreot Turks spoke and wrote Greek, and even the 'ulemā swore by Christ and by the Panayía.⁴ The Albanian Muslim Moreots, who were new-comers in A.D. 1715,⁵ were wilder and fiercer than their Turkish coreligionists; yet the Varduniots in their fastness in the Southern Taygetus and the Laliots and their neighbours at Phlóka in their fastness on Pholoë all bore Christian as well as Muslim names.⁶ Meanwhile the Moreot Greek Christian oligarchs betrayed their provincialism by continuing to cultivate an Ottoman Muslim style of living which had long since been in process of being abandoned in favour of a Western style by the sophisticated metropolitan Phanariots.

"The khōja-bāshy imitated the Turk in everything, including dress, manners, and household. His notion of living in style was the same as the Turk's, and the only difference between them was one of names: for instance, instead of being called Hasan the khōja-bāshy would be called Yānni, and instead of going to mosque he would go to church. This was the only distinction between the two. All the same, the Turk would cut off the khōja-bāshy's head whenever he chose, and keep his corpse exposed for three days in public, with the head placed by the backside as an additional humiliation, whereas the Turk's head would be placed under his arm-pit. From these facts you will be able to judge whether the khōja-bāshy was, or was not, a popularly elected magistrate."⁷

¹ Khrysanthópoulos, Ph. [Photákos]: *Ἀπομνημονεύματα περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως* (Athens 1899, Sakellarios, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 34-37.

² See Sakellarios, op. cit., p. 120.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 226-7.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 117.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 117.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 227.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 120, n. 4.

IX. B (ii) (a) 3, ANNEX I

THE PEASANT MAJORITY OF MANKIND AND THE AGRARIAN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION

To see the problem of a depressed peasantry in India in its true perspective, we must extend our field of observation far beyond the Indian sub-continent's limits; for this depressed peasantry in India was one contingent of an immense host of human beings in the same plight which, at the time of writing, still accounted for perhaps not less than three-quarters of the living generation of Mankind¹ and which was massed, not only in India, but in Indonesia, Indo-China, China, Japan, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Egypt, and those superficially Latinized 'Indian American' countries, from Mexico to Bolivia inclusive, which had inherited an indigenous peasantry from the submerged Central American and Andean civilizations.²

Could the condition of this vast and widespread rural depressed class be effectively improved by any orthodox devices of Modern Western democratic 'social engineering'? To be democratic in the Modern Western sense of the term, the solution of the problem must be one which could be introduced by consent, without having to be imposed by coercion; and it remained to be seen whether the peasantry, in its prevailing mood of self-assertiveness and expectancy not yet illuminated by more than a glimmer of intellectual enlightenment, would voluntarily agree to the things necessary for its economic salvation. The peasantry's divers desires at this time seemed, indeed, likely to prove mutually incompatible. The peasants now wanted an improvement in their material condition, but they also still wanted to go on living their customary life and using their traditional agricultural technique; and the ambition of

¹ According to E. M. Patterson, *An Introduction to World Economics* (New York 1947, Macmillan), p. 5, Table I, following and supplementing A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends* (London 1936, Oxford University Press), p. 42, 'Europe', including the whole of the Soviet Union, and North America, excluding Mexico, together contained 33.2 per cent. of the total population of the World in A.D. 1938. To arrive at an approximate estimate of the respective percentages of non-peasants and peasants in the total population of the World at that date, we have to allow on the one side of the account for a small non-peasant minority in Asia, Africa, Oceania, and South and Central America, and on the other side for a large peasant majority in the Soviet Union and in the adjacent countries of Eastern Europe. On this basis the ratio of the peasant element in the population of the World in A.D. 1938 would work out at something like 75 per cent.; and it would be still higher if calculated on the population estimates for mid-year A.D. 1950, given in the *United Nations Demographic Year Book, 1951* (New York 1951, Statistical Office of the United Nations). The estimate, as at this date, for the aggregate population of the predominantly non-peasant parts of the World (the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Western Europe) amount to about 487,637,000, and those for the predominantly peasant remainder of Mankind to about 1,910,989,000; and, on this reckoning, the peasant element will have accounted for not much less than 80 per cent. of the World's total population in A.D. 1950.

² Paraguay, where a native American Indian population had been initiated into the arts of Civilization by Jesuit Roman Catholic Christian missionaries from the Old World, should be added to this list. The Jesuits' achievements in Paraguay have been noticed on pp. 597-8, above.

every peasant household was not only to own a plot of land but to work its own plot as a separate unit of labour and production. Yet, short of there being any hope of raising their standard of living, there might be no chance of saving it from being further depressed to a nadir which would be disastrous for them and for the World as a whole, if the other points in the peasants' dimly conceived programme were to be treated as sacrosanct. Could this rustic Gordian knot be untied? Or could it only be got rid of by being cut? And, if it should prove impossible to avoid a summary operation, what scabbard was to furnish the latter-day counterpart of Alexander's sword?

Could the problem of this vast non-Western peasantry be solved by a culturally alien Modern Western régime such as the late British Rāj in India? Probably not, since an alien régime can seldom venture to interfere with the deep-seated prejudices of its subjects,¹ however well placed it may be for carrying out useful reforms on the surface of life. Then could the task be achieved under the régime of a native intelligentsia of the kind that, in India, had become the British Rāj's heir? Such rulers might perhaps be expected, *a priori*, to have better prospects of success in commending a policy framed by their Westernized minds to a peasantry from whom their hearts were not altogether alienated. Yet in A.D. 1948-9 Pandit Nehru and his colleagues must have felt some misgivings as they looked on from India at the death agonies in China of a Kuomintang régime which was so similar to their own in composition, character, and outlook, and which had come to power in China little more than twenty years before the Congress régime's own advent to power in India. In those few years the Kuomintang had rapidly degenerated from being the generous apostles of the Ideas of the French Revolution into becoming the corrupt conservators of traditional Chinese vested interests; retribution for this breach of trust had been no less quick to overtake them; and this nemesis had taken the form of a mass-secession of the Chinese peasantry from the Kuomintang to the Communist camp. Was Communism now to take its turn in trying to solve in China a problem with which an abortive Chinese experiment in Modern Western Democracy had failed to come to grips? And, if this was to be the next chapter of Chinese history, was that a portent of what was likely to happen next in other non-Western societies in which an antique peasantry was likewise being shaken out of a long-established psychological and economic inertia by the impact of Modern Western Democracy and Technology?

In bidding for a mandate to take the world-wide problem of the peasantry in hand, Communism had at any rate one strong card to play mid-way through the twentieth century. At this date its advocates could argue that, of all the societies that were saddled with the problem, Russia was the only one so far in which an effort to grapple with it had been made on a scale and with a vigour that were worthy of the greatness and the gravity of the challenge; and they could go on to point out that

¹ The British Rāj in India had nevertheless ventured to use its power to put down infanticide, sati, and the self-immolation of the devotees who had formerly offered themselves year by year to be crushed to death by Juggernaut's car.

this notable effort in Russia had not been made until after the establishment there of the existing Communist régime.

This was, indeed, one of the points in which Lenin and his companions could justly claim to have done in Russia a deed of pressing urgency and momentous importance that had been perpetually left undone by their Western-minded predecessors; for neither Tsar Peter the Great nor Tsar Alexander II had attempted to solve the problem of the peasantry in the terms in which their Communist successors envisaged it.

Peter, indeed, had not tried to solve it at all, but had actually aggravated it by piling a top-heavy superstructure of Modern Western military organization and civil administration upon the frail foundation of a traditional rural economy which he had neglected to reinforce without calculating whether it would be capable of bearing the additional load that he was remorselessly laying upon it. Peter made no serious attempt to increase the agricultural production which was virtually the sole economic resource of the Russia of his day, and, so far from relaxing the legal obligations of the serfs to their owners, he tightened them up in pursuance of a short-sighted policy of using the institution of serfdom as an agency for the indirect collection of public revenue from the peasant producers of Russia's national income through the direct taxation of the personal incomes of the serf-owners.¹

¹ Peter had little cognizance of the sufferings inflicted on the population of his empire by the social heritage of Russian Orthodox Christendom and by his own innovations (Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 513); he was concerned to place taxation on a statistical basis (*ibid.*, p. 513), and he looked at the peasantry primarily from a fiscal standpoint (p. 524). Hence he not only rejected the idea of emancipating the peasants (p. 524), but actually increased the powers of the landlords over their serfs with a view to increasing the landlords' tax-paying capacity (p. 523). The fugitive serf laws were made more stringent (p. 296); the practice of selling serfs apart from the land to which they were attached, which had occurred for the first time in A.D. 1675, became frequent in Peter's reign (p. 523); industrialists were permitted to buy peasants as a means of providing themselves with man-power (p. 523); freeholders disappeared (p. 523). The truth was that Peter did not care for agriculture, and the result was that he made the condition of the Russian peasantry still worse than it had been before his time (p. 522).

This deterioration in the peasantry's condition went on in Russia under the Petrine régime until A.D. 1861 (Metigg, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im 18. Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), p. 439), on the principle, established by Peter himself, that the state should lend its power to force the serf to work for his master in consideration of the work performed by the serf-owner for the state (*ibid.*, p. 441). In A.D. 1747 the nobility were given the right to sell their serfs, and in A.D. 1760 the right to send them to penal servitude in European Russia or to exile in Siberia (p. 418). Passages recommending the emancipation of the serfs, which had been included in the first draft of the Empress Catherine II's celebrated instructions for the abortive legislative commission that met in Moscow in A.D. 1767-8, were omitted from the final draft at the instance of the Empress's advisers (p. 246). In A.D. 1780-3 the Great Russian institution of serfdom was introduced into the Ukraine (pp. 255 and 443).

In Northern Russia, which had been opened up in relatively recent times and where the individual initiative of the pioneer settlers was still reflected in the frequency of peasant proprietorship, the Imperial Government was forcing communal ownership of the land upon the local peasantry in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century (Metigg, *op. cit.*, p. 447). The village communities (*mir*s) were apt to treat rich peasants as the municipal *curiales* had been treated in the western provinces of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries (*ibid.*, p. 448), and the Imperial Government, for its part, was hostile (p. 448) to the growth of a class of well-to-do peasants (the class pilloried as *kulaks* by the subsequent Communist régime). Even under the emancipation scheme of A.D. 1861, the ownership of the land, in so far as it passed out of the hands of the former serf-owners, was acquired communally by the *mir* and not individually by the peasants composing the village community, and the Imperial Government forced

As for Tsar Alexander II, his success in securing the abolition of serfdom with the former serf-owners' acquiescence was, from a Modern Western standpoint, certainly the greatest achievement of Russian statesmanship under the Petrine régime, and perhaps the greatest under any régime that had ever ruled in Russia down to the time of writing. In this act an autocratic empire which was a recent convert to the Modern Western way of life showed itself a more sincere and more effective devotee of Modern Western liberal ideals than the ostensibly democratic Southern States of a republican American Union whose slave-owning citizens were children of the Western Civilization by birth and not by adoption. The same decade of the nineteenth century which saw a voluntary emancipation of the serfs in Russia saw these American slave-owners bring disaster and disgrace upon themselves by driving their Northern fellow countrymen to abolish slavery in the South by *force majeure*, at the cost of a civil war, as a penalty for the Southerners' own persistent failure to rid themselves of their 'peculiar institution' on their own initiative. Yet, in relieving Russia, by bloodless revolution,¹ of her institutional agrarian malady, Tsar Alexander II did nothing to cure her technological agrarian malady; for the legal change in the peasants' personal status was not accompanied by any appreciable change in methods of cultivation. About half the total arable land of Russia continued to be cultivated by the peasants individually for their own benefit,² and about half by their former masters on a larger scale of agri-

the *mir* to serve, in place of the former serf-owner, as its instrument for collecting public revenue from the peasants and keeping them under governmental control.

Though in the latter days of serfdom in Russia there were enlightened serf-owners who, in their treatment of their serfs, distinguished themselves by their philanthropy (Metigg, op. cit., p. 449), the landowners as a class were out of touch with the peasantry, as Peter the Great had been, and this was true of the circles from which the 'Decembrists' of A.D. 1825 were drawn (*Le Monde Slave*, Nouvelle Série, 2^{me} Année, No. 12, December 1925 (Paris 1925, Alcan): 'Centenaire des Décabristes', p. 366). The 'Decembrists' were military officers recruited from the landowning nobility. The private soldiers, who were recruited from the nobility's peasant serfs, were apt, for their part, before they had worked out their sentence of twenty-five years' military service, to lose a contact with the peasantry that their officers had never possessed (*ibid.*, pp. 366-7).

¹ Though, unlike the abolition of slavery in the Southern States of the American Union, the abolition of serfdom in Russia was achieved without the owners having to be coerced by defeat in a civil war, the Russian reforms in the eighteen-sixties were undoubtedly accelerated and facilitated by the antecedent defeat of Russia in a war against foreign adversaries. The Crimean War (*gorebatur* A.D. 1853-56) was a military reverse abroad which opened the way for a triumph of Liberalism at home by bringing to a discreditable end the oppressive reign of Tsar Nicholas I (*imperabat* A.D. 1825-55). Such harvesting of liberal reforms at home from military reverses abroad was, indeed, characteristic of Russian history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The abortive liberal revolution of A.D. 1905 was the fruit of defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1902-4, and the abortive liberal revolution of A.D. 1917 the fruit of defeat in the General War of A.D. 1914-18. Conversely, military successes abroad were apt, in this chapter of Russian history, to play into the hands of political reactionaries on the home front. The tyrant Nicholas I was the principal beneficiary from the Russian people's victory over a French invader of Russia in A.D. 1812, and this tyrant's hold on Russia was confirmed by the victories of his armies over the Turks in A.D. 1829 and over the Poles in A.D. 1831. The working of the same ironical law of Russian history revealed itself again when the Russian people's victory over a German invader of Russia in A.D. 1940-5 served to clamp upon their shoulders, more tightly than ever, the yoke of a Soviet Communist régime.

² The peasants were still more eager to preserve and enlarge the allotments of land which they cultivated individually for their own benefit than they were to obtain their personal freedom from the bondage of serfdom. Their attitude was indicated in a reply which an inquiring nineteenth-century serf-owner, I. Zakushkin, drew from his own

cultural operations; and the fact that the peasants now cultivated their land as free men, and the larger landowners theirs with hired instead of servile labour, did not have any magic effect upon a stagnant agricultural technique.¹

No doubt, in contemporary France and Belgium and Denmark, peasant proprietorship might be wedded with specialization in agricultural production and technique to yield increased economic returns thanks to the auspiciously combined effects of the richness of the soil, the proximity of favourable markets, and the peasant's personal industry, intelligence, and zeal in working as his own master; but these achievements of peasant proprietorship here and there in Modern Western Europe were irrelevant to the situation in contemporary Russia. In the vast inefficiently cultivated expanses of Russia, agricultural productivity could be increased only by mechanical cultivation on the grand scale, and this was the radical reform which the Soviet Communist régime had dared to impose by force on a Russian peasantry which would never have adopted it of its own volition.

After the Bolsheviks had incited the peasantry to bring them into power on a mandate to distribute the lands that Alexander II had left in the possession of the *ci-devant* serf-owning landlords, a duly established Communist régime used the power which they owed to the peasants' support in order to reverse the policy by which this support had been purchased. They took out of the peasants' hands by force not only the lands which Lenin had distributed among them individually but also those which had been left in their hands by Alexander, and they rode rough-shod over the peasants' habits, prejudices, and aspirations by compelling them to cultivate virtually all the land thenceforward in large-scale mechanized collective farms. It could hardly be denied that the Russian peasantry had been first deceived and then coerced by their demonic latter-day rulers, but it would have been more difficult to refute the Soviet Government's contention that the Russian peasantry and, with them, Russia herself had been dragooned into economic salvation by this high-handed and unscrupulous act of state. If it is possible for human beings to be saved in spite of themselves, and, if physical survival is not too dearly bought at the price of forfeiting both liberty and happiness, the Soviet Government might claim to have been the Russian peasantry's saviour from economic disaster; and, since the establishment of their ascendancy over the peasant countries of Eastern Europe after the general war of A.D. 1939-45, they had seen to it that the same medicine should be administered to the agrarian economy of these satellite states by the puppet governments that had been hoisted into office there on the points of Russian bayonets.²

serfs: 'We belong to you, but the land belongs to us' (*Le Monde Slave*, Nouvelle Série, 2^{me} Année, No. 12, December 1925 (Paris 1925, Alcan): 'Centenaire des Décabristes', p. 368).

¹ There had been little change in agricultural technique in Russia since the introduction of a money economy in the sixteenth century (Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im 18. Jahrhunderte* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), p. 390). The *raskolniki* (i.e. the archaizing dissidents from a Romaicizing Russian Orthodox Church) had refused to cultivate potatoes from a feeling that any new food-plant must be Satanic (*ibid.*, p. 396).

² The agrarian social policy of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and its

In A.D. 1952 it was impossible to foretell whether the same destiny was in store for the Chinese and Indian peasantries in their turn. At this stage all that could be seen was that the problem of the starveling peasantry had now been placed on the agenda for the governments of all countries where such a peasantry was still to be found, and that in the handling of this problem the Communists now held the initiative. This was as much as to say that this problem had now become crucial for the Modern Western World. At the time, no doubt, the Western Society's first concern was to put its own house in order; but a successful achievement of this urgent and difficult task at home would not suffice to ensure the West's salvation; for even an internally united Western World would find itself in a precarious position in the World as a whole if the great peasant majority of Mankind were to be gathered into the Communist fold; and this might be the peasantry's cultural destiny if the Modern Western way of life failed to offer any practical prescription for the peasantry's economic malady; for in that event the Communists' prescription, however unpalatable in itself, would hold the field *faute de mieux*.

satellites was all of a piece with their social policy for the urban industrial workers. In town and country-side alike, they were deliberately creating a proletariat of the kind which, in nineteenth-century England, had been heedlessly brought into existence as a social by-product of the private economic enterprise of farmers and industrialists. The children of these English employers of rural and urban labour had taken stock of the social result of their fathers' economic handiwork, and had seen that it was very bad, long before the Communist critics of Western Capitalism had come into power in Russia and had used this power to create the very social conditions which were being denounced by them elsewhere. If a proletariat may be defined as a class whose members have no personal stake in the society in which they find themselves, and no say in the ordering of their own lives, the twentieth-century workers in the factories and collective farms of the Soviet Union would pass this test as well as the factory workers and agricultural labourers of a nineteenth-century Great Britain. No doubt a spokesman of Communism would lose no time in reminding a bourgeois observer of one obvious difference in the situation of the proletariat in a communist and in a capitalist country. Whereas in a capitalist country the proletariat's masters were private employers, in a communist country the proletariat's sole master was the state. The difference was certainly an important one; but, if the proletariats of the Soviet Union and the Western World could have compared notes in A.D. 1952 on the relative rigours of their respective lots, the proletarian employees of an omnipotent totalitarian state would probably have been judged to be more helplessly at the mercy of their masters than those of even the most powerful and oppressive private employers under a régime of free individual economic enterprise.

IX. B (ii) (a) 3, ANNEX II

SOME HISTORICAL CLUES TO THE RIDDLE OF PAKISTAN'S FUTURE

DURING the century and three-quarters that had elapsed between Russia's acquisition of a sea-board on the Black Sea in A.D. 1774 and the transfer of the responsibility for India's security against foreign aggression from British to Indian hands in A.D. 1947, the imaginations of British strategists and statesmen had been haunted by the bogey of a Russian descent upon India from the Central Asian side of the Hindu Kush. Was this British anxiety to be inherited by the Indian heirs of a British Rāj? In Indian minds in A.D. 1948-49 that question could hardly fail to be raised by the spectacle of a sweeping triumph of Communism in China. Perhaps an Indian student of history might seek comfort in recalling that, when, in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, all the rest of Asia, up to the Euphrates and the Halys and the Carpathians, had been overrun by the Mongols, the Indian sub-continent alone had remained unmolested by world-conquerors who were lowering upon India simultaneously from a subjugated Burma and from a subjugated Afghanistan. Yet, if our Indian knew his history well and could bring himself to read its lessons without flinching, he might be driven to conclude that India's escape from the Mongols, like her encounter with the English, was an exception to an historical rule that India's foreign conquerors were usually to be looked for across the Hindu Kush; and, if he was also a student of political geography, the new political map that had emerged from the partition of an ocumenical British Indian Empire into three successor-states would call up in his visual memory some disquieting reminiscences.

The main body of Pakistan—extending, as it did, from the south-eastern foothills of the Hindu Kush to the coast of the Indian Ocean at the delta of the Indus—would remind him of the Transaropanisian limb of the mountain-besriding empire of the Bactrian Greeks and their Kushan, Ghaznawī, Ghūrī, and Durrānī¹ successors; and, if he went on to search the contemporary map for counterparts of the other members of this geographically paradoxical yet historically familiar composite body politic,² these would leap to his eye in the contemporary shapes of Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union. In the second century B.C. and in the first, the eleventh, the twelfth, and the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, Central Asian empire-builders with a land-locked base of operations within the borders of the territories latterly known as Afghan and Soviet Uzbekistan had forced the passage of the Hindu Kush and cleft their way through Indian territory down the valley of the Indus till they had carried their

¹ Previously known as Abdālī.

² This remarkable recurrent political phenomenon of an empire besriding the Hindu Kush has been investigated by Sir W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler in *Afghanistan* (Oxford 1950, University Press), *passim*, but especially Part III, chap. 1.

advancing south-eastern frontier to the shores of an open sea; and in the twentieth century it required no great stretch of the political imagination to envisage a fresh repetition of this recurrent episode of history. Had not the creation of Pakistan prefabricated for a future empire-builder from Central Asia the complementary Indian dominion which a Demetrius and a Kadphises¹ and a Mahmūd Ghaznawī and a Muhammad Ghūrī and an Ahmad Durrānī had been required to carve out for themselves? And, if land-locked Central Asian Powers whose metropolitan territories were confined within the modest limits of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been impelled by claustrophobia to make a strenuous march to the sea across the breadth of a sub-continent, might not the same stimulus be expected to launch on the same course an empire embracing not merely a land-locked Central Asia² but the entire land-locked 'heartland' of the Old World?

Since the days of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (*imperabat* A.D. 1533-84), Russia had been seeking an outlet to an ice-free open sea. She had battered her way to the east coast of the Baltic, only to find this outlet masked by Denmark's command of the Sound; she had battered her way to the north coast of the Black Sea, only to find this outlet likewise masked by Turkey's command of the Bosphorus. The exit from Russia's remote north-western ice-free port of Murmansk was commanded by the adjoining coast of Norway; Archangel was ice-bound for half the year; Vladivostok could barely be kept open in the winter by the constant labour of ice-breakers whose crews saw the water freeze again behind them in their wake.³ These results were little to show for nearly four hundred years of Russian endeavours to reach the open sea in all directions but one. For Russia in the twentieth century, an outlet on the Indian Ocean was the sole still untried possibility. Was not Karachi a tempting bait to dangle before eager Russian eyes? And could the transfer of Karachi from British to Pakistani hands have failed to suggest 'dangerous thoughts' to calculating Russian minds?⁴

¹ Kadphises II Kushan *regnabat circa* A.D. 50-68 (see V. v. 275, n. 3.).

² The Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union were represented at the Asian Congress, convened on Pandit Nehru's initiative, which met at Delhi on the 23rd March-2nd April, 1947.

³ The writer saw this happen with his own eyes from on board a Japanese packet-boat which made its way into the harbour of Vladivostok, piloted by an ice-breaker, on the 13th January, 1930.

⁴ A corridor to Karachi was not the only attractive possibility that the creation of Pakistan had opened up for expansive-minded Russian geopoliticians; for the shape of this Muslim successor-state of the British Indian Empire was one of the curiosities of political geography. While its main body in the Indus Valley offered an open road to Karachi from the North-West Frontier of India, its enclave in Eastern Bengal, which was separated from the main body of Pakistan by the whole breadth of the Indian Union, offered an equally inviting ingress into India across a North-East Frontier which had been opened up, in the course of the general war of A.D. 1939-45, by the building of the Burma Road. At the moment when, in China, Communism seemed to be carrying all before it, a Russian historian would have the pleasure of recollecting that in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era the Mongol cavalry had succeeded in making their way from Transbaikalia to Burma, across the whole breadth of China, without any Burma Road to speed them on their path.

THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF PANISLAMISM

THE remarkable success of the core of the Islamic World in preserving or regaining its freedom from alien political control during the 270 years that had elapsed between A.D. 1683 and A.D. 1952¹ was, no doubt, one explanation of the equally remarkable miss-fire of a nineteenth-century Panislamic Movement that was the response which the Muslims might have been expected to make to the challenge of an increasing Western and Russian pressure upon them. The nineteenth-century Muslims to whom the Panislamic programme of strength through solidarity made an appeal were those outlying Muslim communities that did lose their independence in this age.

Both the local Ottoman dominant minority and the Arab and Berber subject majority of the population in Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania, for example, reversed their attitude towards the Ottoman Empire after the initiation in A.D. 1830 of the French conquest of the Maghrib. During the preceding two centuries or so, the ruling element in the Ottoman Barbary States had been bent on asserting its *de facto* independence of the Porte; from A.D. 1830 onwards both the anti-French resistance movement in Algeria and the local Ottoman régime in the now likewise threatened adjoining Ottoman principality of Tunisia began to look to the Porte for support against French aggression. In A.D. 1864 the reigning Bey of Tunis sought to strengthen his ties with the Porte by sending on a mission to Constantinople the Circassian slave-statesman Khayr-ad-Dîn, who published in A.D. 1867 a book advocating the adoption of Westernizing reforms by Muslim countries as a means towards their becoming more competent to hold their own against Western imperialism.² A further move in the same direction was made by the Tunisian Government in A.D. 1871.³

From the opposite extremity of the Islamic World, similar embassies from Central Asian Turkish Muslim rulers, soliciting the help of the Porte against Russian imperialism, began to arrive at Constantinople in the seventh decade of the nineteenth century, after the Russians had begun to direct their military energies from the by then all but completed conquest of the Caucasus to the conquest of Central Asia.⁴ In A.D. 1863 a Western traveller in Central Asia found that Central Asian khans were taking pride and comfort in being invested with honorary

¹ See pp. 219-32, above.

² Khayr-ad-Dîn Pasha: *Muqaddamât Kitâb Aqwam al-Masâlik fi Ma'rifat Ahwâl al-Mamâlik*, first published in Arabic in A.D. 1867 and in a French translation, under the title *Réformes Nécessaires aux États Musulmans*, in A.D. 1868. The writer of this Study possesses a copy of the second French edition (Paris 1875, Dentu) and of an Arabic edition published at Constantinople in A.H. 1293 (A.D. 1876) at the Jevâ'ib ('News') Press.

³ See Davison, Roderic H.: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (thesis submitted to Harvard University for the Degree of Ph.D., 1st April, 1942), pp. 263-5 and 349. [The author had kindly permitted the writer of this Study to read and cite a typescript copy of this still unpublished work which was deposited in the Library of Harvard University.]

⁴ See Davison, op. cit., pp. 343-7.

offices in the Ottoman Pādishāh's household;¹ and from A.D. 1869 onwards there were contacts between the Porte and Ya'qūb Beg, the Turkī Muslim rebel against Manchu rule in the Tarim Basin. From A.D. 1873 onwards Ya'qūb caused the Pādishāh's name to be inscribed on his coinage and invoked in the *Khutbah* within his dominions, and an Ottoman mission made its way from Constantinople to his headquarters. Envoys from Afghanistan and from the Panthai Muslim rebels against Manchu rule in Yunnan also presented themselves, on similar errands, at the court of Sultan 'Abd-al-'Azīz (*imperabat* A.D. 1861-76), and in A.D. 1873 he received an appeal from the Achinese Muslims in Sumatra for help against the aggression of the Dutch.

A sentimental attachment to an idealised conception of the Ottoman Empire began to appear about the same time among the Muslim diaspora—Shī'ī as well as Sunnī—in India, as a psychological compensation for the loss of their own former imperial dominion over a Hindu majority of the population of the sub-continent and for the painfully overwhelming service which the subsequent British conquerors of India had done for these local Muslim predecessors of theirs in saving them from the vengeance of the resurgent Hindus by imposing an impartial British Rāj on both these Indian communities.

The Ottoman Empire was, indeed, the only political rallying point on which the Muslim victims of Western and Russian imperialism could fall back—not so much in virtue of her dubious and long-neglected title to the inheritance of the Caliphate as because, even in her nineteenth-century infirmity, she was by far and away the most powerful, efficient, and enlightened Muslim state in existence. At the same time, her patent weakness in this age by comparison with the encircling non-Muslim Powers made it an embarrassment rather than an opportunity for her to find herself the cynosure of nineteenth-century Muslim eyes. Out of fear of France, she forbore from making any serious response to Tunisian overtures to her between the date of the French descent on Algeria in A.D. 1830 and the date of the long-dreaded establishment of a French protectorate over Tunisia in A.D. 1881, and she was quite impotent to help the Caucasian and Central Asian Muslims in their desperate struggle to resist the imposition on them of a Russian yoke. All that the Porte could do was to take a modest advantage of the revulsion of Maghribī feeling in her favour by establishing her direct rule over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in A.D. 1835 and to salve her conscience for her inability to assist the Maghribī and Caucasian resistance movements in the field by giving new homes in still intact Ottoman territory to Algerian and Circassian 'displaced persons' after their struggles to maintain their independence had ended in an inevitable ultimate defeat.

Thus Panislamism fell between two stools. On the one hand neither the Ottoman Empire nor, *a fortiori*, any other still independent Muslim state was capable in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era of constituting itself into an effective agency for vindicating the integrity and independence of the Islamic World as a whole, while on the other hand

¹ See Vambéry, A.: *Travels in Central Asia, 1863* (London 1864, Murray), pp. 434-5.

the fact that all but a few fragments of the core of the Islamic World had succeeded in remaining independent on a low level of vitality took the edge off the appeal of the Panislamic gospel of self-preservation through an increase of inter-Islamic solidarity. If, in the course of the nineteenth century, the whole of the Islamic World, instead of a few fragments and fringes, had been engulfed in the British, French, and Russian empires, the nineteenth-century apostle of Panislamism, the Sayyid Jamāl-ad-Dīn¹ al-Afghānī (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1838–A.D. 1897),² might have found a more favourable mission-field for his propaganda.

Jamāl-ad-Dīn's message to his fellow Muslims was twofold. They were to defend themselves against the West in the first place by transcending their own traditional sectarian and political divisions and rallying round the Ottoman Pādishāh as Caliph, and in the second place by adopting Western ideas, institutions, and techniques that were the secret of the Modern's West's strength;³ and it is significant that the Sayyid was far more successful in his advocacy of the second of these two prescriptions. In his preaching of Islamic solidarity he was, it is true, unprecedentedly successful in gaining a following among Sunnis and Shī'is alike. In a Sunnī Egypt he was the inspiration of Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh, and in a Shī'ī Persia he moved the mujtahids in A.D. 1891–2 to crush Nāsir-ad-Dīn Shāh's attempt to grant a tobacco monopoly to a group of British *entrepreneurs*. Yet the chief practical effect of his missionary work was to promote the birth of a parochial nationalist movement in Egypt and a parochial nationalist movement in Persia, and thereby to create new, and perhaps insurmountable, obstacles to the political unification of the Islamic World under the aegis of a universal state crystallizing round the nineteenth-century torso of the Ottoman Empire. In so far as Jamāl-ad-Dīn's Ottoman admirer and patron Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II (*imperabat* A.D. 1876–1909) tried to translate the Sayyid's ideas into practice, he largely stultified the Sayyid's intentions by seeking in Panislamism a political prop for the declining strength of Turkey rather than attempting to use Turkey's residual strength as a pillar for the support of Panislamism.⁴

The inference from this aftermath of Jamāl-ad-Dīn's career seems to

¹ Accounts of the Sayyid Jamāl-ad-Dīn's career and ideas will be found in Browne, E. G.: *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (Cambridge 1910, University Press), pp. 1–30, and in an article by Goldziher, I.: s.v. 'Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. I (Leyden 1913, Brill), pp. 1008–11.

² According to Browne, op. cit., p. 4, the As'adābād which was Jamāl-ad-Dīn's birthplace was probably not the place of that name near Kābul, which was claimed as his birthplace by the Sayyid himself, but the As'adābād near Hamadan, as asserted by Nāzīm-al-Islām of Kirmān in his *Ta'rikh-i-Biddā'i-i-Irānīyan*. If so, the Sayyid was born a Shī'ī and a subject of the Shah of Persia.

³ The Panislamic strategy of resistance to Western aggression against the Islamic World could, of course, be combined equally well with either Herodian or Zealot tactics. As an example of a Zealot-minded exponent of Panislamism we may cite the North Caucasian Panislamic leader the Amir Shaykh Uzun Hajji Khayr Khan, who was active in A.D. 1910. 'Uzun Hajji was distinguished by simplicity and directness, as much as by his fanaticism. "I am twisting a rope in order to hang all engineers, students and, in general, people who write from left to right." These words of Uzun Hajji's... (Arshurani, A., and Habidullin [?Habibullin], Kh: *Ocherki Panislamizma i Panturkizma v Rossii* [Studies in Panislamism and Panturkism in Russia] (Moscow 1931, Bezbozhnik [Anti-religious] Press), p. 67, communicated to the writer by B. H. Sumner).

⁴ 'Abd-al-Hamid's exploitation of the Ottoman Caliphate has been touched upon in VI. vii. 22–24.

be that the nineteenth-century Western and Russian pressure on the heart of the Islamic World was not sufficiently severe to make the still unsubjugated Muslim peoples feel that Western nationalism was a luxury in which they could not afford to indulge. In any case it is an historical fact that the still independent Islamic peoples Westernized piecemeal, like the Ottoman Orthodox Christian peoples, instead of Westernizing *en bloc*, like Russian Orthodox Christendom, within the political framework of a universal state.

THE EXPLOITATION OF EGYPT BY
MEHMED 'ALĪ

EGYPT was not just a passive piece of Mankind's physical environment; it was a creation of human audacity, industry, and genius out of the unpromising raw material of a forbidding jungle-swamp;¹ and, unlike its sister creature the Land of Shinar, the system of embanked and irrigated fields in the Lower Nile Valley had never ceased, even in the periods of its worst neglect, to be the going concern that had been made of it in the fourth millennium B.C. by the founders of the nomes, who had tamed the valley piecemeal, and by the subsequent founders of the United Kingdom, who had co-ordinated these works of local reclamation into a single technologically and administratively centralized concern. Through these abiding results of their handiwork, the genius of the fourth-millennium makers of Egypt set its stamp more than once in the course of subsequent history on the policy of later masters of Egypt who had sufficient genius of their own to enter into the founding fathers' labours.

The founders' original lay-out of their Nilotic estate imposed on their successors the necessity of subjecting the population to a centralized autocratic régime in order to harvest the potential productivity of a regimented soil and water—whatever the proportions in which the joint product of management and labour might afterwards be distributed between the human parties to this vast economic enterprise². This permanent idiosyncrasy of Egypt herself must be the explanation of the astonishing similarity between the régimes respectively inaugurated by Mehmed 'Alī in the first half of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era and by the Ptolemies at the turn of the fourth and third centuries B.C., since it is improbable that Mehmed 'Alī was aware, even dimly, of the methods employed by these predecessors of his who were also his Macedonian fellow countrymen, while it is impossible that he should have been familiar with the details of the Ptolemaic administration that were brought to light after his death by the excavation and study of documentary papyri. Yet so masterful was Egypt herself in dictating to her rulers the methods by which they must exploit her that a survey of the acts of Mehmed 'Alī and his son Ibrāhīm might also serve, with a mere change of names, to describe the acts of Ptolemy Soter and Ptolemy Philadelphus.

The Turkish Macedonian rulers of Egypt, like their Greek Macedonian forerunners, planted Egypt with fruit and forest trees;³ extended the area of irrigation and cultivation;⁴ dictated what crops should be

¹ See II. i. 302-15.

² On this question see III. iii. 214-15.

³ See Clot-Bey, A. B.: *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin et Masson, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 153.

⁴ See Jabarti, Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-: *'Ajā'ib-al-Āthār fi'l-Tarājim wa'l-Akhhār* (French translation: Cairo 1888-1896, Imprimerie Nationale; Paris 1888-1896, Leroux), vol. ix, p. 194; Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 242 and 247; vol. ii, pp. 436-7;

sown in what quantities;¹ laid out model farms and botanical gardens;² introduced new crops, of which cotton was the chief,³ but which also included silk, indigo, sugar, hemp, and opium;⁴ imported agricultural experts from abroad and sent Egyptian students of agriculture to Europe and the West Indies;⁵ and monopolized for the Government the purchase of the cotton, rice, gum, indigo, sugar, opium, and other crops.⁶

Under Mehmed 'Ali's régime in Egypt the peasants had become the Government's tenants—holding the arable land in usufruct only, and paying *kharāj*—in the course of the years A.D. 1808–14, when Mehmed 'Ali had abolished tax-farming (*iltizām*), eliminated the tax-farmers (*multazims*), and expropriated the waqf endowments invested in arable land (as distinct from gardens and houses) against compensation in the form of annuities from the public treasury.⁷ The new system of direct collection of the land-tax by the Government itself was based on a new survey of the land.⁸ By the time when the Government had also taken it upon itself to direct the peasants' agricultural operations, to supply them with the means of production, and to buy their non-cereal crops at fixed prices, the peasants had become mere hands on a state-managed plantation coextensive with the cultivated area of the country,⁹ and the

Kramers, J. H., s.v. 'Khediw', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (Leyden 1927, Brill), p. 947.

¹ See Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 190; Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes), pp. 14 and 19. 'He not only compelled the fellāh to cultivate, but in some areas he determined what crops should be grown, and required the produce to be delivered into the government warehouses at a fixed rate' (Dodwell, H.: *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge 1931, University Press), p. 218).

² See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 154–60, and vol. ii, p. 394; Bowring, op. cit., pp. 26–27.

³ Cotton culture was started in Egypt in A.D. 1821 and Sea Island cotton seed from South Carolina was introduced in A.D. 1828 (Kramers, op. cit., pp. 947–8).

⁴ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 260–9; Bowring, op. cit., pp. 21–22 and 23; Kramers, op. cit., p. 948. According to Bowring, loc. cit., Ibrāhīm Pasha started a sugar plantation and sugar mills, and sent a certain Ōmer Efendi to the West Indies to study rum-making. According to Kramers, op. cit., the cane-sugar culture in Upper Egypt was started only in A.D. 1867, in the reign of the Khediw Ismā'il.

⁵ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 257; Bowring, op. cit., pp. 23 and 26.

⁶ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 186; Bowring, op. cit., p. 20.

⁷ See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 182–3; Kramers, op. cit., p. 946. Details are given in Dodwell, op. cit., p. 32. In A.D. 1808 Mehmed 'Ali investigated the *multazims'* titles and records, and then annulled all irregular grants and expropriated (on pensions) all *multazims* who were in arrears with their payments to the Treasury. The surviving *multazims* were expropriated in A.D. 1814 (see Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 79).

⁸ See Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 90.

⁹ Mehmed 'Ali 'succeeded in centralising the entire production in his own hands [by his monopoly system] and of [sic] disposing of it freely; the peasants were no more than day-labourers who were obliged to sell their products at fixed prices to the Government and to pay likewise their taxes in kind' (Kramers, op. cit., p. 947; cp. Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 182–3). The impact made by Mehmed 'Ali's monopoly system on the life of the Egyptian people reverberates through Jabarti's narrative. In A.D. 1812 Mehmed 'Ali monopolized the marketing of the entire cereal crop of Upper Egypt and the entire rice crop (*ibid.*, vol. viii, pp. 344 and 348); but the practice was not confined to the handling of agricultural produce. In the same year, the Pasha monopolized the marketing of imports, at the same time raising the prices (*ibid.*, vol. viii, p. 345), and established a hold over internal transport by building a river-fleet which he operated himself (*ibid.*, vol. viii, p. 345). He also monopolized slaughter-houses (*ibid.*, vol. viii, p. 351) and even forbade artisans to work for private employers (*ibid.*, vol. viii, p. 357). According to Jabarti the new monopolies were devised by Greeks and Armenians and were farmed out by the Pasha to them (*ibid.*, vol. viii, p. 355). In A.D. 1814 Mehmed 'Ali monopolized the transport of Ottoman pilgrims to the Islamic Holy Places in the Hijāz, and exacted his price from them (*ibid.*, vol. ix, p. 100). In A.D. 1816 he established a virtual monopoly over all shipping (*ibid.*, vol. ix, p. 197). The objective of these monopolies was, of course,

servile status to which they had been reduced was brought home to them by the conscription of their labour for public works.¹

It will be seen that, unlike Peter the Great, Mehmed 'Alī did not neglect the agricultural basis of his Western superstructure; but the measures which he took in his fundamental economic policy have to be credited—or debited—to the dictates of Egypt as well as to the promptings of Mehmed 'Alī's own genius. Peter's economic insight was certainly not inferior to his; and we may indeed surmise that Mehmed 'Alī, had he been Tsar of Muscovy, would have neglected agriculture as Peter did, and that Peter, had he been Viceroy of Egypt, would have fostered agriculture by the drastic but dubious methods of Mehmed 'Alī.

price-control with a view to price-raising. The state slaughter-houses sold their product to the butchers at fixed wholesale prices, and the butchers' retail prices were likewise fixed by the state (op. cit., vol. ix, p. 226). According to Jabarti (vol. ix, pp. 224 et seqq.) the imposition by the state of maximum retail prices without regard to seasonal variations in the relation between supply and demand, and even without regard to the levels of the state-imposed wholesale prices, proved paralysing for trade. In A.D. 1817 Mehmed 'Alī established a monopoly of hides at fixed prices (ibid., vol. ix, p. 252) and a monopoly of the operation of all looms. The raw materials of the textile industry were bought up by the Government and were distributed by it to the weavers, and the product was then sold by the Government at about three times the previous price (pp. 252-3). In A.D. 1820 Mehmed 'Alī monopolized soap (ibid., vol. ix, p. 317).

One of the objects of British policy in the negotiation of the Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty of the 16th August, 1838, was to secure the abolition of monopolies in the Ottoman Empire with an eye to insisting on the application of this treaty provision to Ottoman territories under Mehmed 'Alī's administration. An escape-clause in previous Ottoman capitulations which had left the Ottoman Government a loophole for establishing monopolies at will was duly eliminated by the terms of the new treaty (Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 220-1; Bailey, F. E.: *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, 1826-1853* (Cambridge, Mass. 1942, Harvard University Press), p. 125); but subsequent local negotiations between representatives of the British Government and Mehmed 'Alī ended in a compromise. It was agreed that Mehmed 'Alī should maintain his monopolies on condition of his selling the produce at public auction (Dodwell, op. cit., p. 222).

¹ Jabarti records that in A.D. 1817 peasants were conscripted to dig a new Alexandria canal (op. cit., vol. ix, p. 240). In A.D. 1819 they were conscripted again for canal digging, and this just before the maize harvest, so that it was no wonder that they had to be secured with ropes round their necks (ibid., vol. ix, p. 299). In 1818, 4,000 young men were conscripted to work in government factories (ibid., vol. ix, p. 274).

JEWISH HISTORY AND THE MILLET IDEA

BY JAMES PARKES

THE conception of community evolved between the first and fourth centuries of the Christian Era by a Rabbinic Judaism fitted admirably into the millet idea; and, so long as the majority community was prepared to allow a Jewish community milletal autonomy, the essential minimum requirements of Rabbinic Judaism could be maintained in any country in the World. In tolerating a variety of legal and social systems within a larger whole, Medieval Christendom as well as Islam made a Jewish Millet an acceptable social organisation for Judaism, and in the Western Society the Jewish Millet outlived by centuries all its peers, surviving until the nineteenth-century emancipation.

It seems to me, however, necessary to recognize that the millet idea in East and West, while it made Jewish survival possible by its recognition of communal autonomy, yet contained elements which made it intolerable as a permanent social organization. In particular the idea of inequality seems to me to be inherent in it. Neither Islam nor Medieval Christendom recognized Jews as equals; and both tolerated Jewish autonomy because both had the power to circumscribe it at will in their own interests. In both East and West there was also the social factor, in the sense that the inferiority of status implicit in the milletal dispensation encouraged a contempt which was always there, even if under the surface. A great deal of rubbish is talked about the excellent situation of Jews under Islam before Zionism. Existence for all but a few rich merchants was unenviable in the ghettos and malās of the Islamic World for many centuries before Zionism as a political movement was born.

Emancipation, by its emphasis on Judaism as an individual ethic, and on Jews as citizens manifesting a personal difference only in the religious buildings which they attended (or did not attend) for worship one day a week, created just the situation described by you.¹ Gentile societies that could afford not to fear Jewish competition accepted Jews; Gentile societies that had a still unfulfilled ambition to breed a native Gentile 'bourgeoisie' of their own hated the Jews and were jealous of them. But either situation dealt only with that aspect of Jewish life which expressed itself in economic structures and adaptabilities; and both ignored the fact that the heart of Judaism and of Jewish communal life was left unsatisfied by an economic liberty supplemented by a right to go to synagogue on Saturday instead of going to church on Sunday. The core of Rabbinic Judaism, inherited from its interpretation of the Law and the Prophets of the Old Testament, was a belief in a community that would give scope for a social justice and a righteousness which were the divinely appointed objectives of Man's life in This World. The ideal had been narrowed, ossified, and even perverted by the conditions of millet life; but within the Millet it had at least a chance of survival.

¹ On pp. 285-8, above.—A.J.T.

After the dissolution of the Millet, Jews individually plunged, where free, with enthusiasm into all movements for social reform and humanitarianism in a nineteenth-century Western World; but in Eastern Europe, where most of the Jewish people lived, the local conditions ruled out the possibility of any such individual Jewish participation in a liberal Gentile life; and therefore here one of two things was bound to happen. Some East European Jews sought an outlet for their inner malaise in taking part in Gentile revolutionary movements, some in an attempt to find a new communal basis for Jewish life. When a recrudescence of Antisemitism in Western Europe inhibited, or prevented, individual Jews there from expressing themselves in Gentile national movements aiming at the achievement of greater social righteousness, Jews in Western Europe likewise began to be attracted to one of the two alternatives which had grown out of the Eastern European situation.

In both East and West a return to a milletal dispensation was ruled out. With all its merits a millet system is only possible either in a society that is at a much more developed stage than any society had yet reached at the time of writing, or else in a society in which there is no effective devolution of responsibility and authority from the central government to the local geographical administration—the city, the county, or what not. The Islamic Society's weakness in this respect had enabled the millet system to survive in Dār-al-Islām down to recent times, and had allowed minorities a certain liberty and vitality, but this only at the cost of their having to live within a general framework of stagnation. It was inevitable that to many Jews the only alternative should seem to be the autonomy (or independence) of the national community (it is interesting that Austrian Jewish 'revolutionaries' for some time sought to cope with the nationality problem in Eastern Europe along the lines of 'personal nationality', which was an attempt to adapt the millet idea to contemporary European conditions).

Jews turned to Nationalism, not only because it was the contemporary vogue, but also because, with the failure of the idea of 'personal nationality', it was the only framework within which the unsatisfied longing for a medium in which to work for greater social righteousness could be satisfied. In other words, there were deeper Jewish roots for Jewish nationalism than you have allowed for.

It is also interesting to discover the way in which the emergence of a Jewish nationalism—which was, as you say, fantastic in terms of the non-existence of a territory where Jews cultivated the soil—followed a period of intense Jewish intellectual activity which had been devoted largely to the study of Jewish history, and not merely to the study of a Rabbinic Judaism which a Rabbinic orthodoxy had come to regard as the Jewish intellect's sole legitimate field. The flowering of a *Jüdische Wissenschaft* is an integral part of the picture of the emergence of a Modern Jewry; and this must also be regarded as being one of the outstanding events in the Jews' encounter with the Western Society, since it was the product of Jewish access to Western academic and intellectual life.

IX. B (ii) (a) 7, ANNEX

THE WELTANSCHAUUNG OF ALEXANDER HERZEN

ALEXANDER HERZEN (*vivebat* A.D. 1812-70) was the natural son of a Russian nobleman by a German mother. While still a student at the University of Moscow, he fell foul of the autocratic régime of Tsar Nicholas I. He left Russia in A.D. 1847 and spent the rest of his life in Western Europe in a society of Russian and Western liberal exiles. In taking this personal course, Herzen was opting for Westernization, and he accounted himself an opponent of his 'Slavophil' Russian contemporaries; yet in the same breath he proclaimed his affinity with them:

'Yes, we were their opponents, but very strange ones. We had the same love, but not the same way of loving, and, like Janus or the two-headed eagle, we looked in opposite directions, though the heart that beat within us was but one.'¹

The love which these nineteenth-century Russian 'Herodians' and Russian 'Zealots' shared was, of course, their love for Russia; but an even stronger bond between them was a hatred which they likewise shared for a middle-class outlook and way of life that had become dominant in the contemporary Western World. Herzen revolted as violently as the Slavophiles themselves against any suggestion that Russia might renounce her historic identity by abandoning herself to this Modern Western middle-class culture. This idea seemed outrageous to him because he believed no less fervently than the Slavophiles in Russia's destiny; and this belief that Russia had a destiny incompatible with conversion to the Modern Western middle-class way of life brought Herzen into line, not only with his Slavophil Russian contemporaries, but also with his Communist Russian successors. As an anti-bourgeois Russian aristocrat he became a Russian prophet of a socialism that was to be attained in Russia through revolution and was to lead to a sanguinary conflict between Russia and a Western World from which Russia—Slavophil or Socialist—was divided by a permanent and unbridgeable moral gulf.

These features in Herzen's outlook are brought out in his memoirs with a wealth of illustration of which only a few characteristic specimens can be cited here.

'The Western European is not in a normal condition; he is moulting. . . . The historical process has left in the foreground the slimy stratum of the petty-bourgeois, under which the fossilised aristocratic classes are buried and the rising masses submerged.'² . . . The petty-bourgeois were not produced by the Revolution. . . . Set free, they passed over the dead bodies of those who had freed them, and established their own régime.'³

¹ This passage from Herzen's periodical *The Bell*, p. 90, is quoted in Herzen, A.: *My Past and Thoughts*, English translation by Garnett, C. (London 1924-7, Chatto and Windus, 6 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 254 and 302. The quotations from Mrs. Garnett's translation have been made with the permission of the publishers.

² Herzen, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 228-9.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 134; *cp.* p. 147.

... Parliamentary government ... is simply the wheel in a squirrel's cage, and the most colossal one in the World.¹ ... Under the influence of petty-bourgeoisie, everything is changed in Europe. Chivalrous honour is replaced by the honesty of the book-keeper, elegant manners by propriety, courtesy by stiff decorum, pride by a readiness to take offence, parks by kitchen gardens, palaces by hotels open to *all* (that is, all who have money).² ... Bourgeoisie is the final form of Western European Civilisation, its coming of age. ... This closes the long series of its visions. ... By hard work the nations of the West have won their winter quarters. Let others show their mettle.'³

How infinitely remote from all this is the Russian spirit!

'Petty Bourgeoisdom is incompatible with the Russian character—and thank God for it.⁴ ... There is ... something irrational in our lives, but there is nothing vulgar, nothing stagnant, nothing bourgeois. ... You are restrained by scruples, you are held back by second thoughts. We have neither second thoughts nor scruples; all we lack is strength ... We have no law but our nature, our national character.'⁵

Russia's character is her destiny, and a nineteenth-century Herzen is as sure of this destiny as a sixteenth-century Philotheus.⁶

'Are we not perhaps satisfied with vestibules because our history is still knocking at the gate?' ... In our attitude to the Europeans ... there are points of resemblance to the attitude of the Germans to the Romans. In spite of our exterior, we are still barbarians.⁸ ... We have nowhere those hard-and-fast prejudices which, like a paralysis, deprive the Western European of the use of half his limbs.⁹ ... [The Polish émigrés] had a rich past; we had a great hope. Their breast was covered with scars, while we were toughening our muscles to receive them. Beside them, we were like recruits beside veterans. The Poles are mystics; we are realists.¹⁰ ... Have we not ... the right to look upon Russia as ... the centre towards which the Slav World, in its striving toward unity, is gravitating?¹¹ ... Do you not think it would be as well to become more closely acquainted with this inconvenient neighbour who makes himself felt throughout the whole of Europe, in one place with bayonets, in another with spies?'¹²

The next manifestation of Russia's puissant non-Western destiny will be an anti-bourgeois revolution.

'The free and rational development of Russian national existence is at one with the ideas of Western Socialism.'¹³ ... The Russian enjoys a terrible advantage over the European; he has no traditions, no habits, nothing akin to him to lose. The man who has no wealth of his own or of others goes most safely along dangerous paths.¹⁴ ... The Russian imperial autocracy ... is a military and civil dictatorship with far more resemblance to the Caesarism of Rome than to a feudal monarchy. A dictatorship ... cannot be permanent.¹⁵ ... Who will be the predestined saviour? ... Whoever it may be, it is our task to meet him with warm welcome.'¹⁶

¹ Herzen, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 144.

² *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 65.

³ See VI. vii. 35–36.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 46; *cp.* vol. iv, p. 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. iv, p. 209.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 278.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 115.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 229.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 230.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 220.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 106.

¹² *Ibid.*, vol. v, p. 331.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 142.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 240.

¹⁵ Herzen, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 114.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 92.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 211.

Herzen's exultation over his vision of Russia's revolutionary future is seldom chilled by the cold touch of doubt.

'We perhaps ask for too much and shall get nothing. That may be so, but yet we do not despair.'¹

He seems naïvely blind to the trenchancy of Western comments on the Russian *éthos*, which he records *en passant*. 'You Russians are either the most absolute slaves of your Tsar or . . . anarchists, and it follows from that that it will be a long time before you are free', the conservative and monarchist-minded Duc de Noailles once remarked to Herzen.² 'I tell you what, gentlemen: Hard as it may be for us with the Russian Government, anyway our position under it is better than what these socialist fanatics are preparing for us', declared the Polish émigré Demontowicz after prolonged arguments with the Russian émigré Bakunin.³

Herzen is not dismayed by the prospect, which he foresees, of a head-on collision between a revolutionary Russia and a conservative West.

'Our classic ignorance of the Western European will be productive of a good deal of harm; race hatreds and bloody collisions will develop from it later on.'⁴ . . . Much hatred yet will be engendered and much blood yet will flow through this difference in the two stages of growth and education⁵ . . . from "the conflict of these two different forms of culture".⁶

¹ Ibid., vol. vi, p. 241.

³ Ibid., vol. v, p. 174, n. 2.

⁵ Ibid., vol. iv, p. 24.

² Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 13-14.

⁴ Ibid., vol. iii, p. 146.

⁶ Ibid., vol. vi, p. 47.

SICILIAN LIGHT ON ROMAN ORIGINS

IN rejecting as a professional pedigree-maker's fake the story, immortalized by Virgil, that the ancestors of the Romans were refugees from a foundering Minoan World who had been cast up on the coast of Italy by the same tornado that stranded the Philistines on the coast of Syria, we need not rule out the possibility that the Romans may in fact have been descended from immigrants of a later date.

This possibility is suggested by a consideration of the linguistic map of Italy in the period between the establishment of the Greek and Etruscan settlements on Italian ground and the subsequent Latinization of the Peninsula as a result of a Roman conquest. In the intervening age, languages of the Latin type were spoken by three peoples: the Sikel natives of Sicily,¹ the Ligurians in the North-Western Appennines and the Maritime Alps,² and the Latins and Falisci in the lower basin of the River Tiber. The rest of the Italian Peninsula, apart from the Greek and Etruscan settlements, was occupied in that age by peoples speaking other languages who would appear to have spilled over into Italy from the north-east in three successive waves. A wave of Umbrian-speakers had reached the west coast both north and south of Latium; for Umbrian dialects were spoken by the untamed Volscians ('marshmen') in the Pomptine swamps, as well as by the natives of an Etruria where, under an alien ascendancy, the largest river in the land testified to the nationality of the subject population by continuing to bear the name Umbro (Ombrone). Behind the Umbrian-speakers stood the Oscan-speakers, and behind these the Illyrian-speaking peoples of Venetia, Apulia, and Northern Calabria.

The general configuration of this linguistic map suggests that the speakers of languages of the Latin type in this age were survivors of an earlier wave of immigrants into Italy who had been pushed out south-westward into Sicily beyond the Straits of Messina and north-westward into a Ligurian highland fastness by three waves following in their wake; but this interpretation still leaves to be explained the presence of a Latin-speaking population in the open country of Latium. How are we to account for this Latin enclave in an elsewhere Umbrian and Oscan

¹ The fragmentary surviving relics of the Sikel language have been presented and discussed by R. S. Conway in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1926, University Press), pp. 436-7; by J. Whatmough in *The Foundations of Roman Italy* (London 1937, Methuen), pp. 365-6; and by T. J. Dunbabin in *The Western Greeks* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 189-90. As it appears to the writer of this Study, the evidence proves conclusively that the Sicels' mother tongue was virtually identical with Latin, and that it can be classed at any rate as a language belonging to the same sub-group as Latin within an Italic family in which the other two sub-groups were the Oscan and the Umbrian.

² The relics of the Ligurian language have been presented and discussed by Conway in loc. cit., pp. 433-5, and by Whatmough in op. cit., pp. 129-30. Whatmough agrees with Conway that Ligurian is an Indo-European language of Sikel affinities, and, *pace* Whatmough's judgement that it is not a member of either the Italic or the Celtic family, the present writer ventures the opinion that Ligurian, as well as Sikel, will turn out to be an Italic language of the Latin sub-group.

Central Italy, just beyond the south-eastern limits of the Umbrian territory that had been occupied by the Etruscans? We may find a clue to the puzzle if we turn our eyes for a moment to a point just beyond the opposite extremity of Etruria, along the coast to the north-west of the mouth of the River Arno.

Here, at the eastern end of the Italian Riviera, we find four place-names—not of Roman mintage, and therefore presumably ante-dating the Roman conquest—that are identical with the principal place-names in the Elymian country in the north-western corner of Sicily. The Gulf of Spezia is flanked by a Port of Eryx (the latter-day Lerici), bearing the name of the celebrated Sicilian mountain, and by a Portus Veneris, dedicated to the same goddess as the celebrated temple of Aphrodite on the Sicilian mountain's flank. Again, about half-way between the Gulf of Spezia and Genoa, the mouth of the River Labonia (Lavagna) is flanked on one side by a Segesta (the latter-day Sestri Levante) and on the other by an Entella (still commemorated in the name of a local stream). This fourfold correspondence between place-names in Sicily and on the Riviera can hardly be accidental; we cannot reject the inference that the places known by these four names in Liguria had been called after the four places with identical names in Sicily, or vice versa; and the probability that the group of names in Liguria was derived from the group in Sicily is indicated by the fact that in Liguria, as in Sicily, the mountain-name appears in the Graecized form 'Eryx' and not in a Ligurian equivalent of the Latin form 'verruca' ('peak'), which we should expect to find surviving here if the name had originated in Liguria and had been carried thence to Sicily.

The reappearance of these four Sicilian names on the Riviera thus indicates that the Sicilian Elymi had planted settlements here at some date; and this date must be earlier than the Roman Age; for the Romans did not draw on their Graecized Sicilian subjects for the colonists whom they planted at Luna and other points in and around Liguria in and after the second century B.C. The hypothesis that most naturally suggests itself is that these Elymian settlements along the Eastern Riviera were part of the older colonizing movement that had created Magna Graecia and Etruria. We know that the Elymi were particularly receptive to Hellenic influences, besides being particularly hard pressed by the encroachments of Greek intruders on their territory. It might well have occurred to them to relieve the pressure of population in a shrunken homeland in Sicily by resorting to the Greek expedient that had borne so hard upon the Elymians themselves. Why should they not follow the Greeks' example by colonizing some stretch of West Mediterranean coastline where the natives were sufficiently backward to be easily subdued or expelled? If, at some stage in the colonizing movement that was in process from the eighth to the sixth century B.C., the Elymians did join in the game, an obvious field for them to choose would have been the Riviera between the north-western outposts of the Etruscans and the eastern outposts of the Massiliots. The Italian Riviera had a promising commercial hinterland in the upper basin of the River Po, and thus in their general location the four Elymian settlements were

well placed—though the Hannibalic War was eventually to demonstrate that, in overlooking the superlative advantages of Genoa, the Elymian prospectors had been no less blind than those Megarian Greek prospectors who passed by the vacant site of Byzantium in order to settle at Calchedon.¹

The Elymian settlers along the Eastern Riviera had, however, at any rate chosen a location where they could count on a 'natural frontier' to safeguard them against Etruscan encroachments; for, as late as the time of the Hannibalic War, the lower valley of the Arno was a pestilential swamp, which Hannibal's army found it almost as difficult to traverse as the Alps, and which cost their leader the loss of an eye. The Etruscans' Latin neighbours at the opposite extremity of the Maremma likewise enjoyed the benefit of a protective river-barrier which enabled the Romans to repulse the Etruscan war-lord Lars Porsenna's attempt to reconquer them after they had expelled their Etruscan tyrant Tarquin. On the analogy of the Elymian settlements along the Riviera, is it too rash a conjecture to guess that the cluster of Latin-speaking communities adjoining the lower course of the Tiber, which appear on the linguistic map of Italy in the period intervening between the colonization of Magna Graecia and Etruria and the Roman conquest, were not relics of an aboriginal deposit of peoples speaking languages of the Latin type, but were colonists from Sicily who had succeeded in thrusting themselves into a promising site in between the farthest south-eastern outpost of Etruria and the farthest north-western outpost of Magna Graecia?

A scrutiny of the map of Latium and the adjoining Faliscan country confirms the impression that this Tiberine enclave of Latin-speaking population was not, like the Volscians' marshes or the Hernicans' crags, a fastness in which a hard-pressed native people had managed to hold out against aggressive assailants, but was a 'bridgehead' established by invaders from overseas who had made a landing *vi et armis* on the beaches just south-east of Ostia. On this reconstruction of an unrecorded chapter of history, the Falisci would be a vanguard of the Sicel invaders who rashly pushed up the Tiber Valley and settled on its right bank, only to fall permanently under the domination of Etruscans on whose preserves they were trespassing. A more cautious Latin rear-guard would have confined its encroachments within an area covered by a number of natural frontiers: the river-line constituted by the courses of the Lower Tiber and its tributary the Anio, the south-western spurs of the Sabine Mountains, and the natural system of fortifications provided by the rampart-like slopes of the craters-within-craters known as the Alban Hills. The fortresses built by the Latin interlopers to protect this perimeter would have been Rome, Tibur, Praeneste, and Alba Longa.

On this showing, there would be a sense in which Rome had been 'an Hellenic city'² already before the first stone of her material structure had been laid, since it would have been an Hellenic example that had inspired her Sicel founders to join in a colonizing movement that in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B.C. was planting the west coast of

¹ See II. ii. 43-48.

² See V. v. 212, n. 3.

Italy, from a Chalcidian Rhegium on the Straits of Messina to an Elymian Entella on the Riviera, with sea-borne settlers of Greek, Etruscan and Sicilian origin.

This inference from a linguistic map has some support in the Roman literary tradition, for Siculi or Sicani are located in Latium by both Virgil and Pliny. Siculi are named by Pliny in a list of early peoples of Latium,¹ and Sicani in a list of 'carnem in Monte Albano soliti accipere populi Albenses.'² Sicani are thrice enumerated by Virgil among the peoples already established in Latium before the advent of Aeneas.³ In the first and the third of these passages of the *Aeneid*, these Latian Sicani are associated with the Rutuli and the Aurunci, and in the third passage these three peoples are described as being one another's neighbours.

This Virgilian tradition of a Sican element in the population of Latium is, of course, quite independent of the tale of a Trojan invasion of Latium which is the main theme of the *Aeneid*. Indeed, Virgil makes his Latian Sicans join with the other old inhabitants of Latium in attempting to resist the Trojan intruders. While continuing to reject the tale of a Trojan settlement in Latium as fictitious, we may perhaps accept the tradition of a Sican settlement in Latium with the amendment that these Latian Sicans were colonists from Sicily who had not settled in Latium before the eighth century B.C. at the earliest.

¹ Plinius Secundus, C.: *Historia Naturalis*, Book III, chap. v (ix), § 56.

² Op. cit., Book III, chap. v (ix), § 69.

³ See *Aeneid*, Book VII, l. 795; Book VIII, l. 328; Book XI, l. 317.

IX. C (i), ANNEX
'ASIA' AND 'EUROPE': FACTS AND
FANTASIES

IN the introduction to his history of a concatenation of encounters culminating in a collision between the Achaemenian Empire and the Hellenic World,¹ Herodotus professes to reproduce a Persian exposition of the motive that had impelled the Achaemenidae to take the offensive against the Hellenes, and of a theory of history which was the ground of the Persians' Hellenophobia according to this story. The alleged motive is one of the characteristic points of honour in the barbarian *Weltanschauung* of the Heroic Age. The Persians, according to Herodotus, believed that they had inherited a blood feud in which the latest entry in the running account was a still unavenged injury, suffered by predecessors of theirs, which it was their moral duty to requite. The alleged theory in virtue of which the Persians are represented by Herodotus as believing themselves to be saddled with this obligation is as sophisticated as the blood-feud *motif* is primitive. The Persians, according to Herodotus, felt it incumbent on themselves to exact vengeance from the Hellenes for the siege and sack of Troy because, on the Persian theory of history, the Persians' own encounter with the Hellenes, the Trojans' encounter with them, and the Colchians' and the Phoenicians' encounters with them before that, were so many incidents in an historic feud between Asia and Europe. The hypothetical continuity of the feud would make these incidents historically continuous with one another and so create a moral solidarity between successive representatives of Asia in this quarrel of the continents.

The wrong inflicted on Asia which the Persians are declared by Herodotus to have felt it to be their duty to avenge was the Hellenes' wanton offence of retaliating for the abduction of a princess by waging a war of annihilation and thereby opening a new and unprecedentedly devastating chapter in the feud between Europe and Asia.²

'Up to this point the injuries that they had inflicted on one another had been confined to abductions, but at this juncture the Hellenes put themselves monstrously in the wrong. They committed an unprovoked act of military aggression against Asia when the Asiatics were still innocent of any such outrage against Europe. . . . The Persians claim that "they" (identifying themselves with the Asiatics) had let the abductions pass without taking any notice, whereas the Hellenes had exacted vengeance for the abduction of a Lacedaemonian princess by collecting a great expeditionary force and then invading Asia and destroying Priam's empire. From that date, the Persians say, "they" had always regarded the Hellenic World as being in a state of war with "them"—the point being that the Persians lay claim to Asia and to the non-Hellenic Asiatic peoples as their own domain, while they think of Europe and the Hellenic World as being an *alter orbis*. This is the Persians' version of the course of

¹ This Herodotean concatenation of encounters has been discussed on pp. 454-60, above.

² The 'chain-reactions' that 'in real life' are apt to be set in motion by such wanton acts of *hybris* have been discussed on pp. 454-63, above.

historical events: they see in the sack of Troy the origin of their own quarrel with the Hellenes.¹

If any of Herodotus's Persian contemporaries had ever taken Hellenic life and letters seriously enough to think of reading this Asiatic Greek historian's introduction to his story of an oecumenical concatenation of encounters, the Persian explorer of an alien Hellenic mental world would assuredly have been taken aback at finding his countrymen credited with the motive and the theory that Herodotus has here attributed to them. The authentic motive behind the Persians' unsuccessful attempt, between 492 and 479 B.C., to conquer the then still independent residue of the Hellenic World was certainly not to avenge legendary wrongs supposedly inflicted on Trojan victims by Achaean aggressors. The number of Persians who had heard of 'the Trojan War' cannot have exceeded the number who were familiar with the epic poetry of their Asiatic Greek subjects,² and a Persian who knew Homer must indeed have

¹ Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 4-5. Caricature is perhaps the best comment on this Herodotean reconstruction of the historical antecedents of the encounter between the Achaemenidae and the Hellenes. Let us imagine that, at a date still in the future at the time of writing, Continental Western Europe has been militarily overrun and politically subjugated by the Soviet Union and that Herodotus has returned to life to write the history of a consequent conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. We can imagine him transposing this episode in an encounter between the Western and the Russian civilizations into terms of a 'war of the worlds' in which the Old World and the New World are the perennial parties to an inter-mundane feud.

'The Castilians', Herodotus might have written, 'were the authors of the original crime out of which this feud between the New World and the Old World arose. After wantonly drawing upon themselves the Envy of the Gods by venturing to make their way across an Ocean which no man-made ship had ever previously traversed, they proceeded to provoke the Godhead further in another way by attacking and overthrowing the empires of the Aztecs and the Incas, when these legitimate sovereigns of the New World had never thought of committing aggression against the Old World on their part. The wrong thus inflicted on the New World by Castilian hands was avenged by the colonists planted there by the Castilians themselves and by the English, who rebelled against their mother countries, and thereby put an end to the Old World's dominion over the New World, in retaliation for the arbitrary action of a King of England named George III in imposing a tax in his American dominions on the importation of an old-world herb called tea, from which the colonists had learnt to brew a drink to take the place of wine. This re-establishment of American independence would have balanced the account between the two worlds if the equilibrium had not been upset again by the intervention of the United States in the World War of A.D. 1914-18. The Americans defend this intervention by arguing that they were acting in self-defence, on the ground that, if they had allowed the Germans to win that war, then the Germans, who are notoriously deficient in a sense of moderation, would never have been content with having made themselves masters of the Old World but would have proceeded to mobilize all the Old World's resources for an attack upon the New World in which the United States would assuredly have lost her liberty. The Russians, on the other hand, argue that, in intervening in the affairs of the Old World, the United States was committing an act of aggression and that, since the overthrow of Germany in the Second World War, the duty of championing the cause of the Old World has fallen on Russia's shoulders. On this ground they maintain that their own recent occupation of the countries along the Atlantic seaboard of the Old World, facing the United States, was not an act of aggression on Russia's part but was a necessary measure of precaution, taken in the occupied countries' own interests, to forestall a further act of aggression against the Old World which was to be expected from a United States which had committed two such crimes already. This, then, was the origin of the Great Russo-American War, in which all the forces of the Old World and the New World were arrayed against one another.'

² It is perhaps worth noting that the Herodotean interpretation of 'the Trojan War' as an episode in a feud between 'Europe' and 'Asia' has no warrant in the Homeric Epic. The authors of the two catalogues of the opposing forces (*Iliad*, Book II, ll. 484-759 and ll. 811-77) describe an Achaean confederacy astride the Aegean making war on a Trojan coalition astride the Dardanelles; and, whatever the relation between these passages and other parts of the poem may be held to be, there is at any rate no inconsistency between them on this particular point of political geography.

been a *rara avis*. In another context¹ we have already observed that the authentic motive for Darius's forward policy was, not any romantic impulse to pursue an imaginary feud, but the prosaic need to find a tenable north-west frontier for the Achaemenian Empire in lieu of an existing line which had been proved to be untenable by the painfully cogent experience of the Asiatic Greek and Carian revolt of 499-494 B.C. And, as for the theory of a perennial feud between 'Asia' and 'Europe', there is no serious evidence that the Persians of the Achaemenian Age ever applied to such mundane matters as Geography, History, and Civilization a capacity for thinking in abstract general terms which they displayed in the transcendental sphere of a Zoroastrian theology that concerned itself, not with a merely terrestrial Habitable World, but with the Universe, and that made its grand dichotomy, not between Asia and Europe or between Orientalism and Hellenism, but between Light and Darkness and between Good and Evil.

The motive and the theory that Herodotus attributes to the Persians were both manifestly invented by some Hellenic mind. The Hellenic inventor was not Herodotus himself, for Asia is already a current synonym for the Achaemenian Empire in Aeschylus's *Persae*,² which was produced for the first time in 472 B.C., and the same antithesis between Asia and Europe reappears in Hellenic medical works of the Hippocratean school which were probably written in Herodotus's own generation. Nor does Herodotus himself explicitly endorse an interpretation of history which he has borrowed from Hellenic predecessors without acknowledgement and has attributed to Persian contemporaries without permission. Yet, in effect, 'the Feud between Europe and Asia' is the dominant and unifying theme of Herodotus's work, and the masterliness of his workmanship is largely responsible for the subsequent vogue of this fifth-century Hellenic fantasy of a 'quarrel of the continents'.

This fantasy had been begotten when some imaginative Hellenic mind had given a revolutionary change of meaning to the two traditional Hellenic geographical names 'Europe' and 'Asia' by transferring them from the mariner's chart to the publicist's political map and to the sociologist's diagram of the habitats of cultures. This feat of imagination had been unluckily inspired; for, though Herodotus was to turn it to such good literary account, it was, all the same, a fantasy that had turned sense into nonsense. The mariner's navigational distinction between 'Asia' and 'Europe', as far as it went, could have had as long a life as the physical geography of the Quaternary Age of the planet's geological history, whereas a constellation of political forces in which the waterway between 'Asia' and 'Europe' coincided with a political frontier had never arisen, from the dawn of recorded human history down to the time of writing of the present work, except during the two brief periods 547-513 B.C.³ and 386-334 B.C., when this waterway constituted the north-west frontier of the Achaemenian Empire.⁴ As for the identifica-

¹ See pp. 430-5, above.

² See, for example, ll. 12, 61, 249, 270, 549, 584, 763, and 929.

³ See p. 434, above.

⁴ It is true that the frontier of the Lydian Empire had gradually approximated towards his water-line in the course of the century preceding Cyrus's conquest of Lydia in

tion of the mariner's 'continents' with the domains of diverse cultures, this was, if possible, even more fantastic than the political misapplication of these nautical terms; for the historian cannot lay his finger on any period at all, however brief, in which there was any significant cultural diversity between 'Asiatic' and 'European' occupants of the all but contiguous opposite banks of a tenuous inland waterway which would have continued to be the fresh-water river that it originally had been if Poseidon had not high-handedly enlarged his own domain by a mighty trident-stroke that had brought the salt water flooding in, up the rift which the god had cleft, from the mouth of the Aegean to the head of the Sea of Azov.¹

Whatever the ultimate origins of the names 'Asia' and 'Europe' may have been,² their usage as a pair of antithetical but mutually complementary physiographical expressions must have been first brought into currency by navigators of the Aegean who had succeeded in mastering the challenge of 'the estranging sea'³ and who had consequently become disagreeably aware of limitations set by *terra firma* to their freedom of movement in an element which they had now made their own.

It is the mariner's nomenclature that first draws the distinction between his friends the islands, which offer him ports of call and harbours of refuge, and his enemies the 'continents' whose continuous coastline disappointingly bars his passage, as gulf after gulf which promises to be a strait turns out to be a cul-de-sac. The Hellenic mariner who had inherited a mastery of the Aegean from Minoan predecessors could not fail to note and name the two continents that proved to set an eastern and a western bound to his sea-faring. Feeling his way northwards along the Asiatic and the European coast of the mainland, he summoned up the courage to hazard the passage of three successive straits—the

547 B.C.; but even Croesus, the last and widest-ruling of the Kings of Lydia, had never succeeded in extending his dominions up to the continental Asiatic water-front all along the line. Miletus, the leading Continental Asiatic Greek city of the day, as well as the non-Greek-speaking Hellenic country Lycia, had successfully maintained their independence until, after the fall of Sardis, they had been compelled to submit to Lydia's Persian conquerors.

¹ See I. i. 326, n. 2.

² The Aegean mariner's term 'Asia' to denote the continent which set the eastward limit to his freedom of movement in his own element appeared to have been derived from the local name for a marsh or watermead in the valley of the River Cayster, presumably somewhere not far from its mouth (*Iliad*, Book II, l. 461); and the documents retrieved by Western archaeologists from the wreck of the Hittite imperial archives at Boghaz-qa'eh indicated that this Asian mead was called after the thirteenth-century West Anatolian principality Aššuwā. The etymology of the name 'Europe' was obscure. It might be a Greek travesty of the Phoenician word *'ereb* (corresponding to the Arabic *gharb*) meaning the dark quarter where the Sun sets in the West; or, if it was not a technical term borrowed by Greek mariners from their Phoenician confrères, but was a native Greek word, it might signify the 'broad faced' *terra firma* which had proved itself to be a 'continent' by stretching away continuously without a break through which a ship could thread its passage, in contrast to the islands of the Archipelago round whose circumscribed coasts the Aegean mariner had learnt readily to find his way. This literal interpretation of the word is perhaps too rational to be convincing, and another possibility is that the Continent of Europe may have derived its name from a goddess who was 'broad-faced' because she was bovine. 'The Tyrian princess Europa' (Herodotus, Book I, chap. 2) who had been abducted, according to the Hellenic myth, by Zeus in the guise of a bull seems likely to have been a goddess in the guise of a cow, and we may identify her, according to our fancy, with 'the cow-faced Hera' or with the goddess incarnate in a heifer whom the Hellenes knew as Io and the Egyptians as Hathor.

³ The genesis of the Minoan Civilization has been traced back to a victorious response to this physical challenge in I. i. 323-30.

Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and the Straits of Kerch—where Asia and Europe all but clasped hands and threatened to crush between their fingers the audacious ship that ventured to run the gauntlet. For each of these daring transits the adventurous Hellenic mariners of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. were rewarded by finding their way into a new Aegean in the shape of another inland sea; but, when they had thus successively won their way from the Aegean into the Marmara, from the Marmara into the Black Sea, and from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov, and had ascended the River Don to the head of fluvial navigation, they there at last came to a point where their own element finally failed them and where the opposing continents, which had so far thrice alternately converged and receded, at length lost their separate identities by melting into one.

Even on the plane of physical geography, the mariner's distinction between 'Europe' and 'Asia' made sense only so far as the physical effect of Poseidon's trident-stroke extended. The distinction could neither have been invented nor even have been understood by a Nomad who in his own peculiar element could range at will over a steppe which afforded him passage without any appreciable break—when once he had made his discovery of the waterless Dardanelles called the Zungarian Gap—all the way between the eastern slopes of the Carpathians and the western slopes of the Khyngan Range. The distinction drawn between an Asiatic and a European continent in an Hellenic nautical nomenclature would have been equally unintelligible to the Eurasian Nomad's northern neighbour and adversary the Eurasian peasant, whose element was the belt of Black Earth extending from the eastern slopes of the Carpathians to the western slopes of Altai. The sedentary cultivator of the soil would have agreed with the nomadic herdsman in dismissing, as the ineptitude that it was, an arbitrary division of his realm between two continents invented in another region of the globe by alien seamen for navigational purposes; and an Herodotean 'quarrel of the continents' would have been brushed aside, as a meaningless irrelevancy, by a pair of landmen who were both intent on Cain's and Abel's historic conflict between 'the Desert' and 'the Sown'.¹

The boundary between the Hellenic mariners' continents of Asia and Europe was a navigable waterway, and this continuous channel of salt water which carried their ships from the Aegean through the Dardanelles and the Marmara and the Bosphorus and the Black Sea and the Straits of Kerch came to an end at the head of the Sea of Azov. This last link in a chain of inland seas still served to demarcate an Asia and a Europe from one another;² but beyond that point the Hellenic geographers never succeeded in laying their finger on any inland feature in the physical landscape that could offer any convincing line for partitioning an indivisible Eurasia which no Poseidonian trident-stroke had here cleft asunder; and this problem of drawing a land-frontier between Asia and Europe proved equally baffling to Modern Western geo-

¹ See III. iii. 7-22.

² The Sea of Azov was the boundary between Asia and Europe according to Hippocrates, *Influences of Atmosphere, Water, and Situation*, chap. 13.

graphers who had saddled themselves with this Hellenic intellectual incubus as one of the penalties of profiting by a Modern Western Renaissance of the corpus of Hellenic culture.¹

It was in vain that these Hellenomane Western geographers shifted an imaginary boundary eastward from the line of the Don to the lines of the Volga and the Caucasus, and subsequently followed the Russian Empire's military advance into Transcaucasia in order to find a boundary between the continents of Europe and Asia in Russia's fluctuating political frontiers *vis-à-vis* Turkey and Persia.² Even this desperate expedient of equating the bounds of a continent with transitory political frontiers was of no avail to the perplexed geographers in the formidably broad torso of Eurasia between the north shore of the Caspian and the south shore of the Arctic Ocean; for on this front the political frontier of Russia had long since rolled on eastward up to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, and to have stretched the Continent of Europe, in Russia's train, to extend as far as Okhotsk and Vladivostok would merely have multiplied the geographers' embarrassments. They were reduced to dissecting the living body politic of Russia into an imaginary 'Russia-in-Europe' and 'Russia-in-Asia' along the unconvincing line of the Ural River and the Ural Mountains, and garnishing their fictitious 'Russia-in-Asia' with a non-existent political capital at Irkutsk for the edification of school-children who would feel their geographical education incomplete if they could not name a capital for every so-called state on the list that they were given to learn by heart. Thereafter the geographers belatedly discovered that the Ural Mountains which they had made into a household word were no more noticeable a feature in the physical landscape than the Chiltern Hills,³ and that this vaunted physical barrier between Europe and Asia was not strongly enough pronounced even to serve as a boundary between one local province of the Russian Empire and another.⁴

The geographers' dissection of Eurasia into a 'Russia-in-Europe' and a 'Russia-in-Asia' was almost surpassed in fatuity by their dissection of the Ottoman Empire into a 'Turkey-in-Europe (capital: Constantinople)' and a 'Turkey-in-Asia (capital: Smyrna)'; and they could not save their reputation by pointing out that 'European' and 'Asiatic' Turkey, unlike 'European' and 'Asiatic' Russia, were physically demarcated from one another by Poseidon's salt-water-filled rift.⁵ The geographers' error here lay in attempting to translate a serviceable piece of navigational nomenclature into political and cultural terms. In the daily life of Hellenes whose element was the sea, the salt water was a bond between continents

¹ This is acknowledged by Oskar Halecki in *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London 1950, Sheed and Ward), p. 85.

² On this political principle of demarcating continents, the Transcaucasian districts Qars, Ardahan, and Batum 'changed continents' twice within forty years—from Asia to Europe in A.D. 1878 and back again from Europe to Asia in A.D. 1918.

³ On the 23rd January, 1930, the writer of this Study traversed the Urals *en route* across Eurasia from Vladivostok to Ostend via Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg), and found them as unobtrusive as the Chilterns on the road from London to Oxford via High Wycombe.

⁴ This is acknowledged by Halecki, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁵ Halecki, in *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76, acknowledges that the Straits do not sunder Europe from Asia Minor.

which were barriers to intercourse by navigation; and in the daily life of latter-day inhabitants of Constantinople the Bosphorus was the central thoroughfare of a city bestriding it. The twentieth-century Turkish business man who worked every day in Pera and slept every night in Scutari would have been astonished to hear that the *thalweg* of the familiar metropolitan waterway which he crossed in a penny steamer twice a day on the way to and fro between his dormitory and his office marked the boundary between two of the major divisions of the land-surface of the globe, and that this thread of 'salt estranging sea' was so potent an insulator that Scutari, Haydar Pasha, and the other 'Asiatic' quarters of the Bosphoran imperial city had a closer affinity with Calcutta and Peking than they had with Pera and Istanbul, while conversely Istanbul and Pera had a closer affinity with a 'European' Paris and Madrid than they had with Haydar Pasha and Scutari.

No citizen of Constantinople could ever have been persuaded to swallow such nonsense; for the Republic of Turkey which bestrode the narrow seas between Asia and Europe at the time of writing was only the latest of a series of states with the same geographical configuration. In the political geography of the Ottoman Empire, the East Roman Empire, the Roman Empire itself since the age of Diocletian and Constantine, and the abortive empire of Alexander the Great's local successor Lysimachus, the waterway between the Aegean and the Black Sea had proved itself to be the body politic's spinal cord by attracting the site of the seat of government to its shores. Lysimachus had laid out a capital on the Dardanelles, in the neck of the Gallipoli Peninsula, for an empire which he had momentarily extended to the Danube in one direction and to the Taurus in the other. The capital of the Roman Empire had gravitated from the banks of the Tiber to the shores of the Marmara,¹ and Diocletian had governed the Hellenic World from Nicomedia (Ismid)² before Constantine had converted Byzantium into the Second Rome which an East Roman Empire and an Ottoman Empire successively adopted as their capital.

When the East Roman Imperial Government at Constantinople was overthrown by Western Christian adventurers in A.D. 1204, the Greek Orthodox Christian resistance movement which immediately declared itself at half a dozen places in the provinces found its most effective base of operations at Nicaea, a provincial city which combined the political advantage of proximity to the East Roman Empire's central waterway with the military advantage of being fortified by Nature as well as by art. Nicaea, like the landward face of Istanbul, was encased in a triple line of fortifications; a ring of mountains encircled the inland basin in which the city lay; and the western half of this basin was filled by a lake which drained through a defile into the Gulf of Cius (Gemlik) and thence into the Sea of Marmara. The Greek Orthodox Christian principality which was established at Nicaea in A.D. 1204 by the refugee patriot Theodore Lascaris gave a practical demonstration of the working of local laws of political geography which was not lost upon the 'Osmanlis' when, 122 years later, these Turkish Muslim empire-builders gained

¹ See VI. vii. 219-20.

² See VI. vii. 217-18.

possession of a neighbouring and comparable site at Brusa.¹ The princes of Nicaea demonstrated between A.D. 1204 and A.D. 1261 that a provisional capital within a stone's throw of the Asiatic shore of the Marmara afforded a practicable base of operations for a conquest of Thrace and Macedonia which could then be rounded off by the capture of a straits-besriding empire's inevitable ultimate capital at Constantinople.

Nicaea and Brusa successively fulfilled their destinies by reinstating Constantinople as the capital of an empire which these two temporary queens of the narrow seas had built up for the benefit of their still more auspiciously situated sister on the Bosphorus; but a twentieth-century Republic of Turkey, whose capital was not Constantinople but Ankara, had other predecessors which, like itself and unlike the Ottoman and Palaeologan empires, had bestridden the narrow seas without planting the seat of government on their shores. The Dardanelles were thus bestridden first by the Seleucid and then by the Pergamene successor-state of the abortive empire of Lysimachus. Though both these Hellenic empires, like the latter-day Republic of Turkey that emerged from the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire after the World War of A.D. 1914-18 and like their own predecessor the Achaemenian Empire, were land-powers centred on Asiatic ground and not sea-powers centred on the Straits, the water-boundary between the continents of Asia and Europe was too slight a barrier to provide them with 'a natural frontier'; and they both found it advisable, for the defence of their Asiatic dominions, to hold a European bridgehead across the water.

The salt-water boundary between the mariner's continents Asia and Europe was as insignificant a feature on the cultural, ecclesiastical, and ethnographical maps as it was on the political map.

The Aegean Sea was bestridden by the Hellenic World and by the main body of the Orthodox Christian World since the first emergence of each of these two societies, and by the Iranic Muslim World since the Ottoman conquest of Rumelia in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era. In the internal structure of the sea-faring Hellenic Society in its pre-Alexandrine Age, the waters of the Aegean proved themselves to be, not a barrier, but a bond by knitting together an Asiatic and a European half of an indivisible Hellas as a European and an American half of an indivisible Western World were knit together by the conductive waters of the Atlantic in the ocean-faring age of Western history; and, when we turn to the ecclesiastical map, we find that the water-boundary between Asia and Europe was crossed by religious missionaries as readily as by military conquerors.

In his two days' voyage from Troas to Neapolis,² Saint Paul, as we have seen,³ was following in the wake of Seleucus Nicator and of Darius the Great's lieutenant Mardonius; and, some thirteen hundred years later, Islam, in its turn, was propagated from Asia to Europe with equal facility by Ottoman disciples of the Prophet Muhammad who pursued

¹ The Lascarids' role as path-finders for the 'Osmanlis has been noticed already in III. iii. 27.

² Acts xvi. 11.

³ In VI. vii. 95-97.

the missionary's aim by the conqueror's methods. In the history of the Eastern Orthodox Church the distinction between 'Europe' and 'Asia' was not merely meaningless but was positively misleading. A division of the World's land-surface into continents was inapplicable to the ecclesiastical geography of a commonwealth of churches whose two oldest members were an 'Asiatic' Patriarchate of Antioch and an 'African' Patriarchate of Alexandria, and whose senior member was an Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in which 'Asiatic' and 'European' sees were indissolubly associated with one another, while the largest and most powerful member of the group at the time of writing was a Patriarchate of Moscow whose ecclesiastical subjects were scattered over the face of an indivisible Eurasia from the shores of the Baltic Sea at Leningrad to the shores of the Pacific Ocean at Vladivostok.

The linguistic map tells the same tale as the ecclesiastical, cultural, and political maps at which we have just glanced. In the spread of languages, as in the propagation of religions and cultures and the building of empires, the narrow seas dividing an 'Asia' from a 'Europe' never proved to be a barrier and frequently provided a highway. The waters of the Aegean wafted the Greek language from the 'European' to the 'Asiatic' side of this conductive sea at least as early as the age of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung (*circa* 1425-1125 B.C.). The Thracian-speaking peoples, who spread north-westward perhaps as far as Upper Silesia after they had broken out of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe into the preserves of *Homo Agricola*, also spread south-eastward perhaps as far as North-Western Kurdistan¹ as easily as if the continuity of the hills and dales over which they drove their flocks had not been broken in this quarter by 'the silver streaks' of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

The ineffectiveness of the narrow seas as an obstacle to the spread of the Thracian-speaking peoples was attested by the appearance of the same Thracian tribal names on both the European and the Asiatic side. There were Thyni on the Ismid Peninsula, as well as in the Istranja Mountains overhanging the west shore of the Black Sea just across the Bosphorus. The Phrygians of the Anatolian Plateau and Bebryces of the Qaramursal Peninsula on the Asiatic shore of the Marmara had left a rear-guard in Europe whose name might have passed into oblivion² if these Macedonian Brygi had not once crossed the path of History by falling foul of the Persian Mardonius's expeditionary force in 492 B.C.³ An equally obscure rear-guard of the Mysian occupants of the Asiatic hinterland of the Marmara survived in a nook between the Balkans and the Lower Danube to give their name to the Roman province Moesia. Conversely, the Dardani whose main body had dug themselves in on the watershed between the basins of the Morava and the Vardar in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula had thrown an advance party into the

¹ See VI. vii. 604-5 and 660-2, and pp. 432-3, above. Herodotus (Book V, chap. 3) estimated that the Thracians were the most numerous of all peoples with the sole exception of the Indians.

² Like the forgotten name of the European rear-guard of the Hittites who had blazed the trail for the Phrygians in the second millennium B.C.

³ See Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 45.

Troad across straits that preserved the record of this tribal migration by acquiring from it the name 'Dardanelles'.¹

The Thracian-speaking peoples' migration across the Straits in and after a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* was emulated in the third century B.C. by the Celtic-speaking peoples when a sudden diversion of Macedonian arms from the conquest of the barbarian hinterland of European Greece to the conquest of the Achaemenian Empire invited Celts, whom Philip's aggression had provoked, to take a hand in the scramble for Alexander's spoils;² and the ineffectiveness of the Straits as a barrier against a *Völkerwanderung* was attested once again by the appearance of the same tribal name *Tectosages* both in an Asiatic Galatia round Ankara and in a European Gaul round Toulouse. Even after the barbarians' well-worn highway across the Straits had been obstructed by the foundation of Constantinople, the Goths and the Slavs in turn followed the trail of the Hittites and the Phrygians and the Gauls out of Europe into Asia—as deportees, if not as conquerors—while in the opposite direction a legendary feat of the Mysi and the Teucris³ was performed in real life by Ottoman Turkish migrants who conquered and colonized Rumelia from an Anatolian base of operations in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era.

The nullity of the Narrow Seas as a cultural barrier is demonstrated so conclusively as to raise the question why it was that any Hellenes should ever have thought of trying to find a dividing line between an Hellenic and an Oriental World in a waterway which was actually the link between the Hellenic World's Asiatic and European provinces. How did any school of Hellenic thought ever come to think of the Aegean Sea, which was in reality the central thoroughfare of Hellas, as demarcating her eastern boundary, when the effect of drawing a cultural frontier along this line was to declare the Asiatic half of Hellas to be out of the Hellenic World's bounds? The explanation of this perverse cultural misinterpretation of a pair of nautical terms divorced from their original context is perhaps to be discovered in an abnormal and temporary political situation which placed the Asiatic and the European half of Hellas in an unfortunate relation with one another.

During the period between the conquest of the Continental Asiatic Greek city-states by the Lydian Empire and the conquest of the Continental European Greek city-states by Philip of Macedon, the European Greeks were able to look down upon the Asiatic Greeks for having lost their political independence, while the Asiatic Greeks could still look down upon the European Greeks on the score of their relative cultural backwardness; and it was not till after the opening of the post-Alexan-

¹ The Dardani who founded Dardanus on the Hellespont ('Dardanelles') were probably an Illyrian-speaking, not a Thracian-speaking, people, but their passage of the Straits tells the same tale as the Thracian-speaking peoples' migration across the same narrow seas.

² See II. ii. 281 and V. v. 209.

³ See Herodotus, Book V, chap. 13, and Book VII, chap. 20. Presumably this legend was founded on the appearance of the tribal name Mysi-Moesi in both North-Western Anatolia and the Balkan Peninsula. This pair of homonyms did commemorate a migration; but the Hellenic observer who interpreted the evidence correctly thus far made the mistake of assuming that the Asiatic Mysi must have been the progenitors of the European Moesi because they happened to be the less insignificant of these two sister tribes in the pre-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history.

drine Age that the superficiality of this temporary differentiation between the two halves of Hellas once more became apparent. The truth was that the Continental Asiatic Greek city-states lost their political independence to a Hellenized Lydia some 250 years before the Continental European Greek city-states lost theirs to a Hellenized Macedonia just because the Asiatic Greeks were culturally so much more precocious than their European kinsmen that the radiation of their culture brought the adjoining sub-Hellenic Kingdom of Lydia up to a level of cultural efficiency at which it was politically capable of subjugating its Greek spiritual pastors and masters about a quarter of a millennium before the same stage was duly reached in the parallel history of the relations between the European Greeks and the adjoining sub-Hellenic Kingdom of Macedon. In the meantime the European Greeks could find a facile psychological compensation for their oppressive consciousness of cultural inferiority to their Asiatic kinsmen by assuring themselves that the Asiatic Greeks' loss of a political independence which the European Greeks had so far managed to retain was a proof that the Asiatic Greeks were decadent, and that, if such decadence was the price of sophistication,¹ then the European Greeks' own ingenuousness was, on balance, a happier state.

This legend of the Asiatic Greeks being decadent was disproved, as we have noticed in another context,² by the sequel to Alexander's overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire. This sequel showed that the eclipse of Asiatic Greece between 494 and 334 B.C. had been due to the peculiarly adverse situation in which the Asiatic Greeks had found themselves in the Achaemenian Age. The Achaemenian conquest of Lydia and her Continental Asiatic Greek dependencies in 547 B.C. meant something much more serious for the Asiatic Greeks than just the replacement of one foreign political ascendancy by another. It meant the substitution

¹ One amusing symptom of the Asiatic Greeks' continuing intellectual vitality in the fifth century B.C. was the part played by Herodotus of Halicarnassus and by the Hippocratean school of medicine in Cos in propagating the legend that the politically subjugated Asiatic Greeks were in some sense beyond the pale of a Hellas who was nowhere quite fully herself except on the free soil of Europe. In putting into circulation a theory that was uncomplimentary to their own half of Hellas, the fifth-century Asiatic Greek men of science were giving evidence of their intellectual honesty, and at the same time they displayed their intellectual acumen in the discrimination with which they interpreted the theory in the light of the facts. In the Hippocratean treatise on *Influences of Atmosphere, Water, and Situation* the thesis that the Asiatics are on the whole less brave, tough, hard-working, and spirited than the Europeans is based (chap. 12), not on some imaginary difference of magic virtue in the soil of the two continents, but on a general theory of a correlation between physical environment and human *ethos* (see the passages quoted from op. cit., chaps. 13 and 24, in II. i. 251-2). The Hippocratean argument starts from the premiss that in Asia the physical environment is more benign than it is in Europe; and, on the Hippocratean hypothesis that hard countries breed strong characters, it follows that the inhabitants of Asia are less warlike than those of Europe on the whole (chaps. 12 and 23). At the same time the variety of the physical environment in Europe breeds a variety in the physique of the European peoples (chaps. 23 and 24), while a variety in the *ethos* of the Asiatic peoples is produced by the variety in Asiatic political conditions. The relative unwarlikeness of a majority of the Asiatics is due not merely to the relative benignity of the Asiatic physical environment but also to the political fact that most Asiatics live under a monarchical régime which deprives them of the incentive to exert themselves and risk their lives. 'The Hellenes and non-Hellenes in Asia who are not under despotic rule, but are free agents and struggle for their own benefit, are as warlike as any populations in the World' (op. cit., chap. 16, quoted in II. i. 471, n. 1).

² In IV. iv. 20-23.

of Persian masters who were barbarian converts to an alien civilization for Lydian masters who had been the conquered Hellenes' own cultural disciples; and the Asiatic Greeks merely kept on falling out of the frying pan into the fire when their Attic European kinsmen 'liberated' them from an Achaemenian yoke in 479 B.C. and when their Spartan European kinsmen replayed this comedy by 'liberating' them from an Athenian yoke in the last phase of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. in order to sell them back to the Achaemenidae in 386 B.C. As soon as the new order of the post-Alexandrine Age had released the Asiatic Greeks from the peculiar tribulations to which they had been subject during the preceding quarter of a millennium, the brilliant success with which they immediately rose to the occasion showed that their vitality was unimpaired. From 334 B.C. down to the generation of Justinian the Asiatic Greeks played as prominent a part in the life of the Hellenic World as they had played before the generation of Cyrus.

In the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history the thesis that the conflict between Hellenism and the Oriental civilizations was a feud between 'Europe' and 'Asia' was once more so plainly contradicted by the facts that it fell into oblivion and ceased to work mischief, but the ghost of an erroneous Hellenic theory which had been effectively discredited by the logic of events in its Hellenic birthplace unfortunately returned to haunt a Modern Western World which had laid itself open to this visitation by its reception of the Hellenic culture in a fifteenth-century Italian Renaissance. In this new setting, History repeated itself with a singular exactness. A revival of the Hellenic concept of 'continents' which was innocuous so long as this concept was employed only in its proper nautical context bred a fresh crop of trouble when the nautical terminology was once again diverted to a cultural usage.

The Modern Westerners who adopted and adapted the Hellenic mariners' geographical terminology were the peoples on the eastern shores of the Atlantic, from Castile and Portugal northwards, who opened a new chapter in both Western history and World history by mastering the art of oceanic navigation at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era; and the Hellenic terminology proved still to make nautical sense in a situation in which making the sea passage between Europe and Asia meant not just swimming across the Dardanelles or ferrying over the Aegean but circumnavigating Africa now that the banks of the Narrow Seas which divided Asia from Europe by a hair's breadth had been placed out of bounds for Western maritime enterprise by the establishment of the Ottoman Empire astride those inland sea-waters.

On the oceanic chart drawn by Western navigators in a Modern Age of Western history, 'Europe' meant the hinterland of the mariners' own home ports from Cadiz to Trondhjem and Helsingfors; 'Asia' meant the hinterland of another chain of ports, stretching from Maskat and Hormuz to Canton and Nagasaki, which the conquest of the Ocean had brought within the Western mariners' range; and 'Africa' meant the huge peninsula, jutting out from the south shore of the Straits of Gibraltar to the Cape of Good Hope, which had to be rounded by

travellers between Europe and Asia who were debarred by political obstacles from short-circuiting the circumnavigation of the Dark Continent by using the overland routes across the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles or the portages across Egypt and South-West Asia between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. This oceanic application of an Aegean nautical terminology fitted all the newly discovered geographical facts that had swum into the Western mariners' ken;¹ but the Modern Western geographers entangled themselves in their turn in the intellectual and moral toils that had caught their Hellenic predecessors when they set themselves to give the continents a cultural as well as a nautical meaning.

In taking the nautical term 'Europe' to serve as a substitute for the cultural term 'Western Christendom', the Modern Westerners could plead an excuse which the Hellenes could not have pleaded when they tentatively identified 'Europe' with 'Hellas' in the fifth century B.C. The Hellenic misuse of the name 'Europe' was the more wanton of the two misnomers, because 'Hellas' or τὸ Ἑλληνικόν was always a perfectly serviceable label for the Hellenic Society from the beginning to the end of its history, whereas the Modern Westerners found themselves awkwardly at a loss, by the end of the seventeenth century, for a collective name to designate their own society and culture. The traditional name 'Western Christendom' had ceased to be applicable when, within less

¹ This Modern Western chart of the continents in an oceanic setting justified retrospectively the enumeration of a separate continent of 'Africa' which its Hellenic inventors had never quite succeeded in distinguishing from 'Asia'. The Hellenes had been enticed into inventing this Continent of Africa (*Graecè* Libya) by their passion for symmetry. On the Hellenic chart of the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, the mouths of the Nile faced the mouths of the Aegean; and, if the *thalweg* of the sea-drowned river of which the Aegean was the lowest reach marked the boundary between Asia and Europe, the law of geographical symmetry required that the *thalweg* of the Nile should similarly demarcate Asia from another continent which could be labelled 'Libya' by an extension of the usage of the name of the country adjoining Egypt on the west. This Hellenic sailors' distinction between an 'Asiatic' and a 'Libyan' bank of the Nile would have made sense for a Nile boatman, but not for an Egyptian whose business it was to think, not in narrow terms of navigation, but in broad terms of culture. On the cultural map the Nile waterway was, of course, the spinal cord of the Egyptian World, as the Aegean Sea was the heart of Hellas. A subsequent increase in geographical knowledge led the Hellenic geographers to set back the western boundary of Asia from the east bank of the Nile to the east coast of the Red Sea; but a still uncut Isthmus of Suez presented them, on a miniature scale, with the same insoluble geographical problem as the vastly broader isthmus between the head of the Sea of Azov and the Hyperborean shore of Ocean Stream, and their eventual discovery that 'Libya' was circumnavigable made them still more doubtful about the legitimacy of trying to erect 'Libya' into a separate continent instead of treating it as a mere peninsula of Asia. It was left to Modern Western ocean-faring navigators to demonstrate that, on a marine chart, 'Africa' had a much better claim than 'Europe' had to rank as something more than a mere excrescence of Asia. From the cultural standpoint, on the other hand, the concept of 'Africa' never made any more sense than the concept of 'Europe' or of 'Asia'. Africa north of the Sahara, which was insulated culturally from Tropical Africa by an estranging desert, was linked up culturally with South-West Asia and Southern Europe by the conductive waters of the Mediterranean Sea—as was attested at the time of writing by the distribution of the Arabic language and culture and of the metropolitan territory of France. The Hellenic geographers' misgivings about the feasibility of distinguishing an 'Africa' from an 'Asia' were justified by the configuration of a latter-day Arabic World which stretched across South-West Asia and North Africa from Iraq to Morocco inclusive without a break. The administrative organization of Algeria to constitute three French departments which ranked juridically as an integral part of France herself was a political testimony to the geographical fact that, whatever the mariner's chart might say, the Maghrib was for practical purposes a European, not an African, country.

than half a century of the opening of the modern chapter of Western history, the outbreak of the Protestant Reformation had split the Western World in two on the ecclesiastical plane;¹ and the retention of the word 'Christendom' in the title of the Western World had become still more incongruous when, after the close of the Wars of Religion, the Westerners—Catholics and Protestants alike—had deliberately sloughed off their society's traditional chrysalis and had proceeded to propagate their culture all over the face of the planet in a dehydrated secular abstract of its original plenary form.

When the Western Society's historic name had thus been made obsolete by the early modern course of Western history, the Hellenistic-minded spokesmen of a Modern Western culture consulted their familiar Hellenic oracles for guidance in their search for a convenient alias for a 'Christendom' that had become an awkward terminological anachronism in the vocabulary of a post-Christian Western World.² The Hellenes' geographical concept of a *terra firma* articulated into 'continents' had served the Hellenes' Modern Western disciples well when they had adopted this Hellenic pattern of geographical thought in its original nautical usage. Why not follow a step farther in the Hellenic geographers' traces by giving the names of the continents a cultural as well as a navigational connotation? Reinterpreted on this Hellenic precedent, the name 'Europe' offered an alias for the name 'Christendom' that was free from the old name's now misleading religious associations. The Western minds that put this Herodotean cultural usage of the word 'Europe' into circulation in the Modern Western World might be forgiven for having failed to perceive that in taking this way of extricating themselves from one awkward plight they were implicating themselves in another; but, however excusable their error of judgement might be, its intellectual and moral consequences for both the West and the World were as unfortunate as if these coiners of a secular name for a de-consecrated Western Christendom had been actuated by malice prepense.

The most glaring intellectual weakness of this unlucky usage was that it was a desperate geographical misfit. A Western World that was now calling itself 'Europe' had never embraced the whole of the European continent up to the water boundaries assigned to it in the original Hellenic nautical usage of the word, while on the other hand the West had already expanded overseas into regions which could not be deemed to be parts of Europe on any reading of the map.

The quarter of Europe which was indisputably entitled to bear the name was the European hinterland of the shores of the chain of narrow seas running up from the mouth of the Aegean to the head of the Sea of Azov. This had been the first quarter of the continent to which the name 'Europe' had ever been applied; but this south-eastern nucleus of Europe had always lain outside the bounds of the Western World in the medieval as well as in the modern chapter of Western history; it had lain, and still lay, within the domain of the main body of Eastern Orthodox Christendom; and an abortive Medieval Western Christian attempt

¹ This point has been noticed already in I. i. 33-34.

² See Halecki, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

to annex that alien Christian body social to Western Christendom had defeated its own purpose by resulting in the establishment of Ottoman Muslim rule over the European as well as the Asiatic provinces of Orthodox Christendom with the exception of Russia.¹ A Modern Western World which thus fell short of being conterminous with Europe in one direction had, however, burst the bounds of Europe in another direction when it had inaugurated the opening of the modern chapter of Western history by the historic act of mastering the Ocean;² and an ocean-borne expansion of a hitherto merely West European society over the whole face of the planet, which had been initiated in and after the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era on the economic and political planes, was extended, as we have seen,³ to the cultural plane as well, as soon as a former religious impediment to a reception of the Western culture by non-Western societies had been removed by the action of the Westerners themselves in secularizing their way of life at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a label for the domain of the Western Civilization from that date onwards, the name 'Europe' was thus on the one hand too narrow to cover the West's thenceforth rapidly expanding non-European cultural empire, while on the other hand it was too broad to be reconcilable with the no less pertinent fact that South-Eastern Europe still lay outside the Western Society's cultural bounds.

This inapplicability to South-Eastern Europe of the Modern Western usage of the word 'Europe' as an alias for the Modern Western World not only made intellectual nonsense of the cultural situation in that culturally non-Western quarter of a 'continent' that had no unity, and indeed had no existence, in any other setting than a mariner's chart; this Modern Western usage of the word 'Europe' as a synonym for the West also made moral mischief by suggesting to self-confident and self-righteous Modern Western minds the preposterous implication that the cultural diversity of South-Eastern Europe from the western extremity of 'the European Continent' was the monstrous outcome of a scandalous miscarriage of History which could be, and should be, put right by some benevolently high-handed exercise of Modern Western power. In drawing this misguided moral from an erroneous interpretation of the facts, the Modern West was adopting an attitude towards the contemporary Islamic and Orthodox Christian worlds that was bound to breed mutual misunderstanding and ill-feeling.

The Modern Western assumption that South-Eastern Europe was part of the Western Civilization's patrimony *ex officio*, in virtue of the West's unauthorized appropriation of the name 'Europe' as a label for itself, was a 'geopolitical' dogma that was irreconcilable with the historical facts; yet the evidence of the facts did not deter nineteenth-century Western Liberals from pronouncing pontifically that the Turks were trespassers in Rumelia,⁴ and that *a fortiori* these interlopers had no

¹ See pp. 151-2, 362, and 395-7, above.

² This point is noticed by Halecki in op. cit., pp. 51 and 54.

³ On pp. 516-18, above.

⁴ 'Rumili', the Turkish name for 'Turkey-in-Europe', meant 'the land of Orthodox Christendom' (*Turci'de Rûm*), signifying the [East] Roman Empire). If South-Eastern

business to bear rule there, because they were 'Asiatics', not 'Europeans', in origin. These impulsive Gladstonians clamoured for the expulsion of the Turkish intruders from Europe 'bag and baggage'¹ without ever taking the trouble to put their draconian programme to the proof of confronting it with the elementary facts of Ottoman history. These facts were that the Ottoman Empire, like its forerunner the Greek Orthodox Christian Principality of Nicaea, had expanded over the European territories of Orthodox Christendom from a starting-point on Asiatic Orthodox Christian ground because it had a political and a social mission to perform for the whole of the main body of Orthodox Christendom on both sides of the Straits. Eastern Orthodox Christians had acquiesced in Ottoman Muslim rule, in preference to Western Christian rule, because their Ottoman conquerors had shown themselves capable of imposing peace on a distracted Orthodox Christendom whose confusion had merely been worse confounded by the escapades of the Western Crusaders.

In the nineteenth century of the Christian Era no less than in the fourteenth, the acid test for passing judgement on the Ottoman régime was the current state of the account between the benefits conferred by the *Pax Ottomanica* on the Pādishāh's subjects and the cost of the oppression that was the price of an Ottoman Peace; and in the nineteenth century an impartial judge might well have pronounced that the Porte had exhausted its mandate; but this verdict would have conferred a moral claim to liberation from an Ottoman Turkish yoke, not just upon the Porte's non-Turkish subjects in 'Turkey-in-Europe', but upon all its non-Turkish subjects, whatever religion they professed and whatever language they spoke and whatever continent they inhabited. A discredited Ottoman Turkish imperial people's African and Asiatic Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslim co-religionists would have had the same good case for demanding liberation as the European Orthodox Christians, and the Asiatic Arabic-speaking Orthodox Christians and Maronites and Druses the same good case as the European Albanian-speaking Tosk and Serbo-Croat-speaking Bosniak Sunnis. The test was the current balance-sheet of the Ottoman régime, and the issue was a subject's moral claim to be liberated from a régime that had forfeited its moral title to rule. In this moral issue the query whether the victim of misgovernment happened to be domiciled in the European, the Asiatic, or the African dominions of its discredited oppressors was pedantically irrelevant; and no approach to the nineteenth-century problem of the

Europe had been Western and not Orthodox Christian ground at the time when the 'Osmanlis' occupied it, they would have called it, not 'Rumili', but 'Feringhistan' ('Frankland').

¹ 'Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely by carrying off themselves. Their zaptiehs and their mudirs, their bimbashis and their yuzbashes, their kaimakams and their pashas, one and all, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned' (Gladstone, W. E.: *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* (London 1876, John Murray), p. 31).

'The profaned and desolated province' of this celebrated passage was not the whole of 'Turkey-in-Europe' but only that portion of Rumelia that was inhabited by the Bulgars; but the more sweeping programme proclaimed in the simpler slogan 'Expel the Turks from Europe' was the ultimate objective of Gladstone and his fellow Turcophobes in a nineteenth-century Western World that had identified 'Europe' with itself.

Ottoman Empire's future could well have been more perverse than the Modern Western Liberal publicist's uncritical adoption of the Herodotean fantasy of a perennial feud between 'Europe' and 'Asia'—as if the 'European' subjects of the Ottoman Porte were entitled to liberation, not on a moral ground which was equally applicable to their 'African' and 'Asiatic' fellow victims, but on the geographical score of being inhabitants of a privileged continent.¹

The Modern Western identification of the Western World with 'Europe', which had this distorting effect on Western policy towards the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, persisted into the twentieth century to exacerbate an ideological quarrel between the West and a Communist Russia.

The self-deconsecration of the Western World towards the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era did not bring with it any essential change in the traditional Western attitude towards Orthodox Christendom. Since the establishment of a Western military, political, and economic ascendancy over the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the sequel to the collapse of the East Roman Power, the Medieval Westerners had come to look upon their Eastern Orthodox neighbours, no longer as their superiors or even as their peers, but as obstinately unsatisfactory poor relations who must be coerced into making a public confession of sin and profession of repentance, in the form of a solemn acknowledgement of the Papacy's ecclesiastical supremacy over the churches of the Greek Rite, as a condition *sine quâ non* for being considered eligible for receiving Western aid. A latter-day post-Christian Western Society which could no longer logically condemn the 'native Christian' subjects of the Ottoman Empire as religious heretics could still preserve and justify a traditional Western contempt for them by censuring them as 'Europeans' who had inexcusably failed to keep up with 'the progress of European Civilization'. This censure was tantamount to a reiteration, in Modern Western secular terms, of the Medieval Western Christian demand that the Orthodox Christians should renounce their own traditional culture and should adopt in its place the contemporary culture of the West. The weak point in the latter-day Western 'geopolitical' formula for taking Orthodox Christendom to task was that a majority of those indicted for the moral offence of being

¹ The fantasy that the evil of nineteenth-century Ottoman misgovernment would be cured by expelling the Turks from 'Europe' would have been reduced *ad absurdum* if this programme had ever become practical politics. The partition of the Eurasian city of Constantinople by a political frontier following the *thalweg* of the Bosphorus would have been one of the curiosities of political map-making even for a generation that had lived to see the bisection of Jerusalem and Vienna and Berlin after the World War of A.D. 1939-45. One quaint result of applying the fantastic 'geopolitical' principle that political liberty was a European privilege would have been to disqualify the chief intellectual leader of a Modern Greek Westernizing movement that had expressed itself politically in the partially successful Greek uprising against Ottoman rule in A.D. 1821. Till the great Greek exodus from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace in and after A.D. 1922, the Modern Greeks, like the Ancient Greeks before them, were equally at home on the European and on the Asiatic side of the Aegean; and Adhamándios Koraïs was in no way peculiar among the Modern Greeks of his generation in being a Smyrniot of Chiot origin (see pp. 178-9, above). This eminent scholar-patriot would have been as surprised to be told that his Asiatic provenance made him ineligible for liberation from Ottoman rule as he would have been to hear that his Arabic surname (see p. 178, n. 4, above) debarred him from being reckoned as a Greek.

'lapsed Europeans' were actually not inhabitants of Europe on any defensible definition of the boundaries of that elusive continent. Half the Modern Greek people lived in Asia, while the whole of Russia defied the most determined efforts of geographical pedantry to partition her between an 'Asia' and a 'Europe' that melted into one another round the head of the Sea of Azov.

The self-secularization of the West thus left the Western attitude towards Orthodox Christendom essentially unchanged, but it did nevertheless temporarily relieve the tension between the two sister societies by changing the Orthodox Christian peoples' feeling towards the West from an invincible repugnance to a frank admiration. The seventeenth-century distillation of a secular abstract of the Western culture was promptly followed, as we have seen,¹ by a movement in Orthodox Christendom to adopt this attractive as well as anodyne new form of a previously repulsive alien civilization; and this spontaneous Greek, Serb, and Russian imitation of a latter-day secular Western way of life was, of course, flattering to the Westerners' self-conceit. The Tsar Peter Romanov's exemplary good conduct half persuaded the Western dominie to forget the bad mark inscribed in his black book against the name of the Oecumenical Patriarch Michael Cerularius, and the next two centuries of Orthodox Christian cultural history confirmed in Western minds this reassuring impression that the truant 'East Europeans' had at last seen the light and turned over a new leaf. The dismay and indignation in the West were therefore proportionately extreme when in A.D. 1917 Russia suddenly deviated from the broad way leading to Westernization which she had been following since the close of the seventeenth century, and when she added insult to injury by resuming her pre-Petrine ideological war against the West in the name, no longer of Christian Orthodoxy, but of a post-Christian heresy of Western origin. An impartial judge of the issue between the Russian version of Communism and the contemporary Western way of life might perhaps have given judgement against the Russian party to the suit, but he certainly would not have found an aggravating circumstance in Russia's alleged apostasy from an imaginary 'European Civilization' which would have had no geographical claim on Russia's allegiance even if it had had any existence in real life.

This mirage of a 'European Civilization' was another hallucination to which Modern Western Man condemned himself when he appropriated the word 'Europe' as a name for a deconsecrated Western World. His cultural misapplication of a nautical term inevitably led him into two historical aberrations. One of these was the notion that Orthodox Christendom and Western Christendom constituted a single society because their geographical domains, taken together, were deemed to be coextensive with the limits of the mariner's European continent. The second aberration was the notion that Hellenic history and Western history were—not distinct social experiences that might be philosophically contemporaneous as well as philosophically equivalent in value²—

¹ On pp. 132-3 and 161-5 above.

² For these two conceptions of the mutual relations between societies of the species called civilizations, see I. i. 172-7.

but historically continuous as well as chronologically successive acts in a single European drama which was deemed to be a unity in virtue of its having the wonder-working soil of a privileged continent as its scene of action throughout the play. This 'European' rendering of Western and Orthodox Christian and Hellenic history could not face the music of the historical facts.

The thesis that the Western and Orthodox Christian cultures were not two cultures but one culture in virtue of their combined domains being coextensive with 'Europe' had found one of its ablest advocates, down to the time of writing, in a distinguished twentieth-century Polish historian.¹ In his exposition of this theme, Halecki strengthens his case by conceding that Europe had been an intelligible field of historical study only during a limited period that was admittedly already at an end by the date at which the European author was writing his book as an exile in America.² The European Age, as Halecki defines it, was both followed and preceded by an age in which the intelligible field of study, instead of being delimited by the coasts of a continent, was constituted by the shores of a land-locked Sea. In Halecki's view the European Age had succeeded a Mediterranean Age³ and was being succeeded by an Atlantic Age.⁴ The making of Europe had been completed in the second half of the tenth century of the Christian Era, when Poland, Hungary, and the Scandinavian countries had been converted to Western Christianity and Russia converted to Orthodox Christianity.⁵ The destruction of Europe had been completed in the fifth decade of the twentieth century, when the eastern half of the continent had been severed from the West by the descent of a Soviet Russian 'iron curtain'—a catastrophe that had been as lethal for Europe as the Primitive Muslim Arab conquest of South-West Asia and North Africa in the seventh century had been lethal for an antecedent Mediterranean World.⁶ The transition from the Mediterranean to the European Age had been a gradual process, and the eventual transition from the European to the Atlantic Age had been more gradual still.⁷ In round numbers of centuries, however, Halecki dates his European Age between A.D. 950 and A.D. 1950.⁸

This is a moderate and persuasive presentation of the case for giving the word 'Europe' a cultural connotation in addition to its plain nautical meaning. Yet even Halecki's presentation is vulnerable. For example, the assumption that, in 'the European Age', the combined areas of an Orthodox and a Western Christendom were conterminous with Europe is one that will not bear examination. During the first century of Halecki's European millennium, the centre of gravity of Orthodox Christendom still lay outside Europe, in an Anatolian Peninsula known as 'Asia Minor',⁹ while a 'Europa Minor' in the shape of the Iberian Peninsula lay outside the domain of Western Christendom, in Dār-al-Islām. On the second of these two points, Halecki might perhaps reply that, in the

¹ Oskar Halecki, in *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London 1950, Sheed and Ward).

² See *ibid.*, p. 29.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 39–40. Cp. pp. 28–29 and 36–37.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 53–54.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 61.

⁶ See *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 54.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 54 and 58.

⁹ See I. i. 64 and II. ii. 79.

Iberian Peninsula in that century, the majority of the population seems still to have consisted of an Arab and Berber Muslim dominant minority's *musta'rib* Western Christian subjects; but this rejoinder will not revalidate his thesis that, during 'the European millennium', Europe and Christendom were coextensive; for, even if, during the first half of that millennium, Western Christendom was confined within Europe's coasts, Orthodox Christendom continued to straddle the Aegean Sea and the Straits, with one foot in Europe and the other in Asia, until the exodus of Orthodox Christians from Anatolia in A.D. 1922, while, during the second half of the same millennium, when Western Christendom was spreading into the New World, Orthodox Christendom's Russian offshoot spread right across the breadth of Asia till it reached the western shore of the Pacific and leaped over the Behring Straits into the Alaskan Peninsula of North America.

Moreover, the Orthodox and the Western Christendom were only two out of four sectors into which the circular wave of Christianity had come to be articulated in the course of its expansion.¹ The Roman sector in Western Europe and the Orthodox sector in Eastern Europe and Anatolia were balanced by a Monophysite sector extending from Armenia to Abyssinia inclusive through Syria and the Nile Valley and by a Nestorian sector extending from 'Irāq to the north-east corner of Intramural China; and neither of these two other quarters of Christendom had any foothold in Europe. During the first 250 years of Halecki's European millennium, before the mass-conversions to Islam on the eve of the fall of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, a Monophysite Christendom that still embraced the peasantry of Egypt and a Nestorian Christendom that still embraced the peasantry of 'Irāq were perhaps each of them as strong in numbers as either their Orthodox or their Western sister Christian society; and, when the whole of Christendom, instead of merely two arbitrarily selected quarters of it,² is thus taken into account, it becomes manifest that either Asia or Africa could have disputed Europe's claim to style herself 'the Christian Continent' *par excellence* until at least the first four out of Halecki's ten European centuries had run out. If there was a moment—between the late medieval decline of the Monophysite and Nestorian Christian waves in Africa and Asia and the early modern advance of the Orthodox and Western Christian waves into Asia and the Americas—at which Christendom and Europe were in truth approximately conterminous, that moment cannot have had a longer duration than the hundred years immediately preceding the Western mariners' conquest of the Ocean in the later decades of the fifteenth century. Yet, even during that brief interval, the identity between Europe and Christendom was imperfect; for, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era, an Islam that was still

¹ See II. ii. 360-9.

² Halecki's arbitrariness in deeming an Orthodox and a Western Christendom to constitute a unitary Christian society, to the exclusion of both a Monophysite and a Nestorian Christendom, is capped by his arbitrariness in excluding Muscovy, and *a fortiori* the Soviet Union, from a Europe which, for him, is synonymous with Christendom, when he has bestowed the freedom of Europe on Muscovy's predecessor Kievan Russia (op. cit., p. 92), as well as on a predominantly Anatolian East Roman Empire (op. cit., p. 93).

clinging to a remnant of its own domain in a European Andalusia was already encroaching on Christendom's domain in a European Rumelia as well as in an African Nubia¹ and in an Asiatic 'Irāq and Azerbaijan.²

While Europe thus failed to provide a geographical framework for the merger of Orthodox with Western Christendom in a single unitary Christian Civilization, it likewise failed to provide an historical framework for the merger of an Hellenic with a post-Christian Western culture in a single unitary Rationalist Civilization. The thesis that the Western and Hellenic cultures were not two cultures but one culture because they were both alike informed by some common distinctive quality that could be identified as being 'European' was one that could be sustained only if this hypothetical common 'European' quality could be shown to have been not merely distinctive but dominant in a *solidant* 'European' cultural tradition; and this condition in its turn required that, if any non-European contributions to this European cultural heritage could be detected, they should prove to be elements that were not of more than minor importance. It is evident that the thesis refutes itself as soon as it is thus elucidated; for it wrecks itself on two rocks at once: the Jewish contribution to a Western Civilization that was a Christian civilization as well as a Hellenistic one, and the Asiatic Greek contribution to Hellenism. The Asiatic Greeks, as we have seen, had been the pioneers of the Hellenic Civilization in the first chapter of its history, and Ionian Asiatic Greek men of science had been the intellectual fathers of a Rationalism which was taken by Modern Western minds to be the unbroken golden thread of a 'European' cultural tradition,³ but this latter-day Western belief in a 'rationalist' civilization's continuity was achieved at the intellectual price of ignoring the spiritual history of the Hellenic World after the generation of Carneades⁴ and the spiritual history of the Western World before the generation of Descartes.

A distortion of the historical facts which the chimaera of a 'European Civilization' demanded from its votaries was aggravated by the hybris which was the moral nemesis of this intellectual error. The Modern Western Narcissus who had once persuaded himself to believe in the reality of a distinctive 'European' tradition of civilization culminating in the way of life of the observer's own society in his own age was apt to lose his balance so completely as to equate this imaginary 'European Civilization' with 'Civilization' *sans phrase* and to deny the title to rank as civilizations to representatives of this species of society whose geographical domains happened to lie on the wrong side of the Argonauts' track.⁵ A Modern Westerner who had ruled all non-Europeans out of

¹ See Trimmingham, J. S.: *Islam in the Sudan* (Oxford 1949, University Press), pp. 79-84.

² See Budge, E. A. Wallis: *The Monks of Küblai Khān* (London 1928, Religious Tract Society), pp. 76-88.

³ A characteristically judicious and discriminating statement, by Edwyn Bevan, of the case for regarding Hellenic and Western history as the history of a single 'rationalist' civilization will be found in V. v. 6, n. 1.

⁴ The metamorphosis of Hellenic philosophy into religion from the generation of Poseidonius onwards has been noticed in V. v. 546-9.

⁵ The geopolitical counter-mancœuvre of equating 'Civilization' with 'Asiatic Civilization' would have been equally facile and, of course, equally illegitimate. On the analogy of the Modern Western mancœuvre that has been exposed above, this counter-mancœuvre

his reckoning of human achievement was indeed in danger of finding himself in a dizzy position. Now that he had piled his Western Pelion on an Hellenic Ossa, must he not be on the verge of scaling Olympus? The catastrophic ending of the Titans' impious enterprise according to the traditional version of the Hellenic myth gave a sardonic answer to the Westerner's conceited rhetorical question. The sin of *hybris* always makes the sinner prone to fall a victim to an egocentric illusion which is the intellectual corollary of Original Sin,¹ and in the *Weltanschauung* of a student of History this egocentric illusion is apt to conspire with the misconception of growth as a movement in a straight line² to produce a thorough-going misinterpretation of the history of Mankind.

This had proved to be the penalty that a 'European' must pay for the folly of deifying his own continent to the disparagement of the rest of the World; and the consequences of this 'European' folly were manifestly more serious for a post-Christian Frenchman or Englishman than for a pre-Christian Athenian or Peloponnesian; for the European Greeks who allowed themselves to feel superior to their Asiatic Greek contemporaries in the fifth century B.C. were at any rate free from that fanatical Judaic hallucination of being a 'chosen people' which, in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, insidiously haunted and misinspired the secular-minded heirs of a once Christian Western tradition. In adopting the name 'Europe' as a substitute for Western Christendom, the Modern Western World had replaced a misnomer that was merely an anachronism by a misnomer that was seriously misleading.

could have been executed in two steps. In the first place the Hellenic Civilization could have been called 'Asiatic' without departing farther from the truth than the departure made by Aeschylus and Herodotus and their Modern Western followers when they labelled as 'European' a civilization that bestrode both continents. In the second place the mantle of Hellenism could have been declared to have fallen upon the shoulders of Orthodox Christendom without doing any greater violence to the facts of history than was done by Westerners who claimed that the West was Hellas' sole heir, when the truth was that the two sister Hellenistic civilizations of Western and Eastern Orthodox Christendom were both equally entitled to claim heirship to the Hellenic heritage. This counter-Western inversion of a Western misinterpretation of history would have led straight to the conclusion that there was an 'Asiatic Civilization' which was tantamount to 'Civilization' with a capital 'C'.

¹ This egocentric illusion has been examined in I. i. 157-64.

² See I. i. 168-71.

IX. D (ii), ANNEX

THE MERCENARY SOLDIER'S ROLE AS A CULTURAL SPEARHEAD

If an assaulted society succumbs to Human Nature's instinctive irrational abhorrence of anything that is alien and unfamiliar when the challenge takes the form of an encounter with a militarily superior neighbour, the consequences of this instinctive reaction sometimes illustrate the truth that to yield to the promptings of fear is apt to be the most dangerous of all possible alternative courses.

The at first sight apparently most non-committal way for an assaulted society to enlist in its own defence its assailant's military technique is, not the hard course of acquiring, handling, and eventually manufacturing for itself the weapons and equipment, and mastering the drill, tactics, strategy, and military organization, that are the secrets of the assailant's military superiority, but the facile expedient of simply hiring representatives of this militarily superior impinging society to wield their own exotic weapons, execute their own exotic tactics and strategy, and apply their own exotic organization as mercenary soldiers, officers, and administrators in the assaulted society's service. In other contexts¹ we have observed how civilizations embodied in universal states have delivered themselves into the hands of the transfrontier barbarians when they have followed the clever-seeming device of setting a thief to catch a thief by recruiting barbarian mercenary troops to defend the *limes* against the barbarian war-bands that are assailing it. Civilizations have also brought the same fate on themselves by the still more hazardous manoeuvre of enlisting the military services of militarily superior neighbours when these neighbours have been, not barbarians, but representatives of a society of the employer-society's own species.

Instances in which the enlistment of mercenary troops from the ranks of a militarily superior alien civilization has paved the way for the establishment of this alien civilization's domination over the society that has thus with its own hands introduced a Trojan Horse into its precincts are the enlistment of Hellenic mercenary troops by the Achaemenian Imperial Government during the hundred years ending in Alexander's passage of the Dardanelles in 334 B.C.² and the enlistment of Toltec mercenaries to fight the fratricidal battles of the city-states of Yucatan in the last chapter of Yucatec history before the forcible incorporation of the Yucatec Civilization into the Mexic—if this is the correct reconstruction of that chapter of Central American history.³ The enlistment of Norman and other Western Christian mercenaries by the East Roman Imperial Government during the 150 years ending in the overthrow of the East Roman Empire by so-called 'Crusaders' in A.D. 1204 likewise prepared the way for this eventual disaster—and in this case the ultimately disastrous consequence of employing mercenaries recruited from

¹ See V. v. 159-69; VI. vii. 329-38; and pp. 41-44, above.

² See VI. vii. 328-9.

³ See I. i. 123-4.

a society in process of civilization is the more remarkable, considering that the East Roman Empire—like the Carthaginian Empire in its day—had been singularly successful in eluding the similar disaster which it had courted by enlisting the services of all manner of barbarians, ranging from the horse-archers of the Eurasian Steppe to the Scandinavian and English axe-men who manned the Varangian Imperial Guard.

This political risk to which a civilization exposes itself in giving military employment to members of an alien society of its own species is not eliminated when the employer-society abstains from enlisting an alien rank-and-file and confines itself to commissioning alien officers to take command of native troops. The handful of Western soldiers of fortune who were employed in this capacity by the governments of the native Indian successor-states of the Mughal Rāj in India during the hundred years ending in the final overthrow of the Sikh Power by British arms in A.D. 1849 were forerunners of an alien universal state of Western origin in the shape of the British Rāj.¹ This Indian experience indicates that alien military officers cannot be employed with impunity unless their function is restricted—as it was in Petrine Russia and in the Ottoman Empire under the régime inaugurated by Selīm III and Mahmūd II—to providing an alien haven for a corps of officers in which the personnel is still recruited in the main from native sources even after the reception of an alien military technique and alien art of war.

One of the lines along which the private Western military adventurers in a post-Mughal India blazed a trail for the British East India Company, and eventually for the British Crown, was their practice of undertaking the organization as well as the command of the armies of the Mughal Rāj's successor-states, insisting on their employers' assigning to them portions of their land revenues to finance this new-model military organization, and finally taking over the administration of the districts producing these revenues in order to ensure the collection of their dues. This was the method by which the East India Company succeeded in swiftly transforming its own relation with one local Indian state after another from a casual and temporary military alliance into a political control which was apt to grow progressively more effective until at last it became indistinguishable from a plenary sovereignty.

"The system soon reached the stage when the native ally was required to supply not men but money, and the English undertook to raise, train, and pay a fixed number of troops on receiving a subsidy equivalent to their cost. . . . Large sums had hitherto been spent by the native princes in maintaining ill-managed and insubordinate bodies of troops, and in constant wars against each other; they might economise their revenues, be rid of a mutinous soldiery, and sit much more quietly at home, by entering into contracts with a skilful and solvent administration that would undertake all serious military business for a fixed subsidy. But, as punctuality in money matters has never been a princely quality, this subsidy was apt to be paid very irregularly; so the next stage was to revive the

¹ See Compton, H.: *A Particular Account of the European Military Adventurers of Hindustan from 1784 to 1803* (London 1892, Fisher Unwin) and Grey, C., and Garrett, H. L. O.: *European Adventurers in Northern India, 1785-1849* (Lahore 1929, Punjab Government Press).

long-standing practice of Asiatic governments: the assignment of lands for the payment of troops. . . .

"The Oudh Vizier was a weak ruler whose country was in confusion, whose troops were mutinous, and whose finances were disordered by the heavy strain of the English subsidy. In these circumstances Lord Wellesley required the Vizier to disband his disorderly forces in order that more British troops might be subsidized for the effective defence of his dominions. . . . The Vizier ceded all his frontier provinces, including Rohilcund, to the Company, the revenue of the territory thus transferred being taken as an equivalent to the subsidy payable for troops. . . . And Oudh was thenceforward enveloped by the English dominion. This most important augmentation of territory transferred to the British Government some of the richest and most populous districts in the heart of India."¹

¹ Lyall, Sir A.: *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India* (London 1894. John Murray), pp. 245-7.

TABLE OF BARBARIAN WAR-BANDS


Barbarian War-Bands

<i>Civilization</i>	<i>Universal State</i>	<i>Frontier</i>	<i>Barbarians</i>	<i>Poetry</i>	<i>Religion</i>
Sumeric	The Empire of Sumer and Akkad	NE.	Gutaeans Eurasian Nomads (Aryas) Kassites Hittites Eurasian Nomads (Scythae) Medes and Persians Sakas Huns Gujars	The Sanskrit Epic The Sanskrit Epic (recultivated)	The Vedic Pantheon The Hittite Pantheon Zoroastrianism
Babylonic	The Neo-Babylonian Empire	NW. NE.	Eurasian Nomads { (Hiongnu) { (To Pa) { (Juan Juan) { (Siempi)		
Indic	The Mauryan Empire The Gupta Empire	NW. NW.	Eurasian Nomads { (Hiongnu) { (To Pa) { (Juan Juan) { (Siempi)		
Sinic	The T'w'in and Han Empire	NW.	Eurasian Nomads { (Hiongnu) { (To Pa) { (Juan Juan) { (Siempi)		
Hellenic	The Roman Empire	NE. SE. SW. S. NE. N. NW. E. SE.	Eurasian Nomads { (Hiongnu) { (To Pa) { (Juan Juan) { (Siempi)	The Irish Epic The Teutonic Epic	Far Western Christianity First the Continental Teutonic Pantheon, then Arianism
Egyptiac	The Middle Empire The New Empire	NE. SE. SW. S. NE. N. NW. E. SE.	Eurasian Nomads { (Hiongnu) { (To Pa) { (Juan Juan) { (Siempi)	The Pre-Islamic Arabic Poetry	Islam
Orthodox Christian (in Russia)				The Homeric Epic	Set-worship The Olympian Pantheon Yahweh-worship Islam Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism
Far Eastern Western	The Tokugawa Shogunate In Europe	NE. NW. N. NE.	Ainu Insular Celts Scandinavians Continental Saxons Wends Lithuanians Eurasian Nomads (Magyars) Bosniaks	The Irish Epic The Icelandic Sagas	Far Western Christianity The Scandinavian Pantheon
Andean	In North America The Incaic Empire	E. SE. W. E. S.	Red Indians Amazonians Araucanians	The Muslim Jugoslav 'heroic' ballads	First Bogomilism, then Islam Non-violent 'Zealotism'

Syriac	The Achaemenian Empire The Arab Caliphate	NW. NE. NW. SW. SE. N. NE. NE. NE. NE. NW. N.	Maccedonians Parthians Sakas Franks East Roman 'Borderers' Berbers Arabs Eurasian Nomads (Khazars) Eurasian Nomads (Turks) Eurasian Nomads (Mongols) Eurasian Nomads (Khitans) Eurasian Nomads (Kin) Eurasian Nomads (Mongols) Eurasian Nomads (Zungar Calmucks) Chichimecs	The Alexander Romance The Iranian Epic The French Epic The Byzantine Greek Epic	Catholicism Orthodox Christianity Islam 'Ili Shii'ism Judaism Manichaeism {Nestorianism
Far Eastern (main body)	['Time of Troubles'] The Manchu Empire	NW. NE.	Serbs Albanians Rumeliot Greeks Lazars Kurds Arabs Arabs Uzbeks Afghans Achaeans Hebrews and Aramaeans Uzbeks Afghans Gassas Phrygians Achaeans Bastarnae Sarmatians Varangians Pechenegs Cossacks Kirghiz Qazaqs	The Orthodox Christian Jugoslav 'heroic' ballads The Albanian 'heroic' poetry The Rumeliot Greek Armatole and Klephtic ballads	Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism
Central American	The Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain	NW. N.			
Orthodox Christian (main body)	The Ottoman Empire	NW.			Bektashi Sunnism
Hindu	The Mughal Raj	NE. SE. S. NW.			Najdi Wahhabism Kordofani Mahdism
Minoan	The British Raj The thalassocracy of Minos ['Time of Troubles']	NW. N. E. NE.		The Homeric Epic	The Olympian Pantheon Yahweh-worship
Iranic					
Hittite					
Eurasian Nomadism	The Royal Scythian Horde The Khazar Horde The Golden Horde	NE. NW. NW. E. E. NW. NE.		The Homeric Epic The Russian 'heroic' ballads The Kirghiz Qazaq 'heroic' ballads	The Olympian Pantheon Orthodox Christianity

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A STUDY OF HISTORY

BY

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*Director of Studies in the Royal Institute
of International Affairs
Research Professor of International History
in the University of London
(both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)*

But at my back I always hear
Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near.

ANDREW MARVELL

ποιεῖν τι δεῖ ἄς γόνυ χλωρόν.

THEOCRITUS: *Κυνίσκας* "Ερως, l. 70

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

SOLOON

My times are in Thy hand.

Ps. xxxi. 15, in the A.V.

But Thou art the same, and Thy
years shall have no end.


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X

CONTACTS BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS IN TIME (*Renaissances*)

A. 'THE RENAISSANCE'

THE metaphorical application of the French word *renaissance* to denote the 'rebirth' of an extinct culture was a Modern Western usage; and, for Western minds whose vocabulary had come to include this term, the first association of the word 'renaissance', in this latter-day technical meaning of it, was in the singular, not in the plural, and as a proper name, not as the label of a species.¹

Modern Western historians were apt thus to speak of 'the Renaissance' under the spell of the same egocentric illusion² that had prompted *Homo Terricola* in all societies and all ages to speak of 'the Earth', the 'Moon', 'the Sun'. Such *façons de parler* were, of course, as unscientific as they were insidious, and as insidious as they were subjective. They were expressions of an unsophisticated observer's uncritical assumption that his own ego is the centre of the Universe and that a panorama seen from his personal angle of vision is a true picture of the Universe as it really is. In this same egocentric frame of mind an inhabitant of another of 'the Planets' would use *Terricola's* familiar term 'the Earth' to mean the planet whose surface happened to be *his* habitat. If, for example, he happened to be a Martian, 'the Earth' would mean for him the planet Mars and not the planet Terra. On the other hand, *Terricola's* term 'the Moon' would not have any counterpart in other planetary vocabularies, since a diverse parochial experience would have accustomed inhabitants of Jupiter to speak of 'the Moons' in the plural and inhabitants of Saturn to speak, instead, of 'the Ring', while inhabitants of other planets, if un-equipped with telescopes, would deny that such phenomena as either 'moons' or 'rings' were to be seen among the heavenly bodies. It is true that, when they spoke of 'the Sun', inhabitants of any of 'the Planets' would be referring to one and the same star; but, when a 'twentieth-century' *terricola* was reminded, by the spectacle of 'the Milky Way', that suns were as common as dirt, and when he went on to reflect that any of these innumerable suns might have numerous planets revolving round it, he was forced to realize that his habitual phrase 'the Planets' was as provincial an expression as 'the Moon', and 'the Sun' as crass a provincialism as 'the Earth'. Nor did 'the Milky Way' itself fare any better; for *Homo Terricola's* latter-day astronomers had informed him that this smoke-ring composed of stars, including his native planet's sun, was, itself, simply one of a number of nebulae in diverse stages of

¹ In Larousse, P.: *Grand Dictionnaire Universel du XIX^e Siècle*, vol. xiii, p. 936, the earliest French author cited as having used the word 'renaissance' in this technical sense is E.-J. Delécluze (*vivebat* A.D. 1781-1863). In the *New English Dictionary* the earliest passage cited dates from as late as A.D. 1845.

² See I. i. 158-65.

condensation. These astronomical illustrations of the egocentric illusion's distorting effect upon the appearance of Reality were illuminating commentaries on the customary Modern Western usage of the word *renaissance*.

In ordinary Modern Western parlance the singular expression 'the Renaissance' was used to denote something that had happened in one local province of one civilization in one age of its history on two planes of its activity. The particular civilization in question was Western Christendom, the particular province was Northern and Central Italy,¹ the particular age was the Late Medieval period of Western history (*circa* A.D. 1275-1475), the particular activities were the literary and visual arts. The occurrence that was identified by being labelled with this name invented for it *ad hoc* was the evocation—at this time and place, and within these two spheres of cultural action—of the 'ghost' of a 'dead' civilization; and the *revenant* thus called up from Sheol by this feat of cultural necromancy was the shade of an Hellenic culture to which the Western culture was affiliated.²

If our reminder of the distorting effect of the egocentric illusion on our mental picture of the stellar universe has put us on the alert against the danger of error to which this besetting illusion exposes human minds in all their mental operations, we may feel it worth while to re-

¹ i.e. the aboriginally Western Christian parts of the Italian Peninsula, as distinct from a *ci-devant* Byzantine South (see I. i. 32 and 38).

² This evocation of two facets of the Hellenic culture in a Late Medieval Italy was the occurrence to which the label inscribed 'the Renaissance' properly attached; but in popular parlance the usage of the term was sometimes incorrectly narrowed and sometimes incorrectly widened. It was sometimes confined to denoting the enrichment of an Italian renaissance of Hellenism in Latin dress, at a date by which this was already a going concern, through the fifteenth-century Italian humanists' acquisition from Constantinople of original works of Hellenic literature in the medium of the Classical Greek language (see IX. viii. 102). In reality, this Greek contribution to a Late Medieval Italian renaissance of Hellenism was the by-product of a contact in the Space-dimension between a Late Medieval Italy and a contemporary Orthodox Christendom which happened to be a 'carrier' of those Greek elements of an extinct Hellenic culture that the Italians acquired from this Byzantine source in the fifteenth century. On the other hand the meaning of the term 'the Renaissance' was sometimes extended to include the radiation of a Late Medieval Italian sub-culture into the Transmarine and Transalpine provinces of Western Christendom at the transition from the Medieval to the Modern Age of Western history.

In thus transmitting its own special culture to 'the Barbarians', a Late Medieval Italy did, of course, transmit the achievements of her evocation of Hellenism among her other current cultural commodities. But the diffusion of the Italian culture at this date was, in itself, not a renaissance but an encounter between two diverse contemporary Western sub-cultures within the bosom of a Western body social that was their common social setting. (The measure of the gulf by which these two Late Medieval Western sub-cultures had come to be divided by the time when their encounter began was given in a striking visual form by the contrast in style, and still greater contrast in ethos, between the native English sculpture and the imported Florentine master Pietro Torrigiani's work in the English King Henry VII's chapel in Westminster Abbey). This Italianization of the non-Italian provinces of the Western World of the day was a consequence of the Italians' success in forging ahead of the rest of Western Christendom in the course of the two preceding centuries; Italy had already won this lead in a cultural race between the divers provinces of a Medieval Western Christendom before the Italian renaissance of Hellenism had started; and, in virtue of this lead, the eventual diffusion of a Late Medieval Italian culture beyond the Alps and across the Western Mediterranean would assuredly have taken place even if there had been no Italian renaissance of Hellenism at all, or if there had been one that had never gone beyond a mere revival of the second-hand Latin version of the Hellenic literature, without any fifteenth-century Italian recourse to Hellenism's Greek fountain-head (see IV. iv. 275, nn. 1 and 2, and 363, n. 1, and IX. viii. 102, n. 2).

consider the customary Western conception of 'the Renaissance' in a critical spirit; and, as soon as we enter upon this re-examination, we shall find that the popular usage of the term in the singular, to describe a Late Medieval Italian literary and artistic movement, was at variance with the historical facts in at least three respects. In the first place it did not cover the whole field even of the Late Medieval Italian renaissance of Hellenism, since it left out of the picture a political facet that, in the twentieth century, was still dominating the social landscape of a Late Modern Western World in which the literary and artistic traces of 'the Renaissance' had been gradually fading out.¹ In the second place the use of the word *renaissance* as a proper name for the evocation of Hellenism in a Late Medieval Italy ignored the fact that there had been other renaissances of Hellenism, in other provinces of Western Christendom, at other times in Western history (later, as well as earlier, than the Late Middle Ages), and that these other Western renaissances of Hellen-

¹ A child of a Late Modern Western Civilization who had had the good fortune to have been born just in time to have received a Late Medieval Italian (*alias* Early Modern Western) Hellenic education in the Greek and Latin languages and literatures was sadly aware, by the year A.D. 1952 (if he had had the further good or bad fortune to have survived two world wars), that he and his class-mates might be all but the last Western initiates into an Hellenic *Weltanschauung* which had been a veritable 'Illumination of the Soul' (to use Acton's words, quoted above in I. i. 47) for all those children of the West who had been given the opportunity of participating in this inspiring intellectual experience. In the Western educational arena by the year A.D. 1952 the humanist's curriculum introduced through a Late Medieval Italian renaissance of Hellenism had been put out of the running and all but pushed off the track by a physicist's curriculum representing an aboriginal Western *Weltanschauung* which, after having been put out of countenance for a season by the dazzling splendour of the Hellenic *revenant*, had been progressively reasserting itself ever since a native Western genius for an empirical and experimental exploration and exploitation of the Physical Universe had achieved a counter-renaissance in winning 'the Battle of the Books' at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see IV. iv. 363, n. 2, and pp. 62-73, below).

In appraising, *circa* A.D. 1952, the policy pursued by a Late Modern Western World in discriminating, and selecting for retention or discard, the divers elements of the Hellenic culture that had been recaptured for the Modern West by the Italian Humanists, the last survivors of this now all but exterminated intellectual tribe might feel inclined to pray and beseech their exterminators to say after them, in language taken from the Anglican Book of Common Prayer: 'We have left undone those things which we ought to have done, and we have done those things which we ought not to have done.' In the very generation in which the literary and artistic facets of an Italian renaissance of Hellenism were being finally discarded by a post-Modern Western Man, this Caliban was not only clinging to the political facet but was pushing this resuscitated political ideology of Hellenism to extremes that had never been approached by the Hellenes themselves in their own self-immolation on the altar of an idolized Leviathan.

This selective policy that was thus being pursued by twentieth-century Western Man was, of course, as logical as it was perverse. His determination to retain the political facet, while discarding the literary and artistic facets, of Hellenism was governed by the same impulse that was moving him at the same time to give rein to his own native bent for Physical Science. Like this native Western physical technique, an alien Hellenic political ideology ministered to an insatiable lust for power which was the inevitable ruling passion in hearts that had relapsed from Christian to pagan worship of a Collective Humanity. This point had been noted by a Western student of Hellenism in a passage already quoted in a different context:

'Europe's infatuation for the Greeks and Romans dates from the sixteenth century, when she began her great political and military reorganisation. She admired them in all things . . . because they taught her how to organise armies, how to wage wars, and how to build up great states' (Ferrero, G.: *Peace and War* (London 1933, Macmillan), p. 194, quoted in VII. vii. 542).

It looked as if a self-deconsecrated Modern Western Society had taken the political ideals of the Italian renaissance more seriously than its aesthetic ideals just because these political ideals presented a more defiant challenge to a Christian *ethos* against which a latter-day Western Man had rebelled.

ism had extended to other facets of the Hellenic culture besides the literary, artistic, and political. In the third place the customary usage ignored the still more portentous fact that there had been other renaissances of Hellenism in the histories of at least one other Hellenistic Civilization besides Western Christendom, and other renaissances of other 'dead' cultures besides Hellenism in the histories of other civilizations of the third generation besides the two Hellenistic Christian societies.

As soon as we have thus brought all the relevant phenomena into view, we become aware that, in using the word *renaissance* as a proper name, we have been allowing ourselves to fall into the error of seeing a unique occurrence in an event which in reality was no more than one particular instance of a recurrent historical phenomenon. The evocation of a dead culture by the living representatives of a civilization that is still a going concern proves to be a species of historical event for which the proper label is, not 'the Renaissance', but 'renaissances'; and, in an earlier context, we have already identified the genus to which this species belongs. The raising of a ghost by a necromancer produces an encounter between the medium and his oracle; and such encounters between the living and the dead are one species of a generic phenomenon which presents itself in a different specific form in encounters in which both parties are alive at the time when they collide with one another. The species of encounter in which the contact takes place between contemporaries has been the subject of the immediately preceding part of this Study; and, in finding our way into that field of inquiry, we have already taken note of a specific difference between contacts—of the species there examined—in which the characteristic and distinctive aspect of the encounter is a collision in the Space-dimension between contemporaries living side by side in different geographical habitats, and contacts in which the pertinent difference of location between the colliding parties is a distance measured in the Time-dimension of the chronologist and not in the Space-dimension of the geographer¹.

In the same context we have also already observed that, among encounters of the species labelled 'contacts in Time', we can identify at least three distinct varieties. There are encounters in the life, of the kind that we have labelled 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation',² between parties belonging to different, but consecutive, generations whose lives have partly overlapped in the Time-dimension. There are other encounters (and these are our present subject) in which the parties are the same, but in which the encounter takes place at a date when the party representing an older generation is no longer alive, and is therefore only able to participate as a ghost evoked by a living necromancer—in contrast to its original encounter, in the life, with an 'affiliated' civilization whose still living representatives are now awakening the dead in order to establish a fresh contact of a different kind.³ There are other encounters, again, in which one of the parts is likewise played by a ghost, but this by a ghost of the necromancer's own past self, and not by the ghost of one

¹ See IX. viii. 97.

² See I. i. 44 and IX. viii. 97-98.

³ See IX. viii. 97-98 and 101.

of his parents.¹ In this place there is no need to redefine these distinctions between an archaistic endeavour to revert to an earlier stage of the archaist's own history and the two varieties of encounter between civilizations of different generations that are distinguished from one another by the difference between the elder party's status when it participates as a living 'apparented' civilization and its status when it participates as a ghost evoked in a renaissance. There is no need, either, to reduplicate our previous examination of the phenomena of Archaism and of Apparentation-and-Affiliation; and accordingly, in the present Part of this Study, we can confine our attention to renaissances, with which we have not had occasion to deal so far, except incidentally.

Before proceeding to make an empirical survey of renaissances as a first step towards an analysis of their specific characteristics, we have only to take note of one point of difference *ex hypothesi* between renaissances and those diverse contacts in the Time-dimension that are represented by the other two varieties of the species.

In the relation of Apparentation-and-Affiliation between two living societies of different generations, as well as in a society's archaistic reversion to some phase of its own past experience, the two parties must be, *ex hypothesi*, in diverse and dissimilar stages of their life-history. In a case of Apparentation-and-Affiliation, for example,² the elder of the two parties must, not only have broken down, but have gone so far along the road of disintegration as to have split into the two factions that we have called a proletariat and a dominant minority, before the embryo of a younger civilization can be conceived in the womb of the elder civilization's proletariat; and, in consequence, the two parties to one of these encounters in the Time-dimension in which both parties are alive at the time are bound to find themselves, during the period of this encounter between them in the life, in extremely dissimilar phases of experience, at however early a stage of its growth the 'apparented' society may have broken down, and at however early a stage of its own subsequent growth the 'affiliated' society may suffer (if it does suffer) the antecedent society's fate. In a case of Archaism the *a priori* necessity of a corresponding difference between the respective psychological situations of the necromancer and the ghost of his own past self is still more obvious; for the very fact that the necromancer is recalling a past phase of his own life carries the implication that this resuscitated past and the living present represent different stages in the formation of a single cumulatively growing experience. On the other hand, when the ghost that the necromancer evokes is the ghost, not of his own, but of a different civilization, which, though 'apparented' to his own, is now no longer in the land of the living, it is equally open to him, at will, to evoke either a phase of this dead antecedent civilization's experience that is dissimilar from the necromancer's own present or a phase that is more or less on a psychological par with it.³ This wider freedom of choice, and the use that the necromancer is apt to make of it, will prove to be important themes in the study of renaissances upon which we are now embarking.

¹ See IX. viii. 101. The way of life that we have labelled 'Archaism' has been examined in V. vi. 49-97. ² See IX. viii. 97. ³ See IX. viii. 98-100, and pp. 128-37 below.

B. A SURVEY OF RENAISSANCES

(I) A PLAN OF OPERATIONS

IF we have now succeeded in establishing our thesis that a Late Medieval Italian renaissance of Hellenism which had been known as 'the Renaissance' in Modern Western parlance was, after all, not a unique phenomenon but was one representative of one species within a genus labelled 'encounters', the next step that suggests itself is to take advantage of this widening of our horizon for the prosecution of our inquiry along our customary empirical lines. Let us first see how many instances we can collect of renaissances within the meaning of the term as we have now defined it, and then let us go on to use the results of this survey as the basis for an analytical study of this species of encounter by means of the comparative method of investigation.

In setting out to plan a survey of renaissances, we shall find at once that our foregoing critique of 'the Renaissance' has already placed in our hands some clues to the discovery of a procedure. We have noticed that this Italian resuscitation of Hellenism was neither comprehensive nor indiscriminate; it was a recapture of certain particular facets of the resuscitated culture's life. A literary and an artistic facet were two aspects of this renaissance that were in the foreground of a latter-day Western observer's retrospective picture of the phenomenon, and we have also noticed a political facet that had perhaps always been paramount in fact, and that was undoubtedly the one aspect of the Italian renaissance of Hellenism which, in A.D. 1952, was showing an increasing, instead of a diminishing, potency for fascinating Western souls.¹ These three facets of this particular *revenante* culture in this particular evocation correspond to three of the elemental and sub-elemental rays into which we have found the integral radiation of a radioactive culture being diffracted in the process of diffusion in the dimension, not of Time, but of Space;² and, with this clue in our hands, we may push our search for instances of renaissances into the rest of those divers fields of human activity which have figured as separately distinguishable strips in our culture-spectrum. On these lines we shall make successive searches for symptoms of renaissances in the fields of Politics, Law, Science and Philosophy, Language and Literature, the Visual Arts, and Religion.³ Moreover, these inquiries will not be confined to renaissances of various aspects of Hellenism in the Western Christian Hellenistic World at different stages in this civilization's history. We shall also put into the witness box, one after another, all the other civilizations of the third generation that have come within our cognizance⁴—and these are all that come into question in our present inquiry, since these alone had been *en rapport* with their

¹ See p. 3, n. 1, above.

² See IX. viii. 498–500.

³ It will be noticed that Economics are absent from this list, in contrast to the importance of the part that they have proved to play in encounters in the Space-dimension between contemporaries.

⁴ A list of tertiary civilizations will be found in the table of primitive societies, civilizations, and higher religions in serial order, in VII. vii. Table IV facing p. 772.

predecessors on the comparatively intimate terms required for making the feat of evocation a possibility.

While the resuscitation of a dead culture in the heart and mind of a living society may result in the necromancer's recollecting aspects of the resuscitated culture that he has forgotten, or even in his discovering aspects of which he has never before been aware, he could never have performed the initial act of materializing the nucleus of the wraith which he has thus afterwards gradually brought into focus if, before ever he set out to raise this ghost, he had not possessed some hold over the dead society. This indispensable preliminary hold consists, as we have seen,¹ in the possession of a stock of practices and ideas derived from the dead civilization's cultural heritage; and this key is not in the hands of any civilization of a younger generation that is not affiliated to the dead society in virtue of being the issue of a chrysalis church that has been constructed by the dead society's internal proletariat. This link of Apparentation-and-Affiliation, as we have called it, duly subsists between tertiary civilizations and their secondary predecessors; but we have found no more than abortive rudiments of it in the relation between secondary civilizations and the primary predecessors of these;² and, *ex hypothesi*, there can have been no relation of this kind between those primary civilizations themselves and the primitive societies out of which they must have arisen by some process of mutation.³ On this showing, we may take it that we shall have covered the ground of our present inquiry when we have taken an inventory of the tertiary civilizations' performances in their resuscitations of facets of the lives of their secondary predecessors in the divers fields of activity that we have been able to distinguish for our present purpose.

(II) OPERATIONS ACCORDING TO PLAN

(a) RENAISSANCES OF POLITICAL IDEAS, IDEALS, AND INSTITUTIONS

We have already noticed that the Late Medieval Italian renaissance of Hellenism exerted a more enduring influence on Western life on the political plane than on either the literary or the artistic.⁴ We may now go on to observe that the political manifestations of this renaissance not only outlived the aesthetic manifestations but had forestalled them. A renaissance which did not declare itself on the aesthetic plane earlier than the generations of Dante (*vivebat* A.D. 1265-1321) and Petrarch (*vivebat* A.D. 1304-74) had begun to take effect on the political plane as early as the eleventh century, when the government of the cities of Lombardy had passed out of the control of their bishops into the hands of communes administered by boards of magistrates who were appointed by, and responsible to, the citizens. The resuscitated Hellenic political ideal which made this impact on eleventh-century Western Christian urban communities in Northern Italy⁵ proceeded, after the radiation

¹ In IX. viii. 98.

² See II. i. 302-30.

³ See III. iii. 344, n. 2; IV. iv. 352, n. 2; and pp. 645-8, below.

⁴ See VII. vii. 421-2.

⁵ See p. 3, n. 1, above.

of a Late Medieval Italian sub-culture into the Transalpine and Transmarine provinces of Western Christendom, to make a corresponding impact on the peoples of the feudal monarchies which this walking ghost of Hellenism encountered there.

In both its earlier and narrower and its later and wider field the influence of this Hellenic *revenant* on Western politics was the same. The superficial effect was to propagate a cult of constitutional self-government which was eventually to confer upon itself the flattering Attic title of 'Democracy'¹ after demonstrating its potency by precipitating successively an English, an American, and a French Revolution. By the year A.D. 1871 this 'Democracy' seemed to have won a conclusive victory over a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Absolute Monarchy which had been evoked by Late Medieval Italian and Early Modern Transalpine and Transmarine Western despots as an instrument for transposing a resuscitated Hellenic style of polity from a city-state to a nation-state scale.² But a lip-service to a Humanitarianism professedly dedicated to the welfare of individual human beings glozed over a demonic idolization of a tribal Collective Humanity whose juggernaut car was to ride roughshod over the rights of children, women, and men³ when these rights were divested of their religious sanction. In a Christian society this sanction had been the sacrosanctity of each single soul in the eyes of a God who had revealed Himself to be the Father and Redeemer of every creature. In a post-Christian twentieth-century Western World a blasphemously idolatrous revival of the worship of an Athênê Poliúchus masquerading as the Goddess France and of an Athânâ Chalcioecus masquerading as the Goddess Prussia⁴ was threatening to bring down upon the heads of *ci-devant* Christian Western idolators the nemesis that had once overtaken those pre-Christian Hellenic idolators whose abomination of desolation these Hellenizing Western neo-pagans had re-erected in order to fill a desolatingly vacant place on their own swept and garnished altars.

This ghost of an idolatrous Hellenic worship of a Collective Humanity embodied in a parochial state was thus evoked in Medieval Italy some three or four hundred years earlier than the ghosts of an Hellenic literature and visual art that, in their authentic original epiphanies in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., had been raised to their highest level of achievement by Attic worshippers of a parochial Athênê Poliúchus. This Italian renaissance of Hellenic political parochialism was not, however, either the only or the earliest political renaissance of Hellenism in Western history. In the course of Hellenic history itself, a religion of state-worship that had begun to be known by its fruits⁵ had temporarily salvaged its credit in the eyes of partially disillusioned worshippers by passing over from a pristine parochial to a latter-day oecumenical form; Athênê Poliúchus, Athânâ Chalcioecus, Tychê Antiocheôn, Fortuna Praenestina, and the other deified combatants in a *mêlée* of conflicting

¹ See IV. iv. 140.

² See III. iii. 350-61.

³ This deplorable effect of the impact of Democracy upon Parochial Sovereignty has been noticed in IV. iv. 161-7.

⁴ See I. i. 443-4 and IV. iv. 317-20 and 405-8.

⁵ Matt. vii. 20 and xii. 33; Luke vi. 44.

parochial idols had eventually been called to order by being subordinated to the oecumenical supremacy of a Dea Roma and a Divus Augustus; and a post-Diocletianic absolute version of this consolidated worship of the concentrated power of a politically unified Mankind was formally revived in Western Christendom, a quarter of a millennium before the revival of city-state-worship in Lombardy, when Charlemagne was crowned as a Roman Emperor by Pope Leo III in Saint Peter's on Christmas Day A.D. 800.¹

The memory of this Carolingian evocation of a 'holy' Roman ghost of an extinct Hellenic universal state cannot come into our minds without reminding us simultaneously that, since then, the same ghost had been re-evoked again and again in the Western World in the course of the eleven and a half centuries that had elapsed between the date of the coronation of Charlemagne at Rome and the time of the writing of these lines.

The all but fatal collapse of the nascent Western Christian Civilization itself, which had been the price of Charlemagne's failure to resuscitate the Roman Empire in the West effectively, did not deter a Saxon Otto I² from repeating his Austrasian predecessor's attempt; and the subsequent failure of Otto's attempt in its turn did not deter a Swabian Frederick I from attempting, for his part, to undo the political effects of the humiliation of a Franconian Henry IV at Hildebrand's hands by employing against a triumphant Hildebrandine Church the refurbished spiritual weapon of a recently disinterred Justinianean Law.³ Thereafter, when Frederick Barbarossa's experience had demonstrated that the necromancer's wand provided by his Bolognese legists was a broken reed, his grandson Frederick *Stupor Mundi* set himself to reverse, at the eleventh hour, the cumulative disaster of Charlemagne's, Henry IV's, and Frederick I's successive discomfitures⁴—though the weapon in which Frederick II trusted to conjure a victory out of his forlorn hope was one which had missed fire, more than two hundred years back, in the hands of his Saxon predecessor Otto III.⁵

This imaginative tenth-century forerunner of a thirteenth-century *Stupor Mundi* had sought to condense an insubstantial wraith of a defunct *Imperium Romanum* into at least a similitude of flesh and blood by transferring the seat of a rehabilitated Western Christian 'Holy Roman Empire' from Western Christendom's Saxon marches over against the North European barbarians⁶ to her Roman march over against Orthodox Christendom. At the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era the Ducatus Romanus was a patch of common ground on which the domains of the two Christendoms overlapped;⁷ and, in installing himself in the *ci-devant* Imperial City, Otto III had hoped to fortify the sickly counterfeit of the Roman Imperial Power that had been

¹ Charlemagne's attempt to revive the Roman Empire in Western Christendom has been discussed in this Study in I. i. 343; III. iii. 276; IV. iv. 378-9; V. v. 477, n. 1; and VI. vii. 19.

² See II. ii. 167-8.

³ See IV. iv. 557, and p. 31, below.

⁴ See IV. iv. 560-7; VII. vii. 537-8; and IX. viii. 394-5.

⁵ See IV. iv. 617, n. 2.

⁶ See II. ii. 167-9.

⁷ See IV. iv. 335-7, 521-2, and 599-600.

palmed off on Western Christendom by reinforcing it with tougher metal imported from a Byzantine mint. The success of Leo III Syrus's revival of the Roman Empire in Orthodox Christendom had been as conspicuous as the failure of Charlemagne's subsequent attempt to perform a corresponding feat of political necromancy in the West.¹ Could not a clumsy Western necromancer's abortive essay be salvaged by the Herodian expedient of turning to Western Christendom's account the achievements of an Orthodox Christian necromancer's virtuosity?

This complicated experiment of trying to raise the ghost of a dead civilization by employing a living civilization as a medium, which Otto III had failed to carry to success in the cultural crucible of a late-tenth-century City of Rome, was repeated by Frederick II under more promising conditions in a thirteenth-century Kingdom of Sicily which was the East Roman Empire's Transadriatic successor-state. The outcome of this more ambitious adventure in the black art of political alchemy was, as we have seen,² a war to the death between a pseudo-Byzantine 'Holy Roman Empire' and a Hildebrandine Papal Roman Church which brought the victorious ecclesiastical combatant to the ground in the same ruin as his vanquished secular adversary and thereby compromised the future of a promising Western Christian attempt to explore a previously untried approach towards the goal of the baffling enterprise of Civilization. Yet the ghost of an obsolete Hellenic institution that had been so inauspiciously raised at the close of the eighth century of the Christian Era by an Austrasian king and a Roman patriarch was still able to induce fresh Western victims to feed it with their life-blood within full view of their infatuated predecessors' unburied corpses.

By the time of the extirpation of Frederick II Hohenstaufen's brood, the cumulus of historic disasters, that had gradually come to be associated with academic pretensions to the imperial prerogative in the West, had gathered round a tragic imperial crown into a lowering nimbus which might have been expected to serve as an effective deterrent against any further repetition of Charlemagne's folly. Yet this scarecrow *Caesarea Maiestas* was eagerly appropriated by the architects of a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy for the sake of the prestige that it could still lend to their strictly practical enterprise of providing an Early Modern Western World with a local carapace to protect it against Ottoman aggression in the Danube Basin;³ and, after the decay of the Ottoman Power had rendered a Hapsburg Empire's service to the Western Civilization superfluous,⁴ 'the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation'—which had been preserved by the arts of Hapsburg statesmanship to weigh as an incubus on submissive German backs with a gravity that grew heavier century by century—was sedulously transferred to no-less-willing French backs by the policy of a Napoleon whose motives in thus posing as a traditionalist were the hard-headed calculations of *raison d'état*.

The immediate effect of the Corsican adventurer's usurpation of the imperial style and title in A.D. 1804 was to vulgarize a term of Western

¹ See I. i. 343; III. iii. 276; IV. iv. 378-9; V. v. 477, n. 1; and VI. vii. 19.

² In IV. iv. 560-7.

³ See II. ii. 177-9.

⁴ See II. ii. 179-90.

political art whose dignity had been the only one of its pristine virtues that had not by then long since departed from it. The reigning Danubian Hapsburg monarch Francis II's self-metamorphosis from a 'Roman Emperor' into an 'Hereditary Emperor of Austria' on the 10th August, 1804, was caricatured, on the 12th October, 1822, in the proclamation of Don Pedro I as Emperor of Brazil.¹ Yet this *reductio ad absurdum* of the value of a political coinage which a Napoleon I had debased did not deter a Napoleon III from assuming, on the 2nd December, 1852, a title that was to lure him into liquidating a Second French Empire in a more conclusive disaster than the First French Empire's débâcle. Nor did the conclusiveness of the French nation's failure in the nineteenth century to re-establish the reality of a Roman Empire on ex-Roman ground in Europe deter French imperialists from seeking a more propitious field on ex-Roman ground in North-West Africa for an experiment in political necromancy that never ceased to exact sacrifices without ever forfeiting its powers of fascination.²

Meanwhile a German nation that was taking its revenge on the Second French Empire for the sins of the First had not waited for the capitulation of a beleaguered Paris to reassume—as it did at Versailles on the 31st December, 1870—the incubus of which it had been relieved, 64 years back, by the fortuitous combined good offices of a Corsican usurper and a Hapsburg defeatist;³ and even the demonic twentieth-century Austrian improviser of a momentary Third German Reich, in whose wild eyes a Prussian essay in a Second German Reich and an Austrian epilogue to a First German Reich were both alike anathema, eventually came under the spell of the Roman Empire's still unladen ghost so far as to fly in the face of his own crazy ideology by perching his vulture's-nest on a crag overhanging an enchanted Barbarossa's holy cave at Berchtesgaden⁴ and by accepting the regalia of Charlemagne, stolen from a Hapsburg treasure-house, as a tribute from the *Statthalter* of the lethal lunatic's own *gleichgeschaltet* Austrian homeland.⁵

During the 134 years that had elapsed between the date of Hitler's indulgence in this freak of historical fancy and the date of Napoleon I's assumption of a usurped imperial diadem, the now fast-fading phantom of a Roman oecumenical autocrat's *khwarenah*,⁶ which by that time had been haunting a Western political waste-land for more than a thousand years, had been shining with too faint a flicker of light to be capable any longer of working more serious mischief than the will-o'-the-wisp's

¹ See VI. vii. 22, n. 1.

² The quest for a consolation prize in Africa to compensate for disappointments in Europe was a motive of nineteenth-century and twentieth-century French imperialism in the Maghrib that has been noticed in Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1937*, vol. i (London 1938, Milford), pp. 489–90. See also the present Study, IX. viii. 258.

³ Francis II Hapsburg had renounced the title of Holy Roman Emperor on the 6th August, 1806.

⁴ See Bryce, James: *The Holy Roman Empire*, chap. xi, *ad finem*, quoted in III. iii. 463.

⁵ The regalia of the Holy Roman Empire were presented to Hitler by Seyss-Inquart on the 6th September, 1938, at the National Socialist Party's annual rally at Nuremberg. Hitler placed these treasures in the hands of the civic authorities of Nuremberg, who had been the custodians of them before A.D. 1809.

⁶ See IX. viii. 548, n. 1.

prank of enticing fools to follow a treacherous gleam to their deaths. But this ideal of oecumenical unity which, on Western soil, had hitherto invariably proved abortive was only one aspect of the ghost of a senile Hellenic universal state that had been raised in St. Peter's by Pope Leo and King Charles on Christmas Day, A.D. 800. The absolutism of the Diocletianic Roman Empire's demands upon its subjects had been as characteristic a feature of this Late Hellenic political institution as its claim to world-wide dominion; and the intensive, as well as the extensive, potency of the original had been reproduced in the wraith that had been raised to haunt a Western Christendom.

'The Carolingian Empire . . . was conceived as the society of the whole Christian people under the control of a theocratic monarchy, and [it] attempted to regulate every detail of life and thought, down to the method of ecclesiastical chant and the rules of the Monastic Order, by legislative decrees and governmental inspection. . . . The fusion of temporal and spiritual powers was far more complete in the Carolingian State than it had been in the Christian barbarian kingdoms, or even in the Byzantine Empire.'¹

Charlemagne and his successors had condemned this resuscitated Constantinian absolutism to miscarry by attempting to bring, not only every plane of human activity, but also every geographical province of Western Christendom, under the sway of this 'unitary Church State';² but an auspicious difference in the circumstances in which the Carolingian *tour de force* was reattempted by Frederick II Hohenstaufen made it possible for Frederick's political oecumenicalism to fail as lamentably as Charlemagne's without involving his absolutism in the disaster which had overtaken both elements in the Carolingian enterprise.

When Charlemagne had ventured on his attempt to reinaugurate a Constantinian absolutism throughout his wide-spread and still fast-expanding dominions, he had had to start building up again, from the foundations, a sophisticated social structure that had long since been raised to the ground in all the former provinces of the Roman Empire that lay within his frontiers, and this perhaps the most thoroughly of all in his own ancestral patrimony, Austrasia. By contrast, the Emperor Frederick II inherited, in the Kingdom of Sicily, a base of operations in which absolutism was already a going concern, thanks to the effective local revival there of a Late Roman dispensation by the efficient hands of his father's Norman victims' Byzantine and Muslim predecessors.³ And, although the difference in degree of political efficiency between a thirteenth-century Sicily and an eighth-century Austrasia proved not to be great enough—vast though it was—to compensate for Frederick II's handicap in entering the lists so late in the day, the consequent failure of his attempt to unite Central and Northern Italy with Southern Italy and Sicily under a centralized oecumenical autocratic rule did not prevent him from making, as King of Sicily, the mark on Western history that he found himself impotent to make as Holy Roman Emperor. In other

¹ Dawson, Christopher: *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), pp. 15 and 89. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the author, the Society of Authors, and the publishers.

² Dawson, op. cit., p. 89.

³ See IX. viii. 394-5.

contexts¹ we have already observed that the effective local revival of a Late Roman absolutism in the Kingdom of Sicily, which did not avail in Frederick II's lifetime to serve the King-Emperor as an instrument for making the same resuscitated absolutism likewise effective on an oecumenical scale, did stimulate a host of Late Medieval and Early Modern Western parochial diadochi and epigoni of the *Stupor Mundi* to honour his memory by taking his autocracy as their ensample on the less ambitious Siculo-Neapolitan geographical scale on which it had achieved so brilliant a success.

The earliest of these successful experiments in establishing counterparts of a Byzantine Kingdom of Sicily in other provinces of Western Christendom were the work of despots who, in the course of the quarter of a millennium following Frederick's death in A.D. 1250, swept up the seventy or eighty self-governing city-states of Central and Northern Italy into not more than ten miniature empires that were, all of them, faithful reproductions of their Sicilian prototype in proving to be so many local graves of Medieval Italian civic liberties.² This local Sicilian culture of an antediluvian weed which had thus been bedded out in Late Medieval North Italian nursery gardens³ was one of the principal Italian exports to the Transmarine and Transalpine parts of Western Christendom in the diffusion of the Late Medieval Italian sub-civilization at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; and in this wider field the propagators of an inauspiciously resuscitated Late Hellenic autocracy did not have to reperform their North Italian instructors' arduous task of fencing in new political enclosures for the cultivation of the exotic plant of absolutism. Beyond the Alps and the Tyrrhene Sea the North Italian cuttings of a Late Hellenic poison-ivy that had been successfully recultivated in Sicily found ready-made garden-beds in the existing feudal kingdoms and principalities; and in another context⁴ we have seen how, under the impact of this imported autocracy, the medieval parliamentary liberties of the non-Italian parts of Western Christendom came within an ace of suffering the fate that had already overtaken the medieval civic liberties of Italy.

In the ex-feudal Kingdom of England alone the challenge presented to an indigenous medieval parliamentarism by the infiltration of an exotic Italianate autocracy was successfully met by a marriage between parliamentary liberties and autocratic efficiency which bore fruit in the creation of a Late Modern Western form of parliamentary constitutional government. This was, however, merely a local exception to the general

¹ In VII. vii. 537-8 and IX. viii. 363 and 394-5.

² See III. iii. 354-6 and IV. iv. 353, n. 2. In Southern Italy these civic liberties had been extinguished some two hundred years earlier by Norman pupils of Byzantine avatars of Roman Justinians and Diocletians. The civic liberties of the once self-governing city-states of Northern and Central Italy were extinguished—with the two notable exceptions of Venice and Genoa—as effectively when, like Milan and Florence, they became capitals of miniature empires as when, like Pavia and Siena, they became provincial towns; and, though the yoke of political subjection might weigh less heavily on the necks of *ci-devant* city-states which, like Padua and Verona, had lost their independence to a tyrant city and not to a tyrant dictator, dynasty, or Papal Crown, the cities that became subject to Venice did lose their independence no less decisively than their sisters that became subject to the Papal Monarchy, the Medici, and the Visconti.

³ See I. i. 19.

⁴ In III. iii. 358-63.

course of political development in Western Christendom in its Early Modern Age. In the Western World of that age, outside England, the stalking spectre of a reanimated Diocletianic Roman absolutism won a sweeping victory; and, though all victories are wasting assets, it took two hundred years for the tyranny of a Philip II (*regnabat* A.D. 1555-98) to refine itself into the 'enlightened' absolutism of a Joseph (*imperabat* A.D. 1765-90), and three centuries for 'the divine right' of kings, who had converted their limited hereditary feudal rights into an unlimited adventitious Justinianean prerogative, to water itself down into the prosaic 'legitimacy' pleaded by the shell-shocked beneficiaries of a brief post-Napoleonic Restoration.

The kings crept out—the peoples sat at home,
And finding the long-invoked peace
(A pall embroidered with worn images
Of rights divine) too scant to cover doom
Such as they suffered, cursed the corn that grew
Rankly, to bitter bread, on Waterloo.¹

Yet, even after the judgement passed by 'the Ideas of 1789' on a Modern Western ghost of a Late Hellenic absolutism had been executed in the French Revolution's mid-nineteenth-century aftermath (*metabatur* A.D. 1848-71), a vestige of autocracy still survived in the Western World in the Hapsburg government of Austria-Hungary and the Hohenzollern government of Prussia-Germany; and, even when these now patently anachronistic vestigial autocracies were tardily overthrown as a consequence of their defeat in the War of A.D. 1914-18, the sequel was to disappoint President Wilson's sanguine endeavour to 'make the World safe for Democracy';² for, when the ghost of a resuscitated Justinian, that had still been haunting the politically backward eastern marches of a now almost ubiquitous Western Civilization, had thus at last been laid, the victorious 'Anglo-Saxon' institution of responsible parliamentary representative government did not succeed to the exorcised Hapsburg and Hohenzollern Caesars' vacant heritage. In this hour of supreme opportunity an English-grown parliamentarism proved to be a tender plant, which might bear admirable fruits on its native soil in England and her daughter commonwealths founded by English settlers overseas, but which was apt to wilt under the ordeal of transplantation to non-Anglo-Saxon Western ground.

The anti-parliamentarian denouement in Central Europe in the inter-war years A.D. 1919-39 gave 'Anglo-Saxon' votaries of Parliamentarism a shocking surprise; yet the replacement of an overthrown Justinianean 'legitimacy' by a dynamically militarist-minded Agathoclean tyranny, which was the sign of these unhappy inter-war times, had been foreshadowed, long since, in Napoleon I's exploitation of 'the Ideas of 1789' and in Napoleon III's occupation of the vacuum left by the fall of Louis Philippe's constitutional monarchy; and on the morrow of a Second

¹ Browning, E. B.: *Crowned and Buried*, Stanza xii.

² 'The World must be made safe for Democracy'—President Wilson in his Address to the Congress of the United States on the 2nd April, 1917, calling for a declaration of war against Germany.

World War it was no longer possible for Western Liberals to blind their eyes to the truth that, after all, the ghost of a resuscitated Hellenic absolutism had not been laid in Western Christendom effectually. It had no sooner been banned in one epiphany than it had reasserted itself in another; and this second visitation of an unquiet spirit was more disturbing than the first, since the demonic powers latent in Human Nature, which, in the economy of an absolute monarchy, were let loose in one lost soul alone, were 'activated' *viritim* in the eruption of a 'totalitarian' democracy that was a veritable dictatorship of Leviathan.

This Frankenstein's monster was the latest product of a *karma* from which Western Man had never succeeded in releasing himself since he had wantonly incurred it, on Christmas Day A.D. 800, by raising the ghost of an antecedent society's universal state. We may now go on to remind ourselves that this particular exhibition of the necromancer's craft on the political plane was no monopoly of the Western practitioners of the Black Art.

A ghost of a Roman Empire that had served as the Hellenic Society's universal state was raised by an Orthodox as well as by a Western Christian Hellenistic Society; and we have seen¹ that in Orthodox Christendom this necromantic *tour de force* was performed with such virtuosity that the incubus of the East Roman Empire proved heavy enough to break the Orthodox Christian Society's back in the reign of the Emperor Basil the Bulgar-killer (*imperabat* A.D. 969-1025), little more than 250 years after the local evocation of the ghost of Roman imperialism by Leo Syrus (*imperabat* A.D. 717-41). We have likewise seen² that neither the disastrous aftermath of the Great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977-1019 nor the submergence of a surviving remnant of Orthodox Christendom in Western Anatolia, which was the promptly exacted price of the re-erection of a simulacrum of the East Roman Empire at Constantinople in A.D. 1261, nor even the capture of the vampire Imperial City in A.D. 1453 by the 'Osmanlis, made a sufficient impression on the Greeks to break the spell of their infatuation with the ghost of an Hellenic universal state which had been exacting from them these ghastly sacrifices. They required the crowning catastrophe of A.D. 1922, in which the submerged Orthodox Christian diasporà in Anatolia was exterminated, to rid them of 'the Great Idea' of crushing themselves to death for the third time in Orthodox Christian history by once again saddling themselves with a resuscitated Roman Empire.

We have also watched the ghosts of other universal states playing the malignant role played by the Hellenic universal state's ghost in the histories of the two Christian Hellenistic civilizations. The ghost of a Syriac universal state that had eventually been embodied in the 'Abbasid Caliphate was raised at Cairo³ after the fall of Baghdad in A.D. 1258, and was translated to Constantinople, after the fall of Cairo in A.D. 1517, to ride there malignly on the shoulders of 'Osmanlis who had inadvertently acquired this political incubus among the spoils of their victory

¹ In I. i. 64, n. 3, 65, 66, and 70; IV. iv. 320; VI. vii. 19; and IX. viii. 103.

² In VI. vii. 29-31.

³ See I. i. 67, n. 2, 70, 360, and 396; II. ii. 75-76; and VI. vii. 21.

over the Mamlūks.¹ The ghost of a Sinic universal state that had been embodied in the Ts'in and Han Empire² returned to haunt an affiliated Far Eastern Society in the shape of the Sui and T'ang Empire;³ and, when the main body of the Far Eastern Society propagated an offshoot on to Japanese soil, this Sinic political incubus was exported to Yamato in A.D. 645 as an indispensable piece in the conventional suite of contemporary Chinese cultural furniture, to play a weird role in its doubly exotic new environment overseas.⁴

In the analogous propagation of an offshoot of Orthodox Christendom on to Russian soil at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era, the converted Varangian war-lords' Scandinavian mother wit or heaven-sent good fortune preserved them from committing the political solecism of dressing themselves up in a re-conditioned Roman Imperial *skaramangion* which had been transmuted on eighth-century Greek shoulders from a silken robe into a leaden cope, and on tenth-century Bulgar shoulders from a leaden cope into a corrosive shirt of Nessus. Yet the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom proved, after all, unable in the long run to escape its fate of having to take delivery of an Hellenic political incubus which had become the characteristic peculiar institution of the Orthodox Christian way of life since the evocation of this ghost by Leo Syrus's necromantic genius. The Muscovite epigoni of Rurik, who provided a broken-down Russian Orthodox Christendom with its universal state,⁵ won for themselves the dubious privilege of catering for this now necessary social service by equipping themselves with the redoubtable apparatus of an autocracy that consecrated its home-grown institutions by dedicating them to a Byzantine ideal. The formidable mission of casting herself for the role of a Third Rome was the price at which Moscow purchased from malicious gods her licence to monopolize the grim business of empire-building on Russian ground.⁶

Our survey up to this point has made it evident that, in the histories of civilizations of the third generation, a renaissance of the universal state of an antecedent civilization has been a not uncommon event. Indeed, among all the civilizations of this third generation that were not abortive, the Hindu Civilization is perhaps the only one in whose history we do not find this particular institution re-emerging from the psychic storeroom of the affiliated society's memory of the apparented society's life and works; for, in the history of the Iranic Muslim Civilization, we can perhaps detect in Timur Lenk's warped empire-building activities a belated and abortive attempt at a revival of the antecedent Syriac Society's universal state if we follow up the clue offered to us by the resemblances between Timur's career and Charlemagne's.⁷ If Timur's demonic temperament had not carried him to fatally farther lengths

¹ See VI. vii. 21-27.

² Points of likeness and difference between the renaissances of the Sinic and Hellenic universal states are examined on pp. 649-81, below.

³ See II. ii. 376; III. iii. 449; and VI. vii. 19.

⁴ See II. ii. 158-9 and VI. vii. 40-41.

⁵ See IV. iv. 88; V. v. 312; V. vi. 191 and 309.

⁶ See VI. vii. 31-40 and IX. viii. 676-8.

⁷ See IV. iv. 488-504.

than Charlemagne's limit in committing the marchman's besetting sin of turning his arms against the interior of the world which it is his historical mission to defend, it is conceivable that the Transoxanian empire-builder might have emulated the achievement of his Austrasian counterpart, who raised a ghost of the Roman Empire in Western Christendom, by raising a ghost of the 'Abbasid Caliphate on Iranic Muslim ground—though we may also surmise that, even if Timur had achieved the utmost success within his power in this enterprise, the contrast between a Timurid caricature of the Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate at Samarqand and a contemporary 'Abbasid reproduction of the Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate at Cairo would have been even greater than the historic contrast between Charlemagne's caricature and Leo Syrus's reproduction of the Roman Empire.

In every instance of either an effectual or an abortive evocation of an antecedent civilization's universal state that we have examined up to this point, the society whose life this *revenant* has haunted has been linked through a chrysalis-church¹ with the society out of whose ashes the spectre has been conjured up. Is a chrysalis-church an indispensable officiant in the rite whereby this feat of evocation is accomplished? Or are there cases in which the ghost of an antecedent civilization's universal state has been evoked by a civilization which has been linked with its predecessor, not through a chrysalis-church constructed by the predecessor's internal proletariat, but through the predecessor's external proletariat or its dominant minority?² The answers to these questions likewise may prove to be indicated by the Carolingian clue which has just enabled us to detect an abortive evocation of a ghost of the 'Abbasid Caliphate on Iranic Muslim ground by Timur Lenk; for, in the early histories of at least three secondary civilizations derived from primary predecessors through these predecessors' external proletariats, we find polities that bear a closer apparent family likeness to Charlemagne's empire than Timur's empire displays. The polities in question are the Ch'ou Empire in Sinic history,³ the Khatti Empire in Hittite history, and the Toltec Empire in Mexic history.⁴

All these three empires resemble the Carolingian Empire in being products of barbarian interlopers who had established themselves within the former frontiers of the universal state of an antecedent civilization. All three empires also resemble the Carolingian Empire in the further point of having their political centre of gravity in regions which, in the geography of the antecedent civilization and its universal state, had

¹ This conception of the role of churches in the histories of civilizations has been examined in VII. vii. 392-419.

² Our classification of societies in which these distinctions are drawn is set out in the table IV in vol. vii, facing p. 772.

³ In the tables in vol. i, pp. 131-3 and 186, the Sinic Society has been wrongly classified as a primary civilization, in contradiction to the Sinic Society's own tradition that the Ch'ou culture was a secondary one which had been preceded by that of the Shang (*alias* Yin). Since the publication of the first three volumes of this Study in A.D. 1934, the Sinic Society's tradition about its own antecedents had been confirmed by the progress of archaeological discovery (see VI. vii. 213, n. 1).

⁴ For the Toltec Empire, see Gann, Th.: *Mexico from the Earliest Times to the Conquest* (London 1936, Lovat Dickson), pp. 34-50; Vaillant, G. C.: *The Aztecs of Mexico* (London 1950, Penguin), pp. 65-82.

been, not central, but peripheral. The geographical situation of Charlemagne's Austrasia in what had been the Rhenish march of the Roman Empire has manifest parallels in the geographical situations of these other three empires' nuclei. The Chóu Dynasty's original patrimony lay in the Wei Basin, which had been the western marchland of the Shang culture and which was to continue to play the same role in the successive histories of the Sinic and the Far Eastern Civilization.¹ The Khatti Empire's metropolitan territory lay in the former western marchland of a Sumeric universal state on the eastern fringe of the Anatolian Plateau. The Toltec Empire's capital city, Tula, lay in the former north-western hinterland of 'the First Empire' of the Mayas on the south-eastern fringe of the Mexican Plateau.

The four empires that we are comparing bear a further and more intimate resemblance to one another in being, all alike, feudal in their organization. All four were loose and unstable associations of divers peoples constituting so many separate principalities or kingdoms that were held together precariously under the never quite unchallenged overlordship of one of their number.² This ramshackle constitution was a birth-mark that was also a death-warrant; and the slow agony of the Holy Roman Empire's decline and fall, in the course of the 1,005 years and seven and a half months intervening between Charlemagne's coronation at Rome on Christmas Day A.D. 800 and Francis II's abdication at Vienna on the 6th August, 1806, has a striking parallel in Sinic history in the eight or nine hundred years³ long *dégringolade* of a Chóu Empire which received its Napoleonic *coup de grâce* in 249 B.C. at the brutal hands of the revolutionary militarist principality of Ts'in. The ninth-century collapse of the Carolingians, the eleventh-century humiliation of the Carolingians' Franconian successors by Pope Gregory VII, and the thirteenth-century overthrow of the Hohenstaufen by Pope Innocent IV, are milestones on a leisurely yet unswerving road to ruin that have their counterparts in the history of the Chóu in the successive catastrophes of 841 and 771-0 B.C.⁴

The four-hundred-years-long history of the Khatti Empire was chequered by a corresponding series of collapses and recoveries ending in the final cataclysm in the first decade of the twelfth century B.C. Though the progress of Modern Western archaeological discovery in South-West Asia during the second quarter of the twentieth century of the Christian Era had brought to light evidence indicating that a supposed blank interval of 150 or 200 years between the fall of the First Empire of Khatti and the rise of the Second Empire⁵ was the figment of

¹ See VI. vii. 212, n. 4.

² For the structure of the Toltec Empire, see Gann, op. cit., pp. 35-36 and 44. The similarity in point of structure between the Chóu Empire and the Carolingian Empire leaps to the eye when the map on p. 13 in A. Herrmann's *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935, Harvard University Press) is placed side by side with Maps No. 29 and No. 30 in K. von Spruner's and Th. Menke's *Hand-Atlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neueren Zeit* (Gotha 1880, Perthes).

³ Our estimate of the Chóu Empire's duration will differ according to whether we follow the Sinic official tradition in accepting 1122 B.C. as the date of the Chóu Dynasty's overthrow of the Shang, or whether we adopt the shorter chronology which dates this revolution *circa* 1050 B.C. (see VI. vii. 212, n. 4).

⁴ See *ibid.*

⁵ See I. i. 111.

an erroneous chronology,¹ this excision of an imaginary dark age did not invalidate the evidence indicating a break in the continuity of Hittite political history between the reign of a Telepinu who was the last emperor of the first line and the reign of a Tutkhaliya who was the first emperor of the second line—even though the time-interval between these two reigns had to be estimated, on a revised chronological reckoning, in terms of months or years instead of generations or centuries. Nor did the New Empire, once established, run its 250 years' course from the later decades of the fifteenth century to the first decade of the twelfth century without at least one muffled jolt; for the account, in the imperial archives at Boghazqal'eh, of the solution of an admittedly acute political crisis in the first decade of the fourteenth century through the association of Suppiluliuma on the imperial throne side by side with his 'father' Tutkhaliya the Weakling reads suspiciously like a notification, in the bland language of official historiography, of a change of dynasty² that would be a counterpart in Hittite history of the replacement of the Merovingians by the Carolingians in the discreetly managed Frankish dynastic revolution of A.D. 751.

These manifold and remarkable points of likeness between the Khatti, Toltec, and Chóu Empires and the Carolingian Empire lead a student of history to wonder whether they may not be due, at least in part, to some common element in the four empires' respective origins. The Chóu Empire actually represented itself as being what the Carolingian Empire likewise avowedly was; for the Chóu Empire professed to be a revival of an antecedent Shang Empire at the hands of the barbarian invaders by whom the Shang had been overthrown. This Sinic claim was duly vindicated by the progress of archaeological discovery after it had been contested at the tribunal of an arrogantly hypercritical school of latter-day Western historians; and these notoriously captious critics had never denied that the rise of the Khatti Empire had been preceded by the fall of an Empire of Sumer and Akkad which we have identified as being the Sumeric Civilization's universal state, or that an 'Old Empire' of the Mayas, which we have identified as being the Mayan universal state, had come and gone before the rise of the Empire of the Toltecs. On this showing, was it too rash a conjecture to surmise that the Toltec and Khatti Empires were not merely sequels to the Mayan and Sumerio-Akkadian Empires in the bare chronological sense, but were also deliberate attempts—such as the Chóu and Carolingian Empires were known to have been—to bring these dead predecessors back to life by a feat of necromancy?

Our survey of renaissances of political ideas, ideals, and institutions would be incomplete if we were to confine it to the foregoing consideration of diverse types of polity. This would leave still unexplained, for example, the striking contrast between the incompetence that is a common characteristic of the Chóu Empire, the Khatti Empire, and the

¹ See the Note on Chronology in vol. x, on pp. 171-212.

² See Cavaignac, E.: *Le Problème Hittite* (Paris 1936, Leroux), p. 29, and Götze, A.: *Hethiter, Churriter, und Assyrer* (Oslo 1936, Aschenhoug; London 1936, Williams & Norgate), p. 56.

Carolingian Empire and the efficiency that is a no less patent common characteristic of the T'ang Empire and the East Roman Empire. The reason why we find our array of ghosts of universal states thus sorting itself out into two conspicuously diverse types does not become apparent until we go on to observe that the political necromancers who conjured up the T'ang Empire and the East Roman Empire were not content simply to revive the styles, titles, and pretensions of the defunct universal states that they were seeking to bring back to life. In both cases they went on to give substance to these resuscitated forms by recreating the classically educated lay professional civil service which had been the life and soul of the Han Empire and the Roman Empire when these universal states had been present on Earth in the flesh.

These evocations of a ghost of the Roman imperial civil service in the East Roman Empire in and after A.D. 864¹ and a ghost of the Han imperial civil service in the T'ang Empire in and after the reign of T'ai Tsung (*imperabat* A.D. 627-49)² have already been noticed in other contexts, and in this place we have merely to observe that this renaissance of a vital human instrument of imperial administration accounts satisfactorily for the solidity which so impressively distinguishes the T'ang and the East Roman body politic³ from the general ruck of walking ghosts of universal states.⁴ We may go on to observe that the Carolingian Empire attempted, without success, to fortify itself by the less laborious expedient of investing itself with a religious sanction, symbolized in the revival of a rite which was familiar to Early Western Christian minds, more than thirteen centuries after this rite had been put out of action as a consequence of the successive falls of the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah, because the memory of it had been preserved in historical records that had come to rank among the Holy Scriptures of the Christian Church before the Church had become a chrysalis for the incubation of a nascent Western Christendom out of the mortal coils of a dead Hellenic World.

The religious sanction given to the formal revival of the Roman Empire in the West on Christmas Day, A.D. 800, when a Frankish king was created Roman Emperor in virtue of being crowned by the Pope, had no precedent in the unconstitutional history of the authentic Roman Empire, in which the Caesar-making proxy of an impotent Roman Senate and People had been, not the Clergy, but the Army.⁵ The

¹ See IV. iv. 345, with nn. 2, 3, and 4.

² See VI. vii. 357, n. 4, 365, n. 4, 369, and 370-2.

³ In previous examinations of the genesis of the East Roman Empire we have already noticed the incentive that moved its architects first to raise a defunct Roman Empire from the dead and then to clothe this phantom in flesh and blood by recreating the Roman imperial civil service. These successive feats of necromancy were Orthodox Christendom's responses to the challenge of being bombarded at point-blank range by the explosive militancy of the Primitive Muslim Arabs (see II. ii. 369 and 384-5, and IV. iv. 323).

⁴ The historical problem raised by the still more massive solidity of 'the Old Kingdom' of Egypt is discussed on pp. 682-92, below.

⁵ The religious sanction that was not only explicit but was also all-important in the consecration of Charlemagne and his successors as Holy Roman Emperors in the West had been foreshadowed, however, in the political ideology of a Later Roman Empire when the abuse of the Caesar-making power by the soldiers during a century of anarchy (*saevebat* A.D. 193-284) had revealed the full measure of the soldiers' contempt for a

ceremony performed on the 25th December, 800, at Rome had, however, a pertinent precedent in a ceremony performed at Soissons in or about November, 751,¹ when the Austrasian major-domo Pepin had been created King of the Franks in virtue of being crowned and anointed by Pope Zacharias' representative Saint Boniface, and this consecration of Pepin, which had been recelebrated by Pope Stephen II in person at Saint Denis on the 28th July,² 754, was a Western Christian rite—already customary by that time in Visigothia—which was the revival of an Israelite institution commemorated in the Books of Samuel and Kings.

'There can be no question that its ultimate origin is to be found in the Old Testament, where it embodies the theocratic principle and the dependence of the secular power on the spiritual power of the prophet, as we see in the case of Samuel anointing David in place of Saul,³ and in the even more dramatic story of Eliseus's [Elisha's] mission to anoint Jehu as king to destroy the house of Ahab.⁴ In both of these cases the prophet as the representative of God intervenes to change the course of History by transferring the kingship to a new line, and we can hardly doubt that these precedents were in the minds of the Pope and Saint Boniface and the advisers of King Pepin when the new rite was introduced.'⁵

This Western Christian renaissance of an Israelite institution did not avail to give the Carolingian Empire the durability of its more solidly constructed East Roman counterpart and rival, but the unavailing resuscitated Syriac rite was nevertheless to play an historic part in the Western World's political life.

'Henceforward it was to be a characteristic feature of Western kingship, so that the chrism or oil of consecration was held to confer a new sacred character on the person of the ruler. . . . The evolution of the English coronation rite takes us back with hardly any serious gaps to its Carolingian origins.'⁶

(b) RENAISSANCES OF SYSTEMS OF LAW

In proceeding with our survey of renaissances in divers fields of activity, we may now pass on from the province of political ideas, ideals, and institutions to the province of Law, in which the realities of ordinary life are reflected more faithfully than they are in Politics.

living god who was their own creature. This fearful experience had given birth to the idea that a divine ruler whose divinity could be liquidated by killing its human incarnation was more vulnerable than a ruler who did not profess to be more than a mortal himself, but who did claim to be the chosen instrument and protégé of a god whom the soldiers could neither assassinate nor intimidate, because this divine patron of a human ruler who was His vicegerent on Earth was Himself invisible and intangible. 'Aurelian . . . used to say that the soldiers deceived themselves in supposing that the destinies of the Emperors lay in their hands. For he used to aver that it was God who had bestowed the purple and . . . had decided the period of his reign' (*Auctor Anonymus post Dionem*, quoted in V. v. 649, n. 4).

¹ See Hodgkin, *Th.: Italy and her Invaders*, vol. vii (Oxford 1899, Clarendon Press), p. 134, n. 2.

² Doubt is cast upon this date by Hodgkin, *ibid.*, pp. 230-1; but it rests on the authority of an abbot of Saint Denis—the scene of the ceremony—who died only sixty years after the event.

³ 1 Sam. xvi. 1-13.

⁴ 2 Kings ix. 1-10.

⁵ Dawson, Christopher: *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), pp. 85-86.

⁶ Dawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 85 and 92.

We have seen that, after a post-Hellenic interregnum had declared itself on the political plane in the break-up of a unitary Roman Empire into a mosaic of indigenous and barbarian successor-states, the emergence of two new Hellenistic Christian civilizations found its political expression in attempts to raise the Roman Empire from the dead.¹ On the legal plane, as we have also noticed already in other contexts, a Roman Law, which, in the course of ten centuries ending in Justinian's generation, had been slowly and laboriously elaborated to meet the complicated requirements of a sophisticated oecumenical Hellenic Society,² was swiftly left stranded³—and this in the comparatively robust Centre and East, as well as in the sickly West, of a collapsing Hellenic World—by the rapid obsolescence of the whole way of life to which the Roman Law had come to be so nicely geared. Thereafter, the symptoms of decay and death were followed in due course by manifestations of fresh life on the legal, as on the political, plane; but, in a nascent Orthodox Christendom and a nascent Western Christendom alike, the impulse to provide a live law for a living society did not find its first vent in any move to reanimate a Roman Law that, in the eighth century of the Christian Era, was sitting perched, far above contemporary heads, on a pinnacle of the mighty mausoleum of an extinct Hellenic culture, like Noah's Ark when the subsidence of the Flood had left that now superfluous house-boat high and dry on the inaccessible summit of Mount Ararat. In the legal sphere the first move in both these new worlds was, not to raise a ghost, but to perform an act of creation. Each of these two Christian societies demonstrated the sincerity of its belief in a Christian dispensation by attempting to create a Christian Law for a would-be Christian people. In both Christendoms, however, this new departure in a would-be Christian direction was followed by a renaissance, first of the Israelitish law that was latent in Christianity's Scriptural heritage from Jewry, and then of a Justinianean Law which floated clear again when the level at which it had been stranded was reached by these resurgent civilizations' rising waters.

In Orthodox Christendom the Christian new departure was announced, in the joint reign of the two Syrian founders of the East Roman Empire, Leo III and his son Constantine V, in the promulgation, in March, A.D. 740,⁴ of 'a Christian law book' which was 'a deliberate attempt to change the legal system of the Empire by an application of Christian principles'.⁵ This revolutionary work was published under the conservative title of 'A Selection (ἐκλογή), in Abridgment, of the Institutes, Digest, Code, and Novels of the Great Justinian'; but its two imperial promulgators showed their hand and gave notice of their aspirations by adding in the same breath that the work was 'also a Rectification in the Direction of Greater Humanity (καὶ ἐπιδιόρθωσις εἰς τὸ φιλανθρωπότερον)'; and, in the first paragraph of the preface, the

¹ See pp. 9-15, above.

² See III. iii. 266, n. 1, and VI. vii. 279-80.

³ For the date, see P. Collinet in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1923, University Press), p. 708.

⁵ Bury, J. B., in his edition of Edward Gibbon: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Editio Minor, vol. v (London 1901, Methuen), Appendix 11, p. 526.

² See VI. vii. 265-8.

source of law was declared to be (not legislation enacted by the Roman People but) revelation vouchsafed by God, and the sanction of law to be (not human enforcement but) divine retribution.

'Our God who is the lord and maker of all things, the creator of Man who has endowed Man with the privilege of free will, has (in the language of prophecy) given Man, to help him, a law in which God has made known to Man everything that Man ought to do and to shun. The conduct prescribed by the law is to be adopted because it is a passport to salvation (*ὡς σωτηρίας ὄντα πρόξενον*); the conduct prohibited by the law is to be eschewed because it brings punishment on the transgressor. No one who keeps these commandments or who—save the mark—disregards them will fail to receive the appropriate recompense for his deeds of whatever character. For it is God who has proclaimed both the positive and the negative commandments in advance [of the human legislator]; and the power of God's words—a power that knows no variation and that rewards every man's works according to their deserts—shall (in gospel language) not pass away.'

This passage and its sequel drew the following pertinent comment from a Modern Western historian who was equally conversant with an East Roman and an Hellenic mental environment:

'What especially strikes one who is accustomed to the language of Gaius or Tribonian is the ecclesiastical note which characterises both the preface and other parts of the *Ecloga*. The point of view of the old Roman jurists had been almost completely lost, and the spirit of Roman Law had been transformed in the religious atmosphere of Christendom. Men tried now to base jurisdiction on Revelation, and to justify laws by verses of Scripture.'¹

A Modern Western student of the *Ecloga*, if asked how far, in his opinion, its authors were justified in their claim to have humanized the Justinianean Law, would perhaps place his finger first on the mitigation, here at last, of the barbaric native Roman institution of the *Patria Potestas*,² after this enormity had successfully resisted all the expurgatory efforts of cultivated jurisconsults, steeped in the humane atmosphere of the Hellenic schools of philosophy, who had laboured, over a span of four centuries or more ending in the Severan Age,³ to render an archaic Roman Law worthy of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization that had been constrained to receive this antiquated legal dispensation as

¹ Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene* (395 A.D. to 800 A.D.), 1st ed. (London 1889, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 414.

² 'The *Patria Potestas* still holds an important place in the Justinianean Law, although the rights which it gave the father over the children were small indeed compared with the absolute control which had been enjoyed in ancient times. The tendency was to diminish these rights and to modify the stern conception of *Patria Potestas* by substituting the conception of a more paternalistic and less absolute authority (promoted by Christianity) in its place. The two most important points in the later transformation of the *Patria Potestas* were (1) its conversion into a parental *potestas*, the mother being recognized as having the same rights and duties as the father (thus her consent, as well as the father's, is necessary for the contraction of a marriage), and (2) the increased facilities for emancipation when the child came to years of discretion; emancipation seems to have been effected by the act of setting up a separate establishment. These principles were established by the Iconoclasts' (Bury, J. B., Appendix 11 to his minor edition of Gibbon's History, vol. v, p. 528).

³ See VI. vii. 262-3 and 265-8.

a consequence of Rome's conquest of the Hellenic World. If asked, next, which was the chapter in which the influence of Christianity on the *Ecloga* was most conspicuous, the Modern Western student would assuredly have singled out the chapter on Marriage; for in this field the fundamental principles of the Roman Law, which, 'as accepted and interpreted by Justinian, laid down that no bond between human beings was indissoluble, and that separation of husband and wife was a private act, requiring no judicial permission',¹ were overridden in the *Ecloga* by provisions embodying the irreconcilably different Christian view² that marriage was a partnership for life and that to remarry after being divorced was to commit adultery.³ These would not, however, have been the answers that the same two questions would have been likely to receive from Orthodox Christians, either jurists or laymen, in any

¹ Bury, Appendix, p. 527.

² The 'lofty conception of family life' (Collinet, op. cit., p. 709), which the authors of the *Ecloga* had imbibed from Christianity, had, of course, been derived by the Christian Church from a Jewry that had been its matrix. The very passage in the Gospels (Matt. xix. 3-9; Mark x. 2-9) criticizing the facility with which a husband could divorce his wife according to the provisions of the Deuteronomic Code (Deut. xxiv. 1) was an echo of domestic controversies within the bosom of a Jewry which had morally outgrown the Deuteronomic dispensation by the beginning of the Christian Era. This high standard in the sphere of family relations had been one of the most striking features by which the social life of the Jews in the diaspora had been distinguished, to its credit, from the contemporary life of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Society in which the Jews had come to be dispersed abroad, and from which the vast majority of the converts to Christianity had subsequently been drawn. The fifth and seventh chapters of Saint Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians bear witness to the difficulty of inducing Hellene Gentile Christians to rise, in this sphere, to contemporary Jewish standards. These standards were learnt from Judaism by Christianity at first hand, in the generation of the first Hellenic Gentile converts; and later generations of Gentile Christians, who might have been loath in any case to recognize that a Christian virtue had a Jewish origin, were the more easily able to forget their ethical debt to Jewry in the sphere of family relations because, in the canon of Scripture which the Church had taken over from Jewry as Christianity's 'Old Testament', the principles and practice of a post-Exilic Judaism in this province of life figured far less prominently than the luxuriant polygamy that had been the rule among the Israelite ancestors in their heroic age in the days of the dissolution of 'the New Empire' of Egypt and the founding of the Minoan World.

It was left for the Latter-day Saints of the Mormon Church and other nineteenth-century sects of Protestant Christian origin in the New World to carry their Bibliolatry to the point of making a law unto themselves out of the polygamy of the Hebrew Patriarchs as portrayed in the Book of Genesis. These un-ironic-minded 'Bible Christians' do not seem to have taken cognisance of the significant historical fact that the particular Biblical way of family life to which they were piously harking back had by this date been eschewed by the Jews for twenty-four Post-Exilic centuries, at the shortest reckoning.

The tale of centuries would be twenty-five if it could be accepted as an established finding of Modern Western scholarship that a passage in 2 Kings (xxii. 3-xxiii. 25) is to be interpreted as implying that the Book of Deuteronomy was promulgated, under show of being rediscovered, in a Pre-Exilic Kingdom of Judah in the eighteenth year of the reign of King Josiah, i.e. in the year 621 B.C. (see Smith, J. M. P.: *The Origin and History of Hebrew Law* (Chicago 1931, University of Chicago Press), pp. 39-40); for a comparison of the stipulation in the Book of Deuteronomy, xvii. 17—'Neither shall he [the King] multiply wives to himself, that his heart turn not away; neither shall he greatly multiply to himself silver and gold'—with the account, in 1 Kings xi. 1-8, of the luxuriant idolatry into which King Solomon had been led astray by his luxuriant polygamy, indicates that, between Solomon's day and Josiah's, a Solomonian polygamy, which had been as costly to the Israelite tax-payer as its religious sequel had been abominable in the sight of the strict worshipper of Yahweh, had produced in Judah a disapproval of polygamy in high places which was bound after, if not before, the fall of the monarchy to broaden into a disapproval of polygamy in itself.

³ 'The influence of the ecclesiastical view of Marriage as a *consortium vitae* can be seen too in the treatment of the property of the married partners' (Bury, *ibid.*; cp. Collinet, in op. cit., p. 709).

generation from the age of the authors of the *Ecloga* themselves down to the time of writing. Orthodox Christians, if thus interrogated, would have been apt to answer that the most humane and, on this evidence, the most Christian, chapter of the *Ecloga* was Chapter Seventeen, which lays down the penalties for crimes.

"The tendency of the *Ecloga* was to avoid capital punishment as far as possible. . . . Its distinguishing feature is the use of mutilation as a mode of punishment¹—a penalty unknown in Roman Law. . . . Since mutilation was generally ordained in cases where the penalty had formerly been death, the law-givers could certainly claim that their code was more lenient. . . . [But] we may question whether this tendency was due so much to the growth of feelings of humanity as to ecclesiastical motives, namely the active maintenance of the asylum privileges of Christian sanctuaries, and the doctrine of repentance."²

Whatever the origins of this tendency to substitute mutilation for capital punishment may have been,³ it was certainly a radical new departure which had a profound and an enduring effect on the Orthodox Christian ethos; but, when a new departure in the domain of Law was inspired by a Christian theology which placed the Old Testament on a par with the New Testament at the infinite altitude of absolute authoritativeness which was the self-evident prerogative of all Scriptures that were accepted as being the divinely revealed Word of God, it was almost inevitable that the birth of a new Christian law should be followed by a renaissance of the latent law of an Israel to which the Christian Church had insisted on affiliating itself by the compromising act of including the Books of the Law and the Prophets among Christianity's spiritual *impedimenta*.

When we count up the references or allusions to the Bible in the pre-

¹ The table of penalties in *Ecloga*, chap. 17, is summarized in Bury, Appendix, p. 529.—A.J.T.

² Bury, Appendix, p. 529, following Zachariä von Lingenthal, K. E.: *Geschichte des Griechisch-Römischen Rechts* (Berlin 1892, Weidmann), pp. 330-3. When the writer of this Study was making the present footnote on the 10th March, 1950, he had at one elbow Bury's own copy of this work of Zachariä von Lingenthal's, marked with the notes in pencil, from Bury's hand, which the English historian had eventually used in writing his own appendix on Graeco-Roman Law, while at his other elbow he had the copy of the volume of Bury's edition of Gibbon, containing this appendix, which had been given to the writer by his Mother forty-five years back. The impression which this appendix had made on his mind at his first reading of it in A.D. 1905 had lost none of its vividness during the time that had passed between his receipt of this impression and his utilization of it.

³ One source of this new type of punishment seems to have been existing customary practice. 'The Roman magistrates seem to have made occasional use of such discretion as was allowed to them in the determination of punishments in order to inflict punishments' consisting of some form of mutilation (Zachariä von Lingenthal, op. cit., p. 331; cp. Collinet, op. cit., pp. 709-10). Zachariä von Lingenthal (op. cit., p. 332) throws out the conjecture that the authors of the *Ecloga* may have been influenced by an exhortation—thrice repeated in the Gospels (Matt. v. 29-30; Matt. xviii. 8-9; Mark x. 43-47)—to cut off or pluck out a hand, foot, eye, or other offending member rather than condemn oneself to be cast into hell fire un mutilated. This remains no more than a guess, since none of these texts is actually cited in the *Ecloga*; but, if Orthodox Christian legislators did indeed take literally a piece of Primitive Christian poetry in which the problems of the Soul are approached in terms of physical symbolism, this unfortunate misinterpretation would be analogous, in its solemn innocence of irony, to the fortunate misinterpretation of Ovid's cynical prescriptions for the conduct of sordid amours which was one source of the Medieval Western troubadours' ideal of Romantic Love (see Lewis, C. S.: *The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition* (Oxford 1936, Clarendon Press)).

face to the *Ecloga*, we find that the Old Testament is cited half as many times again as the New Testament.¹ It is true that all the six citations from the Old Testament are taken from 'the Prophets' (in the comprehensive traditional Jewish usage of that label) and not from 'the Law'; and the Prophet Amos seems to have been especially venerated by Leo Syrus, to judge by the fact that this emperor not only cited one text from the Book of Amos in the preface to the *Ecloga* but also reproduced another² in mosaic over the chancel arch of the church of Saint Eirênê at Constantinople when he rebuilt it after a fire.³ Yet, in this Orthodox Christian evocation of the Old Testament in the field of Law, it was inevitable that, in the long run, 'the Law', and not 'the Prophets', should prevail; and, sure enough, an *Ecloga Legis Mosaicae* eventually made its appearance in the corpus of an *Ecloga ad Procheirum Mutata* derived from an *Ecloga Privata* which was itself an emanation from the original *Ecloga* promulgated by the Emperors Leo and Constantine in A.D. 740.⁴

If there is truth in the proverb that 'coming events cast their shadows before them', we should not be surprised to find in the original *Ecloga* some unacknowledged influence of a Mosaic Law that, in the gradual development of East Roman legislation, was to take perhaps as many as four centuries to rise naked to the surface; and, if we apply this clue to our search for the original inspiration of the *Ecloga*'s revolutionary partiality for punishments in the form of mutilations, commended as 'humanitarian' substitutes for the death penalty, we may come to the conclusion that the eighth-century legislator is more likely to have been inspired by a correctly literal interpretation of the *Lex Talionis*⁵ as enunciated in 'the Covenant Code'⁶ of the *Corpus Mosaicum* than by an

¹ The passages cited from the New Testament are 1 Pet. i. 17; 1 Pet. v. 2; Luke xvi. 17; John vii. 24. Those cited from the Old Testament are Isa. viii. 20; Ps. lviii. 1-2 [in the Septuagint's version: Ps. lvii. 2-3]; Eccl. vii. 4 and 6; 1 Kings iii. 16-28; Isa. v. 23-24; Amos ii. 6.

² Amos ix. 6.

³ See Freshfield, E. H.: *Roman Law in the Late Roman Empire* (Cambridge 1932, Bowes & Bowes), p. 46.

⁴ See Collinet, op. cit., p. 717.

⁵ The possibility that, in this point, the *Ecloga* may owe an unacknowledged debt to the *Corpus Mosaicum* comes to look almost like a positive probability when we observe that the contrast between the *Ecloga* and the *Corpus Iustinianum* in the matter of their respective philosophies of punishment had been anticipated by a corresponding contrast between Israel's 'Covenant Code' and the Sumeric Code of Hammurabi. 'The Code of Hammurabi is much the more severe of the two and uses the penalty of capital punishment to a much greater extent' (Smith, J. M. P.: *The Origin and History of Hebrew Law* (Chicago 1931, University of Chicago Press), p. 20, quoted already in VI. vii. 293, n. 1). On the other hand 'the rectification in the direction of greater humanity' which 'the Covenant Code', like the *Ecloga*, introduced in its departures from the provisions of the latest code of an antecedent civilization largely consisted, in the earlier case as well as in the later, in the replacement of the death penalty by various forms of mutilation: 'Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe' (Exod. xxi. 24-25).

We may also observe that the Code of Hammurabi and the *Corpus Iustinianum* agreed with one another on a further point of common difference from the Mosaic Law and the *Ecloga* alike. 'The second decalogue of "the Covenant Code" (Exod. xxi. 12-27) deals with personal injuries. The Code of Hammurabi deals with the same class of offences (§§ 195-214). The greater number of the laws in Hammurabi's Code is due in part to the fact that the fine or penalty is graded according to the social and economic rank of the one injured' (Smith, op. cit., pp. 21-22). Correspondingly, 'it is worth while to observe in the *Ecloga* a democratic feature which marks a real advance, in the interests of justice, on the Justinianean code. The *Ecloga* metes out the same penalties to poor and rich, whereas the older law had constantly ordained different punishments for the same offence, according to the rank and fortune of the offender' (Bury, Appendix, p. 530).

⁶ Exod. xxi. 23-25.

incorrectly literal interpretation of a piece of poetic symbolism in the New Testament.¹

In contrast to the gradualness and unselfconsciousness of this renaissance of the Mosaic Law out of an Orthodox Christian Law's Israelite Scriptural heritage, the renaissance of the Roman Law out of Orthodox Christendom's own Hellenic antecedents² was both selfconscious and abrupt. In the preface to 'the Handbook' (ὁ πρόχειρος νόμος) promulgated between the years A.D. 870 and A.D. 879 by the founder of the Macedonian Dynasty of East Roman Emperors, Basil I, in conjunction with his sons and colleagues Constantine and Leo (VI), the new legislators gave notice³ that the *Ecloga* was hereby abrogated, not indeed entirely, 'but to the requisite extent' (ἀλλ' ὅσον ὠφείλεν), while, in the preface to a subsequent draft for a second edition (ἐπαναγωγή) of 'the Handbook' which was published between the years A.D. 879 and A.D. 886 in the names of the Emperors Basil I, Leo VI, and Alexander, notice was given that 'Our Imperial Majesty . . . has totally (πάντη) rejected and scrapped the imbecilities promulgated by the Isaurians⁴ in defiance of the . . . Divine Dogma and to the undoing of the salutary laws'.

The *odium theologicum* which the Macedonian Emperors here advertise as their motive for setting themselves the task of superseding their Syrian predecessors' legislation either partially or completely might perhaps not have been a sufficiently powerful motive in itself to nerve them for the formidable positive enterprise of resuscitating the Justinianean Law if they had not already found their hands being forced by the mounting pressure of practical needs arising from an increasing complication and sophistication of life in the body social of a then rapidly advancing Orthodox Christian Civilization. The relatively simple 'Selection' that had satisfied the legal requirements of the nascent Orthodox Christendom of the eighth century of the Christian Era was inadequate to meet the additional demands made on the Law by the cumulative effect of a subsequent 130 years and more of social progress; and we may conjecture that, even if the Syrian Dynasty had not identified itself with Iconoclasm, or, alternatively, if the Iconoclastic Movement which the Syrian Emperors did promote had never been reversed by an Iconodule reaction, a ninth-century East Roman Imperial Government would still have found in a resuscitation of the Justinianean Law the most obvious method open to them for providing a more advanced Orthodox Christian Society with the more subtle legal apparatus which had now become one of its crying needs. In any case—whatever may have been the respective parts played by practical necessity and religious animus in stimulating the Macedonian legislators to engage in necromancy—their two preliminary experiments in the Black Art, of which 'the Handbook' and 'the Second Edition' were the trophies, were followed up promptly by the promulgation, circa A.D. 888–90,⁵ of 'the Imperial Decisions' (τὰ βασιλικά) in no less than sixty books, and tardily⁶

¹ See p. 25, n. 3, above.

² *Procheirum*. Preface, § 2.

³ i.e., by the Emperors of the Syrian Dynasty.—A.J.T.

⁴ For the date, see Collinet, op. cit., p. 713.

⁵ Constantine IX (X) Monomákhos's Law School had the same ironic fate as the

² See IX. viii. 103.

by the foundation of an Imperial School of Law at Constantinople in A.D. 1045.¹

The ninth-century Vasilican ghost of a sixth-century *Corpus Iustinianum* resembles its original in presenting an imposing first appearance which it is incapable of sustaining under closer examination. The only touch of originality in the codificatory work of the Emperor Leo VI is his substitution, in the *Vasiliká*, of a single unitary system of classification for Justinian's dispersion among four works (Code, Digest, Institutes, and Novels) of materials concerning the same subjects.² But

'within the titles, the laws (or chapters) are not the personal work of Leo; their text was in no way revised by the commissioners for the Basilics. They were all drawn from earlier works, chiefly from the Code and the Digest, a very few from the Institutes, many from the Novels of Justinian and his successors, a few also from the *Procheiron*. The laws are all given in Greek; when they are derived from the three Latin works of Justinian, they have been extracted, not from the originals, but from Greek commentaries of the sixth and seventh centuries.'³

To quarrel with a renaissance for being unoriginal is a criticism that might perhaps be discounted as captious; but the ineffectiveness that is another characteristic of the Macedonian Dynasty's attempt to reinstate the Roman Law is a more serious weakness; for a ghost, after all, is only distinguishable from a nonentity in so far as he succeeds in making an impression on the living men and women whom he haunts. The ninth-century renaissance of Roman Law in Orthodox Christendom showed itself conspicuously impotent to supersede in reality the Iconoclast Emperors' new Christian Law which it was abrogating verbally, and even impotent to exorcise the rival ghost of a Mosaic Law which was re-emerging out of the Christian Law's Pentateuchal crypt.

It is significant that the Iconodule legislator Basil I's 'Handbook' (*πρόχειρος νόμος*) 'in its second part also reproduced the provisions of the *Ecloga*, in spite of the abuse of its authors in the prologue,'⁴ and that in Basil's 'Second Edition' (*ἐπαναγωγή*), which professed to have abolished the *Ecloga*, no longer just partially, but entirely, the *Ecloga* was actually followed even more closely than it had been in 'the Handbook'.⁵ The strength of the *Ecloga*, in its encounter with a resuscitated Roman Law, lay in the fact that the *Ecloga* was a faithful reflection of the Orthodox Christian *êthos*—partly because it had successfully caught

Emperor Justinian's codification. The work had no sooner been accomplished than it was left high and dry by a catastrophe that swept away a complicated and sophisticated social life which was both the *raison d'être* and the *sine qua non* of a refined legal apparatus. The foundation of the East Roman Imperial Law School in A.D. 1045 was followed within twenty-six years by the simultaneous military disasters at Bari and Manzikert (Melazkert) in A.D. 1071 which heralded the débâcle, not only of the East Roman Empire, but of the Orthodox Christian Civilization (see IV. iv. 354, n. 2), just as the completion of Justinian's codificatory work in A.D. 529 had been followed within sixty-eight years by the débâcle heralded by the assassination of the Emperor Maurice in A.D. 602 (see VI. vii. 270).

¹ See Collinet, op. cit., pp. 719–20, and the present Study, IV. iv. 345.

² See Collinet, *ibid.*, p. 713.

³ Collinet, *ibid.*, p. 713.

⁴ Collinet, *ibid.*, p. 712.

⁵ See Zachariä von Lingenthal, C. E.: *Collectio Librorum Juris Graeco-Romani In-
editorum: Ecloga Leonis et Constantini; Epanagogê Basilii, Leonis et Alexandri* (Leipzig
1852, Barth), p. 62, n. 16.

the Byzantine spirit and partly also, no doubt, because it had done so much to make that spirit what it had come to be—whereas the Hellenic spirit expressed in the Late Roman Law was an alien presence in an Orthodox Christian environment. In the Law of Marriage, for example, 'Basil returned to the Justinianean system, but the doctrine of the *Ecloga* seems to have so firmly established itself in custom that Leo VI found it necessary to make a compromise and introduced a new system which was a mixture of the Iconoclastic and the Justinianean doctrines.'¹ Basil had a similar experience when he sought to undo his Syrian predecessors' beneficent work of humanizing the barbaric Roman institution of the *Patria Potestas*.² In this sphere, likewise, 'Basil revived the Justinianean legislation; here, however, as in many other cases, the letter of Basil's law books was not fully adopted in practice, and was modified by a novel of Leo VI which restored partly the law of the *Ecloga*'.³ As for the criminal law, 'here the system established by the *Ecloga* is retained in most cases, and sometimes developed further',⁴ against the grain of a Macedonian legislation which was consciously striving to depose the Iconoclast legislators and to reinstate Justinian.

'The system of punishments provided in the *Ecloga* continued on the whole to set the standard for later ages. The relevant passages of the *Ecloga* are for the most part incorporated into the *Procheiron*, into the *Epanagoge*, and even into the *Vasilika*, some of them *verbatim*, some in rather different language or in a slightly modified form—though it is at the same time also true that the *Ecloga*'s system of punishments is not retained or applied in its purity. The penal chapters of the [Justinianean] Digest and Code have on the whole also found their way into the *Vasilika*, with the result that the *Vasilika*—particularly in contexts in which they are concerned with crimes or misdemeanours not expressly dealt with in the *Ecloga*—prescribe the old [Roman] punishments which frequently contradict the spirit of the new system.'⁵

The vigour with which this would-be Christian spirit continued to assert itself against the would-be Roman spirit of an imperious Justinian's impotent ghost is betrayed in a sentence in the preface to the *Epanagoge* leading up to the passage, quoted above,⁶ in which the Macedonian legislators denounce their Syrian predecessors and all their legal works.

'The experience by which Our Majesty has been aroused and stimulated to bestir itself to retrieve and proclaim the good world-saving law with the utmost zeal and utmost care is what we can only describe as our initiation in the secret chambers of the heart by the divine intervention of the Trinity in Unity (ἐκ τῆς φύσικῆς μοναρχίας καὶ τριαδικῆς δεσποτείας . . . θείως πως καὶ ἀπορρήτως μνηθεῖσα).'

Thus, though the Macedonian Emperors were bent on reinstating a Roman Law that had been disestablished—wrongfully, in their belief—by the preceding Syrian Emperors' innovations, it never occurred to

¹ Bury, Appendix, p. 527.

² Bury, Appendix, p. 528.

³ Zachariä von Lingenthal, K. E.: *Geschichte des Griechisch-Römischen Rechts* (Berlin 1892, Weidmann), pp. 333-4.

⁴ See p. 23, n. 2, above.

⁵ Bury, *ibid.*

⁶ On p. 27.

these Iconodules, any more than it would have occurred to their Iconoclast bugbears, to look for the sanction of Law in autonomous acts of human volition. As a matter of historical fact, the Roman Law, whose champions the Macedonian Emperors professed to be, had been the man-made product of a well-documented series of legislative acts performed first by the Roman People in their lawfully constituted assemblies and latterly by Emperors to whom the People had formally delegated their legislative power. Yet, in defiance of all recorded Roman legal history, the Macedonians showed themselves true Orthodox Christians in displaying a veritably 'Isaurian' inability to imagine that any law could be validated by any other sanction than the ordinance of a God who had 'given Man a good law to salvage and blend and preserve' a Human Nature in which the polar and antithetical elements of spirit and matter had been combined and compounded by the Creator.¹ In other words, 'the salutary law' which the Macedonians were vindicating against the Iconoclasts was founded, in the Macedonians' belief likewise, on 'the divine dogma', and their quarrel with these Syrian predecessors of theirs was a family quarrel in which the opposing theses that were championed with so much zeal and bitterness by their respective advocates were two closely related variants of one identical Orthodox Christian creed.

The plot of a legal drama in which a Christian new departure was dogged by the successively raised ghosts of Moses and Justinian can be seen likewise working itself out on a Western stage on which Leo Syrus's role was played by Charlemagne.

'The Carolingian legislation . . . marks the emergence of the new social consciousness of Western Christendom. Hitherto the legislation of the Western kingdoms had been of the nature of a Christian appendix to the old barbarian tribal codes. Now, for the first time, a complete break was made with the Past, and Christendom enacted its own laws, which covered the whole field of social activity in Church and State and referred all things to the single standard of the Christian *êthos*. This was inspired neither by Germanic nor [by] Roman precedent.'²

In Western, as in Orthodox, Christendom, however, the ghost of Moses trod hard on the Apostles' and Evangelists' heels.

'The Carolingian Emperors gave the law to the whole Christian people in the spirit of the kings and judges of the Old Testament, declaring the Law of God to the people of God. In the letter which Cathaulf addressed to Charles at the beginning of his reign, the writer speaks of the king as the earthly representative of God, and he counsels Charles to use the Book of Divine Law as his manual of government, according to the precept of Deuteronomy xvii. 18-20, which commands the King to make a copy of the Law from the books of the priests, to keep it always with him, and to read it constantly, so that he may learn to fear the Lord and keep

¹ 'Ο τῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντων πρῦτανις καὶ ταμιοῦχος εἰς βουλευθείς, μετὰ τὴν τῶν νοσητῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν ποίησιν, μικτῶν [MSS. μικτόν] τε κοινὸν σύνδεσμον [MSS. σύνδεστον] καὶ τύπον κοινὸν τῶν ἀντικειμένων καὶ ἀντιθέτων φύσεων παράγει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, νόμον αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν δοῦς ὡς ἀνάγκησιν τινα καὶ κρᾶσιν καὶ διαμονὴν τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως.—*Epanagoge*, Preface, as emended by Zachariä von Lingenthal.

² Dawson, Christopher: *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), p. 90.

Yet, in Western, as in Orthodox, Christendom, a resurgent Moses was overtaken by a resurgent Justinian.

In the course of the eleventh century of the Christian Era the Imperial Law School established by official action at Constantinople in A.D. 1045² found its counterpart in Western Christendom at Bologna in the spontaneous emergence there of an autonomous university dedicated to the study of the Justinianean *Corpus Iuris*;³ and the effect of this Western renaissance of the Roman Law was not confined to the abortive attempt—which was the Bolognese necromancers' first essay in the practical application of their art—to use the Constantinopolitan Roman Imperial Prerogative, in the form in which it had emerged from Justinian's hands, as a legal weapon to reinforce the armaments of Hohenstaufen Emperors in their twelfth-century renewal of the Holy Roman Empire's eleventh-century struggle with the Papacy.⁴ Though in Western Christendom—in contrast to the course of Orthodox Christian history—a resuscitated Roman Law thus failed to serve the political purpose of under-pinning a resuscitated Roman Empire, it did potently serve the different political purpose of fostering the revival, on Western ground, of an earlier Hellenic political institution: the sovereign independent parochial state.⁵

In Western Christendom's sinister evocation of this formidable ghost of political parochialism from a defunct antecedent civilization's dead past, the graduates of the University of Bologna played parts comparable to those played in the evocation of ghosts of dead universal states by the

² See p. 28, above.

3 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
4 Bury conjectures (Appendix, p. 526) that the foundation of the Constantinopolitan Law School in A.D. 1045 'may have possibly had some influence on the institution of the school at Bologna half a century later'. This is perhaps unlikely, considering the mutual hostility of Western and Orthodox Christendom towards one another in that age. It is true that the Romagna, of which Bologna was the principal city, had been, as was attested by its name, the last fragment of Italy to pass out of the political jurisdiction of a Roman Imperial Government at Constantinople. Yet in A.D. 1045 little less than three centuries had elapsed since the Constantinopolitan Government's definitive loss of the Exarchate in A.D. 751 (see VII, p. 103). There is no ground for supposing that in the eleventh century the Romagna had not long since lost its familiarity with the Orthodox Christian World which Venice and Amalfi then still retained thanks to the importance of the part played in their economies by their trade with the Levant. This negative conclusion does not, of course, imply that the location of the earliest and greatest Western school of Justinianean Law at Bologna was nothing more than a geographical accident. It was assuredly not an accident that the study of the Justinianean Law in the West should have radiated from the principal city of an Italian province in which this law had been in force, *de facto* as well as *de jure*, for little less than two centuries running from the systematic reincorporation of Italy into the Constantinopolitan Roman body politic, after the final liquidation of an Ostrogoth resistance movement in A.D. 553, down to the final loss of the Ravennese Exarchate by the East Roman Emperor Constantine V in A.D. 751 (if we may assume that the *Ecloga* had not had time to supplant the *Corpus Iustinianum* in the Exarchate during the eleven years that had elapsed since its promulgation in A.D. 740). Those two centuries of practical familiarity with the *Corpus Iustinianum* must have enabled this version of the Roman Law to strike far deeper roots in 'the' Romagna than in an adjacent Po Basin which had been converted from a Romania into a Lombardia at intervals ranging from a period of no more than fifteen to a period of no more than fifty years (A.D. 568-603) after the date of the integral reincorporation of Italy into the Constantinopolitan Roman Empire in A.D. 553.

⁴ See IV. iv. 557; VII. vii. 539; and p. 9, above.

⁵ The Western renaissance of this Hellenic political institution has been noticed on pp. 7-8, above.

graduates of the East Roman academy founded by the Caesar Bardas at Constantinople *circa* A.D. 864¹ and the corresponding Far Eastern academy that the T'ang Emperor T'ai Tsung brought into existence at Si Ngan when in A.D. 622 he reinstituted the Han imperial régime's system of competitive examinations in the Confucian Classics as the method of selecting new recruits for the Imperial Civil Service.² The civil lawyers educated by Bologna and her daughter universities became the administrators, not of an abortive 'Holy Roman Empire', but of parochial sovereign states on Western ground, and the efficiency of their professional services was one of the secrets of this other resuscitated Hellenic political institution's progressive victory over all the alternative forms of political organization that were latent in Western Christendom's original social structure.

This victory was not won exclusively by the labours of the doctors of civil law whom Bologna began to breed in the generation of the pioneer Western civil lawyer, Irnerius (*florebat circa* A.D. 1090-1130). While the Bolognese civilians were providing the cities of North and Central Italy with administrators whose competence enabled the nascent communes to cut loose from their post-Carolingian prince-bishops' apron-strings and launch out upon a career of civic self-government,³ the canonists, who were able to supplement the Bolognese school of civil law with a sister faculty of ecclesiastical law after the publication of Gratian's encyclopaedic *Decretum circa* A.D. 1140-50, made an indirect and unintentional contribution to the development of the Western Parochial Secular State in the course of their purposive organization of a Western Oecumenical Church under the sovereignty of the Papacy; and this unforeseen and unintended appropriation of the fruits of the Medieval Western canon lawyers' labours for the benefit of the Modern Western parochial sovereign states, that were eventually built out of the ruins of a fallen Medieval Western Papal Commonwealth,⁴ is one of the ironies of history; for in A.D. 1268, on the morrow of the cold-blooded execution of the last of the Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen's heirs, it looked as if the perpetuation of this thirteenth-century triumph of a Western Papal commonwealth designed and built by Bolognese canonists had been assured by the now manifestly irretrievable overthrow of a Western oecumenical empire which the twelfth-century Bolognese civilians had vainly aspired to fortify by lending Justinianean flesh and blood to a Carolingian wraith.

On the Papal side in a struggle between the Papal Church and the Hohenstaufen Dynasty which had lasted for a hundred years, not only the rank-and-file, but the leaders themselves, had been recruited from the Bolognese school of Canon Law and had owed their victories to the weapons which their education had placed in their hands and trained them to use. Bologna was the *alma mater studiorum* and *mater saeva*

¹ See IV. iv. 345 and p. 20, above.

² See VI. vii. 357, n. 4, 365, n. 4, 369, and 370-2; and p. 20, above.

³ The role of the Bolognese Faculty of Civil Law in providing civil servants for the nascent Italian city-states is brought out by Dawson in *op. cit.*, pp. 224 and 227.

⁴ This plundering of a Late Medieval Oecumenical Western Church's administrative armoury by the Papacy's parochial secular diadochi has been noticed in IV. iv. 577-8.

*cupidinum*¹ of Pope Alexander III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1159-81), Pope Lucius III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1181-5), Pope Innocent III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1198-1216), and Pope Innocent IV (*fungebatur* A.D. 1243-54), while Pope Honorius III (*fungebatur* A.D. 1216-27), Pope Urban IV (*fungebatur* A.D. 1261-4), and Pope Clement V (*fungebatur* A.D. 1265-8) were also likewise canonists.² Thus no less than half the number of the incumbents of Saint Peter's chair during the crucial years A.D. 1159-1268 had arrived at the apex of the Western ecclesiastical hierarchy by climbing a recently erected juristic ladder.³ In the now decisively concluded struggle between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire the canonists had been both the principal agents of the Church's victory and the principal beneficiaries from the spoils; and in the third quarter of the thirteenth century it looked as if the civil lawyers whose loss gave the measure of the canonists' gain had obtained the poorest of consolation prizes for their failure to become the omnipotent civil servants of a Western avatar of a secular Roman imperial body politic. When they had been disappointed of the realization of this grandiosely ambitious dream of oecumenical jurisdiction, what did it signify that they had been finding obscure employment as the modest notaries and secretaries of fledgling parochial Italian city-states?

Even after a Pope Boniface VIII (*fungebatur* A.D. 1294-1303), who was both a trained canonist and trained civilian,⁴ had brought to the ground in its turn the Papal *Respublica Christiana* that his canonist predecessors had reared so high upon the Holy Roman Empire's ruins, the oecumenical administrative machine which the canonists had been building up for the Papal Church was the one wing of the Innocentian edifice that not only survived intact but continued to grow. The financial organization to which an Innocent IV had given an impetus, in order to provide a militant Roman See with the sinews of war, was carried to its acme during a fourteenth-century 'Babylonish Captivity' (*durabat* A.D. 1309-77) which gave the Papacy's fiscal officers the advantage of operating from a headquarters situated near the geographical centre of communications of the Western Christendom of the day.⁵

After the return of the Papal Curia to Rome in A.D. 1377, yet another century had to pass before the 'Modern Western' type of parochial polity, which had come into being in the Late Medieval Italian city-states, thanks to the creative work of the civil lawyers who were these cities' public employees, made its fortune by imposing its exotic pattern of administrative practice and political theory on the feudal monarchies in the Transalpine and Transmarine provinces of the Western World; and this moment of transition from the 'Medieval' to the 'Modern' chapter of the history of the Western World at large, outside the narrow limits of a politically precocious Northern and Central Italy, at last revealed, for the first time, the ironic destiny of a Western Christian

¹ Horace: *Carmina*, Book I, Ode xix, l. 1.

² See IV. iv. 530-1.

³ Dawson points out, in op. cit., p. 227, that Alexander III was actually a pupil of Gratian and a commentator on his works, and that Innocent III, in his day, was a pupil of the Bolognese canonist Uguccio of Pisa.

⁴ See IV. iv. 532.

⁵ The convenience of the location of Avignon from the Papal administrators' standpoint has been noticed in IV. iv. 520, n. 2, and 571, n. 1.

Canon Law which had been worked out at Bologna on the model of a pagan Roman Civil Law in order to give a Papal Church the victory over an abortive Western resuscitation of the Roman Empire. In the modern chapter of Western history the Canon Law continued to play a major part in Western life only in so far as its practical applications in the spheres of administration and finance were pressed into the service of the parochial secular states which boisterously held the stage in this noisy 'modern' act of a Western tragi-comedy.¹

This Modern role of the Canon Law was, however, as unobtrusive as it was influential, and the legal triumph that attracted all the éclat was the 'reception' of the Justinianean Roman Law in one parochial state after another of a now rapidly and widely expanding Western body social. In the Western Civilization's European homelands a conquering Roman Law overleapt an intractable England to seize upon Scotland;² but the winning of this outpost in a European *Ultima Thule* was merely the prelude to a Transoceanic expansion. In the New World of the Americas, the Spanish Crown was as much indebted to the faithful services of its civil lawyers for its hard-won sixteenth-century victory over the truculent Castilian *conquistadores* as the Roman See had been to the services of its canonists for its thirteenth-century victory over the Hohenstaufen. In the New World of South Africa, Dutch colonists, planted there after the 'reception' of the Roman Law in their mother country, gave Justinian a fresh footing on a Continent from whose northern extremity he had been evicted a thousand years earlier by the artificers of an Islamic Law which had entered Egypt and the Maghrib in the train of seventh-century Arab Muslim conquerors.

The Islamic Law, like the Roman Law, had its renaissances in the

¹ If, at first sight, it might seem surprising that it should have been feasible thus to turn an oecumenical Canon Law to account for the benefit of parochial secular states that were the Civil Law's nurslings, an explanation of this apparent enigma is to be found in an illuminating passage of Christopher Dawson's *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), pp. 224-5 and 227:

'While the University of Paris throughout the Middle Ages was essentially a clerical institution, Bologna was largely a lay university where the lawyers and officials who played such a large part in the government of the Italian cities received their education.

'No doubt the development of the study of the Canon Law which was associated with the work of Gratian about 1140 made Bologna an equally important centre of training for the administrators and lawyers of the Mediaeval Church. But it was as a school of Roman Law that Bologna first became famous in the days of Irnerius (*circa* A.D. 1090-1130), and it was the civilians, not the canonists, who set the standard and determined the course of studies. . . .

'The fact that [the] work [of actually supplying the Mediaeval Church with its organisation] was done by men trained in the same school and the same traditions as the civilians who during the same period were organising and rationalising the Mediaeval State was of the first importance for the history of Western institutions; and it was in the life of the Italian cities that this process of interaction was most complete. The rulers and officials of the City-State and the administrators of the Church were drawn from the same classes, [were] educated in the same universities, and shared the same intellectual background, so that there was a continual process of mutual criticism which stimulated the growth of an educated public opinion, such as did not yet exist in Northern Europe.'

² 'It is clear that the Common Law of Scotland is in considerable measure derived from the Civil Law; to a less extent, but in important particulars, from the Canon Law. Though there was probably no period at which the Civil Law was accounted part of the law of Scotland, yet that law, as explained and in some respects amended by the Dutch and French commentators of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is the basis of the Scots law of contract and of property, apart from feudal conveyancing' (Gloag, W. M., and Henderson, R. C.: *Introduction to the Law of Scotland*, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh 1939, Green), p. 8).

histories of civilizations of a new generation that eventually arose out of the ruins of the universal state in which the resuscitated law had formerly been current; but this broad general resemblance between the respective posthumous fortunes of the Justinianean *Corpus Iuris* and the Islamic *Shari'ah* is diversified by differences of detail due to differences between the Roman Empire and the Arab Caliphate in the several points of their antecedents, their origins, their structures, and their relations to the higher religions that propagated themselves within these universal states' frontiers.

The difference between the Roman Empire and the Arab Caliphate that had the greatest effect in giving different turns to the posthumous histories of the Roman Civil Law and the *Shari'ah* was that the Arab conquerors who built the Caliphate and gave this oecumenical empire an oecumenical law were likewise the missionaries of Islam, so that, in the Caliphate, Religion, Law, and Government were all in the same hands from the outset, in sharp contrast to the history of the relations between these three activities in the Roman Empire, where an oecumenical government and an oecumenical law, created by pagan hands, had set hard in their pagan mould before the Roman imperial régime found itself constrained to come to terms with an exotic Christian Church against which this pagan Hellenic universal state had been fighting a losing battle for a quarter of a millennium ending in the generation of Constantine.

The common purpose of providing the legal currency for a universal state was, it is true, reflected in certain similarities in the respective processes of evolution through which these two oecumenical systems of law arrived at their final forms. The *Shari'ah* in the Age of the Caliphate, like the Roman Law in the Imperial Age, owed its development largely to jurists recruited, not from the ruling people itself, but from these empire-builders' subjects; and in both episodes of legal history the imperial jurists who had thus made their way up from below drew freely upon their indigenous social heritage in carrying out their arduous task of transfiguring the archaic and fragmentary traditional law of conquerors, who had been marchmen in the Roman case and transfrontier barbarians in the Arab case, by smoothing away its rugged edges and filling in its lacunæ until they had succeeded in making out of this unpromisingly incongruous material a legal system more or less capable of serving the complicated and sophisticated needs of the society on which the empire-builders had imposed their own law by right of conquest.¹ Owing, however, to the difference in the respective historical relations of Christianity and Islam to the founders of the oecumenical states that were their original political frameworks, the outcome of two otherwise more or less similar episodes of legal history was in the one case a still essentially pagan *Corpus Iuris Romani Iustinianeum* and in the other case a *Shari'ah* in which the ingenuity of non-Arab jurists had not only eked out a most inadequate Arab customary law by surreptitiously introducing elements of Oriental Roman Law and other legal systems previously current

¹ The evolution of the Roman Law has been sketched in VI. vii. 262-3 and 265-8; the evolution of the *Shari'ah* has been sketched *ibid.*, 288-91.

among the populations that the Arabs had subjugated, but had presented the whole of this amalgam in the form of logical deductions and inductions from the Qur'ān and the Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad.

It will be seen that, in thus resetting fragments of old secular law in a new religious mould, the Islamic jurists of the Umayyad and 'Abbasid ages who were the authors of the *Shari'ah* were doing something reminiscent, not so much of the interpretative and codificatory work of the Roman jurists of the Imperial Age, as of the creative work of the Orthodox Christian authors of the *Ecloga* and the Western Christian authors of Charlemagne's would-be Christian legislation; and, in the light of this analogy, it might perhaps have been expected *a priori* that there would have been no occasion for a renaissance of the *Shari'ah* because there would have been no necessity for this already developed and established Islamic Law to pass out of currency as a result of the downfall of the Caliphate—considering that Islam itself survived the dissolution of the Caliphate as robustly as Christianity had survived the downfall of the Roman Empire.

If the Eurasian Nomad barbarians who overran the derelict provinces of a dissolving Caliphate in the course of the two centuries ending in the Mongols' sack of Baghdad in A.D. 1258 had all been as barbarous as the Eurasian Nomad and North European sedentary barbarians who overran the Roman Empire's derelict western provinces in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era, they might indeed all have taken the option, which the eleventh-century Saljūq Turkish barbarian invaders of the Caliphate did take, of 'receiving' the *Shari'ah* as an automatic consequence of their conversion to the faith of a rapidly growing Muslim majority of the ex-subjects of the universal state whose former territories these barbarians were now overrunning. As it happened, however, the Mongols, who broke upon the shores of Dār-al-Islām in the last and most violent wave of the Eurasian Nomad invasion of the Caliphate's derelict domain, and the Türkmen ancestors of the 'Osmanlis, who fled westwards, before the Mongols' menacing advance, from Central Asia into North-Western Anatolia, both resembled the Arab founders of the Caliphate in being barbarians who were gifted with exceptional capacities; and their ability displayed itself in the originality of their creative work in the field of law as well as in the field of politics.

In previous contexts¹ we have already noticed that Chingis Khan and his successors were so confident of the virtue and value of their own traditional barbarian customary law that they made the audacious attempt to impose it on their subjects by force, in place of the *Shari'ah* and the other legal systems under which the conquered peoples had been living at the time when they had been overtaken by the Mongol conquest; and in an earlier Part of this Study² we have also taken a glance at 'the peculiar institution' which the 'Osmanlis fashioned for themselves—as their instrument for conquering and holding an oecumenical empire—out of elements of the Eurasian Nomad culture which were just as independent of the *Shari'ah* as was Chingis Khan's Mongol

¹ In VI. vii. 74 and 256-7; and IX. viii. 354-5.

² In III. iii. 22-50.

Yāsāq itself. The Mongol and the Ottoman attitude towards the *Sharī'ah* were, of course, very different; for, while the Mongol conquerors of the Old World remained—in some cases for as long as a hundred years after the conquest—either militant shamanists or militant Nestorian Christians who were bent upon suppressing the *Sharī'ah* and superseding it, the Ottoman 'Ghāzis of Rūm',¹ so far from being persecutors of Islam, were zealous propagators of it. Yet, though the peculiar and characteristic Ottoman institution of the Pādishāh's Slave-Household was built up, not as a substitute for the Islamic dispensation, but as an instrument for the enlargement of the domain of Dār-al-Islām by slaves of a Muslim potentate who were Muslims themselves, besides being peculiarly trained *qullar*, it was nevertheless also true that 'the Ottoman Ruling Institution', as it has been called by one of the most discerning of the Modern Western students of it,² was based on non-Islamic foundations, was set up alongside of 'the Muslim Institution' as an independent organization, and was the predominant organ in the Ottoman body social during the creative age of Ottoman history in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era.³

Both the independence and the predominance of the Pādishāh's Slave-Household were asserted by its members when they prevailed upon Sultan Bāyezīd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1481-1512) to grant their corporation the privilege of judicial autonomy.

'The members of the Ruling Institution had not always had their own system of justice; they had long been under the jurisdiction of the ordinary Muslim courts. This had led to an essential difficulty: the ordinary courts were part of another institution and were recruited in a wholly different way; their judges had risen through a rival system of education, and were men of letters rather than men of war; the favoured *qullar* of the Sultan had therefore come to feel averse to obeying them. Accordingly, Bāyezīd II had ordered that the members of his family should be judged by their own officers. This was a radical change; for it brought into prominence the distinction between the two institutions, and had the further effect of setting off the *qullar* from all the rest of the population of the Empire and of constituting them almost a separate nationality.'⁴

After the relative power of 'the Ruling Institution' of the Ottoman body politic had thus risen to its apogee at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the balance promptly began to swing over to 'the Muslim Institution's' side as a consequence of the

¹ The Timurid Mughal Emperor Bābur's habitual use of this periphrasis for describing the 'Osmanlis has been noticed in I. i. 349, n. 1.

² See Lybyer, A. H.: *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass. 1913, Harvard University Press), p. 36.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 233-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 116. As has been noticed in this Study in IX. viii. 186, n. 2, above, the practical effect of this exemption of the *qullar* from the jurisdiction of the Islamic judicial authorities was to confer on them the corporate status of a *millet* which, in the Ottoman Empire, was enjoyed likewise by another corporation of privileged Muslims, the Seyyids (see Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-7 and 216). The privilege of judicial autonomy which was thus obtained by the slave companions of the Ottoman Pādishāhs was also possessed by the free companions of the Macedonian Kings in the post-Alexandrine as well as in the pre-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history—at any rate in any case in which one of the Companions was being tried on a capital charge (see Granier, F.: *Die Makedonische Heeresversammlung* (Munich 1931, Beck), pp. 51-52).

extension of direct or indirect Ottoman rule over five-sixths of the Arabic Muslim World, including the dominions of the Mamlūks in Syria, Egypt, and Arabia, in the course of the fifty-eight years running from A.D. 1516, when Syria was occupied by Sultan Selīm I and Algiers by the 'Osmanli corsair Khayr-ad-Dīn Barbarossa, and A.D. 1574, which was the date of the 'Osmanlis' definitive eviction of the Spaniards from Tunis.¹ In the Arab countries ruled by Mamlūks who had inherited from their extinct Ayyubid masters a tradition of serving as defenders of the Islamic faith, and who had completed the expulsion of the Crusaders from Syria in order to turn this liberated province of Dār-al-Islām into a glacis covering the approaches to Islam's Egyptian citadel in the quarter from which Egypt was under the threat of Mongol attacks,² these *ci-devant* slaves who had entered into their former masters' heritage had sought to legitimize their usurpation of power by ruling in the name of a Cairene ghost of a Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate;³ and, though these Mamlūks had, like the 'Osmanlis, developed 'a peculiar institution' of their own which, in their case, likewise, had been the secret of their success,⁴ the reign of the Islamic *Shari'ah* had been maintained unbroken and unimpaired in the Mamlūks' dominions by the Mamlūks' policy of wielding their power in a puppet 'Abbasid Caliph's name and by their prowess in preserving Syria and Egypt from being swept by a tornado of Mongol conquest that had devastated all the eastern provinces of Dār-al-Islām from Farghānah as far westward as the eastern bank of the Middle Euphrates.⁵ The conquest of the Mamlūk Empire by the Ottoman Sultan Selīm I in A.D. 1516-17 thus produced a sudden and drastic change in the demographic constitution of the Ottoman body politic by bringing under the Pādishāh's rule a mass of new Arabic-speaking Muslim subjects who knew no other dispensation than the *Shari'ah*;⁶ and this demographic change was quickly reflected in the field of law.

Already, nearly half a century before Selīm I (*imperabat* A.D. 1512-20) burst through the Taurus and descended upon the Arabic World in A.D. 1516, his predecessor Mehmed II the Conqueror (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81) had found that the requirements of his Muslim subjects in an Ottoman Empire which in his reign was still confined to originally Orthodox Christian ground called for a new codification of the *Shari'ah* as expounded by a Hanafī school of Islamic jurists, whose presentation of the Islamic Law was the one that had been officially 'received' in the Ottoman dominions; and Mehmed II had accordingly put in hand a new Ottoman redaction of the *Shari'ah* according to Abu Hanīfah.⁷ This work, finished in A.D. 1470, was not sufficient in the days of Suleymān (*imperabat* A.D. 1520-66). At the time of its preparation the Ottoman Empire had been still wholly within territory that had re-

¹ See I. i. 69-70, 348, and 396, n. 5; II. ii. 444-5; IX. viii. 105, n. 1; and IX. viii. 220-1.

² See I. i. 350; IV. iv. 447; and V. v. 248.

³ See VI. vii. 20.

⁴ See III. iii. 30-31.

⁵ On the 2nd September, 1929, the writer of this Study swam the Euphrates from its Mamlūk shore below the bluff crowned by the castle of Qal'at-an-Najm to the Mongol shore opposite.

⁶ See Lybyer, op. cit., pp. 152-3 and 233-4.

⁷ See Lybyer, op. cit., p. 152, following d'Ohsson, I. M.: *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1788-1824, Didot, 7 vols.), vol. i, p. 21.

mained Christian during all the early brilliant period of Islam';¹ and Sultan Mehmed's choice of a Christian renegade, Khosrev Pasha,² as his codifier of the *Shari'ah* for the use of an Iranic Muslim community *in partibus Christianorum* was a characteristic stroke of the Ottoman political genius in its pre-Selimian Age, however inappropriate the choice might look from a conservative Hanafite Sunnī Muslim standpoint. Since Mehmed II's day, however, the 'Osmanlis

'had conquered three seats of the later Caliphate—Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo—and had come to hold the protectorate of the Holy Cities, where Muhammad and the early Caliphs had ruled. A new code of law, therefore, better adapted to the more widely Muslim character which the Empire had assumed, was [now] demanded. Suleymān charged Shaykh Ibrahīm Halabī with the task of preparing such a code; and the result, prepared before A.D. 1549, was the *Multeqā el-Ebhār* ('the Confluence of the Seas'), which remained the foundation of Ottoman Law until the reforms of the nineteenth century.'³

It was no accident that the work of replacing a redaction of the *Shari'ah* which had been made for Sultan Mehmed II by a Christian renegade should have been entrusted by Sultan Suleymān I to a Muslim-born doctor of the Islamic Law whose home was Aleppo—an Arabic-speaking Muslim city which was the nearest of all the seats of theological learning in an Arabic Muslim World to the new domain in Anatolia which had been won by Turkish Eurasian Nomad converts to Islam for an Iranic Muslim World at the expense of Orthodox Christendom.

This progressive renaissance of the Islamic Law in an expanding Ottoman Empire was achieved, as has just been observed, on the initiative of converted descendants of the local Eurasian Nomad barbarian interlopers when these 'Osmanlis eventually extended their rule over the Arabic-speaking portion of the former dominions of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. In the Transoxanian marches of a defunct 'Abbasid Caliphate and a nascent Iranic Muslim World the local Eurasian barbarian interlopers became converts to Islam in their turn in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era;⁴ but this tardy conversion of the Mongols of the Chaghatāy Horde was not sufficiently thorough or wholehearted to reconcile their sedentary Iranic Muslim subjects to an oppressive Nomad domination; and accordingly in Transoxania, in contrast to the course of events in the Ottoman World, the local renaissance of the *Shari'ah* was achieved in the teeth of the converted descendants of the barbarian conquerors, and not through their agency. In a previous context⁵ we have noticed that Timur Lenk rose to power by becoming the military leader of an anti-Nomad cultural reaction on

¹ Lybyer, loc. cit.

² See Hammer-Purgstall, J. von: *Des Osmanischen Reichs Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung* (Vienna 1815, Camesinasche Buchhandlung, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 9.

³ Lybyer, op. cit., pp. 152-3 (cp. p. 152, note 1, d'Ohsson, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 22-24, and Hammer-Purgstall, J. von: *Des Osmanischen Reichs Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung* (Vienna 1815, Camesinasche Buchhandlung, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 10. 'The *Multeqā* is the basis of d'Ohsson's excellent work, which consists [in vols. i-vi—A.J.T.] of a translation of the code with its comments, to which he has added [in vol. vii—A.J.T.] observations of great value based on historical studies and on his own investigations during many years' residence in Turkey' (Lybyer, op. cit., p. 153, n. 1).

⁴ See II. ii. 145.

⁵ In II. ii. 147-8.

the part of the Transoxanian townspeople and 'ulamā which began as an insurrection against a Chaghatāy ascendancy and was followed up by Timur's military genius with a counter-offensive in which Cain took his long overdue revenge on a provocative Abel. In this place we have only to notice that Timur followed up his overt assumption of sovereign power at Balkh on the 8th April, 1369, by re-validating the *Shari'ah* in all fields that came within the *Shari'ah's* cognizance; and, though he seems to have refrained from following up this positive act by the negative one of expressly abrogating the Mongol *Yāsāq*, its abrogation was accomplished in effect by the reinstatement of an Islamic Law in whose sight *nihil humanum was alienum*.¹

(c) RENAISSANCES OF PHILOSOPHIES

In other contexts² we have watched the Confucian litterati surviving the dissolution of a Sinic universal state embodied in the Han Empire and eventually regaining their monopoly of an imperial civil service after a ghost of the Han Empire had been raised by the Sui Dynasty and kept on foot by the Sui's successors the T'ang; and in the same contexts we have also observed that, in achieving this remarkable recovery of lost ground on the plane of public administration, the Confucians were winning a political victory over Taoist and Mahayanian Buddhist contemporaries and rivals. The reestablishment by T'ang T'ai Tsung, in A.D. 622, of an official examination in the Confucian Classics as the method of selecting new recruits for the imperial civil service signified that, in this political field, the Taoists and Buddhists had let slip an opportunity for supplanting the Confucians which had seemed to be within the grasp of these upstart competitors for public office during a post-Sinic interregnum, when the prestige of the Confucians had been damaged by the collapse of the universal state with which they were identified, while, in a defunct Han Empire's former northern provinces, which had been the cradle of the Sinic culture, Taoists and Buddhists were enjoying the political patronage of barbarian rulers of local successor-states who found the Mahāyāna more attractive than Confucianism and who would have been glad in any case to recruit their civil servants from any non-Confucian community that might be qualified for office by possessing the necessary standard of education, rather than place themselves in the hands of Confucians whose loyalty they sagely doubted.

The contrast between this political failure of the Mahāyāna in Northern China in a post-Sinic Age and the success with which the Christian Church seized and harvested its corresponding opportunities in Western Europe in a post-Hellenic Age brings out the fact that—at any rate by comparison with Christianity—the Mahāyāna was a politically incompetent religion. The patronage of the parochial princes in Northern China during the best part of three centuries, running from

¹ Terence: *Hautontimorumenus*, I, 77 (Act I, scene i, line 25). See Cahun, L.: *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie: Turcs et Mongols des Origines à 1405* (Paris 1896, Colin), pp. 469-72, and Bouvat, L.: *L'Empire Mongol, Deuxième Phase* (Paris 1927, Boccard), pp. 66-69.

² See VI. vii. 355-8, and pp. 649-81, below.

the break-up of the United Tsin Empire to its reconstitution by the Sui, was of no more avail than the more potent patronage of the Kushan Emperor Kanishka had been at the turn of the first and second centuries of the Christian Era. Even this royal aid failed to give the followers of the Mahāyāna a firm seat in a political saddle. As soon, however, as the encounter on Far Eastern ground between the Mahāyāna and Confucianism was transferred from an alien political plane to a spiritual plane on which both were breathing their native air, the fortunes of their almost bloodless war were dramatically reversed.

The Confucians exposed themselves to the risk of experiencing this *peripeteia* when they followed up the political triumph of securing the reinstatement of the Confucian Classics, as the shibboleth for admission into the civil service of an avatar of the Sinic universal state, by attempting to reanimate the thought latent in their literary canon. This process of re-eliciting a philosophy out of a cut-and-dried official examination-subject was started, after the T'ang régime's partial recovery from its first convulsion half way through the eighth century of the Christian Era, by the Neoconfucian thinkers Han Yü (*vivebat* A.D. 768-824) and Li Ao (*mortuus circa* A.D. 844);¹ and, after this Neoconfucianism had branched in the eleventh century into two schools that were first differentiated by the brothers Ch'eng Yi (*vivebat* A.D. 1033-1108) and Ch'eng Hao (*vivebat* A.D. 1032-85), the younger brother's 'School of Principles' was carried to its culmination by Chu Hsi (*vivebat* A.D. 1130-1200), while the elder brother's 'School of Mind' culminated in the thought of Wang Shou-jen² (*vivebat* A.D. 1473-1529).³ This Far Eastern Neoconfucianism began and ended⁴ with declarations of dissent from both Taoism and the Mahāyāna. Yet

'we can say that the Neoconfucianists more consistently adhere to the fundamental ideas of Taoism and Buddhism than do the Taoists and Buddhists themselves. They are more Taoistic than the Taoists, and more Buddhist than the Buddhists.'⁵

The channel through which a would-be revival of Confucianism imbibed the spirit of the Mahāyāna was the Ch'an⁶ School of Mahayanian Buddhism, which had struck root on Far Eastern ground in the Early T'ang Age.⁷

"There are three lines of thought that can be traced as the main sources of Neoconfucianism. The first, of course, is Confucianism itself. The second is Buddhism, together with Taoism, via the medium of Ch'anism; for, of all the schools of Buddhism, Ch'anism was the most influential at the time of the formation of Neoconfucianism. To the Neoconfucianists, Ch'anism and Buddhism are synonymous terms, and . . . in one sense Neoconfucianism may be said to be the logical development of Ch'anism. Finally, the third is the Taoist Religion, of which the cosmological views

¹ See Fung Yu-lan: *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York 1948, Macmillan), p. 267.

² Commonly known as 'the Master of Yang-ming' (Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, p. 308) or as Wang Yang-ming.

³ See Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 267-8 and 316-18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

⁶ A Chinese rendering of the Sanskrit word 'Dhyāna' which, in turn, was rendered as 'Zen' in Japanese (see V. v. 96-103).

⁷ See Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-65.

of the Yin-Yang School¹ formed an important element. The cosmology of the Neoconfucianists is chiefly connected with this line of thought.²

The particular potency of the Ch'an School of Mahayanian philosophy in informing and inspiring a post-Buddhaic Confucian school of Far Eastern thought was due, not merely to the external accident that Ch'anism happened to be in fashion in the Far East at the time when the Neoconfucian Movement was initiated, but also to the fact that an Indic Dhyāna which had struck root on Far Eastern ground had gone a long way, in this new cultural environment, towards adapting its ethics to a Confucian moral climate.

'The most important development in Chinese Buddhism was its attempt to depreciate the Otherworldliness of original Buddhism. This attempt came close to success when the Ch'an masters stated that "in carrying water and chopping firewood, therein lies the wonderful Tao". But . . . they did not push this idea to its logical conclusion by saying that, in serving one's family and the state, therein also lies the wonderful Tao. The reason, of course, is that, once they had said this, their teaching would have ceased to be Buddhism.'³

Yet, while developing this affinity with Confucianism on the ethical plane and thereby qualifying itself to exert an unacknowledged influence on the thought of professedly anti-Buddhist Neoconfucian philosophers, the Ch'an School of the Mahāyāna *in partibus Confucianorum* remained faithful, on the metaphysical plane, to its Mahayanian origins; and, after insinuating itself into Neoconfucianism through an ethical door, it gave this ghost of Confucianism a metaphysical substance which had been lacking in Confucianism in its original authentic form.⁴ 'The Neoconfucianists developed a point of view from which all the moral activities valued by the Confucianists acquire a further value that is "supermoral"';⁵ and, without this infusion of Mahayanian metaphysics through a Ch'an Mahayanian channel, Neoconfucianism might have remained a stranger in its own Far Eastern house; for the impact of the Mahāyāna on a moribund Sinic Society, at a time when the inhabitants of this dissolving world were undergoing the harrowing experience of living through a social interregnum, had produced in their souls a profound and enduring change of spiritual outlook which recalls to the mind of a Western student of History the similar change produced in his own forebears' souls by the impact of Christianity on a moribund Hellenic Society.

'After the revival of Taoism and the introduction of Buddhism, people had become more interested in metaphysical problems and in . . . "super-

¹ See the present Study, II. i. 201-3. The Neoconfucians translated the notion of Yin and Yang into intellectual terms (Forke, A.: *The World-Conception of the Chinese* (London 1925, Probsthain), p. 200).—A.J.T.

² Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 271. Cp. pp. 264-5.

⁴ Chu Hsi's debt to Mahayanian Buddhist metaphysics is pointed out by Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), pp. 346-7, in a passage cited in this Study in II. i. 202, n. 2. For Chu Hsi's Buddhist solution of the logico-metaphysical problem of the relation between the intellectual unity of an idea (in the Platonic sense of the term) and the multiplicity of its manifestations in the World of Sense, see Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

⁵ Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

moral values", or, as they were then phrased, the problems of the nature and destiny [of Man].¹

The influence on Neoconfucianism of these aspects of the Mahāyāna made itself felt not only in the adoption of the peculiarly Ch'anist theory and practice of 'sudden enlightenment',² but also—at least according to the doctrine of the Neoconfucian 'School of Mind'—in an identification, *more Indico*, of the mind of each individual human being with a Cosmic Intelligence.³

It is true that Neoconfucianism did make some motion to break away from its Mahayanian moorings in the metaphysical sphere, in which the Mahāyāna on Sinic soil had remained true to its original Indic genius, in contrast to its concessions to the Sinic genius in the sphere of Ethics. For example, in prescribing a method of spiritual cultivation, the Neoconfucians departed from Ch'anism by substituting an active 'attentiveness' for a passive 'quiescence' as the requisite state of mind for a neophyte.⁴ Yet attempts, such as this, to recapture the authentic spirit of a Confucianism which these Far Eastern intellectual necromancers had set out to resuscitate were feeble and fitful by comparison with the force and copiousness with which a fountain of Mahayanian Buddhist thought continued to well up through a Neoconfucian conduit-pipe that had been designed to perform the quite different intellectual service of tapping the buried springs of a genuine pre-Buddhist Confucian philosophy; and this captivation of the Neoconfucian philosophical renaissance itself by the spirit of the Mahāyāna made nonsense of the reinstated Confucian imperial civil servants' efforts to reduce the strength of an exotic Mahayanian universal church's hold on the spiritual allegiance of a now politically reunited and socially advancing Far Eastern World.

Even before the reunification of the whole former domain of the Han Empire by Sui Wên-ti in A.D. 589 and the reinauguration of the public examinations in the Confucian Classics by T'ang T'ai Tsung in A.D. 622, the Confucians had seized an opportunity offered to them in the North by their own captivation of the *ci-devant* barbarian To Pa 'Wei' dynasty. In A.D. 446 they had induced the reigning emperor of this house to issue an anti-Buddhist edict;⁵ and they had no sooner acquired a hold upon the government of a resuscitated oecumenical

¹ Ibid., p. 266.

² For the role of 'sudden enlightenment' in Ch'anism, see *ibid.*, pp. 261-2; for its adoption by the Neoconfucian 'School of Principles', see *ibid.*, p. 306. 'Sudden enlightenment' was likewise adopted by 'the School of Mind' (*ibid.*, pp. 307, 308, 309, 310). Other Ch'anist elements in Neoconfucianism are noticed *ibid.*, pp. 272 and 290.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 309, 312, and 315. In this Neoconfucian identification of individual human selves with a Cosmic Self we may perhaps discern one of the key-ideas of Early Indic thought which had reasserted itself in the Mahāyāna. The Buddha himself rejected by the historical Buddha Siddhārtha Gautama as being the *ātman* was not an acceptance of his own key-doctrine that an individual's self was a mere continuum of intrinsically separate and ephemeral psychological states inauspiciously held together by the sinister force of *Karma* in a complex that could be dissolved and dissipated by going through a prescribed course of spiritual *askēsis* which the Buddha himself had worked out in order to put it within the power of his suffering fellow sentient beings to purge the cumulus of this tormenting *Karma* away.

⁴ See Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

⁵ See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), pp. 275-6, quoted on p. 678, n. 4, below.

empire than they began to abuse this power for the purpose of repressing their hated Buddhist rivals. From A.D. 626 onwards, Buddhist monasteries in the T'ang Imperial Crown's dominions were placed under a Confucian official control that grew progressively more severe;¹ and a series of anti-Buddhist memorials addressed to the T'ang Imperial Throne by Confucian high officials—by Fu Yi in A.D. 624,² by Yao Ch'ung in A.D. 713,³ and by Han Yü in A.D. 819⁴—at length produced their cumulative effect in a systematic official persecution, started in A.D. 845,⁵ which, though mild and indeed almost humane compared to many of the persecutions of which a Christian Church was either a victim or a perpetrator, was an exceptionally violent and bloody incident in the less unhappy history of the relations between Church and State in the Far Eastern World.

As it turned out, this Confucian attempt to repress, and if possible eradicate, the Mahāyāna in the Far East was abortive; and, mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the Mahāyāna was still a living spiritual force in China as well as in Indo-China, Korea, and Japan. Even, however, if the Mahāyāna, as an institution, had been successfully extirpated in China eleven hundred years before that date, a discreditable political success that would then have been achieved by Confucian civil servants would have been stultified in advance by a then already consummated surrender to the Mahāyāna on the metaphysical plane which did credit to the intellectual integrity of a Neoconfucian School of Far Eastern philosophers. The pioneers of this Buddhistic Neoconfucianism had already set their course on these Mahayanian lines before the Great Persecution of A.D. 845 was launched; and, when a Neoconfucian philosophy that had been duly approved by a Confucian imperial régime had thus taken the Ch'an version of the Mahāyāna to heart, an authentic renaissance of unadulterated Confucianism would still have been as far off as ever if, before the final downfall of the T'ang Dynasty, the Confucian civil servants had succeeded in their efforts to suppress the external manifestations of an exotic higher religion which had now found an inviolable sanctuary and an ideal base of spiritual operations in Neoconfucian bosoms that were both unsuspect and unsuspecting.

When a Zealot-minded Ming Dynasty (*imperabant* A.D. 1368–1644) conferred on Chu Hsi the posthumous canonization that Han Wuti (*imperabat* 140–87 B.C.) had conferred on Confucius, and added the works of this prince of the Neoconfucian 'School of Principles' to the 'set books' prescribed for the official examinations, to serve thenceforth as the sole authorized commentary on the Confucian Classics,⁶ these

¹ See Hackmann, H.: *Chinesische Philosophie* (Munich 1927, Reinhardt), pp. 272–3.

² See Hackmann, op. cit., p. 272; Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 390 and 570; Goodrich, L. C.: *A Short History of the Chinese People* (London 1948, Allen & Unwin), pp. 122–3.

³ See Franke, op. cit., p. 572; Hackmann, op. cit., p. 272 (who gives the date as A.D. 714).

⁴ See Franke, op. cit., pp. 490 and 572; Hackmann, op. cit., p. 273.

⁵ See Franke, op. cit., pp. 497–9; Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 125–7; Hackmann, op. cit., p. 273 (who gives the date as A.D. 844).

⁶ See Hackmann, op. cit., p. 357.

Zealots were unconsciously and unintentionally defeating their own purposes by enthroning a thinly disguised Ch'an Buddhism in an authentic Confucianism's never reoccupied place; and, when Wang Shou-jen committed what had now become the political offence of attacking Chu Hsi's version of a Buddhistic Neoconfucian philosophy on behalf of the rival 'School of Mind',¹ one incidental effect of his polemics was to plunge the bows of his own craft deeper than ever into Mahayanian Buddhist waters.

It will be seen that the Neoconfucian philosophers' *odium philosophicum* towards an Indic Mahāyāna was as ironically self-frustrating an essay in the perverse exercise of kicking against the pricks² as the Macedonian legislators' *odium theologicum* towards the would-be Christian legislation of an antecedent Syrian Dynasty;³ and there is a common moral to be drawn from this common failure of two similar attempts, in different provinces of life, to substitute ghosts raised from Sheol for living ideas or institutions. It is all very well for a necromancer to evoke a wraith; but he courts failure if he goes on to try to merge his own identity in the spectral form that he has succeeded in conjuring up; for a phantom is nothing if not transparent; and a creature of flesh and blood that seeks to take cover behind a *revenant* from the world of shades will remain conspicuously visible through the tenuous wisps of this ghastly fancy dress. The shape of the Mahāyāna shows through the shimmer of Neoconfucianism as plainly as the solid substance of the Syrian Emperors' would-be Christian legislation can be discerned beneath the patches of a Justinianean veneer with which its nakedness was partially covered by the Syrians' Macedonian successors.

When we pass from the renaissance of a Sinic Confucian philosophy in Far Eastern history to the renaissance of an Hellenic Aristotelian philosophy in Western Christian history,⁴ we find the plot of the play taking a piquantly different turn on this other stage. Whereas Neoconfucianism succumbed to a Mahāyāna that, in the official view of a Confucian imperial régime, was a trespasser squatting on demesne land to which it could not show any legal title, Neo-Aristotelianism imposed itself on the theology of a Christian Church in whose official view Aristotle—even when the paragon of Medieval Western theologians had fallen into the habit of referring to him as 'the Philosopher' *sans phrase*—nevertheless still remained a son of perdition who was to be kept under mistrustful surveillance on the precarious footing of an enemy alien provisionally permitted to reside within the terrestrial bridgehead of the *Civitas Dei*. In fact, the Hellenic philosopher's ghost captivated a Christian Church that had readmitted this pagan *revenant* on sufferance

¹ See *ibid.*, p. 360, and Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-10.

² Acts ix. 5 and xxvi. 14.

³ See pp. 27-30, above.

⁴ An illuminating account of this Aristotelian intellectual renaissance in Medieval Western Christendom will be found in the following works of the Modern Western scholar C. H. Haskins: *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass. 1927, Harvard University Press); *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, Mass. 1927, Harvard University Press); *Studies in Mediaeval Culture* (Oxford 1929, University Press). A psychological question concerning the Andalusian and Sicilian Muslim and the Byzantine Greek Orthodox Christian channels through which a knowledge of Aristotle's philosophical works was acquired by a Western European Christendom is discussed in the present Study on pp. 130-35, below.

into a Western Earthly Paradise after the Church had gained possession of the title deeds, while, conversely, the Sinic philosopher's ghost was captivated by a Mahāyāna on which it had served notice to quit on the strength of title deeds which the Confucians had never let out of their hands. It will be seen that these two otherwise antithetical versions of a ghost-story have one common feature. In either variant of the tale, a party which can claim to have the law on its side is worsted by an opponent who has to rely solely on his merits because, at law, he has no case.

In these at first sight adverse circumstances, a ghostly Neo-Aristotelianism in Western Christendom displayed the same astonishing intellectual potency as a living Mahāyāna in the Far Eastern World.

'It was not [from the Roman tradition] that [Western] Europe derived the critical intelligence and the restless spirit of scientific inquiry which have made [the] Western Civilisation the heir and successor of the Greeks. It is usual to date the coming of this new element from the [Italian] Renaissance and the revival of Greek studies in the fifteenth century, but the real turning-point must be placed three centuries earlier. . . . Already at Paris in the days of Abelard (*vivebat* A.D. 1079-1142) and John of Salisbury (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1115-1180) the passion for dialectic and the spirit of philosophical speculation had begun to transform the intellectual atmosphere of [Western] Christendom; and from that time forward the higher studies were dominated by the technique of logical discussion—the *quaestio* and the public disputation which so largely determined the form of Mediaeval [Western] Philosophy even in its greatest representatives. "Nothing", says Robert of Sorbonne, "is known perfectly which has not been masticated by the teeth of disputation;" and the tendency to submit every question, from the most obvious to the most abstruse, to this process of mastication not only encouraged readiness of wit and exactness of thought but, above all, developed that spirit of criticism and methodic doubt to which Western culture and Modern Science have owed so much.'¹

A ghost of Aristotle that set this abiding impress on the spirit, as well as on the form, of Western thought also produced a passing effect on its substance; and, though the impress here was less durable, it nevertheless went deep enough to require a long and arduous campaign of mental strife as the price of its eventual effacement.

'In [the] whole picture of the Universe [as seen by Medieval Western eyes] there is more of Aristotle than of Christianity. It was the authority of Aristotle and his successors which was responsible even for those features of this teaching which might seem to us to carry something of an ecclesiastical flavour—the hierarchy of heavens, the revolving spheres, the intelligences which moved the planets, the grading of the elements in the order of their nobility and the view that the celestial bodies were composed of an incorruptible fifth essence. Indeed, we may say [that] it was Aristotle rather than Ptolemy who had to be overthrown in the sixteenth century, and it was Aristotle who provided the great obstruction to the Copernican theory.'²

¹ Dawson, Christopher: *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), pp. 229-30.

² Butterfield, H.: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London 1949, Bell), pp. 21-22.

By the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, when the native intellectual genius of the West reasserted itself, in its own characteristically empirical and utilitarian vein,¹ by setting out on a hazardous intellectual pioneering expedition in a carriage-and-pair in which the two steeds yoked in double harness were a technological-minded Natural Science and a scientific-minded Technology, the theology of the Western Christian Church had become so closely entwined with the Aristotelian espalier on which it had been industriously trained by the cumulative labours of twelve generations of Schoolmen that a post-Christian Occidental secular faith's historic martyr, Giordano Bruno, forfeited his life in A.D. 1600 for an intellectual offence which was a flagrant crime of *lèse majesté* against the sovereignty of Aristotle without being explicitly incompatible with Christian theological doctrine.² And, when the Medieval Western Frankenstein's monster whose offended dignity had exacted this sixteenth-century burnt-offering was at last brought to bay by Bruno's scientific successors and avengers,³ Aristotle died as hard in Padua as Jezebel in Jezreel.⁴

'To the Humanists of the [Italian] Renaissance, Padua was an object of particular derision because it was the hotbed of Aristotelianism; and it was one of the paradoxes of the Scientific Revolution that so important a part was played in it by a university in which Aristotle was so much the tradition and for centuries had been so greatly adored.'⁵

Before the seventeenth-century Transalpine Western scientists and philosophers had attacked the Schoolmen for their subservience to 'Aristotle their dictator',⁶ the fifteenth-century Italian Humanists had despised them for their bad Latin; but a ghost of Aristotle which had been raised by the serious-minded heralds of an Early Medieval Western Renaissance of Hellenic philosophy could not be driven out of a Western intellectual arena by such finnikin weapons as the darts, culled from a Ciceronian quiver, that were shot at 'the Philosopher's' heroic wraith by frivolous heralds of a Late Medieval Western Renaissance of the 'classical' Latin and Greek languages and literatures. When, in the course of the seventeenth century, Aristotle's ghost was laid at last in a Western World which this formidable *revenant* had been haunting by that time for not much less than six hundred years, the indignantly recalcitrant spectre did not beat its sullen retreat into the Cimmerian Darkness, from which it had been released for so long a term

¹ See III. iii. 385-6.

² The indiscretion through which Bruno brought on himself a fate that did not overtake Copernicus is explained in Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

³ The positive assertion of the existence of a plurality of worlds, which had cost Bruno his life in A.D. 1600, was repeated with impunity in A.D. 1686 by Fontenelle in an *œuvre de vulgarisation*, his *Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds*, which immediately became a 'best seller' (see Bury, J. B.: *The Idea of Progress* (London 1924, Macmillan), pp. 113-15). Yet in the eighth book of *Paradise Lost* Milton did 'not venture to affirm the Copernican system' (Bury, *ibid.*, p. 114), any more than Copernicus himself had ventured to affirm the infinity of the Physical Universe (see Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 50), though the date of publication of Milton's poem was only nineteen years earlier than that of Fontenelle's dialogue.

⁴ 2 Kings ix. 30-37.

⁵ Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁶ Bacon, Francis: *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human*, Book I, chap. iii, § 3.

of probation, without enjoying the satisfaction of seeing the crestfallen shades of an ornamental Cicero and an academic Isocrates simultaneously rebanished at the expiry of a very much briefer ticket of leave.

(d) RENAISSANCES OF LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES

A Revenante Literature's Psychological Appeal

When our progressive survey of renaissances carries us into the field of languages and literatures, it confronts us here with an apparent paradox. In this field we meet on the one hand with grotesquely blatant revelations of a vein of pedantry or frivolity, or both, which has caught our eye here and there in our foregoing review of renaissances in the fields of Law and Politics, and which may well be latent in all renaissances as a perhaps inevitable effect of their intrinsic artificiality. On the other hand, this is the field in which the *tours de force* of the cultural necromancer's art win the most enthusiastic acclamation and esteem and are able to count on the most devoted and most uncritical support in setting at defiance the exorcist's salutary summons to an unduly long lingering ghost to return to the nether regions from which it has been conjured up.

The solution of this puzzle is to be found in a feature of the literary and visual 'Fine Arts' that distinguishes them from the social activities of life as well as from Mathematics, Natural Science, and Technology. In the field of the 'Fine Arts' the artist's gift and the critic's taste are independent—to a degree unknown in either of those two other provinces of human culture—of the temporary local circumstances of the historical time and place; and the aesthetic faculties enjoy this unparalleled measure of freedom because they have their roots in the subconscious depths of the Psyche, in whose sight 'a thousand years are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night'.¹ The pace of psychic evolution is indeed immeasurably slower in this psychic abyss than on the conscious and volitional surface of the Soul. On the Time-scale of the Subconscious the span of five or six thousand years, counting back from the time of writing, which had seen human societies of the species known as civilizations come and go in a series that had by then already arrived at the third generation, was no more than 'the twinkling of an eye'² in which the hidden light of the 'collective subconscious' human spirit had known 'no variableness, neither shadow of turning'.³

The products of this 'Collective Subconscious' which had been welling up from the depths to the surface of the Psyche in creative works of Literary and Visual Art were thus, in one aspect, virtually eternal, universal, impersonal, and inevitable⁴ by reason of the characteristics of the

¹ Ps. xc. 4. Cp. 2 Pet. iii. 8.

² 1 Cor. xv. 52.

³ Jas. i. 17.

⁴ The word 'virtually' in this sentence perhaps needs underlining, since the appearance of eternity, universality, impersonality, and inevitability which the subconscious abyss of the Human Psyche presented, at its 'collective' depth, to conscious individual human intelligences was, of course, no more than an illusory trick of Relativity. If a human intelligence became capable of viewing 'the Collective Subconscious' with the eyes, not of an individual human being, but of God, it would, no doubt, then become aware that, by comparison with the veritable Absolute, the human 'Collective Sub-

subconscious source from which they sprang, while in another aspect they were also actually ephemeral, parochial, personal, and arbitrary owing to their having to make their epiphanies on the surface of Life at some particular moment in the history of some particular body social, through the action of some individual man or woman who happened to have a genius for giving expression to a *Zeitgeist* in the medium of 'the Primordial Images'.¹

In an earlier context² we have noticed that such expressions of something temporary and local in terms of something lasting and ubiquitous are apt to be so distinctive that the aesthetic test proves to be the surest as well as the subtlest method of ascertaining the limits of a society's extension in the dimensions of Time and Space. Yet this aesthetic monogram which is an almost infallible token for establishing the identity of a social milieu is nevertheless not an intrinsic feature of the body social on whose lineaments it displays itself; it is an arbitrary imprint in the sense that a style of art is not constrained to the same extent as is a system of government or law to reflect the practical exigencies of a particular time and place, while on the other hand it is free from the intellectual servitude which compels a system of Mathematics or Natural Science or Technology to conform to an already acquired and accepted body of knowledge or 'know-how' in order to qualify for finding its

conscious' was a creature of the same parochial and ephemeral kind as the individual human intelligence itself.

The Collective Subconscious's illusory appearance of absoluteness in the individual's intellectual sight was an optical illusion of the same order as the illusory appearance of immobility which a growing plant presents to the physical vision of a human observer. When the growth of a plant has been photographed in a cine-camera with a time-exposure of several weeks' or months' duration, and when a motion that is imperceptible to human eyes in real life has been rendered visible to them on the film by the device of reeling off the tale of weeks and months in so many seconds, it becomes manifest, even to an observer whose powers of vision are limited by the obtuseness of so crude an organ as the human eye, that a plant is in truth no less limber and lithe a living creature than an animal. When the tempo is artificially speeded up on the screen to this degree, the human spectator can watch the roots of a growing plant twisting and turning, like wriggling worms or writhing snakes, as they feel their way round stones and other obstacles in their feverishly eager search for nutriment, while the spectacle of the frantic competitive upward growth of the flowers and grasses under a hedgerow in springtime, and the successive sudden wilting of each competitor when it reaches the limits of its staying power in this struggle for access to a light and an air that are necessities of life, will remind the onlooker of the tragic competition for survival between the human prisoners in the Black Hole of Calcutta. Thus, on the Time-scale of the twinkling of even a human eye, when this Time-scale has been artificially substituted for a normal pace that is of an incommensurably slower order of velocity, the normally apparent distinction between the seeming immobility of a plant and mobility of an animal can be perceived to be illusory; and on this physical analogy we may infer that, in the psychic universe, the corresponding distinction, normally apparent in the mental vision of a human intelligence, between the flux of human life on its conscious and volitional surface and its seeming invariability in its subconscious depths is an illusion which does not cloud the clear sight of an Almighty God.

In the writer's world in his generation, in which 'the Collective Subconscious' was a recent, and therefore an imposing, discovery of a post-Modern Western Science, it was important to be constantly mindful of the truth that the godlike appearance of this deep level of the abyss of the Psyche was no less illusory than the spurious divinity of individual human mannikins of the stature of a Cheops or a Chephren or an Alexander or a Caesar; for, considering the strength and persistence of men's impulse to worship their own latest creations or discoveries, it was to be apprehended that a Twentieth-Century Western Man might mistake a human 'Collective Subconscious' for God (see VII. vii. 514).

¹ For this concept of 'Primordial Images', see the works of C. G. Jung, *passim*.

² In III. iii. 378-80.

place in the cumulatively growing structure of the Human Spirit's 'collective intelligence'.¹ The Fine Arts thus contrive to make the best of both the worlds between which they serve as mediators. Like the voice of the Pythia delivering oracles to Hellas from the Omphalos, they overawe the Conscious Mind and Will by intoning with all the authority of Absolute Necessity, and at the same time delight them by babbling with all the licence of Perfect Freedom. The logically incompatible categories of Necessity and Freedom are, in fact, miraculously reconciled in these oracular artistic intimations of the Primordial Images.

This ambivalent Freedom-in-Necessity or Necessity-in-Freedom, which is the peculiar quality of the Fine Arts and is the secret of the influence that a literature or a visual art is able to exercise over the life of the society in which this art has originally lived and moved and had its being,² makes its magic power felt with a heightened potency in the life of an affiliated society in which the ghost of an antecedent society's art has been conjured up. An aesthetic style that has been arbitrary in one sense even in its original social milieu becomes doubly arbitrary when it is imposed on an alien body social which has already created for itself a native style of its own; yet the exponents of this native aesthetic style which is the haunted society's blazon find the ground give way under their feet when they try to stand up to the spectral trespasser upon their patrimony; for the familiar native style, no less than the uncanny *revenant*, is an arbitrary coinage of the Primordial Images into the aesthetic currency of a particular time and place. A native style of art cannot plead, like a native system of government or law, that it is the only practicable solution of local contemporary social problems; and it cannot plead either, like a current system of Mathematics or Natural Science or Technology, that it is the only rational integration of the sum of knowledge within its field that has been accumulated up to date. When the native art of a haunted society is waging its defensive war against a stalking ghost of the art of an antecedent civilization, it finds itself destitute of Law's or Science's natural defences in the realm of Here and Now, and it is therefore easily driven out of such forward positions into a last ditch in the realm of *Semper et Ubique* where the phantom aggressor is able to contend with the assaulted living art on equal terms.

The issue on which the battle will be decided in this last ditch will be the question which of the two contending arts presents the identical substance of unvarying Primordial Images in an alternative form that better satisfies the abiding and ubiquitous spiritual needs of the souls of men and women, without regard to the local temporary social milieu in which their lot has been cast in their mortal life as individuals; and, on this issue, a live art has no advantage over a ghost; for the accident of the live art's happening to be alive at the moment when the combat is taking place is irrelevant to the determination of the respective merits of the combatants if these merits are being weighed in balances that render their account in terms of eternal and universal values, without being

¹ The respective relations of the Fine Arts and the Mathematical and Natural Sciences to the social milieu are examined further on pp. 697-704, below.

² Acts xvii. 28.

subject to the distorting gravitational pulls of Date or Locality. Under these conditions the odds are even. The ghostly invader has just as good a chance as the living defender of an open city to be awarded the crown of victory by the suffrages of the living generation of the society in whose life the combat is taking place. In the emotional depths of their spiritual experience, in which they are citizens of a Commonwealth of the Subconscious which has likewise been the spiritual home of every other human being who has ever lived—whatever may have been the particular time and place of his conscious volitional life on the surface of human existence—the voters in the forum have no closer affinity and no more compelling obligation to the literature or visual art that they happen to have created for themselves out of the Primordial Images than they have to the arts which their predecessors, in their day, have created out of the same abiding and ubiquitous psychic *kylê*. On the plane of the Subconscious it is incontestably true that *nihil humanum* is *alienum* from any human soul.¹

The considerations which we have just set out will perhaps suffice to explain why it is that *revenantes* literatures and visual arts present such markedly ambivalent appearances and arouse such bitterly violent and stubborn controversies; and we may now pass on from this preface to a review of the facts to which it applies.

The Resuscitation of a Classical Literature in an Anthology, Thesaurus, or Encyclopaedia

A survey of renaissances of languages and literatures that require resuscitation because they are 'dead', and demand it on the score of being 'classical',² is in one respect easier to undertake than our foregoing surveys of those living languages that have served as *lingue franche*³ or as the official languages of universal states⁴ or the liturgical languages of churches,⁵ and than our accompanying surveys of living literatures which have used those living languages as their media. A living language has a life of its own; for it is not only *ex hypothesi* 'a going concern' before the birth of any literature that may eventually employ this living language as its medium; it may also continue thereafter to go its own way in the vocal and audible realm of the tongue and the ear on lines independent of its literary career in the scriben and legible realm of the penman's hand and the reader's eye into which it has now been translated. This original relation between a literature that uses a language and the language that is used by this literature is inverted when the ghosts of the same literature and same language are raised from the dead; for the ghost of a language can haunt the living world only as a parasite on the ghost of a literature which will originally have been an excrescence on the language in the days when the two have both been alive; and therefore, in surveying the renaissances of languages and literatures, we need not, and indeed cannot, deal with the *revenantes* languages apart from the *revenantes*

¹ Terence: *Hautontimorumenus*, Act I, scene 1, line 25.

² An attempt to define the distinctive characteristics of a 'classical' language and literature is made on pp. 705-17, below.

³ See V. vi. 62-83.

⁵ See VI. vii. 253-5.

⁴ See VI. vii. 239-53.

literatures which provide these 'dead' languages with their librettos for catching the eye of the audience of deaf mutes that confronts them when they reappear on the stage of History. Down to the time of writing, the hard labour of recapturing a 'dead' language had seldom been undertaken except for the sake of regaining access to monuments of literature in which this language had been enshrined;¹ and the usual course of a literary renaissance had been a series of steps towards a goal which was not the interpreter's *tour de force* of speaking a dead language as it had originally been spoken, but the scribe's *tour de force* of writing it as it had originally been written.

The first step in this arduous and unpromising enterprise was to retrieve the dead literature's remains; the second step was to remaster their meaning; the third step was to reproduce them in counterfeits which might be mistaken for maliciously adroit parodies if they were not patently inspired by a superstitious reverence for the originals which convicts them of being solemnly clumsy tributes of admiration.² In our survey of renaissances in this field, it will be convenient to follow *gradatim* in the footsteps of the literary necromancers whose procedure is the present object of our curiosity; but, as we investigate the three stages of this procedure in their historical order, it will become evident that they overlap with one another in the Time-dimension, and also that they are distinguished from one another by differences that are not mere corollaries of their chronological sequence.

For instance, when we come to look at the attempts to reproduce a 'classical' literature, we shall find that these imitative works of art, uninspired and uninspiring though they may be, do genuinely have at least one thing in common with their originals. Like these, they are the personal creations of individual human beings, not the mechanically assembled products of collective man-power. On the other hand we shall find team-work counting for more, and individual enterprise for less, in the execution of the preliminary and preparatory tasks of scholarship.

It is true that, here too, we shall meet with culture-heroes who have performed prodigies single-handed. The type is well exemplified in Photius (*vivebat circa* A.D. 820-91), the pioneer Orthodox Christian explorer of an Hellenic literature which, for a nascent Orthodox Christian Society, had been a *terra incognita* during a social interregnum that, on the cultural plane, had held the field continuously for two centuries down to Photius's own generation. The failure of the historical record to name anyone who was Photius's teacher is as eloquent as is its catalogue of his goodly company of pupils.³ His *Library* (*Violiothiki*) or *Host of Books* (*Myrióvivlon*) became a mine of information for later Orthodox

¹ It is true that in the Modern Western World there had been several attempts—which, down to the time of writing, had met with diverse degrees of success—to reanimate a 'dead' language *viva voce* as well as in the visual medium of script. Some of these experiments have been noticed in this Study already in V. vi. 62-71.

² In the realm of the Fine Arts the faculty of *mimêsis* is, of course, a two-edged sword which can be made to serve either as the sincerest form of flattery or as the deadliest form of exposure. The choice between these opposite uses is determined, not by any variation in the nature of the weapon, but by a difference in the temper of its wielder.

³ This point is made by Krumbacher, K.: *Geschichte der Byzantinischen Literatur*, 2nd ed. (Munich 1897, Beck), p. 515.

Christian students of the Hellenic literature, and thereafter for Western students of it in their turn; the actual number of works noticed in this literary digest is 280; and, according to Photius's own account, these were merely the books that happened to have been read, studied, discussed, and appraised in his literary circle during the temporary absence of his brother, to whom the *Library* is dedicated as a *compte rendu* of the transactions in which the absentee had been unable to participate personally. Even if we were to suspect that this dedication was a literary *jeu d'esprit*, and that the contents of the Library represented a larger part of Photius's life-long literary output than the small fraction that they purport to be,¹ the extent of Photius's acquaintance with the Hellenic literature would still remain portentous by comparison with the ignorance of this pioneer scholar's own immediate predecessors.

An independent private scholar of the stature of a Photius is not, however, the characteristic figure in the landscape of a dawning literary renaissance. The pioneer enterprise of reoccupying a long since derelict literary empire is a piece of titan's work that may require the mobilization of a living political empire's organized collective resources; the typical monument of a literary renaissance in its first or second phase is an anthology, thesaurus, corpus, lexicon, or encyclopaedia compiled by a team of scholars at the instance of a prince; and the princely patron of such works of co-operative scholarship as these has, more often than not, been the ruler of a resuscitated universal state that has, itself, been the product of a renaissance on the political plane. Of the five outstandingly eminent representatives of the type who had appeared on the stage of History down to the time of writing—namely, Assurbanipal, Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Yung Lo, K'ang Hsi, and Ch'ien Lung—the last four had all been emperors of *imperia rediviva*.

In the execution of the preliminary task of collecting, editing, annotating, and publishing the surviving works of a 'dead' classical literature, the Far Eastern emperors of a resuscitated Sinic universal state had not only far outdistanced all their competitors up to date but had raised paper monuments whose pyramid-like mass could not easily have been equalled even by the output of a post-Modern Western World with its unprecedented capacity for material production.

It is true that the size of Assurbanipal's two clay libraries of Sumerian and Akkadian classical literature was an unknown and unknowable quantity for the latter-day Western archaeologists who had learnt of the assemblage and dispersal of these two great Assyrian collections by recovering some of the tablets in the course of their excavations on the site of Nineveh; for, within perhaps not more than sixteen years of the royal scholar-criminal's death, the contents of both his libraries had been 'scattered broadcast over the ruins'² of a hateful city that had been stormed, sacked, and devastated in 612 B.C. by the infuriated victims of the last and most atrocious bout of Assyrian militarism.³ Assurbanipal's collection may have been larger than the Confucian Canon of the Sinic

¹ See Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

² Thompson, R. Campbell, in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1925, University Press), p. 206.

³ See IV. iv. 468-70 and 483-4.

Classics which was, not facily impressed on soft clay, but laboriously engraved on hard stone, at Si Ngan, the imperial capital of the T'ang Dynasty,¹ between A.D. 836 and A.D. 841,² and was printed between A.D. 932 and A.D. 953—during the bout of political anarchy between the extinction of the T'ang and the establishment of the Sung—in an edition which, including the commentary as well as the text, filled 130 volumes.³ Yet we may guess with some confidence that the number of the cuneiform characters contained in Asshurbanipal's collection during the brief period of its existence as a going concern was small by comparison with the number of the Sinic characters contained in the comprehensive collection of works of a Sinic and Sinistic literature which Yung Lo, the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty,⁴ assembled in A.D. 1403-7; for the revised version of Yung Lo's *Ta Tien* ran to no fewer than 22,877 books filling 11,095 volumes, without reckoning in the table of contents.⁵

This gigantic *Corpus Sinicum*, which had required the services of 2,180 or more scholars for the task of selection and transcription,⁶ was beyond the printing capacity⁷ even of a Far Eastern World whose enthusiasm for its Sinic cultural heritage had been reinforced by a Zealot hatred of alien Mongol conquerors⁸ whom the Ming had recently succeeded in expelling from Intramural China; and, according to one account, a set of the *Ta Tien* in manuscript that had become, if it had not always been, unique was eventually destroyed by fire during the fighting in Peking in A.D. 1900 when the Legation Quarter was besieged by 'the Boxers' and relieved by an international expeditionary force.⁹

¹ See VI. vii. 213.

² See Goodrich, L. C.: *A Short History of the Chinese People* (London 1948, Allen & Unwin), p. 132.

³ See Goodrich, op. cit., p. 141. This task was executed by the Hanlin Academy of Letters, which had been founded by the T'ang Emperor Hsüan Tsung on the eve of the troubles of A.D. 755-65, and which survived into the nineteenth century (ibid., p. 132).

⁴ Some of Yung Lo's achievements in other fields have been noticed already in II. ii. 122 and in VI. vii. 264, n. 6.

⁵ See Goodrich, L. C.: *A Short History of the Chinese People* (London 1948, Allen & Unwin), p. 201. The table of contents, running to sixty books, accounts for the discrepancy between the figure of 22,877 books given in *Der Grosse Brockhaus* (Leipzig 1929, Brockhaus, 20 vols.), vol. iv, p. 54, s.v. 'Chinesische Literatur', and the figure of 22,937 given in *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1929, vol. v, p. 573, s.v. 'Chinese Literature'. These figures are derived from the Manchu Emperor Ch'ien Lung's notice of the *Ta Tien* in his catalogue of his own collection. An English translation of this notice by W. F. Meyers will be found in *The China Review*, vol. vi (1877-8), pp. 215-17.

⁶ See Goodrich, ibid. The number is stated to have been 2,169 in the notice of the *Ta Tien* in Ch'ien Lung's catalogue of his own collection, cited in the preceding footnote.

⁷ Though the work could not be printed as a whole, a number of its component parts were printed separately (see Goodrich, ibid.).

⁸ See V. v. 348-52.

⁹ This is the account given in Wilhelm, R.: *Geschichte der Chinesischen Kultur* (Munich 1908, Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung), pp. 40 and 41. According to Goodrich, op. cit., loc. cit., and to *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1929, loc. cit., there had once been three manuscript sets of the complete work. Out of these three sets, only 368 volumes were known to be in existence in A.D. 1949, according to Goodrich, ibid. According to the notice, cited already, in Ch'ien Lung's catalogue of his own collection, one duplicate manuscript set of the *Ta Tien* was made in the years A.D. 1407-9 for the printer's use before the project of printing the *Ta Tien* was abandoned; the whole collection was moved from Nanking to Peking when the imperial capital was transferred thither by Yung Lo in A.D. 1421 (see II. ii. 122); two more manuscript sets were made at Peking in A.D. 1562-7; the two original sets were then sent back to Nanking; but, out of the four, one Peking copy alone survived the disturbances that accompanied the fall of the Ming Dynasty. At the time when the notice in Ch'ien Lung's catalogue was drawn up (i.e. at some date between A.D. 1772 and A.D. 1782), only 2,422 books were missing in this surviving set, out of the original total of 22,937 (including the table of contents). At the date when Meyers was

When the Manchu Emperors K'ang Hsi (*imperabat* A.D. 1662-1722) and Ch'ien Lung (*imperabat* A.D. 1736-96) emulated their Ming predecessor Yung Lo's achievement, they endowed their own collection of the Sinic classical literature with better expectations of life. K'ang Hsi's *K'in Ting Ku Ch'in T'u Shu Chi Ch'êng* ('Compendium of Literature and Illustrations, Ancient and Modern, drawn up under Imperial Authority')¹ was more fortunate than Yung Lo's *Ta Tien* in duly finding its way into print, thanks to the comparative modesty of its compass of 10,000 books in 5,000 volumes (not including a table of contents running to 40 books in 20 volumes) and to the adoption of a suggestion, made by the Jesuit mission in Peking, that a fount of movable metal type should be cast for it as a cheaper alternative method of printing than the cutting of wooden blocks. K'ang Hsi's collection was eventually printed—in a hundred sets according to one account, and in thirty according to another—in A.D. 1726 under the auspices of his successor Yung Chang (*imperabat* A.D. 1723-35).²

The printing *in extenso* of Ch'ien Lung's *Ssu-k'u Ch'üan Shu*³ was out of the question, for this was a collection, not of extracts, like Yung Lo's and K'ang Hsi's, but of complete works⁴ of all genres, which were collected by the imperial officials throughout the Empire in pursuance of a decree issued by Ch'ien Lung in A.D. 1772, and were collated with the materials already assembled in Yung Lo's and K'ang Hsi's collections by an editorial commission appointed in A.D. 1773.⁵ The commission eventually incorporated in the collection, according to one account, 3,511 works in 78,731 books, or, according to another account, 3,460 works in 75,854 books.⁶ The commission also produced an analytical writing (A.D. 1877-8), this copy was still extant in the Hanlin College at Peking, in a building erected there for the housing of imperial collections of literature (see Mayers, *ibid.*, p. 217).

¹ See Mayers, *ibid.*, pp. 218-23.

² 'The editors of the famous encyclopaedia *Ku Ch'in T'u Shu Chi Ch'êng*, whom his father had pardoned for political offences, were put in danger of their lives in order that he might enjoy the cheap satisfaction of having the work brought out under orders of his own choosing, though it was probably already complete' (Goodrich, L. C.: *The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-lung* (Baltimore 1935, Waverley Press), p. 21).

³ See Mayers, *ibid.*, pp. 291-9. Goodrich, *op. cit.*, pp. 31 and 36, cites an unprinted essay, on deposit in the library of Columbia University, by Wen-yu Yen, entitled '*Ssu-k'u Ch'üan Shu*, "The Four Treasuries Library" and its Influence upon Chinese Culture' (dated June 1932).

⁴ See Goodrich, *op. cit.*, p. 30; Mayers, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

⁵ 'The same officials who were appointed to invite book-collectors to lend or sell rare texts to the Emperor were likewise required to search out and demand volumes and manuscripts thought inimical to dynastic interests; and . . . for nearly ten years the same officials in Peking who made the selections of books to be copied into *The Four Treasuries* also made note of censorable items and reported them to the Throne.

'Ch'ien Lung . . . for all the munificence of his gifts to literature . . . stands accused before the bar of public opinion for his open interference with the independence of the scholars of his day, for his deliberate falsification of history, for his malice towards a score of authors (several deceased long before) and their descendants, and for his repeated burning of hundreds of books, wood blocks of many of them included . . . a destruction of literary matter which one modern Chinese writer [Wang Kuang-wei in the *Bulletin de l'Institut de l'Université Nationale* (Peking) for the 3rd February, 1926, 17] has no hesitation in classing as second only to the holocaust under Ts'ien Shih Hwang'—Goodrich, L. C.: *The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-lung* (Baltimore 1935, Waverley Press), pp. 31 and 36.

⁶ See Mayers, *ibid.*, pp. 297-8 and 295. Mayers considers the larger of these two alternative sets of figures to be the more authoritative. The material taken from the *Yung Lo Ta Tien* consisted of 85 complete works and 284 fragmentary works (Mayers, *ibid.*, p. 298), running to 4,946 books (Mayers, *ibid.*, p. 217).

catalogue, running to 200 books, giving a calendar of works submitted but rejected, as well as one of works included. This catalogue, an abridgement of it, and 147 of the collected works themselves,¹ were eventually printed. The preservation of the collection as a whole was provided for by the multiplication and dispersion of manuscript sets. In addition to the original fair copy, three others were made for official use, and these four were deposited in buildings, specially erected to house them, in the precincts of the Imperial Palace at Peking, at Yüan-ming Yüan, at Jehol, and at Mukden.² Three further complete manuscript sets were deposited in existing libraries at Yangchow, Chinkiang, and Hangchow. The rough copy was presented to the Hanlin Academy. Two manuscript sets of an anthology containing about a third of the complete collection were also lodged in the Imperial Palace at Peking and at Yüan-ming Yüan respectively.

These huge collections of the remains of the Sinic classical literature that were assembled by rulers of a Far Eastern oecumenical empire dwarf the corresponding works of the East Roman Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*imperabat* A.D. 912–59). Constantine organized the extraction of excerpts, classified under divers heads,³ with the object of thereby making accessible to an intellectually awakening Orthodox Christian Society the cream of an Hellenic classical literature which—even in the shreds and tatters to which its remains had been reduced already by the storm and stress of a post-Hellenic interregnum—was still, in the tenth century of the Christian Era, quite ‘immeasurable’ and ‘unmanageable’ in its bulk⁴ when this was pitted against the narrowly limited receptive powers of an individual human intellect. These Byzantine works of collective scholarship that were produced on Constantine Porphyrogenitus’s initiative and under his auspices shrink into insignificance under the shadow of the mighty works of a Yung Lo and a Ch’ien Lung; and, if the East Roman scholar-emperor could challenge comparison with his giant Far Eastern counterparts on any ground at all, he would have a better prospect of holding his own as an author of original works⁵

¹ See Goodrich, *op. cit.*, p. 148. Mayers, *loc. cit.*, p. 296, gives the number as ‘some 130 in all’.

² See VI. vii. 199, n. 4.

³ i.e. *Diplomatic Missions, Virtues and Vices, Sententious Sayings* (περὶ γνωμῶν), and *Conspiracies against Sovereign Princes*, to mention only the heads under which Constantine Porphyrogenitus is known for a certainty to have made collections of extracts from the Hellenic Classics (see Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 258–61). Constantine also arranged for the production of new editions of two late Hellenic works of the same character as his own collections: namely, the sixth-century compiler Cassianus Bassus’s *Information about Agriculture* (Γεωπονικά) and the fourth-century compiler Oreibasius’s *Concise Survey of Medical Theories* (Ἐπιτομή τῶν Ἱατρικῶν Θεωρημάτων) (see Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 261–4).

⁴ Ἐπ’ ἀπειρὸν τε καὶ ἀμήχανον ἡ τῆς ἱστορίας εὐρύνητο συμπλοκή.—Constantine Porphyrogenitus: *περὶ Ἀρετῆς καὶ Κακίας*, Introduction, quoted by Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 258–9.

⁵ Constantine Porphyrogenitus wrote *An Historical Narration of the Life and Acts of the Emperor Basil* (Ἱστορικὴ Περὶ τοῦ Βασιλέως Βασίλειου ἱστορία) [i.e. the author’s grandfather Basil I (*imperabat* A.D. 867–86), the founder of the Macedonian Dynasty]; *The Administration of the Empire; The Army Corps Districts* (θέματα) *appertaining to the Empire of the Romans and the Origins and Etymologies of their Names, bringing out the distinction between the Names that have been Newly Coined and those that have been Resuscitated from the Ancient Nomenclature*; and *An Exposition and Outline of the Imperial Rules and Regulations* (Ἡ τῆς Βασιλείου Τάξεως Ἐκθεσις τε καὶ Ὑποτύπωσις), labelled *De Caerimoniis Aulae Byzantinae* by Modern Western scholars.

In the foregoing list, the order in which Constantine’s original works have been

than as a 'captain of literary industry' directing and organizing the labours of 'intellectual workers'.¹

The Byzantine scholar-Heraclès who could have looked Ch'ien Lung in the face without being abashed was not the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus but his commoner-namesake and approximate contemporary Constantine Kephalàs, who, without having at his command the resources of an imperial secretariat and an imperial exchequer, succeeded in accomplishing the formidable task of collecting and arranging under subject-headings a vast anthology of the Hellenic poetry written in elegiac verse that had been produced in the course of the twelve or thirteen hundred years ending in the sixth century of the Christian Era. Nor was Kephalàs the only private Byzantine scholar who distinguished himself as a collector of Hellenic poems of this genre. At the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries he found a worthy successor in Maximos Planoúdis, whose anthology proclaims its independence of Kephalàs' work in its arrangement as well as in its contents.²

When we pass from the preliminary work of collecting and editing a classical literature to the subsequent task of interpreting its meaning, we find Far Eastern scholarship here again putting all competitors into the shade. At least three notable encyclopaedias of Sinic knowledge were compiled during the T'ang régime³ and four during the Sung.⁴ Three of these became classics under the collective title *San T'ung* ('The Three Encyclopaedias').⁵ In the Ming Age, six such works dating from the T'ang and Sung Age were used by Yü Ngan-k'í for the compilation of a thesaurus of literary extracts;⁶ and his work, in its turn, was capped by the Manchu Emperor K'ang Hsi's dictionary of universal reference, *Yuan Kien Lei Hai*, published in A.D. 1710.⁷ The Sung Age had seen the compilation of two notable lexicons, one of which dealt with no less than 53,525 characters.⁸ The *Tsü-Hui*, published in A.D. 1615 at a time when the Ming Dynasty was declining towards its fall, dealt with not more

mentioned is a descending order of originality. The *De Caerimoniis* owes its great historical value to the fact that it is little more than a new edition of an old handbook in which the date and authorship of a number of the earlier component parts are still recognizable. The *De Thematis* likewise draws largely, and in many passages *verbatim*, on previously existing works; but in this case, unfortunately, the sources on which Constantine has chosen to draw are descriptions of the administrative organization of the Late Roman Empire as it was before the great administrative interregnum in the seventh century of the Christian Era, with the result that this disappointing work of Constantine's tells us much less than its title promises about the origin and development of the actual administrative organization, based on army-corps districts, which was the new and distinctive system current in the East Roman Empire (see Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-4). We have noticed in another context (in IV. iv. 342) that the East Roman Empire had been generated by the union of the two army-corps districts of the Anatolici and the Armeniaci with one another and with the imperial city of Constantinople in the eighth century of the Christian Era.

¹ The comparable 'industrialization' of historical scholarship in a post-Modern Western World has been noticed in I. i. 3-8.

² Though Planoúdis left out of his collection many epigrams that Kephalàs had included in his, he also included a number that Kephalàs had left out; and he arranged his own selection on a new plan, under a larger number of heads which he divided into sub-heads (see Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 727-8).

³ See Goodrich, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-6.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 152-3.

⁵ See Mayers, W. F.: 'The Chinese Imperial Collections of Literature', in *The China Review*, 187, pp. 214-15.

⁶ See Mayers, *ibid.*, p. 287.

⁷ See Mayers, *ibid.*, pp. 287-8.

⁸ See Goodrich, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

than 33,179 characters but was remarkable for the achievement of arranging these under not more than 214 radicals, in contrast to the 540 that was the lowest figure to which the number had been reduced in any previous analysis.¹ K'ang Hsi (*imperabat* A.D. 1662–1722) organized the production of a lexicon dealing with more than 40,000 characters² (the *K'ang Hsi Tsi-Tien*, published in A.D. 1716) and two concordances (the *P'ei-Wen Yün-Fu*, published in A.D. 1711 in 444 books, with a supplement of 112 books published in A.D. 1716, and the *P'ien-Tsi-Lei-Pien*, published in A.D. 1726 in 240 books) that were designed for the same use as the Modern Western Humanist's *Gradus ad Parnassum*.³ There are corresponding works to the credit of private Byzantine scholars—Photius's lexicon,⁴ Soufthas' encyclopaedia,⁵ and a number of etymological dictionaries of unknown authorship⁶—but, if these Byzantine scholars could have had any inkling of the scale on which K'ang Hsi was to do for the Sinic classics what they were trying to do for the Hellenic classics in the lexicographer's line, there would have been no more spirit in them than there was in the Queen of Sheba when she had seen all Solomon's wisdom.⁷

When we pass from lexicography to criticism and exegesis, Orthodox Christendom can produce one outstanding figure in the person of the twelfth-century scholar-bishop Eustathius, whose commentary on the Homeric poems had proved of lasting value to succeeding Byzantine and Western students down to the time of writing. Eustathius's intellect was no less eminent than his moral character.⁸ But how could one single champion be expected to prove a match for the legion of Western scholars who invaded the field of Hellenic studies in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, or for the two waves of Far Eastern scholars who made progressive conquests in the field of Sinic studies in the age of the Sung and the age of the Manchu Dynasty?⁹

Critical scholarship in China under the Manchu domination was the child of abortive political endeavours that, in failing, moved the scholar-administrators who had made them to transfer their energies to an intellectual field in which they could count on finding themselves still masters of the situation. In the early decades of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, when the Ming imperial régime in China was in its death agonies, the Confucian civil servants made two successive attempts—which were as honourable and as unsuccessful as the similar attempts that these latter-day imperial administrators' predecessors had made in the last days of the Posterior Han¹⁰—to save the régime from collapse

¹ See Goodrich, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

² According to *Der Grosse Brockhaus*, 1929, vol. iv, p. 55, the number was 40,545; according to *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1929, vol. v, p. 573, this lexicon ran to 49,000 characters arranged under 214 radicals (like Mei Ying-tso's *Tzû-Hui*).

³ *Der Grosse Brockhaus*, 1929, vol. iv, p. 55. Details will be found in Mayers, *loc. cit.*, pp. 288–91.

⁴ See Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 519–21.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 562–70.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 573–6.

⁷ 1 Kings x. 5 and 4.

⁸ In A.D. 1185 even the obscene Western Christian conquerors of Salonica, the Orthodox Christian city that was Eustathius's archiepiscopal see, were unable to resist the spell of this 'schismatic' prelate's saintliness; and, as far as his unfortunate flock did receive any mercy, they owed it to his intrepid intercession on their behalf (see IX. viii. 375, n.3).

⁹ See *Der Grosse Brockhaus*, 1929, vol. iv, p. 55.

¹⁰ See VI. vii. 371, n. 3.

by rescuing it from the hands of the palace eunuchs.¹ Thereafter, when the incurable corruption and incompetence of an effete indigenous dynasty brought extinction upon them and subjugation upon their subjects at the hands of Manchu barbarians, the Confucian litterati once again played an honourable part in the political arena—first by taking their share in an eventually unsuccessful Zealot resistance movement in the South, and then by engaging in an eventually successful manoeuvre to captivate a resuscitated Sinic universal state's Manchu barbarian conquerors by making their own administrative services indispensable to the Empire's new masters.² In this 'cold war' between litterati and barbarians the intellectual attractiveness of the Confucian literary culture was as potent a weapon in the hands of the mandarins as the political utility of the Confucian administrative tradition; and, in this light, the outburst of critical scholarship in China in the seventeenth century may be regarded as a by-product, on the intellectual plane, of a movement of withdrawal-and-return that was to end on the political plane on which it had begun.³

The critical scholarship of the Manchu Age was not an entirely new departure, since the Neoconfucian philosophers of the Sung Age⁴ had already cast doubt on the authenticity of some of the works that had come to be included in the canon of the Classics.⁵ But, if the seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Confucian scholars were indebted to the twelfth-century and thirteenth-century Neoconfucian philosophers for their critical approach to the Classics, they found their chief stimulus in exercising these awakened critical faculties at the Neoconfucians' expense. After having exposed the Buddhist and Taoist provenance of the Neoconfucians' cosmology, ethics, and psychology, they went on to condemn their scholarship itself as being unscientifically subjective;⁶ and they justified their censoriousness by the exactness and exhaustiveness of their own work on the Sinic classical literature not only in the fields of phonetics, semantics, and textual criticism but in the less pedestrian enterprise of higher criticism as well.⁷

The Counterfeiting of a Resuscitated Classical Literature

When we pass from these preliminary and preparatory tasks of scholarship to the scholar's conceit of producing counterfeits of a classical literature that he is striving to raise from the dead, we must leave it to statisticians to determine whether the number of essays in the Sinic classical style that were produced by candidates for the imperial civil service examinations in China in the course of the 1,283 years that

¹ See Hu Hsih: 'The Chinese Renaissance', in *The China Year Book*, 1924-5 (London N.D., Simpkin Marshall), p. 633.

² See Hu Hsih, *ibid.* p. 634.

³ On this showing, it would appear that the seventeenth-century Chinese scholars who performed such prodigies in the exegesis of the Sinic classical literature were following in the footsteps of Confucius himself and were thereby also taking the same course as the Pleiad of historians—a Thucydides, Xenophon, Josephus, Ollivier, Machiavelli, Polybius, Clarendon, and Ibn Khaldūn—whose auspiciously broken careers we have examined in an earlier context (see III, iii. 248-377).

⁴ See pp. 41-43, above.

⁶ See Hu Hsih, *ibid.*, p. 635.

⁵ See Hu Hsih, *ibid.*, p. 634.

⁷ See Hu Hsih, *ibid.*, pp. 635-6.

elapsed between their reinstitution by T'ang T'ai Tsung in A.D. 622¹ and their abolition in A.D. 1905 in the last days of the Manchu régime was greater or less than the number of exercises in the writing of classical Latin and Greek prose and verse that had been produced by scholars and schoolboys in the Western World between the fifteenth century of the Christian Era and the time of writing. But, whatever might prove to be the answer to this statistical conundrum, it could be predicted that, in a competition in the use of resuscitated classical languages for literary purposes, mere volume of production would not avail to wrest into Chinese or Western hands the palm held by a band of Byzantine historians who found their medium of literary expression in the renaissance of an Attic Greek *κοινή*.

"The authors who brought historiography back to life after the fatal interregnum, extending from the middle of the seventh to the middle of the ninth century of the Christian Era, promptly addressed themselves to the ancient models; and the Age of the Comneni and the Palaeologi brings with it the spectacle of a marked increase in this subservience to [Hellenic] Antiquity. It would be a legitimate generalisation to say that the only substantial difference that distinguishes the [Byzantine] historians of the eleventh to the fifteenth century from the [Late Hellenic] historians of the sixth and seventh centuries is to be found in their respective ways of using a common external medium of exposition. As used by the historians of the Byzantine School, this literary instrument is much more artificial and much more obviously something that has been learnt by rote like a school-boy's lesson. Procopius, Agathias, Menander Protector, Evagrius, and Theophylactus Simocatta may indulge in all kinds of mannerism and apishness, yet they have none of them quite lost their foothold in the living [Greek] speech of the cultivated society of their time, whereas an Anna Comnena studies her Ancient Greek as a foreign language, and this predicament of Anna's is the common embarrassment of all Byzantine historians from the twelfth century onwards. By their time the living [Modern Greek] language had departed so far from Ancient Greek in its morphology, its vocabulary and its syntax that the traditional language of *belles lettres* had come to be no longer even intelligible except at the price of a thorough preparatory grounding in it. This is the sole really generic formal difference that distinguishes the Byzantine historians in the strict sense of the term from the Late Hellenic historians."²

This linguistic and literary make-believe was carried to its preposterous *reductio ad absurdum* by two of the four last cultivators of the genre: a fifteenth-century Athenian Nicholas Khalkokondhýlis who transposed his Christian name into an Hellenic-looking 'Laónikos', and a fifteenth-century Imbrian Kritópoulos who, by a more adroit change of just two letters of the Alphabet,³ coined a likewise Hellenic-looking 'Kritóvoulos' out of a surname that advertised the bearer's Cretan origin. Not content

¹ 'After A.D. 681, the final examination for the highest degree, conducted 262 times during the [period of the] T'ang régime, included: (1) five essays on current events, (2) essays on the Confucian classics and history, (3) an original poem and a composition in rhythmic prose, and (4) special tests covering such topics as Mathematics and Law' (Goodrich, L. C.: *A Short History of the Chinese People* (London 1948, Allen & Unwin), p. 131, n. 18, following A. W. Hummel in *Report of the Librarian of Congress*, 1938, p. 222).

² Krumbacher, op. cit., pp. 226-7.

³ Κρητόπουλος could be transformed into Κριτόβουλος by substituting an ι for an η and a β for a π.

—as an Anna Comnena and a Nikítas Khoniátis had been—with trying to write an Attic *κωμῆ* that might be mistaken by a charitable reader for the language of a Diodorus or a Procopius, the latter-day Athenian aspired to be a second Herodotus, and the latter-day Imbrian to be a second Thucydides; and each of these would-be mimics of the most elusive of all Hellenic originals rashly proclaimed his pretensions in an exordium aping his august ensample's famous opening words—only to fall into solecisms of syntax, vocabulary, and morphology for which a classically educated Modern Western schoolboy would have blushed if he had been convicted of having made such gross mistakes in such countless numbers. Yet the classically educated reader of these Byzantine historians' works whose teeth are set on edge by the stridency of the discord between their pretensions and their performance on the linguistic and literary plane would be guilty of the very frivolity by which these unsuccessful mimics offend him if he were to allow a wanton injury to his aesthetic sensibilities to blind him to the serious merits of the intellectual substance that is masked by an excruciatingly affected linguistic and literary form. A Malvolio-like Kritópoulos or Khalkokondhýlis can challenge comparison with an unpretentious Dhoúkas or Phrantzis when he offers himself for appraisal, not as an author of a work written in Attic or Ionic Greek in the classical Hellenic style, but as a writer of the history of his own time. A Phrantzis and a Khalkokondhýlis in the service of the Palaiológhi, a Dhoúkas in the service of the Gattilusi, and a Kritópoulos in the service of the 'Osmanli all succeeded, from their divers angles of vision, in appreciating and conveying the historic importance of the rise of an Ottoman Power that, in their day, was imposing an alien universal state upon their own Orthodox Christian Society; and a comparable historical insight had been shown by a number of their predecessors.

The first of the series, Léon Dhiakónos, whose work covers the history of seventeen years (A.D. 959–75) ending shortly before the outbreak of the Great Romano-Bulgarian War (*gerebatur* A.D. 977–1019), fully deserved a tribute that had been paid to him by Bury;¹ and, within the span of nearly five hundred years that separates Leo's generation from Kritópoulos's, Leo had a number of notable successors, among whom we may pick out, for mention here,² the Emperor Alexius Comnenus's

¹ 'With the history of Leo Diaconus (Leo Asiaticus) we enter upon a new period of historiography. After an interval of more than three hundred years, he seems to reopen the series which closed with Theophylactus Simocatta. His history . . . is . . . a contemporary work in a good sense, depending on personal knowledge and information derived from living people, not on previous writers' (Bury, J. B., in his edition of Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Editio Minor, vol. v (London 1901, Methuen), p. 504).

² In refusing an honourable mention to Léon Dhiakónos's immediate successor Michael Psellos, the writer of this Study was conscious of his temerity in challenging the verdict of a scholar who was far better versed than he was in Medieval Greek literature. In Miss J. M. Hussey's judgement, Psellos's work was so excellent that the highest praise which she could bestow on Leo's was to rate this only one degree lower than the Psellan level. 'Leo's story of the tenth century is almost as delightful as Psellus's of the eleventh, although quite different in style and outlook' (*Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire, 867–1118* (London 1937, Milford), p. 27). It is different indeed; and, though, by the date at which this note was being written, eighteen years had passed since the writer had had his own experience of reading Leo's history and Psellos's continuation of it one after the other, the passage of time had not taken the edge off the sharpness of

learned daughter Anna (*vivebat* A.D. 1083–*post* 1148), who continued and completed a history of the restoration of the East Roman Empire in her father's generation which had been begun by her husband the Caesar Nikiphóros Vryénnios (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1062–*post* 1137); a Ioánnis Kínnamos who wrote the history of the Comnenan régime during its 'Indian Summer' (A.D. 1118–76); a Nikítas Khoniátis who lived to see and describe the catastrophe of A.D. 1204; and a fourteenth-century Ioánnis Kandakouzínos whose plausible *apologia pro vitâ suâ* could not cover the tracks of the truth that, in usurping the East Roman imperial crown and thereby precipitating a civil war (*saeviebat* A.D. 1341–54), he had opened the way for the 'Osmanlis to leap the Dardanelles and entrench themselves in Rumelia.

The Discomfiture of an Hellenic Ghost by a Western Vernacular Literature

If we now extend our synoptic view of the Far Eastern, Orthodox Christian, and Western renaissances of a classical language and literature to embrace the whole course of each of these three movements from beginning to end, we shall notice that the Far Eastern and the Orthodox Christian renaissance resemble one another and differ alike from the Western renaissance in two respects. In the first place, each of the two non-Western movements succeeded, when once it had got under way, in going forward, not indeed without occasional pauses, but at least without any serious set-backs, whereas the Western literary renaissance that got under way in Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had had an eighth-century precursor of Northumbrian origin which had been abortive.¹ In the second place the counter-movement by which each of the two non-Western literary renaissances was eventually overcome was not any domestic reaction against it in favour of the native genius of the civilization which had put itself under a self-imposed ban by conjuring up this ghost of an antecedent society's culture. In the Far Eastern World and Orthodox Christendom, the haunted society never even attempted to exorcize the domineering *revenant*, and was not relieved of its oppressive presence until one masterful alien intruder was expelled by another in the shape of a contemporary Western Civilization which captivated Orthodox Christendom in the course of the seventeenth century, and China at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,

the disappointment that he had suffered then in finding Psellos belying his high reputation by showing himself quite destitute of Leo's flair for what is historically interesting and important.

It is true enough that 'scholarship in the eleventh century is often unconsciously considered in terms of Michael Psellus' and that he is 'the most prominent figure of the revival of learning [in Greek Orthodox Christendom] in the eleventh century' (Hussey, *op. cit.*, p. 43); but the conspicuousness of the position which Psellos undoubtedly succeeded in securing for himself in the Hall of Fame certifies nothing beyond his ability to impress Posterity. He achieved this by his facility as a writer; but this very facility convicts him of superficiality in the sight of a reader who measures the felicity of his pen against the jejuneness of his intellect. On this test the present writer inclines towards Krumbacher's harsh judgement on Psellos (Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, p. 435, cited in Hussey, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–44) rather than towards Miss Hussey's more indulgent appreciation of him; and he remains of the opinion that, without prejudice to the question whether Psellos's loss of his academic chair was or was not deserved (see Hussey, *op. cit.*, pp. 65–71), the professor of Hellenic philosophy cannot hold a candle to his predecessor the deacon as a writer of the history of his own times.

¹ This difference has been noticed in IV. iv. 363, with n. 1.

of the Christian Era.¹ By contrast, the Modern Western renaissance of an Hellenic literature represented by the surviving remains of the Greek and Latin Classics was exorcized by the native genius of the Western Civilization, without the help of any alien cultural ally, in a *Kulturkampf* between the respective champions of 'the Ancients' and 'the Moderns' which resulted, before the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, in a decisive victory for an anti-Hellenic 'Counter-Renaissance'.²

The abortive first attempt at a literary renaissance of Hellenism in Western Christendom was coeval with the birth of the Western Christian Civilization itself. The insular prophet of the movement in Northumbria³ was the Venerable Bede of Jarrow (*vivebat* A.D. 673-735); its continental apostle in Carolingia was Alcuin of York (*vivebat* A.D. 735-804);⁴ and, before it was prematurely extinguished by a blast of barbarism from Scandinavia, its exponents had not only begun to revive the Hellenic literary culture in its Latin dress, but had even acquired a smattering of the original Greek.⁵ Alcuin had dared to dream that, in partnership with Charlemagne, he would be able to conjure up a ghost of Athens on the soil of Frankland;⁶ but this Carolingian vision was as fleeting as it was splendid; it had no sooner made this first momentary epiphany than it vanished again without giving its dupes the time to test it; and, when, after a seven-hundred-years-long night-watch,⁷ it was recaptured at last, at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era, by an exultant band of sanguine-minded Italian Humanists,⁸ their longer hold upon it merely served to demonstrate that its fabric was baseless, and that, in persistently clutching at this elusive wraith of Hellenism, *Homo Occidentalis* was courting the poignant frustration that Aeneas brought upon himself when he thrice endeavoured to embrace the shade of Creüsa.⁹

¹ See IX. viii. 182-4 and 324-30.

² This Modern Western cultural civil war has been noticed in IV. iv. 363, with n. 2.

³ An appreciation of this Northumbrian renaissance and a notice of its propagation in the Carolingian Empire will be found in Dawson, Ch.: *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), pp. 63-66 and 69-72.

⁴ See Duckett, E. S.: *Alcuin, Friend of Charlemagne* (London 1952, Macmillan).

⁵ The Carolingian Hellenists, such as they were, may have been the Irish Hellenists' teachers. At any rate, the Irish scholars who are known to have had some acquaintance with Greek seem all to have been ninth-century Irish residents in Continental Western Europe (see II. ii. 327, n. 1).

⁶ Alcuin: *Correspondence*, Letter No. 170, addressed to Charlemagne (see Dawson, op. cit., p. 71).

⁷ In a thirteenth-century University of Paris that was given over to the study of the Aristotelian philosophy, the arts and *belles lettres* were despised; and, in a thirteenth-century University of Oxford, Robert Grosseteste and his disciple Roger Bacon studied Ancient Greek (see pp. 133-5, below), not with a view to gaining any wide acquaintance with the Hellenic literature, but solely with an eye to a more accurate understanding of the works of Aristotle and the Scriptures of the Christian Church. This was a revulsion from the aftermath of a Carolingian literary renaissance which had left Western scholars destitute of any source of knowledge beyond the Latin *belles lettres* that had been preserved in the West to serve as textbooks for grammar and rhetoric; but a shift of interest from literature to metaphysics that was so marked in a twelfth-century and thirteenth-century Transalpine Western Christendom had no counterpart in a contemporary Italy, where, as we have seen (on pp. 31-34, above), the academically ablest minds turned in this age to the study, not of the Aristotelian philosophy, but of the Civil and the Canon Law (see Taylor, H. O.: *The Mediaeval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 118-21).

⁸ See IV. iv. 275, n. 1, and 363, n. 1.

⁹ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book II, ll. 792-5.

The illusory semblance of solidity which this phantom displayed at its long-delayed second appearance was so well simulated in its first flush that the pioneers of Humanism might be forgiven, in their day, for flattering themselves that they had been privileged to make Alcuin's noble dream come true; but this sanguine fifteenth-century Italian belief could only have been justified by the event if the Humanists had been right in their underlying assumption that the geni of the western Civilization and Hellenism were two persons of one substance; and this was, indeed, the crucial article of faith in the creed of these Modern Western Hellenists.

In making this assumption the Humanists were simply applying to their own essay in the art of necromancy one of the necessary tenets of the necromancer's ideology. The motive for raising a ghost is to produce some change in the outlook and conduct of the living people whom the ghost is intended to haunt. If the haunted party were to show no sign of being affected by the apparition of the *revenant*, the evocation of this spectre would have been so much labour lost; the measure of the necromancer's success is the degree to which the ghost's intrusion effectually deflects the haunted party from his previous course; but, while the necromancer is thus bound to do his utmost to produce a deflection which will be notable enough to show that he has not exerted himself in vain, he also cannot afford to lay himself open to the charge that he is leading his patient astray from a course which is this wayfarer's high road; for to admit this would be tantamount to confessing that the necromancer's familiar spirit is a misleading will-o'-the-wisp and that the human object of his magical operations is, not his patient, but his victim.

For this reason, every successful necromancer has to justify what he has done by contending that, at the moment when he took it upon himself to raise a ghost from the Past, the living individual or society for whose benefit he professes to have been acting was wandering in the wilderness off the beaten track, and that therefore the magician, when he deflected the wayfarer from his course, was doing him the beneficent service of guiding him back out of a side-track into the highroad. This was the view of their work which the authors of a Modern Western literary renaissance of Hellenism endeavoured to impose on their contemporaries; and the power of the impression that this Late Medieval Italian cultural doctrine was able to make upon the Western tradition is indicated by the confidence with which this fifteenth-century dogma is reasserted in a work, published no less than a quarter of a millennium after the decisive defeat of 'the Ancients' in their seventeenth-century battle with 'the Moderns', by a latter-day Western historian-philosopher who was a contemporary of the writer of this Study.

'Western Civilisation has formed itself by . . . reconstructing' within its own mind the mind of the Hellenic World and developing the wealth of that mind in new directions. Thus Western Civilisation is not related to Hellenic in any merely external way. The relation is an internal one. Western Civilisation expresses, and indeed achieves, its individuality, not by distinguishing itself from Hellenic Civilisation, but by identifying itself therewith.¹

¹ Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), p. 163.

In *The Knights* of Aristophanes, Demosthenes has the happy thought¹ of routing Cleon by enlisting against him a sausage-monger who out-Cleons Cleon and so vanquishes him; and, if we take this cue from an Athenian playwright, our first retort to Collingwood's *ipse dixit*² will be to pit against it one of Spengler's which makes a precisely contrary assertion in terms that are even more magisterial.

'The Renaissance was . . . a rebellion against the spirit of [a] Faustian music, cast in the form of the fugue and breathing the spirit of the woods, which was at that moment on the point of asserting its dictatorship over the whole orchestra of the Western Civilisation's divers forms of self-expression (*über die gesamte Formensprache der abendländischen Kultur*). It [? i.e. the Renaissance] was a logically consistent consequence of the mature Gothic style in which this [Faustian spirit's] will to power had emerged undisguised. It [? i.e. the Renaissance] never attempted to deny either that its genesis was this or that its nature was (as in fact it was) that of a mere counter-movement; and the character of such a counter-movement was bound to be determined from first to last by the contours of the original movement whose negative effect upon the hesitant soul had declared itself in this reaction.

'It is consistent with the origin and nature of the Renaissance that this movement should lack (as it does lack) all genuine depth—and this in the double sense of a shallowness in its ideas and a shallowness in their manifestations. In point of ideas, one need only remind himself of the passionateness of the *abandon* with which the Gothic spirit (*Weltgefühl*) discharged itself over the whole landscape of the Western Culture in order to appreciate the character of the movement that was started, about the year 1420, by a little group of chosen spirits: scholars, artists and humanists. In the outburst of the Gothic spirit, it was a question of "to be or not to be" for a new type of spiritual life (*eines neuen Seelentums*); in the Renaissance it was just a question of taste. The Gothic spirit seizes in its grip the whole of Life, and penetrates into its most secret recesses. It created a new kind of human being and a new kind of world. . . . The Renaissance took possession of a few of the arts, and that was the whole story. It produced no change at all in Western Europe's intellectual outlook or emotional attitude to life. It made itself felt in matters of costume and mannerism without penetrating to the roots of existence. Between Dante and Michael Angelo—both of whom already overstep the Renaissance's chronological limits—this movement cannot muster any representative who can claim to rank as a genius. And, as for the manifestations in which the ideas of the Renaissance expressed themselves, these never gained any hold on the people—no, not even in Florence. In the depths of the people's soul—and this alone makes it possible for us to understand the epiphany of Savonarola and the power, of a wholly different order of potency, that he was able to exert over men's feelings—in the depths of the people's soul the Gothic undercurrent flows serenely along its musical course to its Baroque fulfilment. . . .³

¹ See ll. 141-9.

² In the passage quoted above, Collingwood adopts and asserts, without entering into any argument of the case, a disputable, and in fact long since successfully disputed, view of the rôle of the Italian Renaissance in Western history. The context shows that he has been moved to take up this dogmatic position by a belief that, in the Renaissance of Hellenism, the Western World was doing 'exactly' [*sic*] what is done by 'the historian who studies a civilisation other than his own'. Collingwood's view of the historian's relation to the objects that he studies is examined on pp. 718-37, below.

³ Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 320-1; cp. pp. 591-2.

'The Renaissance is a movement which is both anti-Gothic and antagonistic to the spirit of [Modern Western] instrumental music, and in this role it has an exact counterpart in Hellenic history (*in der Antike*) in a Dionysiac spirit (*Weltgefühl*) which is anti-Doric and at loggerheads with the plastic Apollinean spirit. . . . The great insurrection occurred in Hellas *circa* 700-600 B.C. and in Italy *circa* A.D. 1400-1500. In both cases we are witnessing a war in the soul; a rift in the foundations of the civilisation (*Kultur*) which has found its outward visible expression (*seinen physiognomischen Ausdruck*) in an entire epoch of [the society's] history, and especially in that epoch's universe of artistic forms; a revolt of the soul against its destiny (*Schicksal*), of which it has now taken the measure in its full compass. The recalcitrant forces in the society's bosom—Faust's second soul, which would fain dis sever itself from his other soul—are attempting to do violence to the civilisation's intrinsic spirit; something that is an ineluctable necessity is to be repudiated, rescinded, evaded; the inwardness of the movement is a shrinking from the completion of the society's history in the pre-ordained terms of the Ionic style and of the Baroque style [respectively].

'In Hellenic history this revulsion attaches itself to an orgiastic worship of Dionysus which finds its medium in music and its goal in conjuring away Reality and dissipating corporeal objects (*den Körper vergeudenden*); in Western history it attaches itself to the literary tradition of "Antiquity" and to its cult of the plastic arts, and these two [elements of Hellenic culture] are brought to the rescue in the hope that, through powers of suggestion inherent in antagonistic forms of expression, these alien influences may provide the repressed feeling with a rallying point, may invest it with a pathos of its own, and may thereby obstruct the current which flows in Hellenic history from Homer and the geometric style [of painting] to Pheidias, and flows in Western history from the Gothic cathedrals through Rembrandt to Beethoven.'¹

In these characteristic passages Spengler stigmatizes as an unsuccessful revolt against a manifest destiny the self-same movement that Collingwood commends as the successful fulfilment of a manifest destiny in words that are perhaps no less characteristic of their author's *ethos*. The same dogmatism asserts itself through the piquantly diverse English and German styles of two fine minds whose common foible has brought them into this head-on collision; and, if we were condemned to choose blindfold between one of these two unsupported asseverations and the other, we might find ourselves hard put to it to break the deadlock. As it happens, Collingwood contradicts his own pronouncement, quoted above, in another passage of the same work of his in which he pronounces that the philosophy of the Italian renaissance of Hellenism was as Christian at heart, under an Hellenic mask, as we have found² the Far Eastern Neo-confucian philosophy of the Sung Age to have been Buddhist at heart under a mask of Confucianism.

'In spite of the new interest in Graeco-Roman thought, the Renaissance conception of Man was profoundly different from the Graeco-Roman; and, when a writer like Machiavelli, in the early sixteenth century, expressed his ideas about History in the shape of a commentary on the first ten books of Livy, he was not reinstating Livy's own view of History.

¹ Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 321.

² On pp. 41-43, above.

Man, for the Renaissance historian, was not Man as depicted by Ancient Philosophy, controlling his actions and creating his destiny by the work of his intellect, but Man as depicted by Christian thought, a creature of passion and impulse. History thus became the history of human passions, regarded as necessary manifestations of Human Nature.¹

Collingwood's two pronouncements manifestly cancel one another out; yet, since both alike are unsupported assertions, the question which they raise is left still calling for a reasoned answer. Fortunately there are other voices to be heard in this debate; and, if, after listening to them, we find ourselves coming to the conclusion that happens to coincide with Spengler's thesis, this will not be because we have taken the hierophant's oracular dicta on faith; it will be because we have been convinced by the reasoning of soberly empirical-minded historians who have not disdained to argue their case by appealing to the relevant facts.

After having heard Spengler and Collingwood, let us listen to the following critique of the Modern Western literary renaissance of Hellenism from Bury's pen:

'In discarding mediaeval naïveté and superstition, in assuming a freer attitude towards theological authority, and in developing a new conception of the value of individual personality, men looked to the guidance of Greek and Roman thinkers and called up the spirit of the Ancient World to exorcise the ghosts of the Dark Ages. Their minds were thus directed backwards to a past civilisation which, in the ardour of new discovery and in the reaction against Mediaevalism, they enthroned as ideal; and a new authority was set up—the authority of ancient writers. In general speculation the men of the Renaissance followed the tendencies and adopted many of the prejudices of Greek philosophy. Although some great discoveries, with far-reaching, revolutionary consequences, were made in this period, most active minds were engaged in rediscovering, elaborating, criticising and imitating what was old. It was not till the closing years of the Renaissance that speculation began to seek and feel its way towards new points of departure.'²

While Bury thus gives reason for Spengler's characterization of 'the Renaissance' as a revolt against the medieval manifestations of the Western Civilization's native genius, Butterfield enlarges Spengler's *aperçu* of a seventeenth-century counter-revolution against the tyranny of a rebel Renaissance. The eruption of a Baroque visual art and music, which occupies the whole of Spengler's field of vision, is overshadowed in Butterfield's panorama by the eruption of a Late Modern Western Science as this presents itself in the Time-perspective of an observer looking back at it from the chronological vantage-point of a date near the middle of the twentieth century.

'We of the year 1949 . . . are in a position to see [the] implications . . . of the Scientific Revolution . . . much more clearly than the men who flourished fifty or even twenty years before us. . . . The very strength of our conviction that ours was a Graeco-Roman civilisation—the very way in which we allowed the art-historians and the philologists to make us

¹ Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), p. 57.

² Bury, J. B.: *The Idea of Progress* (London 1924, Macmillan), p. 30. Cp. Butterfield, H.: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London 1949, Bell), p. 162.

think that this thing which we call "the Modern World" was the product of the Renaissance—the inelasticity of our historical concepts, in fact—helped to conceal the radical nature of the changes that had taken place.¹

If, in the light of Butterfield's and Bury's reasoning, we give judgement in favour of the Spenglerian thesis in the issue between Spengler and Collingwood, our verdict will be that, before the close of the seventeenth century, the Western World did exorcize a ghost of Hellenism which it had conjured up some two or three hundred years earlier, but that, before the ghost was laid, this *revenant's* hold upon a living society's imagination had become so strong that another two or three hundred years had to pass before the epigoni of the victors in a seventeenth-century *Kulturkampf* could become fully alive to the truth that Queen Anne was dead.²

The issue between a ghost of Hellenism and the native genius of the Western Civilization had actually been decided before Queen Anne's accession to the throne; for a counter-attack that had been opened cautiously by Bodin (*vivebat* A.D. 1530–96),³ and been carried on more boldly by Bacon (*vivebat* A.D. 1561–1626)⁴ and Descartes (*vivebat* A.D. 1596–1650),⁵ was pressed home to a decisive victory for the living Western culture's cause, and an irretrievable defeat for the Hellenic ghost's, by Fontenelle (*vivebat* A.D. 1657–1757)⁶ in France and William Wotton (*vivebat* A.D. 1666–1727)⁷ in England. The two telling shots to which

¹ Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

² The writer of this Study would be guilty of odious ingratitude to Hellenism itself, as well as to the Late Medieval Italian Humanists who raised its ghost to haunt a Modern Western World, if at this point he forbore to acknowledge and confess how thankful he was that one of 'those surprising overlaps and time-lags which so often disguise the direction things are taking' (to quote Butterfield, *ibid.*) had inhibited the arbiters of educational fashions in his own country from laying sacrilegious hands on the humane study of Greek and Latin letters for more than two centuries after this once sacrosanct curriculum had been implicitly condemned, as a logical consequence of the defeat that had overtaken 'the Ancients' in their seventeenth-century contest with 'the Moderns'. Whatever might be the verdict, from other points of view, on the 'classical' education instituted by the fifteenth-century Western Humanists, this was unquestionably the best education conceivable for a Westerner who wanted to be an historian; for a study of *Litterae Humaniores* was the one school of education open to a Westerner in the Modern Age in which he could learn to look at the society into which he happened to have been born with the alien eyes of an outsider whose spiritual home was Hellas, not Hesperia; and, for an historian, no training could be more valuable than this, since the first accomplishment that is required of an historian is an ability to jump clear of his own fortuitous Here and Now.

In having been born just in time to share in this boon, the writer might count himself fortunate indeed, considering that, by the date of his birth, the leaven of Fontenelle's *Digression* had already been working in Western minds for no less than 201 years. Though pedagogues are notorious for being arch-conservatives, even they do eventually respond to influences that have been in the ascendant for a very long time in the rest of the body social, and in England the bastions of a traditional Late Medieval Italian system of education in the Greek and Latin Classics at last duly began to crumble under the fire of Fontenelle's seventeenth-century batteries only a few years after the present writer's fifteen-years-long education in Latin and twelve-years-long education in Greek had been safely completed in A.D. 1911. In later life he thanked his stars for having permitted him to be so *felix opportunitate natus*.

³ See Bury, J. B.: *The Idea of Progress* (London 1924, Macmillan), p. 43. In the precise form of a comparison of merits, the controversy opened in Italy in A.D. 1620, and in France in A.D. 1635 (see *ibid.*, pp. 80–1).

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 53–56.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 67–69. 'He was proud of having forgotten the Greek which he had learnt as a boy. The inspiration of his work was the idea of breaking sharply with the Past, and constructing a system which borrows nothing from the dead.'

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 98–126.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 119–23.

'the Ancients' had finally succumbed had been Fontenelle's *Une Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes* (editum A.D. 1688)¹ and William Wotton's *Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning* (editum A.D. 1694). Sir William Temple had played into Fontenelle's hands when he had attempted to answer the *Digression* in 'An Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning' which he had published in A.D. 1690 in the second volume of his *Miscellanea*; for he had not only provoked Wotton's able rejoinder but had brought his own cause into derision by rashly declaring his belief in the authenticity of the spurious *Epistles of Phalaris* and thereby drawing an annihilating broadside from a classical scholar of the calibre of Richard Bentley. Temple had not succeeded in rehabilitating himself in 'Some Thoughts upon Reviewing the Essay of Ancient and Modern Learning';² but his discomfiture had evoked the one immortal work indited in the course of this seventeenth-century controversy; for it had moved the hard-pressed scholar-statesman's brilliant protégé Jonathan Swift to come to his patron's support by writing in A.D. 1697 *The Battle of the Books* (editum A.D. 1704).

In this cultural civil war, whose outcome carried the Western Civilization out of an Early Modern into a Late Modern chapter of its history, one of the signs of the times was the publication at Rotterdam, in A.D. 1695-7, of Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique*; for Bayle, the *déraciné* Southern French Protestant who had found his congenial second home at the meeting-point of an expanding Western World's oceanic and inland waterways at Rotterdam, was one of the prophets of a Rationalism which was a revulsion from the Wars of Religion,³ and one of the founding fathers of a 'Republic of Letters' which was a secular substitute for a lost Medieval Western *Respublica Christiana*,⁴ while Bayle's dictionary was the parent of Diderot's and d'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* (editum A.D. 1751-65)⁵ and thus the grandparent of all subsequent Western works of co-operative intellectual engineering⁶ whose promoters acknowledged their debt to the mother of Modern Western encyclopaedias by converting its title into a generic name for a line of literary production.

Dictionaries and encyclopaedias were not, of course, trophies of Late Modern Western Man's versatile inventive genius. They had been invented in a disintegrating Hellenic World in its post-Diocletianic Age

¹ 'La Lecture des Anciens a dissipé l'ignorance et la barbarie des siècles précédents, je le crois bien. Elle nous rendit tout d'un coup des idées du Vrai et du Beau que nous aurions été longtemps à rattraper, mais que nous eussions rattrapées à la fin sans le secours des Grecs et des Latins si nous les avions bien cherchées. Et où les eussions-nous prises ? Où les avoient prises les Anciens. Les Anciens mêmes, avant que de les prendre, tâtonnèrent bien longtemps. . . Si l'on nous avoit mis en leur place, nous aurions inventé; s'ils étoient en la nôtre, ils ajouteroient à ce qu'ils trouveroient inventé; il n'y a pas là grand mystère' (Fontenelle, B. le Bovier de (vivebat A.D. 1657-1757): *Poésies Pastorales, avec un Traité sur la Nature de l'Eglogue et une Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes*, 4th ed. (Amsterdam 1716, Etienne Roger), pp. 147 and 138).

² This essay is to be found in *The Works of Sir William Temple* (London 1720, Churchill and others), vol. 1, pp. 290-304.

³ See IV. iv 142-3, 150, 184, 227-8, and 643-5; V. v. 669-71; and V. vi. 317.

⁴ An illuminating appreciation of Bayle's personality, outlook, and work will be found in Hazard, P.: *La Crise de la Conscience Européenne, 1680-1713* (Paris 1935, Boivin), pp. 101-18.

⁵ In eighteen volumes of text and four volumes of plates.

⁶ See I. i. 4.

and in a disintegrating Sinic World in the Age of the Posterior Han as strong-boxes for preserving an accumulated cultural wealth that was under threat of being lost through oblivion, and they had been revived, as we have seen,¹ in Orthodox Christendom and in the Far East as a first step towards recovering command of the buried treasures of an antecedent culture with a view to eventually bringing them back into circulation out of these golden treasuries. In sheer physical bulk, the monuments of a Far Eastern encyclopaedism dwarfed the most imposing structures of the kind that the technological resources of the Modern West had been able to produce down to the time of writing, as royally as the Pyramids at Gīzah dwarfed the 'sky-scrapers' on Manhattan Island. The novelty of the Late Modern Western encyclopaedias lay, not in their structure or in their scale, but in their purpose and in their spirit; for, in stealing this weapon from the armoury of a post-Diocletianic Hellenism, the Western champions of 'the Moderns' against 'the Ancients' in a seventeenth-century Western *Kulturkampf* were employing it neither for the preservation nor for the resuscitation of a 'dead' culture but for the assertion of a living culture's pretensions to be worth more than its predecessor's ghost.

The successive encyclopaedias that were published and republished, on an ever larger scale and at ever shorter intervals, in a Late Modern Western World from A.D. 1695 onwards, were so many manifestos giving notice of the Westerners' claim to have outstripped the wisdom of the Hellenes, and so many *comptes rendus* of the progress achieved by Western mental pioneers in virgin fields of knowledge, thought, and understanding. In the intellectual field of Mathematics, Natural Science, and Technology, which was the realm of an Impersonal Collective Consciousness, these self-confident Late Modern Westerners might prove in retrospect to have been justified in their belief that they had made original and momentous contributions to the cumulative wealth of Mankind. In aesthetic, moral, and religious fields in which a Collective Intellect's privilege of earning compound interest was denied to the seekers after spiritual treasure, and in which every society, and indeed every individual human being, was therefore forced to begin afresh Man's perennial search for the Pearl of Great Price,² Time alone would show whether an Occidental Faust was an any more acceptable candidate for God's grace than an Hellenic Prometheus. Meanwhile, one thing was certain; and this was that before the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era a living and lively Western World had given a dead Hellenism's imperious ghost an unequivocally clear notice to quit.

Can we put our finger on any distinctive feature in the linguistic and literary renaissance of an antecedent civilization in the history of the Western World that might account for the Westerners' success in eventually shaking off this cultural incubus by their own unaided efforts, when this feat proved to be beyond the strength of both the Greek Orthodox Christians and the Chinese? We shall find at any rate one clue in the contrast, which we have noticed already,³ between the spasmodic course

¹ On pp. 57-58, above.

² Matt. xiii. 45-46.

³ On pp. 62-63, above.

of the linguistic and literary renaissance of Hellenism in the West and the uninterrupted progress of the corresponding renaissances in Greek Orthodox Christendom and in China; for the interruptions of the importunate activity of a ghost of the Hellenic culture in the West were so many opportunities for an original literature in the living vernacular languages of the Western peoples to spring up too high to be overshadowed, and strike root too deeply to be overthrown, when a temporarily banished spectre returned to try once again to captivate the Western World after a spell of quiescence following the failure of its first attempt. The new native Western poetry in the vulgar tongue had discarded an Hellenic mode of versification based on the quantitative value of syllables in favour of a mode, based on the accentuation of words, which was the natural mode for poetry in the living Romance¹ and Teutonic languages of the Western Christian peoples; and this native Western accentual verse had been enriched by the adoption of a contemporary Arabic poetry's device of rhyme, which was alien to the literary tradition of the Hellenic World and Western Christendom alike.² Yet, revolutionary as this Western new departure was, its triumph was portended in the success of the rhymed accentual Provençal poetry of the troubadours, and was assured when Dante made his historic decision to indite his *Divina Commedia*, not in Latin hexameters, but in rhymed accentual poetry in which he correctly took the troubadours' cue by using as his linguistic medium, not the troubadours' Provençal, but a Tuscan that was his own mother tongue.

It is true that the moral courage and aesthetic imagination here displayed by Dante had their counterparts, in the history of another civilization, in Ikhnaton's decision to discard, in favour of a living New Egyptian language, the long since dead Classical Egyptian which, down to Ikhnaton's day, had continued to be the obligatory medium of literary expression in the Egyptiac World because once, some 1,500 years before Ikhnaton's generation, this had been the living language of that world in the Age of 'the Old Kingdom'. It is also significant that, of all the sweeping reforms that Ikhnaton tried to impose upon the Egyptiac Society of his day, this linguistic reform alone survived his death.³ Yet

¹ The natural bent of the Romance languages towards accentual, as opposed to quantitative, verse was part of their heritage from Latin. The 'Saturnian' verse of the oldest surviving specimens of Latin literature had been based on accent, not on quantity; and, although part of the price of the Romans' 'reception' of the Hellenic culture had been the banishment of this pristine native mode of Latin verse from the 'high-brow' Hellenizing Latin poetry of the Classical Age, the constriction of so strongly accented a language as Latin in the strait-waistcoat of a quantitative verse, reflecting the alien genius of Ancient Greek, could never—even in a Virgil's masterly hands—be anything but a *tour de force*. The unnaturalness of this imposition of an Ancient Greek prosody upon a Latin linguistic medium received its conclusive exposure when, some four centuries after the 'Saturnian' mode of versification had been driven off the field, an accentual prosody reasserted itself in a Christian Latin popular poetry produced by poets who were more keenly concerned to express themselves in a way that would be congenial to their public than they were to uphold any exotic literary canon.

² While a Medieval Western vernacular poetry adopted from a contemporary Arabic poetry the device of rhyme, which could be applied to accentual verse as readily as to quantitative, it is noteworthy that the Medieval Western vernacular poets were not inveigled by their admiration for their Arabic models into doing violence to the genius of their own mother tongues by going on to borrow from the Arabic a quantitative basis of versification which was common to the Arabic school and the Hellenic.

³ See V. v. 496, and cp. IV. iv. 413.

these points in common between Ikhnaton's act and Dante's bring out all the more sharply the contrast between the respective relations in which these two men of genius stood to their social milieux.

Ikhnaton was spiritually at war with the *éthos* of the Past-ridden society into which he had been born; and, in this milieu, the weight of the incubus was so crushingly heavy that a would-be saviour of society could not afford to compromise. If he was to win any relief from pressure for his contemporaries and for Posterity, he could only hope to succeed by rejecting the Past *in toto*. By contrast, Dante was not faced with this desperate choice between two extreme alternatives. Living, as he had the good fortune to live, in an age of Western history in which the pressure of a resurgent Hellenism happened to be down in the trough between the sundered crests of a Carolingian wave that had already receded and a Medicean wave that was still beyond a fourteenth-century Florentine poet's temporal horizon, Dante was able to achieve his life-work as an exponent of the *Zeitgeist* instead of being forced, as Ikhnaton found himself forced, to resort to the hazardous *ultima ratio* of declaring war on it. Dante was able to express the spirit of his world and age by combining the cultivation of a vernacular poetry with a cult for a resuscitated Hellenic cultural past. He contrived—and this without strain, because without selfconsciousness—to be the exponent of a renaissance and of a new life simultaneously. And his ability to achieve this magically creative harmony was at least partly due to the auspicious fact that, in the Italy of his age, at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the influence of a resuscitated Hellenic culture was not overwhelmingly potent.

The impotence of this ghost to stifle the growth of a new and original culture that was springing up under its shadow is revealed in the success with which the living creature turned the tables on the *revenant* from a dead world; for in this case the spectre was dexterously captivated by its intended victim. When we examine the poetry composed in Latin in Western Christendom from the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries onward, we hear the accents of Jacob's voice while we are feeling the hands of Esau.¹ This medieval Latin poetry, as it was written from the twelfth century to the fifteenth, may be described not inaptly as vernacular poetry masquerading in a Latin dress. Though the words are Latin, the rhythm, rhyme, sentiment, and *je-ne-sais-quoi* of this ostensibly Latin poetry have all been breathed into it by the creative spirit of a contemporary Western literature in the vulgar tongue²—as Man became a living soul when the breath of life was breathed by the Lord God into a receptacle that he had formed of the dust of the ground.³ And, when fifteenth-century Italian Humanists, in their injudiciously pedantic enthusiasm for a genuinely Hellenic article, proved clever enough to

¹ Gen. xxvii. 22.

² On this point see H. O. Taylor: *The Mediaeval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 154. In this connexion it is significant that the quarter of Western Christendom in which the finest works of Medieval Latin poetry were produced was a region lying to the north of the Loire, in what had been the north-western fringes of an Hellenic World of the Imperial Age, and not any of the Romance-speaking countries adjoining a Mediterranean Sea that had once been the Roman Empire's *mare nostrum* (see *ibid.*, p. 122).

³ Gen. ii. 7.

write classical Latin quantitative verse that might occasionally pass for the work of a Lucan or even an Ovid, they merely succeeded in killing a vernacular poetry in Latin fancy dress without ever coming within sight of their ulterior objective of installing a resuscitated literature in the classical Latin and Greek idiom and vein in the place of a long since securely established vernacular poetry in the unaffected medium of the vulgar tongue. The Humanists' revival of the art of writing quantitative Latin and Greek verse in a correct Hellenic style was followed, not by an eclipse of a native Western literature that was flying its own proper colours unabashed, but by a fresh outburst of it in a blaze which effectively took the shine out of the Humanists' frigid academic exercises.

The Discomfiture of an Orthodox Christian Greek Vernacular Literature by an Hellenic Ghost

The spontaneously generated native literature in the vulgar tongue which came to this fine flower in a Western World had its counterparts in a Greek Orthodox Christendom and in the Chinese main body of a Far Eastern Society; but here the seed fell among the thorns of the resuscitated language and literature of an antecedent civilization,¹ 'and the thorns sprang up with it, and choked it'.²

The Modern Greek language resembled Latin and Latin's Romance offspring, and differed, like them, from Ancient Greek, in being accentual and not quantitative, and it duly found for itself a congenial form of accentual versification—the so-called 'Metropolitan³ Metre'—which was as alien in its technique from the Ancient Greek quantitative verse of a Homer or a Theognis as the contemporary accentual verse of Western Christendom was from the Latin quantitative verse of Homer's imitator Virgil or Theognis' imitator Ovid. As we have seen in another context,⁴ this Modern Greek accentual verse provided the literary vehicle for a tenth-century epic poem celebrating the exploits of the Greek borderers in an East Anatolian no-man's-land beyond the Antitauran frontier of the 'Abbasid Caliphate; and this Byzantine Greek Epic of Basil Digénis (Dhiyénis) Akritas was thus, on both the literary and the social plane,⁵ a true counterpart of the *Chanson de Roland*. Yet, whereas an eleventh-century *Chanson de Roland* was able to become the parent of a vernacular literature, in all the living languages of the Western World,⁶ which was still bearing fruit nine hundred years later, the tenth-century Byzantine Greek Epic was cheated out of its manifest destiny through being sterilized by the triumph of a Greek Orthodox Christian renaissance of the Ancient Greek language and literature;⁷ and, though the living Modern Greek language and its native accentual style of versification were emboldened, thereafter, to reassert themselves by the example of a Medieval Western vernacular literature which made its influence felt

¹ The successive vicissitudes in the history of an Orthodox Christian Greek literature, from its emergence during a post-Hellenic cultural interregnum down to the twentieth century, can be studied in the life in Trypánis, C. A.: *Medieval and Modern Greek Poetry, An Anthology* (Oxford 1951, Clarendon Press).

² Luke viii. 7. Cp. Matt. xiii. 7.

³ i.e. Constantinopolitan (*Graecè: στίχοι πολιτικοί*).

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 260-1.

⁷ This has been noticed by anticipation in VII. vii. 409, n. 9.

⁴ In V. v. 252-9.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 252-3.

in Greek Orthodox Christendom as a consequence of the ascendancy which the Franks progressively established over the Greeks from the close of the eleventh century onwards,¹ the price of this Frankish cultural assistance in revolting against an Hellenic cultural tyranny was the heavy one of being constrained to submit to a mere change of masters instead of recovering a lost cultural liberty. In Crete, where the Medieval Greek vernacular literature went farther, because the Medieval Frankish ascendancy here lasted longer, than in any other province of Greek Orthodox Christendom except the Ionian Islands, it flourished in virtue of resigning itself to becoming a version, in the Modern Greek language, of the contemporary literature of the West, while the Italianate Greek Orthodox Christian Ionian Islanders came to find it easier to make contributions to a Western literature in its native Italian medium than to transpose their literary compositions into their own Modern Greek mother tongue.²

It might perhaps have been expected that, after the Greek Orthodox Christians' feelings towards the West had changed, as they did change in the seventeenth century,³ from contempt and hostility to admiration and receptivity, and after this revulsion had culminated, as it did culminate in the nineteenth century, in a resolve, on the Greek people's part, to become naturalized members of the Western Society of the day without any lingering Byzantine xenophobe reservations, one of the first fruits of this process of cultural conversion would have been the liberation of the Modern Greek language from the dead hand of a Hellenism that had been resuscitated in Greek Orthodox Christendom before the beginning of this Christian civilization's long and momentous encounter with a sister Christian society. Unhappily for the Greeks, the Western Society with which they threw in their lot in the nineteenth century was by then already infected with the spiritual malady of Nationalism, which had been engendered in the Western World by the impact of a Classical Hellenic ideal of political parochialism⁴ on the Western World's parochially variegated linguistic map. It was not surprising that the nineteenth-century Greek proselytes to the altar of a Modern Western culture should succumb to this Modern Western Nationalism and should develop the linguistic symptoms that were characteristic of this cultural disease; but it was unfortunate that, in adopting a Western-minded linguistic Nationalism, the Modern Greeks should have elected to combine this, as they did, with a Byzantine-minded linguistic Archaism.

Instead of learning, as they might have learnt, from the troubadours and Dante the invaluable lesson that the poetry of the West had come to flower so finely just because the poets of the West had not been ashamed of their living mother tongues, the nineteenth-century Greek Orthodox Christian converts to a contemporary Western culture were obsessed by a haunting consciousness that the Modern Greek language was lineally descended from the Ancient Greek and that their ancestral Orthodox Christian Civilization was affiliated to the Hellenic; and these irrelevant historical facts imposed upon them so imperiously that, in their lin-

¹ See IX. viii. 392-4.

³ See IX. viii. 165-8.

² See IX. viii. 679-80.

⁴ See pp. 7-8, above.

guistic policy, they dared not live up to the ideals of the Western cultural faith to which they had formally declared their allegiance. They could not summon up the moral courage to take their own language as they found it and to rely on their own literary genius to fashion this language into a worthy instrument for conveying whatever they might prove to have it in them to express. They chose the untoward alternative course of taking refuge in the cultivation of a linguistic Archaism; and, though they refrained from carrying this folly to the lengths to which it had been carried by Byzantines who on paper had discarded their living Modern Greek mother tongue altogether in favour of an artificially resuscitated Attic,¹ the nineteenth-century Westernizing Greeks did the next worst thing when, like callous manufacturers of *foie gras*, they set themselves to denature their mother tongue by grouting into it as gross an infusion of the Attic Greek vocabulary, inflexion, and syntax as they could compel a tortured living language to swallow.²

Thus, on the linguistic and literary plane, the Greeks' 'reception' of a Modern Western culture, whose distinctive gift was to use living vernaculars as its literary vehicles, had the paradoxical result of fettering a living Greek language instead of liberating it.

The Sinic Classical Incubus on a Chinese Vernacular Literature

In the Chinese heart of a Far Eastern World, as in Greek Orthodox Christendom, a popular literature in the living vulgar tongue had succeeded in springing up, under the shadow of an antecedent culture's classical language and literature, before an expanding Western Civilization had appeared on the scene. A living 'mandarin' *lingua franca*³ had become a vehicle not only for folk-songs⁴ but also for drama since the thirteenth century of the Christian Era,⁵ and for novels in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.⁶ In China, again, the same

¹ See pp. 73-74, above.

² This Modern Greek linguistic and literary Archaism and the *Kulturkampf* to which it gave rise have been noticed in V. vi. 68-70. Though the anti-archaistic movement in favour of the living language was abortive, it managed to keep the field in just sufficient strength to condemn a politically reunited Modern Greek people to live in a state of chronic cultural schism between the respective adherents of the *καθαρεύουσα* and the *δημοτική*. Either school of Modern Greek linguistic dogmatism could sit on its own behalf the authority of a Modern Western dogma, but the *δημοτική* law for Modern Greeks of both schools alike. The *δημοτική* answered to a Modern Western dogma, begotten by a sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation, that a national language ought to be 'understanded of the people'; the *καθαρεύουσα* answered to another Modern Western dogma, begotten by a nineteenth-century Romantic Movement, that a national language ought to have roots in the national past. In the native social milieu of the Western Society in which this pair of dogmas had originated, they did not conflict; for the local Western vernaculars—Italian, French, English, Dutch, German, and the rest—answered to both dogmas alike, in opposition to a Latin that had been the linguistic vehicle of a Western chrysalis-church. When, however, the same two dogmas were applied in the alien social milieu of a Modern Greek Orthodox Christian community which had 'received' the Modern Western culture by an act of conversion, the two dogmas here proved irreconcilable owing to the success previously achieved by a Byzantine renaissance of a dead Attic Greek in blighting the literary cultivation of the living Modern Greek language in an earlier chapter of Modern Greek cultural history.

³ See V. v. 512-14.

⁴ See Hu Shih: *The Chinese Renaissance: The Haskell Lectures, 1933* (Chicago 1934, University Press), p. 60. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the author and the publishers.

⁵ See Hu Shih, op. cit., pp. 45 and 53.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 51.

negative, unintentional, and unconscious, yet none the less valuable, literary service had been performed by Mongol invaders as had been performed in Greek Orthodox Christendom by the Frankish conquerors of an East Roman Empire. Here, as there, an irruption of militant barbarians had been a cultural and social as well as a political and military catastrophe; here, as there, it had hit a small highly cultivated official class more severely than it had hit the uncultivated merchants, artisans, and peasantry;¹ here, as there, the shock dealt to this classically educated officialdom had broken 'the cake of custom'² which this governing class had imposed on the lower strata of society; and, since, in a resuscitated Sinic and a resuscitated Hellenic universal state alike, the linguistic and literary custom hitherto upheld by the now crestfallen pandits had been the cult of a dead classical language and literature at the expense of a living vulgar tongue and the popular literature conveyed in it, the cultural effect, in China as in Greek Orthodox Christendom, was to liberate this popular literature from the incubus of a classical ideal and thereby give it a chance to invigorate itself by gaining access to the air and to the light.

While the Chinese popular literature had the same history as its Modern Greek counterpart in these respects, it gave proof of a greater vitality by emulating the Medieval Western vernacular literature's feat of 'haunting the haunter'. As Hu Shih tells the story of how his own eyes were opened:

'I found that the history of Chinese literature consisted of two parallel movements: there was the classical literature of the scholars, the men of letters, the poets of the imperial courts, and of the *élite*; but there was in every age an undercurrent of literary development among the common people which produced the folk songs of love and heroism, the songs of the dancer, the epic stories of the street reciter, the drama of the village theatre and, most important of all, the novels. I found that every new form, every innovation in literature, had come never from the imitative classical writers of the upper classes, but always from the unlettered class of the country-side, the village inn and the market-place. I found that it was always these new forms and patterns of the common people that, from time to time, furnished the new blood and fresh vigour to the literature of the literati, and rescued it from the perpetual danger of fossilisation. All the great periods of Chinese Literature were those when the master minds of the age were attracted by these new literary forms of the people and produced their best works, not only in the new patterns, but in close imitation of the fresh and simple language of the people. And such great epochs died away only when those new forms from the people had again

¹ After the sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders in A.D. 1204, some of the previously well-to-do Greek refugees from the sacked city were ill-treated by the Greek rural population in the hinterland, who forcibly relieved them of the money that they had been able to bring away with them, and gloated over the spectacle of grandees reduced to an equality with themselves on a common level of destitution. The poorer Greek inhabitants of Constantinople, who did not take flight, enriched themselves by buying from the Latin conquerors, at derisory prices, valuable articles of property that the Latins had plundered from the Greek purchasers' wealthy fellow-citizens (see the indignant comments on these proceedings in Nikitas Khoniátis' *Khroniki Dhitiyisis*, Epilogue on the Aftermath of the Catastrophe, chap. 5, on pp. 784-5 of I. Bekker's edition (Bonn 1835, Weber)).

² Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th ed. (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 27 and 35, quoted in II. i. 192.

become fixed and fossilised through long periods of slavish imitation by the uncreative litterati. . . .

'It was the anonymous folk songs of Antiquity that formed the bulk of the great *Book of Poetry* and created the first epoch of Chinese Literature. It was again the anonymous folk songs of the people that gave the form and the inspiration in the developments of the new poetry in the Three Kingdoms and later in the T'ang Dynasty. It was the songs of the dancing and singing girls that began the new era of *ts'ü* or songs in the Sung Dynasty. It was the people that first produced the plays which led to the great dramas of the Mongol period and the Mings. It was the street reciters of epic stories that gave rise to the great novels, some of which have been "best sellers" for three or four centuries.'

Yet, in striking contrast to the attitude of a Dante, a Petrarch, or a Boccaccio, the Chinese literary artists who owed so much to artless masterpieces in the vulgar tongue, and who turned their borrowed talent to such good account,² were as anxious to hide their light under a bushel³ as if they had to fear the pains and penalties of failing to conform to some rigidly imposed cultural 'black-out'. 'They were so ashamed of what they had done that many of the earlier novelists published their works anonymously or under strange *noms de plume*';⁴ and we may infer that no self-respecting Chinese litteratus would have dreamt of asking for trouble by putting his name to a work on the lines of Dante's *De Vulgari Eloquentiâ*, in which this sublime Western vulgarian indited, in the sacrosanct classical language, an appreciation of contemporary Western poetry in the living Provençal and Tuscan vernaculars, and garnished his shocking dissertation with quotations *verbatim* from this unmentionable literary garbage, to illustrate points of vulgar style that ought to have been beneath the notice of a properly instructed clerk. All the same, the breach of literary etiquette which a Dante dared to commit openly was perpetrated by Dante's Chinese counterparts in secret; for 'all those great novels have been most widely read by almost everybody who can read at all', and 'even the litterati who pretended to condemn them as vulgar and cheap know them well through reading them stealthily in their boyhood days'.⁵

'Why did it take so long for this living language of such wide currency and with such a rich output in literature to receive due recognition as the most fitting instrumentality for education and for literary composition? . . . The explanation is simple. The authority of the language of the Classics was truly too great to be easily overcome in the days of the [resuscitated Sinic oecumenical] empire. This authority became almost invincible when it was enforced by the power of a long united empire and reinforced by the universal system of state examinations, under which the only channel of civil advancement for any man was through the mastery of the classical language and literature. The rise of the national languages in Modern Europe was greatly facilitated by the absence of a united empire and of a universal system of classical examination. Yet the two great churches in Rome and in East Europe—the shadowy counterparts of the Roman Empire⁶—with their rigid requirements for advancement in clerical life,

¹ Hu Shih, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

² Matt. xxv. 14-30; Luke xix. 12-27.

³ Matt. v. 15; Mark iv. 21; Luke viii. 16 and xi. 33.

⁴ Hu Shih, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁶ See Hobbes' description of the Papacy, quoted in VII. vii. 696.—A.J.T.

have been able to maintain the use of two dead classical languages throughout these many centuries. It is therefore no mere accident that the revolution in Chinese Literature came ten years after the abolition of the literary examinations in A.D. 1905, and several years after the political revolution of A.D. 1911-1912.¹

It is likewise no accident that the impact of an alien Western culture, which was the *primum mobile* at work in the overthrow of a resuscitated Sinic imperial régime in China, should also have given the initial impulse to the literary revolution which here followed so close upon the political revolution's heels.

'Contact with strange civilisations brings new standards of value with which the native culture is re-examined and re-evaluated, and conscious reformation and regeneration are the natural outcome of such transvaluation of values. . . . The novels which were read by the millions of Chinese, but which were always despised by the Chinese litterati, have in recent decades been elevated to the position of respectable literature, chiefly through the influence of the European literature.'²

This tardy cultural enfranchisement of a notable living genre of literary composition was an incident in the revolutionary exaltation³ of the whole of this formerly humiliated body of living literature, together with the living 'mandarin' *lingua franca* that was its linguistic vehicle, into the seat of the once mighty mummy of a dead Sinic language in which the Confucian Classics were embalmed. In a feat of cultural iconoclasm which was as salutary as it was sacrilegious, the bull who led the way into the china shop was the eminent scholar, man of letters, and philosopher who has been so largely quoted in the last few pages of the present chapter; and anyone who is curious to know the details of this fascinating episode of cultural history⁴ should read Hu Shih's own authoritative account⁵ of the events of which he himself was *magna pars*.⁶ To what the curiosity of readers of this Study, it will suffice to quote the opening sentence of Hu Shih's personal narrative, in which he records that 'the solution of this problem came from the dormitories in the American universities'.⁷

The Entente between the Vernacular Languages of the Hindu World and a Perennial Sanskrit

The severity of this *Kulturkampf* that had to be fought out in China in order to liberate a popular literature in the living 'mandarin' language from the incubus of the Sinic classics presents a piquant contrast to the auspiciously fruitful relations in the history of a contemporary Hindu World between a classical Sanskrit language and literature and a pleiad of popular literatures in living vernacular languages.

¹ Hu Shih, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

² Ibid., p. 47.

³ Luke i. 52.

⁴ This latter-day Chinese revolt against the incubus of a classical Sinic language and literature is itself 'the Chinese Renaissance' according to Hu Shih's terminology, whereas, according to the usage followed in this Study, it would figure as 'the Chinese Anti-Renaissance' in reaction against a previous resuscitation of the language and literature of an antecedent civilization which would rank as 'the Chinese Renaissance' according to our usage of the term.

⁵ In op. cit., pp. 50-57.

⁶ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book II, l. 6.

⁷ Hu Shih, op. cit., p. 50.

This happier Hindu experience is the more remarkable, considering that, *a priori*, the Sanskrit language and literature might have been expected to weigh even more heavily than the Sinic upon the neck of an affiliated society. The Sanskrit's Cronos-like feat of devouring its own children, the *prākṛits*, in a post-Açokan Age of Indic history¹ had endowed the cannibal tongue with such an irrepressible vitality that in the history of a Hindu Civilization, affiliated to the Indic, there was never any question of a renaissance of Sanskrit, because the successfully re-instated archaic Indic language and literature had never tasted death² during an intervening social interregnum which had seen the end of so many other elements of a dissolving Indic Civilization's cultural heritage. In a subsequently born Hindu World this ever-green Sanskrit language and literature enjoyed two signal advantages, neither of which was possessed by the Sinic classics in the Far Eastern World in which these had been resuscitated.

In the first place, Sanskrit was a sacred language, and the literature enshrined in it therefore holy writ, in the eyes of all pious Hindus, whereas in China the classics conveyed in the Sinic characters were merely the canonical expositions of the philosophy of an esoterically cultivated corporation of civil servants. This Confucian guild's influence on the masses was not comparable, either in range of diffusion or in degree of intensity, with the influence of the Brahman caste that was the custodian of a Hindu Society's Sanskrit heritage from an Indic past; and the Brahmans had turned their social prestige to account by achieving two feats which, if they had not been achieved both at once, might have been imagined to be incompatible. On the one hand the Brahmans had incorporated into their canon of holy scripture the profane works of Sanskrit literature, including the epics, by dint of copiously interpolating incongruous theological matter;³ and on the other hand they had managed to save a drastically 'doctored' heroic poetry from losing its popular appeal. An interpolated *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana* were never relegated to the shelves of Brahmanic theological libraries; throughout the course of Hindu history they never ceased to 'flit alive from mouth to mouth'.⁴

An early twentieth-century Confucian litteratus would have been dumbfounded if on an oecumenical grand tour he had found, at the annual *paniyiris* on the Aegean island of Tinos, crowds of Modern Greek Orthodox Christian pilgrims listening spellbound to a recital of the *Odyssey* interpolated with passages of Neoplatonic theology in a passable imitation of the Homeric diction, or if, at some gathering of a similar kind in Algarve or in Hainault, he had come across Portuguese or Walloon peasants drinking in, with equal eagerness, a recital of the *Aeneid* interpolated with an exposition of Saint Augustine's arguments against Pelagianism in Latin verse which Augustine, if not Virgil himself, might have allowed to pass muster. Even in a latter-day Chinese setting, not to speak of a latter-day Greek Orthodox Christian or

¹ See V. vi. 75-78.

² Matt. xvi. 28; Mark ix. 1; Luke ix. 27.

³ See V. v. 597 and 605-6.

⁴ 'Volito vivo' per ora virum'.—Quintus Ennius's anticipatory epitaph for himself.

Romance Western secular setting, such imaginary scenes are, of course, wildly fantastic. The epic stories of the street reciter and the drama of the village theatre (with its auditorium open, *more Hellenico*, to the sky), with which our cultivated Chinese scholar-traveller would have been contemptuously familiar at home, would have been products, not of the pre-Confucian Age of an antecedent Sinic Civilization, but of the Confucian licentiate's own living Far Eastern Society's still recent Time of Troubles. The oldest of them would not yet have been seven hundred years old by the year A.D. 1900.¹ If, however, our traveller from Tientsin had visited, *en route* for the West, the festival annually celebrated in Rāma's honour at Benares, he would have had to confess that his own Sinic classics had been put out of countenance by Indic classics that had never ceased to be cherished by the people as well as by the pandits; for at Benares at this season of the year he would have witnessed² in the every-day life of a living Hindu Society an exact counterpart of those imaginary scenes that look so fantastic when set against even a Far Eastern, not to speak of a Near Eastern or a Western, back-cloth.

Where the classical language and literature of a dead antecedent civilization had thus managed to retain their hold on the imagination and affection of an affiliated society as living treasure-houses of both theological authority and popular entertainment, what chance might the living vernacular languages of the Hindu World be expected to find of securing employment for themselves as alternative vehicles for literature? When Sanskrit was so securely and completely in possession of this field, could any living language aspire to play even a modest and subordinate literary role? Had not Sanskrit already driven its own children, the *prākṛits*, out of the literary field before the close of the history of an antecedent Indic Civilization? And, if this world-conquering classical language's diadochi had suffered this fate at Sanskrit's hands, did not this precedent spell in advance the doom of the *epigoni*?

Any alien observer who had ventured to make such prognostications on the basis of Indic experience would, however, have found them falsified by the event; for the effect of the vitality of Sanskrit on the fortunes of the Hindu World's vernaculars was not a withering blight but was, on the contrary, a potent stimulus.³ In the Archaic Age of Hindu history,

¹ See Hu Shih: *The Chinese Renaissance* (Chicago 1934, University Press), pp. 53 and 61, cited on pp. 77 and 78, above.

² See MacDonell, A. A.: *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (London 1900, Heinemann), p. 317.

³ In seeking to account for the difference in the respective literary fortunes of the *prākṛits*—which, save for the survival of Pāli as the medium of the Hinayanian Buddhist scriptures, were driven off the field of literary usage by their Sanskrit parent's counter-offensive—and of the latter-day parochial vernacular languages of a Hindu World which were fertilized by their encounter with the Sanskrit language and literature, instead of being blighted by it, we have to allow for one pertinent consideration of a linguistic, not a literary, order. The *prākṛits*' chances of victory in their competition with their Sanskrit parent were no doubt compromised by the linguistic fact that the degree of their differentiation from a common Sanskrit stock was slight enough to allow anyone who was literate in any *prākṛit* to take to reading and writing Sanskrit, instead, with little difficulty. In departing from the pattern of Sanskrit, the *prākṛits* had not gone so far as to break with the habit of expressing relations by the inflexion of the verbs and nouns that were the vehicles of meaning, instead of hitting upon the use of separate auxiliary words. The *prākṛits*, like their Sanskrit parent, were inflective languages of the primitive Indo-European type. On the other hand the vernaculars of the next generation, derived

between the first emergence of a Hindu Civilization out of a post-Indic interregnum towards the end of the eighth century of the Christian Era and the Muslim conquest of the Ganges-Jumna Basin towards the end of the twelfth century,¹ we find the heroic poetry at the courts of parochial Rājput princes, descended from Hun and Gurjara Eurasian Nomad barbarian invaders, being composed, not in the classical Sanskrit of the *Mahābhārata*, but in a vernacular Hindī which was the living language caught by the interloping alien conquerors from their Hindu subjects.² If now—racing the drum round which our film of Hindu history unwinds—we pass on, in a flash, to the first phase of a universal state in which the Hindu Society temporarily arrested its disintegration after having gone through the experiences of a breakdown and a Time of Troubles, we shall find the Hindu genius embodied, in this generation, not in the alien Timurid Turkish Muslim empire-builder Akbar (*vivebat* A.D. 1542-1605), but in his contemporary and subject—probably unknown to Akbar himself—the Hindī poet Tulsī Dās (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1530-1623).³

A priori an alien observer might have expected that a Hindu man of genius, whose mission in life was to do in the Hindī language what was done in Latin by an Augustan Hellenic Virgil and in Tuscan by an Early Modern Western Ariosto, would have chosen for his own literary epic in Hindī any subject rather than the theme of a *Rāmāyana* whose Sanskrit *ślokas* were still 'fitting alive from mouth to mouth' in the latter-day poet's own time. Tulsī Dās, however, had a truer intuition of both the inclinations and the capacities of a catholic-hearted Hindu soul. He correctly divined that his people's devotion to a Sanskrit *Rāmāyana* would open, and not close, their hearts to the appeal of a Hindī *Rām-charit Mānas*; and a Late Modern Western student of the Sanskrit literature has seen the culminating triumph of the *Rāmāyana* in this Sanskrit epic's ability, more than a thousand years after it had set hard in its own definitive form, to inspire the composition of a Hindī epic 'which, with its ideal standard of virtue and purity, is a kind of bible to a hundred millions of the people of Northern India'.⁴

from the prākritis, did sharply differentiate themselves from their parents by taking the revolutionary step that was taken by the Romance languages when they broke out of Latin, and by English when it broke out of Anglian (see III. iii. 176-9). In crossing this great linguistic 'divide', these Indo-Aryan languages of the third generation had cut themselves off from their prākrit parents and their Sanskrit grandparent alike, and had thereby ensured their hold, more effectively than the prākritis had ever ensured theirs, against the risk of an attempt on the part of Sanskrit to capture for itself exclusively the entire literary allegiance of the peoples speaking these derivative languages as their mother tongue. *Admittedly* it was difficult for Sanskrit to deprive of their literary birth-right the *prākrita* languages of Southern India which, like the Ugro-Finnish languages in Hungary, Finland, and the domain of the Soviet Union, were non-Indo-European. The Hindu devotional poetry in the Dravidian languages was even less in danger than a Hindī *Rāmcharit Mānas* was of ever being supplanted by a classical Sanskrit equivalent.

¹ See I. i. 85, with n. 2, and II. ii. 130-1.

² See Rawlinson, H. G.: *India, A Short Cultural History* (London 1948, Cresset Press), pp. 214-15.

³ See Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 373-5, and the present Study, V. v. 518, with n. 3.

⁴ Macdonell, op. cit., p. 317. Compare the appreciation in Sir Charles Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 245-7. His *Rāmāyana* [i.e. the *Rāmcharit Mānas*], which is an original composition and not a translation of Vālmīki's work, is one of the great religious poems of the World and not unworthy to be set beside *Paradise Lost* (p. 246).

Tulsī Dās' happy experience of an immortal Sanskrit epic's genially fructifying effect on the literary use of a living vernacular language would assuredly have given him no inkling of the hardness of the battle that a Hu Shih would have to fight in order to liberate a living 'mandarin' *lingua franca* from the tyranny of the Sinic classics.

(e) RENAISSANCES OF VISUAL ARTS

The renaissance of one or other of the visual arts of a dead civilization in the history of an affiliated civilization of the next generation is a not uncommon phenomenon. Among the more familiar instances of it we may mention the renaissance of 'the Old Kingdom's' style of sculpture and painting, after a two-thousand-years-long lapse, in a latter-day Egyptiac World of the Saïte Age in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.;¹ the renaissance of a Sumeric style of carving in bas-relief—of which the finest specimen retrieved by Modern Western archaeologists was the stele of the Akkadian war-lord Naramsin (*dominabatur circa 2422–2367 or 2358–2303 B.C.*)—in a Babylonian World of the ninth, eighth, and seventh centuries B.C. in which this resuscitated Sumeric art was practised with the greatest virtuosity in Assyria; and the renaissance, in miniature, of an Hellenic style of carving in bas-relief, of which the most exquisite exemplars were Attic masterpieces of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., on Byzantine diptychs—carved, not in stone but in ivory, in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries of the Christian Era²—in which the folds of the drapery of the Theotókos are nostalgically Hellenic in the beautiful severity of their lines. These three visual renaissances, however, were all left far behind, both in the range of the ground covered and in the ruthlessness of the eviction of the previous occupants, by a renaissance of Hellenic visual arts in Western Christendom which made its first epiphany in a Late Medieval Italy and spread thence to the rest of the Western World during a Modern Age of Western history. This evocation of ghosts of Hellenic visual arts was practised in the three fields of Architecture, Sculpture, and Painting; and, in every one of these three fields, the *revenant* style of art made so clean a sweep of the style that it found in possession of the corresponding sector of a Western artistic arena that, by the time when the aggressive ghost had spent his formidable force, Western Man had become so thoroughly used to living his aesthetic life under this alien ascendancy that he did not know what to do with a liberty that was not recovered for him by his own exertions, but was reimposed upon him by the senile decay of a pertinaciously tyrannical intruder. When the evaporation of an Hellenic spectre presented Western souls with an aesthetic vacuum, they found themselves at first unable, for the life of them, to say what was the proper visual expression for the West's long-suppressed native artistic genius.

The same strange tale of a house swept and garnished³ by the drastic hands of ghostly visitants has to be told of each of the three provinces of

¹ See V. vi. 61–62. The peculiar relation of a post-Hyksos epilogue to an Egyptiac history which had reached its natural term after the dissolution of 'the Middle Empire' makes it hard to know whether to label the artistic revival of the Saïte Age a renaissance or a manifestation of Archaism.

² See IX. viii. 103.

³ Matt. xiii. 44; Luke xi. 25.

Western visual art that have been mentioned; but the most extraordinary episode of the three was the triumph of an Hellenic *revenant* over the native genius of the West in the province of Sculpture in the Round; for, in this field of artistic endeavour, the thirteenth-century Northern French exponents of an original Western style had produced masterpieces that could look in the face those of the Hellenic, Egyptian, and Mahayanian Buddhist schools at their zeniths, whereas in the field of Painting, by the time when a *revenant* Hellenic style invaded it, Western artists had not yet shaken off the tutelage of the more precocious art of a sister Orthodox Christian Society, while in the field of Architecture the Romanesque style—which, as its latter-day label indicates, was a nascent Western World's variation on an architectural theme inherited from the latest age of an antecedent Hellenic Civilization—had already been overwhelmed by an intrusive 'Gothic' style which, contrary to the implication of its misnomer, had originated, not among the barbarians in a no-man's-land beyond the European *limes* of the Roman Empire, but in a Syriac World which, *in articulo mortis*, had made a cultural conquest of the savage Western Christian military conquerors who had seized upon fragments of a dissolving 'Abbasid and a dissolving Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate.

For a twentieth-century Londoner's enlightenment the combatants in a mortal struggle between a doubly defeated native Western visual art and its alien Syriac and Hellenic assailants were still standing, turned to stone in the postures of the last act in their encounter, in the architecture and sculpture of the chapel (*aedificatum* A.D. 1503–19) that had been built on to Westminster Abbey under the auspices of King Henry VII of England (*regnabat* A.D. 1485–1509). In the vaulting of the roof the 'Gothic' style had achieved a *tour de force* which, though manifestly its *ne plus ultra*, was a *chef-d'œuvre* capable of still holding at bay the waxing Hellenic invader who was now treading so importunately on a waning Syriac invader's heels. In the host of erect stone figures *in excelsis*, which declared in dumb-show *morituri te salutamus* as they gazed down at an Italian Hellenomime's trinity of recumbent bronze figures on the tombs below,¹ a Transalpine school of native Western Christian sculpture was singing a silent swan-song between frozen lips. The centre of the stage was held by the Hellenizing masterpieces of a Torrigiani (*vivebat* A.D. 1472–1522) who—contemptuously ignoring the uncouth milieu in which he had deigned to execute his own competently polished work for the sake of the lucrative profits to be earned from a royal patron *in partibus Barbarorum*—was looking round him complacently in the confident expectation that, *in saecula saeculorum*, these fruits of a Florentine master's voluntary exile would be the cynosure of every Transalpine sight-seer's eyes.²

¹ The contrast between these respective products of a surviving Transalpine native Western school and a contemporary Hellenizing Italian school of sculpture in Henry VII's Chapel came out dramatically when, after the War of A.D. 1939–45, the pensive English-carved figures usually marooned at Westminster up aloft were placed on exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum at South Kensington on a level with the spectator's eye and face to face with Torrigiani's accomplished gilt angels.

² 'This man had a splendid person and a most arrogant spirit, with the air of a great soldier more than of a sculptor, especially in . . . his vehement gestures and his resonant

A 'Gothic' architecture which thus continued to hold its own until the first quarter of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era in London—and the first half of the seventeenth century in Oxford—had by then long since been driven off the field in Northern and Central Italy; for here it had never succeeded, so decisively as in Transalpine Europe, in supplanting a Romanesque style which, in the realm of Architecture, was the native expression of the Western spirit. Italy was the bridgehead in which an alien presence, conjured up from a dead Hellenic World, first entrenched itself on Western soil; and the successive stages in the triumphal progress of a Hellenizing style of architecture, which was eventually to replace the Romanesque and the 'Gothic' alike in all quarters of the Western World, could be followed in the history, running from A.D. 1296 to A.D. 1461, of the building of the Cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore at Florence. The Florentines' decision, taken in A.D. 1294, to 'scrap' their medieval cathedral dedicated to Saint Reparata in order to erect a modern building on the site may be taken as a symbolic act signifying a resuscitated Hellenism's declaration of aggressive war upon a Medieval Western *status quo ante*. The climax of an architectural drama which did not become tedious through being spun out over a span of 167 years was the victory of Filippo Brunelleschi (*vivebat* A.D. 1377–1446) in a public competition, opened in A.D. 1418, for designs for the construction of a cupola to crown the fane of a goddess who, to tell the truth, was not Mary the mother of Christ but was Venus the mother of Cupid.¹

Brunelleschi's cupola made so deep an impression on the imagination of a duly astonished Western World that the homely Italian word *duomo*, signifying 'the house [of God]', thereafter acquired, in Western parlance, the secondary meaning of an architectural structure which Western builders had lacked the skill to execute before Brunelleschi elicited the secret from the testament of a dead Hellenic Society that had mastered this difficult art in its own extreme old age.² Yet Brunelleschi's cautiously high-pitched 'dome', which created this sensation in the West after it had been translated from an idea into a reality by the labours of fourteen years (A.D. 1420–34), would have looked clumsy to the eye of the contemporary Ottoman architect of a Green Mosque at Brusa³ which was built for Sultan Mehmed I (*imperabat* A.D. 1413–21);⁴ and, four hun-

voice—together, with a habit he had of knitting his brows, enough to frighten any man of courage. He kept talking every day about his gallant feats among those beasts of Englishmen' (Benvenuto Cellini: *Autobiography*, English translation by J. A. Symonds (London 1949, Phaidon Press), Book I, chap xii, p. 18).

¹ The prominence of the role which the Florentines assigned to their own city in the 'reception' of a *renewed* Hellenism in Italy and in the Western World at large was symbolized in the picture, painted by Sandro Botticelli (*vivebat* A.D. 1444–1510), of Florence hospitably running forward to cast a magnificent cloak over the shoulders of a naked Venus, newly risen from the foam and serenely riding on a fabulously gigantic sea-shell, who was being blown inshore by obstreperous puffs from the Winds.

² See IV. iv. 21 and 54–55.

³ If the Ottoman architect Hajji Ayvas, son of Ahî Bâyezîd, whose name appears in the inscription in the porch above the main entrance to the Green Mosque, had been given an opportunity of inspecting Brunelleschi's work, his verdict would probably have been that this was not even a genuine cupola.

⁴ The inscription in the porch of the Green Mosque bears a date A.H. corresponding approximately to A.D. 1419 (see *Bursa*, published by la Direction Générale de la Presse, Ankara, 1949). The inscription over the Sultan's upper chamber, within, records that

dred years after the Feringi Brunelleschi's day, when his successors had run through all the resources of a resuscitated Hellenic technique, and had gone on to apply them to the revolutionizing of domestic as well as public architecture, the ultimate effect of their technical ingenuity was to make an aesthetic desert, since they had quenched both a native Romanesque and an exotic 'Gothic' vein long before they had emptied an Hellenic Amalthea's imported cornucopia.

The sterility with which the Western genius had been afflicted by a renaissance of Hellenism in the domain of Architecture was proclaimed in the West's surprising failure to reap any architectural harvest from the birth-pangs of the Industrial Revolution. In Great Britain at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in the Western World as a whole before the nineteenth century reached its close, a mutation in industrial technique that had begotten the iron girder had suddenly thrust into the Western architect's hands an incomparably versatile new building-material; and this gift of the grimy gods might have been expected to inspire the favoured Western human recipient to break even the toughest cake of inherited architectural custom in an eager exploration of the potentialities of a hitherto untried instrument. As it happened, no great effort was required of a Western architect of that generation to break a Hellenizing architectural tradition that was then already crumbling between his fingers; yet the architect who had been presented by a blacksmith with the iron girder, and by Providence with a clean slate, could think of no better ways of filling an opportune vacuum than to cap an Hellenic Renaissance with 'a Gothic Revival' and to recoil from the 'Gothic' ironmongery of Ruskin's Science Museum at Oxford and the Woolworth Building in New York into a 'Colonial' brickwork¹ reproducing the Hellenizing Western style of architecture as this had been practised during an eighteenth-century North American 'Indian Summer'.

The first Westerner to think of frankly turning the iron girder to account as a building material without bashfully drawing a 'Gothic' veil over his Volcanic vulgarity was not a professional architect but an imaginative amateur; and, though he was a citizen of the United States, the site on which he erected his historic structure overlooked the shores of the Bosphorus, not the banks of the Hudson. The nucleus of Robert College—Hamlin Hall, dominating Mehmed the Conqueror's Castle of Europe—was built by Cyrus Hamlin in A.D. 1869-71;² yet it was only within the life-time of the writer of this Study, who was born in A.D. 1889 and was writing these lines in A.D. 1950, that the seed sown by

the work was completed in A.D. 1423 (see *Konstantinopel und das Westliche Kleinasien* (Leipzig 1905, Baedeker), p. 144).

¹ See V. vi. 60.
² 'The building is 113 feet by 103. . . . The stone is the same as that of the fortress built in A.D. 1452-3. . . . It is fire-proof, the floors being of iron beams with brick arches' (Hamlin, Cyrus: *Among the Turks* (London 1878, Sampson Low), p. 297).

'While the work of construction was going on, Dr. Hamlin . . . might be in the water at the bottom of the well mending the force pump, or at the top of the building standing on an iron girder with forty feet of empty space below him. . . . He . . . was never daunted by any new and unthought-of problem which presented itself in the building. . . . The public opening was postponed to the 4th July [1871], just two years from the laying of the corner stone' (Washburn, D.: *Fifty Years in Constantinople* (Boston and New York 1909, Houghton Mifflin), pp. 28-29 and 47).

Hamlin in Constantinople bore fruit in a Western World that was Brunel's as well as Hamlin's homeland.

This sterilization of the West's artistic genius, which was the nemesis of a Hellenizing renaissance in the realm of Architecture, was no less conspicuous in the realms of Painting and Sculpture. Over a span of more than half a millennium running from the generation of Dante's contemporary Giotto (*decessit* A.D. 1337), a Modern Western school of Painting, which had unquestioningly accepted the naturalistic ideals of an Hellenic visual art in its post-archaic phase, had worked out, one after another, divers methods of conveying the visual impressions made by light and shade until this long-sustained effort to produce the effects of photography through prodigies of artistic technique had been stultified, on the eve of its consummation, by the invention of photography itself. After the ground had thus inconsiderately been cut away from under their feet by the shears of Modern Western Science, Modern Western painters made a 'Pre-Raphaelite' Movement,¹ in the direction of their long since repudiated Byzantine provenance, before they thought of exploring a new world of Psychology which Science had given them to conquer in compensation for the old world of Physical Nature which she had stolen from the painter in order to hand it over to the photographer. After the invention of photography the best part of a century had to pass before the rise of an apocalyptic school of Western painters who made a genuinely new departure by frankly using paint—veritably *more Byzantino*—to convey the spiritual experiences of Psyche instead of the visual impressions of Argus;² but the increasing sureness of foot with which the Western painters were advancing along this new road by the close of the first half of the twentieth century seemed to augur that the Western sculptors, in their turn, would eventually set their faces in the same direction after discovering, by trial and error, that the broken road to Athens, which they had been following ever since a Niccolò Pisano had swerved into it in the thirteenth century, could not, after all, be regained by a detour through either Byzantium or Benin.

Thus, at the time of writing, it looked as if, in all three visual arts, the sterilization of a native Western genius by an exotic Hellenizing renaissance might eventually be overcome; but the slowness and the difficulty of the cure showed how serious the damage had been.

(f) RENAISSANCES OF RELIGIOUS IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS

In the Realm of Religion the classical example of a renaissance was Judaism's perennial trick of springing up, like an accusatory jack-in-the-box, out of Christianity's Ark of a New Covenant.

The relation of Christianity to Judaism was as damningly clear to Jewish eyes as it was embarrassingly ambiguous for Christian consciences. In Jewish eyes the Christian Church was a renegade Jewish sect which, on the evidence of its own unauthorized appendix to the

¹ See V. vi. 60.

² In IV. iv. 52, this positive aim of a revolutionary twentieth-century school of Western painting has not been given due recognition.

Canon of Scripture, had sinned against the teaching of the obscure, misguided, and unfortunate, but undeniably idealistic, Galilean Pharisee whose name these traitors to Pharisaism had impudently taken in vain. As Jewish witnesses saw it, Christianity's allegedly miraculous captivity of an Hellenic *oikoumenê* was not the Lord's doing and was not marvellous;¹ for this was assuredly no repetition of what Yahweh had done for Israel in the days of Moses and Joshua, when He had led His Chosen People through the Wilderness and given them the Promised Land. The posthumous triumph of a Jewish rabbi who had been saluted by his followers, *more Hellenico*, as the son of a god by a human mother, was a pagan exploit of the same order as the historic conquests of an Alexander and a Caesar or the legendary conquests of a Bacchus and a Héraklès. Judaism herself could have anticipated Christianity's conquest of the Hellenic World before Christianity had ever been heard of, if Judaism had stooped to conquer by descending to Christianity's level; but 'what shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole World and lose his own soul?'² A Christianity which had never repudiated the authority of the Jewish Scriptures, and which had the audacity to declare itself to be the fulfilment of the Law, had made a facile conquest of a whole Hellenizing World—with the outstanding exception of a faithful remnant of Jewry—by betraying Judaism's two cardinal principles, Monotheism and Aniconism, which were Yahweh's supreme revelations. If Jewry had been willing thus to betray the Lord's trust by compromising with an Hellenic Polytheism and an Hellenic Idolatry, Jewry, too, could have cajoled the Hellenes into a nominal acceptance of Judaism at the price of Judaism's capitulating to Hellenism on the two crucial points of substance. And now, in face of a still impenitent Hellenic paganism, whose unchanged Ethiop skin³ remained indecently visible through a transparent Christian dress, the watchword for Jewry was to persevere in bearing her witness to the Lord's everlasting revelations and commandments. In the words of a renegade disciple of Gamaliel's:

'Take unto you the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to withstand in the evil day, and, having done all, to stand. Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth.'⁴

This 'patient deep disdain'⁵ with which a sensationally triumphant Christianity continued to be regarded by an unimpressed and unshaken Jewry was an annoyance which a victorious Church could perhaps have afforded to discount as the expression of a discomfited competitor's inevitable pique, if Christianity herself had not combined a sincere theoretical loyalty to a Jewish legacy of Monotheism and Aniconism with those politic practical concessions to an Hellenic Polytheism and Idolatry for which she was being arraigned by her Jewish critics. A Christian Church's reconsecration of the Jewish Scriptures as the Old Testament of a Christian Faith was the weak spot in Christianity's armour through which the shafts of Jewish criticism went home to Christianity's heart. 'Thou shalt have no other gods before Me' and 'Thou shalt not make

¹ Ps. cxviii. 23.

³ Jer. xiii. 23.

⁵ Matthew Arnold: *Obermann Once More*, Stanza 28, l. 2.

² Mark viii. 36. Cp. Matt. xvi. 26; Luke ix. 25.

⁴ Eph. vi. 13-14.

unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in Heaven above or that is in the Earth beneath or that is in the water under the Earth, thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them',¹ were commandments which the Christian believed, just as unquestioningly as the Jew, to be words of God which Man was required to obey without any reservations.

The Ten Commandments were of the essence of an Old Testament which the New Testament was perpetually invoking as its authority and hallowing as the Scripture that Christ had come to fulfil. The Old Testament was consequently one of the foundation stones on which the edifice of Christianity rested; but so, too, was the doctrine of the Trinity, so again was the cult of the Saints, and so likewise was the visual representation of the Saints and of all three Persons of the Trinity in three-dimensional as well as two-dimensional works of visual art. None of these foundation stones could be pulled out from under the building without danger of bringing it down. Yet how could Christian apologists answer the Jewish taunt that the Church's Hellenic practice was irreconcilable with her Judaic theory? Some reply was required that would convince Christian minds that there was no substance in Jewish arguments; for the tellingness of the Jewish exposure of the hypocrisy of the Christian Church lay in the responsive conviction of sin which this Jewish indictment evoked in Christian souls. Judaism was thus able to take its revenge on Christianity by forcing the Church to fight on two fronts simultaneously; and the foreign war against an obstinately unconverted Jewry was less formidable for the Christian ecclesiastical authorities than the domestic struggle, waged within the *penetralia* of each individual Christian soul, between an Hellenically easy-going Christian paganism and a Judaically tender Christian conscience.

The duality of the conflict is reflected in Christian polemical literature in the distinction between the genre of apologias for Christianity against Jewish attacks upon it and the genre of controversies within the bosom of the Church between Christian iconodules and Christian iconoclasts, though the arguments bandied about in both genres, and taken over, on either side, by successive generations of controversial writers from the works of their predecessors, are, of course, identical to a large extent.²

¹ Exod. xx. 3-5. Cp. Lev. xxvi. 1; Deut. v. 7-9 and vi. 14.

² Stock arguments in the armoury of Christian iconodule apologetics were: (i) that God's veto, communicated to Moses on the Tables of the Law, forbidding the visual representation of human beings and animals, must have been at least tacitly rescinded by Solomon's time, since Solomon is recorded in the Bible (see 1 Kings vi. 23-29, 32, 35, and vii. 25, 29, 36, 44) to have included graven images among the paraphernalia that he introduced into his temple, but is not recorded to have got into trouble with the Lord for having done this, though he is frankly recorded to have got into trouble in the same quarter for other doings of his (see 1 Kings xi. 9-40); (ii) that Christian iconodules differed decisively from the pagan idolators in the capital point that, unlike them, they did not make the images into objects of worship in themselves, but merely paid them reverence out of regard for the living beings of which they were lifeless representations, and reserved their worship for God alone in His invisible spiritual essence.

Iconodule arguments used at the turn of the sixth and seventh centuries in a tract against the Jews published by the Cypriot Archbishop Leontius of Neapolis in Greek also appear in the Armenian text of a tract against Christian iconoclasts that is attributed to Leontius's contemporary Vrt'anes K'ert'ogh (*florebat circa* A.D. 600). A French translation of Vrt'anes' tract is given by S. Der Nersessian, in 'Une Apologie des Images du viii^e Siècle', in *Byzantion*, vol. xvii, 1944-5 (Baltimore, Md. 1945, Byzantine Institute and

After the nominal conversion, *en masse*, of an Hellenic Gentile World in the course of the fourth century of the Christian Era, the domestic controversy within the bosom of a now Pan-Hellenic Church tended to overshadow the polemics between Christians and Jews; but the theological warfare on this older front seems to have flared up again in the sixth and seventh centuries in consequence of a puritanical house-cleaning in Jewry which, in the Palestinian Jewish community, had been taken in hand towards the close of the fifth century. This domestic campaign, within Jewry's bosom, against a Christian-like laxity that had latterly been tolerating the visual representation of animals, and even of human beings, in the mural decorations of synagogues,¹ had its repercussions on a Jewish-Christian battle-front in a resumption of offensive-defensive Christian polemical operations against the Jewish denunciation of Christian idolatry. When we turn to the parallel controversy between Christian iconophiles and Christian iconophobes, we shall be struck by its persistence and its ubiquity. From the morrow, and indeed from the eve, of the Christian Church's victory over a pagan Diocletianic imperial régime, we find this 'irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces'² bursting out in almost every province of Christendom in almost every succeeding century of the Christian Era.

In a still unfissured Catholic Church a ferment of Iconophobia can be seen spreading in and after the fourth century. The exhibition of pictures in churches was forbidden by the thirty-sixth canon³ of the Council of Elvira (*sedebat circa* A.D. 300/11).⁴ Eusebius of Caesarea (*vivebat circa* A.D. 264-340) refused to oblige Constantine the Great's sister, Constantia, by granting a request of hers to him to send her a holy image. Epiphanius, Bishop of Constantia (alias Salamis) and Metropolitan of Cyprus (*vivebat circa* A.D. 315-402; *thronum conscendit* A.D. 367), tore up a curtain with a picture embroidered on it which he found hanging in a church.⁵ In a Syriac Orient an attack against image-worship

Mediaeval Academy of America), pp. 58-69. A confrontation of parallel passages in Vrt'anes' and Leontius's tracts will be found *ibid.*, p. 76. See also N. H. Baynes: 'The Icons before Iconoclasm', in *The Harvard Theological Review*, vol. xlv, No. 2 (Cambridge, Mass. 1951, Harvard University Press), pp. 93-106. It was Professor Baynes who first called the present writer's attention to Miss Der Nersessian's paper. See now also Alexander, P. J.: 'Hypatius of Ephesus, A Note on Image Worship in the Sixth Century', in *H.T.R.*, vol. xlv, No. 3 (1952), pp. 177-84.

¹ See Der Nersessian, S.: 'Une Apologie des Images du viii^e Siècle' in *Byzantion*, vol. xvii, 1944-5 (Baltimore, Md. 1945, Byzantine Institute and Mediaeval Academy of America), p. 79, citing, in n. 92, Frey, J. B., 'La Question des Images chez les Juifs', in *Biblia*, vol. xv, 1934, p. 298. The date of this domestic campaign in Jewry against intrusive idolatrous practices is historically significant. Coming, as it did, in the fifth century of the Christian Era, on the heels of the successive Nestorian and Monophysite reactions, inside the Christian Church, against the Hellenic element in Christianity, this puritanical Jewish drive against an infection of Hellenism in Jewry's bosom can be seen to have had its origin in the wave of Hellenophobia that began, in that century, to rise from the depths of a submerged Syriac Society, and that continued thereafter to swell up until it eventually broke upon the Hellenic World in an Islamic cataclysm.

² William H. Seward at Rochester, N.Y., on the 25th October, 1858.

³ 'Placuit picturas in ecclesiâ esse non debere, ne quod colitur et adoratur in parietibus depingatur.'

⁴ *Circa* A.D. 300 according to Zeiller, J., in Lebreton, J., and Zeiller, J.: *Histoire de l'Église*, vol. ii (Paris 1938, Bloud et Gay), p. 399; *circa* A.D. 311 according to Vogt, J.: *Constantin der Grosse und sein Jahrhundert* (Munich 1949, Münchner Verlag), p. 169.

⁵ In this connexion it is perhaps significant that Epiphanius was a Palestinian of Jewish origin.

was launched, *circa* A.D. 488, by Xenaïas the Monophysite bishop of Mabbūg (*Graecè* Bambycê-Hierapolis); and in the sixth century there were iconoclast riots at Edessa and at Antioch. In the same century in the Greek heart of a Christian *oikoumenê* the strength of iconoclastic feeling is indicated by the recorded fact that Julian, bishop of Adramyttium, prohibited the exhibition, in churches of his diocese, of any [visual] representations in the round and of any two-dimensional representations in the media of stone and wood, and permitted sculpture-work on the doors only.¹ In the same century in the Latin West the strength of iconoclastic feeling is indicated by the recorded facts that a sixth-century bishop of Narbonne found it politic to drape a picture of Christ on the Cross, and that Pope Gregory the Great's contemporary, Bishop Serenus of Marseilles, broke or removed all images found by him in churches in his diocese.² *Circa* A.D. 670, in the citadel of Melchite orthodoxy at Constantinople, the Western Christian pilgrim Arculf was told a story of a man (vilified by him, or by his recorder Adamnan, as *ille Iudeus incredulus*) tearing down an image of the Theotókos from the wall of a house on which it was hanging, when he had learnt who it was that the image represented, and carrying it—apparently without making any concealment of what he was doing and also without exciting any protest—to a neighbouring public latrine, where,

'ob Christi ex Mariâ nati dehonorationem, imaginem matris eius per foramen super humanum stercus inferius iacens proiecit et ipse super-sedens, per idem foramen alvum purgans, proprii stercus ventris super thoracidem beate Marie paulo ante ibi depositam dimittens, stolidissime agens profudit.'³

In Cyprus, where the iconophobe persuasion in the Christian Church's controversy found a champion in the fourth century in an Epiphanius of Constantia, and where the iconodule cause was championed at the turn of the sixth and seventh centuries by a Leontius of Neapolis in a polemical tract addressed to the Jews,⁴ the question seems to have been a burning one; and we may hazard the guess that the perennial interest in it, and sharp division of opinion over it, in Cypriot Christian circles may have been a legacy from the former presence of an influential Jewish community on an island which the Roman imperial authorities had subsequently placed out of bounds for Jews, in retaliation for the Jewish insurrection there in A.D. 115-17.⁵ There was not, however, any com-

¹ See Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 179. A tract addressed to Bishop Julian by his ecclesiastical superior Hypatius, Metropolitan of Ephesus, putting the case for visual representations in churches, will be found in *Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, vol. cxvii (Rome 1938, Pontificale Institutum Orientalium Studiorum), pp. 127-9. A translation, with notes and commentary, is given by Alexander, in *loc. cit.*

² Gregory's correspondence with Serenus about these proceedings is printed by J. P. Migne in his *Patrologia Latina*, vol. lxxvii, cols. 1027-8 and 1128-30.

³ *Arculfi Relatio de Locis Sanctis ab Adamnano Scripta*, Book III, chap. 5 (in Tobler, T., and Molinier, A.: *Itinera Hierosolymitana et Damascena Terrae Sanctae Bellis Sacris Anteriora et Latina Lingua Exarata* (Geneva 1893, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 199-201). All the cases of Iconophobia, except for Julian's case, that have been cited in this paragraph have been collected by S. Der Nersessian in *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70, and the references to the original sources will be found there.

⁴ See p. 88, n. 2, above. The surviving fragments of this tract are printed by J. P. Migne in his *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. xciii, cols. 1597-1609. Extracts—apparently from a different version—are quoted by Saint John of Damascus (see Baynes, *op. cit.*, p. 97, n. 10). A résumé of Leontius's arguments is given by Baynes, *ibid.*, pp. 97-103.

⁵ See V. v. 68.

parably potent local Jewish stimulus, either present or past, to account for the sixth-century and seventh-century skirmishes between Christian iconophiles and Christian iconophobes in Armenia and Transcaucasia which have left their mark on the surviving local historical records; and these traces of the controversy in this outlying province of a Christian *oikoumenê* at this date suggest that an iconophobe reaction against a prevailing Iconophilia must by then have become endemic throughout an oecumenical Christian body ecclesiastic.

In the days of the Catholicos Nerses II of Albania¹ (*fungebatur* A.D. 548–57), local iconoclasts, whom this pontiff had expelled from his patriarchate, sought an asylum, beyond the limits of their persecutor's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in Armenia.² Their advent presumably accounts for the anti-iconoclast measures that were taken at an Armenian church council held at Dvin, the capital of Persarmenia,³ in A.D. 554.⁴ These measures, however, proved ineffective; for, after the cession of Persarmenia to the Roman Empire in A.D. 591 and the election, in the same year, of a pro-Calchedonian Melchite Catholicos of Armenia, John, at Karin (alias Theodosiopolis, alias Erzerum), the capital of the section of Armenia that had always been in Roman hands since the partition in the reign of the Emperor Theodosius I, three iconoclast monks fled eastwards from Dvin, where they had hitherto been taking their stand under the nose of the anti-Calchedonian Monophysite Catholicos of Armenia, Moses. After seeking asylum first at Sot'k' in Siunik, and then at Artsakh, just on the Armenian side of the Armenian-Albanian frontier, the fugitives were eventually arrested in Ut'i by the Baron of Gardman and were sent back by him in chains to the Armenian ecclesiastical authorities.⁵

Nevertheless, Iconophobia was still rife in Albania nearly a hundred years later, in the eighth and ninth decades of the seventh century;⁶ and who knows whether this unextinguished ember in Transcaucasia may not have been the source of the spark which flared up at Constantinople in A.D. 726 in a blaze of Greek fire? In A.D. 686 a Roman expeditionary force commanded by the Emperor Justinian II's general Leontius had not

¹ This Transcaucasian Albania was approximately coterminous with the Shirwân of the Islamic geographers and with the Republic of Azerbaijan in the political geography of the U.S.S.R.

² Der Nersessian, *op. cit.* pp. 70–71, on the authority of the Armenian Catholicos John of Odsun (*fungebatur* A.D. 717–28), who mentions this episode in a tract of his against the Paulicians.

³ The Kingdom of Armenia had been partitioned, by agreement, between the Sasanian and the Roman Empire *circa* A.D. 387–90 (see IX. viii. 413, n. 1). The Roman Imperial Government had ceded the lion's share of these spoils to the Sasanidae in the hope of thereby purchasing a relaxation of pressure on their Asiatic frontier which would allow them to concentrate their military efforts on the defence of their hard pressed frontier in Europe.

⁴ See Der Nersessian, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁵ This episode is recorded in a letter, written in A.D. 682 or 683 (see Der Nersessian, *ibid.*, p. 72) by Vardapat John Mayragometsi, the text of which has been preserved by Moses Kaghankavatsis in his *History of the Albanians*. A French translation of the Armenian text of this letter is given by Der Nersessian, *ibid.*, pp. 71–72. The three iconoclast monks' names, according to John Mayragometsi, were Thaddaeus, 'Hesu', and Gregory. Thaddaeus is also mentioned as a prominent iconoclast in the tract attributed to Vrt'anes K'ert'ogh (see p. 88, n. 2, above); and Vrt'anes' 'Isaiah' is perhaps identical with John's 'Hesu', though, in John's text, 'Hesu' probably stands for 'Joshua' (see Der Nersessian, *ibid.*, pp. 71 and 73).

⁶ John Mayragometsi, *op. cit.*, translated by Der Nersessian, *ibid.*, p. 71.

only recovered from the Primitive Muslim Arab invaders whatever part of Roman Armenia these may have occupied by that date, but had pushed on eastwards as far in that quarter as Roman arms had ever previously been carried even by Marcus Antonius or by Heraclius; and Albania, as well as Armenia, is named among the countries thus momentarily brought under Roman rule.¹ The local Romano-Arab hostilities that had been restarted by this Roman counter-offensive had continued until A.D. 693, when Armenia and Transcaucasia had been reconquered by the Arabs and been incorporated into the Umayyad Empire definitively.² We may guess that on this Armenian-Caucasian front, as on the Syrian front, the retreating Roman troops had been accompanied by civilian refugees, and that some of the Albanian and Armenian refugees may have been iconophobes who carried their doctrine with them westwards into the Armenian and Anatolic army corps districts of the East Roman Empire. Moreover, Caucasia, as we have noticed in other contexts,³ was the scene of the romantic exploits in which, *circa* A.D. 710-13,⁴ Leo Syrus won his spurs and paved his way to the East Roman imperial throne; and, according to the story, when Leo re-entered East Roman territory in order to become the Empire's saviour, he arrived, not alone, but at the head of a marooned East Roman force, extricated by him from the Western Caucasus, which was partly composed of Armenian troops.

In any case the evidence, cited above, attesting the vitality of the iconoclast cause in the Gallic and Caucasian extremities of Christendom, as well as in its Greek heart, during a period of some four hundred years precedent to the date at which an all-powerful East Roman Emperor made this cause his own, would explain how it was that, in Orthodox Christendom in A.D. 726, the ghost of a Judaic Iconophobia was able to assert itself so brusquely. In A.D. 726 this *revenant* did not have to be called up in a trice from the depths of Sheol; for by that date it had been hovering already for centuries round the flanks of a renegade Jewish Christian pilgrim's consciousness, on the wait for any opportunity to fasten upon his conscience.

In Orthodox Christendom the renaissance of a Judaic Iconophobia had a history not unlike that of the literary renaissance of Hellenism in the West. It broke out in two distinct eruptions (*aestuabant* A.D. 726-87 *et* A.D. 815-43),⁵ separated chronologically by an interval of quiescence;

¹ The names in the list given by Theophanes in his *Chronographia, sub Anno Mundi* 6178 (= A.D. 685-6), are Armenia, Iberia, Albania, 'Voukania', 'Media'. Since Iberia (= Eastern Georgia) and Albania (= Northern Azerbaijan) could not have been reached by a Roman army overland except via Persarmenia, the term 'Armenia' in this passage must be interpreted as including the whole country and not as being limited to the Roman territory of Erzerum. Theophanes' 'Media' may then be identified with Southern Azerbaijan, and his 'Voukania' with Varkāna (*Graecē* Hyrcania), i.e. the eastern section of the strip of territory between the Elburz Mountains and the Caspian Sea in which the Zoroastrians up to that time had kept the Arabs at bay (see II. ii. 446-7).

² See Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Later Roman Empire* (London 1889, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 322, n. 4, following St. Martin.

³ In I. i. 64, n. 3, and III. iii. 274-6.

⁴ For the date, see Bury, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 376, n. 1.

⁵ The East Roman Emperor Leo V (*imperabat* A.D. 813-20), who re-inaugurated Leo Syrus's policy, was an Armenian, and his provenance may account for his proclivities, in the light of the evidence, noticed above, indicating that Iconophobia had been rife in Armenia already in the sixth and seventh centuries of the Christian Era.

and the augury of eventual failure that might be discerned in the intervening set-back was fulfilled when the illogical but statesmanlike compromise on which an iconoclast administration and an iconodule opposition in the East Roman Empire came to terms in A.D. 843¹ proved to have won for the Orthodox Church no mere ephemeral truce but a lasting peace in a theatre of ecclesiastical warfare in which the polemics had been flaring up, off and on, by that time for no less than five centuries.

This apparently permanent settlement of the controversy over images in Orthodox Christendom was not, however, the last that was to be heard of this vexed question in Christendom at large. The temporary re-establishment of the cult of images in Orthodox Christendom by the decisions of a council held at Nicaea in A.D. 787 evoked expressions of dissent and disapproval in Charlemagne's dominions;² and, though this protest in Frankland against Iconodulia was quashed at Rome by Pope Hadrian I (*fungebatur* A.D. 772-95), when he rejected Charlemagne's suggestion that he should co-operate with him in a joint condemnation of the Second Nicene Council's acts,³ the eruption in Transalpine Western Europe which these anticipatory rumblings portended did burst out at long last. A slow-growing Western Christendom had to wait, it is true, some eight hundred years longer for its Martin Luther than a precocious Orthodox Christendom had had to wait for its Leo Syrus; but, when the renaissance of a Jewish Iconophobia did break out in Western Christendom at length, the sixteenth-century explosion in

¹ See IV. iv. 364.

² In the *Libri Karolini* composed in Charlemagne's name by his ecclesiastical advisers in A.D. 790, the Fathers of the Second Nicene Council were taken to task on the ground that they had taken it upon themselves to declare the cult of images to be obligatory under pain of anathema, whereas, according to the iconodule Greek theologians' Frankish critics, the correct view was that the exhibition of pictures in churches was neither obligatory nor unlawful. Thereafter, at the council of Frankish bishops held at Frankfurt in A.D. 794, the acts of the Second Nicene Council were formally condemned on the false assumption (due apparently to a mistranslation) that the Fathers had awarded the same honours to the images as to the Holy Trinity (see Hodgkin, *Th.: Italy and her Invaders*, vol. viii, Book IX: *The Frankish Empire* (Oxford 1899, Clarendon Press), pp. 17-18).

This unfriendly reaction in Frankland to the Second Nicene Council's decisions was, no doubt, to some extent the reflection of a cultural antipathy between Western and Orthodox Christendom and a political rivalry between the Carolingian and the East Roman Power. In the intercourse between the two churches it was a cardinal principle of policy on either side that the other party must never be admitted to be in the right; and the position taken up by Frankish theologians in the *Libri Karolini* was nicely calculated to put Greek iconodules and Greek iconoclasts equally in the wrong. It is suggested by Hodgkin, *ibid.*, that Charlemagne's hostility to the full-blooded Christian Iconodulia of the Nicene Fathers may also have been partly inspired by his own personal experience in wrestling with the pagan idolatry of Saxon barbarians whom he was finding it difficult to subdue and convert. Though there seems to be no positive evidence to corroborate this conjecture, it is supported by an analogy between Charlemagne's experience and Muhammad's; for Muhammad's uncompromising Iconophobia was undoubtedly a reaction to the stubbornness of the idolaters to their pagan worship of the idols in the Ka'bah. Yet, when all due allowance is made for local and temporary considerations of a religious order, as well as for non-religious considerations of a cultural and political order, which may have played some part in inclining the Frankish Church to react unfavourably to the Second Nicene Council's Iconophilism, a recollection of the instances, noticed on pp. 89-90, above, of Iconophobia in Frankland as early as the sixth century of the Christian Era may lead us to look for the main cause of the manifestations of Iconophobia in Frankland in A.D. 790 and 794 beyond the horizon of current affairs, in an original and abiding Judaic element in Christianity. We must not leave out of our reckoning here the gaffly ghost of a Judaic Aniconism.

³ See Hodgkin, *ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

Germany was no less violent than the eighth-century explosion had been in Anatolia, while, as far as could be seen at the time of writing, rather more than four hundred years later, its effects showed signs of being much more persistent. This long delayed discharge of pent-up iconophobe feelings in a Western quarter of Christendom in which there had been evidence of such feelings since as early a date as the beginning of the fourth century, when they had found expression at the Council of Elvira, suggests that Christian consciences were haunted by the presence of a Judaic Iconophobia *semper et ubique*.

In a Protestant Reformation in Western Christendom an Aniconism that was one of the two fundamental tenets of Judaism was not the only Judaic ghost that succeeded in reasserting itself. A Judaic Sabbatarianism simultaneously captivated the sixteenth-century secessionists from the Roman Catholic Church; and the renaissance of this other element of Judaism in a Protestant Western Christianity is less easy to explain, since the extreme meticulousness to which a post-Exilic Jewry in diasporà had carried its observance of a Sabbath Day's rest prescribed in the Mosaic Law was a peculiar people's response to a peculiar challenge. Ritualism had been a Jewish diasporà's effective elixir for preserving its corporate existence as a community under conditions of adversity under which most other similarly placed communities had dissolved;¹ but, in a Modern Western Protestant Christian World, the triumph of a Judaizing Sabbatarianism was not confined to those Protestant communities which, like the Calvinist minorities in France and in Hungary, found themselves scattered abroad, *more Judaico*, among a Roman Catholic Gentile majority; the same Sabbatarianism captivated those Protestant communities in the Northern Netherlands, England, Scotland, the Scandinavian countries, and a number of autonomous Swiss cantons and German principalities and city-states in which the Protestants were masters in their own house.

It has been suggested that, in some, at least, of these cases, the 'reception' of a Judaic Sabbatarianism was an unconscious act of self protection against a demonic obsession with gainful economic activities which was so intense that it might soon have worn its votaries out if they had not providently reserved for themselves a salutary minimum of leisure by placing this under the sanction of a no less demonic superstition. But this psychological explanation of a Protestant Western Christian Sabbatarianism would appear to be ruled out by the historical fact that these Modern Western Protestant Christian communities had already become slaves of the Sabbath long before their enslavement to a power-driven mechanized industry capable of keeping its human slaves' noses to the grindstone for all the 168 hours in the week. What, then, are we to make of this paradoxical spectacle?

The Protestants' paramount objective was to return to the pristine practice of a Primitive Church; yet here we see them obliterating a difference of practice between Primitive Christianity and Judaism which the Primitive Church had introduced expressly to serve as a distinguishing mark. The Primitive Church had advertised its secession from Jewry by

¹ See IX. viii. 274.

transferring its weekly holy day from the Sabbath to the first day of the week; and the Protestants were now doing their best to cancel the intended effect of this Primitive Christian new departure by applying to 'the Lord's Day' both the Judaic name of the Sabbath and the Judaic tabu associated with it. Could these 'Bible Christians' be unaware of the logion 'the Sabbath was made for Man, and not Man for the Sabbath'?¹ Could they have read, without marking, the numerous passages in the Gospels,² illustrating this thesis, in which Jesus was reported to have gone out of his way to break the Sabbatarian tabu, and to have taken the offensive against the Pharisees by exposing the heartlessness of their legalistic observance of it? Could it have escaped the Protestants' notice that Paul, whom they delighted to honour above all the other Apostles, had made himself notorious by repudiating and denouncing the Mosaic Law, root and branch? The answer to all these questions is that, in appealing from the authority of the Papacy to the authority of the Bible, the Protestants had reanimated, not only the New Testament, but the Old Testament as well, and that, in a contest between these two resuscitated spirits for the dominion over Protestant souls, the spirit of Judaism had prevailed. The consequent renaissance of a Judaic Sabbatarianism was an impressive piece of testimony to the abiding potency of a ghost of Judaism by whose presence a Gentile Christianity had been haunted and harassed ever since its birth.

These renaissances of Judaic elements in Christianity, impressive though they may be, are not, of course, the only examples of the phenomenon in the field of Religion; and this chapter would be incomplete if we did not remind ourselves of other revivals of religious ideals and institutions in the histories of Christianity and of other higher religions. A Christianity which had eventually committed itself to a 'Conceptionist' Christology lived to be haunted by a repressed 'Adoptionism' when a Paulician fossil of a submerged Adoptionist Church struck sparks of Bogomilism by its impact on Slavonic-speaking Orthodox Christians in South-Eastern Europe, and sparks of Catharism by its subsequent impact on Romance-speaking Western Catholic Christians in Lombardy and Languedoc.³ And a Western Christian Church that had barely succeeded in exorcizing Catharism by the simultaneous practice of a Dominican violence and a Franciscan gentleness lived on to be haunted by a ghost of Augustinian predestinarianism which Jansen raised within the newly fortified precincts of a Tridentine Catholicism after Calvin had raised it in the camp of a rebellious Protestantism.⁴ In the history of Islam an Iranic Muslim Society that had emerged out of a post-'Abbasid social interregnum was rent asunder, in the spring of its growth, by the Safawis' sudden evocation of a ghost of Imāmī Shi'ism at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era;⁵ and thereafter an Arabic Muslim Society which had been forcibly incorporated into an Ottoman World, as a consequence of a 'war of religion' between the 'Osmanlis and

¹ Mark ii. 27.

² e.g., Matt. xii. 1-13; Mark ii. 23-28 and iii. 1-6; Luke xiii. 11-17; John v. 1-18 and vii. 23.

³ See IV. iv. 364-9 and 624-34.

⁴ See V. v. 426-7 and 615-18, and pp. 304-5, below.

⁵ See I. i. 366-400.

the Safawīs, raised ghosts of a Primitive Muslim puritanism in the successive explosions of Wahhābī, Sanūsī, Mahdist, and Idrīsī Zealots.¹

(III) THE ROLE OF PILGRIMAGES IN RENAISSANCES

In our survey of renaissances down to this point, we have been reconnoitring, one by one, the principal channels of social life and taking note of the instances, in each line of activity, of the phenomenon that we are studying in this Part. The necromancer's feat of evoking ghosts from the dead pasts of extinct civilizations has been found to have different effects in these divers departments of a living social milieu; but there is one feature, of a geographical order, that is common to all the cases that we have reviewed so far. Whatever differences these divers kinds of renaissance may display in other respects, they all uniformly manifest themselves in changes in the life of a living society that take place within the limits of the society's native geographical habitat. If our survey is to be complete, we must now go on to notice a geographical effect, beyond those limits, that may also be produced by a renaissance of any kind. The evocation of a ghost of some element, whatever it may be, in an antecedent culture may move the haunted society to break its own geographical bounds by trespassing on ground that lies outside these but within the former habitat of the dead predecessor with which the living trespasser is seeking to enter into communion.

Such attempts to translate renaissances from the Time-dimension into the Space-dimension had played an important part in the history of the contacts between civilizations because, as we have seen in an earlier context, the breach of temporal continuity between an antecedent society and its successor or successors in the next generation had often been accompanied by a breach of spatial continuity between the earlier and the later society's respective territorial domains. Though there had been affiliated societies whose habitats had been virtually co-extensive with those of their predecessors, there seemed to have been a greater number of cases—perhaps nine, as against six—in which the geographical coincidence had been only partial, or in which there had been no geographical coincidence at all.² In cases of these two latter kinds, a cultural renaissance is apt to produce a geographical tension; for a living society that is haunted by a ghost is prone to treat as holy ground³ the scene of the *revenant's* acts and experiences in its original epiphany as a creature of flesh and blood; and holy ground exerts a potent attraction, because it seems to offer a tangible medium of communication between a pious living votary and the elusively spectral object of his devotion. If the votary can continue to set foot in the holy land, he will be able to stand in the footprints of the saints and perhaps to see, touch, and adore their bones, their tombs, and other abiding material relics of their transitory life on Earth. Thus, in all cases where there has been a total or partial geographical displacement of an affiliated civilization's habitat from the

¹ See V. v. 295 and 329; V. vi. 227; IX. viii. 250 and 602.

² See the table in I. i. 132.

³ Exod. iii. 5.

locus of its predecessor's habitat, one of the ways in which a renaissance is apt to seek expression and satisfaction is through the institution of Pilgrimage.

This institution is not, of course, a by-product of renaissances; it is much older and far more widespread. Pilgrimages must have begun to be made by Mankind wherever and whenever one local shrine came to surpass its neighbours in prestige to a degree that moved the regular local votaries of the neighbouring shrines to reinsure their claim on the good graces of the *numina* by paying occasional or periodical visits to the pre-eminent shrine as well. This practice is not peculiar to any single species of society. We find it rife in the primitive societies as well as in the civilizations, and the greatest dimensions ever attained by any pilgrimages down to the time of writing had been in the lives of universal churches embodying 'higher religions'. Whether we measure these dimensions in quantitative terms of the numbers of the pilgrims, the linear mileage of their travels, and the square mileage of their catchment area, or whether we reckon in qualitative terms of the spiritual effect on the corporate life of a church and on the individual lives of its adherents, we shall arrive at the conclusion that the pilgrimages instituted by Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam, and by the divers sects into which each of these oecumenical religious societies had broken up, were to be reckoned among the most important human institutions of any kind that had been in operation within the two millennia ending *circa* A.D. 1950. In a Judaic religious *oikoumenê* a Jerusalem which had been hallowed by Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike had outstripped the exclusively Christian holy cities Bethlehem and Nazareth, as well as the exclusively Muslim Mecca and Medina. But who shall say whether the *mana* of the Haram-ash-Sharîf and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Wailing Wall was greater in the aggregate than the *mana* of a Bodh Gayâ which, in an Indic religious *oikoumenê*, was the supreme goal of every Buddhist pilgrim's aspirations?

The inauguration of pilgrimages on an oecumenical scale which accompanied the propagation of the higher religions to the ends of the Earth was inevitably followed by a reaction in favour of pilgrimages of a narrower range. Any pilgrims would be tempted to travel less far afield, into less strange and hostile social milieux, if they could be assured that, in choosing an easier option, they would be earning an undiminished amount of spiritual merit; and their ecclesiastical pastors and masters might be inclined to give them such assurances under the influence of mixed motives, including a circumspect reluctance to lay on their sheep's shoulders a burden too grievous to be borne,¹ as well as a politic desire to keep their flock within geographical bounds within which they would not be exposed to any rival religious influences. For these reasons, every secession of a sect from a universal church, and every emergence of a secular civilization from an ecclesiastical chrysalis, was apt to be followed by the establishment of new goals of pilgrimage, nearer home, as at least partial substitutes for the Haramayn, Jerusalem, or Bodh Gayâ.

¹ Matt. xxiii. 4.

A classic example of the narrowing of a pilgrimage-horizon was to be found in the history of the holy places of the Shī'ah. Within less than a hundred years of the date of the Hijrah, Mecca and Medina, the two oecumenical Islamic holy cities in the Hijāz, had been partially supplanted, as goals of pilgrimage for Shī'i Muslims, by two sectarian holy cities in 'Irāq—Najaf and Karbalā—that had been sanctified by the martyrdoms of an 'Alī and a Husayn; and these 'Irāqī cynosures of the Shī'ah had afterwards been supplemented by the tombs of an Imāmī Shī'ah's seventh and ninth imāms, Mūsā al-Kāzim and Muhammad al-Jawād, at Kāzimayn. When, in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, the career of the Safawī Imāmī Shī'ite empire-builder Shāh Ismā'il resulted in 'Irāq's losing to Iran the position, enjoyed by 'Irāq for more than eight hundred years down to that date, of being the principal stronghold of this 'Twelve-Imām' variety of Shi'ism,¹ and when, thereafter, 'Irāq itself fell under the dominion of the Safawīs' Sunnī arch-enemies the 'Osmanlis,² it became the policy of a Safawī imperial régime to discourage its Shī'i subjects from making pilgrimages even to the historic holy places of the Shī'ah in an Arab 'Irāq that was now in hostile Ottoman Turkish Sunnī hands, and to divert their hungry eyes with the lure of competitive cynosures inside the Safawī Empire's political frontiers. Persian pilgrims heading for Karbalā and Mecca were provided with alternative goals *en route* at Qumm and Qāshān in a Persian 'Irāq where they could slake their spiritual thirst at a lower cost in money, fatigue, and danger without having to descend from their temperate native plateau to the sultry lowlands at its western foot, or to make the arduous transit of the Arabian desert between the Shī'i Muslim holy cities on the Lower Euphrates and the oecumenical Muslim holy cities in the neighbourhood of the Red Sea. Better still, these Persian Shī'i pilgrims could be induced not merely to stop short of the Qiblah, but to turn their backs on it, by being directed towards the Mashhad of the Imām Rizā in Khurāsān, in the north-eastern corner of the Safawī dominions.³

This Shī'ite Muslim story has Far Eastern Buddhist and Western and Orthodox Christian parallels.

After the propagation of the Mahāyāna into the domain of a disintegrating Sinic Civilization, the converts to this oecumenical higher religion in a nascent Far Eastern World were inspired with a zeal to visit the scenes of the Buddha's life and work in Northern India; and surviving records of journeys made by Chinese pilgrims to the holy land of Buddhism in the course of a span of years beginning in A.D. 259 and ending *circa* A.D. 1050⁴ showed that the practice had been at its height in the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries of the Christian Era. This *floruit* is surprising at first sight, considering that the more frequented pilgrims' way was not the sea-route from the south-east coast of China to the Bay of Bengal but the land-route via the Tarim Basin and the Oxus-Jaxartes

¹ See I. i. 366-400, together with the note by Professor H. A. R. Gibb, *ibid.*, pp. 400-2.

² See I. i. 389-90.

³ See I. i. 392.

⁴ See Goodrich, L. C.: *A Short History of the Chinese People* (London 1948, Allen & Unwin), pp. 64 and 156.

Basin and the passes into the Indus Basin over the Hindu Kush; for the period during which the overland pilgrimage from China to India was enjoying its *floruit* approximately coincided with a period, running from *circa* A.D. 375 to *circa* A.D. 675, when the Eurasian Nomads were in a state of effervescence,¹ and when the perils braved by pilgrims on the overland route were consequently at a maximum.

Why should this route have been frequented by Chinese pilgrims during these particularly hazardous centuries, and deserted in the course of the next three hundred years, though these were times in which the Nomads were relatively quiescent? No doubt, one element in the answer is that the incentive of the merit to be earned by making the pilgrimage counted for more in Chinese Buddhist minds than the deterrent of the dangers that had to be faced. On this reckoning, the greater the peril, the greater the virtue of braving it; and accordingly the pilgrimage from China to India flourished, in spite, or perhaps rather because, of its hazardousness, so long as a distant holy land in Bihār was the only pilgrimage-resort where the Chinese pilgrim could hope to earn the merit that was the object of his quest. From the same angle of vision, we can also see that the stream of Chinese pilgrims to Bodh Gayā would be likely to dwindle, and finally to run dry, when a Mahāyāna that had long since taken root on Chinese soil begat there, in the fullness of time, a number of local Far Eastern Buddhist holy places—Wu-T'ai Shan in Shansi, Omei in Szechwan, and the like—whose gradually accumulated *mana*² eventually came to rival in the Chinese Buddhist community's estimation the *mana* of a Bodh Gayā in a once Buddhist Hindustan where in the meantime Buddhism had been progressively giving place to Hinduism.

In the same fashion, both an Orthodox and a Western Christendom eventually begat substitutes, within their own respective ecclesiastical bounds, for an oecumenical Christianity's original holy places in a Palestine that had fallen under Muslim rule in the seventh century of the Christian Era. In the tenth century, Orthodox Christendom provided itself with an equivalent of the Chinese Buddhists' Wu-t'ai Shan in 'The Holy Mountain' Athos, lapped by the waters of the Aegean, where in later times Russian pilgrims *en route* for Palestine could be induced to break their journey and to part with a portion of their offerings. A Russian pilgrim who wished to earn his merit still nearer home, without having to cross the sea, could content himself with visiting the shrine of a local theotókos in a north-eastern outpost of the Islamic World at Qāzān which had been won for Muscovy and Orthodoxy by the Tsar Ivan IV in A.D. 1552. A Greek pilgrim who did not wish to venture beyond the landlocked waters of an Archipelago which he had hallowed for himself as 'the Sacred Sea' could earn his merit no less conveniently by making his pilgrimage to the island of Tinos. In Western Christendom, *pari passu*, the Papacy encouraged a pilgrim *en route* for Jerusalem from the Transalpine ecclesiastical dominions of the Holy See

¹ See III. iii. 414.

² Wu-t'ai Shan, for instance, had already acquired such sanctity by the time of the great persecution of Buddhism in China in A.D. 845 that it was rehabilitated thereafter as early as A.D. 857 (Goodrich, *op. cit.*, p. 127).

to break his journey, and lighten his purse, at Rome;¹ but Rome, in her turn, had to part with some of the custom thus captured by her from Jerusalem to younger holy places more conveniently placed than Rome herself. A pilgrim heading towards Rome from Lombardy might earn his merit and spend his money nearer home at Loreto; and a devout native of England might make his pilgrimage to Canterbury or Walsingham without having to leave the shores of his insular *alter orbis*.² It was left for France to emulate in a nineteenth-century Western Christendom the feat achieved by Khurāsān in a sixteenth-century Shi'ite fraction of Dār-al-Islām. At Mashhad, Khurāsān had given birth to a shrine that would draw Shi'i Muslim pilgrims in the opposite direction from Qarbalā and Mecca. At Lourdes and at Lisieux, France similarly gave birth to shrines that could draw Roman Catholic Christian pilgrims in the opposite direction from Rome and Jerusalem.

The foregoing examples illustrate the tendency of a pilgrimage-horizon to contract from the oecumenical range set for it by the world-wide expansion of a universal church to the parochial limits of sects, civilizations, and states. This tendency towards a narrowing of the horizon on the religious plane had, however, sometimes been checked or reversed by a counter-tendency on the military, political, and economic planes. This counter-movement would be set in motion by an impulse to recapture by main force a lost hold upon some site that was still holy ground in the now militant pilgrims' eyes in virtue of its having been the birthplace of their society's chrysalis-church; and such impulses were the offspring of renaissances, since they were responses to the appeal of a ghost who had risen from the dead to exercise his powers of fascination upon the living.

A classic example of a renaissance thus expressing itself geographically in a militant movement of expansion is the explosion of a Medieval Western Christendom in the Mediterranean in the Crusades.³ In effect the Crusades were assaults made by Medieval Western Christian aggressors on the contemporary domains of their living Muslim and Orthodox Christian neighbours; but the conscious motive of these Western Christian invasions of Dār-al-Islām and Orthodox Christendom was a yearning to incorporate in the Western Christian body social the birthplace of another society that was not a rival civilization but was the Western Civilization's own mother church. The Crusaders were seeking to gain possession of a Palestine that was prized by them not so much on account of its present strategic and economic value as for the sake of those historical associations with the origins and antecedents of Christianity that had long since made Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Jerusalem the goals of pacific Christian pilgrims. 'It was the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and not the Levant trade of Pisa and Genoa, that inspired the Crusading Movement'.⁴

¹ Rome had become a goal of Western Christian pilgrims before the end of the fourth century. See Bardy, G.: 'Pèlerinages à Rome vers la Fin du iv^e Siècle', in *Analecta Bollandiana*, vol. i, pp. 224-35.

² See I. i. 17-18.

³ See I. i. 38 and IX. viii. 346-63.

⁴ Dawson, Christopher: *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), p. 203.

In taking up arms under the impulse of this homesickness for their pristine holy land, the Crusaders not only made for Christendom's oldest and most sacred pilgrimage-resort as their ultimate objective; they also set themselves intermediate goals to draw their flagging feet forward along the intervening stages of their long war-path by throwing out, *en route*, new pilgrimage-resorts in advanced posts just beyond an expanding Western Christendom's previous borders. Norman pilgrimages to the shrine of Saint Michael the Archangel on Monte Gargano, in the Apulian dominions of the East Roman Empire, were reconnaissances that became preludes to a Norman conquest of the bridgeheads of Orthodox Christendom and Dār-al-Islām in Southern Italy and Sicily,¹ and French pilgrimages to the shrine of Saint James the Apostle at Compostela, in a Galician no-man's-land between a Western Christian fastness in Asturia² and the former domain of a dissolving Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate, provided successive new drafts of military manpower for the progressive conquest of the Iberian Peninsula by the joint efforts of Cispyrenean and Transpyrenean Frankish aggressors.³

The perilous exposure of the shrine at Compostela on the fringe of a Medieval Western Christendom's *dār-al-harb* had the same effect in spurring the Crusaders into making superhuman exertions as the desperate deed of a Scottish knight who, on an Andalusian battlefield where he had broken his pilgrimage in order to fight under a Castilian banner, turned the fortunes of a day which had been going against the Franks by flinging into the midst of the all-but-victorious Muslims a silver casket containing Robert the Bruce's heart, and rushing forward after it to conquer or die for the sake of rescuing a treasure, entrusted to his safe-keeping, which he had thus deliberately thrown into jeopardy as a last resort for calling out his own supreme reserves of vigour and valour.⁴ This incident was an omen; for the mission which the Bruce on his death-bed had charged his companion in arms, James Douglas, to fulfil had been to carry his heart to Jerusalem in order to bury it there in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; the attainment of this Palestinian objective was sacrificed for the sake of a Frankish victory on Andalusian ground which was won by Douglas at the cost of the martial pilgrim's own life; and this personal story repeated itself on an oecumenical scale. While the last of the Crusaders' bridgeheads on the coast of Syria was lost within less than two hundred years of the Frankish invaders' first descent upon Palestine, their conquests in the Iberian Peninsula, Southern Italy, and Sicily under the auspices of the far-flung shrines at Compostela and Gargano were the two abiding gains of territory that were made by Western Christendom in the Crusades at Dār-al-Islām's and Orthodox Christendom's expense.

Elsewhere, and above all in Palestine, the Crusades were the failure that is the usual nemesis of attempts to reach religious goals by military short-cuts; but the Western Christians' yearning for the holy land of Christendom, which had found its earliest expression in these misguided

¹ See IV. iv. 401-2.

² See II. ii. 446.

³ See V. v. 259-60.

⁴ The tale is told by the writer's mother, Edith Toynbee, in *True Stories from Scottish History* (London 1896, Griffith Farran Browne), pp. 90-91.

Frankish military enterprises, was too deeply ingrained in Western Christian hearts to be expunged by the mortification of a military fiasco. More than five and a half centuries after the Mamlûks had evicted the last of the Crusaders from Acre, a dispute between Western Christian and Orthodox Christian ecclesiastical authorities over their respective rights in Christendom's Palestinian holy places provided the diplomacy of a *ci-devant* Christian World with an occasion for making the Crimean War. The same abiding Western Christian interest in the Christian Holy Land also found sincere and innocent expressions in the same century in the inauguration of The Palestine Exploration Fund by British 'Bible Christians' in A.D. 1864 and the establishment of a Protestant bishopric at Jerusalem under the joint auspices of the English and Prussian Crowns in A.D. 1841.¹ In the twentieth century the fascination of the Christian Holy Land was still strong enough to lure Victorian British 'Bible Christians' grandchildren into implicating themselves in a shirt of Nessus when they succumbed to the temptation to undertake a mandate for the administration of Palestine on terms that were bound to disappoint either the Arab natives of the country or the Zionist immigrants of the great expectations which these ambiguous terms could not fail to create in the minds of both parties.²

Perhaps the most impressive of all latter-day testimonies to the tenacity of the Christian Holy Land's hold on Western Christian imaginations and affections were the North American Protestant mission-stations which, in the course of the nineteenth century, were established at key-points in the Ottoman countries and in Persia. The founders and propagators of these American Protestant missions in South-East Europe and South-West Asia were descendants of pioneers who had plucked up their roots in the Old World and shaken its dust from off their feet³ in order to clear the ground for the creation of a New World on the other side of the Atlantic. These transoceanic emigrants from England who had put their hand to the plough that was to call a New England into existence were duly inhibited, by a warning text,⁴ from looking back over their shoulder towards their English mother land; but, in boldly choosing and steadfastly following this arduous course, the Pilgrim Fathers had been inspired by the Biblical myth of a Chosen People enduring the ordeal of the wilderness for the sake of making their way into a Promised Land;⁵ and, in thus identifying the *Mayflower's* historic

¹ 'There is an Anglican bishop resident in Jerusalem. Previous to A.D. 1887 he was appointed by the Queen of England and the King of Prussia alternately. Three bishops held office under this arrangement (A.D. 1841-1881)' (British Admiralty, Naval Staff, Intelligence Division, Geographical Section: *A Handbook of Syria (including Palestine)* (London, N.D., H.M. Stationery Office), p. 209).

² 'As to the project of a Jerusalem bishopric, I never heard of any good or harm it has ever done, except what it has done for me' (Newman, J. H.: *Apologia pro Vita Sua* (London 1890, Longmans Green), p. 146).

³ For Newman, the crucial points were that this concerted action of the English and Prussian crowns convicted the Established Church of England of being in communion with the united Lutheran-Calvinist Protestant Church of Prussia, and that in an Act of the Parliament at Westminster, in execution of the project, the Church of England was labelled 'Protestant' expressly (see *ibid.*, pp. 141-6).

⁴ See IX. viii. 303-6.

⁵ Matt. x. 14; Mark vi. 11; Luke ix. 5; Acts xiii. 51. Cp. Acts xviii. 6 and Neh. v. 13.

⁶ Luke ix. 62.

⁷ See I. i. 211-12.

Gentile Christian human freight with a legendary Mosaic Israel, they were fortifying one of their emotional links with the Old World in the act of nerving themselves to sever another; for, though any lingering home-sickness for England that might have persisted in their hearts would have been condemned by their consciences and repressed by their wills as a hankering after the fleshpots of Egypt¹ which would indeed have proved them unfit for the Kingdom of God, there was no counter-text in the Bible to harden their hearts against the appeal of texts² summoning them to succour scattered and shepherdless Christian sheep in 'Bible Lands' where the labourers were few. The nineteenth-century descendants of seventeenth-century Pilgrim Fathers who dedicated their lives, from father to daughter and from mother to son, to the service of American missionary institutions at Bayrūt, Smyrna, Constantinople, Merzifün, and a dozen other stations in the Near and Middle East were pilgrims still, as their fathers had been before them;³ and, when they thus turned right-about-face, to make the return-voyage eastward-ho across the Atlantic from the Fair Havens⁴ of an American New Canaan⁵ to Levantine scalas at which Saint Paul had once embarked and disembarked, instead of pressing on westward to a Salt Lake or a Klondyke, they were showing their loyalty to their ancestral faith by responding to a call of 'Bible Lands' which was stronger than their dread of re-entangling themselves in an Old-World city of destruction.

The call of a holy land in *partibus alienis*, which thus continued to re-echo in Western Christian ears down a corridor of Time stretching from 'the Dark Ages' to the twentieth century of the Christian Era, likewise availed, in the ninth century of the Islamic Era, to move the Iranic Muslim 'Ghāzis of Rūm'⁶ to trespass on Arabic Muslim ground by annexing an Egyptian Mamlūk Empire which included among its dominions the Islamic Holy Land in the Hijāz. The last Egyptian Mamlūk Sultan Tūmān Bey's Ottoman conqueror, Sultan Selīm I, who did not deign to relieve the Mamlūks' puppet Cairene 'Abbasid Caliph of a Caliphial title which Selīm I's forebears had already usurped,⁷ was proud to number among the fruits of his portentous victory the privilege of becoming the guardian of the Holy Places of Islam;⁸ and, some three hundred years later, his successor Sultan Selīm III (*imperabat* A.D. 1789-1807) was confronted with the choice between vindicating his claim to this still-treasured ancestral office by effective action or else suffering a politically disastrous loss of face in orthodox Sunnī Muslim eyes when, in A.D. 1803, the Sunnī Muslim World was cut to the heart by the shocking news that the impiously militant Wahhābī sectaries had made a descent upon the Hijāz. The Pādishāh at Constantinople was constrained to discharge his bounden duty vicariously by instructing his virtually self-appointed viceroy in Egypt, Mehmed 'Alī,⁹ to act on his

¹ See II. ii. 24-25.

² Matt. ix. 36-38; Mark vi. 34; Luke x. 2; John iv. 34-35.

³ Ps. xxxix. 12.

⁴ Acts xxvii. 8.

⁵ See I. i. 212, n. 1.

⁶ The 'Osmanlis are thus designated by their Timurid Turkish kinsman Zahir-ad-Din Muhammad Bābur in his *Memoirs* (see I. i. 349, n. 1).

⁷ See VI. vii. 21-22.

⁸ See Arnold, Sir T. W.: *The Caliphate* (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press), pp. 148-53.

⁹ For a notice of Mehmed 'Alī's career, see IX. viii. 239-49.

nominal lord and master's behalf; and, though the ensuing conquest of the Wahhābīs' homeland and fastness in the Najd by Egyptian Ottoman arms proved ephemeral,¹ Mehmed 'Alī's execution of the Sublime Porte's commands did have the effect of making the Hijāz safe again for Sunnī Muslim pilgrims by liberating the Islamic Holy Land in A.D. 1812 from a Wahhābī domination that was not re-established thereafter until A.D. 1924-5.

The intermission of the annual pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of the Hijāz under threat of Wahhābī attack had been singled out by the eminent Egyptian Muslim historian Jabartī as being, in his estimation, the most important event of a year A.H. 1213 (A.D. 1798-9) which had also witnessed the descent on Egypt of a French expeditionary force;² and neither the eventual reconquest of the Hijāz by a resurgent Wahhābī Power in A.D. 1924-5 nor the simultaneous triumph of a secularizing movement *alla Franca* in the Ottoman Empire's republican Turkish successor-state availed to dry up a pilgrimage-stream whose convergent waters were fed from a catchment area extending as far west as the Senegal and as far east as Indonesia.

The military measures twice taken by an Ottoman Sunnī Muslim Power in order to bring the Hijāz under its aegis, and thereby ensure due access to Mecca and Medina for Sunnī Muslim pilgrims from all parts of a Sunnī Muslim World, had their counterparts in the repeated attempts of the Safawīs and their successor Nādir Shāh to reverse the military decisions of the years A.D. 1534 and 1546³ by reconquering from their 'Osmanli adversaries an Arab 'Irāq which contained the oldest and most venerable holy cities of the Shi'ah; and in the present context we may also remind ourselves that the 'Osmanlis' descent from the Anatolian Plateau upon the lowlands to the south of the Taurus in A.D. 1516-17 had been anticipated by the East Romans in and after A.D. 926⁴ in a repeatedly renewed offensive culminating in A.D. 999 in a raid which had brought East Roman armies as far south as Tarabulus—more than half the length of the road from the Cilician Gates to Jerusalem—a hundred years before any Western Christian Crusader set foot on Syrian ground.

This expansion of the East Roman Empire southward into Syria in the tenth century of the Christian Era, like the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the same direction in the sixteenth century, was, no doubt, partly the almost automatic consequence of a local change in a balance of military and political power. The decline of the Mamlūk polity, which gave the opening for the 'Osmanlis' sixteenth-century swoop upon Syria and Egypt, had its counterpart in the tenth century in an enfeeblement of Islam through the break-up of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. Is there any evidence that the East Roman aggressors, too, were partly moved, as the 'Osmanli aggressors appear to have been, by an aspiration to bring under their aegis the holy places of their religion? A longing to wrest the Holy Land of Christendom out of non-Christian hands had once inspired the

¹ See V. vi. 233, with n. 5, and IX. viii. 250.

² See IV. iv. 462, n. 2.

⁴ See IV. iv. 399-400 and V. v. 242, 246, 253-4, and 256.

³ See I. i. 390.

Roman Emperor Heraclius and his subjects to persevere, in the face of an apparently irretrievable defeat, in waging the last and worst of the Romano-Persian wars (*gerebatur* A.D. 603-28) until they had liberated Christendom's holy city Jerusalem from a Zoroastrian domination and had recovered a Holy Rood which had been removed by sacrilegious Persian hands in A.D. 614. The same ardent feeling for the same Christian Holy Land was to be the loadstone of Western Christian Crusaders' efforts a hundred years after the time of Basil II's two Syrian campaigns. When the Eastern Orthodox Christian warrior-emperors Niki-phóros Phokàs (*imperabat* A.D. 963-9), John Tzimiskes (*imperabat* A.D. 969-76), and Basil II (*imperabat* A.D. 969-1025) successively invaded Syria, were they moved in part by the same nostalgia for the cradle of Christianity?

If the master-motive of Basil's raid in the direction of Palestine in A.D. 999 had indeed been a crusader's zeal, it would be difficult—even after making full allowance for Basil's double preoccupation with the Great Romano-Bulgarian war on a distant European front and with the repeated rebellions of feudal magnates in the Anatolian heart of his dominions¹—to understand how in A.D. 1001 Basil could have brought himself to conclude a ten-years' truce with the 'Fātimid' Power under which the Syrian arena was partitioned between the two empires along a line running, far out of range of Jerusalem, from a point on the shore of the Mediterranean, just to the north of Tartūs (Antaradus), to a point on the bank of the River Orontes just to the south of Shayzar (Caesarea).² It would be even more difficult to understand why in A.D. 1009 Basil did not break the truce, even at the cost of interrupting his war-to-the-death with Bulgaria, as he had interrupted it once before in A.D. 995, in order to transfer his striking force to a Syrian theatre of operations. In A.D. 995 Basil had made a forced march across Anatolia for the sake of saving Aleppo from falling into the hands of the 'Fātimid' Power; in A.D. 1009 what was at stake in Syria was not the fortress of Aleppo but the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. In A.D. 1009 this Christian holy place was pillaged and rased by order of the 'Fātimid' Caliph Hākim (*imperabat* A.D. 996-1020).³ Yet Basil made no military move either to prevent the outrage or to avenge it.

There are, nevertheless, some indications that Basil II, as well as his successors Constantine VIII (IX) (*imperabat solus* A.D. 1025-8) and Constantine IX (X) Monomákhos (*imperabat* A.D. 1042-54), was partly moved by a genuine concern for the Palestinian holy places. In A.D. 987-8, seven years before his first Syrian campaign, Basil himself had sent a mission to Cairo charged with funds for the upkeep of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem.⁴ In A.D. 1027 Constantine VIII negotiated with the 'Fātimid' Government a treaty empowering him to undertake the restoration of the church, which Hākim had destroyed in the meantime. This treaty was renewed in A.D. 1036; and the actual work of

¹ See IV. iv. 390-3 and 396-7.

² See Runciman, S.: *A History of the Crusades*, vol. i (Cambridge 1951, University Press), p. 33.

³ See V. v. 683-5.

⁴ See Runciman, op. cit., p. 34, n. 1.

rebuilding was carried out by Constantine Monomákhos some ten years after that.¹

'To supervise the work, imperial officials voyaged freely to Jerusalem, where, to the disgust of Muslim citizens and travellers, the Christians seemed to be in complete control. So many Byzantines were to be seen in its streets that the rumour arose amongst the Muslims that the Emperor himself had made the journey.'²

These facts suggest that the East Romans were not indifferent to the appeal of the Christian Holy Land; yet the full strength of its hold on Orthodox Christian affections and imaginations was only to be demonstrated some three hundred years and more after the last vestiges of the East Roman Empire had been obliterated by an Ottoman conqueror, when a 'Holy Russia' that had not been converted till A.D. 989,³ six years before the date of the first of the East Roman Emperor Basil II's two raids into Palestine, tardily vindicated her pretension to be 'the Third Rome'⁴ by constituting herself the champion of the Orthodox Church throughout the Ottoman Empire,⁵ and, above all, in the Palestinian holy places.

In taking up this cause on the morrow of the decisive Russian victory in the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, a secular-minded Westernizing Petrine Imperial Russian Government was, no doubt, exploiting its subjects' religious feelings for the furtherance of political ambitions of its own which, in the Crimean War, were eventually to lead the Russian Empire into military and political disaster; but the sincerity of the Russian peasantry's devotion to the Holy Land was attested by the volume of an annual pilgrimage-stream that used to roll through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles till it broke on the coast of Palestine after sweeping over the promontory of Athos. The aspiration to make the pilgrimage to their holy places came to play as dominant a part in the Russians' life as in the Muslims'; and in the World War of A.D. 1914-18 an Imperial Russian Government at its last gasp obstinately vetoed all Western suggestions for establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine on the ground that this would create an intolerable eye-sore for Russian pilgrims to Orthodox Christendom's Holy Land. In A.D. 1917 the Tsardom had to fall on the 12th March before the Balfour Declaration could be published on the 2nd November.

If we now pass on to inquire whether there are examples of renaissances expressing themselves in geographical terms in cases in which two civilizations of different generations have been related to one another in some other way than through the link of a chrysalis-church, we may glance first at instances in which the successor-society has been a civilization of the second generation, and the predecessor-society a civilization of the first generation which has not bequeathed any universal church to the affiliated civilization, and we may then proceed to examine instances in which a civilization of the third generation that has been related to an antecedent civilization of the second generation through a chrysalis-church has also come into direct contact with its predecessor

¹ See Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

³ See II. ii. 352.

⁴ See VI. vii. 31-40 and 577-9.

⁵ See IX. viii. 127, n. 2.

outside the field in which the chrysalis-church has served as an intermediary.

The south-eastward movement of expansion out of an Anatolian homeland into 'the Fertile Crescent' between the Taurus and the North Arabian Desert, which we have seen a Sunnī Iranic Muslim Ottoman Empire making in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, and an Orthodox Christian East Roman Empire in the tenth century, had been anticipated in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. by a Khatti Empire that had established its hegemony over an Anatolian Hittite World; but there is nothing to suggest that this Hittite Power's aggressive expansion south-east of the Taurus in this age, or even its earlier raid on Babylon, was consciously inspired by any pious yearning to gain possession of an antecedent Sumeric Civilization's birthplace in the Land of Shinar. We have still less warrant for imagining that the Toltec military adventurers from a Mexic World who established themselves, first as mercenaries and then as masters, in the domain of a sister society in Yucatan¹ had been drawn in this direction by any yearning to set eyes on the Guatemalan homeland of an antecedent Mayan Civilization to which the Yucatec and the Mexic Society were both affiliated.

Orthodox Christian and Western Christian military adventurers conquered and reconquered the Continental European Greek homeland of an Hellenic Civilization which was the parent of both these mutually antipathetic Christian Hellenistic societies, and here the evidence would seem to give us grounds for pronouncing, with some confidence, that these efforts to seize and hold Greece, energetic and persistent though they were, were not inspired by any conscious feeling of piety towards a treasured past such as moved the Western Crusaders to seize and hold Palestine.

When the Byzantines conquered Greece from pagan Slav barbarian squatters there in the reign of the East Roman Emperor Basil I (*imperator* A.D. 867-86), and again when they afterwards recaptured it from schismatic Western Christian usurpers, foot by foot, in the course of 168 years running from A.D. 1262 to A.D. 1430, the value of Greece in Byzantine eyes, which induced the Byzantines to make these strenuous military efforts for the sake of gaining possession of it, did not, as far as we can judge, reside in the historic role that Greece had once played as the birthplace of Hellenism. The motive that moved Basil I to conquer Greece seems to have been, not cultural piety, but a strategico-political calculation. He appears to have been seeking to forestall the danger that, if he did not occupy Greece himself, it might fall into the hands of a rival Bulgarian Power, which, during Basil's reign, was rapidly appropriating the lion's share of the hitherto independent Slaviniæ in the interior of the Balkan Peninsula;² and, when the Palaiologhi persisted in squandering the rapidly dwindling resources of a precariously restored East Roman Empire on the luxury of reconquering the Morea from the Latins, instead of concentrating their military efforts on the defence of their last bridgeheads in Anatolia against Turkish assailants whose knife was then already at Byzantium's throat, they would appear to have

¹ See I. i. 123-4 and IX. viii. 315.

² See IV. iv. 343.

been moved by a short-sighted eagerness to turn to immediate account the military weakness of Frankish trespassers on East Roman ground who had become even more decrepit than the Byzantine lawful owners. In reconquering the Morea from the Latins, the Palaiológhi were providently securing the twofold immediate satisfaction of taking their revenge for grievous wrongs suffered in the past at the hands of hated schismatic Christian aggressors and at the same time momentarily compensating themselves for irreparable losses of strategically invaluable territory in Anatolia with ephemeral gains of strategically valueless territory in Rumelia. The Palaiológhi chose to act on this short view without reflecting that, in expelling the Franks from the Morea, they were working, not for themselves, but for their future Ottoman successors. Yet, unstatesmanlike though their preoccupation with the Morea may look in retrospect to an historian's eye, there is no evidence that the warping of their political judgement was the effect of any sentimental attachment to a country that had once been the cradle of Hellenism.

In the vocabulary of a Greek Orthodox Christendom the word 'Hellene' had acquired the opprobriously pejorative connotation of the English Western Christian word 'heathen';¹ and, in the sixth, no less than in the first, century of a progressive renaissance of the Ancient Greek language and literature in Byzantium that had started in the generation of Photius (*vivebat circa* A.D. 820-91), this was still the first association that the word 'Hellene' would spontaneously suggest in the minds of Byzantine Hellenists, however pedantically they might have schooled themselves to conform to the literary affectation of using the term in its original laudatory sense, in imitation of its usage in the classical works of Hellenic literature which they had consciously taken as their models. Moreover, even the most affectedly self-conscious Byzantine votary of an Hellenic literary culture would never have answered 'Hellas' if he had been asked to name his cultural holy land; for, though the East Roman garrisons in Central Greece which had kept their heads above the flood-waters of a Slav Völkerwanderung had been christened 'the Helladhikí', neither a mouldering Athens nor a desolate Delphi and Olympia were the sites which, in the vision of a Photius or a Souídhás, were hallowed by the visibly abiding presence of the Hellenic genius.

The temenos which every Byzantine votary of Hellenism would have named as his cultural holy of holies was not an Athens that had been 'the education of Hellas'² at the Hellenic Civilization's apogee; it was a Constantinople that had become Hellenism's city of refuge in the last chapter of Hellenic history. This transference of a cultural halo from the city of Cecrops to the city of Constantine was registered in the language of every-day life in Constantinople's arrogation to herself of Athens' former privilege of being designated 'the City'³ (ἡ πόλις) *par excellence*;

¹ See the passage in chap. 50 of Constantine Porphyrogenitus's *De Imperio Administrando* that has been quoted in II. ii. 259, n. 1.

² Thucydides, Book II, chap. 41.

³ The common noun that thus became Constantinople's distinctive appellation eventually provided 'the City' with a new proper name. The Ottoman Turkish 'İstanbul' reproduces a Megarian Doric Greek *εἰς τὴν πόλιν* (pronounced 'stambólin), signifying 'to the city' in the sense of 'to Constantinople'. This would be the context in which the term would first come to the ears of non-Greek-speaking strangers who had asked the

and a patriotic Byzantine 'metropolitan' (πολίτης) in the age of the Macedonian and Comnenian dynasties could, and would, have pointed out, to any Hellenic provincial who had ventured to challenge 'the City's' claim to her title, that Constantinople's heritage from Athens was 'an enduring substance'¹ and not an empty name. From the days of Constantine the Great onwards the later Roman Emperors who had reigned at Constantinople had collected there the surviving masterpieces of Hellenic visual art; and these original monuments of the Hellenic culture, together with the Constantinopolitan collections of manuscripts reproducing the surviving masterpieces of Hellenic literature, were visible proofs that Constantinople's assumption of Athens' proud title had been no unwarrantable usurpation.

It was, indeed, true that from the year A.D. 529, in which Justinian had closed the University of Athens,² to the year A.D. 1203, in which Constantinople was captured for the first time by the Frankish perpetrators of 'the Fourth Crusade', an imperial city which, down to the latter of those two dates, had never seen an alien conqueror within her walls, had justified her claim to be called 'the City' by being the unique sanctuary of Hellenism, of which the like was not to be found in Hellas or anywhere else. This hitherto inviolate treasury stored with choice works of Hellenic literature and visual art was under Western Christian military occupation from A.D. 1204 to A.D. 1261; and there could be no more conclusive proof of the Crusaders' indifference to a Hellenistic Western Christian Civilization's cultural birthright than their almost complete failure to turn to any cultural account their fifty-seven-years-long tenancy of Hellenism's Constantinopolitan store-house. When these thirteenth-century Western French and Venetian barbarians broke into 'the City', they found it adorned with masterpieces of the classical Hellenic sculptors; and any fifteenth-century Italian pope or despot would have gone and sold all that he had³ if he had ever been offered the chance of buying a single one of these treasures; yet these Humanists' thirteenth-century forebears, who held the whole priceless collection in their grasp, could think of no better way of turning Hellenic bronzes to account than to break them up and melt the base metal down for coinage into petty cash.

A record of some of the masterpieces that fell victims to these atavistic Frankish acts of Vandalism was made, for the information of Posterity, by a contemporary Greek historian.⁴ It is astonishing that French men-at-arms should have had no eye for the beauty of these Hellenic statues in a century in which figures of comparable aesthetic merit in their own style were being carved by French sculptors. It is perhaps still more astonishing that, among the Western Christian clerics who accompanied the Frankish expeditionary force and who wielded, for good or evil, way and had been given the answer in a phrase surviving from the locally prevalent dialect of Ancient Greek.

¹ Heb. x. 34.

² See IV. iv. 272-3; V. vi. 115 and 223-4.

³ Matt. xiii. 46.

⁴ Nikítas Khoniátis' memorandum on Hellenic works of art destroyed by the Frankish conquerors of Constantinople is printed on pages 854-68 of I. Bekker's edition of Nikítas' *Khroniké* (Dillingen 1835, Weber).

a considerable moral influence over their combatant comrades,¹ not one, so far as we know, should ever have thought of employing himself at Constantinople in learning Ancient Greek in order to read in the original language those philosophical works of Aristotle's that were being studied so minutely and discussed so eagerly by these military chaplains' fellow clerks in the universities of Western Christendom during both the century preceding and the century following the establishment of a Latin imperial régime at Constantinople in A.D. 1204.

This barbarous indifference to dazzling cultural opportunities was not, of course, displayed by all contemporary Western Christian clerks. Medieval Western students of the philosophy of Aristotle did not neglect the chance offered to them in a Frank-ridden thirteenth-century Romania of verifying and revising from the original Greek text the Latin translations of Aristotle's works that they had already been making from Arabic translations in a Frank-ridden Sicily and Andalusia that had been overrun by the Crusaders more than a hundred years earlier. It is significant, however, that the translators who laboured with such devotion at Toledo and at Corinth were not native local 'fresh-water Franks' of the lineage of the *conquistadores*, but were 'salt-water Franks' born and bred in Lombardy, Germany, Britain, Brabant, and other provinces of the Crusaders' Western Christian homeland, whose enthusiasm for the study of Aristotelianism had been passionate enough to nerve them, for the sake of it, to make a long and perilous journey over the passes of the Pyrenees or across the waters of the Mediterranean. These Medieval Western culture-heroes will demand our attention in a later chapter.² In the present context we have merely to observe that the indifference to the opportunities for tapping the living waters of Hellenism at the fountain-head which was displayed by the thirteenth-century Western conquerors of Constantinople is cogent evidence that the predatory Frankish adventurers who sallied out from a conquered imperial capital to overrun outlying provinces of Romania in a Cis-isthmian European Hellas and a Peloponnesus were not drawn in that direction by the spell of classic ground, but were moved solely by the Medieval Western man-at-arms' insatiable hunger to acquire for himself a feudal lordship over some patch of rent-producing agricultural land where there was a peasantry that he could use as serfs.³

If, on this showing, we find no evidence that a yearning to set eyes on the homeland of an antecedent Hellenic culture was one of the motives in the minds of the French and Venetian conquerors of Constantinople, Central Greece, and the Morea in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, we shall not find any grounds for imagining that a cult of Hellenism

¹ See, *passim*, Villehardouin, Geoffroi de: *Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. by Wailly, N. de (3rd ed., Paris 1882, Firmin-Didot), and Clari, Robert de: *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. by Lauer, P. (Paris 1924, Champion).

² On pp. 133-5, below.

³ The only product of an occupied Greece that a Medieval Frankish 'ascendancy' there can claim credit for having popularized in the Western European homeland of those Levantine *conquistadores* was—not the Greek text of Aristotle's works which was translated at Corinth by a scholar from Brabant, William of Moerbeke (see pp. 133-5, below), but a 'Malmesey' wine exported from the Laconian port of Monemvasia (Frenchified as 'Malvoisie').

played a greater part in moving the Venetians to reconquer the Morea in the ninth decade of the seventeenth century. This seventeenth-century Frankish reoccupation was, however, followed by secular pilgrimages of a new-fangled kind of which the thirteenth century had seen no trace; and the trickle of Late Modern Western connoisseurs of Hellenic art and students of Hellenic literature on pilgrimage to the homeland of Hellenism round the shores of the Aegean Sea did not cease to flow when the short interlude of Venetian rule in the Morea was abruptly terminated by an Ottoman reconquest in A.D. 1715.

This difference between the respective cultural sequels to two Frankish conquests of the Morea that were separated from one another by a Time-span of nearly five hundred years was due, of course, to the intervening captivation of the Modern Western World as a whole by a renaissance of Hellenism in the literary and aesthetic spheres which had been initiated in Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; for a modern tendency towards the secularization of a Western way of life which had previously been lived within a Christian religious chrysalis had its effect upon the originally religious institution of Pilgrimage. Since an early stage in the growth of this institution, pilgrimage-resorts had tended to become museums of the visual arts; for, in wholly or mainly illiterate societies, it was a commonplace that pictures and sculptures were the books of an unlettered majority. In another context¹ we have quoted a passage in the *Ion* of Euripides in which a party of Athenian women pilgrims to Delphi are brought on to the stage as sightseers perambulating the precincts of the temple of Apollo. The interest that these visitors find in looking at the works of art with which the temenos is adorned lies in identifying these portrayals of mythical characters and scenes that are part of the familiar furniture of the spectators' own imaginations. This delight in the visual satisfactions that a pilgrimage-resort can provide was inherited from naïve and illiterate religious pilgrims to the holy places of Paganism and Higher Religion by sophisticated and erudite secular pilgrims to relics of the works of Hellenic art, and sites and scenes of events celebrated in surviving records of Hellenic history, when a fifteenth-century Italian renaissance of Hellenism had invested these visible and tangible 'antiquities' with an aura of pseudo-religious sanctity in the sight of a cultivated ruling minority in a Modern Western World.

This secularized Modern Western version of an ancient religious institution took the form of a 'grand tour' that, for the polite society of the Transalpine and Transmarine countries of a Modern Western World, found its earliest goal in a Roma Profana from whose long-observed virgin countenance a pious Humanism had been gingerly stripping away Roma Sacra's meretricious enamel mask. A classic example of the genre was Goethe's *Italienische Reise* (*peregrinabatar* A.D. 1786-8).

In Italy Goethe directed his attention above all to the artistic treasures. The works of art that captivated him were, however, almost exclusively confined to the relics of Antiquity and those modern works which, like

¹ In V. vi. 521-2.

Palladio's buildings, have brought Ancient forms back to life.¹ The concentration of his interest on this genre was carried by him to such extremes that at Venice he had no eye for Titian's pictures, and at Assisi none for the celebrated Franciscan Church with its picture-covered walls and ceiling.² The nearer Goethe approached to Rome, the more passionate and tempestuous became his yearning to set foot in the Capital of the World.³ After his arrival there on the 20th October [, 1786], he lived through his Roman days in a state of high beatitude. Here he found himself renewing his youth. He felt himself regenerated and endowed with a new capacity for the enjoyment of Life, the enjoyment of History, Art and Antiquity.⁴

¹ 'Palladio was penetrated (*durchdrungen*), through and through, by the essence of the Ancients, and was conscious of the pettiness and narrowness of his own age—in the spirit of a great man who is resolved not to resign himself but to re-mould the rest of Creation (*das Uebrige*) as far as possible in accordance with his own noble concepts.'—Goethe: *Italienische Reise*, ed. by Schuchardt, Chr. (Stuttgart 1862, Cotta, 2 vols.), vol. 1, p. 117.

² 'The monstrous substructures of the churches—piled one on top of another, Babylonian fashion—in which Saint Francis rests, did not detain me. I gave them a wide berth to my left, with a feeling of aversion. . . . Then I asked a handsome youngster the way to the Maria della Minerva [the *ci-devant* pagan Hellenic temple in the heart of the city]. . . . The growth in spiritual stature that I owe to the contemplation of this work of art is something ineffable. It will bear everlasting fruit. . . . [As I made my way down again,] the dear Minerva gave me one more last glimpse of her benign and consoling countenance, and then I took a side glance to my left at the melancholy cathedral of Saint Francis' (*ibid.*, pp. 159–61).

³ 'My yearning (*Begierde*) to reach Rome was so great, and was increasing by such leaps and bounds from moment to moment, that it would brook no further delay; so I made no more than a three-hours' stop in Florence. . . . I hurried through the place post-haste—the cathedral, the baptistery and all that. Here, once again, an entirely new and unknown world confronts me—and it is a world on which I have no inclination to linger (*verweilen*). The lay-out of the Boboli Gardens is exquisite. At Florence my exit was as rapid as my entry' (*ibid.*, pp. 168 and 156).

Students of Goethe's outlook and *ethos* will be reminded of a more famous passage in which the same verb *verweilen* is employed apropos of the same temptation to linger on the course of a journey—heading, in this case, not towards a physical Rome, but towards a spiritual goal of human endeavours. In agreeing the terms of his fateful wager with Mephistopheles, Faust makes the following commitment:

Werd' ich zum Augenblicke sagen:
'Verweile doch! Du bist so schön!'
Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen,
Dann will ich gern zugrunde gehen!

Goethe: *Faust*, II. 1699–1702, quoted in II. i. 281.

⁴ Karl Alt in *Goethe's Werke: Auswahl* (Berlin, N.D., Bong, 4 vols.), vol. 1, pp. xxix–xxx. While the paramount objective of the Modern Western 'grand tour' was to venerate the relics, and set eyes upon the scenes, of an antecedent Hellenic culture whose legacy to an affiliated Western Civilization had at last come to be appreciated at its full value by latter-day Western Humanists, this was not, of course, the cultivated traveller's sole concern. The typical Modern French, Dutch, English, German, Scandinavian, or American visitor to Italy was, unlike Goethe, eager also to acquaint himself at first hand with the Italian monuments of an earlier phase of his own Western culture, and also to improve his own mastery of this culture in its contemporary phase by sampling other contemporary local varieties of it besides the one in which he himself had been educated owing to the accident of his having been born in the particular province of the Western World of which he happened to be a native.

The interest in the tourist's own civilization's past which was one of the attractions exercised by Italy on a Transalpine or Transmarine Modern Western secular pilgrim was a manifestation, not of the renaissance of an antecedent culture, but of a different vein of nostalgia which we have labelled 'Archaism' (see V. vi. 49–97). This Modern Western transposition of an archaic yearning from the Time-dimension into the Space-dimension by giving vent to it by way of a secular pilgrimage had had its counterpart in Hellenic history in the grand tours that had been in the fashion for cultivated Romans from the second century B.C. until the onset of the paroxysm with which an elderly Hellenic Society was afflicted in the third century of the Christian Era. After the Hellenic World had recovered from this stroke—in so far as it ever did recover from it—the secular Hesperian pilgrim to Greece, in the wake of a Titus Flamininus, a Cicero, a Nero, a Hadrian, and an Aulus Gellius, gave way to the religious Hesperian pilgrim to Palestine

Yet, fruitful though this sojourn in Rome was to prove for all the future literary labours of a *Bürger-höflich* man of genius, Goethe's comfortable journey to Rome from Karlsbad in A.D. 1786 was prosaic compared with the veritable pilgrimage to a now profanely holy city that had been made in A.D. 1755 in *formâ pauperis* by Goethe's revered¹ plebeian forerunner Johann Joachim Winckelmann, the shoemaker's son.

Meanwhile, from the close of the seventeenth century onwards, a gradually increasing band of more adventurous Western spirits had been pushing their reconnaissances of profanely holy ground beyond a Rome that had been saluted as a πόλις 'Ἑλληνίς by Heracleides Ponticus² and been vituperated as a *Graeca urbs* by Juvenal³ into a Greece that, for these classically instructed Western eyes, was Hellenism's authentic holy of holies. After a grand tour culminating at Rome had been celebrated in Goethe's *Italienische Reise*, one in which Greece was the first objective and Rome was an afterthought and anticlimax was celebrated in *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (in *Graeciâ peregrinabatur* A.D. 1809-11) in language that simulated the rapture of a Christian pilgrim's more spontaneous feelings at the sight of Bethlehem and Galilee.⁴

on a new course set by an Aethieria and a Jerome. In a Western World in the modern chapter of its history, a Gibbon and a Goethe and a Byron and a Leake reverted, under the auspices of a fifteenth-century Italian renaissance of Hellenism, from Aethieria's and Jerome's religious pilgrimage to Hadrian's and Gellius's cultural tour.

¹ See Goethe's appreciation of Winckelmann in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Book VIII (vol. iv, pp. 279-80, in Karl Alt's *Auswahl*).

² See V. v. 212.

³ See V. v. 67.

⁴ The writer of this Study had to confess that he himself had been a life-long addict to this sentiment for Hellenic ground. It had led him to make the traditional Modern Western Humanist's pilgrimage to 'classical lands' as soon as he had finished his studies at home, in *partibus Barbarorum*, at the Medieval Western Christian University of Oxford, and he had been confirmed in his devotion to this profanely sacred soil by the inexhaustible benefits that he had found himself deriving, ever after, from a ten-months' stay, first in Rome and then in Greece, in A.D. 1911-12. He could never forget his feelings on the 30th September, 1911, when, for the first time, he had made the journey from Genoa to Rome by the coastal railway. After returning, with indifference, the stare of a Leaning Tower of Pisa, which had peered in at him through his railway-carriage window looking just as it had always looked in the pictures of it, he was thrilled to find himself crossing the Arno into territory that had lain within the frontiers of the Roman Commonwealth since before the outbreak of the First Romano-Punic War. 'Henceforth', he found on the 20th May, 1950, that he had entered in his *ephemerides* for the 30th September, 1911, 'I know every stage of the way, and can always tell where we are by the look of the country. Cecina, with distant Volterra mountains to the left... O pulcherrima Maritima Tusciae—haec vera Italia, non Ligures neque Taurini.' At that moment he had the strange experience of setting eyes on his spiritual home for the first time in his life when he was in his twenty-third year; and the effect was heightened when, on the 20th November, 1911, he found his ship travelling up the Gulf of Corinth, threading its way through an isthmian canal, and breaking out into the Saronic Gulf of the Aegean Sea, to confront the pilgrim dramatically with the converging view of serried classic sites closing in round him at point-blank range: Salamis, Aegina, Methana, Megara, Cithaeron, Peiraeus, Lycabettus, Hymettus, Laurium. This was the spectacle that had overwhelmed Servius Sulpicius Rufus one day in the year 45 B.C. when he had run into it from the opposite direction (see his letter to Cicero (*Ad Familiares*, iv, 5) quoted in IV. iv. 315).

The present writer had also to confess that, in his neglect of a 'post-classical' Italy, he had gone to farther extremes than Goethe's worst extravagances. Goethe had at least set foot in Assisi, whereas the writer, down to the 13th August, 1952, had been content with a Pisgah sight of Assisi caught from Spello on the 30th October, 1911. Moreover, though he had three times been shunted into and out of Venice by train *en route* between Calais and Constantinople, he had not set foot in Venice till the third of these occasions—on the 30th April, 1923, between the hours of 5.0 and 6.0 A.M.—and had then failed to advance farther than the pair of Late Roman Emperors in porphyry who embrace one another on the threshold of St. Mark's. His third offence against his native Western

Where'er we tread, 'tis haunted, holy ground;
 No earth of thine is lost in vulgar mould,
 But one vast realm of wonder spreads around,
 And all the Muse's tales seem truly told,
 Till the sense aches with gazing to behold
 The scenes our earliest dreams have dwelt upon;
 Each hill and dale, each deepening glen and wold,
 Defies the power which crushed thy temples gone:
 Age shakes Athena's tower, but spares gray Marathon.

Yet to the remnants of the splendour past
 Shall pilgrims, pensive but unwearied, throng;
 Long shall the voyager, with th' Ionian blast,
 Hail the bright clime of battle and of song;
 Long shall thine annals and immortal tongue
 Fill with thy fame the youth of many a shore;
 Boast of the aged! Lesson of the young!
 Which sages venerate and bards adore,
 As Pallas and the Muse unveil their awful lore.¹

If, as perhaps it might have pleased Gibbon to remark, the sincerity of a cult can be measured by its capacity for breeding illusions, we may gauge the strength of a Modern Western *Schwärmerei* for the classic landscape of Greece by the vitality of a nineteenth-century Western Philhellenism. When, in A.D. 1821, the Ottoman Porte's Greek Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh* in the Morea revolted against the Pādīshāh, Metternich's disapprobatory interpretation of the event as an inexcusable defiance of a legitimate sovereign's lawful authority² might perhaps have won the day in a reactionary-minded post-Napoleonic Western Society if the romantic lighting of a Byronic stage had not availed instantaneously to transfigure a 'now degenerate horde' into 'spitten images'³ of 'hero sires' whom they had so recently still 'shamed'.⁴ Thereafter, Byron lived to rectify one volte face by making another; and the final estimate of the character of the Modern Greek people which he was led to form by bitter experience on a grim second pilgrimage to their country was far harsher than an earlier verdict which had been the light-hearted by-product of a poet's brilliant child's play. Yet, if Byron was thus cured of his illusion about the living inhabitants of his Hellas by less than four months' intimate intercourse with them in A.D. 1824, he never lost his illusion about Hellas herself; and his devotion to this idealized ghost of a dead world, that, for good or ill, could not ever disappoint him by confronting him in the flesh, moved the Frankish poet to spend the remains of his fortune, and crown the sacrifice by laying down his life, on behalf of the unworthy living human fauna of a latter-day Western Hellenist's brazenly undiscredited profane Holy Land.

cultural past was that he had always so far deliberately refused to break any journey in Tuscany, for fear that the siren charms of a Medieval and Early Modern Italy might detain him from pressing on into Hellenic holy ground in a 'Roman Italy', a Greece, and a Turkey that had been the goal of his pilgrimages up to date.

¹ Byron: *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, Canto II, Stanzas lxxxviii and xci.

² See II. ii. 185-6.

³ See Wright, J.: *The English Dialect Dictionary*, vol. v (London 1904, Frowde), pp. 670-1, s. vv. 'spit an image' and 'spitten image'.

⁴ *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, Canto II (published in March 1812), Stanza lxxxiii.

C. THE DRAMA OF RENAISSANCES

(I) THE STAGE OF THE DRAMA OF RENAISSANCES

NOW that we have concluded our survey of renaissances, it is time to examine the stage on which the *dramatis personae* play their parts.

If an encounter of any kind is to take place, there must be some common ground on which the parties can meet. In all the encounters with which we are concerned in this Study, the parties are living souls or their wraiths, and the interaction between them is therefore always some form of action on the psychic plane, even when, as in warfare, this operates through the medium of physical collisions and combats. In 'encounters in the flesh', however, in which all the parties engaged are simultaneously alive at the time, the meeting-place in which they make their psychic contact with one another is the external physical world, whereas in renaissances the encounters are not only of a psychic order in themselves but are also experienced in a psychic meeting-place, not a physical one. A renaissance takes place in the *for intérieur* of a living actor, who provokes the encounter by waking in his own mind a memory, dormant there, of a party who is no longer alive. To recall to mind something that one has forgotten is equivalent, as has been pointed out by Socrates,¹ to learning something new; and a recollection thus precipitates an event.

The difference in the setting of the respective stages of renaissances and encounters in the flesh generates a corresponding difference in their respective ranges of action in the two dimensions of Space and Time. In the Space-dimension, 'encounters in the flesh' have the wider range; for they can occur between any parties that happen to be alive simultaneously on the face of the planet, even if these parties have been unknown to one another previously—as, for example, the indigenous societies of the New World and a Western Christian Society in the Old World were unknown to one another until they collided at and after the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era as a result of the Western Christian maritime explorers' physical feat of making the transit of the Atlantic Ocean. In renaissances there is no such possibility of encounters on the geographical plane between parties previously quite unacquainted, since, in the psychic medium in which a renaissance takes place, the living party to the encounter can, as we have seen, resuscitate only those elements of the life of a dead party that happen to be already latent in the living party's memory. In the Time-dimension, on the other hand, 'encounters in the flesh' have a narrower range than renaissances; for in 'encounters in the flesh' the parties can only encounter one another at the moments in their respective lives at which they happen to meet in the Space-dimension, whereas in renaissances the living necromancer—likewise confined in the Time-dimension, though he is, to the moment of his own life at which he is

¹ See Plato: *Phaedo*, 72 E-76 C, and *Meno*, 81 A-86 C.

performing his act of magic—is at the same time able to call up, at will, out of the storehouse of his memory, elements of the dead party's life taken from all stages of this dead party's history that are on mental record there. Moreover, the evocator has it in his power to bring on to his inner mental stage simultaneously any number of events in the dead party's history that in real life were not simultaneous but were successive.

The difference in the setting of the stages of renaissances and 'encounters in the flesh' also sets different limits to the number of the characters that can take part in the play. In 'encounters in the flesh' the possible number is limited only by the capacity of the habitable surface of the planet for simultaneously providing coexisting human societies with the habitat and subsistence requisite for keeping them all alive, side by side, on minimum scales of *Lebensraum* and welfare. In renaissances the maximum possible number of dramatis personae is three, since *ex hypothesi* there can be no more than two dead civilizations whose ghosts the living necromancer will be able to conjure up out of the Sheol of his own subconscious psyche by animating some memory of them that has been lying entranced there. There cannot be an intact mental record where there is not an unbroken cultural tradition; and there can be only two dead antecedent civilizations with which a living society will have been able to maintain this necessary cultural contact across the gulf of an intervening social interregnum.

One of the two will be the civilization to which the living society is 'affiliated';¹ the other will be a contemporary of this antecedent civilization which has been implicated with it through an 'encounter in the flesh' at the time when those two now dead civilizations were simultaneously alive, and which, in the course of this encounter, has imparted to the 'apparented' civilization's internal proletariat the 'spark of life' or 'germ of creative power' inspiring a church, incubated in the bosom of this proletariat, which has eventually served the 'affiliated' society as a chrysalis.² In the history of the Western Civilization, for example, the renaissances that our foregoing survey has brought to light will be found to be revivals of some element of the life either of an antecedent Hellenic Civilization, to which the Western Civilization is 'affiliated', or else of an antecedent Syriac Civilization, contemporary with, and implicated with, the Hellenic, to which the Western Civilization is related through a germ of creative power derived from the Syriac Civilization by a Christian Church that has served the Western Civilization as its chrysalis.

Until not much more than a hundred and fifty years before A.D. 1952, renaissances and 'encounters in the flesh' were the only kinds of contact between one civilization and another of which there had been historical instances within the Time-span of some five or six thousand years during which societies of this species had been in existence up to date. But, within a period inaugurated by the French invasion of Egypt in A.D. 1798 (to give this new era a convenient, though conventional, initial date), a third kind of contact had been established through the enterprise of Late Modern and post-Modern Western archaeologists. These brilliant pioneers of historical exploration had succeeded in

¹ See I. i. 43-44.

² See I. i. 57.

making contact with civilizations that were neither living contemporaries of their own society, whom it could meet in the flesh, nor dead predecessors related to it by an unbroken tradition of the kind that linked the Western Society with a dead antecedent Hellenic Civilization to which it was 'affiliated' and also with a dead antecedent Syriac Civilization with which it was in liaison through the Christian Church.

The first of these 'lost' or 'forgotten' civilizations to be retrieved by Western ingenuity was the Egyptian; and this was hardly an accident, since the Egyptian was, for several reasons, less difficult than other castaways were to recapture. For one thing, the Egyptian culture did not have to be literally disinterred, since it had left physical monuments that not only stood above ground but towered into the sky. The Pyramids at Gîzah did not have to wait for the arrival of a French expeditionary force in A.D. 1798 to loom large in the minds of living men. Ever since their erection in the third millennium B.C. they had made an overwhelming impression on the imaginations of non-Egyptian sight-seers; and Western and Greek Orthodox Christian scholars who had never set eyes on them were familiar with the fact of their existence—and with the further fact that they were the abiding products of a now long since extinct Egyptian Civilization—thanks to the accounts of the Egyptian Society's culture and history in the records of an Hellenic Civilization which, throughout its own life-span, had been in contact in the Space-dimension with an Egyptian Tithonus.¹ One of the incidental products of this Hellenic-Egyptian encounter had been the bilingual inscription in the Greek Alphabet and in two Egyptian scripts on 'the Rosetta Stone' (*incised est* 196 B.C.) which had given Modern Western scholars their key to the deciphering of both the Hieroglyphic and the Demotic Egyptian characters; but the task of proceeding from the reading of scripts to the interpretation of a dead language conveyed in them might have been still more arduous than it actually was if in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era a language descended from the demotic Egyptian had not been still in daily use as the liturgical language of a Coptic Monophysite Christian Church.

Western scholars had more ado to recapture a Babylonian and an antecedent Sumerian Civilization whose still visible monuments were shapeless mounds of disintegrating sun-dried brick that could not compare with granite-built pyramids in impressiveness; yet here, too, living languages furnished valuable clues. The Achaemenian inscriptions in a simplified version of the cuneiform script, which provided the keys for this script's decipherment, conveyed a language of the Indo-European family from which a still living Modern Persian was descended;² the Akkadian language, conveyed in parallel columns of cuneiform script in the Achaemenian inscriptions, proved to be a member of the same Semitic family as the already familiar Arabic, Syriac, Aramaic, Hebrew, Amharic, and Ge'ez; an already acquired knowledge of Old Persian and Akkadian made it possible to decipher the Elamite language, which was the third of those employed in the Achaemenids' trilingual inscriptions,

¹ The doom of Tithonus has been observed in VI. vii. 47-52.

² See VI. vii. 247-8.

though Elamite had no affinity with any previously known language, living or dead; and bilingual texts in Asshurbanipal's library¹ enabled philologists who had already mastered a Semitic Akkadian language to interpret a Sumerian language which, like Elamite, had no known affinities, but which was of much greater historical importance than Elamite, since it proved to be the mother tongue of the creators of a Sumeric Civilization into whose heritage the speakers of Elamite and Akkadian had entered belatedly as proselytes.

Perhaps the most remarkable of all the triumphs of a Modern Western Archaeology was the disinterment of civilizations that had not only been long since dead and buried but had fallen into complete oblivion. The Minoan Civilization and the Indus Culture, both of which had been disinterred within the present writer's lifetime in the Old World, and the Mayan Civilization in the New World, were the most notable cases of dead civilizations that had suffered this total eclipse; and the recapture of the marvellously accurate but formidably complicated Mayan system of chronological reckoning and notation was perhaps the greatest feat of archaeological skill so far achieved.

The vividness of the life with which these dead, buried, and in some cases entirely forgotten civilizations were endowed in the consciousness of a latter-day Western Society that had succeeded in recapturing them was piquantly illustrated by the vitality of Ikhnaton's ghost, which, after a *vitai pausa*² of more than thirty-two centuries' duration, aroused the same controversially conflicting feelings of sympathy and antipathy in Western academic circles in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era that the Egyptiac records testified to his having aroused in the flesh in Egyptiac clerical circles when he was living, reigning, and innovating in the fourteenth century B.C.

In thus establishing a third kind of contact between one civilization and another, the Modern Western archaeologists had done contemporary Modern Western historians the invaluable service of raising the number of known civilizations to a figure at which it had become just feasible to make this species of human society a subject of comparative study.³

(II) THE OCCASION OF THE DRAMA OF RENAISSANCES

'Encounters in the flesh' may be precipitated by deliberate acts of will—inspired by aggressiveness, piety, curiosity, or other incentives—on the part of one or more of the parties. Curiosity, for example, was the motive of Herodotus's, Marco Polo's, and Ibn Battūtah's travels; piety the motive of Goethe's and Byron's, as well as Fa Hsien's and Arculf's, pilgrimages; aggressiveness the motive of Alexander's, Demetrius's, the Cid's, and Chingis' conquests. It is also possible, however, for these encounters between contemporaries in the Space-dimension to come about by accident. For example, contact between a Tari Furora Society and a

¹ See pp. 53-54, above.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturā*, Book III, ll. 860 and 930.

³ See pp. 205-6, below.

Western Society that had previously had no knowledge of one another was established in A.D. 1935 when the natural fortifications of the Tari Furora's secluded fastness in Papua were penetrated by an enterprising Western explorer¹ who had not been attracted by any rumour of the existence of a mysterious people behind a barrier of knife-edged mountains, but had been impelled by a desire to fill in one of the few still remaining blanks in a Western map of the World plotted out by predecessors of Hides' who, by his day, had been at work continuously for some four and a half centuries.

The encounters negotiated by Modern Western archaeologists with dead civilizations, not related by any unbroken thread of tradition with either the Western or any other living civilization, might likewise be the outcomes of either accident or design. Schliemann, for example, made it the master-purpose of his career to identify and excavate the site of a Troy whose fame had been immortalized in the Homeric Epic,² whereas nothing but the play of Chance could have thrust into the hands of expert and imaginative investigators the clues that led to the discovery of the previously quite forgotten Minoan Civilization and Indus Culture. A renaissance, on the other hand, cannot ever come about in this accidental way; for the evocation of a ghost by a necromancer is, by definition, a deliberate act of will on the necromancer's part; and, in practising his grim and perilous art, the necromancer is always inspired by a conscious purpose.

If the wizard screws up his courage to the pitch required for subjecting himself to the self-imposed ordeal of awaking the dead, he embarks on this desperate enterprise as a last resort, under pressure of an urgent need to solve some current problem in his own life which he has failed to solve by drawing upon his native resources. The ghost of a universal state, for example, is usually evoked in the hope that its presence may quell the anarchy of a current Dark Age by the application of a remedy which, in the now dead antecedent civilization's history, did once effectively quell the anarchy of a Time of Troubles. The evocation of ghosts of the Roman Empire in the shapes of an East Roman Empire³ and a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy,⁴ and the installation, at Cairo, of a simulacrum of an 'Abbasid Caliphate that had just been extinguished at Baghdad,⁵ were mainly inspired by the need for a united military and political front against an alien aggressor. The installation in Japan,

¹ See V. v. 197, with n. 1. The assumption, made by the writer of this Study in this earlier passage, that the Tari Furora must have acquired some elements of their material culture from abroad before the Westerners' advent is corroborated in a letter written on the spot by Mr. C. R. Stonor on the 25th January, 1950, when he was engaged in carrying out a survey of the economy of the Tari Furora people for the Government of the Territory of Papua. 'They grew maize before we discovered them—a crop which, without doubt, they obtained by occasional trading with coastal tribes, who, in turn, obtained it from Europeans.' On the other hand, Mr. Stonor writes that, apart from the acquisition of this simple American crop from some alien source, he 'can find nothing in the indigenous system of agriculture to justify the views of the late Mr. Hides, or of any popular accounts of this region, wherein it is assumed that people so low in the cultural scale could not have evolved their system of cultivation' [for themselves, independently of any of the agricultural civilizations].

² See XIII. x. 12-16, 155, and 163.

³ See II. ii. 367-9; IV. iv. 323; and VI. vii. 19-21.

⁴ See II. ii. 177-88; V. v. 325-7; and VI. vii. 28.

⁵ See I. i. 67, n. 2, 70, and 349-50; and VI. vii. 21.

in A.D. 645, of a copy of the Sinic Han imperial régime, that had just been reinstated in China, was designed to foster the planting out of the Far Eastern Civilization, *de toutes pièces*, on the virgin soil of the Japanese Isles;¹ and the corresponding purpose of taming German, Scandinavian, and Slav barbarians beyond the north-eastern frontier of Western Christendom was likewise one of the motives for the evocation of the Holy Roman Empire.² The ghost of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic city-state was revived in a Medieval Italy, and the ghost of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic absolute monarchy in the Modern Western World at large, in the hope of thereby enabling a potentially progressive Western Society to achieve its own latent possibilities on the political plane beyond the limits of the modest capacity of the clumsy native Western institution of Feudalism. The ghost of a Roman Law was evoked first in Orthodox and then in Western Christendom in the hope of providing a native economy that was rapidly increasing in complexity with a correspondingly elaborate legal framework which could not be pieced together out of a juvenile Christian society's rudimentary native law derived from Christian and Judaic sources. Aristotle's ghost in the West, and Confucius's ghost in the Far East, were evoked in the hope of enabling a Western and a Far Eastern intellect to break out of the shell of a Christian and a Mahayanian Buddhist patristic theology. The ghost of a Sinic Literature was evoked in the Far East, and a ghost of an Hellenic Literature in a Greek Orthodox and a Western Christendom, in the hope of thereby irrigating an arid native vein of literary genius. The ghosts of an Hellenic Sculpture and an Hellenic Architecture were evoked in a Modern Western World which was painfully aware that the medieval school of native Western and borrowed Syriac visual art had no more arrows left in its quiver.

A renaissance is thus always deliberately produced for a consciously conceived purpose by a living agent who is awaking the dead from their sleep; and, if the living party to the relation did not thus deliberately take the initiative, an encounter of this kind could never occur; for a ghost cannot raise itself on its own initiative, to haunt the living uninvited; nor can the dead and the living meet one another by chance, as two or more living individuals or societies can, if they happen to be alive simultaneously on the face of the same planet.

(III) THE PLOT OF THE DRAMA OF RENAISSANCES

The distinctive feature of a renaissance that determines its occasion is also the key to its plot; and our inquiry into the occasion has shown us what this distinctive feature is. In an encounter between a necromancer and a ghost the *dramatis personae* can never exchange their roles, because, in contrast to the *dramatis personae* in an encounter in the flesh between parties who are all alike alive at the time, the parties to a renaissance are not 'of like passions'³ with one another.⁴

¹ See II. ii. 158-9.

² See II. ii. 166-70.

³ Acts xiv. 15.

⁴ This difference between an encounter in the flesh between contemporaries and an encounter between a necromancer and a ghost is analogous to the difference between a

Of course, in an encounter of either, or indeed of any, kind, the initiative will have come from one side only; but, in an encounter between the living, the party which happens to have been the victim of the first assault, no less than the party by whom the first assault happens to have been delivered, has it in him to take the initiative if occasion offers. In an encounter of this kind the assaulted party's passivity and inferiority and the assailant's activity and superiority at the opening of the first act of the play are not due to intrinsic qualities in the parties' respective natures which, in virtue of being immutable, make the effects that follow from them irreversible. In 'encounters in the flesh' the assailant's ascendancy usually proves to be a wasting asset, while the assaulted party usually demonstrates his potentialities from the outset. As soon as the encounter begins, there is, as we have observed elsewhere,¹ a reciprocal exertion of influences and a concomitant tendency for the initiative to change hands through being captured from the original aggressor by the party that has been his victim at the moment when the curtain has risen on the first scene. This 'reversal of roles' (*Graecè περιπέτεια*) is, in fact, the distinctive feature of this genre of encounters; and *ex hypothesi* a corresponding exchange of parts cannot occur in encounters of the different genre in which one party only is a living individual or living generation of a society, while the other party is a wraith. We have already noticed that, in an encounter of this latter kind, the living party alone has the power to take the initiative; and we may now go on to observe that, when once, thanks to the necromancer's initiative, the ghost has been raised, the ghost alone has the power to exert an influence. The spectre's uncanny presence cannot fail to affect the haunted living soul, while the necromancer cannot retort by exercising any counter-influence on the ghost that he has raised; for the living can influence only the living, and it is impossible for the necromancer to catch alive the dead individual or society whose ghost he has called up, since, in order to catch him alive, he would have to have been his contemporary and to have encountered him in the flesh instead of in his own haunted psychic inner world. When the ghost gets on his nerves he has no means of retaliating. In an encounter of this uncanny genre the channel of influence is a 'one-way street' which admits no counter-flow of traffic; and the haunted necromancer will find cold comfort in reflecting that he has only himself to blame, and quoting *ad hominem*: 'Vous l'avez voulu!'²

An influence to which there can be no retort in kind is a challenge (indeed a formidable one); and the plot of the play which the evocation of a ghost sets in action can be summed up in the formula that the necromancer seeks to find aid for coping with one challenge at the price of exposing himself to another. He is responding to a challenge from a living contemporary by inviting a challenge from the ghost of a dead

sedentary society, in which every member is inherently capable of exchanging roles with every other, in spite of the institutional impediments of class or caste, and a Nomadic society consisting of three non-interchangeable components: the shepherds or herdsmen, the dogs, horses, and camels that are their non-human auxiliaries, and their flocks and herds (see III. iii. 7-22).

¹ In IX. viii. 464-80.

² Molière: *Georges Dandin*, Act I, scene ix.

predecessor. In every renaissance this is the structure of the plot; and the structure is necessarily rigid and invariable because the dramatis personae are incapable of exchanging their parts. Since there can be no *peripeteia* there can be no second act—and no 'concatenation',¹ either, between a series of one-act plays. In contrast to an encounter between contemporaries, which is apt to run into several acts and to link up with previous and subsequent dramas of its own genre, a renaissance is bound to be an insulated experience.

The only element of elasticity in the plot of a renaissance is the diversity of the possible denouements of a situation in which one of the parties is confronted with two challenges at once; for the doubling of the challenge raises the number of possible alternative responses to four.

One alternative, which the necromancer may bring to pass if he is sufficiently cool-headed and adroit, is for him to play off his two adversaries against one another. If he can first succeed in getting the better of the living adversary whom he is encountering in the flesh by mobilizing against him the ghost that he has evoked with that intent, he may then perhaps succeed in exorcizing the now superfluous *revenant* with the aid of the now subjugated living party. A classic example of this tricky feat of prestidigitation is the Western Civilization's success in exploiting an Italian renaissance of the Hellenic culture to retrieve a breakdown in its own native cultural growth, and then shaking off the incubus of a resuscitated Hellenism by reverting to its own distinctive Western vein.² On the other hand—and this is the second alternative—the ingenious necromancer may get the worst, and not the best, of both worlds, as a latter-day Persia found to her cost when she was constricted by the strait-waistcoat of an Imāmī Shi'ism which her Safawī conquerors had called up from Sheol to serve them as a spiritual weapon in a competition for political supremacy in an Iranic Muslim World in which the 'Osmanlis, and not the Safawīs, eventually won the day.³ As this example shows, the necromancer may both fail to solve the problem confronting him in his own social milieu which has tempted him into resorting to the necromancer's art, and may also fail to rid himself of a ghostly incubus which in this case he will have imposed on himself in vain. The third alternative is a failure to meet the challenge of a contemporary problem combined with a success in escaping the challenge of the vainly resuscitated ghost—as a nascent Western Christendom was compensated by the fiasco of the Carolingian evocation of a ghost of the Roman Empire for the failure of this abortive act of necromancy to quell the anarchy of a Dark Age.⁴ The fourth alternative—which is the inverse of the third—is exemplified in the fatal success of a Leo Syrus and a Sui Yang Chien in solving the same problem of anarchy in a nascent Orthodox Christendom and in a nascent Far Eastern World at the price of saddling the salvaged society with an incubus that defied all subsequent efforts to throw it off and that progressively increased its pressure until

¹ The phenomenon of 'concatenations' of encounters between contemporaries has been examined in IX. viii. 454-63.

² See pp. 62-73, above.

³ See I. i. 366-400.

⁴ See p. 9, above.

it eventually broke the back of the society that had deliberately assumed this fatal burden.¹

After taking this bird's-eye view of the plot of the drama of renaissances, it may be convenient to glance at the process of evocation before looking further into the nature of a challenge from the *revenant* which is the nemesis of recourse to the necromancer's art.

¹ See pp. 15 and 16, above.

D. THE PROCESS OF EVOCATION

(I) THE INVERSION OF AN ORIGINAL HISTORICAL ORDER

AT first sight it might seem possible to call up the whole culture of a dead antecedent society *en bloc*, since *ex hypothesi* the whole of this dead society's history has already been played out to a finish, and, just because it is all now dead, and is extant only in the tradition of a living society, it might be expected to be also all now revocable simultaneously. Actually, as we have found in our survey of renaissances,¹ the elements of a dead antecedent culture are apt to be resuscitated piecemeal; and there are two reasons for this. One reason, as we have seen,² is that a ghost is never raised except for the immediate practical purpose of obtaining its assistance for the solution of some pressing problem in the necromancer's own life; and the element which, with this purpose in view, he selects for reanimation out of the comprehensive spectrum of a dead civilization's accumulated experience will be only what is relevant to the current problem that is exercising the necromancer himself at the time. If, however, the necromancer were nevertheless to overstep the limit of his immediate requirements by trying to resuscitate the dead culture in its entirety, a positive obstacle to an integral renaissance would then present itself. The simultaneous presence of elements of human action and experience that have never been in existence simultaneously 'in real life' is only possible in a psychic world in which these elements have been reduced to the tenuous consistency of disembodied memories. As soon as the Will takes delivery of these ghosts from the Intellect in order to translate them into real life again, they once again become amenable to a law of real life which debars incompatible institutions, ideas, and ideals from reigning simultaneously in one and the same social milieu.

The most crack-brained Medieval Western votary of Hellenism would never, for example, have dreamed of deliberately resuscitating, side by side, a bevy of sovereign independent parochial city-states *alla Greca* and an oecumenical Roman Empire which, in the history of the Hellenic Civilization, had been the tardily applied antidote to the fatal anarchy which the licence of parochial sovereignty had eventually let loose upon the Hellenic World. When, in the twelfth century of the Christian Era, these two resuscitated Hellenic institutions did come face to face with one another in a Western arena as a result of the unco-ordinated operations of rival schools of Medieval Western necromancers, their inherent incompatibility promptly brought them into violent collision; and it proved impossible to make a Medieval Northern and Central Italy safe for a plenary indulgence in the Greek vice of parochial sovereignty without reducing 'the Holy Roman Empire' to nonentity.

For these reasons the ghosts of elements which, in the life of a dead

¹ On pp. 6-114, above.

² On pp. 118-20, above.

antecedent civilization, have come and gone in succession to one another, without ever having appeared on the stage simultaneously, are apt likewise to be resuscitated successively, and not simultaneously, in the history of an affiliated society. When this happens, the chronological order in which these ghosts are evoked is neither the original order nor a haphazard one bearing no relation to it; it is the original order in reverse.¹

In the political field, for example, a Roman Empire which had been the last political institution to be thrown up in the course of Hellenic history was the first to be resuscitated in the history of a Hellenistic Western Christendom. 'The Holy Roman Empire' was inaugurated at Rome a week before the eighth century of the Christian Era ran out, and in Charlemagne's life-time its writ ran in all provinces of the Western World of the day except Britain and Asturia. On the other hand the sovereign city-state whose emergence in Hellenic history had been almost coeval with the birth of the Hellenic Civilization itself was not resuscitated in the Western World until after the beginning of the eleventh century, and even then its first effective reappearance was confined to a Northern and Central Italian province of the Western World.² Two or three hundred years had to pass, after that, to give an expanding Medieval Western cosmos of city-states time to establish secondary strongholds in Flanders and in Germany,³ and some two hundred years more to give the resuscitated Hellenic ideal of parochial sovereignty time to translate itself from the city-state to the nation-state scale by captivating the feudal monarchies of Transalpine and Transmarine Western Europe;⁴ and it was not till after the outbreak and exacerbation of the French Revolution in Paris, little less than a thousand years after the date of the coronation of Charlemagne at Rome on Christmas Day A.D. 800, that the Hellenomane nations of a Late Modern Western World finally capitulated to the Periclean Attic political ideals of absolute sovereignty for each parochial state, *vis-à-vis* the rest of the body social, and absolute democracy for the citizens of each parochial state in the management of their own parochial domestic affairs.⁵

In this instance the reason why the original chronological order was reversed in the evolution of a renaissance is perhaps not difficult to descry. The explanation is to be found in the utilitarian considerations which are the motive of every renaissance, as we have already noticed. In Charlemagne's generation throughout Western Christendom, a nascent civilization's most urgent political need was to extricate itself from the anarchy of a Dark Age; and the obvious institutional instrument for the purpose was a universal state which had been instituted originally by a disintegrating antecedent civilization as a means of

¹ This phenomenon has been touched upon already in IX. viii. 98-101.

² 'The State in the Classical and Modern sense of the word first re-emerged in the Italian city-state with its intensive political life, its strong civic consciousness, and its complex and artificial constitutional systems' (Dawson, *Chr.: Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), p. 214).

³ See III. iii. 299-300 and 344-7.

⁴ See III. iii. 360-3.

⁵ See pp. 7-15, above.

extricating itself from the anarchy of a Time of Troubles. So long as the Roman Empire had been an effective régime, a mortally wounded Hellenic body social had enjoyed a reprieve. When the Roman Empire had been stricken with its second and final paralytic stroke—which, in the western provinces, had incapacitated it at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era—the Hellenic Civilization had dissolved into the resurgent anarchy of a social interregnum with which a nascent Western Christendom was still battling in the eighth century. The Western Hellenistic Society of Charlemagne's day did not have far to seek in order to hit upon the happy thought that, if only it could now revive the Roman Empire in the form in which this had existed in the West from Augustus's reign to Theodosius the Great's (save for an interlude of recurrent anarchy between Alexander Severus's reign and Diocletian's), it might be able to recapture the blessed *pax oecumenica* which the Western Christian Society's Hellenic predecessor had enjoyed for the greater part of those four centuries.

On the other hand, Charlemagne's generation in Western Christendom, and *a fortiori* Charles the Fat's, would have found nothing attractive in the international anarchy of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic cosmos of sovereign parochial city-states and a post-Alexandrine Hellenic cosmos of sovereign parochial 'enlightened monarchies' which were to prove so attractive in their turns to the Medieval Italians and to the Modern peoples of the Transalpine Western countries; for this international anarchy, which the Roman Empire had temporarily quelled, was the crying evil with which the Carolingians were contending. Parochial liberties bought at the price of oecumenical chaos could appeal only to communities whose energies had accumulated a head of steam strong enough to need a vent, but not yet strong enough to blow Society to pieces; and this new set of social circumstances—which differed from those of a Carolingian Western Christendom in almost every point except the significant point of being transitory—was the situation in which the pre-Augustan Hellenic ideal of parochial absolute sovereignty ran riot through the Western World in the course of some eight or nine centuries following its first revival on the city-state scale in an eleventh-century Italy.

Corresponding considerations explain the reversals of an original chronological order in the evolutions of renaissances in divers non-political fields of activity.

In the linguistic and literary field, for example, the collection of texts of works of the antecedent culture's literature, which we have found¹ to be the earliest symptom of a dawning cultural renaissance, is the latest cultural pursuit of an antecedent civilization in its death agonies. The manuscript-hunting fifteenth-century Italian Humanists were crossing pens with the manuscript-copying sixth-century monks in Cassiodorus's *vivarium* at Squillace, where the last of the great Roman imperial civil servants in the West had spent his old age in providently lading a monastic Noah's ark with samples of the Latin version of an Hellenic literature after he had retired from his thankless secular pro-

¹ On pp. 52-57, above.

fessional task of trying to make an Ostrogothic barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire work.

The compilation of encyclopaedias and dictionaries, which is apt to follow after the collection of texts in the evolution of a renaissance,¹ comes before them in an antecedent society's cultural history; for, even when a disintegrating civilization has reached a stage of cultural decay at which it gives up the attempt at further creation in order to concentrate its dwindling energies on trying to preserve the cultural legacy of the Past, it makes, at first, an effort to bequeath the quintessence of this heritage to Posterity in a systematized form worthy of a rational mind, before eventually resigning itself to the *ultima ratio* of a mere mechanical reproduction of texts. Lexicographical activities thus occupy not the last, but the penultimate, chapter in the cultural history of a disintegrating civilization, whereas, in the evolution of a renaissance, they come, as we have observed, not first, but second, after the texts of the antecedent society's literature have been retrieved and explored. The fourth-century commentators Servius and Macrobius, the fourth-century grammarian Aelius Donatus, and the fifth-century encyclopaedist Martianus Capella, who were labouring for the preservation of the Latin version of the Hellenic literature in the western provinces of the Roman Empire on the eve of a fifth-century collapse, had to wait for their Modern Western avatars until the sixteenth century and after. In the Greek-speaking heart of the Roman Empire, where Hellenism survived for some two hundred years longer than in the western provinces, a sixth-century Hesychius of Miletus was the encyclopaedist who, in a Byzantine renaissance of Hellenism, found his avatar in a tenth-century Souïdhas;² and Hsü Shên's *Shuo Wên*, comprising 10,000 characters arranged under 540 radicals,³ which was the model for all the dictionaries compiled in a Far Eastern renaissance of Sinic letters from the T'ang Age onwards, had been produced at some date during the first half of the second century of the Christian Era, before the collapse of a Posterior Han Dynasty which was the Sinic counterpart of the Hellenic Civilization's post-Diocletianic régime.

The inversion of an original chronological order persists as a cultural renaissance continues to unfold itself. The writing of original works in the antecedent culture's literary language, which, in the antecedent civilization's own history, is apt, as we have seen, to be on the wane by the time when lexicography comes to the fore, is apt, in the evolution of a renaissance, to hang fire until the reincarnate lexicographers have prepared the ground for it.⁴ We have noticed this sequence in the history of a Byzantine renaissance of Hellenic letters,⁵ and we have also noticed⁶ that the Byzantine writers in the medium of Ancient Greek were content to imitate a Neo-Attic *κοινὴ* which had been the vehicle

¹ See pp. 57-58, above.

² See Sandys, J. E.: *A History of Classical Scholarship from the Sixth Century B.C. to the End of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge 1903, University Press), p. 371.

³ See *Der Grosse Brockhaus* (Leipzig 1929, Brockhaus, 20 vols.), vol. iv, p. 55, and *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1929, vol. v, p. 573.

⁴ See pp. 59-62, above.

⁵ See pp. 60-61, above.

⁶ See pp. 60-62, above.

of the Hellenic literature of a post-Augustan Imperial Age before they had the temerity to produce caricatures of the language and style of a Thucydides and an Herodotus. In a parallel Western renaissance of Hellenism in a Latin dress, the sequence was likewise the inverse of the original order. Medieval Western Latinists were content to reproduce the Latin of a post-Diocletianic Age before they ventured to try their hand at imitating the works of an antecedent Silver Age of Latin literature, or those of a Golden Age by which the Silver Age itself had been preceded.¹

This inversion of an original chronological order can also be observed in the evolution of renaissances in the field of visual art. For example, in the evolution of a Western renaissance of Hellenic architecture, an Andrea Palladio (*vivebat* A.D. 1518-80) made his appearance 141 years later than a Filippo Brunelleschi (*vivebat* A.D. 1377-1446). In other words, a series of Western architects who were turning their eyes towards Hellenic sources of inspiration, because they were no longer finding scope for their creative powers either in a native Western Romanesque style or in an imported 'Gothic', sought to reproduce the cupola of the *Ayía Sophía*² before they thought of reproducing the columns and pediment of the Parthenon, though the Parthenon was the *chef-d'œuvre* of the native style of Hellenic architecture at its zenith, whereas the *Ayía Sophía* was a *tour de force* of Ionian epigoni of Ictinus who, after discarding their already worked-out native style as impiously as Brunelleschi and Palladio were discarding theirs, had sought their own fresh inspiration abroad in an exotic Syriac style which was the native Hellenic style's antithesis.³ In the long-drawn-out epilogue to the history of an Egyptiac Civilization which had been galvanized into an unnatural life-in-death after it had run through all the phases of disintegration to the very verge of dissolution,⁴ the artistic as well as the political style of a 'Middle Empire' which had played the senile role of an Egyptiac universal state was promptly revived, after an abortive interregnum, under 'the New Empire' in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries B.C.,⁵ whereas the revival of the artistic style of 'the Old Kingdom', whose floruit had come and gone some seven or eight hundred years before 'the Middle Empire's', was not attempted until the advent of the Saïte Age in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.

If, as the sequence of renaissances of Hellenic political institutions in Western history suggests, the order in which a living society evokes ghosts out of the past life of a dead predecessor is determined by the living society's estimate of the ability of divers ghosts to help it to meet its own successive pressing needs, how are we to account for the apparently well-attested fact that this utilitarian order of evocation turns out to be correlated with the order in which these elements of the life of the dead civilization had originally succeeded one another in the flesh? If the order of evocation is, as it appears to be, the inverse of the

¹ See Taylor, H. O.: *The Mediaeval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 152.

² See p. 84, above.

³ See IV. iv. 54-55.

⁴ See I. i. 133-9; II. ii. 112; V. v. 351-3; V. vi. 190; and VI. vii. 49-50.

⁵ See further pp. 350-1, below.

historical order, how are we to explain a correlation which is apparently an historical reality and yet does not appear to serve any useful purpose in itself and is certainly not deliberately intended? The explanation is perhaps to be found in the consideration that the living party to the encounter is apt to be still in process of growth during the time when it is making its successive renaissances of divers elements drawn from a dead antecedent society's past life, whereas, *ex hypothesi*, the dead society whose experiences and achievements are thus being laid under contribution one after another will have passed through all the successive stages of a disintegration into which it will have fallen as a result of having had its growth cut short by a breakdown. If we may assume that, in the living society's memory, the traditions of the archaic stage of the dead antecedent society's growth will have left no abiding impression, then, of all the phases of the dead society's history that the living society does still recollect, the last phase of its disintegration, in which it will have entered into 'a second childhood', will be the phase which will display the closest affinity with the infantile first phase of the living society's growth, whereas the adult last phase of the dead society's growth, in which it was standing at its zenith on the eve of its breakdown, will be the last phase of its history to become intelligible to its living successor, though it will be the oldest phase of the dead civilization's history that is still within the living society's ken. The living society will not begin to become capable of understanding or appreciating this adult phase of its dead predecessor's history until, in the course of its own growth, it has passed out of childhood through adolescence into a corresponding state of spiritual maturity; and, whatever may be the potential fruitfulness of some other individual's or society's recorded experience, this experience cannot become of any practical use to us unless we have learnt to understand its significance and appreciate its value.

Even a talent that we have inherited as our birthright will remain barren so long as we ourselves remain incapable of turning it to account. Just as the potential agricultural wealth of North America was inaccessible to native hunting peoples who lacked the iron axes needed for cutting down the forests,¹ or as the potential agricultural wealth of the clay soils of Britain was inaccessible to husbandmen who had not yet mastered the technique of deep ploughing,² so the spiritual experience of social maturity is inaccessible to a society that is still spiritually juvenile. And, since a treasure, so long as it remains inaccessible, is for practical purposes non-existent, it is not, after all, surprising that a living civilization which is still in its own childhood should neglect the mature achievements of a dead predecessor's manhood, and should start its course of successive renaissances by exploiting the senile products of a subsequent 'second childhood' which even a child can already comprehend and, in consequence, already utilize. The growing civilization will have to be increased in wisdom and stature³ to an altitude of approximate parity with its dead predecessor's altitude at its zenith before it can profitably bring out of its mental storehouse those choice

¹ See II. ii. 278-8.

² See VIII. viii. 38-39.

³ Luke ii. 52.

treasures that the dead society ultimately created in a period of ripeness which, in the dead society's own history, came long before the period of its senile decay.

(II) THE ECLECTICISM OF *WAHLVERWANDTSCHAFTEN*

If this explanation¹ hits the mark, our phenomenon of chronological inversion will have proved to be a variation on Goethe's theme of *Wahlverwandtschaften* ('elective affinities', 'congenialities'). In the language of the Gospels,

'Whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.'²

The hard truth proclaimed in this ruthlessly illuminating text is pointedly illustrated in the cultural history of Western Christendom.

For example, there was never a time—not even at the blackest nadir of a Western Dark Age—at which this Hellenistic Christian civilization did not 'have' the poetry of Virgil in the sense of possessing manuscripts of the text and retaining a sufficient knowledge of the Latin language to be able still to construe the literal meaning of the words. Yet there were at least eight centuries, running from the seventh to the fourteenth century of the Christian Era inclusive, during which Virgil's poetry was beyond the comprehension of even the most gifted, pious, and industrious Western Christian students of it, if we take, as our standard of what constitutes a genuine understanding, an ability to divine in Virgil's poetry the meaning that had been intended by the poet himself and that had been duly apprehended by kindred spirits in his own world, from a contemporary Horace down to a fourth-century Servius and Augustine. Even a Dante, in whose spirit the first glimmer of an Italian renaissance of Hellenism was already beginning to dawn, saw in Virgil a figure which the historical Virgil would have taken, not for his own unassumingly human self, but for some augustly mythical Orpheus or Musaeus; and, in the mental vision of less enlightened Medieval Western souls, the true lineaments of the classical poet were still further transmogrified into the quite unrecognizable shape of a wonder-working magician who had left his mark on a Neapolitan landscape where the historical poet had lived a quiet life of literary seclusion and where his mortal remains had eventually been laid to rest in a tomb on the road between Naples and Puteoli.³

Similarly, there was never a time at which the Western Civilization did not 'have' the philosophy of Aristotle in the sense of possessing the texts of the Hellenic philosopher's principal treatises on logic in competent translations by a Late Hellenic man of letters, Boëthius (*vivebat circa* A.D. 480–524), who combined a mastery of Aristotle's thought with a mastery of the Ancient Greek language in which this thought had

¹ Suggested already, by anticipation, in IX. viii. 99–100.

² Matt. xii. 12. Cp. Matt. xxv. 29; Mark iv. 25; Luke viii. 18 and xix. 26.

³ See Comparetti, D.: *Virgilio nel Medio Evo*, 2nd ed. (Florence 1896, Seeber), Parte Seconda: 'Virgilio nella Leggenda Popolare.'

originally been conveyed.¹ Yet there were six centuries, reckoning from the date of Boëthius's death, during which his translations of these works of Aristotle's were beyond the comprehension of the most acute Western Christian thinkers, notwithstanding Boëthius's foresight in leaving them keys in the shape of Latin commentaries of his own and a Latin translation of a commentary of Porphyry's.²

Moreover, there was once a time—between the date of the Crusaders' capture of Toledo in A.D. 1085 and the date of their loss of Constantinople in A.D. 1261—during which a Medieval Christendom 'had', in the sense of holding physically in its grasp, the whole philosophical, scientific, and literary legacy of Hellenism that was extant, in that age, in Dār-al-Islām in Arabic translations and at Constantinople in the Ancient Greek originals;³ yet Western Christian scholars failed to make any use of their opportunity for winning a knowledge and understanding of Hellenic poetry in the original Greek during those fifty-seven years for which the Constantinopolitan store-house of Hellenism was under Western Christian rule, whereas their fifteenth-century Humanist successors in Italy, who were debarred from the Crusaders' potentially invaluable direct access to the springs of Helicon by the successive counter-strokes of a Greek Orthodox Christian *revanche* and a consequent Ottoman Muslim conquest of an ephemerally liberated Romania, succeeded nevertheless in acquiring a mastery of the Ancient Greek language and literature as a *κτῆμα* *ἐς αἰεὶ*⁴ for a Modern Western World, thanks to their zest, energy, and acumen in profiting to the utmost from the imperfect scholarship of a dozen Byzantine Greek refugees who had found asylum in Italy from the Ottoman conquerors of their homeland and had managed to bring away with them a handful of manuscripts of Ancient Greek texts.

Considering the effectiveness of the fifteenth-century Italian Humanists' exploitation of these slender opportunities that were all that came their way, how are we to explain their thirteenth-century Venetian and French predecessors' signal failure to harvest their own immense opportunities for gathering in all the fruits of an Hellenic literary culture in Greece itself?

In seeking an explanation of this apparent paradox, we have, no doubt, to take into account the bitterness of the two sister Christian Hellenistic civilizations' animosity towards one another from the close of the twelfth century of the Christian Era to the later decades of the seventeenth.⁵ Their mutual estrangement went to farther lengths than their common quarrel with Islam, and either of these Christendoms found it easier to enter into fruitful pacific intercourse with its Muslim neighbours than with its schismatic Christian co-religionists. For this reason, a Palermo captured in A.D. 1072 and a Toledo captured in A.D. 1085 by the Western Christian Crusaders from the Muslims turned out in the sequel to be more favourable forums for cultural intercourse

¹ See Sandys, J. E.: *A History of Classical Scholarship* (Cambridge 1903, University Press), pp. 239 and 507.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 239-40; Taylor, H. O.: *The Mediaeval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. 1, p. 92.

³ See p. 110, above.

⁴ Thucydides, Book I, chap. 22.

⁵ See IX. viii. 151-65 and 380-92.

between the conquerors and the conquered than a Constantinople that was captured by another band of the same Western Christian aggressors in A.D. 1204. It was thus psychologically easier for Medieval Western Christian scholars to take delivery of Hellenic cultural treasures of which the Muslims happened to be 'carriers' than it was for them to incur a corresponding cultural debt to other alien 'carriers' who were schismatic Byzantine Greek Orthodox Christians; and subjugated Byzantine Greeks, on their side, may have been less ready than subjugated Muslims were to share their Hellenic cultural riches with their new Frankish masters.

In another context¹ we have noticed that, when, under the successively unfurled banners of Nestorianism, Monophysitism, and Islam, a Syriac World that was progressively liberating itself from an Hellenic ascendancy had simultaneously opened its mind to receive the Hellenic culture, it had not taken delivery of this alien culture as a whole, but had confined its interest in Hellenism to the two intellectual provinces of Philosophy and Physical Science. An Hellenic philosophy and physical science, not an integral Hellenic culture, was thus the legacy of Hellenism that Medieval Western scholars found accessible to them, through the good offices of Muslim middlemen, in the cultural forum of an eleventh-century Palermo or Toledo, and it is notorious that, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a Western scholarship that had previously failed to take advantage of the legacy of an Hellenic Boëthius did show the same zest, energy, and acumen in profiting by its opportunities of mastering Hellenic philosophy and science through an Arabic medium at Palermo and Toledo as it was to show thereafter, in the fifteenth century, in acquiring the literary culture of Hellenism, in its Ancient Greek original dress, from a handful of Byzantine Greek refugees.

The speed, enterprise, and determination with which Western scholarship turned to account the opportunities offered at Toledo are particularly impressive.² One of the earliest of the series of translators who laboured there, Dominic Gondisalvi, who set to work at the instigation of the Western Catholic Christian Archbishop of Toledo, Raymond (*fungebatur circa* A.D. 1130-50), translated into Latin a running translation—made for him orally, into Castilian out of Arabic, by a bilingual Andalusian Jew, Johanan ben David ('Avendeath') of Seville—of the Muslim *savants'* commentaries on Aristotle and original works in the philosophical and scientific fields.³ The earliest maker, at Toledo, of Latin translations of the existing Arabic translations of Hellenic philosophical and scientific works was a Gerard of Cremona (*obit* A.D. 1187); and this Lombard translator at Toledo was followed by a Michael Scot (who is believed to have learnt his Arabic at Palermo), by a German Hermann, and by an English Alfred (*florebat* A.D. 1215-70).⁴

¹ In IX. viii. 408.

² See Sandys, J. E.: *A History of Classical Scholarship from the Sixth Century B.C. to the End of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge 1903, University Press), pp. 539-47. See *ibid.*, p. 507, n. 5, for Sandys' debt to A. Jourdain: *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, et sur les commentaires grecs ou arabes employés par les docteurs scholastiques* (1st ed. 1817; 2nd ed. 1843).

³ See Sandys, *ibid.*, pp. 539-40.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 540 and 543-7.

If this were the whole story, we might imagine that we had now fully explained the contrast between the imperviousness of Medieval Western Christian minds to the classical works of Hellenic literature which lay at their disposal in the original Greek at Constantinople and other points in Greek Orthodox Christendom, that were conquered by Western Christian arms in and after A.D. 1204, and the eagerness with which the same Medieval Western Christian minds seized upon and mastered the philosophical and scientific works of Aristotle which were accessible to them, in Arabic translations, at Palermo and Toledo. We might jump to the conclusion that this contrast was simply the corollary of a difference in degree of intimacy and cordiality between the respective relations in which the Medieval Western Christians stood to their Arab Muslim and to their Greek Orthodox Christian contemporaries. We might not suspect that a Medieval Western mind's selection of the works of Aristotle, and rejection of the works of Plato, the Attic dramatists, Pindar, and the authors of the Homeric Epic in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era had anything to do with any differences in degree of psychological affinity between the respective relations in which a Medieval Western culture stood to divers successive phases of the Hellenic culture itself, as these were represented by the various works of an Hellenic intellect and imagination that have just been mentioned. There would, however, be two palpable flaws in any answer to our question which ignored the play of *Wahlverwandschaften* in the contact in the Time-dimension between an affiliated Western Christian Hellenistic Civilization and its Hellenic predecessor, in order to offer an explanation solely in terms of the contacts in the Space-dimension between a Medieval Western Christendom and its Muslim and Greek Orthodox Christian contemporaries that were the dead Hellenic culture's two living 'carriers'.

Any answer that was confined within these limits would have failed to take account of two intractable historical facts. One of these facts is that in the fifteenth century, when Italian Humanists were eagerly acquiring from refugee Byzantine Greek 'carriers' their knowledge of the Ancient Greek language and literature, the religious and cultural animosity between Western and Orthodox Christians was even more violent than it had been in the thirteenth century,¹ when Medieval Western Christian scholars were showing themselves insensible to the attractions of Ancient Greek poetry. The other relevant fact is that in the thirteenth century the Western Christian enthusiasts for the study of Aristotle's philosophy, who were making such good use of the opportunities offered at Toledo for studying it through an Arabic medium, did not, as a matter of fact, neglect the simultaneous opportunities offered at Constantinople and elsewhere in the Frankish principalities on Greek Orthodox Christian soil for gaining access to texts of Aristotle's works in the Hellenic philosopher's own original Ancient Greek. Though the Frankish conquerors of Romania, including the clerks as well as the fighting-men, would appear to have been barbarously indifferent to the Hellenic cultural treasures of all kinds—philosophical as well as poetic and plastic—that they held in their insensitive hands,² the contemporary Frankish

¹ See IX. viii. 151-2.

² See p. 110, above.

Aristotelians in the Crusaders' West European homeland did make serious efforts to supplement their Palermitan and Toledan translations of Aristotle's works into Latin from Arabic with better translations into Latin from the original Greek which the Frankish conquest of Romania in and after A.D. 1204 made it possible thereafter to produce.¹

"The Schoolmen, no longer satisfied with renderings from the Arabic versions of Aristotle, began to obtain translations taken directly from the Greek. Thus the *De Anima* was known to William of Auvergne (who became a bishop of Paris in A.D. 1228 and was still alive in A.D. 1248) in a translation from the Greek, before the Schools of Paris had received Michael Scot's translation either of the Arabic text or [of] the commentary by Averroës. The *Rhetoric*, the *Politics*, the first four books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Magna Moralia*, part at least of the *Metaphysics*, and the *Parva Naturalia*, were known from the first in Latin translations from the original.² . . . It may . . . be inferred³ that a Latin translation of the Greek text of the *Ethics* was known under the name of [Robert] Grosseteste [*vivebat circa* A.D. 1175-1253], having probably been executed under his direction between A.D. 1240 and A.D. 1244 by one of the Greeks whom he had invited to England.⁴ . . . Thomas Aquinas . . . in quoting Aristotle . . . uses translations from the Greek alone, and not from the Arabic.⁵ It was at his own instance that "William of Brabant" is said to have produced in A.D. 1273 (doubtless with the help of others) a literal Latin translation of the Greek text of "all the works of Aristotle", which superseded the old renderings from the Arabic.⁶ "William of Brabant", [who] is none other than William of Moerbeke or Meerbecke, . . . was probably one of the young Dominicans annually sent to Greece to learn the language. After his return (*circa* A.D. 1268) he was chaplain to Clement IV and Gregory X, and acted as Greek secretary at the Council of Lyons [A.D. 1274].⁷ . . . Towards the close of his life he became [Latin Catholic] Archbishop of Corinth (A.D. 1277-1281) and continued the work of executing (and possibly superintending) translations from Greek into Latin."⁸

¹ See Sandys, op. cit., pp. 547-64.

² Ibid., p. 548.

³ From the two facts (i) that Hermann, the Toledan translator from the Arabic, 'who finished his translation of the Arabic commentary of Averroës on the *Ethics* in A.D. 1240, states, in the preface to his rendering of Al-Farābī's comments on the *Rhetoric* in A.D. 1256, that his work on the *Ethics* had been rendered useless by Grosseteste's translations of the latter from the original Greek' (Sandys, op. cit., pp. 554-5, citing Hermann's: 'Reverendus pater, magister Robertus, Lincolnensis episcopus, ex primo fonte, unde emanaverat, Graeco videlicet, ipsum librum est completius interpretatus et, Graecorum commentis praecipuas annexens [*sic apud Sandysium*—A.J.T.] notulas, commentatus.'). and (ii) that Grosseteste's 'great admirer, Roger Bacon, . . . assures us that . . . [Grosseteste] could never translate from either Greek or Hebrew without assistance' (Sandys, op. cit., p. 553)).

⁴ Ibid., p. 555.

⁵ Jourdain, op. cit., p. 40.

⁶ "[*Sub anno* A.D.] 1273: Wilhelmus de Brabantia, Ordinis Praedicatorum, transtulit omnes libros Aristotelis de Graeco in Latinum, verbum ex verbo, quā translatione scholares adhuc hodiernā die utuntur in scholis, ad instantiam domini Thomae de Aquino" (Slav. Chron. in Lindenbrog's *Scriptores Rerum Germ. Septent.*, 1706, p. 206; cp. Jourdain, p. 675).⁷

According to Taylor, H. O.: *The Mediaeval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 391, a series of Latin translations of Aristotle's works made from the Greek text, direct, was produced by collaborators of Saint Thomas Aquinas from A.D. 1263 onwards.—A.J.T.

⁷ See the present Study, IV. iv. 532, 569, 616, and 622.—A.J.T.

⁸ Sandys, op. cit., pp. 562-3. A list of works of Hippocrates and Galen and of Simplicius, Ammonius, and Proclus, besides Aristotle himself, that were either certainly or probably translated by William of Moerbeke into Latin out of the original Greek, will be found *ibid.*, p. 563.

This historical evidence makes it clear that the mutual antagonism of the two Christian Hellenistic societies did not, in fact, prevent thirteenth-century Western Christian scholars from acquiring from their Orthodox Christian contemporaries any elements in Orthodox Christendom's cultural heritage from Hellenism on which any thirteenth-century Western Christian hearts were set.

'In the course of about 130 years, i.e. in the interval between the early translations at Toledo in A.D. 1150 and the death of William of Moerbeke in A.D. 1281, the knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy had passed in [Western Christian] Europe from a phase of almost total darkness to one of nearly perfect light;'¹

and, in this thorough, as well as rapid, Medieval Western Christian intellectual conquest of Aristotelianism which culminated in William of Moerbeke's labours at Corinth, the pacific *conquistadores* were not deterred by any psychological inhibitions from drawing upon a Byzantine Greek as well as an Andalusian Arab storehouse of Hellenic culture. How came it, then, that, when they were so eagerly pulling out the original Greek texts of Aristotle's works from thirteenth-century Byzantine shelves, they were content to leave untouched the works of Ancient Greek poetry, stacked there side by side with the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, which were to be pulled out in their turn some two hundred years later by fifteenth-century Italian Humanists with an eagerness as lively as the thirteenth-century Western Schoolmen's passion for the philosophy of Aristotle?

Considering that, in the interval, the already bad relations between the Franks and their living Greek contemporaries the Byzantines were steadily deteriorating, we can only account for the subsequent awakening of Western imaginations to an appreciation of the beauty of a dead Ancient Greek poetry on the supposition that, in the course of those intervening two centuries, some cultural *épanouissement* in Frankish souls in Northern and Central Italy had been attuning them to Ancient Greek melodies to which the thirteenth-century Frankish Aristotelomaniacs had remained deaf when their ears had been opened to the clicking Morse Code of an Aristotelian logic that had been equally inaudible to them till then; and, as soon as we find ourselves having to allow for this unknown quantity, we can identify it, with some assurance, with a familiar historical event. In Italy between Dante Alighieri's day (*vivebat* A.D. 1265-1321) and Poggio Bracciolini's (*vivebat* A.D. 1380-1459), a growing school of Humanists had been successfully 'tuning in' to the melodies of a dead Hellenic poetry in the Latin rendering into which the original Greek cadences had been transposed by Virgil and the lesser denizens of a Latin Muse's transported Parnassus. We can watch this cultural process of recapturing an appreciation of Hellenic poetry in a Latin dress in the act of accomplishment in the fourteenth-century Italian soul of Petrarch (*vivebat* A.D. 1304-74). By the fifteenth century the process was complete; and this long and arduous apprenticeship in a Latin medium had elicited, in the souls of the fifteenth-century Italian

¹ Sandys, *op. cit.*, p. 565.

Humanists who had served it, the aesthetic capacity to appreciate Hellenic poetry in the Greek original.

The door of a Medieval Western mental prison-house was thus by that time unlocked and ajar; and one touch from the fumbling hand of a dimly enlightened Byzantine Greek refugee therefore now sufficed to push this door wide open. The ease with which the fifteenth-century Italian Humanists in a Latin medium made themselves Humanists in the original Greek vindicates the truth of the aphorism 'Whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance'.¹ The Italians' successful cultivation of their native Latin legacy from Hellenism in the course of the Later Middle Ages of Western history had assimilated the mental atmosphere of the precocious fifteenth-century Italian province of an embryonic Modern Western World to the cultural climate which a by then long since dead Hellenic World had once enjoyed in the times in which the Greek and Latin masterpieces of an Hellenic literature had been created.

This episode of Medieval Western cultural history points to the explanation of a phenomenon which has come to our notice as a matter of historical fact. If, in the history of a living civilization, the divers phases of a dead antecedent culture are apt to be conjured up in a sequence which is the inverse of the order in which these same phases have originally appeared in the antecedent society's own life, the reason, as we can now discern, is because a ghost does not become amenable to a necromancer's incantations unless and until the would-be wizard has learnt the art of invoking the departed spirit in the dead soul's own familiar language. The necromancer will never be able to raise a ghost with which he is not already psychologically in sympathy; for, even if the shades in Sheol were willing to answer to the summons of a discordant living voice, it would be impossible for a necromancer to have addressed a summons to a shade with which he had not already acquired some psychic affinity. Without this bond of pre-established harmony to place him *en rapport*, the necromancer would be disablingly insensitive to the aura of the ghostly presence.

A truth which, in this Study, we have approached empirically, through a survey of historical embodiments of it, has been apprehended by Plato intuitively and been presented by him in a myth. Plato's account, in the *Critias*, of an imaginary civilization of the first generation flowering on the subsequently lost continent of Atlantis, out in the Ocean somewhere to the west of the Straits of Gibraltar, is prefaced by a passage purporting to explain why it is that no more than the most jejune tradition of this dead civilization's character and achievements has been preserved by its successors through an intervening series of social interregna caused by recurrent cataclysms.

'While the names of [the great men of this dead Atlantic Civilization] have been preserved, the memory of their achievements has been obliterated by the catastrophes that have overtaken their successors and by the immensity of the periods of the time that has since elapsed. We

¹ Matt. xiii. 12, quoted on p. 130, above.

have already observed¹ that the survivors of the periodic catastrophes have always been a remnant consisting only of illiterate highlanders whose knowledge of the past rulers of their world has been virtually confined to a bare list of names. These famous names have still had a strong enough hold on their affections to move them to bestow them on their own children, but they have had no knowledge of their predecessors' qualities and institutions beyond the faintest echoes of hearsay. The reason is that, from father to son for many generations running, they have suffered from a shortage of the sheer necessities of life, and that their attention—and consequently their intellectual activity—has been concentrated on these shortages to the neglect of Ancient History. Mythology and historical research are a pair of activities that only gains a footing in communities in process of civilization (*πόλεις*) *pari passu* with a margin of leisure. Their opportunity arrives when a community has reached a stage at which the necessities of life have been provided for; until that stage is reached, there is no opening for them; and this is the reason why only the names of the famous men of Antiquity have been preserved, without any accompanying memory of their achievements.²

In other words, there can be no renaissance of a dead culture except in the bosom of an affiliated society that has raised itself to the cultural level at which its predecessor was standing at the time when it was accomplishing these achievements that have now become candidates for resuscitation; and (Plato reminds us), even if the affiliated society does eventually attain this degree of cultural maturity, the possibility of a renaissance is not thereby automatically guaranteed; for, in the meantime, the tradition of the antecedent culture in the affiliated society's heritage from its predecessor may have worn so thin that a tardily established cultural affinity may find itself neutralized by the lack of even the most ethereal medium for establishing communications between the living society in the current phase of its history and the corresponding phase of the history of the dead civilization.

¹ In the *Timaeus*, 21E-23C, quoted in this Study in IV. iv. 24-25.

² Plato: *Critias*, 109D-110A.

E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NECROMANCY

(I) THE TRANSFUSION OF PSYCHIC ENERGY

WHAT rites are required for establishing effective contact with a ghost with whom a necromancer has business to transact?

According to a legend in the *Odyssey*, the technique of raising the dead was found to be a dangerous game by the hero of the epic when, some twenty-seven centuries before Columbus's day, he cast off from the land of the living and made the untried westward transit of Ocean Stream in quest, not of gold and spices in the workaday markets of a terrestrial Cathay, but of oracles from a phantom seer's uncanny lips in a mouldering House of Hades.¹ Though Odysseus showed his usual prudence by following, to the letter, the professional instructions of the sorceress Circe,² even so he had considerable difficulty in extricating himself from his hazardous psychic adventure; and Odysseus' experience, as narrated in the epic in the adventurer's *oratio recta*, is doubly disconcerting to the reader; for the hero of the *Odyssey* was granted a privilege which we cannot hope to share if we venture in his wake in real life.

The crux of necromancy lies in the hard fact that a psychically depotentiated ghost cannot hold converse with the living unless its vitality has been momentarily raised again to the level of consciousness;³ the sole means of administering this indispensable temporary reinvigoration to the shades of the departed is to give them a restorative draught, and for this purpose such insipid ingredients as honey, milk, wine, water, and barley meal⁴ are not enough; in order to bring a ghost back to an effective state of animation, the vivifying brew has to be 'laced' with the sinister infusion of some living creature's freshly shed blood. This is a prescription *sine qua non* without which no business can be transacted; 'no blood-offering, no oracle';⁵ and Odysseus duly provided the life-taking life-giving draught; but the legendary Achaean hero was allowed to reanimate the shades of Teiresias and the rest of the ghastly rout by a vicarious sacrifice. The operative blood that Odysseus infused into the innocent but ineffective bloodless offerings in his sacrificial trench spurted from the sword-slashed throats of a young ram and a black ewe,⁶ whereas the blood that has to be contributed in real life is not an amenable substitute's but is the necromancer's own—with which he parts at a risk, for himself, of succumbing to pernicious anaemia.

Thus, in real life, the necromancer can restore a ghost's vitality only at the cost of lowering his own by the exact degree to which he raises his phantom beneficiary's; and the venturesome necromancer's plight becomes more and more precarious as the difference in psychic potency between the souls of the two parties to this ghoulish encounter is progressively reduced by the living party's deliberately performed self-

¹ *Odyssey*, Book XI, 'Necyia', *passim*.

² For these, see *Odyssey*, Book X, ll. 504-40.

³ See *Od.* XI, ll. 140-54.

⁴ *Od.* X, ll. 518-20; *Od.* XI, ll. 26-28.

⁵ The shade of Teiresias in *Od.* XI, ll. 147-9.

⁶ *Od.* X, ll. 527-8; *Od.* XI, ll. 35-36.

devitalizing ritual act. At the beginning of the proceedings, when the spectre's potency registers zero, while the necromancer's registers a still undiminished plenitude of normal human blood-pressure, the difference is of a magnitude at which it constitutes a securely impassable gulf;¹ but, as the original difference approaches parity, this gulf dwindles to the narrowness of a strait across which the reanimated ghost can leap; and at that stage the necromancer has both attained the result for which he has been working and has incurred the peril which, in his profession, is inseparable from success. The reanimated ghost is now at the successful necromancer's disposal for him to command if he can; but, in consequence, the necromancer himself is now exposed to a risk of having the tables turned on him by the reanimated ghost.

The truth seems to be that a ghost which is impotent to take the initiative in engineering its own revival does not feel any moral obligation towards a necromancer whose motive in taking the necessary initiative and in making the indispensable blood-sacrifice has not, after all, been a disinterested one. The first use that the ghost will make of the vitality that the blood-transfusion is restoring to him will be to reassert a will of his own. In the language of a nascent post-Modern Western Science of Psychology,

'An autonomous complex pursues its way and goes through its paces, repeating its own special performance quite regardless of any human consideration. It is a kind of ghost haunting the corridors of the Mind, and, like a ghost, it enters the sphere of the Present from the still living Past. It is elusive and hard to challenge, like the ghost. Only analytical insight, with fair appraisal of its historical significance, can break through the intangible envelope and release the energy informing it.'²

In real life a necromancer seldom has the legendary Odysseus' luck of drawing as his 'opposite number' in the lottery a Teiresias who honours a gentleman's agreement by delivering his oracle in exchange for the draught of revivifying blood and then tactfully relieving the necromancer of his presence.³ And, even when the shade with which the necromancer has business to transact does behave in this gentlemanly way, his unwanted fellow phantoms neutralize his tact by their importunity. When Odysseus was engaged in raising the ghost of Teiresias, the dark life-blood had no sooner spurted into the sacrificial trench than

'they came flocking up from Erebus, the souls of the lifeless dead: brides and their grooms; old men with a tale of sufferings to match their tale of years; and maidens in the springtide of their sorrow, which was as fresh as the bloom of their youth. There came warriors, too, slain in battle, with their armour bedabbled in gore. All these in their multitudes came crowding round the trench from every quarter, with an unearthly clamour; and I, at their onset, was gripped by a blanching fear.'⁴

¹ Luke xvi. 26.

² Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall & Cox; 1949, Methuen), p. 862.

³ *Od.* XI, ll. 150-1.

⁴ *Od.* XI, ll. 36-43. Lines 38-43 were rejected as spurious by the Alexandrian critics Zenodotus and Aristophanes on the unconvincing ground of an alleged inconsistency with what follows them.

Odysseus, being Odysseus, did not lose his nerve, disconcerted though he was. As Circe had counselled him, he drew his sword and, squatting behind his trench with the weapon outstretched over it at arm's length, he 'fended off the feeble forms of the dead from approaching the blood' until he had done his business with Teiresias.¹ In thus inflexibly carrying out his instructions, this man of many sufferings and superhuman powers² performed a prodigy of strongmindedness; for, in the uneasy interval before the gentlemanly seer Teiresias presented himself, the first ghost to importune him was his unburied comrade Elpenor's,³ while the second was his mother Anticleia's.⁴ After Teiresias' ghost had duly appeared and delivered his oracle and withdrawn, Odysseus let down his guard over the blood-offering and gave access to other ghosts in a queue, with his own mother inevitably at the head of it;⁵ but in the end he found it advisable to beat a hasty retreat for fear that the hazardous situation might get out of hand.

'After saying his say, Hêraklès went back to the House of Hades, while I stood my ground by the trench in case I might be approached by yet another of the hero warriors who had met their deaths aforetime. And, as like as not, I might have gone on seeing warriors of olden times according to my choice; but, before I could sate my curiosity, there came flocking upon me countless hordes of the dead with an unearthly din, and I, at their onset, was gripped by a blanching fear lest queenly Persephone might send upon me from Hades the Gorgon's head—fell monster's countenance.'⁶

Odysseus thereupon acted with a characteristic promptness which saved him from the fate that Pandora had brought upon Mankind when she had let loose all the scourges of human life by lifting the lid of her jar.⁷ Odysseus made off in a trice, got his crew and himself back on board, and baffled his spectral assailants, as a living German army was to be baffled one day at Dunkirk, by putting the insulating breadth of Ocean Stream between the pursuers and the pursued.⁸ This happy ending is not, however, a guaranteed outcome of the necromancer's adventure. A legendary Odysseus has his historical fellow adventurers who have not escaped so lightly.

(II) THE CHALLENGE FROM THE *REVENANT* AND A PAIR OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE RESPONSES

(a) THE ANTAEBAN REBOUND AND THE ATLANTIAN STANCE

When Odysseus had the temerity to trespass on the threshold of the Underworld, he duly won his sought-for oracle from the reanimated ghost of Teiresias, but, in winning it, also put himself in jeopardy of being made to pay for his impertinence by being confronted with the Gorgon's head. What was this *visio malefica* that Odysseus thus both

¹ *Od.* XI, ll. 48–50 and 82.

² Πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.—*Odyssey*, *passim*.

³ *Od.* XI, ll. 51–83.

⁴ *Od.* XI, ll. 84–89.

⁵ *Od.* XI, ll. 152–625.

⁶ *Od.* XI, ll. 626–35.

⁷ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 42–105, especially ll. 90–104.

⁸ *Od.* XI, ll. 636–40.

courted and dreaded? It was the nemesis to which every necromancer exposes himself whenever he scores a success in playing his dangerous professional game. Thanks to his successful interrogation of Teiresias' obliging shade, Odysseus secured invaluable information in advance¹ about his own stormy future; it was invaluable because this uncanny foreknowledge just enabled the hero to master his fate by winning his way home to Ithaca and there recovering possession of his lost wife, property, house, and kingdom. Odysseus thus 'got away with' what he wanted in playing his game with the Infernal Powers; but other players, of hardly less note, have proved either less adroit or else perhaps merely more unfortunate.

Jacob, for example, in his nocturnal encounter at Peniel,² where he 'was left alone and there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day', won a blessing from this formidable jinn that was no less precious than a gracious Teiresias' oracle; but a legendary Canaanite Jacob brought tribulation on himself for lack of a legendary Hellenic Odysseus' saving sense of measure. Jacob did not know when he had had enough; and his insufferably obstinate terms to his foiled supernatural adversary—'I will not let thee go except thou bless me'—cost him the dislocation of a major joint which left him lame for life. Jacob's retrospective boast—'I have seen God face to face and my life is preserved'—though it may perhaps have been no exaggeration of the truth, was at the same time admittedly no cure for the boaster's permanent disablement. His fateful adversary had left an abiding mark on Jacob for evil as well as for good.

A legendary Canaanite Pygmalion, who fell in love with a statue that was the work of his own art, was extricated by the gods from the predicament into which this princely artificer had brought himself through an idolization of his own technique³ by their gracious act of breathing the breath of life into the nostrils of an ivory ikôn which, thanks to this auspicious supernatural intervention, miraculously became a living soul.⁴ As for a legendary post-Christian Western Frankenstein, who had no claim upon God's grace, this eponymous hero of a latter-day society came to an awful end which both a Pygmalion and a Jacob had escaped. Frankenstein's monster, like Jacob's jinn, did eventually take his departure; but in this Modern Western version of a Syriac myth the roles were reversed; for in this latter-day encounter it was the necromancer, and not the ghost, that took the initiative in breaking off the engagement, and the inhuman creature of a human creator's science made off with a curse instead of a blessing on his lips. 'I go, but remember: I shall be with you on your wedding night.'⁵ While Jacob got off from his wrestling match with the Powers of Darkness none the worse for it beyond being lamed for life, Frankenstein's penalty was the loss of his birthright of creativity.

Is it possible to define more closely this terrifying challenge from the *revenant* which is the price of invoking the *revenant's* aid in seeking a response to some pressing challenge in the realm of current life? Such

¹ Detailed in *Od.* XI, ll. 92-137.

² See IV. iv. 423-65.

³ Shelley, Mary: *Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus*, chap. 20.

⁴ Gen. xxxii. 24-32.

⁵ Gen. ii. 7.

a definition is perhaps implicit in the words in which Frankenstein was addressed by the monster whom he had conjured into life: 'You are my creator, but I am your master;—obey!'¹ It looks as if the relation between the necromancer and the ghost that he has raised can never be one of psychic parity. One or other of the two parties must be master, and one or other slave; and the shade of the departed has no sooner been reanimated by the sorcerer's *tour de force* than the live man and the *revenant* find themselves plunged—and this inevitably and immediately—into a contest which is deadly because a vital issue is at stake.

What is going to be the gruesome blood-transfusion's ultimate effect? Is the necromancer going to gain more by giving the reanimated ghost the strength to work for him, supposing that the ghost proves amenable, than he is going to lose by proportionately diminishing his own strength and thereby affording the ghost an opening for establishing an ascendancy over the living man who has recalled the dead to life, supposing that the ghost chooses thus to take advantage of his resuscitator's self-inflicted weakness? Is the rash communicant with the dread powers of an Underworld to return inspired by a muse or possessed by a devil? Is his encounter with the dead to be a stimulus or an obsession? Manifestly either of these alternatives is a possible outcome, since it is already manifest that the challenge from a *revenant* is a particular form of a general phenomenon, discernible in encounters of all kinds, that has come to our attention in more than one previous context. A personality's response to the psychic impact of another personality may be the kindling of a creative 'light caught from a leaping flame',² or it may be a submission to the deadening 'social drill' which we have labelled 'mimesis'.³ A military uniform that may stiffen a soldier's plastic human nature into the superhuman inflexibility of a hero under fire may also stiffen it into the sub-human lifelessness of an automaton on the parade-ground; and the same pair of alternative possible outcomes presents itself when the challenger happens to be a *revenant* from the Underworld of a Dead Past as when he happens to be a living contemporary.

In the language of a nascent post-Modern Western science of Psychology,

'The atavistic attraction of a primordial image can become so overpowering at certain crises that only a disciplined devotion to reality, a devotion that cannot be uprooted or deflected, is able to withstand it. . . . The alternative possibility contained in the symbol can be apprehended by the term "psychological creation". . . . The ambivalence of the anima-figure now appears as an alternative to which Consciousness is able to respond in two ways. To . . . become identified with the archaic image would be one way. To express the Unconscious creatively, but to maintain psychological responsibility towards the expression, would be the other. Both ways are possible; the choice is fundamentally a question of attitude.'⁴

These two alternative possible attitudes have been given classical expressions in an Hellenic mythology.

¹ Shelley, Mary: *Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus*, chap. 20.

² Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341B-E, quoted in III. iii. 245.

³ See III. iii. 245-8 and 374; IV. iv. 123-9, 131-2, and 234; V. v. 20; and V. vi. 255.

⁴ Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall & Cox; 1949, Methuen), pp. 701-2.

When Hêraklê's was making his westward trek along the length of North Africa to find the Garden of the Hesperides and bring back thence the guardian nymphs' life-giving apples, he ran across two giants, Antaeus and Atlas. Before Hêraklê's advent, Antaeus had proved an invincible adversary for all comers who had ever been so rash as to join battle with him; for this sanguine giant was a son of Mother Earth; and, if ever, in any wrestling-match, his antagonist contrived to throw him, the momentary victor was merely defeating himself; for, in thus causing Antaeus to renew his contact with his mother, he was giving him the opportunity to replenish his vitality from its original source, and the giant refreshed invariably scored a decisive victory on the rebound from his momentary prostration. When Hêraklê's accepted Antaeus's challenge and was baffled, in his turn, by this Earth-child's buoyant recoveries, he found a solution for the Antaeian problem by strangling the wretch to death while holding him aloft off the ground. In sharp contrast to the series of triumphs that Antaeus had won before Hêraklê's advent, the experience with which Atlas had met had been the discouraging one of defeat. This giant Atlas was the child, not of the goddess Earth, but of the titan Iapetos;¹ he had taken part, together with the rest of Iapetos's brood, in the Titans' unsuccessful assault on the Olympian citadel of the usurper high god Zeus; and, when the battle was over, the malicious leader of a victorious war-band of interloping barbarian gods had exercised his ingenuity in devising retaliatory torments for his defeated adversaries. Whatever we may think of the dooms of Menoetius and Prometheus, we must admit that, in the sentence passed on Atlas, Zeus did 'make the punishment fit the crime'.²

'The baleful mind of Atlas plumbs the depths of all the seas, but the giant's own frame holds up the tall pillars that keep Earth and Heaven asunder.'³

'Atlas, compelled by an overmastering constraint, holds up wide Heaven, supporting it with his head and his unwearying hands in his station at the ends of the Earth, just on the hither side of the shrill Hesperides; for this was the doom that was dealt out to him by the wit of Zeus.'⁴

Atlas's crime had been an attempt to scale high Heaven; the punishment inflicted on him was to hold high Heaven up; and this was the stance in which the melancholy giant was eventually found by his visitor Hêraklê's. In order to grasp the relation between an Atlantean stance and an Antaeian rebound, we have to recognize that the Earth, off whose fostering breast a buoyant Antaeus was perpetually bouncing up like an india-rubber ball, and the Firmament whose dead weight was constantly pressing down upon the head and hands of an immobilized Atlas, are merely two different aspects of one and the same psychic continent as seen from opposite quarters of the spiritual compass. This depressing Firmament and refreshing Earth are, in psychic reality, identical. 'The choice' between falling into an Atlantean stance and making an Antaeian rebound is in truth 'fundamentally a question of attitude'.

¹ Hesiod: *Theogony*, l. 509. This Hellenic Iapetos is the Japheth of the Book of Genesis.

² Gilbert, W. S., in *The Mikado*.

³ *Od.*, Book I, ll. 52-54.

⁴ Hesiod: *Theogony*, ll. 517-20.

The antithesis between the Antaeian and the Atlantean attitude has been traced out in a Platonic dialogue, staged in a post-Marxian Russian social setting, which is no less illuminating if it is myth than if it happens to be history.¹

'In the summer of A.D. 1920 the two philosophers, M. Gershenson and V. Ivanov, were living in the Convalescent Home for Scientific and Literary Workers in Moscow. Each of them was installed in a corner of the common room. From one corner to the other they exchanged twelve letters about problems of the Philosophy of History. . . .

'The standpoint represented by Gershenson was one of an anarchic hostility to Culture.

' "All the spiritual achievements of Mankind, [he wrote] all the wealth of intuitions, factual knowledge and moral standards that has been garnered and fortified in the course of the centuries—all this has latterly become burdensome to me. It weighs on me like some throttling yoke, like some dress that is excessively heavy and excessively warm.² This feeling has been distressing me for a long time past; but it used to descend on me only occasionally, and even then never for long at a time, while now it has become a chronic experience. As I see it, it would really be the greatest possible blessing if one could plunge into Lethe and, in those waters, flush out of one's soul, without leaving a trace, the recollection of all religions and systems of philosophy, all factual knowledge, all arts and all poetry, in order to step out on to the [farther] bank as naked as Primaeval Man, and there—naked, unencumbered, and joyful—stretch out one's bare arms, in freedom, till they touched Heaven. There would be only one thought out of the Past that one would wish to retain in one's consciousness, and that is: How burdensome, how oppressively hot, it was in those [now discarded] clothes! How blissfully unencumbered one feels without them!"'

We may pause at this point in our quotation to observe in parenthesis that both the depression and the yearning which Gershenson has here

¹ The dialogue, as reproduced here, is a translation from the German text of Ernst Robert Curtius's *Deutsche Geist in Gefahr* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1932, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt), pp. 116–19. Professor Curtius records that he had extracted it from the journal *Die Kreatur*, Jahrgang I, Heft 2 (1926). The passages here translated have been quoted with the permission of the author and the publishers.

² This inhibiting effect of the incubus of the Past has been noticed by Hume in his essay *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*. In Hume's opinion, however, the impositions of a dead antecedent civilization are not so paralysing as those of some living community in one's own world which has forged ahead of its neighbours and consequently made an impact on them comparable to that of an alien culture.

'Perhaps it may not be for the advantage of any nation to have the arts imported from their neighbours in too great perfection. This extinguishes emulation and sinks the ardour of the generous youth. So many models of Italian painting brought into England, instead of exciting our artists, is the cause of their small progress in that noble art. The same, perhaps, was the case of Rome when it received the arts from Greece. That multitude of polite productions in the French language, dispersed all over Germany and the North, hinder these nations from cultivating their own language, and keep them still dependent on their neighbours for those elegant entertainments.

'It is true, the Ancients had left us models, in every kind of writing, which are highly worthy of admiration. But, besides that they were written in languages known only to the learned—besides this, I say, the comparison is not so perfect or entire between modern wits and those who lived in so remote an age. Had Waller been born in Rome during the reign of Tiberius, his first productions had been despised when compared to the finished odes of Horace. But in this island the superiority of the Roman poet diminished nothing from the fame of the English. We esteemed ourselves sufficiently happy that our climate and language could produce but a faint copy of so excellent an original.'

depicted in the light of his own experience are sensations that Atlas is experiencing while he is performing his interminable fatigue-duty of holding up the Firmament.

The melancholy giant's state of depression can be taken for granted; his longing for release is attested by the alacrity with which he accepted Hêraklê's offer when the wayfaring demigod proposed to give Atlas a holiday by temporarily taking the giant's burden on his own shoulders, on the understanding that Atlas would employ his ticket of leave on the mission of collecting for his temporary liberator a basketful of life-giving apples from the neighbouring Garden of the Hesperides. Atlas duly performed this part of the bargain; but, when he came back, apples in hand, and, standing, for once, at ease, saw his intolerable load resting on other stalwart shoulders, he was seized by a sudden overwhelming temptation to play on his obliging visitor the mean trick of leaving him eternally *planté là* in a stance in which it was impossible for the living pillar to get out from under his incubus unless some voluntary substitute should first step in under to relieve him. According to the Hellenic myth, Hêraklê—stimulated to an unwonted intellectual activity by an emergency in which brawn could not serve instead of brain—hit upon a ruse for tricking the dishonest Titan into reassuming his pristine burden and thereby enabling his temporary *remplaçant* to slip out again after all.

We can now see, however, from a chance disclosure in Gershenson's account of the Atlantean state of mind, that Atlas would inevitably have retrapped himself, even if Hêraklê had not had his uncharacteristic 'brain-wave'. For Gershenson's one idea of how to use an imaginarily recaptured liberty is to reach up and touch the very Firmament from whose pressure he imagines himself released; and the Atlantean touch has a magic effect which is the opposite of the Antaeus. When Antaeus touches a motherly Earth, he rebounds from her bosom; but, when Atlas touches a step-fatherly Heaven, he clamps the load down upon his head. Atlas' predicament looks rather like a hopeless case. At infinity, Atlas' interminable stance seems bound to lose him his life, either by freezing him into the state of petrification that is a living creature's penalty for having beheld the Gorgon's head,¹ or alternatively by goading him into Samson's suicidal act of pulling down the roof in order to die with the Philistines.² But we must not anticipate the sequel to the story in our post-Marxian Russian version of it.

Ivanov's answer to Gershenson contains the following significant passages:

"I will tell you what is the real origin of the mood to which you are so painfully subject at the moment. It is a reflection of a particular attitude towards Culture—an attitude in which Culture is experienced, not as a live treasure-house of gifts, but as a system of exquisitely subtle constraints. That is not surprising; for, after all, the goal that Human Culture has pursued has been precisely to make itself into a strait-waistcoat. As I see it, though, Culture is something very different: it is a guide of Erôs and a hierarchy of veneration."

¹ This is the common fate of 'arrested civilizations' (see III. iii. 1-111), 'fossils' (see I. i. 35 and 90-92), and 'Tithoni' (see VI. vii. 47-52).

² Judges xvi. 30.

'Gershenson, however, insists upon Primitivism like the true blue Rousseauite that he is:

"I would give up [he writes] all the factual knowledge and all the ideas that I have gleaned from books, and would sacrifice, into the bargain, the whole of my own intellectual superstructure that I have succeeded in erecting on those academic foundations, in exchange for the joy of personally achieving, entirely out of my own experience, one single original act of knowledge. It might be as simple as you please, but it would have the freshness of a summer's morn."

"The discussion is then carried to a deeper level by Ivanov's passing beyond the limits of a merely cultural ideal and introducing the transcendence of the Absolute.

"A man who has faith in God [he writes] will not consent at any price to see in his faith merely one of the constituents of Culture. On the other hand, a man who has become a slave of Culture will inevitably diagnose Faith as a cultural phenomenon, whatever may be the exact definition of Faith that he goes on to work out. He may define it as an inherited outlook and an historically determined psychic *habitus*, or define it in terms of Metaphysics and Poetry, or define it, again, as a socially formative force and an ethical standard: it all comes to the same thing. . . . The real point is this: our faith in an Absolute—in which we are already in touch with something that is not Culture—is the issue on which our destiny hangs. If we have this faith it gives us an inward freedom which is veritably Life itself; if we do not have it, our unbelief condemns us to an inward enslavement by a Culture that has long since become godless in principle through the effect that it has had of imprisoning Man in himself (as has been definitively expounded by Kant). Faith alone—and, by 'faith', I mean a complete renunciation of the Fall of Man, for which 'Culture' is another name—will enable you to overcome that 'temptation' of yours which you have felt so deeply. But Original Sin cannot be eradicated by a superficial obliteration of its outward marks and manifestations. To un-learn our literacy and to 'expel the Muses' (to speak with Plato's words) would be merely a palliative; the letters of the Alphabet would reflect, all over again, the old unalterable spiritual constitution of the prisoner fettered to the rock in the Platonic Cave.² Rousseau's dream is the offspring of unbelief. On the other hand, living in God means living no longer entirely in the realm of Relativity which is the realm of Human Culture; it means rising above Culture into Freedom in one part of one's own being."

"The two friends did not succeed in arriving at an understanding with one another; but Ivanov's way of working out the idea implicit in Humanism is a clarification that is of such truly decisive significance for ourselves that I will take the liberty of quoting one last utterance of his.

"Culture itself, in the true sense of the word, is, as I see it, no dead level, no plain bestrewn with ruins, no field sown with dead men's bones. Culture has in it, moreover, something veritably hallowed; for Culture is a recollection, not only of our forefathers' terrestrial form and outward appearance, but also of their spiritual achievements in dedicating Mankind to ideals. It is a live, everlasting recollection which, in souls that become participants in these dedications, is undying. These dedications have been bequeathed by our forefathers for the benefit of their remotest

¹ See the passages of works of Plato's that have been discussed in the present Study, IV. iv. 585-8.—A.J.T.

² Plato: *Respublica*, 514A-521C, quoted in this Study in III. iii. 249-52.—A.J.T.

descendants; and no jot of the once new letters shall pass away;¹ for the Spirit of Mankind on which they are stamped is one and indivisible. In this sense, Culture is not just something monumental; over and above that, it is a spiritual initiative; for the faculty of recollection, which is Culture's sovereign ruler, permits the true servants of Culture to become participants in our forefathers' 'initiations' and communicates to these faithful servants, in the act of renewing these initiations in their souls, the power to make new beginnings and new departures.

"Recollection is a dynamic principle, in contrast to an oblivion that signifies lassitude, cessation of movement, decline, and regression to a condition of relative torpidity. We share Nietzsche's determination to keep a sharp watch on ourselves, to make sure that we do not harbour in our souls the poison of disintegration, infection, and 'decadence'. What is 'decadence'? It is a sense of an exquisitely subtle organic bond with the monumental tradition of a dead civilisation (*hohen Kultur*), combined with an oppressively proud consciousness of being, ourselves, the last epigoni in the series. In other words, a recollection that no longer has any life in it because it has lost its spirit of initiative, and therefore does not any longer give us any power of participating in the initiations of our forefathers or any impulse towards taking the initiative effectively, is tantamount to an awareness that 'the oracles are dumb'²—which is, as a matter of fact, the title given by a decadent Plutarch to one of his works (*De Defectu Oraculorum*)".

In this last-quoted passage, Ivanov is diagnosing the nature of 'the Antaeon rebound' in terms of Socrates' doctrine of ἀνάμνησις³ and Jung's concept of Primordial Images. 'If the Soul is to achieve this recovery of self-possession (*diese Selbstbesinnung*), it has, as we can learn from Ivanov, to comply with one indispensable condition: it must go back into the very innermost depths;⁴ and then, when it has risen again from this pearl-fishing diver's descent into Hell, it has to resist an Atlantean temptation 'to become identified with the archaic image'⁵ that it has retrieved from the Abyss, in order 'to express the Unconscious creatively'⁶ in a masterful act of metabolization that is 'the alternative possibility'.⁷ A living soul that does thus succeed in accomplishing an Antaeon rebound from the renaissance of a dead antecedent culture acquires thereby 'the power to make new beginnings and new departures' because its creative way of handling what it has resuscitated generates the *élan* that is the gait of growth⁸—in contrast to the mechanicalness of the mimesis⁹ that is the inadequate Atlantean response to an identical challenge from the same *revenant*.

If to 'have life and have it more abundantly',¹⁰ in the spiritual and not merely in the physical sense of the word, is the true end of Man, the possibility, opened up by a renaissance, of making an Antaeon rebound is an opportunity that is not too dearly bought at the price of incurring the inevitable risk of stiffening, instead, into an Atlantean stance. We can also now perhaps see why it was that, in Modern Western minds, the renaissance of a dead antecedent culture, which in reality is no more

¹ Matt. v. 18. Cp. Luke xvi. 17.—A.J.T.

² Milton, John: *Hymn on the Morning of Christ's Nativity*, Stanza 19.—A.J.T.

³ See p. 115, above.

⁴ Curtius, op. cit., p. 119.

⁵ Baynes, op. cit., quoted on p. 142, above.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ See III. iii. 112-27.

⁹ See IV. iv. 119-33.

¹⁰ John x. 10.

than a neutral event in the issue between Life and Death, should have so incongruously acquired a connotation that associated it with a spring-like outburst of fresh vitality. In the history of a fifteenth-century Italian renaissance of the Hellenic culture, which had been canonized as 'the Renaissance' *sans phrase* in a subsequent Modern Western tradition,¹ the repetitive rebirth of something that had been born before was followed, *resiliente Antaeo*, by the unprecedented new birth of something that was now being born for the first time. These two events were so far from being identical that the second of them had to fight for its life—in a strenuous 'Battle of the Books'²—in order to make good its debatable birthright. In the sequel to this fifteenth-century renaissance in the Western World there were unmistakably Atlantean tendencies warring against those that were manifestly Antaeian; but, by dint of ignoring these Atlantean symptoms, having no eye for any except the Antaeian, and identifying these with the foregoing renaissance³ of Hellenism that had provided the occasion of this mighty Antaeian rebound in Modern Western history, Western minds had contrived to invest 'the Renaissance', and therefore the generic term 'renaissance' as well, with an aura of vitality and creativity strangely out of keeping with a Cimmerian fog that is the genuine atmosphere of the Odyssean and all other 'necyia'.

(b) A SURVEY OF ANTEAEAN AND ATLANTAEAN REACTIONS⁴

If we now take a survey of responses to the challenge presented by renaissances, we shall find the examples of Atlantean stances preponderating over those of Antaeian rebounds in the ubiquity of their distribution among the divers provinces of social life, if not in the sheer weight of their numbers. Whereas the unequivocal examples of the Antaeian rebound seem to be confined to the two fields of Religion and Literature, we find the Atlantean stance not only likewise strongly represented in both these fields, but also presenting itself in the fields of Politics, the Visual Arts, and Pilgrimages, in which no examples of the Antaeian rebound are forthcoming. In surveying the Soul's reactions to renaissances, we shall also find, as we have already found in surveying its reactions to encounters between contemporaries, that there are instances—and these perhaps not the least interesting and important of those on our muster-roll—which cannot be classified exclusively under either of two antithetical heads, but have to be pronounced ambivalent. In the array of reactions to renaissances, cases of ambivalency present themselves in the fields of Religion, Politics, the Visual Arts, Philosophy, and Law; and in Philosophy and Law they seem to have the field to themselves.

The supreme example of an Antaeian rebound is the sequel, in the soul

¹ See pp. 1-5, above.

² See pp. 68-69, above.

³ In thus identifying a birth of something new with a new birth of something old, the Modern Western literary purveyors of the French word *renaissance* were doing what had been done with the Greek word *palingenesis* in a post-Alexandrine chapter of Hellenic history (see V. v. 27, n. 2, and V. vi. 172-3). They were taking liberties with the literal meaning—a new birth of something old—which had been the original usage of the word, in order to invest it with a new significance that was hardly legitimate.

⁴ In order to avoid an unnecessary multiplication of footnotes, the writer has refrained, in this chapter, from giving references to the survey of renaissances in X. B (ii), above.

of Saint Francis of Assisi, to his evocation of the spirit of Christ. An *imitatio Christi* which would have been intolerably presumptuous if it had not been unselfconsciously humble was proved to have been no mechanical act of mimesis by the light of the leaping flame that seared the saint's body with the stigmata of its lightning-like passage as it kindled Christ's spirit in his soul. In the histories of the civilizations of the third generation it would be hard to descry any other soul that had won such grace from so hazardously high a spiritual venture; but, when we pass from this unique evocation of Christ's own spirit to evocations of the spirit of His Apostles, we find more than one example of the Antaeian rebound from this still lofty yet not quite Everestian spiritual altitude. This creative reaction is exemplified in the souls of those other Western saints who set themselves to lead an apostolic life, both outside the fold of the Western Christian Church of the day, as heretics, and inside it, as friars of the Orders of Saint Francis and Saint Dominic, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era;¹ and it is exemplified again in the souls of a John Wesley and his companions and successors, who in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were moved with the same compassion² for shepherdless sheep scattered abroad in urban wildernesses.

An Antaeian rebound was likewise the sequel to the evocation of a ghost of Jewish Aniconism in the Protestant fraction of a fissured Modern Western Christian Church; for this resuscitated tabu on the representation of the Godhead in visual form was a reminder of the greatness of the spiritual gulf across which the encounter between God and Man takes place; and, the keener the human soul's sense of the distance between these two spiritual poles, the higher the tension of the current that streams between them in a vaulting arc.

Iconoclasm, however, is not enough in itself to ensure an Antaeian rebound—as is attested by its Atlantean outcome in the history of a sister Christian Church. Though the Iconoclastic Movement in Orthodox Christendom petered out, as we have seen, in a compromise in which the Iconodules had the best of the bargain, it did not fail to fulfil its first imperial patron Leo Syrus's purpose of disciplining the Orthodox Christian Church into becoming an obedient humble servant of an East Roman *imperium redivivum*.³ Nor was this bitted and bridled Church afterwards any more happily inspired when it evoked the ghost of a Jewry in diaspora⁴ in order to keep itself still in existence after its subjugation by an East Roman Imperial Government had resulted in the breakdown and disintegration of the Orthodox Christian Civilization and the imposition of peace on the main body of Orthodox Christendom by an alien universal state in the shape of the Ottoman Empire. In eventually consenting to serve in an Ottoman régime as a *millet*, as in previously consenting to serve in an East Roman régime as a department of state, the Orthodox Church was accepting the sentence passed on Atlas by Zeus in the Hellenic myth.

¹ See IV. iv. 369-71, 558-60, 562, and 652-6.

² Matt. ix. 36 and xiv. 14; Mark vi. 34.

³ See IV. iv. 346-53 and 592-623.

⁴ This diasporan organization of Jewry has been noticed in IX. viii. 272-313.

Moreover, a Western Protestantism that had reacted with an Antaeon rebound to an evocation of a Jewish tabu on graven images, from which an Orthodox Christendom had recoiled into an Atlantean stance, did not escape Atlas' fate when it evoked another ghost of Judaism in the shape of Sabbatarianism; and a similar fate overtook a latter-day Islamic Society when it evoked, out of the past of Islam, a pristine puritanism in and after the eighteenth century of the Christian Era¹ and a pristine Shi'ism at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.² These successive revivals of two movements in the history of Primitive Islam, which had been at daggers drawn in their original epiphanies, both had the uniform effect of drawing down upon a latter-day Islamic Society's devoted head the incubus of a pair of spiritual maladies—militancy and formalism—which had always been Islam's besetting sins, and which had never failed to seize any opportunity of fastening upon her again whenever she had succeeded for a season in rising above them and momentarily shaking them off.

It is impossible to guess which type of reaction might have been precipitated by the evocation, first in Orthodox and then in Western Christendom, of the ghost of an 'Adoptionism' that appears to have preceded the 'Conceptionist' presentation of Christianity and to have survived in an Antitauran fastness in order to re-emerge from there, in the ninth century of the Christian Era, in the shape of Paulicianism. A ninth-century Paulician movement in Eastern Anatolia, and a Bogomilism and a Catharism whose subsequent invasions of Europe were a murdered Paulicianism's posthumous revenge, were each in turn repressed by physical force³ at too early a stage for it to be possible for us to know them by their fruits.⁴ There are other reactions to the evocation of a ghost from the Past in the field of Religion which compel us to classify them, not as unidentifiable, but as ambivalent, by displaying unmistakably Antaeon and unmistakably Atlantean symptoms side by side.

In a modern chapter of Western history, for example, we have seen a renaissance of an Augustinian predestinarianism, which had persistently reasserted itself in the successive forms of a Protestant Calvinism, a Tridentine Roman Catholic Jansenism, and a post-Christian and anti-Christian Marxism, first generating Antaeon outbursts of energy and enterprise and then freezing the Western body social into an Atlantean posture⁵ in which this colossus's feet of clay were sundered by an unbridgeable gulf of 'unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea'⁶ insulating race from race, whether these were the spiritual races of the Elect and the Damned,

¹ See IX. viii. 250 and 602.

² See I. i. 366-400.

³ See IV. iv. 364-9 and 624-34. The 'manifest destiny' of Paulicianism had been to take the place, in Orthodox Christendom, of a 'Conceptionist' Christianity which, in both its Iconoclast and its Iconodule vein, had failed to save the Church from becoming the servant of a resuscitated Hellenic universal state. The 'manifest destiny' of Catharism had been to take the place, in Western Christendom, of a Catholic Christianity which had been failing to serve as a good shepherd for sheep astray in the strange social milieu that had been conjured up in Western Christendom by a resuscitation of the Hellenic political institution of the idolized city-state.

⁴ Matt. vii. 16-20 and xii. 33; Luke vi. 43-44.

⁵ See V. v. 426-7 and 615-18.

⁶ Arnold, Matthew: *Isolation*, quoted in II. i. 326.

or the social races of the Proletariat and the Bourgeoisie, or the physical races of the Albinos and the Negroes.¹

A Modern Western Protestant Christian bibliolatry had had a no less ambivalent effect. In evoking this ghost from the Sheol of Christianity's Judaic past, Protestantism had released hidden waters of life in a galaxy of new fountains that had irrigated not only the Protestant countries in which they had welled up, but the whole of the Modern Western World. The translation of the Bible into the vernacular languages of the Protestant Western peoples had conferred on all Western vernacular languages alike, in Catholic as well as Protestant eyes,² a prestige that had previously been the monopoly of a dead Latin and Greek; the literary cultivation of a people's mother-tongue had prepared the ground for universal education; the microscopic study of a sacred text had been an apprenticeship in a higher criticism which could be, and duly was, applied thereafter in all fields of scholarship. These reactions to a Judaic idolization of the Bible had been Antaeian indeed; yet the Atlantean responses to the same challenge had been no less portentous. The political nemesis of hallowing the local vernaculars of a society which was a linguistic Babel had been the grim epiphany of a Gorgon's head in the guise of a Linguistic Nationalism.³ The moral and intellectual nemesis of deifying holy scriptures was a Protestant servitude, from which a still priest-ridden Tridentine Catholicism had remained free, to 'the letter that killeth'.⁴ The Protestant deification of the Bible in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era had had the same deadening effect on spiritual life as the Muslim deification of the Qur'ān in the ninth century, and as the Sikh Granth-worshippers' caricature of this Muslim lapse into the mortal sin of polytheism (*shirk*).⁵

When we pass from Religion to Language and Literature, we find both a fifteenth-century Italian revival of Classical Latin and Ancient Greek in a Western World, and the perennial survival of Sanskrit in a Hindu World, uniformly giving rise to an Antaeian outburst of literary creativity in living vernacular languages. As a Sanskrit Rāmāyana inspired a Hindi *Rām-charit Mānas*, so the Ancient Greek and Latin classics in divers literary genres inspired corresponding works in Tuscan, Castilian, and Portuguese, in Northern French and Midland English, in High German and Low Dutch. So far from checking the progress of a Western polyglot vernacular literature which, since its birth in the eleventh century, had blossomed in French, Provençal, and Tuscan in turn, the fifteenth-century Italian renaissance of Latin and Greek gave an impetus to the vernacular literary movement that carried it from Italy and France into all the other linguistic provinces of an Early Modern Western World. The new mastery of Ciceronian Latin which was achieved by an Erasmus did not lure his fellow Westerners into abandoning the literary cultivation of their own mother tongues in order

¹ See II. i. 207-49.

² For example, the literary form of a High German language that had been created by Luther in his act of translating the Bible had been adopted by German-speaking Catholics as well as by German-speaking Protestants.

³ See IV. iv. 185-90 and IX. viii. 536-8.

⁴ 2 Cor. iii. 6.

⁵ See I. i. 9, n. 3.

to revert to a reanimated dead language which had been shown, by the great Humanist's performance, to be a superb medium for conveying all the thoughts and feelings that Erasmus's contemporaries in the Western World might be moved to express in prose; it inspired them with the ambition to develop their divers living vernaculars into adequately massive vehicles for carrying a Ciceronian load, and, *a fortiori*, to refine them into adequately subtle instruments for catching, from a Horace or a Virgil, strains that could find a convincing echo only in some language that was still alive on the lips of a latter-day Western poet. An Erasmian Latin prose found its *métier*, and kept it for some two hundred years, as the *lingua franca* of an early Modern Western Republic of Letters; but, when, towards the end of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, the Humanists' cult of Hellenism suffered its decisive defeat in the controversy between the respective champions of 'the Ancients' and 'the Moderns', even this limited function of serving as an oecumenical linguistic medium for Western philosophy, science, and scholarship was captured from Erasmus's Latin by Bossuet's French. The transition may be caught in the act in the table of contents of the collected works of Leibnitz (*vivebat* A.D. 1646-1716).

These incidents in a Modern Western reaction to a Late Medieval Italian renaissance of Latin and Greek were Antaeian indeed; but they were also Antaeian with a vengeance. A living French vernacular which, in the *grand siècle* of Modern French history, came to be elevated above its peers to an invidious eminence, in order to play a discarded Latin's oecumenical role, had neither the literary prestige nor the political neutrality that had made Latin so apt an instrument for this indispensable Western cultural purpose. The failure of French fully to fill the formidable linguistic vacuum produced by the abandonment of Latin was the first symptom, in this cultural encounter between the Modern West and a ghost of Hellenism, of the stiffening of an Antaeian rebound into an Atlantean stance; and this tragic *peripeteia* declared itself unmistakably when, in a Late Modern chapter of Western history, the local vernacular languages of the Western World began to prostitute to the political service of a parochial nationalism the literary gifts that had accrued to them in double measure from the Humanists' cult of the Hellenic classics and from the Protestants' cult of the Bible.¹

This Atlantean aspect of the sequel to a fifteenth-century renaissance of Hellenism in the Western World was, however, relatively incon-

¹ Down to A.D. 1952 it looked as if the Hindu World might succeed in avoiding a corresponding aberration. There seemed to be little sign of any tendency for a polyglot Hindu Society's sense of oecumenical solidarity to disrupt itself into parochial national movements animated by the perverse ideal of manufacturing so many political fatherlands out of the areas in which the divers living vernacular languages of the Hindu World happened respectively to be current. If it were indeed true that the Hindus had not reacted in this unfortunate Western way to the literary cultivation of local living vernaculars under the stimulus of a classical language and literature derived from an antecedent civilization, the Hindus' happier record in this respect was perhaps the consequence of external pressure rather than the fruit of innate virtue. Whereas the Modern Western World had been virtually free from external pressure from A.D. 1683, when the 'Osmanlis had met with their second, and decisive, reverse before the walls of Vienna, down to A.D. 1917, when the Bolsheviks had entered into the heritage of a Petrine Russian Empire, the Hindu World had been under Muslim pressure since the tenth century of the Christian Era, and under Western pressure since the eighteenth.

spicuous by comparison with the portentousness of the Atlantean reaction to a ninth-century renaissance of Hellenism in a Greek Orthodox Christendom; for here, as we have seen, the recultivation of the Ancient Greek classics stifled, instead of stimulating, the growth of a literature in a living Modern Greek language. The few stunted shoots that had succeeded in forcing their way up in competition with the choking thorns¹ of a resurgent Hellenism would hardly have survived if the field had not been drastically ploughed up again by aggressive Western trespassers. A Modern Greek vernacular literature held its own—as far as it did hold its own—against Byzantinism at the price of following a Western lead; and, in the latest chapter of the history of this Graeco-Occidental cultural intercourse, the archaizing Romanticism in which the indigenous vernacular literatures of a Late Modern Western World had proclaimed their self-enslavement to the service of a parochial Nationalism was caricatured in a new-born Kingdom of Greece by the perpetration of the *καθαρεύουσα*. A Modern Greek people that had just liberated itself from an Ottoman political ascendancy promptly used its newly won powers of self-determination to put its Modern Greek mother tongue in Ancient Greek irons.

If this Atlantean reaction to a renaissance of Hellenism in Greek Orthodox Christendom carried to extremes an Atlantean tendency that is likewise discernible in the Western response to a challenge from the same *revenant*, the whole-heartedly Antaeian rebound of the living vernacular languages of the Hindu World from their contact with a maternal Sanskrit is offset by the hyper-Byzantine stance of the Chinese main body of a Far Eastern World under the petrifying Gorgon stare of the resuscitated Sinic classics. It will be seen that the field of Language and Literature, like the field of Religion, was a debatable ground on which an Antaeian-minded Ivanov and an Atlantean-minded Gershenson had fought inconclusive battles.

When we turn to Politics and the Visual Arts, we here find the Atlantean reaction holding the field, save for one or two cases of ambivalence.

The classic political examples of the Atlantean stance are the avatars of an antecedent civilization's universal state in the shapes of the Sui and T'ang Empire in the Chinese main body of a Far Eastern World, the East Roman Empire in a Greek Orthodox Christendom, and the Cairene Caliphate in an Arabic Muslim World; and, if the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, the Carolingian and Timurid empires, and the caricature of a Chinese T'ang régime in the Far Eastern Civilization's Japanese offshoot failed to play the same disastrously momentous part in the histories of the Western Christian, Iranic Muslim, and Japanese societies, this was merely because the Danubian Monarchy never succeeded in making itself more than nominally oecumenical,² while the

¹ Matt. xiii. 7; Luke viii. 7.

² See V. v. 325-7. The Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy had been called into existence after the collapse of the Kingdom of Hungary in A.D. 1526 to serve as a carapace for protecting the south-eastern land-frontier of the Western World against Ottoman aggression (see II. ii. 177-88); a union of the remnant of Hungary with the lands of the Bohemian Crown and with the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg proved

other three evocations all happened to prove expensively abortive.¹ In contrast to the social effect of a universal state in its original epiphany in the flesh, when it secures a postponement, though not a permanent remission, of the execution of a self-imposed sentence for a society that has already inflicted mortal wounds on itself, the social effect of the evocation of a dead and buried universal state's ghost is to force the growth of the evoking society to a hot-house pace at which it is condemning itself in advance to pay for a spell of artificially induced precocity by a premature breakdown in which Atlas involuntarily betrays and stultifies his mission by doing Samson's suicidally vindictive deed.

In the history of Western Christendom up to the date of writing mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the same penalty had been paid already three times over for the sin of resuscitating the pre-Augustan Hellenic political institution of the deified parochial state; and in this parochial three-act play of Western political

to be a sufficient mobilization of Western strength to prevent the 'Osmanlis from making further continental conquests at Western expense; and the rest of the Western World therefore left it to the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy to perform this public service for the Western common weal, without acknowledging its obligation to the Monarchy by submitting to the hegemony of a *Caesarea Maestas* whose suzerainty, even within the limits of the Holy Roman Empire, had never been more than nominal, outside the frontiers of the hereditary dominions of the imperial house of the day, since 'the Great Interregnum' (*vacabat* A.D. 1254-73).

The role of unprofitable servants, who had done that which it was their duty to do, without having earned thereby any claim to recognition or reward (Luke xvii. 7-10), was naturally resented by the Hapsburgs of the Danubian line when it was imposed upon them by their Western beneficiaries, and they expressed this resentment by making their weight felt in the interior of the Western World whenever any slackening of the pressure from their Ottoman adversaries gave them an opportunity to neglect their task of serving as wardens of the West's anti-Ottoman marches. Such opportunities for occasional intervention in the domestic politics of the Western World were expended by the Danubian Hapsburg Power, with remarkable consistency, on Atlantean efforts to uphold lost causes. The ninety-years-long eclipse of the Ottoman Power from the death of Sultan Süleymân I in A.D. 1566 to the appointment of Mehmed Köprülü to be Grand Vezir in A.D. 1656—an eclipse that was only momentarily relieved by the meteoric career of Sultan Murâd IV (*imperabat* A.D. 1623-40)—was spent by a Viennese *Caesarea Maestas* in Counter-Reformational activities culminating in the Thirty Years' War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1618-48). The temporary exhaustion of the Ottoman Power after the Great War of A.D. 1682-99 was taken by the Danubian Hapsburg Power as an opportunity for joining forces with the Netherlands and Great Britain in order to repress King Louis XIV of France for the benefit of British interests. The relief from Ottoman pressure after the collapse of the Ottoman Power in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 tempted the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy into committing itself to the forlorn hope of repressing the hydra-headed 'Ideas of Seventeen Eighty-Nine', which had no sooner been crushed in their first avatar in the form of a Napoleonic imperialism than they reasserted themselves in the form of a nineteenth-century Romantic Nationalism which the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy was so far from being able to repress that it was first encircled and finally disrupted by it.

It is true that these Atlantean reactions to the raising of a ghost of a Roman *Caesarea Maestas* at Vienna were not entirely unaccompanied by Atean symptoms. The most lively of these was the role which Vienna came to play as a melting-pot for transforming Orthodox Christians or ex-Orthodox Christian Uniates into Westerners. An eloquent memorial of this Atean activity was the Vienna telephone directory (see VI. vii. 235 and IX. viii. 529-30); yet, when the history of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy from A.D. 1526 to A.D. 1918 is viewed as a whole in perspective, this Atean twitch does not perceptibly relax the rigidity of the Monarchy's Atlantean stance.

¹ Charlemagne's abortive empire-building cost a nascent Western Society the recrudescence of a post-Hellenic social interregnum (see IV. iv. 490); Timur's cost a nascent Iranic Muslim Society the loss of its opportunity to make itself the heir of the Eurasian Nomad World (see IV. iv. 496-500); the pseudo-T'ang régime that had been installed de toutes pièces in Yamato cost a nascent Japanese Society the harsh experience of subjection to the ascendancy of the unexotically crude marchmen who opened up the Kwanto (see II. ii. 158-9).

necromancy the tragedy had been more ironic than in the drama of resuscitated universal states, since, each time, the first effect had been an Antaeian enhancement of vitality which had tempted self-betrayed Western victims of the Black Art to leap like rabbits into a noose which they themselves had set to wring their own necks. This had been the unvarying outcome of the successive resuscitations of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic city-state in a Medieval Western Italy, Germany, and Flanders,¹ a post-Alexandrine Hellenic absolute monarchy in almost all provinces of an Early Modern Western World,² and an Hellenic Democracy in Late Modern Western states in which parliamentary constitutions of an indigenous Medieval Western pattern had either succeeded, as in England and her daughter communities, in surviving the impact of the two earlier waves of political Hellenization or else, as in other Western countries, had eventually reasserted themselves, under English inspiration, against the renaissance of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic absolutism.³ The offspring of a resuscitated Hellenic Democracy's impact upon an indigenous Western Parliamentarism was a Nationalism from whose deadly toils a self-tormented Western World was struggling, for dear life, to extricate itself on the morrow of a Second World War.⁴

In the field of the Visual Arts a spectacular example of the Atlantean stance is presented by the sequel to the Modern Western World's reception of the Hellenic order of Architecture. The same Atlantean posture can be detected by a discerning eye in an Assyrian renaissance of a Sumeric style of bas-relief and in a Saïte renaissance of the minor arts of an Egyptiac 'Old Kingdom', while the tragi-comedy of an Atlantean snare set with an Antaeian bait, which we have witnessed in the sequel to successive Western resuscitations of parochial Hellenic political institutions, is reproduced in the sequel to the abandonment of

¹ See III. iii. 299-310, 341-50, and 355-7; and V. v. 619-42.

² See III. iii. 357-9.

³ See III. iii. 359-63. In the English-inspired revivals of a Medieval Western Parliamentarism in Late Modern Continental European Western countries, beginning with the reconvoation of the States General in France in A.D. 1789, there was a vein of academic artificiality which betrayed itself in France in the successive collapses of parliamentary government in A.D. 1799, A.D. 1852, and A.D. 1940; in Germany in the fiasco of 'the Revolution of the Intellectuals' in A.D. 1848, in the discomfiture of the Prussian Liberals by Bismarck in A.D. 1862-3, and in the collapse of the Weimar régime in A.D. 1933; and in Italy in the *de facto* liquidation, in A.D. 1922, of the Sardinian constitution of A.D. 1848. 'The Frankfort Parliament was a highly academic assembly—it contained 49 university professors and lecturers, and 57 schoolmasters, and at least three-fourths of its members had been to a university' (Namier, L. B.: *The Revolution of the Intellectuals* (London 1944, Cumberlege), p. 86, n. 1). In the retrospect of 160 years of disappointing experience, the artificial revival of an indigenous Western Parliamentarism in Continental Western Europe could be seen to be a sickly plant. In the same Time-perspective, however, it was also manifest that the resuscitation of Hellenic Democracy, in the sense of the rival self-deification of parochial human tribes, had been as effective as it had been disastrous. 'The *Volksgeist* of mass-movements replaced the *Zeitgeist* of the intellectuals, and came to be worshipped by the modern *clerics*' (Namier, *op. cit.*, p. 73). 'Democracy', in this archaeologically correct parochial and idolatrous interpretation of a resuscitated pre-Augustan Hellenic ideal, was worshipped by the Napoleons, Mussolinis, Hitlers, and other Late Modern and post-Modern Continental European Western war-lords and dictators as fanatically as it was by any professorial member of the abortive German Parliament at Frankfort in A.D. 1848. What is more significant, it was also worshipped with a no less pagan bigotry, though usually with a greater show of discretion, by better seasoned and less incompetent parliamentarians in Great Britain and in the overseas Western countries of British origin.

⁴ See IV. iv. 156-67.

an indigenous style of Western painting in favour of a resuscitated Hellenic Naturalism. The aesthetic petrification to which a Western school of painting had condemned itself in adopting a dead Hellenic style in place of its own indigenous Western aesthetic ideals is attested by the frustration of the genius of a Dhominikos Theotokópoulos (*vivebat* A.D. 1541-1614), who tried to bring to the rescue of his Hellenizing Western contemporaries the aesthetic ideals of a Byzantine culture that had been tardily relieved of the incubus of the East Roman Empire. As we have noticed in another context,¹ the vista which a Byzantine Greek Theotokópoulos had opened up for Western painters was obstructed for no less than three centuries by the wraith of an Hellenic Greek Apelles, until the eventual exhaustion of an artificially administered Hellenic stimulus at last enabled latter-day Western eyes to see through the mirage by which Giotto had been bemused.

In the field of Philosophy the same ironic denouement was the sequel to the renaissances of a Sinic Confucianism in the Far Eastern World and an Hellenic Aristotelianism in Western Christendom. In the epilogues to both these tales the immediate effect was an Antaeian outburst of intellectual energy, and the eventual effect a stiffening into the Atlantean stance of a dogmatic scholasticism.

The intellectual petrification which was the ultimate effect of an intellectual renaissance in the histories of both these societies is attested in either case by the frustration of a creative genius. In China in the Sung Age, Wang An-shih (*vivebat* A.D. 1021-86), who had foreseen that the Sung Empire would succumb to a barbarian onslaught unless it quickly put its house in order, and who had gone on to work out and translate into action the social reforms required in order to rally the people to the support of the Sung régime and the Far Eastern way of life, lived to see his work undone—with immediate catastrophic consequences—by Confucian litterati in whose eyes he had committed the unpardonable offence of breaking away from preconceived ideas in wrestling with unprecedented problems.² In Western Christendom in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, Wang An-shih's frustration in the field of Public Administration had its counterpart in Roger Bacon's in the field of Physical Science. The vista which Bacon (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1214-94) opened up by looking at Nature as she was, with the unprejudiced eyes of an empirical observer, was obstructed for no less than four centuries by the straw-stuffed skin and bones of a dead Aristotle posted by the Schoolmen between the jambs of the door which Bacon had unlocked and opened. The obstruction was not removed by the fifteenth-century Italian Humanists' jeering exposure of the truth that this imposingly resuscitated Hellenic figure was a corpse; and Western Man had to wait for admission into a realm that was his own peculiar discovery till an obsolete Hellenic frame of mind was blown away at last by a mine laid and exploded by René Descartes (*vivebat* A.D. 1596-1650). While philosophers may question whether Descartes

¹ In IV. iv. 360-1.

² See Williamson, H. R.: *Wang An Shih* (London 1935-7, Probsthain, 2 vols.), and the present Study, V. vi. 306, with n. 6.

did, or could, divest his mind of all preconceived ideas and set it to work again, *ab initio*, on a genuinely clean slate, historians will not doubt that his naïve belief in the possibility of a new intellectual start, and his bold attempt to put this idea and ideal into practice, did effectually reopen the way for the resumption of a Baconian advance which an Aristotelian obstruction had arrested at the outset of the first day's march.

To the historian's eye, Descartes' supposedly clean slate reveals an unobliterated Christian inscription;¹ for, fortunately for the intellectual future of the two societies that had rashly evoked the ghosts of philosophies created by their predecessors, their uncritical enthusiasm had not availed to make a clean sweep of a living theology in order to enthrone a resuscitated philosophy in its place. In Western Christendom a Saint Thomas Aquinas had been at liberty to enfeoff Aristotle only in so far as he could contrive to do this without trespassing on the already established tenures of those Fathers and Councils of the Christian Church whose authority was recognized in the West; in China the Neoconfucians' nominally integral reinstatement of Confucianism had been achieved only by the sleight of hand with which they preserved, *en masse*, under a Confucian veneer, the tenets of a Mahayanian Buddhist theology which they professed to be rejecting *in toto*. Thus, when the renaissance of a dead philosophy had spent its force and taken its toll, this dubious intellectual adventure did not leave the society that had indulged in it altogether destitute of resources for making a fresh intellectual start; and, though in China this new departure was not taken without the help of a push from alien hands, a Western World which gave a twentieth-century China a salutary intellectual shock was able to perform this service for one of its contemporaries by that date because by then it had already succeeded in throwing off its own intellectual incubus by its own unaided intellectual prowess.

In the field of Law, Greek Orthodox Christendom in the Age of the Macedonian Dynasty partially insured itself against the risks of its evocation of the *Corpus Iustinianum* in the *Vasilikà* by condescending to the same trick that was practised in the China of the Sung Age in the Neoconfucian renaissance of Confucianism. We have noticed already that the compilers of the *Vasilikà* tacitly retained the Christian essence of the legislation of an Iconoclast Syrian Dynasty whose works they were professedly execrating and rejecting. The truth was that, notwithstanding the retrospective anathema that the Iconoclasts had incurred, the Biblical elements out of which they had created their new system of law were sympathetic to the genius of an Orthodox Christian Society to which the pagan Hellenic spirit of a classical Roman Law had become morally repugnant; and the East Roman legislators of the Macedonian Age must have been aware at least intuitively, if not consciously, that the Orthodox Christian public for whom they were legislating would not be able to bear the dead weight of a genuinely integral Justinianean juristic renaissance. They therefore deftly lightened the incubus of the resuscitated Roman Law that they were imposing on the social life of Orthodox

¹ On this point see Butterfield, H.: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London 1949, Bell), pp. 98-99.

Christendom by resorting to a device that had been employed by the Late Roman Emperor Justinian's own architect Anthemius of Tralles as his solution for the physical problem of imposing a cupola on the cathedral church of the *Αγία Σοφία* without risking a collapse of the supporting pilasters. The light Rhodian bricks of which, according to the legend,¹ Anthemius's ethereal cupola was ingeniously constructed, found their Byzantine juristic counterpart in *Vasilikà* whose ponderous-sounding Justinianean titles were affixed to contents covertly fabricated from the more ethereal substance of the *Ecloga*.

In a Western Christendom where the resuscitation of the Justinianean Roman Law in Orthodox Christendom under the Macedonian Dynasty was emulated, some two hundred years after the time of the East Roman Emperor Basil I (*imperabat* A.D. 867-86), by academic enthusiasts, no corresponding precautions were taken to temper the rigour of an obsolete legal system to the exigencies of a social *terrain* with which it was still more out of keeping than it was with the life of a ninth-century Orthodox Christian World; and it is therefore not surprising to find the 'reception' of the Civil Law in the West having Atlantean sequels. We have seen² how the Hohenstaufen Dynasty's academic pretension to benefit by a post-Diocletianic Roman imperial prerogative, which, in the West, had never been exercised effectively since the death of the Emperor Theodosius I in A.D. 395, committed the Holy Roman Empire to a policy of self-assertion that was so ludicrously beyond its strength that it inevitably resulted in the collapse registered in 'the Great Interregnum' of A.D. 1254-73. This Atlantean doom which the Holy Roman Empire thus brought down upon its own head might have seemed at the time to be offset by an Antaeus sequel to the contemporary reception of the Civil Law in the North and Central Italian city-states. Yet, though the first effect may have been stimulating both in a Late Medieval Western cosmos of city-states and in an Early Modern Western chaos of nation-states, it could be seen in retrospect that the ultimate effect had been Atlantean here likewise; for the reception of an oecumenical Roman Law within the cramping framework of a parochial state had manifestly aggravated the explosiveness of an idolization of parochial sovereignty which the Western World had resuscitated from the charnel house of a pre-imperial Age of Hellenic history.

If, in conclusion of our present survey of Antaeus and Atlantean reactions, we now take a second glance at some of those pilgrimages in which renaissances of elements of dead cultures had been transposed from the Time-dimension into the Space-dimension, we shall observe

¹ According to Lethaby, W. R., and Swainson, H.: *The Church of Sancta Sophia, Constantinople* (London 1894, Macmillan), p. 156, 'there was no trace [in the dome] of the light bricks made in Rhodes which the Anonymous mentions, although in the pendentives a light substance, whitish, with impressions of plants in it, was used in irregular masses'.

An English translation of this *Anonymus Combefisii* (or *Bandurii* or *Lambecii*) will be found *ibid.*, pp. 129-43, and the passage about the Rhodian bricks appears on pp. 136-7:

'The Emperor sent Troilus the cubicular, Theodosius the prefect, and Basileidès the quaestor to Rhodes to have bricks of Rhodian clay made, all equal in weight and length. . . . And they sent bricks of measured sizes to the Emperor—twelve of them weigh [the weight of] one of ours; for the clay is light, spongy, fine, and white.'

² In II. ii. 170-1.

that the auspicious failure of the Crusades saved Western Christendom from the Atlantean fate that it was courting when it tried to slake its thirst for the fountain-head of Christianity by mistranslating a spiritual nostalgia into a military occupation. The Ayyubid and Mamlūk defenders of an embryonic Arabic Muslim Society who evicted the Crusaders from Palestine and their other conquests in Syria, and the Nicene Greek and Ottoman Turkish defenders of a disintegrating Orthodox Christendom who evicted these Western Christian intruders from Constantinople and Greece, compelled the Franks to divert from the Levant to the Baltic and the Atlantic most of the energies that Frankland had to spare for navigation, piracy, maritime trade, and overseas conquest; and this compulsory diversion of energies made the Franks' fortunes in spite of themselves and contrary to the intentions of their victorious Muslim and Orthodox Christian adversaries. In wresting out of Frankish hands the mastery of the Mediterranean, the Mamlūks and the 'Osmanlis pushed the Franks into mastering the Ocean, taking Dār-al-Islām in the rear,¹ winning two new worlds for Western Christendom in the Americas, and establishing a temporary Western ascendancy over the whole face of the planet.

The undesired and unintended benefit that the repulse of the Crusades thus thrust upon the Franks on the whole is demonstrated by a Venetian and a Genoese exception. The Late Medieval Italians' superiority in efficiency over their Transalpine and Transmarine Frankish contemporaries resulted, as we have noticed in another context,² in their gathering into their hands such fragments of the Crusaders' conquests *outré mer* as were not liberated by force of Greek and Turkish arms; and this exceptional success of the maritime Italian city-states in the hour of the Crusaders' general failure in the Levant was one cause of the Italians' own subsequent failure in the hour of the great *peripeteia* in which a Frankish discomfiture was converted into a Frankish triumph through the conquest of the Ocean by the maritime nation-states of Western Europe.

In these feats of West European maritime enterprise individual Venetian and Genoese seamen played parts of outstanding importance. When a progressive exploration of the West Coast of Africa, that had been initiated by the Portuguese Prince Henry the Navigator *circa* A.D. 1421,³ had petered out in A.D. 1448,⁴ the fresh impetus which saved this Portuguese enterprise from missing its manifest destiny was given to it in A.D. 1455-6 by the Venetian Alvise da Ca' da Mosto, who in two successive voyages⁵ turned the flank of Dār-al-Islām by establishing contact, beyond its southern limits, with still pagan Negro African peoples; reached and explored the River Gambia; and perhaps discovered the Cape Verde Islands.⁶ As for a Genoese Columbus who carried the Castilian flag across the Atlantic to the Caribbean threshold of the Mexic and Andean

¹ See IX. viii. 216-19.

² In III. iii. 347, n. 1.

³ See Prestage, E.: *The Portuguese Pioneers* (London 1933, Black), p. 54.

⁴ See Prestage, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

⁵ See Prestage, op. cit., pp. 94-125.

⁶ Alvise da Ca' da Mosto's, Diogo Gomez's, and Antonio da Noli's rival claims to have been the discoverer of the Cape Verde Islands are discussed by Prestage in op. cit., pp. 122, 140, and 143-4.

worlds, he was Fortune's favoured child among a goodly company of his Genoese fellow countrymen who had been lending their expert professional services to the Iberian Christian kingdoms since A.D. 1317.¹

When individual Genoese and Venetian maritime adventurers were so keenly alive to Western Christendom's possible future on the Ocean, and were so effectively active in helping to translate this possibility into accomplished fact, how came it that the Genoese and Venetian commonwealths let slip, with such fatal consequences for themselves, their own opportunity of playing in this immense new field of Western maritime enterprise the leading part that was theirs for the taking, in virtue of their then still unchallenged supremacy over all other maritime Western Christian states in skill, experience, and wealth? Their geographical location within the basin of an inland sea is not, in itself, enough to account for their failure to compete in the new Oceanic race; for a Mediterranean Sea that was landlocked over against the Indian Ocean had an egress into the Atlantic, and at least a modest share in an Early Modern Western World's oceanic activities was afterwards taken by the Grand Duchy of Courland,² whose location within the basin of the Baltic was quite as serious a geographical handicap in the oceanic race as any to which Genoa and Venice were subject. The underlying explanation of the two Italian maritime commonwealths' failure to respond to the challenge of the Ocean was not a Mediterranean geographical location but was a Levantine commercial, political, and military commitment which was the modern legacy of their medieval success. At the critical moment at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Venice and Genoa were still being held fast in an Atlantean stance by the baneful incubus of a Medieval Western Christian reversion to Western Christendom's Levantine past out of which these successful Italians had never been shaken by disasters such as had opportunely overtaken their French and Catalan fellow adventurers in that unpromising quarter.

This Atlantean doom was thus Genoa's and Venice's exceptional fate in the sequel to a failure of the Crusades in which the rest of Western Christendom had been saved, in its own despite, by a timely defeat. When however, a nascent Iranic Muslim Society was dragged at the heels of Timur Lenk's war-horse into turning its face away from lands of promise round the shores of the Great Eurasian Steppe towards the cradle of a dead antecedent Syriac Civilization,³ the whole of the aberrant society paid the Atlantean penalty for its demonically wayward war-lord's commission of a sin that had once been the undoing of Lot's wife.⁴ When Timur's conquests in the interior of the Iranic and Arabic Muslim worlds had proved to be as ephemeral as they had been devastating, the Iranic Muslim Society stood as stiff as any pillar of salt while the Mongol and Calmuck pagan Nomads were being converted to the Tibetan Tantric form of Mahayanian Buddhism instead of being converted to the Sunni form of Islam, and while the political dominion over the shores of the Eurasian Steppe was being partitioned between Sinified Manchus and Orthodox Christian Muscovites. This *gran rifiuto*, through which

¹ See Prestage, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

² See IV. iv. 493-5.

³ See IX. viii. 129.

⁴ Gen. xix. 26.

Timur Lenk arbitrarily cheated of its manifest destiny an Iranic Muslim World that he had just liberated from a Chaghatây Nomad ascendancy, is a classic example of an Atlantean sequel to a renaissance translated into the geographical terms of a physical return to an antecedent civilization's cradle.

(III) THE BLESSEDNESS OF IMMUNITY, MERCIFULNESS OF MORTALITY, AND UNTOWARDNESS OF PRECOCITY

An Attic tragedian in a celebrated chorus¹ has declared his conviction that

Not to be born, by all acclaim,
Were best; but, once that gate be passed,
To hasten thither whence he came
Is Man's next prize—and fast, Oh fast!²

Whether we do or do not agree with Sophocles in his pessimistic verdict on the predicament of being born into This World, we can hardly have arrived at the present point in our study of renaissances without feeling sure that at any rate it is best not wantonly to provoke the re-birth of something that has already been born once and that is now obligingly dead, buried, and in abeyance, and that, if on any occasion we have had the temerity to raise the dead, the least awkward denouement to which we can look forward in this ill-advised escapade is to see the *revenant's* disturbing presence laid again as hastily as Fate may allow; for our survey of the courses and consequences of renaissances in the histories of civilizations of the third generation has made it clear that the severity of the penalty that the necromancer will have to pay for having indulged a disembodied ghost's yearning to haunt the land of the living will be proportionate to the vehemence of the craving of the shade in Sheol to be reanimated by a draught of life-blood drawn from a living creature's veins.

The blessedness of immunity from renaissances was attested by the contrasts between the respective fortunes of the Visual Arts and Literature in the Chinese main body of a Far Eastern World, of Architecture and Literature in the main body of Orthodox Christendom, and of Music and Architecture in the West; for the Visual Arts in China, Architecture in Orthodox Christendom, and Music in the West had manifestly each been the master-art of its own culture; and in the history of each of them a renaissance of elements from the past life of an antecedent civilization was conspicuous by its absence. In China an Indo-Hellenic school of art that had been introduced into the Far Eastern World at a pre-natal stage by a Mahāyāna which had served as a chrysalis for the embryo of a Far Eastern Civilization was never disturbed by the re-emergence of a pre-Mahayanian Sinic art. In Orthodox Christendom a Syriac school of Architecture whose archetype was the church of the Ayía Sophía at Constantinople was never disturbed by a revival of the

¹ Sophocles: *Oedipus at Colonus*, ll. 1227-8.

² Gilbert Murray's translation (London 1948, Allen & Unwin), p. 93.

incompatible ideal embodied in the Parthenon at Athens. In the West a school of music that had discarded all but two of the numerous Hellenic 'modes', and, out of these two, had concentrated its efforts on one, was never disturbed by any resurgence of the Hellenic Babel that it had repressed. On the other hand a renaissance was, as we have seen, the dominating event in the histories of a Chinese Far Eastern and a Greek Orthodox Christian literature, as well as in the history of a Western architecture; and it was assuredly no accident that these activities that had been potentially haunted by reanimated ghosts were all convicted of having been dismal failures by confrontation with the brilliant success of contemporary activities in which a living society's native genius had not been blighted by the malign influence of a *revenant*.

The mercifulness of mortality, when the dead have been ill-advisedly brought back to life, is illustrated in the history of a Western Civilization that repeatedly escaped the due penalties for its own perverse feats of necromancy thanks to the premature dissipation of the haunting spectre either by the necromancer's own ruthless hand or by the indulgence of Fate. The Western Civilization earned by its own efforts the relief from an incubus that it won for itself by sending back to limbo, in a seventeenth-century victory of 'the Moderns' over 'the Ancients', the ghost of the Hellenic classics that had been raised in a fifteenth-century Italian renaissance, and by shattering, in the thirteenth-century victory of a Hildebrandine *Respublica Christiana* over a Frederician Holy Roman Empire, the simulacrum of an Hellenic universal state that had been imposed on Western Christendom for the second time at the hands of Otto I. On the other hand the West owed to Fate rather than to any Western foresight or forcefulness the fortunate premature collapse of the Holy Roman Empire after its original installation by Charlemagne, and likewise the fortunate premature expiry of the Carolingian renaissance of an Hellenic literature in its Latin version. Fate was equally kind to Western Christendom in making a fiasco of the Crusades and thereby liberating Western energies from an atavistic adventure in the blind alley of the Mediterranean Basin in order to set them free for encircling the Globe by mastering the Ocean. How much the Western Civilization did gain by the timely reinternment of these inopportune *revenants* in the Sheol from which they had been evoked can be measured by the extent of the damage which the same civilization suffered from a resuscitated Hellenic art and architecture that inopportunely escaped the guillotine, and from a resuscitated Hellenic parochial state that seemed to have an inexhaustible reserve of hydra-heads.¹

At the time of writing in the first century of a post-Modern Age of Western history, the Western Society's continuing failure to exorcize a demon that was as assiduous as it was insidious presented the most formidable of all the pending threats to the Western Civilization's future. Yet, even in this field of Politics, in which it had thus paid so heavy a penalty for having revived an Hellenic parochialism, the Western Society had at least been more fortunate than a sister Orthodox Christian Society in being saved by the successive collapses of the Carolingian and Otto-

¹ See VII. vii. 542-3.

nian resuscitations of an Hellenic universal state from the incubus which had been imposed on the Orthodox Christian Society at the dawn of its history by the disastrous efficacy of Leo Syrus's resuscitation of this oecumenical Hellenic political spectre. A similar comparison between the fortunes of two other sister societies likewise indicated that the Japanese offshoot of a Buddhistic Far Eastern Society had been more fortunate than the main body of the same society in China in being saved by the collapse of a pseudo-T'ang régime in Yamato from the doom which the disastrous efficacy of the T'ang régime itself had eventually brought upon China.

In this connexion we may also notice that even a quasi-immunity is rewarded by a modicum of beatitude. The partial successes of a Mahayanian Buddhist theology in foiling the renaissance of a Confucian Sinic philosophy in the Far East, and of a Syrian Dynasty's Christian legislation in foiling a Macedonian Dynasty's renaissance of a Justinianean Hellenic law in Orthodox Christendom, had, as we have seen, the auspicious effect of attenuating the untoward consequences of these two renaissances for the societies that had done their worst to evoke them.

The untowardness of precocity is likewise illustrated by synoptic views that have already come under our eyes.

For example, in the field of Language and Literature, where the negative or positive value of a renaissance of dead classics can be measured by the blight or stimulus of its influence on the creation of a literature in living vernacular languages, we can see that the effective renaissance of Hellenism in a Greek Orthodox Christendom as early as the ninth century of the Christian Era, less than two hundred years after the emergence of an infant Orthodox Christian Civilization out of a post-Hellenic interregnum, was far more noxious than the effective renaissance of the same Hellenism in the fifteenth century in a Western World which had enjoyed a six hundred years longer immunity from the haunting presence of this Hellenic ghost, thanks to a Carolingian renaissance's fortunate failure. We can also see that, when a Modern Greek people conjured up a ghost of the Attic Greek language at the very moment of its entry as a proselyte into a Western Society's gates, the chimaera of a 'purist' Greek language (*ἡ καθαρεύουσα*), with which it saddled itself in the act, was a still more grievous incubus than an Anna Comnena's Attic *κοινή* or even than a Nicholas Khalkokondhýlis' pseudo-Herodotean Ionic.

In the field of Religion, where the negative or positive value of a renaissance can be measured by its influence in hindering or helping the Soul in its perennial struggle with the sin of Idolatry, we can see that an effective renaissance of a Judaic Aniconism in a Greek Orthodox Christendom as early as the eighth century of the Christian Era partially cured an infant Orthodox Christian Church of image-worship at the cost of committing an Orthodox Christian Society to the likewise idolatrous worship of a ghost of an Hellenic universal state, whereas the renaissance of the same Judaic Aniconism in Western Christendom some eight hundred years later wholly cured a Protestant Western Church of image-worship—though this at the cost of helping to commit

a Modern Western World to the idolatrous worship of a ghost of an Hellenic parochial state.

In the field of political ideas and institutions we can see that the fortunate successive Western fiascos of a Carolingian resuscitation of the Hellenic universal state which collapsed in the ninth century, and of an Ottonian resuscitation of it which collapsed in the thirteenth century, gave the Western Christian Civilization at any rate a longer lease of life than was enjoyed by an Orthodox Christendom which had succumbed to the suicidal sin of state-worship in the eighth century when it had deified the East Roman Empire. The similarly suicidal self-commitment of the Western World to a state-worship in which the idol was a parochial one and in which the idolatry was polytheistic had not captivated the Western World as a whole until the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when this brand of idolatry, with which the Italians had marked their foreheads¹ as early as the eleventh century of the Christian Era, was painstakingly reproduced by all the other peoples of a *ci-devant* Christian Western World.

If we now go on to ask ourselves why the most prudent counsels for any living soul that is playing with the Black Art should be—as History shows them to be—‘That thou doest, do slowly [*sic*]² and ‘Better late, best never’, we may find an answer to our question in the principle ‘One man’s meat is another man’s poison’ which our foregoing study of encounters between contemporaries³ has brought to light; for this ‘law’ is also operative in encounters in which the parties are a necromancer and a ghost.

In an encounter of any kind, an invasion of the life of one of the *dramatis personae* by some element in the life of another of them which has been torn out of its original context and has been introduced in isolation into an alien social milieu can, indeed, hardly fail to be a highly disturbing event in the history of the invaded party. The effect of a twelfth-century Western renaissance of Aristotelianism in suspending the creative activity of Western Christian thought has been noticed by a distinguished Modern Western student of the Medieval Western Mind;⁴ and the consequences of a renaissance may be still more baneful when its influence is stimulating than when it is repressive. Great, for example, as was the havoc wrought in Hellenic history by the Hellenes’ sin of idolizing their parochial states, the havoc was still greater⁵ when this particular form of Hellenic idolatry was resuscitated in a Western Christendom where the vein of Judaic fanaticism inherent in Christianity was lying in wait, ready to inspire an Hellenic parochial state-worship imported from the shadow-realm of Hades with a demonic intensity which it had never attained in even the deadliest of its pristine manifestations on its native heath in a heathen Hellenic World whose life it had brought to a premature bad end.

The extent, however, of the ravages which a renaissance will thus, in

¹ Rev. xiii. 16; xiv. 9; xix. 20; xx. 4.

² Cp. John xiii. 27.

³ See IX. viii. 530-42.

⁴ Taylor, H. O.: *The Mediaeval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 17.

⁵ See the passage on p. 194 of Guglielmo Ferrero’s *Peace and War*, English translation, London 1933, Macmillan, that has been quoted in VII. vii. 542-3.

the nature of the event, be apt to make in the psychic constitution of the necromancer will manifestly be apt to vary in accordance with the degree of the patient's powers of resistance at the time when he wantonly infects himself with the bacillus; and in the history of a healthily growing civilization, so long as the growth has not been cut short by a breakdown, we may presume that every further decade, generation, and century of growth will enhance the robustness of the growing body social's constitution and accordingly will, to that degree, increase its capacity for carrying Atlas' load without collapsing under the weight of the incubus, even if the patient's vitality, in the hour of crisis, does not prove lively enough to enable him to avoid falling into an Atlantean stance by responding to the challenge with an Antaeian rebound. The better the spiritual health of the victim of a renaissance at the time of his self-inflicted ordeal, the better his chance of metabolizing the uncanny treasure that he has wrested from the coffers of Hades, and, in metabolizing it, constraining it to serve his weal as an elixir instead of working his woe as a cancer. A subconscious awareness of these saving truths reveals itself in phenomena that have already come to our notice in the present Part of this Study. This is, in fact, the reason why divers elements in the culture of a dead antecedent civilization are apt to be resuscitated in a chronological order that is the inverse of their original sequence in the history of the civilization that has been their native milieu.¹ It is also the reason why a necromantically inclined society is apt to discriminate among the ghosts that are within range of its magician's wand by studiously ignoring shades whose psychic stature would dwarf the wizard's if he were so foolhardy as to reanimate them, while at the same time he may be eagerly courting other shades whose psychic stature is not thus unmanageably incommensurate with his own.²

(IV) THE STERILITY OF THE BLACK ART

Even, however, when a necromancer avoids or escapes the nemesis of being enslaved by a ghost that he has reanimated at his own expense by nurturing it with a transfusion of his own life-blood, the sterility to which even the least noxious achievements of the Black Art are condemned *ex officio originis* is exposed remorselessly when these are compared with the contemporary achievements of a necromantic society's native genius.

In the field of politics, for example, it is evident that, in the Medieval chapter of Western history, the master-institution was not an *Imperium Romanum Redivivum* but was a newly created Papal Roman *Respublica Christiana*,³ and that in Arabic Muslim history it was, not the Cairene ghost of an 'Abbasid Caliphate, but a novel self-recruiting Mamlūk corps, that endowed this society, in its infancy, with the strength to hold its own even against the world-conquering Mongols.⁴ In the modern chapter of Western history, again, the indigenous Western institution of parliamentary representative government eclipsed the resuscitated Hellenic

¹ See pp. 124-30, above.
² See IV. iv. 405.

² See pp. 130-7, above.
⁴ See IV. iv. 446-50.

institution of a demagogic Democracy that was apt—first in city-states in Italy after A.D. 1254 and then in a nation-state in France after A.D. 1789—to turn, as fast as milk turns in thundery weather, into the sour brew of a plebiscitary dictatorship. In the field of Law the genius of an Orthodox Christian Civilization revealed itself, not in a Macedonian Dynasty's revival of a dead Justinianean Hellenic law, but in an antecedent Syrian Dynasty's new creation of an East Roman law inspired by Christian principles. In the field of Philosophy, likewise, the genius of a Far Eastern Civilization revealed itself, not in the revival of a dead Confucianism, but in the foregoing new creation of indigenous Far Eastern philosophies inspired by Mahayanian Buddhist thought, while, in the intellectual history of a Medieval Western Christendom, the genius of Saint Thomas Aquinas revealed itself, in his *Summa Theologica*, not in the resuscitation of Aristotelian theses but in the construction of a system that was the Angelic Doctor's own.¹ In the field of Physical Science the Medieval Western Schoolmen's revival of the intellectually vicious Hellenic practice of arguing about the phenomena of Physical Nature *in vacuo*, as if Logic could do duty for verification, threatened to sterilize, and succeeded in retarding, the harvest that was to be garnered from the application of an experimental method of research in accordance with the Western Civilization's native bent.² In the field of Language and Literature the all but flawlessly Ciceronian Latinity of an Erasmus, who had taught himself to speak with the tongues of men and of angels, was become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal³ in a Modern Western house of many mansions⁴ that had been filled with a sound as of a rushing mighty wind⁵ by a vernacular poetry in a chorus of divers living Western languages, while, in a contemporary Far Eastern World, a creative art of the Drama and the Novel, conveyed in a living 'mandarin' *lingua franca*, had likewise eventually taken the light out of a pedantic reproduction of the style and themes of the Sinic classics. In the field of the Visual Arts an Orthodox Christian Civilization's miniature reminiscences in ivory of an Hellenic style of bas-relief carving in marble turn deathly pale, exquisite though they are, in the presence of mosaics glowing and vibrating with a veritable life engendered by the fruitful marriage of an indigenous Byzantine creativity with an indigenous Byzantine technique.

The last word on the comparative merits of the realm of Hades and the land of the living was spoken to Odysseus by the shade of Achilles:

'I would rather be a wretched peasant on the land, labouring as a serf with a poor portionless man for my master, than be sovereign lord of all the legions of the shades of the dead and departed.'⁶

¹ This point is made by Taylor, H. O.: *The Mediaeval Mind* (London 1911, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 18, and vol. ii, p. 437.

² See III. iii. 385-6.

³ 1 Cor. xiii. 1.

⁴ John xiv. 2.

⁵ Acts ii. 2.

⁶ *Od.*, Book XI, ll. 489-91.

XI

LAW AND FREEDOM IN HISTORY

A. THE PROBLEM

(I) THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

WHEN the writer was planning the present Study in the summer of A.D. 1927, he saw that he would have to grapple with the problem of the respective roles of Law and Freedom in human history before he could attempt to win a Pisgah sight of the prospects of the Western Civilization. Yet in the winter of A.D. 1928-9, when, with that ulterior objective in mind, he was drafting his notes for eventually writing the present Part, he was conscious that the fateful question then still seemed academic to most people in Western countries that had been either neutral or on the winning side in the World War of A.D. 1914-18. In the June of A.D. 1950, when, after a seven-years-long interruption extending over the years 1939-46, he at last reached this point in the writing of the book, he found himself working in a new atmosphere that was decidedly more congenial to his theme.

By the year A.D. 1950 the survivors of a generation of Westerners that had fought two fratricidal world wars in one lifetime had emerged from the second of these unprecedentedly destructive conflicts of a traditional military kind only to find itself engaged in a 'cold war' which was neither less arduous nor less critical for being less barbarous than a twice-played military overture in which the *encore* had surpassed the first performance; and these disillusioning and disquieting experiences had brought about, in most living Western souls, a revolutionary change of feeling and outlook. By this time, most Westerners had become aware that their own civilization was in danger of coming to grief; and reflection had then reminded them that this was, after all, no novel prospect in an historical arena in which most, if not all, other human societies of the same species had come to grief already. The living generation in the West was, in fact, beginning to look at the facts of History as these presented themselves to the naked eye, instead of continuing to peer at this formidable spectacle through smoked glasses inherited from its grandparents; and, in the light of luminous facts which they were at last allowing themselves to see, they were asking themselves questions that would have shocked their grandparents if these could ever have dreamed of formulating them.

The generation of *Homo Occidentalis* that had already been in its dotage in A.D. 1914 had been the latest generation to hold, with an unquestioning faith, a dogma which, by then, had been serving for a quarter of a millennium as the gist of a Late Modern Western Man's mechanically desiccated and peptonized religion. This fallaciously comfortable doctrine was that the Western Society could see ahead of it an unbroken vista of progress towards an Earthly Paradise, and that its

triumphant advance along this open avenue was inevitable, since the only 'law' binding upon a *Homo Sapiens* who was free to shape his own future in every other respect was 'a law of progress' rendering a wishful thinker's desires inevitable.

In A.D. 1950 the grandchildren of these Victorian Last of the Mohicans were asking themselves questions that had been formulated for Western inquirers on the morrow of the First World War by Oswald Spengler, a pontifical-minded man of genius thinking and writing in the psychological milieu of a country which had then just suffered what, by the still moderate standards of the day, had been a shattering military defeat. Some thirty years after the publication of the first edition of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* in A.D. 1919, a chorus of Western voices was echoing Spengler's prescient questionnaire. Are the great tribulations that we have suffered, and the greater tribulations that we forebode, the products of 'laws', beyond our control, that turn out to be no 'laws of progress'? If such unpleasant laws are, in truth, in operation, do these govern the whole of Human Life, or are there some provinces or planes of Life in which Man is his own master—free, within those limits, to find remedies, through his own action, for evils that are of his own making? If human affairs should prove to be thus under dual control, then what affairs are under our own control and what are governed by 'Law'? And, if we do find that Man's stable contains a loose-box, can we use this islet of freedom as a *ὅπου στῶμεν* from which—by virtue, wisdom, and work—we may perhaps succeed in enlarging the borders of the province under Man's control at the expense of the province under the dominion of 'Law'?

The German philosopher who led the way in putting these disturbing new questions into once complacently sluggish Western minds went on to give to all of them one comprehensive dogmatic answer of his own. The true law of Human Social Life, he laid down, was not a law of inevitable progress; it was a law of inevitable breakdown, disintegration, and dissolution—and this within a Time-span which was perhaps even more inflexibly uniform than the life-spans of living organisms. Happily, the adoption of Spengler's fateful questions did not commit his fellow Westerners to endorsing, in advance, the German hierophant's oracular response to his own shrewd inquiry; and, since in other contexts we have already exposed the fallacy of Spengler's confusion of societies with organisms¹ and the groundlessness of his belief in the omnipotence of the savage goddess Necessity,² we can regard the questions asked and answered by Spengler as being, *pace Spengleri*, still open.

(II) DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

In venturing, without prejudice, to seek a fresh answer of our own to the question whether human affairs are governed by laws, our first step must be to define what we mean by 'laws' and by 'human affairs'.

In the context of our present Study, 'human affairs' manifestly mean, not Medicine, but the Humanities; not the organic chemistry, biology,

¹ See III. iii. 219-23.

² See IV. iv. 7-39.

and physiology of the human body, but the affairs of human beings in that spiritual aspect of Humanity in which Man is a person with a consciousness and a will moving on the face of the waters¹ of a subconscious psychic abyss, and not in the physical aspect in which Man is a body whose chemical constituents can be analysed, weighed, measured, and priced at their current value in the market for material commodities. If, for our purposes in this Study, we define the term 'human affairs' in the spiritual sense, we can see that our field of human affairs articulates itself into four provinces occupied respectively by the Soul's diverse relations with God, with its own self, with a relatively small circle of other human beings with whom it is in direct personal communion, and with a relatively large circle of people with whom it is in indirect impersonal contact through the mechanism of institutions.² We shall be reconnoitring all four provinces in this Part of our Study.

In this same context, 'law' manifestly does not mean the man-made legislation which is, of course, the only authentic 'law' in the literal sense of the word, and which is also the only law with which we have a direct acquaintance in our immediate day-to-day human experience. The 'law' with which we are concerned in this Study resembles this familiar man-made institution in being a set of rules governing human affairs; but the differentia of this so-called 'law' is that it is not made by Man; and, in using the term with this transference of meaning, we are attributing the characteristics of a known human institution to the enigmatic working of a mysterious Universe. In resorting to this linguistic expedient of metaphor we are flagrantly guilty of Anthropomorphism; and, if we cannot—as indeed we cannot—reach our goal without taking this flight of the imagination, we must recognize that, in transporting a word from the social to the metaphysical sphere, we cannot help transporting the word's connotations together with the label to which these notions adhere. The inherent threat to the accuracy, as well as to the clarity, of our thought is as evident as it is unavoidable; and the most effective safeguard against it will be to remind ourselves, in advance, what these *a priori* connotations of the word 'law' are.

The most striking characteristic of man-made law is that it is intended to apply consistently in uniform circumstances in all human situations that are deemed to fall within the scope of whatever the particular law may be. By implication the law is intended to be imposed impartially, and to be enforced effectively, upon all and sundry who come within its ambit. Furthermore, the law is intended, not only to be consistently formulated and applied and to be impartially and effectively administered, but also to be, and to be recognized by all concerned as being, morally right. Since, however, Human Nature is lamentably imperfect in morals, intelligence, and practice alike, and since this all-pervasive imperfection is ubiquitously reflected in the unsatisfactoriness of Man's conduct of his human affairs, even the best law known to History is never quite just, never quite effectively or impartially administered, and never quite consistently applied or formulated.³ A perfectly consistent

¹ Gen. i. 2.

² See I. i. 45-5 and III. iii. 223-30.

³ There were on record notorious cases in which a community's will or power, or

formulation of the law is indeed inherently impossible, since the most acute and supple intellectual operations of the most consummate legal genius would be unequal to coping with the subtlety and complexity of the concrete human affairs with which a lawyer's abstractions have to deal.

This intractability of Life to Law accounts for the moral ambivalence which is an ineradicable trait of Law and an irrefutable testimony to the power of Original Sin. The impersonal objectivity that is the Law's acknowledged ideal had been mocked, in every actual law that had ever been enacted since the dawn of legislation, by the unmistakable reflection in it of some personal bias unjustly favouring one 'interest' by unjustly penalizing another. The perfect justice of a God who 'is no respecter of persons',¹ and 'who, without respect of persons, judgeth according to every man's work',² had never been exhibited by any human legislator. Even the least unscrupulous and most disinterested human legislation had always perceptibly reflected in some degree the play of current religious, economic, political, military, and other social forces. Yet, even if we could imagine the advent of an omnipotent human legislator who was at the same time perfect in every faculty of the Human Spirit, the disinterested impersonality that would be the glory of this imaginary paragon's legislation and dispensation of justice would be concurrently the scandal of his work, since a law that can never be sufficiently impersonal in the sense of ignoring the personal interests of the legislator, the judge, and the administrator can also never be sufficiently personal in the sense of allowing sufficiently for the personal circumstances of each and every human soul who is subject to this law and whose case is *sub judice*. The inherent, and consequently inescapable, dilemma of all human legislation and legal proceedings is that, in so far as the Law succeeds in being impersonal, it necessarily achieves this at the odious price of treating human souls—which are individual and unique—as if they were mass-produced, standardized non-human objects like coins or bricks or pounds of butter or sacks of coal, while, in so far as it succeeds in making allowances for personal circumstances, it necessarily achieves this at a risk of grievously departing from an impartiality that is of the essence of human justice.

This was the historical human social context from which the name and notion of 'law' had been transferred to a metaphysical context by a resort to the perilous yet unavoidable expedient of Anthropomorphism. At an earlier point in this Study³ we have noticed that the social milieu in which this flight of the human imagination is apt to be made is the experience of a disintegrating society that has won a reprieve for itself by a political union within the framework of a universal state; and we have observed that, in these social circumstances, the idea of law is apt, in

both, to administer the law impartially and effectively had lagged far behind its will or power, or both, to formulate and apply the law consistently. One instance was the state of the municipal law of the Icelanders in the tenth century of the Christian Era; another was the state of the international law of the sovereign states of the Western Society in the twentieth century of the same era. The sequel in Iceland (see II. ii. 357, n. 2) suggests that an anarchy of this repulsively sophisticated type is apt to bring itself to a speedy end by inviting the intervention of some masterful alien hand.

¹ Acts x. 34.

² 1 Pet. i. 7.

³ In V. vi. 15-17.

the act of being translated from the social to the metaphysical plane, to become polarized into two apparently antithetical concepts. For minds in whose mental vision the personality of the human legislator, judge, and administrator looms larger than the law of which he is at once the master and the servant, the metaphysical 'law' governing the Universe is the law of a unique and omnipotent God pictured in the image of a human Caesar.¹ For other minds, in whose vision Caesar's figure is eclipsed by a human law that is impersonally formulated, applied, administered, and enforced—such as 'the Law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not',² that was the oecumenical law of the Achaemenian Empire—the metaphysical 'law' governing the Universe is the law of a uniform and inexorable Nature. In this diffracted vision, metaphysical 'law' in the guise of 'a Law of God' and metaphysical 'law' in the guise of 'laws of Nature' present between them the double-faced countenance of a Janus, and in either face there are—as in the human law of every-day life—both consoling and horrifying features.

The horrifying feature in 'the laws of Nature' is their inexorability; for, although, in theory, these 'laws' may be scheduled as being *de jure* mere 'by-laws' or 'secondary causes' subject to the fiat of a 'First Cause' that will then be identified with God, in practice they will be taken as being *de facto* autonomous. 'The laws of Nature', in fact, fulfil the Medes' and Persians' ideal of laws that cannot ever be repealed or ever even be revised in the light of experience.³ This inhuman quality of inexorability is horrifying indeed, yet its moral enormity carries with it an intellectual compensation; for laws in which there 'is no variableness, neither shadow of turning',⁴ will on that very account be ascertainable, both exactly and definitively, by a human intelligence; and, while no more than isolated fragments of these 'laws of Nature' may be thus ascertainable at any particular time and place by any particular human mind, their intrinsic stability and permanence render them accessible to a process of progressive exploration by a Collective Human Intellect.⁵ A knowledge of Nature thus appears to be within Man's mental grasp, and there is a sense in which this knowledge is power; for human beings who know Nature's unvarying laws and who can therefore predict with certainty which way she is going to jump will not only be able to dodge this inhuman monster's aimless blows; they will also be able to harness the energy generated, released, and expended in these undesigned operations, and so to turn this energy to account for serving human purposes (in so far, of course, as individual human wills can agree on what their common purposes shall be). And thus a Collective Human Intellect, which cannot divert the inexorable course of Nature by a hair's breadth, can nevertheless make a world of difference, for good or for evil, to the effect of the play of laws of Nature on human affairs by bringing into action technological devices that can effectively control, not the operation of these laws, but the incidence of their operation on Man's life.

¹ See V. vi. 33-36.

² Dan. vi. 8 and 12.

³ 'Biological progress exists as a fact of Nature external to Man' (Julian Huxley, in his 'Conclusion' to T. H. and J. Huxley: *Evolution and Ethics, 1893-1943* (London 1947, Pilot Press), p. 182).

⁴ Jas. i. 17.

⁵ See pp. 697 and 701, below.

All the same, the limits within which even the most ingenious human technology can outmanœuvre a railbound Nature are narrowly circumscribed.

'Canst thou draw out Leviathan with an hook? Or his tongue with a cord which thou lettest down? Canst thou put an hook into his nose? Or bore his jaw through with a thorn? Will he make many supplications unto thee? Will he speak soft words unto thee? Will he make a covenant with thee? Wilt thou take him for a servant for ever? Wilt thou play with him as with a bird? Or wilt thou bind him for thy maidens? Shall the companions make a banquet of him? Shall they part him among the merchants?'¹

The Stellar Universe, which was the first field in which any exact and systematic discovery of 'laws of Nature' was ever made by the Collective Intellect of Man in Process of Civilization, had not yet been made amenable to technological manipulation at the time of writing; and a Late Modern Western Man's world-conquering intelligence had liberated him from the astrologer's mistaken belief that human affairs were at the mercy of malignant influences emanating from the inexorable courses of the stars, only to convince him of a truth that convicted him of sin. The successive discoveries of a 'know-how' for navigating the air and splitting the atom in a society that had not yet rid itself of the institution of War had made it manifest to a technologically triumphant generation that the malignity of Leviathan 'is not in our stars but in ourselves'.²

A human soul that has been convicted of sin, and been convinced that it cannot achieve its own reformation without the help of God's grace, will opt, like David, to fall into the hand of the Lord and not into the hand of Man.³ An inexorability in punishing, as well as in exposing, Man's sin, which is the Last Judgement of 'the laws of Nature', can be overcome only by accepting the jurisdiction of a 'Law of God'. The price of this transfer of spiritual allegiance is a forfeiture of that exact and definitive intellectual knowledge, with its attendant technological power, which is the material prize and the spiritual burden of human souls that are content to be Nature's masters at the cost of being her slaves. 'It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God';⁴ for, if God is a spirit,⁵ His dealings with human spirits will be unpredictable and inscrutable, as the acts of any personality always are for any other personality that has to meet its kind in an encounter. In appealing to the Law of God, a human soul has to abandon certainty in order to embrace Hope and Fear; for a law that is the expression of a will is animated by a spiritual freedom which is the very antithesis of the *saeva necessitas* of laws of Nature, and an arbitrary law may be inspired either by redemptive Love or by vindictive Hate, may be administered either by making a winning appeal or by exerting an overbearing compulsion, and may be designed to promote either good or evil. In casting itself upon the Law of God, a human soul is apt to find in this what it brings to it; for in the mirror of God's perfection it will see a reflection of itself, and hence Man's notions of the Law of God have run to irreconcilable extremes of

¹ Job. xli. 1-6.

³ 2 Sam. xxiv. 14.

² Shakspeare: *Julius Caesar*, Act I, scene ii.

⁴ Hebrews x. 31.

⁵ John iv. 24.

diversity, in which a *visio beatifica* of God the Father wars with a *visio malefica* of God the Tyrant. This conflict of incompatible visions will exercise us throughout this Part. At the present stage we have merely to take note of the indisputable truth that both visions alike are consonant with the image of God as a personality pictured in the anthropomorphic guise beyond which the human imagination seems to be impotent to penetrate even in its farthest flights of intuition.

(III) THE ANTINOMIANISM OF LATE MODERN WESTERN HISTORIANS

(a) THE REPUDIATION OF THE BELIEF IN A 'LAW OF GOD' BY LATE MODERN WESTERN MINDS

The idea of a 'Law of God' had been wrought out by the travail of the souls¹ of Israelite and Iranian prophets in intuitive responses to the challenges of Babylonian and Syriac history, while the classical expositions of the concept of 'laws of Nature' had been blue-printed by philosophic observers of the disintegration of an Indic and an Hellenic World. Yet, though these might be the illustrations of the two possible schools of metaphysics that would occur most readily to a twentieth-century Western mind, we have already observed² that one or other of the two concepts had been embraced in some form by the children of almost all civilizations that had met with the experiences of breakdown and disintegration.

Moreover, both concepts can be entertained by the same mind at the same time without any prohibitive inconsistency; for, even if they were incompatible in the theoretical sense of being logically irreducible to unity,³ this would not *ipso facto* make them incompatible in the practical sense of its being inconceivable that these two kinds of Law should be in force simultaneously side by side. We can, indeed, conceive of them as being co-regnant, not only without conflict, but in positive co-operation

¹ Isa. xliii. 11.

² In V. vi. 15-49.

³ Actually, the gulf between the repetitive recurrent regularity of 'a law of Nature' and the purposively, and therefore non-repetitively, persistent regularity of the Law of God appears to be unbridgeable only so long as we forget that, in thinking of the phenomena in which 'a law of Nature' manifests itself, the thinking human mind itself is a party to the situation.

There is a sense in which the mind's faculty of memory—reinforced and amplified in its range by the social technique of making and preserving records—converts every repetitive cyclic movement into a unique one-way movement (i.e. a movement of the same character, in this respect, as the movement manifested in the Law of God). When the repetitions of the phenomena are not unrealistically abstracted from their subjective setting, it is manifest that Repetition No. $x+1$ differs from Repetition No. x not merely quantitatively but also qualitatively, because the apprehension of it carries with it a memory of x previous instances, whereas the apprehension of No. x carries with it a memory of $x-1$ instances only.

'Let us take the most stable of all internal states: the visual perception of an exterior object at rest. It is in vain that the object remains the same, and that I look at it from the same side, from the same angle, in the same light: the vision that I have of it differs, none the less, from the vision that I had of it just now—if only because it has aged by the quantum of one instant. My memory is there, and my memory injects something from this past into this present. My mental state, as it advances along the track of Time, is constantly swelling its bulk with the duration that it is amassing; it is making, so to speak, a snowball of itself' (Bergson, H.: *L'Évolution Créatrice*, 24th ed. (Paris 1921, Alcan), p. 2).

with one another, in virtue of the very diversity between the two notions of regularity which they respectively embody. 'The Law of God' reveals the regularity of a single constant aim pursued unwaveringly, in the face of all obstacles and in response to all challenges, by the intelligence and will of a personality. 'Laws of Nature' display the regularity of a recurrent movement—for instance, the motion of a wheel revolving any number of times round its axis. If we could imagine a wheel coming into existence without owing its creation to a wheelwright, and then revolving *ad infinitum* without ever serving any purpose, these 'repetitions' would indeed seem 'vain';¹ and this was the pessimistic conclusion drawn by Indic and Hellenic philosophers from a *Weltanschauung* in which, by a *tour de force* of intellectual abstraction, they had set 'the sorrowful wheel of existence' turning 'for ever *in vacuo*'. In real life, of course, we find no wheels without wheelwrights, and no wheelwrights without drivers who commission these artificers to build wheels and fit them to carts in order that the wheels' repetitive revolutions may recur, not in vain, but for the practical and practicable purpose of conveying a cart towards the driver's intended goal. 'Laws of Nature' make sense when they are pictured as being the wheels that God has fitted to His own chariot;² and a truth that is true of the orbits of the stars in courses laid down for them by an act of God's power is no less manifestly true of recurrent spiritual responses to the challenges of God's love, such as a human soul's experience of sin, fall, penitence, and grace, or a human society's experience of breakdown, disintegration, and illumination by the spark of creativity that announces the epiphany of a higher religion.³

In fact, the apparent incompatibility between the two kinds of regularity is merely a mirage in the shadow-world of abstract logic; in real life they are not only compatible with one another but are inseparably complementary in a divinely inspired interplay in which, at divers levels of Reality, cyclic movements according to laws of Nature are successively transcended in experiences and endeavours that, in turn, are subject to cyclic movements at a higher level from which, in turn, still higher experiences and endeavours spring. The astronomical day-cycle and year-cycle are transcended in the cumulative experience and endeavour of a human being's life-time. A life-time is subject to the biological generation-cycle, and this in turn is transcended in the cumulative experience and endeavour of a human society in process of civilization. A civilization is subject to a menacing possibility (though not to an inexorably predetermined doom) of breaking down and disintegrating, and the breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations in turn are transcended in the cumulative spiritual progress of Religion through learning by suffering. This cumulative progress of Religion—which is the spiritually highest kind of experience and endeavour within the range of Man on Earth—is a progress in the provision for Man, in his passage through This World, of means of illumination and grace for helping the pilgrim, while still engaged on his earthly pilgrimage, to attain a closer communion with God and to become less unlike Him.⁴

¹ Matt. vi. 7.

³ See I. i. 57 and VII. vii. 551-5.

² See IV. iv. 34-38.

⁴ See VII. vii. 563-4.

If our two concepts of the character of metaphysical 'law' can thus both be held simultaneously by the same mind, and if at any rate one or other of them has actually been held by the children of most of the civilizations known to History, it is not surprising to find that the Western Christian Civilization was originally no exception to this rule. A belief that the whole life of the Universe was governed by 'the Law of God' was the *qiblah* of a Judaic *Weltanschauung* that was the common heritage of the Orthodox Christian, the Western Christian, the Arabic Muslim, and the Iranic Muslim societies; and a theocentric philosophy of history derived from the intuitions or inspirations of the Prophets of Israel and Judah and the Iranian Prophet Zarathustra was bequeathed to Western Christendom in Saint Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* and to the Arab Muslim World in Ibn Khaldūn's *Prolegomena* to his *History of the Berbers*—two works of spiritual genius which unmistakably reflect one single common outlook and whose mutual affinity can only be accounted for by their indebtedness to a common source, since Ibn Khaldūn was as ignorant of his Christian predecessor and fellow Maghribī's theodicy as Augustine was of *Muqaddamāt* that did not see the light till more than nine hundred years after the Christian North African Father's death.

The Augustinian version of a Judaic view of history was taken for granted by Western Christian thinkers throughout the first millennium (circa A.D. 675–1675) of the Western Civilization's life and was reformulated—to incorporate the additions made to Western knowledge since the fifteenth century of the Christian Era by an Italian renaissance of Hellenism and an Iberian conquest of the Ocean—in a *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* published in A.D. 1681 by Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (*vivebat* A.D. 1627–1704). The Eagle of Meaux's majestic variation on a traditional Judaic theme was, however, the last serious Western performance of this spiritual masterpiece; for, while Bossuet was in the act of writing his classic discourse, a spiritual revolution was taking place around him in his world. Within the brief span of the last few decades of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, a Western World that was exorcizing a stalking ghost of Hellenism¹ was at the same time liquidating its own ancestral Judaic *Weltanschauung*.

This Late Modern Western act of apostasy has an explanation which is also an excuse. The Western exponents of the view that History was governed by a 'Law of God' had 'given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme'² by allowing themselves to fall into an anthropomorphic misconstruction and misrepresentation of the Prophets' and Evangelists' insight into the relation established between God and Man by God. The heart of the Judaic discovery—or revelation—had been an intuition of the truth that, in virtue of a love, forbearance, and self-abnegation (κένωσις)³ that were the stigmata of God's divine creativity, God's service is Man's perfect freedom⁴ and God's Law is a perfect law of liberty;⁵ but this revelation had become blurred in human hearts and

¹ See pp. 62–73, above.

² 2 Sam. xii. 14.

³ Phil. ii. 7–8 (as translated in the Revised Version).

⁴ The Second Collect, for Peace, in the order for Morning Prayer in the Book of Common Prayer according to the Use of the Church of England.

⁵ Jas. i. 25 and ii. 12.

minds because the mystical experience of the relation between Man and God was not, and could not be, reproduced in the practical experience of any relation between Man and Man in an exclusively human social milieu. A coercive justice that vindicated an imperfect freedom by usurping a perfect freedom's place was the best that Man, following his own devices, had found himself able to make of the bad business of trying to hold together a society of sinners who showed themselves humanly ungodlike in standing upon their own rights and in envying their neighbours' prosperity even when it was inoffensive and legitimate; and the Prophets' God-given vision of God had only to falter and fade for the bleared eyes of the Prophets' children to misread 'the Law of God' by interpreting the word 'law' literally in terms of a familiar human law in which the Prophets had found their inadequate but indispensable human symbol for speaking of divine thoughts and ways that, being God's, were ineffable.¹

This travesty of a Christian intuition of 'the Law of God' has been accurately described and erroneously identified with the reality in the following summary account of it by a post-Modern Western historian-philosopher.

'Any history written on Christian principles will be of necessity universal, providential, apocalyptic, and periodized. . . . If challenged to explain how he knew that there was in History any objective plan at all, the mediaeval historian would have replied that he knew it by revelation; it was part of what Christ had revealed to Man concerning God. And this revelation not only gave the key to what God had done in the past; it showed us what God was going to do in the future. The Christian revelation thus gave us a view of the entire history of the World, from its creation in the past to its end in the future, as seen in the timeless and eternal vision of God. Thus mediaeval historiography looked forward to the end of History as something fore-ordained by God and through revelation foreknown to Man. It thus contained in itself an eschatology.'²

While we may challenge our historian-philosopher's claim to have expounded the theology of the Bible, we must concede that his picture is a trenchant *exposé* of the misconception entertained by Bossuet; for the guileless bishop of Meaux has furnished us with inculpatory evidence against himself.

'Ce long enchaînement des causes particulières qui font et défont les empires dépend des ordres secrets de la divine Providence. Dieu tient du plus haut des cieux les rênes de tous les royaumes; il a tous les cœurs en sa main: tantôt il retient les passions, tantôt il leur lâche la bride, et par là il remue tout le genre humain. . . . Dieu exerce par ce moyen ses redoutables jugements, selon les règles de sa justice toujours infaillible. C'est lui qui prépare les effets dans les causes les plus éloignées et qui frappe ces grands coups dont le contre-coup porte si loin.'³

In Bossuet's picture a Medieval Western Christian imaginary portrait

¹ Is. lv. 8.

² Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), pp. 49 and 54.

³ Bossuet, J.-B.: *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1700), Troisième Partie, chap. viii.

of God the Tyrant has been brought up to date by painting over the naïve original the more sophisticated lineaments of a Louis XIV; and our historian-philosopher has good ground for asserting that

'In Mediaeval thought the complete opposition between the objective purpose of God and the subjective purpose of Man, so conceived that God's purpose appears as the imposition of a certain objective plan upon History quite irrespective of Man's subjective purposes, leads inevitably to the idea that Man's purposes make no difference to the course of History, and that the only force which determines it is the Divine Nature.'

This reading of a distorted Medieval Western Christian *Weltanschauung* is borne out by a scrutiny of Early Modern Western reproductions of it.

Bossuet, for example, delivers himself into his critics' hands when he seeks to justify his picture of God's plan by placing this under a magnifying glass.

'Vous voyez un ordre constant dans tous les desseins de Dieu, et une marque visible de sa puissance dans la durée perpétuelle de son peuple. . .

'Plus vous vous accoutumerez à suivre les grandes choses et à les rappeler à leurs principes, plus vous serez en admiration de ces conseils de la Providence. Il importe que vous en preniez de bonne heure les idées, qui s'éclairciront tous les jours de plus en plus dans votre esprit, et que vous appreniez à rapporter les choses humaines aux ordres de cette sagesse éternelle dont elles dépendent. . .

'Trois choses devaient . . . concourir ensemble: l'envoi du Fils de Dieu, la réprobation des Juifs, et la vocation des Gentils. . . L'Église, victorieuse des siècles et des erreurs, ne pourra-t-elle pas vaincre dans nos esprits les pitoyables raisonnements qu'on lui oppose; et les promesses divines, que nous voyons tous les jours s'y accomplir, ne pourront-elles nous élever au-dessus des sens? Et qu'on ne nous dise pas que ces promesses demeurent encore en suspens, et que, comme elles s'étendent jusqu'à la fin du Monde, ce ne sera qu'à la fin du Monde que nous pourrions nous vanter d'en avoir vu l'accomplissement. Car, au contraire, ce qui s'est passé nous assure de l'avenir: tant d'anciennes prédictions si visiblement accomplies nous font voir qu'il n'y aura rien qui ne s'accomplisse, et que l'Église, contre qui l'enfer, selon la promesse du Fils de Dieu, ne peut jamais prévaloir, sera toujours subsistante jusqu'à la consommation des siècles, puisque Jésus-Christ, véritable en tout, n'a point donné d'autres bornes à sa durée. . .

'Si on ne découvre pas ici un dessein toujours soutenu et toujours suivi; si on n'y voit pas un même ordre des conseils de Dieu qui prépare dès l'origine du Monde ce qu'il achève à la fin des temps, et qui, sous divers états, mais avec une succession toujours constante, perpétue aux yeux de tout l'univers la sainte société où il veut être servi, on mérite de ne rien voir, et d'être livré à son propre endurcissement comme au plus juste et au plus rigoureux de tous les supplices.'

The Eagle of Meaux is able to carry off this travesty of the authentic Christian revelation on the wings of a magnificent style; but, when

¹ Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), p. 55. Cp. p. 48.

² Bossuet, J.-B.: *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1700), Seconde Partie, chap. xxx; Troisième Partie, chap. i; Seconde Partie, chaps xxix and xxx.

Bossuet's theme is handled by pedestrian representatives of the same Medieval school of Early Modern Western historical thought, the ridiculous bathos to which a sublime Biblical doctrine has been reduced becomes prosaically apparent.¹ Archbishop Ussher² (*vivebat* A.D. 1581–1656) makes the Medieval Western Christian *Weltanschauung* chronologically ludicrous when he mobilizes the heavy artillery of Early Modern Western scholarship to demonstrate that the date of the Creation was 4004 (*sic*, not 4000) B.C.,³ Old Style, at 6 p.m. on the evening before the 23 October;⁴ and Dr. Hartmann Schedel, the learned compiler of the Nuremberg Chronicle,⁵ makes it visually ludicrous when, between a preview of the Last Things that are to bring History to its meticulously predetermined end and the colophon of a record of already accomplished events, that he has carried down to the moment at which the manuscript was sent to the printer, he inserts three blank folios in order to give an industrious owner of the tome the necessary space, if he is willing to write on both sides of each sheet, for completing the record between the year 1493 of the Christian Era and God's fore-appointed 'D-Day' for the sounding of the Last Trump.⁶ When all due allowance has been made

¹ 'Du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas' (Napoleon to de Pratt, after the Grand Army's retreat from Moscow in A.D. 1812).

² See VI. vii. 299.

³ 'In hanc concessi sententiam: a vespere primum Mundi diem aperiente ad medium noctem primum Christianae aerae diem inchoantem, annos fluxisse 4003, dies 70, et horas temporarias 6, verumque Christi Domini natalem, quadriennio toto (quod mortis Herodis tempus demonstrat) vulgaris aerae Christianae principio anteriorem extitisse. Juxta rationes enim nostras, et Salomonici Templi structura 3000 Mundi anno est absoluta; et 4000 Mundi anno, impletis diebus quibus Virgo Θεοτόκος erat paritura, Christus in perfecta carne, cujus Templum fuerat typus, hominibus primum apparuit et manifestatus est. Unde ad annos aerae Christianae 4 additis, et ab annis ante eandem totidem detractis, pro communi et vulgata vera et certa obtinebitur Nativitatis Christi epocha' (Ussher, J.: *Annales Veteris Testamenti a Principii Mundi Origine Deducti* (London 1650, Fleisher), *Lectori*).

⁴

	Anno Periodi Juliani	Anno ante aeram Christianam
'In principio creavit Deus Coelum et Terram' [Genes. i, 2], quod temporis principium (juxta nostram Chronologiam) incidit in noctis illius initium quae xxiii diem Octobris praecessit, in anno Periodi Julianae 710. 'Primo igitur seculi die (Oct. 23, feriâ 1) cum supremo Coelo creavit Deus angelos,' etcetera.	710	4004

Ibid., p. r.

⁵ Schedel, Hartmann: *Liber Chronicarum* (Nuremberg, 12th July, 1493, Anton Koberger).

⁶ After bringing his narrative of the *Sexta Etas Mundi* down to the moment (ka'as Junias Anno ab incarnatione salvatoris xpi Millesimo quadringentesimo nonagesimo tercio) of going to press, Dr. Schedel addresses the reader as follows in his last paragraph on the reverse side of his folio cclviii:

'Cartas aliquas sine scriptura pro sexta etate deinceps relinquere convenit. indicio posteriori ꝛ. q̄ emēdare addere. atq; gesta principum ꝛ privatorum succedentium perscribere possunt. Non em̄ omnia possumus omnes. Et quando q̄ bonus dormitat homerus. In terra em̄ aurum queritur. ꝛ de fluviorum alveis splendens profertur gloria. pactolus q̄ ditior est ceno q̄ fluente. Varii quoq; mirabiles q̄ motus in orbe in dies exoriuntur. Qui novos requirunt libros. quibus ordine referantur. Pauca tamen de ultima etate ut perfectum opus relinquatur in fine operis adjiciemus.'

The three immediately following folios, Nos. cclviii, cclx, and cclxi, are duly blank on both sides except for the page number at the head of the recto side of each of them; and these blank folios are followed in turn by an illustrated account of the *Septima etas mūdi*. This occupies folios cclxii to cclxvi inclusive, and consists of four and a half pages of

for the margin of elasticity which the use of the pen instead of the press would confer on an owner-chronicler by permitting him to contract or expand his hand-writing to fit the chronological length of the lacuna, whatever this might turn out to be,¹ Dr. Schedel can hardly be acquitted, even so, of having come impiously near to playing Providence in venturing to cast up the number of pages that would be required for completing the record of 'the times before appointed'² on the same scale as the already past and printed portion of the story. What would an earthly autocrat have said to one of his subjects who had thus presumed to indulge in public speculation on the timing of a future act of state when the intended date had been expressly docketed 'top secret'? And had not Christ rebuffed the importunate curiosity of the Apostles with the chastening words 'It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in His own power'?³

In presenting a travesty of the Christian revelation in such quaintly ridiculous caricatures as these, the Medieval-minded Early Modern Western historians were inviting decimation by a cross-fire from a Late Modern scientific dogmatism on the one flank and from a Late Modern agnostic scepticism on the other; and they are defenceless against the strictures with which their 'abstract and one-sided theocentric view' has been castigated by a post-Modern Western historian-philosopher. The Medieval historians 'fell', according to this harsh but not unmerited verdict, 'into the error of thinking that they could forecast the future', and, 'in their anxiety to detect the general plan of History, and their belief that this plan was God's and not Man's, they tended to look for the essence of History outside History itself, by looking away from Man's actions in order to detect the plan of God.'

'Consequently the actual detail of human actions became for them

narrative *De Antichristo*, *De morte ac fine rerum*, and *De extremo iudicio ac fine mundi*; a commentary in Latin verse on a half-page woodcut of the Dance of Death; and two full-page woodcuts: one of the epiphany of Antichrist and the other of the Last Judgement.

The awe-inspiring effect of this *finale* is somewhat diminished by the addition of the supplement, occupying folios cclxvii to ccc inclusive, that is advertised in the last sentence of the last paragraph on folio cclviii, quoted above; but it is plain that the learned doctor could not restrain himself from providing this unseasonable receptacle for a windfall of information about Poland and for a map of Europe.

The writer of this Study had come across a copy of Dr. Schedel's *magnum opus* at Blellach House, Dinnet, Aberdeenshire, in July 1908, and the blank folio pages had made an indelible impression on his memory; but, being then still at an unmethodical age, he had neglected to take a note of what the book containing these blank pages had been. He identified the work as the Nuremberg Chronicle on the 23rd June, 1952, when he was allowed, by the courtesy of the keepers of the New York Public Library's rare books, to inspect the second of the copies in the Library's possession.

¹ 'Sometimes a copy comes to light in which an owner did accept the challenge. Usually written in sixteenth-century hands, they record all-but-forgotten wars which were bitterly important, no doubt, to the people who wrote them. The carelessness of later binders who could not read the text and saw no point to including blank leaves in a volume, or who had, perhaps, a desire for a few sheets of fine, old, handsome paper, has cost many a copy of the Chronicle its famed three blank leaves. But in perfect copies they still remain, their white, unblemished surfaces questioning a future which has already extended nearly half a millennium beyond the time when Hartmann Schedel arranged to put them there for the accommodation of his readers' (Shaffer, Ellen: *The Nuremberg Chronicle* (Los Angeles 1950, Plantin Press, for Dawson Book Shop, Los Angeles), pp. 31-32).

² Acts xvii. 26.

³ Acts i. 7.

relatively unimportant, and they neglected that prime duty of the historian, a willingness to bestow infinite pains on discovering what actually happened. This is why mediaeval historiography is so weak in critical method. That weakness was not an accident. It did not depend on the limitation of the sources and materials at the disposal of scholars. It depended on a limitation, not of what they could do, but of what they wanted to do. They did not want an accurate and scientific study of the actual facts of History; what they wanted was an accurate and scientific study of the divine attributes, a theology . . . which should enable them to determine *a priori* what must have happened and what must be going to happen in the historical process.

'The consequence of this is that, when Mediaeval historiography is looked at from the point of view of a merely scholarly historian, the kind of historian who cares for nothing except accuracy in facts, it seems not only unsatisfactory but deliberately and repulsively wrong-headed; and the nineteenth-century [Western] historians, who did in general take a merely scholarly view of the nature of History, regarded it with extreme lack of sympathy.'¹

This hostility towards a Medieval Western *Weltanschauung* was not peculiar to a generation of latter-day Western historians whose complacent agnosticism facilely reflected the pleasant tranquillity of the places in which the lines had happened to be fallen unto them;² at a higher temperature it also animated both their epigoni and their predecessors. A twentieth-century generation of Mankind, that was tasting the extremely unpleasant experience of being driven from pillar to post by the whips of human dictators bent on putting their subjects through four-years' and five-years' plans, would have revolted, as from a chastisement of scorpions,³ against any seriously intended suggestion that a six-thousand-years' plan was being imposed on them by a dictatorial Deity. The grotesque precision with which the term of this alleged sentence of penal servitude on Mankind had been dated by the pedantry of an archbishop, who had constituted himself the self-appointed clerk of God's court, would have been the last straw on a twentieth-century camel's back if this human beast of burden had any longer taken Ussher's calculations seriously. A seventeenth-century Western Man who had had to pay for his fidelity to a Medieval *Weltanschauung* by inflicting on himself the agony of the Wars of Religion could not afford either to dismiss Bossuet's thesis, in the biting twentieth-century manner, as a bad joke or to ignore it, in the conceited nineteenth-century manner, as the negligibly irrelevant error of a securely transcended ignorance. The seventeenth-century Western intellectual rebel was defiantly up in arms, and the unacceptable words of his mouth⁴ soared, instead of condescending, when he proclaimed his resolve

To wage by force or guile eternal war,
Irreconcilable to our grand foe,
Who now triumphs, and in th' excess of joy
Sole reigning holds the tyranny of Heaven.⁵

¹ Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), pp. 55-56.

² Ps. xvi. 6.

³ See 1 Kings xii. 1-16.

⁴ Ps. xix. 14.

⁵ Milton: *Paradise Lost*, Book I, ll. 121-4.

Like the Satan in whose indomitable perversity the spirit of Late Modern Western Man had been prefigured by Milton's foreboding genius, the heralds of a mundane *Aufklärung* opened their campaign by fastening upon hostages that their adversary had given to Fortune. A Bossuet who had consciously followed the lead of his Christian and Jewish masters, and had unconsciously kept in step with his Muslim contemporaries, in taking for his metaphysical pole star a 'Law of God' governing the whole Life of the Universe, had at the same time found a place in the divine economy of human affairs for 'laws of Nature' which, in Bossuet's belief, were enacted by God as by-laws and were administered by the same divine legislator and potentate to suit the exigencies of His own paramount plan. According to this view the normal cyclically recurrent regularity of these 'by-laws of Nature' could be, and duly was on occasion, interrupted by 'miraculous' acts of personal intervention not unlike those performed by the human driver of a wheeled vehicle when he puts on the brake in descending a hill or even temporarily unships the wheels from the body of the coach in order to negotiate its passage through a strait gate or over a precipitous portage.¹ The first of the new departures made by Bossuet's revolutionary-minded contemporaries was to deny that the wheels of the Universe were ever unshipped, or even braked, in this unceremoniously purposeful fashion. Without prejudice to the questions whether God existed and whether, if He were deemed to exist, He might or might not be deemed to have the same mastery over His Universe as a human coachman has over his coach, the intellectual heralds of a Late Modern Age of Western history declared with one voice that in fact there was no evidence of any deity exercising any such divine prerogative.

There was no essential difference in outlook between Late Modern Western 'deists', who took their cue from 'the Glorious Revolution' of A.D. 1688 in England and Scotland by allowing the deity still to reign on the understanding that he should no longer aspire to govern, and Late Modern Western atheists, who, taking their cue from subsequent political revolutions in North America and in France, professed to have dethroned and perhaps even decapitated a Capetian God as the necessary preface to a declaration of Nature's independence. In thus banishing God from the cosmic scene and, in the act, eliminating miracles, Late Modern Western deists and atheists joined forces to release 'the laws of Nature' from their ancient servitude to arbitrary divine checks and balances. Henceforward these 'laws of Nature' were to be free to be entirely inexorable and were consequently to be subject to becoming completely intelligible to the Collective Intellect of Man.

'Avec l'éclat du génie, Newton marque ce passage du transcendant au positif qu'un Pufendorf essayait d'opérer dans le droit, un Richard Simon

¹ 'Ce même Dieu qui a fait l'enchaînement de l'univers, et qui, tout-puissant par lui-même, a voulu, pour établir l'ordre, que les parties d'un si grand tout dépendissent les unes des autres, ce même Dieu a voulu aussi que le cours des choses humaines eût sa suite et ses proportions . . . et qu'à la réserve de certains coups extraordinaires où Dieu voulait que sa main parût toute seule, il n'est point arrivé de grand changement qui n'ait eu ses causes dans les siècles précédents.'—Bossuet, J.-B.: *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1700), Troisième Partie, chap. ii.

dans l'exégèse, un Locke dans la philosophie, un Shaftesbury dans la morale. Avec assurance, il écarte les craintes qu'on pouvait concevoir au sujet des excès d'une raison qui, pendant un temps, se concevait comme destructive. Il réalise l'union, si difficile qu'on pouvait la croire impossible, entre les exigences critiques et les faits d'expérience. L'homme repart à la conquête de l'univers.¹

(b) THE CONTEST BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ANTINOMIANISM FOR
THE POSSESSION OF AN INTELLECTUALLY DERELICT REALM
OF HUMAN AFFAIRS

The realm of Nature which a Late Modern Western Man thus claimed to call 'mine' embraced, in his acquisitive vision, the whole range of non-human phenomena, including the physical composition, structure, and working of the human body—which, in our own definitions of terms,² we have duly excluded from the domain of human affairs in adopting a usage in which the word 'human' has the connotation of meaning something spiritual. At this point, however, on his light-hearted aerial voyage, Late Modern Western Man dashed his foot against a stony paradox from which he could not be steered clear by the absent hands of evicted angels.³ The human priests of Reason, who had divested God of His divine privilege of arbitrary intervention in order to assert the counter-omnipotence of their own rival goddess, had no sooner subjected the formerly recalcitrant province of Non-Human Nature to Reason's rule than they made a second revolutionary new departure by paradoxically proclaiming another province which had hitherto been submissive to Reason's sway to be, after all, outside the bounds of her jurisdiction.

Late Modern Western minds that had risen in rebellion against the alleged arbitrariness of God now found Man usurping a prerogative that the Deity was deemed to have forfeited; for, if this was Reason's hour, it was also the power of Darkness.⁴ Even these ingeniously rational minds had not the wit to make the sovereignty of Nature effective in every nook and corner of a Universe throughout which they had now abrogated the sovereignty of God; and one of these newly created residual Alsatias which eighteenth-century Western philosophers ruefully found themselves compelled to abandon to the anarchy of Chaos and Ancient Night⁵ was the field of human history in the conventionally restricted sense of the history of those human societies that had been in process of civilization for the past few thousand years. In the vision bequeathed by Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah to Augustine, Ibn Khaldūn, and Bossuet, this episode of history had raised no insuperable moral or intellectual stumbling-block, since a faith that had been 'the evidence of things not seen'⁶ had not doubted that 'all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to His purpose';⁷ but the Late Modern Western philosophers had now swept off the altar of Destiny a living cloth⁸ woven on a divine pattern; and, in

¹ Hazard, P.: *La Crise de la Conscience Européenne (1680-1715)* (Paris 1935, Boivin), p. 328.

² See pp. 168-9, above.

³ Ps. xci. 11-12.

⁴ Luke xxii. 53.

⁵ Milton: *Paradise Lost*, Book II, l. 970.

⁶ Heb. xi. 1.

⁷ Rom. viii. 28.

⁸ See Goethe: *Faust*, I. 509, quoted in II. i. 204 and in V. vi. 324.

hastily setting themselves to cover a shockingly denuded surface with their own blue-print of 'the laws of Nature', they were disconcerted to find that this paper substitute could not be stretched, however mercilessly they might rack the scientific imagination, to extend over the particular field of events that concerned Man more than any other in virtue of its being the field in which Man's own life was at stake.

'In the eighteenth century, scientific inquiry concerned itself with what was "natural", to the exclusion of what was judged to be "unnatural", "monstrous", "accidental" and "unusual". . . . The humanists of the eighteenth century . . . assumed that the scientific study of change must have for its aim the determination of the "natural" or normal course of development of social groups, abstraction being made from the "accidental" interferences or hindrances occasioned by historical "events". . . . If we adopt this point of view . . . historical events will be conceived [of] merely as interferences with the "natural order". . . . What this mode of approach entailed was that the investigator should ignore, or rather eliminate from consideration, the intrusive influences which had interfered with the operations of the "natural order" in the course of Time. The point of view was thus arrived at which regarded historical "events" as unimportant and irrelevant for the purposes of scientific inquiry in the investigation of "progress" and of "evolution".'

The stand thus taken by eighteenth-century Western philosophers was a logical corollary of their metaphysical policy; for, when once they had placarded on the door of Nature's power-house the notice 'No admittance except on Nature's business', they had left themselves no excuse for putting up with interferences by Man in precincts where they had shut the door in the face of an interfering God. Logic constrained rational minds to give to 'historic events' the short shrift given by them to 'miracles'. Yet, logical though this eighteenth-century Western attitude might be, it was not on that account at all less quaint, and its nineteenth-century sequel was quaint; for the subsequent evolution of the film of a Late Modern Western *Weltanschauung* brought on to the screen the spectacle of nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Western historians still clinging, in the name of Science, to the eighteenth-century philosophers' tenet that History does not make sense.² The quaintness of this self-stultifying eighteenth-century-mindedness of latter-day Western historians³ lay in their apparently weather-proof imperviousness to the influences of a number of radical nineteenth-century and twentieth-

¹ Teggart, F. J.: *Theory of History* (New Haven, Conn. 1925, Yale University Press), pp. 84-87.

² The statement of this tenet had been reduced from five words to three in an epigram—'History is bunk'—that had been maliciously attributed to Mr. Henry Ford the First.

³ General statements, such as this and those that follow, about the tenets, views, and attitudes of Late Modern and post-Modern Western historians are, of course, merely descriptions of what, as the present writer saw it, was the *predominant* school of thought among them; and therefore these statements, even if they were found to be correct in the main, would never be more than approximately accurate in the sense of being all-embracing. In every generation in this age, it would be possible to point to distinguished individuals of whom these statements were not true. The purpose of the present part of this Study is to trace, analyse, and appraise the prevailing line of historical thought in a Late Modern and a post-Modern Western World, at the risk of perhaps doing some injustice to a perennially dissident minority.

century changes in the climate of thought in their own Western intellectual milieu.

The first of these changes was a revolutionary improvement in the intellectual status of the historians' own mental activity. In the eighteenth century the depreciation of History in theory for the metaphysical reasons expounded by the latter-day student of History whom we have just cited had been accompanied, as was to be expected, by a contempt for, and neglect of, the pursuit of History in practice; and the acclamation with which Gibbon's work of genius (*edebatur* A.D. 1776-88) was greeted by that great eighteenth-century historian's contemporaries was the exception that proved the eighteenth-century rule. Gibbon's contemporary fame and vogue were, however, also portents of an approaching avalanche into a new geological age; for, within twenty-five years of the publication of the last instalment of *The History of the Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire* in A.D. 1788, the valuation of History had begun to appreciate on the Western intellectual stock exchange, and thereafter the boom had been buoyed up progressively to ever higher levels until, at the time of writing mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, a school of post-Modern Western scientists, whose own prestige was then perhaps only just passing its zenith, had paid their tribute of sincere flattery to the still rising prestige of the history of human affairs by condescending to take observations of their non-human objects of study in an historical perspective.

The latter-day Western physical scientists who were thus courteously dipping their flag to latter-day Western historians of human affairs, as their ships glided past one another, were, however, at the same time slyly committing against their fellow mariners a series of acts of piracy on high seas that had been left lawless through having been released from the jurisdiction of God without having been brought within the three-mile limit of any human intellectual discipline's territorial waters.

Eighteenth-century metaphysical cartographers had partitioned the Universe on the one side into an orderly province of non-human affairs in which 'the laws of Nature' were believed to be in force, and which was therefore held to be accessible to progressive exploration by the cumulative enterprise of a Collective Human Intellect, and on the other side into a chaotic province of human history which was dogmatically declared to be intrinsically unchartable. This arbitrary division of the Apple of Life was as pretentious a gesture as the disreputable Early Modern Western Pope Alexander VI's pretension to divide the surface of one planet between the Borgia's Castilian fellow-countrymen and their Portuguese competitors; and the eighteenth-century metaphysical operation also suffered from two incurable flaws which had made Pope Alexander's cartographical bulls a dead letter. Like these, it was influenced by a human bias and, like these again, it failed to allow for the extent and configuration of still undiscovered seas and lands. The eighteenth-century Western partition of the Universe did not, in fact, account for all that therein is.¹ It did not cover the whole area of even the single province of human affairs. There were branches or aspects of

¹ Ps. cxlvi. 6.

human affairs that were left by this imperfect partition in a no-man's-land; and, in the course of a quarter of a millennium running from the date of Bossuet's death to the time of writing, stretches of this post-Bossuetan Western intellectual no-man's-land had been occupied, polder by polder, by predatory pioneers of a Late Modern Western Science and had been progressively annexed by these intellectual pirates to the domain of 'the laws of Nature'.

In embarking on these empire-building intellectual enterprises, these aggressive-minded Western civil engineers had found a base of operations long since prepared for them, and invitingly awaiting their installation, in one science of human affairs that had been inherited by these post-Christian scientists from Christian predecessors to whom this property had been bequeathed by Hellenic philosophers. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Western minds had continued, on the strength of an acquiescence in tradition which was as uncritical as it was unacknowledged, to believe that the conscious human mind was effectively governed by 'laws of thought'; Descartes himself had never dreamed of retreating from this venerably green polder on to the forbiddingly bleak metaphysical *terra firma* in its rear; and, since the Hellenes had remained unaware of their Indic contemporaries' discovery of the Subconscious, while the Franks did not begin to make their own independent discovery of this until they had been enlightened by shell-shock after their catastrophe in A.D. 1914, Science's Modern Western empire-builders in the domain of human affairs were able to benefit for more than two hundred years by a mental illusion which made the science of 'Logic' and 'the Theory of Knowledge' loom decidedly larger than Life.

From this antique base, between the opening of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era and the middle of the twentieth, Western *conquistadores* whose war-cry was the vindication of Nature's legitimate rights had already reclaimed and annexed at least four further polders from the Modern Western no-man's-land of human affairs without being challenged, or perhaps even observed, by contemporary Western historians. These newly staked-out sciences in the field of human affairs, which a Late Modern Western embodiment of the Collective Human Intellect had succeeded in adding to the orthodoxly ancient science of Logic, were Psychology, Anthropology, Political Economy, and Sociology.

In the field of Psychology—the youngest of these four new sciences of human affairs and, on a superficial view, also the least obviously open, among the four, to the charge of encroaching on the traditional domain of History—the post-Modern Western scientific mind was verifying by observation Pascal's intuition that 'the Heart has its reasons, of which the Reason has no knowledge'.¹ In the twentieth century of the Christian Era a post-Christian Western science of Psychology was beginning to explore the subconscious abyss of the Human Psyche and to discover 'laws of Nature', reigning there, which were not the laws of Logic but were laws of Poetry and Mythology.

¹ 'Le cœur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît point' (Pascal, B.: *Pensées*, No. 277, in the text as arranged by L. Brunschvicg). In Pascal's vocabulary, 'the Heart' includes 'intuition' as well as 'feeling'.

In the field of Anthropology, Western Science had begun, before the close of the eighteenth century,¹ to bring to light 'laws of Nature' governing the social, cultural, and spiritual life of surviving representatives of Primitive Man who were still lying torpid—after an arduous climb from a sub-human to a human level which it had taken their ancestors hundreds of thousands of years to accomplish—on a ledge from which Man in Process of Civilization had begun, within the last five to six thousand years, to make a number of attempts to climb the cliff-face above.²

The label 'Anthropology', that had been assigned to this science of human affairs in the Yin-state into which the primitive societies had latterly subsided, bore on its face the unintended yet psychologically none the less significant implication that Man could only vindicate his title to call himself human so long as he remained torpid, and that Man in Process of Civilization had divested himself of his humanity in the act of crying 'excelsior' and resuming Mankind's temporarily interrupted ascent. In reality, however, it was impracticable for the science of Anthropology to boycott the study of the civilizations, even if that had been its intention, since, long before the enterprise of Civilization had entered on its fifth or sixth millennium, the radiation of one or other of the historical civilizations that had come and gone by that time had penetrated, affected, and modified the social fabric and life of all primitive societies that had survived the impact of this formidable *parvenue* social force.³

As a consequence of these encounters with civilizations, to which the primitive societies had been exposed in the course of their latter-day sabbath rest, and through which an epilogue that was not of these primitives' own making or choosing had been added to the closed dynamic chapter of their history, it was impossible for latter-day Western anthropologists to lay hands on any pure specimens of the primitive species of human society that could be certified to be free from all social contamination by the radioactivity of some civilization or other; and the presence of this tincture of Civilization in all the primitive social fabric that was accessible to the anthropologists signified that, if the new science of Anthropology had really been successful—as, admittedly, it had been⁴—in discovering 'laws of Nature' governing the surviving semi-primitive or ex-primitive societies in the contaminated state in which these now presented themselves, a scientific method of ascertaining laws of human affairs that had thus justified itself empirically by proving to be valid in this field of ex-primitive culture would also be, to say the least, a promising line of scientific attack upon the study of societies of the species, known as civilizations, by which all the surviving primitive societies studied by the anthropologists had been contaminated in some degree. In a lull between two world wars, a pair of experienced students of surviving primitive societies had deliberately applied the technique of Anthropology to the study of contemporary life in a typical city in one

¹ The classical pioneer work in the literature of the science of Anthropology was Martin Dobritzhofer's (Dobrizhoffer's) *Historia de Abiponibus, Equestri Bellicosâque Paraquariae Natione* (Vienna 1784, de Kurzbeek, 3 vols.).

² See II. i. 192-5.

³ See II. i. 187.

⁴ See I. i. 179.

section of the North American province of a Western World;¹ but these anthropologists' dashing reconnaissance into the domain of the civilizations had been anticipated by two other expeditions organized by latter-day Western intellectual *conquistadores* who had never deigned to concern themselves with the conquest of primitive Caribs and Comanches, but had concentrated from the start, with the vaulting ambition of a Cortés or a Pizarro, on the conquest of the Mexicos and Perus.

The first of these scientific attacks on the life of Man in Process of Civilization had been made by what, at the time of writing, it had become fashionable to describe as a 'functional' approach. The eruption of Industrialism out of a social crater in Great Britain in the latter decades of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, and the wide-spread devastation inflicted by the cataclysmic lava-flow, had produced enormities of material power, social injustice, and spiritual suffering² that had caught a horrified Frankenstein's imagination and, in moving his feelings, had spurred his collective intellect to work on the problem of ascertaining what 'laws of Nature' these might be that had thus suddenly asserted their tyrannical rule over Late Modern Western affairs. It was true that, within the century and three-quarters that had elapsed, by the time of writing, since Adam Smith's publication of *The Wealth of Nations* in A.D. 1776, the new Western science of Political Economy had hardly begun to extend its horizon beyond the spatial limits of the Western World or the chronological limits of the industrial phase of the Western Civilization's history; and this was, of course, an almost derisorily small fragment of the total history, already running to five or six millennia, of a species of society of which the Western Civilization was merely one of more than twenty known specimens. The intellectual importance of this new Modern Western science of human affairs was not, however, to be measured by the narrowness of the range of the data that it had brought within its purview so far. In a Late Modern Western World the establishment of a science of Economics had been an intellectually revolutionary event because, on one plane of social³ activity, within the limits of one society in one chapter of its history, Political Economy had translated into an accomplished reality the eighteenth-century Western philosophers' dream of bringing to light the laws governing 'the natural order'⁴ in the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization.

Moreover, the 'classical' nineteenth-century Scottish and English political economists had not been content merely to report the discovery of 'laws of Nature' in their newly reclaimed polder; they had gone on to proclaim to an awe-struck British Israel that these commandments which they had adventurously brought down from the goddess Science's holy mount were 'iron laws' of an adamantine severity; and this timely psychological substitute for the terrors of Hell had been swallowed with

¹ See Lynd, Robert S. and Helen M.: *Middletown* (New York 1929, Harcourt Brace) and *Middletown in Transition* (New York 1937, Harcourt Brace).

² See IV. iv. 137-92.

³ In the eighteenth-century term 'Political Economy', the word 'political' had been employed to convey the meaning expressed by the word 'social' in twentieth-century Western usage.

⁴ See the passages quoted from Teggart's work on p. 183, above.

a ravenous credulity by an ex-Christian people that was suffering the discomfort of a spiritual vacuum as a consequence of the decay of its ancestral Christian religious beliefs. In the year 1952 of the Christian Era, few Western children were being kept awake at night by a fear of suddenly hearing the blast of the Last Trump, but many chronologically adult Western men and women were living in terror, night and day, of seeing 'the iron laws of Economics' inexorably ordain a catastrophic slump in which the wretched votaries of Free Enterprise would be carried off by the gleefully pouncing demons of Communism to suffer torments, predestined for the economically damned, against which there were no known means of insurance or moral rights of appeal.

After the invading Myrmidons of Science had thus triumphantly established an apparently impregnable strong-point, at the economic level, in the hitherto inviolately irrational domain of Civilization, it would have been surprising if they had not followed up this signal first success in a virgin field by breaking into a general advance at every level and all along the line. This ambitious attempt to assert the sovereignty of 'the laws of Nature' over the life of Man in Process of Civilization in all its aspects and all its dimensions had been initiated by the pioneers of a new human science that had been labelled 'Sociology', though the cause of intellectual clarity might have been served better if this department of the science of Man had been explicitly distinguished from the sociology of Primitive Man by being designated 'the Anthropology of Man in Process of Civilization'. The truth was that the two latter-day Western sciences which had come to be known by the conventional names 'Anthropology' and 'Sociology' were distinguishable from one another, not by any intrinsic difference between their respective methods and aims, but merely by a fortuitous difference between their respective objects of study. They were at one with one another in being endeavours to discover 'laws of Nature' governing Human Life.

This affinity between the sciences of Primitive Human Life and of Human Life in Process of Civilization had been tacitly but eloquently recognized in the practice of research and teaching, and this practical rapprochement between the two academic disciplines had gone so far by A.D. 1948 that in that year the opening sentences of a paper by a sociologist on 'the limitations of anthropological methods in Sociology'¹ could be conceived as follows:

'One of the more interesting of contemporary developments in the

¹ This discussion of 'the Limitations of Anthropological Methods in Sociology' by Robert Bierstedt, with a comment on Bierstedt's paper by Clyde Kluckhohn, will be found in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. liv, No. 1, July 1948 (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), pp. 22-30. Bierstedt's thesis is summarized as follows in his own abstract of it:

'Profound differences between primitive and civilised societies restrict the efficacy of anthropological methods when applied to the latter. Among the more important of these differences are the following: (1) civilised societies are literate; (2) they have histories; (3) they are susceptible to comprehensive causal analysis in historical terms; (4) their cultural diversity and variety are incomparably great; (5) their relations with other societies are constant and pervasive in both Time and Space. Anthropological methods in general are designed to answer questions whose sociological significance is limited when the subject of inquiry is a civilised society.'

The present writer's comment on Bierstedt's thesis would be: (1) the antithesis

social sciences is the increasingly intimate relationship between Sociology and Anthropology. The influence of anthropological methods, concepts, and even theories has become so powerful in recent years that for many purposes and in many areas of investigation the two sciences have become indistinguishable. In a number of academic departments the personnel is the same; and, in the universities where separate departments are maintained, research and teaching in Social Anthropology and Sociology are characterised by ever closer cooperation.'

It might be added that, in all Western universities mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, officially established chairs of Logic, Psychology, Anthropology, Political Economy, and Sociology were to be seen 'parked' side by side with no less officially established chairs of History, without any apparent recognition of the academically awkward fact that, if the intellectual creeds of either the professors of History on the one side or the professors of the sciences of human affairs on the other side were to be taken at all seriously by the academic authorities, a decent regard for intellectual integrity would constrain them to rase from the parquet of their aula either one or the other of these two rows of professorial cathedrae. In other periods of Western history than an intellectually anarchic Late Modern and post-Modern Age, Western opinion would indeed have revolted against an intellectual inconsistency and a moral laxity of this cynical enormity; for the intellectual creeds respectively professed by the historians and by the mental and social scientists were irreconcilably contradictory; and, if either creed were ever to be canonized as a sacrosanct orthodoxy, the contrary creed would have to be anathematized in the same breath as a damnable heresy.

'literate' versus 'non-literate' is not a valid differentia between societies in process of civilization and primitive societies: we have at least one instance of a non-literate civilization, i.e. the Andean Society; (2) and (3) the 'historylessness' of primitive societies is not a valid differentia either, for they must have had a lively history once upon a time, though the record of this had been lost and though the surviving primitive societies had become static by the time when the civilizations made their first impacts on them (see the present Study, I. i. 179-80 and II. i. 192-5); (4) the cultural diversity and variety of the civilizations is not incomparably, but only comparatively, greater than that of the primitive societies; (5) the surviving primitive societies had *ex hypothesi* had relations with those civilizations that had made the records of the histories of their encounters with them, and these relations had actually been constant and pervasive in both Time and Space since an early date in the histories of the civilizations of the first generation.

In short, the likenesses between the two sciences of Sociology and Anthropology seemed to the present writer to cut deeper than the differences. On the other hand, in the present Study, in I. i. 148, 455, and 458-61, we have come across what looks like a pertinent point of difference that is not discussed in Bierstedt's paper, and that is the difference in the respective numbers of the specimens of the two species of human society that happened to be at the disposal of Western scientists in the twentieth century of the Christian Era. The sociologists had at their command perhaps no more than twenty-one specimens of their object of investigation, whereas the anthropologists had more than six hundred specimens of theirs. This numerical point of difference was not a difference between the respective methods and aims of the two sciences, and was not a difference, either, between the intrinsic natures of the two species of society that the two sciences were respectively investigating. It was a difference in the extent of the respective current facilities for studying the two species of society scientifically. In practice, this difference was assuredly an important one—even in a generation in which Archaeology had at last brought the civilizations just within the range of scientific investigation by raising the number of specimens to the still meagre figure of twenty-one.

In truth the two schools of latter-day Western scholars held quite incompatible views about the methods and aims that were necessary for intellectual salvation in the study of the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization during the last five or six thousand years; and, since in the twentieth-century phase of their long and hitherto inconclusive controversy the word 'scientific', like the word 'democratic', was a fig-leaf which no Western *savant* could discard without falling foul of a cultural watch committee, the ideological argument between Western scientists and Western historians had to be conducted, like the argument between Russian Communists and Western Old Believers, in the form of a dispute about the meaning to be attached to a word whose sacrosanctity neither party dared impugn. In the political forum the word 'democratic' meant in Russian parlance 'egalitarian' at the expense of liberty, while in Western parlance it meant 'libertarian' at the expense of equality. Neither usage ventured to discard completely either of the two explosive ideas—Equality and Liberty—which the word 'democratic' held together at high tension, but the difference in relative emphasis was a difference of degree that went so far as to be tantamount to a difference of kind for practical purposes. The no less blessed word 'scientific', which was the football in the intellectual arena, likewise held together two ideas—the idea of ascertaining the facts of Nature and the idea of inferring the laws of Nature from an unprejudiced, accurate, and exhaustive study of the facts—and here the difference of doctrine was uncompromisingly sharp.

In this twentieth-century Western intellectual disputation, the writer of this Study was aware that he himself was a combatant and not a neutral spectator; and therefore, in order to neutralize as far as possible the effect of any personal bias that might have influenced his own convictions on the subject, he preferred to refrain from attempting to expound in his own words the doctrinal point at issue, and to lay before his readers, instead, a pair of expositions—the one more favourable and the other less favourable to the thesis which was orthodox for contemporary Western historians—from the pens of two contemporary Western scholars, one of whom was an historian as well as a philosopher, while the other was an historian who had made a special study of the history of Western science.

The philosopher-champion of the historians' thesis sums up and gives judgement as follows:

'Every natural science, said the Positivists, began by ascertaining facts and then went on to discover their causal connexions. Accepting this assertion, Comte proposed that there should be a new science called Sociology, which was to begin by discovering the facts about Human Life (this being the work of the historians) and then go on to discover the causal connexions between these facts. The sociologist would thus be a kind of super-historian, raising History to the rank of a science by thinking scientifically about the same facts about which the historian thought only empirically. . . . The claims of Comtian Sociology were quietly set aside by the abler and more conscientious historians, who came to regard it as sufficient for them to discover and state the facts themselves: in the famous

words of Ranke, *wie es eigentlich gewesen*.¹ History as the knowledge of individual facts was gradually detaching itself as an autonomous study from Science as the knowledge of general laws.²

The contemporary historian-critic of the historians' thesis presents an identical picture in a different light:

'In historical science, and particularly in the upper regions of the study, a . . . policy of abstraction has become customary. Historians, limited by the kind of apparatus they use and the concrete evidence on which they must rely, restrict their realm to what we might almost call the mechanism of historical processes: the tangible factors involved in an episode, the displacements produced in human affairs by an observed event or a specific influence, even the kind of movements that can be recorded in statistics.'³

The difference, brought out in this pair of passages, between the twentieth-century Western historians' and the contemporary Western scientists' respective usages of the word 'scientific' is driven home by our historian-philosopher in the following hammer-strokes with which he batters the devoted heads of 'positivistic historians . . . who have conceived the true or highest task of History as the discovery of causal laws connecting certain constant types of historical phenomena':

'Perversions of History on these lines all share one characteristic in common, namely a distinction between two kinds of History: empirical history which merely discharges the humble office of ascertaining the facts, and philosophical or scientific history, which has the nobler task of discovering the laws connecting the facts. . . .'

At this point the philosopher-historian deals the unphilosophic historians a blow in the face with his left fist, and the scientists a blow in the face with his right:

'There is no such thing as empirical history, for the facts are not empirically present to the historian's mind: They are past events, to be apprehended not empirically but by a process of inference according to rational principles from data given or rather discovered in the light of these principles; and there is no such thing as the supposed further stage of philosophical or scientific history which discovers their causes or laws or in general explains them, because an historical fact, once genuinely ascertained, grasped by the historian's re-enactment of the agent's thought in his own mind, is already explained. For the historian there is no difference between discovering what happened and discovering why it happened.'⁴

It will be seen that this philosopher-historian's exposition of the twentieth-century Western historians' creed comes near to asserting that

¹ *Geschichten der Romanischen und Germanischen Völker*, preface to the 1st ed. (Leopold Ranke's *Werke*, vol. xxxiii-xxxiv, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1874, Duncker and Humblot), p. vii).—A.J.T.

² Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), pp. 128 and 130-1.

³ Butterfield, Herbert: *Christianity and History* (London 1949, Bell), p. 19. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the author and the publishers.

⁴ Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), pp. 176-7. Cp. pp. 263-6.

the genius of History lies, not simply in 'not trying', but actually in 'trying not', to make sense of historical facts. Ignoring the consensus of sociologists, economists, psychologists, epistemologists, and logicians, whose scientific activities all alike presupposed the feasibility of studying scientifically the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization, as well as those of a *Homo Sapiens Pristinus* who was the anthropologists' target, most twentieth-century Western historians were in truth still maintaining that anyone who might venture to profess any such science of Man in Process of Civilization would be at best a heretic and at worst a charlatan.

For an interested spectator of this contest, it might be a delicate operation to declare which of the two parties was in the right, but it was not a difficult forecast to foretell which of the two, rightly or wrongly, would be approved as orthodox, and which condemned as heretical, if the case were ever to be brought before the bar of an oecumenical council of the Western Republic of Letters by some controversialist who had the courage of his convictions. It could be predicted with confidence that in that event the anathema would fall upon the historians, for it was manifest that the main line of Western thought was represented, not by them, but by the believers in the possibility of a scientific study of the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization in the sense of an attempt, in this province of Reality as in others, to discover 'laws of Nature' by inference from ascertained facts.

The fundamental faith of Western Man had always been a belief that the Universe was subject to Law and was not given over to Chaos, and a deist or atheist Late Modern Western Man's version of this Western faith was (as we have seen) that the Law of the Universe was a system of 'laws of Nature' which were accessible to progressive investigation, discovery, and formulation by a Collective Human Intellect. Grand discoveries of hitherto latent 'laws of Nature' had been the essential triumphs of a Late Modern Western Civilization's intellectual heroes: Galileo, Newton, Lavoisier, Buffon, Lamarck, Cuvier,¹ Darwin, Einstein—to cite eight of the more famous names. Who would presume to draw a line beyond which these intellectual *conquistadores* must not extend their operations, or, in other words, presume to confine the jurisdiction of 'the laws of Nature' within some conventional limit? A proclamation that one province of the Universe—and this the metropolitan province occupied by Man in Process of Civilization—had been reserved once for all, by some undesignated higher authority, as a sanctuary for Chaos which was to be for ever immune from the jurisdiction of all law, natural or divine, would be odious treason and horrible blasphemy in the judgement of all scientifically *bien pensants* twentieth-century minds; and, if

¹ Any reader of Herbert Butterfield's *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London 1949, Bell) will observe that, in the notices of the work of these first six heroes on pp. 61, 125, 186, 203, 207, and 208-9, there is a common feature which in every case is the hero's essential feat. In every case his life-work is the vindication of the reign of 'laws of Nature' in provinces of Reality in which the evidences of Nature's jurisdiction had hitherto been invisible to Mankind's mental vision. While some of these six men of scientific genius did also distinguish themselves by ascertaining or verifying facts, they were famous, not for this, but for 'the discovery of causal laws, connecting certain constant types of . . . phenomena', which, in the province of historical phenomena, was, as we have seen, an illegitimate activity in the eyes of twentieth-century Western historians.

ever the antinomian historians were to be 'put on the spot', an explicit public confession of their shocking atavistic eighteenth-century belief that the life of Man in Process of Civilization was 'a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing',¹ would inevitably provoke a conviction on the charge of heresy and a sentence to whatever punishment might await a convicted heretic in a post-Modern Western World in which the Late Modern Western virtue of tolerance had fallen back several degrees below an eighteenth-century standard of 'politeness'.

It could be predicted with no less confidence that, if, in our imaginary oecumenical council, some trick of oratory or freak of fortune were to win a majority of the votes for the antinomian historians, the sociologists on whom the tables would then be turned would be no less rightly combustible heretics according to the verdict of an historian-inquisitor. Indeed, if the historians had not yet asked for trouble by taking the offensive against the social scientists and denouncing them on the very charge of heresy that was hanging over the historians' own heads, this tactful tolerance of theirs seemed to be the genial product of an infinite capacity, not for holding their own passions in check, but for ignoring their aggressive adversaries' existence. Mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, most Western historians seemed still to be contriving to turn as blind an eye to the social scientists' successive trespasses on the historians' pointedly placarded preserve as a Neville Chamberlain had turned in A.D. 1938 to the Third Reich's successive aggressions in the Western World's political arena. In an era of appeasement the historians were allowing the economists to rob the Antinomian World of an Austria, and the sociologists to rob it of a Czechoslovakia, from under the Antinomians' very eyes, without betraying, by even the flicker of an eyelid, any consciousness of these impudent depredations that were being committed at the historians' expense.

One day in the winter of A.D. 1949-50, when the writer of this Study, with the present chapter in mind, was meditating in his native city of London on this strange comedy that was being played within his sight on a contemporary human stage, his legs carried him to the brink of the Round Pond in Kensington Gardens to enjoy a spectacle of which he had never grown tired since the abnormally severe weather in the early months of the year A.D. 1894 had taught the sea-gulls bred in the provinces and abroad to spend their winters in the London parks as the uninvited but pampered guests of the human inhabitants of the metropolis. While he was listening, on this particular afternoon, to the familiar screaming of the excited gulls, as they wheeled and dived, like fighter planes, and jostled with one another to catch in the air the morsels of bread that their human benefactors were, as usual, tossing to them, his eye was caught by the comically 'know-nothing' air of the domesticated ducks, officially domiciled in the Royal Parks and Gardens, who were placidly riding on the water just below the scene of the gulls' frantic aerial manœuvres. 'Too proud to fight',² these lawful denizens of the

¹ Shakspeare: *Macbeth*, Act. V, scene v.

² 'There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight' (President Woodrow Wilson at Philadelphia on the 10th May, 1915).

pond were saving their face by pretending not to notice how aggressively the boisterous trespassers were behaving. Even when one of the rare crusts that fell into the water without having been intercepted by a gull's beak in its short aerial trajectory was snatched from right under the beak of a lazily floating duck by one of the swooping screeching marauders, the insulted duck, as it bobbed up and down on the wavelets that the gull's swoop had rudely raised, betrayed no sign of awareness that any irregularity was being committed. When the writer heard his wife's voice asking him, in a tone of amused surprise, why he had suddenly burst out laughing, he realized that this comic encounter between ducks and gulls on the Round Pond in Kensington Gardens had moved him to mirth by presenting itself to his imagination as an animated allegory of a drolly similar encounter between historians and social scientists.

(c) THE UNCONSCIOUS CREDULITY OF PROFESSED AGNOSTICS

Did those historians who, duck-like, ignored the gull-like scientists' predatory descents on the historians' preserve live up, in real life, to their own antinomial interpretation of the sacred word 'scientific'? The answers to this question would appear to be that they did not translate their profession of faith into practice and that they failed because the ideal which they had set themselves was impracticable *a priori*; but, in finding the answers to one question, we shall have confronted ourselves with another; and that is the deeper question why a majority of this particular generation of historians in this particular social milieu should ever have taken their antinomial stand at all.

An ironic feature of the latter-day Western historians' failure to honour their own antinomial principles was their unawareness that they were refuting their professions by their practice.

'The men of a given generation are generally unaware of the degree to which they envisage their contemporary history within an assumed framework, ranging events into certain shapes or running them into certain moulds which are sometimes adopted almost as in a day-dream. They may be sublimely unconscious of the way their minds are constricted by their routine formulation of the story; and only when the World is different, and there emerges a new generation not locked from birth in the accepted framework, does the narrowness of that framework become apparent to everybody. . . . It is a mistake for writers of history and other teachers to imagine that if they are not Christian they are refraining from committing themselves, or working without any doctrine at all, discussing History without any presuppositions. Amongst historians, as in other fields, the blindest of all the blind are those who are unable to examine their own presuppositions, and blithely imagine therefore that they do not possess any.'¹

This tragi-comic figure of the prisoner who pronounces himself free because he is unconscious of his chains has crossed our path once already. In an earlier context we have quoted a profession of unbelief

¹ Butterfield, Herbert: *Christianity and History* (London 1949, Bell), pp. 140 and 46.

which its distinguished author manifestly felt to be an effective declaration of intellectual independence:

'One intellectual excitement has . . . been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in History a plot, a rhythm, a pre-determined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave; only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalisations; only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognise in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.'¹

This declaration had become a *locus classicus* within seventeen years of the date of its publication;² yet, before it was published, it had already been put out of court by its author's choice of his title for the book in which this prefatory passage was intended to strike the key-note. An historian who had thus publicly declared his allegiance to the dogma that 'Life is just one damned thing after another' might have been expected to give his work some such conformably non-committal title as 'A History of Some Emergencies in Some Human Affairs'; but, in calling it, as he did, 'A History of Europe', he was recanting in his title his own denial in his preface that he had 'discerned in History a plot, a rhythm, a pre-determined pattern'; for the portmanteau word³ 'Europe' is a whole *Corpus Juris Naturae* in itself.

In writing into his title this one word 'Europe', the historian was compromising himself inextricably by subscribing implicitly to at least thirty-nine articles of a submerged Western *religio historici*.

Article One of this traditional Act of Faith is an endorsement of a glaring pattern of cultural geography in which the *Oikoumenê* is dismembered, by a Procrustean operation, into fragments labelled 'Europe' and the rest of 'the continents'.⁴ Article Two is an act of homage to an egocentric illusion which was shared by the children of a Western Society with the children of all other societies known to History, and which had misled them all into the identical, and therefore in every case incongruous, assumption that each society's own culture was 'Civilization' with a capital 'C'.⁵ Article Three is the detection of a plot in which the emergencies that follow 'upon one another as wave follows upon

¹ Fisher, H. A. L.: *A History of Europe* (London 1935, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. vii, quoted in the present Study, V. v. 414.

² The brilliance with which, in this passage, the *Weltanschauung* of an antinomian school of Late Modern Western historians is propounded by a master of the art of History, and the force of the impression made on the minds of contemporaries by so challenging an exposition of a sharply controversial thesis by an eminent authority, were the considerations that moved the present writer at this point in his argument to illustrate his theme by citing an historian of an older generation for whom he felt an abiding professional respect and personal regard. Herbert Fisher's kindness to him as a young man had been one of the happy circumstances in his life, and one of the milestones in his education had been *Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany*. His *History of Europe* was a masterpiece in the practice of the delicate art of . . .

³ 'You see, it's like a portmanteau—there are two meanings packed up into one word' (Humpty Dumpty in *Alice Through the Looking Glass*, by Lewis Carroll).

⁴ A critique of this traditional pattern of cultural geography will be found in IX. viii. 708–29. For the purposes of the present argument, it makes no difference whether this pattern is, or is not, a reflection of historical realities.

⁵ This egocentric illusion had been examined in I. i. 157–64.

wave' wash up the historian's own culture, country, and clan on to a pinnacle on which History finds its denouement and its consummation.¹ Article Four is a no longer avowed, yet none the less patently implied, ascription of this plot of Human Destiny to a divine playwright and stage-manager who, by a sovereign act of predetermination, has selected the historian's tribe to be God's own Chosen People. Article Five is the Christian doctrine that God's choice has been transferred from Israel to the Christian Church. Article Six is the Medieval Western Christian dogma that the truly orthodox Christian Church is not the canonically Orthodox Church but the Western (notwithstanding any play that a Photius may make with the *filiouque*). Article Seven is the Late Modern Western postulate that the mantle of a Medieval Western Christendom has fallen upon the shoulders of an ex-Christian Modern Western Society by the divine oversight of a God who has now ceased to govern and perhaps even ceased to reign. Article Eight is the equation of this de-consecrated shadow of a defunct Western Christendom with the imaginary cultural continent already labelled 'Europe'. Article Nine is a parrot cry that was being refuted by fresh strokes of the anthropologist's pencil and the orientalist's pen and the archaeologist's spade as often as it was being repeated by the tongues of Western historians. Its burden was that 'Europe' was distinguished alike from an 'Unchanging East'² and from primitive 'peoples that have no history'³ by being History's only possible subject; and it will be seen that this slogan was an assertion that the only possible history was the history of Europe because European affairs alone had a rhythm.

A citation of the remaining thirty articles of religion that still lie packed in an expanding Pandora's Box labelled 'Europe' might tax the reader's patience without being strictly necessary for clinching the present argument. On the strength of Articles I-IX, as these have been recited above, we may perhaps take it as having been already demonstrated that an historian's professed inability to discern in History any plot, rhythm, or predetermined pattern is no evidence that blind Samson has actually won his boasted freedom from the bondage of 'laws of Nature'. The presumption is, indeed, the opposite; for, when bonds are imperceptible to the wearer of them, they are likely to prove more difficult to shake off than when they betray their presence and reveal something of their shape and texture by clanking and galling.

It is, no doubt, also true that, even when a thinker is salutarily aware of an intellectual pattern in his mind, this awareness is not in itself any guarantee that he will be able to get rid even of the particular pattern that is obsessing him, not to speak of his finding himself able to dispense with intellectual pattern-making altogether. Yet, short of that, Man's consciousness is likely to prove itself Man's guardian angel in this pass as in others; for, in so far as he manages to bring one of these patterns within

¹ This misconception of the process of growth as being a movement in a straight line culminating in the historian's own time and place has been examined in I. i. 168-71.

² The catchword of 'the Unchanging East' has been dissected in this Study in I. i. 164-8.

³ The grounds for rejecting this opprobrious label as a misnomer have been examined in I. i. 179-80.

the focus of consciousness, he is winning for himself at least a chance of managing to discern whether this image in his mind is a reflection of Reality or a baseless hallucination; and, even if he finds that he cannot think at all except on the lines of some pattern or other, he will at any rate have an opportunity, in the light of consciousness, of sorting his intellectual stock, comparing one pattern with another, discarding the patterns that seem to him counterfeit, and retaining those that seem to him true copies of 'laws of Nature'. By contrast, when a thinker can boast that, whether wilfully or by act of God (in an insurance company's usage of that phrase), he is unconscious of any plot, rhythm, or pattern in his panorama of the Universe, he is telling us in effect that he is at the mercy of whatever pattern, rhythm, or plot may be in invisible occupation of his professedly empty, swept, and garnished¹ mental house. This occupying pattern may be so archaic, infantile, crude, and far-fetched that, if the occupied mind ever could or would look its masked master-ideology in the face, it would be horrified to see itself in bondage to an ape, child, Caliban, or Chimaera.² Yet, so long as this master is able to rule the blind soul by an invisible *acte de présence*, just so long will the soul—like 'a horseman borne afar, who never sees the horse beneath his thigh'³—remain impotent either to exchange this unworthy pattern for a better or to redeem it by refining it in the crucibles of reflection and self-criticism.

The figure of the typical antinomian latter-day Western historian, caught fast in bondage to an invisible pattern whose dominion over him was secure just because he believed himself to be proof against ever entertaining any such idea, was, of course, a living witness to a relativity of historical thought that was the looking-glass through which we forced our entry into the vista of our present Study.⁴ This captive mammoth was a unique twentieth-century relic of a now old-fashioned-looking Western intellectual fauna which, save for this single surviving representative, had become extinct because its *habitus* had been too nicely adapted by the goddess Natural Selection to the temporary exigencies of an eighteenth-century Western intellectual environment. The eighteenth-century dogma, still cherished by so many twentieth-century Western historians, that no sense was to be made of human affairs, had been gradually whittled away, as we have seen, by the progressive encroachments of Science during the intervening quarter of a millennium. Yet Science's overt conquests at the expense of a would-be antinomian school of historians were not so damaging to this school's thesis as its own subconscious thralldom to mental patterns that displayed the tell-tale imprint of a particular time and place.

This relativity of an unacknowledged pattern of thought, which was so conspicuous, and so crippling, an infirmity of eighteenth-century-

¹ Matt. xii. 44; Luke xi. 25.

² 'The danger of subconscious and primitive theorising should not require further argument. Our choice is not between theory and no theory but between workmanlike theory and theory that is not workmanlike' (Schumpeter, J. A.: *Business Cycles* (New York 1939, McGraw-Hill, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 32, n. 1).

³ Jalāl-ad-Dīn Rūmī: *Mathnawī*, Book I, ll. 1109 seqq., translated by Nicholson, R. A., in *Rūmī, Poet and Mystic* (London 1950, Allen & Unwin), p. 106.

⁴ See I. i. 1-16.

minded twentieth-century historians had been adroitly turned to account by a spirited historian-philosopher in an attempt to vindicate the historians' antediluvian Antinomianism by casting discredit on their *bête noire* in the shape of 'laws of Nature' in the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization.

'So-called sciences of the Human Mind, whether total or partial (I refer to such studies as those on the Theory of Knowledge, of Morals, of Politics, of Economics, and so forth). . . are designed as accounts of one unchanging subject-matter, the Mind of Man as it always has been and always will be. . . .

'This assumption is present . . . in Montesquieu, but it also lies at the back of all the philosophical work of the eighteenth century, not to mention earlier periods. The Cartesian innate ideas are the ways of thinking which are natural to the Human Mind as such, everywhere and always. The Lockian human understanding is something assumed to be everywhere the same, though imperfectly developed in children, idiots, and savages. The Kantian mind which, as Intuition, is the source of Space and Time, as Understanding the source of the Categories, and as Reason the source of the ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality, is a purely human mind, but Kant unquestioningly assumes it to be the only kind of human mind that exists or ever has existed. Even so sceptical a thinker as Hume accepts this assumption. . . . Hume never shows the slightest suspicion that the Human Nature [which] he is analysing in his philosophical work is the nature of a Western European in the early eighteenth century, and that the very same enterprise, if undertaken at a widely different time or place, might have yielded widely different results. He always assumes that *our* reasoning faculty, *our* tastes and sentiments, and so forth, are something perfectly uniform and invariable, underlying and conditioning all historical changes. . . .

'A positive science of Mind will, no doubt, be able to establish uniformities and recurrences, but it can have no guarantee that the laws [which] it establishes will hold good beyond the historical period from which its facts are drawn. Such a science (as we have lately been taught with regard to what is called Classical Economics) can do no more than describe in a general way certain characteristics of the historical age in which it is constructed. If it tries to overcome this limitation by drawing on a wider field, relying on Ancient History, Modern Anthropology, and so on, for a larger basis of facts, it will still never be more than a generalised description of certain phases in Human History. It will never be a non-historical Science of Mind. . . .

'Little acquaintance with [so-called sciences of the Human Mind] is demanded in order to see that they are nothing of the sort, but only inventories of the wealth achieved by the Human Mind at a certain stage in its history. The *Republic* of Plato is an account, not of the unchanging ideal of political life, but of the Greek ideal as Plato received it and re-interpreted it. The *Ethics* of Aristotle describes, not an eternal morality, but the morality of the Greek gentleman. Hobbes's *Leviathan* expounds the political ideas of seventeenth-century absolutism in their English form. Kant's ethical theory expresses the moral convictions of German pietism; his *Critique of Pure Reason* analyses the conceptions and principles of Newtonian science in their relation to the philosophical problems of the day.'¹

¹ Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), pp. 229, 82-83, 223-4, 229.

All this is both true and well said, and we may observe in parenthesis that it is as pertinent a critique of the work of professedly antinomian historians as it is of attempts to discern 'laws of Nature' governing human affairs. A Chinese antinomian confrère and contemporary of the Western antinomian historian Herbert Fisher would have labelled his book, not 'A History of Europe', but 'A History of the Middle Kingdom'.¹ Yet a diversity of inscriptions on title-pages, which would thus illustrate the relativity of antinomian historians' outlooks to their own social milieux, would also testify, in the same breath, to the uniformity of antinomian historians' delusions about the workings of their own minds; for these two diverse titles are, both alike, specifications of patterns in the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization, and, in thus committing himself on his title-page to a pattern, whatever the pattern may be, either historian will have 'escaped his own notice' (to enlist an Ancient Greek turn of phrase) in making a public recantation of his boasted inability to discern in History any pattern, rhythm, or plot. Nor could our Chinese or Western historian-sceptic succeed in salvaging his scepticism by describing his work expressly as being 'A History without a Pattern'; for, supposing that this vaunted 'patternlessness' could be genuinely conceived of and that the idea could then be successfully put into execution, the result could be nothing but just one pattern the more. In this light we can see that Collingwood's act of sceptical faith in taking the shimmer of relativity in the foreground of historical thought² at its face value cannot be the last word; and indeed every sceptic who has the honesty to be thoroughgoing brings his negations tumbling to the ground by sawing clean through the branch on which the sceptic-sawyer is perching.

Overrunning the combative philosopher's échelon of advanced positions in the successive zones of Economics, Politics, and Morals without lingering, at this stage, to mop them up, let us now press our counter-offensive home into the zone of the Theory of Knowledge, which is Scepticism's last ditch where it will decisively stand or fall; and, in conducting this operation, let us take a leaf out of the tactical note-book of a nameless genius who, according to an amusing legend, once initiated his mates into the secret of how to win 'hands down' in a contest over some long since forgotten issue between the employees on the Italian State Railways and the Ministry of Communications at Rome.

When the leaders of the aggrieved *ferrovii* were nervously debating whether they should take the risk of depleting their trade-union funds, and perhaps even falling foul of the law, by instructing their followers to strike work, one ingenious mind suggested an alternative course of action that would be certain to bring the railwaymen's adversaries to their knees without putting the workers in the wrong or even costing them a penny. 'Instead of going on strike', he suggested, 'let us simply carry out the official regulations'; and this elegant solution of the railwaymen's problem had only to be propounded in order to be accepted, *nemine contradicente*, as the unquestionably advantageous line

¹ See the rescript, cited in I. i. 161, which was addressed in A.D. 1793 by the Oecumenical Emperor Ch'ien Lung to the parochial princeling *in partibus barbaricis*, George III of Britain.

² See I. i. 16.

of tactics to pursue. Its elegance lay in the fact—too familiar to have registered itself in any ordinary railwayman's consciousness—that the continued operation of the Italian State Railways was dependent on the continued observance of a tacit 'gentleman's agreement' between the employees and the authorities that the regulations officially in force were to be tactfully ignored. So, by simply carrying out their legal duties for once in a way, the railwaymen could instantaneously bring the traffic on the railways to a standstill without either forfeiting their pay or rendering themselves liable to prosecution. No sooner said than done. When the moment arrived for the morning express train to leave Milan for Rome, and the guard duly blew his whistle, the driver correctly waited to hear the same blast twice repeated at intervals of fifteen minutes; and, when the train then did get under way, the driver, correctly again, accommodated the train's speed to the walking-pace of a colleague who was likewise correctly carrying out the regulations by advancing, ten paces ahead of the buffers of the locomotive, waving a red flag held in his right hand to ensure the safety of the public while he was tapping the rails with a hammer held in his left hand to ensure the safety of the passengers. This sly 'cold war' could have only one outcome, and the end came quickly. On receipt of a telegraphic report from the station-master at Milan, the Ministry at Rome announced its unconditional surrender.

Translating the Italian railwaymen's tactics from an economic to an intellectual arena, let us now try the effect of taking Fisher's dictum 'There can be no generalizations'¹ *au pied de la lettre*. We can perhaps now still legitimately utter the word 'battle' in recording the battle of Megiddo (*commisum circa* 1468 B.C.); but, now that we are conscientiously abiding by the regulation that 'History never repeats itself', we must, of course, find some other word to describe what happened at Marathon, and some other again to describe what happened at Waterloo; and, when we have shot all the bolts in our most copious dictionary of synonyms (though, strictly speaking, we shall be guilty of 'not playing the game' if we stoop to any such verbal subterfuge), we shall find ourselves constrained to keep silence for ever after on the subject of the affairs of *Homo Belligerans*. We can also perhaps now still legitimately pronounce the words 'Pope John I'; yet all the known synonyms of that ilk—'pontiff', 'prelate', 'primate', 'hierophant', 'Grand Lama', 'Möbadh-ân Möbadh', and what-not—will hardly legitimize for us the twenty-two (or is it twenty-three?) repetitions that are obstinately demanded of us *sub rosa* by a History that officially declines to repeat itself. But our plight is perhaps more serious than we have yet realized, for, if 'History never repeats itself', one single 'John' is the only 'John' whom it is permissible for us to name; and, though we may dishonestly eke out this iron ration by buying 'Jack', 'Jean', 'Euan', 'Evan', 'Ivan', 'Johann', and 'Yohanan' in a philological black market, famine will still be lying in wait for us round the corner when we are left with no unappropriated homonym for affixing to the next man in the queue. But what are we saying? For Adam, now that we think of it, was a man, and, since 'His-

¹ See the passage quoted on p. 195, above.

tory does not repeat itself', our common father must have been the last man as well as the first, without prejudice to the question of how we are to refer to Adam's children. At this point speech and thought alike fail us. We have effectively inhibited ourselves from thinking or writing either about History or about anything else; and, if the philosopher-historian who has ruled out 'uniformities and recurrences' from the realm of Reality¹ wishes to be given quarter, he had better now make up his mind to capitulate with the promptness that, according to the legend, was once the only salvation of the Italian Ministry of Communications.

The truth which confounds an honestly consistent sceptic is that the Human Intellect is so constituted as to be intrinsically incapable of ever thinking about anything at all except in terms of uniformities, recurrences, regularities, laws, rhythms, plots, and patterns of other kinds, while, conversely, of course, none of these patterns is conceivable as being anything but an arrangement of facts.

'The theories with which Science works cannot be conceived as existing apart from the facts of human experience, and men can apprehend facts only in terms of the notions with which their minds are furnished. . . . In scientific work these two blends, knowledge of fact and theoretical conceptions, keep stimulating, extending, and enriching each other. An investigator who starts with what purports to be an exposition of theory is tacitly using the facts by which the ideas have been moulded; and one who starts with what purports to be an exposition of facts is tacitly using the theoretical conceptions by which facts have been apprehended.'²

Thus *Homo Sapiens* is confined *a priori* to a choice between two alternative conclusions, and these two only, when he is confronted with the ultimately inescapable necessity of making up his mind about the credentials of his own mental patterns. Either we must conclude that, in so far as we do apparently manage to think about something, the pattern that we register in performing any act of thought is a pattern that is genuinely present in Reality, or else we must conclude that the pattern registered in our minds is an illusion and that, in other words, our thoughts are not reflections of 'things' but are mental figments without counterparts in any reality distinguishable from our consciousness. In this dilemma a sceptic who has the courage of his convictions must either retire from the field or else change sides; and, when it comes to the point, he will find that, for a philosopher, desertion, not withdrawal, is the honourable course because it is the only logical one; for, in acknowledging that he is a sceptic, our adversary has proclaimed that he is a thinker and has committed himself in the act, by an involuntary re-affirmation of a celebrated proposition of Descartes', to a declaration of faith in the archetype-pattern, 'I am'.³

¹ Collingwood, in the passage quoted on p. 198, above.

² Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles: The Problem and its Setting* (New York 1927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 59, n. 2.

³ Exod. iii. 14; Exod. iii. 6 and 16; Matt. xxii. 32; Mark xii. 26-27; Luke xx. 37-38.

(d) THE GROUNDS OF THE LATE MODERN WESTERN HISTORIANS' AGNOSTICISM

The antinomian latter-day Western historians' dogma that the history of Man in Process of Civilization is an unintelligibly chaotic congeries of brute facts thus proves to be a heresy from the standpoint, not merely of Western science, but of Human Thought itself; and this spectacle of 'the laws of Nature' standing entrenched and embedded in the very structure of Man's intellect forces us to ask ourselves what can have possessed any—even antediluvian—breed of Man to make him nail these heretical colours to his mast. The antinomian historians' response to the challenge of a decisive change of intellectual climate in their cultural environment was not merely reactionary but truculent. So far from seeking to earn an erasure of the stigma with which they had been branded by eighteenth-century Western philosophers,¹ they retorted by telling the world that 'their glory' was 'in their shame'.² Their response to the challenge of outlawry was to proclaim themselves to be the Antinomians that they were. Constituting themselves the grand jury in their own case, they found that the charge indicting them of making nonsense of History was a true bill, and then, proceeding to constitute themselves, in turn, the jury, they acquitted themselves with a self-indulgent verdict of 'not guilty', on the plea that to be convicted of making nonsense was as good as to be warranted 'scientific'.

On this point our comparison of the historians with the ducks in the Round Pond will hardly help us out; for the ducks, as we have seen, were not truculent; they were supine; and, in proudly refraining from fighting with the vagrant gulls for the crusts that were tossed to the birds by the general public, the ducks were rationally discounting in advance a never yet disappointed expectation that the subsistence allowance, annually voted to them by a benevolent Parliament, would continue to be issued to them by a dutiful Ministry of Works. By contrast, the historians had no such comfortable assurance that, if they allowed the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization to be snatched from under their noses, morsel by morsel, by their predatory rivals the social scientists, any providence, human or divine, was going to dish out to them any alternative means of subsistence. Indeed, on any rational calculation the chances were that, on the contrary, the historians' policy of non-violent non-co-operation with the social scientists' depredations at their expense would result in leaving them destitute. Thus for the historians, unlike the ducks, the attitude of being 'too proud to fight' was a luxury that they could not afford; yet, nevertheless, they were indulging in it. Like the ducks, they were refusing to scramble for bread falling like manna from Heaven. They were declining to defend their own birthright by taking a leaf out of their rivals' book. What had prompted these latter-day Western historians to play this foolhardily dangerous game of challenging the validity of the ineluctable laws of thought by refusing to entertain the contemporary Western scientists' hypothesis that there were 'laws of Nature' governing the history of Man in Process of Civilization? They

¹ See Teggart, in the passages quoted on p. 183, above.

² Phil. iii. 19.

would hardly thus have followed the Pharisees' forbidding example of passing sentence of ostracism on themselves¹ if they, in their turn, had not been moved by Pharisaically compulsive motives. Can we account for the idiosyncrasy of these antinomian historians by laying bare its intellectual grounds?

One argument that was sometimes propounded by latter-day Western historians to prove the impracticability of applying to human affairs those methods by which non-human affairs had been successfully brought under the jurisdiction of laws of Nature was to point out that, in the study of human affairs, hypotheses could not be verified by mounting 'controlled' experiments, since in real life, in sharp contrast to the utopian conditions of an Huxleian *Brave New World*, Man had never yet been conditioned to the amenability of a guinea-pig, but was still exhibiting all the contrariness of a most recalcitrantly wild animal.² This observation was, of course, correct, but the agnostic conclusion drawn from it was put out of court by the following considerations. In the first place a human wild animal that was fiercely refractory to the personal wills of other representatives of its kind might at the same time turn out to be tamely submissive to the impersonal yoke of custom and impressionably amenable to spells cast upon the conscious personality by both a personal and an impersonal layer of a subconscious psychic underworld. The second weakness of the argument was the postulate that a 'law of Nature' could never properly be certified as having been duly ascertained unless it had been verified by experiments arranged and executed so as to insulate the particular phenomena in which the regularities and recurrences constituting this hypothetical pattern, rhythm, plot, or law were alleged to reveal themselves. The acceptance of this postulate would have entailed the disfranchisement of a number of sciences which had been recognized, by the general consensus of a Collective Human Intellect, to have won a legitimate title to the name by having put their finger on systems of 'laws of Nature' that were generally admitted to be valid.

Since Primitive Man was no more amenable to being made a victim of controlled experiments than was Man in Process of Civilization, the science of Anthropology would have been the first to lose its franchise on the postulated test; and no doubt the historians would not have been sorry to find this opportunity of disallowing retrospectively a title to which they had implicitly given a grudging recognition by maintaining a disapprobatory silence. Fortunately, however, for the vulnerably human science of Anthropology, the impeccably inhuman science of Astronomy happened to be in the same boat. The courses of the stars³ were no more amenable to the test of controlled experiments⁴ than were the tides in the affairs of men;⁵ and Astronomy and Anthropology must therefore either sink or swim together—sharing the same watery grave if an ability to insist on registering its subjects' finger-prints was to be taken as the

¹ For the common use of the word 'Pharisees', see V. v. 73, with n. 4.

² See Darwin, *The Next Million Years* (London 1952, Hart-Davis), chap. vii: 'Man—A Wild Animal' (pp. 115–33).

³ Judges v. 20.

⁴ See p. 172, above.

⁵ Shakespeare: *Julius Caesar*, Act IV, scene iii, l. 217.

crucial test of a science's respectability, and riding the storm hand in hand if this proposed test was to be dismissed as an imposition that was invidious and unnecessary. In these circumstances it was manifest that Astronomy and Anthropology alike would retain, and not forfeit, their titles to being recognized as full-blooded sciences, since it was manifest that, if common sense were confronted with the choice of having to throw overboard either Astronomy's claim to be a science or the historians' forensic insistence on the indispensability of controlled experiments, then common sense would salvage Astronomy at the price of jettisoning the requirement that *soi-disants* 'laws of Nature' must have been verified by controlled experiments in order to qualify for being promulgated as the findings of a science. Astronomy was not only perhaps the oldest of all the sciences; she had also continued to retain her place of honour even in an age that had seen the sinister rise of a parvenu Atomic Physics; and this persistent and unabated brilliance of a venerable science in which the method of controlled experiment was inapplicable in the nature of the case was a practical vindication of the thesis that, in the study of phenomena, non-human and human alike, observation, unverified by experiment, was after all capable of effectively ascertaining 'laws of Nature'.

This question of principle, however, probably counted for much less among the considerations inclining a latter-day school of Western historians towards Antinomianism than the question whether the ascertainment of 'laws of Nature' in the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization was feasible in practice under the conditions with which these historians were confronted by the quantity of the data with which they had to deal. It was arguable that this quantity was too great, and also arguable that it was too small; and both these mutually exclusive arguments were used by different sects of contemporary Western historians who were all of the antinomian persuasion. Since those who argued that the data on the table were too numerous to be made to make sense appeared to be in a large majority over their confrères who arrived at an equally agnostic conclusion for the opposite reason, it will be convenient to examine this plea that the quantity of data was disablingly abundant before considering the alternative plea that it was disablingly scanty.

Since the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, when the Modern Western historians had incurred the censure of the Modern Western philosophers, the historians had in truth vastly increased the quantity of data within their purview by raking in enormous masses of them from two previously unexploited rubbish-heaps. On the one hand they had opened up the archives of Western public institutions such as the Papal Curia and the governments, central and local, of the Western World's parochial states; and on the other hand they had brought within their horizon the ordinary affairs of private people who had left their trails in the archives of firms and families. If the historians had been concerned to erase the stigma with which the philosophers had branded them, they would have noticed that, for the purpose of an apologia, their two simultaneous paper-chases were not equally promising.

The gravamen of the philosophers' indictment had been that the

historians neglected what was susceptible of scientific study in order to attend exclusively to events that interfered with 'the natural order' by being 'unnatural', 'monstrous', 'accidental', and 'unusual';¹ and the sting of truth in this charge had been retrospectively pressed home under the historians' thin skin by the witty authors of *1066 and All That*² in their parody of a presentation of History which had actually once held the field. In dissociating themselves from History as it was being written by Western historians in the eighteenth century, the Western philosophers of that age had in effect been praying to be delivered 'from battle and murder and from sudden death' (in the words of the Litany in *The Book of Common Prayer* according to the use of the Church of England). Sudden death, murder, and battle, however, were the dominant theme not only of a pre-Rankean Western historiography but likewise of the documents that the nineteenth-century Western historians had been extracting from Western public archives; and the 'unnaturalness' and 'monstrousness' of this 'penny dreadful', 'Sunday paper' streak in human affairs were not mitigated by bringing the stuff out of the wholesalers' warehouses in bulk and retailing it to the public in an infinite number of infinitesimally small samples.

On the other hand the nineteenth-century historians were genuinely breaking new ground—and thereby effectively converting their shame into glory—when they broke their way out of the madhouse of sensational public events, in which their predecessors had been 'cabined, cribbed, confined, bound in'³ by a conventional limitation of the usage of the word 'historic', and thereby won for themselves the freedom of the great open spaces of private life, in which ordinary people demonstrated daily to intellectual sight-seers that, when the human animal was given the run of a Yellowstone Park, he could wear a less repulsive countenance than he was condemned to exhibit in his public life, where he had to live under the pathological slum conditions of the zoological gardens in a metropolis. In claiming for History this wholesomely spacious parkland of private life, the historians were legitimately appropriating for their own purposes a field of human affairs which the economists and the sociologists were cultivating contemporaneously with fruitful results. It was a pity, as well as a paradox, that the historians should feel themselves inhibited from joining in the search for a 'natural order' by their acquisition of the very data that were enabling the sociologists and the economists to make some sense out of a human chaos by establishing two new sciences through the discovery of 'laws of Nature' reigning over virgin soil.

The historians' inhibition was paradoxical because, in all fields of study, both human and non-human, it had been the experience of a Collective Human Intellect that, the greater the quantity of the data, the greater was the precision with which 'laws of Nature' were ascertainable.⁴ This finding holds good, as we have seen, wherever the quantity of the data is not either so small that nothing can be made of them beyond the

¹ See Teggart, quoted on p. 183, above.

² Sellar, W. C., and Yeatman, R. J.: *1066 and All That, A Memorable History of England* (London 1930, Methuen).

³ Shakspeare: *Macbeth*, Act III, scene iv, l. 24.

⁴ See I. i. 452-7.

establishment of the facts, or else so great that the only practicable way of coping with the data is the method, not of Science, but of Fiction. Western historians might perhaps be forgiven for having failed to find any rhyme or reason in fifteen decisive battles, twelve imāms, seven sages, four Georges, three ages,¹ and other casts in which the dramatis personae had been brought on to the stage in these exiguous numbers;² but, in contrast to the quantity of data yielded by public events, the quantity yielded by ordinary affairs of private people was of just that intermediate order of magnitude that permits 'laws of Nature' governing data to reveal themselves to the human eye. The number of annual harvests, for example, that had been reaped by Man in Process of Civilization between the date of the invention of Agriculture and the time of writing, midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, was probably something between 6,000 and 12,000. The number of 'middletowns' that had come and gone from the *floruit* of Heliopolis and Ur and Harappa to the *floruit* of Chicago and Magnitogorsk and Shanghai must have run, all told, into some scores of thousands. The economists and sociologists had been showing what could be done with data presenting themselves in these quantities. Why was it that the historians were not taking the same advantage of the same opportunity?

The historians seem to have missed this opportunity by falling into a snare and a delusion. The snare was an obsession with their own professional technique;³ the delusion was a mistaken impression that the panorama of History was incomprehensibly complex.

'For students of modern history it was an important moment when the young German historian Ranke, looking at the Age of the Renaissance, took various authors of that period, who had written the chronicles of their own times, and by various forms of detective-work undermined their credibility. The novelty of his technique was perhaps exaggerated in the nineteenth-century,⁴ but it established the fact that you were foolish

¹ A critique of the Late Modern Western historians' conventional periodization of the history of Man in Process of Civilization into an 'ancient', a 'medieval', and a 'modern' age will be found in I. i. 168-71.

² It was noteworthy, however, that, of the five numbers here cited, the last two only would be decidedly too small to reveal underlying regularities and uniformities by giving the play of Chance on the surface a sufficient scope for it to neutralize itself.

³ 'The number usually need not be at all large for the chances to average out. With the typical example of spinning a coin, even a quite small number like ten will almost count as a large number in the sense that, if the coin is spun ten times, the number of heads will rarely be more than two away from five, which is the average number of heads. In most matters concerned with probability, three or four count as small numbers, ten as a fairly large number, and a hundred as a very large number' (Darwin, C. G.: *The Next Million Years* (London 1952, Hart-Davis), p. 90).

⁴ By the time when this authoritative pronouncement by one of the most eminent mathematical physicists of the present writer's generation was published, the writer had been spending some twenty-five years of his working life on mental operations with twenty-one specimens of the species 'civilizations' without having any assurance that this number was, in truth, large enough for his requirements. He was proportionately elated when he came to this passage in Sir Charles Darwin's book.

⁵ See I. i. 1-8.

⁶ Ranke had certainly been anticipated by a school of Chinese philologists and textual critics in the Far Eastern World in the age of the Han (see pp. 58-59, above) and by a school of Greek documentarists in the Hellenistic-Aristotelian age of Hellenic history. If Ranke and his disciples had taken to heart the two historical facts that Aristotle had organized the manufacture of a digest of the constitutions of 158 parochial states, and that Craterus had assembled a corpus of Athenian official

to depend on the contemporary chroniclers and narrative-writers of the sixteenth century if you wished to know what really happened in that period—you must go to official documents.¹ . . . The intensity of criticism

documents recorded in inscriptions, there might have been little more spirit left in them than was left in the Queen of Sheba after she had made her inventory of King Solomon's apparatus (1 Kings x. 5).—A.J.T.

¹ Scholars go to official documents at their peril if they have not previously trained themselves for interpreting them by having taken a hand in the manufacture of them; and Modern Western documentarians who had neglected this precaution would have been well advised to take warning by the cautionary tale of Aristotle's anonymous research assistant who, in the compilation of the narrative section of *The Constitution of Athens*, had the temerity to discard Thucydides' account of the *coup d'état* in 411 B.C. that had brought into power the ephemeral régime of 'the Four Hundred'. In our post-Rankean Age of Western intellectual history we can recapture the conscientious young woman's thrill when her patient exploration of the papyrus in the Record Office at Athens, or of the stelae on the Acropolis, was rewarded by her discovery of the series of official documents manufactured in the official year within which the episode of 'the Four Hundred' had occurred. 'Who could have dreamed', she must have cried, as she was excitedly announcing her discovery to her august master, 'that our documentary technique would vindicate itself as sensationally as this? By going to the official documents we have now demonstrated how foolish it is to depend on Thucydides if one wants to know what really happened in that period.' Here indeed, as Horace was one day to write, *bonus dormitat Homerus* (*Epistulae*, Book II, Ep. iii, l. 359); but a latter-day historian's detective-work would not be complete until he had established the identity of the 'napping Homer' in the case, and here the last laugh turns against, not Thucydides, but Aristotle; for it was Aristotle . . . when he condescendingly put his own name to his ingenuous . . . The discrepancy between Thucydides' chronicle and the contemporary official documents which the young woman had pointed out to Aristotle was indeed just as glaring as she had reported it to be; but, unfortunately for Aristotle's reputation, the explanation that he had allowed his pupil to impose upon him was a mare's nest.

The true story of the *coup d'état* of 'the Four Hundred' *wie es eigentlich gewesen* ('in the famous words of Ranke') turned out after all to have been the tale told by Thucydides on the authority of participants and witnesses whose evidence he had sagaciously followed though he tactfully withheld their names. The discrepant documents in the Athenian public records were (if the young blue-stocking was not in error in assigning the date of their manufacture to the time when the Four Hundred were in power) untruthful and, by the same token, authentic. They were untruthful because they had been manufactured (if manufactured at that time), on instructions from 'the Four Hundred', for the serious practical purpose of covering their politician-fabricators' tracks by throwing dust in academically innocent eyes. Thucydides, of course, was not taken in; he had once been in politics himself, and he was alive to the disreputable tricks of the trade; but 'the Four Hundred' did score a notable posthumous success when their documentary dust-cloud (if the credit for having raised it could truly be claimed by them) put Aristotle off the scent—and this after the location of the truth had been revealed to any sharp-eyed huntsman by the good dog Thucydides' shrewdly pointing tail. This re-vindication of Thucydides' veracity was a feat of Modern Western detective-work to the credit of M. O. B. Cary (see *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. xxxiii (London 1913, Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies), pp. 1-18; vol. lxxii (1952), pp. 56-61).

This posthumous success of 'the Four Hundred's' documentary imposture fully recouped these politicians for an expenditure of time and thought which, if they did spend them, they could ill afford to spare for the luxury of whitewashing themselves in the midst of a crisis in which they were struggling for power and life. A documentary misrepresentation of the truth that took in Aristotle had certainly not been labour lost. All the same, the Four Hundred, being men of action, were, no doubt, acting on shorter views, and working for quicker returns, than this in any documentary hoax that they may have committed. The normal motive for manufacturing an official document is to produce some immediate practical effect in current politics. The intention may be to prevent something from happening, to make something happen, or to create a false impression about something that has happened, or not happened, already; there are divers practical purposes which the manufacture of official documents can be made to serve; but there is one purpose—one which, though theoretically possible, would hardly occur to anyone but an historian—which the historian would be wise to leave out of his reckoning: the manufacturer of official documents is never inspired by an academic concern to record the truth for the benefit of future historians; for, from the man of action's standpoint, the briefing of future historians is, at best, unprofitable and, at worst, imprudent.

This is a cardinal consideration which historians seldom bear in mind, though

and the awareness of the possible pitfalls increased in a remarkable manner as time went on. . . . The development of the scientific method in nineteenth-century historiography did not merely mean that this or that fact could be corrected, or the story told in greater detail, or the narrative amended at marginal points. It meant that total reconstructions proved to be necessary, as in the detective stories, where a single new fact might turn out to be a pivotal one; and what had been thought to be an accident might transform itself into an entirely different story of murder. In these circumstances, evidence which had seemed to mean one thing might prove to be capable of an entirely different construction.¹

This nineteenth-century experience had two psychological effects. The Modern Western historians' discovery for themselves of the classic technique of 'detective-work' gave them an unwarranted sense of masterly power; the dissolution of once hard-looking facts under corrosively acid documentary tests gave the same historians an undue sense of helpless impotence. The more confident they became of their technical ability to handle the facts, the less confident they remained of their intellectual ability to apprehend these facts, not to speak of making any sense out of them; and these two conflicting psychological forces found their resolution in a concentration on professional technique both as an end in itself and as a mental city of refuge;² for here were sands in which an ostrich could reassuringly bury his head when the sight of a pursuing Hound of Heaven had got upon the fugitive's nerves.

The snare of historical technique has been exposed by the Western Christian historian whom we have just quoted:

'We fall into certain habits of mind and easily become the slaves of them, when in reality we only adopted them for the purpose of a particular technique. It is as though people could be so long occupied in tearing flowers to pieces and studying their mechanism that they forget ever to stand back again and see the buttercup whole. It is possible that in the transition to the modern outlook the World was guided much less by any deliberated philosophy than is often assumed, and I think that few people could be said to have come to that modern outlook by an authentic process of thinking things out. Men are often the semi-conscious victims of habits of mind and processes of abstraction like those involved in technical historical study or in physical science. They decide that for purposes of analysis they will only take notice of things that can be weighed and measured, and then they forget the number they first started from and come to think that these are the only things that exist. . . .'³

politicians seldom fail to act on it. Among the official documents with which the writer of this Study happened to be acquainted, the Hossbach Memorandum of the 10th November, 1937, recording the minutes of a conference held in the Reichskanzlei, Berlin, on the 5th November, was perhaps the only one that, by any stretch of the imagination, could be supposed to have been manufactured out of deference to an academic ideal. At any rate, the writer of this Study could not think of any credible motive for putting this incriminating record on paper except a concern to facilitate the future task of the Nazi war-criminals' historian-prosecutors. This one academically exemplary official document was, however, a joker in a pack in which most other cards were severely practical in their design. It was not Hitler's Colonel Hossbach, but the Four Hundred's anonymous secretary, who was the typical representative of the official document manufacturers' profession, and it was surely significant that an ingenious Hossbach should have been an ingenious Ranke's fellow-countryman.—A.J.T.

¹ Butterfield, Herbert: *Christianity and History* (London 1949, Bell), pp. 12, 13, and 14-15.

² See the passage of Butterfield's work quoted on p. 191, above.

³ Butterfield, op. cit., p. 21.

Yet, even so, insidious though these toils of technique might thus prove to be, the example of the social scientists suggests that the captivated historians need not have remained prisoners if a failure of nerve had not scared them into hugging their technological chains. After having been intimidated by an ever more sensitive 'awareness of the possible pitfalls' in a mental landscape in which a once solid Earth was melting into a dreamlike kaleidoscope of 'total reconstructions', these distracted latter-day Western historians were appalled by a nightmare in which they saw this Protean chaos solidifying again, only to confront the tormented observer with a novel universe of an incomprehensible complexity; and this prospect made the sheltering sands of technique look like the only practicable refuge from the mental hell of being compelled to play an eternal game of croquet with the unmanageable implements prescribed for the luckless players of the game in Lewis Carroll's fantasy *Alice through the Looking-glass*.

If the latter-day Western historians' own appreciation of their plight had been correct, this plight would have been desperate indeed; but fortunately their attempt to distinguish between Appearance and Reality happened to be an outright inversion of the truth. The nightmare vision of Reality from which they were seeking shelter in the sand-heap of technique was an illusion generated by this obscurantist technique itself. The apparent dissolution of a once stable world into a Protean chaos of infinitesimally small vagrant electrons, which would re-form into an infinitely complex universe if they were ever to re-form at all, was not the apocalypse of an appalling Reality; it was the illusory optical effect of a distortingly diffractive lens; and the nightmare could be dispelled in an instant by the simple salutary act of dropping this delusively sophisticated apparatus and reverting to the effective use of the naked eye.

The physical eye itself presents a living allegory of this tragi-comedy of an intellectual *malade imaginaire*:

'In an organ like the eye there are two points that are equally striking: the complexity of the structure and the simplicity of the way in which it works. . . . The eye is a machine composed of an infinite number of machines which are all extremely complex, yet eyesight is a simple fact. The eye has merely to open for eyesight to come into action. . . . It is this contrast between the complexity of the organ and the unity of its operation that is intellectually disconcerting. . . .

'As a general rule, when an object looks simple from one side and infinitely composite from the other side, the two aspects are far from being of equal importance or—to put it more precisely—far from being on a par with one another in degree of reality. In such cases the simplicity is intrinsic to the object itself, while the infinite complexity is an effect of views that we take of it as we reconnoitre it, of disparate symbols through which our senses or our intelligence represent the object to us, and, in a more general way, of elements of a different order with which we try to imitate the object artificially, but with which nevertheless it remains incommensurable because its nature is different from theirs.

'An artist of genius has painted a figure on his canvas. We can imitate his picture in mosaic, in pieces of many colours, and, the smaller and the more numerous these pieces are, and the greater the variety of their shades

of colour, the better we shall be able to reproduce the curves and nuances of our model. But we should require an infinite number of infinitesimally minute components, presenting an infinite number of nuances, in order to obtain the exact equivalent of a figure which the artist has conceived as a simple thing, which he has sought to transfer to his canvas *en bloc*, and which approaches perfection in its presentation in the measure in which it reveals itself as being the projection of an intuition which is indivisible . . . because [in the artist's own work] there has really been no such thing as an assemblage of pieces in a mosaic. What has happened is that the picture—by which I mean the simple act projected on to the canvas—has spontaneously decomposed in our eyes, through the mere fact of having come within our perception, into thousands and thousands of little pieces which, in their re-composition, present the spectacle of a wonderful arrangement.

'In the same way the eye, with its marvellously complex structure, might be nothing more than the simple act of sight, in spite of its splitting up, as it does, for us into a mosaic of cells, whose order appears marvellous to us when once we have represented this totality to ourselves as being an assemblage.

'If I raise my hand from Point A to Point B, this movement presents itself to me in two aspects simultaneously. Felt from within, it is an act that is simple and indivisible; perceived from outside it is the course of a particular curve AB. In this line I can distinguish as many distinct positions as I choose, and the line itself can be defined as a particular co-ordination of these positions among themselves. But this innumerable host of positions and the order linking one position with another are automatic products of the indivisible act in which my hand has moved from A to B. . . .

'It is the same with the relation of the eye to the eyesight. . . . [So far from Nature's having] produced the simple act of seeing by performing a Herculean *tour de force* with an infinite number of infinitely complicated elements, it has cost her no more trouble to make an eye than it costs me to raise my hand. Nature's simple act has split up automatically into an infinite number of elements which will all be found co-ordinated with a single idea, as the movement of my hand has precipitated an infinite number of points which all prove to answer to a single equation.'¹

In the light of Bergson's intuitions, we can see that the latter-day Western historians' nightmare was the illusory visual effect of an intoxicating technique. The Saint Vitus's dance of an infinite number of infinitesimally small data which these self-confounded intellectual technicians saw through their perversely granulated lens was a shadow play substituted by this distorting medium for the simplicity and integrity of real life. The previously unpublished data which Western researchers had been eliciting from Western archives, private and public, in apparently overwhelming quantities were, in truth, not so many integral facts, but merely so many artificial fragments into which the integral facts had been arbitrarily pulverized by a nihilistic technique. While the shivered splinters had become unmanageably numerous and complicated, the intact bones remained intelligibly few and simple. The true crux of History, in fact, was that the significant known integral events in the history of Man in Process of Civilization were, not awkwardly abun-

¹ Bergson, H.: *L'Évolution Créatrice*, 24th ed. (Paris 1921, Alcan), pp. 96-100.

dant, but awkwardly scarce;¹ and the question on which the possibility of ascertaining 'laws of Nature' in this episode of history turned was the question whether the significant known integral events were actually numerous enough to provide a basis for generalizations.

This experience is described in the following testimony from the pen of a practised investigator of the working of 'laws of Nature' on the economic plane of latter-day Western social life:

'The volume of economic statistics is certainly imposing—it is even intimidating at first sight. But on closer inspection the mass proves to consist less of a multiplication of independent observations upon particular phenomena than of observations upon a vast variety of phenomena, and of the infinite detail in which certain processes must be observed. . . . As an investigator gets deeper into a quantitative analysis of business cycles, his first impression that the statistical data to be dealt with are embarrassingly abundant turns into a conviction that they are painfully inadequate.'²

The agnostics who put their finger on the scarcity of significant known events as their ground for denying the possibility of discerning 'laws of Nature' in the history of Man in Process of Civilization were thus at any rate nearer the mark—mistaken though they too might be—than their fellow agnostics whose identical denial was based on the contradictory thesis that the hoppers in their factory had been choked by a plethora of overproduction.

This case for agnosticism on the ground, not of a redundancy in the data, but of an insufficiency, is judiciously presented in the following passage from the pen of a distinguished twentieth-century Western historian:

'The reading public asks for a final interpretation of History, and for an answer to the question why civilisations rise and fall. Is there, as Hume thought, a tidal movement in human affairs and nothing more than this tidal ebb and flow? Is there no hope of stability or of unmixed achievement in the temporal sphere? Or can it be said that, in spite of ages of regression towards barbarism, historians are able to bring evidence of progress towards a desirable end?

'To these questions British historians are not very ready to give an answer, and, in general, the answers which are given are not put forward by the most learned or the most profound scholars. In the preface to his *History of Europe*, H. A. L. Fisher wrote that he had no ultimate philosophy of history. Such a view does not imply scepticism, or even lack of belief in the possibility of a final synthesis. The difficulty at present is that the *data* are insufficient.³ To a historian the history of the World of Man is a very short history. The years of the astronomers and the geologists reach beyond a historian's reckoning; a small fraction only of these vast epochs is covered by the period during which Man, with knowledge

¹ See I. i. 455–6.

² Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting* (New York 1927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), pp. 203 and 205.

³ 'It is not—to my mind—altogether paradoxical to say *also* that we know too much. I mean, we know so many facts which lend themselves to arrangement in patterns that we can make any number of such patterns; but we do not know enough to judge between these patterns or to be sure that we are doing more than pick out chance or superficial resemblances' (Sir Llewellyn Woodward in a letter of the 25th July, 1952, to the writer of this Study).

of the wheel, of fire, of pottery, and of edged tools, has set out to be master of his environment. Within this fragment of Time, the history of Lettered and Civilised Man fills an even smaller space. It is therefore not remarkable that a satisfactory clue has yet to be found to the meaning of the strange acts of the strangest of living creatures. Bede tells the story of the Northumbrian thane who compared the life of Man on Earth, in relation to the unknown immensity of Time, to a moment in which a bird might fly into the warmth of a hall in winter, and then be lost to sight again in the storm—*de hieme in hiemem regrediens*. Of this short space of Time men had knowledge; they knew nothing of what had gone before, nothing of what might follow after.¹

British historians are not necessarily without "care of knowing causes" if they refuse to commit themselves to any more definite judgment upon the pattern of History and the meaning of human existence.²

¹ In the famous passage (Baeda: *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, Book II, chap. 13) that Sir Llewellyn Woodward has cited here so aptly to illustrate his own thesis, the actual terms in the comparison are, of course, not the brevity of the civilizations' Time-span up to date by contrast with the immensity of the Time-span posited by Anthropology, Geology, and Astronomy, but the brevity of a soul's visible life on Earth by comparison with the immeasurable magnitude of this same soul's mysterious non-terrestrial history. The relevant words are *vita hominum in terris, ad comparationem eius, quod incertum est, temporis* and *ita haec vita hominum ad modicum apparet; quid autem sequatur, quidve praecesserit, prorsus ignoramus*. The meaning of these words seems clear, and it is clinched by the context; for the debate in which these words are reported by Bede to have been spoken was a discussion in the *witenagemot* of the Kingdom of Northumbria, and the question at issue was whether to abide by a traditional Paganism or to be converted to Christianity; it was not the question whether the data for studying the history of Man in Process of Civilization were at present to be deemed insufficient—on a criterion to be found in the estimated scale of Anthropological, Geological, and Astronomical Time—for attempting to make sense of this post-primitive current episode of human affairs.

The subject of the Northumbrian notables' debate was, in short, not History, but Religion and Politics. If, however, we could imagine the debate raised by Sir Llewellyn Woodward before or after their historic debate, the question raised by Sir Llewellyn Woodward, we can be sure, *a priori*, that, whether they had been converted pagans or been speaking as recent converts to the Christian faith, the Northumbrian notables have been as confident of their ability to read the riddle of the terrestrial history of Mankind as they were shy of trying to read the riddle of the eternal destiny of a soul. On the lips of Bede's seventh-century Northumbrian thane, 'the unknown immensity of Time' did not mean the chronological aeons with which the twentieth-century Western geologists and astronomers credited the duration of a Physical Universe; it meant an Eternity that was not commensurate with Time in the astronomer's or the annalist's sense of that word. In the seventh-century *Weltanschauung* of a Northumbrian thane or a Christian Roman missionary, the Time-span of the history of Man on Earth was not dwarfed by the Time-span of the age of the Earth and the far greater age of the Stellar Cosmos, since these seventh-century Western minds had no idea that chronological periods of these latter orders of magnitude might have elapsed already and might be due to go on rolling into the future. In their cosier vista, as presented in both the Christian and the pagan myth, the Cosmos, the Earth, Terrestrial Life, Human Life, and Civilization had all come into existence and entered on their careers in the self-same week; and this imaginary date lay a shorter time back than the estimated date at which the twentieth-century Western historian placed the rise of the earliest civilizations at the culmination of a geological Time-span of almost unspeakably greater length. In this seventh-century *Weltanschauung*, the history of the World of Man nor the, on this estimate, coeval history of the Stellar Cosmos presented a puzzle to which a satisfactory clue had not yet been found; and neither the pagan seventh-century Northumbrian nor the Christian seventh-century Roman inquirer would have hesitated to commit himself to a definite judgement upon a pattern of history whose meaning, so he devoutly believed, had been revealed to Man by God.

Thus, in citing Bede, Sir Llewellyn Woodward is taking a pre-Christian or Christian antithesis between Time and Eternity, not as a precise equivalent, but as a suggestive allegory, of a post-Christian antithesis between one Time-span of one order of chronological magnitude and another Time-span of a different order of magnitude in the same chronological dimension.—A.J.T.

² Woodward, E. L.: *British Historians* (London 1932, Collins, produced by Adprint

The prudent answer to this challenge, at the date at which it was delivered, was King Agrippa's 'Almost thou persuadest me'.¹ It is indisputable that the discovery of 'laws of Nature' by induction cannot be attempted with any prospect of success unless the investigator has at his command a minimum quantity of data to serve as instances for testing hypotheses by the empirical method of trial and error. When the number is less than the minimum—whatever this indispensable minimum may be held to be in the particular field that happens to be under investigation—the margin of possible error in the findings of tentative inductions becomes prohibitively wide; and, on this account, an importunately scientific-minded student of history might have found himself constrained to admit that an unconditional surrender was the only honest response to an agnostic-minded historian's challenge if this had been delivered, not in the first century of a post-Modern Age of Western history, but, let us say, some four hundred years earlier.

If in A.D. 1532, instead of in A.D. 1932 (the year in which Woodward's book was actually published), a seeker after 'laws of Nature' governing the history of Man in Process of Civilization had been taxed to declare the number of the data of the highest order of magnitude in his chosen field of study about which he could claim to possess effective knowledge, a Western scholar at that earlier date would have had to confess an inability to muster more than three data on the requisite scale; and this insufficient figure of three² could not have been bettered at the time by the intellectual heirs to the cultural heritages of any of the other living civilizations. A Western scholar's effective knowledge of civilizations other than his own would have been confined in A.D. 1532 to the Hellenic Civilization, to which the Western was affiliated, and the Syriac Civilization, from which the spark of creativity in Christianity had been derived. A knowledge of the same two extinct civilizations of the second generation would likewise have constituted the entire intellectual stock-in-trade of a contemporary scholar in Orthodox Christendom, in its Ottoman and its Russian provinces alike, and in the Islamic World of the day. A contemporary Far Eastern scholar's knowledge of civilizations other than his own would similarly have been limited to the Sinic and the Indic, while a contemporary Hindu scholar would have had no knowledge of any civilizations except his own and its Indic predecessor. As for the living civilizations of the New World, they were at that moment losing consciousness through being brutally knocked on the head by Castilian *conquistadores*.

On this showing, it is manifest that in A.D. 1532 an agnostic would have been justified in submitting that the data were at present not sufficient to warrant an attempt to discover 'laws of Nature' governing the history of Man in Process of Civilization; and at that date this agnostic argument would have been unanswerable, not only in Western

in the 'Britain in Pictures' series), p. 48. The quotation from this book has been made with the permission of the author and the publishers. See further the same historian's Raleigh Lecture, 'Some Considerations on the Present State of Historical Studies', read on the 17th May, 1950, and published in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. xxxvi.

¹ Acts xxvi. 28.

² See the passage of Sir Charles Darwin's work quoted on p. 206, n. 2, above.

Christendom, but in the contemporary academies of all the other living civilizations. By A.D. 1932, on the other hand—and that was the year in which the passage quoted above was, in fact, published—the facilities at the disposal of a scientific-minded student of History had been improved and enlarged, out of all recognition, by three achievements that the Western Civilization had accomplished in the course of its intervening Modern Age.

In the first place the explosive aggressiveness of the Western peoples in this age had—for the first time in recorded history—rounded up the whole of Mankind, over a literally world-wide range, into a single oecumenical society; and, while in the first chapter of this gradually unfolding story the unification had been carried out within a frankly Western framework and on the superficial planes of Economics and Politics, it was evident by A.D. 1932 that the heaven was then working its way down to the cultural and spiritual depths of life and that, on these deeper levels, the receptivity of the living non-Western societies to the radiation of Western techniques, institutions, and ideas was preparing the way for a cultural counter-offensive.¹ A culturally servile non-Western intelligentsia, that had originally been called into being, like Frankenstein's monster, to further its callous manufacturer's step-fatherly purposes,² had begun, by the twentieth century, to beget a happier and more fruitful freedmen-class of 'occidentalists' who were making it their mission to serve the need of the hour in the lives of their own societies by interpreting the intrusive Western culture in their own cultural terms and thereby giving the great non-Western majority of Mankind the means of exercising some discrimination in a retaliatory spoiling of the Egyptians. The 'occidentalists' were already beginning to appropriate, for the common use and benefit of Humanity at large, the cultural wealth that had been amassed by an acquisitive-minded West; and in the meanwhile this internationalized stock of honey had been notably increased by the labours of busy Western bees.

If the Modern Western historians had been the sole representatives of Modern Western intellectual enterprise, a robbery of the Western hive in A.D. 1932 would have proved disappointingly unrewarding for the 'occidentalists'; for, in those imaginary circumstances, the occidentalists' plunder in A.D. 1932 would still have been as exiguous as it would have been four hundred years earlier. As we have already noticed, the Late Modern and post-Modern Western historians had done nothing to increase the number of the data of a significantly high order of magnitude that the Modern Western student of the history of Man in Process of Civilization had inherited from his Medieval predecessors. Though the latter-day Western historians had been no less restlessly industrious than the contemporary Western apprentices in other intellectual trades, they had been spending their energies on grinding the already known significant data into details, to the exclusion of any attempt to make significant additions to knowledge by discovering new data on an illuminatingly large scale. While, however, the Western historians had thus been leaving undone those things which they ought

¹ See IX. viii. 64-80.

² See V. v. 154-9.

to have done, their proper study had been magnificently advanced by their proxies the contemporary Western orientalists¹ and archaeologists.²

Since the days of the pioneer Western Sinologist Matteo Ricci (*vivebat* A.D. 1552–1610) and the pioneer Western Arabist Edward Pococke I (*vivebat* A.D. 1604–91), Western orientalists had been making accessible to contemporary Western scholars,³ and hence also to future non-Western occidentals, an effective knowledge of all the living non-Western civilizations and all those extinct civilizations of the preceding generation to which one or other of the living non-Western civilizations happened to be affiliated. Meanwhile, since the 2nd July, 1798, which was the day on which Napoleon had landed in Egypt, a new-model army of Western archaeologists had gone into action shoulder to shoulder with the Western orientalists in an intellectual crusade against a parochial-minded native Western ignorance; and within the next 134 years they had not only brought into clear visibility, out of the twilight, a number of extinct civilizations—the Egyptian, Babylonian, Mexican, Yucatec, and Andean—which had already lain just within the ken of Western scholarship thanks to a few monuments still standing above ground and a few fragmentary and garbled references in the known literary records of other civilizations; the archaeologists had also brought to light—and this was the crowning glory of their rapid series of sensational successes—a number of other extinct civilizations—the Sumerian, Hittite, Minoan, and Mayan, not to speak of an Indus Culture and a Shang Culture—whose oblivion had been so complete that, on the eve of the moment when they were thus brought back within the ken of the living by ringing strokes of pick and spade that simulated in real life the mythical music of a Last Trump, there was no human scholar alive who was aware that these miraculously resurgent forgotten civilizations had ever risen and fallen.

By these veritable miracles of intellectual faith and works, the Western archaeologists and the Western orientalists, between them, had increased the number of civilizations known to Western scholars sevenfold, from a trio to more than a score;⁴ and this immense enlargement of the West's historical horizon which had been thus achieved by Western intellectual pioneers had been won by them, not merely for the West itself, but for an oecumenical Republic of Letters which was a twentieth-century offspring of the West's assault upon the World. How did this revolutionary transformation of a traditional intellectual situation affect the issue between the seeker after 'laws of Nature' in the history of Man

¹ See I. i. 345–6.

² See I. i. 129, n. 1, and 157.

³ The alertness shown by both Voltaire and Gibbon in recognizing, mastering, and turning to account the new datum that had been brought to the West by the scholarship of seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Jesuit Western Sinologists has been noticed in I. i. 346. Gibbon also made good use of the work of the pioneer Modern Western Arabists.

⁴ In virtue of the archaeologists' contribution to Western knowledge of historical data of a significantly high order of magnitude, twentieth-century Western scholars enjoyed a still greater advantage over Gibbon and Voltaire than Voltaire and Gibbon, in their day, had enjoyed over Bossuet or over Hartmann Schedel, the compiler of the Nuremberg Chronicle (see p. 178, n. 5, above).

in Process of Civilization and the agnostic who argued that the quest was foredoomed to failure because the number of the effectively known significant data was insufficient?

The multiplication of the mustered number by seven was not, of course, in itself any guarantee that the social scientist's case had been won for him by the orientalist's and archaeologist's achievements; for the social scientist's original fund of significant knowledge had been so grotesquely incommensurate with his ambitious purpose that, even when the figure of significant data had been raised from three to twenty-one, it might still perhaps be contended that, for serving as a basis for induction, this seven times larger number was still not large enough. In the present writer's personal judgement, a stock of twenty-one significant data was just sufficient to warrant a search for 'laws of Nature' in the history of Man in Process of Civilization; and, twenty years after the publication of Sir Llewellyn Woodward's book, this judgement had been fortified by the authority of Sir Charles Darwin.¹ But the present writer would not have denied that the margin of practicability provided by a stock standing at this twentieth-century figure—twenty-one—was a narrow one, and, notwithstanding Sir Charles Darwin's comforting assurance that a number no higher than ten would prove sufficient for a comparative study and for the induction of 'laws of Nature', he would have gone so far as to concede that an agnostic who could not have failed to win his case in A.D. 1532 might still—even in spite of the orientalist's achievements during the ensuing two centuries and three-quarters—have had a chance of winning it as late as A.D. 1798, if his book had been out of the printer's hands before the 2nd July of that intellectually momentous year.

Thereafter, in the present writer's view, the intellectual battle on this field had been won for Science by the intervention of the archaeologists in the long-since-combatant orientalist's support. As he saw it, the archaeologists had played here the decisive part that the Prussians had once played on a military battlefield on which their British allies had been bearing the heat and burden of the day. At Waterloo an Anglo-Prussian conjunction of military forces had proved irresistible; and the united intellectual forces of the orientalist and the archaeologist had similarly put the historians to rout. Under a twentieth-century spectator's eyes, these picturesque antinomian warriors had gone down to as ignominious a defeat at the hands of the disciplined champions of Science as their prototypes the Egyptian Mamlûks had suffered on the 21st July, 1798, in the Battle of the Pyramids, when they had been mowed down by the well-timed fire of Napoleon's efficiently manœuvring Janissaries.² The impression made on the writer by the spectacle of this decisive intellectual battle was the experience that had moved him to attempt a study of History; and his answer to the challenge of the agnostics is presented, not solely in the present passage, but throughout the present work.³

¹ See p. 206, n. 2, above.

² Jabarti's graphic account of this battle has been quoted in IV. iv. 458–60.

³ See I. i. 458–9.

(IV) THE OPENNESS OF THE QUESTION

Without prejudice to the eventual findings of our present inquiry into the relation between the respective roles of Law and Freedom in History, we may conclude, from the results at which we have arrived up to this point, that, in repudiating a belief in the reign of Law, Late Modern Western Man (*florebat circa* A.D. 1675–1875) had been guilty of hybris, and that, in divers variations on his antinomian theme, the sinner had carried it to divers degrees of enormity. In their unanimous repudiation of a belief in a 'Law of God', all Late Modern Western minds alike had been making the unwarrantably overweening assumption that they had a deeper insight into the secret of the Universe than the Prophets of Israel, Judah, and Iran and these seers' Christian and Muslim epigoni from Amos through Augustine to Ibn Khaldūn and Bossuet. In their sectarian repudiation of a belief in 'laws of Nature' as well, the antinomian school of Late Modern Western historians had been making a still more overweening assumption that was even more unwarrantable—so unwarrantable and so overweening that it had laid this school of historians open to conviction on a charge of heresy by a jury of scientists who had been the historians' fellow-travellers on the first stage of Western Man's spiritual exodus from the Kingdom of God. The Late Modern Western scientists who had kept the historians company in going the length of throwing over 'the Law of God' had still clung to the skirts of Indic and Hellenic philosophers who had promulgated 'laws of Nature' in the name of the goddess Reason; and the Late Modern Western historians had taken a solitary way¹ when they had defiantly made a virtue of their former fellow-travellers' charge against them that they had denied the validity of 'laws of Nature', as well as the validity of 'the Law of God', in the realm of the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization.

Hybris of any degree in any circumstances is everywhere and always wrong and dangerous; but it was at least comprehensible, though not on that account necessarily excusable, that the Late Modern and post-Modern generations of Western Man should have succumbed to the hybriatic fancy of imagining themselves to be above the Law in the halcyon days that had dawned upon the Western World after the close of the Wars of Religion and the repulse of the second Ottoman assault upon Vienna. In that hour, Western Man had just seen the two giant figures of an Almighty God and a Grand Signor disappear simultaneously from a mental horizon above which both of them had once loomed so formidably large; and he had not paused to recollect the Hellenic poet Menander's admonition that 'all that injures issues from within'.² But the twentieth-century epigoni of the Bayles and Fontenelles had no case at all for retaining their late-seventeenth-century predecessors' complacency in an age which had seen the destructiveness of the Wars of Religion matched, and their atrociousness exceeded, in Wars of Nationality and Ideology that had once again rent the Western Society asunder and, in the act, had conjured up against her an accuser

¹ Milton: *Paradise Lost*, Book XII, l. 649.

² Menander, fragment 540, quoted in IV. iv. 120, n. 3.

more damaging than Islam and an adversary more puissant than the 'Osmanli. Communism was more damaging than Islam because it spoke to the West with the voice of the West's own conscience, and the Soviet Power was more puissant than the Ottoman because it made war on the West with Western material and spiritual weapons. These harrowing and terrifying new Western experiences had demonstrated unanswerably that a century of low tension which had opened for the Western Society with an Ottoman 'cease fire' under the walls of Vienna in A.D. 1683, and had closed for it in A.D. 1775 with the firing, at Concord, Massachusetts, of 'the shot heard round the World',¹ had, after all, been nothing more than a deceptive lull; and, after the successive warnings served on Western Man by History in A.D. 1775, 1792, 1914, 1917, 1933, and 1939, the rake had come to a point in his progress at which his ears ought to have been open to Menandrian saws that certain of his own poets had been saying.² Volney's 'La source de ses calamités . . . réside dans l'homme même' had anticipated Meredith's 'We are betrayed by what is false within';³ and in these sentences a Late Modern Western Antinomianism had written its own self-indictment.

The moral question whether these experiences and admonitions would move Western Man to repent of his hybris was one that could be answered by nobody except the tragic hero himself; but, on the intellectual point at issue between latter-day Western historians and latter-day Western scientists, it seemed reasonable, in the circumstances of A.D. 1952, to ask the historians to meet the scientists to the extent of admitting that it might, after all, at least be an open question whether 'laws of Nature' were or were not to be found governing the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization. Indeed, the openness of the question was actually so patent, the need to look into it so pressing, and the aphasia afflicting the historians so invincible, that it seemed warrantable at this point for a student of History to make the requisite declaration on the historians' behalf.

If we do thus take the liberty taken by godparents in the ministration of the Christian Church's rite of baptism by declaring open for discussion the question whether 'laws of Nature' have any currency in the domain of History, we immediately find a string of supplementary questions unrolling itself.

What (if any) instances of 'laws of Nature' governing the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization are brought to light in fact by an empirical survey of the data? If 'laws of Nature' operative in the realm of History do emerge from our study, what are the possible explanations of their currency? Do such 'laws of Nature' governing human affairs turn out, when we understand them, to be inexorable? Or can their incidence on Human Life be brought under human control at least in some measure? Are there any tracts in the realm of History in which human affairs appear, on the evidence of the data, to be, not amenable to 'laws of Nature', but recalcitrant to them? And, if this, too, is one of the findings

¹ Emerson, R. W., in his quatrain inscribed on the spot where the first shot was fired in the American Revolutionary War. The historical significance of this war has been discussed in IV. iv. 165.

² Acts xvii. 28.

³ See IV. iv. 120.

of an empirical survey, what are the possible explanations of Man's apparent freedom from the rule of 'laws of Nature' in certain circumstances? Is the appearance simply an illusion that arises because our data are insufficient or because our interpretation of them is inadequate? Or have we grounds for surmising that, however great our knowledge and our insight might be, we should never find 'laws of Nature' operative here, because these tracts of human affairs are genuinely exempt from Nature's jurisdiction? If, however, certain tracts of human affairs are genuinely exempt from 'laws of Nature', what are the powers that do reign over these Alsatias? Are they spiritually waste lands swept by wayward winds of Chance? Or are they spiritual arenas for the interplay of Challenge and Response in encounters between personalities?

It will be seen that these last two supplementary questions carry us beyond the bounds of 'laws of Nature' and bring us back face to face with 'the Law of God'. The riddle of the relation between God's Law and a human soul's freedom is the last, the most difficult, and the most crucial of all questions on our present agenda.

B. THE AMENABILITY OF HUMAN AFFAIRS TO 'LAWS OF NATURE'

(I) A SURVEY OF INSTANCES

(a) 'LAWS OF NATURE' IN THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF PRIVATE PEOPLE IN AN INDUSTRIAL WESTERN SOCIETY

OUR exploration of the problem of Law and Freedom in History has brought us to the point of assuming that the question whether 'laws of Nature' have or have not any footing in the history of Man in Process of Civilization may legitimately be treated as open for the purpose of making headway in our inquiry. In allowing ourselves to make this postulate, we have bound ourselves to put it to an empirical test. Let us start by making a survey of affairs of Man in Process of Civilization in which 'laws of Nature' do appear to be operative, and then—when we have looked into possible explanations of such phenomena, and into the subsequent question whether 'laws of Nature' are inexorable or controllable in the domain of human affairs, if they do have any currency there—let us go on to make a corresponding survey of affairs of Man in Process of Civilization in which 'laws of Nature' appear not to be operative, and let us look into possible explanations of such phenomena in turn.

In embarking on our survey of apparent evidences of an amenability of human affairs to 'laws of Nature', it might be convenient to take our first soundings in the ordinary affairs of private people, since in this tract, in which fishing rights had been venturesomely claimed and profitably exercised by latter-day Western historians, the number of the data was apt, as we have noticed,¹ to run into comparatively high figures, rising from thousands to hundreds of millions, and figures of these orders of magnitude are high enough, and at the same time not too high, to allow of accurate and subtle statistics. Statistically established uniformities and recurrences are capable, not only of being visualized in mathematical curves, but also of being verified by being put to the test of being taken as bases for prediction; and, in the Western World at a date some two hundred years after the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain in the latter part of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the possibility of accurately working out statistical expectations in the light of the statistical patterns presented by arrays of relevant accomplished facts had been amply demonstrated by the magnitude of the financial profits earned by entrepreneurs who had staked their capital on a faith that, in their social milieu, the ordinary affairs of private people were governed by 'laws of Nature' that were at least sufficiently regular to be both ascertainable and trustworthy.

There were two principal departments in the province of private people's ordinary affairs in which commercially profitable predictions, made on the basis of statistical patterns detected in the data of past his-

¹ See pp. 205-6, above.

tory, had come to be commonplaces of latter-day Western business activity. One of these two sources of profit from predictions based on past statistics was the business of catering for divers markets for goods and services; the other was the insurance business. Catering was, no doubt, coeval with Civilization itself, though the scale on which it had come to be practised in the Western World, and the narrowness to which the margins of error and profit had been reduced *pari passu*, in this Western social milieu, by the competitiveness of Western capitalistic enterprise in its adolescence, may have been without precedent in other civilizations' histories. As for the insurance business, the insurance of commercially valuable commodities other than merchant ships and their cargoes seems to have been a Late Modern Western innovation; and, when we glance at the divers ramifications of a latter-day Western insurance business, we find in them as many demonstrations that 'laws of Nature', operating regularly enough to afford possibilities of making financial profits from statistical predictions with narrow margins, were in force, not only in the realm of Non-Human Nature in which the risks of damage or destruction by the blind fury of storm or tempest were run by sailors in ships at sea, but also in fields in which a waywardly purposeful human intelligence and human will had some power arbitrarily to interfere with a Non-Human Nature's course.¹

The proven profitability of the insurance business in quoting premiums for accepting risks on storm-damage to ships and crops, lightning-damage to ricks and buildings, frost-damage to waterpipes, and pest-damage to fruit-trees and livestock was neither so remarkable nor so significant as the likewise proven profitability of insurance policies into which the human factors of intelligence and will did enter in divers measures. The death, for example, that was the subject of the wager in a life policy² was an event which the human intelligence and will were

¹ This latter-day Western insurance business was conducted on the assumption that God, if He existed, was the god of the eighteenth-century deists, who could be counted upon to be content to reign, while leaving it to Nature to govern and leaving it to Man to harness Nature by exerting his intellectual ingenuity upon her. In the technical terminology of this business, 'an act of God' was an event which, in the business relations between the two parties to an insurance policy, was the counterpart of a miracle in the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim meaning of that term, because it was something that had not been foreseen or provided for in the policy, as a miracle was something incongruous with what had come to be taken as being the normal course of Nature. An earthquake, for example, would be 'an act of God' in the construing of a policy on the structure of a building which gave cover only against the risk of damage or destruction by fire; but it would not be 'an act of God' in the construing of a policy which did cover the risk of damage or destruction by earthquake as well. It will be seen that the sphere of God's operation, in the meaning of this quaint professional jargon, would be perpetually expanding or contracting in accordance with the variations in the terms of the contracts negotiated between underwriters and their clients.

² The latter-day Western life insurance business could never have been launched if the pioneer entrepreneurs in this field had not been able to lay hands on data for statistics that were both abundant enough and accurate enough to enable them, from the outset, to quote rates of premium in which the margin of allowance for the element of statistical uncertainty would be narrow enough to make it possible for the transaction to fulfil simultaneously the two commercially requisite conditions of being neither prohibitively expensive for the party seeking to be insured nor prohibitively hazardous for the party proposing to invest capital in covering the acceptance of risks.

This statistical stock-in-trade with which the pioneer Western life insurance companies started business consisted of the statistical patterns discernible in three sets of data: 'the Breslau Table' (*editum* A.D. 1693) compiled by Dr. Edmund Halley from records of deaths in the Silesian city of Breslau in the years A.D. 1687-91; 'the Northampton Table'

able in some cases to postpone, though they were powerless to avert it in the long run, while, in an age in which Western preventive medicine was making sensational advances, will and intelligence were showing themselves able to mitigate, and even to avert, sickness on the grand scale, without, of course, being able to prevent death through sickness from supervening in the last resort. When it came to accepting risks of accidents, the insurance business was venturing into a field on the borderline between the domain of a physical and a subconscious psychic life, that were both governed by ascertainably, and therefore predictably, working 'laws of Nature', and the domain of a personal intelligence and will that were free to pursue their own purposes. The risk of accidents being caused by personal carelessness and recklessness was manifestly far less easy to calculate than the risk of automatic physical and subconscious psychic responses proving inadequate to cope with an emergency occurring too suddenly to give the party's will and intelligence the time to come into action. Nevertheless, the insurance business had found it profitable to cover risks not only of accidents but of burglaries, which were conscious, deliberate, and often carefully planned personal acts.

The fact that commercial profits could be made out of insuring against risks of burglaries demonstrated that individual acts of human will might be subject to 'laws of Nature' that would be statistically ascertainable if the instances could be mustered in sufficient numbers; and this commercially successful establishment of a burglary branch of the insurance business in the history of a Late Modern Western Society was also an indication that the dominion of 'laws of Nature' over individual acts of will might prove not to be confined to the ordinary affairs of private people but to extend to those extraordinary public affairs which had been the conventional theme of History in all societies in process of civilization¹ until the nineteenth-century Western historians had expanded their horizon to include the ordinary affairs of private people in their panorama. The latter-day Western phenomenon of burglary insurance had this historical significance in the field of public affairs because burglaries were the counterparts in private life of acts of military aggression and diplomatic chicanery in public life—as a captured Tyrrhenian pirate

(*editum* A.D. 1783) compiled from records of deaths, recording the ages at death, in a parish comprising the greater part of the English city of Northampton in the years A.D. 1735-80; and 'the Carlisle Table' (*editum* A.D. 1815) compiled from censuses taken in A.D. 1780 and 1787 and from records of deaths in the years A.D. 1779-87 in two parishes of the English city of Carlisle.

When once the life insurance companies had begun to transact the business which this original fund of statistical information had enabled them to start, their own records began to provide them with a great and ever growing volume of data to serve them for the elaboration and refinement of their statistics with an eye to increasing their aggregate profits by transacting business on ever narrower margins. The first table to be constructed entirely from life insurance records was 'Morgan's Equitable Table' (*editum* A.D. 1834), which was based on the experience of the Equitable Life Assurance Society.

Accounts of these primordial foundations on which the Modern Western life insurance business's indispensable statistical apparatus was originally based will be found in Farren, E. J.: 'The History of Assurance', in *The Assurance Magazine*, vol. i (London 1851, Layton), pp. 42-46; Raynes, H. E.: *A History of British Assurance* (London 1948, Pitman), pp. 125-30; Anderson, J. L., and Dow, J. B.: *Actuarial Statistics* (Cambridge 1948, University Press, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 158-60. The writer of this Study was directed to these authorities by the kindness of Mr. Thomas Wallas, the General Manager of the London and Lancashire Insurance Company, Ltd.

¹ See pp. 182-4, above.

once pointed out to a self-righteous Alexander the Great, if we are to give credence to a celebrated anecdote.¹ Meanwhile, in the field of private affairs, the recognition that individual acts of will had only to occur in sufficiently large numbers in order to become amenable to commercially lucrative statistical calculations was a discovery that had not had to wait for a latter-day Western insurance business to bring it to light. The economic demand that had been profitably catered for by the Egyptian potter, the Nomad conductor of caravans, and the Syriac innkeeper, long before any Western manufacturing concern, omnibus, railway, or airways company, or hotel or restaurant proprietor had put in an appearance, was, of course, for the purpose of our present inquiry, a statistical quantum of the same quality as the insurance risk of burglary, inasmuch as it was a collectively regular, and therefore predictable, statistical pattern emerging from an aggregate of individually wayward, and therefore unpredictable, acts of personal will.

(b) 'LAWS OF NATURE' IN THE ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF AN INDUSTRIAL WESTERN SOCIETY

The statistical patterns discernible in the fluctuations of demand and supply in the dealings between caterers and their customers were woven, in the social woof and weft of an Industrial Western Society, into a wider network of economic regularities, uniformities, and recurrences revealing themselves statistically in the aggregate effects of numerous personal acts which, individually, were too wayward to be predictable. At the time of writing, half way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the state of knowledge and the range of activities in this particular field were illuminating for the study of the questions whether the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization were or were not governed by any 'laws of Nature', and, if they were, then to what extent and degree. By this date the man in the street in an Occidental Babylon had already long since come to take for granted the reality of 'booms' and 'slumps' whose alternations had made or marred his private fortunes perhaps more than once in his own personal experience; but the pattern of these popularly recognized 'business cycles' had not yet been worked out in statistical terms with sufficient clarity or precision to have emboldened the in-

¹ 'If justice is eliminated, what are states but gangs of robbers writ large (*quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia*)? For, after all, what are gangs of robbers but states writ small? . . . The captured pirate's retort to Alexander the Great was as neat as it was true. When the king asked the man what he meant by infesting the sea, he gave the frank and truculent answer: "What do you mean, pray, by infesting the globe? The only difference is that, because I do it with one small ship, I am called a robber, while you are called an emperor because you do it with a great fleet."—Saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book IV, chap. 4, already quoted in VI. vii. 210, n. 1.

This truth had, of course, always been unpalatable to heads of states. Early in the year A.D. 1936, one of Hitler's subjects who had invited the writer of this Study to give a lecture in Berlin found himself constrained to translate orally to his Führer a passage in one of this prospective visitor's published works in which the Englishman had written that 'it was shocking to see the head of a state—even when he was the leader of a recently victorious revolutionary movement—shooting down his own former henchmen in the style of an American "gangster"'. On the 29th–30th June, 1934 (*Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London 1935, Milford), p. 325). Hitler's comment on this was: 'That is not fair, because the gangsters do it for money, and I did not do it for that.' The naïveté of this line of defence was engaging, but it did not impugn the justice of the Tyrrhenian pirate's point.

surance companies to open up a new branch of their business by quoting premiums for insurance against the formidable risks arising from economic fluctuations.¹ On the other hand, scientific investigators had rushed in where business men were still fearing to tread; and, in Modern Western history, disinterested scientific research had been apt to be followed by a profitable industrial application of the results as surely as, in the field of contemporary Western colonial enterprise, the advent of the missionary had been followed by that of the trader and the soldier.

The still disinterestedly academic students of latter-day Western 'business cycles' seemed, *circa* A.D. 1952, to be agreed that these particular economic patterns were peculiar to a social milieu in which a monetary economy had driven a barter economy off the field, in which Agriculture had become socially subordinate to Commerce and Industry, and in which the process of manufacture (in defiance of the etymology of the word) had come to be performed by power supplied, not by the muscles of men and non-human animals, but by inanimate forces of Nature ranging from winds caught in the sails of ships and windmills to electrons liberated in plant capable of splitting atoms.

'Business cycles which affect the fortunes of the mass of people in a country, which succeed each other continuously, and which attain a semblance of regularity, do not become prominent in the economic history of a country until a large proportion of its people are living mainly by making and spending money incomes.'²

'The "cause", if we wish to use that term, of business cycles . . . is to be found in the habits and customs (institutions) of men which make up the money economy, with its money and credit, prices, private property, buying and selling, and so on—all loaded, so to speak, on the industrial process.'³

In the history of the Western Civilization, business cycles had made their epiphany *pari passu* with the prevalence of a money economy in which the incentive to economic action was a desire to earn profits reckoned in monetary values;⁴ and this cyclic rhythm in the flow of economic activity was a phenomenon that appeared to be peculiar to Modern Western business organization.⁵

'Presumably this contention that business cycles arise from that peculiar form of economic organisation which has come to prevail in England within the last two centuries, and over much of the World in more recent times, would be admitted by most theorists.'⁶

'The conception of business cycles obtained from a survey of contemporary reports starts with the fundamental fact of rhythmical fluctua-

¹ The unwillingness of the insurance companies to do business in economic fluctuations up to date was probably due to an excessive uncertainty in the relevant statistics rather than to an excessive timidity or conservatism on the part of business men who had recently ventured no less spiritedly than profitably into the new field opened up for insurance by the mechanization of road traffic.

² Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles, The Problem and its Setting* (New York 1927 (2nd impression 1930), National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 458. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the author and the publishers.

³ Frank, L. K.: 'A Theory of Business Cycles,' in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. xxxvii (Cambridge, Mass. 1923, Harvard University Press), pp. 625-42, quoted by Mitchell in *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 61.

⁴ See Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 62 and 63.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

tions in activity, and adds that these fluctuations are peculiar to countries organised on a business basis, that they appear in all such countries, that they tend to develop the same phase at nearly the same time in different countries, that they follow each other without intermissions, that they are affected by all sorts of non-business factors, that they represent predominant rather than universal changes in trend, and that, while they vary in intensity and duration, the variations are not so wide as to prevent our identifying different cases as belonging to a single class of phenomena.¹

In the intellectual history of an industrial Western Society the phenomenon of trade cycles had been discovered empirically from direct social observation before it had been confirmed statistically from patterns discernible in collections of data.² The earliest known description of it had been given in A.D. 1837 by a British observer, S. J. Loyd, *alias* Lord Overstone (*vivebat* A.D. 1796–1883), in the light of experience in Great Britain since the time of the Napoleonic Wars;³ and there was nothing to suggest that this empirically demonstrated relativity of the phenomenon to the social milieu in which it presented itself was not one of its intrinsic features. In a book first published in A.D. 1927 an American student of business cycles declared his belief that 'the characteristics of business cycles may be expected to change as economic organisation develops'.⁴ On the basis of 'business annals' compiled by another American scholar, W. L. Thorp,⁵ from non-statistical evidence for the economic history of the West in its Industrial Age, a third American scholar⁶ had descried, within the longer Time-span illuminated by this less precise but more widely ranging kind of information, a secular tendency towards a prolongation of the wave-length of 'business cycles' of the shortest kind. In the light of these data, F. C. Mills had calculated that the mean wave-length of a short cycle was 5.86 years in the early stages of industrialization, 4.09 years in a subsequent stage of rapid economic transition, and 6.39 years in a succeeding state of relative economic stability; and, in the judgement of the first of the three American scholars just cited, expressed in a book first published in A.D. 1927,⁷ 'there can be little doubt that the average duration of business cycles has undergone secular changes in the countries for which Thorp has compiled the longest records'. In a book published in A.D. 1939 a German economist, in whose belief 'innovation' was 'the outstanding fact in the economic history of Capitalist Society'⁸ and was at the same time the cause of the cyclic fluctuations in

¹ Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting* (New York 1930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), pp. 458–9.

² See Hawtrey, R. G.: 'The Monetary Theory of the Trade Cycle and its Statistical Test', in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. xli (Cambridge, Mass. 1927, Harvard University Press), p. 471. 'No statistical finding can ever prove or disprove a proposition which we have reason to believe by virtue of simpler and more fundamental facts' (Schumpeter, J. A.: *Business Cycles* (New York 1939, McGraw-Hill, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 33).

³ See Hawtrey, *ibid.*, pp. 471–2.

⁴ Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

⁵ Thorp, W. L.: *Business Annals* (New York 1926, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.).

⁶ Mills, F. C., in *The Journal of the American Statistical Association*, December 1926, pp. 447–57.

⁷ Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting* (New York 1930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 415.

⁸ Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 86. The same authority, in *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 223, defines Capitalism as 'that form of private property economy in which innovations are

this society's economic life, made it clear that this thesis of his was restricted in its application to the social milieu of the Western World in its Industrial Age,¹ and hazarded the guess that this particular social milieu in this particular society might already be passing away by the time at which he was writing.² In a book published in A.D. 1947 a Belgian economist had expressed the view that

'l'expansion contemporaine . . . ne peut être qu'un épisode de l'histoire de l'humanité et doit se terminer un jour, soit devant des impossibilités matérielles de continuer, soit parce que le complexe économique et social provoque la désagrégation de l'effort, soit enfin parce que les aspirations collectives se donnent un autre bout'.³

Yet, ephemeral though the social milieu of these pulsations in the flow of economic activity might prove to be, and brief though the experience of these peculiar phenomena, occurring in these peculiar circumstances, had actually been up to date, the fathers of a Western economic science had succeeded, within less than two hundred years of the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain,⁴ in describing economic cycles of divers wave-lengths in latter-day Western history, without allowing themselves to be inhibited by an age-old conundrum of Formal Logic that was paralysing contemporary non-economic Western historians. The Western economists satisfied the non-economic historians' most exacting Rankean requirements in studying the course of history *wie es eigentlich gewesen* and in taking due account of the element of uniqueness in each single historical datum; but, unlike the non-economic historians, they did not fail to grasp the not very novel or abstruse logical points that there was also an element of uniformity common to one datum and another and that this element of uniformity, so far from being proved illusory by the coexistence of the element of uniqueness, was the background against which the element of uniqueness showed up, and without which it would have been invisible.⁵

This difference-in-likeness and likeness-in-difference was noted, for example, by an investigator who had described a series of seven cycles in the fluctuations of the incidence of unemployment in the economic history of the United Kingdom during the years A.D. 1850-1914:

"The general movement is . . . rhythmic, both in respect of wave-lengths and of amplitude. . . . The rhythm is rough and imperfect.⁶ All

carried out by means of borrowed money, which in general, though not by logical necessity, implies credit creation'.¹ See Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 144 and 223.

² See *ibid.*, p. 145.

³ Dupriez, L. H.: *Les Mouvements Économiques Généraux* (Louvain 1947, Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 280.

⁴ In Schumpeter's opinion, the minimum span of known history that was required for a study of cycles in Modern Western economic life was of the order of 250 years (*op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 220).

⁵ The truth is, of course, as has been pointed out by W. C. Mitchell in *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting* (New York 1930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 382, that the problem presented by the simultaneous uniqueness and uniformity of the specimens of a species is a general problem of thought, not a special problem peculiar to thought about business cycles.

⁶ According to Mitchell, *ibid.*, pp. 377 and 453-4, the statistical and the annalistic evidence concurred in indicating that business cycles were 'cyclic' in the sense of being measurable recurrences, but were not 'periodic' in the sense of being measurable recurrences with a uniformly regular wave-length.—A.J.T.

the recorded cycles are members of the same family, but among them there are no twins.¹

The same finding was reported by a student of the general economic history of Great Britain during the years A.D. 1790-1914:

'A reading of the evidence, statistical and qualitative, on the movements within the British economy in modern times, taken year by year, month by month, or week by week, leaves two enduring impressions. First, one is impressed with the uniqueness and variety of the story of economic life. The combinations of forces within the moving economy are, like those in political life, in an important sense always new and fresh. No year is quite like another year;² and after a time one gets to know them like old friends. . . . Second, one is impressed with the solid reality of the cyclical pattern which steadily recurs, in Britain and then—gradually widening—throughout the World,³ from the end of the American Revolution to the outbreak of the First World War. No two cycles, of course, are quite the same; and one can trace, as well, certain long-period changes in the character of cycles. But it is evident that the whole evolution of Modern Society in the West occurred in a rhythmic pattern, which had consequences for social and political, as well as for economic, events.⁴

This finding that the spectacle of likeness-in-difference is no peculiar feature of British nineteenth-century economic history, but is discernible in contemporary Western economic history as a whole, is endorsed by an impressive consensus of authoritative opinions. For instance, the authors of an essay in measuring business cycles find that

'Two conclusions emerge from this analysis. In the first place our tests, so far as they go, bear out the concept of business cycles as units of roughly concurrent fluctuations in many activities.⁵ In the second place they demonstrate that, although cyclical measures of individual series usually vary greatly from one cycle to the next, there is a pronounced tendency towards repetition in the relations among the movements of different activities in successive business cycles. Our analysis of hundreds of time series is sufficiently advanced to give us full confidence in these conclusions. Later monographs will demonstrate . . . that business-cycle phenomena are far more regular than many historical-minded students believe.'⁶

'Strictly speaking, every business cycle is a unique historical episode. . . . Business cycles differ in their duration as wholes and in the relative

¹ Pigou, A. C.: *Industrial Fluctuations*, 2nd ed. (London 1929, Macmillan), pp. 12-13.

² 'Each one [instance in any series of instances of a phenomenon: 'fluctuations, crises, booms, depressions'] is a historic individual and never like any other, either in the way it comes about or in the picture it presents' (Schumpeter, op. cit., vol. i, p. 34).—A.J.T.

³ According to Pigou, op. cit., p. 11, industrial fluctuations became oecumenical in their range from about A.D. 1872 onwards. 'Bare as they are and short their span, the annals reveal a secular trend towards territorial expansion of business relations and a concomitant trend towards economic unity', and this both within the United States and in the World at large, according to Mitchell, *ibid.*, p. 446. Cp. p. 456.—A.J.T.

⁴ Rostow, W. W.: *British Economy of the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 31-32.

⁵ 'The swings of the different industries are not independent. . . . They are concordant in direction. We may fairly speak of common swings of expansion and contraction in the main body of industries taken separately, and not merely in the aggregate or average of industries. But . . . the amplitudes of the swings in different occupations are very far from concordant; some are much larger than others' (Pigou, A. C.: *Industrial Fluctuations*, 2nd ed. (London 1929, Macmillan), p. 13).—A.J.T.

⁶ Burns, A. F., and Mitchell, W. C.: *Measuring Business Cycles* (New York 1946, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 488-91.

duration of their component phases; they differ in industrial and geographical scope; they differ in intensity; they differ in the features which attain prominence; they differ in the quickness and the uniformity with which they sweep from one country to another. . . . [But] differences among business cycles . . . afford no reason for doubting that these cycles constitute a valid species of phenomena.¹

'A tendency toward alternations of prosperity and depression must have considerable constancy and energy to stamp its pattern upon economic history in a world where other factors of most unequal power are constantly present. . . .² The quiet business forces working towards uniformity of fortunes must be powerful indeed to impress a common pattern upon the course of business cycles in many countries.'³

These findings reappear in a judicious surveyor's panoramic view:

'Each cycle, each period of prosperity or depression, has its special features which are not present in any, or not in many, others. In a sense, each cycle is an historical individual: each is embedded in a social-economic structure of its own. Technological knowledge, methods of production, degree of capital-intensity, number, quality, and age-distribution of the population, habits and preferences of consumers, social institutions in the widest sense including the legal framework of Society, practice in the matter of interventions of the State and other public bodies in the economic sphere, habits of payment, banking practices and so forth—all these factors change continuously and are not exactly the same in any two cases. . . .

'This . . . raises the question whether it is possible to make any general statements at all as to the causes and conditions of cycles—in other words, whether the same theory holds for the cycles in the first half of the nineteenth century and for those in the second quarter of the twentieth century, for the cycles in the industrial countries of Western Europe and the United States and for those in the agricultural countries of Eastern Europe and overseas. . . .

'We believe . . . that a very general theory of the most important aspects of the Cycle can be evolved, which will not on the one hand be so formal as to be useless for practical purposes, while, on the other hand, it will have a very wide field of application. . . . The mere fact that each cycle is an historical individual is not a sufficient argument against a general theory. Are there two men who are in all respects alike? Does this dissimilarity in many respects destroy the possibility and practical usefulness of Anatomy, Physiology, etc.? That each cycle is unique in many respects does not prevent all cycles from being similar in other respects, over and above those similarities which constitute the fundamental elements of the Cycle.'⁴

In this summing up, certain salient features emerge. Three points are picked out by A. C. Pigou:⁵ 'the first general characteristic of industrial fluctuations is their wide international range; the second, the rough similarity among successive cycles; the third, the general concordance in timing and direction between the wave movements of different occupations.' W. C. Mitchell's first and last word is that 'business history repeats

¹ Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting* (New York 1930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), pp. 354 and 383.

² *Ibid.*, p. 421.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 450.

⁴ Haberler, G.: *Prosperity and Depression: A Theoretical Analysis of Cyclical Movements*, 3rd ed. (Geneva 1941, League of Nations), pp. 275-6.

⁵ Pigou, A. C.: *Industrial Fluctuations*, 2nd ed. (London 1929, Macmillan), p. vii.

itself, but always with a difference', which does not, however, make the search for uniformities either impracticable or useless.¹ Considering the paucity of the data at the inquirers' disposal so far, it was not surprising to find that some of the four or five different kinds of cycles which different investigators had claimed to have discovered should have been less widely accepted than others as being proven historical realities, or that there should have been still undecided controversies over many points concerning even those kinds of cycles that had won recognition by a general consensus of authoritative scholars; the remarkable and significant features in the history of a still adolescent Modern Western economic science had been the boldness with which a band of intellectual pioneers had made use of the still scanty data at their disposal for hazarding generalizations, and the extent of the fundamental agreement underlying their superficial domestic quarrels. The attitude prevalent among economists mid-way through the twentieth century is made clear in the following passage of a letter, dated the 2nd December, 1949, from Professor T. S. Ashton to the writer of this Study in answer to inquiries on these points:

'There is no doubt whatsoever of the existence of what may reasonably be called a trade or business cycle in the nineteenth century: all are agreed on that. It is equally clear that the booms and slumps occurred at the same time, or almost the same time, in all industrialised countries and in the less developed areas connected with these by trade. The only dispute is as to the periodicity.'

Of the four or five kinds of cycles in view, the best established at the time of writing seemed to be one with a wave-length of something between 11 and 7 years² or something between 10 and 7 years;³ of 9.4 years reckoning from peak to peak (between the dates A.D. 1792 and A.D. 1913), and 9 years reckoning from trough to trough (between the dates A.D. 1788 and A.D. 1914), in a series discernible in the economic history of Great Britain;⁴ and of 9.2 years on the average.⁵

A cycle with a wave-length of about four years on the average had been described, by at least one observer, alternating with the nine-year cycle in Great Britain during the first phase of her Industrial Age; but, in this observer's view, these four-years cycles 'tend virtually to disappear from the array of trade cycles [in the history of Great Britain] after 1860', except for a special case in A.D. 1907;⁶ and he accounts for this progressive submergence of four-years cycles by nine-years cycles in Great Britain

¹ See Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles and their Causes*, being a new edition of the author's *Business Cycles, Part III* (Berkeley, Cal. 1941, University of California Press), pp. ix-xi.

² See Hawtrey, op. cit., p. 476.

³ Professor T. S. Ashton in a personal letter of the 2nd December, 1949, to the writer of this Study. In this letter, Professor Ashton draws attention to 'clearly marked booms in England in 1818, 1825, 1836, 1845, 1856, 1866, 1873, 1882, 1889/90, 1899/1900, 1906, 1913, and so on'. According to Mitchell, *Business Cycles, The Problem and its Setting*, p. 334, 'the memorable cycles which culminated in 1882, in 1893, in 1907, in 1917 and in 1920 stand out clearly in all our curves'.

⁴ See Rostow, op. cit., p. 38, n. 1.

⁵ See Huntington, E.: *Mainsprings of Civilisation* (New York 1945, Wiley), p. 477. The cycle of this wave-length had been first brought to light by Clément Juglar in *Des Crises Commerciales et de leur Retour Périodique* (Paris 1892, Guillaumin, et aux États-Unis 1st ed.: Paris 1862, Guillaumin; 2nd ed.: Paris 1882, Guillaumin).

⁶ Rostow, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

by interpreting the four-years cycle as an 'inventory cycle' whose 'character stems from the nature of the merchant's trade', and 'which one could, almost certainly, trace back into the eighteenth century, and perhaps even back to mediaeval times'.¹ He points out 'that, until about the [eighteen-] fifties, the principal British exports were consumers' rather than capital goods',² but that, 'from the late 1780's at least, . . . this rhythm is woven into the longer and deeper rhythm of fluctuations in long-term investment',³ and that the sixth decade of the nineteenth century marks the date at which, in the economic life of Great Britain, long-term investment in capital goods supplanted the production of consumers' goods as the country's major economic activity.⁴ 'The two types of fluctuations', however, 'did not pursue their course in separate and discrete channels. They were linked in at least four ways.'⁵

Students of the economic history of the United States in the Industrial Age had here described a cycle with a wave-length of 42 or 43 months on the average.⁶

'The average (and the model) American cycle seems to be made up of two unequal segments, a two-year period of gradually increasing activity, and a period, four to six months shorter, of less gradually shrinking activity.'⁷

The same school of American investigators had seen in this three-and-a-half-years cycle in the United States one local variant of a kind, likewise exemplified in the four-years cycle in Great Britain, of which there were other local variants to be found in the contemporary economic histories of France, Germany, and Austria⁸—the chronological locus of this short-wave cycle lying within minimum and maximum limits of three and six years.⁹ On the other hand, in the opinion of a Belgian scholar,

'Pour qui dépasse le cadre de l'histoire des États-Unis, la distinction entre le cycle de sept à dix ans et le cycle court de quarante mois ne trouve plus aucun semblant de confirmation dans les faits: le cycle de quarante mois n'existe simplement pas.'¹⁰

A British scholar,¹¹ who likewise discounts, as being dubious, the evidence for the existence 'of a purely commercial short wave of about 3½ years', also makes the same reservation of judgement about the evidence for the existence 'of longer waves of from 20 to 80 years' duration'. 'Long cycles of remarkably regular duration'—with a chronological locus between minimum and maximum limits of fifteen and twenty years—were described nevertheless, by some investigators, in the history of building construction in the United States;¹² and, in the general economic history of Great Britain between A.D. 1790 and A.D. 1914, five phases of an average wave-length of just under twenty-five years were described by one of the investigators already quoted.¹³

¹ Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 41. Cp. pp. 39-40.

² *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41, n. 1.

⁵ Enumerated *ibid.*, p. 43.

⁶ Mitchell, *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting*, p. 341. See also Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 463-8.

⁷ Mitchell, *ibid.*, p. 337.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 457.

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 385 and 390-1.

¹⁰ Dupriez, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 280.

¹¹ Professor T. S. Ashton, in the letter quoted above.

¹² See Burns, A. F., and Mitchell, W. C.: *Measuring Business Cycles* (New York 1946, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 418.

¹³ See Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

These economic cycles of the order of magnitude of about a quarter of a century, which W. W. Rostow detects in a British setting, are articulated by him as follows:

(i) A.D. 1790-1815: A war-period of economic stagnation and of decline in real wages.¹

(ii) A.D. 1815 to the end of the eighteen-forties: 'This was the period when the rates of increase in industrial production were at a maximum for the whole era to A.D. 1914';² and it was also a period in which 'real wages rose for a rapidly expanding population'.³

(iii) The end of the eighteen-forties to A.D. 1873: A war-period, gold-mining period, and railway-building period.⁴

(iv) A.D. 1873-1900: A counterpart of Period (ii), with a tendency, in investment, to concentrate on openings at home.⁵

(v) A.D. 1900-14: A counterpart of Period (iii), with a corresponding spurt in gold-mining and a tendency to invest abroad in economically virgin fields.⁶

It will be seen that the last four of these five phases of an average wave-length of just under 25 years coalesce into a pair of still longer cycles, one taking fifty-eight years (A.D. 1815-73) and an at least partially repetitive successor taking forty-one years (A.D. 1873-1914) if the year 1914 is to be regarded as marking this second cycle's close.

A chronological pattern not unlike that described by W. W. Rostow in the history of Great Britain between the years A.D. 1790 and 1914 had been described by A. Spiethoff in the contemporary history of the Western World as a whole during the years A.D. 1822 to 1913 inclusive, where the German investigator finds four phases of an average wave-length of twenty-three years, articulated as follows:⁷

(i) A.D. 1822-42: on the whole, depressed.

(ii) A.D. 1843-73: on the whole, prosperous.

(iii) A.D. 1874-94: on the whole, depressed.

(iv) A.D. 1895-1913: on the whole, prosperous.

It will be noticed that in Spiethoff's geographically wider vista, as in Rostow's geographically narrower one, there are four phases of an average wave-length of not much less than a quarter of a century⁸ coalescing into a pair of longer cycles which, on Spiethoff's reckoning, take respectively fifty-two years (A.D. 1822-73 inclusive) and forty years (A.D. 1874-1913 inclusive).

The pair of cycles of an average wave-length of about half a century, which emerges from Spiethoff's and from Rostow's vista alike, represents a long-wave kind of cycle which was described independently by a couple of Dutch scholars—J. van Gelderen, who published his findings in A.D. 1913, and G. de Wolff, who endorsed van Gelderen's findings in

¹ Ibid., p. 17.

² Ibid., p. 17.

³ Ibid., p. 19.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 20, 21, and 23.

⁵ Ibid., p. 25.

⁶ Ibid., p. 26.

⁷ As summarized in Habeler, G.: *Prosperity and Depression: A Theoretical Analysis of Cyclical Movements*, 3rd ed. (Geneva 1941, League of Nations), p. 273. See also Schumpeter, op. cit., vol. i, p. 164.

⁸ A twenty-five-years cycle was described by S. S. Kuznets as well (see Mitchell, *ibid.*, p. 226, and S. S. Kuznets himself in his *Secular Movements in Production and Prices* (New York and Boston, 1930, Houghton Mifflin)).

A.D. 1924¹—and by a Russian scholar, N. D. Kondratieff, who published his own findings in A.D. 1926.² Kondratieff articulates his long-wave cycles as follows:³

	<i>Trough</i>	<i>Crest</i>	<i>Trough</i>	<i>Total duration</i>
(i)	<i>circa</i> 1790	1810-17	1844-51	50/60 years
(ii)	1844-51	1870-75	1890-96	40/50 years
(iii)	1890-96	1914-20		

An attempt to correlate these forty/sixty-years 'Kondratieff cycles' with the nine/ten-years 'Juglar cycles' and the three-and-a-half-years 'Mitchell cycles' had been made by J. A. Schumpeter.⁴ His suggestion was that each 'Kondratieff cycle' was a clutch of six 'Juglar cycles', and each 'Juglar cycle' a clutch of three 'Mitchell cycles'.

'We . . . postulate that each Kondratieff should contain an integral number of Juglars, and each Juglar an integral number of Kitchins.⁵ The warrant for this is in the nature of the circumstances which give rise to multiplicity. If waves of innovations of shorter span play around a wave of a similar character but of longer span, the sequences of the phases of the latter will so determine the conditions under which the former rise and break as to make a higher unit out of them, even if the innovations which create them are entirely independent of the innovations which carry the longer wave. . . . For every time series the sweep of any cycle is the trend of the cycles of next lower order. . . . The three deepest and longest depressions of the Industrial Age—1825-30, 1873-8, 1929-34—were depressions in the cycles of all three wave-lengths alike. . . . Barring very few cases in which difficulties arise, it is possible to count off, historically as well as statistically, six Juglars to a Kondratieff and three Kitchins to a Juglar—[and this] not [just] as an average, but in every individual case.'⁶

Schumpeter's hypothesis had not, however, won the support of W. C. Mitchell.

'No arrangement of our monthly measures in groups of three consecutive cycles will produce an approximation to "Juglar cycles" of from nine to ten years.⁷ . . . The evidence is better that business cycles vary substantially within periods of "Juglar cycles" than that they do so within the long-cycle periods.⁸ . . . The trough dates of the "Juglar cycles" correspond roughly to the trough dates of severe business depressions.'⁹

But, in the estimation of W. C. Mitchell and his colleague A. F. Burns, it remained still an open question whether 'the periods separating severe depressions are genuine cyclical units,'¹⁰ while the same two investigators' judgement on the 'Kondratieff cycles' was that the evidence told, on balance, against their claim to be realities.¹¹

¹ See Mitchell, *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting*, p. 227.

² Kondratieff, N. D.: 'Die Langen Wellen der Konjunktur', in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, December 1926; 'The Long Waves of Economic Life', in *Statistics*, November 1935.

³ As summarized in Mitchell, *ibid.*, pp. 227-8.

⁴ Schumpeter, J. A.: 'The Analysis of Economic Change', in *The Review of Economic Statistics*, May 1935, p. 8.

⁵ *Alias* Mitchells.—A.J.T.

⁶ Schumpeter, J. A.: *Business Cycles* (New York 1939, McGraw-Hill, 2 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 172-4.

⁷ Burns, A. F., and Mitchell, W. C.: *Measuring Business Cycles* (New York 1946, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 442.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 448.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 464. Cp. p. 460.

¹¹ See *ibid.*, p. 465.

It will be seen that the believers in the three-and-a-half-years cycle and the believers in the nine-years cycle were each sceptical about the reality of the others' article of faith, and that both schools alike were still more sceptical about the reality of the 'Kondratieff cycle' with a reputed wave-length of about fifty years. At the same time it will be realized that, midway through the twentieth century, the data were still scanty indeed; for, even if the earliest occurrences of the phenomena themselves were anterior to the last decade of the eighteenth century, there was at any rate no adequate evidence for them earlier than that date; and it is manifest that, within the span of 160 years running from A.D. 1790 to A.D. 1950, there had not been time for the completion of more than forty-five three-and-a-half-years cycles, more than seventeen nine-and-one-fifth-years cycles, or more than three fifty-years cycles. Even if the count of instances of the shortest and therefore most numerous represented of these three kinds of cycles were to be multiplied by reckoning as so many separate data the simultaneous epiphanies of one and the same occurrence in different geographical provinces of the Western World, the total number would still stand in three figures.

'In the sense in which the term is used here—recurrences of prosperity, recession, depression, and revival in the business activities of countries taken as units—the total number of past business cycles may well be less than a thousand. For business cycles are phenomena peculiar to a certain form of economic organisation which has been dominant even in Western Europe for less than two centuries, and for briefer periods in other regions. And the average cycle has lasted five years, if we may trust our data. Of the whole number of cases to date, the 166 cycles we have measured form a significant fraction. . . . We should be glad to have a larger sample; but the present one constitutes an appreciable fraction of its "universe".'¹

The exiguousness of the quantity of data obtainable during the first half of the twentieth century for the investigation of business cycles even of the shortest wave-lengths had deterred investigators from attempting to apply to fluctuations in economic human activities a method of 'periodogram analysis' that had been found to work in the natural sciences. In the, so far, brief history of an Industrial Western Society the series were still too short; it was still uncertain whether these series were strictly periodic; and it was also still uncertain whether, if there were genuine periodicities, these were maintaining themselves over long enough periods for 'periodogram analysis' to be feasible.² Yet, short of going to these mathematical lengths, the investigators of business cycles resorted to mathematical devices that would have horrified any conventionally heterodox contemporary Western historian.

"The procedure adopted in ascertaining secular trends is usually empirical in high degree. Starting with a time series plotted to convenient scale on a chart, the statistician seeks to find for that one series, within the period covered by his data, the line which best represents "the long-time tendencies" shown by the plotted curve. . . . The technical process usually

¹ Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting* (New York 1930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), pp. 395-6 and 397.

² See Mitchell, *ibid.*, pp. 259-60.

consists in (1) fitting a "mathematical curve" (for example, a straight line or a third-degree parabola) to the data, or to the logarithms of the data, by the method of least squares or of moments; (2) computing moving or progressive arithmetic means or moving medians, including in the averages whatever number of items seems to give satisfactory results; (3) first computing moving averages and then fitting trend lines to the results; (4) drawing a free-hand curve through the data representing the investigator's impression, formed from careful study, of the long-time tendency; or (5) using ratios between the paired items of series which are believed to have substantially the same secular trends.¹

The pioneers of a Western economic science had the courage of their convictions, and they were justified in their faith that economic history must make sense by the validity and the value of the intellectual results that they achieved by staking their intellectual fortunes on the rationality of their hypothesis and pushing their interrogations of the data to the third degree.

(c) 'LAWS OF NATURE' IN THE HISTORIES OF CIVILIZATIONS

1. *Struggles for Existence between Parochial States*

The War-and-Peace Cycle in Modern and post-Modern Western History

If, without taking our eyes off the Modern and post-Modern chapters of the history of the Western Civilization, we now focus them on the political, instead of the economic, plane of activity, we shall see that, in an epoch in which the outstanding economic phenomenon was the epiphany and dissemination of Industrialism, the outstanding political phenomenon was the earlier epiphany of a Balance of Power between parochial states and the progressive inclusion of an ever widening circle of states within the field of force governed by this unitary system of inter-state power politics.

The Modern Western political Balance of Power resembled its younger contemporary the Modern Western industrial economy not only in tending to expand progressively over an ever wider geographical area, but also in exhibiting a cyclic rhythm in its history. Alternating phases of war and peace were the political counterparts of alternating phases of economic prosperity and depression; and a confrontation of the political with the economic series of fluctuations in Modern Western history threw fresh light on those cycles with wave-lengths of about twenty-five years, and double cycles with wave-lengths of about half a century, for which the economic evidence was so inadequate that the more cautious economic investigators had returned verdicts of 'non-

¹ Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting* (New York 1930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 213, in chap. iii: 'The Contribution of Statistics', iii: 'The Analysis of Time Series', 3. 'The Problem of Secular Trends', (1) 'The Empirical Approach to the Problem'. Schumpeter (*Business Cycles*, vol. i, pp. 200-5), declares himself sceptical of 'fitted trends' except in so far as these follow a lead given by an empirical investigation of the historical facts. 'Trend analysis by means both of smoothing and of fitting may, from additional theoretical and historical information, derive a right of existence not naturally or generally its own' (p. 203). 'Such trends [as autonomous changes in taste, such as occurred with respect to alcoholic drinks or heavy foods] can in no case be found by formal methods' (p. 205).

proven' on these longer cycles' claims to be economic realities.¹ The political evidence bore out the view, entertained by judicious economic inquirers,² that the apparitions of economic 'long waves' might not be hallucinations but might be economic reflections of political realities that had already been 'a going concern' in the Modern Western World for some three hundred years before the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain.³ In any case, whatever the political cycles' relations to the economic cycles might eventually prove to be, there were indications that the political cycles, like their economic counterparts, were changing in character in accordance with a secular trend. Recurrent Western wars, for example, were, as we shall see, apparently becoming progressively shorter and sharper, while conversely the alternately recurrent spells of peace in Western political history had, as we shall also see, tended to occupy a progressively greater aggregate number of years in each successive peace-and-war cycle down to the outbreak of the general war of A.D. 1914-18, though at the same time these progressive chronological gains for Peace at War's expense were being offset by a progressive aggravation of the economic, the political, and (above all) the spiritual devastation produced by wars when these did recur.

In studying the evidence for the currency of 'laws of Nature' in the economic affairs of a latter-day Western Society, we have noticed that inquirers who believed such laws to be both current and ascertainable were also aware that their validity was confined to a monetary and industrial economic régime which had not established itself, even in its birthplace in Great Britain, before the later decades of the eighteenth century and which might be expected eventually to pass out of existence after an ephemeral appearance, and a still briefer oecumenical ascendancy, on the stage of History.⁴ At the time of writing, mid-way through the twentieth century, the Balance of Power had had a longer innings than Industrialism had had so far in the history of the Western Civilization, since the epiphany of the Modern Western Balance of Power had been coeval with the opening of the modern chapter of Western history in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, some three hundred years before Industrialism had made its appearance. On the other hand a mortality which, in the history of Western industrialism, was at this time still no more than an academic expectation, was perhaps already asserting its dominion over the Balance of Power between parochial Western states.

A post-Modern Age of Western history which had opened in the seventh and eighth decades of the nineteenth century⁵ had seen the rhythm of a Modern Western war-and-peace cycle broken, in the course of its fourth beat, by the portent of one general war following hard at the heels of another, with an interval of only twenty-five years between the outbreaks in A.D. 1939 and in A.D. 1914, instead of the interval of 120 years or more which had separated A.D. 1914 from A.D. 1792 and A.D. 1792 from A.D. 1672. In the histories of civilizations that were already

¹ See pp. 230-2, above.

² For example, by W. W. Rostow, in the passage cited on p. 231, above.

³ See pp. 286-7, below.

⁴ See pp. 224-6, above.

⁵ See I. i. 1, n. 2.

extinct, so that the twentieth-century Western historian had the advantage there of knowing the whole story, such 'non-stop' recurrences of major wars had been apt to portend historic catastrophes. When, in the second chapter of Hellenic history, the Decelean War of 413-404 B.C. had followed the Archidamian War of 431-421 B.C. after an interval of only eight years, the consequence of this Atheno-Peloponnesian double war had been the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization. When the Hannibalic War of 218-201 B.C. had followed the First Romano-Punic War of 264-241 B.C. after an interval of only twenty-three years, the consequence of this Romano-Punic double war had been the first relapse of a broken down and disintegrating Hellenic Society after its first rally.¹ When the Great Romano-Sasanian War of A.D. 603-28 had followed the Great Romano-Sasanian War of A.D. 572-91 after an interval of only twelve years, the consequence had been the obliteration of a frontier between an Hellenic universal state and recalcitrant Iranian Power which, reckoning from the date of its original establishment by the Roman empire-builder Pompey in 64 B.C., had maintained itself for all but seven hundred years by the time when the momentary restoration of the territorial *status quo ante bellum* in A.D. 628 was undone, once for all, by an explosion of Primitive Muslim Arab military force that completed the liquidation of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic ascendancy south of Taurus and re-established in the shape of an Arab Caliphate the Syriac universal state which Alexander had overthrown in the shape of an Achaemenian Empire.

At a moment in the post-Modern chapter of Western history at which the denouement of the double Germano-Western War of A.D. 1914-18 and A.D. 1939-45 was not yet an accomplished fact, the approaching overturn of a Balance of Power which had maintained its precarious existence since its inauguration in the last decade of the fifteenth century had already been announced by a rise in the death-rate of Western or Westernizing Great Powers that had been as steep as it had been sudden; and this carnage was ominous, considering that the first law of every balance, political and physical alike, is that the instability of the equilibrium varies in inverse ratio to the number of its *points d'appui*. While a two-legged stool, chair, or table would be doomed by the impracticability of its construction to fall over in a trice, a three-legged stool is capable of standing by itself, though a corpulent sitter would rest more securely on a four-legged chair and a careful housewife would prefer a six-legged to a four-legged table for carrying a display of her best china. Since politics are never static but are always dynamic, an apter analogy from the chances and changes of physical life is to be found in the superiority of a tricycle over a bicycle as a mount for a rider who finds difficulty in keeping his balance, and the superiority of a six-wheeled omnibus over a four-wheeled car as a vehicle for traversing the sands of the desert. In the light of these homely physical analogies, the rise and decline in the number of Western or Westernizing Great Powers between A.D. 1552 and A.D. 1952 was politically most significant.

From the first epiphany of a Modern Western system of international

¹ See V. vi. 290-1.

relations at the close of the fifteenth century down to the outbreak of the General War of A.D. 1914-18 more than four hundred years later, the precariousness of the international equilibrium in the political life of the Western World had been progressively reduced by a gradual increase in the number of participant Powers of the highest calibre.

In the first bout of Modern Western wars (*gerebatur* A.D. 1494-1559), in which the original constellation of Modern Western Great Powers had crystallized out of a Late Medieval nebula surrounding the city-state cosmos in Northern Italy, Southern and Western Germany, and the Netherlands, there had been a phase (*durabat* A.D. 1519-56)—and this the decisive phase—in which only two Powers of the very highest calibre had been face to face; and this preliminary duel between Valois and Hapsburg, which was the overture to the rhythmic fluctuations of a Balance of Power in the subsequent course of Western political history, was, in the last analysis, a civil war between Valois and Valois,¹ since, in this chapter of Hapsburg history, the heart of the Hapsburg Power was that portion of the heritage of the Burgundian-Valois Duke Charles the Bold which Charles' Hapsburg son-in-law Maximilian I had managed to retain in A.D. 1477-82 for his Burgundian-Valois wife Mary, and to retrieve in A.D. 1493. This Burgundian nucleus of the dominions of a Hapsburg great-grandson and namesake of Charles the Bold who happened to be King of Castile and Aragon² and subsequently Holy Roman Emperor,³ as well as Count of an Imperial Burgundy and a French Flanders,⁴ was the heart which pumped out the life-blood that nourished the Hapsburg Power's sinews of war; and, if Charles V's treasury and arsenal were thus French in their provenance in virtue of being furnished by a Flanders that was a French county, his court was French in its culture in virtue of having been moulded in the tradition of a Burgundy that was a French duchy.

The Burgundian-Valois House had been founded by an act of the French Crown as recently as A.D. 1363, when King John of France had conferred on his fourth son Philip the Bold a Duchy of Burgundy which had escheated to the French Crown through the extinction, in A.D. 1361, of the dukes of the Capetian French line; and the fortunes of this newly endowed Burgundian cadet branch of the House of Valois had been made by Philip the Bold's marriage in A.D. 1369 with the reigning Count of Flanders' daughter and heiress Margaret; for Flanders was a fief of the French Crown that was still more important than Burgundy; and this matrimonial alliance had resulted, on the death in A.D. 1384 of Margaret's father, Count Louis II of Flanders, without male heirs, in the union of the French fief of Burgundy with the French fiefs of

¹ See Fueter, E.: *Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1492-1559* (Munich and Berlin 1919, Oldenbourg), pp. 101-3, for the thesis that the fundamental cause of conflict in this cycle was not a rivalry between the two national states of France and Spain. Fueter suggests that, after Francis I's victory over the Swiss at Marignano on the 13th-14th September, 1515, Spain might have acquiesced in a partition of Italy between herself and France if the union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon with the Hapsburg-Valois Power in A.D. 1516 had not resulted in the subordination of Spanish interests to Burgundian interests in the determination of the foreign policy of Charles V.

² Since the 23rd January, 1516.

³ Since the 28th June, 1519.

⁴ Since the 5th January, 1515.

Flanders, Artois, Nevers, and Rethel and the Imperial County of Burgundy into the bargain.¹

The duel between Royal French Valois and Burgundian Ducal French Valois who were thinly disguised under a Hapsburg Imperial mask did not, however, result in a reunion of these two branches of the House of France which, in the political circumstances of the Western World of the day, would have brought with it a political reunification of Western Christendom under the oecumenical rule of a resuscitated Carolingian Empire; and, in proving to have been at least an 'undecisive contest', if not a 'temperate' one,² this opening round in a rhythmical series of Modern and post-Modern Western wars justified the inauguration of a Balance of Power involving the Western World as a whole³ if the value of this political device is to be measured by its capacity to obtain for a society a maximum amount of political decentralization and maximum degree of cultural diversity at a minimum cost in terms of political friction and military conflict. Thereafter, as the further fluctuations of this Modern Western Balance followed their rhythmic course, they long continued on the whole to serve the interests of a *Homo Occidentalis* who was at once their perpetrator and their victim, if we may find an index of their beneficence in the concomitant net increase in the number of participant Great Powers from the figure of two, at which it had stood on the eve of the abdication of Charles V in A.D. 1555/6, to the figure of eight, at which it stood in A.D. 1914.

In the course of those three centuries and a half, the number of Great Powers in the Western World had gradually risen. It rose from two to three through the fission of the Burgundian-Valois-Hapsburg Power into a Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy and a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy after the abdication of Charles V in A.D. 1555/6,⁴ and then, during

¹ The Imperial County of Burgundy (Franche-Comté) had been inherited in A.D. 1347 by Jeanne, the wife of Count Louis II of Flanders and the daughter of another Jeanne who had been the wife of King Philip V of France and the daughter of Count Otto IV of Franche-Comté. Philip of France had married this older Jeanne in A.D. 1307, ten years before he himself had come to the French throne in A.D. 1317, and Franche-Comté had thus temporarily fallen into the possession of the French Crown; it had then passed into the hands of the Capetian duke of the French Duchy of Burgundy, Odo IV, in A.D. 1330 through his marriage with Margaret, the daughter of Jeanne the elder and sister of Jeanne the younger; thereafter, in A.D. 1347, it had been inherited by Jeanne the younger upon Duke Odo IV of Burgundy's death; and, through Jeanne the younger, it was subsequently inherited by her daughter Margaret upon the death of Jeanne the younger's husband and Margaret's father, Count Louis II of Flanders, in A.D. 1384.

² See Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xxxviii, *ad finem*: 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West'.

³ A local Balance of Power, involving the city-states of Northern and Central Italy, had been in operation during the last half of a millennium running from the death of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II in 1250 to the invasion of Italy by King Charles VIII of France in A.D. 1494.

⁴ The first step towards the construction of a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy had been taken as early as A.D. 1522, when, by a treaty signed at Brussels on the 7th February of that year, Charles V had invested his brother Ferdinand with a regency over the hereditary possessions of the House of Hapsburg. The second step had been taken in A.D. 1526, when the Crowns of Hungary and Bohemia had been conferred on Ferdinand after the Hungarians' disastrous defeat by the 'Osmanlis' at Mohacz (see II. ii. 177-9). The third step was taken when Ferdinand was elected Holy Roman Emperor, in succession to Charles V, on the 28th February, 1558.

The separate existence of a Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy may be dated from Philip II's succession to Charles V in A.D. 1556 in Spain and in the Burgundian dominions, which were thereby reduced to the status of Spanish dependencies.

the first of the regular cycles of war-and-peace in this series (*currebat* A.D. 1568–1672), the number rose again from three to five through the successful self-assertion of a United Northern Netherlands that had broken out of the Spanish Monarchy and a Sweden that had broken out of the Danish Monarchy.

During the second of these three regular cycles (*currebat* A.D. 1672–1792) the number threatened to fall as sharply as it had risen during the preceding cycle; for Spain, as well as the Netherlands and Sweden, now proved unequal to staying the course, while the sixteenth-century fission of the Hapsburg Power into a Spanish and an Austrian branch came into danger of being neutralized by an eighteenth-century union of the Spanish Monarchy with France to create a Bourbon Power which, in the hands of Louis XIV, would have outclassed all the other Powers of the Western World as decidedly as the undivided Hapsburg Power had outclassed its French rival before the abdication of Charles V. None of these possibilities, however, materialized; for the replacement of a Hapsburg by a Bourbon dynasty at Madrid did not, after all, 'abolish the Pyrenees';¹ a Bourbon Spain remained at least as separate from a Bourbon France after A.D. 1713 as a Hapsburg Spain had been, since A.D. 1556, from a Hapsburg Austria; and the casualties among the parvenues 'just-great' Powers were made good by replacements. A United Kingdom of England and Scotland took the place of a United Netherlands who had exhausted herself in winning a General War of A.D. 1672–1713 in which she had been the protagonist in the anti-French coalition; Prussia took the place of a Sweden who had exhausted herself in waging the Northern War of A.D. 1700–21; and, though an eighteenth-century Spain who succeeded in retaining her independence did not succeed in becoming a Great Power again, this gap in the ranks of the Great Powers of the Western World was filled by the enlistment of an Orthodox Christian Russia whose decisive victory over Sweden had demonstrated the effectiveness of her reception of the Western Civilization, at any rate on the military plane.

During the third cycle (*currebat* A.D. 1792–1914) a number which had thus remained constant during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries at the figure of five was raised once more, and this time from five to eight, by the successive additions of a United Italy, a United States of North America, and a Westernizing Japan. A nineteenth-century Italy attained the stature of a 'just-great' Power that had been attained by a seventeenth-century Holland and Sweden. A twentieth-century Japan won her spurs by defeating Russia, as an eighteenth-century Russia had won hers by defeating Sweden. The United States emerged through a fission of an eighteenth-century British Empire which ultimately had the same effect of making two Great Powers out of one as the fission of the Hapsburg Power after the abdication of Charles V, though the secession of the United States from the British Empire was achieved by the force of arms with which Sweden and the United Netherlands had

¹ 'Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées' was Louis XIV's comment on the accession of his grandson to the throne of Spain in A.D. 1700 according to Voltaire, *Le Siècle de Louis Quatorze*, chap. 28.

won their independence from Denmark and Spain, and not by the pacific and amicable process through which the Danubian and the Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy had parted company.¹

Thus, on the eve of the outbreak of a General War of A.D. 1914-18 which was to open the fourth regular cycle in the series, it looked, in the light of the experience of the past 350 years, as if the current Balance of Power in the Western World had ensured its own perpetuation for an indefinite time ahead by progressively increasing the number of the bases on which it rested and if it had come to stand steadily upon eight legs instead of shakily upon two; and this appearance of security was enhanced by the spectacle of a row of ninepins standing in between the legs; for the increase in the number of Great Powers in the Western system of international relations between A.D. 1556 and A.D. 1914 had been accompanied by an increase *pari passu* in the number of 'buffer states' on which the mutually frustrating jealousies of rival Great Powers around them had bestowed an independence that these pigmies would have been incapable of either winning or keeping by force of their own arms. Such 'buffer states' had emerged and survived in so far as the balanced pressures of their powerful neighbours upon one another had happened to create and preserve here and there some nook or cranny in which a militarily impotent minor state could nestle and thrive like a rock-plant in an interstice between the rugged faces of the untooled stones in a wall of cyclopean masonry.²

The United States, for example, in her military and political infancy, had been able to win her independence in the war of A.D. 1775-83 in North America thanks to a temporary neutralization of British sea-power by French sea-power, and had then been able to expand westwards across the Continent by securing the reversion of the Mississippi Basin through the Louisiana Purchase thanks to a preponderance of British sea-power over French sea-power in the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 which had made it impossible for Napoleon to take delivery for France of a Transatlantic territory which he had compelled Spain to retrocede to France on paper. The Latin American republics, in their turn, had owed their independence to a mistrust of the Continental European Powers that had moved Great Britain to co-operate with the United States by tacitly putting the sanction of British sea-power behind President Monroe's announcement of his doctrine on the 2nd December,

¹ The first step in the rise of the United States to the rank of a Great Power was the winning of her independence in the Revolutionary War of A.D. 1775-83. The second step was the development of her potential strength through the political acquisition and economic exploitation of a trans-continental territory (a stage corresponding to the geographical expansion of the Danubian Hapsburg Power in and after A.D. 1526). The third step was the maintenance of the Union by force of arms in the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5 (to which the counterpart in Hapsburg history was the Thirty Years War of A.D. 1618-48). The fourth step was the victory of the United States in the Spanish-American War of A.D. 1898, which drew the United States out of a political isolation that she had been maintaining since A.D. 1783, and involved her in commitments overseas.

² This generation of minor states as a by-product of the pressures exerted by rival Great Powers upon one another, when these pressures neutralize one another, is an outcome of the Balance of Power which has been noticed in this Study already, apropos of the emergence of the city-states of Northern and Central Italy in an interstice between the Holy Roman Empire and the Hildebrandine Papacy (see III. iii. 345-6; IV. iv. 524; and p. 294, below).

1823, in order to make sure that the current insurrections in the Spanish American Empire against the Spanish Crown should not end in a re-establishment of Spanish rule there through the arms and under the aegis of the Powers of the Holy Alliance. The Monroe Doctrine had prescribed that American communities which had declared and maintained their independence were not to be allowed to fall again under the control of any European Power; and, since at the time there were no Great Powers in the Western system of international relations that were not located in Europe, the Monroe Doctrine had been tantamount to a declaration that no Great Power was to be allowed to profit by the break-up of the Spanish Empire in the Americas. It was because the United States was not yet either able or willing to play the part of a Great Power in the European cockpit of Western power politics¹ that the Great Powers of the day acquiesced in her purchase, in A.D. 1803, of Louisiana from France; in her veto, in A.D. 1823, on the entry of any Great Power into the political vacuum created by the collapse of Spanish rule in the Americas; and in her annexation of the northern fringe of the former Spanish dominions in North America, from Texas to California inclusive, after waging a victorious war of aggression against the Spanish Empire's local successor-state, Mexico, in A.D. 1846-7.

A principle thus first established in Western history in respect of the Americas was promptly applied in the Near and Middle East when, on the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1792-1815, 'the Eastern Question' became interwoven with the older strands of Western diplomacy. The break-up of the Ottoman Empire, like the break-up of the Spanish Empire, created a political vacuum that would have been dangerous for the preservation of peace if the Great Powers had engaged in a scramble for Ottoman spoils with an eye to a competitive self-aggrandizement; and, just because this risk of a disturbance of the existing balance might have been impossible to counteract by any means less drastic than a resort to war, it was prudently parried by the concerted institution of a Near Eastern equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine which was none the less efficacious for not being explicitly enunciated.

The measure of the efficacy of this tacit Near Eastern Monroe Doctrine in practice is given by the contrast between the respective destinies of the territories lost by the Ottoman Empire after the year A.D. 1815 on the one hand and before that date on the other hand. While the Ottoman Empire's territorial losses between A.D. 1815 and the final débâcle in A.D. 1918 were far larger than the losses between the turn of the tide in Ottoman-Occidental relations in A.D. 1683 and the end of the Western General War of A.D. 1792-1815, the amount of ex-Ottoman territory that passed under the sovereignty of Western or Westernizing Great Powers in the course of the later of these two periods was trifling compared to the extent of the gains made by the same Powers at Ottoman expense between A.D. 1683 and A.D. 1815. After A.D. 1815 the only gains made by

¹ In the message in which President Monroe warned the Great Powers off the former Spanish dominions in the Americas, he was careful to assure them, in the same breath, that the policy of the United States in regard to Europe was one of benevolent non-interference.

Great Powers at the Ottoman Empire's direct expense¹ were the acquisition of the tiny Caucasian districts of Akhaltzik and Akhalkalaki after the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1828-9 by Russia² and the acquisition of Qars-Ardahan-Batum, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Cyprus by Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain respectively after the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1877-8. All other territories lost by the Ottoman Empire after A.D. 1815 went to the making of the national states of Greece, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. The Hapsburg Monarchy did not even reacquire a Northern Serbia and a Western Wallachia that it had held from A.D. 1718 to A.D. 1739. By contrast, the territories permanently lost by the Ottoman Empire between A.D. 1683 and A.D. 1815³ had all been acquired by one or other of the two adjoining Great Powers in the Western system. Between those two dates the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy had acquired the whole of the Ottoman portion of Hungary and Croatia, together with the Bukovina, and Russia the whole northern and north-eastern hinterland of the Black Sea, from the east bank of the Pruth to the south bank of the Rion, that had formerly lain under Ottoman sovereignty or suzerainty.

These clusters of newly created minor states on the American and the Near Eastern fringes of the Western World were not, however, such remarkable by-products of a latter-day Western Balance of Power as the states of the same small calibre that emerged or survived nearer to the centre of the system, where the political pressure was more severe. The classic case here was the success with which, from A.D. 1667 to A.D. 1945, first France and then Germany had been prevented from acquiring the Southern Netherlands by coalitions of Powers which had taken up arms to preserve the sovereignty of Spain, Austria, and Belgium in turn over this small but strategically important piece of territory. A corresponding play of the Balance of Power had enabled Portugal in the seventeenth century to anticipate the Spanish American countries' nineteenth-century achievement of breaking away from Spain, and had enabled Spain herself, as well as the United Netherlands and Sweden, in the eighteenth century to retain her independence after she had fallen out of the ranks of the Great Powers. On the eve of a General War of A.D. 1914-18 which was to open with Germany's unprovoked violation of the neutrality of Belgium, the existence of nine small neutral states in Western Europe—the three Low Countries, the three Scandinavian Countries, the two Iberian Countries, and Switzerland—looked like an even better augury for the future maintenance of a Western Balance of Power than the existence of eight Great Powers in the World at large at the same date.

Thus, at the time by when the Western Balance of Power had been 'a going concern' for rather more than four hundred years, the international

¹ The North African territories which France and Great Britain respectively brought under their control between A.D. 1830, the date of the beginning of the French conquest of Algeria, and A.D. 1881-2, which witnessed the establishment of a French protectorate over Tunisia and a British military occupation of Egypt, had already ceased to be Ottoman *de facto*, though they were still Ottoman *de jure*.

² See IX. viii. 193, n. 1.

³ The Morea, which was conquered from the Ottoman Empire by Venice in and after A.D. 1684, had been reconquered in A.D. 1715.

outlook wore a deceptively promising appearance. Even if, as was being prophesied by the more sensational-minded publicists at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy that had prolonged its life by coming to terms with Magyar nationalism in the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* of A.D. 1867 were nevertheless to break up, after the death of the venerable King-Emperor Francis Joseph, under the pressure of Slav national movements which the partial settlement of A.D. 1867 had left unsatisfied, the effect on the general system of international relations in the Western World that was expected to follow from a local Danubian débâcle was merely a reduction of the number of the Great Powers from eight to seven. In A.D. 1912 even the boldest prophet would not have dreamed of forecasting that by A.D. 1952 the number would have been reduced, as it actually had been, from the figure of eight which it had reached at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the figure of two at which it had stood between A.D. 1519 and A.D. 1556;¹ yet this drastic reduction had taken place within a span of thirty-two years running from A.D. 1914 to A.D. 1945 inclusive.

The break-up of the Danubian Monarchy, which had duly resulted from the General War of A.D. 1914-18, had proved in the event to be only the first of half a dozen casualties. On the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1939-45 a Prussia-Germany which had gone from strength to strength, until she had come, twice in one life-time, within an ace of conquering the World, now lay not only prostrate but partitioned, with her eastern frontier pushed back westwards to the line at which it had stood eight hundred years earlier.² In Germany's Assyrian fate an Israelite prophet would have seen God's judgement on Germany's Assyrian crimes of deliberately inflicting on Mankind, twice in one life-time, the awful sufferings of a general war and cold-bloodedly violating, in the course of her two orgies of aggression, the neutrality of seven out of those nine West European minor states whose immunity from the blood-tax that was the price of counting as a Great Power had been the touch-stone of the moral worth of a latter-day Western system of international relations. Milder chastisements had requited the punier outrages committed by a National-Socialist Germany's accomplices, Italy and Japan; but the death that had likewise been the fate of the other Great Powers who had been less guiltily involved in the Western general wars of A.D. 1914-18 and A.D. 1939-45 could not be interpreted so convincingly as having been the wages of sin.³ Great Britain and France, as well as Italy and Japan, had failed to stay the course, as the Netherlands and Sweden had failed two hundred years earlier, though the British Empire, like Prussia-Germany, had grown, during the two hundred years ending in A.D. 1914, to a stature at which these two Powers had

¹ The undivided Hapsburg Power which Charles V had held together before his abdication in A.D. 1555/6 had come into his hands by successive steps during the years A.D. 1515-19. On the 5th January, 1515, he had inherited the Kingdom of France; on the 23rd January, 1516, he had succeeded King Ferdinand as King of Aragon and Castile; on the 12th January, 1519, he had succeeded Maximilian I as ruler of the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg; on the 28th June, 1519, he had succeeded Maximilian I as Holy Roman Emperor.

² See II. ii. 169.

³ Rom. vi. 2.

latterly overshadowed all the rest, while France had held the same position of pre-eminence from A.D. 1648 to A.D. 1815.

In A.D. 1952 the Soviet Union and the United States alone were still standing erect; and from a strategico-political standpoint the respective stances of these two Powers *vis-à-vis* one another were reminiscent of those of France and the Burgundian-Hapsburg Power some four hundred years earlier. In an arena which had expanded in the meanwhile beyond the bounds of Western Europe till it had come to be co-extensive with the entire surface of the planet, a prize that had expanded *pari passu* beyond the bounds of Italy, until it had come to embrace the whole of the Old World outside the limits of Russia's present domain, was being contended for in A.D. 1952 between a Russia which enjoyed the advantages of interior lines, compact metropolitan territory, and centralized autocratic government, once enjoyed by France, and a United States whose overwhelming superiority in aggregate strength on paper, when the assets of her dependencies and her allies were added to her own, was largely offset in practice, like the strength of the Count-King-Emperor Charles V, by the liabilities that these assets brought in their train and by the wide dispersion of the scattered territories and populations whose resources America had to defend in order to be able to draw upon them. It was easier for a twentieth-century Russia, as it had been for a sixteenth-century France, to take her adversary by surprise, in making sudden sorties in divers directions, than it was for a twentieth-century United States to mobilize her own and her friends' forces effectively for the arduous task of containing her adversary all the way round a line of circumvallation which, scale for scale, was proportionate in its length to the line which Charles V had once set himself to hold. The strategico-political bearings of a confrontation of two Great Powers, and two only, were thus much the same *circa* A.D. 1952 as they had been *circa* A.D. 1552. Yet, in these geographically similar circumstances, the Western Balance of Power's expectation of life was, for ideological reasons, decidedly less promising in the twentieth century than it had been in the sixteenth.

If the division of power in the Western World between no more than two competitors during the years A.D. 1519-55 had resulted, not in an increase in the number from the dual to the plural but in the reduction of a duality to a unity, the most likely way in which this unification would have been achieved would have been through the negotiation of one more felicitous dynastic marriage; and, even if a miscarriage of matrimonial diplomacy had made it impossible to avoid resorting to the barbarous alternative of unification through force of arms, the unifying war would still have been a temperate one, like those 'undecisive contests' through which the number of the Great Powers was, not diminished, but augmented in the course which history actually took during the three centuries and a half running from A.D. 1556 to A.D. 1914. The Royal French Valois and the Imperial Burgundian Valois were divided by nothing more serious than a dynastic rivalry that could have been removed painlessly by a marriage and almost painlessly by a conquest. They were not estranged from one another by any impassable gulf of incom-

patible religious or ideological faith or practice, such as had come, by A.D. 1952, to be fixed between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

It is true that the ostensible point of difference between the twentieth-century American and the twentieth-century Russian *Weltanschauung* and way of life was not insuperable; for ostensibly the two Powers were at issue over the question of the ratio in which private economic enterprise and public economic enterprise ought to stand to one another in a predominantly industrial society; and this was a question to which the correct answer could not be any absolute 'right or wrong' or 'yes or no', but only an arguable and adjustable 'more or less'. In every phase of every civilization known to History, the economy had always been a combination of public with private enterprise in proportions that had varied continually in response to changes in the social circumstances; the determination of the best mixture for meeting the practical needs of a particular time and place was a question, not of principle touching the religious foundations of life, but of expediency in regulating its economic surface; and, if this had really been all that was at issue between the United States and the Soviet Union in A.D. 1952, their conflict need have been no more tragic than the quarrel between the Burgundian ducal branch and the French royal branch of the House of Valois. The duel in A.D. 1952 was more formidable than the duel in A.D. 1552 because in A.D. 1952 the ostensible economic issue, which was no more serious in itself than the dynastic issue had been, masked a moral issue between the principles and practice of a Totalitarian Autocracy on the one hand and those of a Parliamentary Democracy on the other, in which the then still unanswered question

utrorum ad regna cadendum
Omnibus humanis esset terrâque marique¹

was a matter of life and death for every living human being.

Thus the reversion of the number of Great Powers in a latter-day Western international arena from a maximum figure of eight to a previous figure of two, after a run of some four hundred years of precariously maintained equilibrium between a larger number of gladiators, was an indication that the cyclic rhythm, which was the first law governing this international balance of political power, was itself governed by an overriding law that convicted this system of mortality—as the gyrations that keep a spinning top temporarily in balance are subject to an oscillatory movement that inclines farther, with each gyration, until at last it brings the gyrations to a stop by bringing the top to the ground. This diagnosis was confirmed by other symptoms which pointed the same way as the drastic reduction in the number of the Great Powers between A.D. 1914 and A.D. 1945. All these symptoms, taken together, suggested that the cyclic rhythm which had been keeping the political Balance of Power going during the Modern and post-Modern chapters of Western history was being accompanied by a secular movement that was working steadily towards an eventual overturn of the unstable equilibrium between a plurality of parochial states and towards the replacement of this by an at

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book III, ll. 836-7.

least temporarily stable oecumenical régime in which political power would be a monopoly administered from some single centre.

On a political plane which was the field of cycles of war and peace, as on an economic plane which was the field of 'booms' and 'slumps', the strength of this secular tendency towards integration was indicated by the failure of a concomitant tendency towards geographical expansion to counteract it. By A.D. 1952 the world-wide extension of the tentacles of a Western Industrial System of Economy that had made its epiphany in Great Britain during the later decades of the eighteenth century had been matched by the attraction of all the states then still surviving on the surface of the planet into a Western system of international relations that had made its epiphany in the last decade of the fifteenth century as a local West European political vortex round the nucleus of a Late Medieval city-state cosmos in Italy. In A.D. 1952 the prize at stake in the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union was nothing less than the command over all other habitable lands and navigable sea-routes and airways; and the General War of A.D. 1939-45 had been already 'global', and no longer merely 'European'; for in this war the battlefields had not been confined to a Lombardy and a Flanders that had been the cockpits of latter-day Western warfare during its overture and its first three regular cycles (*currebant* A.D. 1494-1914), and had not been confined, either, to the wider Continental European arena of the General War of A.D. 1914-18, with its western front stretching from the North Sea to the Alps and its eastern front stretching from the Baltic to the Carpathians. The General War of A.D. 1939-45 had been literally 'a world war' in which one battlefield embracing Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Eastern Atlantic had been matched by another embracing the Western Pacific and the Far East.

This twentieth-century integration of international relations all round the globe into a single system, centring on a Balance of Power that had originated in Western Europe and had then progressively brought the rest of the Earth's surface within the field of its magnetic attraction, presented a striking contrast to the configuration of the field of force in earlier chapters of the same story. The overture (*currebat* A.D. 1494-1559) had ranged no wider than the areas involved in a competition for hegemony over Italy between nascent adjoining Great Powers in the Transalpine and Transmarine provinces of Western Europe; and even Flanders had then been only a secondary theatre of military operations, though the two Great Powers of the day actually marched with one another there, without being insulated on this front by any intervening political vacuum or buffer. The civil war between Catholics and Protestants in France (*gerebatur* A.D. 1562-98) went on its way more or less independently of the contemporary civil war between Dutch and Spaniards in the Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy (*gerebatur* A.D. 1568-1609). The civil war in England (*gerebatur* A.D. 1642-8) likewise followed its own course without becoming implicated in the contemporary civil war in the Holy Roman Empire (*gerebatur* A.D. 1618-48). The Americas and the Indies were drawn into the main vortex of Western warfare only in the course of the first regular cycle (*currebat* A.D. 1568-1672); and,

though during the second regular cycle (*currebat* A.D. 1672-1792) the decisive military operations on Flemish and Lombard battlefields were usually accompanied by 'side-shows' in North America and in Continental India in which the same belligerents were engaged, the synchronization of the local conflicts in the West European and the overseas theatres of war was still inexact. As often as not, the eighteenth-century campaigns on American and Indian soil would open later or earlier and close later or earlier than the corresponding campaigns in Western Europe, so that there were years in which France and Great Britain were at war with one another in Europe while at peace with one another overseas, or conversely at war overseas while at peace in Europe.¹

As for the wars which the eastern border-states of the Western World were waging with a Muscovite Orthodox Christian Power in the continental hinterland of the Baltic, and with an Ottoman Iranic Muslim Power in the Danube Basin and the Mediterranean, these sequels to the Crusades were at first carried on in virtual independence of the Western Powers' fratricidal warfare with one another. The move made by France in A.D. 1534-62 to redress the balance between herself and the Hapsburg Power by allying herself with the Hapsburgs' Ottoman adversary was an obviously expedient application of a Machiavellianly rational statecraft which struck a contemporary Western Christian public, including the French themselves, as being so shocking that France forebore to follow this policy up, notwithstanding the importance of the military and political advantages that she stood to gain by it and the extremity of the straits in which she found herself at the time;³ and, as late as A.D. 1664, Louis XIV gave precedence to the oecumenical interests of Western Christendom over the parochial interests of France when he permitted French volunteers to help a rival Western Power in the shape of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy to stem an Ottoman invasion whose success would have been advantageous to France on a Machiavellian reckoning.⁴ France did not exploit, as she could have done, the predica-

¹ For example, in the General War of A.D. 1672-1713 the respective war years were 1672-8, 1688-97, 1702-13 in Western Europe; 1690-7, 1702-10 in North America. In the epilogue to the General War of A.D. 1672-1713 the respective war years were 1733-5, 1740-8, 1756-63 in Western Europe; 1744-63, 1775-83 in North America; 1746-9, 1750-4, 1758-61, 1778-83 in India.

The synchronization of the local conflicts continued to be inexact in the third regular cycle (*currebat* A.D. 1792-1914). In the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 the respective war years were 1792-1802, 1803-14, 1815 in Europe; 1812-14 in North America; 1799-1805, 1816-18 in India. In the epilogue to the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 the respective war years were 1848-9, 1859, 1864, 1866, 1870-1 in Europe; 1861-7 in North America (taking account of the French expedition to Mexico, 1862-7); 1838-42, 1843, 1845-6, 1848-9, 1857-9, 1878-81 in India; 1839-41, 1853-6, 1875-8, 1882, in the Near and Middle East.

² In May 1534 France made a treaty with the Ottoman Corsair Khayr-ad-Din Barbarossa; in February 1536 she made a commercial treaty with the Porte that served as a cloak for a political entente.

³ See Fueter, E.: *Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1492-1559* (Munich and Berlin 1919, Oldenbourg), pp. 47-49. There was no sequel to the Franco-Ottoman combined naval operations of A.D. 1543/4, in which an Ottoman fleet was harboured in the French naval base at Toulon.

⁴ A regular French expeditionary force, as well as a flow of French volunteers, came to the aid of the Venetians in A.D. 1668-9 during the last agonies of the siege of Candia, but this French support of Venice against the 'Osmanlis was less meritorious than the French support of the Danubian Monarchy against the same assailant, considering that Venice, unlike the Danubian Monarchy, could not be regarded by France at this date as

ment of a Hapsburg Power that was implicated in Western Christendom's border warfare with the 'Osmanlis as well as in the Hapsburgs' family quarrel with France; and, thanks to this French forbearance, whether it was deliberate or inadvertent,¹ the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, usually found itself able to avoid simultaneous engagements on its French and on its Ottoman front.

The same policy of limiting her military liabilities to a single front at a time was followed by Russia after she had become implicated in the Western Balance of Power at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and, until after the close of the General War of A.D. 1792-1815, the insulation of the vortex round the frontier between Western Christendom and the Ottoman Empire from the vortex in the interior of the Western World usually proved to be practical politics. 'The Eastern Question' began to enter into the Western Balance of Power only when Napoleon's failure to expand a French ascendancy over the debris of a Medieval city-state cosmos into a French ascendancy over the whole of a Modern Western and Westernizing World² left a victorious Russia and a victorious Great Britain free to pursue a rivalry with one another in the Near and Middle East.

Even the vortex round the frontier between Western Christendom and Russian Orthodox Christendom did not coalesce completely with the vortex in the interior of the Western World till more than a hundred years after the date of Peter the Great's victory at Poltava in A.D. 1709 over Charles XII of Sweden. It was not so surprising that, before Russia had been received into the Western Society as a result of Peter's life-work, the Great Northern War of A.D. 1700-21 should have been waged without becoming implicated in the Western World's General War of A.D. 1672-1713, just as the Great Northern War of A.D. 1558-83 had been waged without being implicated either in the last cadences of the overture (*currebat* A.D. 1494-1568) to a latter-day Western series of cycles of War and Peace or in the first cadences of the first regular cycle in this series (*currebat* A.D. 1568-1672). It was more remarkable that the partitions of Poland-Lithuania in A.D. 1772-95 between Russia and the two eastern march-Powers of the Western World, and also even Russia's acquisition of Finland from the Scandinavian march-State of the Western World in the Russo-Swedish war of A.D. 1808-9, should still have taken place in the margin, and not in the centre, of the Western system of international relations. It is true that Russia was a belligerent in the Seven Years War from A.D. 1756 to A.D. 1762, and that her withdrawal from this war in A.D. 1762 may have marked a turning-point in the fortunes of Frederick the Great. Yet the first Western general war in which Russia played a principal part was the war of A.D. 1792-1815, and

a rival Power, while on the other hand the French might have hoped, if their intervention against the 'Osmanlis at Candia had been successful, to enter into Venice's heritage in at least a remnant of her dominion in Crete.

¹ According to Fueter, *op. cit.*, p. 48, no special consideration was shown to the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy or to Venice by other states of the Western comity in return for the public service which these two anti-Ottoman march-states were performing for Western Christendom as a whole.

² See V. v. 619-42.

even in this war it was not till A.D. 1812 that Russia's role came to be a decisive one. On the other hand, from A.D. 1812 onwards down to the War of A.D. 1939-45 inclusive, there was no general war in the Western World in which the part played by Russia was not one of first-class importance. There were, however, down to the eve of the outbreak of the General War of A.D. 1914-18, still certain local wars—fought in outlying regions only recently incorporated into a Westernizing World—which followed independent courses of their own without being drawn into the central vortex of the Western Society's international relations. The Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904-5 was one case in point; the Spanish-American War of A.D. 1898 and the British-Afrikaner War of A.D. 1899-1902 were two other instances.

The geographical expansion of an originally West European system of international relations to a world-wide range had not, however, sufficed to counteract the play of a centripetal force that, since A.D. 1914, had made itself felt by reducing the number of the Great Powers in this system from eight to two; and this carnage revealed a secular tendency in the history of a latter-day Balance of Power in the Western World for this unstable equilibrium, fluctuating in recurrent cycles, to bring about its own eventual overturn through the inversion of a competition into a monopoly. This tendency might prove to be no peculiar feature either of this Western political balance or indeed of political balances as a species of the generic social structure represented by any Balance of Power between any competitors.

'The experiences of our age refute the notion, which has been governing people's thinking for more than a hundred years past, that a Balance of Power between freely competing units—be these states, businesses, artisans or what you will—is a system that can maintain itself in this condition of unstable equilibrium for an indefinite length of time. To-day, as in the past, this state of equilibrium in a competition that is free from monopolistic restrictions has a nusus to pass over into some form of monopoly or other.'¹

This nusus was presumably traceable in the last analysis to the working of some law of human dynamics that came into play wherever and whenever a balance of human forces had been set up on any plane of social activity; where the plane of activity was politics and the parties to the encounter were parochial states, the particular mode of this general law's operation was a matter of common knowledge.

The difficulty of maintaining in perpetuity a political Balance of Power between parochial states was due, at bottom, to the sinfulness of the vein of Human Nature that was the raw material of statesmanship. In politics, men and women who in other walks of life might be conscientious workmen, faithful friends, and devoted parents were apt to behave as idolatrous tribesmen; and, in their worship of their tribal idols of collective power, pride, passion, prejudice, and covetousness, they were prone to break moral laws that they would never have dreamed of breaking, and to perpetrate crimes that they would never have dreamed

¹ Elias, N.: *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. ii: *Wandlungen der Gesellschaft: Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation* (Basel 1939, Haus zum Falken), p. 436.

of perpetrating, in their private affairs. This immoral temper was not an auspicious psychological setting for the execution of the delicate and laborious task of constantly adjusting a balance in answer to constant changes in the relative strengths of parties whose strengths were bound to change in virtue of their being, not inanimate objects, but living creatures. The tribesmen of a tribe that had forged ahead of its neighbours in population, wealth, technique, or other constituent elements of military and political power were apt to yield to the temptation to try to take advantage of their relative gain in collective strength in order to make a bid for collective aggrandizement; and such criminally childish collective ambitions were not easily discouraged by merely diplomatic counter-measures. When the parties whose interests were threatened by the baleful rise of a new Mars in the international constellation had resorted to the crude device of a reversal of alliances and the subtle device of a general self-denying ordinance binding all Great Powers alike to abstain from competing for the spoils of some derelict empire, there were not many other pacific cards left in a diplomatist's hand; in the history of every political Balance of Power between parochial states whose story was on record, it had invariably proved to be beyond the resources of Diplomacy to save the balance from being overturned without at least an occasional recourse to inter-state war; and the institution of War, which was, itself, an outcome and expression of the tribal spirit, had proved, time and again, to be unamenable to rational regulation and control and, when out of control, to be destructive.

War had proved to be deadly, not only for a political Balance of Power that it had been called in to redress, but also for the civilization in whose body politic the maintenance of a balance was being attempted; and this destructiveness of War was not just incidental to its clumsiness, but was inherent in its nature. A collectively organized resort to violence was, indeed, so rough and ready a method of attempting to adjust a political balance that, even when successfully used to restore equilibrium in one quarter, it usually also had the effect of producing a new derangement of the balance in some other quarter. A diplomatist driven to resort to War *faute de mieux* was in the unhappy quandary in which a watch-maker would find himself if he were instructed to mend a broken watch and were given no tools for doing the job except a sledge-hammer. War was, however, also destructive in its essence, quite apart from the incongruousness of its diplomatic use, and its destructiveness tended to grow greater progressively, at each fresh hammer stroke. The toll taken by War tended to rise with the passage of Time because, in any society in which War was an established institution, the service of Mars was apt to be the first charge on the society's energies; and the maintenance of a competition by means of War, in default of Diplomacy, between parochial states was therefore apt to drive the competing military Powers into devoting to War an ever increasing proportion of their strength. Even while a society was still in growth, the increase in the demands made by War would thus outstrip the increase in the society's capacity to satisfy them; the rate of the blood-tax would rise with every improvement in the technical ability to mobilize the society's non-human and

human resources; and, even when the mounting strain of War had produced a social breakdown, a still belligerent society would still continue to devote to War an increasing proportion of a strength that would now be, not increasing, but diminishing.

In an earlier context¹ we have watched the Hellenic Civilization following this fatal road during its disintegration, and in that instance we know what fate it was to which an unconscionably belligerent society condemned itself. In the course of an Hellenic Time of Troubles the toll taken by War eventually rose to a height at which the Hellenic Society would have died, forthwith, of the mortal wounds that it had already inflicted on itself if the then imminent dissolution of the body social had not been postponed (without being ultimately averted) in consequence of a sudden overturn of the Balance of Power itself. In the Hellenic World within the fifty-three years 220-168 B.C. a Balance of Power between parochial states was inverted into a monopoly of power in the hands of a universal state through a swift succession of 'knock-out-blows' with which four out of five Great Powers were laid low by one victorious survivor.² This dramatic episode of Hellenic history bore an ominous likeness to the dramatic course of Western history since A.D. 1914; and both stories alike threw light on a mortality that seemed to be the inevitable doom of all Balances of Power.

While Balances of Power thus appear to be intrinsically unstable and transitory, it is still more clearly evident that they could not follow this secular course from their original installation to their eventual overturn if they were not kept going in the meanwhile, like spinning tops, by rhythmically alternating fluctuations. Our next task is therefore to analyse the regularly recurrent characteristics of the cycle as these present themselves in Modern Western, post-Alexandrine Hellenic, and post-Confucian Sinic history, and to put our analysis to an empirical test by identifying the successive occurrences of the operation of this cyclic 'law of Nature' in a Western, an Hellenic, and a Sinic international arena.

Considering the dominance of the part played by War in the working of a political balance among parochial states, it is not surprising to find that the most emphatic punctuation in a uniform sequence of events recurring in one repetitive cycle after another is the outbreak of a great war in which one Power that has forged ahead of all its rivals makes so formidable a bid for world dominion that it evokes an opposing coalition of all the other Powers implicated in this particular system of international relations.

The storm that thus breaks in the form of 'a general war'—as we may conveniently label a great war of the all-engulfing kind just indicated—has usually been brewing in the course of a spell of fair weather following the calming down of the last preceding atmospheric disturbance. The derangement of an established equilibrium that is registered so sensationally in the outbreak of a general war is usually the cumulative outcome of gradual processes of growth, decay, and divers other forms

¹ In III. iii. 150.

² See the quotation from Polybius in III. iii. 312-13, and also IV. iv. 210-14.

of change that Life is always experiencing in Time. An equilibrium retrospectively designed to serve as a response to one particular set of already past challenges is thus virtually bound, with the sheer passage of Time, to fall farther and farther out of gear with current facts and needs, as these change in the flow of the Time-stream; every one of these changes adds to the mounting strain on the established equilibrium by increasing the discrepancy between an Epimethean dispensation and a Promethean reality; and, while it may be arguable that the consequent tension would never have exploded into a general war, but for the disproportionate increase in the relative strength of one of the Great Powers, it will usually also be arguable that the aggressor would never have ventured to challenge his peers for the prize of world dominion if he had not been able to count on reinforcing his own strength, and masking the egotism of his own ambitions, by presenting himself as the champion of other forces which could likewise claim that an antiquated equilibrium was no longer giving them fair play.

The storm in which this cumulative tension eventually discharges itself sometimes breaks unheralded from a clear sky. Sometimes, on the other hand, it is preceded by premonitory showers that are ominous for observers who have eyes to see. A burst of short local minor wars is a characteristic prelude to a general war, though it is not a symptom that invariably displays itself.

When, with or without such a prelude, a general war does break out, its immediate outcome is apt to be negatively decisive without being positively constructive. The outstanding direct result is usually the defeat of the arch-aggressor; but, in this act of the play, he is apt to be temporarily foiled rather than permanently ham-strung or sincerely converted to a good-neighbourly state of mind and feeling; and the other, perhaps ultimately more important, problems that had found no solution within the framework of the old order are now apt to be shelved, rather than solved, in a patched-up peace that is improvised primarily in order to meet the urgent immediate need for giving the society a rest in which it may recover from its exhaustion.

Even if the urgency of restoring peace for its own sake did not thus force the peace-negotiators' pace, they would, no doubt, find it difficult or impossible to map out a blue print for the summary and comprehensive solution of problems that were not open to being solved either all at once or all in the council-chamber. The passage of Time, which, in the spell of peace preceding the general war, had malefically created intractable problems by turning an accomplished settlement into an anachronism, now beneficently ripens these still unsolved problems to a point at which a solution of them at last becomes attainable. Yet, even when Time is thus working to facilitate Diplomacy, instead of working, as before, to aggravate the difficulties of the statesman's task, Diplomacy once again proves incapable of doing its job without again employing the instrument of War to carry its policy over the stiles of collective obtuseness and inertia. A spell of peace that gives a war-stricken society the necessary breathing-space is therefore apt to be followed by a further burst of warfare over the still unsettled issues on which the recent

general war was fought; but this martial epilogue to a general war usually differs auspiciously from the antecedent general war itself in producing more constructive and more lasting solutions for the social problems with which both these bouts of warfare are concerned, and in achieving this at a lower cost in terms of destruction and exhaustion.¹

Though this martial aftermath of a general war usually outclasses the martial prelude to the general war in its scale, it also usually resembles the prelude in taking the form of a burst of short wars, some, at least, of which are only local, in contrast to the protractedness and the ubiquity that are a general war's characteristically noxious features; and, though the peace-settlements following these supplementary lesser wars may be partial and piecemeal by comparison with the grand essay in comprehensive and definitive peace-making after the antecedent general war,² their aggregate effect is often to find more or less adequate and enduring solutions for the problems which have precipitated the general war and which have been left still unsolved by the abortive peace-making after it. Thereby the disturbed equilibrium is temporarily restored by more positive measures than the mere frustration of a single Great Power's bid for world dominion that is the negative achievement of the opposing coalition in a general war. For this reason the interval of general peace that elapses between the constructive settlement achieved in the martial epilogue to a general war and the outbreak of another general war as the result of the ultimate explosion of gradually pent up new forces is more genuinely peaceful, and hence also more creative, in its quality, even when it is not longer in its duration, than the breathing-space between the end of a general war and the beginning of its martial epilogue.

The foregoing analysis has brought to light the composition and structure of the uniform sequence of events constituting one war-and-peace cycle in a repetitive series of cycles of the kind. The uniformly recurring sequence consists of alternating bouts of War and spells of Peace; there are four of these altogether, namely two of each, but these couples are not pairs of twins; for, in both the couple of spells of Peace and the couple of paroxysms of War, one of the two beats is more sharply accentuated than the other. The tranquillity of the interval of general peace following the martial epilogue to a general war presents as sharp a contrast to the uneasiness of the breathing-space between the

¹ This sequence of events is not, of course, invariable, and, even when it does duly present itself, it does not always conform exactly to the standard pattern delineated here. In Modern Western history, for example, the Thirty Years War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1618-48) did set the seal on the frustration, in the foregoing general war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1568-1609), of the Hapsburgs' bid for World dominion; but, at any rate in the Central European theatre of hostilities, this conclusive confirmation of a previous military and political decision took, not a lighter, but a heavier toll than the general war had taken. Similarly, in post-Alexandrine Hellenic history, the toll taken by the supplementary wars of 90-80 B.C. was greater in Italy—and indeed in the Aegean Basin as well—than the toll taken by the civil disturbances and social revolutions of 133-111 B.C., which had taken the place of a general war in this chapter of Hellenic history, as the civil wars in the Spanish Hapsburg Empire and in France had taken the place of a general war in the chapter of Western history within which the Thirty Years War fell.

² Here again the Thirty Years War presents an exception to the normal rule, inasmuch as the peace-settlement of Westphalia, by which it was followed, was actually the first Modern Western essay in peace-making on an oecumenical scale.

general war itself and its martial epilogue as the mildness of this epilogue presents to the severity of the antecedent general war.

Now that we have plotted out the typical physiognomy of a war-and-peace cycle, our next step must be to set out in tabular form¹ the successive occurrences of this sequence of phenomena in the Modern and post-Modern chapters of Western history.

This table shows that, in the course of the four and a half centuries that had elapsed between the last decade of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, when this particular Balance of Power had been installed in the Western World, and the year A.D. 1952, the repetitive cycle through which a precariously unstable equilibrium had been turbulently maintaining itself had so far revolved five times over, counting in the overture to the series as well as the still uncompleted fourth round of the subsequent cycles. The table also shows that this fourth cycle, as well as the overture, had departed from the norm represented by the three regular cycles that had occurred between A.D. 1568 and A.D. 1914, and that, among these three, the second and the third cycle were closer replicas of one another than the first cycle was of either of them.

The departures of the overture and the fourth cycle from the norm were not of the same kind; for the fourth cycle differed from the overture and from the preceding three regular cycles alike in its structure, whereas the overture resembled the regular cycles in its structure and differed from them only in its wave-length.

The structural novelty of the fourth cycle was, as we have seen,² the portentous one of capping one general war with another one of still greater severity, atrocity, and inconclusiveness, instead of following it up with a burst of milder, but nevertheless more conclusive, supplementary wars that, on the precedent of the uniform sequence of events in each of the preceding cycles, were to be expected as the sequel to a breathing-space. There was no such radical difference of structure between the three regular cycles and the overture. In the overture, as in the regular cycles, a breathing-space after a general war had duly been followed by supplementary wars which had duly been followed, in their turn, by a general peace. The difference in this case was merely a chronological one. The overture's duration of seventy-four years (*currebat* A.D. 1494-1568) had been not much longer than the maximum wave-length of a single 'Kondratieff cycle' on the economic plane of latter-day Western history, and not quite so long as the sum of a couple of minimum wave-lengths of the same economic 'long cycle',³ whereas the duration of the second and third regular cycles (*currebant* A.D. 1672-1792 *et* A.D. 1792-1914), running, as it had done, to 120 years in the one case and 122 years in the other,⁴ had been equal to the sum of a couple of maximum 'Kondratieff'

¹ See Table I, opposite.

² On p. 235, above.

³ These 'Kondratieff cycles' with wave-lengths ranging between maxima of about sixty years and minima of about forty years have been noticed on pp. 231-2, above.

⁴ These are the respective wave-lengths found for Cycles II and III by measuring the intervals between outbreaks of general wars; and the durations of 104 years and 74 years, found for Cycle I and for the overture respectively, are obtained by measurements on the same basis. This basis is the obvious one to take, since the outbreaks of general wars are, as we have observed, the most emphatic of all the punctuations marking out the uniform sequence of events composing each of these repetitive cycles. An alternative

TABLE I. *Successive Occurrences of the War-and-Peace Cycle in Modern and post-Modern Western History*

Phase	Overture (A.D. 1494-1568)	First Regular Cycle (A.D. 1568-1672)	Second Regular Cycle (A.D. 1672-1792)	Third Regular Cycle (A.D. 1792-1914)	Fourth Cycle (A.D. 1914-)
(i) Premontory Wars (the Prelude)	1667-8 ¹	..	1911-12 ²
(ii) <i>The General War</i>	1494-1523 ³	1568-1609 ⁴	1672-1713 ⁵	1792-1815 ⁶	1914-18
(iii) The Breathing-space	1523-36	1609-18	1713-33	1815-48	1918-39
(iv) Supplementary Wars (the Epilogue)	1536-59 ⁷	1618-48	1733-63 ⁸	1848-71 ⁹	1939-45 ¹⁰
(v) <i>The General Peace</i>	1559-68	1648-72	1703-92	1871-1914	..

¹ Louis XIV's attack on the Spanish Netherlands.

² The Turco-Italian War of 1911-12; The Turco-Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

³ 1494-1503, 1510-16, and 1521-5.

⁴ 1568-1609 in the Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy; 1562-98 in France.

⁵ 1672-8, 1688-97, and 1702-13.

⁶ 1792-1802, 1803-14, and 1815.

⁷ 1536-8, 1542-4, [1544-6 and 1549-50, England v. France], [1546-52, Schmalkald League of Protestant Princes in the Holy Roman Empire v. Charles V], 1552-9.

⁸ 1733-5, 1740-8, and 1756-63.

⁹ 1848-9, 1853-6, 1859 [1861-5, civil war in the United States; 1862-7, French occupation of Mexico], 1864, 1866, and 1870-1.

¹⁰ This recrudescent general war of 1939-45 was heralded by a splutter of premonitory wars: the Japanese attack on China launched in Manchuria in 1931; the Italo-Abyssinian War of 1935-6; the War of 1936-9 in Spain; and the fateful one-day campaign in the Rhineland on the 7th March, 1936, which was to pay for its bloodlessness at compound interest in the holocausts of the years 1939-45.

wave-lengths, while the first regular cycle (*currebat* A.D. 1568-1672), with its duration of 104 years, had been equal to the sum of a couple of 'Kondratieff cycles' of average length.

It is also noticeable that the shortness of the total span of the overture by comparison with the spans of the three regular cycles was accounted for mainly by the abnormal shortness of its two spells of Peace, and that, by contrast, its two bouts of War were not appreciably shorter than those of the regular cycles. The breathing-space after the general war had lasted for 11 years in the overture, as compared with 9 years in the first cycle, 20 years in the second, and 33 years in the third; the general peace after the supplementary wars had lasted for 9 years in the overture, as compared with 24 years in the first cycle, 29 years in the second, and 43 years in the third. On the other hand the general war had continued for 31 years (A.D. 1494-1525) in the overture as compared with 41 years each (A.D. 1568-1609 and A.D. 1672-1713) in the first and second cycles, and 23 years (A.D. 1792-1815) in the third cycle, while the bout of supplementary wars had continued for 23 years (A.D. 1536-59) in the overture as compared with 30 years each (A.D. 1618-48 and A.D. 1733-63) in the first and second cycles and 23 years (A.D. 1848-71) in the third cycle.

Our table also brings out a tendency, which we have already noticed by anticipation,¹ for the number of war years in a cycle to diminish, and for the ratio between the numbers of war years and of peace years to change to the numerical advantage of the peace years, with each successive repetition of the sequence.

This tendency does not, it is true, pronounce itself so sharply when measured in terms of individual years as when measured in terms of the groups of years, representing alternate bouts of War and spells of Peace, into which the sequence has been analysed; for, though the overall length of the bout that we have labelled 'the general war' falls off strikingly from the figure of 41 years at which it stands in the first and second cycles to its 23 years in the third cycle and its 4 years in the fourth, these reductions of the span are partly offset by concurrent eliminations of intercalated peace years. No less than 15 peace years, for example, were intercalated in the general war of A.D. 1672-1713—consisting, as this did, of three constituent bouts separated by two truces lasting from A.D. 1678 to 1688 and from A.D. 1697 to 1702, whereas in the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 the truces following, in A.D. 1802-3, the abortive conclusion of peace at Amiens and preceding, in A.D. 1814-15, 'the Hundred Days' were matters, not of years, but of months, while the sole truce during the General War of A.D. 1914-18 was the fraternization on the first Christmas Day after the outbreak of hostilities. When, however, the overall figures have been duly corrected to allow for such intercalations of peace years and peace months, the tendency towards a diminution in the relative lengths of the war periods still stands out

basis would be to measure the intervals between restorations of general peace; and on this basis the length of Regular Cycle I would work out at 89 years (1559-1648), that of Cycle II at 115 years (1648-1763), and that of Cycle III at 108 years (1763-1871).

¹ On p. 235, above.

conspicuously in a comparison of the four-years' span of the General War of A.D. 1914-18 with the corrected figures of approximately 21 years for the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 and approximately 26 years for the General War of A.D. 1672-1713.¹

At the same time a synoptic view of the later and the earlier general wars in this Western series also shows that, in the act of becoming shorter, Western general wars had been becoming more concentrated, more intense, and more relentless, and that, so far from the progressive shortening of the lengths of bouts of general warfare signifying an alleviation of the scourge of War, the progressive concentration of general warfare within an ever smaller number of years at an ever higher degree of intensity had resulted in the recurrent general wars working greater havoc in the life of the Western Civilization than they had worked when they had been carried on more desultorily over longer Time-spans. While it was true that under this older dispensation the plague of War had been more or less endemic in the Western body social, it was also true that a relatively mild perennial malady was in many ways more tolerable and less dangerous than a series of occasional sudden violent epidemics breaking in upon spells of relatively good health. This abrupt alternation of Total War with Total Peace was, indeed, manifestly more trying to the constitution of Society than an earlier condition in which the difference between spells of health and bouts of sickness had been less sharply accentuated. In the Early Modern Age of Western history the war-ridden society had been affected like a victim of chronic malaria, whose vitality is permanently lowered by his complaint without his life being brought into jeopardy. In the Late Modern Age the Western Society had been relieved of its malaria thanks to a gratifying improvement in the day-to-day performance of Western political preventive medicine, but the patient had been made to pay for this rise in his normal level of health by becoming subject to thunderbolt 'strokes' which were as unpredictably sudden as they were lethally violent.

While the deadliness of War had thus been increasing by geometrical progression with each further repetition of a Western war-and-peace cycle in which the bouts of War had been becoming shorter, and the spells of Peace longer, every time, the respective stances of the competing Powers had been as uniform, throughout the series of recurrent cycles, as the sequence of events in which, cycle by cycle, the resolution of political and military forces had recurrently worked itself out.

We have already noticed² that the Western international tableau of

¹ The average figure for the length of time by which each successive Western general war was becoming shorter than its immediate predecessor thus works out at eleven years as between the latest three general wars in this series according to the corrected calculations of their spans. When the writer was doing this sum on the morning of the 2nd August, 1950, he had at his elbow his original notes, written in A.D. 1929; and, considering that at that date the possibility of constructing an atom bomb was still beyond the mental horizon of a layman like himself, he was startled to read in his own handwriting, jotted down twenty-one years ago: 'Since the General War of A.D. 1914-1918 lasted little more than four years, we find, on following out the progression, that the next general war, which might be expected to break out about A.D. 2035, would be instantaneous in duration, i.e. annihilating in effect. This mathematical fantasy is borne out by all the empirical evidence available for a forecast in this year A.D. 1929.'

² On p. 244, above.

A.D. 1952, in which the Soviet Union was striving to break out of a ring within which the United States was striving to contain her, was a reproduction of the tableau of A.D. 1552, with a twentieth-century Russia playing a sixteenth-century France's part and the United States playing Charles V's. We can now see that this disposition of forces was not peculiar to the situation existing at those two dates, at each of which the number of Great Powers had been no more than two. In every round with the sole exception of the first regular cycle (*currebat* A.D. 1568-1672), the aggressor Power had invariably been a continental Power in a central position occupying a compact territory with sally-ports opening into the back-yards of the countries that were the arenas of combat, the stakes of contention, and the prizes of victory.

In the overture (*currebat* A.D. 1494-1568) this role had been played by a France who marched with Italy along one land frontier and with Flanders along another; and, after a temporary eclipse that had been the penalty of her civil war of A.D. 1562-98, France had recaptured this role from a Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy that had acquired it, in France's temporary absence, during the General War of A.D. 1568-1609 which had inaugurated Regular Cycle I (*currebat* A.D. 1568-1672).¹ In the

¹ This General War of A.D. 1568-1609 took, like the contemporary warfare in France during the years A.D. 1562-98, the form of a civil war between conflicting local interests and religious persuasions as far as the two principal belligerents were concerned. This civil war between the Spanish Catholic and Dutch Protestant subjects of Philip II was converted into a general war by England's entry into the lists as one of Spain's adversaries. This English intervention gave an oecumenical significance to what would otherwise have remained a domestic conflict within the body politic of a single Great Power, because, if the Spanish Armada had conquered England in A.D. 1588 and had installed there a minoritarian Roman Catholic Government dependent on Spanish backing, this increase in the power of the Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy would presumably have ensured, not merely the eventual subjugation of the Protestant insurgents in the Netherlands, but the temporary supremacy of Spain in the Western international arena, since Spain would then have been able to take full advantage of the opportunity, offered to her by the civil war in France, for bringing France too under a Spanish hegemony through the agency of a Roman Catholic Government in France that would likewise have had to look to Spain for support.

The insurrection of the Netherlands against the Spanish Crown in A.D. 1568 and the increasing provocation of the Spaniards by the English in and after A.D. 1572 gave the measure of the temporary paralysis of French power during the French civil war of A.D. 1562-98. The inability of Spain to profit by the chance of winning world dominion, with which the temporary eclipse of France had presented her, gave the measure of Spain's intrinsic permanent weakness under her temporary outward appearance of strength. Whenever France was her normal mighty self, her neighbours Spain, the Netherlands, and England, none of whom was a match for France singly, had a strong interest in holding together against the Central Power that was a menace to all of them alike. The marriages between Henry VIII and Catharine of Aragon in A.D. 1509 and between Philip II and Mary of England in A.D. 1554—like the Anglo-Spanish combined military operations in the Iberian Peninsula in A.D. 1811-13—were the reflection of a community of Spanish and English interests that was normal until France fell out of the competition for world dominion after A.D. 1815; and it was a fatality that both these matrimonial alliances should have been exceptions to a rule which made the political felicity of Hapsburg—if not of Spanish—marriages proverbial.

An even greater portent, however, than the breach between England and Spain during the French civil war of A.D. 1562-98 was the alacrity with which the English and the Dutch fell out with one another over the scramble for Spanish and Portuguese spoils overseas, and the tardiness with which they eventually made up their minds to call a truce to their feud with one another in face of a menace from a rehabilitated France which was more dangerous for both of them than the menace from Spain had ever been. The treaty made by England with France on the 29th May, 1527, on the morrow of the crushing defeat of the French at Pavia on the 24th February, 1525, was not, on any Machiavellian reckoning, a precedent that could justify the treaty made on the 1st June, 1670, on the morrow of the French invasion of the Spanish Netherlands in May 1667.

general wars of A.D. 1672-1713 and A.D. 1792-1815 France had played the aggressor's part once again; but in the meantime a Western World that had been engaging in these domestic conflicts with one hand had been enlarging its territorial domain with the other hand; and this change in the Western World's geographical scale and structure had eventually deprived France of her central position.

France's last chance of winning world dominion had passed away at Waterloo upon the final failure of her third bid for it in the General War of A.D. 1792-1815. Thereafter the Western World's continental centre of gravity had shifted eastward from France to Germany as a result of the reception of the Western culture first in a Russian and then in an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom. These sweeping cultural conquests, which had carried the eastern marches of a Westernizing World as far as Alexandria and Vladivostok, had also substituted the Near and Middle East for Italy and Flanders as the arena in which the stakes were held, the wars were fought, and the prizes were to be won; and this transformation of the Western World's geographical landscape had been reflected on the political and military plane in the transfer of the role of aggressive Central Power from France to Prussia-Germany in the course of the supplementary wars (*gerebantur* A.D. 1848-71) following the General War of A.D. 1792-1815. Germany's tenure of a role which she had thus captured from France was, however, to be very much briefer

Though Louis XIV's premonitory attack on the Spanish Netherlands in A.D. 1667 had moved the United Netherlands and England to make peace with one another in that year and to enter into an anti-French triple alliance, including Sweden, in A.D. 1668, France nevertheless had England for her ally against Holland for the first three years (A.D. 1672-4) of a general war in which a French attack on the Dutch was the first move in a fresh French attempt to win world dominion.

The Spanish danger to the liberties of Western parochial states was never so great as the French danger—not even at the height of the power of Philip II—for the Spanish Power was an idol with feet of clay in a Western international arena in which the economic sinews of war were coming progressively, with each further round in the game, to count for more and more by comparison with mere military valour. The descendants of the Iberian Western Christian barbarians who had defeated the Maghribi Berber Muslim barbarians in a contest for the spoils of an Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate that had collapsed in A.D. 1010 were born soldiers in the Gothic and the Vandal vein; and, in their socially parasitic profession, they displayed an impressive adaptability when, in the Western General War of A.D. 1494-1525, they mastered a new-fangled Swiss infantry technique which, in this phase of a Western art of war, was the talisman of victory. This Spanish stock of military material was, however, as inadequate in quantity as it was outstanding in quality; for the Christians in sixteenth-century Spain were no more than an 'ascendancy' in a population which mustered perhaps no more than seven million souls in all, as against the fifteen or sixteen million culturally and communally homogeneous inhabitants of a contemporary France; and the Muslim and Jewish subject communities were Spain's economic mainstay. Whereas the Castilian and Aragonese soldiery of a sixteenth-century Spain were shepherds and herdsmen in civil life, her agriculture, such as it was, was carried on by a Morisco and a Catalan peasantry in the valley of the Wādī'l-Kabir and along the seaboard of the Mediterranean, while the Jews were the life of the trade and industry of the Spanish cities. Whereas France could feed her sixteen millions from home-grown cereals, Spain could not feed her seven millions without importing cereals from Sicily and from Northern Europe; and, as if these economic handicaps were not serious enough as they were, the Spanish 'ascendancy' did its worst to aggravate them by oppressing and evicting the Moorish and Jewish producers of Spanish wealth. Simultaneously, even the reservoir of Castilian Christian military man-power was depleted by the draining off of *conquistadores* to live happily ever after as renters taking toll of subject peasant populations in overrun Mexico and Andean worlds.

A brilliant portrait of sixteenth-century Spain has been painted by Eduard Fueter in his *Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1492-1559* (Munich and Berlin 1919, Oldenbourg), pp. 79-103.

than her predecessor's. The slower tempo of the Modern Western World's expansion during its earlier stages had enabled France to cling to this role—albeit at the price of bringing ever direr disasters upon herself—from A.D. 1494 to A.D. 1870, with no more than a temporary eclipse *circa* A.D. 1562–98. But the Western Civilization's transit from a Modern to a post-Modern Age of Western history at the very moment at which Germany was supplanting France had been accompanied by a sudden immense acceleration in the tempo of Western geographical expansion; and a change of geographical scale which had wafted Germany into a commanding position by A.D. 1871 had by then already begun to gather an impetus that in A.D. 1945 was to bring Germany lower than France had ever yet fallen.

In a Western system of international relations which, in the meantime, had continued to expand until it had attained a literally world-wide range, a Germany who had bid for world dominion twice within one lifetime, in a brace of general wars fought in swift succession (*gerebantur* A.D. 1914–18 *et* A.D. 1939–45), had been compelled, in her turn, by A.D. 1945 to surrender the role of aggressive Central Power to a Soviet Union who occupied a commanding position in a geographical setting that was oecumenical now and no longer merely regional. In A.D. 1952, when an arena of competition which had originally been confined to Italy and Flanders had come to embrace the whole of the Old World outside the Soviet Union's own borders, the Soviet Union possessed sally-ports opening into the back-yards of Scandinavia, Western Europe, the Near and Middle East, the sub-continent of India, South-East Asia, Indonesia, China, Korea, and Japan. In the course of four centuries the geographical scale of a Western system of international relations had thus been enlarged to a stupendous degree; yet the lay-out of the arena and the stance of the gladiators face to face within it was recognizably the same in A.D. 1952 as it had been four hundred years earlier.

The War-and-Peace Cycle in post-Alexandrine Hellenic History

We have now perhaps reached the limit to which we can carry our analysis of the war-and-peace rhythm in the Modern and post-Modern chapters of Western history; and in any case we have carried it far enough to enable us, if we turn our attention to the post-Alexandrine chapters of Hellenic history, to see at a glance that a war-and-peace rhythm is discernible here too, and that some of the main features of it are identical with features that we have already observed in our Western example of the working of this particular law of Nature in the political affairs of civilizations.

In the Hellenic, as in the Western, case the series of cycles begins with an overture in which the parties to the competition are jockeying with one another not merely for victory in the race but for the winning of a place in the running; and this inaugural round of the cycle takes the form of a civil war among Alexander's successors over the swollen heritage of the Argeadae which is reminiscent of the civil war between a royal branch and a Burgundian ducal branch of the French House of

Valois over the swollen heritage of the Valois dukes of Burgundy. In the Hellenic case, again, a sequence of alternating bouts of war and spells of peace, that makes its first epiphany in the overture, then repeats itself in a cycle of competition between the survivors of the ordeal to which the overture had subjected all competitors who had had the hardihood to enter the lists. We shall also notice in the Hellenic course of events a tendency, which we have noticed in the corresponding Western story, for regional vortices which at first behave like so many independent focuses of military and political force to coalesce into a single vortex drawing into itself the whole of the action in all quarters of the international arena. In the evolution of a Western Balance of Power we have watched such outlying vortices round the marches between Western Christendom and the Ottoman Empire and between Western Christendom and Muscovy coalescing with the central vortex round Italy and Flanders. In the Hellenic story we shall see a vortex round the coasts of the Aegean in the Levant and a vortex round Sicily and Magna Graecia in the western basin of the Mediterranean¹ coalescing into a vortex engulfing the Mediterranean Basin from end to end.

We shall also see the partial neutralization of the Great Powers' potency, through their respective successes in frustrating one another's ambitions, giving opportunities for minor states to come to birth and grow in the interstices between the rugged cyclopean boulders which the deliberately engineered traffic-blocks in the avalanche have brought into a precarious equilibrium. For example, a Rhodian tripolis, that found itself in a key position in the new world called into existence by Alexander's overthrow of the Achaemenidae, was able, in the course of the overture cycle, during the General War of 321-301 B.C., to hold out in 305 B.C. against the siege artillery of Demetrius Poliorcêtês with the help of the coalition of Alexander's other successors that was opposing Demetrius's father Antigonus Monophthalmus's bid for world dominion. An Aetolian Confederacy of Continental Greek cantons and city-states, a similar Achaean Confederacy in the Peloponnese, and an Attalid Principality in the immediate hinterland of the Continental Asiatic half of the original homeland of Hellenism all started their political careers in the course of the overture during the catastrophic sequel to a supplementary war which had followed, in 282-281 B.C., the General War of 321-301 B.C.; and the exhaustion of the Great Powers in the next general war (*in Oriente gerebatur* 266-241 B.C.) not only gave these four already established minor states opportunities of consolidating and extending their previous gains, but also enabled partisans of reform at Sparta to regenerate their commonwealth by the social revolution of 227 B.C., and advocates of a quiet life at Athens to recapture a precarious independence for their country in 229 B.C.

While all these features in a post-Alexandrine Hellenic international landscape are reminiscent of the corresponding features in the landscape of a Western World in its Early Modern Age, the Hellenic tragedy differed from the Western in giving rein to violence with an unparalleled lack of restraint; and this demonic mania, which reminded a twentieth-

¹ 'The Ponent' of the Medieval Western mariners.

century Western historian of the temper that had erupted in his own world in his own later day, brought upon a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Society, in the first recurrence of the war-and-peace cycle after the overture, the catastrophe of a double general war to which a latter-day Western Society had not condemned itself till it had passed through three regular cycles of the rhythm and had entered on a fourth round. The recklessness of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Society's violence in the conduct of its international affairs explains how it came about that the promise of the overture to the symphony was promptly and rudely belied by the performance in the first ensuing movement. The first war-and-peace cycle after the overture witnessed a decisive and irretrievable overturn of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Balance of Power through the liquidation of all but one of a number of Great Powers which, in the course of the overture (*in Oriente currebat* 321-266 B.C.), had risen, not just from two to three, as in the course of the corresponding chapter of Early Modern Western history (*currebat* A.D. 1494-1568), but from two to as many as five.

At the moment of Alexander's death on the 13th June, 323, there were two Great Powers, and two only, in an Hellenic World whose eastern bounds Alexander had carried forward within the last eleven years from the Anatolian hinterland of the east coast of the Aegean Sea to the banks of an eastern tributary of the Indus. Alexander himself had momentarily united under his personal rule the domain over which the Achaemenian Empire had extended at its widest with the domain of a Macedonian Power which his father Philip had built up in Continental European Greece¹ between 357 and 338 B.C. The only other Great Power existing at that moment within the horizon of a thus vastly expanded Hellenic World was a Carthaginian Empire which had controlled the southern half of the western basin of the Mediterranean, with its African and Iberian continental hinterlands, since the closing years of the sixth century B.C.,² and which Alexander had not had time to liquidate as he had liquidated an Achaemenian Empire of which the Carthaginian had been a colonial counterpart in the political geography of a Syriac World. After the settling of the dust raised by the two successive wars for the possession of Alexander's heritage which had ended respectively at Ipsus in 301 B.C. and at Corupedium in 281 B.C., no less than five Great Powers came into view in the arena.

The Carthaginian Empire was still standing, not only intact but to all appearance more puissant than ever, in a still semi-detached West Mediterranean theatre of colonial competition between an Hellenic and a Syriac Society.³ Meanwhile, Alexander's ephemerally united heritage

¹ Sparta was the only Continental European Greek state that had been able to hold aloof from the League of Corinth that Philip had inaugurated in 338 B.C. as the constitutional instrument of a Macedonian hegemony.

² See IX. viii. 426-7, 428-9, 437-8, and 485-6.

³ In thus managing to retain her rank as a Great Power in an Hellenic or Hellenizing World in spite of the sudden vast increase in the scale of Hellenic life at the transition from a pre-Alexandrine to a post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history, Carthage achieved something that Venice failed to achieve at the transition from a Late Medieval to an Early Modern Age of Western history. *Circa* 281 B.C. Carthage was a Great Power still, whereas Venice, *circa* A.D. 1559, was lucky to find herself still independent and in possession of an empire in the Levant and on the Italian mainland that was now dwarfed

had been partitioned into three now more or less securely established successor-states which, under their appearance of being new creations artificially carved out by capricious strokes of Macedonian military adventurers' swords, revealed themselves on closer inspection to be, like the Carthaginian Empire, old structures masked, unlike the Carthaginian Empire, behind new façades. A Ptolemaic Power based on the Lower Nile Valley was an avatar of the Egypt of Psammetichus I; a Seleucid Power based on the alluvium of the Lower Tigris-Euphrates Valley (*Graecè* Babylonia, *Arabicè* 'Irāq) was an avatar of the Achaemenian Empire of Cyrus; an Antigonid Power based on the lower valleys of the Vardar (Axius) and the Struma (Strymon) was an avatar of the Macedonia of Philip II. The one genuinely new creation among the five Hellenic Great Powers that were in being at the end of the overture (*currebat* 321–266 B.C.) to the post-Alexandrine chapter of Hellenic history was a commonwealth which the city-state Rome had been building up in Central Italy between 340 and 290 B.C.¹

By 168 B.C. this one new Power was also the only survivor among the five Powers that had been in the arena in 266 B.C. Of the four Powers that had enjoyed the advantage of standing on old foundations, Carthage, the Seleucid Monarchy, and Macedonia had been felled to the ground by Roman blows in the years 201, 190, and 168, while Ptolemaic Egypt had been reduced to the status of a Roman protectorate when Roman diplomatic intervention had saved her in 170 B.C. from being annexed by Rome's defeated Seleucid adversary. This overturn of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Balance of Power, and its replacement by an unchallengeable monopoly of power in the hands of Rome, was not incomparable, in its abruptness, to the overturn of a Balance of Power in Sinic history through Ts'in's destruction of her six peers between the years 230 and 221 B.C.; and an Hellenic violence reminiscent of the spirit of those Sinic 'contending states' accounts for the striking divergence between a course of Hellenic events in which an international Balance of Power was thus overturned before the completion of the first cycle after the overture and a course of Western events in which an international balance, inaugurated during a similar overture, had run

by the gigantic stature of Great Powers of a higher calibre that had loomed up all around her. This contrast between the respective fortunes of Carthage and Venice during these corresponding chapters of their histories is accounted for by two differences in their experiences. By A.D. 1559 Venice had long since met her Ottoman fate, whereas Carthage was not to meet her Roman fate till 264 B.C.; and by A.D. 1559 Venice had also felt the adverse economic effects of the Portuguese conquest of the Indies and the Spanish conquest of the Americas, whereas the Macedonian conquest of the Achaemenian Empire had no similar adverse economic effects on Carthage's monopoly of the African and Iberian hinterlands of her 'wooden curtain'.

¹ The Central Italian Roman Commonwealth that had been brought into being by 290 B.C. was as genuinely new as the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy that came into being in A.D. 1526; for, though the Roman Central Italy which in 290 B.C. was an accomplished fact had been foreshadowed in an Etruscan imperialism in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., these Etruscan attempts to bring the Greek settlements on the coast of Campania and the Latin settlements in the lower valley of the Tiber under the hegemony of the Etruscan settlements between the Tiber and the Arno had been as abortive as the divers ephemeral unions between Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, and the patrimony of the House of Hapsburg in South-East Germany which in their successive permutations and combinations had foreshadowed the establishment, in A.D. 1526, of a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy that was to hold together for nearly four hundred years (see II. ii. 178–9).

through three subsequent regular cycles before it had begun to get out of hand.

The difference in temper between the Western gladiatorial combat of A.D. 1494-1559 and the Hellenic combat of 321-281 B.C. can be measured by the difference between the personal fates that overtook the principal adventurers in the two arenas. The military defeat suffered by Francis I at Pavia in A.D. 1525 was no less crushing than the overthrows of Antigonus at Ipsus in 301 B.C. and Lysimachus at Corupedium in 281 B.C., yet the worst that happened to Francis was to have to spend rather less than a year as a prisoner of war and to ransom himself at the price of undertaking to marry his adversary's sister and to renounce his claims to the Italian and Burgundian territories that were the stakes in his contest with Charles V. There was never any serious question of the destruction or even subjugation of a Kingdom of France which had brought upon itself this prostrating blow; and Francis had no sooner recovered his liberty and his throne than he broke the promises in exchange for which he had been released, and resumed a struggle that was fraught with no mortal danger either for his person or for his realm. Francis lived to die in his bed more than twenty-two years after the day on which he had been taken prisoner on the battlefield of Pavia. There is a piquant contrast between the impunity with which Francis thus played with fire and the experiences of an Antigonus and a Lysimachus, whose realms perished with them on the battlefield.

There were no such fatal casualties in the Western gladiatorial contest of A.D. 1494-1559; and the contrast between the characters of the Western and the Hellenic episode comes out still more sharply when we pass on to compare the respective fates of the victors. The worst that happened to Charles V was to become so weary of his Sisyphean task that he insisted on sloughing off his public burdens on to other shoulders and retiring into private life under conditions skilfully devised to give his body its long-overdue rest without prejudice to the long-neglected welfare of his soul. Like a discomfited Francis I, a disillusioned Charles V died in his bed; and this tame death did not overtake him till more than thirty-three years after a victory at Pavia whose aftermath had been still more ironically disappointing for the victor than it had been for his vanquished opponent. A more tragic destiny was in store for Charles V's Hellenic counterpart Seleucus Nicator, who, after overthrowing and slaying his last adversary, was foully murdered in his old age by a younger and more unscrupulous adventurer, to whom he had rashly given his confidence, before he had satisfied his heart's desire to set eyes once again on a Macedonian homeland which he had not seen for fifty-four years.

The mutual exhaustion of the belligerents in this last round (*debellatum* 282-281 B.C.) of the Wars of Alexander's Succession was so extreme that a Macedon from which an Alexander had gone forth, conquering and to conquer,¹ in 334 B.C. was overrun in 279 B.C. by barbarians from a North European hinterland who went on in 278 B.C. to cross the Dardanelles and break into the vast Asiatic dominions of Seleucus

¹ Rev. vi. 2.

Nicator's son and heir Antiochus I.¹ A poetic justice which, within a year of the murder of Nicator, thus brought the Macedonian Macbeth, Ptolemy the Thunderbolt, to his death in battle, in a vain attempt to defend the kingdom whose diadem he had usurped against the north-western barbarians' onslaught, had to be purchased by Macedon's tutelary genius at a veritably prohibitive price.

Du treibst mir's gar zu toll,
Ich fürcht', es breche!
Nicht jeden Wochenschluss
Macht Gott die Zeche.

This apprehensive exclamation, wrung from a Goethe who was observing, with his heart in his mouth, the criminal recklessness of his own contemporaries, might have been wrung, with no less reason, from a spectator of the international arena in either the Western World of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era or the Hellenic World of the Age of Alexander's successors; yet, in the less turbulent course of Western history, God's settlement of accounts with Man was relatively long delayed.

The fate that, in the Hellenic tragedy, a mad-dog militarist Pyrrhus had brought, by 272 B.C., before the close of the overture, on a small and backward kingdom on which he had irresponsibly attempted to force the untenable role of a Great Power was not brought on Sweden by Charles XII until after the corresponding Western tragedy had entered on the second of its regular recurrent cycles; and, though Epirus, after Pyrrhus had got himself killed at Argos in 272 B.C., was allowed to lapse into the tranquillity of a premature exhaustion, like Sweden after Charles XII's defiantly courted death in the trenches before Frederiksten in A.D. 1719,² this long since inoffensive little Continental Greek country was given over to pillage in cold blood by the Roman conqueror of

¹ In II. ii. 281, n. 1, it has been noticed that the Macedonians invited this barbarian invasion by their imprudence in first stimulating the European barbarians by an aggressive expansion at their expense in the reign of King Philip Amyntou (*regnabat* 359-336 B.C.) and then neglecting this reanimated barbarian frontier in order to turn their arms against the Achaemenidae and thereafter against one another. The equivalent event in Early Modern Western history would have been an invasion of Spain on the morrow of the Battle of St. Quentin (*commisum* 10 August, 1557) by a horde of resurgent Muwahhid Berbers from the Atlas or Murābit Berbers from the Senegal, with an impetus that we must imagine to have carried these erupting barbarians on beyond an overrun Spain into Italy in one direction and Mexico in the other. Castile did neglect her Berber frontier when, after the completion of the conquest of Granada in A.D. 1492, she failed to follow up her seizure of this last unsubjugated remnant of Andalusia by a seizure of North-West Africa that was the logical next step in the march of Castilian imperialism. Instead of concentrating all her military efforts on pushing forward to the natural frontier offered by the north shore of the Sahara, she made a few half-hearted descents upon North-West African ports while diverting the best part of her energies to a conquest of the Americas and to a competition with France for the hegemony over Italy. Spain, like Macedon, did pay a penalty for having thus looked back after having put her hand to the plough (Luke ix. 62); she exposed herself to the scourge of a piracy organized by Ottoman corsairs ensconced in North-West African naval bases on which Spain had neglected to secure her own hold. Yet this nuisance was trivial compared to the catastrophe that Macedon brought on herself in 279-276 B.C.

² Between A.D. 1494 and A.D. 1952 the only other actor of a leading part in the Western power game who had lost his life in battle had been one of Charles XII's predecessors on the throne of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus. Napoleon, like Francis I, had died in his bed; Hitler had died in his bunker. By contrast, the deaths among eminent participants in a post-Alexandrine Hellenic power game are too numerous to record.

Macedon, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, in 167 B.C., 105 years after Pyrrhus's death, whereas in A.D. 1952, 233 years after the death of Charles XII, Sweden was still inviolate, though her fellow ephemeral Great Power Holland, as well as her two Scandinavian neighbours Denmark and Norway, had suffered at German hands in A.D. 1940 what Epirus had suffered at Roman hands in 167 B.C. In A.D. 1952 the ultimate military and political outcome of a Western Balance of Power that had been inaugurated in A.D. 1494 was still obscure; and, however ominously impenetrable might be the darkness that still shrouded the future, an already accomplished passage of 458 years testified that this Modern and post-Modern Western Balance of Power, whatever might be the denouement towards which it was heading, had at any rate already achieved a decidedly longer run than had been attained by an Hellenic Balance which Rome had overturned by establishing her sole supremacy in 168 B.C., not more than 153 years after the post-Alexandrine Balance had been inaugurated by the outbreak of the first fighting between Alexander's successors.

After these general considerations it will be convenient to set out the successive occurrences of the war-and-peace cycle in post-Alexandrine Hellenic history in a tabular form which we can then analyse in the light of our foregoing table of the corresponding Western phenomena.¹

The most striking feature in the history of the post-Alexandrine Hellenic war-and-peace cycles that our present table throws into relief is the balefully decisive importance of the Reduplicated General War of 220-189 B.C.

Before the outbreak of this war, an Hellenic World whose area had been vastly expanded by the conquests of Alexander the Great had not constituted a single unitary field of international politics but had consisted of two distinct arenas—one in the Levant and the other in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean—in which the competition between Great Powers had been carried on more or less independently; in the course of the Reduplicated General War of 220-189 B.C. these two arenas coalesced into one; the political event in which this coalescence was registered was the treaty of alliance against Rome that King Philip V of Macedon rashly concluded with Hannibal in 215 B.C. During the preceding period each of the two arenas had been infested with an aggressor Power of its own: the role played by Egypt in the Levant had been played by Rome in the Ponent.² After the close of the general war of the first cycle

¹ See Tables I, p. 255, and II, pp. 268-9.

² It is noteworthy that both Rome in the first Romano-Punic War (*gerebatur* 264-241 B.C.) and Egypt in the contemporaneous general war in the Levant (*gerebatur* 266-241 B.C.) employed sea-power as the principal instrument of aggression, whereas, in the history of a Modern Western balance of power, the successive arch-aggressors—France, Germany, and Russia—were, all alike, land-powers who were comparatively weak at sea. In the first Romano-Punic war, Rome transformed herself, by a technological *tour de force*, from the land-power that had conquered Italy and had defeated Pyrrhus's attempt to undo her work there into a sea-power capable of conquering Sicily and invading North-West Africa from an Italian base of operations. This difference in the matter of armament between the typical Hellenic and the typical Western aggressor Power was the corollary of a corresponding difference in geographical structure between the Hellenic and the Western World. The Hellenic World, throughout its history, was centred on a landlocked sea—the Aegean Basin at the beginning of the story and eventually the Mediterranean Basin as a whole. The geographical expansion of the

(in *Levante gerebatur* 266–241 B.C.), Egypt not only fell out of the running but actually became the principal victim of aggression instead of continuing to be the principal perpetrator of it, whereas Rome was provoked by an abortive Carthaginian war of revenge and Macedonian war of aggrandizement into assuming in the Levant, from 200 B.C. onwards, the aggressor's role which she had begun to play in the Western Mediterranean in 264 B.C.

The Reduplicated General War of 220–189 B.C. did not, however, merely unify the military and political action on the stage of Hellenic history round the now all-overshadowing presence of Rome;¹ it also imported into the conduct of Hellenic warfare a new vein of atrocity for which the arch-aggressor Rome was not solely responsible.

Though, in this episode of Hellenic history, the overture (*currebat* 321–266 B.C.) and the general war in the first cycle (*in Levante gerebatur* 266–241 B.C.) had produced heavy casualties among war-lords by comparison with the corresponding acts in the Modern Western drama, this first phase of the Hellenic episode came in retrospect to seem mild by contrast with the sequel. Judged according to this subsequent standard, the General War of 266–241 B.C. had been as 'temperate' a contest as the Modern Western wars of the second regular cycle (*currebat* A.D. 1672–1792) on which Gibbon looked back with an unprescient complacency² until he was overtaken by the outbreak of the General War of A.D. 1792–1815. The comparative temperateness of Hellenic warfare in this phase can be gauged by the fact that the deliberately and persistently aggressive policy of Egypt, directed though it was against both the Seleucid Monarchy and Macedon simultaneously, drove these two assaulted Powers into taking concerted action for their common defence on one occasion only, so far as we know, and then only for a spell of some five or six years (260–255 B.C.). This must mean that neither Power felt the aggression of Egypt to be a serious threat to its own survival. The comparative temperateness of the General War of 266–241 B.C. in

Hellenic Society left the maritime structure of the Hellenic World intact, albeit enlarged in scale, even after the incorporation of South-West Asia and Northern India. By contrast, the Western World had originally been centred on one corner of the Eurasian Continent; and here again the geographical expansion of the society did not produce any immediate radical modification of its original structure, since the world-wide oceanic extension of the Western World, which began towards the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, was balanced by an eastward extension into the interior of the Eurasian Continent. Owing to this progressive enlargement of the continental area of the Western World, the arch-aggressor Power in the Western arena had continued to be a land-power from the inauguration of the Modern Western balance of power in A.D. 1494 down to A.D. 1952. All the same, the new Western World overseas that had been called into existence by Western maritime enterprise had gradually come to play a progressively greater part in redressing the balance of the old Western World on the Eurasian Continent. Whereas the bullion imported by the Spaniards from the Americas into Western Europe during the overture (*currebat* A.D. 1494–1568) and the first regular cycle (*currebat* A.D. 1568–1672) of this Modern and post-Modern episode of Western history had not availed to save Spain from falling out of the running, the 'colonial wares' that the overseas annexes of the Western World had afterwards come to produce had played an appreciable part in deciding the issue of the General War of A.D. 1792–1815; and in the subsequent general wars of A.D. 1914–18 and A.D. 1939–45 the decisive contribution to the defeat of Germany had been made by the war potential of the United States.

¹ On this portent see the passage of Polybius—*Oecumenical History*, Book I, chaps. 1–4—quoted in III. iii. 312–13.

² See the passage cited on p. 238, n. 2, above.

TABLE II. *Successive Occurrences of the War-and-Peace Cycle in post-Alexandrine Hellenic History*

Phase	Overture (321-266 B.C.)		First Cycle (266-133 B.C.)		Second Cycle (133-49 B.C.)	Third Cycle (49-31 B.C.)
	Levant	Ponent	Levant	Ponent		
(i) Premonitory Wars (the Prelude)	276-273 ²¹		135-131 ²	..
(ii) <i>The General War</i>	321-301 ³	340-290 ⁴	266-241 ⁵	264-241 ⁶	133-111 ⁷	49-31 ⁸
(iii) The Breathing-space	301-282	290-280	241-220	241-218	111-90 ⁹	..
(i) (bis) Reduplicated Premonitory Wars	224/3-222/1 ¹⁰	219 ¹¹
(ii) (bis) <i>The Reduplicated General War</i>	220-189 ¹²	
(iii) (bis) The Reduplicated Breathing-space	189-171	
(iv) Supplementary Wars (the Epilogue)	282-281 ¹³	280-272 ¹⁴	171-146 ¹⁵		90-80 ¹⁶	..
(v) <i>The General Peace</i>	281-266	272-264	146-133		80-49 ¹⁷	31 B.C.-A.D. 376 ¹⁸

¹ The first war between the Ptolemaic and the Seleucid Power for the possession of Coelê Syria and of the Mediterranean coasts of Anatolia from Cilicia to the Dardanelles.

² The first revolt of the plantation-slaves in Sicily (see V. v. 69-71).

³ Antigonos Monophthalmus's bid for world dominion, and his defeat.

⁴ The creation of a Roman Commonwealth embracing the whole of Central Italy. The half century that witnessed this Roman achievement saw the successive failure of a series of half-hearted attempts to re-establish in some form the Greek Great Power in

Sicily and Southern Italy that had been a going concern in the days of the Deinomenidae (*dominabantur circa* 485-466 B.C.) and the Dionysii (*dominabantur* 405-344 B.C.). These abortive enterprises were the Corinthian 'honest broker' Timoleon's intervention in Sicily (344-339 B.C.); the Spartan King Archidamus's intervention in Southern Italy (342-338 B.C.); the Epirot King Alexander's intervention in Southern Italy (333-331 B.C.); the Spartan Prince Cleonymus's intervention in Southern Italy (303 B.C.); the career of the Theraean adventurer Agathocles (*Syractis dominabantur* 322-289 B.C.). These episodes have been noticed in III. iii. 357, n. 1, and in IV. iv. 589-91.

¹² 220-217, the war in Continental European Greece between the Aetolian Confederacy and a coalition of Macedon and the Achaean Confederacy; 219-217, the fourth war between the Ptolemaic and the Seleucid Power; 218-201, the Hannibalic War; 215-205, the First Romano-Macedonian War; 202-198, the fifth war between the Ptolemaic and the Seleucid Power; 200-197, the Second Romano-Macedonian War; 191-189, the War between Rome and a coalition of the Aetolian Confederacy and the Seleucid Monarchy.

¹³ The overthrow of Lysimachus by Seleucus Nicator.

¹⁴ 280-272, the war in Southern Italy between Rome and a coalition of Tarentum and Epirus; 278-276, the war in Sicily between Carthage and Epirus.

¹⁵ 171-168, the Third Romano-Macedonian War; 149-148, the Fourth Romano-Macedonian War; 149-146, the Third Romano-Punic War; 146, the Romano-Achaean War.

¹⁶ The first bout of Roman civil wars.

¹⁷ This general peace was interrupted by the insurrections of Spartacus in 73-71 B.C. and of Catiline in 63-62 B.C.

¹⁸ The *Pax Romana*, under which the Hellenic World enjoyed political unity in a universal state constituted by the Roman Empire.

⁵ 266-261, 'the Chremonidean War' between Macedon (rehabilitated since 276 B.C. by Antigonus Gonatas) and a coalition of the Ptolemaic Power and its Continental Greek satellites; 260-255, the war between the Ptolemaic Power and a coalition of the other two Levantine Great Powers, Macedon and the Seleucid Monarchy; 253-246/5, naval warfare between the Ptolemaic Power and Macedon; 246-241, the third war between the Ptolemaic and the Seleucid Power.

⁶ The First Romano-Punic War.

⁷ 133-111, the Gracchan agrarian revolution in Roman Italy; 132-130, Aristonicus's proletarian insurrection in the *gleichgeschaltet* principality of Pergamum.

⁸ The second bout of Roman civil wars.

⁹ This breathing-space was interrupted by the second revolt of the plantation-slaves in Sicily (104-100 B.C.). The Hellenic World was in almost continuous revolution from 133 to 31 B.C., and even the spells of relative quiescence were broken by eruptions.

¹⁰ 224/3-222/1, the war in Continental European Greece between Sparta and a coalition of Macedon and the Achaean Confederacy; 221, the Seleucid King Antiochus III's first tentative attack on the barrier fortresses covering the Ptolemaic Empire's possessions in Coelê Syria.

¹¹ Hannibal's attack on, and conquest of, Saguntum.

the Levant is also attested by the recuperation of the Hellenic Society during the breathing-space (*durabat* 241–220 B.C.) that followed; for these two decades saw the culmination of the Hellenic Civilization's first rally¹ since its breakdown in the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431–404 B.C.

Against the background of this false dawn the unprecedentedly severe lapse into atrocity which the onset of the Reduplicated General War of 220–189 B.C. brought with it was thrown into sinister relief. In an earlier context² we have already noticed that, when the proud and virile Macedonians first crossed swords with the war-scarred Romans in 200 B.C., the Macedonian high command felt it necessary to safeguard the *moral* of their magnificent troops against the shocking spectacle of the carnage inflicted by new weapons which the Romans had learnt to employ in the Romano-Carthaginian War of 218–201 B.C.; yet, during these crucial years, a relatively sensitive Macedonian King Philip V was bringing himself into odium through the inhumanity of his own style of war by contrast with the practice of Alexander's successors and their epigoni. At an abortive conference between the belligerents in the Second Romano-Macedonian War that was held in the winter of 198–197 B.C. in Malis on the eve of the campaign that was to result in a military decision at Cynoscephalae, the following indictment of Philip is reported to have been addressed to him to his face by an Aetolian spokesman, Alexander Isius:

Alexander complained that Philip was not making peace sincerely now and was not in the habit of making war honourably when war was the order of the day. . . . He abandoned any attempt to face his opponents in the field, but signalled his flight by burning and plundering the towns—a policy of avenging defeat by ruining the prizes of the victors. What an utter contrast to the standards observed by past wearers of a Macedonian crown! These sovereigns had fought one another continuously in the open country but had rarely destroyed and wrecked the towns. This was a fact of general knowledge, established by the war which Alexander the Great waged against Darius for the empire of Asia and again by the struggle of Alexander's successors over his inheritance, when they fought Antigonos for the possession of Asia in coalition. Moreover, the policy of the successors in the second generation, down to Pyrrhus, had been the same. They were ready enough to stake their fortunes in battle in the open country and they left nothing undone in their efforts to overcome one another by force of arms, but they used to spare the towns in order that the victors might enjoy the dominion over them and might receive due honours at the hands of their subjects. On the other hand, to destroy the objects of contention in the war while leaving the war itself still in train was the act of a madman and of one far gone in the malady; yet that was precisely what Philip was now doing.³

By the turn of the third and second centuries B.C. there had indeed been an appalling deterioration, in the Levant as well as in the Western Mediterranean, in those standards of conduct in international relations that had prevailed in the Hellenic World during the preceding three or

¹ The symptoms of this rally have been surveyed in V. vi. 287–9.

² In II. ii. 163.

³ Polybius: *Oecumenical History*, Book XVIII, chap. 3.

four generations. In the Reduplicated General War of 220-189 B.C. there was no refflorescence of the chivalry that had been shown on both sides during Demetrius Poliorcêtês' siege of Rhodes in 305-304 B.C. and that had afterwards been shown to Demetrius, after his final surrender in 285 B.C., by Seleucus Nicator; and, if in this post-Hannibalic chapter of Hellenic history there was nothing to compare with these earlier mitigations of the barbarity of War, *a fortiori* there was no counterpart of the social solidarity which, in the halcyon days of a delusively promising antecedent spell of peace, the Hellenic World had displayed when, in 227 B.C., kings, princes, and city-states had vied with one another in contributing to the relief of Rhodes after this ornament of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World had been laid in ruins by an earthquake.¹

A comparison of our two tables brings out the further fact that, in recurrences of cycles of War and Peace, inter-state wars and civil wars are equivalent to one another and are interchangeable. We have noticed already² that, in the Modern Western episode, a series of wars that came to be fought as inter-state wars between France, Spain, and other parochial states was inaugurated by a civil war between two branches of the French House of Valois. Conversely, in the post-Alexandrine Hellenic episode, a series of wars that was similarly inaugurated by a civil war between rival successors of the Macedonian Argead king Alexander the Great, and that then similarly passed over into inter-state wars between Egypt, Asia, Macedon, Rome, and Carthage, was not brought to an end by Rome's overthrow of the last surviving rival Power in 168 B.C., but ran on thereafter through a second cycle into a third cycle in the form of a succession of civil wars within the bosom of a now oecumenical Roman Commonwealth.

The War-and-Peace Cycle in post-Confucian Sinic History

If we now enlarge our field of historical vision by bringing into our synoptic view the episode of Sinic history traditionally known as the 'Period of the Contending States' (*Chan Kuo*), we shall detect correspondences between this post-Confucian chapter of Sinic history and both the post-Alexandrine chapter of Hellenic history and the Modern and post-Modern chapters of Western history—and this not only in the general features of the historical landscape but also in the particular structure of the successive war-and-peace cycles.

Like those other two series, this Sinic series of cycles was originally set in motion by a struggle for possession of the derelict heritage of a former Great Power in which there had been a breakdown of the central government. The heritages of Alexander the Great and of Charles the Bold, which had been the original apples of discord in the post-Alexandrine Hellenic and in the Modern Western episode, had their counterpart in the post-Confucian Sinic episode in the heritage of the state of Tsin,³ which fell to pieces in the fifth century B.C. after having played a leading part in a previous chapter of Sinic history as one of two prin-

¹ See Polybius: *Oecumenical History*, Book V, chaps. 88-90.

² In the present volume on pp. 237-8, above.

³ See V. vi. 293-4.

cial competitors for the prize of hegemony in the Sinic World.¹ In the post-Confucian Sinic episode, again, the series of cycles had an overture in which the historically significant warfare took the form of civil war; and in the course of the first subsequent regular cycle the severity of the incidence of War upon Society was accentuated, in the Sinic World likewise, by appalling increases in the effectiveness of weapons,² in the ruthlessness with which non-combatants, as well as defeated combatants, were treated,³ and in the magnitude of the political prizes of victory and penalties of defeat.⁴ After it had exacerbated the evils of War to this intolerable degree, the Sinic episode was terminated, like the Hellenic, by the establishment of an oecumenical peace through the elimination of all the contending Powers except one single surviving victor.

A chronological analysis of this post-Confucian episode of Sinic history reveals a series consisting of an overture and two subsequent cycles with respective wave-lengths of 78, 86, and 112 years.⁵ In the overture the *Leitmotiv* was the break-up of the state of Tsin into three successor-states; in the first of the two ensuing cycles it was the abortive attempt of one of Tsin's three successor-states, Wei, to play the part of arch-aggressor Power; in the next cycle it was the assumption of the arch-aggressor's part by the state of Ts'in with such success that this cycle ended in the political unification of the Sinic World through the overthrow, by Ts'in, of all other Powers in the Sinic international arena.

In the overture (*currebat* 497⁶-419 B.C.) the most significant bouts of warfare took the form of civil wars.

¹ See IV. iv. 66 and V. vi. 292-3. Tsin's principal rival during this earlier chapter of Sinic history had been Ch'u.

² The adoption of the Eurasian Nomad military weapons, equipment, and tactics at the turn of the fourth and third centuries B.C. by Chao, a successor-state of Tsin which had inherited Tsin's wardenship of an anti-Nomad march, has been noticed in III. iii. 167, n. 1. This Sinic technical military innovation was the counterpart, in post-Confucian Sinic history, of the adoption of new weapons by the Romans during the Hannibalic War and of the application to War of the new driving forces of Democracy and Industrialism in the Modern Western World in the seventh decade of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era (see IV. iv. 151-2). It is significant that the Sinic state that was the first to make this revolution in its military technique during the Sinic General War of 333-247 B.C. should also have been the state that, at a later stage of the same war, successfully repulsed the attacks of the state of Ts'in, which, by that time, had established its military ascendancy over all other Powers in the Sinic World. Chao's successful resistance to Ts'in's repeated attempts to conquer her during the years 270-258 B.C. caused this general war to end in an inconclusive peace and postponed the political unification of the Sinic World by force of Ts'in's arms for half a century (from 270 B.C. to 221 B.C.).

³ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 194.

⁴ See Maspéro, H.: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), pp. 390-1, quoted in V. vi. 295, for the observation that, during the post-Confucian paroxysm of a Sinic Time of Troubles, the contending states were fighting for existence, as distinct from the smaller stakes of independence or hegemony for which they had fought during the pre-Confucian paroxysm. Franke points out, however, in op. cit., vol. i, p. 178, that the conventional restriction of the term 'the Period of Contending States' to the post-Confucian paroxysm is an arbitrary misnomer, for the period of no less than 36 princes and the destruction of no less than 52 states between the years 722 and 481 B.C. is recorded by Confucius in his annals of that period of Sinic history. The post-Confucian series of war-and-peace cycles was the second of two paroxysms which, together, constitute the Sinic Time of Troubles. In previous contexts (in IV. iv. 65-66 and in V. vi. 292-5) we have dated the beginning of the Sinic Time of Troubles from the outbreak of the first great war between Tsin and Ch'u (*gerebatur* 634-628 B.C.).

⁵ See Table III, opposite.

⁶ This year, which saw the outbreak of the great civil war (*gerebatur* 497-490 B.C.) in

TABLE III. *Successive Occurrences of the War-and-Peace Cycle in post-Confucian Sinic History*

Phase		Overture (497-419 B.C.) ¹	First Cycle (419-333 B.C.)	Second Cycle (333-221 B.C.)
(i) Premonitory Wars (the Prelude)
(ii) <i>The General War</i>	.	497-490	419-370	333-247
(iii) The Breathing Space	.	490-455	370-354	247-230
(iv) Supplementary Wars (the Epilogue)	.	455-453	354-340	230-221
(v) <i>The General Peace</i>	.	453-419	340-333	221 B.C.-A.D. 184 ²

¹ These dates are reckoned in terms of the domestic history of the state of Tsin. If we were reckoning in terms of the contemporary history of the state of Ch'u, we should have to date the beginning of the overture in 506 B.C. instead of dating it in 497 B.C., and the Time-span of the overture would then run to 87 years, as compared

with the 86 years of the first regular cycle and the 112 years of the second regular cycle.

² The *Pax Sinica* running from the establishment of a Sinic universal state by T'sin She Hwang-ti to its dissolution in the last days of the Posterior Han.

During this overture a common tendency towards spontaneous disruption through the play of centrifugal domestic forces was at work in all the larger states of the Sinic World of the day. The anarchic effect of the institution of feudalism, which had previously made itself felt at the expense of a once oecumenical Chóu Power, and which had brought about the breakdown of the Sinic Civilization and the onset of a Sinic Time of Troubles before the close of the seventh century B.C., after the Chóu had become manifestly impotent to control their parochial vassals, was now making itself felt within the body politic of each of these parochial states that had been the beneficiaries of this centrifugal tendency in the preceding chapter of the story. The principal sufferers in the fifth century B.C. were the states that had exhausted themselves in the seventh and sixth centuries by taking leading parts in the competition for hegemony during that earlier paroxysm. Now, however, that it was the turn of the parochial states to undergo an ordeal which had already worsted the imperial Chóu, the local responses to this identical challenge were far from being uniform. The two parochial states which had played the most ambitious—and consequently the most exhausting—parts in the first paroxysm of the Sinic Time of Troubles (*saevebat* 634–528 B.C.) were Tsin and Ch'u; and, after the failure first of Ch'u's final attempt to impose her hegemony by force of arms in the war of 538–528 B.C.¹ and then of Tsin's subsequent motion to deal a *coup de grâce* to Ch'u in 506 B.C.,² the authority of the central government was at a low ebb in both states. The sequels, however, were dramatically different in the two cases.

Ch'u's predicament was, to all appearances, by far the more serious of the two, for, whereas Tsin at this time was threatened only by domestic disruptive forces, Ch'u was the target of foreign attacks as well. In the very year, 506 B.C., in which Tsin found herself too feeble to strike, Ch'u was attacked and overrun by Wu—a *ci-devant* barbarian state in the Lower Yangtse Basin which had followed Ch'u's example in adopting the Sinic culture and turning to account the consequent potential enhancement of her military strength by intervening in the arena of Sinic power-politics. In this crisis in Ch'u's fortunes, Ch'u was saved by the recklessness of her parvenue adversary Wu and by the rise, in this adversary's rear, of another ambitious *ci-devant* barbarian state, the principality of Yüe in the country that was eventually to become the Chinese province of Chekiang. In 506 B.C. Yüe saved Ch'u from annihilation by attacking Wu from behind; and, though Wu subsequently took her revenge on Yüe by imposing her suzerainty upon her in 494 B.C.,³ Wu was ruined by these successive triumphs over Ch'u and Yüe. They

the state of Tsin, marks the true beginning of the first war-and-peace cycle of the *Chan Kuo* period of Sinic history. Since this great civil war was the beginning of the break-up of Tsin, and since the break-up of Tsin was the historic event which set this new series of war-and-peace cycles in motion, 497 B.C. is manifestly a more significant date to take as marking the beginning of the *Chan Kuo* period than either 403 B.C., which saw the recognition *de jure* of a break-up of Tsin into three successor-states which by 403 B.C. had been an accomplished fact for half a century past, or 479 B.C., which is the traditional date for the death of Confucius (see V. vi. 294, with n. 3).

¹ See Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 348–51, and the present Study, V. vi. 293.

² See Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 352–3.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 355.

tempted her to make a bid for hegemony; and, while she was engaged on an unsuccessful assault on Ts'i during the years 489-485 B.C.,¹ King Hui of Ch'u seized the opportunity to re-establish his kingdom on firm foundations between the years 488 and 481.² Thereafter, in 473, Ch'u was suddenly liberated from the menace of Wu through the destruction of Wu at a resurgent Yüe's hands. The combined effect of Ch'u's internal reconstruction during the years 488-481 B.C. and her liberation from external pressure in 473 B.C. was to enable Ch'u, not merely to survive, but to expand. Her success in meeting the challenge of internal disintegration which was being presented to all the major parochial states of the Sinic World in the fifth century B.C. was registered in her successive conquests of adjoining minor states in the central arena of the Sinic World. Ch'u annexed Ch'ên in 479 B.C., Ts'ai in 447 B.C., and K'i in 445 B.C.³

The effective reassertion of the central government's authority in the state of Ch'u in 388-381 B.C. had its counterpart in the state of Ts'i, which likewise survived an attack delivered by Wu and likewise overcame its disruptive domestic feudal forces—though in Ts'i's case at the price of an eventual change of dynasty in 379 B.C.⁴ These triumphs over feudalism in Ts'i and Ch'u stand out in sharp contrast to the collapse of the central government's authority in the state of Tsin in 497-490 B.C. During those years Tsin was disrupted and devastated by a civil war between rival factions of feudal lords which the Crown was impotent to prevent. The outcome was the virtual partition of Tsin between the four feudal houses on the winning side; this partition was confirmed by the outcome of a supplementary civil war (*gerebatur* 455-453 B.C.)⁵ in which one of the four nascent successor-states of Tsin was annihilated by a coalition between the other three. This partition of Tsin in 453 B.C. between the successor-states Chao, Wei, and Han *de facto* received recognition *de jure* in 403 B.C., and the royal house of Tsin was formally disestablished in 376 B.C., 130 years after its loss of effective power. This break-up of Tsin in the fifth century B.C. was an event of greater historical importance than the contemporary survival of Ch'u because it changed the politico-military configuration of the Sinic World and opened the way for the eventual triumph of Ts'in, Tsin's previously isolated and backward western neighbour.

This denouement of a post-Confucian Sinic drama, for which the ground had thus been prepared during the overture, was, however, delayed by an abortive but determined attempt on the part of Wei, one of the three successor-states of Tsin, to play, in the post-Confucian paroxysm of a Sinic Time of Troubles, the part that had been played in a pre-Confucian paroxysm by Tsin herself. Wei's bid for supremacy in the Sinic World was the *Leitmotiv* of the first regular war-and-peace cycle (*currebat* 419-333 B.C.) in the post-Confucian series.

In thus aspiring to a role to which Tsin had proved unequal, Wei was courting the disaster that eventually overtook her. The largest and strongest of the three successor-states of Tsin was not Wei, but Chao;

¹ See Maspéro, op. cit., p. 356.

² See Franke, op. cit., vol. i, p. 187.

³ See *ibid.*

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 181-2.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 180; Maspéro, op. cit., p. 366.

and Chao had opportunities that were not open to either Wei or Han for extending her territory and improving her military technique, thanks to her geographical situation on the border between the Sinic World and the Great Eurasian Steppe.¹ By contrast, Wei had for her western neighbour not the Eurasian Nomad World but the potentially more formidable Sinic anti-Nomad march-state of Ts'in; and Wei's territory was not only smaller in the aggregate than Chao's; it was also divided into three geographically discontinuous fragments, one of which lay on the farther side of Chao's territory, and another on the farther side of Han's, while Han's metropolitan territory, which lay south of the Yellow River, was similarly insulated by both the territory of Wei and the remnant of the imperial patrimony of Ch'ou from a detached province, north of the river, which was wedged in between the territories of Wei and Chao.² This awkward geographical distribution of the former domain of Tsin condemned Wei to find herself perpetually at war with her two fellow successor-states in addition to the wars with other neighbours which she brought upon herself by her aggressive policy of expansion.

The general war (*gerebatur* 419-370 B.C.) with which this cycle opened consisted of a series of efforts on Wei's part to dominate her neighbours.³ Wei's first move was to take advantage of the domestic troubles, common to all states in the Sinic World of the day, by which Wei's western neighbour Ts'in was paralysed during the years 415-384 B.C.⁴ In the course of the years 419-409 B.C.⁵ Wei reconquered from Ts'in a strategically important belt of territory inside the great loop of the Upper Yellow River which had been part of the original domain of Wei's parent state Tsin but had been conquered from Tsin by Ts'in during the pre-Confucian paroxysm of the Sinic Time of Troubles. This reconquest by Wei of 'the Country west of the River' (Ho-si) in 419-409 B.C. was followed up by a temporarily effective subjugation of Han; but in 386 B.C. Chao succeeded, with Ts'i's help, in resisting Wei's efforts to complete the reunification of Tsin's former domain by subjugating Chao likewise; and, though Wei inflicted defeats on Ts'i in 384, 380, and 378 B.C., and on Ch'u in 371 B.C., her bid for oecumenical supremacy was frustrated in 370 B.C. by the combined forces of Chao and Han after Han had doubled her area and resources in 375 B.C. by annexing her neighbour on the west, the state of Cheng.⁶

This negative outcome of the General War of 419-370 B.C. was confirmed by the outcome of the supplementary wars of 354-340 B.C.⁷ This bout of warfare opened, significantly, with a campaign in which Wei lost to Ts'in part of the reconquered territory 'west of the River'. This reverse was the signal for a general attack on Wei; and, though Wei staved off her now inevitable fate by winning repeated victories against

¹ See Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 180-1.

² See Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 369-70; Herrmann, A.: *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935, Harvard University Press), p. 16; and xi, Map 26.

³ See Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 392-3.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 377.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 392 and p. 369, n. 1.

⁶ See *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 369; Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 181.

⁷ See Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 394-6.

heavy odds, she was eventually brought to the ground in 340 B.C. The most important result of this bout of supplementary wars in terms of the redistribution of territory was the permanent recapture from Wei by Ts'in of a portion of the long-disputed territory 'west of the River' which gave the hitherto mountain-locked 'Country within the Passes'¹ a sally-port into the great plain of the Lower Yellow River Basin; and this decisive shift of the frontier between Ts'in and Wei in Ts'in's favour was registered in changes of the sites of the capitals of the two states. In 350 B.C. the capital of Ts'in was moved eastward from its former location in the Middle Wei Valley to a point in the Lower Wei Valley, opposite the site of the future Si Ngan;² in 340 B.C. the capital of Wei was moved eastward from its now perilously exposed former location at Ngan-yi, which had been overrun by the Ts'in forces in 352 B.C., to the site of the future Kai-fêng.³

The second and last of the post-Confucian Sinic regular war-and-peace cycles (*currebat* 333-221 B.C.) saw the series brought to an end through the political unification of the whole Sinic World by force of Ts'in's arms. The opportunity for performing this feat was presented to Ts'in by Wei's failure to establish her supremacy during the preceding cycle. But Ts'in would not have been in a position to succeed in an enterprise in which Wei had thus failed if she had not previously fitted herself for the task by innovations in her military technique, administrative organization, and economic policy (above all, measures for increasing her agricultural productivity and, therewith, her man-power) which were more rational, more radical, and more ruthless than any contemporary reforms in any other existing Sinic state. This internal transformation of the state of Ts'in was carried out during the reigns of the princes Hien (*dominabatur* 384-361 B.C.) and his son Hiao (*dominabatur* 361-338 B.C.).⁴ The moving spirit was Wei Yang (*alias* Kung-sun Yang, *alias* Shang Yang),⁵ a cadet of the princely house of the ancient minor central state of Wei.⁶ He had first taken service under the government of the state of the same name—one of the three successor-states of Tsin—which at this time had not only imposed its suzerainty upon Shang Yang's native state of Wei but was attempting to establish its supremacy over all other states in the Sinic World. After having rejected a previous overture from Ts'in, Shang Yang transferred his allegiance from Wei, the successor-state of Tsin, to Ts'in during the reign of Hiao; and, though the revolutionary character of his measures provoked opposition to which he succumbed after Hiao's death, he succeeded in permanently changing the face of Ts'in by carrying out enactments which could not have been repealed without bringing to a halt the aggressive military expansion that these drastic measures enabled Ts'in to achieve with

¹ For this expressive synonym for Ts'in, see VI. vii. 172, n. 3, and 173.

² See VI. vii. 211.

³ See Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 184-5.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 183-5; Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 377-9; and the present Study, VI, vii. 351, 352, and 374.

⁵ See *The Book of Lord Shang*, translated by Duyvendak, J. J. L. (London 1928, Probsthain).

⁶ Not to be confused with the parvenue Wei that was one of the three fifth-century successor-states of Tsin. Though the two names are oral homonyms, they are conveyed visually in two different ways.

ever increasing success. Though the most conspicuous motif of the first post-Confucian Sinic regular war-and-peace cycle (*currebat* 419-333 B.C.) was the abortive attempt of Wei to win an oecumenical supremacy, the course of the succeeding cycle (*currebat* 333-321 B.C.) was to make it evident, in retrospect, that the most significant event in Sinic history during the first regular cycle had really been the internal reconstruction of Ts'in.

The great war (*gerebatur* 333-247 B.C.) that inaugurated the second of the post-Confucian Sinic regular war-and-peace cycles opened, like the great war in the first of the post-Alexandrine Hellenic cycles, with two contemporaneous but unrelated sets of hostilities in two different theatres, one in the Yellow River Basin and the other in the Yangtse Basin; and the action in 333 B.C. in the Yangtse Basin, which took one of those sensational turns that were characteristic of war and politics in these southern fringes of the Sinic World, must have seemed at the time to be by far the most significant public event of the year. In 333 B.C. Yüe attacked Ch'u and brought upon herself a crushing defeat which was the end of Yüe as a Great Power. The former territory of Wu, which Yüe had held since 473 B.C., was now annexed by Ch'u, while Yüe's home territory broke up into petty principalities which fell under Ch'u's suzerainty.¹ The sequel was to show, however, that this imposing apparent increase in the strength of Ch'u was of no avail against the scientifically developed strength which Ts'in was now putting forth in the Yellow River Basin.

The enhancement of Ts'in's strength through the reforms of Shang Yang had become sufficiently apparent already during the wars of 354-340 B.C. to evoke in 333 B.C. a collective security pact between the other six Great Powers in the Sinic World of the day—the three successor-states of Tsin, together with Ch'u, Ts'i, and Yen—in which the contracting parties undertook to come with one accord to the aid of any of their number who might be attacked by Ts'in.² The six thus admittedly threatened Powers continued, however, to fall out with one another, while Ts'in showed unflinching skill in fomenting their mutual antagonism and allaying their suspicions of Ts'in's own aggressive designs—even after these had been unmasked, time and again, in action which told its own tale for those who had eyes to see; and consequently, from the beginning of this second and last cycle of the series in 333 B.C. down to its close in 221 B.C., there was only one occasion on which Ts'in had to face the united forces of all six Powers in the field. Ts'in's policy, like Hitler's, was to take her intended victims 'one by one'; and, unlike Nazi Germany in a post-Modern Western World, Ts'in succeeded in carrying this transparently Machiavellian policy through to its long premeditated goal when in 221 B.C. she completed the forcible unification of the entire Sinic World under her own oecumenical rule.

¹ See Maspéro, *op. cit.*, p. 400, with n. 1; Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 188-9.

² The moving spirit was Su Ts'in, a professional statesman who retaliated by this diplomatic coup for the lack of appreciation of his abilities that had been shown by the government of his native state Ts'in. After having failed to find professional employment in Ts'in, Su Ts'in had been taken into the service of Yen and Chao (see Hirth, F.: *The Ancient History of China* (New York 1908, Columbia University Press), pp. 308-11).

Ts'in's first move in the Sinic General War of 333-247 B.C. was a campaign against Wei (*gerebatur* 332-328 B.C.) in which Ts'in, profiting by the vantage ground which she had won from Wei in the first campaign of the wars of 354-340 B.C., now conquered from Wei the rest of 'the Country west of the River' and other border districts into the bargain.¹ A counter-attack against Ts'in in 318 B.C. by the combined forces of all the other six Powers, reinforced by Eurasian Nomad mercenaries, resulted in the sanguinary defeat of the allies and the reduction of Wei and Han to the rank of impotent satellites of the victor Power;² and, after Ts'in had thus confirmed her hold on the passes opening eastward from the Wei Valley into the Lower Yellow River Basin,³ she proceeded in 316 B.C. to anticipate Ch'u by seizing the command over the passes opening southward from the Wei Valley into the Upper Yangtse Basin and imposing her own suzerainty on the two contending local semi-barbarian states between which the vast and potentially productive territory that was eventually to become the Chinese province of Szechwan was at that time divided.⁴ By 285 B.C. Ts'in's resources had been doubled by the thoroughgoing incorporation of this country into her body politic;⁵ but Ts'in had not waited for this consummation in order to use the occupied territory as a jumping-off ground against Ch'u. In a series of offensives delivered in 312-311 B.C.,⁶ in 302-292 B.C.,⁷ and in 280-272 B.C.,⁸ Ts'in annexed from Ch'u first the Han Valley and then the Middle Yangtse Basin, which was the homeland of the Ch'u Power. The capital city, Ying, fell in 278 B.C.⁹ The first move in the last of these three campaigns was an encircling movement in which Ts'in 'mopped up' the barbarian no-man's-land beyond Ch'u's southwestern fringes.¹⁰

While Ts'in was thus wearing down Ch'u with her right hand, she still had strength to spare in her left hand to crush a coalition between Ts'i, Han, and Wei (*debellatum* 298-293 B.C.).¹¹ Ts'in made sweeping annexations in the heart of Wei between 286 B.C. and 275 B.C.¹²

Even now that Ts'in's ominous shadow had thus been cast right across the Sinic World, her prospective victims did not abstain from fighting one another to Ts'in's advantage. In 286 B.C. Wei, Ts'i, and Ch'u combined to partition Sung in revenge for conquests which Sung had made at the expense of all three allies in 318 B.C.¹³ Thereafter, in 285-279 B.C., Ts'i was attacked and temporarily occupied by Yen with the support of Chao, Wei, Ch'u, and, of course, Ts'in,¹⁴ who was the ultimate beneficiary from this fratricidal warfare through which the other surviving states were using up the last remnants of their strength.

Towards the close of the third decade of the third century B.C. it

¹ See Maspéro, op. cit., p. 398; Franke, op. cit., vol. i, p. 185.

² See Maspéro, op. cit., pp. 401-3; Franke, op. cit., vol. i, p. 186.

³ See Maspéro, op. cit., p. 403.

⁴ See Franke, op. cit., vol. i, p. 186.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 187.

⁶ See Maspéro, op. cit., pp. 404-5.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 410-11.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 418; Franke, op. cit., vol. i, p. 194.

⁹ See Hirth, op. cit., p. 318; Maspéro, op. cit., pp. 411-12.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 194.

¹¹ See Franke, *ibid.*, p. 196; Maspéro, op. cit., p. 415; Hirth, op. cit., p. 319.

¹² See Franke, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 190 and 196; Maspéro, op. cit., pp. 415-18; Hirth, op. cit., p. 319.

looked as if an offensive which had been maintained by that time for some sixty years had now brought the arch-aggressor Power to within a stone's-throw of her goal of world conquest; but at this point Ts'in's career of aggression was checked, and thereafter the general war was brought to a conclusion just short of the decisive result that had now long since come to be eventually inevitable.

The principal cause of Ts'in's temporary frustration was the toughness of the state of Chao, which, like Ts'in herself, was a march-state of the Sinic World over against the Eurasian Nomad barbarians, and which had, as we have seen, been the first Sinic state to enhance her military efficiency by adopting the Nomads' armament and tactics. Though Ts'in had inflicted one defeat on Chao in 280 B.C.,¹ she suffered severe reverses when she returned to the attack in 270 B.C.² and again in 262-258 B.C.³ The second cause of Ts'in's temporary discomfiture was the encouragement that Chao's spirited and effective self-defence gave to other threatened Powers. When, in 263 B.C., Ts'in had invaded the detached northern enclave of Han territory (the Shang-tang) in an interstice between the territories of Wei and Chao, and the central government of Han had proved impotent to defend this outlying province, the Shang-tang had offered its allegiance to Chao, and Chao had accepted this dangerous gift. This was Ts'in's *casus belli* against Chao in 262 B.C., and the first consequence was disastrous for both the protégés of Chao and their protectors. In 260 B.C. a strong force which Chao had thrown into the capital of the Shang-tang was compelled by a besieging Ts'in army to capitulate and was then massacred. In 258 B.C., however, when a Ts'in army laid siege to Han-tan, the capital of Chao itself, it failed to take this city and eventually suffered a disaster under its walls through the intervention of Wei on Chao's side.

Though Wei paid dearly thereafter for this audacity, Chao was saved, and the concerted diplomacy of four statesmen representing the states of Chao, Wei, Ts'i, and Ch'u⁴ succeeded in dragging the war out to an inconclusive close in 247 B.C.⁵ Their diplomacy was assisted—and this was the third cause of Ts'in's temporary discomfiture—by the falls of a statesman and a general who had been the joint authors of Ts'in's previous successes. The year 265 B.C. had seen the disgrace of the minister Wei Jan, who had been in charge of the government of Ts'in for the past thirty-one years.⁶ The year 258 B.C. saw the suicide, by royal command, of Po K'i,⁷ whom Wei Jan, upon his own accession to office, had appointed generalissimo of the Ts'in armies, and who had been the winner of Ts'in's subsequent military victories from the overthrow of the coalition in 293 B.C.⁸ to the capture of the Shang-tang from Chao in 260 B.C. The offence that cost Po K'i his life was his refusal to

¹ See Hirth, op. cit., p. 319.

² See *ibid.*

³ See Maspéro, op. cit., pp. 421-2; Hirth, op. cit., pp. 321-2.

⁴ See Hirth, op. cit., pp. 321-2.

⁵ See Maspéro, op. cit., p. 423.

⁶ 296-265 B.C., according to Maspéro, op. cit., pp. 412-20. According to Hirth, op. cit., pp. 318-20, Wei Jan fell in 266 B.C. after having come into power in or after 298 B.C.

⁷ See Maspéro, op. cit., p. 421; Hirth, op. cit., p. 322.

⁸ See Hirth, op. cit., p. 318.

continue to serve under the unworthy successor of his former patron and partner Wei Jan.

This combination of circumstances postponed the date of the inevitable denouement; but, when, after a breathing-space of seventeen years (*currebat* 247–230 B.C.), Ts'in returned to the attack under the command of an implacable King Chêng (*accessit* 246 B.C.) who was to make himself the first emperor of a Sinic universal state under the title of Ts'in She Hwang-ti,¹ the bout of supplementary wars (*gerebantur* 230–221 B.C.)² was as dramatically short as the foregoing general war (*gerebatur* 333–247 B.C.) had been inordinately long.

Within these ten years 230–221 B.C. Ts'in destroyed and annexed all the six surviving other states, together with the surviving fragments of Yüe which had been under the suzerainty of Ch'u since 333 B.C.³ Han, who was the first victim, submitted tamely to her extinction in 230 B.C., and of all the six, the only one to put up a strenuous resistance was Chao. The reduction of Chao cost Ts'in two years of hard fighting (*debellatum* 229–228 B.C.); and, even after the fall of the capital, Han-tan, in 228 B.C., an indomitable remnant of Chao's army withdrew northward into the highlands adjoining the border of the Eurasian Steppe, and set up there a refugee state Tai, as a remnant of Assyria's army had withdrawn to Harrân after the fall of Nineveh in 612 B.C. The year 226 B.C. saw the fall of Yen, save for its outlying north-eastern annex in Liao-tung, and the year 225 B.C. the fall of Wei. The subjugation of Ch'u, like that of Chao, required two campaigns (*gerebantur* 223–222 B.C.), in the second of which the Ts'in armies 'mopped up' the Yüe principalities as well as their suzerain. The same year 222 B.C. saw the destruction of the refugee remnants of Yen in Liao-tung and of Chao in Tai. In 221 B.C. the forcible political unification of the Sinic World at the hands of Ts'in was completed by the *Gleichschaltung* of Ts'i, which, after having passively watched its fellow victims being extinguished one by one, now submitted in its turn as tamely as Han had submitted in 230 B.C.⁴

A Synoptic View of the Currency of the War-and-Peace Cycle in the Histories of the Western, Hellenic, and Sinic Civilizations

If we plot out the series of war-and-peace cycles in Sinic history during the years 497–221 B.C. in the tabular form in which we have already presented the cycles in Hellenic history during the years 321 B.C.–31 B.C. and the cycles in Western history during the years A.D. 1494–1945, we shall observe a common pattern that is unmistakable; and this uniformity in the structure of three episodes in the mutually independent histories of three civilizations, of which the Western episode did not overlap

¹ The moving spirit in this last phase in the process of unification in the Sinic World was Ts'in She Hwang-ti's minister Li Sse (see Bodde, D.: *China's First Unifier* (Leiden 1938, Brill)).

² See Maspéro, op. cit., p. 424; Franke, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 198–9.

³ See VI. vii. 167.

⁴ After 221 B.C. the only Sinic parochial state that still retained a nominal independence as an enclave within the universal state established by Ts'in was the ancient central state Wei—the native state of the fourth-century statesman Shang Yang, whose revolutionary innovations in the state of Ts'in had been the secret of Ts'in's subsequent military and political achievements.

chronologically with either of the other two, while the Sinic and the Hellenic episode were out of step with one another to the extent of about 190 years,¹ suggests that the operation of a Balance of Power between rival parochial states is governed by its own particular 'laws of Nature' which reveal themselves regularly in different social milieux because they are inherent in a particular human predicament which has been these divers' societies common experience.

It would be open to us to extend our field of induction for ascertaining the purport of these particular 'laws' by taking further samples in addition to the three that we have now examined. Each of these three episodes is, indeed, a second chapter in a story whose first chapter we have left unanalysed. The continuity of the post-Confucian Sinic episode with a pre-Confucian chapter of the same story is manifest, since most of the dramatis personae in the two acts are identical, notwithstanding the change in both the cast itself and in the grouping of the actors on a gradually expanding stage that resulted from the break-up of the state of Tsin in the fifth century B.C. In the corresponding passages of Hellenic and Western history the continuity of the action is obscured at first sight in either case by a sweeping change in the cast and by a sudden and sensational increase in the size of the stage on which the tragedy is being played. Yet the post-Alexandrine Hellenic balance of power between Powers of a supra-city-state calibre was nevertheless historically continuous with a previous balance between city-states that had been in play from 478 to 338 B.C., and the latter-day Western balance, brought into play by the French invasion of Italy in A.D. 1494, was likewise historically continuous with a previous balance between Late Medieval city-states, or agglomerations of them, in Northern and Central Italy.

If we chose, we could proceed to analyse each of these earlier chapters in the three stories on the lines that we have now worked out. For example, we can discern that the pre-Alexandrine Hellenic balance of power was brought into play in 478 B.C. by the splitting of a Pan-Hellenic coalition which had been formed in 480 B.C. against the Achaemenian Empire, and that it was brought to an end in 338 B.C. by the formation of a new coalition against the same common adversary. Again, in the history of the pre-Confucian Sinic series of war-and-peace cycles, we can discern a cycle, running from 634 to 506 B.C., in which the *Leitmotiv* was an inconclusive struggle for hegemony between Ch'u and Tsin, and an overture to this cycle in which the decay of the oecumenical Ch'ou Power was giving ever larger opportunities for a number of local Powers to assert their independence and to enter into competition with one another. We can date the beginning of this overture from the

¹ Augustus's achievement of establishing a universal state in the Hellenic World in 31 B.C. had been anticipated in the Sinic World, 190 years earlier, by Ts'in She Hwang-ti's establishment of a universal state there in 221 B.C. Neither the post-Alexandrine nor any other episode in Hellenic history overlapped chronologically with any episode in Western history, since the Western Society sprang from the Hellenic Society's ruins, as the Hellenic, in its day, had sprung from the ruins of the Minoan. If we can trace the Western Civilization back to the close of the seventh century of the Christian Era, and the Hellenic back to the close of the twelfth century B.C., we shall reckon the 'interval' between them to have been of the chronological magnitude of about 1,800 years.

recognition by the Chóu Imperial Government in 680 B.C. of the hegemony with which the parochial state of Ts'i had been invested in 681 B.C. by four of the minor central states;¹ or, as an alternative initial date, we can take the overrunning of the capital city of the Chóu by the western barbarians in 771 B.C.²—a catastrophe which invited the Chóu Power's parochial feudatories to assert *de facto* their independence of a suzerain who had now flagrantly forfeited his claim to exercise his authority over them by having shown himself incompetent to perform any longer his oecumenical task of defending the common frontier of the Sinic World against barbarian attacks. On a similar reckoning, the beginning of the overture to the play of the Late Medieval balance of power between Northern and Central Italian city-states could be dated from the beginning of the process of political consolidation which reduced the number of states in Northern and Central Italy from seventy or eighty to ten in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era,³ while an alternative initial date for this episode of Western history would be the death in A.D. 1250 of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II—an event which had for its consequence the reduction of the Holy Roman Empire to the condition of practical impotence into which the Chóu Empire lapsed after the catastrophe of 771 B.C.

Our survey of war-and-peace cycles could, indeed, be carried far and wide. In the Sumeric World, for example, there was a balance of power between contending parochial states that was in play for centuries before it was brought to an end by the establishment of a Sumeric universal state in the shape of Ur-Engur's (*alias* Ur-Nammu's) Empire of the Four Quarters, and in the Egyptiac World a twentieth-century Western historian might guess, pending a recovery of the missing records, that there must have been a similar prelude to Narmer's establishment of a United Kingdom.⁴ Nor need we confine our investigations to struggles in which the parties are contending states and in which the denouement is the elimination of all the competitors save for the one surviving victor Power whose victory converts her from a parochial state into an oecumenical empire.

In examining the history of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Balance of Power, we have observed already⁵ that, in the last two cycles of this series, the bouts of warfare took the form of civil war and social revolution in place of the international warfare between parochial sovereign states through which the same current of violence had discharged itself before that vent had been stopped by the elimination, in the course of the preceding cycle, of all the Great Powers of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World except Rome. We may now go on to remind ourselves that this alternating rhythm of bouts of war and spells of peace did not cease to manifest itself in the Hellenic World after the inauguration of a *Pax Augusta* in 31 B.C., any more than it had ceased after the assertion of Rome's oecumenical supremacy in the Reduplicated General War of

¹ See Maspéro, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 63-64; Hirth, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-7.

³ See III. iii. 355.

⁴ See p. 687, below.

⁵ See p. 271, above.

220-189 B.C. and the confirmation of this result in the supplementary wars of 171-146 B.C. In the forms of civil war, social revolution, and barbarian invasion, the rhythmic bouts of disorder continued to recur throughout the history of an Hellenic universal state which Augustus had founded and which Diocletian afterwards rehabilitated, until the onset of a final bout of such severity that this time the moribund society was unable to rally its depleted vital forces. There was the eruption of A.D. 66-70; the convulsion, ending with the accession of Diocletian in A.D. 284, whose beginning may be dated from the assassination of Alexander Severus in A.D. 235 or indeed from the death of Marcus Aurelius in A.D. 180; and the recurrent convulsion of A.D. 376-394, which proved fatal to the Empire in the West and which was followed in the Centre and the East by a likewise fatal seizure after Justinian's death in A.D. 565.

We could go on to analyse on the same lines the histories of other universal states that we have identified in this Study, and, besides taking account of social revolutions, civil wars, and barbarian invasions, we could also bring into our panorama the warfare with neighbouring Powers representing alien civilizations. The Roman Empire, for example, served from 64 B.C. to A.D. 632 as the warden of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World's marches over against a resurgent Syriac Power clothed in the successive forms of the Arsacid and the Sasanid Empire;¹ and an Ottoman Empire which had provided the main body of Orthodox Christendom with an alien universal state found itself recurrently at war with Hungary and Hungary's successor the Hapsburg Monarchy in the Danube Basin, with Venice and with Spain in the Mediterranean, and with the Safawi Power in South-West Asia.

Our purpose, however, is, not to make an exhaustive survey of war-and-peace cycles, but to carry our investigation far enough to assemble adequate evidence for judging whether there is, or is not, any uniform common rhythm discernible in different series of such cycles that are sufficiently remote from one another in date and location to be reasonably regarded as being mutually independent; and for this positive purpose a wider expansion of our field of vision might be less illuminating than a closer comparative view of the three series that we have now examined in some detail. We may therefore conclude the present chapter by juxtaposing our three series with an eye to ascertaining whether the likeness between them, which we have already observed, is no more than a similarity in their general structure, or whether it extends to a chronological correspondence between the lengths of the Time-spans of the alternating bouts of warfare and spells of peace out of which this more or less uniform structure is built up in all three episodes.

The accompanying table² sets out, side by side, the data presented separately in the three preceding tables displaying successive occurrences of the war-and-peace cycle in Modern and post-Modern Western history, in post-Alexandrine Hellenic history, and in post-Confucian Sinic history respectively. In each of the three triple columns of dates in Table IV, the dates in the column on the left are the historical dates of

¹ See I. i. 75.

² Table IV, opposite.

the major alternating transitions from bouts of war to spells of peace and vice versa, as these stand in the preceding table recording the particular series—Western, Hellenic, or Sinic, as the case may be—which this column reproduces. Dates of transitions from peace to war are printed in roman type, dates of transitions from war to peace in italics. The

TABLE IV. *A Synoptic Table of the Dates marking Turning-points from Bouts of War to Spells of Peace and vice versa in the Modern and post-Modern Western, the post-Alexandrine Hellenic, and the post-Confucian Sinic Series of War-and-Peace Cycles*¹

Historical Western Dates	Transposed Corresponding Dates ²		Historical Hellenic Dates	Transposed Corresponding Dates ²		Historical Sinic Dates	Transposed Corresponding Dates ²	
	Hellenic	Sinic		Western	Sinic		Western	Hellenic
	A.D.			B.C.			B.C.	
1477 ³	(1479)	321	(323)
1482 ⁴	(1484)	[316] ⁵	(318)
1494	(1485	1493)	[315] ⁶	(306	307)	497	(496	505)
[1503]	(1499	1500)	301	(297	300)	490	(487	491)
[1521]	(1518)	282	(279)	..	()
1525	(1519)	281	(275)	..	()
1536	(1534	1535)	266	(264	265)	455	(454	456)
1559	(1559	1537*)	241	(241	263*)	453	(431*	431*)
1568	(1580*	1571)	220	(232*	229)	419	(422	410)
1609	(1611	1620*)	189	(191	180)	370	(381*	379)
1618	(1629*	1636*)	171	(182*	164)	354	(372*	361)
1648	(1654	1650)	146	(152	150)	340	(342	336)
1672	(1667	1657*)	133	(128	143)	333	(318*	323)
[1697]	(1689)	111	(103)	..	()
[1702]	(1709)	90	(98)	..	()
1713	(1720	1743*)	80	(87	57*)	247	(277*	270*)
1733	(1751*	1760*)	49	(67*	40)	230	(257*	239)
1763	(1769	1769)	31	(37	31)	221	(227	221)

¹ Dates of turning-points from peace to war are printed in roman type, dates of turning-points from war to peace in italics. Dates enclosed in square brackets are those of minor turning-points.

² A transposed date is marked with an asterisk when it falls more than ten years wide of the corresponding historical date with which it is being brought into comparison.

³ Date of the outbreak of war over the inheritance of the Burgundian Valois Duke Charles the Bold.

⁴ Date of the peace-settlement partitioning the inheritance of Charles the Bold between the French Crown and the Burgundian Valois-Hapsburgs.

⁵ Date of the liquidation of Eumenes.

⁶ Date of the formation of the coalition against Antigonos Monophthalmus.

dates between square brackets in these left-hand columns are those of minor transitions which, in the tables, are identified in footnotes. The pair of dates between round brackets by which each of the dates in the left-hand columns is accompanied are transpositions of the corresponding dates in each of the other two series into terms of the historical series represented by the dates on the left hand of each triple column. An Hellenic date is transposed into a Western date by the addition of 1,800 years, and into a Sinic date by the subtraction of 190 years, on the reckoning that the Western Civilization emerged about 1,800 years later

than the Hellenic (i.e. *circa* A.D. 675 as against *circa* 1125 B.C.) and that the Sinic episode resulted in the establishment of a universal state 190 years earlier than the date of the corresponding denouement in the Hellenic episode (i.e. in 221 B.C. as against 31 B.C.). On the same reckoning, a Western date is transposed into an Hellenic by the subtraction of 1,800, and into a Sinic by the subtraction of 1,990 years; a Sinic date into an Hellenic by the addition of 190 years, and into a Western by the addition of 1,990 years.

Transposed dates, calculated in accordance with these scales, which fall more than ten years wide of the corresponding historical date in the series with which they are being brought into comparison, are marked with an asterisk; and it will be seen that, out of 84 transposed dates within the round brackets in our table, 22 fall outside, and 62 inside, this range of chronological proximity to the historical dates of which they are the equivalents. It will also be seen that, while the conspicuous 'misses' thus amount to something more than 25 per cent. of the total number of 'shots', and the approximate 'hits' to something less than 75 per cent., the comparison between the three series which reveals this surprising degree of coincidence¹ is simply a comparison of turning-points marking alternations between bouts of war and spells of peace. As soon as we introduce the distinctions that we have drawn between 'general wars' and 'supplementary wars' and between 'breathing spaces' and spells of 'general peace', we shall see that, as often as not, the correspondences apparent in the present table do not extend to these qualitative differences between bouts and spells of different characters. For example, the chronological correspondence between the Western bout of war running from A.D. 1536 to A.D. 1559 and the Hellenic bout of war running from 266 B.C. to 241 B.C. is very close; but, whereas the Hellenic bout in question ranks as 'a general war' in our analysis, the corresponding Western bout ranks as a set of supplementary wars. Moreover, in several cases, a major turning-point in one series has for its counterpart in one of the two other series a turning-point that is merely a minor one.

Our table does, on the other hand, enable us to calculate the average Time-span of the intervals between turning-points marking major transitions from spells of peace to bouts of war and vice versa. In our confrontation of the Western and the Hellenic series, apart from the Sinic, there are thirteen of these intervals within a total Time-span amounting to 286 years (A.D. 1477-1763) in the Western series, and fifteen of them within a total Time-span amounting to 290 years (321 B.C.-31 B.C.) in the Hellenic series. A division of the average length of these two Time-spans, which works out at 288 years, by the average of the two numbers of intervals, which works out at fourteen, gives us an

¹ The writer must confess that he was surprised to find this degree of chronological correspondence between the three series of dates—the more so because his conscience did not convict him of having procured 'a pre-established harmony' by any designing manipulation of the figures when he was compiling the three tables out of which the present table has been composed. The tables of war-and-peace cycles in Modern and post-Modern Western history and in post-Alexandrine Hellenic history were compiled by him in A.D. 1929; the table of war-and-peace cycles in post-Confucian Sinic history in A.D. 1950; and it was not till after he had compiled this third table that he thought of bringing the three tables together into a synoptic view.

average interval of 20.57 years between turning-points, and an average wave-length of 41.14 years between successive turning-points in one or other of the two directions either from peace to war or from war to peace. In our confrontation of all three series, there are eleven intervals between turning-points marking major transitions within a total Time-span of 269 years (A.D. 1494-1763) in the Western series and of 276 years (497 B.C.-221 B.C.) in the Sinic, while in the Hellenic series there are fifteen intervals between turning-points marking major transitions within a total Time-span of 284 years (315 B.C.-31 B.C.). A division of the average length of these three Time-spans, which works out at just over 276 years, by the average of the three numbers of intervals, which works out at twelve and one third, gives us an average interval of 22.38 years between turning-points and an average wave-length of 44.76 years between successive turning-points in the same direction.

These average figures are perhaps not of any great significance, considering that, in our analysis of the Western series of war-and-peace cycles, we have found that the overture was on a very much shorter Time-scale than any of the ensuing regular cycles, and also that, in the course of these, there was a tendency for the bouts of war to become shorter and the spells of peace longer. The approximate correspondence in wave-length between these regular Western war-and-peace cycles and the contemporary Western 'long' business cycles¹ may well prove more illuminating.² The total Time-span of these three cycles amounted to 346 years (A.D. 1568-1914), and within this period there were twelve intervals between major turning-points. The average length of an interval between turning-points in these three regular Western war-and-peace cycles was thus 28.83 years, while the average wave-length between successive turning-points in the same direction, either from peace to war or from war to peace, was 57.66 years. It will be seen that these two Time-spans are respectively of about the same order of magnitude as the twenty-two-to-twenty-five-years-long 'Rostow-Spiethoff' phases of alternating economic booms and depressions and as the 'Kondratieff' economic cycles with a wave-length of something between forty and sixty years.

2. *The Disintegrations and Growths of Societies*

'Laws of Nature' in the Disintegrations of Civilizations

In our foregoing investigation of war-and-peace cycles in three episodes occurring in the histories of three different civilizations, we have found indications suggesting that these rhythmical fluctuations were, in each episode, the products of a tension between two conflicting tendencies. A tendency to keep the balance perpetually in play by taking action to right it whenever it was in danger of being overturned was in each case countered, and eventually overcome, by a tendency for the recurrent wars through which a disturbed equilibrium was periodically readjusted to become progressively more severe in their incidence on Society until a point was reached at which the 'temperate and undecisive contests',

¹ See pp. 230-2, above.

² See p. 322, below.

which once, perhaps, had more or less satisfactorily fulfilled their regulative purpose, came to defeat the intentions of statesmanship by escaping from its control and rankling into enormities which were bound, sooner or later, to liquidate themselves either by destroying the society on which they had come to prey or alternatively by moving a society whose life was now at stake to terminate this series of ever more destructive wars between parochial states by allowing all the contending pieces but one to be swept off the board.

The self-amortization of a cyclic rhythm which thus proves to be the dominant tendency in struggles for existence between parochial states has previously come to our notice in our study of the disintegrations of civilizations; and it is not surprising that there should be this visible affinity between the respective rhythms of two historical processes that are manifestly bound up with one another. Our study¹ of the breakdowns in which the disintegrations of civilizations have originated has shown us that a frequent occasion, symptom, and even veritable cause of breakdown has been the outbreak of a war between parochial states in which a perennial evil that has previously been kept under control and been practised with moderation now disconcertingly lights up, in one of its periodical recurrences, to a degree of intensity that is so unprecedentedly severe as to constitute a deadly danger to the society's survival. In the pre-Alexandrine chapter of Hellenic history, for example, the Atheno-Peloponnesian 'reduplicated general war' of 431-404 B.C. was a scourge of this unprecedentedly lethal kind, as contrasted with the relatively moderate warfare with one another in which the Athenian and the Lacedaemonian faction in an Hellenic body politic had been indulging down to that date since their split in 478 B.C. In the pre-Confucian chapter of Sinic history, similarly, the great war of 634-628 B.C., in which the principal belligerents were Tsin and Ch'u, marked a corresponding climacteric crisis in a series of cycles of warfare between parochial states.

In our examination of three series of this kind, we have also noticed² that the replacement of a litter of contending parochial states by a single oecumenical power is apt to be followed, not by an entire cessation of recurrent outbreaks of anarchic violence, but by their translation from the previous form of wars between parochial states into the alternative form of civil wars and social disorders; and, if we thus find that the establishment of a universal state does not inevitably bring to an end the alternating rhythm of War and Peace generated by an antecedent Balance of Power between parochial states, it is more patently evident that this achievement of constructive statesmanship, magnificent though it is, does not avail to reverse, and so avert, a process of disintegration which it temporarily arrests.

We have observed³ that—in the histories of civilizations down to the time of writing—the disintegrations of civilizations, like the struggles for existence between parochial states through which the breakdowns of civilizations had been precipitated, had run their course in a series of rhythmic fluctuations; and an empirical survey of ten examples—leaving

¹ In IV, *passim*, in vol. iv.

² On pp. 271 and 283, above.

³ In V. vi. 278-321.

out of account a lost Minoan and an uncompleted Western record—has enabled us to ascertain¹ that the cyclic rhythm of Rout-and-Rally in which the dominant tendency towards disintegration has fought out its long battle with a resistance movement has been apt—apart from cases in which the domestic history of a society has been thrown out of its own course by the impact of an alien body social—to take a run of three-and-a-half beats—rout-rally-relapse-rally-relapse-rally-relapse—in accomplishing the historical journey from the breakdown of a civilization to its final unretrieved dissolution. The first rout throws the broken-down society into the first paroxysm of 'a Time of Troubles' which is relieved by the first rally, only to be followed by a second, and usually more violent, paroxysm that is brought on by a relapse. This relapse is followed, in its turn, by a second rally which is more robust and more durable than the first inasmuch as it manifests itself in the establishment of a universal state; and, when a further relapse eventually supervenes nevertheless, the universal state manages to stage a recovery. This third rally, however, is the last that the disintegrating Civilization finds the strength to make. When, thereafter, the universal state is smitten by a second paralytic stroke, this is the end, not only of this oecumenical body politic, but also of the body social whose life the universal state has prolonged by incapsulating it in a carapace.

It will be seen that the drama of Social Disintegration has—to judge from performances up to date—a more precise and regular plot than the drama of the Balance of Power. In this drama of Disintegration the number of the acts seems to be normally three-and-a-half. We may now go on to observe that the regularity of the structure of the plot of this play is matched by a uniformity in the length of the time that this plot takes to work itself out. If we study our table of universal states,² we shall find that—in cases in which the course of events is not disturbed by the impact of alien bodies social—a span of some four hundred years is apt to be occupied by the movement of rout, rally, relapse, and more effective rally running from the initial breakdown of the civilization to the termination of its Time of Troubles through the establishment of its universal state, and a further span of about the same length—some four hundred years again—by the ensuing movement of recurrent relapse, last rally, and final unretrieved relapse running from the establishment of the universal state to its dissolution. The standard Time-spans both of Times of Troubles and of universal states would thus appear to be of the order of four centuries each;³ but a universal state is apt to die hard, even after it has been overtaken by the deadly second stroke. A Roman Empire which went to pieces in the socially backward western provinces on the morrow of the catastrophe at Adrianople in A.D. 378 did not go

¹ See *ibid.*, especially pp. 278–87.

² Printed in vol. vi, on p. 327, and reproduced in vol. vii, as Table I, on p. 769.

³ Ibn Khaldūn, whose survey of universal states was limited in range to the special class of empires founded by Nomads (see III. iii. 475), reckons the standard duration of an empire at *circa* 120 years, i.e. at a Time-span running to three generations of 40 years each (see his *Muqaddamāt*, French translation by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863–8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 348–50). This number of generations is, in truth, the normal term for Nomad empires *in partibus agricoliarum* (see the present Study, III. iii. 24–25).

the same way in the central and eastern provinces until after the death of Justinian in A.D. 565. Similarly, a Han Empire which had met with its second stroke in A.D. 184, and which broke up thereafter into 'the Three Kingdoms', managed to reconstitute itself for a moment in the empire of the United Tsin (*imperabat* A.D. 280-317) before going into its final dissolution in the fourth century of the Christian Era.

In cases in which the dissolution of a broken-down civilization has been followed by the emergence of an affiliated civilization there has usually been an interval of some three hundred years between the date of the declining civilization's last, and fatal, stroke and the earliest date at which the rising civilization becomes visible above the historical horizon. Considering that this intervening chronological interregnum is apt to be filled to some extent by a 'die-hard' epilogue to the history of the moribund antecedent civilization's universal state,¹ we have to reckon that the process of disintegration may exceed its minimum Time-span of some eight hundred years, running from the initial breakdown of the society itself to the second breakdown of its universal state, by trespassing on a subsequent interregnum which gives scope for an epilogue of any length up to a limit of three hundred years. The maximum Time-span of the disintegration process thus turns out to be of the order, not of eight centuries, but of eleven.

Within the minimum Time-span of eight hundred years, the six intervals between turning-points, into which the three complete cycles of Rout-and-Rally can be analysed, fall into two groups, consisting of three intervals each, which are of approximately equal aggregate length. The first run of four centuries, constituting the Time of Troubles, is occupied by a down-swing between the original rout and the first rally, an up-swing between the first rally and the ensuing relapse, and a down-swing between this relapse and the second rally. This second rally, which occurs at the half-way point on the eight-hundred-years-long total course, brings with it the establishment of the universal state, and the second batch of four centuries, during which a *pax oecumenica* prevails, is occupied by an up-swing between the second rally and a further relapse, a down-swing between this further relapse and a final rally, and an up-swing between this final rally and a final unretrieved relapse in which the fabric of a long-since-disintegrating society now dissolves in a social interregnum. While either group of three intervals between turning-points is thus apt to occupy a span of four centuries in the aggregate, there is no indication in the historical evidence of any corresponding tendency, within each of these four-hundred-years-long spans, for the three intervals occupying it to be uniform with one another in their length. On the contrary, it looks as if the chronological articulation of these intervals within any four-hundred-years-long span were highly elastic; for in any one example of the series they are apt to differ from one another in duration, and these differences in their duration which thus present themselves within the history of each disintegrating civilization also seem to differ, from case to case, in the ratio in which they stand to one another. There does not seem to be any uniform ratio be-

¹ See V. vi. 210-13.

tween the different lengths of the successive intervals that is common to all the divers examples of this series of intervals in the histories of different civilizations.

'Laws of Nature' in the Growths of Civilizations

When we turn our attention from Social Disintegration to Social Growth, we shall recollect our finding, at a previous stage of this Study,¹ that Growth, as well as Disintegration, exhibits a cyclically rhythmic movement. Growth takes place whenever a challenge evokes a successful response that, in turn, evokes a fresh challenge that is not identical with the preceding challenge by which the creatively provocative response has been elicited. We have not found any intrinsic reason why this process should not repeat itself *ad infinitum*, even though a majority of the civilizations that had come to birth down to the time of writing might have failed, as a matter of historical fact, to maintain their growth by managing, for more than a small number of times in succession, to make a response that had been both an effective answer to the challenge that had called it forth and at the same time a fruitful mother of a new challenge demanding a new response.

We have seen, for example,² that in the history of the Hellenic Civilization the initial challenge of an anarchic barbarism, which was the legacy of the break-up of an antecedent Minoan Civilization's universal state, evoked an effective response in the shape of a new political institution, the city-state, which was perhaps created by ship's companies of refugees who were cast up upon the eastern shores of the Aegean Sea in the course of a post-Minoan interregnum (*durabat circa* 1425-1125 B.C.); and we have noticed in the same context that the very success of this response to a challenge on the political plane evoked, in its turn, a fresh challenge, this time on the economic plane, in the shape of the rising pressure of a population whose natural increase was now no longer being kept in check by battle, murder, and sudden death as drastically as it had been before the return of law and order accompanying the rise of city-states.

This challenge presented to the Hellenes by the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence, in a physical environment in which Nature set rigid limits to the increase of agricultural production, evoked, as we have seen, a number of alternative responses of unequal efficacy. There was the disastrous Spartan response of conquering the fields of the Spartans' Messenian next-door-neighbours within their common Hellenic homeland; there was the temporarily effective Corinthian and Chalcidian response of winning new fields for Hellenes to plough overseas in lands wrested from more backward peoples in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean; and there was the permanently effective Athenian response of increasing the aggregate productivity of this enlarged Hellenic World—after its geographical expansion had been brought to a halt by the concerted resistance of Phoenician and Tyrrhenian competitors³—

¹ In III. iii. 119-27.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 120-2. See also I. i. 24-26; II. ii. 36-49; and III. iii. 139-40 and 197-8.

³ See I. i. 24-25; II. ii. 38-42; III. iii. 122; and IX. viii. 436.

through an economic revolution in which an undifferentiated economic régime of subsistence farming was replaced by a differentiated régime of cash-crop farming and industrial production for export in exchange for imports of staple foods and raw materials.

This successful Hellenic response to the economic challenge of a rising pressure of population evoked, as we have also seen, a further challenge on the political plane;¹ for a now economically interdependent Hellenic World required a political régime of law and order on an oecumenical scale; the existing régime of parochial city-state dispensations, which had fostered the rise of an autarkic agricultural economy in each isolated patch of plain in an original Hellas round the shores of the Aegean and thereafter also in a Magna Graecia in the Western Mediterranean, no longer provided an adequate political structure for an Hellenic Society whose economic structure had now come to be unitary. This third challenge in Hellenic history—the challenge to transcend the city-state and to create a polity of oecumenical dimensions—was not met by the Hellenes in time to save the growth of the Hellenic Civilization from being cut short by a breakdown.

In the growth of the Western Civilization we can descry a concatenation of successive challenges evoking effective responses evoking new challenges which surpasses the Hellenic concatenation by running to as many as three completed links, as contrasted with the two which were all that a growing Hellenic Civilization succeeded in forging.

The initial challenge with which a nascent Western Society was confronted was the same challenge of an anarchic barbarism that had confronted a nascent Hellenic Society; the break-up of the Roman Empire and the break-up of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' bequeathed an identical legacy to their respective heirs; but the Franks' response to this identical challenge was not the same as the Hellenes'. Whereas the Hellenes had mastered anarchy by creating a parochial political institution in the shape of the city-state, the Franks mastered anarchy by creating an oecumenical ecclesiastical institution in the shape of the Hildebrandine Papacy;² and the meeting of an identical challenge along these different lines evoked a new challenge of a different character. A growing Western Civilization that had now achieved an oecumenical unity under the ecclesiastical aegis of the Papacy found itself in need of a politically and economically efficient parochial state; and this need was met by the resuscitation of the Hellenic institution of the city-state in a Medieval Western Italy and Flanders.³

These local materializations in the Western World of an Hellenic institution on its original miniature scale were not, however, more than a foretaste of the response which the Western Society had to make to the challenge that it was facing; for the late Medieval city-state cosmos⁴ extending from Central and Northern Italy through Southern and Western Germany to Flanders did not embrace more than a fraction of the Western World of the day, and the city-state itself was not an institution that could be grafted, *tel quel*, on to the medieval feudal monarchies of

¹ See IV. iv. 206-14.

³ See pp. 7-8, above.

² See IV. iv. 512-32.

⁴ See III. iii. 299-300 and 341-8.

vastly larger geographical dimensions which were the typical parochial polities of the Western World taken as a whole. Accordingly, the locally effective response, in the shape of the resuscitation of the Hellenic city-state, which Italy and Flanders had made to the need for an efficient form of parochial polity, presented the rest of the Western World with a new challenge. Could the solution of the problem of creating efficient parochial organs of Western political and economic life, which had been attained in Italy and Flanders through the resuscitation of an Hellenic institution, be harvested for the Western World as a whole by translating this Italian and Flemish efficiency from the city-state to the nation-state scale?

This problem, in its turn, was solved, as we have seen, in England, first on the political plane through the successful injection of an Italianate efficiency into the Medieval Transalpine institution of parliamentary representative government,¹ and afterwards on the economic plane through the Industrial Revolution.² The Late Modern Western Industrial Revolution, however, like the Solonian Economic Revolution in Hellenic history, had the effect of replacing a parochial economic autarky by an oecumenical economic interdependence; and thus the Western Civilization found itself confronted, as a result of its successful response to a third challenge, with the same new challenge that had faced the Hellenic Civilization after its successful response to a second challenge in its history. Would a society that had now achieved economic interdependence on an oecumenical scale succeed in providing its unified body economic with the requisite unitary political framework? This challenge, which had been presented to the Hellenic Society before the close of the sixth century B.C. and had defeated it before the close of the fifth century B.C., had likewise been presented to the Western Society before the close of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, when the eruption of Democracy and Industrialism had already threatened to put a demonic new driving force into the old institution of War. By the time of writing, mid-way through the twentieth century, this challenge had not yet been met by Western Man, but it had already become manifest to him that, if he were to be defeated by it, he would be unable to save his civilization from disaster.

These brief glances at the histories of the growths of the Western and the Hellenic Civilization suffice to show that there is no uniformity between them in respect of the number of the links in the concatenation of interlocking rounds of Challenge-and-Response through which social growth had been achieved in these two cases; and this negative conclusion would be neither confirmed nor impugned by an extension of our survey to the histories of other civilizations in their growth-stage; for, among these comparable cases, there was none in which the growth-stage itself had not been too brief, or in which a twentieth-century student's knowledge of the history of the society in this stage had not remained too scanty, to enable the historian to attempt an analysis even of the summary kind that we have just been making of this phase in the histories of the Western and Hellenic societies.

¹ See III. iii. 350-63.

² See IV. iv. 167-73.

If there is thus no indication of there being any uniformity in the number of the chapters in the history of social growth as between one civilization and another, there is also no evidence of there being any standard length to which the Time-spans of the successive chapters conform.

If, with an eye to this latter point, we look once again at the history of the growth of the Western Civilization, it might appear, perhaps, at first glance, as if each of the interlocking rounds of Challenge-and-Response through which the process of growth had been achieved in this episode had had something like a regular wave-length running to approximately four hundred years. This was in fact the Time-interval between the date of the emergence in the Western World of the nation-state, round about the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, and the foregoing emergence of the Hildebrandine Papacy round about the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries; and this earlier landmark in the history of the Western Civilization's growth is likewise separated by an interval of about four hundred years from the date of the emergence of the Western Civilization itself round about the turn of the seventh and eighth centuries. This appearance of uniformity of wave-length as between successive rounds of Challenge-and-Response in the growth-phase of Western history is belied, however, by an ominous absence, round about the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of anything resembling the emergence of an effective Western political organization on the oecumenical scale in response to the challenge presented to the Western Civilization by its own previous success in providing itself with an efficient parochial form of polity on the nation-state scale. If the growth-process were in truth not merely cyclic but also periodic in the sense of proceeding through cycles with a uniform wave-length, the Western Society's current problem of establishing some kind of oecumenical order on the political plane ought to have been visibly on the way to solution by the year A.D. 1952; and the Western Civilization's actual failure to solve this problem up to date must indicate either that the appearance of a uniform four-hundred-years-long wave-length in the growth-process was an illusion or else that, by A.D. 1952, the Western Civilization had broken down.

The former of these two possibly alternative, but not necessarily incompatible, inferences was borne out by the irregularity of the date at which the Medieval Western renaissance of the Hellenic city-state had occurred. So far from being separated in Time by an interval of anything of the order of four hundred years from the antecedent emergence of the Hildebrandine Papacy and from the subsequent emergence of the nation-state, the renaissance of the Hellenic city-state in the Western World followed hard at the heels of the epiphany of the Hildebrandine Papacy and was indeed one of its immediate incidental effects, considering that a temporary Balance of Power in the struggle between a waxing Papacy and a waning Holy Roman Empire was the constellation of forces that gave the Medieval Western city-states in an intervening no-man's-land in Northern and Central Italy their opportunity to raise their heads.¹

Our reconnaissance of the history of the growth of the Western Civiliza-

¹ See III. iii. 345-6; IV. iv. 524; and p. 240, n. 2, above.

zation thus points to the negative conclusion that, in the process of social growth, the cyclic movement of Challenge-and-Response through which growth is achieved has no fixed uniform wave-length for the successive beats of the rhythm, any more than it has a fixed uniform number of beats beyond which the movement cannot go.

The upshot of our present inquiry therefore seems to be that the operation of 'laws of Nature' is as inconspicuous in the histories of the growths of Civilizations as it is conspicuous in the histories of their disintegrations; and in a later chapter we shall find grounds for thinking that this striking difference in appearances is not just an accidental and illusory effect of the fragmentariness of our information and the dullness of our understanding, but is inherent in an intrinsic difference in character between the growth-process and the disintegration-process themselves.

(d) 'THERE IS NO ARMOUR AGAINST FATE'¹

In studying the operation of 'laws of Nature' in the histories of civilizations, we have found that the rhythm in which these laws reveal themselves is apt to be generated by a struggle between two tendencies of unequal strength. There is a dominant tendency at work which prevails in the long run against repeated—and, in the short run, repeatedly successful—counteracting moves in which the recalcitrant opposing tendency asserts itself. The struggle sets the pattern of the action; the persistence of the weaker tendency in refusing to resign itself to defeat accounts for the repetitions of the encounter in a series of successive cycles; the dominance of the stronger tendency makes itself felt by bringing the series to a close sooner or later, instead of letting it go on repeating itself *ad infinitum*, as, in theory, it might perhaps go on if the two forces at work were of exactly equal potency.

On these lines we have watched² struggles for existence between parochial states following—through three or four cycles of wars fought on one side for the overthrow, and on the other side for the maintenance, of a Balance of Power—a course that in each case eventually overturns the Balance and terminates the struggle by liquidating all the competitors except one, whose sole survival has the effect of replacing a bevy of contending states by a unitary oecumenical empire. We have likewise watched³ the struggle between a broken-down society's tendency to disintegrate and an opposing effort to restore it to a lost state of health following, through three-and-a-half cycles of lapse and rally, a course that in each case eventually ends in a dissolution which is final inasmuch as, this time, the relapse is not even partially retrieved. In studying⁴ the operation of 'laws of Nature' in the economic affairs of an Industrial Western Society we have found expert investigators of 'business cycles' surmising that these repetitive movements of divers wave-lengths might prove to be waves rippling the surface of waters that were, all the time, flowing in a current whose headway would eventually bring these rhythmic fluctuations to an end by dissipating the particular conjunction of

¹ Shirley, James: *Death the Leveller*.

³ On pp. 287-91, above.

² On pp. 234-87, above.

⁴ On pp. 223-34, above.

economic and social conditions—a system of free competition for earning profits reckoned in terms of money—in which the series of Late Modern and post-Modern Western ‘business cycles’ had taken its rise. In the same connexion we may remind ourselves of our finding¹ that, when and where a conflict between a disintegrating civilization and bands of recalcitrant barbarians beyond its pale had passed over from a war of movement into a stationary warfare along the *limes* of a universal state, the passage of Time had been apt to militate against the professional defenders of the *limes* to the advantage of its barbarian assailants, until in the end the sagging dam had burst and the gradually accumulated flood waters of Barbarism had descended in a sudden devastating spate on the domain of a society whose defence had become at last an intolerably heavy tax on its resources. We may further remind ourselves of our observation² of a tendency for the native bent of a civilization to reassert itself, sooner or later, against the deflecting effect of the renaissance of some incongruous element artificially resuscitated from the ossuary of a dead antecedent culture.

The foregoing observations are all illustrations of our more general finding³ that cyclical movements in human history, like the physical revolutions of a cart-wheel, have a way of forwarding, through their own monotonously repetitive circular motion, another movement with a longer rhythm which, by contrast, can be seen to be a cumulative progress in one direction, even if we cannot be equally sure that this course has ever been set for it deliberately in execution of a plan. In each of the historical instances in which we have detected one of these finite series of cycles generated by a struggle between two tendencies of unequal strength, the stronger tendency of the two has been apt to bring the series to a close by eventually winning a decisive victory over its weaker opponent; but, of course, this denouement tells us no more about the winning tendency than that, in this particular episode, it has proved stronger than its opponent to a degree that has eventually availed to put an end to the unequal struggle. There is no warrant for interpreting these victories of one tendency over another *de facto Historiae* as victories *de jure Naturae*. Empirically observed matters of fact are not necessarily the outcomes of an inexorable fate; the *onus probandi* here lies with the determinist, not with the agnostic. The unwarranted assumption that the historical denouement whose historical occurrence has been recorded in retrospect must therefore have been predestined to occur, in the teeth of all possible variations in previous acts of the play, has been propounded as a *jeu d'esprit* in Lewis Carroll's fable of ‘the time-machine’;⁴ but the English mathematician C. L. Dodgson left it to his German confrère Oswald Spengler to crystallize this airy conceit into the ponderous dogma under which a man of genius has perversely buried the brilliant findings of his intuitive insight. This undocumented Determinism is the bane of many passages of Spengler's work besides the one—already quoted in this study⁵—in which the Western culture's reassertion of its

¹ In VIII. viii. 16–44.

³ In IV. iv. 34–37.

⁵ Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), p. 321, quoted on pp. 65–66, above.

² On pp. 62–73, above.

⁴ See V. vi. 214–15.

native bent against a fifteenth-century Italian renaissance of Hellenic art and letters is delineated with what would be a fine sense of historical reality if only the philosopher-hierophant had been content to present his findings as the matters of fact which they are—without importing the *ex cathedra* judgement that they are also the fore-ordained acts of an ineluctable Destiny.

After thus taking warning from the spectacle of Spengler's self-stultification against the error of reading the unproven operation of an hypothetical Destiny into secular tendencies in human affairs which have happened in the end to win decisive victories over a stubborn opposition, we may now proceed, without prejudice to a still open issue between Law and Freedom in History, to take note of certain other episodes in which some tendency has reasserted itself in the face of successive rebellions against it. Such resolutions of conflicting human forces, in which Spengler would see the hand of 'Fate', can be observed in the histories of the political fortunes of territories; in the histories of encounters between different civilizations; and in the histories of struggles between conflicting religious concepts, doctrines, and allegiances; and this rhythm is endemic in the history of Man, in which all those particular episodes are embraced.

There is a conspicuous rendering of this rhythm in the political history of North America since its incorporation into a Western World expanding overseas from a Western European nucleus.

The unitary physiography of North America, with its magnificent natural system of internal waterways providing means of through-communication from the delta of the Mississippi to the estuary of the St. Lawrence via the Great Lakes, manifestly gave this giant Northern Island of the Western Hemisphere a physical predisposition to become the unitary political dominion of some single one out of the litter of Modern West European national states that were in competition for the prizes of a Western Society's New World. The French pioneers of West European enterprise in North America were quick to perceive this geographical nius towards political unity, and they went on to take deliberate and systematic steps to bring the whole of North America under the all-embracing rule of the French Crown by entrenching themselves at both extremities of the central waterway and establishing a chain of connecting links inland between these two maritime terminals.¹

In the course of the hundred years ending in A.D. 1763 this grandly conceived and ambitiously initiated French enterprise was frustrated by two unforeseen developments to the disadvantage of France in her contest for the possession of North America with her rival Great Britain. In the first place the British colonies planted along the eastern seaboard outstripped French Canada and Louisiana in the growth of their population to an extent that more than made up for the handicap of a location—hemmed in between the Atlantic and the Appalachians—that was, in itself, much less favourable for expansion into the interior.² In the second place a French colonial population in North America that was now no

¹ See II. ii. 66–67.

² See *ibid.*

match for the neighbouring British colonial population, if left to its own resources, was deprived of indispensable support from the mother country in Europe in the hour of need by the ascendancy that the British Navy had gained over the French. Through the combined and cumulative effect of these two shifts in the Balance of Power, the French Crown not only failed to achieve its ambition of bringing the whole of North America under its own rule, but actually lost all its holdings on North American soil in the Seven Years War. Yet the peace settlement of A.D. 1763, which ratified this outcome of a Franco-British war over North America that had been smouldering, off and on, for some seventy years in effect, appeared to have disappointed French ambitions without invalidating the geographico-political conception on which these had been based. In declaring against France's design to unite the whole of North America under the French flag, the course of Modern Western history up to date had apparently substantiated the French 'geopolitical' thesis that a unification under one flag or another was the political dispensation to which North America was predestined by her physiographical structure. The fortunes of war might now have decided that the unifying West European Power was to be, not France, but Great Britain; yet in A.D. 1763 this might have looked as if it were only a superficial modification of a course of political events which seemed still to be moving steadily towards a now more than ever apparently inevitable ultimate goal of unity.

Nevertheless, within not more than twenty years of the disappearance of the French flag from North America in A.D. 1763, the peace-settlement of A.D. 1783 was to indicate that the dominant tendency in this North American episode of Western history was, not the *nisus* towards political unification that was inherent in the giant island's physiography and that, in A.D. 1763, had been momentarily translated into an accomplished political fact, but an inclination to fall apart, in defiance of physiography, into two separate political domains on lines foreshadowed in the competitive plantation of English and French colonies on North American coasts in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era. The political map of North America after A.D. 1783 was, and remained, in its general pattern, the same map of a politically partitioned island that it had been before A.D. 1763, with the two originally separate political domains once again separate under interchanged flags,¹ whereas the map of a politically united North American island, which had been a political reality between A.D. 1763 and A.D. 1775, turned out to have been merely History's passing tribute to a Physiography whose political requirements History was evidently bent on defying. After having per-

¹ While the French flag had disappeared from North America and the United States flag had made its epiphany there, the British flag had kept a footing on the North American island by contriving to supplant the French flag in Canada before it was supplanted, in its turn, by the Stars and Stripes in the United States. An English traveller *en route* by rail from New York to Montreal in A.D. 1952 would have the historically pregnant experience, at the moment when his train crossed the border, of re-entering the dominions of the sovereign whose subject he was and at the same instant passing out of the domain of his own English mother tongue into eastern counties of the Province of Quebec in which the place-names might be English but the prevailing language was unquestionably French.

mitted the British flag to supplant the French flag at Quebec and Montreal, History promptly reasserted her ascendancy over Physiography by seeing to it that the Stars and Stripes should replace the Union Jack from New England to Georgia inclusive.

The new flag that History had thus introduced into the North American landscape to serve her own anti-unitarian caprice was never allowed by her to defeat her intentions by achieving North America's physiographically manifest political destiny through any sly move behind History's back. During the War of A.D. 1812-14, no less than during the War of A.D. 1775-83, History kept a watchful eye open to make sure that the United States of North America should not surreptitiously put Canada into her pocket; and, in the course of the next hundred years after the negotiation of the peace treaty of Ghent, Clio made sure that the United States should continue to fulfil the North American designs that this officious Muse had had in mind when she had called into being the first Western sovereign independent national state to make its appearance on non-European ground; for, in the course of the nineteenth century, History led the people of the United States to lose all desire to annex Canada at the very time when she was putting it into their power to bring the whole of North America under the Stars and Stripes if they had still had any lingering ambition to make a seventeenth-century French dream come true.

This outcome of a tug-of-war in North America between two conflicting tendencies, making respectively for the political partition and for the political unification of the island, is an interesting case because the eventually frustrated *nisus* towards unity was favoured by physiographical forces which were as potent as they were obvious, whereas the ultimately victorious inclination towards partition was History's 'dark horse' in the field.

The 'fate' of North America to be partitioned into two separate political domains in spite of a physiographical structure which 'predestined' this island to attain political unity has an historical parallel in the 'fate' of the post-Diocletianic Roman Empire to lose possession of Italy, in the teeth of the historical fact that Italy had been the base of operations from which the Hellenic World had been knocked together into a universal state by Roman arms.

In the course of the fifth century of the Christian Era a post-Diocletianic Roman Empire lost Italy *de facto* to a series of North European barbarian war-lords—first to Ricimer (*dominabatur* A.D. 456-72), then to Odovacer (*dominabatur* A.D. 476-93), and then to Theodoric (*dominabatur* A.D. 493-526)—and this was not surprising, considering that, in the course of the thirty-seven years between A.D. 293, when Diocletian had officially established his headquarters at Nicomedia, and A.D. 330, when Constantine had celebrated the completion of his lay-out of a New Rome on the Bosphorus,¹ the political capital of an Hellenic universal state had already gravitated from an always eccentrically western location at Rome towards a borderline between the Central and the Oriental provinces which had always been the locus of the Roman Empire's eco-

¹ See VI. vii. 217-18.

monic centre of gravity. These facts were the politically pertinent facts when, in the fifth century, Italy slipped out of the Imperial Government's control; yet present political realities counted for less in determining the emotional reaction of Constantinople to the eclipse of the Imperial Government's authority in Italy in this age than the historic role once played by a Roman Italy in the creation of a Roman Empire in a past age which had long since become ancient history. The *de facto* sovereignty of barbarian war-lords in Italy was never recognized at Constantinople *de jure*; and the work of financial, economic, and military reconstruction, that a Constantinopolitan Imperial Government had gradually carried out during the fifth century in the Central and Oriental provinces,¹ had no sooner borne fruit in the accumulation of a reserve of public resources than this reserve was squandered by the sixth-century Constantinopolitan Emperor Justinian on the archaistic enterprise of re-subjugating Italy to the direct rule of a Roman Imperial Government.

This political objective was duly attained by Justinian at the cost of an eighteen-years-long war (*gerebatur* A.D. 535-53). But, within five years of the collapse of the last Gothic resistance to Roman arms on Italian soil in A.D. 563,² the laboriously reconquered Italian dominions of the Roman Imperial Crown were lost again to yet another war-band of barbarian invaders. The Lombard irruption into Italy, which broke upon her in A.D. 568, did not come to a standstill until it had robbed the Empire of the whole of Italy save for seven bridgeheads on the beaches³ and a line of isolated inland fortresses,⁴ strung along the road between Ravenna and Rome, which survived, like stepping-stones, amid an encompassing flood of Lombard invasion that had swirled round their walls on its torrential course from the Po Basin into the Abruzzi. This prompt resumption of the march of History in reply to Justinian's archaistically conceived counter-attack was even less surprising than the anticipation of a post-Justinianean Alboin's exploit by his pre-Justinianean forerunners Ricimer, Odovacer, and Theodoric; for Justinian's ephemeral conquest of Italy for a Constantinopolitan Roman Empire had been purchased at the threefold price of ruining the Empire's revenue-producing Oriental provinces, depopulating her military recruiting grounds in the Danubian provinces, and alienating the 'liberated' Italians by first devastating Italy in the act of exterminating the Ostrogoths and then wringing revenue out of her for the treasury of a Transadriatic Imperial Government to whose jurisdiction Italy had never been subject before her annexation to it by Justinian himself. In these circumstances it would have been a miracle if Justinian's conquest of Italy had had any enduring effect. The 'fate' of a post-Diocletianic Italy, unlike the 'fate' of a Modern North America, was, in fact, as clear as day from first to last, and even a

¹ See IV. iv. 324-6.

² The date of the capitulation of the Gothic garrisons of Brescia and Verona. The garrison of Compsae had capitulated in A.D. 555.

³ The Exarchate of Ravenna, together with the adjoining Pentapolis; the Ager Romanus, together with the adjoining maritime city-state of Gaeta; the 'toe' and the 'heel' of Italy; and the three isolated maritime city-states Venice, Amalfi, and Naples.

⁴ Of which Perugia was the most considerable.

Justinian could hardly have succeeded in remaining blind to it if he had not taken pains to reinforce a congenital myopia by putting on the blinkers of Archaism.

The 'fatality' of a post-Diocletianic Roman Empire's loss of Italy has its closest historical parallel in the loss of the Oriental provinces south of Taurus; for this loss, likewise, was no historical surprise. Though the Hellenic ascendancy in South-West Asia west of Euphrates was little less than a thousand years old by the time when, in the seventh century of the Christian Era, Arab *conquistadores* liquidated it almost as rapidly as Macedonian *conquistadores* had established it in the fourth century B.C., Hellenism had never succeeded south of Taurus—apart from a cluster of maritime Greek settlements on the Cilician Plain which had been planted in the pre-Alexandrine Age—in becoming anything more than an exotic alien culture, all but confined within the walls of a few Hellenic or Hellenized cities and only feebly radiating out from these into a still invincibly Syriac and Egyptiac agricultural countryside. Hellenism's capacity to achieve mass-conversions here had been put to the test by the Seleucid Hellenizer Antiochus IV Epiphanes (*regnabat* 175–163 B.C.) when he had set out to make Jerusalem as Hellenic as Antioch or Athens; and the resounding defeat of this cultural missionary enterprise had portended the ultimate total disappearance of the intrusive culture *in partibus Orientalium*. Indeed, the sporadic veneer of Hellenism which Epiphanes had so signally failed to transmute into solid timbers would have been stripped away before the opening of the Christian Era by Arab Nomad intruders from the Syrian Desert and Iranian Nomad intruders from Eurasia if Rome had not given Hellenism a further lease of life in South-West Asia and Egypt by stepping masterfully into the shoes of prematurely senile Seleucidae and Ptolemies. The wonder was that an anti-Hellenic resistance movement—which in Egypt had first gone into action as far back as the turn of the third and second centuries B.C.¹—should not have found an effective retort to an Hellenic ascendancy earlier than the same fifth century of the Christian Era that saw Roman Italy fall under the dominion of barbarian war-lords.

The Hellenic ascendancy over the Syriac and Egyptiac societies had been imposed and maintained by force of arms; and, so long as the subjugated societies had reacted by replying in kind, they had been courting defeat. When the Jews and Egyptians had been encouraged by the success of their insurrections against the epigoni of their Macedonian conquerors to try conclusions with the Roman heirs of those *peritura regna*², they had found to their cost that this Roman second wave of Hellenic domination had a more formidable momentum than its Macedonian forerunner. The discomfiture of Epiphanes at the hands of the Maccabees had been avenged on a Palestinian Jewry by a Titus and a Hadrian; and thereafter, when the temporary breakdown of the *Pax Augusta* in the third century of the Christian Era had given a militant Oriental resistance movement a fresh opportunity for trying its fortune, Zenobia's successor-state of the Roman Empire had gone the way, not of Mu'āwiyah's

¹ See V. v. 68.

² Virgil: *Georgics*, Book II, l. 498.

some four hundred years later,¹ but of Samsigeramus's successor-state of the Seleucid Empire some three hundred years earlier. In the next chapter of the story after the overthrow of Zenobia by Aurelian, the mass-conversion of the population of the Oriental provinces to Christianity, which had been consummated during the pre-Diocletianic bout of anarchy, might have seemed at the moment to have done for Hellenism incidentally what Epiphanes had once tried to do for it deliberately without success; for in the Oriental provinces a triumphant Catholic Christian Church had captivated a subject native peasantry and an urban Hellenic 'ascendancy' alike; and, since Christianity had been making its triumphal progress in an Hellenic dress, it looked as if the Orientals had now at last inadvertently 'received', in association with Christianity, a Hellenism which they had so vehemently rejected when it had been offered to them unadulterated and undisguised. This conclusion was not belied by the first of the schisms that rent the Christian Church after the Imperial Government, *imperante Constantino*, had given the Church its countenance; for the strife between Athanasians and Arians was not a cultural conflict between Hellenes and Orientals but a family quarrel between two rival factions of philosophizing Alexandrian Greeks. The subsequent breach between Catholics and Nestorians did, on the other hand, split the population of the Oriental provinces on communal lines; and, in thus resuming the Oriental resistance movement against Hellenism in the form of a theological controversy within the bosom of the Christian Church, the Orientals had hit upon a new technique of cultural warfare which eventually prevailed over a Hellenism that had shown itself to be invincible so long as the Orientals had been content to fight it on ground of Hellenism's choosing, and not of theirs.²

The series of Oriental counter-attacks on Hellenism in the form of Christian theological movements that were branded as 'heresies' by a dominant minority of 'Melchites'³ has come to our attention in divers contexts in this Study so many times already that in this place we may confine our observation of it to the point of noticing that this was one of those 'fateful' movements that advance towards an ultimate victory through successive defeats. When an Oriental resistance movement struck at Hellenism by way of a Nestorian Christian attack on a Catholic Christian Christology, an Hellenic Orthodoxy was still strong enough to be able to proscribe a Syriac Nestorianism within the frontiers of the Roman Empire—though not strong enough to prevent the banned Nestorians from finding a second home under a Sasanian political aegis, capturing the whole of the Christian community in the Sasanian dominions, and thereby winning for themselves the monopoly of a Christian mission-field extending overseas south-eastward into Southern India and overland north-eastward into Western China. When thereafter the same Oriental resistance movement struck a second stroke at Hellenism by way of a Monophysite Christian attack on a Catholic Christian

¹ The historical relation between Mu'āwiyah's and Zenobia's successor-states of the Roman Empire in the East has been noticed in I. i. 74, n. 4.

² See IX. viii. 413-14.

³ This nickname for the Catholic Christians which was applied to them by the Monophysites was a Graecized form of a Syriac word signifying 'Imperialists'.

theology—thus making a Christology that was the antithesis of the Nestorian serve the self-same purpose as a weapon of cultural warfare—an Hellenic Orthodoxy this time failed to drive the anti-Hellenic insurrectionary movement beyond the frontiers and merely played into its hands by succeeding in driving it underground. Underground and on the run, the missionaries of Monophysitism won the allegiance, *en masse*, of the submerged Egyptian and Syriac populations within the Roman Empire's borders, and they increased their following further by also winning the allegiance of the Armenians, who had been the first people in the World to adopt Christianity as their national religion.

These sweeping subterranean triumphs of a militantly anti-Hellenic Monophysitism unmasked an Hellenic 'ascendancy's' perennial weakness; for Hellenism had now come to be identified with an anti-Monophysite and anti-Nestorian Christian Orthodoxy, and it had become manifest that, within the bounds of the three Oriental Patriarchates of Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Antioch, 'the Melchites' were—as their invidious nickname indicated—no more than a dominant minority consisting of the sprinkling of Roman Imperial officials and soldiers stationed in these provinces, together with a handful of Hellenic townspeople and Hellenized landowners who looked to the Imperial authorities to maintain them in their position of privilege *vis-à-vis* a Monophysite Oriental peasantry. This native peasantry's overwhelming numerical preponderance over an intrusive Hellenic 'ascendancy' began to make its weight felt now that the people themselves were conscious of it thanks to their having acquired a Monophysite national church of their own to give them a heartening sense of solidarity, as well as an inspiring cause. Within thirty-one years of the breach between Orthodoxy and Monophysitism in A.D. 451, the Emperor Zeno had made public, in promulgating an 'Act of Theological Union' (*Henôtikon*) in A.D. 482, his conviction that the Imperial Government could no longer hope to retain its political hold over the economically indispensable Oriental provinces except at the price of theological appeasement; and, when the political exigencies of Justinian's vain enterprise of conquering Italy constrained this unstatesmanlike successor of Zeno's to abandon an appeasement of Monophysitism that was anathema to the Papacy, Justinian thereby consummated the alienation of his Oriental subjects without succeeding in his attempt to conciliate the Italians.

The moral secession of an Orthodox Christian Roman Empire's Monophysite Christian Oriental subjects now went with a run; in the Oriental provinces, as in Illyricum and Italy, the Constantinopolitan body politic had become a hollow shell by the date of Justinian's death (*decessit* A.D. 565); and there was no longer any prospect of its surviving the deluge which the archaist emperor had put in store for his own unhappy successors on the Imperial Throne. A shell that Khusrū II Parwīz so easily shattered and that Heraclius so painfully pieced together again would assuredly have fallen to pieces, past retrieving, thereafter, even if Monophysitism had been the last of the domestic Oriental heresies, and Khusrū's invasion the last of the foreign Oriental military assaults, to which the worm-eaten fabric of the Roman Imperial body politic had

been exposed. In raising up a successor to Nestorius and Eutyches in the person of Muhammad, and in unleashing the Primitive Muslim Arab assailants of the Empire at the heels of their Zoroastrian Persian predecessors, History was giving herself unnecessary trouble for the sake of making assurance doubly sure.

A 'Fate' that condemned the Roman Empire to lose both Italy and its Oriental provinces irretrievably in the end, in spite of the Imperial Government's obstinately repeated attempts to halt and reverse the remorseless march of History, asserted its power over the Achaemenian and Mauryan empires by the contrary move of constraining them to re-establish themselves sooner or later in new shapes after the militant intrusion of the Hellenic Society into the Syriac and Indic societies' domains had prematurely overthrown, first the Syriac, and then the Indic, universal state, before either of these had attained the term of four hundred years that seems to be the standard life-span of a polity of this species.¹ We have identified an avatar of the Achaemenian Empire in the Arab Caliphate, and an avatar of the Mauryan Empire in the Guptan Empire.² In the tug-of-war between an intrusive Hellenic Society's effort to absorb the Syriac and Indic societies' frayed social tissue into her own body social and the *nisus* of the two invaded societies to expel the invader, however tardily and at however high a cost, in order to resume and complete the regular course of a disintegrating society's history, we have another example, on the political plane, of a trial of strength between conflicting social forces working itself out in a series of successive rounds.

If we now pass from the political plane to the religious, we shall find here a counterpart of North America's 'fate' to be partitioned between two sovereignties in the 'fate' of France and England to be partitioned between two ecclesiastical allegiances.

In another context³ we have already noticed that, since the twelfth century of the Christian Era, the Roman Catholic Church in France had been engaged in a never more than temporarily successful struggle to re-establish the ecclesiastical unity of France as a Catholic country against an impulse towards secession which, from that time onward, kept on reasserting itself in some new form after each previous manifestation had been repressed. A revolt against Catholic Christianity which had taken the form of Catharism at its first outbreak in Southern France in the twelfth century was stamped out there in the thirteenth century in this form only to re-emerge in the same region in the sixteenth century in the form of Calvinism. Proscribed as Calvinism, it promptly reappeared as Jansenism, which was the nearest approach to Calvinism that was possible within the Catholic fold. Proscribed as Jansenism, it reappeared as Deism, Rationalism, Agnosticism, and Atheism. Every time that a repeatedly challenged Catholic Church seemed to have succeeded in reimposing a Catholic ecclesiastical unity upon France through an apparently conclusive victory over the dissenting movement of the day, the momentarily defeated forces of dissent thus baffled the victor by

¹ See p. 289, above.

³ In IX. viii. 609-10.

² See I. i. 76-77 and 86-87.

re-entering the lists under a fresh banner and in a new-fangled panoply. More than seven hundred years after the savage repression of the Albigenses had been completed in A.D. 1229,¹ France was farther than she had been at the twelfth-century zenith of Catharism's fortunes in Languedoc from an ecclesiastical unity that the Catholic Church had re-established in France by *force majeure* no less than three times over in the meanwhile. The Protean stratagem of metamorphosis had invariably saved a repeatedly defeated movement of religious dissidence from ever being stamped out for good and all; and, at the time of writing, mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, it looked as if this historic wrestling match between Proteus and Menelaus in a French ecclesiastical arena would end, unlike the fabulous incident in the *Odyssey*,² in Menelaus, not Proteus, giving up the game and capitulating on his opponent's terms.

This irrepressibly recurring rebellion in France against ecclesiastical unity under the auspices of the Roman Church has its counterpart in England in a likewise irrepressible rebellion against ecclesiastical unity under the auspices of an Episcopalian Protestant Established Church of England. An anti-episcopalian Protestant secessionist movement, which had raised its head in the course of the last quarter of the sixteenth century and had put down Episcopacy from its seat in A.D. 1643, was quashed in the form of Puritanism in and after A.D. 1662, only to re-assert itself in the form of Methodism in the eighteenth century. An Episcopalian Established Church of England, whose prelates might have imagined in A.D. 1662 that they had succeeded in their day in achieving an ecclesiastical uniformity that their redoubtable predecessor, Archbishop Laud, had failed to achieve in his, was living in the same ephemeral fool's paradise as the 'Melchites' on the morrow of a proscription of Nestorianism which had been the signal for the more baffling onset of Monophysitism. In England, as in France, by the middle of the twentieth century, the ideal of an authoritarian ecclesiastical unity had been demonstrated to be a lost cause by the repeated stultification of successive attempts to carry it to a conclusive victory.

In other contexts, again, we have noted the 'fate' of a Judaic Monotheism to be perpetually beset by a repeatedly resurgent Polytheism, and the 'fate' of a kindred Judaic concept of the One True God's Transcendence to be no less perpetually beset by a repeatedly resurgent yearning for a God Incarnate.

Monotheism put down the worship of Ba'al and Ashtoreth only to find a jealous Yahweh's rigidly proscribed traditional divine associates slyly creeping back into the fold of Jewish orthodoxy in the guise of personifications of the Lord's 'Word', 'Wisdom', and 'Angel',³ and afterwards establishing themselves within the fold of Christian orthodoxy, from the outset and as of right, in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and in the cults of God's Body and Blood, God's Mother, and the Saints. These re-encroachments of Polytheism on Monotheism in the Christian Church, which were more flagrant than the re-encroachments in Juda-

¹ See IV. iv. 369, n. 4.

² *Odyssey*, Book IV, ll. 363-570.

³ See VII. vii. 718.

ism, evoked a whole-hearted reassertion of Monotheism in the shape of Islam and a less thoroughgoing reassertion of it in the shape of Protestantism; yet Protestantism confessed its nostalgia for the comfortable practices of an abandoned Roman Church by eventually ranking into Anglo-Catholicism, while a would-be meticulously monotheistic Islam was no more successful than Judaism or Protestantism or Catholicism in living up to its superhumanly etherial principles. Islam, in its turn, made the now familiar concessions to the Soul's irrepressible appetite for a plurality of gods. Even the Sunnah found its equivalent for a personified Word of God in an uncreated Qur'ān and acquiesced in a cult of saints which owed at least as much to the corresponding Christian practice as this owed to the cult of pagan Hellenic heroes and demigods, while a doubly heretical 'Alī Ilāhī sect had the courage of the Shi'ah's muffled convictions when it openly conferred upon 'Alī the apotheosis that Jesus had received from the Christian Church. The Christians' apotheosis of Jesus had been rejected as a relapse into Polytheism by 'Alī's own cousin and father-in-law the Prophet Muhammad. The yearning, manifest in the Shi'ah, to find a legitimate Islamic substitute for a proscribed Christian God Incarnate gives reason to Horace's dictum *Naturam expelles furcā, tamen usque recurret*.¹

These variations on the theme of a trial of strength between conflicting tendencies, in which the eventually defeated tendency kicks repeatedly against the pricks without succeeding in the long run in defying its 'fate', are all embraced in the drama of Man's 'fate' of having daily and hourly to purchase and re-purchase his right to Life and Freedom by perpetually responding to repeated challenges.

Nur der verdient sich Freiheit, wie das Leben,
Der täglich sie erobern muss.²

In our search for a criterion of the process of growth,³ we have found it in a cumulative success in responding to challenges which is rewarded, not by an exemption from Challenge which would be tantamount to a discharge from the active service of Life, but by a transfer of the field of challenge from a Macrocosm where God challenges Man through the agency of Non-Human Nature or of Man's fellow human beings to a Microcosm where God challenges Man through the agency of Man's own soul by an ineffable epiphany of God the Challenger Himself.

(II) POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS OF THE CURRENCY OF 'LAWS OF NATURE' IN HISTORY

The Emancipation of Man's Work from the Day-and-Night Cycle and from the Annual Cycle of the Seasons by Civilization

The evidence for the amenability of human affairs to 'laws of Nature' that has presented itself in the foregoing survey of historical facts seems sufficient to warrant, and indeed to demand, an inquiry into possible explanations of the appearance of regularities and recurrences too well

¹ Horace: *Epistulae*, Book I, Ep. x, l. 24.

² Goethe: *Faust*, II. 11575-6, quoted in II. i. 277.

³ In III. iii. 192-217.

attested to be convincingly explained away. If these repetitions and uniformities have to be accepted as being realities, there are two obvious main alternative possibilities to be explored. The human affairs with which we are concerned in the present Part of this Study are, we may here remind ourselves, Man's psychic and spiritual affairs, as contrasted with his bodily physique and physiology, which, for our present purpose, we are treating as part of his non-human environment. If human affairs in this pertinent restricted sense of the term are subject to 'laws of Nature', these laws that govern them may be either laws current in Man's non-human environment which impose themselves on human affairs from outside by *force majeure* without having any more intimate relation than this with Human Nature, or alternatively they may govern human affairs in virtue of being inherent in the psychic structure and working of Human Nature itself. It may be convenient to look into these two possibilities in the order in which we have just mentioned them.

We may perhaps venture to start by making the assumption that, in the non-human provinces of Nature, there are 'laws of Nature' that are not only operative but manifest. Post-Modern Western men of science seemed to take the reign of Law over Non-Human Nature for granted, and, so far as the present writer was aware, post-Modern Western historians had not carried their Antinomianism to the length of challenging the *savants* of the non-human sciences on these sciences' own ground. Nor again did the historians seem to dispute the thesis that, in Man's non-human environment, there were some uniformities, regularities, and recurrences that had an effect on human affairs. Some of the astronomical cycles in the physical motion of the Stellar Universe are obvious cases in point.

The Day-and-Night Cycle, for example, manifestly affects 'the everyday life of ordinary people' in all human societies of every species, since human beings have an ineradicable physiological need for sleep at least once in every twenty-four hours, and night-time is the time for sleep that is indicated to Man by the physiological laws governing his body. Though fish-spearers, burglars, bakers, monks,¹ and journalists may be con-

¹ The monks of a monastery on Mount Athos in which the writer had been spending the night as a guest in June 1912 courteously expressed to him, the morning after, their hope that his sleep had not been disturbed by their frequent nocturnal celebrations of the Liturgy. Wishing to return his hosts' courtesy in kind, the writer on his side expressed the hope that the monks did not find these never intermitted night-long vigils too painfully exhausting. 'Not at all', replied the monks, 'considering that we are able to sleep in the day-time.'—'And how do you manage to do that?' their English guest inquired. 'O, well, because we have fine estates in Rumili, with peasants on them to work them for us. You will remember our showing you yesterday our arsenal at the water's edge, stored with provisions of grain, oil, and wine. All that comes from our estates, and the peasants have to deliver it to us at the arsenal by water.'—'And how do the peasants live?' I asked. 'O, the peasants live like dogs', said the monks, 'but you can see for yourself what an admirable arrangement ours is. As the peasants work for us and fetch and carry for us, instead of our having to do any of this for ourselves, we can afford to sleep in the day-time and so keep ourselves fresh for praying at night, and this is really most advantageous, as you can imagine. After all, most people in the World—including, perhaps, Your Honour (*τὸν λόγον σας*)—are in this respect in the less favourable position of our peasants. Having, as they do have, to work all day, they are forced to spend the night in sleep instead of in prayer, in order to be fit for work again next morning; so at night-time the volume of prayers reaching God is at a minimum, and this means that God can give to a prayer offered up to Him during the night an amount of individual attention that would be out of the question in the day-time, when the great majority of

strained by the exigencies of arduous professions to exchange the time-table of the common run of Man and Beast for the time-table of foxes, owls, and bats by working at night and sleeping in the day-time, these night-workers, no less than other people, conform to the astronomical rhythm of the Day-and-Night Cycle in their own topsy-turvy way; they merely turn inside out the ordinary human way of keeping in step with the planet's periodic rotation round its own axis. As for the majority of Mankind who sleep by night and wake by day, you can see them keeping time with the alternations of light and darkness in country life and in city life alike. The Moreot peasant who comes down every morning from his village on the crag to his field in the plain, and climbs up again every evening from the kambos to the kastro, is dancing to the same astronomical tune—played by the Earth's rotatory rhythm—as the New York business man who commutes between New Canaan and Manhattan or the New Yorker's Constantinopolitan confrère who makes the shorter daily 'round trip' between Asia and Europe.¹ All the same, by the writer's day, Man in Process of Civilization had contrived to break the chains even of this physiologically imperative Day-and-Night Cycle. He had extricated himself from his servitude to this particular law of Physical Nature by inventing the double shift. An organizational device that was being practised already in a post-Minoan heroic age by Laestrygonian herdsmen, who had tumbled to it thanks to living far enough north to know summer days that ran into one another without any intervening nights,² had been adopted before the writer's day in all latitudes by the navigators of the high seas and by the industrial workers on the *terra firma* of a Westernizing planet. By this trick of putting Mycerinus³ into commission, the scientific managers of a latter-day Western industry had translated an Egyptian fairy tale into a prosaic reality.⁴

Another astronomical cycle to which Man had been a slave was the Annual Cycle of the Seasons; and, though this Summer-and-Winter Cycle did not impinge upon Man directly, as the Day-and-Night Cycle did, by communicating its rhythm to the human body's physiological demands, it had exercised a hardly less potent indirect dominion over Man's life through its direct dominion over a physical environment out of which Man had to wring his livelihood and, beyond that, to gather a surplus, above the minimum required for bare subsistence, to spend on war

Mankind are awake and in the running to gain a hearing for their prayers at odd moments of their working day. Yes, thanks to the endowments bequeathed to us by pious benefactors, we monks do find ourselves in a decidedly advantageous position.'

¹ In this comparison the relevant point for our present purpose is the regulation of the rural and the urban worker's daily round alike by the cyclic motion of the Earth's night-and-day clock. It is true, of course, that the journey which these two kinds of workers make, in one direction every morning and in the reverse direction every evening, is forced upon them by diverse considerations. The peasant is moved to commute by the insecurity of his field of work, the business man by its congestion; but this diversity of motive for an identical daily shuttling movement is irrelevant to our present inquiry.

² See *Odyssey*, Book X, ll. 81-86.

³ The tale of Mycerinus is told by Herodotus in Book II, chap. 133.

⁴ The successive shifts of hands, through which a latter-day Western plant was kept in operation for twenty-four hours in the day, had been anticipated in the successive watches through which a ship had been enabled to hold on her course for twenty-four hours in the day without having to be beached each night in order to allow the crew to sleep ashore.

against his fellow human beings in a World which, so far, had not succeeded in attaining to an all-embracing permanent political unity under the rule of a single effective World Government. The Cycle of the Seasons, generated by a daily rotating Earth's annually recurrent movement round an orbit centred on the Sun, had set the clock for Man's military as well as for his economic activities in food-gathering, hunting, fishing, agricultural, and pastoral societies.¹

In the Age of the Civilizations, when the food-gathering and hunting societies had been either exterminated or driven into holes and corners, and when Farmer Cain had eventually established a decisive ascendancy over Shepherd Abel,² the husbandman's dance to the recurrent tune of the Seasons had impressed its rhythm deeply upon the feelings and ideas of all but a fraction of the survivors of a five-or-six-thousand-years-long struggle for existence between the warring votaries of diverse ways of making a living. Though, down to the date of writing, the husbandman's annual series of operations had been repeated perhaps no more than some five thousand or some ten thousand times even in the South-West Asian regions in which the agriculture of the Old World had been invented, the *ἐναντὸς δαίμων*³ had been able, within this brief Time-span, to erect in the Human Psyche's subconscious abyss a primordial image of such spiritual potency that, through this dark glass, Christian faith had caught its vision of a Suffering and Dying God. In the post-Christian Industrial Western World of the twentieth century of the Christian Era this vision still appeared, in Christian eyes, to be the most penetrating and illuminating of any that Man was known ever to have been granted so far. Yet in the same century the husbandman's economic dance to the astronomical tune of the Seasons, out of which this sublime religious imagery had been conjured, was in the act of losing a dominion over Human Life which, in a post-Modern Western astronomer's, or even geologist's, Time-perspective, could now be seen in retrospect to have been short-lived, even at the longest estimate, when measured on the Time-scale of the life-span of the Human Race in the primitive pre-agricultural chapter of human history.

An organizing technique that had been able to liberate an Industrial Western Man from his physiological servitude to the cycle of Day-and-Night had found it relatively easy also to liberate him from his economic servitude to the Cycle of the Seasons by manning, with double or triple shifts of human ants, an industrial plant built to run, not only for twenty-four hours in the day, but for 365 days in the year; and the same spirit of Western enterprise had even succeeded, for the benefit of some Western consumers, in circumventing the dominion of the Seasons over Agriculture. In a Western World that had extended its domain out of the

¹ This annual refrain of human labour had, of course, been played in divers variations that were reflections of as many diversities of climate and occupation. In some variations the hot season, in others the cold season, and in others again the wet season was the closed season for economic activities; and the annual maxima of economic and military activity were in some cases crowded into one and the same season, while in other cases they were 'staggered' over different times of year. All these variations on Man's yearly round, however, had a common master theme in an astronomical Cycle of the Seasons to which, in one way or another, each of the human year-cycles conformed.

² See III. iii. 13-22.

³ See III. iii. 256-8.

Northern into the Southern Hemisphere and had invented cold storage and expeditious means of transport, any vegetable, fruit, or flower could be purchased at any season by any members of the public who had the money to make an 'effective demand' for it. A still more signal triumph of Man over Physical Nature was Western Man's discovery of ways and means for growing crops out of season without having to resort to the opposite hemisphere in order to perform this agricultural sleight of hand. He had learnt how to supplement the natural heat and light of the Sun by artificial lighting and heating; and this had also enabled him to push the cultivation of particularly valuable crops into colder latitudes than these could have braved in a state of nature without human nursing. Western Man's ingenuity had covered the irrigated lowlands of Southern California with a pall of 'smog' rising from a myriad frost-averting 'smudge-pots' interspersed among the ranks of many times their own number of orange trees, while in the Connecticut Valley it had covered the tobacco-plantations with acres of gauze to serve the same purpose of screening them from the blighting touch of winter. Perhaps the greatest of all such agricultural *tours de force* was the all-year-round production of southern fruits on the fringe of the Arctic Circle in an Iceland which had been transformed from a bleak wilderness into a market garden under glass through the tapping of an inexhaustible natural source of hot water welling up from a thousand geysers.

The Emancipation of a Psychological Business Cycle from a Physical Crop Cycle by the Industrial Revolution

The familiar annual round was possibly not the only astronomical cycle to which the Earth's flora was subject and to which Man was therefore indirectly enslaved in so far as he was dependent on Agriculture for winning his means of subsistence. The researches of latter-day Western meteorologists had brought to light indications of the currency of weather-cycles with a longer Time-span than the period of a single year. In an investigation of the eruptions of the Nomads out of 'the Desert' into 'the Sown' we have found some indirect evidence—in the shape of oscillations in the Balance of Power between the Nomads and their sedentary rivals in disputable borderlands—for the currency of a cycle with a span of as many as six hundred years, made up of two alternating bouts of humidity and aridity.¹ This inferential six-hundred-years-long climatic cycle was, however, at the time of writing, probably farther from being substantiated than were certain other apparent cycles of the same class, with wave-lengths running only into double or single figures reckoned in years, which had been described by meteorologists in periodical fluctuations of the yield, not of the natural grasses of the Steppe on which the Nomad pastured his flocks and herds, but of the crops artificially sown and harvested by the husbandman in his cultivated fields.² The approximate correspondence in dates of peaks and troughs,

¹ See III. iii. 395-454.

² See Huntington, E.: *Mainsprings of Civilisation* (New York 1945, Wiley), p. 460, fig. 57: 'Cycles in Wheat Prices for Three Centuries (after Beveridge) and in Weather for a Century in Europe (after Brunt and others).' According to Huntington, *ibid.*, 'the

as well as in wave-lengths, between certain series of these alleged crop-yield cycles and the contemporary series of 'Kitchin' cycles and 'Juglar' cycles in the economic history of an industrialized Western World had evoked the conjecture that the observed coincidence between these isorhythmic series of diverse orders might be, not a meaningless freak of Chance, but an indication that the crop series and the business series stood to one another in the relation of cause and effect.

If this conjecture had been confirmed by convincing evidence and by cogent reasoning, we should have had to add the Crop Cycle to the Year Cycle and the Day Cycle in compiling our list of instances of 'laws of Nature', current in Non-Human Nature, which had led or forced Mankind to dance to their tune; and no doubt the crop cycle too had exercised an at times tyrannical dominion over the lives of predominantly agricultural societies; but, among professional students of the business cycles current in a predominantly industrial Westernizing World, there was, at the time of writing, a preponderance of opinion, clear enough to be manifest even to the layman's eye, against accepting the suggestion that the currency of business cycles could be explained as an effect of a currency of crop cycles that was itself presumably an effect of periodic fluctuations in those meteorological conditions on which the weal or woe of cereal crops depended. In this judgement, W. C. Mitchell, T. S. Ashton,¹ R. G. Hawtrey,² J. A. Schumpeter,³ and G. Haberler concur. Haberler points out that there is a wide disagreement among different exponents of the theory that business cycles are to be traced to agricultural causes,⁴ and gives it as his own opinion that

"There can be no "agricultural theory" of the cycle in the sense of an alternative to, say, the monetary theory or the over-investment theory, any more than there can be an "invention theory" or an "earthquake theory". . . . It is conceivable that a good harvest may exercise now a stimulating and now a depressing influence according to the phase of the cycle and the portions of the Earth's surface and the World's population affected. Nor must it be readily assumed that a good wheat crop and a good cotton crop have the same kind of effects."⁵

Mitchell points out that

'Even the writers who regard changes in crop yields as the cause of business fluctuations . . . recognise that these fluctuations manifest themselves chiefly in commercial dealings, manufacturing activity, transportation, and financial operations.'⁶

At least two of the same authorities also agree in rejecting suggestions

most obvious approaches to agreement between Beveridge and Brunt fall near $3\frac{1}{2}$, 5, 8, $9\frac{1}{2}$, and 35 years.⁷

¹ In a personal letter to the present writer, dated the 2nd December, 1949.

² Hawtrey, R. G.: 'The Monetary Theory of the Trade Cycle and Its Statistical Test', in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. xli (Cambridge, Mass. 1927, Harvard University Press), p. 473.

³ Schumpeter, J. A.: *Business Cycles* (New York 1939, McGraw-Hill, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 177-8.

⁴ See Haberler, G.: *Prosperity and Depression*, 3rd ed. (Geneva 1941, League of Nations), pp. 152 and 154.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 163 and 164.

⁶ Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting* (New York 1927 (new impression 1930), Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 87.

that business cycles may be effects of periodic fluctuations in some other non-human medium than the weather of the Earth whose fluctuations presumably account for those of crop yields. Ashton and Mitchell mention, only to discard,¹ the brilliant pioneer Stanley Jevons' audacious astrological conjecture that business cycles might be effects of fluctuations in the radioactivity of the Sun advertised by the appearance and disappearance of sun-spots; and Mitchell goes on to reject in principle all theories of physical causation, on the ground that no physical theory can be reconciled with secular changes in the wave-length of the 'Kitchin' Cycle which he believes that he has detected in the course of this cycle's currency up to the date of his own investigations during the third decade of the twentieth century.²

There was a wider consensus, in which A. C. Pigou concurred with the authorities already cited, in support of the view that the independence of the Late Modern and post-Modern Western business cycles of divers wave-lengths from the dominion of either the crop-yield cycle or any other periodic rhythm in Non-Human Nature had been the outcome of a progressive emancipation; and, on this view, the Industrial Revolution in the Western World had been revolutionary in two senses. It had not only inaugurated a novel kind of economic technique and organization; it had at the same time progressively liberated economic life itself—*pari passu* with the progressive establishment of the preponderance of Industry over Agriculture—from a bondage to the meteorological crop-yield cycle and to other alien forces, both non-human and human, to whose dominion Man's economic life had been subject in some measure under pre-industrial economic dispensations.³

A. C. Pigou, for example, in whose minoritarian view there had been a positive correlation between crop yields and pig-iron production in the United States⁴ and an approximate correlation between crop yields and the volume of industrial activity in general in the Western World as a whole,⁵ goes on to allow that, while 'crop changes are an important factor in determining industrial fluctuations',⁶ their influence in this field had been diminished by the relative decline in the importance of Agriculture by comparison with Industry in a Westernizing World.⁷

'Harvest variations as a factor determining, whether by direct or by indirect process, fluctuations in industrial activity, are substantially less important [in the third decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era] than they used to be fifty or a hundred years ago.'⁸

And Pigou's final conclusion is that statistical correlations between crop-yield variations and business cycles

'do not warrant the opinion that crop variations are the sole, or even the

¹ See Mitchell, *ibid.*, p. 13; Ashton, *loc. cit.*

² See Mitchell, *ibid.*, p. 418.

³ The progressive freedom from the dominion of external forces was the distinguishing feature of the Industrial Western Economy according to Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

⁴ See Pigou, A. C.: *Industrial Fluctuations*, 2nd ed. (London 1929, Macmillan), pp. 42-44.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 46.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 221.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

main, determinants of such periodicity as there is in industrial fluctuations.¹

Ashton draws the same picture of a shift, accompanying the march of a Late Modern Western Industrial Revolution, in the Balance of Power between the non-human external forces and the human internal forces exercising dominion over Western Man's economic life.

'There is little doubt, I think, that the fluctuations of harvests were a major cause of variations in economic activity in the eighteenth century. But nearly all economists now agree that the cyclical movements of the nineteenth century at least can be attributed to oscillation in investment (i.e. the creation of capital goods or goods not in a form available for direct consumption). It is the human factor rather than physical environment that is responsible.'²

In W. W. Rostow's opinion³ 'the domestic harvests played a significant part in British trade fluctuations' until A.D. 1850 beyond question, and probably till the eighteen-seventies.

The epiphany of the particular rhythmical economic fluctuations that had come to be known as business cycles had been contemporaneous with the rise and spread of the industrial type of economy. On the strength of evidence marshalled by W. R. Scott, 'it seems clear', in W. C. Mitchell's view,

'that the English crises of 1558-1720 were not business crises of the modern type, and that the intervals between these crises were not occupied by business cycles.'⁴

According to W. R. Scott himself, the vicissitudes in the economic history of England in the Early Modern Age of Western history were mostly caused by repercussions of forces operative on non-economic planes of life.

'It is when the forecast of the majority of traders is in error that a crisis results. The cause of the miscalculation may lie either mainly in the men who judge or in the events to be judged. . . . At later periods the importance of Man's judgment and calculation becomes marked in the period of speculative activity which precedes a crisis. But, prior to the development of banking, such intense activity is scarcely to be expected. . . . Analysing the crises up to 1720 . . . it will be seen that, owing to defective intelligence in the form of news or to bad government, the objective aspect tends to predominate.'⁵

The next chapter of the story may be told in Mitchell's, Ashton's, and Dupriez's words:

'Business cycles are much later in appearing than economic, or even strictly financial, crises. In England itself they seem not to have begun before the close of the eighteenth century. But, when they did appear, it was in the form of an extension—over all branches of industry—of difficulties not unlike those which had been suffered for more than a hundred

¹ Ibid., p. 233.

² Ashton, loc. cit.

³ Rostow, W. W.: *British Economy of the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), p. 50.

⁴ Mitchell, *ibid.*, p. 80.

⁵ Scott, W. R.: *The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish, and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720* (Cambridge 1910-12, University Press, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 469-71.

years by large capitalists, bankers and speculators in stocks. With this extension in scope came a shift in the relative importance of the causes. In the past the undermining of credit had usually been caused by war, by the making of peace, or by some violation of financial obligations on the part of Government. In the future it was to be caused more frequently by stresses engendered within the world of business itself. The reason for both changes lay in the gradual extension of the highly organised business enterprise from its earlier centres of foreign commerce, mining, finance, and banking over the wide field of manufacturing and domestic trade—an extension that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. . . . In proportion as the Industrial Revolution and its concomitant changes in the organisation of commerce and transportation spread to other countries, the latter began to develop the phenomena of business cycles already familiar in England.¹

'It is . . . clear that the booms and slumps occurred at the same time, or almost the same time, in all industrialised countries and in the less developed areas connected with these by trade.'²

'Dans le monde, par extensification géographique, comme dans la nation, par pénétration des sphères d'activité les moins industrielles, les spasmes de la conjoncture tendent à gagner du terrain et à se synchroniser.'³

In an oecumenical economy of Western origin in which Industry had established its ascendancy over Agriculture and in which this new-fangled predominantly industrial way of economic life had spread from its Western birthplace all over the face of the planet, the distinctive feature in the rhythm of economic activity was its autonomy.

'The waning, like the waxing, of prosperity . . . must be due, not to the influence of "disturbing causes" from outside, but to processes that run regularly within the world of business itself.'⁴

'The mysterious thing about [these fluctuations] is that they cannot be accounted for by such "external" causes as bad harvests due to weather conditions, diseases, general strikes, lock-outs, earthquakes, the sudden obstruction of international trade channels and the like. Severe decreases in the volume of production, real income, or level of employment as a result of crop failures, wars, earthquakes, and similar physical disturbances of the productive processes rarely affect the economic system as a whole, and certainly do not constitute depressions in the technical sense of business-cycle theory. By depressions in the technical sense we mean those long and conspicuous falls in the volume of production, real income, and employment which can only be explained by the operation of factors originating within the economic system itself, and in the first instance by an insufficiency of monetary demand and the absence of a sufficient margin between price and cost.'⁵

'For various reasons it seems desirable, in the explanation of the business cycle, to attach as little importance as possible to the influence of external disturbances. . . . The responses of the business system seem *prima facie* more important in shaping the business cycle than external shocks. Secondly, historical experience seems to demonstrate that the cyclical movement has a strong tendency to persist, even where there are

¹ Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles and their Causes*, a new edition of Mitchell's *Business Cycles*, Part III (Berkeley, Cal. 1941, University of California Press), pp. 170-1.

² Ashton, loc. cit.

³ Dupriez, L. H.: *Les Mouvements Économiques Généraux* (Louvain 1947, Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 542.

⁴ Mitchell, *ibid.*, p. 26. Cf. pp. 2 and 71.

⁵ Haberler, op. cit., p. 265.

no outstanding extraneous influences at work which can plausibly be held responsible. This suggests that there is an inherent instability in our economic system, a tendency to move in one direction or the other.¹

If the fluctuations that made themselves felt in the flow of an industrialized Western economic life were neither astronomical rhythms in the motion of the stellar universe, such as the Day Cycle and the Year Cycle, nor meteorological rhythms in the temperature and circulation of the atmosphere and the water-jacket of the Earth, such as made themselves felt in the crop-yield cycle, we have to identify the medium in which these business cycles were inherent; and, here again, our question is answered for us by a consensus of the authorities whom we have just cited as witnesses to the industrial Western economic system's autonomy. The medium in which the recurrent cycles of expansion and contraction in an industrial society's business activity revolve is the psychic and spiritual medium of Human Nature itself.

'Every economic fact has a psychological aspect. The subject matter of economic science is human behaviour—chiefly conscious and deliberate behaviour. . . . The psychology of human behaviour is therefore a constituent part of the subject-matter of economics. When we assume that an entrepreneur will increase his output if demand rises or cost is reduced, or that workmen will respond to changes in money wages but not so readily to changes in real wages, or that consumers will buy more of a given commodity if the price falls and less if they think it will fall further, or that people will hoard money if the value of money rises—all these assumptions are assumptions about human behaviour which presuppose a certain state of mind on the part of the human agents.'²

'Money making for the individual, business prosperity for the nation, are artificial ends of endeavour imposed by pecuniary institutions. Beneath one lie the individual's impulsive activities—his maze of instinctive reactions partly systematised into conscious wants, definite knowledge, and purposeful efforts. Beneath the other lie the vague and conflicting ideals of social welfare that members of each generation refashion after their own images. In this dim inner world lie the ultimate motives and meanings of action, and from it emerge the wavering standards by which men judge what is for them worth while.'³

'The "cause," if we wish to use that term, of business cycles . . . is to be found in the habits and customs (institutions) of men which make up the money economy, with its money and credit, prices, private property, buying and selling, and so on, all loaded, so to speak, on the industrial process.'⁴

In this psychic medium a sense of uncertainty about the future is a potent motive force.

'Every economic decision is part of an economic plan which extends

¹ Haberler, op. cit., p. 10. This passage must, however, be read in the light of one on the preceding page, in which the author declares his opinion that purely endogenous, as well as purely exogenous, explanations of the Business Cycle are unconvincing.

² Haberler, G.: *Prosperity and Depression: A Theoretical Analysis of Cyclical Movements*, 3rd ed. (Geneva 1941, League of Nations), p. 144.

³ Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles and their Causes*, pp. 190-1.

⁴ Frank, L. K.: 'A Theory of Business Cycles,' in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. xxxvii, August 1923 (Cambridge, Mass. 1923, Harvard University Press), p. 639, quoted on p. 224, above.

into the more or less distant future. In principle, there is therefore always an element of uncertainty in every activity. There are, however, certain cases where the element of uncertainty is especially great and conspicuous, such as the case of investment of resources in long processes and durable plant and the provision of funds for these purposes. The longer the processes in which capital is to be sunk, and the more durable the instruments and equipment to be constructed, the greater the element of uncertainty and risk of loss.¹

"Uncertainty" . . . is . . . an all-pervading phase of every business undertaking. The tap root is uncertainty concerning what people will buy at what prices. . . . The fruits of uncertainty appear in the emotional aberrations of business judgments.² [Uncertainty about the future] gives hopeful or despondent moods a large share in shaping business decisions.³ . . . These emotional states are . . . in part the product of suggestions.⁴ . . . [Optimism] helps to produce conditions that both justify and intensify it.⁵

A significant part in building up the recorded rhythm of Industry is played by the mutual generation of errors of pessimism and errors of optimism.⁶

Perhaps the most impressive testimony to the truth that business cycles are products of psychic causes in a psychic medium is the avowal that Stanley Jevons has been constrained by his intellectual probity to make in the teeth of his own penchant in favour of seeing in business cycles the effects of non-human causes. While he cannot resist commenting

'It seems to be very probable that the moods of the commercial mind, while constituting the principal part of the phenomena, may be controlled by outward events, especially the condition of the harvests',

this comment is merely a wistful pendant to a frank admission that

'periodic collapses are really mental in their nature, depending upon variations of despondency, hopefulness, excitement, disappointment and panic.'⁷

'In recent years it has become fashionable to lay stress on the element of expectation.'⁸

'As economic events depend on Man's actions, one has to investigate what determines these actions. They always refer to a more or less distant future. Hence, one must study those expectations about the future which govern the actions.'⁹

'The record of movements in prices and interest rates goes to show that fluctuations in the real demand for labour come about predominantly through changes in expectations' [and not through changes in real income].¹⁰

¹ Haberler, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

² Mitchell, *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting*, pp. 156-7.

³ 'Credit—the disposition of one man to trust another—is singularly varying' (Bagehot, quoted by Rostow in *op. cit.*, p. 164).—A.J.T.

⁴ Mitchell, *Business Cycles and their Causes*, p. 5. Cp. pp. 57-58.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5. Cp. p. 25. Cp. also Bagehot, Walter: 'All people are most credulous when they are most happy' (*Lombard Street* (London 1931, John Murray), p. 151).

⁶ Pigou, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

⁷ Jevons, W. Stanley: *Investigations in Currency and Finance*, 2nd ed. (London 1909, Macmillan), p. 184.

⁸ Haberler, *op. cit.*, p. 144, n. 2.

⁹ Ohlin, B., in *The Economic Journal*, vol. xlvii (London 1937, Macmillan), p. 58.

¹⁰ Pigou, *op. cit.*, p. viii.

'A change in expectations . . . can be taken . . . to define the beginning of the down-turn.'¹

These psychic disturbances that manifest themselves in the form of economic fluctuations may originate either in the subconscious abyss of the Psyche or on its conscious volitional surface, and from either of these two alternative possible psychic sources they may communicate themselves to the other psychic plane. For example,

'Deflation must not . . . be interpreted in the narrow sense of a deliberate act or policy on the part of the monetary authorities or commercial banks. . . . When the process has once got under way, a sort of automatic deflation or self-deflation of the economic system (in contradistinction to a deflation imposed on it by the monetary authorities) is just as much an effect as a cause.'²

Conversely, the dealings between consumer and producer begin at the consumer's end on the subconscious level but are raised to the conscious level in the producer's response to the consumer's challenge. In the first movement of this market dance

'the psychological categories important to the understanding of consumers' demand are habit, imitation, and suggestion—not reflective choice.'³

In the second movement

'production is guided by forecasts of what consumers will buy, supplemented by judgments concerning profitable methods of providing both consumers' goods and the endless variety of producers' goods which modern technique requires.'⁴

A progressive increase in the relative influence of conscious ideas, aims, plans, and decisions in the psychic causation of economic events seemed to have been one of the characteristic concomitants of the industrialization of Western economic life.

'The most significant items [among various factors determining the amplitude of industrial fluctuations] in a world of complex organisation . . . are the monetary and banking arrangements of the country, the policy of industrialists as regards spoiling the market, and the policy of work-people as regards rigidity of wage-rates.'⁵

In a money economy in which private enterprise enjoys an ascendancy over public enterprise, the individual's desire to make money is the most obvious of the conscious and deliberate psychic driving forces behind the production machine.⁶ 'Profit making is the central process among the congeries that constitute the activities of a business economy.'⁷ As Pigou puts it, 'in the Modern World industry is closely enfolded in a garment of

¹ Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 56. *Ibid.*, p. 163, the same scholar draws attention to 'the role of expectations about the future, operating through the institutions of credit', in Bagehot's theory of economic cycles.

² Haberler, *op. cit.*, p. 323. The meaning which the author intends to convey in the last nine words here quoted seems to be 'is not only an effect but a cause'.

³ Mitchell, *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting*, p. 165.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁵ Pigou, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁶ See Mitchell, *ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 183. Cf. Mitchell, *Business Cycles and their Causes*, p. 149.

money.¹ In the particular form taken by a money economy in an industrialized Western World, one gauge of the increasing relative importance of conscious over subconscious psychic motive power was the submergence of business cycles that were fluctuations in the demand for, and supply of, consumers' goods by business cycles that were fluctuations in the volume of investment in producers' goods. This change in the character of business cycles had occurred in Great Britain round about the sixth decade of the nineteenth century, as we have already noticed in another context.² In a full-blown Industrial Age, 'industrial booms have nearly always been characterised by large and conspicuous investment in construction of some kind;³ and this is evidently bound to be a deliberate form of action.

The role of Reason in generating the business cycles in the economic life of an industrialized Western World was rated at its highest in a 'monetary' theory of which the most eminent and most wholehearted exponent at the time of writing was R. G. Hawtrey. According to this theory, the rhythm of 'slumps' and 'booms' was produced by a manipulation of monetary levers in the bankers' hands. 'The banks cannot allow optimism to prevail when gold is deficient, or pessimism when gold is redundant.'⁴ As one cause of business cycles among others, this 'monetary' cause was widely recognized as being, not merely authentic, but important. 'The crucial importance of the policy followed by the leading banks in determining whether a crisis shall become a panic' is underlined by W. C. Mitchell,⁵ while Haberler, after agreeing that the monetary theory must be near to the heart of the explanation of cyclical movements in an industrial Western economy,⁶ goes so far as to concede that a depression 'may be started by purely monetary forces without anything being wrong with the structure of production.'⁷ In its most uncompromisingly absolute form, however, the monetary theory of business cycles had proved unacceptable to a majority of the authorities down to the time of writing. Haberler, for instance, goes on to express the opinion that deflationary measures deliberately taken by governments or banks are not an all-sufficing explanation of all economic down-turns;⁸ Pigou finds that his 'personal judgment is adverse to the full claims of the monetary school';⁹ in Mitchell's opinion¹⁰ the state of the money market is not an infallible pointer to the general state of the body economic; and Rostow's study of the economic history of Great Britain during the years A.D. 1790-1914 has led him to the conclusion that 'in no cycle, over this period [in Great Britain], does inelasticity in the supply of money appear to have been the decisive factor in determining the moment of the down-turn.'¹¹ Yet, even if the ultimate verdict on this

¹ Pigou, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

² On p. 230, above, following W. W. Rostow.

³ Pigou, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁴ Hawtrey, R. G.: 'The Monetary Theory of the Trade Cycle and its Statistical Test', in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. xli (Cambridge, Mass. 1927, Harvard University Press), pp. 481-2.

⁵ Mitchell, *Business Cycles and their Causes*, p. 126.

⁶ Haberler, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 350. Cp. pp. 362-3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 323, n. 1.

⁹ Pigou, *op. cit.*, p. 219, summing up his critique of Hawtrey's theory on pp. 210-19.

¹⁰ See Mitchell, *Business Cycles and their Causes*, pp. 7-8.

¹¹ Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

ultra-rationalistic account of the psychology of business cycles were to be an adverse one on the whole, it seemed already certain that there would be a consensus in favour of looking for a psychological explanation of some kind, on one plane or other of psychic life, as opposed to a physical explanation of these fluctuations in the volume and profit of industrial economic activity in a latter-day Western World.

The Human Spirit's Educational Use of a Physical Generation Cycle as a Psychological Regulator of Social Change

The Crop-Yield Cycle that had been more or less authoritatively pronounced not to be the generator of the business cycles current in an industrialized world was a meteorological cycle of a longer wave-length than the astronomical Year Cycle or Day Cycle; but there was another physical cycle, with a longer wave-length again, which differed from both the Crop-Yield Cycle and the Annual Cycle of the Seasons, but resembled the Day-and-Night Cycle, in exerting its dominion over the Spirit of Man, not at two removes, through elements in his terrestrial environment out of which he made his living, but at one remove only, through a biological law which in this case was a law governing the physical self-perpetuation of the Human Race. This biological cycle was, of course, the Generation Cycle of birth, growth, life-work, procreation, and senescence leading up to a death which left the field clear for the time-expired individual human being's successors. The wave-length of this Generation Cycle varied between lower and upper limits of about a quarter and about a third of a century in response to differences in social customs and in the average expectation of life in different societies at divers times and places; and it was indisputable that the periodic breaks in the continuity of life arising from the recurrent replacement of representatives of one generation by representatives of another at each successive revolution of the Birth-and-Death Cycle produced a rhythm of their own in human affairs which made itself felt in the gait of human history. Have we here encountered a periodic rhythm which, though current in a biological medium, external to Man's psychic and spiritual nature, nevertheless held Man's psychic and spiritual nature under its sway and constrained the Soul to dance to Mortality's tune?

A sinister 'Dance of Death' which seems to mock Man's spiritual ideals and aspirations by cutting them off brutally with swiftly recurrent sweeps of an inhuman scythe had been apt to haunt men's imaginations in unsettled times, as, for example, at the transition from the medieval to the modern chapter of Western history on the evidence of contemporary German woodcuts,¹ and during a post-Minoan interregnum on the evidence of a passage in the *Iliad* that has been quoted already in this Study.² But Nature had a retort to both a Homeric pathos and a Teutonic morbidity which had been cast for her into biting verse by a poet-philosopher who had risen above all self-regarding emotional reactions to the spectacle of the procession of the generations of Man.

¹ e.g. the woodcut on fol. cclxiii of the Nuremberg Chronicle, cited on p. 178, n. 6, above.

² *Iliad*, Book VI, ll. 146-9, quoted in III. iii. 257.

Denique si vocem Rerum Natura repente
 mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa
 'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris
 luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles? . . .'
 iure, ut opinor, agat, iure increpet inciletque.
 cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas
 semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest . . .
 materies opus est ut crescant postera saecula,
 quae tamen omnia te vitâ perfuncta sequentur;
 nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere, cadentque.
 sic alid ex alio numquam desistet oriri,
 vitaeque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu.¹

The ordeal of Death, which was so tragic a catastrophe for each individual living creature, was evidently an indispensable contrivance for an ambitious Natura Creatrix if she was ever to break out of the blind alley of a deathless and therefore static unicellular organism into the infinite variety of multicellular organic life. Nature's endowment of her new creation with the gift of multiplicity-in-unity at the price of mortality insured her against being committed to more than a limited liability towards any single specimen or single species of her brood. It gave her a perpetually recurrent opportunity to liquidate her proven miscarriages and to follow up her more promising experiments. In fact, the epiphany of Death in the history of Life on Earth, so far from convicting Nature of ineptitude or impotence, was evidence that she had been successful in retaining an initiative that was a synonym for creativity itself; for the mortality of the creature was merely the obverse of Nature's unforfeited freedom to carry on her work of creation by varying at will the ratio between racial change and racial stability in the ever flowing series of her offspring.

If this 'concede: necessest'² were the whole story of Death's role in Nature's dealings with her creature Man, we might have ruefully to conclude that, in the working of the Generation Cycle, a rhythm in the flow of Physical Life had in truth imposed its dominion on the Spirit of Man. Before we accept this conclusion, however, we may recall that, in the life of those higher living creatures, culminating in Man, which procreate and die, there are two alternative methods of transmitting, from one generation to another, behaviour approved as valuable for future representatives of the species. There can be a transmission of a racial heritage of instincts and aptitudes through the physiological process of procreation; and there can be a transmission of a social heritage of habits and knowledge through the spiritual process of moral and intellectual education in the broad unprofessional meaning of this word.³ The second of these methods of transmission, which was the younger of the two, had been employed, as a second string to the older physiological device, by

¹ Lucretius, *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book III, ll. 931-4, 963-5, and 967-71.

² Lucretius, op. cit., Book III, l. 962.

³ 'Just as biological evolution was rendered both possible and inevitable when material organisation became self-reproducing, so conscious evolution was rendered both possible and inevitable when social organisation became self-reproducing' (Huxley, Julian: *Evolutionary Ethics*, the Romanes Lecture 1943, reprinted in Huxley, T. H. and J.: *Evolution and Ethics*, 1893-1943 (London 1947, Pilot Press), p. 122).

the non-human higher animals; but Man had been unique in inverting these proportions in the relative use that he had made of these two facilities; for Man had made singularly little use of a sexual animal's physiological facility,¹ while on the other hand he had developed a social animal's educational facility on an enormous scale without apparently having come within range of exhausting a capacity that thus bade fair to go on serving him *ad infinitum*.²

This capacity for transmitting a social heritage through a spiritual channel of the Human Spirit's own making was manifestly Man's distinctive trait.³ In the creation, preservation, improvement, and liquidation of all the pre-human multi-cellular terrestrial flora and fauna, Nature had used Death for her own purposes without asking her creatures' leave; but, in the ensuing human episode of the story, Man—impotent though he might be to win exemption from Nature's common law—had at any rate discovered a means of making an ineluctable Death serve Man's purposes as well as Nature's. A social animal which, in virtue of its sociality, had succeeded in scaling the precipitous ascent from Sub-Man's level to Man's had made use of Nature's Generation Cycle as an instrument for regulating the ratio between a social change and a social stability that, unlike the racial change and racial stability which had hitherto been Nature's prime concern, were elements in a spiritual world of Man's own. In thus making the Generation Cycle serve a social as well as a racial purpose, the Spirit of Man in the Age of the Primitive Societies had been doing what we have already watched it doing when, in the Age of the Civilizations, it seized the chance offered by an industrial revolution in Western Man's economic life in order to emancipate Man's economic activities from the dominion of astronomical and meteorological laws of Nature by bringing them under the rule of laws intrinsic to these human activities themselves. In these two achievements Man was progressively conjuring into existence an autonomous human province within Nature's realm; and this finding may help us to answer a question which we raised at the beginning of this chapter; for it suggests that, among the 'laws' whose currency we have detected in human history, laws of Non-Human Nature exercising a dominion over human affairs are likely to have been, not, of course, abrogated, but restricted in the scope of their incidence, by laws intrinsic to Human Nature in the psychic and spiritual meaning to which we are here confining our usage of the term. We can test this possibility by ascertaining whether it is in

¹ 'Indeed, there are grounds for suspecting that biological evolution has come to an end, so far as any sort of major advance is concerned' (Huxley, J., *ibid.*, p. 123).

² 'Real advance is now on quite another and more active front—the acquisition and transmission of wisdom and experience' (Sinnott, E. W.: 'The Biological Basis of Democracy', in *The Yale Review*, vol. xxxv, pp. 61–73 (New Haven, Conn. 1945, Yale University Press), quoted in Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 184).

Man 'has invented a new mechanism of heredity—the transmission of Civilisation to his descendants by writing, teaching, artistic creation. . . . The essential feature of human evolution is . . . that it is a process dependent on Man's social life' (Waddington, C. H.: 'Human Ideals and Human Progress', in *The World Review*, August 1946, pp. 29–36, quoted in Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 185).

³ 'With the advent of Man, major evolutionary change is, and will continue to be, mediated through a social, not through a biological, mechanism' (Huxley, J.: 'The Vindication of Darwinism', in Huxley, T. H. and J.: *Evolution and Ethics, 1893–1943* (London 1947, Pilot Press), p. 176).

harmony or in contradiction with historical facts. The business cycles in the history of an Industrialized Western Society, the war-and-peace cycles in the histories of the Western, Hellenic, and Sinic societies, and rhythms discernible in the growths and in the disintegrations of these and other civilizations are obvious test cases for us to explore.

In our consideration of business cycles in the present context, we have already come to the conclusion that, in the industrial phase of economic activity with which these cycles are associated, the laws of Nature whose currency can be detected are laws inherent in the life of the Human Psyche itself, and that, even if these psychic laws should prove not to be solely the laws of Reason which the pure monetary theory of business cycles was inclined to see in them exclusively, it was recognized by most authorities that some of them, at least, were laws governing the play of feelings welling up from the subconscious depths of the Psyche—particularly the expectant feelings of Hope and Fear. When we pass from the consideration of the forty-months-long 'Kitchin' business cycles and the nine-to-ten-years-long 'Juglar' business cycles to the twenty-three-to-twenty-five-years-long 'Rostow-Spiethoff' phases and the forty-to-sixty-years-long 'Kondratieff' business cycles¹ which had been keeping time with the contemporary war-and-peace cycles in latter-day Western history, and which might turn out to be reflections on the economic plane of these cycles on the political and military plane, it is evident that the alternating bouts of war and spells of peace with an average duration of 28·83 years, and the waves, with an average span of 57·66 years, between successive turning-points in the same direction, either from peace to war or from war to peace, out of which the three regular war-and-peace cycles in Modern and post-Modern Western history had been built up,² could be accounted for convincingly as products of the working of the Generation Cycle in the transmission of a social heritage.

It is manifest that the survivors of a generation that has been of military age during a bout of war will be shy, for the rest of their lives, of bringing a repetition of this tragic experience either upon themselves or upon their children, and that therefore the psychological resistance to any move towards the breaking of a peace that the living memory of a previous war has made so precious is likely to be prohibitively strong until a new generation that knows War only by hearsay has had time to grow up and to come into power. On the same showing, a bout of war, once precipitated, is likely to persist until the peace-bred generation that has light-heartedly run into war has been replaced, in its turn, by a war-worn generation whom these inexperienced war-mongers have sent to the shambles. Thus the alternating transitions from war to peace and from peace to war which succeed one another in the three Western regular war-and-peace cycles at intervals of an average span of 28·83 years could be explained as effects of the periodic breach that is made in the continuity of a social tradition every time that an experience has to be transmitted by the generation that has experienced it in its own life to a generation that has merely learnt of it at second hand. Yet this loss of compelling first-hand experience in the transition from one generation

¹ See pp. 230-2, above.

² See p. 287, above.

to its immediate successor, which might account for alternations of war and peace at intervals of about the average length of a generation, would not account for the distinction that an empirical survey of the historical evidence has led us to draw between 'general wars' and 'supplementary wars' and between the 'general peace' that is apt to follow a round of 'supplementary wars' and the 'breathing-space' that is apt to precede it; for the complete War-and-Peace Cycle constituted by the occurrence of a set of these four diverse phases in an unvarying regular order has a wave-length with a span, not just of approximately the length of a single generation cycle, but of approximately the aggregate length of four generation cycles, whether we measure this span from outbreak to outbreak of general wars or from the inauguration of one general peace to that of the next in the series. If we are to look for an explanation of the War-and-Peace Cycle in the working of some psychic law of Human Nature, and to find this psychic law in the periodic breaking of the continuity of a social heritage as this is transmitted by one generation to another, we shall not be able to account on these lines for a rhythm of the wave-length of the War-and-Peace Cycle unless we find that a cumulative psychic and social effect can be produced by a series of breaks between generations running beyond the singular into the plural.

We have only to remind ourselves of this consideration in order to recognize that a concatenation, not just of two generations, but of three, is apt to be the vehicle of social transformation in changes of Nationality, of Religion, and of Class. In all these three variations on the theme of social metamorphosis, it takes not only more than the experience-span of a single lifetime, but also more than a single breach of social continuity through the transmission of experience from one generation to another, to negotiate the passage from an inherited nationality, religion, or class to an adopted one.

In the field of changes of Nationality, this 'law' to the effect that it takes three generations for a family to achieve a social metamorphosis is aptly exemplified in an illustration of it that once came to the writer's personal notice. One day in the summer of A.D. 1932, at a public luncheon in the city of Troy, New York State, the writer, finding himself seated next to the local Director of Public Education, took the opportunity to ask his neighbour what, among all his manifold professional duties, was the job that he was finding the most interesting at the time. 'Organizing English lessons for grandparents' the Director promptly and unhesitatingly replied. 'And how, in an English-speaking country, does anybody manage to arrive at being a grandparent without having mastered the national language?' I thoughtlessly went on to inquire. 'Well, you see,' said the Director, 'Troy is the principal seat of the linen collar manufacturing industry in the United States, and, before the enactment of the United States Immigration Restriction Acts of 1921 and 1924, most of the labour-force here was recruited from foreign immigrants and their families. Now the immigrants who came from each of the principal emigrant-exporting countries had a way—which was natural enough in the new and strange surroundings in which they found themselves over here—of cleaving, as close as they could, to their own familiar past by

continuing to consort with other birds of the same feather. Immigrants of the same national origin were not only apt to work side by side in the same factories; they were apt to live next door to one another in the same blocks of tenements; and so, when the time came for them to retire, most of them knew little more English than they had known when they had first landed on American shores. They did not have to know any more up to this point in the American chapter of their life, because they commanded the services of home-bred interpreters. Their children had arrived in America young enough to go to the public school before entering the factory in their turn, and the combination of an American education with, let us say, an Italian infancy had made them thoroughly bilingual; they talked English in the factory, street, and store and Italian in their parents' homes almost without noticing that they were constantly switching back and forth from one language to the other; and their effortless and ungrudging bilingualism was highly convenient for their old parents. Indeed, it abetted their parents' inclination, after their retirement, to forget even the smattering of English that they had once picked up during their working life in the factory. However, this is not the end of the story; for in due course the retired immigrants' children married and had children of their own, and, for these representatives of a third generation, English was the language of the home as well as the school. Since their own parents had married after having been educated in the United States, one of them would be of non-Italian origin as often as not, and then English would be the *lingua franca* in which the father and mother would communicate with one another. So the American-born children of bilingual parents would not know their grandparents' Italian mother tongue, and, moreover, would have no use for it. Why should they put themselves out in order to learn a foreign lingo that would convict them of an un-American origin which they were eager to slough off and consign to oblivion? So the grandparents found that their grandchildren could not be induced to communicate with them in the only language in which the grandparents were able to talk with any ease, and they were thus confronted suddenly, in their old age, with the appalling prospect of being unable to establish any human contact with their own living descendants. For Italians and other non-English-speaking Continental Europeans with a strong sense of family solidarity, this prospect was intolerable. For the first time in their lives they now had an incentive for mastering the hitherto unattractive language of their adopted country; and last year they thought of applying to me for help. Of course I was eager to arrange special classes for them; and, though it is notorious that the enterprise of learning a foreign language becomes more difficult progressively as one grows older, I can assure you that these English lessons for grandparents have been one of the most successful and rewarding pieces of work that we have ever taken in hand in our department.'

This tale of Troy shows how a series of three generations can achieve, through the cumulative effect of two successive caesuras, a social metamorphosis which could never have been achieved by representatives of a single generation within the span of a single lifetime. The process by

which an Italian family transformed itself into an American family could not be analysed or described intelligibly in terms of any single life. An interaction between representatives of three successive generations was required in order to bring it about. The first generation of immigrants had to wait for the birth of grandchildren to move them seriously to embrace an alien nationality into which their grandchildren had been born. And, when we turn from changes of Nationality to consider changes of Religion and of Class, we find that, in these other two fields likewise, the family, not the individual, is the intelligible unit, and that, in the process of these changes likewise, the cumulative effect of two successive breaks between generations is needed in order to achieve the metamorphosis.

In a class-conscious Modern England which in A.D. 1952 was fast dissolving under the writer's eyes, it had usually taken three generations to make 'gentlefolk' out of a family of 'working-class' or even of 'lower-middle-class' antecedents; and in the field of Religion the standard wave-length of the process of conversion seems to have been the same. In the history of the eradication of Paganism in the Roman World, the intolerantly devout Christian-born Emperor Theodosius I followed the ex-pagan convert Constantine I on the Imperial Throne, not in the next generation, but in the next but one; and in the history of the eradication of Protestantism in an Early Modern Western France there was the same interval between the intolerantly devout Catholic-born Bourbon King Louis XIV and his ex-Calvinist Bourbon grandfather King Henry IV. In a post-Modern Western France at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era it took the same number of generations to breed genuinely devout Catholics among the grandchildren of officially reconverted bourgeois agnostics or atheists who had re-embraced Catholicism on the cynically calculating consideration that this was a traditional form of virtual Paganism, native to the soil of France, which promised, if only the Church could re-enlist sufficient support, to serve as an effective institutional bulkhead against a rising tide of Socialism and other ideologies that threatened to do away with the economic inequality between the bourgeoisie and the working class.¹ In the Syriac World, again, under the Umayyad Caliphate, it took three generations to breed genuinely devout Muslims among Mawlās² whose ex-Christian or ex-Zoroastrian grandfathers had officially embraced Islam in order to make themselves eligible for being adopted as clients by influential members of a Primitive Muslim Arab ruling class. The duration of the Umayyad régime, which stood for the conquerors' ascendancy over the conquered, was determined by the three-generations-long period that had to elapse in order to bring the original converts' Muslim-born grandchildren on to the stage of History. The Umayyad agents of a libertarian Arab 'ascendancy' were supplanted by 'Abbasid exponents of a Muslim egalitarianism'³ when, in the name of Islamic principles and ideals, the genuinely devout Muslim grandchildren of cynical converts

¹ See the observations of a French authority in Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1929 (London 1930, Milford), p. 480, n. 1.

² See VI. vii. 142-4.

³ See VI. vii. 147-52.

tried conclusions with the Laodicean Muslim grandchildren of Laodicean Muslim Arab *conquistadores*.¹

If a concatenation of three generation cycles thus proves to be the regular psychic vehicle of social change in the three fields of Religion, Class, and Nationality, it would not be surprising to find a concatenation of four generations playing a similar part in the field of International Politics. In another context² we have already found that, in the field of encounters between civilizations, the Time-interval between the creation of an intelligentsia and its revolt against its makers has had an average length of about 137 years—i.e. about twenty years more than the combined Time-span of four generations of average length—in a set of three or four instances; and it is not difficult to see how a concatenation of four generations might also determine the wave-length of the War-and-Peace Cycle, if we may assume that the agony of a general war makes a deeper impression on the Psyche than is made on it by a comparatively anodyne round of supplementary wars. While it might require no more than a single inter-generational caesura to efface the impression of a general war sufficiently to give the next generation the nerve to embark on supplementary wars of limited scope, it might require two or three caesuras to make the grandchildren or great-grandchildren of the perpetrators and victims of a previous general war so insensitive to their forebears' crimes and sufferings as to have the heart to re-perform the tragedy on the grand scale. A psychological process thus working itself out across two or three inter-generational caesuras would extend, on an average, over a time-span of something between $87\frac{1}{2}$ and $116\frac{3}{4}$ years; and, in the Modern and post-Modern ages of Western history, these are, as we have seen,³ in fact the approximate maximum and minimum lengths of an interval between the outbreak of one general war and another which gives the measure of the wave-length of the War-and-Peace Cycle.⁴

The Subjection of Broken-down Civilizations to Laws of Subconscious Human Nature

This War-and-Peace Cycle, however, is neither the last nor the longest of the regularities and recurrences for which we have to seek an explanation; for each of these cycles running to a wave-length of anything from about 80 to about 120 years is merely one term in a series. In

¹ See VI. vii. 144. This is an exemplification of a 'law'—noticed in III. iii. 24-25—that, in Nomad empires *in partibus agrorum*, it usually takes three generations, reckoning from the date of the Nomad conquerors' eruption out of 'the Desert' on to 'the Sown', for the Nomad empire-builders to degenerate and for their 'human cattle' to recuperate.

² See IX. viii. 341, n. 1.

³ In this series of war-and-peace cycles the overture took 74 years (A.D. 1494-1568), the first regular cycle 104 years (A.D. 1568-1672), the second regular cycle 120 years (A.D. 1672-1792), the third regular cycle 122 years (A.D. 1792-1814). See Table I on p. 255, above.

⁴ In the light of this tentative psychological explanation of the standard wave-length of the War-and-Peace Cycle, we can perhaps now see why a reduplicated general war—in which one general war is followed, after a single breathing-space, by another general war instead of by a round of relatively innocuous supplementary wars—should be so portentous an enormity. If it normally requires two or three inter-generational caesuras to nerve a society to plunge into a general war again, the reduplication of a general war after a single caesura is manifestly something contrary to Human Nature, and the penalty for this breach of a psychic law is likely to be as signal as the breach itself.

Western history a series of war-and-peace cycles which had started in A.D. 1494 was in its 458th year and its fourth cycle in A.D. 1952; in Hellenic history a series that had started in 321 B.C. had run through 290 years and three cycles before it had been wound up in 31 B.C.; in Sinic history, 459 (or 550) years and five cycles had elapsed before a series that had started in 680 (or 771) B.C. had been wound up in 221 B.C.¹ Moreover, each of the first two series was, as we have seen,² only the second chapter of an older and longer story. In the history of each of these civilizations, and of others as well, we can trace these series of war-and-peace cycles in the relations between parochial sovereign states back into the afflicted civilization's growth-phase; we can watch the general wars that the civilization periodically inflicts on itself progressively taking a greater toll of the war-making society's energies until, sooner or later, one of these catastrophes precipitates a social breakdown; and from that epoch-making point we can follow the series of war-and-peace cycles working itself out to its conclusion through a Time of Troubles whose standard length we have found empirically to be of the order of approximately four centuries. A Time of Troubles, however, is no more than one phase of a far longer process of social disintegration; Times of Troubles are apt to be followed by universal states, and these, too, seem to run to a standard length of about four hundred years, which they sometimes exceed when they encroach upon the ensuing interregnum that is apt to intervene between the dissolution of a disintegrating civilization and the emergence of a successor affiliated to it. Thus the total Time-span taken by a series of war-and-peace cycles may vary between a minimum of 400 years and a maximum of 600, or perhaps even more, while the total Time-span taken by the disintegration of a civilization may vary between a minimum of 800 years and a maximum of not much less than 1,100. Will a psychological explanation of regularities in human affairs, which has served us up to this point, avail to account for the uniform recurrence of social processes, phase for phase in an identical sequence and measure for measure on an identical Time-scale, when these processes uniformly recurring in the histories of divers civilizations expand over periods which are many times longer, not only than the individual experience of a single life-time, but also than the cumulative experience of a concatenation of three or four generation cycles? Considering that, on the level of personal consciousness, the span of continuous human experience is confined within the limits of a single life-time, our answer to our question would have been bound to be in the negative if, in our eyes, the intellectual and volitional surface of the Psyche had been the whole of the Psyche, as the Hellenic discoverers of the Intellect were prone to assume that it was.

It is true that even the fathers of Hellenic philosophy were not so thoroughly blinded by the dazzling light of a newly discovered Reason as to be altogether without an inkling of an irrational psychic life brewing below this brightly illuminated surface of the Psyche in the dark depths of a subconscious abyss. Aristotle perceived and declared that 'the Intellect

¹ See Tables II and III, on pp. 268-9 and 273, above.

² See pp. 282-3, above.

by itself moves nothing';¹ and Plato had anticipated, and advanced beyond, this merely negative Aristotelian dictum in his myth of the Soul as a charioteer driving two mettlesome steeds of diverse temperaments.² All the same, it was left to the children of a Western Civilization, affiliated to the Hellenic, eventually to follow up these Hellenic surmises by tardily embarking, in a post-Modern Age of Western history, on the scientific exploration of a psychic underworld that had been familiar to Indic and Sinic contemporaries of the Hellenic discoverers of the Intellect, and that had been the source of every poet's and prophet's inspiration in all times and places.

In the Western World in the writer's generation a Western science of Psychology was still in its infancy; yet the pioneers had already carried their reconnaissances far enough to enable C. G. Jung to report that the subconscious abyss on whose surface each individual human personality's conscious intellect and will were afloat was not an undifferentiated chaos but was an articulated universe in which one layer of psychic activity could be discerned below another. The nearest layer to the surface appeared to be a Personal Subconscious deposited by a personality's individual experiences in the course of his or her own life up to date; the deepest layer to which the explorers had so far penetrated appeared to be a Racial Subconscious that was not peculiar to any individual but was common to all human beings, inasmuch as the Primordial Images latent there reflected the common experiences of Mankind, deposited during the infancy of the Human Race, if not at a stage before Man had yet become completely human. On this showing, it was perhaps not unreasonable to surmise that, in between the uppermost and the lowermost of the layers of the Subconscious that Western scientists had so far succeeded in bringing within their ken, there might be intermediate layers deposited neither by racial experience nor by personal experience, but by corporate experience of a supra-personal but infra-racial range. There might be layers of experience common to a family, common to a community, or common to a society; and, if, at the next level above the Primordial Images common to the whole Human Race, there should indeed prove to be images expressing the peculiar *êthos* of a particular society, the impress of these on the Psyche might account for the length of the periods which certain social processes seemed to require in order to work themselves out.³

For example, one such social image that was manifestly apt to imprint itself deeply on the subconscious psychic life of the children of a civilization in process of growth was the idol of the parochial sovereign state; and it can readily be imagined that, even after this idol had begun to exact from its devotees human sacrifices as grim as any that the Canaanites ever paid to Moloch or the Bengalis to Juggernaut, the victims of a demon which these victims themselves had conjured up might well need the poignant experience, not just of a single life-time and not just of one concatenation of three generation cycles, but of a span of not less than

¹ Aristotle: *Ethica Nicomachea*, Z 2, pp. 1139 A-B, quoted in III. iii. 231, n. 1, and on p. 395, below.

² Plato: *Phaedrus*, 246A-257B.

³ This consideration has been anticipated in IX. viii. 115-16.

four hundred years, in order to bring themselves to the point of plucking this baneful idolatry out of their hearts and casting it from them. It can also readily be imagined that they might need, not just four hundred years, but eight hundred years or a thousand, to dissociate themselves from the civilization whose breakdown and disintegration a Time of Troubles had made manifest, and to open their hearts to receive the impress of some other society of the same species or of the different species represented by the higher religions. For the image of a civilization presumably makes a still more potent appeal to the Subconscious Psyche than the image of any of the parochial states into which civilizations are apt to be articulated on the political plane unless and until they eventually enter into a universal state. From the same angle of mental vision we can likewise understand how a universal state, once established, should sometimes succeed, in its turn, in retaining its hold over its ex-subjects', or even over its actual destroyers', hearts for generations or perhaps even for centuries after it has lost its usefulness as well as its power and has become almost as grievously heavy an incubus as the antecedent parochial states that it had been created to liquidate.¹

'The relation between the external anxieties felt by the representatives of an adult generation—anxieties that are directly conditioned by the social position of the people who feel them—and the inward, automatically operating, anxieties of these people's children in the rising generation is unquestionably a phenomenon of importance over a wide field. . . . The stamp that is set by the procession of successive generations on both the psychic development of the individual and the course of historical change is something that we shall only begin to understand more adequately than we do at present when we have become more capable than we are to-day of taking our observations, and doing our historical thinking, in terms of long chains of generations.'²

If the social laws current in the histories of civilizations are indeed reflections of psychological laws governing some infra-personal layer of the Subconscious Psyche, this would also explain why these social laws should be, as we have found them to be, so much more clearly pronounced and more exactly regular in the disintegration-phase of a broken-down civilization's history than in its foregoing growth-phase.

Though the growth-phase, as well as the disintegration-phase, can be analysed into a series of bouts of Challenge-and-Response, we have found it impossible to discern any standard wave-length common to the successive bouts through which social growth takes place, whether we measure the intervals between successive presentations of challenges or the intervals between successive deliveries of effective responses, and we have also seen that in the growth-phase these successive challenges and successive responses are infinitely various. By contrast, we have found that the successive stages of the disintegration-phase are marked by repeated presentations of an identical challenge which continues to recur because the disintegrating society continues to fail to meet it;³ and we

¹ See VI. vii. 7-46.

² Elias, N.: *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. ii: *Wandlungen der Gesellschaft: Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation* (Basel 1939, Haus zum Falken), p. 451.

³ See V. v. 12-13.

have also found that, in all past cases of social disintegration that we have mustered in an empirical survey, the same successive stages all invariably occur in the same order, each stage taking approximately the same period of time in the history of one civilization as the corresponding stage in the history of another, so that the disintegration-phase as a whole presents the picture of a uniform process with a uniform total duration when we take a synoptic view of the divers examples of it provided by the histories of a dozen different broken-down civilizations. Indeed, as soon as a social breakdown has occurred and the process of social disintegration has set in, the tendency towards variety and differentiation that is characteristic of the growth-phase of a civilization is replaced by a nîsus towards uniformity and identity that shows its power and persistence by triumphing sooner or later over interference from outside, as well as over recalcitrance from within.

We have observed, for example,¹ how, when first a Syriac and then an Indic universal state was cut short by the impact of an intrusive Hellenic Civilization prematurely, before it had completed a universal state's standard life-span of some four hundred years' duration, the smitten and submerged society could not or would not pass away until, in spite of the disturbing influence of an alien body social, it had duly completed the regular course of a broken-down society's disintegration by eventually re-entering into the interrupted phase and abiding in a reintegrated universal state long enough to make up, in the aggregate, a psychological equivalent of the length of time normally occupied by this phase in the standard pattern of the disintegration-process.² Disintegration did not culminate in dissolution in either of these two historic cases until the prematurely shattered universal state had re-established its structure and resumed its course, even though in Indic history the interrupted universal state had to wait for more than 450 years before it could find its opportunity to achieve an avatar of the Mauryan Empire in the shape of the Guptan Empire, while in Syriac history it had to wait for no less than 950 years for the Achaemenian Empire to re-emerge in the shape of the Arab Caliphate. These belated but insistent resumptions of a regular

¹ In I. i. 73-77.

² This 'psychological equivalent' of a normal continuous Time-span of approximately four hundred years' length does not, of course, add up to precisely the same figure in the aggregate when it is provided in two instalments separated from one another chronologically by the intrusion of an alien civilization. We should expect it to take a longer aggregate tale of years to produce a psychological effect in two instalments than to produce it in a single instalment. In the Syriac case, for instance, in fact, that the effective durations of the interrupted universal state and the Arab Caliphate amount, in the aggregate, not just to 400 years, but to 522 (see Table I in vol. vi, p. 327, and also in vol. vii, p. 769, there). On the other hand the effective durations of the Mauryan and Guptan Empires amount to no more than 322 years (see *ibid.*); and, even if we were to equate the period of the *Pax Guptica* with the full length of time during which the Gupta Dynasty was officially regnant, we should barely arrive at an aggregate exceeding four hundred years for the two instalments here.

This at first sight surprisingly small aggregate duration of a *pax oecumenica* in Indic history is perhaps partly explained by the consideration that a psychological equivalent of it was also provided regionally, during the period of Hellenic intrusion, by the Bactrian Greek, Sakan, Kushan, and Andhran régimes to some extent. In this context we may observe that, during the corresponding Hellenic intrusion upon the Syriac World, the role of the Andhra Dynasty in Indic history was played in Syriac history by the Arsacidae and Sasanidae, and the role of the Bactrian Greek, Sakan, and Kushan princes by the Seleucidae.

course of disintegration, with a standard duration, that had been interrupted by the intrusion of an alien society, have their converse in the belated but ineluctable dissolution of the Egyptiac Society after it had set Fate at defiance by galvanizing its dead body social into a state of life-in-death which it managed to maintain for as long a period—some two thousand years in all—as the aggregate length of the preceding growth-phase and disintegration-phase.¹ The moral of this fruitless Egyptiac *tour de force* is

Nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum
tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus
quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti.
proinde licet quot vis vivendo condere saecula:
mors aeterna tamen nilo minus illa manebit,
nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno
lumine qui finem vitae fecit, et ille
mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante.²

Apparently a broken-down civilization that has travelled so far along the path of disintegration as to have entered into a universal state has no more power to achieve immortality by prolonging this phase of life-in-death in *saecula saeculorum* than it has to anticipate the inevitable hour by going into dissolution before it has served the full term which every disintegrating civilization is doomed to serve in this phase of the disintegration process.

This striking contrast between the regularity and uniformity of the phenomena of social disintegration and the irregularity and diversity of the phenomena of social growth has been noted frequently in this Study up to this point as a matter of manifest historical fact, without any attempt so far to account for it. In the present Part, which is concerned with the relation between Law and Freedom in human affairs, it is incumbent on us to grapple with this problem; and a key to its solution may be found in the difference between the respective natures of the conscious personality on the surface of the Psyche and the subconscious levels of psychic life underlying it.

The distinctive gift of Consciousness is a freedom to make choices—between alternative courses of action for the Will, and between alternative ideas and beliefs for the Intellect; and, although this path of freedom has an inner law and order of its own which is manifest from within to the thinking, planning, and acting personality itself, the same path looks capriciously disorderly when it is surveyed by a spectator from outside. In the sight of an alien observer, 'the wind bloweth where it listeth';³ and, considering that a relative freedom is one of the characteristics of the growth-phase in the history of a civilization, it is, after all, only to be expected that, in so far as human beings are free in these circumstances to determine their own future for themselves, the course which they follow should be in truth, as it appears to be, a wayward one in the sense of being recalcitrant to the rule of 'laws of Nature'.

The reign of Freedom, which thus keeps 'laws of Nature' at bay, is,

¹ See I. i. 136-9.

² Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book III, ll. 1087-94.

³ John iii. 8.

however, precarious inasmuch as it depends upon the fulfilment of two conditions, both of which are evidently exacting and arduous. The first condition is that the conscious personality must keep the subconscious underworld of the Psyche under the Will's and the Reason's control; the second condition is that it must also contrive to 'dwell together in unity'¹ with the other conscious personalities with which it has to dwell on some terms or other in the mortal life of a *Homo Sapiens* who was a social animal before he was a human being, and was a sexual organism before he was a social animal. These two necessary conditions for the exercise of freedom are actually inseparable from one another; for, if it is true that, 'when knaves fall out, honest men come by their own',² it is no less true that, when persons fall out, the Subconscious Psyche escapes from the unwelcome control of each and all of them.

Plato's comparison of the demonic forces of the Subconscious to mettlesome steeds, and of the controlling Personality to a charioteer, is perhaps too flattering to the Soul. The Zen School of Mahayanian Buddhism may be nearer to the mark in likening the Subconscious to an ox and the Conscious Personality to a boy who has to win and keep control over the powerful and recalcitrant beast by cultivating the Orphic arts of tact and charm.³ Mithraism, picturing the beast, not as an ox, but as a bull, draws the conclusion that he cannot be domesticated and must therefore be butchered if the Personality is to assert its freedom effectively, and this militant attitude towards the Subconscious Psyche, which is the antithesis of a Far Eastern *modus vivendi*, was bequeathed by Mithraism to Western Christendom.

'From the beginning the Chinese seem to have favoured a dynamic rather than a moral conception of the Universe. The specialisation of the Intellect never assumed so great an ascendancy as to pit Reasoning Man against Unreasoning Nature. Whereas the heroic attitude of the West tends to picture Man in constant warfare with the destructive powers of Nature, Chinese common sense prefers to convince the bull that a parallel movement is better in every way than mere opposition. In the West the dragon symbolises the power of evil or the force of regression, for the Western mind is rooted in the idea that Man's original nature is evil. In the East the dragon dwells on the highest mountains and is identified with clouds and flowing water, because the Eastern mind sees spiritual events as the interplay of natural elements. Hence the dragon, as symbol of the inexhaustible potential of natural energy, represents beneficent spiritual power.⁴ So long as it is conceived along Miltonesque lines as representing

¹ Ps. cxxxiii. 1.

² Palmer, Samuel: *Some of the Most Curious and Significant English, Scotch, and Foreign*. . . 1710, Bonwicke), p. 327.

³ See Suzuki, D. T.: *The Ten Oxherding Pictures* (Kyoto 1948, Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai), quoted in VII. vii. 506.

⁴ Was Goethe inspired by some picture, or pictorial image, of Chinese provenance when he wrote

Kennst du den Berg und seinen Wolkensteg?
Das Maultier sucht in Nebel seinen Weg,
In Höhlen wohnt der Drachen alte Brut,
Es stürzt der Fels und über ihn die Flut:
Kennst du ihn wohl?

Dahin! Dahin!

Geht unser Weg; O Vater, lass uns ziehn!

Was it merely a chronological coincidence that an eighteenth-century Western philo-

the power of Hell, it has to be combated as evil. Yet, if we only could regard the dragon as a superior power, it would possibly reveal to us the daemonic aspect of God.¹

A more prosaic variation on the same mythical theme is the picture of a man who has to drive to market neither Saint George's dragon nor Mithra's bull nor a Chinese sage's ox, but some sullenly obstinate animal, such as a camel, a mule, or a goat, or some perversely insubordinate animal, such as a pig. It is relatively easy for the man to survey the country, choose his market, and find the most direct road leading to this goal; but 'the Intellect by itself moves nothing';² the man would be going to market on a bootless errand if he failed to bring the pig along with him; and in any case his freedom does not run to the length of allowing him this choice; for he is tied to the pig by an undetachable umbilical cord, and he must therefore either contrive to take the pig with him or resign himself to never reaching his own objective. His choice lies, not between bringing the pig to market and leaving it behind in its sty, but merely between alternative methods of trying to get the pig to travel his way. If he is Mithraic-minded, he will cut the pig's throat, sling the carcass over his shoulder, and stagger forward with his back bowed down under the weight of Pilgrim's burden. If he is Prussian-minded, he will try to coerce the creature with a drill-sergeant's rod;³ if he is Platonic-minded, he will try to drive it with a charioteer's firm but sympathetic handling of the reins; if he is Zen-minded, he will try to charm it, with Orphic strains, to travel of its own accord towards the magic flute-player's appointed goal for this pair of incongruous yet inseparable Siamese twins. The man has a wide choice of tactics for bringing the beast along with him; the one thing that he cannot do is to travel unencumbered by the creature's awkward company. His predicament has been portrayed, with the insight of genius, by Pascal.

'Il ne faut pas se méconnaître: nous sommes automate autant qu'esprit; et de là vient que l'instrument par lequel la persuasion se fait n'est pas la seule démonstration. . . . Les preuves ne convainquent que l'esprit; la coutume fait nos preuves les plus fortes et les plus crues; elle incline l'automate, qui entraîne l'esprit sans qu'il y pense. . . . Quand on ne croit que par la force de la conviction, et que l'automate est incliné à croire le contraire, ce n'est pas assez. Il faut donc faire croire nos deux pièces: l'esprit, par les raisons, qu'il suffit d'avoir vues une fois en sa vie; et l'automate, par la coutume, et en ne lui permettant pas de s'incliner au contraire. *Inclina cor meum, Deus.*'⁴

It is evident that, even if this life-long implication with a subconscious fellow-traveller were the only impediment to the progress of a personality

sophy discarded a traditional Christian belief in Original Sin in favour of a revolutionary faith in the perfectibility of Human Nature on the morrow of the initiation of a Late Modern Western Republic of Letters into the Sinic Weltanschauung by Jesuit Sino-logues at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Or did these consecutive events in Western history stand to one another in a relation of cause and effect?—A.J.T.

¹ Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall & Cox; 1949, Methuen), p. 872.

² Aristotle, cited on p. 328, n. 1, above.

³ See IV. iv. 123-4.

⁴ Pascal, *Pensées*, No. 252 in Léon Brunschvicg's arrangement of the text. The quotation is from Ps. cxix. 36.

along the path of freedom, the task of perpetually vindicating this freedom by keeping this obligatory subconscious companion in step with itself would be a heavy tax on a personality's spiritual resources; but, in this ceaseless contest between man and pig, the man also labours under one grievous handicap from which the pig is exempt and of which the pig also knows how to take full advantage. While there is only one pig, there is a host of drivers tethered to his sly tail; and, if the drivers fall out with one another and, in falling out, neutralize one another's efforts to control the pig, then the pig has a chance of capturing the initiative from each and all of them, and of taking his revenge by leading each and all of them by the nose. The worst of it—from the drivers' standpoint—is that, notwithstanding their common interest in keeping the pig in order, it is superhumanly difficult for the drivers to achieve and maintain the mutual harmony without which each of them will be impotent to carry out their identical task; for, though Man is a social animal, and indeed is this *ex officio originis*, his attempts to achieve harmony between will and will and between mind and mind have been as singularly unsuccessful as his attempts to discipline or civilize his subconscious mate, by contrast with Man's extraordinary success in discovering the secrets, and tapping the energies, of Physical Nature. Moreover, in his social life Man has been least unsuccessful within the narrow range of his personal relations; the social problem that has signally defeated him is, as we have seen,¹ the problem of harmonizing wills and minds over a wider range on which a majority of the relations are necessarily impersonal. On this wider range, on which Man is bound to lead his social life if he is not to renounce his ambition to master Physical Nature, Man has so far not hit upon any more effective or less perilous an expedient than to mechanize the relations between wills and intellects by subjecting them to 'social drill' through the enlistment of a faculty of mimesis which is the antithesis of rational choice and is, indeed, native, not to the conscious surface of the Psyche, but to the underlying subconscious abyss. If the quarrelsome drivers of the pig can think of no better way of keeping the peace among themselves than to take a leaf out of a porcine copybook, it is no wonder that their best-laid plans for securing social harmony with one another should 'gang aft a-gley';² and it is, in fact, notorious that the institutional machinery through which Man has endeavoured to organize his life on a supra-personal range has been Man's most tragic and most deadly failure. In the life which Man has made for himself on Earth, his institutions, in contrast to his personal relations, are the veritable slums, and the taint of moral obliquity is still more distressing in the least ignoble of these social tenements of the Human Spirit—for instance, in the churches and the academies—than in such unquestionably malignant institutions as Slavery and War.

Thus the gift of Consciousness, whose mission is to liberate the Human Spirit from 'laws of Nature' ruling over the subconscious abyss of the Psyche, is apt to defeat itself by misusing, as a weapon in a fratricidal conflict between one personality and another, the freedom that is its *raison d'être*; and the structure and working of the Human Psyche

¹ See IV. iv. 133-584.

² Burns, Robert: *To a Mouse*.

account for this tragic aberration without any need for recourse to Bossuet's¹ impious hypothesis of special interventions on the part of an omnipotent yet nevertheless jealous God to make sure that human wills shall reduce one another to impotence by cancelling one another out.

'History is so made that the end result always arises out of the conflict of many individual wills in which every will is itself the product of a host of special conditions of life. Consequently there exist innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite group of parallelograms of forces which give rise to one resultant product—the historical event. This again may itself be viewed as the product of a force acting as a Whole without consciousness or volition; for what every individual wills separately is frustrated by what everyone else wills, and the general upshot is something which no one willed.² And so the course of History has run along like a natural process; it also is subject essentially to the same laws of motion.'³

This acute observation by one of the twin founding fathers of a Communist Church had been elaborated by a later Western student of social laws of Human Nature.

'Historical change, taken as a whole, is not the working out of any "rational" plan; yet at the same time it is also not just a chaotic appearance and disappearance of forms subject to no kind of order. How is this possible? How can it happen, at all, in a human world, that formations should come into being that have not been intended by any single human being, yet which, nevertheless, are worlds away from those shapes without stability, development, or structure that are assumed by the clouds. . . ?

'The answer to these questions is a simple one. The plans and the transactions, the feelings and the thoughts, of individual human beings are perpetually subject to interference, friendly or hostile, from one another. This interweaving of individual human plans and transactions, which is [one of the] fundamental [facts of human life], . . . and which, moreover, goes on continuously from generation to generation, is something that has not, itself, ever been planned. It cannot be understood by reference to the plans and aims of individual human beings, or on the

¹ See the passage quoted on pp. 381-2, below.

² In the same passage, Engels credits his poignantly true story of the mutual frustration of human wills with an unconvincingly 'happy ending':

'From the fact that the wills of individuals—who desire what the constitution of their body, as well as external circumstances, in the last instance economic (either personal or social), determine them to desire—do not get what they wish, but are sunk into an average or common result, from all that one has no right to conclude that they equal zero. On the contrary, every will contributes to the result and is in so far forth included within it.'

This 'happy ending' to Engels' grim proposition rings hollow; for wills that 'do not get what they wish' do equal zero in terms of the achievement of a conscious personality's deliberate purpose; and Engels' statement can mean no more than that each frustrated will would have made a contribution to a resolution of forces if the forces here in play had been mechanical (as they are not) instead of being volitional (as they are).

What moved Engels to adulterate the pure milk of his word by throwing in a grain of comfort that has the triple demerit of being untrue, unconsoling, and incongruous? The belief that human history is subject to laws of Nature is one of the cardinal doctrines of the Communist faith. What has induced this secular theologian thus to blunt his theology's cutting edge? It looks as if Engels were here inadvertently contaminating the Communist conception that laws of Nature come into operation in human affairs through the mutual frustration of human wills with a reminiscence of the Christian conception that human wills can save themselves from frustration in so far, and only in so far, as they voluntarily conform themselves to the will of God.—A.J.T.

³ Engels, F.: Letter of the 21st September, 1890, to J. Bloch, reprinted in Hook, S.: *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx* (New York 1933, Day), pp. 334-5.

analogy of the pattern that these display. . . .¹ [On the other hand,] it has the power to produce changes and formations which no single human being has planned or created. This interdependence of human beings, one with another, gives rise to an order of a highly special character—and this order is more compelling and more powerful than the will and the reason of the individual human beings who bring it into existence. This order, consisting in a network of interwoven relations, is the power that governs the course of historical change; this is the principle that lies at the root of the process of Civilisation.

"This order is neither "rational"—if by "rational" is meant something that has come into being, like a machine, as a result of purposive thinking done by individual human beings—and it is not "irrational" either—if by "irrational" is meant something that has come into being in a way that is beyond our comprehension. . . . The law governing the phenomena of social interweaving is a distinctive system which is identical neither with the law of the "Spirit" (*des "Geistes"*), in the sense of individual thinking and planning, nor with the law of what we call "Nature", in spite of the fact that all these divers dimensions of Reality are indissolubly bound up with one another in action (*funktionell*)."²

Engels' 'force acting as a whole without consciousness or volition', which comes into play when wills illuminated by Consciousness frustrate one another, and which is governed by a social law that is neither the law of the Spirit nor the law of Physical Nature, is none other than the subconscious tide in the Psyche, which no sooner escapes from the control of some will and mind that have been carrying it whither it would not³ than it relapses into an unchallenged obedience to a law which is the antithesis of Freedom and which is morally facile just because it dispenses its subject from the free spirit's agonizing responsibility for making choices.⁴ The character of these laws of the Subconscious Psyche was being brought to light by post-Modern Western psychologists in the writer's day, and two features of it were already clearly discernible: by comparison with the volatility of conscious thought and volition, the gait of subconscious imaginative and emotional life was evidently as slow as it was regular. Even when a conscious personality was more or less in control of its subconscious underworld, its freedom of manoeuvre would be limited by the necessity of humouring the *éthos* of an inseparable subconscious fellow-traveller who could not be forced, either by coaxing or by coercion or by the *ultima ratio* of resort to a Mithraic butcher's knife, to exceed his own dead-slow maximum pace or his own infinitesimal maximum capacity for swerving from an irrationally sacrosanct rut of routine. *A fortiori*, when the subconscious brute was exempt from the imposition of conscious control thanks to an incapacitating fratricidal strife among the host of conscious personalities between whom

¹ This passage will be found, in the original, on p. 476.—A.J.T.

² Elias, N.: *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. ii: *Wandlungen der Gesellschaft: Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation* (Basel 1939, Haus zum Falken), pp. 313-15.

³ John xxi. 18.

⁴ The penalty that conflicting wills bring upon themselves by frustrating one another is thus not merely their own dethronement; it is the re-enthronement of the Subconscious Psyche; and this disconcerting positive consequence of mutual frustration is not faced by Engels in the perfunctory consolations of Philosophy that he offers in the passage quoted on p. 335, n. 2, above.

this control had to be shared, it was only natural that Caliban should celebrate his release from an irksome servitude by moving at a slower and more regular gait than ever.

On this showing, a process of social disintegration running through a regular series of phases in an unvarying order, and moving at a set pace over periods of approximately identical length in all cases, can be seen to reflect the *ethos* of a Subconscious Human Nature so faithfully that the detection and recognition of this process can hardly be dismissed as the baseless conceit of a phantasy arbitrarily imposing a subjective standard pattern of its own on the histories of broken-down civilizations in their disintegration-phase. A student of the *ci-devant* intelligence that had been petrified into instinct in the psychic life of the bees had ascertained that, in this apian psychic universe, instinctive acts that fall into sequences of chapters have to be performed integrally if they are to be performed at all. No chapter can be omitted because it has become superfluous, or be repeated because it has not been performed effectively at the first essay, or be transposed from its established place in the series because a transposition would make for increased efficiency;¹ for the law that rules over the instinctive life of the bees is not the flexible law of rational experiment and reflection; it is the adamant 'law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not',² however convincingly and insistently a change may be demanded by an empirical common sense.

These findings of an apian social science can be translated into the human language of Plato's simile of the charioteer and our own simile of the cart and the wheel. So long as the driver of a vehicle is seated on the box with the reins in his hands, no spectator who does not happen to be in the driver's confidence can foretell the equipage's destination, route, or speed; but, if a brawl between two rival coachmen scrambling for possession of the reins unintendedly gives the horses their head, an observer has only to acquaint himself with the horse-power of the draft animals and the relief of the *terrain* in order to be able to calculate exactly how many seconds will elapse and how many revolutions of the wheels will occur before the runaway horses land themselves and the carriage and its quarrelling occupants in the ditch. 'Fertur equis auriga neque audit currus habenas.'³ For the purposes of this calculation it makes no difference whether the accident has overtaken the party at the outset of the journey or within sight of their destination, nor what route the map records nor what mileage the taximeter registers nor what passage of time the stopwatch reads down to the moment when the driver lost control and the catastrophe happened. All these antecedent data are irrelevant because, whatever they may be—and they may, of course, be widely diverse in different cases—the carriage and pair, when once left to their own devices, will take, in every case, an identical course and an identical time to go to perdition.

¹ See Hingston, R. W. G.: *Problems of Instinct and Intelligence* (London 1928, Arnold), chap. iv, pp. 38–53.

² Dan. vi. 8.

³ Virgil: *Georgics*, Book I, l. 514.

(III) ARE LAWS OF NATURE CURRENT IN HISTORY INEXORABLE OR CONTROLLABLE?

If our foregoing survey has convinced us that human affairs are amenable to laws of Nature as a matter of fact, and that the currency of these laws in this realm is also explicable, at least to some extent, we may now go on to inquire whether laws of Nature current in human history are inexorable or controllable. If we here abide by our previous procedure of considering laws of Non-Human Nature first before we bring laws of Human Nature into our picture, we shall find that, as far as laws of Non-Human Nature are concerned, we have virtually answered our present question in the preceding chapter.

The short answer is that, though Man is powerless either to modify the terms of any law of Non-Human Nature or to suspend its operation, he can affect the incidence of these immutable and inexorable physical laws on human affairs by steering his own course on lines on which the laws of Non-Human Nature will be ministering to human purposes instead of frustrating them. It is true, for example, that no human being, by taking thought, can add one cubit unto his stature;¹ but it is also true that a biped on whose bodily height a 'ceiling' of little more than four cubits above ground level had been imposed by Physical Nature so long as the creature was standing with its feet on *terra firma*, had succeeded in raising this 'ceiling' to an altitude of several miles above sea-level for human beings whose intelligence and manual skill had enabled them to take to the air by making other laws of Non-Human Nature work for Man through the device of the internal combustion engine. We have already watched Man eluding the incidence of the Day-and-Night Cycle by equipping his ships and his industrial plants with large enough crews to keep the ship travelling, or the factory wheels turning, for twenty-four hours in the day by the device of dividing the crews into 'shifts' constantly relieving one another. We have likewise watched Man eluding the incidence of the Year Cycle by growing crops in the antipodes, inventing cold storage and rapid means of transport in bulk, and keeping the cold and the heat at bay by divers methods of artificial heating and cooling.

Western Man's success in modifying the incidence of laws of Non-Human Nature upon human activities had been registered in reductions in rates of insurance premium. Improvements in charts, followed up by the installation of wireless and radar on board ship, had diminished the risk of shipwreck through running aground or through crossing the path of a hurricane; the installation of lightning-conductors had diminished the risk of lightning damage to ships, ricks, and buildings; the smudge-pots of Southern California and the gauze screens of the Connecticut Valley had diminished the risk of frost damage to crops cultivated in a climate that would have been just too inclement to harbour them without Man's deft intervention in Flora's favour; the devices of inoculation, spraying, and baptism with pest-killers had diminished the danger of pest-damage to crops, trees, and flocks; while, in the life of the human husbandmen of this domesticated Flora, and shepherds of this

¹ Matt. vi. 27; Luke xii. 25.

domesticated Fauna, the incidence of disease had been diminished, and the expectation of life had been lengthened, by advances in preventive medicine which had proved most effective when they had taken the positive form of improvements in the physical and spiritual conditions of human life.

When we pass into the realm of laws of Human Nature, we find the same tale being told by reductions in rates of insurance premium here likewise. The risk of accidents on the road and in the factory had been reduced through a moral education in a sense of responsibility still more effectively than through the imposition of pains and penalties or through the installation of physical safety-devices. The risk of burglaries—which was more conspicuously refractory than the risk of accidents was to reduction either through precautions or through punishments—had been found to vary in inverse ratio with the general average level of moral probity, and this, in its turn, was apt to vary in some relation with the minimum level of material well-being in societies in which there was no more than an infinitesimally rare leaven of saints capable of rising wholly superior to their material circumstances.

On the economic plane it had been found that the volume of production per man-hour could be increased by the stimulation of the will to work more notably than by improvements in the skill of the workman or in the efficiency of his tools; and religious, ideological, and political motives for working with a will had sometimes proved more potent than economic incentives.

When we come to consider, for our purpose in this chapter, those alternating increases and decreases in Western economic activity that had come to be known as business cycles, we find the professional students of them drawing a distinction between the 'controllable' and the 'uncontrollable' factors,¹ and one school—namely, the exponents of the 'pure monetary theory'—going so far as to maintain that these fluctuations were due to a control deliberately exercised by the bankers over the activities of the traders and the manufacturers. A majority, however, of the experts in the writer's day evidently held that these deliberate acts, based on rationally calculated considerations of individual self-interest, on the part of persons occupying key positions of power in the economic system, counted for less in the generation of a rhythm of alternating booms and slumps than the uncontrolled play of imagination and feeling welling up from the subconscious lower levels of the Psyche.

'In rejecting some and accepting other schemes, the men of money are taking an important, though not a conspicuous, part in determining how labor shall be employed, what products shall be made, and what localities built up. Not all lenders, however, are able to make intelligent decisions. The great mass of small investors, and not a few of the large, lack the experience or ability or time to discriminate wisely between profitable and unprofitable schemes. . . . Investors who lack independent judgment are peculiarly subject to the influence of feeling in the matters where feeling is a dangerous guide. The alternating waves of confidence and timidity

¹ See, for example, Haberler, G.: *Prosperity and Depression* (3rd ed., Geneva 1941, League of Nations), p. 7.

which sweep over the market for securities are among the most characteristic phenomena of business cycles. Even those who are relied upon for advice are not wholly immune from the emotional contagion. Thus the guidance of economic activity by the investing class is only in part an intelligent review of plans by competent experts.¹

This picture of economic activity fluctuating under the ascendancy of almost blindly irrational subconscious psychic forces came into sharper focus when Economic Man was considered, not as a producer, but as a consumer.

'One reason why spending money is a backward art in comparison with making money [is that] the family continues to be the dominant unit of organisation for spending money, whereas for making money the family has been superseded largely by a more highly organised unit. The Housewife, who does a large fraction of the World's shopping, is not selected for her efficiency as a manager, is not dismissed for inefficiency, and has small chance of extending her sway over other households if she proves capable. . . . It is not surprising that what the World has learned in the art of consumption has been due less to the initiative of consumers than to the initiative of producers striving to win a market for their wares.'²

These considerations suggested that the fluctuations in the volume of business activity in an Industrial Western World might continue to escape control so long as the units of consumption continued to be households, and the units of production freely competing individuals, firms, trade-unions, and states whose conflicting wills largely cancelled one another out and, to that wide extent, left the economic arena open for the play of subconscious psychic forces. At the same time there seemed no reason why the Hebrew Patriarch Joseph's legendary success, as economic intendant of an Egyptiac World during the last days of a Hyksos régime, in making provision during years of abundance against coming years of scarcity should not be emulated on a 'global' scale in a latter-day Western World that had become coextensive with the entire habitable and traversable surface of the planet. By maintaining reserves of non-perishable commodities, by rendering perishable commodities non-perishable through deep-freezing, and by constantly rationing supplies of consumers' and producers' goods and purchasing power on a comprehensive long-term plan, there seemed no reason why some historic American or Russian Joseph should not one day bring the sum total of Mankind's economic life under a central control which, whether benevolent or malevolent, would assuredly outrange in its effectiveness the wildest flights of either Mosaic or Marxian fancy.

When we pass from business cycles with a forty-months-long or a nine-to-ten-years-long wave-length to a Generation Cycle with a wave-length of something between a quarter and a third of a century, we can see that, in a twentieth-century Westernizing World, the wastage to which any cultural heritage was perhaps bound to be subject in some measure in the course of its transmission from one generation to another was being reduced on the physical plane by typing, printing, photostating, and

¹ Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting* (New York 1927 (reprinted 1930), National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.), p. 163. ² *Ibid.*, pp. 165-6.

other techniques for producing permanent visual records, and on the spiritual plane by improvements in education—in the broader meaning of the word—that were making a larger proportion of the total social heritage more fully available to a higher percentage of the total population in each successive rising generation. This diminution of the entries on the debit side of the Generation Cycle's account was, however, manifestly less difficult to achieve with the physical and spiritual means so far acquired by Man than it would be for Man deliberately to engineer an enhancement, or even merely to safeguard the maintenance, of the Generation Cycle's positive service to mortal men as a culturally profitable regulator of social change. In a rationally ordered world, in which a progressive improvement in record-taking and in education had reduced the wastage of Man's social heritage through the Generation Cycle to vanishing-point, it was conceivable that Mankind might one day wake up to find that, in the act of making itself master of the Generation Cycle, it had enslaved itself to the tyranny of an indelible tradition no less cramping than the indelible instincts into which, for ages past, a *ci-devant* Intelligence had been petrified in the Spartan-like universe of the Ants and the Bees.

When we pass on from the Generation Cycle to social processes with a vastly longer wave-length, such as a series of war-and-peace cycles running to three or four revolutions of 'the sorrowful wheel', or the disintegration of a broken-down civilization in the eight-or-ten-centuries-long course of a Time of Troubles and an ensuing universal state, our present question whether laws of Nature current in History are inexorable or controllable assumes a form in which—however academic it might have looked in Western eyes at any date during the two and a half centuries ending in A.D. 1914—this question was now insistently presenting itself to an increasing number of minds in the Western World on the morrow of what had been the second world war within living memory.

When a civilization had once broken down and entered on the path of disintegration, was it doomed already in advance to go on following this path to the point at which it would end in dissolution? Or was there a possibility of retracing one's steps—at any rate so long as the broken-down society had not yet slipped farther down than the upper and less precipitous slopes of the *descensus Averni*? In A.D. 1952 this question could no longer be ignored or dismissed by any citizen of a Western Society who had any sense of History (and this sense seemed to be becoming more acute, as it is apt to become in days of increasing distress and anxiety). At the same time there was no guarantee that an increasingly anxious post-Modern Western Man would be in any way better placed for finding an answer to the riddle of the Sphinx than his persistently self-complacent Late Modern Western forebears would have been if the same fateful question had ever rung in their ears.

Perhaps the strongest practical motive for the interest that was undoubtedly being taken by the writer's Western contemporaries in a synoptic study of the history of Man in Process of Civilization was an eagerness to take their historical bearings at a moment in the history of their own civilization which they felt to be a turning-point. In this crisis

the Western peoples, and the American people perhaps above all, were manifestly conscious of a load of responsibility that was weighing upon them. 'See, I have set before thee this day Life and Good and Death and Evil.'¹ Mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, Westerners saw themselves confronted with choices which might perhaps decide the fate, not merely of their own society, but of all Mankind; and, in looking to past experience for light to guide them in taking momentous decisions, they were turning to the only human source of wisdom which had ever been at the disposal of Mankind—though wise men had also never failed to recognize that the lessons of experience could not be applied automatically to grind out cut-and-dried solutions for current problems. In the twentieth century, Western minds were seeking in Mankind's historical experience for such guidance as experience could be expected to give; but they could not turn to History for light on how they ought to act without first putting to the oracle the preliminary question: Did History give them any assurance that they were really free agents? The lesson of History, after all, might turn out to be, not that one choice would be better than another choice, but that their sense of being free to choose was merely a flatteringly oppressive illusion, and that in truth it was out of their power to affect their own future. A comparison of the unfinished history of the Western Civilization with the histories of other civilizations in which the whole story was already known from beginning to end might inform the living generation of Westerners that they were in a phase in which their future no longer lay even partially in their own hands. The lesson of History might be that there was nothing now for them to do except to recognize, and resign themselves to, a doom from which there was no possibility of escape.

Was there indeed a stage in the disintegration of a civilization at which it ceased to be possible for human intellects and wills to recover control and to make use of this recaptured power by taking rational steps to avert an irretrievable disaster? In the regularly recurring pattern of the disintegration-process there was at least one landmark that was so outstanding as to be unmistakable whenever it was reached, and this was the termination of a Time of Troubles through the establishment of a universal state as a result of the forcible liquidation of all previously contending parochial states save one. At stages in the course of disintegration before this mark was reached and passed, was a recovery still feasible? In answer to this first question, perhaps the most that could be said was that, among all the untoward developments that were characteristic of a Time of Troubles, there was no sign of any that would make a recovery inherently impossible, though no doubt it would always be harder to recover from a relapse after a rally than to recover from an original breakdown that had not yet been repeated. The second question that presented itself was whether there was likewise no ground for assuming a recovery to be impossible after the establishment of a universal state, and in this case we might find ourselves giving a decidedly pessimistic answer with rather more assurance than we might have felt in giving a tentatively optimistic

¹ Deut. xxx. 15. Cp. 19.

answer to an identical question regarding the prospects during a Time of Troubles.

When once a Time of Troubles has passed over into a universal state, there are manifest inherent obstacles to recuperation that are so serious that they may well be insurmountable. To begin with, it is difficult to imagine how a society could have purchased peace at this price without having involuntarily inflicted mortal wounds upon itself. The price of a *pax oecumenica* imposed through the establishment of a universal state is, after all, a sacrificial price; for it is nothing less than the elimination, by force of arms, of all the previously contending parochial states save one which, if it does not die of its wounds, has to pay for its survival by suffering a grievous derangement of its life; and, in this political hecatomb, the parochial *regna peritura* themselves are the least valuable of the treasures that are destroyed; for, in the process of becoming the idols of infatuated communities, these political Juggernauts have a way of centring round themselves many of the non-political elements in a now disintegrating civilization's life; and, by the time when the progressive exacerbation of the Time of Troubles has come to threaten the stricken society with imminent death, it is as impracticable to overthrow these idols without simultaneously shattering the treasures now inextricably associated with them as it is imperative to overthrow these idols, whatever the cost. 'Ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant'¹ is, for this reason, an indictment on which all architects of universal states are bound in the nature of the case to be found guilty; and, for our present purpose, it is beside the point to argue whether or not the stricture is morally just; for, however convincingly the defendant may plead that he has saved a suffering world from a greater evil at the cost of inflicting on it a lesser evil in a situation in which no third choice was open to him, he will find it difficult to rebut the charge that even this lesser evil to which he has thus made himself a party is in the first place irretrievable and in the second place necessarily fatal in the long run to the afflicted body social.

If we may employ the homely simile of the eggs and the omelette, and identify the eggs with our clutch of contending parochial states, we may say that, during a Time of Troubles, down to the moment when it is liquidated through the establishment of a universal state, some, at any rate, of the eggs are likely to have remained unbroken, however severely even these may have been battered; but, when once the cook has converted all that is left of the eggs into an omelette, he has put it beyond his own or anyone else's power ever to reconstruct the eggs again by the impossible feat of putting scrambled yolks back inside broken shells. Moreover, as we have noticed in another context,² the chef's successors will find it beyond their power to preserve even the scrambled relics of broken eggs unadulterated, though, in originally making the omelette, the cook was aiming solely at preserving at least some recognizable vestige of his drastically processed raw materials. Time soon shows that the omelette will not keep without an infusion of preservatives, and these indispensable condiments inevitably de-nature the omelette's texture

¹ Tacitus: *Agricola*, chap. 30.

² In VI. vii. 57-60.

and taste, so that the pursuit of a conservative policy produces an unintended innovatory effect which plays straight into the hands of an insidious Spirit of Change. In our foregoing study of universal states¹ our principal conclusion has been that the conservative-minded makers and masters of universal states work, willy-nilly, for future destroyers, supplanters, and heirs of the civilization which the empire-builders themselves have been striving to make immune against the assaults of decay and death.

On this showing, it looks as if the process of social disintegration is likely to become inexorably irreversible if and when the disintegrating society passes out of a Time of Troubles into a universal state; and this finding raises the further question: Is there any remedy, short of the fatal imposition of a universal state, for the progressively more and more destructive fratricidal warfare between contending parochial states which appears to be the commonest symptom of a social breakdown?

If we try to answer this question empirically, as we ought, in the light of the historical evidence presented by the histories of civilizations up to date, we shall have to report that, out of some fourteen clear cases of breakdown, we cannot point to one in which the malady of fratricidal warfare had been got rid of by any means less drastic than the eventual elimination of the war-making parochial states themselves; but, in accepting this formidable finding, we must not allow ourselves to be discouraged by it; for a loyalty to the empirical method of investigation that requires us to be frank also requires us at same time to be judicious. The inductive method of reasoning is, after all, even at best, notoriously an imperfect logical instrument for proving a negative proposition, and the smaller the number of the instances under review the weaker, of course, the argument is. Now, at the time of writing, the number of known specimens of societies of the species 'civilizations' amounted, on the largest admissible count, to something less than thirty, and the species itself was apparently not more than some 5,000 or 6,000 years old, which was a brief span by comparison with the 300,000 or 600,000 or 1,000,000 years during which societies of a primitive kind had been in existence since the days before a sub-human social animal had achieved its mutation into Man. Against this historical background it was evident that the experience of some fourteen civilizations over a span of some five or six millennia established no very strong presumption against the possibility that, in response to the challenge by which these pioneer civilizations had been worsted, some other representative of the infant species might succeed some day in opening up a hitherto unknown avenue for a fresh and unprecedented spiritual advance by finding some less prohibitively costly device than the forcible imposition of a universal state for curing the social disease of fratricidal warfare between parochial states.

If, with this possibility in mind, we now glance back, once again, at the histories of those civilizations which, by the time of writing, had trodden the whole length of the *via dolorosa* leading from breakdown to dissolution without having managed to stop short of taking the perhaps irretrievable step of passing into a universal state, we shall observe that

¹ In VI, *passim*, in vol. vii.

at least some of them had caught a Pisgah sight of a saving alternative solution, even though none of them had ever yet succeeded in translating this ideal into an achievement.

In the Hellenic World, for example, the vision of a Homonoia or Concord that might do what Force could never do towards healing a deadly strife between contending states and contending social classes, and even between contending civilizations, had unquestionably been caught by certain rare Hellenic souls¹ under the spiritual stress of a Time of Troubles that had set in at the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C.—even though this glimpse of a happier alternative possibility had not availed to save the Hellenic Society from continuing to tread the path of destruction to the point at which a temporary reprieve had been purchased, through the imposition of a Roman Peace, at the cost of making the Hellenes' descent of Avernus irretrievable. In a post-Modern Western World the same ideal had been embodied, in response to the challenge of two successive world wars, in two successive oecumenical institutions—in the League of Nations after the War of A.D. 1914-18, and in the United Nations Organization after the War of A.D. 1939-45. In Sinic history during the Sinic Society's first rally after its breakdown, Confucius's zeal for the revivification of a traditional code of conduct and ritual and Lao-tse's quietist belief in leaving a free field for the spontaneous operation of the subconscious psychic forces of Wu Wei² had both been inspired by a yearning to touch springs of feeling that might release a saving power of spiritual harmony; and in the Sinic, as in the Western, World this yearning had also found institutional expression. In 681-679/8 B.C., for example, at a date when the progressive assertion of rival parochial sovereignties *de facto* was already threatening the Sinic Society with the breakdown that it eventually brought upon itself in 634 B.C., an attempt was made to provide an effective substitute for a now shadowy oecumenical presidency of the Imperial House of Ch'ou by an international recognition of the hegemony of one of the leading parochial Powers of the day;³ and at least two Powers in turn

¹ There could be no doubt that this idea which was at the same time an ideal had made its epiphany in the Hellenic World in the course of its Time of Troubles; the only point in dispute between latter-day Western scholars was the question: Whose soul was it that was to be given the credit for having caught the vision first? For the debate between the respective champions of Alexander of Macedon and Zeno of Citium, see V. vi. 6, n. 4. Since the publication of that volume of the present Study, the debate had been carried farther. Alexander's advocate, Sir W. Tarn, had expounded his theory more fully in his masterly work *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1948, University Press, 2 vols.); and, according to this exposition (in op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 447-8), Alexander's ideas about Brotherhood and Unity could be seen to be 'three facets of a single idea':

'The first is the statement that all men are brothers; Alexander was the first man known to us, at any rate in the West, to say so plainly and to apply it to the whole Human Race, without distinction of Greek or Barbarian. The second thing is his belief that he had a divine mission to be the harmonizer and reconciler of the World, to bring it to pass that all men, being brothers, should live together in Homonoia, in unity of heart and mind. . . . The third thing . . . was the desire, expressed in the libation and prayer at Opis, that all the peoples in his realm should be partners and not merely subjects.'

In *Classical Philology*, vol. xlv, No. 3, July 1950, Tarn's contentions had been disputed by Philip Merlan in a paper under the title 'Alexander the Great or Antiphon the Sophist?' in which the writer argues that 'the idea of the equality of all men, Greeks and Barbarians alike', had been 'proclaimed, a century before Alexander the Great', by the fifth-century Athenian man of letters Antiphon in his work called *Truth*.

² See III. iii. 187 and V. v. 416-19.

³ The first hêgemôn in the series, Huan, the prince of the parochial state Ts'i, secured

duly exercised this authority in the name of the Chóu before this embryonic constitution for a Sinic League of Nations fell into abeyance.¹ Thereafter, there were occasional revivals—as, for instance, in 546 B.C.²—of the international conferences for the preservation of peace between parochial states which, between 679 and 628 B.C., had been convened under the successive hegemonies' auspices. It was not until after the opening of the second chapter in a Sinic series of war-and-peace cycles that the contending states finally abandoned their half-hearted quest for some way of living peacefully side by side, and allowed their fratricidal warfare to degenerate into a sheer struggle for existence; and, even after the onset of this second paroxysm of a Sinic Time of Troubles, the moderating institution of hegemony seems to have been revived once or twice.³

These Sinic, Hellenic, and Western essays pointed to a possibility of preventing the perhaps inevitable friction between parochial states from grinding a body social to powder by recourse to some remedy less drastic than the shattering of these trouble-making idols at the cost of mortal injury to the suffering society itself. As an alternative to the forcible imposition of a universal state, which had invariably proved in the event to have been a lethal remedy for a mortal disease, might not some civilization some day succeed in responding to the challenge of breakdown by inducing the loyal subjects of still unliquidated parochial states voluntarily to subordinate their parochial patriotisms to an overriding allegiance to some paramount oecumenical institution which would be a political embodiment of the whole of the society and not just of one or other fragment of it? Would not some such new solution for an old political problem offer a more favourable expectation of life to the parochial states themselves, as well as to the society of which these were political articulations? Surely, if these parochial states ceased to be a menace to the survival of the society in virtue of ceasing to be objects of idolatrous worship, then their votaries need no longer have to face the agonizing choice of allowing their idolization of these parochial political institutions to break the society up or else acquiescing in the preservation of the society at the all but prohibitive price of allowing the parochial states, and all the treasures associated with them, to be liquidated in order to make way for a universal state imposed by force.

The objective on the political plane was to find a middle way between two mutually antithetical deadly extremes: a devastating strife between

the recognition of his hegemony by the states represented at a congress which he convened in 681 B.C. This arrangement was embodied in a formal diplomatic instrument in 679/8 B.C. (see Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 161).

¹ The two hégemonies whose hegemonies seem to be historical are the first two out of the five in the traditional list: Prince Huan of Ts'i (*dominabatur* 685–643 B.C.) and Prince Wên of Tsin (*dominabatur* 635–628 B.C.). In Franke's opinion (see op. cit., vol. i, p. 162) the hegemonies of the three last princes on the list are not so well attested by the historical evidence, and Franke suggests that these three were included in order to make up the tale of five, because of the significance of this number in the conventional system of Sinic thought. The Time-span of the Age of the Hegemonies in Sinic history would thus be 685–628 B.C. instead of 685–591 B.C., which is the traditional dating.

² See I. i. 89 and V. vi. 292.

³ In this period there may have been some recognition of the hegemony of King Kou-tsen of Yüé (*regnabat circa* 500–470 B.C.) and of Prince Hiao of Ts'in (*dominabatur* 361–338 B.C.) according to Franke, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 162 and 177–8.

irreconcilable parochial states and a desolating oecumenical peace imposed through the delivery of a knock-out blow. The reward for success in running the gauntlet of these adamantyne Symplegades, whose clashing jaws had crushed every vessel that had attempted to make the passage up to date, might be the Argonauts' legendary experience of bursting out of the perilous straits into a hitherto un-navigated open sea. If the children of one of the civilizations one day were to accomplish this feat of pioneering, such an achievement might well open a new chapter of history with a new spiritual climate. It was obvious, however, that this happy issue out of some of the afflictions that Man had been bringing on himself in the Age of the Civilizations could not be ensured by any talismanic blue-print of a federal constitution for an oecumenical polity. The precise constitutional arrangements best calculated to secure the saving harmony of multiplicity-in-unity and unity-in-multiplicity would necessarily vary according to the nature of the particular circumstances in which the challenge presented itself; and the most adroit and opportune political engineering applied to the structure of a body social could never serve as a substitute for the spiritual redemption of souls. Such proximate causes of breakdown and disintegration as the horizontal schism cleft in the Body Social by warfare between parochial states and the vertical schism cleft in it by strife between classes were in truth no more than political symptoms of a spiritual disease; and a wealth of experience had long since demonstrated beyond dispute that technically perfect institutions were of no avail to save froward souls from bringing themselves and one another to grief, whereas brethren who had attuned their wills to dwell together in unity would find no insuperable difficulty in making technically imperfect institutions work by short-circuiting a mimetic social drill through flashes of 'light caught from a leaping flame'¹ and by subordinating the things that are Caesar's to the things that are God's.²

If the prospects of Man in Process of Civilization, on his arduous climb up a precipitous cliff-face towards an unattained and invisible ledge above,³ evidently depended above all on his ability to recover a lost control of the pitch, it was no less evident that this issue was going to be decided by the course of Man's relations, not just with his fellow men and with himself, but, above all, with God his Saviour.

¹ Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341 B-E, quoted in III. iii. 245.

² Matt. xxii. 21; Mark xii. 17; Luke xx. 25.

³ See II. i. 192-4.

C. THE RECALCITRANCE OF HUMAN AFFAIRS TO LAWS OF NATURE

(I) A SURVEY OF INSTANCES

(a) THE VARIABILITY OF THE RATE OF CULTURAL CHANGE

1. *The Hypothesis of Invariability and the Evidence against it*

IN the preceding division of this Part we have come to the conclusion that there are laws of Nature to which human affairs are amenable; but the same empirical survey of historical facts that has borne witness to the currency of these laws has also informed us that they are not inexorable.

We have found that laws of Non-Human Nature which Man cannot abrogate or even modify can nevertheless be brought under human control in the sense that Man can elude the incidence of these laws when their operation would have frustrated his purposes, and court it when this will serve them. Though, for example, Man is powerless to change either the direction or the force of the winds, he can trim his sails to catch winds that will carry his ship towards the port for which he is making; he can design a rig that will enable him to take advantage of almost contrary winds by sailing in their eye; and, when he encounters a hurricane blowing dead against him, he can reef his sails and thus mitigate the impact of the blast. By adroitly steering the course of human affairs amid the play of non-human forces subject to rigid and therefore calculable and predictable laws, Man can prevent potentially adverse laws from hindering him and can constrain potentially favourable laws to help him in the execution of his plans; and, where the laws of Nature with which he is confronted are laws of the Human Psyche, Man can bring these laws, likewise, under human control in the sense that he can diminish the discord and increase the harmony in human life by reconciling personal wills that are bound to encounter one another in the life of a creature that had to become social before it could become human, and by bridging the gulf between each of these conscious personalities and the Subconscious Psyche with which any personality is bound to be mated in the life of a creature in whose soul the Spirit could never have moved except upon the face of the waters,¹ and which could never have been made to see the light except against the foil of the darkness.²

Such evidences of Man's ability to control his own affairs either by circumventing laws of Nature or by harnessing them raise the question whether there may not be some circumstances in which human affairs are not amenable to laws of Nature at all. We can explore this possibility by following the same empirical method of inquiry that we have just been employing in order to ascertain the extent of Nature's dominion over Man; and we may begin by inquiring into the rate of social change. If the tempo proves to be variable, this will be evidence, as far as it

¹ Gen. i. 2.

² Gen. i. 4.

goes, that human affairs are recalcitrant to laws of Nature in the Time-dimension at least. We cannot, however, take the variability of the rate of social change for granted.

In studying the phenomena of social disintegration, we have found that the disintegration-process has run a regular course which it has followed uniformly in a dozen divers instances up to date. It has invariably opened with a Time of Troubles which has invariably passed over into a universal state; the transit from the outbreak of the Time of Troubles, signifying the civilization's breakdown, to the break-up of the universal state, signifying the civilization's dissolution, has invariably been accomplished within the compass of three and a half revolutions of a Rout-and-Rally Cycle; and this process has invariably taken a minimum period of eight centuries to work itself out, while its maximum period has never been as much as eleven hundred years. Moreover, the rules of this process have been proved by the apparent exceptions.

When a universal state has been interrupted, before it has completed its regular Time-span of some four hundred years' duration, by the impact of an alien body social, the assaulted society has declined to accept this intervention as a *coup de grâce* and has obstinately prolonged its own existence until it has found an opportunity to swing back into the regular course of the disintegration-process by resuming its interrupted universal state and, this time, abiding in it until this phase of social experience has produced the full psychological effect that it has been its function to produce according to the disintegration-process's hitherto standard pattern. This process that has thus refused to allow an external agency to prevent it from working itself out has likewise been intractable to attempts to tamper with it from within. A universal state that has completed the full normal period of its course may have perversely insisted on superfluously prolonging the tale of its years; but we have seen that in every case it has broken up in the end, however long it may have succeeded in postponing the evil day; and we have also seen that in every case this illegitimate epilogue has been barren of creative achievements. The vanity of all such attempts to set the laws of social disintegration at defiance testifies to the inexorability of these laws so impressively, and this law-bound process of social disintegration has loomed so large in the history of the societies of the species 'civilizations' during the first five or six thousand years of this species' existence, that we are moved to ask ourselves whether the time-keeping propensity which has thus displayed itself in the disintegration-process over a span of something between a minimum of about eight hundred and a maximum of about a thousand years may not govern the histories of civilizations, not only when these societies are disintegrating, but also when they are still in growth.

If the tempo of History should indeed prove to be constant in all circumstances, in the sense that the passage of each and every decade, century, or millennium could be shown to generate a definite and uniform quantum of psychological and social change, it would follow that, if we knew the value either of a quantum in the psycho-social series or of a span in the Time-series, we should be able to calculate the

magnitude of the corresponding unknown quantity in the other series. Supposing, for example, that, in the history of civilization α , a generation β were known to be separated from a generation α by a Time-interval of, say, one hundred years, we ought then to be able to estimate the psychic and social distance between these two generations, even if their chronological relation to one another were the only information about them that we had on record. Conversely, if we knew the psychic and social difference between two generations, thanks to being informed about their respective manners and customs by undated records such as folk-tales handed down orally or the material evidence of stratified artifacts disinterred by archaeologists, we ought then to be able to estimate the chronological interval between them by inference, even if we had not inherited or recovered any table of dates to tell us their chronological relation to one another in plain figures. The assumption that a particular quantum of psycho-social change invariably takes the same span of Time in accomplishing itself had become so unquestionable an article of faith in the mind of at least one distinguished Modern Western student of Egyptiac history that he actually rejected the chronological data presented by Astronomy on the ground, not that this evidence was dubious in itself, but that to accept it would mean accepting, in consequence, the, to him, inadmissible proposition that the tempo of psycho-social change in the Egyptiac World must have been notably quicker during one period of two hundred years' length than it had been during an immediately preceding period of an approximately equal span.

'If we find that the heliacal rising of Sirius is noted in an Egyptian document as falling in a certain month of a certain year in the reign of a certain king, it would seem that by calculating the loss of days implied we could discover the year B.C. to which the given year corresponds. On this principle, by means of a statement in a papyrus found at Kahun, that Sothis rose heliacally on the first of the month Pharmouthi in the seventh year of Senusret III, it has been computed that this year was 1882 (1876) or 1876 (1872) B.C., while from the same data another computer has arrived at 1945 B.C. But there are many considerations which militate against an unreserved acceptance of either of these dates, in the present state of our knowledge. If the former date were accepted, the end of the XIIth Dynasty would fall in 1788 B.C.¹ But it will be admitted by all who have studied the material for the history of the time that to allow only two centuries for the period between Dynasties XII and XVIII is difficult. If there are resemblances in culture between the XIIth and the early reigns of the XVIIIth Dynasty which argue a comparative proximity in time, there are, on the other hand, differences which cannot be accounted for if the distance is to be measured by no more than two hundred years. The XIIth Dynasty itself lasted for two centuries. Are the changes observable during its continuance in any way comparable to those which had come

¹ The last (incomplete) year of the Twelfth Dynasty's régime would be, not 1788 B.C., but 1778 B.C., according to L. H. Wood's revision (in the *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, No. 99, October 1945 (New Haven 1945, A.S.O.R.), pp. 5-9) of W. F. Edgerton's chronology (in the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. i (Chicago 1942, University of Chicago Press), pp. 306-14). R. A. Parker, in *The Calendars of Ancient Egypt* (Chicago 1950, University of Chicago Press), p. 69, makes the last year of the Twelfth Dynasty's régime 1786 B.C.—A.J.T.

about between its termination and the rise of the XVIIIth? The answer can only be a decided negative.¹

This answer might be correct; yet it would not avail, by reason of that, to prove the case which is here based upon it. It might be true that, during the interval between the end of the Twelfth Dynasty and the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty, the Egyptiac culture had changed more than it had changed while the Twelfth Dynasty had been on the throne; but it would not follow that the time taken by the greater of these two unequal quanta of change must have been proportionately longer than the time taken by the lesser quantum. So far from its being requisite to assume that the rate of change must have been constant, it would be surprising if the pace of change had in truth been the same in two periods which were so different from one another in their social circumstances. The second of the two was an anarchic interregnum in which we should expect the pace of change to accelerate, whereas the preceding period was a time of relative peace, order, and stability in which we should expect the pace of change to be sluggish. An expectation based on this difference in character between two periods would thus have anticipated the astronomical evidence indicating that the greater quantum of change during the second period took no longer a time to come to pass than the smaller quantum during the first period; and, in fact, by the time when the present chapter of this Study was being written in A.D. 1950, the consensus of Egyptologists had declared itself unmistakably in favour of accepting the chronological evidence of Astronomy without regard for an unconvincing hypothetical law to the effect that the tempo of psycho-social change is not subject to variation.

This judgement of common sense is strikingly vindicated by indisputable facts in a number of cases in which the spans of time taken by cultural changes comparable in character to the change from a Twelfth-Dynasty culture to an Eighteenth-Dynasty culture in Egyptiac history are known to us from chronological records that cannot be impugned by any subjective estimate of the time required for allowing these cultural changes to take place.

For example, we know for a fact that the remains of the Temple of Zeus at Olympia and of the Parthenon at Athens which are still standing in our day date from the fifth century B.C.; that the remains of Hadrian's Olympieum at Athens and of the Temple of the Sun at Ba'lbak date from the second century of the Christian Era; and that the Church of the Ayía Sophía at Constantinople dates from the sixth century of the Christian Era. Supposing, however, that we had no record of any of these dates, and that in the absence of direct evidence we tried to reconstruct the chronology by making an estimate of the Time-intervals between the dates of the three sets of buildings on the basis of Hall's assumption that the tempo of cultural change is invariable, we should be bound to guess that the Time-interval between the Olympieum and the Ayía Sophía—representing, as these two buildings do, two orders of architecture that are, not merely diverse, but antithetical in their styles,

¹ Hall, H. R.: 'Egyptian Chronology', in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. i, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1924, University Press), pp. 168-9.

inspiration, and *êthos*—must be notably longer than the Time-interval between the Parthenon and the Olympieum, considering that the Olympieum is manifestly a mere variation on the Parthenon's architectural theme. In reality, as we happen to know, beyond dispute, the Time-interval between the Parthenon and the Olympieum, so far from being notably shorter than the Time-interval between the Olympieum and the *Ayía Sophía*, was half as long again, and an estimate of the relative length of the intervals, based on the hypothesis of invariability in the tempo of change, would be utterly misleading.

If we turn our attention from ecclesiastical to naval architecture and apply the hypothesis of invariability in the tempo of change to the dating of successive types of battleship in the history of the British Navy, we shall find ourselves inveigled into inferring that the *Sovereign of the Seas* (launched in A.D. 1637) must have been separated from the *Queen* (launched in A.D. 1839)¹ by a notably shorter Time-interval than that separating the *Queen* from the *Royal Sovereign* (launched in A.D. 1891). On this *a priori* method of reckoning, no other conclusion would be plausible, considering that the *Queen* was a wooden three-masted square-rigged sailing ship with her guns mounted along her broadsides, whose points of difference from the *Sovereign of the Seas* were merely points of detail, whereas the *Royal Sovereign*, with her gun-turrets fore and aft and her iron hull, steel armour, pair of funnels, and propellers driven by steam, was a Martian sea-monster that would not have been recognized as being a ship, in any intelligible sense of the word, by any sailor in Codrington's squadron at Navarino on the 20th October, 1827.

We should be similarly misled if we were to put our trust in the same *a priori* principle in trying to estimate the relative Time-intervals between the equipment of a Roman soldier in the last days of the Roman Empire in the West, a Saxon soldier in the *comitatus* of the Holy Roman Emperor Otto I, and a Norman knight depicted on the Bayeux tapestry. Considering that the round shields and the gladiator's square-rimmed crested helmets with which Otto's soldiers are equipped are manifest variations on the equipment of Majorian's soldiers,² whereas William the Conqueror's soldiers are equipped with Sarmatian conical helmets

¹ 'As late as 1845 there was laid down at Devonport a *Sanspareil* designed upon the lines of the ship of the same name captured from the French in 1794, although, it is true, the vessel was never actually launched as a sailing line-of-battle ship, but, while yet upon the stocks, was lengthened, converted to a screw ship of 80 guns, and launched as such in 1851' (Clowes, W. L.: *The Royal Navy: A History*, vol. vi (London 1901, Sampson Low, Marston, & Co.), p. 191). 'The first [British] ship of the line to be designed, *ab initio*, for the screw was the *Agamemnon*, which was laid down at Woolwich in 1849, and launched in 1852' (*ibid.*, p. 191). [British] wooden battleship, though fitted with a screw, was the *Collingwood* of 1861' (Mr. Christopher Lloyd, of the Navy Records Society, in a letter of the 23rd January, 1951, in which he kindly gave this information to the Librarian of the R.I.I.A. in answer to an inquiry made on the present writer's behalf).

² No doubt we have to allow for the possibility that the portrayal of a tenth-century Western soldier's equipment may have been influenced by a perhaps unconscious conservatism that may have made it look more like a fifth-century Roman soldier's equipment than it actually was; but such conservatism cannot have gone so far as to blind Western artists in the Dark Ages to the visual evidence, for they did not ignore the new-fangled equipment of an eleventh-century knight; on the contrary, they evidently took a delight in reproducing it faithfully to the facts. On this showing it seems reasonable to assume that their portrayal of a tenth-century Western soldier's equipment is likewise essentially true to life.

and with kite-shaped shields, the hypothesis of invariability in the tempo of change would lead us, here too, to fly in the face of the chronological facts by guessing that the Time-interval between Otto I (*regnabat et imperabat* A.D. 936-73) and William the Conqueror (*ducebat et regnabat* A.D. 1035-87) must have been notably longer than the Time-interval between Majorian (*imperabat* A.D. 457-61) and Otto I.

In the three cases just cited, estimates based on the assumption that the tempo of change is invariable fall wide of the true chronological marks because in reality the tempo was not constant. In all these three cases a spell of relatively slow cultural change was succeeded rather abruptly by a spurt of relatively fast change. We may complete our exposition of the argument against the hypothesis of invariability in the tempo of change by citing an inverse case in which a spurt of fast change was succeeded by a spell of slow change.

Anyone who takes a synoptic view of the standard Western male (non-military and non-clerical) dress as worn in A.D. 1700 and in A.D. 1950 respectively will see at a glance that the coat, waistcoat, trousers, and umbrella of A.D. 1950 are merely variations on the coat, waistcoat, breeches, and sword of A.D. 1700. By contrast, the doublet and trunk-hose of A.D. 1600 are as different from the Western civilian costume of A.D. 1700 as the Western military equipment of A.D. 966 is from the Western military equipment of A.D. 1066. If a child ignorant of the dates were asked to guess, from a series of pictures of celebrated Western poets, which two of our three sets of costumes were separated from one another by a Time-interval of a century and a quarter, and which two by an interval of two centuries, the innocent child would assuredly guess that the century and a quarter was the interval between Pope (*natus* A.D. 1688) and T. S. Eliot (*natus* A.D. 1888), and that the two centuries was the interval between Shakespeare (*natus* A.D. 1564) and Pope (*natus* A.D. 1688).

These cautionary tales are warnings against the danger of confiding in an hypothesis of invariability in the tempo of change as a basis for trying to estimate, not only the Time-interval between an Egyptiac Middle Empire and New Empire, but also the length of time that it took for successive strata of the debris of human occupation to accumulate on some site whose history has to be reconstructed solely from the material evidence disinterred by the archaeologist's spade, in default of chronological data furnished by independent, decipherable, and authoritative written records.¹ If, for example, we were tempted to compute the dura-

¹ Such an attempt to work out an absolute chronology by inference from the thickness of strata of deposits has, of course, to be distinguished from an attempt to estimate the relative age and duration of the strata deposited on different sites within the same broad cultural field by comparing the likeness and differences between their respective contents, on the lines of C. F. A. Schaeffer's monumental and masterly *Stratigraphie Comparée et Chronologie de l'Asie Occidentale (iii^e et ii^e Millénaires): Syrie, Palestine, Asie Mineure, Chypre, Perse et Caucase* (London 1948, Oxford University Press). In comparing the successive strata on different sites, Schaeffer is comparing entities that are legitimately comparable. The error in method lies in assuming that the tempo of change is constant and that it is therefore feasible to argue from the thickness of strata to duration of Time, or vice versa. Absolute chronological values cannot be assigned to strata of debris with any likelihood of accuracy unless two conditions are satisfied. In the first place the stratum that is to be dated must contain some object bearing evidence of having

tion of the Neolithic Age on the site of Cnossos by measuring the thickness of the Neolithic deposits and reckoning that these were laid down at a constant rate of so many feet per century, without allowing for the possibility that the rate of deposit might have been slower at the dawn of the Neolithic Age than on the eve of the Chalcolithic, we should be well advised, before we committed ourselves to this wild-goose chase, to take to heart the two pertinent facts that the cubic content of the archives deposited in Whitehall during the six war years A.D. 1939-45 was equal to that of all extant British archives deposited before September 1939, and that the cubic content of the mineral ore mined by Mankind during the quarter of a century ending in the year A.D. 1925 was equal to that of all the ore that had ever been mined down to the year A.D. 1900 inclusive.¹

The second of these two facts ought to warn us against attempting to estimate age by measuring height, whether we are practising on a slag-heap or on a *tell*. This procedure might perhaps be legitimate if we were dealing with an ant-heap or with a termitary, since the insect societies which deposit these inanimate material traces of their life have been in stable equilibrium with their environment² for ages beginning long before the epiphany of the Human Race. It might even be legitimate to assume the rate of deposit to be a constant if we were dealing with primitive human societies in their latter-day Yin-state (the only state in which we have any knowledge of them)³—always supposing that we could lay hands on a primitive society, either still alive or else extinct yet still on record, which was uncontaminated by the radiation of any of the civilizations and which had deposited debris comparable in size and solidity, scale for scale, with a termite community's baetyl-like phalanstery. However that may be, the hypothesis of invariability in the tempo of change is manifestly not legitimate when we are dealing with civilizations, considering that the distinguishing mark of their rhythm is an

been manufactured during some particular reign or some other independently well-defined and limited unit of Time. In the second place the reign or other Time-unit with which the stratum has thus been identified must be assignable to some definite place in a chronological table continuous with the well-established chronology that begins in Egyptian history *circa* 1580 B.C. with the inauguration of the New Empire by Amosis and which runs on thence without a break until it passes over into the Christian Era.

¹ These two statements of fact both have the sanction of high authority. The second of them was made by Professor C. K. Leith, of the University of Wisconsin, at a lecture at the Williamstown Institute of Politics in August 1925 at which the writer of this Study was present in the audience; the first was verified by the writer at a conference on war documentation at Amsterdam in September 1950 in conversation with Professor W. K. Hancock, the scholar in charge of the production of official histories of the acts of the divers departments of the Government of the United Kingdom during the War of A.D. 1939-45.

A reiteration of Leith's statement is on record in a book published eighteen years after the delivery of the lecture. 'The burst of industrialisation since the opening of the present century has intensified the use of minerals, both in volume and [in] variety. In this forty-years period of industrial expansion the World has used more of its mineral resources than in all preceding history' (Leith, C. K.: *World Minerals and World Peace* (Washington, D.C. 1943, The Brookings Institution), p. 1). Leith's estimate of the acceleration in the use of minerals in general is corroborated by another contemporary expert's estimate of the acceleration in the use of copper. 'The total world production from earliest times up to 1910 has been estimated at 21 million tons. In the years 1911-1930 a further 25 million tons have been extracted' (Högbom, I.: 'Mineral Production', in the *Proceedings of the Royal Swedish Institute for Engineering Research*, No. 117 (Stockholm 1932, Svenskabokhandelscentralen), p. 29).

² See III. iii. 106-10.

³ See I. i. 179-80.

instability that is equally characteristic of their growths and of their disintegrations.

2. *Instances of Acceleration*

We may perhaps usefully follow up our opening attack on the hypothesis that the rate of cultural change is invariable by making a brief survey of instances, first of acceleration, then of retardation, and, in the third place, of an alternating rate.

A familiar example of acceleration is the phenomenon of Revolution within the family circle of a single society; for Revolution, in this commonest current Western usage of the term, proves on analysis—as we have found, in a previous context in this Study¹—to be a social movement generated by an encounter between two communities which, though they belong to the same society, happen at the moment to be in different stages of evolution—military, political, economic, intellectual, or spiritual, as the case may be—differing markedly enough to stimulate the more backward of the two parties deliberately to quicken his pace with the intention of catching up, by a forced march, with his more forward neighbour and contemporary. In Late Modern Western history the classical example is the French people's revolutionary move, in and after A.D. 1789, to catch up with the constitutional progress, ahead of an eighteenth-century French *ancien régime*, that had been achieved in Great Britain and the United States by that date.

A rather more violent kind of revolution is generated by an encounter between marchmen on the fringe of a civilization and the more precociously cultivated denizens of the interior, when the marchmen set out to make good a cultural lag which in their case is apt to be greater than any cultural differentiation between one community in the interior and another. In Hellenic history the classical example is the Roman people's series of revolutionary moves to catch up, first with the constitutional progress of Athens, and afterwards with the social progress of Sparta. When Rome entered on her forced march in the fifth century B.C. she was, as we have seen,² some 140 or 150 years behind Athens, if we are right in equating the compilation of the Twelve Tables of Roman Law by the Decemviri *circa* 450 B.C. with the constitution that Solon worked out for Athens in and after 594 B.C. By the year 133 B.C., when Tiberius Gracchus launched in Italy a revolutionary programme of agrarian reform emulating the programme launched in Lacedaemon by King Agis IV in 243 B.C.,³ the Roman marchmen of the Hellenic World had reduced their Time-lag behind the communities in the heart of Hellas from nearly 150 years to no more than 110; but it took the century of revolution and civil war which Tiberius Gracchus undesignedly precipitated to enable Rome to draw right abreast of the farthest advanced of her Hellenic contemporaries. In the course of this terrible century the *stasis* within the bosom of the Roman Commonwealth became identical with the final paroxysm of an Hellenic Time of Troubles; and the no longer distinguishable tasks of bringing international peace to the Hellenic World and internal peace to the sole surviving Hellenic

¹ In IV. iv. 135–6.

² In IV. iv. 205.

³ See V. vi. 288, n. 4.

Great Power were both performed in the same act by an Augustus who combined a revolutionary dictatorship within the Roman body politic with a providential mission for the salvation of the Hellenic World in a personal union between the *deus ex machina* and the boss which made this Janus-headed statesman as great a hero in the eyes of Rome's intolerably oppressed subjects as it made him a villain in the eyes of a tardily chastened Roman senatorial aristocracy which had so long and so abominably abused its power.

This progressive acceleration of the Romans' pace in the course of Hellenic history is, of course, merely one outstanding example of the forced marches made by peoples on the fringes of a society's domain in order to catch up with more precociously cultivated peoples living nearer to the society's heart. In Minoan history, for instance, we catch glimpses—even through Archaeology's dark glass—of the Peloponnese progressively catching up with the Cyclades and Crete, Central Greece with the Peloponnese, and Thessaly with Central Greece.¹ When Thessaly passed out of her Neolithic into her Chalcolithic Age *circa* 2000 B.C., she was no less than 1,000 years behind the Peloponnese, the Cyclades, and Crete, which had all made the same transition *circa* 3000 B.C., and was 500 years behind even Central Greece, which had parted company from Thessaly by emerging from the Neolithic Age *circa* 2500 B.C. Thereafter, when Thessaly made the subsequent transition from the Chalcolithic Age to the Bronze Age *circa* 1580 B.C., she was only 620 years behind the Peloponnese, which had crossed the same line *circa* 2200 B.C., and no more than 820 years behind the Cyclades and Crete, which had crossed it *circa* 2400 B.C. At the end of the Minoan story, *circa* 1200 B.C., Thessaly plunged out of the civilization of the Bronze Age into the barbarism of the Iron Age² neck and neck with all the other provinces of a dissolving Minoan World—which means that, during the 380 years 1580–1200 B.C., Thessaly had covered the cultural distance which it had taken the Cyclades and Crete the 1200 years 2400–1200 B.C. to traverse. This series of comparative dates indicates that, in Thessaly in the time of the Minoan Civilization, there was a progressive acceleration of the cultural tempo in the course of eight hundred years ending at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C.

Beyond the outermost marches of a civilization's geographical domain there lies a limbo tenanted by primitive societies whose children are potential converts to the culture of an adjoining civilization in its growth stage but become an alienated external proletariat when the civilization loses its attractiveness as the result of a breakdown.³ In an earlier context⁴ we have glanced at what happens to these transfrontier barbarians after the collapse of a universal state's military *limes* which has been

¹ See the chronological chart in Glotz, G.: *La Civilisation Égée* (Paris 1923, La Renaissance du Livre), pp. 28–31. Glotz's dating of strata of debris in the Minoan World is based on the presence there of objects of Egyptian provenance which have made it possible at least tentatively to translate the relative terms of Aegean stratigraphy into the absolute terms of Egyptian chronology from the date of the Eighteenth Dynasty's inauguration onwards.

² See III. iii. 160–1.

³ See V. v. 194–210.

⁴ In VIII. viii. 45–72.

damming the barbarians back for generations or perhaps even for centuries. By the time when the sudden bursting of a barrage that has been cultural as well as military brings the flood of Barbarism down in spate upon the long sheltered but now at last defenceless remains of a garden-city within the fallen ring-wall, the cultural differentiation between the unreclaimed barbarians and the sophisticated citizens of a cosmopolis has become so extreme that the effort of cultural acceleration required of the barbarian invaders, if they are to make good their Time-lag behind the conquered subjects of the vanished universal state, usually proves to be beyond the limits of the Human Psyche's adaptability. The barbarians' fate is therefore often an ironical one. The more sensational their military and political triumphs, the more demoralizing their spiritual *bouleversement* is apt to be.

These encounters between marchmen just within the fringe of a civilization's domain, or barbarians just beyond its pale, and the more highly cultivated communities in the interior are variations on the same historical theme as the encounters between representatives of two or more different civilizations; and in our study of these we have noticed that, when a civilization is hit by the impact of a more powerful and aggressive society of its own kind, one of the defensive responses that the children of the assaulted civilization are apt to make is the attempt to fight the aggressor with his own weapons which we have labelled 'Herodianism'.¹ Since Time is of the essence of the Herodian's problem if his policy is to be justified by success in making an assaulted society able to hold its own before it has been overwhelmed, Herodianism necessarily calls for an effort of cultural acceleration; and this is assuredly the explanation of the success of the Herodian movement which was an abortive Scandinavian Civilization's prevailing reaction to the impact of an early Medieval Western Christendom.

The writer of this Study vividly remembers the impression made on him by a visit to the Nordiska Museet at Stockholm in the summer of the year 1910. After passing through a series of rooms displaying *chefs-d'œuvre* of the Scandinavian Palaeolithic, Neolithic, Bronze-Age, and pre-Christian Iron-Age cultures, he was startled to find himself walking through a room displaying Scandinavian-made products of the Early Modern Age of Western history in the style of the Italian Renaissance. Wondering how he could have failed to notice the Scandinavian-made products of the Western Middle Ages, which must surely be on view in their due place in the sequence, the English visitor retraced his steps—to find that there was, sure enough, a Medieval room, but that its contents were so inconspicuous, by comparison with the trophies of the pre-Christian ages, that after all it was quite easy to traverse it unawares. Thus the visual impression made on a traveller through this series of rooms in a museum of Scandinavian arts and crafts was that Scandinavia had passed in a flash out of a Late Iron Age in which she had been beginning to create a promising distinctive civilization of her own into an Early Modern Age in which she had become an undistinguished participant in a standardized Italianate Western Christian culture; and

¹ See IX. viii. 580-623.

this impression faithfully reflected the patent historical truth that the Scandinavian peoples' *tour de force* of grafting themselves on to the stem of an alien Western Christian Civilization had been achieved by a forced march.

Part of the price of this feat of acceleration had been the cultural impoverishment to which the Nordiska Museet bore witness; for the banality of the Italianate Modern Western paraphernalia attesting the Scandinavians' success at that stage in drawing abreast of the main body of Western Christendom was thrown into relief by the inimitable excellence of the products of ages anterior to Scandinavia's cultural conversion in the eleventh century of the Christian Era; and this excellence had been one of the fruits of a previous Time-lag which the Scandinavian converts to a Western Christian culture had subsequently made good. The products of a Scandinavian Palaeolithic Age, Neolithic Age, and Bronze Age had been excellent because a laggardly Scandinavian craftsmanship had been wont to go on cultivating and perfecting imported techniques and *motifs* long after these had been abandoned in favour of some new-fangled device in the culturally precocious regions in which these *motifs* and techniques had originated.¹ To retain the cultural advantages of laggardliness while achieving the *tour de force* of catching up with precocious neighbours was beyond the wit of the Scandinavian or any other school of culture; and, over and above a cultural acceleration's inescapable penalty of cultural impoverishment, the Scandinavian Herodians also had to pay the further penalty of spiritual demoralization² which had likewise been the price of the Romans' forced march to catch up with the Greeks,³ and of the Vandals' forced march to catch up with the Romans.

After this glance at one instance of acceleration in the field of encounters between contemporaries, in which a long procession of Westernizing Herodians, extending from Hauk Erlendsson through Peter the Great to Mustafâ Kemâl, had succeeded, through forced marches, in catching up, at least on the surface of life, with the current Western culture of their day, we may turn next to the field of renaissances in which dead cultures had been brought back to life through being conjured up by living societies; and in this field we shall see that an acceleration of cultural tempo is part and parcel of the response to the challenge from the *revenant* which we have labelled 'the Antaeon rebound'.⁴

This lively reaction to the evocation of a ghost is evidence that the establishment of a psychic contact with the dead can be exhilarating; and this at first sight surprisingly stimulating emotional effect of so eerie an encounter is explained by the fact that the necromancer's communion with the dead gives him a chance of sharing in experiences which are still out of his reach in his own living world. This exciting possibility is opened up by the gruesome art of Necromancy because an experience that lies chronologically in the Past may be situate philosophically in the Future, in the sense of being something that the necromancer who has conjured it up out of a dead civilization's repertory has

¹ See II. ii. 342-3; III. iii. 138 and 157.

³ See IV. iv. 505-10.

² See II. ii. 357-60.

⁴ See pp. 140-8, above.

never yet experienced in his own life. If, for example, the *lacrimae rerum*¹ that Virgil has immortalized in his poetry have been distilled from the experience of an age of Hellenic history that is philosophically some five hundred years later than Dante's age in Western history, then, if Dante can succeed in entering into Virgil's thoughts and feelings, he will be anticipating a stage in the experience of his own living society that will not be reached there until, at earliest, the generation of Wordsworth, and perhaps not until a generation still unborn in A.D. 1952. This means that in psychic, as opposed to chronological, terms a Dante who has placed himself *en rapport* with a Virgil will be, not recoiling thirteen hundred years back into the Past, but shooting ahead five hundred years forward into the future. In other words, his feat of raising Virgil from the dead will have been a feat of cultural acceleration.

The most drastic of all known movements of cultural acceleration is the offspring of a mood of Futurism² in which the heirs of a disintegrating civilization reject their own cultural heritage in order to embrace an alien culture which attracts these purest of all revolutionaries to the extent to which it presents an antithesis to ancient cultural traditions when these have ceased to satisfy deep spiritual needs that insist on seeking satisfaction from some source or other. A classical example is the conversion of the Hellenic World during its universal state from its native cults of nature-worship, state-worship, and philosophy to incoming Oriental religions which now met with no serious rivals except one another for the allegiance of pagan Hellenic souls, and whose competition ended in the decisive victory of Christianity. This complete triumph of Christianity in the Hellenic World has a counterpart in the Sinic World in the partial triumph there of the Mahāyāna; and in both cases we find the spiritual revolution expressing itself visually in an aesthetic revolution that is no less thorough. In a dissolving Sinic Society the native Sinic art of the Han Age was rejected in favour of an Hellenic-Indic art that was the Mahāyāna's aesthetic vehicle. In a dissolving Hellenic Society the Hellenic style was rejected in favour of the Byzantine.

If the latter, at any rate, of these two aesthetic revolutions was, as it would seem to have been, a conscious and deliberate act,³ this would explain how it could happen that the four hundred years between Hadrian's and Justinian's day should have witnessed a change of style in the architecture of the Hellenic World that was incomparably more radical than any change that can be observed in the course of the six hundred years between Ictinus's day and Hadrian's.⁴ On the aesthetic plane, as on the military plane,⁵ Justinian's generation had deliberately taken the plunge out of a disintegrating Hellenic into a nascent Byzantine culture which the next generation was compelled to take on the economic and political planes willy-nilly by the deluge that descended after Justinian's death. This revolutionary breach of cultural continuity accounts for the striking acceleration in the rate of change in the style

¹ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book I, l. 462.

³ See IV. iv. 21 and 54-55.

⁵ See III. iii. 163 and IV. iv. 445.

² See V. vi. 97-132.

⁴ See pp. 351-2, above.

of architecture that is recorded visually in the contrast between the *Ayia Sophia* and the *Olympieum*; and in this Helleno-Byzantine illustration of the rapidity of the pace of cultural change during the social interregnum intervening between the histories of an antecedent civilization and its successor we have the answer to H. R. Hall's conundrum; for in Egyptian history the interval between the end of the Twelfth Dynasty and the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty was likewise a social interregnum that can be recognized, on close inspection, as being the historical lesion that it is, in spite of the solidity with which a parted steel cable's frayed and flying ends have been posthumously spliced and welded together in the white heat of an explosion of cultural fanaticism.

In previous contexts¹ we have seen reasons for believing that, after the expiry of the mandate of a Middle Empire which had served as a disintegrating Egyptian Society's universal state, the disintegration-process was heading towards the dissolution of the time-expired civilization and the eventual emergence of a new society affiliated to it, when this normal course of events was arrested and reversed by the abnormal effects of a fanatical hatred that had been aroused in Egyptian souls by Hyksos barbarian invaders who had committed the, in Egyptian eyes, unpardonable offence of acquiring a tincture of an alien culture before setting foot on Egyptian soil. The consequent anti-Hyksos *union sacrée* between an Egyptian dominant minority and internal proletariat resulted in a resurrection of the Egyptian universal state in the shape of the New Empire and in the consequent substitution of an Epimethean epilogue to Egyptian history for the new civilization, distinct from the Egyptian though affiliated to it, that was showing signs of coming to birth when the normal course of historical development was given a peculiar twist in this Egyptian case. The social interregnum insulating a moribund Egyptian Civilization that refused to die from an embryonic affiliated civilization that was denied the opportunity of being born was to that extent abortive; yet the breach of cultural continuity at this point, which was afterwards so studiously patched up and plastered over by the hands of archaistic-minded Egyptian Zealots under the régime of a post-Hyksos restoration, was nevertheless sharp enough to account for the empirically verifiable fact that the two centuries between the end of the Twelfth Dynasty and the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty witnessed a notably greater change of style in Egyptian art than the immediately preceding two centuries during which the Twelfth Dynasty had been continuously in the saddle. So far from its being incredible that 'the changes observable during its [the Twelfth Dynasty's] continuance' should not be 'in any way comparable to those which had come about between its termination and the rise of the Eighteenth,'² it would be inexplicable if the second of these two periods of equal chronological length should not have witnessed a notably greater change of style than the first, considering that during the first the Egyptian Civilization was in its universal state, whereas the second period was occupied by one of

¹ See I. i. 136-45; IV. iv. 85, 412; V. v. 2-3, 152, and 351-3.

² H. R. Hall, quoted on pp. 350-1, above.

those social interregna in which the current of history perceptibly quickens its pace.¹

If we were challenged to find evidence for some general law governing the tempo of change in the realm of Life, the evidence that has proved irreconcilable with the hypothesis of invariability might perhaps lend itself more speciously to an hypothesis of secular acceleration.

In the history of Life on Earth, the Fauna had developed faster than the Flora; the vertebrates faster than the invertebrates; the mammals faster than the reptiles; Man through the transmission of a social heritage by means of education faster than the non-human animals through the transmission of a racial heritage by means of physical procreation;² Upper Palaeolithic Man faster than Lower Palaeolithic Man; and Man in Process of Civilization faster than a Primitive Man who had lapsed into a Yin-state in reaction from the Yang-effort of struggling up into becoming human. In a twentieth-century Westernizing World in which the pace of Man's intellectual and technological progress had been speeded up once again, and this time to an unprecedented degree, by a recent Western Industrial Revolution, it looked as if a crescendo that had been rising by geometrical progression, in a steeper and steeper curve, ever since Life's first epiphany, might now be on the point of culminating, in Human Life, in a pace at which men's racing thoughts and wills would no longer find themselves able either to coax or to drive their inseparable subconscious fellow-traveller in the depths of the Psyche to keep in the running; and the psychic catastrophe which this threat of psychic discord portended seemed at this stage to be not merely overtaking the surviving primitive societies and surviving non-Western civilizations that were being uprooted by the Western bulldozer's titanic impact; it now also appeared to be impending over the heads of the demonic Western chauffeurs of a potently mechanized Juggernaut's car.

'One of the phenomena that bring out, particularly clearly, the relation between the magnitude and pressure of the network of interdependence [linking together individual human beings in the Modern Western World] on the one hand and the psychic state of the individual on the other hand is what we call "the tempo" of our age. This [term] "tempo" is in reality nothing but an expression for indicating the multiplicity of the chains of the social network that find a node in every single social function and the pressure of the competition, emanating from this far-flung and densely populated net, that puts its "drive" into every single transaction.'³

We need not commit ourselves to the theory of a secular tendency towards acceleration in the march of Life which might seem at first sight

¹ See I. i. 43-44.

² See pp. 319-26, above. Julian Huxley points out that, in the jump from evolution on the inorganic level to Life, as well as in the subsequent jump from the transmission of a heritage by procreation to its transmission by education, 'the evolutionary process' had to pay for being 'much accelerated in time' by being 'immensely restricted in extent' (Huxley, J.: *Evolutionary Ethics*, the Romanes Lecture, 1943, reprinted in Huxley, T. H. and J.: *Evolution and Ethics*, 1893-1943 (London 1947, Pilot Press), pp. 120-1 and 123).

³ Elias, N.: *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. ii: *Wandlungen der Gesellschaft: Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation* (Basel 1939, Haus zum Falken), p. 337.

to be commended by the evidence that we have just been marshalling; for one manifestly weak point in the implicit argument is that the evidence, impressive though it looks when viewed *en gros*, does not cover, at the human climax of the story, more than the intellectual and technological sides of Man's nature and activity; and the formidably clear-cut picture of imminent and apparently inescapable disaster falls out of focus as soon as we begin to make it more true to real life by bringing Man's aesthetic and religious faculties and activities into the frame. The value of this specious hypothesis of a secular acceleration in the tempo of change lies, not in any intrinsic probability of its own, but in its testimony against the probability of the hypothesis that the tempo is invariable.

3. *Instances of Retardation*

Now that we have mustered these divers instances of acceleration in the tempo of cultural change, we shall not find it difficult to identify antithetical instances of retardation.

For example, the accelerations that declare themselves in revolutions within the family circle of a single society have their antithesis in the social enormities that are generated by a straggler's refusal to try to catch up with the progress of the main body.¹ A classical example of an enormity arising from a wilful retardation is the exacerbation of the Modern Western institution of Plantation Slavery in the Southern States of the American Union during the generation that elapsed between the peaceful abolition of Slavery throughout the British Empire in A.D. 1833 and its forcible abolition in the United States in A.D. 1863 at the cost of the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5.²

The acceleration that is demanded of marchmen when they are inducted into the life of more precocious communities in the interior, and into which the transfrontier barbarians are spurred at a hotter pace when they pour across a fallen *limes* into the derelict provinces of a universal state, has its antithesis in the retardation that is apt to be the price of migrating, in the opposite direction, from the heart of a society towards its extremities. Classical examples are the 'living museums'³ in which a seventeenth-century Normandy, Ulster, England, and Holland, and a sixteenth-century Castile and Portugal, were still to be found in a twentieth-century Quebec, Appalachia, Charleston, Transvaal, Peru, and Macao. The moral *bouleversement* that registers a barbarian invader's inability to accelerate the pace of his cultural adaptation to the almost prohibitively extreme degree demanded by the suddenness of his translation from an unreclaimed wilderness into a derelict paradise has its antithesis in a previous arrest of this adolescent's psychic development that has registered his frustration when he has found himself barred out by a military *limes* whose sudden creation at the moment of a universal state's establishment is as portentous an event in an external proletariat's experience as the sudden collapse of the *limes* when the universal state eventually breaks up.

In the field of encounters in the Space-dimension an Herodianism

¹ See IV. iv. 136-7.

² See IV. iv. 137-41.

³ See III. iii. 134-9.

that deliberately quickens its pace, in order to learn, before it is too late, how to keep an alien assailant at bay by fighting him with his own weapons, has its counterpart in a Zealotism that wilfully slows its pace down in the vain hope of thereby breaking off contact with a galloping adversary. In Jewry's reaction to the impact of Hellenism, classical examples of Zealotism are presented by the violent responses of the Maccabees and *sicarii* and the non-violent responses of the Pharisees, Scribes, and Rabbis;¹ and, in an Islamic Society's reaction to the impact of a Modern Western Civilization, the militant Maccabees and *sicarii* have their counterparts in the Wāhhābis, Sanūsīs, Idrīsīs, and Mahdists.² In the field of encounters in the Time-dimension an Antaeus rebound that wins from Necromancy an anticipatory communion with the Future has its antithesis in an Atlantean stance in which a Necromancer who has yielded to the legendary Epimethean impulse of Lot's wife is petrified by the hypnotic stare of a resuscitated corpse's Medusan countenance into the rigidity of a pillar of salt pinned down by the incubus of the Past. A classical example is the retardation of the Orthodox Christian and Far Eastern civilizations on the political plane through the resuscitation of the Roman Empire in the shape of the East Roman Empire in the one case, and of the Han Empire in the shape of the T'ang Empire in the other,³ and their retardation on the linguistic and literary plane through the resuscitation of the Hellenic and the Sinic Classics.⁴

The violent acceleration in the tempo of cultural change that is generated by Futurism when it repudiates a social heritage has its antithesis in a comparably extreme retardation that is induced by Archaism when it surrenders itself to the spell of the Past. We have already come across classical examples of this archaistic retardation on the linguistic and literary plane in the Neo-Attic and Neo-Sanskrit languages and literatures,⁵ and on the visual aesthetic plane in a Western Neo-Gothic architecture⁶ and in an Egyptiac revival, in the Age of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty, of the classic style of an Old Kingdom which had been obsolete for some two thousand years.⁷ A Saïte régime that recoiled that distance back into the past in its search for aesthetic inspiration was the penultimate avatar of an Egyptiac universal state which had refused to be content with a universal state's standard lease of life; and such tortoise-paced 'Tithoni',⁸ within whose creeping carapaces a senile body social continues to lead a lingering life-in-death, are enormities of the same genus as the 'fossils' of extinct civilizations exemplified in the Jews and the Parsees,⁹ and as the live but arrested civilizations exemplified in the Spartans and the Esquimaux.¹⁰ An arrest which had been the nemesis of superhuman previous exertions was perhaps the most dramatic instance of retardation in the histories of the civilizations up to date; and in the histories of the primitive societies this had its counterpart in Primitive Man's eventual lapse into a Yin-state that had been the nemesis of a social animal's previous *tour de force* of transmuting itself from Sub-Man into Man.

¹ See V. v. 68-76 and IX. viii. 584-5. ² See V. v. 295-6 and 329, and IX. viii. 601-3.

³ See pp. 15 and 16, above.

⁴ See pp. 62-78, above.

⁵ See V. vi. 71-81.

⁶ See V. vi. 60.

⁷ See V. vi. 61-62.

⁸ See VI. vii. 47-52.

⁹ See I. i. 35 and 51.

¹⁰ See III. iii. 1-88.

4. *Instances of an Alternating Rate of Change*

In our survey of evidences of variability in the tempo of change we have so far confined our attention to cases in which this variability has displayed itself in some single change of speed, whether upwards or downwards. Our survey would be incomplete if we did not also take account of cases in which there has been a concatenation of changes of speed in which the two antithetical movements of acceleration and retardation have alternated.

A conspicuous instance of an alternating change of speed is the rhythm of Withdrawal-and-Return which we have analysed in a previous Part.¹ The purpose, whether conscious or subconscious, of a potentially creative minority's temporary withdrawal from full participation in the contemporary common life of the society of which it is a member is to win for itself an opportunity of realizing its potentialities by forging ahead of the rank-and-file. Its disengagement from contact with its neighbours permits an acceleration of its own pace which it could never have achieved if it had been content to have its own pace set for it by the average pace of these pedestrian neighbours; and it is in the course of this individual spurt of acceleration that the minority succeeds or fails in bringing its creative potentialities to fruition. This, however, is not the end of the story; for, as we have seen, a creative minority's mission is to perform its work of creation, not just for itself, but for the benefit of the whole of the society to which it belongs. A creative withdrawal therefore will have missed fire if it is not followed by a redemptive return; and a re-entry into the ranks that the minority has temporarily deserted is necessarily accompanied by a retardation of its pace from the rate at which it has been travelling *in vacuo* to the slower rate at which it must now travel once more if it is to keep in step with neighbours whom it has to convert to the newly created idea or ideal or aptitude that it is bringing back with it from its lone reconnaissance. It will be seen that, on analysis, the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return turns out to follow a rhythm of three beats entailing two changes of speed, the first change upward and the second downward; and, as far as it is possible to portray a spiritual act in terms of the mechanical play of physical forces, we may compare the tripartite movement of a creative minority's withdrawal and return with the drill performed by the driver of a car when he changes gear by the threefold action of declutching, acceleration, and a re-engagement that reabates the momentarily free-running engine's racing speed by loading it once again with the retarding weight of the momentarily disengaged vehicle.

A concatenation of alternating changes of speed which runs, not just to two, but certainly to three and possibly to four, terms is to be found in the Modern Western history of the arts of shipbuilding and navigation. This story begins with a sudden acceleration which revolutionized both these arts in the West during the fifty years A.D. 1440-90; this spurt was followed by a technological retardation which persisted throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries; and

¹ In III. iii. 248-63.

this relatively long spell of comparative stagnation was then followed by another sudden acceleration which revolutionized the same arts once again during the fifty years A.D. 1840-90. In A.D. 1952 the next phase was still enigmatical because it was still in progress; but to a layman's eye it looked at this date as if the fresh technological advances achieved during the immediately preceding sixty years, remarkable though they might have seemed in any other historical context, might prove in retrospect not to compare in extent with the revolutionary achievements of a Victorian half-century. This series of alternating changes of pace in one sphere of technological activity in the history of one civilization is worth examining for the light that it may throw on the general question of the relation between Law and Freedom in History.

The key-notes of the fifteenth-century acceleration in the shipwright's and the navigator's art were its suddenness and its speed.

'In the fifteenth century . . . there was a swift and momentous change in the building of ships. It was a great era of architecture. In the space of fifty years the sea-going sailing-ship developed from a single-master into a three-master carrying five or six sails.'¹

And this technological revolution in the West not only gave its authors access to all quarters of the Globe by making them masters of Oceanic navigation; it also gave them an ascendancy over all non-Western mariners whom they encountered in any seas.²

'At the beginning of the fifteenth century the seaborne trade of Europe was carried in ships markedly inferior in design and workmanship to the vessels used in many parts of the East; but at the end of the sixteenth century the West European ships were the best in the World. They were, perhaps, less handy and less weatherly than the junks of the China seas, but in general, in their combination of seaworthiness, endurance, carrying capacity, and fighting power, they proved superior to anything else afloat.'³

This new-fangled Western type of vessel is the most characteristic emblem of a Modern Age of Western history (*currebat circa* A.D. 1475-1875) during which its unchallenged supremacy was proclaimed in its monopoly of the title 'ship', by which it came to be known *par excellence*. The 'ship's' distinctive virtue, in which it surpassed its successors as conspicuously as its predecessors, was its power to keep the sea for an almost unlimited length of time on end; and this virtue has been divined and lauded by a nineteenth-century Western man of letters who lived to see the 'ship' reach its peak of technical perfection, and all but lived on to see it disappear from the seas as suddenly as it had invaded them some four hundred years earlier.

'L'ancien navire de Christophe Colomb et de Ruyter est un des grands chefs-d'œuvre de l'homme. Il est inépuisable en force comme l'infini en

¹ Bassett-Lowke, J. W., and Holland, G.: *Ships and Men* (London 1946, Harrap), p. 46. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

² This revolutionary change in an oecumenical balance of power is touched upon in Toynbee, A. J.: *Civilization on Trial* (London 1948, Oxford University Press), pp. 62-96: 'The Unification of the World and the Change in Historical Perspective.'

³ Parry, J. H.: *Europe and a Wider World, 1415-1715* (London 1949, Hutchinson), p. 21.

souffles, il emmagasine le vent dans sa voile, il est précis dans l'immense diffusion des vagues, il flotte et il règne.¹

This Modern Western ship was the offspring of a happy marriage between divers traditional builds and rigs, each of which had peculiar excellencies but also consequent limitations. The Western ship that was brought to birth between A.D. 1440 and A.D. 1490 was a felicitous harmonization of the strong points of an age-old Mediterranean oar-propelled 'long ship', *alias* galley, and a coeval Mediterranean square-rigged 'round-ship', *alias* 'carrack', with a lateen-rigged Indian-Ocean-faring 'caravel' whose forerunner is depicted in the visual records of an Egyptian maritime expedition to the East African land of Punt in the reign of the Empress Hatshepsut (*imperabat* 1486-1468 B.C.), and with a massively built Atlantic-Ocean-faring sailing-ship which caught Caesar's eye in 56 B.C. when he occupied the territory of the insurgent Veneti around the city that afterwards came to be known as Vannes in Brittany.² The fifteenth-century Western harmonization of these far-fetched elements was felicitous in the sense that their diverse excellencies were combined in a new pattern in which their respective limitations were transcended.

The carrack—which was introduced from Mediterranean into Atlantic waters, and was there blended with the local indigenous Ocean-faring type of craft, at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries³—had the right rig to serve as the main equipment of ships of the large dimensions to which the coming West European Indiamen must run, because the carrack's square rig allowed the sail to be broken up into units of a manageable size, and therefore allowed the total spread of sail to be progressively increased by multiplying the number of these units.⁴ At the opening of the fifteenth century the standard Western square-rigged ship had only a single sail, since it had only a single mast, and this mast carried no top-sail.⁵ By the middle of the century the standard number of masts had risen from one to three in West European Atlantic waters;⁶ and, though the sixteenth-century addition of a fourth mast was discontinued in the seventeenth century and was not reintroduced until the nineteenth,⁷ the spread of sail was nevertheless increased by the alternative method of progressively raising the number of tiers of sail on each mast to six and by supplementing the regular sails with studding sails. This advantage of the square rig was, however, offset by the drawback that it gave the navigator no choice but to sail before the wind;⁸ and no doubt this was one reason why 'the square-rigged ship—the *nau*—played no considerable part in the early discoveries. The Portuguese preferred a borrowed alternative, the lateen caravel—a highly individual craft which betrayed Asiatic influence in its every line.'⁹

¹ Hugo, Victor: *Les Misérables*, Part II, Book II, chap. 3.

² See Caesar: *Bellum Gallicum*, Book III, chap. 13.

³ See Bowen, F. C.: *From Carrack to Clipper* (London 1948, Staples Press), p. 8. Cp. *ibid.*, p. 12.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴ See Parry, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

⁶ See Bowen, op. cit., p. 8. Cp. *ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷ See Clowes, G. S. L.: *Sailing Ships, their History and Development*: Part I: *Historical Notes* (London 1932, H.M. Stationery Office), p. 107. Cp. Parry, op. cit., p. 25, and Prestage, E.: *The Portuguese Pioneers* (London 1933, Black), p. 332.

⁸ See Parry, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

The lateen sail had been invented in the Indian Ocean; and lateen caravels had been introduced into the Mediterranean by the Muslims and had been borrowed by the Portuguese from them.¹ In Prince Henry the Navigator's annual southward voyages of discovery down the Atlantic coast of Africa, which had begun in A.D. 1421, if not before,² caravels were 'first used in 1440, to judge by Azurara'.³ The virtue of the lateen rig was that it enabled the navigator to beat to windward;⁴ but in this rig there were two drawbacks to set against the advantage. One was that in a lateen-rigged vessel it was difficult to 'go about'—a manœuvre that might be seldom necessary in monsoon navigation, but that became a matter of serious concern when the lateen rig was introduced from the Indian Ocean into other waters.⁵ The other drawback of the lateen rig was that the size and weight of lateen spars were so great in proportion to the size of the sail which they could carry, by comparison with the sail-carrying capacity of the square rig, that this defect of the lateen rig set limits to the maximum spread of canvas, and therefore to the maximum size of the vessel thus equipped.⁶

Out of these two piquantly diverse types of vessel, the Portuguese and Spanish shipwrights succeeded, before the end of the fifteenth century, in creating a new composite type with a mixed rig, the *caravela redonda*.⁷ This was a three-masted vessel of barquentine rig, in the sense that it carried square sails on the fore-mast and lateen (not, of course, yet fore-and-aft) sails on the main-mast and the mizen-mast.⁸ By an early date in the sixteenth century this type—with the main-mast as well as the fore-mast now square-rigged—had become the standard type throughout Western Christendom;⁹ and, though the vessels used by Vasco da Gama are recorded to have been, not *caravelas redondas*, but *naus*,¹⁰ we may presume that these late-fifteenth-century 'ships' resembled the late-fifteenth-century caravels in having a mixed rig, even if they differed from them in being of heavier tonnage¹¹ and clumsier build. In the course of the sixteenth century this clumsiness was fined down in the build of the galleon, which was a carrack with a *caravela redonda*'s mixed rig and with a Mediterranean galley's slim lines.¹² By A.D. 1485 the navigators of this full-blown Modern Western 'ship' had equipped themselves for finding their way over the high seas by mastering the art—invented by Arab navigators in the Indian Ocean—of reckoning their latitude by the co-ordinated use of the quadrant and a set of astronomical tables.¹³ By the opening of the sixteenth century they had equipped them-

¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 23–24.

² See Prestage, E.: *The Portuguese Pioneers* (London 1938, Black), p. 54.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 332. The reference is to Eannes de Azurara, G.: *Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista de Guiné*, edited by Carreira and Santarem (Paris 1841, Aillaud); English translation by Beazley, C. R., and Prestage, E.: *The Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea* (London 1896–9, Hakluyt Society, 2 vols.).

⁴ See Parry, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 23.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷ See Prestage, *op. cit.*, p. 332; Parry, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁸ See Bowen, *op. cit.*, p. 9; Parry, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–25.

⁹ See Parry, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹⁰ See Prestage, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

¹¹ According to Prestage, *op. cit.*, p. 332, the tonnage of the Ocean-faring *caravelas redondas* ranged from 150 to 200 tons, as against a range of from 400 tons to 800/1,000 tons for Vasco da Gama's *naus*.

¹² See Bowen, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

¹³ See Prestage, *op. cit.*, pp. 315–18.

selves for holding their own against any human adversaries *en voyage* by the invention of opening up gun ports between-decks.¹

'What is so remarkable about these ships is their wonderful development. They do not stand so very far distant in point of general structure and rig from the ships of Nelson's day;²

and, by the same token, what is so remarkable about the half-century of acceleration in the Western arts of shipbuilding and navigation *circa* A.D. 1440-90 is that it was followed by three centuries of hardly less conspicuous retardation.

'[The] smug complacency [of the majority of British shipowners at the time of the revision of the Navigation Acts in A.D. 1845] had devastating effects on the shipbuilding industry itself, as well as disclosing an inertia that was out of step with the changing times; for we were passing, as a nation, out of an agrarian order into an industrial one, which made far greater demands on transport. How much progress had been made in naval architecture in the past two centuries? Certainly there had been many innovations and important improvements in the construction and the rig.³ Labour-saving appliances, too, had been invented. But, if we confine ourselves to essentials, especially in respect of the hull, the progress is almost negligible. After all, there was little incentive towards better ship-design while there was little competition. . . .

'Builders were content to pursue the well-tried methods, and there is small evidence of creative originality. The Dumer's draughts of ship-plans for 1680 . . . show a method of ship-building which does not differ very appreciably from that employed a century later. The standard work on the architecture of the wooden ship was written by Frederick Hendrick Chapman, who became Chief Constructor and Admiral Superintendent of the Swedish Naval Dockyard at Karlskrona. This great designer, born in 1721, came of an old English family from Deptford, from whom he inherited his skill and enthusiasm for naval architecture. His *Architectura Navalis Mercatoria* and his *Treatise on Shipbuilding*, an amplification of the former work published in 1775, were freely quoted from in the official report of the Chatham Committee of Naval Architects of 1842-44.⁴ There could be no more conclusive evidence than this of the "mark-time" in shipbuilding and ship-design. . . .

'The ordinary standard of merchant ships was not creditable. They were slow, unhandy, ill-equipped, and inferior in workmanship. Can one say they reflect two centuries of progress? Ship-design, like a spinning-top, rotated on a point. The opening of the nineteenth century saw no

¹ See Parry, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28; Bowen, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

² Bassett-Lowke, J. W., and Holland, G.: *Ships and Men* (London 1946, Harrap), p. 48.

³ 'The main innovation in the course of the three hundred years A.D. 1500-1800 had been the Dutch invention of the fore-and-aft rig, which was 'an immense advance upon the lateen for beating to windward'. In the non-square-rig part of the rig of big ships (as distinct from the small craft in which the fore-and-aft rig had been first developed), fore-and-aft sails were substituted for lateen sails by the Dutch towards the end of the seventeenth century (Parry, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-4). 'The late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries saw great improvements in the rig of sea-going ships, notably the introduction of fore-and-aft headsails working on the stays, and a little later the transformation of the cumbersome lateen mizen into the fore-and-aft "spanker"' (*ibid.*, p. 186).—A.J.T.

⁴ 'Vessels were built to the patterns laid down under the Stuarts right down to the death of George III, even to the start of Victoria's reign' (Abell, W.: *The Shipwright's Trade* (Cambridge 1948, University Press), p. 102).—A.J.T.

lively effort to improve ship-design, nor any of that competitive enterprise that marked the race of the factory-owners for business.¹

Thus, at a date some four hundred years after the opening of the half-century, bestriding the transition from a Medieval to an Early Modern Age, that had witnessed a revolution in the build and rig of Western ships, it might have looked in retrospect as if a fifteenth-century burst of acceleration in the tempo of Western marine technology, which had given the West a subsequent Ocean-wide ascendancy, had been a unique bout of creativity in the long annals of a Western maritime practice that had been almost as stagnant during the Modern sequel to this short-lived golden age as it had been during the Medieval prelude to it. Yet at this very date the Western art of shipbuilding was actually on the eve of another burst of acceleration that was to produce as great a revolution as its predecessor; and this time the work of creation at high speed was to go forward along two parallel lines. On the one hand, artificially generated mechanical power was to be substituted for wind-power as the driving force by which ships were to be propelled; and contemporaneously, in response to the same challenge that had thus evoked the application of steam-power to navigation, the art of building the classic Modern Western sailing-ship was to awake from its long slumber in order to carry an old type to a new and previously undreamed-of degree of perfection at which, for some of the purposes of maritime traffic, the sailing-ship was to hold its own against the steamship throughout the doubly creative half-century A.D. 1840-90.

The new-fangled type of vessel that was to acquire its classic form in the course of the half-century beginning in A.D. 1840 had by that year only just emerged from the pioneer experimental stage of its development. Though William Symington's steamship *Charlotte Dundas* had plied on the Forth and the Clyde as early as A.D. 1802,² and the Atlantic had been crossed by steam-power reinforced with sail-power in A.D. 1819³ and by unaided steam-power in A.D. 1827,⁴ the era of mechanical navigation as 'a practical proposition' did not open earlier than the triennium A.D. 1838-40, which saw the launching of the first screw-propelled vessel, the *Archimedes*,⁵ in A.D. 1838, the successive establishment of the Cunard, the Royal Mail, and the Peninsular and Oriental steamship navigation lines (the first two of the three in A.D. 1839 and the third in A.D. 1840),⁶ and the crossing of the Atlantic under steam in A.D. 1838 by the *Sirius* and the *Great Western*, and in A.D. 1840 by a *Britannia* that was the first Cunarder to make the passage.⁷

'The power-ship opens a new era in water-transport. She is not evolutionary but revolutionary, for she represents a complete break with tradition. Any compromise with the sailing-ship works to her disadvantage both in efficiency and aesthetically. . . . Not till conservative tradition had been scrapped could the power-ship evolve in accordance with her own needs. For the power-ship is modern, different, and original. Her life is not in the

¹ Bassett-Lowke, J. W., and Holland, G.: *Ships and Men* (London 1946, Harrap), pp. 124-6.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 166-7.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 168.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 178.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 178.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 172.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 174 and 170.

sails but [in] the engine-room. Her natural home is the port rather than the sea. She is tied to her fuel supplies and crosses the oceans sailing to a time-table. Her officers are composed of scientists and technicians, specialists confined to special departments—deck or engine-room—and her crews have specialised duties. The engine-room staff is proportionately bigger than the deck-staff, which grows less and less numerous.¹

The conquest of the Ocean by this new-fangled mechanically driven type of vessel in the course of the fifty years A.D. 1840–90 was indeed as great and rapid a revolution as the previous triumph of the Modern Western Ocean-faring sailing-ship some four hundred years earlier; but the distinctive virtue of the steamship, like the qualities of the carrack and the caravel, was offset by consequent limitations. In the act of liberating navigation from its age-long servitude to the vagaries of the winds, the revolutionary new invention of mechanical propulsion re-tethered *Homo Navigans* to the land, of which he had been virtually independent ever since he had substituted the sail for the oar. The steamship dispensed with wind-power at the price of tying itself to coaling-stations; and, however short the intervals at which she might reluctantly consent to break her voyage in order to refuel, she would still be constrained to convert commercially valuable cargo-space into bunker-space which was as unprofitable as the rowing-space which the invention of the sailing-ship had long since enabled the merchantman to eliminate. A high consumption of coal for each effective unit of coal-generated steam power had to be paid for in a reduction of cargo-space and in a shortening of the maximum possible length of unbroken voyage that made the archaic steamship's performance uneconomic by comparison with the classic sailing-ship's.

In mechanically propelled vessels using coal for fuel the solution of this problem had to wait for the invention of the compound engine, which was first installed in the Holt Line S.S. *Cleator* in A.D. 1863, and which in A.D. 1865 enabled the Holt Line S.S. *Agamemnon* to make a non-stop run of 8,500 miles from Liverpool to Mauritius.² Even after this triumph of marine engineering, auxiliary sail, which had been the steamship designer's earliest expedient for keeping down the rate of coal consumption, was rigged in the Cunard S.S. *Umbria* as late as A.D. 1884;³ and sailing-ships which avoided the steamship's handicaps by continuing to rely on wind-power alone earned the highest profits in their commercial history during those mid-nineteenth-century decades in which the technique of steam-propulsion was still feeling its way towards full efficiency.⁴ The sailing-ship's nineteenth-century *tour de force* of keeping in the running with her new mechanically propelled rival could hardly have been achieved, however, if, during the same fifty years A.D. 1840–90, that saw the steamship's crucial problems solved, the sleeping art of sailing-ship construction had not bestirred itself out of a three-hundred-years-long stagnation in order to enter on a fresh spurt of creativity. In tempo and in quality alike, the improvements made in the Modern Western sailing-ship in that half century could bear com-

¹ Bassett-Lowke and Holland, op. cit., p. 163.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 182.

² See *ibid.*, p. 182.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 180.

parison with the contemporary progress that was being made in the outlandish mechanism of the new-fangled steamship,¹ and perhaps even with the fifteenth-century revolution in marine technology which had brought the Modern Western sailing-ship herself into being.

The designers of the 'clipper' ship in the eighteen-thirties and eighteen-forties abandoned the late-seventeenth-century models which their predecessors had been lazily copying for the last 150 years in order to introduce revolutionary changes of build which gave a higher speed to a sailing-ship of more than twice the previous standard tonnage;² and they were also no less alert than the architects of the steamship in turning an Industrial Revolution to account. The use of iron as a material for shipbuilding, which was introduced in A.D. 1829,³ made it possible to reduce the weight of the hull by 35 per cent.⁴ A composite construction, part iron and part wood, was employed for sailing-ships from A.D. 1851 to A.D. 1870 or thereabouts.⁵ The first sailing-ships constructed wholly of iron were built for the Australia wool trade.⁶ The year A.D. 1851 saw the first use of ropes made of wire instead of hemp,⁷ and the early eighteen-eighties the first use of steel tubing instead of timber for masts and lower yards.⁸ Circa A.D. 1884 the substitution of mild steel for iron as the material for the construction of large sailing-ships made possible a further reduction of weight—by 15 per cent., this time.⁹ In and after A.D. 1887 donkey engines, driven by steam, were installed on sailing-ships to save man-power, and, with the same end in view, all tiers of sails above the top-gallants were then cut out.¹⁰

Though the overcoming of the steamship's original limitations through the successful experiment with the compound engine in A.D. 1863–5 had spelled a rejuvenated sailing-ship's eventual doom, the Modern Western sailing-ship actually attained its acme at a time when it was thus already under sentence of death at the hands of a now irresistible competitor. Just as the coaches and the canals had been brought to their highest point of efficiency in Great Britain on the eve of their being put out of action by the railways, and a Medieval Western Latin poetry had reached its zenith throughout Western Christendom on the eve of its being silenced by the voice of the vernacular tongues, so the Modern Western sailing-

¹ According to Schumpeter, J. A.: *Business Cycles* (New York 1939, McGraw-Hill, 2 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 369–70, the innovations in the construction of Western sailing-ships from circa A.D. 1840 onwards were partly evoked by the new challenge presented to the sailing-ship by the steamship's epiphany.

² The new move in sailing-ship design which produced the 'clipper' started in the shipbuilding yards at Baltimore, and it seems to be a moot point whether the *Ann McKim*, launched there in A.D. 1832, or the *Scottish Maid*, launched in A.D. 1839, was the first ship that could fairly claim the new title (see Bowen, op. cit., p. 58). Ships on the lines of the Baltimore clippers, but with a tonnage of over 750 tons, began to take the sea from American yards in and after A.D. 1843 (see Clowes, op. cit., p. 103). The development of the new breed of sailing-ship was given an impetus by the discovery of gold in California in A.D. 1849, since at this date the cheapest and surest route thither from the Atlantic seaboard of North America was by sea round Cape Horn. The average tonnage of a clipper then rose from 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons plus or minus (Bassett-Lowke and Holland, op. cit., pp. 145–6).

³ According to Bassett-Lowke and Holland, op. cit., p. 168, the first iron ship was built as early as A.D. 1821.

⁴ See Clowes, op. cit., p. 104.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 104.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 105. Cp. Bassett-Lowke and Holland, op. cit., p. 157.

⁷ See Clowes, op. cit., p. 109.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 109.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 107.

¹⁰ See Bassett-Lowke and Holland, op. cit., p. 159.

ship sang its swan song during the quarter of a century A.D. 1865-90, bestriding the transition from a Modern to a post-Modern Age of Western history, when it was on the point of being driven off the seas by the steamship. The tonnage of the sail-borne British merchant marine reached its peak in A.D. 1875.¹ The historic race between tea clippers from Foochow to London was run in A.D. 1866;² the historic race between wool clippers from Australia to London in A.D. 1887-8.³ The *Thermopylae* was launched in A.D. 1868; the *Cutty Sark*—a composite-built ship with a tonnage of 2,100 tons—in A.D. 1869.⁴ The largest sailing-ship ever launched—the *Preussen*, with a length of over 400 feet and a tonnage of over 5,000 tons gross—was built at Geestemünde, near Bremen, after the turn of the century, in A.D. 1902.⁵

The writer of this Study had the good fortune, as a child, to catch a last glimpse of the sailing-ship before she vanished from the seas, and to be initiated into the lore of her divers rigs by the former master of an East Indiaman, his great-uncle Captain Henry Toynbee (*vivebat* A.D. 1819-1909),⁶ who had retired from the sea in A.D. 1866 without ever having seen service on a steamship or indeed on any build of sailing-vessel other than a full ship since his first voyage at a tender age on a barque. On summer holidays in the eighteen-nineties at St. Margaret's Bay on the English shore of the Straits of Dover, under the eye of the South Foreland lighthouse, the small boy learnt the rigs from the old sailor as the ships came gliding past: schooners and three-masted schooners and top-sail schooners (very common); brigantines and brigs (rather rare); barquentines and barques; and full-rigged ships ranging from classic three-masters to the four-masters and five-masters that were a nineteenth-century revival of a sixteenth-century fashion. He learnt to know and love them all, without ever suspecting that he would live to see the disappearance of this divine work of Man's hands which, in his uncle's confident eyes, was as much a part of the eternal order of Nature as the chalk cliff on which they were standing, or as the water which gave the measure of the distance from the shore to the passing ship. In the eighteen-nineties the sailing-ships plying through the Straits were still far more numerous than the steamships (though doubtless steam had by then long since outstripped sail in aggregate tonnage). As late as the summer of 1910, there used always to be several four-masted sailing-ships at anchor in Falmouth harbour, and in the summer of 1911 the wreck of one huge sailing-ship was lying huddled against

¹ See Schumpeter, J. A.: *Business Cycles* (New York 1939, McGraw-Hill, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 369.

² See Bassett-Lowke and Holland, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 153.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 152-3; Abell, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁵ See Bassett-Lowke and Holland, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁶ 'Captain Henry Toynbee was one of the most scientific navigators of his day. . . . "He was always sure of his longitude within five miles," writes one of his officers. And his wonderful landfalls were the admiration of his passengers.

'Toynbee . . . went to sea in 1833 at the age of fourteen as a midshipman in the East Indiaman *Dunvegan Castle*. . . . Toynbee's first command was the *Thermopylae*. . . . He had also commanded the *Gloriana* and *Marlborough* before he took command of which he resigned in 1866 in order to succeed Admiral . . . Superintendent of the Meteorological Office. He retired in 1888, and lived to be over ninety years of age, an example of all that an officer in our mercantile marine should be (Lubbock, Basil: *The Blackwall Frigates*, 2nd edition (Glasgow 1950, Brown, Son, & Ferguson), pp. 145-6).

the cliffs between the South Foreland and Dover. Yet, already, forty years back, sail was being driven by steam off one sea-route after another. The China tea clippers had been put out of business by the opening of the Suez Canal in A.D. 1869,¹ which had deprived them of their advantage over steamships trying to compete with them on the long voyage round the Cape; by A.D. 1875 all routes except the Australian had been captured by steamships;² and in A.D. 1881 the Australian route itself was conquered for steam by the S.S. *Aberdeen* with her triple expansion engines,³ though the wool clippers went on fighting their losing battle till the end of the decade.⁴ The interval between the first two world wars saw the process of extinguishing the sailing-ship completed.⁵

If a lay observer's eye is not mistaken, the close of the ninth decade of the nineteenth century, which marked the virtual end of a fifty-years-long struggle between a rejuvenated sailing-ship and a new-fangled steamship, also marked the end of the spurt of creative activity which the shipwright's art had been making during those same fifty years in both these competing lines. While the standard battleship and merchantship of A.D. 1890 had no more recognizable affinity with those of A.D. 1840 than a basilisk has with an angel fish, the standard battleship and merchantship of A.D. 1950 bore as close a resemblance to those of A.D. 1890 as the standard battleship and merchantship of A.D. 1840 had borne to those of A.D. 1640. No doubt the sixty years A.D. 1890-1950 had also brought with them further innovations and improvements. The introduction of turbine engines driven by steam generated by burning oil instead of coal had been a change of perhaps the same order of magnitude as the substitution of fore-and-aft sails for lateen sails in the Modern Western ship at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,⁶ while the invention of radio-telegraphy and the installation of the apparatus on board ship just after the end of the First World War, and the invention of radar and its installation after the Second World War, were perhaps as great landmarks in the history of the Western art of navigation as the eighteenth-century solution of the problem of calculating longitudes through the perfecting of the chronometer.⁷ Yet, however notable these changes might be in themselves, they looked insignificant by comparison with the swiftness and greatness of the revolution that had been accomplished between A.D. 1840 and A.D. 1890. To a lay observer born in A.D. 1889 and looking back in the year 1952, it seemed clear that his own lifetime had been, in the history of shipbuilding, a period of retardation in the tempo of change by comparison with the pace of the forced march during the immediately preceding half century.

If this impression was correct, then a series of alternating accelerations and retardations which had begun with the acceleration *circa* A.D.

¹ See Clowes, *op. cit.*, p. 105; Abell, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-2.

² See Bassett-Lowke and Holland, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 182.

⁴ See Clowes, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁵ See Bassett-Lowke and Holland, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-1. In *The Times* of the 25th January, 1951, a photograph will be found of 'the *Pamir* and *Passat*, the last two sailing barques to take part in the traditional grain race from Australia to England, lying at Penarth Docks. They will be taken in tow to Antwerp for breaking up.'

⁶ See p. 368, n. 3, above.

⁷ See Prestage, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

1440 had run through a first retardation into a second acceleration and thence into a second retardation in the course of some five centuries.

This glance at the history of the Western shipwright's art concludes our survey of evidences of variability in the rate of social change; and these evidences—which have presented themselves in divers phases of the histories of a number of different civilizations—are so many indications that a recalcitrance to laws of Nature is no less characteristic of Human Nature than an amenability to them. Indeed, if we now look again at the pattern of the disintegration-process, in which we have found our classic example of regularity, we shall see that a varying rate of change is one of this regular process's uniformly recurring features. There is a particularly sudden and extreme change of tempo at the transition from a Time of Troubles to a universal state; for the second paroxysm of a Time of Troubles, which is precipitated by the first relapse and is pulled up short by the second rally, is the most feverishly fast-moving episode in the story, whereas there is no episode in it so slow-moving as the first spell of oecumenical peace which supervenes. This rebellious variability in the rate of change is not, however, the only irregularity in the gait of History which suggests that, after all, Man may not be completely subject to Nature's orders.

(b) THE DIVERSITY OF CORRESPONDING EPISODES IN THE HISTORIES OF DIFFERENT CIVILIZATIONS

1. *A Diversity in the Duration of the Growth-Phases of Civilizations*

Evidences of human recalcitrance to laws of Nature multiply when we place the records of the life-histories of civilizations side by side and take a synoptic view of them. Two breaches of uniformity that stand out conspicuously are a quantitative diversity in the duration of the growth-phases of those civilizations whose growth-spans we are able to measure, and a no less striking qualitative diversity in the relations of Religion to the rises and falls of civilizations in different generations.¹

The diversity in the length of measurable growth-spans is extreme, as can be seen by anyone who runs his eye down Table V at the end of the present volume.

In compiling this table we have had to leave out of account the seven civilizations of the first generation (the Egyptiac, Sumeric, Minoan, Indus Culture, Shang Culture, Andean, and Mayan), since each of these arose out of the mutation of some primitive society² at a stage of social development earlier than the invention of techniques for keeping records; and, though we may know, or guess, the nature of the challenges from Physical Nature by which these mutations were evolved,³ we have no means of even approximately estimating the dates at which they occurred. In the history of the Egyptiac Civilization, for example, the evidence, as it stood in A.D. 1952, did not suffice to indicate whether the age of 'the Old Kingdom' was to be equated with the growth-phase of the Egyptiac Society, or whether an investigator was to see here a uni-

¹ See Table IV: Primitive Societies, Civilizations, Higher Religions, in vol. vii, *ad fin.*

² See II. i. 188.

³ See II. i. 302-30.

versal state representing the last phase in the disintegration of a society whose antecedent Time of Troubles, breakdown, and growth-phase were still buried in oblivion.¹ In our present search for approximately ascertainable measurements of growth-spans, our field is therefore limited to the group of 'affiliated' civilizations; and in A.D. 1952 there were seven-teen known specimens of these (reckoning the Sinic Civilization as one, now that the progress of archaeological discovery had deprived it of its title to rank as a primary civilization by bringing its Shang predecessor to light).

The epiphany of an 'affiliated' civilization ought to be less difficult to date, since we may expect to see it emerge out of an interregnum following the break-up of a universal state representing the last phase in the history of an antecedent civilization. There were, nevertheless, at least three 'affiliated' civilizations—the Yucatec, Mexic, and Sinic—whose epiphanies were almost as difficult to date as those of the primary civilizations in the dim and flickering light of the archaeological evidence at the disposal of an historian mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era. In their pioneer attempts to link the Mayan Society's impressively exact, but self-contained and insulated, chronological records with the post-Amosan chronology of the Old World, Modern Western scholars had divided into two schools whose respective datings differed by no less than a quarter of a millennium; and this discrepancy was reflected in a corresponding uncertainty about the chronology of the growth-phases of the affiliated Yucatec and Mexic civilizations. As for the dating of the epiphany of the Sinic Civilization, Western scholars were confronted here with a discrepancy within the Sinic tradition itself, in which, for the period before the year 841 B.C., the standard chronology was challenged by the testimony of the so-called 'Bamboo Books'.² These two conflicting Sinic chronologies were as much as seventy-two years apart in their dating of the overthrow of the Shang Power by the Chóu invader Wu Wang; and, even if we were to opt in favour of the Bamboo Books' date 1050 B.C. against the standard chronology's date 1122 B.C., we might still find ourselves uncertain how to interpret this event in terms of the replacement of an antecedent Shang Society by an affiliated Sinic. Was the Shang Power whose latest capital at Mo the archaeologists had disinterred³ since the publication of the first three volumes of the present Study in A.D. 1934 a universal state in the sense in which we have been using the term? And was the Chóu Power that replaced the Shang Power a semi-barbarian successor-state like the Achaean Power that asserted itself at Mycenae after the sack of Cnossos, or the Ostrogoth Power that established itself at Ravenna after the collapse of the Roman Imperial Government's rule over the Roman Empire's western provinces? These moot points of historical interpretation conspired with the discrepancy between conflicting chronological systems to baffle an historian seeking in A.D. 1952 to date the Sinic Civilization's epiphany.

¹ See pp. 682-92, below.

² See Hirth, F.: *The Ancient History of China* (New York 1908, Columbia University Press), p. 176.

³ See VI. vii. 213, n. 1.

Moreover, there was at least one 'affiliated' civilization—the Western—whose epiphany could be dated but whose growth-span nevertheless could not be measured in A.D. 1952 because at that date it was still impossible to tell whether this civilization had or had not yet broken down.¹

Subject to these still unclarified uncertainties, it was possible in A.D. 1952 to draw up the accompanying table² of the approximate Time-spans of the growth of the 'affiliated' civilizations in a descending order of duration.

In this table there are, no doubt, certain traces of regularity. For example, apart from the two extremes represented by the Western Civilization and the Mexic Civilization respectively, the Time-spans appear to fall into five groups: one of about 600 to 700 years length (in four instances); one of about 400 years (in three instances); one of about 300 years (in two instances); one of about 175 to 200 years (in four instances); and one of about 100 years (in two instances). It also seems unlikely to be merely an accident that two civilizations so closely resembling one another in their structure as the Hellenic Civilization and the Medieval Western city-state cosmos should have an identical Time-span. Such appearances of regularity, however, are insignificant by comparison with the magnitude of the differences in a spread of Time-spans ranging in length from 850 years or more to zero; and some of the greatest of these chronological differences are to be found between the respective spans of twin societies that are affiliated to the same predecessor and are coeval in their epiphanies. The Hellenic Society's growth-span of some 700 years presents as great a contrast to the twin Syriac Society's span of some 200 years as the Western Society's span of 875 years or more presents to the twin Orthodox Christian Society's span of some 300 years.

2. *A Diversity in the Relations of Religion to the Rises and Falls of Civilizations in Different Generations*

In a previous context³ we have observed that every social interregnum between civilizations of different generations that had occurred in the history of this species of society up to date had been marked by flashes of religious light; but we have also observed that these successive flashes had been strikingly unequal in the degree of their luminosity. The higher religions which had made their epiphany during the falls of the secondary civilizations had brought into the world a spiritual illumination which seemed beyond compare with the fainter light cast either by the rudimentary higher religions that had appeared during the falls of the primary civilizations or by the secondary higher religions that had been appearing during the falls of the tertiary civilizations.⁴ This difference in degree of spiritual power was so great that it amounted to a difference in kind and quality; and there could be no clearer intimation than this that the rotation of the sorrowful wheel of Human Life on

¹ See XII, *passim*, below.

² Table V at the end of the present volume.

³ In VII. vii. 420-5.

⁴ See Table IV in vol. vii, *ad fin.*

Earth was something more than one of those vain repetitions of the Heathen¹ through which Man is convicted of being in penal servitude to laws of Nature.

(II) POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS OF THE INOPERATIVENESS OF LAWS OF NATURE IN SOME PHASES OF HUMAN AFFAIRS

Now that we have encountered some phases in which human affairs have all the appearance of being recalcitrant to laws of Nature, we shall find ourselves looking for possible explanations of a partial inoperativeness of these laws in the field of Human Life, where we have previously found impressive evidences of their currency. Divers alternative possibilities suggest themselves. This appearance of recalcitrance might be merely an illusion, due to ignorance, which would be dispelled if we were precisely informed of all the relevant facts. Or, supposing that an advance in our knowledge had made it certain that this appearance was a faithful reflection of Reality, then a genuine recalcitrance of human affairs to laws of Nature might perhaps be explicable as being either an effect of the play of Chance or a product of creative responses to challenges. Let us look further into each of these three possibilities.

The interpretation of the appearances of freedom in Human Life as mere mirages induced by sheer ignorance was one possible explanation that a twentieth-century Western inquirer was not entitled to rule out, since in that age a post-Modern Western intellect was only on the verge of discovering laws of Nature reigning in the Human Psyche's subconscious abyss, while at the same date the actual quantity of recorded statistical evidence bearing upon laws of Nature in the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization was still minute by comparison with the potential quantity of the evidence in the same field that might accumulate in the future.

The number of civilizations that were known to have existed up to date—leaving out of the reckoning those that had been abortive or had been arrested—amounted to no more than twenty-one, and these represented no more than three generations, so far, spread over no more than five or six thousand years, reckoning from the probable era of the species' epiphany down to the time of writing. In previous contexts² we have observed that, if we were to reckon the duration of the Age of the Civilizations up to date at the maximum figure of 6,000 years and were to halve the figure of 1,000,000 million years at which twentieth-century Western scientists had estimated the Human Race's present expectation of life on its native planet (always supposing that the race did not exterminate itself long before reaching the end of Nature's rope), there would be time during these next 500,000 million years for no less than 1,743,000,000 further civilizations to come and go if they were to continue to come and go at the same rate as during the first 6,000 years of the history of this species of Society. For an historian this was an in-

¹ Matt. vi. 7.

² In I. i. 456-64 and VII. vii. 453-4, and on p. 344, above.

timidating calculation, notwithstanding the evidence indicating that the tempo of social change was by no means uniform as a matter of fact. Within the writer's own infinitesimally short experience between the time when he was drafting his first systematic notes for this Study in A.D. 1927-9 and the time in A.D. 1950 when he was approaching the completion of the writing of the text, previously unknown facts had been brought to light—for example, in the realm of pre-Sinic archaeology and in the realm of Sumeric chronology—which were no mere points of detail but were 'integral' facts throwing fresh light on the whole study of History. The spectre of ignorance haunted the writer at the close of his work as insistently as at the beginning; and it was always in his mind that future students of History, equipped with vastly ampler funds of relevant knowledge, might smile at his faith in a pittance of knowledge that, by comparison with what they knew, would look as tiny as a squirrel's winter store. A faith that had moved him to carry out his own reconnaissance did not blind him to the possibility—improbable though he personally felt this to be—that the appearance of freedom in human affairs might be dissipated one day by a progressive increase in the candle-power of Science's dry light.

If a haze of Ignorance was thus one of the contingencies that had to be reckoned with, was it also necessary to allow for the play of Chance? The answer to this second question could be given out of hand, without any question here of having to await the verdict of a still untold tale of 500,000 million years; for the settling of the historian's accounts with Chance was a matter, not of fact-finding, but of reasoning; and Reason pronounces that Chance is not an absolute positive concept, but a negative and therefore necessarily a relative one, and that accordingly to see in Chance an ultimate explanation of any phenomenon would be as naïve an error as to mistake a sign-post for the goal to which it pointed. Just as the label 'Heterodoxy' merely indicates the existence of another 'doxy' labelled 'Orthodoxy',¹ and the name 'Neustria' merely indicates the existence of another country labelled 'Austrasia',² so the labelling of a phenomenon as an outcome of the play of Chance merely indicates that this phenomenon does not display the pattern of some particular kind of order that the thinker happens to have in mind—and perhaps also to expect, or even desire, to find—at the moment when he indicates its absence in the case in point by holding Chance responsible for the production of the phenomenon that has to be accounted for. To attribute a child's paternity to Chance is thus merely a form of words for stating that this child cannot be credited with some other paternity that might have been expected to be proved; but this negative label does not tell us what the child's true paternity is; nor can this or any other verbiage act as a spell to perform the miracle of begetting a child without recourse to any father at all. The patronymic 'child of Chance' merely informs us that the foundling is not the child of so-and-so; and this negative finding

¹ A theologian with a sense of humour who was asked by a lady at a dinner party to explain the difference between Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy is said to have answered her: 'Well, Orthodoxy is *my* doxy and Heterodoxy is *your* doxy.'

² See II. ii. 167, n. 2.

leaves us just where we were; for it leaves still unanswered our original question asking who the child's true father is.

All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction which thou canst not see.¹

This relativity, and consequent inconclusiveness, of the concept of Chance has come to our attention already in this Study in other contexts;² and, in order to make sure, once again, of making this logical point clear, we will quote, once again, a French philosopher's lucid exposition of it.

'If, at a venture, I select a volume in my library, I may replace it on the shelves, after taking a glance at it, with the remark "This isn't verse". But is this really what I perceived when I was turning the pages? Clearly not. I did not see, and I never shall see, an absence of verse. What I did see was prose. But, as it is poetry that I am wanting, I express what I find in terms of what I am looking for; and, instead of saying "Here is some prose", I say "This isn't verse". Inversely, if it takes my fancy to read some prose and I stumble on a volume of verse, I shall exclaim "This isn't prose"; and in using these words I shall be translating the data of my perception, which shows me verse, into the language of my expectation and my interest, which are set upon the idea of prose and therefore will not hear of anything else. . . .

'An order is contingent, and appears so to us, in relation to the inverse order, in the way in which verse is contingent in relation to prose, and prose in relation to verse. . . . If we analyse the idea of Chance, which is a near relation to the idea of Disorder, we shall find the same elements. When the purely mechanical operation of the causes which bring the roulette to a halt on a particular number makes me win and so behaves as a good genius would have behaved if he had been looking after my interests, and when the purely mechanical force of the wind snatches a tile from the roof and flings it down on my head—thus acting as an evil genius would have acted if he had been plotting against my life—in both cases I find a mechanism in a place where I would have looked for—and ought, it would seem, to have encountered—an intention; and that is what I am expressing when I speak of "Chance". And in describing an anarchic world, where the phenomena follow one another at the pleasure of their caprice, I shall say, again, that this is the reign of "Chance", and I shall mean by this that I find myself confronted by acts of will, or rather by "decrees", when what I was looking for was mechanism. . . . The idea of "Chance" simply objectifies the state of mind of someone whose expectation has been directed towards one of two species of order and who then encounters the other. Chance and Disorder are, then, necessarily conceived of as relative.'³

In another context⁴ we have noticed already that this mirage of 'Chance' and 'Disorder', even when it has been conjured up out of the emotional underworld of the Psyche by some disappointment of expectations, can avail to obscure the regularities and uniformities of an underlying positive order only so long as the number of instances of the

¹ Pope: *An Essay on Man*, Ep. i, ll. 289-90.

² In V. v. 419-21 and VII. vii. 544, n. 3.

³ Bergson, Henri: *L'Évolution Créatrice*, 24th ed. (Paris 1921, Alcan), pp. 239-58, quoted in V. v. 419, n. 4.

⁴ On p. 206, n. 2, above.

phenomenon under consideration which the observer has at his command is less than ten or thereabouts.

If we take Bergson's elucidation of the concept of 'Chance' as our clue for unravelling the answer to our question whether the play of 'Chance' can be accepted as a possible explanation of an apparent recalcitrance of human affairs to laws of Nature, we shall have now to put two leading questions to ourselves: First, what is the species of order that we are expecting to find in human affairs? And, second, what is the other species of order with which we are actually confronted when we say that we find ourselves here in the presence of the reign of 'Chance'? In our foregoing inquiry into possible explanations of the manifest currency of laws of Nature in human history, our finding was that these laws governing human affairs were, for the most part, laws current in the Human Psyche's own subconscious underworld; and, if this is the species of order for which we are looking in this field, then the different order, found in fact to be reigning here, that we label 'Chance' because it is not what we had been expecting, must be one or other of three possible alternatives. It may be the order of Physical Nature as contrasted with Psychic Nature, or the order of human will as contrasted with the subconscious level of the Human Psyche, or the order of God's will as contrasted both with human wills and with the by-laws, psychic and physical alike, which the will of God has enacted.¹ These three alternatives would seem to exhaust the possible identities of the order, not identical with an expected subconscious psychic order, that we have left incognito in labelling it 'Chance'. Our negative label must mask some one of these three positive realities, since a label cannot be pasted on to a vacuum. We have already noticed that the 'Chance' which appears to come into play when conflicting human wills frustrate one another is a label masking the self-assertion of the laws of the Subconscious Psyche.² On this showing, the 'Chance' which appears to come into play when these laws of the Subconscious Psyche fail, in their turn, to answer to conscious expectations by asserting themselves must be a label masking the operation of some other positive force.

The possibility that 'Chance' in our present context might prove to be a label masking the order of Physical Nature diminishes to a vanishing point in the light of our inquiry into the amenability of human

¹ A belief in the reality of any of these three kinds of order, like a belief in the reality of the order of Subconscious Psychic Nature, is the offspring of experience wedded to faith. Without the faith that 'is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen' (Heb. xi. 1), a human being's experience of Physical Nature, his experience of his fellow human beings, and even his experience of himself, would not guarantee the reality of any of these phenomena; and a belief in the reality of God and of His action in the Universe derives from the same twofold source. The experience of an encounter with God that was attributed to Jacob, Moses, and Samuel, and that was granted to the prophets of Israel, Judah, and Iran according to these prophets' own conviction, may not be experienced even by the prophets in more than one or two brief flashes in a lifetime, while the great majority of human beings may never have this experience at all at first hand; so that a belief in God will be an act of faith for the prophet himself for most of his life and for most of his followers for all of their lives. 'Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed' (John xx. 29) is thus a truth that is conspicuously true of a belief in the reality of God; yet a belief in the reality of one's self, of other selves, and of Nature, Psychic or Physical, also requires a large measure of faith as well as of experience.

² See pp. 326-37, above.

affairs to laws of Nature; for we have found that, by comparison with the jurisdiction of the laws of the Subconscious Psyche, the jurisdiction of the laws of Physical Nature over human affairs has never been of much consequence; and we have also found that, whatever this jurisdiction may have amounted to originally, the human social animal has been singularly successful in discovering how to elude its incidence, and has been liberating himself in this way from Physical Nature's dominion at a pace that has been increasing by geometrical progression. We have watched human beings successfully conspiring to elude the incidence of the astronomical law of the Year Cycle that governs the yield of their domesticated plants and trees; we have watched them similarly eluding the incidence of a physiological law of the Day-and-Night Cycle;¹ and we have also seen them turning to human account even Nature's in-human device of a procession of generation cycles punctuated by the deaths of individuals, when human beings have overlaid Nature's own method of transmitting a racial heritage of instincts and aptitudes through the physiological process of procreation with the artificial human device of transmitting a social heritage of habits and knowledge through the spiritual process of moral and intellectual education.² On this showing, an apparent play of 'Chance' in human affairs is unlikely, if it looms at all large, to mask a reign of laws of Physical Nature; for, *pace* the astrologers, it seems much less likely that human affairs in which we do not discern the operation of laws of the Subconscious Psyche are governed, under the label of 'Chance', by hitherto unrecognized laws of Physical Nature than that they are governed either by hitherto unrecognized laws of the Subconscious Psyche itself or else by the will either of human beings or of God.

When human wills encounter one another without concurring in a common purpose to do God's will, they are prone, as we have seen, to frustrate one another, and their thus unintentionally concerted self-stultification reopens the way for the compulsive laws of the Subconscious Human Psyche to reassert themselves. When a human soul encounters God, what is the outcome of a meeting between wills of such immeasurably unequal potency?

Theologians who have pictured God in Man's image, through a failure to rise to a worship of God in spirit and in truth,³ have sometimes fallen into the spiritual error of imagining that God exerts His irresistible power to make His own will prevail over Man's—either by ruthlessly over-riding it or by craftily bending it to conform to God's will unawares.⁴ This picture of an iron law of God the Tyrant lurking under the mesh that God's guileless creatures label 'Chance' has been painted for us by Bossuet.

'Ne parlons plus de hasard ni de fortune, ou parlons-en seulement comme d'un nom dont nous couvrons notre ignorance. Ce qui est hasard à l'égard de nos conseils incertains est un dessein concerté dans un conseil plus haut, c'est-à-dire dans ce conseil éternel qui renferme toutes les causes et tous les effets dans un même ordre. De cette sorte tout concourt

¹ See pp. 306-10, above.

³ John iv. 24.

² See pp. 319-26, above.

⁴ See pp. 175-9, above.

à la même fin, et c'est faute d'entendre le tout que nous trouvons du hasard ou de l'irrégularité dans les rencontres particulières.¹

The orator's language is as brilliant as it is masterful, but the theologian's ideas of what God is and how God acts are as unconvincing as they are repellant to any drinker at the fountain-head of Christianity. As God is revealed in the Gospels, He is Love as well as Omnipotence; He is the Soul's father, redeemer, and illuminator, as well as its creator and its master;² and this Christian faith assures us that, when a soul encounters the God of whom this is the authentic Christian picture, Love suspends the fiat of Omnipotence in order to transmute a command into a challenge which confronts the human recipient of it with a free choice between Good and Evil and between Life and Death.³ Such challenges from God may evoke in human souls creative responses that are genuinely free human acts; and this spiritual drama of Challenge-and-Response⁴ is perhaps the key to an explanation of those human affairs in which human action wears the appearance of being at any rate partially exempt from the dominion of laws of Nature.

If we now recall some of our instances of an apparent recalcitrance of human affairs to laws of Nature, we shall find that these are also instances of a creative response to a challenge.

When, for example, a creative individual or minority distinguishes itself by breaking contact with the rank-and-file, forging ahead of them, and then re-entering into contact again, these distinctive moves, which are so many evidences of the minority's freedom of action, are at the same time so many stages in a response that the creative individual or minority has been stimulated to make in answer to some challenge that has been presented to all the members of the society, including the unresponsive rank-and-file, and also perhaps including other individuals or minorities who have made a choice of Evil instead of Good that brings Death instead of Life.⁵

If we now also look again at the history of the art of ship-building in the Modern and post-Modern ages of Western history, in which we have watched the sequence of an acceleration followed by a retardation occurring, not once only, as in the movement of Withdrawal-and-Return, but twice over, we shall find this duplication of the same sequence accounted for here by the presentation of two different challenges in succession.

The challenge that evoked the creation of the Modern Western 'ship' within the half-century A.D. 1440-90 was a political one. Towards the close of the Medieval Age of Western history, Western Christendom found itself not only conclusively foiled in its attempt to break out of its West European homeland south-eastward into Dār-al-Islām and Orthodox Christendom, but seriously threatened by a north-westward-heading counter-attack in which the military resources of Orthodox Christendom and Islam were brigaded under Ottoman auspices.⁶ The dangerousness of Western Christendom's plight in the fifteenth century

¹ Bossuet, J.-B.: *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1700), Troisième Partie, chap. viii.

² See p. 175, above.

³ Deut. xxx. 15-19.

⁴ See II. i. 271-302.

⁵ See I. i. 22-26 and III. iii. 217-377. ⁶ See IX. viii. 216-72, 346-63, and 454-80.

was accentuated by geographical circumstances that had perhaps also been partly accountable for the launching of the ill-starred Crusades. The homeland of the Western Christian Society happened to lie at the tip of one of the peninsulas of the Great Eurasian Continent, and a society so precariously situated must sooner or later be pushed into the Ocean by the pressure of mightier forces thrusting outwards from the heart of the Old World if this besieged society did not succeed in forestalling disaster by breaking out of its West-European *cul-de-sac* into some larger *Lebensraum*. By the fifteenth century of the Christian Era the *peine forte et dure* of being crushed to death between the Devil and the Deep Sea had already brought to their last gasp the surviving representatives of an abortive Far Western Christian Civilization in 'the Celtic Fringe' of the Old World; and a Latin Christendom likewise had been exposed, since its birth, to this manifest destiny of all West European societies by which a Celtic Christendom was eventually to be overtaken. In the Crusades the Latin Christians—choosing the Mediterranean Sea as their war-path and faring across it in vessels of the traditional Mediterranean builds—had been moved by a nostalgia for the cradle of their Christian faith¹ to defy Fate by breaking out of Western Europe into the Levant; and the eventual failure of this enterprise had not been followed by a return of the *status quo ante*. The retort to Medieval Western aggression had been in Egypt the replacement of effete 'Fātimids' by militarily efficient Mamlūks,² and in Orthodox Christendom the replacement of an effete East Roman Empire by 'Osmanlis who were still more efficient and far more aggressive than their Mamlūk cousins.'³

These local revolutions which the West's own aggression had precipitated had eclipsed the West's military and political prospects in the Levant, and had made her commercial prospects there dependent on the new Islamic Powers' goodwill. In what other direction was Western Christendom to look for an outlet? A once barbarian no-man's-land in Northern Europe had been eliminated before the end of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era by a parallel northward advance of Western and of Russian Orthodox Christendom which had carried their common frontier up to the shore of the Arctic Ocean;⁴ and, when Western Christendom had taken advantage of Russia's prostration by a tornado of Mongol invasion from the Eurasian Steppe in order to trespass on her Russian neighbour's domain in White Russia and the Ukraine, this eastward aggression overland had been halted, in its turn, by the rise of Muscovy.⁵ Mid-way through the fifteenth century, when the sea-route via the Mediterranean into the Levant and the land-route via Russia into the heart of the Eurasian Continent had both been effectively closed against any further Western expansion in either of these directions, the Atlantic Ocean was the sole remaining frontier of Western Christendom that was not beset by an impassable hostile human cordon; and the Atlantic was thus uninfested by human adversaries of the West only

¹ See I. i. 38; IX. viii. 346-63; and p. 100, above.

² See IV. iv. 447-50.

³ See III. iii. 22-50.

⁴ See II. ii. 168-9.

⁵ See II. ii. 174-7; IX. viii. 126 and 398-403.

because it was, and always had been, believed by all denizens of the Old World to be an unharvested and unharvestable sea, setting an impassable physical western limit to the habitable portion of the Earth's surface. In the fifteenth century of the Christian Era the Atlantic was challenging the beleaguered peoples of Western Christendom by confronting them with a choice between two extreme alternatives. If they were not to be driven into the Atlantic in their turn, as they themselves had been driving the hapless Celtic Christians, they must convert Seneca's fancy¹ into fact by conquering an Ocean which not even a poet had ever seriously supposed to be conquerable by Man 'in real life'. The dual alarum of simultaneous challenges from the Atlantic and the 'Osmanli' was the emergency that, within the half century A.D. 1440-90, stimulated Western shipwrights to create an Ocean-faring, globe-encircling sailing-ship, capable of keeping the sea continuously for months on end, of which the like had never before been designed or even imagined.

Why was this fifteenth-century outburst of creative energy in the Western shipwright's trade followed by a spell of relative stagnation lasting some three or four hundred years? Challenge-and-Response is the clue to the answer to this question likewise; for the creation of the Modern Western ship had been so effective a response to the military and political challenge presented to the West in the fifteenth century that the fifteenth-century Western shipwright's epigoni had little incentive for seeking to improve on their predecessors' work until they were eventually shaken out of their lethargy by a new challenge that was not military or political but was economic, and that did not impinge on the Western World from abroad but emerged from within.

The Modern Western ship had been an adequate solution for the Early Modern Western World's besetting problem of *Lebensraum*. It had enabled the Western peoples with one hand to acquire in the Americas what looked like an inexhaustible addition to their reserves of cultivable land, and with the other hand to seize for themselves a monopoly of all the existing Oceanic maritime trade in the World; and this sudden turning of the tables in their favour in their competition with the other living civilizations had not only given the Western peoples full military and political security; it had also amply satisfied their economic needs in an age in which they, as well as their contemporaries, were still living under the traditional economic dispensation of Man in Process of Civilization. In this dispensation—which, in the Lower Nile Valley and the Lower Tigris-Euphrates Basin, had already been a going concern at least as early as the end of the fourth millennium B.C.—agriculture was the staple source of livelihood and the standard occupation, while trade and manufacture were subsidiary and exceptional. In societies of this traditional type, towns and ports that lived by importing foodstuffs and raw materials and paying for these by exporting manufactured goods and by performing the economic services of providing and financing maritime and overland transportation, were few and far between; rarer still were the parasitic capitals of oecumenical empires—a Rome, a Constantinople, or a Peking—which used the lever of political

¹ See Seneca: *Medea*, ll. 364-79, quoted in II. i. 263, n. 1.

power to exact imports without making any economic return;¹ and the only other notable variation on the prevailing economic pattern of subsistence farming was an exchange of cereals and other products of agriculture for products of stockbreeding between the Nomads of the Steppes and their nearest sedentary neighbours. Classical examples of this unusual trade in commodities that were necessities, not luxuries, had been the importation of grain into the homeland of the Hellenic Civilization round the coasts of the Aegean out of the Russian agricultural hinterland of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe from about the sixth century B.C. to about the third century of the Christian Era, and the importation of the same staff of life out of Sicily and Apulia into a sixteenth-century Spain² whose heart had been given over to breeding sheep for wool.³

The Western Society continued, like its contemporaries, to live under this traditional economic dispensation for some three centuries (*circa* A.D. 1475-1775) after it had won its economic victory over these other living civilizations in terms of the traditional economic values by monopolizing the Oceanic maritime trade in luxuries and impounding the World's largest still uncultivated reserve of cultivable land. During the last third or quarter of the eighteenth century, however, a new economic revolution—almost comparable in magnitude to the earlier revolution from food-gathering and hunting to agriculture and stock-breeding—declared itself in Great Britain and spread thence progressively to Belgium, Germany, and the Northern United States and eventually to Japan and other Westernizing countries beyond the original bounds of the Western World.

The two outstanding features of this fresh economic revolution were a sudden increase in population at a steeply accelerating rate and a concomitant rise of commerce and manufacturing industry to a decisive preponderance over agriculture as the standard occupations and staple sources of livelihood, no longer merely in tiny, rare, and insulated urban enclaves, but throughout whole countries and regions previously dedicated to subsistence farming. This sweeping subordination of agriculture and stockbreeding to industry was the more impressive considering that Western agriculture and Western stockbreeding, so far from remaining stagnant or regressing, were actually passing at this time through a simultaneous revolution in which their productivity, like the productivity of urban industry, was being notably increased by the jettisoning of traditional methods in favour of new experiments that were as rational as they were radical. The eighteenth-century technological revolution in agriculture⁴ ran neck and neck with the eighteenth-century

¹ See VI. vii. 87-91, for the digging of the Grand Canal in China, after the political unification of the main body of the Far Eastern Society by the Sui Dynasty, in order to bring foodstuffs to a northern capital from a southern centre of agricultural production.

² See Fueter, E.: *Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1492-1559* (Munich and Berlin 1919, Oldenbourg), p. 96.

³ Klein, J.: *The Mesta: A Study in Spanish Economic History, 1273-1836* (Cambridge, Mass. 1930, Harvard University Press).

⁴ See Ashton, T. S.: *The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830* (London 1948, Oxford University Press), pp. 6-7.

technological revolution in industry, as the nineteenth-century creation of the 'clipper' sailing-ship ran neck and neck with the nineteenth-century creation of the steamship. If, in spite of this sudden spurt of progress, agriculture nevertheless failed to maintain its age-old primacy over industry in a Western and a Westernizing World, the reason was that the eighteenth-century agricultural revolution, by itself, would have been no adequate response—even in combination with the accompanying extension of the acreage under cultivation in Western Europe as well as overseas—to the Malthusian challenge which the eighteenth-century industrial revolution did prove able to meet.

The formidably steep and rapid increase in population, which declared itself in Great Britain first among the countries of the Modern Western World, seems to have been due to a reduction of the death-rate, thanks to an improvement in the standard of public health,¹ which was not offset by any countervailing fall in the birth-rate for the next five or six generations. In Great Britain the fall in the death-rate began to make itself felt *circa* A.D. 1740;² 'between 1740 and 1820 the death-rate fell almost continuously, from an estimated 35.8 for the ten years ending in 1740 to one of 21.1 for those ending in 1821';³ but net rates of reproduction did not begin to fall off in either Great Britain or France before A.D. 1875-80, and not in other West European countries before A.D. 1905-10.⁴ The net increase in the population of Western Europe through this Time-lag between the fall in the death-rate and the fall in the birth-rate was to reach its peak in A.D. 1890-1910.⁵ By the time of writing of the book, published in A.D. 1947, in which these remarkable figures are presented, the average expectation of life in the Western World had risen from the span of thirty-five years, at which it had stood under the *ancien régime*, to a span of no less than sixty.⁶

This great spurt in the growth of population, first in Great Britain and then in other provinces of a Western and a Westernizing World, would have been an economic liability if the explosion of the Industrial Revolution had not responded to the challenge by converting this potential liability into an asset. The Industrial Revolution enabled an increasing population actually to raise its standard of living through a concomitant increase in the volume of economic production that more than kept pace with the increase in the number of mouths to be fed and bodies to be clothed and housed; and our familiarity with this achievement must not blind us to the truth that it was an amazing *tour de force*.

'The spectre of the pressure of population on the means of subsistence which oppressed the mind of Malthus in 1798 was no chimaera. . . . An increase of people . . . does not necessarily mean either a greater effective demand for manufactured goods or an increased production of these in

¹ As many as ten distinct influences operating in Great Britain, from about A.D. 1740 onwards, to reduce the incidence of death are enumerated by T. S. Ashton in *The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830* (London, 1948, Oxford University Press), p. 4.

² See Dupriez, L. H.: *Les Mouvements Économiques Généraux* (Louvain 1947, Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 304.

³ Ashton, T. S.: *The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830* (London 1948, Oxford University Press), p. 4.

⁴ See Dupriez, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 306.

⁵ See *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 303.

⁶ See *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 304.

the country concerned . . . it may just as well lead to a lower standard of life for all!¹—

which, was, in fact, its consequence in Ireland, where the population increased in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century *pari passu* with the simultaneous increase in the adjoining island. This Irish, and not the English, consequence was likewise the sequel to corresponding increases in the populations of China in the same age under a *Pax Manchuana*, and of India in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century under a *Pax Britannica*.

"There are to-day on the plains of India and China men and women, plague-ridden and hungry, living lives little better, to outward appearance, than those of the cattle that toil with them by day and share their places of sleep by night. Such . . . standards . . . are the lot of those who increase their numbers without passing through an industrial revolution. . . .²

"The central problem of the age [A.D. 1760–1830 in Great Britain] was how to feed and clothe and employ generations of children outnumbering by far those of any earlier time. Ireland was faced by the same problem. Failing to solve it, she lost in the 'forties about a fifth of her people by emigration or starvation and disease. If England had remained a nation of cultivators and craftsmen, she could hardly have escaped the same fate, and, at best, the weight of a growing population must have pressed down the spring of her spirit. She was delivered . . . by those who, seeking, no doubt, their own narrow ends, had the wit and resource to devise new instruments of production and new methods of administering industry.³ . . . Britain might have learnt from bitter experience the fallacy of the view that, because with every pair of hands there is a mouth, therefore every expansion of numbers must lead to an increase of consumption, and so of output, if, after the middle of the nineteenth century, there had been no railways in America, no opening up of the prairies, and no steamships.⁴

We can now see what the challenge was which, after a three-or-four hundred-years long interlude of comparative stagnation in the Western art of shipbuilding, evoked, during the half-century A.D. 1840–90, a burst of fresh creative activity—comparable to the previous burst in A.D. 1440–90—which brought forth the 'clipper' and the long-distance steamship in a twin birth. Under the goad of a sudden sharp increase in the pressure of population on the means of subsistence, a Modern Western Society which, so far from being resigned to seeing its standard of living fall, was bent upon raising it, had set out—in the footsteps of the Hellenic Society of the sixth century B.C.⁵—to convert an economy of subsistence farming into an economy of specialized production for export; and, for the first time in the history of Man in Process of Civilization, this economic revolution was now being put in train, not just within the walls of a handful of city-states, but throughout the body social of a hitherto preponderantly agricultural society. This revolutionary economic enterprise could not be carried through to success unless the *entrepreneurs* could multiply, many times over, a maritime carrying capacity that had met the comparatively modest requirements

¹ Ashton, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 161.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵ See I. i. 24–25; II. ii. 38–42; III. iii. 122; IV. iv. 200–14; IX. viii. 429–30.

of the traditional economy; for these requirements had been limited to the transport of luxuries for a small governing class and of foodstuffs and raw materials for a few towns and ports specializing in commerce and industry. In order to make the revolutionary new economic régime work, maritime carrying capacity had to be expanded at short notice to cater for the transport of bulky and heavy primary commodities for consumption, not just by a few exceptional urban communities, but by the entire body social of a society that was making itself preponderantly industrial instead of remaining preponderantly agricultural.

Maritime carrying capacity could be expanded along three lines: by increasing the number of ships in commission, by increasing their size, and by increasing their speed and thus increasing the frequency of their voyages; and all three expedients were, in fact, resorted to in the Western World in face of the nineteenth-century Western maritime carrying-capacity crisis.

The line of least resistance was, of course, to shirk the arduous task of structural and mechanical innovation by simply increasing the number of ships of the customary size, build, and drive.

'The data available show that the changes in the size of vessels were not notable in England until after 1830, even though the proportion of the larger vessels to the total increased, especially after 1730. If we were to study the shipping of Europe as a whole, the changes in the size of merchant vessels would be less considerable than in the case of England alone. Down to 1850 no merchant vessels are recorded with a registered tonnage in excess of 1200 tons, and there were very few vessels in England in the group from 420 to 1199 tons. There were large numbers of vessels of that rate in the Mediterranean as early as 1500; there were proportionately more in Holland than in England, though the size of Dutch vessels was probably not as great as that of the larger Mediterranean carriers. Throughout the period [*circa* A.D. 1572-1830] the merchant fleets of the different countries included large numbers of very small vessels.'¹

¹ Usher, A. P.: 'The Growth of English Shipping, 1572-1922', in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. xlii (Cambridge, Mass. 1928, Harvard University Press), p. 476.

'There were changes in the proportions between the definitely small and the medium-sized vessels in all the countries, but less change in England than elsewhere, because the conditions in England were especially favourable to the persistence of small units in the carrying trade' (*ibid.*, pp. 476-7). The average tonnage of a British merchantman had risen to a surprisingly small degree during the two centuries between the end of King James I's reign in A.D. 1625 and the end of King George III's in A.D. 1820. During James I's reign, the normal tonnage of English merchantmen had jumped from 100 tons to 300/500 tons, and between A.D. 1675 and A.D. 1680 sixteen East Indiamen had been built with tonnages ranging as high as 1,600 tons; but after A.D. 1702 the average figure for an East Indiaman had dropped back to 350/400 tons; and, though it had risen again in A.D. 1750 to a standard of 499 tons, and in A.D. 1786-90 to a new level of 1,200 tons, the average tonnage of British merchantmen of other ownership did not rise concomitantly. In the British merchant marine in A.D. 1810, apart from the East India Company's fleet, there were only twenty ships with a tonnage of more than 600 tons, and none with a tonnage of more than 1,000 tons (Abell, W.: *The Shipwright's Trade* (Cambridge 1948, University Press), pp. 99-100).

This virtual stationariness of the average size of the standard merchantman in the Western World in general, and in Great Britain more especially, over a period of some two hundred years ending *circa* A.D. 1830 is the more remarkable considering that, within the same period, the volume of British maritime trade was not static, but, on the contrary, was subject to perceptible fluctuations. 'The curve for the tonnage of the merchant fleet indicates that there were three periods of active growth: 1663-1730, 1770-1811, 1840-1910. The intervals between these periods, while not registering actual decline, were periods of relative stagnation, particularly the later intervals. The clearances in foreign trade disclose two periods of growth: 1663-1760 and 1801-1910' (Usher, op.

By contrast, from *circa* A.D. 1830 onwards, increases in the size of ships, requiring revolutionary changes in their build, and soon also in their drive, came to contribute far more than increases in the number of ships in commission towards the now steeply rising increase in the aggregate tonnage of the United Kingdom merchant marine, as can be seen from the following figures in the tables compiled by Usher.¹

Year	Number of vessels	Register tonnage
1788	12,461	1,279,062
1830	19,174	2,201,592
1860	27,663	4,658,687
1890	21,591	7,978,538
1910	21,090	11,555,663

Percentage of Vessels in the United Kingdom Merchant Marine in Each of the Different Tonnage-Classes Distinguished in the Series of Columns Set Out Below

Year	Under 100 tons	100-419 tons	420-1,199 tons
1788	31.1	62.1	6.8
1830	25.2	62.4	12.4

Year	Under 100 tons	100-399 tons	400-1,199 tons	1,200-1,999 tons	2,000-3,999 tons	4,000 tons and over
1869	9.6	27.4	45.9	15.6	1.2	0.3

It is manifest that the almost six-fold increase in the United Kingdom merchant marine's aggregate register tonnage from a figure of 1,551,072 tons in A.D. 1799 to a figure of 9,304,108 tons in A.D. 1900 was mostly accounted for by an increase in the size of vessels, and not by an increase in their numbers, considering that, between the same two dates, that saw a 600 per cent. increase in aggregate tonnage, the numbers increased by hardly more than 50 per cent., from 12,461 in A.D. 1799 to 19,982 in A.D. 1900, after having reached and passed in A.D. 1860 a peak figure of 27,663.² It is no less evident that the increase in size could never have

cit., p. 474). 'The rapid growth in the seventeenth century is comparable to the growth of the late nineteenth century, which we have been inclined to think of as unexampled in the centuries preceding' (ibid., p. 472). Yet, in spite of the building of sixteen abnormally large East Indiamen during the years A.D. 1675-80, an increase in size evidently counted for much less than an increase in numbers in the doubling, between A.D. 1663 and 1688, of both the tonnage of the English merchant marine and the clearances in England's foreign trade (see the figures in Table I, on p. 467, and Table II, on p. 469, of Usher, op. cit.). 'It is important to note that the commercial growth of the late seventeenth century, as shown by both sets of data, was not accompanied by any large increase in population, whereas the increase in population was very considerable in the nineteenth century' (ibid., p. 474).

¹ The two sets of figures set out above are extracted respectively from Table I, on p. 467, and from Table IV, on p. 475, of Usher, op. cit. In Table I the figures for A.D. 1830, by comparison with those for A.D. 1788-1825, have been cut down by about 7 per cent. through the exclusion of lost vessels formerly carried on the register. The figures of tonnage for the years beginning with A.D. 1860, by comparison with those for A.D. 1830-50, have been raised by about 7.5 per cent. through a change in the rules for the measurement of tonnage that became effective in A.D. 1857.

² See Usher, op. cit., Table I, on p. 467.

been carried to the lengths attained in the event without an accompanying revolution in build.

'Some increase in size would have been possible without a change in materials. Wooden vessels could be built up to 4000, and possibly 5000, tons, but with rapidly increasing costs of construction and maintenance. Serious structural difficulties would have been encountered in building very large wooden vessels, because the stems and stern-posts must needs be single timbers, and there are fairly definite limits to the size of first-class timbers for these purposes. The introduction of iron and steel disposed effectively of all these problems. This radical change should be borne in mind in any discussion of the size of vessels in the earlier periods. The revolution in the character of the merchant fleet is a chapter in the history of the late nineteenth century—an outgrowth of the development of the iron ship.'¹

The employment of iron made it feasible, as we have seen,² to build clippers of double the tonnage of the largest previous standard size of sailing-ship; yet, even when the problem of construction had thus been solved, there were limits to the possible tonnage of a sail-borne ship even of the square rig in which the total spread of sail could be increased, up to a point, by adding to the number of the tiers of sails and to the number of the masts; and the size of the nineteenth-century British merchantman, like that of the fifteenth-century Portuguese lateen-rigged caravel,³ would have been confined, perforce, within the limits thus set by the technique of sail-drive, if revolutionary-minded nineteenth-century British shipwrights had not made the further innovation of propelling their new-fangled iron hulls by steam-power instead of by wind-power. The tonnage of British steamships, as distinct from the tonnage of all British merchantmen, whether steam-propelled or sail-borne, doubled between A.D. 1860 and A.D. 1868 according to Rostow;⁴ and the ever more preponderant part that was being played by the increase in steam-propelled tonnage, as compared with the increase in wind-propelled tonnage, in the aggregate increase of United Kingdom merchant-marine tonnage, is reflected in the fact that the United Kingdom merchant marine's approximate carrying power, adjusted for steam, rose, according to Usher,⁵ from 4,068,000 tons in A.D. 1850, when there was an aggregate register tonnage of 3,651,133 tons distributed among 25,984 vessels of both kinds, to 30,924,000 tons in A.D. 1900, when there was an aggregate register tonnage of 9,304,108 tons distributed among 19,982 vessels.⁶

It will be seen that, when nineteenth-century shipwrights were challenged, by the explosion of the Industrial Revolution, rapidly to cater for an enormous increase in marine carrying capacity which had to be conjured up somehow if an audaciously revolutionary economic enterprise was not to end in a catastrophic failure, the shipwrights solved the

¹ Usher, *op. cit.*, pp. 477-8.

² On p. 371, n. 2, above.

³ See p. 367, above.

⁴ See Rostow, W. W.: *British Economy in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), p. 23.

⁵ In Usher, *op. cit.*, Table I, on p. 467.

⁶ In Schumpeter, J. A.: *Business Cycles* (New York 1939, McGraw-Hill, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 268, the United Kingdom merchant marine's approximate carrying-power, adjusted for steam, is reckoned, as by Usher, at rather less than 31 million tons for A.D. 1900, but at rather more than 8 million tons for A.D. 1850.

crucial problem with which the Industrial Revolution had thus confronted them by enlisting new technical resources that the Industrial Revolution itself had placed at their disposal. The creativity displayed in the nineteenth-century shipwrights' response was proportionate to the severity of the challenge that evoked it. But, as soon as the problem of carrying capacity had been solved through the creation of a long-distance steamship whose speed could be progressively increased *pari passu* with progressive increases in its size, there was a slackening of the pressure that had been constantly stimulating the shipwrights' inventive faculties during the preceding fifty years; and this relaxation of tension would seem to explain why it was that, in shipbuilding, the rate of innovation during the sixty years A.D. 1890 to 1950 was markedly slower than it had been between A.D. 1840 and A.D. 1890, in spite of the fact that, during the six decades ending in A.D. 1950, the general progress of Western technology had been continuing to accelerate in a geometrical progression.

The sensitiveness, speed, and vigour of the Western shipwright's responses to two altogether different challenges within the four and a half centuries running from *circa* A.D. 1440 to *circa* A.D. 1890 are striking evidences of human freedom of action in response to a technological challenge; but Technology is, after all, the field where, if anywhere, evidences of human freedom are to be expected, considering that Man never comes so near to being master of a situation as when he is dealing with Non-Human Nature. Man seldom shows anything like the same mastery in his dealings either with the Subconscious Psyche underlying his personality or with the other personalities who are his fellow human beings; and it is therefore perhaps more remarkable if we find evidences of Challenge-and-Response giving birth to human freedom on the spiritual as well as on the technological plane. We do, in fact, find such evidences here too when we recall the part played by Challenge-and-Response in generating the diversity between corresponding episodes in the histories of different civilizations.

The diversity in the duration of the growth-phases of civilizations has manifestly been the consequence of a recurrent freedom of choice that brings with it, each time, both a chance of success and a risk of failure. As we have found in a previous context,¹ the process of social growth consists in a concatenation of acts of Challenge-and-Response in which a successful response to one challenge gives rise to another challenge which may be met by another successful response giving rise to yet another challenge in the series. It will be seen that, in each successive act, the recipients of the challenge of the hour are free to choose between a Good and an Evil that are fraught with Life and with Death;² and this means that each act raises afresh the issue 'to be or not to be'. In any such series of encounters between God the deliverer of the challenge and Man the recipient of it, there is manifestly nothing that makes it impossible for the spinning of a golden thread of challenge-met-by-successful-response-leading-to-further-challenge-met-by-further-successful-response to continue *ad infinitum*. It is equally manifest that, at the

¹ In III. iii. 119-20.

² Deut. xxx. 15-19.

presentation of each successive challenge, there can be no assurance that the spinner will not fail, this time, to add another fathom's length to his life-line; for in each act Man is free to choose Death instead of Life; and, each time, his momentous choice depends on the uncertain issue of a spiritual struggle within his soul between an aspiration towards Grace and a gravitation towards Original Sin.

The severity of this perpetually recurring struggle is indicated by our finding that, out of twenty-two known civilizations,¹ there was only one that could not be certified to be either dead or in disintegration by the twentieth century of the Christian Era. It is true that these figures did not warrant any inferential estimate of a civilization's normal expectation of life, because this species of Society was at this date still so young, and the number of its representatives was still so few, that any attempt at a generalization must be subject to a stultifyingly wide margin of error. Yet, even if the statistics gave no legitimate ground for pessimism, it might be argued that each additional round might be likely to make the game more perilous, since a sinful Human Nature was apt to be tempted by every successful response to a challenge into succumbing either to the active sin of hybris or to the hardly less ruinous passive sin of resting on its oars.² If 'the greater the success, the greater the temptation' were in truth one of the laws to which the Human Psyche was subject, then it would seem to follow that an equilibrium which had to be unstable if it was to be a vehicle for the growth-process must be prone to become ever more precarious with each successive victory of Life over Death.

This besetting danger, which was the price of freedom, was advertised in the spectacle of disintegrating, petrified,³ arrested,⁴ and abortive⁵ civilizations, and was illustrated in the history, not only of human societies, but of terrestrial life itself. Every species of living creature is an earnest of growth, inasmuch as it is the fruit of some past creative mutation of an antecedent species and might become in its turn the seed of some further creative mutation into yet another species; yet at the same time every living species 'is a halt', and it is this 'by definition', since it 'is essentially a created thing'.⁶

The tragic breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization in the flower of its growth was sensitively forecast in the premonitory arrest of the growth of the Attic art of the tragic drama in a generation that lived to see the Atheno-Peloponnesian War.

'Tragedy—as also Comedy—was at first mere improvisation. . . . Tragedy advanced by slow degrees; each new element that showed itself was in turn developed. Having passed through many changes it found its natural form, and there it stopped (ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τῇ ναύτης φύσιν).'⁷

The changes through which the Athenian tragic drama had passed

¹ On a count in which a Medieval Western City-state cosmos is given the status of a civilization distinct from the main body of the Western Society.

² See IV. iv. 245-61.

³ See III. iii. 1-111.

⁴ See VI. vii. 4-6 and 47-52.

⁵ See II. ii. 322-60 and 388-91.

⁶ Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 251, quoted in III. iii. 235.

⁷ Aristotle: *Poetics*, chap. iv, § 12 (1449a), translated by Butcher, S. H.: *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, 3rd ed. (London 1902, Macmillan), pp. 18-19.

before its development was arrested had been rapid as well as radical; for a run of no more than three generations had seen the development begin and end; and the end and the beginning had both been abrupt. The 'natural form' attained by Attic tragedy at the hands of Sophocles and Euripides was conscientiously reproduced thereafter, without any further creative innovations, by their successors, not merely down to Aristotle's time, but until this genre of literature went out of cultivation in the Hellenic culture's latter days; and in the prelude to the story a traditional dramatic ritual, performed as a spell for ensuring the regular recurrence of an annual harvest and vintage, had, as far as we know, remained for centuries on end as static as the technique of agriculture itself until the genius commemorated in the historical or legendary name of Thespis transfigured this archaic religious institution into a rudimentary artistic vehicle for conveying the deepest feelings, problems, and interests of a flowering civilization. Considering that Aeschylus took over this new-born art in its swaddling clothes and handed it on to Sophocles all but full-grown, the three generations that saw the beginning and end of the growth of Attic tragedy virtually contract to the span of one single generation only.

How are we to account for a period of creativity hardly longer than the life-time of Aeschylus, when this brief spurt of growth has for its overture an aeon of the timeless ritual of the *ἐναυτός δαίμων*,¹ and for its epilogue an aeon of the conventional post-Euripidean Hellenic drama? The answer to this question is to be found in the history of the city-state of Athens in which the art of Tragedy was brought to life, like Pygmalion's statue, only to be turned to stone, like the Phaeacian galley,² in full career. The transfiguration of an Attic agricultural rite into a fine art was one of the expressions of a contemporaneous social and cultural transfiguration of Athens herself as a result of the Solonian revolution.³ In accomplishing this revolution in her own life, Athens made herself 'the education of Hellas';⁴ yet a title which conveyed the truth about the Athens of an age beginning with the generation of Solon at the turn of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. and ending with the generation of Aeschylus (*vivebat* 525/524-456 B.C.) had ceased to be deserved by Athens before it was coined for her in 431-430 B.C. by Pericles; for by that date Athens, under the influence of no other leader than Pericles himself, had hardened into the repellent figure of 'a tyrant city'⁵ who was selfishly misusing her power in Hellas in the narrow interests of her own citizens, and was jealously on her guard against the extension of an Athenian franchise that had now become a lucrative privilege. This moral fall of Athens had taken place during the half-century that had elapsed between the repulse of Xerxes's invasion of Continental European Greece and the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War; and the act in which it is most expressively symbolized is the scrutiny and purgation of the official register of Athenian citizens in 445-444 B.C., on the occasion of a distribution of grain, presented to the Athenian people

¹ See III. iii. 256.

³ See IV. iv. 200-14.

² See *Odyssey*: Book XIII, ll. 159-64.

⁴ See I. i. 24-26.

⁵ "Τυραννίδα ἔχερε τῇ νάρχῃν" (Cleon, in a speech put in his mouth by Thucydides Book III, chap. 37).

by their ally Egypt, which prompted them to act on a restrictive law enacted, at Pericles' instance, six years earlier.¹ It is assuredly no accident that this symbolic date of Athens' spiritual narcosis should coincide with the artistic *floruit* of a Sophocles in whose hands the Attic art of Tragedy came to the end of a growth that had been so vigorous in the generation of Sophocles' own immediate predecessor Aeschylus. The hybris bred in Athenian souls by the triumphant success of Athenian responses to the Hellenic World's sixth-century ordeal of encirclement and fifth-century ordeal of invasion had blighted the Athenian people's moral growth; and the halt in the development of the Attic art of Tragedy was a consequence and an index of this spiritual disaster.

The element of freedom in human affairs which reveals itself in a diversity in the duration of the growth-phases of civilizations, and whose epiphany and atrophy we can see—in the history of the growth and petrification of the Attic art of Tragedy—as sharply focused as if we were gazing through a magnifying glass, is likewise revealed in a diversity in the relations of Religion to the rises and falls of civilizations in different generations; and in this field, as in that, we can discern that human freedom springs from an encounter in which Man is summoned to respond to a challenge presented by God.

The challenge of social breakdown, disintegration, and dissolution had been identical in the histories of the civilizations of each of the three generations of this species of society that had run their course so far, and, as between the divers representatives of a single generation, it had been identical *a fortiori*; yet the responses made to this spiritual challenge in the second generation had, as we have seen, been immensely more fruitful than any responses made in either the first generation or the third; and, among these responses in the second generation, it seemed unlikely to a latter-day Christian historian that either Hinduism or Islam would be placed on a spiritual par with either the Mahāyāna or Christianity by a judge who was wholly disinterested and at the same time fully qualified (if any such godlike human arbiter was anywhere to be found). This wide diversity in the responses to an identical challenge becomes intelligible if—and perhaps only if—we see in it the consequence of a freedom of choice which God had granted to human souls; and thus we see freedom springing from Challenge-and-Response in the most crucial of all the ordeals through which Man in Process of Civilization had been reminded of his Creator in the course of the five or six thousand years during which the human climber had been striving to scale this precipitous 'pitch' on the cliff-face of his terrestrial purgatory.²

¹ See Aristotle: *The Constitution of Athens*, chap. 27, *ad finem*; Plutarch: *Life of Pericles*, chap. 37.

² See II. i. 192-3.

D. THE FREEDOM OF HUMAN SOULS THAT IS THE LAW OF GOD

IN the present Part of this Study we are trying to gain some insight into the relation between Law and Freedom in History; and, if we now reapproach this question in the light of the evidence that we have been gathering in the course of an empirical inquiry, we shall find that the question has already received an answer. How is Freedom related to Law? Our evidence declares that Man does not live under one law only; he lives under two laws, and one of these two is a Law of God which is Freedom itself under another and more illuminating name.

This 'perfect law of liberty'¹ is also a law of Love; for Man's freedom could only have been given to Man by a God who is Love in person,² and this divine gift can only be used by Man for freely choosing Good and Life instead of Death and Evil³ if Man, on his side, loves God well enough to be moved by this responsive love of his to commit himself to God, by making God's will his own, as unreservedly as God has committed Himself to Man by giving Man the power of free choice.

Our wills are ours, we know not how;
Our wills are ours, to make them thine.⁴

'La sua voluntade è nostra pace';⁵ and this self-surrender of Man's will to God's, which the Prophet Muhammad has preached in the lapidary word *islām*, is 'the glorious liberty of the children of God'.⁶ 'History is, . . . above everything else, a call, a vocation, a dispensation to be heard and responded to by free human beings—in short, the interaction of God and Man';⁷ and this truth has been partially divined by pre-Christian Hellenic philosophers and been faintly echoed in the utterances of post-Christian Western heresiarchs. Plato has testified that the Gods do not drive human beings, but steer them;⁸ and Hegel's description of creation as a synthesis obtained through a settlement of accounts between a thesis and an antithesis is a recognizable academic abstract of the living truth, even though it makes nonsense of it by perversely depotentializing the creative act of God's and Man's mutual love into the logical procedure of an intellect that 'by itself, moves nothing'.⁹

Law and Freedom in History prove to be identical, in the sense that Man's freedom proves to be the law of a God who is identical with Love. But this finding does not dispose of our problem; for in answering our

¹ James i. 25.

² 1 John iv. 8.

³ Deut. xxx. 15.

⁴ Tennyson: *In Memoriam*, in the invocation.

⁵ Dante: *La Divina Commedia*: 'Paradiso', Canto III, l. 85.

⁶ Rom. viii. 21.

⁷ Lampert, E.: *The Apocalypse of History* (London 1948, Faber), p. 45.

⁸ Plato: *Critias*, 109 B-C: 'They tended us as herdsmen tend their flocks, live-stock and nurselings, except that they did not use physical force, as shepherds do when they drive beasts by beating them. The Gods led Mankind by steering them. They guided Mankind's course from astern, which is the way in which a living creature is most easily manipulated, and they used as their rudder the instrument of Persuasion to influence the Human Psyche in accordance with the Gods' own ideas.'

⁹ Aristotle: *Ethica Nicomachea*, Z2, pp. 1139 A-B, quoted in III. iii. 231, n. 1, and on pp. 327-8, above.

original question we have raised a new one. In finding that Freedom is identical with one of two codes of Law, we have raised the question of the relation in which these two laws stand to one another; and at first sight the answer to this new question would seem to be that the Law of Love and the Law of Subconscious Human Nature, which both manifestly have jurisdiction over human affairs, are not only different but are contradictory, and are not only contradictory but are incompatible; for the law of the Subconscious Psyche, which our Western psychologists have located in the psychic abyss from which the Babylonian astrologers once projected it on to the stars in their courses, holds in spiritual bondage human souls whom God has called to work with Him in freedom. When one of two dispensations spells liberty, while the other spells servitude, are we not wantonly obscuring the truth and confusing the issue by using the same word 'law' to describe them both?

The more searchingly we compare these two 'laws', the wider the moral gulf between them seems to be. If we appraise the Law of Nature by the standard of the Law of Love, and see through Love's eyes everything that Nature has made, behold, it is very bad.¹

Ay, look: high Heaven and Earth ail from the prime foundation;
All thoughts to rive the heart are here, and all are vain.²

And, in the bitterness of his riven heart, Man explores divers possible explanations of a moral anomaly and enormity that he cannot explain away and cannot take for granted.

One of the conclusions that have been drawn by human spectators of the moral evil in the Universe is that this chamber of horrors cannot be any god's handiwork.

Quod si iam rerum ignorem primordia quae sint,
hoc tamen ex ipsis caeli rationibus ausim
confirmare aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
naturam rerum: tantâ stat praedita culpâ.³

To explain this evil universe as the undesigned outcome of a fortuitous concourse of indestructable atoms of matter is indeed the line of least resistance for an Epicurean in whose belief the gods are *rois fainéants*; but this Epicurean solution of the problem of Evil will not satisfy either a logician who sees through the word 'Chance' to an undesignated positive order lurking incognito under this negative label, or a Christian in whose belief God is the Love that has bestowed on Man a law that is Freedom. The Christian finds himself compelled to choose between two other alternatives, both of which are grievously disconcerting: Either the God who is Love must be also the creator of a manifestly ailing Universe, and therefore be either an incompetent demiurge or a malignant *mater saeva cupidinum*;⁴ or, if the God of Love is not one aspect of a Janus-headed Godhead that, in another aspect, is Our Lady of the

¹ Gen. i. 31.

² Housman, A. E.: *The Shropshire Lad*, xlviii, quoted in V. vi. 139.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book V, ll. 195-9. The grounds of this verdict are indicated in ll. 200-27.

⁴ Horace: *Odes*, Book I, Ode xix, l. 1.

Jungle, *πότνια θηρῶν*, then the ailing Universe must have been created by another god who is not the God of Love. In the second century of the Christian Era the Catholic Christian Church impaled itself on the first of the two horns of this dilemma, while a Marcionite Christian Church impaled itself on the second.

Marcion was a posthumous disciple of the Apostle Paul who drew, with an un-Pauline rigour, the logical consequences of a Pauline distinction between opposing realms of Mosaic Law and of Christian Grace. Marcion's uncompromising jealousy for the immaculateness of the God who is Love made it impossible for him to remain in communion¹ with any fellow Christian

Who trusted God was Love indeed,
And Love Creation's final law,
'Tho' Nature, red in tooth and claw
With ravin, shriek'd against his creed.²

Marcion broke with a Catholic Christianity because he had wrestled with the question

Are God and Nature then at strife,
That Nature lends such evil dreams?³

and had given, for his part, the affirmative answer that William Blake's *anima naturaliter Marcionita* was to give to the same question some seventeen hundred years later.

When the stars threw down their spears
And watered Heaven with their tears,
Did He smile His work to see?
Did He that made the Lamb make thee?

Blake's and Marcion's solution for this moral enigma is to attribute the creation of an ailing Universe to a god who, so far from being identical with God the fount of Love and Father of the Saviour, is His antithesis inasmuch as the creator god's distinctive characteristic is the forbidding negative quality of being both unloving and unlovable. In Blake's, as in Marcion's, theology, God the Creator's role is to play the Erinyes to God the Redeemer's Orpheus.⁴ While the Saviour God wins souls by love, without ever terrorizing them by threats of constraining them by force, the highest moral level to which a creator god depicted as a Prussian drill-sergeant *in excelsis* is deemed capable of rising is to exact outward conformity with the prescriptions of a cut-and-dried moral law by imposing savage penalties for formal breaches of it. He is spiritually impotent to move his human creatures by touching their heart-strings.

This melancholy taskmaster god whom Marcion identifies with a Mosaic Jehovah and whom Blake names 'Urizen' and nicknames 'Nobodaddy' would be bad enough if he performed his self-imposed duties

¹ Marcion founded a church of his own in A.D. 144, after his doctrine had been rejected by the Catholic Christian community at Rome. For the date, see Harnack, A. von: *Marcion, Das Evangelium vom Fremden Gott* (Leipzig 1921, Hinrichs), pp. 24 and 18*.

² Tennyson: *In Memoriam*, Section LVI, Stanza 4.

³ *Ibid.*, Section LV, Stanza 2.

⁴ See IV. iv. 123-5.

competently even according to his own limited lights; but his work is a hideous failure; and this failure must be due either to incompetence or to malevolence. Even if the Creator were to be acquitted on the charge of wilful malice, he would have to be convicted of being either culpably unaware of his wantonly assumed responsibilities or else no less culpably indifferent to them; and either of these verdicts would be damning in the judgement of a decently human jury; for no human being who was not shockingly obtuse or callous could imagine himself ever having had the heart, if he had been creating morally irresponsible sentient living organisms, to victimize his own creatures by enduing them with the capacity to suffer when he was not endowing them with any capacity to turn suffering to moral account. It would have been still harder for him to imagine himself ever having implanted, in any morally responsible sentient living creatures of his, the capacity not only to suffer but to sin without having made sure in advance that he would never be driven by force of circumstances to lead these human beings into temptation and would always be sufficiently master of the situation to be able to deliver them from evil.

"That there is a "soul of good in things evil" is unquestionable; nor will any wise man deny the disciplinary value of pain and sorrow. But these considerations do not help us to see why the immense multitude of irresponsible sentient beings, which cannot profit by such discipline, should suffer; nor why, among the endless possibilities open to omnipotence—that of sinless, happy existence among the rest—the actuality in which sin and misery abound should be that selected."¹

When a human soul thus finds itself confronted with two numinous presences which are morally antithetical² to one another, yet which, none the less, both have to be recognized as being indubitably divine, the most obvious conclusion is that there must be, not one god, but two gods, in the Universe; and this argument came home *ad hominem* to the writer of this Study when, with the present chapter in mind, he was reading simultaneously Adolf von Harnack's *Marcion, the Gospel of the Stranger God*, and Thor Heyerdahl's *Kon-Tiki*.³

"They that go down to the sea in ships, that do business in great waters, these see the works of the Lord, and His wonders in the deep."⁴

But they that go down to the sea, not in a ship, but on a balsa-log sieve, see works of God the Creator that are yet more wondrous and appalling than any that discover themselves to seafarers who 'plough across' the water, in latter-day Western style, 'with roaring engines and piston-strokes'.⁵ "The sea contains many surprises for him who has his floor on a level with the surface and drifts along slowly and noiselessly";⁶ and in the experience of the crew of the *Kon-Tiki* most of these surprises were

¹ Huxley, T. H.: *Evolution and Ethics*, the Romanes Lecture, 1893, reprinted in Huxley, T. H. and J.: *Evolution and Ethics*, 1893-1943 (London 1947, Pilot Press), p. 76.

² Marcion's principal recorded original work (published as a commentary on a Bible composed of expurgated versions of some of Saint Paul's Epistles and of the Gospel according to Saint Luke) bore the expressive title *Antitheses*.

³ Heyerdahl, T.: *Kon-Tiki, Across the Pacific by Raft* (Chicago 1950, Rand McNally).

⁴ Ps. cviii, vv. 23-24.

⁵ Heyerdahl, op. cit., p. 117.

⁶ Ibid., p. 117.

nightmares: the whale shark with a toadlike jaw four or five feet wide that came grinning like a bulldog;¹ the three luminous monsters larger than elephants;² the devilish green eyes of giant squids which shone in the dark like phosphorus;³ and the ghastly life-and-death struggle between sharks, tunnies, and dolphins.⁴ 'When we turned in on these evenings, in our mind's eye we saw greedy, open shark jaws and blood, and the smell of shark meat stuck in our nostrils';⁵ yet these predatory monsters of the deep were bone of the bones and flesh of the flesh⁶ of these horrified human spectators; for all terrene life is known to have originated in the sea, and the chemical composition of the human body betrays the marine origin of a perhaps not less predatory Mankind. Almost, Thor, thou persuadest me to be a Marcionite⁷—yet, though Man's heart may be moved by the *visio malefica* of Creation to curse a god who has brought these horrors into being, Man's head will forbid him to embrace a theology that breaks down under examination.

While Marcion is on strong ground in affirming that Creation is bound up with Evil, he is on weak ground in denying that Creation has anything to do either with Goodness or with Love; for the truth is that God's love is the source of Man's freedom, and that a freedom which gives vent for Creation thereby opens a door for Sin. The ordeals in which Man has to exercise his freedom to choose between Life and Death and between Good and Evil can be described, with equal faithfulness to truth, as challenges from God and as temptations from the Devil. We have watched the Devil unintentionally serving God's purpose by helping God to carry on His creative activity, and we have even wondered whether, under the disguise of a satanic malice, a divine love may not be operating through a Mephistopheles without whose left-handed assistance God's work might be brought to a halt by its own paradoxically paralysing perfection.⁸ Every encounter between a human soul and God is thus inevitably fraught with possibilities of Evil as well as Good; and this chain that links Evil, as well as Good, to Love cannot be severed by the knife-edge of Marcion's logic. All morally sensitive hearts will sympathize with Marcion's zeal to keep the hem of a Divine Love's garment unspotted; yet the same fine feeling will make such hearts revolt against the logic of Marcion's consequent denigration of a Sub-conscious Psyche that animates Man and Beast alike, and that bears up human personalities on the surface of its abyss, as the unplumbed Pacific bore up Thor Heyerdahl's balsa-log raft. For this primal living creature that is the Great Mother of Life on Earth is not only the Kali whose obscene womb has spawned Leviathan and Behemoth, the Dragon and the Bull;⁹ it is also the Pytho whose oracular omphalos—in 'that shady city of palm trees'¹⁰ where 'Heaven lies about us in our infancy'¹¹—is the fount of Poetry and Prophecy; and, if we believe that the voice of a God who is Love thus speaks to the Soul through the

¹ Ibid., p. 120.

³ Ibid., p. 118.

⁶ Gen. ii. 23.

⁹ See VII. vii. 506, and pp. 332-3, above.

¹¹ Wordsworth, William: *Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood*.

² Ibid., pp. 118-19.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 203-4.

⁷ Acts xxvi. 28.

⁵ Ibid., p. 206.

⁸ See II. i. 271-99.

¹⁰ Vaughan, Henry: *The Retreat*.

Subconscious in the divinely inspired accents of a Dante and a Deutero-Isaiah, we may venture on to believe that Love is also the God who has created the tentacles of the squid and the teeth of the whale-shark. 'For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of Him who hath subjected the same in hope.'¹

In logic, this is evidently a harder saying than Marcion's *creatorem aut ignorasse aut noluisse aut potentem non esse*;² but in reality, as registered in the full gamut of our human experience, Marcion's vindication of God's love at the cost of denying His unity is no less evidently wider of the mark than Irenaeus's vindication of the identity of God the Almighty Creator with God the All-loving Redeemer at the cost of identifying with one another two epiphanies of the Godhead which are logically and morally irreconcilable from a human standpoint. And experience's testimony to the truth of a logical and moral paradox is strikingly vindicated by the findings of a science which cannot be suspected of having gone out of its way in order to ratify an Irenaean system of Christian theology. The travail of striving to reconcile two irreconcilable epiphanies of God, which torments the consciousness of the adult saint and scholar, is declared by at least one school of post-Modern Western psychological research to have already tormented a Subconscious Psyche in an antecedent struggle through which the future saint and scholar's moral personality has been originally acquired at a stage of early infancy in which God's future place in the Soul's universe has been occupied by the infant child's Mother.

'As the baby begins . . . early in the . . . second year of post-natal life . . . to draw a distinction between itself and outer reality, it is the Mother³ who comes to represent the external world and to mediate its impacts on the child. But she dawns upon its growing consciousness under two opposite aspects. She is the child's chief object of love, and its fountain-head of satisfaction, security, and peace. But she is also Authority, the chief source of power mysteriously set over the child and arbitrarily thwarting some of the impulses along whose paths its new life quests outwards. The frustration of infantile impulse generates anger, hate, and destructive wishes—what the psychologists generally style aggression—directed against the thwarting authority. But this hated Authority is also the loved Mother. The infant is thus faced with the primal conflict. Two irreconcilable sets of impulses are directed towards the same object, and that object is the centre of its surrounding universe.'⁴

Thus, according to one psychological theory, the conscious moral conflict of maturity is subconsciously anticipated in early infancy; and, in the infantile, as in the adult, struggle, a spiritual victory exacts its spiritual price. 'Primitive Love conquers Primitive Hate by saddling it with the burden of primal guilt';⁵ and Psychology thus endorses

¹ Rom. viii. 20.

² Marcion as interpreted by Tertullian in his *Adversus Marcionem*, Book IV, chap. 41 (see Harnack, op. cit., p. 95).

³ 'And/or any efficient mother-substitute, such as a nurse who takes over the care of the baby, or a large part of it.'

⁴ Huxley, J.: *Evolutionary Ethics*, the Romanes Lecture, 1943, reprinted in Huxley, T. H. and J.: *Evolution and Ethics, 1893-1943* (London 1947, Pilot Press), p. 107.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

the Irenaeus anti-Marcionite Christian finding that Love and Hate, Righteousness and Sinfulness, are indissolubly linked with one another through the chain of Creation.

'Without a mother, no strong love focussed on a personal object; without such love, no conflict of irreconcilable impulses; without such conflict, no guilt; and, without such guilt, no effective moral sense.'¹

A latter-day Western psychology's discovery, in an infantile Sub-conscious Psyche, of two irreconcilable impressions of one Mother, who represents Authority as well as Love in her own indivisible person, testifies to the veracity of Irenaeus's intuition that the apparent co-existence of two gods, morally antithetical to one another, must be, not a faithful reflection of the divine reality, but a mirage reflecting merely a diffraction of the unitary image of the One True God in the prismatic lens of an imperfect human spiritual vision.² God the Lover and Redeemer of souls must, in spite of Marcionite appearances to the contrary, be identical, in an ineffable reality, with God the Creator of sub-conscious terrestrial life, as well as with God the Creator of a material cosmos whose mathematical perfection is not marred by any moral bar sinister on the inanimate level. This paradoxical truth that Love is inseparable from the Almighty Power put forth in Creation is visually portrayed in Medieval Western Christian *mappae mundi* in which the latent figure of Christ Crucified holds together and sustains the World; and this image does not become less true to reality if we replace the Greek cross on which the seventeenth-century Western mathematicians hung their analysis of a static universe by the Saint Andrew's cross, embodied in the three-dimensional form of an hour-glass, on which a twentieth-century Western mathematical physicist had learnt to hang his analysis of a universe travelling through Space-Time.

For finite human minds, it is morally inexplicable that God the Creator of Life on Earth should have anticipated the gait of His creature *Homo Faber* by feeling his way *gradatim et pedetemptim*. They can understand why Man should have had to serve an apprenticeship in flaking flints in order to learn how to build an atomic pile; but why did an Almighty God who is Love and Creativity in one not avail Himself of His power to create a Buddha and a Saint Francis *de toutes pièces*? Why did He elect to approach the creation of these spiritual masterpieces of His by the slow, laborious, clumsy, and apparently maleficent method of creating

¹ Ibid., p. 110.

² The psychological process by which the *Visio Beatifica* is distorted in a sinful soul's sight is perhaps adumbrated in the psychologists' account of the distortion of the image of a child's parents in the sight of the refractory infant child.

'It is characteristic of this first beginning of our ethical mechanism that it is in many respects unrealistic. The parents have to exercise control over the child, and in so doing will be strict, or even harsh, and will certainly sometimes appear cruel. But to their actual and real strictness is added an unreal quota and quality of unpleasantness in the shape of the child's own thwarted aggressiveness. Thus the dialectic of growth succeeds in intro-jecting a parent-figure very different from the real parent, since it is "endowed with all the crude and primitive aggressiveness of the child himself. In this way, it would appear, does the super-ego acquire its more alarming and barbaric features", and this is why the semi-conscious or unconscious core of the super-ego (which may persist even throughout life) is so harsh and so unnecessarily severe, calling all the time upon the Self to make atonement for its load of primal guilt' (Huxley, J.: 'Conclusions', in Huxley, T. H. and J., op. cit., p. 206. Cp. p. 195).

amoebas, cholera germs, sharks, and sabre-toothed tigers by the way? 'Did He that made the lamb make thee?' Can God, Marcion again interpellates, be almighty if He is unable, or all-loving if He is unwilling, to evoke sainthood except at the cost of a spiritual tension and struggle fraught with the certainty of suffering and with the possibility of sin? Is the rarely trodden path to sainthood only a higher and steeper reach of the steep and arduous ascent climbed by every human infant that acquires a moral personality at the cost of a psychic conflict? Human minds cannot find a logically self-consistent answer to this riddle of creation because they cannot view the travail of creation with the all-comprehending vision of a Divine Creative Love which sees everything that It has made, from the shark to the saint, and beholds that it is very good.¹ Yet even a finite human understanding may surmise that the history of Life on Earth describes a curve through Space-Time-Psyche in which each of the imperfect and ephemeral successive living moments out of which this curve is built up has its absolute value for the *Deus Crucifixus* whose Cross is at once the sure evidence of God's love and the firm frame on which the moving curve of His creation through suffering hangs. 'Wie es eigentlich gewesen' is a mystery that may pass the understanding of any creature afloat in the creative Time-stream; but the historian's very consciousness of the relativity of his own infirm standpoint is evidence that he has some inkling of an absolute *ὁπου στῆ*; and perhaps even he may catch a fleeting glimpse of 'wie es geworden' by clutching, for an instant, the skirts of 'I am'.² In such flashes of illumination a human understanding may divine that the service performed for God by Evil as an instrument of creation in His hands is a reality in God's creative work in Time which is transcended in those higher spheres that are entered by a contrite Doctor Marianus in the last act of the second part of Goethe's *Faust*; and this intuition is shared with Christianity by Buddhism if the conception of *Nirvāna* is to be interpreted as implying the extinction, not of Life itself, but of the tragically creative experiences of Life-in-Time.³

In Life-in-Time, as human souls experience it in their passage through This World, a finite human understanding, that cannot resolve an apparent moral conflict between divers laws reigning within human ken, can at least discern that, from the standpoint of creatures subject to their dominion, these laws stand to one another in a hierarchical relation, and that this hierarchy of laws is a Jacob's ladder up which God is ever seeking to draw His Creatures towards Him, rung over rung. This partial intuition of the role of Law in History, imperfect though it be, throws some light on the relation between Law and Freedom if we also take the view that 'Freedom', like 'Chance' and 'Heterodoxy', is a relative concept, not an absolute one, and that, accordingly, Freedom from the dominion of a law can be won only at the price of accepting the dominion of some other law that is higher in the scale in the sense of having power to liberate from the rule of the previously prevailing law anyone able to live up to the rule of the new law and willing to live

¹ Gen. i. 31.

² Exod. iii. 13-15 (see V. vi. 42, n. 1).

³ See V. vi. 18, n. 1.

under it. Freedom from the ineffectual law of an anarchic Iceland can be won only by submitting to a stern Norwegian King's Peace; freedom from the capricious law of Xerxes can be won only by submitting to the inexorable law of the Lycurgeoan *agóge*;¹ freedom from the brutal law of Ishmael can be won only by submitting to an arbitrary law of Moses; freedom from the law of the Mosaic letter that killeth can be won only by embracing a law of Christ's spirit that giveth life.²

Since it is thus impossible to win freedom from the service of one law except by entering into the service of some higher law, the liberation that is achieved at each upward step from law to law is inevitably at the same time a sacrifice. The rise from the level of a law of inanimate Physical Nature to the level of a law of Subconscious Psychic Nature liberates Life at the cost of inflicting Death and of kindling sensations and passions that, in a retrospective view from a subsequently attained human standpoint, display a moral spectrum diffracted into Good and Bad. The rise from the level of a law of Subconscious Psychic Nature to the level of a law of Conscious Will liberates the Human Spirit at the cost of charging a creature hitherto as innocent as the lamb and the tiger with the crucial responsibility of having to make divine or satanic choices between Right and Wrong. Liberty from a lower law can never be purchased except at this cost of submitting to a higher law; and, when purchased at this cost, it can be preserved only at the price of eternal vigilance; for an empirically experienced hierarchical relation between these divers laws current in the Universe, which seems to certify that they are so many enactments of a single divine legislator, creates an agonizing conflict of laws for any of God's creatures that have accepted His challenge to transfer their allegiance from some lower law of His to some higher one.

'I delight in the Law of God after the Inward Man; but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the Law of Sin which is in my members.'³

And Saint Paul's testimony from his personal experience was endorsed by a nineteenth-century Western man of science who had done as much as any man to write the laws of Nature large on his contemporaries' mental map.

'Cosmic Nature is no school of virtue, but the headquarters of the enemy of Ethical Nature. . . . Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process, the end of which is not the survival of those who

¹ This point is made by Herodotus (*Histories*, Book VII, chaps. 101-5) in an imaginary conversation which he puts into the mouths of Xerxes and the exiled King of Lacedaemon, Dámarátus, who is serving on Xerxes' staff during the Achaemenian Power's invasion of Continental European Greece in 480 B.C. The Spartan quisling is represented as saying to the Persian autocrat:

"Though the Lacedaemonians are free, their freedom is not absolute. They are subjects of a lord and master whose name is the Law; and they fear this master a great deal more than Your Majesty's subjects fear Your Majesty. At any rate, they never fail to carry out whatever orders this master may give them; and his orders are always the same: "The troops are forbidden to retreat in the face of the enemy, however great his numerical superiority; their orders are to remain at their posts and there conquer or die."'

² 2 Cor. iii. 6.

³ Rom. vii. 22-23.

may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically the best. . . . The ethical process is in opposition to the principle of the cosmic process, and tends to the suppression of the qualities best fitted for success in that struggle. . . . What would become of the garden if the gardener treated all the weeds and slugs and birds and trespassers as he would like to be treated, if he were in their place? . . . The practice of that which is ethically best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint. . . . It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. . . . Man, as a “political animal”, . . . is compelled to be perpetually on guard against the cosmic forces, whose ends are not his ends, without and within himself. . . . The ethical progress of Society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it. . . . The history of Civilisation details the steps by which men have succeeded in building up an artificial world within the Cosmos. . . . In virtue of his intelligence, the dwarf bends the titan to his will. . . . That which lies before the Human Race is a constant struggle to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature, the State of Art of an organised polity, in which, and by which, Man may develop a worthy civilisation, capable of maintaining and constantly improving itself, until the evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway and, once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of our planet.¹

If Freedom is to be taken as being a relative concept, and if all the mutually contrary and contradictory laws in an ascending hierarchy are in some sense laws of God, even though human minds cannot resolve an apparent moral conflict between God’s Law of Love and God’s Law of Subconscious Psychic Nature, is there any sense in which the Law of Love can be called God’s Law without qualification, and in which the freedom to be found in God’s service is, after all, not relative, but truly ‘perfect’?² When we have heard Christ’s challenge ‘Take up the cross and follow me,’³ can we credit His assurance ‘My yoke is easy and my burden is light’?⁴

The answer to this question seems to be that ‘the glorious freedom of the sons of God’, which they enjoy under the Law of Love, is not merely the relative freedom of a release from the law of a compulsive Subconscious Psyche; it is also the perfect freedom possessed by God Himself, which an all-loving Creator has bestowed upon His creature Man at the sacrificial price of emptying Himself⁵ of almighty power. Under a Law of Love which is the law of God’s own Being, God’s self-sacrifice challenges Man by setting before Man an ideal of spiritual perfection which Man has perfect freedom to accept or to reject. The Law of Love leaves Man as free to be a sinner as to be a saint. The one thing that Man

¹ Huxley, T. H.: *Evolution and Ethics*, the Romanes Lecture, 1893, and *Prolegomena*, 1894, reprinted in Huxley, T. H. and J.: *Evolution and Ethics*, 1893–1943 (London, 1947, Pilot Press), pp. 78, 81, 51, 52, 81–82, 59, 82, 83, 83, 60.

² ‘Whose service is perfect freedom.’—The Second Collect, for Peace, in the Order for Morning Prayer Daily throughout the Year, in *The Book of Common Prayer* according to the Use of the Church of England.

³ Mark x. 21.

⁴ Matt. xi. 30.

⁵ Phil. ii. 7, as translated in the Revised Version.

can be sure that this law will never do to him is to make him take up the Cross against his will; for the Law of Love is the one law that can never be served involuntarily. There is not, and cannot be, any externally applied coercion to obey this law, or any externally imposed punishment for disobeying it. The punishment for disobedience is inherent in the act of disobedience itself; for, in using his God-given freedom to reject the ideal in which the Law of Love consists, a human soul that has been created 'to glorify God and fully to enjoy Him for ever'¹ is rejecting 'the true end of Man', and is running, self-driven, into the disaster that overtakes Man through the inexorable working of the Law of Subconscious Human Nature, if he fails to respond to God's challenge to rise to the service of the Law of Love by using his God-given freedom to choose what is the will of God for him. Moreover, even this self-inflicted disaster is no final judgement and no irrevocable doom, since mundane disaster brings with it the opportunity of learning through suffering for any sinner who repents of his sin and is moved by his penitence to seek the aid of God's grace.

Thus, on this highest visible pitch of a cliff-face up which the creature is being drawn by the call of his Creator to essay a perilous ascent, we catch a glimpse of God's hand reaching down to meet the upstretched hand of the struggling human climber; and, at the point where hands meet in the clasp of Love, Law and Freedom cease to be distinguishable; for 'tis only he that loves not that is fettered by compulsion'.² Since the God who is Love is also Omnipotence, a soul that loves is liberated by the maker and master of all laws from a bondage to laws of the Subconscious Psyche which Babylonian souls used to project on to inexorable stars in their courses and which Hellenic souls used to personify as malignant *kêres* and *daimones*; and a liberating truth which had once proved potent to set free³ fast-fettered Hellenes and Babylonians might once again be taken to heart by the children of a post-Christian World which had been vainly seeking to ban those dread psychic principalities and powers⁴ in the name of a Science that was as impotent to exorcize them as any pre-Christian magic.

¹ Answer to Question 1 in the Larger Catechism agreed upon by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster with the Assistance of Commissioners from the Church of Scotland . . . and approved Anno 1648 by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.

² Jalâl-ad-Dîn Rûmî: *Mathnawî*, Book I, ll. 1456 seqq., translated by R. A. Nicholson in *Rumi, Poet and Mystic* (London 1950, Allen & Unwin), p. 162.

³ John viii. 32.

⁴ Rom. viii. 38; Eph. iii. 10 and vi. 12.

XII

THE PROSPECTS OF THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION

A. THE NEED FOR THIS INQUIRY

AS he took up his pen to write the present Part of this book, the writer was conscious of a sense of distaste for this self-imposed task which was due to something more than a natural shrinking from the obvious hazards of a speculative subject.

On the 30th November, 1950, it was, of course, clear that the forecasts about the prospects of the Western Civilization that he was venturing to put on paper might be belied by events almost before the ink was dry, and perhaps long before the manuscript could be printed and published.¹ Yet, if the risk of making himself ridiculous had been a governing consideration in the writer's mind, this would have deterred him from ever embarking on any part of this Study; and, in committing himself to Part Twelve of the work after having already given eleven hostages to Fortune, he could take heart from the reflection that at this date the prospects of the Western Civilization were at any rate very much less obscure than they had been when, in the early months of the year 1929, he had been drafting the original notes for this Part that were now lying at his elbow.

In A.D. 1929, before the break on Wall Street, it was already possible to discern the general direction in which the Western World was moving, but it was far more difficult then than it was twenty-one years later to picture the alternative possible routes along which this movement might take its course. In 1929 it could already be foreseen, for example, that, in a Westernizing World that had become coextensive with the entire habitable surface of the Planet, a process of unification which, on the economic, technological, and intellectual planes, was accelerating in a geometrical progression was bound to prevail on the military and political planes likewise, sooner or later; yet in 1929 it was still impossible either to guess how long it would take to arrive at this consummation or to imagine how the unificatory process would overcome a passive and active opposition which, at that date, were no less impressive than was the contrary *nisus* towards unification. In 1929 an historian seemed to be in presence here of a contest like the legendary race between the hound who could never fail to catch his quarry and the fox who could never be caught; and on the military and political plane this apparently insoluble riddle of A.D. 1929 was illustrated by the situation of the Great Powers

¹ 'Lorsqu'il s'agit . . . d'un ensemble aussi complexe, la difficulté de reconstituer le passé, même le plus récent, est toute comparable à la difficulté de construire l'avenir, même le plus proche; ou, plutôt, c'est la même difficulté. Le prophète est dans le même sac que l'historien. Laissons-les y.' (Valéry, Paul: 'La Crise de l'Esprit,' in *Variété* (Paris 1924, Gallimard, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française), p. 17).

as a group, and most pointedly by the particular situation of France. Though the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy had become a total wreck in the War of A.D. 1914-18, the other seven of the eight Great Powers in existence at the outbreak of war had all survived, and, of these, Germany and Russia, which had both been prostrate in A.D. 1919, were manifestly both on the road to recovery ten years later. As for France, on the one hand it was manifest in A.D. 1929—and had indeed been evident since A.D. 1870-1—that she must resign herself, sooner or later, to losing the status of a first-class Power which she had enjoyed continuously ever since her decisive victory over an aggressive England in the fifteenth century; on the other hand it was no less manifest that she was still determined to play her traditional role of 'la Grande Nation', though she might be patently staggering under her present load and be hardly less patently anxious about her future.

Prospects that were thus so bafflingly ambiguous in A.D. 1929 were, by comparison, startlingly clear in A.D. 1950 for an observer who took as his criterion either France in particular or the Great Powers as a group.

By 1950 two decades of French history that had still been below the historian's horizon in 1929 had given a practical demonstration of the psychic alchemy by which 'a nation of patriots'¹ who had once prodigally sacrificed their lives on the goddess France's altar could transmute itself into a nation of 'defeatists'; and one of the most unpredictable, surprising, and significant metamorphoses in this sombrely miraculous transformation-scene was the inversion of French nationalists into French collaborators with a German attempt to reduce France to the status of being Germany's helot-in-chief *en permanence*. The French slogan, to the tune of which the Vichyssois had danced this German dance, had been 'la France seule'; for, under this parade of patriotically refusing to pull Great Britain's or any other foreign country's chestnuts out of the fire at the cost of burning French fingers, French 'defeatists' had indicated that they would reject all foreign proffers of help to throw off a German yoke to which France herself had submitted rather than endure the agony of remaining at war, like Norway, Holland, and Belgium, with an enemy who had overrun her metropolitan territory; and, though France had, in the end, been liberated in spite of herself, and had indeed anticipated the landing of the liberating American and British armies on French soil by throwing up a native resistance movement after the turn of the tide against Germany in a war from which France had previously contracted out, the Vichy chapter of French military, political, and psychological history had left a palpable mark on the spirit of a France who in A.D. 1950 was officially execrating the Vichy régime and all its works.

In 1950 there were Frenchmen who were resigned in advance to seeing France submit to a Russian yoke as she had submitted to a German yoke in A.D. 1940; and those other Frenchmen who were imbued with the spirit of the maquis rather than of Vichy agreed with their 'defeatist' compatriots in feeling that, in 1950, France could no longer stand

¹ Hayes, C. J. H.: *France, a Nation of Patriots* (New York 1930, Columbia University Press).

alone in the true sense in which these words expressed France's former political ideal of genuine national sovereign independence. In 1950 the more sanguine and constructive spirits in France saw their country's salvation in a merger of her once jealously vindicated separate national identity in a supra-national Western community that was to embrace at least all Western Europe and was perhaps eventually to bestride the Atlantic. In the hearts of Frenchmen who were 'good Europeans', as in those of Frenchmen who were 'defeatists', the ideal of parochial nationalism was thus dead; and this was a portent for the Western World as a whole; for, in a post-Medieval Western Society, France had been the archetype of the self-sufficiently sovereign independent national state; and therefore, if, in France, a five-hundred-years-old tradition of political parochialism had been broken between the years 1933 and 1940 by the irresistibly mightier force of an explosive German imperialism, it could be foreseen that tougher wills to retain a sovereign national independence might likewise be broken by the impact of forces mightier than a National-Socialist Germany.

Great Britain, for instance, had refused to give in when, in 1940, France's will to resist Germany had broken down; yet from 1931 to 1940 Great Britain had been France's fellow-traveller down the road of appeasement which France had followed to the bitter end; and, after 1940, Great Britain's happy issue out of afflictions to which she had then exposed herself at the eleventh hour—by then taking an heroic decision—had been due to the mighty reinforcement of her own inadequate national strength by the arms of a Soviet Union and a United States who were successively drawn into the war on the anti-Axis side thanks to a German and a Japanese miscalculation that were, either of them, egregious. The Second World War left Great Britain's two eventual allies alone still capable of playing the part of Great Powers in a struggle for existence between parochial states that had now become vastly more strenuous than it had been in A.D. 1929; America's and Russia's fellow victor Great Britain, no less than a defeated Germany, Japan, Italy, and France, had fallen out of the running; and a Second World War which had thus reduced the number of the Great Powers in a Westernizing World from seven to two had, in the act, forged a new weapon that might prove potent enough to break the spirit of parochial Powers even of a Russian or an American calibre. Even if the uranium atom bomb should fail to produce the same morally devastating effect on these two loose-limbed giants as it had produced on a congested and exhausted Japan, an inconscionable post-Modern Western Science still had up her sleeve a hydrogen atom bomb that could be guaranteed, if ever detonated, to blow even a United States or Soviet Union out of the water—at the cost, perhaps, of making the whole face of the Planet uninhabitable by human or any other living organisms.¹

¹ The following comment on this passage, and on other passages to the same effect in the present Part of this Study, has been made by Professor William McNeill:

'I doubt the likelihood of total extinction of Civilization, still more of Mankind, as a result of a third world war. The will to resist and the capacity to conduct an organized campaign breaks down short of physical extinction; and the breaking point is removed farther from the point of physical extinction in proportion as the waging of war becomes

Thus in A.D. 1950 it was already far less open to doubt than it had been in A.D. 1929 that, in a struggle for supremacy between two titanic post-Christian Western idols—a Moloch Nationalism and a Juggernaut Technology—the treads of Juggernaut's irresistibly high-powered bulldozer were going to trample over the antique plates of Moloch's brazen furnace; and this lesson from the experience of twenty-one sinisterly illuminating years had made experiments in prognostication less hazardous by pinning the still patently open questions within a framework of relatively sure prediction. On the 1st December, 1950, it was still impossible to foresee whether the third round in the struggle was going to be played out without another explosion of 'total war', and whether life on the planet would survive if a Third World War did break out within the bosom of an oecumenical human society that had now learnt how to split the atom. It could, however, now be foreseen that, if a Western Technology's victory over a Western Nationalism were to be consummated without the annihilation of the Human Race, the story would end in the monopoly of the technical means of annihilation in the hands of some single authority whose fiat would be virtually law, not merely in one island, continent, or hemisphere, but throughout the *Oikoumenê*—in whatever quarter of the globe this oecumenical authority's geographical base of operations might be located, and whatever the constitutional form in which its monopoly of world-power might be veiled or advertised. This concentration of political power might or might not be achieved by the 'knock-out blow' that had brought into being a *Pax Romana* and all the other 'universal states' so far known to History; the parochial *peritura regna* might be ostensibly preserved instead of being overtly liquidated; but, whatever course and shape the political unification of a post-Modern Westernizing World might take, it seemed safe to predict that the acquisition of atomic weapons would bring about the political unification of the *Oikoumenê* in one way or another—and this sooner rather than later—considering that a *Pax Romana* had been forced upon an Hellenic World, and a *Pax Hanica* upon a Sinic World, by the intolerableness of the alternative choice of continuing to suffer the consequences of wars between parochial states waged with unprecedented atrocity by new-fangled 'methods of barbarism'. If this revolutionary political effect could be produced by 'total war' fought with such comparatively humane and innocuous weapons as the spear, the bow, and the horse, it must assuredly be produced by atomic warfare *a fortiori*.

Thus in A.D. 1950 an intellectual prospector could enter on a mental exploration of the Western Civilization's future with rather more confidence that he could have felt in A.D. 1929; he need not feel now that he was sentencing himself to undertake a Psyche's task; and the writer's own distaste for his present subject ought therefore to have been appreciably diminished by the intervening passage of two enlightening addi-

a more complex activity, requiring the coordination of larger numbers of specialists both in and outside of the fighting forces. At the time of Germany's surrender in A.D. 1945 about 80 per cent. of Germany's industrial equipment was still intact, in spite of the bombing operations of the Allied Powers. This, however, does not mean that a particular battle-ground, such as Europe, could not be destroyed more or less completely by alien fighting forces whose bases of supply were situated elsewhere.'

tional decades of history if it had been merely a recoil from the risk of a hazardous intellectual adventure. Why was it, then, that, so far from diminishing, his distaste had been increasing steadily in the meantime? The answer to this question was not obscure to the writer himself. The reason was that this growing disinclination of his had in fact little or nothing to do with the difficulty of estimating the Western Civilization's prospects, but was rooted in a reluctance to throw overboard one of the cardinal principles governing the writer's whole approach to his study of History. He was distressed by a fear that, if he allowed himself to single out any one civilization for special treatment, he might be abandoning a standpoint from which alone it was, in his belief, possible to see in true perspective the whole history of a species of Society of which the Western Civilization was one, but only one, representative; and his belief in the rightness of this non-Western standpoint had been confirmed, in his personal judgement, by the results of two decades spent in trying to read the map of history from a non-Western angle of vision.

One of the stimuli that had originally spurred the writer to embark on the present Study was an intellectual revolt against a current Late Modern Western convention of identifying a parvenue and provincial Western Society's history with 'History', writ large, *sans phrase*. In the writer's view this convention was the preposterous offspring of a distorting egocentric illusion¹ to which the children of a Western Civilization had succumbed like the children of all other known civilizations and known primitive societies. In a latter-day chapter of Western mental history this blight of egocentricity had been the nemesis of an act of hubris. Western minds had contracted their vision to the narrow limits of a parochially Western horizon because they had despised and rejected the cultural heritages of Christianity and Hellenism that had been bequeathed to them in the Bible and the Classics. This, in the writer's belief, was an intellectual effect of Original Sin from which an historian must thoroughly purge himself in order to win any hope of being able to catch and communicate even a glimpse of the truth; and, if it was true that an argument must find a point of departure in some axiom or other, then the unavowed and unavowable axiom of egocentricity ought to be ruled out by adopting the contrary axiom that all the representatives of any species of human society are philosophically on a par with one another.² This spiritual discipline, which no historian could afford to neglect in any age of the history of any society, was incumbent *a fortiori* on an historian of Western origin and upbringing in an age of Western history in which the Western Civilization happened to be in the ascendant. The writer, for his part, had taken to heart this counter-axiom of a philosophical parity between all societies of the same species; it had justified his faith in it by serving him as his pole star for steering his course through the first six parts of the present Study; and, though, in a later Part,³ the value of the civilizations known to have existed up to date had been found to be unequal as a matter of historical fact on the evidence of an assay in which the touchstone had been the part played

¹ See I. i. 158-64.

³ See VII. vii. 422-3 and 444-9.

² See I. i. 175-7.

by the breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations in the history of Religion, the result of this test had not been to re-exalt the Western Civilization to the pinnacle on which it had once been placed by a naïvely vulgar native Western egocentric prejudice; the finding had been that the civilizations of greatest mark and moment in the history of Religion had been civilizations of the second generation—the Syriac Civilization, the Indic, the Hellenic, the Sinic—and that, by comparison with these, the Western Civilization and its contemporaries of the third generation had been ‘vain repetitions of the heathen’¹ from the standpoint of an observer who saw the guide-line of History in a progressive increase in the provision of spiritual opportunities for human souls in transit through This World.²

The writer’s own adoption of this standpoint had confirmed and reinforced his original reluctance to single out the Western Civilization for special treatment. After having done his best, throughout the first eleven parts of this Study, to battle against a sin that beset his Western mind so easily,³ was he to capitulate at the last moment to this tribal infirmity? Was he deliberately to redistort an historical perspective that he had been at such pains to correct? In deciding, in spite of such misgivings, to abide in A.D. 1950 by a plan originally drawn up in A.D. 1927–9, he was bowing to the logic of three facts which had lost none of their cogency during the intervening years.

The first of these facts was that, in the second quarter of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the Western Civilization was perhaps the only extant representative of its species that did not show indisputable signs of being already in disintegration. Of the seven other extant civilizations, five—namely the main body of Orthodox Christendom and its Russian offshoot, the main body of the Far Eastern Civilization and its Korean and Japanese offshoot, and in the fifth place the Hindu Civilization—had already not only entered into, but passed through, the universal state phase in a familiar rhythm of social disintegration;⁴ and, though, on the strictest view, it might be held that, pending the epiphany of a universal state, disintegration could never be diagnosed with absolute certainty,⁵ a scrutiny of the histories of the Iranic and Arabic Muslim civilizations revealed strong evidence of these two societies having broken down in the second decade of the sixteenth century of the

¹ Matt. vi. 7.

² See VII. vii. 555–68.

³ Heb. xii. 1. When a Westerner of the present writer’s age and upbringing was conscious of being perpetually beset by his collective Western egocentricity, the difficulty of laying aside this sin must have been still greater for his younger Western contemporaries, since the writer himself had had the good fortune to be born into a generation which, in England, had still been educated on the Bible and the Greek and Latin Classics, and not on any native Western cultural pabulum. As a consequence of this fifteenth-century Italian education, the writer’s spiritual home was, not a post-Christian Western World, but a pre-Christian Hellas; and, whenever he was moved to put his deeper and more intimate feelings into words, they found expression in Greek or Latin verse, and not in the English vernacular that happened to be his mother tongue. In the twentieth century of the Christian Era it was indeed hard for any living observer—Western or non-Western—to take an unbiased view of the Western Civilization and its prospects. A Western observer of the West would find it difficult to correct a bent towards his own collective Western ego without falling into the opposite inclination to lean over backwards.

⁴ See Table I in vol. vi, p. 327, reprinted as Table I in vol. vii, p. 769, *ad fin.*

⁵ See pp. 341–4, above.

Christian Era, when the Iranic Society had been split by an explosive recrudescence of Shi'ism, and when the ensuing struggle between the two fractions of this fissured body social had led an Ottoman Sunni Iranic Muslim Power to conquer the sister Arabic Muslim Society. On this showing, the Western Civilization in the twentieth century of the Christian Era was apparently in the singular position of being the only one among all the known representatives of the species, extinct or extant, whose present state and future prospects might still be open questions. While all the others were either certainly dead or almost certainly *in articulo mortis*, the Western Society alone was possibly still in its growth-phase.¹

This uncanny uniqueness of the contemporary situation of the West first struck the writer when he was putting on paper his original notes for the last portion of this Study in the early months of A.D. 1929; and the subject and title of the present Part were then immediately conjured up in his mind by a sudden reminiscence of a passage in *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*. In his mind's eye he saw the picture of the stricken ship becalmed on the boundless expanse of the South Seas, with the crew prostrated by the torments of thirst; he saw the spectre bark shooting towards him from the horizon, on which the ribs of its skeleton hull had shown up sinisterly black against the blood-red disk of a setting sun; and, as the dreadful apparition drew near, he descried, on board, two demonic figures, one of which was Death, while the other was still more ghastly than her grim companion.

Her lips were red, her looks were free,
Her locks were yellow as gold:
Her skin was as white as leprosy,
The nightmare Life-in-Death was she,
Who thicks men's blood with cold.²

He saw Life-in-Death winning the throw of the dice in her game with Death for the prize of the ship's crew; and his recollection of the poem ran on to bring before his eyes a vision of the dying sailors giving up the ghost one by one, till, on board the spellbound ship, the Ancient Mariner is left alone alive with his dead companions lying around him.

The many men so beautiful
And they all dead did lie:
And a thousand thousand slimy things
Lived on: and so did I.³

When these words in which Life-in-Death's legendary victim describes his thoughts and feelings were ringing in the present writer's ears in A.D. 1929, he was conscious of a weird contrast between the Ancient Mariner's agony in his loneliness and the complacency of a post-Modern Western World whose own singular situation had evoked in the writer's mind these echoes of Coleridge's poetry. At that date the prospects of the Western Civilization appeared, on the whole, to be favourable. After

¹ See IV. iv. 38-39.

² Coleridge, S. T.: *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, Part III, Stanza xi.

³ Ibid., Part IV, Stanza iv.

shuddering under the shock of the First World War, the Western body social seemed to have recovered its balance and to have resumed its rudely interrupted course. The spectre of an imminent break on Wall Street was then still hull-down below the horizon, and the tragic sequence of errors, crimes, and sufferings which this financial catastrophe in the United States was to bring in its train was still unsuspected, *a fortiori*. It looked, in fact, as if the Western ship had triumphantly weathered an unusually violent storm; and, if it had, what sense could be made of an irrational imagination's oracular impulse to identify the West's situation in A.D. 1929 with the Ancient Mariner's plight after the death of his companions? Need a once more prosperous Western Civilization take the other civilizations' deaths to heart? In A.D. 1929 it had been easier than it was in A.D. 1950 for Western common sense to dismiss this disturbing question.

One debating point that Common Sense could perhaps still make in A.D. 1950 was to suggest that, whatever the West's plight might now be, it was at any rate not singular, since it could not be distinguished from the plight of the two Islamic civilizations on any impartial interpretation of the evidence. If the evidence did not convict the West of being already in disintegration, then it would not convict the Islamic civilizations either; while, conversely, if it did convict these, then the West must stand convicted in their company. The Islamic civilizations, like the Western Civilization, were not yet in a universal state; yet the Western Civilization, like the Islamic civilizations, was showing signs of being already in a Time of Troubles. In a previous Part¹ we have detected, in the Modern and post-Modern chapters of Western history, the disintegration-rhythm of lapse-rally-relapse recording itself in a sixteenth-century outbreak of a paroxysm of Wars of Religion, in a lull lasting from the third quarter of the seventeenth century to the third quarter of the eighteenth,² and in a paroxysm of Wars of Nationality beginning with the outbreak of the American War of Independence.³ If an impartial inquirer into the state of the extant civilizations in A.D. 1950 were to decide, notwithstanding this evidence, to give the Western Civilization the benefit of the doubt—on the ground that, whatever other symptoms of disintegration might be recognizable in recent Western history, it was at any rate still certain in A.D. 1950 that the West had not yet entered into a universal state—the same inquirer might perhaps feel bound to give the same benefit to the pair of Islamic civilizations on the same grounds. Yet, even if, in this point of not being yet demonstrably in disintegration, the Western Civilization's ambiguous situation were found to be shared with the West by two of its seven contemporaries, the second of the facts that seemed to qualify the Western Civilization for receiving special treatment in a study of History was a fact of Western history which had no parallel in the history of any other extant society.

This unique fact of Western history was that, in the course of some five centuries ending in A.D. 1950, the expansion of the Western Society and the radiation of the Western culture had brought all other extant civilizations and all extant primitive societies within a world-encompass-

¹ In V. vi. 312-21.

² See IV. iv. 142-50.

³ See IV. iv. 165-7.

ing Western Civilization's ambit.¹ Already, some two hundred years before this date, the approaching unification of the entire *Oikoumenê* round a Western centre had been discerned and announced by a Western man of genius. In an *Esquisse d'un Plan de Géographie Politique* Turgot had put on record the propositions

'que chaque peuple qui a devancé les autres dans ses progrès est devenu une espèce de centre autour duquel s'est formé comme un monde politique composé des nations qu'il connaissait et dont il pouvait combiner les intérêts avec les siens; qu'il s'est formé plusieurs de ces mondes dans toute l'étendue du globe indépendants les uns des autres, et inconnus réciproquement; qu'en s'étendant sans cesse autour d'eux, il se sont rencontrés et confondus, jusqu'à ce qu'enfin la connaissance de tout l'univers, dont la politique saura combiner toutes les parties, ne formera plus qu'un seul monde politique, dont les limites sont confondues avec celles du monde physique.'²

By A.D. 1950 Turgot's prognostication had been vindicated by accomplished facts. By this date the two Islamic civilizations, which had not yet entered into the universal state phase, were no less compromisingly enmeshed in a Western net than the five non-Western civilizations which had passed through this phase already. Even the Russian Civilization, which, among these seven societies, had taken the lead, up to date, in making a fight for the preservation of its own identity, ethos, and genius, had found, as we have seen,³ that the only practical way of trying to hold its own against the West was to master the technology which was the source of Modern Western Power and to step into a Western arena as a combatant arrayed in a panoply fashioned on the latest Western model. This world-wide ascendancy of a Western culture, at least on the plane of Technology, even over the non-Westerners who had dedicated themselves to the task of leading an anti-Western crusade, might prove to be a short-lived phenomenon; indeed, a glance at the history of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization's impact on the Oriental civilizations of the day—a history which had long since completed its course and was therefore on record from beginning to end—seemed to suggest that a Western ascendancy, in its turn, was likely to be liquidated in the long run by military, political, and religious counter-attacks of the kind that had once brought the ascendancy of Hellenism to an end. Yet this Hellenic precedent seemed also to suggest that even an eventual liquidation of a now prevailing Western ascendancy would come to pass in a world that had been unified within a framework of Western workmanship; and this unique role of a Modern Western Society as a unifying agency over a literally world-wide range of operations was the second fact that demanded—in A.D. 1950 no less than in A.D. 1929—a special consideration of the Western Civilization's prospects.

The third of the facts that seemed to make this inquiry imperative was the alarming fact that in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, perhaps for the first time in the history of the Human Race, all Mankind's

¹ See V. v. 152-3, and pp. 479-90, below.

² Turgot, A. R. J.: *Œuvres*, new ed. (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 616-17.

³ In IX. viii. 130-41.

eggs had been gathered into one precious yet precarious basket as a consequence of the Western Civilization's world-wide expansion.

Gone are the days when madness was confined
 By seas or hills from spreading through Mankind:
 When, though a Nero fooled upon a string,
 Wisdom still reigned unruffled in Peking;
 And God in welcome smiled from Buddha's face,
 Though Calvin in Geneva preached of grace.
 For now our linked-up globe has shrunk so small,
 One Hitler in it means mad days for all.
 Through the whole World each wave of worry spreads,
 And Ipoh dreads the war that Ipsden dreads.¹

Some degree of interdependence was, of course, nothing new in the history of human societies. The civilizations had, no doubt, begun to influence one another, as well as all the extant primitive societies, by their radioactivity at an early date after their first epiphany;² and these impersonal influences had been followed up by military and political assaults since the time when—at about the turn of the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries B.C.—an Egyptiac Middle Empire that had never collided with Hammurabi's reconstructed Sumeric Empire of the Four Quarters had been overrun, after Hammurabi's death, by Hyksos barbarian invaders who had imbibed a tincture of the Sumeric Civilization from Eurasian Nomads in their rear.³ A latter-day Soviet Union's 'geopolitically' commanding position—with sally-ports opening on to the back-yards of all other extant civilizations located on *terra firma* in the Old World⁴—had been captured by Russia from Eurasian Nomads among whom the Mitanni had been the first to flood over the domains of adjoining moribund sedentary civilizations. The collisions with one another into which these sedentary civilizations had continued to fall since the Mitanni had implicated an Egyptiac Civilization in a Sumeric Civilization's fate had provided so many occasions for epiphanies of higher religions. At least twelve of these⁵ had sprung from the impact made on six Oriental civilizations by an Hellenic Society which had radiated its culture as far as Japan in one direction and Britain in another. Yet none of these expansive movements, before the expansion of the Western Society, had ever been world-wide in the literal sense on the military and the political as well as on the commercial and the cultural plane. For example, the Roman Empire and the Han Empire had coexisted, not only on the face of the same planet but within the bounds of the same continent, for some two hundred years without ever coming into direct military or even political contact with one another—if the diplomatic mission from Marcus Aurelius, whose arrival in A.D. 166⁶ is recorded in the Posterior Han Dynasty's annals, is to be written off as having been in reality perhaps no more than an isolated private commercial venture—and in this classic case even the convulsions of one of

¹ Skinner, Martyn: *Letters to Malaya*, I and II (London 1941, Putnam), pp. 34-35.

² See II. i. 187.

³ See V. v. 351.

⁴ See p. 260, above.

⁵ See Table IV in VII. vii, p. 772, *ad fin.*

⁶ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin and Leipzig 1930, de Gruyter), p. 404.

the two contemporary empires in its death agony did not impinge upon the survivor, as a post-Sumeric *Völkerwanderung* had impinged upon the Egyptiac World. When the Han Empire went to pieces at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era, the inhabitants of the Roman Empire remained unaware that an earth-shaking event was occurring at the opposite extremity of the Old World; and conversely, when, some two hundred years later, the Roman Empire in its turn went to pieces at a time when, in the Far East, a new society was beginning to emerge from the Han Empire's ruins, this nascent Far Eastern Civilization was not thrown back into chaos by the Roman Empire's fall. In the days of the Han Empire and the Roman Empire, human destinies had not yet been gathered into one basket, and so, though some eggs were constantly being broken, there were always others left intact.

The freedom which an Hellenic and a Sinic 'universal state' each still enjoyed to work out its own destiny without interference from the other appears the more remarkable when we recollect that neither of these 'oecumenical' empires was confined within the bounds of the single civilization that had brought it to birth. Each of them also embraced portions of the domains of other societies¹ and was consequently regarded by its inhabitants as being coextensive with Mankind itself. In a Westernizing World of A.D. 1950 which had not yet been united politically in a universal state, any such illusion would have been impossible for the members either of the supra-national community gravitating round the United States or of the community of the same order of magnitude gravitating round the Soviet Union; for, however tenuous might be the commercial contacts between these two groups of countries by comparison with the web of either group's internal trade, the competition between them in military technology and in political propaganda was so intense that the members of either were acutely aware all the time of the other community's existence and activity. The unification of the whole habitable and traversable surface of the planet, thanks to Western enterprise, had by this time gone so far on this plane of politico-military rivalry that there was reason to fear that, in this highly charged and at the same time highly conductive atmosphere, there might prove not to be room, even within the wide limits of a spaciouly all-inclusive *Oikoumenê*, for both a sovereign independent Soviet Union and a sovereign independent United States, in spite of the auspicious fact that—in contrast to a Germany and a Japan who, between them, had detonated the Second World War—either of these giants was, on the economic plane, a 'satiated' power still possessing within its own boundaries immense reserves of undeveloped non-human resources and correspondingly immense opportunities of finding innocently productive employment for a growing population for as long a time as could be seen ahead. In A.D. 1950 the United States and the Soviet Union were enjoying freedom from want, but not freedom from fear.

If the charge with which an ever more high-powered Western technique and organization had thus loaded the now perilously conductive atmosphere of a not yet politically unified twentieth-century Western-

¹ See VI. vii. 63.

izing World were ever to be detonated by some carelessly or malignantly ignited spark, the resultant military, political, and spiritual explosion would sweep from end to end of the *Oikoumené* as it vented itself with all the physical force of a post-Modern Western technology which had vastly heightened the destructiveness of the weapons at Man's command between A.D. 1929 and A.D. 1950 and was still, so far as the layman could learn, triumphantly advancing along the same suicidal course. A world-wide catastrophe might leave not a single egg unbroken in the solitary basket into which all human destinies had now been gathered.

In a Third World War fought with atomic or bacteriological weapons, it seemed, indeed, improbable that the Angel of Death would overlook even those nooks and corners of Man's terrestrial habitat which, till recently, had been either so uninviting or so inaccessible, or both, as to give their poor, weak, backward inhabitants a virtual immunity against the unwelcome attentions of 'civilized' militarists. In a talk given at Princeton¹ just three weeks before the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine of American support for Greece and Turkey against Russian pressure,² the writer had given play, half seriously and not wholly in joke, to the fancy that, if a Westernizing World were to allow itself to fall into a Third World War, the sequel might be a rendering, in real life, of one of Plato's myths in which the Athenian philosopher imagines the mountain-shepherds periodically issuing from their fastnesses in order to build up a new civilization on the vacated site of an old one that has perished in the latest of a number of periodic cataclysms.³ In the imagery of a Collective Subconscious Psyche in the Age of the Civilizations, 'shepherds' had come to symbolize the unspent and unspoiled primitive human potentialities for creation that God had still held in reserve after He had led a sophisticated majority of Mankind into the temptations that had worsted Cain the husbandman⁴ and Cain's son Enoch the city-builder,⁵ and their heir Tubal-Cain the smith.⁶ Whenever Man in Process of Civilization had come to grief in essaying this most recent, and perhaps most hazardous, of all human enterprises up to date, he had always, so far, counted on being able to draw upon the reserve power latent in still primitive brethren of his whom he had driven out of those choicer portions of the Earth that he had appropriated as his own domain, 'to wander about in sheepskins and goatskins in deserts and in mountains';⁷ and, in the past, these comparatively innocent survivors of the children of Abel had heaped coals of fire on the heads of the children of Cain by coming to their murderers' rescue when the Cainites' sins had found them out. A shepherd from Ascræ, on the foothills of Mount Helicon, had spoken the prologue to the tragedy of Hellenic history, and shepherds from the Negeb, on the fringes of the Arabian Desert, had stood by the cradle of Christianity in Bethlehem.⁸ In his

¹ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Civilization on Trial* (London 1948, Oxford University Press), pp. 150-63.

² The Truman Doctrine was made public on the 12th March, 1947; the writer's talk, here mentioned, was delivered on the 20th February, 1947.

³ See Plato: *Timæus*, 21 E-23 C, quoted in IV. iv. 24-25.

⁴ Gen. iv. 3.

⁵ Gen. iv. 17.

⁶ Gen. iv. 22.

⁷ Heb. xi. 37-38.

⁸ See V. vi. 174-5.

Platonizing *jeu d'esprit* the present writer had suggested in A.D. 1947 that, if the Western Civilization in which he and his audience were implicated were to inflict some major catastrophe on the *Oikoumenê*, the task of launching, all over again, a cultural enterprise that had been on foot for the last five or six thousand years might perhaps fall to Tibetans hitherto safely ensconced behind the ramparts of their plateau or to Esquimaux hitherto snugly nestling against an innocently inclement ice-cap that was a less vicious neighbour than any *homo homini lupus*.¹ Within the three and a half years that had elapsed between the delivery of that address and the writing of the present lines in the still peaceful precincts of the same university town, these tentative fancies had been overtaken and ridden down by the march of historical events. At the moment of writing in December 1950, an invading Chinese Communist expeditionary force was reported to be *en route* for Lhasa, while Esquimaux who had formerly been happy in having no foe or friend except Physical Nature found themselves in the fairway of a transpolar bombing-route between the basins of the Volga and the Mississippi, and of a *ventre-à-terre* invasion-route, across the ice-floes of the Behring Straits, from the once sequestered habitat of the primitive denizens of the north-eastern tip of Russia-in-Asia into an Alaska that was divided from the main body of the Continental United States by nothing but a Canadian 'Polish Corridor'.

Thus a now ubiquitous Western Society held the fate of all Mankind in its hands at a moment when the West's own fate lay on the finger-tip of one man in Moscow and one man in Washington who, by pressing a button, could detonate an atom-bomb.

These were the facts that led the present writer reluctantly to endorse in A.D. 1950 the conclusion, reluctantly reached in A.D. 1929, that an inquiry into the prospects of the Western Civilization was a necessary part of a twentieth-century study of History.

¹ See V. vi. 161-2.

B. THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF *A PRIORI* ANSWERS

(I) THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF STATISTICS

WHAT were the Western Civilization's expectations of life in A.D. 1950 or 1952? On first thoughts a student of History, taking an observation in either of those years, might be inclined to rate the West's current expectations low, considering the well-known prodigality of Nature. The Western Civilization, after all, was one out of no more than twenty-one representatives of its species—or, at most, no more than thirty if the number were to be assessed at the highest possible figure by including four arrested civilizations and five abortive civilizations in the count. Was it rational to expect to see the twenty-first, or even the thirtieth, civilization on trial succeed in avoiding the failure that had been the history of all other civilizations up to date? Success would mean either finding some hitherto untravelled way for a civilization to go on living and growing in *saecula saeculorum*, or else creating a mutation that would generate a new species of society. Considering the number of failures that had been the price of each dearly bought success in the past history of the evolution of Life on Earth, it might appear improbable that, in the history of a species still so young as the civilizations were, any representative of the third generation would have been cast for the part of Fortunatus. Yet, if a twentieth-century inquirer's first thoughts did incline towards this pessimistic conclusion, his second thoughts were likely to enter the caveat that so momentous a question could not be disposed of so easily.

The thesis that, in the evolution of Life, it required many more than twenty or twenty-nine failures to pay for one success was, after all, an inference from empirical evidence; and the particular evidence from which this particular inference was drawn was the experience of Life, not at the human, but at a pre-human, level. The dicta that thirty issues of a species was a very small number, and that a species that could not yet muster more than thirty representatives was a very young species, might be justifiable in the mouths of naturalists studying spiders or beetles or perhaps some far more primitive manifestation of Life than these. It might be true that, when Nature had been engaged on the evolution of rudimentary organisms, she had been apt to coin hundreds and thousands and millions of specimens of a type in order to give herself the off-chance of making, at the millionth or the million-millionth strike of the die, a lucky hit that would produce either an execution of her design that was a close enough approximation to it to be worthy of being perpetuated or alternatively an adumbration of some novel and superior design which would render the type now on trial obsolete and therefore superfluous. At this relatively low level of Nature's creative activity, experience might indeed suggest that the twentieth or thirtieth representative of a type would have little chance of turning out to be the successful

exponent of it. It might even be warrantable to draw from this limited experience the general inference that it was Nature's way, in all her creative work, to deal in prodigally large numbers. This generalization, however, might prove to be legitimate only in virtue of being barren; for it gave no clue for translating the abstract concept of 'a large number' into any single order of magnitude that could be warranted to hold good uniformly for all Nature's creative activities at all levels.

In the evolution of species of plants, insects, fishes, or other pre-human living organisms, twenty or thirty would have been, no doubt, not 'large numbers', but almost ridiculously small numbers; but, for the same creative purpose of Natura Creatrix, these same numbers might well be, not small, but large, when the species on which Nature was working was, not an organism, but a society, and when the living creatures whose fields of action intersected in this social arena¹ were, not spell-bound ants or bees, but human beings endowed with consciousness and freedom of choice. It was true that, even in this context, twenty or thirty were not very large numbers on the level of human societies of the primitive species; for, though the known number of representatives of this species did not run to millions or million-millions, it did run to hundreds and perhaps thousands.² The species now in question was not, however, the primitive human societies; it was the civilizations; and these differed so greatly from the primitive human societies—not to speak of any pre-human manifestation of Life—that any evidence derived from the experience of Life at these other levels would be irrelevant to an inquiry into a civilization's prospects. Second thoughts thus gravitated towards the negative conclusion that it was impossible to give any rational *a priori* answer to an inquiry into the Western Civilization's expectation of life because it was impossible to find any significant statistical basis on which an answer could be founded. While statistics lent no support to the egocentric illusion harboured by a Western Civilization which felt confident that the twenty-first civilization on trial was bound to triumph because this particular candidate happened to be the Western Civilization itself, statistics lent no support either to a dogma that, in the mintage of any species of any manifestation of Life whatsoever, twenty-one must be too low a figure to qualify for success. The statistical record of one species could not be invoked to lay down the law for the statistical prospects of any other species; and, where success or failure hung on the issue of Challenge-and-Response, success and failure were unpredictable. 'The wind bloweth where it listeth.'³ 'The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation.'⁴ 'The day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night',⁵ and the hour at which the thief will come is never known beforehand by the householder.⁶

¹ See III. iii. 227-31.

² See I. i. 148.

³ John iii. 8.

⁴ Luke xvii. 20.

⁵ 1 Thess. v. 2.

⁶ Matt. xxiv. 43; Luke xii. 39.

(II) THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF FEELINGS

When a twentieth-century Western inquirer into the prospects of the Western Civilization had recognized that a statistical approach to his problem was impracticable, he was still confronted by a pair of emotional *a priori* answers that he must take into consideration before proceeding to examine the testimony of the civilizations themselves, in order to see what light might be thrown on the prospects of the Western Civilization by a synoptic view of the recorded experiences of the twenty or thirty known representatives of the species. The two emotional answers were mutually contradictory; and the writer of this Study, who had been born into the Western World in A.D. 1889, had lived, by A.D. 1952, to see feeling in the West begin to lose faith in a self-complacent outlook which had previously been taken as a matter of course, and begin to revert to an alternative outlook that was, not merely different, but antithetical.

The outlook prevalent among people of the middle class in Great Britain at the earliest date in the last decade of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era at which the writer had begun to be aware of the psychological atmosphere of his social milieu was something that was best conveyed in caricature. In this milieu in the eighteen-nineties the feeling was:

‘History is now at an end; this history is therefore final’;¹

and at this date this *Weltanschauung* was shared with an English middle class by the children of the German and the Northern American victors in the latest bout of Modern Western wars (*gerebantur circa* A.D. 1848–71). The beneficiaries from this aftermath of the General War of A.D. 1792–1815 had not, by then, begun to suspect, any more than their English ‘opposite numbers’ had, that the Modern Age of Western history had been wound up only to inaugurate a post-Modern Age pregnant with imminent experiences that were to be at least as tragic as any tragedies yet on record. At the close of the nineteenth century even a German middle class, that was then still permitting itself to indulge in criminally irresponsible day-dreams of more *frisch fröhlich* six-weeks’ wars, was of the same mind as its North American and English ‘opposite numbers’ in its workaday sober senses. In these three provinces of a post-Modern Western World an unprecedentedly prosperous and comfortable Western middle class was taking it as a matter of course that the end of one age of one civilization’s history was the end of History itself—at least so far as they and their kind were concerned. They were imagining that, for their benefit, a sane, safe, satisfactory Modern Life had miraculously come to stay as a timeless present. ‘History is now at an end’ was the inaudible slogan of the celebrations of Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in A.D. 1897, which made a vivid and lasting impression upon the present writer’s childish imagination; and ‘this history is therefore final’ was the invisible motto on the title-page of a topical publication—*Sixty Years a Queen*²—which was the same child’s earliest source-

¹ Sellar, W. C., and Yeatman, R. J.: *1066 and All That* (London 1930, Methuen), p. viii.

² Maxwell, Bart., Sir H.: *Sixty Years a Queen* (London [1897], Harmsworth).

book of Western history in the nineteenth century. The assumption that the final product of those sixty years A.D. 1837-97 had come to stay was patently contrary to reason, considering that the pictures with which the text of *Sixty Years a Queen* was copiously illustrated presented a fascinatingly fast-moving pageant of change in every department of life, from Technology to Dress, in which change could clothe itself in visual form. In A.D. 1952 it was manifest in retrospect, even to the duller eye, that this visual evidence had portended, not a perpetuation of the fleeting circumstances of late-nineteenth-century English middle-class life, but a revolutionary transformation of the ephemeral Victorian scene along the grim lines actually followed by the course of History within the next half-century. An oracular foreboding of the future was, indeed, uttered at the time by the Subconscious Psyche through an incongruous poetic medium. Yet Rudyard Kipling's *Recessional* made little impression on the contemporaries of a Late Victorian poet who had found himself writing these ominous lines at an imperious Muse's dictation. In the United Kingdom, as in Germany and in the Northern United States, the complacency of a post-Modern Western bourgeoisie remained unshaken till the outbreak of the first post-Modern general war in A.D. 1914.

English middle-class Conservatives for whom the Millennium had already arrived, and English middle-class Liberals for whom it lay only just round the corner, were, of course, aware that the English working class's share in the middle class's economic prosperity was shockingly small, and that British subjects in most of the colonies and dependencies of the United Kingdom were not enjoying a self-government that was the privilege of their fellow subjects in the United Kingdom itself and in a few other dominions of the British Crown; but these political and economic inequalities were discounted by Liberals as being something remediable and by Conservatives as being something inevitable. Citizens of the United States at the North were similarly aware, for their part, that their own economic prosperity was not shared by their fellow-citizens at the South, and that the fathers of these Southern contemporaries of theirs had seceded from the Union and had been brought back into it only by the *force majeure* of the North's crushing victory over the South in a terrible civil war. Citizens of the German Reich were aware that the inhabitants of a 'Reichsland' annexed from France after her crushing defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of A.D. 1870-1 were still French at heart and that the rest of a French nation which had not yet ceased to be a Great Power was still unreconciled to the amputation of the ceded departments. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries France was still entertaining thoughts of a *revanche*, and the subject population in Alsace-Lorraine was still dreaming the same dream of an eventual liberation as other subject populations in Slesvik, Poland, Macedonia, and Ireland. These dissatisfied contemporaries of a sated German, British, and North American bourgeoisie were nursing national grievances and national aspirations which did not permit them to acquiesce in a comfortable belief that 'History' was 'at an end'; indeed they could not have continued, as they did continue, to keep alight the

flickering flame of a forlorn hope if they had succumbed to a *Weltanschauung* which, for them, would have spelled, not security, but despair. Yet their unwavering confidence that a, to them, intolerable established régime must be borne away, sooner or later, by Time's 'ever rolling stream' made little impression on the torpid imagination of 'the Ascendancy'. 'As a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth';¹ and, though 'the Ascendancy' was under a delusion in mistaking for an intimation of consent a silence that was inspired by the watchword 'N'en parlons jamais, y pensons toujours',² there was in A.D. 1897 no living man or woman, even among the most sanguine-minded prophets of a nationalist or a socialist revolution, who dreamed that a demand for national self-determination was going to break up the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov empires and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland within the next twenty-five years, and going to spread, within another twenty-five years, from a few sore spots in Western Europe and in Orthodox Christendom to the uttermost parts of the Old World, or that a demand for social democracy was going to spread from the urban working class in a few precociously industrialized provinces of the Western World to the peasantry of Mexico and China. Gandhi (*natus* A.D. 1869) and Lenin (*natus* A.D. 1870) were then still unknown names; and the word 'Communism' then commemorated a lurid event in the past that had been the last eruption of History's now extinct volcano. This ominous outbreak of savagery in a Parisian underworld in A.D. 1871 was written off by optimistic post-Modern Western minds as an abnormal atavistic reaction to the shock of a startling military disaster, and there was no discernible fear of the recrudescence of a conflagration that had been smothered now for longer than a quarter of a century under a bourgeois Third Republic's wet blanket. In 1897 a Western bourgeois gentilhomme's sleep was not being seriously disturbed by prophetic nightmares.

This irrational faith had been fortified by experience, for the *fin-de-siècle* prosperity of the Western middle class was not a thing of yesterday. In Germany, it is true, the mirage of a golden age had not dawned on the bourgeoisie until A.D. 1871, when the victory of the German states over France and their unification in a Second Reich had been followed by a titanic local outburst of industrial development. There had been a contemporaneous local outburst of Industrialism in the North-Eastern United States after a victory of the North over the South in A.D. 1865 that had re-established and consolidated the Union; but in the United States the Golden Age had been inaugurated by a victory over Great Britain in A.D. 1783 through which the insurgent colonies had won the recognition of their independence; and in the history of Great Britain an inquirer bent on tracing the Golden Age back to its origins would have to look behind the General War of A.D. 1792-1815, which had made a victorious Britain the workshop of the World as well as the ruler of the waves, to 'the Glorious Revolution' of A.D. 1688 and perhaps

¹ Isa. liii. 7.

² The watchword suggested for the guidance of members of the rising generation in France, on the morrow of her loss of Alsace-Lorraine in A.D. 1871, by a French statesman of an older generation (? Paul Déroulède).

to the Restoration of the Monarchy in A.D. 1660. In the middle-class life of England, at any rate, the entries in Pepys' diary testify to a sense of security, comfort, and prosperity that was perhaps not attained in the middle-class life of the Lowlands of Scotland until after the suppression of the last and boldest Jacobite insurrection in A.D. 1745; and Pepys' incidental and *insouciant* expressions of confidence were deliberately echoed in bolder accents by Gibbon in 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West'¹ which must have been finally passed for the press at some date in the first quarter of the year 1781,² when Gibbon's own country was in what this English historian will have felt to be a serious plight if he was appraising it by his own serene century's exacting standards.³

In this parenthesis in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* Gibbon was inquiring 'whether Europe is still threatened with a repetition of those calamities which formerly oppressed the arms and institutions of Rome', and his conclusion was that the Late Modern Western Society of his day stood in no danger of being destroyed either by domestic civil war or by barbarian invasion. The perpetuation and progressive improvement of her present Golden Age were assured, as Gibbon saw it, by a political constitution which—in contrast to the debilitatingly despotic centralization of political authority in the Hellenic World under a *Pax Romana*—was a felicitous balance between parochial autonomy and oecumenical unity.

'In peace, the progress of knowledge and industry is accelerated by the emulation of so many active rivals;⁴ in war, the European forces are exercised by temperate and undecisive contests. . . . It is the duty of a patriot to prefer and promote the exclusive interest and glory of his native country; but a philosopher may be permitted to enlarge his views, and to consider Europe as one great republic, whose various inhabitants have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation. The Balance of Power will continue to fluctuate and the prosperity of our own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be alternately exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts and laws and manners which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of Mankind, the Europeans and their colonies.'

Gibbon's optimistic appraisal of the Western Civilization's prospects in his day was no mere personal *parti pris*. Among the cultivated minority

¹ This passage of Gibbon's work has been quoted already in this Study in III. iii. 311; IV. iv. 148 and 283; V. v. 625, n. 1, and 644. It is so germane to the subject of the present Part of this Study, and at the same time so alien to the outlook of a Western student of History speculating on the prospects of the Western Civilization in A.D. 1952, that it has been reprinted with a running commentary in an annex on pp. 741–57, below.

² The first draft for this passage may have been written as early as A.D. 1772. See IV. iv. 148, n. 3, and compare III. iii. 311 and V. v. 644, n. 3.

³ In the first quarter of the year 1781 Great Britain was at war with France and Spain and Holland, as well as with the Thirteen Colonies; the Northern Powers of Europe were maintaining an unfriendly 'armed neutrality' for which the term 'non-belligerency' had not yet been coined; and in the North American theatre of operations a campaign was about to open which was to decide the outcome of the war disastrously for the British cause.

⁴ Compare the passage in Hume's essay *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences* quoted in II. i. 473–4, together with the references *ibid.*, p. 474, n. 1, to variations on the same theme by Turgot, Eduard Meyer, and J. W. Headlam-Morley.—A.J.T.

in an eighteenth-century Western World there was a consensus in this sense, and the very passage of Gibbon's general observations that has just been quoted may have been a half-conscious echo of a kindred passage in Turgot's *Second Discours*, delivered at the Sorbonne on the 11th September, 1750, *sur les Avantages que l'Établissement du Christianisme a procurés au Genre Humain*.

'Tout se rapproche peu à peu de l'équilibre, et prend à la longue une situation plus fixe et plus tranquille. L'ambition, en formant les grands états des débris d'une foule de petits, met elle-même des bornes à ses ravages; la guerre ne désole plus que les frontières des empires; les villes et les campagnes commencent à respirer dans le sein de la paix; les liens de la société unissent un plus grand nombre d'hommes; la communication des lumières devient plus prompte et plus étendue; et les arts, les sciences, les mœurs avancement d'un pas plus rapide dans leur progrès. Ainsi que les tempêtes qui ont agité les flots de la mer, les maux inséparables des révolutions disparaissent: le bien reste, et l'humanité se perfectionne.'¹

As for Gibbon's optimism, this was so robust that it inveigled a temperamentally sceptical eighteenth-century mind into committing itself to a credulous declaration of faith in the perpetual progress, not merely of the Western Civilization, but of Civilization in general.

'Since the first discovery of the arts, war, commerce, and religious zeal have diffused among the savages of the Old and New World those inestimable gifts: they have been successively propagated; they can never be lost. We may therefore acquiesce in the pleasing conclusion that every age of the World has increased and still increases the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of the Human Race.'

The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire had been the last chapter in the history of the breakdown and disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization,² and this disaster that had swept away an imposing society had been within the knowledge of post-Hellenic Western Man ever since the first shoots of a new civilization, affiliated to the defunct Hellenic Society, had begun to sprout among the rubble of the fallen empire's ruins at the turn of the seventh and eighth centuries of the Christian Era. Gibbon had found the subject for a monumental work in this débâcle of a universal state which was also the débâcle of the culture which that oecumenical body politic had incapsulated; and, in the first paragraph of his first chapter, he had described it as 'a revolution which will ever be remembered, and is still felt by the nations of the Earth'. Can one contemplate a skull without being reminded of his own mortality? To a Western student of History in A.D. 1952 it was not at all surprising that Gibbon's subject should have impelled him to inquire whether his own Western Society might not be in danger of being overtaken, in its turn, by an antecedent Hellenic Society's fate. From a mid-twentieth-century Western angle of vision it did, however, appear amazing that, when Gibbon had once faced this question, he should have answered it, in transparent good faith, in the extravagantly optimistic terms of the sentences above quoted.

¹ Turgot, A. R. J.: *Œuvres* (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 599.

² See IV. iv. 58-63.

As the present writer was rereading this passage of Gibbon's history on the 11th December, 1950, his mind's eye conjured up a Late Medieval Florentine picture of saved souls in Heaven leaning lazily over a marble balustrade in order to make their bliss full and perfect by gazing down upon the torments of the damned in Hell; and, among the participants in this Satanic celestial recreation, a dreaming mind's roving glance singled out one figure whose ungainliness would have made it conspicuous, even if the uncouth effect had not been enhanced by an outlandishly un-medieval costume. There, in an uncongenial Dantesque Paradise to which he had unwittingly sentenced himself by embracing the irrational belief that 'History' was 'now at an end', stood Gibbon, in silver-buckled shoes, knee-breeches, tie-wig, and tricorne, looking down on wretched creatures, born under a different star, who had been floundering in the turbid waters of History in days before the flow of Time's 'ever rolling stream' had been cut off, for the benefit of the eighteenth-century English historian and his kind, by the advent of their secular Millennium in A.D. 1688.

In a pre-Gibbonian Early Modern Age a renaissance of Hellenic arts and letters had not been able to prevent an obstinately fanatical religious enthusiasm from beheading a King of England in A.D. 1649 or from defenestrating a Caesarean Majesty's envoys in A.D. 1618, or from celebrating Saint Bartholomew's Day, A.D. 1572, by a massacre of the adherents of one of two rival sects. In a pre-Modern 'Gothic Age'—into which Gibbon's historical vision ran together the Western 'Middle Ages' (*currebant* A.D. 1075–1475) and the Western 'Dark Ages' (*currebant* A.D. 675–1075) and a post-Hellenic social interregnum (*currebat* A.D. 375–675)—the human werewolf's inveterate crimes, follies, and misfortunes¹ had not even been relieved by a nascent gleam of intellectual and aesthetic light. That tale of eleven bestial centuries had been told off under the joint reign of Barbarism and Religion, whose triumph had been Gibbon's theme;² and, for two centuries after the official deposition of Barbarism by fifteenth-century Italian Hellenists, Religion had not only remained on the throne herself but had contrived to serve as a most effective deputy for her nominally dethroned colleague. Thus the history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire—which Gibbon had pronounced to be 'the greatest, perhaps, and most awful scene in the history of Mankind'³—had been followed by no less than thirteen centuries, all told, in which History had persistently run true to her Gibbonian type; and then suddenly, rather less than a hundred years before the time at which Gibbon was writing, we are invited to believe that the noisome flow had inexplicably come to a halt and had left the historian and his contemporaries securely high and dry.

'God, I thank Thee that I am not as other men are.'⁴ Gibbon's implicit faith in the uniqueness of his own advantageously distinguished generation's destiny is a classic example of the egocentric illusion;⁵ and we are

¹ See Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. iii (an echo of Bayle, P.: *Dictionnaire*, 4th ed. (Rotterdam 1720, Bohm, 4 vols.), iii. 1899 b).

² See Gibbon, op. cit., chap. lxxi.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. lxxi, in the first sentence of the last paragraph of this last chapter of the whole work.

⁴ Luke xviii. 11.

⁵ See I. i. 159.

left wondering how an eighteenth-century philosopher who was a merciless critic of 'Gothic' credulity could ever have come to harbour so incredible a belief as this. The answer must be that a conventional Christian *Weltanschauung* in Bossuet's vein, which Gibbon had repudiated on the level of his consciousness, had taken its revenge upon him by disappearing underground in order to evolve a secularized caricature of itself out of the sump of an outraged Subconscious Psyche.

This irrational eighteenth-century complacency about the present state and future prospects of a latter-day Western Society was not easily disturbed, though History lost no time in retorting to Gibbon's pontifical sentence of expulsion by recurring as inconscionably as Nature herself.¹ Gibbon had fallen into the naïve observational error of mistaking for the Millennium a spell of low ideological temperature (*durabat circa* A.D. 1660–1792) between two paroxysms of savage fratricidal warfare, owing to the lucky accident that his *magnum opus* happened to have been on the stocks when this low temperature had been at its nadir. The twenty years² (*circa* 1768–87) during which he had been writing *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* had elapsed within the lull (*durabat* A.D. 1763–92) between the martial aftermath of one general war—the most temperate and undecisive contest of its kind in Modern Western history—and the onset of another general war into which the newly kindled fire of Democracy was to put an ominously fervent drive.³ Yet the experience of the General War of A.D. 1792–1815 and its aftermath did not save a latter-day Western bourgeoisie that was born into a subsequent lull (*durabat* A.D. 1871–1914) from hugging Gibbon's error; and, even after the great cataclysm of A.D. 1914–18, Gibbon's eulogy of a Modern Western international anarchy was re-edited in the form of an apologia by a distinguished English historian and public servant of the prediluvian generation, Sir James Headlam-Morley (*vivebat* A.D. 1863–1929)—as witness the following passage in an address delivered by him in April 1924.

'In our analysis of this [Western] culture the first great fact that we will notice is that, though undoubtedly there is a common history and common civilisation for all Western Europe, the people were not joined in any formal political union, nor has the country ever been subjected to one common government. For a moment, indeed, it looked as though Charlemagne would establish his authority over the whole area; that hope, as we know, was to be disappointed; his attempt to create a new empire failed, as all subsequent attempts have failed. Again and again attempts were made by the later Empire, by the rulers of Spain and France, to unite the whole of Western Europe in one great state or empire. Always we find the same thing: the appeal to local patriotism and personal liberty inspires a resistance which breaks down the efforts of every conqueror. And so there has been as a permanent characteristic of Europe that which critics call anarchy; for the absence of a common rule means struggle, fighting, and war, a ceaseless confusion between rival units of government [contending with one another] for territory and predominance.

¹ Horace: *Epistulae*, Book I, Ep. x, l. 24.

² See *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lxxi, *ad finem*.

³ See IV. iv. 150–1.

'This is a condition which to many is very shocking. Undoubtedly it implies a great expenditure of energy, a great destruction of wealth, at times a great loss of life. There are many, in consequence, who would have preferred to see the gradual establishment of some common government and who, to its disadvantage, contrast the history of Europe with that of Imperial Rome, or—at the present day—of the United States of America. There are many, from the days of Dante onwards, who have longed for that ordered government which might appear to be the true reflex and instrument of Divine Providence. How often do we hear it said that if, on the soil of America, English and Italians and Poles and Ruthenians and Germans and Scandinavians can all live side by side in peace and contentment, why should they not do so in their original homes?

'I have not to-day to discuss ideals of the future; we are concerned with the past, and all that we have to do is to note the fact that this anarchy, this warfare, this rivalry, existed just at the time when the energies of the Continent were at their highest. Let us note also that the energies of the Mediterranean World—the vital force, artistic spirit, intellectual ingenuity—seem gradually but steadily to have decayed, and that the beginning of the decay coincided with the establishment of a common government.¹ May it not be that the friction and disorder was not in reality merely destruction of energy, but the cause by which the energy was produced?'²

It is strange to hear Gibbon's reassuring voice still echoing in an England that was now ringing with the dread sound of an apocalyptic trump. By A.D. 1924, however, the antithetical feeling, expressed in a different reading of the significance of an antecedent Hellenic Civilization's decline and fall, was already in the ascendant in a stricken Western World; and indeed Gibbon himself had lived to be overtaken by a revulsion of feeling about the prospects of the Western Civilization, though he did not live to make any corresponding revision of the text of his 'General Observations'.

At Lausanne, some two years after the night of the 27th June, 1787, on which he had written the closing words of the 'Decline and Fall' in his quiet garden in that peaceful Swiss city, an historian whose unsuspecting ear had failed to catch the undertones of a new ideological enthusiasm in the music of a temperate contest played in A.D. 1775-1783³ was suddenly shaken out of his complacency by the outbreak of the French Revolution, and he never recovered from the shock. He had flattered himself that a once rolling stream of Time had been frozen into a perpetual immobility, and now the rebellious waters had burst out again in an unprecedentedly boisterous flood. The horrifying cataclysm had swept away the sandy foundations of the hapless historian's confidence long before it became a menace to the independence and integrity of the Swiss Confederation, and the glimpse of Time's angry sea-horses tossing their white manes above the sky-line of the Jura was something more than Gibbon's nerves could stand. 'Altogether there was too much his-

¹ It will be noticed that Headlam-Morley here takes as marking the beginning of the disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization an event which, in this Study, has been taken as marking the second and most notable of the successive rallies by which the course of this disintegration was punctuated.—A.J.T.

² J. W. Headlam-Morley: 'The Cultural Unity of Western Europe', in *The New Past and other Essays on the Development of Civilization*, edited by E. H. Carter (Oxford 1925, Blackwell), pp. 88-89.

³ See IV. iv. 165-7.

tory going on for a historian to feel quite safe.¹ In May 1793 Gibbon fled from Lausanne for the insular asylum of which he was a native. Racing breathlessly round the wide arc described by the east bank of the Rhine while revolutionary French armies were battering the fortresses guarding the western approaches to the river, the historian-refugee managed to make his way to England via Holland; but his Muse had been silenced and his spirit broken; and he added nothing to his laurels before his death on the 16th January, 1794.

The verdict on an eighteenth-century Western Society's self-satisfaction was

'Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you; for so did their fathers to the false prophets.'²

'I have said: Ye are gods, and all of you are children of the Most High; but ye shall die like men and fall like one of the princes.'³

Nemesis was the inevitable consequence of *hybris* in both Hellenic and Hebraic belief;⁴ and the nemesis which a Modern Western Society invited by succumbing to a Gibbonian *Weltanschauung* was the death that had overtaken so many other representatives of the species. Intimations of mortality from experiences of the French Revolution might have been expected to have been the last testament of an English man of letters who had lived to see the French Revolution break out two years after he had finished writing *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*; but Gibbon left the message to be delivered, sixty years after his death, by a French aristocrat of perverse yet, in some points, prescient genius, Count J. A. de Gobineau (*vivebat* A.D. 1816-82),⁵ who was born in the year following the close of the General War of A.D. 1792-1815, and who published his *Meisterwerk* late enough to include Western Industrialism as well as Western Democracy in his prophetic indictment, and to find the death's head that was to be his grand *pièce justificative* in the wreckage, not of Rome, but of Tiahuanaco.⁶

'Pour la vapeur et toutes les découvertes industrielles, je dirai aussi, comme de l'imprimerie, que ce sont de grands moyens; j'ajouterai que l'on a vu quelque fois des procédés nés de découvertes scientifiques se perpétuer à l'état de routine, quand le mouvement intellectuel qui les avait fait naître s'était arrêté pour toujours, et avait laissé perdre le secret théorique d'où ces procédés émanaient. Enfin, je rappellerai que le bien-être matériel n'a jamais été qu'une annexe extérieure de la civilisation, et qu'on n'a jamais entendu dire d'une société qu'elle avait vécu uniquement parce qu'elle connaissait les moyens d'aller vite et de se bien vêtir. . . .

'Nous croyons, nous, que notre civilisation ne périra jamais, parce que nous avons l'imprimerie, la vapeur, la poudre à canon. L'imprimerie, qui n'est pas moins connue au Tonquin, dans l'empire d'Annam et au Japon que dans l'Europe actuelle, a-t-elle, par hasard, donné aux peuples de ces contrées une civilisation même passable? . . .

¹ Young, G. M.: *Gibbon*, 2nd ed. (London 1948, Hart-Davis), p. 172.

² Luke vi. 26.

³ Ps. lxxxii. 6-7.

⁴ See IV. iv. 245-61.

⁵ The political background of de Gobineau's racial theory of History has been indicated in II. i. 216-17.

⁶ For Tiahuanaco, see the passage of a work by P. A. Means that has been quoted in the present Study in II. i. 322.

'Est-on bien en droit de . . . conclure, comme on le fait généralement avec trop de facilité, que notre civilisation ait la préexcellence sur toutes celles qui ont existé et existent en dehors d'elle? Oui et non. Oui, parce qu'elle doit à la prodigieuse diversité des éléments qui la composent, de reposer sur un esprit puissant de comparaison et d'analyse, qui lui rend plus facile l'appropriation de presque tout; oui, parce que cet éclectisme favorise ses développements dans les sens les plus divers; oui, encore, parce que, grâce aux conseils du génie germanique, trop utilitaire pour être destructeur [*sic* — A.J.T.], elle s'est fait une moralité dont les sages exigences étaient inconnues généralement jusqu'à elle. Mais, si l'on pousse cette idée de son mérite jusqu'à la déclarer supérieure absolument et sans réserve, je dis non, car précisément elle n'excelle en presque rien. . . .

"Toutes les civilisations qui nous ont précédés ont pensé, comme nous, s'être cramponnées au rocher du temps par leurs inoubliables découvertes. Toutes ont cru à leur immortalité. Les familles des Incas, dont les palanquins parcouraient avec rapidité ces admirables chaussées de cinq cents lieues de long qui unissent encore Cuzco à Quito, étaient convaincues certainement de l'éternité de leurs conquêtes. Les siècles, d'un coup d'aile, ont précipité leur empire, à côté de tant d'autres, dans le plus profond du néant."¹

In these passages de Gobineau draws from *les ruines*² a moral that gives the lie direct to Gibbon's. De Gobineau, was an erratic stumbling-block in a primly Philistine Victorian wilderness, and his maliciously paradoxical style of delivery was not well calculated to make these tart intimations of mortality carry far in the crassly non-conductive psychic medium of nineteenth-century Western bourgeois feelings. It required a more terrifying portent than the French Revolution, and a sharper stab than a disgruntled French aristocrat's gadfly sting, to produce an outright inversion of Western feelings about the Western Civilization's prospects. A French voice intoning a palinode to Gibbon's paean in Western ears that were at last attuned to receive this solemn warning was not to be heard before the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1914-18. The first effective counterblast to Gibbon's 'Observations' was an elegy from the pen of Paul Valéry that was first published in the spring of A.D. 1919 in an English translation.

'Nous autres, civilisations, nous savons maintenant que nous sommes mortelles.

'Nous avons entendu parler de mondes disparus tout entiers, d'empires coulés à pic avec tous leurs hommes et tous leurs engins; descendus au fond inexplorables des siècles avec leurs dieux et leurs lois, leurs académies et leurs sciences pures et appliquées, avec leurs grammaires, leurs dictionnaires, leurs classiques, leurs romantiques et leurs symbolistes, leurs critiques et les critiques de leurs critiques. Nous savions bien que toute la terre apparente est faite de cendre, que la cendre signifie quelque chose. Nous apercevions à travers l'épaisseur de l'histoire les fantômes d'immenses navires qui furent chargés de richesse et d'esprit. Nous ne pouvions pas les compter. Mais ces naufrages, après tout, n'étaient pas notre affaire. *Elam, Ninive, Babylone* étaient de beaux noms vagues, et la ruine totale de ces mondes avait aussi peu de signification pour nous que leur existence

¹ de Gobineau, le Comte J. A.: *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (Paris 1853-57, Firmin-Didot, 4 vols.), vol. i, pp. 281, 276, 170, 281.

² Volney, C. F. C. de: *Les Ruines* (Paris 1791, Desenne).

même. Mais *France, Angleterre, Russie* . . . ce seraient aussi de beaux noms. *Lusitania* aussi est un beau nom. Et nous voyons maintenant que l'abîme de l'histoire est assez grand pour tout le monde. Nous sentons qu'une civilisation a la même fragilité qu'une vie. Les circonstances qui enverraient les œuvres de Keats et celles de Baudelaire rejoindre les œuvres de Ménandre ne sont plus du tout inconcevables; elles sont dans les journaux.¹

In chastened Western eyes, from which the scales had now fallen, the first vision of Reality was a recognition of the Western Civilization's mortality;² but the tardy dawning of enlightenment through suffering did not stop here; and the second vision was a conviction of sin which was a still more shattering spiritual experience than the recognition of mortality.

'Ce n'est pas tout. La brûlante leçon est plus complète encore. Il n'a pas suffi à notre génération d'apprendre par sa propre expérience comment les plus belles choses et les plus antiques et les plus formidables et les mieux ordonnées sont périssables *par accident*; elle a vu, dans l'ordre de la pensée, du sens commun et du sentiment, se produire des phéno-

¹ Valéry, Paul: 'La Crise de l'Esprit', in *Variété* (Paris 1924, Gallimard, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française), pp. 11-12. The two letters composing this essay were written 'for translation into English' and were first published in the London Journal *The Athenaeum* on the 11th April and the 22nd May, 1919 (No. 4641, pp. 182-4; No. 4644, pp. 279-80).

² The present writer received his first intimation of the mortality of the Western Civilization in an experience (mentioned in this Study already in IV. iv. 282) at the south-eastern corner of the Island of Crete, *en route* from Khandrà to Palafkastro, on the 19th March, 1912. Rounding the southern shoulder of a mountain, he was startled at suddenly finding himself face to face with the ruins of a country house in the Baroque style of architecture. If the date of this experience had been A.D. 1952 instead of being A.D. 1912, probably he would not have felt the same shock; for by A.D. 1952 a deserted and dilapidated seventeenth-century country house was no longer an unimaginable object in the landscape of the writer's native province of the Western World; but in A.D. 1912 every house of the kind in England would have been intact and have been inhabited—as likely as not, by descendants of the country squire who had had the house built for him some two or three hundred years back in the past. What was startling and disturbing for a Western observer in A.D. 1912 was to see a piece of architecture which, in his mental picture of his native country, was associated with the living world of his own generation standing here in Crete as starkly dead and deserted as the monuments of an Hellenic architecture at Gortyna and Praesus, and the monuments of a Minoan architecture at Cnossos and Phaestus, that he had been inspecting within the last few days in the course of his journey. This inevitable comparison awakened his imagination to the truth that, on this island, a civilization which was his own, and which on his own island was then still self-confidently alive, was already as dead as the civilizations that had come and gone in earlier generations of this species of society.

Gazing at what, at that date, was so portentous a spectacle for Western eyes, the English traveller realized that this house must have been built, on the eve of the Great Veneto-Ottoman War of Candia (*gerebatur* A.D. 1645-69), by some Venetian country gentleman or official, and that this seventeenth-century Venetian builder must have taken it just as much for granted as his English contemporaries, who were then building other houses in the same style on another island, that his new family mansion would continue to be occupied by his descendants for many generations to come. The Englishman then reflected that a Venetian rule in Crete that had been extinguished by Ottoman arms in A.D. 1669 had by that date been in existence for no less than 457 years—a span of time which, in A.D. 1912, was longer than that of the duration, up to date, of British rule in the oldest of the overseas possessions of the British Crown. The inference was inescapable. If the Venetian Empire had perished, the British Empire could not be immortal; and, if the Western Civilization, in which Great Britain as well as Venice lived and moved and had her being, had become extinct in a former Cretan province of its domain, there could be no province, on any shore of either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic, in which a Westerner would be justified in assuming that his civilization was invested with the incredible privilege of being exempt from the jurisdiction of Death the Leveller.

mènes extraordinaires, des réalisations brusques de paradoxes, des déceptions brutales de l'évidence.

'Je ne citerai qu'un exemple: les grandes vertus des peuples allemands ont engendré plus de maux que l'oisiveté jamais n'a créé de vices. Nous avons vu, de nos yeux vu, le travail consciencieux, l'instruction la plus solide, la discipline et l'application les plus sérieuses, adaptés à d'épouvantables desseins.

'Tant d'horreurs n'auraient pas été possibles sans tant de vertus. Il a fallu, sans doute, beaucoup de science pour tuer tant d'hommes, dissiper tant de biens, anéantir tant de villes en si peu de temps; mais il a fallu non moins de *qualités morales*. Savoir et Devoir, vous êtes donc suspects?'¹

This keen-eyed castaway, peering down into the depths of Western Man's Subconscious Psyche from a revealing observation-post on the flotsam from a spiritual shipwreck, had anticipated the experience that Thor Heyerdahl and his comrades were to have when they peered down into the depths of the Pacific Ocean between the logs of their balsawood raft. This perilously intimate commerce with elemental Nature brought into view deep-sea monsters that had been invisible to the comfortable passengers on board a mechanically propelled Modern Western luxury liner;² and Valéry had the imagination to realize that there must be yet more horrifying depths below the depths so far surveyed by eyes receiving only a first lesson in enlightenment through suffering. The inhabitants of London needed the harsher ordeal of a Second World War to transfigure their mood from the hysterical *abandon* of Armistice Day, 1918, to the sober restraint of VE Day, 1945. An observer who, on both days, was out and about in the streets of London, in the neighbourhood of Buckingham Palace and Whitehall, could hardly fail to be struck by the contrast between the temper of a crowd who had jumped to the childish conclusion that they had seen the last of War in their time, and perhaps for all time, and the temper of the same crowd when another twenty-seven years of disillusioning experience had taught them to suspect that, in their time, world wars were not just meaninglessly hideous accidents in a normally rational and benign order of Nature, but were the very stuff of which the thread of contemporary world history was being spun. This lesson, which the Londoners were taking to heart in A.D. 1945, had been learnt by the French man of letters twenty-seven years earlier. At the moment of the sounding of the first cease-fire, Paul Valéry had been aware that he was witnessing the end of an act which was not the end of the tragedy—as he testifies in the following exordium of an address delivered by him at Zürich on the 15th November, 1922.

'L'orage vient de finir, et cependant nous sommes inquiets, anxieux, comme si l'orage allait éclater.

'Presque toutes les choses humaines demeurent dans une terrible incertitude. Nous considérons ce qui a disparu, nous sommes presque détruits par ce qui est détruit; nous ne savons pas ce qui va naître, et nous pouvons raisonnablement le craindre. Nous espérons vaguement, nous redoutons précisément; nos craintes sont infiniment plus précises que nos espérances;

¹ Valéry, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

² See Heyerdahl, Thor: *Kon-Tiki, Across the Pacific by Raft* (Chicago 1950, Rand McNally), p. 117, quoted on pp. 398-9, above.

nous confessons que la douceur de vivre est derrière nous, que l'abondance est derrière nous, mais le désarroi et le doute sont en nous et avec nous. Il n'y a pas de tête pensante, si sagace, si instruite qu'on la suppose, qui puisse se flatter de dominer ce malaise, d'échapper à cette impression de ténèbres, de mesurer la durée probable de cette période de troubles dans les échanges vitaux de l'humanité.

'Nous sommes une génération très infortunée à laquelle est échu de voir coïncider le moment de son passage dans la vie avec l'arrivée de ces grands et effrayants événements dont la résonance emplira toute notre vie.'¹

In truth, the entr'acte during which these words of foreboding were written was to be followed by a second act of a post-Modern Western tragedy in which German virtues were to be the agents of far worse German wickedness than the worst that had come into action in the years A.D. 1914-18. The atrocities committed in hot blood by the armies of the Second Reich on the war-path through an invaded Belgium whose neutrality Germany had pledged herself to respect were to be eclipsed by the enormity of the cold-blooded atrocities that were to be perpetrated by Nazi gangsters on a home front, while the moral shock to Western feelings was to be in inverse ratio to the ghastliness of the crimes. Western consciences which in A.D. 1914 had still been tender enough to be startled and outraged had become too numb, twenty and thirty years later, for horror to keep pace with familiarity. Yet, where *saeva indignatio*² fell out of the race, intellectual integrity could still keep in the running, and this virginal virtue of the Human Spirit testified that, in bringing in a well-deserved verdict of 'guilty' against German prisoners at the bar of Divine Justice, the rest of the Western World was proclaiming its own guilt in the same breath; for, when a non-German majority of a Western community had done its best to clear itself of complicity in German crimes by making the most of the German people's peculiar aberrations from the main path of the Western Civilization's moral and political progress in the Modern Age, these non-German Westerners could not deny, in the last resort, that those horrifyingly aberrant Germans were still bone of their bones and flesh of their flesh.³ A Western nation which, for good or evil, had played so central a part in Western history, since the first emergence of a nascent Western Civilization out of a post-Hellenic interregnum, could hardly have committed these flagrant crimes if the same criminality had not been festering foully below the surface of life in the Western World's non-German provinces. The twentieth-century German psyche was like one of those convex mirrors in which a gazer learns to read the character printed on his own countenance through seeing the salient features exaggerated in a revealing caricature. If a twentieth-century Germany was a monster, then, by the same token, a twentieth-century Western Civilization was

¹ Valéry, Paul: Extrait d'une conférence donnée à l'université de Zurich le 15 Novembre 1922, reprinted in *Variété*, pp. 33-34. See also Bridges, Robert: *The Testament of Beauty*, Book II, ll. 954 to the end, especially the last ten lines, recording the poet's feelings, charged with 'a profounder fear', 'amid the flimsy joy of the uproarious city'.

² 'Ubi saeva indignatio ulterius cor lacerare nequit' (Dean Swift's anticipatory epitaph on himself).

³ Gen. ii. 23.

a Frankenstein guilty of having been the author of this German monster's being. There, in this monstrous exhibition of a Germany running amok, went France, England, and America likewise, but for the Grace of God—and not one of them could be sure of being saved when their sister Germany had been lost.

Thus already in A.D. 1922, and *a fortiori* in A.D. 1952, when the paroxysm by which the West had been seized in A.D. 1914 was another thirty years older, it was manifest that the West's direst malady was Sin and not Mortality.

'On peut dire que toutes les choses essentielles de ce monde ont été affectées par la guerre. . . . L'usure a dévoré quelque chose de plus profond que les parties renouvelables de l'être. Vous savez quel trouble est celui de l'économie générale, celui de la politique des États, celui de la vie même des individus: la gêne, l'hésitation, l'appréhension universelles. *Mais parmi toutes ces choses blessées est l'esprit.* L'Esprit est en vérité cruellement atteint; il se plaint dans le cœur des hommes de l'esprit et se juge tristement. Il doute profondément de soi-même.¹ . . . L'oscillation du navire a été si forte que les lampes les mieux suspendues se sont à la fin renversées.²

'Ainsi la Persépolis spirituelle n'est pas moins ravagée que la Suse matérielle. Tout ne s'est pas perdu, mais tout s'est senti périr.'³

This note of interrogation, on which a French man of letters concluded an inquiry into the prospects of the Western Civilization on the morrow of the first of the general wars that a Westernizing World inflicted on itself in its post-Modern Age, was presented in a challenging visual form by a contemporary English caricaturist whose sardonic pictorial treatment of the same theme was not less effective than Paul Valéry's elegiac prose in bringing out an inherent tragedy.

In a serial triptych exhibited in London early in the inter-war period A.D. 1919-39, Max Beerbohm depicted, in his inimitable style, his notion of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth Centuries' divers conceptions of their approaching successors.

In the first cartoon in the series, the Eighteenth Century, in the guise of a faultlessly frizzed and powdered man of the world, is looking down quizzically at the Nineteenth Century in the guise of a raw young man who is unable to hide his embarrassment under his disdainful senior's disgusted scrutiny. According to the Eighteenth Century's Gibbonian philosophy, History ought, of course, to have culminated in this Golden Age's unsurpassable self. The very suggestion that this definitive century might have a successor is a most offensive imputation upon its claim to have found and quaffed the elixir of immortality; and the present young pretender to a no longer open succession has added insult to injury by presenting himself as a figure of fun whose uncouthness is not a good joke when judged by eighteenth-century standards of good taste.

In terms of Sinic imagery with which we have made ourselves familiar in this Study, the Eighteenth Century is striking in this first cartoon the wry attitude of a complacently established Yin-state towards a diffidently

¹ Valéry, Paul: lecture of the 15th November, 1922, in *Variété*, p. 34.

² Valéry, Paul: 'La Crise de l'Esprit', in *Variété*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

approaching Yang-activity. In the second cartoon the Nineteenth Century—here portrayed as a portly business man in Victorian dress whose rotundity and rubicundity give the measure of his prosperity—is shown beaming with a fatuous confidence as he pats on the back a still more rotund and rubicund reproduction of himself, attired in the self-same Victorian trousers, frock coat, and top hat; and in this mid-way tableau of the three a Sinic eye would no doubt see a picture of the Yang-activity no longer diffident and apologetic but flushed with an exhilarating sense of boundless achievement. The crack-brained inventor of a chimaerical steam-engine has justified his hopes, beyond his own wildest dreams, by getting up a hitherto unimaginably powerful head of steam. He has exploded a wizened Eighteenth Century's illusion of an already attained static perfection in order to substitute for this a dynamic ideal of perfectibility to be approached through a perhaps endless number of bigger and better editions of the sanguine Nineteenth Century itself.

In the third of the three cartoons, by contrast with the other two, there is only one figure on the stage on which the tragedy of Western history is being played out; and this solitary actor is an emaciated young man in a twentieth-century suit of clothes and with one arm in a sling. His clothes are of so dark a hue that you would take him to be in mourning, and the sombreness of his dress is matched by the obscurity of the prospect ahead of him. He is facing a curtain of night whose blackness is relieved only by the pale glimmer of an enormous question-mark; and this symbol of uncertainty, on which the wistful young man's apprehensive eyes are riveted, occupies the place where the spectator's eye looks to find the missing second living performer.

What is the question that is tormenting this tragic Twentieth Century that has just come through the shattering experience of being blown up in early manhood by a terrific explosion of the Nineteenth Century's recklessly over-heated boilers? Is he saying to himself that he, for his part, cannot even profess to have any notion of what a Twenty-First Century is going to be like? Or is he, perhaps, wondering whether he can even look forward to having any successor of any kind? A prospect which a Gibbonian Eighteenth Century has taken as an insufferable insult would be taken by a Valérian Twentieth Century as a comforting assurance; but, in venturing to consider this reassuring possibility, is not he (the unhappy questioner asks himself) indulging in a vice of 'wishful thinking' which has come to be rated a mortal sin in a disillusioned century's recension of the Decalogue? Is it not far more probable that a second and a third explosion will have blown the coffinship *Hesperus* and all her crew to pieces long before the arrival of New Year's Day, A.D. 2001, can give the signal for the next change of the watch?

In these two identical portrayals of a Western World's outlook on the morrow of the War of A.D. 1914-18, Max Beerbohm and Paul Valéry are giving as faithfully accurate a picture of the same world's outlook on the morrow of the War of A.D. 1939-45 as if the draughtsman had reined in his pencil, and the writer his pen, till he had lived through a second

world war in one lifetime and had survived to witness the making and dropping of an atomic bomb.

If, however, we find this consensus between Valéry and Beerbohm impressive, what are we to make of it when Valéry and Gibbon, so far from speaking with one voice, declaim to us in irreconcilably discordant accents? When prophets disagree, are we to give credit to either of their opposing voices? The common-sense answer is that prophets talk the language of feeling, and that neither of the two antithetical attitudes which a Gibbon and a Valéry respectively represent is warranted by the facts. Gibbon's belief that, in his generation, the Western World had extricated itself, once for all, from the flow of History was decisively refuted, as we have seen, by revolutionary events that Gibbon himself lived to witness; but Gibbon's signal discomfiture is no evidence that an opposite appraisal of the Western Civilization's prospects is bound to prove correct. The symbol which a stricken Twentieth Century sees glimmering through the darkness ahead is not a skull-and-crossbones; it is a question-mark; and, though this cautionary signal will rightly give pause to a wayfarer who has been allowing himself to expect the light ahead of him to show green, the colour of the light that he is actually being shown is neither this beckoning green nor a forbidding red, but is a cryptically neutral yellow. Signs and portents which are good evidence that the wayfarer is in danger are no evidence at all that he is doomed to come to grief.

The truth is that Valéry's pessimism and Gibbon's optimism are, both alike, rationalizations of feelings that are irrationally subjective.

The only rational ground for Gibbon's complacent outlook was the ephemeral experience—out of date within Gibbon's own lifetime—of an exceptional spell of peace in the course of an exceptionally temperate passage of Modern Western history; but, if we were to try to account for Gibbon's complacency by seeing in it a rational inference from experience, we should hardly have begun to explain it. The deeper explanation of Gibbon's mood is to be found, not in any process of reasoning, but in an irrational egocentric illusion; and this most fantastic of all freaks of Maya is of course no peculiar aberration of one eighteenth-century Western philosopher's mentality.

The egocentric illusion has always beset every living organism in which an ego has ever asserted itself. In an earlier context we have made a survey of the breakdowns which human creatures, institutions, techniques, and ideals have brought upon themselves by the sin of self-idolization;¹ and we have observed² that there has never been a human personality, community, or society that has not been tempted to commit the fatuous impiety of trying to put itself in the place of its Creator by casting itself for the role of being 'the Chosen People' and 'the Heir of the World'.³ The most damning characteristic of this Original Sin of Human Nature is its aptness to vary in the degree of its virulence in inverse ratio to the measure of any rational justification for succumbing to it. Self-idolization is most flagrantly in evidence, not as a self-

¹ See IV. iv. 261-465.

² See IV. iv. 245-61.

³ Rom. iv. 13.

adjudicated reward for success, but as a self-exculpating compensation for failure. For example, in encounters between divers civilizations, the party that is the more apt to fall into the self-hypnotization of Narcissus is the assaulted party, not the assailant. This mirage is the inspiration of a Zealotism¹ that is an assaulted party's negative reaction; and the same baneful vice of self-worship manifests itself in Tithonian universal states,² in petrified civilizations,³ in the fossils of extinct civilizations,⁴ in arrested civilizations,⁵ and in primitive societies in their Yin-state.⁶

Such extreme manifestations of egocentricity are so many attempts to find escape in an inner asylum from an external reality with which the ego has failed to cope; and the most extreme manifestation of all is a Racialism which dreams of securing an automatic and inalienable salvation through the imaginary spiritual virtue of some particular physical make-up.⁷ We can still say 'We have Abraham'—or Arminius—to our father⁸ when we have no other word of hope or justification left; and this plea is, in fact, the last resort of spiritual bankrupts. Here, in self-esteem's last ditch, Zionists and National-Socialists meet; and here a de Gobineau rubs shoulders with a Gibbon; for the same ubiquitous egocentric illusion is the common ground for the pessimism of a nineteenth-century French aristocrat who despairs of a Western Civilization that has bred out or killed out his own incomparable Nordic Race, and for the optimism of an eighteenth-century English man of letters who believes in the prospects of a Western Civilization that has culminated in his day in his own incomparably polite society. An illusion that captivates such incongruously mixed company must spring from an Original Sin common to all Human Nature, and not from any common element in the allegedly objective facts on which the rival claimants to a unique pre-eminence have sought to base their mutually incompatible pretensions.

Another indication that Gibbon's optimism about the prospects of the Western Civilization was not grounded in any rational appreciation of contemporary Western experience is the significant fact that the same experience has moved other Western participants in it to view the Western World, not as a Paradise Regained which must be, and can be, preserved, but as a City of Destruction from which a faithful remnant must flee before this Gomorrah's jerry-built towers fall about a blindly unrepentant majority's ears. The same landscape may take on irreconcilably different aspects from diametrically opposite standpoints. Where top-dog sees a heaven, under-dog will see a hell; and, in fact, while 'the best of all possible worlds' was being commended to a comfortably placed religious, political, social, and intellectual 'ascendancy' by a Leibnitz and a Gibbon, the Early Modern, Late Modern, and post-Modern chapters of Western history were seeing the same world being denounced, repudiated, and deserted in equal good faith by a long series of

¹ See IX. viii. 580-623.

³ See I. i. 133-46.

⁵ See III. iii. 1-111.

⁷ See II. i. 207-49.

² See VI. vii. 47-52.

⁴ See I. i. 90-92.

⁶ See I. i. 179-180 and II. i. 192-3.

⁸ Matt. iii. 9.

ardent secessionists. The Protestants revolted against a Roman Catholic Church which, in their eyes, had ceased to be *Una Sancta* to become the Scarlet Woman of the Apocalypse.¹ The English shook from their feet the dust² of a treacherous continent, and the Americans the dust of a treacherous hemisphere. And, when a Western internal proletariat had become as widespread as the 'capitalist' Western Civilization that, in the Communists' indictment of it, stood accused of having reduced the proletariat to misery, the seceding Communists found in Russia a non-Western base of operations for mounting an attack upon Capitalism in its Western birthplace and citadel. The irreconcilability of these conflicting appreciations of a Western Civilization's value showed that all of them were subjective, and their subjectivity convicted all of them of inconclusiveness.

Pessimism, of course, was no more proof than optimism against the possibility of being refuted by events. If Gibbon lived to see the outbreak of the French Revolution refute his unfounded optimistic conviction that History had come to an end in the eighteenth century, he was only suffering the same fate as his forebears the eleventh-century Western Millenarians,³ whose no better founded pessimistic conviction that History was coming to an end on the thousandth anniversary of Christ's nativity—or, failing that, at any rate on the thousandth anniversary of the end of His mission on Earth—was no less conclusively refuted within their own lifetime by History's inconsiderate performance of sailing on serenely through each, in turn, of these nicely calculated successive terminal dates.

Nor did History merely insist on continuing to flow beyond the latest term that these Millenarians had prescribed for her. She completed their discomfiture by choosing the very date on which they had predicted that she was to go out of action as her date for opening a new chapter in the growth-phase of these eccentric Millenarian pessimists' own society. An eleventh century of the Christian Era which, in the event, did not bring with it the end of the history of all things, did doubly falsify the Millenarians' gloomy expectations by inaugurating, instead, the opening of a new chapter in the growth of the Western Civilization; and the fresh impetus acquired by this growing civilization in this critical passage of its history was actually comparable, in its vigour and creativity, to the classic flowering of the same civilization some four hundred years later. If it is a commonplace that the fifteenth century of the Christian Era saw the Western World move out of a 'medieval' into a 'modern' stage of its growth, it is no less clear that the eleventh century of Western history witnessed a similar transition to 'the Middle Ages' from 'the Dark Ages'.⁴ Yet, in thus conclusively demonstrating the erroneousness of the eleventh-century Western Millenarians' application to their own times of a Primitive Christianity's belief in the imminence of Christ's Second Coming, the course of Western history did not eradicate this traditional expectation from the minds of the confuted Millenarians' descendants. In cultivated Western

¹ Rev. xvii. 3-6.

³ See I. i. 171, n. 1.

² Luke ix. 5. Cp. Matt. x. 14; Mark vi. 11.

⁴ See I. i. 171.

minds this belief did not fade out before the seventeenth century; in 'fundamentalist' Western Christian minds it was still alive in the present writer's lifetime.

The pessimist's error of mistaking dawn for nightfall may be rarer than the optimist's error of mistaking sunset for noon; yet the eleventh-century Western Christian Millenarians' misapprehension of the character of the age through which they were living has at least one striking counterpart in the Boeotian poet Hesiod's misapprehension of the prospects of his own Hellenic Civilization in the eighth century B.C. Hesiod believed that the Iron Age into which it had been his fate to be born was a worse age than all previous ages¹ of human history. In his eyes it was an age that was to see Honour and Justice, the slowest of the Gods to despair of Human Nature, at last break off their losing battle against triumphantly aggressive forces of evil and sorrowfully withdraw from the terrestrial arena, leaving human sinners and sufferers to their self-inflicted fate. The iron had entered into this eighth-century Hellenic prophet's soul.²

'O would that I had not tarried to live thereafter with the fifth race, but had either died before or had been born after; for now in these latter days is the Race of Iron. Never by day shall they rest from travail and sorrow, and never by night from the hand of the spoiler; and cruel are the cares which the Gods shall give them. The father shall not be of one mind with the children nor the children with the father, nor the guest with the host that receives him, nor friend with friend, nor shall brother cleave to brother as aforetime. Parents shall swiftly age and swiftly be dishonoured, and they shall reproach their children and chide them with cruel words. Wretches that know not the visitation of the Gods! Such as these would not repay their aging parents for their nurture. The righteous man or the good man or he that keeps his oath shall not find favour, but they shall honour rather the doer of wrong and the proud man insolent. Right shall rest in might of hand and Ruth shall be no more. The wicked shall do hurt to his better by use of crooked words with oath to crown them. All the sons of sorrowful Man shall have Strife for their helpmate—harsh-voiced Strife of hateful countenance, rejoicing in evil.

'And then, at long last, shall those spirits go their way to Olympus from the wide-wayed Earth, with their beautiful faces veiled in white raiment, seeking the company of the immortals, and leaving behind them the company of men—even the spirits of Ruth and Retribution. Pain and grief are the portion that shall be left for mortal men, and there shall be no defence against the evil day.'³

The sincerity of Hesiod's cry of anguish is transparent; yet it is manifest in retrospect that Hesiod in the eighth century B.C. was misreading the signs of the times as egregiously as the Millenarians were to misread them in the eleventh century of the Christian Era. Hesiod's announcement of the withdrawal of Astraea was just as wide of the mark as the Millenarians' announcement of the approach of the Last Judgement;

¹ The diffraction of a post-Minoan heroic age in Hesiod's retrospective vision of it through two different lenses has been noticed in VIII. viii. 74-78.

² 'Ferrum pertransiit animam eius', Psalm cv. 18, as mistranslated in the Vulgate version (where it is numbered civ. 18).

³ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 174-201.

for 'the Dark Night of the Soul' is a darkness that is the herald, not of Death, but of Dawn.

Thus feelings prove to be as inconclusive as statistics when we interrogate them as witnesses in an inquiry into the prospects of the Western Civilization; and, now that we have drawn blank in these two preliminary reconnaissances, it is time to have recourse to our well-tried empirical method of investigation.

C. THE TESTIMONY OF THE HISTORIES OF THE CIVILIZATIONS

(I) WESTERN EXPERIENCES WITH NON-WESTERN PRECEDENTS

IN earlier Parts of this Study we have tried to gain some insight into the causes of the breakdowns of civilizations and into the process of their disintegrations by making empirical surveys of relevant historical facts,¹ and in these surveys we have taken a synoptic view of evidence from the histories of all the civilizations known to us, including the Western. At the point which we have now reached in our present inquiry into the prospects of the Western Civilization mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, it may be useful to recall and review any conspicuous counterparts in Western history of phenomena in the histories of other civilizations which, in those histories, are recognizable symptoms of breakdown and disintegration.

In studying the breakdowns of civilizations, we found that the cause was, in every case, some failure of self-determination, and that, when human beings thus lost control over their own destinies, this social disaster usually turned out to have been the consequence of a moral aberration. A broken-down society, community, or individual would prove to have forfeited a salutary freedom of choice through having fallen into bondage to some idol of its own making. Mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era the Western Society was manifestly given over to the worship of a number of idols that had been the bane of other civilizations in the past; but, among these, one stood out above all the rest, and this was the cult of the institution of Parochial Sovereignty embodied in parochial states that were being worshipped by their respective subjects as very gods² and that were demonstrating their demonic power over their devotees by exacting from them human sacrifices of ever greater enormity in cycles of fratricidal wars of a violence that was increasing in a geometrical progression.

This grimly prominent feature of post-Modern Western life was a terrifying portent on two accounts: first because this idolization of

¹ See IV. iv. 7-584; V. v. 15-568; and V. vi. 1-326.

² At some date during the latter part of the breathing-space between the general wars of A.D. 1914-18 and A.D. 1939-45, the writer of this Study heard the presiding officer of one of the livery companies of the City of London bear testimony which was convincing, because it was unselfconscious, to the primacy, in his *Weltanschauung*, of one of these tribe-worships. The occasion was a dinner at which the company was entertaining the delegates to an international congress that was in session in London at the time, and the presiding officer had risen to propose the toast 'Church and King'. Having it on his mind that a majority of his guests were foreigners who would not be familiar with an English tribal custom, the president prefaced the toast with an apology and an explanation. No doubt, he said, the order in which he had rehearsed the two institutions that were to be honoured conjointly in the toast that he was about to propose might seem to a foreigner not only quaint but perhaps even positively unseemly. He apologized for abiding, nevertheless, by the traditional order, and explained that he did so because it was the pride of the city companies to be meticulous in preserving antique usages, even when these had become so anachronistic as to be open to misconstruction by the uninitiated.

belligerent parochial sovereign states was the true, though unavowed, religion of a great majority of the inhabitants of the Westernizing World of the day¹ and, secondly, because this false and maleficent religion had been the death of no less than fourteen civilizations for certain, and perhaps of no less than sixteen, out of the twenty-one civilizations that had come into existence during the currency of this species of Society up to date.

Fratricidal warfare of ever increasing violence between parochial sovereign states had been by far the commonest cause of mortality among civilizations of all three generations.² In the first generation it had certainly been the destruction of the Sumeric³ and the Andean⁴ Civilization, and probably the destruction of the Minoan⁵ as well. In the second generation it had destroyed the Babylonian,⁶ the Indic,⁷ the Syriac,⁸ the Hellenic,⁹ the Sinic,¹⁰ the Mexic,¹¹ and the Yucatec.¹² In the third generation it had destroyed the Orthodox Christian Civilization, both in its main body¹³ and in its Russian offshoot;¹⁴ the Far Eastern Civilization in its Japanese offshoot;¹⁵ the Hindu¹⁶ and the Iranic.¹⁷ Of the five remaining known representatives of the species of Society to which the Western Civilization belonged, we may suspect that the Hittite Civilization likewise had brought itself to ruin by fratricidal warfare at home before it had run full tilt against a petrified Egyptiac World and had subsequently succumbed to a barbarian Völkerwanderung;¹⁸ and there were only four foundered civilizations whose evil genius had probably or certainly been an idol of a different clay. The evidence about the breakdown and disintegration of the Mayan Civilization that had been yielded by archaeological exploration so far was negative in the sense that it showed hardly a trace of any ravages of fratricidal warfare;¹⁹ the more abundant evidence about the breakdowns of the Egyptiac Civilization and the Far Eastern Civilization in China indicated that the idol to which these had sacrificed their lives had been, not Parochial Sovereignty asserting itself in fratricidal warfare, but an oecumenical polity—'the Old Kingdom' in the one case²⁰ and in the other case the Sui and T'ang evocation of a ghost of the Han Empire²¹—which had brought with it the additional incubus of a more and more top-heavy and parasitic bureaucracy. The incubus of a parasitic Nomad institution *in partibus agricolarum*—the slave-ascendancy of the Egyptian Mamlûks²²—may have been the death of the Arabic Civilization,²³ unless the fate of this society was a solitary instance of assassination by the hand of an alien assailant.²⁴

An idol whose cult had thus proved fatal to fourteen or sixteen out of twenty-one representatives of the species of Society to which the Western Civilization belonged manifestly could not be worshipped by its latter-day Western devotees with impunity. This form of collective self-wor-

¹ See I. i. 442-5.

⁴ See IV. iv. 105.

⁷ See IV. iv. 66.

¹⁰ See IV. iv. 65-66.

¹³ See IV. iv. 72-73.

¹⁶ See IV. iv. 99-100.

¹⁹ See IV. iv. 108.

²² See II. ii. 376; III. iii. 449; and VI. vii. 19.

²³ See IV. iv. 112.

² See V. v. 41-43 and 189.

⁵ See IV. iv. 64-65.

⁸ See IV. iv. 67-68.

¹¹ See IV. iv. 105-6.

¹⁴ See IV. iv. 96.

¹⁷ See IV. iv. 107.

²⁰ See I. i. 136-7 and 141-3, and III. iii. 212-15.

²¹ See I. i. 136-7 and 141-3, and III. iii. 212-15.

²⁴ See IV. iv. 113-14.

³ See IV. iv. 64.

⁶ See IV. iv. 101-3.

⁹ See IV. iv. 62-63.

¹² See IV. iv. 105-6.

¹⁵ See IV. iv. 94.

¹⁸ See IV. iv. 108-12.

²² See III. iii. 30-31.

²⁴ See IV. iv. 113-14.

ship had, in fact, already been the death of a Western city-state cosmos which had disengaged itself from, and forged ahead of, the rest of the Western World in the Medieval Age of Western history.¹ In the unhappy experience of this abortive sub-society within a Western Christian body social, the Venetians' idolization of their own dead collective self from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century of the Christian Era² had, as we have seen, been a startlingly close counterpart of the Athenians' idolization of their dead collective self from the fourth century B.C. onwards;³ and such examples from the history of the disintegration of a Western sub-society were not the only cases of this spiritual malady in the history of the Western World. While the Epimethean stance of Eire⁴ might perhaps be discounted on the ground that this was a defensive reaction of a submerged relic of an originally alien Far Western Christian Civilization which was showing in this way its recalcitrance to the Western Civilization's attempt to assimilate it, the reaction of the Virginians and the South Carolinians to their defeat in the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5 in the United States⁵ was an indubitable post-Modern Western instance of the Venetian-Athenian attitude; and, while this backward-turned posture was peculiarly incongruous with the forward-looking outlook normally characteristic of pioneers on new ground, the post-Bellum Epimetheanism of 'the Old South' of the United States was not so significant a portent for the prospects of the Western World as a whole as the Epimetheanism that had become rife in France after the General War of A.D. 1914-18 and, to a still greater degree, after the General War of A.D. 1939-45.

Moreover, in the Western World as a whole in the post-Modern chapter of its history, the devastating effects of the idolization of parochial sovereign states had been enhanced by the importation of a demonic 'drive' into the suicidal performances of these tribal gods' votaries. The restraining influence of an oecumenicalism on the ecclesiastical plane which the Western Civilization had inherited from its chrysalis the Western Christian Church had been removed by a lamentable victory of parochialism over oecumenicalism in Western life on this ecclesiastical plane at the transition to the Modern Age from the Middle Ages.⁶ The capacity of the parochial sovereign states of a Modern Western World to ruin their common civilization by ruining one another had been enhanced by the importation into their statecraft of an Italian efficiency which had been the unfortunate legacy of a foundering Medieval Western city-state cosmos.⁷ The impact of Nationalism upon the historic political map of a Late Modern Western World had imported a new ferocity into the fratricidal wars between Western parochial states by most inexpediently raising the stakes.⁸ In the paroxysm of wars fought in the name of Nationalism coupled with some form of political ideology which had begun with the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in A.D. 1775, the contests could no longer be kept 'temperate and undecisive' because the parochial states of the Western World were now fighting one another

¹ See III. iii. 299 and 342-50.

³ See IV. iv. 263-74.

⁶ See IV. iv. 214-22.

⁴ See IV. iv. 291-6.

⁷ See IV. iv. 198-200.

² See IV. iv. 274-89.

⁵ See IV. iv. 280-91.

⁸ See IV. iv. 185-90.

—as the Sinic parochial states had fought one another in the second and final paroxysm of a Sinic Time of Troubles—for their very existence, and no longer just for an inclination of the Balance of Power that would be too slight to menace the warring society's 'general state of happiness'.¹ The most serious of all these aggravations of an evil which was, at the best, a galloping consumption was, however, the impact of two recently begotten Western demons, Democracy and Industrialism, upon both Parochial Sovereignty² and an inter-state warfare³ that could never be abolished so long as Parochial Sovereignty was permitted to survive.

An Industrial Revolution that had overtaken the Western World in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era was an unmistakable counterpart of the economic revolution that had overtaken the Hellenic World in the sixth century B.C.;⁴ and this likeness was ominous inasmuch as the effect of either of these revolutions on the economic plane had been to increase the aggregate productivity of the society in which the revolution had taken place through the expedient of creating a single large-scale economic unit out of the hundreds of small-scale economic units of which the society had previously been composed. Communities that had previously made their living by subsistence farming had now combined to increase their output and their income by learning to produce specialized commodities—not only agricultural but now also industrial—for export in exchange for imports of raw materials and foodstuffs. Parochial communities that had formerly been economically autarkic had thus now become economically interdependent; and even the largest and wealthiest of them could no longer resume its former economic autarky, however keenly it might regret the loss of it, since the penalty would have been a prohibitively precipitous fall from a now customary standard of living (in the material sense of the term).⁵ Thus the effect of the Western and the Hellenic economic revolution alike had been to give the society a new structure on the economic plane that was incongruous with its structure on the political plane. On the economic plane the society had now been unified, whereas on the political plane it had continued to be partitioned among a litter of parochial states. This incongruity had

¹ Gibbon, E.: 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West', at the end of chap. xxxviii of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

² See IV. iv. 156–85.

³ See IV. iv. 141–55.

⁴ See I. i. 24–25; IV. iv. 200–14; and IX. viii. 429–30.

⁵ The progressive integration of the Western World on the economic plane as a result of the Industrial Revolution has been noticed already in another context (pp. 313–14, above). 'Bare as they are and short their span, the annals reveal', not only in the United States but likewise in the World at large, 'a secular trend towards territorial expansion of business relations and a concomitant trend towards economic unity' (Mitchell, W. C.: *Business Cycles and their Setting* (New York 1927 (reprinted 1930), N.B.E.R.), p. 446. Cp. p. 456). 'The larger the agricultural element in a given nation, the less likely are that nation's business cycles to fit neatly into the international pattern over a long series of years. For two nations with large farming interests are not likely to have closely similar harvest fluctuations year after year' (ibid., p. 448). 'The quiet business forces working toward uniformity of fortunes must be powerful indeed to impress a common pattern upon the course of business cycles in many countries' (ibid., p. 450). 'Undoubtedly a larger proportion of the population' of Great Britain 'felt the impact of the trade cycle on their lives and fortunes in 1910 than in 1790' (Rostow, W. W.: *British Economy of the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), p. 44). We have already cited A. C. Pigou's dictum (in *Industrial Fluctuations*, 2nd ed. (London 1929, Macmillan), p. 11) that, by A.D. 1872, the industrial fluctuations in the economic activity of a Westernizing World had come to be oecumenical in their geographical range.

created a tension of a magnitude proportionate to its own; and the incongruity had been so extreme that the tension had become intolerable.

In the history of the Hellenic Civilization this tension had generated a Time of Troubles manifesting itself in two paroxysms of inter-state warfare, of which the second had been more devastating than the first;¹ and the idolization of the ephemeral institution of the city-state had died so hard in Hellenic hearts² that the troubles had lasted for four hundred years—from the outbreak of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. until the establishment of a *Pax Augusta* in 31 B.C.—before the rending tension had been relieved at last by a political revolution that had brought the political map of the Hellenic World into tardy conformity with a unitary economic map which had been in existence by then for at least five hundred years. The establishment of an Hellenic universal state to serve as a political framework for an Hellenic oecumenical economy had been achieved too late to save the life of the Hellenic Society; it had availed merely to bring it a temporary reprieve; and the expiry of this four-hundred-years-long period of grace had been the signal for the demise of a society which had inflicted mortal wounds on itself at least as early as the onset of the second paroxysm of its Time of Troubles in the Hannibalic War (*gerebatur* 218–201 B.C.). What was going to be the effect of the same tension, arising from the same incongruity, in the life of a Western World which, since the Industrial Revolution, had become, in its turn, a unity on the economic plane while continuing to be partitioned on the political plane among a litter of still, and indeed perhaps now more than ever, fanatically worshipped parochial sovereign states? Would the Western World, unlike the Hellenic World, succeed in arriving at some less belated and less radical solution of this problem than the *ultima ratio* of abolishing fratricidal warfare by abolishing the war-generating institution of Parochial Sovereignty through a liquidation of all existing parochial states and the establishment of a single universal state in their stead?

One discouraging symptom in Modern Western history had been the emergence there, first in Prussia and latterly in Germany at large, of a militarism that had been deadly in the histories of other civilizations. Militarism was a portentous moral evil because it was an abnormal one. The millions of human beings who had sacrificed wealth, happiness, and life itself in fighting the battles of some parochial state, whose subjects they had happened to be, had mostly gone to war, not because they had delighted in War for its own sake, but because they had more or less ruefully resigned themselves to war-making as an evil necessary for the preservation of another evil—Parochial Sovereignty—to which they had perversely said 'Be thou my good'.³ In contrast to this normal negative human attitude towards the evil of War, militarism was a state of mind in which War had ceased to be looked upon merely as a means of serving an idolized state and had become an idol and an end in itself; and this cult of War was manifestly something contrary to Human Nature.

On this showing, it was disquieting for a Western historian to recall in

¹ See V. vi. 287–91.

³ Milton: *Paradise Lost*, Book IV, l. 110.

² See IV. iv. 303–20.

A.D. 1952 that a Modern Western militarism in its pristine Prussian form had made its first appearance—*regnantibus Frederico Gulielmo I et Frederico II*, A.D. 1713–86—in an age in which, of all ages of latter-day Western history, the evil of War had been at its minimum.¹ Yet this Western militarism, as it had been practised in Prussia in the days of Frederick the Great and even in the darker days of Bismarck, had been, like the Hellenic militarism practised at Sparta in the days of Cleomenes I, a vice that had still been kept within bounds by a surviving respect for at least some of a civilization's traditional conventions. The more devastating militarism of a post-Bismarckian Prussia-Germany which had brought upon the Western World the catastrophe of A.D. 1914–18 had been a Western counterpart of a Spartan spirit, exacerbated by the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431–404 B.C., which had found its nemesis in 371 B.C. at Leuctra, or of a Babylonian militarism practised in Assyria in the days of Assurnazirpal II and Shalmaneser III (*regnabant* 883–824 B.C.). As for the mad-dog militarism of a National-Socialist Germany, this could only be compared with the last phase of the *furor Assyriacus*, after its temperature had been raised to the third degree by Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 746–727 B.C.).² It was true that, in A.D. 1952, it might look as if the fires of Western militarism had at least temporarily burnt themselves out, even in Germany, and at the same date it seemed improbable that even the virus of Russophobia would prove sufficiently inflammatory to kindle the same flame in the traditionally unpropitious atmosphere of the United States. Nevertheless, the fact that, no farther than seven years back, one of the principal nations of the Western World had been still waging an unprovoked war for war's sake, and this with all its might, was a fact of bad augury for the Western Civilization's prospects.

To set against these bad omens on a Western World's horizon in A.D. 1952 there were, on the other hand, certain more auspicious symptoms.

For example, the Epimethean self-worship of Venice and the other *ci-devant* city-states in Italy and Germany had yielded in the end to new allegiances in the course of the three or four generations running from A.D. 1789 to A.D. 1871; and, though at that stage the Venetians had merely exchanged their parochial loyalty to Venice for a parochial loyalty to Italy, and the Lübeckers their loyalty to Lübeck for a loyalty to Germany, the very fact that such old and, in their dotage, apparently hard-set idolatries had at least once been transcended gave some ground for hope that the descendants of those converts from the worship of a city-state to the worship of a nation-state might one day transfer their allegiance to a universal state between whose provinces war would be impracticable. It was also a good sign that, eighty-seven years after the forcible reincorporation of a Southern Confederacy into the United States, the descendants of bellicose Southern secessionists had become reconciled to a political destiny which had been imposed by force of arms upon their great-grandfathers.

Moreover, there was one ancient institution—no less evil than War itself—which the Western Civilization had plucked out and cast from it,

¹ See IV. iv. 142–50.

² See IV. iv. 473, n. 3.

albeit at the cost of a terrible civil war in one province of the Western World in which a 'peculiar institution' had been obstinately maintained for some thirty years after its abolition in the Western World at large.¹ A Western World which had succeeded in abolishing Slavery in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era might surely take heart from the memory of this unprecedented victory of a Christian ideal in a Western arena as it addressed itself in the twentieth century to Hêraklês' next labour, namely the attempt to abolish the coeval institution of War; for War and Slavery had been twin cancers of Civilization ever since this species of society had first emerged; and the nineteenth-century conquest of one of these two fell social diseases was therefore a good augury for the Western Society's prospects in its twentieth-century campaign against the disease of War.

The abolition of Slavery in a nineteenth-century Western World had also been a particularly notable triumph on two accounts. In the first place Slavery, like War, had been a potent cause of mortality among civilizations in the past. Slavery as an instrument of government and war had conspired with War itself to bring an Ottoman Civilization to grief;² Slavery as an instrument of specialization in economic production had similarly conspired with War to bring an Hellenic Civilization to grief during the second paroxysm of its Time of Troubles;³ and a Modern Western Society's decisive victory over an evil that had thus proved almost as puissant as War in defeating other civilizations in the past was therefore impressive evidence of moral health in a latter-day Western body social. The second reason why the abolition of Slavery in a nineteenth-century Western World was noteworthy was because this evil in this century in this social milieu had been raised to a potency without precedent in any previous chapter of Western history by the impact of the new motive-power of Industrialism. On the cotton plantations in 'the Old South' of the United States, Slavery had been harnessed to the production of a crop supplying the raw material for a mechanized textile industry which was the master craft of Industrialism in that stage of its development. A victory over an ancient social institution into which a youthful Industrialism had put a demonic new 'drive' was a victory that might well be pregnant with future moral triumphs.

Moreover, a Western Society that in A.D. 1952 was still being worsted by War, eighty-seven years after its triumph over Slavery, could take heart from its record on other spiritual battlefields where the issue was still in the balance.

In its response to a challenge presented by the impact of Industrialism on the institution of Private Property,⁴ the Western Society had already made some headway in Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, New Zealand and Australia in forcing a passage between Scylla and Charybdis. The empirical compromises between Free Economic Enterprise and Socialism that were being worked out in those countries in that generation promised on the one hand to steer clear of an untempered economic individualism that would have driven all but a masterful minority to the

¹ See IV. iv. 137-41.

³ See IV. iv. 507-8 and V. v. 69-70.

² See III. iii. 22-50.

⁴ See IV. iv. 191-2.

wall if economic enterprise had been left uncontrolled in an age in which Industrialism had put a demonic 'drive' into it, while on the other hand this homoeopathic inoculation of a disordered body social with a moderate dose of socialism was a prophylactic against the danger of the society's succumbing to a totalitarianism that would have imposed on human beings the social justice of the ant-heap and the beehive at the cost of forcibly depriving them of Man's distinctive birthright of freedom.

In the same generation the Western Society had also been achieving some success in coping with the impact of Democracy upon Education.¹ In throwing open to the majority an intellectual treasure-house which had been a small minority's jealously guarded and oppressively exploited preserve since the dawn of Civilization,² the Modern Western spirit of Democracy had given Mankind a new hope at the cost of exposing it to a new danger. The danger lay in the opening which a rudimentary universal education gave for propaganda, and in the skill and unscrupulousness with which this opportunity had been seized by salesmen for advertising their wares and by news agencies, 'pressure groups', political parties, and the public relations departments of firms and governments for 'selling' their policies. The hope lay in the possibility that these exploiters of a semi-educated public would prove unable to 'condition' their victims so thoroughly as to succeed in preventing them from continuing their education; for, if only they could continue it, it might be expected to carry them to a point at which they would begin to become capable of detecting intellectual dishonesty and penalizing intellectual foul play.

Education was a two-edged sword which could be used at will, by the powers that wielded it, either for opening the minds of their fellow human beings to a liberating truth³ or for subduing them to a cramping dogma. At the time of writing, when this mental strife between Enlightenment and Obscurantism was raging *aequo Marte* in the 'democratic' as well as the 'totalitarian' provinces of a Westernizing World,⁴

¹ See IV. iv. 192-8.

² See IV. iv. 418-21.

³ John viii. 32.

⁴ The extent to which people's opinion and feelings were being 'conditioned' in the West in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, even in a Western country that boasted of itself that it was democratic, had been brought home to the present writer by an amusing incident at an unofficial international conference convened at Kyoto in the autumn of A.D. 1929 by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

This conference was attended by representatives of a number of countries with frontages on the Pacific Ocean; and, when English-speaking Westerners from the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom found themselves sitting round the same table with Chinese and Japanese colleagues, they put their heads together and decided with one accord to improve the shining hour by doing something, out of school, to advance their Oriental colleagues' education in the principles of 'Democracy'. To this end they planned a series of evening meetings at which distinguished 'Anglo-Saxon' speakers were to hold forth to a voluntary class of Oriental neophytes on divers aspects of this beatific Western institution, and they placed 'Public Opinion' at the head of their select list of edifying topics. On the appointed evening their Oriental colleagues courteously presented themselves, the distinguished Anglo-Saxon speaker spoke his lines, and the Anglo-Saxon chairman then called for questions in an intonation suggesting that he expected the response to be a negative one, while the Anglo-Saxon supporters of the chair sat back in a row and relaxed with the air of men who had accomplished a meritorious evening's work. The atmosphere changed, however, from one of drowsy complacency to one of expectant amusement when a little Chinese lady, sitting in the back row, asked permission, not to put a question, but to make a statement. What on earth could a middle-aged headmistress from Changsha, in the far interior of China, have to say?

— 'During the war', meaning the war of A.D. 1914-18, the little lady began, 'I was living

there was no reason to take it as a foregone conclusion that an insidious Propaganda would win a permanent victory anywhere over an innate Human Intelligence. The impact of Democracy upon Education, however, was not so formidable a challenge to the Spirit of Man as the impact of Civilization, reinforced by the 'drives' of both Democracy and Industrialism, on the Division of Labour and on an indispensable but perilous social drill which we have labelled 'mimesis';¹ yet these, again, were not the battlefields that were likely to prove decisive for the Western Civilization's destiny. The plane on which the decisive spiritual battle was likely to be fought was neither the military nor the political nor the social nor the economic nor the intellectual; for in A.D. 1952 the crucial questions confronting Western Man were all religious.

Had the fanatically positive Judaic, if not the unfanatically negative Indic, higher religions been discredited beyond repair by the incriminating historical record of an intolerance that had given the lie to their professions?² Was there any virtue in the religious toleration into which a Western World, disillusioned by the inconclusive savagery of the Wars of Religion, had subsided towards the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, at the opening of a Late Modern Age of Western history?³ How long would Western souls find it bearable to go on living in an empty, swept, and garnished house?⁴ And, now that the discomfort of a spiritual vacuum had tempted them to open the door to such devils as Nationalism and Fascism and Communism, how was their vaunted latter-day conversion to a belief in tolerance likely to stand this test? Toleration had been easy to practise in a lukewarm age of Western history in which all varieties of Western Christianity had lost their former hold on Western hearts and minds, while these had not yet found any alternative objects for their frustrated devotion. Now that they had gone a whoring after other gods,⁵ would an eighteenth-century toleration hold its own against a twentieth-century recrudescence of a seventeenth-century fanaticism which, in Gibbon's naïvely optimistic belief, had been exorcized once and for all from the precincts of a 'polite' society? And, even supposing that a fanatical intolerance were to bring upon itself, once again, when harnessed to the service of idolized parochial states, the discredit into which it had eventually fallen when it had raged in the service of warring Western Christian sects, might not this vice even then regain its hold on human hearts and minds once more by

in Blackheath"—and, at the mention of this familiar suburb of London, the Englishmen in the room all woke up with a start. 'I was living in Blackheath,' she went on, 'and travelling to my office in London every morning in a suburban train; so I could observe what newspapers my fellow-travellers were reading, and could listen to their comments on the news of the day. After a few days of this, I found myself able to tell each of them what his views would be before he had opened his mouth. "Now you have been reading *The Daily Mail*," I would say to one of them, "so your opinions on this morning's news will be such and such. You, though, have been reading *The Daily News*, so your opinions will be these". These predictions were fairly simple,' she said, 'so I thought I should like to tell you about this experience of mine, as a small contribution to a study of public opinion—at least, as this is understood in the West.'

This was enough. That same evening, before going to bed, the Anglo-Saxon committee for the education of Orientals in Democracy held an emergency meeting and cancelled the rest of their programme.

² See IV. iv. 222-7.

⁴ Matt. xii. 44. Cp. Luke xi. 25.

¹ See IV. iv. 232-45.

³ See IV. iv. 227-8.

⁵ Judges ii. 17.

taking service, this time, with an idol standing, not for division, but for unity?

Wanderers in a Western wilderness, astray from their forefathers' One True God, who had been taught by a further bout of disillusioning experience that parochial states, like sectarian churches, were idols whose worship brought not peace but a sword,¹ might be tempted to seize upon a Collective Humanity as an alternative object for idolization.² A 'religion of Humanity' which had missed fire in the frigid mould of a Comtian Positivism had set the World ablaze when it had been fired from the canon's mouth of a Marxian Communism. Would a life-and-death struggle for the salvation of souls which Christianity had waged and won in its youth against an Hellenic worship of a Collective Humanity embodied in oecumenical cults of Dea Roma and Divus Caesar have to be fought out again, two thousand years later, against some latter-day embodiment of a worship of the same Leviathan? The Hellenic precedent raised the question without revealing the answer to a mid-twentieth-century inquirer into the Western Civilization's prospects.

If, in our review of Western experiences with non-Western precedents, we now pass on from the symptoms of breakdown to the symptoms of disintegration, we shall recall that, in our analysis of schism in the body social, we found unmistakable traces, in a latter-day Western World, of the epiphany of a dominant minority³ and of an internal and an external proletariat.⁴

The Western World's external proletariat will make little demand upon our attention; for our general conclusion⁵ that the barbarians had played no more than an insignificant part in the histories of the civilizations was conspicuously borne out by the situation on the Western World's anti-barbarian marches at the time of writing.⁶ The fate of the surviving barbarians had been sealed, as far back as the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, by the success of two sedentary Powers in encircling a Eurasian Steppe that had been the most devastating source of barbarian eruptions for at least three thousand five hundred years; and, though neither the Russian nor the Manchu Power had been a Western polity, their combined achievement had redounded to the benefit of a Western Civilization that had been expanding all over the *Oikoumenê* thanks to a mastery, not of the Steppe, but of the Ocean. By A.D. 1952 the last surviving enclaves of still recalcitrant barbarians were all manifestly on the verge of being eliminated. By the same date, however, it could already be foreseen that the barbarians would not pass out of existence without leaving their mark on the life of their victorious antagonists.

At the very moment when a Western Society armed by a Western Science was conquering the barbarians in the flesh, Barbarism was taking its revenge by finding its way into the souls of its Western conquerors.⁷ A regressive Western Neobarbarism, which, in the breathing-space between a First and a Second World War, had made so disconcerting an epiphany first in Italy and then in Germany,⁸ was, of course, morally far

¹ Matt. x. 34.

² See IV. iv. 300-3.

³ See V. v. 40-41 and 48-49.

⁴ See V. v. 152-94 and 319-37.

⁵ See I. i. 58-62 and VIII. viii, *passim*.

⁶ See pp. 743-4, below.

⁷ See pp. 744-5, below.

⁸ See V. v. 334-7.

more evil and politically far more formidable than the relatively innocent pristine Barbarism into whose heritage it had entered; and this evil had not been exorcized from Western souls by the military overthrow of an Italian Fascism and a German National-Socialism; for this perverse Western manifestation of Original Sin was an occupational disease of a semi-educated urban lower middle class that was as ubiquitous as the Western Civilization itself,¹ and there was perhaps no province of the Western World in which this class was not in some danger of succumbing to this malady. In an inter-war Italy and Germany, the heart of the disease had shown itself to be a morbid state of public opinion and feeling that was sufficiently malignant, and at the same time sufficiently widespread, to give an opening in public life for criminal activities. In this odious atmosphere a villain could count on being able to win popularity and power for himself by making preposterously false charges against the innocent, since it was an atmosphere in which the innocent had only to be accused of impiety against the current idols of the market-place to find themselves permanently under a cloud, however conclusively they might have proved their integrity, while the unscrupulous had only to launch such accusations to find themselves the heroes of the hour, even when they had been convicted of having known their charges to be false before they had launched them. In A.D. 1952 a touch of this painfully familiar inter-war Italian and German atmosphere was perceptible in the United States; and, though, in a North American social milieu, this spiritual malaria might be expected to bring about its own cure by stimulating a host of antagonistic spiritual forces to deliver a vigorous counter-attack, it was nevertheless disquieting for all people of good will in a stricken and beleaguered Western Community that such symptoms should have manifested themselves at all in the one Western country that, after a Second World War, still remained capable of serving as the arsenal, citadel, and conning-tower of Democracy in the Western sense of the word.

In the same chapter of Western history a vanishing external proletariat was also leaving its mark on Western life in a more direct and concrete way; for the *ci-devant* barbarians were being eliminated for the most part, not by being physically exterminated, but by being transferred to the ranks of a Western internal proletariat which by this time had come to embrace a great majority of the living generation of Mankind.²

The thus forcibly domesticated *ci-devant* barbarians were actually one of the smallest of the contingents of which this vast twentieth-century Western internal proletariat was composed. A far larger quota of the human beings who had been reduced to the status implied in the word 'Natives'³ by the sweep of a latter-day Western imperialism⁴ were children of non-Western civilizations that had been caught, like the last of the barbarians, in a world-encompassing Western net. A third contingent—the most unhappy and therefore the most actively dissident of the three—consisted of *déracinés* of divers origins, Western as well as

¹ See V. v. 158-9.

³ See I. i. 33 and 151-3.

² See V. v. 153-4, and p. 744, below.

⁴ See III. iii. 133 and 148-50, and V. v. 45-47.

non-Western, who had suffered divers degrees of coercion. There were the descendants of African negroes who had been taken prisoners or kidnapped, been sold into slavery, and been forcibly transported beyond the Atlantic to the Americas;¹ there were the descendants of indentured Indian and Chinese coolies whose migration overseas had often in effect been just as involuntary as the African's, even though their virtual servitude might have been imposed on them under the legal cover of a formal contract. There were the descendants of transported West-European indentured servants and convicts² whose prospects had been less tragic than those of the Asiatic coolie or the African slave, since these temporarily disfranchised children of a Western household had been able to look forward to recovering their personal liberty after they had worked out the term of their sentence, and to finding themselves thereafter in as good a position as any voluntary emigrant of their own race to take advantage of opportunities offered by a new country. There were exiles whose banishment had been the penalty, not of real or imaginary crimes or misdemeanours, but of imputed heresies—religious, political, or ideological.³ And there were emigrants who had chosen to go into a voluntary exile rather than continue to put up with a state of hopeless poverty to which the niggardliness of Nature or the injustice of their fellow men would have continued to condemn them if they had clung to an ancestral home.

There were other *déracinés* who had been uprooted without suffering a sea-change. The most flagrant examples of 'proletarianization' in a post-Modern Western World were 'the Poor Whites' in 'the Old South' of the United States and in the Union of South Africa, who, after having crossed the Ocean in order to better themselves, had sunk to the social and moral level of their more successful fellow colonists' imported or indigenous African helots.⁴ There was an agricultural proletariat in Great Britain whose status had been depressed, not by the direct competition of helot 'Native' labour in their homeland, but by the ability of a West European country that had temporarily become 'the workshop of the World' to buy cheap mass-produced foodstuffs from overseas in exchange for exports of British manufactures. And there was an industrial urban proletariat⁵ which, in Great Britain first of all, and thereafter in one country after another in a Western and a Westernizing World, had been drawn off the land into the city as a fall in the death-rate—bringing this down to ever lower levels over a Time-span of five or six generations before the restoration of the balance by a compensatory fall in the birth-rate—had made the creation of an unhappy urban proletariat the only alternative to the multiplication of an even more unhappy rural one.⁶ This urban proletariat seemed in A.D. 1952 to be on the way to becoming as world-wide⁷ as a Western standard of public health which was the ultimate cause of its epiphany, and as a Western style of Technology which was its staff of life; but there was another contingent of *déracinés* uprooted *in situ* which was the peculiar product of originally

¹ See II. ii. 218.

³ See V. v. 159–60.

⁶ See pp. 385–7, above.

⁴ See V. v. 163.

² See V. v. 161.

⁵ See V. v. 163–5.

⁷ See V. v. 155–6.

non-Western societies that had found themselves forced to conform in some degree to an alien Western way of life. An *intelligentsia*, called into existence to serve as a corps of interpreters between a proletarianized 'Native' society and an importunate Western 'ascendancy',¹ was, as we have observed, the most unhappy and the most explosive of the many ingredients of which a world-conquering Western Civilization's world-wide internal proletariat was composed.

The relations between a Western internal proletariat and a Western dominant minority were further aggravated by a 'colour-bar' in countries where there was an indigenous or imported proletariat that happened to have been stamped with the physique of a Black, Brown, or Yellow Race, and where the dominant minority had been recruited from Teutonic-speaking descendants of those White barbarians who had battered on the carcass of a dead Hellenic body social some fifteen hundred years back in the past. At the time of writing, the worst offenders were the Dutch-speaking lords and masters of the Union of South Africa; but the same fundamentally Fascist régime—making a class-distinction ineffaceable by identifying it with a race-distinction—was being maintained under the auspices of English-speaking cousins of the Afrikaners in Kenya Colony, in 'the Old South' of the United States, and in some respects—as, for instance, in a *de facto* segregation of domiciles—also in other sections of the North American Republic. Thus, in both a South African and a North American province of a latter-day Western World, a 'colour-bar' between divers communities sharing a common country was setting up, in a new social environment, the institution of Caste, which, in an Indic World that had been blighted by it, had likewise originated in a 'colour-bar' according to the tell-tale evidence of its Sanskrit name.²

In these circumstances it was not surprising to find a Western internal proletariat retorting to repression by exploding in outbreaks of retaliatory violence³ reminiscent of the classical explosions during the second paroxysm of an Hellenic Time of Troubles.⁴ The earliest of these outbreaks had occurred in an expanding Western Civilization's West European homeland; but the Anabaptist terror at Münster in A.D. 1543-5 and the successive Jacobin and Communard terrors in Paris in A.D. 1792-4 and in A.D. 1871 had been dwarfed in scale, though perhaps not surpassed in vindictiveness, by the insurrection of that vast majority of a latter-day Western internal proletariat which was of non-Western origin. The first of these anti-Western counter-attacks had been launched by Peter the Great, the Russian prototype of the Herodian saviour-king in a Westernizing World, in the Great Russo-Swedish War of A.D. 1700-21; but the consequent cession of the Baltic Provinces and the Karelian Isthmus by an eighteenth-century Western to an eighteenth-century Westernizing Power⁵ was a trifling loss for the Western Community

¹ See V. v. 154-8.

² 'Colour' is the literal meaning of *Varna*, the Sanskrit word for which the Modern Western languages had found an equivalent in the Portuguese word *Casta*.

³ See V. v. 167 and 170.

⁴ See V. v. 177-80.

⁵ See Gibbon's observations on this, and the present writer's comments on those observations, on pp. 752-4, below.

compared to the sweeping reversals of Western conquests during the fifth decade of the twentieth century.

In the General War of A.D. 1939-45, Russia had profited lucratively by her victorious alliance with the English-speaking Western Powers against a National-Socialist German Neobarbarism that had rankled into hideous life within the Western Society's bosom when in Germany a long since repressed abomination of desolation¹ had risen again, like an evil genius, from the depths of a collective Western subconscious psyche. In A.D. 1944-5 a Soviet Union, that had been compelled in A.D. 1918 to renounce Russian sovereignty over all Western territories that had been annexed by Russia since the days of Peter the Great, had re-established a Russian ascendancy over the Western World's East European marches; and this time Russia had succeeded in bringing under her domination a far larger portion of the Western Civilization's Continental European patrimony than had ever fallen under a Petrine Russia's rule. After the War of A.D. 1939-45, Russia had not only reannexed the Balticum and the Karelian Isthmus and suspended a sword of Damocles over Finland's head; she had enveloped the whole of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and large fractions of Germany and Austria, within her 'iron curtain'. These East European marches of the Western World were being kept under a Communist Russia's control by indigenous Communist parties with the backing of an undemobilized Russian Army; and this deft manoeuvre of harnessing volunteer non-Russian running-dogs to the sledge of a Russian imperialism was being practised by the statesmen in the Kremlin not only in Europe but in Asia as well.

In Eastern Asia, Russia had been the beneficiary of Japanese conquests which had been as extensive as they had been short-lived; for, ephemeral though they had proved to be, these triumphs of a non-Western Great Power over Western empire-builders on Asiatic ground had irretrievably shattered the myth of Western invincibility. In the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya, Indonesia, Indo-China, and Burma in A.D. 1941, the Western strong man armed had met one who was stronger than he;² and the signal retribution that had afterwards overtaken a Japanese black dragon had not availed to set up a Western humpty-dumpty again in the esteem of his former Asian subjects. In their suicidal act of breaking the West's spell over Asian souls, the twentieth-century Japanese disciples of the Forty-Seven Rōnin had let loose, out of Aeolus's wind-bag, the long-pent-up spiritual force of Asian resentment against a Western ascendancy which had been all the more galling for being asserted on the cultural level as well as on the economic, the political, and the military; and an anti-Western crusade which had been half-hearted so long as it had had to be carried on by quislings in the service of a nakedly self-seeking Japanese nationalism had been resumed, after Japan's defeat, with a novel enthusiasm under the banner of a Communism in which a self-seeking Russian nationalism was artfully camouflaged. In 1952 it looked as if Chinese Communist armies that had, in effect, been fighting Russia's battles in Korea might have it in their

¹ Matt. xxiv. 15 and Mark xiii. 14, following Dan. xi. 31 and xii. 11.

² Luke xi. 21-22.

power to sweep off the Asiatic chess-board most of the Western pawns that had been precariously replaced on it in A.D. 1945.

The example of an insurgent Asia might be followed by an effervescent Africa whose soldiers had seen the World and taken stock of it in the South-East Asian and West European war-zones of a Second World War; and, as the spark ignited by Russian Communism travelled along a train of gun-powder long since laid by Western imperialism, it was not inconceivable that it might fire the native peasantry in a chain of Latin American republics, from Mexico to Paraguay inclusive, that had been planted on the volcanic soil of buried Andean and Central American worlds. A conflagration that had started in Mexico in A.D. 1910 by spontaneous combustion might spread to Peru and Bolivia if the flame were to be fanned by Communism's forced draught. In short, a world-wide proletarian revolt against a world-wide Western ascendancy had now become a possibility with which the West had to reckon; and, for a Western Society at bay, this prospect was daunting.

At the same time there were a number of less sensational, but not necessarily on that score less substantial, entries on the other side of the account.

The first point that might come to tell in a menaced Western Civilization's favour was the alloy of Russian nationalism in an Oecumenical Communism that professed, with a show of Pauline fervour, to have risen superior to all invidious distinctions between Jew and Greek or bond and free.¹ For this vein of insincerity, however adroitly it might be veiled, was a flaw in the physique of Communism which exposed it to the danger of death by thrombosis. At a moment when in Eastern Asia the Western cause was suffering grievous immediate adversity, a Western telepathist who could have looked into the hearts of the close-lipped statesmen in the Kremlin might have learnt that they were watching their Chinese allies' rather spectacular military successes against their common Western adversaries with not unmixed feelings. Would Chinese Communists elated by victories over the greatest Power in the Western camp be content to dance to Russia's tune thereafter? The future of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang was, after all, of vastly greater importance for China and for Russia alike than the future of Indo-China, Hong Kong, and Formosa. The territorial issues between China and Russia were, in fact, both more momentous and more intractable than those between China and the West. Might not a Communist China, flushed with her demonstration of her ability to engage the United States in battle on equal terms, round on Russia with the cutting observation that, in accordance with the Marxian Religion of Humanity that both Russia and China professed, what was sauce for the American goose must be sauce for the Russian gander. A now hard-pressed Western World might perhaps live to see a Communist Russia's Asian Communist allies go a Communist Yugoslavia's way; and, at a moment when eager voices were being raised in the United States for a precipitate rearming of a Germany and a Japan who had been flying at the Western Community's throat only seven or eight years back, an English observer could look forward in his

¹ 1 Cor. xii. 13; Gal. iii. 28; Eph. vi. 8; Col. iii. 11.

imagination to a perhaps not distant day when the same voices would be hailing Holy Russia as 'the White Man's hope'.

This no doubt at first sight unconvincing prognostication had a solid basis in two indisputable facts. Russia was the only major province in the patrimony of the White Race in which the population was increasing in the twentieth century at the rate at which it had increased in the nineteenth century in Western Europe and North America; and Russia was also the province of the White Race's patrimony which marched with the Continental frontiers of China and India. If either or both of these two sub-continents, which, in the twentieth century, each housed nearly one quarter of the living generation of Mankind, were ever to succeed in carrying the process of Westernization on the technological and organizational planes to a point at which Chinese or Indian 'man-power' would begin to count—in contemporary Western terms of economic, political, and military strength—in proportion to its immense strength in sheer numbers, it was to be expected that a reinvigorated Samson would insist—under threat of pulling down the pillars of Humanity's house—on a drastic revision of the grossly inequitable distribution of the World's natural resources in territory, raw materials, and food producing capacity which had been the consequence of the West European peoples' conquest of the Ocean in and after the fifteenth century of the Christian Era. In such not inconceivable circumstances, Russia, in struggling to preserve her own existence, might find herself involuntarily performing, for a Western World snugly sheltering under her lee, the unrewarding service of acting as a buffer that the main body of Orthodox Christendom had once involuntarily performed for the same Western World when the explosive quarter of the Continent had been, not China or India, but a South-West Asia politically reunited under a dynamic Primitive Muslim Arab leadership.¹

In A.D. 1952 it would, no doubt, have been folly for a Western World that had been thrown on the defensive by a Russo-Chinese *entente* under the banner of Communism to count upon any possibility of a future breach between the two titanic non-Western Powers that were now co-operating with one another in an anti-Western campaign. There was perhaps more legitimate ground for encouragement in the fact that a Western Community which had come into headlong collision with the Chinese in Korea and which was desperately embroiled with the Vietnamese in Indo-China had managed to come to terms with the Indonesians after having crossed swords with them on the morrow of the 'liberation' of the East Indian archipelago from the Japanese, and had voluntarily abdicated its dominion over the Filipinos, Ceylonese, Burmans, Indians, and Pakistanis by amicable agreements that had not been sullied by any stain of bloodshed.

The voluntary liquidation of American rule in the Philippines was perhaps not so remarkable—though an English observer could hardly claim to be an impartial judge in this case—as the voluntary liquidation of a British Rāj in India that was not only a hundred years older than the American régime in a former dominion of the Spanish Crown but had

¹ See I. i. 156; II. ii. 376-9; and III. iii. 276, n. 1.

also come to count for far more in the life of the ruling Western country. When, on the 18th July, 1947,¹ Great Britain had completed the fulfilment of a pledge, first made on the 20th August, 1917,² to grant full self-government to India by stages at the fastest practicable pace, the Western country that had carried out this transfer of political power on this scale without having been constrained by any immediate *force majeure* had performed an act that was perhaps unprecedented and was certainly auspicious for the future, not merely of the Western Civilization, but of the Human Race.

In thus bestowing political independence on a sub-continent which they had originally brought under their rule by force of arms during a bout of anarchy at a late stage of a Hindu Civilization's disintegration, the British people had been inspired by an indelible memory of their disastrous failure in the eighteenth century to retain the allegiance of their own kinsmen and colonists in North America. This redoubtable lesson had burnt into their souls a conviction that it was as unwise as it was unwarrantable to attempt to rule other people by force when they could no longer be governed with their own consent, and that the right and statesmanlike course was always to grant self-government to a subject population that was demanding it in time to avoid the humiliation of being forced at last to concede it at the bayonet's point. This was the psychological background in British hearts and minds to the historic act of the 18th July, 1947; but so novel and difficult a political undertaking could hardly have been carried peacefully to success if the psychological atmosphere had not been propitious on both sides. The transformation of a British Rāj into the three independent Asian states of India, Pakistan, and Burma had been a joint achievement of the British people and their former Continental Asian subjects; and the Asian contribution had been a Hindu spirit of non-violence which had been blended with a Western spirit of non-violence—the living tradition of the Society of Friends—in the soul of the Mahatma Gandhi. The spiritual worth of this joint achievement and the genuineness of the co-operation between Westerners and Asians that had been the secret of its success were attested by the immediate transformation of a previous bitterness on the Asian side and a previous irritation on the Western side into a mutual esteem and friendship founded on a common sense of relief and satisfaction at having found, in concert, a happy issue out of a strange and awkward, but perhaps fatefully creative, encounter between the children of such diverse civilizations as the Western, the Hindu, the Islamic, and the Indic.³

This notable reconciliation between an Asia represented by various communities formerly subject to a British Rāj and a Western Society represented by British protagonists in the drama of Late Modern Western imperialism opened up a prospect that—in spite of a Communist

¹ This was the date on which the Royal Assent was given, at Westminster, to an India Independence Act enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The formal assumption of authority by the Governments of the Indian Union and Pakistan followed on the 15th August, 1947.

² In the House of Commons at Westminster by the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Edwin Montagu.

³ For a diagnosis of the Hinayanian Buddhist communities in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia as fossils of an otherwise extinct Indic Civilization, see I. i. 35.

enemy's assiduity in sowing tares in an expansive Western Civilization's Asiatic field—some part, at least, of the vast Asian contingent in an oecumenical Western internal proletariat that had been heading towards secession from a Western dominant minority might be moved to change its course in order to make for the alternative goal of entering into a social partnership on terms of political and psychological equality with its former Western masters. In that event, a world order, embracing the whole habitable and traversable surface of the planet, which had originally been established by Western force of civil and military technology on the inequitable basis of a Western minority's ascendancy over the rest of Mankind, might perhaps be saved from being shipwrecked on the rock of its own primal injustice through being converted into a common home for the whole Human Race, in which all members of the family would find themselves able to dwell together in unity¹ under the impartially hospitable roof of a house of many mansions.²

In Asia and in the North African province of an Islamic World the reconciliation of a world-encompassing Western Society's internal proletariat to its dominant minority seemed most likely to come about through the grant of local self-government to previously subject peoples within the framework of a political world order in which all states would enjoy an equal measure of liberty, while none of them would be free to exercise the licence of unlimited sovereign independence. The same open road to corporate membership in an oecumenical society seemed also to lie ahead of un-uprooted representatives of the Black Race in West Africa south of the Sahara whose continuing possession of their ancestral homes was guaranteed to them by the benevolence of a climate that made it impossible for any representatives of the White Race to enter in and dwell there³ permanently. A reconciliation was manifestly more difficult in provinces of a Westernizing World in which the representatives of visually diverse races were citizens of the same country, working in the same fields and factories, and living in adjoining quarters of the same villages, towns, and cities. Yet the 'colour-bar' that had been a Dutch-speaking and English-speaking White dominant minority's inhuman response to this heart-searching challenge in South Africa and in North America north-east of the Rio Grande was not the only answer that had been found by European pioneers of the Western Civilization who had called into existence overseas new communities composed of diverse races.

The French, for example, had shown themselves ready to fraternize with any convert to the French version of the Modern Western culture, and the Spaniards and Portuguese to fraternize with any convert to the Roman Catholic version of a Western Christianity, whatever the colour of the proselyte's skin might happen to be;⁴ and, though, in a post-Modern Age of Western history, the Romance-speaking representatives of the Western Civilization outside Europe might count for less than its Teutonic-speaking representatives, their older and more humane Western solutions for the problem of 'the clash of colour' were at any rate

¹ Ps. cxxxiii. 1.

³ Matt. xii. 45; Luke xi. 26.

² John xiv. 2.

⁴ See IX. viii. 565-6.

still in the field as alternatives to a 'colour-bar' which, so far from solving the problem, grievously aggravated it. The living examples of these happier alternative responses might perhaps still have some effect on the eventual handling of the race problem in English-speaking provinces of a Westernizing World in which the 'colour-bar' was a stumbling-block to Protestant as well as Catholic Christian consciences.

In the United States, in particular, at the time of writing, the tendency of a 'colour-bar' to harden into a caste-distinction on Indic lines was being resisted by the counter operation of the spirit of Christianity; and, though, at the time of writing, it was still impossible to tell whether this Christian counter-attack was a forlorn hope or whether it was 'the wave of the Future', it was at least a good omen that in the United States, as in India, the redeeming spirit had been at work on both sides. In the hearts of a dominant North American White majority a Christian conscience that had insisted on abolishing the evil institution of Negro Slavery at the cost of a civil war within the bosom of the White community had come to realize that a merely juridical emancipation was not enough, and had been moved by the Apostle's warning of the spiritual unprofitableness of good works, if these were not hallowed by Christian love,¹ to press on towards the more elusive goal of winning for a juridically emancipated Negro minority a social and psychological equality for lack of which the bare legal status of personal freedom had proved to be as bitter to the taste as Dead Sea fruit. This indefatigably sustained Christian endeavour on the part of a White minority that was the salt of this North American earth would, however, have been of little avail if a Christian spirit on a Coloured minority's side had not been ready to respond to a contrite White minority's Christian overtures. In other contexts² we have admired the spectacle of a Negro *anima naturaliter Christiana* taking to heart, in a New World that, for the African slave, had been a land, not of hope and glory, but of exile and servitude, a Christianity that had left no mark on the stony hearts of White slave-traders and slave-owners who had been its incongruous and impervious carriers. In North America, as in India, if the schism in the body social were eventually to be healed, the salvaging of a disintegrating civilization would, once again, have been Christianity's achievement.

A third arena in a Westernizing World in which Christianity had been battling with an inhumanity that had been making for social disruption was on the Western Society's home front, and on this front the critical sector was a Britain that had been the scene of the first eruption of a Late Modern Western Industrial Revolution. If, in the generation in which this visitation was conjuring into existence the English vanguard of an oecumenical industrial urban proletariat, John Wesley (*vivebat* A.D. 1703-91) had not devoted a long life to evangelizing an English under-world to which an eighteenth-century Established Church had heartlessly turned a blind eye, who can tell that the tribulations to which this pastor's sheep were subjected during the half-century following his death might not have goaded them into savagely militant insurrections of the kind that had once devastated a disintegrating Hellenic World in

¹ 1 Cor. xiii, *passim*.

² See II. ii. 213-16 and 218-20, and V. v. 191-3.

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the course of the second paroxysm of an Hellenic Time of Troubles in the second and the last century B.C.¹ It was thanks to the labours of Wesley and his fellow Christian evangelists in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a slowly maturing political Labour Movement in Great Britain had not taken either an anti-clerical or an anti-constitutional turn.

The bloodless political revolution through which India had obtained her emancipation from a British Rāj on the morrow of the War of A.D. 1939-45 was not more remarkable than a simultaneous bloodless revolution in Great Britain through which a Western country, where power, wealth, and opportunity had been, within living memory, the close preserve of a scandalously small and odiously over-privileged minority, had now peacefully transformed itself, without vindictiveness on the majority's part and without rancour on the minority's, into a community in which a maximum of social justice had been secured at the cost of a minimal sacrifice of individual liberty. These two liberal and constructive non-violent revolutions—one in Great Britain and the other in India—on the morrow of a devastating war were achievements in which any living Englishman could take pride, for whatever party he might happen to have cast his parliamentary vote.²

¹ See V. v. 68-71.

² The writer of this Study, for example, who was not a member of the Labour Party, had found himself moved, on visits to the United States during the years A.D. 1947-52, to expound the ideals and commend the policy of the Labour Movement in the United Kingdom to middle-class American critics whose attitude towards British Labour was one of suspicion inclining towards hostility.

In the sight of these American onlookers this policy was obnoxious on two grounds. They deemed it in the first place socially superfluous, and in the second place politically untoward. It seemed to them superfluous because in the United States no regimentation or socialization had been required in order to enable the industrial workers as a group to share in a continuing general rise in the national standard of material living; it seemed dangerous because, in their expectation, even a modicum of socialism was bound to act as the thin end of a wedge which must eventually prise the last remnants of individual liberty out of the body social, and was consequently bound in the end to clamp the yoke of a totalitarian régime *à la Russe* on the necks of the whole nation, including the deluded industrial workers whose misguided socialist leaders had set this fatal train of events in motion. It was difficult at this date for an Englishman, even if he were in the forensically strong position of not being a member of the Labour Party himself, to convince his American interlocutors that the leaders of the British Labour Movement, as well as the rank-and-file, were as constitutional-minded as any British Conservative or any American Republican; that the British trade union organization had been built up in accordance with a national tradition of keeping elected representatives under their constituents' control; that the British working class set immense store by their trade unions, as going concerns which they had created for themselves and which had proved their value to them by enabling them over the course of decades to obtain notable successive improvements in their standard of living; that this trade union organization could only survive (as had been demonstrated by the fate of the trade unions in a Communist Russia) in a social milieu in which Labour and Capital were free to bargain with one another; and that, if ever the logic of events were to force British Labour to choose between the preservation of their trade unions' right to negotiate and right to strike and the assertion of the absolute authority of a socialist state, a doctrinaire socialism, not a traditional trade unionism, was the cargo that would go by the board. It was no less difficult to convince middle-class Americans at this time that a modicum of socialism was, nevertheless, also indispensable if the minimum standard of living was to be raised substantially in a country whose aggregate national income and resources were as small as those of the United Kingdom were by comparison with those of the United States.

In putting these considerations before middle-class Americans the writer was always at pains to make it clear that his defence of British Labour policy was a defence of its application in Great Britain under current conditions of life in that particular country, and that he was not advocating it as a panacea for all countries in all circumstances. The United States, for example, with its vast already-developed national wealth and vast

The foregoing survey of facts telling against, as well as in favour of, the likelihood of the Western Civilization's coming to grief through the secession of an internal proletariat suggests two tentative conclusions. In the first place, the forces of reconciliation and recuperation that were in the field against the forces of schism and disintegration in the Western World at this stage in its history appeared to be stronger than any corresponding forces that might have been at work in the Hellenic World in the course of the second paroxysm of an Hellenic Time of Troubles in the second and the last century B.C. In the second place, this difference, to the Western World's advantage, between these two comparable passages of history appeared to be mainly due to the continuing operation of a spirit of Christianity that had not lost its hold over the hearts of latter-day Western men and women when their minds had eventually rejected an outworn creed in which the abiding spiritual truths of Christianity had been translated into the ephemeral language of a pagan Hellenic philosophy.¹

This persistent vitality of a higher religion which had once provided a larval Western Civilization with its chrysalis was an element in the Western situation in the twentieth century of the Christian Era that had been conspicuously absent in an otherwise comparable Hellenic situation in the last two centuries B.C.; and it seemed not unreasonable to conjecture that there was some relation of cause and effect between this apparent invincibility of a living higher religion and the paucity and jejunity of the new crop of religions of the same species that were raising their heads in a Westernizing World at this time. The Bahā'iyah and the Ahmadiyah² might be approximate counterparts, in the current chapter of Western history, of religions that had competed with Christianity for the conversion of an Hellenic World in its universal state; and Communism might resemble the Mahāyāna in being a religion that had been conjured out of a philosophy. But Communism had already fallen into the aberration

reserve of still-untapped national resources, might, for all he knew, be able to make just as near an approach towards the democratic ideal of a classless society as had been made in A.D. 1945-51 in the United Kingdom under a Labour régime, without finding herself compelled to have any recourse to regimentation or socialization. However that might be, it was in any case an historical fact, as far as a foreign observer could judge, that, in the United States so far, there had been no appreciable signs of a tendency for an industrial urban proletariat to secede from Society. In the United States the industrial workers had not gone through the tribulations that in Great Britain had been their penalty for being the earliest representatives of their species to make their appearance in a Modern Western World. The North American industrial workers' minimum standard of living had always been fabulously high, as measured by even the highest contemporary West European standards; and any North American industrial worker who was energetic, able, and enterprising could still look forward—or at any rate still believed that he could still look forward—to finding opportunities of rising into the middle class by his own personal exertions. On this account, industrial workers in the United States mid-way through the twentieth century were perhaps still almost as much concerned to keep open their opportunities of attaining individually to a middle-class prosperity as they were to improve collectively a present state of life which they were inclined, one and all, to regard as transient. If this is a correct diagnosis of the mid-twentieth-century outlook of the industrial workers in the United States, this state of mind would manifestly be an effective insurance against any risk of a secession of the industrial proletariat in the leading Western industrial country of the age. A West European observer, however, would be moved at this point to ask himself whether, in the long run, North American conditions were not more likely in these respects to approximate to West European conditions than West European conditions were to approximate to North American.

¹ See VII. vii. 473-8.

² See V. v. 174-6.

tion, to which the Mahāyāna had never succumbed, of lending itself to the mundane purposes of a militant state; and a sterility that had been the uniform nemesis of Zoroastrianism, Imāmī Shi'ism, and Sikhism when these abortive higher religions had prostituted themselves respectively to the service of the Sasanian Empire, the Safawī Empire, and the Khalsa¹ might be expected to blight a Communism that had prostituted itself to the service of the Soviet Union² at the very moment when it had embarked on the audacious spiritual enterprise of challenging not only a post-Christian Western Civilization but a Christianity that was the tap-root of the Western and the Russian Civilization alike.

Thus, while the symptoms of schism in the Western Civilization's body social were unmistakable, the patient's prospects were still enigmatic in A.D. 1952; and we shall find ourselves arriving again at this same pair of conclusions if we look into the contemporary state of Western souls. A sense of drift, for example, could be detected on the intellectual plane in the antinomianism of the post-Modern Western historians,³ and on the economic and political planes both in a Liberal *laissez faire*⁴ and in a Marxian determinism;⁵ and any anti-Marxist who might be seeking comfort in the idea that a deterministic creed could not be a dynamic one would have been wise to recollect that Fatalism has a paradoxical power of acting as a spiritual tonic.⁶ A sense of sin that Methodism had inculcated in the eighteenth century into the hearts of a despised and rejected urban proletariat was at work in the twentieth century in the hearts of Protestant Westerners of the middle class, to judge by the vogue of the revivalist enthusiasm that was being propagated in this soil by a 'Moral Rearmament' movement.⁷ A sense of promiscuity was, of course, strongly marked in a Western Civilization that had become ubiquitous; but its most characteristic manifestations in a twentieth-century Westernizing World were not those tendencies towards pammixia and proletarianization that had loomed so large in the histories of civilizations whose geographical expansion had been an unequivocal symptom of cultural disintegration.

The notorious receptivity of empire-builders had been displayed by Modern Western representatives of the type for the most part in trivialities such as a partiality to exotic foods and beverages.⁸ It was true that the advance-guard of the West European settlers on North American ground had gone considerably farther towards adopting in its entirety the barbarian way of life of the Red Indian 'natives' with whom they had fought and traded, but these barbarized pioneers of an expanding Western Civilization had ensured their own disappearance in the act of exterminating their barbarian 'opposite numbers'. As soon as they had accomplished their murderously romantic historical mission of clearing the North American barbarians out of the way, they themselves were swiftly sucked back into the prosaic Main Street of a pullulating Middletown.⁹ The culture of this Middletown had lapsed into a conspicuous vulgarity and barbarism in the realm of Art;¹⁰ yet an observer who might

¹ See V. v. 187-8.

³ See pp. 173-216, above.

⁵ See V. v. 426.

⁸ See V. v. 444-5.

² See V. v. 181-7.

⁴ See V. v. 414-15.

⁶ See V. v. 615-18.

⁹ See V. v. 479-80.

⁷ See V. v. 439.

¹⁰ See V. v. 481-2.

be inclined to see in this the token of a failure of creative power would have been wise to recollect that the vulgar Hellenic art of Gandhāra had given birth, in its day, to the etherially creative Mahayanian Buddhist art of China and Japan.¹

An expanding Western Society had found it convenient to employ the Tuscan,² French,³ and English⁴ languages as *lingue franche* at successive stages of its progressive occupation of the *Oikoumenê*; but the inevitable debasement of these languages in this rough and ready usage had not disqualified either English, French, or Tuscan for continuing to be used as a vehicle of high poetry by poets who still spoke the language as their mother tongue. Latter-day Western history could also furnish examples of syncretism in religion. Since A.D. 1688 one of the attributes of the British Crown had been a simultaneous association with two—and, from A.D. 1714 to A.D. 1837, actually with three—different denominations of a Protestant Western Christianity;⁵ and this late-seventeenth-century constitutional combination of varieties of one of two branches of the Western Society's ancestral religion, which had marked the transition from a fanatical Early Modern to a latitudinarian Late Modern chapter of Western ecclesiastical history, had been surpassed in daring by the nineteenth-century infusion of an exotic Protestant Christianity into the ancestral Hinduism of the Brahmō Samāj and into the ancestral Taoism of the T'ai'p'ing.⁶ Yet, however daring they might be, these and other syncretisms between an Occidental and an Oriental religion in Modern Western history had so far shown no sign of playing the momentous part that had been played in post-Alexandrine Hellenic history by Christianity, Mithraism, and the worships of Isis, Cybele, and Iuppiter Dolichenus.

In the life of a latter-day Western Society there were also some manifest exhibitions of Archaism and Futurism.

Archaism had displayed itself on the plane of institutions and ideas in Rousseau's cult of Primitive Human Nature⁷ and in Hitler's cult of Barbarian Blood and Soil;⁸ on the plane of visual art in a Neo-Gothic and a Neo-Colonial architecture which had been conspicuous in a pre-atomic Western urban landscape;⁹ on the plane of language and literature in attempts to revive an antique Norse and an antique Irish;¹⁰ and on the plane of religion in the nostalgia for a traditional Roman Catholic ritual that had been displayed in both Positivism and Anglo-Catholicism,¹¹ and in the nostalgia for a semi-fictional Nordic barbarian ritual that had been displayed in Hauerism.¹² Yet this Hitlerian German attempt to revive a primitive pagan past was convicted of being nothing more than a passing extravaganza when it was measured by the standard of the Meiji Japanese revival of Shintō;¹³ the preciousness of a selfconscious Anglo-Catholic and Positivist ritualism fell far short of achieving either a social or a moral effect that could be compared with the effects of the revival of traditional Roman religious observances by Augustus;¹⁴ and it is significant

¹ See V. v. 482-3.

⁴ See V. v. 507-12.

⁶ See V. v. 537.

⁹ See V. vi. 60.

¹² See V. vi. 85.

² See V. v. 502.

⁷ See V. vi. 58.

¹⁰ See V. vi. 64-67.

¹³ See V. vi. 89-93.

³ See V. v. 503-6.

⁵ See V. v. 533-4.

⁸ See V. vi. 56-57.

¹¹ See V. vi. 83-84.

¹⁴ See V. vi. 86-89.

that the linguistically selfconscious nineteenth-century Norwegians and Irish were descended neither from the original members of the Western Civilization nor from its barbarian proselytes, but from frustrated representatives of two abortive civilizations that had been blighted by premature encounters with a rising Roman Western Christian Civilization for which they had been no match.¹

A glance at the contemporary exhibitions of Futurism in a latter-day Western Society's life told the same tale. On the plane of political institutions, the deliberate effacement of traditional boundaries through an artificial redrawing of the administrative map, *more Cleistheneo*,² had been exemplified in the remapping of an eighteenth-century France into departments and of a twentieth-century Germany into Gaue,³ while, on the plane of the arts, there had been patent symptoms of Futurism in all provinces of a post-Modern Western World in music, dancing, painting, and sculpture.⁴ Yet, though such manifestations of Futurism were discernible, it was also manifest that their effect, so far, had been slight.

In addition to these latter-day Western evidences—at whatever value their importance was to be appraised—of schism in the Soul and schism in the Body Social, we have found,⁵ in a synoptic analysis of the rhythm of the disintegration-process, that the Western Civilization's latter-day history conformed to a pattern—a series of two paroxysms punctuated by one rally—that had been the regular rhythm of a Time of Troubles in the histories of civilizations that had run through the whole disintegration-process from breakdown to dissolution. The appearance of this sinister pattern in Western history was, in A.D. 1952, perhaps the most alarming of all current Western experiences with non-Western precedents. Yet, as we have already observed in another context,⁶ the nebulous possibility that the Western Civilization might, at this date, be in the grip of the second paroxysm of a Time of Troubles was less significant than the plain fact that it had at least not yet entered into a universal state.

The inquiry that we have now completed thus suggests that the non-Western precedents for Western experiences were inconclusive. While we have found enough evidence to make it clear that authentic symptoms of breakdown and disintegration were discernible in the life of the Western Civilization mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, an assessment of this evidence has proved not to be so easy; and we might be in danger of exaggerating the significance of the facts if we were to allow ourselves to forget that, in the life of every living society, as in the life of every living organism, a tendency towards breakdown and disintegration is constantly asserting itself, and as constantly requiring to be resisted, even when the society is in the healthiest and most vigorous burst of its growth. The pertinent question was not whether the symptoms of breakdown and disintegration were present, but whether they were serious. Was the malady grave? Was it incurable? Was it lethal? And in A.D. 1952 these were questions to which no conclusive answer could be given when they were asked with reference to

¹ See II. ii. 322-60.

² See V. vi. 107-8.

³ See V. vi. 108-9.

⁴ See IV. iv. 51-52.

⁵ See V. vi. 312-21.

⁶ On pp. 411-12, above.

the prospects of the Western Civilization, because in A.D. 1952 the plot of this Occidental drama had not yet arrived at its denouement.

(II) UNPRECEDENTED WESTERN EXPERIENCES

In the pursuit of our inquiry into the prospects of the Western Civilization we decided to take testimony from the histories of all societies of the species, and in the preceding chapter we have called the roll of Western experiences with non-Western precedents. Our investigation would, however, be incomplete if we did not go on to consider evidence furnished by the history of the Western Civilization to which the histories of other civilizations present no parallels; and, as soon as we address ourselves to this remainder of our present undertaking, our attention will be caught and held by two commanding features in the social landscape of a latter-day Western World that have no visible counterparts in the landscapes of the other societies of the same species when, in our mind's eye, we conjure these up, side by side with the Western Society, in a synoptic view. The first of these apparently unprecedented Western experiences is the extent of the mastery that a Late Modern and post-Modern Western Man had acquired over Non-Human Nature; the second apparently distinctive Western experience is the constantly accelerating rapidity of the process of social change in the Western World in consequence of the no less constantly accelerating rapidity of Western Man's advance in his mastery over Non-Human Nature. It is true that these two at first sight seemingly unique experiences of a latter-day *Homo Occidentalis* turn out, on a closer view, to have been shared with him in some degree by all other avatars of Man in Process of Civilization, and in lesser degrees by all Mankind and perhaps even by all Life since the first epiphany of Life, human or pre-human, on the face of the planet. These differences of degree were, however, so great that they were tantamount to differences of kind, and this meant that the impression of being unique that these two latter-day Western experiences gave at first sight came nearer to the heart of the truth than the observation that both of them were actually shared by Western Man with the representatives of other species of Human Society and other forms of Terrestrial Life.

In an earlier context¹ we have noted that, since Mankind's passage from the Lower to the Upper Palaeolithic stage of a cumulative technological progress, the Human Race had been the lords of Creation on Earth in the sense that, from that time onwards, it had no longer been possible either for Inanimate Nature or for any non-human terrestrial living creature to exterminate Mankind or even to prevent them from continuing to increase their knowledge, their power, or their happiness. From that time onwards nothing on Earth, with one outstanding exception, had been capable any longer of thwarting Man's material and moral progress or of bringing him to ruin or destruction; but this one last unsubdued enemy and potential destroyer of Man was a formidable one, since he was, of course, none other than Man himself. Man's firmly established lordship over Creation had endowed him with a surplus of

¹ In VII. vii. 486.

power over and above his limited requirements for holding his own against Non-Human Nature; and it was open to him to use this surplus as he chose.

The craft of his engines hath passed his dream,
In haste to the good or the evil goal;¹

and he had turned his face so perversely towards the evil goal of being his own enemy that, ever since his acquisition of this two-edged superfluity of material power, his crux had been the spiritual problem of dealing with himself, his fellow men, and God, not the technical problem of dealing with Non-Human Nature. Man's relation to a conquered Non-Human Nature now no longer had any importance for Man in itself, since his power to hold his own against this once formidable but now defeated adversary was something that, henceforward, he could take for granted. The importance of his Technology for him now lay in the surplus of power that he was able to extract from Non-Human Nature for use either for or against God and himself; but, by reason of the metamorphosis of a technological into a spiritual problem, the importance of Technology had actually become greater than ever; for its spiritual effects for good or for evil had increased and were increasing *pari passu* with each fresh advance in technological progress.

In the light of this tragic relation between Technology and Morality since a Fall that had been coeval and identical with Life's attainment of the level of Humanity, it might look as if, after all, there were nothing new in the spiritual challenge that a latter-day Western Man was presenting to himself by his continuing technological progress in the twentieth century of the Christian Era. In previous passages of Western history, as well as in the histories of other civilizations, human affairs had not infrequently been upset by sudden great advances in Man's command over Non-Human Nature; and this previous evidence was even sufficiently copious and illuminating to warrant the tentative formulation of a 'law' to the effect that, the greater the technological triumph, the greater the risk of spiritual devastation. The Western dawn of an Atomic Age had now, however, registered the point at which the stakes in the game of human life that Man must play willy nilly *ex officio humanitatis* had been raised to a degree that had made the change tantamount to a difference in kind; for the eruption of a Late Modern Western Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, less than two hundred years since, had brought with it a fresh increase in Man's power over Non-Human Nature that dwarfed the previous sum total of Man's cumulative achievements in a field of activity in which he had been as signally victorious over Non-Human Nature as he had been signally defeated by his own nature in the things of the spirit.

An unprecedented increase in Man's material power, which had begun with the harnessing of steam, generated by coal, to the service of manufacture and locomotion, had been mounting up in one feat of technological virtuosity after another. The physical driving force at Man's com-

¹ Sophocles: *Antigone*, ll. 365-6, translated by Gilbert Murray (quoted already in V. v. 61).

mand had been multiplied by the subsequent harnessing of mineral oil to drive an internal combustion engine, and by the discovery of a 'know-how' for converting Man's older servant water-power into electricity. The consequent possibility of producing cheaply an abundance of artificial light and heat had enabled Man to make himself at home within the Arctic Circle,¹ while the progress of Tropical Medicine and the discovery of a technique for air-conditioning had enabled the children of temperate latitudes to exploit the wealth and enjoy the amenities of the Tropics without any longer incurring a prohibitive risk of finding a grave there. After the invention of the steamship, the railway train, and the motor-car had 'annihilated distance' for travellers on the land and water surface of the planet, the invention of the submarine and the aeroplane had given Man's habitat a third dimension in both depth and height. The telegraph, telephone, gramophone, radio, television, and radar had 'annihilated distance' in a fourth dimension by enabling human beings to communicate with one another instantaneously round the whole circumference of the globe without having to meet one another in the flesh. And, finally, since the last days of a Second World War, the unprecedentedly fast and fertile technological progress of the Western World in the course of the preceding six generations had been crowned by a feat that had made even the intellectually and morally blindest men and women in the living generation suddenly aware of the fateful significance of all technological progress, not only in the Western World since the outbreak of a Late Modern Western Industrial Revolution, but in the World at large since the dawn of a Late Palaeolithic Age. The discovery of a 'know-how' for tapping the titanic force of atomic energy and applying this to the destruction of human lives and works had brought home to the imagination of Mankind in the mass some inkling of a tragic lesion in the affairs of men which more than one Western man of science had already diagnosed and reported.² A geometrically progressing Technology had now armed a perpetually reborn Original Sin with a weapon potent enough to enable a sinful Mankind to annihilate itself. 'The wages of Sin is Death.'³ The fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had set these dread words ringing again in ears that, through a long familiarity with their sound, had long since grown deaf to their meaning.

In A.D. 1952, seven years after the detonation of an explosion that had been heard round the World, it was evident that an unprecedented human situation had now been created by the unprecedented potency to which Mankind's progressively accumulating surplus of material power had been raised, with an unparalleled rapidity, by the technological prowess of the Western Civilization in the latest chapter of its history. Man's acquisition of this degree of command over non-human forces had made it impossible for him any longer to evade the challenge of two

¹ The sudden provision of an abundance of cheap lighting in Northern Norway during the winter months of perpetual night through the generation of electricity out of the abundance of a previously unutilized local water-power was said to have been followed by a proportionately steep fall in the local rate of death by suicide.

² See, for example, the passage from Sir Alfred Ewing's address, on the 31st August, 1932, to the British Association for the Advancement of Science that has been quoted in III. iii. 211-12.

³ Rom. vi. 23.

evils which Man himself had brought into the World in the act of providing himself with a new species of society. For some five or six thousand years ending on the 6th August, 1945, Man in Process of Civilization had been indulging in wars and class-conflicts between fractions of societies that had articulated themselves vertically into mosaics of parochial states and horizontally into layers of stratified classes. The strife generated by these fatal flaws in the structure of the civilizations had already been the death of perhaps twenty out of the twenty-one representatives of the species that had come into existence up to date. The vast and swift further technological progress that had since been made by the sole survivor was now threatening to bring destruction, not just upon one more civilization, but upon this species of Society itself and upon the species of living creature that had created it. The challenges of War and Class-Conflict had now been raised to a pitch of intensity at which the choice with which Mankind found itself confronted was the extreme choice of kill or cure. A latter-day Western Civilization's technological *tours de force* had, in fact, made War intolerable by making it manifestly suicidal,¹ and made Class-Conflict intolerable by making it apparently remediable.²

While the vast new impetus imparted by Western Man to Mankind's secular technological progress had thus precipitated a crisis in human affairs that had been pending since Primitive Man's entry into an Upper Palaeolithic Age, the correspondingly vast new acceleration of the pace of change that a Western technological revolution was now forcing upon Human Nature on every plane of activity had precipitated a crisis that had been pending since the first epiphany of Life on Earth. In a previous context³ we have seen that an acceleration which was one of the key-notes of the current phase of Western history was the latest term in a serial crescendo movement that had been gathering momentum with each fresh advance in the evolution of terrestrial living organisms; and in this perspective the technological stimulus by which this movement had been carried forward in a human milieu looked like Man's translation, into his own rational purposive terms, of some *nisus* inherent in Life itself. In the same context, however, we have also seen that in the current phase of Western history the pace had been forced to a speed that had imported a new element into the situation. For the first time in the history of Mankind, not to speak of the history of pre-human forms of Terrestrial Life, the speed had risen to a height at which a quantum of change within a single lifetime that was beyond the adaptational capacity of a single life was being demanded of all living members of a Western Society that by this time had engulfed the whole living generation of Mankind.

A killing pace was not, of course, in itself, an altogether unknown tragedy in previous human experience. Ever since the time, some five or six thousand years back, when societies that were chronologically contemporary with one another had begun to become differentiated from one another culturally by the emergence of the civilizations above the

¹ See pp. 473-560, below.

³ On p. 361, above.

² See pp. 561-641, below.

level of the primitive societies and by the distinctive individuality of the contours of each of these uprising cultural peaks, an abrupt encounter between two or more sharply diversified societies had been a perpetual possibility that had also frequently been realized as a matter of tragic historical fact. In such encounters between diverse contemporaries the weaker party was apt, as we have already observed,¹ to be confronted with the agonizing necessity of having to attempt to achieve an adaptation beyond the compass of its adaptational capacity as the only alternative choice to going under without a struggle; and, though we have not come across any instance of a civilization in its growth-phase having been broken down by a collision with a more potent alien society, we have noted a number of examples of civilizations already in disintegration receiving their *coup de grâce* from an alien hand.²

The Western Civilization, for example, had played either the murderous or the insidious aggressor's part in encounters with ten contemporary societies of its own species. It had assassinated the Mexic, Yucatec, and Andean civilizations, and had led the other seven the dance that Goethe's Mephistopheles leads Goethe's Faust.³ The new element in the situation in a Westernizing World in A.D. 1952 was not the destructive or subversive effect that was the familiar consequence of any cultural encounter, but the fact that, in an *Oikoumené* that was in process of being made into the common home of a single all-embracing society within a Western framework, the unifying Western Civilization had carried the acceleration of its own spontaneous internal change to a pitch at which it was now already victimizing itself by acting as its own Mephistopheles and was threatening to victimize itself more crudely than that by acting as its own Cortés or Pizarro. The pace of Western change had now become so fast that, even within the Western Civilization's own original Western patrimony, where this pace was being set from within and was not being forced upon the Subconscious Psyche by the pressure of any external agent, it was imposing an intolerable tax on the stamina of the best-trained native-born Western runners. *A fortiori*, this was a killing pace for that great majority of Mankind who were not native children of Hesperia's household but were alien conscripts in her immense internal proletariat.

At this critical moment in the history both of the West and of the World, when it would have been difficult in any circumstances for the Human Psyche to move fast enough and far enough along the path of psychological adaptation to a process of technological advance that was now rushing at a break-neck speed, the difficulty had been aggravated by revolutionary social and political changes that the revolutionary technological changes had brought with them.

Since the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, the work of unifying the World within a Western framework had been mostly carried out by six West European countries—Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, Britain, and Belgium—and, within these countries, mainly by one class, the bourgeoisie; and, after the two Iberian pioneer countries in a Modern Western movement of world-wide Oceanic expansion had fallen out of the race, the British, French, Dutch, and Belgian middle

¹ In IX. viii. 88-629.

² See IV. iv. 76-114.

³ See II. i. 272-99.

class had been left to share between them the bulk of the profits of this gigantic Western enterprise. In drawing profits and exercising power they had gradually acquired experience and undertaken responsibilities; and, though their Western competitors and non-Western commercial customers and political subjects might complain that these middle-class North-West European organizers of a Unitary World had been awarding to themselves unduly high fees for their unsolicited managerial services, the World's history since A.D. 1914 had demonstrated by the method of experiment that these services had come to be indispensable, whatever the fair charge for them might be estimated to be, and whatever agency might have the handling of the business of performing these services on commission. It had also been demonstrated that, whatever might be History's ultimate verdict on the conduct of a Unified World's affairs by its self-appointed previous British, French, Dutch, and Belgian managers, no other candidate had so far come forward who was, as yet, equally well qualified to execute delicate and exacting tasks that must be carried out with vision as well as with efficiency if a now oecumenical Western Society was to be saved from shipwreck.

By A.D. 1914 the North-West European bourgeoisie had knit the whole habitable and traversable surface of the planet together in a network of shipping, trade, and finance of which the nodes had come to be London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels, and they had also bridged the cultural gulf between the Western Civilization and its contemporaries by building overseas empires that had brought Western and non-Western populations together under common governments operated and controlled by the West European imperial Powers who had organized them. No doubt, a world order that had been founded on so narrow a basis would have had to be placed on a broader basis sooner or later as a necessary alternative to a break-up that would have been a catastrophe for all parties in an age in which Technology had come to operate on an oecumenical range; but this doubtless ultimately inevitable transfer of profits, power, and responsibility would probably have taken place gradually, over a span of several generations and perhaps even more than one century, if a Westernizing World had continued to suffer no more severely from Civilization's historic maladies of War and Class-Conflict than it had been suffering during the century that had ended in A.D. 1914. If the World had gone on living at that tolerable nineteenth-century tempo the North-West European middle class would have had time to share their profits, power, responsibilities, and experience with a continually widening circle of successively co-opted new partners without being ruined by being called upon to adapt themselves to this necessary change at an impracticably headlong gait, while the new participants in North-West European middle-class experience, responsibilities, power, and profits would have had time, for their part, to digest the experience and to accept the responsibilities as a moral obligation bound up with the taking of the profits and the assumption of the power. Unhappily the Subconscious Psyche's failure to keep pace with the accelerating speed of technological innovation had forced an anyway inevitable change to take, not the auspicious course of orderly rational evolution, but the

disastrous course of a revolution that was as uncircumspect as it was anarchic.

Between A.D. 1914 and A.D. 1945 the high tension between a conservative Psyche and a revolutionary Technology had discharged itself in two world wars in one lifetime; and this reduplicated catastrophe had 'put down the mighty from their seat and . . . exalted the humble and meek'¹ at a pace that was not less bewildering and overwhelming for suddenly exalted *novi homines*—a Bevin, a Nehru, a Truman, a Stalin—than it was for elder statesmen, proconsuls, financiers, and diplomatists who had been as suddenly deposed from a long-exercised office. In the course of little more than thirty years the North-West European middle class had had to concede a preponderance of political and economic power at home to the industrial workers, and simultaneously to hand over the whole of its previous political and economic power in its former Asiatic dominions to a native Asian *intelligentsia* whose left-handedly sincere way of flattering its European creators and employers by imitation had been to insist on taking their places as the masters in each once subject Asian people's own now emancipated national house. Within the same brief period of time a North-West European middle class that had thus been losing its predominance at home and its ascendancy in Asia had simultaneously been forfeiting its oecumenical economic and political influence to new supra-national Great Powers of an invincibly higher material calibre that had swiftly loomed up out of great open spaces where they had been able gradually to develop, unthwarted, on the fringes of an *Oikoumenê*² that since A.D. 1498 had been unified by, and till A.D. 1914 had been centred upon, a diminutive row of half a dozen nation-states along the Atlantic seaboard of Western Europe.

In A.D. 1952, when it was already possible to look back on this 'awful revolution'³ as a decisively accomplished fact, the practical question of vital moment for the future of the West and of the World was whether the new holders of power and responsibility had grown in wisdom commensurately with their growth in stature.⁴ People whose experience had been gained, and whose habits of feeling, thinking, and action had been formed, in the negative school of an opposition, in which they had been serving their apprenticeship for decades and even for generations, had now suddenly saddled themselves, or been saddled by the fiat of History, with the moral burden of onerous positive duties. A British industrial working class bred up in a century-old tradition of resisting exploitation by middle-class employers now had to 'make the country pay its way'. Indian nationalists bred up in a fifty-years-old tradition of rebelling against the rule of British imperialists now had to 'carry on the' *ci-devant* 'King-Emperor's government'. American politicians bred up in a one-century-and-three-quarters-old tradition of making it impossible for any American avatar of a British King George III to levy taxation without representation, and Russian autocrats bred up in a six-centuries-old tradi-

¹ Luke i. 52.

² See III. iii. 302-4.

³ Gibbon, E.: 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West,' at the end of chapter xxxviii of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

⁴ Luke ii. 52.

tion of making Holy Russia safe for an orthodox faith, had now 'to make the World go round' between them.

Would these rawly inexperienced new pilots succeed in keeping Mankind's battered and labouring ship off the rocks? This was the question that, in A.D. 1952, rose to the lips of a sixty-three-years-old middle-class North-West European observer who had been born into a seemingly rational and manageable world in which the feasible responsibility for keeping a world-wide Westernizing Society on an even keel had rested with his own kin and kind, and who had now lived on into an unfamiliar and disconcerting World in which his own kin and kind had become flies on a hazardously untended wheel that was spinning this way round and that way round at a venture, while two titans who alone now possessed the brawn-power to manipulate it were engaging in a quarrel over the dangerous competition between them for exercising the control. This question how a twentieth-century Westernizing World was likely to fare in the hands of its new masters is manifestly of the essence of our present inquiry into the Western Civilization's prospects. In trying to read this riddle we may manage to simplify to some degree a bafflingly complex intellectual task by giving separate consideration, first to Technology, War, and Government, and then to Technology, Class-Conflict, and Employment.

D. TECHNOLOGY, WAR, AND GOVERNMENT

(I) THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

THE problem with which the heirs of a Western Civilization were being confronted by the institution of War in A.D. 1952 had been set by the impact of an unprecedentedly potent latter-day Western technique on a literally world-wide Westernizing Society that was still articulated into a plurality of parochial states, since these states were still at liberty—and, because individually free, were collectively under pressure of a mutual fear and competition—to continue to go to war with one another as the penalty for being still severally sovereign and independent.

This problem was, as we have seen, by no means peculiar in itself to the Western World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era; it had likewise beset, in their day, all the civilizations that by this time were demonstrably extinct, fossilized, petrified, or moribund; but, as we have also observed, the extreme difference of degree between a latter-day Western and a previous human mastery over Non-Human Nature was tantamount to a difference in kind, because the additional 'drive' that it had put into the traditional institution of War had heightened the hazard of War for Humanity from a limited to an unlimited risk. In the situation as it was in A.D. 1952 the continuance of a possibility of War was no longer only a menace to the survival of another man-made institution, the now oecumenical Western Society. Since the invention of the atomic bomb and the incubation of further, and perhaps still more deadly, new weapons, War had also become a menace to the survival of all human beings implicated in this society—and, by the time of writing, the membership of the Western Civilization on the technological and military planes had come to include the entire living generation of the Human Race.

(II) THE SITUATION AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

(a) A PROGRESSIVE CONCENTRATION OF POWER

On the morrow of the Second World War, a World that had now been unified within a Western framework found itself in the midst of a revolution generated and propelled by the double shock of two blows dealt by a Western technology that had been raised to an unprecedented degree of potency. The impact of Technology on the Human Psyche had detonated two world wars within twenty-five years of one another and had thereby reduced the number of the Great Powers in a Western system of international relations from eight to two within the thirty-one years 1914-45. The impact of Technology on Mankind's means of communication had brought these two surviving Great Powers within

point-blank range of one another round the circumference of the globe by 'annihilating distance'. The situation thus created was so formidable, as well as so novel, that it called for a closer analysis.

The deadliness of the rate of the casualties among the Great Powers during these first thirty-one years of a new bout of Western warfare was grimly evident in retrospect. It was now clear that political and military power—and, by implication, economic power as well, in an industrialized and mechanized world—were being concentrated at a headlong pace; and the effect of a now manifest tendency upon its victims' minds and feelings was the sharper inasmuch as this dominant undercurrent of international affairs had been concealed, in and after the peace-settlement following the General War of A.D. 1914–18, by a short-lived tendency in the opposite direction that, at the time, had been conspicuous¹ just because it had been superficial.

By breaking up one Great Power, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, and one *ci-devant* Great Power, the Ottoman Empire, and temporarily maiming and crippling two other Great Powers, Germany and Russia, the War of A.D. 1914–18 had permitted a previously dammed-back wave of Nationalism—rampant among politically un-unified and un-liberated peoples who had been dazzled by the historic success of the classical nation-states of Modern Western Europe²—to increase, at those four stricken Powers' expense, the number of the states of a medium and a small calibre in the Western international comity. During the preceding forty-three-years-long lull (*durabat* A.D. 1871–1914) between the end of the aftermath of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of the First World War, the political unification of Italy and of Germany had reduced the number of the lesser states in the Western system to a minimum and had indeed temporarily removed from the map all remaining states of a medium calibre with the sole exception of Spain. In the peace-settlement of A.D. 1919–21 this medium class of states had been reintroduced on to the political map by the reconstitution of Poland and by the aspiration of Brazil to have outgrown the stature of a small state even if she might not yet be deemed to have attained the dimensions of a Great Power.³

In the constitution of the League of Nations the success of the lesser states' self-assertion during the first decade after the close of the First World War had been registered in A.D. 1922 in the raising of the number of non-permanent seats on the Council from the provisional minority figure, originally agreed in A.D. 1919, of four, as against the minimum number of five permanent seats then reserved for Great Powers,⁴ to the majority figure of six, as against four;⁵ and in A.D. 1926 the Great Powers

¹ See Toynbee, A. J.: *The World after the Peace Conference* (London 1925, Milford), pp. 24–43, especially the comparative table, on pp. 32–34, of states, below the rank of Great Powers, which were playing an active part in international affairs before and after the War of A.D. 1914–18.

² See IV. iv. 185–90.

³ See Toynbee, A. J., *op. cit.*, pp. 35–36, and Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1926* (London 1928, Milford), p. 21.

⁴ See the original text of Article 4 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

⁵ See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1926* (London 1928, Milford), pp. 10–14.

on the Council had been prevented by the minor states' obstruction from securing Germany's admission to membership in the League with a permanent seat on the Council until they had consented to pay the price of agreeing to the institution of three 'semi-permanent' seats for the benefit of Poland and other medium-sized states of her kind.¹ The Wilsonian illusion, thus created, that the comity of states was being 'democratized', had been fostered at the time by the self-restraint of the three Great Powers—France, Great Britain, and the United States—that had emerged from the First World War as temporary victors; for it had been incompatible with these Powers' principles, and not imperative for their interests, to treat the lesser states very high-handedly.

The brutal truth that had been hidden under this amiable but brittle mask had, however, been quickly exposed by the resurgence of Germany under a National-Socialist régime; and, after a criminal Power that had taken full advantage of having been let off lightly in the Paris peace-settlement of A.D. 1919–20 had paid in A.D. 1945 for her abominable crimes by being first blasted, then invaded, and finally dismembered like the Hapsburg Monarchy in A.D. 1918, it had become clear that the significant event in the First World War had been the destruction of the weakest of the Great Powers of the day, not the spawning of a litter of new minor states. The temporary erection of minor states in a political vacuum produced by the break-up or mutilation of former Great Powers, so far from militating against the concentration of power, had created an opportunity for it. The nominal 'liberation' of 'successor-states' had indeed been illusory from first to last. They had been created to be enslaved; for no other fate than enslavement could await minor states, new or old, in a world in which the concentration of power was being ordained inexorably by Technology's relentless progress.

In this world, states of anything less than the highest calibre were not any longer either economically or militarily or politically 'viable'; their presence on the map was an invitation to an aggressor, and the opportunity had been perceived by Hitler's intuitive genius and had been exploited by his criminal lust for power as a key that was to open for Germany her way to a world-wide domination. Hitler's strategy of aggression had been to equip Germany with the material resources for dominating the World by capturing the defenceless pawns that had taken the *ci-devant* Hapsburg and Romanov Empires' places on a Central and East European political chess-board; and his eventual catastrophic failure to win for a Third German Reich this Hapsburg and Romanov heritage had merely bequeathed to the Soviet Union the chance of snatching out of a slain Third Reich's dead hands, and concentrating in her own giant grasp, the whole of the Hohenzollern Empire's, as well as the Hapsburg and Romanov Empires', legacy of 'successor-states' as far west as the Elbe, Thuringia, and the Boehmerwald.

This progressive liquidation, since A.D. 1938, of the successor-states of destroyed or mutilated Great Powers in Central and Eastern Europe had indicated what the fate of all other successor-states in other regions was likely to be. The only reason why West Germany and South-West

¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 16–78.

Austria had not, by A.D. 1952, yet followed East Germany and North-East Austria into Russia's maw was that these two other fragments of a dismembered Third Reich had come meanwhile under the control of the United States and her West European allies Great Britain and France; and by this date it had become clear that the substitution of a United States protectorate for an untenable independence was the only insurance against Russian domination that promised to be effective in the long run for any state anywhere in the World.

This role, which was a new role for the United States in the Old World, was a familiar role of hers in the New World; for the substitution of a covert for an overt subjection through a process of nominal liberation was a tragi-comedy that, before being played in Central and Eastern Europe between A.D. 1918 and A.D. 1945, had been played in Latin America more than a hundred years earlier, between A.D. 1810 and A.D. 1823. From the days of the Holy Alliance to the days of the Third Reich, the Monroe Doctrine had saved the successor-states of the Spanish Empire in the Americas from falling under the domination of some other Continental European Power at the price of replacing a Spanish imperial administration by a United States political hegemony, that had been none the less effective for being exercised light-handedly, and by a no less alien economic ascendancy that had been enjoyed for a hundred years by the United Kingdom before this, too, had passed into North American hands. Since the reversal of the ratio of the relative strengths of the United States and Great Britain as a result of Great Britain's loss, and the United States' gain, in economic strength in the War of A.D. 1914-18, the underwriting of the Monroe Doctrine by British sea-power had ceased to be a necessity for the United States at the moment when it had ceased to be a possibility for the British Empire.

In a nineteenth-century Western World in which all the Great Powers except Great Britain had been situated on the European peninsula of the Eurasian Continent, the sea-power of the United Kingdom had incidentally screened the Americas in the act of screening the British Isles and the Transoceanic possessions of the British Crown against the danger of attack by any other Great Power then in existence. The temporarily favourable politico-geographical situation that had made it possible for the British Navy thus to provide strategic security for the entire English-speaking and overseas world had, however, ceased to exist when, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era, two new Great Powers—the United States herself and Japan—had arisen outside the British naval cordon round Continental Europe at the moment when, from within the cordon, British naval supremacy was being challenged by Germany; and the United Kingdom's inability, in these radically altered circumstances, to continue to give effective naval protection to the whole of the British Empire, not to speak of the United States and the Latin American republics, had been demonstrated in the course of half a century ending in A.D. 1945.

Even before the outbreak of the First World War, the challenge from Germany had constrained Great Britain to seek a reinforcement of her own naval strength—in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean by entering

into an alliance with Japan in A.D. 1902 and in European waters by making an entente with France in A.D. 1904. In the Second World War, in which both the Japanese and the Italian Navy had gone into action on the anti-British side, even the countervailing aid of the by this time immense sea-power of the United States had not enabled British sea-power to save Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Dutch Empire in Indonesia from being temporarily overrun by the Japanese at a time when the whole strength of the British Navy was having to be employed nearer home on the three-fold task of holding the Levant, screening Great Britain herself from invasion, and keeping open the western approaches to the British Isles. In other words, the British Empire's tribulations during the Second World War had proved conclusively that, on the strategic plane, the British Empire was now no longer the unitary Power that it had been so long as the sea-power of the United Kingdom had been able effectively to protect the whole of the Empire, from its frontage on the North Sea and the English Channel to its frontage on the China Seas inclusive; and this dissolution of the British Empire's former strategic unity had been discounted on the political plane in advance. A British statesmanship that had never forgotten the lesson of Great Britain's disastrous intransigence towards her North American colonies in A.D. 1775-83 had been forestalling the violent break-up that had been the Spanish, the Ottoman, and the Danubian Hapsburg Empire's fate by transforming the British Empire into a Commonwealth of fully self-governing states since A.D. 1867, 1848, 1841, or even as early as 1791 if the local landmarks in the constitutional history of Canada are taken as indicators of the progress of political devolution in the British Empire as a whole.¹

The voluntary, gradual, and pacific transformation of a once unitary empire into a free association between an ever-increasing number of fully self-governing states had been a triumph of good feeling and good sense which was perhaps almost unique in the political annals of Mankind in Process of Civilization up to date; and this political achievement reflected credit on the parties that had been willing to receive self-government in instalments, as well as on the party that had been willing to make progressive cessions of political power on its own initiative without waiting to be compelled. The creditableness of the political process in this British case could not, however, prevent the political effect of a dissolution of the British Empire by agreement from being much the same, in the stark terms of power politics, as the political effect of the break-up of the Spanish, Ottoman, and Danubian Hapsburg Empires by force. In this case, as in those, the effect had been the creation of a dangerous political vacuum which the champions of a dissolving Hapsburg Monarchy had diagnosed and deprecated when they had given it the pejorative nickname 'Balkanization', in allusion to the sequel to the previous break-up of the Ottoman Empire in Rumelia. The hard fact was that, by A.D. 1952, the sea-power of the United Kingdom

¹ A convenient list of the dates when responsible government was granted in the various British colonies with populations of West European origin will be found in Nathan, M.: *Empire Government* (London 1928, Allen & Unwin), pp. 47-48.

had ceased to be able, unaided, to protect the United Kingdom itself or what remained of its dependent empire, while the other now fully self-governing dominions of the British Crown, which had ceased to be able to count upon effective protection by the United Kingdom's Navy, had not become capable, unaided, of providing for their own security; and this meant that all continuing or former states members of the British Commonwealth, like all Continental European states west of the Soviet Union's 'iron curtain', must become protectorates of the United States as the only practicable alternative to their becoming satellites of the Soviet Union.

This was another way of saying that, in A.D. 1952, the Soviet Union and the United States found themselves confronting one another as the only two Great Powers still surviving on the face of the planet; and, in any international balance of power, two was bound, even at the best, to be an awkward number. It was true that in this current chapter of Western international history—in contrast to the situation during the chapter that had been opened in A.D. 1931 by Japan's initial act of aggression in Manchuria and had been closed in A.D. 1945 by the overthrow of both Japan and Germany—the two rival Great Powers were, both of them, economically 'sated' countries, either of which could find peaceful employment for the whole of its man-power, for many decades to come, in cultivating its own garden and developing the still untouched reserves of human and non-human resources within its own frontiers; and in this respect the international situation was less dangerous in A.D. 1952 than it had been before and during the Second World War, when Germany and Japan had been led into committing aggression by their belief that they could not continue to provide for a growing population at an acceptable standard of living within their own frontiers. By contrast, both the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed, and admitted to enjoying, in A.D. 1952, a freedom from want that made both these surviving Great Powers immune to one of the historic motives for aggressiveness. Unfortunately, however, they did not, either of them, enjoy an equal freedom from the mutual fear that had been the other powerful motive for aggressiveness in the past; and their fear of one another was engendered and kept alive by the convergent operation of several different causes.

To begin with, the Russian and American peoples differed in *ethos*. The Russian people's habitual and characteristic temper was one of docile resignation, the American people's one of obstreperous impatience; and this difference of temper was reflected in a difference of attitude towards arbitrary government. The Russians acquiesced in this as an evil that some six hundred years of experience had schooled them to regard as inevitable, whereas the Americans' experience of successfully revolting against arbitrary government by ministers of a British King George III and successfully preventing any domestic recrudescence of arbitrary government during the first century and three quarters of the history of the United States had led them to think of arbitrary government as an evil which any people could banish if it had the will. In consequence, the Americans—including a middle-class-

minded American industrial working class—saw their *summum bonum* in a liberty that they equated with equality, whereas a Russian Communist dominant minority saw their *summum bonum* in an equality that they equated with liberty. These temperamental and doctrinal differences made it difficult for the two peoples to understand, and therefore difficult for them to trust, one another; and this inevitable mutual distrust bred a no-less-inevitable mutual fear in the hearts of the two strong men armed, now that the arena in which they menaced one another had been transformed out of all recognition by the unprecedentedly rapid and far-reaching recent progress of Technology in Western hands.

(b) A METAMORPHOSIS OF THE *OIKOUMENÊ*

By the middle of the twentieth century of the Christian Era the progress of Technology had made a once wide world shrivel to dimensions so diminutive as to make it henceforth impossible for two gladiators to take their stand in this arena without finding themselves within point-blank range of one another—and this, *mirabile dictu*, simultaneously from the rear as well as from the front, since, in the act of diminishing the size of Mankind's habitat, the *Oikoumenê*, in terms of its conductivity for human purposes, Technology had also transformed the *Oikoumenê*'s shape.

The unprecedented vulnerability of the position of even the relatively least vulnerable Great Power in the World of A.D. 1952 was, indeed, a consequence of a recent revolutionary change in the strategico-political map. Within living memory, Man's World, in the sense of the habitable and traversable surface of the planet of which Man was a denizen, had at last become round in fact as well as in theory—or, if not yet fully round, at least already more than hemispherical.

The theoretical knowledge that the Earth was a globe and not a disk had, of course, been inherited by the Western Civilization from its Hellenic predecessor; and this theoretical globularity had been confirmed by an empirical demonstration when, in the course of Western Man's conquest of the Ocean at the opening of the Modern Age of Western history, Magellan's squadron, setting sail westward from Seville in A.D. 1519, had encountered in the Moluccas in A.D. 1521 Portuguese compatriots of its late commander's who had arrived there by setting sail eastward from Portugal, and when the *Vittoria* had clinched this proof by coming home to port in Seville, and thus completing the circumnavigation of the globe, in A.D. 1522. Yet even this empirical demonstration had been barren of any immediate appreciable practical consequences.

So long as a Modern Western World's footholds on the shores of the Pacific had remained under the rule of Spain, a mercantile community at Seville that had been determined to retain a monopoly of the trade between the Spanish Empire overseas and the metropolitan country had succeeded in confining the annual trade across the Pacific Ocean to a single 'round trip' in which a galleon (usually accompanied by a tender) from Manila had brought a cargo of Chinese wares to the port of

Acapulco on the Pacific coast of Mexico.¹ It had been only in the course of the nineteenth century that this one sixteenth-century thread of Trans-Pacific maritime commercial traffic had been multiplied in consequence of the intervention of other Western Powers. From the eighteen-forties onwards, the Western World's frontage on the American shores of the Pacific had been extended northwards as a result of the overland expansion of both the United States and Canada from coast to coast. The Mexican port of Acapulco had been reinforced by San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver, while, on the East Asian shores of the Ocean, the Spanish port of Manila, the Portuguese settlement at Macao, and the Dutch commercial establishment on Deshima² had been eclipsed by Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tientsin, Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Dairen. Yet, even when the one tenuous thread, linking Manila with the Spanish dominions in the Americas, to which the Modern Western maritime traffic across the Pacific had been confined for the first three hundred years, had thus been transformed, during the nineteenth century, into a multiple skein, the *Oikoumenê* had still retained, for practical purposes, the flat and finite shape that it had worn since the days of Ptolemy, Eratosthenes, and Hecataeus, and indeed since the pre-Hellenic dawn of Civilization.

In the Old World, all civilizations of all generations up to date had risen and fallen within a festoon-shaped zone that had been slung like a hammock between a north-eastern peg in Eastern Asia slightly to the north of the 45th parallel of northern latitude and a north-western peg in Western Europe slightly to the north of the 60th parallel, with the festoon's pendulous mid-point brushing the Equator at the Straits of Malacca and sagging below it in Java. The divers sections of this elongated home of the civilizations of the Old World had communicated with one another through two socially and culturally conductive media—a waterless inland sea, consisting of a chain of steppes and deserts extending from Eastern Mongolia to the Western Sudan³ via the Shā-miyah and the Desert of Sinai, and a chain of coastal and land-locked waters extending from the Western Pacific to the Eastern Atlantic via the Straits of Malacca, the portage linking the heads of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea with the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean, and the Straits of Gibraltar—and this pristine shape of the *Oikoumenê* had not been changed when the western terminal of the longitudinal water-route had been pushed westward, across the relatively narrow waters of the Atlantic, from the west coast of the Continent to the two large off-shore islands of North America and South America, or when the portage previously interrupting the continuity of the voyage between the Continent's Atlantic and Pacific coasts had been circumvented in A.D. 1498 by da Gama and breached in A.D. 1869 by de Lesseps. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era an *Oikoumenê* whose eastern selvaie had been extended southward from the east coast

¹ A.D. 1592 was the date at which the eastern terminal of the Spanish annual Trans-Pacific voyage had been transferred to Acapulco from Callao. Officially the traffic had been limited to *per annum*. In practice there seems to have been a good deal of illicit traffic after, as well as before, this date.

² See II. ii. 232-3.

³ See I. i. 64 and III. iii. 7-8.

of Asia to Australasia, and its western selvage westward from the west coasts of Europe and Africa to the west coasts of North and South America, had been still, in effect, just as flat and as finite as ever. It had merely been tied to the circumference of the globe, as if it had been an oblong strip of cloth, by a skein of threads attaching its eastern and western selvages to one another across the breadth of the Pacific; and, even when these threads had been drawn tight enough to convert the oblong strip into a band in the shape of an armlet by bringing the two selvages together, a tell-tale suture had remained visible as an International Date-Line intersecting the Pacific Ocean along a *tracée* which followed, with some local variations, the 180th meridian of longitude.

The establishment of this International Date-Line in A.D. 1884¹ had borne witness to two contemporary facts of human geography. On the one hand a circum-global maritime traffic-belt had now come to be sufficiently frequented to demand a global adjustment between the now contiguous extremities of a longitudinal series of regionally differentiated time-zones that could not extend in a continuous chain round the entire circumference of the globe without there being a chronometrical discrepancy, of the time-length of twenty-four hours, between the respective timings of the first and the last zone in the series at the line along which these two extremities now adjoined one another. On the other hand the Pacific Ocean had continued still to be decidedly the least-frequented section of a maritime traffic-belt that had come to encircle the globe by expanding eastward and westward simultaneously from a base-line along the Atlantic coast of Western Europe; and for this reason the heart of the Pacific had proved to be the least inconvenient locus on the traversable face of the globe for a conventional line at which west-bound travellers would add to, and east-bound travellers subtract from, their time-reckoning the twenty-four hours that, at some line or other, must be added or subtracted, according to the direction of the voyage, in order to cancel an inevitable twenty-four hours' discrepancy between necessarily contiguous extremities of a circum-global belt of differential time-zones.

Meanwhile, an *Oikoumené* that had become round on the explorational plane in A.D. 1522, and on the chronometrical plane in A.D. 1884, had remained flat and finite on the strategico-political plane till A.D. 1941; for neither the passage of the Pacific on a voyage of exploration nor even the subsequent establishment of regularly frequented Transpacific traffic-lanes for merchant-ships had availed to reduce the Pacific to the dimensions of a basin in which navies based on opposite sides of its rim could manage to meet and fight. The turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had seen this great Pacific gulf, breaking the continuity of the strategic map of a Westernizing World, still fixed—to all appearance as firmly as ever—in the locus of the International Date-Line; and a tacit assumption that the gulf not only was, but also would remain, an impassable one had been the common presupposition, on a fundamental point of fact, underlying the agreements reached at the Washington

¹ At the International Meridian Conference held in A.D. 1884 at Washington, D.C.

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Naval Conference of A.D. 1921-2 between the Western naval Powers of the one part and Japan of the other.¹

The basis of these agreements had been a reciprocal undertaking,² as between the United States, the British Empire, and Japan, to maintain the *status quo* with regard to fortifications and naval bases in certain specified territories and possessions of theirs in the Pacific area; for the effect of this reciprocal self-denying ordinance had been to insure Japan against the risk of seeing any potentially hostile foreign naval bases constructed within a closer range of her own home bases than the range of Pearl Harbour and Singapore; under the technical conditions of the moment, this provision had assured to the Japanese Navy the ability to maintain an unchallengeable regional supremacy in the Western Pacific; and, in return for the English-speaking naval Powers' consent to her thus preserving the security of her home territory through the retention of her command over the surrounding seas, Japan, for her part, had been willing to make a pair of counter-concessions without which the English-speaking Powers would not have been willing to make their own crucial concession to her.

In the first place, Japan had resigned herself to remaining markedly inferior to her two English-speaking competitors in absolute naval strength by agreeing³ to maxima in the ratio of 525,000 tons each for them, as against 315,000 tons for herself, as the figures for the replacement of capital ship tonnage. In the second place, she had bound herself not to abuse her now virtually guaranteed naval supremacy in the Western Pacific by misusing it for the purpose of committing aggression either against the now defenceless West Pacific possessions of the English-speaking naval Powers (for instance, the Philippines and Hong Kong) or against a likewise defenceless China. Japan had entered into an agreement with the United States, the British Empire, and France in which the four parties had undertaken to respect one another's rights in relation to their insular possessions and dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean,⁴ and into an agreement with the same three parties, together with Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and China, to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity and to refrain from taking advantage of anarchic conditions in China in order to take action there inimical to the security of the other contracting parties or damaging to the rights of their subjects or citizens.⁵

Twenty years after the date of the Washington Naval Conference the same assumption that the Pacific Ocean was still a strategically impassable gulf had nerved the Japanese Government to launch an attack on possessions of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the

¹ See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-3 (London 1925, Milford), pp. 489-90.

² In Article 19 of the Treaty of the 6th February, 1922, for the Limitation of Naval Armament, between the United States, the British Empire, Japan, France, and Italy.

³ In Article 4 of the Five-Power Treaty of the 6th February, 1922.

⁴ In Article 1 of the Washington Treaty of the 13th December, 1921, between the United States, the British Empire, Japan, and France.

⁵ The Washington Nine-Power Treaty of the 6th February, 1922, 'relating to the principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China'.

Netherlands in the Pacific; but this audacious Japanese act of aggression had proved in the event to have been suicidal because the underlying assumption had proved, this time, no longer to hold good.

By A.D. 1941 the Japanese naval authorities must have come to believe in the possibility of the United States Navy's being able, from a base in Hawaii, at least to threaten the eastern flank of a Japanese advance southward in the Western Pacific; for there can be no other explanation of their surprise attack on the 7th December, 1941, upon the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour. Their failure, however, to follow up their sensational success in this initial operation by attempting to occupy the Hawaiian Islands and to proceed thence to an attack upon the Pacific coast of the United States and Canada is presumptive evidence of an abiding conviction in Japanese minds that it would still be beyond the Japanese Navy's, and therefore likewise beyond the United States Navy's, power to conduct sustained naval operations on the grand scale across the breadth of the Pacific. It can never have entered into Japanese calculations, when the Japanese Government were taking their fateful decision to challenge the United States' sea-power, that the United States Navy would be able within less than four years to bring Japan to her knees by succeeding, as it did in A.D. 1942-5, in solving the unprecedentedly complex and difficult logistical problem of bringing a crushingly superior striking-power to bear upon Japan in a West Pacific theatre of naval operations that was more than 3,000 miles distant from Pearl Harbour and more than 4,500 miles distant from San Francisco.¹ Admiral Nimitz's achievement in dealing Japan a knock-out blow across the Pacific in A.D. 1945 was, indeed, as epoch-making an event in the history of the West and of the World as Magellan's achievement of making his way across the Pacific to the Philippines in A.D. 1521. The American seaman was, in effect, translating on to the far more exacting strategic plane the feat performed by his Portuguese forerunner on the relatively facile explorational plane 424 years earlier.

The capitulation of Japan on the 15th August, 1945, under the Trans-Pacific pressure of United States sea-power signified the consummation of the revolutionary metamorphosis of a flat and finite *Oikoumenê* into a round one. After having been transformed from the shape of a card into the shape of an armlet when in A.D. 1884 its two selvages had been sewn together in a suture along the International Date-Line, the *Oikoumenê* had now been transformed again by the conversion of a sewn-up armlet into a welded ring; and this saturnine steel ring of unbroken strategic conductivity that had thus been clamped round the circumference of the globe in A.D. 1941-5 was threatening in A.D. 1952 to put the *Oikoumenê* through yet another metamorphosis by expanding into the shape of a great helm pulled down over the face of the globe from the North Pole to the southern edge of the Southern Temperate Zone.

In A.D. 1952 the problem of making direct flights, at least for warlike purposes, across the Arctic Circle was reported to be on the way to being solved, and this approaching fresh triumph of Western technology

¹ The distance to Yokohama was 3,445 miles from Hawaii and 4,750 miles from San Francisco.

would have the effect of putting the United States and the Soviet Union in jeopardy from one another on no less than three out of the four quarters of the compass. As a consequence of the latitudinal encirclement of the globe by the *Oikoumenê* through the United States Navy's strategic conquest of the Pacific in A.D. 1942-5, the two surviving Great Powers were already both in the same plight of simultaneously encircling and being encircled by one another—colliding, as they now did, on a front or rear in Eastern Asia, as well as on a rear or front in Europe.¹ The approaching conquest of the Arctic by the aeroplane was threatening soon to make the strategic position of both Powers even more precarious by now exposing both the United States' and the Soviet Union's northern flank to the new danger of trans-polar attack by air;² and, if this menace were to materialize, either Power would find itself in the desperate situation of having to provide concurrently for the defence of three fronts, each of which would be in danger of being turned from one flank as well as from the rear. Thus, in a now global *Oikoumenê* at the opening of the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, either of the two still standing gladiators was in a posture to inflict upon, and to have inflicted upon him by, his adversary the shattering experience that once, at the crisis of the second paroxysm of an Hellenic Time of Troubles, had been inflicted upon the Romans by Hannibal and his brethren,

ad configendum venientibus undique Poenis
omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu
horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris oris
in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum
omnibus humanis esset terrâque marique.³

Nor was this the end of a twentieth-century transformation-scene; for, in the act of enveloping the face of the globe, the *Oikoumenê* was contracting in scale, as measured by the speed of human means of communication, far faster than it was expanding in area, as measured by its extension over the physical surface of the planet. At the instant at which the *Oikoumenê* was assuming, on the strategic plane, the shape of a thirteenth-century Western helmet, this great helm was shrinking to the

¹ When the news of the Japanese attack on the United States fleet in Pearl Harbour reached England, an American visitor remarked to an English colleague of the present writer's, with whom he was discussing the news: 'It is all very well for you here in England to take this news so calmly! You can afford to, I suppose, considering that, in England, you are six thousand miles away from the front'. Forgetting, in the excitement of the moment, that the World had now become round and boundless, instead of being still flat and finite, this American commentator had consequently forgotten for the moment that a Britain which was six thousand miles and more to the east of the Japanese fleet's and air force's Pacific theatre of operations against Pearl Harbour was only twenty miles to the west of the German Luftwaffe's Continental bases of operations against Britain herself.

² The possibility that the ardent advance of Western Science might soon be going to set the North Pole on fire seems to have been overlooked by Senator Dandurand of Canada when, in A.D. 1924, in a debate on the draft Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, he had the hardihood to say about his native country: 'We live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials. A vast ocean separates us from Europe.' In A.D. 1952 it was manifest that, as soon as the Arctic Circle became traversable by military aircraft, Canada's strategico-political situation would become much like what Belgium's had been in A.D. 1914 and in A.D. 1940.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book III, ll. 833-7.

diminutive size of a thimble; and the strategic consequence of the coming reduction of 'the great open spaces' of Man's once immense terrestrial habitat to the dimensions of a Lilliput had already been visible to the mind's eye of a prophetically imaginative Victorian English mathematician.

' "What is the smallest *world* you would care to inhabit?" . . .

' "You don't mean to say you have been trying experiments in *that* direction!" I said.

' "Well, not *experiments* exactly. We do not profess to *construct* planets. But a scientific friend of mine, who has made several balloon-voyages, assures me he has visited a planet so small that he could walk right round it in twenty minutes! There had been a great battle, just before his visit, which had ended rather oddly: the vanquished army ran away at full speed, and in a very few minutes found themselves face-to-face with the victorious army, who were marching home again, and who were so frightened at finding themselves between *two* armies that they surrendered at once!" ' 1

At a date no more than half way through the twentieth century, current Western improvements in the technique of overland transport had not yet arrived at such a perilous pitch of efficiency as to have made it likely that a vanquished North Korean Army, if it had been thrown out of North Korea in a north-westerly direction by a victorious United Nations Army in A.D. 1952, would have cannoned into a dumbfounded American Army in Bavaria. The technique of maritime transport had, on the other hand, already been brought to a point at which a United Nations Army, if it were to be dislodged or withdrawn from South Korea in A.D. 1952, might be ferried round the globe in a trice to confront a Russian Army on the Elbe; and the contemporary progress in the technique of aerial transport had already left the utmost achievements of maritime and overland transport far behind. In A.D. 1952 there was talk of aeroplanes which would be able to circumnavigate the Equator without having to break their flight in order to refuel, and which, when travelling from east to west, would be able to arrive before they had started by flying faster than the speed of the planet's eastward rotation round its axis; and presumably a single mechanical dragon of the kind could be freighted with bombs lethal enough to do execution on the appalling scale contemplated in the Book of the Revelation of Saint John the Divine. An *Oikoumené* which had been so rapidly coalescing and contracting had, in fact, no less rapidly been transforming itself from a common home into a common abattoir for the Human Race.

Πάντες τῷ θανάτῳ τηρούμεθα καὶ τρεφόμεσθα,
ὡς ἀγέλη χοίρων σφαζομένων ἀλόγως.²

In contemplating the straits to which the Human Race had thus brought itself in the twentieth century of the Christian Era through the 'annihilation of distance' by a Western Civilization's prowess in Technology, an historian would recollect that this was not the first instance of an abrupt change of scale in the histories of the civilizations. In Western history itself, for example, there had been a previous change of the kind

1 Lewis Carroll: *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded* (London 1889, Macmillan), pp. 169-70.

2 Palladas of Alexandria in the *Anthologia Palatina*, Book X, No. 85.

some four hundred years back, when the old city-states of Italy and Flanders had been dwarfed by the sudden rise of nation-states along the Atlantic seaboard of Western Europe, and when these nation-states had suddenly extended Western Christendom's horizon by mastering the Ocean. There had been a corresponding dual change in Hellenic history after Alexander the Great's passage of the Dardanelles in 334 B.C., when the Hellenic World's horizon had been rapidly extended first eastward to India and then westward to the eastern shores of the Atlantic, while simultaneously the old Hellenic city-states had been dwarfed by new multi-municipal polities on the scale of the Seleucid and the Roman commonwealths.¹ The same pair of simultaneous and associated sudden changes of scale can be discerned in Sinic history at the time of the outbreak of the post-Confucian paroxysm of a Sinic Time of Troubles. From an historical standpoint the difference between these earlier instances of an abrupt change of scale in the histories of other civilizations and the current instance in Western history was one of degree; but this difference of degree was so great—whether measured in terms of Time or of Space or of Force—as to be tantamount, in practice, to a difference in kind.

In its current act of transforming itself by simultaneously coalescing and shrivelling, the *Oikoumenê* had reduced its strategico-political structure to an unprecedentedly stark simplicity. In A.D. 1952 there was, for practical purposes, only one surviving ocean, the Pacific; only one surviving continent, the Old World; only one surviving mediterranean sea, the Atlantic; only one surviving pair of islands, the Americas; and only a couple of surviving Great Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. The 'heartland'² of the Continent and the more northerly of the two islands were the respective seats of the two Powers' metropolitan territories; the remainder of the habitable and traversable surface of the globe was a no-man's-land between the homelands of these two gladiators who were the only two still on their feet in a Western arena that had now become world-wide; and the comparative success or failure of the Soviet Union and the United States in a competition for gaining control over the human and non-human resources of the intervening no-man's-land seemed likely to be the decisive factor in determining the side to which the scales of an oecumenical Balance of Power would eventually incline. The circum-global range of this fateful no-man's-land on the strategico-political map of the World in A.D. 1952 was as significant a feature in the current situation as it was an unprecedented one.

In an earlier context³ we have come across 'laws', operative in the play of the Balance of Power, that can be seen uniformly asserting themselves in divers episodes of history. In any system of international relations governed by the Balance of Power, it had been common form for the states at the centre to be pigmies by comparison with the relatively gigantic size of the states on the periphery, and for the central area, tenanted by the pigmy states, to be the arena into which the surrounding

¹ See IV. iv. 308-13.

² For this illuminating conception, see Mackinder, Sir H. J.: *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (London 1919, Constable), reissued in 1942 (New York 1942, Holt).

³ In III. iii. 299-306 and 311-12.

giants descended to meet and do battle with one another. Since the particular constellation of states constituting a particular balance of power had usually been brought into existence by one of those abrupt changes of scale that we have just been calling to mind, the pigmies of today were apt to be the giants of yesterday, and the arena of today, in which today's contending giants were doing their worst to ruin the civilization that was their common mother, was apt to be yesterday's nursery-garden, in which the civilization of today had been brought up as a seedling before being bedded out farther afield.¹

For example, the plain traversed by the Lower Yellow River, which in a post-Confucian Age of Sinic history was the principal battlefield of surrounding Great Powers that had arisen on the periphery of an expanding Sinic World, had previously been the domicile of the Chóu Dynasty and of a preceding Shang Dynasty's surviving successor-states, which in an earlier age had been the Great Powers of the Sinic World and the seed-beds of the culture that had come to prevail throughout the Sinic World in the subsequent Age of the peripheral Contending States. In Hellenic history corresponding roles were played by Continental European Greece and Sicily, and in Western history by Northern Italy and Flanders. Continental European Greece and Sicily, which in the third and second centuries B.C. were the battlefields of post-Alexandrine Hellenic Powers of the calibre of Egypt, Macedon, Carthage, Rome, and the Seleucid Monarchy, had been the domiciles of city-states that had been the Great Powers of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic World and the seed-beds of an expanded Hellenic Civilization's post-Alexandrine phase of culture. Northern Italy, which from A.D. 1494 to A.D. 1866 was one of the two principal battlefields of the Great Powers of the Modern Age of Western history, and Flanders, which was their other principal battlefield down to A.D. 1918, had in a preceding constellation of forces been the domiciles of city-states that had been the Great Powers of a Medieval Western city-state cosmos and the seed-beds of the Western Civilization's Modern phase of culture.

It will be seen that these examples of *peripeteia*—the reversal of roles—in the play of the Balance of Power conform to a uniform pattern; and in Western history, by the time of writing, this pattern of events had repeated itself. In a twentieth-century Western World the nation-states that had been the Great Powers in the Modern chapter of Western history had been overtaken in their turn, since the transition to a post-Modern chapter, by the *peripeteia* which they themselves had inflicted once upon a time, at the preceding transition to the Modern chapter of Western history from a Medieval chapter, upon the city-states that had been the Western World's Great Powers in a foregoing Medieval Age. Since the onset of the series of world wars that had opened in A.D. 1914, France, Germany, Spain,² and Britain,³ as well as Italy and Belgium,

¹ See I. i. 19, for the performance of this part by Northern Italy in a Medieval overture to a Modern chapter of Western history. See further II. ii. 263, and the passages in III. iii, cited on p. 486, n. 3.

² In the Civil War of A.D. 1936-9, which, under the guise of being a domestic conflict, had been a local prelude to the international war of A.D. 1939-45.

³ In the attacks from the air to which she had been subject from A.D. 1940 to A.D. 1945.

had been suffering the ill-treatment that Lombardy and Flanders had suffered at French, Spanish, Austrian, Prussian, and British hands during the three war-and-peace cycles that had rolled over a Modern Western World in successive waves of calamity from A.D. 1494 to A.D. 1914.

Since A.D. 1914 the whole of the European nursery-garden of a Western culture that was now radiating into the whole of the rest of the *Oikoumenê* had become the Lombardy and Flanders of a literally world-wide constellation of forces in which the only surviving Great Powers were two states that were both non-European in their location and supra-national in their calibre; and this fate—physically and psychologically devastating though it was bound to be for the French and English and their like, now that their turn had come to suffer it—was nothing out of the ordinary in the sense that it was no exception to a ‘law’ of History exemplified in a number of earlier cases. The extraordinary feature in the strategico-military situation of a Westernizing World in A.D. 1952 was not that the European nursery-garden of a post-Modern Western culture had become the battlefield of a post-Modern Westernizing World’s supra-national Great Powers; what was novel and anomalous was that, instead of being confined to the locality where its location was to be looked for in the light of all the historical precedents, the battlefield of a Westernizing World which had become literally world-wide had expanded—far beyond the limits of the Western Civilization’s European patrimony—to embrace all the domains of all the civilizations that had risen and fallen up to date.

In the Old World the no-man’s-land between the Soviet Union and the United States included the whole of the festoon-shaped zone extending from the Japanese Archipelago through Java to the British Isles that had contained the habitats of all civilizations originating in the Old World until the propagation of the Orthodox Christian Civilization into Russia at the close of the tenth century of the Christian Era and the propagation of the Western Civilization into the Americas at the close of the fifteenth century; and this globe-encompassing no-man’s-land between two oecumenical Great Powers also embraced the habitats of the pre-Columbian civilizations of the New World in North America south-west of the Rio Grande and in a western strip of South America extending from Colombia to Bolivia. This conversion of all the nurseries of all the civilizations that had risen and fallen up to date into a common arena for a solitary pair of surviving Great Powers was an event that was, not merely unprecedented, but portentous. It seemed to signify that the latter-day expansion of the Western Civilization had been unique in two respects. Besides giving the *Oikoumenê* a spherical shape instead of a crescent shape in the act of expanding in the Space-dimension over the whole habitable and traversable face of the planet, a post-Modern Western Civilization had apparently been expanding in the Time-dimension as well by gathering up into its own heritage all the heritages of all the previous civilizations. All the eggs that all the representatives of this species of society had ever laid were thus now in the Western Civilization’s basket, and this novel and hazardous concentration,

in one target-area, of all the cultural treasures that Mankind had accumulated during the past five or six thousand years might be taken to indicate that the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era was to see the history, not only of the Western Civilization, but of Civilization itself, arrive at a crisis that might prove to be its climacteric.

In an historically as well as geographically unified *Oikoumenê*, it looked as if a competition for world-power between the Soviet Union and the United States might be decided in the long run by the suffrages of those three-quarters of the living generation of Mankind who, five or six thousand years after the dawn of Civilization, were still living in the Neolithic Age on the material plane of life, but who, within living memory, had begun to become aware that a higher material standard, opening up the possibility of a higher spiritual standard as well, had been demonstrated by the achievements of an industrialized Western Society to be attainable, under a latter-day Western technological dispensation, by a wider circle than the tiny minority which had monopolized the fruits of Civilization in all societies that had entered on the path of Civilization previously. In exercising a choice, now open to it, between an American and a Russian way of life, this hitherto submerged majority might be expected to choose whichever way of the two appeared in its eyes to promise better to satisfy this awakening majority's revolutionary aspiration to share in a hitherto dominant minority's traditional privileges; and the way of life for which the majority eventually opted on this criterion was likely to prevail throughout the *Oikoumenê*, as the progressive spread of a latter-day Western technological 'know-how' among Westernizing non-Western populations gradually enabled these to make their superiority in numbers tell in the conduct of Mankind's now common affairs.¹

Yet, although the last word might lie with a hitherto submerged non-Western majority of Mankind, it nevertheless seemed probable that in the short run the decisive weight in the scales of a Russo-American balance would prove to be, not those three-quarters of the World's total present population, but that one-quarter of the World's total present industrial war-potential that in A.D. 1952 was still located in the Western Society's patrimony in Western Europe; for, in undergoing her melancholy metamorphosis from being the nursery-garden of a post-Modern Western culture to being one sector of a Westernizing World's battlefield, Western Europe had been losing her security, prosperity, and happiness without losing her economic, political, or military importance. In this circum-global battlefield the West European sector was a crucial one because it was the Insular Power's Continental bridgehead, and because, if this bridgehead on the tip of a Eurasian Continent's European Peninsula were to fall into the hands of the Continental Power domiciled in the Continent's 'heartland', the proportion between the respective shares of the World's total current industrial war-potential at the command of the two surviving rival Great Powers would be changed at a stroke from a present ratio of three to one in favour of the United

¹ The temper generated by militarization in the non-Western peasantry of a Westernizing *Oikoumenê* is examined on pp. 503-16, below.

States¹ to an approximate equality; and, although, to begin with, that half of the World's total industrial war-potential that in A.D. 1952 was located within the frontiers of the United States might be expected to count for more than the other half because it would be less difficult to organize and to manipulate as an organic unity, it was also to be expected that this organizational advantage on the side of the United States would be outweighed, as time went on, by an increasingly effective mobilization, under a Russian single command, of the resources of a Eurafasian Continent whose aggregate resources, human as well as non-human, would doubtless prove far to exceed the aggregate resources of the American pair of islands.

(c) A TRANSMIGRATION OF THE MARTIAL SPIRIT

The Crescendo and Diminuendo of Militarism in Western Europe

The situation in which a Westernizing World on the morrow of a Second World War thus found itself on the strategico-political plane had its counterpart on the psychological plane; and, since the progress of Technology had no power to diminish the sway of feelings over the course of human affairs, but only power to put physical 'drive' into human action, our survey would remain incomplete if we did not take account of the spiritual, as well as the material, forces in the field. The effect of the current rapid increase in Mankind's material power, and of the recently consummated polarization of this power through its concentration at two points, and two only, on the face of a now global *Oikoumené*, would depend on the feelings and calculations of the divers actors in a drama in which the action had become unprecedentedly high-powered without having ceased to be familiarly human. In a mid-twentieth-century Westernizing Society, the choices between Peace and War and between Parochialism and Oecumenicalism would be decided, not by a blindly mechanical play of non-human forces, but by the hopes, fears, recollections, and expectations of men and women domiciled in divers sections of an embryonic World Community.

In this psychological situation one crucial point was the temper of the people of Western Europe, since this *ci-devant* metropolitan area of a Westernizing World still contained, as we have noticed,² a large enough proportion of the World's total current industrial war-potential to determine the inclination of the Balance of Power as between the United States and the Soviet Union. In A.D. 1952 a Western Europe that had been in a perpetual ferment of aggressiveness, with the wide world for its arena, during more than four centuries ending in the catastrophe of A.D. 1914-18, was belatedly making involuntary psychological amends to its former victims by displaying markedly less martial spirit than any other region in the *Oikoumené* of the day. After having at last converted even the Chinese, by the example of her own aggressiveness at their expense in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, from a distaste for Militarism which had been ingrained in the Sinic tradition since

¹ This current superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union in the amount of industrial war-potential at its command is taken into account on pp. 529-30 and 531, below.

² On p. 489, above.

221 B.C., Western Europe mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era had lost her own stomach for a warlike temper which she had thus perversely re-evoked in Chinese hearts; and this revolutionary psychological change in Western Europe marked the turn of a local tide that had been flowing, save for one pause in the eighteenth century, since the opening of the Modern chapter of Western history.

When, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the North Italian field of a Late Medieval Western Balance of Power between city-states had suddenly expanded to embrace the whole European domain of Western Christendom, the nation-states that were now replacing the city-states as the Great Powers in a larger constellation of forces had still followed the example of their Milanese, Venetian, and Florentine predecessors in fighting their battles mainly with mercenary troops—and these in numbers that were relatively small by comparison with the contemporary Western World's total stock of potential 'cannon-fodder'. In this Early Modern Western World the only peoples yet broken in to military service *en masse* were the seafaring populations of Venice and Genoa who furnished the man-power required for rowing their war-galleys.¹ In most of the Transmarine and Transalpine West European countries the only class yet militarized was a rural aristocracy that furnished a national heavy cavalry.

In sixteenth-century France, for instance, poverty conspired with martial spirit to send the younger sons of the nobility into the *gendarmerie*.² On the other hand the younger sons of a French peasantry that was able to make a living from agriculture found no need and felt no inclination to seek service in a national infantry;³ the only French province that produced a native infantry in the sixteenth century was Gascony;⁴ and in this age the French Government did not persevere in its discouraging attempts to build up a native infantry on a nationwide scale,⁵ because it was rich enough to hire a Swiss infantry which had established its ascendancy over the heavy cavalry of a Medieval Western Christendom since the eighth decade of the fifteenth century⁶ and which had been constrained by poverty to raise its military proficiency to a professional pitch of excellence at which it could sell itself at a high price for mercenary service abroad.⁷ Taking a cue from the Venetian Government,⁸ the French Government in the sixteenth century recruited its light cavalry from mercenary Albanian 'stradioti';⁹ and, for the reinforcement of armies operating in the Italian arena of Modern Western warfare, France could compete with other belligerents, non-Italian or Italian, for the services of the professional forces of the Italian principalities of Mantua, Ferrara, and Urbino,¹⁰ which were pioneers in the state trading enterprise—afterwards taken over by German principalities catering for a wider market—of maintaining standing

¹ See Fueter, E.: *Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1492-1559* (Munich and Berlin 1919, Oldenbourg), pp. 30-31, 163-4, and 228.

² See *ibid.*, p. 54.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 53.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 59.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 59.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 18.

⁷ The equipment, drill, and licensing of these Swiss mercenaries in the pre-Reformation generation of Early Modern Western history are described by Fueter, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-18 and 234-6.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 19 and 103.

⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 58.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 231-2.

armies as profit-earning establishments to be hired at auction to the highest bidder.¹

The Spanish light cavalry (*ginetes*),² French heavy cavalry (*gendarmérie*), and Gascon infantry were thus the only land-troops of any account in the Western World at the opening of the series of Modern and post-Modern Western war-and-peace cycles that sought service with their own national governments; and they too, like their Swiss contemporaries who sold their services abroad, were moved by mercenary motives as well as by a zest for bearing arms. In contrast to the spirit of the Governments of the Early Modern Western parochial states, which already delighted in war as ardently as any of their successors, a great majority of the population of Western Christendom was thus at this date still unmilitarized. While they were already being victimized by their rulers' warlike propensities, they had not yet become their rulers' accomplices in the public crime of making war for the love of it.

This initial unmilitary-mindedness of the peasantry and bourgeoisie of Modern Western Christendom is perhaps one explanation of the long survival there of the practice of treating military service as a professional career for 'expendable' foreign mercenaries rather than as a patriotic duty for respectable citizens. Scottish and Irish mercenaries were still employed, side by side with Swedish national forces, by Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1618-48), and German mercenaries by the Dutch and Venetian Governments in the Western General War of A.D. 1672-1713 and in the Veneto-Ottoman War of 1683-1715. The British Government employed hired Hessian conscripts as well as voluntarily enlisted native British professional troops in North America in its war with the insurgent people of the British colonies there in A.D. 1775-83; and as late as the time of the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1854-6) it raised a foreign legion of German, Swiss, and Italian mercenaries amounting to nearly thirteen thousand men, all told.³

Even after the hired foreign mercenary had been superseded by the native professional soldier as the typical man-at-arms on Western parade-grounds, so ardent a militarist as Frederick the Great had reversed, as we have noticed already in another context,⁴ his father's imprudent step of conscripting Prussian artisans as well as Prussian agricultural serfs;⁵

¹ The Rivieran principality of Monaco engaged in the corresponding state enterprise of maintaining a navy for hire (see Fueter, *op. cit.*, p. 231) before it went in for the still more profitable public business of turning a sovereign independent city-state into an international gambling resort.

² See *ibid.*, p. 19.

³ See Fortescue, J. W.: *A History of the British Army*, vol. xiii (London 1930, Macmillan), p. 227. When the writer of this Study was a child, he once met an old lady who told him that, in her own childhood, she had seen, encamped on the South Downs, the German mercenaries who, as she put it, had been hired to garrison Great Britain while the bulk of the small native British professional army of the day was on active service overseas. By the time of writing in A.D. 1951, the writer could not recollect his informant's identity, but the memory of what she had told him some fifty years or more ago was clear enough to send him in search of verification of it. The passage, cited in this footnote, of Fortescue's classical work shows that, out of close upon 10,000 German and Swiss mercenaries assembled in Great Britain from May 1855 onwards, about 6,000 were in fact retained there, while nearly 4,000 were sent to the seat of war.

⁴ In IV. iv. 145-6.

⁵ In an eighteenth-century Western World a selective conscription of the peasantry had been supplemented by the conscription of convicts and other 'social misfits'. The

and King Frederick William I himself would no more have dreamed than his son ever dreamed of attempting to impose military conscription upon the Prussian bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the replacement of foreign mercenary volunteer or conscript professional troops by native volunteer or conscript professional troops, which had become the usual practice of a Late Modern Western World by Frederick the Great's day, was the prelude to the institution of compulsory universal service that was to be inaugurated, six years after Frederick's death, in a French *levée en masse*; and the raising of a native professional infantry, in imitation of, and substitution for, the rare, prized, and therefore costly Swiss, had been started by the Governments of contending Modern Western parochial states during a general war of A.D. 1494-1525 that had been the first war in the first war-and-peace cycle in the current Western series.

A sixteenth-century Austria who, like a sixteenth-century France, had no martial native source to tap for the meeting of her requirements in infantry,¹ and whose Government's poverty made it impossible for it to compete on equal terms with the French Government in the Swiss mercenary market,² had soon found a recruiting ground in adjoining German lands—in Bavaria, in Swabia, in Alsace—for Landsknechts who were passably good cheaper imitations of Swiss models;³ and in a contemporary Spain the same necessitudinousness had been the mother of the same invention. On a Castilian Plateau which, like the Swiss highlands, was a predominantly pastoral country, the native herdsmen offered better material for making soldiers than the husbandmen who were numerically predominant in the populations of most sixteenth-century West European countries.⁴ A Spanish 'gente armada y ordinada a la suiza' is mentioned as early as the 13th April, 1504, in correspondence between Their Catholic Majesties and the *gran capitán* Gonzalo de Córdoba;⁵ by about the year A.D. 1520, this new-model Spanish infantry had made its début in the field of Western warfare;⁶ and a Spanish copy had proved itself more versatile than its Swiss original in, for example, its capacity to storm fortresses besides fighting pitched battles.⁷ A partial and gradual militarization of the population of Western Christendom, which had thus begun soon after the opening of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era with these German and Spanish national imitations of a Swiss model, had been the prelude to the wholesale militarization which had been inaugurated, some three hundred years later, in the French *levée en masse* of A.D. 1792.⁸

Napoleon's intemperately aggressive abuse of this newly forged French weapon had provoked a more thorough-going adoption and more efficient organization of compulsory universal military service in A.D. 1807-13 in an only temporarily crushed and humiliated Prussia; and

legislation of the day, which was the reflection of an oligarchic régime, had the effect of driving into the ranks of 'the criminal classes', and from these into the ranks of the armed forces, categories of offenders who might have been saved for Society if they could have had the benefit of the more humane Western legislation in force mid-way through the twentieth century.

² See *ibid.*, p. 10.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 120.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 93.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 91.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 92.

⁸ The tragically crucial importance of this revolutionary French step has been noticed in IV. iv. 150-1.

the political unification of Germany and Italy under the auspices of the military-minded Houses of Hohenzollern and Savoy in the course of the fifty-six years following the close of the Napoleonic Wars had militarized Western Christian populations—in Tuscany, Saxony, the former city-states of Frankfurt-am-Main, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck, and elsewhere—which had long since become unaccustomed to bearing arms. The last members of Western Christendom to hold out against the twentieth-century Franco-Prussian institution of compulsory universal military service had been the English-speaking peoples; but in the United States ‘the draft’ had been introduced and enforced on both sides in the Civil War of A.D. 1861–5; in Australia and New Zealand compulsory military service had been adopted in A.D. 1909, albeit reluctantly and, as it turned out, only temporarily,¹ by two overseas Western peoples who had come to fear that their thinly populated territories might be coveted today, and appropriated tomorrow, by the congested populations of Eastern Asia; and an institution which the United States had found herself constrained to revive, and Great Britain to introduce, *ad hoc* in the two first world wars had been retained in both countries after the Second World War when the World had found itself in a twilight state that was neither war nor peace as these had been known in the past. Yet a still rising institutional tide of militarization had hardly begun to reach the English-speaking peoples before the psychological tide of martial-mindedness had begun to ebb in France.

The French psyche was, indeed, a psychological barometer on which the readings at successive dates of Western history since A.D. 1494 had been apt to give accurate forecasts of imminent rises and falls in the strength of martial feeling in the Western World as a whole. The progressive militarization of Western Christendom in the course of the four centuries beginning with a French King Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy had been registered in the French people’s change of mood from the peaceableness (perhaps due to their still lively memories of their sufferings in the Hundred Years War) that had been characteristic of a majority of the French people in the first chapter of this tragic story to the chauvinism that had come to be characteristic of a majority of them by the Napoleonic Age. This adventitious aggressive spirit in France had not been blunted by the horrors of the Grand Army’s retreat from Moscow in A.D. 1812 or by the experience of fighting on French soil in A.D. 1814 or even by the humiliatingly decisive defeat, at Waterloo in A.D. 1815, of a light-hearted attempt to reverse the military decision of the preceding year. Thereafter, the French had still had in them the spirit to seek psychological compensation for the loss of an abortive Napoleonic French empire in Europe by embarking in A.D. 1830 on the arduous aggressive military enterprise of conquering a substitute-empire in North-West Africa; and a French aggressiveness which had thus survived a chastisement with whips at Waterloo had required the sharper sting of a chastisement with scorpions at Sedan to make it wince and wilt. The nemesis of a Napoleon I’s militarism had not deterred French-

¹ Compulsion was suspended in Australia in A.D. 1929 and in New Zealand in A.D. 1930.

men of a later generation from placing their lives and fortunes in the hands of a Napoleon III; and, after having pandered to his subjects' still impenitently militaristic taste by leading them successively into a Roman adventure in A.D. 1849, a Russian adventure in A.D. 1854-6, an Austrian adventure in A.D. 1859, and a Mexican adventure in A.D. 1862-7, this second-rate practitioner of a dangerous trade had committed his country in A.D. 1870 to a Prussian adventure in which the agonies of the Hundred Years War had been concentrated within a Time-span of seven months. This terrible retribution upon France for a militarism to which her Government had been addicted since A.D. 1494, and her people since A.D. 1792, had been so shattering a psychological experience that French souls had never afterwards fully recovered from it.

Though in A.D. 1914 a conscript French national army had patriotically flown to arms to stem a fresh German invasion, and though for four years thereafter the French people had heroically endured casualties of a severity that was crushing for a country in which the population had ceased to increase, besides being grievous for millions of bereaved families, the French had emerged in A.D. 1918 from this deadly struggle for existence with a sharpened consciousness of having been caught by the malice or nemesis of History in a strategico-political position that was so perilously exposed that, sooner or later, it must prove untenable. History had condemned France in a post-Modern Age to have for her next-door neighbour a German national state that was at least as aggressive-minded as France had ever been at her worst, and that was now far more than a match for France in industrial war-potential, as well as in man-power. On the 11th November, 1918, the French had been aware that they would never have emerged on the winning side from a war with the Germany of that day if the combined strength of all the English-speaking peoples had not also been thrown into the anti-German scale; and from that moment onwards France's English-speaking allies and associates had started perversely to do their worst to break French hearts by serving public notice on France that she could not depend upon their being willing to come to her rescue again if the German peril were once more to loom up. In these cruelly unpropitious circumstances the French had entered an inter-war breathing-space in a mood of disillusionment and discouragement that had been registered in action eventually in France's collapse and capitulation in June 1940; and the ensuing passage of French history had been big with the future of the Western World as a whole.

The Vichyssois temper and régime had given a practical demonstration of a psychological process through which Nationalism, when carried to an extreme, could box the compass by turning into an equally extreme renunciation of a traditional will to maintain and assert a parochial sovereign independence. Frenchmen, responsible at the time for the government of their country, who, on the 16th June, 1940, had rejected with indignation Churchill's eleventh-hour offer of a voluntary political union on equal terms between a then all-but-conquered France and a then still unconquered United Kingdom, on the ground that this British offer was an insidious move to consummate the sacrifice of France for

the United Kingdom's benefit, did not rebel when, six days afterwards, on the 22nd June, they were required to sign an armistice which placed France at the mercy of a National Socialist Germany, and did not refuse, after that, to accede to German demands for French collaboration with Germany's continuing war-effort against a Britain who, till yesterday, had been France's ally, though a German victory over Great Britain would have extinguished France's last hope of ever being liberated from the German yoke to which she had bowed her neck. The ostensibly nationalist Vichysois slogan 'la France seule' was a euphemism for the unspeakable truth that France had placed herself at Germany's disposal and had accepted the shameful role of principal slave to a foreign tyrant nation that had attacked and conquered its neighbours in Continental Europe as a first step towards attacking and conquering the rest of the World with sinews of war that were to be reinforced thanks to the pliancy of Continental European victims who were to be bullied into becoming their German conquerors' accomplices.

It was true that a demoralized French nationalism would never have entered into a transaction of which it was manifestly ashamed if the alternative course demanded by a traditional standard of heroism had not been beyond the French people's powers of endurance under novel technological conditions of warfare which had keyed up a once familiar and tolerable ordeal to an unprecedented degree of severity; but this turn of a technological screw was not the whole explanation of the collapse of French *moral* that had declared itself in A.D. 1940. Part of the explanation also was that, for nationalist-minded souls, the psychological difficulty of acquiescing in the abrogation of a national sovereign independence by a foreign conqueror's exercise of an irresistible brute force was not so great as the psychological difficulty of taking the initiative in voluntarily surrendering some agreed part of the same national sovereign independence in order to enter into co-operation with people of other nations, on a footing of equality, in a loose confederation like the League of Nations or in a full federal union like the United States—and this though the difference between the respective effects of these two alternative ways of foregoing sovereignty was the extreme difference between purchasing security through co-operation and paying the penalty of subjection for the luxury of choosing the psychologically easier option of accepting a *fait accompli* imposed by *force majeure*.

The second factor that was reinforcing the effect of an advancing Technology in undermining a parochial patriotism was a victory of class-feeling over patriotism in a competition for precedence between two conflicting expressions of sectional corporate self-interest that were irreconcilable in the last resort. In a France that had been living under the régime of a *Front Populaire* from June 1936 to April 1938 a considerable portion of the middle class had apparently come, by A.D. 1940, to feel that the aggression of its working-class fellow-countrymen on a domestic front was a greater menace to the preservation of the middle class's most highly prized assets than the aggression, on an international front, of a Fascist Power which promised to protect a compliant French

bourgeoisie's private property as a *quid pro quo* for the abrogation of their country's national sovereignty.¹

If in France the Vichyssois policy and spirit had thus demonstrated that the experience of a First World War had made one once aggressively martial-minded Western nation willing to purchase peace 'at any price', the French people's British allies had been convicted of a willingness to purchase peace 'at almost any price'² by a policy and spirit of 'appeasement' (in a pejorative connotation of the word) that had been in the ascendant in Great Britain from the 18th September, 1931, when her inter-war temper had first been put to the test by the opening move in a new Japanese campaign of military aggression in the Far East, and the 10th May, 1940, when the British people had taken for their leader a statesman who had lost no time in putting their temper to the test again by his challenging offer to his countrymen of 'blood and toil and tears and sweat'³ as the price that must be paid for the United Kingdom's present survival and future victory.

From June 1940 to August 1945 the British people had paid as appallingly heavy a price for the purchase of an inestimably valuable spiritual treasure as the French people had paid in A.D. 1914-18; and in A.D. 1952, some seven years after their release from this supreme ordeal, it had still to be seen whether the ultimate psychological effect of a Second World War on British *moral* would or would not prove to have been the same as the effect of a First World War had proved to have been on French *moral*. Would British souls that had been willing to purchase peace 'at almost any price' rather than have to face a Second World War be found willing to purchase it 'at any price' if a third world war were to descend upon them? There were, after all, limits to Human Nature's powers of endurance, even in communities of the toughest moral fibre fortified by the most Spartan martial tradition. If the spirit of France had flinched in June 1940 at the prospect of having to face casualties in the field even heavier than the French casualties in A.D. 1914-18 and having to see the whole of her metropolitan territory overrun by a temporarily victorious enemy, how was the spirit of Britain likely to react to the prospect of seeing a congested island subjected to an intensive bombardment with guided atomic missiles which would do incomparably greater execution than the heaviest of the blows recently delivered by Göring's *Luftwaffe*?

The answer to this question was no foregone conclusion, and any future follower, German or Russian, in Hitler's footsteps would be inviting the fate that Hitler had brought on himself and his ambitions if, like Hitler, he were to gamble on the answer to the question turning

¹ Similarly, in a China that had been living under the régime of a Kuomintang during the years A.D. 1928-48, a considerable section of the industrial working class and even of the peasantry had apparently come, by A.D. 1948, to feel that the incompetence and corruption of this ruling clique of a Chinese *intelligentsia* was a greater evil than the hegemony of the Soviet Union under which they would be allowing their country to fall if they acquiesced in the liquidation of the Kuomintang régime by a Chinese Communist Party.

² 'Not peace at any price, but peace at almost any price' (Mr. Eden in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 25th June, 1937).

³ Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons at Westminster, 13th May, 1940.

out to be that the British no longer had any spirit left in them; yet, for all that, the question could not be denied a hearing in A.D. 1952; and the British people was not, of course, the only people in the World at this date about whom this importunate question had to be asked. If it was at least questionable whether a third world war would be endurable for the people of the United Kingdom, it was manifestly questionable *a fortiori* whether this tribulation would be endurable for Continental West European peoples who had undergone in the years A.D. 1940-5—and, in the Belgian, French, Italian, and Polish cases, in the years A.D. 1914-18 before that—an experience that was more harrowing, and very much more demoralizing, than the British people's ordeal of an aerial bombardment. These Continental West European victims of an inordinate German militarism had seen their countries partially or completely overrun and occupied by invading hostile armies, and they had found themselves at the mercy of an occupying alien enemy that had taken advantage of its power over them to distraint upon their material resources for the reinforcement of its own war effort against their surviving allies and to harness their energies to its own evil will by training upon them all the terrors of a post-Modern Western totalitarian police-state.

This institutional engine of militarism had been keyed up to a sinister efficiency on the home fronts of a Fascist Italy and a National-Socialist Germany; and, while in A.D. 1952 it was indisputably true that Western Europe as a whole had had its martial spirit damped by its devastating experiences since A.D. 1914, was this true without reservations of the two West European countries in which Fascist national governments had deliberately re-stoked the local fires of militarism after the First World War with the intention of profiting, in a Second World War, by a consequent marginal difference between the respective limits of their foreign victims' and their native instruments' capacity for continuing to stand the traditional test of an ordeal by battle? What had been the ultimate effect, on Italian and German souls, of the misdeeds that they had allowed their governments to require of them, and of the retribution that they had consequently allowed their governments to bring down upon their guilty heads? In what mood had the Italians emerged from the twenty-one years A.D. 1922-43, and the Germans from the twelve years A.D. 1933-45?

An observer in the year A.D. 1952 could predict with some assurance that the Italians would prove to have no more stomach for a Mussolinian militarism to which a majority of the nation had paid lip-service, not because they ever had it in them to go forth conquering and to conquer¹ any foreign people that was their match in technical equipment, but because they did not have in them the spirit to defy the will of a domestic tyrant from the Romagna. It was assuredly no accident that there was always an exceptionally strong local resistance to Fascism in a Piedmont that was also exceptional in being the one locality in a twentieth-century Italy that had preserved something of an earlier martial tradition. On this showing, it might be prophesied in A.D. 1952 that Italy would go the

¹ Rev. vi. 2.

same way as the rest of Western Europe. But could the same prophecy be made at the same date with the same confidence about Germany, where the traditional Prussian militarism that Hitler had stoked up to such incendiary effect manifestly had a far more wide-spread and far more tenacious hold on the souls of the people?

This question was one of grave concern to non-German West Europeans at a moment when, with their reluctant and half-hearted assent, the Americans were soliciting a German people that had attacked and overrun its neighbours twice in one lifetime to revive a martial tradition that, within living memory, had cost the rest of the World two world wars. At the time of writing, it was impossible to predict what the German response was going to be to a challenge presented to Germany by the current quarrel between the ex-victors in the latest of two wars that Germany had made and lost. Which of two features in the new situation would loom the larger in German eyes? The possibility for Germany of reacquiring political power by auctioning German military services to the higher bidder of the two parties that were now feverishly competing for so unquestionably valuable a military asset? Or the possibility of exposing herself to suffer a fate that would be even worse than the fate that she had brought upon herself in A.D. 1945, and indeed as bad as the fate that she had experienced in A.D. 1618-48, if she were now to become the battlefield of a war between foreign Powers by whom she had formerly been 'encircled'? On the morrow of the War of A.D. 1939-45 there were signs in Germany that some Germans, at any rate, had by this time had enough of sacrificing life, property, and conscience by submitting to serve as 'cannon-fodder' for successive German Governments to spend in successive wars of aggression ending in successive disastrous defeats; and the emergence of this mood in Germany after VE-Day, 1945, was, after all, something that was to be expected in the light of similar changes of heart which, at earlier dates, had come over other West European peoples who, in their day, had been addicted to Militarism no less strongly or persistently than the Germans.

The Germans' French victims, as we have already noticed, had lent themselves to Militarism for 376 years (A.D. 1494-1870), till they had been cured of it by a crushing German retort. A Swedish militarism that had been rampant since Gustavus Adolphus (*regnabat* A.D. 1611-32) had disembarked his expeditionary force on German soil on the 27-28th June, 1630, had been extinguished by a subsequent and consequent Swedish experience of being bled white by Charles XII (*regnabat* A.D. 1697-1718). A Spanish militarism that had been coeval with its French counterpart had evaporated after the Thirty Years War. "Therefore say: "Thus saith the Lord God: . . . I will put a new spirit within you; and I will take the stony heart out of their flesh and will give them an heart of flesh".¹ When this God-given change of heart had been vouchsafed, in recent Western experience, to the Spaniards and the Swedes and the French, it seemed unlikely that the Germans would be proof against an influence to which these other West European peoples had all yielded. Spanish, Swedish, and French hearts had been changed, sooner or later,

¹ Ezek. xi. 16 and 19.

by the experience of learning through suffering (*παθει μάθος*);¹ and since A.D. 1914 the Germans had received, in their repeated punishment for a repeated sin, a double measure of this sovereign spiritual education. 'Whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth',² was a timeless truth that held out hope for the conversion of the Germans in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era.

No doubt the non-German West Europeans, in their dealings with their German neighbours at this critical time, might, while putting their trust in God, still feel inclined, *en attendant*, to keep their powder dry.³ Yet, notwithstanding the openness of this question concerning Germany, by the year A.D. 1952 it looked as if, in a Western Europe which had already been put to the torment of a Second World War, dispirited nations and exasperated social classes had been reduced, by the combined operation of the psychological forces analysed above, to a temper in which their moral capacity to offer resistance to a world-conqueror would be at a minimum.

The Significance of Hitler's Bid for World-Dominion

The opportunity for political crime on an oecumenical scale which had been opened up by a recession of Militarism in Western Europe had indeed been visible to Hitler as early as the morrow of the First World War.

Hitler had perceived that, in a World whose peoples were all now miserably war-weary and war-shy, world-dominion might be the easy prize of any nation that could still be coaxed, duped, doped, or flogged by an audacious demagogue or despot into being one degree less unwarlike than its neighbours. 'In the realm of the blind the one-eyed man is king.' On the strength of this intuition Hitler had cold-bloodedly remilitarized Germany and then attacked Poland, four small West European countries, and France; and the sensationally successful results of these successive criminal acts had testified to the correctness of Hitler's calculations up to that point. The German people, for the second time in one lifetime, had duly allowed themselves, not only to be used by a German Government as instruments for the commission of an international crime, but to be induced to play this criminal role with all their heart, soul, mind, and strength;⁴ a Polish people that had remained exceptional in having lost nothing of its martial spirit had been overwhelmed by a German aggressor's crushing superiority on the plane of Military Technology; and the collapse of Hitler's West European victims had justified Hitler's thesis that, in the state of mind and feeling then prevalent in Western Europe, a small margin of superiority in martial spirit might earn for a boldly wicked aggressor a fabulous dividend in military conquests. Hitler was reported to have said, and this not in jest, that all good pacifists ought to wish him success because the con-

¹ Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, l. 177, quoted in this Study, *passim*.

² Heb. xii. 6.

³ 'Put your trust in God, my boys, and keep your powder dry' (Blacker, Valentine: *Oliver's Advice*).

⁴ Mark xii. 30.

centration of a monopoly of military and political power in Germany's hands was the only practical means, in the World as it was, of translating the ideals of Pacifism into reality. Hitler was, in truth, offering the World, at his own price, a commodity—freedom from fear of further world wars—of which Mankind stood in dire need, and for which they were therefore already prepared to pay dear.

In psychological principle, therefore, the business of world-conquest on which Hitler had embarked was as 'sound' as it was immoral; and, if in the event this would-be world-conqueror, so far from making Germany's and his own political fortune, brought down upon his Third Reich and upon himself a disaster that eclipsed the previous downfall of the Hohenzollern Reich and Dynasty, this was because Hitler was guilty of two fatal errors, of which the second, at any rate, might have been avoidable.

The builder of a Third Reich who had also been the creator of National Socialism had made the price of a *Pax Teutonica* so intolerably high in requiring submission to a Nazi German domination that, at the first glimmer of a prospect that this tyranny might ultimately be foiled and overthrown, resistance movements sprang up in even the tamest of the countries that Hitler's armies had overrun, while a British people which had allowed its governing class to practise 'appeasement' towards Japan, Italy, and Germany from A.D. 1931 to 1939 falsified the not irrational expectations that Hitler had founded on his observation of this decidedly un-martial and apparently persistent British temper by refusing to accept peace at Hitler's price even when the collapse and capitulation of France in A.D. 1940 had left Britain fighting on alone without any apparent prospect of staving off imminent defeat and subjugation.

Hitler's second fatal error was his abandonment of a hitherto brilliantly successful policy of administering his aggression to his victims in successive doses nicely calculated to be, each time, just not too large for a docile patient to swallow; and this error looks like a gratuitous one, since an historian cannot descry any contemporary change in the international situation that could have forced Hitler's hand in this crucial issue. By his seizure of Bohemia and Moravia on the night of the 15th-16th March, 1939, Hitler made it certain that, when he went on to attack Poland, he would find himself this time at war with Great Britain as well; by ensuring the belligerency of Great Britain, he converted a local war into a general war; by thus bringing on a general war, he ensured the eventual intervention of the United States (whatever assistance his Japanese accomplices might or might not eventually give in driving the United States into belligerency); and, by thus condemning Germany, sooner or later, to be smitten by the full force of an industrial war-potential in the United States that amounted to more than half the aggregate industrial war-potential of the whole World at the time, Hitler was condemning Germany to receive a knock-out blow. Moreover, as if this chain of inevitable and inevitably fatal consequences of a false step taken on the 15th March, 1939, was not enough to make sure of Hitler's frustrating his own purposes, he gratuitously attacked the Soviet Union

after he had failed to subdue Great Britain and had succeeded in moving the United States to convert herself into 'the arsenal of Democracy'.

It will be seen that Hitler's eventual failure to impose peace on the World by force of arms was due, not to any flaw in his thesis that the World was ripe for conquest, but to an accidental combination of incidental errors in his measures for putting into execution a nefarious grand design that, in itself, was a feasible scheme for profiting by a correctly diagnosed psychological situation. A twentieth-century World, that had thus, in A.D. 1933-45, been reprieved, thanks only to a chapter of lucky accidents, from a fate which Mankind's patently increasing defeatism and submissiveness had almost provocatively invited, could hardly count upon any future would-be world-conqueror's being so clumsy as to let the same easy prey escape for the second time by allowing himself to blunder in his turn into an Hitlerian combination of egregious errors; and, if a future follower in Hitler's footsteps was unlikely to make Hitler's mistakes, he could, on the other hand, be sure of profiting by his Nazi forerunner's pioneer work in clearing the ground for a successor to cultivate; for, in failing by so narrow a margin to win the prize of world-dominion for himself, Hitler had left the prize dangling within the reach of any successor capable of pursuing the same aim of world-conquest with a little more patience, prudence, and tact.

The yeoman service that Hitler had performed for some future architect of a *Pax Oecumenica* was his historic achievement of forcing an oecumenical society that had already been devastated by one world war to inflict upon itself, within the lifetime of the generation that had been smitten by that shattering catastrophe, a Second World War that had brought still more grievous tribulations upon the World at large, and especially upon Europe. An Hitlerian 'revolution of destruction'¹ was an irrevocably accomplished fact by the time when Hitler came to grief; and the collapse of all Hitler's designs for the aggrandizement of Germany left this negative result of his criminal career intact. In A.D. 1952 it was manifest that, in failing to win world-dominion for his own abortive Third German Reich, Hitler had bequeathed, to any successor with the ability to take advantage of this opportunity, the legacy that Assyria had bequeathed to the Achaemenidae, Ts'in She Hwang-ti to Han Liu Pang, and Pompey and Caesar to Augustus.² Hitler, finding the peoples of a twentieth-century Westernizing World already psychologically devastated by the experience of one world war, had left them more than doubly devastated by a more harrowing repetition of the same experience within the same lifetime. A field that in A.D. 1914-18 had been scored by trenches and pitted with shell-holes had been ploughed up by bulldozers and effaced by bomb-craters in A.D. 1939-45. An *Oikoumenê* that in August 1914 had been under cultivation as a chequer-board of national allotments had now become a waste-land open to a unitary occupation. For a post-Hitlerian empire-builder, Hitler's derelict legacy was a gift of the Gods.

¹ Rauschnig, H.: *Germany's Revolution of Destruction*, English translation (London 1939, Heinemann).

² See V. vi. 186-7.

The Temper generated by Militarization in the Non-Western Peasantry

At the time of writing, it could not be foreseen whether, after a failure for which Hitler had paid with his reputation as well as with his life, other adventurers would embark on an enterprise in which the magnitude of the risk was proportionate to that of the prize that would be the reward of success. It could, however, already be foreseen that, if Hitler did have successors, their calculations, like his, would largely turn on estimates of the marginal differences in the degree in which vestiges of a martial spirit still survived in the hearts of the divers peoples of a world in which a traditional heroism was everywhere being called in question by the revolutionary psychological effect of technological changes. For the purposes of our own present inquiry into the prospects of the Western Civilization at this date, we may find it illuminating to take our stand in a hypothetical post-Hitlerian aggressor's observation-post and try to read, through his eyes, a psychological map of the contemporary *Oikoumenê* on which the aggressor may be imagined to have plotted out, for his purposes, the local differences in the degree of the defeatism and submissiveness that he can count upon in the hearts of his intended instruments and victims.

In attempting such a psychological survey, we have to bear it in mind that even the most judicious aggressor might be prone to fall to some extent into Hitler's error of over-estimating the lengths to which he could go with impunity. Even in an Atomic Age, traditional virtues and ideals might be expected to die hard when, like martial valour and like patriotism, they had in them the momentum of a five-or-six-thousand-years-long tradition. In setting our standard of expectation in regard to the prospective behaviour of a Westernizing World in the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, we shall be wise to recall such pertinent historical precedents as, for example, the alacrity with which, in 522 B.C., some of the peoples that had been passed under Assyria's harrow seized an opportunity—offered by the assassination of an occupant of the Achaemenian imperial throne who was the last legitimate representative of the Cyran Achaemenid line if he was not an impostor—to plunge their world into anarchy again and expose themselves once more to all the horrors suffered by their forebears in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., in the hope of depriving themselves of the dearly bought blessings of a *Pax Achaemenia* and resubjecting themselves to the curse of a now manifestly anachronistic parochial sovereign independence. With this cautionary tale in our minds we may perhaps venture on a tentative appraisal of the diversities in the temper of the divers peoples of a Westernizing World on the morrow of its Second World War. Manifestly the crucial question here was whether the martial spirit which had been ebbing out of Western Europe had evaporated or had migrated to other regions of the *Oikoumenê*.

The second of these two possibilities required consideration because, by A.D. 1952, it had become clear that the thirty-eight years which had now passed since the outbreak of the First World War in A.D. 1914 had brought to pass a dramatically complete inversion, not only of Western

Europe's previous temper, but also of her corresponding previous role. A region out of which one wave of aggression at the heels of another had been surging up indefatigably and travelling to the uttermost parts of the Earth for some four centuries and a quarter, ending in A.D. 1914, had now become the battlefield of a World which, in that now past chapter of history, Western Europe had been knitting up with herself by innumerable acts of economic, political, and cultural victimization; and this recent revolution in Western Europe's strategico-political situation was one of the experiences that had made the mood of her inhabitants apprehensive and conciliatory instead of confident and truculent. This reversal of fortunes and feelings in Western Europe, which had become manifest to all politically conscious West Europeans, and indeed to all their politically conscious contemporaries, by A.D. 1952, had been perceptible on the morrow of the First World War to the sensitive spirit of a French man of letters in the light of his own people's tragic experience and limpid intelligence.

'Un frisson extraordinaire a couru la moelle de l'Europe. Elle a senti, par tous ses noyaux pensants, qu'elle ne se reconnaissait plus, qu'elle cessait de se ressembler, qu'elle allait perdre conscience — une conscience acquise par des siècles de malheurs supportables, par des milliers d'hommes du premier ordre, par des chances géographiques, ethniques, historiques, innombrables. . . .

'L'Europe va-t-elle garder sa prééminence dans tous les genres? L'Europe deviendra-t-elle *ce qu'elle est en réalité*, c'est-à-dire: un petit cap du continent asiatique? Ou bien l'Europe restera-t-elle *ce qu'elle paraît*, c'est-à-dire: la partie précieuse de l'univers terrestre, la perle de la sphère, le cerveau d'un vaste corps? . . .

'La balance qui penchait de notre côté, quoique nous paraissions plus légers, commence à nous faire doucement remonter — comme si nous avions sottement fait passer dans l'autre plateau le mystérieux appoint qui était avec nous. *Nous avons étourdiement rendu les forces proportionnelles aux masses!* . . . Notre science — devenue moyen de puissance, moyen de domination concrète, excitant de la richesse, appareil d'exploitation du capital planétaire — cesse d'être une "fin en soi" et une activité artistique. . . . L'utilité du savoir fait du savoir une *denrée* qui . . . se préparera sous des formes de plus en plus maniables ou comestibles; elle se distribuera à une clientèle de plus en plus nombreuse; elle deviendra chose du commerce, chose enfin qui s'imité et se produit un peu partout. . . . Donc, *la classification des régions habitables du monde tend à devenir telle que la grandeur matérielle brute, les éléments de statistique, les nombres — population, superficie, matières premières — déterminent enfin exclusivement ce classement des compartiments du globe.* . . .

'Le phénomène de la mise en exploitation du globe, le phénomène de l'égalisation des techniques et le phénomène démocratique, qui font prévoir une *diminutio capitis* de l'Europe, doivent-ils être pris comme décisions absolues du destin? Ou avons-nous quelque liberté *contre* cette menaçante conjuration des choses? C'est peut-être en cherchant cette liberté qu'on la crée.¹

On the morrow of a Second World War that had harrowed Western

¹ Valéry, Paul: 'La Crise de l'Esprit', in *Variété* (Paris 1924, Gallimard, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française), pp. 13-14, 24, 30, 29, 30, and 32.

Europe far more cruelly than the War of A.D. 1914-18, it was evident that this cradle of the Western Civilization had indeed been overtaken by the fate that, on the morrow of the First World War, Paul Valéry had still been hoping against hope to see her succeed in keeping at bay. The knack of using the products and copying the procedures of a West European technology had by now been effectively acquired by other inhabitants of an *Oikoumené* which had been unified by a secular movement of West European aggression; and, on the fringes of a world of which Western Europe had been the heart, a successfully propagated West European technique could command the brute force of an area of territory, a volume of non-human natural resources, and a head of population that this technique had never had, and would never have, at its disposal in the hands of its West European originators.

What use were Western Europe's pupils going to make of the power which their painful education had now placed in their hands? The wave of militarization, whose course since A.D. 1494 we have already traced within the narrow limits of Western Europe, had not come to rest at an expanding Western World's original boundaries or slackened the pace of its advance because the native Western peoples who had first set it travelling were now becoming war-weary as a consequence of having continued to indulge in recurrent bouts of warfare for more than four and a half centuries. Since the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era this ever advancing wave of militarization on Western lines had engulfed one after another of the once autonomous non-Western societies that had been drawn successively into an expanding Western Civilization's ambit; and in each case the introduction of this alien Western institutional process had had the same consequence as it had been having in the West since the opening of the overture to the current Western series of war-and-peace cycles. In the Western World at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the West European peasantry, with a few small local exceptions, had, as we have seen,¹ been strangers to the bearing of arms, and War had been the business of either a foreign mercenary infantry and light horse or a native feudal heavy cavalry; but we have also seen² that, since the General War of A.D. 1494-1525, there had been a sustained series of moves in all militant Western states to substitute native troops for foreign troops in all arms, conscripts for volunteers, and a universal compulsory service imposed on the whole population, without distinction between classes, for an earlier selective compulsory service in which the peasantry had been made to bear the brunt of the burden. These effects of modern militarization in the Western World itself were reproduced when the wave of militarization on Western lines spread to the once autonomous societies that were being swept into a Western net.

In these originally non-Western societies, as in the Western World itself in the past, the peasantry had as a rule been non-militant. The principal public service that had been required of them by their rulers had been to provide, out of their production of food and fibres, for the feeding and clothing of relatively small fighting forces consisting of

¹ On pp. 491-2, above.

² On pp. 492-4, above.

specialists for whom the bearing of arms at the public expense had been, not a *corvée*, but a privilege. These fighting forces might be recruited from transfrontier barbarians, such as the Gurkhas and Pathans who had served in the British Indian Army,¹ the Mongol bannermen, both tribal and professional,² who had been employed by the Manchu régime in China, or the Egyptian Mamlûks of Eurasian Nomad or Caucasian highlander origin; they might be recruited from members of some alien civilization, like the British troops employed by the British Rāj in India, the Iranian Muslim troops employed by these British empire-builders' Timurid Mughal predecessors,³ the Abyssinian Monophysite Christian mercenaries employed by the Muslim states in the Deccan which the Timurids eventually swallowed up,⁴ or the Egyptian Mamlûks of Georgian Orthodox Christian origin; they might be recruited from the descendants of conquerors, drawn from one or other of the two external sources above mentioned, who had made themselves at home in the country, like the Manchu bannermen in China⁵ or like the Rājput heavy cavalry of Hun and Gurjara origin who served the Mughal Raj as *foederati*, the Marāthā light horse of Saka origin who became the vanguard of an anti-Mughal Hindu counter-offensive, and the Jāt and Doghra fighting men, likewise of Saka origin, who became the backbone of a Sikh Khālsā; or they might be recruited from a feudal class of indigenous origin, like the Japanese Samurai. Examples of professional troops recruited from a native peasantry are rare in the antediluvian chapters of the histories of the non-Western civilizations that were swamped by a Western deluge and whose military systems were consequently revolutionized by the impact of Western arms and influences. The highly selective compulsory levy of boys from the Orthodox Christian peasantry of the Ottoman Empire, which eventually became the principal source of recruitment for the Pādishāh's Slave-Household,⁶ is one historic case of the kind; the enlistment of extramural Chinese volunteers in the professional banners of the Manchu Imperial Army⁷ is another. The Streltsy ('Archers') raised by Ivan IV (*dominabatur* A.D. 1533-47; *imperabat* A.D. 1547-84) were Muscovite counterparts of the contemporary Janissaries.

With these three institutionally notable, but numerically inconsiderable, exceptions, the peasantry in the non-Western societies, like the peasantry in the Western World at the dawn of a Modern Age of Western military history, had, as the foregoing summary indicates, for the most part not been permitted, and *a fortiori* not been compelled, to bear arms before the military institutions of these non-Western societies were revolutionized, one after another, by the Western Civilization's impact. In all these encounters with the West except the Hindu World's and Russian Orthodox Christendom's, the impact did not occur on the military plane until after an English Industrial Revolution had begun to make

¹ See VI. vii. 330-1.

² See VI. vii. 332.

³ See VI. vii. 126-7.

⁴ *Honoris causā* we may cite the loyalty of the Abyssinian commandant of Asirgarh in Khāndāsh, who committed suicide rather than surrender the fortress to Akbar in A.D. 1600 (see Smith, V. A.: *Akbar the Great Mogul*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1919, Clarendon Press), pp. 278-80).

⁵ See VI. vii. 128-9.

⁶ See III. iii. 37, n. 1.

⁷ See VI. vii. 129.

universal compulsory military service an economically practical possibility,¹ and until after this possibility had been translated into a portentous accomplished fact in the fateful French *levée en masse* of A.D. 1792; and therefore everywhere, except in Russia and India, the effect of the introduction of Western military institutions was to militarize *en masse* at one stroke, without any transitional phase of selective conscription, a peasantry that had been non-militant up to that moment.

The Petrine Russian Army was exceptional in passing first through the phase of selective conscription, which was the system in vogue in the eighteenth century in the armies of the Continental European Western states, before following a French lead into the subsequent Western system of universal conscription. As for the British Indian Army, it remained a select professional force of the eighteenth-century Western type in its method of recruitment, and a force of privileged specialists of the pre-Western type in its sources of recruitment, until it passed out of British control upon its transfer in A.D. 1947 to the Governments of the British Indian Empire's Indian and Pakistani successor-states. Throughout the British chapter of its history the Indian Army continued to be recruited by voluntary enlistment and to be composed of troops drawn partly from transfrontier barbarians and partly from the so-called martial communities of barbarian origin in India itself. Its mainstays were the Jāts, Doghras, and other breeds of Panjābī manhood which, in the ranks of an early-nineteenth-century Sikh Army organized on Western lines by ex-Napoleonic Western officers,² had been the latest, and sole formidable, Indian antagonists of the British in a competition of all against all for the Mughal Empire's heritage.

The British Indian Army was perhaps the most conservative, as well as the most efficient, of the non-Western fighting forces that had been reorganized on a Western new model; yet, even in this decidedly old-fashioned military institution, the necessity of 'Indianizing' the cadres as a preliminary to handing the Army over to indigenous Indian successor-states of an abdicating British Rāj had been taken as an opportunity for making a breach in the traditional practice of recruiting the personnel almost exclusively from certain privileged communities.³ In the cadres from which, between the years A.D. 1918 and A.D. 1947, the previous British personnel was progressively withdrawn,⁴ the replacements were

¹ Professor William McNeill comments: 'There are real economic obstacles to the militarization of the World's peasantry. Where can a peasant country get modern arms? It takes at least a generation to establish an industry capable of producing them locally; and conditions for reduplication of the Russian *tour de force* cannot be assumed to be present in countries like India and China necessarily or, I should say, even probably.'

In A.D. 1952 the answer seemed to be that the peasantry could get arms from one or other of the two industrially potent Super-Powers that were competing, at this time, for the peasantry's allegiance. A North Korean, Continental Chinese, and Communist Annamese peasant soldiery was being armed from an 'arsenal of Communism' in the Soviet Union, while a South Korean, Formosan Chinese, and anti-Communist Annamese peasant soldiery was being armed from an 'arsenal of Democracy' in the United States.

² See IX. viii. 731.

³ As late as A.D. 1930 divers communities domiciled in the Panjāb were still providing 54 per cent. of the combatant troops in the British Indian Army (see *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, vol. i, Survey (London 1930, H.M. Stationery Office = Cmd. 3568), p. 96, and the instructive map of India facing this page).

⁴ In A.D. 1923 a decision had been taken to 'Indianize' five infantry battalions, two cavalry regiments, and one pioneer unit; in A.D. 1932 the decision was taken to 'Indianize'

no longer made solely from those indigenous Indian communities that had previously shared with alien British officers the privilege of manning their country's fighting force. Steps were deliberately taken to ensure that the elimination of the British element from a force that had hitherto been virtually an Anglo-Panjābī preserve should not have the effect of making it a Panjābī monopoly, at the risk of saddling India with a Panjābī Rāj—or pair of Panjābī successor-states, one Hindu and one Muslim—in place of a British Rāj. Pains were taken to make certain that indigenous Indian candidates for commissions should be drawn from all over the country, and the same new policy was applied to the recruitment of other ranks. The pace of this transformation of the Indian Army was greatly accelerated in the course of the Indian Army's expansion during the Second World War. In consequence, the militarization of India had entered, by A.D. 1947, on the same stage that the militarization of Russia had reached in the eighteenth century. Though the peasantry had not yet been subjected to a military service that was either compulsory or universal, their enrolment, by voluntary recruitment, in an army that had previously been a preserve for traditionally martial communities, indigenous and foreign, had set the Indian peasant's feet on the military road which the Russian peasant's feet had begun to tread after the way had been cleared in Russia by Peter's destruction of the Streltsy in A.D. 1698-9.¹

This militarization of a previously non-militant peasantry, which had thus begun in Russia in A.D. 1699 and in India in A.D. 1918, had also been taking place in other quarters of the World. There is no need to retell in this place a story that has already been told in previous contexts.² It will suffice to recall that the militarization of the peasantry had been put in hand in Egypt after the destruction of the Mamlūks in A.D. 1811; in Turkey after the destruction of the Janissaries in A.D. 1826; in Japan after the voluntary abdication of the indigenous feudal lords (the *daimyō*) and their indigenous military retainers (the *samurai*) in A.D. 1868-9; in China after the deposition of the Manchu Dynasty, and disbanding of the Manchu Imperial banner regiments, in A.D. 1911; in Korea after her annexation by Japan in A.D. 1910. In the present context the only further observation that has to be made is that this revolutionary militarization of the peasantry had not been confined to the Old World. An eighteenth century that had seen the Russian peasant inducted into selective military service on the contemporary West European pattern had seen in Paraguay the warlike traditions of the *ci-devant* barbarian Guaraní reanimated by the policy of resourceful Jesuit philosopher-kings who had been prompted by their benevolence to make this pro-

one division of all arms and one cavalry brigade; and in the October of the latter year an Indian Military Academy for the training of Indian officers was opened at Dehra Dun; but the beginnings of the 'Indianization' of the British Indian Army went back to the last year of the First World War. From A.D. 1918 onwards a small number of vacancies in the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst had been thrown open to Indian candidates, and, from A.D. 1928 onwards, vacancies had also been offered at Woolwich (the training institute for the British Royal Engineers and Artillery) and at Cranwell (the training institute for the British Royal Air Force). In A.D. 1931 the number of vacancies offered to Indian candidates at Sandhurst had been ten, while at Woolwich it had been three.

¹ See III. iii. 282, n. 1.

² In VI. vii. *passim* and IX. viii. *passim*.

vision for the defence of their Reductions against marauding *Mamelucos* from Brazil;¹ and, after the break-up of the Spanish Empire of the Indies into a score of mutually hostile successor-states, the forgotten wars which the Guaranís had fought in the seventeenth century as soldiers of the Society of Jesus, and in an earlier age as barbarian invaders of an Andean Empire of the Four Quarters, had been refought in the nineteenth century in Paraguay's deadly single-handed war of A.D. 1864-70 against the combined forces of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, and in the twentieth century in her duel with Bolivia in A.D. 1930-35 for possession of the Gran Chaco. In Mexico, again, since the revolution in A.D. 1910 against an oligarchy of Creole Spanish and other alien origin, the descendants of once martial Toltecs and Chichimecs had exercised themselves, like a previously non-militant Chinese peasantry since the revolution in A.D. 1911 against a Manchu 'ascendancy', in chronic civil wars which had been 'undecisive', though unfortunately not 'temperate', contests.

This widespread militarization of a hitherto primitive and, for the most part, pacific peasantry, that, mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, still accounted for some three-quarters of the living generation of Mankind, was an event that could hardly fail, in the long run, to have some decisive effect on the destinies of a Westernizing World. Its most impressive feature was one that was manifestly pregnant with alternative possibilities, good and evil. In almost every case, these hitherto unmilitary peasants had no sooner been drilled and armed according to the latest Western fashion than they had astonished the World by defeating, and this with ease, old-fashioned warriors of the traditional type who had hitherto taken it for granted that the peasants were of no military account.

The Egyptian fallāhīn, who had been subjugated, oppressed, exploited, and despised by an interminable series of martial alien conquerors, proved their mettle by breaking the resistance of the Moreots, in those wild highlanders' native mountain lairs, in A.D. 1825, only one year after Mehmed 'Alī had begun to draft the fallāhīn in any appreciable numbers into his new-model army,² and some two thousand years after they had given their latest previous proof of a capacity to make good soldiers when, in the service of another Macedonian master of their country, Egyptian peasant phalangites had defeated Greek peasant phalangites in pitched battle at Raphia in 217 B.C.³ This twice-performed achievement of the peasantry of Egypt had been capped by the peasantry of Japan when in A.D. 1877, only four years after the implementation in A.D. 1873⁴ of the conscription law of A.D. 1870,⁵ they had put down an insurrection of a dissident faction of the *samurai* of the self-assertive fief of Satsuma⁶ against a Meiji régime that had been inaugurated in A.D. 1868-9.

The prowess of these Japanese peasant conscript soldiers in this early ordeal is the more noteworthy considering that, in A.D. 1873, they had

¹ See O'Neill, S.J., George: *Golden Years on the Paraguay: A History of the Jesuit Missions from 1600 to 1767* (London 1934, Burns Oates), pp. 89-91.

² See IX. viii. 242, n. 4.

³ See V. v. 68, with n. 1.

⁴ See Sansom, G. B.: *The Western World and Japan* (London 1950, Cresset Press), p. 342.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 339 and 342.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 347-50.

shown a distinct reluctance and apprehension¹ upon their receipt of the summons to take up a military calling from which they had been jealously excluded for at least a thousand years past, and considering further that, in the event, the first enemy whom they had been called upon to face in the field had been a war-band of those indigenous Japanese feudal warriors whom the Japanese peasant had been taught sedulously, throughout those last thousand years, to revere as his legitimate and invincible lords and masters. Even the parvenu element in a British Indian Army had had time, before the transfer of the *rāj* in A.D. 1947, to demonstrate, by gallant conduct in the General War of A.D. 1939-45, that it, too, had military virtue in it which, through the long age of inhibition, had been awaiting, undamped, the first opportunity to declare itself. For example, a Bihar Regiment, raised in A.D. 1941-2,² and a Madras Regiment, reformed in A.D. 1942, both distinguished themselves on the Burma front in warfare that was perhaps the severest ordeal to which any troops engaged in this Second World War were subjected in any theatre of operations.

The beneficial consequence of the peasant conscript's prompt and conclusive success in proving himself in action to be the traditional privileged warrior's military peer was the gain won by each of these military demonstrations for the civil cause of social justice. One of the conspicuous moral shortcomings of Civilization during the first five or six thousand years of its currency had been its endowment of a small minority with material and spiritual treasures at the expense of a large majority whose own share in the fruits of the whole body social's co-operative labours had been as inequitably inadequate as the minority's share had been inequitably excessive.³ This moral flaw had reappeared in the histories of all the civilizations that had risen and fallen since the breakdown of the Egyptian Civilization in the Age of the Pyramid-Builders;⁴ so long as the flaw was allowed to persist, the institution of Civilization would remain morally unsound; and, in an aeon in which Mankind in Process of Civilization had not yet succeeded in extricating itself from the practice of War, it would perhaps have been too much to hope that a *misera plebs contribuens* should succeed in securing a long-since overdue modicum of social justice without having first vindicated its claim in an ordeal by battle. Nevertheless, it could be argued in A.D. 1952, on the evidence of disconcerting events, that militarization had by then already proved in practice to have been too high a price to pay for an approach towards egalitarianism. The course of Japanese history since A.D. 1877 aptly illustrated this point; for, while, on the one hand, the Japanese conscript peasant army instituted in the Meiji Era had proved to be the one effective institution for securing a minimum of social justice for a still conspicuously depressed majority in a Japanese Society that had continued,

¹ See Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

² The First Bihar Regiment came into existence on the 15th September, 1941, when the Eleventh Battalion of the Nineteenth Hyderabad Regiment was converted into a regular battalion and redesignated. This was the first time that aborigines were recruited into the Indian Army. The Second Battalion of the Bihar Regiment was raised on the 1st December, 1942, at Agra. Fifty per cent. of its recruits were from the aboriginal forest hill tribes of Chota Nagpur.

³ See pp. 489, above, and p. 561, below.

⁴ See I. i. 141-2.

in the main, to be authoritarian and oligarchic, this self-same Japanese conscript peasant army had been employed during the same period as an instrument of military aggression against Japan's neighbours by a Westernizing régime in Japan which had been unable or unwilling to think of any better device for raising the standard of living of a depressed peasantry within the national frontiers than the method—long since condemned by the judgement of History, but not yet discredited in human consciences—of taking tribute by force of arms from a still more deeply depressed peasantry in foreign parts.

An historian, contemplating this evil consequence—exemplified in recent Japanese history—of the success with which the peasant majority of Mankind was being militarized on Western lines, could find no comfort in the fact that an aggressive Militarism, evoked by this institutional process of militarization, had carried its Japanese addicts into disaster in A.D. 1945 in a military adventure in which a new-model military machine was being perversely used by its makers for the morally indefensible purpose of trying to raise the peasantry's standard of living in one country at the rest of the World's expense by force of arms; for in this case, as in others, Militarism had not recoiled upon its authors until after it had enabled them to inflict monstrous injury on Society at large. If the observer was to gauge the probable effects of the militarization of the peasantry upon a Westernizing World's prospects, he had to ask himself whether the hatching of Militarism from militarization, which had been the sequel to the history of militarization on Western lines in Japan, appeared to be the rule or the exception in a Westernizing World's current history.

There were, no doubt, here and there, peasant populations that could be militarized with impunity. The Egyptian peasant conscript army was perhaps a case in point; for the promise—or menace—implicit in the inaugural victory that it had won in an offensive campaign against the Moreots in A.D. 1825 had been belied by its signal failures to suppress the Mahdī Muhammad Ahmad's insurrection in the Sūdān in A.D. 1883–5 and to expel the Zionists from Palestine in A.D. 1948–9.¹ Thus in Egypt the militarization of the local peasantry bade fair to be as innocuous as it had been in the Kingdom of Naples.²

Was it this Egyptian experience or was it the Japanese experience that was to be taken as an index of the effect of militarization on the temper of the non-Western peasantry as a whole? At a moment when a North Korean and a Chinese conscript peasant army were fighting side by side

¹ The Egyptian Army crossed the Egypto-Palestinian frontier on the 15th May, 1948; an armistice agreement between the Egyptian and Israeli governments was signed on the 25th February, 1949.

² The significance of a conscript Egyptian peasant army's on the whole inglorious record is underlined by Professor William McNeill in the following comment: 'Among some peoples the psychological obstacles to militarization are tremendous. A nation without military traditions presents very refractory material. Egyptian fallāhs and Porto Rican jibaros are two cases, and some of the Indian peoples—the Bengalis, for example—must be similar. The military virtues cannot be called into existence at will, yet are very useful if an army is to fight effectively.' The military virtues can, however, manifest themselves spontaneously when they are given a chance, as is demonstrated by the records of the Bihar and Madras regiments of the Indian Army in the Second World War (see p. 510, above); and this Indian evidence is no less pertinent than the Egyptian evidence.

against a composite Western expeditionary force in a Korean theatre of military operations, while a Russian conscript peasant army in reserve was standing to arms both in Eastern Siberia and in Eastern Germany, it was evident that the temper and capacity of troops of this type would count for much in the shaping of a Westernizing World's destinies. What light was thrown on the peasant-soldier's qualities by his past performance? History indicated that, as might have been expected *a priori*, he was at his strongest in military situations calling for the exercise of the passive military virtues. He was stronger in endurance than in initiative, and stronger in defending his own country against an invader than in playing the invader's part himself.

In the history of a Westernized Russian peasant army, which was older, by more than a century, than other armies of the kind, the glorious passages, up to date, had all taken the form of ultimately successful wars of defence fought on Russian soil against an invader who, in the first phase of the war, had been apt to carry all before him. This had been the story of the Northern War of A.D. 1700-21, in which Peter the Great's callow peasant army had won its spurs in A.D. 1709 at Poltava, in the Ukraine, against Charles XII's far-ranging Swedes; the story of the foiling of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in A.D. 1812; and the story of the foiling of Hitler's invasion in A.D. 1940-4, when, in November 1942, the tide had been turned at the approaches to Stalingrad. On the other hand, in the Russo-Turkish wars of A.D. 1828-9 and A.D. 1877-8, in which the Tsar, by assuming Charles XII's and Napoleon's aggressive role, had thrust the Westernized Russian peasant army's classic defensive role upon this army's feebler Turkish counterpart, the noteworthy feature, on each occasion, had been, not Russia's victory in the second year's campaign, but her failure to overcome Turkey's resistance in the first campaigning season.

The extent of a nineteenth-century Russia's superiority over a nineteenth-century Turkey in military resources, as well as in experience of waging war on Western lines, had made an ultimate Russian victory a foregone conclusion in any trial of strength between the two Powers in that age; the length of the time that it had taken Russia, in both wars, to win her inevitable victory, and the heaviness of the price that she had found herself compelled to pay for it, had given the measure in which a conscript peasant army's *moral* and efficiency were apt to depreciate when this military instrument was transferred from the defensive role in which it felt itself at home to an aggressive role which it was accustomed to associate, not with glorious victories won by its own arms, but with shameful defeats incurred by enemy invaders of a patriot peasantry's own country. The beau rôle of offering a patriotic resistance to an invader was the moral advantage that had inspired a Turkish conscript peasant army to give so good an account of itself, against such heavy odds, in otherwise desperately adverse circumstances. A newly enrolled Turkish peasant-soldiery's achievement in the campaign of A.D. 1828, when it had succeeded in preventing the Russian Army from crossing the Balkan Range, had been particularly meritorious, considering that Sultan Mahmūd II had not been able to make any serious progress with the

organization of his new-model army until after the destruction of the Janissaries on the 15th June, 1826.

The same conclusions emerge from the history of a Chinese conscript peasant army organized on Western lines since the overthrow of the Manchu régime in A.D. 1911. After twenty years devoted to preliminary domestic exercises in civil wars, the Chinese peasant-soldier had won his spurs in his stubborn defence of an area in Greater Shanghai against a Japanese assault from the 28th January to the 3rd March, 1932.¹ In psychology as well as in strategy this campaign had been reminiscent of the Russo-Turkish wars of A.D. 1828-9 and A.D. 1877-8, and it had been prophetic of China's ultimate victory over Japan in a defensive war on a sub-continental scale that was to drag on from A.D. 1937 to A.D. 1945. At Shanghai in A.D. 1932, as in the Balkans in the nineteenth century, the moral victory had been won by the belligerent who had managed by sheer endurance to postpone the hour of a defeat which he knew to be ultimately inevitable owing to the odds being overwhelmingly in his antagonist's favour, while this ultimate victor had been humiliated by having to take so long, and pay so high, to overcome the resistance of an antagonist who was notoriously not his match.

If a non-Western peasant-soldiery that had proved itself so stalwart in wars in defence of its own hearths and homes had thus been found to lose so much of its spirit when it was led into wars of aggression on foreign soil, was not this an historical fact that was of good augury for Mankind's prospects? Did it not mean that, though the non-Western World had been following Western Europe along the road of militarization, there might nevertheless be some hope that the baneful rankling of militarization into Militarism, which had been the ruin of Western Europe, might not, after all, be the destiny of the World at large? Any Western observer who might be tempted to look to this consideration for comfort in A.D. 1952 would have been wise to temper his optimism by reminding himself that the quality in the non-Western peasantry which had made it possible to drill them so easily into becoming, for the most part, such unexpectedly good soldiers was a habit which would also impel them unquestioningly to obey the word of command, even when this bade them advance gloomily to the attack instead of bidding them stand cheerfully on the defensive. The soldierly trait in this peasantry's traditional ethos was an ingrained habit of submissiveness imprinted by an immemorially old experience of living in a state of serfdom on the verge of starvation; and a submissiveness that had not availed to beget a fighting-man when it had been mated with militarization in the soul of an Egyptian fallāh had borne a dragon's-tooth crop in the soul of this Egyptian peasant's Korean cousin.

A Western historian who, *en route* from Pusan to Seoul on the 15th November, 1929, has seen nothing in the Korean peasants, visible from his railway-carriage window, except a pathetic submissiveness mated with a comic unpracticality, had lived to chide himself, twenty-three years later, for having left out of account, in committing himself to that

¹ See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1932* (London 1933, Milford), pp. 480-95.

ill-judged appraisal, the combination of martial prowess and technological resourcefulness through which those ineffective-looking Koreans' indomitable forebears had once countered and defeated a Japanese assault upon their country in the Korean-Japanese War of A.D. 1592-8. This admonitory testimony of Korean history had been ignored by the Western traveller in A.D. 1929, as his own words now rose against him to testify.

'[The] inaudible music of the Korean landscape [this traveller had written in A.D. 1929] was not the serene and triumphant "music of the spheres"'. It was an elegy in a minor key—a dirge over a country that was in the autumn of its days. The rhythm was repeated in the movements of the little people who were working conscientiously but languidly in the fields or creeping along the roads. The little men and little women were all dressed in white—appropriately to the country's mood, since white in the East is usually the colour of mourning, yet in a manner obviously quite unsuitable for the day's work. In other countries the husbandman girds up his loins for the combat with Nature. But nobody could possibly gird up those voluminous white robes; and what hours the women must spend in washing out of them the mud imparted daily by those terraced fields in which their wearers laboured! The last touch of quaintness was given by the men's diminutive top-hats of black glazed gauze which were held in position on the crown of the head by a ribbon tied under the chin. . . . Yes, the poor Koreans were a joke. . . .

'Look at this scene at a country railway station where . . . the local Japanese colony is seeing off the Japanese police-commandant and his lady. . . . Where . . . are the Koreans? For there is nobody visible on this Korean platform except the Japanese colony and ourselves. O, there they are, a whole crowd of them, herded behind a barrier in the background. The expression on their pathetic faces was not even faintly resentful. It was wholly submissive. And, as I glanced from one row of faces to the other, I felt as if I were a spectator of some comedy of manners, with the Japanese playing "empire-builders" and the Koreans "ryots" or "fallāhīn". So the Koreans were Japan's Bengalis! And I could scarcely suppress an unmannerly guffaw as I suddenly thought of a colony of ants bearing sway over their insect-cattle.'¹

The wayfaring Occidental Philistine who had written these patronizing words in A.D. 1929 had it is true, also written, in the same context, that a 'ghostly music, audible all the time to the inward sense, would not allow one to forget that', besides being a joke, the Koreans 'were a tragedy'; and, in the light of an obvious analogy between Japanese rule in Korea and a British Rāj in India which, in A.D. 1929, was already in process of liquidation, he had also foreseen the passing of a Japanese ascendancy.

'As I strolled up and down that platform, looking at the scene that was being played before me there, the inaudible music of the Korean landscape began to develop a secondary theme, which was an elegy over the prospects of Japanese dominion. While the overtones were still sounding the dirge of Korea's national past, this undertone sang the transitoriness of all insular conquests on Continental ground.'²

¹ Toynbee, Arnold J.: *A Journey to China* (London 1931, Constable), pp. 185-6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 187.

This twenty-three-years-old intimation of mortality was still pertinent in A.D. 1952, since by that date the ever accelerating shrinkage in the scale of the *Oikoumenê*, as measured in terms of human means of communication, had reduced the effective size of the Island of North America to about that of the British Isles or the Japanese Archipelago twenty-three years back. Yet, in catching in A.D. 1929 this glimpse of the irony in the destiny of an ephemeral Japanese rule in Korea, the observer had failed to penetrate to the inwardness of the tragedy in the destiny of Japan's Korean subjects. What he had seen had reminded him of the social insects, but he had failed to apprehend the meaning of this cue. He had failed to recollect that the inhuman or superhuman discipline to which the social insects had subjected themselves had enabled them to cultivate a super-Spartan Militarism;¹ that a discipline which had been the matrix of Militarism had been the fruit of habits of docility, industry, and endurance; that, for the inculcation of these ant-like or bee-like *mores* in the Human Psyche, the best school in the World had been the life and labour of a primitive peasantry working at a standard of living just above starvation-level; and that it was no accident that Frederick II's Prussian Janissaries, like Mehmed II's Ottoman Imperial Slave-Household before them, had been recruited from a subject peasantry and not from the wilful and wayward scions of a traditional privileged warrior class.

The traditional submissiveness of the peoples of Asia had, since time immemorial, taken the political form of passive obedience to arbitrary governments. and the cultural process of Westernization would have to go far beyond the rudimentary accomplishment of acquiring a Western military technique before the Asian peasant-soldier would begin to think of questioning, or, *a fortiori*, defying, orders from above to sacrifice his life even in an aggressive war that meant nothing to him personally. On the other hand the citizens of West European states who were accustomed to exercise at least some measure of control over their governments, through parliaments composed of their own elected representatives, would be apt to display their novel unwarlikeness in compelling their governments to submit, Vichy fashion, to a foreign aggressor rather than go to war for the traditional object of preserving their countries' sovereign independence at a cost in life, property, and welfare which the West European peoples might now no longer have the will to pay.

How far could mid-twentieth-century Asian governments go in exploiting their subjects' ingrained submissiveness for military purposes? On the evidence of recent history, they could go less far in a war of aggression abroad than in a defensive war fought on their own soil; yet History had demonstrated that they could make their peasant armies obey, however reluctantly, the order to march into battle even in a foreign campaign for which they had no heart. What were the limits of the Asian peasant-soldier's endurance in honouring his rulers' demands upon his self-sacrificing submissiveness? In Western eyes it might look as if the Chinese or Russian peasant-soldier had given his government a blank cheque drawn on his life; yet History had demonstrated that there

¹ See III. iii. 88-111.

was some limit—however remote this might be by Western standards—beyond which neither a Chinese nor a Russian Government could venture, with impunity, to continue to turn the screw on their long-suffering subjects. Chinese régimes, from the Ts'in Dynasty's to the Kuomintang's inclusive, that had had the temerity to give the screw just one turn too many, had repeatedly paid for this excess by the forfeiture of their mandate to bear rule; and in Russian history it had been the same story.

The Temper in the Soviet Union and in the United States

A Tsardom that had had the wisdom to take the sting out of the Russian people's sufferings, defeat, and humiliation in the Crimean War by conceding the reforms of the eighteen-sixties had paid with its life for its stiff-neckedness in refusing to forestall trouble once again by paying a corresponding ransom for subsequent military reverses. The sufferings, defeat, and humiliation that the Tsardom had brought upon the Russian people by an imperialistic policy in Korea that had precipitated the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904-5 had provoked the abortive Russian Revolution of A.D. 1905; the far worse tribulations of the General War of A.D. 1914 had cost the Tsardom its existence in the double revolution of A.D. 1917; and the breakdown of the Russian people's endurance on that occasion was noteworthy, considering that in A.D. 1917 the Russian peasant army had been fighting in self-defence against invading armies on Russian soil—a posture in which it had shown itself indomitable in A.D. 1812 and in which it was to display the same invincibility in A.D. 1941-4.

It seemed, then, that there were limits—even in a manifestly defensive war on home ground, and even without allowing for the unpredictable effects of atomic weapons upon the most tenacious habit of endurance—at which the *moral* of Russia or any other peasant country would collapse under the strain of war waged on Western lines. Russia, like France, but on a greater scale and to a more extreme degree, had suffered, twice in one lifetime, the agonies of a war in her own country, inflicted on her by a deliberately ruthless invader; and the fibre of Russian endurance could not be so tough as to have remained unaffected by this experience. Nevertheless, it seemed likely that the Government of the Soviet Union would face the terrors of a war with the United States rather than make any political concession to the United States that, in Russian eyes, would be tantamount to submission to an American ascendancy; and it also seemed likely that, if the Soviet Union did ever go to war with the United States, it would be able to carry a traditionally submissive Russian people with it, even if the initial military operations on the Russian side took the form of invading and overrunning countries allied to the United States, and not the form of resisting an American invasion of the territories of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Even then, a Russian peasant-soldiery's habit of submissively obeying their rulers' most distasteful orders might be expected to prevail over a war-weariness bred by recent and poignant experiences of war in their own country.

If it was thus likely that there were circumstances in which the Soviet Union could and would go to war with a Great Power of its own calibre,

was this also to be predicted of the United States? The question was a pertinent one, since there could not be a major war unless two Powers of first-class calibre were each prepared in the last resort to go to war with the other; and, when, at the opening of the latter half of the twentieth century, an inquirer put to himself the question whether the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, was willing to face a war with the one Power of her own calibre that was still on the map, he would find himself giving this question an affirmative answer.

Since the declaration of the independence of the United States, and perhaps since the first settlement of the oldest of the Thirteen Colonies, the American people had been one of the most unmilitary, yet at the same time one of the most martial, of the nations of the Western World. They had been unmilitary in the sense that they had disliked submitting themselves to military discipline and had had no Gallic ambition to see their country win military glory for such glory's own sake. They had been martial in the sense that, till the date of the closing of the frontier *circa* A.D. 1890, they had always numbered among them a contingent of frontiersmen accustomed, not only to bearing arms, but to using these at their own personal discretion in pursuit of their own private enterprises—a state of affairs which had become obsolete in Great Britain, even on the Anglo-Scottish Border, after the Union of the Crowns in A.D. 1603, and obsolete in most Continental West European countries since before the close of the fifteenth century. The martial spirit of ten generations of American frontiersmen would have been acknowledged by the North American Indians at any time since the first landing of White men from the British Isles on American coasts; by the English colonists' French rivals in the eighteenth century; and by their Mexican victims in the nineteenth century—and these encounters between the Anglo-American frontiersmen and their competitors for the possession of North America are also evidence that not only the frontiersmen, but the American people as a whole, were prepared, exceptionally and temporarily, to submit themselves to a military discipline without which the frontiersmen's personal spirit and prowess would have been unable to prevail against antagonists of their own cultural level.

The soldierly qualities latent in the American people as a whole had been revealed to their British adversaries in the wars of A.D. 1775–83 and 1812–14, and to their German adversaries in the wars of 1916–18 and 1941–5; but, up to date, by far the most impressive demonstration of American valour, discipline, generalship, and, not least, endurance had been given in a war in which Americans had been arrayed against Americans. The civil war of A.D. 1861–5 between the Union and the Confederacy had been the longest, the most stubborn, the costliest in casualties, and the most fertile in technological innovations of all wars in the Western World between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of the First World War; and this was a portent that the twentieth-century German militarists had twice overlooked to their own undoing.

Moreover, the two world wars that, within living memory, had harrowed Germany and Germany's Russian and West European victims, as severely as the American Civil War had harrowed the South, had left

the United States virtually unscathed. The psychological effects that two world wars in one lifetime had produced on the *moral* of West Europeans had hardly made themselves felt on the American side of the Atlantic. This immunity from a living experience of war in their own country seemed likely to prevail over a traditional aversion from Militarism if the American people were to be faced, or to believe themselves to be faced, with a choice between submitting to the Russians and fighting them; and in A.D. 1952 it could not be doubted by any open-eyed observer that the American people would indeed be prepared to face the terrors of a war with the Soviet Union rather than make any concession to the Soviet Union that, in American eyes, would be tantamount to submission to a Russian ascendancy. On this point of being willing to fight another major war in the last resort—and it was a crucial point for the eventual decision of the still open question whether there was, or was not, to be a Third World War—the Americans and the Russians felt and thought alike in A.D. 1952, as far as could be judged by a West European observer.

The Psychological Consequences of Atomic Warfare

Yet there was no people in the World—not even the Russian people and not even the American—that was in a position to boast in advance that, in a third world war, it would be capable of staying the course; for, though War might be coeval with Civilization itself, an advancing Western technology's discovery of the 'know-how' for releasing atomic energy for military purposes had now aggravated the incidence of a familiar social evil to a degree at which it seemed no longer likely to produce its familiar psychological effects.

The new psychological situation, created by the invention of atomic weapons, which had made an aggravation in the degree of the severity of the incidence of War amount to a difference that was virtually one of kind, arose, of course, out of the consequent immense enhancement of War's lethal power.

In War as it had been traditionally waged, each individual combatant had gone into action fortified by the knowledge that the chances were in favour of his coming through alive and even unscathed, and that, the greater the courage, the cool-headedness, and the discipline that he and his companions in arms displayed, the lighter their casualties were likely to be. In the history of Hellenic warfare down to 371 B.C., the Lacedaemonians had notoriously kept their casualties low by keeping their martial spirit high;¹ and even the devoted three hundred Spartiates who had gone to their deaths at Thermopylae in the year 480 B.C. had sacrificed their lives in the consoling knowledge that neither their country nor even their families would die with them. In picking his three hundred devotees, King Leonidas is said to have been careful not to take any fighting man who did not leave a son at home behind him;² he and these three hundred companions were all aware that, even if no single one of them were to return alive (and only two of them did survive in the event), the total loss of a force of this number would not jeopardize the

¹ Xenophon: *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*, chap. ix, quoted already in III. iii. 63.

² Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 205.

existence, or even cripple the fighting-power, of a Lacedaemonian Commonwealth whose combatant strength was estimated to have been, at this time, about eight thousand Spartiates, all as good soldiers as the three hundred, without counting the fighting men from the perioecic Lacedaemonian communities, who were 'good enough soldiers, even though they might not be the Spartiates' equals'.¹ As for the future of the Lacedaemonian body politic, the Lacedaemonian Government were said to have received an oracle from Delphi assuring them that, in the current war with the Achaemenian Empire, Lacedaemon would not be wiped out by the enemy if a King of Sparta were to forfeit his life, and this was afterwards supposed to have been one of the decisive considerations in Leonidas' mind when he took his decision to stand fast at Thermopylae and die there.² Leonidas and the rest of the three hundred thus believed, on the day on which they went to their deaths, that, if they did lose their lives, there would infallibly still be a Sparta in being to receive the news that they had died in carrying out their countrymen's orders; and this is, of course, the theme of the Cean poet Simonides' immortally ambiguous couplet.³ They could also feel sure that these surviving countrymen of theirs would not forget either their deed or their names.⁴

The self-sacrifice of Leonidas and his three hundred in the year 480 B.C.⁵ was thus rational, as well as heroic, under the technological conditions in which War was waged in that year and at any later date down

¹ See the words that Herodotus puts into the mouth of the exiled Spartan King Damarátus, who was serving on Xerxes' staff, in Book VII, chap. 234.

² Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 220.

³ Quoted by Herodotus in Book VII, chap. 228.

⁴ Some thirty or forty years after the event a complete list of the names of the three hundred was obtained at Sparta by Herodotus (see Book VII, chap. 224).

⁵ G. B. Grundy, the distinguished Modern Western historian of *The Great Persian War* (London 1901, Murray), argues, in his chapter on Thermopylae (pp. 257-317), that, when Leonidas, after receiving the intelligence that his position had been turned by an enemy force, took his decision to continue to hold his ground, between the mountains and the sea, with the Lacedaemonian, Theban, and Thespian contingents of his own force, was not so much sacrificing his men's lives together with his own, but was dividing his force with the intention and expectation that the contingents which he was sending to the rear would not take the opportunity, as they actually did take it, for decamping, but would occupy and hold a position on the path over the mountains along which the enemy turning-movement was being made, in time to be able to bring to a halt the enemy's advance from this quarter, while Leonidas, with his half of the confederate army, continued to block the passage of the enemy's main body through the pass of Thermopylae itself.

This masterly and persuasive interpretation of what was in Leonidas' mind at that moment postpones the hour of the Lacedaemonian and Thespian contingents' witting and deliberate sacrifice of their lives without cheating these heroes of the glory of having performed their heroic act of self-sacrifice at a later hour of the same memorable day; for indisputably they did deliberately sacrifice their lives when, upon receipt of the news that the enemy turning-force had now succeeded in debouching out of the mountains on to the coastal plain in their rear, athwart their only possible line of retreat, they took their decision to retire to the famous hillock and make their last stand there, instead of taking a decision to lay down their arms, which was what the Thebans did in this now quite desperate situation.

Thus Grundy's theory, if accepted, leaves the Lacedaemonians and Thespians still eventually sacrificing their lives as deliberately as they are said to have sacrificed them in the traditional rendering of the traditional story.

In the course of his own reconstruction of the course of events, Grundy casts doubt on both the story of the oracle and the story that Leonidas did not take with him anyone who had not a son to leave behind him at Sparta. Yet the second, at least, of these two stories is surely credible, since Leonidas' expedition must, from the outset, have been one in which all participants will have faced the likelihood that they were going to lose

to the 6th August, A.D. 1945, when an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Let us suppose, however, that the Babylonian, Egyptian, and Syriac civilizations had been 2,425 years ahead of a latter-day Western Civilization in the development of Military Technology. The supposition is not fantastic, considering that, in some branches of Technology, these older civilizations were at least that much in advance; and, if we allow this licence to our imagination, we may find ourselves puzzled to estimate how Leonidas and his three hundred would have acted in circumstances that would have stultified most of the considerations that are attributed to them.

Suppose that Xerxes' invading army had not been constrained, as it was, by the state of Military Technology at the time, to kill Leonidas and his three hundred companions in hand-to-hand combat with swords and spears, or at short range with arrows; suppose that they had had a stock of two atomic bombs, one to drop on the Greek force at Thermopylae, and another to drop simultaneously on Sparta—or, better still, that they had had a single hydrogen bomb whose explosion would instantaneously have destroyed all life in Continental European Greece and in the Aegean Archipelago before the Achaemenian expeditionary force had started cautiously to advance from its assembly-point in the interior of Anatolia: in those then inconceivable circumstances there would have been no perpetuation of the three hundred devotees' families, since the sons whom they had left behind at home would have been killed at the same instant as their fathers; there would have been no Sparta to receive the news of the three hundred heroes' faithfulness unto death¹ and to remember their deed and their names; no Simonides to compose an epitaph; and no monumental mason to engrave it. The presupposition of the three hundred Spartiates' self-sacrifice was an assurance—which, in these hypothetical circumstances, would have been denied to them—that, in giving their lives, they were saving their country's existence; and this was likewise the theme of another epitaph composed by Simonides in commemoration, not of Spartiates who had fallen in defence of Sparta against Achaemenian aggression, but of Tegeatans who had fallen in defence of Tegea against Lacedaemonian aggression some years later.

Τῶνδε δι' ἀνθρώπων ἀρετὰν οὐχ ἔκετο καπνὸς
αἰθέρα δαιομένης εὐρυχόρου Τεγέας·
οἱ βούλοντο πόλιν μὲν ἐλευθερίᾳ τεθαλυῖαν
παισὶ λιπεῖν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐν προμάχοισι θανεῖν.²

their lives, even if they believed that the Lacedaemonian Government genuinely intended¹ to reinforce Leonidas' little army, and even if they were unaware that the position at Thermopylae could be turned via a path over the mountains. On the last day, when the position had in fact been turned by the enemy before any reinforcements had reached the Hellenic army, the normal human reaction was either to decamp (as was done by the contingents which, according to Grundy's hypothesis, had been detached by Leonidas to check the advance of the enemy turning-force) or thereafter to surrender (as was done by the Thebans). Even if Leonidas did go into action that day, with little more than one half of his total force, with the intention of still holding his position while the other half of the force checked the enemy's turning-movement, the decision in these circumstances to continue to hold his ground instead of withdrawing while the coast was still clear was heroic enough; and the Spartan and Thespian survivors' subsequent decision to die fighting after the enemy turning-movement had been reported to have achieved success was just as heroic as it has always been deemed to be.

² *Anth. Pal. VII. 512*; Bergk, *P.L.G.*, 4th ed., iii. 459.

¹ *Rev. ii. 10.*

The point made in this poem is that the fallen Tegeatan fighting-men had been free to choose between preserving their lives and sacrificing them and that, in choosing to sacrifice them, they had chosen right because, at this price, they had purchased the preservation of treasures which, for them, were of far greater value. Suppose, however, that, instead of being inspired by a reasonable hope of being able to save Tegea from physical destruction and to hand her on to their children with her political independence still intact, these heroic Tegeatan fighting-men had known in advance that a Lacedaemonian atomic bomb would annihilate Tegea's masonry, independence, and progeny in the same flash as her combatant troops in the field, what would have been a Tegeatan warrior's psychological reaction then? 'Who dies, if England live?'¹ was a question to which, in a pre-atomic age, a noble soul had been able to give only one answer; but this time-honoured challenge had undergone a disconcerting mutation since the explosion at Hiroshima on the 6th August, 1945, and the question had now come to read: 'Who can die to make England live, if England has to die with him?' While few might be found to dispute that *pro patria mori* was *dulce et decorum*,² it was not indisputable that to die *with*, instead of *for*, one's country would be either gratifying or even meritorious.

No doubt this reformulation of the question does not dispose of the problem, for there is an element in heroism which is beyond Reason because it is above it. If we can imagine Leonidas and his three hundred being deprived, by an ante-dated advent of atomic warfare, of all the reasons that they may have given to themselves to rationalize a resolve to sacrifice their lives, we can still imagine them doing, nevertheless, exactly what they did. When, sixty-five years, or thereabouts, before the three hundred Spartiates gave their lives at Thermopylae, Cyrus's general Harpagus had been imposing Achaemenian rule on the south-west corner of Asia Minor, the fighting-men of Xanthus, 'when they had been defeated in the field and been driven within their city walls', had 'collected their women and children and property and slaves in the citadel', had 'made a holocaust of them by setting the citadel on fire, and' had 'then bound themselves by the most formidable mutual oaths [to seek their own deaths], and' had 'duly made a sortie and died fighting to the last man'.³ On the same occasion the Xanthians' neighbours the Caunians had met the same challenge with the same response.⁴ This was also to be the response of the Marmareis in 334 B.C.⁵ and of the Tyrians in 332 B.C. to Alexander, of the Isaurians on the morrow of Alexander's death to Perdikkas,⁶ of the Carthaginians in 146 B.C. to Scipio Aemilianus, of the Xanthians (once again) in 42 B.C. to Brutus,⁷ of the Jews in A.D. 70 to

¹ Kipling, Rudyard: *For All We Have And Are*.

² Horace: *Carmina*, Book III, Ode ii, l. 13.

³ Herodotus, Book I, chap. 176.

⁴ See *ibid.*

⁵ See Diodorus of Agyrium: *A Library of History*, Book XVII, chap. 28, cited by Bevan, E. R.: *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Arnold; 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 94, n. 2.

⁶ See Diodorus of Agyrium: *A Library of History*, Book XVIII, chap. 22, cited by Bevan, loc. cit.

⁷ See Appian of Alexandria: *The Roman Civil Wars*, Book IV, chap. 80. According to Appian, *ibid.*, this was actually the third time that the Xanthians had chosen annihilation in preference to surrender—the second of their three performances of the heroic deed

Titus, and of the Suliots who blew themselves up or threw themselves and their children over a precipice in A.D. 1803 rather than surrender to 'Ali Tepelenli.¹ Nor can we omit from this role of honour those execrable Assyrians who died like heroes at Harrân in 610-609 B.C., two years after the destruction of the wasps' nest at Nineveh.

It is, however, significant that in Jerusalem in A.D. 70 a majority of the besieged would have countenanced overtures for forestalling extermination by surrender if they had not been terrorized by a minority of fanatics into participating in these Zealots' suicidal heroism—under pain, as the penalty for 'peace talk', of being stabbed to death by the dagger of a Jewish *sicarius* before any Roman legionary's sword could come within striking distance of them; and, though Josephus, who is the source of our information, is a hostile witness to the conduct of the Jewish Zealots, there is no reason to suspect him of having falsified the truth on this point.

It is also significant that the Christian martyrs, who gave their lives rather than commit what would have been, in their eyes, an act of disloyalty to God, died in the confident belief that their blood was the Church's seed;² that a Church which Christ Himself had founded would endure, not only till Christ's ministers on Earth had had time to go into all the World and preach the Gospel to every creature,³ but to the end of Time; and that, though Heaven and Earth would pass away, Christ's words would not pass away⁴—as they believed that Christ Himself had declared after His resurrection and had then guaranteed by another positive act when He had ascended into Heaven, where He sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty in *saecula saeculorum*. Though the citizens of this or that earthly commonwealth might have had the spirit, on occasion, to see their motherland perish with them, or even before them, rather than stoop to bow their necks to a foreign yoke, only the adherents of a religion that made no account of This World by comparison with an Other World could logically court, for the glory of God, a death that would be, not only their own death, but simultaneously the death of all life on the face of a planet that was their mundane home. It is all the more significant that the Early Christian martyrs, who did hold this transcendental belief, should have been inspired, not solely by a confidence that they were sacrificing their lives for the glory of God in a Heavenly Kingdom utterly beyond the reach of the most potent operations of a terrestrial human Technology, but also in part by a confidence that, by making this supreme personal sacrifice, they were promoting the propagation of Christ's Church Militant here on Earth—as Leonidas and his three hundred companions at Thermopylae had been confident that, by sacrificing their lives, they were furthering the mundane interests of the Commonwealth of Lacedaemon.

of mass self-immolation having been when they had refused to surrender to Alexander the Great.

¹ See Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864*, vol. vi (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press), p. 51.

² See the passages from the works of Justin and Tertullian that have been quoted in V. vi. 202, nn. 2 and 3.

³ Mark xvi. 15.

⁴ Matt. xxiv. 35; Mark xiv. 31; Luke xxi. 33.

If it was thus true that even the Christian martyrs had been moved in part by a belief that their deaths would redound to the welfare on Earth of a Church and Faith that would live after them on Earth and would not die there with them, then we cannot know for certain what their psychological reaction would have been supposing that the Roman executioner's sword had been fraught with a hydrogen bomb's power to extinguish the Earthly Church Universal, throughout its geographical range at that day, from a Mesopotamian Edessa to a Baetican Gades and from an Egyptian Philae to a British Corstopitum. Would a martyr who knew in advance that this would be the earthly consequence of his own self-sacrifice have still gone unhesitatingly to his death with a serene confidence that he was doing God's indubitable will?

This was a hypothetical question that could never be answered conclusively by an historian living in A.D. 1952; but any human being at any date could comprehend that, if his martyrs-designate happened to be, not Christian transcendentalists, but post-Christian materialists who had deliberately invested in This World all their treasure, to the uttermost farthing,¹ it would be paradoxical to expect such self-made citizens of a 'Commonwealth of Swine'² to consent to sacrifice their lives for their treasure's sake if they knew in advance that, in the act, they would be bringing annihilation upon this mundane treasure as well as upon themselves; and this consideration was particularly pertinent to the circumstances of a Westernizing World mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era; for in this world at this date—as, no doubt, in most times and places—both bona fide Christians and bona fide Spartans were rare indeed, while the Communist and Capitalist ideologies, whose respective champions were competing for the allegiance of all Mankind as eagerly and bitterly as if their beliefs and conduct had been poles apart, were in agreement with one another, and at variance with Christianity and with Spartanism alike, in setting up an exclusively mundane objective and ideal for Man, and differed from one another on this head only over the secondary question whether Man was to make a worldly success of himself as an individual or as a phalanstery.

What logic was there in asking a whole-hearted votary of either Capitalism or Communism to sacrifice his life for the sake of maintaining or improving a material mundane standard of living—not, of course, for his own personal benefit, *quod esset absurdum*, but even for the benefit of his family, tribe, or species—if the hydrogen bomb that was to take the prospective sacrificial victim's life was known by him in advance to be certain to extinguish in the self-same flash all possible beneficiaries of his proposed self-sacrifice? In this baleful light it looked as if an advancing Western technology's recent success in tapping atomic energy for use in War might have sapped the foundations of a traditional standard of heroism by stultifying some of the most compelling of the traditional motives for it.

¹ Matt. v. 26.

² Plato: *Respublica*, 372 D, cited in II. i. 193, n. 1; in II. ii. 23, n. 2; and on p. 612, below.

(III) ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO
WORLD ORDER

Our foregoing survey of the situation after the Second World War has shown that, at the opening of the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, a Westernizing World found itself in a plight that can be summarily described as follows. Three recent achievements of Western technology—the coalescence and simultaneous shrinkage of the *Oikoumenê* and the invention of atomic weapons—had made it imperative for Man in Process of Civilization to abolish War; War could not be abolished unless the control of atomic energy employable for military purposes could be concentrated in the hands of some single political authority; this monopoly of the command of the master-weapon of the age would enable, and, in enabling, compel, the authority controlling atomic energy to assume the role of an oecumenical government; the seat of this oecumenical government must be either Washington or Moscow in the constellation of political forces that had emerged from the overthrow of Germany and Japan in A.D. 1945; but in A.D. 1952 neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was prepared voluntarily to place itself at the mercy of its sole surviving peer by submitting, without fighting, to seeing this rival arrogate to itself the world-wide political ascendancy that would be conferred automatically on either Power by a monopoly of the control of atomic energy for military purposes.

What was to be the denouement of this political problem-play? The line of least psychological resistance would, no doubt, be a resort to the old-fashioned expedient of ordeal by battle. Now that four centuries and a half of recurrent warfare in a Western arena had left only two gladiators still erect and *aktionsfähig*, a third world war might be expected to elicit a knock-out blow that would leave only one Power alive, with no competitor now remaining in the lists to dispute the sole survivor's monopoly of a control of atomic energy that would carry world-dominion with it. This catastrophic denouement was evidently feasible, since a world war fought with atomic weapons would be likely to have at least as conclusive an ending as the first and second world wars, both of which had ended in the decisive defeat of one side, though both these wars had been waged with relatively ineffective pre-atomic armaments. It could therefore be predicted that a third world war between the two remaining Powers would prove to be the final round in a series of contests that, since A.D. 1914, had already reduced the number of the Powers in this arena to two from eight. The outcome of a third world war thus seemed likely to be the imposition of an oecumenical peace of the Roman kind by a victor whose victory would leave him with a monopoly of the control of atomic energy in his grasp.

This denouement was foreshadowed, not only by present facts, but by historical precedents, since, in the histories of other civilizations, a Time of Troubles had been apt to culminate in the delivery of a knock-out blow resulting in the establishment of a universal state; but the precedents also suggested that Mankind could not afford in A.D. 1952

to resign itself to sanctioning a reperformance of this familiar tragedy. Whenever, in the histories of other civilizations, a series of cycles of warfare had eventually been brought to a close by the destruction of all the contending Powers except one single survivor, this barbarous remedy for a desperate malady had not availed either to save the sick civilization's life or to rid a war-stricken world of war in perpetuity, because the cost of arriving at a world order by this rough road had been mortally heavy. In the past the forcible establishment of an oecumenical peace had been purchased by a war-stricken society only at the prohibitive price of its inflicting wounds upon itself from which it found itself unable to recover; and, if this had been the ultimate effect of imposing universal peace by violence in a pre-atomic age, what were the Western Civilization's prospects in the event of its falling into a third world war in which a knock-out blow would be delivered with the unprecedented violence that had now been imported into the conduct of War by the invention of atomic weapons?

If the Western Society took this traditional war-path now that it was equipped with unprecedentedly potent armaments, would it not be condemning itself to purchase an ephemeral peace at a price that would be prohibitive? Would not the spiritual ravages of War, which had always been much harder to repair than its physical ravages, be likely, this time, to exceed all imaginable measure? Would not the agonies inflicted by atomic warfare make even a once humane and generous-hearted victor turn savage? These were considerations that might well deter the most fanatical Russian mind from allowing itself to believe that a third world war was the necessary price for completing the conversion of Mankind to the Communist Faith, and, *a fortiori*, deter the most sanguine American mind from allowing itself to believe that, the sooner a third world war was fought and won, the sooner the American people would be rid of the distracting anxieties of international politics and be free once more to devote themselves to the normal pursuits of private life. A sober-minded observer could foresee that after a third war fought with atomic weapons there would no longer be any possibility of life as it had previously been lived either in the United States or in the Soviet Union.

In these perilous circumstances the best hope for the future of Mankind lay in the possibility that the governments and peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union might have the imagination, wisdom, tolerance, self-restraint, patience, and fortitude to seek and ensue the one alternative to a third world war that, at this stage, was practical politics: that is to say, a pacific partition of the *Oikoumenē* between these two surviving Powers for an indefinite time to come. All the virtues enumerated above would be required on both sides if this policy was to have any chance of success, since it was evident that a society which had tapped atomic energy could never rest easy until it had brought under the control of some single oecumenical authority a newly released titanic physical force which would be a menace to the existence of at least half the Human Race, or, more probably, to the existence of the whole of it, so long as two mutually independent and antagonistic

Powers each remained at liberty to use this appalling weapon in waging war against its neighbour. Yet, if this risk of a Third World War fought with atomic weapons was the consideration that made the establishment of some kind of world order imperative, it would be a *reductio ad absurdum* of Mankind's quest for freedom from fear if, in seeking the solid and lasting security against a social catastrophe that was to be found in the establishment of a unitary control over atomic energy, the governments and peoples of the two surviving Great Powers were to precipitate the very catastrophe that all Mankind was concerned to avert. If the establishment of a world order was imperative for the sake of avoiding an atomic war, the avoidance of an atomic war must be imperative *a fortiori*, as an end in itself.

In the circumstances of the time the greatest menace to the welfare and existence of the Human Race was not the invention of atomic weapons, but the rise in living human souls of a temper reminiscent of a mood once prevalent in an Early Modern Western World for about a hundred years beginning with the outbreak of the Western Wars of Religion in the seventh decade of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era. At the opening of the second half of the twentieth century there were Capitalists and Communists who, like their Catholic and Protestant forerunners, felt it to be impracticable as well as intolerable to acquiesce in leaving the allegiance of Society divided, for an indefinite time to come, between an orthodoxy that they identified with their own faith and a heresy that they identified with the ideology of their adversaries. The wrong-headedness of this attitude was betrayed by the conclusion, logically following from it, that Orthodoxy was called upon by duty and self-interest in unison to combat, suppress, and eliminate Heresy by the ruthless employment of every weapon at Orthodoxy's command. The history of the Western Wars of Religion bore witness that spiritual issues could not be settled by force of arms; and the acquisition of atomic weapons gave warning that it would not be open to Capitalists and Communists in a post-Modern Age of Western history to learn the futility of religious warfare, and the necessity for religious toleration, by an empirical method of prolonged trial and chastening error that had been practicable for Catholics and Protestants in an Early Modern Age in which gunpowder was the deadliest weapon at the command of wrong-headed crusaders.

In the nineteen-fifties, as in the fifteen-sixties, the advocate of a patience that could claim to be the highest form of fortitude laid himself open, no doubt, to the charge of being a contemptible procrastinator who could offer no prospect of being able ultimately to avert the 'show-down' that he was cravenly seeking to postpone; but in the nineteen-fifties, at any rate, this taunt did the Fabian policy an injustice; for it failed to take account of the positive advantage that Mankind stood to gain by a successful pursuit of a policy of playing for time in the particular social circumstances of the Westernizing World of the day. The vehemence of the animosity, at this date, between the respective adherents of Communism and of a traditional Western way of life was one of the psychological effects of the sudden coalescence and shrinkage

of the *Oikoumenê* under the masterful impulsion of an ever faster advancing Western technology. It was an emotional reaction to the malaise that a Western and a Russian Society were both feeling as a result of finding themselves brought abruptly into an immediate physical contact with one another before either society had had time to become spiritually intimate with the other. Either party was having to accommodate itself to the sudden epiphany of a neighbour who had been a stranger to it during the centuries in which its own peculiar culture-pattern had been taking shape. What, on both sides, was now needed above all was time to allow a Subconscious Psyche, whose pace was the tortoise's gait, to adjust itself to the revolutionary situation created by the technological conjuring tricks of a Practical Intellect that had been racing ahead of its subconscious yoke-fellow at the pace of a march hare.¹

This common-sense consideration is clearly brought out in the following passage from the pen of a nineteenth-century Chinese philosopher:

'Now that the ingenious inventions of the steamship and the railway are enabling the European peoples to reach every corner of the Earth and every strange tribe of Mankind, the beginning of a world unity is here. When scattered races and nations are brought together, then divers civilisations will also gradually become unified. Our ancient sages made a distinction between the *Tao* [the Way of Life] and the *Ch'i* [the Tools]. The ways of life cannot be immediately unified; they must first be brought together by the tools or implements of human invention. The steamship and the railroad are the carriages of the ways of life. . . . Therefore, these great inventions, which the Western Powers are using for their encroachment upon China, are the very things which the sages of a future age will utilise as the means for the unification of the ways of life of all the nations of the Earth.'²

This shrewd Chinese observation brings out the further point that the psychological discomfort, and consequent animosity, that had been caused by Technology's feat of 'annihilating' physical distance, were not peculiar to the relations between a twentieth-century Western Society and a contemporary Russian Society. The same psychological disturbance had been produced by the same technological revolution in the West's relations with a Chinese Society and with all the other living non-Western civilizations. There had been a simultaneous and similar disturbance in the relations of these living non-Western civilizations with one another in so far as they had been brought abruptly into closer contact with one another through the introduction of Western means of communication; and these divers twentieth-century psychological tensions were so many examples of regular consequences of encounters between contemporaries that, in a previous Part of this Study,³ have also been illustrated from the histories of other arenas.

¹ See pp. 210-11, above.

² Wang T'ao (*natus* A.D. 1828), quoted by Hu Shih in *The Chinese Renaissance: The Haskell Lectures, 1933* (Chicago 1934, University Press), pp. 34-35. The contrast, in point of comparative effectiveness, between the respective careers of Wang T'ao and the contemporary Japanese pioneer of Westernization, Ito, is pointed out by Hu Shih, *ibid.*, pp. 10-12. Cp. pp. 33-34.

³ In IX. viii. 522-629.

Our foregoing study of encounters between contemporaries has lit up one truth that, in A.D. 1952, was most pertinent to the consideration of a Westernizing World's prospects. History showed that the psychological disturbance inevitably produced by an encounter was apt to be aggravated to a disastrous degree if either party sought impatiently to cut the Gordian knot by which he found himself unwelcomely tied to an uncongenial fellow-traveller, whereas the same disturbing effect of the same encounter might be turned to account as a supreme opportunity for an act of spiritual creation by evangelists who came to bring, not a sword, but peace, and who found their mission, not in striving to make one of two colliding cultures prevail over the other, but in seeking to make the challenge of an encounter yield the response of a new spiritual vision opening up the vista of a new way of life.

If this was indeed the truth, then the World's first need on the political plane in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era was a *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union in the spirit of the *détente* which, at an equally critical moment of Hellenic history, the Roman and the Arsacid Power had jointly achieved in 23-20 B.C.—to their common credit and to the general benefit of a world whose fate had lain in the hands of those two Powers between them. In 23-20 B.C. the Roman and Arsacid governments virtually agreed to partition between them, *uti possidebant*, an Hellenic World which had been expanded by previous Macedonian conquests to embrace a Hittite, Syriac, Egyptiac, Babylonian, and Indic Society's domains in addition to the Hellenic Civilization's own patrimony.¹ Augustus was abandoning a Roman aspiration—inspired by a consciousness of Rome's decisive superiority over Parthia in military resources, and entertained since the year 53 B.C. by Crassus, Julius Caesar, and Mark Antony in succession—to reassert by force of Roman arms, as far eastward into the heart of the Continent as Alexander the Great had ever penetrated, an Hellenic ascendancy that, in the course of a century ending in 53 B.C., had been all but extinguished east of the Euphrates. In return for this tacit assurance that Rome was now renouncing an ambition whose achievement would have required the overthrow and destruction of the Parthian Empire, the Arsacid Government was now making it possible for Rome to forget her rankling resentment at the humiliating defeat of an aggressive Roman military adventure by giving back the captured standards and releasing the surviving prisoners of war that had been the trophies of a Parthian victory over an invading Roman army thirty years back.

It is true that the Romano-Parthian *détente* of 23-20 B.C. did not eliminate all the friction from the relations between the two surviving Powers in a war-stricken Hellenic World. For another four centuries and more, Rome and Ctesiphon were to contend for the prize of paramountcy over a buffer state in Armenia which was to play the part played by Afghanistan in the relations between the British and Russian empires in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era. There were

¹ The outlying Indian province of this expanded Hellenic World was the only fraction of it which, at this date, was not under either Arsacid or Roman rule.

also to be other bones of contention between Rome and Parthia besides Armenia, and these divers chronic disputes were to erupt into occasional wars. Nevertheless, the *détente* of 23–20 B.C. was as auspicious as it was historic; for it set a tone which governed the relations between the Roman Empire and its eastern neighbour on the whole for not much less than six hundred years thereafter;¹ and the tradition of moderation that thus came to prevail in the relations between the western and the eastern Power in a partitioned Hellenic World was not easily overcome by the deliberately banned spirit of militancy.

When Trajan strained Roman resources almost to breaking-point by reverting to the Alexandrine Oriental ambitions of Mark Antony, Caesar, and Crassus, the Augustan policy of self-restraint was promptly readopted by Trajan's immediate successor Hadrian; and, after this Hadrianic liquidation of a Trajanic adventure, a 'temperate and undecisive' border warfare that continued occasionally to interrupt a normal state of peace was not converted into a holy war either by the hold that Zoroastrianism gained over the later Arsacid princes of the Parthian line or by their Sasanid successors' act of officially establishing the Zoroastrian Church as the state church of their empire. The friction between the Roman trustees of Hellenism and the Iranian trustees of a temporarily submerged but never extinguished Syriac Civilization did not rankle into a life-and-death struggle until the two Powers fell into the reduplicated Romano-Persian war of A.D. 572–91 and A.D. 603–28; and it was only in the course of the second of the two bouts of this long-drawn-out struggle that a political conflict came to be inflamed into an ordeal by battle between the fanatical adherents of two rival faiths.

In the particular social circumstances of a Westernizing World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, in which time was needed for the breeding of familiarity, the danger of an atomic world war, which loomed large in A.D. 1952, might be expected to recede if American and Russian statesmanship could contrive to keep the peace even for a much shorter period than the time for which it had been kept between the Roman and Parthian empires in virtue of the *détente* of 23–20 B.C.; but in this case, as in that, the task of statesmanship would not be easy.² A consideration that seemed likely to tell in favour of a preserva-

¹ From first to last the Euphratean frontier of the Roman Empire endured for nearly seven hundred years, running from Pompey's organization of the province of Syria in 64 B.C. to the irruption of the Primitive Muslim Arab barbarian invaders into the Roman and Sasanian empires simultaneously in and after A.D. 632 (see I. i. 75).

² Professor William McNeill comments: 'I feel that the Rome-Carthage relationship is a far more convincing parallel to contemporary conditions than the Rome-Parthia relationship. In the relations between Rome and Parthia mortal fear and the density of contact were, I believe, absent.' The present writer's comment on this comment is that it was not too much to expect of American and Russian statesmanship in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era that it should stabilize the relation between the United States and the Soviet Union on a Romano-Parthian basis and save it from degenerating into a Romano-Carthaginian 'irrepressible conflict'. Some of the obstacles to the achievement of the statesmen's task in the encounter between the United States and the Soviet Union are examined in the remainder of this chapter. These obstacles were manifestly formidable. Yet the present writer would submit that, when the obstacles had been looked in the face and had been estimated at their highest possible magnitude, it would still be a culpable surrender to despair—or, more culpable still, to mere impatience—if the statesmen were to resign themselves to the conclusion that a

tion of the peace was the current disparity between the two Powers' respective military resources.

In an age in which the sinews of war were technological and organizational experience and ability commanding man-power and non-human raw materials in quantities sufficient to ensure a full investment of the fund of human skill, the United States possessed in A.D. 1952 a superiority, in potential military strength, not only over the Soviet Union and her satellites, but over the whole World outside the United States' own frontiers;¹ and, though this present American superiority might, as has been noted,² be diminished, or even eventually converted into an inferiority, if the Russians were ever to succeed in fully developing the latent resources of the Soviet Union and in gaining effective control over the developed and latent resources of the rest of the Old World, the United States' present superiority seemed likely to last as far into the future as it was possible to see ahead, since the fund of skill which was the key to industrial power was, in the nature of things, an asset that it would take the Russians much longer to build up than material resources that could be converted into military strength only to the extent to which the skill to exploit them was forthcoming.³

On this showing, the present disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union in potential military strength seemed likely to endure. Yet it would have been rash to jump, on this account, to the conclusion that the Soviet Union would be willing or able in all circumstances to refrain from challenging her rival's decisively superior potential strength; for the competition between Rome and Parthia for paramountcy over Armenia after the *détente* of 23-20 B.C., and the competition between Athens and the Peloponnesian Confederacy for the accession of Corcyra after the peace settlement of 445 B.C., were warnings that, in any society that was partitioned politically between two Powers, and two only, a Balance of Power, even when this had been deliberately established by overt or tacit agreement, was in constant danger of being upset, even against the parties' will, by their falling into an involuntary yet unavoidable competition for the allegiance of forces, hitherto neutral, whose added weight might be expected to give the scales a decisive inclination to one side or the other—whichever of the two sides should succeed in securing this accession of strength for itself.

third world war could not be averted by a saving combination of the spiritual forces of wisdom, good will, and, above all, forbearance.

¹ Professor William McNeill comments: 'United States superiority is less than statistics of steel production would suggest, since, in the United States, more effort and material has to be devoted to civilian consumption, and more of military man-power and supply to services, than is required in the Soviet Union, where the lowness of the people's standard of living and the hardihood of their spirit makes them able to live and fight on a much smaller allowance of comforts and amenities than is demanded by Americans.'

² On pp. 488-9, above.

³ 'Les atouts actuels de l'Europe ne paraissent pas reposer sur des nécessités physiques, mais sur un acquis historique qui ne peut lui échapper que par une évolution prolongée, et sur les qualités morales et intellectuelles de ses populations. Notre civilisation sur-industrialisée ne peut avoir d'autres centres que l'Europe et les États-Unis, tant que les autres régions n'ont pas atteint le même degré de surindustrialisation, donc de technique, de capitalisation, de standard de vie; les courants ne peuvent donc être détournés que très insensiblement' (Dupriez, L. H.: *Les Mouvements Économiques Généraux* (Louvain 1947, University Press, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 380).

In a twentieth-century *Oikoumenê* that, since A.D. 1947, had been virtually partitioned into an American and a Russian sphere of influence, there were at least two pawns on the board that imperilled the maintenance of peace between the two rival Powers through being assets on which neither Power's hold was secure, and consequently being objects for which the two Powers were bound to compete. One of these disputable assets was the industrial war-potential of Europe, which at this date amounted in the aggregate—including the Russian as well as the American sphere of Europe—to more than a quarter of the total industrial war-potential of the World; the other disputable asset was the man-power of the non-Western and non-Russian peasant countries in Asia, Africa, and Indian America (from Mexico to Paraguay inclusive), which amounted in the aggregate to about three-quarters of the living generation of Mankind. In A.D. 1952 each of these two assets was partly in American and partly in Russian hands; if either of them were to fall wholly into the hands of only one of the two competitors for possession, the effect might be to give the Russo-American balance a decisive inclination in the successful competitor's favour; and, in either field, the hold of one of the two competitors was precarious. While the United States had good reason for fearing that the secession of China from the American to the Russian camp in A.D. 1948-9 might be followed by further landslides in the same direction in other Asian or African countries, the Soviet Union had no less good reason for fearing that she might not be able permanently to retain her control over those eastern fringes of the Western Society's Continental European patrimony on which she had imposed her domination during the last phase of the Second World War. Thus either Power was vulnerable, on one of two critical fronts, to the danger of formidable encroachments at its expense on the rival Power's part; and the consequent instability of the current balance made it difficult to hold the political scales even, and proportionately difficult to keep the political temperature low.

A Russian observer, drawing an interim balance sheet in A.D. 1952, and entering in his credit column the accession of China over against an entry in his debit column recording the defection of Yugoslavia, might find it hard to say whether, on balance, the Soviet Union had been a loser or a gainer. If the triumph of Communism in China were indeed an augury of what was to come in the South-East Asian countries, in India, in Pakistan, in Persia, and in an Arab World extending westward from the oil-fields of 'Irāq and Sa'ūdī Arabia to the Atlantic seaboard of Morocco, this might seem in Russian eyes to be a winning card on a long view; for, in a competition for the allegiance of all Mankind between Communism and a traditional Western way of life, the suffrages of a peasant three-quarters of Mankind might be expected to be the determining factor in the long run; and, in appealing to this vast primitive electorate, Russia enjoyed advantages that America lacked.

The chief of these Russian advantages was that Russia herself, till yesterday, had been one of the primitive peasant countries at the mercy of a Western Society which had outstripped the rest of the World in its technological progress; and that, since yesterday, Russia had

discovered a method of catching up with the Westerners by a forced march, and had by this means transformed her own economy at short notice with a success that had been registered in her victory in the Second World War over a Germany who, next to the United States, had been the strongest industrial Power in the Western World of the day. The Russians could thus use their own striking technological achievements under a Marxian dispensation as an impressive argument when they were commending Communism to other peasant peoples who still found themselves in the Russians' pre-Stalinian, or even in their pre-Petrine, plight of individual poverty and collective impotence. Russian propagandists could appeal in the same breath to an ancient Asian peasantry's new aspiration to raise its standard of living, and to a parvenu Asian intelligentsia's aspiration—which was as old and as young as this intelligentsia itself—to make itself mistress in its own house by throwing off the ascendancy of Western intruders who, for their own purposes in Asia, had called this Asian intelligentsia into being.¹

At this point an alert Western counter-propagandist might try to put a spoke in the Russian propagandist's wheel by pointing out to the Asian intelligentsia that in reality the Russians were inviting them to exchange a Western ascendancy for a Russian ascendancy, and not for the national independence that the Russians were dangling before Asian eyes, and by simultaneously pointing out to the peasantry that in reality the Russians were inviting them to exchange the familiar woes of rack-rented tenants, not for the utopia of peasant proprietorship, but for the prison-house of a mechanized collective farm.² Such home truths, however, were likely to fall on deaf ears. The Asian peasants would not easily be deterred from making the common human blunder of exposing themselves to hitherto unknown evils in their eagerness to escape the known evils from which they were suffering at the moment. As for the Asian intellectuals, they might pay heed to a Western warning against a Russian imperialism if they happened to be natives of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, or Soviet Central Asia, where this warning would evoke an echo in their memory of their own experience; but the voice of this handful of land-locked intellectuals would not carry far. In the experience of an overwhelming majority of the Asian intelligentsia of the day the typical alien imperialist was not a Russian; he was an Englishman, a Frenchman, a Dutchman, or some other variety of Frank. For the past 450 years the West European conquerors of the Ocean had been taking advantage of the conductivity of their physical medium of aggression to perpetrate indiscreet *actes de présence* in every corner of the *Oikoumenê*—'going to and fro in the Earth, and . . . walking up and down it'³ with the assiduity of Satan himself. These ubiquitous Western mariners' Cossack contemporaries who had made the toilsome trek overland from the Urals to the Sea of Okhotsk had contrived hitherto to commit their aggression less conspicuously. In A.D. 1952 the Russian imperialist, in his missionary warfare with the Western imperialist, enjoyed the advantage of being relatively unknown

¹ See V. v. 154-8.

² See IX. viii. 674-5.

³ Job ii. 2.

that had sometimes proved to be a winning card in American presidential elections. At this date the Russian candidate for the spoils of Imperialism was no more than a specious name to most of the peoples to whom Imperialism was now anathema.

By contrast, Eastern Europe was a region where, for the last two hundred years or so, the Russians had been acquiring the self-same bad reputation that, in the world at large, had been pre-empted by the Franks; and in A.D. 1952 a Russian observer, contemplating the entry of Yugoslavia's name on the debit side of his balance sheet, must have been ruefully conscious of Russia's weakness in this quarter. If Slavonic-speaking ex-Orthodox Serb Communists had broken with Slavonic-speaking ex-Orthodox Russian Communists—whose support was of vital importance to Yugoslavia in her dispute with the Western Powers over Trieste—because they could not bear the domineering behaviour of the Soviet Union Communist Party, how could the Soviet Union hope to win any voluntary adherents anywhere in Eastern Europe, or hope permanently to retain her hold on any East European countries if once she found herself reduced to holding them down by sheer physical force? The ominous symptom here, from Russia's point of view, was her unpopularity in East European countries that, as peasant countries, as Orthodox Christian countries, and as Slavonic-speaking countries, ought, on any *a priori* ideological theory, to have felt themselves drawn towards the Soviet Union rather than towards the West.

An Orthodox Christian Georgia, for example, had not been reconciled to Russian rule by the freak of chance that had saddled Russia with a Georgian dictator; a Bulgaria that was Slavonic-speaking as well as Orthodox Christian was apparently as recalcitrant to Russian domination in A.D. 1952 as she had shown herself to be on the morrow of her liberation from Ottoman rule by Russian arms in A.D. 1878; Slavonic-speaking Bosniak Muslims and Croat and Slovene Catholic Christians, who were apt to resent their Serb fellow Yugoslavs' ascendancy, had followed the Serbs' lead with alacrity in the stand that the Serbs had now taken against a Communist Russian imperialism. The Czechs had once looked confidingly to their Russian fellow Slavs to rescue them from the toils of Pan-Germanism; they had cherished this hope all through a century ending in A.D. 1945 with the arrival of a liberating Russian army in a Bohemia that, since the 15th March, 1939, had been a Third German Reich's 'Protectorate'; but the same Czechs had been quickly cured of their sentimental attachment to Russia by the experience of meeting Russians in the flesh in the role of representatives of an officially benevolent occupying Power. As for the Poles, the Magyars, and the Finns, History had demonstrated, long before A.D. 1945, that the Russians had no chance of reconciling them, and *a fortiori* none of assimilating them. The outcome of the Russian Empire's suzerainty over Finland from A.D. 1809 to A.D. 1918, and of her dominion over 'Congress Poland' from A.D. 1815 to A.D. 1915, indicated that a Slavonic-speaking Catholic Poland and an Ugrian-speaking Lutheran Finland were, both of them, proof against any attempts at Russification. As for the Ugrian-speaking Catholic and Calvinist Magyars, Russia had been

their bugbear since A.D. 1849, when her military intervention in support of a Hapsburg Imperial Government at bay had enabled the Emperor Francis Joseph to put down a Magyar national insurrection with which he had been finding himself unable to cope unaided. After the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* of A.D. 1867 Russia had come to figure in Magyar, as in Czech, imaginations as the champion of Pan Slavism; and, when invading Russian armies had arrived in Hungary in A.D. 1945 as the champions of Communism instead, this had not, of course, mollified the Magyars' by that time traditional Russophobia.

Nor could the Russians look forward to offsetting their general unpopularity in Eastern Europe by establishing an advanced post for Communism in Eastern Germany; for, in East German as well as West German minds, the Russian régime was bound to be abhorrent on account of its association with the partition of Germany, like Korea, between a Russian and an American hemisphere and with the annexation of Germany's eastern marches to Poland as far west as the Oder-Neisse Line. In the feelings of all Germans under all régimes after the Second World War, the Soviet Zone of Germany and the German territory annexed to Poland might be expected to fuse together into a monumental *Germania Irredenta*.

Thus, in a world that had been partitioned between the Soviet Union and the United States in A.D. 1947, either Power's hold on important portions of its provisional domain was decidedly precarious; this element of uncertainty made the current Russo-American Balance of Power unstable; this instability was inimical to the statesmen's task of keeping the peace until mutually alien societies, which the progress of Technology had suddenly brought into close quarters with one another, should have had time to become better acquainted; and, though the length of time required for allowing this psychological adjustment to work itself out seemed unlikely to be of the order of magnitude of the six centuries for which the Romano-Iranian frontier had endured after the Augustan *détente* of 23-20 B.C., it was nevertheless evident that a long period of precarious peace would be needed before there could be any practical possibility of placing this peace on the surer foundation of a genuinely good understanding between the Russian and the Western camp.

In the Western peoples' experience, in their intercourse with one another, the key to collective friendships between nations had been individual friendships between human beings whose personal comprehension of one another and goodwill towards one another had spun a network of human links across the psychological barriers set up by politico-military frontiers. In the light of this Western experience the Soviet Union's Western allies had taken the initiative, before the close of the Second World War, in proposing arrangements on a large scale for the promotion of personal intercourse between her nationals and theirs—especially in the promising form of an interchange of students. In the Westerners' belief it was not their fault that these overtures had not met with any response on the Russian side. They deplored the Soviet Government's evident unwillingness to let its subjects take

advantage of these opportunities that were being offered to them of sampling the Western way of life at first hand for themselves; and, while they read in the Soviet Government's opposition to their proposals for intercourse a lack of confidence in the spiritual power of Communism to hold its own against the contemporary Western way of life in the judgement of Soviet citizens, if these were once given a chance of making a comparative personal trial of the two dispensations, this reading of the motives inspiring the Soviet Government's policy of seclusion was no comfort for those Westerners who saw no salvation for the World except in the achievement of a *détente* between the Western Society and its Russian neighbour. If the Politburo's belief in the hold of Communism upon the hearts and minds of Soviet citizens were ever to become robust enough to outweigh the Soviet Government's fear of allowing their subjects to see the Western World for themselves, then (so it would appear to Western minds) a positive approach would have been made towards the healing of a spiritual schism that was a menace to the prospects, not merely of the Western Civilization, but of Mankind itself, not excluding the garrison of a Communist camp.

In circumstances that were so plainly precarious but in other respects so enigmatically obscure, a dogmatic optimism was as unwarrantable as a dogmatic pessimism, and the living generation of Mankind had no choice but to reconcile itself as best it could to the disturbing knowledge that it was facing issues in which its very existence might be at stake, and that it was at the same time impossible at this stage to guess what the event would be.

In A.D. 1952 these perennial waifs on board Noah's Ark were in the situation in which Thor Heyerdahl and his five fellow vikings on board a balsa-log raft found themselves on the morning of the 7th August, 1947. On that fateful morning a westward-flowing current that had borne the raft *Kon-Tiki* 4,300 nautical miles across the breadth of the Pacific Ocean was now carrying her towards the Raroia Reef. Beyond the line of surf breaking over this barrier the approaching seafarers could descry the feathery tops of palm trees, and they knew that these palms bedecked idyllic isles set in a still lagoon; but between them and this haven where they would be¹ ran the foaming and thundering reef 'in one line from horizon to horizon',² and the set of the current and the wind gave the voyagers no chance of circumnavigation. They were heading perforce towards an inevitable ordeal; and, though they might know what were the alternatives awaiting any voyagers in this plight, they could not guess which of these alternatives was to be the ending of their own saga.

If the raft were to be broken up by the breakers, the crew would be torn to pieces by the knife-edged coral if they were not saved by speedy drowning from that more painful death. If the raft were to hold together, and if its crew were to succeed in holding on to it, until the breakers had defeated their own malice by washing the raft up on to the reef

¹ Psalm cvii. 30.

² Heyerdahl, Thor: *Kon-Tiki* (Chicago 1950, Rand McNally), p. 242.

high and dry, a shipwrecked crew might swim across the still lagoon beyond, and so reach one of the palm-crowned isles alive. If the moment of the raft's arrival at the reef should happen to coincide with the flood of one of those high tides that periodically submerged the reef to a depth that compelled the breakers temporarily to subside, the *Kon-Tiki* might, after all, clear the death-line in calm water, and so come through unscathed. In the event, a high tide did flow in to lift her battered frame off the reef into the lagoon¹ some days after the surf had cast her up on to a bare coral crest; but on the morning of the 7th August, 1947, no man on board the *Kon-Tiki* could tell which of these alternative destinies was going to be hers and theirs.

The experience of these six young Scandinavian seafarers on that day was an apt allegory of an ordeal that still lay ahead of Mankind at the opening of the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era. In A.D. 1952 an Ark of Civilization that had travelled a time-distance of some five or six thousand years across the ocean of History was now making, like the *Kon-Tiki*, for a reef which its crew would not be able to circumnavigate. This unavoidable danger ahead was the perilous line of transition between a world partitioned into an American and a Russian sphere and a world united under the control of the single political authority which, in an age of atomic weapons, must supersede the present division of authority sooner or later in one way or another. Was the eventual transition to be pacific or catastrophic, and, if catastrophic, how dire was the catastrophe to be? In A.D. 1952 no one in the World could foreknow the outcome of the ordeal towards which the World was then manifestly moving. One thing alone was certain, and this was that the spirit in which an inevitable ordeal would best be met was the spirit shown by Thor Heyerdahl and his companions at the moment when the *Kon-Tiki* struck the Raroia Reef.

(IV) POSSIBLE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF A FUTURE WORLD ORDER

Without waiting for a facile wisdom after the event, an observer of world affairs in A.D. 1952 might perhaps usefully speculate on the shape of things to come so long as he confined his consideration of a future world order to elements that an oecumenical dispensation seemed likely to have in common with each of the two demi-mundane dispensations that had been crystallizing round the United States and round the Soviet Union since A.D. 1947.

If the construction of a world order had depended on the Technology in which Man was so accomplished an adept, and not on the Human Nature that Man found it so difficult to govern and guide, Mankind in A.D. 1952 could have contemplated the future with complacency; for a simultaneous coalescence and shrinkage of the *Oikoumenê* that had made it more dangerous than ever before to go on waging war had also made it less difficult than ever before to put Mankind in a position to preserve the peace by finding technological solutions for the administrative prob-

¹ See Heyerdahl, op. cit., pp. 273-4.

lem of bringing the whole of the *Oikoumenê* under the undivided control of a single oecumenical government.

In terms of facilities for human intercourse no point in the *Oikoumenê* was so remote from Washington in A.D. 1952 as Georgia and New Hampshire had been when, in A.D. 1792,¹ the Congress of the United States had provided for a four months' delay in the inauguration of a President after the election of his electors, in order to give the successful candidate the time that he would need for winding up his affairs at home and making his way to the seat of the Federal Government on horseback. For purposes of human intercourse the United States at the time of its establishment was of about the same size as the Achaemenian Empire in the fifth century B.C., when it took three months to travel to Susa, the imperial capital, from Ephesus, the Aegean terminus of the Great North-West Imperial Highway;² and the Roman Empire may be reckoned to have been of about the same size in human terms, if we may assume that the centurion who took charge of Saint Paul after the Apostle had appealed to Caesar would not have taken more than three months in conveying his prisoner from the Palestinian port of Caesarea to the Italian port of Puteoli if he had been able to book a direct passage and if he had been less unlucky in his weather.³ In A.D. 1952 three months seemed an inordinate length of time to allow for any journey imaginable. Yet the Roman Empire, the Achaemenian Empire, and the United States in her pre-railroad age were effectively administered commonwealths, though in each of them a period of three months had to be allowed for making the journey from the frontier to the capital; and, in this pre-railroad age, a Darius, Alexander, Demetrius, Caesar, Constantine, and Napoleon were able repeatedly to confound their antagonists by the speed at which they managed to dart from one extremity to another of an *Oikoumenê* whose radius, in human terms, was a three months' journey for ordinary official travellers, and a proportionately longer time than that for anyone not entitled to travel by the public post.

While in point of conductivity an eighteenth-century United States had been a polity of the same order of magnitude as the Roman or the Achaemenian Empire, in point of constitution it had been more ambitious. In contrast to the Roman and Achaemenian imperial régimes, which had been content to impose upon their subjects an authoritarian government maintained by a professional army and administered by a professional civil service responsible to an individual autocrat, the Constitution of the United States had provided for democratic government in a polity of the Roman or Achaemenian size by combining the Medieval Western device of parliamentary representation of an electorate with the

¹ In an Act approved on the 1st March, 1792, the Congress of the United States laid down that the members of the Electoral College, provided in the Constitution (Art. II, § 1, par. 2) for electing the President, should themselves be elected on the Tuesday following the first Monday in the November of a presidential election year, and that the term of office of the President elected by the Electoral College should run from 'the fourth day of March next succeeding' the date of election. The initial date of the President's term of office was eventually advanced from the 4th March to the 20th January by the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, which was proclaimed on the 6th February, 1933—a date by which the United States had moved out of the Horse Age through the Railroad Age into the Air Age.

² See VI. vii. 82, n. 1.

³ See Acts xxvii. 1–xxviii. 16.

Hellenic device of federalism. A representative system in which the people's control over the government was exercised at one remove would, no doubt, have seemed an anaemic dilution of Democracy to citizens of city-states like Florence or Athens, for whom Democracy had signified the direct participation of all the citizens in public affairs; and, for the sake of making a reality of this political ideal, most of these Hellenic and Medieval Western democracies had been content to see the size of their commonwealths limited for ever to the maximum within which a direct participation of the whole citizen body in the government was still practicable. When this was taken as the touchstone for testing the genuineness of Democracy, a country with the area and population of Attica in the fifth century B.C. was the largest that could be governed democratically in the Athenian and Florentine sense; for in Attica the points farthest from the capital—an Eleusis, a Marathon, a Sunium—were none of them farther away from Athens than a single day's journey on foot,¹ while a citizen body that, at a maximum estimate, may have approached a total strength of sixty thousand at its peak,² was unlikely, except on rare occasions, to present itself on the Pnyx in such force as to make the conduct of public business unmanageable.³

¹ On the 10th December, 1911, four students of the British Archaeological School at Athens, one of whom was the writer of this Study, verified this by walking from Sunium to Athens between the dawn and the dusk of a winter's day. Starting from Sunium at 6.30 a.m., our party reached Athens as night was falling. We should have arrived in daylight if, when approaching Vári, we had not wasted an hour or so by swerving off the track and scouring the south-eastern spurs of Hymettus in a vain search for the Cave of Pan. A citizen of fifth-century Athens whose home was at Sunium, Marathon, or Eleusis would, no doubt, have had to spend at least one night in the capital when he made the journey thither on foot in order to transact business there.

² That is, if M. N. Tod, in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, v (Cambridge 1927, University Press), p. 11, is right in interpreting *ἡλικίᾳ* in *The History of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War*, Book II, chap. 13, to mean that the total number of male Athenian citizens of all classes, of the age of eighteen years and upwards, was something between 55,000 and 61,000 in 431 B.C. Whatever the figure actually was in 431 B.C., it may have been higher before 445 B.C., when some 5,000 men were struck off the register in execution of a law, passed in 451-450 B.C., restricting the Athenian franchise to the children of married couples in which both parents had been Athenian citizens at the time of the child's birth. We do not know the extent to which this reduction of the total by 5,000 in 445 B.C. had been offset by natural increase during the next fourteen years.

³ In composing their nostalgic political utopias, in which Sparta was their ideal and Athens was their bugbear (see III. iii. 90-91), Plato and Aristotle agreed with one another in setting the optimum number of citizens of a city-state at a figure that was very much lower than the actual numerical strength of the Athenian citizen body in their day, when its strength was considerably smaller than it had been at its peak. In the *Republic* (423 A-D) Plato declares that, so long as his ideal city-state has the constitution that he has laid down for it, he does not mind if the number of citizens capable of bearing arms is no more than 5,040, and he stipulates that, if the number is to be higher than that, it must not be raised to a figure at which the community will lose its unity. In *The Laws* (737 C-738 A) Plato takes as his criterion for the scale of his ideal city-state the need for the community's man-power to be sufficient to enable it to defend itself successfully if attacked by its neighbours, and on this criterion he opts for a figure of 5,040 citizens capable of bearing arms. Aristotle, in his discussion of the optimum magnitude in *The Politics* (1225 B-1226 B), refrains from committing himself to any precise figure and merely stipulates that the number of the citizens must not be so large as to make it impossible for them to be all personally acquainted with one another, or impossible for an announcer without a loud-speaker (*κῆρυξ ἢ Στενόρροπος*) to make himself heard by the whole assembly. A popular assembly even of this size would, of course, have been unmanageable if it had been the only organ of government. In a competently managed Hellenic democracy such as the Athenian in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., the popular assembly was enabled to transact its business effectively thanks to an infusion of the representative system into the Cleisthenean Constitution of 508-507 B.C. Public business was pre-digested and presented, and its

The size of the territory of the Roman Commonwealth was perhaps hardly more than a third of the size of the territory of a contemporary Athens at the time when, at some date in the fifth century B.C., the Ager Romanus was divided into twenty districts in order to articulate a national popular assembly into as many companies of voters, each consisting of the citizens whose domicile lay in one of these 'tribal' districts;¹ and the maximum distance that any Roman citizen would have to travel from his home to the capital in order to take part in national public business remained well within Attic limits even after the territory of Rome had been enlarged by the addition of one new district (the Tribus Clustumina) up the left bank of the River Tiber² and four further new districts into which the territory of Veii, across the Tiber, was subsequently carved up after its conquest in 396 B.C.³ When in 358 B.C. two more districts (the Pomptina and the Publilia) were carved out of conquered Volscian territory⁴ in the lowlands south-east of the Alban Hills, Roman citizens now resident there might find it still just possible to

subsequent transaction in the popular assembly was controlled, by a grand jury, or general purposes committee, of the citizen body which was, not elected, but picked by lot, on a representative system in which the quota allocated to each local administrative district of Attica was proportionate to the fraction of the total citizen body that was estimated to be represented by the citizens resident in that district. Since this committee (the *Boulê*) was itself five hundred strong and was therefore, like the general assembly, too unwieldy to dispatch executive business in plenary session, it was divided into ten sections, which took it in turns to serve as an executive sub-committee for periods of thirty-six or thirty-five days each within the *Boulê's* twelve months' term of office. This executive sub-committee had a chairman, picked by lot, who changed every twenty-four hours. The task of presiding over meetings of the *Boulê* and of the general assembly was entrusted to a presidential body of nine members, picked by lot *ad hoc*, with a chairman of their own, likewise picked by lot, from the nine sections of the *Boulê* that were not serving as the executive sub-committee at the moment (see Aristotle: *The Constitution of Athens*, chaps. 43-44).

¹ The date of the division of the Ager Romanus into the twenty 'tribal' districts is discussed by K. J. Beloch in his *Römische Geschichte bis zum Beginn der Punischen Kriege* (Berlin and Leipzig 1926, de Gruyter), pp. 270-1 and 298-302. The only certain chronological facts are that these first twenty 'tribal' districts must have been instituted before the addition of a twenty-first (the Clustumina), and that the territory of Crustumium, out of which this twenty-first district was constituted, must have been annexed to the Ager Romanus before the annexation, in 396 B.C., of the territory of Veii, on the opposite bank of the river, which was subsequently carved up into four more districts (the twenty-second to the twenty-fifth inclusive). It can also be deduced from the lie of the land that the territory of Fidenae, along the left bank of the Tiber between the territory of Crustumium and Rome, must have been annexed to the Ager Romanus before the annexation of Crustumium, and Beloch (in op. cit., pp. 298-302) gives reasons for thinking that Fidenae was conquered by Rome in either 428 B.C. or 426 B.C. We do not know, however, whether this conquered Fidenate territory was included in one of the first twenty Roman 'tribal' districts or in the twenty-first district, i.e., the Clustumina.

Even, however, if the Ager Fidenas was already included in the Ager Romanus at the date at which the original twenty Roman 'tribal' districts were instituted, the aggregate area of the Ager Romanus at the time would have been no more than 861.5 square kilometres, as against 822 if at that time Fidenae was still independent (these figures will be found in Beloch, op. cit., p. 178). On the other hand the area of Attica, within her frontiers as they ran in the fifth century B.C., was as much as 2,440 square kilometres according to Beloch's reckoning in his *Die Bevölkerung der Griechisch-Römischen Welt* (Leipzig 1886, Duncker and Humblot), p. 56, if we include the island of Salamis, which had been colonized by Athenian citizens, but omit the two districts of Oropus and Eleutheræ, adjoining the land-frontier between Attica and Boeotia. Thucydides describes the Oropians as 'subjects of Athens' (Book II, chap. 23; cp. Book IV, chap. 99), while it is not certain that the Eleutheræis possessed the full Athenian franchise (the status of the inhabitants of these two districts is discussed by G. de Sanctis in his *Atthis* (Turin 1912, Bocca), p. 333, n. 1).

² See Beloch, *Römische Geschichte*, pp. 159, 174, 265, and 270.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 607.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 265 and 356-8.

exercise their public rights and duties in the capital by making, within the day, a journey that was rather longer than the journey from Sunium to Athens. This physical feat would certainly have been practicable for Roman citizens domiciled in two other new districts (the Maecia and the Scaptia) that were carved in 332 B.C.¹ out of territory, ceded to Rome in 338 B.C. by the Confederation of Latin City-States, between the two previously acquired outlying districts in the Pomptine Marshes and the metropolitan domain of the Roman Commonwealth containing the original twenty districts. A Roman citizen domiciled in another new district (the Oufentina), carved in 318 B.C. out of territory, ceded to Rome by Privernum,² in the Pomptine Marshes south-east of the two districts established there in 358 B.C., might have been able to reach Rome within the day by an athlete's *tour de force*; but the task would have defeated the classical Athenian long-distance runner Philippides himself if Philippides had been a Roman citizen domiciled in a district (the Falerna) that had been constituted in 332 B.C.³ out of territory, ceded to Rome by Capua along the north bank of the Lower Volturnus, more than a hundred miles away from Rome as the aeroplane flies;⁴ and, when in the course of the years 268–241 B.C. the territory inhabited by Roman citizens legally invested with the active rights of citizenship was progressively extended from the northern environs of Rome northward across the Appennines to the shores of the Adriatic, and when these fully enfranchised Sabines and Picentes were enrolled in 241 B.C. in a newly created Tribus Quirina and Tribus Velina,⁵ the territory of the Roman Commonwealth flagrantly burst the bounds within which it was physically possible for every citizen to participate in the national government directly.

Thus, long before the time when the Roman Empire became co-extensive with the Hellenic World, and when local communities of transplanted or naturalized Roman citizens were scattered all over the territory of this Roman-built Hellenic universal state, an ever increasing majority of the total Roman citizen body had come to find itself unable in practice to exercise its rights and duties in the forum of Roman national politics simply because its domiciles were too far distant from a capital city that was the only place where, under Rome's city-state constitution, national public business could legitimately be transacted.⁶

¹ See Beloch, *Römische Geschichte*, pp. 164–5, 388, and 525.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 390 and 526.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 388.

⁴ The writer flew over this stretch of country, from Ostia to the gap between Terracina and Monte Circeo, on the 28th October, 1948, after having traversed it by train on the 14th November, 1911.

⁵ See Beloch, *op. cit.*, p. 265; eundem: *Der Italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie* (Leipzig 1880, Teubner), pp. 76 and 122–3.

⁶ As late as A.D. 69, when the *Pax Augusta* was a century old, and when a quarter of a millennium had passed since the date when Rome had made herself virtually mistress of the Hellenic World by overthrowing Macedon, the last other Hellenic Great Power capable of challenging Rome's supremacy, the Roman public was surprised at the discovery that the post of autocrat in constitutional disguise (*princeps*), which had long since become an indispensable organ in the government of the Roman Commonwealth, could be filled by a pronunciamiento on the part of Roman citizens serving in the garrisons of the imperial frontiers ('*Finis Neronis . . . varios motus animorum non modo in urbe apud patres aut populum aut urbanum militem, sed omnes legiones ducesque conciverat, evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri*' (Tacitus: *Histories*, Book I, chap. 4).

These outlying Roman citizens had to satisfy their Hellenic craving for direct participation in the government of a city-state by participating in the local government of the *praefectura*, *forum*, *conciliabulum*, *colonia Romana*, or *municipium* of which they were also citizens under a Boeotian system of dual citizenship that had been adopted by the Roman Commonwealth as well as by its post-Alexandrine contemporaries the Seleucid Monarchy and the Aetolian and Achaean confederacies;¹ but this municipal franchise was no compensation for the virtual disfranchisement that had been inflicted on them in the forum of Roman national politics, not by any narrow-hearted policy of making the control of the Roman national government a monopoly of a metropolitan minority of the citizen body,² but by the inability of pre-mechanical means of communication to enable the outlying citizens of the Roman Commonwealth to put in an appearance in the capital city when the territory inhabited by Roman citizens had become as extensive as it had actually come to be some two or three centuries before the Emperor Tiberius, upon his accession in A.D. 14, at last took cognizance of the stultification of Rome's city-state constitution by her territorial expansion in the long since overdue act of liquidating the anachronistic Roman national popular assemblies in the capital city.

It was, in fact, technologically impossible for the Roman citizen body in the first century of the Christian Era—and *a fortiori* in the third century, after the enfranchisement of almost all Rome's alien subjects in A.D. 212 by the Emperor Caracalla (*imperabat* A.D. 211-17)³—to take, in the government of a Pan-Hellenic Roman Empire, the direct part that the Athenian citizen body in the fifth century B.C. had been able to take in the government of Attica; and this would likewise have been impossible in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era for the citizen body of a United States whose populated territory was then still confined to the eastern seaboard of North America between the Atlantic and the Appalachian Mountains. On the other hand, by A.D. 1952 the progress made by Western technology within the 177 years that had elapsed since the Declaration of Independence had, in terms of human intercourse, reduced to the dimensions of a Periclean Attica a United States that now stretched from coast to coast of the North American island. On the 10th October, 1950, it took the writer of this Study a shorter time, by four hours, to fly from New York to Los Angeles than it had taken him to walk from Sunium to Athens on the 10th December, 1911. By A.D. 1952 it was possible for any politician in Washington, on any day of the year, to present himself, within the day, in person before an audience in any part of the United States; and, though it was not possible for him to be present in the flesh in every city, town, village, and homestead in the country at the self-same moment, it was possible at the self-same moment

¹ See IV. iv. 310-13.

² It was true that Roman citizens organized in local communities with the status of *municipia* had originally been saddled with the duties of Roman citizenship without enjoying the corresponding rights; but Roman citizens organized in local communities with the status of *coloniae Romanae* had always enjoyed these rights, besides being bound by those duties, subject to their being physically able to exercise these rights by making the journey to Rome.

³ See V. vi. 7, n. 4; VI. vii. 156, n. 3; VI. vii. 375; and pp. 553-4, below.

for every inhabitant of all these homesteads, villages, towns, and cities to enjoy the edifying experience of listening to Cleon by radio and viewing him by television.

Thanks to these recent *chefs-d'œuvre* of Western Technology, it was in fact possible for all citizens of the United States at any moment to listen in and look in to the public discussion of political issues; and it was also possible for the spokesmen of any 'lobby' to take a more active part than this in American national politics by flying within the day from Portland, Oregon, or from San Diego, California, to Washington, D.C., and bringing Cleon to bay in his den on Capitol Hill before the demagogue had had time to forestall a Pacific Slope 'pressure group's' offensive by winging his own way to the Pacific Coast and cajoling a Californian or Oregonian audience face to face. It was true that the citizen body could not yet descend on Washington at a day's notice *en masse* pending the requisite multiplication of seats on aeroplanes and rooms in hotels. Yet, if in this respect the United States in A.D. 1952 might be deemed still to be not quite so close-knit, in terms of human intercourse, as Attica had been in 449 B.C., the United States was already closer-knit than Attica had ever been on the new plane of intercourse that the inventions of broadcasting and television had opened up. In Hellenic history there had never been a time when the entire population even of a Lilliputian Belbina, not to speak of a Brobdingnagian Attica, had been able to listen to the voice, and watch the countenance and gestures, of a politician talking to an assembly in the agora at the capital. On this plane the United States in A.D. 1952 was as diminutive in size, expressed in terms of human intercourse, as Abraham Lincoln's Springfield or as Demosthenes' Paeania; and the United States' size today gave the measure of the World's size tomorrow, since, if any one thing could be predicted with assurance in the apprehensive World of this date, it was that a rapidly growing fleet of aeroplanes, flying at a rapidly accelerating speed, would become capable of reaching their destinations in a rapidly diminishing number of minutes, and that a rapidly growing host of radio and television sets would become capable of picking up sights and sounds at a rapidly increasing distance from the points where these importunate instruments were located.

It will be seen that in A.D. 1952 world government was already within Mankind's grasp in so far as Technology could avail to thrust this now urgent political necessity into human hands. As soon, however, as we ascend—or descend—from the plane of Technology to the plane of Human Nature, we find the earthly paradise skilfully assembled by the ingenuity of *Homo Faber* being reduced to a fool's paradise by the perversity of *Homo Politicus*.

In A.D. 1952 a democratic world government that had now become technologically feasible was not within sight of becoming practical politics, because the ripe fruits of Technology could not be harvested without a change of heart of which, so far, there was little sign. In a coalescing and shrinking *Oikoumenê* whose human inhabitants were finding themselves at ever closer quarters with one another, an urgently needed, but not yet inaugurated, world order was still awaiting the

fulfilment of a prophecy made in the Syriac World in the eighth century B.C. by the Judæan seer Isaiah:

'The wolf . . . shall dwell with the lamb and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them. And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young ones shall lie down together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. And the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice' den. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all My holy mountain; for the Earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.'¹

This Hebrew prophecy had not been left altogether unfulfilled by the Earth's non-human fauna; for it was a scientifically verified fact that the beasts of prey did have a habit of granting a truce to fellow creatures that were normally their quarry when a drought drove them all to the same still welling spring, or a forest fire to the same still unscorched glade, or a flood to the same still unsubmerged holy mountain; and these habitual signs of grace in the dumb animals' response to the challenge of emergencies threatening the lives of all creatures alike were the foil against which a Syriac prophet or a Western naturalist would contemplate the twentieth-century spectacle of human carnivores that still could not or would not bring themselves to enter into a Truce of God, even when they were being forced to rub shoulders with one another by the menacing rise of a tide of atomic science round the coasts of a shrinking *Oikoumenê*.

In A.D. 1952 the nearest approach to political co-operation that a Russian bear and an American eagle found themselves able to make to one another was their common participation in the activities of the United Nations Organization. The inability of the two surviving Great Powers to come closer together than this had been the limiting factor that had prevented the architects of the constitution of the U.N.O. from making of it anything more intimate than a forum for international debate between delegates of the governments of sovereign independent states, of which three, besides the two titans, were armed with a veto on resolutions passed by a majority of their fellow states-members. During the five years of its existence up to date, the U.N.O. had demonstrated its value, notwithstanding the severity of these limitations, by proving to be a decidedly more conductive means of political communication than 'the usual diplomatic channels'. Delegates of the United States Government and the Soviet Government could still continue to talk to one another here when the traditional channels of communication had become choked; and at Lake Success they were parleying in the presence, and with the participation, of delegates of governments of states of lesser calibre which, in this forum, had a constitutional right to make their own voices heard.

These were no mean services to the cause of peace and concord; and an oecumenical institution that provided these services was one with which Mankind could not afford to dispense in their perilous situation at the time. Yet these merits did not make the U.N.O. capable of be-

¹ Isa. xi. 6-9.

coming the embryo of a world government. The realities of the distribution of power in the World that had emerged from the Second World War were not adequately reflected in the clumsiness of a constitution that had embodied the unrealistic principle of 'one state one vote', and that had then found no better means of bringing a fictitious 'equality of states' into line with a harsh reality than the concession to five Powers of a veto that was denied to their nominal peers. The best prospect in sight for the U.N.O. was a possibility that it might evolve from being a forum into becoming a confederacy; but there was a great gulf fixed between any confederacy of sovereign independent parochial governments and any federation of peoples with a central government claiming and receiving the direct personal allegiance of each individual citizen of the union; and it was notorious that the history of political institutions knew of no case in which this gulf had been crossed by any other process than a revolutionary leap.

On this showing, the U.N.O. seemed unlikely to be the institutional nucleus out of which an eventually inevitable world government would develop, though it seemed likely to remain an indispensable instrument for the preservation of peace unless and until a unitary world government had grown out of some other germ. In A.D. 1952 the probability seemed to be that, if and when an effective world government did come into being, it would take shape through a development, not of the U.N.O., but of one or other of two older and tougher political 'going concerns' which, as a result of the outcome of a Second World War, had already partitioned the *Oikoumenê* between them. The world government of the future seemed likely to stem either from the Government of the United States, which in A.D. 1952 was already in effect the government of more than one-half of the *Oikoumenê*, or from the Government of the Soviet Union, which at the same date was already in effect the government of the rest of the Habitable and Traversable World.

If the living generation of Mankind had been free to choose

utrorum ad regna cadendum
omnibus humanis esset terrâque marique,¹

there could be little doubt in a contemporary Western observer's mind that a decisive majority of all living men and women that were competent to make any judgement at all upon this issue, and an overwhelming majority of such people in all Western countries, would have opted for becoming subjects of the United States, and not subjects of the Soviet Union, so long as these two Powers continued to divide between them the dominion over the *Oikoumenê*; and there could be equally little doubt that the same millions would also have prayed for the victory of the United States in the event of a war between the two Powers for the prize of world-wide supremacy that the elimination of one competitor would leave exclusively in the surviving competitor's hands. In Western eyes, at least, it seemed self-evident that, if Mankind were indeed to be confronted with a choice between destroying itself or acquiescing in the enforcement of peace by the fiat of some single Power, and if they were

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book III, ll. 836-7, quoted on p. 484, above.

then to be confronted with a choice between the United States and the Soviet Union as the only possible two candidates for this necessary yet invidious political mission, the United States would be preferable, out of all comparison, to the Soviet Union as the victor in this fateful competition for being the Power whose fiat the rest of Mankind was henceforth to obey.

The virtues that made the United States incomparably preferable to the Soviet Union as a candidate for this imperial role stood out conspicuously against a Communist Russian foil.

America's cardinal virtue in the sight of her present and prospective subjects was her transparently sincere reluctance to be drawn into playing this role at all. An appreciable portion of the living generation of American citizens, as well as all the ancestors of all American citizens who were not themselves immigrants, had been moved to pluck up their roots in the Old World and to start life again on the farther side of the Atlantic by a yearning, not to meddle in, but to extricate themselves from, the affairs of a Continent whose dust either they or their forebears had once demonstratively shaken from off their feet;¹ and the buoyancy of the hope with which the forebears had made their deliberate withdrawal from the Old World in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries was matched by the poignancy of the regret with which the living generation of Americans was making its compulsory twentieth-century return. The compulsion, as we have seen,² was taking the form of an 'annihilation of distance' through the progress of a Western technology; and the Americans themselves had done perhaps more than any other Western people to develop this peculiarly Western art in the direction in which its course was now running directly counter to its American adepts' cherished political aims and ideals. The flaming sword wielded by this inexorable angel of their own creation who was expelling the Americans from their utopian earthly paradise had been flaring in the skies since the invention of the aeroplane at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet nothing less cogent than the experience of finding themselves involved willy nilly in two world wars in one lifetime could have moved the American people between A.D. 1941 and A.D. 1947—as the Japanese people had been moved between A.D. 1853 and A.D. 1868 by the logic of comparably portentous events—to recognize that they could no longer safeguard their interests, independence, or even existence unless they broke with a traditional policy of isolation which still retained a hold on their hearts even when it was ceasing to convince their intellects. Shrinking, as they did, from involvement in international politics, the Americans shrank still more vehemently from being cast, as they were being cast by their inescapable preponderance in power, for the role of serving as their neighbours' leaders and masters; and their manifestly genuine regrets for a lost idyllic seclusion were their best credentials for commending them to foreign peoples over whom the force of circumstances was constraining them to assume authority.

'The truth is, and must be, that social life is happiest and most har-

¹ Matt. x. 14; Mark vi. 11; Luke ix. 5 and x. 11; Acts xiii. 51 and xviii. 6.

² On pp. 479-86, above.

monious where those who have to rule are the last people who would choose to be rulers, and is least happy and least harmonious where the rulers are of the opposite disposition.¹

On the morrow of the Second World War, Plato's dictum was as exculpatory for the Americans as it was damning for the Russians.²

The Americans' second outstanding virtue was their generosity. It has been noticed in a previous chapter,³ as one of the auspicious features in the situation after the Second World War, that the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, was a 'sated' Power; but the economic and social situations of the two countries were identical only in the general sense that Russia, like America, was a country commanding vast still undeveloped human and non-human resources. In contrast to America, Russia had hardly yet begun to exploit her potentialities, and the developments that she had carried out at such cost in human effort and suffering during the twelve years immediately preceding the German assault upon her in A.D. 1941 had been largely sabotaged by her abominable Western invaders. Thereafter, the Russians had taken an unjust advantage of finding themselves on the winning side by recouping themselves for the Germans' destruction of Russian industrial plant by seizing and removing plant, not only from a guilty Germany, but from East and Central European countries that the Russians professed to be liberating from the Nazis, and from Chinese provinces in Manchuria that they professed to be liberating from the Japanese. This was a contrast indeed to the United States' post-war reconstruction policy of first making, on a vote passed in the House of Representatives at Washington on the 25th January, 1944, a major contribution to the resources placed at the disposal of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and then following up this short-term emergency measure for the relief of the war-stricken peoples of the World by launching, on the 5th June, 1947, a long-term plan for reconstruction in Europe that was to be payable entirely out of the American tax-payer's pocket.

The Marshall Plan was perhaps not quite unprecedented. There was a classical precedent in a post-Alexandrine chapter of Hellenic history that had seen the states of the Hellenic World of the day vie with one another in the generosity of their gifts to the city-state of Rhodes after Rhodes had been smitten by an earthquake in 227 B.C.⁴ This, however, had been a case of many countries contributing towards the relief of one country, whereas the Marshall Plan was a case of one country offering help to all the rest, and making this offer at a time when the donor was

¹ Plato: *Respublica*, 520 D, quoted in III. iii. 252.

² Damning, that is to say, for the Russians in the role of rulers, in which the Russians had always been at their worst. There had, however, been another role in which the Russians had always been at their best since the days of Boris and Gleb (*passorum* A.D. 1015), and that was the role of martyrs. The noble army of Russian martyrs, whose ranks had been perpetually recruited by one generation after another of intrepid volunteers from the eleventh century to the twentieth, bore witness to the historical fact that the tyrannical vein in the Russian *êthos* had always been under challenge from an anti-theological Russian spirit of self-sacrificing love that had known no fear of 'them which kill the Body but are not able to kill the Soul' (Matt. x. 28; cp. Luke xii. 4-5). A student of Russian history, looking forward in A.D. 1952, would be slow to believe that this other vein in the Russian *êthos* had run dry.

³ On p. 478, above.

⁴ See Polybius: *Oecumenical History*, Book V, chaps. 88-90, cited on p. 271, above.

already the strongest single Power in the World of the day. In the past it had been customary for dominant Powers, not to give, but to take,¹ and there had been no departure from this evil custom in the policy that the Soviet Union had been following. In setting a new moral standard for 'power politics' by launching the Marshall Plan, American statesmanship was putting Russian post-war actions to shame and Russian post-war intentions to an 'acid test',² and on both these counts Russian statesmanship made a poor showing in its response to this searching American challenge. In declining Marshall Aid for the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government might be held to be acting within its rights, and foreign critics, at any rate, had no *locus standi* for objecting to a decision against which no effective protest had been made by the *misera plebs Sovietica* at whose expense their government's decision had been taken; but, in using her hold over her satellites in order to compel them too to reject the American offer, the Soviet Union was guilty of an abuse of power that was particularly flagrant in cases in which countries at her mercy whom she was forbidding to accept American assistance happened to be countries that were doubly in need of it because they had been stripped by the Soviet Government, since the end of the Second World War, of industrial plant which the war itself had spared.

It will be seen that Russia's behaviour would have made a present to America of the beau rôle even if America's behaviour had not been as handsome as in fact it was; and this contrast between the post-war records of the two surviving Great Powers comes out even more sharply when we pass from the economic plane to the political and the military. A post-war world that was craving for freedom from want had a still greater yearning for freedom from fear; and, while the fear inspired by the Soviet Union was as intense as it was ubiquitous, fathers of families in countries under the hegemony of the United States were not being kept awake at night by any fear that a United States Government that had them in its power might abuse this power by coercing them with the threat of taking their children's lives with atomic weapons which, in 'the Free World', were an American monopoly.

Citizens of West European countries were, however, now haunted by fears that some American decision, in which the West European peoples

¹ Imperial Powers which, like the Roman Empire in the Hellenic World and the British Rāj in India, had plumed themselves on their disinterestedness, had been apt to claim credit, not for having subsidized their subjects out of their own pockets, but for having (as Clive saw it) shown an astonishing moderation in leaving even a shred of wool on the backs of defenceless sheep whom the imperialists had been at liberty to shear. It was true that, in the British dominions in India, Lord Cornwallis had restrained a British rapacity, and stamped out a British corruption, that had been running riot for a generation, and that in the Roman Empire Caesar and Augustus had put an end to the still more disgraceful orgies of Roman business men after these had run riot for longer than a century and a half; but such testimonials are not easy to distinguish from indictments. 'What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid' (Rom. vi. 1-2).

² In A.D. 1947 the reigning government in Russia was a fair target for a telling phrase which in A.D. 1918 had been levelled primarily at the government then reigning in Germany by a President of the United States speaking on Russia's behalf. 'The treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will' (Point VI of President Wilson's Fourteen Points announced in his address at a joint session of the two houses of the Congress at Washington on the 8th January, 1918).

might have had no say, might inadvertently bring Russian atomic missiles hurtling down on Dutch, Danish, French, and British heads. Such West European fears of dire consequences descending upon Western Europe as unintended by-products of some impulsive American retort to some provocative Russian act of aggression were anxieties that might or might not be well founded, but their currency in Western Europe was a fact, and this psychological fact exposed a constitutional flaw in the structure of a commonwealth of Western nations in which all the partners, with the crucial exception of one partner whose 'fiat' was 'law', were exposed to the risk of being involved in a perhaps irretrievable catastrophe as a consequence of decisions in which they might have had no voice, on issues in which, for them, the stakes were life and death. It was proverbial that in a society articulated into a number of sovereign independent parochial states every people was apt to get the government that it deserved;¹ and even this political nemesis was not easy for human souls to bear, notwithstanding the undeniable justice of it. In a commonwealth of nations indissolubly associated under the hegemony of a paramount Power, the lot of all the subordinate participants was the intolerable injustice of getting a government that had been deserved, not by them, but by their predominant partner; and this was the plight of America's, as well as Russia's, satellites in A.D. 1952.

It was, moreover, a plight that could not be mitigated appreciably by resorting either to 'the usual diplomatic channels' or to the new forum provided by the United Nations Organization. Under the current unwritten constitution of a nascent Western Community, issues of vital or lethal moment to its West European, Canadian, and Australian citizens were being decided by the play of party politics in the domestic political arena of the United States. The non-American citizens of the Western Community had no institutional means of taking part in the working out of Western policy at this domestic American formative stage; and the most that their municipal governments could do on their behalf was to make the ineffective gesture of tabling motions pleading that a stable door should be locked after an apocalyptic steed had flown.²

By A.D. 1952 a celebrated American definition, dating from A.D. 1895, of the standing of the United States in the Western Hemisphere had come to be no less true of her standing in a world-wide *Oikoumenê* in which all countries were under the United States' hegemony save those that were under the Soviet Union's domination.

'To-day the United States is practically sovereign' ['in the United States' portion of a partitioned world', as an observer, quoting Olney's despatch in

¹ 'Toute nation a le gouvernement qu'elle mérite' (de Maistre, J.: *Lettres et Opuscules Inédits* (Paris 1851, Vaton), vol. i, p. 215, 15th August, 1811).

² By the end of the year A.D. 1950 these painful truths had been borne in upon the minds of the West European citizens of the Western Community by their experience of an international crisis over a local war in Korea that had been threatening to rankle into a war of world-wide dimensions. The contemporary reaction of a West European nationalist was expressed in caricature in the aphorism 'America was thus clearly top nation, and History came to a.' (Sellar, W. C., and Yeatman, R. J.: *1066 and All That* (London 1930, Methuen), p. 115). The reaction of a West European federalist, addressing himself to an American public, might be expressed in the slogan: 'No annihilation without representation.'

A.D. 1952, would be inclined to amend the text in substitution for the original words 'on this continent'], 'and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilised state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources, combined with its isolated position, render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other Powers.'

This dictum on the standing of the United States had not lost any of its cogency in coming to be applicable to a far wider sphere of hegemony than had been in the mind of the Secretary of State at Washington who had written those sentences in A.D. 1895; and, though a patriotic non-American citizen of a twentieth-century Western commonwealth of nations might be content to make the pertinent comment that the most lacerating American whips were, at any rate, less grievous instruments of political chastisement than even the least venomous Russian scorpions, 'a philosopher' might 'be permitted to enlarge his views'² by taking some meteorological observations. In the first place he would observe that the virtual monopoly, by a paramount Power, of the determination and execution of policies in which the lives and fortunes of satellite peoples were at stake was pregnant with a constitutional problem that could not be evaded; second, that, in the partitioned *Oikoumenê* of A.D. 1952, this problem was a live one both in the American and in the Russian sphere of hegemony or domination; third, that the problem would still present itself, and still demand a solution, if the two spheres were eventually to be amalgamated; and, fourth, that this problem could not be solved without recourse to some form of federal union.

The mere recital of these observations made it clear that the constitutional issues raised by the advent of a supra-national order on the political plane were unlikely to be settled easily or rapidly. One promising feature in the situation was that the United States and the Soviet Union—one or both of whom would have a decisive say in the constitutional development of a commonwealth of nations under its hegemony—were, as it happened, both of them morally committed to an approval of federalism in principle in virtue of having written it into their own constitutions.

The Constitution of the United States was the product of a deliberate choice of full federal union in preference to a looser form of political association—between states only, and not also between human beings—that had quickly been proved inadequate by painful experience; and the people of the thirteen original states—members of the Union had federated with one another on terms that had left a door open for the admission of new-comers. In the minds of latter-day citizens of a United States that had increased its membership from the original figure of thirteen states to an eventual figure of forty-eight between A.D. 1792 and A.D. 1912, a

¹ Secretary of State Richard Olney, in a dispatch of the 20th July, 1895, to the United States Ambassador to the Court of St. James's.

² Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West', at the end of chap. xxxviii.

familiarity with the history of their country during those 120 years had associated the idea of federalism with the idea of progressively incorporating additional constituents; and against the historical background of this domestic American precedent a suggestion that the American people themselves might one day enter into a federation with other peoples would not be startling even to Americans who found it unpalatable. A federation between the peoples of the United States and other English-speaking countries would, indeed, be very closely in line with domestic American constitutional tradition. A proposal to extend a federation of English-speaking Western peoples to Continental West European peoples that were akin to the English-speaking peoples in their way of life without being linked with them by a community of language might, on the other hand, look, in American eyes, like a hitherto untried venture for which no adequate precedent was to be found in the domestic American experience of incorporating into the citizen body of the United States a small French-speaking population in Louisiana in A.D. 1803 and small Spanish-speaking populations in California and New Mexico in A.D. 1848. Yet the United States' next-door neighbour Canada was a successfully working model of a federation between two peoples, speaking different languages and professing different religions, who were approximately equal to one another in numbers; and another cue was offered by the letter of the law officially in force in the Soviet Union.

In Western eyes the federal constitution with which the Soviet Union had equipped itself might look suspiciously like a façade put up to mask the retention or re-establishment of a centralized despotism that had the momentum of six hundred years of Russian history behind it. The Petrine Russian Empire from which the Soviet Union had inherited its immense patrimony had been the heir of a Muscovite principality that, from the fourteenth century of the Christian Era onwards, had added field to field by extinguishing the independence of one after another of its neighbours. Was not the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics merely a disingenuous new title for a unitary autocracy of which no concealment had been made by Stalin's franker predecessors Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible? As far as any Western observer could judge, this current Western critique of the constitution of the Soviet Union was fair comment on the whole. Yet there was one point in which the Bolsheviks' professed constitutional new departure appeared to have some substance, and this was a point in which Stalin's hand was credibly reported to have been at work. Thanks to his own Georgian origin, Stalin seems to have appreciated the strength of the nationalist opposition aroused among the non-Russian subjects of the former Russian Empire by a policy of Russification; and he seems to have drawn the conclusion that, if this policy were not repudiated and reversed by the Tsardom's Communist successors, the effect would be to alienate the non-Great-Russian citizens of the Soviet Union from a Communism which they would then write off as a new disguise for a familiar Russian imperialism.

Accordingly, when the constitution of the Soviet Union was being worked out during the years A.D. 1918-24,¹ the internal administrative

¹ The constitution in force in A.D. 1952 was that of the 6th December, 1936.

map of the former Russian Empire was entirely recast—and this apparently on Stalin's initiative—on lines that brought it into correspondence with the linguistic map; and the non-Great-Russian nationalities of the Union—including even the smallest and the most backward peoples in the Caucasus, the Urals, and Central Asia—were thus granted at least the boon of having their local administration and education conducted in their own mother tongues, however illusory their official autonomy might be in other respects. This Stalinian administrative map of the Soviet Union, drawn on a linguistic basis, was no *Magna Carta*. For example, the erection of an Autonomous Republic of Bashkiristan within the framework of a Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in A.D. 1920 did nothing to abate the centralization at Moscow of the control of police, communications, economic affairs, and, indeed, all the effective levers of power; and, more than that, it did nothing in this case—under a local government on which the Bashkirs themselves were not represented—to check the continuation under the Soviet régime of the unedifying process of chicanery, expedited by brute force, through which, under the Tsardom, the Bashkirs' lands had been passing into Great Russian hands.¹ No doubt the Bashkirs, like the Five Civilized Indian Nations in the South-Eastern United States, were marked out for being made the victims of spoliation by the fact of their happening to lie in the fairway of a mighty tide of aggressive colonization; but the Bashkirs were not the only non-Russian people to suffer adversity under the Soviet régime. Thereafter, in the Great Purge of A.D. 1936, the non-Great-Russian personnel in the governments of some of the non-Great-Russian units on Stalin's administrative map was reported to have been liquidated,² and in the Russo-German War of A.D. 1941–5 both the Crimean Tatar Republic and the Kalmuck Republic on the Steppe between the Lower Don and the Lower Volga seem to have foundered on the charge that their peoples had been guilty of disloyalty to the Soviet cause.

It will be seen that Stalin's administrative map of the Soviet Union was not to be taken at its face value; but a moral commitment cannot be wiped out through being dishonoured by its makers; and, in the world that had emerged from the Second World War, Stalin's map might live to be translated, after all, from the limbo of camouflage into the realm of reality if, on either side of the dividing line between a Russian and an American demi-monde, the letter of the Soviet Union's federal constitution were one day to be applied in the spirit of the Pan American Union of Republics and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

On the constitutional plane neither of these two political associations between a number of fully self-governing parochial states was a stage on any road leading towards world government, since the basis of both associations was the scrupulousness of the associated states' reciprocal respect for one another's independence. The members of the Pan American Union were not moving towards a federation between these

¹ See Pipes, R. E.: 'The First Experiment in Soviet National Policy: The Bashkir Republic, 1917–1920', in *The Russian Review*, October 1950 (New York), pp. 303–19.

² See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1937*, vol. i (London 1938, Milford), pp. 13–20.

successor-states of four different West European Powers' colonial empires,¹ and the members of the British Commonwealth had been positively moving away from the former political unity of an old-fashioned British Empire governed from Westminster. The British Commonwealth was, in fact, an *entente* between mutually independent states that had disengaged themselves from a unitary empire, while the Pan American Union was an *entente* between mutually independent states that had never been united politically in the past and were not moving towards unity now. Yet, just because the weaker parties to the association were aware—as they were in either case—that the strongest member of the partnership had no intention of misusing his superior strength in order to impose his will upon the rest, both the Pan American Union and the British Commonwealth had achieved a felicitous relation of psychological parity between states of widely different calibre whose peoples not only spoke different languages but were also divided from one another by the more formidable barrier of a diversity in their ways of life. In this favourable psychological climate it had proved possible for Great Britain and Ceylon, the Indian Union and New Zealand, the United States and Guatemala, Brazil and Hayti, freely to co-operate with one another as moral equals; and the spirit animating these *ententes* might be enlisted in the cause of federation.

Though the practical possibility of federation, either with the United States or with the Soviet Union, was limited by the notorious fact that, hitherto, so intimate a form of political association had proved practicable only between communities closely akin to one another in their ways of life, the cultural and social circumstances of the time gave scope, within these limits, for federal union on a considerable scale. Federation with the Soviet Union did not, it is true, seem likely, in the dubious judgement of a Western observer, to prove an attractive proposition either to the Soviet Union's Orthodox Christian satellites to the south of her or to her Western Christian satellites to the west of her; but a federal union between the United States, the other English-speaking peoples, and the Continental West European peoples would already have been within sight above the horizon of practical politics if an affinity in culture and a community of interests had been the sole, or even the decisive, considerations. The obstacle—and it was a formidable one—was a human political animal's proneness to give prejudice the precedence over common sense and to allow itself to be swayed by feelings instead of taking rational decisions on the merits of a constitutional case. An American people which had once had to fight in order to win its independence would be reluctant to pool its sovereignty in a federal partnership with other peoples, even if the candidates for partnership were peoples of like passions with itself² and also even if the principal partner were assured that her own representation in the prospective federal government would be proportionate, not merely to the relative numerical strength of her population, but to an index figure registering

¹ The United States was a successor-state of the British Empire, Brazil of the Portuguese, and Hayti of the French. All the other seventeen members of the Pan American Union were successor-states of the Spanish Empire.

² Acts xiv. 15.

the United States' overwhelming preponderance over the rest of the Western World in economic productivity. On the other side, West European satellites of the United States might be reluctant, for their part, to sacrifice a shadow of sovereignty that they still retained in a dependent relation which actually left them at the United States' mercy; and, for the sake of clinging to this shadow, they might refrain from making any attempt to win the substance of an equitable share in the joint conduct of common affairs which could be obtained only at the price of pooling, in a federal union with the United States, a sovereignty which, in this form, could be revalidated within limits corresponding to current political and economic realities.

The mulish perversity of Human Nature that thus threatened to assert itself on both sides, if and when a proposal for federation was brought forward, was an obstacle that could not be expected to yield easily or quickly to common sense and goodwill; yet there were historical precedents which indicated that, in any commonwealth of nations that had originated in the establishment of one dominant Power's paramountcy over a cluster of satellites, the passage of time would be likely to bring with it a gradual approach towards political equality through the progressive enfranchisement of the imperial people's former subjects or subordinates.¹

In the history of a Roman Commonwealth whose *arcanum imperii* had been its liberality in conferring the Roman citizenship upon aliens who had fallen under Rome's rule or hegemony, successive narrow-hearted reactions against this characteristic manifestation of a Roman political genius had all, in turn, been successively transcended sooner or later. Between 338 B.C. and 241 B.C. the inhabitants of about one quarter of Cisappennine Italy, extending along the south-west coast as far down as Cumae, and along the north-east coast as far up as Pesaro, had been progressively incorporated into the Roman citizen body, and this politic generosity had enabled Rome to establish her dominion over the whole peninsula. The door that had thus been held open for a century had then been closed and had been kept bolted and barred thereafter for the next 150 years; but in 90-89 B.C. the rest of Rome's Italian satellites had extorted the Roman franchise from the paramount Power by force of arms; and, when, after this tardy further step forward, the reactionaries had brought the process of enfranchisement to a halt again, this time along the line of the River Po, the door had been broken open by Caesar and had never been closed again. Caesar's enfranchisement of Rome's Transpadane satellites in 49 B.C. restarted a process which this time never came completely to a halt till in A.D. 212 it reached its term in Caracalla's enfranchisement of virtually all the residue of Rome's then still unenfranchised subjects throughout an empire that embraced all but a fragment of the Hellenic World; and the readiness of the Roman citizen body at this stage to share its political privileges with the rest of the inhabitants of an Hellenic *Oikoumenê* that had been united politically under Rome's aegis seems to have been matched by a readiness on the part even of ancient and famous non-Roman Hellenic communities now

¹ See, for example, VI. vii. 146-58.

to accept Roman citizenship at the cost of, at long last, merging in an oecumenical body politic a parochial identity which they had been jealously preserving through the ages. In earlier chapters of Hellenic history there had been at least two critical occasions—the first in 431 B.C. and the second in 228 B.C.¹—on which Athens and Sparta had remorselessly sacrificed the Hellenic Society's prospects of attaining an urgently needed political unity to their own parochial corporate egotism. There is no record of the re-emergence of this spirit in either Spartan or Athenian hearts on the historic occasion at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era.²

In the history of the Caliphate a corresponding evolution was accomplished more swiftly. Little more than a hundred years elapsed between the political reunification of the Syriac World by the arms of Primitive Muslim Arab *conquistadores* in the fourth and fifth decades of the seventh century of the Christian Era and the *Gleichschaltung* of the Arab Muslim 'ascendancy' with their non-Arab ex-Christian and ex-Zoroastrian converts and clients as a result of the Khurāsānī Iranian Muslim marchmen's victorious insurrection against the Umayyad régime in A.D. 750.³

These precedents from Syriac and Hellenic history were good auguries for the prospect that, in a post-Modern chapter of Western history, a supra-national commonwealth originally based on the hegemony of a paramount Power over its satellites might eventually be put on the sounder basis of a constitutional partnership in which all the people of all the partner states would have their fair share in the conduct of common affairs. A constitutional development on these lines seemed as probable in the long run as it was desirable, but in A.D. 1952 this was not the first business on Mankind's political agenda. The rock immediately ahead was a sooner or later inevitable transition from a present political partition of the *Oikoumenê* between two rival Powers to a

¹ See III. iii. 340-1 and IV. iv. 265.

² Professor William McNeill comments: 'Was Roman citizenship still a privilege by the time of Caracalla? Or was it a burden? Some historians think that the franchise was extended to all free men for the purpose of making them liable to the citizens' taxes on inheritances, etc., [in addition to the subjects' taxes, to which they were liable already]. In any case the willingness of the existing citizen body to see new-comers allotted to its ranks will hardly have counted. The act of enfranchisement was surely an administrative act of a bureaucracy which was by then more or less immune from public opinion—at least in most matters.'

The present writer's reply would be, in general, that bureaucratic or autocratic governments, as well as elected representative governments, are amenable to public feeling and opinion—though their reaction to it may sometimes be slower, and though they may perhaps be able to go rather farther in the dangerous game of flouting it without being called to order. In regard to the case in question, his reply, in particular, would be that this enfranchisement of virtually the whole of the still remaining non-citizen element in the population of the Roman Empire was followed by the growth of a corporate sense of imperial patriotism which eventually expressed itself in the coining of the new word 'Romania' to denote a now undivided and homogeneous Roman imperial people's oecumenical fatherland. This sequel to the Act of A.D. 212 suggests that this Act was well timed in the sense of having been enacted at a date at which the public feeling of the divers elements in the population of the Empire was ripe for it; and if it had not been 'practical politics' in this sense in A.D. 212 it would not, so the writer would guess, have been possible to enact it in that year merely because of its fiscal attractiveness in the professional eyes of an imperial bureaucracy. The writer would also guess that even as recently as the reign of Hadrian (*imperabat* A.D. 117-38) it would not yet have been 'practical politics' to enact the provisions of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* of A.D. 212, however attractive the measure might have been to the bureaucracy already at this earlier date.

³ See II. ii. 141 and VI. vii. 147-52.

future political unification of the *Oikoumenê* under the control of some unitary political authority; and the first concern of the living generation of Mankind was that this perilous transit should be accomplished without a third world war.

In an age of atomic warfare there were no peoples for whom this was not a matter of life and death in a world whose unification was already an accomplished fact on the military plane, but there were three peoples that had also incurred a special measure of moral responsibility for seeing to it that an urgently needed world order should be established without another catastrophe. In bringing about, between them, the defeat of Germany in the World War of A.D. 1939-45, the peoples of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States had taken it upon themselves on behalf of Mankind to reject Hitler's offer of a lasting peace at Hitler's price. If in A.D. 1940-1 Hitler had been allowed by these three Powers to have his way, peace would have been imposed on the World by the establishment of a *Pax Germanica* that would have relieved Mankind from the fear of another world war for as far ahead into the future as any human eye could see. Hitler's price for this boon had been so exorbitant that the three victor Powers' decision to reject his offer was likely to win for them the blessings of Posterity supposing that they were now to succeed, between them, in bestowing the same boon on Mankind at an appreciably lower cost in the coin of standardization, regimentation, injustice, and tyranny. On the other hand, these same victors over Hitler would bring down upon their own heads Posterity's curses if they were to allow a third world war to rankle out of their victory. In denying to Mankind the opportunity of enjoying the substantial benefits of an odious *Pax Germanica*, the peoples of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain had taken upon themselves a binding moral obligation to provide Mankind with a better world order than Hitler's without inflicting on Mankind the third world war that a German victory would have spared them.

Should the ex-victors now fail to accomplish this self-imposed task, they must expect to share with the Germans the execrations of an intolerably tormented Mankind so long as any memory survived of Mankind's history in the twentieth century of the Christian Era. On the other hand, if, between them, they were to succeed in piloting Noah's Ark intact into the still waters of the lagoon beyond the perilous reef, they could look forward to being remembered throughout the rest of the Human Race's term of life on Earth as the heroes who, by an unprecedented moral triumph over the perversity of their own human nature, had closed a chapter of human history branded with the ghastly mark of Cain¹ as the abominable Age of Civilization, Human Sacrifice, Slavery, and War, and had opened the way for Mankind to acquit itself better than before in its perennial struggle with an innate Original Sin. A generation which, in A.D. 1952, was thus bound over to render a strict account of a morally onerous stewardship might take heart from the words of an Athenian philosopher who had witnessed the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization.

¹ Gen. iv. 15, 17, and 22.

'In the struggle that will decide whether good or evil is to prevail in us, the issue is immeasurably greater than at first sight it might seem to be. . . . We must do everything that lies in our power to attain to Virtue and Wisdom in This Life. The prize is so splendid and the hope is so great.'¹

(V) PROBABLE FUNCTIONS OF A FUTURE WORLD ORDER

Supposing that a world government were to be established, what would its functions be? Presumably these functions would be much the same whether the establishment of this prospective world government were to be achieved pacifically or at the cost of a third world war, and whether it were to remain fixed in its initial form of a domination or hegemony exercised by a paramount Power or were eventually to acquire a federal constitution in which all the people in a supra-national commonwealth might hope to receive something like their fair share in the conduct of common affairs. Evidently the choice between these divers alternative roads might make a world of difference to the possibility of a world government's being able to perform its functions satisfactorily, whatever these functions might be; but the functions themselves would presumably have been determined in advance by the play of those historical forces that, in A.D. 1952, seemed to be making the establishment of some kind of world government, at some price, inevitable. Was the nature of these future functions then perhaps already discernible?

A world government would be the government of a universal state; and the specific characteristics of universal states, as well as the generic characteristics of states of all the divers historic species, were revealed in the history of Man in Process of Civilization within the last five or six thousand years.

A state was an institution in which part of the psychic power-charge of an individual human being was impounded and combined with parts of the power-charges of other men and women to constitute a pool of power at the disposal of persons controlling and operating a government. A state might be defined as a piece of social mechanism designed for the twin purposes of accumulating power and of applying it; and the preservation of the power of a state was consequently bound to be the first concern of the persons, whoever these might be, who had one of these political pools of power at their command. The most dangerous threat to the survival of any parochial state had always been the existence of other parochial states within striking distance of it, and therefore the most urgent business of any parochial sovereign government had been to maintain its own power against encroachments on the part of other parochial governments in the same politico-military arena and, if possible, also to increase its own power at the expense of each and all of its neighbours. At the same time, every parochial government had always had to fight for the preservation of its power on a domestic front as well as on a foreign front, since, even when it was not being threatened by

¹ Plato: *Respublica*, 608 B, and *Phaedo*, 114 C, quoted in V. vi. 168.

the aggressiveness of some foreign Power, a government would still have to reckon with the perennial recalcitrance of its own subjects; and, while it might be true that even in the smallest and weakest state the most powerful private individual would be impotent to resist the government's will so long as he was trying to resist it in isolation from his fellows, it was an obvious move for a number of individuals to take a leaf out of the state's own book by making common cause among themselves in order to pit against the pooled power of the state the pooled power of a family, clan, fief, faction, class, or interest.

In view of this possibility of a concerted private challenge to a state's corporate power, the concern felt by every government for the preservation of its power would force any government to set limits to its subjects' freedom of private enterprise. A government could not afford to allow any individual subject, and *a fortiori* not any organized group of subjects, to enjoy an unregulated licence to accumulate and apply power on their own private account, even in private relations with one another in which the state's interests were not involved directly and were perhaps not involved ostensibly at all. In order to safeguard its authority against threats to it on the domestic front, every government found it necessary to impose laws on its subjects and to see to it that these laws were effectively enforced. States had learnt, for example, that they could not afford to let their subjects take the law into their own hands, or even to let them keep it in their own hands in spheres in which the application and execution of the law had traditionally been, not a public, but a private, affair regulated by non-state institutions like the Blood Feud and the Wergeld. Equity demanded, of course, that a law drafted, promulgated, and enforced in the name of a state by the persons controlling and operating that state's government should not discriminate either to the advantage or to the detriment of any particular member or group of members of the political community, and should not be devised to serve the selfish interests of the ruling group of members constituting the government. In practice, even those states that had achieved the highest standards of justice so far known in the history of Civilization had never been able to preserve their legislation from being affected to some extent by the current domestic balance of power. It would, indeed, probably have been possible for a competent student of human affairs, possessed of full information about the content and application of the laws of any state at any date, to reconstruct, by inference, the domestic balance of power prevailing in that state at that time.

Thus, during the first five or six thousand years of the currency of this institution, a struggle—in which the government of every state that had ever existed had been constantly engaged—for the preservation and increase of a state's power had led, in the lives of parochial states, to a concentration of governmental activity on two functions: the function of competing with foreign Powers by waging war with them for objects unattainable by diplomacy and the function of regulating the private relations between the state's own subjects by legislation in which the current domestic balance of power was invariably reflected to some extent. The existence of states had thus been bound up with the

of the future as being patently *peritura regna*, this struggle within their bosoms between two competing and ultimately incompatible ideals was a new event of abiding interest because the struggle would be bequeathed by them to the world government, whatever this might be, that was to become the doomed parochial states' residuary legatee.

In the obscurity that at this time still veiled Mankind's political future, it could at any rate be foreseen that, if and when something in the nature of a world government did take shape, the task of maintaining its own power would cost it less effort and less anxiety than this had cost any universal state known to History. A single authority holding a world-wide monopoly of the control of atomic energy employable for military purposes would not be confronted by any rival of its own calibre, and it would also not have anything to fear from any residual pockets of recalcitrant barbarians in fastnesses encircled by a global polity that would already have embraced the rest of Mankind. A world government of the future would therefore be free to concentrate its efforts on the promotion of human welfare with a singleness of purpose that had not been feasible for any universal state in the history of any other society.

When a future world government eventually went into action in pursuit of this objective, what would be likely to be its first move? The pursuit of human welfare by political means would raise, as we shall see, for any political authority embarking on it the problem of striking a balance between the competing claims of individual freedom and social justice; but it might be prophesied that this would not be the first concern of a world government in the initial stage of its political operations. The best-intentioned world government would not have its hands free to work either for Justice or for Liberty or for a practical compromise between these two goals of human endeavour unless and until it had succeeded in making adequate provision for Police, in the broadest construction of the term, in a world in which all tools had now become edged tools and in which every act—deliberate or impulsive, wise or foolish—was now charged, no longer just with the innocuously feeble force of human muscles, but with the titanically high-powered 'drive' of machinery 'possessed' by atomic energy.

E. TECHNOLOGY, CLASS-CONFLICT, AND EMPLOYMENT

(I) THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

IF the meaning of the word 'employment' may be stretched to cover not only the amount and the distribution of work and leisure but also the spirit in which the work is done and the use to which the leisure is put, it would be true to say that the impact of an unprecedentedly potent latter-day Western technique on a literally world-wide Westernizing Society that was still articulated into a number of separate classes with widely different standards of living had confronted the heirs of the Western Civilization with a problem of employment comparable to the problem of government that has been discussed in the preceding chapter.

Like the problem of government, the problem of employment was nothing new in itself; for, if the primary cause of the breakdowns and disintegrations of other civilizations in the past had been a failure to get rid of war by a voluntary and timely expansion of the scope of government from a parochial to an oecumenical range, a secondary cause had been a failure to get rid of class-conflict by voluntary and timely changes in the distribution of the pressure and product of work and the enjoyment and use of leisure. In this field, however, as in that, the extreme difference in degree between a latter-day Western and a previous human mastery over Non-Human Nature was tantamount to a difference in kind. By putting an unprecedentedly powerful new 'drive' into economic production, a Modern Western technology had made a customary social injustice seem remediable and therefore feel intolerable. When the new-fangled cornucopia of a mechanized industry had churned out fabulous wealth—beyond the dreams of any class in any previous generation of this or any other society—for those Western *entrepreneurs* who had sown the seed and reaped the harvest of the Industrial Revolution, why should wealth and leisure still be monopolized by a privileged minority just as they had been before this Modern Western cornucopia had been invented?¹ Why should not this new-found abundance be shared with the Western capitalists by the Western industrial workers, and with the Western industrial workers by an Asian, African, and Indian-American peasantry that had been herded *en masse* into a world-embracing Western Society's internal proletariat?

This new dream of the possibility of abundance for all Mankind had generated unprecedentedly insistent and impatient demands for 'freedom from want'; the vehemence and ubiquity of these demands raised the

¹ This odious reign of arbitrary privilege had been accepted tranquilly, as part of an evidently unalterable order of Nature, by a Late Modern Western historian who had lived to see the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in his own country without having perceived its social implications.

'Such is the constitution of Civil Society that, whilst a few persons are distinguished by riches, by honours, and by knowledge, the body of the people is condemned to obscurity, ignorance, and poverty' (Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. ii).

question whether the productivity of the cornucopia was really inexhaustible, as the importunity of the claims upon it assumed it to be; and this question could be answered only by solving an equation in which there were at least three unknown quantities.

The first of these unknown quantities was the extent of a latter-day Western technology's potential capacity to satisfy the rising demands of a Human Race which was continuing to multiply and was beginning to ask for leisure. What were the planet's reserves of irreplaceable material resources in the shape of minerals, and of replaceable material resources in the shape of water-power and crops and livestock and man-power and human skill? How far could the resources so far tapped be made to increase their yield by the application of more efficient methods of extraction and processing and utilization? And how far could Mankind's wasting assets in the shape of irreplaceable resources be set off by the tapping of alternative resources hitherto unexplored or at any rate unexploited?

At the opening of the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era the current findings of Western Science suggested to a layman's mind that the Western technology's capacity was enormous; but at the same time the contemporary reactions of Human Nature to the impact of the Western technological revolution made it evident that there might prove to be practical limitations on this human plane to a productivity that might be virtually infinite in abstract terms of technological potentiality. The production that had been rendered technically possible by a continuing and accelerating Industrial Revolution was a potentiality that could not be translated into a reality unless and until human hands could be found to hew the coal and stoke the fires and pull the levers with a will; but the price of the immensely enhanced power over Non-Human Nature that Western Man's mechanical prowess had now brought within Mankind's grasp was a proportionate increase in the regimentation of the workers and in the pressure of their work upon their life; and their inevitable resistance to these assaults on their personal freedom was bound to militate against the realization of those technological potentialities that had evoked the current demands for freedom from want.

What was the extent of the sacrifices of personal freedom that the workers would be prepared to make for the sake of increasing the size of the cake of which they were each now demanding a larger slice? How far would the urban industrial workers go in submitting to 'scientific management'? And how far would the primitive peasant majority of Mankind go in adopting Western scientific methods of agriculture and in accepting limitations on a traditionally sacrosanct right and duty of procreation? These questions are probed further in a later chapter,¹ and the outcome of our examination of them there need not be anticipated at this point except for reporting that, at the time of writing, it seemed premature to expect to find precise values for these two further unknown quantities in Mankind's current economic equation. At this stage the most that could be said was that the potential capacity of a latter-day

¹ On pp. 563-9 and 595-604, below.

Western technology to increase production perhaps virtually *ad infinitum* was running a race with the natural human refractoriness of the peasants and the industrial workers. The World's teeming peasantry was threatening to cancel the benefits of technological progress by continuing to raise the numbers of the World's population *pari passu* with each successive increase in the means of subsistence that Technology might achieve. The industrial workers were threatening to cancel the benefits of technological progress by restricting production through trade-union practices *pari passu* with each successive increase in the potentialities of productivity thanks to the triumphal march of scientific invention.

(II) THE SITUATION AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

At the opening of the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era the outstanding feature in Mankind's situation on the economico-social plane in a world that was then undergoing a Western Industrial Revolution was a tug-of-war between a regimentation that was being imposed on Human Nature by the mechanization of the World's work and an obstinate human impulse to strive for freedom from regimentation, even if regimentation was the obligatory purchase-price of freedom from want.

The crux of the situation was the hard fact that, in Human Life, mechanization and police were as inseparable as Siamese twins. For Human Nature this was an unpalatable truth; yet any living observer of the age of sixty years or upwards who found himself shying at this truth would be compelled to look it in the face if, on any journey that he ever made by car, he compared the spectacle that now flashed past his eyes with his memory of what the traffic on the roads had been like in his childhood. Down to the close of the nineteenth century a trickle of horse-drawn and hand-pushed vehicles had been exempt from police control because it had been too slow and too thin to put life and limb in any serious jeopardy if drivers were left to their own devices. By contrast, on a twentieth-century road crowded with swift passenger-cars and ponderous lorries, travelling would have been, not merely perilous, but impracticable if the traffic had not been elaborately regulated, and if the regulations had not been strictly enforced. This change in the régime of the road, which we have noticed already in another context,¹ was an apt simile of the progressive encroachments on human freedom that were being imposed upon Mankind by a progressive increase in Man's command over Non-Human Nature and a consequent increase in the power-charge of men's actions in their encounters with one another.

An observer of this struggle between Technology's demand for discipline and Human Nature's recalcitrance to regimentation might find his impressions affected by the light in which he happened to be viewing the scene. From the technician's angle of vision the recalcitrant industrial workers' attitude might appear almost childishly unreasonable.

¹ In III. iii. 209-11.

Were these people really blind to a truth that was one of the truisms of Human Life? Had they never acquired the common knowledge that every desirable object has its price? Would they insist on demanding the 'freedom from want' which the technician's cornucopia could churn out, without reconciling themselves to the discipline that was the condition *sine qua non* for the successful performance of the technician's white magic? This indictment of the industrial workers' attitude might seem unanswerable to our observer so long as he was viewing the scene from the technician's standpoint; but as soon as he exchanged this for the historian's he might find himself seeing the same spectacle with different eyes. An historian would draw the spectator's attention to a string of historical facts. The Western Industrial Revolution had started in an eighteenth-century Great Britain; at that time and place an exceptionally high degree of freedom from regimentation on the economic-social plane had been enjoyed by at least a minority of the population, particularly by the Whig landlords and by the Nonconformist business men;¹ members of this economically free and powerful minority had been the creators of the industrial system of mechanized production; and the pre-industrial freedom of enterprise which these pioneers of Industrialism had inherited from a previous social dispensation had been the inspiration and life-blood of the new economic-social dispensation that their initiative had conjured into existence.

Moreover, the industrial *entrepreneurs'* pre-industrial spirit of freedom, which had been the *primum mobile* of the Industrial Revolution, continued to be its driving-force in the next chapter of the story; for, in the souls of the 'capitalists' who became the first masters of the new economic power-machine in virtue of having been its makers, this pristine *éthos* did not immediately succumb to the antithetical spirit of regimentation that was innate in their monstrous creature. While, however, the captains of Industry thus continued for a season to elude the fate of being crushed by a steam-roller of their own manufacture, this fate was the birthmark of the new urban industrial working class that the pioneers of Industrialism had called into existence to be the servitors of their new machines.² The industrial working class felt from the outset, in their full weight, the crushing effects upon human life of a triumphant Technology's success in mastering a previously intractable Non-Human Nature. In a previous context³ we have watched Technology liberating Man's economic activities from the tyrannies of the cycle of Day-and-Night and the cycle of the Seasons; but, in the act of

¹ The return of the English Nonconformists to power on the economic plane after their exclusion from power on the political plane has been noticed in III. iii. 334 and 358, n. 1.

² This new industrial working class in the interior of the Western World had been cursed with the same congenital unhappiness as the new intelligentsia in the Russian and other non-Western societies that had been caught in the Western Civilization's net; and the cause of the unhappiness was evidently the same in the two cases. Either of these two new classes had been called into existence artificially and hastily for the purpose of performing a new social function for which there was an urgent demand; and the society that had commandeered the new class's professional services had not provided for its new servants' human needs. Both the Industrial Proletariat and the Intelligentsia were, in fact, proletarians in the original sense of being 'in' Society without being 'of' it. For the Intelligentsia, see V. v. 154-9; for the Proletariat, see I. i. 41, n. 3, and p. 597, below.

³ On pp. 306-10, above.

setting Human Life free on one plane from an ancient servitude to the stars in their courses, Technology had been enslaving Man on another plane to Man himself by removing a buffer which Non-Human Nature had formerly interposed between the freedom of human souls and the impact on Man of Man's own collective material power.

In an agrarian economy out of which the new industrial working class had been uprooted, the incidence of Man's work upon Man's life had been rationed and regulated, not by a trial of strength between conflicting human wills championing divergent human interests, but by inexorably recurrent astronomical events—the fall of Night, the advent of Winter's frost or Summer's drought, the onset of the Monsoon—whose incidence *Homo Agricola* was impotent to elude. When these blindly beneficent non-human interruptions of Man's economic activity had been overcome by the invention of industrial plant capable of running without a pause for twenty-four hours in the day and for 365 days in the year, the workers in this plant found themselves under pressure of a new force—'heavy as frost, and deep almost as life'¹—that bore harder on human souls than any tyranny of Inanimate Nature to which they had ever been exposed. This unfamiliar force that had substituted itself for the vanquished forces of Nature was Man's own collective material power. It lost nothing of its psychic 'drive' in being brought to bear upon the lives of its living victims along the driving-belt of a physical machine; and in this perspective an industrial working class's recalcitrance to the demands of a technique that promised, at the price of discipline, to set Mankind free from want might wear the appearance, not of a perverse impulse to hinder Mankind from breaking the bonds of Non-Human Nature, but of an heroic struggle to keep human souls free from regimentation by Leviathan.

The trade-union organization and procedure that were the new industrial working class's characteristic contributions to the structure of the Western Society were, indeed, legacies from the same pre-industrial paradise of private enterprise that had bred the ethos and activity of the industrial *entrepreneurs*. Looked at as instruments for enabling the workers to hold their own in their struggle with their employers, the trade unions were, in fact, creatures of the self-same social dispensation as their 'capitalist' antagonists. Privately Organized Labour, no less than Privately Organized Capital, stood or fell with a régime in which the terms of trade and the distribution of the product of economic activity were determined by bargaining between private parties in a public arena in which the local state confined its intervention to the negative role of holding the ring for these private competitors. Freedom of private economic enterprise was the air which trade unions, as well as 'capitalist' employers of labour, breathed; and this truth had been demonstrated by the common fate of both these gladiators in states which, in the interval between the First and the Second World War, had been captured by totalitarian régimes.

In Russia after the Communist Revolution of A.D. 1917 the liquida-

¹ Wordsworth, W.: *Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood*.

tion of the private employers of labour had been followed by a *Gleichschaltung* of the trade unions; in Germany after the National-Socialist Revolution of A.D. 1933 the liquidation of the trade unions had been followed by a *Gleichschaltung* of the capitalists. Conversely, in Great Britain after the General Election of A.D. 1945, under a Labour government whose programme was to take the ownership of industrial enterprises out of private hands without trenching upon the sacrosanctity of personal freedom, the workers in the nationalized industries never thought of dissolving their trade unions or renouncing their right to promote their own private interests by means of collective bargaining backed by the sanction of collective strikes. In their dealings with the new public boards of management they plied these well-tried weapons as vigorously as they had ever plied them in their dealings with the state's private predecessors in the ownership of these particular means of production.

The diverse local histories of Great Britain, Germany, and Russia since A.D. 1917 thus presented, between them, a conclusive proof that the purpose for which the trade unions had originally been created, and for which they were still being maintained in all industrialized countries not yet captured by totalitarian political régimes, was to serve the workers as weapons in a struggle against regimentation; and, considering that the workers' will to freedom was thus not open to question, it was significant that the workers had not succeeded in finding any other effective means of resisting the pressure of a collective human material power than the desperate expedient of counter-regimenting themselves.¹ The pioneers of the trade-union movement had perceived from the outset that the workers' potential power of numbers was the one asset on their side that they could pit against the power derived by their employers from their control of the means of production. It had been obvious that this power of numbers could be made effective only through action that was both collective and disciplined; and thus the proletarian Western fathers of Trade Unionism, confronted by an aggressive Western capitalist dominant minority, had found themselves in the same dilemma as the non-Western fathers of Herodianism when these had been confronted by an aggressive Western World. The victims of aggression must either abandon the struggle or adopt their aggressive adversaries' weapons if they were to pursue the struggle with any hope of success; and accordingly the industrial workers had found themselves constrained to introduce their arch-enemy—regimentation—into the inner ward of their castle as an indispensable auxiliary in the defence of the outer ward against the assaults of the self-same adversary. They had had to impose regimentation upon themselves in order to resist its

¹ Professor William McNeill comments: 'Is there not a will to conform which is in constant tension with the will to freedom? I conceive of this tension as being parallel to the instinct of workmanship and the impulse to scamp work; and that most, if not all, men exhibit each of these contrary impulses in greater or lesser degree.'

The present writer would not deny the existence of this will to conform. He would merely suggest that in a mechanized twentieth-century Westernizing World the loyalty of the trade unionist, as against the skill of the craftsman, was the ideal towards which a perennial will to conform was steering a majority of the living generation of industrial workers.

imposition upon them by their employers, and this tragic paradox was a demonstration of a rampant Technology's unholy power to regiment human souls by hook or by crook.

The workers had been moved to resist regimentation by the same spirit of freedom, inherited from a pre-industrial past, that had inspired the *entrepreneurs* to make the Industrial Revolution and thereby to put the workers under pressure; and this pre-industrial ethos had been the psychic counterpart of an economic dispensation in which each individual worker had at least seen the results of his labours, even when he had not reaped the reward, and had therefore found himself able to work with zest—not because he had been able to count upon pocketing an equitable share of the profits of his own exertions, but because, even when he had been sweated and fleeced, his work had been intrinsically effective and significant and therefore psychologically satisfying. By contrast, under an industrial economic dispensation under which the pressure of the work upon the worker had, as we have seen, become overwhelming owing to the removal of ancient automatic safeguards, the *chefs-d'œuvre* of Technology that had swept those safeguards away had mechanized the processes of Industry to so high a degree, and had carried the Division of Labour to such extremes, that the factory hand's work had become intrinsically impersonal, monotonous, and infantile.

'We invent the machinery of mass-production, and, for the sake of cheapening the unit, we develop output on a gigantic scale. Almost automatically the machine delivers a stream of articles in the creation of which the workman has had little part. He has lost the joy of craftsmanship, the old satisfaction in something accomplished through the conscientious exercise of care and skill.'¹

The effect of these psychologically untoward technological improvements had been, inevitably, to make a worker's attitude towards his work defensive and negative, like a schoolboy's attitude towards an uncongenial imposition.²

Thus the workers' resistance to regimentation at the hands of an external power had driven them into regimenting themselves. In fighting against the fate of being turned into robots in the factory, they had imposed on themselves the fate of serving as soldiers in a trade-union phalanx; and at the time of writing it was not easy to see how either fate could be exorcized, for by this time it was already evident that the external pressure on the industrial workers could not be relieved by the

¹ Sir Alfred Ewing in a presidential address delivered on the 31st August, 1932, at York, to the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Another passage of this address has been quoted already in this Study in III. iii. 211.

² Professor William McNeill comments: 'Is there not an instinct of workmanship that may act as an antidote to the trade unionist and civil servant spirit?' The present writer would not deny either the existence of this instinct or its pertinacity. He would merely suggest that, in a mechanized twentieth-century Westernizing World, Technology was tilting the balance adversely for the instinct of workmanship and favourably for a workers' resistance movement against the social effect of physical machinery which, at the current power of its 'drive', was threatening to serve as an instrument for placing the would-be craftsman at the mercy of a collective human social pressure instead of promising to serve as a tool for enabling him to express his own individuality in and through his work.

comparatively simple measure, on which such high hopes had once been set, of taking the means of production out of private hands.¹

This was no radical remedy because, under the industrial dispensation, the private employer was in truth no longer the ultimate villain of the piece. Oppression by profiteering private employers or by rack-renting private landlords had, after all, been the lot of many workers in the histories of many societies, including the Western Society itself, in the days before the advent of a Western Machine Age; and before this Western Industrial Revolution, as well as after it, economic oppression had provoked resistance among its victims. Yet, under those pre-industrial dispensations, this resistance had never organized itself on trade-union lines and had never displayed the trade-union spirit; and the explanation of these new departures in the character of the resistance movement was that under the new industrial dispensation the personal oppressor who was the workers' familiar bugbear had been reduced, by his own revolutionary achievement, from his age-old status of being one of the principals in a conflict between two human antagonists to the novel status of being merely the personal agent of an impersonal force. The pressure against which the industrial workers were reacting could not be removed by eliminating the private employer, because this was a new pressure inherent in the new technique of machine industry. So costly an initial capital investment could not be made to yield an economically adequate return on the outlay unless the wheels were kept revolving at full speed, night and day, year in and year out; and, while it was true that a private owner of the plant would therefore be bound to press the human tenders of these Satanic mills to make the utmost exertions that the management could wring out of them, any public owner—municipality, community, or state alike—would be bound for the same reasons to do likewise.

Thus the change from private to public ownership could not abate a pressure that was being exerted on the industrial workers by the impersonal force of a mechanized technique; and, indeed, the representation of this impersonal oppressor by a public instead of a private agent made the trade unions' task of conducting the workers' resistance movement a more difficult one psychologically and politically. In contending with the *ci-devant* private employers before the bar of public opinion, the trade unions had been able to put their adversaries 'on the spot' by manœuvring them into the invidious role of harpies who were so bent upon grinding the faces of the poor that, rather than give the workers their due, they were prepared to deprive the public of essential economic services by forcing the workers to resort to a strike as their only practicable means of redress. It was not so easy to bring odium upon a public authority by accusing it of being actuated by motives of personal cupidity. A public authority was indeed as awkward

¹ This was not to say that in a mechanized society it was right or wise or feasible to leave Private Property uncurbed now that this traditional institution was being charged by the new social force of Industrialism with an unprecedentedly powerful new 'drive'. This point has been touched upon in IV. iv. 191-2. The measures for curbing Private Property, without abolishing it, that were being taken in Great Britain on the morrow of the Second World War are noticed on pp. 588-92, below.

an antagonist for a trade union as Peer Gynt's legendary obstructor the Böig.¹ The industrial workers' ultimate adversary was an impersonal collective human material power which was both more potent and more elusive than a personal villain; no man knew how to put asunder a Leviathan that the Western Industrial Revolution had joined together;² and this last enemy might well prove to be almost as tenacious as Death.³ Indeed, the constant, and at the same time constantly accelerating, progress of Western technological invention—a progress of which the end was not, as yet, in sight—threatened to continue to key up the pressure on the industrial workers to ever higher degrees of severity; and the response of the workers to this mounting challenge seemed bound to be a progressive accentuation of the trade-union movement's characteristically defensive and negative *éthos*.

If this probable aggravation of the inauspicious elements in the industrial workers' spirit was a gloomy prospect, it was also an awe-inspiring spectacle to see the Western middle class beginning to take a road on which the Western working class's feet had been set long since. The period between the achievement of the Industrial Revolution and the outbreak of the First World War in A.D. 1914—a period that had lasted for about a century and a half in Great Britain and for about half a century in Germany and in the United States—had been the Western middle class's golden age; but the new era which the First World War had inaugurated had seen this Western middle class fall, in their turn, into the adversity to which the Industrial Revolution had condemned the industrial workers in the act of calling them into existence.

In the twentieth-century history of the Western middle class the liquidation of the bourgeoisie in Russia in and after the Bolshevik Revolution of A.D. 1917, which had been the first portent in a series, had not been the most significant one; for Russia was a recently and imperfectly Westernized country in which the Western social phenomenon of a bourgeoisie had been something exotic. The bourgeoisie in Germany that had been ruined after the War of A.D. 1914–18 by the social and economic consequences of Germany's military defeat had, by contrast, been part and parcel of the native Western middle class; but this local disaster might perhaps be interpreted as being the special nemesis of the German bourgeoisie's peculiar perversity, and might then be written off as one of those 'partial events' that could not 'essentially injure' the Western middle class's 'general state of happiness'.⁴ A more accurate index of the fortunes and tendencies of the Western middle class in this age was to be found in the contemporary social histories of Great Britain and the other English-speaking countries, since in these countries the middle class was as deeply rooted as it was anywhere in the Western World, while, in contrast to its fate in the Continental Western countries, it had suffered less severely in

¹ Ibsen, Henrik: *Peer Gynt*, Act II, scene vii.

² Matt. xix. 6.

³ 1 Cor. xv. 26.

⁴ See Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West', at the end of chap. xxxviii.

the English-speaking countries—and this even in Great Britain—from the direct impact even of the Second World War. The recent history of the middle class in the English-speaking countries thus seemed more likely to reveal the 'secular' trend of the Western middle class's current social evolution, in so far as it might be possible to identify this social trend by isolating it from contemporaneous military and political vicissitudes. It was therefore significant that in the English-speaking countries too—in Great Britain first and foremost, but also in the rest in divers degrees—this age had seen the middle class begin to lose both its nineteenth-century prosperity and its sanguine pre-industrial *éthos*. The psychological change was more portentous than the economic, since it was in virtue of its pre-industrial *éthos* that the middle class had made the industrial fortune that was now slipping out of its hands.

During the period between the Industrial Revolution and the outbreak of the First World War, the distinguishing psychological characteristic of the middle class, by contrast with the contemporary spirit of the clerical workers as well as the industrial working class, had been its unabated zest for work.

In the citadel of Capitalism on Manhattan Island there had been a trivial yet significant illustration of this difference of attitude as recently as the year A.D. 1949. In that year the financial houses on Wall Street were trying, without success, to induce their shorthand-typists, by offers of special remuneration at high overtime rates, to reconsider a collective decision to refuse henceforth to attend at their offices on Saturday mornings. The shorthand-typists' employers were eager to devote their own Saturday mornings to work for the sake of retaining the profits that they would forfeit if they were to submit to this shortening of their own working week; but they had ceased to be able to do their own work without having shorthand-typists in attendance to assist them, and they found themselves unable to persuade these indispensable collaborators in their business of money-making that the game of working on Saturdays was worth the candle. The shorthand-typists took the stand that one day's, or even one half-day's, additional leisure was worth more to them than any monetary inducement for withdrawing their demand for this amenity. Additional money in their pockets was of no use to them if they had to earn it at the price of forgoing the additional leisure without which they would have no time for spending it. In this choice between money and life, they opted for life at the cost of letting the money go, and their employers did not succeed in persuading them to change their minds. By A.D. 1952 it had begun to look as if, so far from the Wall Street shorthand-typists ever being brought round by a monetary inducement to the Wall Street financiers' point of view, the financiers might eventually be converted by economic adversity to the standpoint of the typists; for by this date even Wall Street was beginning to feel a breeze that had already chilled once sanguine hearts in Lombard Street.

In the twentieth century of the Christian Era the Western middle class's opportunities for doing profitable business were being progressively reduced in one Western centre of capitalist activity after another;

and these economic reverses were having depressing effects upon the middle-class *éthos*. The middle class's traditional zest for work was now being sapped by a progressive restriction of the field for private enterprise and a progressive regimentation of the remnant of private enterprise that was being permitted provisionally to survive. Inflation and taxation were conspiring to make nonsense of the sovereign middle-class virtues of strenuous earning and thrifty saving by robbing these ascetic activities of their sybaritic rewards. A rising cost of living was conspiring with a simultaneously rising standard of living to reduce the size of middle-class families. The loss of personal domestic service was threatening to undermine the middle class's professional efficiency. The loss of leisure was threatening to undermine its culture.

These blows that were raining down upon a twentieth-century Western middle class were hitting the man in the office less hard than the woman in the home; for, in order to make both ends meet when a falling income was failing to keep abreast of a rising budget, a middle-class housewife might find herself compelled—like so many working-class housewives in an earlier phase of the Industrial Age—to do two men's work by keeping house and earning a salary simultaneously. Neither a reduction in the size of middle-class families nor an improvement in domestic labour-saving contrivances could avail to save the middle-class married woman from being saddled with a burden of overwork from which her husband was exempted by a physical disability to bear children and by a degree of professional specialization which (in West European countries, though not in the United States) restricted his competence to be a help in the house. By contrast, his wife, who was still the only member of the family partnership who could bear and bring up the children and could make the house a home, had now also won for herself the opportunity of widening her horizon, or had exposed herself to the liability of adding to her labours, by taking on 'men's work' as well, thanks to the provision of higher education for girls as well as boys in Western countries within the last hundred years. In the very generation in which these new educational facilities had made it possible for middle-class women to take up professional careers in a world of affairs that had previously been the male sex's monopoly, the self-same social and economic revolution had deprived them, in their homes, of the paid help of domestic servants, and unpaid help of maiden aunts, sisters, and daughters, which had been enjoyed by middle-class married women of earlier generations who had had no duties or interests outside the domestic circle; and these two contemporaneous but antithetical changes in her circumstances had placed the highly educated and professionally competent twentieth-century Western wife and mother in a dilemma in which the acceptance of either of two alternatives spelled frustration. She found herself confronted with an unhappy choice between resigning herself to be a household drudge, without the leisure to turn her education to any account, and forcing herself to carry the intolerably heavy load of two simultaneous full-time jobs. In the Western middle class's twentieth-century crisis, as in the Western working class's nineteenth-century crisis, the

wife and mother was, in fact, both the heroine and the victim of the tragedy.¹

Meanwhile the Western middle-class woman's brother, husband, and son were in process of making a change of professional occupation which entailed a corresponding change of attitude and outlook. A nineteenth-century social and economic revolution in the life of the Western working class which had transported the manual worker from the field to the factory, and had transmuted his *êthos* from the husband-man's into the trade unionist's, was now finding its counterpart in the history of the Western middle class in a twentieth-century revolution which was turning private business men and professional men into employees of governments or of non-governmental business concerns that were almost equally impersonal because they were on an almost equally large scale;² and this change from being their own employers to being Leviathan's employees was producing a corresponding change of *êthos* in these middle-class workers' souls in their turn.

The twentieth-century Western middle class's progressive exodus out of private enterprise into public service or into its psychological equivalent in the service of giant non-governmental corporations had been bringing with it gains, as well as losses, for the Western Society. The principal gain—and this was a notable one—was the subordination of the egoistic motive of making personal economic profits to the altruistic motive of serving the public interest; and the social value of this change of personal objectives and moral ideals could be measured by the effects of corresponding changes in the histories of other civilizations in which the sequel was on record. In the histories of the Hellenic, Sinic, and Hindu civilizations, for example, the social rallies inaugurated by the establishment of universal states had been signalized and achieved—in so far as the credit for a complex corporate achievement can be assigned to any one of the contributing factors—by the redirection of a hitherto predatory class's ability and experience to serve social, instead of anti-social, ends.³ Augustus and his successors had made good civil servants out of predatory Roman business men of the 'equestrian' class; Han Liu Pang and his successors had made them out of predatory feudal gentry bred by the contending Sinic parochial states; Cornwallis and his successors had made them out of predatory commercial agents of the British East India Company.

The beneficence of the social effects of these acts of moral redemption had been proportionate to the magnitude of the spiritual revolution in each case. Yet, in each case likewise, the social rally signalized in a universal state had been ephemeral; and a good civil service had so far

¹ At the cost of bearing this excessive burden, the women members of the Western Society in its post-Modern Age had won for themselves a position in which the World's work, outside as well as inside the home, would have come to a standstill if the women had gone on strike. The simultaneous entry of the women and the industrial workers upon the stage in this act of the drama of Western history had its parallel in Hellenic history in the likewise simultaneous entry of the women and the slaves upon the stage in a post-Alexandrine Age.

² Professor William McNeill comments: "The transformation of the owner-manager-entrepreneur into the salaried manager is very striking in the United States and elsewhere, and is almost, if not quite, as significant as the rise of the civil service itself."

³ See V. v. 35-58.

never proved able to stage a recovery from more than a single relapse, and therefore never able to avert the ultimate dissolution of a disintegrating society. This ultimate failure of a mission that had achieved so striking an initial success was to be explained, in these previous cases, by the ambivalence of a civil-service *éthos* in which the sovereign virtue of moral integrity was counter-balanced by a lack of zest, a disinclination to take the initiative or to incur risks, and an impulse to play for personal safety which could militate against the public interest as severely as a thirst to acquire personal power and wealth; and these inauspicious defensive and negative characteristics of an historic civil-service *éthos* were all now being displayed by twentieth-century Western middle-class civil servants who, at the time of writing, were serving, in the administration of parochial *peritura regna*, an apprenticeship for their future task of organizing and maintaining a world government.

When we look into the causes of a civil-service *éthos* which the twentieth-century Western civil servant thus shared with his professional counterparts in the histories of other civilizations, we find that this *éthos* was the response to the challenge of pressure exerted by a machine which bore no less hardly upon human souls for being constructed out of psychic instead of metallic materials. To tend the machinery of a highly organized state administering many millions of subjects was, indeed, as soul-destroying a task as stoking a furnace, minding a power-loom, or performing a repetitive set of scientifically managed physical movements in an assembly plant. The sheer magnitude of the scale of civil-service operations dwarfed and dominated any single concrete piece of civil-service business, with the consequence that, in any official action which a civil servant had to take, his decision was apt to be determined less by the actual merits of the case in point than by a calculation of the precedents which this or that course of action might or might not create.

This effect of the administrative machine in setting a negative rather than a positive impress on its servants' *éthos* was enhanced by the vein of caprice and tyranny in the *éthos* of any public administrative machine's sovereign lords and masters. One of the arch-fallacies in a nineteenth-century Western optimistic estimate of the capabilities of *Homo Politicus* had been the fatuous postulate that the occupational vices of an individual autocrat would be automatically exorcized by the trick of putting autocracy into commission. The truth was that an enlightened individual autocrat, however rare a bird he might have been, had proved himself, by occasional visitations, to be a bona fide natural species, whereas the legendary nineteenth-century enlightened parliament or electorate was as chimerical a figment of the imagination as Sinbad's Orc or Herodotus's Phoenix.

In their short history up to date, Western parliaments elected on a wide franchise had quickly betrayed their historical paternity by emulating the bad behaviour of an English King Henry VIII and a French King Louis XIV; these parliamentary corporate despots' constituents had been lax or incompetent in exercising their constitutional

right and duty of bringing their elected representatives to book; the brunt of the consequent corporate abuse of power by parliaments had fallen upon their slave-household of civil servants; and the effect of this arbitrary parliamentary régime on the administrative action of these latter-day Western civil servants who found themselves in the plight of an Ottoman Pādishāh's *qullar* had been to set up a second impediment to the decision of cases on their merits; for if the first question that a conscientious civil servant must ask himself was 'What awkward precedents for the service might this decision create?' the second question that a cautious civil servant must ask himself was 'What awkward parliamentary questions for me might this decision evoke?' There were thus two irrelevant stumbling-blocks to be surmounted before the merits of a case could obtain consideration from the civil servant who would be called to account eventually over the outcome of whatever action had been taken or been withheld on his advice; and, since, in becoming a civil servant, he had not ceased to be a human being, it was inevitable that his conduct should be influenced by a personal anxiety to be in a strong position in any future reckoning, as well as by an impersonal concern not to compromise the interests of the public service by creating an unfortunate precedent.

It was also inevitable that civil servants should take personal advantage, against the public interest, of a notorious trait of parliamentary psychology. Civil servants had learnt from a long experience that, while a parliament was usually quick to notice and resent even the slightest damage to the public interest that might be traceable to a civil servant's recommendation of some positive action, the same corporate autocrat could usually be trusted not to visit upon a civil servant any proportionately condign punishment for a sin of omission, even when the sinner's failure to perform his public duty of recommending that positive action should be taken had been the cause of a public catastrophe. This bad habit of parliaments was as pertinent to the civil servant's professional work and personal interests as it was irrational in itself and inimical to the common weal; and a parliamentary practice of putting a premium upon sins of omission thus worked together with an administrative concern for the avoidance of awkward precedents to write 'Thou shalt not' into the exordium of each commandment in the civil servant's decalogue.

It would thus appear that, in the twentieth century, the psychic steam-roller of a ponderous public administration was crushing the business man turned civil servant as remorselessly as, in the nineteenth century, the metallic steam-roller of a ponderous industrial plant had crushed the husbandman turned machine-tender. A pressure that had made the industrial worker curl up like a hedgehog had made the civil servant mortify himself like a monk; two defensive reactions that were so widely diverse in their outward manifestations were nevertheless substantially identical in their psychological effect; and this pervasive psychological consequence of a penetrating technological revolution was inauspicious for the prospects of the Western Society in whose bosom this revolution had taken place.

While the breaking of the spirit of any class was, of course, bound to be damaging to the spiritual health of any body social in which this spiritual disaster occurred, the damage already suffered by the Western Society in consequence of the nineteenth-century tribulations of its working class might prove not to have been so grave as the further damage that the Western middle class's twentieth-century tribulations were now threatening to inflict upon an already ailing Western social constitution. The progressive depotentialization of the Western middle class's characteristic pre-industrial spirit was fraught with a serious threat to the stability, and even to the survival, of a world-wide Westernizing industrial society, because the Western middle class was the heart of this oecumenical body social;¹ it was the creative minority that had originally brought this body social into being and had subsequently kept it alive; and it had achieved all this in virtue of being animated by the pre-industrial *êthos* that was now showing signs of succumbing to the pressure of the same impersonal collective human material power that had already crushed the Western working class. 'A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump',² and 'salt is good';³ 'but if the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be seasoned?'⁴

In the cosmic imagery of an Atomic Age the pre-industrial temper of the Western middle class might be likened to the physical tone of the inner core of the Sun. In that titanic physical power-house in the current aeon, the temperature stood at a height at which the physical effect was a continual annihilation of atoms; this physical process was perpetually releasing a physical energy of enormous potency; and the discharge of this energy into the Sun's field of radiation might produce utterly diverse effects on any physical object that the out-streaming waves encountered in their passage, according to the distance of this object from the radiating energy's solar source and the corresponding degree of the energy's intensity at the moment when it made its impact.

A solar energy whose genial warmth had rendered it physically possible for Life to make its epiphany, and thereafter to maintain itself in being, on the surface of the planet Terra, might nevertheless one day fulfil the cosmological predictions of the Stoic school of Hellenic philosophers by melting the same planet into a gaseous vapour if a school of mid-twentieth-century Western cosmologists was right in predicting that the Sun was destined, in one of the future chapters of its history, to swell to a size at which it would envelop not only the Earth but also some, at least, of the remoter planets.⁵ On the other hand, when, in a further chapter, subsequent to that, the Sun shrivelled and cooled into a 'black dwarf'—and this was believed by Western astronomers at this date to be the inevitable ultimate destiny of every star ever spawned in any nebula—the solar furnace would then have lost, utterly

¹ This indispensable role of the Western middle class in the life of a Westernizing World Society could have been conveyed by an Hellenic political scientist, without resort to a simile, by saying that the Western middle class was the *πολίτευμα* (i.e. the effective and responsible governing body) of an oecumenical *πολιτεία*.

² Gal. v. 9.

⁴ Luke xiv. 34; cp. Matt. v. 13 and Mark ix. 50.

³ Mark ix. 50; Luke xiv. 34.

⁵ See Hoyle, Fred: *The Nature of the Universe* (Oxford 1950, Blackwell), p. 40.

and forever, its once seemingly inexhaustible capacity to radiate energy either for the weal or for the woe of terrestrial living creatures. 'Fear no more the heat of the Sun' would then be Everyman's posthumous consolation; and the exhaustion of the Sun's energy, which would thus have guaranteed any survivors among the dead star's planets against the danger of a repetition of a life-destroying conflagration, would also have extinguished all hope of any return of a genial warmth which, in the chapter before that, had given Life on Earth its opportunity.

This story—true or fabulous—of successive vicissitudes in the intensity, and consequently in the effect, of a physical energy radiating from the Sun might serve as a parable to expound the Western middle class's role in the Modern and post-Modern chapters of Western history. Here was an element in the Western body social whose radiant energy had threatened in the sixteenth century to consume all the non-Western civilizations on the face of the *Oikoumenê* in a veritably Zenonian cultural world-conflagration, and had then threatened in the nineteenth century to consume a native Western working class in the burning fiery furnace of an Industrial Revolution. Now that, in the twentieth century, the temperature of this Western middle-class psychic energy was being reduced to a milder degree through the conversion of the children of predatory buccaneers and *entrepreneurs* into conscientious civil servants and employees of giant non-governmental business concerns, had not the rest of Mankind, whom the fathers had ruthlessly ground down into a proletariat, good reason to rejoice at the children's change of heart? In the light of our parable we may be inclined to reply that the answer to this question must depend upon the length of the view that the observer of the Western middle class's metamorphosis might be able and willing to take. On a short view, the current abatement of the psychic temperature of the Western middle class was, on balance, possibly proving beneficial for the Western body social as a whole; but suppose that the welcome transformation of an incinerator into an incubator should prove to be merely one brief stage in a 'secular' cooling process that would eventually transform the incubator into a refrigerator, what, on this longer view, would be the significance of the 'secular' process for the Western Society's ultimate prospects?

The significance for the prospects of the current 'capitalist' system of Western economic life was not so difficult to gauge. The Western middle class's fund of pre-industrial psychic energy had been 'Capitalism's' driving force; and, if this energy was now being depotentiated and at the same time diverted from private enterprise into public service, this process unquestionably spelled Capitalism's doom.

'Capitalism is essentially a process of (endogamous) economic change . . . without innovations, no entrepreneurs; without entrepreneurial achievement, no capitalist returns and no capitalist propulsion. The atmosphere of industrial revolutions—of "progress"—is the only one in which Capitalism can survive. . . . Stabilised Capitalism is a contradiction in terms.'¹

At the opening of the second half of the twentieth century of the

¹ Schumpeter, J. A.: *Business Cycles* (New York 1939, McGraw-Hill, 2 vols.), vol ii, p. 1033.

Christian Era it looked as if the regimentation inexorably imposed by a latter-day industrial Western technology might be taking the life out of a pre-industrial spirit of private enterprise in economic affairs by which the Western Industrial Revolution had originally been brought to birth; and this prospect opened up further questions, which were more enigmatic, as well as more important, than any questions about the future of the Western Capitalist system or the Western middle class. Would the technical system of mechanized industry be able to survive the social system of private enterprise which had brought it into operation originally and had kept it in operation hitherto?¹ And, if a Western mechanized industry were to prove unable to survive the death of Western private economic enterprise, would the Western Civilization itself be able to survive the death of a mechanized industry to which the Western Society had now given hostages by allowing its population to increase in the Machine Age far beyond the numbers that any non-industrial economy could support?

It was indisputable that the Industrial System, like any other technique, could work only so long as there was some fund of creative psychic energy to drive it, and that, hitherto, this psychic driving-power had been supplied to the Western industrial system by the energy of the Western middle class. The ultimate question therefore seemed to be whether there was some alternative source of psychic energy, employable for the same economic purposes, on which a Westernizing World could draw if the Western middle class's energy were to be depotentiated or diverted. If a practical alternative was within sight and within reach, the World could perhaps afford to look forward with equanimity to the possibility of the capitalist system's demise. On the other hand, if there was no such alternative on the horizon the outlook would be disconcerting; for Mankind might then have to reckon with the possibility that a Mechanized Technology might contain within itself the psychic seeds of its own decay. If mechanization spelled regimentation, and if this regimentation had taken the spirit out of a Western industrial working class and a Western middle class in succession, was it possible for any human hands to handle 'the accursed thing'² with impunity? The answer to this mid-twentieth-century question, whatever the answer might be, was pregnant with the Western Civilization's destiny.

(III) ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO SOCIAL HARMONY

The social problem confronting Mankind on the morrow of a Second World War was being approached from different angles by divers members of a Westernizing Society that, on the economic plane, was already oecumenical in its range. One approach was being made in

¹ Professor William McNeill comments: 'I cannot think that there is much likelihood of a decay of established technology as a consequence of the decay of individual initiative. There may well be, however, a decrease in the *rate* at which new inventions are made and introduced, as bureaucratic habits of thought spread and harden themselves.'

² Joshua vi. 18.

North America, another in the Soviet Union, and a third in Western Europe.

The North American approach (which was shared with the peoples of the United States by the English-speaking element in the population of Canada) was inspired by the ideal of creating an Earthly Paradise in a New World. 'The lot is fallen unto me in a fair ground; yea, I have a goodly heritage.'¹ The motive that had moved the ancestors of the living generation of Americans to pull up their roots in the Old World and to make a fresh start in life on the farther side of the Atlantic had been a hope of being able to leave behind them the tares in their social heritage and to sow an American crop in which there should be nothing but wheat;² and in American eyes freedom for private enterprise in economic affairs was one of those good things in America's heritage from the Old World that were to be, not discarded, but transplanted. The American people believed in private economic enterprise wholeheartedly, and they were confident of being able, in their New World, to allow private economic enterprise to retain the freedom that was its life-breath without exposing themselves to the inconveniences and abuses that had been bred by private enterprise in the Old World when its freedom had there been left unrestricted.

In their New World the Americans claimed to have found a practical solution for a social problem which in the Old World had proved intractable. They claimed to have succeeded in getting rid of class-conflict in an industrial society, not by the inhuman and uneconomic crime of liquidating the middle class, but by building up a classless society on a middle-class footing. As middle-class Americans saw it, the American way of life had satisfied all reasonable demands for social justice that the industrial workers could make by raising the minimum standard of living in North America to at least the West-European middle-class level and by providing every industrial worker who chose to exert himself with opportunities for rising into the middle class, or at least with opportunities for educating his children into a middle-class career. The proof of a pudding is in the eating; and the social success of the American way of life was demonstrated (so its middle-class American advocates would contend) by the industrial workers' attitude. They were (it was asserted) much more eagerly concerned to change their momentary station in life for a better one than to spend their energies in striving for improvements in the conditions of the transitional station in which they happened at the moment to find themselves.³

The strong point in this North American approach to the social problem of an industrial society was its recognition of the truth that the energy which had set the wheels of a mechanized industry turning was the psychic energy generated by the pre-industrial *éthos* of the

¹ Ps. xvi. 6.

² See p. 545, above.

³ Professor William McNeill comments: 'I feel that your description of the American response to the problem of class-conflict [as seen through middle-class American eyes in A.D. 1952] is valid only for the period before A.D. 1929. I feel that the differences between the United States and [Western] Europe are growing much narrower, and this in both economic and cultural organization and activity. In general the United States lags a bit behind the more advanced [West] European nations in its internal development, but surely it has been catching up, and doing so rapidly over the past generation.'

Western middle class. Middle-class Americans had grasped this truth, and they were determined at all costs to preserve the middle-class spirit of private enterprise by preserving the middle-class way of life, because they were alive to the danger that the energy which had originally made the Industrial Revolution and which was now keeping going the Industrial System of economic production might be paralysed by the rise and spread of the defensive, negative, unenthusiastic trade-union and civil-service *éthos*.

The weak points in the North American approach are all implicit in Horace's observation that 'coelum, non animum, mutant qui trans mare currunt'.¹ The American hope of being able to create an Earthly Paradise was founded, as we have noticed, on a belief in the possibility of being able to leave the Old World behind by making the transit of the Atlantic, and this belief was an illusion; for the Old World was not a physical continent whose dust the Pilgrim Fathers could shake off² as they took to their boats; it was the spiritual burden of Original Sin, which Christian had to carry with him to a stage in his progress that was far in advance of the farthest point normally attained by *l'homme moyen sensuel* on either side of the Atlantic.

The Old World in this haunting spiritual sense of the term had crossed the Atlantic into the New World of North America in the souls of the first settlers from Europe on North American soil; and Original Sin made havoc of the sanguine middle-class American belief that the claims of social justice could be satisfied by a guarantee to all men of an absolute minimum standard of living, however high that standard might be set; for human standards are never absolute and objective; they are always subjective and relative; and it is not in Human Nature for one man to be content with his own standard, whatever its height, if his neighbour's standard is conspicuously higher. The cause of class-conflict thus lay, not in the inadequacy of the absolute standard of the lowest class in the scale, but in the inequality between the standards of the lowest class and the highest; this law of Human Nature was no less valid west of the Atlantic than east of it; and, if the proof of the pudding was in the eating, there was another side to the attitude of the American industrial workers which militated against the contention that in North America the class-conflicts of the Old World had been exorcized by a new American way of life. It was both incontestable and significant that the height of the minimum standard of living enjoyed by industrial workers in North America, and the abundance of the opportunities open to them for rising into the middle class, had not made the North American working class proof against succumbing to trade-union practices and the trade-union *éthos*.

Moreover, an Old World that had invaded the New World of North America in the seventeenth century in the inward spiritual form of Original Sin had launched a second wave of invasion in the twentieth century in a form which, by comparison, was material and superficial, yet which nevertheless was importunately intrusive. The geographical

¹ Horace: *Epistulae*, Book I, Ep. xi, l. 27.

² Matt. x. 14; Mark vi. 11; Luke ix. 5 and x. 11; Acts xiii. 51 and xviii. 6.

coalescence and shrinkage of the *Oikoumenê* in the twentieth century as a result of a latter-day Western technological revolution¹ had put an end, even on the physical plane, to an isolation which, on that plane, had in truth been achieved partially and temporarily by West European settlers in North America whose boasted insularity had never, on the spiritual plane, been anything but a pure illusion.

The issue between an ideal of American insularity and an ideal of oecumenical human solidarity had been the most important issue in the history of the United States, and this was both a moral issue and a practical one. Was it possible to insulate the United States from the rest of the *Oikoumenê*? And, if it was possible, was it also right for Americans to make this one of the aims of their national policy?

The possibility of isolating the United States from the Old World had been open to question long before the Old World had closed in upon America on the physical plane as a consequence of twentieth-century Western Man's technological feat of 'annihilating distance'. The novel amplitude of the opportunity in the United States for rising in the social scale had, for example, been created by a stream of immigration from the Old World which had flowed, and this in an ever-increasing volume, for nearly a hundred years ending in A.D. 1914. Each annual influx of immigrants, as it poured into the sump of the American melting-pot, had buoyed up all the layers of immigrant population that had preceded it, and each of the annual contingents had been able to count upon being buoyed up, in its turn, by all the future annual influxes that were to follow. In the nineteenth century an American family's rise in the social scale had thus been almost automatic at every level in the structure of a social pyramid that was being jacked up and underpinned by the importation of a fresh layer of immigrant population year by year; and the same reservoir of population in the Old World that had ensured this rise by feeding an inflowing stream of immigration into the United States had also ensured a livelihood for the increasing population of the United States by providing a market for the increasing abundance of commodities that these new hands in a New World were producing through the exploitation of hitherto untapped American natural resources.

Thus, on the economic plane, the New World in North America had still been part and parcel of the Old World east of the Atlantic in the nineteenth century, even more conspicuously than in the eighteenth and the seventeenth. In the nineteenth century the United States had developed her new estate by importing man-power and capital from the Old World's surplus stores and exporting resultant American products to the Old World's markets; and, though successive approximations towards the achievement of North America's economic independence had been marked by the raising of the height of the United States' tariff wall during and after the Civil War and by the cutting down of the volume of immigration into the United States after the First World War, this approach towards autarky on the economic plane had been offset on the political plane by an increasing entanglement in inter-

¹ See pp. 479-90, above.

national politics that had been made dramatically manifest when the United States had found herself compelled to become a belligerent in two world wars in succession.

Looking back in A.D. 1952 over the history of the United States since the Declaration of Independence, an historian could see in retrospect that, on the political plane, the United States' long-protracted endeavour to keep out of the arena of Western international power politics had been a losing battle. Since A.D. 1941 the United States had become more deeply implicated in international politics than the Thirteen Colonies had been before they had severed their political connexion with Great Britain; and, while the question whether isolation was any longer a practical possibility was being answered for the American people in the negative by the *force majeure* of world-shaking events, the question whether Isolationism was a morally legitimate ideal was being answered in the same sense by the American people themselves in a national debate between the respective advocates of a policy of isolation and a policy of co-operation with like-minded peoples abroad for the establishment and maintenance of a world order. This domestic controversy in the United States was momentous for the oecumenical prospects of the Western Civilization, as well as for the national prospects of the United States herself.

The issue on which the American people had to take a decision had been ventilated, soon after the close of the Second World War, in a public discussion of the verbal question whether the twentieth century of the Christian Era should be described as 'the American Century' or as 'the Century of the Common Man'; for in spite of their brevity these two competing 'slogans'¹ brought out the essence of the issue when they were pitted against one another. Both slogans alike were inspired by the national American ideal of exorcizing the class-conflicts of the Old World by creating a classless society on a middle-class footing; their difference lay in a diversity between their respective conceptions of the range of the geographical field in which the endeavour to translate this ideal into an accomplished fact could and should be made; and even on this point the difference was not an irreconcilable discrepancy between incompatible programmes but was no more than a difference of emphasis. Yet a disagreement that was not irreconcilable was nevertheless crucial, for it raised the question whether the American ideal of creating an Earthly Paradise in a New World could and should be pursued within the political frontiers of the United States in isolation from the rest of the *Oikoumenê*, or whether it was neither morally right nor practically possible to draw the limits of the New World that was

¹ The original field of the competition in which these two slogans had been coined had been the domestic arena of American party politics. 'The American Century' had been coined (in an article published under this title in *The New York Times*, 4th March, 1941, pp. 14-15) by Mr. Harry Luce, who was one of the most successful living incarnations of a traditional American spirit of capitalist enterprise. 'The Century of the Common Man' had been coined (in a speech delivered at a 'Free World' dinner in New York on the 8th May, 1942), in reply to Mr. Luce's challenging slogan, by Mr. Henry A. Wallace, a leading champion of 'the New Deal' who had carried a traditional American spirit of liberal idealism to lengths at which this had eventually cost him the loss of his chance of being nominated as a candidate for the Presidency of the United States on the Democratic Party's ticket.

to be the site of the Earthly Paradise along any line short of the bounds of the *Oikoumenê* itself. Was the New World to be just a geographical expression, or was it to have a spiritual connotation? Was the new hope to be the monopoly of one fraction of Mankind that happened in the twentieth century to be domiciled within the frontiers of the United States thanks to the enterprise and foresight of its pilgrim forebears, or was it to be a hope in which the whole of Mankind could share? In working out their American way of life, had the American people been labouring for themselves alone, or had they been labouring for all Humanity?

A presciently affirmative answer to the second of these two questions had been given in the American people's name thirty-four years back by an American idealist speaking with the authoritative voice of a President of the United States. On the 30th May, 1917, fifty-four days after the date on which the United States had become a belligerent in the First World War, Woodrow Wilson had proclaimed America's conversion to an oecumenical interpretation of her mission in his Memorial Day address at the National Cemetery at Arlington.

'We have said in the beginning that we planned this great government that men who wished freedom might have a place of refuge and a place where their hope could be realised; and now, having established such a government, having preserved such a government, having vindicated the power of such a government, we are saying to all Mankind: "We did not set this government up in order that we might have a selfish and separate liberty, for we are now ready to come to your assistance and fight out upon the field of the World the cause of Human Liberty."'

In A.D. 1952 this great issue was being debated in the United States on a practical as well as on a moral level; Americans were asking themselves whether isolation was or was not now feasible, as well as whether Isolationism was morally right or wrong; but, in the contemporary American scene as this presented itself to at least one non-American observer, it seemed clear that the moral issue was paramount in American minds and that, unless and until Isolationism had been finally rejected by American consciences, American wills would not be disposed to capitulate to the importunate logic of events—however plainly manifest it might have become by this date that the American people would not have it in their power to construct an Earthly Paradise in North America in accordance with American specifications if they were to allow the collective economic, political, and military power of the Old World to be concentrated in the hands of a totalitarian government at Moscow whose blue-print for an Earthly Paradise was 'un-American' in every line. These practical considerations had, no doubt, been at work in American minds ever since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour had provided the crowning and conclusive proof that the United States could not contract out of international power politics by any unilateral action. Yet a thus forcibly enlightened regard for the United States' national self-interest had assuredly counted for less than an intuitive idealism in moving public feeling and opinion in the United States to support the Administration's historic decisions to join in founding the

United Nations Organization; to underwrite, in the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece and Turkey; to offer Marshall Aid to the peoples who had been hit the hardest by the Second World War; to make an improvement in the standard of living of the World's poverty-stricken peasantry an American concern (along the lines of President Truman's 'Point Four'); and to make the United States a party to the Atlantic Pact.

In any case there could be little doubt in A.D. 1952 of the direction in which American minds were moving, whatever the balance of motives might have been. Americans were coming to the conclusion that if they wanted the twentieth century to be 'the American Century' they must aim at making it 'the Century of the Common Man', not just within the frontiers of the United States, but throughout the *Oikoumené*. It did not follow from this that the American approach to a solution of the problem of class-conflict would in fact prevail, or would even prove feasible, everywhere. It seemed unlikely, *a priori*, that an approach which reflected the American people's own exceptionally fortunate economic experience and exceptionally successful economic achievements would prove to be practicable, *tel quel*, in the widely different current economic and social circumstances of the majority of the living generation of Mankind; and the American approach was in fact being challenged by alternative approaches reflecting other achievements and other experiences. The American solution for the problem of class-conflict might or might not eventually prevail in the World at large; at the time of writing, its oecumenical prospects were still unpredictable; it could, however, already be predicted with some confidence that, unless the American solution did prove to have some general value for the World at large, it would not be able ultimately to prevail even within the narrow enceinte of a North American fastness.

The Russian approach to the problem of class-conflict was inspired, like the American, by the ideal of creating an Earthly Paradise, and took shape, like the American again, in a policy of getting rid of class-conflict by eliminating class-divisions; but here the likeness ended; for the Russian and American lines of attack on a common objective were poles apart. While the Americans were trying to eliminate class-divisions by bringing the industrial working-class on to a middle-class footing, the Russians had eliminated them within the frontiers of the Soviet Union by liquidating the middle class and by banning all freedom of private economic enterprise, not only for 'capitalists', but also (in political practice, though not in constitutional theory) for Trade Unionism as well.

In this Communist Russian policy there were strong points which the Soviet Union's Western rivals in a competition for world power could not afford to underrate; and the first and greatest of these Russian assets was the *éthos* of Communism itself. In the long run, perhaps, this 'ideology'—offering, as it did, a stone for bread¹—might prove to be an unsatisfying substitute for Religion; and the disillusionment of one idealistic-minded Western convert after another who had embraced

¹ Matt. vii. 9; Luke xi. 11.

Communism in the belief that he had found in it Man's way of salvation was a portent which perhaps foreshadowed the eventual reaction of Mankind in the mass to the Marxian gospel. In the short run, on the other hand, Communism did offer to any soul whose house was empty, swept, and garnished¹ an immediate satisfaction for one of the deepest and most insistent of Man's religious needs by offering to the spiritual *déraciné* a purpose of high importance, transcending his own petty personal aims, as an object for his devotion. A Leviathan embodying the collective power and corporate interests of the Human Race was a more imposing idol than any of the individual mannikins whose trivial, ephemeral, and conflicting personal interests ranked as the ultimate goals of human endeavour under a post-Christian Western dispensation in which personal freedom had been cut loose from its religious origin, inspiration, significance, and sanction. Any hungry soul that was offered no objects for worship except these paltry Western idols and this imposing Russian one would be bound, when faced with that dismal choice, to opt for becoming a votary of Leviathan. The mission of converting the World to Communism was more inspiring, exhilarating, and edifying than the mission of keeping the World safe for the right to take profits or for the right to strike. 'Holy Russia' was a more rousing war-cry than 'Happy America'.

Another strong point in the Russian approach was that Russia's geographical position made it impossible for Russians to waste their energies, *more Americano*, by chasing the will-o'-the-wisp of Isolationism. The inextricable implication in the affairs of the rest of the *Oikoumenê* which was now overtaking the United States as a result of the *Oikoumenê*'s recent coalescence and shrinkage was a plight in which Russia had found herself since the dawn of Russian history. Isolationism was an ideal which could not be entertained by the inhabitants of a land-locked country. Russia marched with the domains of all the non-Russian civilizations of the Old World; and her frontier with the Western Society—which, in Russian experience, had been the most dangerous frontier of all—was a line drawn across an open plain where there was neither a mountain rampart nor a river moat to lighten the task of Russia's human defenders. The perilous exposure of her geographical location thus constrained 'Holy Russia', like the Biblical Israel with whom she was identified in her repressed but unexorcized Orthodox Christian tradition, to see herself as a Zion against whose Lord and His Anointed the Kings of the Earth would always be standing up and the rulers taking counsel together.² 'Why do the heathen so furiously rage together, and why do the people imagine a vain thing?'³ They rage because the Chosen People are the depositories of a unique truth and unique righteousness which the froward hearts of the wicked are bent upon challenging. 'Holy Russia's' defence was not any 'natural frontier' like the now rapidly narrowing Atlantic Straits that had once insulated the United States; it was orthodoxy ('I will preach the law'⁴) supported by a faith in the inevitability of Truth's and Righteousness's ultimate

¹ Matt. xii. 44; Luke xi. 25.

³ Ps. ii. 1.

² Ps. ii. 2.

⁴ Ps. ii. 7.

triumph ('Thou shalt bruise them with a rod of iron and break them in pieces like a potter's vessel'¹). Marx's Russian Khalifah's proclamation to the capitalists was an echo of Muhammad's legendary message to Heraclius and Khusrū Parwiz: 'Be wise now therefore, O ye Kings; be learned, ye that are judges of the Earth.'² . . . Kiss the Son lest He be angry, and so ye perish from the right way.'³ Russian Communism's simultaneous proclamation to the Proletariat was: 'Blessed are all they that put their trust in Him.'⁴

A third strong point, in the short run, in the Communist Russian approach was the replacement of a traditional Eastern Orthodox Christianity by a Marxian post-Christian Western ideology as the current expression of Russia's perennial orthodoxy; for the Marxian ideology was a heresy in orthodox post-Christian Western eyes, and the anathematization of Marxism by a Western dominant minority was a testimony to its truth and righteousness in the sight of a now world-wide Western proletariat in which the peasant majority of Mankind had been brigaded together with the Western industrial workers.

Marxism interpreted by Lenin and Stalin and preached from the Kremlin made, in this exotic Russian dress, a potent appeal to the World's peasantry from China to Peru and from Mexico to Tropical Africa; for Russia herself had been, till yesterday, one of these poor and powerless peasant countries. In her social and economic situation Russia had a much closer affinity than the United States had with the depressed three-quarters of the Human Race for whose allegiance the two Powers were competing; and Russia could claim, with a specious appearance of veracity, that she had saved herself by her exertions and the rest of the Proletariat by her example. The heretical Western ideology which the Russians had made their own had enabled them to increase one great peasant country's collective power, and in the same act to raise its inhabitants' personal standards of living,⁵ by acclimatizing a current Western technology through an industrial revolution—which, in Russia, had been made by the State in the Community's interest (as the Bolsheviks conceived of it) and not by private *entrepreneurs* in theirs. Soviet Communism's achievements, as presented in Soviet Communist propaganda, sounded impressive in the ears of non-Russian peasants and industrial workers who had no opportunity of checking the story that they were being told by the evidence of their own eyes; and even in the United States there were elements that might prove to be not altogether impervious to the Communist gospel.

In North America an oecumenical proletariat had been reproduced in miniature; for, in spite of tardy measures for the restriction of immigration from Europe and Africa and for the exclusion of immigration from a 'Barred Zone' of Asian countries,⁶ the peasantry of the Old

¹ Ps. ii. 9.

² Ps. ii. 10.

³ Ps. ii. 12.

⁴ Ps. ii. 12.

⁵ See IX. viii. 684-9.

⁶ See T. Oynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924 (London 1926, Milford), pp. 86-114 and 127-60. On the 27th June, 1952, when the writer was revising the present passage in his present work at Princeton, New Jersey, the McCarran-Walter Immigration Bill was enacted through being repassed by the Congress at Washington by more than the two-thirds majority of votes that was required in order to override President Truman's veto. This Act, which, on the whole, consolidated and

World was widely represented in the lower ranks of the American industrial working class; and the fusing power of 'the Melting Pot', in which America had put her trust as her solution for the problem of class-conflict, was counteracted by the institution of caste to the detriment of any American citizens of alien origin who differed markedly from their White fellow-citizens in physique. In a United States whose population was no longer being recruited by immigration in any appreciable volume, a Negro proletariat that was drifting away from Southern fields into Northern slums seemed destined to remain permanently battered down at the bottom of a social sump. The cutting off of the nineteenth-century stream of immigration was thus having the effect of generating, inside the Oceanic moats that were 'Fortress America's' natural frontiers, a penalized and alienated class in the American body social in which an enterprising director of Russian operations in a 'Cold War' might perhaps one day find the makings of a 'fifth column';¹ in this new American proletariat, in the technical sense of the term, the urban coloured population was merely the most conspicuous among a number of elements; and the middle class's sensitiveness to this potential danger in their midst was betrayed in their inclination to tolerate an odious practice of 'witch-hunting' that was a menace to traditional American civil liberties, and in their readiness to jump to the conclusion that any American citizen who had once been denounced by American 'witch-hunters' as an agent of Soviet Communism must be guilty even if proved innocent.

While this American nervousness was an index of the opportunities for Communist propaganda in an American mission-field, there were of course, weak points, as well as strong points, in the Russian Communist approach to a solution of Mankind's current social problems.

The most serious of these Russian weaknesses was the most obvious one. Soviet Communism had set out to put an end to the private exploitation of one individual human being by another, and, consistently with this aim, the fundamental law in the Soviet Communist social code was a veto on the private employment of labour; but the only practical means of liberating individual human beings from private exploitation by their fellows that Soviet Communism had been able to devise—or been willing to adopt—was the public exploitation of all individuals alike by the omnipotent rulers of a totalitarian state. The urban proletariat that a Western middle class had inadvertently called into existence in the course of their pursuit of their own private purposes had been manufactured deliberately in Russia by the Soviet Government for the sake of fulfilling the Marxian scriptures. A consequent weakness of Soviet Communist policy was that, in suppressing all individual liberty and thereby making sure of getting rid of the abuse

confirmed the already existing restrictive legislation, had at least the merit of abolishing, for the benefit of non-Communist Asian countries, the former invidious difference in status, for the purposes of the immigration law of the United States, between Asian countries on the one hand and European and African countries on the other.

¹ Professor McNeill comments: 'I believe it is true that, so far, Communism has made little progress among American Negroes; a better example would be the relative prominence of Jews in the ranks of the United States Communist Party.'

of private power to which the enjoyment of individual liberty might give rise, the Soviet Government had also cut the roots of an incentive to produce and to create which individual liberty alone could keep alive.

If the tasks of production and creation were ever to be taken wholly out of the hands of human beings and were to be assigned wholly to an impersonal 'Collective Man', the result could only be to bring production and creation to a standstill. The psychic driving-force of personal purposefulness and zest cannot be effectively replaced by the goads of governmental terrorism and coercion, and the rulers of the Soviet Union had tacitly confessed that they had learnt this lesson by experience when they had introduced their 'Stakhanovite' system of differential rewards for different degrees of efficiency in output, which was familiar in the West under the name of 'piece-work', and when they had sought to find an alternative to the monetary incentive for competition in honorary incentives of the kinds that had proved effective in Western monarchies under the *ancien régime* and subsequently in the recreational field of non-professional sport. Such concessions by Communism to Individualism may have tempered Communism's damping effects; yet these were no more than mitigations of a system that was intrinsically inimical to the application of human energies to economic purposes, and a non-Russian and non-Communist observer found it hard to see how, in the long run, on the economic and administrative (as distinct from the ideological) plane, a Communist totalitarian régime could avoid evoking an extreme manifestation of the defensive, negative, unenthusiastic trade-union and civil-service ethos. This prospect was a serious menace to the Soviet Union's chances of success in her competition with the United States, where even the trade-unionist industrial working class was infected with the American middle class's belief in the virtues of private enterprise and with its determination to keep this source of economic productivity and creativity alive.

The Soviet Union's present economic inferiority to the United States was as indisputable as it was depressing for believers in the Soviet Communist dispensation; and, though this inferiority was due, not merely to a difference of régime, but to the backwardness of Russian technology as appraised by Western standards, the Soviet Government had debarred themselves by the extravagance of their mendacity in their own domestic propaganda from making the valid and pertinent points that this technological backwardness of Russia's was at least as old as the seventeenth century and that, since the Bolsheviks' own advent to power in A.D. 1917, they had emulated the achievements of Peter the Great himself in notably diminishing the length of Russia's technological lag behind the contemporary progress of her Western neighbours.¹ Instead of claiming credit for their genuine and praiseworthy successes in narrowing the gap between Russia's and the West's technological and social performance, they had painted, for their subjects' edification, a fancy picture of an instantaneously attained Soviet Communist Earthly Paradise by comparison with which the contemporary Capitalist World was a howling wilderness. In consequence, the

¹ See IX. viii. 126-49.

Soviet Government were now living in constant fear of the possibility that their subjects might discover the very different truth; and the acuteness of their concern about this danger was betrayed by the rigour of their precautions for preventing personal intercourse between their subjects and the citizens of 'capitalist' countries.¹ Western psychological opportunities for propaganda in a Russian mission-field, if ever the iron curtain were to become rusty enough to be perforated, could be gauged by the degree of the Soviet Government's nervousness. The Soviet Government were taking individual lapses out of the Communist Faith in the Soviet Union just as hard as the American public were taking individual lapses into it in the United States.

The likeness between these contemporaneous American and Russian anxieties was significant because it was not fortuitous. The reason why both parties were taking so tragically any successes scored on their home front by their adversaries was that, in an *Oikoumenê* whose conductivity had been gaining in intensity in proportion to the progressive diminution of geographical distance measured in terms of human intercourse, it had now manifestly ceased to be feasible to attempt to create an Earthly Paradise in any artificially insulated province of what was already, on the psychic plane, One World. In the history of the Soviet Union the counterpart of an American Isolationism had been Stalin's slogan 'Socialism in One Country'; but, though this slogan had served Stalin's personal domestic purpose of defeating and ousting his rival Trotsky in a four-years-long struggle within the bosom of the Soviet Communist Party that had ended in Stalin's definitive victory in January 1928, it was no more fit than American Isolationism was to serve as a practical programme for a policy in the real world of the day; for in this world the Soviet Union and the United States were competing with one another at close quarters, and either party would be condemning itself to swift defeat and to eventual subjugation at its adversary's hands if it were ever to leave this adversary a free scope for sowing tares in the oecumenical mission-field² while it confined its own activities and attention to the cultivation of its own garden. The recent metamorphosis of the *Oikoumenê* through the magic of Western technology was forcing the Soviet Union and the United States to contend with one another in a world-wide arena.

The West European approach towards a solution of the problem of class-conflict, which was most in evidence in Great Britain and in the Scandinavian countries, differed from both the American and the Russian approach in being less doctrinaire than either of them. The British people, in particular, were now feeling their way towards a solution by compromise—an approach to political problems to which the British had become addicted as the result of a more-than-three-hundred-years-long apprenticeship in trial and error. In this span of their political history, intransigence had cost them the two catastrophes of the English Civil War and the secession of the Thirteen Colonies in North America, while the contrary tactics of compromise had enabled them to negotiate the gradual transformation of a unitary empire into a co-operative

¹ See pp. 534-5, above.

² Matt. xiii. 25.

commonwealth of nations and to carry out the domestic revolutions of A.D. 1688, 1832, and 1945 without either falling into civil disorders or sowing the seeds of inveterate resentment in the hearts of the class that happened to be the loser on each occasion. Since as early as the thirteenth century it had been one of the recognized principles of English statesmanship that it was the part of wisdom for the ruling element (*Graecè πολίτευμα*) in the body politic to forestall the danger of a *coup d'état* by voluntarily taking into partnership with itself any class, hitherto outside the privileged circle, which had accumulated sufficient power and experience to be now probably capable, in the last resort, of forcing an entry if it did not find an already open door. In A.D. 1945 the British middle class, which had profited by the agrarian landlords' acquiescence in its enfranchisement in A.D. 1832, had acquiesced in its turn in the industrial workers' advent to power; and this compromise between the politically conflicting interests of the middle class and the working class had been made feasible by a simultaneous compromise between the ideologically antithetical dispensations of Private Economic Enterprise and Socialism.

This institutional compromise was a common-sense recognition of the hard facts of the situation in which all West European peoples now found themselves. In countries that were in process of losing power and wealth to rising giants on the fringes of an expanding Western World¹ at the very time when the local industrial workers were demanding 'a new deal', it was manifestly impracticable for the West European middle class to follow the North American middle class's policy of offering to the working class the two amenities of a virtually middle-class standard of living and an abundance of individual opportunities for rising in the social scale as alternatives to governmental intervention for the promotion of social justice at the price of a regimentation that had proved to be unavoidable in any redistribution of private purchasing power through governmental action. On the other hand, in Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, the Low Countries, and France civil liberties were so strongly entrenched and so highly prized by citizens of all classes that it would have been equally impracticable in any of these countries to carry governmental intervention on behalf of social justice to the Russian length of a régime of totalitarian autocracy. Accordingly the current Anglo-Scandinavian approach to the problem of class-conflict was an attempt to find a middle way between an American and a Russian extreme by experimenting in an illogical combination of a modicum of free private economic enterprise with a modicum of governmental planning and regimentation in the interests of social justice. In medical parlance this Anglo-Scandinavian Social Democracy might be described as a vaccine for giving immunity against the virus of Communism; and the efficacy of this West European preventive social medicine was certified by its irritating effect on Soviet Communist nerves. Next to the Trotskys and Titos whose deviationist Communism was a threat to a Stalinian orthodoxy within the Com-

¹ This dwarfing of Western Europe has been noticed in IV. iv. 308-13, and on p. 486, above.

munist fold, the Stalinists' principal bugbears were the Undéns and Attlees whose contemptible milk-and-water nostrum was breaking all the rules of a Marxian Historical Necessity by sterilizing the orthodox Communist Faith's mission-field in Western Europe.

This prosaic Anglo-Scandinavian policy of institutional compromise would ultimately be appraised on the practical test of its outcome in the long run, and in A.D. 1952 it would have been premature to try to anticipate History's future verdict on it; yet some, at any rate, of both its strong points and its weak points were by then already apparent.

Its strongest point was its consonance with the general experience of Man in Process of Civilization and with the particular requirements of the living generation of Mankind in an *Oikoumenê* in which a number of formerly segregated and diversified societies had been suddenly brought into close quarters with one another by advances in a Western technology that had been too swift to allow time for these now next-door neighbours to become culturally acclimatized to one another.

The policy of brewing a mixture between Socialism and Freedom of Private Economic Enterprise was justified by past experience, inasmuch as it would have been difficult for the best informed historian to cite significant examples of historical communities in which either of the two elements in this mid-twentieth-century British mixture had been wholly absent. Between the repellent anarchy of an abortive Scandinavian Civilization in Iceland and the uninviting regimentation of an Incaic Andean universal state, the constitutions of a vast majority of the communities that had risen and fallen up to date in societies in process of civilization had contained both an appreciable ingredient of Socialism and an appreciable ingredient of Personal Liberty. Communities that had allowed Individualism to run riot in private armies and private executions of private judgements founded on private laws had been as abnormal as communities that had allowed Socialism to go so far as to impose a community of wives and husbands or combs and toothbrushes; and, while, in the mixture between the two dispensations that was the normal constitution of Society, there had been an infinite variety in the quotas of the two ingredients, and a perpetual dissension over the perennial question of what these quotas should be in any particular ephemeral set of kaleidoscopically changing social circumstances, the same two ingredients had regularly been present in the constitutions of most communities in the common run. In the solid setting of this historical background, mid-twentieth-century British social policy looked as realistic as it was empirical; and, if this conformity with past experience was its outstanding justification, its outstanding merit was its relevancy to present needs.

The philosophical implication of the current British institutional compromise was that the issue between Socialism and Private Enterprise on the economic plane—as, for example, over the question whether the telegraph and telephone service should be operated by the public post office or by private enterprise—was not a question of ideological principle on which it would be wrong not to take an intransigent stand, but was a question of practical expediency on which it would be wrong

not to follow the pedestrian path of empiricism and give-and-take. This was a saving truth in a world which was faced with a genuine and crucial question of principle in the issue between a worship of God and a worship of Collective Human Power, and which had seen the power of Leviathan formidably reinforced by the onset of a soul-destroying Mechanized Technology. This was the battle in which the Spirit of Man must conquer or die in a twentieth-century oecumenical arena; and the living generation of Mankind had much to gain by adopting a British approach to current social problems that would leave human souls free to throw themselves into the momentous struggle on the religious plane without having their attention and energy diverted to fight on the economic plane over an issue of secondary importance.

The British approach was also sound common sense in a world in which peoples bringing with them sharply diverse cultural heritages had now been brought face to face with one another so suddenly by a technological 'annihilation of distance' that even the pace of the rapid and radical economic and social transformation which Technology was simultaneously bringing to pass throughout the *Oikoumenê* was not swift enough to give this jostling crowd of motley communities time to make mutual adjustments unless the period of grace could be prolonged by the exercise of Charity and Tolerance. Perhaps the two most promising features of the British approach were its flexibility and the coolness of its emotional temperature. In the British mixture between Socialism and Free Private Economic enterprise the proportions between the two ingredients could be agreed *ad hoc* in accordance with the particular requirements of a particular community at a particular time and place, and the proportions agreed today could be modified by a fresh agreement tomorrow in order to cater for changes overnight in methods of technique, in the size and distribution of national, sectional, and individual incomes, and in manners and customs. This flexibility of the British prescription for alleviating a social indisposition was unquestionably better adapted to provide for Mankind's still locally diverse and now everywhere rapidly changing current social needs than the rigid lines on the blue prints of rival Russian and American plans for social engineering, while the lowness of the temperature generated by a British social apothecary's work made it feasible to keep on perpetually experimenting in it without courting any serious risk of a catastrophic explosion.

When a British observer reached a conclusion that was so gratifying to British self-esteem, he had to ask himself whether—in spite of his not being an adherent of the Labour Party—he might nevertheless be a victim of a distorting national egocentric illusion; and, even if perchance his judgement were to be endorsed by non-British contemporary observers who could not be suspected of the same partiality, a disinterestedly favourable appreciation of the British approach might still be offset by a pessimistic estimate of the prospects of seeing a Twentieth-Century World take this salutary British middle course. The Anglo-Scandinavian experiment in Social Democracy was being made at a time when the margin of energy, wealth, and power required for embarking

on a great new social venture had been wiped out in Western Europe by the cumulative effects of two world wars fought mainly on European battlefields; and, even if Great Britain were to succeed in making an enduring practical success of Social Democracy at home, it might be doubted whether, in the second half of the twentieth century, her influence would still be great enough—as it might have been a hundred years earlier, when she had been at the zenith of her power and prestige—to move other countries to follow her in experimenting in *ad hoc* mixtures of Socialism with Free Private Economic Enterprise.

If the peaceful domestic revolution in Great Britain in and after A.D. 1945 and the peaceful departure of the British from India in A.D. 1947 should come to be reckoned, in the judgement of Posterity, among the finest of the examples that the British people had ever set, then the timing of these two historic British acts might come to be lamented as one of the ironies of History. There could never have been a greater need for such examples of the unflamboyant virtues of reasonableness, self-restraint, conciliatoriness, and far-sightedness; but the practical effect of a good example is determined, not by the degree of the need, but by the degree of the readiness to follow it; and on this practical criterion these two British examples had possibly been given a hundred years too late. Yet, whether a distracted Twentieth-Century World did or did not prove willing to follow a British lead, it would find itself unable to elude the problem with which British statesmanship was wrestling in the United Kingdom on the morrow of a Second World War. In this chapter of British, Western, and human history the British people were groping after a practical solution of a theoretically insoluble problem by which the Human Social Animal was perennially beset. If Freedom and Justice were intrinsically incompatible ideals, as they were, and if nevertheless *Homo Politicus* could not afford to renounce either of them, as he could not, how was Jehu to drive in double harness two equally indispensable steeds that were pulling their human driver's chariot in two opposite directions? Any practical solution of this problem would be unlikely to be anything more than a local and temporary makeshift; yet the problem itself was so importunate and so crucial that even a makeshift solution in a single chapter of parochial history might prove to be something of general and permanent value for Man in his perpetual struggle with his own Human Nature.

(IV) POSSIBLE COSTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

Since social life is impossible for Man without some measure of both Personal Liberty and Social Justice, Human Society is a house perpetually divided against itself, which will not stand¹ unless the thrusts of these two conflicting dynamic ideals are shrewdly directed to making them hold the house together instead of pulling it to pieces. The temptingly simpler expedient of relying solely on one of the two opposing forces and eliminating the other is impracticable, because it is impossible for the Human Social Animal to dispense with either ideal. Personal

¹ Matt. xii. 25.

Liberty is an indispensable condition for any human achievement, good or evil, since human action can be undertaken only by individual minds and wills. At the same time, Social Justice is the sovereign rule of the game of human intercourse, and this rule can never be broken with impunity for the sake of giving scope to Personal Liberty, even when in other respects the exercise of Personal Liberty is achieving results that are indisputably good. An uncurbed Personal Liberty generates oligarchy by giving a free hand to a minority who, in an unrestricted competition of all against all, are more than a match for the rest of the community in physical strength, mental ability, wealth, or political power. On the other hand, Social Justice cannot be enforced up to the hilt except by completely suppressing Personal Liberty and instituting an absolute dictatorship.

In the history of Man in Process of Civilization, all known social constitutions had been pitched somewhere between these two theoretical extremes, with a bias, more or less strongly pronounced, in the one direction or in the other. The Soviet Communist régime in Russia, for example, had been expending almost all its zeal and alertness on guarding against the abuse of Personal Liberty through the private exploitation of one person by another, without being comparably sensitive to the evils of the dictatorship through which it was vindicating the demands of Social Justice.¹ By contrast, the Constitution of the United States had provided effective safeguards against dictatorship by its elaborate mechanism of checks and balances, without having shown a comparable concern to prevent freedom of personal enterprise from degenerating into freedom for one person to exploit another for his private profit.

Considering that, at the time of writing, both the United States and the Soviet Union were going concerns, it could be inferred that, in practice, neither of these two antithetical polities had pushed its own characteristic bias to the point of disequilibrium at which the house would come tumbling down upon its inmates' heads. In the working constitutions of both the Soviet Union and the United States, as in those of all other polities known to History, elements of both Personal Liberty and Social Justice were combined in diverse ratios; and in a mid-twentieth-century Westernizing World the mixture, whatever it might be, was invariably labelled 'Democracy', because this disinterested Attic blessed word had come to be an obligatory shibboleth for every self-respecting political alchemist. In the Soviet Union in A.D. 1952 'Democracy' signified a substantial measure of Social Equality combined with a vestige of Personal Liberty that was the maximum compatible with the Communists' prescription for securing Social Justice. In the United States at the same date the same term 'Democracy' signified a substantial measure of Personal Liberty combined with as generous a modicum of Social Justice as an American indulgence of Personal Liberty allowed.

¹ Professor William McNeill points out that the Social Justice which, at this date, was being purchased in the Soviet Union at so high a price, in terms of a sacrifice of personal freedom, did not compare favourably with the Social Justice current at the time in the United Kingdom, or indeed in the United States, when the comparison was made in terms of the gamut of the differences in the personal incomes that different individuals in different occupational groups or classes were allowed to draw out of the total product of the community's collective work.

These diverse brews uniformly labelled 'Democracy' all had the elementary practical merit of making the wheels of a social mechanism revolve; yet the display of a reassuringly pretentious term of political art was a disingenuous device for concealing the cracks in the divers make-shifts over which the label bearing the bold imprint 'Democracy' had been pasted by rival bill-posting politicians. An intrinsic contradiction between Personal Liberty and Social Justice could not be reconciled at all by the mere repetition of a political catchword that was specious only because it was ambiguous, and it could not be reconciled more than superficially and provisionally by the more respectable and useful artifice of improvising makeshift political and economic measures for reconciling the two ideals in practice. The only genuine reconciliation between these conflicting ideals of Liberty and Equality was to be found in the mediating ideal of Fraternity;¹ and, if Man's social salvation depended on his prospects of translating this higher ideal into reality, he would find the politician's ingenuity a bruised reed,² since the achievement of Fraternity was beyond the reach of human beings so long as, in their struggles to achieve it, they trusted exclusively in their own powers. The Brotherhood of Man was an ideal that men could never translate into reality without acting on a saving belief in the common Fatherhood of God; and the implicit truth that human social problems could be solved only by lifting them from the social to the religious plane was as true in a twentieth-century Westernizing World as it had been true always and everywhere since the transfiguration of Sub-man into Man.

If in that world in that age Mankind's perennial social problem displayed any distinctive facet, this was to be found in the imperious intervention of a latter-day Western Technology; for, in the trembling balance in which Personal Liberty and Social Justice were being weighed against one another there and then, Technology's girder had been thrown, like Brennus's sword, into the anti-libertarian scale.

This finding could be illustrated and supported by taking an observation of a coming state of Society which was already within sight, though it might not yet be within reach. Let it be assumed, for the sake of the argument, that an almighty Technology has already accomplished the next major tasks on its agenda. By thrusting an atomic bomb into Man's hands Technology will have forced Man to abolish War and Civil Disorder and at the same time will have enabled Man to reduce the death-rate to an unprecedentedly low minimum by bestowing impartially on all classes in each community, and on all communities in the *Oikoumenê*, the benefits of preventive medicine. Let it further be assumed that these prodigious improvements in the conditions of Human Life by means of institutional changes have been carried out at a speed with which the

¹ The trio 'Liberty-Equality-Fraternity' had been deified by the authors of the French Revolution as a humanitarian substitute for a Christian theology's Holy Trinity. The incomprehensible persons of a hypothetical Godhead were to be replaced by three rational and practicable ideals. But this unacknowledged Christian inspiration of the ideas of 1789 was responsible for an *a priori* misreading of the true relation in which the three deified ideals stood to one another. In reality the trio was not a Nicene Trinity-in-Unity but was an Hegelian resolution of forces. Fraternity was the synthesis that could resolve a conflict between the thesis of Liberty and the counter-demands of an Equality that was Liberty's antithesis.

² 2 Kings xviii. 21.

consequently requisite cultural changes have failed to keep pace. These assumptions require us to imagine that the peasant three-quarters of Mankind will not yet have lost their immemorially old habit of reproducing their kind up to the limits of their means of subsistence; and this assumption in turn requires us to imagine them still to be expending on increases in their head of population all the additional means of subsistence that will have been placed in their hands by the establishment of a World Order that will have brought in its train the benefits of peace, police, hygiene, and the application of Science to the production of food.

Such prognostications would not be fantastic; they would merely be projections of current tendencies into the future. In China, for example, increases in the head of population had swallowed up increases in the means of subsistence which had been bestowed on the peasantry in China by the introduction of previously unknown food crops from the Americas in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era and by the establishment, in the seventeenth century, of a *Pax Manchuan*. Thanks to the naturalization of maize in China *circa* A.D. 1550, of sweet potatoes *circa* A.D. 1590, and of pea-nuts at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the population had risen from the 63,599,541 indicated by the returns in the census of A.D. 1578 to an estimated figure of 108,300,000 in A.D. 1661—and this in spite of the fact that in the interval between these two dates this spurt in the growth of population had been partly offset by the mortality arising from Chinese civil disorders and Manchu military operations in the anarchic transition to the Manchu régime from the Ming.¹ Thereafter, under the Manchu Peace, the population had continued to rise to 143,411,559 in A.D. 1741 and to a figure of the order of 300 million by the time when, half-way through the nineteenth century, the decline of the Manchu régime in its turn had brought with it a fresh bout of anarchy that had taken another heavy toll of Chinese life. This prompt conversion of additional resources into additional population in China under the Ming and Manchu dispensations had been duplicated in a comparably portentous increase in the populations of India under a British Rāj and of Java under Dutch rule; and it was significant that all recent increases in Asian peasant populations were ultimately traceable to the oecumenical effects of Modern Western enterprise, since even in China, which had never come under the direct rule of any Western Power, the increase in the food-supply through the introduction of new crops had been a consequence of the West Europeans' discovery of the Americas.

If the effect of Modern Western enterprise in enabling Asian peoples to indulge their habit of increasing their populations up to the limit had been so great, yesterday and the day before, in the local and temporary incubators constituted by a Manchu, a Dutch, and a British Peace, it seemed safe to predict that the same effect of the same cause would be powerfully enhanced tomorrow if the whole *Oikoumené* were to be united politically under an American Peace and if, within this global Earthly Paradise, the beneficent medical applications of a still advancing Western

¹ See Goodrich, L. C.: *A Short History of the Chinese People* (London 1948, Allen & Unwin), pp. 198-9.

Science were to continue to reduce the World's death-rate, besides continuing to increase the World's production of food. Though Science's magic cornucopia had produced an abundance that had falsified Malthus's pessimistic expectations up to date, the insuperable finiteness of the area of the Earth's surface must set a ceiling to the progressive increase in Mankind's food-supply that even Science could not transcend; and the pace of the Intellect in making scientific discoveries, and of the Will in applying them, was so much swifter than the pace of the Sub-conscious Psyche in adjusting its habits to conform with the necessities of successive new situations, into which it was perpetually being hustled by its volatile yoke-fellow, that it seemed at least as likely as not that Science's ceiling of global food production would be reached some time before the Peasantry's habit of breeding up to the limit would have been overcome.

The British people had taken not much less than 140 years to adjust their breeding habits to a rise in the population of Great Britain produced by a fall in the death-rate that had begun *circa* A.D. 1740;¹ and this had been the rate of change of habits in a then already predominantly commercial-minded community in which 'the cake of custom'² had been much less massive, less opaque, and less resistant than it yet was in the twentieth century in any of the peasant communities. It was, no doubt, conceivable that the Peasantry's custom of breeding up to the limits of subsistence might yield some day to the solvent of an exotic Western technology; for a Peasantry who by A.D. 1952 were already discovering that this Western talisman could endow them with something like a Western military efficiency,³ at the price of their submitting to a Late Modern Western drill, might go on to discover that it could also endow them with something like a Western standard of living at the price of their adopting post-Modern Western methods of keeping the increase of population within bounds. Yet, even if there was thus some hope of the Peasantry's eventually making this revolutionary change of practice in this Malthusian field, the change here could hardly be counted upon to come quickly enough to forestall the onset of an already impending crisis.

In thus forecasting a posthumous fulfilment of Malthus's expectations, we should also have to forecast that, by the time at which the disconcerting gap between the World's food-supply and the Peasantry's breeding habits would have brought the Peasantry to the verge of famine, some oecumenical authority would have made itself responsible for looking after at least the elementary material needs of the whole living population of the planet. This prognostication, again, would be merely a projection of current tendencies, since, at the close of the Second World War, the quantities and kinds of the food required by the whole population of the World had actually been estimated, and the existing supplies been commandeered and allocated, to meet the minimum needs of the rice-eating, wheat-eating, and maize-eating provinces of the *Oikoumenê*,

¹ See pp. 386-7, above.

² Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th ed. (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 27 and 35, cited in II. i. 192.

³ See pp. 503-16, above.

by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Even if we assume that the minimum standard of living that a future oecumenical authority would have undertaken to secure for the population of the World would have been no higher than the minimum standard for the population of England that had been contemplated in Queen Elizabeth's 'Poor Law' statute of A.D. 1601, a situation in which any authority would have assumed any responsibility for guaranteeing the whole living generation of Mankind against starvation in a world in which the production of food would have reached its ceiling would be a situation in which the begetting of children would have ceased to be the private affair of wives and husbands and have become the public concern of a ubiquitous impersonal disciplinary power.

If this situation were one day to arise, it would impose on Mankind one of the most drastic revolutions in human history since the first essays in Civilization; for hitherto men and women had not only been at liberty to beget children at their own discretion but had enjoyed this freedom when they had been destitute of all other rights and assets. This historic freedom was attested, as we have noticed in an earlier context,¹ by the etymology of the word 'proletariat'; for that technical term in the vocabulary of a Modern Western sociology was derived from a Latin word coined for the statistical purposes of the Roman census to describe a category of Roman citizens 'who had nothing but their children to enter in their returns as their contribution to the common weal'.² This Roman administrative terminology was an eloquent testimony to the truth that, in the history of Man in Process of Civilization up to date, no government—not even the most meticulous and most inquisitorial tyranny—had ever thought of contesting its subjects' freedom to reproduce their kind.

The nearest that governments had come hitherto towards intruding on this inner sanctum of private life had been to institute negative or positive rewards for the parents of large families if the public authorities were anxious to obtain an increase in their supplies of man-power or cannon-fodder; but they had no more dreamed of forbidding their subjects to restrict the size of their families than they had dreamed of compelling them, instead of merely inducing them, to multiply. Indeed, the freedom to beget or not to beget had been hitherto so uncontroversially sacrosanct that it had been tacitly taken for granted; and even as late as A.D. 1941 it had not occurred to President Roosevelt to raise the number of the axiomatic human freedoms consecrated in his charter from four to five by explicitly putting on record a wife's and husband's sacred right to determine the size of their own families.³ It now looked as if the future might show that there had been an unintentional logic in Roosevelt's artless silence on this point, since it appeared that in the last resort—

¹ In I. i. 41, n. 3.

² 'Proletarii dicti sunt plebei qui nihil rei publicae exhibeant sed tantum prolem sufficient' (Nonius Marcellinus in his *Compendiosa Doctrina per Litteras*, quoted *ibid.*).

³ This right was not challenged in principle by the ban on the procurement of abortion, or even by the ban on the advertisement and sale of artificial contraceptives, that was the law of the land in many countries at the time of writing; for, in theory at least, these bans still left husbands and wives free to limit the size of their families by the exercise of sexual self-control.

given the World's ultimate ceiling of food production and the Peasantry's traditional breeding habits—a novel 'freedom from want' could not be guaranteed to Mankind unless a familiar 'freedom to beget' were taken away from them. On this showing, the maintenance of a minimum oecumenical material standard of living would require a public interference with Personal Liberty that hitherto was unheard of; for, though it was true that in the past a minute fraction of Mankind had been either forcibly precluded from exercising its right of reproduction or had voluntarily abstained from exercising it, religious celibacy had always been considered to be an exceptional act of spiritual heroism, while the practice of making eunuchs had ranked with Human sacrifice, Prostitution, Slavery, and War as one of the blots on the pages of the history of Civilization.

If the time were indeed to come when the begetting of children would have to be regulated in conformity with imperious requirements of public policy instead of being left to chance in being left to the personal discretion of wives and husbands, how was this revolutionary future extension of the powers of authoritarian government into the intimacies of private life likely to be received on the one hand by the peasant majority of Mankind and on the other hand by a minority whom an Industrial Technology had emancipated from the peasant's bondage to unquestioned custom? The controversy between these two sections of Mankind that the Malthusian issue was bound to evoke was likely to be acute and acrimonious, since either section would have grievances against the other which would seem clamant in the aggrieved party's estimation. The peasantry would feel aggrieved at being threatened with the loss of their traditional freedom to reproduce their kind on the plea that this was the only alternative to starvation; for this sacrifice would be demanded of them at a time when the gulf between their own pauper standard of living and the industrial peoples' relatively lavish standard would have come to be greater than it had ever been before.

A progressive widening of this gulf was, in truth, one of the consequences that must be expected to follow from the course of events that we have been anticipating, if we are right in forecasting that, at the time when global food production would be reaching its ceiling, the peasantry would still be expending most of its additional supply of food on adding to the head of its population, and the industrialized peoples be expending most of their additional supply of commodities on raising a slowly increasing or even stationary population's standard of living. Considering that, by the time of writing, most of the industrialized peoples had already either reached or come within sight of reaching a new equilibrium in the movement of their population through the offsetting of an antecedent decrease in the death-rate by an eventual countervailing decrease in the birth-rate, it seemed likely that, among these peoples, this tendency would continue;¹ and, considering further that their standard of living had risen notably even during the period when their populations

¹ Professor William McNeill comments: 'The stabilization of population in the industrialized countries is surely less certain now, since the Second World War, than this passage implies.'

had been increasing very rapidly in consequence of a decrease in the death-rate which at that time had not yet been offset by a countervailing diminution in the number of births, it seemed likely that these peoples' standard of living would rise still more steeply after their populations' net rate of growth had fallen off (assuming that this new lower rate would be, and would continue to be, not far from the economic optimum in the sense of being the rate that in the current social and technological circumstances would best work together with the contemporary local rate of increase in production to achieve the maximum of material prosperity).

In this situation in an *Oikoumenê* that would have been unified on the psychological and moral planes while on the economic plane the local contrasts between diverse standards of living would have been accentuated, the Peasantry would not see why, before they themselves were called upon to renounce what, for them, was the most sacred and precious of all human rights, an affluent minority of Mankind should not be called upon to part with a larger quota of their provocative superfluity in order to save an indigent majority from the stark choice between birth-control and starvation; and this demand, which the Peasantry would present with all the vehemence of a simple-minded good faith, would strike the relatively comfortable and sophisticated Western minority as being even more outrageously unreasonable than it was outrageously unjust.

What effrontery to demand that a Western élite which owed its enviable prosperity to its own ability, exertions, foresight, and self-control should be penalized in order to pay for the inevitable nemesis of the Peasantry's improvident incontinence! And what naïveté to imagine that, even if the Western peoples could be cajoled or coerced into allowing their own standard of living—'the system of arts and laws and manners which so advantageously' distinguished them 'above the rest of Mankind'¹—to be reduced to the starveling level on which the Peasantry had elected to remain, this sacrifice would extricate the Peasantry from a plight for which they had only themselves to blame! A distribution of the Western peoples' margin of material resources among the wilfully indigent mass of Mankind would obtain for the Peasantry no more, at the most, than a momentary postponement of an inevitable crisis, and it would produce this futile result, not merely at the cost of depriving the Western peoples of the fair reward for arduous good conduct, but also at the cost of depriving Mankind at large, including the peasant majority, of the possibilities of 'general happiness'² with which (so a Western mind was apt to assume) the Western way of life, and this way alone, was pregnant. If the peasants' way were to be allowed to prevail to the Western peoples' undoing, this would in fact be a holocaust of the rational hopes of Mankind on the altar of sentimentality. Surely this was a case in which an enlightened altruism demanded of the Western peoples that they should have the moral courage to insist on following the dictates of an enlightened self-interest!

If and when this controversy broke out, it seemed likely to be carried

¹ Gibbon, E.: 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West', in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, at the end of chap. xxxviii.

² Gibbon, *ibid.*

from the planes of Economics and Politics on to the plane of Religion and this on several accounts. In the first place the Peasantry's current obstinate persistence in continuing to breed up to the limits of its food-supply was the social effect of a religious cause which could not be modified without a change in the Peasantry's religious attitude and outlook. The religious sanction that was now making the Peasantry's breeding habits so resistant to the arguments of a Western rationalism might not have been irrational in its origin, if we may hazard the conjecture that it had originated in a primitive state of society in which a household had been the optimum social and economic unit of agricultural production, and in which the perpetuation of each family had therefore been the key to keeping this Primitive Society in being. The epiphany of a latter-day Western industrial civilization was the new factor in Mankind's situation that had cut the rational roots of the Peasantry's by now traditional cult of *lares et penates*; for a Mechanized Technology had done away with the social and economic environment in which a worship of family continuity had made social and economic sense.

The persistence of the cult when there was no sense left in it was a consequence of the relative slowness of the Psyche's fastest pace on the subconscious level by comparison with the pace of the Intellect and Will, and it was to be apprehended that the Peasantry might cling to its ancestral deification of family continuity, at the ever more imminent risk of driving Humanity's ship on to Malthus's well and truly charted rock, unless and until the Peasantry's religion could be reoriented from an agrarian to an industrial *qiblah*. Now that the Industrial Revolution, through its 'annihilation of distance', had made one single family out of the whole of Mankind, the welfare and survival of the Human Race, instead of just the welfare and continuity of one household without regard for the rest of Mankind, had become the proper social objective of the religious commandment 'that he who loveth God love his brother also';¹ for a latter-day metamorphosis of the *Oikoumené* through the progress of Technology had vindicated the truth of Saint Paul's proclamation to the Athenians that God had 'made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the Earth, and' had 'determined the times before appointed';² and the advent of this long-since heralded oecumenical dispensation would call for a spiritual revolution as radical as the forgotten spiritual revolution that must have accompanied the creation of neolithic husbandmen out of palaeolithic hunters, fishermen, and food-gatherers.

Without this fresh religious revolution in the souls of the Peasantry, it was hard to see how the World's otherwise inexorable Malthusian problem was to be solved; but the Peasantry was not the only party to the situation that would have to achieve a change of heart if Mankind was to find a happy issue out of an impending affliction; for, if it was true—as experience had shown it to be true—that Man doth not live by bread only,³ then a self-complacently prosperous Western minority of Man-

¹ 1 John iv. 21.

² Acts xvii. 26.

³ Deut. viii. 3, quoted in Matt. iv. 4 and in Luke iv. 4.

kind still had something to learn, on its side, from the unworldly vein¹ in the *êthos* of a Peasantry which, in preference to hoarding the bread that it wrung from the ground in sorrow and in the sweat of its face,² had shared this hard-earned nutriment with an ever-increasing progeny in childlike obedience to Elohim's commandment to be fruitful and multiply and replenish the Earth and subdue it.³ This traditional religious duty, which had been laid upon the peasantry at the moment when they were reclaiming their first tiny fields from an apparently boundless wilderness, might become a bane instead of a blessing for Mankind in an age that had seen the *Oikoumenê's* last reserves of cultivable land brought under the plough in the Americas, Australia, Qāzāqstan, and Manchuria; but, inasmuch as this was also the age that had witnessed the rise of an acquisitive Western industrial civilization, it was no time for despising and rejecting the Peasantry's traditional virtue of subordinating the quest for material well-being to the pursuit of a non-material objective; for, in making nonsense of the Peasantry's ancestral worship of the Family, the Industrial Revolution had not discredited the abiding truth that Man is not merely a consumer but is also a soul, and that the Soul lives 'by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God'.⁴ 'For what is a man profited if he shall gain the whole World and lose his own soul? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?'⁵

A latter-day Western Man had brought himself into danger of losing his soul through his concentration on a sensationally successful endeavour to increase his production of material commodities; and it was ironical that the society which had put itself in this spiritual jeopardy should have been one which, by comparison with a contemporary peasantry in Asia, Africa, and Indian America, had already been in enjoyment of a lavish standard of living at the time when it had embarked on its eighteenth-century agricultural and industrial revolutions. The insatiability of the Westerners' acquisitiveness laid them open to a Western philosopher's indictment.

'The Indian scale of values has never been at all like ours. On the whole it is true to say that in India the love of God has always been put above the love of material things. India is a civilisation based on Religion, while ours is a civilisation based on wealth.'⁶

If an industrialized Western Society was to find salvation in spite of itself, it would find it in virtue of having all the time unconsciously been

¹ This unworldly vein was, of course, only one element in the *êthos* of a Peasantry that was saddled with as heavy a load of Original Sin as a contemporary Industrial Proletariat with whom it had in common a uniform Human Nature. The peasant *êthos*, like the urban *êthos*, had its selfish, exploitative, and materialistic side; and there were peasantries—for example, in the Flemish and French provinces of a Western World—in whose spiritual 'make-up' these unattractive characteristics were not perceptibly mitigated by the touch of archaic piety with which they were still apt to be combined in the character of the peasantries in the non-Western societies. A sentimentally idealized portrait of a non-Western peasantry, when painted with a Western brush, might be suspect of being a subjective expression of the painter's dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of his own society rather than an objective reproduction of the observed lineaments of the picture's professed subject.

³ Gen. i. 28. Cp. Gen. ix. 1 and 7.

⁴ Matt. iv. 4. Cp. Luke iv. 4.

² Gen. iii. 17-19.

⁵ Matt. xvi. 26.

⁶ Stace, W. T.: *What are Our Values?* (Lincoln, Nebraska 1950, University of Nebraska Press), p. 54.

working not solely for its own material profit, but also for the benefit of a majority of its fellow men who were still living at the Peasantry's starveling level. Industrialism was a Western gift to Mankind at large which might be not the less beneficent for having been unintended; and the best hope for Mankind lay in a spiritually fruitful marriage of the Western engineer's insight with the Asian husbandman's. The peasant had to learn from the engineer that, in Human Life on Earth, a minimum of economic well-being was the necessary material condition (*Graecè χορηγία*) for spiritual achievement, while the engineer had to learn—or re-learn—from the peasant that the enterprise of increasing Man's command over Non-Human Nature had no value except as a means towards some end beyond itself, even if the particular end that had been the Peasantry's traditional objective were now an anachronism in the new world that the engineer had conjured into existence.

If these were the new religious issues that a future oecumenical Malthusian crisis might be expected to raise, it was also to be foreseen that this crisis would present a challenge to the old religious establishments, since the Peasantry's primitive worship of family continuity was part of the flotsam which the higher religions had picked up and swept along in their flood waters when they had come down upon Mankind in spate.¹ Even a Buddhism whose original, authentic, and essential mission had been to reveal to suffering human beings a way of escape from the sorrowful wheel of sensuous existence had not succeeded in keeping clear of an older cult of procreation which was its antithesis; and, if Siddhārtha Gautama's philosophy had thus been constrained to come to terms with the husbandman's religion, it was not surprising that Confucianism, Christianity, and Hinduism should have been captivated by it.

In these divers higher religions and philosophies the influence of the cult of procreation could be detected in different degrees. In the Roman Catholic variety of Western Christianity this influence had not penetrated so deep as to impose upon the ecclesiastical subjects of the Catholic Church the positive pre-Christian commandment to be fruitful and multiply; the influence of the primitive cult on the current Catholic Christian code of morals could be detected only in a ban upon artificial methods of birth-control that had been invented in the Western World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era; and a prohibition that could be criticized as an irrational concession to Conservatism could also be defended on its merits as a courageous stand against a morally undesirable sexual practice. But the pertinent fact for the purposes of an inquiry into the prospects of the Western Civilization was that, in all the higher religions alike, the cult of procreation had won a footing that was sufficiently strong to threaten—or promise—to bring a revolutionary public policy into collision with established religious traditions if the time were to come when the pressure of the World's population upon the World's food supply would compel an oecumenical public authority to grapple with the formidable task of trying to regulate the movement of the World's population.

In this not improbable event, what would the old religious estab-

¹ See VII. vii. 455.

ishments' reactions be? The still older cult of procreation that had ensconced itself among the higher religions' traditions would presumably impel the ecclesiastical authorities of the day to champion the peasant's cherished freedom to reproduce his kind; but how would they apply their traditional teaching in an unprecedented situation? In a world whose population would be pressing upon its food supply because this world would have been liberated at long last from the inveterate evils of War, Pestilence, and Famine,¹ the churches would assuredly recoil from even considering the diabolical proposal that, in order to make room in a teeming world for the Peasantry to go on breeding without restriction, one and all of those three dire scourges should be let loose again upon Mankind. The nemesis for opening Aeolus's windbag that had overtaken Odysseus' insubordinate crew had been grievous even when the fatal act had been committed in the heat of passion by mutineers who had been blind to the consequences of what they were doing.² To sow the storm in cold blood, with the deliberate intention of reaping the whirlwind, would be a crime that no responsible ecclesiastical authorities would be likely to contemplate.

It seemed even more unlikely that the churches would countenance any proposal to regulate the movement of population by resorting on the grand scale to the infamous neo-pagan 'scientific' method—once practised by German National Socialists—of forcibly sterilizing, as a matter of routine, all persons who happened to be so unfortunate as to fall within categories condemned by the fiat of the public authorities; and, if these two fantastically wicked alternatives may be left out of consideration in any sober forecast of the churches' future policy on this formidable question, we must imagine the issue being narrowed down, in ecclesiastical counsels, to a choice between divers voluntary means of controlling the number of births. Could the sexual continence that had hitherto been the rare achievement of religious celibates be required of *l'homme moyen sensuel* in the marital state? And, if this degree of self-discipline could not be expected of Human Nature in a non-monastic social and spiritual environment, what was to be Religion's ultimate attitude towards artificial methods of voluntary birth-control? Was it to continue to set its face against them? And, if it did still hold to the churches' twentieth-century view, was it to regard this as a precept which the individual soul ought to be free to follow or reject according to the dictates of its own conscience? Or were the churches to try to enlist the support of a coercive secular arm by calling upon the public authorities to keep on the statute book the legislation that had made the advertisement and sale of artificial contraceptives illegal?

At the time of writing, when this issue had not yet come to a head in a society that was then still heavily engaged in wrestling with the rampant social evils of Class-Conflict and War, it was not yet possible to anticipate the decisions that a still unborn generation would be likely to take in a situation that at the time of writing was still merely hypothetical. It was, however, already possible to foresee that the debate, whatever its outcome, would be conducted on the religious plane, since it was evi-

¹ See 2 Sam. xxiv. 13.

² *Odyssey*, Book X, ll. 20-79.

dent that this issue raised the religious question of the ultimate significance and purpose of Human Life on Earth.

(V) PROBABLE EMPLOYMENTS IN A FUTURE OECUMENICAL SOCIETY

(a) 'A COMMONWEALTH OF SWINE'

If we could imagine a future Oecumenical Society in which Mankind had first rid itself of Civilization's congenital maladies, War and Class-Conflict, and had then followed up this success by going on to solve a Malthusian problem which the establishment of a world order would have brought to a head, we might surmise that Mankind's next problem after that would be the future role of Leisure in a mechanized society's life.

Leisure had already played a part of capital importance in human history; for, if Necessity had been the mother of Civilization, Leisure had been its nurse. One of the distinctive features of Civilization had been the astonishing rapidity of the pace at which this parvenu way of life had developed its potentialities during the five or six thousand years of its currency up to date by comparison with the tortoise-like tempo of the primitive way of life which Mankind had been following for hundreds of thousands of years before the earliest civilizations had made their epiphany; and this unprecedented impetus had been imparted to the civilizations by an able, purposeful, and virtuous minority of a privileged minority whose privilege had been the enjoyment of leisure. All the unique achievements of men and women in the realm of Art and all the cumulative achievements of Man in the realm of Science and Technology had been fruits of the profitably employed leisure of this creative minority within a minority; but in a post-industrial Westernizing World it could no longer be taken for granted that the growth of Civilization would continue to be fostered by the employment of leisure for these creative purposes; for the Industrial Revolution had upset—and this in several different ways—the previous equilibrium between Leisure and Life.

The first and most momentous of these changes had been a psychological one. The mechanization of work in an industrialized society had set up in the industrial worker's psyche a tension between his feelings towards his work and his feelings towards his leisure to which neither the peasant majority nor the privileged minority of the body social had been subject in a pre-industrial age in which Man's rations of work and leisure had not been dictated to Man by Man but had been given to Man by Non-Human Nature.¹ In an agrarian society a cycle of the seasons that had been the husbandman's calendar had consequently also settled for a leisured minority the allocation of their time between holding court and going on the war-path or between sitting in parliament and going shooting, fishing, and hunting; and the Peasantry and their rulers alike had taken both Work and Leisure for granted as inevitably

¹ See p. 565, above.

alternating phases in a Yin-and-Yang rhythm beaten out by the perpetually recurring astronomical cycles of Day-and-Night and the Seasons. Each experience of either phase was both a relief from the last bout, and at the same time a prelude to the next bout, of an alternate phase that was psychologically complementary rather than antithetical to the phase that happened at the moment to be in course. But this pre-industrial interdependence and consequent parity between the psychological values of Work and Leisure had been deranged when the worker had been transformed from a husbandman whose time-table was set for him by Nature into a tender of machines with power-driven wheels that could go on turning in season and out of season; for the chronic industrial warfare which the worker had now found himself compelled to wage in order to prevent his new masters the machines from working him to death had instilled into him, as we have seen,¹ a negative, defensive, hostile feeling towards a toil that his peasant forebears had taken as a matter of course; and this new attitude towards Work had brought with it a new attitude towards Leisure; for, if Work was intrinsically evil, then Leisure must have an absolute value in itself.

Human Nature's reaction against the routine of the factory and the office had indeed gone so far as to make the value of freedom from an excessive pressure of work count for more than the value of the remuneration that the manual or clerical worker could earn by working at full stretch; and this order of preferences, which in A.D. 1949 had been the conscious motive of the Wall Street typists' refusal to come to work on Saturdays,² had been implicit from the outset in the restrictive practices that Trade Unionism had worked out for itself; for these were methods of purchasing relief from the pressure of work by the sacrifice of potential earnings. This rating of leisure—at least in the negative form of an exemption from an excessive pressure of mechanized work—at a higher value than money-making was a preference which, in the first chapter of post-industrial Western history, had been a distinguishing mark of the industrial and clerical workers and a prime cause of dispute between them and their employers; and this attitude had begun to communicate itself from the working class to a hitherto pre-industrial-minded middle class in a subsequent chapter in which the working class's more and more effectively insistent demand for social justice was being met by a more and more drastic redistribution of purchasing power through the differentially graded taxation of middle-class incomes. By the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era the Western middle class had begun to follow the working class's example by opting for leisure in preference to profits at a level of income—and this level was progressively being lowered—at which the greater part of any additional earnings would be taken from the nominal recipient by the tax-collector.

At the same time the so far unchecked advance of Technology at a constantly accelerating pace was playing a sardonic practical joke on its human victims; for, while the ceaseless turning of the never tiring wheels was threatening to work them to death, it was simultaneously

¹ On pp. 563-9, above.

² See p. 570, above.

threatening, in consequence, to throw them into technological unemployment, without ever allowing them to make up their minds which of these two contradictory scourges of Industrialism was the greater menace to human welfare and happiness. The industrial workers had no sooner reacted against the pressure of mechanization by insisting upon their right to leisure than their inhuman tyrant and tormentor Technology began to drive them into insisting upon their right to work by taking them at their word and forcing leisure upon them; and, although the trade-union practices that had been devised for putting a brake upon the killing 'drive' of mechanized industrial work also served the workers' further purpose of spinning out the residue of the employment that was now being snatched out of human hands by progressive improvements in the machinery that these hands were tending, this rear-guard action of Trade Unionism in a fight to make an inexorably dwindling amount of work still go round was manifestly a losing battle.

Technology and Trade Unionism, between them, were thus generating an abundance of Leisure that was unprecedented; and the manifest irresistibility of this tendency was making it possible to cast the occupational horoscope of a future Oecumenical Society that would have rid itself of War and Class-Conflict and have found some acceptable way of regulating the movement of population. In this Earthly Paradise Regained, a régime of full employment would also be a régime in which the ration of work that could be doled out to each individual would occupy so small a fraction of his day that he would have almost as much leisure on his hands as if he had been a member of the privileged minority in some antediluvian agrarian society. In such circumstances the use made of Leisure would evidently be even more important than it had been in a pre-industrial chapter of human history in which *Homo Faber* had still been such a tiro in his Technology that the number of man-hours which he had yet been able to liberate for Leisure had been minute by comparison with the number that he had still been compelled to devote to Work.

If there was a prospect of such revolutionary changes as these in the amount of the leisure acquired by, or thrust upon, Man, as well as in Man's attitude toward Leisure in its relation to Work, what effects on Human Life might this revolution be expected to have?

In an industrialized Western Society in which an excessive acquisitiveness had been the besetting sin of its middle-class moving spirits, there was one negative effect that was manifestly good in itself as far as it went. By the time when the middle class, as well as the working class, had begun to value Leisure more highly than earnings, it was beginning to look as if the mechanism of the Industrial System of economic production included a providential automatic brake that might perhaps avail to save *Homo Faber Mechanicus* from his demonic self. In making the Industrial Revolution, Western Man's acquisitive-mindedness had perhaps unintentionally been working out a cure for itself by first making work odious and then making this now already odious work also unremunerative. If a shark-like Western appetite for acquisition was thus having its edge taken off by the pressure and the insipidity of routine-

work in a mechanized society and by the ruthless efficiency of the tax-collector in a welfare state in reaping where he had not sown and gathering where he had not strawed,¹ this was surely a blessing in disguise for a *Homo Occidentalis* whose characteristic temptation had been to sell his soul if that was the market price of worldly prosperity. A society in which a minority had been allowed and encouraged to enrich themselves without restriction was surely a less estimable society than one in which a more equitable distribution of wealth was being secured at a cost of restricting the opportunities for enrichment and perhaps thereby diminishing, through the diminution of incentives to earn, the aggregate amount of the wealth that was now being less inequitably distributed.²

So far, so good; yet a mid-twentieth-century observer could not hail the reluctant transfer of psychic energy from money-making to the enjoyment of leisure as an unquestionable blessing, even for a Western Man whose nineteenth-century god had been Mammon, without taking into account the use to which the frustrated Mammon-worshipper was going to put the leisure for which he was now opting in preference to making money for the tax-collector to redistribute. This question had been raised in a notable address delivered, some twenty years before the time of going to press, by a philosophic spokesman of those magician-engineers whose cornucopia had 'been shaken over all the Earth, scattering everywhere an endowment of previously unpossessed and unimagined capacities and powers'.³ Speaking at York on the 31st August, 1932, to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, their president, Sir Alfred Ewing, had ended on the following note:

'We must admit that there is a sinister side even to the peaceful activities of those who in good faith and with the best intentions make it their business to adapt the resources of Nature to the use and convenience of Man. Where shall we look for a remedy? I cannot tell. Some may envisage a distant utopia in which there will be perfect adjustment of labour and the fruits of labour, a fair spreading of employment and of wages and of all the commodities that machines produce. Even so the question will remain. How is Man to spend the leisure he has won by handing over nearly all his burden to an untiring mechanical slave? Dare he hope for such spiritual betterment as will qualify him to use it well? God grant [that] he may strive for that and attain it. It is only by seeking [that] he will find. I cannot think that Man is destined to atrophy and cease through cultivating what, after all, is one of his most God-like faculties—the creative ingenuity of the engineer.'

The pertinence of Sir Alfred Ewing's question about Mankind's spiritual prospects in a world that was being mechanized by a Western technique was brought home to a student of the Hellenic Classics by the reminiscence of a passage in a treatise on *Sublimity in Style* which had been written during the reprieve that a disintegrating Hellenic Society had won for itself through an Augustan rally of its retreating forces.⁴

¹ Matt. xxv. 24 and 26; Luke xix. 21-22.

² This point is made by W. T. Stace in *What are our Values?* (Lincoln, Nebraska 1950, University of Nebraska Press), p. 58.

³ Quoted already in III. iii. 211.

⁴ Down to the time of writing, Western scholars had been unable to determine whether this work had been written in the third century of the Christian Era or in the first.

The Hellenic Civilization had been distinguished by its relative indifference to a quest for economic gain that had become the master passion of the Western Civilization in the first chapter of its Industrial Age; and therefore, if, even in the Hellenic World, an observer living in an age of social recovery had been struck and distressed by the spectacle of the spiritual impoverishment of his generation through their passion for material enrichment, the same distressing effect might be expected, *a fortiori*, to follow from the working of the same sinister cause in a demonically acquisitive post-Modern Western Society.

In the last extant chapter of *Sublimity in Style* the author professes to be reporting a recent conversation between himself and a philosopher in which they had been disputing about the causes to which this contemporary spiritual decadence was to be ascribed. The philosopher argues, like Tacitus in his *Dialogus de Oratoribus*,¹ that the literary decadence in which this spiritual decadence is reflected can be adequately explained as being a consequence of the loss of political liberty; but this political explanation is rejected by the author, who sees in it merely an example of Human Nature's notorious proneness to seek an alibi for itself by blaming external circumstances. In his alternative explanation of the spiritual decadence of his day the author puts his finger on the demoralizing effect of an oecumenical peace. World Peace demoralizes its beneficiaries by releasing their energies for expenditure on 'total war' (*ἀπεριόριστος πόλεμος*) in the non-military fields of money-making and pleasure-seeking, and, in the author's view, as he expounds it, these are the spiritual maladies that have reduced this generation's spiritual stature. He raises the question whether the loss of political liberty may not be a blessing in disguise for a generation that has sunk to so low a spiritual level; for, if characters like these were given a free hand, an Ishmaelitish acquisitiveness would bring down a deluge of evils upon the *Oikoumenē*.

'One of the cancers (*δαπανῶν*) of the spiritual life in souls born into the present generation is the low spiritual tension (*ράθυμιαν*) in which all but a few chosen spirits among us pass their days. In our work and in our recreation alike our only objective is popularity and enjoyment. We feel no concern to win the true spiritual treasure that is to be found in putting one's heart into what one is doing and in winning a recognition that is truly worth having.'

These findings of an Hellenic literary critic at some date during the first spell of a Roman Peace were endorsed, at the dawn of the Modern Age of Western history, by one of the foremost pioneers of a distinctively Western scientific spirit. The following passage is to be found in *The Advancement of Learning*,² which was published by Francis Bacon in A.D. 1605.

'... For as it has been well observed, that the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are military; and while virtue is in state, are liberal; and while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary: so I doubt that this age of the World is somewhat upon the descent of the wheel. With

¹ Cited in V. vi. 80-81.

² Book II, chap. x, § 13.

arts voluptuary I couple practices jocular; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the pleasures of the senses.¹

If the writer of these prescient words could have revisited the Western World three and a half centuries after the date at which he had written them, he might have been surprised to observe how accurately he had gauged the trend of the spiritual curve in which Western souls had begun to descend from Heroism towards Frivolity. Mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era it was notorious—and significant—that the United States, where the Western industrial working class had come nearer than it had come in any European country towards being assimilated to the middle class in its material standard of living and in its opportunities for material advancement, was also the Western country in which, on the cultural, in contrast to the economic, plane, the middle class, for its part, had gone farthest down the *descensus Averni* which Bacon had foreboded. Yet the same middle class was slipping down the same steep place¹ in other Western countries likewise; and unwarily envious West European spectators of the use to which 'the common man' in the United States was putting his relatively ample margin of wealth and leisure at this date were apt to betray their own hankering after the frivolity that they were professedly castigating in an American whipping-boy when they maliciously described the American scene as a fun-fair patronized by grown-up children whose main interest in life was to play with mechanical toys. This caricature was perhaps not inaccurate as far as it went; for joy-riding could not be more felicitously described than as a 'practice jocular', nor television more felicitously than as an 'art voluptuary' designed to please the senses by deceiving them.² Yet any contemporary American critic of American *mores* could silence the carping West European visitor with a crushing 'De te fabula narratur',³ for the reality that was being caricatured in some of the

¹ Matt. viii. 32; Mark v. 13; Luke viii. 33.

² On the evening of the day on which he had written this sentence in the morning, the writer received a timely intimation that this might not be the last word that would have to be said about the cultural effects of the wholesale installation of television in the United States. That same evening he heard a shrewd American observer of the American political scene tell an English audience that, if they wished to understand the current movement of American feeling on international affairs, they must not ignore the effect of the rapid current spread of the network of an American television service. Television, he explained, had now made it possible for the American public to see the countenances and gestures, as well as to hear the voices, of the delegates to the Council and the Assembly of the United Nations Organization at Lake Success; every owner of a television set who tuned in to the sessions of these international bodies received a vivid impression of the contrast in manners, and in the inner ethos that these outward manners betrayed, between the Russian delegates and their Western colleagues; and this impression was making a potent effect on American public opinion because the proceedings at Lake Success had effectively caught and held the interest of American 'viewers'. When a meeting at Lake Success came on, 'viewers' would tune in to it, even if this meant their having to break away from looking at a classic boxing-match or at a popular vaudeville.

This piece of information neatly illustrated two points that had to be taken into account in any attempt to gauge the Western Civilization's prospects. In the first place it showed that Television was beginning to play its part in a political unification of the *Oikoumenê* through a 'medium of distance' that has been noticed in XII. D (ii) (b), above. In the second place it showed that a new instrument, which in the first flush of its novelty had been treated as a toy, might quickly be turned to account for serving a more serious purpose.

³ Horace: *Satires*, Book I, Satire 1, ll. 69-70.

extravagances of American life was a contemporary Western *Weltanschauung* that was shared with North America by Western Europe. The United States at this time was, in fact, performing the salutary service of an automatic confessional for the Western World at large. She was serving as a convex mirror in which any Western observer, from either side of the Atlantic, could become acquainted with some of his own spiritual deformities by beholding them here revealingly magnified.

It was, in truth, no mere accidental coincidence that the current symptoms of cultural proletarianization in the life of a Western middle class in the United States should have been contemporaneous with the raising, in the same country, of a Western industrial working class's material standard of life to what was virtually a middle-class level. One of the elements in a higher material standard of living was, as we have seen, a larger ration of leisure. This increase of leisure was simultaneously being bestowed upon the industrial working class in Western Europe as one consequence of a radical revision of rates of wages and hours of work; and it was only to be expected that the progress towards social justice that was thus now being made in the Western World as a whole, along a West European as well as a North American line of approach, should have the, at first sight, paradoxical immediate effect of precipitating a fall in the mean level of Western culture.

This undesirable effect was to be expected in the first instance, not because Leisure was now still being bestowed, as it had always been, without regard to the recipient's capacity or incapacity for making use of it, but because it had also always taken even the choicest spirits time to learn how to make good use of any new gift. The pearls that were now being redistributed among a majority instead of remaining the monopoly of a minority were not being taken away from a minority consisting exclusively of connoisseurs in order to be cast before a majority consisting exclusively of swine who knew no better than to trample these precious offerings under their feet.¹ The misuse of Leisure by a majority of its possessors was, notoriously, no new thing. In the days when Leisure had been a monopoly of a minority, a majority of that minority had always misused it, as we have already observed.² Only a minority of that minority had made the creative use of Leisure that had been the main-spring of Civilization. The reason why, nevertheless, a redistribution of Leisure was likely to result in a lowering of the level of culture was that even the creative minority of a leisured minority had needed time to mature. The inestimably precious spiritual treasures that this minority had eventually created had been ripe fruits of self-education and self-discipline,³ and these had been the cumulative spiritual achievement of a series of consecutive generations. This was the secret of cultural creativity; and it was something that could not be transmitted by print-

¹ Matt. vii. 6.

² On p. 604, above.

³ The importance of the part that had been played by self-discipline in the creation of a Western Christian culture was indicated in the history of the word 'clerk', which, before its meaning had been depreciated to signify a worker who worked in an office and not in a factory, had once signified a possessor and trustee of culture, and had stood for this because, in Western Christendom, the original possessors and trustees of culture had been the clergy and, among them, above all, a disciplined minority that was enrolled in the monastic orders.

ing and distributing a sheet of directions for use. It was a secret that all new recipients of the gift of Leisure had to discover for themselves; and it could not be discovered in a day.

If this was the historic and intrinsic relation between Leisure and Culture, how were the Western Civilization's prospects likely to be affected by a current sacrifice of Culture on the altar of Social Justice? At a crisis in its history the Western Society was clipping the wings of a creative minority of a leisured minority and was lavishing leisure on a majority that had not yet had time to grow a new creative core. The immediate cultural effect of this equitable social revolution was as plain as it was deplorable.

'Over against the ever more amazing inventions of Science we see a kind of childishness creeping over our thoughts, our modes of expression, our art, our music, our morals. We talk in words from a very limited vocabulary, we produce pictures and statues of a more than ungainly "neo-primitiveness", we croon nigger songs while we push one another round a room in dances that need no brain, no zest, and no vitality for their successful performance. Many of our buildings have as their chief merits the fact that they can be rushed up quickly and finished within a few weeks. We tear over the Earth's surface along roads of brick-box straightness, past rows of houses of brick-box exactitude and hideousness, in order to get somewhere, it does not much matter where, in record time. Finally, the novels we read, apparently with pleasure, for there are many of them, show men and women as ill-conducted children whose one concern is that which they share with the animal world.

'There is to me something grim and horrible in an essentially mature civilisation playing at savage immaturity when it knows better. We cannot go back to the beginning of things any more than a mature mind can change into that of a child.'¹

These words spoken in A.D. 1933 by the headmistress of a distinguished school in London made a powerful impression at the time upon the writer of this Study; for, in the village in the North Riding of Yorkshire where he was reading the report in the press, he had neighbours who, at that moment, were giving hospitality to relatives of theirs who had been thrown out of work in Leeds by an 'economic blizzard' that was then sweeping over the face of an Industrialized World, and he had been hearing these countryfolk describe the impressions that their town-bred cousins had been making on them. The description had been forcible and vivid; for the good-natured hosts had been amazed and horrified by their progressive discovery of their unfortunate guests' extraordinary manners and customs.

'Why, they don't know how to cook and they don't know how to sew and they don't know how to cure a ham; and then, in the evenings, they can't even sit at home and talk, because they have nothing in their heads to talk about. Their only notion of enjoying themselves is to take the bus to Malton and kill time at an "entertainment"—"the pictures" or something of the kind.'

¹ Miss E. Strudwick, the Headmistress of St. Paul's Girls' School, Hammersmith, London, England, in a presidential address delivered on the 17th June, 1933, at Liverpool, at a Conference of the British Association of Head Mistresses. The text quoted here has been taken from the report in *The Manchester Guardian* of the 19th June, 1933.

In taking their town-bred guests' inability to entertain themselves as the crowning and damning evidence of their urban neobarbarism, these country cousins were touching the heart of a spiritual malady from which all classes of a contemporary industrialized society were suffering in all provinces of a mechanically standardized *Oikoumenê*. The malevolent sorceress Technology had inveigled her victims into putting themselves in her power by selling them new lamps for old. She had bribed them with 'the pictures' and 'the wireless' into selling her their souls; and the outcome of this ruinous cultural 'new deal' was the spiritual wilderness which Plato had dismissed as a 'Commonwealth of Swine'¹ and Aldous Huxley had satirized as a 'Brave New World'.

In a Westernizing World mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era this Huxleian anti-utopia was a very present reality. The guests at Circe's banquet had soon found themselves penned in Circe's sty.² Their plight was plain beyond all dispute; the open question—and it was a vital one—was the length of their term of humiliating metamorphosis and irksome incarceration. In succumbing to the enchantment of a latter-day Western technology, had Mankind sentenced itself to languish in 'Brave New World' for the rest of its days on Earth? Or was there in the offing some still unenchanted Odysseus who, with Hermes' aid, might have it in his power to release his unfortunate comrades from duress and bring them back to their lost human shape? Was this sordid 'Commonwealth of Swine' the destiny that had been lying in wait for Mankind on a hitherto invisible ledge that had been the goal of human endeavours while Mankind had been striving to scale the climbers' pitch called 'Civilization'?³ If so, the fate of any climber who succeeded in attaining his objective on this pitch would be still more cruel than the doom of his fellows who had been falling to meet their deaths on a lower ledge that had been their common point of departure on this latest human enterprise. To wallow for ages in a 'Commonwealth of Swine' as a reward for having achieved Civilization would be as ironical a fate as the last phase of the primitive human societies that had been lying torpid for ages as their reward for having raised themselves from a sub-human level. An aeon of quarantine in Circe's sty might be the price that Mankind was doomed to pay for the boon of getting rid of War and Class-Conflict.

Was this a fate to which the Human Race was likely to resign itself? Would Human Nature really be content to 'live happily ever after' in a 'Brave New World' in which the only change from the monotony of a life spent on a frivolous employment of Leisure would be a modicum of mechanical work performed under restrictive trade-union rules in an unenthusiastic civil-service spirit? Even if a majority in each successive generation could be dragooned, drugged, hypnotized, or cajoled into living and dying like 'the beasts that perish',⁴ the stewards of a 'Commonwealth of Swine' would still have to reckon with a creative minority that had been the salt of the Earth⁵ in a pre-Porcine Age of human

¹ Plato: *Respublica*, 372 D, cited in II. i. 193, n. 1; in II. ii. 23, n. 2; and on p. 523, above.

² See *Odyssey* X, ll. 233-40, quoted in II. ii. 23.

³ See II. i. 192-4.

⁴ Ps. xlix. 12 and 20.

⁵ Matt. v. 13. Cp. Mark ix. 50 and Luke xiv. 34-35.

history. The stewards would have to be past-masters in the technique of eugenics if they were to succeed in breeding out of Human Nature this angelically or demonically dynamic spiritual strain; and such mastery would probably prove to be beyond their capacity, for it could hardly be achieved without enlisting the aid of a creative intellectual activity which would be anathema in official circles in Hyampolis. Yet, if the managers of 'Brave New World' could not contrive to prevent the dynamic strain in the Spirit of Man from continuing to incarnate itself in a diaspora of untamed and untamable men and women, the security of their dehumanized commonwealth would never be complete; for the fatal flaw in the mechanism of a 'Brave New World' was its failure to provide a safety-valve for a spirit that would endure torture to the death rather than obey 'Brave New World's' first commandment: 'Et surtout, pas trop de zèle!'¹

The trouble that this spirit was likely to give to the ruling authorities in an oecumenical Hyampolis was foreshadowed in the history of the Roman Imperial Government's long losing battle with the Christian martyrs; for martyrdom was a response to the challenge of a régime that was keeping the peace at the price of taking the savour out of Human Life;² and the attractiveness of Christian martyrdom to zealous souls under a Roman Imperial dispensation was the more significant in view of the fact that, under a Roman Peace that was not literally world-wide, Christian martyrdom was not the only opportunity open to Roman citizens or subjects for putting all their heart and all their soul and all their strength and all their mind³ into the service of a cause that was worthy of being served with a wholehearted devotion. An alternative career in which they could sacrifice themselves like men instead of leading the life of human swine was offered to Roman citizens and subjects in the military police that held the cordon of the Roman Empire's anti-barbarian frontiers; and the *esprit de corps* of this magnificent force required its members to live up to a standard of professional conduct, in the performance of their military duty,⁴ which the Christian Church

¹ Attributed to Voltaire.

² The Roman Empire was, and was intended by its makers and masters to be, a 'Brave New World' inasmuch as its *raison d'être* was to prevent the recurrence of War and Class-Conflict at whatever cost in terms of repression of creativity. The Roman Imperial Government was suspicious of any move—even on a non-political plane—that might conceivably disturb the existing equilibrium. This apprehensive, defensive, repressive official attitude is illustrated in the story—*ben trovato, se non vero*—of the unfortunate subject of the Emperor Tiberius who, after succeeding in inventing a malleable kind of unbreakable glass, offered his invention to the Emperor in the hope of receiving a reward as a public benefactor. The Emperor's reaction was to give orders—after ascertaining that the secret of the process was, so far, known to no one beyond the inventor himself—that the new invention should be suppressed and the inventor be put to death as a dangerous character whose misguided activities were a threat to the stability of Society because his unbreakable glass, if ever put on the market, would bring about a catastrophic fall in the prices of the metals and would thereby precipitate an economic crisis. This story is told by Petronius Arbiter in his *Caena Trimalchionis*, chap. 51; by the Elder Pliny in his *Naturalis Historia*, Book XXXVI, chap. 26 (66), § 195; and in a garbled form by Dio Cassius in his *History of Rome*, Book LVII, chap. 21, *ad finem*. The emperor who is the villain of the story is anonymous ('Caesar') in Petronius's version, but the other two authorities both name Tiberius. The writer was directed to these sources by his sister Professor J. M. C. Toynbee.

³ Luke x. 27. Cp. Matt. xxii. 37. These passages in the Gospels are reminiscences of Deut. vi. 5; x. 12; xxx. 6.

⁴ Among the many well-known illustrations of the standard of conduct that was demanded and attained in the Imperial Roman Army, we may cite the gallantry of the

itself did not disdain to commend to its own members as a shining example.¹ A pagan cult of the Eagles that drew this tribute of admiration from Christian worshippers of God was the Roman Imperial régime's officially approved vent for spiritual energies that refused to live at low tension and insisted on exerting themselves to full capacity. Yet this politic provision of an outlet for a zeal that was an ineradicable and irrepressible element in Human Nature was proved inadequate by the epiphany of martyrs who insisted on laying down their lives, not in battle with barbarians in defence of the Hellenic World, but in defiance of Caesar himself for the glory of the One True God.

When a 'Brave New World' had thus bred martyrs with whom it could not cope in a Roman Empire where there was a military police to provide an alternative outlet for zeal, it seemed likely, *a fortiori*, to breed martyrs in a literally world-wide commonwealth in which no opportunities would be left for risking life and winning honour in the defence of Civilization against outer barbarians. In a twentieth-century *Oikoumenê* the vindication of spiritual freedom was the living generation's most urgent business, and the arena in which this spiritual battle would be lost or won would be a field of Leisure that in a fully mechanized world might come to be all but co-extensive with the field of Life itself.

(b) 'THE ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC'

What, in this field, was Hermes' sovereign antidote to Circe's nefarious magic? One negative answer to this question could be given without hesitation. The remedy for a frivolous misuse of an inordinately ample leisure could not lie in re-evoking the evil spirits of greed and lust for

Syrian soldier Sabinus, with his eleven comrades (see Josephus: *A History of the Romano-Jewish War*, Book VI, §§ 54-67), and of the Bithynian centurion Julianus (see Josephus, *ibid.*, §§ 81-90), during the Roman siege of Jerusalem in A.D. 70.

Professor William McNeill comments: 'I wonder whether the Roman soldier's experience can bear comparison with the Christian's conversion? Regular professional soldiers of my acquaintance are men attracted by pay and relatively easy conditions of work, not dedicated souls. I am inclined to imagine the Roman soldier as something like [that], and his occasional heroism as a psychological reaction against his normal "soldiering on the job"—a break-through of the instinct of workmanship, if you like.'

A non-American observer of American life in A.D. 1952 might point to the United States Marine Corps as an arm of the United States armed forces of the day that was animated by the same spirit of self-dedication as the Roman professional army in the Imperial Age. Neither a United States marine nor a Roman legionary was required to play the hero all day and every day; and many a member of either force might live out his term of service without ever having his *moral* put to the test of a practical ordeal. The rareness of the occasions for heroism is of the essence of any professional military service; the crucial question is whether, if and when the occasion does come, the troops have it in them to rise to it; and in this respect the professed Christian in the interior of the Roman Empire was in the same situation as the professional soldier on its frontiers. A professor of the Christian faith might live and die without ever being called upon to make the hard choice between apostasy and martyrdom; and in his case, as in the soldier's, the crucial question was how he would behave if and when the choice between honour and life ever did present itself for him personally. On this showing, there does perhaps, after all, seem to be something common between the Early Christian's and the contemporary Roman's attitude of mind, and standard of conduct; and, whatever may be the judgement of Modern Western historians on this point, it is attested by testimonials extant in the surviving literature of the Early Christian Church that the Christians themselves felt the standard of conduct in the Roman Army of the day to be closely enough akin to Christian ideals to be taken by Christians as an inspiring example for themselves.

¹ See the instances cited from Adolf Harnack's *Militia Christi* in VI. vii. 338-44.

power which had possessed Man in Process of Civilization; for that cure would be worse than the disease. The rebellious prisoner of 'Brave New World' would be stultifying his own efforts and ideals if he sought to make his escape by casting himself down the precipice which he had just scaled at so great a cost. The only line of escape that would be worth pursuing would be one leading, not downward, but upward. What upward openings, then, were there within the prisoner's sight and reach? If the most promising prelude to action is a recourse to the oracle of experience, the obvious first step for a hard beset twentieth-century *Homo Mechanicus* to take was to look into the experience of the primitive societies; for (strange though this might sound to twentieth-century Western ears) the spiritual problem of unemployment arising from a solution of the economic problem of scarcity had been encountered up to date, not by societies in process of civilization, but by primitive societies living on the margin of the *Oikoumenê*, where the pressure of the struggle for existence had always been at its lowest.¹ Primitive experience of a problem beyond Civilization's ken could be studied in the legend of the Lotus-Eaters² and in the fable of the Doasyoulikes³ and in the true history of the 'Argonauts of the Western Pacific'.⁴ Twentieth-century Melanesians had found a solution for the problem of total leisure by which their mythical counterparts had been worsted; and the experience and achievements of these primitive islanders were not without interest for their sophisticated Western contemporaries now that the same problem was overtaking these in their turn.

The Trobriand Islanders' first attempt to occupy an inordinately increasing leisure had failed to keep pace with the progressive aggravation of their problem.

¹ The Australian Blackfellows, for example, had proved to be at an advantage in this respect over the pioneers of Civilization who had eventually overtaken and all but exterminated them in their antipodean Ultima Thulé—as had once been discovered, to his surprise, by an airman who had fallen in with a vagrant food-gathering tribe of aborigines as a result of having had to make a forced landing at a remote spot in the interior of the Northern Territory. Wishing to give his unsophisticated hosts an overwhelming impression of his superiority in power and skill, the castaway took up his rifle, which had come down with him intact, and picked off one of the innumerable black swans that were riding on the waters of a lake on whose shore the wandering Blackfellows were encamped. He had duly demonstrated Civilization's power of taking life at long range, yet it was evident that the Blackfellows had not after all been impressed, and his chagrin and bewilderment must have been manifest on his countenance, for his considerate hosts lost no time in giving him a demonstration of the proper way to do the job. As soon as the rest of the swans, who had risen in flight from the water at the sound of the rifle-shot, had recovered from their alarm and had settled again, an aged Blackfellow daubed his hair with mud, crowned the daub with a bunch of waterplants, stuck a hollow reed into each of his nostrils, waded gently into the water, and disappeared under the surface. All that was now visible was a bunch of water plants, apparently drifting in the wind among the swans, with the ends of two broken reeds protruding from the water a few inches away. The swans were not alarmed, nor did the survivors take alarm when, one by one, some six or seven of their number softly and silently vanished under water and did not reappear. After a few seconds the old Blackfellow re-emerged from the lake bringing with him the six or seven swans whom he had caught and killed by seizing their legs, pulling them down, and drowning them. The Blackfellows' method of food-gathering was so crushingly superior to the rifleman's that, after all, it was no wonder that his rifle-shot had failed to hit its intended psychological mark. For this tribe, the problem of scarcity was non-existent so long as there was a mud-banked, reed-fringed, swan-covered lake in their universe.

² See *Odyssey*, Book IX, ll. 92-102, quoted in II. ii. 22-23.

³ See II. ii. 25-31.

⁴ See Malinowski, B.: *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London 1922, Routledge).

When the sensational productivity of a happy marriage between the yam and the local soil and climate had first plunged the human husbandmen into technological unemployment, they had tried to consume their redundant time and energy by devising ingenious non-economic refinements on their utilitarian agricultural operations.

'In gardening . . . the natives produce much more than they actually require, and in any average year they harvest perhaps twice as much as they can eat. . . . They produce this surplus in a manner which entails much more work than is strictly necessary for obtaining the crops. Much time and labour is given up to aesthetic purposes, to making the gardens tidy, clean, cleared of all debris; to building fine solid fences; to providing specially strong and big yam-poles. All these things are to some extent required for the growth of the plant; but there can be no doubt that the natives push their conscientiousness far beyond the limit of the purely necessary. The non-utilitarian element in their garden work is still more clearly perceptible in the various tasks which they carry out entirely for the sake of ornamentation in connexion with magical ceremonies and in obedience to tribal usage. . . .

'All, or almost all, the fruits of his work, and certainly any surplus which he can achieve by extra effort, goes, not to the man himself, but to his relatives-in-law. . . . But, although he thus derives practically no personal benefit in the utilitarian sense from his harvest, the gardener receives much praise and renown from its size and quality, and that in a direct and circumstantial manner. For all the crops, after being harvested, are displayed for some time afterwards in the gardens, piled up in neat conical heaps under small shelters made of yam vine. . . . Their yam houses are built so that the quantity of the food can be gauged, and its quality ascertained, through the wide interstices between the beams. . . . The yams are so arranged that the best specimens come to the outside and are well visible. . . . They will boast that . . . half of the yams will rot away in the storehouses and be thrown on . . . the rubbish heap at the back of the houses to make room for the new harvest. Here . . . we meet the typical idea that the main aim of accumulating food is to keep it exhibited in the yam houses till it rots and then can be replaced by a new *étalage*.'¹

Such ingenious methods as these for spinning out a stint of work had never been devised by any contemporary Western trade-unionist; but, in the Trobriand Islands, Adam's task was so fantastically productive that the islanders were hopelessly defeated in their efforts to lose their race against it. Do what they would, they could not make their agricultural work occupy more than half of their working time;² and at this critical point they gave proof of a power of imagination, amounting to genius, by finding a new occupation which did effectively consume all their surplus leisure, and which achieved this without leading them into mischief. The achievement was a remarkable one, considering that 'Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do',³ and that the *désœuvrés* Trobriand Islanders would not have had far to look for a bad example. They could have found it in their neighbours the Dobuans; for, in Dobu Island, Nature had been as niggardly to Man as she had

¹ Malinowski, B.: *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London 1922, Routledge), pp. 58-59, 61, 168, and 169.

² See *ibid.*, p. 58.

³ Watts, Isaac: *Divine Songs for Children*, xx: 'Against Idleness and Mischief'.

been bountiful in the Trobriand Islands; in Dobu, population pressed hard upon resources;¹ and 'from this island, in olden days, fierce and daring cannibal and head-hunting expeditions were periodically launched to the dread of the neighbouring tribes. . . . Districts . . . over a hundred miles away by sail never felt safe from the Dobuans.'² If the Trobriand Islanders had given ear to Satan's promptings, they might have found their solution for a problem of surplus leisure arising from a chronic excess of food production in a vicious Dobuan practice to which the Dobuans themselves had resorted as a remedy for the opposite evil of a chronic shortage in their home-grown food-supply. The Trobriand Islanders did follow the Dobuans' example in taking to long-distance voyages,³ but not in making head-hunting and cannibalism the objects of their seafaring. They invented an alternative object, which was as engrossing as it was harmless, in the institution of the Kula.⁴

The Kula was a continual long-distance maritime exchange of objects which—like the garlands of greenstuff that had once been the prizes for victory in the four classic oecumenical sporting events in the Hellenic World—had an economic value that was derisory and a psychological value that was inestimable. The international exchange of these objects was conducted in a closed maritime circuit, round which articles of two kinds (necklaces of red shell and bracelets of white shell), and these two kinds only, were constantly travelling in opposite directions and being exchanged for one another *en route*.

'Every movement of the Kula articles, every detail of the transactions, is fixed and regulated by a set of traditional rules and conventions, and some acts of the Kula are accompanied by an elaborate magical ritual and public ceremonies.'⁵

This ceremonial exchange of economically worthless treasures in a perpetually recurrent cycle was an occupation on which the Trobriand Islanders could be sure of being able to spend the whole of their spare time, even if their agriculture were one day to attain a degree of technical efficiency at which the maximum time that it could take up would approximate to zero.

The Trobriand Islanders' invention of this invincible leisure-consuming institution was a moral as well as an imaginative triumph; for the Kula was so irresistibly attractive an employment for a Melanesian human nature that even the abominable Dobuans were drawn into the Kula ring; and, though these proselytes operated this borrowed institution in the peculiar spirit of their own repulsive culture,⁶ their sharp practice in this ceremonial trade in non-economic commodities was at least a less objectionable offence against a Melanesian international code of good manners than their previous practice of sea-raiding to supply themselves with man-meat and human heads. The conversion of the

¹ Benedict, Ruth: *Patterns of Culture* (London 1934, Routledge), p. 130.

² Malinowski, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

³ The Dobuans seem to have been the pioneer 'Argonauts of the Western Pacific', to judge by the fact 'that their language is spoken as a *lingua franca* all over the d'Entrecasteaux Archipelago, in the Amphletts, and as far north as the Trobriands' (*ibid.*, pp. 39-40).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁴ See *ibid.*, *passim*, but especially pp. 81-84.

⁶ See Benedict, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-9.

Dobuans from head-hunting to the Kula was a measure of the Trobriand Islanders' success in finding a satisfying alternative activity to the curse of hard labour—which had proved itself, by the awkwardness of the vacuum that it left when it was lifted, to have been a blessing in disguise to the progeny of a sinful Adam.

The Kula was a virtuoso's solution for a problem that the Trobriand Islanders' amateurish British contemporaries were seeking to solve by eating city dinners, dancing attendance on the hunting, fishing, shooting, and social seasons, and looking on at horse and dog races and cricket and football matches; but the justness of this comparison was a reminder that the Kula and its contemporary Western counterparts were not solutions that could satisfy the Soul's spiritual aspirations; for these effectively time-killing occupations had been kept morally innocent only at the price of being made spiritually fatuous; creation, not mere recreation, was the true end of Man; and, since the creative spark in Man had happily shown itself to be inextinguishable, neither the Kula nor a grosser contemporary Western regimen of bread and circuses¹ could bring true spiritual salvation to the spellbound prisoners in Circe's sty.

(c) THE SPIRITUAL ODYSSEY OF THE WESTERN WORLD

Where then would a prospectively out-of-work Mankind have to look for a better employment of a morally perilous leisure than was to be found in either a Kula or a Lord Mayor's Show? Two of the Human Soul's higher faculties were Thought and Art; and the past exercise of these two faculties by Man in Process of Civilization had demonstrated that their fields of activity were boundless. In any future society that had sense and grace as well as leisure, the moving spirits would assuredly see to it that their fellow men's and women's intellectual and aesthetic capacities were given the best opportunities for coming to flower that an enlightened education could provide. Yet it seemed unlikely—as far as could be foreseen before this cultural experiment had been tried—that Thought and Art would prove to be activities in which a majority of Mankind could find their lifework; for Thought and Art appeared to be intrinsically esoteric in their nature, in the sense of requiring for their cultivation an innate spiritual gift with which only a minority was endowed; and this rare endowment was no talisman of spiritual perfection. 'To the purely spiritual, the intellectual but stand in a sort of corporeal relation'.² If the solution for Man's problem of total leisure lay in expending it in the service of some high calling to which all men would find themselves able to devote their lives, then Mankind must turn again for salvation to Religion; for the one employment of total Leisure that offered an infinite spiritual scope to Everyman was the use of this challenging gift for the glory of the God who had bestowed it.

Whatever the religious future of a Westernizing World might prove to be, a post-Christian chapter of Western history had already made it clear that, in some form, a banished Religion was going to return in any event; for it had not proved so easy, after all, to give the Hound of

¹ 'Panem et circenses' (*Juvenal*: Satire X, l. 81).

² Melville, H.: *Moby Dick*, chap. xlv.

Heaven¹ the slip. Rather than relinquish His pursuit of His spiritual prey,² He had resumed it in the guise of a hell hound; and a liberal-minded and rationalist-minded society which had facilely assumed that it had rid itself of fanaticism for ever by exorcizing it on the ecclesiastical plane had lived to see it break out again with seven-fold virulence on political and economic planes on which the complacent watchman had been off his guard.

Mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era it was already evident that the choice before Western Man was, not whether he was to be religious or irreligious, but whether his spiritual allegiance was to be given to this religion or to that; and in a scientific-minded society this choice between competing religions was limited virtually to two alternatives. A twentieth-century Western World might either return to a Christian worship of the God who is Love as well as Power, or it might succumb to a Narcissan worship of Man's own hypnotizing image. In an age in which Human Technology had so decisively and sensationally subjugated Non-Human Nature, it was no longer possible for Man to find a third alternative in a return to the worship of a Magna Mater who had been the principal object of Man's worship before the higher religions had made their epiphany in the wake of Civilization's higher technology. A generation that had discovered how to 'annihilate distance' and how to split the atom might be more prone than any of its predecessors to fall into the deadly error of deifying Man, but it had effectively debarred itself from recapturing a primitive vision of Non-Human Nature as the Great Mother of gods and men.

A Physical Universe that a Western Science had stripped naked and dissected could no longer be mistaken for a Theotókos. At the most she might be personified poetically as one of God's daughters; and the error of according to her some of the worship due exclusively to God Himself was a pitfall into which a twentieth-century Western worshipper of the One True God would have no excuse for falling, considering that, in a seventh-century Mecca, the Prophet Muhammed, at a time when his prophetic mission had been at its nadir, had manfully overcome a momentary temptation to compromise with the traditional idolatry of his compatriots by associating the three goddesses of the Ka'bah—Manat, Allat, and al-'Uzzā—with the worship of an Allah whose daughters these goddesses had been deemed to be.³ The One True God and His creature Man were the sole two possible alternative objects of worship for a *Homo Faber Mechanicus*; and the choice between these two competitors for victory, in the final round of a struggle for existence between religions that was coeval with Mankind, had been brought to a crisis by a triumph of Human Technology over Non-Human Nature which had conclusively discredited the primitive worship of a Magna Mater.

Now that a conquered Material Universe was out of the running, Man Himself was the greatest power of which Man had any indisputable

¹ Thompson, Francis: *The Hound of Heaven*.

² Blake, William: *The Everlasting Gospel*, β, l. 27.

³ For the tradition of this incident, see Andrae, T.: *Mohammed: The Man and his Faith* (New York 1936, Scribner), pp. 21-23.

direct experience; and the critical question was whether a scientifically warrantable worship of a visible and tangible human idol would now follow up a victory over the scientifically exploded worship of Cybele by also putting to rout a worship of God—considering that a faith which was ‘the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen’,¹ was the only justification for worshipping a God whom no man had seen at any time.² ‘Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear’;³ but this faith was not countenanced by Science; and, long before Man had been led into a temptation to worship the Human Mind by the intellectually triumphant sequel to a seventeenth-century Western Scientific Revolution, Man-worship had already come to be the characteristic idolatry of Man in Process of Civilization, since one aspect of Civilization had been Man’s progressive conquest of Non-Human Nature.

The response to the challenge of this first wave of Man-worship had been the epiphany of the higher religions; and it had been no accident that these had made their appearance and won their footing at times and places at which human beings had temporarily learnt the salutary lesson of disillusionment with Civilization from the suffering that had been inflicted on them by the breakdowns and disintegrations of the civilizations of an early generation. The spiritually educative effects of this creative experience of suffering had, however, afterwards been overwhelmed by the impetus of the triumphant resurgence of Civilization in the Modern Age of a Western Society’s history. The evidence of things not seen had been rejected, and the substance of things hoped for had been devalued, by a Modern Western Man from whom a Westernizing majority of Mankind had latterly been learning to take its cue. Was this the last word in the story? The four principal surviving higher religions—the Mahāyāna, Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam—had all consistently spoken with one voice in proclaiming the truth that Man was not God. Was their consensus on this negative yet crucial point now to be overruled in a second reading of the bill? A Christian Church Militant had started its career by challenging a cult of Dea Roma and Divus Caesar that had been one of the most respectable and beneficent expressions of Man-worship so far devised. Were the heirs of the Christian martyrs who had given their lives to win the Church’s battle against the deification of an Hellenic universal state now to capitulate to the worship of Leviathan in the cruder and wickedder latter-day Western forms of Fascism and Communism? The key to an answer to this question was to be found in the significance and prospects of a current domestic controversy within the bosom of the neo-pagan church whose religion was the worship of Humanity.

In an earlier chapter of this Part⁴ we have already noticed that the real issue between Communism and a traditional Western way of life was not the economic issue between Socialism and Freedom for Private Economic Enterprise which was the ostensible subject of contention. We

¹ Heb. xi. 1.

³ Heb. xi. 3.

² 1 John iv. 12.

⁴ On p. 584, above.

have seen that this economic issue masked a religious one that was of much greater account and was therefore much more difficult to settle, and we have identified this religious issue as a conflict between two incompatible versions of the cult of a human idol. Communism was preaching that Man's divinity lay in Man's collective material power, while Liberalism was preaching that it lay in men's individual and personal freedom; and we have already committed ourselves to the forecast that, in a struggle for the spiritual allegiance of Mankind in which the only two competitors in the lists were the Communists' idol Leviathan and the Liberals' idol Homunculus, Leviathan could not fail to win the day.

The Liberals had, in fact, virtually admitted defeat when they had stooped to alloying their Liberalism with Nationalism; for this partial apostasy was not merely a confession that their proper godling Homunculus was an unsatisfying object of worship; it was also a confession that the Communists' idol Leviathan was verily the one true god, since, on the road from Liberalism to Communism, Nationalism was a half-way house at which there could be no permanent abiding place for the harassed *ci-devant* Liberal traveller. In becoming a nationalist the Liberal had in fact inadvertently but irrevocably become a fellow-traveller with his Communist adversary, since Nationalism, in unison with Communism and in contrast to Liberalism, was a worship of Collective Man, and the only substantial difference between these two varieties of the cult of Leviathan was that Communism was a worship of the collective human beast in its oecumenical entirety, whereas Nationalism was a worship of it in fragments chipped off to constitute parochial states. When even in the mundane sphere of economic and political and military affairs these idolized parochial states had already become untenable anachronisms, it was hard to believe that they could long continue to command the ideological allegiance of ex-Christians who, if their hearts were set on worshipping Collective Man, could find ready to hand, in Communism, an alternative form of Leviathan-worship that was more satisfying, more rational, and more practical.

The encounter between a Communist and a Liberal ideology on a twentieth-century Western religious battlefield was not unlike the encounter between the French gendarmes and the Genoese crossbowmen in the first phase of the Battle of Crécy. The two contingents of a twentieth-century man-worshipping army were in the field against the same God-worshipping adversaries; but, before either or both of them could join battle with their common theist enemy, they had first to settle accounts with one another; and, in this preliminary heat, the Communist devotees of Leviathan, in their attitude towards the Liberal patrons of Homunculus, were showing all the impatience and contempt that the French Knights had displayed in dealing with the French Crown's Genoese mercenaries on the 26th August, 1346. In twentieth-century Communist eyes the Liberal Western advocates of Individual Liberty were as ineffective in combat as the Genoese crossbowmen had been found by their French employers to be when their bowstrings had gone slack as a result of an improvident exposure to the rain. These useless

troops in the van of the atheist army's order of battle were now standing in the way of a Marxian task-force that had the weapons and the will to bring the battle to a decision by charging home. To Communist minds the only open question was whether the Liberals had been making fools of themselves unintentionally in allowing their weapons to be put out of action by the weather and in taking up a position in which they were now nothing but a nuisance to their own side, or whether their ostensible ineptitude was in reality a cunning camouflage for a treacherous collusion with theists who, in theory, were Liberalism's and Communism's common enemies. The Communist answer to this question would be the verdict on Liberalism in the court of Marxian history; but for current practical purposes the question was academic; for the Marxian heavy cavalry had already made up their minds that they must clear the field for a decisive assault upon their ultimate adversaries the theists by riding the obstructive Liberals down; and, whether the prospective victims of this military necessity were fools or whether they were knaves, the necessity was in either case imperative.

In the face of the Communists' implacable determination to sweep the Liberals out of their path, the Liberals were in a sorry plight; for the negative Liberal ideal of civil liberty for individual men and women was as ineffective a weapon as an unstrung crossbow to pit against the positive Communist ideal of a self-sacrificing devotion to the service of a Collective Humanity. The apparent grandeur of the Communist ideal made the Liberal ideal appear trivial; yet there was one unquestionably genuine fact with which these appearances did not tally, and this was that in their allegiance to a seemingly trivial ideal the Liberals were thoroughly in earnest. Their belief in individual liberty, and the willingness of at least a few zealous souls to demonstrate their sincerity by going to the length of dying for this belief in the last resort at the hands of National Socialist German and Communist Russian and Chinese persecutors, were the one article of faith and the one spark of the martyrs' fiery spirit that were unquestionably still alive in a post-Christian Western World which had deliberately repudiated its title to the name 'Western Christendom'.¹ Considering how feeble this latter-day Western ideal of personal liberty appeared to be when it was held up to scorn against the foil of Communism's zeal for the welfare of the Human Race, it might seem strange that it should have retained so singular a hold upon the feelings of an otherwise prosaically utilitarian-minded society. What was the explanation of this mystery?

In attempting to explain the strength of a twentieth-century Western feeling for Liberty, an historian's first move would be to look into its origins; and he would begin his retrospective investigation by pointing out that the Liberals were allowing the Communists to do them a gross injustice in allowing them to state the issue between Liberalism and Communism in economic terms. The right of private *entrepreneurs* to take their profits might indeed seem a less worthy cause to champion than the right of Mankind to make its collective economic interests prevail over the selfish economic aims of a few able or privileged individuals; but this

¹ See I. i. 34.

exclusively economic interpretation of Liberalism was, of course, a travesty of it. The freedom which the Western Liberals had most at heart was not a freedom for the rich to make profits at the expense of the poor; it was a freedom for anyone of any class to express an unpopular opinion, advocate an unpopular policy, and co-operate for these unpopular purposes with other representatives of a like-minded minority of the community. This civil liberty was the freedom for which the members of a twentieth-century Western Society were prepared to fight and die; and they set this supreme value on civil liberty because they were aware that it was the palladium of Democracy; but this was only the latest chapter in the story; for civil liberty had been prized in the West long before the selfconscious resuscitation of a defunct Hellenic political ideal at the beginning of the Modern Age of Western history.¹

The Western cult of civil liberty was not only older than a Modern Western democracy; it was also older than a Medieval Western parliamentarism, as was witnessed in the English rendering of Western constitutional history by the chronological fact that King John's signature of Magna Carta in A.D. 1215 had preceded by thirty-nine years the summoning of the first rudiment of a representative parliament in A.D. 1254. A passion for personal liberty on the political plane had in fact been a Modern Western democracy's priceless heritage from a Medieval Western aristocracy; but the feudal barons had not been the creators of this Western ideal of liberty, and politics had not been the plane on which it had first risen above the Western World's horizon. The Western ideal of personal liberty had made its epiphany on the religious plane, and this before the first rudiments of a Western Civilization had begun to take shape out of the chaos of a post-Hellenic interregnum; for this Western belief in personal liberty was part of the Western Society's spiritual heritage from Christianity, and its provenance was attested by 'the visionary gleam' of a halo of unearthly light that still made this ideal glow and shine, and so still made it thrill the hearts of men and women with its radiance, even after it had been debased into a prosaic twentieth-century Western secular concern to preserve the freedom of business men to make economic profits.

Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.²

A latter-day Western belief in the value of personal liberty was a faded vestige of an original Christian belief in the brotherhood of Man; and this Christian belief in the brotherhood of Man was a corollary of a Christian discovery—or revelation—of the fatherhood of God, for which the First Epistle General of John was the *locus classicus*.

'Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God. . . . And this commandment have we from him, that he who loveth God love his brother also.'³

¹ See pp. 3 and 7-8, above.

² Wordsworth, William: *Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood*.
³ 1 John iii. 1 and iv. 21.

A belief in the absolute and inestimable value of personal liberty, which was neither intellectually nor morally defensible when Liberty was claimed as the divine right of an impiously deified Homunculus, would take on a very different colour if this miserable pretender to the divinity of his Creator were to be salvaged from the worship of himself by again receiving 'the spirit of adoption whereby we cry "Abba, Father!"';¹ for 'the glorious liberty of the children of God', into which 'the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption',² was a cause in which Christians, vindicating it against the tyranny of an idolatrous worship of Leviathan, could lay down their lives, if need be, with a sure conviction that this was a worthy cause for martyrdom.

If we have accounted correctly for the abiding sincerity and earnestness of a twentieth-century Western belief in personal liberty by tracing this belief back to its historic Christian origin, we have perhaps performed for a hard-pressed Liberalism a service that might have saved the lives of the unfortunate Genoese soldiers on the field of Crécy if they could have done the same thing for themselves on the morning of the 26th August, 1346. We have rearmed our Liberal crossbowman by restoring the tone of his perished Christian bow-string; and, in thus effectively reconditioning his paralysed weapon, we have given him the power to turn the tables on his Communist assailant; for a crossbow in working order is more than a match for antique swords and lances. The historian's intervention with his time-machine³ will, in fact, have given the battle a new turn. The mail-clad horsemen will make their charge with the same recklessly confident *élan* as ever, but this time their shrift will be short, for they will never arrive within range of the expectant longbowmen's shafts; they will meet their deaths *en route* at the hands of the interloping crossbowmen whom they had imagined to be at their mercy and had been expecting to trample under foot. They will be slain by bolts shot at point-blank range from unexpectedly restrung arbalests.

This military simile was an enlightening allegory of the religious issue that a post-Christian Liberalism was being forced to face under the mounting pressure of a post-Christian Communism's challenge. On the neo-pagan terms on which this spiritual battle had been joined, Liberalism was hopelessly outmatched; for Communism had been able to put the *élan* of its heritage of Christian enthusiasm into its worship of the idol Leviathan, while Liberalism had condemned itself to unstringing its bow by taking as its counter-idol an Homunculus whose pretension to divinity was so patently spurious as to be incapable of kindling any glimmer of Christian zeal. This contemptible little idol might have been adequate for meeting a Western Society's ideological requirements during a comfortable nineteenth-century vacation, when Islam's once loud challenge to the Western World had fallen silent before any Western ear had yet begun to catch the first sound of a Communist Russian heavy cavalry's oncoming horse-hoofs; but by the middle of the twentieth century, when this new horde of charging Oriental cataphracts was bearing down, full tilt, upon a shaken Occidental infantry, it had become manifest that a nineteenth-century belief in civil liberty

¹ Rom. viii. 15.

² Rom. viii. 21.

³ See V. vi. 214-15.

was no adequate armament for meeting the impetuous attack of the most formidable assailant that the Franks had yet encountered.

The Communist onslaught had thus forced upon its Western victims a drastic choice between two extreme alternatives. Either the Westerners must resign themselves to seeing the defeat of a Western ideal of personal liberty that had been depotentiated in the process of being secularized, or else they must reinstate this now gravely imperilled ideal in its original Christian setting, since it was only through being reconsecrated that the ideal of Liberty could be revalidated. In forcing this choice upon a post-Christian Western Society, a post-Christian Russian Society was unintentionally doing an inestimably valuable service to its unloved sister; for it was thrusting into its Western adversary's unnerved hand the one spiritual weapon that had the power to turn the balance in the hitherto weaker combatant's favour. In a struggle between the two conflicting ideals of Freedom and Totalitarianism in which the cause of Freedom was at a desperate disadvantage so long as Freedom meant nothing more than a secular civil liberty, the idol Leviathan might still be triumphantly defied and defeated by souls contending for the liberty of Conscience and risking martyrdom for the glory of God.

If a latter-day Western Liberalism was to be retransfigured into the religion that was the fountain-light of all its day and the master-light of all its seeing,¹ it would have to carry out both a negative and a positive spiritual exercise.

Its negative task would be to recapture a saving humility. The first lesson in humility, for a society that had won a dominion over non-Human Nature by enthroning Natural Science in a dethroned Religion's seat, would be to acknowledge and confess the spiritual impotence of a Mechanized Technology that had proved itself capable of moving physical mountains;² and the palinode that was now demanded of the Western scientific intellect could not be evaded by the gesture of replacing a Newtonian 'God the Engineer' by an Einsteinian 'God the Mathematician'.³ This perfunctory twentieth-century Western etherialization of a complacent eighteenth-century Western deism would not be enough to restore sick Western souls to spiritual health; for, though

¹ Wordsworth, *op. cit.*

² The writer can remember an occasion in one of the museums in London when he was gazing, as a child, at a beautiful fragment of Medieval Western stained glass and was listening to his mother's comment that this was the one Medieval Western art of which the Modern Western World had lost the secret. This remark made a lasting impression on his mind, because, for this mind at that age, an admission of the possibility of retrogression, even in one single art, had been as disquieting as it had been novel. In his subsequent musings over this recollection of early childhood, the writer gradually came to perceive that, while the loss of any technique was something portentous in a social milieu in which Technology was *in excelsis*, the Modern Western World's loss of the Medieval Western technique of making stained glass was particularly significant. It was indeed no accident that this particular technique should have been the first to have slipped out of a Modern Western virtuoso's hand; for, of all Medieval Western techniques, the making of stained glass had been the one in which Technology had been the most dependent for its success upon its marriage with Spirituality; and the repudiation of a Medieval Western spirituality had been the price of the sensational advance of a secularized Modern Western science.

³ 'We have already considered with disfavour the possibility of the Universe having been planned by a biologist or an engineer; from the intrinsic evidence of His creation, the Great Architect of the Universe now begins to appear as a pure mathematician' (Jeans, Sir James: *The Mysterious Universe* (Cambridge 1930, University Press), p. 134).

these second thoughts of Western minds might be commended as the beginning of wisdom,¹ they would not exempt Western hearts from the duty and ordeal of conversion. Abashed Western intellects must follow the Hellenic example set by Socrates when he turned away from the study of an outer physical universe to the exploration of an inner spiritual one.² Contrite Western souls must accept a contemporary Asian verdict that 'Western science is ignorant of the distinction between worldly knowledge and godly knowledge'³ and a classical Hellenic verdict that 'omnia . . . ista sagacitas hominum, non sapientia, invenit'.⁴

'The first scientific quest was concerned, not with the nature of the Objective Universe, but with the central problem of human fate.⁵ Dream-interpretation, Divination and Astrology, the three great branches of Primitive Science, all attempted to answer the most poignant questions about the fundamental nature of Man. These questions still remain unanswered. . . . We know very well that the specific quest of the early intuitive sciences was not taken over by the scientific disciplines which superseded them. . . . Because of the immense success and prestige of the scientific *Weltanschauung*, it was hardly noticed until recently that these central problems of the Human Soul had been omitted from the fields of Modern Science and Philosophy. . . . It would be idle to contend that extraversted Science and Religion do not serve real human ends. Their social, ethical, and cultural values are manifest. But the Soul of Man is still athirst for the essential things which were left behind in the pre-scientific limbo—things which have lain dormant but are not dead. In the Unconscious they await the day of resurrection, ready to break through whenever the spiritual quest is undertaken anew, clothed perhaps in strange archaic garb, and whispering their primordial longings to our dreaming minds.'⁶

The negative act of spiritual purification through humility would be a necessary preliminary to this positive act of replenishing an empty Western cistern from well-springs in which the living waters of Religion had never run dry; and these sources for a renewal of Western Man's spiritual life were unlikely to be found either in Western or in Russian geological formations; for History and Scripture had testified with a conclusive unanimity that the parts of Caesar and Christ could never both be played by the same person or same people. If either the Americans or the Russians were to cast themselves for the Caesarean role of putting a distracted *Oikoumenê* into political and material order, they would thereby be disqualifying themselves for becoming candidates for the privilege of being chosen to be the prophets of a spiritual revival, while the West European peoples would have to face the hard truth that their recent forfeiture of their ephemeral power did not carry with it any guarantee that these *ex-conquistadores*, *ex-proconsuls*, and *ex-entre-*

¹ Ps. cxi. 10; Prov. i. 7 and ix. 10.

² See Plato: *Phaedo*, 96-97, quoted in III. iii. 186-7.

³ P. Rāmanāthan, Solicitor General of Ceylon: 'The Miscarriage of Life in the West', in *The Hibbert Journal*, vol. vii, No. 1 (London 1909, Williams & Norgate), p. 12.

⁴ Seneca: *Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium*, Ep. xc, § 11.

⁵ See N. K. Chadwick: *Poetry and Prophecy* (Cambridge 1942, University Press), pp. 91-94, quoted in VII. vii. 761.—A.J.T.

⁶ Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall, & Cox; 1949, Methuen), pp. 646 and 647-8.

preneurs would be compensated for their material losses by the receipt of a consolation prize in the shape of a prophet's mantle opportunely descending upon their shivering shoulders to cover their unwonted nakedness. After having provided a Westernizing World with its leaven, its workshop, and its cockpit in swift succession, Western Europe under a future *Pax Americana* seemed likely to settle down, like Greece under a *Pax Romana*, into the uninspiring role of a museum for conserving the relics of a departed greatness; and in the era of a Marshall Plan and a Festival of Britain, as in the days of the Antonines and Aulus Gellius, *ex Oriente lux*.

This had been the theme of the friars' chant in the Temple of Jupiter that had fallen on Gibbon's ears on the 15th October, 1764;¹ and, though the impenetrable complacency of an eighteenth-century *Zeitgeist*, in which Gibbon's talent had been lapped, had not permitted even this master mind to perceive that the subject on which his muse was inviting him to write was Man's mysterious spiritual ascent on the wings of material catastrophe,² and not the familiar vanity of Man's mundane ambitions,³ the learning that comes only through suffering had begun to enlighten far more commonplace souls than Gibbon's within less than two centuries after the great historian had failed to catch the undertones of 'the bare-footed fryars' descant. The friars' unfading song had outlasted the Forum's brief clamour and the Campo Vaccino's long silence; and by the beginning of the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era a disoriented Western moth had already begun to hover wistfully round an unextinguished Oriental candle, according to the testimony of at least one contemporary Western psychiatrist, reporting his own clinical experience.

'Despite intellectual resistance, the Unconscious of the West turns irresistibly to the East; for there the "heliocentric" structure of the Self has long been realised, and the greater psychological depth and insight of Oriental philosophy comes directly from this recognition. . . . Allusions to Eastern ideas are liable to occur in a [Western] patient's material just at the critical juncture where the one thing needful is to be able to see things differently. These people are seriously seeking a more comprehensive view of themselves and of the Universe than that provided by their own background. Naturally, only those who have felt cramped and stultified by the traditional [Western] view of the Soul, which divided it arbitrarily into black and white, will be prompted to subject authoritative moral categories to psychological understanding. But, once the sheep and the goats have escaped from their respective folds, they can never again be herded into authoritarian enclosures. . . . Our tendency to think of instincts as separate and distinct entities makes it difficult to understand Psychology in terms of elementary dynamic principles; but the Unconscious still thinks in the grand manner of Ancient China: "There are

¹ *The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon*, edited by Murray, J. (London 1896, Murray), p. 302. This experience of Gibbon's is discussed in the present Study in II. ii. 210, n. 1; IV. iv. 58-63; and XIII. x. 98-107.

² See VII. vii. 423-5 and 551-5.

³ Ecclesiastes had reduced this topic to a truism by his immortal statement of it in the twelve words of the second verse of his first chapter, and, though the *tour de force* of making these dry bones live (Ezek. xxxvii. 1-10) was to be achieved by Shelley in the fourteen lines of his *Ozymandias of Egypt*, this feat was beyond the compass of Gibbon's ponderous genius.

three elements: Heaven, Earth and Man". The age-long veneration of the swan, the goose, and the stork is the evidence of Man's constant need to find some reconciling symbol which could unite this elementary opposition in his nature. . . . The Chinese naturalistic conception . . . reduces the terrors of the moral conflict, in which the Soul swings dizzily between salvation and perdition, to the play of natural forces—Yang and Yin.¹

In a Westernizing World mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the time was indeed ripe for the onset of a new Yang-movement to carry Western souls back from their long obsession with an extraverted Physical Science towards a fresh quest for the divine Dweller in the Innermost.² In the chapter of Western history that was now coming to a close, Western souls had disqualified themselves for the pursuit of this quest; for 'der Gott der mir im Busen wohnt'³ does not act in a material medium; His activity is the passivity of Wu Wei in which His spiritual energy is at its acme;⁴ He would not be Himself if He made His epiphany in the physical energy of the external universe of His creation; and therefore a Modern Western *Homo Faber Mechanicus* could fancy that he had no use for this *Deus Absconditus*⁵ so long as he was preoccupied with his own victorious assault upon his material environment. But now, at the moment when this act of material conquest was being consummated by the extraordinary prowess of a scientific Western technology, the conqueror had been confronted by the ironical discovery that the very completeness of his triumph had placed in jeopardy, not merely the Earthly Paradise that he had seemed to be on, the verge of recapturing, but perhaps even the survival of Life on Earth, which had never before been under threat of being extinguished by Man's maleficence.

The devastating agency that Western Man had thus let loose to his own mortal peril was not the physical force generated by splitting an atom; it was the spiritual force generated by a schism in the Soul; but, happily for Mankind's prospects in both This World and an Other World, the inadvertently liberated *jinn* was not evil in its essence; its titanic power was capable of working as much good, if it were rightly guided, as it was bound to work evil if it were allowed to run riot; and now, primed and poised for action, demonic or angelic, this potent spirit was awaiting a sign from the alchemist who had unintentionally liberated it from the alembic in which he had been conducting his excessively ingenious physical experiments. If he was to give himself a chance of self-preservation, the distractingly possessed *majnūn* technologist must now recognize, and act upon, the truth that, 'of all tools used in the shadow of the Moon, men are [the] most apt to get out of order'.⁶ He must throw aside the physical tools with which he had been mastering his material environment, in order to concentrate his efforts on the now

¹ Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall, & Cox; 1949, Methuen), pp. 505, 896, 698, and 872.

² See the picture with this title by George Frederic Watts in the Tate Gallery, Millbank, London.

³ Goethe: *Faust*, I. 1566, quoted in II. i. 279.

⁴ See III. iii. 187.

⁵ 'Vere tu es Deus absconditus, Deus Israel salvator' (Isa. xlv. 15, in the Vulgate Latin text).

⁶ Melville, H.: *Moby Dick*, chap. xlv.

far more urgent task of re-conquering an inner spiritual world that had slipped out of his control while he had been engrossed in his unduly prolonged child's-play with clockwork; for this spiritual world was the field in which lay buried his pearl of great price¹—his master tool consisting of his Self; and 'what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?'² A Western Man who had all but gained the whole World could not recapture his lost self till he had made his peace with his fellow men and women, with his Subconscious Human Nature, and with his God; and he must first turn again to worship a *Latens Deitas*³ if he was to have any hope of achieving an eventual reconciliation with his fellows and with himself. He must reorient his spiritual outlook by once more taking for his *qiblah* his father Abraham's Mecca in place of his prospector Bentham's New Jerusalem.

If this act of reconversion was what was required of Western souls seeking, at the eleventh hour, to find salvation, was it possible to estimate how far they had already travelled by this date on their spiritual Odyssey, and what experiences they had been encountering on the way? By the time when, under the surface of Western Man's spiritual life, the Subconscious Psyche was somnambulantly veering eastward, a vanguard of more alert—or more apprehensive—Western spirits had been racing so far ahead that they had already reached a critical divide in the road. *Hic locus est partis ubi se via findit in ambas*;⁴ and this parting of the ways was critical because of the contrast between the two spiritual *terrains* into which the forking branches led; for one of them was as invitingly sheltering as the other was deterrently bleak.

In this valley of decision,⁵ where the prodigal found himself confronted by the two frowning baetyls that had been waiting for his arrival there to bear witness against him,⁶ his temptation was to retreat into the bosom of some established church enshrining some historic higher religion.

Rock of Ages, cleft for me,
Let me hide myself in Thee.⁷

In the spiritual life of the Western World mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era there were already unmistakable signs of a movement of withdrawal that had been detected, and been stigmatized as 'the second bout of religiosity' (*die zweite Religiosität*), by a Western philosopher writing on the morrow of a First World War.⁸ In the disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization, this tendency to seek shelter in a reversion to traditional religious observances had begun to be perceptible in the second century B.C., after the onset of the second paroxysm of an

¹ Matt. xiii. 46.

² Matt. xvi. 26.

³ 'Adoro te devote, latens Deitas'—the first line of the hymn, attributed to Saint Thomas Aquinas, that, in a Catholic Western Christian church, was sung during processions on Corpus Christi Day.

⁴ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book VI, l. 540.

⁵ Joel iii. 14.

⁶ Auden, W. H.: *The Two Witnesses*.

⁷ In the writer of this hymn, A. M. Toplady, Western Man's subconscious psyche was as prescient as it was complacent in the author of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Toplady published *Rock of Ages* in A.D. 1775, a year before the date of the publication of the first volume of Gibbon's work.

⁸ See Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. ii (Munich 1922, Beck), pp. 381-3.

Hellenic Time of Troubles;¹ in the disintegration of the Sinic Civilization, it had come to a head under the *Pax Hanica*.²

'The second bout of religiosity is the inevitable counterpart of Caesarism, which is the final political constitution of all disintegrating civilisations in their last phase (*später Zivilisationen*).³ . . . The creations of this [latter-day] piety have no more originality about them than is to be found in the form of the Roman Imperium. There is no constructive activity, no development of any idea. The phenomenon resembles the [optical] effect of the dispersal of a mist that has been shrouding a landscape: the old familiar forms begin to reappear—hazily at first, and then in clearer and clearer outline. The content of religiosity in this second bout is, once again, just what it was in the first authentic early bout, save for a difference of nuance in the experience and expression of it. The first symptom is the disappearance of Rationalism; the next symptom is the emergence of the forms of the Early Age of Growth (*der Frühzeit*); the last symptom is the resurrection of the whole universe of the primitive religions, which had been compelled to give way to the grandiose forms of an Early [Higher] Religion (*des Frühgläubens*), and which now bursts out again, with an impetus that will not be denied, in a proletarian syncretism⁴ which is a never failing feature of every civilisation (*Kultur*) in this phase.'⁵

This vista of spiritual regression becomes attractive to self-deconsecrated souls even in the heyday of Rationalism, before their first experience of the nemesis of Rationalism has begun to shake their nerve.

'Materialism would not be complete if it did not feel a need now and again to escape from its psychological tension by letting itself fall into mythopoeic moods, by indulging in some kind of religious ritual, and by finding relief from an internal pressure in allowing itself to savour the charm of something irrational, something alien, something bizarre and, in the last resort, something sheerly silly.'⁶

This gravitational pull will become doubly strong when the truant from the fold of an established religion has experienced—like Gibbon at Lausanne after the outbreak of the French Revolution—the shock of suddenly finding himself on the brink of a catastrophe that he had never foreboded. In this unhappy plight the impulse to take cover by retreating into the abyss of the Subconscious Psyche's beatifically infantile *Nirvāna* out of the storm-swept eyrie of an adult consciousness is as natural as the instinct of an unweaned baby kangaroo to wriggle back into its mother's pouch at its first alarming encounter with the challenging presence of a dangerous world outside. Yet, however natural the promptings of spiritual cowardice may be, they are seldom either admirable or expedient; and a post-Christian Western Society's temptation to seek refuge from the consequences of its own technological handiwork by begging for readmittance into the fold of a conventional Christian orthodoxy was neither morally nor intellectually defensible. The impulse to indulge in 'a second bout' of traditional religion is, indeed, merely a manifestation,

¹ See V. v. 534 and 545-9.

² See V. v. 535 and 549.

³ In Spengler's terminology, *Zivilisation* signifies a civilization in its disintegration-phase, and *Kultur* a civilization in its growth-phase.—A.J.T.

⁴ See V. v. 527-68 in the present Study.—A.J.T.

⁵ Spengler, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 382-3.

⁶ Ibid., p. 381.

on the religious plane,¹ of an Archaism which, on all planes, we have found, in an earlier context, to be a bolt-hole that is always a trap because it invariably proves to be a blind alley.

Archaistic religious movements are intellectually indefensible because the antecedent Rationalism that has driven a traditional religious faith off the field does not in reality just come and go like the fog with which Spengler misleadingly equates Rationalism in his simile. It would be nearer to the truth to identify the fog with the alien matter which a higher religion, after its descent from Heaven, picks up and carries along with it on its terrestrial journey.² The onset of Rationalism will then assume the appearance of a process, not of obfuscation, but of enlightenment (*Aufklärung*); and it is a harder task for Psyche to undo the effects of enlightenment by reassembling the mental fog that the advent of Rationalism has once dispersed than it has been for her, in that antecedent chapter of her mental history, to disperse the fog by directing upon it the rays of enlightenment. This unaccommodating truth has been proclaimed, with an authority derived from personal experience, by a Muslim theologian-mystic who had the courage to face the loss of his religion for the sake of winning an opportunity of recovering it through an act of transfiguration.

"There is no hope in returning to a traditional faith after it has once been abandoned, since the essential condition in the holder of a traditional faith is that he should not know that he is a traditionalist. Whenever he knows that, the glass of his traditional faith is broken. That is a breaking that cannot be mended, and a separating that cannot be united by any sewing or putting together, except it be melted in the fire and given another new form."³

Souls that have once had the experience of intellectual enlightenment can never thereafter find spiritual salvation by committing intellectual suicide; and, though the quest of recapturing their lost faith is in itself both intellectually and morally legitimate, agnostics who embark on this quest will not find themselves able to worship God again in spirit and in truth⁴ if they seek to open for themselves a homeward spiritual path by deliberately closing their mind's critical eye and by making a virtue of refusing henceforth to follow an argument fearlessly wherever it may lead them. In a would-be return to Religion, the path of intellectual dishonesty can lead only to worshipping we know not what;⁵ for Reason, like Faith, is a goddess with whom Man cannot take the liberty of playing fast and loose—as though these mighty *numina* were cringing curs whom a capricious human master could break in to complying slavishly with his wayward mood. Faith and Reason cannot be alternately dismissed with a kick and then called back to heel with a whistle to suit Man's volatile fancy or changing convenience.

¹ See V. vi. 83-94.

² See VII. vii. 455-6.

³ Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid al-: *Al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl* ["The Preservative from Error"] (Cairo A.H. 1303), translated by D. B. Macdonald in *The Religious Life and Attitude in Islam* (Chicago 1909, University of Chicago Press), p. 180. In C. Barbier de Meynard's French translation of the complete text of al-Ghazzālī's *Munqidh in Journal Asiatique*, seventh series, vol. ix (Paris 1877, Imprimerie Nationale), this passage will be found on pp. 19-20.

⁴ John iv. 23-24.

⁵ John iv. 22.

If a once conventionally orthodox Muslim religious genius had been able to divine that it was intellectually impracticable to re-embrace a lost traditional religious faith *telle quelle*, it ought to be manifest to an ex-Christian soul that the temptation to take spiritual cover is morally reprehensible; for the attempt to put Christianity into action must mean trying to follow Christ's example; and the impulse of an ex-Christian on the run to find a hiding-place in Christ's riven side ran directly counter to the spirit and significance of Christ's incarnation. The essential and distinctive Christian belief about the nature and action of God was that a Person of the Trinity 'who, being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God',¹ had been moved, by the Love that He was,² to divest Himself of His divine impassibility in order to come down from Heaven and be made man and suffer death for the sake of us men and our salvation.

'[He] emptied Himself (*ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*), taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men; and, being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.'³

The example set by Christ for Christians was an example, not of shrinking from the suffering inherent in Human Nature, but of accepting it for the sake of saving human beings whom their Creator loved with a love that led Him to die for them as His brethren.

If a belief and an ideal that were the heart of Christianity did not give pause to an unnerved ex-Christian rationalist in panic flight back to the shelter of a traditional Christian orthodoxy, the fugitive might perhaps find an alternative example to fortify his *moral* in the history of another higher religion which latterly had been brought within the ken of Western minds as a result of the technological unification of the *Oikoumenê*.

The Mahāyāna, which shared with Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism the historic role of being one of the four surviving oecumenical higher religions, had sprung from a Buddhist philosophy which had concentrated on ethics to the exclusion of metaphysics and had valued ethics for their practical utility in offering to sentient beings a way of escape from suffering. In divining that the experience of pain was an inseparable concomitant of consciousness and will, the Buddha had shown a penetrating psychological insight. The moral weakness of the philosophy founded on the Buddha's teaching was that, in its compassionate concern to liberate Life from suffering, it was willing to condemn Life to lose its savour by counselling it to relapse into a beatific subconsciousness; and Buddhism fell into this spiritual error because it allowed itself to ignore the truth that, in extinguishing pain at this price, Man was also renouncing his highest capacities for good. In an Hellenic spiritual environment, Gautama's contemporary Aeschylus had divined that, for Human Nature, suffering was the necessary price of learning;⁴ and Christianity was to add the revelation that suffering was also the necessary means of grace. The Indic philosophy had started on its course by precluding itself from

¹ Phil. ii. 6, Revised Version.

² Phil. ii. 7-8, Revised Version.

³ 1 John iv. 8 and 16.

⁴ *πάθει μάθος*.—Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, l. 177, quoted in this Study *passim*.

taking cognizance of suffering's spiritual and intellectual value; and, considering the unpropitiousness of this start, it is remarkable and significant that, in the next chapter of the history of Buddhism's spiritual development, one sect of Buddhists should have discovered for themselves, by experience, that the evasion of suffering at any price was not a spiritual objective whose pursuit was a spiritually satisfying way of life.

The spiritual fruit of this Christian lesson of Buddhist experience was, as we have noticed in other contexts,¹ the transfiguration of a philosophy of escape into a religion of salvation through the rejection of the Hinayanian arhat's self-centred ideal of getting rid of his suffering self by anaesthetizing his own consciousness and the adoption, instead, of the Mahayanian bodhisattva's self-sacrificing ideal of helping his fellow living beings to make the arduous passage to the arhat's goal at the cost of postponing his own entry into his rest.² The bodhisattva's concern to rid himself of himself counts with him for so much less than his compassion for his kind that Love moves him to tarry, for an aeon if need be, in an excruciating state of consciousness after he has won his own right of entry into *Nirvāṇa* by the perfect performance of an arhat's spiritual exercises. The bodhisattva has it in his power to release himself from suffering by crossing the threshold of *Nirvāṇa* at any moment that he might choose, and the one desire that still fetters him to the pains of sentient life is the self-transcendent desire to put his own dearly bought experience at his fellows' disposal by serving them as their psychopomp.³ The transit from the Hinayāna to the Mahāyāna is thus nothing less than a spiritual revolution, and a Christian disciple of Buddhism would not quarrel with the Mahayanian sect of Buddhists for calling the ideal of the bodhisattva 'the Great Way', and the ideal of the arhat 'the Little Way', of interpreting the Buddha's teaching; for the bodhisattva's ideal was an imitation of Christ that was not the less authentic for being undesigned.⁴

The ideal of the bodhisattva was assuredly an example that the Western World could not afford to disregard in a generation in which it was in retreat towards the inviting shelter of a traditional form of Christianity; for the characteristic virtue of a bodhisattva was his fortitude in withstanding a perpetual temptation to desert his self-assigned post in a world of painful action in order to take the short cut to oblivion that lay perpetually open to him. In the latter half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era such fortitude as this was the first spiritual necessity for Western souls on the religious plane as well as on the political. In his politics, as we have seen,⁵ Western Man's task in this chapter of Western history was to school himself to 'living dangerously', without yielding to the temptation of trying to resolve the tension either by capitulating or by committing aggression, in an *Oikoumenē* that had been overtaken by the invention of the atomic bomb before it had achieved political unity. In

¹ In V. v. 133-6 and 552; V. vi. 148 and 164, n. 3; and VII. vii. 733.

² Ps. xcvi. 11.

³ See IX. viii. 628.

⁴ See VII. vii. 733. The rise of the Mahāyāna is accounted for by a yearning, in Buddhist souls, for the Christian graces of love and self-sacrifice for which a Primitive Buddhist philosophy found no place.

⁵ On pp. 525-9, above.

his religious life in the same age, a comparable endurance in the exercise of self-command was the spiritual feat that was required of him.

Western souls, apprised by experience of the limits and the nemesis of Rationalism, must school themselves, in their consequent quest for reconciliation with God, to the prospect of finding themselves commanded by Conscience to check their panic impulse to try to force a premature entry into the Promised Land. They must repress their eagerness to take sanctuary again on soil hallowed by the tombs of the Patriarchs. They must even face the prospect that Conscience's injunction might sentence them to end their days in the Wilderness, like the generation of Israelites who after their exodus from Egypt had had to wander in the Wilderness for forty years until not a man of them was left alive save Caleb the son of Jephunneh and Joshua the son of Nun;¹ and they must steel themselves by recalling that in that generation the sternest test of fortitude had been reserved for the Israelite in whom God had been best pleased; for Moses' last experience in This Life had been a tantalizing Pishgah sight² of a Promised Land which his own feet were never to tread. 'I have caused thee to see it with thine eyes, but thou shalt not go over thither'³ had been the last words of the Lord that had fallen on a dying Moses' ears.⁴

The temptation to run for shelter and the duty of riding the storm have been eloquently described by a nineteenth-century Western man of letters who divined, with the intuition of a poet, a truth that his generation came and went too early to have learnt from experience.

'All deep earnest thinking is but the intrepid effort of the Soul to keep the open independence of her sea, while the wildest winds of Heaven and Earth conspire to cast her on the treacherous, slavish shore. But, as in landlessness alone resides the highest truth, shoreless, indefinite as God—so, better is it to perish in that howling infinite than be ingloriously dashed upon the lee, even if that were safety.'⁵

The writer of this Study, who happened to have been born into a generation in whose time this ordeal had come to be a common Western experience, once had a personal intimation of the truth uttered by Herman Melville. In the summer of A.D. 1936, in a time of physical sickness and spiritual travail, he dreamed, during a spell of sleep in a wakeful night, that he was clasping the foot of the crucifix hanging over the high altar

¹ Num. xiv. 26-35 and xxvi. 64-65.

² Deut. xxxiv. 1.

³ Deut. xxxiv. 4.

⁴ A few weeks after he had written this passage, the writer came across a characteristically sincere and noble exposition of the same idea by a Western scholar-banker of an older generation, Walter Leaf (*vivebat* A.D. 1852-1927), with whom the writer had the good fortune to become personally acquainted after the publication of Leaf's *Troy, A Study in Homeric Geography* (London 1912, Macmillan), when Leaf was preparing for the press his *Homer and History* (London 1915, Macmillan).

⁵ 'I am sure that we are working together to win a new form in which all the hearts of men will again be able to join in common worship, as they have hardly been able to do for many years. But the time does not seem near yet; and meanwhile a great deal of painful lonely groping has to be done by each one for himself. New faiths, like children, must be brought forth in sorrow, and many souls will have to pass through struggles greater than they can bear. . . . I feel that the minds of all men are slowly working their way from Trouble to Truth' (Walter Leaf, letters written on the 1st and the 4th April, 1894, to Charlotte M. Symonds, before their marriage on the 22nd May, 1894, in *Walter Leaf* (London 1932, John Murray), by Charlotte M. Leaf, pp. 180 and 182).

⁵ Melville, Herman: *Moby Dick*, chap. xxiii.

of the Abbey of Ampleforth and was hearing a voice saying to him *Amplexus expecta* ('Cling and wait').

An impetuous spiritual traveller on the road back to Religion from Agnosticism might be inclined to interpret this dream as an irresolute soul's subconscious apologia; and the postponement of a decision that was ripe for being taken would indeed convict the procrastinator of a culpable weakness of will; but the judgement on Fabius must be founded on a right reading of his situation and his motive; and in the spiritual circumstances of a twentieth-century Western Society an ex-agnostic who took *expectans expectavi*¹ for his watchword, without allowing himself to cry 'Make haste, O Lord, to help me',² would be clear of the imputation of irresoluteness if his motive for resisting the temptation to pray for a shortening of the term of his trial was a resolve to face and act upon the truth that in a latter-day Western spiritual Odyssey the dire passage of Time was a necessary means of grace in virtue of its being an inevitable source of suffering.

This spiritual necessity for a painful period of probation could have been short-circuited with impunity only if it had been possible for a twentieth-century Western *ci-devant* Christian agnostic to take a traditional form of Christianity as he found it; but this would have meant taking it back as he had left it; and that would have been no solution for either the agnostic's or the Church's contemporary problem; for the progressive decay of a belief in, and an allegiance to, an ancestral religion, which had been the note of a Western Society's spiritual history since the latter decades of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, had not been due solely to Modern Western Man's perversity nor even solely to his bewitchment by his intellect's entrancing scientific discoveries and by this fascinating science's lucrative technological fruits. The responsibility for Modern Western Man's apostasy was shared with the apostate by a Western Christian Church that had eventually alienated its long-suffering votaries by its grievous sins of both heart and head.³

The moral scandal through which the Western Church had forfeited Western Man's esteem had been a schism that it had allowed to rankle into the savage Western Wars of Religion (*saeviebant* A.D. 1562-1660); and the morally shattering effect of this resort to military force in pursuance of an ecclesiastical feud has been noticed in this Study in earlier contexts.⁴ The intellectual scandal which had consummated a Western Church Militant's self-stultification in Western eyes had been its reaction to a Modern Western movement of intellectual enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) for which the Wars of Religion had opened the door and the subsequent Scientific Revolution had paved the way. The Western Christian churches' response to an intellectual challenge which their moral iniquity had brought upon them had been to discredit themselves intellectually as well. They had taken the stand that their traditional creed, including the whole cumulus of accretions acquired from pre-Christian pagan religions and from Hellenic science and philosophy, was

¹ Ps. xxxix. i, in the Vulgate Latin text; Ps. xl. i, in the English A.V.

² Ps. xl. 16.

³ See IV. iv. 583-4.

⁴ See IV. iv. 142-3, 150, 184, 227-8, and 643-5; V. v. 669-71; and V. vi. 317.

an organic unity in which all articles of belief were equally sacrosanct; and they had fought as stubbornly to retain an exploded Ptolemaic astronomy, Aristotelian theology, and Isiac or Cybelene mythology as if this pre-Christian flotsam¹ had been as close to the heart of Christianity as the truth that God is Love and as God's witness to this truth in Christ's incarnation and crucifixion. These were the issues on which the Western Christian churches' once obedient flock had parted company with their ecclesiastical shepherds.

'The diseased have ye not strengthened, neither have ye healed that which was sick, neither have ye bound up that which was broken, neither have ye brought again that which was driven away, neither have ye sought that which was lost; but with force and with cruelty have ye ruled them.'²

And, though, by the middle of the twentieth century, a quarter of a millennium had passed since the flock had begun to scatter, the issues that had driven sheep and shepherds apart were still standing like a wall between them.

It was true that in the meantime the churches had ceased to assert their creeds and claims by force of arms; yet they had persisted in making War an instrument of ecclesiastical policy so long as they had been able to persuade any secular governments to put their armed forces at the churchmen's service. The churches had also been jettisoning one after another of their non-Christian intellectual paraphernalia; yet they had clung to them till they had become untenable and had abandoned them with the reluctance of a mother throwing her child to the wolves or of a senile mundane empire recognizing the independence of disaffected and insurgent provinces which it has shown itself impotent either to reconcile or to re-subdue. The estranging issues thus still remained open 250 years or more after the date at which they had come to a head; and, whatever God's eventual judgement on unfaithful shepherds and truant sheep might be, it was manifest, even to human eyes, in the writer's generation (*vivebat* A.D. 1889—), that a change of heart was required on both sides. The streams must be cleansed of the mud that had fouled the waters, and the land must be cleared of the jungle that had overgrown the pastures, before the flocks could return without being confronted immediately with a choice between scattering again and staying to die of hunger and thirst.

At this point a champion of a traditional orthodoxy might be moved to ask by what authority this process of purification was to be carried out. Supposing that churchmen were to concede that a purification was necessary, must they not also insist that this task was the Church's prerogative? Would semi-penitent agnostics have the effrontery to claim that they would be better hands at winnowing the chaff out of the wheat than the official heirs of an unbroken apostolic succession? Would the prodigal have the hardihood to stipulate that his re-entry into his father's house must be conditional on its being guaranteed to him in advance that the Church would submit its time-honoured traditions to his philistine judgement? These questions would be legitimate and pertinent enough to require an answer; and the present writer's personal answer

¹ See VII. vii. 455-6.

² Ezek. xxxiv. 4.

to them would be that the task of winnowing the chaff out of the traditional form of Christianity—or any other living higher religion—was a task to which both the two human parties to the case would find their own unaided judgement and insight unequal. An agnostic who could show a valid scientific warrant for challenging the Church's apostolic authority would be plunging out of his own depth if he then went on to claim for himself an alternative scientific authority to replace a traditional ecclesiastical chart by a revolutionary lay blue-print; for a petrified higher religion could not be requickened by methods that might serve for reconditioning an obsolete industrial plant. A futuristic reconstruction of Christianity by reconverted agnostics and an archaistic restoration of it by trustees of a traditional orthodoxy would both be impracticable for the same reason; and the reason was that no human hands could anticipate the operation of the Holy Spirit.¹

If it were then to be asked how the dayspring from on high had ever come to visit human souls through God's tender mercy,² the answer would be that 'whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth', and that, 'if ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as sons.'³ If Christianity was to be requickened in agnostic Western souls through a winnowing of the chaff out of the wheat,⁴ this palingenesis could be achieved only through suffering; and suffering is an experience that takes Time—and takes it at a length which is proportionate to the measure of the chastening that is required for the sufferer's salvation. If this is the truth, then what was required, above all things, of homeward-faring agnostic Western souls in the twentieth century of the Christian Era was the creative endurance exemplified in the age-long ministries of the bodhisattvas. Resisting the temptation to hide themselves in the rock, and facing the blast of the rushing mighty wind⁵ that bloweth where it listeth,⁶ these pilgrims through the Valley of the Shadow of Death⁷ must let suffering do its unhurrying work within them till, in the fullness of times and seasons which it was not for them to know,⁸ they should receive power⁹ through the anguish of being born of the spirit.¹⁰

(d) THE 'LAW' OF PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPENSATION

A reader who has had the patience to follow the foregoing argument from its opening in a prospect of technological unemployment to its close in a vigil in expectation of a Day of Pentecost may be inclined to ask the sceptic's question 'How can these things be?'¹¹

In a world whose economic and political life had been caught in the grip of regimentation, how could there be any hope of a spiritual revival on the religious plane? Does not this speculation conflict with previous findings in this Study? Have not the chapters dealing with encounters between contemporaries led to the conclusion that every culture is an organic whole in which all the parts prove, on trial, to be interdependent, however independent of one another some of them may seem to be at

¹ Acts ii. 1-4.

⁴ Matt. iii. 12.

⁸ Acts i. 7.

² Luke i. 78.

⁵ Acts ii. 2.

⁹ Acts i. 8.

⁶ John iii. 8.

¹⁰ John iii. 8.

³ Heb. xii. 6-7.

⁷ Ps. xxxiii. 4.

¹¹ John iii. 9.

first sight?¹ And have we not noticed² that, among the processes or tendencies that are thus apt to spread from one part of a body social to another, mechanization is apt to be particularly infectious? In previous chapters of the present Part of this Study³ we have been watching the spread of regimentation from the economic to the political plane of life in an Industrialized Western Society. What ground could there be there for expecting to see the process of infection come to a halt at this point, if a body social is the highly conductive medium that we have found it to be? We have quoted Bergson's authority for the possibility that '*la mécanique, en se développant, pourra se retourner contre la mystique*';⁴ and this was surely what was to be expected if we have been on the right track in our findings that the fabric of Society is highly conductive. Has this finding now to be disavowed? Or, if it holds good, does it not open up a different prospect for the Western Society than the vista that we have been sketching? Does it not suggest that, in a chapter of Western history that was on the horizon in A.D. 1952, the religious plane of life, so far from being likely to be a scene of spiritual travail coming to flower in spiritual creation, was likely to succumb to the arid social climate of regimentation which had come to prevail on the economic and political planes already? If it is in truth the nature of any culture to be all of a piece, could the religious life of the Western World have any chance of escaping the blight of a creeping paralysis which had fastened upon its economic life in the restrictive practices of Trade Unionism and on its political life in the *éthos* of a conscientious but unenthusiastic civil service?

The answer to this hypothetical objection would be that it had sprung from a misconception arising from the ambiguity of the phrase 'all of a piece'; for a fabric might be said to be all of a piece so long as it was a seamless web, even if the threads interwoven in it were of diverse stuffs, diverse twists, and diverse colours, while alternatively the same phrase might be used to describe a web whose texture was homogeneous in the sense that the interwoven threads were uniform with one another. If the latter and ampler of these two senses had been the one in which we had found the structure of a body social to be 'all of a piece', this finding would indeed have been incompatible with a vista of the Western Civilization's prospects in which a regimentation of its life on the economic and political planes might still leave room on the religious plane for freedom and creativity; but this is not in fact the true account of our finding. The truth is that the interdependence which we have observed in the relation between the several parts of a body social is the interdependence of interwoven elements that differ from one another in kind; and our forecast of the Western Civilization's prospects, so far from being in contradiction with this observation, has been partly founded upon it. Our observation that all the elements of a culture are apt to be interdependent was the ground for our prediction that some revolutionary change in the Western Society's religious life was likely to occur as a result of the revolu-

¹ For this thesis, see IX. viii. 530-64.

² In IV. iv. 125-7.

³ On pp. 561-604, above.

⁴ Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), p. 252, quoted in this Study in IV. iv. 126.

tionary changes produced in the Western Society's economic and political life by the psychological effects of the mechanization of its technology; but changes that are inter-related and concomitant do not, on that account, all have to take a single uniform course.

Indeed, so far from the regimentation of Western life on the economic and political planes being likely to induce a regimentation of Western life on the religious plane as well, it seemed likely to militate against this; for one of the devices by which Life achieves the *tour de force* of keeping itself alive is by compensating for a deficit or a surplus in one department by accumulating a surplus or incurring a deficit in another. Considering the importance of this 'law's' role in Life's perpetual struggle for survival, we should expect *a priori* that, in a social milieu in which, as in the twentieth-century Western case in point, there is a deficit of freedom or surplus of regimentation in Economics and Politics, the combined effect of the working of 'the law of interdependence' and 'the law of compensation' would be to produce a surplus of freedom or deficit of regimentation in Religion. This had, for example, been the history of the Hellenic Civilization in its universal state. After the wars and social conflicts of an Hellenic Time of Troubles had been effectively suppressed by the imposition of an Augustan Peace, the psychic energy that had thus been deprived of its former vent in Politics and Economics had found a new vent in Religion. The dullness of a world in which War had been banished to anti-barbarian frontiers beyond the horizon,¹ and in which the sterilization of Politics had taken the heart out of public speaking,² had been effectively relieved on the religious plane by a compensatory outbreak of Christian martyrdom. This psychological compensation had been effective because there could be no surer way of making Life worth living again than to rediscover a cause for which it was worth sacrificing it. It will be seen that this chapter of Hellenic history was a precedent that was significant for Western prospects.

One lesson of this Hellenic episode was that in Life there is always an irreducible minimum of psychic energy that will insist on discharging itself through some channel or other; but it is equally true, as we have observed in an earlier context,³ that there is also a maximum limit to the quantity of psychic energy which Life has at its disposal; and from this it follows that, if a reinforcement of energy is required for putting a greater drive into one activity, the requisite additional supply will have to be obtained by making economies of energy in other quarters. Life's device for economizing energy is mechanization. For example, by making the beating of the heart and the alternating inflation and deflation of the lungs automatic in the human body, Life had released human thought and will for other uses than the continual maintenance of physical vitality from moment to moment. If a conscious act of thought and act of will had never ceased to be required for the initiation of each successive breath and successive heart-beat, no human being would ever have had any margin of intellectual or volitional energy to spare for doing anything else than just keeping alive; or, to state the point more accurately, no sub-human being would ever have succeeded in becoming human. On

¹ See VI. vii. 122-3.

² See V. vi. 80-81.

³ In IV. iv. 125.

the analogy of this creative effect of the economy of energy in the life of Man's body physical, we might surmise that, in the life of his body social, Religion would be likely to be starved so long as thought and will were pre-occupied with Economics (as they had been in the West since the Industrial Revolution) and with Politics (as they had been in the West since the Western renaissance of a deified Hellenic state);¹ and we might infer from this that the regimentation that was now being imposed on the Western Society's economic and political life would be likely to liberate Western souls for fulfilling the true end of Man by glorifying God and enjoying Him once again.

This happier spiritual prospect was at least a possibility in which a dispirited generation of Western men and women might catch a beckoning gleam of kindly light; and, with this possibility in view, an historian recalling the history of the emergence of the Western Civilization out of a post-Hellenic interregnum would recollect that, in that episode, a psychic energy that had been transferred from Economics to Religion during an antecedent Hellenic Civilization's disintegration had eventually produced, as an incidental economic by-product of a life in which Religion had come to be the lode-star, economic effects which had been beyond the compass of a Roman oecumenical government commanding the total resources of a great society and the skill, experience, and good will of an admirable professional civil service. A decline and fall of agriculture in Italy, which the imperial Roman régime had proved as impotent to arrest as had their republican predecessors the Gracchi, was not only arrested but was reversed by monks of the Benedictine Order following the rule of a founder who had prescribed for his spiritual sons a daily stint of manual labour as an alternative way of serving God that would provide a psychologically wholesome foil to the singing of the Liturgy.²

This first chapter of Western history might perhaps repeat itself in a chapter that, in A.D. 1952, still lay unwritten in the womb of the Future. The transfer of psychic energy to Religion from Economics might once again save *Homo Economicus* from himself by saving him from the necessity of artificially reducing his economic productivity as the only means at his command for defending himself against the noxious effects of an excessive economic appetite. In previous chapters³ we have noticed that the demonic physical 'drive' which Modern Western Man had put into his economic activities through the mechanization of his technology had manufactured a psychological brake for itself by generating the trade-union spirit in the industrial working class and the civil-service spirit in the middle class. These defensive psychic mechanisms had proved effective for the negative purpose for which they had been mounted; but they had protected *Homo Faber Mechanicus* against the tyranny of his clockwork at the cost of taking the heart out of his handiwork, and they had taken the heart out of his handiwork at the cost of depotentiating economic activities on which the mechanization of Technology had placed too grievously heavy a psychic load. It might be that, in the long

¹ See X. ix. 7-15.

² See III. iii. 266, with the passages quoted there, in footnotes 2 and 3, from Saint Benedict's Rule.

³ On pp. 563-74 and 604-6, above.

run the transfer of energy from Economics to Religion would justify itself from the chartered accountant's, as well as from the spiritual pastor's, point of view.

If the transfer of energy from Religion to Economics at the opening of the Modern Age of Western history had shot a bolt that had subsequently come home to roost like a boomerang in the economic field, it was conceivable that a re-transfer of energy from Economics to Religion at the opening of a post-Modern Age might ultimately come to a self-stultified Western *Homo Economicus*'s rescue. Under the aegis of Religion, Western Man might find himself able to handle with spiritual impunity the material power thrust into his hands by the mechanization of Western technology. A neo-pagan Frankenstein who had been enslaved by the monster that he had made might live to become this monstrous mechanism's once more Christian master; for, if the Western Society's progressive economic self-defeat since the Industrial Revolution had proved the truth of the saying in the Gospels that 'from him that hath not, even that he hath shall be taken away from him',¹ this saying was inseparable from its context 'that unto every one which hath shall be given', and this complementary *logion* was illustrated in the legend of Solomon's choice in his dream by night at Gibeon.² When the dreamer had responded to God's challenging invitation 'Ask what I shall give thee' by asking God to give his servant an understanding heart to judge God's people, he had been rewarded for his unselfseeking choice of a spiritual gift by being given, over and above this, the mundane riches and honour for which he had not asked. This Syriac legend might be taken by Western souls as a parable of the choice before them in the twentieth century of the Christian Era.

¹ Luke xix. 26. Cp. Luke viii. 18; Matt. xiii. 12; Mark iv. 25.

² 1 Kings iii. 4-15.

F. THE STRAITS AHEAD

IF the foregoing appreciation of the prospects of the Western Civilization in A.D. 1952 has not fallen altogether wide of the mark, the general conclusion that is to be drawn from it is not obscure. At this date the feat that had to be performed by Western navigators on the face of the waters of History was to pilot their vessel, without disaster, through perilous straits in the hope of making their way into more open waters beyond; and in this post-Christian Odyssey there was more than one passage to be negotiated and more than one kind of ordeal to be faced.

In terms of our Mediterranean maritime simile, we may compare the social and spiritual enterprise to which these Western adventurers were committed in the twentieth century of the Christian Era with the navigational task confronting Hellenic mariners in the sixth century B.C. who had bidden farewell to their Ionian homeland and had set sail westward rather than submit to the alien dominion of un-Hellenic-minded Achae-menidae. Following in Odysseus' wake, these Phocaeen seafarers would have first to negotiate the straits between Sicily and Italy without approaching either an Italian shore where they would be pounced upon by the monster Scylla or a Sicilian shore where they would be engulfed by the whirlpool Charybdis; but, if, by managing to steer their course along the narrow fairway through this first danger-zone, they should succeed in making the friendly port of Marseilles, they would not there find themselves at rest in the haven where they would be;¹ for their bold and skilful negotiation of the Straits of Messina would merely have carried them from the inner basin into the outer basin of the Mediterranean, without having liberated them from the imprisoning shores of their landlocked native sea.

If they were to reach the boundless waters of a globe-encompassing Ocean, these voyagers must put to sea again from the sheltering harbour of their mother country's daughter city in order to make for the Straits of Gibraltar between the Pillars of Hercules, where this pair of menacing mountains, towering above the African and the European shore and threatening, from either flank, to fall upon any ship audacious enough to run the gauntlet without their leave, were visible embodiments of Imperial Carthage's decree that no Hellenic vessel was ever to sail on through this golden gate leading out from the landlocked waters into the main. And here woe betide the Hellenic mariner who allowed himself to be intimidated by his adversary's veto into following the Theban Pindar's poor-spirited advice to his Agrigentine patron Thêrôn.

'And now Thêrôn's achievements have carried him to the limit: they have brought him to the Pillars of Hercules on his long voyage from home; and what lies beyond this terminus is out of bounds (*ἄβατον*) for all men, wise or witless. I will not pursue this venture. I should deserve to lose my senses if I did this senseless thing!'²

¹ Ps. cvii. 30.

² Pindar: *Odes in Honour of Victors in the Olympic Games*, Ode iii, ll. 43-45.

Ne plus ultra! These were the very words that a forbidding Carthaginian statesmanship had been intending to extort from defeatist Hellenic lips; and, so long as this self-imposed Hellenic psychological inhibition held, no Hellenic explorer would ever sail on to test the truth of a later poet's intuition that the untried passage of the Ocean would prove to be the avenue to a New World.¹ More than two thousand years were to pass before Columbus's victorious defiance of the veto once imposed by a jealous Carthage was to be commemorated, in the device of 'the dollar sign', by the first sovereign on whose globe-encircling dominions the Sun could never set.² On coins minted for Charles V out of American bullion, the antistrophic words *Plus ultra!* were triumphantly inscribed on a scroll displayed behind the minatory pair of pillars;³ and the moral was one which a twentieth-century Odysseus ought to take to heart if this series of episodes in the history of the art of navigation was an apt parable of the spiritual voyage on which his sails were set.

In the interpretation of this parable in terms of the Western Civilization's prospects, the finding of a passage between Scylla and Charybdis signified the negotiation of the Western World's immediate problem of finding some way of avoiding self-destruction without falling into self-stultification. Mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era the Western Society was in imminent danger of destroying itself by failing to stop making War now that a demonic drive had been put into War by the progress of a Western physical science; and it was in hardly less imminent danger of stultifying itself by seeking asylum from War and Class-Conflict in Circe's pig-sty. If post-Christian Western souls did succeed in threading their way between these two immediate perils, they would owe their happy issue out of this affliction to an inspiration to take Religion as the mark on which they were once more to set their course; but an impulse to return to Religion would not in itself suffice to bring the Western pilgrims' ships out of inland waters into open sea; for the call of Religion was being uttered in diverse tongues;⁴ and the questions to which the agnostic Western pioneer in search of a Christian oracle would have, at his own peril, to find an answer for himself, were:

'Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Are all teachers? . . . Have all the gifts of healing? . . . Do all interpret?'⁵

In this spiritual ordeal the forbidding Pillars of Hercules were a pair of rival authoritarian and dogmatic faiths, both of which alike were offer-

¹ Seneca: *Medea*, ll. 364-79, quoted in II. i. 263, n. 1.

² See IX. viii. 428, n. 9.

³ See Raymond, Wayte: *The Silver Dollars of North and South America* (New York 1939, Wayte Raymond, Inc.) for photographs of dollars coined for the Spanish Crown, over a series of reigns ranging from Charles V's (*regnabat* A.D. 1516-56) to the break-up of the Spanish Empire of the Indies in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, which display the pair of pillars with the motto *Plus ultra*. On 46 of the 67 specimens (not counting 'necessity coins') of 'pillar type' coins here reproduced, including the earliest in the series, Charles V's coin from Santo Domingo (p. 18, No. 1), the two words are inscribed on a single scroll linking the pillars (and passing behind an heraldic shield inserted between the pillars on coins of this type minted for the Bourbons). On fifteen specimens, each of the two pillars is wreathed in a separate scroll of its own, with 'Plus' inscribed on the left-hand scroll and 'Ultra' on the right-hand scroll. On six specimens, including Philip II's dollar minted in Peru (reproduced in Supplement, p. 3, No. A 1), the motto is inscribed behind or above the pillars without being mounted on a scroll.

⁴ 1 Cor. xii. 28.

⁵ 1 Cor. xii. 29-30.

ing to the storm-tossed voyager an everlasting *Nirvāna* in their stony bosoms and were threatening him with the eternal punishment that had been inflicted on the Flying Dutchman if he were to be so impious and so fool-hardy as to reject their offer and sail on past them out into the blue. From the one shore this ultimatum was being delivered to Western souls by a Christian heresy in which the stone of Communism had been substituted for the bread¹ of the Gospel, and from the other shore by a Christian Orthodoxy in which the body of Christ,² who had 'come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly',³ had been petrified into a pillar of salt⁴ by a backward-looking ecclesiastical tradition. To dare the passage between these two frowning Pillars of Hercules was a venture that might daunt even a mariner whose *moral* had been fortified by a previous success in making his way safely between Scylla and Charybdis. But, if, at this supremely critical point in his voyage, the pilgrim were to feel his heart failing, he might recover his courage and initiative by taking his oracle from Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians:

'Covet earnestly the best gifts; and yet show I unto you a more excellent way.'⁵

If a contrite humility was the first of the Christian virtues that were necessary for the Western pilgrim's salvation, an indomitable endurance was the second. What was required of him at this hour was to hold on his course and to trust in God's grace; and, if he prayed God to grant him a pilot for the perilous passage, he would find the bodhisattva psychopompus whom he was seeking in a Francesco Bernardone of Assisi, who was the most god-like soul that had been born into the Western World so far. A disciple of Saint Francis who followed faithfully enough in the saint's footsteps to participate in the saint's gift of receiving Christ's stigmata would know, with the knowledge that comes only through suffering, that his sacrifice had been accepted by the Lord.⁶ *Asperges me hyssopo et mundabor.*⁷

¹ Matt. vii. 9; Luke xi. 11.

³ John x. 10.

⁶ Gen. iv. 3-7.

⁷ Ps. l. 9, in the Vulgate Latin text; Ps. li. 7, in the English Authorized Version.

² 1 Cor. xii. 27; Eph. iv. 12.

⁴ Gen. xix. 26.

⁵ 1 Cor. xii. 31.

THE CONFLICTING THEORIES OF SURVIVAL AND REVIVAL AS ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE MEDIEVAL ITALIAN CITY-STATES

DURING the post-Napoleonic decades of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, when Italians who had been arbitrarily resubjected to an *ancien régime* were demanding their national unity and independence in the name of the French ideas of A.D. 1789, one of the forms in which this demand was expressed was a claim to the restoration of the constitutional liberties that had once been won and enjoyed by the Medieval Italian urban communes; and a feeling that the strength of this claim would be proportionate to the length of their ancestors' historical tenure of these allegedly prescriptive political rights moved a tendentious school of Romantic Italian historians, taking their cue from Savigny, the German historian of the renaissance of Roman Law in the West, to maintain that the communes which had begun to make their mark on the stage of Early Medieval Italian history in the eleventh century of the Christian Era were no new arrivals there and then, but were none other than the original city-states of a pre-Roman and Roman Italy which, on this hypothesis, had mutely survived the Hellenic Civilization's lapse into social anarchy in the third century of the same era, its subsequent last rally under the crushing aegis of a Diocletianic totalitarian régime, and its final dissolution in an interregnum preceding the emergence of a nascent Western Christian Hellenistic Society. According to this romantic thesis the 'ancient' Italian city-states had continued, through all these vicissitudes, to be going concerns. They had temporarily been 'off the record' without ever having lost their identity, and the epiphany of the Medieval communes in the eleventh century was not the 'ancient' city-states' rebirth, but merely their re-emergence.¹

Considering that a progressive decay of constitutional self-government is the dominant note of Hellenic political history throughout the span of more than six hundred years intervening between the generation of Philip of Macedon and the generation of Diocletian of Doclea, the burden of proof surely rests on the shoulders of the advocates of a thesis that the self-governing institutions of the Italian city-states resisted the elsewhere victorious forces of disintegration so successfully that they managed to survive even the final series of devastating catastrophes that gave the Hellenic Civilization its *coup de grâce*.² In this instance the *argumentum ex silentio* is one that decidedly requires an answer. Yet

¹ See Goetz, W.: *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, philologisch-historische Abteilung, Jahrgang 1944, Heft 1 (Munich 1944, Beck), pp. 5 and 105-6.

² This point is rightly emphasized by Goetz, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-9.

this argument remains unrefuted; and the formidable negative case against the thesis that the Medieval Italian communes were derived from the 'ancient' Italian city-states without any breach of historical continuity is confirmed by a positive consideration which would appear to be conclusive.

In the Medieval Italian communes the civic magistrates bore the title 'consuls'; and the advocates of the thesis that a Medieval Italian civic self-government goes back, without a break, to 'ancient' origins will be hard put to it to explain how and why and when the cities of Italy had come to adopt a piece of constitutional nomenclature which, in 'ancient' times, had been foreign to all of them with the sole exception of Rome. After Rome had made herself the queen of Italy and the rest of the Hellenic World through the prowess of Roman armies led by Roman consuls, no state-member of a Roman commonwealth of city-states would ever have ventured to call its municipal magistrates 'consuls' in lieu of the traditional local title, whatever this might happen to be. If the civic institutions of the Medieval Italian communes had really been handed down from days before the Roman conquest, then their supreme magistrates would still have borne the title *meddices tutici* in ex-Oscan-speaking communities and the title *praetores* or *dictator* in ex-Latin-speaking communities. If their institutions had been of Roman origin, then their magistrates would have been called *duumviri* or *quattuorviri*. If they had dated from the last century of the Principate they would have been called *curator*. If they had dated from the post-Diocletianic Age they would have been called *defensor civitatis*. But they could never have been given the Roman title 'consuls' until the official abolition of the Roman Consulate by the Emperor Justinian in A.D. 541¹ had become so immemorially old an accomplished fact that the term had had time to fade out of the field of practical politics into an academic limbo of historical memories. Then, and not till then, this term 'consul' would have come to be at the disposal of any academic-minded constitution-maker who might be attracted by it—and it would, of course, possess the supreme attraction of being associated historically with memories of the greatest age in the history of the most potent of all Hellenic city-states.

This tell-tale internal evidence inherent in the history of the title 'consuls' is confirmed by external evidence testifying that, in the parts of Italy conquered by the Lombards in and after A.D. 568, the last vestiges of civic self-government were effaced by new institutions for governing the cities through officers appointed by, and answerable to, the kings and dukes who ruled over the Lombard successor-states of the Constantinopolitan Roman Empire on Italian ground; and these new Lombard royal and ducal officials in Italian cities bore such new titles as 'counts', 'viscounts (*locopositi*)', *missi*, *gastaldi*, 'Schultheisse', *iudices*, *decani*. During the interval of four hundred years between the completion of the Lombard conquests and the rise of the Medieval Italian city-states, the surviving contemporary documents and other records show no trace of the currency either of the Medieval Italian title

¹ See V. vi. 111 and 224.

'consuls' or of any of the pre-Lombard titles of Italian civic magistracies dating from the Roman or pre-Roman Age.¹

This testimony borne by indisputable facts in the field of constitutional nomenclature tells conclusively in favour of the view that the communes which made their epiphany in Italy in the eleventh century of the Christian Era were walking ghosts of the 'ancient' Italian city-states and were not living survivals of them; for the use of the word 'consuls' to designate their magistrates shows that the eleventh-century Italian constitution-makers were playing at a resuscitation of 'ancient' republican institutions, consecrated in their tradition of the glories of 'Ancient Rome', with the same deliberate and selfconscious pedantry as was to be displayed, in their day, by the authors of the French constitution of the 25th December, 1799.

This vein of antiquarianism, which betrays the lack of any genuine continuity between the Medieval Western Italian city-states and the Late Hellenic city-states that had previously occupied some of the same sites on Italian ground, was not, of course, the creative source of the revival of a defunct Hellenic political institution in the life of a growing Western Civilization. Even in Italy the consciousness of a Roman past was exceedingly nebulous from the eighth to the thirteenth century of the Christian Era,² and these centuries included the period of gestation preceding the re-birth of the City-State in Italy. Down to the thirteenth century this successful Medieval Western revival of the Hellenic City-State was an unconscious, not a conscious, response to the challenge of new needs³ (in contrast to the abortive Medieval Western revival of the Roman Empire, which was selfconscious at every stage). The preponderance of the part played in this particular renaissance by the subconscious depths of the Psyche is indicated by the fact that Italy—where a gleam of selfconsciousness is registered in the coining of the antiquarian title 'consuls'—was only one of a number of localities in a Medieval Western Christendom in which the resuscitation of the Hellenic institution of the City-State occurred more or less simultaneously. This was a Pan-Hesperian movement in which Flanders, Germany, France, the Iberian Peninsula, and England were implicated, as well as Italy. The demands for greater security of person and property which evoked the first rudiments of Western civic self-government were rife in Transalpine Western Europe perhaps at least as early as in Italy.⁴ In presenting such demands, are we to suppose that 'the townsfolk of Northern France, Flanders, and Italy were taking their stand on Ancient Roman ideals? Is it not much more likely that the pressure of an emergency which was the same everywhere was the stimulus that evoked the same demands in all these places?'⁵ And, if it comes to that, are we to imagine that the Lombard *nobiles* of the Italian city of Savona and the likewise Lombard *arimanni* of the Italian city of Mantua, who obtained charters from the Margrave of Savona and

¹ Goetz, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8. Cp. *ibid.*, p. 113.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 107 and 113-14.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 108 and 113-15.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 116, n. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 116. Cp. *ibid.*, pp. 108, 111, and 118.

from the Holy Roman Emperor respectively in the year A.D. 1014, 'really retained any recollection of Roman civic franchises? Is it [their incentive] not much more likely to have been an urgent need for protection against the arbitrary proceedings of the great rural potentates?'¹

¹ Goetz, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

X. B (ii) (a), ANNEX II

POINTS OF LIKENESS AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RENAISSANCES OF THE SINIC AND HELLENIC UNIVERSAL STATES

A HAN EMPIRE that had served as the Sinic Society's universal state and a Roman Empire that had performed a corresponding service for the Hellenic Society were both alike eventually raised from the dead to minister to the needs of new societies that had sprung up among the Sinic and Hellenic worlds' ruins; and, in both cases alike, these feats of necromancy were performed after the derelict domain of the defunct society and its fallen universal state had been irradiated by a higher religion whose spark of creativity was of alien cultural origin, and had also been invaded by barbarian war-bands from a no-man's-land beyond the fallen universal state's *limes*. In both cases, again, the interloping barbarians consisted partly of local sedentary peoples and partly of Eurasian Nomads;¹ and, in both, the interloping higher religion was introduced by subjects of the declining universal state, and members of the disintegrating society's internal proletariat, who had this alien spiritual treasure to impart because they were the offspring of *ci-devant* members of another society—the Indic Society in the one case and the Syriac in the other—who had not renounced their pristine cultural allegiance when they had been incorporated into an alien oecumenical empire by military force. These points of likeness between the two episodes of history which we are here examining synoptically are so remarkable that they challenge us to search for the causes of the no less remarkable points of difference which the resemblances throw into sharp relief.

The most striking of these differences is also the one that was fraught with the most momentous historical consequences. The Han Empire found its avatar in a single polity—established by the Sui and consolidated by the T'ang—which was not only an intentional resuscitation of the defunct Sinic universal state but was also actually a genuine reincarnation of it, at least in a geographical sense, in virtue of the Sui Power's success in establishing its undisputed dominion over the entire area that had once been occupied by the Sinic Society and by a Han Empire under whose aegis the Sinic World had been united politically in the concluding chapter of Sinic history.² On the other hand the Roman Empire was resuscitated in two separate and mutually hostile avatars, either of which claimed to be the sole genuine reincarnation of the defunct Hellenic universal state and consequently found itself constrained to denounce its rival as an impostor.

These two competing ghosts of the Roman Empire were severally evoked in different fragments of former Roman territory at different

¹ The Eurasian Nomad barbarian invasion of a moribund Sinic World has been noticed in V. v. 272-3.

² See V. v. 356, n. 6.

dates. Leo Syrus established his East Roman Empire in Anatolia after foiling the Arabs' second attempt to capture Constantinople (*iterum obsidebatur* A.D. 717-18); the Carolingians established their Holy Roman Empire under the lee of the Roman Empire's former frontier along the Rhine in the course of the sixty-eight years that elapsed between Charles Martel's repulse of the Arabs at Tours in A.D. 732 and Charlemagne's coronation at Rome in A.D. 800. The Roman Empire was thus resuscitated as a split personality; and, even so, the aggregate area of the actual domains of the two rival *soi-disants* Roman Empires that made their successive appearances on the political map in the eighth century of the Christian Era did not cover, between them, anything like the entire area of the Roman Empire *imperante Hadriano* (A.D. 117-38) or even *imperante Diocletiano* (A.D. 284-305). The Arabs' conquest of the Visigothic successor-state of the Roman Empire in the Iberian Peninsula in A.D. 711-13 had completed the liberation of all provinces of the Syriac World that had ever been annexed to the Hellenic World by force of Macedonian and Roman arms; and the military reverses which the Arabs suffered thereafter in A.D. 717 and in A.D. 732 merely prevented them from engulfing a Hellenized Hittite World in Anatolia and the adjoining Greek and Italian homelands of the defunct Hellenic Civilization, without resulting in the re-establishment of even a simulacrum of Roman rule over the former Roman provinces south of the Taurus and of the Pyrenees.

Moreover, the two rival eighth-century avatars of the Roman Empire were insulated from one another overland by the effects of successive eruptions of Eurasian Nomadism out of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe into the Balkan Peninsula; and, though the Avars on the Alföld were extirpated by Charlemagne in A.D. 791, this Austrasian 'Roman Emperor's' success in thus disposing of one intrusive Nomad horde was purchased at the price of enlarging the domain of another. Charlemagne found himself constrained to divide the territorial spoils of the Avars with the Bulgars, and the elimination of the Avars thus left the Bulgars astride the Middle as well as the Lower Danube, while it did not relieve the Balkan Peninsula of the presence of pagan Slav sedentary barbarians whom the Avars had parked there as their 'human cattle' when they were restocking a ranch that had been depopulated by the ravages of the Avars' Nomad forerunners, the Huns, and by the simultaneous drafts drawn on Illyrian military man-power by the Roman Emperor Justinian in pursuance of an anti-barbarian *revanche* that had defeated its own ultimate purposes.

This partition of two salvaged fragments of former Roman imperial territory between two rival ghosts of the defunct Hellenic universal state is a tale of comparative failure which gives the measure of the success achieved by the Sui and the T'ang in reuniting the whole former territory of a defunct Sinic universal state under the undivided rule of a single reincarnation of the Han Empire; and the historical consequences of this difference between the outcomes of these evocations of ghosts of a Sinic and an Hellenic universal state were truly momentous. The Sui and T'ang empire-builders' success in establishing

and maintaining a single oecumenical empire embracing the whole former domain of the extinct universal state of which this new empire was intended to be an avatar was a political achievement which ensured that the Sinic Civilization should be succeeded by a single undivided Far Eastern Society.¹ Conversely the Syrian and Carolingian dynasties' common failure to reincarnate a single unchallenged avatar of the Roman Empire was a political reverse which ensured that the Hellenic Civilization should be succeeded by one Christian Hellenistic Society in Anatolia and by another in the West.²

In the light of these portentous failures to re-establish either the political unity of the Roman Empire or the cultural unity of the Hellenic Society in the former geographical domain of the Hellenic World, the culturally fruitful political achievement of the Sui and T'ang Power stands out impressively; and this impression will be enhanced when we make a closer inspection of this great event's historical antecedents; since these will be found to forbid the assumption that, because this act of political reunification was successfully accomplished, it must therefore have been either a foregone conclusion or even an easy task.

By the time when the North and the South of a nascent Far Eastern World were united politically by the Sui Power in A.D. 589, the political separation between them had lasted, without a break, for no less than 272 years,³ and the previous political unity that had dissolved in A.D. 317 had been both ephemeral and unsubstantial. Even in name the oecumenical empire of 'the United Tsin' had existed for no more than thirty-seven years (A.D. 280-317); and the façade of political unity that had been erected by Sse-ma Yen (alias Wu-ti) in A.D. 280 and had been maintained by his successors during the 'United Tsin' Dynasty's brief régime had been purchased by them at the fatal price of losing hold, *de facto*, of the dynasty's own original patrimony in the North which had been their base of operations for this anachronistic reunification of the Sinic World a hundred years after the fall of the Posterior Han. This concentration of the military energies of one of the Han Empire's three indigenous successor-states on the fratricidal objective of suppressing the other two came as a godsend to Eurasian Nomad *laeti* who had been establishing themselves inside the Great Wall, by a process of more or less peaceful infiltration, ever since the first beginnings of the Han Power's decline; for this internecine Sinic civil war gave these barbarian interlopers their patiently awaited opportunity to shake off

¹ The eventual supplementation of the main body of this Far Eastern Society in China by a branch in Korea and Japan was the result of a subsequent process which was one, not of division, but of multiplication.

² Even after the differentiation between an Orthodox Christian and a Western Christian Hellenistic Civilization had declared itself in the generation of Leo Syrus and had accentuated itself in the generation of Charlemagne and had exacerbated itself in the generation of Photius (see I. i. 66-67), History's decree *nisi* need not, even then, necessarily have been made absolute—as it was made in fact in the generation of Michael Cerularius—to judge by the different denouement of another historical drama after it had arrived at the same dramatic situation. The differentiation between an Arab Muslim and an Iranian Muslim successor of a defunct Syriac Civilization was at least arrested, even if it was not permanently overcome, through the political union of five-sixths of the Arabic World with one-third of the Iranian World as a result of Ottoman conquests of Arabic territories in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era (see I. i. 388-400).

³ See V. v. 356, n. 6.

the control of the sedentary Power on whose domain they were trespassers.¹ When we have discounted an attempt to re-establish the Han Empire at the turn of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era which had such unfortunate consequences, we shall realize that, in effect, the political separation between North and South that was brought to an end by Sui Wên-ti in A.D. 589 had prevailed, by that date, not merely for 272 years, but for no less than four hundred years if we ignore the interlude of the United Tsin and carry our reckoning back to the date of the Posterior Han Dynasty's death agonies, which had set in before the close of the second century of the Christian Era. The feat performed by Yang Kien (alias Sui Wên-ti) in thus overcoming a political disunity, which, by his day, was entrenched in the accumulated inertia of four centuries of use and wont, was only surpassed by the succeeding T'ang Dynasty's feat of consolidating the unity of the long severed northern and southern halves of the Far Eastern World which the Sui had so dexterously joined together.²

Both the Sui and the T'ang were heirs of the Eurasian Nomad barbarian successor-states of the Han Empire³ which had overtly asserted their independence in the hinterland of the Great Wall at the beginning of the fourth century of the Christian Era after the fiasco of the ostensible political reunification of the Sinic World under the United Tsin; and, if we bear in mind this barbarian heritage of the dynasties responsible for the renaissance of the Sinic universal state in the history of the subsequent Far Eastern Civilization in its original political shape of a single oecumenical empire embracing the entire domain of the former Sinic Society, we shall be able to discern what the corresponding course of events would have been in the aftermath of the histories of the Hellenic Civilization and of a Roman Empire that had played the part of an Hellenic universal state.

To reconstruct a corresponding denouement here, we should not only have to imagine Charlemagne emulating, as he did, the achievement of the Sui's predecessors the Pe Chôu, who had provided the Sui with their base of operations for uniting the South of the Far Eastern World with the North in A.D. 589 by having already reunited a previously partitioned North in A.D. 577; we should have to imagine Charlemagne, after his reunion of the Roman Empire's Lombard successor-state with its Frankish successor-state in A.D. 772-4, being supplanted by a usurper of native Gallo-Roman descent who then went on—by conquest or marriage or diplomacy—to reunite the contem-

¹ See V. v. 272-3. In thus purchasing a transitory political reunification of the South with the North of the Sinic World at the cost of opening the door for barbarian usurpers to make themselves masters of an archaistically ambitious Imperial Power's home territories, the United Tsin were making the same mistake that Justinian was to make when he purchased for the Roman Empire a transitory reconquest of Italy at the cost of losing the Balkan Peninsula to the Avars and their droves of Slavs (see V. vi. 286), and that Michael Palaiologhous was to make when he purchased for the East Roman Empire's Nicaean Greek Orthodox Christian successor-state a burdensome re-occupation of Constantinople at the cost of losing Western Anatolia to Turkish Muslim war-bands set in motion by the dissolution of the Saljûq Sultanate of Qöniyeh.

² Matt. xix. 6.

³ These barbarian antecedents of theirs are underlined by Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), p. 250. On this point, see also the present Study, V. v. 273, 356, n. 6, and 477-8.

porary East Roman reincarnation of the Roman Empire in Anatolia and Constantinople with Charlemagne's reincarnation of the Roman Empire in Gaul and Italy. But, to make our imaginary correspondence of post-Roman history with post-Han history complete, we must also endow the eighth-century East Roman Empire, which we are imagining Charlemagne's hypothetical Gallo-Roman supplanter to have annexed, with a vastly wider dominion than the modest combination of an Anatolian citadel with a Constantinopolitan bridgehead that had actually been inherited by Charlemagne's contemporaries Constantine VI and his mother Irene from their predecessor Leo Syrus. We must imagine the East Roman Empire of Charlemagne's day to have been coextensive with the Roman Empire within the frontiers that had been recovered for it by Justinian, and we must imagine Justinian to have succeeded completely in attaining his objective of reconquering the Roman Empire's Visigothic, as well as its Ostrogothic and Vandal, successor-state. This series of imaginary successes would have to be substituted for so many historical failures in the political history of a post-Hellenic interregnum in order to credit Charlemagne's hypothetical supplanter with an imaginary achievement of the same order of magnitude as the actual performance of the Chinese empire-builder Sui Wên-ti; and, even then, we should find that we had not succeeded in bringing Charlemagne's imaginary Gallo-Roman heir completely into line with his mighty Far Eastern counterpart; for the combination of actually unachieved successes which we have placed to the credit of Charlemagne's imaginary heir still leaves the English successor-states of the Roman Empire in Britain beyond our preposterously exaggerated imaginary limits of the Holy Roman Empire, whereas the whole former domain of the Han Empire was duly reassembled in the realm that Sui Wên-ti actually brought into being.

The residual discrepancy resulting from the recalcitrant independence of Mercia and the other barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire in Britain might perhaps be glozed over, but we must not flatter ourselves by supposing that, if we were to ignore this minor point, we should find ourselves at the end of our imaginary rewriting of post-Roman history if we were seriously intent on bringing it into line with the post-Han history of the Far East; for an avatar of the Han Empire that had been integrally reconstructed by Sui Wên-ti was preserved all but intact for the next 553 years (A.D. 589-1142) under successive Sui, T'ang, and Sung régimes,¹ whereas Charlemagne's diadochi and epigoni actually proved incompetent to hold together even the fraction of the Roman Empire's former domain that Charlemagne had managed to reassemble. To bring the course of Far Eastern history into conformity with the course of Western history, we must imagine the year A.D. 589

¹ A stricter count would limit the duration of the Far Eastern avatar of a Sinic universal state to a span of some three hundred years, since the main body of the Far Eastern World went through a spell of political disruption between the onset of the T'ang Dynasty's death-agonies in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era (see IV. iv. 86 and 87-88) and the establishment of the Sung Dynasty in A.D. 960 (see V. vi. 306); and during this bout of anarchy sixteen border districts were ceded, between the years A.D. 927 and 937, to the Khitan transfrontier barbarians (see II. ii. 121; IV. iv. 86; V. v. 308; and V. vi. 307).

witnessing in the Far East, not the consummation of the Pe Chóu Dynasty's reunification of the North in A.D. 577 through Sui Wên-ti's unification of North and South, but the undoing of the local achievement of A.D. 577 in the North through a relapse of the North into the state of political disintegration in which it had been languishing before A.D. 577 since the break-up, in A.D. 534, of the 'Wei' empire in which the North had been reunited *circa* A.D. 410/439¹ as a result of the To Pa Eurasian Nomad barbarian principality's success in progressively swallowing up all the other barbarian successor-states of the Han Empire which had come to the surface in the North since the beginning of the fourth century.²

If we may assume that we have now taken the full measure of the difference between the respective courses of post-Han history and post-Roman history that has to be taken into account in order to see the equally evident points of likeness between the same two stories in their true perspective, we may now go on to inquire into the causes of this partial diversity of two lines of development that are at the same time partially similar. We shall find ourselves able to identify one geographical cause and one political.

The geographical cause is to be found in a physiographical difference between the Sinic and the Hellenic World which is reflected in the respective structures of the Han and the Roman Empire.

The Sinic Civilization³ was a continental culture, and its geographical expansion was carried out overland up to 'the natural frontiers' of an East Asian sub-continent which was delimited by the southern shore of the Eurasian Steppe, the western shore of the Pacific Ocean, and the eastern escarpment of the Tibetan Plateau almost as definitely as the Indian sub-continent was delimited by the southern escarpment of the Tibetan Plateau, the eastern escarpment of the Iranian Plateau, and the northern shores of the Indian Ocean. In the expansion of the Sinic Civilization, the extirpation or assimilation of the sedentary barbarian highlanders previously inhabiting the northern fringes of the latter-day provinces of Shensi and Shansi had brought the Sinic World into immediate contact with the Eurasian Nomad World; and the risk of being invaded by the Nomads, to which the Sinic Society had thereby laid itself open, was not effectively parried by the expedient of reinforcing a 'natural' frontier in this quarter by the construction of those artificial fortifications that were eventually consolidated by Ts'in She Hwang-ti into one continuous Great Wall.⁴ Yet, though this rather wantonly incurred peril from a seething pot towards the North⁵ was not counteracted by these immense anti-Nomad defensive works, it was discounted, as the sequel was to show, by a vast overland extension of the Sinic Society's domain in another direction. A progressive subjugation of the sedentary barbarians beyond the south-western fringes of the Sinic World of the third century B.C. was initiated by Ts'in She Hwangti and was carried to completion rather more than a hundred

¹ See Herrmann, A.: *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935, Harvard University Press), p. 29, Map IV.

² See V. v. 356, n. 6.

³ See Maps 25 and 26 in vol. xi.

⁴ See II. ii. 119-20 and V. v. 142.

⁵ Jer. i. 13-15. Cp. iv. 6-7; v. 16-17; vi. 1 and 22-25; x. 22; xxv. 9.

years later by the Ts'in emperor's Han successors when they eventually pushed their advancing frontier over the crest of the Yangtse Basin's southern watershed down to the 'natural' frontier presented by the East Asian sub-continent's southern coast;¹ and this rounding-off of the Sinic universal state's domain towards the south-west, which was achieved by the Emperor Han Wuti in 111 B.C., was to prove its value four hundred years later, when in A.D. 311 the burst of a long-lowering Eurasian Nomad storm-cloud was proclaimed in the sack of 'the United Ts'in's' historic capital, Loyang, by the Hiongnu founders of a barbarian successor-state which they sought to dignify with the name 'Pe Han'.²

This catastrophe of A.D. 311 gave a then senile Sinic Society a shock which was perhaps even more severe than the shock given to it by the previous sack of Loyang in A.D. 191, which had announced the beginning of the Posterior Han Dynasty's death-agonies; for in A.D. 191 the outrage had at least been committed by native Sinic hands, whereas the sacrilege of A.D. 311 was the deed of barely disguised *ci-devant* barbarians. The sack of Loyang in A.D. 191 had been followed in A.D. 221 by the dissolution of the Han Empire into the three indigenous successor-states, known as 'the Three Kingdoms', which had partitioned the Sinic World between them until its transitory political reunification under the United Ts'in. The more appalling repetition of the catastrophe in A.D. 311 did not, however, sound the death-knell of the so-called 'Ts'in'. Though they had now lost to the Nomad barbarian interlopers their own original territory in the upper and lower basins of the Yellow River, which had been the Sinic Civilization's original cradle before becoming the metropolitan territory of its universal state, the 'Ts'in' were still masters of the Yangtse Basin and the Southern Seaboard, thanks to their completion of the reunification of the partitioned domain of the Han in A.D. 280.³ In A.D. 318 the 'Ts'in' turned to account their still unchallenged possession of this vast reserve of territory in the South by re-establishing their government in a new capital in the Lower Yangtse Basin in the city that eventually came to be known as Nanking.

By this politic migration the Ts'in succeeded in prolonging the period of their rule for another century;⁴ and, when they fell at last in A.D. 420,

¹ See V. v. 141-2 and 147.

² i.e. 'Northern Han'.

³ In A.D. 280 the Ts'in had annexed the Kingdom of Wu, which had held the Middle and Lower Yangtse Basin and the Southern Seaboard. The Kingdom of Shu, which had held the Upper Yangtse Basin (the latter-day province of Szechwan), had been annexed by the Northern Kingdom of Wei in A.D. 263, two years before the replacement of this Wei Dynasty by the Ts'in Dynasty in the North in A.D. 265.

⁴ This migration would not have achieved the political success that it did achieve if it had not had its economic counterpart in the effective development of the agricultural potentialities of the refugee régime's Southern fastness.

'The unity of China under the Western Ts'in Dynasty (A.D. 265-317), which succeeded the Three Kingdoms, did not last long. Less than fifty years after its inauguration, the Ts'in emperors had to retire to the south of the Yangtse River in the face of victorious rebellions on the part of the peasants in the northern provinces, who were in some districts the descendants of "barbarians" from what is now Chinese Turkistan and Mongolia, who had settled south of the Great Wall several centuries before. This period marks the change from "Western" Ts'in to "Eastern" Ts'in (A.D. 317-420). . . . The transition from "Western" to "Eastern" Ts'in and subsequent events in the interval before China was unified again under the Sui Dynasty in A.D. 589 involved a tremendous

the Southern Empire which they had established did not fall with them, but passed intact to succeeding dynasties known as the Sung (*imperabant* A.D. 420-79), Ts'i (*imperabant* A.D. 479-501), and Liang (*imperabant* A.D. 502-55). It was not till A.D. 555, 244 years after the sack of Loyang by the Hiongnu in A.D. 311, that any part of the South came under the rule of a northern state of Eurasian Nomad barbarian origin. In A.D. 555¹ the Liang Empire's capital, Kiangling, on the Middle Yangtse, was captured by the armies of the 'Western Wei' fraction of the To Pa Northern Empire; but the consequent break-up of a Southern Empire, which, by that time, had been a going concern for an unbroken period of little less than a quarter of a millennium, resulted at the moment in only a partial southward extension of northern barbarian rule. In A.D. 555 the middle and upper basins of the Yangtse were duly annexed by the 'Western Wei', to pass thereafter from the 'Western Wei's' To Pa hands into the 'Pe Chóu's' Hiongnu hands² in A.D. 557,³ and from the Pe Chóu's barbarian hands into the Sui's Chinese hands⁴ in A.D. 581; but, in the Lower Yangtse Valley and on the Southern Sea-board, an attenuated Southern Empire survived under the Ch'en Dynasty (*imperabant* A.D. 557⁵-89) until the extinction of the Ch'en by the Sui in A.D. 589 at last reunited the whole former domain of the Han Empire under the rule of an oecumenical Power incubated in the North.

If we ask ourselves why this conquest of the South by heirs of the Eurasian Nomad conquerors of the North was so long delayed, the first answer is that the Prior Han Dynasty, in rounding off their domain towards the south-west, had created a 'Solid South' which was to prove impregnable to Nomad assaults.⁶ In contrast to a long-since dry and open North, in which Man had won his victory over Water⁷ as early as the Shang Age, even a latterly likewise tamed and regulated Yangtse Basin still presented a network of waterways to hamper the advance of the Nomad cavalry; and, if some enterprising squadrons were to suc-

change in the socio-economic history of the nation. The risings of "barbarian" settlers, who were mostly serfs working on land owned by Chinese "mandarin" lords, as well as the rebellions of discontented Chinese peasants, drove a vast number of Chinese of the upper classes, as well as retinues of their supporters, to the south of the Yangtse River. When the "barbarian" dynasties set up in their northern homes had lasted over a generation, hopes of regaining the northern domain were practically given up in the latter years of the Eastern Tsin, and the Chinese refugees in the Lower Yangtse Valley prepared for a permanent stay. . . . Such an impetus and necessity for migration had hitherto never been so keenly felt in the history of the Chinese people. The result . . . was the beginning of a period of rapid development of the fertile Yangtse Valley, which ultimately made it the Key Economic Area in China, replacing the Ching-Wei Basin and Lower Yellow River Valley. This brought about a sharp transformation of Chinese culture' (Chi, Ch'ao-ting: *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History as Revealed in the Development of Public Works for Water-Control* (London 1936, Allen & Unwin), pp. 107-8 and 110).

¹ This is the date given by Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), p. 175. In op. cit., vol. cit., p. 229, however, the same scholar dates the same event as having happened before the close of the year A.D. 554.

² For the Hun origin of Yü-wên T'ai, the barbarian mayor of the *ci-devant* barbarian Western Wei Dynasty's palace who laid the foundations of the parvenu Power that subsequently took the name 'Pe Chóu', see Franke, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 226-7.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 235.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 180.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 176.

⁶ This point has been noticed already in VI. vii. 357, n. 4.

⁷ See II. i. 318-21.

ceed in threading their southward way through this watery maze and floundering out again without having been bogged, they would then straightway find themselves confronted with a broad belt of forest-clad highlands over which they would have to force a passage if they were bent on descending upon their Sinic victims' last ditch on the South China Coast. The strength of this Sinic 'Festung Südland' was demonstrated in A.D. 383, when a supreme effort to conquer the refugee 'Tsin' Dynasty's Southern Empire was made by a northern barbarian empire-builder of Tibetan origin, 'Ts'in' Fu Kien (*imperabat* A.D. 350-85),¹ who had momentarily united under his own rule all the barbarian successor-states of the former 'United Tsin' Empire in the North. This barbarian invasion of the South in A.D. 383 met with a crushing disaster before it had penetrated beyond the basin of the River Huai;² and the barbarian rulers of the North learnt this lesson so well that, as we have seen, the indigenous Southern Empire survived thereafter for 172 years (A.D. 383-555) intact, and for 206 years (A.D. 383-589) in an attenuated form, till it was eventually united with the North by a Northern Power with barbarian antecedents in whose ethos a hereditary barbarism had been winnowed out, by the date of the Sui Dynasty's accession to power in A.D. 581, through the persistent counter-influence of a still radioactive Sinic culture that had been playing upon the barbarian interlopers in the North for no less than four hundred years by the date of the Sui's conquest of the Ch'en.

Thus the continental physiography of the Sinic World enabled Han empire-builders to provide the Sinic culture with a natural fortress in the South which proved impregnable to the Eurasian Nomad barbarian conquerors of the North. In contrast to the physical structure of the Sinic World, the physiography of the Hellenic World was not continental but maritime, and the corresponding structure of the Roman Empire partly accounts for the Hellenic universal state's relative ill-success in foiling its barbarian invaders.

Whereas the Sinic Civilization had spread from river basin to river basin—originating in the Basin of the Yellow River and expanding into the Basin of the Yangtse—the Hellenic Civilization had spread from the shores of a lesser inland sea round the circumference of a greater one. It had come to birth between the Asiatic and European shores of the Aegean;³ and in the penultimate phase of its decline⁴ it had been unified politically by Roman empire-builders within the framework of a 'thalassocracy' commanding the entire perimeter of the Mediter-

¹ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 80-101.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 95-97. The date of this decisive battle, which was fought in the angle between the Huai and its tributary the Fei, is given as A.D. 387, not 383, by C. P. Fitzgerald in *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 257.

³ See IX. viii. 711-12.

⁴ The first attempt to provide the Hellenic World with a universal state had been made within the confines of Hellenism's Aegean cradle; but by the year 478 B.C., which saw the establishment of this abortive Athenian 'thalassocracy', the Hellenic World had already expanded far beyond these original limits; and, when, in 415 B.C., the Athenians sought to make their 'thalassocracy' coextensive with the contemporary domain of Hellenism by attempting to conquer Sicily, this enterprise proved to be so much beyond their strength that it led them into a disaster which was ultimately fatal to their 'thalassocracy' even within its more modest previous Aegean bounds.

reanean.¹ Though Roman roads and Roman legions left a deeper impression on the mind of Posterity than Roman shipping-lanes and naval patrols, the Roman Empire was in truth a pool of water surrounded by a hollow ring of land,² in contrast to the structure of the Han Empire, which was a plain of ploughland flanked on one side by a moated highland citadel.³

When we compare this maritime structure of the Roman Empire with the continental structure of the Han Empire, we can see that the Pan-Hellenic 'thalassocracy' had two politico-geographical weaknesses from which the Pan-Sinic terrene empire was exempt.

In the first place a Power that ruled the shores of the Mediterranean in virtue of ruling its waves could not extend its rule inland in any direction very far beyond the range of action of naval landing-parties, and therefore, in most directions, was constrained to draw the line of its *limes* along an alinement that fell far short of the nearest 'natural frontier'. The halo of impregnability with which the semi-official panegyrist of the Roman Empire sought to crown its landward defences during its illusory 'Indian Summer'⁴ was rudely dissipated by the historical sequel; and the Emperor Hadrian had already seen through it as early as the year A.D. 117, when the death of a frustrated Roman Alexander had given this Roman Antipater his chance of liquidating a Trajanic adventure by reverting to a sober Augustan policy of territorial retrenchment. The Romans failed to find either a natural frontier or a satisfactory artificial substitute, not only in the South-West Asian hinterland of the Mediterranean,⁵ but in its European hinterland as well.⁶ The only two natural frontiers that they did succeed in reaching were the First Cataract in the Nile Valley—where they had merely to take over a line that an Augustan-minded Pharaoh, Psammetichus I, had laid down for them⁷ more than six hundred years before Augustus's own occupation of Psammetichan Egypt after the Battle of Actium—and the Atlantic coast of Continental Europe between the Straits of Gibraltar and the Delta of the Rhine; but the Roman hold on this Continental European natural frontier was never confirmed by an integral occupation of its natural outworks in the British Isles. Though Claudius and his successors realized that the occupation of Britain was a necessary complement to that of Gaul, Lower Germany, and the north-west corner of the Iberian Peninsula, they were never willing to face the truth that, so long as their occupation of Britain stopped short at the line of the Solway and the Tyne, or even at the line of the Clyde and the Forth, without going on to embrace Caledonia and Ireland, they were condemning themselves to an increase in their military liabilities instead of securing a diminution of them.

The Romans' failure to round off their conquest of Britain by pushing

¹ See VI. vii. 216-17.

² See VI. vii. 217.

³ The plain—consisting of the Wei Basin 'within the Passes' and the Lower Yellow River Basin to the east of that mountain barrier—corresponded physiographically to the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean in the structure of the Roman Empire. The 'Festung Südländ', perched on the southern watershed of the Yangtse Basin behind a network of waterways, corresponded to the Roman dominions in North-West Africa.

⁴ See the panegyrics cited in VI. vii. 43-44 and 45-46.

⁵ See IX. viii. 411-13.

⁶ See V. v. 591-5.

⁷ See II. ii. 116.

on to the natural frontiers that here lay close within their reach was more significant, and more ominous, than their failure to find a satisfactory frontier in the great open spaces of Continental Northern Europe and South-West Asia. Their performance in Britain argued an inability or unwillingness to mobilize even a limited additional quantum of energy or resources or both when this quantum amounted to no more than an inconsiderable fraction of Rome's total latent strength, and when a temporary exertion of this marginal effort promised to bring her a permanent relief from strain. The weakness that the Romans thus exhibited in Britain was also displayed by them in North-West Africa; and their failure here is particularly pertinent to our present inquiry because, as has been pointed out,¹ North-West Africa corresponded, in the geographical structure of the Roman Empire, to that southern hinterland of the Sinic World in which a Sinic universal state at bay eventually found 'a natural citadel' thanks to the successful exploitation of this region's politico-geographical potentialities by the conscientiously thorough-going labours of Prior Han empire-builders.

In terms of human geography North-West Africa was an island; for, wherever its coasts were not laved by the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, they were brushed by the sands of the Sahara; and this desert, as the Romans had found it, had been a more effective insulator than the conductive waters of the Western Mediterranean, since the Sahara remained recalcitrant even to the steppe-conquering technique of the Afrasian Nomads until the Romans themselves placed a Sahara-conquering weapon in their Afrasian Nomad barbarian adversaries' hands by introducing the camel into North-West Africa from Arabia.² The conquest of the Sahara by indigenous North-West African Zanāta Berber Nomads,³ who had learnt the use of the camel from Nafūsa and Lawāta Berber Nomad immigrants from Tripolitania,⁴ was not, however, consummated before the overthrow of the Roman régime in North-West Africa in A.D. 429-39 by the co-operation of an intrusive barbarian war-band, composed of Alan Eurasian Nomads and semi-nomadized Vandals, with indigenous barbarian war-bands recruited from the never subjugated sedentary barbarian North-West African highlanders. This long-delayed but, in the event, irresistibly overwhelming assault on Roman North-West Africa by the combined forces of convergent barbarian aggressors was the penalty of the Romans' failure to exploit the Maghrib's potentialities as 'a natural fastness' by subjugating the Berber highlanders up to 'the natural frontier' offered to Rome by the dry shore of a then still untenanted Sahara.⁵ The Romans' sole achievement in this field was a precarious pacification of the isolated massif of the Aurès; but they did not ever effectively occupy more than the eastern half of the Algerian Tall, and, *a fortiori*, they hardly touched the Moroccan Rif and never took even a first step towards subduing the Atlas.

This Roman record in North-West Africa was a very different story

¹ See p. 658, n. 3, above.

² See Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 162, 184, and 199-200.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 209-10.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 197-8.

⁵ This failure has been noticed in V. v. 205.

from the Han Empire's record in South China; for, though, in this case likewise, the subjugation of the local sedentary barbarian highlanders was by no means complete, it went sufficiently far to rule out all possibility of dangerous combinations between unsubdued southern barbarian highlanders and invading northern barbarian Nomads in the crisis in which the strength of the Sinic World's southern citadel was put to the test in the fourth century of the Christian Era, whereas, in Roman North-West Africa, a local eruption of unsubdued barbarian highlanders had been one of the regular incidents in each of the successive paroxysms of simultaneous concentric barbarian attacks on the perimeter of the Roman Empire's hollow ring. The *Bellum Gildonicum* had broken out in A.D. 398, thirty-one years before Genseric's passage into North-West Africa from the European shore of the Straits of Gibraltar; and in the previous paroxysm in the third century of the Christian Era there had been a similar outbreak of dissident local Berbers taking up arms on their own initiative.¹

Another politico-geographical weakness of the Roman Empire was that, if once an aggressive external enemy had succeeded in breaking through its inevitably long-drawn-out and ill-sited artificial frontier defences, the Roman armies found themselves hampered by the narrowness of their manœuvring room in their attempts to foil the invader by a strategy of defence in depth² which proved the salvation of the Han Power's feeble 'Tsin' epigoni in A.D. 383.³ When once an assailant had broken through the Roman *limes*, the odds would be heavily against the Roman defence force in its subsequent efforts to prevent the invader from reaching the coast; for the whole terrene perimeter of the Roman Empire was so thin—even in those Gallic and Anatolian sectors which were of twice the tenuous standard thickness⁴—that any breach of the *limes* would bring the Mediterranean within the invader's range; and, when once he had debouched on its shores, the conductivity of this central pool of politically neutral navigable water would give any pawn that launched a keel on it the range and versatility of a queen, and would offer these facilities for a sudden vast increase in mobility to Gothic, Vandal, or Arab piratical craft with the same indiscriminating hospitality that it had shown to Roman warships and to Alexandrian merchantmen. The maritime physiography of the Hellenic World thus militated against a latter-day Roman Empire at bay⁵ as powerfully as it had once told in favour of Roman empire-builders who had made Rome's imperial fortune when their audacity in taking to an element on which their Carthaginian adversaries had previously reigned supreme had justified itself by its success in breaking through a sea-borne Punic 'wooden curtain'.⁶

These weaknesses in the structure of the Roman Empire proved, in the event, to outweigh, in combination, one fortuitous advantage over the Han Empire which the Roman Empire enjoyed thanks to an accident

¹ See V. v. 219.

² The Diocletianic Restoration's substitution of a system of defence in depth for a broken cordon along the *limes* has been noticed in VI. vii. 322-3.

³ See p. 655, above.

⁵ See VI. vii. 93.

⁴ See VI. vii. 217.

⁶ See IX. viii. 428-9.

of physical geography. We have seen that the Han Empire was exposed at point-blank range to the blast of Eurasian Nomad explosion along the enormous length of a Great Wall whose masonry was all that stood between the nucleus of the Sinic universal state in the Yellow River Basin and the huge reservoir of Nomad energy in and beyond Gobi. By contrast, the Roman Empire was nowhere in immediate contact with the Eurasian Steppe except at the tip of the Steppe's Great Western Bay where the Iron Gates barred the way farther westward into the isolated enclave of steppe-land in the Hungarian Alföld.¹ Yet one band of Alan Eurasian Nomads, whose point of departure was this far-flung western outpost of their native Eurasia, capped their initial feat of breaking through the Continental European *limes* of the Roman Empire by making their way, not only overland into the south-western extremity of the Continent, but on across the waters of the Western Mediterranean into the Romans' North-West African island, in the train of the Vandal war-lord Genseric. And, after thus making their sea-passage without mishap in A.D. 429, these outlandish invaders from beyond the extreme opposite sector of the vast Roman perimeter brought their long trek to a triumphant termination by entering Carthage itself within ten years of their audacious landing on African ground.

This brilliant success of Vandal-led Alan Nomads at the Roman Empire's expense in North-West Africa in A.D. 429-39 throws into piquant relief the blackness of the disaster that overtook the Tibetan-led Hiongnu and Sienpi Nomad assailants of the Sinic World's moated southern fortress at the very first ditch that these ill-starred barbarian aggressors tried to cross. The water-jump in the Huai Basin was the outermost of all the Sinic southern fortress's defences. How was it that the regulated waterways of a Far Eastern river-basin availed in A.D. 383 to foil the Nomad cavalry who, at the opposite end of the Old World only forty-six years later, were to commit themselves with impunity to the less familiar waters of 'the salt estranging sea' when they ventured to take ship from Europe to Africa in A.D. 429?

These versatile Alano-Vandal 'horse-marines' did not merely escape mishap in making a single sea-passage from Europe to Africa; when once they had taken to the sea they immediately made themselves so much at home on this previously unfamiliar element that, from a newly conquered North-West African base of operations, they succeeded in wresting back out of Roman hands the naval command of the Western Mediterranean which the Romans had wrested out of Carthaginian hands seven hundred years back, in the First Punic War (*gerebatur* 264-241 B.C.). How was it that the Alano-Vandals were able to master the sea when the Hunno-Tibetans had been worsted by a river?

The surprising answer to this irrepressible question seems to be that the art of marine navigation was less difficult for these centaurs to acquire than the steeple-chaser's knack of leaping clear from bank to bank of a fresh-water ditch. The Eurasian Nomad's strange inability to cope with inland waterways was indeed eventually to prove his undoing

¹ See III. iii. 401-2.

when this fatal flaw in his efficiency was discovered and exploited by the Cossacks;¹ and the rare amphibious prowess of 'Water Sakas', who turned to account on the Indus a fluvial waterman's skill that they had acquired on the Oxus,² was manifestly one of those exceptions that prove a rule. If this reading of the historical evidence is correct, it requires us to discard, as a misleading illusion, the visual impression produced by a synoptic view of the physiographical maps of the Han Empire and the Roman Empire when we place these two pictures side by side. If, in ignorance of the historical facts, we were to ask ourselves which of these two strikingly diverse physiographical structures might be expected to offer the greater facilities to mounted invaders, the obvious *a priori* answer would be that a continental empire built round the basins of two rivers with a common watershed would be as easy for an invading cavalry to overrun as it would be difficult for these horsemen to conquer the transmarine provinces of a maritime empire built round the basins of two interconnecting bays of one continuous inland sea. Yet this *a priori* answer is given the lie by the historical fact that the Alano-Vandals brilliantly succeeded in conquering a transmarine North-West Africa in A.D. 429-39, whereas the Hunno-Tibetans were ignominiously repulsed in A.D. 383 on the banks of the River Huai.

The outcome of the contest between an Alano-Vandal attack and a Roman defence in North-West Africa in the fourth decade of the fifth century of the Christian Era was decided, as we have already observed, by the cumulative effect of one feature of the Roman Empire's physiographical structure and one politico-military legacy of an antecedent chapter of Roman imperial history. The Alano-Vandals were sped on their way from Central Europe to North-West Africa by the conductivity of the invaded oecumenical empire's central sea; but their subsequent conquest of Rome's North-West African dominions would certainly not have been completed so quickly, and might perhaps never have been completed at all, if, in the course of the 575 years that had elapsed, by the date of the Alano-Vandal landing in Africa in A.D. 429, since Rome's first annexation of territory in Africa in 146 B.C., the Romans had emulated the thoroughness of the Prior Han empire-builders' work in Southern China by effectively subjugating all the North-West African highlands up to the natural frontiers afforded by this virtual island's Saharan desert coasts. The conjuncture that ensured the rapid and complete extinction of Roman rule in North-West Africa after the advent of the Alano-Vandals in A.D. 429 was the survival of a still unsubjugated local barbarian enemy at the gates, ready to join hands with the exotic Eurasian barbarian new arrivals. The alliance between the interloping horsemen and the indigenous highlanders was as decisive as it was inevitable.

Thus Rome failed to furnish a senile Hellenic World with a defensible fortress in a North-West Africa which, in the physiographical structure of the Roman Empire, was the morphological counterpart of the New South in the structure of the Han Empire. On the other hand, Rome did succeed in creating an imperfect, yet locally effective, functional

¹ See II. ii. 154-7 and V. v. 283 and 313-15.

² See V. v. 603.

counterpart of the Sinic World's never violated southern fortress in an Anatolia¹ which had no morphological affinity at all with the Sinic World's latter-day southern extension, though it had a partial affinity on this physiographical plane with the Sinic World's original nucleus in the North.

Both the extent and the limits of this physiographical correspondence between Anatolia and Northern China come to light when we remind ourselves that the chain of mountain-girt fluvial plains, extending from the Wei Basin on the west to the Lower Yellow River Basin on the east, had played, in the genesis and growth of the Sinic Civilization, the part played in the genesis and growth of the Hellenic Civilization by a chain of landlocked seas extending from the Aegean on the south to the Sea of Azov on the north.² The Aegean reach of this saline inland waterway had been the original home of a maritime Hellenic Society which had come to birth between the Aegean's Asiatic and European shores; and the Asiatic half of the birthplace of Hellenism—which was to figure on a pre-Diocletianic Roman imperial administrative map as the province of 'Asia'—occupied the western extremity of the Anatolian Peninsula up to the western fringes of the Central Steppe. Thus the Anatolian citadel of a post-Diocletianic Roman Empire included the Asiatic half of the Hellenic World's original nucleus; but, on the other hand, it did not include the European half of this homeland of Hellenism, while it did include a Central and an Eastern Anatolia which, so far from having been parts of the Hellenic Civilization's original patrimony, had been the homelands of a Hittite Civilization which had neither been annexed to the Hellenic Society's political domain nor exposed to an intensive play of Hellenic cultural radiation until after the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great. The Anatolian citadel of the Roman Empire was thus composed of one-half of the original homeland of Hellenism in combination with the whole of the original homeland of the Hittite Civilization; and we have already noticed in previous contexts³ that, in the eventual structures of both a Hellenistic Orthodox Christian World and an East Roman avatar of the Roman Empire, the centre of gravity came to rest in a *ci-devant* Hittite Central and Eastern Anatolia that were occupied by the East Roman Empire's Anatolic and Armeniac army corps districts, and not in a *ci-devant* Hellenic Western Anatolia, where a Thracensian army corps district occupied the area once covered by the Roman province of Asia.

In Late Roman Imperial history an Anatolia whose cultural heritage was thus partly Hellenic but predominantly Hittite was the scene of decisive events corresponding on the politico-military plane to the historic defeat in A.D. 383 of the Hunno-Tibetan barbarian assailants of the Sinic southern fortress; and the salvaging of Anatolia in the fifth century of the Christian Era was as signal an achievement of contemporary Roman imperial statesmanship as the loss of North-West Africa was a nemesis of local Roman sins of omission in the past.

¹ See VI. vii. 357, n. 4.

³ In II. ii. 79-80 and IV. iv. 342.

² See IX. viii. 711-12.

By the end of the fourth century, Roman rule in Anatolia was already in jeopardy from a local juxtaposition of those two varieties of Barbarism that were to provide the ingredients for so explosive a mixture in North-West Africa twenty-nine years later. The never subjugated Berber highlanders had their fourth-century Anatolian indigenous barbarian counterparts in Isaurian highlanders who had shaken off a precariously established Roman control,¹ while counterparts of the future Alano-Vandal conquerors of North-West Africa, in the shape of Alano-Gothic *laeti*, had been imported into Anatolia already by the deliberate action of the Roman imperial authorities themselves. Yet, in the event, this ominous situation in Anatolia was saved by a Constantinopolitan Imperial Government's success in forestalling Gainas the Goth's plotted *coup* in A.D. 400 and Aspar the Alan's plotted *coup* in A.D. 471; the Gothic *laeti* in Anatolia were extirpated before it had occurred, either to these imported carnivores or to the native Isaurian representatives of the breed, that the wolf and the jackal in partnership would have it in their power to make the stricken deer their prey; and the indigenous Anatolian barbarians, who thus missed their opportunity of becoming co-partners of local Visigothic *laeti* in establishing an Anatolian barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire, allowed themselves to be enlisted, instead, in the Roman Imperial Army and eventually to be used by a Constantinopolitan Imperial Government for the reconquest of an Ostrogothic successor-state of the Roman Empire in Italy.²

This series of energetic Roman acts of state, which were as prescient as they were strong-minded, successfully exorcized a sinister possibility that, in the course of the fifth century of the Christian Era, Anatolia might become the site of an Alano-Gothico-Isaurian barbarian principality corresponding to the actual fifth-century Alano-Vandalo-Berber successor-state of the Roman Empire in North-West Africa and to the fourth-century Tibetan, Hiongnu, To Pa, and Sienpi successor-states of a Sinic oecumenical empire in the Yellow River Basin. Late Imperial Roman statesmanship did not, indeed, rise to the height of saving the whole of the cradle of Hellenism from being swamped, like the cradle of the Sinic Civilization, by an influx of barbarism. Justinian's improvident expenditure of an irreplaceable residue of Illyrian man-power on the indulgence of his perverse ambition to reconquer Italy had to be paid for before the close of the sixth century by a stampede of the Avars' Slav 'human cattle' into a Continental European Greece which had been saved from becoming the prey of the Visigoth war-lord Alaric by Stilicho's generalship in A.D. 396 and by the diplomacy of Constantinopolitan ministers of state who had unobtrusively sped a departing barbarian guest in A.D. 410. But, though the European half of the cradle of Hellenism thus suffered, in a post-Justinianean deluge, the fate that overtook the entire cradle of the Sinic Civilization after the débâcle of the United Tsin, the Asiatic half of the Hellenic Society's original patrimony was saved from the same doom by the defeat of the Arabs' attempts to capture Constantinople in A.D. 673-7 and A.D. 717-18, and by the miscarriage in A.D. 823 of a formidable insurrection of Slav

¹ See IV. iv. 325 and V. v. 206, n. 1.

² See IV. iv. 324-5 and VI. vii. 335-7.

laeti who had been planted in Anatolia to till fields left fallow there by the extermination of these Slavs' Gothic predecessors in A.D. 400.¹

The preservation of this citadel of Hellenism in Anatolia during the social interregnum that followed the dissolution of the Hellenic Society elsewhere was a feat of the same kind as the preservation of a citadel of the Sinic culture in Southern China during the interregnum that followed the dissolution of the Sinic Society in the Yellow River Basin; and this common achievement on the politico-geographical plane is, as we have seen, one of two distinctive common assets which account, between them, for the remarkable robustness of both the T'ang Empire and the East Roman Empire by comparison with such anaemic ghosts as the Holy Roman Empire and the Ch'ou Empire. The two exceptionally stalwart *revenants*' other special common achievement was, as we have also already noticed, the revival of a professional lay civil service. We may now go on to observe that, of the two achievements, this institutional feat was by far the more efficacious in assisting the wraith of a dead oecumenical empire to clothe itself in flesh and blood. The truth is that the part played in the two miracles of reincarnation by an inviolate South Chinese fortress in the one case and by an inviolate Anatolian fortress in the other case was only a passive one. The mere survival of a cultural asylum would have been of no avail in itself if it had not served to give sanctuary to an imperial corporation by whose action a suspended imperial administration's paralysed, but never fatally dislocated, heart could be conjured into beating again; and, when we compare the relative success of the Han régime's and the Roman régime's residuary legatees in weathering this ordeal of hibernation, we shall find that the Han imperial civil service far surpassed its Roman counterpart in both the extent and the success of its performance.

During a post-Roman interregnum the anarchy into which the central and eastern provinces followed the western provinces after the murder of the Emperor Maurice in A.D. 602 put out of action, here too, an imperial administrative machine that in the western provinces had already ceased to function some two hundred years earlier; and, even when an eventual break of political continuity in the central provinces, which had lasted, when it had come, for not less than four generations, had been followed at length by Leo Syrus's evocation of an East Roman ghost of the Roman Empire in Anatolia in A.D. 717, another 147 years had still to pass before this local simulacrum of the Roman Empire was to be endowed with a local simulacrum of the Roman civil service²

¹ The largest settlements of Slav *laeti* in Anatolia of which a record survives took place during the first reign of the Heraclian Emperor Justinian II (*imperabat* A.D. 685-95 et 704-11) (see Vasiliev, A. A.: *Histoire de l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris 1932, Picard, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 288-9). Thomas the Slav, who was the leader of the great Anatolian insurrection of A.D. 821-3, was the offspring of a Slav family settled at Gaziura (Toqat) in the Armeniac army-corps district, and the Anatolian Slavs were one of the dissident elements in Anatolia that joined his standard. The insurrection was not, however, confined to the Slav element in the population of Anatolia, and Thomas was aiming at a more ambitious objective than the establishment of an Anatolian Slav successor-state of the East Roman Empire. His aim was to make himself master of the East Roman Empire itself, and this was why he wasted his strength on a fruitless siege of Constantinople.

² The conspicuous absence of an administrative renaissance of the Diocletianic Roman Imperial régime in the administrative organization of Leo Syrus's East Roman Empire has been noticed in VI. vii. 357, n. 4.

thanks to the foundation of the Caesar Bardas' college in the Magnaura in A.D. 864.¹ By comparison with this undistinguished post-Roman administrative record in the limited area once occupied by the Roman Empire's central provinces, the heirs of the Han imperial civil service gave a far better account of themselves. To begin with, they maintained their corporate life and remained on active service without any break at all in the Sinic World's southern citadel, to administer a southern remnant of the Sinic universal state, under its successive 'Eastern Tsin', Sung, Ts'i, Liang, and Ch'en dynasties, from the date of the installation of a refugee Imperial Government at Nanking in A.D. 318 down to the date of the political reunification of the entire former domain of the Han Empire through the conquest of the Ch'en by the Sui in A.D. 589.² Thereafter, this never incapacitated southern residue of the Sinic imperial civil service was able, in virtue of having survived as a going concern in the South, to provide the Northern political necromancer T'ang T'ai Tsung with the fund of professional man-power that he required in order to create a unitary oecumenical civil service for his resuscitated unitary oecumenical empire.³ This seventh-century Far Eastern feat of necromancy had a Northern as well as a Southern historical background; and in this Northern episode the heirs of the Han imperial civil service had acquitted themselves like men in a role that had demanded far greater heroism than their contemporary performance in the South, highly creditable to them though this southern performance was.

T'ai Ts'ung would never have been able to reintroduce the Han tradition of imperial administration into a politically dominant North from a newly annexed South, nor indeed have been capable even of conceiving in his own mind the ambitious project of incubating this administrative renaissance, if the great T'ang statesman himself, and his predecessors of barbarian origin who had been ruling the North ever since the collapse of the United Tsin régime there at the beginning of the fourth century of the Christian Era, had not already been profoundly Sinified in the course of the 278 years that had elapsed between the sack of Loyang by the Hiongnu in A.D. 311 and the annexation of the Ch'en Dynasty's attenuated Southern Empire by Sui Wên-ti in A.D. 589. The founder of the Hiongnu successor-state of the United Tsin Empire, Liu Yuan (*'imperabat'* A.D. 304-10), was already so far Sinified that he sought to legitimize his usurpation by claiming descent from the founder of the authentic Imperial Han Dynasty, Han Liu Pang, and styling his own dynasty 'Pe Han' ('Northern Han') accordingly.⁴ The deliberate self-Sinification of *ci-devant* barbarian intruders

¹ See IV. iv. 345.

² See VI. vii. 369.

³ See VI. vii. 365, n. 4.

⁴ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 40-45, and the present Study, V. v. 273. This practice of adopting the name of some dynasty of the Ch'ou Age of Sinic history, which had been canonized posthumously as classical, had perhaps been invented by Liu Yuan's alleged ancestor Liu Pang himself; for Liu Pang had taken over the dynastic title 'Han' with the territory (ruled, in the Ch'ou Age, by a local dynasty of that name) which had happened to be the first scrap of the spoils of the Ts'in Empire to come into Liu Pang's possession (see VI. vii. 172). After the fall of the thus self-styled Imperial Han Dynasty, their practice was imitated in the nomenclature of almost all succeeding dynasties—indigenous and bar-

on the sacred soil of the original homeland of the Sinic culture in the North was thus coeval with the first overt establishment there of barbarian successor-states of the United Tsin; and this Herodian movement reached its totalitarian climax in the Sinomane measures taken in A.D. 494-6 by an ex-barbarian ruler of a temporarily reunited North whose To Pa provenance was disguised under the dynastic name 'Wei' and the throne-name Hiao Wên-ti.¹

This intensive and progressive Sinification of the immigrant barbarian squatters in the North, who established successor-states of the United Tsin Empire there in and after the beginning of the fourth century of the Christian Era, is the cultural background of the administrative unification of the South with the North of a nascent Far Eastern World in the seventh century by the joint endeavours of a T'ang heir of these Sinophil barbarian war-lords in the North and a Confucian imperial civil service which had succeeded in preserving its continuity during a post-Han social interregnum and which welcomed an opportunity of co-operating with the Northern ruler of a reunited empire in giving practical effect to cultural and administrative ideals that T'ai T'sung shared with the litterati. The survival of the Sinic culture in the South during this age is adequately explained, as we have seen, by the impregnability of the southern fortress which had been provided for a senile Sinic Society by far-sighted and energetic Prior Han empire-builders. But how are we to explain the same Sinic culture's contemporary survival in the North, where the open plains of the Wei Basin and the Lower Yellow River Basin had been swept by the icy blast of a Eurasian Nomad whirlwind in spite of the massive artificial windbreak that had been erected, for the protection of this northern homeland of the Sinic culture, by the Titans who had built the Great Wall? An answer to this question may perhaps be yielded by a further pursuit of our comparative study of post-Sinic and post-Hellenic history.

If we explore this synoptic view, the first point that we shall notice is that, in the first phase of the interregnum following the break-up of a Sinic universal state, all the fragments of a now dissolved Han Empire's former domain still remained provisionally exempt, during a period of grace which lasted for more than a century, from seeing the calamity of partition capped by the still more grievous calamity of falling under barbarian rule. In the Age of the Three Kingdoms (*dimicabant* A.D. 221-263/80), the Northern successor-state of the Han Empire, as well as its two southern rivals, was a work of native Sinic hands; and here, at the very outset, the courses of these two comparable episodes of post-Sinic history and post-Hellenic history diverged on lines which placed the Sinic Society at a relative advantage over its Hellenic contemporary; for a corresponding chapter of Hellenic history that had the same opening quickly took a different turn.

When in A.D. 395 a post-Diocletianic Roman Empire was divided into two indigenous successor-states as a consequence of Theodosius I's

barian, parochial and oecumenical, alike—down to the end of Sinic history and throughout the subsequent course of Far Eastern history until the abolition of the imperial régime in China in A.D. 1911.

¹ See V. v. 477-8.

concern to provide an appanage for either of his two sons Arcadius and Honorius, this bi-partition of the Roman Empire was carried out smoothly and peacefully, in auspicious contrast to the bout of political and social disorder in the Sinic World at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era which was the price of the tri-partition of the Han Empire in that generation. Yet, on the morrow of the division of the Roman Empire into an appanage for Arcadius in the central and eastern provinces and an appanage for Honorius in the western provinces, the western indigenous successor-state of Theodosius's unitary Roman Empire fell a prey to barbarian war-lords whose power spread so far and wide and increased so rapidly, both in the provinces and at the centre, that in A.D. 476, only eighty-one years after Theodosius's death, the last successor of Honorius was compelled to abdicate by a barbarian gangster who, in virtue of being accepted as their leader by the barbarian mercenary troops in Italy, was already master, *de facto*, of all the territory still remaining under the effective control of the government ruling in the name of Honorius's successors, while the outlying fragments of this shattered western indigenous successor-state of the Roman Empire that had not already passed out of local Roman hands by A.D. 476 went the same way as Italy when in A.D. 481¹ the Scirian usurper Odovacer added the ex-emperor Nepos' principality in Dalmatia to the Italian dominions which Odovacer had already taken over from the ex-emperor Romulus 'Augustulus', and when in A.D. 486 the Salian Frankish war-lord Clovis wrested the Seine Basin out of Syagrius's hands.

In the next chapter of our synoptic history, we again find an identical movement working itself out on different lines in the Sinic and in the Hellenic case. The identical movement in this chapter was an endeavour on the part of one of the indigenous successor-states of a divided oecumenical empire to re-establish a lost imperial unity by force of arms. The United Tsin's successful reunification (*stabat* A.D. 280-317) of the whole former domain of the Han Empire has its counterpart in the partial success of the Constantinopolitan Emperor Justinian (*imperabat* A.D. 527-65) in reuniting African, Italian, and Spanish fragments of a defunct Honorian indigenous successor-state of the Roman Empire with an Arcadian indigenous successor-state that was still a going concern. These two endeavours had not only a similar general aim but also a similar general sequel; for in both cases the attempt to re-establish a lost imperial unity so cruelly taxed the human and material stamina of the indigenous successor-state whose resources were expended on the pursuit of this ambitious politico-military aim that the successors of Justinian and Sse-ma Yen (alias Tsin Wu-ti) not only found themselves unable to maintain the imperial unity that their predecessors had re-established at so heavy a cost, but also had to witness the collapse of their régime even in their own metropolitan territories. Justinian's successors paid for Justinian's excesses by seeing his and their momentarily swollen dominions reduced to the confines

¹ See Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene*, 395 A.D.-800 A.D., 1st ed. (London 1889, Macmillan, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 279.

of Anatolia through the loss of their South-East European provinces to the Slavs and of their Oriental provinces to the Arabs, while the successors of Tsin Wu-ti lost to barbarian successor-states the entire domain of the northern indigenous successor-state of the Han Empire which had been the Tsin dynasty's original base of operations, and were forced to transfer their capital to a recently annexed South over which they still retained their hold after they had ceased to reign over a reunited Sinic universal state.

In these respects the Justinianean chapter of Hellenic history and the United Tsin chapter of Sinic history ran on parallel lines; but this resemblance was accompanied by differences which had their origin in the preceding divergence between the Sinic and the Hellenic course of events. In order to translate the course of Hellenic history in the Justinianean Age into the corresponding Sinic terms, we should have to imagine that in the foregoing post-Theodosian Age the Honorian indigenous successor-state of a unitary Roman Empire had not only been as successful as the Arcadian indigenous successor-state was in crushing the attempts of barbarian war-lords to make it their prey, but had lived on through the fifth century of the Christian Era into the sixth century in order to achieve—and this completely—from a seat of government at Milan or Trier the reunification of the Theodosian Empire which was actually achieved in part by Justinian from a seat of government at Constantinople; and we should then have to imagine an Honorian Empire which had shown this impressive capacity for survival and recuperation suddenly suffering after all, at the end of this imaginary Roman imperial story in the sixth century, the fate which it actually suffered in the fifth century when its dominions were divided up among a host of usurping barbarian war-lords.

When we see the northern indigenous successor-state of the Han Empire eventually meeting this Honorian fate, our first thought is likely to be that the auspiciously un-Honorian path which this northernmost of 'the Three Kingdoms' had managed to follow during the preceding hundred years had not, after all, made any difference in the end. What had it profited the North, in the long run, first to keep the local reins of government out of barbarian hands and then to reunite the whole former domain of the Han Empire under its own indigenous régime, if in the third chapter of the story it was destined to be overtaken, as it was overtaken, by the doom which descended upon an Honorian indigenous successor-state of the Roman Empire no later than the morrow of its establishment? Any such first impression that the former northern provinces of the Han Empire under a belatedly established barbarian régime were no better off than the former western provinces of the Roman Empire under a promptly established barbarian régime will, however, give way to very different second thoughts when we go on to look at the third chapter of our synoptic history; for in a barbarian-ruled western fragment of the Hellenic World there was no sequel corresponding to the brilliant recovery of an apparently moribund culture in a barbarian-ruled northern fragment of the Sinic World.

The cultural sequel in the Far East to the establishment of barbarian

successor-states of the United Tsin was, as we have seen, a Sinification of these barbarian war-lords and their followers which reached its climax in the reign of the To Pa chief who took so seriously his Sinic duties as the 'Wei' Emperor Hiao Wên-ti (*imperabat* A.D. 490-9). The thorough-going reception of his Sinic subjects' culture in A.D. 494-6 by this To Pa successor of the United Tsin was the logical sequel to the assumption of the imperial title by Hiao Wên-ti's ancestor To Pa Kuei in A.D. 398¹ and to the conversion of the To Pa horde itself from a Nomad to a sedentary way of life by Kuei's grandfather Shi-i-kien (*dominabatur* A.D. 338-76);² and, during the century intervening between Kuei's reign and Hiao Wên-ti's, Kuei's presumptuously Herodian gesture had been justified politically by his barbarian 'Wei' Dynasty's success in extinguishing all rival barbarian successor-states of the United Tsin Empire and enlarging the borders of a thus politically reunited North of the Sinic World by stretching out a long arm towards the Tarim Basin.³

This was, it is true, the limit of the To Pa Power's political achievement; for, when Hiao Wên-ti sought to crown his predecessors' successes by uniting the South with an already reunited North, he suffered in A.D. 495, at the hands of the Ts'i, as decisive a defeat at the first ditch of the southern fortress in the Huai Basin⁴ as had been inflicted on his Tibetan forerunner Fu Kien in A.D. 383 by the Ts'i Dynasty's forerunners the refugee Tsin.⁵ Yet, though either of these successive disastrous outcomes of a Northern barbarian invasion of the South of the Sinic World had the same consequence as far as the South was concerned, the repercussions in the North were different in the two cases. In the South, the impregnability against Northern barbarian attack which the southern citadel of the Sinic culture displayed first in A.D. 383 and then in A.D. 495 gave the refugee culture, on either occasion, another hundred years of grace; and thanks to these successive reprieves the South was exempted from ever having to undergo the supreme ordeal of proving its mettle under even a belated experience of the *ci-devant* barbarian rule to which the North had succumbed as early as A.D. 317, since the Northern Power that did eventually reunite the South with the North in A.D. 589 was one which by that date had, as we have seen,⁶ already winnowed out the chaff of an intrusive Barbarism from the grain of an unmildewed local store of native Sinic culture. In the North, on the other hand, the effects of the two decisive battles of A.D. 383 and A.D. 495 were diverse instead of being similar and cumulative.

In the North, as we have seen, the barbarian war-lord Fu Kien's 'Ts'in' régime had been so deeply discredited by his disaster in A.D. 383 on the banks of the Huai that this local Tibetan barbarian successor-state of the United Tsin Empire immediately fell to pieces⁷ and, in crumbling, opened the way for a rival To Pa Tungus barbarian suc-

¹ See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 108-9.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 149-50.

³ See p. 657, above.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 160.

⁵ On p. 657, above.

⁶ On p. 657, above.

⁷ See Franke, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 98-101.

cessor-state to occupy the vacuum. The To Pa eventually reunited the whole of the North under their own rule between the year A.D. 385, in which Shi-i-Kien's grandson To Pa Kuei had declared his barbarian principality's independence under the high-sounding Sinic name 'Wei',¹ and the year A.D. 439, in which the last of the other surviving barbarian principalities in the North was extinguished.² In contrast to these Northern repercussions of the decisive battle in the Huai Basin in A.D. 383, the no less decisive battle in the same theatre in A.D. 495 did not bring to the ground the To Pa barbarian 'Wei' reproduction of the Tibetan barbarian 'Ts'in' realm. The unitary Wei régime in the North survived for another thirty-nine years; its eventual bi-partition in A.D. 534 was followed, within another forty-three years, by the reconstitution of a unitary Northern Empire under the régime of the Pe Chóu in A.D. 577; and this political reunification of the North was followed in its turn, within twelve years, by a third, and this time at last successful, endeavour on the part of a Northern war-lord to conquer the South. An enterprise that had proved to be beyond a Tibetan Ts'in Fu Kien's strength in A.D. 383, and still beyond a To Pa Wei Hiao Wên-ti's strength in A.D. 495, was thus eventually achieved in A.D. 589 by a Chinese Sui Wên-ti who had supplanted his Hiongnu Pe Chóu master in the North in A.D. 581.

In this perspective the histories of the former northern provinces of the Han Empire during a post-Han interregnum and the former western provinces of the Roman Empire during a post-Roman interregnum take on very diverse appearances. When we look in a post-Roman Western Europe for a counterpart of the Wei Empire in a post-Han Northern China, the Merovingian Power will be the closest match that we shall find. Like the To Pa under the Wei régime, the Franks under the Merovingian régime progressively swallowed up the neighbouring barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire that had been carved out by rival barbarian war-bands. Clovis himself annexed the Alemannic principality in Alsace and Swabia in A.D. 496 and threw the Visigoths out of Gaul in A.D. 507; in A.D. 528 Clovis's successor Theodoric I stretched out his arm into a then still barbarian interior of the Continent as far eastward as Thuringia; and the Burgundian principality in the upper basin of the Rhône and the Saône was definitively annexed to an expanding Frankish realm in A.D. 532-4. If there is any period in the Merovingian Frankish annals that invites comparison with the half-century of To Pa history, ending in the year A.D. 495, during which the Wei régime was at its zenith, we shall find this Merovingian equivalent 'in good King Dagobert's palmy days'.³ As soon, however, as we confront the Merovingian and the Wei dispensations with one another, as they were in these periods of their respective *floruits*, we become aware of the immensity of the Wei régime's relative superiority.

¹ See *ibid.*, p. 105.

² See Herrmann, A.: *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935, Harvard University Press), p. 29, Map IV.

³ Barham, R. H.: *The Ingoldsby Legends*, Second Series: 'The Lay of Saint Medard', line 1.

The first point of diversity that strikes the eye is a difference in the degree of success in the enterprise of empire-building. Whereas the Wei Power had succeeded in reuniting the whole northern third of the Han Empire's former domain under its own exclusive rule by A.D. 439, and was able thereafter to hold these dominions together till A.D. 534, the Merovingian Power never succeeded in reuniting under its own rule more than a Gallic splinter of a western fragment of the former domain of the Roman Empire. The Franks left it to their Lombard fellow barbarians to undo Justinian's work in Italy, and to their Arab fellow barbarians to undo the same ineffectual Roman spendthrift's work in Africa and to complete in the Iberian Peninsula the work of liquidating Visigothia which Clovis, the founder of the Merovingian Dynasty's fortunes, had begun in Gaul some two hundred years earlier. But this balance sheet of relative successes and failures in acquiring political dominion over territory is a crude test of relative total achievement, and to get to the heart of the matter we must lift our comparison from the political to the cultural plane. It is here that the contrast between the sterling Sinism of a Hiao Wên-ti (*imperabat* A.D. 490-9) and the transparent barbarism of a Dagobert I (*regnabat* A.D. 629-39) brings to light the full measure of the breadth of the gulf between these two barbarian essays in writing an epilogue to the history of a fallen civilization.

So far from finding an adequate counterpart in the Merovingian Frankish dispensation at its apogee, the Wei dispensation at its apogee, when it achieved on the political plane an integral reunification of one-third of the former domain of the Han Empire, was performing a feat which, in the western portion of the former domain of the Roman Empire, was not performed by the Franks until after the Merovingians had been supplanted by the Carolingians. And even a Carolingian Frankish dispensation that might venture to challenge comparison with the Wei dispensation on the political plane could not hold a candle to it on the cultural plane—not even in the light of the Carolingian linguistic and literary renaissance.¹

Manifestly this immense difference in the cultural outcome of our synoptic history of a post-Han Northern China and a post-Roman Western Europe must be traceable to the operation, in Northern China in the post-Han Age, of some potent force, making for the resurgence of a classical culture there, which was not in action in the post-Roman Age in Western Europe; and this force that availed to decide the destiny of the Far East was none other than the pertinacity of a corporation of masters of Confucian arts in holding their ground, not only within the cosily sheltered precincts of a politically inviolate southern citadel where a Confucian licentiate could continue to practise his administrative profession, but also in the bleakly exposed waste land of a North that had fallen under barbarian rule.

"The gist of the political history of the Far west [of the former Sinic World during the post-Sinic interregnum] is to be found in the vicissitudes of fortune in struggles between military leaders of [barbarian] war-bands

¹ See p. 63, above.

—Sienpi, Tanguts, Tibetans, and Huns—in which the Chinese element can hardly be said to have played an independent role. Every petty captain of mercenaries who enjoys an official status and has troops at his command becomes the ruler of a piece of territory, makes himself independent, and founds a state in which all the [traditional Sinic] imperial pomp and circumstance—a distinctive dynastic era, the supreme sacrificial rites, the traditional offices of state, and the rest—is faithfully reproduced. And thus, while the political power of the Chinese population in the North dwindles to the vanishing point of a complete insignificance, the formal institutions of the Sinic State succeed in subjugating every [barbarian] people and every [barbarian] ruler, in the teeth of all other spiritual influences, in virtue of their being enjoined by Confucian doctrine. . . . Confucianism was the force to which the [Sinic] universal state (*Weltstaat*) owed its salvation and its renaissance.¹

This northern triumph of the official Sinic imperial philosophy of state is the more impressive in view of the unparalleled strength of those 'other spiritual influences' with which Confucianism had to contend in a northern arena; for the same Sinic corporation of Confucian licentiates that was endowed, in the Han Empire's inviolate southern citadel, with a local asylum, for which they would have been envied by post-Diocletianic Roman imperial civil servants, had to hold their ground in the North against a convergent drum-fire of radioactive alien spiritual influences that their Roman confrères were never called upon to face in any quarter.

A Sinic World under a Han imperial régime and an Hellenic World under a Roman imperial régime were both exposed, like other disintegrating civilizations in their universal states, to the impact of alien spiritual influences of two kinds—higher religions organized in universal churches making their epiphany among an internal proletariat, and the barbarian ethos of an external proletariat's Heroic Age—but the distribution of the incidence of this twofold impact was quite different in the two particular cases with which we are concerned at the moment. The Hellenic World in its universal state was attacked by Barbarism and Religion² from opposite quarters of the compass; and, though the two attacking forces' fields of fire did eventually come to overlap in the last phase of the assaulted civilization's débâcle, there was never a stage of the battle at which the defence had to contend with both invaders at once on one and the same sector of the perimeter of Hellenism's beleaguered fortress.

The province of the Hellenic World in which Christianity made its earliest lodgement in the greatest force, and entrenched itself thereafter most strongly, was an Anatolia which Saint Paul and his fellow missionaries rapidly overran from a base of spiritual operations at Antioch;³ but this precociously Christianized province of Hellenism in Anatolia

¹ Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 112 and 55.

² Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lxxi (already quoted in this Study in I. i. 42 and IV. iv. 58).

³ In VI. vii. 93–95, we have noticed that, in making this conquest of Anatolia from a North Syrian base, Saint Paul was brilliantly succeeding on the religious plane in an enterprise which the Seleucidae had previously attempted on the military and political plane with signal ill-success.

did not come within the range of barbarian infiltration from Northern Europe and the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe until long after Hellenism and Christianity in Anatolia had already negotiated an *entente* with one another; and Hellenism's local success in making Anatolia into a citadel for itself in the fifth century of the Christian Era¹ was partly due to the support which Hellenism received here in this crisis from a Church that, in Anatolia, had long since been converted from Hellenism's adversary into its ally. The measures taken by a Constantinopolitan Imperial Government to forestall Gothic and Alan attempts to give Anatolia the alternative destiny of becoming one of the Roman Empire's barbarian successor-states thus proved effective partly because Hellenism never found itself constrained in Anatolia to contend with two alien enemies at once; and in the western provinces of the Empire, where a contemporary Honorian imperial régime failed to save itself from being supplanted by barbarian usurpers, the only vestiges of Hellenism that survived were actually such elements of the moribund pagan culture as had already been incorporated into the cultural heritage of Christianity in this area during the brief interval that had elapsed in this western theatre of operations between the belated achievement of an *entente* between Hellenism and Christianity and the victory there of the local barbarian war-lords over the Roman Empire's Honorian indigenous successor-state.²

The wide dispersal of the geographical distribution of the two pressures of Christianity and Barbarism on the perimeter of the Hellenic World, together with the difference in the timing of the religious and the barbarian attack on Anatolia (in contrast to the virtual simultaneity of the same two alien invaders' victories over Hellenism in the western provinces), manifestly told in Hellenism's favour in its fight to save its Anatolian citadel from falling. In the corresponding episode of Sinic history the strategic circumstances were more adverse to the prospects of the defence; for Barbarism's and Religion's assaults on the Sinic World were delivered not only at the same moment but on the same front. The North had to bear the brunt of both on the morrow of the débâcle of the Han Empire at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era; and a hundred years later, on the morrow of the débâcle of the United Tsin Empire at the beginning of the fourth century, the simultaneous offensives of Nomadism and the Mahāyāna against the same northern front of the Sinic World were resumed with a redoubled intensity. In sharp contrast to this twofold ordeal to which the North was subjected for some four hundred years ending in A.D. 589, the southern citadel of the Sinic culture in the same age suffered little more heavily from the Mahāyāna's spiritual infiltration than from the Nomads' attempts at military invasion.

¹ See the present Annex, pp. 662-5, above.

² 'Unlike Christian Byzantium, Christian Rome represents only a brief interlude between Paganism and Barbarism. There were only eighteen years between Theodosius's closing of the temples and the first sack of the Eternal City by the Barbarians. The great age of the Western Fathers from Ambrose to Augustine was crammed into a single generation, and Saint Augustine died with the Vandals at the gate' (Dawson, Christopher: *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), p. 28).

It is true that on the throne of the Southern Empire, in the last phase but one before its political reunification with the North, we are confronted by the almost Açoka-like figure of the convert-emperor Liang Wu-ti (*imperabat* A.D. 502-49), who proved the sincerity of his devotion to his Mahayanian faith by repeatedly attempting to retire from the World without regard to the public responsibilities inherent in his imperial office. And, though Liang Wu-ti's politically awkward Mahayanian Buddhist piety was manifestly an unusual phenomenon in the political life of Southern China in this imperial devotee's age, it is true on the other hand that, in the South as well as in the North, the Mahāyāna's Indo-Hellenic ecclesiastical art made a total conquest of the aesthetic faculties of Far Eastern souls that were much less prone to dedicate themselves whole-heartedly to the Mahāyāna's Indic unworldliness. Nor did either the artistic or the spiritual ray of the Mahāyāna's radiation into a Sinic Society's southern citadel play exclusively upon northern approaches where those water-barriers that so effectively baffled a predatory Nomad cavalry proved impotent to arrest an ethereal vehicle of salvation. The Mahāyāna also took South China in the rear by availing itself of an alternative southern approach along an Oceanic water-route which was taken over in the fifth century of the Christian Era by Indian apprentices of Hellenic navigators who had begun to open up the sea-routes from the Red Sea coast of Egypt to India towards the end of the second century B.C.,¹ when the Prior Han empire-builders were on the point of arriving at their 'natural frontier' on the South China coast, and who had made their first land-fall on Sinic *terra firma* in A.D. 166,² just in time to catch a glimpse of the Posterior Han Empire before its collapse.³ Yet even this far-flung encircling movement did not place the Mahāyāna in a position to penetrate the South of the Sinic World with the impetus that carried it into the heart of the North.

The Mahāyāna's overland route from its Indian cradle to its Far Eastern mission-field has already been surveyed in previous passages of this work.⁴ We have watched an esoteric philosophy turning into a popular religion as it travelled from North-West India to North-East Iran, from North-East Iran to the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, and from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin to the Tarim Basin; and from the Tarim Basin we have seen a nascent Mahāyāna being transmitted to the internal proletariat of the Sinic Society as a lasting and momentous religious consequence of a transitory and inconclusive series of border wars between the Kushan and the Posterior Han Power in which the Tarim Basin more than once changed hands between the two contending empires round about the turn of the first and second centuries of the Christian Era.⁵ The temporary reincorporation of the Tarim Basin into the Sinic

¹ See Herrmann, A.: *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935, Harvard University Press), pp. 26-27, and the present Study, V. vi. 448, n. 1.

² See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), pp. 193-4.

³ A.D. 166 was the year in which the Confucian civil servants of the Han régime formed an abortive association for the purpose of combating the influence of the eunuchs who were bringing the Han Empire to ruin (see VI. vii. 371, n. 3).

⁴ See IV. iv. 65, n. 4; V. v. 133-46; and IX. viii. 90 and 91.

⁵ See V. v. 142-5 and IX. viii. 95.

universal state, and of its Iranian inhabitants into the Sinic Society's internal proletariat, at this date opened the way for the Mahāyāna to travel on eastwards in search of the fortune that awaited it in a wider world.

The subterranean proletarian channels through which the Mahāyāna permeated were social counterparts of those masterpieces of hydraulic engineering, called *qanāt* or *kārīz*, through which, in the thirsty climate of Central Asia, the life-giving waters of the mountain springs were conveyed over vast distances underground in order, at the end of their long hidden course, to emerge at last on the surface of the plain and there to transfigure a desert into a garden through the far-borne waters' fruitful marriage with a soil whose latent fertility had been awaiting this magic rite of baptism. The geographical route along which a spiritually rejuvenating Indo-Hellenic higher religion made its way to the Far East was the narrow corridor of Sinically cultivated territory between the southward-looking inner face of the western extremity of the Great Wall and the northward-pointed foot of the northern escarpment of the great Tibetan Plateau. In crossing the watershed between the Upper Yellow River Basin and the Wei tributary of the Lower Yellow River on the eve of the Han Empire's débâcle, the Mahāyāna impinged on the northern cradle of the Sinic Civilization, rose to the surface of a Sinic Society whose social crust was at that moment caving in, burst into spiritual flower, and at the same time encountered the barbarians who were likewise taking advantage of the collapse of the Sinic dominant minority's universal state in order to break into the Wei Basin and the Lower Yellow River Basin out of a Eurasian Steppe from which those homelands of the Sinic culture were now no longer screened by any effective defence of the Great Wall.

This simultaneous invasion of the North of the Sinic World by the Eurasian Nomads and by the Mahāyāna plunged the Confucian litterati there into a sea of troubles. The breakdown of the Han régime had already been a disaster for them in itself, since it had deprived them, outside the bounds of the southern citadel, of the authority and emoluments deriving from a monopoly of the imperial civil service which they had been enjoying since the reign of their first imperial patron Han Wuti (*imperabat* 140-87 B.C.).¹ To accentuate their discomfiture, these unemployed Confucian civil servants now lost whatever moral influence they might previously have been able to exert on the internal proletariat of the Sinic Society; for the collapse of a Sinic oecumenical empire which threw these representatives of a *ci-devant* Sinic dominant minority out of official employment also brought appalling tribulations on the rank-and-file of a Sinic body social that had been relieved of the relatively efficient and benevolent rule of the Confucian litterati only to fall into the rough and clumsy hands of parvenu barbarian war-lords; and these cruel experiences moved the masses to look to non-Confucian quarters for relief and solace. A third blow suffered by the Confucian litterati in the North was their new barbarian masters' disinclination to re-employ them in the administrative service of the Han Empire's nascent barbarian successor-states.

¹ See V. v. 418-19, 654-5, and 708; and VI. vii. 355.

This unfriendliness of the barbarians towards the Confucians seems to have had two psychological roots. In the first place the barbarian usurpers of Sinic imperial prerogatives were well aware that the *ci-devant* imperial civil servants—whose interests, traditions, and principles conspired to make them 'die-hard' legitimists—were bound to be unfriendly to régimes whose pretensions they did not acknowledge; and the barbarians' consequent lack of confidence in the Confucians' loyalty made them anxious to dispense with these Confucians' services if they could find effectively trained Buddhist or Taoist substitutes for them.¹ In the second place the fascination which was exerted on the imagination of these, as well as other, militarily triumphant barbarians by a culture whose spiritual superiority was not effaced by its military defeat was counteracted to some extent, in this case as in others of the kind, by the victorious barbarian's usual desire² to distinguish his lordly self from his contemptibly servile subjects by wearing and airing the cultural badges of an unorthodox religion and an heroic poetry; and, in the sphere of religion, a Mahāyāna that was as alien an intruder on Sinic soil as the barbarian war-lord himself seemed to offer this military conqueror the distinctive religious emblem that he required.

Thus the Confucian ex-civil servants of an indigenous Sinic imperial régime who were left stranded in the North by the ebb of the imperial power after the fall of the Posterior Han, and *a fortiori* after the fall of the United Tsin, were constrained to watch their once docile Northern Sinic sheep straying out of a now dilapidated Confucian fold in search of some alternative spiritual shelter against the steppe-wind's icy blast, and at the same time to watch the once effectively barred-out barbarians who had now invaded the sacrosanct Sinic imperial paddock looking about them in Buddhist and Taoist quarters for new shepherds to employ in rounding up the scattered flock. In lieu of a Confucian philosophy which, like other philosophies, was a closed book to the unsophisticated and cold comfort to the afflicted,³ the common run of Sinic provincials in the North under an oppressive barbarian tyranny turned for comfort to a higher religion which offered a prospect of release from the painfulness of life;⁴ and such members of a Sinic internal proletariat as were not gathered into the bosom of the Mahāyāna fell into the net of an indigenous Taoist Church which had managed in the wilderness to survive a four-centuries-long Confucian ascendancy, and whose prelates now shrewdly observed and slyly imitated the methods of appeal by which the Mahāyāna was rapidly making its fortune on Far Eastern ground.⁵ These two religious by-paths along which a suffering Sinic rank-and-file sought ways of spiritual release turned out also to be avenues to worldly advancement owing to the barbarian usurpers' policy of seeking civil servants who would be literate without being Confucian; and the ousted Confucian litterati thus had the double mortification of seeing apostasy to an alien Mahāyāna and to

¹ See the passage quoted, in VI. vii. 371, from Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 275.

² See V. v. 229-34, et seqq.

³ See Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 259, quoted in VI. vii. 371-2.

⁴ See V. v. 146-7, 178, n. 1, and 557.

⁵ See V. v. 557-68.

a charlatan Taoism rewarded by appointment to offices of state from which Confucian licentiates were now *ex officio* debarred after having formerly been *ex officio* the only candidates eligible.

It is not surprising that, in these discouraging circumstances, a large number—perhaps a majority—of the Confucian litterati in the North should have taken the easy and attractive option of migrating to an inviolate southern citadel of the Sinic World in order to pursue their professional career in the administrative service of the refugee Tsin Dynasty and its southern successors.¹ The astonishing thing is that any of them should have elected to stay out in the cold; and it seems at first sight positively miraculous that this steadfast, but tiny, remnant² should eventually have captivated the barbarian rulers who had deliberately put these Confucian ex-imperial civil servants out of business.

In the sequel, as this progressively unfolded itself in the North in the course of the 278 years running from the sack of Loyang in A.D. 311 to the *Gleichschaltung* of a residue of the Southern Empire by the Chinese Northern war-lord Sui Wên-ti in A.D. 589, the disestablished remnant of the corporation of Confucian litterati in the North won their first victory when they subtly prevailed upon the local barbarian usurpers voluntarily to mould their illegitimate successor-states into likenesses of the Sinic imperial régime that they had supplanted by force; and an inevitable corollary of this change of countenance on the barbarians' part was, of course, the reinstatement in office of Confucian licentiates who were the sole repositories of Sinic *arcana imperii*.³ These reinstated northern survivors of the Sinic imperial civil service were not, however, content with their success in thus inducing the barbarians who had dismissed them to re-employ them. To their mind, the re-establishment of the Confucian form of government was incomplete so long as the Confucian officiants in these civil rites were performing their ritual duties in the name of mere *mulūk at-tawā'if*.⁴

So soon as the re-established Confucian civil servants in the North were confident that their *ci-devant*-barbarian pupils in the Confucian lore had thoroughly taken their education to heart, they felt that the time had come to crown their long and patient work of rehabilitation by employing barbarian converts on whom they could now at last rely as instruments for achieving an ultimate aim of which they had never lost sight. The political reunification in A.D. 589 of the South with the North of the former domain of the Sinic universal state might look, from the Northern Barbarians' standpoint, like an attainment, by the

¹ See Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 275, quoted in VI. vii. 371.

² By the year A.D. 405 the surviving non-Buddhist element in the population of the North had dwindled to a ratio of about 10 per cent., including the Confucians' Taoist competitors as well as the Confucians themselves, according to the Confucian historians' own admission (see Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 276, quoted in VI. vii. 371).

³ Tacitus: *Annals*, Book II, chap. 36, § 2; *Histories*, Book I, chap. 4, § 2. On this point see Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 286, quoted in VI. vii. 372.

⁴ The inadequacy of this half-way house was brought home to the resurgent Confucian litterati when they followed up their local reinstatement in the Northern Barbarian principalities by opening a counter-offensive against their now discomfited Buddhist competitors. 'In A.D. 446 the ruler of Wei, the Northern Empire, [at the instance of his Confucian advisers,] issued an edict against the Buddhists; but, as his rival in the [Southern] Chinese Empire was prepared to receive them, the monks were able to escape its effects' (Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-6).

barbarians' Chinese legatee Sui Wên-ti, of a barbarian objective that had eluded the grasp of a To Pa Wei Hiao Wên-ti before him, and of a Tibetan Ts'in Fu Kien before Wei Hiao Wên-ti; but, from the standpoint of the Confucian litterati in North and South alike, this same historic act of union looked like a reattainment—through the use of a now Chinese-controlled Northern Empire of barbarian origin—of a Confucian objective which, once before, had been attained—on that occasion only to be lost as soon as gained—by the unreinforced native Sinic efforts of the United Tsin.

What is the explanation of this apparent miracle? When we trace back the causes of the political reunification of the domain of the Han Empire in A.D. 589 as far as an historical analysis can follow them, we find ourselves led back to two acts of state that were both performed by the Prior Han Emperor Wuti (*imperabat* 140–87 B.C.): his endowment of the Sinic World with an impregnable southern citadel, through his southward expansion of his dominions up to the natural frontier presented by the South China Coast, and his investiture of the Confucian school of Sinic philosophers with a monopoly of the Sinic imperial civil service. In the light of the inquiry which we have now carried out, we shall pronounce that, of these two mighty deeds, the decisive act was, not an act of conquest that was Wuti's own exclusive achievement, but an institutional measure which would have been beyond the power even of this mightiest of all the Han Emperors if he had not been using his power merely to fulfil, in the fullness of time, the long disappointed hopes of a sage who had lived and died some four hundred years before Han Wuti's day. In short, the ultimate credit for the epoch-making renaissance of the Sinic universal state in the year A.D. 589 is shared by Han Wuti with Confucius.

The marriage of the Han imperial civil service with the Confucian school of philosophy which Han Wuti thus solemnized was the crucial event in Sinic history to which Hellenic history can show no parallel.¹ If Han Wuti's Hellenic counterpart is to be seen in the Roman Emperor Trajan, we can imagine this Roman empire-builder perhaps dreaming of equipping his Hellenic World with an equivalent of Han Wuti's southern citadel by setting himself to complete the Roman conquest of North-West Africa up to the natural frontier offered by the north shore of a Saharan sand-sea;² but we cannot imagine this prosaic-minded

¹ This capital point of difference between the respective courses of Sinic and Hellenic history has been noticed in VI. vii. 354–7.

² There is no indication that this dream ever did flit across Trajan's mind, but there is evidence that, if it ever did, it would have been doomed before birth to remain abortive, supposing that the dreamer had sought to translate it into reality; for before the end of Trajan's reign the Hellenic universal state was showing symptoms of severe strain and stress as a result of Trajan's mobilization of its resources for the pursuit of a Central European and a South-West Asian military objective, even without the aggravation of a third military enterprise on a North-West African front. After Trajan had followed up his incomplete and ephemeral annexation of an outstanding Dacian enclave of Central European barbarism by an attempt to arrive at a definitive settlement of the Roman Empire's 'eastern question', his momentary conquest of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin from Armenia to Mesênê was immediately undone by insurrections in his rear not only in the newly annexed territories but in provinces west of Euphrates which had been under Roman rule since the time of Pompey or earlier; and these unexpected and alarming complications in the East were accompanied in the West by threats of

practical soldier and administrator ever hitting upon the idea of solemnizing a marriage between a Stoic school of philosophy and a Roman imperial civil service, any more than we can imagine Trajan's third successor Marcus, in whose person the Roman imperial diadem was actually worn by a Stoic philosopher-king, summoning up either the zest or the energy or the *savoir faire* to attempt to translate into reality an ideal which Marcus, unlike Trajan, might well have entertained. In any case it is an historical fact that the Roman imperial civil service never did come to be identified either with Stoicism or with any other school of Hellenic philosophy; and, in thus remaining a mere professional corporation, this Roman civil service failed to qualify itself for outliving the oecumenical empire whose administration was its sole *raison d'être* from the beginning to the end of its professionally hide-bound existence. When the Roman Empire's Honorian indigenous successor-state was torn to shreds by contending predatory barbarians, the imperial civil servants whom this political catastrophe threw into technological unemployment had no choice open to them beyond the two courses of going out of business altogether and of finding alternative employment in the service of a Christian Church¹ which did not cease to be a going

a strike on the part of colonial communities of Roman citizens whose limited supply of man-power was no longer equal to meeting Trajan's inordinate drafts upon it. The representations made to Trajan in Mesopotamia by the representatives of the western municipalities, like those made to Alexander in the Panjab by his Macedonian veterans, were all the more compelling for being respectful; and Trajan would have found himself constrained, like Alexander, to bow to them, if Death's timely visitation had not permitted him to bequeath to Hadrian the urgent dirty work of liquidating a now patently over-ambitious South-West Asian military adventure.

In these unpropitious circumstances an attempt to subdue the vast virgin barbarian fastness in the Atlas would manifestly have been out of the question; and, indeed, if Trajan's grim North-West African cavalry-general Lusius Quietus had been given the task of completing the pacification of his own homeland, a Nomad Berber light horse that had acquitted itself brilliantly on the Mesopotamian plains might have fared ill in mountain-warfare against its sedentary Berber kinsfolk in the Atlas highlands.

The slenderness of the Roman Empire's reserves of war-potential in Trajan's day was exposed, as it was, without any need for a North-West African test, by the Central European and South-West Asian tests to which Trajan did, in fact, subject it; and this exposure gives the measure of the disparity in strength between the Roman Empire in the Age of the Principate and the Han Empire in the Age of the Prior Han Dynasty. For the Emperor Han Wuti, who successfully rounded off the Han Empire's southern marches up to the natural frontier presented by the South China Coast, was also the Prior Han emperor who committed the Sinic universal state to a war to the death against the Hiongnu Nomad lords of the eastern half of the Great Eurasian Steppe; and, though Wuti himself did not live to see this hazardous and exacting enterprise carried to completion, his eventual successor Han Yuanti did succeed, within a hundred years of the launching of Wuti's first attack *circa* 133 B.C., in gaining at least that measure of victory over the Hiongnu that Trajan succeeded in gaining over the Dacians (see V. v. 144-5 and 271).

However imperfect and transitory this Sinic triumph over a Eurasian Nomadism might be, the relative magnitude of the Sinic achievement here may be gauged from the significant fact that neither Trajan nor any other Roman empire-builder ever attempted to emulate Han Wuti's audacious attack on the Eurasian Nomads even within the confines of the Steppe's extreme Western Bay, any more than the Romans ever attempted to complete the pacification of North-West Africa by embarking on the enterprise of subjugating the Atlas and the Rif. The Sarmatians were never threatened, at Roman hands, with the fate that the Han Power inflicted on the Hiongnu; and we may guess that, if any Roman emperor had been so rash as to attack the Sarmatians, he would only have brought upon himself a repetition of the humiliation which had been suffered by the Achaemenian emperor Darius the Great when he had attacked the Sarmatians' local predecessors the Scyths.

¹ This transfiguration of frustrated Roman civil servants into creative Fathers of the Christian Church has been noticed in VI. vii. 369-70.

concern in the West when the western indigenous successor-state of the Roman Empire fell about the distracted imperial civil servants' ears.

In sharp contrast to this dilemma, from which there was no escape for Roman imperial civil servants in the Roman Empire's derelict western provinces, the Sinic imperial civil servants in the Sinic universal state's derelict northern provinces had no need to look for hospitality to an alien church in order to provide themselves with an alternative institutional framework when there had ceased to be even a fraction of an oecumenical empire for them to administer. It is true that these Sinic imperial administrators showed themselves just as blind as all but a handful of their Roman counterparts to the opportunity for a *beau geste* that was seized, according to the legend, by a Pannonian Roman soldier who impetuously divided his cloak with a beggar before the soldier's pursuing barbarian adversary had time to tear a surprisingly sanctified *sagum* from a suddenly transfigured warrior's shoulders. Like Saint Martin's civilian Roman contemporaries, the Sinic civil servants did wait stolidly to see themselves ignominiously stripped of their official robes of office; yet, in allowing themselves to incur this humiliating common experience, they were not exposing themselves, as their Roman confrères were, to face winter cold and barbarian scorn stark naked.

A Confucian civil servant who had been deprived of his official robe remained clad in his philosopher's shirt; and this respectable garment protectively covered his nakedness. With an all but deified hero-sage still to revere and confide in as his infallible master, and with a cloud of fellow witnesses,¹ past as well as present, to testify to the efficacy of a Confucian faith that had justified itself first in the glorious Wutian outcome of a four-hundred-years-long initial ordeal, the professionally unemployed passed-master of Confucian arts could bide his time, after the downfall of the United Tsin régime, without losing a *moral* which had carried his elder brethren, in their day, through their weary wanderings in the wilderness of a Sinic Time of Troubles and its first aftermath during the four centuries that had elapsed between Confucius's death and Wuti's belated advent. A patience that had once been crowned with such a dazzling ultimate reward could be practised in a second emergency with a new leaven of hope to lighten the old burden of fortitude; and, for a still living school of Confucian philosophers, this waiting game, so long as they had the strength of mind to play it, was bound, as we have seen, to be a winning game as well. After the political reunification of the whole former domain of the Sinic universal state by Sui Wên-ti in A.D. 589, the *manes* of Confucius were to see that disappointed sage's overweening pretensions posthumously vindicated for the second time; and T'ai Ts'ung's homage must have been even sweeter than Wuti's to Confucius's demurely jubilant ghost.

¹ Heb. xii. 1.

THE ROLE OF 'THE OLD KINGDOM' IN
EGYPTIAC HISTORY

WHAT is 'the Old Kingdom's' role in Egyptiac history? In this Study up to this point we have assumed that 'the Old Kingdom' was the political expression of the growth stage of the Egyptiac Civilization; but this assumption cannot be endorsed without verification, considering that, in the growth stage of other civilizations, the constellation of political forces that usually presents itself to the historian's eye is, not an oecumenical empire, but a litter of parochial states, while, in the few cases in which we do find an oecumenical empire on the scene at this stage, it can be accounted for as the product of a renaissance. The oecumenical and at the same time ineffectively ramshackle structure of the Carolingian, the Ch'ou, and the Khatti Empire, for example, is what we should expect, *a priori*, to find in an oecumenical polity which had been brought into being through the evocation of a ghost at a stage in the necromantic society's history at which it would have been incapable of achieving, or indeed of conceiving, so ambitious a programme of political construction by an independent exercise of its own creative powers without the aid of the Black Art. The ineffectiveness of the three empires above mentioned is thus self-explanatory. We have then still to explain the establishment of an efficient oecumenical polity such as, for example, the T'ang Empire or the East Roman Empire at an early stage in a civilization's growth; and, where an explanation that accounts for the facts on the hypothesis of a renaissance is not forthcoming, as it is in these two cases,¹ when we are thus confronted with the emergence of an efficient oecumenical polity at what would appear to be an early stage of a civilization's growth, we must look elsewhere for the solution of an historical problem that cannot be either ignored or evaded. A so-far unsolved problem of the kind is presented by the effective political union of Lower with Upper Egypt, to constitute 'the Old Kingdom', at a stage of Egyptiac history which is an early one according to the provisional analysis of the structure of Egyptiac history which we have been using as our working hypothesis in this Study up to the present point; for on this hypothesis 'the Old Kingdom' cannot be accounted for, like the East Roman Empire and the T'ang Empire, as a ghost of the universal state of an antecedent civilization effectively re-embodied in a reconstituted imperial civil service, since no such antecedent civilization or oecumenical empire figures either in the Egyptiac tradition or in the dossier of our Modern Western Egyptologists.

Does the enigma thus presented by 'the Old Kingdom' in our present vista of Egyptiac history require us to view Egyptiac history in a new perspective? And might a fresh avenue of interpretation be opened up

¹ See pp. 15 and 20, above.

by a recognition of the possibility that, in contenting ourselves with the view of Egyptiac history which we have taken so far, we may have been neglecting one of our own precepts? At the outset of this Study¹ we took note of the risk of error to which a student of History would be exposing himself if he were to allow his vision of an historical landscape to be governed by the fleeting distribution of the light and shade at the moment when the scene happened to be under his observation. The comparative abundance or scarcity of the evidence at an historian's disposal for the study of this and that past episode is determined for him by freaks of Chance which bear no relation whatsoever to those episodes' relative intrinsic importance or unimportance; and we should therefore be positively courting error if, in our mental reconstruction of the course of past history, we were to treat the capriciously irrational quotas of the intellectual materials at our disposal for our professional work as if these were trustworthy indexes of the true proportions of the past realities which we were seeking to bring into the focus of our present consciousness.

In administering this prefatory warning to ourselves, we commended it by citing, as an example of the consequences of ignoring it, the disproportionate concentration of the attention of Modern Western scholars on the Ptolemaic successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire, to the comparative neglect of its Seleucid sister commonwealth, and we pointed out that the consequent distortion of historical vision was the result of an unconsidered subservience to blind workings of Chance through which 'the natural museum' of Upper Egypt happened to be included among the shreds of ex-Achaemenian territory which, in the scramble for the spoils of Alexander's conquests, Ptolemy Lâgou decided to seize and managed to hold. Ptolemy's choice of Egypt for his personal prize was determined by shrewd 'geopolitical' calculations which, of course, had no connexion whatsoever with those peculiar local qualities in the climate and soil of a post-pluvial Upper Egypt that were to make the Sa'id a veritable archaeologist's paradise. Ptolemy's objective in seizing Upper Egypt was to appropriate its revenues, and, even if he might have been gratified to learn that he was also incidentally acquiring a ready-made record office in which the debris of his dynasty's acts would automatically accumulate into a collection of material evidence that moth and rust would not corrupt before thievish Modern Western archaeologists would be moved by a Faustian curiosity to break through and steal,² we may take it as certain that this consideration would have counted for nothing in his decisions if he had come to the conclusion that Egypt was a less desirable prey than the South-West Asian territories which he actually decided to abandon to Seleucus as a bone for this confederate of his to pick with their formidable common rival Antigonus.

This example provided an excellent illustration of our point; but we might have illustrated it equally well without looking so far afield from Upper Egypt as Lower Asia, and without descending so far in the Time-scale of Egyptiac history as the Ptolemaic Age. If we had confined our

¹ In I. i. 5-7.

² Matt. vi. 19-20; Luke xii. 33.

chronological horizon to 'the Predynastic Age' and our geographical horizon to the Lower Nile Valley, we could have made our point no less effectively by citing the contrast, in the archaeologist's historically misleading inventory, between the preservative powers of a dry-as-dust Sa'id and the destructive powers of a water-logged Delta; and, had we clinched our argument by adducing this illustration as well, we might have saved ourselves from what may prove to have been an hallucination in our subsequent interpretation of Egyptiac history.

The premiss of this interpretation was an assumption that the emergence of the Egyptiac Civilization could be equated, for practical purposes, with the conquest of Lower Egypt by the Upper Egyptian militarist empire-builder Narmer; and this assumption was based on the fact that in our Modern Western archaeologists' Upper Egyptian 'natural museum' the earliest extant monuments of the apparatus of the Egyptiac culture—and, in particular, the earliest specimens of its script—are attributable to this epoch. The weak point in this chain of reasoning is its unspoken and uncriticized prior assumption that an array of evidence derived almost exclusively from Upper Egypt can be treated with assurance as if it were good evidence, not merely for the local history of Upper Egypt itself, but also for the oecumenical history of the Egyptiac World as a whole. This prior assumption ignores the possibility that a relatively mature Egyptiac culture which, in our Upper Egyptian 'natural museum', has left no evidence of its existence dating back appreciably earlier than Narmer's day, may have had a previous history—and this perhaps a long one—in a Lower Egyptian 'natural destructor' of the debris of human activities.¹ And this possibility opens up the further one that the sudden appearance of, for example, an already mature Egyptiac script² in the Sa'id at the transition from 'the Predynastic Age' to Narmer's new era may be evidence, not that the Egyptiac culture suddenly came to birth in Narmer's day, but that a more advanced form of the Egyptiac culture was suddenly introduced into Upper Egypt from Lower Egypt as a consequence of Narmer's sudden forcible political unification of the two lands.

The magnitude of the possible error to which we expose ourselves in ignoring these considerations can be gauged by imagining, for the sake of the argument, that the unknown historical relation between the Sa'id and the Delta in the Egyptiac World may have been analogous to the known historical relation, in the Andean World, between the Plateau and the Coast.

In the history of an Andean World that consisted, like the Egyptiac World, of two physiographically diverse cultural provinces,³ we happen to know that the Andean culture originated in the coastal province and

¹ See Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University Press), p. 16.

² In the earliest specimens of the Egyptiac script that had been discovered by Modern Western archaeologists down to the time of writing, the characters were already being used, not as 'pictograms' giving a visual representation of objects or ideas, but as 'phonemes', in which the sound of the spoken Egyptian word corresponding to the original visual meaning of the character was associated with the character for the conveyance of this sound in other contexts. 'At the very beginning of history, Egyptian hieroglyphic writing appeared on stone and clay with this rebus-principle already accepted' (Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 38).

³ See II. i. 322-3.

that this was the scene of successive experiences of growth, breakdown, and disintegration through which the Andean Civilization passed before its coastal birthplace was eventually united politically with a culturally parvenu highland province to constitute an Andean oecumenical empire as a result of the conquest of the lowland coastal states Chimú and Nazca by the highlander militarist Pachacutec (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1400-48).¹ The reason why we are able to see Andean history now in this true perspective is because, in Peru, the coastal province that was the true birthplace of the culture happened, like the Sa'id in the Egyptiac World, to be 'a natural museum' in which climate and soil conspired to preserve the incriminating material evidence of Civilization instead of conspiring to destroy it; and, by the time of writing, this Peruvian 'natural museum' had been explored by the enterprise of experienced twentieth-century Western Americanists with a skill and energy that would have done credit to the pioneer nineteenth-century Western Egyptologists. The bearing of these triumphs of Archaeology in Peru on the interpretation of Egyptiac history was indicated by the revolutionary violence of the change in the interpretation of Andean history which these Peruvian archaeological discoveries had dictated.

Before the archaeologists started operations in Peru, Modern Western knowledge of Andean history had been virtually confined to evidence concerning the Empire of the Incas; and, while this evidence had partly consisted in the massive material monuments of cyclopean architecture constructed by these empire-building highlanders and their neighbours and predecessors on the Plateau, the main source of information at the disposal of Western scholars at that stage had been the Incaic imperial tradition preserved in Castilian literary dress and more or less misleadingly travestied in the process.² In the picture presented in this tradition the rise and fall of the Incaic Power were equated with the beginning and end of Andean history; and, while Modern Western scholarship correctly divined, on the strength of the internal evidence, that little credence was to be given to a version of the Incaic tradition, picked up by the seventeenth-century Spanish Jesuit historian Fernando Montesinos,³ which professed to carry the record of Incaic history back to a high antiquity, this well-justified rejection of an apocryphal prelude to genuine Incaic history was merely a negative result of historical criticism, and the most acute analysis of the Incaic traditional evidence would never have brought to light the authentic early history of the Andean Civilization in a coastal province of the Andean World where neither the Incas nor their predecessors in the highland province had played any decisive part before the fifteenth century of the Christian Era.

The true perspective of Andean history could only be brought to light by the instrument of Archaeology; and, when an archaeological

¹ See I. i. 121-2.

² The life and work of the Herodian half-breed Garcilaso de la Vega have been noticed in IX. viii. 597.

³ A critique of Montesinos' *Memorias Antiguas Historiales y Políticas del Perú* will be found in Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), pp. 17-18. Montesinos wrote this book in A.D. 1652, in the fifth generation after the Spanish conquest of the Andean Empire of the Four Quarters.

searchlight was eventually brought into action, it showed up the falsity of the picture that the Incaic tradition had presented; for even that portion of the traditional Incaic story that was not now proved false in itself was now proved to have been placed in a most misleadingly false perspective. While the traditional account of the foundation of the Incaic Empire according to the shorter of the two irreconcilable traditional schemes of chronology might still be accepted as being more or less true as far as it went, it was now shown to be, not the alpha and omega of Andean history, but merely the last chapter in the story of the Andean Civilization's disintegration.

If we were to apply this Andean analogy to our interpretation of Egyptiac history, we should find ourselves having to reckon with the possibility that the picture which we had accepted here so far might be little less misleading than an Incaic tradition which had been exploded by an archaeological bomb. The corresponding Upper Egyptian tradition was, no doubt, unlikely ever to be discredited in this conclusively objective way, because the Delta, unlike the coastal province of the Andean World, was unlikely to yield up positive archaeological evidence of the part that it had played in history. Nevertheless, the Upper Egyptian tradition which, in the absence of Deltaic archaeological evidence, had hitherto held the field was at least impugned by the sensational overthrow of the Incaic tradition at the archaeologists' hands; for an egocentricity that led the Incaic makers and masters of an Andean universal state to telescope the whole drama of Andean history into the single last act in which the Incas themselves happened to hold the stage is, as we know, a common infirmity of Human Nature; and it would be surprising if there had been no alloy of the same human weakness in the character of the Upper Egyptian makers and masters of 'the Old Kingdom' of the Two Lands. The inference to be drawn from this presumption of a taint of Original Sin would be that 'the Old Kingdom' in Egyptiac history, like 'the Empire of the Four Quarters' in Andean history, might in truth have been merely the last chapter of a long story, or, in other words, might have been, like 'the Empire of the Four Quarters', a universal state in the technical sense in which that term is used in this Study.

When once this idea has been suggested by the external evidence, it becomes manifest that there is also internal evidence which likewise testifies in favour of it.

In the first place 'the Old Kingdom' actually was a universal state in the literal sense of the words, inasmuch as it was an oecumenical empire embracing the whole domain of the Egyptiac World of the day. In the second place it exhibits the constitution and *éthos* of a universal state if 'totalitarianism' is to be regarded as one of the distinctive characteristics of this species of polity. While 'the Middle Empire', in which we have hitherto seen the Egyptiac universal state, and 'the New Empire', in which we have seen a recrudescence of it, both certainly pass muster on this test, 'the Old Kingdom' qualifies even more conspicuously for recognition as being another representative of the same species, considering that 'totalitarianism' probably asserted itself more rapidly in

'the Old Kingdom' than in 'the Middle Empire',¹ and certainly went to greater lengths in 'the Old Kingdom' than in either of its two successors.² There was no phase of Egyptiac history after the fall of 'the Old Kingdom' in which any Pharaoh could have said 'L'État, c'est moi' with the same plenitude of veracity that would have animated the Early Modern Western *Roi Soleil's* celebrated words if they had been uttered by one of the Pyramid-Builders. In other contexts we have seen how the Pyramid-Builders broke the Egyptiac Society's back,³ and how the mark made by this inordinate abuse of power on the Egyptiac Society's folk-memory bit so deep and smarted so sorely as to make it impossible for any of those titanic egoists' successors ever to emulate their total inhumanity *vis-à-vis* their subjects.⁴ In our first reading of Egyptiac history we identified the catastrophe inflicted on the Egyptiac Society by the Pyramid-Builders with the breakdown of the Egyptiac Civilization. On second thoughts we might be inclined to see in it, not the first blow, but the *coup de grâce*, and to look for the breakdown in some forgotten disaster in 'the Predynastic Age' which had passed into oblivion simply because the historical evidence happened to have been swallowed up in a Deltaic Serbonian Bog.

On the analogy of what we know about the causes of the breakdowns and disintegrations of other civilizations, we might conjecture that the Egyptiac Civilization ruined itself, like so many societies of its kind, through a failure to keep within bounds the destructiveness of a chronic warfare between parochial sovereign states;⁵ and on this line of interpretation we might see in the gruesome scenes carved on the palette of Narmer⁶ a record of the knock-out blow that brought an Egyptiac Time of Troubles to its tardy close. The measure of the incidence of an evil is apt to be reflected in the scale of the price that its victims bring themselves to pay for the sake of escaping from it; and the plenitude of the power that, under the régime of the Old Kingdom, was invested in a Pharaoh reigning on Earth as a god incarnate suggests that the suffering inflicted on the Egyptiac World by political disunity in a predynastic age of unrecorded warfare between contending parochial states was probably proportionate in its severity to the exorbitancy of the price which this society is known to have consented to pay in the next chapter of the story for an oecumenical peace which had come to be recognized as a necessity of Egyptiac life.

If we were to find ourselves convinced by the argument of our present *retractatio* of our previous interpretation of Egyptiac history, we should

¹ Wilson, op. cit., pp. 45-47, conjectures that the dogma that Pharaoh was not a man, but was a god incarnate on Earth, was officially adopted after the establishment of the United Kingdom in order to ground a political union which had originally been brought about by force upon a moral consent springing from a religious faith. He suggests that this institution took root in the time of the first two dynasties.

² See IV. iv. 408-14.

³ See I. i. 136-7 and 141-2, and III. iii. 212-15.

⁴ See IV. iv. 412-14.

⁵ In the later Predynastic Age of Egyptiac history, 'Archaeology produces a great amount of arrowheads and mace-heads, and the skeletons of the Predynastic Egyptians show an extraordinary number of broken bones. Apparently, communities had come into competitive contact with other communities, so that there was already that warfare which built little states into larger states' (Wilson, op. cit., p. 25).

⁶ See IV. iv. 502-4.

then have to revise that interpretation in two respects. We should have to suppose that 'the Middle Empire', like 'the New Empire', was a recrudescence of a universal state, and that a phenomenon which we had already detected in Egyptiac history in one occurrence had actually occurred not merely once but twice. And we should then have to regard the chapter of Egyptiac history that intervened between the fall of 'the Old Kingdom' and the rise of 'the Middle Empire' as having been, not a Time of Troubles following the breakdown of a civilization and ending in the establishment of a universal state, but an interregnum following the dissolution of a universal state and ending in this case, not in the emergence of a new civilization, but in the recrudescence of a universal state that had gone into dissolution without having lost its capacity to reconstitute itself. Such recrudescences of universal states after they had once gone to pieces might not represent the 'normal' course of History according to a standard of normality based on what had been perhaps the more usual denouement of the histories of the disintegrations of civilizations during the five or six thousand years within which a score of societies of this species had been rising and falling up to date; yet it would not be surprising to find an additional instance of the phenomenon of recrudescence in an Egyptiac history which had already shown itself peculiar by providing the historical investigator with one specimen of this unusual turn of events at a later stage in its long course. When once we have interpreted 'the New Empire' as being a recrudescence of 'the Middle Empire', there is no intellectual stumbling-block to hinder us from similarly interpreting 'the Middle Empire' as being a recrudescence of an 'Old Kingdom' which, on this revised interpretation, we should then identify as having been the original Egyptiac universal state.

We have, however, still to ask ourselves whether a view of 'the Old Kingdom's' role in Egyptiac history that is suggested by the deification of an oecumenical Pharaoh and by material evidences of the previous ravages of warfare in a Late Predynastic Age is compatible with all the phenomena that have to be taken into account in an appreciation of a period of Egyptiac history extending from the date of the unification of Lower Egypt with Upper Egypt under the First Dynasty to the dissolution of the United Kingdom under the Sixth Dynasty. In the survey of other oecumenical empires from which our concept of a universal state has been derived, we have found that one of the outstanding features of this institution is a negative one. The dominant minority that has pieced together, in a universal state, the fragments of a society that has been broken up by the same dominant minority's fratricidal strife in a foregoing Time of Troubles is conspicuously destitute of the creativity which, before the breakdown, has been displayed by its predecessors when they have been leading the rank-and-file by the persuasive arts of Orpheus instead of dragooning them with a Prussian drill-sergeant's rod.¹ If there is any creative activity in the body social of a disintegrating society in its universal state, this makes its appearance among the Internal Proletariat; it works from below upwards; and, if the Dominant Minority is ever stirred by this fresh breath of life, it

¹ See IV. iv. 122-31.

yields to it grudgingly and late in the day. Does the record of an Egyptiac dominant minority conform to this pattern of behaviour in the Age of 'the Old Kingdom'? If the first two dynasties in the history of an Egyptiac United Kingdom had been followed immediately by the Fifth and Sixth, we could have certified that, on the test of the dominant minority's being destitute of creativity, 'the Old Kingdom' would have qualified for classification as a universal state; but the performance of the Third and Fourth Dynasties—which has, of course, likewise to be taken into account—does not fit into this picture.

At first sight, indeed, it might look as if the First and Second Dynasties, too, were convicted of creativity by the sudden epiphany, at the inauguration of the United Kingdom, of an Egyptiac script at an advanced stage of development.¹ This invention, without which the problem of administering an oecumenical empire on the scale of the Egyptiac United Kingdom might well have been insoluble, must have been the fruit of a creative activity of a high potency at some time and place, but the creative act will not be debited to the Thinites' account. While, in the absence of records from the Delta, it is no more possible to prove than it is to disprove that the Egyptiac script was an independent invention of the people of Lower Egypt in the predynastic days before the political unification of the two lands, there is the alternative possibility that the idea of a script consisting of phonemes derived from pictograms may have come to the Egyptiac Society from the Sumeric World; for in the first place the archaeological record, as it stood in A.D. 1951, indicated that in Sumer the art of writing had appeared earlier than in Egypt and had developed gradually from rudimentary beginnings, whereas in Egypt it seemed to have made a sudden epiphany at an advanced stage,² while in the second place there were certain other elements of culture in Egypt in the Late Predynastic and the Early Dynastic Age which were undisputedly Sumeric in origin: for example, the cylinder seal; a panelled brick architecture; an antithetic composition of groups of figures; the portrayal of composite monsters and animals with intertwined necks; and the use of boats of a distinctively Sumeric build.³ These Sumeric influences, which had declared themselves in the Egyptiac World during the last two centuries of the Predynastic Age, continued to dominate the Egyptiac culture under the first two dynasties;⁴ and, though they may not be so important as to impugn the Egyptiac Civilization's claim to originality,⁵ they do absolve the First and Second dynasties from any imputation of creativity.

On the other hand the Fourth Dynasty, if not the Third, is convicted of creativity by an apparently sudden effacement of these Sumeric

¹ See p. 684, n. 2, above.

² See Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 37, and the present Study, IX. viii. 453, n. 2.

⁴ See Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 and 50.

⁵ Wilson contends that, for some 1,800 years out of the 2,000 years that may have elapsed between the genesis of the Merimidian predynastic culture and the establishment of the United Kingdom, 'the development of Egyptian culture was internal' (*op. cit.*, p. 37). Egypt's 'debt to the influence of Mesopotamia was very great, but the inner spiritual urge to a new way of life was the essential factor—really the only motivating factor—in the great change' in the Egyptiac way of life at the transition from the Predynastic Age to the Age of 'the Old Kingdom' (*ibid.*, p. 40).

influences, after a reign of perhaps not less than six centuries' duration according to Wilson's chronology,¹ through the abrupt creation of a new style of culture that was distinctively Egyptiac.² The initiative in this burst of creative activity manifestly came from above, not from below; its pace seems to have been extraordinarily swift, if the speed of the development of Architecture is a fair sample of it;³ and this sudden swift advance was made on a broad front: in the provinces of Medical Science⁴ and the Philosophy of Religion⁵ as well as in the visual arts. In the province of Architecture, which was the master art of the time and place,

'this sudden development seems to have been entirely native within Egypt. It was called forth by two devotions: the acceptance of the dogma that the King was a god and thus deserving of a supreme offering of energies, and the excitement of a new adventure in Art and Technique.'⁶

And, while the piling up of colossal buildings in honour of a god incarnate—an oecumenical monarch who was an object of worship because he was a guarantor of peace through unity—is something that might be interpreted as one of the familiar phenomena of a universal state, on a par with the big buildings of 'the New Empire' of Egypt under the Nineteenth Dynasty and of the Roman Empire in its post-Diocletianic Age,⁷ 'the excitement of a new adventure in Art and Technique' is a mark, not of a temporary rally in a long-drawn-out losing battle against the forces of social disintegration, but of an early stage of social growth. Moreover, the distinctive feature of the pyramids built by pharaohs of the Third and Fourth Dynasties, as contrasted with pyramids of a later age, is not the inordinate physical bulk that they have in common with the fallen colossus of Ramses II at Thebes or with the Baths of Diocletian at Rome, but the beautiful exactness of workmanship⁸ that they have in common with the Parthenon at Athens and with the Green Mosque at Brusa.

On this showing, we are bound, in reconsidering our analysis of the structure of Egyptiac history, to conclude that, whether or not there was a flowering of creativity in the Early Predynastic Age, there un-

¹ See Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 39, 44, and 78.

³ Under the first two dynasties the Egyptians were content, with one or two exceptions, to go on using a Sumeric building material in a Sumeric style of architecture, in spite of the fact that in Egypt, in contrast to Shinar, brick was not the only building material within the architect's reach. Though, in Egypt, 'stone was abundant and easy to work' (Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 50), 'the first significant structure of stone' (*ibid.*, p. 70) was the Third Dynasty Pharaoh Djoser's Step Pyramid at Saqqārah, and 'the stone of this structure was cut into small bricks, laid as if the stone blocks were mud bricks, and panelled in the same way as the previous brick tombs were' (p. 51). The rise from a Sumeroid brick architecture to the climax of an Egyptiac stone architecture in the Pyramid of Khufu was, by contrast, 'astonishingly fast. The first serious stone masonry may have been about 100 or 125 years before Khufu; . . . Djoser's Step Pyramid was about 75 years before Khufu. In that brief span the Egyptians had learnt how to handle tremendous masses of stone. . . . They abandoned the handling of stone as if it were brick and treated the new material for its own qualities of mass and durability. And they learnt how to finish off myriads of blocks with a perfection that presented a single unified mass' (*ibid.*, p. 70).

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 56-58.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 58-60.

⁷ See *IV. iv. 638*.

⁸ See Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55, citing Edwards, I. E. S.: *The Pyramids of Egypt* (London 1947, Penguin).

questionably was one in the Age of the Third and Fourth dynasties;¹ and then we shall also find ourselves further bound to conclude that, whether or not there was a social breakdown, leading to a Time of Troubles, in the Late Predynastic Age preceding the establishment of the United Kingdom under the First Dynasty, there was unquestionably a breakdown after the running out of the Fourth Dynasty, and a Time of Troubles between this breakdown and the political reunification of the Egyptiac World by a Theban Mentuhotep² circa 2050 B.C. So, after all, we shall not find ourselves able to account for the decline and fall of the Old Kingdom under the Fifth and Sixth dynasties entirely as a belated but eventually inevitable nemesis of wounds inflicted by the Egyptiac Society on its own body in an age before a temporary reprieve had been won for it by the First Dynasty's feat of imposing an oecumenical peace. We shall have to find the chief cause of this decline and fall where we have found it in earlier passages in this Study,³ and that is in the egotism which was the dark reverse side of the Pyramid-Builders' dazzling creativity; for this egotism brought in its train a nemesis that worked itself out in the full light of history.

The official concentration of political power in the hands of a Pharaoh whose practical capacity to transact business could not in truth surpass the limits of the ordinary human nature of this bogus god found its nemesis in a decentralization of power, *de facto*, which Pharaoh might ignore but found himself impotent to arrest. The expenditure of an economic surplus—acquired by a politically united Egyptiac Society through the corporate achievement of systematically reclaiming a Nilotic jungle-swamp—upon building the Pyramids, and then setting apart lavish assignments of land revenues for the maintenance of successive Pharaohs' mortuary cults, found its nemesis in an economic breakdown that conjured penury out of abundance. The dedication of 'a new adventure in Art and Technique' to the perpetuation of a life-in-death for dead pharaohs found its nemesis in the freezing of the living plasma of a new-born Egyptiac style of art into a rigid convention⁴ as swiftly as the lava welling out of the crater of a volcano is frozen in the act of flowing down the mountain's side. And all these divers unhappy consequences of the deification of a human ruler eventually stung Egyptian hearts into a moral revolt against the injustice of a régime of privilege that had been

¹ The cause of this flowering in this age was still a mystery at the time of writing. Wilson, in *op. cit.*, p. 61, raises the questions: 'Did a new government bring into being new ruling classes and therefore new social classes? Did a single government, controlling the land from the First Cataract to the Mediterranean, so improve the economic standard of the nation that there was a newly rich class and a notable increase in population? These are highly important questions, but we cannot answer any of them.' Yet, while these questions remained unanswerable apropos of the history of an Egyptiac 'Old Kingdom', they could be answered in the affirmative apropos of a Roman Empire in Hellenic history and of a Han Empire in Sinitic history, and it could be reported that, in those two cases, in which the answers to Dr. Wilson's questions were known, a *prima facie* promising conjunction of political unity with economic development had not availed to kindle a new flame of creative activity.

² See Drioton, É., and Vandier, J.: *L'Égypte* (Paris 1946, Presses Universitaires de France), pp. 271-3; Winlock, H. E.: *The Rise and Fall of the Middle Kingdom in Thebes* (New York 1947, Macmillan), pp. 22-32.

³ See I. i. 136-7 and 141-2, and III. iii. 212-15.

⁴ On this point, see Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

carried to monstrous lengths. In its moral atmosphere the anarchic chapter of Egyptiac history between the dissolution of 'the Old Kingdom' and the establishment of 'the Middle Empire' is much more reminiscent of the Time of Troubles between the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization and the establishment of the Roman Empire than it is of the interregnum between the dissolution of the Roman Empire and the emergence of Christian Hellenistic societies affiliated to the Hellenic Civilization.

In view of these well-authenticated positive facts, we must abide by our original finding that, in the structure of Egyptiac history, the Age of the Pyramid-Builders is an authentic age of growth, in spite of its being an episode in the life of an 'Old Kingdom' which bears marks of being the universal state of a disintegrating society. We must recognize, in fact, that 'the Old Kingdom' is enigmatically Janus-faced.

X. B (ii) (a), ANNEX IV

THE RELATION, IN RENAISSANCES OF UNIVERSAL STATES, BETWEEN EFFECTIVENESS OF EVOCATION AND DEGREE OF GEOGRAPHICAL DISPLACEMENT

IN a preceding Annex to this chapter,¹ in which we have compared the renaissances of the Sinic and Hellenic universal states, we have found that the renaissance of the Sinic universal state in the main body of the Far Eastern World was remarkably more effective than was the renaissance of the Hellenic universal state in either Western or Orthodox Christendom, and also that, as between these two renaissances of the Roman Empire in the histories of the two Christian Hellenistic civilizations, its renaissance in the shape of an East Roman Empire in the main body of Orthodox Christendom fell less far short than its renaissance in the shape of a Holy Roman Empire in the West fell short of the standard of effectiveness set by the renaissance of the Ts'in and Han Empire in the shape of the Sui and T'ang Empire. These findings suggest, as far as they go—and they are, of course, based on a consideration of only three cases—that the effectiveness of the evocation of an antecedent society's universal state varies in direct ratio with the tenacity of the original universal state in surviving, or with its persistence in rallying, during the death agonies of the moribund society of which it was a tardy political embodiment, and in inverse ratio with the degree of the geographical displacement of the domain of the affiliated civilization, in whose history the renaissance takes place, from the domain of its defunct predecessor.

In Sinic and Far Eastern history the dissolution of the Posterior Han Empire at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era was ephemerally retrieved during the years A.D. 280–317 by a reunion of the whole of its former territory under the rule of 'the United Tsin'; and, when, thereafter, a nascent Far Eastern Society emerged out of a post-Sinic interregnum, its domain was virtually coextensive with its Sinic predecessor's, even though, within this domain, the Yellow River Basin, which had been the Sinic Civilization's cradle, was now rivalled in importance by a Yangtse Basin which had been incorporated into the Sinic World only in the course of its Time of Troubles and its universal state. In Hellenic and Orthodox Christian history a Roman Empire which had dissolved at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era in the West survived till the turn of the sixth and seventh centuries in the central and eastern provinces with a tenacity comparable to the persistence of a temporarily dissolved Sinic universal state in reconstituting itself for a further spell under the auspices of the United Tsin. On the other hand the domain of the Orthodox Christian Society that emerged thereafter out of a post-Hellenic interregnum,

¹ On pp. 649–81, above.

unlike the domain of the Far Eastern Society, was not coextensive with the domain of the antecedent society to which it was affiliated. The cradle of the Hellenic Civilization had been the basin of the Aegean Sea;¹ but for some two hundred years after the emergence of an Orthodox Christendom the whole of Continental European Greece and the Morea, save for a few isolated fortresses, was in the hands of pagan Slav interlopers, while Continental Asiatic Greece and the islands of the Archipelago, though they were inside the Orthodox Christian fold, were playing a subordinate part in the nascent civilization's history. Orthodox Christendom's cradle lay on the Anatolian Plateau, and the antecedent civilization to whose domain it approximately corresponded was not the Hellenic but the Hittite. The only important common ground between a nascent Orthodox Christendom and a pre-Alexandrine Hellas was the coastline and immediate hinterland of the Black Sea Straits—above all, of course, an Orthodox Christian imperial capital at a Constantinople which had once been the Hellenic city-state founded by Megarian colonists at Byzantium. This province of the Hellenic World beyond the Dardanelles had, however, lain outside the original domain of Hellas round the Aegean, and the planting of Hellenic colonies along the coasts of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus had not begun before the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.

As for the relations between the Hellenic Civilization and Western Christendom, the earliness of the date of the break-up of the Roman Empire in the West was matched by the extent of the displacement of the cradle of Western Christendom from the Hellenic World's Aegean homeland. The cradle of Western Christendom lay in Gaul, north-west of the Alps and astride the Rhine, in territory that had not been incorporated into the Hellenic World until the eve of the establishment of the Roman Empire; and in the early centuries of Western history the Mediterranean seaboard of Gaul in Provence and Languedoc, which had been won for Hellenism by Roman arms a century earlier than the interior and had been penetrated, long before that, by Hellenic influences radiating from Marseilles, played no more important a part than was played in Orthodox Christian history by a *ci-devant* Roman province of Asia that had become the East Roman Empire's Thracian army-corps district.

We have now to inquire whether the historical 'law' which we have inferred from a synoptic examination of these three cases stands or falls if we bring into the picture the other cases known to us. In another context² we have classified fifteen 'related' civilizations³—reckoning the offshoots of the Far Eastern and Orthodox Christian civilizations separately from their main bodies—on the criterion of the degree of their geographical displacement from the antecedent societies to which they are affiliated. Does this widening of our horizon discredit or vindicate our tentative 'law' to the effect that the evocation of the ghost of an antecedent civilization's universal state in the history of an affiliated

¹ See IX. viii. 419 and 711-12.

² In I. i. 132.

³ The Sinic Civilization should be added to this list if we are right in concluding, in the light of the progress of archaeological discovery since the time when the first six volumes of this Study were being written, that this Sinic Society had a predecessor in the shape of the Shang Culture.

civilization varies in its effectiveness in inverse ratio to the degree of the geographical displacement of the affiliated society's cradle from its predecessor's? If we now go on to complete our survey, we shall find our tentative 'law' vindicated on the whole.

For example, in the history of the offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan, on ground lying right outside the domain of the antecedent Sinic Civilization, even at its widest extent, a ghost of the Sinic universal state that had been successfully resuscitated in the main body of the Far Eastern Society in the shape of the Sui and T'ang Empire was duly introduced into Japan *tel quel*; but, as we have seen,¹ this unimaginatively exact replica of the T'ang régime was too exotic a plant in Japan to strike root there effectively; and accordingly a resuscitation of the Han régime that was against nature even in China was soon reduced in Japan to a political façade thinly masking a free play of native Japanese political forces on original lines of their own.

The offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia resembled the offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan in lying right outside the geographical limits of the antecedent civilization, even at their widest; and here Moscow's claim to be 'the Third Rome'² was not belied by her performance so conclusively as Kyoto's claim (if ever made) to be 'the third Ch'ang Ngan'. Yet, though a Muscovite Tsardom was a more effective avatar of the Roman Empire than a Western 'Holy Roman Empire' ever contrived to be, the native Russian element in its *éthos*, which was the source of its vitality, made it a much less exact replica of its Roman model than was reproduced in an East Roman Empire which had retained the authentic 'Second Rome' to serve as its own imperial capital.

If we pass on to take a synoptic view of the two Islamic societies affiliated to the Syriac Civilization, we shall find our 'law' holding good here again. In an Arabic Muslim World whose cradle included Syria itself, a reintegrated Syriac universal state, in the shape of an 'Abbasid Caliphate, was revived, in a beleaguered fortress which had Syria for its glacis and Egypt for its donjon, within less than three and a half years after the extinction of the original 'Abbasid Caliphate in its residual metropolitan territory in 'Irāq.³ On the other hand, in an Ottoman extension of the Iranic Muslim World into Anatolian territory that had not been embraced in the domain of the Syriac Civilization at any time since its inclusion, from 547 B.C. to 334 B.C., in the dominions of the Achaemenian Empire, the Caliphate enjoyed so little prestige that, as we have seen,⁴ Sultan Selīm I, the Ottoman conqueror who overthrew the Egyptian Mamlūk power and annexed its dominions, never took the trouble to usurp the title of Caliph from the last scion of the Mamlūks' Cairene 'Abbasid puppets; and Istanbul's potential claim to be 'the Third Baghdad' was not exploited by Ottoman statesmanship till the rapid break-up of the Ottoman Empire after the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 moved the Porte to bring its dusty title to the Caliphate out of its muniment room as a long-neglected political asset which might perhaps be used to offset the Ottoman Empire's grievous

¹ In II. ii. 158-9.

³ See VI. vii. 20.

² See VI. vii. 31-40.

⁴ In VI. vii. 21-27 and on p. 103, above.

losses of territory and power by helping to preserve some residue of Ottoman political influence over former Muslim subjects of the Porte who had now passed under non-Muslim rule, and to extend this influence over other Muslims, likewise living under non-Muslim rule, who had never at any time been subjects of the Ottoman Empire, even at its widest extent.

We can see, again, that the régime of the Kassite barbarian kings and their indigenous successors, in a Babylonia that was coextensive with an antecedent Sumeric Civilization's cradle in the Land of Shinar, ran much truer to the type of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, which had been the Sumeric Civilization's universal state, than did the régime of a Hittite barbarian Empire of Khatti on an Anatolian Plateau that had been only on the fringe of the Sumeric World even at the Empire of Sumer and Akkad's apogee.

While our 'law' has thus stood the test of an empirical survey so far, there is at least one case in which the 'law' seems to break down. In the history of a Hindu Society whose cradle was as nearly coincident with an antecedent Indic Civilization's as the Far Eastern Society's cradle was with an antecedent Sinic Civilization's, we should expect to find some avatar of the Mauryan Empire comparable in effectiveness to the Sui and T'ang avatar of the Ts'in and Han Empire; but an inspection of Hindu history reveals no political renaissance of the kind.¹

As for the histories of the sister societies affiliated to the Minoan Civilization, we should expect an Hellenic World whose cradle partially coincided with the Minoan World's to be the scene of an avatar of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' to which we should find no such effective counterpart in a Syriac World whose cradle lay completely outside the bounds of the Minoan World, even at its widest extent, save for the Minoan settlement at Ugarit on Ras ash-Shamrah. Actually we do find something that might be taken for a Syriac avatar of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' in the maritime predominance of the Phoenicians in the Mediterranean in the archaic age of Syriac and Hellenic history, while, on the other hand, no such avatar is to be found in Hellenic history. The thalassocracy in the Aegean Basin that was established by Athens in the fifth century B.C. shows no trace of having been the ghost of a dead Minoan universal state. This abortive Athenian first attempt at the creation of an Hellenic universal state shows all the signs of having been an original response to a contemporary challenge.²

On this showing, we must conclude that the 'law' which we have been examining in this Annex holds good in a majority of the cases in point, but is by no means universally valid.

¹ This non-conformity of Hindu history to our tentative 'law' would be offset by the conformity of Sinic history, if the Sinic Society should prove to have been affiliated to a predecessor in the shape of the Shang Culture; for the cradle of the Chóu barbarians, whose overthrow of the Shang Power gave the Sinic Civilization its opportunity for coming to birth, lay in 'the Country within the Passes' in the Middle Basin of the Yellow River (see VI. vii. 170), not within the homeland of the Shang Culture in the Lower Basin of the Yellow River, and we have noticed (on p. 682, above) that the Chóu Empire wears the appearance of being, like the Khatti Empire and 'the Holy Roman Empire', an attempt, though a clumsy one, to resuscitate the universal state of a defunct antecedent civilization.

² See IX. viii. 435-6 and 522-5.

X. B (ii) (d), ANNEX I

ARE THE RELATIONS OF THE FINE ARTS
AND THE MATHEMATICAL AND NATURAL
SCIENCES TO THE SOCIAL MILIEU DIVERSE
OR SIMILAR?

IN the chapter to which this Annex attaches,¹ we have taken, in passing, a synoptic glance at the relations in which three varieties of human activity stand respectively to a social milieu—located in some particular time and place—which is the field of all these three activities alike; and we have formed the opinion that the relation is a different one in each of the three cases.

While activities in the realm of social human affairs, as exemplified in Politics and in Law, would manifestly be stultifying themselves if they did not try to provide parochial and ephemeral solutions for social human problems that are nothing if not local and temporary, activities in the realm of Non-Human Nature, as exemplified theoretically in Mathematics and in Natural Science and practically in Technology, would be stultifying themselves no less signally if they did not extend their view backwards and outwards beyond the narrow and fleeting bounds of Here and Now to take account of the whole sum of knowledge and 'know-how' accessible to their professors and practitioners. On the other hand, the Fine Arts, as exemplified in Literature and in the Visual Arts, enjoy a relative freedom from the trammels of Time and Space in virtue of their source in the subconscious abyss of the Psyche; for 'the Primordial Images' which the Arts translate into the temporary and local symbolism of some particular social milieu had known 'no variableness, neither shadow of turning',² during the five or six thousand years within which human societies of the species labelled 'civilizations' had been coming and going down to the time of writing, half-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era; and therefore the oracles, drawn from this unvarying subterranean source, which it was the mission of the Fine Arts to deliver to intelligences and wills domiciled in the kaleidoscopic social milieux on Life's conscious volitional surface, were not only independent of the particular Here and Now in which any system of government or law was bound to be imprisoned, but were likewise free from the hardly less narrow confines of a cumulative intellectual inheritance which was the social prison-house of Mathematics, Natural Science, and Technology.

In the history of Modern Western thought the difference between the respective relations of the Fine Arts and the Mathematical and Natural Sciences to the social milieu was brought out in the course of the seventeenth-century controversy in France and England over the respective merits of 'the Ancients' (i.e. the creators and exponents of

¹ Pp. 48-82 above.

² Jas. i. 17.

the Hellenic culture, seen through the medium of the surviving works of Classical Greek and Latin literature and art) and 'the Moderns' (i.e. the representatives of a Western culture in transition from its Early Modern to its Late Modern phase). Both parties to this debate perceived that the Fine Arts were, for some reason,¹ exempt from the necessity—or debarred from the opportunity—of progressing by a process of cumulative growth which was the servitude—or privilege—of Mathematics, Natural Science, and Technology; and the more temperate and judicious spirits among the champions of the Moderns' cause made a virtue of conceding this point to their opponents. It was frankly admitted by Fontenelle, for example, in *Une Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes*:²

'Pour ce qui est de l'Éloquence et de la Poésie, qui sont le sujet de la principale contestation entre les Anciens et les Modernes . . . je croi que les Anciens en ont pû atteindre la perfection, parceque . . . l'Éloquence et la Poésie ne demandent qu'un certain nombre de vûes assez borné, par rapport à d'autres arts, et elle[s] dépendent principalement de la vivacité de l'imagination.³ Or les hommes peuvent avoir amassé en peu de siècles un petit nombre de vûes, et la vivacité de l'imagination n'a pas besoin d'une longue suite d'expériences, ni d'une grande quantité de règles pour avoir toute la perfection dont elle est capable. . . . Comme l'Éloquence et la Poésie sont assez bornées, il faut qu'il y ait un temps où elles soient portées à leur dernière perfection, et je tiens que, pour l'Éloquence et pour l'Histoire, ce tems a été le siècle d'Auguste. Je n'imagine rien au dessus de Cicéron et de Titelive. Ce n'est pas qu'ils n'aient leurs défauts, mais je ne crois pas qu'on puisse avoir moins de défauts avec autant de grandes qualitez, et l'on sait assez que c'est la seule manière dont on puisse dire que les hommes soient parfaits sur quelque chose. . . .

'Mais la Phisique, la Medecine, les Mathematiques sont composées d'un nombre infini de vûes, et dépendent de la justesse du raisonnement, qui se perfectionne avec une extrême lenteur, et se perfectionne toujours. Il faut même souvent qu'elles soient aidées par des expériences que le hazard seul fait naître, et qu'il n'amène pas à point nommé. Il est évident que tout cela n'a point de fin, et que les derniers phisiciens ou mathematiens devront naturellement être les plus habiles.'⁴

The same concession to the claims of the Ancients in the realm of the Fine Arts was made by the ablest of the English champions of the Moderns, William Wotton, in his *Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning*.⁵

¹ The autonomy on the social plane which the Fine Arts enjoyed in virtue of their source in the subconscious abyss of the Psyche was divined intuitively by the Modern Western thinkers of that generation more than two hundred years before 'the Collective Subconscious' was discovered empirically by the cumulative intellectual labours of Modern Western Science.

² First edition, January 1688 (see Bury, J. B.: *The Idea of Progress* (London 1924, Macmillan), p. 101).

³ Fontenelle's 'limited number of ideas within a narrow horizon' which are animated by 'the liveliness of the Imagination' are synonyms, in non-technical phraseology, for Jung's 'Primordial Images'.—A.J.T.

⁴ Fontenelle, B. le B. de: *Poésies Pastorales, avec un Traité sur la Nature de l'Eglogue et une Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes*, 4th ed. (Amsterdam 1716, Etienne Roger), pp. 142, 140, 143-4, and 140.

⁵ See the second edition (London 1697, Leake), pp. 23-24. The first edition of Wotton's book was published in A.D. 1694.

The consensus on this point between the victorious advocates of the case for the Moderns and their discomfited opponents might have been expected to have settled this question, at least, definitively. Yet, between the close of this seventeenth-century *Kulturkampf* and the time at which this Study was being written, some 250 years later, the controversy over this issue had been reopened again from two sides. On the one side Oswald Spengler, in a work published on the morrow of the War of A.D. 1914-18, had put forward the thesis that Mathematics, Natural Science, and Technology, notwithstanding their proud pretensions to be objective, were in fact just as much at the mercy of the influences and exigencies of diverse social milieux as any activities in the realm of social human affairs.¹ On the other hand, Shelley² had won Bury's applause³ for having resuscitated a suggestion—thrown out tentatively, in the course of the seventeenth-century debate, by Charles Perrault, but not taken up by such circumspect advocates of the Moderns' cause as Fontenelle and Wotton—that the Fine Arts did, after all, progressively improve in the same fashion as Mathematics, Science, and Technology.

Spengler's thesis was enunciated by its author in characteristically dogmatic language:

'There is not and cannot be any such thing as Number-in-Itself. There is a plurality of worlds of numbers because there is a plurality of civilizations. . . . The notion of a universally valid Science which is true for all civilizations is an illusion.'⁴

The grain of truth in these misleadingly unqualified statements is the fact that each particular historical way of life or culture is in some sense a whole whose parts are sensitively and subtly interdependent. This truth has presented itself to us forcibly in our study of encounters between societies that are one another's contemporaries.⁵ We have found that, when some single element in one culture is modified by the impact of another culture, the effects of this modification of the assaulted culture in one point are apt to spread through the entire body social and to make themselves felt at points which might seem, at first sight, to have no connexion with the point in which the change has been introduced first. This intimate interdependence has proved, in the light of such convincing evidence, to be so characteristic a feature of the structure of Human Society that it would indeed be surprising if one particular group of activities, represented by Mathematics, Natural Science, and Technology, should turn out to be entirely unaffected by a tendency that appears to be one of the general 'laws' of social life; and we may find ourselves able to come to an understanding with Spengler when we catch him slipping out of his pontifical vestments and condescending to explain to us that the distinctive quality of each individual civilization, on which he has been insisting, is to be interpreted, not as an absolute

¹ See the passage quoted in III. iii. 380-2.

² In his Introduction to *The Revolt of Islam*.

³ In *The Idea of Progress*, p. 124.

⁴ Spengler, O.: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i (Munich 1920, Beck), pp. 85 and 532, quoted in this Study *ibid*.

⁵ See IX. viii, *passim*.

difference of essence, but as a gradational difference of emphasis, *habitus*, or penchant.¹

We can, for example, agree with Spengler in holding that the predominant penchant that gives a particular culture its distinctive style may impart to all the men and women who have been brought up in the atmosphere of that culture, whatever the native psychic orientation of each individual may happen to be, a uniform inclination either towards or away from the mathematical, scientific, and technological approach to life, or, short of that, may at least incline them, within the bounds of this broad field of activity in the realm of Non-Human Nature, to address themselves to one branch of Mathematics, Science, or Technology rather than to another. In this sense and within these limits it may be true, as Spengler contends,² that the 'Apollinean' spirit of an Hellenic upbringing would foster a static-minded *Weltanschauung* which, in the province of Mathematics, would find its most congenial expression in Geometry, whereas the 'Faustian' spirit of a Western upbringing would foster a dynamic-minded *Weltanschauung* which, within the same mathematical field of intellectual activity, would find its most congenial expression in Algebra and the Calculus. But of course, in assenting to this more judiciously formulated version of Spengler's proposition, we are admitting nothing beyond the indisputable facts that there are diverse schools or fashions of education (in the widest meaning of that word) and that the uniform impress of any such educational *habitus* is bound to leave its mark on all individual human beings whose fate it may be to be put through that particular cultural mill, even when the penchant of the society into which a particular individual happens to have been born is at variance with that individual's native personal bent. In admitting this much, we are not committing ourselves to the nonsense implicit in the pontifical version of Spengler's thesis, in which the philosopher-hierophant goes so far as to assert that 'there is not and cannot be any such thing as Number-in-itself' and that 'the notion of a universally valid Science . . . is an illusion'.

It would, indeed, be as fantastic to suggest that Geometry and the Calculus are diverse, alternative, and incompatible systems of Mathematics as it would be reasonable to say that these are different aspects of one identical object of mathematical study that can properly be called 'Number-in-Itself'. We may go on to observe that the several provinces of this realm of Mathematical Science have been opened up at different times and places by divers members of a single mathematical fraternity whose choices of their particular fields of mathematical research have been always influenced, and sometimes virtually determined, by a mental penchant or *habitus* imparted to the individual mathematician by his social milieu. In going thus far, however, we must be careful to steer clear of the nonsense that Spengler makes of his own thesis when he propounds it in its extreme form; for Spengler is manifestly flying in the face of the facts when he suggests that a pioneer in the realm of Mathematics cannot occupy the whole kingdom simultaneously, but

¹ See Spengler, op. cit., vol. i, p. 156, quoted in this Study in III. iii. 383-4.

² Ibid., pp. 380-3, quoted in III. iii. 388-9.

must evacuate the province of Euclidean Geometry as the price of gaining an entry into the province of a Cartesian Calculus, or alternatively must renounce all hope of mastering the Calculus if he is unwilling to relinquish his hold upon Geometry.

The divers provinces of Mathematics, Natural Science, and Technology that have been successively conquered by the Collective Intellect of Mankind do not stand to one another in the same relation as the divers systems of government or law that succeed one another in the history of a human society. A new ministry, new ruler, new dynasty, new régime, or new state cannot come into power without replacing a predecessor; a new law cannot be enacted without abrogating the law previously in force on the same subject. In short, successively established political and legal institutions cannot coexist side by side. They are mutually exclusive because they are incompatible, and they are incompatible because each of them has, as we have seen, to be geared to the particular circumstances of some local and temporary social situation. There is no room in the dimension of social life for more than one such situation at a time, and therefore there is no room there, either, for more than one institution at a time, since every institution's *raison d'être* is to provide a solution for some social problem here and now. Thus, on the plane of social affairs, all human experience testifies with one accord that

Time, like an ever rolling stream,
Bears all its sons away;
They fly forgotten, as a dream
Dies at the opening day.¹

But a 'law of Sin and Death',² which reigns inexorably in this social human realm of government, legislation, and the rest, has no dominion over the abstract non-human realm of Mathematics. In the struggle for mastery between Time and Man in this bloodless intellectual arena, Man has succeeded in making Time Man's servant instead of allowing Time to make Man Time's victim. The monument of Man's victory over Time here is a Collective Human Intellect's cumulative achievement; and this exception to Time's rule, which Watts overlooked and Spengler ignored, had long since been divined by Fontenelle and been noted by Gibbon.

'The Mathematics are distinguished by a peculiar privilege that, in the course of ages, they may always advance and can never recede.'³

If we are right in thinking that we have now disposed of Spengler's contention that Mathematics are subject to the same law of social relativity as social human affairs,⁴ we may now go on to examine Perrault's contention that the Fine Arts are subject to the same law of cumulative growth as Mathematics.

¹ Watts, Isaac, quoted in I. i. 459.

² Rom. viii. 2.

³ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lii.

⁴ This thesis of Spengler's receives short shrift at Collingwood's hands (see Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), pp. 225-6).

While Perrault¹ anticipated Fontenelle and Wotton in conceding that the general superiority which the champions of the Moderns' cause claimed for 'the Moderns' over 'the Ancients' might not be demonstrable in the provinces of Poetry and Eloquence, he made this concession expressly 'for the sake of peace'² and perceptibly against the grain; for Perrault himself was a poet; and, though his poetry was doomed to be judged inferior by all standards, whether 'Modern' or 'Ancient', he was vain enough to fancy that he had a personal stake in the question of the relative merits of 'the Moderns' and 'the Ancients' in the field of his own art. His advocacy of the Moderns' cause in the domain of the Fine Arts was therefore not altogether disinterested, and his argument, ingenious though it might be,³ was eventually exploded by one of the twentieth-century Western scientific achievements of a progress which, in the field of Science, was to vindicate Perrault's championship of the Moderns in the act of confuting the seventeenth-century Western poet on the particular issue which he had most at heart.

Perrault's argument ran as follows:

'Pourquoy, voulés-vous . . . que l'Eloquence et la Poësie n'ayent pas eu besoin d'autant de siecles pour se perfectionner que la Physique et l'Astronomie? Le cœur de l'homme qu'il faut connoistre pour le persuader et pour luy plaire, est il plus aisé à penetrer que les secrets de la Nature, et n'a-t-il pas de tout temps esté regardé comme le plus creux de tous les abîmes, où l'on découvre tous les jours quelque chose de nouveau, et dont il n'y a que Dieu seul qui puisse sonder toute la profondeur? . . . Je pourrois vous faire voir ce que j'avance en examinant toutes les passions l'une après l'autre, et vous convaincre qu'il y a mille sentimens delicats sur chacune d'elles dans les ouvrages de nos auteurs, dans leurs traitez de morale, dans leurs tragedies, dans leurs romans, et dans leurs pièces d'eloquence, qui ne se rencontrent point chez les Anciens. Dans les seules tragedies de Corneille il y a plus de pensées fines et delicates sur l'ambition, sur la vengeance, sur la jalousie, qu'il n'y en a dans tous des livres de l'antiquité.'⁴

These were Perrault's grounds for his contention that there might be a possibility of cumulative achievement in Poetry as well as in Mathematics; and, if there had been any cogency in the minor Modern Western poet's case, his suit would have been won for him by the posthumous support that he received from one of the immortals. In reflecting on the sources of his own inspiration, Shelley once observed⁵ that he had found 'common sources of those elements which it is the province of the poet to embody and combine' in 'the beautiful and majestic scenery of the Earth' and in 'the poetry of Ancient Greece and

¹ Perrault, Ch.: *Parallele des Anciens et des Modernes en ce qui Regarde les Arts et les Sciences* (Paris 1688-96, Coignard, 4 Parts).

² 'Nous concluons, si vous l'avez agreable, que dans tous les arts et dans toutes les sciences, à la reserve de l'Eloquence et de la Poësie, les Modernes sont de beaucoup superieurs aux Anciens, comme je croy l'avoir prouvé suffisamment, et qu'à l'égard de l'Eloquence et de la Poësie, quoy qu'il n'y ait aucune raison d'en juger autrement, il faut pour le bien de la paix ne rien decider sur cet article' (Perrault, op. cit., Part iv, Cinquième et Dernier Dialogue, pp. 292-3).

³ A summary of it will be found in Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, pp. 86-87.

⁴ Perrault, op. cit., Part ii, Troisième Dialogue, pp. 29-31. Cp. p. 294 and Part iii, Quatrième Dialogue, pp. 23, 155, and 279.

⁵ In his Introduction to *The Revolt of Islam*, composed in A.D. 1817.

Rome and Modern Italy and our own country', which had been to him, 'like External Nature, a passion and an enjoyment'; and this personal experience suggested to Shelley's mind that

'in this sense there may be such a thing as perfectibility in works of fiction, notwithstanding the concession, often made by the advocates of human improvement, that perfectibility is a term applicable only to Science.'¹

In endorsing a suggestion which Shelley had thus thrown out in passing, Bury drew out the implications of Shelley's argument in the following terms:

'In other words, all the increases of human experience from age to age, all the speculative adventures of the Intellect, provide the artist in each succeeding generation with more abundant sources for aesthetic treatment. As years go on, Life in its widest sense offers more and more materials "which it is the province of the poet to embody and combine". This is evidently true; and would it not seem to follow that Literature is not excluded from participating in the common development of Civilisation?'²

Bury's expansion of Shelley's argument is a legitimate interpretation of Shelley's words which would assuredly have been certified as correct by the poet himself if he could have lived to read Bury's book. Yet, in invoking Poetry in the same breath as External Nature, and describing their effect on his soul as being 'passion' and 'enjoyment', Shelley was unconsciously testifying that the sources of the Wild West Wind that was his tempestuous inspiration were, not 'the speculative adventures of the Intellect', but 'the Eternal Deep' from whose Primordial Images Wordsworth derived his intimations of Immortality. From the same testimony it could be divined that the tale of the years that it had taken 'Life in its widest sense' to accomplish Psyche's task of accumulating the 'materials' for the fund of experience on which every inspired poet drew amounted to an aeon of an utterly different order of magnitude from the brief span of some twenty-six centuries or thereabouts that was the extent of Shelley's own chronological distance from the anonymous authors of an Homeric Greek Epic which was the chronologically remotest poetry within Shelley's conscious ken. The 'passion' and 'enjoyment' that were kindled in Shelley's soul by the works of his brother poets did not find their fuel in any 'increases of human experience' during the few thousand years within which a few representatives of the recently created species of Human Society labelled 'civilizations' had been rising and falling. It would be as fantastic to look for the sources of any great poet's inspiration there as it would be to fancy that a blast-furnace could have been stoked with the contents of a charcoal-burner's basket. 'The visionary gleam' of which the poet catches his beatific glimpse in External Nature and in the poetry of his brother poets alike is the glow of a spiritual fire fed by mighty coal-seams that have been slowly compacted in the womb of Mother Earth out of the debris of forests deeply buried there countless ages ago.

¹ Shelley, *ibid.*, in a footnote.

² Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, p. 124.

A thousand ages in Thy sight
 Are like an evening gone,
 Short as the watch that ends the night
 Before the rising Sun.

No doubt, in God's sight, the aeons in which the human historian has to reckon the longevity of the Human Psyche's primordial abyss will approach no nearer than the brief annals of recorded human history to being comparable with an Eternity with which all Time is incommensurate and into which none of God's creatures can ever enter without being first transfigured by God's grace; yet it is neither inaccurate nor impious to ascribe a godlike timelessness to a subconscious underworld of the Psyche that is merely one of God's creatures, when we find ourselves impotent to plumb the thoughts of 'the human heart by which we live', or to compass the range of 'an eye that hath kept watch o'er Man's mortality', by applying to the Primordial Images the yard-measure of the Intellect. The surface of a planet which in God's sight may loom no larger than an orange would appear to be of an infinitely vast extent to the mind of any human surveyor who set out to measure the Earth's circumference with a measuring-rod of the dimensions of a match.

If these considerations move us to reject Perrault's thesis as well as Spengler's, we shall be confirmed in our acceptance of Fontenelle's and Gibbon's thesis that it is the privilege of Mathematics, Natural Science, and Technology to be capable of progress on a Time-scale set by the pace of the conscious Intellect, and the privilege of the Fine Arts to be exempt from a servitude to Time which is the price of a capacity for cumulative achievement. We shall also be able to repay part of our debt to Fontenelle by underpinning his intuition with one of the empirical discoveries made by Science in the course of its progress between Fontenelle's day and ours. For, within the quarter of a century that had elapsed between the year in which Bury had endorsed Shelley's tentative approval of Perrault's argument and the year in which the present lines were being written, Jung had demonstrated that the Fine Arts draw their inspiration from creative depths of subconscious experience at which, on the Intellect's Lilliputian scale of time-reckoning, there 'is no variableness, neither shadow of turning',¹ in the ageless presences of the Primordial Images.

¹ Jas. i. 17.

‘CLASSICAL’ LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES

THE most striking point about the usage of any language or literature that has been canonized as ‘classical’ is that it is not the mother tongue of any of the members of the society in which it is being cultivated in virtue of having been given this status; and this salient feature of ‘the classics’ is as characteristic as it is prominent; for a ‘classical’ language or literature is *ex hypothesi* a ‘dead’ one which has been brought back to life artificially through the deliberate and selfconscious cultural achievement of a renaissance.

In the polyglot population of the Western World, for example, there was no people whose mother tongue was Ancient Greek or Latin at the time of the literary renaissance of Hellenism at the beginning of the Modern Age of Western history. The Romance-speaking Western peoples, whose mother tongues were derived from Latin as a matter of philological fact, were just as incapable of understanding, speaking, or reading Latin by the light of nature as were their fellow Westerners whose mother tongues were twigs of the Celtic, Teutonic, Slavonic, or Letto-Lithuanian branches of the Indo-European family of languages; and those Western peoples whose non-Indo-European mother tongues—Basque, Magyar, Estonian, and Finnish—had not even the remotest linguistic affinity with either Latin or Greek showed no less enthusiasm than was shown by their Indo-European-speaking neighbours for a revival of the study of the Hellenic literature in the original Greek, as well as in an imitative Latin, which became one of the common cultural enterprises of the Western peoples in and after the fifteenth century of the Christian Era.

The same point comes out in a survey of the currency of other classical languages and literatures in other societies. In an Arabic Muslim World a Classical Arabic language and literature were cultivated by peoples whose mother tongues were varieties of the Berber form of Hamitic speech, as well as by those whose mother tongues were dialects of a current vernacular Arabic. In an Iranic Muslim World both a Classical Arabic and a Classical Persian language and literature were cultivated by peoples whose mother tongues were members of the Turkish and Indo-Aryan families, as well as by peoples whose mother tongues were Irano-Aryan vernaculars linguistically akin to Classical Persian. In a Hindu World a Classical Sanskrit language and literature were cultivated by Indians whose mother tongues were members of the Tamil and other non-Indo-European families, as well as by Indians whose mother tongues were Indo-Aryan vernaculars of Sanskrit origin. In a Far Eastern World a Classical Sinic language which had been standardized (for the eye, though not for the tongue and ear) by Ts’in She Hwang-ti, the founder of the Sinic universal state, and which had consequently

become the exclusive vehicle for conveying the Confucian classics, was cultivated, as the key to the classical literature which it enshrined, by peoples whose mother tongues were Korean and Japanese, as well as by peoples whose mother tongues belonged, as Annamese belonged, to the Sino-Siamese family, or were actually derived, as the latter-day Chinese spoken vernaculars were, from the particular language belonging to the Chinese branch of the Sino-Siamese family which had been canonized as 'classical'.

When we extend our survey to languages and literatures that were cultivated as 'classical' by civilizations of the second generation, the same picture presents itself again. In a Babylonian World the Classical Sumerian language and literature, like their Classical Greek counterparts in the Modern Western World, were cultivated by peoples whose diverse mother tongues—in this case, Semitic, Elamite, and Urartian—had in common the single negative characteristic of having no affinity with the language that had been canonized as 'classical'; and the Classical Akkadian language and literature, that were parasites on the Sumerian as the Latin were on the Ancient Greek, were cultivated, side by side with the Sumerian, by the non-Semitic-speaking Elamite and Urartian peoples of the Babylonian World as well as by the speakers of Babylonian and Assyrian Semitic vernaculars of Akkadian origin. The same Classical Sumerian and Classical Akkadian languages and literatures were likewise cultivated in a polyglot Hittite World whose peoples' Asianic and Indo-European mother tongues had no affinity with either Sumerian or Akkadian. We may also observe that in the corpse of an Egyptian body social which was galvanized into a long-drawn-out life-in-death by the repeated stimulus of successive stabs administered by a series of alien intruders—Hyksos, Assyrians, Persians, Hellenes—a Classical Egyptian language and literature were cultivated, until the advent of Christianity, not only by latter-day Egyptians whose mother tongue was of Classical Egyptian origin, but also by Libyans whose mother tongue belonged to a different branch of the Hamitic family and by polyglot Ethiopians among whom an earlier Hamitic-speaking stratum of population had been partly submerged under successive waves of invaders from the heart of Tropical Africa whose mother tongues were not akin to Classical Egyptian even remotely.¹

Thus, wherever we find any language or literature being cultivated as classical, we almost invariably² also find that it is current in this classical usage among people who do not speak this language, or any language derived from it, as their mother tongue. Yet this trait, though almost invariably present, is nevertheless not a distinctive hall-mark that can be taken as the differentia of languages and literatures that have become 'classical'; for there are other categories, besides, in which the self-same feature presents itself. *Lingue franche*,³ the official languages of

¹ See II. ii. 114-15.

² 'Invariably' has to be qualified by 'almost', in view of the fact that, in Orthodox Christendom, the revival and cultivation of Ancient Greek as a classical language was virtually confined to Modern-Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians. A possible explanation of this exception to what seems to be the general rule is offered on pp. 713-17, below.

³ See V. v. 483-527.

universal states,¹ and the liturgical languages and literatures of universal churches² are three categories which share with 'classical' languages and literatures the characteristic of being cultivated by peoples who have not inherited them as their mother tongues; and we must look farther for the points of difference that distinguish 'classical' languages and literatures from these.

One such point of difference is that, whereas a classical language or literature is, by definition, a ghost that has been raised from Sheol after a *vitai pausa*³ during which it has not been current, a *lingua franca* or an official language or a liturgical language or literature must have been, not merely alive, but aggressively radioactive, at the time when it won its status, and must also have maintained and preserved this status, after winning it, without any break of continuity from the beginning to the end of its career. These common characteristics of a *lingua franca*, an official language, and a liturgical language or literature, which a classical language or literature does not share with them, all derive from the fact that languages and literatures in these three categories are propagated by 'men of action'—merchants, empire-builders, deportees, or missionaries, as the case may be—to meet the practical needs of some current form of intercourse between contemporaries such as trade or administration or communal worship, whereas classical languages and literatures are propagated by scholars whose purpose is to enrich the culture of the society into which they have been born by making accessible in their own world the cultural treasures of an antecedent civilization which, in their belief, are superior to their own society's corresponding native products.

This distinction between a practical-minded utilitarianism and a scholarly-minded idealism must not, however, be pressed too far; for on a closer scrutiny we shall find that it is not a difference of kind but is merely one of degree. A scholar who would repudiate any suggestion that he was animated by a 'utilitarian' purpose would be equally unwilling to admit that his activities were useless; and in a previous context⁴ we have already noticed that a ghost is never evoked simply for its own sake; the necromancer is always moved to act by the practical motive of seeking, through the exercise of his black art, to find a solution for some pressing current problem in the life of his own society. Moreover, when a ghost has been successfully raised, this *jinn* is apt to make the fortune of the magician who has enslaved him. A classical education has frequently been the passport to an eligible career in the administrative service of a state. In the Far Eastern World, Greek Orthodox Christendom, and the Arabic Muslim World, a proficiency in the Sinic, the Ancient Greek, and the Classical Arabic language and literature respectively was the indispensable qualification for enrolment in the imperial civil service of a resuscitated universal state,⁵ while in the Iranic, Early Hindu, and Modern Western worlds the administrators of parochial states were similarly recruited from candidates whose qualification

¹ See VI. vii. 239-53.

² See VI. vii. 254-5.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book III, ll. 860 and 930.

⁴ On pp. 119-20, above.

⁵ The three universal states here in question were, of course, the Sui and T'ang Empire, the East Roman Empire, and the Cairene 'Abbasid Caliphate.

was a proficiency in the Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, Ancient Greek, and Latin classical languages and literatures.

The canonized dead language, which thus opens the door to a career in the public service in the political life of a society which has taken to cultivating this element of an extinct antecedent culture, may once have served as an official language of the antecedent civilization's universal state. The Ancient Chinese language that had been standardized visually by Ts'in She Hwang-ti had subsequently served as the official language of the Empire of the Ts'in and Han before being given the status of a classical language in a latter-day Far Eastern World. Latin and Ancient Greek had served as the official languages of the Roman Empire before Ancient Greek in Orthodox Christendom, and both Ancient Greek and Latin in the Western World, were canonized and cultivated as classical. Sumerian and Akkadian had served as the official languages of the Empire of the Four Quarters, from the days of its Sumerian founder Ur-Engur (*alias* Ur-Nammu) of Ur down to the days of its Amorite restorer Hammurabi of Babylon, before becoming classical in the eyes of a latter-day Babylonian Society. A Sanskrit that had been brought back into currency in an Indic World by a feat of linguistic archaism¹ had subsequently served as the official language of the Guptan Empire before being adopted as classical by a latter-day Hindu Society.

This use of a language as the official language of a universal state can never overlap chronologically with its eventual apotheosis as a classical language in the life of an affiliated society, since a universal state is always carried to destruction in the final dissolution of the disintegrating society that, in its last phase, has come to be embodied politically in an oecumenical empire of this type,² and therefore a language that has once served as the official language of a universal state is bound to have lost this function before gaining the status of a classical language as the result of a linguistic and literary renaissance in the life of an affiliated society that has come to birth eventually after a social interregnum. On the other hand the use of a language as the liturgical language of a universal church may well overlap chronologically with the use of the same language as a classical language canonized in a renaissance, since a church, unlike a universal state, is apt to survive the social interregnum between the dissolution of an old civilization and the emergence of a new one;³ and there are in fact a number of instances of the simultaneous cultivation of the same language in these two different roles. Cases in point are the simultaneous currency of Sanskrit as the liturgical language of the Hindu Church and as the classical language of the Hindu Civilization; of Arabic as the liturgical language of the Islamic Church and as a classical language of the Arabic and Iranic Muslim civilizations; of the standardized visual form of Ancient Chinese as the liturgical language of the Taoist and Far Eastern Mahayanian Buddhist churches and as the classical language of the Far Eastern Civilization; of Ancient Greek as the liturgical language of the Greek Orthodox Christian Church and as the classical language of Modern-Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians; and of

¹ See V. vi. 75-77.

³ See I. i. 56 and 59, and VII. vii. 392-419.

² See I. i. 53 and VI. vii. 1-379.

Latin as the liturgical language of the Western Catholic Church and as one of the two classical languages of the Western Civilization.

In some of these cases this simultaneous use of the same dead language in two different roles did not produce any sense of incongruity and therefore did not generate any cultural friction. No effect of the kind followed from, for example, the dual role played by Arabic, since the liturgy of the Islamic Church and the secular Arabic literature that came to be canonized as classical had a common fountain-head in the Qur'ān.¹ The dual role of Sanskrit was likewise eased by a pre-established harmony, since the Sanskrit epic had been transfigured, long before it had become one of the classics of the Hindu World, into one of the holy scriptures of Hinduism, and this not merely through the interpolation of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, but through a permeation of the secular native substance of the *Mahābhārata* by a religious leaven.² In the Sinic and Hellenic worlds, as in the Indic World, the secular language and literature that were eventually to be canonized and cultivated as classical in the latter-day life of an affiliated civilization had already been going concerns before the epiphany of a universal church in the underworld of an internal proletariat; but in these cases the church was either unable or unwilling, or both unable and unwilling, to swallow an existing secular literature and digest it.

A nascent church did, nevertheless, in both these cases, adopt the language or languages in which the existing secular literature had been written, since in the Sinic World at the time of the epiphany of the Mahayanian and Taoist churches and in the Hellenic World at the time of the epiphany of the Christian Church even the most militant 'futurist' innovator would never have dreamed of using any language but Ancient Chinese in the one case and Ancient Greek and Latin in the other case as the medium for any serious literary work, either secular or religious; and, if a Buddhist, Taoist, or Christian missionary had attempted to boycott languages that were current, not only as vehicles of an ancient and revered secular literature, but also as *lingue franche*, he would have defeated his own purpose by eschewing the only linguistic media that were both universally familiar and universally esteemed in his day in the world that was his mission-field. But, when a church thus found itself constrained to use a current oecumenical language as its literary vehicle without being able or being willing, as the case might be, to capture, appropriate, and transfigure the secular literature that had already been written in this language either in its current form or in some older dialect, the inevitable result was the production of a new corpus of religious literature—a liturgy, holy scriptures, commentaries on the scriptures, and treatises on theology—in rivalry with the already existing corpus of secular literature in the same language.

¹ It is true that the Qur'ān was not the only source of a subsequent secular Arabic literature's inspiration. It was also inspired in part by a pre-Islamic lyric poetry that was one of the spontaneous cultural products of an heroic age of the Arab transfrontier barbarians adjoining the Syrian *limes* of the Roman Empire (see V. v. 234). The Qur'ān itself, however, had already drawn inspiration from this same pre-Islamic source; so there was no clear-cut division between a pagan source of an Arabic used in a secular Arabic literature and an Islamic source of an Arabic used in the Islamic Church's liturgy.

² See V. v. 596-9 and 604-6.

The consequent coexistence of two competing literatures in the same language was bound to cause friction between their respective votaries, and such friction duly made itself felt when this situation arose in a moribund Sinic World in the Age of the Posterior Han and in a moribund Hellenic World in the Age of the post-Diocletianic Roman imperial régime. Thereafter, when a once dominant minority by whom the secular literature had been kept alive had been wiped out, as it was in the former domain of the Hellenic Civilization, or, short of that, had been driven into a corner, as it was in the former domain of the Sinic Civilization,¹ the friction diminished as the cultivation of the secular literature dwindled towards vanishing point, leaving the religious literature temporarily in almost unchallenged possession of the field; but, if and when a neglected and half-forgotten secular literature recovered its vitality through a renaissance of it in the history of an affiliated civilization—as happened in the Far Eastern World in and after the Age of the T'ang, in Greek Orthodox Christendom in and after the generation of Photius, and in the Western World in and after the fifteenth century of the Christian Era—the friction was bound to recur.

In its recurrence as the sequel to a renaissance, as well as in its original occurrence in the last days of an antecedent civilization, this friction between two literatures conveyed in one language was apt to be accentuated by any appreciable difference of nuance between the particular forms of the common language in which the secular literature and the religious literature were respectively embodied. We have already noticed² that, in Greek Orthodox Christendom by the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, when a school of Byzantine imitators of Hellenic historians had been at work for not much less than four hundred years, at least two of their number had become sensitive to the difference between a post-Alexandrine Attic *κωμῆ* and the undiluted Attic Greek of a Thucydides and Ionic Greek of an Herodotus; and, although, as we have also seen, a Khalkokondhýlis and a Kritópoulos flew ambitiously higher than a Léon Dhiakónos or a Nikítas Khoniátis, only to fall ludicrously lower, their dawning glimmer of a finer aesthetic sense lit the way for more sure-footed Italian and Transalpine Western followers in these Greek Orthodox Christian pioneers' shambling footsteps. So far from coming to grief, these Modern Western literary mountebanks achieved an amazing virtuosity in keeping their precarious footing on a slippery path, thanks to an infinite capacity for taking pains which a nineteenth-century Western vernacular poet was to immortalize in his fantasy of *A Grammarian's Funeral*. But, the more accurately these Western Humanists performed their self-imposed *tour de force* of aping the styles of Ancient Greek and Latin classical authors, the more exquisitely were their over-refined aesthetic sensibilities excruciated by the barbarism of a 'Low Latin' that was the sacrosanct language of the Vulgate version of the Bible, the Roman liturgy, and the works of the Latin Fathers of a Western Catholic Christian Church.

¹ Joannes Petrus Maffeus, S.J., (*vivebat* A.D. 1536–1603) was one of the

¹ See VI. vii. 357, n. 4, 367, and 370–2; and pp. 649–81, above.

² On pp. 60–61, above.

best of the Jesuit writers. He wrote in Latin, and prided himself on the purity and elegance of his style. His two principal works are *Historiarum Indicarum Libri XVI* (Florence 1585) and *Vita Ignatii Loyolae* (Venice 1585). The first of these took twelve years to complete; but, as the author is said to have spent hours, even days, in modelling a single sentence, the wonder is that he ever did complete it. So great was Maffeus's reverence for *la belle Latinité* that he used to repeat his breviary in Greek, so as to avoid contaminating his style.¹

This sixteenth-century extravaganza was surpassed by the pedantry of at least one nineteenth-century Western scholar who succeeded in sharpening his sensibilities to a still finer point. When the writer of this Study first went up to Oxford as an undergraduate in the autumn of A.D. 1907, one of the tutorial fellows of his college, who had by then devoted the best part of a lifetime to the hot-house cultivation of *Litterae Graecae et Latinae*, was alleged to have refined his taste to such an exquisite degree that he had eventually rendered himself incapable of enduring the torture which he had diligently trained himself to suffer from reading even the common run of 'classical' pagan Greek and Latin authors, not to speak of a 'post-classical' Christian Greek and Latin literature. By the year 1907 this scholar was reported to have carried his progressive mental self-mutilation to an extreme at which the only authors in any tongue that he could any longer bear to read were four Latin poets, namely Virgil, Horace, Ovid, and the humanist-fakir himself. For fear of forgetting one day to slip a printed copy of one or other of the first three of these still unproscribed classics into his pocket, he used to inscribe Latin verses of his own composition on his shirt-cuffs as an iron ration to insure him against the risk of dying of aesthetic starvation. The fate that did overtake him was the sadder one of mental inanition.

The irreconcilably divided spiritual allegiance of a less fanatically humanist Maffeus betrays the tension between a would-be *revenant* Hellenism and its votaries' ingrained Christian spiritual heritage, which, in a tug-of-war for the possession of Maffeus's soul, had demonstrated the tenacity of its grip by drawing this ardent Hellenist into the ranks of a Spartanly disciplined Society of Jesus. The renaissance of a classical language and literature in the history of a civilization which had been hatched out of a chrysalis-church inevitably confronted the humanist—in the West, in Greek Orthodox Christendom, and in the Far Eastern World alike—with the insoluble problem of trying to serve two masters.² The tension thus produced by the resuscitation of a pagan classical literature was, of course, no more of a novelty than was the resuscitated literature itself. In the cases in question, the Fathers of a Christian, a Mahayanian, and a Taoist Church had been caught on the horns of the same dilemma in the last phase of the history of an antecedent civilization, when they had found themselves constrained to conduct their propaganda campaign against an outworn paganism in an irreplaceable pagan

¹ Payne, C. H., in Du Jarric (S.J.), P.: *Akbar and the Jesuits*, English translation (London 1926, Routledge), Introduction, p. xxv, n. 1.

² Matt. vi. 24; Luke xvi. 13.

linguistic and literary medium.¹ When this tension recurs as the result of a renaissance, it may prove, in spite of appearances, to be in this

¹ Unless they were to resign themselves to confining their preaching to the proletariat and renouncing all hope of penetrating the ranks of a dominant minority, the missionaries of the higher religions had to present their case to a cultivated pagan public in a literary guise which readers of this class would find at least familiar, if not congenial. The difficulty of persuading a sophisticated audience to give a hearing to an outlandish gospel would be great enough in any case; and the apostles to 'the high-brows' would have deprived themselves in advance of all prospect of success if they had gone out of their way to antagonize their shy spiritual quarry at the outset by wantonly making the form of their creed as *rébarbatif* as the substance of it could hardly fail to seem to an aesthetically sensitive Hellenically-cultivated mind ('si quando . . . prophetam legere coepissem, sermo horrebat incultus'—Saint Jerome, *Ep.* xxii ad Eustochium, chap. 30). These diplomatic considerations, however, were not the Fathers' only motive, and indeed not even their strongest one, for resorting to the use of a cultural instrument which their church had officially condemned as frivolous at its best and, at its worst, pernicious. The evangelists of a cultivated pagan society were moved to address this audience in its own idiom chiefly because these evangelists themselves were mostly converts from these very pagan circles. Their conversion to an alien proletarian religion had not availed to break the spell of a pagan culture which was their birthright; and, when they used their pagan literary culture for missionary purpose, they were acting, not on calculation in cold blood, but spontaneously, *con amore*.

The abiding value of a pagan culture for Christian converts from a cultivated pagan milieu was demonstrated by the severity of the blow which Julian succeeded in dealing to the Christian community in the Hellenic World of his day by his shrewdly malicious stroke of making a professing Christian ineligible, *ex officio religionis*, for holding a teacher's official licence (see V. v. 682). The Christian victims of this sly manoeuvre in a 'cold' religious war were so hard hit by their exclusion from a pagan field of cultural activity, and were at the same time so well versed in a literature which was the common heirloom of both parties, that, according to the story (as told by Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xxiii, following Sozomen), Christian men of letters 'had recourse to the expedient of composing books for their own schools. Within a few months Apollinaris produced his Christian imitations of Homer (a sacred history in twenty-four books), Pindar, Euripides, and Menander; and Sozomen is satisfied that they equalled, or excelled, the originals'.

Julian's stroke was a shrewd one because the Christians' unwillingness to dispense with a pagan cultural instrument not only laid them open to a public exposure as hypocrites but also secretly vexed their own consciences and continued to vex them even when Julian was no longer there to taunt them with their inconsistency. At a time when Julian was dead and his Hellenic paganism was moribund, a Saint Jerome suffered the same inward spiritual discomfort from a tension between a Christianity to which he had dedicated himself and a pagan cultural heritage which he had failed to pluck out and cast from him ('bibliotheca . . . carere non poteram'—Saint Jerome, *ibid.*) as a Father Maffius was to suffer, in his day, from a corresponding tension between a Humanism to which he had dedicated himself and a Christianity from which he had found himself unable to break loose. Jerome's psychological conflict came to the surface of his consciousness in the celebrated dream in which he fancied that he was hailed before the heavenly tribunal of Christ; was convicted by his divine judge of being still a Ciceronian and no Christian; and was reprieved only thanks to the intercession of the consistory and in consideration of an oath which he swore by Christ's name, binding himself never to read any profane literature any more: 'si legero, te negavi' (Hieronymus: *Epistulae*, No. xxii ad Eustochium, chap. 30). Paganism had to become not merely moribund but extinct before the Christian heirs of a pagan Hellenic culture could play their part as Hellenism's literary executors with an easy conscience.

This task of cultural conservation, which was thus voluntarily undertaken during a post-Hellenic social interregnum by a Christian clergy, was sometimes thrust upon their Buddhist and Taoist counterparts during a post-Sinic interregnum. 'In A.D. 409, for example, when the eighteen-year-old T'o-pa Ssu ascended his father's throne . . . [as the ruler of one of the barbarian successor-states of a United Tsin imperial régime], he commanded Ts'ui Hao (*vivebat* A.D. 381-450), a rising young scholar who later became famous as the Taoist foe of Buddhism, to give him a course in [Confucian classical] Chinese literature. This course, which took three years, included the Han vocabulary and exercise book *Chi chiu chang*, *The Classic of Filial Piety*, *The Analects*, *The Odes*, *The History*, *The Spring and Autumn Annals*, *The Book of Rites*, and *The Changes*' (Goodrich, L. C.: *A Short History of the Chinese People* (London 1948, Allen & Unwin), pp. 83-84). A convinced Taoist can hardly have relished the *corvée* of giving this command performance in the role of a professor of Confucianism; for, in a nascent Far Eastern World in Ts'ui Hao's day, 'Confucianism was not dead', as Stoicism and Neo-

milieu a superficial antagonism masking a covert co-operation between two ostensibly conflicting cultural forces.

This possibility is indicated by a difference, which we have already noticed in passing,¹ between the respective fortunes of resuscitated classical languages and literatures in the Far Eastern and Western worlds on the one hand and in Orthodox Christendom on the other. We have observed that, when a visually standardized Ancient Chinese classical language and literature were resuscitated in the Far East, and when an Ancient Greek and a Latin classical language and literature were similarly resuscitated in the West, the cultural coin that had thus been brought back into currency came into general circulation in all the linguistic provinces of a Western and a Far Eastern World; but we have also observed that in Orthodox Christendom the circulation of a resuscitated Ancient Greek classical language and literature never spread *proprio motu* beyond the Modern-Greek-speaking province of a polyglot Orthodox Christian World. The Georgian-speaking, Slavonic-speaking, and Rumanian-speaking Orthodox Christians never attempted to appropriate the secular cultural heritage of Hellenism except in so far as they may eventually have taken up the study of the Ancient Greek and Latin languages and literatures as a consequence of their eventual reception of a Modern Western culture on to which those classical Hellenic studies had been grafted by that time as a result of a fifteenth-century Italian Renaissance.

This difference in the respective ranges of the circulation of resuscitated classical languages and literatures within the ambits of the worlds in which they have been conjured back to life becomes intelligible on the hypothesis that a resuscitated classical language or literature finds difficulty in striking root on any ground that has not been prepared for its reception by the survival there of a religious liturgy and literature embodied in the same language. At any rate, it is a matter of historical fact that a Mahayanian Buddhist liturgy and literature conveyed in Sinic characters had already become current in the non-Chinese-speaking as well as in the Chinese-speaking provinces of a Far Eastern World before the reception there of a classical Sinic secular literature conveyed in the same visual medium, and that a Christian liturgy and literature conveyed in the Latin script and language had already become current in the non-Romance-speaking as well as in the Romance-speaking provinces of a Western World before the reception there of a classical Hellenic literature that was likewise conveyed in Latin before the West's reception of Ancient Greek, whereas in the Orthodox Christian World the use of Ancient Greek as a vehicle for a Christian liturgy and literature had been confined to the province in which Modern Greek was the local current vernacular. This conterminousness of the range of circulation of a resuscitated classical language and literature with the range of the same language in its surviving use for ecclesiastical purposes is so regular an occurrence that it cannot be explained away as a fortuitous coincidence;

platonism were in a nascent Western Christendom in Bede's day: 'it was merely quiescent' (Goodrich, *ibid.* Cp. the passage quoted in VI. vii. 372 from Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 286).

¹ On p. 705, above.

and the only other possible explanation is that the survival of an otherwise 'dead' language as 'a going concern' for ecclesiastical purposes is an indispensable antecedent condition for the successful recultivation of a 'dead' classical secular literature that has used the same 'dead' language as its vehicle.

On this showing, we must conclude that the linguistic liberality of the Eastern Orthodox Church was as inimical to the eventual cultivation of a classical secular Ancient Greek literature, in those provinces of Orthodox Christendom in which Ancient Greek was not imposed as the local ecclesiastical language, as the Western Catholic Church's illiberal insistence on an oecumenical use of Latin, as the exclusively authorized and uniformly required ecclesiastical language for all spiritual subjects of the Holy See, was favourable to the eventual cultivation of a classical secular Latin literature in all provinces of Western Christendom, whatever the local vernacular might happen to be.¹

It is noteworthy, for example, that the fruits of the renaissance of Ancient Greek linguistic and literary studies at Constantinople in the ninth century of the Christian Era were not disseminated into an adjacent Orthodox Christian Bulgaria, though the Bulgarian Tsar Symeon (*imperabat* A.D. 893-927) had been brought up in Constantinople and had been educated there, not only in a School of Slavonic Studies founded by Photius, but also, apparently, in the School of Hellenic Studies founded by the Caesar Bardas,² where he had acquired a taste for the works of Demosthenes and Aristotle.³ Why was it that a Bulgar autocrat who had become so enthusiastic a Hellenist that he had been nicknamed 'the semi-Greek'⁴ was unable or unwilling to introduce his beloved Hellenic studies into his own country? In this Bulgarian case the answer to our question is ambiguous, since the Bulgarian and East Roman Empires were embroiled with one another by a political conflict⁵ which came to a head in Symeon's day and which would probably have blighted the prospects of Hellenic studies in Bulgaria even if the ecclesiastical language with which a then recently converted Bulgaria had been endowed had been the Greek Orthodox Church's own Attic Greek *κοινή* and not the Macedonian Slavonic dialect that had been equipped with an alphabet and been turned to ecclesiastical account by the Salonican Greek missionary-philologist Saint Cyril.⁶ It is perhaps significant, all the same, that Symeon's cultural work in Bulgaria even at the beginning of his reign, before his political breach with the East Roman Imperial Government, took the form, not of introducing into Bulgaria the study of the Ancient Greek language and literature in the originals, but of translating into the Slavonic a number of Ancient Greek classics, of which the majority were Christian and not pagan works.⁷ The test case, however, is not the Bulgarian case but the Russian.

¹ The contrast between the diverse linguistic policies of the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Western Catholic Church has been noticed in IV. iv. 374-7.

² See IV. iv. 382.

³ See Runciman, S.: *A History of the First Bulgarian Empire* (London 1930, Bell), p. 137.

⁴ See IV. iv. 382.

⁵ See IV. iv. 377-91.

⁶ See IV. iv. 376-7.

⁷ See IV. iv. 382, following Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 139: 'The Presbyter Gregory

In Russia's, in contrast to Bulgaria's, encounter with the East Roman Empire and conversion to Orthodox Christianity, there was no political complication to interfere with the reception of Hellenism in its original Ancient Greek dress by a converted Slavonic-speaking people. The acknowledgement of the East Roman Empire's political suzerainty, which was implicit in a submission to the Oecumenical Patriarchate's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, did not stick in the throats of Varangian princes at Kiev and Novgorod who well knew that their principalities were *de facto* safely beyond the reach of even Basil the Bulgar-killer's long arm. While Bulgaria lay on the East Roman Empire's threshold, Russia was insulated from the East Roman Empire by the twofold physical barrier of the Black Sea and the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe. The Russians therefore had nothing to fear from exposing themselves *de jure* to an East Roman political pretension which in their case could never have any serious practical effect; and they felt so sure of their political security that in the ecclesiastical sphere they submitted not only to being enrolled among the Oecumenical Patriarch's spiritual subjects but to leaving in this Constantinopolitan Greek prelate's hands the appointment of the local head of the Russian national church, and allowing him to exercise this right of patronage by always installing a Greek in preference to a Russian.¹

The Metropolitans of Kiev were, with only two exceptions, Greek appointees of the Oecumenical Patriarch's from *circa* A.D. 1037/9 until the Kievan Russian World was overwhelmed by the impact of the Mongols in and after A.D. 1237;² during the same two centuries about half the bishops in Russian Orthodox Christendom were Greeks as well;³ and Russia's consequent ecclesiastical intercourse with the East Roman Empire 'was most fertile for spiritual culture'.⁴ Yet in Russia, as in Bulgaria, literature written in Ancient Greek was acclimatized, not in the original, but only in translation; and the range of the Greek works selected for translation into Macedonian Slavonic for the edification of Bulgar and Russian converts to Orthodox Christianity approximately coincided with the contents of 'the library of an average Greek monastery'.⁵ 'At first the main bulk of the translated literature belonged to the Christian Antiquity of the fourth and fifth centuries';⁶ and, though it is true that, of the two or three dozen translations from the Greek which show linguistic signs of having been made before the Mongol conquest of Russia in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, 'most are the works of secular or half-secular literature',⁷ it is significant that, out of these, only one—Josephus's *History of the Great Romano-Jewish War*—is a non-Christian author's work, and not one a pagan author's, while some of them are not works of the Hellenic Age at all, but are medieval. For instance, a translation of the Medieval Greek Epic—written in a mix-

translated the chronicle of John Malalas, and also a romantic tale of Troy for "the book-loving prince".

¹ See Fedotov, G. P.: *The Russian Religious Mind: Kievan Christianity* (Cambridge, Mass. 1946, Harvard University Press), pp. 57-58 and 401-2.

² See Vernadsky, G.: *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, Conn. 1948, Yale University Press), pp. 69, 79, and 350.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 350.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁴ Fedotov, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

ture of Modern and Ancient Greek—whose hero was Digénis (Dhiyéris) Akritas¹ was included in this earliest batch.² As for the secular works subsequently translated from the Greek, these amounted to no more than a tiny fraction of the total bulk of the literature that had been translated by the sixteenth century; and this batch consisted of one Late Hellenic chronicle, one Early Byzantine chronicle, and some fragments of works on grammar and logic. Here again, there is not one pagan Greek classic in the list.

How are we to account for this signal failure of the classical Hellenic literature to strike root in a Russia whose reception of Orthodox Christianity had exposed the Slavonic-speaking converts to the influence of their Greek-speaking co-religionists? In this case, as we have seen, no political obstacle loomed up across the path of cultural intercourse; and by the date of Russia's conversion the literary renaissance of Hellenism in Greek Orthodox Christendom was already in full swing. Why should a Medieval Greek renaissance of Hellenism have failed to capture Russia as a Medieval Italian renaissance of Hellenism eventually captured Hungary, Poland, and Scandinavia? The key to an explanation of this puzzle is perhaps to be found in the practice of translating Greek into Slavonic, instead of studying works of Greek literature in the original; for, notwithstanding the power and prestige enjoyed by the Greek Metropolitans of Kiev,

'the knowledge of Greek seems to have been not much extended among Russians. In the *Chronicles* or in the *Lives* of Saints we never find them speaking Greek, nor is there any mention of the Greek language being taught in schools. What is still more significant, there have been preserved no Greek manuscripts written in Russia, no Greek quotations or even single words in Greek letters in Russian manuscripts. It appears that Greek was for the Russians a language of practical intercourse with foreigners and not an instrument of culture. Studying the theological and scientific fund of the most learned Russian authors, one cannot discover among their sources direct Greek originals. . . . Everything in their writings can be explained on the ground of the existent literature of translations.'³

The formidable intellectual enterprise of mastering Greek had thus been made superfluous for the Russians thanks to the linguistic liberality of the Orthodox Church and the philological ability of Saint Cyril, the Greek Apostle to the Slavs. Yet this exemption from an intellectual labour was a doubtful blessing, since, in being let off a task, these Slavonic-speaking Christians were at the same time being denied an opportunity. If they had been compelled to take Orthodox Christianity in its original Greek dress, a mastery of the Attic Greek *κωνή* in its ecclesiastical use would have provided them with the necessary stepping-stone for mounting to the higher attainment of cultivating the pagan Hellenic literature written in an earlier form of the same Attic Greek dialect, and passing on thence to an Ionic Greek Herodotean prose and an Epic Greek Homeric poetry. A Greek Orthodox Christian who had

¹ See V. v. 252-9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

² See Fedotov, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

mastered his church's liturgy and literature in the original Ancient Greek could not be confronted with the pagan classical literature written in the same language without finding himself both easily able to understand it and potently affected by its aesthetic charm and its intellectual power; but this ghost of a dead Hellenic literary culture would be impotent to haunt a Slav Orthodox Christian who had contentedly remained ignorant of Greek because all that he needed to know of the Orthodox Christian liturgy and literature had been adequately translated for him out of the original Greek into a dialect of his own Slavonic mother tongue.

Whatever the explanation may be, it is an indisputable fact that, in the Orthodox Christian World, a renaissance of the Ancient Greek language and literature that was both vigorous and persistent in the geographical province within which the Orthodox Christian Church had continued to use Ancient Greek as its literary vehicle failed to make any headway in those provinces in which the Orthodox Christian liturgy and literature were translated out of Greek into Georgian or into Slavonic. On the other hand, this diversity of ecclesiastical languages did not prevent the spread of another resuscitated element of Hellenism which was not a literature but a political institution, and which therefore, unlike the Ancient Greek classics, was not dependent on a linguistic vehicle for its dissemination. In contrast to the ghost of a dead Hellenic literary culture, the ghost of a dead Hellenic universal state in its post-Diocletianic totalitarian last phase did not remain confined within the ambit of a Modern-Greek-speaking province of Orthodox Christendom where it, too, had originally been raised. After having made its first reappearance in the shape of the East Roman Empire, it proceeded, as we have seen, to haunt one after another of the non-Greek-speaking peoples who were successively converted to the Orthodox Christian Religion and Civilization. After Constantinople had seen her pretension to be 'the Second Rome' made good by a Leo III and a Constantine V (*imperabant* A.D. 717-75), she lived to see a Bulgar Symeon in A.D. 925, a Vlach Asen and Cuman Terteri after A.D. 1204,¹ a Serb Stephen Dushan in A.D. 1346, and a Russian Ivan IV in A.D. 1547 each attempt in turn to steal her title from her by inaugurating 'a Third Rome' at Preslav, Trnovo, Skoplje, and Moscow in succession.² Thus, unlike the Byzantine renaissance of the Ancient Greek language and literature, the Byzantine renaissance of the Hellenic universal state knew no geographical bounds short of those of Orthodox Christendom itself; and it transcended even these when, from a base of operations in the East Roman Empire's Norman successor-state in Sicily and Apulia, it was launched by Frederick II Hohenstaufen on its triumphal career of conquest in the Western World.³

¹ See VI. vii. 34.

² See VI. vii. 31-36.

³ See pp. 10-11, above.

R. G. COLLINGWOOD'S VIEW OF THE HISTORIAN'S RELATION TO THE OBJECTS THAT HE STUDIES

In the passage to which this Annex attaches,¹ we have quoted Collingwood's dictum:

'Western Civilisation expresses, and indeed achieves, its individuality, not by distinguishing itself from Hellenic Civilisation, but by identifying itself therewith.'²

These words can only be construed to mean that in 'the Renaissance' of Hellenism the Western World was doing what is done by a man who expresses and achieves his individuality, not by distinguishing himself from Napoleon, but by identifying himself with him; and this is in fact an accurate statement of what the makers of the Renaissance professed to be trying to do and claimed to have accomplished. The difference between a Humanist and a lunatic is in fact one of degree. The lunatic has 'bet his life' on his illusion, whereas the Humanist has taken care not to go to quite that fatal length.

For good or evil, the Modern Western Humanists were not plagued with the lunatic's devastatingly whole-hearted sincerity; they were, as Spengler depicts them,³ *poseurs* in whose activities there was a saving, and at the same time damning, element of make-believe. Their identification of themselves with 'the Ancients' was kept within the bounds of a few innocuous conceits. They aped the language and style of the classical Latin and Ancient Greek writers;⁴ they sometimes Latinized or Graecized their own barbarophone personal names; and for the occasion of a fancy-dress party or a pageant they would dress up in what they imagined to be classical costume; but they reserved the permanent assumption of the imperator's lorica or the orator's toga for their posthumous apotheosis in bronze or marble, and the same prudent unwillingness to sacrifice their physical comfort on the altar of their Hellenomania can be detected in their architecture. In discarding a grotesque Gothic in favour of a classical Vitruvian canon, they never carried their Hellenic purism to the length of renouncing fireplaces, chimneys, and glazed windows. This judicious discrimination in the pursuit of their

¹ p. 64, above.

² Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), p. 163.

³ In the passage quoted on pp. 65-66, above.

⁴ This aping of an alien idiom might, however, cease to be a conceit through becoming a second nature; and the writer might, as Collingwood would testify from his own personal experience to the genuineness of a cultural metamorphosis in which he might otherwise have seen nothing more than a rather tiresome pose. As a result of his good fortune in having received a Late Medieval Italian education at the College of Saint Mary de Winton prope Winton and at Balliol College, Oxford, in the years A.D. 1902-11, he had acquired, and retained in after life, an articulateness in Greek and Latin of which he was destitute in his vernacular mother tongue. Whenever his feelings were deeply moved, they used to discharge themselves by finding expression in Greek or Latin verse which welled up spontaneously from the subconscious depths of his psyche.

folies saved the Humanists from the madhouse, but it also condemned them to be hustled off the stage of Modern Western history after a vogue which lasted no longer than two hundred years in the Transalpine provinces of an Occidental pseudo-Hellas. A seventeenth-century controversy between the champions of 'the Ancients' and 'the Moderns' had resulted, as we have seen,¹ in the exorcizing of the Renaissance and the reassertion, in the Modern Western World, of the Western Civilization's own native bent about a quarter of a millennium before the date at which Collingwood pronounced that the Western Civilization had identified itself with the Hellenic and had thereby expressed and achieved its own individuality.

In the same passage² Collingwood also asserts that, in performing this alleged feat of identifying itself with Hellenism, the Western Civilization has done 'exactly' [*sic*] what is done by 'the historian who studies a civilization other than his own'; and this assertion, too, takes the reader aback by coming into headlong collision with reality; for, however like a lunatic the historian may look in any other respect, he does at any rate hold the diametrically opposite view to the lunatic's view about his relation to Napoleon. The one mistake about Napoleon that an historian is sure not to make is to mistake the Napoleon whom he is studying for the historian himself.

It would, of course, be unlikely *a priori* that a thinker who, like Collingwood, was an eminent historian, as well as an eminent philosopher, really intended to say what he actually says in this startling passage. The context in which these assertions occur is a criticism of the present writer's idea of History as seen through Collingwood's eyes, and these statements of Collingwood's own ideas are thrown out here just in passing. More carefully considered statements of his views are to be looked for in the essays, published in the same volume as epilogomena to *The Idea of History*, in which Collingwood's first concern is, not the criticism of other people's ideas, but the exposition of his own; and, if Collingwood had lived to revise these sibylline leaves of his for publication, we may be sure that he would have sorted out and cleared up any inconsistencies between them, and may guess that in bringing his divers statements into harmony he might have reconsidered some of his premises. This was, of course, a task which no one but Collingwood himself could have undertaken; and, in using a posthumously published edition of his work in which the editor has perforce left the content (as distinct from the layout and some of the form) of the book in the unfinished state in which it happened to be when the brilliant author of it was overtaken by a premature death,³ the student who wishes to profit from this skilfully salvaged intellectual treasure must do his best, in the face of inevitably uneliminated inconsistencies, to divine which exposition it is, where divers expositions conflict, that most faithfully reflects Collingwood's thought at its zenith.

In the case in point—in which we are seeking to ascertain what Collingwood really meant by saying that an historian identified himself

¹ On pp. 68–69, above.

² Collingwood, op. cit., p. 163.

³ See the Editor's preface to Collingwood, op. cit., p. v.

with the object of his study—the passage quoted above is manifestly less authoritative than another,¹ in which Collingwood answers an imaginary critic's objection that Collingwood's theory implies 'an immediate identity between the historian and his object'—'say Thomas Becket'—by putting it that

'for Becket, in so far as he was a thinking mind, being Becket was also knowing that he was Becket; and for myself, on the same showing, to be Becket is to know that I am Becket, that is, to know that I am my present self re-enacting Becket's thought, myself being in that sense Becket.'

To credit the lunatic's statement 'I am somebody other than myself' with having the meaning of the sane man's statement 'I am myself thinking thoughts that somebody else has already once thought' is to strain the interpretation of plain words to a degree that Collingwood would not readily have tolerated if the torturer had been anyone but himself. A forced interpretation that vindicates the historian's sanity is, nevertheless, proved to be Collingwood's true meaning by the testimony of other passages whose cumulative weight of evidence is decisive.

'All thinking is critical thinking; the thought which re-enacts past thoughts [*sic*], therefore, criticises them in re-enacting them.² . . . The historian . . . re-enacts past thought [*sic*] . . . in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it, criticises it.³ . . . This re-enactment . . . is not a passive surrender to the spell of another's mind; it is a labour of active and therefore critical thinking.⁴ . . . Unless he knows that he is thinking historically, he is not thinking historically.⁵ . . . Historical thinking is always reflexion; for reflexion is thinking about the act of thinking, and . . . all historical thinking is of that kind.'⁶

By this time it has become clear that Collingwood's historian is not, after all, going to be certified as insane. Yet his acquittal on the charge of lunacy leaves him still open to a hardly less serious charge of eccentricity, to which he exposes himself by insisting on confining his field of action within limits that look capriciously arbitrary to Philistine eyes.

'All history is the history of thought.⁷ . . . Of everything other than thought, there can be no history.⁸ . . . In order . . . that any particular act of thought should become subject-matter for history, it must be an act not only of thought but of reflective thought.⁹ . . . Reflective acts may be roughly described as the acts which we do on purpose, and these are the only acts which can become the subject-matter of history.'¹⁰

It will be noticed that the acts of reflective thought which are declared by Collingwood on one page to be the only possible subject-matter for history are equated by him on the next page with 'the acts which we do on purpose'; and here it looks to the historian-Philistine as if the historian-philosopher has slipped unintentionally and unconsciously into practising a sophist's sleight of hand; for, unless some undeclared esoteric construction is to be placed upon the meaning of Collingwood's words, 'the acts which we do on purpose' include acts of other kinds—

¹ Collingwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 296–7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 216.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

for instance, acts of will—besides acts of reflective thought; and acts of other kinds—for instance, acts of impulse as well as acts of will—play a much larger part than any acts of reflective thought in the action that is the subject-matter of History as we find this 'in real life' when we look at the actual practice of historians without allowing a philosopher's *a priori* dictum to hypnotize us into ignoring the realities.

In another passage,¹ in which Collingwood speaks of the historian as 'investigating actions' and consistently defines an 'action' as being an event that has something 'in it which can only be described in terms of thought', in contrast to 'everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements', the philosopher takes, as an illustration of his meaning, Caesar's action in crossing the Rubicon. The least philosophical-minded of historians would assuredly agree with Collingwood that the physical movements made by Caesar and his troops, when they transported themselves from the north to the south bank of a river, were only a trivial element in the action that is both the object of the historian's study and the fount of the River Rubicon's fame; and the historian would also agree that the psychic element in Caesar's action, which is recognized, by a general consensus, as being the significant element in it, can be described in terms of thought in one of its aspects; but he would demur to Collingwood's assertion that this non-physical element 'can only [*sic*] be described in terms of thought'; for the 'thought' which Collingwood cites to prove his point is 'Caesar's defiance of Republican law, or the clash of constitutional policy between himself and his assassins',² and in the ordinary usage of words these events would not be called acts of 'thought'; they would be called an act of will on Caesar's part and a resulting conflict of wills between the author of this act and other dramatis personae in an interplay between Caesar and the constitutionalists which Caesar's initial act had set in motion.

This is not the only passage in which Collingwood's equation of the historian's subject-matter with 'thought' compels him to describe a familiar historical event in language which, if the words that the philosopher uses are to be taken in their normal meaning, will strike the reader as being quaintly inadequate.

For example, when 'the historian of politics or warfare' is trying to understand Caesar's actions, he is trying, according to Collingwood, 'to discover what thoughts [*sic*] in Caesar's mind determined him to do them'.³ Caesar is an unusually favourable subject for Collingwood's verbal treatment, since History knows few men of action of his calibre in whose psychic 'make-up' the intellectual element has counted for so much; yet even in Caesar's history the historian's main concern is not, in reality, with the thoughts in Caesar's mind; for even in a Caesar's psychic spectrum it is the 'affective' and the 'conative', not the 'cognitive', activities that loom largest in the historian's field of vision. In the historian's endeavours to understand Caesar's actions, Caesar's thoughts are *les cadets de ses soucis*; Caesar's feelings, ambitions, purposes, and decisions are the first things about Caesar that the historian seeks to

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

discover. If he were to start by trying to discover Caesar's thoughts and were to content himself with leaving it at that, the historian would then be leaving himself still in the dark. This is why Collingwood's phrase makes the impression of artificiality that it does make on the mind of Collingwood's reader; and the same impression is made by Collingwood's formula for Brutus:

'When an historian asks "Why did Brutus stab Caesar?" he means "What did Brutus think [*sic*], which made him decide to stab Caesar?"'

If Collingwood's imaginary historian were given the chance to explain his meaning in the language that came natural to him, he would not say, 'What did Brutus think?' He would say, 'What did Brutus feel?'

When Collingwood substitutes some stock character—'a politician' or 'a military commander'—for his historic Brutus or Caesar, the effect of the application of his formula is quaint still.

'If it were possible to say of any man that he acted with no idea whatever what would come of it, but did the first thing that came into his head and merely waited to see the consequences, it would follow that such a man was no politician, and that his action was merely the intrusion into political life of a blind and irrational force.'¹

The truth here is, of course, exactly contrary to Collingwood's assertion. In real life such a man as Collingwood describes would be no politician if he did not [*sic*] behave in the intellectually horrifying way that the philosopher deprecates. President Wilson, for instance, proved himself to be no politician, and tragically brought himself to grief, by answering all too well to Collingwood's specification. This 'intellectual' who had been the president of a university before becoming President of the United States is one of the rare examples of a prominent actor on the political stage who would have been a strong candidate for Collingwood's degree of master of political arts. And, if blind and irrational forces were in truth outside the pale of political history, most published works on political history, from Thucydides' *History of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War*² to D. C. Somervell's *British Politics since 1900*,³ would have to be thrown on the scrap-heap. Yet, in Collingwood's own words, 'it would be generally admitted that politics is a thing that can be historically studied'.⁴

How has Collingwood got himself into this tangle? He has entangled himself by giving a wrong explanation of a commonplace truth. 'The reason', he goes on to assert, why it is possible to study politics historically 'is that politics affords a plain instance of purposive action'; and since this assertion flies in the face of historical facts it is not surprising that it should reduce *ad absurdum* an idea of History that is founded on it.

The same false premise, applied to the history of warfare, leads Collingwood into the equally untenable position of maintaining that if a military commander's acts were not done on purpose 'there can be no

¹ Collingwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-10.

² *Scaptēsylē*, date uncertain, publisher unrecorded.

³ London 1950, Dakers.

⁴ Collingwood, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

history of them'.¹ An open-minded student of military history will find this dictum of Collingwood's less convincing than the picture of Bagration's generalship in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*.

We need not, however, *subpoena* either Tolstoy or Somervell or Thucydides to rise up in judgement against² Collingwood, since we can win our case more expeditiously by appealing from Collingwood theorizing about history as a philosopher to the same Collingwood studying and writing history as an historian. An equal eminence in two fields of intellectual activity was the distinctive mark of Collingwood's genius, and his characteristic achievement as an historian was his masterly employment of Archaeology in History's service. 'Everything belonging to' an event 'which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements'³ was grist to Collingwood the historian's mill, though it might be chaff to Collingwood the philosopher's winnowing fan; and, in virtue of their rare archaeological merits, Collingwood's own historical works would fail still more ignominiously than Thucydides' or Gibbon's to pass the test of Collingwood's idea of History.

How has this historian-philosopher arrived at an idea of History which he has confuted by 'direct action' of his own? Collingwood's confutation of Collingwood is as irresistible as Doctor Johnson's confutation of Bishop Berkeley. The historian has given a conclusive kick to a philosopher's stone that is a plain man's stumbling-block. How has the philosopher ever come to erect the artificial obstacle which the historian in the same philosopher's skin has unceremoniously removed from our path? An answer to this question may perhaps be elicited from the following arrestingly paradoxical passage.

'If the discovery of Pythagoras concerning the square on the hypotenuse is a thought which we today can think for ourselves, a thought that constitutes a permanent addition to mathematical knowledge, the discovery of Augustus, that a monarchy could be grafted upon the Republican constitution of Rome by developing the implications of *proconsulare imperium* and *tribunicia potestas*, is equally a thought which the student of Roman history can think for himself, a permanent addition to political ideas. If Mr. Whitehead is justified in calling the right-angled triangle an eternal object, the same phrase is applicable to the Roman constitution and the Augustan modification of it. This is an eternal object because it can be apprehended by historical thought at any time; time makes no difference to it in this respect, just as it makes no difference to the triangle.'⁴

In this passage Collingwood shocks even an unphilosophic-minded reader by placing a political improvisation on all fours with a mathematical proposition on the score of its being 'a permanent addition to political ideas'. The mathematical theorem which came into the focus of human consciousness for the first time in Pythagoras' mind, according to the Hellenic tradition, was in truth 'a permanent addition to mathematical knowledge' in the sense that, when once this element in an eternally valid system of mathematical truth had been brought within the pale of a Collective Human Intellect, it was open, ever afterwards, to any other

¹ Ibid., p. 310.

³ Ibid., p. 213.

² Matt. xii. 42.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 217-18.

individual mind to apprehend the theorem for itself, and use it for the purposes of its own mathematical thought, on the sole condition of having access to a cumulative body of mathematical knowledge that was one of the common possessions of Mankind. On the other hand, if a President of the United States who happened, like President Wilson, to be a better historian than politician were to act on Collingwood's thesis that Augustus's discovery was 'a permanent addition to political ideas', he would quickly run into trouble that will never overtake the mathematician who acts on the assumption that Pythagoras' discovery was 'a permanent addition to mathematical knowledge'.

In a Western international arena on the morrow of a Second World War, let us imagine a President Wilson *redivivus* coming to the conclusion that Mankind can be saved from committing the crime and folly of race-suicide only by the prompt establishment of an effective oecumenical government. His next thought will be that, in the existing oecumenical constellation of political forces, the Presidency of the United States is the one well-established vantage-point from which it might be just possible to achieve the Herculean task of reducing a world-wide political anarchy to a world-wide political order. His next thought after that will be that the Presidency's powers, as laid down in the Constitution of the United States and as customarily interpreted in American political practice, are at present quite inadequate for the accomplishment of this urgent and arduous political labour. And this thought, in turn, will lead on to the further consideration that, however desirable it may be that the powers of the Presidency of the United States should be enlarged to the requisite extent, and however ardently this change in the Constitution of the United States may be desired by the vast majority of Mankind who are not American citizens, the change cannot be made without the acquiescence of at least a sufficient majority in the Senate and People of the United States to make a presidential dictatorship workable for practical purposes. But how can the Senate and People be induced to play their indispensable part? Clearly it would not be practical politics just to put the cards on the table and, in the light of them, make a naïve appeal to Reason and to Virtue; for the most adult-minded electorate and most experienced representative body could not be expected to make so great a readjustment of its political feelings and ideas at such short notice. Again, it would not be practical politics to try coercion; for, even if the inevitable resistance could be overcome, the struggle would generate a friction that would bring the high-handed usurper's benevolent activities to a standstill. In a fix in which neither Force nor Reason will break the deadlock, the only remaining alternative is to try cajolery; and at this stage in his brown study our imaginary historian-president will recollect that this was the device by which the problem now confronting him was solved, in other ages and in other worlds, by an Augustus and a Mu'āwiyah and a Han Liu Pang.

So far so good; but in the political arena, in contrast to the intellectual forum, to apprehend a proposition is not the same thing as to put it into effect; for a practical proposition, unlike a theoretical one, has to be translated into action, and this action will be successful only in so far as

it is geared to the actualities of Here and Now. The fineness of their sense of these all-important actualities was the common gift that was the secret of Augustus's and Mu'āwiyah's and Liu Pang's common success; and their possession of this gift explains why it was that Augustus and Liu Pang succeeded in solving problems that had defeated their more brilliant forerunners Divus Julius and Ts'in She Hwang-ti.¹ The very brilliance of their ideas had been the undoing of those two men of genius, for it had enticed them to fly straight into the light, like moths plunging into the flame of a candle. The clarity with which they perceived their goal had made them so impatient of approaching it by any roundabout road that, instead of being content to feel their way between the natural obstacles, they had tried to ride roughshod over the perilous broken ground of actualities that were none the less actual for being irrational. Caesar the God invited assassination by allowing his partisans to make the provocative gesture of paying him royal honours; Augustus the politician discovered 'that a monarchy could be grafted upon the constitution of Rome by developing the implications of *proconsulare imperium* and *tribunicia potestas*'; but this Augustan 'modification' of the republican constitution of Rome was the antithesis of the 'eternal object' that had been Divus Julius's will-o'-the-wisp; and, if any twentieth-century dictator-aspirant were to follow Collingwood's prescription by trying to 're-enact' Augustus's 'experience for himself',² he would soon find himself in queer street; for, just because Augustus's sly policy fitted Augustus's own political milieu like a glove, it was bound, if tried in any other political milieu, to prove there an egregious misfit. Since a sensitiveness to the exigencies of his own Here and Now was the secret of Augustus's success, the only profitable lesson that a twentieth-century American aspirant to an oecumenical dictatorship could learn from 'the crafty nephew of Julius'³ would be the hint that his cue was to develop with equal tact, care, and patience the implications of the presidential prerogative in the written and the customary constitution of the United States. A cue that, taken in these general terms, might put him on the road towards an Augustan success would infallibly lead him into a Julian disaster if he were ever to try to translate it from the general into the particular by setting out to develop the implications of *proconsulare imperium* and *tribunicia potestas* in the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era at Washington, D.C.

Collingwood's contention that Augustus's political contrivance is 'a permanent addition to political ideas' and 'an eternal object' thus proves to be untenable; and it is, indeed, implicitly contradicted by Collingwood himself in another passage published in the same book.

'The *Republic* of Plato is an account, not of the unchanging ideal of political life, but of the Greek ideal as Plato received it and reinterpreted it. The *Ethics* of Aristotle describes, not an eternal morality, but the morality of the Greek gentleman. Hobbes's *Leviathan* expounds the political ideas of seventeenth-century absolutism in their English form.

¹ See V. vi. 186-9.

² Collingwood, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

³ Bryce, quoted in I. i. 343.

Kant's ethical theory expresses the moral convictions of German pietism; his *Critique of Pure Reason* analyses the conceptions and principles of Newtonian Science, in their relation to the philosophical problems of the day.¹

Here the historian in Collingwood joins forces with the philosopher in him to proclaim the relativity of political, ethical, and even meta-physical thought to the local and temporary social milieu in which the thinker is living and working; and the unphilosophic historian will break no lance with Collingwood over this issue; he will, though, find himself all the more curious to discern how it can be that an historian-philosopher who so resolutely refuses the status of 'an eternal object' to a product of political thought can at the same time venture to confer this enviable status upon a product of political action. An act of thought—even when its object is the parochial, ephemeral, and contingent world of politics—is at any rate more nearly akin to an act of thought in the realm of Mathematics than it is akin to an act of state in the realm of practical political activity. To dub Augustus's principate 'an eternal object', while describing Plato's *Republic* as a progress report on the state of political science up to the date of its publication, is a paradox that demands an explanation.

What motive has led Collingwood to commit himself to this *tour de force*? He has set his readers a puzzle, but he has also supplied them with the key. It is evident that, in Collingwood's view, the perfect kind of knowledge is the mathematician's relation to the objects that he studies. This mathematical kind of knowledge is Collingwood's ideal; and in the emotional thermometer of his feelings the prestige of Mathematics attains so high a degree that the best turn that Collingwood can think of doing to the historian is to demonstrate, if he can, that the historian's kind of knowledge is a knowledge of this mathematical sort. If this diagnosis is correct, Collingwood's idea of History—like any other idea entertained by any other philosopher, however intellectually austere he may be doing his best to be—carries a human charge of emotion in it. The emotional 'affect' that is just perceptible in this passage may be presumed to be latent elsewhere; and, if the presence of this emotional nigger can in truth be detected in Collingwood's intellectual wood-pile, we have here identified the villain who has betrayed the philosopher's thought into confusions that have landed him in intellectually untenable positions. In the equation of an Augustan principate with a Pythagorean theorem we can detect two intellectual flaws in Collingwood's idea of History that can both be traced to this 'affective' origin. One of these is a failure to distinguish between the historian's and the mathematician's diverse interests in the same mathematical proposition; the other flaw is a failure to distinguish between the historian's way of apprehending the thought in a mathematical proposition and the same historian's way of apprehending a mathematical or any other act of thought in its historical setting in real life, where acts of thought are always found to be intertwined with acts of will and acts of feeling in a psychic rope in which the intellectual strand is sometimes conspicuous mainly by its virtual

¹ Collingwood, *op. cit.*, p. 229, quoted on p. 198, above.

absence. These distinctions that the philosopher has ignored to his cost must now be investigated by the historian at his peril.

The difference between the historian's interest and the mathematician's in taking cognizance of the same mathematical proposition is not difficult to descry. When a mathematician is confronted with a mathematical proposition, he asks himself two questions: first, 'Is it true?' and, second, 'If it is true, then what position does this particular piece of mathematical truth occupy in the structure of the general system of mathematical truth in so far as this system and its structure are known to me?' For these professional purposes of the mathematician's, it does not matter when, where, or how this particular mathematical truth first happened to become known to the mind of some individual human being. Let the memory of Pythagoras' life and work 'fly forgotten as a dream'; the proposition which an historian associates with Pythagoras' name would lose none of its mathematical validity through becoming a proposition without a history. Its mathematical validity is conferred on it solely and wholly by an apprehension of its truth in the mind of a mathematician who is thinking it at the moment. This is the sense in which it is 'the eternal object' that Whitehead has proclaimed it to be. It is an element in a system of mathematical truth which is intrinsically self-consistent, coherent, and constant; and these intrinsic characteristics of this system of truth are not affected by the historical fact that a knowledge of it, accumulated in 'the collective consciousness' of the Human Race, has been, and is still being, acquired piecemeal by the successive intellectual exertions of individual human minds. In other words, the eternity of any object of thought that is successively entertained by the minds of a series of mathematicians has its converse, condition, and price in the impersonality with which this object is entertained by one mind after another without establishing any human link between them.

In thinking a proposition which Pythagoras is said to have been the first human being to have thought, a latter-day mathematician is not 're-enacting' Pythagoras' 'experience for himself';¹ for the experience shared with Pythagoras by this historical successor of his is the bare intellectual act of thinking an impersonally mathematical thought,²

¹ Collingwood, *ibid.*, p. 163.

² This point is made by Collingwood himself in another context: 'Even thought itself, in its immediacy as the unique act of thought with its unique context in the life of an individual thinker, . . . cannot be re-enacted; if it could, Time itself would be cancelled and the historian would be the person about whom he thinks, living over again in all respects the same. The historian cannot apprehend the individual act of thought in its individuality, just as it actually happened. What he apprehends . . . is the act of thought itself, in its survival and revival at different times and in different persons' (*ibid.*, p. 303). This is Collingwood's exegesis of his own previous contention that 'the process of argument which I go through is not a process resembling Plato's, it actually is Plato's . . . if I not only read his argument but understand it—follow it in my own mind by re-arguing it with and for myself' (*ibid.*, p. 301; cp. p. 215).

We shall concur with Collingwood's considered view that, while the thought that is thought on the two occasions is identical, it can only be so in so far as it is impersonal; but we must apply to this conclusion of Collingwood's the distinction that we have drawn between the historian's purpose and the mathematician's or natural scientist's. It is true that the rethinking of a thought does not bring a later thinker of it into personal communion with an earlier thinker of it, and it is also true that a mathematical or scientific thinker is not seeking to conjure any ulterior personal communion out of the impersonal mathematical or scientific thought into which he does effectively enter. On the other

whereas Pythagoras' actual experience included the sensation of suddenly seeing the light, the belief that his was the first human mind that had ever seen it, and the emotional exultation of feeling himself to be an intellectual pioneer. All these non-mathematical elements in a mathematician's actual experience are expressed in Archimédês' exclamation *ἤρηκα*; yet the latter-day student of hydrostatics is deaf to a cry which, coming as it does from Archimédês' heart, never fails to thrill the heart of the historian, however faintly the sound may echo in the historian's ears across an ever widening gulf of fleeting Time.

There is indeed a piquant difference between the mathematician's impersonal way of looking at a proposition and the way in which the same proposition interests the historian. When the historian is confronted with it, he does not ask himself, 'Is this mathematically true?' He asks himself, 'What can this mathematical proposition tell me about the personality and life of Pythagoras and about the history of his social milieu—the thoughts, feelings, aims, and characters of Pythagoras and his contemporaries, predecessors, and successors in Samos and in Croton, in the Hellenic World at large, and in the other societies that were this society's successors, predecessors, and contemporaries? So long as the mathematical proposition associated with Pythagoras gives him some light on the answers to these historical questions, it is of no professional consequence to the historian whether the proposition happens to be mathematically true or false; for a mathematically true proposition might prove to be barren of historical information, while a mathematically false proposition might prove to be an historian's gold mine.

Since everything that has been said about Mathematics in this Annex is likewise true of Natural Science, the case of Astrology will serve to illustrate our point. In Collingwood's and Toynbee's day in Western scientific circles, Astrology was in deep disgrace. It was perpetually being cited as the classical example of a pseudo-science whose falsity had been exposed and whose prestige had been exploded;¹ yet, in this selfsame generation, masterly studies of astrological beliefs for historical purposes had been throwing floods of light on the *Weltanschauung* and *Gefühlsart* of the children of the Babylonian Civilization who had invented—or discovered—Astrology in the eighth century B.C.² and the children

hand the historian, even if he fails fully to apprehend this impersonal mathematical thought, may nevertheless succeed in utilizing it for his own ulterior purpose of making a psychic passage across the gulf of Time and Space that lies between him and some earlier thinker of the same thought with whom he is seeking to make contact (see pp. 729 and 730, below).

¹ There was, of course, a long time-lag between the date, before the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, at which Modern Western men of science ceased to believe that astrological propositions were true and the consummation of Astrology's ruin as a practical going concern in non-scientific circles in the West and elsewhere. In A.D. 1952 a glance at any issue of any organ of the popular press in England would inform an historian that at this date Astrology, so far from having been sent to Jericho, was fast occupying a spiritual vacuum created by the waning of Western Man's belief in the truth of Astrology's old rival, Christianity. A more surprising phenomenon, of which there were indications at this date, was an incipient readmission of this long-since scientifically discredited science into the Eden of scientific truth from which it had once been ignominiously expelled. The tree of knowledge on to which Astrology was being grafted this time was not its ungrateful natural daughter Astronomy, but an indulgent adoptive mother—Psychology.

² See V. v. 56-57.

of contemporary and posterior civilizations, down to and including Collingwood's and Toynbee's own seventeenth-century forebears in the West, who had fallen like ninepins to the fascination of this professedly scientific system of ideas.

'The human interest' which attaches to the history of astrological beliefs, and which is just as well served by a study of them if they happen to be scientifically false as if they happen to be scientifically true, is the hidden treasure¹ that is the historian's lodestone. Nothing else except the quest for this trove would induce the historian to give his mind to scientific and mathematical propositions which for the historian have no intrinsic professional interest either *a priori* or even in consequence of the historian's being told by a *savant* that the *savant* believes them to be true—and, perhaps, not only true but momentous—in the inhuman realm of scientific and mathematical reality.

It will be seen that the mathematician's and the historian's respective professional interests in the same mathematical proposition are mutually exclusive; and consequently either party's interest is at best boring to the other party and at worst exasperating to him. The historian has no professional use for a system of mathematical or scientific truth if he is asked to study it for its own sake; for he is not concerned to certify the permanence of 'a permanent addition to mathematical knowledge' in thinking this mathematical thought for himself, any more than he is concerned to certify the permanence of 'a permanent addition to political ideas' in entering into the thoughts and aims of Augustus. If he sets himself to think thoughts that were once entertained by the mind of either an Augustus or a Pythagoras, his purpose is to utilize the political calculation or the mathematical theorem as an intellectual spring-board from which his imagination can make an attempt, by taking a flying leap, to establish psychic communications with other human souls whose intellects have thought the same thought at other times and places. Conversely, the mathematician or natural scientist has no professional use for the history of mathematical or scientific beliefs.

It is true that the beliefs which mathematicians and scientists will be found to be holding at any date will always also be found to be the historical product of beliefs held by their predecessors, some of which will have been retained, and others discarded, by these past thinkers' present epigoni; and this is an aspect of mathematical and scientific beliefs that is of greater professional interest to an historian than the mathematician's or scientist's professional question whether these beliefs happen to be intrinsically true or false. At any date at which the historian takes a sounding, he is apt to find the mathematicians and scientists of that generation indebted to the past beliefs that they have discarded, not much less deeply than to those that they have retained; but the historian is also apt to find himself being astonished by his own mathematical and scientific contemporaries' ingratitude. If they are confronted with one of their predecessors' beliefs, their first question is not, 'What do we owe to it?' but, 'Is it true or false?' And, if once they have pronounced it to be false according to their own present lights, they suffer

¹ Matt. xiii. 44.

no natural human sentiment of gratitude to restrain them from ruthlessly consigning this discarded belief to the scrap-heap, as a nuisance of which they must resolutely rid their minds for fear that it might breed intellectual confusion and error there if they were to dwell on it at the prompting of their own better feelings.

When once men of science have thus condemned some previously orthodox belief, it is idle for the historian to upbraid them for this impiety towards their predecessors. He will meet with no success in his endeavour to prick these hard hearts to compunction. The mathematician's and the scientist's judgement on the history of Mathematics and Science runs on the lines of the Caliph 'Umar's legendary dispatch to his lieutenant 'Amr b. al-'Ās in reply to 'Amr's request for instructions for the disposal of a Ptolemaic Library at Alexandria in which the treasures of an Hellenic literary culture had been accumulating for the best part of a millennium by the date of the Arab conquest of Egypt. 'If these writings of the Greeks agree with the Book of God, they are useless and need not be preserved; if they disagree, they are pernicious and ought to be destroyed'¹ is the minute which 'Umar is said to have made on 'Amr's query. 'If these tenets held by our predecessors agree with those held by us today, they are useless and need not be preserved; if they disagree, they are pernicious and ought to be destroyed' is the answer which, in fact and not in fiction, the historian evokes from the mathematician and the scientist when he begs them to take a pious interest in the genesis of their own current beliefs.

If we have now sufficiently explored the difference between the historian's and the mathematician's or scientist's respective interests in the same mathematical or scientific proposition, we may pass on to an examination of the difference between the historian's way of apprehending a thought that has been thought in other minds before his, and his way of apprehending the manifold human experience in which every act of thought is actually implicated in real life.

We have observed already² that the historian, when he is thinking for himself a thought that has also been entertained by some other person's mind in some other time and place, is not interested in the naked thought for its own sake; he is interested in it as a possible spring-board from which he may perhaps find himself able to take a flying leap into psychic communion with that other person who, in his own act of entertaining the same thought, was certainly animated by feelings associated with his act of thinking, and was perhaps also meditating, planning, or executing some associated act of will for the weal or woe of his contemporaries. This interest, which is a genuine historian's abiding ultimate interest,

¹ Gibbon, Edward: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. li, paraphrasing the thirteenth-century Jacobite Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch, Abu'l-Farāj (*alias* Mar Gregor of Malatīyeh, *alias* Bar Hebraeus). Gibbon's paraphrase is based on a passage on p. 114 of Edward Pocock's Latin translation (Oxford 1663, printed by H. Hall, Printer to the University) of 'Abulpharagius's' own Arabic translation, from the original Syriac text, of the political part of his chronicle of universal history, both political and ecclesiastical. The title of this Arabic version is *Tārikh Mukhtasar al-Duwal* (*Historia Compendiosa Dynastiarum*). The story has been cited in VI. vi. 111-12.

² On p. 729, above.

could not have been described more accurately than it has been described by Collingwood in the following words:

'To the historian, the activities whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived through in his own mind; they are objective, or known to him, only because they are also subjective, or activities of his own;'¹

and if it were indeed true of Toynbee, as Collingwood believes it to be, that

'he regards History as a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts observed and recorded by the historian, phenomena presented externally to his gaze, not experiences into which he must enter and which he must make his own,'

then—q.e.d.—Toynbee would have been convicted by Collingwood of being no historian.

This personal question is, of course, a trivial piece of private business; and in any case the only line of defence that would be likely to appeal to the defendant's readers would be for him to whisper *Circumspice* and then at once move on to the next piece of public business on the agenda—and this is the momentous question: How far is it actually possible for the historian to perform that feat of living through other people's experience which is agreed on all hands to be the historian's proper aim? Collingwood's answer is that it is possible for the historian to achieve this aim completely; but if he is able to give this simple and satisfactory reply this is only because, as we have noticed already,² Collingwood defines the area of the historian's field of sympathetic magic in terms that strike an historian-philistine as being arbitrarily restrictive. 'All history is the history of thought'³. . . . Of everything other than thought, there can be no history⁴. . . . The record of immediate experience, with its flow of sensations and feelings, . . . is not history',⁵ Collingwood maintains; and in thus defining and limiting the historian's field he is alleviating, by the exercise of a royal prerogative, the weight of the load that the imperious philosopher has legitimately imposed on the historian's devoted shoulders. When Collingwood admonishes the historian that 'he must always remember that the event' which he is studying 'was an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action',⁶ he reduces this Psyche's Task to finite dimensions by a ruling that is as merciful as it is arbitrary. 'To think himself into this action' is to be interpreted, Collingwood rules, as meaning 'to discern the thought [*sic*] of its agent'. The same restrictive interpretation is applied again when Collingwood reminds the historian that 'the events of history are never mere phenomena, never mere spectacles for contemplation, but things which the historian looks, not at, but through';⁷ for, after thus demanding of the historian's vision that it should pierce, and not just strike, its target, he scales down his demand, here too, by defining the

¹ Collingwood, op. cit., p. 218. Cp. p. 293.

² On pp. 720-2, above.

³ Ibid., p. 304.

⁶ Ibid., p. 213.

³ Collingwood, op. cit., p. 215.

⁵ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p. 214.

objective of this arduous penetration as being 'to discern the thought [*sic*] within' the objects under fire.

If it were indeed true that 'thought' was the sole possible element in human experience that the historian's psyche can apprehend, and therefore the sole legitimate target for the historian's proper aim of penetrating through the phenomena to the psychic inwardness of events, the historian's task, however exacting, would at least be straightforward, since, as we have seen, it is practicable for the same thought to be entertained by the minds of different persons, and there is one body of thought—namely mathematical and scientific thought—that is a thoroughly impersonal product and possession of a 'Collective Human Consciousness'. Unhappily for the historian, this doctrine of Collingwood the philosopher's is a dogma which is belied by the experience and practice of historians, including Collingwood himself on the evidence of his own published historical works. In real life, thought is never to be found apart from the non-intellectual strands in the composite rope of human experience; and, if Collingwood is right—as he is right—in requiring of the historian that he must 'enter into' other people's experiences and 'live through' them, he is wrong in instructing the historian to ignore all strands of experience except the intellectual strand.

The historian, for his part, must therefore resist the temptation to close with this relatively easy option. He must take to heart Collingwood's commandment 'Thou shalt get inside events'; but he must obey this commandment more rigorously than Yahweh requires of him. If he is to participate in other people's experiences, he must participate, not only in their thoughts, but also in their emotions and in their volitions; and his task will not have been achieved even when he has participated in the total individual experience of some single personality; for any act of will implies and duly produces an encounter between the person who performs the act and at least one other person whose action the act of will is intended to influence. An experience that embraces acts of will must, *ex hypothesi*, also embrace encounters; and this *a priori* conclusion is, of course, borne out by our own experience in this Study, in which we have been led by an empirical method of inquiry to find, below the surface of this phenomenon of encounters between personalities, the mysterious fount of spiritual creativity.¹ The historian must obey Collingwood's commandment over a wider field of experience than the intellectual allotment of which, alone, Collingwood takes cognizance; and from this it follows that the historian must discover for himself some additional means of establishing psychic communications with the human objects of his study beyond a re-performance of acts of thought which is the sole means suggested by Collingwood for attaining an arbitrarily limited objective.

The inadequacy of Collingwood's prescription for an historian's *modus operandi* is not, of course, equally obvious in all cases. It is least obvious where the intellectual strand in the experience in which the historian has to participate is the most important strand in this experience in the unanimous opinion of the historian and the subject of

¹ See II. i. 271-99, and pp. 395-405, above.

the particular experience that is the historian's object of study in the case in point. A classic instance of this type of case is that experience of Pythagoras' which Collingwood has cited. In Pythagoras' and Posterity's opinion alike, the important element in this experience is the thought that the area of the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the areas of the squares on this triangle's other two sides. Pythagoras himself would have been the first to pronounce that the thrill of exultation accompanying the mathematical pioneer's experience of intellectual discovery was a piece of private business that cannot compare in importance with the momentousness of the associated impersonal mathematical thought. Yet however austere that exultant feeling may be depreciated by the historian's and Pythagoras' consentient intellects, their concordant hearts cannot help leaping up at the recollection of it, to thrill rebelliously in unison. Even when the gist of an experience is a mathematical theorem, an irrepressible explosion of concomitant feeling proclaims that Thought is not the whole of Life and that Nature will keep on coming back at you however energetically you may have pitched her out.¹

If Collingwood's prescription thus proves inadequate to the historian's need even when the experience in which the historian has to participate is Pythagoras the mathematician's, how is the poor historian likely to fare in coping with some experience of 'Timur Lenk the ogre's'? In the ghastly history of human affairs, Pythagoras' experience of the thrill of discovering a theorem inside the city-wall of Croton is, after all, an event of a rarer and less characteristic kind than Tamerlane's experience of the thrill of building minarets out of five thousand human heads outside the city-wall of Zirih;² and how is the conscientious historian to 'enter into' and 'live through' that? The pertinent difference between this experience of Tamerlane's and that experience of Pythagoras' is that the strand of thought, which looms so large in Pythagoras' experience, is so exiguous in Tamerlane's experience as to be barely discernible, whereas the exuberance of Tamerlane's feelings on this gruesome occasion must have been veritably Gargantuan. By comparison, the thrill experienced by Pythagoras was a barely perceptible emotional tremor. Since 'the activities whose history' the historian 'is studying . . . are objective, or known to him, only because they are subjective, or activities of his own',³ he has to make Tamerlane's experience 'an integral part of his own . . . by re-enacting' it 'for himself';⁴ and at this point, if the historian is a truly conscientious workman, the shadow of the madhouse once again falls athwart his thorny path.

How is a scrupulous historian to set about the job? We have to picture him studying a gazetteer to find some easily accessible town whose population will suffice to provide him with about twice the number of heads (to be on the safe side) that he requires for making a pile of the same order of magnitude as Tamerlane's historic pile at Zirih. He selects Princeton, New Jersey; takes the afternoon train from

¹ Horace: *Epistulae*, Book I, Ep. x, l. 24.

³ Collingwood, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

² See IV. iv. 500.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

New York; gives himself a good night's rest at the inn or the tavern; raises his temper to the requisite pitch by meditating for five minutes on the last demand-note served on him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; rushes out in a thoroughly Tamerlanian rage into the quiet unsuspecting streets; and has not bagged more than half a dozen heads towards his target of five thousand before he finds himself in the police court being asked by the magistrate what he means by it. When he explains that he has not been committing a *crime passionel* but has been simply taking seriously his professional duties as Tamerlane's historian under Collingwood's marching orders, an enlightened Department of Justice sends him, not to the electric chair, but to the asylum. What a theme for Edward Lear!

In the eyes of an outraged society, the homicidal maniac has got off lightly; yet, even as it is, this professionally scrupulous historian's fate is sad enough from the victim's personal standpoint. Is there any way out of such an awkward dilemma? Can our devoted historian find some means of doing his professional duty by Tamerlane without making all that havoc of his own life, not to speak of his neighbours'? Yes, it is open to him to participate in Tamerlane's experience without 're-enacting' it in real life if he can bring himself to use his imagination. This alternative course likewise has its price. The historian who does his job by using his imagination is exposing himself to the censure meted out by Plato to painters and poets who have brought this sly faculty into play in their own professional activities. Yet to be castigated by Plato is, after all, a lesser evil than to be certified insane.

'Your painter,' Plato half-seriously complains, 'will paint for you a shoemaker, carpenter, and every other kind of artisan without ever having been initiated into the technique of any of these trades; yet, all the same, if he is a good artist, he will be able to take in a child or a feeble-minded adult by painting him a carpenter that he will mistake for a real carpenter if he is given a distant view of the picture. . . . [In fact,] when someone tells us, about someone else, that in him he has met a man who is a master of all trades and actually has a more accurate knowledge of each single one of them than can be claimed by any of that particular trade's professional practitioners, our conclusion will be that our interlocutor is a simpleton and that he must have come across a cheat who took his victim in so completely by tricks of mimicry that he succeeded in giving him the impression that he was a universal genius—owing to the victim's inability to distinguish between mimicry and knowledge and ignorance. . . .

'Well, this calls for an inquiry into "high-brow" poetry (*τραγωδία*) and its presiding genius Homer, because there are people who tell us that these poets are masters of all the arts and of all the problems of ethics and of theology. A good poet, the argument runs, must *ex hypothesi* be a connoisseur of his subject if he is to write about it properly—if he were not a connoisseur, he would not be able to write at all. The question for inquiry is whether the poets may not be adepts at mimicry who have taken in these sponsors of theirs by a confidence trick which has been so well played that the victims of it, when they see the poets' works, do not tumble to it that these products are at three removes' distance from reality and are easy for an ignoramus to fabricate because these works of the poets' are not realities at all but are mere phantasms. . . .

'Let us now be generous to Homer or any confrère of his whom we may choose to interrogate. Let us confine our interrogation to a single question. We will not ask him: "If you are really a doctor and not just a mimic of the medical profession's patter, what evidence can you produce, master poet, ancient or modern, of cures performed by yourself?" . . . But we are justified in questioning Homer about the greatest and the noblest of the activities on which he has the assurance to hold forth—I mean, War and Generalship and Government and Education. "Well now, Homer," we may justifiably say to the poet, "If you are really not at three removes' distance from the truth in the relation in which you stand to human conduct at its best (*ἀρετῆς πέρι*)—if you are not one of those fabricators of simulacra whom we have labelled mimics—if you are really at no more than two removes' distance from the truth and are really an expert in the science of ethics, private and public, give us an instance of a state whose government has shown an improvement thanks to you". . . . Name a war, fought in Homer's lifetime, that is recorded to have been efficiently conducted thanks to Homer's leadership or counsel. . . . Is there any suggestion that Homer ever gathered round him in his own lifetime a school of disciples who felt it a privilege to be in personal touch with him and who handed down to Posterity the tradition of an Homeric way of life? . . .

'Well, [on this showing,] must not our verdict on Homer and all his successors in the poetic line be that they are mimics of simulacra of human conduct at its best and of any other subject that they may elect to adorn? I think we must conclude that they are quite out of touch with the truth, and must therefore place them in the same category as the painter, whom we were considering just now, who, without himself having been initiated into the technique of shoemaking, will make for you what will look like a shoemaker to eyes that judge merely by colours and shapes because their owners are no better initiated than the painter who has thus imposed on them. . . . On this analogy, we shall describe what the poet does by putting it that, without himself having been initiated into any technique except the art of mimicry, he tints his nouns and verbs with colours stolen from the divers trades and thereby makes, on birds of his feather who judge merely by words, an invariable impression of talking admirably about anything that he elects to talk about—shoemaking or generalship or what you will—so long as he does his business in metre and rhythm and harmony. It is these stage properties of his that do the trick for him in virtue of the extraordinary fascination that they exercise. If you strip off the literary colouring from a poet's ideas and make him express them in naked prose—well, I do not need to tell you what the impression then will be. . . . You have seen what happens to a face that is in the flush of youth without possessing any intrinsic beauty. You know what that face comes to look like when the bloom has faded.'¹

If Plato means his readers to take this passage at all seriously, he has committed himself to approving our over-scrupulous historian's legendary escapade. If Plato had heard the news of our mythical 'incident' at Princeton, New Jersey, and had had the courage of his own professed convictions, he would have appeared in court to testify on behalf of the defence that the prisoner in the dock would have been committing a cold-blooded fraud on the public if he had undertaken to produce and publish a work purporting to be a history of Tamerlane without attempting bona fide to make Tamerlane's experience 'an

¹ Plato: *Respublica*, 598 B-601 B.

integral part of his own . . . by re-enacting' it 'for himself'. If our historian has any sense, however, he will be less grateful to Plato for this courageous defence of his conscientious head-hunting expedition than for his disclosure of a trick for doing an historian's professional business without having to go to these embarrassing extremes. Plato, if he likes, may give this trick the bad name of 'confidence trick', and may stigmatize as 'mimicry' something that the historian, the poet, or the painter, for their part, might prefer to call 'imagination'. But the philosopher's magisterial censure is a cheap price to pay for the benefits of the same philosopher's unintentional 'tip'—as will be evident if we come to our hard-pressed historian's rescue with Lewis Carroll's benevolent 'time-machine'.¹

Let us make sure that our historian has taken Plato's back-handed hint to give his imagination free play, and then let us see him off again on his journey from New York to Princeton. He buys his ticket, catches his train, registers at his hotel, and works up his feelings by thinking of a recent income-tax demand-note, all just as before; but at this critical point, instead of rushing out into the streets, yataghan in hand, and decapitating the first foot-passengers that he meets, like a Spartiate Cleomenes in the streets of a Ptolemaic Alexandria,² he stalks out into the garden, walking-stick in hand, and decapitates the first dandelions that catch his eye—and, if the useful occupation of weed-killing fails to strike in him the requisite Tamerlanian spark, he can proceed to make a glorious massacre of the sun-flowers and handsomely indemnify the hotel management for their pecuniary loss without any risk of finding himself on the wrong side of the Law. If he then goes back indoors, sits down at his writing-desk, and indites his history of Tamerlane's life and works, his ingenuous reader (*teste Platone*) will never know that the heads which the historian duly cut off, in order to put himself in the proper mood for doing his job, were not human, but only floral. We can be reasonably confident of the plausibility of the impression that Timur Lenk's unscrupulously unhomocidal imaginative historiographer will contrive to make, since we have no evidence that Christopher Marlowe ever took any more drastic steps than those suggested here when he was working himself up to write his *Tamburlaine the Great*.

But what is this faculty of Imagination which makes it possible, after all, for an historian to participate in Timur Lenk's experience without his having to re-experience it in real life? Are the historian, the painter, and the poet really practising on the public the fraud of which Plato accuses them half in earnest? Are they really palming off appearance as reality, and getting something for nothing out of their professional activities at the price of sacrificing their moral integrity? The truth is that the exercise of the Imagination is something that is quite as familiar as it is mysterious. It is not just a professional trick of a literary and artistic trade; it is an indispensable means of social intercourse between ordinary people in every-day life; and, since Sub-Man had to become a social animal before he could become fully human,³ it is no exaggera-

¹ See V. vi. 214.

² See V. vi. 391.

³ See I. i. 173.

tion to say that a constant use of the Imagination is one of the primary necessities of life for the Human Race, and that, if Mankind were to take Plato's castigation seriously enough to pluck this vital faculty out and cast it from them, they would be sentencing themselves to the doom of the legendary Kilkenny Cats.

While Plato pillories the Imagination by stigmatizing its exercise as a fraud practised by painters and poets on the public, Collingwood saves the historian's reputation, according to Collingwood's own lights, by ruling out any psychic activity other than thought about thought from his definition of what constitutes the historian's legitimate business. In thus committing himself to a doctrine that cannot be reconciled with the facts, Collingwood has fallen a victim to a common human infirmity. Each of us is prone to exaggerate the importance of the organ or faculty or activity—hand, ear, or eye; sensation, intuition, or feeling; will or thought—that happens to be the principal instrument or medium of his own dealings, personal or professional, with his fellow human beings; and Collingwood the historian has been led up this prim garden path by Collingwood the philosopher. An idolization of thought is the philosopher's idolatrous sacrifice on the altar of his professional patriotism;¹ but it is as true in the Academy as it is in the world outside its garden walls that 'patriotism is not enough';² for there are always more things in Heaven and Earth than are dreamt of in the philosophy of any of our Horatios.³

¹ Collingwood has also laid a wreath on the Imagination's cenotaph, but he has nullified the signature of this tribute by the terms in which he has composed his inscription. The idea, he declares (op. cit., p. 249) that governs an historian's work 'is the idea of the Historical Imagination as a self-dependent, self-determining, and self-justifying form of—thought [*sic*]'.
² Edith Cavell at Brussels on the 12th October, 1915.
³ Shakspeare: *Hamlet*, Act I, scene 5.

WAS THERE A RENAISSANCE OF MINOAN RELIGION IN HELLENIC HISTORY?

IN the pre-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history there were several religious movements that were felt by the Hellenes at the time to be, in some sense, exotic. The chief instances were the worship of Dionysus, the rites, poems, and ideas associated with the name of Orpheus, and the Pythagorean School of Philosophy. If some, at any rate, of the elements in these divers religious practices, experiences, and beliefs were un-Hellenic in reality, there were two different possible quarters from which they might have made their way into Hellenic life. Either they might have been introduced through the radiation of some living contemporary non-Hellenic culture or cultures with which the Hellenic World was already in contact in the pre-Alexandrine Age—as it is notorious that a number of alien religious influences were introduced subsequently, in the sequel to the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander—or alternatively such un-Hellenic religious phenomena in a pre-Alexandrine Hellas might have been, not importations from living contemporary societies, but evocations of ghosts from the dead past of an antecedent civilization to which the Hellenic was affiliated. The hypothesis of an Hellenic renaissance of Minoan religion has been found convincing—at least as far as the worship of Dionysus is concerned—by one of the most eminent of the twentieth-century Western authorities on the subject.

“The ecstatic cult of Dionysos, which spread all over Greece in the Archaic Age, was a powerful religious movement. I venture to think that its strength is better understood if we assume that it was not an importation of a completely foreign god and form of religion but the revival of old Minoan and Mycenaean religious ideas, and perhaps also rites, which had for a time fallen into the background. The ideas peculiar to the Minoan religion were suppressed under the overwhelming onset of the gods and religious ideas which the [Achaean barbarian] conquerors brought with them; but, just as the old gods did not vanish but mingled with the newcomers, so the old religious ideas persisted in secret. When the opportunity arose they emerged once more to cause a religious revolution, the occasion being the acceptance of a foreign cult with kindred ideas of a mystic character. This was the Thracian worship of Dionysos combined with the Phrygian form of the same cult, which had already been transformed through the influence of the native religion of Asia Minor, which in its turn also contained elements of Minoan origin, identical with or similar to Minoan ideas which still survived in Greece.”¹

In the historical perspective of a latter-day Western historian, this hypothetical renaissance, in Hellenic history, of supposedly repressed elements of Minoan religion would have counterparts in the historic

¹ Nilsson, M. P.: *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion* (London 1927, Milford), p. 504.

renaissances, in Orthodox and in Western Christian history, of a Judaism embedded in a Christianity that was these two Hellenistic civilizations' religious heritage from their Hellenic predecessor. This analogy, however, so far from corroborating Nilsson's view, actually militates against it *a priori*; for the hypothesis that there has been a renaissance of some element of an antecedent civilization's religion in the history of an affiliated civilization pre-supposes the survival, through an intervening social interregnum, of a religious tradition in which the eventually resuscitated element of an earlier religion has been latent all the time; and in a previous context¹ we have found reason to believe that a religious link of this kind, such as is provided by a chrysalis church, between two civilizations of different generations is the distinctive mark of the historical relation between a civilization of the second generation and one of the third—as, for example, the Orthodox and Western Christian civilizations were affiliated to the Hellenic through the link provided by Christianity. By contrast, the normal link between a civilization of the first generation, such as the Minoan, and a successor in the second generation, such as the Hellenic, seems to be, not a chrysalis church, but an external proletariat; and in a previous inquiry, after we had raised the question whether a religious legacy from a Minoan past was to be detected in 'Orphism',² our judgement inclined tentatively towards the alternative view³ that the un-Hellenic elements in 'Orphism', if such there were, were not revivals of a Minoan past, but were importations into Hellas from the contemporary Syriac and Indic worlds.

Between the date of publication of the fifth volume of this Study in A.D. 1939 and the date of writing of the present Annex in A.D. 1950, our doubts about the hypothesis of an Hellenic renaissance of Minoan religion had been confirmed by the authoritative verdict of a lucid-minded scholar who had re-examined all the extant historical evidence regarding 'the arts of Orpheus' by a stringently scientific method.⁴ Professor Linforth's most significant conclusion is the negative one that there is no cogent evidence for there ever having been anything in the nature of an institutionally organized 'Orphic Church', or even anything in the nature of a systematic body of Orphic doctrine;⁵ and he finds no 'trustworthy support' for the view, which had received some countenance in previous works of scholarship,⁶

'that the teletae and the poem of the dismemberment [of Dionysus] were actually the work of Onomacritus, and that therefore "the Orphic Religion" originated in Athens, or was introduced into Athens, in the time of Peisistratus.'⁷

In the dry light of Linforth's salutarily ruthless criticism of theories without warrant in the sources, the supposed evidence for the presence of Syriac and Indic elements in pre-Alexandrine Orphic rites, poems,

¹ In VII. vii. 392-419.

² See V. v. 82-87 and 697-8.

³ Linforth, I. M.: *The Arts of Orpheus* (Berkeley, Cal. 1941, University of California Press).

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 288, 291, 304-5, and 356.

⁵ See the references in V. v. 697-8.

⁶ See I. i. 95-100.

⁷ Linforth, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

and ideas dwindle almost to the vanishing-point at which the supposed evidence for the presence there of Minoan elements quite disappears from view.

Scepticism can, of course, be carried to an extreme at which it becomes more paradoxical than credulity; and, if there were incontrovertible evidence, as there seems in fact to be,¹ that in a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic World a belief in the transmigration of souls under stress of *Karma*,² and a prescription for winning release from a melancholy round of successive reincarnations, were current in Pythagorean, Orphic, or any other philosophical or religious circles, it would seem decidedly more improbable that these practices and doctrines had been worked out in the Hellenic World independently than that they had been derived by the Hellenes from the Indic World through the culturally conductive medium of the Achaemenian Empire.³ Moreover, whatever the source or sources of the philosophy of Pythagoras and of the 'miscellaneous' and 'disparate'⁴ 'arts of Orpheus'⁵ may have been, it has still to be explained why a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Society should ever have welcomed and promoted movements that were certainly felt to have in them at least a touch of something alien. An explanation suggested in a previous passage of this Study⁶ was that 'Orphism' proved attractive to Hellenic souls because it promised to fill a fearful spiritual void; and, since the publication of Linforth's book, this idea, at least, can be entertained with somewhat greater assurance, since it has received the *nihil obstat* of a scholar who has placed so many other once cherished notions on a scientific censor's index.

'If we look for a wider unity in the things that bore the name of Orpheus, we may perhaps find that they are the expression of a particular aspect of the religious instinct among the Greeks. The practice of the public cults involved little or no religious speculation and was not developed to meet the deeper religious needs of the individual. Greek poetry—epic, lyric, and dramatic—full as it was of gods and myths and profound thought on the relations between gods and men, was secular rather than hieratic. Philosophy, though it touched Religion at many points and became more and more a guide for the moral life, was primarily intellectual and divorced from religious practice. Meantime, the common human need required a religion in which practice and belief would be united, a religion which would allay the concern which men individually felt for their spiritual welfare, in this life and the next. This need was met by the things that bore the name of Orpheus, the comfortable rites of the mysteries, with the doctrines that were implicit in them, and the poems which gave expression to the doctrines and supplied authority for the rites.'

¹ As, for example, in Pindar's Second Olympian Ode, ll. 62-91 (according to the numbering in Christ's edition), and in the myth at the end of the Tenth Book of the *Republic*. If the inspiration of these passages was not Orphic, it must have been Pythagorean.

² The Indic conception of *Karma* has been noticed in V, v. 432-3.

³ If the philosophy of the Buddha was indeed the original source of these pre-Alexandrine Hellenic notions, it had suffered lamentable spiritual damage *en route*. For instance, the perfect freedom of an Indic *Nirvāṇa*, which was the ethereal goal of the would-be arhat, had been jettisoned in favour of the sensuous delights of an Egyptian Elysium.

⁴ Linforth, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

⁵ In V. v. 86.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

⁷ Linforth, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

XII. B (ii) ANNEX

A CRITIQUE OF GIBBON'S GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE IN THE WEST

IN the chapter to which this annex attaches, three passages of this analytical parenthesis in Gibbon's narrative have been quoted as classical expressions of an eighteenth-century Western spirit of complacency.¹ Gibbon's analysis, however, throws light, not only on the outlook of a cultivated minority in the Western World of his day, but also on the prospects of his generation's and his society's successors mid-way through the twentieth century, after the lapse of some 170 years or more since the date—some time between A.D. 1772 and A.D. 1781²—when Gibbon's 'General Observations' were drafted. The last six of the ten paragraphs of which these observations consist are devoted to a comparison, point by point, between the state of the Hellenic Society at the time of the fall of the Roman Empire in the West, in the fifth century of the Christian Era, and the state of the Western Society at the time when Gibbon was writing—which was during the lull between the close of the Seven Years War in A.D. 1763 and the outbreak of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in A.D. 1792. The points that Gibbon brings up as topics for comparison are so well chosen, and his estimates, point by point, of the Western Civilization's prospects in his day are so illuminating for any mind attempting to make corresponding estimates five or six generations later,³ that, in the present Annex to a Part of this Study dealing with the prospects of the Western Civilization in the twentieth century, the writer has reprinted the synoptic paragraphs of Gibbon's observations with a twentieth-century commentary on each of them, in the belief that he could have found no more effective way of prosecuting his own inquiry.

The fifth paragraph of Gibbon's observations, which opens with a passage quoted already in the main body of the present Part,⁴ may now be reprinted in full.

'This awful revolution may be usefully applied to the instruction of the present age. It is the duty of a patriot to prefer and promote the exclusive interest and glory of his native country: but a philosopher may be permitted to enlarge his views, and to consider Europe as one great republic, whose various inhabitants have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation. The Balance of Power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be alternately exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws, and manners,

¹ See pp. 424 and 425, above.

² See IV. iv. 148, n. 3.

³ The original notes for the present Annex were drafted, not in A.D. 1950, but in A.D. 1929.

⁴ On p. 424, above.

which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of Mankind, the Europeans and their colonies. The savage nations of the globe are the common enemies of Civilised Society; and we may inquire, with anxious curiosity, whether Europe is still threatened with a repetition of those calamities which formerly oppressed the arms and institutions of Rome. Perhaps the same reflections will illustrate the fall of that mighty empire, and explain the probable causes of our actual security.'

In this paragraph Gibbon enunciates the argument that governs the remainder of his observations: The Western World is now not exposed to the possibility of a breakdown from within; the only danger by which it might conceivably still be threatened is that of another attack by barbarians from the outer darkness; and, since this danger does not now appear to be a serious one, the Western World may consider itself secure.

The major premiss of this argument—a premise which Gibbon simply takes for granted—would be challenged by a twentieth-century Western inquirer who had lived to see the history of his own society demonstrate, in its turn, that 'we are betrayed by what is false within.'¹ In the light of this first-hand experience it was easier for a twentieth-century Western historian than it had been for his eighteenth-century predecessor to see that the breakdowns of all the civilizations that had broken down by Gibbon's time, not to speak of a date some 170 years later, had been due to inward spiritual failures and not to outward physical blows. We need not labour a point that we have already illustrated at length in an empirical survey.² If Gibbon had taken this point, he would have divined that the decline and fall of the Roman Empire had been no more than an episode, and this a late one, in the decline and fall of the Hellenic Civilization; and he would have detected the cause of the downfall, not in 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion' in the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era, but in the fratricidal warfare between the parochial city-states of Hellas in the fifth century B.C.³

After filing this notice of dissent we may go on to Paragraph Six:

'The Romans were ignorant of the extent of their danger and the number of their enemies. Beyond the Rhine and Danube the northern countries of Europe and Asia were filled with innumerable tribes of hunters and shepherds, poor, voracious, and turbulent; bold in arms, and impatient to ravish the fruits of industry. The Barbarian World was agitated by the rapid impulse of war; and the peace of Gaul or Italy was shaken by the distant revolutions of China. The Huns, who fled before a victorious enemy, directed their march towards the West; and the torrent was swelled by the gradual accession of captives and allies. The flying tribes who yielded to the Huns assumed in *their* turn the spirit of conquest; the endless column of barbarians pressed on the Roman Empire with accumulated weight; and, if the foremost were destroyed, the vacant space was instantly replenished by new assailants. Such formidable emigrations no longer issue from the North; and the long repose, which has been imputed to the decrease of population, is the happy consequence of the progress of arts and agriculture. Instead of some rude villages thinly scattered among its woods and morasses, Germany now produces a list of

¹ George Meredith, quoted in IV. iv. 120 and VI. vii. 46, n. 6.

² In IV. iv. 119-584.

³ See IV. iv. 58-63.

two thousand three hundred walled towns; the Christian kingdoms of Denmark, Sweden, and Poland have been successively established; and the Hanse merchants, with the Teutonic knights, have extended their colonies along the coast of the Baltic as far as the Gulf of Finland. From the Gulf of Finland to the Eastern Ocean, Russia now assumes the form of a powerful and civilised empire. The plough, the loom, and the forge are introduced on the banks of the Volga, the Oby, and the Lena; and the fiercest of the Tartar hordes have been taught to tremble and obey. The reign of Independent Barbarism is now contracted to a narrow span; and the remnant of Calmucks or Uzbecks, whose forces may be almost numbered, cannot seriously excite the apprehensions of the great republic of Europe.¹ Yet this apparent security should not tempt us to forget that new enemies and unknown dangers may *possibly* arise from some obscure people, scarcely visible in the map of the World. The Arabs or Saracens, who spread their conquests from India to Spain, had languished in poverty and contempt till Mohamet breathed into those savage bodies the soul of enthusiasm.

A twentieth-century Western observer would find no difficulty in agreeing with Gibbon that the Western World was unlikely ever again to be successfully invaded by barbarians from any no-man's-land beyond its borders; for, if Gibbon had lived to see the offensive power of the Eurasian Nomads broken at last, after a 3,500-years-long series of explosions, by the Manchus' overthrow of the Zungar Calmucks in A.D. 1755² and the flight of the Torgut Calmucks in A.D. 1771 from a Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe where the Russians had reasserted the ascendancy of a sedentary civilization, Gibbon's twentieth-century successors had lived to see the last of the barbarians—in the highlands as well as on the steppes—followed up and subjugated in the last of their fastnesses.³ Gibbon's doubts about the stability of the Manchu Empire were to be proved prescient by the swiftness of its decline and fall after the death of Gibbon's own contemporary the Emperor Ch'ien Lung (*imperabat* A.D. 1735–96); but the beneficiaries from this decay of the Manchu power were not to be the Calmucks or any other Eurasian Nomads; they were to be Russia along the disintegrating empire's continental frontiers and the maritime Powers of the Western World along its coasts; and a twentieth-century Western observer might feel justified in venturing to leave out of his reckoning Gibbon's *caveat* 'that new enemies and unknown dangers' might '*possibly* arise from some obscure people, scarcely visible in the map of the World'. This conclusion, however, would bring with it no sense of security to a twentieth-century Western historian who dissented from Gibbon's thesis that the barbarians had been responsible for the overthrow of the Roman Empire;

¹ [in the original, 6]. 'The French and English editors of the Genealogical History of the Tartars have subjoined a curious, though imperfect, description of their present state. We might question the independence of the Calmucks, or Eluths, since they have been recently vanquished by the Chinese, who, in the year 1759, subdued the lesser Bucharina, and advanced into the country of Badakshan, near the sources of the Oxus (*Mémoires sur les Chinois*, tom. 1, pp. 325–400). But these conquests are precarious, nor will I venture to ensure the safety of the Chinese Empire.'

² See Courant, M.: *L'Asie Centrale aux XVII^e et XVIII^e Siècles: Empire Kalmouk ou Empire Mantchou?* (Paris 1912, Rey), pp. 101–17.

³ See V. v. 332–4, and pp. 450–1, above.

and, if the twentieth-century Western inquirer held the opposing view that the Roman Empire itself was merely a symptom of the decline and fall of an Hellenic Civilization which had been betrayed from within, and this four hundred years before the tardy establishment of a *Pax Augusta*, then this latter-day Western investigator would find no consolation in being able to endorse Gibbon's judgement that the Western Civilization was unlikely ever to be overthrown by barbarian arms. He would find this conclusion cold comfort because he would find it irrelevant to his and Gibbon's common problem.

In attempting to estimate the Western Civilization's prospects, the twentieth-century Western student of History might be expected to concentrate his attention on the question whether a betrayal by something false within—which had been, as he saw it, the true cause of the Hellenic Civilization's downfall—was or was not likely to bring the Western Civilization to the same tragic end; and in this inquiry the elimination of a former menace from the Barbarians would be beside the point for several telling reasons. In the first place a ubiquitously expanding Western Society's external proletariat had been eliminated, for the most part, not through being annihilated, but through being transferred from the external to the internal proletariat's ranks, and this Western internal proletariat had been reinforced simultaneously by the conscription into it, *en masse*, of the populations of all the extant non-Western civilizations.¹ In the second place the possibility that the Western Civilization, like the Hellenic, might be betrayed by something false within had been brought home by the appalling experience of seeing a vanishing barbarian's most evilly barbarous propensities reappearing—in reproductions that were far more sinister than the original—among superficially Westernized children of non-Western civilizations that had been caught in the Western net and—most terrifying portent of all²—among native sons and heirs of the Western Civilization's promise.³

Gibbon had been gratified to observe that 'the fiercest of the Tartar hordes have now been taught to tremble and obey' by Russian converts to the Western Civilization who, by mastering a Western technique, had made themselves into efficient wardens of anti-Nomad marches, to the Western World's advantage as well as to Russia's. It had not occurred to Gibbon that the introduction of 'the plough, the loom, and the forge . . . on the banks of the Volga, the Oby, and the Lena', which in his time was serving the Western World's convenience by making the Nomads tremble and obey, might be employed one day by the same now irrevocably Western-fingered Russian hands for the inconvenient purpose of putting the same fear and trembling into Western hearts.

A fortiori, it had not occurred to an English historian who was a contemporary of King Frederick II of Prussia that a Germany producing 'a list of two thousand three hundred walled towns' might present a greater threat to the Western World, if Germany's rulers and leaders repudiated the moral standards of the Western Civilization, than 'rude villages scattered among' Germany's 'woods and morasses', in a no-man's-land

¹ See V. v. 152-3, and pp. 413-15, 451-2, and 489, above.

² See pp. 450-1, above.

³ Heb. vi. 17 and xi. 9.

beyond the *limes* of the Roman Empire, had ever presented to an Hellenic World which had been successfully defended against primitive barbarian German assaults by this Roman military rampart for some four hundred years, and which might never have succumbed, and indeed never even have been exposed, to a German peril if, four hundred years before the date at which the Roman *limes* was established, Hellas had not been betrayed by something false within. The unreclaimed barbarian beyond the pale is a negligible danger to a civilization by comparison with the apostate son and heir¹ who has deliberately looked back after having put his hand to the plough;² and Frederick's unprincipled attack on the dominions of Maria Theresa in A.D. 1740, within Gibbon's own lifetime, was the first step in a German *descensus Avernii* which was to reach the bottom of the infernal pit in A.D. 1933-45. If a Western people which had played so capital a part as the Germans had played in the long and hard task of building up a Western Christian Civilization could fall so low as this, no guarantee of immunity against future aggression by a straightforward barbarism from abroad could make up to the Western World for its now proven exposure to betrayal by a morally perverse barbarism within its own bosom.³

'The empire of Rome was firmly established by the singular and perfect coalition of its members. The subject nations, resigning the hope, and even the wish, of independence, embraced the character of Roman citizens; and the provinces of the West were reluctantly torn by the Barbarians from the bosom of their mother-country.⁴ But this union was purchased by the loss of national freedom and military spirit; and the servile provinces, destitute of life and motion, expected their safety from the mercenary troops and governors who were directed by the orders of a distant court. The happiness of an hundred millions depended on the personal merit of one or two men, perhaps children, whose minds were corrupted by education, luxury, and despotic power. The deepest wounds were inflicted on the empire during the minorities of the sons and grandsons of Theodosius; and, after those incapable princes seemed to attain the age of manhood, they abandoned the church to the bishops, the state to the eunuchs, and the provinces to the Barbarians. Europe is now divided into twelve powerful, though unequal, kingdoms, three respectable commonwealths, and a variety of smaller, though independent, states; the

¹ On this point, see V. v. 334-7, where it is illustrated by the citation of an Italian neobarbarism which had not yet been eclipsed by a still darker German neobarbarism at the time when that passage of this book was written.

² Luke ix. 62.

³ 'Vevey [1875].

⁴ 'There is a perfect little woman here, mother of a fair-haired child, niece of Gortschakoff. She smokes cigarettes, very small, very elegantly. She told me that Ignatieff never by any chance told the truth. It is a proverb in Russia: "Il ment comme Ignatieff".'

'She was mentioning the overthrow of previous civilisations by barbaric forces; and we came to the conclusion that it was unlikely that the Tartars, who seem the only available barbarians, would stamp out the civilisation, extended as it is over the World. She expressed her belief that the dark force is developed with the brightness of prosperity all-pervading now; and then suggested that what could provide a force strong, ignorant, barbarian, and widespread, is the lower populations of the various nations of Europe grouped in some such society as the International Inbred with communistic and destructive notions' (*Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher*, ed. by M. V. Brett, vol. i (London 1934, Nicholson & Watson), p. 34). This passage was brought to the present writer's attention by his friend J. L. Hammond on the 3rd September, 1934.

⁴ [in the original, 7] 'The prudent reader will determine how far this general proposition is weakened by the revolt of the Isaurians, the independence of Britain and Armorica, the Moorish tribes, or the Bagaudae of Gaul and Spain.'

chances of royal and ministerial talents are multiplied, at least, with the number of its rulers; and a Julian, or Semiramis, may reign in the North, while Arcadius and Honorius again slumber on the thrones of the South. The abuses of tyranny are restrained by the mutual influence of fear and shame; republics have acquired order and stability; monarchies have imbibed the principles of freedom, or, at least, of moderation; and some sense of honour and justice is introduced into the most defective constitutions by the general manners of the times. In peace, the progress of knowledge and industry is accelerated by the emulation of so many active rivals: in war, the European forces are exercised by temperate and undecisive contests. If a savage conqueror should issue from the deserts of Tartary, he must repeatedly vanquish the robust peasants of Russia, the numerous armies of Germany, the gallant nobles of France, and the intrepid freemen of Britain; who, perhaps, might confederate for their common defence. Should the victorious Barbarians carry slavery and desolation as far as the Atlantic Ocean, ten thousand vessels would transport beyond their pursuit the remains of Civilised Society; and Europe would revive and flourish in the American World, which is already filled with her colonies and institutions.¹

In this brilliant appreciation of the cost, in loss of liberty, initiative, and variety, which is the price of gaining unity and fraternity under the aegis of an oecumenical empire, Gibbon is implicitly contradicting his own major thesis that the Antonine Age had been the Golden Age of Hellenic history. Yet even in the present passage he shows no sign of any awareness of the obvious truth that, if, in the generation of Augustus, the Hellenic World did bring itself to buy unity and fraternity at an exorbitant price, this purchase must have come, by Augustus's day, to be a matter of life and death for the Hellenic World. In other words, Gibbon fails to recognize the two historical truths that the *Pax Augusta* was a disintegrating Hellenic Society's tardy response to the challenge of a four-hundred-years-long Time of Troubles and that the weak points, as well as the strong points, of the Roman Empire only become intelligible when they are viewed against this historical background; and his blindness to these two truths is the penalty for an antecedent failure to recognize a prior truth; for he has also failed to recognize that an Hellenic Time of Troubles which had preceded and evoked the organization of a Roman Peace had arisen out of the breakdown, in the fifth century B.C., of a felicitous but also precarious equilibrium between the two conflicting social forces of oecumenicalism and parochialism which had been a counterpart, in fifth-century Hellas, of the delicate equilibrium between the same two forces in the Western World of Gibbon's day.

The virtues of this régime of diversity-in-unity, which have been indicated by Gibbon in an introductory paragraph already quoted in this Annex, are enlarged upon in the present paragraph with the same masterly touch. Yet, in spite of the fact that the parallel between a classical Hellas and an eighteenth-century Western Christendom is explicitly

¹ [in the original, §] 'America now contains about six millions of European blood and descent; and their numbers, at least in the North, are continually increasing. Whatever may be the changes of their political situation, they must preserve the manners of Europe; and we may reflect with some pleasure that the English language will probably be diffused over an immense and populous continent.'

pointed out in the works of two of Gibbon's own contemporaries, Hume¹ and Turgot,² Gibbon himself has not drawn the obvious moral for the prospects of his own civilization from the tragic historical fact that the once beneficent diversity-in-unity of a Classical Hellenic body social—whose parochial sovereign states had brought themselves to 'confederate for their common defence' in the crisis of 480–479 B.C.—eventually fell so desperately out of joint that a long-tormented Hellenic society came, at last, to acquiesce in the hardly less desperate remedy of replacing a dislocated constellation of parochial Powers by one single universal state. In the light of this tragic episode of Hellenic history, it would be no paradox to suggest that the foundation of the Roman Empire was a more 'awful revolution' than its fall. Yet, familiar though Gibbon was with the plot of this pre-Augustan Hellenic tragedy, he seems never to have inferred from it the possibility that the diversity-in-unity of an eighteenth-century Western body social might be exposed to the same danger of going awry.³

Another disagreeable contingency that Gibbon overlooks in this passage is the possibility that the effect of social conductivity may be equivocal. He perceives that the Western body social of his day is conductive in virtue of the unity underlying the diversity in its constitution, but he tacitly makes the assumption that the political qualities which one member of a Western family of states will acquire from another can only be those that happen to be desirable in his estimation. The same assumption was still being made, a hundred years and more after Gibbon's time, by British, American, French, and Belgian practitioners of a parliamentary representative form of constitutional government which its votaries labelled 'Democracy'.⁴ At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it was being taken for granted in 'democratic' Western countries that 'Democracy' was destined to supplant all other forms of government, not only in still 'undemocratic' Western countries, but in the World at large. But after the lapse of yet another half-century this optimistic assumption had come to seem naïve to Western observers who had seen the tide of 'Democracy', in the Western meaning of the word, begin to ebb on the morrow of a First World War which had been fought and won in order 'to make the World safe for Democracy', in the words of President Wilson's accurate description of the Western Allied and Associated Powers' principal war-aim.⁵ Since A.D. 1919 'the general manners of the times' had been furthering the propagation, from one state to another, of the principles and practice, not of parliamentary democracy, but of Communist and Fascist totalitarianism; and in the

¹ In his essay *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*, quoted in II. i. 473–4. Hume had been anticipated by Sprat, T.: *The History of the Royal Society* (London 1667, Martyn), pp. 22–23.

² In his *Second Discours sur les Progrès Successifs de l'Esprit Humain*, delivered on the 11th December, 1750, which has been cited *ibid.*

³ This inference was obvious to a Western observer taking his bearings some 170 years after Gibbon's time, when a constitutional weakness in the structure of a Modern Western body social, to which Gibbon's genius had been blind, had become too flagrant to escape the notice of even the dullest understanding. There is, of course, no need to be a genius in order to be wise after the event.

⁴ See I. i. 2.

⁵ President Woodrow Wilson in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 2nd April, 1917.

mouth of a believer in constitutional government this statement of an indisputable historical fact was tantamount to a confession that, in these latter days, the abuses of tyranny were proving more infectious than the principles of freedom or even of moderation. In a dolorous twentieth century any citizen of a Western community that was then still partitioned among a host of warring parochial states would have been content to see Arcadius and Honorius slumber harmlessly on their thrones without itching to see their sleep disturbed by the pernicious activities of wakeful neighbours; for in an age in which Gibbon's Julian had turned out to be a Phocas, and his Semiramis a Sennacherib, political dynamism was at a discount.¹

Gibbon's dictum that 'in war the European forces are exercised by temperate and undecisive contests' conveyed in one sentence to the ears of Gibbons's successors in A.D. 1952 the full measure of the change for the worse in the Western Civilization's prospects since Gibbon's day. We need not enlarge here on a point that we have already taken to heart in a number of previous contexts.² Since A.D. 1914 Europe had become a Westernizing World's battlefield.³ We need only add that, since the inter-war dates at which those earlier passages of the present Study had been published, the disillusioning flow of Time had also brought with it a refutation of Gibbon's complementary thesis that 'in peace the progress of knowledge and industry is accelerated by the emulation of so many active rivals'; for the suspension of hostilities at the close of a Second World War had been anticipated by the dropping of two atomic bombs; and this horrifying triumph of a marvellous post-Modern Western scientific technique had marked the beginning of the end of an era of free scientific research and discussion which had now brought forth this satanic *chef-d'œuvre* after two and a half centuries of gestation.

This epoch of Western history had opened at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era with the liberation of scientific inquiry from the intellectual bonds of a Christian theology that had been clamped upon it some thirteen hundred years earlier under the auspices of the Christian Roman Emperor Theodosius I (*imperabat* A.D. 379-95); and, during a subsequent quarter of a millennium in which Science had been enjoying a freedom that was her life-breath, her volac-

¹ 'Benevolent government is rarely associated with a ruler whose mind is over-alert and intelligence over-developed. Benevolence is most commonly found in rulers who are easy-going or who behave as if they were. The worst defect in the alert-minded ruler is that he lays burdens upon his subjects which are greater than they can bear; and he does this because his mental vision outranges theirs and because his insight penetrates to the ends of things at the beginnings—with disastrous consequences for them. The Prophet says: "Go the pace of the weakest among you"; and in this context the exponent of the Divine Law prescribes in the case of rulers that excess of intelligence should be avoided . . . because it produces oppression and bad government and makes demands upon the people which are contrary to their nature. . . . It is evident from this that intellectuality and intelligence is a fault in an administrator, because this is an excess of mental activity—just as dull-wittedness is an excess of mental torpidity. The two extremes are to be deprecated in every attribute of Human Nature. The ideal is the Golden Mean. . . . And for this reason a man who is over-intellectual has Satanic attributes attributed to him and is called "Satan", "possessed by Satan", and so on' (Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, Book I, chap. xxiv).

² See, for example, III. iii. 311; IV. iv. 148, 189, and 283.

³ See III. iii. 303-4, and *Civilization on Trial* (London 1948, Oxford University Press), pp. 97-125: 'The Dwarfing of Europe'.

ries had never suspected that their liberation from the theological censorship of an oecumenical church was to be followed after a season by their subjection to the political control of a litter of sovereign independent parochial states. This twentieth-century forfeiture of a Western Science's intellectual freedom was the penalty for a Western Technology's practical success; for Science had been supplying Technology with edged tools; these tools were bound to be used and misused as weapons in a world that was partitioned among parochial states prone to go to war with one another; and, when Science had once furnished Technology with the 'know-how' for forging a weapon of the potency of the atomic bomb, any parochial government that possessed or aspired to acquire this 'know-how' was bound, on categorically imperative grounds of military security, to make this deadly knowledge a state secret and in consequence to bring the intellectual activities of atomic scientists under politico-military control.

Thus, on the morrow of 'V-J Day', A.D. 1945, the scientific workers of the Western World had woken up to find themselves conscripted into the secret service of this or that parochial state, whichever state might happen to be able to claim this or that scientist as its subject. And this political enslavement proved to have been only the milder of two calamities that had overtaken the men of science on that day of horror. The subjection of their scientific work to a political control was bound, no doubt, in the long run, to sterilize their flow of intellectual creativity; but this strangulation of their intellects by the dead hand of the secret police was a light affliction¹ compared with the *peine forte et dure* that was being inflicted on their consciences by a crushing sense of guilt and remorse. From the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era till the 15th August, 1945, a post-Christian school of Late Modern Western physical scientists had been casting upon the waters² a series of socially and morally subversive intellectual discoveries in a blind belief that any increase in Man's knowledge of, and command over, Physical Nature was an absolute good which was bound to bring in profitable returns, without regard to the human effect of this new inhuman knowledge and power upon the social milieu into which it was being spawned. In the ears of these prodigally irresponsible devotees of a renascent Athena, the explosion at Hiroshima on the 6th August, 1945, had reverberated with the sound of the Last Trump. A blast that had rent the veil under which they had been content hitherto to leave their goddess's ambiguous countenance hidden had suddenly confronted them with reality and convicted them of sin; and an inward spiritual monitor that might help a mortified soul to work out its personal salvation in the long run was a harsher taskmaster in the short run than the merely external tyranny of the security police.

In these circumstances, Gibbon's thesis that, during suspensions of international hostilities, the progress of knowledge and industry is accelerated by international competition could no longer carry conviction. But in the context of Gibbon's General Observations this thesis is only a parenthesis. The particular virtue of political diversity-in-unity that is

¹ 2 Cor. iv. 17.

² Eccl. xi. 1.

Gibbon's principal theme in this paragraph is the military effect of 'temperate and undecisive contests' between Western parochial states in exercising them for the common military task of meeting 'the Yellow Peril', if the Nomads should ever again break westwards out of the Great Eurasian Steppe. In the improbable event of these hypothetical aggressors from the heartland of the Old World overcoming the resistance of each and all of the mutually independent sedentary peoples living between the European shore of the Steppe and the Atlantic coast of Europe, Gibbon imagines 'the remains of Civilised Society' seeking and finding asylum in an America which by his time had already become a second home of the Western Civilization.

By Gibbon's time a series of waves of refugees, as well as *conquistadores*, from Western Europe had, in truth, already broken on the coasts of a New World where these *déracinés* had found themselves able to strike fresh root, and this stream of Transatlantic migration was to flow on, in greater volume and at a faster pace, for another 140 years after the date at which Gibbon was writing. But neither the Pilgrim Fathers nor 'the Forty-Eighters' were victims of 'the Tartar hordes'; and, if in A.D. 1952 'the remains of Civilised Society' on the European Peninsula of Asia were hoping once again—and this for the third time in one lifetime—that America was going to play the part of arsenal and citadel of Democracy on behalf of European peoples 'who perhaps might confederate for their common defence', this was not because the European homeland of the Western Civilization was having to face the prospect of another Nomad attack. This once perennial peril had never loomed up again since A.D. 1237–41, when the dreaded advance of Bātū Khan's expeditionary force had moved the herring-fishermen of Friesland and Gothland to stay ashore, mounting guard over their homes and families, while the whole season's catch of the year 1238 glutted the market in a snugly insular England.¹ In the general wars of A.D. 1914–18 and 1939–45 the aggressors whose ambitions had been frustrated by the intervention of the United States had been, not Nomad Mongols, but urban Germans; and, though in December 1950 Mongol cavalry were operating in Korea as auxiliaries of an intervening Chinese Communist army, it was not the Mongols, but the Russians, who were playing the aggressor's part in this fateful year. Thus a persisting partition of the Western World among a litter of warring parochial states, in which Gibbon had seen a salutary insurance against the chimaerical danger of a resurgence of the Nomads, had actually opened the way for a betrayal of the West European sanctuary of Western culture to an enemy within the gates. In Gibbon's order of battle against a Nomad offensive, 'the robust peasants of Russia' are posted in the first line of the defending forces, and 'the numerous armies of Germany' in the second. How will a historian-strategist fare when

¹ 'Unde Gothiam et Frisiam inhabitantes, impetus eorum pertinentes, in Angliam, ut moris est eorum, apud Gernemue [Yarmouth], tempore allecis capiendi, quo suas naves solebant onerare, non venerunt. Hinc erat quod allec eo anno in Angliā quasi pro nihilo prae abundantia habitum, sub quadragenario vel quinquagenario numero, licet optimum esset, pro uno argento in partibus a mari etiam longinquis vendebantur' (Matthew Paris: *Chronica Maiora*, sub anno A.D. 1238, in H. R. Luard's edition, vol. iii (London 1876, Longman, Trübner, Parkes, Macmillan, Black, & Thom), p. 488).

forces detailed for the defence betray their trust by delivering the attack? And what chance would Europe have of reviving and flourishing in an American city of refuge if the Power that had driven 'the remains of Civilised Society' out of the Old World and across the Atlantic was, not 'the Tartar hordes', but a sedentary people equipped with the most recently invented engines of a Western military technique?

Experience indicated that Gibbon's confidence in the inviolability of an American asylum for the Western Civilization would have been justified if—but only if—the aggressor's part had been played in reality by those arrested Nomad riders who had been cast for it in Gibbon's imagination. If the Continental Power that was under suspicion in A.D. 1952 of entertaining designs of world-wide conquest had been, once again, the Mongols, the peoples of the Western World would assuredly have had better reason this time for counting on the survival of their own distinctive culture than they had had in A.D. 1238, when they had been facing the prospect of a Mongol occupation of the West European peninsula of Asia without having any reassuring Transatlantic asylum at their backs. In A.D. 1952 they could have taken comfort in reminding themselves that in A.D. 1281 the forces of a Mongol Empire, which at that date had been mistress of the Continent from the shores of the Pacific Ocean to the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Baltic Sea, had been thrown back ignominiously from the beaches of Japan;¹ for a cavalry Power which had proved impotent to conquer a cluster of small islands separated from the Continent by only a hundred miles of sea at the nearest point would have had no prospect, if she had occupied the European coastline of the Continent that the Germans held in June 1940, of being able to conquer the great island of North America on the farther side of a nearly two-thousand-miles-broad Atlantic Ocean, or even the sister island of South America, which was divided by not less than sixteen hundred miles of sea from the Continent at the Straits of Dakar, where the westward bulge of Africa approached closest to the eastward bulge of Brazil. Indeed, the fiasco of Qubilay Khan's attempt on Japan suggests that even the twenty-miles-wide Straits of Dover, which had foiled Napoleon and foiled Hitler when the local Continental war-lord of the day had had the whole of Europe under his command, might have proved impassable for Qubilay Khan in spite of his commanding the Asiatic mass as well as the European extremity of the Continent. But the historic immunity of the isles from conquest by Continental war-lords had been due to the comparative innocuousness of even a sedentary community's most formidable weapons of offence until a hundred years and more after the date at which Gibbon had been writing; and no one who had lived through the war of A.D. 1939-45 could be blind to the truth that, since then, times had changed. The weapons with which Hitler had come within an ace of conquering Britain, and with which the combined forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth had succeeded thereafter in conquering Hitler's vaunted *Festung Europa*, were indications that in a future world war the conquest of North America might not be beyond the reach of a Power controlling the aggregate resources of the Old World

¹ See IV. iv. 93.

and capable of forging this incomparably vast store of war potential into unprecedentedly potent weapons through a mastery of an ever improving Western technology.

The significance of the Western World's progress in military technology is examined by Gibbon in the paragraph that follows next.

'Cold, poverty, and a life of danger and fatigue fortify the strength and courage of Barbarians. In every age they have oppressed the polite and peaceful nations of China, India, and Persia, who neglected, and still neglect, to counterbalance these natural powers by the resources of military art. The warlike states of Antiquity, Greece, Macedonia, and Rome, educated a race of soldiers; exercised their bodies, disciplined their courage, multiplied their forces by regular evolutions, and converted the iron which they possessed into strong and serviceable weapons. But this superiority insensibly declined with their laws and manners: and the feeble policy of Constantine and his successors armed and instructed, for the ruin of the empire, the rude valour of the Barbarian mercenaries. The military art has been changed by the invention of gunpowder, which enables Man to command the two most powerful agents of Nature, air and fire. Mathematics, chymistry, mechanics, architecture have been applied to the service of war; and the adverse parties oppose to each other the most elaborate modes of attack and of defence. Historians may indignantly observe that the preparations of a siege would found and maintain a flourishing colony;¹ yet we cannot be displeased that the subversion of a city should be a work of cost and difficulty; or that an industrious people should be protected by those arts which survive and supply the decay of military virtue. Cannon and fortifications now form an impregnable barrier against the Tartar horse; and Europe is secure from any future irruption of Barbarians, since, before they can conquer, they must cease to be barbarous. Their gradual advances in the science of war would always be accompanied, as we may learn from the example of Russia, with a proportionable improvement in the arts of peace and civil policy; and they themselves must deserve a place among the polished nations whom they subdue.'

In this paragraph Gibbon first suggests a second reason why a latter-day Western Civilization is unlikely ever to succumb to a Nomad conqueror, and then goes on to make an anticipatory reply to our critique of the immediately preceding paragraph of his General Observations. Our Western Civilization can count on never being extinguished by an eruption of the Eurasian Nomads, not only because 'the Tartar horse' would be incapable of pursuing across the Atlantic the ten thousand vessels that would transport to the Americas the refugees from a conquered Europe, but also because these Nomad barbarians would not even be capable of conquering the European peninsula of the Continent

¹ [in the original, 9]. "On avoit fait venir [for the siege of Turin] 140 pièces de canon; et il est à remarquer que chaque gros canon monté revient à environ 2,000 écus: il y avoit 110,000 boulets; 106,000 cartouches d'une façon, et 300,000 d'une autre; 21,000 bombes; 27,700 grenades, 15,000 sacs à terre, 30,000 instruments pour le pionnage; 1,200,000 livres de poudre. Ajoutez à ces munitions le plomb, le fer, et le fer-blanc, les cordages, tout ce qui sert aux mineurs, le soufre, le salpêtre, les outils de toute espèce. Il est certain que les frais de tous ces préparatifs de destruction suffiroient pour fonder et pour faire fleurir la plus nombreuse colonie." — Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV*, chap. xx, in his Works, tom. xi, p. 391.

against defenders armed with Modern Western weapons. After thus completing the otiose task of flogging a dead Tartar horse, Gibbon makes the admission that the Nomads are not the only potential barbarian invaders on a Western World's eastern horizon, and that, even if we may assume that the Nomads could never succeed either in launching an ocean-going navy or in assembling a siege train of heavy artillery, there might be sedentary barbarians capable of mastering, for the purpose of aggression against the West, all the latest devices of Western military technology that the Western peoples, on their side, would have at their own disposal for the purpose of self-defence. Gibbon avowedly has in mind the metamorphosis of Russia in and after the reign of Peter the Great; and his reading of this passage of Russian history emboldens his optimism to venture on the highest of all its flights. 'Europe is secure from any future irruption of Barbarians, since, before they can conquer, they must cease to be barbarous': *si monumentum requiris*, look at Russia and be of good cheer!

What would have been Gibbon's second thoughts about this most 'doubtful' and most 'fallacious' of all his speculative grounds for optimism if he could have lived to see this particular argument tested by the experience of another 170 years? The fallacy, of course, lies in failing to distinguish the intellectual culture that takes practical effect in Technology from the spiritual culture that takes effect in morals. The flaw in Gibbon's argument here is to be found in his equivocal phrase 'the arts of peace and civil policy'. If this phrase could reasonably be construed as meaning no more than civil as contrasted with military engineering, then the minor argument of this sentence could perhaps be salvaged at the cost of jettisoning the major argument of the whole passage. It might be true, at any rate in the peculiar circumstances of latter-day Western life, that Technology was indivisible. Military engineering might be incapable of ever rising very high if it were not based on a firm civil foundation. But this truth—if it were indeed the truth—about Technology had no bearing on any question of morals, since it was not true that morals and Technology were indivisible from one another. On the contrary, we have found reason to believe that they go their different ways—Technology being a cumulative and collective acquisition of Mankind's, whereas the battle between good and evil has to be fought over again in the soul of each child that is born into the World.¹

Gibbon's case for optimism in this context thus proves to be founded on nothing more substantial than the ambiguity of a 'portmanteau' phrase which, by verbally confounding with one another the two mutually independent movements of moral and material progress, serves to give the false impression that these actually run in double harness. This is never true even within the bosom of a single society, where there is a *nisus* towards a harmony between the different elements constituting what is, after all, a single culture-pattern. *A fortiori*, there is no reason to expect that the moral standards of a civilization will keep company with its technique when this is being radiated out into an alien social milieu; for our study of encounters between different societies has shown that—

¹ See III. iii. 154-74; VII. vii. 556 and 701-11; and pp. 697-704, above.

whether both parties are civilizations¹ or whether one party is a civilization in its universal state and the other party a barbarian war-band beyond the *limes*²—the invariable effect of any impact on an alien body social is to diffract the integral culture-ray of the impinging civilization into its constituent elements; and we have also observed that, whenever this process of cultural diffraction occurs, the technical and economic radiation of the impinging civilization is apt to travel faster and penetrate farther than its political and cultural radiation.

In ignoring these manifest lessons of History, Gibbon is practising on himself the same trick that a contemporary Russian courtier once practised on a German Empress of Russia whom Gibbon has delighted to honour under the pseudonym 'Semiramis'; for, if, as Gibbon's major argument requires, the phrase 'arts of peace and civil policy' is to be construed as meaning morals as well as Non-Military Technology, the answer to Gibbon is that, while Russia, from the time of Peter the Great onwards, did indeed make advances in Technology *accelerando*, her advances in public morals, in and after the reign of the Empress Catherine the Great, were no more substantial than 'Potemkin villages'. Since morals, and not Technology, must be taken to be the true criterion of any conquering Barbarians' title 'to deserve a place among the polished nations whom they subdue', Gibbon was adding insult to injury in advising conquered Estonians and Latvians to console themselves with the reflection that the Russians' proven ability to conquer these 'polished' Western nations with borrowed Western weapons was good evidence that their conquerors had become their peers in a 'politeness' which was the eighteenth-century Western equivalent of a twentieth-century Western 'civilization'.³

The last two paragraphs of Gibbon's General Observations may be quoted together, since they are open to a common criticism that has been anticipated in our critique of the paragraph immediately preceding them.

'Should these speculations be found doubtful or fallacious, there still remains a more humble source of comfort and hope. The discoveries of ancient and modern navigators, and the domestic history or tradition of the most enlightened nations, represent the *human savage* naked both in mind and body, and destitute of laws, of arts, of ideas, and almost of language.⁴ From this abject condition, perhaps the primitive and universal

¹ See IX. viii. *passim*.

² See VIII. viii. *passim*.

³ An older contemporary of the present writer's who was a scion of one of the families of the *ci-devant* Baltic German landed aristocracy had heard, as a child, his father tell a story that is historically significant just by reason of its triviality. Some time about three-quarters of the way through the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, this Baltic Baron was travelling out of an Orthodox Christian Great Russia into the Protestant Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire in the company of one or two native Russian nobles. At the provincial boundary they changed carriages (they were travelling by road), and, as they were climbing into the carriage that had been awaiting them, the coachman happened to take out his handkerchief and blow his nose. The boys, who were visiting the Baltic provinces for the first time, had been expecting surprises, but at this first exhibition of Baltic 'politeness' they were overwhelmed. 'Well,' they exclaimed to their Baltic host, 'What a country! Even a coachman here has a handkerchief! Why, this is Europe!'

⁴ [in the original, 10]. 'It would be an easy, though tedious, task to produce the authorities of poets, philosophers, and historians. I shall therefore content myself with appealing to the decisive and authentic testimony of Diodorus Siculus (tom. i, Book I, pp. 11, 12; Book III, p. 184, &c., ed. Wesseling). The Ichthyophagi, who in his time

state of Man, he has gradually arisen to command the animals, to fertilise the Earth, to traverse the Ocean, and to measure the Heavens. His progress in the improvement and exercise of his mental and corporeal faculties¹ has been irregular and various; infinitely slow in the beginning, and increasing by degrees with redoubled velocity: ages of laborious ascent have been followed by a moment of rapid downfall; and the several climates of the globe have felt the vicissitudes of light and darkness. Yet the experience of four thousand years should enlarge our hopes and diminish our apprehensions: we cannot determine to what height the Human Species may aspire in their advances towards perfection; but it may safely be presumed that no people, unless the face of Nature is changed, will relapse into their original barbarism. The improvements of Society may be viewed under a threefold aspect. 1. The poet or philosopher illustrates his age and country by the efforts of a *single* mind; but these superior powers of Reason or Fancy are rare and spontaneous productions; and the genius of Homer or Cicero or Newton would excite less admiration if they could be created by the will of a prince or the lessons of a preceptor. 2. The benefits of law and policy, of trade and manufactures, of arts and sciences, are more solid and permanent; and *many* individuals may be qualified, by education and discipline, to promote, in their respective stations, the interest of the community. But this general order is the effect of skill and labour; and the complex machinery may be decayed by time or injured by violence. 3. Fortunately for Mankind, the more useful, or, at least, more necessary, arts can be performed without superior talents or national subordination; without the powers of *one* or the union of *many*. Each village, each family, each individual must always possess both ability and inclination to perpetuate the use of fire² and of metals; the propagation and service of domestic animals; the methods of hunting and fishing; the rudiments of navigation; the imperfect cultivation of corn or other nutritive grain; and the simple practice of the mechanic trades. Private genius and public industry may be extirpated, but these hardy plants survive the tempest and strike an everlasting root into the most unfavourable soil. The splendid days of Augustus and Trajan were eclipsed by a cloud of ignorance; and the Barbarians subverted the laws and palaces of Rome. But the scythe, the invention or emblem of Saturn,³ still continued annually to mow the harvests of Italy; and the human feasts of the Laestrigons⁴ have never been renewed on the coast of Campania.

¹ Since the first discovery of the arts, war, commerce, and religious zeal have diffused, among the savages of the Old and New World, those inestimable gifts: they have been successively propagated; they can never

wandered along the shores of the Red Sea, can only be compared to the natives of New Holland (*Dampier's Voyages*, vol. i, pp. 464–69). Fancy, or perhaps Reason, may still suppose an extreme and absolute state of Nature far below the level of these savages, who had acquired some arts and instruments.

² [In the original, '1']. 'See the learned and rational work of the President Goguet, *De l'Origine des Loix, des Arts, et des Sciences*. He traces from facts or conjectures (tom. i, pp. 147–337, edit. 12mo.) the first and most difficult steps of human invention.'

³ [12]. 'It is certain, however strange, that many nations have been ignorant of the use of fire. Even the ingenious natives of Otaheite, who are destitute of metals, have not invented any earthen vessels capable of sustaining the action of fire and of communicating the heat to the liquids which they contain.'

⁴ [13]. 'Plutarch, *Quaestiones Romanae*, in tom. ii, p. 275. Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, Book I, ch. viii, p. 152, edit. London. The arrival of Saturn (or his religious worship) in a ship may indicate that the savage coast of Latium was first discovered and civilised by the Phoenicians.'

⁵ [14]. 'In the ninth and tenth books of the Odyssey, Homer has embellished the tales of fearful and credulous sailors who transformed the cannibals of Italy and Sicily into monstrous giants.'

be lost. We may therefore acquiesce in the pleasing conclusion that every age of the World has increased, and still increases, the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of the Human Race.¹

In these concluding paragraphs Gibbon—prudently recollecting certain considerations that had emerged from a celebrated controversy between the respective champions of the Ancients and the Moderns²—is at pains to refrain from drawing too optimistic a conclusion from the cumulativeness and collectiveness of Mankind's progress in Technology. He readily admits that the wind of individual genius bloweth where it listeth;³ and he goes so far as to concede that the corporate culture-pattern of a civilization may be precarious. He is content to follow Turgot⁴ in making for Technology the relatively modest claim that the humbler skills providing an agrarian society's fundamental necessities of life 'can never be lost';⁵ and twentieth-century Western sociologists and economists would perhaps find little to quarrel with in this Gibbonian thesis. Yet a Western historian who had lived to see the moral collapse of the Western Civilization in the twentieth century would hesitate to follow Gibbon in assuming it to be self-evident that a recrudescence of cannibalism in the Western World was quite so unlikely as a discontinuance of agriculture there; and, in agreeing that 'the imperfect cultivation of corn or other nutritive grain and the simple practice of the mechanic trades' are 'hardy plants' which 'survive the tempest and strike an everlasting root into the most unfavourable soil', a twentieth-century Western Christian would certainly not 'acquiesce in the pleasing conclusion that every age of the World has increased, and still increases, . . . the happiness, . . . and perhaps the virtue', as well as 'the knowledge, . . . of the Human Race.' Indeed, on the morrow of a Second World War that had laid Europe and Eastern Asia in ruins, a Western historian writing in A.D. 1952 might also be inclined to dispute even the proposition that 'the real wealth' of Mankind was inevitably increased by the progress of a Technology that could be used just as effectively for destruction as for production.

Gibbon's unargued assumption that progress in Technology and pro-

¹ [15]. 'The merit of discovery has too often been stained with avarice, cruelty, and fanaticism; and the intercourse of nations has produced the communication of disease and prejudice. A singular exception is due to the virtue of our own times and country. The five great voyages, successively undertaken by the command of his present Majesty, were inspired by the pure and generous love of Science and of Mankind. The same prince, adapting his benefactions to the different stages of Society, has founded a school of painting in his capital, and has introduced into the islands of the South Sea the vegetables and animals most useful to human life.'

² See pp. 62-73, above.

³ John iii. 8.

⁴ 'Les arts mécaniques n'ont jamais souffert la même éclipse que les lettres et les sciences spéculatives.'—Turgot, A. R. J.: 'Plan du Second Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle dont l'Objet sera les Progrès de l'Esprit Humain,' in *Œuvres*, nouvelle édition, (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 666. Compare *eundem*, 'Second Discours sur les Avantages que l'Établissement du Christianisme a procurés au Genre Humain', delivered at the Sorbonne on the 11th September, 1750, *ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 608, cited already in this Study in III. iii. 159, n. 3.

⁵ Among the higher intellectual activities, the same claim is made for mathematics alone by Gibbon in another context: 'The mathematics are distinguished by a peculiar privilege, that, in the course of ages, they may always advance and can never recede' (*The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lii, quoted on p. 701, above).

gress in morals must run neck and neck, as a matter of course, had been so effectively refuted by the experience of 170 more years of Western history that it could not fail to be evident to a Western historian, taking an observation in A.D. 1952, that progress in Technology, so far from being a guarantee of progress in virtue and happiness, was a challenge to it. Each time that Man increased the potency of his material tools, he was increasing the gravity of the moral consequences of his acts and was thereby raising the minimum standard of the goodness required of him if his growing power was not to turn to his destruction; and, while it was true that, in so far as a human soul succeeded in meeting Technology's spiritual challenge, technological progress might be credited with having been at least the blind and unintentional stimulus of this spiritual achievement, it was also true, as we have observed, that each individual soul had to fight the same ever recurring spiritual battle for itself under a mounting pressure from a Technology whose collective and therefore cumulative progress was bearing ever harder on each individual human spirit. In the intolerably mechanized 'Brave New World' conjured into existence by the Western Civilization in its post-Modern Age it was hard indeed for any human soul to resist the temptation of becoming a fiend without succumbing to the opposite temptation of becoming a robot.¹ This was the Human Race's predicament as twentieth-century Western eyes saw it, and from this observation no facilely pleasing conclusion could be drawn.

¹ See pp. 563-77, above.

TABLE V. *The Time-spans of the Growth-phases of the Affiliated Civilizations*

<i>Civilization</i>	<i>Date of Epiphany</i>	<i>Date of Breakdown¹</i>	<i>Span of Growth-phase (in approximate number of years)</i>
Western	<i>circa</i> A.D. 675	<i>post</i> A.D. 1550 ²	875 at least
Medieval Western			
City-State Cosmos	<i>circa</i> A.D. 675	A.D. 1378 ³	700±
Hellenic	<i>circa</i> 1125 B.C.	431 B.C.	700±
Indic	<i>circa</i> 1375 B.C.	<i>circa</i> 725 B.C. ⁴	650±
Far Eastern in Japan	A.D. 554 ⁵	A.D. 1185	631
Babylonian	<i>circa</i> 1375 B.C.	<i>circa</i> 1000 B.C. ⁶	400±
Far Eastern in China	<i>circa</i> A.D. 475	A.D. 878 ⁷	400±
Hindu	<i>circa</i> A.D. 775	A.D. 1175	400±
Orthodox Christian, main body	<i>circa</i> A.D. 675	A.D. 977	300±
Yucatec	<i>circa</i> A.D. 900 ⁸	A.D. 1201 ⁹	300±
(either or)	<i>circa</i> A.D. 1150 ¹⁰	A.D. 1451 ¹¹	
[Mexic]	<i>circa</i> A.D. 900 ¹²	<i>circa</i> A.D. 1150 ¹³	250±]
Syriac	<i>circa</i> 1125 B.C.	<i>circa</i> 937 B.C. ¹⁴	200±
Iranic	<i>circa</i> A.D. 1275	A.D. 1511 ¹⁵	200±
Arabic	<i>circa</i> A.D. 1275	A.D. 1516-17 ¹⁶	200±
[Sinic]	<i>circa</i> 825 B.C. ¹⁷	<i>circa</i> 634 B.C.	200±]
Hittite	<i>circa</i> 1375 B.C.	<i>circa</i> 1200 B.C.	175±
Orthodox Christian in Russia	<i>circa</i> A.D. 989 ¹⁸	<i>circa</i> A.D. 1075	100±
Sinic	<i>circa</i> 750 B.C. ¹⁹	634 B.C.	100±
Mexic	<i>circa</i> A.D. 1150 ²⁰	<i>circa</i> A.D. 1150	zero

¹ See IV. iv. 56-114, and Table I in vol. vi, p. 327, reprinted as Table I in vol. vii, p. 769.

² The only statement that could be made with assurance in A.D. 1952 regarding the phase in which the Western Society was living at that date was that, so far, it had not entered into a universal state; and, if it is legitimate to infer from the uniformity of the pattern of the disintegration-process that a broken-down civilization would be unlikely to arrive at a universal state without having previously passed through a Time of Troubles with the standard Time-span of some four centuries, it would seem to follow that, if the Western Civilization had broken down (which was still an open question), this catastrophe could not have overtaken it earlier—at the earliest—than about half-way through the sixteenth century.

³ The date of the outbreak of the Veneto-Genoese War of Chioggia, which was the counterpart, in the history of the Medieval Western city-state cosmos, of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War that broke out in 431 B.C. in the Hellenic World.

⁴ This date is an inference from the date of the establishment of an Indic universal state by Chandragupta Maurya in 322 B.C.

⁵ This is the date of the introduction of the Mahāyāna into Japan from Korea (see Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. i (London 1910, Kegan Paul), p. 111). Literacy in the Sinic characters and classics is recorded to have been introduced into Japan from Korea as early as A.D. 404 (see *ibid.*, p. 44). If this record is correct, and if this cultural event, rather than the introduction of the Mahāyāna, were to be taken as marking the planting of an offshoot of the Far Eastern culture in Japan, then the growth-phase of Japanese history—running, as it then would run, to 781 years—would be the longest of any in our list except the Western Civilization's.

TIME-SPANS OF GROWTHS OF CIVILIZATIONS 759

⁶ The approximate date of the flood-tide of the influx of Aramaean and Chaldaean Nomad barbarians from the North Arabian Steppe into both Babylonia and Mesopotamia. The Babylonian Civilization was brought to ruin by the militarism to which the Assyrians succumbed as the price of their arduous victory over the Aramaean invaders (see II. ii. 133-5).

⁷ The date of the sack of Khānfū (see IV. iv. 87).

⁸ Following Spinden's chronology, which dates the end of 'the First Empire' of the Mayas *circa* A.D. 600 (see I. i. 125, nn. 3 and 4).

⁹ Following Spinden's and Gann's chronology (see I. i. 124, n. 2).

¹⁰ Following Thompson's chronology (see I. i. 125, n. 3).

¹¹ Following Thompson's chronology (see I. i. 124, n. 2).

¹² Following Spinden's chronology.

¹³ This date is an inference from the fact that the Aztecs were on the eve of establishing a universal state in Central America when the Spaniards arrived on the scene in A.D. 1519.

¹⁴ The approximate date of the death of Solomon (see IV. iv. 68).

¹⁵ The date of the Shi'i revolt against the Ottoman Power in Anatolia.

¹⁶ The date of the Ottoman conquest of the dominions of the Egyptian Mamlūks.

¹⁷ Following the standard Sinic chronology, which dates the overthrow of the Shang Power by Wu Wang in 1122 B.C.

¹⁸ The date of the conversion of Russia to Orthodox Christianity.

¹⁹ Following the chronology of the Bamboo Books, which dates the overthrow of the Shang Power by Wu Wang in 1050 B.C.

²⁰ Following Thompson's chronology, which dates the end of 'the First Empire' of the Mayas in the first half of the ninth century of the Christian Era (see I. i. 125, n. 3).



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A STUDY OF HISTORY

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A STUDY OF HISTORY

BY

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*Director of Studies in the Royal Institute
of International Affairs
Research Professor of International History
in the University of London
(both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)*

But at my back I always hear
Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near.

ANDREW MARVELL

ποιεῖν τι δεῖ ἄς γόνυ χλωρόν.

THEOCRITUS: *Κυνίσκας* "Eρως, l. 70

γῆράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

SOLON

My times are in Thy hand.

Ps. xxxi. 15, in the A.V.

But Thou art the same, and Thy
years shall have no end.

Ps. cii. 27, in the A.V.

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VOLUME VII

- p. 30, line 15: *for* Ypsilandi *read* Hypsilandi
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note on p. 89: *for* Yang Ti *read* Yang-ti
p. 89, n. 1, lines 2-3, 12, and 13: *for* Yang Ti *read*
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p. 150, n. 5, line 2: *for* Zanâtâ *read* Zanâta
p. 189, n. 1, line 1: *for* Artabanes *read* Artabanus
p. 357, n. 4, line 9: *for* A.D. 111 *read* 111 B.C.
p. 400, line 6: *for* Karîm *read* Qârin
p. 695, line 36: *for* Lagus *read* Lagou
p. 698, line 16: *for* 1939 *read* 1929
p. 698, footnote 3, line 5: *for* arroventate *read* arro-
ventato

VOLUME VIII

- p. 239, line 17: *for* 1788 *read* 1787
p. 414, line 28: *for* 263 *read* 264
p. 429, line 1: *for* 263 *read* 264
p. 437, line 5: *for* 263 *read* 264

VOLUME IX

- p. 255, Table I, (iv) Supplementary Wars, under *First
Regular Cycle*: *for* 1618-48 *read* 1618-59
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p. 256, line 12: *for* 24 *read* 13
p. 256, lines 18 and 19: *for* 30 years each (A.D. 1618-
48 and A.D. 1733-63) in the first and second cycles
read 41 years (A.D. 1618-59) in the first cycle, 30
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p. 285, Table IV, column 1, line 12: *for* 1648 *read* 1659
p. 285, Table IV, column 5, line 12: *for* (152 *read* (141
p. 285, Table IV, column 8, line 12: *for* (342 *read* (331

XIII

THE INSPIRATIONS OF HISTORIANS

A. THE HISTORIAN'S ANGLE OF VISION

WHY do people study History? Why, to put the question *ad hominem*, had the writer of the present work been studying History since he was a child and been spending thirty years on this book which he was now finishing? Is an historian born or made? Every historian will have his own answer to this question, because he will be speaking from his own experience. *Quot homines, tot sententiae*:¹ each must speak for himself. The present writer's personal answer was that an historian, like anyone else who has had the happiness of having an aim in life, has found his vocation in a call from God to 'feel after Him and find Him'.²

If this personal answer finds any favour with the reader, it may help us also to answer a second question that is implicit in the one from which we have started. In beginning by asking ourselves why we study History we have begged the question: What do we mean by History? And the writer, continuing to speak simply for himself from his personal experience, would reply that he meant by History a vision—dim and partial, yet (he believed) true to reality as far as it went³—of God revealing Himself in action to souls that were sincerely seeking Him. Since 'no man hath seen God at any time'⁴ and our clearest visions are but 'broken lights' of Him,⁵ there are as many angles of vision as there are vocations, and the historian's angle is only one among a number of diverse angles from which souls with diverse gifts and diverse experiences obtain diverse partial visions of God seen through diverse fractions of His 'inconceivably mighty works'.⁶ Besides the historian's angle there is the astronomer's, the physicist's, the mathematician's, the poet's, the mystic's, the prophet's, the priest's, the administrator's, the lawyer's,

¹ Terence: *Phormio*, Act II, scene iv, line 14 (= line 454 of the play).

² Acts xvii. 27.

³ Man's vision of God has been aptly compared by Edwyn Bevan to a dog's vision of his human master. In the dog's association with his master there are some fields of action in which the master's activity comes within the range of the dog's understanding, while there are other fields in which the dog does not and cannot comprehend what his master is about. What the dog does come to feel and know, even with his limited intelligence, if he is a good dog and his master a good master, is that he is in the service of a being who is immeasurably superior to the dog himself; and from this intuition the dog—mere dog though he is—draws an intellectual and a moral conclusion. His intellectual conclusion is that his master's unintelligible acts and orders are likely to be as wise as those which the dog can understand have always proved to be. The dog's moral conclusion is that it is his own duty to take this superior being's acts and orders on trust—always obeying the orders with alacrity and acquiescing in the acts with resignation.

The present writer cannot find in Edwyn Bevan's published works any passage setting out this simile. He may perhaps have had it direct from this Christian historian's own mouth in conversation.

⁴ John i. 18; 1 John iv. 12.

⁵ Tennyson: *In Memoriam*, Invocation, stanza 5, line 3.

⁶ 'Die unbegreiflich hohen Werke'—Goethe: *Faust*, I. 249, quoted in II. i. 276.

the soldier's, the sailor's, the fisherman's, the hunter's, the shepherd's, the husbandman's, the artisan's, the engineer's, the physician's—and this roll-call could be extended over many pages, since human vocations are as numerous and as various as the glimpse of God that each of them gives is narrow and feeble. Among these innumerable angles the historian's angle is only one; but, like the others, it makes a distinctive contribution of its own to Mankind's piecemeal vision of reality. History's contribution is to give us a vision of God's creative activity on the move in a frame which, in our human experience of it, displays six dimensions. The historical angle of vision shows us the physical cosmos moving centrifugally in a four-dimensional frame of Space-Time; it shows us Life on our own planet moving evolutionarily in a five-dimensional frame of Life-Time-Space; and it shows us human souls, raised to a sixth dimension by the gift of the Spirit, moving, through a fateful exercise of their spiritual freedom, either towards their Creator or away from Him.

B. THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE FACTS OF HISTORY

(I) RECEPTIVITY

IF we have been right in seeing in History a vision of God's creation on the move, from God its source towards God its goal,¹ we shall not be surprised to find, in the minds of creatures endowed with consciousness, an awareness of History being awakened by the mere experience of being alive; but, since we have observed that 'Time's 'ever rolling stream'² flows at a varying pace,³ and that the surface of its waters is sometimes calmer and sometimes rougher, we shall also not be surprised to find that, in human minds whose innate receptivity to the impress of History is presumably always much the same on the average, the actual strength of the impression varies in accordance with the patient's historical circumstances.

For example, we have noticed in an earlier context⁴ that the vividness of historical impressions is apt to be proportionate to their violence and their painfulness. In the Western World in the generation that was in its childhood at the time of the transition from a Modern to a post-Modern Age of Western history towards the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, a child who had lived through the American Civil War in the territory of the Southern Confederacy would be likely to grow up more historical-minded than one who had lived through the same experience at the North, while for the same reason a French child who had lived through the Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent establishment and suppression of the Parisian Commune in A.D. 1870-1 would be likely to be more aware of History than any of this French child's Belgian, Swiss, or English contemporaries. Yet even the Englishman or New Englander of that generation, who had been lucky enough not to have been given the unsolicited and unpleasant grounding in History that had been inflicted by Fate upon his Parisian and South Carolinian class-mates, could not help becoming automatically aware of History in some degree, simply in virtue of having been born into a social milieu in which the process of Civilization happened at the time to be in full swing. Even in the pleasantly placid reach of the mighty river in which his lot had fallen to him, a thousand familiar experiences would be constantly making him aware of his goodly heritage.⁵ History would be impressed on his receptive mind by the war memorials and other monuments in public places;⁶ by the names of streets, piazzas, farmsteads, and fields; by the architecture of the old buildings that the child had found already in existence when he had first become conscious of the outer world and by the architecture of the new buildings

¹ 'Ilayhi marji'ukum jami'an' ('To Him return ye every one')—*Qur'ân*, x. 4.

² Watts, Isaac: 'Our God, our help in ages past', quoted in I. i. 459.

³ See XI. ix. 348-77.

⁴ In XII. xi. 421-3.

⁵ Psalm xvi. 6.

⁶ The present writer's debt to the Albert Memorial in Kensington Gardens, London, for having given him a visual education in History (though not in Beauty) is mentioned among his acknowledgements on p. 214, below.

that he had since seen rising alongside of the older buildings, or in their place;¹ by the changes in fashions of dress;² by political events such as general elections to representative parliamentary bodies, the inaugurations of presidents and the coronations of kings and queens; by regularly recurrent festivals and ceremonies such as, in London, the Trooping of the Colour and the Lord Mayor's Show; and by the liturgy performed in church.

The conservatism of the bodies ecclesiastical that had come to encase the surviving higher religions had made these churches into incomparably potent radiators of impressions of historic events and historic characters; for the problem—which all the missionary religions had had to face—of converting illiterate populations *en masse* had been solved by them through the device of telling their story, conveying its moral, and inculcating its doctrine, in visual form.³ Even in a mosque, in which the possibilities of an educational use of Visual Art were restricted by the Prophet Muhammad's faithfulness to the second of the Mosaic Com-

¹ The changes which the present writer had seen, since his childhood, in the architecture of Park Lane, London, had given him an education in current social history. In the eighteen-nineties, new palaces, built for South African millionaires, were thrusting their way in between the older palaces of the English nobility. Between the First and the Second World War, palaces of both kinds were being pulled down to make way for blocks of flats and for mammoth hotels.

² The present writer used to be told by his Mother that, as a child, he had once announced to her that he had discovered the difference between 'ladies' and 'women'. 'Ladies', he had explained, 'wear bonnets; women wear shawls'—and it was true that, in England in the eighteen-nineties, feminine headgear still displayed the sharp differentiation into two categories that had been characteristic of it since the dawn of Civilization. While a small minority was privileged to follow the vagaries of a fashion that was deliberately kept on the move in order to make profits for the producers and to advertise that their customers were rich enough not to have to wait to make a new purchase till their last purchase had worn out, a majority still draped their heads in the timeless scarf (*Turcicé* charshaf) that had been consecrated for Christian eyes through figuring in the conventional garb in which the Virgin Mary was portrayed in the traditional representations of her. Since then, the writer had lived long enough to see this differentiation between two categories of feminine headgear not only disappear in England but also first appear and then begin to disappear in Turkey.

At the time of his first visit to Turkey in A.D. 1921, all Turkish women of all classes were still wearing the timeless charshaf; at the time of his third visit in A.D. 1929, the situation in Turkey was what it had been in England in the eighteen-nineties: while Turkish 'women' were then still wearing scarves over their heads, Turkish 'ladies' were by this time already wearing hats. By the time, however, of the writer's fourth visit to Turkey in A.D. 1948, feminine costume was already reverting towards egalitarianism—though now not *alla Turca* but *alla Franca*—by conforming to a new rule of 'fashions for all', in place of the old rule of 'charshafs for all' which had still been in force only twenty-seven years back. On the morning of the 3rd November, 1948, the writer and his wife, on the summit of the *qal'eh* (the citadel) at Ankara, found themselves walking along the principal street just behind three women, parading in a row, who were inadvertently displaying a *tableau vivant* of the last quarter of a century of the history of female dress in their country. The two youngest of the three were dressed according to the standard ecumenical Western fashion of the year. If an old-fashioned *jinn* had picked either of them up, transported her on a carpet to London or New York, and deposited her on the pavement or the side-walk, she would have been indistinguishable from the other young women of her age walking along the Edgware Road. The third member of this Ankaran trio, who might have been the girls' mother, was wearing a quaint mixture between the current fashion and the timeless feminine costume which reminded the writer of the eclectic dress that he had seen men—not women—wearing in A.D. 1929 in Japan. On the steps of one of the houses that we passed in procession on the main street of the citadel at Ankara on the 3rd November 1948, there was sitting a grandmother wearing the traditional Turkish female dress complete—including conspicuous shalwar (trousers). As the two girls paraded past her, we saw her eye them with an air in which self-assurance and disapproval were struggling comically with admiration and misgiving.

³ See V. vi. 508–34.

mandments, the *qiblah*, towards which the lines of the architecture skillfully drew the worshipper's eye, pointed, through the eloquent symbolism of an impressively empty niche, not only inwards in the Space-dimension towards the Ka'bah at Mecca, but also backwards in the Time-dimension towards the Prophet of Allah who had been the human Founder of the Faith. In a Christian church—unless it were the tabernacle of a Protestant sect of Western Christians in which the Second Commandment was obeyed with an Islamic punctiliousness—the apostles, prophets, and martyrs cited collectively in the *Te Deum* could be seen portrayed individually with their traditional distinctive attributes—the cross, sword, wheel, or other means of death through which the martyr had attained his crown, or the evangelist's book and pen—and these pictures, bas-reliefs, or statues told the spectator, at a glance, what they stood for, while the meaning of the Mass sung in 'a dead language' was declared to the devout worshipper's eye by the church's counterpart of the mosque's *qiblah*, since, all the time, the tabernacle on the altar was speaking to the worshipper visually of Christ, His passion, His divinity and His incarnation.

It will be seen that, in the days when the surviving civilizations were all still living under the aegis of the surviving higher religions clad in their traditional forms, 'going to church' (or mosque or synagogue or Hindu or Buddhist temple) was an automatic education in History that was apt to carry the passive recipient of it far afield in Time as well as in Space; and this education was as effective as it was informal, since it reached broad strata of the population that had no chance of going to school, while it taught lessons that came nearer to the heart of its pupils' lives than any formal book-learning. Christ and His apostles, the saints and the martyrs, the patriarchs and the prophets, and the biblical vista of History from the Creation through the Fall and the Redemption to the Last Things, were in truth realities of far greater importance for Christian souls than the parochial secular histories and the national notables, military, civil, literary, and scientific, that were subsequently to be thrust down the throats of a *plebs Occidentalis nuper Christiana* by the well-meaning but myopic-eyed organizers of national systems of compulsory universal education in post-Modern Western states. To put the case, once again, *ad hominem*, the longer the writer of this Study lived, the more glad he was that he had been born early enough in the Western Civilization's day to have been taken to church as a child every Sunday as a matter of course and to have received his formal education at a school and a university in which the study of the Greek and Latin classics, by which the Medieval Western study of Scripture and Theology had been replaced as a result of a fifteenth-century Italian renaissance,¹ had not yet been ousted in its turn by a study of Western vernacular languages and literatures, Medieval and Modern Western history, and a latter-day Western physical science.²

This automatic stimulus from the social milieu in which a human being grows up, and in which he continues to live and work as an adult, is the earliest and most widely radiative of the inspirations of potential

¹ See X. ix. 68, n. 2.

² See X. ix. 63-70.

historians; but this primal inspiration, while indispensable, is at the same time insufficient, and this in two ways.

In the first place, even in the civilizations of the third generation, which had all enjoyed the advantage of having had churches for their chrysalises,¹ the informal education in History through an ecclesiastical medium had never penetrated Society to its depths, since, throughout the Age of the Civilizations up to date, the vast majority of the population of every society in process of civilization had consisted of a Primitive Peasantry that, in A.D. 1952, still accounted for about three-quarters of the living generation of Mankind, and, for the Peasantry since the dawn of Civilization, History, as they had experienced it so far, had been a tale that had signified nothing, in spite of being 'full of sound and fury'.² This Peasantry, which had been rounded up into the fold of the civilizations and which had been fleeced there to provide a surplus for a privileged minority, had remained much like its less unfortunate brethren still at large in surviving primitive societies that the civilizations had not yet managed to devour; and, in the Peasantry's consciousness, the Government that was always impinging on their life so disagreeably was not the historical pageant, moving along an irreversible course through Time, that it looked like to a cultivated minority which had been trained to learn by heart the names and dates of the kings of England, Judah, Israel, Assyria, Babylon, and Ur, or alternatively those of the pharaohs of Egypt and the emperors of China and Japan; Government for the Peasantry was just an everlasting inevitable affliction of the same timeless presentness as the wars in which Government abused its power and as the pestilences and the famines that Government was powerless to avert.

One passage of History in which the Peasantry might have felt some interest, had they been aware of it, was the prehistoric mutation through which Sub-Man had once become Man in a Yang-movement in the evolution of Life that was a more prominent historical landmark than the subsequent rise of the civilizations;³ but this historic event, which latter-day Western archaeologists, anthropologists, and psychologists had recently begun to bring to light, had faded, ages ago, out of the folk-memory of their contemporaries who in A.D. 1952 were still lying torpid in Primitive Man's Yin-state; and, for practical purposes, the primitive human substratum of the living civilizations was still thoroughly un-historical-minded. The movement in the fabric of Creation that set the tune to which the Primitive Peasantry danced was the cyclic rhythm of Physical Nature: the cycle of the seasons, which governed their food-supply; the cycle of Day and Night, which dictated to them their timetable of alternating labour and rest; and the cycle of Birth and Death, which determined the life-span of every human being in his generation. The festivals that had a meaning and a value for the Peasantry were not the Fourth of July, Dingaans' Day, Guy Fawkes' Day, Armistice Day, and such like; they were the unhistorical red-and-black-letter days of the annually recurrent agricultural year. In fact, for at least three-

¹ See VII. vii. 392-409.

² Shakspeare: *Macbeth*, Act v, scene v, line 26.

³ See II. i. 192-5.

quarters of the men and women alive on Earth in A.D. 1952, History was virtually non-existent—not because this majority were less receptive to the educative influence of their social milieu than were the minority that were at this time in process of Civilization, but because the majority were then still living in a social milieu that spoke to them, not of History, but of Nature.

Even, however, for the minority whose social milieu did speak to them of History, this exposure to the radiation of an historical social environment was not enough in itself to inspire a child to become an historian. A passive receptivity without which he would never get under way would also never avail to waft him into port unless it inspired him to travel under his own steam by awakening his mind to an active curiosity. A light glider will answer more readily than a heavy aeroplane to the fits and starts and twists and turns of a fitful veering breeze, but, for this very reason, its pilot will remain at the mercy of a capricious atmosphere unless his craft is converted from a glider into an aeroplane by being fitted with an engine; for, until he commands a driving-power of his own, he will never be able to choose a course and hold to it.

(II) CURIOSITY

The potential historian's mind is like an aeroplane driven by jet-propulsion. After it has received its first impulse to study History by being made aware of History through the impress of an historic social environment, the mind obtains its next impulse through a mutation of receptivity into curiosity. This transition from a passive to an active mood inspires the apprentice in History to take the initiative, go into action, and set off on aerial voyages of discovery into unknown skies.

Without this creative stirring of curiosity, the most familiar, impressive, and numerous monuments of History will perform their eloquent dumb-show to no effect, because the eyes to which they will be addressing themselves will be eyes that see not.¹ This truth that a creative spark cannot be struck without a response as well as a challenge was borne in upon the Modern Western philosopher-pilgrim Volney when he visited the Islamic World in the years A.D. 1783–5.² Volney had been born and brought up on one of the fringes of the *Oikoumenê*, in Transalpine Western Europe, in a region which had been drawn into the current of the histories of the civilizations only as recently as the time of the Hannibalic War (*gerebatur* 218–201 B.C.),³ whereas the region that Volney was visiting had been a theatre of History for some three or four thousand years longer than Gaul, and was proportionately well stocked with those relics of the Past of which the France of Volney's day could show comparatively few. Yet, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the living generation in the Middle East were squatting among the amazing ruins of extinct civilizations, piled stratum upon

¹ Isaiah xlii. 20; Jeremiah v. 21; Ezekiel xii. 2; Matt. xiii. 14; Mark iv. 12; Luke viii. 10; John xii. 40; Acts xxviii. 26; Romans xi. 8.

² See Volney, C. F.: *Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte pendant les Années 1783, 1784, et 1785*, 2nd ed. (Paris 1787, Desenne et Volland).

³ See I. i. 40.

stratum, without being moved to inquire what these monuments were; when, how, or why they had been first erected and then overthrown or allowed to decay; or what light these historic tragedies might throw upon the meaning of Human Life.¹ The curiosity to ask these questions had been stirred, not on the spot, in the cradle of Civilization, where the stimulus was at its maximum, but in a corner of the Old World where the stimulus was relatively weak. Yet, in Western Europe in the Modern Age of Western history, the faint impress of History which this weak stimulus had made on receptive minds had aroused in them a curiosity that was keen enough to draw Volney from his native France to Egypt in A.D. 1783² and, in his wake, the goodly company of French *savants* who seized the opportunity offered to them in A.D. 1798 by Buonaparte of

¹ See Volney, C. F.: *Les Ruïnes, ou Méditation sur les Révolutions des Empires*, chaps. 1 and 2, in *Œuvres Complètes de Volney* (Paris 1876, Firmin-Didot), pp. 9-12.

The indifference to the monuments of a pre-Islamic past which the Muslim population of Egypt and Syria showed in the ninth decade of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, at the time of Volney's visit to those countries, was not peculiar to that generation of Muslims and was not confined to the field of archaeology. It was one facet of a catholic indifference 'to anything that is not directly of moment for his life in This World or the next' which is enjoined upon every pious Muslim by the precepts of orthodox Islamic theology (see MacDonald, D. B.: *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam* (Chicago 1909, University Press), p. 120). 'And this is not simply theological; it is in the very texture of the Muslim mind. We can say: "This is an interesting book"; in Arabic you cannot express that idea. . . . Even curiosity, in the highest and finest sense, we cannot render. . . . The free, self-determining, self-developing soul may not walk its own path, however innocently, but must fit itself to the scheme and pattern of schools' (*ibid.*, pp. 120-1).

MacDonald goes on to quote 'Odysseus' [Sir C. Eliot]: *Turkey in Europe* (London 1900, Edward Arnold), p. 98, as a witness that there is the same lacuna in the Turkish vocabulary as there is in the Arabic. 'The Turkish language, copious as it is, contains no equivalent for "interesting". . . . The ordinary Turk does not take an interest in anything. . . . A natural want of curiosity, and a conviction that their own religion contains all that Man knows or needs to know, keep the provincial population in a state of ignorance which seems incredible and fantastic.' As far as Turkey, at least, was concerned, an intellectual indictment which had perhaps still been warranted by the facts as they had been in A.D. 1900 had become an anachronism by A.D. 1948 as a result of the Westernizing revolution through which Turkey had put herself in the meanwhile (see p. 10, n. 2, below).

² Volney has informed his readers—in prose in the preface to his *Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte* and in poetry in *Les Ruïnes*—of the considerations which led him to choose Asia—and, in particular, Syria and Egypt—in preference to America or Europe as the theatre for a bout of foreign travel on which he had decided to spend a legacy.

'C'est en ces contrées, me dis-je, que sont nées la plupart des opinions qui nous gouvernent; c'est de là que sont sorties ces idées religieuses qui ont influé si puissamment sur notre morale publique et particulière, sur nos lois, sur tout notre état social. Il est donc intéressant de connaître les lieux où ces idées prirent naissance, les usages et les mœurs dont elles se composèrent, l'esprit et le caractère des nations qui les ont consacrées. Il est intéressant d'examiner jusqu'à quel point cet esprit, ces mœurs, ces usages, se sont altérés ou conservés; de rechercher quelles ont pu être les influences du climat, les effets du gouvernement, les causes des habitudes; en un mot, de juger, par l'état présent, quel fut l'état des temps passés.'—Volney, C. F.: *Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte pendant les Années 1783, 1784 et 1785*, preface.

'Ahl si tu lis dans mon cœur, tu sais combien il désire la vérité, tu sais qu'il la recherche avec passion. Et n'est ce pas à sa poursuite que tu me vois en ces lieux écartés? . . . J'ai dit: . . . "J'irai dans la solitude vivre parmi les ruïnes; j'interrogerai les monuments anciens sur la sagesse des temps passés; j'évoquerai du sein des tombeaux l'esprit qui jadis, dans l'Asie, fit la splendeur des états et la gloire des peuples. Je demanderai à la cendre des législateurs par quels mobiles s'élèvent et s'abaissent les empires; de quelles causes naissent la prospérité et les malheurs des nations; sur quels principes enfin doivent s'établir la paix des sociétés et le bonheur des hommes."'—Volney, *Les Ruïnes*, in *Œuvres Complètes*, pp. 13-14.

Read also the invocation at the beginning of this work of Volney's, *ibid.*, p. 9. The double title of the work—*Les Ruïnes, ou Méditation sur les Révolutions des Empires*—tells, in itself, the tale of the author's successive passages, in his intellectual voyage of exploration, from receptivity to curiosity and from curiosity to investigation.

accompanying his expeditionary force. Unlike these intrepid men of science, neither Napoleon himself nor his officers and men were drawn to Egypt primarily by History's call; the mainsprings of their action were the barbarian's restlessness and ambition; yet Napoleon knew that he was striking a note to which even the uneducated rank-and-file of an eighteenth-century Western army would respond when he reminded them, before going into action on the decisive battlefield of Imbābah,¹ that forty centuries of History were looking down on them² from the Pyramids which their audacious march on Cairo had now brought within their view. We may be sure that Murād Bey, the commander of the opposing Mamlūk force, never thought of wasting his breath by addressing any similar exhortation to his own incurious comrades.

The French *savants* who visited Egypt in Napoleon's train distinguished themselves by finding a new dimension of History for a Modern Western Society's insatiable curiosity to conquer. This curiosity's first objective, at the dawn of the Modern Age, had been the classical languages and literatures of an Hellenic Civilization to which the Western Civilization was affiliated;³ and by A.D. 1798 it had followed up this feat of recovering possession of its own cultural heritage by taking possession of the cultural heritages of its contemporaries. After remastering their own Greek and Latin classics, Western scholars had proceeded to master the Islamic Society's Arabic and Persian classics, the Far Eastern Society's Sinic classics, and the Hindu Society's Sanskrit classics; and, not content with mastering the Hebrew original of the scriptures which a Christian Church shared with a Jewish diaspora, Western scholarship had also mastered by this time the Iranian language of the Zoroastrian scriptures of a Parsee diaspora which, like Jewry, was a fossil of an extinct Syriac Society that had been the Hellenic Society's sister. After having thus gone far towards appropriating all the treasures of the Past that had been preserved in the cultural heritages of the surviving civilizations, Western scholarship now went on to disinter other treasures that had been lying buried underground, wrapped in the napkin of oblivion,⁴ for hundreds and even thousands of years.

This was a much more formidable intellectual enterprise, for here the chain of tradition had long since been broken, and there were therefore no living interpreters to induct Western scholar-catechumens into these mysteries. By their own unaided efforts they had to decipher forgotten scripts and discover the structure, vocabulary and meaning of dead languages which were dead in the exact sense of being no longer in living use for any purpose whatsoever, in contrast to such so-called 'dead languages' as Latin or Sanskrit, which had merely passed out of current vernacular employment without ever having ceased to be spoken in liturgies and read in classical works of literature. The disinterment of the Egyptian Civilization by the enterprise of Western scholars in and after A.D. 1798 was thus a more remarkable achievement of Modern Western historical curiosity than the Italian renaissance of Latin and

¹ See IV. iv. 459-60.

² 'Soldats, quarante siècles vous regardent.'

³ This Late Medieval Italian renaissance of Hellenic letters has been discussed in X. ix. 62-73.

⁴ Luke xix. 20.

Greek letters in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era; and by the present writer's day no fewer than eleven once dead civilizations—the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the Sumerian, the Minoan, and the Hittite, together with the Indus Culture and the Shang Culture, in the Old World, and the Mayan, Yucatec, Mexican, and Andean civilizations in the New World—had thus been brought to life again in Western minds whose curiosity had led them to make these arduous voyages of intellectual exploration. The present writer's own lifetime (*vivebat* A.D. 1889–) had already, by the year A.D. 1952, seen the discovery of the most recently discovered four out of the eleven—namely the Shang Culture, the Indus Culture, and the Hittite and Minoan civilizations—and it had also seen vast progress made in the increase of Western knowledge and understanding of the rest.

Nor was this either the limit or the summit of these Western intellectual pioneers' achievement. Their *chef-d'œuvre* had been to infect with their own curiosity those non-Western peoples who, only a century and a half back, in Volney's and Napoleon's day, had been living and working under the shadow of the visible monuments of the Past without being moved by them.¹ In A.D. 1952, Japanese, Chinese, Indian, Egyptian, and Turkish philologists, historians and archaeologists² were labouring side

¹ 'Je pris l'hospitalité chez de pauvres paysans arabes, qui ont établi leurs chaumières sur le parvis même du temple [dédié au soleil à Palmyre] . . . Ah! comment s'est éclipsée tant de gloire? Comment se sont anéantis tant de travaux?'—Volney: *Les Ruines*, chaps. 1 and 2.

² In Turkish minds the present writer had seen, at first hand, this mental revolution in their attitude towards Turkey's pre-Turkish and pre-Islamic past accomplished since his first visit to the country in A.D. 1921.

In A.D. 1921, when the Ottoman Turkish people was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to retain possession of its homeland in Anatolia, the local monuments of a pre-Turkish and pre-Islamic past were still regarded by all but a tiny sophisticated minority as so many *pièces justificatives* which the Turks' Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh* and their Frankish patrons could and would place on exhibition in support of their contention that the Turks were recent interlopers who had never acquired a prescriptive right to the territories on which they had squatted, and who therefore ought to be evicted in order to reinstate lawful proprietors who had been ousted by the Turkish intruders without ever having lost their title. Even in April 1923, when the writer paid his first visit to Ankara, this attitude still prevailed, though by that date the Turks had already succeeded in saving themselves by their own exertions. The Greek invaders' attempt to reach Ankara had been foiled; the fortunes of war had been dramatically reversed by a débâcle of the Greek army in Anatolia; and fresh negotiations for a peace-settlement between Turkey and the West European Powers were being conducted—this time on a footing of equality—at Lausanne. Yet in April 1923 the impression made on the writer by the spectacle of the temple of Augustus—occupied by a garden, annexed to a mosque, and crowned with storks' nests—was the same as that made on Volney 138 years earlier by the spectacle of the ruins of the temple of the Sun at Palmyra.

When the writer paid his next visit to Ankara in the summer of 1929, some six years after the Peace Treaty of Lausanne had been duly signed on the 24th July, 1923, he found the temple of Augustus cleared of its incrustations, converted into a museum, and filled with Hittite monuments collected from all parts of the country. By this time the Turks had begun to acquire confidence in their own future, and President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had launched a counter-offensive on the battlefield of political archaeology by ruling that the Hittites had been proto-Turks. This ruling may not have been good history, but it was a good thing for History nevertheless, since its practical corollary was the revolutionary idea that Hittite monuments were Turkish national assets which it was the Turkish people's patriotic duty to preserve.

By the time of the writer's fourth visit to Turkey in the autumn of 1948 the change of attitude was complete. A public directorate of museums in the capital was matched by a local museum in every seat of a provincial administration, and this Turkish public archaeological service was working enthusiastically—undaunted by the inadequacy of its means for coping with the immensity of its task—to preserve and study all monuments

by side with the Western pioneers in intellectual fields that were 'white already to harvest';¹ and the progressive achievements of an intellectual pursuit that was exacting an ever increasing degree of specialization from scholars who set themselves to acquire its technique was at the same time arousing an ever increasing interest in an ever widening circle of laymen.

The popularity of Archaeology in the writer's day was attested by the alacrity with which the weekly illustrated papers and magazines found space for publishing pictures of archaeological excavations and finds. The discovery, on and after the 4th November, 1922, of the tomb of the Pharaoh Tutankhamen (*imperabat circa* 1362-1352 B.C.) created almost as great a furore in England as the birth of a polar bear cub in the Zoological Gardens in Regent's Park in A.D. 1950. The publication, in and after A.D. 1924, of the earlier volumes of *The Cambridge Ancient History*, dealing with once forgotten chapters of history which the archaeologists had recently brought to light, likewise caught the imagination of a cultivated lay public; and the contemporary interest in the history and literature of the Hellenic Civilization did not appear to have been diminished either in volume or in intensity as a result of the change in its character resulting from the breaking, in the writer's lifetime, of the virtual monopoly which, in England for some four hundred years past, the Greek and Latin Classics had shared with Mathematics alone in furnishing the staple pabulum of formal higher education. In a generation in which Hellenic studies were being pushed out of the centre into a corner of the field of education in the formal sense of the word, the absolute number of boys and girls learning Latin and Greek in at least this one Western country was apparently rising—and this without a catastrophic decline in the relative number—as a result of the great increase in the number of the recipients of a secondary education in some intellectual discipline or other,² while the growth of a popular interest in the life and letters of the Hellenic World among a wider public which had not mastered the Greek and Latin Classics in the original languages was attested by the

of the Past in every stratum without discrimination. At Ankara on the 3rd November, 1948, the writer and his wife met a pair of young Turkish archaeologists—man and wife—who had just found a trove of business archives accumulated, in the second millennium B.C., by a colony of Assyrian business men in their suburb outside the proto-Hittite city of Kanesh (on the 9th November, 1948, we visited this site, now known as Kanlı Saka, near Qaysari). At Bursa on the 21st November, 1948, the writer was asked to give a lecture on the history in the local secondary school to give a lecture at the Club on the history and pre-Islamic history of the region to a group of Bursans with antiquarian interests. The lecturer found an audience of several hundred people waiting for him, though the lecture had been arranged at not more than eight hours' notice, and, in conversation after the lecture was over, several of those present asked him to give them references to editions of the Greek texts of the works of Dio of Prusa and Arrian of Nicomedia with French or English translations in parallel columns, with the intention of acquainting themselves at first hand with the literary remains of a citizen of Bursa and a citizen of Ismid who were such eminent figures in the past history of this section of the country. This experience at Bursa made it clear to the writer that the Turkish people's change of attitude towards History was now an accomplished fact.

¹ John iv. 35. Cp. Matt. ix. 37-38; Luke x. 2.

² The vicissitudes of Greek and Latin studies in schools in England were indicated by the figures, given in the annual reports of H.B.M. Ministry of Education (published by H.B.M. Stationery Office) showing the numbers of those taking the School Certificate and the Higher Certificate in the various subjects. The following selection—which Mr. F. J. Kinchin Smith of the University of London Institute of Education had kindly

mounting sales of an increasing number of translations attaining ever higher levels of literary excellence. The distinguishing feature of these latter-day translations—and this was no doubt what commended them to their readers—was their success in making the Greek and Latin originals come alive in the vernacular. Instead of deliberately putting distance between the Classics and their readers by rendering the Classics into a 'translationese' unknown to real life, they exerted themselves to bring home to their readers the 'philosophical contemporaneity' and 'philosophical equivalence'¹ of the Hellenic and the Western Civilization by reproducing the originals in the living language of the corresponding literary genres of the day.

This Faustian insatiability of inquiring Western minds had come to be a theme of Western poetry. The impetus of a curiosity that had pressed on from an exploration of a physical ocean in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era to the sounding of the psychic abyss of the Subconscious in the twentieth century is deftly conveyed by Martyn Skinner in his *Letters to Malaya*.² Yet this cumulative collective achievement of curiosity, impressive though it be, is not the heart of a passion and a drama that can have no other theatre than a soul; and this individual experience had found its immortal expression in the English language in Keats' sonnet *On First Looking into Chapman's Homer*.

Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken,
Or like stout Cortez when, with eagle eyes,
He stared at the Pacific, and all his men
Look'd at each other with a wild surmise,
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.

In the present writer's mind, the heroic exemplar of an invincible curiosity's response to the challenge of heart-breaking circumstances had always been Heinrich Schliemann (*vivebat* A.D. 1822–90), ever since a memorable day at Winchester when the writer as a boy had listened spell-bound to his master M. J. Rendall retailing, with zest, the salient episodes of this romantic life in a parenthesis during a session officially allocated to the construing of the *Iliad*.

'If I begin this book with my autobiography [Schliemann himself has communicated to the writer—would give an idea of the tendency during the thirty years ending in A.D. 1949.

SCHOOL CERTIFICATE

Absolute Figures			Relative Figures		
Year	Latin	Greek	Year	Latin	Greek
1919	10,102	1,215	1919	35.1%	4.2%
1929	25,456	2,327	1929	42.7%	3.9%
1939	28,508	1,989	1939	35.3%	2.4%
1949	36,916	2,411	1949	32.1%	2.1%

HIGHER CERTIFICATE

Absolute Figures			Relative Figures		
Year	Latin	Greek	Year	Latin	Greek
1929	1,980	818	1929	21%	9%
1949	4,159	915	1949	12%	2%

¹ See I. i. 172–7.

² Skinner, Martyn: *Letters to Malaya III and IV* (London 1943, Putnam), pp. 40–47, quoted in VII. vii. 496–7.

written in the introduction to his *Ilios*],¹ it is not from any feeling of vanity, but from a desire to show how the work of my later life has been the natural consequence of the impressions I received in my earliest childhood, and that, so to say, the pickaxe and spade for the excavation of Troy and the royal tombs of Mycenae were both forged and sharpened in the little German village in which I passed eight years of my earliest childhood.²

In the village of Ankershagen, between Waren³ and Penzlin in the Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, of which Heinrich's father, Ernst Schliemann, was the Protestant pastor, and where Heinrich lived from his second to his fifteenth year (A.D. 1823-36), there were two elements in the social milieu—the local folk-lore and the pastor's personal interest in Hellenic history—that made their impress on Heinrich's receptive mind; and 'the persistence with which, throughout his life, he recalled the scenes of his youth and wrote to the people there—a family-feeling which no love of country had helped to nourish in this cosmopolitan—indicates the depth of those first experiences and discoveries'.⁴

'Just behind our garden was a pond called "das Silberschälchen", out of which a maiden was believed to rise each midnight, holding a silver bowl. There was also in the village a small hill surrounded by a ditch, probably a prehistoric burial-place (or so-called *Hünengrab*), in which, as the legend ran, a robber knight in times of old had buried his beloved child in a golden cradle. Vast treasures were also said to be buried close to the ruins of a round tower in the garden of the proprietor of the village. My faith in the existence of these treasures was so great that, whenever I heard my father complain of his poverty, I always expressed my astonishment that he did not dig up the silver bowl or the golden cradle, and so become rich.'⁵

The curiosity of the future excavator of the treasures buried in the Second City at Troy and in the royal tombs at Mycenae was diverted from Mecklenburg to the Mediterranean by his father's talk of the excavations at Pompeii and Herculaneum and his recital of the tale of the Trojan War; and here, twelve days before Heinrich's eighth birthday, the decisive impact was made by an engraving,⁶ representing the flight

¹ This account of Schliemann's career by the hero himself is as thrilling as it is brief (Schliemann takes no more than eighteen pages to bring himself from the cradle to the Troad in his forty-seventh year, A.D. 1868); but it was not written till Schliemann was nearly sixty years old, and it does not tally at all points with Schliemann's current records, which run to 150 manuscript volumes and 20,000 papers (see Ludwig, Emil: *Schliemann of Troy* (London 1931, Putnam), p. 24) and which have also been used by Schliemann's biographer. In op. cit., p. 27 n., and pp. 47 and 52, Ludwig hints that the retrospective autobiography must be taken *cum grano salis* in the light of the contemporary documents. (One specimen of these (see Ludwig, op. cit., p. 48) is an autobiographical letter, written by Schliemann in his twenty-first year to his sisters, which would fill eight printed pages.) The ampler contemporary information which Ludwig has had at his command has not, however, led him to impugn the authority of any of the passages from Schliemann's *Ilios* which are quoted in this Study.

² Schliemann, H.: *Ilios* (London 1875, Murray), p. 1.

³ The Waren from whom this village had received its name were presumably representatives of a Teutonic-speaking North European barbarian *Waren* (or *Wari* *alias* Warni *alias* Varini—who in the post-Hellenic Völkerwanderung (*aestuabat* A.D. 375-675) had anticipated Heinrich Schliemann's nineteenth-century descent from the Baltic upon the Aegean (see Chadwick, H.M.: *The Origin of the English Nation* (Cambridge 1907, University Press), pp. 102-10).

⁴ Ludwig, E.: *Schliemann of Troy* (London 1931, Putnam), p. 135.

⁵ Schliemann, *ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

⁶ Reproduced by Emil Ludwig in his *Schliemann of Troy* (London 1931, Putnam), facing p. 106.

of Aeneas from the burning city of Ilium, in a *Universal History*¹ which was the father's present to his son on Christmas Day, 1829. The boy had long been grieved to hear from his father that Troy had vanished without leaving a trace, and this picture—depicting massive city-walls—was naïvely taken by little Heinrich as evidence that his father had, after all, happily been mistaken, since the author of the book must have seen Troy as it was here represented. When his father replied that the picture was merely a fanciful one, Heinrich drew from him the admission of his belief that Troy must, in fact, have had walls as massive as those which the imaginary picture displayed.

“Father”, retorted I, “If such walls once existed, they cannot possibly have been completely destroyed: vast ruins of them must still remain, but they are hidden away beneath the dust of ages.” He maintained the contrary, whilst I remained firm in my opinion, and at last we both agreed that I should one day excavate Troy. . . . Thanks to God, my firm belief in the existence of that Troy has never forsaken me amid all the vicissitudes of my eventful career; but it was not destined for me to realise, till in the autumn of my life . . . , our² sweet dreams of fifty years ago’.³

¹ Written by Dr. Georg Ludwig Jerrer, and published at Nuremberg in 1828. Some forty years after Schliemann's death, this volume was found among his books and papers in his house at Athens by his biographer (see Ludwig Jerrer, *Life of Troy* (London 1931, Putnam), p. 24).

² The second person in this ‘our’ is not Heinrich Schliemann's father, whose character and conduct were not such as to inspire in his son's heart an admiration or a love to match the stimulus that the father's archaeological interests gave to his son's intellect; the second person was Minna Meineke, a girl of Heinrich's own age who was the daughter of a neighbouring farmer, and the words omitted in the passage quoted above are ‘and then . . . far from her’.

Schliemann, like Dante, had projected his anima on to a feminine figure of flesh and blood. In 1829, just after he had found his aim in life, ‘Minna . . . showed me the greatest sympathy and entered into all my vast plans for the future. Thus a warm attachment sprang up between us, and in our childish sympathy we exchanged vows of eternal love’ (Schliemann, *ibid.*, p. 4). But, like Dante, Schliemann lost his love in the flesh to recapture her in the spirit by redirecting his tragically thwarted passion into a mighty piece of creative work on to which he projected her image.

Ἐργάσομαι μεγάλ' ἔργα δι' ἔργων σου πελάσαιμ' ἄν
ἂν δ' ἄρα λείψωμαι, μέλζον' ἔτ' ἐργάσομαι.

The mighty works are eventually accomplished; but who is this ‘thou’ for whose sake they are undertaken? Is it really the lost living woman, or is it the hero's own indomitable and inescapable anima (‘quam scilicet, ut fit, effugere haud potis est’) in search of an alternative object?

Heinrich Schliemann inherited the destiny of the Trojan hero who, in Jerrer's picture, was displayed in flight from the City of Destruction to a new world. He, too, had to lose his Creusa in order to be free to espouse his Lavinia in the fullness of time; and Heinrich Schliemann relived Aeneas' legendary experience in real life in seeing Minna Meineke slip three times from his clasp—the first two times as a vicarious punishment for his father's misdemeanours (see *ibid.*, pp. 5 and 6) and the third time by a cruel mistiming (pp. 11–12). His account of his unexpected meeting with Minna on Good Friday, 1836 (p. 6), is not unworthy to be compared with the fourteenth chapter of Dante's *La Vita Nuova*.

Ter conatus ibi collo dare braccia circum,
Ter frustra comprehensa manus effugit imago
Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.

‘It had indeed happened to Minna and me as it often happens to us in our sleep, when we dream that we are pursuing somebody and can never catch him, because as often as we reach him he escapes us again. I thought I could never get over the misfortune of losing Minna as the partner of my life; but Time, which heals all wounds, at last healed mine, so that, although I remained for years mourning for her, I could at least continue my mercantile pursuits without further interruption’ (Schliemann, *ibid.*, p. 12).

³ Schliemann, *ibid.*, pp. 3 and 5.

These dreams, once formed, remained the constant inspiration of Heinrich Schliemann's life.

'As long as I live, I shall never forget the evening when a drunken miller came into the shop. . . . He was the son of a Protestant clergyman in Roebel, Mecklenburg, and had almost completed his studies at the gymnasium of Neu Ruppın when he was expelled on account of his bad conduct. . . . Dissatisfied with his lot, the young man gave himself up to drink, which, however, had not made him forget his Homer; for, on the evening that he entered the shop, he recited to us about a hundred lines of the poet, observing the rhythmic cadence of the verses. Although I did not understand a syllable, the melodious sound of the words made a deep impression upon me, and I wept bitter tears over my unhappy fate. Three times over did I get him to repeat to me those divine verses, rewarding his trouble with three glasses of whisky, which I bought with the few pence that made up my whole fortune. From that moment I never ceased to pray God that by His grace I might yet have the happiness of learning Greek.'¹

The shop was Theodore Hückstädt's grocer's shop at Fürstenberg, and the year—A.D. 1837—was the second year of Heinrich Schliemann's employment there and the sixteenth of his age. Some five years later, when he had already risen from being an assistant in a North German village grocer's shop to being a clerk in a Dutch financial house at Amsterdam, he once more proved his faithfulness to his dreams by paying a high price for another step towards making them come true.

'My annual salary amounted only to 800 francs (£32), half of which I spent on my studies; on the other half I lived—miserably enough, to be sure.'²

And the rest of the acts of Heinrich Schliemann, and all that he did between his arrival in Amsterdam in A.D. 1842 as a ship-wrecked cabin-boy and his winding up of his business in St. Petersburg in A.D. 1863 as a millionaire—how he made his fortune by importing indigo into Russia and by trading in gold dust in California (automatically becoming, in the process, a citizen of the United States), and how, in the meantime, he taught himself to read and write English, French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Swedish, Polish, Modern Greek, Ancient Greek, Latin, and Arabic—is it not written in the Trojan hero's autobiography and in the book of Emil Ludwig?³

'Heaven continued to bless all my mercantile undertakings in a wonderful manner, so that at the end of 1863 I found myself in possession of a fortune such as my ambition had never ventured to aspire to. But in the midst of the bustle of business I never forgot Troy, or the agreement I had made with my father and Minna in 1830 to excavate it. I loved money indeed, but solely as the means of realising this great idea of my life.'⁴

The idea was indeed realized beyond all expectation; for the hero, who had spent his fifteenth to his forty-second year (A.D. 1836-63) in

¹ Schliemann, *ibid.*, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³ Ludwig, E.: *Schliemann of Troy, The Story of a Gold-Seeker* (London 1931, Putnam).

⁴ Schliemann, *ibid.*, p. 17.

accumulating the means, spent his forty-seventh to his sixty-ninth year (A.D. 1868-90)¹ in disinterring from the ground, and retrieving from oblivion, not only Troy, but Ithaca, Mycenae, Orchomenos, and Tiryns as well. The first of these two chapters in the story of Heinrich Schliemann's life might have come straight out of Smiles' *Self-Help*, and the second straight out of *The Arabian Nights*; but, of the two, it is the first that is, not only the more illuminating, but also the more romantic.

The writer of this Study, who was born only twenty months before the date of Schliemann's death, was compensated for having thus missed the chance of meeting this hero of History alive by coming to know two younger contemporaries of his own who had been inspired by the same indomitable spirit of curiosity to win victories over hardly less fearful odds.

Professor H. W. Bailey (*natus* A.D. 1899), a philologist of world-wide renown who in A.D. 1952 was the Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Cambridge, had awoken to consciousness as a child on a farm in Western Australia; and it would be hard to think of a more unpromising environment than this for producing a *savant* in the field of Oriental languages. The virgin soil of a recently colonized *terra nullius* exhaled no folk-lore to play the part of those local legends that had put Heinrich Schliemann, in his Varangian village, on the track of buried treasure; but the local human environment in Western Australia in the first decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era did provide Harold Walter Bailey with the equivalent of the *Universal History* that had given the decisive turn to Heinrich Schliemann's life when it had come into Schliemann's hands on Christmas Day, 1829. The books that descended from Heaven upon the boy on the West Australian farm were 'a set of seven volumes of an encyclopaedia (eagerly devoured) and four other volumes with lessons in French, Latin, German, Greek, Italian, and Spanish. Later came Arabic and Persian, out of which Persian took the lead (joined later to Sanskrit)'.²

This was the trove that set Bailey's curiosity on fire; and in A.D. 1943 the present writer induced the modest scholar to describe to him how his family used to watch him, with a benign but whimsical gaze, while, during the noonday rest from their common labours in the field, he would be conning his Avestan grammar in the shade of an Antipodean haystack. By the time when he was approaching the age to matriculate at a university, the young student of Oriental languages had become aware that he had reached the limit of what he could teach himself, unaided, out of the books on which he could lay hands. What was the next step? At the University of Western Australia at this date there was no

¹ In this symmetrically rhythmic life, the caesura between the strophe and the antistrophe was marked by a voyage round the World in A.D. 1864-5 and a study of Archaeology in Paris in and after A.D. 1866.

² Note communicated, on the 7th April, 1952, by Professor Bailey to the writer of this Study with his letter granting the writer's request for his permission to allow his intellectual history to be cited here. The writer is most grateful to Professor Bailey for his kind consent. 'I am most flattered', this eminent scholar modestly and humorously remarks, 'to find I have left at least a faint streak on the surface of this tossing world of Samsāra!'

provision for Oriental studies; for help in these, the would-be student would have to go on to Western Europe or to North America. So Bailey taught himself Latin and Greek; took these as his subjects at his own university; won a scholarship at the University of Western Australia to take him to the University of Oxford; and found at Oxford the help that he needed in order to complete his mastery of Oriental languages.

Yet even Cambridge, England, could not provide this Australian philologist with a chair specifically allocated to the Khotanese language, akin to Persian and to Sanskrit, which had been introduced into the Tarim Basin by the Sakas¹ and which, while H. W. Bailey was studying Avestan under his haystack in Western Australia, had been recovered from oblivion by the labours of a series of Western pioneers in the Tarim Basin, culminating in the Hungarian-British archaeologist-explorer Sir Aurel Stein's trove of religious and secular literature in known and still all but unknown languages, on which this path-finder had lighted in May 1907 in a Taoist shrine at Ch'ien Fo-tung ('the Caves of the Thousand Buddhas'), near Tun-huang in the Su-lo-ho Basin, 'a natural corridor' leading from North-Western China into Central Asia, at the Western terminus of the former *limes* of a Sinic universal state;² and Khotanese and Tokharian were the fields in which Bailey, in the next stage of his intellectual career, was to give the most impressive demonstrations of his prowess in advancing the frontiers of philological knowledge.³

Schliemann's and Bailey's experience of being kindled into an undying glow of curiosity by the casual impact of one or two books was shared by another contemporary and colleague of the writer's, F. C. Jones, who in A.D. 1952 was a lecturer in Modern History at the University of Bristol with a special commission in the field of Far Eastern studies. At the same university, some thirty years earlier, Jones, as an undergraduate, had happened, while exploring the stacks of the university library, to stumble upon a cache of old books concerning the Far East that had been bequeathed to the university by F. V. Dickins, an Englishman who had

¹ For this Indo-European-speaking wave of Eurasian Nomads, see VI. vii. 580-689 *passim*: 'The Administrative Geography of the Achaemenian Empire.'

² See Stein, Sir Aurel: *On Ancient Central Asian Tracks* (London 1933, Macmillan), pp. 203-16 = chap. 13: 'Discoveries in a Hidden Chapel', with fig. 86, facing p. 204.

'The priest summoned up courage that morning to open before me the rough door closing the entrance to the rock-carved recess where the great trove had lain hidden. . . . The sight disclosed in the dim light of the priest's little oil-lamp made my eyes open wide. Heaped up in layers, but without any order, there appeared a solid mass of manuscript bundles rising to ten feet from the floor and filling, as subsequent measurement showed, close on 500 cubic feet. Within the small room measuring about nine feet square there was left barely space for two people to stand on' (*ibid.*, pp. 203-4).

³ See, for example, Bailey, H. W.: 'Hvatanica', in the *Bulletin of the London School of Oriental Studies*, vol. viii, Part 4 (London 1937, Luzac), pp. 923-36; 'Ttagara', *ibid.*, pp. 883-921; *Zoroastrian Problems* (Oxford 1943, Clarendon Press); 'Recent work in "Tokharian"', in the Philological Society's *Transactions* (London 1947, David Nutt), pp. 126-53; *Khotanese Texts*, vol. i (Cambridge 1945, University Press); *Khotanese Buddhist Texts* (London 1951, Taylor's Foreign Press).

In his letter of the 7th April, 1952, to the writer of this Study, Professor Bailey tells him: 'Only this morning I sent off to Sven Hedin a volume explaining his documents in the Khotanese language of the Sakas (four years' work). The Cambridge University Press is at this moment printing vol. ii, and I still plan two or three more volumes of this material. Persian and Sanskrit have come together for me in Khotanese studies—the Iranian speech with the Buddhist culture. My "curiosity" is as great as ever for this Central Asian miscellany!'

served as a medical officer in China and Japan in A.D. 1866-70 and had eventually become the university's Reader in Japanese. The dust with which the youthful explorer found these books covered told him that he was the first member of his university ever to have taken any interest in them; but this hitherto neglected batch of books now had a decisive effect on one student's mental life. From that moment onwards, Jones persistently pursued Far Eastern studies as a personal interest in addition to his regular academic work. He continued this pursuit as a lecturer in history, first at Dalhousie and King's University at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and then at Harvard. After that, with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation, he made his way to China and spent nearly two years there—from the autumn of A.D. 1935 to the summer of A.D. 1937—partly studying Chinese at the College of Chinese Studies in Peking and partly travelling about the country; and, though China was in turmoil at the time, he managed to make his way far and wide into the interior. At the end of the year 1937 he joined the staff of the Far Eastern department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, and eventually returned from there to his *alma mater* at Bristol. The present writer, who, by A.D. 1952, had had the pleasure of knowing, and of working with, this devoted student of Far Eastern history for more than fourteen years, had never seen a sign that his friend's curiosity was abating. Throughout he had continued to show the same steadily burning zeal to widen and deepen his knowledge and understanding of his beloved subject.

An experience that had meant so much to F. C. Jones, H. W. Bailey, and Heinrich Schliemann had also come the way of the present writer.¹ He will never forget a memorable morning in one of the early months of the year A.D. 1898 when a row of four books in a uniform binding made its first appearance² on a bookshelf in the dining-room of his parents' house in London, No. 12 Upper Westbourne Terrace. The series was Fisher Unwin's *The Story of the Nations*, and the subjects of the four volumes were *Ancient Egypt*; *Assyria*; *Media, Babylon, and Persia*; and *The Saracens*.³ The writer, who on that day was either approaching the end of his ninth year or just entering on his tenth, had awoken to consciousness in the most favourable human environment imaginable for the making of an historian, since, in his Mother, he had had an historian to bring him up. In A.D. 1898 he could already remember his Mother's having written *True Stories from Scottish History*,⁴ and could recall the

¹ In the present Part of this Study the writer has drawn, among other sources, upon his personal experience—not, of course, in any delusory belief that this is particularly interesting or important in virtue of being his own, but because, in the nature of the case, it is the only first-hand information about the subject of this Part that has been at his disposal.

² The date is approximately fixed by the fact that the books had been given to the writer's Mother, because she was an historian, when her mother-in-law's personal possessions were being distributed among the members of the family; for the date of the writer's grandmother's death was the 19th December, 1897.

³ For the authorship and dates of publication of these four volumes, see the acknowledgements in the present volume, on p. 219.

⁴ Toynbee, Edith: *True Stories from Scottish History* (London N. D., Griffith Farren Browne). There is no imprint of the date; but, in the copy which the writer took down just now from the bookcase, given him by his Mother, which stands behind his shoulder in his study at No. 45 Pembroke Square, London, the book is dated by the inscription, in his Mother's handwriting: 'Arnold Joseph Toynbee, October 1896, with Mother's love'.

excitement of seeing the proofs of the illustrations arrive and of finally holding the first bound copy in his hands. His Mother had written the book in order to pay for keeping his nurse till he was five years old instead of four; and, though, when the additional year ran out, he had been desolated to see his nurse leave, he had quickly been reconciled to the change by the intimate companionship that his Mother had given him during the years that had followed. Night by night, while she was putting him to bed, she had told him, in brief instalments, the history of Britain from Caesar's landing to the Battle of Waterloo, and the child had been readily receptive to this gracious impact of the parochial history of the Western country in which he had happened to be born. Yet that morning in A.D. 1898 on which those mighty suns the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Syriac civilizations swam into his ken in all their overwhelming grandeur was the decisive moment in the intellectual experience of this young watcher of the skies of History; for the advent of these hitherto unknown heavenly bodies shook him out of the Yin-state of receptivity into a Yang-movement of curiosity which, happily for him, was still a flowing tide on the 15th September, 1952, more than fifty-four years later.

Omnes

Restinxit stellas, exortus ut aetherius sol.¹

The epiphany of those civilizations of the first and the second generation took the light out of such commonplace planets as the parochial histories of ephemeral nations spawned in a parvenu Western World. The shallow landlocked waters of Lake Tenochtitlan could no longer satisfy the soul of a seeker after new worlds when once he had stared at the Pacific.

The child flung himself upon the Ocean,² and from that time onwards its expanse continued to open out in front of him faster than his ship's prow could cleave the ever widening waters. His inquiries whether Mexico was part of the United States and whether the Persians were Muhammadans were referred by his Mother to his Father. At school his awakened curiosity led him to relive Herodotus's experience of breaking his way into the new world of the Achaemenian Empire, and to explore two marooned enclaves of Christendom, Georgia and Abyssinia. At the university it led him to break into the new world of the Far East, via the Great Eurasian Steppe, in the footsteps of his fellow Franks John of Piano Carpini, William of Rubruck, Marco Polo of Venice, and their living successors Sven Hedin the Swede and Aurel Stein the Hungarian,³ and to acquaint himself with the career of the renegade Ottoman

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book III, ll. 1043-4.

² In A.D. 1952 the writer's earliest surviving memory was a recollection of having taken and carried out, at the age of two, on the beach at Abersoch in Wales, a decision to run into the sea in order to find out what would happen. What did happen was that his nurse ran in after him, pulled him out, and, in the act, sprained her ankle. There was no benevolently officious nurse to pull him back from the intellectual plunge that he made, six years after that, into the ocean of History.

³ The writer could still recapture the excitement to which he had been moved at the time by a lantern-lecture that Sir Aurel Stein had given at Oxford, in the great hall of the Examination Schools, at some date while the writer was an undergraduate (*studia exercebat* A.D. 1907-11). The panoramas of huge snow-covered mountain ranges would

cul, Scanderbeg. As soon as he was quit of his final examinations, it led him to spend a year surveying the theatre of Hellenic history on foot, as a student of the British archaeological schools at Rome and Athens, and to make the discovery of a living Ottoman World which eventually found him a place in the Turkish section of the Foreign Office division of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference of Paris in A.D. 1919. Between the First and the Second World War it led him to widen his range by taking into his cognizance the general course of current international affairs, and to add a new dimension to this mental universe by transshipping, with C. G. Jung as his navigator-psychopompus, from a surface-craft to a submarine in order to sound the Psyche's subconscious abyss. After the Second World War the same still irresistibly beckoning curiosity led him into making an excursion on the economic plane into a science of business cycles which promised to throw light on the larger and more momentous subject of the relation between Law and Freedom in History; and on the 15th September, 1952, when he was midway through his sixty-fourth year, the peremptorily rising note in the roar of Time's winged chariot's¹ accelerating engine was urging him to press forward, *ἔς γόνυ χλωρόν*,² into new worlds which this curiosity had marked down long since for future conquest.

At that age he was being spurred on by the example of the historian-banker-statesman George Grote (*vivebat* A.D. 1794-1871), who, more than two years before he had returned to the printer, on the 23rd December, 1855,³ the last corrected proof-sheets of the twelfth and concluding volume of his history of Greece, had begun to knap off two sister works on the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.⁴ The work on Plato had straightway been written and published in three volumes;⁵ and, 'no sooner had the *Plato* been completed, and the printing begun,⁶ than the author "set the loom" afresh for his *Aristotle*—scarcely permitting himself breath' before applying himself 'to the preparation of the third part of what he used to call "my trilogy."' Yet, notwithstanding the diligence of Grote's response to the challenge of Time's hurrying chariot's clatter, Death had overtaken him with his *Aristotle* still incomplete.

In taking to heart this example set by George Grote, the present writer was following in the footsteps of Lord Bryce (*vivebat* A.D. 1838-1922), who, whenever he was writing a book, used to have on his agenda not only the next book but also a perpetual next book but one. This permanent lure on the intellectual athlete's literary horizon was a projected

flash up in his visual memory, and he could recall how, when the lecturer had mentioned, in passing, that he had lost some toes there through frost-bite, the eager listener had recognized that he was in the presence of a discoverer who was indeed in earnest about his intellectual mission.

¹ Marvell, Andrew: *To His Coy Mistress*, l. 22.

² Theocritus: *Κυρίκας Ἔπος*, l. 70.

³ See Grote, Harriet: *The Personal Life of George Grote* (London 1873, John Murray), p. 224.

⁴ See Grote, George: *A History of Greece*, vol. xi (London 1853, John Murray), preface dated the 15th April, 1853, pp. iii-iv.

⁵ London 1865, John Murray. On the 23rd April, 1951, the present writer took down from the shelf in the Athenaeum Club in London the set of these volumes that had been given to the Club by their author, with an inscription in vol. i in George Grote's handwriting.

⁶ In September 1864.

⁷ Grote, Harriet, op. cit., p. 277.

work on the lives and time of the Roman Emperor Justinian I and his consort Theodora; and, though this most lovingly cherished of all the historian-jurist-statesman's literary projects eventually had the same fate as the historian-banker-statesman's work on Aristotle, this ever receding and never captured intellectual quarry performed for Bryce the invaluable service that 'the electric hare' performs for the greyhound on the racing track. It kept the runner's energies at full stretch; and his never flagging eagerness to catch his *Justinian* was, no doubt, not the least potent of the stimuli that prompted him to achieve the heroic feat of producing his *Modern Democracies* (*conscripsum* A.D. 1918-21)¹ after he had turned eighty.

¹ The present writer had the good fortune to become personally acquainted with Lord Bryce in his seventy-seventh year, when the writer, as a young man, had been commissioned to compile, under Lord Bryce's direction, a blue book on *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, published as Miscellaneous No. 31 (1916) [Cmd. 8325] (London 1916, H.M. Stationery Office); and, thanks to the friendliness which Lord and Lady Bryce never ceased to show to people of younger generations, he had had the happiness thereafter of continuing to see something of the historian during the last eight years of his life.

At this age, Bryce still showed a youthfulness which showed itself physically in his persistence in going upstairs two stairs at each step. This apparently inexhaustible fount of physical energy was replenished (so it seemed to the writer) from spiritual sources, and one of these was an unfailing curiosity. *Γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος* (Solon, fragment 17, in Bergkh-Hiller-Crusius's edition). At a time when Bryce was clearing his decks from war-work in order to go into action on *Modern Democracies*, the writer happened to mention in conversation with him that he knew G. D. H. Cole, who at that time was active in expounding the idea of Guild Socialism. Lord Bryce instantly began to ask the writer whether he could direct him to any literature that had been published on the subject, as he had already made a mental note that he must not fail to take account of Guild Socialism in his own forthcoming work. This was evidence indeed of Bryce's freshness of mind at the age of eighty. When, at this age, he was girding himself for the huge task of writing a comprehensive work on the political phenomena of the Modern Western World, he might have been expected to feel, not exhilaration, but repugnance, at the prospect of having to take account of yet another mushroom ideology; and an intellectual inhibition might well have been reinforced by a political prejudice, considering that Bryce himself was, not a socialist, but a life-long liberal. Yet his vaulting curiosity cleared both these psychic fences at one bound. On the 23rd April, 1951, the present writer's own curiosity moved him to take Bryce's *Modern Democracies* (London 1921, Macmillan, 2 vols.) down from the shelf in a library to look up 'Guild Socialism' in the index. Sure enough, it is described in vol. ii, on p. 645.

The writer never ceased to be struck by the contrast, in their respective responses to the challenge of chronological age, between Lord Bryce and another historian, James Leigh Strachan-Davidson, the Master of Balliol, who was Bryce's junior by five years (*vivebat* A.D. 1843-1916). In A.D. 1913-15, at meetings on academic business in the Master's study, the writer, scanning the books on his shelves, discovered, to his surprise and concern, that there had been hardly any fresh acquisitions since the early eighteenthies—hardly any, that is to say, since the historian had passed his fortieth year (see Mackail, J. W.: *James Leigh Strachan-Davidson* (Oxford 1925, Clarendon Press), p. 53). Down to about that date the principal English, American, French, and German publications in the fields of Hellenic history, Hellenic and Western philosophy, Western political economy, and contemporary Western *belles lettres* were well represented, but, after that, the flow of new acquisitions had suddenly ceased, and this could only mean that, in his early forties, the fire of this scholar's curiosity had gone out. The writer could never discover any outward event in this period of Strachan-Davidson's life that would account for this intellectual mishap, but a clue to the whole of the Master's intellectual history had come into his hands on the 22nd October, 1913; for that day had been the Master's seventieth birthday; the fellows of the College had given a dinner in the Master's honour that evening; and the keypoint in the speech in which the Senior Fellow had proposed his health had been the remarkable fact that the Master had never been away from the College for as long as twelve months running at any time since his first arrival there as an undergraduate at the age of eighteen. As the writer listened, he was struck with dismay; for he himself, being at that time in his twenty-fifth year, had just returned to the College after a sixteen months' absence and had been inducted as a fellow on terms which

Encouraged and admonished by the examples of Bryce and Grote, the present writer took his arrival in December 1950 at the threshold of the twelfth part out of the planned thirteen parts of this Study as a signal for him to cast his mind forward, in anticipation of the now imminent date at which this current work would be over, to plan the writing of a *Religio Historici* and the completion of a history of the Hellenic World—begun in A.D. 1914 on an invitation from the editors of *The Home University Library*—of which he had written the first forty-two sheets¹ when his progress had been interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War.

In A.D. 1952 the present writer's curiosity was also agog to finish learning the Arabic and Ottoman Turkish languages and to begin learning Classical New Persian. He had found himself compelled to suspend work on acquiring these three languages when, after having started in A.D. 1924 to produce an annual *Survey of International Affairs* under the auspices of Chatham House, he had started in A.D. 1927 to make systematic notes for the present Study, which he began to write, *pari passu* with the *Survey*, in A.D. 1930. Ever since the time, towards the close of his five years at Winchester (A.D. 1902–7), when he had gained a sufficient mastery over the Greek and Latin languages to make him at home in the Hellenic classics, it had been his ambition to make himself equally at home in the Islamic classics, and he had taken the first step towards this end between A.D. 1915 and A.D. 1924 at the London School of Oriental Studies—starting to learn there the rudiments of Turkish during the First World War from 'Ali Rizā Bey,² and the rudiments of

were tantamount to a life tenure so long as he did not marry, go bankrupt, or commit any other immoral act. That night he dreamed that the corresponding toast was being proposed in his own honour as a veteran fellow of the College on the 14th April, 1959, after another forty-five years, five months, and twenty-three days had passed as swiftly as he knew that they would pass for him if he were to adopt the Master's regimen. Next morning he woke up firmly resolved not to allow this doom to overtake him.

¹ As he wrote these words, he took these sheets out of a drawer in a bookcase, given him by his Mother, in his study at No. 45 Pembroke Square, Kensington, London.

² The experience of his date had been his horror at the events which he had been recording in the blue book on *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire* that he had been compiling under the direction of Lord Bryce. How had any human beings come to perpetrate those inhuman acts? The 'Osmanlis, being human, must be men of like passions with his and his fellow-countrymen's English selves. What was the explanation of this appalling mystery? The first step towards arriving at it would be to understand the Turks, and the key to that would be to learn the Turkish language.

When the writer enrolled at the London School of Oriental Languages in A.D. 1916 in order to begin learning Turkish, the lecturer in Turkish, 'Ali Rizā Bey, demurred to being asked to take as a pupil a man who, as he saw it, had just shown himself, in a published work, to be an enemy of 'Ali Rizā Bey's country. When he submitted this objection to the Director of the School, Sir Denison Ross, the Director pointed out to him that, if his patriotism was founded—as it was—on a sincere belief in the sterling qualities of the Turkish national character, he was now being presented with an opportunity—which, as a patriot, he ought not to let slip—of making an English convert. The Turkish lecturer was convinced by the Director's shrewd argument, and happily he did not afterwards have to regret that he had taken Sir Denison Ross's advice; for the knowledge of the Turkish language—rudimentary though it still was—which the writer had acquired from 'Ali Rizā Bey by A.D. 1920 enabled the writer in A.D. 1921 to make an exposure of the treatment of the Turks in that year in the Ottoman territories then under Greek military occupation.

By that time the writer had made an empirical discovery of the truth that Human Nature is nowhere and never proof—not even in the communities that have travelled the

Arabic after the Peace Conference of A.D. 1919 from Professor Sir Thomas Arnold and Professor H. A. R. Gibb. By A.D. 1952 a craving that had been dammed back since A.D. 1924 had accumulated a powerful pressure of urgency. The writer was stung by shame whenever he recollected that his hero Heinrich Schliemann had taught himself no less than thirteen languages during the twenty-seven years (A.D. 1836-63) that he had had to spend on making his fortune; but he could then recruit his courage by recalling that his heroine Jane Ellen Harrison had taught herself both Persian and Russian after she had passed her sixty-fifth year; for this example carried with it the admonition 'Go and do thou likewise'.¹

In A.D. 1952 the writer's curiosity was also still being stimulated through still being tormented by longings to make his pilgrimage to historic points on the face of the *Oikoumenē* on which he had never yet set eyes or which had once tantalized him with a Pisgah sight. He had seen Assisi from Spello on the 30th October, 1911, without ever having succeeded in reaching Assisi at any time during the next forty years. He had been shunted in and out of Venice on the Orient Express three times without ever having come nearer to Saint Mark's than into the presence of the pair of Roman emperors in porphyry who stood clasped in a mutual embrace outside a door that was barred and bolted at 5.30 a.m. He had twice passed Qāramān by train without having had time, either on the 31st August, 1929, or on the 13th November, 1948, to break his journey in order to view the interior of those romantic city-walls and press on, beyond, across Cilicia Tracheia to Selefkēh. On the 14th September, 1929, he had gazed longingly up the River Kārūn into Persia while his ship bore him on inexorably, past the confluence of the Kārūn with the Shatt-al-'Arab, *en route* from Basrah to Karachi. On the Great Wall of China, at the Nankow Pass, he had had to turn back without being able to pursue the Wall on its snakelike westward course towards a terminus thirteen hundred miles and more away. And he had never yet come near to setting eyes on Trier, Ravenna, Monte Vulture,² Yannina, Rhodes, Diyārbekir, Qars, Ani, Van, Ispahan, Yazdikhvast, Persepolis, Shīrāz, Khotan, Turfan, the Najd, the Yaman, Abyssinia, Qayrawān, the High Atlas, Cholula, Mayaland,³ Easter Island, or the hyper-cyclopean masonry of the Andean highlands.

Whenever the writer was racked by this unfulfilled Herodotean

farthest along the road towards Civilization—against the temptation to commit inhuman atrocities. There will always and everywhere be a point at which the mounting pressure of this temptation will burst the precarious dam within which social habit imprisons the floodwaters of Original Sin. An education in the psychology of atrocities which the writer began as an eye-witness on the Qaramursal Peninsula in the Sea of Marmara in A.D. 1921 was completed when he came back to England to hear of what the English 'Black and Tans' had been doing meanwhile in Ireland.

By this time, 'Ali Rizā Bey and the writer had become fast friends; but it was not till long afterwards that the writer was told about 'Ali Rizā Bey's conversation with Sir Denison Ross in A.D. 1916.

¹ Luke x. 37.

² Climbed on the 7th October, 1953, while this page was in the press.

³ Thanks to a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for travelling with an eye to producing a revised edition of the present work, the writer and his wife had now visited Cholula on the 20th April, 1953, and Palenque, Chichén Itzá, Uxmál, and Kabah between the 7th and the 14th May of the same year, and were planning to visit the Andean World in the autumn of A.D. 1956.

ambition to complete his oecumenical pilgrimage, he used to revive his drooping hopes by recalling an anecdote which he had once heard from the mouth of that triumphantly world-wide traveller Lord Bryce. After having explored half the surface of the globe in the course of a long life, Lord Bryce had felt one day a slight misgiving lest his advance in chronological age might hinder him from carrying out the rest of his peregrinational agenda; so he had decided, in consultation with Lady Bryce, that they would choose for the field of their next journey some region that would serve to test their physical stamina. Their choice had fallen upon Siberia; and, when they had ascertained that they could stand this physical ordeal without feeling any strain, they had been able to put their anxiety behind them and to proceed with their exploration of the remainder of the Inhabited World.¹ Lord Bryce's example became the more encouraging to the writer the nearer he approached to the end of *A Study of History*; and, midway through his sixty-fourth year, he was thanking God that a curiosity which had set sail fifty-four years ago had, so far, never found itself becalmed. Rather than be condemned to the Ancient Mariner's life-in-death, he would pray to be carried on by the divine wind of curiosity's unflagging inspiration at the risk of meeting *Kon-Tiki's* end among deadly breakers on a Raroia Reef² at the Ocean of History's unimaginable limit.

(III) THE WILL-O'-THE-WISP OF OMNISCIENCE

Without the inspiration of curiosity, no one can be an historian, since, without it, no one can break out of a Yin-state of infantine receptivity by setting the mind on the move and taking bearings in the Universe. No one can either become an historian till he has acquired curiosity or remain an historian if ever he loses it. Yet an inspiration which is indispensable is at the same time insufficient; for curiosity is a faculty which is valuable only as a driving force for generating higher activities. If it is allowed to spin round in a vacuum, turning nothing but its own wheels, it stultifies itself and also sterilizes the soul in which it has thus been allowed to run amok. Curiosity by itself is of no more avail than is receptivity by itself for bringing a budding mind to flower. The mind that is to blossom into an historian's mind must rise to a higher flight; and, if it allows its curiosity to set its spiritual ceiling for it, it will be guilty of a grave moral error that will prove also to have been a serious

¹ Looking up this episode, on the 23rd April, 1951, in H. A. L. Fisher's *James Bryce* (London 1927, Macmillan, 2 vols.), the writer found it duly recorded there in vol. ii, on pp. 104-6. On his retirement in A.D. 1913, when he had turned seventy-five, from being British Ambassador at Washington, Lord Bryce seized the opportunity of returning home to England via the Pacific, Japan, Manchuria, and Siberia; and, travelling via the Transsiberian Railway, he was unwilling to let slip the further opportunity of catching a glimpse of the Altai Mountains, as these lay not more than a mere four hundred miles or so off his course. Accordingly the Bryces detrained from the Transsiberian Express at Taiga, embarked on a river-boat at Tomsk, and proceeded by water down the Tom and up the Tobol via Novonikolayevsk (afterwards renamed Novosibirsk) and Barnaul to Biisk. Transferring here from boat to tarantas, they then experienced 'eight of the hardest days of travelling we have ever gone through'. Their reward was a sight of the Altai Range from the summit of the Semenski Pass on the 22nd August, 1913. The 'round-trip' had mounted up to some 1,200 miles before they re-entrained for Moscow.

² Read Thor Heyerdahl: *Kon-Tiki, Across the Pacific by Raft* (Chicago 1950, Rand McNally).

intellectual mistake; for, if curiosity is a Pegasus from which the historian must never dismount, this winged steed is also one which he must never allow himself to ride without a curb.

The scholar who permits his curiosity to run away with him is courting the danger of condemning his creativity to be blighted; and this was a danger to which Western scholars were peculiarly exposed by a Western educational tradition in which the goal of education that was set before the pupil's eyes by his masters was, not adult active life, but an examination. This institution, which had worked such havoc with Western intellects during the last eight centuries of Western history, had presumably been introduced by the Early Medieval fathers of the Western universities into the educational field from the theological; for the myth of a Last Judgement had been part of the Christian Church's heritage from the Osirian Church through the Zoroastrian,¹ and, while the Egyptian fathers of the worship of Osiris had conceived of the Last Judgement as an ethical test symbolized in a weighing of the departed soul's good and bad deeds against one another in the scales of Osiris' balances, a Christian Church which had taken on board a top-heavy freight of Hellenic philosophy² had overlaid an Osirian ethical questionnaire in which the query was 'Good or bad?' with an Aristotelian intellectual questionnaire in which the query was 'True or false?'

When this abomination of intellectualism, standing in the place where it ought not,³ had thus been given dominion over Western secular education as well as over Western Christian theology, the anxiety not to be found wrong by a human examiner on matters of mundane fact had come to weigh as heavily on the souls of apprentices in Western schools of higher education as if the penalty for being caught out in an intellectual mistake had been, not the mere refusal of a degree which was the severest censure that a university could inflict in reality, but the awful condemnation to eternal torment in Hell which, in Medieval and Early Modern Western Christian belief, was the inexorable retribution for the holding of unorthodox tenets in the sphere of theology.

In Western educational circles a fear of intellectual damnation that had thus originally been inspired by an analogy taken from current religious ideas had survived when, in a Late Modern chapter of Western history, the belief that eternal damnation after death was the penalty for theological error had gradually ceased to haunt Western minds and oppress Western spirits. As, in the course of this age, the quantity of mundane information at the disposal of Western examiners for use as ammunition in their intellectual warfare with Western examinees came to increase by geometrical progression, Western educational examinations came to be the nightmare that Western theological inquisitions had once been; and the worst of their effects was the posthumous one; for even an alumnus who had passed with honours all the ordeals that his *alma mater* had known how to inflict upon him was apt to emerge from his education haunted by an abiding subconscious fear of being weighed in an imaginary future examiner's

¹ See V. vi. 34.

² See VII. vii. 465-506.

³ Dan. xi. 31 and xii. 11; Matt. xxiv. 15; Mark xiii. 14; Luke xxi. 20.

balances and found wanting,¹ and such victims of an intimidating Western examinational system of education would need the intervention of God's grace to save them from spending the rest of their lives, not in living and acting and making practical use of what they had learned, but in still anxiously preparing for an unseen final examination lying in wait to confound their disembodied souls after they had carried their life-long accumulation of learning with them into the grave.

This pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of omniscience convicts its addicts of a moral error in two degrees. In ignoring the truth that the only legitimate purpose of learning is to make something of it, within the learner's lifetime, that can become part of Mankind's common stock of useful knowledge, the scholar-sinner betrays a lack of sociality; in ignoring the further truth—which is just as true on the intellectual plane of human activity as on any other—that completeness and perfection are unattainable by human souls in This World, he betrays a lack of humility; and the second of these two sins, which is the graver, is also the more insidious; for the scholar's intellectual hybris masquerades as humility itself. A scholar is proving himself guilty of a subconscious hypocrisy to which he is wilfully shutting his mind's eye when he pleads guilty of ignorance and protests that his conscience will not permit him to publish, write, or even say anything on his subject until he has mastered the last jot and tittle of the information available up to date. This profession of humility is a camouflage for the three deadly sins of Satanic pride, undutiful negligence, and culpable sloth.

The professedly humble-minded scholar stands convicted of pride because the intellectual standard which he is confessing his failure to attain so far is the omniscience of Almighty God and not the partial and relative knowledge which is the most that can actually be compassed in human life by any mind which, like the scholar's mind, is a mortal human being's; and this apology of his for being a little lower intellectually than his Creator therefore betrays a mood that is the antithesis of modesty. The scholar-hypocrite also stands convicted of negligence, because a scholar's proper study is the modest but useful task of producing, within the brief span of time that is the inexorable limit of the longest human life, some provisional addition to human understanding which this intellectual worker bee's contemporaries and successors can use, criticize, improve, and eventually discard in favour of other slightly closer provisional approximations to an ineffable divine truth. The transient scholar of the day would have done his intellectual duty and have won his spiritual crown if, in passing through This World, he had made it his business, following the example of the first two servants in the parable of the talents,² to contribute one fresh thimbleful of water to the great and growing stream of collective human knowledge.³

In hiding the talent entrusted to him in the earth,⁴ or keeping it laid

¹ Dan. v. 27.

² Matt. xxv. 14-30; Luke xix. 12-26.

³ 'The thought once worked out to the point of written record is complete, its work done. It is a fragment, a grain, added to the thought of the Universe, a grain of sand added to the ever-growing edifice of God.'—Walter Leaf, quoted by Charlotte M. Leaf in *Walter Leaf* (London 1932, John Murray), p. 167.

⁴ Matt. xxv. 25.

up in a napkin,¹ he has shown himself to be an unprofitable servant.² He has left open merely the question whether the motive of his misdemeanour was disaffection or sloth;³ and the charge of slothfulness is one from which he cannot clear himself by filing evidence to prove that he has sat at work for six and a half days out of every week and for ten and a half hours out of every day; for the unprofitable scholar's dreaded post-mortem examiner will not fail to parry this plea by asking the prisoner at the bar what kind of work his has been; and every scholar knows that he is under constant temptation to postpone or evade the ordeal of doing creative work on any plausible excuse, because this kind of intellectual work, which is the only kind that has any intrinsic and ultimate value, is also the kind that exacts the most excruciating and most repugnant intellectual travail. The inborn spiritual frailty which tempts every human being at all times to renounce his birthright of sharing in the bliss of creation for the sake of escaping its pangs tempts the scholar at his desk to go on reading, so long as he can find any excuse for this, instead of taking up his pen to write, and then, when that excuse fails him, to write, not those painfully-begotten winged words that are required in order to convey one mind's thoughts to another mind, but a string of facilely pedestrian entries on the cards of a bibliographical index. This perpetual human proneness to take the easier option is as natural, but also as culpable, in the scholar as it is in other men.

The intellectual mistake inherent in the pursuit of omniscience is, like the moral error, a multiple one; and the beginning of evils here is a mistaken identification of innumerability with infinity. It is true that human souls have an inborn need to put themselves in tune with the Infinite on the intellectual plane as on every other; but, on this plane, as on the rest, the only way in which a communion with the Creator is ever attainable by the creature is, 'like a light caught from a leaping flame',⁴ through a personal encounter. Omniscience, as Faust's insatiable mind discovered to its discomfiture, cannot be attained by adding item to item, art to art, and science to science in an infinite regress.

Habe nun, ach! Philosophie,
Juristerei und Medizin,
Und leider auch Theologie!
Durchaus studiert, mit heissem Bemühn.
Da steh' ich nun, ich armer Tor!
Und bin so klug als wie zuvor . . .
Und sehe dass wir nichts wissen können!
Das will mir schier das Herz verbrennen.⁵

Faust has, in fact, as we have noticed in an earlier context,⁶ merely succeeded in imprisoning himself in the immobility of a Yin-state. Yet in Goethe's tragedy the hero is deemed to have succeeded in his misguided intellectual endeavour at least to the extent of acquiring all the information accessible to any scholar in his ephemeral time and transient place. Here, however, Goethe has allowed himself a poetic licence; for,

¹ Luke xix. 20.

² Matt. xxv. 30.

³ Matt. xxv. 26.

⁴ Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341 B-E, quoted in III. iii. 245.

⁵ Goethe: *Faust*, ll. 354-9 and 364-5.

⁶ In II. i. 276.

as the present writer learnt at an early age from his Mother, Dante had been the last man in Western history who had actually mastered all the Western lore of his day; and even the sixteenth-century historical prototype of Goethe's Faustian projection of his own eighteenth-century self had been born too late to emulate Dante's achievement in real sixteenth-century life.¹

Since Dante's time, Western scholars had been seeking to solve a self-imposed insoluble problem by electing to 'know more and more about less and less'; but this procedure had been merely more perverse than a Goethean Faust's without having been, in truth, more practical; for, as fast as each Western scholar was reducing the diameter of his boring in the hope of being able still to drill deep enough to strike oil, an advancing Western science was demonstrating that infinitesimal quanta were as infinitely complex as quanta of an infinite positive immensity; and, even if the pursuit of infinitesimals had proved to be less chimerical than the pursuit of infinite magnitudes, the academic huntsmen could have made nothing of their captured intellectual quarry; since, as we ascertained in the opening chapter of this Study,² it is impossible for human minds to emulate an eternal-instantaneous divine comprehension of an infinite-infinitesimal Here-Now by piecing together scraps of information, produced by a division of intellectual labour, in an intellectual assembly plant constructed on the analogy of a post-industrial Western factory. To an historian's eye the last judgement on the mania for encyclopaedism of both the microscopic and the telescopic variety had been pronounced by History herself; for this mistaken intellectual ideal had been apt to be the last intellectual folly to be abandoned by a senile civilization *in extremis* and the first to be abandoned by an infantile civilization³ as soon as the time had come for it to put away childish things.⁴

The present writer—to illustrate this point, too, *ad hominem*—had once gone through the stultifying experience of taking this wrong intellectual turning.

The writer had first been made aware of the choice in his eighteenth year, when, in December 1906, he had been staying with a pair of distinguished scholars in the persons of his uncle Paget Toynbee (*vivebat* A.D. 1855–1932), the author of *A Dictionary of Proper names and Notable Matters in the Works of Dante*,⁵ and his aunt Helen Toynbee (*vivebat* A.D. 1868–1910),⁶ the editor of Horace Walpole's letters. At the close of an agreeable and stimulating visit, in which the boy had unselfconsciously disclosed historical interests embracing the Assyrians, the Fourth Crusade, and whatnot, he was chilled by a piece of parting advice which his uncle gave him out of the kindness of his heart. 'Your Aunt Nellie and I',

¹ The historical Dr. Faust is believed to have lived *circa* A.D. 1480–1540.

² In I. i. 1–8.

³ Encyclopaedism was, as we have noticed in X. ix. 53–57, a weakness of the Sinic, as well as the Hellenic, Civilization in its last phase; and, like the Hellenic again, the Sinic Civilization bequeathed this weakness to its successors. This heritage of encyclopaedism perhaps partly accounts for the subsequent emergence of a system of education by examination in the Far Eastern and in the Western World alike; but the latter-day Far Eastern examinees were at least less unfortunate than their Western fellow-victims in being exempt from the terror imported into an intellectual ordeal by the Zoroastrian-Osirian myth of a Last Judgement.

⁴ 1 Cor. xiii. 11.

⁵ Oxford 1898, Clarendon Press.

⁶ *Née* Helen Wrigley, of Bury, Lancs.

the Dante scholar had announced, 'have come to the conclusion that you have been dispersing your interests too widely, and our advice to you is to make your choice of some single subject and to concentrate hereafter on that.' In A.D. 1952 the writer had a still freshly vivid recollection of his own instantaneous conviction that this advice was bad, and of his likewise instantaneous decision not to follow it; and his uncle subsequently gave him reason in retrospect by amiably sacrificing his own pernicious intellectual principles on the altar of personal affection when his wife's literary work was cut short by her premature death. From that day onwards, her loving survivor took her Walpole, as well as his Alighieri, under his wing in order to complete her edition of the letters as a labour of love.¹ Meanwhile, his nephew was heading, in spite of his good resolution at the end of the year A.D. 1906, towards the intellectual blind alley from which the Dante scholar was to be harshly extricated in A.D. 1910 by a tragic event in his personal life.

During eleven years of adolescence, from the autumn of A.D. 1900 to the summer of A.D. 1911, the present writer was continuously at the stretch in the intellectual hurdle-race of alternately preparing for and sitting for examinations; and the cumulative demoralizing effect of this ordeal slowly but surely undermined his resolve never to allow himself to be corralled in a specialist's pound. As late as his last undergraduate academic year A.D. 1910-11, he was still wholesomely shocked to find the dismal orthodox cult of specialization capturing an older contemporary of his, G. L. Cheesman, who at school had gone out of his way to stimulate his junior's interest in the Late Roman Empire after having noticed that the younger boy was reading Hodgkin's *Italy and Her Invaders*.²

With these exhilarating memories of the catholicity of his older friend's intellectual interests still fresh in his mind, the writer, one day at Oxford, had come straight to Cheesman's rooms in New College (where Cheesman was then a tutorial fellow, teaching Roman history) from a meeting in Dr. F. W. Bussell's rooms at Brasenose which this mature scholar had convened in the hope of generating in Oxford a wave of interest in Byzantine studies. On separating, we had agreed to widen our circle by recruiting brother enthusiasts, and the writer had taken it for granted that his schoolfellow at New College would be as enthusiastic

¹ Paget Toynbee was handsomely rewarded for an unprofessional human piety that had taken for its counsellor an unerring heart instead of a fallible head. For one thing, he became almost as highly distinguished in the field of scholarship bequeathed to him by his wife as he had long since been in his own field. But his most gratifying reward was that, when he had made room in his quiver for Horace Walpole's works beside Dante's, he found himself armed with an unfailing store of apt quotations. It was hardly possible for there to be any event in the news which a scholar who had thus made himself a double *hâfiz* could not illustrate by a passage from one or other of the two authors whose works this intellectual archer now knew by heart. On the slightest provocation he would shoot a letter, containing a quotation from either Walpole or Dante, at the editor of *The Times*; and, as the quotation was always attractively felicitous and the covering letter always discreetly short, the literary arrow usually went home and, in the course of years, the deft archer scored a prodigious tale of hits. Thus, thanks to his unprofessional addition of a second string to his academic bow, Paget Toynbee succeeded in lodging in the columns of *The Times* a quantity of letters that can hardly have been equalled by any of his contemporaries.

² Hodgkin, Thomas: *Italy and Her Invaders* (Oxford 1892-9, Clarendon Press, 8 vols. in 9 parts).

over Dr. Bussell's project as he was himself. To his surprise and discomfort, his confident approach was met by his friend with a vehement refusal that would have been becoming in a conscientious novice, bent on qualifying for admission to a rigorous monastic order, if Mephistopheles had approached him with some tempting alternative proposition. The apprentice tutor hastily explained that his manifest duty, now that he had obtained his appointment as a don, was to concentrate on the task of mastering the particular subject for the teaching of which he had made himself responsible to his college. Now that he had found the confines of his intellectual province, 'pastures new'¹ were henceforward out of bounds for him. His refusal to indulge his personal interest in Byzantium any further was decisive,² and his baffled tempter went away crestfallen yet unshaken in his own intellectual convictions by his admired friend's distressing lapse from intellectual grace.

After having been appointed in his turn, in the summer term of A.D. 1911, to a tutorial fellowship in Greek and Roman history at Balliol, and having subsequently taken his final academic examination in the School of *Litterae Humaniores*, the writer still saw light enough to lead him to make a resolve never to sit for any further academic examination in his life, and this was a vow which he had faithfully kept at any rate till his sixty-second birthday, on which he was writing these words. Yet the morrow of his final examination was the moment of his own fall; for the shades of the examinational prison house in which he had been doing hard labour for eleven years past now closed on him with the swift downrush of a tropical night. It was an idle gesture to foreswear further examinations in real life at a moment when he was capitulating to the intimidating spectral presence of an imaginary examiner post mortem.

After having spent two and a half years in preparing himself for being examined by fellow mortals in the summer term of A.D. 1911 in the history of the Hellenic World between 776 and 404 B.C., the writer proceeded to spend the ensuing long vacation on reading all the extant sources for the period following, and he had ploughed his way on through these from the end of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War to the death of Alexander the Great when he was mercifully interrupted by the advent of the day on which he was to start on a grand tour of Paris, Rome, and Athens as a prelude to returning to Oxford as a don in the autumn of A.D. 1912. From the moment when he found himself *en voyage*, an inborn passion for making a countryside his own by walking over it happily diverted him from spending more than a minimum of his travelling time in museums and libraries, reading books that would be accessible to him in England and poring over *objets d'art* which he could continue to study elsewhere in casts and photographs. He had the wit to realize that

¹ Milton: *Lycidas*, l. 193.

² How much longer G. L. Cheesman would have persisted in exploring his blind alley could never be known, since, some four years later, in A.D. 1915, he was killed on landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The present writer's personal belief is that, had he lived, he would have become the greatest Roman historian in his generation; and this belief is founded on the further belief that, possessing the magnificently inquisitive mind that he did possess, this potentially great scholar would soon have repented of his unfortunate resolution to try to make himself a Roman historian by the *via negativa* of refusing ever to be anything more than that.

the landscape of the Hellenic World was the spectacle which he must make sure of seeing with his own eyes because this was the field in which there was no substitute for autopsy; but, even then, he perversely strove at first to exclude from his contracting field of vision every scene that was not either Hellenic or Minoan.

It was through the grace of God, and not thanks to any native common sense, that other worlds did impinge upon the academic pilgrim's consciousness. In Paris during the week running from the 22nd to the 28th September, 1911, the reverberations of the Agadir Crisis did just patter, like spent bullets, against his ear-drums through the archaic iron lattice-work of the Eiffel Tower. *En retour* to Rome on the evening of the 8th November, 1911, from an expedition to visit the Etruscan tombs at Cerveteri and Corneto, the young antiquarian did ascertain that his fellow-passengers in the train were Neapolitan conscripts, and did notice, as the train passed through Civit  Vecchia, droves of other young Italian soldiers, with a look of unenthusiastic resignation on their faces, in the act of embarking for the theatre of war in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. At Brindisi on the 18th November, 1911, he had to transfer to a Greek steamer from the Italian one on which his passage to Patras had been booked, because the Italian boat was shy of running the gauntlet of an enemy Turkish coast between Acroceraunus and Pr veza; and during the next eight months, passing his evenings in caf s in Greek villages, he heard, for the first time in his life, 'the foreign policy of Sir Edward Grey' being discussed, and the question whether 'the war' would break out this spring or next being canvassed by peasants and shepherds in zestful conversation with brothers and cousins just back home, with gold five-dollar pieces and napoleons in their wallets, from following the gainful occupations of shining shoes in Kansas City or selling fruit in Omaha. Meanwhile, in the landscapes of Continental Greece and Crete, Medieval French castles and Early Modern Venetian fortresses were competing for his attention with Hellenic temples and with Minoan palaces.

Twice, on that antiquarian tour, the Oxford don-elect was arrested as a Turkish spy, first on the evening of the 16th November, 1911, on the last lap of a day's march from Terracina to Formia, by an Italian carabinieri,¹ and then again, on the 21st July, 1912, by a Greek military patrol.² At Cattaro and Ragusa in August 1912 he found the streets thronged with Austro-Hungarian troops in a picturesque variety of old-fashioned uniforms reminiscent of the revolutionary year A.D. 1848. At

¹ On this occasion, the suspect was able to clear himself by showing a card with 'Balliol College, Oxford' engraved on it. 'Ah! Collegio! Dunque non siete Turco', reasoned the intelligent Italian security officer, and straightway left the suspicious-looking traveller in peace. Forty years later, in A.D. 1952, the carabinieri would, of course, no longer have been justified in acting on an *a priori* assumption that 'Turk' and 'college' were incompatible ideas.

² On this second occasion, he was arrested on the reasonable charge that he had walked across the perilously vulnerable railway viaduct over the gorge of the River Asopus at Eleftherokh ri, where the sole railway running from Athens to the Graeco-Turkish frontier leaped across a chasm to come to earth again along the eastern flank of the Hellenic citadel of Trachis. This charge was supported by the less convincing argument that the trespasser must be a foreign military spy because he was wearing insignia in the shape of a military water-bottle that was not of the pattern affected by the Greek Army.

Trieste he gazed at the red fezes of a Bosniak regiment in garrison in the castello, and listened to an old Triestino explaining in Italian to a little boy that these were now loyal soldiers of the Emperor-King, though their fathers had made it hot for the old man and his comrades in A.D. 1878, when they had been serving in the expeditionary force that had been sent by the Imperial-Royal Government to occupy Bosnia in that year. Next day, in his through-carriage from Trieste to Flushing, he noticed quantities of German soldiers drilling in green fields sandwiched between greener hop-gardens in Bavaria, without registering any sharper impression from this ominous sight than he had received, eleven months earlier, from the headlines displaying the latest news from Agadir in special editions of the Parisian Press. He had no sooner reached his journey's end at Southwold than, finding himself in hospital with dysentery contracted through drinking treacherously clear running water from a stream between the mouth of the River Eurotas and the town of Yýthion, he plunged back into the reading that he had had to interrupt in the previous September. Before he was convalescent he had finished reading Strabo's *Geographica* and had started reading Pausanias' *A Personally Conducted Tour of Hellas*; and, before he had finished with Pausanias during his first term at Oxford as a don, he had begun to suffer acutely from the nemesis that is the penalty for the quest of omniscience within however narrowly restricted an intellectual allotment.

A scholar in quest of intellectual omniscience is, indeed, courting the same nemesis as a soul in quest of spiritual perfection. Each successive advance that he makes towards achieving his ideal sends his standard soaring higher in a geometrical progression that leaves his arithmetically progressing attainments ever farther behind. Just as the aspirant to sainthood is the more crushingly self-convicted of sin each time that he attains a yet loftier spiritual altitude above the ceiling of ordinary mortals, so the aspirant to omniscience is the more crushingly convicted of ignorance each time that he makes a fresh addition to an already super-human stock of knowledge. In both careers the gap between aim and achievement thus grows only the wider the greater the achievement comes to be; and the nemesis of this inevitable progressive defeat, in a race which a finite Human Nature has condemned itself in advance to lose by impiously pitting itself against God's infinity, is a moral regress from frustration through disillusionment into cynicism.

After having tasted for himself the pains of this unprofitable pursuit of an hallucination, the present writer was liberated from the spell of an imaginary implacable post-mortem examiner by an intellectual event in his own *for intérieur* that had nothing to do with the wars and rumours of wars¹ which, from the outbreak of the First Balkan War on the 17th October, 1912, to the outbreak of the First World War on the 1st August, 1914,² were bearing down upon the Western World with a roar that was growing louder as fast as the thunder of an approaching express train.

In the summer of A.D. 1911, during his intensive course of reading

¹ Matt. xxiv. 6; Mark xiii. 7; Luke xxi. 9.

² Germany was at war with Russia by that date. Great Britain did not find herself at war with Germany till the 4th.

the original Greek sources for the history of the Hellenic World in the fourth century B.C., the writer's conscience had been troubled at intervals by finding himself occasionally falling short of his daily stint of reading because his mind had been insisting upon breaking with its habit of acquiring additional information in order to allow itself to begin putting two and two together. Pieces of information about the organization and numbers of the Lacedaemonian Army, at divers dates in the fourth century, which were presented by Xenophon incidentally in the course of his narrative, confirmed a dissatisfaction that had been implanted in the writer's mind, during his previous reading for the School of *Litterae Humaniores*, by Thucydides' presentation of the Lacedaemonian order of battle at Mantinea in 418 B.C.¹ What was more, the data supplied by Xenophon seemed to provide clues for tracing Thucydides' mistake—if he had indeed made a mistake—to its source and for penetrating, behind this error, to the truth. The question at issue was the ratio, at divers dates, between the respective strengths of the Spartiate contingent in the Lacedaemonian Army and the Perioecic contingents; this question turned, in the last analysis, upon the ratio between the respective areas of the arable land in the home territory of Sparta herself and in the aggregate of the territories of the Perioecic city-states in the Lacedaemonian dominions within their frontiers at the time; and this was a question, raised by reading, which could be settled only by autopsy.

In consequence, when, a few months later, the writer found himself in Greece, the historical inquiry which had already come into action in his mind conspired with the alluring beauty of the landscape in Messenia and Laconia to lead him into an inquisitive reconnaissance of the Perioecic states and their domains;² and this deliberate autopsy in A.D. 1912 reinforced the undesigned effect of his reading in A.D. 1911. The field work and the book work, between them, activated his mind to a degree at which a salutary impulse to take action gained the upper hand in A.D. 1913 over an insatiable craving to add still further to a hoard of inert knowledge. In that year he wrote and published an article on 'The Growth of Sparta';³ and he had not had time to relapse into another debauch of aimless reading before the outbreak of the First World War compelled him to cease work on a history of the Hellenic World,

¹ See Thucydides: *A History of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War*, Book V, chaps. 64-74.

² In *ci-devant* Lacedaemonian territory the writer's itineraries in A.D. 1912 were as follows (the dates being those of nights passed at the places with which the dates are here coupled):

Kalamáta (by train from Athens) 20th February, Koron 21st, Navarino (via Módhon) 22nd, Philiatrâ 23rd, Olympia (via Arkadhiâ, *alias* 'Kyparissia') 24th.

Astros (by boat from Ermióni, via Pétses and Lenidhi) 15th April, Arákhova 16th, Sparta (via Sellasia) 17th-19th; Yeráki 20th, Moláous 21st, Neápolis-on-Malea 22nd, Monemvasia 23rd, Hiéraka (via the fjord) 24th, Káto Vezáni 25th, Yýthion 26th-27th, Pálos-on-Taenarum 28th, Pálos-on-Taenarum 29th, Kótronas-in-Máni 30th, Tsímovavon 31st May, Liméni-in-Máni 2nd, Kalamáta 3rd, from Kalamáta by train to Athens 4th.

The kháni of Khelmós (from Sinán, *alias* 'Meghalópolis') 19th May, Sparta 20th-22nd, Trýpi (via Mistrá) 23rd, Kalamáta 24th, Mavrommáti (via Ithômé) 25th, Pávlitsa (Phigaleia) (via Sulimá) 26th.

³ See *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. xxxiii (London 1913, Macmillan), pp. 246-75.

which he had just started to write for the *Home University Library*,¹ and impelled him to write and publish a book on the redrawing of the political map of the World in a forthcoming peace-settlement.² After that, the financial pressure of rising prices on the budget for a growing family completed his education in intellectual action by driving him into journalism as fuel for 'pot-boiling'. He had been saved so as by fire,³ and he had found this salvation by making the simple discovery that his curiosity had been given to him, not in order to be turned loose to eat its head off on the pastures of a boundless prairie, but in order to be harnessed and put to work. When once he had embarked on a literary enterprise with a plan that determined its shape and with a shape that delimited its contents, he had found an intellectual talisman that had power to ban the demonic subconscious psychic force which had been tormenting him so long as he had been allowing himself to remain its slave instead of insisting upon making himself its master. In Hellenic language, he had succeeded in setting a limit (*πέρας*) to a previously unlimited chaos (*τὸ ἄπειρον*) which Hellenic minds had rightly abominated because they had correctly discerned that, at any moment, it might flood in upon them and overwhelm them.

By A.D. 1952, thirty-seven years and more after this decisive turn in the course of his intellectual life in A.D. 1913-15, the writer had long since worked out for himself an intellectual regimen that was the inverse of the course that he had followed in A.D. 1909-13. He had accustomed himself since then to making writing, not reading, the first charge on his time and energy. The reading and travelling that were requisite preparations for this writing had been left to fend for themselves; but at the same time the writer had learnt not to be so improvident as ever to give himself an excuse for suspending the hard labour of intellectual creation in order to indulge in the softer options of travelling and reading through having permitted himself to neglect to make the necessary intellectual preparations betimes. He had formed a habit of prompting himself to gather the required information a sufficient number of months or years ahead of the date at which he expected to reach the corresponding points in his agenda to ensure that the continuous flow of writing should never have to be checked.

In thus giving his intellectual energy an ever-open vent in action, this adult regimen had liberated him from the painful tyranny of a curiosity which, before it had been thus bitted and bridled, had been apt to be the more insatiable in its demands the more lavishly he had indulged it. Since A.D. 1916 he had been practising the trick of blunting the edge of any residual craving by keeping an amateur bibliographical card index of published works in the field of History interpreted in the broadest sense; but he had always taken care to confine this side-line of his intellectual activity within limits very far short of any professional pretension to exhaustiveness; for the appalling spectacle of the debauchery of potentially creative minds had soon taught him that a collector's mania to inscribe *ad libitum* dates, titles, and names of authors and publishers on

¹ See p. 22, above.

² *Nationality and the War* (London 1915, Dent).

³ 1 Cor. iii. 15.

cards might be no less sterilizing than the bookworm's hunger to devour *ad libitum* the pages between the covers. While thus holding himself on the alert to keep his curiosity in order, the writer took care, however, not to put it to death, for that would have been as fatal a step in real life as the killing, in the fairy story, of the goose that laid the golden eggs. The proper course with curiosity is, not to kill the precious bird, but to clip its wings in order to make sure that it shall not fly away with its possessor. Curiosity is given to the mind to serve it as a bow serves a bow-string. The bow acquires the power to shoot only if and when the string bends it; and the mind must handle its curiosity as imperiously as the bow is handled by the string. It must insist on being the possessor, not the possessed, if its potentialities for creative work are to be realized; for the price of continuous creation is a perpetual tension.

The writer owed his narrow escape from intellectual perdition on the morrow of his completion of a standard Western course of education-by-examination to the happy accident of stumbling ingenuously upon a truth that might have been dismissed as a truism if so many once intellectually promising Western minds had not notoriously overlooked it to their undoing. This truth which is so obvious yet is so frequently ignored by scholars is the truth that Life is Action. A life which does not go into action is a failure; and this is just as true of a prophet's, a poet's, or a scholar's life as it is true of the life of 'a man of action' in the conventionally limited popular usage of the term. When Faust revolted against his servitude to the cult of a barren omniscience, the rebel scholar's thirst for action was salutary (though he need not consequently have fallen into the crude error of fancying that the only effective remedy for his academic complaint was to let Mephistopheles inoculate him with a *rabies Teutonica*).

Geschrieben steht: 'Im Anfang war das Wort!'
 Hier stock' ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort? . . .
 Mir hilft der Geist! Auf einmal seh' ich Rat
 Und schreibe getrost: 'Im Anfang war die Tat!'¹

On a scholar's tombstone the epitaph *obiit rê infectâ* is just as damning as it is on a business man's, a statesman's, or a soldier's.

Why is it, then, that scholars are apt to be so much less alive to this fundamental common law of Man's calling than the general run of 'men of action' in the conventionally limited sense? The conventional limitation of the meaning of the phrase gives us a clue. Why has a phobia against taking action become the scholar's distinctive occupational disease? Perhaps the answer is to be found in the fact that action is a genus of divers species which have different terms and ranges because they operate in different media.

This was the discovery of the Hellenic philosopher who first drew a distinction between the life of longer-range activity (*ὁ θεωρητικὸς βίος*) and the life of shorter-range activity (*ὁ πρακτικὸς βίος*); but Plato, at any rate, never intended to convey the false suggestion—subsequently crystallized in a latter-day Western usage of the derivative words 'theory'

¹ Goethe: *Faust*, II. 1224-5 and 1236-7.

and 'practice'—that the antithesis between two different kinds of action was really an antithesis between action and inactivity. Plato was alert to warn insouciant candidates for initiation into his philosophy that 'the sole way of acquiring it' was 'by strenuous intellectual communion';¹ and Elijah, when he heard the still small voice after the fire and the earthquake and the wind, was instantaneously and indubitably aware that he was now in the immediate presence of the spiritual Power that was the source of all the action in the Universe.² The 'great and strong wind' that 'rent the mountains and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord' had come and gone, in advance of its Maker and Master, in order to put Elijah's prophetic intuition to the test. Elijah had to show, by waiting on the Lord, his recognition that the blustering physical force was merely one of God's mighty works, not Almighty God Himself, before he could hear God's voice and receive His commands. Elijah knew, as Lao-tse knew,³ that the stillness of the Fount of Life, Wu Wei, is in truth a plenitude of activity which looks inert to uninitiated human eyes only because, being human, they are not born to see the Absolute as it really is.

Prophets, poets, and scholars are chosen vessels who have been called by their Creator to take human action of an etherial kind that is perhaps less unlike God's own action than any other kind that Human Nature can compass; and in this, as in every other, form of encounter between God and one of His creatures an ordeal is the price of a privilege; for the truth that Life is Action is as hard a saying for the tender-minded follower of a higher spiritual calling as it is an obvious platitude for the man of action who has been called to act on spiritually lower levels. Elijah himself had to be called to order by the Word of the Lord from a culpable truancy prompted by a despair that had been the nemesis of a loss of faith.⁴ But this sin of omission, which is the besetting sin of prophets, poets, and scholars, does not beset business men or fighting men. When Hector and Ajax, striving with one another in physical combat on the Plain of Troy,⁵ had each hurled his spear at his adversary without putting him out of action, neither warrior was tempted to stand at ease, since neither needed to be warned that if he did so he would instantly lose his life through having his throat cut by his adversary's sword. These warriors' sense of action was so keen that, without pausing to lose time in drawing their swords, they picked up the boulders at their feet and hurled these at one another; and, when these bolts, too, had been shot without producing a military decision, the liaison officers did not find themselves required to push the champions into continuing the struggle; on the contrary, all their tact had to be brought into play in order to induce Ajax and Hector to keep their swords in their scabbards and break off the action for that night at least.

Hector and Ajax did not need to be told that Life is either action or failure; but these were warriors equipped for hand-to-hand fighting with weapons that had no sooner been discharged than they registered

¹ Plato's letters, No. 7, 341 B-E, quoted in III. iii. 245.

² 1 Kings xix. 11-13

⁴ 1 Kings xix. 1-18.

³ See III, iii. 187.

⁵ *Iliad*: Book VII, ll. 244-312.

their hit or miss at a point-blank range at which their objective was in full view. By contrast, the prophet's, poet's, and scholar's spiritual armament resembles an archer's who is aiming at a target which is too far distant to be visible.

I shot an arrow into the air,
It fell to earth, I knew not where;
For, so swiftly it flew, the sight
Could not follow it in its flight.

I breathed a song into the air,
It fell to earth, I knew not where;
For who has sight so keen and strong,
That it can follow the flight of song?

Long, long afterward, in an oak
I found the arrow, still unbroke;
And the song, from beginning to end,
I found again in the heart of a friend.¹

'Cast thy bread upon the waters, for thou shalt find it after many days.'² Ajax or Hector could not delude himself into imagining that his target, standing there before his eyes within a stone's throw, could ever be hit by his stone if he himself were to forbear to take the necessary action of picking the stone up and hurling it. The ineptitude of expecting inaction to produce an unperformed action's effect is the occupational folly of the archer whose target is out of sight or of the speculator whose return on his outlay lies hidden in a future beyond his mental horizon.

In thus outranging 'practical' action in the dimensions of both Space and Time, spiritual action shows itself to be the more godlike of the two kinds. An Agamemnon who has lived his brief physical life in the lime-light owes his literary immortality to a poet who has died in obscurity. The Homeric poems continue to move men's hearts and kindle their imaginations for ages after the ephemeral empire of Mycenae has ceased to have any perceptible effect on the political surface of life; and the long file of strong men armed who, before Agamemnon, must have stalked across the stage of History has passed into oblivion because these predecessors of Homer's hero failed to find a poet to make them famous.³ Yet, just because Human Nature's spiritual activities have this divine power of producing effects at distances thousands of miles and years away from the human agent's own birthplace and lifetime, souls that have been called to these spiritual vocations are prone to stultify themselves, and to make failures of their lives, by overlooking the crucial difference between long-range action and inactivity—as if, just because the archer's target happens to be out of sight, it were any more feasible for him to hit it without ever shooting an arrow than it would be

¹ Longfellow: *The Arrow and the Song*.

² Eccl. xi. 1.

³ Horace: *Carmina*, Book IV, Ode ix, ll. 25–28. Homer's continuing dominion over the imagination of Posterity was still so potent in a nineteenth-century Western World that, when Heinrich Schliemann was at last ruefully convinced by the arguments of his expert advisers that the royal bones which he had disinterred at Mycenae were those of *fortes ante Agamemnona*, not those of the Homeric heretoga and his contemporaries, he was disgusted. "What?" he exclaimed on one occasion. "So this is not Agamemnon's body, these are not his ornaments? All right, let's call him Schulze".—Ludwig, E.: *Schliemann of Troy* (London 1931, Putnam), pp. 296–7.

for the swordsman to smite his adversary in hand-to-hand combat without ever striking a blow.

If Acton's calling,¹ no less than Ajax's, is thus in truth subject to an inexorable law that Human Life is either action or failure, then we must write off the scholar's cherished boasts as vapourings of an intellectual *miles gloriosus* who, in uttering them, is convicting himself of incompetence in the profession that he has chosen. When the devout disciples of Robert Browning's dead grammarian² sing of their master that he 'sucked at the flagon', we shall agree with them that he was 'soul-hydropic', but we shall dispute their claim that his thirst was 'sacred'. When they ask 'How should Spring take note Winter would follow?' we shall reply that human souls are distinguished from 'the beasts that perish'³ precisely by a God-given power to 'look before and after'.⁴ When they quote his exclamation 'Let me know all! Prate not of most or least', we shall interpret this as either a childish petition to God or an impious emulation of His Almightyness. When they comment

Others mistrust and say 'But Time escapes:

Live now or never!

He said 'What's Time? Leave now for dogs and apes!

'Man has Forever',

we shall reply that Time is the medium in which God has ordained that Man shall live and work in This World, *vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu*.⁵ 'Eschew a line of study in which the work done dies together with the worker'.⁶

Man does not have 'Forever'—God's Eternal Now—in mortal human life. The grammarian's desperate assertion is not even true of the Collective Mankind that accumulates, in the course of successive generations, an increasing corporate heritage of Science and Technology; for even this human coral reef would never have come into existence if each of the innumerable animalculæ that have co-operated to build it up had not performed the positive individual act, within its own brief lifetime and narrow field of operations, of mixing and carrying a minute contribution of mortar in its tiny hod. The collective achievements of Science and Technology do not accomplish themselves automatically any more than the unique achievements of Poetry and Prophecy. Like these, they owe their existence to creative acts of individual souls who have had the sense and grace to take action under the conditions laid down for human beings in This Life by their Creator. We therefore shall refuse to call a homunculus who has kept his talent laid up in a napkin⁷ a 'high man' for missing a unit through aiming at a million; for, if it is the truth that he has 'a great thing to pursue', he has no business to die ere

¹ Acton's incapacity for taking intellectual action, and the sterilizing effect of this psychic inhibition upon that great Modern Western historian's intellectual career, have been noticed in I. i. 46-47.

² Browning, R.: *A Grammarian's Funeral shortly after the Revival of Learning in Europe*.

³ Psalm xlix. 12 and 20.

⁴ Shelley: *To a Skylark*, stanza 18.

⁵ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book III, l. 971.

⁶ 'Fuggi quello studio del quale la resultante opera more insieme coll' operante d'essa'—Leonardo da Vinci, in *The Literary Works of Leonardo da Vinci*, compiled and edited from the original MSS. by J. P. Richter, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1939, University Press, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 244, No. 1169.

⁷ Luke xix. 20.

he knows it. Even if we were to concede (as we do not) that the grammarian's conduct is *magnifique*, we should be bound, none the less, to damn it by pronouncing that *ce n'est pas la guerre*;¹ for it is not

God's task [*sic*] to make the Heavenly period
Perfect the Earthen.

It is Man's task to execute, within the time that God allots to him on Earth, a human mission to do God's will by working for the coming of God's Kingdom in Earth as it is in Heaven; and, when a man irresponsibly throws back on God the task that God has set him in This Life, we cannot agree with the grammarian's disciples in their confident assumption that God 'loves the burthen'. Say, rather, God loves to see His will done by 'that low man' who, in the strength of a sincerely God-fearing humility,

seeks a little thing to do,
Sees it and does it.

The doing of it is what matters in God's sight; for Acton, no less than Ajax, has been created by God to take action² under the divinely appointed conditions of Man's Earthly Life.

If scholarship is indeed subject, like every other human vocation, to the necessity of having to choose between going into action and being a failure, a scholar is being untrue to his calling if he retorts to God's special challenge to scholars—*Ars longa, vita brevis*³—by throwing in God's face the defiant falsehood 'Man has Forever' instead of eschewing rhodomontades in order to concentrate on the prosaically workmanlike job of cutting his coat according to his cloth. A scholar is no more justified than any other man of action in shirking the workman's duty of making an inventory of the materials and tools, and an estimate of the time and energy, that are at his disposal for executing the commission which has been entrusted to him. To leave his talent hidden in the Earth till his corpse is lowered into the grave to rot beside it is a sin of omission in which criminal negligence swells to the dimensions of high treason. The intellectual, like the manual, worker has, at the longest, one

¹ Comment by the French Maréchal Bosquet on the charge of the British Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava in the Crimea on the 25th October, 1854.

² The poet himself, of course, testified to this truth by producing his works; for Robert Browning was a happily uninhibited man of action on the plane of his own imaginative art. His own detestation of 'the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin'—'the sin I impute to each frustrate ghost'—is declared in *The Statue and the Bust*. The poem that we have been dissecting in the present chapter is a particularly brilliant example of Browning's gift for entering imaginatively into the experience, feelings, and thoughts of souls whose temperaments differ widely from his own, but there is one passage in *A Grammarian's Funeral* where the author of *Dramatic Romances* can be caught napping.

He settled *Hoti's* business—let it be!—
Properly based *Oun*,
Gave us the doctrine of the enclitic *De*,
Dead from the waist down.

'Settled'! 'Let it be'! 'Properly based'! 'Gave us the doctrine'! Save the mark! Who but the incorrigible man of action that Robert Browning was would ever have credited an orthodoxly inhibited scholar with such unprofessionally conclusive conduct as this? If the dead grammarian really had taken action, he would hardly have thanked his disciples for these damagingly indiscreet revelations, and the disciples themselves might have hesitated to honour him, as they did, in their obsequies.

³ *Ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή*—Hippocrates: *Aphorismata*, I. 1.

full working life to use to best advantage, and his own tenure of this life may, for all he knows, be shorter than the average; at every moment he has to reckon with the possibility that death, or the deadly living death of incapacitation, may pounce upon him next year, next month, next week, tomorrow, or today. With these pertinent hard facts of human life ever present in mind, he must take the brevity of life, and not the *longueurs* of intellectual dissipation, as the measure for his intellectual enterprises; he must keep his plans within human compass and must put these feasible plans into execution here and now; for, in real life, no miracle will intervene to enable Psyche to acquit herself of an impracticable task imposed upon her by an overweening Intellect, since it is one of the fundamental laws of Human Nature that an undertaking which is manifestly beyond the compass of a mortal man's or woman's maximum expectation of working time and energy is *ipso facto* convicted of being an undertaking that is inherently unsound. Indeed, an intellectual worker who is able and willing to learn by experience will discover that even the largest work of art that a human soul has the capacity to create will not necessarily occupy the whole length of the average span of a human working life.

In the creation of a work of art the actual length of the particular workman's working life is, of course, one of the limiting conditions; for, if his reasonable expectation of life is falsified in the event by the crash of Death's cruel coulter,¹ 'the best laid schemes' may 'gang a-gley'.² But the unpredictable limitations set upon human beings' opportunities for creation by the chances and changes of this mortal life are only external and negative; and the positive factor that determines the Time-span of an act of creation is one that is internal and intrinsic to the act itself. The artist's working tempo is set for him by a psychic chronometer, and the two hands of this human clock are the Intellect and its partner the sub-conscious well-spring of Spiritual Creativity. Human acts of creation are governed by a law of spiritual dynamics which can be conveyed in a mathematical simile. Each act has its own proper curve to describe at its own proper pace; and, in so far as it diverges from its inherent course, or takes this course slower or faster than its inherent speed, the action will be falling short, to that extent, of the optimum performance of which it is capable. In the incubation of each particular work of art, a human creator's soul has a corresponding particular period of profitable gestation which it will shorten or lengthen at its peril; and an egg that is allowed to go addled under the suffocating breast of a broody hen³ will be just as sterile as the still-born fruit of a premature birth.

¹ Burns, Robert: *To a Mouse*, stanza 5.

² *Ibid.*, stanza 7.

³ The error, to which scholars are notoriously prone, of spoiling their work by continuing to revise it after it has reached and passed its optimum state can often be traced to an infantile ignorance of one of the fundamental rules of art. The occasion on which the present writer had learnt this rule had made an indelible mark on his memory. On the 17th April, 1951, when he was writing this note, he could recall, as vividly as if it had been yesterday, a day in July, 1894, on which he was intently watching his Mother painting a water-colour sketch of a ruined church that then seemed to be on the verge of toppling over the edge of the cliff at Dunwich on the coast of Suffolk. When his Mother had finished the sketch and they were looking at it together, he pointed out to her that it was incomplete because she had put in only the ruined church wall and the seascape visible through its glassless windows, and had left out the luxuriant dock leaves and nettledbeds sprouting through the church's dislocated pavement (as sordid witnesses

The human creator, if he truly and earnestly intends to respond to God's call to co-operate with Him in His creative work, must speak to his anima in the poet-member-of-parliament Andrew Marvell's masterful words:¹

Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, Lady, were no crime. . . .
My vegetable love should grow
Vaster than empires, and more slow, . . .
An age at least to every part,
And the last age should show your heart. . . .
But at my back I always hear
Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near. . . .
Now therefore. . . .

and, with the sanction of Time's inexorable onset to enforce his demand, the man of action delivers Mortality's imperious ultimatum.

Now . . . while thy willing soul transpires
At every pore with instant fires, . . .
Let us roll all our strength and all
Our sweetness up into one ball
And tear our pleasures with rough strife
Thorough the iron gates of Life:
Thus, though we cannot make our sun
Stand still, yet we will make him run.²

of Man's ephemeral occupation of the site). His Mother answered quietly, but without hesitation, that the secret of sketching was to know what to leave out, and, fifty-seven years later, her son could still distinctly remember (though he could no longer reproduce in the unsophisticated language of a five-year-old child) the succession of thoughts that this notable answer sent chasing one another through his mind. His first thought was that, in leaving out the dock leaves, his Mother had shown something less than an absolute faithfulness to the truth, even though, for the moment, he could not put his finger on the weak spot in her defence. His second thought was that she had lifted a veil from his eyes and shown him the truth behind it.

This second thought was the one that had remained with him to illuminate him for the next fifty-seven years; and, indeed, within five years he had enjoyed the pleasant surprise of earning good marks at school for having passed in accordance with his Mother's invaluable precept. His class had been given a lesson in the importance of account of the reign of Queen Elizabeth from their memory of the anecdote of the princess's passage in a textbook of English history which they had been set to read. The passage in the textbook had opened with the anecdote of the princess's exclaiming 'This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes' (Psalm cxviii. 23; Matt. xxi. 42; Mark xii. 11) when, sitting under an oak-tree in Hatfield Park, she had received the news that she was to ascend the throne and not the scaffold. When the essays were read and compared by the form master, it was found that several boys who were endowed with a better verbal memory than the writer's had reproduced this anecdote *verbatim* and had then been forced to break off, before they had been able to mention any of the events of Queen Elizabeth's reign, by the expiry of the time that had been allotted for the task. The writer had employed this Time-allotment in setting down what he had judged, from the textbook, to have been the principal events of the reign without mentioning the inaugural anecdote. To his astonishment the master not only commented on the difference between these two ways of handling the task, but told the class that the writer's way (i.e. his Mother's way) was the right one.

¹ Marvell, Andrew: *To His Coy Mistress*, ll. 1-2, 11-12, 17-18, 21-22, 33.

² *Ibid.*, ll. 33, 35-36, 41-46.

C. THE IMPULSE TO INVESTIGATE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FACTS

(I) CRITICAL REACTIONS

IN our inquiry, up to this point, into the inspirations of historians, we have found that, if a child is to become an historian, its passive receptivity to the suggestions of its environment must pass over into an active curiosity to know the facts of History. While we have found that a child cannot become an historian, and an adult cannot remain one, if the mind's mill is not set and kept in motion by a perpetual flow of curiosity over the mill-wheel, we have also found that, if, instead of putting away childish things¹ after passing the threshold of manhood, the would-be historian then allows his curiosity to run amok, it is likely to lead him off in pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of omniscience, and that this is a wrong turning which leads nowhere.

What, then, is the right turning? 'Thinking means asking questions';² and, if the child is to become an historian in very truth and deed, it must learn to harness its curiosity about the facts to the service of something more purposeful and more creative than curiosity itself. It must come to be inspired with a desire, not just to know the facts, but also to divine their meaning;³ and this is a quest in which there are several successive stages; for the meaning of the facts may be found either in their relations with one another or in their relations with something that is embodied in them or in their relations with something that lies behind them. This quest is, indeed, ultimately a quest for a vision of God at work in History; and the first blind step along this pilgrims' way is a desire to understand how the facts of History hang together. In this investigation into the relations between the facts, the first mental movement is a critical reaction to apparent discrepancies, and the second a creative response to challenging phenomena.

In an inquiry into the awakening of the critical faculty in a would-be historian's mind, the writer was reduced once again to drawing upon his personal experience because no other first-hand evidence was accessible to him.

He could remember, for instance, how in March 1897, on a visit to some friends of his family's towards the end of his eighth year, he had broken out into exclamations of dissentient surprise when one of the grown-up people present had begun to expatiate on the goodness, abundance, and variety of the fare on a Transatlantic voyage from which he had just landed. The listening child could not accept a statement that was irreconcilable with what he had heard, time and again, straight from the mouth of his own great-uncle Harry, who was then still alive and who surely must be regarded as a greater authority, considering that he had

¹ 1 Cor. xiii. 11.

² Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), p. 281. An illuminating presentation of this truth that questioning is the method of History will be found *ibid.*, on pp. 269-74 and 278-82.

³ Cp. Collingwood in *op. cit.*, p. 275.

been, not just a passenger on his own ship, but her captain. The child was never tired of hearing the old man telling how the mouldy taste of ship's biscuit was welcomely relieved by the sharp taste of a weevil when the eater's teeth happened to bite through one of the biscuit's living occupants, and how, when captain and crew from time to time lost patience with their fellow-travellers the rats, they would entertain themselves by organizing a rat hunt which would bring them in tasty rat-pie to supplement for the next few days their dull normal fare of salt beef and plum duff. These, the child knew for certain, were the facts, so this talk of high feeding on board ship could be nothing but a mendaciously spun traveller's yarn; and it was a revelation to him when the present traveller, just ashore from one of the Cunard or White Star liners of the day, explained good-humouredly, to the child who had been calling his veracity in question, that there had been a good deal of change in the conditions of sea-travel during the thirty-one years that had gone by since Captain Henry Toynbee's retirement from the sea in A.D. 1866. Thanks to this convincing explanation of the discrepancy which had startled the child's mind, it dawned upon it for the first time that human affairs were on the move, and that this movement might run so fast as to produce sensational changes within the span of a single lifetime.

The next discrepancy that exercised the writer's mind in childhood was one on which he stumbled in the first step that he took to enlarge a new vista of History that had opened up before his eyes at some date either just before or soon after the end of his ninth year. Having at that stage encountered and read, among four volumes in *The Story of the Nations* series, Z. A. Ragozin's *Media, Babylon, and Persia*,¹ which told the story of the Iranian-speaking peoples' entry on to the stage of Oecumenical History between the time of the decline and fall of the Assyrian Empire and the time of the Achaemenian Empire's collision with the Hellenes, he had become inquisitive to 'look before and after' into the antecedent and subsequent chapters of Iranian history, and had therefore chosen S. G. W. Benjamin's volume in the same series, entitled *Persia*,² for a present from his Aunt Elsie Marshall on his tenth birthday. Plunging into his new book excitedly, in the expectation of here beholding the entire Iranian historical landscape of which one tantalizing patch had been revealed to his eyes in *Media, Babylon, and Persia*, he found himself being led down unknown paths and began to race along these impatiently in the expectation of reaching an already familiar patch of Iranian history that would give him his bearings. Fifty-three years later he could still recall vividly his growing surprise and dismay as he gradually found himself forced to face the fact that Benjamin's and Ragozin's accounts of Iranian history were irreconcilable.

It was true that, at the beginning of Benjamin's seventh chapter,³ a familiar Cyrus was at last introduced as a synonym for an outlandish Kay Khusraw; but the young reader's mind was not satisfied by this apparently arbitrary and certainly abrupt transformation scene; and no impression was made upon it, at the time, by the author's unsatisfactorily

¹ See p. 18, above.

² Third edition: London 1891, Fisher Unwin.

³ See Benjamin, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-86.

evasive plea¹ that it was not 'expedient in a volume of this size to go into a discussion concerning the discrepancies or historic difficulties that exist between the records of the Persian and the Greek or classic historians'.

The sorely perplexed reader did not, of course, get to the bottom of these discrepancies until many years later. He had first to take the point that the versions of the story given in the Achaemenian emperors' own inscriptions and by the Hellenic historian Herodotus were authenticated by the remarkable closeness of the approximation to agreement between a contemporary and an all but contemporary source, and he had then to read Theodor Nöldeke's *Das Iranische Nationalepos*² in order fully to realize just how little his reading of the pre-Sasanian chapters of Benjamin's *Persia* had added to the knowledge of historical facts that he had previously gained from reading Ragozin's *Media, Babylon, and Persia*. He eventually came to see that Benjamin—down to the point where he had drawn abreast of Herodotus and had there clumsily swapped horses in mid-stream of Persian history—had been riding the latter-day Muslim New Persian poets Daqiqi (*obit* A.D. 952) and Firdawsī (*vivebat circa* A.D. 932–1020/1), and that the written sources on which Firdawsī had drawn exclusively³ had been translations, made into New Persian in Khurāsān in the tenth century of the Christian Era, of Pahlawī prose versions of a corpus of Iranian epic poetry⁴ in which the true facts of Iranian history had been transmuted out of all recognition⁵ as the result of the operation of a law of literary evolution which constrains an artistically promising story to develop on lines, not of maximum fidelity to historical truth, but of maximum accommodation to literary expediency.⁶

The Rustem cycle of legends, which looms so large in Firdawsī's legendary history of Iran because the richness of this lode of literary ore attracted the genius of a great poet, proves, under Nöldeke's scientific assay, to have been a piece of local colour from Seistan and Zābulistān which may have been deposited in those two East Iranian provinces by Saka invaders in the second century B.C.⁷ In the miscellaneous assemblage of garbled history and rationalized myth from which the Iranian national epic had been concocted in the Sasanian Age, the ingredient that was most conspicuous by its absence was the Achaemenian episode of authentic Iranian history; for, after the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great, almost all recollection of the Achaemenidae had dropped out of the Iranian peoples' folk-memory, and, of the few stray references to these Iranian empire-builders that are to be found in the Iranian national epic,⁸ some, at least,⁹ prove to

¹ See Benjamin, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

² Second edition: Berlin and Leipzig 1920, de Gruyter.

³ See Nöldeke, *ibid.*, p. 41.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 15–17.

⁵ See V. v. 599–602.

⁶ See Nöldeke, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–11. Nöldeke rejects the hypothesis that this cycle may be of Saka origin, but his scepticism is based on the inadequate ground that the personal names in this cycle are Iranian, and he fails to reckon with the fact that the Sakas, like the previous occupants of these countries, were Iranian-speaking.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 13.

⁹ See *ibid.*, 607–14.

⁹ See *ibid.*, loc. cit.

have found their way into it through translations of the Alexander Romance.¹

In April 1899, more than fifty-three years before the date at which this chapter was sent to press, these considerations were, of course, far above the head of a child trying to understand History; but, under the intellectual shock that he had suffered from stumbling upon a discrepancy which he had not found himself able to reconcile, the child had taken the point that 'authorities' could discredit themselves by disagreeing with one another, and this disconcerting discovery had been for him the painful beginning of historical wisdom,² inasmuch as it had taught him that 'authorities' were not to be taken at their word as if they were infallible oracles of gospel truth.

A year or so later the same boy was to suffer another shock of the kind from the detection of a tell-tale loose end in a chronological chart of Oecumenical History that was pinned up one day along two walls of the largest class-room in the preparatory boarding school—Wootton Court, near Canterbury—to which he had been sent in his eleventh year. At his previous day-school—Warwick House, adjoining the Regent's Canal, in London—a reading of the tenth chapter of the Book of Genesis had opened his mind to the fascinating and inspiring truth that Mankind was all one family, and History all one story; and, when he had begun to play his subsequent game of locating the descendants of Shem, Ham, and Japhet on the map and identifying them with extant or extinct divisions and subdivisions of the Human Race, he had found, in the maps included in 'the Queen's Printers' Aids to the Student of the Holy Bible', data that had enabled him to people the *Oikoumenê* with the descendants of Noah as far afield from their centre of dispersion in the South-West Asian 'fertile crescent' as the western basin of the Mediterranean in one direction and Central Iran in another. For the moment, he had not looked farther; but the posting of the chart in the schoolroom suddenly confronted him with a problem that had hitherto escaped him.

Looking first at the beginning of the chart, he had been struck by the preciseness of the date 4004 B.C. that was here assigned to the year of the Creation.³ Walking across from there to the far corner of the room, where the chart broke off at some date within the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, he noticed here, among the bands of various colours, representing the histories of divers peoples and states, one conspicuously broad band labelled 'China'. Were the Chinese descended from Shem, from Ham, or from Japhet? It had not occurred to him to ask the question before, but now it was going to be answered for him out of hand; for he had just ascertained that the chart began, at the opposite end, with the creation of the two parents of the Human Race, and he had now only to follow 'China' back in order to discover which of Noah's three

¹ The Alexander Romance went through an evolution that is a romance in itself (see V. vi. 440-4.) ² Prov. ix. 10.

³ This dating of the Creation was, of course, (see XI. ix. 178), the sign manual of Archbishop Ussher; and it therefore seems likely that his *Annales Veteris et Novi Testamenti* (London 1650-4, Fleisher, 2 vols.) was the original source from which this chart had been derived.

sons it was through whom the Chinese went back to Adam and Eve. Verification should be easy, since the snakelike band labelled China was of a python's girth; and, sure enough, the young investigator's finger traced this continuous ribbon of colour back into the second millennium B.C. But his hair stood on end when, at this point in his moving finger's backward journey, the three-thousand-years-long Chinese dragon's solid body suddenly broke off without linking up with either Japhet, Ham, or Shem—as if, more than a thousand years after the date of disembarkation from Noah's ark, four hundred million Chinese had been conjured up out of nowhere by an act of spontaneous generation. The workmanship of the draftsman of this at first glance imposing chart had, in fact, proved, on inspection, to be as shoddy as the performance of a plumber who, later on, was to instal a bath for a grown-up historian-householder without taking the trouble to connect the overflow-outlet with the waste-pipe.

This damning analogy did not occur to a child who, in A.D. 1899, was still living in an age of English history in which middle-class households were not yet encumbered with bathrooms; but he did realize at once that the Ussherite cartographers stood convicted of a culpable neglect—or perhaps, worse still, of a sheer inability—to trace back to the fruitfulness and multiplication of Noah and his sons¹ the latter-day diversity-in-unity of a Mankind that had duly replenished the Earth; and this shocking discovery raised in a would-be historian's mind his first doubt as to whether a genealogical tree was a vehicle that could effectively convey the history of the progressive differentiation of the Human Family.

As this doubt persisted and grew stronger, the writer experimented with alternative systems of classification which might perhaps comprehend all the living and extinct branches of Mankind and might at the same time account for all the gradations of diversity and affinity between them. Could the key to this historical puzzle be found in Physical Race if a mythical criterion of racial relations in the shape of a Biblical genealogy were discarded in favour of a 'scientific' criterion compounded of such objective and measurable data as the colour of the skin, the texture of the hair, 'the cephalic index', and the facial angle? Or, alternatively, could the key be found in language if a myth of the confusion of tongues at the abortive building of a Tower of Babel² were discarded in favour of the findings of the Late Modern Western science of Comparative Philology? After the writer's critical faculty had thus been set to work upon the problem of Mankind's diversity-in-unity thanks to the shock administered to his mind by an Ussherian chart of Occumenical History in A.D. 1899, it took him some ten or twelve years to arrive at the conclusion that the linguistic and the racial approach to the problem were each as unsatisfactory³ as the genealogical approach had previously proved to be. It was only after this thrice-repeated preliminary negative process of drawing blank that the writer was able to clear the ground in his own mind for the positive solution proposed in the present Study, in which he has argued that, in human affairs, the significant differences

¹ Gen. ix. 1 and 7.

² Gen. xi. 1-9.

³ A critique of the racial approach will be found in II. 1, 207-49.

and likenesses are not those of Race or Language, but are those of religious and secular Culture.

Another illuminating discrepancy impinged on the writer's mind one afternoon during the First World War when, as he was wandering through the Victoria and Albert Museum in South Kensington, his eye was caught by the bust of a girl in majolica in the naturalistic Modern Western style, and his curiosity was moved to ascertain the provenance and date of this attractive work of art. He was not surprised to find that a work as beautiful as this had been made in Italy, but he was astonished to discover that a work as modern as this had been made in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era. This bust was a piece of material evidence that, in the fourteenth century, Italy had already been living in the Modern Age of Western history; but in the rest of Western Christendom, with the possible exception of Flanders, the Modern Age had not dawned before the close of the fifteenth century or even the opening of the sixteenth. So Italy had been 'modern' already for perhaps as long as two hundred years before the rest of Western Christendom had followed suit to her; and this example proved that, within the bosom of one and the same society, it was possible for different 'sections' (in the 'geo-cultural' sense in which this word was used in the United States) to be historically out of step with one another. People who were chronological contemporaries might, in fact, be living side by side in two different cultural epochs.

This inference from the modernity of a fourteenth-century Italian bust was confirmed in the writer's mind when, some thirty years later, at the end of the Second World War, he paid another visit to the same museum in order to see on exhibition there the statues and other decorations from the English King Henry VII's chapel at Westminster Abbey. On this occasion he was able to appraise at close quarters the extent of the cultural gulf between the still inviolate Medieval Western style of the English work and the resurgent Hellenic style of the contemporary work of the imported Italian master Torrigiani.¹ This visual evidence of the temporary cultural precocity of Northern and Central Italy in a Late Medieval Age of Western history was one of the signals that drew the writer's attention to the historical role of creative minorities.

Light can also be thrown on History by critical reactions to discrepancies that have merely been suspected without having been verified. In September 1952 the writer could remember a day in March 1899 when his Mother was reading aloud to him Z. A. Ragozin's *Chaldea*² in *The Story of the Nations* series. Nineteenth-century Western Assyriologists and Egyptologists had been impressed by the length of their new vista of past history, by comparison with the relative shortness of the Biblical vista, much more forcibly than they had been impressed by the shortness of the Biblical and archaeological vistas alike by comparison

¹ This contrast has been noticed already in X. ix. 83.

² Fifth edition: London 1896, Fisher Unwin. This volume was the prolegomena to the same author's *Assyria*, which had already come into the present writer's hands (see p. 18, above). A curiosity to explore the antecedents of Assyrian history had moved him for the first time to spend his pocket-money on buying a learned work in preference to a box of lead soldiers.

with the relative length of the geological and astronomical vistas that were being opened up simultaneously by contemporary Western physical scientists; and consequently the antiquity of the 'Chaldean' (i.e. the Sumeric) Civilization was one of the principal themes of Ragozin's stimulating *œuvre de vulgarisation*. In expounding her thesis, the gifted authoress cited two by then already rediscovered chronological assertions that had been made by the Assyrian King Asshurbanipal (*regnabat* 660–626 B.C.) and by the Neo-Babylonian Emperor Nabonidus (*imperabat* 556–539 B.C.) without questioning whether these latter-day sovereigns' historical advisers had really possessed authentic information warranting their confidently presented figures. On Asshurbanipal's figure of 1,635 years for the length of the time that had elapsed since a statue of the goddess 'Nana',¹ which Asshurbanipal had brought back to Uruk (Erech) from Susa in 645 B.C., had been carried away into an Elamite captivity, her comment² was that '1,635 added to 645 make 2,280, a date not to be disputed'; and, though she boggled³ at the antiquity of the date—3750 B.C.—which was assigned to the *floruit* of the Akkadian war-lord Naramsin by Nabonidus's statement that Naramsin had reigned 3,200 years before Nabonidus's own day, she took refuge here in 'the possibility of an error of the engraver' of the inscription, without considering the alternative possibility that the latter-day emperor-archaeologist himself might have been drawing the long bow in the dark and might therefore perhaps not deserve to be taken *au pied de la lettre*.

Ragozin's unquestioning assumption that Nabonidus and Asshurbanipal had known what they were talking about was, of course, accepted by the listening child uncritically, but it suddenly occurred to him to wonder how the authoress knew that these Assyrian and Babylonian 'years' were periods of the same length as the familiar years in which time was reckoned in a nineteenth-century England, and he interrupted his Mother's reading by putting this question to her. Perhaps the question had been evoked in his mind by some echo of a nineteenth-century 'fundamentalist' Western Christian attempt to salvage the veracity of the Book of Genesis by suggesting that the 'years' of life attributed there, in generous hundreds, to the Patriarchs were in reality periods that would read, not as 'years', but possibly as 'months', if the chronological terminology of the Bible were to be translated into current parlance with a pedantic precision. Probably, if he had been country-bred, he would never have entertained the idea that there could be any such arbitrary variations in the length of the year, considering that its span was settled for the farmer, not by human fiat, but by a cycle of the seasons that invariably came round in the same course within the same period, whatever the human calendar-makers might choose to say. As, however, the child happened to be town-bred, he was blind to Nature's visual clock on whose face the fixed spans of the revolving and recurring seasons were registered by the regular alternation of the spring of the blossom and the fall of the leaf. In his cockney *Weltanschauung* in his tenth year,

¹ i.e. Inanna, the original Sumerian name of the goddess whose Akkadian name was Ishtar. The Sumerian 'Nanna' was not a goddess but a god—the moon-god whose Akkadian name was Sin.

² In op. cit., on p. 195.

³ Ibid., pp. 211–15.

'years' presented themselves as artificial spans of Time which human beings could expand or contract at will because human wills were presumed to have created them arbitrarily *ex nihilo*.

The naïve questioner lived to laugh at his childish ignorance, and then lived on to discover that his question had been shrewder than his wit. He had no sooner been sent to school in the country than he became aware of Nature's solar year, and he had no sooner followed up Arthur Gilman's *The Saracens*¹ in *The Story of the Nations* series by getting hold of Stanley Lane-Poole's *Mohammadan Dynasties*² than he discovered that Nature's clock displayed more than one dial, and that, where, as in this instance, Nature was at variance with herself, human wills were consequently invested with at least the limited freedom of choosing which dial to follow. The calendar of Babylonian origin that was current in an English boy's world at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era was based on the solar cycle of the seasons, and, in the course of centuries, it had been readjusted several times over to coincide with this cycle with an ever closer approximation to exactitude—leaving the lunar cycle of the months to take care of itself, as best it could, by submitting perforce to a Procrustean process of arbitrarily stretching or docking the lengths of the months in order to fit them into a paramount solar framework. The English boy now made the discovery that the method of calendrical reckoning that happened to be current in Christendom was not the universal way of the World; for here, in current use in the Muslim quarter of the *Oikoumenê*, was a calendar—based, not on the solar, but on the lunar cycle—whose nominal 'year' of literally lunar months, ignoring the recurrent procession of the seasons, allowed itself to fall short of the true solar year's full measure, with the result that, as the tale of Islamic 'years' had mounted up from the initial date of the Era of the *Hijrah*, these *soi-disant* 'years' had been travelling time and again round the face of Christendom's Babylonian solar clock.

It was not, however, until A.D. 1950, when he was making his preparations for writing the note on Chronology printed in this Study in the present volume,³ that the writer realized the full bearing of an Islamic lunar calendar upon the question regarding the length of the Sumerian year which he had put to his Mother more than fifty solar years back. At Princeton, New Jersey, in the fall of the solar year A.D. 1950, he first read Poebel's articles⁴ on the recently rediscovered Assyrian King-List from Khorsabad and marvelled at the ingenuity of this accomplished contemporary Assyriologist's ways and means of harmonizing with this list the chronological assertions of two latter-day sovereigns—in this case, not Nabonidus and Assurbanipal, but Esarhaddon (*regnabat* 680–669 B.C.) and Shalmaneser I (*regnabat* 1272–1243 B.C. according to Poebel's dating).⁵ He then went on to read Sidney Smith's critique⁶ of

¹ London 1887, Fisher Unwin.

² London 1894, Constable.

³ On pp. 167–212, below.

⁴ In the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. i, pp. 247–306; *ibid.*, pp. 460–91; and vol. ii, pp. 56–90 (Chicago 1942–3, University of Chicago Press).

⁵ See *J.N.E.S.*, vol. i, pp. 290–5.

⁶ Smith, Sidney: 'Middle Minoan I–II and Babylonian Chronology', in the *American Journal of Archaeology*, vol. xlix, No. 1 (Concord, N.H. 1945), pp. 1–24.

Poebel's reconstruction of Assyrian chronology and was astonished to find one eminent contemporary professional archaeologist here putting to a confrère the very question that the writer himself, as a child, had once put to his Mother: How could one be sure that the 'years' in which the Assyrian chronologists reckoned were solar years or, indeed, even would-be approximations to them?

This hypothetical correspondence, which Poebel had tacitly taken for granted throughout his own reconstruction of Assyrian chronology from the recently discovered Khorsabad King-List in combination with the rest of the evidence, was roundly challenged by his distinguished adversary. In Assyria, Sidney Smith submitted,¹ the Babylonian solar calendar, which had arrived at a close approximation to the true solar year, did not appear to have been adopted for official use before the reign of Tiglath-Pileser I (*regnabat* 1114-1076 B.C.). 'Over a long period of years that calendar remains equivalent to Julian years in reckoning. . . . But the Assyrian calendar previously in use shows considerable variations from the Babylonian, and no precision in converting Assyrian years into Julian reckoning is possible.' In the non-Babylonian calendar current in Assyria before Tiglath-Pileser I's day there may have been a different and inferior system of intercalation; 'but the known facts at present favour the view that there was no intercalation at all'; and 'this is an important factor in calculating early dates'.² Sidney Smith suggests³ that the calendar which, in his belief, had been discarded in Assyria in 1114 B.C. in favour of the Babylonian solar calendar of the day, had been a lunar one—i.e. one constructed on the same basis as the calendar which, 1,736 years after the date at which it may have been abandoned in an Assyria that lay next to the heart of the Babylonian World, was still in use in the remote and backward Arabian oasis of Mecca, and which then, through the accident of its survival in this insulated desert-girt fastness, was to have its fortune made for it by automatically becoming the official calendar of a new oecumenical church founded by a Meccan prophet.

This controversy between Sidney Smith and Poebel, in which these two champion Assyriologists were hurling lunar and solar calendars at one another as Hector and Ajax had once hurled boulders, demonstrated that a critical reaction even to a disputable discrepancy might play an important role in a debate involving an entire scheme of chronology for the history of the Sumeric Civilization.

(II) CREATIVE RESPONSES

(a) MINUSCULA

If the observation, or even the unverified suspicion, of discrepancies between historical facts may inspire human minds to take intellectual action by arousing a negative critical faculty, we may expect, *a fortiori*, to see minds moved to act by the observation, or even by the unverified in-

¹ Smith, Sidney, *ibid.*, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 22-23. This suggestion was rejected by some contemporary scholars (see the Note on Chronology, p. 177, below).

tuition, of connexions between historical facts which call for some positive explanation.

Rudimentary historical puzzles of this positive kind are set by the observation of the currency, at widely different points in Space and in Time, of identical elements of culture—identical clothes, for example, or identical words; for, however far apart from one another on the stage of History these identical elements may have made their successive separate epiphanies, a resemblance that approximates to identity is less likely to be a coincidence than to be due to some continuous chain of historical tradition and geographical diffusion which it may be possible to retrace.

How comes it, for example, that, on a bronze medal made in A.D. 1439 by the Italian master Vittore Pisano (Pisanello) for the East Roman Emperor John VII Palaiológhos (*imperabat* A.D. 1425–48), and in a fresco—painted on the west wall of the Church of San Francesco at Arezzo, at some date between A.D. 1452 and A.D. 1466,¹ by Piero della Francesca—in which the same John VII Palaiológhos is depicted in the role of Constantine the Great at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge,² this last but one of the occupants of a Byzantine imperial throne should be portrayed by two contemporary Italian witnesses³ as wearing a head-dress which looks uncommonly like the Egyptian Double Crown⁴—a

¹ For the date, see Clark, Kenneth: *Piero della Francesca* (London 1951, Phaidon Press), pp. 35–36.

² See the plates, in *op. cit.*, of the whole fresco (Plate 57), of the left-hand half of it depicting Constantine and his army (Plate 58), and of the head of Constantine (represented by John VII Palaiológhos) himself (Plate 62).

³ Warburg and others have supposed that Piero took the likeness of Palaeologus from Pisanello's medal of 1439, but this is not entirely true. The characteristic shapes and rhythms of the two heads are different... Piero, who had been living in Florence in A.D. 1439 when the Emperor John VII had come to Florence to attend the Church Council that had sat at Florence in that year, 'almost certainly saw Palaeologus with his own eyes' (Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 26, n. 1). In Piero della Francesca's picture of the Flagellation, at Urbino, which was probably painted in the fourteen-fifties, both John VII's countenance and his head-dress reappear, but here no longer in association with one another (see Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 19 and Plates 27–28).

⁴ The resemblance is particularly striking in Piero della Francesca's fresco, which brings out two points that are not apparent on Pisanello's medal (though, in the light of the fresco, the first point of the two can perhaps be detected on the finer of the two exemplars of the medal in the British Museum). The fresco shows that the two components of the head-dress were separate: the bottom edge of the conical inner component is just visible below the lower edge of the front portion of the outer component, which resembles the looped-up brim of an eighteenth-century Western three-cornered hat; and this detail is visible because the two components are of sharply different colours.

Since the plates of this fresco in Sir Kenneth Clark's book are not among those in which the original colours are reproduced, they reveal merely that the conical inner component of the imperial head-dress is relatively light in colour and that the looped-up outer component is relatively dark. In the original fresco, is the inner component white, as the conical crown of Upper Egypt was, and the outer component red—the colour of the looped-up crown of Lower Egypt? The answer to this question is given in the following sentence in a letter of the 6th October, 1952, from the Reverend Father P. Benedetto Renzi, Rector of the Church of San Francesco at Arezzo, in answer to an inquiry from the writer of this Study: 'I colori della corona di Costantino risultano bianco con sfumature rosse nella parte superiore, verde cupo nella parte inferiore.' The colouring here described by an eye-witness is faithfully reproduced in d'Ancona, Paolo: *Piero della Francesca: Il Ciclo Affrescato della Santa Croce nella Chiesa di S. Francesco in Arezzo* (Milan 1951, Pizzi), Plate XVI. The streaks of red do not come out in Longhi, Roberto: *Piero della Francesca: La Légende de la Croix (Fresques d'Arezzo)* (Milan 1952, Sidera; Paris 1952, Amiot-Dumont), Plates xxxi, xxxiv and xxxv.

It will be seen that, in the Emperor John VII Palaiológhos's head-dress as painted by Piero della Francesca, the Crown of Upper Egypt (if such it is) preserves its pristine

head-dress that had become part of the insignia of the Pharaohs after the political unification of Upper and Lower Egypt by Narmer *circa* 3100 B.C.¹ How could this complicated and outlandish headgear—which would look bizarre to anyone not acquainted with the crucial episode of Egyptiac history that it commemorated—have survived (if in truth it did survive) over a Time-span of more than four and a half millennia in order to make its eventual reappearance, not on the banks of the Nile where it had been invented, but on the alien shores of the Bosphorus at least a thousand years after the last remnants of a living Egyptiac tradition had become extinct in what had once been an Egyptiac World? An historian's mind in search of an answer to this question would recollect that the pre-Christian Roman Emperors had acted on their pretension to be the Pharaohs' legitimate successors by having themselves portrayed, on the monuments of the latest age of Egyptiac history, as wearing the Pharaohs' traditional insignia. Would it be too fanciful to imagine that these Roman impersonators of Egyptiac Pharaohs may have provided themselves with actual sets of the Pharaonic insignia, including the symbolic Double Crown, and that, in spite of the subsequent extinction of the Egyptiac culture and the eventual loss of Egypt itself by the Christian Roman Empire to its Primitive Muslim Arab invaders, these long-since obsolete Egyptiac regalia may first have been transferred from the Old Rome to the New Rome and afterwards been preserved there in the office of the Protovestiaris of an extinct Roman Empire's East Roman ghost till the last of the Palaiológis came across them in some imperial lumber room and took the fancy to wear them—probably without being aware of either their origin or their significance.

How comes it, too (to pursue this fascinating subject of the diffusion of headgear),² that the brimless 'stove-pipe' hat (*Persicè* 'taka'), curving outwards towards its flat crown, in which the Persian guardsmen are portrayed on Achaemenian bas-reliefs, and in which Baluchi shepherds were still to be seen stalking over the highlands of South-Eastern Iran at the time of writing,³ should have been in academic use in twentieth-

white with a taint of Lower Egypt's red, but that the Crown of Lower Egypt (if such it is) has changed its hue from red to bottle-green.

The same head-dress, in the same colours, has been placed by the same painter on Pilate's head in his picture of the Flagellation in the Ducal Palace at Urbino. In a letter of the 30th October, 1952, in answer to an inquiry from the writer of this Study, Signor Pietro Zampetti, Soprintendente alle Gallerie delle Marche, notes that this head-dress 'comes close, in its shape, to the beret of the "Clerici Vagantes", but might also be reminiscent of the ancient crown of Egypt—though it is distinguished from this by the cut of its peak, which is strongly pronounced.' 'Per quanto riguarda i colori, essi sono il rosato per la parte interna del copricapo ed il verde scuro per quella esterna. La striscia bianca dovrebbe essere cosa a sè, specie di fascia che si nota anche in altra figura dello stesso dipinto.'

The resemblance of Pilate's head-dress, in this picture, to the Crown of Lower Egypt is noticed by Longhi in his *Piero della Francesca* (Rome 1927, p. 41: 'Pilato si effigia faraonico.')

¹ See II. ii. 112 and 114-15, and IV. iv. 502-4.

² Two illustrations of it have already been noticed in this Study in other contexts: the derivation of the nineteenth-century Western 'top hat' from the sixteenth-century Western steeple-crowned hat in III. iii. 136, with n. 2, and the derivation of 'the cardinal's hat' from the shield-shaped or mushroom-shaped headgear of the Achaemenian Empire's subjects in the Aegean Archipelago in VI. vii. 681-2.

³ See VI. vii. 681.

century English-speaking countries in the recognizably derivative shape of the 'college cap' or 'mortar-board'? The last link but one in the lost chain of transmission could readily be detected in the 'toque' worn by members of the legal profession in France; but from whom had this headgear been borrowed by these French representatives of one of the liberal professions of Western Christendom? From the Ottoman grandees who, before the revolutionary substitution of an egalitarian fez by Sultan Mahmūd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808-39), had worn the Achaemenian 'taka' wrapped in a voluminous turban? Or from the priests of the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church in *partibus Ottomanicis*, on whom a plain black variant of this Persian headgear had been imposed by their Muslim masters? Or from the uhlans¹ whose Turkish appellation testifies that their accoutrements must have been introduced into Poland from Turkey on their way to becoming acclimatized in Prussia?

What, again, was the line of descent by which the hood that was associated with cap and gown in the academic costume of twentieth-century English-speaking countries had been derived from the 'hood' that, in the Achaemenian Emperor Darius I's bas-relief carved on the face of the cliff at Behistan before the close of the sixth century B.C., draws the eye to the last of the figures in the file of vanquished rebel leaders who are being brought to judgement before the face of their puissant subjugator? It is true that the enormously high pointed cap that the Massagetan Saka chieftain Skunkha is here portrayed as wearing bears slightly more resemblance to Little Red Ridinghood's headgear than it bears to the glorified scarf that twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon doctors and bachelors of Theology, Law, Arts, and Science wore slung over their shoulders; yet the identity of the name attests the historical connexion; for, in virtue of their distinctively peculiar headgear, the Massagetae were nicknamed by their Persian conquerors 'the Pointed-Hood Saka' (Sakā Tigrakhaudā). What were the successive stages in the subsequent metamorphosis of Skunkha's headgear?

Anyone contemplating Skunkha's 'pointed hood' in a photograph of Darius's bas-relief could predict that sooner or later its point would sag either forwards or backwards; and there was evidence to show that both these alternative possible variations in the fashion of wearing this preposterous Massagetan headgear were subsequently tried. At the time of writing, the forward-curving variant was to be seen in the Panjab in the horn-shaped cap of stiff dark blue felt round which the Sikh akalis wore their ring-shaped war-quoits, and in the flabbier headgear of the same shape that was part of the insignia of a Neapolitan Pulcinello, while the backward-curving variant was the Medieval Western *liripipium*—still familiar to Modern Western eyes in busts and portraits of Dante—whose point, transformed from a stiff felt steeple into a soft cloth pigtail hanging down between the shoulder-blades, had once captivated the male half of the population of the whole of a fourteenth-century Western Christendom, from Florence to Greenland.²

¹ *Turcicē* 'oghlanlar', meaning 'the boys'.

² The Norse settlers in Greenland, whose losing struggle for survival ended in their extinction round about the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, continued (see Nørlund, P.: *Viking Settlers in Greenland and their Descendants during Five Hundred*

The survival of the forward-pointing variant of the Massagetan 'hood' in the Panjab was, of course, easily explained. It had been carried from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin into the Indus Basin by the Massagetae themselves, together with their tribal name (the Jāts), in their *Völkerwanderung* in the second century B.C. It was not so easy to account for the epiphany of the self-same variant of the pointed hood on Pulcinello's head at Naples; yet an historian might hazard the guess that its carriers from Central Asia to Southern Italy might have been Alzece's war-band of Bulgar Hun Turkish-speaking Eurasian Nomads who were passed on by Grimwald King of the Lombards (*regnabat* A.D. 662-671) to his son Romwald Duke of Benevento, and were then planted by Romwald in the depopulated territories of Bovianum, Saepinum, Aesernia, and other decayed city-states¹ in the district of Northern Samnium that afterwards came to be known as the Molise.² 'It seems probable that this settlement of the Bulgarians was partly a measure of precaution against attack from Rome or Naples';³ and, if so, it might also seem not improbable that the Roman united empire loyalists who had continued, after the irruption of the Lombards, to hold bridgeheads at Naples and Gaeta and in the Ducatus Romanus for an Imperial Government at Constantinople should have given visual expression to their scorn and detestation of the Eurasian Nomad horde which the Lombard usurpers had now planted next door to them by clapping these ex-Nomads' distinctively outlandish 'pointed hood' upon the head of a puppet representing the arch-villain Pontius Pilate in a perfunctorily Christianized *Fabula Atellana*.

Though there is no evidence that the Bulgars' Hun ancestors had, in fact, picked up the Massagetan 'pointed hood' *en route* from Mongolia to the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, it seems just possible that our Parthian shot in the dark may have hit the mark; but whence did Dante acquire his *liripipium*? What was the missing link here between the backward-trailing hood worn by a Florentine poet born in A.D. 1265 and a tendency towards a backward-curving fashion of wearing the Massagetan 'pointed hood' that was revealed in the extant works of art of an Achaemenian Empire that had been overthrown in 334-330 B.C.?

Years (London 1936, Cambridge University Press), pp. 110-11 and 126), to the last, to follow the latest fashions of a Western Christendom into which an abortive pagan Scandinavian Society had been absorbed at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries (see II. ii. 340-60). Among other articles of Medieval Western Christian dress the Greenlanders adopted the fourteenth-century *liripipium* (see Nørlund, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-25); and the seventeen specimens (see *ibid.*, p. 118) that had been recovered by Modern Western archaeologists among the clothing excavated from the graves in the churchyard at Herjolfsnes were probably (see *ibid.*, pp. 123-4) the only representatives of the *liripipium* that were extant at the time of writing.

¹ See Paulus Diaconus: *Historia Langobardorum*, Book V, chap. 29. The historian, writing, as far as can be ascertained, at some date between A.D. 786 and 795, records of Alzece's Bulgars that, 'usque hodie in his, ut diximus, locis habitantes, quamquam et Latine loquantur, linguae tamen propriae usum minime amiserunt'.

² This district was found desolate by Strabo (see his *Geographica*, Book V, chap. iv, § 11 (C 249-50), cited in IV. iv. 391, n. 2, and in V. v. 37, n. 2), not much less than a hundred years after its devastation in 81-80 B.C. by Sulla. The writer is not aware of any evidence that it had ever been resettled before Alzece's Bulgars were planted there three-quarters of a millennium after the commission of Sulla's atrocity.

³ Hodgkin, T.: *Italy and Her Invaders*, vol. vi (Oxford 1895, Clarendon Press), p. 284, n. 1.

Here again, a clue might be found by the historian in one of the periodic eruptions of the Nomads out of the Eurasian Steppe. In A.D. 1241 the unprecedentedly violent eruption of the Mongols out of the heart of the Steppe had sent the Cuman Turkish Nomads flying out of the Steppe's Great Western Bay into the detached enclave of steppe-land in the Hungarian Alföld, with the Mongols themselves following at the Cumans' heels. The Cumans had burst into Hungary as pagan barbarians, and such they might have remained if their Mongol pursuers had stayed there with them. But the wave of Mongol invasion had receded from Hungary as rapidly as it had swept over it, and, when once the Mongols were out of the way, the Magyars, who knew how to handle Nomads in virtue of being *ci-devant* Nomads themselves, had managed to convert the manageably small intrusive horde of Cuman strangers in their midst to the Western Christian religion and culture to which the Cumans' Magyar hosts had been converted a quarter of a millennium earlier.¹ Through the agency of Western Christendom's Magyar marchmen over against the Eurasian Steppe, the Cuman refugees in the Alföld had thus been brought into the fold of Western Christendom in the course of the second half of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era;² and it does not seem unduly fanciful to conjecture that they left a monument of their conversion in the subsequent captivation of the Western Christian World, into which these Eurasian Nomad immigrants had thus made their entry, by the backward-curving variant of the Massagetan 'pointed hood' in the *outré* form of the *liripipium*.³

We cannot take our eyes off Skunkha's steeple-shaped 'hood' without being moved to ask the further question whether this extraordinary headgear was an invention of the Massagetae's own, or whether it is not more likely that they had borrowed it from Anatolia, where the antiquity of its vogue is attested by its appearance on the heads of the warriors on the frieze in the Hittite sanctum at Yazly Qaya, over against the Hittite capital city on Boghazqal'eh, while the persistence of its vogue there—latterly in the service, not of War, but of Religion—is attested by its retention as part of the insignia of the Islamic religious orders in Anatolia down to their dissolution on the 2nd September, 1925, by the fiat of the government of a Westernizing Turkish Republic. These orgiastic worshippers of the One True God are convicted by their headgear of having been the spiritual heirs of those orgiastic worshippers of the goddess Cybele who were nicknamed Corybantes ('High-Hats') by Hellenic observers. Was Anatolia the original centre of dispersion of 'the pointed hood' in the pristine form in which it appears on the head of the Massagetan chief Skunkha in the sixth century B.C. and on the heads of witches, astrologers, heretics, and dunces in Western Christendom?

Whatever its original provenance may have been, the Massagetan 'pointed hood' was in any case not the Eurasian Nomads' normal headgear. The common run of Eurasian Nomad peoples wore 'the Phrygian cap' in which the Scyths are portrayed in Hellenic and Helleno-Scythian works of art made in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., and which is likewise

¹ See III. iii. 426.

² See III. iii. 461.

³ Was the Ottoman Janissaries' headgear a variant of the *liripipium* which had been slung into Anatolia by the same Mongol eruption in Eurasia?

the headgear in which Dacians, colliding with the Romans four or five hundred years after the Scythians' *floruit*, are depicted on Trajan's Column. In bringing this standard Eurasian Nomad headgear on to our stage, we have anticipated the answer to another question: How comes it that the official head-dress of the Doge of Venice, familiar to frequenters of the National Gallery in London in Giovanni Bellini's portrait of the Doge Leonardo Loredano (*ducebat* A.D. 1501-21), is identical with that displayed in clay figurines representing officials in the service of the T'ang Dynasty (*imperabant* A.D. 618-907) in a Far Eastern World that lay on the other side of the Eurasian Steppe from Western Christendom? The link becomes manifest when we realize that this Veneto-Chinese official headgear is the Eurasian Nomad's standard soft 'Phrygian cap' frozen stiff; and it is not difficult to understand how this came to be part of the insignia of public office in Northern China, considering that the Nomads had been politically dominant there for more than three hundred years before the T'ang régime was established with its headquarters within this domain that the Nomads had carved out for themselves in *partibus Sinarum*.¹ Presumably the same official headgear was picked up by the Venetians from one or other of the successive hordes of Nomads—Sarmatians, Huns, Bulgars, Pseudo-Avars, and Magyars—who repeatedly raided the plains of Northern Italy in the courses of the post-Theodosian and the post-Carolingian Völkerwanderungen.²

Nor was it only the headgear of the Eurasian Nomads that found its way into Western Christendom; for the historic accoutrements of the Scyths and the Dacians, as these are portrayed in Hellenic works of art, reappear, *cap-à-pie*, in the garb in which a mythical race of Dwarfs was subsequently clothed in a Western folk-lore. These Dwarfs were, of course, *numina*—projected by the Subconscious Psyche in response to the mind's challenging experience of extracting metallic treasure from the bowels of the Earth—who never had any existence in what the Conscious Psyche calls 'real life'; but the costume in which the Dwarfs made their epiphany in Fairyland must have been the authentic dress of some living people of flesh and blood who were encountered by the pioneers of a Medieval Western Christendom's eastward expansion overland. If we

¹ See X. ix. 651-2.

² See, however, Zanetti, G., in his dissertation *Della Berretta Ducale, Volgarmente Chiamata Corno, che portasi da' Serenissimi Dogi di Venezia* (1779), to which the writer's attention was drawn by Mr. James Laver, the Keeper of the Departments of Engraving, Illustration, and Design, and of Paintings at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. Zanetti argues that the modern form of the Doge's official head-dress was not the result of a single change, but was the recent result of a six or seven hundred years long process of evolution. He claims to have identified nine stages (illustrated at the end of the booklet). The current name *corno*—alluding to the point to which the Doge's cap, in its modern shape, rose at the back—could not be traced back earlier than the sixteenth century, in Zanetti's belief (*ibid.*, pp. xviii-xix). Zanetti finds the origin of the modern *corno* in a conical cap worn by dogi in representations of them in the oldest mosaics in St. Mark's (*ibid.*, p. v). He suggests (*ibid.*, pp. xix-xxi) that this conical cap was a Teutonic barbarian Transalpine headgear which was adopted by the Venetian dogi and was then progressively modified at Venice until it eventually arrived at its modern style. After following Zanetti's arguments and examining his illustrations, the writer of this Study did not find himself convinced that the T'ang-like *corno* and the Carolingian-like conical *berretta* were in truth successive stages in the evolution of one and the same cap.

may also hazard a guess at the provenance of this lost tribe whose dress was thus immortalized by being taken as the model for the clothing of imaginary Dwarfs, we may picture to ourselves a band of Nomad herdsmen straying beyond the limits of their cattle ranges in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe as they push their way up the valley of the Dniestr into the Galician forests; and we may go on to picture these stray stock-breeders finding themselves constrained, in a strange physical environment, to change their economic occupation by taking to mining. The historic prototypes of the mythical Dwarfs would then be a mining community in some secluded valley of the Carpathians or the Riesengebirge whose Nomad origin was still advertised in their ancestral dress at the time when the first aggressive Medieval German mineral prospectors arrived on the scene to put these *ci-devant* Nomad miners out of business.

The itch to find explanations for connexions between historical facts is, of course, excited by facts of other kinds besides identities in fashions of clothes. In the field of Language, for example, how had it come to pass that the vocabulary of a late-nineteenth-century middle-class English nursery included the name of the Sumeric goddess Inanna? The history of the translation of Inanna to an English nursery from a Sumerian temple was illuminated by her epiphany under her original name—none the worse for its long journey through Time and Space, save for the weathering away of its initial vowel—as the Nanna who, in the pagan pantheon of a post-Carolingian Scandinavian heroic age, was still being honoured as the consort of Balder, 'the Lord' who dies and rises from the dead. Though, in Scandinavia in the tenth century after Christ, the Norse version of the dying and rising god's traditional epithet has eclipsed this Sumeric god's proper name, Balder's identity with Tammuz, which is proclaimed in Balder's passion, is established by the tell-tale survival of the Sumerian proper name of a great Mother who is Tammuz-Balder's wife.¹ In a Victorian nursery, where the child's nurse meant more than its mother meant to the child, it was natural enough that the child should apply the name of this unforgettable Mother Goddess to the most puissant female figure within its miniature horizon.²

What, again, was the etymology of βασιλεύς, the Greek word for 'king', which was as enigmatic as it was familiar? *Kral*, the Slavonic word for 'king', was familiar without being enigmatic. The word *kral* was known to have originated in the coining of a common noun out of the proper name of an historical King Karl whose fame had made so wide and so deep and so lasting an impression on the imaginations of the Slavonic-speaking barbarians beyond the eastern borders of Charlemagne's empire that in all Slavonic dialects, from those of the adjacent Wends and Srbs to those of the distant Russians and Bulgarians, the Great Karl's

¹ See V. v. 150.

² The writer could remember how once in his nursery, when his nurse and his mother seemed to him to be annoyingly preoccupied with one another, he sought in vain to distract their attention to his mother's business, crawling under the bed, exclaiming, each time: 'Mother and Nanny are good; Mother and Nanny are God; I am hiding from God.' Without knowing it, he was playing at one of the principal cults of a Sumeric religion which, on the adult surface of life, had been extinct for some two thousand years in its native land of Shinar.

non-Slavonic personal name came, *par excellence*, to denote any holder of the royal office of which Karolus Magnus had been such a pre-eminent incumbent. On this analogy, might an inquirer hazard the guess that the Greek, like the Slavonic, word for 'king' had been derived from the foreign proper name of an historical king who had made a comparable impression on the imagination of the Achæan barbarians at the moment of their entry on to the stage of History? The Hittite counterpart of an Austrasian Karl was forthcoming in the person of Biyassiliš the son of Suppiluliuma, who was installed by his father as the Hittite sub-king of Carchemish,¹ commanding the right bank of the Euphrates at its western elbow, mid-way through the fourteenth century B.C., at just about the time when the Achæan pirates were making their first lodgements on the coasts of Pamphylia and Cyprus. Though Biyassiliš's reign at Carchemish was short, he won swift renown by invading Mitanni on his imperial father's behalf and reinstating there, as a Hittite puppet, Mattiwaza, a refugee claimant to the Mitannian throne.² It would be the less surprising to find that Biyassiliš had made his way into the Greek vocabulary, considering that Biyassiliš's brother, and Suppiluliuma's second successor on the Hittite imperial throne, Muršiliš II, who is known to have crossed the Achæans' path in Millawanda, certainly did make his way into Greek legend as Myrtilus, the tool and victim of the Anatolian adventurer Pelops, while a later Hittite emperor, Tutkhaliya IV, who likewise had dealings with the Achæans in Western Anatolia, figures in Greek legend as Deucalion, the survivor of the Flood.

The itch to find a link between two widely sundered yet patently identical historical terms—linguistic, sartorial, or whatnot—might still set a would-be historian's mind in motion when not only the connecting link but also one of the two terminals was missing. Who had been the ancestors of the Etruscans? Who were the descendants of the Lost Ten Tribes of Israel? There could have been few obscure peoples that had not been cast by some Hellenic or Modern Western antiquarian for the role of having been the Etruscans' progenitors; and there could have been still fewer ambitious and conceited peoples in the broad domains of Christendom and Islam that had not claimed to be the heirs of the Lost Tribes.

The fantastic history of these spurious claims was a warning that the potentially creative intellectual impulse to investigate the relations between historical facts might lose itself in a sandbed of folly; and a prudent adult historian would sternly restrict the ration of time and energy that he allowed his mind to devote to such unsolved, and perhaps insoluble, questions concerning the connexions between things that had fascinated him since childhood. Yet there were at least two grounds for seeing in these alluring curiosities of History something more than unprofitable trivialities. In the first place they might throw light on general historical questions of manifest importance. Our string of Plutarchan questions about the history of divers articles of dress brings out, for

¹ See Contenau, G.: *La Civilisation des Hittites* (Paris 1934, Payot), p. 95; Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, La Renaissance du Livre), p. 98; Cavaignac, E.: *Le Problème Hittite* (Paris 1936, Leroux), pp. 35 and 37.

² See Delaporte, op. cit., p. 108.

example, the interesting truth that the conductivity of the social fabric of human life is exceptionally high in two particular social milieux: in a 'universal state', such as the Achaemenian Empire or the Roman Empire, and in a Nomad pastoral society cruising on the waterless ocean of the Steppe. Our speculations about the provenance of a word in a Victorian English nursery vocabulary similarly bring out the truth that the radiational energy of elements of culture is exceptionally high when these elements are divinities. Such lights on the landscape of Oecumenical History, fitful though they might be, were nevertheless sufficiently illuminating in themselves to justify the exercise of the Intellect in investigating the connexions between facts that at first sight might appear trivial; but the main justification for this childish-looking intellectual pursuit was that it was pregnant with a question—'How did this come out of that? And how did that turn into this?'—which was at the heart of every adult historian's serious business on the intellectual plane.

In endeavouring to trace forwards and backwards the history of Skunkha's arresting 'pointed hood', a child's mind would be setting out on the Intellect's ultimate quest '*rerum cognoscere causas*';¹ and, in putting itself through a childish trial practice of this sovereign intellectual activity, the mind of a potential historian would be unconsciously preparing itself against the historic day when it might rise to the height of some great occasion for wresting from the Sphynx an answer to one of her more significant riddles.

(b) PAULO MAIORA

1. *Inspirations from Social Milieux*

Clarendon, Procopius, Josephus, Thucydides, Rhodes

'How has this come out of that?' If we set ourselves now to trace the genesis of some of the classic achievements of great historians, we shall find that this simple question has presented the challenge to which their mighty works have been the response. In making a survey of instances that are particularly instructive or particularly celebrated or both, we may find it convenient to examine first those cases in which the intellectual challenge has been presented by some public event, and then those in which it has been presented by some personal experience.

Since, in the histories of the civilizations down to the time of writing, wars had been the most frequent and most conspicuous agencies of social change at a pace fast enough to make the change perceptibly revolutionary even within the span of a single lifetime, it is not surprising to find that the intellectually inspiring elemental question 'How has this come out of that?' had often clothed itself in the form: 'How has this post-war state of affairs come out of that pre-war state?'

This question had suggested the subject for a classic historical work to Clarendon, Procopius, Josephus, Thucydides, and James Ford Rhodes; and, of these five great historians, the last-mentioned was perhaps the most remarkable witness to the strength of the inspiration that might be breathed into a potential historian's mind by the question how

¹ Virgil: *Georgics* II, l. 490.

the transit has come to be made from an ante-bellum dispensation to a post-bellum one that is strikingly unlike its predecessor, though it is separated from this previous dispensation chronologically by just a few alchemic war years.

Clarendon, after all, might have been expected to become the historian of the English Civil War of A.D. 1642-7; for, by the date of the outbreak of that war, Clarendon was already active and prominent in English parliamentary politics; as soon as war broke out, he became King Charles' principal adviser on legal and constitutional questions; and, before the war was over, he had risen to be one of the foremost statesmen in the Royalist camp. In short, the Civil War had been as great an event in its historian's personal life as in the public life of the nation that had been rent in twain by it. Procopius, the historian of the wars of Justinian, served in Belisarius's campaigns as the commander-in-chief's private secretary.¹ As for Josephus and Thucydides, the outbreak of the wars of which they eventually wrote histories found both of them of an age and social rank that qualified them for military service in commands of considerable responsibility, while Josephus's dramatic personal fortunes in the Great Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70 gave him the advantage—ineestimably valuable for a future historian—of seeing the military conflict that was to be his subject first from the side of his Jewish compatriots and afterwards from the side of his Roman captors, thanks to the open-mindedness and perspicacity shown by Vespasian in employing his gifted Jewish prisoner-of-war as a confidential adviser on Jewish affairs.² It is not surprising that Thucydides, as he tells us in the first sentence of his history, should have foreseen, at the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C., that this was going to be, not merely a great war, but perhaps actually the most important of all wars that had yet been waged within Hellenic memory,³ or that Josephus,

¹ See Procopius's preface to *A History of the Wars of Justinian* (Book I, chap. 1).

² 'My own record of the war as a whole and of the incidental details is correct, since I was a first-hand witness of all the events. I was in command of our Galilaeans so long as resistance was possible, while after my capture I was a prisoner with the Romans. Vespasian and Titus compelled me to remain in constant attendance upon them under guard, at first in chains, "....." I was released and was sent from Alexandria, on Titus's staff, to the s "....." During this period there was no transaction that escaped my observation. The events in the Roman camp I sedulously recorded at first hand, while I was the only person present who could understand the reports of the deserters from the Jewish side. When all my material was in the proper state of preparation, I took advantage of a period of leisure at Rome to employ the services of collaborators to help me with the Greek language, and I thus wrote out my narrative.'—Josephus: *Preface to Contra Apionem* (Book I, chaps. 47-50).

³ 'Thucydides of Athens has written the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. He began to write as soon as war broke out, in the belief that this war would eclipse all its predecessors in importance. He drew this inference from the fact that both belligerents, when they started hostilities, had reached the highest degree of preparedness in every arm, while the rest of the Hellenic World was already taking sides—some countries intervening at once and others intending to follow their example. This war was, indeed, the greatest upheaval ever experienced by Hellas and by a part of the non-Hellenic World (it would hardly be an exaggeration to say: by the Human Race). It is true that the passage of time has rendered accurate research into the recent as well as the remote past impossible; but, in the light of the earliest evidence that I consider trustworthy, I do not imagine that the past has produced either wars or other events on an important scale.'—Thucydides: *A History of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War*, Book I, chap. 1.

At Princeton, New Jersey, on the 22nd February, 1947, the writer of this Study had the interesting experience of hearing Thucydides' high estimate of the importance of the

in the first sentence of his history likewise, should have claimed for the Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70 in retrospect that it was 'the greatest war of our own times' and that it would hardly be an exaggeration to add that it was 'the greatest of any wars on record between either city-states or nations'.¹ By contrast, James Ford Rhodes was not merely remote from public life but was also still only a boy at the time of the war² that inspired him to carry out his intellectual life-work. The only direct personal connexion, known to the present writer, that Rhodes had with the great public events in the United States either during or immediately before or after the Civil War was his father's participation, as one of the Douglasite Democratic delegates from Ohio, in the Democratic Party's Convention at Charleston, South Carolina, on the 23rd April-1st May, 1860.³ Yet Rhodes' responsiveness to the intellectual challenge of the revolution in his country's life during his boyhood was apparently so vigorous that even in his schooldays, it is said, 'he had conceived the purpose of writing American history',⁴ while in his adult life he demonstrated the steadfastness of an already settled purpose by the patience with which he waited until A.D. 1887 before starting work on his grand historical design⁵ and by the persistence with which he then spent the next nineteen years (A.D. 1887-1906) in bringing *A History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 down to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877*,⁶ and another sixteen years (A.D. 1906-22) after that in carrying the story on from A.D. 1877 to A.D. 1909.⁷

war of which he became the historian endorsed by a great living American soldier who had just taken on his shoulders the burden of the Secretaryship of State. In an address at Princeton on that date, in which he was impressing upon his audience the importance for the country of an enlightened public opinion that could co-operate intelligently with the Administration in the choice and execution of a national foreign policy, General Marshall suggested to them that one way of equipping themselves mentally for this contemporary political task would be to study the history of the Hellenic World during the generation ending in the outbreak of the War of 431-404 B.C.

¹ The intellectual advantage of a position in which he had a foot in both the contending camps and an insight into both the conflicting cultures inspired Josephus not merely to write a history of the war in which he had participated personally, in two successive different capacities, but also to publish an edition of his work in Greek as well as one in Aramaic. In his preface to *The Romano-Jewish War* (Book I, chaps. 1-16) he has recorded that his dissatisfaction with the histories of this war previously published [in Greek] 'has induced me to offer to the public of the Roman Empire, in a Greek translation, a work of my own, originally composed in my native [Aramaic] language and published in the non-Hellenic Orient. . . I felt it a paradox that the truth concerning events of such importance should be allowed to remain unsettled and that the Parthians, the Babylonians, the most remote populations of Arabia, my own compatriots beyond the Euphrates, and the inhabitants of Adiabênê should be accurately informed, through my labours, of the origin, vicissitudes, and issue of the war, while the Hellenes and all Romans who did not serve in the campaign should have nothing better at their disposal than flattering or fictitious accounts which conceal the truth.'

The wideness of the range of the currency of Aramaic as a *lingua franca* in the Syriac World of Josephus's day has been noticed in V. v. 487-91.

² Rhodes was born on the 1st May, 1848, so he was not yet thirteen years old on the 12th April, 1861, when fire was opened on Fort Sumter, and not yet seventeen years old on the 26th April, 1865, when Johnson signed with Sherman the definitive convention for the surrender of all Confederate forces still under arms.

³ See Nevins, Allen: *The Emergence of Lincoln* (New York 1950, Scribner, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 206.

⁴ Morse Jr., John Torrey: 'Memoir of James Ford Rhodes', in the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, October, 1926-June, 1927 (Boston 1927), p. 178.

⁵ The pattern of Rhodes' working life is examined on pp. 147 and 154, below.

⁶ See Morse, *ibid.*, p. 180; A. L. Lowell, *ibid.*, p. 124.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 190.

The experience of living through a war—whether as a prominent participant in the catastrophe or as a sensitive spectator of it—was thus the inspiration of all these five historians, but it is also evident that the theme with which a war presented each of them was a revolution in human affairs which was of greater magnitude and significance than the military conflict by which it was signalized.

Clarendon's underlying theme is the decision, in the English Civil War, of a momentous controversy over the evolution of the traditional constitution of the kingdom;¹ and, though Clarendon may hold that this decision was the wrong one, and may hope that its ostensible reversal at the Restoration may prove to have been genuine and permanent, his belief in the importance of his constitutional theme is attested by his act of writing his history.

Rhodes' underlying theme is the discomfiture, registered in the defeat of the Confederacy in the American Civil War, of one section of the United States and province of the Western World of the day which had been alienated from the rest of an American Commonwealth and a Western Society by the fateful heritage of 'the peculiar institution' of Negro Slavery. In the American Civil War the slave-holding South failed to preserve by the *ultima ratio* of political secession a traditional social evil that, by this date, had been decisively condemned by the conscience of the Western World as a whole. In recording the political failure of eleven of the slave states included in the United States in 1861 to emulate the thirteen colonies that had revolted against the British Crown in A.D. 1775 by establishing a new sovereign independent confederation to house a nation struggling to be born, the historian is at the same time recording the social failure of a slave-holding branch of a Late Modern Western Society to emulate a city-state cosmos which had differentiated itself from the main body of Western Christendom in the Medieval chapter of Western history.

Thucydides' underlying subject is the larger one of the tragic breakdown of a promising civilization;² and an intuition of this theme, and recognition of its importance, were no doubt the considerations that led an American soldier-statesman, on the 22nd February, 1947, to exhort an audience composed of the faculty, students, and alumni of a great American university to study the antecedents of the war that Thucydides had immortalized.³

Josephus's underlying theme was an episode in the long-drawn-out encounter between the Syriac and the Hellenic Society in which a Palestinian Jewry, posted in the perilous front line of the Syriac order of battle, had been partly inflamed and partly intimidated by a Zealot minority into embarking on the forlorn hope of taking up arms against an Hellenic universal state.⁴

'The revolutionary element among the Jews, which was at its zenith both in funds and in forces, timed its rebellion to take advantage of the prevailing disorders. The consequent convulsions were so violent that the

¹ See III. iii. 318.

² See III. iii., 291.

³ See p. 60, n. 3, above.

⁴ See II. ii. 285-6; III. iii. 294-6; and V. v. 68 and 125-6.

fate of the East hung in the balance between the two belligerents, who had everything respectively to hope and to fear from the issue. The Jews hoped that the entire body of their compatriots beyond the Euphrates would join in their rising, while the Romans were harassed by attacks from their German neighbours, unrest among their Celtic subjects, and the world-wide convulsions that followed the death of Nero.¹

As for Procopius, his underlying subject is the rally, registered in Justinian's wars, of an Hellenic Society, embodied politically in a Roman Empire, after both the empire and the society had appeared to be moribund. The questions raised in Procopius's mind by this series of Roman military counter-offensives against the barbarian intruders on Roman territory are: 'How have the Romans managed to regain the upper hand? What have been the new military equipment and tactics through which they have won their victory?'² How has the Imperial Government acquired the resources for building churches as well as fortresses? And what is this revolutionary style of architecture in which Anthemius, in building the church of the *Ayía Sophía*,³ has vindicated the Justinianean rally of the Hellenic Civilization as signally as Belisarius has vindicated it by overthrowing the Vandals and the Ostrogoths? How, in short, has the Romania of Arcadius and Theodosius II (*imperabant* A.D. 395-450) become the Romania of Justinian (*imperabat* A.D. 527-65)? These were the questions that moved Procopius to write *The Wars of Justinian* and *Justinian's Public Works*;⁴ but the sixth-century Caesarean historian-barrister had not reached the end of his tether before the unhappy outcome of a reign that, on the surface, had looked so magnificent had raised a further question in Procopius's mind: 'Has not this apparent rally really been a delusion? Has not Justinian's policy of action and outlay on the grand scale been a megalomaniac's irreparable blunder? Has not he proved, *en fin de compte*, to have achieved nothing more than barren and ephemeral triumphs purchased at the cost of dissipating irreplaceable resources which Arcadius and Theodosius II had conserved and which Leo the Great, Zeno, and Anastasius had augmented?'⁵ This was the question that moved Procopius to think his second thoughts and to put these on record in *A Secret History of the Reign of Justinian and Theodora*.

Polybius

It will be seen that, while all five of the historians whom we have been considering were inspired to write their works by their experience of a war, the elemental question 'How has this come out of that?' came, in all five minds, to embrace a much wider gamut of historical change than just those events that could be construed as direct effects of the war which had originally precipitated the spate of intellectually fruitful questions. There are other historians to whom the elemental question presented itself from the outset in this broader form. For example, Polybius of Megalopolis (*vivebat circa* 206-128 B.C.) lived to see the number of

¹ Josephus: Preface to *The Romano-Jewish War* (Book I, chaps. 4-5).

² See the passage quoted in III. iii. 163.

⁴ The *De Aedificiis*.

³ See IV. iv. 54-55.

⁵ See IV. iv. 324-6.

Great Powers in a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World reduced from the five that had still been in existence at the time of the historian's birth to a single victorious survivor.

"The events which he has chosen as his subject are sufficiently extraordinary in themselves to arouse and stimulate the interest of every reader, young or old. What mind, however commonplace or indifferent, could feel no curiosity to learn the process by which almost the whole World fell under the undisputed ascendancy of Rome within a period of less than fifty-three years,¹ or to acquaint itself with the political organisation that was the secret of a triumph without precedent in the annals of Mankind? What mind, however much infatuated with other spectacles and other studies, could find a field of knowledge more profitable than this?"²

The experience of this political revolution in the Hellenic World of his day, which thus moved Polybius to ask the question 'How has this revolution come about?' also moved him to go on to ask two supplementary questions: 'Who are these Romans who have conquered the World within my lifetime?' and 'What is the intelligible field of historical study?'³

'If the two commonwealths which contended for world-power in this war had been objects of common knowledge [to the cultivated minority of the general public in the Hellenic World], it would perhaps have been superfluous to insert an introductory section in order to explain the policies and resources that inspired them to embark upon enterprises of such magnitude. Actually, however, the previous resources and transactions of the Roman and Carthaginian commonwealths are so unfamiliar to the majority of the Hellenic public that it has seemed essential to preface this history with two introductory volumes. This will ensure that no reader will find himself at the commencement of my main narrative without an answer to the question: "What policy was in the Romans' minds and what resources, military and economic, were in their hands at the time when they embarked upon these projects, which resulted in their becoming masters of the entire Mediterranean and its littoral?" These two introductory volumes will make it clear that the means at the Romans' disposal were admirably adapted to the end of world-power and world-empire, as conceived and attained by them.'⁴

The intellectual task, undertaken by Polybius, of putting these marchmen-conquerors of the Hellenic World on the Hellenic public's mental map was one for which the Megalopolitan statesman-historian had been singularly well equipped by the vicissitudes of his own life.⁵ Like Josephus after him, Polybius was deported from his native land by the Roman authorities—not, indeed, as the prisoner-of-war in chains that Josephus was when he was taken to Alexandria, but as a political hostage sentenced to internment. Like Josephus, again, Polybius, in the next chapter

¹ i.e. from the spring of 219 B.C., when Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, to the 22nd June, 168 B.C., when Lucius Aemilius Paullus won his decisive victory over the Macedonians at Pydna.—A.J.T.

² Polybius: Preface to *Oecumenical History since the [initial year of the] One Hundred and Fortieth Olympiad* [220–219 B.C.] (Book I, chap. 1), quoted already in III. iii. 312–13.

³ This second of Polybius's two supplementary questions was the key which opened the door into a study of History in the mind of the present writer (see the present work, I. i. 1–50).

⁴ Polybius, op. cit., Book I, chap. 3.

⁵ See III. iii. 310–18.

of his personal story, succeeded in winning his Roman captors' confidence and esteem, and in Polybius's case this esteem flowered into a warm personal friendship between the Megalopolitan internee and his younger Roman contemporary, Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus,¹ the son of the victor at Pydna who came to the front in Roman public life, both as a military commander and as a statesman, during the period of Polybius's internment in Italy (166-150 B.C.), and who subsequently took Polybius with him on his staff to the African front for the two Roman campaigns (*gerebantur* 147-146 B.C.) under Scipio's command that ended in the destruction of Carthage. When Polybius's fellow deportees from the city-states of the Achaean Confederacy had been relegated to Italian country towns, Scipio had obtained for Polybius the special privilege of being allowed to continue to reside in the capital. It will be seen that Polybius's portrait of Rome for the instruction of Hellenic eyes had been drawn from the life under exceptionally favourable conditions for the achievement of a faithful likeness.

Polybius's second supplementary question—"What is the intelligible field of historical study?"—opened up wider mental horizons.

"The coincidence by which all the transactions of the World have been oriented in a single direction and guided towards a single goal is the extraordinary characteristic of the present age, to which the special feature of the present work is a corollary. The unity of events imposes upon the historian a similar unity of composition in depicting for his readers the operation of the laws of Fortune on the grand scale, and this has been my own principal inducement and stimulus in the work which I have undertaken."²

The virtual unification of the Hellenic World, within the historian's own lifetime, on the political plane opened his eyes to the continuity,³ the universality,⁴ and the unity⁵ of History.

"Writers and readers of History ought to concentrate attention less upon the bald narrative of transactions than upon the antecedents, concomitants, and consequences of any given action. If you eliminate from History the "Why" and the "How" and the "Wherefore" of the particular transaction and the rationality—or the reverse—of its result, what is left of her ceases to be a science and becomes a *tour de force*, which may give momentary pleasure, but which is of no assistance whatever for dealing with the Future."⁶

"It is impossible to obtain from the monographs of historical specialists a comprehensive view of the morphology of Universal History. By reading a bald and isolated narrative of the transactions in Sicily and Spain, it is obviously impossible to realise and understand either the magnitude or the unity of the events in question, by which I mean the methods and institutions of which Fortune has availed herself in order to accomplish what has been her most extraordinary achievement in our generation. This achievement is nothing less than the reduction of the entire known world under the dominion of a single empire—a phenomenon of which there is

¹ See Polybius, op. cit., Book XXXI, chaps. 22-30.

² Ibid., Book I, chap. 4, already quoted in III. iii. 317, n. 5.

³ See *ibid.*, Book III, chaps. 31-32.

⁴ See *ibid.*, Book V, chaps. 31⁶-33.

⁵ See *ibid.*, Book VIII, chap. 2.

⁶ Ibid., Book III, chap. 31.

no previous example in recorded history. A limited knowledge of the processes by which Rome captured Syracuse and conquered Spain is, no doubt, obtainable from the specialists' monographs; but without the study of Universal History it is difficult to comprehend how she attained to universal supremacy. . . . It is only when we consider the fact that the same government and commonwealth was producing results in a variety of other spheres simultaneously with the conduct of these operations, and when we include in the same survey the internal crises and struggles which hampered those responsible for all the above-mentioned activities abroad, that the remarkable character of the events comes out clearly and obtains the attention which it deserves. This is my reply to those who imagine that the work of specialists will initiate them into Universal and General History.¹

A post-Modern Western historian, re-reading these passages from Polybius's work on the 18th September, 1952, was moved to wonder whether he might live to see 'the reduction of the entire known world under the dominion of a single empire'—a phenomenon of which there had in truth been as many previous examples in recorded history as there had been 'universal states'—inspire another Polybius to write the history of the political unification of another society. At the time of writing, it was impossible to foretell whether 'Fortune' would present this challenging theme to some responsive historian in the rising generation; it was not even possible yet to foretell whether, if a twentieth-century *Oikoumenê* did crystallize into unity, it would crystallize round the United States or round the Soviet Union. It might be guessed, however, that, if Rome's role were to be played in a post-Modern Western World by the United States, the historian of her involuntary assumption of dominion would be a West European, and it could be prophesied with greater confidence that, if the latter-day West European Polybius did leave his native land to do this piece of creative intellectual work, he would visit the United States neither as a prisoner-of-war nor as a political hostage but as the hospitably invited guest of some politically disinterested non-governmental American institution dedicated single-mindedly to the promotion of knowledge.

Josephus and Ibn al-Tiqtaqā

The opportunity, which Polybius found and seized, of making his conquered fellow-countrymen acquainted with their Roman conquerors was equally open to Josephus, who repaired to Rome some 236 years after Polybius had been deported thither; but the account of Roman institutions and policy which Josephus was so well qualified to write for the instruction of an Aramaic-reading Jewish public might not have found a market among the remnants of a shattered yet still Zealot-minded Jewry, in whose eyes the victorious Romans were still the same uninterestingly abominable Gentiles that they had always been, and in whose judgement the victory of Roman over Jewish arms was due, not to any notable human strength or virtue in the Roman Commonwealth, but to the inscrutable will of an omnipotent Yahweh. Josephus did emu-

¹ Polybius, op. cit., Book VIII, chap. 2.

late Polybius in turning to good account his intellectually advantageous footing in two culturally diverse camps, but the use that Josephus made of his opportunity was to address himself, as Polybius had done, to an Hellenic public whose curiosity was still insatiable. The supplementary question that Josephus took up after he had responded to the question raised by the Great Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70 was, not 'Who are these Romans who have crushed an insurgent Palestinian Jewry?', but 'Who are these Jews who have brought this fate upon themselves by daring to challenge the might of an oecumenical empire commanding all the resources of a politically united Hellenic World?' This was the question that Josephus answered by writing, for an Hellenic public, *The Ancient History of the Jews*.

In this work Josephus commemorated, for the instruction of their conquerors, the history and êthos of a Jewish advance-guard of the Syriac Society which had gone down to disaster in a forlorn hope in one of the many engagements in the course of a one-thousand-years-long struggle between a post-Cyran Syriac and a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization; and what Josephus had thus done for a Palestinian Jewry was done for the Syriac Society as a whole, in the last phase of its history, by the Shi'ī Muslim historian Ibn al-Tiqtaqā of Hillah¹ (*natus circa* A.D. 1262).

Ibn al-Tiqtaqā had been born in the metropolitan province of a re-integrated Syriac universal state on the morrow of the extirpation of the 'Abbasid Caliphate and incidental devastation of 'Irāq² by the Mongol war-lord Hülāgū in A.D. 1258. The question presented to him by his social milieu was: 'How has this world in which I have grown up—a world in which 'Irāq is economically derelict and politically subject to the rule of a Eurasian Nomad barbarian war-band—come out of the world in which my forefathers lived from one generation to another over a Time-span of more than five hundred years: a world in which 'Irāq was the garden and granary of the *Oikoumenē*, and in which an 'Abbasid oecumenical government ruled from Baghdad a universal state extending north-eastward to the Jaxartes, northward to the Caucasus, westward to the Atlantic, and southward to the Arabian and Sindī shores of the Indian Ocean?' The supplementary question that arose for Ibn al-Tiqtaqā, as it had arisen for Josephus, was: 'What have been the history and the êthos of this society that has met with this disaster?' And, in Ibn al-Tiqtaqā's generation, as in Josephus's, this was a question that was of some interest to the alien conquerors by whose hands the disaster had been inflicted; for Ibn al-Tiqtaqā lived to see a militarily subjugated Dār-al-Islām begin to take its savage Eurasian Nomad conquerors captive.³

¹ 'Ibn al-Tiqtaqā', 'the son of a chatterbox', was an onomatopoeic nickname for Jalāl-ad-Dīn Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Tajī'd-Dīn Abī'l-Hasan 'Alī, the spokesman of the Shi'ī community in the Shi'ī holy cities—Hillah, Najaf, and Karbalā—in an 'Irāq that was to remain the stronghold of Shi'ism (see the note by Professor H. A. R. Gibb, printed in the present Study, I. i. 400-2) until the forcible conversion of Iran by Shah Ismā'il Safawī. See the notice of Ibn al-Tiqtaqā by Clément Huart in *Les Premiers siècles de l'Islam*, vol. ii (Leiden 1927, Brill), pp. 423-4. According to E. G. ... version of Mirzā Muhammad b. 'Abdī'l-Wahhāb-i-Qazwīnī's edition of 'Alā-ad-Dīn 'Atā Malik-i-Juwaynī's *Ta'rikh-i-Yahān Gushā* (London 1912, Luzac), p. lx, Ibn al-Tiqtaqā's name was Safīyū'd-Dīn Muhammad b. 'Alī b. Muhammad b. Tabātabā.

² See IV. iv. 42-45.

³ See Horace: *Epistulae*, Book II, Ep. i, l. 156.

After the Mongol conqueror Hülāgū's son and second successor Ahmad Takūdar (*dominabatur* A.D. 1252-4) had paid for his conversion to Islam by losing both his throne and his life at the hands of his outraged pagan Mongol *comitatus*,¹ Hülāgū's sixth successor Ghāzān Khān embraced Islam in the year of his accession, A.D. 1295, without suffering his great-uncle Takūdar's fate;² and this definitive conversion of the House of Hülāgū inaugurated a change of attitude on the converts' part towards a religion and culture that had now become theirs as well as their subjects'.³ The question 'What have been the history and *êthos* of this society that is now captivating its conquerors?' was answered by Ibn al-Tiqtaqā in a history of Islam from the epiphany of the Prophet Muhammad down to the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in A.D. 1258, and a work that has become celebrated as *Al-Fakhrī* obtained its title from the name of Ghāzān Khān's governor of Mawsil, Fakhr-ad-Dīn 'Īsā, to whom the book was dedicated by the author. In this answer to the supplementary question that the historian's social milieu had presented to him, Ibn al-Tiqtaqā has succeeded in recapturing and reproducing something of the freshness and radiance of a dawn in which the Primitive Muslims Arab, as they went 'from strength to strength',⁴ had found it 'bliss to be alive'⁵ under a new dispensation in which the long despised and rejected⁶ Children of Ishmael were fortified by the conviction that they had been chosen by God to become the instruments of His will and purpose in place of the Jewish and Christian People of the Book.

'The same stone which the builders refused is become the headstone in the corner. This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes.'

¹ See Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 25-26.

² See I. i. 363.

³ On the 4th Sha'bān, 694 (the 19th June, 1295), Ghāzān 'and ten thousand Mongols made their profession of faith in the presence of Shaykh Sadr-ad-Dīn Ibrāhīm, the son of the eminent doctor Sa'd-ad-Dīn al-Hamawī. Nor did Ghāzān lack zeal for his new convictions; for, four months after his conversion, he permitted [the Mongol amir] Nawrūz [a previous convert who had been instrumental in converting Ghāzān,] to destroy the churches, synagogues, and idol-temples at Tabriz. He also caused a new coinage bearing Muhammadan inscriptions to be struck, and by an edict issued in May 1299 prohibited usury, as contrary to the Muhammadan religion. In November 1297 the Mongol amirs adopted the turban in place of their national head-dress' (Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 40-41).

Ghāzān Khān's conversion secured for Islam not merely its survival but the recovery of its supremacy in the Il-Khāns' dominions, which included Iran, Armenia, and Eastern Anatolia, as well as 'Irāq. On this occasion the anti-Islamic reactions in the converted Il-Khān's pagan Mongol *comitatus* were successfully repressed (see Browne, op. cit., p. 41); and Ghāzān's brother and successor Khudābandah, *alias* Uljaytū (*accessit* A.D. 1305), who had been converted to Islam by his wife, promptly confirmed his predecessor's re-establishment of Islam as the official religion of this Mongol successor-state of the 'Abbasid Caliphate (see Browne, op. cit., p. 48), though his Christian mother had had him baptized as a child under the name of Nicholas (op. cit., p. 46).

The tragic losing battle fought by the Nestorian Christian Church in the Il-Khāns' dominions against a reflux tide of Muslim fanaticism, which the triumphant conversion of Ghāzān Khān had let loose, is graphically described in 'The History of the Life and Travels of Rabban Sāwma, Envoy and Plenipotentiary of the Mongol Khāns to the Kings of Europe, and Markōs who, as Mār Yahbhallāhā III, became Patriarch of the Nestorian Church in Asia', translated from the Syriac by Sir E. A. Wallis Budge under the title *The Monks of Kūblāi Khan, Emperor of China* (London 1928, The Religious Tract Society).

⁴ Psalm lxxxiv. 7.

⁵ Wordsworth, W.: *The French Revolution, as it appeared to Enthusiasts = The Prelude*, Book XI, l. 108.

⁷ Psalm cxviii. 22-23.

⁶ Isaiah liii. 3.

In this portrait of Primitive Islam, painted by a scion of the House of 'Alī, on the morrow of the death of a pre-Mongol Islamic commonwealth, to satisfy the slayers' posthumous curiosity about their victim, there is a touch of the serenity that comes over a human countenance when the hand of Death smoothes away the lines drawn there by the struggles of life.

'Alā-ad-Dīn Jūwaynī and Rashīd-ad-Dīn Hamadānī

The 'Irāqī historian Ibn al-Tiqtaqā's attractive history of the pre-Mongol Muslim Commonwealth in his own Arabic tongue was not the only notable historical work that was written under a Eurasian Nomad domination in the eastern half of Dār-al-Islām, on the morrow of the catastrophe of A.D. 1258, in response to questions raised by this harrowing experience; nor was this the only historical *motif* that was suggested by the spectacle of the 'Abbasid Caliphate's fatal collision with an erupting Mongol Eurasian Nomad Power.

One of the incidental and undesigned effects of the overthrow of the 'Abbasids and devastation of 'Irāq was, as we have noticed already in an earlier context,¹ the birth, in a *ci-devant* Syriac World's now derelict north-eastern provinces, of an Iranic Muslim Civilization, affiliated to the Syriac, in which, for most purposes other than the exposition of Islamic theology, a New Persian language and literature were to supplant the Arabic language and literature that had been dominant in all provinces of Dār-al-Islām during the six centuries intervening between the overthrow of the Sasanids by the Primitive Muslim Arab ghāzis and the overthrow of the 'Abbasids by the pagan Mongols. When a previously oecumenical Arabic culture retreated westwards before the face of the oncoming Mongols into a fastness in Egypt with a glacis in Syria and an eastern frontier at the western elbow of the River Euphrates, a New Persian literature that, by this time, had been on the rise for some three hundred years now at last came fully into its own; and this was perhaps the only creative cultural activity in the conquered and devastated half of Dār-al-Islām that benefited from the disaster on the very morrow of it. During the lifetime of the survivors of a generation in Dār-al-Islām that was old enough to have completed its education in a classical Arabic language and literature before the catastrophe of A.D. 1258, the cultivation of the New Persian language and literature was already relieved of the incubus of the cultural ascendancy of Arabic without being yet impoverished by being cut off from the living sources of Arabic literary inspiration. The period of Mongol domination in Iran and 'Irāq (*curriebat* A.D. 1258-1337) was an age in which the leading Persian men of letters were still bilingual in the full sense of still being able not merely to read Arabic but also to write in it, as well as in their native Persian tongue;² and it was also an age which produced

¹ See I. i. 71, with n. 3.

² This point is made by Browne in op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 62-65. The historian Rashīd-ad-Dīn (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1247-1318), for example, made it his practice to arrange for the translation of his Persian works into Arabic and the translation of his Arabic works into Persian. Rashīd-ad-Dīn's own account of these arrangements of his is quoted

incomparably eminent Persian historians,¹ in contrast to both the previous and the subsequent age, in which the brightest stars in the firmament of a New Persian literature were, not historians, but poets.²

The ascendancy of the historians in the intervening Il-Khānī Age is significant; and it is no less significant that the two greatest members of this pleiad—'Alā-ad-Dīn 'Atā Malik-i-Juwaynī (*vivebat* A.D. 1226–83) and Rashīd-ad-Dīn Fadlallāh Tabīb al-Hamadānī (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1247–1318)—were also eminent civil servants in the Mongol Il-Khāns' service, and that two of the lesser lights, Wassāf-i-Hadrat 'Abdallāh b. Fadlallāh of Shīrāz and Hamdallāh Mustawfī of Qazwīn, both of whom were protégés of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's, were officials of the Il-Khānī Government's Internal Revenue Department.³

The pagan barbarian conquerors of Iran and 'Irāq, who held out for thirty-seven years (A.D. 1258–95) after their conquest of Baghdad before succumbing to Islam themselves, had found themselves from the outset unable to dispense with the services of their newly acquired Muslim subjects; for the conquerors' purpose in invading Dār-al-Islām and overthrowing the Caliphate had been to step into the Caliph's shoes; and the only means by which these interloping barbarians could ensure that, after they had extinguished the Caliphate, the Caliph's government should be carried on for their benefit was by drawing upon an existing panel of native Persian Muslim professional administrators. The historian 'Alā-ad-Dīn 'Atā Malik-i-Juwaynī's brother, Shams-ad-Dīn Muhammad Juwaynī, managed the administration of Hūlāgū's appanage for the conqueror and for his first two successors during twenty-one years (A.D. 1263–84) of the Il-Khānī régime as their *sāhib-dīwān*,⁴ and the two brothers were the sons of a *mustawfī'l-mamālik* (minister of finance) and the grandsons of a prime minister of a by then already *fainéant* 'Abbasid Caliphate's Khwārizmian successor-state in the north-eastern marches of Dār-al-Islām, over against the Eurasian Steppe, on which the Mongol storm had broken in its full fury in A.D. 1220⁵ at the fiat of a world-conquering Chingis.

The grandfather had accompanied the last of the Khwārizm Shahs, Sultan Muhammad, and his indomitable son and successor Jalāl-ad-Dīn Mankubirni, when they had 'gone on the run', fighting rear-guard actions as they went.⁶ The father, who had lingered in Khurāsān, had

verbatim, from *man. arabe* No. 356, foll. 1 et seqq. in the Bibliothèque Nationale [*ci-devant* Royale] in Paris, by E. M. Quatremère in his life of Rashīd-ad-Dīn prefixed to his edition of part of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's *Yāmi'-al-Tawārikh* ('A Comprehensive Collection of Histories'), *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse*, vol. i (Paris 1836, Imprimerie Royale), pp. cxxxiv–cxxxvi. A student of History will be reminded of the cultural situation in Italy under an Ostrogoth domination (*durabat* A.D. 493–535), when the leading Italian men of letters were still conversant with Greek as well as with their native Latin.

¹ See Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 62 and 65.

² The pre-Mongol age of New Persian literary history had been made illustrious by Firdawsī (*vivebat circa* A.D. 932–1020/1) and by Sa'di (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1184–1292); the post-Mongol age was to be made illustrious by Hāfiz (*obūt* A.D. 1389) and by Jāmi (*vivebat* A.D. 1414–92). See I. i. 360, n. 1, and II. ii. 77, n. 1.

³ See Browne, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 and 87.

⁴ For the dates, see Browne, *apud* Juwaynī, *ed. cit.*, pp. xxix and xlvii–xlviii.

⁵ See II. ii. 142, with n. 2.

⁶ See Browne, E. G., in Mirzā Muhammad Qazwīnī's edition of 'Alā-ad-Dīn Juwaynī's *Tārikh-i-Jahān Gushā* (London 1912, Luzac), p. xxi.

been rounded up at Tūs by the Mongol governor Jintimūr and taken, willy nilly, into the Mongols' service in A.D. 1232-3,¹ and his two sons, Shams-ad-Dīn and 'Alā-ad-Dīn, had followed in his footsteps. Shams-ad-Dīn had been in the service of Chingis' grandson and Qūbilāy's brother Hūlāgū, the commander of the Mongol forces on an anti-Islamic front in the Khwārizm Shāhs' already conquered domain to the north-east of the Caspian Gates, two years before his Mongol master's extirpation of the Ismā'īlī Shī'ī Assassins at Alamūt in A.D. 1257, and three years before his sack of Baghdad in A.D. 1258.² Shams-ad-Dīn's brother 'Alā-ad-Dīn, the historian (*natus* A.D. 1226), had entered the Mongol public service before he was twenty years old³ as the protégé of his father's Mongol patron Arghūn, who had been the governor of the Mongol Empire's anti-Islamic march before Hūlāgū Khān's arrival on this front in A.D. 1256,⁴ and he was one of three commissioners to whom Arghūn had entrusted the administration of Khurāsān when he had handed over his own command to Hūlāgū.⁵ 'Alā-ad-Dīn Juwaynī had then accompanied Hūlāgū Khān on his campaigns (*gesta* A.D. 1256-8) against the Ismā'īlī Power in Central and Western Iran and against the remnant of the 'Abbasid Power in 'Irāq;⁶ he was appointed governor of Baghdad by Hūlāgū in A.D. 1259, within a year of the conquest;⁷ and he continued—save for a few months in A.D. 1281-2, when he was under a cloud⁸—to hold this responsible administrative post till his death in A.D. 1283.⁹

The historian Rashīd-ad-Dīn, who gained his first access to the Il-Khānī Court as a professional physician during the reign of Hūlāgū's first successor Abāqā Khān (*dominabatur* A.D. 1265-82),¹⁰ was taken by Abāqā into the public administration, was appointed Grand Vizier by Ghāzān Khān (*dominabatur* A.D. 1295-1304),¹¹ and was retained in this post throughout the rest of Ghāzān's reign and the whole of his successor Khudābandah Ūjaytū's (*dominabatur* A.D. 1305-16). Both Shams-ad-Dīn Juwaynī and Rashīd-ad-Dīn Hamadānī obtained important posts in the public service for their sons and other relatives. One of Shams-ad-Dīn's sons, Bahā-ad-Dīn, had made his mark as governor of 'Irāq-i 'Ajam (the Jabal) and Fars before his death at the age of thirty;¹² and Rashīd-ad-Dīn's son Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn was appointed to his father's post of Grand Vizier¹³ by Abu Sa'īd (*dominabatur* A.D. 1317-34), the last effective ruler of the Il-Khānī line.

Public service proved to be as dangerous a trade for Persian men of

¹ See Browne, *ibid.*, pp. xxi-xxii.

² See Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii, p. 20.

³ See Browne, *apud* Juwaynī, ed. cit., p. xxiii.

⁴ See Browne, *ibid.*, p. xxv.

⁵ See Browne, *ibid.*, p. xxvi.

⁶ See Browne, *ibid.*, pp. xxvii-xxviii.

⁷ See Browne, *ibid.*, pp. xxviii-xxix; eundem: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii, p. 20, n. 1.

⁸ See Browne, *apud* Juwaynī, ed. cit., pp. xxxix-xliv.

⁹ Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii., p. 66.

¹⁰ See Quatremère, E. M., in his life of Rashīd-ad-Dīn prefixed to his edition of part of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's *ġāmi'-al-Tawārīkh* ('A Comprehensive Collection of Histories'), *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse*, vol. i (Paris 1836, Imprimerie Royale), p. viii.

¹¹ See Quatremère, *ibid.*

¹² See Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii, p. 21. Another of his sons Sharaf-ad-Dīn Hārūn, was a poet.

¹³ See Quatremère, *op. cit.*, p. xlvii.

letters under a Mongol régime in Iran and 'Irāq as it had been for Roman men of letters under an Ostrogoth régime in Italy. The historian-governor 'Alā-ad-Dīn 'Atā Malik-i-Juwaynī, after his fall in A.D. 1281 and reinstatement in A.D. 1282, was so fortunate as to die, as Cassiodorus had died, in his bed; but Boethius's fate overtook first the historian's brother, the *sāhib-dīwān*, and then Rashīd-ad-Dīn and Rashīd-ad-Dīn's son, Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn, in turn. Shams-ad-Dīn Muhammad Juwaynī and his surviving sons were Ahmad Takūdar Khān's fellow-victims in the anti-Islamic *émeute* among the Il-Khān's pagan Mongol *comitatus* that was provoked by Takūdar's rashly premature conversion to Islam.¹ Rashīd-ad-Dīn, after having been dismissed from office by Ūljaytū Khān's successor Abu Sa'īd Khān in October 1317, was put to death, with his young son Ibrāhīm, on the 18th July, 1318, at the age of seventy-three, as the penalty for his having incautiously allowed himself to be persuaded to resume office.² Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn and a surviving brother of his met their deaths by violence in A.D. 1336, in the anarchy in which the Mongol régime in Iran and 'Irāq foundered after the death of Abu Sa'īd.³ In a Mongol Iran, as in an Ostrogoth Italy, the civil service was thus a hazardous occupation⁴ for a man of letters, but it was also a stimulating one.

The Persian civil servant historians of the Il-Khānī Age were stimulated by their social milieu to ask Polybius's questions as well as Josephus's and their own Josephan-minded Arab contemporary Ibn al-Tīqtaqā's.

Like Josephus, 'Alā-ad-Dīn 'Atā Malik-i-Juwaynī has commemorated, in the history of the Khwārizm Shāhs that constitutes the second part of his tripartite *Ta'rikh-i-Jahān-Gushā* ('A History of the World-Conqueror' Chingis Khan),⁵ the forlorn hope of an advance-guard of his society that had put up a valiant resistance to the onslaught of an overwhelming alien power, while Rashīd-ad-Dīn in his *Jāmi'-al-Tawārikh*

¹ See Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii, pp. 27-29.

² See Quatremère, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxix-xliv.

³ See *ibid.*, p. lii.

⁴ In both situations the danger arose from the interaction of two untoward factors. One of these was the barbarian rulers' proneness to suspect disloyalty in alien subjects whose professional services were indispensable to them because the intricacies of a civilized administration were beyond their own comprehension. The second untoward factor was the mutual rivalry and jealousy of the native professional civil servants themselves, who found it difficult to resist the temptation to further their own careers by denigrating their colleagues in the eyes of their ignorant and therefore credulous barbarian masters. Under the Il-Khānī régime the principal Persian officers of state were almost driven into falling foul of one another by the practice—introduced, no doubt, by the Mongol rulers deliberately, as a safeguard against possible abuses of power on the part of their Persian employees—of appointing a pair of Grand Viziers, equal with one another in status, without any demarcation, either territorial or functional, between their respective competences (see Quatremère, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxii-xxxiii).

⁵ An edition by Mirzā Muhammad b. 'Abd-al-Wahhāb of Qaswīn has been published in the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, No. xvi, in three volumes (London 1912, Luzac). See also Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii, pp. 65-66. This work, which was completed in A.D. 1260, stops short of the fall of Baghdad in A.D. 1258, but tells, in the third of its three parts, the story of the fall of Alamūt in 1256. The whole of this Part III is devoted to the history of the Ismā'īlis down to Hülāgū's overthrow of their last Grand Master, Rukn-ad-Dīn Khurshāh, in Kūhistan and the Elburz. Juwaynī's work has been continued in Wassāf's, who has carried the regional history of Mongol rule in Iran and 'Irāq on from A.D. 1257, where Juwaynī's history stops, down to A.D. 1328 in his *Tajziyat-al-Amsār wa Tajziyat-al-A'sār* (see Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 67-68).

('A Comprehensive Collection of Histories') has commemorated the history and ethos of the whole of the Syriac Society to which the Mongol invaders had given the *coup de grâce* that the Western Christian Crusaders had previously tried and failed to deliver. Moreover, in this part of his work, Rashīd-ad-Dīn has taken a broader view of the Syriac Civilization than has been taken by Ibn al-Tiqtaqā in *Al-Fakhīr*. The 'Irāqī Sayyid's historical vision is limited to the history of a pre-Mongol Islamic Commonwealth, whereas Rashīd-ad-Dīn treats the history of the Caliphate, from Abu Bakr to Musta'sim, merely as the second of three chapters of an essentially Iranian story in which the first chapter runs from a mythical dawn down to the fall of the Sasanian Dynasty, while the third chapter is occupied with the histories of the 'Abbasid Caliphate's Persian and Turkish successor-states down to the bursting of the Mongol Nomad tornado that has swept them all away.¹ The history of the same Syriac Civilization, seen from the same Iranian angle of vision, and presented within the same framework on the same lines, is the subject of the whole of Mustawfī's *Ta'rikh-i-Guzīdah* ('A Select History'),² in which the author thus shows himself to be, on this point, Rashīd-ad-Dīn's disciple as well as his protégé.

Moreover, for Rashīd-ad-Dīn, the history of a Syriac Civilization that has fallen a victim to the Mongols is not, even on the broader lines on which the Persian historian approaches it, either a whole in itself or an end in itself, as it is for the contemporary Arab historian Ibn al-Tiqtaqā. In Rashīd-ad-Dīn's work the history of his own civilization is introduced as an integral part of Universal History, and he has included Universal History in his 'Comprehensive Collection' because he has undertaken to answer the three questions that have likewise been the inspirations of Polybius's *Oecumenical History*:³ 'How has this revolution in human affairs come about?' 'Who are these previously obscure barbarians who have suddenly made their mark by conquering the World in our time?' 'What is the intelligible field of historical study?' According to Rashīd-ad-Dīn's own account of his intellectual history, he had begun to study the history of the Mongols on his own initiative;⁴ but he had not thought of writing history⁵ till he was commanded by his master Ghāzān Khān to write the history of the Eurasian Nomads⁶ (the part of his work corresponding to Polybius's account of the institutions and policy of the Romans), and thereafter, by Ghāzān's successor Khudābandah Ūljaytū, to write a Universal History and Geography⁷ (corresponding to the remainder of Polybius's work). Rashīd-ad-Dīn implies

¹ See Browne's arrangement of the component parts of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's 'Comprehensive Collection' in op. cit., vol. iii, p. 74. In this Iranocentric presentation of Syriac history the Arab Caliphate is treated, as will be observed, as the successor of the Iranian Empire of the Sasanidae, and not of the Arabian principality established by the Prophet Muhammad. Since Muhammad's career was contemporary with the last days of the Sasanian régime, his biography finds its place in this part of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's 'Comprehensive Collection', as a postscript to the volume devoted to the Sasanidae.

² See the table of contents of Mustawfī's 'A Select History', as reproduced by Browne in op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 90-94.

³ See pp. 64-66, above.

⁴ Rashīd-ad-Dīn: *Yāmi'-al-Tawārikh*, preface, pp. 80-81 in Quatremère's edition and French translation of the Persian text.

⁵ See Rashīd-ad-Dīn, preface to the *Yāmi'*, Quatremère's translation, p. 47.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 7-9, 47, 51, 75, and 81.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 37-39 and 59.

that he might have shrunk from embarking on this vast scholarly and literary enterprise in the narrow margin of leisure left to him by his exacting official duties if he had not felt it to be part of these duties to obey, as best he could, these royal commands in a field outside the normal range of a civil servant's activities.¹ The credit due to the two Mongol princes for having thus set Rashīd-ad-Dīn to work is proclaimed in the titles given by the author to the two parts of his 'Comprehensive Collection'. His special history of the Mongols and Turks is called the *Ta'rikh-i-Ghāzānī*,² while his General History of Mankind is dedicated to Ūljaytū.

The historian's elemental intellectual question 'How has this come out of that?' presented itself in Rashīd-ad-Dīn's social milieu in the same terms as in Polybius's. 'What', this social milieu inspired the Persian historian to ask himself, 'has been the process by which almost the whole World has fallen under the undisputed ascendancy of the Mongols within a period of less than fifty-five years?'³ And this question has been put by Rashīd-ad-Dīn in the preface to his *A Comprehensive Collection of Histories* in terms reminiscent of the corresponding passage⁴ in Polybius's preface to his *Oecumenical History*.

'The beginning of every new religion or new empire constitutes a distinctive new era (*Ibtidā'-i-har milleti wa har dawlati ta'rikh-i-mu'ayyan bāshad*). Now what fact or event has ever been more memorable than the beginning of the dynasty of Chingis Khān, or has better deserved to be taken as marking a new era? The fact is that, within the span of a small number of years, this monarch . . . subjugated a great number of the kingdoms of the World and conquered and exterminated a host of unruly people. . . . When world-wide dominion devolved upon Chingis Khān and his noble kinsmen and illustrious descendants, all the kingdoms of the *Oikoumenē*—Chīn and Māchīn (South China), Khitāy (North China), Hind and Sind (India), Transoxania, Turkistan, Syria, Rūm, the Ās (Alans), the Russians, the Circassians, Qipchāq, Kalār (?),⁶ the Bashkirs—or, to put it in one word, all the countries within the four quarters of the compass—submitted to these princes and became subject to their ordinances . . . [Chingis Khān] gave the whole Universe one and the same physiognomy and instilled identical feelings into all hearts. He purified the domains of the empires by delivering them from the domination of perverse usurpers and from the oppression of audacious enemies. He handed his empire on to his illustrious kinsmen and noble descendants.'⁷

¹ See Rashīd-ad-Dīn, preface to the *Yāmi'*, Quatremère's translation, pp. 47-51.

² The second volume of the *Ta'rikh-i-Ghāzānī*, covering the history of the Mongol Khāqāns from the accession of Chingis' son Ogotāy to the death of Qūbilāy's grandson Timūr, has been edited by E. Blochet in the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, vol. xviii (London 1911, Luzac). The chapters on the career of Hūlāgū Khān in the third volume, which covers the history of the Il-Khāns of Iran and 'Irāq down to the death of Ghāzān, have been edited, together with the preface to the whole of the *Yāmi'-al-Tawārikh*, by E. M. Quatremère in *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse*, vol. i (Paris 1836, Imprimerie Royale).

³ i.e. from the overthrow of Wang Khān the Karāyit by Chingis Khān the Mongol in A.D. 1203 (see II. ii. 237-8) to the overthrow of the 'Abbasid Caliph Mustā'sim by Chingis' grandson Hūlāgū in A.D. 1258.

⁴ Quoted on p. 64, above.

⁵ In the two preceding sentences the author has pointed out that 'new era' is one of two meanings of the word *ta'rikh*, the other meaning being 'chronicle'.—A.J.T.

⁶ See Quatremère's learned but inconclusive note 88, in op. cit., p. 72, on this enigmatic name.

⁷ Rashīd-ad-Dīn, *ibid.*, pp. 60-63 and 70-73.

This epoch-making revolution in the World's affairs raised, in minds that had grown up on the morrow of it, the two Polybian supplementary questions 'Who are these conquerors of the World?' and 'What is this World that they have conquered?' Rashīd-ad-Dīn addressed himself to the first supplementary question at Ghāzān's instance, and to the second at Ūljaytū's. In taking up the first of the two, Rashīd-ad-Dīn had been anticipated by 'Alā-ad-Dīn 'Atā Malik-i-Juwaynī; for the *Ta'rikh-i-Jahān-Gushā* was finished in A.D. 1260,¹ forty-six years before the *Ta'rikh-i-Ghāzānī* was presented by Rashīd-ad-Dīn to Ghāzān's successor Ūljaytū on the 14th April, 1306,² and the first of the three parts of Juwaynī's work deals with the history of Chingis Khān, his predecessors, and his successors down to his son Chaghatāy, whose appanage lay in Transoxania and the Zungarian Gap ('Mughalistan').³ It was, indeed, only to be expected that a Persian Muslim historian whose father and grandfather had been in the public service of the Khwārizm Shāhs should have written his answer to the question 'Who are these irresistible Mongol invaders?' forty-six years before the same question was answered by a Persian Muslim historian whose birthplace was Hamadān; for the Mongol storm had broken upon the Kwārizmian march of Dār-al-Islām as early as A.D. 1220, while Western Iran had not been exposed to it till A.D. 1256, when the Mongols forced the passage of the Caspian Gates in their campaign of that year against the Īsmā'īlis.

The purpose of the special history of the Mongols and Turks which Rashīd-ad-Dīn wrote in accordance with Ghāzān Khān's instructions was, in the author's own Herodotean words, 'to make sure that the memory of the extraordinary events and important facts that have signalized the epiphany of the dynasty of the Mongols should not be obliterated and annihilated by lapse of Time . . . nor suffer the fate of remaining concealed under an impenetrably thick veil [of ignorance]';⁴ and the civil servant historian proceeds to explain the grounds of his royal master's anxiety on this score. The history of the Mongols before and during their conquest of the World was by this time already unfamiliar to all but a few of Ghāzān Khān's subjects; it could be foreseen that the rising generation in the Il-Khān's Mongol *comitatus* would cease to feel any interest in their own family histories and in their ancestors' achievements; and it would be particularly disgraceful to allow oblivion thus to overtake the deeds of Chingis Khān and his Mongol companions, who had achieved, in their day, the unique feat of conquering the World. Reading between Rashīd-ad-Dīn's lines, we can surmise that Ghāzān had instructed his Persian Muslim civil servant to put on record the history of the pagan Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe because he had realized that his own *ci-devant* Nomad retainers—who had

¹ See p. 72, n. 5, above.

² See E. Berthels' article on Rashīd-ad-Dīn in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iii (Leiden 1936, Brill), pp. 1124-5.

³ See II. ii. 145.

⁴ Rashīd-ad-Dīn, *ibid.*, pp. 78-79. Compare the opening words of Herodotus's preface: 'Herodotus of Halicarnassus presents the results of his researches in the following work, with the twofold object of saving the past of Mankind from oblivion and ensuring that the extraordinary achievements of the Hellenic and Oriental worlds shall enjoy their just renown—particularly the transactions which brought them into conflict with one another'.

migrated from 'the Desert' to 'the Sown' forty years before the date of his own accession in A.D. 1395,¹ and who, in the act, had changed their trade by becoming herdsmen of human cattle in place of their former ungulate livestock²—would have been bound in any case soon to become assimilated to their more highly cultivated sedentary subjects and were destined to lose their Eurasian Nomad social heritage all the more quickly now that Ghāzān himself had accelerated their assimilation by his policy of conversion to Islam. Ghāzān Khān had become a devout Muslim without having ceased to be a patriotic Mongol and a proud Chingisid; and, in commissioning Rashīd-ad-Dīn to write in the New Persian language a history of the Mongols and Turks, Ghāzān was seeking to reconcile his new loyalty with his old one.

Rashīd-ad-Dīn—in constant attendance, as he had to be, upon his Il-Khānī masters in North-Western Iran in an age in which the Central Government of the Mongol Empire no longer had the power to summon the administrators of such outlying appanages to the Khāqān's Court to account to him there for their stewardship—had not enjoyed the opportunities, that had been thrust upon Juwaynī,³ of visiting Mongolia and

¹ The expeditionary force with which Hūlāgū made his conquests west of the Caspian Gates had left Qāraqorum in July 1252 and had left the Steppe behind for ever upon entering Transoxania in A.D. 1255, one season before the campaign of A.D. 1256 against the Ismā'īlis (see Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. ii (London 1906, Fisher Unwin, pp. 452-3)). Thus, by the date of Ghāzān's accession, they had been vegetating for forty years in a demoralizing Land of Milk and Honey.

² The social unhealthiness of this change in a Nomad horde's way of life has been noticed in III. iii. 22-25.

³ Both 'Alā-ad-Dīn Juwaynī and his father Bahā-ad-Dīn Juwaynī before him had travelled more than once from Khurāsān to Mongolia and back in the course of their official duties in the Mongol public service. Bahā-ad-Dīn had been sent in A.D. 1235-6 by his captor and patron Jintimūr to the court of the Khāqān Ogotāy, who had confirmed the appointment to the post of *sāhib-dīwān* which Jintimūr had conferred upon him (Browne, *apud* Juwaynī, ed. cit., p. xxii); and he had been taken to Qāraqorum again by Arghūn, Jintimūr's second successor in the government of Khurāsān (see Browne, *ibid.*). 'Alā-ad-Dīn 'spent some ten years of his life in these journeyings to and fro' (Browne, *ibid.*, p. xxiv); and his third journey in Arghūn's company (*peregrinabantur* A.D. 1251-4, during the reign of the Khāqān Mangū) gave him the inspiration to write his history. On this occasion, he arrived at Qāraqorum on the 2nd May, 1252, and did not set out on his journey back to Khurāsān till September 1253.

'It was during this stay of a year and five months at the Mongol capital that it was suggested to our author by some of his friends . . . that he should compose this history to immortalize the great deeds and conquests of the Mongol sovereigns. A certain diffidence as to his capacity for this task at first prompted him to refuse, but he was ultimately convinced that he possessed certain almost unique qualifications for it, to wit his extensive acquaintance with the Mongol Empire and its most notable administrators, the free access to the most authentic sources of information permitted to him by the high official position which he held, and his first-hand knowledge of many important political events. He therefore finally agreed to undertake the task, which he began in A.H. 650 and concluded in A.H. 658 (A.D. 1252-60).'—Browne, *apud* Juwaynī, ed. cit., p. xxv.

A similar journey to the ordu of the Mongol Khāqān Mangū, in the heart of the Eurasian Steppe, inspired a notable work of Medieval Western Christian literature, the *Itinerarium Fratris Willielmi de Rubruquis, de Ordine Fratrum Minorum, Galli, Anno Gratie 1253, ad Partes Orientales*. Friar William of Rubruck arrived at Mangū's court some three months after the date of 'Alā-ad-Dīn Juwaynī's departure, and he attended on the Khāqān from January to June, inclusive, A.D. 1254.

Such journeys right across the breadth of the Old World were made possible by the Mongols' . . . what was certainly the . . . was perhaps also the . . . all the imperial postal- . . . (see VI. vii. 99).

See Marco Polo's account of it in *The Description of the World*, ed. by Moule, A. C., and Pelliot, Paul, vol. i (London 1938, Routledge), pp. 242-7. The experience of travelling post-haste from the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe to the high plateau of Outer Mongolia was as fatiguing as it was inspiring. See William of Rubruck, *op. cit.*,

collecting information about the Mongols at the fountain-head; yet in many respects the sources made accessible to Rashīd-ad-Dīn within the bounds of the Il-Khāns' dominions could bear comparison with those to which Juwaynī had had access at Qāraqorum.

'An authentic chronicle, written in the Mongol language and script,¹ had been written and been brought up to date at intervals, and this was deposited in the [Il-Khānī] archives; but in this form it had no order or method in it; it was an assemblage of isolated and incomplete fragments; it remained inaccessible and unknown to any students who would have been capable of extracting from it some notion of the facts and events recorded in it; and no one had ever received authorisation or permission to make use of it. . . .

'Ghāzān Khān . . . conceived the idea of having these state papers brought together and put in order . . . and the author . . . was instructed to collect the facts concerning the origins and genealogies of all the Turkish peoples in contact with the Mongols and to put into writing [in the Persian language], article by article, the historical records relating to these peoples, part of which is in the Imperial Archives, while the remainder is to be found in the hands of the [Mongol] amīrs and [other] members of the [Il-Khānī] Court.

'Down to that time, no one had been in a position to collect these records or been so fortunate as to have it in his power to put them in order and make a systematic history out of them; and those authors who had [previously] made the attempt to write the history of part of these events had had to do their work without possessing an exact knowledge of the facts.² They had been reduced to collecting oral narratives from the mouths of plebeians, along lines dictated by their own preconceived ideas; and no one could count on these traditions being true or exact.

'The present writer was commissioned to put these fragments of historical materials in order after having made a scrupulous examination of them; he was to digest them in plain language; and he was [thus] to bring . . . these hitherto completely inaccessible records to the light of day. If there were any events that were treated too summarily, or in too little detail, in these historical documents, he was instructed to fill the lacunae by collecting information on these subjects from the *savants* and doctors (*dānīyān wa hukamā*) of Khitāy [North China], India, Uighurland, Qipchāq and other countries—considering that representatives of all the peoples in the World are to be found at His Il-Khanian Majesty's Court.

chaps. 23, 24, and 55: 'In the space of two months and ten days, we did not rest except one single day, when we could not get any horses' (chap. 55). Friar William's predecessor, Friar John of Piano Carpini, . . . who had made the journey in A.D. 1245-47, paints the same picture: 'Passing through Comania we rode most earnestly, having change of horses five times or oftener in a day.'—*Libellus Historicus Joannis de Plano Carpini, qui missus est Legatus ad Tartaros A.D. 1246*, chap. 21.

¹ As Quatremère points out in op. cit., p. lix, Rashīd-ad-Dīn must have been able to speak Mongol in order to transact official business with the Il-Khān and his *comitatus*. He had also written several works in Mongol, according to a statement of his own which his French editor cites from *man. arabe* 356, fol. 213 r.—A.J.T.

² Is this an allusion to Juwaynī's *Ta'rikh-i-Jahān Gushā*? If so, its depreciatory innuendo recoils on Rashīd-ad-Dīn's own head; for Rashīd-ad-Dīn 'included in his great history . . . practically the whole contents of the three volumes of the *Jahān-Gushā*, condensing some portions (such as the history of the Mongol governors of Khurāsān and other provinces of Persia, and the history of the Khwārazm Shāhs), expanding others (such as the history of Chingiz Khān's youth and of his sons and grandsons, and the history of the Assassins), and leaving others (such as the history of Chingiz Khān's conquests in the domains of the Khwārazm Shāhs and in Persia, and the anecdotes of Ogotāy Khān's doings) almost unchanged' (Browne, *apud* Juwaynī, ed. cit., pp. lix-lx).—A.J.T.

'First and foremost, he was to consult . . . Pūlād Chingsang,¹ who has a unique . . . knowledge of the genealogies of the Turkish peoples and the events of their history—particularly the history of the Mongols.'²

These were the oral and documentary sources that Rashīd-ad-Dīn had at his disposal for carrying out Ghāzān Khān's instructions to write a Persian history of the Mongols; but, as the Persian historian tells us, Ghāzān's successor Khudābandah Ūljaytū Khān, when he read Rashīd-ad-Dīn's *Ta'rikh-i-Ghāzānī*, found the historian's answer to Ghāzān's question 'Who were these Mongol conquerors of the World?' raising in his mind the further question 'What is this World that the Mongols have conquered?' And Rashīd-ad-Dīn's new employer also had the acumen to perceive that at least one of the sources of information on which the historian had drawn in answering Ghāzān's question could also be turned to account for answering Ūljaytū's own. After having read the *Ta'rikh-i-Ghāzānī*, Ūljaytū pointed out to the author, so Rashīd-ad-Dīn tells us, that, hitherto, no one had ever written a comprehensive history of the whole *Oikoumenē* and all the peoples in it, but that an unprecedented opportunity for producing a work of this scope had arisen

'now that the *Oikoumenē*, from end to end, is subject either to us or to [other] Chingisids, with the result that doctors, astronomers, *savants* and historians (*hukamā wa munajjimān, wa arbāb-i-dānish wa ashāb-i-tawārikh*), representing all religions and sects (*adyān wa mīl*)—natives of Khitāy, Māchin, Hind, Kashmir, Tibet, Uighurland and other nations, Turk, Arab, and Frank—are assembled in large numbers under Our eyes, and considering that each of them possesses books which set out his country's history, chronology, and religious beliefs, and has at least a partial acquaintance with these different subjects.'³

With these considerations in mind, Ūljaytū Khān, who had piously refused to have the dedication of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's *Ta'rikh-i-Ghāzānī*, covering the history of the Eurasian Nomads, transferred from his dead brother's name to his own,⁴ now commanded the dynasty's Persian civil servant historian to enlarge the *Ta'rikh-i-Ghāzānī* into a *jami'-al-Tawārikh* by adding two new parts—a universal history and a universal geography⁵—which were to bear Ūljaytū's name. In this supplementary

¹ See Quatremère's note 95 *ibid.*, pp. 77–78. Pūlād was a Mongol of the Durban tribe. His father had been Chingis Khān's 'cook' (i.e. a confidential officer in his household). Pūlād himself had entered the service of Chingis' grandson and Hūlāgū's brother Qūbilāy, and had been invested by him with the Chinese title *chingsang* in addition to his hereditary Mongol title *baurji*, the Mongol word for 'cook'. He was the permanent diplomatic representative of the House of Qūbilāy at the Il-Khān Court. In the Il-Khāns' own Mongol *comitatus* there was also a wealth of historical tradition to be harvested; for, as Rashīd-ad-Dīn records in his history of Hūlāgū Khān (see Quatremère's edition, pp. 130–3), Hūlāgū's brother the Khāqān Mangū, when he sent Hūlāgū to enlarge the bounds of the Mongol Empire south-westwards, reinforced Hūlāgū's existing *comitatus* by making for him a special levy of two men out of every ten in the war-bands of all the other Chingisid princes. 'This is why in our countries [i.e. in the Il-Khān's dominions] there always have been, and still are, [Mongol] amirs who are descendants and relations of each of the amirs of Chingis Khān, and each of these still holds his hereditary office.'

² Rashīd-ad-Dīn: Preface to the *Jami'-al-Tawārikh*, Quatremère's edition: Persian text on pp. 74–78; Quatremère's translation on pp. 75–79.

³ Rashīd-ad-Dīn, *ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 36–37.

⁵ No manuscript of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's universal geography was extant as far as was known at the time of writing.

work, which was duly completed in A.D. 1310-11,¹ the universal history fills four volumes. The first three are those presenting the history of the Syriac Civilization in terms of Iranian history which have already been mentioned.² The fourth breaks new ground³ by bringing Turkish, Chinese, Israelite, Frankish, and Indian history into the picture.

Rashīd-ad-Dīn was exceptional among his co-religionists in the Il-Khānī dominions in his day in being psychologically as well as intellectually well qualified for carrying out his second and major historical task. The majority of his fellow Muslims had been exasperated by the temporary favour which a local Christian and Jewish minority had been enjoying during the first phase of a revolutionary régime in which the barbarian conquerors had remained, not merely pagan in their practice, but also positively anti-Muslim in their feelings. The fanatical mood consequently prevalent in the Persian Muslim community is in sharp contrast with Rashīd-ad-Dīn's respect and sympathy for non-Muslim scholarship.

'Although [he ventures to write in his preface]⁴ the tradition of the Muslims is greatly superior to that of the other peoples, all the same we cannot take it as our guide in dealing with the history of the non-Muslim peoples. It goes without saying that the facts which, in the traditions of any people, have been transmitted through a continuous chain of authorities have to be accepted as authentic,'

and he informs us that, in compiling his geographical gazetteer, he has lived up to his own principles.

'In his endeavour to draw on all available sources and to verify his results, the author, in this volume, has not been content merely to assemble everything that has hitherto been known in this country and has been described or delineated in [our] books; he has supplemented this existing information with the facts which, in this fortunate age, the doctors and *savants* (*hukamā wa dāniyān*) of Hind, Chīn and Māchīn, Frankland and other foreign parts have found in their books and have certified as being authentic after having scrupulously verified them.'⁵

A Persian Muslim theologian-historian, Nāsir-ad-Dīn al-Baydāwī, who was Rashīd-ad-Dīn's contemporary, records⁶ that, when Rashīd-ad-Dīn was setting out to write his section on the history of Khitāy (North China), he consulted two Chinese scholars at Ūjaytū's Court—Li Tachi and Mak Sun—who were authorities on Far Eastern medicine, astronomy, and history and who had brought with them, from China, books dealing with these subjects. On the strength of their recommendation, Baydāwī tells us, Rashīd-ad-Dīn based his account of Chinese history on a compendium, written by three Chinese Buddhist monks, which,

¹ See Browne, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 72.

² On p. 73, above.

³ Rashīd-ad-Dīn had, however, had at least one predecessor in this exotic field. Abū Rayhān al-Bīrūnī (*natus* A.D. 973) had not only published, *circa* A.D. 1000, *A Chronology of Ancient Nations*; he had also taken the opportunity, opened up for Persian Muslim scholars by Mahmūd of Ghaznah's conquests in India, to publish, soon after A.D. 1030, his *Indica* (see Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. ii, p. 101).

⁴ In Quatremère's edition, pp. 44-45.

⁵ Rashīd-ad-Dīn, *ibid.*, pp. 58-61.

⁶ See Quatremère in his life of Rashīd-ad-Dīn, p. lxxviii. Baydāwī's historical work was still unpublished at the time of writing.

his two Chinese consultants assured him, had been verified, approved, and passed for the press by a consensus of Chinese litterati.

The oecumenical outlook with which Rashīd-ad-Dīn was thus inspired by the social milieu of the Il-Khānī Court was transmitted by him to at least one disciple, Abū Sulaymān Dā'ūd of Banākat in Transoxania, who enjoyed the same intellectual advantages in virtue of being Ghāzān Khān's poet laureate.

'His information about the Jews, Christians, Indians, Chinese, and Mongols, though largely directly borrowed, often in the same words, from the pages of Rashīd-ad-Dīn, was nevertheless undoubtedly supplemented by what the author learned orally from representatives of the peoples in question. In no Persian history before the Mongol period, and in few after it, do we find so many references to places, people, and historical events beyond the ken of most Muslim writers: places like Portugal, Poland, Bohemia, England, Scotland, Ireland, Catalonia, Lombardy, Paris, and Cologne; people like the Roman Emperors, from Romulus downwards, and the Popes from Saint Peter to the Pope contemporary with the author, who is said to be the two hundred and second in succession; and events like the different church councils, the conversion of Britain to Christianity in the time of Pope Eleutherius, the Nestorian heresy, and the like.'¹

Herodotus

The element in their social milieu that thus inspired a Rashidian school of post-Mongol Persian Muslim historians to rise to an oecumenical view of History was evidently the abrupt encounter, at the Il-Khānī Court, between the representatives of diverse religions and cultures. This cultural effect of the temporarily high conductivity of the Mongol Empire, within an area extending to the Euphrates from Korea and to the Volga from Burma, was the feature that also made the strongest impression on the imaginations of Western Christian observers.² The lists, in Rashīd-ad-Dīn's pages, of subject countries and peoples—as alien from one another in their habits and *éthos* as they are physically far apart—are reminiscent of the similar lists in the inscriptions of the Achaemenidae and on the pages of Herodotus. The similarity is not fortuitous, for in both cases we are in the presence of a universal state that has been established, suddenly and unexpectedly, through sweeping conquests achieved by a hitherto obscure semi-barbarian people from the back of beyond, and it is not surprising that an identical social milieu should have inspired Herodotus, as well as Rashīd-ad-Dīn, first to ask the question 'What is this World that has just been united politically by conquest?' and then, in seeking for the answer, to arrive at the conclusion that no field smaller than the entire *Oikoumenē* since the dawn of Civilization is an intelligible field of historical study.

Like Clarendon, Procopius, Josephus, Thucydides, and Rhodes,

¹ Browne, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 101-2.

² See, for example, the passage, illustrating this point, that has been quoted, in V. v. 113-14, from the narrative of the Flemish Franciscan friar William of Rubruck, who made the 'round trip' from the Crimea to the Khāqān Mangū's ordu at Qāraqorum and back, via Bātū Khān's ordu in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, in A.D. 1253-5.

Herodotus found his immediate inspiration in a great war that had been waged within his own lifetime. Native, as he was, of a Hellenized Carian city on the south-west coast of the Asiatic mainland, he had been born a subject of the Achaemenian Empire and had lived to see his birthplace exchange a Persian for an Athenian suzerainty. 'How has this revolutionary change in the political fortunes of the Asian Hellenes come about within my own lifetime?' was the first form in which the historian's elemental question 'How has this come out of that?' presented itself to Herodotus's mind, and in three books he duly wrote a history of the two decisive first campaigns in the Great Hellenic-Persian War of 480-450/449 B.C.¹ But Herodotus, like Rashīd-ad-Dīn and Polybius, found himself unable to answer his original question without being moved to ask himself a supplementary one which eventually came to overshadow it; for the war whose history he had undertaken to write was a war in which the belligerents were representatives, not merely of different political Powers, but also of different civilizations. The Hellenic Society had collided with a Syriac Society which, through the agency of the Achaemenidae, had united the domains of a Babylonian, an Egyptian, and a submerged Hittite Society with its own domain within the framework of a single universal state.² Thus, in writing the history of an Hellenic-Persian War, Herodotus was led on to study a cultural encounter involving no fewer than five distinct civilizations and in fact six, considering that the Eurasian Nomads were also a party to the transaction; and from this contemporary scene he was led backwards in Time into a study of the separate history and origin of each of his *dramatis personae* and into an inquiry into previous encounters between them in a concatenation in which the Hellenic-Persian War that had broken out in 480 B.C. came to look like the latest link in a long chain of episodes of the kind.³

Thus Herodotus's work, like Rashīd-ad-Dīn's, grew in its author's hands. Ūljaytū Khān's demand on Rashīd-ad-Dīn for a universal history led him to append five additional volumes (reckoning in the geographical gazetteer) to the three volumes of his *Ta'rikh-i-Ghāzānī*. Herodotus's discovery of a concatenation of encounters between East and West led him to prefix six additional books to his three books recording the history of the two campaigns of 480-479 B.C. in the Great Hellenic-Persian War.

In savouring the diversity in habits and *êthos* between the various civilizations whose encounters he was recording, Herodotus was on the brink of another supplementary question which might have carried him a long step nearer to the heart of the mystery of Human Nature and Destiny.

'When Darius was on the throne [Herodotus reports]⁴ he summoned

¹ 450/449 B.C., rather than 449/448, is the probable date of the Peace of Callias according to H. T. Wade-Gery in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, special supplement volume, pp. 149-52 (Cambridge, Mass. 1940, Harvard University Press).

² See I. i. 78-81; II. ii. 137-8; IV. iv. 471; V. v. 122-3; and VI. vii. 64.

³ See IX. viii. 454-63.

⁴ Herodotus: Book III, chap. 38 (see this Study, VI. vii. 617, n. 5). The story might have been impugned as being merely *ben trovato* if its veracity were not vindicated by first-hand accounts of similar confrontations between irreconcilable practices and beliefs

into his presence the Hellenes at his court and asked them for what price they would consent to make a meal of their fathers when they died. The Hellenes replied that all the money in the World would not induce them to do such a thing, whereupon Darius summoned the Callatian Indians, who do eat their parents,¹ and asked them (in the presence of the Hellenes, who were kept informed, through an interpreter, of the tenour of the conversation) for what price they would be willing to burn their fathers when they died. The Indians shrieked aloud and begged him not to pursue such an unmentionable subject—a story which illustrates the habitual attitude of Mankind towards this question, and which, in my opinion, justifies Pindar's poetic aphorism that "Custom is king of all".

Turgot

The confrontation of sharply diverse cultures with one another through the political union of their habitués under an oecumenical Achaemenian régime caught the imagination, not only of the contemporary Hellenic observer Herodotus, but of the Modern Western philosopher civil servant Turgot (*vivebat* A.D. 1727–81). 'Effet singulier', Turgot remarks in his *Esquisse d'un Plan de Géographie Politique*,² 'de la conquête de la Lydie par Cyrus, qui dévoila l'un à l'autre comme deux mondes politiques'; and the spectacle of a cultural phenomenon in which Herodotus had seen nothing more than one of those minuscule that could provide him with a piquant story opened up in Turgot's mind a new approach to the study of human affairs. This many-sided Modern Western man of genius was so sensitive to hints offered to him by his cultural heritage, and so perceptive in his intuition of the implications, that he succeeded in divining the historical significance of a universal state at second-hand; and he achieved this with a minimum of intellectual illumination from his own social milieu; for, though the eighteenth-century Western Society into which Turgot had been born was in contact with a number of alien civilizations and primitive societies as the result of a Modern Western conquest of the Ocean, Turgot's generation of Westerners was as remote in spirit as it was in time from any direct experience of the creative agony out of which a universal state is born.

The lesson that Turgot found in an Herodotean historical panorama was the idea that the observable diversity between different contingents in the living generation of Mankind might provide a key to the understanding of History.

'Je vois tous les jours inventer des arts;³ je vois dans quelques parties

at the Courts of the Northumbrian King Oswiu (see II. ii. 335), the Khān of the Khazars (see VI. vii. 106, n. 3), the Russian war-lord Vladimir (see *ibid.*), the Mongol Khāqān Mangū (see William of Rubruck's narrative, chap. 51), and the Timurid Mughal Emperor Akbar (see V. v. 700–1).—A.J.T.

¹ This practice is ascribed to the Tibetans in William of Rubruck's narrative, chap. 28.—A.J.T.

² *Œuvres de Turgot* (Paris 1844, Guillaumin, 2 vols.), vol. ii. p. 618.

³ This passage appears to have been written in or about the year A.D. 1750, when the Western Industrial Revolution, though not yet broken out. Another illustration of Turgot's prescience is his prediction on 15th December, 1750, of a Declaration of Independence that was to be made a quarter of a century later. 'Les colonies sont comme les fruits qui ne tiennent à l'arbre que jusqu'à leur maturité: devenues suffisantes à elles-mêmes, elles firent ce que fit depuis Carthage, ce que fera un jour l'Améri-

du monde des peuples polis, éclairés, et dans d'autres des peuples errants au sein des forêts. Cette inégalité de progrès dans une durée éternelle aurait dû disparaître. Le monde n'est donc pas éternel; mais je dois conclure en même temps qu'il est fort ancien. Jusqu'à quel point? Je l'ignore.¹

'Si je veux savoir quelque chose de précis, je suis entouré de nuages. . . .² Une clarté faible commence à percer la nuit étendue sur toutes les nations, et se répand de proche en proche. Les habitants de la Chaldée, plus voisins de la source des premières traditions, les Égyptiens, les Chinois, paraissent devancer le reste des peuples; d'autres les suivent de loin; les progrès amènent d'autres progrès. L'inégalité des nations augmente: ici les arts commencent à naître; là ils avancent à grands pas vers la perfection. Plus loin ils s'arrêtent dans leur médiocrité; ailleurs les premières ténèbres ne sont point encore dissipées; et, dans cette inégalité variée à l'infini, l'état actuel de l'univers, en présentant à la fois sur la terre toutes les nuances de la barbarie et de la politesse, nous montre en quelque sorte sous un seul coup d'œil les monuments, les vestiges de tous les pas de l'esprit humain, l'image de tous les degrés par lesquels il a passé, l'histoire de tous les âges.'³

The essays and notes from which the foregoing passages have been quoted testify to the greatness of the student of History who was put out of action on the threshold of his intellectual career by the great civil servant whose life-work was to conjure the Ideas of 1789 out of his creative administration of a decrepit *ancien régime*. Re-reading in A.D. 1951 the essays and notes⁴ in which this lost Western historian has sketched the ground-plan of a mighty intellectual edifice, and recalling that Turgot was only twenty-three years old when he wrote these luminous fragments in A.D. 1750, a latter-day Western historian who had spent ten years of his working life as a temporary civil servant could not forbear to cry 'Qualis artifex perit'⁵ when he read in a notice of the great eighteenth-century philosopher civil servant's career that he had entered the public service on the 5th January, 1752, hardly more than eighteen months after the delivery of the first, and twelve months after the delivery of the second, of his two epoch-making discourses at the Sorbonne.

que'.—Turgot, A. R. J.: *Second Discours en Sorbonne, sur les Progrès Successifs de l'Esprit Humain* (ibid., vol. ii, p. 602).—A.J.T.

¹ Turgot, A. R. J.: *Plan du Premier Discours, sur la Formation des Gouvernements et le Mélange des Nations* (ibid., vol. ii, p. 628).

² Ibid., vol. ii, p. 628.
³ Turgot, A. R. J.: *Second Discours, sur les Progrès de l'Esprit Humain*, prononcé le 11 Décembre, 1750 (ibid., pp. 598–9). In perceiving that the past conditions of the more advanced living societies could be reconstructed from a study of the actual conditions of their more backward contemporaries, Turgot had, of course, been anticipated by Thucydides in his introduction to *A History of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War* (Book I, chaps. 5–6).

⁴ *Premier Discours en Sorbonne, 'Sur les Avantages que l'Établissement du Christianisme a Procurés au Genre Humain'*, prononcé le 3 Juillet, 1750; *Second Discours en Sorbonne, 'Sur les Progrès Successifs de l'Esprit Humain'*, prononcé le 11 Décembre 1750; 'Géographie Politique: Idées Générales', 1750; 'Esquisse d'un Plan de Géographie Politique'; Plan de Deux Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle: 'Idées de l'Introduction', 1750; Plan du Premier Discours, 'Sur la Formation du Gouvernement et le Mélange des Nations'; Plan du Second Discours, dont l'objet sera 'Les Progrès de l'Esprit Humain'; Autre Plan du Discours 'Sur les Progrès et les diverses Époques de Décadence des Sciences et des Arts', 1750; Pensées et Fragments qui avaient été jetés sur le papier pour être employés dans un des trois ouvrages sur l'Histoire Universelle, ou sur les Progrès de la Décadence des Sciences et des Arts (printed in *Œuvres de Turgot*, ed. cit., vol. ii, pp. 586–675).

⁵ Suetonius: *The Lives of the Caesars*, 'Nero', chap. xlix, § 1.

Ibn Khaldūn

Ibn Khaldūn al-Hadramī of Tunis (*vivebat* A.D. 1332-1406)¹ was inspired by the same social milieu as the Sayyid Ibn al-Tiqtaqā al-Hillawī and as Ibn Khaldūn's fellow civil servant Rashīd-ad-Dīn al-Hamadānī to give to the historian's elemental question 'How has this come out of that?' the same particular application. 'How has this derelict Dār-al-Islām come out of that once flourishing Dār-al-Islām?' was the form in which the question presented itself to Arab and Persian alike, in the Maghrib² as well as in the two 'Irāqs,³ on the morrow of the dissolution of a Syriac Society which, in its last phase, had been embodied politically in the Caliphate.

'We have heard with our ears, O God—our fathers have told us⁴—what Thou hast done in their time of old: How Thou hast driven out the heathen with Thy hand, and planted them in; how Thou hast destroyed the nations and cast them out. For they gat not the land in possession through their own sword, neither was it their own arm that helped them, but Thy right hand and Thine arm and the light of Thy countenance, because Thou hadst a favour unto them. . . .

'But now Thou art far off and putttest us to confusion and goest not forth with our armies. Thou makest us to turn our backs upon our enemies, so that they which hate us spoil our goods. Thou lettest us be eaten up like sheep and hast scattered us among the heathen. Thou sellest Thy people for naught and takest no money for them. Thou makest us to be rebuked of our neighbours, to be laughed to scorn and had in derision of them that are round about us. Thou makest us to be a byword among the heathen, and that the people shake their heads at us.'⁵

How has the bright dawn of the first generation of Islam thus faded away into the dreary darkness of a social interregnum? A question evoked in Ibn al-Tiqtaqā's mind by the contrast between the Present and the Past in 'Irāq was evoked in Ibn Khaldūn's mind by the same contrast in the Maghrib; and, though the barbarians by whose hands a paradise had been turned into a wilderness were not the same in the two halves of this devastated world, the Banu Hilāl's handiwork west of the Libyan Desert was indistinguishable from the Mongols' handiwork east of the Euphrates, and an identical tragedy presented the same intellectual problems. 'What was this society that has suffered this downfall?' was the first question with which Ibn Khaldūn, as well as Ibn al-Tiqtaqā, found himself confronted; and a question that the 'Irāqī Sayyid-historian had answered by writing *Al-Fakhrī* was answered by Ibn Khaldūn in *A History of the Berbers*.

Like an 'Irāqī Ibn al-Tiqtaqā's Persian contemporaries 'Alā-ad-Dīn al-Juwaynī and Rashīd-ad-Dīn al-Hamadānī, a Maghribī Ibn Khaldūn set the history of the Islamic Commonwealth within a wider frame; and he, too, found that even the broadest regional framework would not provide him with an intelligible field of study. Like Rashīd-ad-Dīn, Ibn Khaldūn was thus constrained, in answering one question, to ask an-

¹ See III. iii. 321-8.

² North-West Africa and Andalusia.

³ 'Irāq 'Arabī, *alias* Babylonia or the land of Shinar, and 'Irāq Ajamī, *alias* the Jabal or Media.

⁴ Cp. Psalm lxxviii. 3.

⁵ Psalm xlv. 1-4 and 10-15 (as in *The Book of Common Prayer*).

other. 'What is this *Oikoumenê* whose provinces—an Islamic World or an Iran or a Barbary—have discovered their kinship with one another through the common experience of a supreme calamity?' Like Rashīd-ad-Dīn's regional history of Iran, Ibn Khaldūn's regional history of the Berbers was incorporated by its author into a *Universal History*;¹ but this achievement, in which Rashīd-ad-Dīn had reached his intellectual 'ceiling', moved Ibn Khaldūn to climb on into a higher intellectual sphere by asking himself the further question: 'How comes it that empires suffer the decline and fall exemplified in the history of the Islamic Commonwealth?'; and he gave his answer to this question in his Prolegomena (*Muqaddamāt*).² An analysis of this answer has been attempted in a previous passage of this Study³ which need not be recapitulated here. In this place we need only recall that he set out to explain the declines and falls of empires in sociological terms, but discovered that this would-be strictly scientific explanation did not account for all the phenomena.

Though Ibn Khaldūn, like Rashīd-ad-Dīn, had won an intuition of Universal History, the Maghribī's actual range of historical vision was not so wide. It was virtually limited to the history of the rise and fall of Ibn Khaldūn's own Islamic Commonwealth, and the narrowness of this field deluded the Maghribī historian into two erroneous beliefs. He believed that an *esprit de corps* ('*asabīyah*') which was manifestly the psychological cement of all political communities was a monopoly of Nomad peoples in their pristine habitat and that, in virtue of possessing this politically indispensable psychological asset, the Nomads had also enjoyed a monopoly in the business of empire-building. Since he correctly recognized the historical truth that the *ci-devant* Nomad's *esprit de corps* becomes a wasting asset when once its possessor has drifted into becoming a parasitical shepherd of men, instead of remaining the providential shepherd of sheep that it is his proper vocation to be, Ibn Khaldūn's first essay in trying to account for the declines and falls of empires was to explain them as being the necessary consequence of the inevitable demoralization of the *ci-devant* Nomad conquerors through their social intercourse with their sedentary subjects. Knowing of no sedentary peoples except the tax-paying population of the Roman and Sasanian empires whom the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors had taken over as the most valuable part of their spoils of war, Ibn Khaldūn fell into the further erroneous belief that, *ex officio*, all sedentary peoples must be destitute of *esprit de corps*; and, from this misleading combination of three false premises with one true premise, it followed logically that all empires must decline and fall within the number of generations that it would take for empire-builders who, *ex hypothesi*, were *ci-devant* Nomads to lose their politically creative ancestral virtue through acquiring their sedentary subjects' politically destructive ancestral vice.

This simple explanation of the declines and falls of empires was

¹ See III. iii. 324, n. 1.

² See III. iii. 322. The contents of Ibn Khaldūn's whole work are presented by de Slane in his translation of the *Muqaddamāt* (*Les Prolegomènes d'Ibn Khaldoun*, traduits en français et commentés (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i. pp. xcv-cv).

³ In III. iii. 473-6: 'The Relativity of Ibn Khaldūn's Historical Thought'.

borne out by all the historical evidence within Ibn Khaldūn's ken, and it would serve equally well to account for the transitoriness of the work of other *ci-devant* Nomad empire-builders whose histories were beyond Ibn Khaldūn's horizon. Yet, in our list of empire-builders in our table of universal states in this Study,¹ only five will be found in fact to have had a Nomad ancestry.² We may infer that, if Ibn Khaldūn had happened to command the wider horizon that was within any twentieth-century Western historian's purview, he would have recognized that his sociological hypothesis would not serve to explain more than a fraction of the phenomena; and, even within a horizon limited to the confines of the Maghrib, there was in fact one crucial piece of evidence that was refractory to Ibn Khaldūn's sociological explanation of declines and falls.

The derelict state of the Maghrib in Ibn Khaldūn's day, which had been the Maghribī inquirer's point of intellectual departure, was known by him to have been the consequence of ravages committed by two Arab Nomad tribes, the Banu Hilāl and the Banu Sulaym, who had been let loose against a rebellious Maghrib by the 'Fātimid' rulers of Egypt and Syria in A.D. 1051;³ but, if the historian was right in holding that the rises and falls of empires were simply functions of the strength and weakness of the *esprit de corps* of Nomad empire-builders, then, *ex hypothesi*, the Banu Hilāl and Banu Sulaym ought to have brought upon the Maghrib, not the disaster which they had admittedly brought in fact, but the prosperity which had followed in the train of the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of the Maghrib some four hundred years before the date of the Banu Hilāl's devastating westward trek in the wake of that fertilizing previous wave of Arab conquest. These two invading hosts had both been Arab, both been Nomad, and both therefore been endowed with the sovereign social virtue of *esprit de corps*. Why, then, had the social effects of these two Arab Nomad invasions been, not identical, but antithetical? This failure of Ibn Khaldūn's sociological theory to explain North-West African historical facts led Ibn Khaldūn to the conclusion⁴ that a Nomad *esprit de corps*, which (as he saw it) was a *sine qua non* for the social enterprise of empire-building, was at the same time not enough in itself to ensure success.

Why was it that an eleventh-century Arab Nomad invasion had worked havoc in the Maghrib where a seventh-century Arab Nomad invasion had proved a blessing? The answer must be that the second wave of Arab Nomad invaders had lacked some essential qualification, other than their

¹ Printed in vol. vi, on p. 327, and in vol. vii, on p. 769.

² These five *ci-devant* Nomad empire-building peoples are the Amorite restorers of the Sumeric Empire of Sumer and Akkad, the Chaldaean founders of a Neo-Babylonian Empire, the Arab reconstructors of a Syriac universal state, the Mongol founders of a universal state for the main body of the Far Eastern Society, and the 'Osmanli founders of a universal state for the main body of Orthodox Christendom. The Timurids who founded a universal state for the Hindu World were not of Nomad origin, notwithstanding their assumption of the name 'Mughals'. They were descended from a champion of the sedentary population of Transoxania who had been his countrymen's leader in a war of liberation from a Nomad yoke (see II. ii. 144-150). The Manchu reconstructors of a Far Eastern universal state were, not Nomads, but sedentary highlanders who, before they had taken to agriculture, had made their living by hunting in the forests, not by stock-breeding on the Steppe.

³ See III. iii. 323.

⁴ See III. iii. 474-5.

common *esprit de corps*, which the first wave had possessed; and the chapter-headings in Ibn Khaldūn's Prolegomena¹ record the movement of his thought on this point. 'It is impossible', this train of thought begins, 'to establish a domain or to found a dynasty without possessing the support of a people animated by *esprit de corps*', and 'an enterprise which aims at securing the triumph of the religious principle can only succeed if it finds a strong party to support it.' *Esprit de corps* is, in fact, indispensable; but at the same time—and this is the new and crucial point—*esprit de corps* is not sufficient in itself. 'In general, the Arabs are incapable of founding an empire *unless* they have received a tincture of Religion of a certain strength from some prophet or saint'; 'the religious teaching of a prophet or a preacher of the Truth is the only basis on which a great and powerful empire can be founded'; and 'a dynasty which starts its career by placing itself on a religious basis will thereby double the effectiveness of the *esprit de corps* which is the means of its establishment.' It will be seen that the failure of a secular sociological explanation of the rises and falls of empires to account for the course of history in the Maghrib has led Ibn Khaldūn to introduce a new actor on to the stage of History and, in doing so, to give History itself a new dimension. His conclusion is that human affairs do not constitute an intelligible field of study so long as the inquirer is attempting to study them in isolation from the action of Man's Creator; and this is equivalent to saying that Man's *Oikoumenē* only becomes intelligible when it is recognized as being a fragment of God's Universe.

Saint Augustine

Ibn Khaldūn is here saying, in effect, that Man on Earth is a denizen of two worlds and a citizen of two commonwealths simultaneously. Man has a franchise in a mundane commonwealth in virtue of a human *esprit de corps*, and at the same time a franchise in a supra-mundane commonwealth thanks to divine revelations. This ultimate answer to a series of questions evoked by the tragic spectacle of the downfall of a civilization had already been given, a thousand years before Ibn Khaldūn's time, by another Maghribī man of genius who was of native Berber, not of immigrant Hadramī, origin, and whose Semitic *lingua franca* was, not Arabic, but Canaanite.² It is virtually certain that Ibn Khaldūn had never read Saint Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, and perhaps improbable that he had ever even heard of it; and we may also guess that Augustine himself, when he propounded his transcendental thesis of Man's dual citizenship, was hardly conscious that he was applying, in a new and larger context, a concept which, from the fourth century B.C. down to the second century of the Christian Era, had been the constitutional keystone of the mundane commonwealth built up by the Romans.³

The inquiry which Augustine carried to a transcendental altitude had been initiated in his mind by an experience of mundane disaster that also moved Ibn Khaldūn, Rashīd-ad-Dīn, Juwaynī, and Ibn al-Tiqtaqā to ask their creative questions. These four Muslim historians were inspired

¹ Book I, § 2, *ad finem*, and § 3, *ad initium*.

² See III. iii. 138 n. 3.

³ See IV. iv. 307-13.

by the portentous downfall of an Islamic Commonwealth, and three out of the four had personally suffered the shock which had shaken Dār-al-Islām from end to end when Baghdad had been sacked, and the Caliph Musta'sim been put to death, by the Mongol barbarian conqueror Hūlāgū in A.D. 1258. Augustine in his day had lived to suffer the comparable shock administered to all then living citizens of the Roman Empire by Alaric's sack of Rome in A.D. 410;¹ and this harrowing common experience had precipitated a controversy between the pagan and the Christian factions into which the Hellenic body social was divided in this last phase of Hellenic history. The pagans, who had been discomfited in their long struggle with their Christian opponents without having been yet either voluntarily converted or forcibly *gleichgeschaltet*, had seen and taken their opportunity of making capital out of a common calamity for use in their pursuit of a domestic feud. They had insinuated that the cause of Rome's fall in A.D. 410 was to be seen in the antecedent suppression of the rites of the traditional pagan official religion of the Roman Commonwealth through the intolerance of the Christian Roman Emperors Gratian (*imperabat* A.D. 367-83) and Theodosius I (*imperabat* A.D. 378-95).² Was it not to be expected that Rome's tutelary deities would cease to give the Roman Commonwealth their customary protection when their former protégés had ceased to pay them the customary worship that was their due? This tendentious pagan Roman explanation of the fall of Rome in A.D. 410 was the challenge that provoked Saint Augustine—as he has recorded in a passage of his *Reconsiderations*³—to write his own alternative answer to the question: 'What is the cause of this crushing public calamity that has overtaken our world in our time?'

'When we experienced the shock of the disastrous overthrow of Rome through the irruption of the Goths under the leadership of their king Alaric, the "pagan" worshippers of gods who are as false as they are numerous attempted to fasten the blame for this overthrow upon the Christian Religion and took this opportunity to import an unprecedented degree of acerbity and bitterness into their blasphemies against the One True God. This fired me with such zeal for the house of the Lord against blasphemies which were at the same time fallacies that I began to write a treatise *On the Commonwealth of God*.'

As Augustine here states, his initial purpose was to refute the pagans on a controversial issue in the terms in which this issue had been formulated by his adversaries; and, in execution of this purpose, he duly wrote the tract that occupies the first five out of the twenty-two books to which the *De Civitate Dei* was eventually to run.

'The first five books are devoted to a refutation of the thesis that the practice of the pagans' traditional polytheism is a condition *sine qua non* for the assurance of human welfare, and that the prohibition of this cult accounts for the incidence of the sea of troubles that has overwhelmed us.'

This tract, which was the original crystallization-point of Augustine's eventual *magnum opus*, exhibits the forensic ability that was to be expected of a powerful intellect, exercised by a traditional Hellenic train-

¹ See V. v. 223, with n. 2.

³ *Retractationes*, Book II, chap. 69.

² See IV. iv. 226-7 and V. vi. 89.

⁴ *Retractationes*, ibid.

ing in rhetoric, when it had at last found a theme that appealed to the sophist's heart besides commending itself to his head. The author has made some telling points which his pagan opponents might have found it hard to rebut. Would these pagan Romans who insinuate that Christianity has been responsible for Rome's fall be alive today to make this insinuation if, during the sack of the city, they had not stooped to take sanctuary in Christian places of worship? And how was it that they were able to find asylum there? It was because the barbarian conquerors, being converts to Christianity themselves, had voluntarily abstained from despoiling or enslaving any of the conquered population who had sought refuge in Christian fanes. More than that, some of them had even robbed themselves of their legitimate spoils by personally conducting to these voluntarily conceded places of safety the potential victims whom they had encountered in the streets.¹ Had any previous conquerors, barbarian or Roman, ever shown such merciful forbearance in times past?² Or (to make the same point in other terms) had any pagan Hellenic temple ever secured to refugees the effective asylum that had been provided by Christian places of worship in Rome in A.D. 410?³ Why had the Romans ever imagined that Rome would be saved by divinities who had been constrained to migrate to Rome by their failure to save Troy?⁴ And why, if Paganism was the talisman of political and military success, had the devoutly pagan Goth war-lord Radagaisus lost, in marching on Rome, both his war-band and his life, whereas the Christian Goth war-lord Alaric had achieved the sensational success of capturing the Imperial City? Is not the One True God's hand manifest in this signal contrast between the respective fortunes of a pagan barbarian assailant, who would have been merciless to pagan and Christian alike, and a Christian barbarian assailant who showed mercy to pagan as well as Christian refugees in Christian sanctuaries?⁵

This nuclear *De Civitate Dei* is a masterpiece of controversial literature; but its forensic virtuosity would have left the hearts of Posterity cold, when once the artificial literary tradition of an already moribund Hellenic Paganism had become extinct, if the author had allowed the numerous other imperative calls on his time and energy⁶ not merely to interrupt this literary enterprise but to terminate it. Happily Saint Augustine found himself unable to answer the controversial question raised by the dispute over the cause of the fall of Rome without being led into asking other questions. In the first place, his intellectual integrity forbade him to reply to the particular school of pagan Hellenic thought which had indicted the Christian Church without also dealing with a different pagan doctrine that was inconsistent with a belief in the efficacy of the pagan divinities' protection yet was equally incompatible with a Christian theology; and, in pursuit of this second battalion of pagan adversaries, Augustine was led into writing a second batch of five books to supplement his first essay.

¹ *De Civitate Dei*, Book I, chaps. 1 and 7, quoted in V. v. 224.

² *Op. cit.*, Book I, chaps. 2, 5, and 6.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. 4.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Book V. chap. 23, quoted in V. v. 224-5.

⁶ See *Retractationes*, *ibid.*

'The five books that follow [i.e. Books VI–X inclusive] argue against a thesis in which the practice of Polytheism is likewise defended in spite of its being conceded in this alternative pagan doctrine that troubles such as we have experienced have never failed, and never will fail, to beset Mankind, and that the variations in the severity of the incidence of these troubles are attributable to differences of place, time, and personality. The doctrine against which I argue in this part of the work is that a Polytheism expressing itself in rites of sacrifice has its utility for a life after Death, though not for our life in This World.'¹

In this second instalment of the *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine has thus exceeded the limits of the initial question that had been set for him by his pagan adversaries. After asking himself 'Is it because Rome has ceased to be pagan that Rome has come to grief?' he has gone on to ask himself: 'Can a Paganism which has failed to prove its mundane utility prove that it has any greater utility for an after life?' And, if he had come to a halt after he had given his answer to this second question, his work might have been remembered as an interesting critique of a pair of varieties of pagan Hellenic religious experience. Indeed, considering that these two varieties, between them, cover virtually the whole gamut of Hellenic Paganism, Saint Augustine, in arriving at the end of his tenth book, would have given a substantially complete Christian answer to the question: 'What was this pagan Hellenic way of life that has suffered such dire disaster in our day?' Manifestly this is a far larger and more momentous question than the controversial issue raised in the forensic debate which had originally moved the combative Numidian apologist for Christianity to take up his powerful pen; but Augustine's second question was pregnant with a third; and this ultimate question, which is the subject of the last twelve books of the *De Civitate Dei* out of the eventual total of twenty-two, is the theme that has given Augustine's great work not only its title but its immortality.

After asking himself 'What was this mundane commonwealth that has fallen?' Augustine has risen to the height of the implicit consequent question: 'What is this other commonwealth that remains standing now that the mundane commonwealth has bitten the dust?' And thus the Christian theologian-historian's 'obstinate questionings'² have opened up to him, at the end of his long quest, the vision of a glorious Commonwealth of God which is living in two spiritual dimensions simultaneously. In the flow of Time it is living by faith while it is running the gauntlet of the ungodly on its earthly pilgrimage; and in the stability of its eternal home, for which it is now waiting with patience³ 'until Righteousness turn again unto Judgement',⁴ it is already participating in God's own peace and felicity.⁵ We need not enlarge here upon Saint Augustine's conception of the relations between the Mundane and the Supra-Mundane Commonwealth; for we have touched upon it already in another context,⁶ and no summary by an alien hand can dispense a reader from going to drink at the fountain-head. In this place we have

¹ *Retractationes*, Book II, chap. 69.

² Wordsworth: *Ode on Intimations of Immortality*.

³ Psalm xciv. 15 (as in *The Book of Common Prayer*).

⁵ Saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book I, Preface.

³ Romans viii. 25.

⁶ In V. vi. 365–9.

only to observe that, in passing to the second part of the *De Civitate Dei* from the second instalment of the first part, Saint Augustine is being carried by the Human Mind's impulse to investigate the relations between the facts of History into embarking on the Human Heart's quest to find a meaning behind them.

A Twentieth-Century Western Student of History

The intellectual histories of no less than eleven out of the thirteen historians whom we have just been passing in review¹ indicate that shocking public events are apt to be fecund of intellectual inspirations for historians. On this showing, the generation into which the writer of this Study had been born in a post-Modern Western World could not plead that its own social milieu had been uncondusive to historical thought; and the writer himself could testify (if he might venture once again to draw upon the only first-hand experience at his command) that, by the time when he found himself in his sixty-fourth year, the subjects for at least nine historical works of diverse ranges had been presented to him by questions arising from catastrophic events that he had lived to witness.

An historian born in A.D. 1889 who was still alive in A.D. 1952 had indeed already heard a long peal of changes rung on the historian's elemental question 'How has this come out of that?' How, first and foremost, had it happened that he had lived to see the immediately preceding generation's apparently reasonable expectations so rudely disappointed? In liberal-minded middle-class circles in democratic Western countries in a generation that had been born round about the year A.D. 1860, it had seemed evident by the close of the nineteenth century that a triumphantly advancing Western Civilization had now carried human progress to a point at which it could count upon finding the Earthly Paradise just round the next corner. This *fin-de-siècle* liberal Western hope had been a secularized version of Christ's promise in the Gospels: 'Verily I say unto you that there be some of them that stand here which shall not taste of death till they have seen the Kingdom of God come with power.'² How was it that this hapless generation had lived to see, instead, not the second coming of the Son of Man, but the advent of Antichrist? What fell miscarriage had overtaken the world-wide and perpetual peace that had been confidently augured in A.D. 1851 at the opening of a Great Exhibition in London and had then apparently been achieved twenty years later, after the end of the Franco-Prussian War of A.D. 1870-1? How had this peace come to be shattered in A.D. 1914 and A.D. 1939 by the successive explosions of two world wars in one lifetime? How had the twentieth century of the Christian Era come to see the eighteenth century's 'laws of civilized warfare' thrown to the winds? How had Human Nature prevailed upon itself to perpetrate the atrocities which Turkish hands had committed against the Armenians, and German hands against the Belgians, the Jews, the Poles, and all their other victims? Such

¹ These eleven are Clarendon, Procopius, Josephus, Thucydides, Rhodes, Polybius, Ibn al-Tiqaqā, 'Alā-ad-Din Juwayni, Rashid-ad-Din Hamadāni, Herodotus, Saint Augustine.

² Mark ix. 1. Cp. Matt. xvi. 28 and Luke ix. 27.

wickedness, if not incompatible with Human Nature, was at least irreconcilable with a Western Civilization's moral heritage from Christianity; and, if Turkish atrocities could be explained as anachronistic outcrops of a residual savagery in the hearts of recent proselytes to a Western way of life, how was a Western historian to explain the apostasy of Germans who were native-born children of the Western household? How, through this welter of war and crime, had the political map of the *Oikoumené* come to be changed beyond all recognition? How had the Ottoman Empire, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, and the British Rāj in India come to be replaced by a litter of successor-states? How had the number of the Great Powers in a Western World come to be reduced, within a period of thirty-two years, from the figure of eight at which it had stood at the outbreak of a First World War in A.D. 1914 to the figure of two at which it stood at the close of a Second World War in A.D. 1945? How was it that these two survivors, the Soviet Union and the United States, were, both of them, located outside Western Europe? How had this West European peninsula of Asia, which had dominated the entire *Oikoumené* for 231 years ending in A.D. 1914, come, by A.D. 1945, to be dwarfed by an outer ring of new countries conjured into life by West European enterprise? How had distance come, for human purposes, to be annihilated by the invention of the art of flying? And how had Mankind's conquest of the Air come to be enslaved to the service of a subsequently invented atomic weapon which threatened to annihilate the Western Civilization and perhaps Life itself on this planet?

Here were contemporary themes enough to occupy the time, energy, and genius of all those eleven great historians in our catalogue who, in other times and places, had been moved to show their mettle by the challenge of questions similarly presented by the history of their time; and the writer was aware that, if he had not had an Hellenic classical education, he might have been tempted into expending his stock of intellectual ammunition on an attack upon one or other of the historical targets that had been offered to him and his contemporaries by their own social milieu in their own day. The disappointment of his elders' secularized messianic expectations might have moved a twentieth-century Western historian to study the history of the quest for an Earthly Paradise upon which the Western Society had embarked towards the end of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era in its recoil from the Early Modern Western Wars of Religion. The shattering breach of the forty-three years' peace (*duraverat* A.D. 1871-1914), which had resulted in the dwarfing of Western Europe and the polarization of military and political power in the World round two non-European centres, might have moved him to study the history of a Modern Western Balance of Power. The atrocities committed by Turkish hands against Armenian victims in A.D. 1915-16 might have moved him to study the history of the effects of an impact of Western technique, institutions, ideas, and ideals—particularly the exotic Western ideal of nationally homogeneous parochial states—upon the geographically intermingled Islamic, Eastern Orthodox Christian, and Monophysite Christian societies. The German people's apostasy from the secularized faith of a Modern Western Civilization might have

moved him to study the peculiarities in the ethical development of the German contingent in the Western Society since the Thirty Years War and also the weaknesses in the ethical development of a Late Modern Western Society which had purchased religious toleration at the price of dis severing Christian ethics from their historical roots in the soil of Christian beliefs. The break-up of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires and the British Rāj might have moved him to devote his working life to a dissection of the political anatomy of one or other of these three polities. The conversion of the 'temperate and undecisive contests' of Gibbon's day¹ into wars of annihilation by the conquest of the Air and the splitting of the Atom might have moved him to study the history of the human consequences of the technological triumphs of a Late Modern Western science.

Thanks to his professional good fortune in being born into a Time of Troubles that was, by definition, an historian's golden age, the present writer was, in fact, moved to interest himself in each of these historical questions that were flung at him by current events; but his professional good fortune did not end here; for he had also been as fortunate as Turgot in his education. Like Turgot, he had been born into a civilization that had not sprung straight from the primitive level but was affiliated to a predecessor of its own species; and in England in A.D. 1896-1911, as in France in the mid-eighteenth century, the Western middle class not only recognized its Hellenic cultural heritage but set so high a value upon this spiritual heirloom that it made the Greek and Latin classics the staple medium of its higher education. Born, though he was, 162 years later than the great French historian civil servant, the writer, happening also to be born in an intellectually more conservative Western country, had been born just in time to receive in England a there then still undiluted Early Modern Western education in Hellenism. By the summer of A.D. 1911, when he had been studying Latin for nearly fifteen years and Greek for more than twelve, the languages, literature, history, and *êthos* of the Hellenic Civilization had become, as they were to remain, more familiar, and far more congenial, to him than any cultural treasures that his own native post-Hellenic society had to offer him; and this traditional education had the wholesome effect of rendering its recipients immune against the malady of corporate self-worship in the insidious form of cultural chauvinism. An Hellenically-educated Westerner could not easily fall into the error of seeing in Western Christendom the best of all possible worlds, nor, *a fortiori*, into the grosser error of equating a post-Western Christian Civilization with 'Civilization' *sans phrase*;² and no Hellenically-educated Western historian could consider the historical questions that his own contemporary Western social milieu was putting to him without referring them to the oracles of a Hellas in which he had found his spiritual home.

To illustrate this intellectual consequence of an Early Modern Western classical education from the cases in point, the present writer

¹ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West', in chap. xxxviii, *ad finem*.

² The misconception of 'the Unity of Civilization' has been examined in I. i. 149-71.

could testify that he was unable to observe the disappointment of his liberal-minded elders' expectations without being reminded of Plato's disillusionment with a Periclean Attic democracy. He could not live through the experience of the outbreak of war in A.D. 1914 without realizing that the outbreak of war in 431 B.C. had brought the same experience to Thucydides. As he found his own experience revealing to him, for the first time, the inwardness of Thucydidean words and phrases that had meant little or nothing to him before, he realized that a book written in another world more than 2,300 years ago might be a depository of experiences which, in the reader's world, were only just beginning to overtake the reader's own generation. There was a sense in which the two dates A.D. 1914 and 431 B.C. were philosophically contemporaneous with one another;¹ and this philosophical truth was manifestly more significant than the arithmetical fact that the two dates happened to be 2,345 years apart on a chronological chart. Moreover, when the Hellenically-educated Western historian lived on to see war break out again in A.D. 1939, he could not taste this less shocking, but more harrowing, repetition of the experience of A.D. 1914 without being reminded that Thucydides' Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War had likewise taken the form of a tragedy in two acts separated by an interval of illusory peace, and that the Great Romano-Punic War of 264-201 B.C. and Great Romano-Persian War of A.D. 572-628 had each, again, been a double war on the Thucydidean pattern.² At the crisis of the first World War in the spring of A.D. 1918, when his country's fate had trembled in the balance, the poetry that had kept running through his mind had been no English verse; it had been the lines in which Lucretius had conveyed the indelible impression that had been made on Roman minds by Rome's dire struggle with Hannibal,

ad configendum venientibus undique Poenis
omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu
horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris oris.³

When he felt the shock and bewilderment that every non-German Western soul was bound to feel when faced with the portent of the Germans' apostasy from a common Western Civilization, he found himself reminded of the apostasy of Tiglath Pileser III's Assyrians from a Babylonian civilization that Assyria had previously shared with the Babylonians, Elamites, and Urartians—a moral catastrophe whose social consequences had given the Hellenes their opportunity to contend with the Iranians for an hegemony over devastated Babylonian, Syriac, and Egyptian worlds. When he studied the appalling communal conflicts in a contemporary Turkey, Palestine, India, South Africa, and United States, he was reminded of such grim episodes in the history of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World as Mithradates' massacre of Roman citizens and protected persons in Asia Minor in 88 B.C. and the extermination of Hellene and Jewish local minorities by Jewish and Hellene local majorities throughout Syria upon the outbreak of the Great Romano-Jewish

¹ The philosophical contemporaneity of all societies of the species known as civilizations has been discussed in I. i. 172-4.

² See XI. ix. 236.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book III, ll. 833-5.

War in A.D. 66. The foundering of the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy in the First World War recalled to his mind the catastrophes of Macedon, the Seleucid Monarchy, and other *peritura regna*¹ that had collided with Rome. The reduction in the number of a contemporary Western World's Great Powers from eight to two within the thirty-two years A.D. 1914-45 recalled the reduction in the number of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World's Great Powers from five to one within fifty-two years and a quarter (219-168 B.C.).² The dwarfing of Western Europe, in a post-Modern Age of Western history, by a circle of giant Powers that had sprung up around her on the fringes of an expanding Western World, reminded him of the dwarfing of a pre-Alexandrine Hellas, in a post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history, by Macedonian successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire, a Carthaginian thalassocracy in the Western Mediterranean, and a Roman Commonwealth in Italy which had found their battlefields in Ionia, the Aegean, Continental European Greece, and Sicily.³

It will be seen that in the present writer's social milieu there were two factors—neither of them personal to himself, but both of them properties of the rock from which he had been hewn—which, between them, had a decisive influence on his approach to a study of History. The first of these factors was the current history of his own Western World in his own lifetime; the second was an Hellenic education that was the precious legacy of a fifteenth-century Western renaissance of Hellenic life and letters. By perpetually interacting with one another, as they did, these two factors worked together to make the writer's view of History binocular. When the historian's elemental question 'How has this come out of that?' was put to him by some current catastrophic event, the form which the question was apt to assume in his mind was not 'How has this come out of that state of affairs in the history of an un-Hellenic Western World in which I am a stranger and a sojourner?'⁴ A current event so seldom failed to evoke a reminiscence of some comparable event in Hellenic history that, in an Hellenically-educated Western historian's mind, the stock form of the question came to be: 'How has this come out of that state of affairs in Western as well as in Hellenic history?' Two divergent forces in the historian's social milieu—current events and an Hellenic education—were thus always simultaneously exerting themselves upon his line of thought, and these divergent forces found their resolution in his mind in a habit of looking at History as a series of comparisons in two terms.

This binocular view of History might have been appreciated and approved by Far Eastern contemporaries of the writer's in whose then likewise still traditional education the classical language and literature of an antecedent civilization had played a no less predominant part. The English writer's experience would assuredly have been shared by any Chinese litteratus who had been fortunate enough to have completed his education before the abandonment, in A.D. 1905, of the public

¹ Virgil: *Georgics* II, l. 498.

² See the passage of Polybius's *Oecumenical History* quoted on p. 64, above.

³ See III, iii, 310-16.

⁴ Psalm xxxix. 12 (14 in *The Book of Common Prayer*). Cp. Hebrews xi. 13.

examinations in the classics which had previously been the obligatory avenue for gaining entry into the Imperial Civil Service. The Confucian litteratus, likewise, would have found himself unable to encounter any passing event without being reminded by it of some classical allusion, reminiscence, or parallel that would have, for him, a greater value and, indeed, perhaps even a greater reality than the post-classical occurrence that had set his mind working on its congenial task of chewing the cud of a familiar Sinic classical lore. The principal difference in mental outlook between this Late Ch'ing Confucian-minded scholar and his Late Victorian Hellenic-minded English contemporary might prove to be that a Chinese born into this generation could still remain content to make his historical comparisons in two terms only, whereas the Late Victorian Englishman, when once he had begun to think historically in two terms, could no longer rest till he had extended his cultural gamut to a wider range.

For a Chinese receiving his traditional classical education at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era, it would still be a novel idea that any civilization other than the Sinic and its living Far Eastern successor could be deserving of any serious consideration; for, by this date, little more than half a century had elapsed since the Chinese had had their first experience of finding themselves defenceless against the assaults of 'south-sea barbarians' armed with new-fangled weapons. An invincibly Sinic-minded Chinese contemporary of the writer's might perhaps still have contrived to ignore the existence of any civilizations beyond the two which, between them, had meant everything to his forebears; but a similarly blinkered vision was impossible for any Westerner of the same generation.

It was impossible because, within the last four hundred years, a Western Society which had conquered the Ocean had thrust itself into contact with no less than eight other representatives of its own species in the Old World and the New;¹ and it had since become doubly impossible for Western minds to ignore the existence or to deny the significance of other civilizations besides their own and the Hellenic because, within the last century, these Westerners who had already conquered a previously virgin Ocean had gone on to conquer a previously buried Past. Within the fifty years following Napoleon's arrival at Alexandria, three hundred years after Vasco da Gama's arrival at Calicut, a new Western science of Archaeology had added to the number of the civilizations within the ken of Western minds by disinterring at least four buried civilizations—the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the Sumerian, and the Mayan—and the writer was to live to see this list extended by the rediscovery of the Hittite and Minoan civilizations and the Indus and Shang cultures. In a generation which had acquired this wide historical horizon, a Western historian who had been led by his traditional Hellenic education to make historical comparisons in two terms could not be content till he had converted this dual into a plural. He was bound to go on to

¹ The eight civilizations in question were the Orthodox Christian and its offshoot in Russia, the Islamic, the Hindu, the Far Eastern and its offshoot in Japan, the Central American, and the Andean.

collect, for comparative study, as many specimens as he could find of the species of Society of which the Hellenic Society and the Western Society were merely two representatives. The twenty or thirty specimens collected and utilized in the present Study were the fruits of the field-work which the writer had been moved to carry out when it had dawned upon him that, for a comparative study of History, the intellectual resources within the reach of a Western historian in his day were of an unprecedented richness.¹

When he had thus succeeded in multiplying his terms of comparison more than tenfold, he could no longer ignore a supreme question which his original comparison in two terms had already threatened to raise. The most portentous single fact in the Hellenic Civilization's history was the eventual dissolution of a society whose breakdown had been registered in 431 B.C. by the outbreak of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War; and, if there was any validity in the writer's habitual procedure of drawing comparisons between Hellenic history and Western, it would seem to follow that the Western Society, for its part, must at any rate be not immune from the possibility of coming to a similar end in its turn, even though there might be no *a priori* necessity that its history should take, sooner or later, this tragic Hellenic course. The consideration of so dire a possibility could, however, be kept at bay so long as the history of the Hellenic Civilization remained the only other term of comparison in the writer's mental field, since the rules of Logic did not exact the inference of a general and inexorable law of History from a single case which might, after all, perhaps have been a *lusus Naturae*. When, however, a Western student of History had collected as many as twenty-six specimens of societies of the species 'Civilizations' which had duly come to birth, without reckoning in four others which had been abortive, and when he had gone on to observe that, of these twenty-six, no less than sixteen were already dead by the time of writing,² he was bound to infer from this wider range of instances that death was indeed a possibility which confronted every civilization, not excluding the still living society into which he himself happened to have been born.

Haud igitur leti praeclusa est ianua caelo
nec soli terraeque neque altis aequoris undis,
sed patet immane et vasto respectat hiatus.³

What was this 'door of Death' through which sixteen out of twenty-six civilizations within a twentieth-century Western historian's ken had disappeared already? In setting out to answer a question that had thus been forced upon him by an illuminating multiplication of an originally binocular view of History, the writer was led into a study of the breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations; and through studying their breakdowns and disintegrations he was led on into a complementary study of their geneses and growths.

It will be seen that no less than three influences emanating from the writer's native Modern Western social milieu had worked together to

¹ An attempt to survey this rich field of historical study has been made in I. i. 63-129.

² See IV. iv. 1-2 and XII. ix. 411-12.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book V, ll. 373-5, quoted in IV. iv. 4.

present him with the set of questions that had moved him to write the present work. The fifteenth-century Italian humanists who had raised the ghost of an extinct Hellenic culture in a post-Hellenic Western Christian World had compelled him to see History in two terms, *more Sinico*. The fifteenth-century Portuguese and Spanish mariners who had brought Western Christendom into touch with all the other living civilizations in the *Oikoumenê*, and the nineteenth-century French and English archaeologists who had disinterred a number of dead civilizations which had not only passed away but had also subsequently fallen into oblivion, had compelled him to break the bounds of a classical outlook by increasing the number of his terms from a bare two to more than twenty. These three goodly companies of creative Modern Western spirits had thus co-operated to educate one of the latter-day heirs of their cumulative intellectual achievements, and his consequent work had been produced under the auspices of these inspired and inspiring Modern Western pastors and masters.

2. *Inspirations from Personal Experiences*

Gibbon

If we now pass on to consider inspirations that have come to historians, not from their social milieux, but from personal experiences, we shall find a classic example in the genesis of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* from Gibbon's experience at Rome on the 15th October, 1764.

Edward Gibbon's lifetime (*vivebat* A.D. 1737-94) was not barren of historic events. The English historian was thirty-eight years old at the outbreak of the American Revolution and fifty-two years old at the outbreak of the French Revolution; he lived to see his own country involved in no fewer than four wars; and, though he was still a child at the time of the War of the Austrian Succession and its Anglo-Spanish naval prelude (*gerebantur* A.D. 1739-48), he was in the full vigour of his intellectual powers when the Seven Years War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1756-63) and the American Revolutionary War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1775-83) were fought and when the French Revolutionary War broke out (*erupit* A.D. 1792). Yet—though Gibbon elicits a smile from his reader by suggesting that 'the captain of the Hampshire Grenadiers . . . has not been useless to the historian of the Roman Empire'¹—it is patent that neither the Seven Years War nor any other contemporary public catastrophe was the source of Gibbon's inspiration. *L'Essai sur l'Étude de la Littérature* written in A.D. 1758-9, the abortive fragment of a history of the rise of the Swiss Confederation, written (likewise in French) in A.D. 1767-8, and *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, which he began to sketch out in the rough at least as early as A.D. 1771² and finished writing

¹ *The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon*, edited by John Murray (London 1896, Murray), pp. 190 (Memoir B) and 401-2 (Memoir D).

² See chap. xxx, n. 86: 'The Count de Buat is satisfied that the Germans who invaded Gaul were the two-thirds that yet remained of the army of Radagaisus. See the *Histoire Ancienne des Peuples de l'Europe* (tom. vii, pp. 87-121, Paris 1772): an elaborate work, which I had not the advantage of perusing till the year 1777. As early as 1771, I find the same idea expressed in a rough draft of the present History.'

in A.D. 1787, as well as the six drafts for an autobiography, written between A.D. 1788 and A.D. 1793, were all inspired by experiences that were personal to the author.

In the *Essai* (begun at Lausanne in March 1758) the language and the subject alike were acknowledgements of a personal debt to the contemporary French current in the stream of a Late Modern Western Society's intellectual activity; and this debt had been contracted by the author as a consequence of one private action of his own and another which this had evoked from his father. Gibbon's father had responded to Gibbon's conversion to Roman Catholicism at Oxford in A.D. 1753 by packing him off to Lausanne to complete his education there in the house of a Calvinist Protestant minister during the years A.D. 1753-8. A personal interest in Swiss institutions, as well as in French ideas, which had been aroused in Gibbon's mind by this five-years-long residence, at an impressionable age, in a French-speaking subject territory (as the Vaud then was) within the miniature empire of the Canton of Berne, explains Gibbon's tentative choice of the history of the Swiss as his next subject, after the publication of the *Essai* in A.D. 1761; and he set to work on his preparations for this second self-assigned task in the summer of A.D. 1765 for personal reasons again. He himself had then just returned to England from his grand tour on the Continent (*peregrinabatur* January 1763-June 1765); and his Lausannois friend Georges Deyverdun had simultaneously arrived in England to spend four consecutive summers (those of the years A.D. 1765-8)¹ with Edward Gibbon at his father's house at Buriton.

"The two historical designs which had balanced my choice were submitted to his taste, and, in the parallel between the revolutions of Florence and Switzerland, our common partiality for a country which was *his* by birth and *mine* by adoption inclined the scale in favour of the latter. . . . The assistance of Deyverdun seemed to remove an insuperable obstacle. The French or Latin memorials, of which I was not ignorant, are inconsiderable in number and weight; but in the perfect acquaintance of my friend with the German language I found the key of a more valuable collection."²

As for *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, we have Gibbon's own thrice-declared testimony that this was inspired by another personal experience of his which far surpassed all the rest in the fertility of its creative effects.

The failure of contemporary public events to bring into action the creative genius to which Gibbon's *magnum opus* bears irrefutable witness is the more remarkable considering that the historian was in truth (as might have been expected) neither insensitive nor indifferent to the current history of his day. The sureness of his historical intuition was, indeed, displayed in the diversity of his reactions to the divers contemporary public events mentioned above.

He was deeply impressed and gravely perturbed by the French

¹ See Low, D. M.: *Edward Gibbon, 1737-1794* (London 1937, Chatto & Windus), pp. 197-8.

² Gibbon, E.: *Autobiographies*, ed. cit., pp. 275-6 (Memoir C). Cp. pp. 407-8 (Memoir D.)

Revolution; for, though he did not live to see it complete its course, he at once divined that it was an epoch-making new departure in the Western Society's history which sharply challenged the complacent view of a Late Modern Western Civilization's prospects to which he had committed himself so magisterially in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* in his 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West' at the end of Chapter xxxviii.¹ But, when the shock thus administered to Gibbon by the French Revolution did overtake him, nearly two years had already passed since he had written the last sentence of his great work; and, though he lived for more than four and a half years after the advent of an earth-shaking mundane apocalypse that had upset his lifelong *Weltanschauung*,² he was not moved by this revolutionary change in his social milieu to embark on any fresh creative intellectual enterprise. After the completion of *The Decline and Fall*, his only noteworthy literary achievements were the six draft autobiographies;³ and, though these fragments are literary masterpieces which rank with *The Decline and Fall* itself as monuments of the writer's inimitable style, their contents are personal reminiscences which ring no new changes on the historian's elemental question 'How has this come out of that?' though they throw a flood of light on the personal circumstances which had led Gibbon to address himself to this question three times within the thirty years A.D. 1758-87.

As for the American Revolutionary War, Gibbon showed his historical discernment here again in dismissing it, together with the Seven Years War, the War of the Austrian Succession, and the foregoing hostilities between Great Britain and Spain, as one of those 'temperate and undecisive contests' that might produce continual fluctuations in the Balance of Power without deserving to be regarded as anything more than 'partial events' which could not 'essentially injure' the Western World's 'general state of happiness'.⁴ This series of wars through which Gibbon had lived between A.D. 1739 and A.D. 1783 had, in truth, been different in kind from the war which he lived to see break out in A.D. 1792; for, as we have observed in another context,⁵ the Western wars of A.D. 1739-83 were the relatively mild aftermath of the Western General War of A.D. 1672-1713, whereas the war that broke out in A.D. 1792 proved to be another general war, comparable in magnitude to the conflict that had been precipitated, 120 years earlier, by the ambitions of Louis XIV.

The failure of the Seven Years War to inspire Gibbon is nevertheless remarkable; for, though his historical insight may have inhibited him from overrating the historical importance of this 'temperate and undecisive' exercise of the European forces, his literary ambition might have tempted him to try to turn a current public event to personal

¹ See XII. ix. 741-57.

² Gibbon finished writing *The Decline and Fall* on the 27th June, 1787; the session of the French States General was opened at Versailles on the 5th May, 1789; Gibbon died on the 16th January, 1794.

³ *The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon*, edited by John Murray (London 1896, Murray).

⁴ Gibbon: 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West', quoted in IV. iv. 148 and in XII. ix. 424.

⁵ In XI. ix. 252-3 and 255 (Table I).

account, since, at the outbreak of war in A.D. 1756, Gibbon was nineteen years old, and between March 1758 and February 1759, while the war was in progress, his already awakened literary ambition was leading him to write the first of his published works: *L'Essai sur l'Étude de la Littérature*.¹ From the moment when he started writing this juvenile essay till the moment, nearly ten years later, when he broke off work on his second literary project—a history of the Swiss—in the winter of A.D. 1767–8, Gibbon was painfully casting about for subjects with an obvious lack of inspiration which, to a twentieth-century Western historian's mind, was reminiscent of the deplorable attitude prevalent among latter-day candidates for post-graduate degrees in their desperate search for subjects for theses to be offered up to captains of intellectual industry whose fiat was law in the industrialized academic economy of the Western universities in a post-Modern Age.² Gibbon's choice of the histories of Switzerland and Florence as two possible alternative themes on which he might employ his pen had been the sequel to an unrewarding prospector's tour of other arid deposits of possibly metalliferous ore.

In the summer of 1761, after considering the potentialities of Charles VIII's expedition into Italy, Richard I's crusade, the war of King John and the Barons, the Black Prince, a comparison of Titus and Henry V, lives of Sir Philip Sidney or Montrose, he had at last fixed on Sir Walter Raleigh. But in the following summer he felt obliged to drop his hero. He found that he could add little to the existing life by Oldys, poor performance though that might be, while he would hesitate to eke out his work by digressions into contemporary history which had already occupied such men as Walpole, Robertson, and Hume.³

Indeed, from the time when Gibbon had completed his education until the winter of A.D. 1767–8, when, after abandoning the history of the Swiss, 'I more seriously undertook,' as he himself records, 'to methodise the form and to collect the substance of my Roman decay',⁴ he was afflicted with a barrenness of intellectual creative power which he frankly confesses.

'Between [the publication of] my Essay and [the publication of] the first volume of *The Decline and Fall*, fifteen years (1761–1776) of strength and freedom elapsed without any other publications than my criticism on Warburton⁵ and some articles in the *Mémoires Littéraires*.⁶

It is astonishing that, after this long inauspicious prelude, Gibbon should have been continuously occupied, throughout a period of some nineteen and a half years, ending on the night of the 27th June, 1787, in producing a masterpiece of historical research, construction, and writing

¹ See Low, D. M.: *Edward Gibbon, 1737–1794* (London 1937, Chatto & Windus), p. 102.

² This attempt to apply the technique of the Division of Labour to a post-Modern Western World's intellectual activities has been noticed in I. i. 2–8.

³ Low, op. cit., p. 118, mentions three passages, dating from the 14th April, 1761, to the 26th July, 1762, in Gibbon's diary, quoted in *Autobiographies*, ed. cit., pp. 193–7 (Memoir B).

⁴ Gibbon, *Autobiographies*, ed. cit., p. 284 (Memoir C). Cp. p. 411 (Memoir D).

⁵ Gibbon, E.: *Critical Observations on the Sixth Book of the Aeneid* (originally published in 1770, and reprinted in *The Miscellaneous Works of Edward Gibbon Esq.*, new edition, vol. iv (London 1814, John Murray), pp. 467–514).—A.J.T.

⁶ Gibbon, *Autobiographies*, ed. cit., p. 411 (Memoir D). Cp. pp. 283–4 (Memoir C).

which had no superior in its own genre in any literature known to Western scholars in A.D. 1952. It is, however, more astonishing still that, as soon as he had completed this supremely creative piece of intellectual work, Gibbon should have relapsed, for the remaining six and a half years of his life, into the intellectual barrenness from which he had suffered in his youth.

Gibbon did not even produce a final complete version of his autobiography out of his six successive fragmentary drafts; and the new literary enterprise to which he addressed himself between his return from Lausanne to England in the early summer of A.D. 1793 and his death on the 16th January, 1794, had not been his own idea, but had been undertaken at the suggestion of 'a young Scottish antiquary', John Pinkerton, who had audaciously rushed in where Gibbon's defaulting muse had forborne, this time, to tread.¹ A presentiment that this muse was now to desert him as arbitrarily as she had made her epiphany to him on the 15th October, 1764, not much less than twenty-three years back, can indeed be read between the lines of the elegiac passage in which the historian has recorded his feelings after writing the last sentence of his supremely great work.

'It was on the day, or rather the night, of the 27th June, 1787, between the hours of eleven and twelve, that I wrote the last lines of the last page in a summer-house in my garden. After laying down my pen I took several turns in a *berceau*, or covered walk of acacias, which commands a prospect of the country, the lake, and the mountains. The air was temperate, the sky was serene, the silver orb of the Moon was reflected from the waters, and all Nature was silent. I will not dissemble the first emotions of joy on the recovery of my freedom, and, perhaps, the establishment of my fame. But my pride was soon humbled, and a sober melancholy was spread over my mind by the idea that I had taken my everlasting leave of an old and agreeable companion, and that, whatsoever might be the future date of my history, the life of the historian must be short and precarious.'²

Gibbon's gift to his fellow men is indeed all contained in one immortal work which it took him some fifteen years (A.D. 1773-87) to write, some nineteen and a half years (A.D. 1768-87) to produce, including some four and a half years (A.D. 1768-72) spent on systematic study and on preliminary drafting,³ and nearly twenty-three years (15th October, 1764-27th June, 1787) to create, including three years and more during which the already dedicated historian of the decline and fall of Rome 'still contemplated at an awful distance'⁴ the subject that had been vouchsafed to him⁵ by his heavenly visitant on an historic site at a memorable hour in

¹ 'A young Scottish antiquary approached him with a scheme for publishing the English chronicles from Gildas to the accession of the House of Tudor. Gibbon reflected, approved, took fire: he promised first his interest, then his assistance, and finally his collaboration' (Young, G. M.: *Gibbon*, 2nd ed. (London 1948, Hart-Davis), p. 175). 'He agreed to write a general preface and introductions for Pinkerton's projected edition of early English historians' (Low, D. M.: *Edward Gibbon, 1737-1794* (London 1937, Chatto & Windus), p. 345).

² Gibbon, *Autobiographies*, ed. cit., pp. 333-4 (Memoir E).

³ See Gibbon, *Autobiographies*, ed. cit., pp. 284-6 (Memoir C) and 411-12 (Memoir D), and compare these passages with *The Decline and Fall*, chap. xxx, n. 86, cited on p. 98, n. 2, above.

⁴ *Autobiographies*, p. 275 (Memoir C).

⁵ See IV. iv. 59-60 and VI. vii. 9.

circumstances which the recipient of this divine inspiration has recorded in words that rise to the height of the occasion.

'It was on the fifteenth of October, in the gloom of the evening, as I sat musing on the Capitol while the barefooted fryars were chanting their litanies in the Temple of Jupiter,¹ that I conceived the first thought of my history.'²

This imaginative experience, was the sole flash of inspiration with which Gibbon was ever visited. Without it, that wonderful genius might never have come to flower, and that famous name might have found no place in the record of Mankind's intellectual history. In chronological terms the psychic event which had these momentous consequences may have occupied no more than a fraction of one second out of the thirty-six years or so of the great historian's adult intellectual life; yet his watchful muse did not fail to see and seize her fleeting opportunity of gaining access to a mind which was normally rendered impervious to her divine promptings by a carapace of innate scepticism that had been case-hardened in an all too congenial eighteenth-century Western mental climate. Perceiving that her chosen vessel's usually inhibited soul had been momentarily softened by the cumulative emotional influences of a sight which recalled the greatness of a dead Past and a sound whose faintly floating strains conveyed the measure of the gulf between Past and Present, the goddess had made her dazzling instantaneous epiphany from the depths of a Subconscious Psychic Abyss in order to release the springs of a mighty mind's intellectual power by the annunciation of a theme which, at last, was fully worthy of the ready writer.³

'How has this come out of that?' It would be hard to find another instance in which the historian's stark elemental question had generated so fecund a germ of creative thought. The favoured recipient himself did not immediately apprehend more than a fragment of the mental wealth that had suddenly been poured into his lap, and even the incomparably great work that he eventually made of it was no more than a gleaming from the huge potential harvest.

'My original plan', Gibbon tells us,⁴ 'was confined to the decay of the City; my reading and reflection pointed to that aim'; and this project was duly achieved in the essay that eventually found its place as the last chapter of the completed work, in which Gibbon surveys the ruins of Rome in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era and discusses the

¹ The pagan temple that had been replaced by the Christian church of Santa Maria in Arâ Coeli, served by the 'Zoccolanti' Franciscan Friars Minor, was actually the Temple of Juno Moneta, at the northern end of the Mons Capitolinus. The Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus had occupied the south-western end of the hill.—A.J.T.

² *Autobiographies*, pp. 405-6 (Memoir D). This experience is also recorded in two other of Gibbon's drafts for an autobiography. The account in Memoir E (*ibid.*, p. 302) does not differ in any point from that in Memoir D, quoted above. The account in Memoir C (*ibid.*, p. 270) gives 'the place and moment of conception' of *The History of the Decline and Fall* as 'the fifteenth of October 1764, in the close of evening, as I sat musing in [*sic*] the Church of the Zoccolanti or Franciscan fryars, while they were singing Vespers in the Temple of Jupiter on the ruins of the Capitol'. The other two accounts give the impression—though they do not expressly state—that Gibbon was sitting in the open air, with the ruins of Ancient Rome before his eyes, while the sound of the friars' voices was reaching his ears from inside the Christian Church on the site of a former pagan temple.

³ Psalm xlv. 1 (2 in *The Book of Common Prayer*).

⁴ In *Autobiographies*, ed. cit., p. 406 (Memoir D).

causes of the physical decay and destruction of a city which had reached the apogee of its material splendour in the second century. The last words of this chapter, written in the last hour of the 27th day of June, 1787, at Lausanne, nearly twenty-three years after the Muse's epiphany at Rome, are:

'It was among the ruins of the Capitol that I first conceived the idea of a work which has amused and exercised near twenty years of my life, and which, however inadequate to my own wishes, I finally deliver to the curiosity and candour of the public.—Lausanne, June 27, 1787.'

But in the meanwhile the growth of the original germ of thought had kept pace with the passage of Time; for, by the date at which Gibbon indited these closing words, this chapter was numbered, not 'Alpha and Omega', but lxxi. In the course of its elephantine gestation, the germ planted in Gibbon's mind on the 15th October, 1764, had grown more than seventyfold beyond the modest compass of its primal nucleus.

'My original plan was circumscribed to the decay of the City rather than of the Empire; and, though my reading and reflexions began to point towards that object, some years elapsed, and several avocations intervened, before I was seriously engaged in the execution of that laborious work.'¹

The historian goes on to tell us² that he 'had yet a very inadequate notion' of the 'limits and extent' of his theme, even when he did start his serious labours on it in A.D. 1768.

'I gradually advanced from the wish to the hope, from the hope to the design, from the design to the execution, of my historical work. . . . Through the darkness of the Middle Ages I explored my way, in *The Annals and Antiquities of Italy* of Muratori, and compared them with the parallel or transverse lines of Sigonius and Maffei, of Baronius and Pagi, till I almost grasped the ruins of Rome in the fourteenth century, without suspecting that this final chapter must be attained by the labour of six quartos and twenty years.'³

By the 27th June, 1787, this labour had extracted a history of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire out of a theme which, on the 15th October, 1764, had been enunciated by the Muse merely as a history of the physical decay of a city that Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonines had bequeathed to unworthy epigoni. 'How has this come out of that?' The labour of twenty years and six quarto volumes had expanded the field of Gibbon's answer to the historian's elemental question from the *pomoerium* of an imperial city to the *limites* of the universal state of which Rome had been the foundress and first capital; yet, immense though this progressive expansion of Gibbon's historical horizon was, it was prevented from expanding right up to 'the natural frontiers' of even a mundanely intelligible field of study by the narrowness of the original nucleus of the germinating idea.

The tragically dramatic contrast that had fired Gibbon's imagination

¹ Gibbon, E.: *Autobiographies*, ed. cit., pp. 270-1 (Memoir C).

² *Ibid.*, p. 284 (Memoir C).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 411 (Memoir D). Cp. p. 284 (Memoir C).

among the ruins of the Capitol on the 15th October, 1764, had been the physical contrast between these present ruins and the past magnificence of those buildings when they had stood intact; and Gibbon had been right in seeing in the second century of the Christian Era the physical city of Rome's architectural *floruit*. In setting out to trace the history of the city's subsequent physical decay, he had therefore likewise been right in taking the death of Marcus Aurelius and accession of Commodus as his chronological starting-point. He had, however, failed to perceive that the geographical enlargement of his subject from an *Urbs Roma* to an *Orbis Romanus* demanded of him a concomitant extension of his chronological limits. He did not take Bacon's point¹ that the Roman Empire's mission and significance had lain in serving as a universal state for the whole of the Hellenic Society, and that the *orbis* which had been arrogantly styled *Romanus* by citizens of the city-state which had happened to serve as History's instrument for bringing this world into political unity was in truth an Hellenic World whose decline and fall had already been in full train before the rise of Rome had begun, and whose principal pre-Roman polities—Sparta, Athens, Olynthus, Macedonia, and Syracuse—had given Rome her opportunity by failing to solve for the Hellenic Society betimes the political problem that Rome had solved for it eventually too late. The episode of mundane history that had been the implicit theme of Gibbon's flash of inspiration on the 15th October, 1764, was in truth the decline and fall, not just of a Roman Hellenic universal state, but of the Hellenic Civilization itself; and the 'beginning of great evils for Hellas',² in which the historian of the Decline and Fall ought to have found his chronological starting-point, was, not the accession of Commodus in A.D. 180, but the outbreak of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C.³

This was not, however, either the only or the greatest spiritual treasure latent in Gibbon's fecund experience on the Capitol which the subject of the experience failed to harvest. The antiquarian approach which misled Gibbon into entering upon his story at a point more than six hundred years after its true beginning was not so grave a limitation as the sceptical temperament and the eighteenth-century Western bent of mind which inhibited him from apprehending the ultimate theme with which this marvellous revelation was pregnant. The ultimate theme was not a decline and fall of the Hellenic Civilization—occupying a somewhat longer span in the Time-dimension than the decline and fall of that society's Roman universal state after the death of Marcus Aurelius. It was not either this or any other episode of merely mundane history. It was a drama in which the action was raised to a higher spiritual dimension through an invasion of Time by Eternity. The heart of the revelation conveyed by the sound of a Christian liturgical chant impinging on the sight of the ruins of a Trajanic Rome was the truth that Man's mundane failures are seized by God as His hell-sent opportunities for offering to human souls a chance of finding spiritual salvation.⁴

¹ See the passage quoted from Bacon's essay 'Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates' in VI. vii. 110.

² Thucydides, Book II, chap. 12.

³ This point has been made already in IV. iv. 58-63.

⁴ See II. i. 271-99.

This truth that Man's failure, sin, and suffering in This World may serve Man, through God's grace, as a chariot on whose wings the Soul can soar heavenward¹ is an apocalypse in which History works together with Theology to lift a corner of the veil that shrouds from human vision the mystery of Human Nature and Destiny; for, in giving us an inkling of the good of Evil, this truth gives us a glimpse of the self-consistency and goodness of God's providence.

This is the ultimate meaning of 'the triumph of Barbarism and Religion' which Gibbon, in the closing seventy-first chapter of his work, claims to have described in the seventy chapters that precede it; and it is a meaning that had been duly divined by a Roman in whose person 'Religion and Barbarism' appeared, to Gibbon's unsympathetic eye, to be repulsively combined.² Not much less than twelve hundred years before the date of Gibbon's experience, Saint Gregory the Great, preaching a sermon to his Roman flock in the selfsame physical surroundings, had perceived and proclaimed the hollowness of this Trajanic Rome's outward grandeur;³ and on the 15th October, 1764, Gibbon's visitant muse must have been fain to convey the Christian saint's inspiration to the post-Christian historian; for this visitant was a greater spiritual power than the Clio in whose garb she had presented herself in order to put her would-be chosen vessel to the test. Gibbon had in truth been visited in that ineffable moment by the Hokmah—God's Holy Wisdom⁴—who had once been recognized unerringly for what she was by the physically blind eyes of an English poet when his unquenched voice had hailed her as 'offspring of Heaven first-born'.⁵ But Gibbon's heart had not known how to respond to the epiphany of this Celestial Light with Milton's prayer:

Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers
Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell
Of things invisible to mortal sight.

Instead of asking the historian's elemental question 'How has this come out of that?' with the spiritual humility that would have allowed his answer to expand to the full measure of its potential dimensions, the

¹ See II. ii. 210, n. 1; VII. vii. 420-9; and XII. ix. 627.

² Gibbon's treatment of Gregory the Great is a monument of the historian's virtuosity in the unamiable art of bestowing praise in terms that are more devastating than a candid censure:

'The pontificate of Gregory the Great . . . is one of the most edifying periods of the history of the Church. His virtues, and even his faults, a singular mixture of simplicity and cunning, of pride and humility, of sense and superstition, were happily suited to his station and to the temper of the times. . . .

'Experience had shown him the efficacy of these pompous rites. . . . and he readily forgave their tendency to promote the reign of priesthood and superstition. . . .

'The most abject ideas must be entertained of their [the sixth-century Italians'] taste and learning, since the epistles of Gregory, his sermons, and his dialogues are the work of a man who was second in erudition to none of his contemporaries.'

These are three fair samples of the laudatory arrows with which Gibbon has nailed his mighty victim to his sarcastic page in the forty-fifth chapter of his work.

³ Saint Gregory the Great: *Homiliae Quadraginta in Evangelia*, No. xxviii (Migne, J. P.: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. lxxvi, col. 1212), quoted in IV. iv. 60-61.

⁴ See Meyer, E.: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), pp. 104-5; Dodd, C. H.: *The Bible and the Greeks* (London 1935, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 217-18.

⁵ Milton: *Paradise Lost*, Book III, l. 1.

self-assured child of a post-Christian Western secular enlightenment cramped the fruitful question from the outset by introducing into it a specious qualification. 'How on Earth has this come out of that?' was the form in which Gibbon recast, in his own style, the question that had been planted in his mind by its heavenly visitant; and, in thus automatically ruling the supra-mundane dimension of Reality out of his reckoning, he was unconsciously precluding himself from finding the treasure hid in his field,¹ though he sifted the soil with a diligence that could hardly have been surpassed by a twentieth-century Western archaeologist.

Volney

This personal experience of which Gibbon made so much or made so little, according to the standard by which we measure his achievement, was, of course, in any case not unique. We have already taken note² of the comparable personal experience that inspired Gibbon's younger contemporary Volney (*vivebat* A.D. 1757-1820) to write *Les Ruines, ou Méditations sur les Révolutions des Empires*; and, though Volney's tale of a visitation that overtook him while he sat musing on a fallen column among the ruins of Palmyra³ may be apocryphal, there can be no doubt that this myth, if such it is, is a literary artifice for conveying a genuine experience. Volney on his travels in Egypt and Syria, like Gibbon on his visit to Rome, was inspired to write a great work on human affairs by a personal experience of a dramatic contrast between a miserable Present and a magnificent Past; and the inspiration that he had received *en voyage* in A.D. 1783-5 bore fruit in the publication of *Les Ruines* in A.D. 1791,⁴ as Gibbon's inspiration *en voyage* in A.D. 1764 had borne fruit in the publication of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* between A.D. 1776 and A.D. 1788.

Peregrinus Wiccamicus

The writer of the present Study had an authentic minor personal experience of the kind on the 23rd May, 1912, as he sat musing on the summit of the citadel of Mistrà, with the sheer wall of Mount Taygetus bounding his horizon in the western quarter of the compass, towards which he was bound, and the open vale of Sparta stretching away in the opposite eastern quarter, from which he had made his way that morning.

Though he had sat there, musing and gazing (and prosaically taking the edge off his hunger by consuming slabs of Pavlidhis' chocolate) through most of a long summer's day, till the gloom of evening constrained him reluctantly at last to move on in search of supper and a bed at Trýpi, he cannot pretend that he was inspired during his reverie on the summit by any strains from the throats of the nuns serving the church

¹ Matt. xiii. 44.

² See *Les Ruines*, chaps. 1-4.

³ Volney's fortuitous chronological advantage over Gibbon in being his junior by twenty years enabled him to profit mentally by a public catastrophe from which his senior had proved unable to derive any intellectual inspiration. The outbreak of the French Revolution, which had devastated Gibbon, stimulated Volney to bring the fruits of his Levantine experiences to harvest—though he had to pay for this stimulus by spending the last ten months of the Terror as a prisoner in irons.

⁴ On pp. 7-8, above.

of the Pandánassa, for he had left this far below in his spiral ascent of the miniature purgatorial mount that the citadel crowned like a Dantean Earthly Paradise. The sensuous experience that activated his historical imagination was not a sound of liturgical chanting; it was the sight of the ruins among which he had wound his way upwards to the peak; and this spectacle had been appalling; for, in this shattered fairy city, Time had stood still since that spring of A.D. 1821 in which Mistrà had been laid desolate, and in the spring of A.D. 1912 the nuns (rare birds in a Greek Orthodox Christendom) were the solitary inhabitants of a *kástro* that, for some six hundred years ending in the final catastrophe, had been the capital of Laconia under a series of successive régimes. Founded by the Franks *circa* A.D. 1249, recovered by the Byzantines in A.D. 1262, conquered by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1460, wrested from Ottoman hands by the Venetians in A.D. 1687,¹ and recovered by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1715, Mistrà had continued, through all these political, religious, and cultural vicissitudes, to reign for those six hundred years as the queen of the broad landscape that could be surveyed from her topmost battlements; and then, one April morning, out of the blue, the avalanche of wild highlanders from the Máni had overwhelmed her; her citizens had been forced to flee for their lives and had been despoiled and massacred as they fled; her deserted mansions had been sacked; and her ruins had been left desolate from that day to this.

Gazing across the plain which stretched away from this ruined hill-town's foot to her trim and respectable lowland successor near the banks of the Eurotas where he had passed the previous night, and reading in the guidebook in his hand that 'the present Sparta . . . founded in A.D. 1834 under King Otho after the War of Independence . . . is of entirely modern origin',² he was convicted of a horrifying sense of the sin manifest in the conduct of human affairs. Why should this lovely medieval eyrie have to be put to the sack in order that a commonplace modern townlet might be laid out on a different site to serve the selfsame public purpose?³ The history of Laconia between A.D. 1821 and A.D. 1834 had been a typical sample of human history in general. *Quam parvâ sapientiâ mundus regitur!*⁴ A Gibbon might well find it difficult to decide whether Man's most damning vice was his brutality or his irrationality.

Needless to say, the writer of this Study had made no progress towards reading the cruel riddle of Mankind's crimes and follies by the time

¹ See Hammer, J. de: *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, French translation, vol. xii (Paris 1838, Bellizard, Barthès, Dufour, et Lowell), p. 227.

² Baedeker, K.: *Greece*, 4th revised edition (Leipzig 1909, Baedeker). This old campaigner, which had been in the writer's hand at Mistrà on the 23rd May, 1912, was on his table in London on the 31st May, 1951, while he was writing these words.

³ Even now, when it is abandoned to the tortoises and the sheep, the hill of Mistrà looks down, as it were, with feudal pride upon the brand-new streets and hideous cathedral of the modern Sparta'.—Miller, W.: *The Latins in the Levant* (London 1908, John Murray), p. 100.

⁴ Bureaucracy had completed in cold blood the work of destruction that had been started in hot blood by war. 'The government of King Otho having transferred the residence of the official authorities to the new town of Sparta, the inhabitants of Misithra have followed, and the town of the Frank princes is sinking into a village'.—Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time*, new ed., vol. iv (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press), p. 198.

⁵ Axel Oxenstierna, quoted in I. i. 463, n. 2.

when he was forced down from the heights of Mistrà by the twofold pressure of hunger and nightfall. Yet, before his reluctant descent, the binocular historical vision which he had acquired from a Late Medieval Italian classical education at Winchester and Oxford had won from the Laconian landscape an intuition that was the germ of the present work.

As he brooded over the catastrophe through which a Sparta founded under the auspices of a Bavarian king of Greece had usurped the role of a Mistrà that had been founded by a French prince of the Morea, it was borne in upon him that the nineteenth-century performance of this historical tragedy was not the only one within his knowledge. After all, every Western schoolboy knew that the present town of Sparta was not the first to have occupied that site and borne that famous name; and, indeed, only yesterday the dreamer himself had been taking cognizance of one corner of an Hellenic Sparta which had recently been excavated by other members of the British Archaeological School at Athens. 'Dorian' hands had anticipated Modern Greek hands in founding 'the city on the sown-land' (*spartâ*) at some date perhaps little less than three thousand years earlier than A.D. 1834. But if the history of a latter-day Western Society into which the Modern Greeks had forced their way out of an Ottoman prison-house was an antitype of the history of an antecedent Hellenic Civilization—and this was the aspect in which the Western Society's history presented itself to an Hellenically-educated Western mind—then the Hellenic Sparta that was the historic counterpart of the present city in the plain must be presumed to have been preceded by some pre-Hellenic counterpart of the Frankish and Ottoman Mistrà on whose topmost pinnacle the latter-day Western classical scholar was at this moment perched. An Hellenic Sparta's fortunes must have been founded on some previously regnant hill-town's catastrophe.

Had Hellenic Sparta in truth had such a predecessor? And, if so, where was the hill on which this hapless victim of that Hellenic Sparta had been set? 'A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid'.¹ 'I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help';² and, raising his eyes as these texts shot through his mind, the gazer saw staring him in the face, on the crown of the bluff that overhung the farther bank of the Eurotas just opposite the all but coincident sites of Sparta the First and Sparta the Second, a monument that signalled to him the location of the pre-Hellenic counterpart of the Frankish and Ottoman citadel over whose battlements he was looking out. That white masonry that was flashing over there like a heliograph in the sunlight was 'the Mene-laïon' to which he had hastened to make his pilgrimage upon his arrival at Sparta three days back; and this ruined shrine was reputed to stand on the site of Therapnê, the hill-city that was said to have been the capital of Laconia in a Mycenaean last phase of Minoan history. Here, at a strategic point equivalent to Mistrà's situation on the opposite side of the vale, had stood Frankish Mistrà's pre-Hellenic double whose overthrow had made the first Sparta's fortune; and the historic tragedy of Mistrà had thus in truth been played at least twice in this rock-bound amphitheatre of everlasting hills.³

¹ Matt. v. 14.

² Psalm cxxi. 1.

³ Gen. xlix. 26.

Before the gazer descended from Mistrà that night, the impact of the Laconian landscape on his classical *Weltanschauung* had impressed on his mind two lasting lessons—one concerning the historical geography of Continental European Greece and the other concerning the morphology of the history of civilizations.¹

He had learnt that, in this Mediterranean peninsula, the physical environment lent itself to two possible alternative social and political régimes which had in fact alternated with one another here at least twice over. The lie of the land and the set of an insinuating sea had decreed that in this country there should be a perpetual tug-of-war between the shepherds in the highlands which covered all but a fraction of the *terra firma* and the husbandmen, artisans, and mariners in the fruitful patches of plain and in the profitably situated ports; and the fluctuations in a perpetual struggle between these two elements in the population, who divided the territory so unevenly between them, were bound to be reflected in corresponding fluctuations in the fortunes of geographical sites and in the currency of political institutions. When the seafaring and farming population of the ports and plains was on the defensive—as it was apt to be particularly when it consisted of alien intruders who had thrust their way in from overseas—it could do no more than maintain a precarious hold over the plains, and over the passes leading from one plain to another, from fortified eyries. One such eyrie had been planted on the pinnacle of Mistrà by Frankish invaders in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, and another on the bluff at Therapnè by Minoan invaders in the second millennium B.C., and the eventual catastrophe in which both these variations on the same historical theme had ended was manifestly the denouement that was to be expected from the inherent insecurity of this type of régime.

The exotic castle might pass, time and again, from one set of alien hands to another—as Mistrà had passed through French, Byzantine, Ottoman, Venetian, and, once again, Ottoman hands, and Therapnè through Cretan, Pelopid, and Achæan—but, sooner or later, the *tour de force* was likely to end in the same way. The perilously exposed outpost of an alien civilization would be overwhelmed by a social cataclysm in which the native wild highlanders, who had been kept at bay by the intruders without ever being either subjugated or assimilated, would descend upon the plains in a devastating spate; and this recurrent catastrophe, whenever it occurred, would be apt to result in a *peripeteia* that would inaugurate a spell of the alternative régime. For, when once the native highlanders had thus possessed—or repossessed—themselves of the plains, the ports, and the passes, their children would come to adopt the corresponding agricultural and maritime way of life without ceasing to be a match in warfare for their cousins who had stayed among the mountains to continue there to pursue the highlanders' two traditional avocations of shepherding and brigandage.² In contrast to the

¹ These two lessons implicit in the historical geography of Laconia have been noticed already in IX. viii. 491-5.

² In Macedonia, where the social *peripeteia* accompanying a transfer of sovereignty from the Ottoman Empire to the Kingdom of Greece had taken place ninety-one years later than in Laconia, the writer once had the good fortune to obtain a vivid sidelight on

alien intruders from overseas, the native highlanders who had ousted them from the plains, and who, in consequence, had taken to husbandry, manufacture, and seafaring, would have it in them to break the residual wild highlanders' spirit; and the visible symbol of the effective ascendancy that, under this indigenous régime, would be established over conservative highland shepherds by *ci-devant* highlanders who had now become lowlanders and husbandmen, would be the replacement of a fortified citadel of Therapnê or a fortified citadel of Mistrà by an open city on 'the sown-land'—a Sparta that could dispense with city-walls because the martial prowess of her disciplined citizen soldiers would have effectively struck terror into the cowed surviving highlanders' hearts.¹

This lesson in the historical geography of Greece which the writer had learnt on the citadel of Mistrà on the 23rd May, 1912, had been treasured by him ever since; yet it had not proved so valuable for his then still unconscious future purposes as the simultaneous lesson in the morphology of the history of civilizations. A notion of the philosophical contemporaneity and philosophical equivalence of chronologically non-contemporary representatives of this species of Society had, it is true, been implanted in his mind by his Hellenic classical education,² and this tentative idea was to be ripened into conviction, little more than two years later, by the light that was to be thrown for him upon the vocabulary and the psychology of Thucydides by the outbreak of a First Western World War.³ Yet these influences from the social milieu into which a classically-educated post-Modern Western historian had been born might not have availed, by themselves, to initiate him into a synoptic view of History if this synoptic view had not unfolded itself physically before his eyes from the summit of Mistrà on the 23rd May, 1912, in an experience that had been personal to the spectator.

Yosoburo Takekoshi

An experience that is personal in the sense of not being imparted by the subject's social milieu may also inspire an historian even when he experiences it at second-hand—as is attested by a twentieth-century

it from a living beneficiary. Waiting for an omnibus at Sorovich on the 4th September, 1921, he fell into conversation with a bystander who turned out to be a Slovene, born in Klagenfurt, Carinthia, who had emigrated as a boy to the United States, had come to Macedonia as a chauffeur for the American Red Cross, and was now driving a tractor in the service of three Greek brothers who were joint owners of a large estate in the neighbourhood of Sorovich, besides owning a whole block of houses just across the road from the railway station. Like the property itself, the present owners' up-to-date Western method of farming was a legacy from their father, who had died only four months since. In answer to a question about his enterprising deceased employer's antecedents, the Slovene mechanic volunteered: 'Well, he hadn't owned this property for very long. Before "the war" [meaning the Balkan Wars of A.D. 1912-13], when the Turks owned the land, he was just one of those "Christians"—what is the English word for them? . . . O, now I remember it: "brigands"—up in the mountains. But, when the Greek Army marched in, the Turks cleared out and the brigands came down from the mountains and seized the land. So that is how my employer got his property, and how I got my job.'

¹ This is perhaps the answer to a question that has been raised by a Modern Western historian. 'One wonders, on visiting Villehardouin's castle to-day, how the Ancient Spartans can have neglected a strategic position so incomparably superior to their open village down in the plain by the Eurotas.' Miller, W.: *The Latins in the Levant* (London 1908, John Murray), p. 100.

² See pp. 93-95, above.

³ See p. 94, above.

Japanese historian, Yosoburo Takekoshi, in his preface to his book *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilisation of Japan*.¹

'When Viscount Motono, who was Japanese Ambassador in Paris between 1901 and 1906, met Monsieur Gustave Le Bon, a distinguished evolutionist, the latter referred to the recent rise of Japan as marvellous and unparalleled in the World's history, and compared her progress to that of a comet which flashes across the sky, but pursues an irregular orbit, is dangerous to approach, and [is] extremely uncertain as to its appearance and disappearance. Japan, he further commented, like the comet, may some day abruptly pass away from sight yonder beneath the horizon. In reply, Viscount Motono pointed out that Japan had not appeared on the sky with any such abruptness as Monsieur Le Bon appeared to think; that, on the contrary, she had, through her long history, passed through various stages of progress till finally she emerged on the stage of the World's theatre fully prepared and ready to play her part. Her rise had only followed its natural course. Monsieur Le Bon thereupon urged the publication of a work dwelling upon Japan's progress; and, when subsequently Viscount Motono was home on leave, he told me of his interview with Monsieur Le Bon, and suggested that I should write a Japanese history to enlighten not only Monsieur Le Bon himself but many others in Europe who might entertain a similar idea regarding Japan.'

This suggestion of Viscount Motono's, arising out of his account of his conversation with Le Bon, duly sowed in his interlocutor's mind the seed of an intellectual enterprise which was retarded, without being choked, by the thorny political career in which the future author of the suggested work was involved for the next nine years or more. As soon as Yosoburo Takekoshi had been compulsorily discharged from political life through his failure to retain his seat in the Japanese Diet at the General Election of A.D. 1915, he took up in earnest the long delayed project and completed it in the course of the five years ending on the 25th November, 1920, when he wrote the preface in which he has recorded the book's genesis. The muse's part in this case had been played neither by a catastrophic public event nor by a poignant personal experience at first-hand, but by a report of a personal encounter between two other living minds.

¹ London 1930, Allen & Unwin, 3 vols.

D. THE FEELING FOR THE POETRY IN THE FACTS OF HISTORY

IN our foregoing inquiry into the impulse to investigate the relations between the facts of History, we have struck the springs of action of a number of historians. Some of those springs prove to have been released by personal experiences and others by events or circumstances in an historian's social milieu, while the historians whom we have constrained to abide our question have ranged in repute from the most eminent to the most obscure. This variety in the evidence which we have cited in dealing with one subject on our agenda gives point to the remarkable concordance of these divers witnesses' incidental uninvited testimony on our next subject. Our survey of responses to the challenging intellectual question 'How has this come out of that?' reveals in retrospect the significant truth that, in their attempts to answer it, historians have been drawn on to go deeper and to look farther.

When we are investigating the relations between the facts of History, we are trying to see God through History with our intellects. The sorting out of facts is essentially an intellectual activity. The Intellect, however, is only one faculty of the Soul. When we think about something, we are apt also to have feelings about it, and our impulse to express our feelings is still stronger than our impulse to express our thoughts. Feelings about History, as well as thoughts about it, have inspired historical works, and similar feelings, evoked by similar facts, have also been expressed in imaginative works in the divers genres of literature. There is, for example, a lyrical genre, an epic genre, a narrative genre, and a dramatic genre; and the feeling for the poetry in the facts of History has availed itself of all of these.

The lyrical genre—to begin with that—is one that has many facets. It may present itself in rejoicings at a dawn, in exultations over a liberation, in celebrations of an achievement, in praises of heroism, or in elegies over the sorrows of Human Life.

The joy of dawn is the emotional charge in some of the most famous scenes in Western history—the Latin Christian warriors' shout of 'Deus le volt' in response to Pope Urban II's preaching of the First Crusade, the ministry of Saint Francis of Assisi seen through Giotto's and through Saint Thomas of Celano's eyes, the landfalls of the *Pinta*¹ and the *Mayflower*, the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the taking of the Tennis Court Oath—and the poetry in some, at least, of these historic events has been uttered in lines that speak more eloquently than volumes. The poetry in the American Revolutionary War has been distilled by Emerson into one quatrain:

By the rude bridge that arched the flood,
Their flag to April's breeze unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood
And fired the shot heard round the World.²

¹ Though the first member of Columbus's first expedition to sight land was a sailor on board the *Pinta*, this vessel's name had not won equal renown with the *Santa Maria*, which was the Admiral's flagship.

² Emerson: *Concord Hymn*, stanza 1.

The poetry in the French Revolution has been distilled by Wordsworth into two lines:

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very Heaven.¹

It is no wonder that, in these rejoicings at a dawn, the historians should have had to let the poets be their spokesmen; for the joy awakened by the dawn of a new era of History is the Soul's response to an epiphany that is something more than a merely temporal event. The dawns that awaken such joy as this are irruptions into Time out of Eternity. What has happened on these historic occasions likewise happens at the birth of every child:

'A woman when she is in travail hath sorrow, because her hour is come; but, as soon as she is delivered of the child, she remembereth no more the anguish, for joy that a man is born into the World.'²

In a mother's joy the Soul hails an incarnation; and, since 'alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis',³ the dawns of mundane eras that have this poetry in them are antitypes of cosmic dawns in which a Divine Light breaks into This World. A radiance which shines in upon us through Botticelli's picture, in the National Gallery in London, of the birth in the stable at Bethlehem is likewise manifest in the enlightenment under the Bodhi Tree, in the descent of the Dove at the baptism in Jordan, in the transfiguration on the mountain, in the vision on the road to Damascus, and in the imprinting of the stigmata in the wilderness; and, as Milton's voice strikes up in a Franciscan ode on the morning of Christ's nativity, Gibbon's voice dies away.

The thrill of liberation is the emotional charge in the historic events conveyed in the words Marathon, Salamis, Befreiungskrieg, Risorgimento, Renaissance; and these mundane historical events that have this poetry in them are antitypes of the Resurrection on Easter Morning. The bliss of achievement is the emotional charge in the recollection of Athens and Florence; in the spectacle of the Altar and Temple of Heaven, the frieze from the Parthenon, the church of the Ayía Sophía, and the Green Mosque;⁴ and in the reading of *La Divina Commedia*; and these human achievements that have this poetry in them are antitypes of the ministries of Christ and the Buddha and the missions of all the bodhisattvas, prophets, and saints, down to a John Wesley and a Mahatma Gandhi, who have come and gone already and will be followed, through the ages, by later members of their goodly fellowship.⁵ The glory of heroism is the emotional charge in the memories of the Three Hundred at Thermopylae, the Six Hundred at Balaclava, the Four Thousand at Waterloo,⁶ and the Fifteen Thousand at Gettysburg; and

¹ Wordsworth: *The Prelude*, Book XI, ll. 108-9, incorporating *The French Revolution as it appeared to Enthusiasts at its Commencement*.

² John xvi. 21.

³ Goethe: *Faust*, ll. 12104-5.

⁴ A writer who had also seen the Dome of the Rock and the Tāj Mahal would, no doubt, mention these, too, at this point. By A.D. 1952 the present writer had already thrice visited Brusa, but he had not yet set foot in either Jerusalem or Agra.

⁵ *Te Deum*, verse 8.

⁶ If this was in truth the strength of the battalions of the French Imperial Guard that took part in the final assault and the subsequent last stand at Waterloo (see Rose, J. H.: *The Life of Napoleon I* (London 1904, Bell, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 506-8).

these martial heroes are subjects for the poetry of a Tennyson or a Simonides in so far as they are antitypes of the Noble Army of Martyrs.¹

'They were stoned, they were sawn asunder, were tempted, were slain with the sword; they wandered about in sheepskins and goatskins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented (of whom the World was not worthy); they wandered in deserts and in mountains, and in dens and caves of the Earth.'²

As for the *lacrimae rerum*,³ these are as innumerable as the drops of water in the sea, since sorrow is the web of Man's mortal life. This is the emotional charge in Hesiod's elegy on Homer's heroes⁴ and in Ch'ü Yüan's and Angilbert's elegies on the victims of fratricidal warfare.

The warriors are all dead: they lie on the moor-field.
They issued but shall not enter: they went but shall not return.
The plains are flat and wide: the way home is long.
Their swords lie beside them: their black bows, in their hand.
Though their limbs were torn, their hearts could not be repressed. . . .
Steadfast to the end, they could not be daunted.
Their bodies were stricken, but their souls have taken Immortality—
Captains among the ghosts, heroes among the dead.⁵

The same voice that speaks these lines written in a Sinic Time of Troubles also makes itself heard in lines written during a post-Carolingian interregnum.

Albent campi vestimentis mortuorum lineis
Velut solent in autumnno albescere avibus. . . .
Maledicta dies illa, nec in anni circulo
Numeretur, sed radatur ab omni memoriâ,
Iubar Solis illi desit, Aurora crepusculo,
Noxque illa, nox amara, noxque dura nimium,
In quâ fortes ceciderunt, proelio doctissimi,
Pater, mater, soror, frater, quos amici fleverant.⁶

The chord of feeling that is touched by the pathos of the warriors' death in battle also sounds in response to the tragedy of the failure of a life-work. The tragedy of the extinction of a forlorn hope that had glimmered like a will-o'-the-wisp over Julian the Apostate's brief career has been conveyed by Libanius in two hexameters, of which the second is a Homeric reminiscence:

Ἰουλιανὸς μετὰ Τίγριν ἀγάρροον ἐνθάδε κεῖται,
ἀμφοτέρων, βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.⁷

The Apostate was, in spite of himself, an imitator of Christ; for such dedicated lives and tragic deaths as his are antitypes of Christ's passion,

¹ *Te Deum*, verse 9.

² Hebrews, xi. 37-38.

³ Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book I, l. 462.

⁴ Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 156-73, quoted in VIII. viii. 75.

⁵ Ch'ü Yüan (*vivebat* 332-295 B.C.), translated by Arthur Waley in *A Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems* (London 1920, Constable), pp. 23-24.

⁶ Angilbert's elegy on the Battle of Fontenoy (*commisum* A.D. 841), in *The Oxford Book of Medieval Latin Verse*, chosen by Stephen Gaselee (Oxford 1928, Clarendon Press), pp. 45-46.

⁷ Attributed to Libanius in *Anthologia Palatina*, Book VII, No. 147, but quoted without attribution by Zosimus in his *Historiae*, Book III, chap. 34. The second of the two lines is taken from the *Iliad*, Book III, l. 179, in which Helen is describing Agamemnon.

and the poetry in those elegies moves our hearts because our ears are catching the tones of the liturgy for Good Friday and our inward eye is beholding the Agony in the Garden—perhaps in the visual renderings of it that are presented in the pictures by Bellini and Mantegna which, in June 1951, were hanging side by side in the National Gallery in London.

The epic genre expresses the sense of romance that is evoked by conquests and defeats, by treks and voyages, and by the musical flow of the all-embracing ocean of History.

The dazzling personal triumphs of a Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar, Chingis, Timur, Cortés, Nādir Shāh, Clive, Wellesley, or Napoleon and corporate triumphs of the Macedonian, Arab, Mongol, Castilian, or British *conquistadores* have their dark reverse side in the agonies of their victims; and the sympathies of Mankind are revealed in the poets' choice of epic themes. Among the poets there is a consensus—which is impressive because it is tacit and manifestly undesigned—in feeling that the poignant woes of the conquered offer to the imagination a more promising subject than the conquerors' prosaic successes; and the victims are thus apt to win a posthumous revenge for their historical defeats on physical battlefields by rising from the dead to be crowned with a literary immortality.¹

Even a violent death by Brutus's hand at the high tide of his career could not recapture for Pompey's conqueror the pathos with which Pompey's death had been invested by his foregoing defeat—as witness Plutarch's inability to move us by his account of Caesar's end as we are moved by the corresponding passage in *The Life of Pompeius Magnus*.² The sordid liquidation of a war-lord who has outlived his prime has been transfigured by the victim's suffering into a symbol of a sorrow that is at the heart of Human Life. On the same poetic plane, Yazdagird has had the last word against S'ad b. abī Waqqās, Roderick against Tāriq, Jalāl-ad-Dīn Mankubirnī against Chingis, and Constantine Dhrágasis against Mehmed Fātih. Even Musta'sim the unready and Atahualpa the usurper and fratricide are redeemed by the wanton cruelty with which their conquerors put them to death; and, if any laurels had sprung from Hūlāgū's sack of Baghdad or from Pizarro's rape of the Empire of the Four Quarters, these would not have adorned the murderer's brow. As for the Aztecs and the Assyrians, nothing became these blood-thirsty militarists so well as the last stands in which they gloriously displayed the courage of their abominable convictions. The no less abominable spirit and conduct of Homer's Achilles would be likewise beyond bearing if the listener were not all the time conscious that this egotist-savage knew full well that he was doomed to die in the flower of his youth. The true hero of the Iliad is, of course, not a conquering Achilles but a conquered Hector; and, though the triumphant war-lord Agamemnon's return home had the power to inspire a consummate work of art, Aeschylus's play had a superhuman theme in the awful irony of Divine Retribution. Even the pitiful crumbling of the Achaean

¹ This compensation for historical fact in 'heroic' tradition has been noticed in V. v. 607-14.

² Chaps. 77-80.

Power on the morrow of the Achaeans' ruthless sack of Troy evoked no poetry to match Euripides' *Troades* or the second book of Virgil's *Aeneid* or Abū'l-Baqā of Ronda's elegy on the *excidium* of Andalusia.

As a fond lover weeps at parting from his beloved, bitterly weeps the
Glorious Religion of Abraham
For desolate countries forsaken by Islam and peopled only by Infidelity.
Their mosques have become churches: there is nothing in them but
bells and crosses,
So that the mihrābs¹ weep, though lifeless, and the minbars² mourn,
though wooden. . . .
Oh, who will come to the help of a people once mighty but now abased,
once flourishing but now oppressed by Unbelievers?
Yesterday they were kings in their dwelling-places, and to-day they are
slaves in the land of the Infidel.
And what if thou couldst see them stricken with consternation, with
none to guide them, wearing the garments of ignominy!
Couldst thou but see them weeping when they are sold, the sight would
dismay thee and throw thee into a frenzy of grief.
Ah, betwixt many a mother and child comes such a sundering as when
souls are parted from bodies!
And many a young girl, beauteous as the new-risen Sun, blushing like
rubies and coral,
The barbarian drags to shame by force, her eyes weeping, her mind dis-
traught.
A sight like this melts the heart with anguish, if in the heart there be a
Muslim's feeling and faith.³

The sorrows of the conquered must be the theme of the epic of Andalusia, since the triumphs of military conquerors—Achaean or Castilian—are not the stuff out of which poetry is made.

Only the actions of the just
Smell sweet and blossom in their dust.⁴

The only conquerors who court no literary nemesis are the victorious missionaries of higher religions whose epic deeds have been hymned in the Acts of Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim Apostles.

The poetry in treks and voyages likewise flows in the epic vein. It wells up in the *Völkerwanderungen* of the barbarians; in the 'Crusades' of the ex-barbarian Medieval Western Christian Latins and Primitive Muslim Arabs; in the Winning of the West by Sinic Pioneers in the second century B.C. and by North American pioneers in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era; in the Winning of the East by John of Piano Carpini, William of Rubruck, Niccolò, Maffeo, and Marco Polo and the other intrepid thirteenth-century Latin travellers who made the iron journey to Qāraqorum and Xanadu across the breadth of the Great Eurasian Steppe; in the prowess of Cossack watermen who pushed their way over tundra and through forest from the Urals to the Pacific

¹ Niches pointing towards Mecca.—A.J.T.

² Pulpits.—A.J.T.

³ Written circa A.D. 1250 by Abū'l-Baqā of Ronda, and translated by R. A. Nicholson in *Translations of Eastern Poetry and Prose* (Cambridge 1922, University Press), pp. 168–9.

⁴ Shirley: *Death the Leveller*, the closing lines.

within the brief Time-span of some fifty years;¹ in Colaeus's voyage to Tarshish between the Pillars of Hercules² and Columbus's passage of the Atlantic from Tarshish to the Antilles; in the fifteenth-century exploration of the Indian Ocean by Far Eastern mariners³ who all but anticipated, from east to west, Vasco da Gama's subsequent feat of circumnavigating Africa from west to east; in the conquest of the Pacific by eastward-faring canoes and (perhaps) by westward-faring balsarafts;⁴ in the conquest of the North Pole, South Pole, Air, Stratosphere, and Mount Everest by Western adventurers within the lifetime of the writer and reader of this Study; and in the pilgrimages of all pilgrims to Holy Places.

As for the grand epic whose theme is History herself, this stands in two rival versions which cannot be reconciled, though both of them can be deduced from Watts' picture of Chaos or from Sophocles' paean⁵ on human achievement:

Wonders are many, but none there be
So strange, so fell, as the Child of Man.⁶

H. G. Wells in *The Outline of History* has written an epic poem on the theme 'Man Makes Himself' which is explicit in the title of a subsequent book from the pen of an eminent Western archaeologist of the next generation.⁷ This bleak assertion is a post-Christian Western Man's defiant answer to the Psalmist's joyful assurance that 'the Lord He is God' and that 'we are His People and the sheep of His pasture' because 'it is He that hath made us and not we ourselves';⁸ and that verse enunciates the theme of History as a series of encounters between Man and his Creator in which a Paradise that has been lost through a Fall is regained through a Redemption, and in which this deliverance⁹ of God's creature is achieved at the cost of a passion that Christ has suffered 'for the means of grace and for the hope of glory'.

The opening lines of this *Divina Commedia* are to be found in another psalm:

I will give thanks unto Thee, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made;
marvellous are Thy works, and that my soul knoweth right well.

My bones are not hid from Thee, though I be made secretly and fashioned beneath the Earth.

Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being imperfect, and in Thy book were all my members written,

Which day by day were fashioned when as yet there was none of them!

How dear are Thy counsels unto me, O God; O how great is the sum of them!

If I tell them, they are more in number than the sand; when I wake up, I am present with Thee.¹⁰

¹ See II. ii. 157 and V. v. 206-7.

² See Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 152.

³ See Duyvendak, J. J. L.: *China's Discovery of Africa* (London 1949, Probsthain).

⁴ Read Heyerdahl, Thor: *Kon-Tiki* (Chicago 1950, Rand McNally); *American Indians in the Pacific* (London 1952, Allen & Unwin).

⁵ Sophocles: *Antigonè*, II. 332-75.

⁶ Gilbert Murray's translation.

⁷ Child, V. Gordon: *Man Makes Himself* (London 1936, Watts).

⁸ Psalm c. 2.

⁹ Romans viii. 21.

¹⁰ Psalm cxxxix. 14-18 (13-18 in *The Book of Common Prayer*).

When we pass on to the story-teller's genre of literary art, we find the novelist vying with the diarist, the biographer, and the letter-writer to determine whether 'Fiction'¹ or 'Fact' is the more propitious medium for bringing out the poetry in the private affairs of ordinary people. In this competition between two rival forms of the art of distilling poetry out of a story, a Pepys, Saint Simon, Boswell, Manucci,² Cicero, and Horace Walpole are arrayed against an Herodotus,³ the anonymous authors of *The Three Kingdoms*,⁴ and a Modern Western school of historical novelists.⁵

The dramatic genre of literary art has the power of conveying the poetry in the facts of History in an ascending order of degrees. It may content itself with a bare rehearsal of the drama that is inherent *ipso facto* in any reversal of roles (*peripeteia*),⁶ or it may present the drama as an act of Poetic Justice, or it may interpret justice as an inexorable operation of the laws of Destiny or grinding of the mills of God.

Classic examples of the reversal of roles in the histories of civilizations are the successive overthrows of the Achaemenian Empire by Macedon and of Macedon by Rome,⁷ the triumph of Christianity over Paganism in the Roman Empire, the change in the fortunes of the Southern States of a North American Union through the outcome and aftermath of an American Civil War, and 'the Chain of Destruction', traced in a previous Part of this Study,⁸ in which one ephemeral military technique after another had been dramatically discomfited by a successor which had then suffered the same fate in its turn. On the plane of personal encounters, as contrasted with institutional relations, we may cite one example from the realm of 'Fact' and another from the realm of 'Fiction'.

The sheer drama of *peripeteia* is Polybius's theme in his account of the feelings experienced by the Seleucid King Antiochus III on a night in the year 214-213 B.C. in which his dissident cousin Achaeus, whom he had been besieging in the citadel of Sardis, was suddenly delivered into his hands.

'Since early in the night, the King had been in such a fever of anxious

¹ In so-called 'works of fiction', the element of fiction never amounts to more than a small percentage of the whole matter, and this authentically fictitious ingredient is capable of conveying philosophic truth that is less easy to convey in citations of so-called 'matters of fact' (see I. i. 448-50 and 452-3).

² Manucci, Niccolao: *Storia di Mogor, or Mogul India, 1652-1708*, translated by William Irvine (London 1906-8, John Murray, 4 vols.).

³ e.g., in his tales of Mycerinus (Book II, chaps. 129-33), Rhampsinitus (Book II, chap. 121), Gyges (Book I, chaps. 8-13), Croesus (Book I, chaps. 28-56 and 85-91), Cyrus (Book I, chaps. 107-30), Polycrates (Book III, chaps. 39-43 and 120-5), Dêmocêdês (Book III, chaps. 129-38), and Scylês (Book IV, chaps. 78-80).

⁴ *San Kuo Chih Yen I*, a romantic legend of the Han Empire's three turbulent local successor-states, which developed through the ages till it attained its definitive form in the time of the Ming Dynasty (English translation by Brewitt-Taylor, C. H. (Shanghai 1925, Kelly & Walsh)).

⁵ See the citations in the present writer's 'Acknowledgements and Thanks' on p. 225, below.

⁶ The problem of *peripeteia* has been discussed, apropos of the nemesis of Creativity, in IV. iv. 245-60.

⁷ See Polybius: *Oecumenical History*, Book XXIX, chap. 21, in which the historian of Macedon's overthrow by Rome comments on a passage, commenting on Macedon's triumph over Persia, which he quotes from the work of his predecessor Demetrius of Phalêrum.

⁸ In IV. iv. 431-65.

expectancy, while he was waiting to see how the plot [to kidnap Achaeus] would work out, [that he had been unable to sleep; so] he had dismissed his suite and had sat up in his tent on the alert, with no one in attendance save for two or three aides-de-camp. And now, when Cambylus and his party entered and deposited Achaeus, [captive and] bound, on the floor, the amazingness of this spectacle gave Antiochus such a shock that he was smitten with aphasia. It was a long time before he could utter a word, and, when his feelings did at last find vent, their first manifestation was a surge of sympathy which made him burst into tears.

'If we are to try to interpret this psychological reaction of Antiochus's, my own diagnosis would be that he was overwhelmed by a conviction of Man's impotence to guard against, or even reckon with, the deadly strokes of Fortune. Here lay Achaeus, nephew of Laodicê [II] the wife of Seleucus [II], husband of Laodicê the daughter of King Mithradates [III] of Pontic Cappadocia], and ruler *de facto* till yesterday of all [the dominions of the Seleucid Dynasty] north-west of Taurus. The citadel of Sardis, in which he had established himself, was deemed to be the strongest fortress in the World by the common consent of his own troops and his adversaries. And now here he was, lying bound on the floor, absolutely in the power of his enemies, before the news of this extraordinary event had had time to reach a soul beyond the immediate participants.'¹

This account of a matter of historical fact which occurred in the Hellenic World in the third century B.C. has an unmistakable fictional companion piece in the following passage near the close of a post-Modern Western novel which, as its author tells us in his preface, was finished by him in July 1908. The *mise-en-scène* here is not a tent but a bedroom, and the prone figure is not a prisoner, alive tonight, who will be put to death tomorrow, but a corpse from which the life has already departed. The figure standing silent and unnerved is, in this tableau, not a man's but a woman's, and she is not the prone figure's rival for a crown; she is his deserted wife who 'had not seen him for thirty-six years'. But the shock is no less great, and its elemental cause is the same overwhelming sense of Man's defencelessness against Fate.

'That was no conventional, expected shock that she had received. It was a genuine unforeseen shock, the most violent that she had ever had. In her mind she had not pictured Gerald as a very old man. She knew that he was old; she had said to herself that he must be very old, well over seventy. But she had not pictured him. This face on the bed was painfully, pitifully old. . . . The body, whose outlines were clear under the sheet, was very small, thin, shrunk, pitiable as the face. And on the face was a general expression of final fatigue, of tragic and acute exhaustion; such as made Sophia pleased that the fatigue and exhaustion had been assuaged in rest, while all the time she kept thinking to herself horribly: "Oh! how tired he must have been."'!

'Sophia then experienced a pure and primitive emotion, uncoloured by any moral or religious quality. She was not sorry that Gerald had wasted his life, nor that he was a shame to his years and to her. The manner of his life was of no importance. What affected her was that he had once been young, and that he had grown old, and was now dead. That was all. Youth and vigour had come to that. Youth and vigour always came to that. Everything came to that. He had ill-treated her; he had abandoned her;

¹ Polybius: *Oecumenical History*, Book VIII, chap. 20.

he had been a devious rascal; but how trivial were such accusations against him! The whole of her huge and bitter grievance against him fell to pieces and crumbled. She saw him young, and proud, and strong, as for instance when he had kissed her lying on the bed in that London hotel—she forgot the name—in 1866; and now he was old, and worn, and horrible, and dead. It was the riddle of Life that was puzzling and killing her.¹

In this riddle of Life the change from Life to Death is, of course, the supreme *peripeteia*. 'All men are born with halters round their necks; but it is only when caught in the swift, sudden turn of death that mortals realise the silent, subtle, ever-present perils of life.'² This total change that deprives Life of Life itself must be of the same absolute magnitude for every creature.

The poor beetle that we tread upon
In corporal sufferance finds a pang as great
As when a giant dies;³

and Death the Leveller brings Gerald Scales' tragedy to a parity with Achaëus's.

Sceptre and Crown
Must tumble down
And in the dust be equal made
With the poor crookèd scythe and spade.⁴

Yet the direness of the reversal of Fortune is, if not more evident, at least more ironic, in the deaths of mortals who, in this transitory life, have been invested with an ephemeral show of power and wealth.

Mortality, behold and fear
What a change of flesh is here!
Think how many royal bones
Sleep within these heaps of stones.
Here they lie, had realms and lands,
Who now want strength to stir their hands,
Where from their pulpits seal'd with dust
They preach 'In greatness is no trust.'
Here's an acre sown indeed
With the richest, royallest seed
That the Earth did e'er suck in
Since the first man died for sin.
Here the bones of birth have cried
'Though gods they were, as men they died!'
Here are sands, ignoble things,
Dropt from the ruin'd sides of kings:
Here's a world of pomp and state
Buried in dust, once dead by Fate.⁵

The drama of *peripeteia*, which has been given these classic expressions by great artists in the twin realms of 'Fact' and 'Fiction', and which is

¹ Bennett, Arnold: *The Old Wives' Tale*, Book IV: 'What Life is', chap. 4: 'End of Sophia'. ² Melville, Herman: *Moby Dick*, chap. lx.

³ Shakspeare: *Measure for Measure*, Act. III, scene i, ll. 79-81.

⁴ Shirley: *Death the Leveller*, stanza i, ll. 5-8.

⁵ Beaumont: *On the Tombs in Westminster Abbey*.

the theme of Edmund Spenser's fluttering stanzas on Mutability,¹ reaches its acme in the realm of 'Myth', where the Truth can be uttered whole and entire because 'the ineffable is here accomplished'.² In the encounters between David and Goliath, Solon and Croesus, Jesus and Pilate, the mystery is progressively revealed to the initiate's understanding.

The Poetic Justice whose judgements this drama executes is most familiar in the realm of brute force.

'When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but, when a stronger than he shall come upon him and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils.'³

'All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword';⁴ and the justice that ever lies in wait for 'the slayer' who 'shall himself be slain'⁵ has overtaken the sons of Cratos and Bia⁶ in a long procession, headed by Hesiod's Race of Bronze,⁷ in which the Aztecs tread on the heels of the Assyrians, while the rear is brought up by Prussians marching to their own destruction into lands that they have invaded in cold blood.

Οὐδ' ὅστις πάρουθεν ἦν μέγας,
παμμάχῳ θράσει βρύων,
οὐδέ λέξεται πρὶν ὧν
ὅς δ' ἔπειτ' ἔφν, τρια-
κτῆρος οἴχεται τυχών.⁸

Yet the doom of liquidation is not the heaviest sentence that can be passed by Justice on an unconscionable militarist. She may stay the hand of the external 'enemy and avenger'⁹ in order to give a triumphant victor time and occasion to emulate a demented Cleomenes' fearful vengeance upon himself.

'When he had gained possession of the edged tool, Cleomenes began to mutilate himself from below the knees upwards by slashing his flesh into strips. He began below the knees, and went on from there to his thighs and from his thighs to his hips and his flanks until he reached his stomach and died in the act of cutting this to ribbons.'¹⁰

Such long-drawn-out acts of *hara-kiri* have been the self-inflicted dooms of militarists collectively as well as individually.

Ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis
Romanas acies iterum videre Philippi.¹¹

The century of Roman domestic revolutions and civil wars (*saeviebant* 133-31 B.C.) was the nemesis of a half-century of wars of conquest in which Rome had made herself the unchallengeable mistress of the Hel-

¹ See the stanzas from *The Faerie Queen*, cantos vii and viii, quoted in V. vi. 100, n. 1.

² Das Unbeschreibliche

Hier ist's getan.

Goethe: *Faust*, II. 12108-9.

³ Luke xi. 21-22. Cp. Matt. xii. 29 and Mark iii. 27.

⁴ Matt. xxvi. 52.

⁵ Macaulay: *Lays of Ancient Rome*, 'The Battle of the Lake Regillus', section 10.

⁶ These two cosmic powers appear among the dramatis personae in Aeschylus's *Prometheus Vincit*.

⁷ See Hesiod: *Works and Days*, II. 143-55, quoted in VIII. viii. 74.

⁸ Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, II. 168-72.

⁹ Psalm xlii. 16.

¹⁰ Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 75.

¹¹ Virgil: *Georgics* I, II. 489-90.

lenic World.¹ Rome, and Rome only, was left to bring Rome to justice; and, within the hundred years opening with the year of Tiberius Gracchus's tribunate, Rome duly measured to herself again with the same measure that she had meted withal—'good measure, pressed down, and shaken together and running over'.² The dragon's-tooth seed of plantation slavery sown in areas devastated by the Hannibalic War produced an unintended crop of 'mean freemen'; and no less terrible examples of a self-inflicted nemesis were to be found in the post-Christian chapters of a Modern Western Society's history. A crop of 'mean Whites' had been the unintended harvest wherever the ubiquitous pioneers of a West European Civilization had sown the seed of Negro slavery, while the trade-union spirit and the civil service spirit had been the fruits of the enslavement of souls to machines in a Modern Western Industrial Revolution.³

The inexorability of the mills of God in grinding out the sentences passed by Justice was borne in upon the soul of Scipio Aemilianus in the last hour of Rome's once formidable rival and adversary, Carthage, according to the first-hand testimony of the Roman commander's Megalopolitan friend and companion, Polybius.

'When Scipio saw this great and ancient city meeting her end for ever in utter annihilation, he is said to have burst into tears and not to have concealed the fact that he was weeping for the enemy. For a long time he remained wrapped in his own thoughts; he realised that cities and nations and empires were destined, by God's providence, to pass away; he remembered that this had been the fate of Ilion, a city prosperous in its day; the fate of the Assyrian and Median and Persian empires which, each in turn, had once been the greatest in the World; and the fate of the Macedonian Empire, the most recent and most brilliant of them all. Then, whether deliberately or unconsciously, he recited aloud the lines:

A day of doom shall dawn, and on that day
Shall Holy Ilion's city pass away,
And Priam, that great spearman, and the host
Of Priam's people in their proud array.⁴

Polybius, whose pupil Scipio had been, asked him in so many words what he intended by the quotation, and Scipio is said to have thrown aside all reserve and to have uttered the name of his own country, on whose behalf he was filled with foreboding by his vision of the destinies of Man. This has been recorded at first hand by Polybius himself.⁵

This spiritual experience of Scipio's convicts him of having been under the dominion of a doctrine of doom which was of the essence of the Hellenic *Weltanschauung* and which worked no less potently in Hellenic souls in which it was unavowed than in those in which it was explicit. This doctrine is enunciated starkly in Herodotus's stock formula

¹ See Polybius: *Oecumenical History*, Book I, chap. 1, quoted on p. 64, above.

² Luke vi. 38. Cp. Matt. vii. 2; Mark iv. 24.

³ See XII. ix. 561-604 (especially 565-6, 572-4, 587). ⁴ *Iliad*, Book IV. ll. 164-5.

⁵ Polybius: *Oecumenical History*, Book XXXVIII, chap. 22. The original text has been lost, but the sense of it has been preserved in the paraphrase, here quoted, by a latter-day Hellenic historian, Appian of Alexandria (*vivebat circa* A.D. 90-160), who was writing in the deceptive sunlight of an Antonine 'Indian Summer'. The passage will be found in Appian's *Roman Studies*: 'The Book of Africa', chap. 132.

'Evil had to befall so-and-so, and therefore' there followed the action, whatever it might be, that brought this doom to pass.¹ A classical situation in which this doctrine seems to be true to life is the apparently inexorable approach of a civil war which everyone can foresee yet no one can avert because no one can—or will—exorcise the besetting sin which is the root of the evil. In the bosom of a post-Scipionic Roman Commonwealth the awful civil war of 90–80 B.C. duly broke out and continued to rage until it had burnt itself to ashes, though its advent had been foreseen and dreaded in advance for at least forty-three years (133–90 B.C.). In the bosom of a North American Union the no less awful civil war of A.D. 1861–5 arose and ran its dreadful course notwithstanding the efforts to avert it that had been made by statesmen on both sides for at least forty-one years running from the negotiation of 'the Missouri Compromise' in A.D. 1820. The drama of inexorability which these tragic passages of History exemplify can be conveyed in poetry better than in prose—as witness two masterpieces of post-Modern Western literature: Stephen Vincent Benét's poem *John Brown's Body* and Thomas Hardy's 'epic drama' *The Dynasts*. There is a veritably Hellenic order in the economy of the English poet's two-storied stage, on which the actions of human beings on Earth who seem to themselves to be freely exercising their wills appear at a supra-mundane level to be determined by the fiat of principalities and powers whose activities are invisible to their human puppets.

At this level the poetry in the facts of History raises the question of the meaning behind the facts with an insistence that it is impossible to ignore. If Necessity is queen of the last act of the play, can Freedom have ever reigned at any stage? If sinners are powerless to elude their punishment, was it ever in their power to avoid committing the sin for which this punishment is the nemesis? And, if the sin has been as inevitable as the punishment is inexorable, how can the doom which the pitiless mills grind out be identified with Justice? If we are to salvage our theodicy,

'we require a theory of human motives which will allow of our conceiving them, simultaneously, both as supernatural causes coming from without and also as integral parts in the working of the agent's mind.'²

When these words were written by a prescient-minded Western classical scholar in or before A.D. 1907, he declared what was the truth at the time when he added that 'Modern Psychology is, of course, not equal to the task of this reconciliation'. Within the forty-six years, however, that had elapsed between the publication of Francis Cornford's book and the time of writing of these lines, a post-Modern school of Western psychologists had rehabilitated as a scientific hypothesis the Hellenic religious belief that Cornford had diagnosed and expounded. In the 'autonomous complex' erupting from the abyss of a Subconscious Psyche to challenge the sovereignty of a Conscious Will that must

¹ See, for example, Herodotus, Book I, chap. 8; Book IV, chap. 79; Book V, chap. 33 [in the negative]; Book V, chap. 928; Book VI, chap. 64; Book VI, chap. 135; Book VII, chap. 11; Book VII, chaps. 17–18; Book VIII, chap. 35; Book IX, chap. 109.

² Cornford, F. M.: *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London 1907, Edward Arnold), pp. 154–5.

either subdue the intruder or suffer the consequences of becoming its slave, we are manifestly presented with a 'scientific' name for the *kêr* or *daimon* that assails the hero of an Attic tragedy.¹ In both these expressions of the identical idea of spiritual 'possession', the linguistic resources at a Time-bound mind's disposal are misleadingly inadequate; for, if the full-blooded language of Hellenic mythology falls wide of the truth in portraying these dread principalities and powers as conscious and wilful personalities, the anaemic language of Western science falls equally wide in classifying them as inanimate abstractions. Yet, through either glass, we see the same truth darkly.

This problem of the relation between Law and Freedom, which is presented by the phenomenon of *Peripeteia*, must not, however, detain us at this point from completing the course of our Study. We have wrestled with it at least twice already at earlier points,² and we should gain nothing now by stepping aside to try a fall with it again. Our present, and concluding, subject is the inspirations of historians.

¹ 'Internally, temptation takes the form of a violent passion, uncontrollable if its victim is unguarded and secure. The conquerors of Troy are beset by Erôs, the spirit of rapine; but this passion is not conceived [of] as a natural state of mind determined by a previous state—the effect of a normal cause; it is a spirit (*δαίμων*) which haunts, swoops down, and takes possession of the Soul when Reason slumbers and keeps no watch. Erôs is constantly spoken of by the Greeks as a disease (*νόσος*); but that word had not the associations merely of a wasting and painful bodily corruption. Diseases were caused by invading spirits, those malignant *kêres* of whom Age and Death are the chief, and who seize as much upon the Soul as upon the Body. . . . This to the Greeks was a very familiar idea.'—Cornford, *op. cit.*, pp. 157–8.

² e.g. in IV. iv. 245–61 and in XI. ix. 167–405, *passim*.

E. THE QUEST FOR A MEANING BEHIND THE FACTS OF HISTORY

The meaning behind the facts of History towards which the poetry in the facts is leading us is a revelation of God and a hope of communion with Him; but in this quest for a Beatific Vision that is visible to a Communion of Saints we are ever in danger of being diverted from our search for God to a glorification of Man; and this sin of associating the creature with the Creator¹ precipitates the man-worshipper into a continuing fall from idolatry through disillusionment to an eventual depreciation of Man which is almost as excessive as the adulation to which it is the inevitable sequel.

From morn
To noon he fell, from noon to dewy eve.²

An idolization of Man by Man himself, which is patently ridiculous when the idol is some individual mannikin, may be more specious when the blasphemous worship is paid to some collective Leviathan. Yet the state-worship that a post-Christian Western Society commended as 'patriotism' and the church-worship that it denigrated as 'fanaticism' both turn as bitter on the palate as the hero-worship of an Alexander, Hitler, Caesar, or Napoleon. In whatever form this anthropolatry may be practised, it stultifies itself by passing over into irony. 'Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.'³ 'Any man of forty who is endowed with moderate intelligence has seen—in the light of the uniformity of Nature—the entire Past and Future.'⁴ And what a spectacle is presented by 'the best of all possible worlds' with which Voltaire makes play, at Leibnitz' expense, in *Candide*. 'Recordare, mi fili, quam parvâ sapientiâ mundus regitur.' An aphorism attributed to a seventeenth-century Western statesman is matched by an eighteenth-century Western historian's sardonic description of History as being 'little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of Mankind'.⁵ 'All is vanity' is the refrain of Ecclesiastes; and, from this disillusioning anthro-

¹ The judgement on 'association' (*shirk*) in the Qur'an has been noticed in I. i. 9, n. 3.

² Milton: *Paradise Lost*, Book I, ll. 742-3.

³ Karr, Alphonse: *Les Guêpes*, January 1849.

⁴ Aurelius, Marcus: *Meditations*, Book IX, chap. 2, quoted in V. vi. 137. Marcus's melancholy view of Human Life was brought home to the writer by two repetitive experiences—one consummated when he was fifty-one and the other when he was fifty-seven. One day in May 1940, as he was approaching the corner of the Cornmarket and George Street in Oxford, his eye caught a poster in a newspaper-vendor's hand announcing: 'Liège falls: Forts held impregnable smashed by German guns', and, for an instant, he was at a loss to know whether he was living in A.D. 1940 or in A.D. 1914, because, at that same corner in August 1914, he had been given the same shock by a poster displaying the same words. His second experience of the kind occurred on a day in April 1946, when, as the official train carrying the British Delegation to the Peace Conference of Paris halted at a point between Calais Harbour and Calais Town, it occurred to him that this was the point where the Delegation had been given lunch when they had been travelling this way on this train on a day in December, 1918. Looking out of the railway-carriage window to identify the building, he found that this time it had been raised to the ground.

⁵ Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. iii, echoing Bayle, P.: *Dictionnaire*, 3rd. ed., iii. 1899b, s.v. Manichéens.

po-centric angle of vision, Life presents the mirage of a wilderness, not only for Mankind but for the gods.

'The Sun hides not Virginia's Dismal Swamp, nor Rome's accursed Campagna, nor wide Sahara, nor all the millions of miles of deserts and of griefs beneath the Moon. The Sun hides not the Ocean, which is the dark side of this Earth and which is two-thirds of this Earth. So, therefore, that mortal man who hath more of joy than sorrow in him, that mortal man cannot be true—not true, or undeveloped. . . . The Gods themselves are not for ever glad. The ineffaceable sad birth-mark in the brow of Man is but the stamp of sorrow in the signers.'¹

Happily Man can find no rest in this spiritual *cul-de-sac*, and his disillusionment with his grotesquely deified Self drives him back into the narrow way which leadeth unto Life² across a bridge built for him by the saving irony of the Gospels.

'Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee.'³

'For whosoever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever will lose his life for My sake shall find it. For what is a man profited if he shall gain the whole World and lose his own soul? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?'⁴

When 'Dominus illuminatio mea' is taken in lieu of 'Man is the measure of all things'⁵ as Man's key to the riddle of Human Life, the vanity of Man is transfigured in this divine light.

'Lord, what is Man that Thou takest knowledge of him, or the Son of Man that Thou makest account of him? Man is like to vanity; his days are as a shadow that passeth by.'⁶

This divine concern with Man's vanity, which for the Psalmist is an enigma, is for Job one of the aggravating circumstances of Man's intolerable plight.

'Let me alone, for my days are vanity. What is Man that Thou shouldest magnify him and that Thou shouldest set Thine heart upon him? And that Thou shouldest visit him every morning and try him every moment? How long wilt Thou not depart from me, nor let me alone till I swallow down my spittle?'⁷

But there is another psalm in which Job's petulant question finds its answer.

'What is Man that Thou are mindful of him? And the Son of Man, that Thou visitest him? For Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honour. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet. . . . O Lord our lord, how excellent is Thy name in all the Earth.'⁸

A spectacle in which no meaning can be found, so long as the meaning

¹ Melville, Herman: *Moby Dick*, chaps. xcvi and cvi.

² Matt. vii. 14.

³ Luke xii. 20. Cp. Psalm xxxix. 6 (7 in *The Book of Common Prayer*).

⁴ Matt. xvi. 25-26. Cp. Mark viii. 35-37 and Luke ix. 24-25. Cp. also Matt. x. 39; Luke xvii. 33; John xii. 25.

⁵ This aphorism, which is attributed to Protagoras, is to be found in Plato's *Theaetetus*, 183 B.

⁶ Psalm cxliv. 3-4. Cp. Psalm xxxix. 4-6 (5-7 in *The Book of Common Prayer*).

⁷ Job. vii. 16-19.

⁸ Psalm viii. 4-6 and 9.

of it is sought in the creature's vain endeavours, proves to be meaningful as soon as the meaning of it is sought in the Creator's indwelling purpose. 'Seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you'¹ is the message of salvation from the Dweller in the Innermost.

'Les grandeurs et les misères de l'homme sont tellement visibles qu'il faut nécessairement que la véritable religion nous enseigne et qu'il y a quelque grand principe de grandeur en l'homme, et qu'il y a un grand principe de misère. Il faut donc qu'elle nous rende raison de ces étonnantes contrariétés.'²

In Pascal's vision, it is part of the paradox of Human Nature that

'L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la Nature, mais c'est un roseau pensant';³

and the purpose for which this 'thinking reed' has been created is proclaimed by Jalāl-ad-Dīn Rūmī in the opening lines of the *Mathnawī*.

Hearken to this reed forlorn
Breathing, even since 'twas torn
From its rushy bed, a strain
Of impassioned love and pain. . . .

'Tis the flame of Love that fired me,
'Tis the wine of Love inspired me.
Wouldst thou learn how lovers bleed,
Hearken, hearken to the reed.⁴

While 'the Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament showeth His handiwork',⁵ this singing reed reveals God's purpose. As the Sun, when he 'rejoiceth as a giant to run his course',⁶ is the source from which 'the things that are seen'⁷ derive not only their visibility but their genesis and their growth and their sustenance,⁸ so God is the source from which Man derives his significance as well as his consciousness and his life, and the purpose of God that is the reason for Man's existence is that the creature should re-enter into communion with its Creator.

When Man's quest thus finds its true *qiblah*, Man's spirit rises to the full height of its powers, and at this spiritual altitude the Soul's feeling for the poetry in the facts of History is transfigured into a sense of awe in the presence of an Almighty God ('*azza wa jalla*) who is also God the Merciful and the Compassionate: Allāh ar-Rahmān ar-Rahīm. The lyrical feeling is transfigured into awe at 'the tender mercy of our God whereby the dayspring from on high hath visited us';⁹ the epic feeling into awe at God's execution of His providential designs. 'This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes';¹⁰ and the psalmist's eager acclamation is involuntarily endorsed by a Laodicean historian when, in writing the last lines of *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Gibbon is moved to describe his subject as 'the greatest,

¹ Matt. vii. 7. Cp. Luke xi. 9.

² Pascal: *Pensées*, No. 430 in Brunschvicg's arrangement.

³ Ibid., No. 347.

⁴ Rūmī, Jalāl-ad-Dīn: *Selections from his Writings*, translated by R. A. Nicholson (London 1950, Allen & Unwin), p. 31.

⁵ Psalm xix. 1.

⁶ Psalm xix. 5.

⁷ 2 Cor. iv. 18.

⁸ Plato: *Respublica*, 509 B.

⁹ Luke i. 78.

¹⁰ Psalm cxviii. 23.

perhaps, and most awful scene in the history of Mankind'. Awe lends wings even to the pedestrian poetry of the story-teller. 'I have been young and am now old, and yet saw I never the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread.'¹ But the drama in the facts of History is the province of poetry in which Awe comes into its kingdom. 'He hath put down the mighty from their seat and hath exalted the humble and meek'² is a Christian theme that, even in a pagan rendering,³ brings the Soul within a bow-shot of God's awful presence. This presence makes itself felt behind the human figures of the prophets who deliver the burden of Nineveh and the burden of Babylon.⁴

The might of the Gentile, uns mote by the sword,
Hath melted like snow in the glance of the Lord.⁵

And the doom of the militarist is only the most dramatic application of a sentence that has been passed on all the shadowy unsubstantial glories of our blood and state.

Some men with swords may reap the field
And plant fresh laurels where they kill,
But their strong nerves at last must yield:
They tame but one another still.
Early or late
They stoop to Fate,
And must give up their murmuring breath
When they, pale captives, creep to death.⁶

When the feeling for the poetry in the facts of History is thus transmuted into awe at the epiphany of God in History, the historian's inspiration is preparing him for an experience that has been described as 'the Beatific Vision' by souls to whom it has been vouchsafed. In this experience, God is seen face to face, and no longer through a glass darkly;⁷ and this means that the vision carries the Soul beyond the limits of History or of any other avenue of approach towards God through His revelation of His nature in His works. Yet, for every seeker after God, his own God-given glimpse of the marvels of the Created Universe—narrow-verged though his human horizon is bound to be—is a lamp unto his feet and a light unto his path;⁸ and the historian's path ascends from a feeling for the poetry in History through a sense of awe at God's action in History to a participation in Man's fellowship with Man which brings him to the threshold of the saint's communion with God.

In this process of progressive initiation, the first stage in an historian's spiritual pilgrimage is the experience of a communion on the mundane

¹ Psalm xxxvii. 25.

² Luke i. 52.

³ An echo of the verse here quoted from the Gospel according to Saint Luke strikes a Christian ear in the account of the activity of Zeus that is ascribed to Aesop, in colloquy with Chilon, by Diogenes Laertius in *The Lives, Doctrines, and Sayings of the Philosophers of Repute*, Book I, chap. iii, § 2. Between Diogenes' τὰ μὲν ὑψηλὰ ταπεινῶν τὰ δὲ ταπεινὰ ὑψηλῶν and the Lucan ὑψῶσε ταπεινούς there is a verbal correspondence that points to a common literary source.

⁴ See Nahum iii. 2-3 and 18, and Isaiah xiv. 4-12, quoted in IV. iv. 468-9, n. 2, and compare Ezekiel xxxi. 3-17.

⁵ Byron: *The Destruction of Sennacherib*, closing lines.

⁶ Shirley: *Death the Leveller*, middle stanza.

⁷ 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

⁸ Psalm cxix. 105.

plane with persons and events from which, in his usual state of consciousness, he is sundered by a great gulf¹ of Time and Space that, in ordinary circumstances, is impassable for all his faculties except his intellect. A tenuous long-distance commerce exclusively on the intellectual plane is an historian's normal relation to the objects of his study; yet there are moments in his mental life—moments as memorable as they are rare—in which temporal and spatial barriers fall and psychic distance is annihilated; and in such moments of inspiration the historian finds himself transformed in a flash from a remote spectator into an immediate participant, as the dry bones take flesh and quicken into life.

The hand of the Lord was upon me and carried me out in the Spirit of the Lord, and set me down in the midst of the valley which was full of bones, and caused me to pass by them round about; and, behold, there were very many in the open valley; and, lo, they were very dry. And He said unto me: 'Son of Man, can these bones live?' And I answered: 'O Lord God, Thou knowest.' Again He said unto me: 'Prophesy upon these bones, and say unto them: "O ye dry bones, hear the word of the Lord. Thus saith the Lord God unto these bones: Behold, I will cause breath to enter into you, and ye shall live; and I will lay sinews upon you and will bring up flesh upon you and cover you with skin and put breath in you, and ye shall live; and ye shall know that I am the Lord."' So I prophesied as I was commanded; and as I prophesied there was a noise, and, behold, a shaking, and the bones came together, bone to his bone. And, when I beheld, lo, the sinews and the flesh came up upon them and the skin covered them above, but there was no breath in them. Then said He unto me: 'Prophesy unto the Wind, prophesy, Son of Man, and say to the Wind: "Thus saith the Lord God: Come from the four winds, O Breath, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live."' So I prophesied as He commanded me, and the breath came into them, and they lived and stood up upon their feet, an exceeding great army.²

'Debout les morts!' The spark that fires an historian's imagination to become a vehicle for this miracle of resurrection may be a quickening encounter with some passage in an historical record or a quickening sight of some historic monument or landscape; and this memorable experience, which is the historian's human reward for his professional labours, may be kindled in the most apparently unpromising tinder.

The present writer, for example, still retained, some forty years after one experience of the kind, an abiding sense of personal participation in the war of 90-80 B.C. between Rome and her Italian allies as a lasting consequence of the instantaneous effect on him of a passage in the table of contents (*periocha*) of the eighty-ninth book of Livy's history upon which he had stumbled one day when, during his reading as an undergraduate for the school of *Literae Humaniores* at Oxford, he was unexpectedly ploughing his way through the surviving précis of the lost books of Livy's work in the faint hope of gleaning some additional scraps of knowledge of the appalling history of the Hellenic World in the last two centuries B.C.

'Mutilus, one of the proscribed [leaders of the Italian Confederacy], succeeded, by muffling his countenance, in making his way undetected to

¹ Luke xvi. 26.

² Ezekiel xxxvii. 1-10.

the back of his wife Bastia's house—only to be refused admittance: she taxed him with having a price on his head. His retort was to plunge his blade into his breast and spatter his wife's door with his blood.¹

As the student read this quickening passage of an arid epitome, he was transported, in a flash, across the gulf of Time and Space from Oxford in A.D. 1911 to Teanum in 80 B.C.,² to find himself in a back yard on a dark night witnessing a personal tragedy that was more bitter than the defeat of any public cause. He saw the Sidicine fugitive, expelled from Nola by craven Samnite comrades-in-arms for fear of Roman retribution if they continued to harbour him,³ stealing up to his own home in his own city in the confident expectation that here, at least and at last, he could count on finding love, loyalty, and shelter; and then, in answer to his low call, a woman's head appears at the window, and one short colloquy informs him that his wife is as heartless as his comrades-in-arms. In an instant, the blade rasps in the scabbard, the body falls with a thud, and the splashing blood irrevocably seals the traitor-wife's infamy.⁴ Already the beat of the avenging Furies' wings can be heard in the air as the twentieth-century eye-witness is caught up again and replaced in a trice in his normal locus in Time and Space.

A stop-watch would, no doubt, have registered that the duration of this transport had been infinitesimally brief; yet, in virtue of the poignancy of the experience, the momentary posthumous spectator's imagination was able, ever after, to recapture the atmosphere of that dire reunion of husband and wife; and this one scene in the tragic drama of a civil war between a Roman Republic and an Italian Confederacy would call up, before his mind's eye, a series of dramatic incidents running back past the climax of the catastrophe to its eve. Through the eyes of a Velleius he could see the Samnite leader Pontius Telesinus lying, on the evening of the 1st November, 82 B.C., at the threshold of the Colline Gate, 'wearing in death the countenance of a victor'⁵ (the Samnite hero was indeed *felix opportunitate mortis*⁶ by comparison with his unhappy surviving Sidicine colleague and comrade Mutilus). Through the ears of Marcus Tullius Cicero, the young recruit, he could hear the parley between the Roman consul Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo and the Marsian

¹ 'Mutilus, unus ex proscriptis, clam capite adoperto ad posticas aedes Bastiae [sic] uxoris cum accessisset, admissus non est quia illum proscriptum diceret; itaque se transfodit et sanguine suo fores uxoris respersit.'—Livy: *Epitome Libri LXXXIX*.

² Gaius Papius Mutilus met his tragic end in the year before that in which Volaterrae capitulated to Sulla (see the passage quoted from Granius Licinianus's history in footnote 3, below), and Volaterrae capitulated (see *ibid.*) in the consulship of [Publius] Servilius [Vatia] and [Appius] Claudius [Pulcher], i.e. in the year 79 B.C.

³ 'Et Volaterrani se Romanis dederunt . . . et proscriptos ex oppido dimiserunt, quos equites a consulibus Claudio et Servilio missi conciderunt. Iam ante [anno superiore] et Samnites qui Nola erant idem fecerant metu obsidionis. Papiusque Mutilus inde fugiens, cum ne ab uxore quidem Bassia noctu Teani reciperetur, quod erat in proscriptionum numero, usus est pugionis auxilio.'—Granius Licinianus, Book XXXVI (*Granius Liciniani quae supersunt*, ed. by Flemisch, M. [Leipzig 1904, Teubner], p. 32).

⁴ Bassia's infamy was the more heinous, considering that, during a soul-testing century of Roman history (133–31 B.C.), when 'a man's foes' were verily 'they of his own household' (Matt. x. 36. Cp. Matt. x. 21 and 35; Mark xiii. 12; Luke xii. 52–53 and xxi. 16), 'id . . . notandum est, fuisse in proscriptos uxorum fidem summam, libertorum mediam, filiorum nullam.'—Velleius Paterculus, C.: *Historia Romana*, Book II, chap. 67.

⁵ 'Victoris magis quam morientis vultum praeferens'—Velleius Paterculus, C.: *Historia Romana*, Book II, chap. 27.

⁶ Tacitus: *Agricola*, chap. 45.

leader Publius Vettius Scato. 'How am I to address you?' the Roman spokesman asks. 'As a would-be friend who is an involuntary enemy' the insurgent spokesman answers.¹ At that moment, perhaps, it was still not too late to arrest the Furies' flight; and there had been a time before that, again, when statesmanship might even have averted a catastrophe which, for a decade, was to turn all Italy into one vast gladiatorial amphitheatre. In the picture conjured up by Plutarch's words a twentieth-century English student could recapture a scene in the Roman politician Marcus Livius Drusus's house in the capital, towards the close of the first decade of the last century B.C., when Drusus's Marsian friend Quintus Pompeius Silo was spending a few days with him as his guest. He could watch the distinguished visitor making friends with his host's nephews and then saying to them, half in joke and half in whimsically tragic earnest: 'Do plead for us with your uncle; do beg him to make our cause his own in our struggle to win the franchise.'²

This resurrection, in a twentieth-century English student's experience, of souls that had striven and suffered and died in Italy in the second decade of the last century B.C. was noteworthy inasmuch as the bones which had been brought back to life were, in this instance, no perfect skeletons, but mere casual bits and fragmentary pieces. In conjuring up out of these scanty relics an exceeding great army, the historian's awe-inspired imagination was performing, on its own plane, something like an equivalent of the miracle performed on the intellectual plane by contemporary Western palaeontologists who knew how to reconstruct a megatherium from a single vertebra and a pithecanthropus from a single tooth. If the Imagination could strike fire from such tinder as surviving tables of contents of lost books and surviving entries in pedestrian chronicles, it was not surprising that it should be able to make as much of the intact works of gifted historians; and the same experience of a magical translation to a distant point-moment in Space-Time, which had overtaken the present student of History when he was reading the tables of contents of the lost books of Livy in A.D. 1911, was to overtake him again in A.D. 1951 when he was reading Bernal Diaz's description of his first sight of the approaches to Tenochtitlan.

'During the morning we arrived at a broad causeway and continued our march towards Iztapalapa; and, when we saw so many cities and villages built in the water and other great towns on dry land, and that straight and level causeway going towards [the city of] Mexico, we were amazed and said that it was like the enchantments they tell of in the legend of Amadis, on account of the great towers and *cues* [temples] and buildings rising from the water, and all built of masonry. And some of our soldiers even asked whether the things that we saw were not a dream. . . . I stood looking at it and thought that never in the World would there be discovered other lands such as these, for at that time there was no Peru, nor any thought of it. Of all these wonders that I then beheld, to-day all is overthrown and lost, nothing left standing. . . .

¹ 'Quem cum Scato salutasset, "Quem te appellem?" inquit. At ille "Voluntate hospitum, necessitate hostem".'—Cicero: *Philippicae*, Speech XII, chap. xi, § 27.

² "Αγε,, εἰπεν, "ὅπως ὑπερ ἡμῶν δεήσασθε τοῦ θεοῦ συναγωνίσασθαι περὶ τῆς πολιτείας.,—Plutarch: *Cato Minor*, chap. 2.

'Gazing on such wonderful sights, we did not know what to say, or whether what appeared before us was real; for on one side, on the land, there were great cities, and in the lake ever so many more, and the lake itself was crowded with canoes, and in the causeway were many bridges at intervals, and in front of us stood the great city of Mexico, and we—we did not even number four hundred soldiers! And we well remembered the words and warnings given us by the people of Huexotzingo and Tlaxcala, and the many other warnings that had been given that we should beware of entering [the city of] Mexico, where they would kill us as soon as they had us inside.'¹

The sense of personal participation in the Castilian expedition to Mexico in A.D. 1519, which the present writer experienced while he was reading this passage in Bernal Diaz's record of his reminiscences, had been anticipated when, in A.D. 1949, he was reading accounts of 'the Fourth Crusade' written by a gifted French and a cultivated Byzantine participant in that sordid transaction between two mutually antipathetic Christendoms.

At one moment he found himself on board a thirteenth-century French ship catching a thrilling first sight of Constantinople through Geoffrey de Villehardouin's eyes.

'Or poez savoir que mult esgarderent Costantinople cil qui onques mais ne l'avoient veue; que il ne pooient mie cuidier que si riche vile peust estre en tot le monde, cum il virent ces halz murs et ces riches tours dont ele ere close tot entor à la reonde, et ces riches palais et ces haltes yglices, dont il i avoit tant que nuls nel poist croire, se il ne le veist à l'oïl, et le lonc et le lé de la vile qui de totes les autres ere souveraine. Et sachiez que il n'i ot si hardi cui la chars ne fremist; et ce ne fut mie mervoille; que onques si granz affaires ne fu enpris de nulle gent, puis que li monz fu estorez.'²

At another moment the twentieth-century reader found himself in Nikítas Khoniátis' shoes, striding back, with his heart in his mouth, into the jaws of Death on the forlorn hope of trying to rescue a girl who had just been kidnapped by a Frankish soldier from among a party of Byzantine refugees that was heading for the Golden Gate in a perilous attempt to make an exodus from the ravished City.

'Our chief anxiety was for the women, so we had put them in the middle of our party with a cordon of men outside and had instructed the girls to smear their faces with dirt [in order to conceal their sexual attractions from the Frankish soldiery's eyes]. . . . We were bound for the Golden Gate; but, when we had got about as far as the church of Mocius the Martyr, a barbarian . . . snatched a beautiful girl from among us. She was a judge's daughter . . . and her father, whose stamina had been broken by old age and sickness, had slipped and fallen in a puddle and was now lying there crumpled up, lamenting aloud and plastered with mud. He kept on looking at me as if he were expecting at least some show of assistance from me, and he began to call upon me by name to do anything that I could to help him to retrieve his daughter. So I turned back there and then,

¹ Bernal Diaz del Castillo: *The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico, 1517-1521*, translated by A. P. Maudslay (London 1928, Routledge), pp. 269-71.

² Geoffroi de Villehardouin: *Conquête de Constantinople*, chap. xxvi, § 128 (3rd ed. of N. de Wailly's text and translation (Paris 1882, Didot), p. 72).

without more ado, and started to follow at the kidnapper's heels, weeping and denouncing at the top of my voice the crime that had just been committed. As I went, I made supplication to any passing soldiers of the Frankish army who were not altogether ignorant of our [Modern Greek] tongue—trying to induce them to come to the rescue and taking some of them by the hand, till I had managed to work upon the feelings of some of them so far as to prevail upon them to form a posse for the pursuit of that lecherous beast. I led the way with my posse behind me; we arrived at the villain's billet; and then he pushed the girl inside and took his stand at the gates in a truculent posture. . . . When my companions told him with some vigour to give the girl back, his first reply was an insolent refusal. Two imperious passions—lust and rage—had him fast in their grip; but, when he saw that the men were losing their tempers, and heard them threatening him with impalement for misconduct aggravated by contumacy, and when he was convinced that they were really in earnest, he reluctantly yielded and gave the girl up.¹

If the imagination could be fired not only by the Champenois adventurer's winged words but even by a narrative in a Byzantine historical work whose pages had been damped by the mildew of an affected style in a pedantic classical diction, it was still less surprising that the same miracle could also be evoked by the sight of monuments and landscapes that were visual echoes of the Past. In A.D. 1952 the writer of this Study had a vivid recollection of six such experiences in which he had found himself participating in an historic past event through a momentary annihilation of the intervening time on the hypnotizing spot.

On the 10th January, 1912, as he sat musing on one of the twin summits of the citadel of Pharsalus, with his eyes ranging away to the peaks of Pelion, Ossa, and Olympus over the downs of Cynoscephalae—the crouching Dog's Heads—the middle distance of a sunlit landscape came, in the brooding gazer's imagination, to be overcast with the sinister mist that, on a morning 2,109 years back in the Past, is blindfolding the patrols of two armies as these nervously grope their way towards one another on those fog-bound slopes. When the parting of the mist reveals to the posthumous spectator's sight the right wing of the Macedonian phalanx already carrying all before it in the momentum of its charge downhill, he instantly feels the stab of anxiety that, at this moment, pierces King Philip's heart as he glances back over his left shoulder to look for the left wing of the phalanx that should have been following his own right wing up. 'O form front, Nicânôr! Form front! And cover my left flank. Close the gap, Elephant, close the gap, for God's sake!' But the fate of Macedon's last army is already sealed. Don't you see what that hawk-eyed Roman field-officer is doing over there on the triumphant Roman right? He is not missing his chance of striking a decisive blow by waiting for orders from Titus. Look, he has already withdrawn two battalions from the victorious Roman attack on Nicânôr's unready wing and has wheeled them, left-about, at the double to take Philip's exposed wing in the rear. And now it is no battle; it is a massacre—for these uncouth Italian troops have never been

¹ Nikitas Khoniâtis: *Narrative of Events after the Capture of the City* [by the Franks], chap. 3, on pp. 779-82 of Immanuel Bekker's edition (Bonn 1835, Weber).

drilled in the humane rules governing the 'temperate and undecisive contests' in which the regular forces of a civilized Hellenic World are more or less innocuously exercised. Look, the outmanœuvred phalangites are raising their pikes—they are making the signal that they surrender—but those murderous Roman swords callously complete their cruel work.

As the harrowed participant from another world averts his eyes from an unbearable spectacle, they catch a glimpse of a despairing commander riding off, *ventre à terre*, with no more than a handful of life-guards still attending him. Is this fleeing horseman Titus Quinctius Flaminius's defeated adversary Philip Demetriou? Or is he Gaius Julius Caesar's defeated adversary Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus? Before the dreamer has time to refocus his diffracted historical vision, it all vanishes abruptly into thin air, and the landscape flickers back into a pastoral present in which the sounds floating up from the slopes of Cynoscephalae to the heights of the acropolis of Pharsalus are, not the din of sword-blades nor the shrieks of wounded men, but the tinkling of goat-bells and the bleating of sheep peacefully grazing, to the strain of their shepherds' pipes, over the site of a doubly historic battlefield. Can the dreamer really have sunk, for that instant, those twenty-one centuries deep below the current surface of Time's waters on which he now finds himself riding, once again, in his normal waking life? He might doubt it if the poignancy of the momentary experience had not left a sequence of Greek elegiac verses running persistently through his head.

Αἶλινον αἶλινον εἰπέ, κατήριπε δῶμα Φιλίππου·
αἶλινον, ἐξ ἐδάφους ὤλετο γῇ Μακεδῶν.
ἡ δὲ φάλαγξ ἔστρωται ἀνὰ στίχας, ὥς ὅτ' ἀμητῆρ
ἑστόρεσεν δρεπάνῳ Θεσσαλικὰς στάχνας—
ὥς ὄγμος κατὰ κόσμον ἐλήλαται αἰχμητῶν,
οὐδ' αὐτὸς κείνων τάξιν ἔλυσ' Αἴδης.
ἴσχει χεῖρ ἀμενηνὸς ἐῆς ἔτι θραῦμα σαρίσσης,
ἀσπίδα δ' ἀργυρέην λυθρὸς ἔβαψε μέλας.
τῶνδ' Ἀσίην πρόγονοι μὲν ἐπικρατέως ἐρατεινὴν
εἶλον, ὑπερφιάλοις κῆρες Ἀχαιμενίδαις·
νῦν δ' αὐτοῖς ἀτηρὸς ἀπὸ ζόφου ἦλθε τριακτῆρ,
αἰετὸς αἰπολοῖς, Ὀσκὸς ἀμαιμάκετος.
ἡ δ' Ἑλλὰς τρις ὀλωλ', αὐτόχθονος οὐκετι χειρὶ
κοιράνου ὀψομένη σκῆπτρον ἀνασσόμενον.¹

¹ The following translation of this Greek has been made for the writer by his friend Mr. John Lodge:

Ah! woe is me for Philip's house made void,
And woe for Macedonia's land destroy'd!
In swathes the phalanx fell, like ears of corn
By sickle of Thessalian reaper shorn:
So sank the warrior host, in strict array,
And Death himself shook not their ranks astray.
The nerveless hand its shatter'd pike retains,
And crusted gore the silver buckler stains.
Their fathers, born for Persians' overthrow,
Wrested fair Asia from that haughty foe;
But these, with western pow'r ill-match'd in fight,
Perish'd, as goats beneath an eagle's might.
Thrice fall'n is Hellas, never to behold
Her realm again by native prince controll'd.

At the east end of the Island of Crete on the 19th March, 1912, as he rounded the shoulder of the last mountain on his path from Khandrà to Palaíkastros, the same twentieth-century Western student of History suddenly sighted the ruins of a baroque villa¹—built, by the look of it, for one of the last of the Venetian governors of Candia—which, had it been erected on English and not on Cretan soil, would probably then still have been inhabited by the descendants of its original occupant, but which in Crete in A.D. 1912 was already a relic of 'Ancient History' on a par with the ruins of the Minoan imperial palace at Cnossos which the twentieth-century English wayfarer had been visiting a week since. As he stood staring at this Jacobean country house, where the Modern Western Civilization in which he himself lived and moved and had his being had suffered the pangs of death on Cretan soil a quarter of a millennium ago, the spectator had an experience which was the counterpart, on the psychic plane, of an aeroplane's sudden deep drop when it falls into an air-pocket. On that spot on which Time had stood still since the eviction of the Venetians by the 'Osmanlis in the War of Candia (*gerebatur* A.D. 1645–69),² the spectator was suddenly carried down in a 'Time-pocket' from a day in the year A.D. 1912 to a day in the fifth decade of the seventeenth century on which History, in that house, had come abruptly to an end in an evacuation without any sequel except solitude and decay.

'The spider has wove his web in the imperial palace, and the owl hath sung her watch-song on the towers of Afrasiab.'³

On the east coast of Laconia on the 23rd April of the same year 1912 the same wayfarer had a similar experience when he scaled the citadel of Monemvasía—'the Little Gibraltar' that had won this name from the isthmus which was its sole link with the mainland and had lent the same name to the 'malmsey' wine which had once been exported to Western Christendom from its quays. As he scaled those miniature Heights of Abraham and scrambled through a breach in the ramparts that crowned the summit, he fell again into the deep trough of Time as he beheld the antique bronze cannon lying tossed about at all angles among the jagged outcrops of limestone and the thorny macchia and the quietly browsing goats. There lay the guns as they had been left on a day on which Time had stood still at Monemvasia. They had lain there till their wooden carriages had rotted away, and no one had ever troubled to remount them or to carry them off. In that instant the spectator was transported to the evening of the day—whatever date that day

¹ This experience has been mentioned in this Study already, in different contexts, in XII. ix. 431, n. 2, and IV. iv. 282.

² See IV. iv. 278.

³ 'From Saint Sophia he [Mehmed the Conqueror] proceeded to the august but desolate mansion of an hundred successors of the Great Constantine, but which, in a few hours, had been stripped of the pomp of royalty. A melancholy reflexion on the vicissitudes of human greatness forced itself on his mind, and he repeated an elegant distich of Persian poetry.'—Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lxviii.

In a footnote, Gibbon observes that 'this distich, which Cantemir gives in the original, derives new beauties from the application. It was thus that Scipio repeated, in the sack of Carthage, the famous prophecy of Homer. The same generous feeling carried the mind of the conqueror to the Past or the Future.'

may have borne in Archbishop Ussher's chronological chart¹—on which this historic fortress had been stranded on the flowing Time-stream's motionless marge.

This experience of the present writer's at Monemvasia on the 23rd April, 1912, was duplicated on the 24th November, 1920, at the opposite end of the Continent, on a larger rocky peninsula, jutting out like a dagger into the Gulf of Chihli, which at that date was held on a lease from China by Japan.

'The strategic and commercial ports of the Leased Territory are not very distant from one another in Space. They stand on two notches, near the dagger's point, that form their harbours; and from notch to notch it is only about two hours' drive in a car. In "ideal" or "philosophic" time, however, they are far apart, and the distance between them is always widening. [While] Dairen is reaching out its hands towards a prosperous bourgeois future, Port Arthur stands fixed in one tragic moment of the Past. . . .

'As I stood on the heights along which the defences of the fortress had run, and let my eyes range over the landscape, I felt as I had felt when, on my way out to the Far East, my route had led me through Verdun a few months before. That landscape had never seen Mankind engaged on their normal works of peace. It had seen war, and war alone; and, now that the tide of war had ebbed away, the landscape had somehow ceased to be part of the actual living world. It was a landscape with no present, no future, and no function except to bear silent testimony to the tragedies of which it had been the scene in its great days, now for ever past.

'At Port Arthur there was one height in particular which commanded a magnificent view in both directions: inwards over the city and the harbour with its slit of an entrance guarded by bluffs on either hand; outwards over the open country across which the Japanese attack had been delivered. The Japanese had carried that height at fearful cost, and the Russians had lost it to their undoing, for, when once the Japanese artillery had opened fire from there, it had shot . . . the Russian fleet in the harbour and the whole Russian garrison to pieces, and the Russian commandant had had no choice but to capitulate.

'On the morrow of that capitulation, Time at Port Arthur had stood still. The place was still living—or lying dead—in that morrow when I

¹ At the time the spectator had taken it for granted that the spectacle which he was beholding in A.D. 1912 was the tableau of Monemvasia as the fortress had been left on the morrow of its recovery from the Venetians by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1715 (see IV. iv. 279); but investigation showed that Monemvasia had changed hands through a peacefully negotiated capitulation, and not through being taken by storm, both on the 7th-10th September, 1715, when the Venetians had surrendered it to the 'Osmanlis, and on the 5th August, 1821, when the 'Osmanlis had surrendered it to the Moreot Greek insurgents. The transactions that resulted in the surrender of Monemvasia on the 7th-10th September, 1715, are recorded by Brue, B.: *Journal de la Campagne que le Grand Vésir Ali Pacha a faite en 1715 pour la Conquête de la Morée* (Paris 1870, Thorin), pp. 53-7. The surrender of the fortress on the 5th August, 1821, is noticed in Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146-A.D. 1864*, vol. vi (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press), p. 213. This testimony is explicit; yet, on the 23rd April, 1912, the citadel of Monemvasia wore the appearance of having been taken by assault at the moment when Time had come to a halt there. The writer could only conjecture that, either in A.D. 1715 or in A.D. 1821, the victors, after making their peaceful entry, had breached the wall and dislodged the guns from the embrasures in order to put the fortress permanently out of commission as an insurance against the risk of a re-occupation by enemy naval forces. An expert on Modern Western military technology would, no doubt, be able to tell at a glance whether these guns were of late seventeenth-century or of late eighteenth-century make.

visited it the other day. Nothing had happened at Port Arthur in between to break the spell and make the hands of the clock move forward again; and I remembered having had precisely that sensation long ago in another famous fortress far away.¹

This experience of communion with a tragic past event, which was imparted to one spectator at Monemvasía in A.D. 1912 and at Port Arthur in A.D. 1929, can hardly be escaped by any visitor to the battle-fields of Chattanooga and Gettysburg, where Time's spontaneous halt has been seconded by Man's artifice. At Gettysburg on the 21st April, 1947, when the same spectator was reconnoitring that tragic landscape, the guns that had been in action there on the 1st-4th July, 1863, were once more standing in battery in their authentic stations; for in this field the wooden gun-carriages which at Monemvasía had rotted away had been providently replaced by replicas in rustless metal. Gazing from the summits of the two Round Tops across no-man's-land to the Confederate lines, and then gazing across the same deadly intervening space in the opposite direction—from the point where Lee had stood to the clump of trees in the Federal lines which had been indicated to Pickett as his objective—the spectator felt once again a sensation which he had known in Liaotung and in the Morea. He was in momentary personal communion with his fellow human beings who had struggled and suffered and died on that field long ago; and, on the evening of the same day, he heard the story of a far more poignant experience than his own on the same enchanted spot. That evening Mrs. Hanson,² the wife of the President of Gettysburg College, who, like her husband, was of Southern birth, told him that, when, after her husband's appointment, she had found herself in Gettysburg for the first time and had been taken to see the battlefield, she had burst into tears at the sight. The emotion that had found this vent had welled up from deep springs; for this lady had had an uncle who had been one of the survivors of Pickett's charge. No description of the battle had ever come to her ears from this first-hand source, since her kinsman could never bring himself to speak of what he had witnessed in that terrible passage of arms; but his pregnant silence had initiated his niece in her childhood into a personal communion with the tragedy of the 3rd July, 1863; and, when, at last, years after, as a grown woman, she first set eyes on the scene of her uncle's and his fallen comrades' unspeakable ordeal, it was no wonder that her feelings should have overcome her.

The most vivid of the present writer's experiences of the local annihilation of Time in a place where Time had stood still had overtaken him at Ephesus on the 11th February, 1921.

'I approached Ancient Ephesus from the slopes of a limestone hill spangled with crimson anemones, gashed with the quarries from which the stones of the city were hewn, and crowned with the remnants of towers and curtain walls. I had chosen my direction so as to descend upon the theatre from above, and the view, suddenly disclosed, of the vast cavity, with the seats still in place and the stage buildings standing, was

¹ Toynbee, A. J.: 'Life and Life-in-Death', in *A Journey to China* (London 1931, Constable), pp. 200-6.

² Mrs. Elizabeth Trimble Painter Hanson.

as impressive as I had expected it to be. Beyond it the great central thoroughfare of the city, a streak of marble pavement showing up against the green of the plain, led down to the ancient harbour, now a reed-bed, yellow and brown. Parallel to the thoroughfare on our left stood the mountain of Coressus, with Lysimachus's fortifications on the sky-line. Beyond, on a separate and lower hill of limestone, stood "the Prison of Saint Paul", a tower in a salient of the city's defences. Beyond that again lay the sea, deep blue against the horizon, and to our right stretched the plain of alluvium which has choked the harbour and driven the sea away. The River Cayster, which built the plain and co-operated with the folly of Man to the city's undoing, wound like a snake in spiteful loops and curves through the feverish levels which it has laid down.¹

At the instant at which this historic panorama impinged on the spectator's eyes, the empty theatre peopled itself with a tumultuous throng as the breath came into the dead and they lived and stood up upon their feet. 'Some . . . cried one thing and some another; for the assembly was confused, and the more part knew not wherefore they were come together.'² Those two dishevelled figures must be Gaius and Aristarchus; that ineffectual-looking creature must be Alexander. What is this rhythmic roar into which the babel of tongues is resolving itself? Will Gaius and Aristarchus escape with their lives? Thank Heaven for the intrepid town clerk's promptness and presence of mind. But at the moment when the cries of 'Great is Diana' are dying down and the clerk is beginning to reason tactfully with the crowd, the life flickers out of the scene as the spectator is carried up again instantaneously to the current surface of the Time-stream from an abyss, nineteen centuries deep, into which the impact of the sight of the theatre at Ephesus had plunged him.

On each of the six occasions just recorded, the writer had been rapt into a momentary communion with the actors in a particular historic event through the effect upon his imagination of a sudden arresting view of the scene in which this long-past action had taken place. But there was another occasion on which he had been vouchsafed a larger and a stranger experience. In London in the southern section of the Buckingham Palace Road, walking southward along the pavement skirting the west wall of Victoria Station, the writer, once, one afternoon not long after the end of the First World War—he had failed to record the exact date—had found himself in communion, not just with this or that episode in History, but with all that had been, and was, and was to come. In that instant he was directly aware of the passage of History gently flowing through him in a mighty current, and of his own life welling like a wave in the flow of this vast tide. The experience lasted long enough for him to take visual note of the Edwardian red brick surface and white stone facings of the station wall gliding past him on his left, and to wonder—half amazed and half amused—why this incongruously prosaic scene should have been the physical setting of a mental illumination. An instant later, the communion had ceased, and the

¹ Toynbee, A. J.: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London 1922, Constable), pp. 148-9: 'Two Ruined Cities', written at Smyrna on the 21st February, 1921.

² Acts xix. 32.

dreamer was back again in the every-day cockney world which was his native social milieu and of which the Edwardian station wall was a characteristic period piece.

A sense of personal communion with all men and women at all times and places, which outranges the gamut of an historian's prose, is articulate in a poem which was already familiar and dear to the writer of this Study at the time when that ineffable experience travelled through him.

Men laughed in Ancient Egypt, long ago,
And laughed beside the Lake of Galilee,
And my glad heart rejoices more to know,
When it leaps up in exultation too,
That, though the laughter and the laugh be new,
The joy is old as is the ancient sea.

Men wept in noble Athens, so they say,
And in great Babylon of many towers,
For the same sorrows that we feel to-day;
So, stranded high upon Time's latest peak,
I can with Babylonian and with Greek
Claim kinship through this common grief of ours.

The same fair moon I look upon to-night,
This shining golden moon above the sea,
Imparts a richer and more sweet delight
For all the eyes it did rejoice of old,
For all the hearts, long centuries grown cold,
That shared this joy which now it gives to me.

Whate'er I feel I cannot feel alone.
When I am happiest or most forlorn,
Uncounted friends whom I have never known
Rejoicing stand or grieving at my side,
These nameless, faceless friends of mine who died
A thousand years or more e'er I was born.¹

'Wherefore, seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us.'² The runner has not yet reached his goal; for the experience, which only poetry can convey, of the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace³ is the revelation of a fellowship which is not the work of men⁴ but is an act of God; and God's presence and participation transfigure a precarious Brotherhood of Man into a Communion of Saints in which God's creatures are united with one another through their union with their Creator.⁵

Quae fessis requies, quae merces fortibus,
Cum erit omnia Deus in omnibus!⁶

¹ Rosalind Murray.

² Hebrews xii. i.

³ Eph. iv. 3.

⁴ Acts v. 38.

⁵ Saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, Book XIX, chaps. 13, 17, and 20, quoted in V. vi. 166 and in V. vi. 367.

⁶ Abelard: *O quanta qualia sunt illa sabbata . . .*

'Vere Jerusalem est illa civitas';¹ for, in this full and perfect communion, man is reconciled with man, and Mankind with Non-Human Nature.

O happy living things! No tongue
Their beauty might declare:
A spring of love gushed from my heart,
And I blessed them unaware.²

In this rapture with which the love of God transfigures a human heart, Saint Francis preaches the Gospel to the birds and finds in the Sun and Moon his brother and his sister.

Luna, dies et nox et noctis signa severa
noctivagaeque faces caeli flammaeque volantes,
nubila sol imbres nix venti fulmina grando³—

this spectacle of the majesty of the stellar cosmos, which captivates a poet's imagination, racks a philosopher's mind with anxiety for fear lest the awe which this sight will inspire in unsophisticated human hearts may re-subdue these to the tyranny of mischievous divinities whom a Philosophy Militant has interned in the intermundia after banishing them from a world which they have malevolently infested.⁴

Nam cum suspicimus magni caelestia mundi
templa, super stellisque micantibus aethera fixum,
et venit in mentem solis lunaeque viarum,
tunc,⁵

while the philosopher is shaking his head, the saint breaks out into jubilation.

Altissimu onnipotente bon Signore,
Tue so le laude, la gloria e l'honore e onne benedictione.
Ad Te solu, Altissimu, se confanno,
Et nullu homo ene dignu Te mentovare.
Laudatu si', Mi Signore, cum tucte le Tue creature,
Spetialmente messor lu Frate Sole,
Lo quale lu jorno allumeni per nui;
Et ellu è bellu e radiante cum grande splendore:
De Te, Altissimu, porta significatione.
Laudatu si', Mi Signore, per Sora Luna e le Stelle;
In celu l'ai formate clarite e pretiose e belle.
Laudatu si', Mi Signore, per Frate Ventu,
E per aere e nubilo e sereno e onne tempu,
Per le quale a le tue creature dà sustentamentu.⁶

The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament showeth his handiwork.

One day telleth another, and one night certifieth another.

There is neither speech nor language, but their voices are heard among them.

Their sound is gone out into all lands, and their words into the ends of the World.

¹ Abelard, *ibid.*

² Coleridge: *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, Part IV *ad finem*.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book V, ll. 1190-2.

⁴ See the whole passage in *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book V, ll. 1183-1240.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ll. 1204-7.

⁶ Saint Francis of Assisi: *Laudes Creaturarum*, ll. 1-14.

In them hath He set a tabernacle for the Sun, which cometh forth as a bridegroom out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a giant to run his course. . . .

The Law of the Lord is an undefiled law, converting the Soul; the testimony of the Lord is sure, and giveth wisdom unto the simple.¹

O All ye Works of the Lord, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever. . . .

O ye Heavens, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever. . . .

O ye Sun and Moon, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever.

O ye Stars of Heaven, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever.

O ye Showers and Dew, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever.

O ye Winds of God, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever. . . .

O ye Nights and Days, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever. . . .

O all ye Whales and all that move in the waters, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever.

O all ye Fowls of the Air, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever.

O all ye Beasts and Cattle, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever.

O ye Children of Men, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever. . . .

O ye spirits and souls of the Righteous, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever.

O ye holy and humble men of heart, bless ye the Lord; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever.²

Nostrum est interim mentem erigere
Et totis patriam votis appetere.³

We praise Thee, O God; we acknowledge Thee to be the Lord.

All the Earth doth worship Thee, the Father Everlasting.

To Thee all angels cry aloud, the Heavens and all the Powers therein. . . .

Heaven and Earth are full of the majesty of Thy glory.

The glorious company of the Apostles praise thee.

The goodly fellowship of the Prophets praise thee.

The noble army of Martyrs praise thee.

The Holy Church throughout all the World doth acknowledge Thee.⁴

As these diverse yet concordant voices awoke in the heart of a twentieth-century Western historian who had been born and brought up in London, their human rendering of the heavenly language of a Communion of Saints called up before his inward eye a human presentation of the Beatific Vision in a picture in the National Gallery in Trafalgar Square which had printed itself on his imagination before the current century of the Christian Era had begun to run. On the altarpiece

¹ Psalm xix. 1-5 and 7.

² *The Song of the Three Holy Children*, vv. 1, 3, 6-9, 15, 23-26, 30-31.

³ Abelard, *ibid.*

⁴ *The Te Deum*, vv. 1-3 and 6-10.

painted by Fra Angelico for the Church of San Domenico at Fiesole the Angels, Patriarchs, Prophets, Saints, and Martyrs stand in their companies,¹ *prasiai prasiai*,² worshipping Christ in His glory in their midst.

Das Unzulängliche,
Hier wird's Ereignis;³

and the Communion of Saints thus made visible is an unspoken call to prayer.

Christe, audi nos.

Christ Tammuz, Christ Adonis, Christ Osiris, Christ Balder, hear us, by whatsoever name we bless Thee for suffering death for our salvation.

Christe Jesu, exaudi nos.

Buddha Gautama, show us the path that will lead us out of our afflictions.

Sancta Dei Genetrix, intercede pro nobis.

Mother Mary, Mother Isis, Mother Cybele, Mother Ishtar, Mother Kwanyin, have compassion on us, by whatsoever name we bless thee for bringing Our Saviour into the World.

Sancte Michael, intercede pro nobis.

Mithras, fight at our side in our battle of Light against Darkness.

Omnes Sancti Angeli et Archangeli, intercedite pro nobis.

All ye devoted bodhisattvas, who for us your fellow living beings and for our release have forborne, aeon after aeon, to enter into your rest, tarry with us, we beseech you, yet a little while longer.

Sancte Joannes Baptista, intercede pro nobis.

Noble Lucretius, who, in spite of thyself, art also a forerunner of the Saviour, instil thy poetry into our hearts and thy sincerity into our understandings.

Omnes Sancti Patriarchae et Prophetæ, intercedite pro nobis.

Valiant Zarathustra, breathe thy spirit into the Church Militant here on Earth.

Sancte Petre, intercede pro nobis.

Tender-hearted Muhammad, who art also one of the weaker vessels of God's grace, pray that His grace may inspire us, like thee, to rise above our infirmity in our zeal for His service.

Sancte Paule, intercede pro nobis.

Blessed Francis Xavier and Blessed John Wesley, continue Paul's work of preaching the Gospel in all the World.

Sancte Joannes, intercede pro nobis.

Blessed Mo-ti, disciple of Christ before Christ's epiphany in a far country, transmit thou too the message of Love that an Unknown God hath revealed to thee.

Omnes Sancti Apostoli et Evangelistæ, intercedite pro nobis.

Strong Zeno, help us to find God by playing the man. Pious Confucius, help us to do our duty towards God by doing it towards our neighbours.

¹ Mark vi. 39.

² Mark vi. 40.

³ Goethe, *Faust*, ll. 12106-7.

Sancte Stephane, intercede pro nobis.

Blessed Socrates, also a martyr, show us, like Stephen, how to suffer death in perfect charity towards those that despitely use us.

Omnes Sancti Martyres, intercedite pro nobis.

All ye who have been persecuted for righteousness' sake without leaving a memorial, teach us too to suffer without expectation of even a posthumous earthly reward.

Sancte Gregori, intercede pro nobis.

Blessed Açoka, who, like Gregory, didst serve God by feeding His sheep, teach us also to bear one another's burdens.

Sancte Augustine, intercede pro nobis.

Jalāl-ad-Dīn Mawlānā, singing reed, make heavenly music for us as the breath of God's spirit pours through thee.

Sancte Pater Benedicte, intercede pro nobis.

Epicurus, who wast likewise the revered founder of a spiritual family, impart to us thy gracious gifts of sweetness and light.

Sancte Antoni, intercede pro nobis.

Marcus, recluse in the palace and hermit in the camp, teach us too to make the flight of the Alone to the Alone amid the bustle of this busy World.

Omnes Sancti Monachi et Eremitae, intercedite pro nobis.

All ye who have also served God, though ye were uncloistered and unwithdrawn, teach us too how to be in the World yet not be of it.

Sancta Maria Magdalena, intercede pro nobis.

Blessed Francis, who for Christ's sake didst renounce the pride of life, help us to follow Christ by following thee.

Omnes Sancti et Sanctae Dei, intercedite pro nobis;

For *ilayhi marji'ukum jamī'an*: to Him return ye every one.¹

Finis

London, 1951, June 15, 6.25 p.m., after looking once more, this afternoon, at Fra Angelico's picture of the Beatific Vision.

¹ Qur'ān x. 4.

XIII. B (iii), ANNEX

A BUSINESS SCHOOL OF INTELLECTUAL ACTION

If, as has been argued in the chapter to which this annex attaches, action is the Alpha and Omega¹ of scholarship, no less than of 'practical' affairs, this accounts for the remarkable fact that a high proportion of an effective minority of scholars in divers fields, including the field of History, has been recruited, not from among the professional Scribes and Pharisees in an orthodoxly academic walk of life, but from publicans and sinners who have taken their intellectual action as amateurs after having served a laborious apprenticeship in such 'practical' trades as war, law, politics, and, notably, commerce. If the essence of scholarship is action, the first and last requirement for success in scholarship is to be *aktionsfähig*; and, accordingly, a 'practical' profession in which a neglect to take action spells instant disaster is a surer training in the essentials of scholarship, as well as in those of 'practical' business, than an academic profession in which the nemesis of inactivity is not immediately brought home to a hesitant soul by a disastrous event.

In a previous context² we have already taken note of the careers of a pleiad of historians and a band of poets, sages, and saints who returned to a life of action on the spiritual plane after having withdrawn from it on the 'practical' plane on which they had served their apprenticeship. Clarendon and Ibn Khaldūn were lawyer-statesmen in retreat. Polybius was a politician who had been deported and interned, Dante one who had been sentenced to exile, and Ollivier one who had fallen into disgrace. Machiavelli was a rusticated, Confucius an unemployed, and Saint Gregory the Great a retired, civil servant. Josephus was a prisoner-of-war and Saint Ignatius Loyola an invalided soldier, while Thucydides and Xenophon were soldiers in exile. Muhammad and Solon were retired business men. Our previous observations on these men of action who had qualified for entering on their spiritual activities by first going through a 'practical' apprenticeship need not be recapitulated here; but it is pertinent to our present inquiry to remind ourselves that the personal careers of seven out of the eight eventual historians on our previous list all follow one uniform pattern. Their withdrawal, temporary or permanent, from 'practical' life had, in every case save Ibn Khaldūn's, been involuntary. Every one of them had taken to History as a *pis aller* to occupy an enforced and unwelcome vacation from some form of 'practical' activity;³ and, when, thanks to their 'practical' training in action,

¹ Rev. i. 8 and 11.

² In III. iii. 263-332.

³ This statement needs some qualification in its application to Thucydides, since he tells us himself in the first sentence of his work (in Book I, chap 1) that he 'started work on it immediately after the outbreak of war, in the expectation that this war would not only be a great one but would be the most important that had ever yet been fought'. The historian's *raison d'être* was, no doubt, a public duty which he took as a matter of course. It is true that he did not welcome the twenty years' period of full-time leisure for concentrating on his historical work to which he was

they made a conspicuously greater success on the intellectual plane of action than they had formerly made in 'practical' life, we may guess that most of them were surprised to find that an activity which had been thrust upon them by a personal misfortune had won them fame besides bringing them consolation. We may now go on to take note of another set of eventual historians recruited from the world of 'practical' affairs—the business world in four cases and the world of law and politics in the fifth—whose careers, in three instances out of the five, conform to the same pattern externally, but prove, when we probe beneath the outward events to the inner psychic realm of ideals, aims, motives, and feelings, to have been, not congruent with, but actually antithetical to, the careers of the seven historians-in-spite-of-themselves whom we have already taken into account.

Outwardly there is a striking correspondence in pattern between the careers of Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Josephus, Machiavelli, Clarendon, and Ollivier and the careers of George Grote (*vivebat* A.D. 1794–1871), Heinrich Schliemann (*vivebat* A.D. 1822–90), and James Ford Rhodes (*vivebat* 1848–1927). These three careers, like those seven, can all be analysed into a strophe, in which a 'practical' profession makes the first call—and this an exacting one—upon the hero's time and energy, and an antistrophe, in which he devotes himself to scholarship; and in these cases again, as in those, the break between the two symmetrically balanced chapters of personal history is likewise marked by a caesura. It is significant, however, that, in the broken careers of a Rhodes, a Grote, and a Schliemann, the caesura is one of the hero's own making.

Though Schliemann's career can challenge comparison, on the score of eventfulness, with that of any other hero known to History, neither the Victorian London banker Grote nor the post-Bellum Cleveland coal and iron merchant Rhodes was ever in danger of having his life-caesura cleft for him by so sensational an intervention of History in action as Josephus's experience of being taken prisoner, Polybius's of being deported, Thucydides', Xenophon's, and Clarendon's of being exiled, or even Machiavelli's and Ollivier's milder mishaps of being rusticated and of falling into political disgrace. Like Schliemann, Grote and Rhodes had to contrive for themselves an indispensable *vitai pausa*¹ that was never provided for them, ready-made, by the alarums and excursions of contemporary public life. Schliemann, as we have already noticed,² insulated his strophic accumulation of a fortune from his anti-strophic excavation of Troy and Mycenae by spending two years, after he had wound up his business at St. Petersburg in A.D. 1864, on travelling round the globe and writing, *en voyage* across the Pacific, a book that had for its subject neither self-help nor Homer, but China and Japan.³ Grote's equivalent step, after he had refrained in A.D. 1841 from

condemned through being exiled from Athens as his penalty for having failed in 424 B.C. (see Book IV, chaps. 104–7) to prevent the capture of Amphipolis-on-Strymon by a Lacedaemonian expeditionary force under Brasidas' command.

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, l. 860.

² On p. 16, n. 1, above.

³ See Ludwig, E.: *Schliemann of Troy* (London 1931, Putnam), pp. 117 and 118–19.

standing again for Parliament¹ and had made up his mind to concentrate on the writing of *A History of Greece* in the country, was to arrange—though he did not find this easy—to absent himself from his bank in the City of London between October 1841 and April 1842 and to spend the interval on visiting Italy for the first time in his life²—a temporary release from a ‘chain’³ of public and private ‘practical’ duties which was made absolute when he retired from business in the summer of A.D. 1843.⁴ Rhodes, after retiring from business at Cleveland, Ohio, in A.D. 1886, spent a year in Europe before settling down to write, first at Cambridge, Massachusetts, and afterwards, on the other side of the same Charles River, in Boston, *A History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877*.

‘If this seemed a singular way of starting literary work, it was certainly shrewd; it effaced the office from his mind; it made a complete break between the two widely different halves of his life and enabled him to launch upon the second section with a fresh, free mind. Incidentally too, while abroad, he translated a French novel, writing it out carefully with the design of shaping his style and familiarising himself with the art of composition. Then upon his return he entered at once upon the real work of his life.’⁵

Thus the careers of our three *ci-devant* business men resembled those of our seven *ci-devant* soldiers and statesmen in being symmetrically divided into strophes and antistrophes by caesuras; but, in noticing that the three business men’s caesuras had to be induced artificially because they were not imposed by events beyond the hero’s control, we have already put our finger on the inner antithesis between two patterns of life that are congruent only outwardly. For Schliemann and for Grote, as for Rhodes, ‘the real work of his life’ was the creative intellectual work that he achieved mainly or entirely during the post-caesuran chapter, and the ‘practical’ affairs to which he had been indentured during the pre-caesuran chapter had been a ‘chain’ that had held him back from devoting himself to the work on which his heart was set, whereas each of our seven soldiers and statesmen had found ‘the real work of his life’ in the pre-caesuran chapter of it and would never have abandoned ‘practical’ affairs for historiography if his creative destiny had not been imposed upon him by the ruthless stroke with which his ‘practical’ activities had been cut short by the shears of the cosmic weaver at the humming loom of Time.⁶ Each of our seven soldiers and statesmen became an historian in spite of himself during the second half of his career, while

¹ See Grote, H.: *The Personal Life of George Grote* (London 1873, John Murray), pp. 140–1, for the text of Grote’s letter announcing his decision not to stand again, to J. Travers, and Travers’ letter to W. E. Gladstone, in which it is stated that ‘Grote’s retirement is his own act, and he is inexorable upon the point’. How happy Ollivier, Clarendon, Machiavelli, and Thucydides would have counted themselves if any of their supporters could have given the same account of the circumstances in which they had taken their departure from public life.

² See Grote, H., op. cit., pp. 143–51.

³ George Grote in a letter of the 14th September, 1841, to Senior, quoted *ibid.* (see p. 144).

⁴ See Grote, H., op. cit., p. 153.

⁵ Morse Jr., J. T.: ‘Memoir of James Ford Rhodes’, in the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, October 1926–June 1927, vol. ix (Boston 1927), p. 179.

⁶ Goethe: *Faust*, II. 501–9, quoted in II. i. 204 and in V. vi. 324.

each of our three business men remained a business man in spite of himself during the first half of his career.

On the criterion of the hero's own intentions, desires, and feelings, the antithesis is extreme; and the cosmic weaver's performance in eventually making a great scholar out of every one of these raw souls is all the more impressive. The conclusions to be drawn from this performance are clear. For a scholar who desires nothing better than to be one, just as much as for a scholar who has been made into one by *force majeure*, 'practical' affairs must be a magnificent apprenticeship for creative intellectual work; and the reason why they have this virtue must be because they give the future historian an effective preliminary training in a life of action which is the scholar's true life as well as the business man's, the statesman's, and the soldier's.

This sovereign virtue of being men of action was shared by our three *ci-devant* business men, not only with our seven *ci-devant* soldiers and statesmen, but also with two lawyer-statesmen-historians, Ibn Khaldūn (*vivebat* A.D. 1332-1406) and Lord Bryce (*vivebat* A.D. 1838-1922), and with a banker-scholar, Walter Leaf (*vivebat* A.D. 1852-1927), who, in contrast to all the others, managed to drive 'practical' activities and creative intellectual work in double harness throughout their working lives.¹ 'Schliemann was always more of a fighter than a thinker, a man of action rather than of contemplation; and so, even in later life, his letters and speeches were more arresting than his books. . . . He was entirely a man of action and not of letters.'² 'The very next morning' after his first arrival in Ithaca in July 1868, 'his inborn impulse towards action came to the fore; about 5 a.m. he climbed the peak' of Mount Aëtos 'with four workmen. . . .'³ 'Bryce, with his boundless energy and his ubiquity, had the general characteristics of a man of action rather than of a scholar. Even his books were planned and sketched in the open air and on the move more than in the study'⁴—and indeed we have noticed already⁵ that Bryce's perennial curiosity to add to his ever growing fund of information was harnessed to a self-set yet faithfully followed agenda in which the writing of books, and not the reading of them, was the scholar-statesman's business. As for Walter Leaf, his recognition of the truth that intellectual, as well as commercial, work is action is on record in his own words. 'Until the thought is definitely

¹ In Leaf's life this contemporaneous pursuit of a pair of diverse activities was a conscious and deliberate policy, as he has recorded in the opening paragraph of an unfinished autobiography printed at the beginning of his wife Charlotte M. Leaf's book *Walter Leaf* (London 1932, John Murray), p. 1:

'I have always been conscious of a double strain in my own mental make-up: a double strain which it has been my conscious aim to foster and to realise in a fair and even balance throughout my whole life. . . . The markedly contrasted characters of my two grandfathers . . . typified . . . the combination, in one of their descendants, of two sides of active life: the administrative and the studious or reflective. It has always been my desire to prove myself true to the tradition of my father's family—Yorkshire men of action, successful men of business—and at the same time not to lose hold of the literary and scholastic vein which seems to have been handed down to me by the inheritance of my maternal grandfather, who was, a hundred years ago, one of the best Greek scholars of his day.'

² Ludwig, E.: *Schliemann of Troy* (London 1931, Putnam), pp. 113 and 25.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁴ E. I. Carlyle in *The Dictionary of National Biography*, 1922-1930 (Oxford 1937, University Press), p. 134.

⁵ On p. 21, n. 1, above.

formulated, it is nothing', he once wrote in a posthumously printed paper;¹ and, after he had accepted in A.D. 1878 an invitation from the publishing house of Macmillan to finish the work on an edition of Homer that had been left incomplete owing to the death by misadventure of a friend of his who had begun it, 'he lost no time in starting'² and wrote in his diary:³ 'It is a comfort to me to think that I am at length employed . . . on something that somebody wants done, and not merely on the dilettante acquisition of knowledge.'

It is noteworthy that, in this vital point of emerging from an apprenticeship in business as effective men of action, the two Homerists Leaf and Schliemann should have been kindred souls, because the native temperament of the indigo merchant who took Life by storm presents a piquant contrast to that of the silks and ribbons merchant who, while admitting *sotto voce* that, 'if a task is forced upon me, and I am convinced of its rightness, I can carry it out with a good deal of executive capacity',⁴ declares, with a characteristic modesty, that 'I have never had a real ambition except to try to carry out to the best of my power the duty which was present to me at the moment.'⁵

The flair for action which inspired these 'practical men' in their intellectual activities, as well as in their businesses, reveals itself in the methods of self-education that they worked out. Schliemann, for example, who would have been a prodigy as a linguist alone, even if he had neither excavated Troy nor made a financial fortune, succeeded in mastering at least twelve foreign languages—though, so he declares, 'my memory was bad, since from my childhood it had not been exercised upon any object'—by always making some active use of the language that he was studying.

'Necessity taught me a method which greatly facilitates the study of a language. This method consists in reading a great deal aloud without making a translation, taking a lesson every day, constantly writing essays upon subjects of interest, correcting these under the supervision of a teacher, learning them by heart, and repeating in the next lesson what was corrected on the previous day. . . . I never went on my errands, even in the rain, without having my book in my hand and learning something by heart.'⁶

Thus Schliemann was preaching what he himself had practised when he advised a friend not to retire from business unless he had a hobby.

'You will make an enormous mistake if you think that good reading will give you adequate occupation. You will get sick of it. But, now I remember, you are a violinist, bravo! bravissimo! That will make it all right. Only you must devote yourself passionately to music, play at concerts, compose, practise day and night.'⁷

On this principle Schliemann, when he dared at last to allow himself to learn Greek, taught himself by learning passages of the classics by heart and then composing in the language himself.

¹ See Leaf, C. M., op. cit., p. 167.

² Ibid., p. 149.

³ Walter Leaf in C. M. Leaf, op. cit., pp. 115-16.

⁴ Schliemann, H.: *Ilios* (London 1880, Murray), pp. 9-10. Cp. pp. 10-11 and 14-16.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Quoted in Ludwig, op. cit., p. 283.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 150.

'I learnt Ancient Greek [he tells us] as I would have learnt a living language. I can write in it with the greatest fluency on any subject I am acquainted with.'¹

Schliemann's biographer Ludwig subsequently tested Schliemann's claim by obtaining, from a specialist in Oriental languages, an expert opinion² on the extant books of exercises in manuscript by which Schliemann had taught himself, not only Greek, but, shortly after, Persian, Arabic, and Turkish. The specialist found, to his astonishment and admiration, that Schliemann's self-taught method of learning a new language enabled him, after six weeks' study, 'to express his thoughts both orally and in writing'. In the first letter³ that he wrote in Greek, Schliemann writes of it as 'the language of my waking thoughts and of my dreams'; and his biographer afterwards found in these Greek exercise-books—which 'represent the veritable monologue of a merchant who longed to escape into the realm of the ideal'—'documents of greater psychological value than any that are to be found in the whole accumulation of thousands of papers which Schliemann collected and preserved'.⁴

In short, Schliemann's prescription for learning a language was to do something with it, and it is significant that his method should have been adopted independently by Grote and by Rhodes. Rhodes, as we have noticed,⁵ deliberately prepared himself, when the time came, for his long-since intended enterprise of literary composition in his mother tongue by translating a French book into English. As for Grote,

'it was . . . a surprise to me [Mrs. Grote records in her account of their first day at Verona in A.D. 1841] when I heard Grote suddenly break forth in a new language, which he apparently employed with facility, questioning our attendant on all the points which attracted his curiosity . . . Within a day or two of our arrival in Rome . . . Grote engaged a master in order to familiarise himself with the Italian tongue—to which end he translated, as best he could, English comedies into Italian, *viva voce*, for an hour daily.'⁶

Though Grote's respect for what Schliemann called 'the tedious rules of grammar'⁷ was characteristically greater⁸ than Schliemann's, he was at one with his younger contemporary in habitually going into action in his studies as well as in his business, and, for him as for Schliemann, the method that he employed in learning a language was merely an application of a constant habit that seems never to have deserted him save once, in the critical winter of A.D. 1833-4.⁹ 'The amount of notes, scraps, extracts, and dissertations which he wrote . . . attests the eager appetite for knowledge which devoured him';¹⁰ and his wife's observation is borne out by her future husband's own record in her extracts¹¹

¹ Schliemann, *Ilios*, p. 15.

² Printed in Ludwig, *op. cit.*, on pp. 104-5.

³ Written to his uncle the pastor of Kalkhorst. See the quotation in Ludwig, *op. cit.*, on p. 103.

⁴ Ludwig, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-8. See the passages quoted, in an English translation, *ibid.*, on pp. 108-12.

⁵ On p. 147, above.

⁷ Schliemann, *Ilios*, p. 15.

⁹ See p. 152, below.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-37. Cp. p. 134.

⁶ Grote, H., *op. cit.*, pp. 146-7.

⁸ See Grote, H., *op. cit.*, p. 146.

¹⁰ Grote, H., *op. cit.*, p. 41.

from his diary between the 22nd September, 1818, and the 28th March, 1819.

The story of George Grote is not the least remarkable of our ten instances in which an outstanding piece of creative intellectual work has been the outcome of a 'practical' training; for, in the temperament of this banker-historian, there was perhaps enough of 'the leaven of the Pharisees'¹ to have inhibited him from intellectual achievement if his father had not been so selfish as to plant him, before he was sixteen years old,² at a desk in the family bank in Threadneedle Street instead of allowing him to complete his academic education by going up to the University. Indeed, Grote's native tendency towards intellectual dissipation was evidently so strong that it may be doubted whether even his enforced apprenticeship in banking would have secured him his intellectual salvation if his wife had not joined forces with his business to induce him to persevere in a self-discipline which is the prerequisite for effective action in any field.

After his father had forced him into the family banking-business, Grote divided the small margin of time still left to him for cultural activities, in which he had not ceased to put his treasure, between learning to play the violoncello, learning German, and studying Economics, History, and Metaphysics;³ not content with this, he threw himself into the movement for establishing the University of London and became, in A.D. 1827, one of the original members of the Council;⁴ and, though he did give up the 'cello in A.D. 1830,⁵ the liberty that he took with the personal freedom that was bequeathed to him before the end of the same year by the death of his selfish and tyrannical father⁶ was to allow himself to be sucked into parliamentary politics on the wave of the contemporary movement in Great Britain for parliamentary reform, and not to retire from business in order to concentrate upon the writing of a history of Greece which he had adopted, perhaps as early as A.D. 1822, as the theme for a future *magnum opus*.⁷ From the time of his plunge in A.D.

¹ Matt. xvi. 12; Luke xii. 1.

² See Grote, H., op. cit., pp. 8 and 10.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 55. 'He sometimes would return from the meetings of Council quite overwheeled' (*ibid.*, p. 57).

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 41.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

⁷ Mrs. Grote claims that the decision to write a history of Greece was taken by her husband, at her suggestion, late in A.D. 1823.

⁸ Towards the autumn of the year 1823, Mrs. Grote, hearing the subject of Grecian history frequently discussed at their house in Threadneedle Street, and being well aware how attractive the study was in her husband's eyes, thought it would be a fitting undertaking for him to write a new History of Greece himself. Accordingly she propounded this view to George Grote: "You are always studying the ancient authors whenever you have a moment's leisure; now here would be a fine subject for you to treat. Suppose you try your hand!" The idea seemed acceptable to the young student, and, after reflecting for some time, he came to the resolution of entering upon the work. His studies became chiefly directed towards it from that time forward. The quantity of materials which he accumulated in the form of "notes" and extracts during his preparation for the History (which have been preserved by the care of his wife), give evidence of his industry, and of the deep interest he felt in his self-appointed task' (Grote, H., op. cit., pp. 49-50).

This account of the genesis of Grote's great work is contradicted, however, by another piece of evidence that also comes from Mrs. Grote's pen. In a letter to G. Warde Norman, written by her in October 1823, she mentions that 'the Grecian History prospers, and G. is more absorbed in it than ever. He has nearly concluded the account of the Greek colonies'—i.e. chapters 22 seqq. of the Second Part of the History as eventually

1830 into politics down to the time of his eventual retirement first from politics in A.D. 1841 and then from business in A.D. 1843, the wife who was also the Egeria of the historian *in posse* was in constant anxiety for fear lest her husband might throw away an intellectual destiny that had long been manifest to her eyes by an intemperate dissipation of his energies.

"The "History of Greece", she wrote in her note-book on the 1st February, 1831, a few weeks before Grote's acceptance of an invitation from the Lord Mayor of London to stand for one of the seats in Parliament allocated to the City, 'must be given to the public before he can embark in any active scheme of a political kind. . . . His reputation must be created by the "opus magnum" (as John Mill calls the "History").'¹

And her failure to prevail upon her husband to give his literary work priority over politics was followed by a realization of her fears. After Grote's election to Parliament in December 1832, 'the History was laid on the shelf',² and on the eve of the parliamentary session of A.D. 1834 Mrs. Grote wrote in her notebook:

'G. did not apply himself, as I earnestly besought him, to the furtherance of his History during the winter, but permitted himself to graze about the field of letters—a propensity with which he is not in general reproachable, having usually had distinct objects in view in his studious hours. This winter he has indulged in all manner of promiscuous reading, and has written fewer memoranda in connection with books than I ever recollect him to have done in the same period. I very much apprehend that he will continue this desultory habit of reading, and feel it painful to resume the old labours to which he once applied himself with fond attention and sustained energy. I see, too, a growing demand in his mind for the acquisition of Physical Science, Geology and Chemistry in particular.'³

In thus taking alarm at the eruption, in the potential historian's mind, of an unregulated appetite for an aimless omniscience, this indomitable woman of action by proxy was not at fault; for her husband's symptoms were veritably those of a soul that is on its way to intellectual perdition. The cause of this intellectual calamity was, of course, not far to seek. The strain that Grote had imposed on himself by playing an active part in the parliamentary session of A.D. 1833 while continuing to be the responsible managing partner in the family banking business had exhausted, in these 'practical' activities, even the exceptional capacity for action with which this banker-politician-historian had been endowed by nature; and, after this excessively severe ordeal, his intellect's overtaxed bow instinctively protected itself by refusing to be rebent for overtime employment on intellectually creative work. But the diagnosis of the malady did not make it any the less alarming. 'This unremitting labour towards public objects made me', his wife recalls,⁴ 'complain not infrequently of the sacrifice; but Grote was inflexible' till his gradual disillusionment with practical politics became at last sufficiently acute to move him to write, as he wrote in February 1838: 'I now look wistfully

printed (see Momigliano, A.: *George Grote and the Study of Greek History* (London 1952, Lewis), p. 7, with n. 12 on p. 21).

² Ibid., p. 75.

³ Ibid., p. 87.

¹ Grote H., op. cit., p. 67.

⁴ Ibid., p. 101.

back to my unfinished Greek history. I hope the time will soon arrive when I can resume it."¹

The notable feature of the sequel was not that Grote eventually recoiled from the politics of which he had, by then, had his fill to the historiography at which, by A.D. 1843, he had been shying for at least twenty years; the feature that made the ending of Grote's story a happy one after all was that, during the last twenty-nine years of his life (A.D. 1842-71), he proved himself to be a Solomon by duly building his temple after having, for the preceding twenty years, been doing his worst to incapacitate himself for playing the intellectual man of action's part by lingering over David's preliminary task of assembling Solomon's building materials.² Grote and his wife had no sooner returned to England from their caesuran five months' visit to Italy in A.D. 1841-2 than Grote 'now methodically laid out the scheme of his first two volumes, as the real basis of his long-contemplated "History of Greece"'.³ During the first half of the year 1843, when he was still responsible for the affairs of the bank, 'few days passed in which he did not devote at least eight hours to the composition of the "History"'.⁴ The winter of A.D. 1845 found him 'getting the first two volumes through the press, whilst continuing the writing of the third and fourth'.⁵ 'Grote never deviated from his system of daily labour; he retired, after breakfasting at 9.0 a.m., to his library, whence he rarely emerged until the afternoon hours'.⁶ The last proofs of the twelfth and concluding volume were returned to the printer on the 23rd December, 1855.⁷

The honours for the historian's eventual attainment of a goal that he had set for himself more than thirty-two years back have to be divided between the hero, his wife, and his banking business in proportions which could have been assessed only, perhaps, by Mrs. Grote; and she has not divulged this information; but the spectator of a Victorian drama whose denouement was the eventual triumph of intellectual purposiveness over intellectual dissipation in the hero's soul can see that the happy ending was the fruit of discipline—whatever the source from which this discipline may have been derived. When, in A.D. 1864, Grote went on, without a pause, to start work upon his book on Aristotle as soon as he had sent his book on Plato to the press,⁸ a friend said to Mrs. Grote, on hearing from her of this,

'Grote's intellectual course always seems to me to resemble the progress of a planet through the firmament: never halting, never deviating from its onward path, steadfast to its appointed purpose; it quite impresses one with wonder!'⁹

Discipline is, indeed, the key-note of the lives of all these successful men of intellectual action, and it shows itself to the greatest effect in their disciplined use of their time. They displayed a capacity for persisting, over periods amounting to as much as half or three-quarters of a normal working lifetime, in the pursuit of long-term intellectual

¹ Ibid., p. 127.

² Grote, H.: *op. cit.*, p. 152.

³ Ibid., p. 170, referring to the historian's regimen in A.D. 1846-7.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 224.

⁵ Grote, H.: *op. cit.*, p. 277.

⁶ 2 Sam. vii; 1 Chron. xxii; 1 Chron. xxviii. 3.

⁷ Ibid., p. 153.

⁸ Ibid., p. 162.

⁹ See p. 20, above.

objectives; and, meanwhile, they wrung from a working life that was mainly occupied with 'practical' duties a modicum of leisure for employment in gradually approaching a distant intellectual goal by teaching themselves how to lay out and economize their time to best advantage in the daily round.

Even Grote, who was perhaps the weakest vessel among these iron wills, was able, after all, to summon up the staying-power to abide by his decision to write a history of Greece for at least twenty years before he began to put it into execution and for twelve years more before the work was complete. James Ford Rhodes held to his purpose for twenty-six years before setting to work in A.D. 1887 on the writing of his *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, and for no less than sixty-one years till the publication, in A.D. 1922, of a final volume carrying the story down to A.D. 1909, if it is true

'that even in school days he had conceived the purpose of writing American history, and, as the Civil War was then waging, he saw tempting material in rapid and exciting creation around him, whereby the scheme inevitably took ever more and more powerful hold upon his imagination.'¹

In Schliemann's life a Time-interval of thirty-nine years separated the date of his resolve, in A.D. 1829, to excavate Troy from the date of his first assault upon the mound at Hisārlyq in A.D. 1868. Bryce lived to accomplish the writing of the most ambitious of all his works, *Modern Democracies*, though the unforeseen interruption of the work on his literary agenda by the calls of public duty during the First World War had prevented him from putting pen to paper on this long-since planned and persistently cherished literary project till he was eighty years old. And these heroically self-disciplined characters showed the same steadfast patience in biding their time for taking their principal intermediate steps towards the achievement of their eventual objectives as in pushing forward their saps and traverses, decade by decade, towards these ultimate goals.

Schliemann, for example, could have put his marvellous linguistic gift to work in mastering the Ancient Greek language at any time after that memorable day in A.D. 1837² on which he had listened, spell-bound, to the recitation of Homeric verses which were then still unintelligible to him; and Greek was, in fact, 'the first language he learnt for other than practical purposes',³ though it was the tenth out of the twelve that he taught himself from first to last.⁴ Yet, just because his craving to drink

¹ Morse Jr., J. T.: 'Memoir of James Ford Rhodes', in the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, October 1926-June 1927, vol. lx (Boston 1927), p. 178. The memoir continues: 'Now Mr. Rhodes was, by his nature, a very wise man. Already, while still so near to the outset of life, he showed that sound good sense and wideness of vision which come to most of us, when fortunately they come at all, so many years later. He had no notion of being too eager, of making a start before he was sure of being able to hold on. So he held his ardour well in hand until all desirable preparations were fully completed and he could devote all his mind and all his hours to his writing.'

² See p. 15, above.

³ Ludwig, E.: *Schliemann of Troy* (London 1931, Putnam), p. 104. At the bank for buying gold-dust which Schliemann set up at Sacramento, California, in A.D. 1851, he conducted, according to his own account, in eight languages a business at which he was working every day from 6.0 a.m. to 10.0 p.m. (Ludwig, op. cit., p. 90).

⁴ See p. 15, above.

of this cup was so strong, Schliemann deliberately refrained, for nearly nineteen years, from raising it to his lips.

'My wish to learn Greek had always been great, but before the Crimean War I did not venture upon its study, for I was afraid that this language would exercise too great a fascination over me and estrange me from my commercial business, and during the war I was so overwhelmed with work that I could not even read the newspapers, far less a book. When, however, in January 1856, the first tidings of peace reached St. Petersburg, I was no longer able to restrain my desire to learn Greek, and at once set vigorously to work.'¹

Even, however, after he had thus, at long last, opened the flood-gates, his iron will still availed to regulate the aperture.

'My recreation [he wrote to his sister] is languages, to which I am bound by a consuming passion. During the week I am continuously occupied in my counting-house, but on Sundays I sit from early morning until late at night over Sophocles, whom I am translating into Modern Greek.'²

The same hero of the life of intellectual action showed a comparable self-restraint in postponing his indulgence in a visit to the land of Troy. The business man who commanded the financial means of transporting himself from St. Petersburg to California as early as A.D. 1850 manifestly had it in his power financially to visit the Troad, from that year onwards at latest, at any time that he might choose. Yet he deliberately postponed his first visit till A.D. 1868, when his self-equipment with the financial and intellectual sinews of archaeological war was at last complete, though in the meantime he had travelled round the globe in A.D. 1864-5³ and had previously come as close to Troy as Smyrna and the Cyclades in A.D. 1859.⁴ Walter Leaf, likewise, had it financially in his power to do his field-work in the Troad for at least as many years as Schliemann had had the same coveted archaeological objective within his financial reach before he had allowed himself to make his first pilgrimage to his poetic imagination's Mecca. Yet Leaf did not carry out his survey of the Troad till A.D. 1911, twenty years after his election in A.D. 1891 to be a director of the London and Westminster Bank had made him a man of means, and eight years after a first tantalizing glimpse of Troy on a three-weeks' holiday cruise in A.D. 1903 had left a mental wake of 'memories of Troy seething behind him'.⁵ The obstacle that compelled this scholar-banker to draw these long drafts upon his patience was an inability to find, not the requisite financial means, but the requisite length of continuous spare time for temporary release from those day-to-day financial responsibilities in the City of London which were the scholar's penance for drawing the banker's remuneration,⁶ and

¹ Schliemann, H.: *Ilios* (London 1880, John Murray), p. 14.

² Quoted by Ludwig in op. cit., p. 107.

³ See Schliemann, *Ilios*, p. 18; Ludwig, *Schliemann*, pp. 118-19.

⁴ See Schliemann, *Ilios*, p. 16; Ludwig, *Schliemann*, pp. 115-16.

⁵ Leaf, C. M.: *Walter Leaf* (London 1932, John Murray), pp. 201 and 203. Leaf had a second brief glimpse of Troy in A.D. 1910 (see *ibid.*, p. 325).

⁶ This necessity, under which Leaf had found himself, of waiting for eight years in order to obtain the necessary leisure for making his survey of the Troad was mentioned by him casually in the course of a conversation with the present writer in A.D. 1913; and an exercise of patience, which the seasoned man of commercial and intellectual action

Leaf the scholar may perhaps have had moments of envying a Cambridge or Oxford don for his leisure as wistfully as a don with children to educate might at times have envied Leaf the banker for his income.

George Grote, in his day, had already met, in his own double life, with the same difficulty in obtaining leave of absence from the banker-spider's parlour for the scholar-fly. In A.D. 1827 Grote had, in fact, been compelled by the exigencies of his duties in Threadneedle Street to cancel a plan (for which another opportunity never afterwards presented itself) of visiting at Bonn the German historian B. G. Niebuhr;¹ and he continued to be thus tightly chained to business for the next fourteen years. 'Up to this time', writes Mrs. Grote, in chronicling their five-months' tour in Italy in A.D. 1841-2, 'the inexorable conditions of our position forbade the idea of distant travel';² and, even at this stage in his career, by when he had been at work in the family bank for thirty-one years and had been 'the real working partner' for twenty-five,³ Grote had to make an advance-payment to his partners—a payment, not of money, but of time—for the luxury of a five-months-long vacation.

'In order to execute this (to us) vast programme, Grote had to earn the leisure required by giving a close attendance, during the months of July, August, and September [1841], at the banking house; his partners, William Prescott and Charles Grote, taking their respective holidays in the interval. This arrangement necessitated the passing much time in London, both George and his wife sleeping in town four or five nights of every week during the whole summer.'⁴

Even then, 'Grote was bound to be in England again early in April [1842] for the bank dividends'.⁵

The self-discipline that thus declared itself in a patient, as well as steadfast, pursuit of distant intellectual objectives would not, of course, have borne fruit if it had not also been exercised simultaneously in a day-to-day regimen that made it possible for the scholar business man to advance along his self-appointed intellectual path at the tortoise's slow but sure gait.⁶

Leaf, for example, ascertained by experiment in September 1875, at a moment when, on the threshold of his career in business, he was preparing himself for the second time to take the examination for a fellow-

manifestly took as a matter of course, made a deep impression on the mind of a young Oxford don on whose subjective Time-scale, in his twenty-fifth year, a span of eight years seemed a veritable aeon.

¹ Grote, H., op. cit., pp. 51-52.
² Grote, H., op. cit., p. 143. 'The annihilation of distance' through the progress of Western technology in an Industrial Age of Western history, into which Grote as well as Leaf had been born, did not proceed quite fast enough to shorten their periods of waiting to make their pilgrimages by shortening the length of the time required for 'the round-trip'. In A.D. 1841-2 there was not yet any through connexion by railway between Calais and Rome, and in A.D. 1911 not yet any through connexion by air between London and Constantinople.—A.J.T.

³ George Grote had been 'the real working partner' since A.D. 1816 (Grote, H., op. cit., p. 46) and had gone into the bank before his sixteenth birthday, i.e. in A.D. 1810.

⁴ Grote, H., op. cit., p. 143.

⁵ Ibid., p. 151.

⁶ 'Nothing surely is so potent as a law that may not be disobeyed. It has the force of the water-drop that hollows the stone. A small daily task, if it be really daily, will beat the labours of a spasmodic Hercules. It is the tortoise which always catches the hare. . . . Constancy in labour will conquer all difficulties.'—Trollope, Anthony: *Autobiography*, chaps. 7 and 20.

ship at Trinity College, Cambridge,¹ that he could do hard intellectual work for six hours a day but not for more.

'This I have always taken as a rule in after life. Needless to say that this does not apply to the ordinary round of more or less mechanical routine which, with most people, passes for work; I am speaking only of real attention, of real thinking, which is the most exhausting of all the occupations of life. . . . But there is a great relief if the attention is not solely concentrated on one subject, and if it is possible to divide it between two. By limiting my deliberate attention during the hours of business in the day and filling up my time with the amount of routine which is always coming in, I have always found it possible to turn in the evening with a fresh mind to study or writing for as much as two or three hours with profit; and it is this alternation of employments which has enabled me to carry on two interests side by side through all my life. . . . I used to retire to my study after dinner and read or write, often up till midnight, and I am inclined to think—though I never timed myself—that for considerable spells I managed to get through my maximum of six hours a day, divided between the office and the study, in addition to an uncertain amount of mere routine in the office which hardly counted.'²

Grote, at any rate in his twenties, found the time for his daily intellectual work mostly not after dinner but before breakfast, to judge by the extracts, printed by Mrs. Grote,³ from a 'diary kept by George Grote, Junior, in order to keep Miss Lewin [the future Mrs. Grote] informed of his way of life during the early period of their engagement'. The consumption of an amazing quantity of formidably solid

¹ In October 1875 Leaf duly won, at this second attempt, an award which was the highest intellectual distinction open to a graduate of the University of Cambridge. With characteristic good feeling, he resigned his fellowship after a few months because he had a conscientious objection to drawing remuneration for a sinecure (see Leaf, C. M., op. cit., pp. 125 and 126).

² Walter Leaf, in the fragment of autobiography printed in C. M. Leaf, *Walter Leaf*, pp. 123-4. Cp. Mrs. Leaf's own observations *ibid.*, on pp. 148 and 225. The advantages of an alternating regimen of intellectual work had likewise been discovered by John Stuart Mill, who served in the office of the Examiner of India Correspondence in the India House for thirty-five years (1823-58)—for the last two years as chief of the office—and then retired only because he was not in sympathy with Parliament's action in liquidating the East India Company and transferring its political and administrative functions to the Crown.

'I was in a few years qualified to be, and practically was,' Mill writes in the third chapter of his *Autobiography*, 'the chief conductor of the correspondence with India in one of the leading departments, that of the Native States. This continued to be my official duty until I was appointed Examiner, only two years before the time when the abolition of the East India Company as a political body determined my retirement. I do not know any one of the occupations by which a subsistence can now be gained, more suitable than such as this to anyone who, not being in independent circumstances, desires to devote a part of the twenty-four hours to private intellectual pursuits. . . . For my own part I have, through life, found office duties an actual rest from the other mental occupations which I have carried on simultaneously with them. They were sufficiently intellectual not to be a distasteful drudgery, without being such as to cause any strain upon the mental powers of a person used to abstract thought, or to the labour of careful literary composition.'

Anthony Trollope's concurrence on this point with John Stuart Mill is impressive, considering the diversity in temperament between these two good civil servants who both managed also to be distinguished men of letters in their very different lines.

'If it be necessary for you to live by your work, do not begin by trusting to literature. Take the stool in the office. . . . and then, in such leisure hours as may belong to you, . . . persevere in your literary attempts. . . . Such double toil, you will say, is severe. Yes; but, if you want this thing, you must submit to severe toil. . . . More than nine-tenths of my literary work has been done in the last twenty years, and during twelve of those years I followed another profession.'—Trollope: *Autobiography*, chaps. 11 and 20.

³ In op. cit., pp. 28-37.

intellectual pabulum is recorded between the first entry—'Tuesday, 22nd September, 1818. Rose at 7. Read Say for a couple of hours'—and the last:

'Sunday, 28th March, 1819. Rose at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5. Studied Kant until $\frac{1}{2}$ past 8, when I set off to breakfast with Mr. Ricardo. Met Mr. Mill [senior] there, and enjoyed some most interesting and instructive discourse with them, indoors and out (walking in Kensington Gardens), until $\frac{1}{2}$ past 3, when I mounted my horse and set off to Beckenham. Was extremely exhausted with fatigue and hunger when I arrived there, and ate and drank plentifully, which quenched my intellectual vigour for the night. Bed at $\frac{1}{2}$ past ten.'¹

'The habits of work were not relaxed after Grote's settling in Threadneedle Street as a married man. . . . A bell was . . . fixed in our bedroom, and duly rung at 6.0 a.m. by the private watchman,² in order to secure Grote's getting up at that hour';³ and, indeed, 'Rose at 6' are the opening words in six out of eight entries in Grote's journal chronicling his intellectual work before breakfast from the 3rd to the 10th December, 1822, inclusive.⁴

The nineteenth-century English banker-historian's daily regimen had been anticipated by a Persian contemporary of Dante's, Rashīd-ad-Dīn al-Hamadānī, who contrived, by making good use of a minimum of spare time, to write the *ǧāmi'-al-Tawārīkh* ('A Comprehensive Collec-

¹ This day-long intellectual orgy of Grote's in Kant's, Ricardo's, and Mill's company on a Sunday was, of course, no more typical of the intellectual hero's normal time-table on a week-day than were Schliemann's Sunday revels in Sophocles' company. The following entry is a characteristic sample of Grote's regimen on a working day.

'Saturday, 13th March [1819]. Rose at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7, after a sleepless night. Read some of Hume's essay on the Academical Philosophy. Breakfasted, and rode to London, where I found a letter from my dearest H., which gave me great delight, as also one from Miss Hale. Went to Guildhall twice this day to prove some debts. Between 4 and 5 read some more Kant. Dined at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5; played on the bass; drank tea at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7; then passed the evening in studying Kant, and writing down some remarks which occurred to me. Journalised the last three days, and went to bed at 11' (*ibid.*, p. 35).

² This regimen of the banker-historian Grote's was emulated by the civil servant novelist Anthony Trollope. 'It was my practice to be at my table every morning at 5.30 a.m., and it was also my practice to allow myself no mercy. An old groom, whose business it was to call me, and to whom I paid £5 a year extra for the duty, allowed himself no mercy. During all those years at Waltham Cross he was never once late with the coffee which it was his duty to bring me. I do not know that I ought not to feel that I owe more to him than to anyone else for the success I have had. By beginning at that hour I could complete my literary work before I dressed for breakfast.'—Trollope: *Autobiography*, chap. 15.

³ Grote, H., *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 48–49. Edward Gibbon, during his voluntary spells of residence in his father's country house at Buriton, had likewise found himself goaded into making time for intellectual work by early rising, under pressure, not of a family business, but 'social' demands on his time.

'At home I occupied a pleasant and spacious apartment; the library on the same floor was soon considered as my peculiar domain, and I might say with truth that I was never less alone than when I was by myself. My sole complaint, which I piously suppressed, arose from the kind restraint imposed on the freedom of my time. By the habit of early rising I always secured a sacred portion of the day, and many scattered moments were stolen and employed by my studious industry. But the family hours of breakfast, of dinner, of tea, and of supper were regular and long: after breakfast Mrs. Gibbon expected my company in her dressing-room; after tea my father claimed my conversation and the perusal of the newspapers; and in the midst of an interesting work I was often called down to receive the visit of some idle neighbours. Their dinners and visits required, in due season, a similar return; and I dreaded the period of the full moon, which was usually reserved for our more distant excursions.'—*The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon* (London 1896, Murray), Memoir B, pp. 162–3. Cp. Memoir C, p. 286.

tion of Histories') while he was Prime Minister in an Il-Khānī Mongol Government—'if we may accept as good evidence his own testimony, cited by Dawlatshah,¹ that the interval between dawn and sunrise was the only time when he was able, after having said his prayers and performed some religious exercises, to occupy himself with the writing of his history, since every other moment was consecrated to affairs of state'.² Rashīd-ad-Dīn has also put it on record that he accomplished a great deal of historical writing by turning to it in spare moments of his official working day.³ 'He was so avaricious with his time that, even during journeys, when he was actually in the saddle, he did not cease to meditate on topics that were of sufficient importance to make it necessary for him to give them a mature consideration.'⁴

Leaf, in spite of his practice of sitting up late, was also, like Rashīd-ad-Dīn and Grote, an early riser—as witness the entry: '2nd April, 1894. . . Up at 6, as usual, to look out of window.'⁵ But this English banker-scholar of a younger generation than Grote's was tempted into rising early by the lure, not of Kant or Say, but of the sunrise and the birds.⁶

These business men who became eminent scholars were at the same time outstandingly successful in their businesses. Schliemann demonstrated his giftedness in this field by making his fortune in spite of having started without a penny; but Grote, Rhodes, and Leaf, who were not pricked by the spur of penury, all likewise made their mark in the business world. 'I have reason to know', Mrs. Grote records,⁷ 'that the reputation of George Grote as a competent and wise banker became at this period [circa A.D. 1828-9] generally acknowledged, and that the result was an extension of the business of the house in Threadneedle Street.' Rhodes 'found himself possessed of a comfortable fortune, and absolutely free to do what he would',⁸ by A.D. 1886, by when he had spent seventeen years in the family business; and during this commercial strophe of his life he made a strong enough impression on his

¹ In his *Tadhkirāt-ash-Shu'arā*, *man. persan* No. 250, fol. 83r., in the Bibliothèque Nationale (ci-devant Bibliothèque Royale) in Paris.

² E. M. Quatremère, in his life of Rashīd-ad-Dīn prefixed to his edition of the preface to the *Jāmi'-at-Tawārikh* and the sections recording the history of Hūlāgū Khan, entitled *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse*, vol. i (Paris 1836, Imprimerie Royale), p. lxx.

³ See Quatremère, *ibid.*, p. lxii.

⁴ Quatremère, *ibid.*, pp. lviii-lix. Compare C. Plinius Secundus the Younger's account, in his *Epistulae*, Book III, Ep. v, of his uncle and namesake Pliny the Elder's habits of work. 'He used to begin to work by lamp light on the Volcanalia [23rd Aug.] . . . getting up while it was still pitch dark. In the winter he used to get up at 1.0 a.m. or, at the latest, at 2.0 a.m., and often at midnight. . . . Before daybreak he used to wait on the Emperor Vespasian (another night-worker) and then go straight on to his office. After getting home, he would devote what was left of his time to study. . . . On the road he would put all business out of his mind and would attend to his studies exclusively; at his elbow he would have a secretary armed with book and writing-pad, and in winter also with mittens to protect his hands, to make sure that even the inclemency of the season should be powerless to rob his master of any of his time for study. For the same reason my uncle used, in Rome, to go about in a sedan chair. I remember his once taking me to task for going on foot, "You might", he said, "have saved those hours". He counted all time lost that was not given to study. . . . So avaricious was he with his time.'

⁵ Leaf, C. M., *op. cit.*, p. 181.

⁶ Like Grote, Leaf was fond of music, and mountaineering was another of his recreations. Grote, for his part, was a keen cricketer (see Grote, H., *op. cit.*, p. 14).

⁷ In *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁸ Morse Jr., J. T., in the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, October 1926-June 1927 (Boston 1927), p. 179.

business associates, by his prowess on ground shared by him with them, for one of them, long after the scholarly antistrophe to Rhodes' business career had made the *ci-devant* coal merchant famous in a world that was not theirs, to have 'remarked regretfully, when his name was mentioned: "I knew Mr. Rhodes very well in the old days. He was highly thought of. What a pity he dropped out, for he would have made his reputation."' ¹ Walter Leaf, who in A.D. 1875 had taken on his shoulders the burden of an ailing family business immediately after finishing his education at Cambridge, did both make and keep his reputation in the City of London by the success with which he acquitted himself of his thankless initial task on Old Change. The perpetual growth of the esteem in which he was held in the business world was registered in his successive appointments to the chairmanship of the London Chamber of Commerce in A.D. 1887, to a directorship of the London and Westminster Bank in A.D. 1891, to the deputy chairmanship of the same bank in A.D. 1909, and finally, in A.D. 1918, to the chairmanship of this rapidly growing business concern. ² So long as Leaf lived, no City man could ever have imagined that this eminent banker had 'dropped out' of the business world, though there may have been some City men who were no more alive than Rhodes' former business associate was to the versatile man of action's fame in a non-commercial sphere of activity. Conversely, Leaf may have had contemporaries in the world of classical scholarship who were unaware that he was anything more than one of themselves; for 'Walter Leaf was undoubtedly one of the outstanding figures among the classical scholars of his generation. . . . He became the recognized authority on his special subject, and his output, both in quality and [in] quantity, would have been remarkable even for a professional scholar with no other occupations; for a man busy all his life in other spheres it was little short of miraculous.' ³

What was the secret of a miracle that was performed, not only by Walter Leaf, but likewise by George Grote, Heinrich Schliemann, James Ford Rhodes, and James Bryce? It was the old secret of a stuttering Demosthenes' miraculous self-transfiguration into a golden-mouthed public speaker. It was the response of a soul charged with a creative intellectual mission to the challenge of a 'practical' profession that must disappoint its apprentice of his hopes of attaining his intellectual objective if he did not take heroic measures to meet this threat of frustration. This was the life-story even of Bryce and Rhodes, who had embraced a 'practical' career deliberately without having been pushed into this by any external pressure. *A fortiori* it was the life-story of Schliemann, Grote, and Leaf, who were all victims, in various ways and degrees, of faults or failings of their fathers.

The Pastor Ernst Schliemann's sins against his son were more flagrant than the banker George Grote Senior's or the merchant Charles John

¹ Grant, Robert, in the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, October 1926-June 1927 (Boston 1927), p. 125.

² The London and County Bank had been amalgamated with the Westminster Bank in A.D. 1909, and Parr's Bank was amalgamated with the London County and Westminster Bank in A.D. 1918 (Sir Montagu Turner in C. M. Leaf, op. cit., pp. 301-2).

³ Bailey, Cyril in C. M. Leaf, op. cit., p. 317.

Leaf's. The pastor's profligacy cost his famous son Heinrich the loss of his childhood's sweetheart Minna Meineke by shocking the Schliemanns' neighbours into ostracizing the whole family after the premature death of Heinrich Schliemann's cruelly wronged mother; and it also cost Heinrich Schliemann the best part of the education which would have been a pastor's son's normal start in life. Yet this long debit column against Pastor Ernst Schliemann's name is partly offset by credits which neither George Grote Senior nor Charles John Leaf could claim. George Grote Senior 'had no sympathy with learning',¹ while the intellectual inspiration that Walter Leaf received from his father² was faint compared with that which Heinrich Schliemann received from his—not to speak of the automatic physical heritage of vitality which Pastor Ernst Schliemann expended on setting Nature at defiance by prolonging a dissolute life to the age of ninety,³ leaving it to his son Heinrich Schliemann to employ a transmitted fund of energy in making his fortune, mastering twelve foreign languages, and excavating Troy and Mycenae.⁴

Of three business men who took intellectually promising sons into partnership—George Grote Senior, Charles John Leaf, and Daniel Pomeroy Rhodes—the last-named alone comes out of the transaction with credit. There is no suggestion that James Ford Rhodes' entry into the family business was anything but the young man's own spontaneous choice, and no suggestion, either, that, thereafter, the father exercised any cramping tyranny over his son's private life. (It is significant, for example, that, in A.D. 1872, only three years after his entry into the family business in A.D. 1869, James Ford Rhodes made the happy marriage for which Grote and Leaf were both constrained to wait.) On the other hand there is a piece of presumptive evidence suggesting that James Ford Rhodes' father may have done something to inspire his son with the resolve—which the future historian is said to have formed in his boyhood⁵—one day to write a history of his country's contemporary tragedy; for Daniel Pomeroy Rhodes had been one of the leading Douglasite delegates from the North-West at the fateful convention which the Democratic Party had held at Charleston, S.C., on the 23rd April–1st May, 1860.⁶ As for the other two partner-fathers, George Grote Senior was a selfish tyrant and Charles John Leaf a pathetic invalid.

The historian-banker's father put George Grote Junior into the family business before his sixteenth birthday in order to make sure of being able to pass his own time in indulging his personal tastes by leading the conventional life of a country gentleman.⁷ He obstructed for nearly five years (A.D. 1815–20) his son's wish to marry.⁸ He then made his consent

¹ Grote, H., *op. cit.*, p. 10.

² See Walter Leaf in Leaf, C. M.: *Walter Leaf*, pp. 17–19.

³ See Schliemann, H.: *Ilios* (London 1880, Murray), p. 1, n. 1.

⁴ 'The almost unswerving attachment of the son to the father, in spite of every form of provocation from the father's side, can be explained only by his instinctive sense of their kinship of spirit.'—Ludwig, E.: *Schliemann of Troy*, p. 39.

⁵ See p. 154, above.

⁶ See Nevins, A.: *The Emergence of Lincoln* (New York 1950, Scribner, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 206.

⁷ See Grote, H., *op. cit.*, pp. 8 and 9–10.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 18 and 38.

conditional on the young couple's living in a house adjoining the bank in Threadneedle Street (a condition which, in Mrs. George Grote Junior's belief, was responsible for the premature delivery and swift death of her child and for an attack of puerperal fever that was all but fatal to its mother).¹ And, though the younger Grote had become 'the real working partner' in A.D. 1816,² his father, till his death in A.D. 1830, 'appropriated the greater portion of the profits which fell to the Grote family, allowing his eldest son no more than just sufficient to keep him from incurring debts.'³ This paternal tyranny was odious, yet George Grote's tribulations under it were perhaps hardly more severe than the trials brought upon Walter Leaf by a breakdown of his father's health which exposed a dutiful son to the more exacting tyranny of his own scrupulous conscience and tender heart.

In the same year A.D. 1874 in which Walter Leaf's father's health gave way, Walter's uncle Frederick died of cancer, and, since his uncle William had already died in A.D. 1871, the family business unexpectedly found itself bereft of all three partners of the older generation.⁴ In these tragic circumstances, which in themselves were enough to put crushing moral pressure upon a sensitive member of the rising generation, Walter Leaf's father appealed to him to come to the family's rescue; and the son 'deliberately accepted the offer of a place in the business with all the consequences', though he 'regarded it from the first as a disagreeable duty'.⁵ The consequences were indeed severe for him; for, in contrast to George Grote Junior, who had taken over a family business at a time when the openings for it had been favourable, and who had then been left free by his father to use his opportunities and abilities in making a success of it, as he did, at his own discretion, so long as he provided his father with sufficient profits from it, Walter Leaf was taking over a family business which was already in decline and which, as was to be proved by the event, ought to have been sold at that stage, and he had to spend the first eighteen years of his business life (A.D. 1875-93) in bearing, as 'counting house partner', the brunt of a losing battle before his father—who did not forbear to interfere with his son's management after he had become incapable of exercising the responsibility himself⁶—could be induced to waive his sentimental objections to amalgamating with another firm.⁷ It was not until he was invited in A.D. 1891, sixteen years after his first entry into the City, to join the Board of the London and Westminster Bank, that Walter Leaf found his way at last into a business career that was congenial to him. Meanwhile, his sense of duty towards his parents led him not only to spend eighteen years of his working life (A.D. 1875-93) on the thankless task of keeping the family business afloat, but also to refrain for nineteen years (A.D. 1875-94) from marrying.⁸

The painfulness of these frustrating sacrifices on the planes of per-

¹ See Grote, H., op. cit., pp. 39-40.

² Ibid., p. 51. Cp. p. 39.

³ Walter Leaf in Leaf, C. M.: *Walter Leaf*, pp. 109-111.

⁴ Walter Leaf, *ibid.*, pp. 114 and 113.

⁵ See Leaf, C. M.: *Walter Leaf*, pp. 145-7.

⁶ See Walter Leaf, *ibid.*, pp. 112-15.

² See *ibid.*, p. 46.

⁸ See Leaf, C. M., *ibid.*, p. 159.

sonal and professional life drove both George Grote Junior and Walter Leaf to seek consolation in intellectual activities. 'Looking forward to a commercial course of life, certain to prove uninteresting in itself', Grote 'resolved to provide for himself the higher resources of intellectual occupation'.¹ 'I made no pretence of liking the drudgery', Walter Leaf wrote, in retrospect, of his entry into the family business in A.D. 1875, 'but it had to be faced; and from the very first day I determined that it should not make me forget the higher intellectual interests'.² 'My dead friends in *Calif and Russia*', George Grote Junior wrote to G. W. Norman in May 1819, 'still continue faithful and interesting, and, if it were not for them, life would be a very waste indeed'.³ 'Only Homer keeps me going' and 'I have taken to work as some men would have taken to drink—to drive away my thoughts'—are two of the entries in Walter Leaf's diary in A.D. 1879.⁴ 'These are they which came out of great tribulation';⁵ for, in the event, Grote and Leaf were, not warped, but stimulated, by their ordeal.

'Soon the pruning of those years was to blossom out all the more vigorously for its ruthless suppression. Does not the gardener prune the rose tree? This same process, which in Walter's life meant a rigid cutting-back, strengthened every fibre of his being for what followed when once his wings were free to soar.'⁶

As for Schliemann,

'while . . . he had railed against the fate of a youth spoilt by his father's irregular life, he did not realise the strength of the impetus which a long artificially obstructed stream can gather before it at last breaks forth.'⁷

Nor are the intellectual benefits of personal and professional tribulations solely negative. An ordeal that stimulates the intellect by challenging it also gives it a positive schooling in open-mindedness, judiciousness, perceptiveness, and an art of communicating ideas to other minds which is an indispensable intellectual accomplishment for a human social animal and is at the same time the most arduous stage in the process of literary composition. Sir Arthur Evans⁸ notices in Schliemann that 'his old intense faculty of self-repression came out again in his later campaigns at Troy, where, in spite of much inward repugnance, he at last submitted to "scientific methods"'; and Cyril Bailey⁹ similarly notices in Leaf 'the eagerness with which, while retaining his general outlook, he would welcome every kind of new light, and the courage with which he could abandon any theory which he felt to be no longer tenable'. John Torrey Morse Junior, in his appreciation of James Ford Rhodes and his work,¹⁰ notices that Rhodes never succumbs, as Macaulay does, to a temptation to embroider at inordinate length

¹ Grote, H., op. cit., p. 11.

³ Grote, H., op. cit., pp. 21-22.

⁴ Leaf, C. M., op. cit., p. 144.

⁶ Leaf, C. M., op. cit., p. 161. Compare the simile of the pollarded willow that has been propounded in the present Study in I. i. 168; II. i. 273; II. ii. 209.

⁷ Ludwig, op. cit., pp. 134-5.

⁹ In Leaf, C. M., op. cit., p. 319. Cp. p. 320.

¹⁰ In the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, loc. cit., pp. 181-2.

² Leaf, C. M., op. cit., pp. 121-2.

⁵ Rev. vii. 14.

⁸ In Ludwig, op. cit., p. 19.

his descriptions of picturesque incidents, and he suggests an explanation of Rhodes' workmanlike sense of proportion.

'Is it possible that his cool self-restraint was indirectly due to the long years of his business training? . . . Business teaches what may be called a clean-cut way of thinking; impulse is absolutely discarded; an accurate knowledge of exact facts is essential; due weight must be allotted among colliding suggestions. In short, the study given to the matter in hand must be both exhaustive and dispassionate.¹ Such had been Mr. Rhodes' mental training for many years; and it had shaped the way in which he contemplated his subject matter. . . . I strongly incline to believe . . . that Mr. Rhodes' score of years in mere practical business were of substantial advantage to him when he came to write the annals of a great multitude of very hard and conflicting facts.'

Besides thus exercising the judgement, business practice can also sharpen the intuition. In noticing that Schliemann divined at first glance which was the true site of Troy, Emil Ludwig² cites Herder's remark to Goethe: 'With you the eye is everything'; and he goes on to comment:

'This rapid, keen, surveying, collating eye was characteristic of Schliemann; and it cannot be denied that a decade spent in looking over stocks, samples, steamships, and warehouses trains the eyes better than the study of the opinions of a hundred experts when, before digesting them, the archaeologist has never been himself to the place concerned.'

As for the training that business practice gives in the social art of conveying ideas, John Stuart Mill³ observes, of his experience at the India house, that

'it was valuable to me by making me, in this portion of my activity, merely one wheel in a machine, the whole of which had to work together. As a speculative writer, I should have had no one to consult but myself, and should have encountered in my speculations none of the obstacles which would have started up whenever they came to be applied to practice. But, as a secretary conducting political correspondence, I could not issue an order or express an opinion without satisfying various persons, very unlike myself, that the thing was fit to be done. I was thus in a good position for finding out by practice the mode of putting a thought which gives it easiest admittance into minds not prepared for it by habit; while I became practically conversant with the difficulties of moving bodies of men, the necessities of compromise, the art of sacrificing the non-essential to preserve the essential. I learnt how to obtain the best I could, when I could not obtain everything.'⁴

This practical philosophy, into which Mill the logician was thus inducted by Mill the India House clerk, is more likely to inspire effective intellectual action than the impossibilism of the grammarian who, in

¹ In this respect, a practical career has the same effect in the province of public administration as in that of private business. 'The occupation accustomed me to see and hear the difficulties of every course, and the means of obviating them, stated and discussed deliberately with a view to execution' (Mill, J. S.: *Autobiography*, chap. 3 *ad finem*).—A. J. T.

² In op. cit., p. 140.

³ In his *Autobiography*, *ibid.*

⁴ Mill, J. S.: *Autobiography*, chap. 3 *ad finem*.

Robert Browning's poem, is carried to his grave *ré infectâ* as the penalty for his hybris in playing for 'all or nothing'.¹

The value of a self-education in practical affairs had been borne in upon the present writer by an experience of his own that had made a deep and lasting impression on his mind. On the 18th-20th November, 1911, *en route* from Brindisi to Athens on his first visit to Greece, he had fallen into conversation with a young American of his own age who was one of his fellow-passengers on board the s.s. *Mykâli*. By that time the writer had been studying Latin for fifteen years, Greek for twelve and a half, and Hellenic history for two and a half intensively, and, on the last day of the voyage, as the boat steamed up the Gulf of Corinth and then through the canal into the Saronic Gulf, he was enjoying the thrill of identifying one feature in the landscape after another: the twin mountains Chalcis and Taphiassus, planted side by side like a pair of gigantic baetyls *vis-à-vis* Patras; Panachaicus wreathed in clouds; Parnassus followed by Helicon and confronted by Cyllênê; Acrocorinthus standing erect at the head of the Gulf; and, as a climax to this perpetually shifting panorama, the sudden view, round the shoulder of Salamis, of the Acropolis of Athens with Hymettus rising up behind it. Yet this constantly recurring thrill of setting eyes, for the first time in his life, on famous and beautiful objects that had long loomed large on his mental horizon could not distract the Englishman from giving an increasing share of his attention to his conversation with his American contemporary who was leaning over the rail at his side; for, while the young Englishman had been making himself into a classical scholar, the young American had been doing half a dozen other things which were so different from the Englishman's personal experiences up to date that they could not fail to arouse his interest. In the brief course of his working life so far, the young American had already worked on a farm, in a bank, in a bakery, in a lawyer's office, and in a grocer's store; and he had confuted the proverb about the rolling stone by accumulating incidentally enough spare money to carry him round the World (he had already travelled three times to and fro through the Mont Cenis Tunnel). Today and tomorrow he would be in Greece; the day after tomorrow he would be moving on to Egypt. In comparison with his English travelling companion, he was a babe in his knowledge of Greece and an old hand in his knowledge of Life. When, as the ship came to anchor at the Peiræus, the two 'Anglo-Saxons' discovered that their otherwise piquantly different educations had been identical in the negative point of sending them both out into the wide world unable to speak with the tongues of either men or angels,² it was the American who, in this emergency, made businesslike bargains for the pair of them with a boatman to row them ashore and with a cabman to drive them up to Athens. Two days after that, he sailed, in accordance with his schedule, for Alexandria; and, though the writer never heard from him thereafter, he never doubted that he duly arrived at a destination which, forty years on, the writer himself had not yet succeeded in reaching.

This brief encounter taught the Englishman a lesson in the cardinal

¹ See p. 38, above.

² 1 Cor. xiii. 1.

virtues of the practical life which made him appreciate one of the surviving fragments of the work of the statesman-historian Polybius.

'Plato says¹ that human affairs will never come right until "either the philosophers receive royal authority or the kings take to philosophy"; and, taking my cue from him, I should say, for my part, that the study of History will never come right until either one or other of two things happens. One of these alternatives is that the men of action (οἱ πραγματικοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν) should take up the writing of historical works—and take this up not just as a side-line (παρέργως), as they do now, but with so genuine a conviction that this is quite as important and quite as well worth doing [as any "practical" business] that they will be inspired with a life-long devotion to this pursuit and will refuse to allow themselves to be distracted from it. The other alternative is that would-be professional historians should take the view that history cannot be written effectively unless the writer has acquired an outlook that can be given only by actual experience of practical life. Until this happens, there will be "no hope of a cessation" of the ignorance of the present breed of historical writers.'²

¹ See Plato: *Respublica*, 473 D, quoted in III. iii. 93 and V. vi. 242.—A.J.T.

² Polybius: *Oecumenical History*, chap. xxviii, §§ 2–5. In Book XII, chap. xxv, section *h* and section *i*, . . . already made the same point *ad hominem* apropos of his predecessor Timaeus of Tauromenium:

'Timaeus confesses that he stayed for fifty years on end at Athens as a visitor who, all that time, admittedly had no experience whatsoever of military service and made no first-hand acquaintance with the topography [of the scenes of the historical events that he was recording]. So it is no wonder that, when, in his narrative, he runs up against these topics, he should display gross ignorance and should get quite a number of things wrong. Moreover, when he does occasionally approach the truth, he is like one of those painters who use lay figures for their models. They sometimes succeed in reproducing the outline of the original, but they fail to catch the verisimilitude and vitality of real live creatures—fail, in fact, to do what is precisely the professional job of an artist. Timaeus, like all other bookish historians, comes to grief in the same way. They fail to catch the verisimilitude of historical events, because nothing but personal experience (*αὐτομαθίας*) can enable the historian to achieve that. An historian who has not actually taken part himself in historical events will never succeed in effectually stimulating his readers. The historians of the classical school attached so much importance to achieving verisimilitude that, when they had to deal with politics, they would note that, as a matter of course, the writer has been a politician and has had practical experience of public affairs; when they had to deal with war, that he has seen active service and has been under fire; when they had to deal with life, that he has been a married man and has brought up a family; and similarly for all sides of life. But obviously this qualification for writing history will be found only in those historians who have mastered it by actually taking part themselves in historical events. . . . The moral is that a preoccupation with documentary materials is only one-third part of an historian's task—and this the third in order of importance.'

A NOTE ON CHRONOLOGY

(I) THE PROBLEM

IN the present work the first approach to the histories of the civilizations has been to make a comparative study of them as so many representatives of one species of Human Society, and this comparative treatment postulates that all representatives of the species are in some sense 'philosophically contemporary' with one another,¹ however far apart their locations may be on a chronological chart. In Parts II-V inclusive, which occupy the whole of volumes i-vi except for an introductory Part I, the chronological relation between one civilization and another has therefore not been a question of crucial importance; for a more or less correct knowledge of the internal chronology of each civilization is all that is required for attempting a comparative study of the geneses, growths, breakdowns, and disintegrations of the civilizations known to have existed up to date.

In the present concluding batch of volumes, however, the writer has been confronted with the task of trying to bring the respective internal chronologies of all the known civilizations into relation with one another by entering them all on a single Time-chart in so far as the historical evidence accessible in A.D. 1952 has allowed of this; for these volumes vii-x, containing Parts VI-XIII, are concerned in Parts VI-VIII with the relation of 'apparentation' and 'affiliation' between an antecedent and a posterior civilization, and in Parts IX-X with encounters between contemporaries in the Space-dimension and between non-contemporaries in the Time-dimension. Moreover, the inquiry into universal churches in Part VII has raised the question of the relation of these religious institutions to the civilizations that have preceded them and have followed them, and this has led to an analysis of the species of Society that we have called 'civilizations' into sub-varieties, representing different generations, which are distinguished from one another by differences in their historical relations to the higher religions.² It is evident that for these purposes we need to know how the several internal chronologies of our twenty-one civilizations (or whatever the number may be) stand to one another; and, as soon as we try to work out a single consolidated Time-chart, we find that the means at our disposal differ sharply in the degree of their adequacy or inadequacy in two different sets of cases.

For a student of the histories of civilizations who was working in the Western World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, it was comparatively easy to correlate the Western Civilization's chronology with the chronologies of its living contemporaries (the Near Eastern Orthodox Christian, Russian Orthodox Christian, Iranic Muslim, Arabic Muslim, Hindu, Chinese Far Eastern, and Japanese Far Eastern societies) and also with the chronologies of antecedent civilizations (the

¹ See I. i. 172-4.

² See VII. vii. 421-3.

Hellenic, Syriac, Indic, and Sinic) to which one or more of the living civilizations were affiliated. But the evidence in the twentieth-century Western historian's possession did not enable him to reconstruct with any degree of certainty the chronology of the earliest chapters in the histories even of those four civilizations belonging to a generation immediately preceding that of his own society and its living contemporaries; and the uncertainty was greater still in the cases of other civilizations—some belonging to the same immediately preceding generation and others to an earlier generation again—of whose history no continuous tradition has been preserved by any of the civilizations that were still alive in the twentieth century of the Christian Era.

These once forgotten civilizations had been buried mentally in oblivion, besides being buried physically underground, for some thousands of years before they had been disinterred by the Modern Western archaeologist's spade. Manifestly the difficulty of correlating their chronology with that of the living civilizations and the immediate predecessors of these was vastly greater than the difficulty of consolidating the chronology of these still living and these never yet forgotten civilizations; and it was almost as difficult to translate into years of the Christian Era the chronology of the pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas which had been contemporaries of the Western Civilization of the Old World but had been overwhelmed and submerged by its impact after having been unknown to it before it fell upon them with this instantaneously destructive effect.

The translation into years of the Christian Era of the chronologies of the pre-Columbian civilizations of the New World and the disinterred civilizations of the Old World was a task which a student of History was bound to attempt, because he could not afford to ignore the invaluable new light that Archaeology had thrown on History within the Western field of vision by bringing these formerly unknown civilizations to the Modern Western historian's knowledge. Yet, in attempting to co-ordinate Archaeology's finds with his traditional store of historical information by locating the disinterred civilizations' chronologies on his own Western Time-chart, the Western historian was manifestly committing himself to a hazardous undertaking; and the hazard was more evident when the present writer started work again on this Study, after a seven-years-long interruption caused by the Second World War, than it had been during the years A.D. 1927-39, within which he had planned the whole book, written the first five Parts of it, and published these in the first six volumes.

During the years A.D. 1927-39 the present writer was well aware that the relation of the Mayan and the affiliated Yucatec Civilization's chronology to that of the Western Civilization was the subject of a still unsettled controversy among the experts,¹ but at that time he mistakenly believed that the chronologies of the disinterred civilizations of North-East Africa and South-West Asia—the Egyptian, Minoan, and Sumeric civilizations and the Indus Culture in the first generation, and the Sumeric Civilization's Babylonian and Hittite successors in the

¹ See I. i. 124-5.

second generation—had been definitively correlated, more or less accurately, both with one another and with the chronology of the Western Civilization, in a Time-chart that had been worked out by Eduard Meyer. He felt no hesitation during those years in adopting the conclusions of this great authority, and indeed in A.D. 1952 these conclusions still appeared in retrospect to have been warrantable in the light of all the evidence forthcoming at the time.

Between A.D. 1939 and A.D. 1946, however, Meyer's conclusions had been thrown into the melting-pot as a result of the digestion, analysis, and discussion of fresh evidence that had been discovered in the nineteen-thirties. The writer returned to a study of History in A.D. 1946 to find that in Sumeric, Babylonian, and Hittite history the old chronological landmarks had been swept away and that no new landmarks had yet secured any general acceptance. The experts all agreed that the new evidence convicted Eduard Meyer's chronology of being too high; but here their consensus ended. There were now in the arena at least four rival new chronologies for South-West Asian history; and, while the most conservative of these reduced Meyer's dating of the First Dynasty of Babylon by only about one hundred years—from 2049-1750 B.C. to 1950-1651 B.C.—the most radical of the four reduced it, by nearly 250 years, to 1806-1507 B.C.

Meanwhile, in compensation, the former disagreement over Mayan and Yucatec chronology appeared to have been resolved by a victory of the lower over the higher of the two main former rival correlations of the internal chronology of the Mayan and Yucatec civilizations with years of the Christian Era.

(II) THE CASE FOR THE GOODMAN-MARTINEZ-THOMPSON CORRELATION OF THE YUCATEC AND MAYAN CHRONOLOGY WITH YEARS OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA

In the first five Parts and six volumes of this Study the present writer set out C. P. Bowdich's and H. J. Spinden's higher correlation and S. G. Morley's and J. E. S. Thompson's lower correlation side by side, without venturing to offer his readers any lead of his own towards making a choice.¹ Considering the blackness of his own ignorance of the subject, this suspension of judgement was the only attitude that he could have adopted without being guilty of intellectual impudence, though this agnosticism had the serious disadvantage of leaving the chronology in the air, since there was a discrepancy of some 260-70 years between the two systems.² Even an amateur, however, could see that Spinden's chronology for the Mayan, Yucatec, and Mexic civilizations had one ominous weakness in common with Meyer's chronology for the Sumeric, Babylonian, and Hittite civilizations. It required

¹ See, for example, I. i. 124-5.

² See the British Museum *Guide to the Maudslay Collection of Maya Sculptures* (London 1923, British Museum), p. 48, and Gann, T., and Thompson, J. E. S.: *The History of the Maya* (London 1931, Scribner), preface.

the assumption that, in the reconstructed record, there was a chronological gap in which History was a blank not occupied by any disinterred archaeological remains. This hypothetical interregnum in the archaeological record, which was about 150–200 years long in Eduard Meyer's chronology of South-West Asian history,¹ was about 350 years long in Spinden's chronology of Central American history;² yet in both cases the archaeological evidence, taken on its own merits, pointed, not to an interregnum, but to continuity;³ and for this reason, among others, 'opinion has turned against it [the Spinden correlation] . . . in recent years'.⁴ J. E. S. Thompson advocates as 'the most acceptable' correlation, without claiming that the evidence in its favour is irrefutable, the Goodman-Martinez-Thompson correlation⁵—a refinement on Morley's correlation which was adopted by Morley himself.⁶

On the authority of Morley, Thompson, and other Mayan scholars associated with the Carnegie Institution of Washington, the conversion of Mayan years into Gregorian years of the Christian Era according to the Goodman-Martinez-Thompson correlation has been adopted in Parts VI–XIII of the present Study. Yet in A.D. 1952 the experience of the revolution in South-West Asian chronology between A.D. 1939 and A.D. 1946 gave warning that the further progress of archaeological discovery might lay Morley's and Thompson's apparently definitive chronological system in ruins, as it had already laid Eduard Meyer's. One inescapable weakness of any attempt to correlate the Mayan Time-count with years of the Christian Era in the existing state of Western knowledge of the Mayan calendrical system was that, before the Maya collided with the Spaniards, they had substituted a relatively imperfect 'Short Count', in which 'accuracy within a period of only 256 years could be achieved',⁷ for a previously current 'Long Count' which 'was exact to the day over a period of 374,440 years'.⁸ 'Thus the problem of correlating the Mayan "Long Count" with Christian chronology consists of two different operations: first of correlating the Gregorian calendar with the Maya "Short Count", and second of correlating the Maya "Short Count" with the Maya "Long Count"'.⁹ Disagreement over the method of performing this second operation had been one cause of the difference between the rival Western computations of Mayan

¹ See I. i. III.

² See Thompson, J. E. S.: *Maya Hieroglyphic Writing: Introduction* (Washington, D. C. 1950, Carnegie Institution of Washington), p. 306, col. 2.

³ In the field of Hittite history the formerly postulated gap, 200 years broad, is pronounced 'artificial and incredible', in the light of the archaeological evidence, by Sidney Smith in *Alalakh and Chronology* (London 1940, Luzac), p. 17. Cp. Böhl, F. M. Th.: 'King Hammurabi of Babylon in the Setting of his Time (about 1700 B.C.)', in *Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 9, No. 10 (Amsterdam 1946, Noordhollandsche Uitgevers), p. 344.

⁴ Thompson, op. cit., p. 33.
⁵ See Thompson, op. cit., pp. 5 and 303, following his *Maya Chronology, The Correlation Question* (Washington, D.C., 1935, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication 456, No. 14, pp. 51–104). 'In the light of present evidence an open verdict must be returned' (*Maya Chronology*, op. cit., p. 75).

⁶ See Morley, S.: *Maya Hieroglyphs* (Palo Alto 1946, Stanford University Press), p. 458.

⁷ Morley, op. cit., p. 291.

⁸ Ibid., p. 457; cp. pp. 288–9.

⁹ Ibid., p. 457.

chronology in Western terms; and, while the Goodman-Martinez-Thompson correlation might be confirmed by further discoveries in the calendrical province of Mayan studies, it might also be overthrown in its turn. Subject to this warning, it nevertheless seemed to be the best correlation to adopt in the circumstances of the time at which Parts VI–XIII of the present Study were being written and published.

(III) THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER THE DATING OF THE FIRST DYNASTY OF BABYLON IN TERMS OF YEARS B.C.

The Overthrow of Eduard Meyer's Reconstruction of the Chronology of South-West Asian History.

In A.D. 1952 the correlation of Mayan with Western chronology in terms of the Goodman-Martinez-Thompson formula appeared at least to be better assured—pending some subversive fresh archaeological discovery in the Middle American field—than any of the four or more rival systems that, in the arena of South-West Asian chronological studies, were at this date in competition with one another for replacing a system, worked out by Eduard Meyer, which the progress of archaeological discovery had already discredited.

It was true that the internal chronology of the First Dynasty of Babylon had not been impugned. This dynasty was still believed to have been on the throne during eleven consecutive reigns whose severally recorded individual lengths added up to an aggregate period of 300 years ending in the overthrow of the eleventh king Samsu-ditana in a raid made on Babylon by the Hittite war-lord Muršiliš I. But there were now four or more rival substitutes for Eduard Meyer's correlation—adopted in Parts I–V of the present Study¹—of these 300 years with the years 2049–1750 B.C.; and, even if one of these competing correlations, or some other again, differing from each and all of them, were eventually to be proved correct, it was now pointed out that 'the earlier dynasties' could 'not be dated exactly from the king-list because the period by which the reigns of Ishbi-Irra [the first king of the Dynasty of Isin] and Ibi-Sin [Ibbi-Sin, the last king of the Third Dynasty of Ur] overlapped' could 'not be fixed, and' because 'the same doubt' applied 'to the reigns of Ur-Nammu [previously transliterated as Ur-Engur, the first king of the Third Dynasty of Ur] and Utu-khegal [of Erech, Ur-Nammu's fore-runner]'.² In A.D. 1952 there was, indeed, no consensus among scholars regarding the correlation of any date in South-West Asian history earlier than about 1450 B.C.³ Nevertheless, the still inconclusive controversy over the dating of the First Dynasty of Babylon was evidently the potential key to a possibility of eventually reacquiring something like the approximate certainty that Eduard Meyer had believed himself to have attained; for the highest and lowest of the current rival datings

¹ e.g., in I. i. 106, 110, and 111, and in V. vi. 296–8.

² Smith, Sidney: *Alalakh and Chronology* (London 1940, Luzac), pp. 30–31.

³ See Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

of this dynasty were not much less than 150 years apart; and, by comparison with a discrepancy of this order, the chronological uncertainties arising from the overlapping of Ishbi-Irra's reign with Ibbi-Sin's, and of Ur-Nammu's with Utu-khegal's, were narrowly circumscribed.¹ Thus, if the current controversy over the dating of the First Dynasty of Babylon could be settled, this would also settle, within narrow limits, the dates of previous chapters of South-West Asian history at least as far back as the days of Lugal-zaggisi of Erech and his victim Uru-kagina of Lagash, who had reigned some five or six hundred years before the First Dynasty of Babylon had been founded.²

In A.D. 1952 the rival datings of the First Dynasty of Babylon stood as follows in terms of years B.C.³:

Modern Western Advocates	Period of the First Babylonian Dynasty	Reign of Hammurabi
(a) Sidersky; Thureau-Dangin; ⁴ Goetze	1950-1651	1848-1806
(b) Ungnad; Sidney Smith ⁵	1894-1595	1792-1750
(c) Albright; ⁶ Cornelius; Van der Waerden	1831/30-circa 1531/30 ⁷	1728-1686 ⁸
(d) Poebel; Böhl; ⁹ Dossin; Schubert	1806-1507	1704-1662

¹ 'There is new evidence to show that the margin of error for the overlap Ibbi-Sin/Ishbi-Irra does not amount to more than a year or two. See A. Falkenstein in *Z.A.*, xv (1949), pp. 59 ff., especially p. 76. Ishbi-Irra conquered Isin in about the twelfth year of Ibbi-Sin.'—Note by Mr. M. B. Rowton. ² See I. i. 109.

³ This table has been taken from a paper read by Professor A. Goetze before the American Oriental Society at its meeting in Cincinnati at Easter time, 1950, which the author has kindly allowed the present writer to cite. See also Professor Goetze's paper on 'The Problem of Chronology and Early Hittite History' in *The Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, No. 122, April 1951, pp. 18-25, especially pp. 19-20.

⁴ See Thureau-Dangin, F.: 'Iasmah-Adad', in *Revue d'Archéologie*, vol. xxxiv (1937), pp. 135-9.

⁵ See Smith, S.: *Alalakh and Chronology* (London 1940, Luzac); 'Middle Minoan I-II and Babylonian Chronology', in the *American Journal of Archaeology*, vol. xlix, No. 1 (Concord, N. H. 1945, Rumford Press), pp. 1-24.

⁶ See Albright, W. F.: 'A Third Revision of the Early Chronology of Western Asia', in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 88, December 1942, pp. 28-32, superseding a previous paper on the subject by the same scholar *ibid.*: 'New Light on the History of Western Asia in the Second Millennium B.C.', in No. 77, February 1940, pp. 20-32, and No. 78, April 1940, pp. 23-33. In this earlier paper Albright had adopted dating (b), but the subsequent publication of Poebel's papers on the Assyrian King-List, discovered in A.D. 1932-3 at Khorsabad, led Albright to lower his dating for the First Dynasty of Babylon by 64 years—this precise figure for the amount of the reduction being determined by the astronomical exigencies of the tenth king Ammi-saduga's Venus observations (see 'New Light', pp. 30-31). The position reached by Albright in his third revision (i.e. Dating (c)) is maintained by him in a review of Sidney Smith's *Alalakh and Chronology* in *A.J.A.*, vol. xlvii, 1943, pp. 491-2, and in a paper on 'An Indirect Synchronism between Egypt and Mesopotamia circa 1730 B.C.' in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 99, October 1945, pp. 9-18. On p. 10 of this paper Albright records that, in lowering his own original reduction of Eduard Meyer's chronology by another 64 years, he was 'combining the evidence of the Venus observations with the data of the Khorsabad List', and he goes on to express the opinion that 'this latest reduced chronology fits the archaeological and historical picture so exactly that it cannot be appreciably wrong, so far as I can see.'

⁷ In *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 88, December 1942, p. 31, Albright had dated the First Babylonian Dynasty 1831/30-1550 (*sic*, not 1530) B.C., but this is, no doubt, merely a misprint, since in *A.J.A.*, vol. xlvii (1943), p. 492, he restores to this dynasty its well-established total span of approximately 300 years by placing its terminal date *circa* 1530 B.C.

⁸ According to Albright in *B.A.S.O.R.* No. 88, December 1942, pp. 30-31. In *A.J.A.*, vol. xlvii, 1943, p. 492, he makes Hammurabi reign for an additional ten years down to 1676 B.C. This is, no doubt, merely a misprint.

⁹ See Böhl, F. M. Th.: 'King Hammurabi of Babylon in the Setting of his Time

When the experts were in such signal disagreement with one another, it would manifestly have been impertinent in a layman to presume to put forward any opinion of his own; but the layman could at least examine, for himself, the new pieces of archaeological evidence on which all four rival datings alike were based; and he could also take note of certain at least relatively well-ascertained points in Assyrian and Egyptiac chronology and in Hittite history with which any revised version of South-West Asian chronology would have to reckon.

There were three new discoveries that were accountable, between them, for the overthrow of Eduard Meyer's reconstruction of the chronology of South-West Asian history.

The Stratigraphical Evidence from Sites in North Syria.

The first discovery was that, on sites in North Syria, especially at Ugarit (Rās ash-Shamrah) on the coast and at Alalakh ('Atshānah) on the River Orontes, which, in the second millennium B.C., were subject to cultural radiation from both the Sumeric and the Egyptiac World, objects of Sumeric provenance or style attributable to the time of the First Dynasty of Babylon were found to lie in later strata than objects of Egyptiac provenance or style attributable to the reigns of the Egyptiac Emperors of the Twelfth Dynasty down to Amenemhat III inclusive.

'A Ras Shamra les cylindres babyloniens gravés d'inscriptions du temps de la première dynastie et dont certains ont pu être attribués au temps d'Hammourabi se trouvent dans les strates où dans les tombes de l'Ugarit Moyen 2, et non dans celles de l'Ugarit Moyen 1 (2100-1900), sauf remaniements. Ils y sont donc attribuables avec certitude à la période entre 1900 et 1750 en chiffres ronds. Dans plusieurs cas nous avons pu établir que les strates qui contiennent les cylindres en question sont postérieures aux monuments égyptiens commençant à Ugarit avec ceux de Sésostris I et se terminant avec ceux d'Aménemhat III; cela restreint encore davantage la date de certains des cylindres babyloniens provenant d'Ugarit et permet de les placer entre 1800 et 1700 environ.

'Ainsi, les monuments et les observations stratigraphiques et chronologiques de Ras Shamra s'accordent fort bien avec les dates proposées par Mr. Sidney Smith . . ., d'après lesquelles la première dynastie babylonienne ne venait au pouvoir que vers 1900 en chiffres ronds et s'écroulait vers 1600.¹ D'après la même chronologie, le règne d'Hammourabi s'étend de 1792 à 1750, c'est à dire qu'il est contemporain de la fin de la période correspondant à la prépondérance politique dont l'Égypte du Moyen Empire avait joui en Syrie et en Palestine.'²

This stratigraphical evidence from North Syria was of some importance

(about 1700 B.C.), in *Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde*, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 9, No. 10 (Amsterdam 1946, Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers), pp. 341-70, especially p. 352.

¹ 'Les dates exactes proposées par Mr. S. Smith sont 1894 pour le commencement, 1505 pour la fin de la dynastie.'

² Schaeffer, C. F. A.: *Stratigraphie Comparée et Chronologie de l'Asie Occidentale (iii^e et ii^e millénaires)* (London 1948, Oxford University Press), pp. 29-30. Cp. Sidney Smith, *Alalakh and Chronology* (London 1940, Luzac), p. 15, where Smith quotes Schaeffer's more tentative statement of the same point in *Ugaritica*, i. 18, n. 2. Cp. Albright, 'New Light', in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 77, p. 29, and Neugebauer, O.: 'The Chronology of the Hammurabi Age', in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. Ixi (New Haven 1941, Yale University Press), p. 58.

in the history of the current 'Battle of the Dates', inasmuch as it had been one of the earliest of the new pieces of information that had cast doubt on the tenability of Eduard Meyer's previously acceptable chronology. Such evidence, however, suffered from the inherent weakness of being inevitably imprecise; and it was significant that the argument in favour of Dating (b), which had been founded upon it by Schaeffer and Smith, was contested both by M. B. Rowton, who was an advocate of Dating (c), and by Professor Albrecht Goetze, who was an advocate of Dating (a). Mr. Rowton comments:

'Little can be made of the seals found at Ras ash-Shamrah or elsewhere in the Aegean area.¹ It might be added that an exact dating of seals of the "Old Babylonian" period has yet to be established. That term is often applied rather loosely to all Mesopotamian seals between the end of Ur III and the Kassite period, a total of over 400 years. A seal that belongs to the beginning of that period can, of course, be clearly distinguished from one that belongs to the end of it. But the grading of those seals (the majority) which do not belong to either of these extremes has not yet been done (probably for lack of reliable chronological evidence). Consequently, as matters stand, it is hardly possible to say whether a seal of this period is to be dated, say, 50 years before or 50 years after the middle of Hammurabi's reign.'²

Professor Goetze, for his part, was of the opinion that, 'where an independent check is possible, the evidence, as far as published, does not bear out Schaeffer's claims';³ and he expressed⁴ the same doubts as those entertained by Mr. Rowton in regard to Dr. Schaeffer's datings and attributions of cylinder seals disinterred from North Syrian sites. Professor Goetze also challenged Dr. Sidney Smith's arguments,⁵ on archaeological grounds, for dating the strata Alalakh VI and VII *circa* 1800-1600 and hence for adopting Dating (b) for the First Dynasty of Babylon. It seemed evident that the stratigraphical evidence from North Syria, though it might suffice for impugning Eduard Meyer's chronology, did not suffice for providing a criterion for judging between the relative merits of the rival new datings.⁶

The Evidence of the Mari Archives

A second revolutionary discovery was the disinterment, in A.D. 1935-8, of the archives of Zimri-Lim, King of Mari (Ma'er) on the Middle Euphrates. Twenty thousand documents—15,000 of them economic, but the other 5,000 political—were retrieved.⁷ The political documents

¹ See Rowton, M. B., in the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. x (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), p. 202.

² Mr. M. B. Rowton, in a note for the writer of this Study. Cp. Porada, E., in the *Journal of Cuneiform Studies*, vol. iv (1950), pp. 155-62.

³ A note by Professor Goetze, enclosed with a letter of the 13th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ In *Alalakh*, pp. 8-10.

⁶ The utility of the archaeological evidence bearing on the period of South-West Asian history under consideration in the present Note on Chronology is appraised as follows by Dr. Sidney Smith in a letter of the 13th October, 1951, to the writer of this Study: 'Archaeological evidence is chronologically important only in establishing sequences. . . . Nothing about lengths of time is proved [by archaeological evidence] in Palestine. In Syria sometimes archaeological material is associated in different levels with dated documents—a very different state of affairs.'

⁷ See Dossin, G., in *Syria*, vols. xix (1938), pp. 105-26, and xx (1939), pp. 97-113, and W. von Soden's résumé in *Die Welt des Orients*, Heft 3 (1948), pp. 187-204.

in this trove straddle a period of at least sixty-two years all told, including the last nine years of the reign of Zimri-Lim's father Yakhdun-Lim, twenty-one years of Assyrian domination, exercised by the King of Assyria Šamši-Adad I, and the thirty-two years of Zimri-Lim's own reign, ending in the year of the destruction of Mari by Hammurabi of Babylon,¹ which is known, from Hammurabi's records, to have occurred in the thirty-fifth year of Hammurabi's reign.² The historical and chronological implications of these Mari Archives, and of contemporary documents from other places in the South-West Asian World of the day, can be appreciated better if we postpone our consideration of them till after we have dealt with the third of our three revolutionary discoveries.

The Evidence of the Khorsabad List of Kings of Assyria

This third discovery was the disinterment at Khorsabad, in A.D. 1932-3, of a list of the Kings of Assyria which purports to record the complete consecutive series down to Asshur-Nirari V (*regnabat* 754-745 B.C.), beginning with the first king of all. This Khorsabad List also gives figures for the lengths of reigns from the reign of the thirty-third king, Ērišu I, except for eight effaced entries and eight reigns—the forty-second to the forty-seventh inclusive, and the eighty-fourth and eighty-fifth—where a figure is replaced by the formula *t[duppišu šarrūta ēpuš* ('He exercised kingship during his *t[duppu*').³

Twenty years after its discovery, this list still remained unpublished; and, at the time of writing, information about it was still to be found only in an article that had been published by Professor A. Poebel in the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* in three instalments.⁴ Poebel's article presented the contents of the Khorsabad King-List in the form of an interpretation of them, and this method of presentation had evoked from other scholars the criticism to which it manifestly laid itself open.⁵ Yet enough was now known about the Khorsabad King-List to make it plain at least that this was a tantalizing document.

Since the reign of the latest king enumerated in it, No. 107, Asshur-Nirari V, was already known with certainty to correspond to the years 754-745 B.C., and since one of the kings for the lengths of whose reigns figures are given in the list—No. 39, Šamši-Adad I—was now known,

¹ These were the figures given by G. Dossin in *Studia Mariana* (edited by Parrot, A.: Leiden 1950, Brill), pp. 51-61, especially p. 59, as was pointed out to the present writer by Professor Goetze. Dossin's figures superseded those given by Böhl, *op. cit.*, p. 348, namely 58 years all told, including the last 8 years of Yakhdun-Lim's reign, 20 years of Assyrian domination, and a reign of 30 years for Zimri-Lim. It was possible that the total span of years would be further increased by the progress of research.

² See Böhl, *op. cit.*, pp. 348 and 354. Hammurabi's conquest of Mari in his thirty-second year, which, according to Böhl, *op. cit.*, p. 354, n. 18, was not the final settlement of accounts, is equated with the definitive conquest by Van der Meer, P.: *The Ancient Chronology of Western Asia and Egypt* (Leiden 1947, Brill), p. 21.

³ See Smith, S.: 'Middle Minoan I-II and the Chronology of the American Journal of Archaeology', vol. xlix, No. 1, p. 19, and the Date of the Journal of Near Eastern Studies, vol. xi, University of Chicago Press), pp. 184-204.

⁴ In *J.N.E.S.*, vol. i, No. 3, July 1942, pp. 247-306 and 460-91, and vol. ii, January-October 1943, pp. 56-90.

⁵ See, for example, Sidney Smith's strictures in 'Middle Minoan I-II and Babylonian Chronology', p. 18.

from the evidence in the Mari Archives, to have ruled Mari for twenty-one years between the end of Yakhdun-Lim's reign there and the beginning of the reign of Yakhdun-Lim's son Zimri-Lim, whom the evidence of the Mari Archives certified to have been a contemporary of Hammurabi's, the Khorsabad List of Assyrian Kings ought to have made it possible approximately to date Hammurabi's reign, and, with it, the whole period occupied by the First Dynasty of Babylon, in terms of years B.C. In order, however, to provide this eagerly desired information with entire certainty and exactness, the Khorsabad List would have had, from reign No. 39 onwards, to be un mutilated and undisputedly precise in its indications, and unfortunately neither of these two conditions was fulfilled. In the first place the figures for kings Nos. 61, 65, and 66 had been effaced; and, though the figure for No. 61 could be restored from a fragment of another copy of the list, the lengths of the reigns of Nos. 65 and 66 remained unknown quantities.¹ In the second place the meaning of the formula 'his period', which did duty for a figure in eight cases (Nos. 42-47 and 84-85), was in dispute. In the third place it was contended by at least one authority, Dr. Sidney Smith, that there was no warrant for taking it for granted that the years recorded in this list were, all the way back to the figure given for Šamši-Adad I's reign, Babylonian solar years calculated according to the system labelled 'Julian' in a latter-day Western World in allusion to its official adoption by the Roman Government under the dictatorship of Julius Caesar as from the beginning of the Babylonian year that eventually came to be known retrospectively as 45 B.C.

A study of Poebel's article made it evident, even to a layman, that the author had succumbed to a temptation to try to force the Khorsabad List to solve the riddle of South-West Asian chronology with complete precision and certainty in spite of all these three impediments. Poebel tacitly assumes that all the years recorded in the list are Julian years; he postulates² that the compiler of the list uses the formula 'his period' in the technical sense of meaning part of the fraction of the preceding-king's last regnal year that was still unexpired at the time of that preceding king's death or deposition; and—as a result of ingenious attempts to check the data given in the Khorsabad List by comparing them with isolated, and apparently mutually conflicting, chronological statements made by Shalmaneser I (*regnabat* 1272-1243, supposing that the solar year had already been adopted in Assyria by his time) and by Esarhaddon (*regnabat* 680-669 B.C.)—he comes to the conclusion that the lost figures for reigns Nos. 65 and 66 would also prove, if they had been preserved or recovered, to have occupied, between them, only a fragment of one single year which is already accounted for in the list. On this showing, he concludes that all the unknown quantities in the Khorsabad List, as we have it, amount, in the aggregate, to no more than zero, and that it is legitimate to use the figures of regnal years contained in the list as if they represented an unbroken series of Julian solar years.

Manifestly, in adopting this procedure, Poebel is courting a risk of

¹ See Smith, S.; 'Middle Minoan I-II and Babylonian Chronology', in *A. J. A.*, vol. xlix, no. 1, p. 18.

² In *J. N. E. S.*, vol. i, p. 296, n. 130.

unduly lowering the dating of Šamši-Adad I's reign in Assyria and Mari, and therefore, by implication, also the dating of Zimri-Lim's reign in Mari and of Hammurabi's at Babylon. Indeed, if Poebel's assumptions in regard to all the three points on which the Khorsabad List was impugned by other scholars had all proved equally vulnerable to attack, the result would have been, not only to discredit Poebel's reconstruction of Assyrian chronology on the basis of the Khorsabad List, but also to demonstrate that any reconstruction on this basis would be impracticable. As it happened, however, the point in Poebel's presentation of his case that proved to be the least convincing to his critics was the point that introduced the smallest margin of arithmetical uncertainty into a calculation based on the figures that the Khorsabad List furnished. If it had been demonstrated that the phrase *t/duppīšu* meant, when used in this king-list, 'an indeterminate period' or 'an unspecified period', then the chronology of Assyrian history from reigns Nos. 84 and 83 upwards would have remained still subject to a considerable possibility of error, while from reigns Nos. 47-42 upwards it would have remained altogether incalculable. And a further element of uncertainty would have been added if it had also been demonstrated that the solar year had not been adopted for official purposes in Assyria until the reign of Tiglath-Pileser I (*regnabat* 1114-1076 B.C.), and that, before that, the 'years' recorded in the Assyrian annals had been lunar years which might or might not have been brought into step with the solar years from time to time by rough-and-ready intercalations. On these two latter points, however, Poebel's assumptions, while they were impugned by Dr. Sidney Smith, were approved by a preponderance of expert opinion, and the only point of the three in which Poebel had an impressive majority against him was his assumption that the pair of reigns for which the figures in the Khorsabad List had been lost through an accidental defacement would have been found to have a zero value if the figures had been preserved.

Dr. Sidney Smith's scepticism in regard to the use of solar years in Assyrian official chronology before the reign of Tiglath-Pileser I did not find favour with other contemporary scholars;¹ and it was also pointed out that, if Assyrian official years before that date were in truth lunar years, the automatic effect would be, not to raise, but to lower, the dating in solar years by about three years in each century, and that a hypothetical excessive correction of this hypothetical automatic reduction by occasional intercalations was the only expedient by which the lunar-year hypothesis could be made to serve as an argument in favour of a higher dating. Moreover, there was one piece of positive evidence which indicated both that *tuppīšu* had the numerical value of zero and

¹ According to Van der Meer, P.: *The Ancient Chronology of Western Asia and Egypt* (Leiden 1947, Brill), pp. 1-2, the Assyrians and the Babylonians both alike used lunar years, and both alike adjusted these to the Julian solar year—thus, both alike, using Julian solar years in practice. The Assyrians had had an automatic method of adjustment —'the month whose beginning was the nearest to the Spring Equinox was the first month of the year'—whereas the Babylonians made the necessary intercalations by decree. The only innovation that Tiglath-Pileser I of Assyria made, according to Van der Meer, was to replace the previous Assyrian method of adjustment by the Babylonian method.

that the Assyrian official years had in truth been solar years for at least a quarter of a millennium before Tiglath-Pileser I's day. The Assyrian King Asshur-Uballit I (No. 73 in the Khorsabad List) was known, on the evidence of the Tall-al-'Amarnah Archives, to have been a contemporary of the Egyptian Emperor Ikhnaton, whose reign was known, from the Egyptian evidence, to have fallen within the second quarter of the fourteenth century B.C. (in the years 1380-1362, according to J. A. Wilson's dating)¹; and, on the basis of the figures in the Khorsabad List, Asshur-Uballit's reign would be dated 1362-1327 B.C.² if the lengths of the reigns of kings Nos. 84 and 85 (two *tuppu* reigns) were assumed to be zero and if the years in which the Khorsabad List was reckoning were assumed to be solar years. There thus seemed to be positive evidence in favour of making both these assumptions of Poebel's at least as far upwards as this point in the Khorsabad List, and no evidence against making Poebel's assumption that the years of the list were solar years right back to the reign of Šamši-Adad I.

Dr. Sidney Smith attacked Poebel's assumption that the formula *t/duppišu šarrūta ēpuš* was equivalent to zero for chronological purposes by impugning the philological contentions on which Poebel's assumption had been based by Poebel himself.³ Smith had succeeded, in Rowton's opinion,⁴ in demolishing Poebel's philological basis for the equation of *tuppišu* with zero; but Rowton, for his part, proposed an alternative philological interpretation of the phrase which, like Poebel's interpretation, would equate it with zero in its usage in the Khorsabad List. The question was whether the formula used in the Khorsabad List meant, as Sidney Smith contended,⁵ 'an indeterminate period', or whether it meant, as Rowton contended, an 'end-bit' required for bringing a measure of capacity up to its full volume or bringing a measure of time up to its full length. The answer turned on the interpretation of the meaning of the Akkadian word *tuppu* in other contexts; and on this matter no one who was not an Assyriologist, and an accomplished one, could presume to pass judgement. The issue was a crucial one for the chronological question that is the subject of the present note; for, if Smith's interpretation was right, the formula would mean that the compiler of the Khorsabad List either had not known or had not chosen to tell the length of the reign to which he was applying the formula; and, considering that the formula is applied to no less than eight reigns before we arrive (in a chronologically ascending order) at the reign of Šamši-Adad I, this would mean that Šamši-Adad I's reign was practically undatable on the basis of the Khorsabad List. On the other hand, if Rowton's interpretation was right, the formula, as used

¹ See Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), p. vii.

² Mr. M. B. Rowton, in *Irāq*, vol. viii (1946), p. 96, had calculated that Asshur-Uballit's accession year was, not 1362, but 1356 B.C.; but there were also alternative datings of Ikhnaton's reign which brought the terminal date of this down to 1352 B.C. The contemporaneity of Ikhnaton and Asshur-Uballit was attested beyond dispute by the retrieval of correspondence between them in the Tall-al-'Amarnah Archives.

³ See Smith, Sidney: 'Middle Minoan I-II and Babylonian Chronology', in *A. J. A.*, vol. xlix, No. 1, pp. 1-24.

⁴ See Rowton, M. B.: '*Tuppu* and the Date of Hammurabi', in *J. N. E. S.*, vol. x (1951), p. 201.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

in the Khorsabad List, would mean that the reign to which it applied fell within a fraction of time between the completion of a period already assigned in the list to a previous king and the antecedent actual date of that previous king's death.¹ And, on this interpretation, a reign characterized in the list by this formula would, after all, be chronologically equivalent to zero, as Poebel had assumed.

A layman who was incompetent to assess the philological pros and cons could at least appreciate Rowton's non-technical point that the formula was unlikely to be a circumlocution for a confession of ignorance or for a refusal to supply information, considering that, in recording the names of the first thirty-two of the kings in his series, the compiler of the Khorsabad List has frankly left a blank opposite each name, without giving either a figure for the length of the reign or a formula to cloak his ignorance of it. If he has thus frankly admitted his ignorance in these thirty-two cases, is it probable that he will have attempted to cloak it in eight other cases? The inference seems to be that the formula means, in Modern Western terms, not 'an unknown quantity', which presumably would have been indicated by a blank as before, but 'zero'.²

If we were to opt for Rowton's, as against Smith's, interpretation of the formula *ṭ/duppišu šarrūti ēpuš*, as well as for the view that the compiler of the Khorsabad List was reckoning throughout in solar years, it would follow that the Khorsabad List could be used as evidence for an approximate reconstruction of Assyrian chronology as far back as King Šamši-Adad I's reign; for, on these assumptions, the only unknown quantity would be the aggregate length of the two reigns Nos. 65 and 66, for which the durations originally recorded in the list had been lost to Modern Western scholarship owing to the accident that the piece of the clay tablet on which this information had originally been inscribed had been broken away before the tablet had been disinterred. Poebel's proposal to equate these two missing figures likewise with zero was unconvincing for two distinct reasons. In the first place, it seemed, *a priori*, improbable that precisely these two entries that had been lost through a physical accident should have happened originally to have been either 'blanks' or 'zeros' and not to have been figures for numbers of years, considering that, out of the 68 intact entries on the list, from king No. 33, whose reign is the first to be dated, down to king No. 107, with whose reign the list ends, not one is marked 'blank' and only eight are marked 'zero'.³ In the second place, if, in spite of this *a priori*

¹ This interpretation of the use of the *ṭuppu* formula in the Khorsabad King-List is advocated, not only by Rowton, but also by Van der Meer, P.: *The Ancient Chronology of Western Asia and Egypt* (Leiden 1947, Brill), p. 10.

² To express "zero" in this case that the missing figure is included in the figure given for the reign, an Assyrian scribe would have had to use a phrase of some sort, for the simple reason that he did not possess a sign for "zero" (see Neugebauer, O.: *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity* (Princeton 1951, University Press), pp. 16, 20, and 29.)—Mr. M. B. Rowton, in a note for the writer of this Study.

³ Mr. M. B. Rowton comments, in a letter of the 22nd January, 1952, to the writer of this Study: 'Apart from the purely mathematical improbability of the two missing reigns being *ṭuppu* reigns (the odds against are at least 60:8), there is also the genealogical factor. If these two reigns Nos. 65 and 66 are to be counted zero, then kings Nos. 61-71 reigned a total of only 79 years in six generations on the showing of Poebel's list in *J.N.E.S.*, vol. ii (1943), pp. 86 seqq. So far as I know, there is no similar instance in World History.'

improbability, Poebel's equation of the sum of the two lost entries with zero were to be accepted, one effect, as we shall see at later points in this note,¹ would be to synchronize chapters of Sumeric history and chapters of Egyptiac history which, in the light of our historical knowledge, would seem unlikely to have been contemporary with one another in truth. On these two grounds, Albright² had made an aggregate allowance of 20 years—which he afterwards extended to 22–27 years³—for the two missing figures, while Rowton had suggested⁴ an aggregate allowance of 32 years, on the ground that 'the average for a reign in the Ancient Near East is 16 years'. Albright's original allowance would raise Poebel's dating for Šamši-Adad I's reign from 1726–1694 B.C. to 1746–1714 B.C.; Rowton's would raise it to 1758–1726 B.C.

Since Šamši-Adad is known to have exercised a 21 years' domination over Mari immediately before the reign of Zimri-Lim there, and since Zimri-Lim is known to have been overthrown by Hammurabi of Babylon in the thirty-second year of Zimri-Lim's reign and in the thirty-fifth year of Hammurabi's, it will be seen that our choice between the alternative datings for Šamši-Adad's reign on the basis of the Khorsabad List will condition our choice between the alternative datings for Hammurabi's reign and in consequence for the whole epoch of the First Dynasty of Babylon. At the same time this synchronism would not suffice, in itself, to enable us to date Hammurabi's reign in terms of years B.C. with precision, since it was vitiated by two still unknown quantities. There was the unknown numerical value of the combined length of the two Assyrian reigns Nos. 65 and 66, which was assessed at 20 or 22–27 years by Albright and at 32 years by Rowton, and there was an uncertainty—not yet cleared up by any evidence forthcoming in the Mari Archives—about the synchronization of Šamši-Adad's reign (he reigned for 33 years as King of Assyria, according to the Khorsabad List) with Zimri-Lim's reign and with Hammurabi's.

The Chronological Significance of Ammi-šaduga's Venus Observations

In view of the failure of even the combined testimony of the Khorsabad List and the Mari Archives to yield a precise dating for Hammurabi's reign in terms of years B.C., it was fortunate that the approximate dating which, between them, they did yield could be narrowed down to the choice of a particular set of years B.C. by bringing to bear a piece of independent evidence—in the shape of observations of the planet Venus, recorded by Hammurabi's fourth successor, Ammi-šaduga, on tablets reporting omens—which restricted the possible choice of datings for the reigns of the kings of the First Dynasty of Babylon to a limited number of sets of years B.C. If these Venus observations had been the only evidence forthcoming, they would have been of no avail for chronological purposes. Dr. Sidney Smith points out⁵ that 'omens . . .

¹ See pp. 194 and 204, below.

² See Albright, W. F.: 'A Third Revision', p. 30, and his review of Dr. Sidney Smith's *Alalakh and Chronology* in *A. J. A.*, vol. xlvii, p. 491.

³ In a letter of the 20th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

⁴ In a note for the writer of this Study.

⁵ In *A. J. A.*, vol. xlix, No. 1, p. 19.

can only fix dates if on other grounds the reign of Ammi-šaduga can be limited to a period within a year or two of a possible astronomical solution of the date of observation'; and Sidney Smith's judgement on this astronomical point is endorsed by O. Neugebauer's,¹ who points out that 'the Ammi-šaduga observations . . . are not sufficient to decide by astronomical means between . . . at least five [chronological] possibilities [for the dating of Hammurabi's reign]'.² Neugebauer concludes that, while 'Astronomy requires for Hammurabi one of the years 1856, 1848, 1792, 1736 (and perhaps a few more dates in between, if we rearrange a little the choice of dates from the Venus tablets), . . . Archaeology and king-lists alone must suffice to date both the First Babylonian and the Twelfth Egyptian dynasties'.³

On Albright's and Rowton's view of the Khorsabad List of Kings of Assyria, this list, taken together with the Mari Archives, does provide—in spite of the uncertainty arising from the loss of the figures for reigns Nos. 65 and 66 and from the lack of evidence for an exact synchronization of Šamši-Adad's reign with Zimri-Lim's and with Hammurabi's—the independent historical evidence required for making use of the astronomical evidence provided by the Venus tablets; and these two scholars' approximate datings of Šamši-Adad's reign lead them, on the evidence of the Venus tablets, to take the astronomically admissible dating 1726–1684 B.C.⁴ as the exact dating of Hammurabi's reign. Sidney Smith, who is sceptical about the possibility of extracting chronological evidence from the Khorsabad King-List but finds alternative independent evidence in the stratification of artifacts disinterred on North Syrian and Aegean sites, opts, on this basis, for the likewise astronomically admissible dating 1792–1750 B.C.,⁵ which would imply the dating 1814–1782 B.C., at the latest,⁶ for the reign of King Šamši-Adad I of Assyria according to Dossin's interpretation, in A.D. 1950, of the internal chronology of the Mari Age.

This dating for this king would imply, in turn, on an interpretation of the Khorsabad List in which *tuppīšu* is taken to mean 'zero', that the two Assyrian reigns Nos. 65 and 66, for which the figures are missing in the Khorsabad List, had lasted for 88 years in the aggregate. This is not an impossible figure for the combined length of the reigns of a father and a son. A higher figure is credibly recorded as the length of the single reign of the Egyptian Emperor Pepi II.⁷ At the same time a hypothetical figure 88 is of so different an order of magnitude from the known average figure of 32⁸ years for the average length of a couple of reigns in the Ancient Near East that, while not impossible, it does

¹ See Neugebauer, O.: 'The Chronology of the Hammurabi Age', in *J.A.O.S.*, vol. lxi, pp. 58–61.

² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³ See p. 172, above.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁵ See p. 172, above.

⁶ Dr. Sidney Smith, in a letter of the 13th October, 1951, to the writer of this Study. In *A.J.A.*, vol. xlix, No. 1. (1945), p. 23, Dr. Smith suggests the slightly lower dating 1812/1811–1780/1779 B.C. for Šamši-Adad I's reign.

⁷ Dr. Smith, in a letter of the 13th October, 1951, to the writer of this Study, suggests that 'the reign of Asshur-rabi I [king No. 65] must have been a very long one to account for short reigns before and short reigns after'. Van der Meer, in op. cit., p. 11, suggests that Asshur-rabi I's reign must have been important, considering the posthumous references to it.

⁸ See p. 180, above.

seem highly improbable. This improbable figure does not, of course, exist for Dr. Sidney Smith himself, because he does not accept the interpretation of the Khorsabad List—equating *tuppišu* with ‘zero’—from which the figure arises; and in any case the improbability of the numerical value ‘88 years’ is not a conclusive argument—any more than the improbability of Poebel’s numerical value ‘zero’ for the pair of missing figures is—in favour of Albright’s and Rowton’s dating of Hammurabi (i.e. Dating (c)), considering that the numerical value ‘88’, as well as the numerical value ‘zero’, is not impossible, however unlikely.

The Relative Certainty of the Dating of the Egyptiac ‘Middle Empire’

If neither the Babylonian King Ammi-saduga’s Venus observations nor the Khorsabad List of Kings of Assyria provided conclusive evidence for passing judgement between Datings Nos. (b) and (c) for the First Dynasty of Babylon, the next recourse would be to see whether a decision between them could be reached on the basis of the chronology of Egyptiac history in the same age. The profitableness of this quest clearly depended on the answers to two questions. Was it possible to establish synchronisms between the chronology of South-West Asian history in this age and Egyptiac chronology? And, if this should prove to be possible, would it also be enlightening? In other words, was the chronology, in terms of years B.C., of Egyptiac history less in doubt—or, at any rate, less in dispute—in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era than the chronology of South-West Asian history was at the same date? It may be prudent to look into this second question first, since, if the answer to it were to prove to be in the negative, the first question would then be hardly worth examining.

In the Egyptian, as in the South-West Asian, field the astronomical evidence, in and by itself, appeared to be indecisive. For example, the astronomical statements in the Kahun papyri would equally well fit rival chronologies for the Twelfth Dynasty of Egypt which differed from one another by as much as one hundred years.¹ Moreover,

‘The chronology of Egypt before the Eleventh Dynasty remains completely uncertain; Eduard Meyer’s system for the early period has collapsed, and, with it, must go all attempt to be precise till there is more evidence.’²

‘For dates of the Sixth Dynasty and all earlier periods, the margin of uncertainty has to be reckoned in centuries.’³

On the other hand, it looked in A.D. 1937 as if

‘the approximate dates of the Twelfth Dynasty and later periods in Egyptian history have been established with a degree of probability which

¹ See Neugebauer, O.: ‘The Chronology of the Hammurabi Age’, in *J.A.O.S.*, vol. lxi, pp. 60–61, and Wood, L. H.: ‘The Kahun Papyrus and the Date of the Twelfth Dynasty’, in the *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, No. 99, October 1945, pp. 5–9.

² Smith, S., in *A.J.A.*, vol. xlix, No. 1, p. 24.

³ Edgerton, W. F.: ‘On the Chronology of the Early Eighteenth Dynasty (Amenhotep I to Thutmose III)’, in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, vol. liii, No. 3, April 1937, pp. 188–97. The sentence quoted will be found on p. 197.

comes very close to certainty, [even though] exact dates—not only months and days but exact years—must still be taken *cum grano salis*.¹

This last statement can be verified by comparing Edgerton's, Wood's, and Parker's² datings for reigns of Twelfth-Dynasty Egyptian emperors. Amenemhat (Amenemmes) I's first regnal year is placed by Edgerton³ somewhere between 1995 B.C. and 1970 B.C. and is tentatively equated by him with 1989 B.C., while it is reckoned by Wood to have begun on the 3rd January, 1991 B.C.⁴ and is equated by Parker with the year 1991 B.C. approximately.⁵ Senwosret (Sesostris) III's first regnal year is placed by Edgerton⁶ somewhere between 1882 B.C. and 1870 B.C. and is tentatively equated by him with 1876 B.C., while it is reckoned by Wood to have begun on the 6th December, 1879 B.C.,⁷ and is equated by Parker⁸ with the year 1878 B.C. approximately. A layman could have some confidence in feeling that he would not be very far astray from the correct correlation of the internal chronology of the Twelfth Dynasty of Egypt with years B.C. if he followed Albright⁹ in accepting both Wood's correlations and Edgerton's internal chronology, and in making the consequently necessary small adjustments of Edgerton's tentative table of dates in terms of years B.C., and if he then went on to follow Albright, Rowton, and Sidney Smith in taking Parker's subsequent conclusions as being virtually definitive.¹⁰ It was also reassuring to observe that these three Egyptologists, in papers published in A.D. 1942 and A.D. 1945 and in a book published in A.D. 1950, were in substantial agreement, not only with one another, but also with Eduard Meyer. Edgerton dates the total period of the Twelfth Dynasty *circa* 1989–1776 B.C.; Wood (by implication from his figures for the first years of Amenemhat (Amenemmes) I and Senwosret (Sesostris) III) *circa* 1991–1778 B.C.; Parker 1991–1786 B.C.; Meyer *circa* 2000–1788 B.C.¹¹ The conspicuously exceptional survival of Meyer's chronology¹² in this instance suggested

¹ Edgerton, *ibid.*, p. 197.

² See Parker, R. A.: *The Calendars of Ancient Egypt* (Chicago 1950, University of Chicago Press), p. 69.

³ See Edgerton, W. F.: 'Chronology of the Twelfth Dynasty', in the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. i (Chicago 1942, University of Chicago Press), pp. 306–314. See the table on p. 314.

⁴ See Wood, *ibid.*, p. 8.

⁶ See Edgerton, *ibid.*, p. 314.

⁸ In *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁵ In *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁷ In *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁹ See Albright in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 99, p. 13.

¹⁰ 'Parker's *The Calendars of Ancient Egypt* . . . not only far surpasses Meyer and Borchardt, but also reconstructs the chronology of the Twelfth Dynasty very solidly' (Professor Albright, in a letter of the 20th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study). 'I agree that Parker's work has settled the chronology of the Twelfth Dynasty in Egypt beyond reasonable doubt' (Mr. Rowton, in a note for the writer of this Study). 'Parker . . . has, to my mind, settled this question' [of lunar datings in Egyptian documents] (Dr. Sidney Smith, in a letter of the 13th October, 1951, to the writer of this Study). For a layman this emphatic consensus of the experts in favour of Parker's conclusions was as encouraging as it was impressive.

¹¹ See the present Study, I, i. 137 and V. vi. 192.

¹² Meyer's chronology for both the foundation of the Twelfth Dynasty and the previous political reunification of the whole Egyptian World by the prince Mentuhotep of the Eleventh Dynasty who commemorated this achievement by taking the title of 'Sam Tawi', 'the Uniter of the Two Lands', had been retained virtually unaltered by H. E. Winlock in 'The Eleventh Egyptian Dynasty' (*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. ii, No. 4, October 1943 (Chicago 1943, University of Chicago Press), pp. 249–83). In this paper, Winlock, like Meyer, equates Amenemhat I's first regnal year with 2000 B.C. (p. 283); he reckons that Mentuhotep 'Sam Tawi's' reunification of the Egyptian World

to a layman's mind in A.D. 1952 that the evidence at the disposal of the Modern Western science of Egyptology for the dating of the Twelfth Dynasty in terms of years B.C. must have been more or less adequate since as far back as the beginning of the twentieth century of the Christian Era; and in this light it did not seem over-sanguine to take Parker's dating of the Twelfth Dynasty in terms of years B.C. as a more or less assured chronological landmark, and to go on to conclude that the chronology of all the subsequent chapters of Egyptiac history was likewise fairly well established in its main outlines—whatever doubts might still remain about the location and duration of some individual reigns or about the relations of certain reigns (especially Thothmes II's, Hatshepsut's, and Thothmes III's) to one another.

The Picture Presented by the Mari Archives and by Babylonian Documents dating from the Reign of Hammurabi

We may now look at the picture of South-West Asia as this presents itself to us in the Mari Archives, in Babylonian documents produced by, or during the reign of, Hammurabi, and in such other contemporary information about this chapter of South-West Asian history as had been disinterred by the middle of the twentieth century of the Christian Era. When we have seen what this picture is, we may be able to make out how the Age of Hammurabi and its sequel, the remaining 155 years of the life of the First Dynasty of Babylon from the first regnal year of Hammurabi's immediate successor Samsu-iluna down to the year in which his last successor Samsu-ditana was overthrown by the Hittite war-lord Muršiliš I, can or cannot be made to fit in with the apparently more or less secure framework of Egyptiac chronology in and after the Age of the Twelfth Dynasty of Egypt.

The picture of South-West Asia in the Age of Hammurabi is a clear one. At the opening of this age at the date, twenty-seven years before that of Hammurabi's accession, at which the Mari Archives begin, South-West Asia is still partitioned among successor-states of a universal state—'the Empire of Sumer and Akkad', *alias* 'the Empire of the Four Quarters'—which had been founded by Ur Nammu (formerly transliterated as Ur-Engur) of Ur and had broken up after the overthrow of Ur Nammu's fourth successor, Ibši-Sin (Ibi-Sin), by Elamite rebels.¹ At the opening of the present chapter there are nine Great Powers in

was within sight of completion in 2061 B.C. (p. 266); and he dates this prince's total reign 2070–2019 B.C. (p. 261). In a later work, however, *The Rise and Fall of the Middle Kingdom in Thebes* (New York 1947, Macmillan), Winlock adopts Wood's chronology (see pp. 8–9, together with the chronological table on p. 2). In this work, Winlock dates Mentuhotep 'Sam Tawi's' accession 2061 B.C.; his reunification of the Egyptiac World 2052 B.C.; and his death 2010 B.C. Thus, in A.D. 1952, there appeared to be a consensus among Egyptologists in favour of a chronology for the Eleventh and Twelfth Dynasties of Egypt that put the initial dates nine years lower than they had been put by Eduard Meyer. The terminal date for the Twelfth Dynasty was, nevertheless, placed by R. A. Parker only two years lower than it had been placed by Eduard Meyer (i.e. was placed by Parker in 1886 B.C. instead of in 1888 B.C.), since Parker emended the Turin Papyrus's figure 213 years for the total span of the Twelfth Dynasty to the figure 223, and thus arrived at the figure 206 years for the net total span—reckoning that 17 regnal years out of the aggregate 223 were years in which two reigns were overlapping, in consequence of the Twelfth Dynasty's institution of co-regencies (see Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–69).

¹ See V. vi. 297.

the South-West Asian arena—Elam, Larsa, Eshnunna (in North-Eastern Shinar), Assyria, Isin (in Central Shinar), Babylon, Mari (on the Middle Euphrates, extending north-westward as far as the valley of the River Balikh), Carchemish (on the west bank of the westward elbow of the Euphrates), and Aleppo (alias Yamkhad)¹—together with a number of lesser states for whose allegiance the Great Powers are in competition.² The Sumeric Great Powers of the day are concerned, not with any external threats to the Sumeric Society as a whole, either from a neighbouring civilization or from barbarians, but with a domestic rivalry with one another. The competition between them is intense; and the period culminates in a successful attempt to reintegrate Ur-Nammu's 'Empire of the Four Quarters' through the annihilation of all but one of the parochial Powers by a single victorious survivor which thereby attains to universal dominion.

This political reunification of the Sumeric World by force of arms, which is the work of the Amorite King Hammurabi of Babylon, is preceded by an abortive bout of aggression on a smaller scale in which the would-be empire-builders are the Amorite King Šamši-Adad I of Assyria (king No. 39 in the Khorsabad List) and his sons Išme-Dagan (No. 40) and Yasmakh-Adad.³ They manage to dominate Mari for twenty-one years (the tenth to the thirtieth year inclusive of the years covered by the Mari Archives); and, on one interpretation of one piece of evidence, Eshnunna, too, is temporarily under their rule.⁴ These Amorite war-lords' imperialism is frustrated by the reinstatement, at Mari, of the previous local dynasty in the person of King Zimri-Lim; but, after an Amorite ruler of Assyria has thus failed, an Amorite ruler of Babylon is subsequently successful in achieving wider ambitions. As early as the seventh and eighth years of his reign, King Hammurabi of Babylon has already conquered and annexed Isin;⁵ and now, after having bided his time for twenty-two years, he proceeds to establish control over most of his other rivals in a series of nine successive annual campaigns, waged from his thirtieth to his thirty-eighth year inclusive.⁶ Assyria (whose power it takes him two campaigns to bend), Larsa, Mari, and Eshnunna—in fact, all the surviving Powers in the South-West Asian arena except Aleppo (Yamkhad) in the extreme

¹ See Böhl, op. cit., pp. 346 and 353.

² See the letter, quoted by Böhl, *ibid.*, pp. 352–3, and by Sidney Smith in *Alalakh*, p. 11, addressed to King Zimri-Lim of Mari by one of his subjects. This letter enumerates five Powers besides Mari—namely Babylon, Larsa, Eshnunna, Yamkhad (i.e. Aleppo), and Qatana. It explicitly makes the two points that each of these Powers has a number of satellites and that, among the Great Powers themselves, there is a Balance of Power which fluctuates in accordance with the success or failure of each Power in a perennial competition for winning the lesser states' allegiance.

³ See Böhl, *ibid.*, p. 346. King Šamši-Adad I of Assyria was, not an Assyrian, but, like Hammurabi, an Amorite (see Dossin G.: 'Šamši-Addu I^{er}, Roi d'Assyrie', in *Académie Royale de la Belgique: Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres*, 5^e Série, tome xxxiv, p. 60).

⁴ Professor Goetze comments: 'The opinion that Eshnunna was dominated by Šamši-Adad is based on the date found on tablets from Ashjaly which say "Year in which Šamši-Adad died." The argument is invalid, since in the same region whole series of dates commemorating the deaths of potentates have come to light... One can only assume that it was a custom at this period to mention the passing of the ruler in a neighbouring state in a date formula.'

⁵ See Böhl, *ibid.*, p. 353.

⁶ See *ibid.* pp. 346 and 353–4.

North-West¹ and Elam in the extreme South-East—fall under the control of Babylon within these nine years. Hammurabi rounds off these victories over other Sumeric Powers by subjugating Gutium,² the strategically vital section of the western mountain rim of the Iranian Plateau through which, between Elam to the south of it and Assyria to the north of it, runs the road (skirting the rock of Behistan) up which a conqueror from the Tigris-Euphrates Basin pushes his way eastward on to the plateau, and down which a barbarian perched on the plateau descends westward upon the lowlands.³

The Nemesis of Hammurabi's Imperialism

For a student of History, Hammurabi's feat of getting the better of four rival Powers within nine years is reminiscent of Ts'in She Hwang-ti's feat of overthrowing six rival Powers within ten years, while Hammurabi's inordinate sacrifice of blood and treasure on the altar of the archaistic ideal of re-establishing a universal state that has long since been in abeyance is reminiscent of the costly campaigns in North-West Africa, Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula that Justinian conducted in pursuit of the objective of recovering for the Roman Empire the outlying western provinces that had been lost by this Hellenic universal state after the death of Theodosius I. In view of the nemesis which overtook both Justinian's and Ts'in She Hwang-ti's achievement within a few years of the baneful world-conqueror's death, it is not surprising to see the same nemesis overtake the same perverse *tour de force* when Hammurabi is the hero—or villain—of the piece.

In fact, Hammurabi's, like Justinian's and Ts'in She Hwang-ti's, immediate successor reaped the whirlwind.

"These conquests did not last longer than half [*sic*] a dozen years: the last four years of Hammurabi himself and the first eight years of his successor Samsu-iluna."⁴

The superficially reintegrated 'Empire of Sumer and Akkad' was disrupted from within, during Samsu-iluna's reign, by the secession of a 'Kingdom of the Sealand';⁵ and

'the date-formula for the ninth year of Samsu-iluna, "Year that the Kassite Army . . .," even in the abbreviated form which is all that is recorded, shows that a Kassite invasion, the only one mentioned in any document,⁶ took place in Samsu-iluna's eighth year.'⁷

In invading Gutium without pushing on to a natural frontier, Hammurabi of Babylon had committed the same military and political error as his predecessor Naramsin of Akkad.⁸ He had given the highland

¹ Mr. D. J. Wiseman, of the Department of Assyrian and Egyptian Antiquities in the British Museum, points out the importance of Yamkhad in the South-West Asia of this age as the Warden of 'the Fertile Crescent's' north-western marches against the barbarians from the Anatolian highlands.

² See Böhl, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

³ For this road, see VI. vii. 205-6 and 210, n. 3.

⁴ Böhl, *ibid.*, p. 354. Cp. pp. 346-7.

⁵ See Smith, S.: *Alalakh*, pp. 18-19.

⁶ Professor Albrecht Goetze notes: 'A Kassite invasion is also mentioned in the formula of the fourth year of Samsu-iluna's son Abi-ešuh; see now *J.C.S.*, vol. v (1951), p. 99.'

⁷ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁸ See I. i. 109.

barbarians provocation without subjugating them effectively, and the sequel in both cases was a barbarian avalanche.¹ In the second millennium B.C. the Kassite barbarian highlanders reacted as the Gutaean barbarian highlanders had reacted in the third millennium. The Kassites were the beneficiaries of Hammurabi's work in Shinar, as the Lombards were of Justinian's work in Italy; and, when, after a social interregnum, the curtain rises in the fifteenth century B.C. on a nascent Babylonian World, we find the whole of Babylonia under Kassite domination.² Nor are these Kassite residuary legatees of Hammurabi's empire in its metropolitan provinces the only barbarians who have profited from the collapse precipitated by Hammurabi's excessive expenditure of a moribund Sumeric Society's remaining stock of energy. The Kassite successor-state of a momentarily restored Empire of Sumer and Akkad in Babylonia marches in the fifteenth century with a Mitannian successor-state in Mesopotamia, with its centre in the basin of the River Khabur; and, though Hammurabi's victim Assyria, unlike Hammurabi's own imperial Babylon, has succeeded in keeping herself free from direct barbarian rule, the fifteenth century finds Assyria standing at bay, almost encircled by Mitannian territory and perhaps at times compelled to acknowledge Mitanni's overlordship.³

An Egyptiac Chronological Framework for the 210 Years of South-West Asian History Running from the Earliest of the Letters in the Diplomatic Correspondence of King Šamši-Adad I of Assyria down to the Hittite War-Lord Muṣṣiliš I's Raid on Babylon

We now have to examine how the more or less well-established framework of Egyptiac chronology will accommodate a phase of South-West Asian history covering, in the aggregate, a span of about 210 years, made up of the last 12 years covered by the Mari Archives before Hammurabi's first regnal year,⁴ the 43 years of Hammurabi's reign, and the 155 years, ending in the year of Muṣṣiliš's sack of Babylon, during which the First Dynasty of Babylon lingered on after Hammurabi's death. In order to fit into our approximately established correlation of Egyptiac chronology with years B.C., any correlation of these 210 years of South-West Asian history with years B.C. has to fulfil four conditions. The initial date (i.e. the date at which Šamši-Adad I's diplomatic

¹ Mr. M. B. Rowton comments: 'The military forces capable of defending [the Lower Tigris-Euphrates Basin] against the barbarians were the national armies of the major city-states. Hammurabi destroyed as many of these as he destroyed city-states. In place of them he had only his own troops to oppose the barbarians, and unavoidably these came to be over-extended. In the conquered territories a good part of the male population would have gone into slavery, and, among the remainder, bitterness would be too great, for at least a generation, to make it feasible for the Babylonian Government to take the risk of enlisting them on any large scale in its own forces.'

² See I. i. 116.

³ See Götze (Goetze), A.: *Hethiter, Churriter und Assyrer* (Leipzig 1936, Harrassowitz), pp. 98-99 and 116-17.

⁴ The Mari Archives extend backwards in time over the twenty-seven years preceding Hammurabi's first regnal year, but the particular correspondence in these archives that has a bearing on the current state of relations between the Sumeric World and the Egyptiac World is the diplomatic correspondence of King Šamši-Adad I of Assyria, and, while this appears to extend over at least the last ten years before Hammurabi's accession, there seems to be no warrant for supposing that any of the extant documents in this series date from much farther back than that.

correspondence begins) must be later than the latest date of the Twelfth Dynasty of Egypt's effective ascendancy over Syria; the terminal date (i.e. the date of Muršiliš I's sack of Babylon) must be earlier than the earliest date of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt's continuous effective ascendancy over Syria; the date of this Hittite King Muršiliš I's reign must be sufficiently earlier than the date of Muršiliš I's eventual successor Suppiluliuma's Egyptian contemporary Ikhnaton's reign to allow the necessary time for the series of known events in Hittite history between Muršiliš I's time and Suppiluliuma's; and the date of Hammurabi's death must be earlier than the date of the arrival of a Hyksos barbarian war-band at the north-eastern corner of the Nile Delta, if the Hyksos were by then already equipped with horse-drawn chariots. The grounds for postulating these conditions must be explained and justified before the conditions can be used as criteria for trying to judge between the four rival datings of the First Dynasty of Babylon that were in the arena in A.D. 1952.

The Twelfth Dynasty's Ascendancy over Syria and the Dating of Šamši-Adad I's Diplomatic Correspondence

Most scholars who had studied the Mari Archives down to A.D. 1952 seemed to have been struck by the absence in them of references to Egypt, and to have taken the view that in this case an *argumentum ex silentio* was a legitimate inference.¹ Considering that cuneiform tablets, discovered in the Balikh Valley and dating from the period of Šamši-Adad's ascendancy over Mari, testified that the domain of this principality in this chapter of its history had come as close to Syria as this,² the date at which Šamši-Adad I's diplomatic correspondence begins—and, *a fortiori*, the date at which this King of Assyria, who was master of Mari from the tenth to the thirtieth of the sixty-two years that the Archives cover, marched across Syria to the Mediterranean³—must, it might seem, have been later than the latest date at which the Twelfth Dynasty of Egypt's ascendancy over Syria had still been effective.

¹ See, for example, W. F. Albright, 'New Light', in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 77, pp. 27 and 31, and O. Neugebauer in *J.A.O.S.*, vol. lxi, p. 58. This negative testimony of the Mari Archives appeared to be supported by the positive evidence of Archaeology.

'Si Hammourabi avait été un contemporain des premiers pharaons de la xii^e dynastie, comment les Sésostris et Amenémhat qui avaient envoyé des cadeaux diplomatiques à Ugarit, à Qatna et même plus loin au Nord, en Asie Mineure, auraient-ils pu ignorer des centres de culture et de politique aussi importants que ceux de Babylone et de Mari? Comment expliquer aussi que ces centres, qui selon les textes de Mari avaient acheté des produits originaires de pays aussi éloignés que la Crète, soient restés dans l'ignorance de la grande culture de la vallée du Nil au temps du Moyen Empire? Enfin, comment expliquer qu'à l'occasion de l'importation des produits égéens à Mari et en Babylonie par l'intermédiaire d'Ugarit alors saturée d'influences égyptiennes, aucun monument égyptien du Moyen Empire ne soit parvenu dans ces pays, alors qu'ils y furent importés du temps du Nouvel Empire?'—Schaeffer, C.F.A.: *Stratigraphie Comparée et Chronologie de l'Asie Occidentale* (iii^e et ii^e millénaires) (London 1948, Oxford University Press), p. 29.

² This piece of information was given to the writer by Mr. M. B. Rowton on the 6th October, 1952.

³ See Smith, S.: *Alalakh*, pp. 12 and 15. 'The peak of Šamši-Adad's power, evidenced by his raid to the Mediterranean, will probably have been reached toward the end of his reign.'—Professor Albrecht Goetze, in a note enclosed with a letter of the 13th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

This conclusion was rejected by Professor Goetze:

"The argument that Egypt ought to be mentioned in the Mari documents [if these are contemporary with the Twelfth Dynasty] does not impress me. If the fact [that Egypt is not mentioned in them] is to be acknowledged, it simply confirms [the evidence indicating] the limitations of Egyptian power, which falls short of the expectations of many among us. I personally feel that not even Sesostris (Senwosret) III exercised political power in Syria, and that his influence on towns like Ugarit was merely diplomatic and cultural. . . . The deductions made by Sidney Smith, *Alalakh*, pp. 13 ff., from certain Egyptianizing seals are completely unconvincing. There is no evidence which would show to my satisfaction that any pharaoh of the Twelfth Dynasty ruled over Alalakh or Yamkhad/Aleppo. . . . My scepticism concerning the Twelfth Dynasty has steadily mounted.¹

Professor Goetze pointed out that Wilson² took the view that the Twelfth Dynasty of Egypt had gained its influence in Syria, not by military conquest, but by 'peaceful penetration', and that Wilson was not alone in holding that opinion.³ This account of the nature of the Twelfth Dynasty's standing in Syria was, however, contested by Professor Albright.⁴

'Goetze, as you know, places the reign of Zimri-Lim (the Mari period proper) roughly about 1850-1820 B.C. This cannot be squared with the Theban Empire of Senwosret (Sesostris) III and Amenemhat (Amenemes) III. It is true that some scholars want to depress the estimates held by many of us with respect to Egyptian power and prestige during this period, insisting that there was no real empire. They forget that (except for the Execration Texts and a few other items) our knowledge of the Theban imperial domination of Nubia comes chiefly from discoveries in Nubia and the region of the First Cataract. Similarly our knowledge of the Egyptian empire in Asia will have to come from excavations in Palestine and Syria. Very few strata of this period have actually been uncovered, but, where they have been reached, Egyptian objects invariably turn up. This is true of Gezer, Megiddo, &c., in Palestine, and also of Byblos, Qatna, and Ugarit in [Northern] Syria. As the Posener Execration Texts prove (and you mention),⁵ the northern limit of Egyptian suzerainty (however desultory the defence of this line may have been) ran approximately along the Eleutherus Valley inland, dipping south to pass through the northern border of the territory of Damascus. Even in the time of the Thirteenth Dynasty there was still some semblance of unity under the first kings and under the kings from Sebek-hotep II to Sebek-hotep IV, including especially Nefer-hotep, who was still nominal overlord of Byblos about 1740-1730 B.C.⁶ In fact there were only a few years before about 1720 B.C. in which Egypt was actually in a state of anarchy and from which no monuments are preserved. This was a flourishing period in literature,

¹ Remarks enclosed with a letter of the 13th November, 1951, from Professor Goetze to the writer of this Study.

² In *The Burden of Egypt*, p. 134.

³ 'Similar views have recently been expressed by A. Scharff in Scharff, A., and Moortgat, A.: *Ägypten und Vorderasien im Altertum* (Munich 1950, Bruckmann), pp. 106 ff., and by R. Dussaud in *L'Art Phénicien du II^e Millénaire* (Paris 1949, Geuthner), pp. 25 ff.'—Professor Goetze, *ibid*.

⁴ In a letter of the 20th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

⁵ See p. 191 below.—A.J.T.

⁶ See Albright, W. F.: 'An Indirect Synchronism between Egypt and Mesopotamia circa 1730 B.C.', in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 99 (1945), pp. 9-18.—A.J.T.

and the art of the period was not entirely negligible. Certainly Egyptian wares were still being exported (e.g., scarabs). If we follow Sidney Smith's chronology¹ and date the Mari period proper about 1790-1760 B.C., we shall find ourselves in the last decade or so of the Twelfth Dynasty and the first generation of the Thirteenth. It is incredible that Egypt should not be mentioned and that Egyptian objects should not be found in Mari during this period (when Egyptian influence was so strong at Byblos, just before and after the end of the Twelfth Dynasty). The Mari records mention Ugarit and Qatna often, Byblos and Hazor in Galilee less often, Cyprus and Crete frequently; they would simply have to mention Egypt unless this period was precisely the generation when Egyptian influence had been reduced to zero by the nomadic Semites who had seized power in the Delta and Lower Egypt generally (no monuments of the later kings of the Thirteenth Dynasty appear north of Upper Egypt).'

It will be seen that the advocates of Dating (c) and of Dating (a) differ *in toto* in their respective estimates of the degree of an Egyptiac 'Middle Empire's' visibility above the horizon of a Power bestriding the Middle Euphrates as far north-westwards as the valley of its tributary the Balikh. Whereas Goetze estimates that 'the Middle Empire's' presence in Syria might have been ignored at Mari even at the height of the Twelfth Dynasty's power, Albright estimates that it could never have been ignored till a stage in the decline and fall of the Twelfth Dynasty's epigoni which was not reached till more than a hundred years after the date of Senwosret (Sesostris) III's death. Böhl, for his part, apparently cannot satisfy himself that Egypt could have been ignored at Mari before the arrival of the Hyksos barbarian invaders of Egypt at the north-east corner of the Nile Delta;² and this seems to be one of his grounds for his dating of Hammurabi's reign as late as 1704-1662 B.C. (i.e. for his adoption of Dating (d)).

Böhl's post-Hyksos dating of the Mari Archives is a *reductio ad absurdum* if, as is argued below, there are other considerations that might indicate that the Hyksos could hardly have made their first lodgement in the Delta while Hammurabi was still alive.³ Moreover, even Dating (d) would not have the effect of making Šamši-Adad's diplomatic correspondence posterior to the establishment of the Hyksos in the Delta unless we accepted, for this event in Egyptiac history, the earliest of several alternative datings for it that range over a Time-span of more than fifty years (between *circa* 1730 and *circa* 1675 B.C.).⁴ An amateur observer of this chronological controversy might feel inclined to reject both the two extremes represented by Böhl's and Goetze's respective theses; and he would also notice that the one point on which there seemed to be some agreement among otherwise dissentient experts was a prevalent impression that the decline in 'the Middle Empire's' standing in Syria had been a gradual process. At what stage in the process had the decline reached a degree at which it would be credible that, in the diplomatic correspondence of a Power astride the

¹ i.e. Dating (b). This argument of Professor Albright's would, of course, militate, *a fortiori*, against Dating (a), which Professor Goetze advocates.—A.J.T.

² See Böhl, *op. cit.*, pp. 348 and 352.

³ See p. 198, below.

⁴ See p. 197, below

Middle Euphrates, the Egyptian factor in international affairs would make no mark? In A.D. 1952 most of the experts seemed to agree that 'the Middle Empire's' standing in Syria (whatever its precise status there may have been) was already past its zenith at least as early as the morrow of Amenemhat (Amenemmes) III's death *circa* 1797 B.C. but was still at its height down to the date of Senwosret (Sesostris) III's death *circa* 1843 B.C. The open question, on which there was as yet no consensus, was that of the political situation in Syria during the reign of Amenemhat (Amenemmes) III (*imperabat circa* 1842-1797 B.C.).

At its apogee, the ascendancy of the Egyptian Middle Empire had extended over the North Syrian principalities of Byblos on the coast, Alalakh on the Orontes, and Yamkhad between the elbows of the Orontes and the Euphrates, as was attested by the evidence of the disinterred monuments.¹ Before the end of Amenemhat (Amenemmes) III's reign, however, Byblos—and therefore presumably *a fortiori* the interior of North Syria—had become independent.² On the other hand the effective maintenance of Egyptian rule over South and Middle Syria during at least the earlier years of Amenemhat (Amenemmes) III's forty-nine-years-long reign seemed to be attested by lists of place-names and personal names inscribed on figurines, preserved at Brussels, which Albright dates in the third quarter of the nineteenth century B.C.; for the place-names here mentioned cover Western Palestine and Phoenicia as far north as the River Eleutherus (*Arabice* Nahr-al-Kabir)—i.e. farther north than Byblos—on the coast, and Northern Gilead, the Hawrān and Damascus in the interior, while in the Baqā' they extend as far north as Rās Ba'lbak, forty miles south of Homs.³ Sidney Smith concedes⁴ that 'the recession of Egyptian power was slow. The monuments at Rās ash-Shamrah imply [Egyptian] control of Ugarit in the time of Amenemhat III. There is no valid ground for believing that Egyptian weakness began till the dynastic troubles set in after his death, and Egypt's footing in Asia was not completely lost till about twenty years after the death of Nefer-hotep.' He comes to the conclusion that 'the domination of the Twelfth Dynasty of Egypt in Syria ceased some time in the reign of Amenemhat III'.⁵ Goetze, however, while admitting, in deference to the *argumentum a silentio*, that the initial date of the Mari Archives must be later than the end of the reign of Senwosret (Sesostris) III, maintains⁶ that the absence in them of any reference to the Egyptian World is compatible with a dating of them that would place their beginning as early as the beginning of Amenemhat (Amenemmes) III's reign.

In face of this disagreement among the experts, the most prudent course in A.D. 1952 for a layman was to assume provisionally that the

¹ See Smith, S.: *Alalakh*, pp. 13-15.

² See Albright, F. W.: 'The Land of Damascus between 1850 and 1750 B.C.', in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 83 (New Haven, October 1941), p. 32; *eundem*: 'An Indirect Synchronism between Egypt and Mesopotamia *circa* 1730 B.C.', *ibid.*, No. 99, October 1945, p. 17, n. 52.

³ See Albright, in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 83, pp. 32-33.

⁴ In a letter of the 13th October, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

⁵ *Alalakh*, p. 29.

⁶ In the paper read by him before the American Oriental Society at Cincinnati at Easter time, 1950.

most probable approximate upper limit for the dating of our problematical 210 years of South-West Asian history was the mid-point of Amenemhat (Amenemmes) III's reign *circa* 1820–1819 B.C., while recognizing that, alternatively, this upper limit might be as high as 1842 B.C. or as low as 1797 B.C. This would make 1792–1750 B.C. (Dating (b)) the highest probable of the several astronomically possible datings for the reign of Hammurabi, since, on this dating, the earliest letters in Šamši-Adad's diplomatic correspondence would be dated *circa* 1804 B.C.; and 1595 B.C. would then be the date of Muršiliš I's raid on Babylon, though, as far as the Twelfth-Dynasty Egyptian evidence went, these dates might be either as high as 1842 B.C. for the beginning of Šamši-Adad's correspondence, 1830–1788 B.C. for Hammurabi's reign, and 1623 B.C. for the raid on Babylon, or as low as 1797 B.C., 1785–1743 B.C. and 1588 B.C., if we were to agree that the moment at which Egypt disappeared from view below Mari's diplomatic horizon might have been at any point in Amenemhat (Amenemmes) III's forty-six-years-long reign (*circa* 1842–1797 B.C.).

It will be seen that, even if we were to admit the feasibility of dating Šamši-Adad's correspondence at the very opening of Amenemhat III's reign, this would still rule out Dating (a), whereas we could set the date of Šamši-Adad's correspondence as late as a median point in Amenemhat III's reign without thereby ruling out Dating (b). On the other hand, if we were to hold that Šamši-Adad's correspondence, in which Egypt is ignored, could not have begun till after Amenemhat III's death, this judgement would rule out Dating (b) as well as Dating (a), as was pointed out by Rowton.¹

'The highest theoretical limit is, as you say, 1842 B.C., since Amenemhat III is attested at Ras ash-Shamrah. Goetze's chronology would place the accession of Hammurabi *circa* 1850 B.C. and the end of Egyptian domination in Syria not later than 1860 B.C. Smith's chronology yields *circa* 1805 B.C. for the latter event, and therefore comes within the limits, as you point out. But it requires the postulate that the Egyptian domination in Syria ended during the reign of the powerful Amenemhat III (cp. *Alalakh*, p. 29). There is no evidence for this, and it certainly cannot be regarded as *a priori* probable. The fact that at Ras ash-Shamrah the monuments of Amenemhat III (and others) were deliberately damaged shows that his domination there was resented and was therefore very real.'

If Dating (b), as well as Dating (a), was held, on these grounds, to be inadmissible, Dating (c), by contrast, would be compatible with the longest estimate of the duration of 'the Middle Empire's' influence in Syria; for, according to Dating (c), Šamši-Adad's correspondence would not have started before *circa* 1740 B.C., i.e. about half a century after Amenemhat III's death.

The Eighteenth Dynasty's Ascendancy over Syria and the Dating of Muršiliš I's Raid on Babylon

How early was the Eighteenth Dynasty's ascendancy over Syria effectively established? A dominion extending to the Euphrates is

¹ In a note enclosed with a letter of the 20th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

claimed by Thothmes (Tuthmosis) I in an inscription dated in the second year of his reign; and, since he does not expressly claim to have won this dominion for himself, it is possible that he may have inherited it from one of his predecessors. While it is held to be improbable that any permanent lodgement in Asia, any farther north than Palestine, had been made by the cautious founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty, Amosis, there is no evidence to disprove, though there is also none to prove, that the ascendancy over the whole of Syria up to the Euphrates, which Thothmes I claims to be exercising, was achieved by Amosis' immediate successor and Thothmes I's immediate predecessor Amenhotep (Amenophis) I.¹ If we take Thothmes I's claim at its face value, and if we adopt Wilson's datings of these reigns² (and his datings were among the lowest estimates current at the time of writing), we can take it as certain that Muršiliš I's raid on Babylon cannot have been later than Thothmes I's accession in 1525 B.C., and possible that it was not later than some date in the reign of Amenhotep I, who, according to Wilson, was on the throne from 1545 to 1525 B.C. Muršiliš I's sack of Babylon cannot have occurred after the establishment of a continuous effective ascendancy over the north of Syria by the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt, since, in this dynasty's records, there is no mention of that historic Hittite campaign and indeed no mention of Muršiliš I at all; and, considering that Muršiliš I not only sacked Babylon but claims to have overthrown the Kingdom of Aleppo,³

'it is incredible that . . . when Egypt was in nominal control of Syria as far as the Euphrates . . . the Egyptian inscriptions should fail to mention the Hittites at a time when, under Muršiliš I, the latter had conquered Syria and Western Mesopotamia.'⁴

This would mean that, if Thothmes (Tuthmosis) I did in truth exercise even a nominal control over Syria as far as the Euphrates, the lowest correlation of our 210 years of Sumeric history with years B.C. that our Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian chronological framework would allow would be 1733-1524 B.C. (i.e. the 210 years immediately preceding Thothmes I's second regnal year according to Wilson's reckoning). It would also mean that, as far as the evidence of Egyptian history went, we should not be entirely sure of our ground unless we dated our 210 years of South-West Asian history as high as 1755-1546 B.C. (i.e. the 210 years immediately preceding the accession of Amenhotep (Amenemmes) I, according to Wilson's reckoning).

There seemed, however, to be no warrant for taking Thothmes (Tuthmosis) I's claim seriously enough to venture to use it confidently as evidence for chronological purposes. The only piece of corroborative evidence known to Western scholars in A.D. 1952 was Thothmes (Tuthmosis) III's statement, in his record of the campaign in the thirty-third year of his own reign in which he reached the westward elbow of

¹ See the discussion of this point in Drioton, E., and Vandier, J.: *L'Égypte* (Paris 1946, Presses Universitaires de France), p. 381.

² See Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), p. vii.

³ See Smith, S.: *Alalakh*, pp. 12-13.

⁴ Albright, W. F., in *A.J.A.*, vol. xlvii, p. 492.

the Euphrates and made a raid across the river, that he set up a stele on the west bank side by side with a stele of Thothmes I's which he found standing there. This testimony of Thothmes III's would prove that Thothmes I, or one of his lieutenants, had once penetrated thus far into Asia and had staked out a boundary for the Egyptian Empire at the 'natural frontier' provided by the course of the Euphrates where it approaches nearest to the shore of the Mediterranean. But this would be no evidence that either Thothmes I himself or any successor of his before Thothmes III had ever held this line effectively or continuously. Indeed, the systematic conquest of Syria which Thothmes III carried out by stages over a total period of twelve years, running from the twenty-second to the thirty-third year of his reign, is presumptive evidence that Syria was not under effective Egyptian control during at any rate the immediately preceding chapter of history, when the Empress Hatshepsut was in power; and, on this showing, while we need not doubt that the Euphrates had once been reached by an expeditionary force led or sent by Thothmes I, we cannot be sure that North Syria, up to the line of the Euphrates, had ever been effectively occupied or continuously held by the New Empire of Egypt at any date before the thirty-third year of the reign of Thothmes III. Since Wilson dates Thothmes III's reign 1490-1436 B.C., this means that the evidence of Egyptian history does not unequivocally preclude our dating our 210 years of South-Western Asian history as low as 1668-1458 B.C. (i.e. the 210 years immediately preceding the thirty-third year of the reign of Thothmes III).

It will be seen that the ascendancy of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt over Syria fails to provide us with a decisive chronological criterion for the dating of our 210 years of South-West Asian history because the facts about this episode of Egyptian history that had been brought to light by Western scholars were, down to A.D. 1952, still so fragmentary that there was at that time a margin of no less than eighty-seven years between the earliest (1546 B.C.) and the latest (1459 B.C.) theoretically possible datings for the latest year B.C. in which Muršiliš I's raid on Babylon might fall without conflicting with Egyptian chronological data. If the Eighteenth Dynasty's ascendancy over Syria up to the Euphrates was the work of Amenhotep I at the beginning of his reign *circa* 1545 B.C., this would rule out the two Datings (*d*) and (*c*) of the four rival datings of South-West Asian history, which date Muršiliš I's raid 1507 B.C. and 1531/30 B.C. respectively, but would not be incompatible with either Dating (*b*), which dates the raid 1595 B.C., or, *a fortiori*, with Dating (*a*), which dates it 1651 B.C. If, on the other hand, the Eighteenth Dynasty's dominion in Syria had been extended up to the Euphrates only just before the second year of Thothmes I's reign *circa* 1523 B.C., this would still rule out Dating (*d*), but would now just allow of Dating (*c*), and would, indeed, provide some presumptive evidence in favour of Dating (*c*) by suggesting that there might have been a relation of cause and effect between these two closely consecutive events; for, if the date of Muršiliš I's raid did immediately precede the date of the extension of the Eighteenth Dynasty's dominion up to the

Euphrates, it would be a plausible conjecture that *post hoc* signified *propter hoc* in this case. The Hittite raid on Babylon via Aleppo would have been the event that stimulated the Imperial Government at Thebes (so we might reconstruct the story) to push its frontier forward from some point in Palestine to a 'natural frontier', along the western elbow of the Euphrates, where the Theban Power would be in a position to prevent any repetition of the Hittite Power's alarming performance.¹

Moreover, even if the Egyptian ascendancy in North Syria in Thothmes I's reign was little more than nominal, it seemed unlikely that, once the claim to it had been asserted in an official inscription and been staked out on the spot by the erection of a stele, it could have been flouted at any subsequent date in Thothmes I's reign by a Hittite raid on Aleppo without this producing reactions on the Egyptian side which would have left some trace on the disinterred Egyptiac records of the period, defective though these records were. We cannot, however, feel so confident that Muršiliš I's raid would have left a mark on the Egyptiac records if it had occurred neither during Thothmes I's reign nor before it, but after it, during the period (dated 1486-1468 B.C. by Wilson) when the Empress Hatshepsut was in power, since it seems to have been the Empress's deliberate policy to ignore Egypt's interests in Asia; and, on this account, we cannot exclude, on the strength of the Egyptiac evidence alone, without reference to other considerations, the possibility that Muršiliš I's raid did occur in Hatshepsut's time and that it was the stimulus that provoked, not Thothmes I's occupation of North Syria, but Thothmes III's.

A dating as low as this for the raid is, of course, highly improbable on other grounds. It would be lower than even Poebel's dating (the fourth and lowest of the four rival schemes), and Poebel's is the lowest that the figures in the Khorsabad List of Kings of Assyria allow of, even when all the unknown quantities in this list are given (as they are given by Poebel) the numerical value of zero. Moreover, a dating of Muršiliš I's reign in the second quarter of the fifteenth century B.C. would make nonsense of the known facts of Hittite history by reducing the interval between Muršiliš I's reign and Tutkhaliya II's to less than thirty years. Yet the theoretical possibility on the Egyptiac evidence—however improbable in the light of the other evidence—that Muršiliš I's raid may have occurred in Hatshepsut's time disqualifies the Eighteenth Dynasty's ascendancy over Syria from serving as a decisive criterion for judging between the four rival datings of South-West Asian history, since, if the date of the raid had been in truth as late as this, it would have been too late to be compatible with any of those four datings, and thus would give us no guidance for deciding between their relative merits.

The Contemporaneity of Ikhnaton's Reign with Suppiluliuma's and the Dating of Muršiliš I's Raid on Babylon

There was, however, another chronological point of reference in the chronology of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt which might perhaps

¹ This point is made by Professor Albright in a letter of the 20th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

be made to yield some indirect evidence regarding the date of Muršiliš I's raid. Ikhnaton (*imperabat* 1380-1362 B.C. according to Wilson) was known to have been a contemporary of the Hittite war-lord Suppiluliuma; Suppiluliuma was one of the successors of Muršiliš I; and it might be possible to estimate the Time-interval between the reigns of these two Hittite Kings by making conjectural allocations of time for the known intervening events in Hittite history. This alternative approach to the dating of Muršiliš I's raid was, however, highly problematical at the time of writing, since, down to A.D. 1952, the information about this period of Hittite history that was at the disposal of Western scholars was still fragmentary, and the interpretation of what there was of it was still in dispute.

Professor Albrecht Goetze, who was the pioneer of this approach,¹ sought to pave his way by establishing an additional Hittite-Egyptiac synchronism to reinforce the synchronism between the reigns of Suppiluliuma and Ikhnaton. Goetze submitted that the reign of Suppiluliuma's great-grandfather Tutkhaliya II could not have begun earlier than *circa* 1449 B.C., since the renascence of Hittite power in Tutkhaliya II's reign made itself felt in an expansion of the Hittite empire into Syria, and it was inconceivable that this expansion could have started so long as the Egyptiac Emperor Thothmes (Tuthmosis) III was alive.² From this concordant pair of synchronisms between Hittite and Egyptiac chronology it would follow that the raid on Babylon by the Hittite King Muršiliš I must be dated early enough to allow for the transaction, between that event and the accession of Tutkhaliya II, of the intervening events of Hittite history which had been brought to light by the disinterment of the Boghazkal'eh Archives. From an examination of the evidence about these intervening events that was known to Western scholars up to date, Goetze concluded³ in A.D. 1951 that the sack of Babylon by Muršiliš I was

'separated from [the renascence of Hittite power under the predecessors of Suppiluliuma] by no less than nine reigns, of which at least two . . . were fairly long. The nine kings in question represent 5 + x, most likely seven, generations. In terms of years, this should mean a period of roughly 200 years. Since Event II is fixed at *circa* 1450 B.C., we would on this basis place Event I around 1650 B.C. Thus, of the four proposed solutions of the problem of Babylonian chronology, (c) and (d) prove impossible, (b) is unlikely, leaving (a) the one that is to be preferred.'

Professor Goetze's reconstruction of this chapter of Hittite history, and consequently also his chronological conclusions from it, were, however, rejected by the advocates of all the three rival datings, including Dr. Sidney Smith,⁴ whose dating was the next highest to Goetze's own. Albright⁵ challenged Goetze's duplication of the series of three

¹ See Goetze, A.: 'The Problem of Chronology and Early Hittite History,' in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 122, April 1951, pp. 18-25.

² This second point is made by Goetze *ibid.*, pp. 19 and 20. Wilson's date for Thothmes III's death was, however, not 1449 B.C. but 1436 B.C.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴ e.g. in a letter of the 13th October, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

⁵ In a letter of the 20th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

Hittite kings: Hantili, Zidanta, and Huzziya. 'There is nothing about these kings', he suggested, 'to support the view that there were two of each.' Rowton¹ attacked Goetze's chronological conclusions on the basis of statistical evidence drawn from the histories of South-West Asia and Egypt. On this basis, he contended that 1432 B.C. was a more probable date than 1449 B.C. for the accession of Tutkhaliya II; that the average span of a generation in royal families in this aeon was, at longest, 25.2 years and perhaps no longer than 23, as against Goetze's allowance of 28; and that, in a politically turbulent age, the known events of Hittite history down to the beginning of Tutkhaliya II's reign from the beginning of Muršiliš I's reign do not require an allowance of more than 120 years, as against Goetze's allowance of 200. On the reckoning that Tutkhaliya II came to the throne *circa* 1430 B.C., this would bring Muršiliš I's accession to *circa* 1550 B.C. A corollary of this Rowtonian revision of Goetze's figures would be that the evidence furnished by known facts of Hittite history would be compatible with a dating of Muršiliš I's raid at 1531/30 B.C. (the date of it according to Dating (c)), instead of constraining us to date the raid at 1651/50 B.C.—a date which, if accepted, would rule out not only Datings (d) and (c) but Dating (b) as well, and would thus leave Goetze's Dating (a) in undisputed possession of the field.

Rowton's critique of Goetze's thesis² seemed, however, to show that, while the argument from Hittite history did tell against Dating (d), it did not avail to rule out either Dating (c) or, *a fortiori*, Dating (b). In other words, Hittite history fails, like the history of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt's ascendancy over Syria, to provide us with the decisive criterion that we are seeking.

The Hyksos Conquest of Egypt and the Dating of the Reign of Hammurabi

Another date in a relatively well-established Egyptiac chronology which might provide a point of reference for a relatively uncertain South-West Asian chronology was, as we have observed, the date of the arrival of Hyksos barbarian invaders at the north-eastern corner of the Nile Delta. In A.D. 1952 this event was diversely dated by Egyptologists in terms of years B.C. at dates ranging from *circa* 1730 B.C.³ through *circa* 1720–1715 B.C.,⁴ 1710 B.C.,⁵ and 1682 B.C.,⁶ to *circa* 1675 B.C.⁷ The choice

¹ In *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 126, April 1952, pp. 20–24.

² A reply to Mr. Rowton by Professor Goetze will be found in *B.A.S.O.R.*, No. 127 (1952), pp. 21–26. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 27–30, Albright, W. F.: 'Further Observations on the Chronology of the Early Second Millennium B.C.'

³ See Drioton, E., and Vandier, J.: *L'Égypte* (Paris 1946, Presses Universitaires de France), pp. 282–4. Cp. Sève-Söderbergh, T.: 'The Hyksos Rule in Egypt', in *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, vol. xxxvii, December 1951 (London 1951, The Egypt Exploration Society), p. 55, with n. 1.

⁴ On the evidence of 'the Stele of the Year Four Hundred' (which Drioton and Vandier interpret as pointing to a date *circa* 1730 B.C. for the first lodgement of the Hyksos in the Delta) Sidney Smith, in *Alalakh*, p. 1, n. 1, dates this lodgement between 1720 and 1715 B.C.

⁵ See Böhl, *op. cit.*, p. 348, following Stock, H.: *Studien zur Geschichte und Archäologie der 13 bis 17 Dynastie Ägyptens*, in *Ägyptische Forschungen*, Heft 12 (Glückstadt-Hamburg 1942).

⁶ Sewall, J. W. S., on the evidence of 'the Stele of the Year Four Hundred', in *The Legacy of Egypt* (Oxford 1942, Clarendon Press), p. 10.

⁷ Mr. M. B. Rowton, in a communication to the writer of this Study.

of dates, within this range of about fifty-five years, for the advent of the Hyksos at the Asian fringes of the Egyptian World would have a bearing on South-West Asian chronology if it were to be established that the Hyksos barbarian invaders of Egypt, like the contemporary Mitanni and Kassite barbarian invaders of Mesopotamia and of Shinar, included at least a contingent of Sanskrit-speaking warriors who were of Central Asian Nomad origin; for it would follow that this contingent, at any rate, must have reached Syria from Central Asia via Mesopotamia, and from this it would follow, in turn, that they could not have traversed Mesopotamia till after Hammurabi's death, since the Upper Tigris Basin, and therefore, *a fortiori*, the basins of the Khabur and the Balikh, had been proved to have been included in Hammurabi's dominions by the discovery, at Diyārbakr, of a monument bearing a portrait of Hammurabi carved in relief.¹ It was true that, in A.D. 1952, the effectiveness of Hammurabi's authority over the several principalities which he claimed to have subjugated was being called in question by the results of recent progress in the discovery and interpretation of contemporary documents. Yet, even when Hammurabi's own account of his achievements had been discounted in the light of this new knowledge, it would still seem hardly credible that, if a Eurasian Nomad war-band had broken through the northern frontier of Hammurabi's empire within Hammurabi's lifetime, no reference to this shattering event should have been found among Hammurabi's disinterred records.

Accordingly, if the Hyksos barbarian invaders of Egypt should prove to have included a contingent of Nomads from Central Asia, the establishment of the date of their invasion of Egypt would furnish a criterion for judging between the four rival datings of Hammurabi's reign. In A.D. 1952, however, this view of the Hyksos war-band's composition and provenance was being disputed by critics of it who maintained that in truth there was no evidence for the Hyksos having been anything but local Semitic-speaking barbarians from the immediate neighbourhood of the north-east corner of the Nile Delta, and also no evidence for the Hyksos invasion having been a sudden overwhelming cataclysm and not a gradual infiltration. If this alternative account of the Hyksos were to prove to be the right one, then manifestly there would be no criterion for South-West Asian chronology to be obtained from the date of the Hyksos invasion of Egypt, whatever this date might be, and whether it was to be equated with some single year B.C. or with a period extending, perhaps, over more than half a century; for a gradual infiltration into Egypt of local barbarians from the Sinai Peninsula, or, at the farthest, from Palestine or Transjordan, might have occurred during Hammurabi's lifetime without having made any mark on the records of his reign. It will be seen that the current controversy over the composition and provenance of the Hyksos, and over the circumstances of the establishment of their ascendancy in Egypt, governed the question whether the date of the Hyksos invasion of Egypt could or could not be used as a criterion for the dating of South-West Asian history. We must therefore look into the pros and cons of this Egyptological controversy

¹ See Böhl, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

before attempting to apply this criterion for our South-West Asian purposes; and, in then proceeding to consider how the four rival datings of South-West Asian history would respond to this test, we must never forget that the test would be a valid one only if the view that the Hyksos included a contingent of Sanskrit-speaking Central Asian Nomads were to hold its ground against the view that the Hyksos were nothing but local Semitic-speaking barbarians from the Asian borderlands of the Nile Delta.

The controversy over the composition and provenance of the Hyksos turned on three points: the language that they spoke, the weapons that they used, and the manner in which they made themselves masters of Egypt.

The belief that the Hyksos included a Sanskrit-speaking contingent was based on two considerations: first, the philologically well-attested presence of a Sanskrit-speaking contingent among the more or less contemporary Mitanni barbarian invaders of Mesopotamia and Kassite invaders of Shinar, and, second, the conjecture that this element among the Hyksos was represented by the element in the fifteenth-century population of Syria that bore the title 'mariannu', and that the word 'mariannu' was an Indo-European word signifying 'males' and thence 'warriors'.

The Mitanni and the Kassites did appear to have been composite hordes in which local transfrontier barbarians from just beyond the northern and eastern borders of Hammurabi's empire had been reinforced by contingents of Nomads from Central Asia who spoke an Indo-European language. The Kassites seem to have consisted of Gutaeans highlanders from the Zagros reinforced by Sanskrit-speaking Nomads; the Mitanni, of Hurrian highlanders from Armenia reinforced by Sanskrit-speaking Nomads. If the Hyksos should prove to have consisted of Palestinian or Sinaitic Semitic-speaking barbarians, reinforced by Sanskrit-speaking Nomads and perhaps by Hurrians as well, this would be all of a piece with the rest of the picture of the Völkerwanderung in the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries B.C.

The geographical distribution of the descendants of the Indo-European-speaking intruders from Central Asia into South-Western Asia, as we find them distributed in and after the fifteenth century B.C., accords with at least one piece of archaeological evidence¹ to suggest that a wave of Sanskrit-speaking invaders which had broken out of the Eurasian Steppe on to the Iranian Plateau had split into a left wing which had swept over Eastern Iran into the domain of the Indus Culture and a right wing which had poured westwards through the Caspian Gates into Azerbaijan and thence across Armenia into Anatolia and across Mesopotamia into Syria and eventually into Egypt—as, in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, the Turkish-speaking Nomad invaders of the 'Abbasid Caliphate divided into a left wing that descended on the Caliphate's dominions in the Indus Valley and a right wing that, from a new base of operations in Azerbaijan, invaded the dominions of the East

¹ The affinity between swords brought to Mohenjo-daro by the Sanskrit-speaking barbarian destroyers of the Indus Culture and swords of the Hyksos Age found in Palestine is pointed out by Stuart Piggott in his *Prehistoric India* (London 1950, Pelican), pp. 228-9.

Roman Empire in Anatolia in and after A.D. 1037, Syria in and after A.D. 1071, and finally Egypt in A.D. 1164-9. On this historical analogy we might also infer that, in the age of the First Dynasty of Babylon, South-West Asia played the same role as in the age of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in acting as a lodestone that drew Nomad invaders out of their distant Central Asian cattle-ranges, and that, in both ages alike, the Nomads' eventual invasions of Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt were incidental consequences of an attack that had been directed towards the Tigris-Euphrates Basin and the Indus Basin as its first objectives.¹

As against this suggestion that the Hyksos are likely to have been all of a piece with the Mitanni and the Kassites in their composition and their provenance, Albright makes the point that

'The Hyksos royal names are, after all, predominantly Canaanite or Amorite, so that the irruption of the Indo-Iranians and Hurrians [into South-Western Asia] seems largely to have spent itself before reaching the Egyptian frontiers.'²

Säve-Söderbergh³ pronounces in the same sense still more categorically. 'Most of the Hyksos names are pure Semitic, and those which cannot be thus explained are in any case hardly Hurrian.⁴ . . . Names of a Hurrian type are conspicuously absent among the Hyksos.'⁵

The inconclusiveness of this reasoning is exposed by the possibility of concluding, on the same grounds, that the irruption of the Scandinavians into Western Christendom in the Dark Ages of Western history must have spent itself before reaching Normandy, since the names borne, and the language spoken, by the Norman conquerors of Apulia, Sicily, and England were, after all, predominantly French. In this instance we happen to know for a fact that, notwithstanding this linguistic evidence, the forebears of the eleventh-century Norman masters of a province on the Channel Coast of France had come thither in the tenth century from Scandinavia. On this showing, Säve-Söderbergh's and Albright's *argumentum a silentio* might have been overridden if the progress of discovery and research had confirmed Eduard Meyer's two theses that surviving epigoni of the Hyksos were to be seen in the 'mariannu' who are found in Syria in the fifteenth century B.C., and that the word 'mariannu' is Indo-European.⁶

In the fifteenth-century B.C. the mariannu in Syria were echeloned immediately in front of the Mitanni just across the Euphrates in Mesopotamia, and the apparent survival of the name 'mariannu', a thousand years later than that, in Anatolia looks like another indication that the mariannu had been associated with the Mitanni in a Völkerwanderung which had reached Anatolia from a starting-point in Central Asia in the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C. Mâres (whose name was still per-

¹ This point has been made in I. i. 104-9.

² Albright, W. F., in B.A.S.O.R., No. 78, April 1940, p. 33.

³ Säve-Söderbergh, T.: 'The Hyksos Rule in Egypt', in *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, vol. xxxvii, December 1951 (London 1951, The Egypt Exploration Society), pp. 53-71.

⁴ Ibid., p. 58.

⁵ Ibid., p. 58, n. 3.

⁶ See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii, Part I, 2nd ed., pp. 33-38, cited in I. i. 105.

petuated in A.D. 1952 in the district of Georgia called Imerethia) are located by Herodotus¹ in the mountainous hinterland of the south-east corner of the Black Sea, while the Mariandyni² who were eventually enslaved by the Hellenic colonists of Heraclea Pontica, on a westerly stretch of the Anatolian shore of the Black Sea, testify by the 'hyphenated' structure of their name that at this point the mariannu had met and mingled with Thynian invaders from South-Eastern Europe, as, in the hinterland of the Mediterranean coast of Spain, Celts similarly met and mingled with Iberians to form the mixed community known as the Celtiberi. Similar evidence shows that a detachment of the Mitanni found its way into Anatolia at the heels of the mariannu, as in the seventh century B.C. the Scythians found their way into Anatolia at the heels of the Cimmerians.³ Herodotus⁴ locates a community of 'Matieni' on the right bank of the River Halys (Qyzyl Irmāq) opposite the Phrygians, and records⁵ that, in Xerxes' expeditionary force, these 'Matieni' were brigaded with the Paphlagonians and were equipped like the Paphlagonians, the Ligyes, the Mariandyni, and the Cappadocians. Hecataeus⁶ perhaps records the presence of an advance guard of these 'Matieni' on the left (i.e. west) bank of the Halys in his mention of a town named Hyopê, near Gordii, inhabited by 'Matieni' who wore Paphlagonian dress, while his 'Matieni' who are neighbours of the Moschi⁷ would be identical with Herodotus's Anatolian 'Matieni' if the Moschi in question are those who contended with the Assyrians in Lycaonia in the eighth century B.C., but would be neighbours of the Mâres, in the hinterland of the south-east corner of the Black Sea, if the Moschi associated with them are, as Hecataeus implies in this passage, the remnant of the Moschi that had survived in this secluded area.⁸

This geographical association of the name 'mariannu' with the name 'Mitanni' might commend the thesis that the mariannu, like the Mitanni, included an Indo-European-speaking element if there were also some philological warrant for this. Eduard Meyer's conjectural Indo-European etymology for the word was, however, rejected by more recent scholars. According to Dr. Sidney Smith,⁹ the 'mar-' in 'mariannu'

¹ In Book III, chap. 94, and Book VII, chap. 79.

² See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 28; Book III, chap. 90; Book VII, chap. 72.

³ Hrozný hazards the conjecture that the Midianites were the epigoni of a detachment of these Mitanni who had accompanied or anticipated a left wing of the mariannu in their invasion of Syria and had broken from there upon the highlands of North-Eastern Arabia. See Hrozný, B.: *Die Älteste Geschichte Vorderasiens und Indiens* (Prague 1943, Melantrich), pp. 134, 152, 213-14. Hrozný points out in op. cit., p. 134, that his equation of Midian with Mitanni is borne out by the presence of the Mitannians' associates the Hurrians astride the King's Highway immediately to the north of Midian, in the highlands east of the Wadi 'Arabah that were subsequently taken from these 'Horites' by the Edomites (see VI. vii. 102, n. 1). Hrozný's identification of the names 'Midian' and 'Mitanni' was, however, rejected by Goetze.

⁴ In Book I, chap. 72.

⁵ Hecataeus, Fragment 287 in Jacoby's arrangement.

⁶ Hecataeus, Fragment 288 in Jacoby's arrangement.

⁷ The evidence about the Anatolian Matieni is presented by F. H. Weissbach in Pauly-Wissowa: *Real-encyklopädie*, new edition, vol. xiv (Stuttgart 1930, Metzler), cols. 2203-4. On the Hellenic map of Anatolia, 'Matianê' (*Turciê Machan*) also figures as the name of a station, just to the south of the southernmost bend of the River Halys, on the road between Soandus (Nevshehir) and Sacasena (Süksün).

⁹ In a personal communication to the writer of this Study. See also *The Antiquaries' Journal*, vol. xix, p. 43.

was derived from a Sumerian word meaning wagon, while 'the -annu could be an affirmative of the Hurri language, not Indo-European'. According to Mr. D. J. Wiseman,¹ no Indo-European personal names were to be found among more than 2,100 personal names of mariannu that were known to Modern Western scholars by June 1953. Mr. Wiseman concurred with Dr. Sidney Smith in holding that 'mariannu' was a Hurrian word; and this would be what was to be expected, considering that, at Alalakh, about 90 per cent. of the personal names were Hurrian in the fifteenth century B.C., while, on the same site in the eighteenth century B.C., some of these fifteenth-century Hurrian names had already been current.² The Hurrian word 'mariannu' seems to have been, not an ethnikon, but a class-designation. There was, for example, a fifteenth-century writ, issued by Niqmepa, making Gabia a 'mariannu' in perpetuity. In North Syria in the fifteenth-century B.C. the mariannu seem to have been the highest of three classes into which the population was divided,³ and they seem also to have been distinguished by the possession of wheeled transport, considering that the entries 'has a chariot/wagon' and 'has no chariot' were placed against the names of mariannu in a disinterred list. A record of one-year-old horses being put to 'mariannu work' had also been found.⁴

This association of the mariannu with horses in the fifteenth century B.C. looks like another indication that, even if they did not share with the Mitanni an Indo-European element in their racial composition, they did share with them the mastering of a military technique that had been ascribed, by one school of Modern Western scholars, to the Hyksos as well. The Hyksos had been credited with the possession of two new-fangled weapons, the horse-drawn chariot⁵ and the composite bow,⁶ and these two new weapons had been held to have been introduced to South-West Asia suddenly by eighteenth-century or seventeenth-century Sanskrit-speaking Nomad invaders from Central Asia.⁷ This thesis, however, had latterly been contested. According to Sève-Söderbergh,⁸ for example, 'the horse was known in Mesopotamia long before we find any traces of Indo-Iranians^{9[3]} and . . . there is not the slightest evidence that the Hyksos used the horse until the very latest part of their rule in Egypt'. Among the material relics of life in Egypt during the period of the Hyksos ascendancy there, 'not even a bone of a horse'

¹ In a personal communication to the writer of this Study. See now also D. J. Wiseman: *The Alalakh Tablets* (London 1953, British School of Archaeology at Ankara: Occasional Papers, No. 2), pp. 9-10.

² In the eighteenth century B.C. the names of the most common implements were also Hurrian at Alalakh, and this suggested that, by that date, Hurrian had become the prevailing language of Northern Syria (note by Mr. Wiseman).

³ 'Alalakh has 34 mariannu, who seem to be the leading citizens in all walks of life. One of them is the mayor. Neighbouring villages have fewer' (note by Mr. Wiseman).

⁴ Note by Mr. Wiseman.

⁵ See Winlock, H. E.: *The Rise and Fall of the Middle Kingdom in Thebes* (New York 1947, Macmillan), pp. 152-8.

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 158-9.

⁷ See VIII. viii. 17.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

^{9[3]} 'Cp., for example, Götze, *Kleinasien*, 72 (inter alia, a *rabi sisē* in the Cappadocian tablets from the nineteenth century); horses and chariots in Mari under Zimri-Lim (*Syria*, No. xix, p. 125); Mallowan, *Iraq*, No. ix, p. 216 ('the chariot was already widely used in the Early Dynastic-Sargonid III periods, and . . . the chariot warfare so freely practised in the middle of the second millennium B.C. was then a comparatively modern exploitation of an invention which had been made more than a thousand years earlier').

had been found in any Egyptian tomb of that age; no picture of a horse had been found; and in hunting-scenes the hunter is depicted on foot.¹ Among all the allegedly Hyksos earth-work fortresses, once supposed to be the characteristic laagers of an army of charioteers, only two had been identified in Egypt itself, and these two had turned out to be probably not fortresses but temple-foundations.² As for the Hyksos' new-fangled weapons, Sève-Söderbergh contends³ that

'it is only towards the end of their rule in Egypt that they introduce a number of improvements in military technique in an attempt to uphold their political power against the growing Egyptian opposition. Then first the horse-drawn chariots, new types of daggers and swords, bronze weapons, the strong compound Asiatic bow, &c., are imported from Asia.'

The opposing view that the Hyksos had brought these new-fangled weapons with them at their first appearance and, in virtue of them, had conquered Egypt at one stroke might seem to be supported by the late and second-hand, but sole surviving, literary record of the Hyksos conquest. Manetho, in a passage quoted from his work by Josephus in his *Contra Apionem*,⁴ writes:

'The story is an almost incredibly fantastic one. A people from the East, of obscure origin, had the audacity to march against Egypt, and they conquered it at one stroke; it was child's play for them; they met with no resistance. And then, when they had overcome the previous government of Egypt, they behaved atrociously; they burned down the cities and rased the temples to the ground, and the whole of the native population suffered cruelly at their hands: the males were massacred; the women and children were enslaved.'

In this passage, which was the sole surviving piece of literary evidence for the event, the note of unexpectedness, suddenness, surprise, and speed is unmistakable and, indeed, emphatic. But against this reading of Manetho's testimony, whatever it may be worth, Sève-Söderbergh pits archaeological evidence for the thesis that the conquest was a gradual one and that it consisted merely in the substitution of local Semitic-speaking rulers for Egyptian rulers, and not in the immigration of a horde of strange barbarians from the back of beyond. In the Eastern Delta, dynasts with Semitic names begin to make their appearance perhaps as early as 1730 B.C.⁵ The term which has been transliterated into Greek as 'Hyksos', and which means 'rulers of foreign countries', 'gives us the impression that the Hyksos were only a little group of foreign dynasts rather than a numerous people with a special civilization'.⁶ 'There are a great many tombs from the Hyksos period in Egypt, but there is nowhere a clear indication of an invasion of a foreign people from the North. . . . There is nowhere a sudden change in the burial customs',⁷ and the alleged evidence in the style of Egyptian pottery of the Hyksos Age for an immigration of a foreign people into Egypt in this period will not hold water.⁸

¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁵ See Sève-Söderbergh, *ibid.*, pp. 55, n. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

² See *ibid.*, p. 60.

⁴ Josephus: *Contra Apionem*, Book I, chaps. 75-82.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

Thus, by A.D. 1952, the thesis that the Hyksos included a contingent of Sanskrit-speaking Central Asian Nomads had come under heavy fire; and, though, in the still inconclusive state of the controversy, this thesis could not be held to have been driven off the field as yet, it was already clear that any attempt to use it as a criterion for dating the reign of Hammurabi was subject to the possibility that it might prove a broken reed. With this reservation in our minds, we may now go on to consider how the date of the Hyksos invasion of Egypt would affect the choice between the four rival reconstructions of South-West Asian chronology if the Hyksos should, after all, turn out to have included a Central Asian contingent who could not have driven their chariots across South-Western Asia while Hammurabi was still alive.¹

If, on these grounds, we could take it as being certain that Hammurabi's death must have been earlier than the Hyksos invasion of Egypt, this would rule out Dating (*d*), which dates Hammurabi's death 1662 B.C., i.e. thirteen years later than the very latest of the divers rival datings, ranging from 1730 B.C. to 1675 B.C., for the Hyksos invasion of Egypt that were in the field in A.D. 1952.² This event in Egyptiac history cannot, however, be used as a criterion for deciding between Datings (*c*) and (*b*) for Hammurabi's reign unless we are able to come to some conclusion regarding the date of the Hyksos invasion itself; for in A.D. 1952 the current rival datings of it splayed out, as we have seen, over a span of no less than fifty-five years extending from 1730 B.C. to 1675 B.C., and, whereas the earlier of these two extreme datings would rule out not only Dating (*d*) for Hammurabi's reign but also Dating (*c*), which dates Hammurabi's death 1686 B.C., the later of the two extreme datings would be compatible with Dating (*c*), as well as with Dating (*b*). It will be seen that the acceptability of Dating (*c*) for the reign of Hammurabi was at stake in the current controversy over the dating of the Hyksos invasion of Egypt—on the assumption, of course, that a contingent of barbarians from Central Asia was included in the Hyksos war-band.

For the establishment of the date of the Hyksos invasion there were two mutually independent approaches in the light of the Egyptiac information at the disposal of Western scholars up to date. Since the dates of the Twelfth Dynasty and the date of the expulsion of the Hyksos from Egypt by Amosis were already more or less well assured, the chronology of the intervening age could be reconstructed on the basis of the Egyptiac king-lists and of the names, the regnal years, and

¹ Goetze, in a paper read before the American Oriental Society at Cincinnati at Easter 1950, maintained that an invasion of Egypt by barbarians from Central Asia could not have taken place so long as Hammurabi's successor Samsu-iluna was on the throne, since during his reign Babylon still maintained her hold on the Middle Euphrates. But might they not have ridden from east to west across the plains of Northern Mesopotamia and have crossed the Euphrates at its westward elbow, at some point to the north of Carchemish? This route would hardly have trespassed on the domain of the Babylonian Empire in the territory of the former Kingdom of Mari.

² Professor W. F. Albright comments, in a letter of the 5th January, 1952, to the writer of this Study: 'Certainly a storm broke over Mesopotamia and Syria-Palestine in the years immediately following the death of Hammurabi, and, since this storm is hard to separate from the rise of the Fifteenth Dynasty in Egypt [i.e. from the establishment of the Hyksos domination—A.J.T.], one would apparently be compelled to date the latter event as late as after 1660 B.C., which does seem highly improbable.'

the acts of individual kings that were recorded in disinterred documents. If the collapse of the Hyksos Power in Egypt was to be dated *circa* 1567 B.C., the figure of 108 years, given by the Turin Papyrus for the total duration of the Hyksos Fifteenth Dynasty,¹ would place the Hyksos invasion of Egypt at 1675 B.C., and this dating of that event would allow sufficient time both for five or six Fifteenth-Dynasty Hyksos war-lords who exercised a domination over Egypt² and for the preceding pharaohs, bracketed together in the king-lists as the Thirteenth Dynasty, who had reigned between the end of the Twelfth Dynasty, dated 1786 B.C. by Parker, and the Hyksos irruption.

This dating accorded so well with all interpretations of all the extant evidence, save for one single item, that it would hardly have been questioned if this other piece of evidence had not turned up in the shape of 'the Stele of the Year Four Hundred'.³

This monument had been discovered on the site of the Deltaic city of Tanis (*alias* Ramses), to which the capital of 'the New Empire' had been transferred from Thebes in the time of the Nineteenth Dynasty.⁴ The inscription on the stele states that it was erected by order of Ramses (Ramesses) II (*imperabat* 1301-1234 B.C. according to Wilson) to commemorate a state visit paid to Tanis by Ramses (Ramesses) II's father, Seti (Sethos) I—at some date, to judge by the styles and titles employed in this context, that was anterior to both Seti I's and his father Ramses I's accession to the Imperial Throne—for the celebration of the reign of 'Seth-the-Great-of-Strength, the Son of Re, His Beloved'. Since Seth was the local tutelary divinity of Tanis, and since the four-hundredth year of his reign was the occasion that had led to the erection of the stele, the initial year of this four-hundred-years-long span was presumably some date at which Tanis had, for some reason, become a place of importance. On the supposition that Tanis was identical with 'Avaris', the city in which the Hyksos war-lord who had been the conqueror of Egypt had established his military headquarters and his summer residence according to the passage of Manetho's work quoted by Josephus in his *Contra Apionem*,⁵ it was conjectured by Western scholars that the selection of the city by the Hyksos for this important role was the event in the history of Tanis which had been taken as the initial date of an era whose four-hundredth year had given occasion for the erection of Ramses (Ramesses) II's stele. This conjecture might appear to be supported by the representation of the god Seth on the stele in Asiatic dress, since the Hyksos were known to have identified the autochthonous Egyptiac divinity Seth with an imported tutelary divinity of their own. If it were further to be assumed that the four-

¹ Manetho gives the figure of 104/3 years for the same epoch, i.e. for the duration of his Fifteenth Dynasty. Säve-Söderbergh, in loc. cit., p. 66, prolongs the total duration of the Hyksos Rāj in the north of Egypt and in Southern Palestine by reckoning that the Hyksos rulers of the Fifteenth Dynasty were followed by 'a second group . . . which we may call the Sixteenth Dynasty'.

² Six names of Hyksos pharaohs of the Fifteenth Dynasty were recorded by Manetho; five names (four of them corresponding to four of Manetho's) had been recovered by Modern Western archaeologists (see Drioton and Vandier, op. cit., p. 285).

³ English translation in Pritchard, J. B.: *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton 1950, University Press), pp. 252-3.

⁴ See II. ii. 112 and 114.

⁵ Book I, chaps. 75-82, partially translated on p. 203, above.

hundred-years period was to be reckoned back, not from the date of the erection of the stele, but from the date of Seti's state visit to Tanis at some date before the end of the reign of Horemheb (*imperabat circa* 1349-1319 B.C.), the cumulative result of this pile of assumptions would indicate, for the Hyksos conquest of Egypt, a date round about 1730-1720 B.C.

Unless it were assumed, as it was by Säve-Söderbergh,¹ that the Hyksos Fifteenth Dynasty had been followed by a Hyksos Sixteenth Dynasty, this interpretation of 'the Stele of the Year Four Hundred' was the sole basis for any dating of the Hyksos conquest of Egypt earlier than *circa* 1675 B.C., which, as we have seen, was the date indicated by the Turin Papyrus's figure of 108 years for the duration of the Fifteenth Dynasty.

An acceptance of even the lowest of the dates for the Hyksos conquest that could be reconciled with this interpretation of 'the Stele of the Year Four Hundred' would have the chronologically awkward effect of allowing too little time for the aggregate length of the reigns known to have occurred between the end of the Twelfth Dynasty and the beginning of the Hyksos Fifteenth Dynasty.² Some of the scholars who pinned their faith on the stele sought to meet this difficulty by assuming that the reigns of some of the pharaohs of the Thirteenth Dynasty were contemporaneous with one another, while others sought to meet it by assuming that the latest of these reigns were contemporaneous with the first stage of the Hyksos conquest of Egypt, which, on this hypothesis, was assumed to have been accomplished in successive stages.

There might be something to be said for the first of these two suggested ways out of the chronological difficulty, considering that, at least in the last stage of all before the Hyksos conquest, the Egyptian imperial government did seem to have disintegrated into a number of petty parochial principalities. The second of the suggested ways out, however, could hardly be reconciled with Manetho's story of the Hyksos conquering Egypt at one blow; and Manetho's story, fantastic though it might sound, was not incredible on the hypothesis that the Hyksos had included in their ranks a contingent of Eurasian Nomad warriors who had swooped down upon South-Western Asia armed with new-fangled weapons which were irresistible to any adversaries who had not yet mastered the use of them. These archer-charioteers would have secured the full benefit of their armament in their assault upon Egypt because they would have descended on her suddenly, from the back of beyond, and so have taken her completely by surprise. This decisive element of surprise would, however, have been a wasting asset. As soon as military contact had been established, the victims of the horse-drawn chariot and the composite bow would have been bound to learn the tricks of their conquerors' trade sooner or later. In Egypt in the sequel to the Hyksos conquest, it did, in fact, take the Thebans rather more than a century—*circa* 1675 B.C.—1567 B.C.—to become sufficiently competent charioteers to be able to drive the Hyksos back into Asia. From this actual sequel we

¹ See p. 205, n. 1, above.

² This point is made by Drioton and Vandier, in *op. cit.*, p. 283.

may infer that, if—contrary to the picture painted by Manetho—the original Hyksos conquest of Egypt had in truth been protracted over a period of about half a century, this ‘staggered’ challenge would have evoked on the Egyptian side an increasingly effective response; and indeed, if the conquest had really moved at that slow pace, it would have been unlikely ever to have been carried to completion.

On this showing, a layman might be inclined to abide by the testimony of Manetho in defiance of an interpretation of ‘the Stele of the Year Four Hundred’ which, after all, was not, and could not be, anything more than a tissue of conjectures. The inscription on the stele did not make it clear whether the four hundred years were to be reckoned back from the date of the erection of the stele by Ramses II or from the date of Seti’s state visit. If the period was to be reckoned back from the date of erection, there was no statement of the year of Ramses II’s reign in which the erection had taken place, and even the dating of Ramses II’s reign in years B.C. was uncertain.¹ If, on the other hand, the period was to be reckoned back from the date of Seti’s state visit, there was no indication of the year of Horemheb’s reign in which this visit had taken place. Finally, whatever the initial date of the four-hundred-years-long period might be, there was no evidence that the event, commemorated by it, in the history of Tanis was the selection of Tanis by a Hyksos conqueror of Egypt to be his military headquarters and his summer residence.² Indeed, it was not certain that Tanis was identical with a Hyksos *place d’armes* which Manetho, in the sole piece of historical evidence concerning it, calls, not ‘Tanis’, but ‘Avaris’.

If we were to renounce the manifestly hazardous endeavour to extract from ‘the Stele of the Year Four Hundred’ a dating for the Hyksos conquest of Egypt, a dating *circa* 1675 B.C. for this event would remain in

¹ Mr. M. B. Rowton had argued, in *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, vol. xxxiv (1948), p. 72, that Ramses II’s accession year should be dated, not 1301 B.C., but 1290 B.C.

² Alternatively the event taken as the inaugural date for an Era of Tanis might have been the selection of the city to be the local seat of government for one of the parochial principalities—some under native Egyptian princelings and others perhaps under Semitic-speaking alien war-lords from a no-man’s-land beyond the eastern fringes of the Delta—into which Lower Egypt may have disintegrated during the last phase of the decline of ‘the Middle Empire’ before the Hyksos conquest. In a letter of the 20th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study, Professor Albright remarks that he would date the Hyksos Empire of the Fifteenth Dynasty about 1690–1580 B.C., 20–30 years below the initial date suggested for this by H. Stock in his *Studien zur Geschichte und Archäologie der 13. bis 17. Dynastie Ägyptens*. The Hyksos Empire, Professor Albright adds in this context, ‘was clearly preceded by an anarchic period of Semitic domination lasting about 40 years, during which the prestige of Egypt sank to zero’. Unlike a *Völkerwanderung* from Central Asia to Egypt, an infiltration of local Semitic-speaking barbarians into Egypt from the Sinai Peninsula, or even from the Syrian Desert, was, as we have observed, evidently something that might have happened during Hammurabi’s reign without having left any mark in contemporary Babylonian records.

The hypothesis that there may have been this infiltration of local Semitic-speaking barbarians into the Eastern Delta from *circa* 1730 B.C. onwards is, of course, quite compatible with the hypothesis that the Hyksos conquest of Egypt was a subsequent sudden catastrophic event, *circa* 1675 B.C., in which Nomads from Central Asia were participants. Säve-Söderbergh, who equates the Hyksos invasion with the local Semitic-speaking barbarians’ infiltration, rejects Albright’s dating of the Hyksos Fifteenth Dynasty *circa* 1690–1580 B.C., and proposes to date it *circa* 1720–1610 B.C., in order to leave time for his Hyksos Sixteenth Dynasty to follow on before the expulsion of the Hyksos by Amosis (see Säve-Söderbergh in loc. cit., p. 62, n. 4).

undisputed possession of the field; and our condition that Hammurabi's reign must have been over before the Hyksos conquest of Egypt took place would then fail to provide us with a criterion for judging between Dating (c) for Hammurabi's reign and Dating (b); for, if the Hyksos conquered Egypt *circa* 1675 B.C., Hammurabi was already dead by that date according to Dating (c) as well as Dating (b), and, indeed, this date for the Hyksos conquest fits in with Dating (c) very neatly. As Professor Albright points out,¹

'According to my chronology [i.e. Dating (c)], the powerful Hyksos rulers of the Fifteenth Dynasty, who conquered Upper Egypt about 1675 B.C., reflect to a still unknown extent the irruption of the Hurrian and Indo-Aryan hordes who flooded Mesopotamia and nearly overwhelmed Babylonia after the death of Hammurabi, in the early years of his son, Samsu-iluna.'

In fact, the first appearance of the Hyksos' Kassite cousins in history, when, in the eighth year of Samsu-iluna's reign, they made an unsuccessful assault upon Babylonia,² would date, according to Dating (c), *circa* 1678 B.C.—that is, about three years before the Hyksos' successful assault on Egypt.

The Kassite Conquest of Babylonia and the Dating of the Reign of Hammurabi

If we hold that Hammurabi's reign must have been over before the conquest of Egypt by the Hyksos, *a fortiori* we are bound to hold that it must have been over before the conquest of Babylonia by the Kassites, and the chronology of the subsequent Kassite Rāj in Babylonia therefore gives us a sixth criterion for judging between the four rival datings for this epoch of South-West Asian history.

In A.D. 1952 this criterion, like the others, was not an instrument of precision; for in A.D. 1952 it was still uncertain exactly how long the Kassites had reigned, what was the exact year in the twelfth century B.C. with which the closing year of their reign was to be equated, and from what exact stage in their progressive conquest of the Land of Shinar they retrospectively dated the official inauguration of their régime. The closing year of the Kassite Dynasty's reign had been diversely dated *circa* 1172 B.C. by Eduard Meyer and *circa* 1150 B.C. by Albright.³ On the lower of these two rival equations the official beginning of the dynasty's reign would fall *circa* 1727/1726 B.C. on the authority of 'King-List A', which assigns to the thirty-six Kassite Kings a total of 576 years and 9 months.⁴ A discrepancy between this list and one of the synchro-

¹ In a letter of the 20th November, 1951, to the writer of this Study.

² See p. 186, above.

³ See Smith, *Alalakh*, p. 20. The exact date was probably 1151 B.C. according to M. B. Rowton, in *Iraq*, vol. viii, p. 97; 1157-1155 B.C. according to Dr. Sidney Smith in a letter of the 13th October, 1951, to the writer of this Study; 1158 B.C. according to van der Meer, *op. cit.*, p. 16; 1162 B.C. according to Cavaignac, E., in *Revue d'Assyriologie*, vol. xl (1945-6), p. 20.

⁴ On Rowton's reckoning that, in the Ancient Near East, 16 years was the average length of a reign, a total of 576 years for the Kassite Rāj would exactly conform to the general average, supposing that none of the 36 reigns assigned to this epoch of 576 years

nous lists disinterred at Asshur indicated, however, that some of the reigns reckoned as successive in 'List A' might in truth have been at least partly contemporary with one another;¹ and this would mean that the date of the official inauguration of the dynasty might be appreciably lower than 1727/1726 B.C., even if the average length of all the thirty-six Kassite reigns was, not twelve years, but sixteen, while it could not be higher than 1749 B.C., even if, as now seemed improbable, 'King-List A' were correct and if, besides this, Eduard Meyer were, after all, not in error in dating its terminal year as early as 1172 B.C.

It will be seen that what was known in A.D. 1952 about the chronology of the Kassite Dynasty was almost certainly compatible with Dating (b), since the highest possible date for the inauguration of the Kassite Rāj was 1749 B.C., and, according to Dating (b), this was just later than the date of Hammurabi's death in 1750 B.C. and was only seven years earlier than the eighth year of Samsu-iluna's reign—reckoned as the year 1743 B.C. according to Dating (b)—in which the Kassites make their first recorded appearance. The probability that some of the Kassite reigns were contemporaneous and the possibility that the terminal date of the Kassite Rāj may have been *circa* 1151/1150 B.C., not *circa* 1172 B.C., make it highly probable that the inaugural date of the Kassite Rāj was later than 1743 B.C., even if the total duration of the Rāj was 576 years, as 'King-List A' states. At the same time, this Kassite criterion does not conclusively rule out Dating (c); for, as we have seen, the figure of 576 years for the total duration of the Rāj seems to be impugned by the figure for the average length of an individual reign that results from taking an average of the nineteen reigns of known lengths; and it is also significant that Dr. Sidney Smith, whose chronology (Dating (b)) would admit of a conquest by the Kassites of the whole of Babylonia up to the walls of Babylon itself at one blow at any time after 1743 B.C.—which, on this dating, was the date of the eighth year of Samsu-iluna's reign—marshals² an imposing array of evidence pointing to the probability that the Kassites made themselves masters of Babylonia by a gradual process of successive encroachments, beginning in Samsu-iluna's eighth year, which was not completed till the city of Babylon itself was occupied by Agum II Kakrime, the ninth king of the Kassite Dynasty, 148 years later, after the extinction of the First Dynasty of Babylon by the Hittite raider Muršiliš I. Agum II Kakrime was 'the first Kassite known to have undertaken restoration of buildings at Babylon. . . . There is no reliable evidence that any earlier king ruled the central provinces'.³ Smith's inference is that the Kassites dated the inauguration of their rāj, not from

by 'King-List A' had overlapped with one another. On the other hand the average worked out at only 12 years apiece for 19 reigns of Kassite kings, out of the total of 36, for which the figures given in 'King-List A' had been preserved. Considering that this Kassite average, if applied to all 36 reigns, would produce a total duration of not more than 432 years for the Kassite Rāj, the figure of 576 years, given for this total in 'King-List A', looks as if it might be too high, even on the assumption that none of the reigns had overlapped with one another, notwithstanding its exact conformity with the general average.

¹ See Smith, *Alalakh*, p. 18.

² In *Alalakh*, pp. 21-25.

³ Smith, *Alalakh*, p. 21.

the completion of their conquest of Babylonia,¹ but from their establishment of their first substantial foothold on Babylonian ground: perhaps from their acquisition of the eastern provinces as a consequence of their 'defeat' by Samsu-iluna, or perhaps from their subsequent extension of this first lodgement westwards over the Kingdom of Khana ('Anah) on the Middle Euphrates.²

Smith points out that two of Agum II Kakrime's (Kassite King No. 9's) successors, Kadashman-Harbe I (No. 16) and Burna-Buriash III (No. 20), were contemporaries of the Egyptian Emperor Amenhotep (Amenophis) III (*imperabat* 1413-1377 B.C., according to Wilson). The interval between Agum II's occupation of Babylon and the death of Amenhotep III would be 218 years (1595-1377 B.C.) according to Dating (b), 154 (1531-1377 B.C.) years according to Dating (c); and the possible duration of Kassite reigns Nos. 9-20 inclusive would be rather longer than this interval, whatever the length of the interval might be reckoned to be, since Agum II may have been on the throne some years before he occupied Babylon, while Burna-Buriash III may have outlived Amenhotep III. Since 12 reigns would run to about 192 years all told on an average of 16 years per reign, and to about 144 years all told on an average of 12 years per reign, it will be seen that Datings (b) and (c) were both alike compatible with the synchronism between the reigns of Kadashman-Harbe I and Burna-Buriash III and the reign of Amenhotep III.

On this showing, the chronology of the Kassite Rāj would not conclusively rule out Dating (c), though Dating (d) would hardly be compatible with the Kassite chronology on any interpretation of it.³

Some Provisional Conclusions from the Evidence as it stood in A.D. 1952

We have now examined six criteria for judging between the four rival datings for a span of 210 years of South-West Asian history, extending from the date of the earliest of the letters in King Šamši-Adad I's diplomatic correspondence to the overthrow of the First Dynasty of Babylon by the Hittite war-lord Muršiliš I. We have found in all six cases that the evidence, up to date, was too fragmentary to allow of either exactness or certainty in our conclusions. Yet, inexact and provisional though these conclusions admittedly were, they did appear to throw some light at least on the relative merits of the four rival datings on the test of the evidence as this stood at the moment. The tentative findings of our inquiry may be tabulated conveniently in the form of an examiner's schedule of marks, if the distinguished scholars whose rival views are here in question will forgive a layman for this rather impertinent treatment of them.

¹ The ninth king, Agum II Kakrime, went a long way towards completing the conquest; for, according to Smith, *ibid.*, this king annexed, not only the city of Babylon, but also 'the District of Nippur, previously held by the Sea-Land Dynasty.'

² The capital of Khana was Tirqa, the modern 'Asharah (Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 22).

³ This was pointed out by Professor W. F. Albright in a letter of the 5th January, 1952, to the writer of this Study.

Criterion	1	2	3	4	5	6
Dating	<i>The Khorsabad List of Kings of Assyria</i>	<i>The Twelfth Egyptian Dynasty in Syria</i>	<i>The Eighteenth Egyptian Dynasty in Syria</i>	<i>The Span of Hittite History between Muršiliš I and Tutkhaliya II</i>	<i>The Hyksos Conquest of Egypt</i>	<i>The Kassite Conquest of Babylonia</i>
(a)	$\gamma-$	$\gamma-$	α	β	α	γ
(b)	$\beta-$	$\beta-$	α	β	α	$\alpha+$
(c)	$\alpha+$	α	α	β	α	β
(d)	$\beta-$	α	β	γ	$\gamma-$	$\gamma-$

In this schedule, $\alpha+$ stands for 'probable almost to the point of certainty', α for 'probable', β for 'possible', $\beta-$ for 'just possible', γ for 'improbable', $\gamma-$ for 'improbable almost to the point of impossibility'. Any attempt to translate these symbols into precise numbers and then to add up each of the competitors' totals would be doubly misleading. It would suggest that it was possible to arrive at a much more definite assessment than was really practicable in A.D. 1952, and it would also suggest that all six criteria were of equal significance, whereas in truth No. 4 was, in its very nature, more subjective than the rest, while Nos. 3 and 5 were nets whose meshes were so loosely knit that they would let through gnats and camels indiscriminately. On this account the signal failure of Dating (d) to satisfy even Criterion No. 5 would have been a damagingly bad mark if there had not been grave doubts whether the date of the Hyksos invasion of Egypt was a valid criterion for our purpose of determining the chronology of South-West Asian history.

When we take into account all six columns of marks, we find that Datings (a) and (d) are both debited with two $\gamma-$, whereas neither Dating (b) nor Dating (c) has any gammas to its discredit. If we take account of Criteria Nos. 1, 2, and 6 only, we find that Dating (a)'s marks are $\gamma-$, $\gamma-$, γ , and Dating (d)'s marks $\beta-$, α , $\gamma-$, whereas Dating (b)'s marks are $\beta-$, $\beta-$, $\alpha+$, and Dating (c)'s marks $\alpha+$, α , β . We may perhaps fairly conclude that, though Dating (d) fares better than Dating (a), both (d) and (a) are practically out of the running, and that only (b) and (c) are left in the field. We may go on to conclude that, though (b)'s marks are appreciably lower than (c)'s, we should not be justified on that account in eliminating (b) and pronouncing (c) to be the winner; for, though (c) looks like the winner on Criterion No. 1, (b) looks no less like the winner on Criterion No. 6. As the evidence stood in A.D. 1952, Dating (b)'s strong point was its consonance with what was known so far about the chronology of the Kassite Rāj in Babylonia, and Dating (c)'s strong point its consonance with what was known so far about the Khorsabad List of Kings of Assyria. These two apparently winning cards could not be played against one another, because there was no means of assessing their relative value. Accordingly, in A.D. 1952 it seemed prudent simply to record Datings (b) and (c) side by side, without attempting to make any absolute appraisal of their respective merits. On the other hand the failure of Dating (a) to fit in with any possible interpretation of the Khorsabad List and its synchronization of Šamši-Adad's diplomatic correspondence with the apogee of the Twelfth Egyptian

Dynasty's ascendancy in Syria were marks which, between them, seemed to disqualify Dating (*a*); and Dating (*d*) seemed likewise to be disqualified by its placing of Hammurabi's death at a lower date than the lowest possible date for the Hyksos conquest of Egypt, together with its failure to allow sufficient time for the duration of the Kassite Rāj in Babylonia even on the shortest credible estimate of this.

The Chronology adopted in Volumes vii-x of this Study.

On the strength of the considerations set out above, the reigns of Hammurabi and of any other sovereigns belonging to the First Dynasty of Babylon have been dated, in passages where they are mentioned in volumes vii-x of this Study, by simply giving the figures according to Dating (*b*) and to Dating (*c*) side by side. Earlier events in Sumeric history have been given corresponding pairs of dates which have been calculated by reducing, to terms of Datings (*b*) and (*c*) respectively, the Time-intervals allowed, for the history of this age, in Eduard Meyer's chronology. The writer is aware that, for reasons given by Sidney Smith,¹ this procedure for dating the pre-Babylonian chapters of South-West Asian history is arbitrary and that the results can, at best, be no more than approximately correct. All the same, it seems better to hazard an approximate dating than to leave all earlier chapters of Sumeric history hanging in the air without even the vaguest chronological *point d'appui*.

In the field of Egyptiac history from the beginning of the Eleventh Dynasty to the end of the Twelfth Dynasty the writer has adopted Parker's chronology,² which, for the most part, is nine years lower than Eduard Meyer's. As for the earlier chapters of Egyptiac history, the writer has felt that here too, as in the Sumeric field, even the vaguest approximation is preferable to 'a perfect and absolute blank', and he has therefore reproduced, here, Wilson's datings,³ which are commended not only by their authorship but by the reassuringly modest tentativeness of their author in his presentation of them. In following the lead of an eminent living Egyptologist in a course that seemed, here too, to be the lesser evil, the writer of this Study was aware that, in these earlier chapters of Egyptiac history, the probability of error—in the state of knowledge as it was in A.D. 1952—was considerable.⁴ Wilson's datings have been followed likewise in the dates given in vols. vii-x of this Study for reigns of pharaohs in the age of 'the New Empire'.⁵

¹ See Sidney Smith's judgement cited on p. 171, above.

² As given in Parker, R. A.: *The Calendars of Ancient Egypt* (Chicago 1950, University of Chicago Press).

³ As given in Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), p. vii. Dr. Sidney Smith, in a letter of the 13th October, 1951, to the writer of this Study, suggests, as minimum datings, the same dates as Wilson suggests for Dynasties III-V inclusive and for Dynasties VI-XI inclusive.

⁴ See Sidney Smith's and W. F. Edgerton's judgements quoted on p. 182, above. Wilson himself notes, in loc. cit., that 'in general it may be said that dates proposed for the period around 3000 B.C. may have a margin of error of 100 years, those around 2500 B.C. of 75 years'.

⁵ Wilson himself notes, *ibid.*, that dates proposed by him for the period around 1500-1000 B.C. may have a margin of error of 10-15 years.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND THANKS

I

To Marcus, for teaching me to return Thanks to my Benefactors

Marcus Aurelius taught me by example how good and how pleasant it is for a writer to declare his gratitude to his pastors and masters. The first of the twelve books of Marcus's *Meditations* consists of a recital of his spiritual debts; and, when I read the *Meditations* for the first time in A.D. 1913, this one book moved me more than the eleven books containing Marcus's notes of his own philosophy. I was struck by the warmth of the human feeling that this first book displays, and by the sincerity and delicacy with which this feeling is expressed. The lesson that I then learnt from Marcus has been in my mind for the past thirty-nine years, and now the time has come for me to act on it.

II

To my Mother, for making me an Historian

My Mother awakened in me a life-long interest in History by communicating to me her own interest in it at a very early stage of my life. At the youngest age to which my memory can travel back, I was already possessed, thanks to what my Mother had by then already done for me, by a love for History which has never left me. If my Mother had not given my mind—and heart too—this early bent, I am sure that I should not ever have written this book; so she bears some responsibility for the undertaking.

III

To Edward Gibbon, for showing me, by Example, what an Historian could do

Edward Gibbon, in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, has always been my cynosure; and I have come to appreciate the greatness of his intellectual powers as I have come to realize that he did almost all that he did do by sheer intellectual prowess, in despite of the handicap imposed on his imagination by the narrowness of his sympathies with the human objects of his historical studies.

IV

To People, Institutions, Landscapes, Monuments, Pictures, Languages, and Books, for exciting my Curiosity

My great-uncle Captain Henry Toynbee (*vivebat* A.D. 1819–1909), who had commanded the East Indiamen *Ellenborough*, *Gloriana*, *Marlborough*, and *Hotspur* and had retired from the sea in A.D. 1866, to become Marine Superintendent of the Meteorological Office in London,

without ever having served on a steamship, made me familiar with the build and life of the full-rigged sailing ship, which had been the master tool of the Western Civilization in its Modern Age, and which has vanished from the face of the seas within my own lifetime.

My great-uncle conjured up for me, as living realities, not only the Modern Western square-rigged sailing ship and the seas over which she sailed, but also the ports in India and China for which she was bound. I could picture the Hoogly pilot coming on board in all his glory, and the laskars chanting sonorous epic poetry as they laboured at the capstan. Every Sunday afternoon my uncle's old friend General Crofton, who lived in Westbourne Square and had sailed from England to India in my uncle's ship with reinforcements during the Indian Mutiny, used to come to tea at our house in London, No. 12 Upper Westbourne Terrace, and I was never tired of hearing the two old men exchanging reminiscences. (On one of these Sundays my uncle's nephew by marriage, Colonel Baden Powell, then just home from Mafeking and at the height of his fame, also came to call; and the two old men, after their usual talk about the Indian Mutiny, finally turned to their junior and asked him politely whether they were not right in thinking that he, too, had lately been on active service somewhere or other, and whether he would not tell them something about it. While my parents and I could hardly contain our laughter, the hero of the South African War had to tell us, as news, all that had been in the headlines months ago. He did what had been asked of him with a good humour that was vastly to his credit.)

The sea captain's and the sapper general's talk, the gigantic triple section of bamboo stem standing by the fireplace in the back part of the dining-room, the copper bonze riding the buffalo (then in the glass bookcase, and today on the mantelpiece in my study), the set of red and white Indian chessmen, Aunt Ellen's water-colour sketches of Indian scenes round the dining-room walls, and the fascinating legend of the duck-barge on the Yangtse, to which the ducks were summoned home at nightfall by a trumpet call—and came home quick, because they all knew that the last duck to return would be soundly thrashed—all this made India and China come alive for me. The evocation of these other worlds in my imagination was completed by my delight in the exotic trees in 'the Flower Walk' in Kensington Gardens, and by the models of Indian houses and villages (monkeys and all) and of Chinese rock-gardens in the Indian Museum. (These last, if I remember right, were gifts from the Manchu Imperial Court to Napoleon which had been intercepted by the British Navy.)

The Albert Memorial in Kensington Gardens peopled my world for me, while I was still in the perambulator, with continents, quadrupeds, poets, artists, sculptors, philosophers, and men of science.

The Indian Museum and the Victoria and Albert Museum in South Kensington, the United Services Museum in Whitehall, the British Museum, the Wallace Collection, the Tate Gallery, the National Gallery, and the Tower of London had put the visible works of Man on my

mental map for me long before I had travelled as far as one day's journey from the Fountains at the head of the Serpentine in Kensington Gardens, which were and are the *omphalos* of my *Oikoumenê*.

Relfe Brothers' *Charterhouse Oxford and Cambridge Atlas*, which I acquired when I went to school in the autumn of A.D. 1896, put on the map for me New York, Vesuvius, and Palestine. A picture of Vesuvius smoking, and an equally exciting sketch-map of New York expanding, faced one another on the frontispiece, and the last map of all—'the World as Known to the Ancients'—excited me because it was centred on the Mediterranean Sea and not on the European peninsula of Asia. On this illuminating map I began to learn the names of the provinces of the Roman Empire; and I remember another boy putting his finger one day on the shore of the remotest corner of the land-locked sea and saying to me, 'That is Palestine'. I could hardly believe that a country which was already so familiar to me from the Bible could be marooned in such an out-of-the-way spot. It was not till long afterwards, when the Indic and the Sinic Civilization had risen above my horizon, that I realized how right our Medieval Western Christian forebears had been in locating the centre of the *Oikoumenê* at Jerusalem, and not at Rome, Paris, Greenwich, or any other point in their own eccentric Feringistan.

Karl von Spruner and Theodor Menke revealed to me the history of the civilizations in the bird's-eye view of cartography, in which, long before the days of flights at the altitude of the stratosphere, the human eye had found a means of taking in at a glance tracts of Space and Time so vast that it would have required innumerable volumes to describe them in the prolix medium of words. The first historical atlas that had come into my hands had been an English one, bought for me in a bookshop in Birmingham by my uncle, Percy Frankland, when I was staying with him and my Aunt Grace in the spring of A.D. 1903 during my convalescence from an illness, and this gift had already given me a new insight into History; but, as far back as I could remember, my Mother had been telling me that the best historical atlas in the World was the German masterpiece 'Spruner-Menke'; on my return to school at Winchester in the summer term of A.D. 1903, I came upon an early edition of this in Moberly Library; and, after that, my first purchase with my first prize money was a set of the latest editions of all three volumes of this supremely great work of German scholarship.¹ My Mother made me a brown holland cover for these folios, as a token that they were a *κτῆμα* *ἐς αἰεὶ*; and, ever since, they have continued to be my constant companions and mentors.

The city of York lifted England for me out of an artificial insularity and put this would-be *alter orbis*² back into its proper place as an

¹ Spruner, K. von: *Atlas Antiquus*, 3rd ed., edited by Th. Menke (Gotha 1862, Perthes); idem: *Hand-Atlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neueren Zeit*, 3rd ed., edited by Th. Menke (Gotha 1880, Perthes); idem: *Hand-Atlas zur Geschichte Asiens, Afrikas, Amerikas, und Australiens*, 2nd ed. (Gotha 1855, Perthes).

² See I. i. 17.

integral part of the *Oikoumenê*. In the names of the streets—Coney Street, Gudrumgate, and the rest—I rediscovered the Danish forefathers of my own family whose home was in the Lincolnshire fens, and I recollected that, in the reign of King Canute, England had been a province of a Scandinavian thalassocracy encircling the North Sea—as, in the days of Constantine the Great, who had been raised on the shield in York, and of Septimius Severus, who had died there, Britain had been a province of a Roman thalassocracy encircling the Mediterranean.

The glory of God, declared¹ in the beauty of *die unbegreiflich hohen Werke*² upon which the puny works of Man have been embroidered, was revealed to me when I saw Parnassus and Helicon and the Acrocorinthus from the Gulf of Corinth; the Acropolis of Athens from round the shoulder of Salamis; Olympus from Dhomokó (a white peak floating on air); Taygetus, stern-on, from Dhimitsána; the mountains of Crete from the crater-rim of Santorin, as they reared their heads out of the sea in the sudden visibility lent to them by nightfall; the Sun setting through the Golden Gate at San Francisco; the Via Appia Antica and the Inland Sea of Japan in the moonlight; Nara haunted by its holy deer; monasteries perched like eyries on the crags of Athos; cenotaphs of the heroes of Japan under the shadow of giant cryptomerias on Koya San; the Great Wall of China wriggling like a snake over billowy mountains; the Roman Wall crowning the crags at Howsteads; the Siebengebirge writhing down on to the Great North European Plain; the Great North Road running out of Seoul to seek Peking; the Rocky Mountains rushing, for an hour before we reached them, to meet our aeroplane at a speed of three hundred miles an hour; the skyline of New York from the eastern approaches; the battlements of the Kremlin at 2.30 a.m. on a winter's night; Lake Baikal with the Sun setting behind its engirdling mountains, as the train picked its way round the southern shore; the valley of the Connecticut River clad in its autumn scarlet and gold; the Mongol Valley of the Shilka and the Ottoman valley of the Hebrus; Boghazqal'eh offering a grander stage than Hisârlyq for the Second Book of *The Aeneid*; the apparition, between serried palm-groves and serried palm-groves, of *majnûn* wharves and refineries at Abadân; Cologne Cathedral looming up at the end of a transcontinental journey home to Western Christendom from Vladivostok; the purple citadel of Jodhpur and the blue sky piercing rose-red marble fretworks at Ahmadabad; the ruins of Rievaulx Abbey from the terrace above; the Sainte Chapelle; Chartres Cathedral; Durham Cathedral seen stern-on from across the river, and the overwhelming first impression of the giant round columns, weirdly carved in hypnotizing patterns; Waynflete's chantry in the cloisters of the College of St. Mary de Winton prope Winton; the ilex in the cloisters of the College of St. Mary de Winton ad Oxon; the Ayía Sophía, the Küchük Ayía Sophía, and the mosque of Mehmed Sököllü Pasha in Istanbul; the tiles in the mosque of Rüstem Pasha; the Qahrîyeh Jâmi'sy with its live

¹ Psalm xix. 1.

² Goethe: *Faust*, I. 249.

mosaics; the Green Mosque at Brusa; the masonry of Aleppo; the Altar and Temple of Heaven at Peking; the Pyramids of the Sun and Moon at Teotihuacán; the church-crowned pyramid at Cholula; Palenque defying the tropical forest; the thirsty cities of the Puuc; Monte Alban, at whose epiphany in his majesty the Acropolis of Sardis dwindles to the stature of a mole-hill; the cock-crows rising, faint but clear, from a sleepy city far below, as the dawn breaks upon the summit of the citadel of Afyūn Qāra Hisār; the blue wall of Taurus rising up sheer on either hand, as we sight it at the watershed *en route* from Nigdeh to the Cilician Gates; the bust of Antiochus the Great and the statue of Julian the Apostate in the Louvre; the bust of Nefertiti in the Reichsmuseum at Berlin.

As a present for my sixteenth birthday, my uncle William Toynbee gave me tickets for my Mother and me to see a performance of Gilbert Murray's translation of *The Trojan Women* of Euripides. As I write this, on the 11th May, 1951, I am taking out of the row of G. M.'s works in the bookcase, given me by my Mother, in my study at 45 Pembroke Square, the copy of the text that we bought at the theatre, with my name in it in my Mother's handwriting, dated '25th April, 1905'. That afternoon, I learnt that a Greek play could be conjured back to life.

My Mother introduced me to Robert Browning. In my fourth year at Winchester his poetry was one of the three special subjects set for our English Literature Prize, and, in the Christmas holidays of A.D. 1905-6, my Mother and I read Browning together. I can remember the evening, in the lamplight, when she opened a volume and said: 'I will begin with *My Star*; I wonder what you will think of it.' Her pleasure at the prospect of sharing her love of Browning's poetry with me had opened my heart to the poet before I had heard a line.

Cyril Bailey introduced me to Lucretius when I was finishing my education in the Hellenic literature by reading for the School of *Litterae Graecae et Latinae* at Oxford.

Supremus veniet, clueat qui dignu' poeta—
Hic deus, hic—fundens divinâ carmina voce.

I could never emulate my tutor's learning in the text of Lucretius's poem¹ or in the philosophy of Lucretius's master Epicurus,² or in the ideas of the atomic school of Hellenic scientists on whose system Epicurus drew for his own ethical purposes;³ but I could and did catch from him his admiration for the Roman poet's work and his love for the nobly austere and sensitive personality that shines through an impersonal exposition of a drab theory about the nature of the Universe.

¹ *Titi Lucreti Cari de Rerum Naturâ libri sex*, edited by Cyril Bailey (Oxford 1947, Clarendon Press, 3 vols.).

² *Epicurus: The Extant Remains*, edited by Cyril Bailey (Oxford 1926, Clarendon Press).

³ Bailey, Cyril: *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (Oxford 1928, Clarendon Press).

Professor Sir Thomas Arnold and Professor H. A. R. Gibb gave me an invaluable start—not carried farther yet—towards learning Arabic, and ‘Alī Rizā Bey towards learning Turkish.

Reynold A. Nicholson, in his *Translations of Eastern Poetry and Prose*,¹ gave me a glimpse of a Classical Islamic literature that I was unable to read in the original.

Arthur Waley, in his *A Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems*,² gave me a glimpse of a Classical Sinic literature that I was unable to read in the original.

Moberly Library in the College of St. Mary de Winton prope Winton, the library of Balliol College, Oxford, the Finlay Library and the general library at the British Archaeological School at Athens, the library of the Societies for the Promotion of Hellenic and Roman Studies in London, the library of the School of Oriental Studies in the University of London, and the Long Gallery at Castle Howard opened up for me the vast universe of Modern Western printed books.

Thor Heyerdahl, in *Kon-Tiki*,³ revealed to me ‘the works of the Lord and His wonders in the deep,’⁴ and this revelation taught me the secret of a latter-day Norwegian hero’s Viking ancestors’ achievements.

The genealogy of the descendants of Noah’s three sons in the tenth chapter of the Book of Genesis gave me my first notion of the differentiation of the Human Race into divers groups and sub-groups, and of the historical problems raised by the question how these groups are related to one another. Coming across the chapter, as I did, in a lesson at school when I was seven years old, I was excited to find myself, as I supposed, being admitted to an inside view of the panorama of the unfolding of human history from the bud. It was not till I read E. Forrer’s *Die Provinzeinteilung des Assyrischen Reiches*,⁵ pp. 70–82, that I fully realized the lateness of the date and the shortness of the period represented by the catalogue, given in verses 2–5, of the sons and grandsons of Japheth. This catalogue proves, in the light of Assyriology, to be a mirror of the political map of the northern borderlands of the Assyrian Empire within the hundred years beginning *circa* 725 B.C. All the same, this late and ephemeral Israelitish *mappa mundi* did me the inestimable service of introducing me to the problem of Mankind’s diversity-in-unity.

H. Drummond, in his *Tropical Africa*,⁶ revealed to me, when I was a child, the life of Primitive Man in one of his last fastnesses, at a moment when this primitive way of life was being broken up by the Modern

¹ Cambridge 1922, University Press.

² Chicago 1950, Rand McNally.

³ Leipzig 1920, Hinrichs.

⁴ London 1920, Constable.

⁵ Psalm cvii. 24.

⁶ London 1888, Hodder & Stoughton.

Western Civilization's steam plough galloping in the tracks of the Islamic Civilization's harrow.

Sir Edward Creasy, in *The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*,¹ gave me my first notion of Universal History. In the Time-dimension the book carries the reader's mind backward as far as 490 B.C. and forward as far as A.D. 1815, while in the Space-dimension it carries him outwards, within that span of 2,305 years, from the Basin of the Aegean Sea across South-Western Asia to the Panjab, across the Black Sea to the Ukraine, and across the Atlantic Ocean to North America. Out of the fifteen battles in Creasy's canon of historical scripture, Arbela, Metaurus, Châlons, and Tours were the most fascinating for me. As I read, I saw Alexander, Hannibal, Attila, and 'Abd-ar-Rahmān rise in turn above my horizon; but, while my imagination was being stirred by these titanic figures, my mind was being educated by the intervening synopses of events in which the author had skilfully strung his fifteen great occasions along one continuous chronological thread.

The authors of four volumes of *The Story of the Nations*²—all four of them on my table on this twenty-first day of February, 1951, fifty-three years after they first came into my hands—suddenly revealed to me, when I was eight or nine years old, the histories of the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Syriac civilizations simultaneously, and thereby initiated me into a synoptic view of History which has been illuminating my study of History since then. These four volumes had belonged to my grandmother Harriet Toynbee (her bookplate is in each of them), and, after her death in A.D. 1897, they were given to my Mother because she was the historian in the family. I remember, as if it were yesterday, catching sight, one morning after breakfast, of this batch of unfamiliar green and brown volumes on a familiar book-shelf. Curiosity moved me to pull them out, and, as soon as I opened them, I found them absorbing. They revealed to me a vista that has been widening and lengthening ever since. My first step towards enlarging it was to buy, with savings from my pocket money, Z. A. Ragozin's *Chaldea* (5th ed., 1896),³ to which the same author's *Assyria* had been a sequel. 'Arnold J. Toynbee, March 1899', is inscribed in this volume in my Mother's handwriting.

¹ The copy which my Father gave me in A.D. 1898 was of the forty-first edition, published in that year (London, Bentley).

² The series was published in London by Fisher Unwin. The four volumes that were of momentous personal importance for me were George Rawlinson's *Ancient Egypt* (2nd edition, 1887); Z. A. Ragozin's *Assyria* (1888); Ragozin's *Media, Babylon, and Persia* (1889); Arthur Gilman's *The Saracens* (1887).

³ The first edition of *Chaldea* had been published in A.D. 1886. Notwithstanding the title of this book, the subject of it was not the wanderings of the Chaldaean Nomad barbarians who had filtered into the south-western fringes of the Land of Shinar out of the North Arabian Steppe in a Völkerwanderung circa 1425-1125 B.C.; it was the genesis and growth of a civilization that, in this Study, has been labelled 'the Sumeric' after the name of the Sumerian people who originated it. The Biblical terminology 'Ur of the Chaldees' (Genesis xi. 31) had led the Western discoverers of this long buried forgotten culture to jump to the mistaken conclusion that the Chaldaeans had been the latest comers before the Sumerians, instead of realizing that they had been the latest comers before the Arabs.

A. J. Church's *Stories of the East from Herodotus*¹ introduced me to the vast and variegated landscape of Herodotus's *Oikoumenē*. The pictures opened my eyes to two distinctive styles of art that were the respective signatures of the Egyptian and the Babylonian Civilization.

J. P. Mahaffy, in his volume² on *Alexander's Empire*³ in the *Story of the Nations*, revealed to me the post-Alexandrine chapter of Hellenic history. I can remember my excitement when, as I opened the book in the foyer of a theatre to which my parents were taking me during one of my holidays from school, I came upon the map showing Hellenism pushing its way from European Greece into the Indus Valley across all the derelict satrapies of a shattered Achaemenian Empire. But it was not till I opened the book again, after an interval of many years, on the 17th April, 1951, that I noticed and appreciated the author's historical insight in reproducing on the cover the bust, not of Alexander, but of Epicurus.

Edwyn Bevan, in his *The House of Seleucus*,⁴ carried me farther into the fascinating study of post-Alexandrine Hellenic history into which I had been initiated by J. P. Mahaffy in his *Alexander's Empire*. Afterwards, when I had the happiness of coming to know Edwyn Bevan personally, I learnt more from this great Christian historian than even he knew how to put into any book.

Emil Schürer, in his *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*,⁵ revealed to me the illuminating historical truth that, in the time of Christ, the Coele Syria that had been conquered from the Ptolemies by the Seleucidae in 202–198 B.C. was a cultural arena in which the Jewish forlorn hope of a Syriac Society was engaged with an aggressive Hellenism *corps à corps*. I vividly remember a Sunday morning at Winchester in Cloister Time, A.D. 1907, when, as I was reading the Second Division, volume i, paragraphs 22 and 23, of Schürer's *History* in bed before breakfast, I made the exciting discovery of the Hellenic city-states—ranged in a pair of parallel tiers, one tier along the coast and another along the well-wooded and well-watered uplands of Transjordania—of which I had already taken a visual cognizance, without having grasped their full historical significance, on two maps⁶ in Spruner's *Atlas Antiquus* on which they were coloured a conspicuous red and were labelled 'urbes Graecanicae'. This summer's morning, as I began to make myself better acquainted with this Coele-Syrian galaxy of Hellenic city-states in Schürer's industriously compiled gazetteer, I learnt for the first time that an Hellenic Gadara, which had been notorious to its Jewish neighbours in the time of Christ for nothing but

¹ London 1881 [1880], Seeley.

² Dedicated to the father of my two contemporaries and friends, Allen and Rex Leeper.

³ Sixth edition: London 1895, Fisher Unwin.

⁴ London 1902, Edward Arnold, 2 vols.

⁵ English translation: two parts in five volumes, with a sixth volume containing an index: Edinburgh 1890–1, Clark.

⁶ Nos. XIII ('Mare Internum cum Populis Adiacentibus à Pompeii ex Asiâ Reditu usque ad Bellum Actiacum') and XXVI ('Judaea Maccabaeorum Tempore').

a Gentile disregard of the Mosaic tabu against breeding swine, had given birth, at the turn of the second and the last century B.C., to the Meleager who was the author of the famous garland poem in the *Anthologia Palatina*, and thereafter to a Theodorus who had made himself sufficiently eminent as a professor of Greek literature to obtain the post of tutor to the future Emperor Tiberius. As this fresh light on the scene of the stampede of the Gadarene Swine began to dawn on me, I felt as if the early morning sunlight, which at that moment was turning the walls of Chapel into glowing gold, were performing some equivalent alchemy in my mind.

Canon George Rawlinson, in *The Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy*,¹ which I read during my convalescence from an illness in the winter of A.D. 1902-3, revealed to me a Sasanian chapter of Iranian history in which Iran had held her own against a Rome that had commanded the united forces of the entire Hellenic World.

V. A. Smith, in *The Early History of India*,² revealed to me the histories of the rise and fall of the Indic Civilization and the rise of its Hindu successor. I stumbled on an early edition of it in the library of Balliol College, Oxford, in A.D. 1907. A later edition has been one of my constant companions since April, 1920.

Friedrich Hirth, in *The Ancient History of China*,³ revealed to me the history of the Sinic Civilization down to a date thirty-five years short of the founding of a Sinic universal state by Ts'ing She Hwang-ti. I stumbled on a copy in one of the book-shops on the south side of Broad Street, Oxford, while I was an undergraduate. A copy of the second reprint, bought in Boston, Mass., in October 1925, has been one of my constant companions.

Sir William Tarn, in *The Greeks in Bactria and India*,⁴ revealed to me the crucible of the Mahāyāna.

Sir Aurel Stein, in a lantern lecture on his Central Asian expedition of A.D. 1907-8 which he gave in the great hall of the Examination Schools at Oxford while I was an undergraduate (*studia Oxoniae exercebam* A.D. 1907-11), revealed to me the Central Asian corridor in which the Indic and the Judaic religions had once run into one another and had afterwards travelled forward abreast on their eastward journey into a Sinic World. I followed up the vista that had been opened for me in this lecture by reading the archaeologist-explorer's *Sand-Buried Ruins of Khotan*.⁵

Sir Charles Eliot, in his *Hinduism and Buddhism*,⁶ gave me the sensation of being shown the other side of the Moon by revealing to me the

¹ London 1876, Longmans, Green.

² Published at Oxford by the Clarendon Press (1st ed., 1904; 3rd ed., 1914).

³ Published in New York in A.D. 1908 by the Columbia University Press.

⁴ Cambridge 1938, University Press.

⁵ M. A. Stein: *Sand-Buried Ruins of Khotan* (London 1904, Hurst & Blackett).

⁶ London 1921, Edward Arnold, 3 vols.

history and *éthos* of that half of the *Oikoumenê* that has received its higher religious illumination from an Indic, and not from a Judaic, source. My geographical horizon, historical vista, and gamut of spiritual experience had all been doubled before I had finished reading this great book.

Michael Rostovtzeff, in his *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*,¹ revealed to me the Nomad Civilization of the Great Eurasian Steppe.

Sir Henry Yule, in his edition of Marco Polo's book,² and Sir Henry Howorth, in his history of the Mongols,³ revealed to me the heart of the Eurasian Steppe, with an *alter orbis* in Eastern Asia, on the far side of it, which Herodotus leaves still tantalizingly veiled when he lifts one corner of the curtain of ignorance to uncover the waterless ocean's western bay. I shall never forget my sensations when, one evening in June 1908, as the night-train for Aberdeen slid out of King's Cross Station, I opened the first volume of Howorth's pioneer work and saw a vast unknown landscape spread itself before my eyes: Kin and Sung and Tangut; Qāra Qitāy and Khwārizm; Naiman and Karāyit. When the train slid into Edinburgh early on the following morning, I was still busily taking on board a cargo of exciting new knowledge that has been a key part of my mental furniture ever since. Propped up with a pillow in my third-class corner-seat, I was sleepy but unsated. Thanks to Howorth's infectious enthusiasm for his subject, I had, I believe, that night, at second hand, some inkling of 'Messer Millione's' excitement when he saw his first sight of China with the eyes of the flesh.

W. H. Prescott, in his *History of the Conquest of Mexico*, which was read aloud to us at my preparatory school, put the civilizations of the New World on my mental map for me.

The Maudslay Collection revealed to me the history of the Mayan Civilization. As I was wandering round the British Museum one day in A.D. 1923, I stumbled on a room in which the central object on exhibition was a cast of a stone of a tortoise-like shape, but far larger than the largest giant tortoise that I had ever seen at the Zoological Gardens in Regent's Park; and I found that this object and its companions were covered with reliefs in a style, new to me, which was reminiscent of the Egyptian, the Sumeric, and the Sinic, and yet was distinctively different from each and all of these. These casts and originals—the fruits of A. P. Maudslay's field work in Mayan lands since A.D. 1881—had then just been brought up from the basement of the South Kensington Museum and placed on view in Bloomsbury. I did not leave the British Museum that afternoon without having bought the *Guide to the Mauds-*

¹ Oxford 1922, Clarendon Press.

² *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, translated into English by Sir H. Yule, 3rd ed., revised by H. Cordier (London 1903, John Murray, 2 vols.); Notes and Addenda by H. Cordier (London 1920, John Murray).

³ Howorth, H. H.: *History of the Mongols*, Parts I–III in 4 volumes (London 1876–1888, Longmans Green); Part IV, Supplement and Indexes (London 1928, Longmans).

lay *Collection of Maya Sculptures from Central America*, published in A.D. 1923 by order of the Trustees. The exhibits and the guide-book, between them, introduced me to a culture which had previously been beyond my historical horizon. I ascertained that the object which had first caught my eye was a cast of 'Monolithic Animal P' from Quiriguá. From that day onwards, the Mayan Civilization had a place on my mental map.

When, in July 1908, I was staying with my Mother's former pupil and life-long bosom friend Urith Perrot in her house at Blellach, near Dinnet, on Donside, I found there in the library Lactantius's *De Mortibus Persecutorum* and the Nuremberg Chronicle, and sat up reading them into the small hours of those twilight midsummer Scottish nights.

Thomas Hodgkin, in *Italy and her Invaders*,¹ awakened my interest in the post-Hellenic interregnum when I found and read the book in Moberly Library at Winchester.

The Benedictine Abbey at Ampleforth has made me aware of the spiritual impetus of the Western Christian monastic life, and has shown me that the secret of the historical continuity of the Benedictine Order is the whole-heartedness of the faith of Saint Benedict's spiritual sons. Listening to the singing of the Office in the church, and reminding myself that this *opus Dei* had been carried on without a break throughout the fourteen hundred years that had passed since the Founder's generation, I came to realize that this Western religious community, which was the matrix of Western Christendom, possessed a greater vitality than any of the secular institutions that had hived off from it. Driven from Westminster on to the Continent by the outbreak of the Reformation, this particular Benedictine community had struck root again at Dieulouard in Lorraine, where, for the next quarter of a millennium, it had been kept alive by a constant supply of English postulants who could follow the monastic calling only at the price of expatriation. Driven from Dieulouard back to England by the outbreak of the French Revolution, the community had struck fresh root in the vale of Ampleforth in Yorkshire. How had it managed to survive these successive uprootings? This question has been answered for me by my experience of the friendships that I have had the happiness of making with some of this community's living members.

My Mother made me aware that there had been a Byzantine, as well as a Carolingian, Empire, and that the Normans had conquered Sicily as well as England.

E. A. Freeman's *Historical Essays*² opened up for me vistas of Western and Hellenic history that led me out into the great open spaces beyond.

¹ Oxford 1892-9, Clarendon Press, 8 vols. in 9 parts.

² London: First Series 1871; Second Series 1873; Third Series 1879; Fourth Series 1892: all published by Macmillan.

Charles Oman, in *A History of the Art of War from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century*,¹ introduced me to the Cataphract² and made it clear to me that an age which had witnessed so great a revolution in military technique as the Late Roman reversion to cavalry from infantry could not be a mere epilogue, but must mark the opening of a new chapter of history. The Psalter of Theodore of Caesarea, from which Oman had reproduced some of the pictures of Byzantine fighting men, was shown to me by a friend of my Mother's in the British Museum.

Geoffroi de Villehardouin, as I sat reading his *Conquête de Constantinople* in de Wailly's attractive edition³ by the fireside in my Uncle Paget Toynbee's library at Fiveways, Burnham, Bucks, in December 1906, made me repeat to myself Lewis Carroll's satirical poem the *Walrus and the Carpenter* when I came to the gifted Champenois adventurer's unctuous account of the pious tears which the Frenchmen and the Venetians shed together over their cold-blooded bargains at Zara's and Byzantium's expense. I remembered that evening when, on the 21st February, 1912, I first set eyes on the Villehardouins' castle at Kalamáta.

Under Campbell Dodgson's auspices, my Mother and I spent many hours in the Print Room of the British Museum looking at Albrecht Dürer's drawings and sketches.

George Finlay, in *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864*,⁴ revealed to me the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the cultural reorientation of the Millet-i-Rûm from an Ottoman to a Western *qiblah*.

Colonel G. F. R. Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson*,⁵ which my father gave me to read in the summer holidays one year while I was at school at Winchester, revealed to me both the tragedy and the romance of the American Civil War.

Beech Point, near Danville, Kentucky, where I stayed with my dear friend Robert Shelby Darbishire for the first time in the summer of A.D. 1925, gave me a glimpse, from inside, of a post-Bellum rural South that was then still as remote in spirit from Cincinnati, across the Ohio, as I found Lithuania to be from East Prussia when I crossed another cultural frontier there in the spring of A.D. 1928.

¹ London 1898, Methuen.

² This early introduction to a type of military accoutrement which has never ceased to fascinate me once got me into trouble when, at my preparatory school, I was given, for translation into Latin, an account in English of Crassus's march eastward in 53 B.C. When I came to a sentence recording the King of Armenia's advice to the Roman commander to hug the Armenian foothills and give a wide berth to the Mesopotamian plains for fear of the Parthian cavalry, I translated the English word 'cavalry' by the Latin word 'cataphracti'. 'Where on earth did you run across that outlandish word?' asked the master, as he crossed it out in red ink and substituted a banal 'equites'. I dared not protest or even explain; yet I knew that no stroke of a magisterial pen could really avail to divest those Parthian centaurs of their iron carapaces.

³ Paris 1882, Firmin-Didot.

⁴ New edition, revised by H. F. Tozer: Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.

⁵ London 1898, Longmans, Green, 2 vols.

Sir Herbert Maxwell, in his *Sixty Years a Queen*, 'The Story of Her Majesty's Reign, Illustrated Chiefly from the Royal Collections',¹ revealed to me, in his panorama, the achievements of Victorian England.

My Mother's account of her conversation with the disgruntled custodian of the deserted royal palace at Hanover, when she visited it during her stay in Germany in A.D. 1885, made me realize, even as a child, that all was not well under the surface in Prussia-Germany.

Sir Lewis Namier, when he made his memorable first appearance at Balliol College, Oxford, as an undergraduate, in A.D. 1908, put on my mental map for me the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy and the Jewish Pale, which were then still quite unknown worlds for English undergraduates of our generation, though, within seven or eight years from then, half of us were to lose their lives in a general war fought to prevent Germany from establishing an ascendancy over Eastern Europe which, at the next stage, would have enabled her to make a bid for world dominion.

R. W. Seton-Watson ('Scotus Viator'), in his *Racial Problems in Hungary*,² lent to me by A. E. Zimmern in the summer term of A.D. 1909, illuminated for me a plague-spot in the East European landscape that Sir Lewis Namier had brought within my horizon.

Though 'historical novels' are apt to set my teeth on edge by offering me a stone instead of bread, I should be ungrateful indeed if I failed to acknowledge my debt to Herodotus for his tales of Mycerinus and Rhampsinitus and Nitocris, to Leo Tolstoy for his *War and Peace*, to Naomi Mitchison for her *The Corn King and the Spring Queen*,³ to L. S. Woolf for his *The Village in the Jungle*,⁴ to O. E. Rølvaag for his *Giants in the Earth*,⁵ to Georg Moritz Ebers for his *Uarda*,⁶ to Victor Hugo for his *Quatre-Vingt Treize* and *Les Misérables*, and to Émile Erckmann and Alexandre Chatrian for their *Le Blocus*. When I looked in at Phalsbourg on the 26th July, 1929, *en route* from Calais to Constantinople, its bastions and casemates were already so familiar to me that I could hardly believe that I was now setting eyes on them for the first time. I had found *Le Blocus* in a row of discarded books on a shelf in the pantry at No. 12 Upper Westbourne Terrace, and *Quatre-Vingt Treize* on a shelf in my Aunt Gertrude Toynebee's flat.

C. G. Jung, in his *Psychological Types*,⁷ opened up for me a new dimension in the realm of Life. The admirable catholicity with which Jung draws upon materials of the most diverse kinds for the illustration of his themes enabled me to find my way into the *terra incognita* of the

¹ London 1897, arranged and printed by Eyre & Spottiswoode, published by Harmsworth Bros.

² London 1908, Constable.

³ London 1913, Edward Arnold.

⁴ London 1931, Cape.

⁵ New York 1927, Harper.

⁶ English translation by C. Bull, Leipzig 1877, Low, 2 vols.

⁷ English translation: London 1923, Kegan Paul.

Psyche's subconscious abyss by proceeding from the known to the unknown. I was fascinated to watch, under Jung's analysis, the same primordial image coming to light in a familiar myth and in some *rebarbatif* clinical case in Jung's own professional practice which might have repelled my mind if my interest in the analysis of the myth had not drawn me on to take a consequent interest in the myth's clinical counterpart.

After Jung had thus given me the freedom of the New World of Psychology, I found here the equivalents, in the experience of the Soul, of a number of phenomena that I had already observed for myself in the experience of Society. The polarization of the *libido* (psychic energy) when it strikes an obstacle was the equivalent of the schism in the Body Social (mirror of the Soul) after a failure to respond to a challenge. The depression of subordinated functions into the Subconscious was the equivalent of the estrangement of a proletariat from a dominant minority. The explosive discharge of obstructed *libido* was the equivalent of a Völkerwanderung of barbarian war-bands when the *limes* behind which they have been pent up at last gives way in a collapse that had been symbolized for me in the bursting of the Dam of Ma'rib. A salvation proceeding from the Subconscious was the equivalent of a salvation proceeding from the Internal Proletariat. The re-emergence, after a submarine voyage, of splinters of conscious psychic life that have been submerged in the Subconscious was the equivalent of the re-emergence in the myth of Jesus, after a submarine voyage along the underground river of Folk-Memory, of a history of Agis and Cleomenes which had descended into the folk-lore of an Internal Proletariat. The projection of elements of the Subconscious upon external objects was the equivalent of the radiation of elements of the life of a disintegrating civilization into its external proletariat.

V

To People and Books, for teaching me Methods of Intellectual Work

H. J. Haselfoot, who initiated me at Wootton Court School, Kent, into the art of coping with unseen translations from Ancient Greek authors in preparation for the Winchester College scholarship elections of A.D. 1901 and A.D. 1902, taught me the sovereign intellectual art of deliberately taking time—even when time is short—to let the mind play round a problem and try to grasp it as a whole before plunging into any attempt to solve it in detail. This is the most valuable single lesson in intellectual method that I have ever been given. It made so deep an impression on me at the time that I was able to take it to heart, and I have used it, ever since, in every piece of intellectual work that I have ever undertaken.

I remember that my master and I started operations together on a description of a naval battle in Thucydides' *History of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War*. My master used this text (I think it must have been Book II, chapter 91) to show me how to arrive at the meaning of the Greek word *μετέωρος* by bringing my scanty acquaintance with the Greek vocabulary into relation with the context of the word in this passage.

This was a masterly piece of educational work for which I am abidingly grateful.

J. A. Smith allowed me to educate myself by listening in to a spacious and fertile mind thinking aloud.

The experience of working in H.B.M. Foreign Office in Whitehall during the First and then again during the Second World War taught me, as a temporary civil servant, two lessons that I have found invaluable for an historian.

The first lesson is that the acquisition of information is, not an end in itself, but only a means to the end of taking action. In the service of a government or any other institution, the action which is the purpose of the acquisition of information is, of course, action of the 'practical' kind; but the golden rule which I had learnt in the Foreign Office from the business of acquiring information for use in such 'practical' action proved to apply with equal force to an historian's work. Action taken on any plane will be in danger of going wrong if it is not taken in the light of the truth and of nothing but the truth; but it will be in equal danger of getting nowhere if it is not also taken in the light of no more of the truth than the minimum that is relevant to the particular piece of action that is on the current agenda.

This golden rule which the Intellect has to learn for itself by 'practical' experience has been made fool-proof on the subconscious level by being made there to work automatically; for the human Memory, as Bergson has pointed out, is a psychic mechanism which gives the Will a chance of taking action by withholding from the Consciousness every record in the vast and ever growing complete collection of past impressions that lies stored in a subconscious psychic depository, unless and until a particular record is required by the Consciousness for the practical purpose of enabling the Will to put some design into effect. If the mechanism of the Memory did not thus implacably withhold from the Consciousness all registered information that was not pertinent to the action in hand, the Consciousness would be paralysed, and perhaps even be driven mad, by an overwhelming flood of irrelevant recollections.

This first lesson that is to be learnt from working in a department of state has a second as its corollary. The information that is to be found in an official document will have been put there—if we may assume that the document has been drafted competently—in order to serve some official purpose which, whatever it may have been, will certainly not have been the irrelevant purpose of informing a future historian. The relevancy of documents to their 'practical' purposes increases their potential value as pieces of historical evidence, but the historian will not be able to profit by them for his own intellectual purpose unless and until he succeeds in rediscovering, or reconstructing, those quite different purposes for which they were made.

John Stuart Mill, in his *Autobiography*, taught me to keep my mind fresh by alternating, on some regular rhythm, between different kinds

of intellectual work. Between the wars I used to write the Chatham House Survey of International Affairs in the winter and spring in London and *A Study of History* in the summer and autumn in Yorkshire. In writing Parts VI–XIII of *A Study of History* since the 1st July, 1947, I have been able—thanks to the generosity of the Rockefeller Foundation of New York in making it possible for Chatham House to release my time to the necessary extent—to follow a daily cycle in London, working at home in the mornings and at Chatham House in the afternoons. The shorter the wave of this alternating rhythm of intellectual work, the longer, in my experience, is the time for which it is possible to go on working continuously on a long task without the mental engine's 'seizing'.

From seeing the mighty remains of Venetian fortresses in the Levant, I learnt to know something of Venice herself without having set eyes on her. From observing the impacts made by the Western Civilization upon other societies, I came to know something of the *êthos* of the West without having studied Western history.

Plato taught me, by example, not to be ashamed of using my imagination as well as my intellect. He taught me, when, in a mental voyage, I found myself at the upper limit of the atmosphere accessible to the Reason, not to hesitate to let my imagination carry me on up into the stratosphere on the wings of a myth. In never being either too proud or too timid to take to a myth for the sake of reconnoitring regions of the Spiritual Universe beyond the Reason's range, Plato was showing both the humility and the audacity of a great mind, and this Hellenic philosopher's example fortified me in an adverse Western mental environment in which I did not find any outstanding contemporary good example to follow. I have now lived to see the subconscious well-spring of Poetry and Prophecy restored to honour in the Western World by the genius of C. G. Jung; but, before Jung's star at last rose above my horizon, Plato's example, brought within my ken by an Hellenic classical education, had given me courage to part company with an early-twentieth-century Western *Zeitgeist* whose oracles were scales and dividers because, in this *Geist*'s self-blinkered eyes, the only realities were those that could be weighed and measured.

Lionel Curtis taught me, by example, a method of production and an attitude of mind which I have found, by experience, to be a sovereign help in dealing with difficult and, above all, with controversial subjects. He taught me that, in the writing of a book, as in every other human activity, the worst of all vices is the hybris that is the nemesis of self-conceit. An author is convicting himself of being past praying for if ever he allows the Old Adam in him to close his mind to a suggestion for some modification of his first draft by answering 'What I have written I have written.'¹ An author had better retire from business if he has not the humility to conceive of the possibility that, after all, he may be mistaken,

¹ John xix. 22.

and if he has not also the common sense to see, in the living authorities on his subject, not critics to be combated after publication, but mentors to be consulted before it, at a stage when it is still not too late to profit by their fruitfully chastening strictures. Taking my cue from Lionel Curtis, I have learnt to put my work through two stages when a controversial subject is on my agenda. The first stage is to produce as good a draft as I can manage out of my own resources. The second stage is to circulate this draft to a number of authorities who have divers experience, knowledge, standpoints, and feelings, and then to rewrite the passage in the light of their comments on the first draft. The first stage is indispensable because a draft is apt to draw comment—in contrast to a questionnaire, which is apt to find its way into a pigeon-hole, if not into the waste-paper basket. But this first stage is merely a prelude to the second, which is the fruitful one. The process of re-writing in the light of comments is fruitful because a synoptic view of comments from different angles gives an author a stereoscopic vision of his subject which is not attainable by a single pair of eyes. This method of taking counsel's opinion does not, of course, dispense the author from the responsibility of eventually taking a line of his own and staking his head on this. But it does put it in his power to give himself the best chance open to him of being of some service to his readers.

VI

To People and Books, for teaching me Methods of Literary Presentation

Theodor Mommsen, in *The History of the Roman Republic*, which I read, in my Aunt Gertrude Toynbee's copy of the English translation,¹ during the summer of A.D. 1907, between leaving school and going up to the University, taught me that an historical work was a better presentation of history for being also a work of art.

Pindar, the Attic playwrights, and Herodotus, interpreted for me by Sir John Myres,² taught me the use of the symmetrical rhythm of strophe and antistrophe. Herodotus also taught me his art of lightening the load on the main thread of a narrative by stowing away into annexes any matter remote enough from the central theme to be detachable from it, but not so remote that it could be simply left out of the book.

Aristotle taught me his method, of which he makes a masterly use in the *Politics*, of illustrating general propositions about human affairs by recounting apposite historical anecdotes.

Lucretius, in his *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book I, lines 58–61, taught me the literary value of ringing changes on synonyms for conveying the key terms in a system of ideas, as a device for avoiding the monotony of the effect that would be produced by invariably employing the same word

¹ English translation by W. P. Dickson: London 1887–8, Bentley, 4 vols. My Aunt Gertrude's copy, with my name written in it in her handwriting, dated 'September 1906', is here on my desk in May 1951.

² See Myres, J. L.: *Herodotus: Outline Analysis of Books I–VI* (Oxford 1912); *Herodotus, Father of History* (Oxford, 1953, Clarendon Press).

to denote the same inevitably oft-recurring term of art. His adroitness in manœuvring his cohort of interchangeable synonyms signifying atomic particles of matter—primordia, principia, prima elementa, corpora prima, semina rerum, genitalia corpora rebus¹—moved me to follow his example by ringing changes of my own on such approximately synonymous words as 'civilization', 'society', 'culture', and 'world' and approximately synonymous compound terms as 'universal state' and 'oecumenical empire'.

Clarendon, in *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England begun in the Year 1641*, taught me always to give a reference in a footnote to chapter and verse for every quotation that I made from the Bible. If this was good practice in England in Clarendon's day, when the Authorized Version of the Bible was a household book, it ought not to be abandoned in our time, when the Bible is rapidly passing into oblivion in the English-speaking countries. On this principle, I have given references for my quotations, not only from the Bible, but also from the Greek and Latin Classics.

I am thankful for the personal good fortune of having been born just not too late in the day to receive an old-fashioned English humane education in the Classics and in the Bible. Enough of the language of the Authorized Version of the Bible has lodged itself in my memory, through having repeatedly come to my ears in the lessons read in church, to bring into my mind, when I am writing, a flow of phrases, or reminiscences of phrases, from the Scriptures.² But I was born too late to become a *hāfiz*, even in the sacred book of my own ancestral religion; I know by heart only a word or two of the Qur'ān; and I have no acquaintance at all with the Pāli Scriptures of the Hinayanian sect of Buddhism or with the Confucian Classics. If I had managed to possess myself of these spiritual riches, I might have been able to do greater justice to the subject of this Study.

F. M. Cornford, in his *Thucydides Mythistoricus*,³ taught me to indicate, by the use of an abstract noun with its initial letter printed as a capital, the presence of one of those psychic principalities and powers—'The Tragic Passions', as Cornford calls them—for which there are no proper names in the sterilized vocabulary of a rationalist latter-day Western Society. Hilm and Aidôs, Civilization and Democracy and Industrialism, Archaism and Futurism, Time and Space, Law and

¹ See Cyril Bailey's edition of the *De Rerum Naturâ* (Oxford 1947, Clarendon Press, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 140.

² An English-speaking writer who has been brought up on the Authorized Version of the Bible is apt to take the use of its language for granted. Sir Lewis Namier, who had grown up in a Catholic country where the living Polish vernacular was impervious to influences emanating from the Latin of the Vulgate and the Liturgy, once passed on to me his own exciting discovery, made by him in England, that an archaic translation of the Bible and the Liturgy into a living vernacular enhances this fortunate language's powers of expression, not only by doubling its vocabulary, but also by giving a speaker or a writer an effective means of evoking emotion, in any degree that he may desire, by drawing on the Bible for reinforcements, ranging from faint allusions to explicit quotations, in support of the pedestrian language of every-day life.

³ London 1907, Edward Arnold.

Fortune, are a few examples, taken at random. This usage has, of course, its own drawback. On the analogy of personal names, it might be misinterpreted as conveying the false, and unintended, suggestion that these presences are personalities, when the truth is that they are non-personal emanations from a subconscious abyss of the Psyche that is the matrix of personalities as well. Yet a usage suggesting personification is at any rate less misleading than one suggesting that these entities are abstractions—as would be implied by printing the initial letters of the corresponding English words in lower-case type—for, though they are not personalities, they are charges of psychic energy that have power to work weal and woe in human affairs, and the lack of proper names for them in a latter-day Western vocabulary betrays a tell-tale lacuna in Modern Western thought and imagination and feeling. There are more things in Heaven and Earth than are dreamed of in Horatio's Western philosophy. τὸ πᾶν δαιμόνων πλήρες;¹ and, if I had been writing in either Greek or Latin, I should never have been troubled with this problem of semantics. The Greek word *δαιμόνες* and the Latin word *numina* bear joint witness to an awareness in Hellenic souls that these non-personal psychic presences are potent live realities.

In looking on at a Japanese puppet show at Osaka one afternoon in November 1929, I duly found, as I had been assured beforehand that I should find, it possible to entertain the illusion that the puppets were animated by an autonomous life of their own, although the human artists manipulating them were in full view of the spectators. An artistic effect which, in the West, would have been produced by the artifice of keeping the manipulators out of sight, was produced in Japan by their artistry in keeping themselves out of mind notwithstanding their visibility. The Japanese manipulators achieved this *tour de force* of managing to deflect the spectators' attention away from themselves and on to their puppets by making their own movements appear lifeless and their own countenances impassive. They succeeded, in fact, in subjectively effacing their objectively visible living human forms; and this *chef-d'œuvre* of Japanese art taught me a trick for serving my readers' convenience by signalling to them the careers and dates of persons mentioned in my text without distracting their attention from the narrative. I learnt to make these useful insertions unobtrusive by putting them into Latin and printing them in italics between brackets.

VII

To People, Monuments, Apparatus, Pictures, Books, and Events, for giving me Intuitions and Ideas

Robert Browning presented me with the phrase 'Challenge and Response'. I had flattered myself that this phrase was of my own coinage

¹ νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν Θεόν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἐμψυχον ἅμα καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρες (Thales, fragment 23); πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι (Thales, fragment 22).—Diels, H.: *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5th ed., vol. i (Berlin 1934, Weidmann), p. 79.

till, more than ten years after I had first put it on paper, I came upon it in the fourth stanza of Browning's *Master Hugues of Saxe Gotha*:

—O you may challenge them, not a response
Get the church-saints on their rounds!

The collocation of the two words must have lain submerged on some subconscious level of my mind for about a quarter of a century since the Christmas holidays of A.D. 1905–6, when I had first read the poem with my Mother. When I fancied that I was inventing it, I was only hauling it up from the hold of my memory.

Professor F. J. Teggart, in his *Theory of History*,¹ chapter 14, showed me where to find the entry into my subject after I had been groping for it without succeeding in discovering it by my own native lights.² The baffling obscurities in my initial problem of method and procedure were illuminated for me by Teggart's dicta³ that 'in the study of Man . . . the first step must be a return to the Present'; that 'the point of departure must necessarily be observation of the differences which particularize the condition of Humanity in different parts of the World'; and that 'the observation of the cultural differences which distinguish human groups leads at once to a recognition of the major problem of the Science of Man', namely: '“How are these differences to be accounted for?”'; "How have the differences which we observe in the cultural activities of men come to be as we find them at the present time?"' I took these directives to heart, and have followed them from beginning to end of the present work. They have proved to be a sovereign clue which has not only initiated me into my subject but has piloted me through it.

Alfred Zimmern taught me, eight years before the publication of Benedetto Croce's *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia* in A.D. 1917, that 'all true history is contemporary history'.⁴ I learnt this from the intellectual ferment raised in my mind in New College hall in the summer term of A.D. 1909 as I listened to A. E. Z. delivering a course of introductory lectures on Hellenic history, for undergraduates starting to read *Litterae Humaniores*, which was the matrix of *The Greek Commonwealth*.⁵ As I sat listening to those catalytic words, the conventional partitions between 'Past' and 'Present' and between 'Ancient' and 'Modern' dissolved out of my mind and have never since returned to hamper it. I had learnt that life, thought, and feeling in the Hellenic World in the fifth

¹ New Haven, Conn. 1925, Yale University Press.

² In my first attempt, made in the summer vacation of A.D. 1920, I had tried to cast my ideas into the form of a commentary on the second chorus in Sophocles' *Antigone* (ll. 332–75). The theme of this poem—"The Mystery of Man"—was apposite and the poetry was magnificent, but the approach was unpromising; for this expedient of referring a question to some classical oracle was the Medieval and Early Modern Western approach into which I had been initiated at school, whereas the intellectual enterprise on which I had now embarked was an attempt to take bearings in the uncharted seas of a post-Modern chapter of Western history. My appeal to Sophocles had, in fact, been a false move, and it was therefore neither surprising nor regrettable that it had been a failure.

³ In op. cit., p. 171.

⁴ 'Ogni vera storia è storia contemporanea'—Croce, B., op. cit., 2nd ed. (Bari 1920, Laterza), p. 4.

⁵ Published by the Oxford University Press (1st ed., 1911; 2nd ed., revised, 1915).

century B.C. were living presences working upon me in a fourteenth-century Western Christian hall in which a crowd of twentieth-century Western undergraduates was sitting at that moment at the feet of a master.

Eduard Meyer, in his essay 'Der Gang der Alten Geschichte: Hellas und Rom',¹ helped me to break away from the conventional nineteenth-century Western presentation of History as a play in three acts—'Ancient, Medieval, and Modern'—by showing me that the history of 'Greece and Rome' was a unity, and that this unity was a whole that was complete in itself with its own Dark Age, Middle Age, and Modern Age. This unitary view of Greek and Roman history, which Eduard Meyer had given me, led me to look for a unitary name to describe the society whose history this was. I labelled it 'the Hellenic Civilization', and, when once I had identified one civilization, twenty other societies of the same species came into focus, one after another, in my field of historical vision.

Polybius, in his *Oecumenical History*, Book I, chapter 4, gave me my marching orders in his dicta that 'the coincidence by which all the transactions of the World have been oriented in a single direction and guided towards a single goal is the extraordinary characteristic of the present age'; 'the unity of events imposes upon the historian a similar unity of composition'; 'the study of general contacts and relations and of general resemblances and differences is the only avenue to a general perspective, without which neither profit nor pleasure can be extracted from historical research'.

The Western general war of A.D. 1914-18 ('World War One') opened my eyes to the historical and at the same time philosophic truth that my world in my generation was entering upon experiences which Thucydides, in his world in his generation, had already registered and recorded.

When, as a child, I used to come home from Kensington Gardens on winter evenings, after dark, across the bridge leading from Westbourne Terrace to Upper Westbourne Terrace over the Great Western Railway, a palaeotechnic arc light was mounted on a tall standard, overlooking the bridge, to illuminate the marshalling yard below; and, as I passed by, I used to be fascinated by the blue flame flickering between the two black carbon points. Long afterwards, when I was ruminating on the mysterious process through which spiritual illumination arises out of schism in the Soul and in Society, a vivid memory of my early visual impression of the arc light came to the aid of my imagination.

Eduard Meyer, in his masterly picture of the Achaemenian Empire,² revealed to me the specific historical function of a universal state. By

¹ In his *Kleine Schriften* (Halle 1910, Niemeyer), pp. 231-2.

² Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), Erstes Buch: 'Der Orient unter der Herrschaft der Perser', pp. 1-233.

liquidating a host of idolized parochial states without succeeding in inspiring the same degree of devotion to itself, a universal state liberates, for conversion to the worship of God, psychic energy that has previously been concentrated on mutually conflicting idolatrous worships of Man's Collective Self.

Alfred von Kremer, by revealing to me in his *Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen*¹ the morphological resemblance of the Caliphate to the Achaemenian Empire, led me to see in the Caliphate a 'reintegration' or 'resumption' or 'avatar' of the original Syriac universal state after a millennium during which the normal course of the disintegration-process in the life of a broken-down civilization had been interrupted in the Syriac World by the forcible intrusion of Hellenism into the Syriac Society's domain.

J. B. Bury, in *A History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene*,² which I found and read in Moberly Library at Winchester, not only revealed to me the existence of the Orthodox Christian Civilization, but showed me the spectacle of one civilization changing into another under the lens of the historian's magnifying glass. In the autumn of A.D. 1912 I had the happiness of coming to know the great historian personally.

Lord Bryce, in *The Holy Roman Empire*, not only revealed to me the Dark Ages and the Middle Ages of Western history, but also gave me my first insight into the process by which time-honoured institutions can acquire a new purpose and new significance without any ostensible breach in the continuity of their history. In A.D. 1915 I had the happiness of coming to know personally this great scholar-traveller-statesman—a patriarch whose perennial zest had made him immune against the doom of Tithonus—thanks to my good fortune in having been given a piece of work to do under his direction.

A. H. Lybyer, in *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*,³ revealed to me the blue-print of Plato's ideal commonwealth translated into real life in the Ottoman Pādīshāh's Slave-Household, and this revelation taught me what could and could not be achieved by handling human beings as if they were domesticated animals. I first heard of Lybyer's work from D. G. Hogarth, before meeting Lybyer himself, and working with him, in Paris during the Peace Conference of A.D. 1919-20.

General J. C. Smuts, in his *Holism and Evolution*,⁴ communicated to me his insight into the cosmic movement in which Reality passes through different orders of being without losing its continuity or its identity.

¹ Vienna 1875-7, Braumüller, 2 vols.

² London 1889, Macmillan, 2 vols.

³ Cambridge, Mass. 1913, Harvard University Press.

⁴ Second edition: London 1927, Macmillan.

The orders differ, but the genius of Creation and the goal towards which its course is set are the same at each and every level of the rising hierarchy of successive creatures.

The more southerly of the two round barrows on Slingsby Moor, on which I used often to lie on summer afternoons in the nineteen-thirties while I was writing Parts I-V of this Study, served as a physical receiving station for catching still unspent reverberations of waves of psychic events that had been breaking upon this fringe of the *Oikoumenē* since the unrecorded time at which this barrow had been heaped over the ashes of the unknown man whose presence was still brooding here in my day. When my dog Tilda and I were lying side by side on the barrow's pelt of heather, she used to prick up her woolly ears as she heard the rabbits stirring beneath us in their burrows, while my own sixth sense used to tingle with the inaudible music of 'the horns of elfland faintly blowing'.

Heine's *Reisebilder* and Goethe's *Faust*, which I read at Winchester, opened up two new worlds to me. The *Reisebilder* gave me an inside view of Napoleon's Empire; *Faust* gave me an insight into the good of Evil. I have been perpetually grateful to E. J. Turner ('the Hopper') for introducing me to these German works of Western literary art with an enthusiasm for them that was infectious because it was the offspring of understanding.

The Gospels and Herodotus made me aware of the divine irony in human affairs: the most tremendous of all the lessons of History.

Aeschylus anticipated my experience of Life in teaching me, while I was still at school, that learning comes through suffering, and that this is a law that has been ordained for us by God. Though I had not yet tasted the cup for myself, the truth of his words—

τὸν πάθει μάθος
θέντα κυρίως ἔχουσιν¹

—was warranted for me by their beauty.

The Authorized Version of the Bible, made in the reign of King James I, gives me, whenever I read it or hear it being read, an intimation of the divine presence informing our fragment of a mysterious Universe. The effect of a diction that is archaic yet at the same time familiar is more like that of music than like that of ordinary speech. It pierces through the Intellect and plays directly upon the Heart.

Paradise Lost, when I discovered it and devoured it in three days before I was eight years old, instilled into my mind, without my understanding it, my first idea of a theodicy.

¹ Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 177-8.

Ibn Khaldūn, in his *Muqḡadamāt* (the Introduction to his *Universal History*), gave me a vision of a study of History bursting the bounds of This World and breaking through into an Other World.

Saint Augustine, in his *De Civitate Dei*, gave me a vision of the relation in which those two worlds stand to one another.

Henri Bergson, in *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*,¹ taught me that the ideal of the brotherhood of Mankind presupposes a belief in the fatherhood of God.

Fra Angelico's picture² of the angels and the souls of the elect, marshalled *πρασιναι πρασιναι* and adoring Christ in His glory, gave me a visual image of the Communion of Saints.

VIII

To People and Institutions, for showing Kindness to me

'Let us now praise famous men, and our fathers that begat us'.³ William of Wykeham gave me my education; and he had made this provision for me 507 years before I was elected a scholar of his College of Saint Mary de Winton prope Winton. Here was a man who had served God by making himself a minister of God's providence. *Fui et ego puer Wiccami*, and, like other sons of his, I feel towards our Founder a direct personal gratitude and affection which could not, I believe, have been warmer if I had known him in the flesh, instead of being born, as I was, 485 years after his death. 'The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God',⁴ and Time has no power to put distance between them and their adopted children.

M. J. Rendall revealed to me the beauty of the English poetry that he used to set to us for translation into Greek and Latin verse, and the beauty of the Italian pictures that he used to show to us in magic lantern lectures out of school. 'By strenuous intellectual communion and intimate personal intercourse' he communicated his love of beauty to us 'like a light caught from a leaping flame'.⁵ But his greatest revelation of beauty was one that was unintentional and unconscious. As we sat at his feet, we learnt what it meant to find ourselves in the presence of an *ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος*.

'And some there be that have no memorial'⁶ in any of those pedestrian achievements that are the slow work of Time and are therefore at the mercy of all the chances and changes of this mortal life. The play of Chance that, by the 23rd September, 1952, had prolonged the life of the writer of this Study into its sixty-fourth year⁷ had cut short the

¹ Paris 1932, Alcan.

³ Eccclus. xlv. 1.

⁵ Plato's Letters, No. 7, 341 B-E.

² Now in the National Gallery in London.

⁴ The Wisdom of Solomon iii. 1.

⁶ Eccclus. xlv. 9.

⁷ By leading him on the 26th April, 1912—on faith in a sheet (lying at his elbow at this moment) of the Austro-Hungarian staff map of Greece which showed a carriage-

lives of contemporaries and friends of his who had been killed in battle some thirty-eight years earlier; and, at the moment of completing a work of his own that had taken more than thirty years to carry out, he could not be unmindful of the unwritten works lost to the World through the heroic untimely deaths in action of Guy Leonard Cheesman, Leslie Whitaker Hunter, Alexander Douglas Gillespie, Robert Hamilton Hutchison, Arthur Innes Adam, Wilfrid Max Langdon, Philip Anthony Brown, Arthur George Heath, Robert Gibson, and John Brown—ten representatives of the innumerable brave and self-sacrificing young men—of whom the World was not worthy¹—whose lives had been cut short in the wars that had been waged since the beginning of the Age of the Civilizations. These scholars who gave their lives as soldiers in their early manhood in the First World War lived on in the hearts and minds of their surviving friends, and the life and work of one of these survivors owed more than he could say to his perpetual memory of these prematurely dead companions.

The Council on Foreign Relations in New York held in safe keeping for me, from before Munich week until after VJ-Day, my notes for Parts VI–XIII of this book and the notebooks in which I had put down the gist of my reading during the previous twenty years. This act of kindness gave me many times over during the Second World War the consolation of feeling *non omnis moriar*.²

Dr. Sylvia Payne helped me, in a time of great personal trouble, to find a way through the dark wood which I could not have found by myself—

E quanto a dir qual era è cosa dura
Questa selva selvaggia ed aspra e forte,
che nel pensier rinnuova la paura.

The Rockefeller Foundation of New York made it possible for me, after an eight-years-long interruption, to write the first draft of Parts VI–XIII of this book within the four years beginning on the 1st July, 1947, and to send these four volumes to press in the second half of the year 1952, by providing the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London with the financial means for releasing a substantial part of my time by reinforcing the staff of the department producing their *Survey of International Affairs*, which had had to be taken up again, after the war, with eight years (and these no ordinary years) of arrears to make good. More than this, the Foundation made it financially possible for my wife and me to accept invitations from the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton to pay periodical visits there which have been invaluable to us for making progress in our work.

road along a stretch where there proved not even to be a goat-track—to miscalculate the number of hours' walking distance between Káto Vezáni and Yýthion, and consequently to exhaust the contents of his water-bottle and replenish it from a stream which proved to be infected with germs of dysentery. ('That is very bad water', as a cottager correctly said, after he had silently watched the unwarned traveller drink his fill of it.) This accident incapacitated the writer for military service in the War of A.D. 1914–18.

¹ Hebrews xi. 38.

² Horace: *Carmina*, Book III, Ode xxx, l. 6.

If the Rockefeller Foundation, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton had not all co-operated with one another to help me in these most imaginative, considerate, and effective ways, I should not have been able to finish the book by this time, and I might never have managed even to make a fresh start with the writing of it.

Sidney Marsh showed himself a friend in need by helping me on my way when I was passing through a time of troubles. His kindness was touching, because it came from the heart; but it was hardly surprising, because it was characteristic. The loggia at Ardens, opening southwards over Ashdown Forest towards the Downs, was a place where I found myself able, after an eight-years-long interruption in the writing of this book, to recover my resolution and to recollect my thoughts when I was setting myself to take my half-finished enterprise up again and to carry it through to its conclusion.

Professor Roland G. Kent and Professor George G. Cameron generously spent much time and trouble on helping me to correct some of the more glaring faults—ranging from errors of judgement, through mis-statements of fact, to mistakes in spelling—in an amateur essay on the administrative geography of the Achaemenian Empire.¹ These two eminent scholars are not, of course, implicated, by my declaration of my gratitude for their help, in any of those faults that have not been eliminated. Professor Kent's invaluable comments on the first draft of my essay must have been one of the last of the many such characteristic acts of kindness that he was able to do before his death on the 27th June, 1952.

Mr. Martin Wight gave up the best part of a much-needed summer holiday to working through the first draft of Part VII of this Study and writing out for me his considered comments and criticisms. I have shown my high appreciation of these by incorporating them *in extenso* in footnotes and appendixes. The effect has been to turn my original monologue into a dialogue which should be decidedly more interesting and valuable to the reader. Mr. Wight has made it clear, apropos of my references to Christianity, what the unabrogated traditional Christian positions are, and the points in which my personal standpoint differs from them. He has drawn attention to the abiding Judaic vein of exclusiveness and intolerance in Christianity, and he has correctly convicted me, on this crucial issue, of holding with Symmachus as against Saint Ambrose, with Mangū as against William of Rubruck,² and with Radhakrishnan as against Karl Adam, Jean Daniélou, and Hendrik Kraemer.

¹ VI. vii. 580–689.

² 'Even as God has given several fingers to the hand, so has He given Man several ways.'—The Mongol Khāqān Mangū in his conversation, on Whitsunday A.D. 1254, with the Franciscan Friar William of Rubruck, as reported by Friar William in *Itinerarium Fratris Willielmi de Rubruquis, de Ordine Fratrum Minorum, Galli, Anno Gratie 1253 ad Partes Orientales*, chap. 51 (see V. v. 114–15 and VI. vii. 106).

Mr. Thomas Wallas, of the London and Lancashire Insurance Company, has most kindly communicated to me authoritative information about the statistical material that was accessible to the earliest insurance companies in Great Britain at the time when they first went into business.

Mr. James Laver, Keeper of the Departments of Engraving, Illustration and Design and of Paintings, at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London; the Rev. Father P. Benedetto Renzi, Rector of the Church of San Francesco at Arezzo; and Signor Pietro Zampetti, Soprintendente alle Gallerie delle Marche, have all given me most kind help in my inquiries into the affinities of certain forms of headgear.

Dr. Sidney Smith, Professor Albrecht Goetze, Professor F. W. Albright, Mr. M. B. Rowton, and Mr. D. J. Wiseman have most kindly come to my aid over my amateur essay on the chronology of South-West Asian history during the first half of the second millennium B.C.¹ It might be no disgrace for an amateur to come to grief in a field in which the professionals agree only in frankly declaring that their own divers reconstructions can be no more than tentative in the present inconclusive state of the evidence. Our knowledge of early South-West Asian history through the progress of archaeological excavation is increasing so fast that this present chronological puzzle may be solved any day—perhaps before this volume is published—by some decisive new discovery. Meanwhile, the essay which the five scholars to whom I am now declaring my gratitude have helped me to revise may serve the reader as an interim report on the main alternative possible reconstructions of this passage of history in the light of the evidence as it stands today (the 24th September, 1952).

I am particularly grateful to Mr. Rowton for the great trouble that he has taken to pilot me through the maze with his steady hand.

My sisters, Professor J. M. C. Toynbee and Miss M. R. Toynbee, have shown their kindness by tolerating my queries, and their learning by never failing to tell me the answers to them.

The librarian of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, Miss Barbara Kyle, and the librarian of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, Miss Judith Sachs, with all their colleagues, have helped me on my way at every stage of a long literary journey by their inexhaustible obligingness and resourcefulness in meeting a formidable flow of queries, besides requests to procure for me the loan of books dealing with a great variety of subjects.

Miss Elizabeth Horton of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton has made it possible for me, by her kindness to me on repeated visits, to enjoy the full benefit of the rare facilities that the Institute offers to scholars. In January 1951, when the international situation looked so

¹ Printed in this volume on pp. 167-212, above.

grave that it seemed folly to carry the unique text of a still untyped manuscript back with me to Europe, Miss Horton and her colleague Miss Farr generously gave me ease of mind by undertaking to type for me the manuscript that I had written at Princeton during the preceding three months.

Miss J. K. Galbraith has checked, with Miss Reddin, the whole of the typescript against the manuscript. Her generous help has made it possible to do something that could not have been done without the co-operation of two minds and two pairs of eyes. The process has been as exacting and laborious as it has been indispensable for securing the accurate reproduction of the text. To cope with such outlandish pieces as, for example, the Annex on the Administrative organization of the Achaemenian Empire has been not merely a kind act but an angelic one.

Miss Bridget Reddin has done the typing, from beginning to end, of a complicated manuscript in crabbed handwriting, infested with footnotes and festooned with annexes. Her patience, care, accuracy, perseverance, and friendship have carried all ten volumes of this book on their passage from the writer's hands to the printer's across a gulf as broad as the Atlantic.

One of the red-letter days in my life is a day in 1933 on which, after I had ventured, with my heart in my mouth, to submit the typescript of volumes i-iii of this Study to Sir Humphrey Milford, I received from him a characteristically laconic note saying: 'I will take your big book'. Since that date, I have been continuing to receive the kind and skilled help of all concerned at Amen House, at 114 Fifth Avenue, and at Oxford in the heavy and exacting task of printing and publishing a work on this scale. Five times within twenty years, I have unloaded on them a suitcase full of copy; and the aggregate weight of these five loads must have been large. At every stage in the long process of production, these friends and collaborators on the technical side of the undertaking have given me innumerable occasions for looking back with gratitude to a decision of Sir Humphrey Milford's which has meant so much to me, first under his auspices and then under Mr. Geoffrey Cumberlege's at Warwick Square and under Mr. H. Z. Walck's on the other side of the Atlantic.

Mr. John Lodge—Headmaster *emeritus* of Nantwich and Acton Grammar School—has read the proofs of volumes vii-x in galley and, besides making a number of suggestions which have been gratefully adopted by the author, and detecting a number of errors that had escaped both the author's and the printer's eye, he has generously taken off the author's shoulders the laborious but indispensable task of verifying cross-references between passages in this Study and references to the Bible, to the Greek and Latin Classics, to works of Western literature in English and other vernaculars, and to other books that are on the shelves of Mr. Lodge's library. Help so kind, disinterested, timely, and effective as this is a gift that touches the heart. I lament my friend's sudden death on the 1st April, 1954.

Professor E. D. Myers, the head of the Department of Philosophy in Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, has compiled the gazetteer of geographical names, covering all ten volumes of this book, which will be issued as a supplementary volume, and has planned and drawn—in a form in which Mrs. Gomme could put them into shape for the Oxford University Press—many of the maps, illustrating all ten volumes, which will also appear in volume xi. The gazetteer illuminates passages in the book in which the geographical setting of the narrative may be unfamiliar to some Western readers, while the maps make it possible for a reader to acquaint himself at a glance with geographical facts which would have required many pages of uninviting letterpress if the author had tried to describe the same facts in words. In thus coming to the reader's rescue, Professor Myers has given a pleasure to the author as well; for it has been pleasant indeed for him to have the chance of working in partnership with an old friend who knows the contents and structure of his book, understands its purpose, and has had the skill and kindness to interpret the book to the public—as, for instance, in the chart reproduced in vol. xi.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs—on whose staff I have had the happiness of serving for almost thirty years (and my wife for still longer)—has given me a profession that has been an education and a fellowship that has been a stimulus. In the course of producing, for the Institute, a *Survey of International Affairs* from the morrow of the peace-settlement of 1919–21 to the morrow of the Second World War, I have been continually educated in the study and the writing of History; and, in doing this work at Chatham House, I have had the immense advantage of finding myself in the society of men and women—on the Council, among the members, and among my colleagues on the staff—who have had a varied experience of practical affairs in responsible positions in many walks of life. I am grateful, above all, for the particularly favourable conditions under which the authorities of Chatham House have always allowed me to do my work. While the production of the *Survey* has been a valuable discipline, because it has been an exacting task (even with the wonderful assistance that I have had), I have been left free to be my own master in the use of my time, and have been given a generous margin of leisure for the writing of the present *Study* under Chatham House's auspices. Both works have, I believe, benefited greatly by being carried on simultaneously for a quarter of a century.

Chatham House means, for me, a host of friends. I cannot name them all, but I cannot leave unnamed my colleagues Ivison Macadam and Margaret Cleeve or my master and mentor Sir James Headlam-Morley, who taught me how to launch our *Survey*. I never forget the generosity with which he gave his time and thought and encouragement in helping a younger historian; and I also never forget the great history of the antecedents of the First World War which Headlam-Morley would have given to the World if his life had not been cut short.

My wife, for the third time, has made the magnificent index without which no batch of volumes of this *Study* would be complete. These

three indexes, which are the keys to vols. i-iii, iv-vi, and vii-x, are labours that have been none the less strenuous for having been labours of love. These indexes have been hard to make because they are no mere catalogues of names and facts, but are masterly analyses of the ideas propounded in the book; and this analytical exposition, which has been such an exacting intellectual task for the indexer, will have been found proportionately valuable by the reader. As for the author, each time that he has read, in draft, one of these indexes to a batch of his volumes, he has been given a fortifying sense of assurance that, after all, his book cannot be altogether nonsense, since some sense seems to have been made of it bona fide by a mind whose critical power is as well known to him as its charity. Yet this is only one of the innumerable things that his wife has done for him.

There are people—some of them mentioned already—to whom I owe so much and with whom I have been so intimate that I cannot put into words the full measure of what they have given to me and can only express my feelings for them by here inscribing their initials—*tot pignora amoris*—in the alphabetical order of their first names, *videlicet*: B.H., B.H.S., C.C.-E., D.D., E.P.F., E.R.M., G.M., H.T.W.-G., J.A.S., J.D.D., J.L.H., M.F., R.M.Y.G., R.S.D., R.T., S.E.T., V.M.T.

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In the cross references in this index, references in small capitals (e.g. ARAB CALIPHATE at end of the heading 'Abbasid Caliphate') are to other main headings, while references in ordinary type are to subdivisions of the same main heading.

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¹ This index includes only those place-names that are of importance as subject-headings. A full list of all place-names mentioned in volumes i-x is being published in vol. xi (Maps and Gazetteer). Many of the battles entered in this index have been given their dates, but the dates of the lives or reigns of individuals and of the durations of states have not been entered. Notices, in the text, of the dates of reigns have, however, been indexed, and the durations of universal states, with their antecedent Times of Troubles, though not the durations of other states, will be found in vii. 769, Table I. If ever a consolidated index of vols. i-x is made, a systematic insertion of dates might be an addition that would be useful to the reader.

The compilation of an index draws attention to variations in the spelling of names. Some of these variations have been deliberate. For instance, while Greek names of people living in 'the Hellenic Age' (circa 1125 B.C. — A.D. 675) have been spelled in these volumes in the Latin travesty of them which is familiar, because conventional, in English and other Western languages, Greek names of people living in 'the Orthodox Christian Age' (i.e. since circa A.D. 675) have been spelled in a romanization of the original Greek spelling as this has been pronounced and accented by speakers of the Greek language in this age. This has been done in order to make the reader's eye constantly remind him that the Byzantines are neither belated Hellenes nor eccentric Franks, but are members of a distinct society of the same species as both the Western and the Hellenic. Again, the vowels in Turkish names have been differentiated from those in Arabic names in order to take account of the vowel harmonies that are a characteristic feature of the Turkish family of languages; and, in Ottoman Turkish names that include the equivalent of the Arabic name Muhammad, account has been taken of the Ottoman Turkish pronunciation by spelling the name as Mehmed. On the other hand, variations in the spelling of Teutonic barbarian names are due to the vagaries of Modern Western scholars, and variations in the spelling of Chinese names to the writer's own ignorance. If he and his wife live to produce a consolidated index for a standardized new edition of vols. i-x, he will ask authorities on the Chinese language to come to his help by standardizing the spelling of all Chinese names consistently in one or other of the current competing systems of romanization.

Even so, in a book in which the names mentioned are taken from a considerable number of different languages, originally conveyed in different scripts, complete consistency could hardly be attained without abandoning the Latin Alphabet and substituting for it some system of phonetic symbols, and few readers would welcome consistency at this price.

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VIII

THE ARTS: ARCHITECTURE, SCULPTURE, PAINTING, MUSIC AND THE DANCE

THE SPIRIT OF INDIAN ART

NEARLY all the artistic remains of ancient India are of a religious nature, or were at least made for religious purposes. Secular art certainly existed, for literature shows that kings dwelt in sumptuous palaces, decorated with lovely wall-paintings and sculpture, though all these have vanished. Much has been said and written about Indian art since, some forty years ago, European taste began to doubt the established canons of the 19th century and looked to Asia and Africa for fresh æsthetic experience. Since then most authorities on the subject, Indian and European alike, have stressed the religious and mystical aspect of Indian art. While admitting the realism and earthiness of the earliest sculpture, most critics have read the truths of Vedānta or Buddhism into the artistic remains of our period, and have interpreted them as expressions of deep religious experience, sermons in stone on the oneness of all things in the Universal Spirit.¹

One student at least disagrees with this interpretation. There are indeed a few remains which seem imbued with an intensity of religious feeling rare in the art of the world, but it is the full and active life of the times which is chiefly reflected in the art of ancient India, at first directly, as at Bhārhut, Sāncī and Amarāvati, then with a gentle idealism, as at Ajantā, and finally in the multitude of figures, divine and human, carved on the many temples of the Middle Ages. In all these phases there is a *horror vacui* and an intense vitality which remind us rather of this world than the next, and suggest to us the warm bustle of the Indian city and the turbulent pullulation of the Indian forest.

Gothic architecture and sculpture are vertical. Spire and arch point upward, and as the style develops the spire becomes taller and the arch more pointed. The Christs, saints and angels of the Middle Ages in Europe are often disproportionately tall, and their tallness is accentuated by long garments reaching to the ankles. Their poses are generally restful, and they rarely smile. Medieval European art was truly religious; its conventions seem to have been

deliberately designed to lead the worshipper's thoughts away from the world of flesh to the things of the spirit. Much of it was the work of pious monks, or of men with deep religious vocations.

The tendency of Indian art is diametrically opposite to that of medieval Europe. The temple towers, though tall, are solidly based on earth. The ideal type is not abnormally tall, but rather short and stocky. Gods and demigods alike are young and handsome; their bodies are rounded and well-nourished, often by European standards rather effeminate. Occasionally they are depicted as grim or wrathful, but generally they smile, and sorrow is rarely portrayed. With the exception of the type of the dancing Śiva the sacred icon is always firmly grounded, either seated or with both feet flat on the ground. We need hardly mention that all Indian temple sculpture, Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina alike, made full use of the female form as a decorative motif, always scantily dressed, and nearly always in accordance with Indian standards of beauty.

Asceticism and self-denial in various forms are praised in much Indian religious literature, but the ascetics who appear in sculpture are usually well fed and cheerful. As an example we may cite the colossal rock-cut medieval image of the Jaina saint Gommateśvara (pl. LIX) at Śravaṇa Belgolā in Mysore. He stands bolt upright in the posture of meditation known as *kāyotsarga*, with feet firm on the earth, and arms held downwards but not touching the body, and he smiles faintly. The artist must have tried to express the soul almost set free from the trammels of matter, and about to leave for its final resting place of everlasting bliss at the top of the universe. Whatever the intentions of the artist, however, Gommateśvara is still an ordinary young man of his time, full of calm vitality. The saint is said to have stood for so long in meditation that creepers twined round his motionless legs, and these are shown in the sculpture; but, though intended to portray his sanctity, they do but emphasize that he is a creature of the earth whom the earth pulls back.

Ancient India's religious art differs strikingly from her religious literature. The latter is the work of men with vocations, brāhmaṇs, monks and ascetics. The former came chiefly from the hands of secular craftsmen, who, though they worked according to priestly instructions and increasingly rigid iconographical rules, loved the world they knew with an intensity which is usually to be seen behind the religious forms in which they expressed themselves. In our opinion the usual inspiration of Indian art is not so much a ceaseless quest for the Absolute as a delight in the world as the artist found it, a sensual vitality, and a feeling of growth and movement as regular and organic as the growth of living things upon earth.

THE EARLIEST ARCHITECTURE

Of the visual arts of ancient and medieval India much architecture and sculpture and a little painting have survived. As most of the existing sculpture was intended to be ancillary to architecture we deal with the latter first.

The utilitarian brick buildings of the Harappā Culture, strong and competent though they were, had apparently little æsthetic merit, and will not be mentioned here. With the exception of the walls of Rājagṛha (p. 198), which also have no artistic value, we have no significant architectural remains between the Harappā period and that of the Mauryas. This was due to the fact that few if any buildings were made of stone during this time.

Megasthenes mentions that the palace of Candragupta Maurya, though very large and luxurious, was built of carved and gilded wood, and the earliest stone buildings to have survived were evidently modelled on wooden originals. We must not assume, from the complete lack of material remains, that Indian building in the Mauryan period, or even before, was mean or primitive. The Mauryan monolithic columns prove that the craftsmen of those days had a thorough mastery of working in stone, and if the great cities of Mauryan times were built of wood we must attribute this chiefly to the comparative scarceness of stone in the Gangetic Plain and the abundance of timber where it is now scarce. There is no evidence of a cultural advance in the Middle Ages, when building in stone became common, but rather of a decline. The adoption of stone as a building medium was due partly to foreign contacts, but also to the gradual disappearance of timber forests from the more populous and civilized regions of India.

The wonderful Mauryan columns with their finely carved capitals fall rather under the head of sculpture than of architecture, for most of those which survive had no architectural purpose. Fragments of similar columns, found at Patnā, supported the roof of a palace, which has been reasonably identified as that of Aśoka. The remains of the Patnā pillared hall are so fragmentary that the plan of the building cannot be accurately reconstructed, but it was evidently a large one. At this time, however, stone buildings must still have been very rare. All the Mauryan pillars and other products of Mauryan stonemasons come from the same quarry, at Chunār, not far from Banāras, and all bear the stamp of the same school. They are the work of craftsmen who had learnt much from Persia, and perhaps a little from Greece, but had given their output distinctive Indian characteristics. Their workshops were probably maintained by the Mauryan kings, and

vanished with the dynasty. Working in stone had then to make a new beginning in India.

THE STŪPA

The stūpa began as an earthen burial mound, which was revered by the local population, and we have seen that the cult of stūpas was taken up by Buddhism, and that Aśoka raised stūpas in the Buddha's honour all over India (p. 263). Only one stūpa, in Nepāl, survives in the form in which the great emperor left it, but excavations of existing stūpas have shown the character of the earlier ones. They were large hemispherical domes, containing a central chamber, in which the relics of the Buddha were placed in a small casket, often beautifully carved in crystal. The core of the stūpa was of unburnt brick, and the outer face of burnt brick, covered with a thick layer of plaster. The stūpa was crowned by an umbrella of wood or stone, and was surrounded by a wooden fence enclosing a path for the ceremonial clockwise circumambulation (*pradakṣinā*), which was the chief form of reverence paid to the relics within it.*

In the period between the Mauryas and the Guptas much wealth and energy were spent on Buddhist architecture, and the older stūpas were greatly enlarged and beautified. Of these three are specially noteworthy—those at Bhārhut in Madhya Bhārat, Sānchī in the old Bhopāl state, and Amarāvati in the lower Kistnā Valley. The Bhārhut stūpa, perhaps in its present form dating from the middle of the 2nd century B.C., is important chiefly for its sculpture, and the stūpa itself has now vanished. That at Sānchī, on the other hand, is one of the most striking architectural remains of ancient India (pl. XIb).

In the 2nd century B.C. the old Sānchī stūpa was enlarged to twice its original size, becoming a hemisphere of about 120 feet in diameter. It was then faced with well-cut masonry laid in regular courses, and, besides the lower path on ground level, an upper terraced path some 16 feet from the ground was added. The old wooden railings were replaced by stone ones 9 feet high, tenoned and mortised in imitation of carpentry. Finally, towards the end of the 1st century B.C., four glorious gateways (torana) were added at the four cardinal points. Lesser stūpas and monastic buildings surrounded the great stūpa (fig. xviii).

The Sānchī gateways (pl. XXVII) are perhaps more noteworthy

* It has been suggested that the stūpa, like the later Hindu temple, was thought of as a microcosm of the universe. There are Mesopotamian precedents for this belief, and the passion for cosmic symbolism, evident in India from Vedic times, certainly led to the making of the analogy at least in respect of the temple.* But, though many authorities would disagree with us, we do not believe that cosmic symbolism played any great part in the thought of the ancient Indian architect.

for their carved ornamentation than their architecture. Each consists of two square columns, above which are three curved architraves supported by animals or dwarfs, the whole reaching some 34 feet above ground-level. The construction of these gateways, from the technical point of view, is primitive, and it has been suggested that their design is based on the log or bamboo portcullis of the ancient Indian village.³ The finish, on the other hand, is remarkably good, and the carvings are among the most fresh and vigorous products of the Indian sculptor (pl. XXVIII).

In respect of size few Indian stūpas greatly exceeded that of Sānchī, but in Ceylon the stūpa reached tremendous proportions. The Abhayagiri Dāgāba at Anurādhapura, the capital of the early




Fig. xviii.—Stūpas and Monasteries at Sānchī. (Reproduced from Percy Brown's "Indian Architecture (Buddhist and Hindu)", published by D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co. Ltd., Bombay)

kings of Ceylon, was 327 feet in diameter, and larger than some of the pyramids of Egypt. It reached its present size, after a succession of enlargements, in the 2nd century A.D.

In India stūpa architecture became more and more ornate. The Stūpa of Amarāvati (fig. xix), which in its final form was completed c. 200 A.D., was larger than that of Sānchī, and its two promenades were adorned with carved panels (some of which can be seen in the British Museum) telling the story of the life of the Buddha. Meanwhile in Northern India stūpas grew taller in proportion to their bases. They were often set on square platforms, which in Burma and Indonesia were developed into stepped pyramids, the largest of which

is the enormous stūpa of Borobodūr, in Jāva, built in the 8th century A.D. Pinnacles became higher, and developed towards the spiring forms of the present-day temples of Burma and Siam.

Of later Indian stūpas the two most famous are those of Sārnāth and Nālandā. The tall stūpa of Sārnāth (pl. XIIa), near Banāras, the scene of the Buddha's first sermon, of which now little more than the inner core remains, was once a most imposing structure of beautifully patterned brickwork with a high cylindrical upper dome rising from a lower hemispherical one, and large images of the Buddha set in gable ends at the cardinal points. In its final form it dates from the Gupta period. The stūpa at Nālandā (pl. XIIb), seven times successively enlarged, in its present ruined state gives the




Fig. xix.—The Stūpa of Amarāvati. (Reproduced from Percy Brown's "Indian Architecture (Buddhist and Hindu)", published by D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co. Ltd., Bombay)

impression of a brick pyramid with steps leading up to its terraces. It was originally a tall stūpa raised on a high base, with a smaller stūpa at each corner, but the monument underwent so many alterations in Gupta and Pāla times that it is now difficult for the untrained eye to recognize its original form at any one stage of its development.

Around the great stūpas were lesser ones, often containing the ashes of monks famous for their piety and learning, and a whole complex of buildings—monasteries, shrine-rooms, preaching halls and resthouses for pilgrims (fig. xviii). At the greater Buddhist sites such as Nālandā the groups of monastic buildings were often

surrounded by fortress-like walls. In their present partial dilapidation these heavy domes sometimes seem a little forbidding. Originally the limewashed or plastered stūpa shone brilliantly white in the tropical sunlight, its pinnacle, now generally broken, rising like a golden spear from the ceremonial stone umbrella on top of the dome. Then it must have given a different impression. The great Ruvanvāli Dāgāba at Anurādhapura in Ceylon, which in recent years has been restored and is once more used in Buddhist worship, rising white in the distance out of the plain, shows the stūpa at its best, as a worthy emblem of a great religion.

CAVE TEMPLES

Of the centuries before the Gupta period the chief architectural remains, other than stūpas and their surrounding gateways and railings, are artificial caves, excavated for religious purposes. Early specimens show a slavish imitation of carpentry which proves conclusively that the art of building in stone was still in its infancy. Thus two of the caves of Barābar Hill, near Gayā, dedicated by Aśoka to Ājīvika monks, are in the form of a plain rectangular outer hall, at one end of which is an inner chamber with a curved wall and overhanging eaves. The caves were evidently substituted for a standardized religious meeting place consisting of a round thatched hut standing in a courtyard, and their designer could not transcend the pattern to which he had been used. Similar dependence on wooden models is evident in many other features of design until the Gupta period.

The caves of the Barābar and Nāgārjunī Hills are quite unadorned, with the exception of one at Nāgārjunī, near Barābar, which has a comparatively simple carved entrance, added during or soon after the Mauryan period. The inner walls of all the caves are finely polished, no doubt by workmen of the school which was responsible for the polish of the Aśokan columns.

Late cave temples and monasteries are to be found in many parts of India, but it was in the Western Deccan, under the Sātavāhana Empire and its successors, that the largest and most famous artificial caves were excavated. The oldest Deccan cave, at Bhājā, near Poona, consists of a deep apsidal hall, cut in solid rock, with a row of plain octagonal pillars near the walls, which support curved ribs carved to represent the barrel vaulting of a wooden building. At the further end of the hall is a small stūpa, also cut from solid rock, and the outside of the cave has a façade, carved like a gable, with smaller ornamental gables on either side. Beside this cave, which was a meeting hall for Buddhist monks and lay worshippers, is a second cave

consisting of a broad cutting into the rock, leading to five cells, which were the dwellings of the monks.

From these beginnings the cave temples developed in size and splendour. The finest single example is the great caitya hall at Kārī (pl. XIII), probably made about the beginning of the Christian era. This is cut 124 feet deep into the rock, and is of the same general pattern as that at Bhājā and many other caves of the




Fig. xx.—Early Capitals. (Reproduced from Percy Brown's "Indian Architecture (Buddhist and Hindu)", published by D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co. Ltd., Bombay)

Western Deccan, but much developed in size and splendour. The columns are no longer plain and austere, but, by a process which can be traced through earlier stages, they have become heavy and ornate. Each is set on a square stepped plinth, and rises from a bulbous base, which is carved to represent a large pot with base and rim; this is another survival of wooden construction, for the octagonal wooden pillars of earlier days were bedded in large earthenware pots

to protect them from ants and other insects. Each pillar carries a complicated group of horses and elephants with riders to support the roof, which is carved in imitation of the timber rafters of barrel vaulting. The caitya or shrine at the end of the hall is much enlarged in comparison with those of other caves.

The simple façades of the earlier caves were developed into elaborately carved verandas, usually with a large window, the full size of the gable-end, which let light into the hall (pl. XIVa). The Kārli cave has three fine entrances, and a frieze of relief sculpture on the lower levels, with small carved gable-ends above.

With the caitya halls the associated rock-cut monasteries or saṅghārāmas also developed in size and splendour. As a cave monastery became too small for its inhabitants a new cave was cut nearby and so the complex of caves grew over the centuries. The most famous of these cave groups is that of Ajantā, in the ~~north-west corner of Hyderābād~~. Here no less than twenty-seven caves, some 30 going 100 feet deep into the rock, were excavated in the horseshoe curve of a hillside, not far from the great trade route leading from the North to the Deccan (pl. XIV). The earliest caves date from the 2nd century B.C., while others are as late as the 7th century A.D. The splendid sculpture and lovely paintings with which they are adorned make them one of the most glorious monuments of India's past (p. 377f).

Perhaps even more impressive are the later cave temples of Ellorā, near Aurangābād, some thirty miles from Ajantā. Here are no less than thirty-four caves, constructed from the 5th to the 8th centuries A.D., most of them Hindu but some Buddhist and Jaina. The crowning achievement of Ellorā is the great Kailāsanātha Temple, excavated on the instructions of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa emperor Kṛṣṇa I (c. A.D. 756-773). With this the concept of the cave temple was transcended, for the king was not satisfied with a mere hollow in the rock. The entire rock face was cut away and a splendid temple carved like a statue from the hillside, complete with shrine-room, hall, gateway, votive pillars, lesser shrines and cloisters, the whole adorned with divine figures and scenes large and small of a grace and strength rarely seen again in Indian art (pl. XV). The ground plan of Kailāsanātha is of about the same size as the Parthenon, and it is half as high again. The labour necessary to construct it, however, was less than that which would be required to build a comparable temple of masonry, for transport created no problem, and the process of construction, beginning at the top of the cliff and working down to the base, avoided the need of scaffolding. But no considerations of this kind can disparage the glory of

Kailāsanātha, "the most stupendous single work of art executed in India".⁴

Kailāsanātha is not the earliest temple hewn from solid rock. Others are to be found at Māmallapuram, on the sea-coast some thirty miles south of Madras, where seventeen temples, none very large in size, were carved from outcropping hillocks of granite under the patronage of 7th century Pallava kings. The most famous of these, the "Seven Pagodas", still show the influence of wood construction, and are of a distinctive style, possibly looking back to Dravidian prototypes.

The latest cave-temples of importance are those of Elephanta, a beautiful little island off Bombay. These, in the same style as those of Ellorā, are famous for their sculpture, especially for the great Trimūrti figure of Śiva (p. 372). After these no important caves were excavated. Indians had long known the art of building in stone. The Kailāsanātha Temple, carved in exact imitation of masonry, showed the dissatisfaction with the older cave form. The great period of medieval temple building had begun.

TEMPLES

The earliest free-standing religious building of which traces remain is a small round hall, probably originally containing a Buddhist stūpa, at Bairāt near Jaipur; this dates from the 3rd century B.C., and was made of brick and wood; little but the foundations now exist, and the form had no future.

The next landmark in temple architecture is the temple generally known, from the modern name of the site, as that of Jandiāl, excavated from one of the mounds which covered the city of Takṣaśilā. This, one of the important buildings of the Greek city, contained a square inner sanctuary, a meeting hall and a courtyard, and its outer and inner entrances were each flanked by two large pillars of orthodox Ionian pattern. The Jandiāl temple was probably Zoroastrian, and had no direct successors, but the influence of Western architecture is clearly to be seen in Kashmīr, where columns of Hellenic type were used throughout the medieval period, in conjunction with distinctive pyramidal roofs and arches surmounted by pointed gables, which give the Kashmīr style an almost Gothic appearance. Most famous of Kashmīr's early temples is the Temple of the Sun at Mārtand, dating from the 8th century. There are no remains of free-standing Hindu temples erected before the Gupta period, though by this time they must long have been built in wood, clay and brick. From the Gupta period, however, several examples survive, chiefly in Western

India, all showing the same general pattern. Pillars were usually ornate, with heavy bell-shaped capitals surmounted by animal motifs, and the entrances were often carved with mythological scenes and figures. All the Gupta temples were small, and most had flat roofs. Their masonry was held together without mortar, and was far larger and thicker than was necessary for the comparatively small buildings. Evidently their builders had not yet fully mastered their technique, and were still thinking in terms of the cave. The finest Gupta temple, that of Deogarh near Jhānsī, probably of the 6th century, marks a great advance. Here iron dowels were used to hold the masonry together, and a small tower rose above the sanctum. The portal veranda was continued all round the building, making a covered walk.

The standard type of the Hindu temple, which has persisted from the 6th century to the present day, was not fundamentally different from that of the ancient Greeks. The heart of the temple was a small dark shrine-room (*garbhagrha*), containing the chief icon. This opened on a hall for worshippers (*maṇḍapa*), originally a separate building, but usually joined to the shrine-room by a vestibule (*antarāla*). The hall was approached by a porch (*ardhamāṇḍapa*). The shrine-room was generally surmounted by a tower, while lesser towers rose from other parts of the building. The whole was set in a rectangular courtyard, which might contain lesser shrines, and was often placed on a raised platform.

The medieval period in India was, like the Middle Ages in Europe, an age of faith. With better techniques of stone construction new temples sprang up everywhere to replace earlier wooden buildings, and kings and chiefs vied with one another in their foundation. Strict canons of design in both architecture and sculpture were laid down in textbooks (*śilpaśāstra*), some of which survive.⁵ The technique of architecture was not far advanced, despite the great achievements of the period. Though arches occur in the cave temples and in Kashmīr, the art of making a true arch, dome or vault, seems to have been ignored, although corbelling—the building up of an arch or dome by overlapping courses of brick or masonry—was widely practised, and produced work of great beauty. Mortar was known, but rarely used, for the style of archless and domeless architecture employed made it virtually unnecessary.

The temple was ornately decorated, often even to the dark shrine-rooms lighted only by flickering oil-lamps. Despite this ornateness the apprenticeship of his tradition in rock architecture gave the architect a strong sense of mass. Heavy cornices, strong pillars,

wide in proportion to their height, and the broad base of the *śikhara*, or tower, give to Indian temple architecture a feeling of strength and solidity, only in part counteracted by the delicately ornate friezes, and the many figures in high or low relief which often fill the whole surface of the temple wall.

Considering the size of the land, Indian temple architecture is remarkably uniform, but authorities distinguish two chief styles and numerous schools. The Northern or Indo-Āryan style prefers a tower with rounded top and curvilinear outline, while the tower of the Southern or Dravidian style is usually in the shape of a rectangular truncated pyramid. The stages of stylistic development are clearer in the South than in the North, where many ancient temples were destroyed by the Muslim invaders. We therefore consider the styles of the Peninsula first.

Temple building gained much from the patronage of the Pallava and Cālukya kings in the 6th–8th centuries. Important early temples of the former dynasty are to be found at Māmallapuram, already referred to (p. 355), and Kāñcī, while the Cālukyas left temple remains at their capital Bādāmi, and the nearby site of Aihole, both in Hyderābād. Both styles show the gradual emancipation of the architect from the techniques of carpentry and cave architecture. The apogee of the Pallava style was reached in the Shore Temple at Māmallapuram (pl. XVIa) and the Kailāsanātha Temple of Kāñcī, built early in the 8th century. The latter has a pyramidal tower formed of two courses of small barrel vaults, surmounted by a solid cupola suggesting a Buddhist stūpa.

The style of the Pallavas was developed further under the Cōla dynasty (10th–12th centuries), the finest products of which are the great temple of Śiva at Tanjore, built by Rājarāja the Great (985–1014), and the temple built by his successor, Rājendra I, at his new capital of Gaṅgaikōṇḍacōlapuram, near Kumbakonam. The former was probably the largest temple built in India up to that time; the comparatively modest tower of the Pallava style was replaced by a great pyramid, rising from a tall upright base and crowned with a domed finial, the whole being nearly 200 feet high. This set the style of the Dravidian śikhara, which has continued with some variation down to the present day. Both these temples contain elaborate pillared halls and beautiful decoration.

In the next phase of Dravidian architecture the emphasis shifted from the tower above the chief shrine to the entrance gateway of the surrounding wall. Though there are a few records of the desecration of temples by hostile sectarians or invaders, it is difficult to find a practical reason for the growing custom of surrounding South Indian

temples with strong and high walls, unless this was done in imitation of the palaces of kings, with which the temples had much in common. From the 12th century onwards it became usual to fortify the temple, often with three square concentric walls, with gates on the four sides. The gates were surmounted by watch-towers or gatehouses, and these developed into soaring towers (*gopuram*), generally much taller than the modest śikhara over the central shrine. The entrance tower was usually in the form of an oblong pyramid, with its broadest side parallel to the wall (pl. XIXa). The new style is often called Pāṇḍyan, from the name of the dynasty which supplanted the Cōḷas in the Tamil country, and the kings of which were responsible for building walls and gateway towers round many existing shrines. The style introduced more elaborate ornamentation, and the use of animal forms in pilasters and columns, including the rampant horses and leogryphs which give a distinctive character to late Dravidian architecture.

The culmination of the Pāṇḍyan style lies in the mighty temple complexes of Madurai, Śrīraṅgam, and elsewhere, which are strictly outside our period, belonging in their present form to the 17th century. The great temple of Madurai is the most famous and beautiful of these (pl. XIXb), but the largest is the Vaiṣṇavite temple of Śrīraṅgam (fig. xv, p. 201), which is contained in an outer wall measuring 2,475 by 2,880 feet, and has six inner walls, all with gopurams, surrounding a shrine of comparatively modest proportions. These later towers were covered with sculptured figures.

While these developments were taking place in the Tamil country, other styles developed in the Deccan, under the Cālukyas, Rāṣṭrakūṭas and Hoysaḷas. The earliest Cālukyan temples closely resemble the Guptan in style. By the 8th century they had developed individual features, including the wide overhanging eaves which became characteristic of the medieval temples of the Central Deccan. The later Cālukyas and Hoysaḷas (11th–14th centuries) developed a more elaborate style. Their temples were no longer built on a rectangular plan, but were polygonal or stellate, raised on a tall solid platform of the same shape as the building. These temples give a strong feeling of flatness, for platforms and walls alike are covered with rather narrow carved friezes of elephants, horsemen, geese, monsters (*yāli*), and scenes of mythology and legend (pl. XVII). The grotesque mask (*kīrtimukha*) * became very common as a decorative

* The *kīrtimukha* is found in other South Indian schools as a decorative motif, especially in the *makara-toraṇa*, a gateway with a large *kīrtimukha* mask above the lintel connected by foliate designs to two *makaras* or sea-monsters at the base of the doorposts. These motifs were exported to South-East Asia and became regular features of Indonesian and Cambodian architecture.

feature, and turned columns, often ornately carved, were widely used. The largest and most famous temples of this style, at Halebīd (Dōrasamudra, the Hoysaḷa capital) and Bēlūr, have no towers, and it is thought that they were not completed. Some smaller temples of the same period have towers, notably the charming temple of Somnāthpur (pl. XVIb), which has three low dome-like śikhara, their breadth emphasized by parallel mouldings. Its profusion of pillars, and its abhorrence not only of blank spaces but even of plane surfaces and straight lines, tend to give this style an impression of wedding-cake prettiness, despite the solid proportions of its masonry and the brilliance of its sculptured decoration.

The school which flourished under the Vijayanagara empire, and reached its apogee in the 16th century, shows both Pāṇḍyan and Hoysaḷa features. The florid carving of the Hoysaḷas was developed with even greater exuberance, and new elements appeared in the temple complex. As well as the main shrine every important temple in South India was provided with a shrine for the *ammaṇ*, the god's chief wife, which was often nearly as large as the main shrine itself, and a marriage-hall (*kalyāṇamaṇḍapam*), wherein the icons of god and goddess were ceremonially united on festival days. Another feature of the Vijayanagara style is the profusion of strong yet delicate carving which adorns the pillared halls, the many columns of which are so decorated that they become sculptures in their own right. Prancing horses, vigorous and energetic, leap from the stone (pl. XVIIIc), with leogryphs and other fantastic monsters. For brilliancy of decorative imagination the Vijayanagara style of architecture was never surpassed in Hindu India. Its finest production is undoubtedly the Viṭṭhala Temple at Hampī, the old Vijayanagara.

In the chief cities of Northern India almost all traces of the architecture of the Hindu period have vanished. Even in holy Banāras all the great and famous temples are comparatively recent. One important exception, however, is the Buddhist temple at Gayā (pl. XXa) the main tower of which is probably as early as the 6th century. This is a large pyramid of brickwork, set on a high plinth; it is adorned with parallel courses of "caitya window" pattern and is surmounted by a lofty pinnacle which was originally a small stūpa. Similar towers existed in other Buddhist monastic establishments, but have long since vanished. The Gayā tower suggests rather the Southern than the Northern style of śikhara, but other temples of the period either have no towers or have small curvilinear ones which are evidently the prototypes of the later Northern śikhara.

Medieval North Indian architecture is best illustrated by three

schools—those of Orissā, Bundelkhand, and Gujarāt and South Rājasthān. There were other local developments, as well as the distinctive style of Kashmīr which we have already noted, but these three are certainly the most important, and their products are the best preserved.

The Orissan school flourished from the 10th to the 13th centuries, and its chief monuments lie in and around the towns of Bhubanesar and Purī. The finest Orissan temple is the Liṅgarāja at Bhubanesar (pl. XXb, fig. xxi), which shows the North Indian śikhara in its final form—a tower which begins to curve inwards at about one third of its height, with rounded top crowned by a flat stone disc (*amalaka*)





Fig. xxi.—Liṅgarāja Temple, Bhubanesar, Orissā. (Reproduced from Percy Brown's "Indian Architecture (Buddhist and Hindu)", published by D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co. Ltd., Bombay)

and a finial (*kalaśa*). The upward movement of this graceful curving tower is emphasized by deep vertical inlets, but its solidity and firm basis on earth are very evident. The Liṅgarāja, like most Orissan temples, is built as a series of four halls—a hall of offerings, a dancing hall, an assembly hall and a sanctuary.* The sanctuary is crowned by the great tower, but the other three elements of the temple, leading one by one to the shrine, are also roofed with characteristic towers of smaller size, carrying the eye to the main śikhara. The whole temple enclosure of the Liṅgarāja is filled with smaller shrines, built on the pattern of the great one.

* Often referred to by the modern vernacular names, *bhog maṇḍir*, *nāṭ maṇḍir*, *jag-mohan*, and *deul* respectively.



b

pārvaṭī or Uṃā, the Wife of Śiva. (Part of the same piece as plate LXVIII).

Kālī, the Stermer form of Pārvaṭī. Bronze. Cōla.



Kālī as Demoness playing Cymbals. Bronze. Cōla.

The Orissan architects were lavish with their exterior decoration, and their sculptors produced works of great merit, but the interiors of their temples are unadorned. In the larger temples the corbelled roofs of the halls rested on four large pilasters, but pillars were not generally used, and roofs were often partly supported by iron girders, a striking technical innovation.⁶

Among the most important Orissan temples are the Temple of Viṣṇu-Jagannātha at Purī, still one of the most famous shrines of India, and the "Black Pagoda" of Konārak, built in the 13th century. The latter, a temple of Sūrya, the sun-god, was formerly one of the largest and most splendid temples of India, much larger than those




Fig. xxii.—Temple of the Sun, Konārak, Orissā. (Reproduced from Percy Brown's "Indian Architecture (Buddhist and Hindu)", published by D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co. Ltd., Bombay)

of Bhubanesar (fig. xxii). The tower, over 200 feet high, has long since fallen, but the great assembly-hall remains. Unlike the other temples of this region that of Konārak had the two smaller outer halls completely separate from the main structure, and assembly-hall and tower were built on an imposing platform, round which were carved twelve decorated wheels, 10 feet in diameter (pl. XXI*a*). The entrance is reached by a broad flight of steps, flanked on either side by prancing horses, the whole representing the chariot in which the sun-god rides across the heavens. The court of the temple was decorated with large free-standing sculptures of great strength and beauty (pls. LVII–III). The exceptionally frank eroticism of many

of the Konārak sculptures has given the "Black Pagoda" a rather infamous reputation. *Maithuna* figures, of couples closely embracing or actually *in coitu*, are common enough as decorative features of many Indian temples, but those of Konārak are exceptionally vivid. Many suggestions have been made as to the true significance of these figures; it has been suggested that they merely served the mundane purpose of advertising the charms of the devadāsīs, or temple prostitutes,⁷ or that they were intended to represent the world of the flesh, in contrast to the bare and austere interior, which symbolized the things of the spirit; probably they were connected, in the minds of their designers, with the sexual mysticism which played so great a part in medieval Indian religious thought.⁸ No doubt the temple of Konārak was a centre of a flourishing tantric cult.⁹

Under the Candella kings of Bundelkhand a great school of architecture flourished in the 10th and 11th centuries, the chief work of which is a beautiful group of temples at Khajurāho, about 100 miles south-east of Jhānsī. These temples are built on a rather different plan from those of Orissā, and are not very large, the finest, a Śaivite temple known as Kandāriya-Mahādeo, was built about A.D. 1000, and is not more than 100 feet high. The standard type of Khajurāho temple contains a shrine-room or sanctuary, an assembly-hall, and an entrance portico. Whereas in the Orissan temple these elements were conceived rather as separate entities joined together by vestibules, the Khajurāho architects treated them as a whole, and though each part has its own roof they are not structurally separate. The Khajurāho śikhara, like those of most Northern temples, is curvilinear (pl. XXc), but differs from the type of Orissā. It is curved for its whole length, and its upward thrust is accentuated by miniature śikharas emerging from the central tower. The crowning discs of these projections break the upward movement, and remind the observer that the divine is to be found on earth as well as in heaven. The effect of the whole, despite its symmetry, is one of organic and natural growth. The tower, and indeed the whole temple, seems intimately at one with the earth, suggesting an enormous ant-hill, or a high peak surrounded by lesser mountains. Though expressed in the most baroque of styles, the Kandāriya-Mahādeo is a striking instance of a feature common in much Indian art, a feeling of unity with nature.

The halls and porticoes of the Khajurāho temples are also crowned with smaller towers, which rise progressively to lead the eye up to the main tower, and thus intensify the impression of a mountain range. While the Orissan roof is pyramidal in pattern, the Khajurāho builders employed corbelling to produce the effect of a flattish

dome. The mass of the buildings is broken by pillared window openings, which relieve the monotony of the ornately carved stone. A further distinctive feature of the style was the introduction of small transepts to the assembly hall, giving the whole a ground-plan not unlike that of a Gothic cathedral.

Like all other schools of architecture, that of Khajurāho made much use of carving. Here, in contrast to Orissā, the temples were adorned with sculpture both outside and in, and the halls have beautifully carved domical ceilings. The style of Khajurāho sculpture lacks the solidity and vigour of the best of Orissā, but the wonderful friezes of statuary contain figures of a graceful vitality, warmer and more immediately attractive than those of the Orissan temples (pls. XLVI–VIII).

In Rājasthān and Gujarāt are many medieval temples, some of much architectural merit. Here we can only mention the greatest of these Western schools, that which rose under the patronage of the Caulukya or Solāṅki kings of Gujarāt, and flourished from the 11th to the 13th centuries. This kingdom was wealthy from the sea-borne trade with the Arabs and Persians, and much of the treasure of kings, ministers and merchants alike was expended on beautiful Jaina and Hindu temples.

The most famous buildings of this school are the lovely Jaina shrines of Mount Ābū, the style of which is not very different fundamentally from that of Khajurāho. The temples were built on high platforms and usually consisted of a shrine and hall only, without an entrance portico. The śikhara over the shrine, like those of Khajurāho, was adorned with a large number of miniature towers, and the ceilings were in the form of corbelled domes. Perhaps through the influence of Muslim architectural styles, these ceilings were carved so as to give the impression of a true dome, the steps of the corbelling being skilfully concealed by the sculptor, and the flat crossbeams, supported on pillars, often being adorned with large brackets meeting at the centre, which gave an arch-like effect, though the true arch was never employed. The most outstanding feature of this style was its minute and lovely decorativeness (pls. XXIc, XXII). The shrines of Mount Ābū, made of cool white marble, are covered with the most delicate and ornate carving, especially in the interiors: it is, however, rather flaccid and repetitive. In comparison with Bhubanesar, Konārak and Khajurāho the rich decoration of Mount Ābū has a flavour of cold lifelessness.

Remains of pre-Muslim secular buildings are few. In the Middle Ages kings and chiefs certainly built stone palaces, but of these only the base of the Vijayanagara throne-room, and some remains in

Ceylon, have survived. Several cities of Rājasthān and Gujarāt have finely carved gateways from the medieval period (pl. XXIb). But, though secular architecture was no doubt highly developed, it is clear that India's architects and masons devoted their greatest energies to temple building. Working according to strict traditions, but showing much ingenuity and originality within the main standardized pattern, they erected monuments of fantastic beauty with the simplest technical equipment. Many patient hands reared the śikhara above the plain, and capped them with great slabs of stone, raised on enormous ramps of earth, like the higher courses of the pyramids of Egypt. Whether or not the architects and craftsmen were conscious of the symbolism, the temple was looked on by some as a microcosm of the world, as the open air sacrifice had been in earlier days. In sculpture, and often in painting also, all the gods were depicted on its walls, every aspect of divine and human existence symbolized. Like Hindu civilization itself, the temple was at once voluptuous and austere, rooted in earth, but aspiring to heaven.

SCULPTURE

In architecture there is no real trace of relationship between the brick houses of Harappā and the stone temples of Hindu India, and the art of building in stone seems to have been learnt slowly from the time of Mauryas onwards. The earliest sculpture of historical times, on the other hand, shows a generic likeness to that of Harappā, which we have already described (p. 20f). From the end of the Indus cities to the rise of the Mauryas over a millennium elapsed, with no surviving work of art to fill it. Somewhere in North India the art of sculpture, no doubt in perishable materials, was certainly kept alive. The patronage of the Mauryan emperors, the influx of western influence, and growing material prosperity, led to its revival, and to the making of stone figures and reliefs which have survived to this day.

The capitals of Aśoka's columns, some of which were perhaps made before his reign, are the earliest important sculptures after those of the Indus cities. They are not characteristic of Indian sculpture, though they contain many native features. The famous lions of the Sārnāth column and the less famous but more beautiful bull of the column of Rāmpūrvā (pl. XXIIIa) are the work of realistic sculptors, owing something to Iranian and Hellenist tradition. Yet, if we did not know that the possibility of Western influence existed, we might suggest that the animal sculptures of the columns were those of a school directly descended from the engravers of the Indus seals,

which also show a realistic treatment very unusual for so early a civilization. The abaci of the capitals perhaps show native influence more clearly than the crowning figures, and bear animals in lively postures, wheels, representing both the Buddha and the Mauryan World-emperor, and floral and foliate designs in which typical Indian motifs appear side by side with some borrowed from the West. Other than the pillars there are few remains of the Mauryan school, with its high polish and fine finish. One beautiful figure, the "Dīdārganj Yakṣī" (pl. XXVIa), bears the distinctive brilliant polish of the school, but the treatment of the figure suggests that it is post-Mauryan. The yakṣī bears a *caurī*, or ceremonial yak's tail fly-whisk with which kings and gods were fanned; this shows that the figure was made as the attendant on another figure or a sacred object, which has now vanished.

A number of figures of yakṣas, somewhat larger than life-size, are the only other important free sculptures of the centuries immediately before Christ. They are strong, bull-necked and heavy, and, though not technically perfect, have an elemental solidity rarely found in later sculpture. The treatment of the ample abdomens of these figures has been compared with that of the abdomen of the Harappā torso and gives further evidence of the survival of tradition over the long intervening period.

The most important sculptural remains of the post-Mauryan period are the carvings on the rails and gateways of the great Buddhist sites at Bhārhut, Gayā and Sānchī. There is no absolute certainty about the dating of these remains, but the sculpture of Bhārhut is in a less highly developed style than that of Gayā and Sānchī, and is probably the earliest, while the gateways of Sānchī, carved with great sureness and skill, are probably the latest of the three. The series Bhārhut-Gayā-Sānchī is to some extent confirmed by epigraphic evidence, and we may date Bhārhut c. 150 B.C. and Sānchī about the end of the 1st century B.C., with Gayā somewhere between the two. The criteria are not, however, absolutely certain, for it is possible that the backward and advanced schools were approximately contemporary.

At Bhārhut (pls. XXIII-V) the upright posts of the stūpa railings are carved with yakṣas and yakṣīs, beautifully finished and very decorative, like all the best Indian sculpture, but archaic and uncertain in treatment. Their flatness suggests that the artists were trained in the working of ivory, and were laboriously learning to translate their skill into a different medium. The medallions of the crosspieces (pl. XXIIIc-e), mostly depicting scenes from Jātaka stories, have a similar archaic flavour.

The Gayā railing, enclosing not a stūpa but the sacred path where the Buddha walked in meditation after he had obtained enlightenment, shows an advance on Bhārhut. The figures are deeper, more vital, and more rounded, and the sculptors had by this time evidently gained greater mastery of their technique. Figures are no longer always carved flat on the stone, but begin to appear in three-quarter poses. Notable at Gayā are the medallions containing human heads, which have such realism that they may well be portraits.

The crowning achievement of early North Indian sculpture is undoubtedly Sāncī. Here a smaller stūpa (Stūpa II) is adorned with carvings of very archaic character, according to some authorities older than those of Bhārhut. The railings of the main stūpa are quite unadorned, but, in sharp contrast, the great gateways are carved with a multitude of figures and reliefs. From top to bottom and on all sides the massive square uprights and triple architraves are alive with the life of the times. Yakṣīs smile as they lean in easy graceful poses,* or serve as brackets to the architraves (pl. XXVIIb), which are supported by massive elephants or cheerfully grinning dwarfs. The flat surfaces of the uprights and architraves are covered with panels depicting scenes from the life of the Buddha or from Jātaka stories (pl. XXVIII). Cities are besieged, riders on elephants and horses pass in procession, men and women worship sacred shrines, elephants roam the jungle; lions, peacocks, yakṣīs, nāgas, mythical animals and ornate floral designs fill the whole. Some of the motifs are evidently of Mesopotamian or Persian inspiration, but the whole is typically Indian in its complexity of pattern, its cheerful busy realism, and its exuberance.

The carvings of the Sāncī gateways were not carried out according to any preconceived scheme. The sculptors were not commissioned by the monastery, but by private patrons, who wished to gain merit by beautifying the stūpa, and they carved what their patrons told them in the way they thought best. Superficially the result was lacking in formal unity, but was endowed with a unity transcending rule and pattern, the unity of a prosperous culture, pious in devotion to its shrines, and delighting in the world it lived in and knew. The visitor, standing on the hill of Sāncī on a sunny winter day, when the wild peacocks walk among the ruins and the great plain shimmers in the hazy distance, gets the overriding impression that this is the work of a happy people at one with itself.

Technically the carvings are of high excellence. The sculptors

* The *tribhaṅga*, a pose in dancing and dramatics with one leg bent and the body slightly turned at the hips, was a favourite with the sculptor from the earliest times. It contrasts sharply with the hieratic poses of most ancient art other than that of the Greeks, and gives an impression of life and vitality.

have now fully mastered their material. Their treatment, while not, of course, realistic in the nineteenth-century sense, has transcended the rather stiff formalism of Bhārhut, and is free and alive. The sculpture of Sāñchī everywhere gives a sense of certainty; the artists knew what they had to depict, and clearly saw in their mind's eye how to do so.

At Bhārhut, Gayā and Sāñchī, and indeed in all the Buddhist sculpture of this period, the Buddha himself is never shown, but symbolized by such emblems as a wheel, an empty throne, a pair of footprints or a pīpal tree (pl. XXVIII). The obvious reason for this iconographical peculiarity is that he was so venerated that it seemed sacrilegious to portray him, but we have no literary or other evidence to confirm this. The aversion to depicting the Buddha may have been due to the fact that, since he had passed quite out of the universe, it was thought misleading to show him in human form. In any case the familiar Buddha image of later times is not to be found at these three early Buddhist sites. The schools of Gandhāra (the lower Kābul Valley and the upper Indus, around Peshāwar) and Mathurā, both of which flourished under the Kuṣāṇa kings, vie for the honour of having produced the first images of the Buddha. Most Indian authorities now believe that the Buddha image originated at Mathurā; most earlier Europeans supported Gandhāra, but some recent experts are less certain.

The school of Mathurā probably began at the end of the 1st century B.C., though some authorities would date it later. Working for centuries in the white-spotted red sandstone of the locality, it produced works which were carried far and wide, and had much influence on later sculpture. Some of the school's inspiration was Jaina, and at an early period the Mathurā craftsmen were making votive plaques depicting the cross-legged naked figure of a Tīrthaṅkara in meditation, which may have inspired the Buddhists to depict their own teacher. Perhaps the most striking remains of the Mathurā school are the yaksīs from the railings of a stūpa, which was probably Jaina. (pl. XXIXa). These richly jewelled ladies, their figures exaggeratedly broad of hip and slender of waist, stand in pert attitudes reminiscent of the Indus dancing-girl (pl. VIIIb), and their gay and frank sensuality in a context of piety and renunciation gives another example of the remarkable antinomy of the ancient Indian outlook on life, which found nothing incongruous in such a juxtaposition.

Rather outside the main range of Mathurā art are the Kuṣāṇa royal statues, most of which were found at the nearby village of Māt, where the kings no doubt had a winter residence, with a chapel in which the memory of former monarchs was revered. The figures have

nearly all been broken by succeeding rulers, and that of the great Kaniṣka, the most striking of the statues, unfortunately lacks its head (pl. XXXa). Wearing the dress of Central Asia, a long coat and quilted boots, and grasping in one hand a sword and in the other its sheath, the king stands with legs apart, in an attitude of authority. This statue may be criticized technically as showing no sense of depth, being virtually in two dimensions. The sculptor was evidently working on a theme to which he was not used, but he succeeded in producing a work of much power, suggesting the hieratic royal statues of Egypt.

The early Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of the Mathurā school are happy fleshy figures with little spirituality about them, but later they developed in grace and religious feeling (pl. XXXVib). Though the Mathurā school owed much to earlier Indian tradition, it also borrowed from the North-West, and adopted more than one Greco-Roman motif. Through Mathurā the style generally known as Gupta developed, and produced some of the greatest Indian religious sculpture.

The school of Gandhāra was evidently influenced by the art of the Roman Empire, and some of its craftsmen may have been Westerners. Though often called Greco-Buddhist, the Greek kingdoms of Bactria and N.-W. India had long vanished when this school emerged. It is not to the Greco-Bactrian heirs of Alexander, but to the trade with the West, encouraged by the rising prosperity of Rome and the eastwards march of her legions, that we must attribute this syncretistic school. The Greeks left only a few lovely silver articles, beautiful coins, and one or two other objects, perhaps imported from the West. It was Kaniṣka and his successors and their wealthy subjects who gave to the school of Gandhāra the encouragement and support through which it flourished. The new devotional Buddhism demanded iconic worship, and figures of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas were produced in large numbers, as well as small votive plaques depicting scenes from the Buddha's life or Jātaka stories (pl. XXXIII).

The Mathurā sculptors drew inspiration for their Buddha images from the burly yakṣa figures of the earlier centuries on the one hand and from the meditating Jaina Tīrthaṅkara on the other. The Gandhāra sculptors had other models in the gods of the Greco-Roman World. Often their inspiration seems almost wholly Western (pl. XXXI), and it is hard not to believe that some of the Gandhāra masters were foreigners from Syria or Alexandria. The school has depreciated in recent years. When all art was judged by classical norms it was thought to be the finest school of Indian art, which once and once only produced work of grace and realism. Now the sculpture of

Gandhāra is sometimes described as a mere imitation of an imitation, the weak copy of a great art in decline. Neither judgement is fair. In an Indian context the style of Gandhāra has a rather insipid flavour, but it is not without originality. The Buddhas of Gandhāra, though perhaps lacking in the spirituality of those of the Gupta period, are gentle, graceful and compassionate, while some of the plaques are vivid and energetic. The school continued after the great Kuṣāṇas, though with less prosperous times it produced few works in stone, but many in plaster or stucco. Its influence was felt far beyond the bounds of India, and can be traced even in China.

While these schools were developing in the North others appeared in the Peninsula. Here, in the Bhājā cave (p. 353) and at Udayagiri in Orissā, very ancient sculpture is to be found, possibly no later than that of Bhārhut. The great Buddhist cave temples of the Western Deccan contain much sculpture of great merit, perhaps the finest of which are the numerous figures of donors, often carved in high relief on the cave walls. These are frequently in couples, their arms on one another's shoulders, and seem to be idealized portraits of the wealthy patrons of the Buddhist caves (pl. XXXIV). Such couples are also to be found in early terracottas (pl. LXIIb), and no doubt their originals believed that by placing their effigies in shrines they would obtain both material and spiritual benefits. It may be that these are the forerunners of the *maithuna* couples of the medieval temples (p. 362), but the spirit behind the early *dampatī* pairs seems very different, for these figures have no overt sexual significance. The man usually looks not at his wife but outwards into the hall, while the woman glances downwards, and, quite unlike the bold yakṣīs of the North, holds her body diffidently, almost timidly, as if rather embarrassed at being stared at in public. We believe that these figures represent the ideals of ancient Indian married life, and are no more esoteric than the family memorial brasses in many English churches.

The region between the lower valleys of the Kistnā and Godāvārī became an important centre of Buddhism at least as early as the 2nd century B.C., and some very ancient sculpture in low relief, intended to adorn the sides of stūpas, is to be found there. This already shows the characteristic elongation of the mature style of Amarāvātī. In the late Sātavāhana period (2nd–3rd century A.D.) the great stūpa of Amarāvātī was adorned with limestone reliefs depicting scenes of the Buddha's life and surrounded with free-standing Buddha figures. The relief medallions are certainly among the greatest works of Indian art (pl. XXXV). Beautifully balanced in composition to fit the circular frames, they convey an intense vitality and sense of rapid movement, quite unexpected in the context of the grave and calm

religion they illustrate. The slender, long-legged figures are portrayed in vigorous action, often rising almost to frenzy, as in the famous medallion showing a host of ecstatic demigods carrying the Buddha's begging-bowl to heaven. The Amarāvātī school had great influence. Its products were carried to Ceylon and South-East Asia and had a marked effect on local styles, while its influence on later South Indian sculpture is also very evident. ~

Meanwhile in the North the Śāka and Kuṣāṇa invaders had in part retreated and in part merged with the indigenous population, to make way for the great Gupta empire. From the point of view of art the Gupta Period is generally taken to include at least the 4th–6th centuries and the first half of the 7th. The plastic remains of this age are comparatively few, but enough survive to show the achievement of the time. If the schools of Bhārhut, Sāñchī and Mathurā are marked by a sensual earthiness, and that of Amarāvātī by vital, excited movement, the Guptan sculpture suggests serenity, security and certainty. It was at this time that India produced some of her most truly religious art, especially in the lovely Buddhas of Sārnāth. Most famous of these is the icon of the Buddha “turning the Wheel of the Law”, or preaching his first sermon (pl. XXXVIa), which, more than any other Indian sculpture, seems to convey the true message of Buddhism. Surrounded by a large and ornate halo, flanked by two small demigods, the Master sits majestically, his body slender and rounded, plastically so simplified that no trace of muscular contour can be seen, his delicate fingers forming the *dharmacakra mudrā*, which indicates that he is preaching. His face is, as usual, that of a young man, with delicately modelled lips; his half-closed eyes and slight smile tell more graphically and vividly than any of the rather dry Buddhist scriptures his fundamental message, and emphasize not its first part, that the world is full of sorrow, death and decay, but that it is possible to transcend these evils, and reach a state where age and grief no longer affect the mind, and where earthly pleasure is transmuted into serene inner joy.

This great masterpiece, however, illustrates only one aspect of Gupta art. In the region of Gwālīor and Jhānsī an excellent school of Hindu sculptors existed, and the carvings of the temple of Deogarh, depicting Hindu gods and mythological scenes, show the beginnings of the early medieval style. The splendid figure of the sun-god Sūrya from Gwālīor (pl. XXXVIIa) illustrates another aspect of the outlook of the times. Broad and sturdy, cheerfully smiling, the god looks straight ahead at his worshippers, his right hand raised in blessing—the god of a good-natured, happy people. Equally significant of the spirit of the Gupta Period, if less perfect

in execution, is the charming relief of a dancer, accompanied by girl-musicians, found at Pāwayā, near Gwālior (pl. XXXVIIb). Another famous Guptan sculpture is the "Sānchi Torso",* the delicately but vigorously modelled body of a Bodhisattva, its smooth contours emphasized by the minutely carved jewelled collar and belt and the scarf of antelope skin hanging over the left shoulder (pl. XXXVIII).

Perhaps the most immediately impressive of all Guptan sculpture is the Great Boar, carved in relief at the entrance of a cave at Udayagiri, near Bhilsā (pl. XXXVIIc). The body of the god Viṣṇu, who became a mighty boar to rescue the earth from the cosmic ocean (p. 302), conveys the impression of a great primeval power working for good against the forces of chaos and destruction, and bears a message of hope, strength and assurance. The greatness of the god in comparison with his creation is brought out by the tiny female figure of the personified earth, clinging to his tusk. The deep feeling which inspired the carving of this figure makes it perhaps the only theriomorphic image in the world's art which conveys a truly religious message to modern man.

Sculptures of the medieval period are so numerous that they cannot be discussed here in detail. By this time iconographical canons were fixed. Every god had his special attributes, which were regularly portrayed in his image; the proportions of body, limbs and features were laid down, and were adhered to with increasing rigidity; but the Indian sculptor succeeded in producing remarkable variety in his now almost hieratic art.

Under the Pāla and Sena kings of Bihār and Bengal (8th-12th centuries) both Buddhists and Hindus made fine icons, much of it in local black stone. The special characteristic of Pāla art is its fine finish; its figures are much decorated and well polished, and often seem rather made of metal than of stone (pl. XLV).

The sculpture of Orissā was greater than that of the Pālas. The carvings of the temples of Bhubanesar and Konārak (pls. LIV-VIII) show a deep sensuous appreciation of the human form and an expressiveness which gives them a characteristic beauty of their own. The finest Orissan sculptures are those in the courtyard of the Temple of the Sun at Konārak, where the forceful horses (pl. LVIII) and the mighty elephant crushing a malefactor in his trunk (pl. LVII) show a strength of treatment and a feeling for animal form rare in the world's art, and reminiscent of the animal sculpture and ceramics of the T'ang dynasty of China.

The Khajurāho temples are covered with figures of divinities and pairs of lovers of wonderful delicacy and grace (pls. XLVI-VIII), and

* Said by some to be an exceptional Pāla production.¹⁰

in many other parts of North India many works of beauty survive, although few can vie with those of Orissā.

In the Deccan individual schools of sculpture appeared. The temples of Aiholē and Bādāmi contain fine work of the 5th century onwards (pl. XL), which shows the influence of the Guptan style, with a tendency to elongation perhaps inherited from Amarāvati. More important are the sculptures of Māmallapuram, adorning the wonderful complex of rock-temples made by the Pallava kings of Kāncī. Most striking of these sculptures is the great relief of the descent of the Ganges (pl. XLI), covering a rock face over 80 feet long and nearly 30 feet high. A natural cleft in the rock has been utilized to represent the Sacred River, who is watched on either side by gods, demigods, ascetics and elephants, as she descends from the head of Śiva, and who has sinuous snake-spirits (*nāgas*) swimming in her waters. The artists who designed this splendid relief had a sardonic sense of humour, for among the worshipping ascetics they carved the crafty cat, who performed penance in order to lure the mice to their doom. Māmallapuram contains other fine relief sculpture, including an idealized portrait of the versatile king Mahendravarman and his queens (pl. XLII), and a number of free-standing animal figures, which are remarkable for their simple strength.

The influence of the Pallava school of sculpture was felt in Ceylon (pl. XLIIIa), and also in the Western Deccan. Here the Buddhist carvings of the Ajantā caves, though important, are dwarfed in significance by the wonderful mural paintings. The carvings of the later Ellorā caves, on the other hand, especially those of the Kailāsanātha Temple (p. 354), are among the finest sculptures of India. They are chiefly in the form of deep reliefs, giving the effect of free-standing sculpture, and illustrate scenes of mythology (pl. XLIIIb). The whole series of reliefs is characterized by balanced design, and a graceful energy akin to that of Amarāvati. Of the same school, but a century or two later, are the cave sculptures of Elephanta. The rock temple of Śiva contains a fine series of deep reliefs, all of which are dwarfed in significance by the colossal *Trimūrti*, which is perhaps the best known of all Ancient Indian sculptures (pl. XLIIIc). The three-headed bust of Śiva, calm with the calmness of eternity, is so impressive and so religiously inspired that it needs little comment. The serene god is perhaps the highest plastic expression of the Hindu concept of divinity.

After Māmallapuram, Ellorā and Elephanta much stone sculpture was produced in the Peninsula, but though often of great merit it lacked the depth and beauty of the work of the earlier schools. The

splendid bronzes of the Cōlas and their successors are the most outstanding products of the Dravidian artists of the later Middle Ages.

TERRACOTTAS

While the rich delighted in figures of stone, metal or ivory, poorer folk contented themselves with small images and plaques of baked clay, no doubt originally painted in bright colours. Nearly every archæological site in India, from Harappā onwards, has produced many of these terracotta objects. Most are religious. Crude clay figures of goddesses—apparently early forms of Durgā, worshipped by the lower classes before her inclusion in the orthodox pantheon—are common, and recall the similar but even cruder mother-goddess figurines of Harappā (fig. ii, p. 13). Other objects have little if any religious significance, though they may have been charms or votive offerings; figures of mother and child, a type rare in sculpture, suggest offerings made by childless women, while the numerous figures of a man and a woman (pl. LXII*b*), standing in modest poses reminiscent of the donors of the cave temple sculpture, may have been charms for a happy marriage. While many terracottas are crude, others are of fine workmanship and real beauty. Some faces are well characterized and divine heads are sometimes beautifully modelled (pl. LXII*c-d*). The terracotta plaques often have much charm.

Most of the terracottas so far found date from the Mauryan to the Gupta period, but the art of modelling in terracotta must have existed earlier, and certainly continued later, for the Buddhist sites of Bihār have yielded many medieval votive plaques of no great artistic interest.

METAL SCULPTURE AND ENGRAVING

Several works of art in metal, very Hellenistic in style, have been found in the North-West, dating from the early centuries of the Christian era. Some of these are quite un-Indian, and may have been imported, or produced by foreign craftsmen, for instance the lovely little golden and jewelled reliquary casket from Bīmārān (pl. LXXXVII*a*). Further afield, in Soviet Central Asia and Northern Afghānistān, have been found beautiful silver cups and other objects, ornamented with motifs usually Hellenistic in inspiration and technique, but showing clear evidence of Indian contacts (pls. LXXXV–VI). Soviet archæologists believe that these are the products of the Greek kingdom of Bactria, and date from the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. Thus they are

in no way connected with the Gandhāra sculpture of the early centuries of the Christian era. Wholly Indian in style, and dating from pre-Gupta times, is the copper vase from Kulū, on the borders of Kashmīr, engraved with a gay procession (fig. xxiii).

From the Gupta period a number of bronze and copper figures have survived, mostly Buddhist. The most impressive of these is the "Sultānganj Buddha" (pl. LXIII), some $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet high, now in Birmingham Museum—a graceful figure, dressed in a diaphanous cloak. Like most of the work of the period it conveys a feeling of aliveness, not by attention to realistic detail and proportion, but by the sense of movement in the slightly tilted body, the delicate fingers, lightly clasping the corners of the robe, and the face, impassively



Fig. xxiii.—Copper Vase from Kulū, *c.* 1st–2nd century, A.D. (By permission, Victoria and Albert Museum)

symmetrical yet with a vitality imparted by the delicate moulding of its features.

The use of bronze images in worship seems to have been specially prevalent among Buddhists. The Sultānganj Buddha was found in Bihār, one of the great centres of Buddhism, where one of the two great medieval schools of metal sculpture arose, under the patronage of the Pāla kings. Pāla bronzes are so numerous that there is no doubt that they were mass-produced. They were exported to South-East Asia, where they are still found, and to Nepāl and Tibet, where they provided prototypes for indigenous schools. These images are characterized chiefly by delicacy of design and ornamental detail, and

deep religious inspiration is usually lacking (pl. LXIV). The earliest Nepāl bronzes, which go back to our period, are less ornate in design, but are gilded and set with semi-precious stones, and give an impression of great brilliance and smoothness.

Other parts of India also produced metal icons, but many of those which have survived have no great artistic value. The Tamils still prefer metal to stone for the images used in temple and domestic worship, and it was in South India, especially in the kingdom of the Cōlas, that the greatest Indian works of art in metal were made, by a school of bronze-casters which has not been excelled in the world. South Indian bronzes vary in size, but many of the finest specimens are very large and heavy, their pedestals fitted with lugs for carrying in procession. The best specimens of South Indian metal work are of great grace and simplicity, for, though the statues have much ornamentation, this, as in most of the best Indian sculpture, is relieved by areas of bare smooth flesh. Physical features and the contours of face and limb are simplified and idealized, the proportions are rigidly fixed by canons laid down in iconographical textbooks, and every attribute of the deity portrayed is determined by convention. It is surprising that, bound as they were by these rigid rules, the Tamil craftsmen succeeded in producing works of such great beauty and often of considerable individuality. As well as images of the gods and goddesses the Tamil school produced many figures representing the saints of devotional theism, and portrait figures of kings and queens, who, in theory, were themselves divine, and whose images were often placed in temples among the lesser divinities surrounding the chief god.

Of the latter class the finest figures are the life-size 16th century statues of King Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya and two of his chief queens (pl. LXXI), which still stand in a temple at Tirumalai. The faces of the queens seem quite conventional, though very beautiful, but that of the great king himself is almost certainly intended to give some idea of his actual appearance. Their hands pressed together in the gesture called *añjali*, to mark their homage and respect to the gods, their large eyes half closed, these three dignified figures seem to represent all that was good and noble in the old Hindu ideals of kingship, and, looking at them, we can understand why the king made so deep an impression on the Portuguese envoys (p. 16).

The greatest and most triumphant achievements of Tamil bronze casting are undoubtedly the dancing Śivas, of which there are many examples dating from the 11th century onwards (pl. LXVI). It was as "Lord of the Dance" (*Naṭarāja*, p. 308) that the Tamil masters specially delighted in portraying the god—a graceful young

man, his four arms delicately posed, often with a flame in the open palm of one hand and a halo of flames encircling him, one foot firm on the back of a demon, and the other raised in a posture well known in the Indian dance. Thus the god appears as the very essence of vital, ordered movement, eternal youth, and ethereal light. This is not the European conception of the highest godhead, but, once the religious background is understood, even the European can recognize in the finest specimens of the dancing Śiva a true religious inspiration, a wholly successful effort at depicting in plastic terms divine truth, beauty and joy.

An important school of bronze casting existed in Ceylon, and produced works similar in style to those of South India. The finest metal product of Ceylon is undoubtedly the lovely life-size figure of a goddess, generally believed to be that of a Buddhist Tārā, but perhaps Pārvatī, the wife of Śiva (pl. LXV). This lovely and delicate casting, now in the British Museum, can hold its own with the greatest products of the South Indian bronzesmith.

Nearly all Indian bronzes were made by the "cire perdue" process. The figure was first designed in wax, which was covered with a coating of clay. The whole was then heated, so that the wax melted away, leaving a mould to be filled with molten metal. Larger standing figures, such as the Sultānganj Buddha, which weighs nearly a ton, were often made in two parts which were then welded together.

PAINTING

Literary references alone would prove that painting was a very highly developed art in ancient India. Palaces and the homes of the rich were adorned with beautiful murals, and smaller paintings were made on prepared boards. Not only were there professional artists, but many men and women of the educated classes could ably handle a brush.

Though now all in very bad condition the surviving remains of ancient Indian painting are sufficient to show its achievement. They consist almost entirely of murals in certain of the cave temples. No doubt most temples were painted in some way, and the statuary was brightly coloured, as it often is in Hindu temples today, and here and there more elaborate schemes of mural decoration were carried out. A few caves in outlying places contain rough painted sketches of no special merit, often primitive in style, and believed by many authorities to be prehistoric. Some of the artificial caves dedicated to religious purposes, however, give us samples of the work of highly developed schools of painting, and few would dispute that the murals



King Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya and two Queens. Bronze, life-size. S. India.
16th century A.D.



Avalokiteśvara-Padmapāni. Mural painting, Ajantā.
Gupta Period.

of Ajantā are among the greatest surviving paintings of any ancient civilization.

The cave paintings of Ajantā (pls. LXXII–IX) are often referred to as frescos, but this term is incorrect, for a fresco is painted while the plaster is still damp, and the murals of Ajantā were made after it had set. The walls were first covered with a coating of clay or cowdung bound together with straw or hair, and then finished with white gypsum. Considering the climate the surface has stood well, but in many places it has flaked away, and even since they were first copied in the last century the condition of the paintings has deteriorated. The pigments, on the other hand, are still remarkably fresh; in their original state the paintings must have been of great brilliance, and their colours are even now clear and well contrasted. The artists worked in the dim caves by light reflected from outside by metal mirrors.

The paintings in Cave X have been shown with fair certainty to date from before the beginning of the Christian era, while those of Caves I and XVI are from perhaps as much as six centuries later. The earlier paintings are more sharply outlined and the later show more careful modelling, but there is no good evidence of a progressively developing style, as in contemporary sculpture, and the differences may be accounted for by the personal styles of the craftsmen who supervised the work in the respective caves. The murals chiefly depict scenes from the life of the Buddha and the Jātakas. No frame divides one scene from the next, but they blend one into the other, the minor figures and the pattern skilfully leading the eye to the central figures of each scene. There is no perspective, but an illusion of depth is given by placing the background figures somewhat above those in the foreground. The effect of this convention is rather like that of a photograph taken with a telescopic camera, and makes the figures stand out from the flat wall as though coming to meet the observer.

Though painted for religious purposes the murals of Ajantā bear rather a secular than a religious message. Here, even more vividly than at Sānchī, we see the whole life of ancient India in panorama. Here are princes in their palaces, ladies in their harems, coolies with loads slung over their shoulders, beggars, peasants and ascetics, together with all the many beasts and birds and flowers of India, in fact the whole life of the times, perpetuated on the dim walls of the caves by the loving hands of many craftsmen. Everything is gracefully and masterfully drawn and delicately modelled.

Among the many masterpieces of Ajantā we must mention the figure of a handsome young man, his body bent slightly in the pose

called *tribhaṅga*, loved by Indian sculptors and artists, with a jewelled crown on his head, and a white lotus in his right hand. His smooth features betray gentle sorrow, and his eyes look downwards compassionately, as if at something far below him (pls. LXXII–III). Around him are *apsarases*, or heavenly damsels, and divine minstrels, all much smaller than the central figure, who is the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara Padmapāṇi, the Lord who Looks Down in Compassion (p. 276). Here, once more, a work of deep religious feeling appears among the cheerfully sensuous scenes of everyday life. The Bodhisattva, for all his jewels and his smooth youthfulness, has shared the sorrows of the world; his gentle eyes have seen countless ages of pain, and his delicately formed lips have spoken words of consolation to countless sufferers. The artist of the Bodhisattva has conveyed his message—the universe is not indifferent to the sorrows and strivings of its creatures.

Religious feeling of a different type is found in the painting of the glorified Buddha, begging his daily bread from a woman and child believed to represent his wife Yaśodharā and his son Rāhula. The lovely portrayal of the two minor figures is scarcely noticed against the majesty of the Master, whose calm features and robed body convey, like the Sārnāth Buddha, the serenity of self-transcendence (pl. LXXIV).

A few other paintings are to be found elsewhere. Those on the walls of the veranda of a cave at Bāgh, some hundred miles to the North of Ajantā, depict a procession of elephants, perhaps more impressive in composition than anything Ajantā has to offer (pl. LXXX), and a lovely scene of a dancer and women musicians (frontispiece). Traces of paintings in the Ajantā style are to be found in other Deccan caves, notably at Bādāmi and Ellorā. Further south, in the Tamil country, a Jaina cave at a place called Sītannaval has yielded a fine, though much decayed, mural.

Some of the best preserved paintings of these schools are to be found in Ceylon. In the centre of the island a great rock, Sigiriya, the "Lion Mountain", rises sharply for 600 feet above the surrounding plain. Here, at the end of the 5th century, the parricide king Kāśyapa I built a palace and a fortress. Kāśyapa, evidently a megalomaniac, was so convinced of his own divinity that he tried to identify his rock-fortress with heaven, and had demigods and heavenly beings painted on the bare walls of the rock, to show his subjects that he transcended them all. Nearly all these paintings have vanished under the hot sun and driving monsoon rain, but half way up the rock face, preserved by an overhanging ledge, are the figures of twenty-one *apsarases* immersed from their hips downwards in banks of

cloud.* These charming ladies, toying with flowers in languid poses (pl. LXXXIII), are so freshly preserved that one can hardly believe that they were painted 1,500 years ago.

The surviving traces of medieval Hindu painting, at Tanjore, Vijayanagara, Polonnaruwa in Ceylon, and elsewhere, indicate that there was some technical decline after the 8th century. Outlines become sharper, and the delicate modelling of the earlier period is lacking, but the achievement is still considerable. Scarcely anything survives from this period in good enough preservation to make a satisfactory reproduction, but what can still be seen shows that the tradition of mural painting continued down to the Muslim invasion.

After the spread of Islāmic influence the Indian painter turned his attention mainly to miniatures and book illustration, deriving much inspiration from Persian models. Literary evidence shows that miniature painting existed long before the coming of the Muslims, however, and a few examples have survived from the 11th and 12th century from Bihār, Bengal and Nepāl (pl. LXXXIIa). These little pictures show great delicacy and skill, but they lack the comparative realism of Ajantā, and the figures are almost unmodelled. They are the products of a formalized Buddhism, the religious inspiration of which was languishing, and which was largely detached from contact with everyday life. Unlike the Ajantā murals, they are probably the work of monks, and not of secular craftsmen.

The dry sands of Central Asia have preserved paintings which, though not strictly Indian, owe much to Indian inspiration. The earliest of these surround a colossal rock-cut Buddha at Bāmiyān in Afghānistān (pl. LXXXI) and are older than most of the paintings at Ajantā. The many murals and paintings on boards found at sites in Chinese Turkistān and other parts of Central Asia are mostly somewhat later, and show greater deviation from Indian models, though their debt to India is quite evident. They date from a period when the trade route to China was wide open, and give proof of the debt which Chinese art, despite its very individual character, owes to India.

MINOR ARTS

The excavations at Takṣaśilā and other sites of the North-West have revealed fine jewellery (pl. LXXXIIb), with semi-precious

* Until recently these figures were thought to be portraits of Kāśyapa's queens and concubines, and some of the faces seem to show individual character. Some authorities might still support the older theory, but the context of the paintings leaves little doubt that the above interpretation is correct.

stones set in gold filigree, much in the manner of the Indian jewellery of the present day. The Bīmārān Casket (pl. LXXXVIIa), and a few other objects in gold and silver, are delicately worked, as are the crystal relic caskets found in Buddhist sites in many parts of India. Engraved intaglio gems from the North-Western sites are usually of no great artistic merit, and nearly all these small objects of art show the influence of western models, while some may well have been imported.

Though little survives, much beautiful work was done in ivory. Guilds of ivory carvers are mentioned in inscriptions and their profession was evidently a well-patronized and honourable one. Of surviving ivory work the most interesting if not the most beautiful specimen is a small statuette of a goddess, found at Herculaneum (pl. LXXXVIIb), no doubt imported with spices and fine textiles via Egypt. More beautiful are the ivory plaques, originally fastened to the lids and sides of boxes, found at the Kuṣāṇa site of Begrām, some fifty miles west of Kābul. Though discovered in the region most open to Western influence, the designs of these plaques are purely Indian in inspiration, and they were either imported from India proper or made by craftsmen who had learnt their trade from Indian masters (pl. LXXXVIIc). The figures are outlined with deep-cut lines, and, although only lightly modelled, give a wonderful impression of depth. Their delicacy and grace are unexcelled in any work of art of ancient India. The art of ivory carving has continued down to the present day both in India and Ceylon (pl. LXXXVIII), but it has never again produced works as lovely as these.

Since they delighted in minute detail and gave great care to the finish of their productions it is surprising that the Indians did not develop their coinage artistically. Ancient Indian coins are generally crude and ugly. Only under the Gupta emperors did they approach the status of works of art, and even the Gupta gold coins are but works of art of the second order. They have originality and charm, however. Thus Candragupta I lovingly gazes at his chief queen, Kumāradevī; Samudragupta, enthroned, performs on the harp; Candragupta II slays a rhinoceros; and Kumāragupta I rides on a splendid elephant (fig. xxive). After this, however, the standard of coin production deteriorated rapidly, and medieval kings who patronized great artists and craftsmen were satisfied with coins of the crudest type.

Exceptional are the lovely large silver coins minted by the Greek kings of Bactria, which bear some of the finest numismatic portraits in the world (pl. LXXXIVa-c); but the inspiration of these coins is purely Hellenistic, and they were no doubt designed by Greek

craftsmen. It is unlikely that they circulated widely in India, where the Greek kings issued cruder bilingual coins (pl. LXXXIV*d*), in a style followed by the later Śakas and Kuṣāṇas (pl. LXXXIV*e*).




Fig. xxiv.—Gupta Gold Coins.

a. Candra Gupta I and his queen Kumāradevī. *b*. Samudra Gupta playing the harp. *c*. Candra Gupta II as lion-slayer. *d*. Kumāra Gupta I slaying a rhinoceros. *e*. Kumāra Gupta I riding an elephant. *f*. Coin commemorating Kumāra Gupta I's horse sacrifice. (By permission of Prof. A. S. Altekar and the Numismatic Society of India.)

MUSIC

There is some evidence to show that the Āryans knew the heptatonic scale, and the instructions for intoning the hymns of the *Sāma Veda* show that the style of liturgical singing in Vedic times was rather like that of medieval plain chant, and has been preserved fairly accurately by the brāhmaṇs down to the present day. Between this and the early centuries of the Christian era we have little knowledge of the progress of Indian music, but in the latter period an anonymous writer composed a textbook on drama, music and dancing, which, in accordance with the custom of the time, he attributed to the ancient sage Bharata, and which has survived to this day. The *Bhārata Nāṭyaśāstra* is our earliest Indian authority on these three arts, and shows that by this time India had a fully developed system of music, which differed little from that of present-day Indian "classical" music. Anyone who has heard a performance on the vīṇā by a good South Indian musician has probably heard music much as it was played over a thousand years ago. For this reason, and because of the highly technical nature of the subject, we treat ancient Indian music briefly.

The basic scale is heptatonic, its seven notes* corresponding approximately to those of the European major scale. They may be elaborated with half-tones or quarter-tones (*śruti*). There are twenty-two quarter-tones in the octave, which occur in the following order:

$\begin{array}{cccccccc} \text{Sa} & & \text{ri} & & \text{ga} & \text{ma} & & \text{pa} & & \text{dha} & \text{ni} & \text{sa} \\ \text{—} & & \text{—} & & \text{—} & \text{—} & & \text{—} & & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \end{array}$

From this diagram it will be seen that the notes *sa*, *ma* and *pa* (approximately the European *do*, *fa* and *so*) may have as many as three degrees of sharpness. The quarter-tones of Indian music are chiefly noticeable in ornamentation, when they are used with striking effect, but they also occur to some extent in melody, so that the untutored Westerner may well think that the singer or musician is out of tune.

As well as the scale based on the note *sa*, corresponding to the European major, other scales may be based on other notes of the seven, thus resembling the modes of ecclesiastical music.

Besides the *grāma*, which we have translated "scale", there are other basic classifications of tune-types, chief of which is the *rāga*. A *rāga* is a series of five or more notes, upon which a melody is based. Over thirty *rāgas* are mentioned in the *Bhārata Nāṭyaśāstra*, and the

* Called *śadjā*, *ṛṣabha*, *gāndhāra*, *madhyama*, *pañcama*, *dhaivata* and *nīsāda*, nowadays generally abbreviated to *sa*, *ri*, *ga*, *ma*, *pa*, *dha* and *ni*.

total has since grown considerably until now hundreds have been enumerated. According to orthodox theory there are six basic *rāgas*, the others being *rāgiṇīs*, personified as the wives of the masculine *rāgas*. The six original *rāgas* are variously given, the oldest list, that of Bharata, being as follows:

<i>Bhairava</i> :	C, D ^b E, F, G, A ^b , B, C.
<i>Kauśika</i> :	C, E ^b , F, A ^b , B ^b , C.
<i>Hindola</i> :	C, E, F [#] , A, B, C.
<i>Dīpaka</i> :	C, D ^b , E, F [#] , A, B, C.
<i>Śrīrāga</i> :	C, D ^b , E, F [#] , G, A ^b , B, C.
<i>Megha</i> :	C, D, F, G, A, C.

The *rāgas* are classified according to the time of day or night for which they are most appropriate. Thus, of the examples above, Bhairava is suitable for performance at dawn, Megha in the morning, Dīpaka and Śrīrāga in the afternoon, and Kauśika and Hindola at night. Bhairava is associated with awe and fear, Kauśika with joy and laughter, Hindola, Dīpaka and Śrīrāga with love, and Megha with peace and calm. It is interesting that the *rāga* most closely corresponding to the European major scale, *Pañcama*, is associated with the night and love in the Indian system.

There is no harmony in Indian music, and the melody, which usually proceeds by conjunct intervals (i.e. adjacent notes on the keyboard), never suggests a harmonic basis, as do many European melodies. The tune is sustained by a drone note and by drumming. The subtle and complex cross rhythms of Indian music take the place of harmony and counterpoint in the ear of the trained listener. Like the ancient Greeks the Indians delighted and still delight in unusual times, such as $\frac{5}{4}$ and $\frac{7}{4}$. The *tāla*, or rhythmic figure is, after the *rāga*, the most important element of Indian music. Bharata recognizes twenty-two *tālas*, and since then many more have been introduced. *Tālas* range in complexity from simple $\frac{2}{4}$ time (*āditāla*) and $\frac{3}{4}$ (*rūpaka*, stressed as | ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ |) to such remarkable rhythms as *jhampā*, a $\frac{16}{8}$ rhythm stressed: | ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ | or *ātā*, which has fourteen notes to the bar, thus:

| ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ |. When two or more of these complex rhythms, each ornamented with grace notes and varied by syncopation, are sounded together, the result is a rhythmic texture nearly as difficult for a European to disentangle as a four-part fugue would be to an Indian.

The Indian musician was, and still is, an improviser. While a simple melody could be recorded in alphabetic notation India never

devised a true musical notation and the music of her ancient masters has vanished for ever. As at the present day, every performance was virtually a new composition. The musician would choose his *rāga* and *tāla* and, often starting from a well-known melody, would elaborate his theme in the form of free variations, working up to a climax of complex and rapid ornamentation.

The chief musical instrument was the *viṇā*, usually loosely translated "lute". The term was originally applied to the bow-harp, often with ten strings, of a type very similar to the small harp used in ancient Egypt and the early civilizations of the Middle East (pl. XXXVIIb). By the end of the Gupta period this instrument had begun to go out of fashion, and its place was largely taken by a lute with a pear-shaped body, played either with the fingers or with a plectrum. This in turn was superseded in the 8th century by the early form of the modern *viṇā*, with long finger-board and small round body, often made of a dried gourd. Bowed instruments may have been known, but seem to have been little used in polite circles until the coming of the Muslims. Flutes and reed-instruments of various kinds were widely played, but instruments of the trumpet type were rarely used except as signals. Of these the most mentioned was the conch, the shell of a large mollusc, blown through its sawn-off point before battle, as an invocation to a deity, and on important occasions generally; its sound was very auspicious. Percussion instruments were numerous and varied. The smaller drums, played in pairs with the fingers as at present, were looked on as almost essential for any musical performance. Larger drums were used for state occasions, and there was a wide range of cymbals, gongs and bells.

The evidence of Bharata shows that, as at the present day, the Indian of two thousand years ago preferred the throaty, rather nasal type of singing, which comes more naturally than that which Europe has learnt to appreciate. The singing voice was often treated as a musical instrument, the vocalist performing long impromptu variations on a simple melody, sung to a single phrase, often an invocation to a deity.

In the late medieval period music became largely the preserve of professionals, who, though much in demand by the well-to-do people who employed them, were of low caste. This was not the case in India's greatest days, when a knowledge of music was looked on as an essential attribute of a gentleman. "The man who knows nothing of literature, music or art," runs an ancient Indian proverb, "is nothing but a beast without the beast's tail and horns".

THE DANCE

Like music, Indian dancing has changed little with the centuries, and the best modern Indian dancers, such as Uday Shankar and Rām Gopāl, still dance according to the rules of the *Bhārata Nāṭyaśāstra*. Dancing (*nṛtya*) was closely connected with acting (*nāṭya*); in fact both are forms of the same word, the latter being a Prākṛitism, and aspects of a single art, *abhinaya*, the portrayal of the eight emotions (p. 417). The drama employed chiefly word and gesture, the dance chiefly music and gesture. As in most other civilizations there is little doubt that the Indian drama, which we consider in the following chapter, developed from ritual miming song and dance.

Indian dancing is not merely a thing of legs and arms alone, but of the whole body. Every movement of the little finger or the eye-brow is significant, and must be fully controlled. The poses and gestures are classified in detail, even as early as the *Bhārata Nāṭyaśāstra*, which mentions thirteen poses of the head, thirty-six of the eyes, nine of the neck, thirty-seven of the hand, and ten postures of the body. Later texts classify many more poses and gestures, every one of which depicts a specific emotion or object. With so many possible combinations the dancer can tell a whole story, easily comprehensible to the observer who knows the convention.

The most striking feature of the Indian dance is undoubtedly the hand-gesture (*mudrā*). By a beautiful and complicated code, the hand alone is capable of portraying not only a wide range of emotions, but gods, animals, men, natural scenery, actions and so on. Some hundreds of *mudrās* are classified in later textbooks, and they are used not only in the dance, but, as we have seen, in religious worship and iconography.

This highly developed dance style demanded years of training, and was probably always chiefly performed by professionals, though there are references in literature to princes and their ladies dancing in their palaces. Ancient India was rich in folk-dances, which were performed at festivals. In later years only low caste people would think of dancing in public, but there seems to have been no social taboo on the art in ancient times, except perhaps for practising brāhmins.

IX

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

I. LANGUAGE

Sanskrit

It has long been universally accepted that Sanskrit is a remote cousin of all the languages of Europe, with the exception of Finnish, Estonian, Hungarian, Turkish and Basque. All the other European tongues look back to a common ancestor in a group of dialects spoken by tribesmen in the steppelands of South Russia some 2,000 years B.C. The relationship of Sanskrit to the languages of the West is indicated by several obvious resemblances, such as *pitr*, "father", and *mātr*, "mother", and many others which are less obvious. For instance the Sanskrit *śvan*, "dog", is cognate with the Greek *κύων*, the Latin *canis*, the German *Hund*, and the English *hound*, the Germanic *h* representing an original *k*. The Sanskrit *cakra* is related to the word with the same meaning in English, *wheel*, both of which originated from a word pronounced something like *kwekulo*, which was also the ancestor of the Greek *κύκλος* and the Old English *hwæogol*, from which our word "wheel" is derived. Many hundreds of relationships of this kind, at first not obvious, have been established with virtual certainty.

The reader with a slight knowledge of Latin or Greek will immediately recognize the relationship between their verbal systems and that of Sanskrit. Thus the present tense of the Sanskrit verb *as* "to be", is declined in singular and plural as follows:

<i>asmi</i> , "I am";	<i>smas</i> , "we are";
<i>asi</i> , "thou art";	<i>stha</i> , "you are";
<i>asti</i> , "he is";	<i>santi</i> , "they are".

Vedic Sanskrit is in many ways closer than any other Indo-European language to the parent tongue, and it was the discovery of Sanskrit which enabled Bopp, Rask, and other scholars of the first half of the last century to establish a clear relationship between the languages of the Indo-European group and to develop the science of comparative philology.

The earliest surviving form of Sanskrit, that of the *R̥g Veda*, bears about the same relation to the classical tongue as does Homeric to classical Greek. At all its stages Sanskrit is a language of many inflexions, but the Vedas contain numerous forms which

later went out of use. The verb is of a complexity rivalling the Greek, with a bewildering array of voices and moods, later much simplified. The Vedic noun, as in later Sanskrit, has eight cases, and both verb and noun have dual numbers.]

An important feature of Vedic Sanskrit is the tonic accent. Every important word had an accented syllable, which was not necessarily stressed, but on which the voice rose in pitch, as in classical Greek. The tonic accent of a Sanskrit word, is, with exceptions due to the special rules of the languages, the same as in the cognate Greek word.

Sanskrit, and most of the languages derived from it, are characterized by the presence of aspirated consonants. Thus *k*, pronounced without appreciable emission of breath, is, to the Indian, quite a different sound from the aspirated *kh*, which is pronounced with a strong breathing, rather like the first sound of the English word *come*. To the average European, the difference is hardly noticeable. The distinction goes back to the Indo-Europeans, and was made in classical Greek, though in Greek the aspirate letters θ , ϕ and χ had lost their original pronunciation before the beginning of the Christian era. Another phonetic characteristic of Vedic Sanskrit, also surviving to modern times, is the series of "retroflex" or "cerebral" consonants, *ṭ*, *ṭh*, *ḍ*, *ḍh*, and *ṇ*. These, to the Indian, are quite different from the "dentals", *t*, *th*, etc., though the European finds them hard to distinguish without practice. The retroflex sounds are not Indo-European, and were borrowed very early from the indigenous inhabitants of India, either proto-Australoid or Dravidian. A further feature of the phonetics of Sanskrit is the predominance of the vowels *a* and *ā*. Vedic is a fine language, capable of vigorous and noble expression. On p. 509 we quote two verses of the Vedic hymns in the original, which will give the reader some idea of the sound of the language.

[After the composition of the *R̥g Veda* Sanskrit developed considerably. In the early centuries of the 1st millennium B.C. old inflexions disappeared, and the grammar was somewhat simplified, though still remaining very complex. New words, mostly borrowed from non-Āryan sources, were introduced, while old words were forgotten, or lost their original meanings. In these circumstances doubts arose as to the true pronunciation and meaning of the older Vedic texts, though it was generally thought that unless they were recited with complete accuracy they would have no magical effectiveness, but bring ruin on the reciter. Out of the need to preserve the purity of the Vedas India developed the sciences of phonetics and grammar. The oldest Indian linguistic text, Yāska's *Nirukta*, explaining obsolete Vedic words, dates from the 5th century B.C., and followed

much earlier work in the linguistic field. Pāṇini's great grammar, the *Aṣṭādhyayī* ("Eight Chapters") was probably composed towards the end of the 4th century B.C. With Pāṇini the language had virtually reached its classical form, and it developed little thenceforward, except in its vocabulary.

By this time the sounds of Sanskrit had been analysed with an accuracy never again reached in linguistic study until the 19th century. One of ancient India's greatest achievements is her remarkable alphabet, commencing with the vowels and followed by the consonants, all classified very scientifically according to their mode of production, in sharp contrast to the haphazard and inadequate Roman alphabet, which has developed organically for three millennia. It was only on the discovery of Sanskrit by the West that a science of phonetics arose in Europe.)

The great grammar of Pāṇini, which effectively stabilized the Sanskrit language, presupposes the work of many earlier grammarians. These had succeeded in recognizing the root as the basic element of a word, and had classified some 2,000 monosyllabic roots which, with the addition of prefixes, suffixes and inflexions, were thought to provide all the words of the language. Though the early etymologists were correct in principle, they made many errors and false derivations, and started a precedent which produced interesting results in many branches of Indian thought (p. 82).

Though its fame is much restricted by its specialized nature, there is no doubt that Pāṇini's grammar is one of the greatest intellectual achievements of any ancient civilization, and the most detailed and scientific grammar composed before the 19th century in any part of the world. The work consists of over 4,000 grammatical rules, couched in a sort of shorthand, which employs single letters or syllables for the names of the cases, moods, persons, tenses, etc. in which linguistic phenomena are classified. The great terseness of Pāṇini's system makes his work very difficult to follow without preliminary study and a suitable commentary. Later Indian grammars are mostly commentaries on Pāṇini, the chief being the "Great Commentary" (*Mahābhāṣya*) of Patañjali (2nd century B.C.) and the "Banāras Commentary" (*Kāśikā Vṛtti*) of Jayāditya and Vāmana (7th century A.D.).

Some later grammarians disagreed with Pāṇini on minor points, but his grammar was so widely accepted that no writer or speaker of Sanskrit in courtly or brāhmaṇic circles dared seriously infringe it. With Pāṇini the language was fixed, and could only develop within the framework of his rules. It was from the time of Pāṇini onwards that the language began to be called *Samskṛta*, "perfected" or

“refined”, as opposed to the *Prākṛtas* (“unrefined”), the popular dialects which had developed naturally.

Pāṇinian Sanskrit, though simpler than Vedic, is still a very complicated language. Every beginner finds great difficulty in surmounting Pāṇini’s rules of euphonic combination (*sandhi*), the elaboration of tendencies present in the language even in Vedic times. Every word of a sentence is affected by its neighbours. Thus *na-avadat* (“he did not say”) becomes *nāvadat*, but *na-uvāca* (with the same meaning) becomes *novāca*; *Rāmas-uvāca* (“Rāma said”) becomes *Rāma uvāca*, and *Rāmas-avadat* becomes *Rāmo ’vadat*, but *Haris-avadat* (“Hari said”) becomes *Harir avadat*. There are many rules of this kind, which were even artificially imposed on the *R̥g Veda*, so that the reader must often disentangle the original words to find the correct metre.

Pāṇini, in standardizing Sanskrit, probably based his work on the language as it was spoken in the North-West. Already the lingua franca of the priestly class, it gradually became that of the governing class also. The Mauryas, and most Indian dynasties until the Guptas, used Prākṛit for their official pronouncements. The first important dynasty to use Sanskrit was that of the Śakas of Ujjain, and the inscription of Rudradāman at Girnar (p. 62) is the earliest written Sanskrit document we possess, with the exception of a few inscriptions which are brief and unimportant.

As long as it is spoken and written a language tends to develop, and its development is generally in the direction of simplicity. Owing to the authority of Pāṇini, Sanskrit could not develop freely in this way. Some of his minor rules, such as those relating to the use of cases indicating past time, were quietly ignored, and writers took to using imperfect, perfect and aorist indiscriminately; but Pāṇini’s rules of inflexion had to be maintained. The only way in which Sanskrit could develop away from inflexion was by building up compound nouns to take the place of the clauses of the sentence.

In the Vedic and Epic literature compound nouns are common enough, but they are usually of only two or three members, like the English “houseboat”, or “blackbird”. In classical Sanskrit, on the other hand, they may have as many as twenty or thirty members. Earlier classical poets such as Kālidāsa are comparatively restrained in their use of compounds, though even in poetry compounds of six elements are not uncommon; but the earliest royal panegyrics in Sanskrit employ enormous compounds. For instance the emperor Samudra Gupta is referred to as “binding together the whole world by putting forth his strength and by [accepting] acts of service [from other kings], such as paying personal homage, the presentation of

gifts of maidens, and soliciting his charter, sealed with the Garuḍa-seal, to confirm them in possession of their territories" in a single word of twenty components.* This remarkable use of long compounds may be due to the influence of Dravidian speech on the language, for early Tamil has few inflexions, and its words are put together in concatenations without definite indication of their relationship. If the components of a Sanskrit compound word are thought of as separate words, as in such an English phrase as "my top right-hand waistcoat pocket" which in Sanskrit would be treated as a single compound word, the new constructions of the classical period become intelligible.

With the growth of long compounds Sanskrit also developed a taste for long sentences. The prose works of Bāṇa and Subandhu, written in the 7th century, and the writings of many of their successors, contain single sentences covering two or three pages of type. To add to these difficulties writers adopted every conceivable verbal trick, until Sanskrit literature became one of the most ornate and artificial in the world.

The interest in language which India had shown from the earliest times continued in the medieval period. A number of valuable "dictionaries" survive from this time; these are not comparable to the alphabetically arranged dictionaries of the West, but rather to such works as *Roget's Thesaurus*. They contain lists of words of approximately the same meaning or used in similar contexts, sometimes with brief definitions, the whole arranged in simple verse. The most famous lexicographer, and the earliest whose work has survived, was Amarasiṃha, by tradition a contemporary of Kālidāsa. Another form of dictionary, more akin to our own, was the list of homonyms, classifying words with more than one meaning.

Indian interest in language spread to philosophy, and there was considerable speculation about the relations of a word and the thing it represented. The Mīmāṃsā school (p. 327), reviving the verbal mysticism of the later Vedic period, maintained that every word was the reflexion of an eternal prototype, and that its meaning was eternal and inherent in it. Its opponents, especially the logical school of Nyāya (p. 323), supported the view that the relation of word and meaning was purely conventional. Thus the controversy was similar to that between the Realists and Nominalists in medieval Europe.

Classical Sanskrit was probably never spoken by the masses, but it was never wholly a dead language. As the official tongue of church and state it was read and spoken by the upper classes, and probably

* *Ātma-nivedana-kany'-opāyana-dāna-garutmad-aṅka-sva-viṣaya-bhukti-śāsana-yācan'-ādy-upāya-sevā-kṛta-bāhu-vīrya-prasara-dharaṇi-bandhasya.*¹

understood to some extent by many of the lower orders. It served as a lingua franca for the whole of India, and even today learned brāhmaṇs from the opposite ends of the land, meeting at a place of pilgrimage, will converse in Sanskrit and understand each other perfectly.

Prākritis and Pāli

The language of the *R̥g Veda* was already rather archaic when the hymns were composed, and the ordinary Āryan tribesman spoke a simpler tongue, more closely akin to classical Sanskrit. In the Veda itself there is evidence of dialectical differences. By the time of the Buddha the masses were speaking languages which were much simpler than Sanskrit. These were the Prākritis, of which several dialects have been attested.

The everyday speech of ancient India has been preserved for us largely through the unorthodox religions, whose earliest scriptures were composed in languages approximating to those spoken by the people. Most inscriptions of pre-Guptan times, notably the great series of Aśokan edicts, are in Prākritis, and the women and humbler characters of the Sanskrit drama are made to speak in formalized Prākrit of various dialects. A few works of secular literature were composed in Prākrit. Thus there is much material for reconstructing the popular languages.

Prākritis were much simpler than Sanskrit both in sound and grammar. Except for certain combinations which were easy to pronounce, such as doubled consonants, or compounds of which a nasal letter was the first member, groups of consonants were drastically simplified. Consonants at the ends of words disappeared, and, in some dialects, even single consonants in the middle of words were omitted. The diphthongs *ai* and *au* of Sanskrit vanished, as did the old vowels *r̥* and *l̥*, the correct pronunciation of which was almost forgotten very early. In one dialect, Māgadhī, *r̥* regularly became *l̥*, giving *lājā* for *rājā*. The rules of euphonic combination were practically ignored, and the dual number disappeared, while the inflexions of the noun and verb were much reduced.

One very important and early Prākrit was Pāli, which became the language of the Sthaviravādin Buddhists. Buddha probably taught in Māgadhī, but as his doctrines spread over India they were adapted to the local dialects. The language chosen by the Sthaviravādins was a Western one, probably spoken in the region of Sāñchī and Ujjayinī. Pāli, which is still the religious language of the Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma and South-East Asia, seems to look back rather to Vedic than to classical Sanskrit.

Māgadhi was the official language of the Mauryan court, and the edicts of Aśoka were composed in it, though the language in which they are inscribed in different parts of India is evidently affected by local vernaculars. A later hybrid Māgadhi, somewhat influenced by the Western Prākritis and usually known as *Ardha-māgadhi* ("Half Māgadhi"), became the sacred language of the Jainas, and a large literature is written in it.

Other important Prākritis were Śaurasenī, spoken originally in the western part of modern Uttar Pradesh, and Māhārāṣṭrī, spoken in the north-western Deccan. Śaurasenī was particularly used in drama, for the speech of women and respectable people of the lower orders. Māhārāṣṭrī was a literary language, especially popular for lyric song. There were several other Prākritis of lesser importance. By the time of the Guptas the Prākritis were standardized and had lost their local character. The vernaculars had already developed beyond them. What Pāṇini did for Sanskrit others did for the Prākritis, and they began to bear little resemblance to the languages actually spoken. Dramatists, employing various Prākritis by convention, thought first in Sanskrit, and produced their Prākrit passages by following mechanically the rules for conversion from one language to another as laid down by the grammarians.

Another stage in the development of the Indo-Āryan language was *Apabhraṃśa* ("falling away"), a vernacular of Western India which achieved literary form in the Middle Ages and was used by Jaina writers in Gujarāt and Rājasthān for the composition of poetry. Its chief characteristic is the further reduction of inflexions, which are in part replaced by postpositions, as in modern Indian vernaculars. A similar degenerate Prākrit was used in Bengal by a few late Buddhist writers, and is the ancestor of modern Bengālī.

The next stage saw the development of the modern vernaculars of North India and is outside the scope of this work, although the earliest vernacular literature is little later than the end of our period. One Indo-Āryan vernacular, however, had a long history behind it by this time—this was Sinhalese, the development of which can be traced in inscriptions and literature from the 2nd century B.C. down to the present day. The prākritic dialect spoken by the early settlers of Ceylon was already far removed from the original Sanskrit. Influenced by the local speech, and also by Tamil, Sinhalese developed rapidly and independently. Very early the aspirated letters, characteristic of most Indo-Āryan languages, were forgotten. Vowels were shortened, and the short vowels *ē* and *ō*, absent in most Indo-Āryan languages, appeared, as well as a wholly new vowel, *ā*, rather like that in the English *hat*. Many words were borrowed



Head of Avalokiteśvara (plate LXXII).



The Temptation of the Buddha. Mural painting, Ajantā. Gupta Period



The Buddha receiving Alms from a
Woman and Child. Ajantā

from the aboriginals and the Tamils. By the beginning of the Christian era Sinhalese was no longer a Prākṛit, but a distinct language. Surviving Sinhalese literature dates from the 9th century A.D., but it is certain that there was much earlier work which is now lost.

Dravidian Languages

While the modern Indo-Āryan languages, with the exception of Sinhalese, had not found literary expression at the time of the Muslim invasion, the Dravidian languages had been flourishing for centuries.

Four of these tongues have distinctive scripts and written literatures—Tamil, Canarese, Telugu and Malayālam. Of these Tamil is spoken in the south, from Cape Comorin to Madras, Canarese in Mysore and parts of Hyderābād, Telugu from Madras northward to the borders of Orissā and Malayālam in Malabār. Tamil is certainly the oldest of these languages, with a literature going back to the early centuries A.D.

Some authorities believe that the Dravidian languages are remotely affiliated to the Finno-Ugrian group, which includes Finnish and Hungarian.² If this is the case it involves interesting corollaries concerning prehistoric race movements, but the hypothesis is not absolutely certain. Dravidian is virtually an independent group of languages with a distinctive character. Its sound system is rich in retroflex consonants, which give it a crisp flavour, and its varied vowels (including *ē* and *ō*, not present in Sanskrit) distinguish it from the northern languages, where the vowels *a* and *ā* predominate. Like Sanskrit it has a complicated system of euphonic combination. It does not recognize the aspirated consonants of Indo-Āryan languages—by the peculiar phonetic laws of Tamil, Sanskrit *bhūmi* ("earth") becomes in Tamil *pūmi*.

Tamil is not inflected, in the sense that Sanskrit is, but the relations of one word with another, and the number, person and tense of verbs, are shown by suffixes, which may be piled up one upon another indefinitely. Sanskrit began to affect the language very early, and by the Middle Ages the learned looked on their suffixes as nominal and verbal endings, on the analogy of Sanskrit. In the oldest texts, however, these suffixes are sparingly used, and related words are juxtaposed in clusters, with few if any indications of their relationship one to another—a system similar to the great compound words of Sanskrit, and giving much difficulty to all but the expert.

The earliest Tamil literature contains comparatively few Sanskrit loan-words, and those it does contain are generally adapted to the Tamil phonetic system. The gradual growth of Āryan influence resulted in the borrowing of many more words in the Middle Ages,

often in their correct Sanskrit form. Telugu and Canarese, which are spoken further north, are naturally even more strongly influenced by Sanskrit. Canarese first appears in inscriptions at the end of the 6th century, and its earliest surviving literature goes back to the 9th. Telugu does not appear as a literary language until the 12th century and only becomes really important under the Vijayanagara Empire, of which it was the court language. Malayālam, very closely akin to Tamil, became a separate language in the 11th century.

Writing

We have seen that the people of the Harappā Culture had a script, which cannot be deciphered. From the time of the fall of Harappā, perhaps about 1550 B.C., to the middle of the 3rd century B.C. no Indian written material has survived. References to writing occur in the Pāli scriptures of the Buddhists, and in the Sūtra literature, but there is no clear mention of it in the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas or Upaniṣads. This negative evidence, however, is not wholly conclusive, and some form of script may have been used by merchants. The Aśokan inscriptions, which are the earliest important written documents of India, are engraved in scripts almost perfectly adapted to the expression of Indian sounds. It is generally thought that the scripts had many years, perhaps many centuries, of development before the days of Aśoka.

The Aśokan edicts employ two scripts. The most important, used everywhere in India except the North-West, was *Brāhmī*, about the origin of which two theories exist. Most Indian authorities would now maintain that the script was derived from that of Harappā. Many Europeans and some Indians believe that it was derived from a Semitic script. The first theory, tentatively put forward by Sir Alexander Cunningham and elaborated by the Assyriologist Professor S. Langdon,³ has many difficulties. Until we know the pronunciation of the 270 Harappā signs we cannot be sure that the dozen or so letters of the Brāhmī script which somewhat resemble them are derived from them, and with so many Harappā signs it is unlikely that no resemblances at all should have been found. Similarities between Brāhmī and some early North Semitic scripts are perhaps more striking, especially as the latter offer only twenty-two letters to choose from,⁴ but the resemblances are still not strong enough to be altogether convincing, and the whole problem needs re-opening.

Brāhmī (fig. xxv) is normally read from left to right, as are European scripts, while the Semitic scripts read from right to left. A very defective series of Aśokan inscriptions at Yerragudi in

Madras, a very early Sinhalese inscription, and an early coin from Eran in Madhya Pradesh, are read from right to left,⁶ which would suggest that this was the original direction of Brāhmī. But this is no evidence of its origin, since it is believed that the Harappā script was also read from right to left.

Whatever its ultimate origin Brāhmī is so skilfully adapted to the sounds of Indian languages that its development must have been at least in part deliberate. In the form in which we have it, it is the work not of merchants but of brāhmaṇs or other learned men who knew something of the Vedic science of phonetics. It may have begun as a mercantile alphabet, suggested by the shapes of Semitic letters, or by vague memories of the Harappā script, but by the time of Aśoka, though still not completely perfect, it was the most scientific script of the world.

The words of Semitic languages, based largely on roots of three consonants modified by internal vowel changes, needed few indications of vowels to prevent ambiguity, and until comparatively late times vowels were marked only at the beginning of words, and then not perfectly. The Greeks, when they borrowed the Phœnician alphabet, adapted it to express vowels other than *a* by the introduction of new signs. The Indians, on the other hand, expressed their vowels by the modification of the basic letter, which was looked on as containing an inherent short *a*. Thus the Brāhmī letter † is not *k*, but *ka*. Other vowels were indicated by ticks attached to the top or bottom of the letter, thus: † *kā*, †̣ *ki*, †̤ *kī*, †̥ *ku*, †̦ *kū*, †̧ *ke*, †̨ *ko*. Two consonants together were expressed by placing one under the other; thus † *ka* and †̣ *ya* combined to form †̣̣ *kya*. No word in Prākṛit ends with a consonant, except with the final *m*, which was expressed by a dot, thus: †̣̣̣ *kaṃ*. In writing Sanskrit, at a later time, a consonant ending a sentence or line of poetry was marked by a diagonal stroke thus †̣̣̣̣ *k*. The words of a sentence were not generally divided, the final letter of one being combined with the initial letter of the other; with some modification this is still the practice in the case of Sanskrit, though not of the vernaculars, and adds to the difficulties of the language for the beginner.

Local variations of the Brāhmī script are evident even at the time of Aśoka. In the following centuries these differences developed further, until distinct alphabets evolved. Before the beginning of the Christian era engravers in the north, no doubt following the custom of scribes, began to add little ticks (called in European printing terminology serifs) to the letters, and to employ flourishes of various kinds. The tendency to ornamentation increased with the centuries, until in the late medieval period the serifs at the tops of




Fig. xxvi.—Kharosthi Script

From an inscribed silver leaf, Takṣaśīlā. 1st c. A.D.

Transcript (Reading the script from right to left)

- (Line 1) Sa 1 100 20 10 4 1 1 A-ya-sa A-ṣa-da-sa ma-sa-sa di-va-se 10 4 1. I-ṣa di-va-se pra-di-sta-vi-ta Bha-ga-va-to dha-tu-(o) U-ra-(sa)-
 (2) ke-ṇa Im-ta-vhri-a-pu-tre-ṇa Ba-ha-li-e-ṇa No-a-ca-e ṇa-ga-re va-sta-ve-na. Te-na i-me pra-di-sta-vi-ta Bha-ga-va-to dha-tu-o
 Dha-ma-ra-
 (3) i-e Ta-kṣa-śī-e ta-ṇu-va-e Bo-si-sa-tva-ga-ha-mi ma-ha-ra-ja-sa ra-ja-ti-ra-ja-sa de-va-pu-tra-sa Khu-ṣa-ṇa-sa a-ro-ga-da-kṣi-ṇa-e
 (4) sa-rva-bu-dha-ṇa pu-ya-e pra-tya-ga-bu-dha-ṇa pu-ya-e a-ra-ha-ṇa pu-ya-e sa-rva-sa-ṇa pu-ya-e ma-ta-pi-tu pu-ya-e mi-tra-ma-ca-ṇa-ti-sa-
 (5) lo-hi-ṇa pu-ya-e a-tva-ṇo a-ro-ga-da-kṣi-ṇa-e Ni-a-ṇa-e. Ho-tu a-(ya)-de sa-ma-pa-ri-ca-go.

Translation.

In the year of Aya * 136, in the month Āṣāḍha on the 15th day.
 On this day the relics of the Lord (Buddha) were deposited by
 Urasaka the Bactrian, the son of Iṇṭavhria, a citizen of the town of
 Noaca. These relics of the Lord were deposited by him in his own
 Bodhisattva chapel of the Dharmarājika (Stūpa) of Takṣaśīlā, for
 the blessing of health for the great King, the King over Kings,

the Son of the Gods, the Kuṣāṇa, and in reverence to all the Buddhas,
 in reverence to all the Pratyeka Buddhas,† in reverence to the
 Arhants,‡ in reverence to all beings, in reverence to his mother and
 father, in reverence to his friends, his advisers, his kinsmen, and
 those of common blood, and for the boon of health and Nirvāṇa for
 himself. May right renunciation be widespread.

* The correct interpretation of this word is much disputed. † See p. 274. ‡ See p. 275.

letters were joined together in an almost continuous line, to form the *Nāgarī* ("City" alphabet, also called *Devanāgarī*, "Script of the City of the Gods"), in which Sanskrit, Prākṛit, Hindī and Marāṭhī are written at the present day. Local variations led to the development of individual scripts in the Panjāb, Bengal, Orissā, Gujarāt and elsewhere.

Meanwhile in the Deccan scripts had been growing even more florid. In Central India in the 5th and 6th centuries a script evolved which substituted square boxes for the serifs of the northern scripts, and introduced several other elaborations. The scripts of the Southern Deccan and Ceylon became more and more circular in form, until in the Middle Ages they approximated to those of the present day. The Tamils, on the other hand, evolved an angular script known as *Grantha*, which is still sometimes used in the Tamil country for writing Sanskrit, and from which the modern Tamil alphabet is derived. Thus by the end of our period the alphabets of India differed little from those of today.

It was from India, especially from the south, that the people of South-East Asia learnt the art of writing. The earliest surviving South-East Asian inscriptions, found in Borneo and Malaya, and dating from the 4th or 5th centuries, are in fairly correct Sanskrit, and in a script resembling that of the early Pallavas. Though superficially very different, every South-East Asian script, except of course the Arabic and Roman scripts in which Malay is written, can be traced back to Brāhmī. Scripts of Indian type have been used as far eastward as the Philippine Islands.

The origin of the other Aśokan script, called *Kharoṣṭhī* (a strange term, meaning "Ass-lip") (fig. xxvi), is not in doubt. It was certainly derived from the Aramaic alphabet, which was widely used in Achæmenid Persia, and was also known in North-West India. Many Kharoṣṭhī letters closely resemble Aramaic, and, like Aramaic, the alphabet is read from right to left. Kharoṣṭhī was adapted to the sounds of Indian languages by the invention of new letters and the use of vowel marks, which were lacking in Aramaic. It is generally thought that Kharoṣṭhī was adapted from Aramaic under the influence of Brāhmī, but the priority of the two scripts is not absolutely certain. Kharoṣṭhī was little used in India proper after the 3rd century A.D., but it survived some centuries longer in Central Asia, where many Prākṛit documents in Kharoṣṭhī script have been discovered. Later, Kharoṣṭhī was replaced in Central Asia by a form of the Gupta alphabet, from which the present-day script of Tibet is derived.

The usual writing material was the leaf of the talipot palm (*tālapatra*, in Tamil *ōlai*), dried, smoothed, sized and cut into strips.

To form a book a number of such strips was held loosely together by a cord passed through a hole in the centre of the leaf, or, in the case of large books, by two cords at either end. The book was usually strengthened by wooden covers, which were often lacquered and painted (pl. LXXXIIa). Palm leaves are still sometimes used as writing material in the outlying parts of South India. In the Himālayan districts, where supplies of dried palm leaf were difficult to obtain, it was replaced by the inner bark of the birch tree, which, carefully pared and smoothed, served the purpose excellently. As well as these materials, sized cotton and silk, and thin slips of wood or bamboo were also used, and important documents were engraved on copper plates (pl. LXXXIX). Paper, traditionally invented in China in the early 2nd century A.D., may have been known in North India and it was certainly widely used in Central Asia.⁶

In most of India ink made from lampblack or charcoal, applied with a reed pen, was the usual writing medium. In the South, however, the letters were usually scratched on the palm-leaf with a stylus, and the leaf then rubbed over with finely powdered lampblack. This system of writing gave the letters a fine sharp outline and allowed the use of very small script; it probably encouraged the development of the angular forms of the Tamil alphabet.*

II. LITERATURE

Vedic Literature

We have already dealt with the Four Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads in many contexts, and have given extracts from them (pp. 234–56). In their literary aspect many of these scriptures are of high merit, especially some hymns of the *Rg Veda* and some parts of the early Upaniṣads; much, on the other hand, is dry and monotonous, or can only be appreciated after a considerable effort of the imagination.

The 1028 hymns of the *Rg Veda* are the work of many authors and show great variation of style and merit. Though their composition may have covered as many as five centuries, even the earliest of these poems is the product of a long tradition, composed according to a strict metrical scheme,† and a settled literary convention.

The collection is divided into ten “circles” (*maṇḍala*) or books. Of these, books ii to vii are ascribed to individual families of seers, and contain the earliest hymns; books i, viii, and x are later, especially

* For further information on the Indian alphabet see Appendix, p. 506ff.

† For notes on the prosody of ancient Indian poetry see Appendix, p. 508ff.

parts of x, while the ninth book was compiled by extracting the hymns to the god Soma from the other parts of the *Rg Veda*. The hymns contain many repetitions and the majority have a general sameness of outlook. Owing to their archaic language and the obscurity of their allusions many passages are not fully understood. The reader will already have obtained some idea of the style of the *Rg Veda*, as far as it can be conveyed in fairly literal translation, from the passages already quoted. We add here a few further translations of hymns of special literary merit.

Our first translation describes Indra's fight with the cloud-dragon Vṛtra. The hymn evidently refers to a well-known legend, which has since been forgotten, but which was probably a variant of the creation myth of Mesopotamia, in which the god Marduk slays the demon of chaos, Tiamat, and creates the universe. Here Indra's function as a rain-maker is also in evidence, and, if the story was originally borrowed from Mesopotamia, it had evidently developed far from its prototype. Interesting is the fleeting reference to Indra's fear, from which it would seem that his battle with the dragon did not go all his own way. The last verse is evidently an addition by another hand.

"Let me proclaim the valiant deeds of Indra,
the first he did, the wielder of the thunder,
when he slew the dragon and let loose the waters,
and pierced the bellies of the mountains.

"He slew the dragon lying on the mountain,
for Tvaṣṭṛ * made him a heavenly thunderbolt.
The waters suddenly, like bellowing cattle,
descended and flowed on, down to the ocean.

"In his strength he chose the soma—
from three cups he drank the essence.
The Generous seized his thunderbolt,
and smote the firstborn of dragons.

"When, Indra, you slew the firstborn of dragons,
and frustrated the arts of the sorcerers,
creating sun and heaven and dawn,
you found no enemy to withstand you.

"Indra slew Vṛtra, and Vyāmsa, stronger than Vṛtra,
with his thunderbolt, with his mighty weapon.
Like the branches of a tree felled by the axe
the dragon lay strewn over the earth.

* The Vedic Vulcan.

- “Like an enraged coward he called a challenge
to the great hero, the strong’s oppressor, charging.
But he did not escape the force of his blows—
the foe of Indra crushed the clouds together [in falling].
- “Footless and handless, he still gave Indra battle,
until the thunderbolt struck him hard on his back.
The bullock sought to be match for the bull,
but Vṛtra lay, his members scattered afar.
- “The waters, flowing for man’s good, pass over him,
as he lies thus, broken like a reed.
Beneath the waters which he had encompassed
in his great might, Vṛtra the serpent lay.
- “The strength of the mother of Vṛtra was exhausted,
and Indra bore away her weapon.
The mother lay above, the son below.
Dānu lay like a cow beside her calf.
- “Fallen in the midst of water-courses,
never pausing, never resting,
floods overwhelm the hidden corpse of Vṛtra.
In a long darkness lay the foe of Indra.
- “Lorded by Dāsas and guarded by the dragon
the waters lay, penned in as cows by a Paṇi.
When the opening of the waters was closed up
the slayer of Vṛtra threw it open.
- “O Indra, you became a wreath of vapour,*
when he impaled you on his lance. Alone
you won the cows, hero, you won the soma,
and you let loose the Seven Streams to flow.
- “Thunder and lightning availed him nothing,
nor the mist he scattered abroad, nor hail.
When Indra and the dragon fought he conquered,
as he, the Generous, will in future conquer.
- “And what avenger of the dragon did you see,
Indra, as fear entered your heart when you had killed him,
when you crossed over nine and ninety streams,
as a frightened hawk crosses the skies?
- “Indra is king of all that moves or rests,
of tame and fierce, the wielder of the thunder.
He is the king of mortals, whom he rules,
encircling them as a wheel’s rim the spokes.”⁷

* Literally “a horse’s tail”, probably implying a wisp of cloud.

A number of hymns show deep feeling for nature, the most famous of these being the hymns to Uṣas, the goddess of dawn; but the hymns to Uṣas are perhaps less beautiful than the single hymn to Rātrī, the personified night.

“The goddess Night has looked abroad
with her eyes, everywhere drawing near.
She has put all her glories on.

“The immortal goddess now has filled
wide space, its depths and heights.
Her radiance drives out the dark.

“Approaching, the goddess has expelled
her sister Dawn.
Now darkness also disappears.

“And so you have drawn near to us,
who at your coming have come home,
as birds to their nest upon the tree.

“The clans have now gone home to rest,
home the beasts, and home the birds,
home even the hawks who lust for prey.

“Guard us from the she-wolf and the wolf,
and guard us from the thief, O Night,
and so be good for us to pass.

“For darkness, blotting out, has come
near me, black and palpable.
O Dawn, dispel it like my debts.

“I have offered my hymn as a cow
is offered, Daughter of Heaven. O Night,
accept it, as a victor praise.”⁸

Similarly sensitive to the moods of nature is the little hymn to Araṇyāni, the elusive spirit of the forest.*

“Lady of the Forest! Lady of the Forest!
who seem to vanish from sight in the distance,
why do you never come to the village?
Surely you are not afraid of men!

* The exact meanings of several words and phrases of this hymn are quite uncertain. In translating I have given the sense which seems to me most probable, and filled out the elliptical Sanskrit to make the meaning clearer.

“When the grasshopper replies
to the distant lowing of cattle,
as though to the sound of tinkling bells
the Lady of the Forest makes merry.

“Sometimes you catch a glimpse of her, and think it is cattle grazing,
or a house, far away,
and at evening you hear the Lady of the Forest
like the distant sound of moving wagons.

“Her voice is as the sound of a man calling his cattle,
or as the crash of a felled tree.
If you stay in the forest in the evening,
you will hear her like a far voice crying.

“But the Lady of the Forest will not slay
unless an enemy draws near.
She eats the sweet wild fruits,
and then she rests wherever she will.

“Now I have praised the Lady of the Forest,
who is perfumed with balm, and fragrant,
who is well fed, although she tills not,
the mother of all things of the wild.”⁹

A few Vedic hymns are by our standards primarily secular. Of these the “Gamester’s Lament” is the most famous. Probably the poem was originally a spell to ensure success in gaming, addressed to the *vibhīdaka* nuts themselves. This was converted by an anonymous poet into a cautionary poem, which obtained a place in the *R̥g Veda* on account of its reference to the god Savitr̥ as attempting to reform the gamester.

“The dangling nuts, born where the wind blows the lofty tree,
delight me with their rolling on the board.
The cheering *vibhīdaka* has brought me joy,
like a draught of soma from Mount Mūjavant.

“She did not scold me, or lose her temper.
She was kind to my friends and me.
But because of a throw too high by one
I have rejected my loving wife.

“Her mother hates me; my wife repels me—
a man in trouble finds no one to pity him.
They say, ‘I’ve no more use for a gambler
than for a worn-out horse put up for sale.’

“When the conquering die has got his possessions
 others embrace the gamester’s wife.
 His father, his mother, his brothers say of him:
 ‘We don’t know him! Take him as a bondman!’

“I think to myself: ‘I won’t go with the others!
 I’ll stop behind when my friends go to play!’
 But then the brown ones * raise their voices,
 and off I go, like a mistress to her lover.

“The gambler goes to the hall of assembly.
 ‘Shall I win?’ he wonders. His body trembles.
 The dice run counter to his hopes,
 and give his opponent the lucky throws.

“The dice are armed with hooks and piercing,
 they are deceptive, hot and burning.
 Like children they give and take again, they strike back at their
 conquerors.
 They are sweetened with honey through the magic they work on
 the gambler.

“They play in a troop of three times fifty.
 Like the god Savitr, they are true to their laws.
 They will not bend to the wrath of the mighty,
 and even a king bows low before them.

“The dice roll down, the dice leap upwards,
 unarmed they withstand the man with arms.
 They are heavenly coals, strewn over the board,
 and though they are cool they burn up the heart.

“The forsaken wife of the gambler sorrows,
 and the mother of the son who wanders afar.
 In debt, in fear, in need of money,†
 he goes by night to the house of others.

“The gambler grieves when he sees a woman,
 another man’s wife, in their pleasant home.
 In the morning he yokes the chestnut horses.‡
 In the evening he falls by the hearth, a beggar.

* I.e. the vibhidaka nuts, loosely translated “dice”. See p. 207f.

† Literally “wealth”. It is almost certain that there was no coined money in India at the time of this poem’s composition (p. 220).

‡ I.e. gambles with the brown nuts.

“So to the general of your great army,
to him who is king, the chief of your host,
I say, stretching out to him my ten fingers:
‘I risk my all! I am speaking the truth!’

“Don’t play with dice, but plough your furrow!
Delight in your property, prize it highly!
Look to your cattle and look to your wife,
you gambler!’ Thus noble Savitr tells me.

“So make friends with us, be kind to us!
Do not force us with your fierce magic!
May your wrath and hatred now come to rest!
May no man fall into the snares of the brown ones!”¹⁰

We need say little here of later Vedic literature. The *Atharva Veda*, in the main a monotonous collection of spells, contains a few poems of great merit. The prose Brāhmaṇas and the various recensions of the *Yajur Veda* are in general without any pretensions to literary qualities, though written in simple straightforward language, very different in style from Classical Sanskrit. Here and there legends are told in terse nervous prose, which gains in effectiveness from its austere economy. We give the story of Purūravas and Urvaśī, which is told in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* as part of the instructions for becoming a Gandharva (p. 238) by means of a magical sacrifice. The story is as old as the *R̥g Veda*, for one hymn¹¹ consists of a dialogue between the earthly lover and his heavenly mistress, from which the verses quoted in the Brāhmaṇa version are taken. The story was very popular in later times, and was the subject of one of Kālidāsa’s plays.

“The nymph Urvaśī loved Purūravas the son of Idā. When she married him she said: ‘You must embrace me three times a day, but never lie with me against my will. Moreover I must never see you naked, for this is the proper way to behave to us women!’

“She lived with him long, and she was with child by him, so long did she live with him. Then the Gandharvas said to one another: ‘This Urvaśī has been living too long among men! We must find a way to get her back!’

“She kept a ewe with two lambs tied to her bed, and the Gandharvas carried off one of the lambs. ‘They’re taking away my baby,’ she cried, ‘as though there were no warrior and no man in the place!’ Then they took away the second, and she cried out in the same way.

“Then he thought to himself: ‘How can the place where I am be without a warrior and a man?’ And, naked as he was, he leapt up after them, for he thought it would take too long to put on a garment.

"Then the Gandharvas produced a flash of lightning, and she saw him as clearly as if it were day—and she vanished. . . .

"Bitterly weeping, he wandered all over Kurukṣetra. There is a lake of lotuses there, called Anyataḥplakṣā. He walked on its banks, and there were nymphs swimming in it in the form of swans.

"And she noticed him, and said: 'That's the man with whom I lived!' 'Let us show ourselves to him,' they said. 'Very well' she replied, and they appeared to him [in their true forms].

"Then he recognized her and entreated her:
 'O my wife, with mind so cruel,
 stay, let us talk together,
 for if our secrets are untold
 we shall have no joy in days to come!' . . .

"Then she replied:
 'What use is there in my talking to you!
 I have passed like the first of dawns.
 Purūravas, go home again!
 I am like the wind, that cannot be caught.' . . .

"Mournfully Purūravas said:
 'Today your lover will perish,
 he will go to the furthest distance and never come back.
 He will lie in the lap of disaster,
 and fierce wolves will devour him'

"She replied:
 'Purūravas do not die! do not go away!
 do not let the fierce wolves devour you!
 Friendship is not to be found in women,
 For they have hearts like half-tamed jackals!'

"And then she said to him:
 'When I dwelt in disguise in the land of mortals
 and passed the nights of four autumns,
 I ate a little ghee once a day,
 and now I have had quite enough!' . . .

"But her heart pitied him, and she said: 'Come on the last evening of the year, then, when your son is born, you shall lie one night with me.'

"He came on the last night of the year, and there stood a golden palace. They told him to enter, and brought her to him.

"She said: 'Tomorrow the Gandharvas will grant you a boon and you must make your choice'. He said: 'You choose for me!' She answered: 'Say, "Let me become one of you!"'

"In the morning the Gandharvas gave him a boon, and he asked: 'Let me become one of you'.

“‘There is no fire among men,’ they said, ‘which is so holy that a man may become one of us by sacrificing with it.’ So they put fire in a pan, and said: ‘By sacrificing with this you will become one of us.’

“He took it and his son, and went homeward. On the way he left the fire in the forest and went to a village with the boy. When he came back the fire had vanished. In place of the fire was a pīpal tree and in place of the pan a mimosa. So he went back to the Gandharvas.

“They said: ‘For a year you must cook rice enough for four [every day]. Each time [you cook] you must put on the fire three logs of the pīpal anointed with ghee . . . and the fire which is produced [at the end of the year] will be the fire [which will make you one of us]. But that is rather difficult,’ they added, ‘so you should make an upper firestick of pīpal wood and a lower one of mimosa wood, and the fire you get from them will be the fire [which will make you one of us]. But that too is rather difficult,’ they added, ‘so you must make both the upper and lower firestick of pīpal wood, and the fire you get from them will be the fire.’

“So he made an upper and a lower firestick of pīpal wood, and the fire he got from them was the fire [which would make him one of them]. He sacrificed with it and became a Gandharva.”¹²

The Upaniṣads rank high as literature, but their chief importance is religious and they have been sufficiently treated and quoted in that setting.

Epic Literature

The earliest Indian literature of a fundamentally secular character is the two great epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which, though worked over by a succession of priestly editors, give clear evidence of their origin as martial legends. Their religious importance lay at first in the royal sacrificial ritual, part of which involved telling stories of the heroes of the past. This put the martial ballads into the hands of the priesthood, who, in transmitting them, often altered their superficial character, and interpolated many long passages on theology, morals and statecraft.

Of the two epics the *Mahābhārata* is the more important. It contains over 90,000 stanzas, usually of thirty-two syllables, and is therefore probably the longest single poem in the world’s literature. Traditionally the author of the poem was the sage Vyāsa, who is said to have taught it to his pupil Vaiśampāyana. The latter, according to tradition, recited it in public for the first time at a great sacrifice held by King Janamejaya, the great grandson of Arjuna, one of the heroes of the story. Stripped of its episodes and interpolations the poem tells of the great civil war in the kingdom of the Kurus, in the region about the modern Delhī, then known as Kurukṣetra.

The throne of the Kurus, whose capital was Hastināpura, fell to Dhṛtarāṣṭra. But he was blind and therefore, according to custom, was not eligible to rule, so his younger brother Pāṇḍu became king. Soon Pāṇḍu, as a result of a curse, gave up the kingdom and retired to the Himālayas as a hermit, with his two wives, leaving Dhṛtarāṣṭra on the throne. When Pāṇḍu died, his five sons, Yudhiṣṭhira, Bhīma, Arjuna, Nakula and Sahadeva, were still children, and were taken back to Hastināpura to be educated with the hundred sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra. When he came of age Yudhiṣṭhira was consecrated heir-apparent. But the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra, led by the eldest, Duryodhana, resented the Pāṇḍavas, and plotted against them, though they were not legally heirs to the throne, owing to their father's blindness and the stop-gap nature of his rule. After foiling a number of plots against their lives the five brothers decided to leave the country, and travelled from one court to another as soldiers of fortune. At the court of the king of the Pañcālas Arjuna won the Princess Draupadī in a *svayamvara*, and, to avoid strife, she became the joint wife of all five brothers. Here they met their great friend and helper, Kṛṣṇa, the chief of the Yādavas. Soon after this the blind Dhṛtarāṣṭra recalled them, renounced the throne, and divided the kingdom between them and his own sons. The five brothers built a new capital at Indraprastha, not far from the modern Delhi.

But the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra were not content with this settlement. Duryodhana invited Yudhiṣṭhira to a great gambling match. With the aid of his uncle Śakuni, who knew all the secrets of the dice, he won from Yudhiṣṭhira his whole kingdom, including his brothers and their joint wife. A compromise was arranged, whereby the five brothers and Draupadī agreed to go into banishment for thirteen years, spending the last year incognito, after which they were to receive back their kingdom.


At the end of the thirteenth year they declared themselves, and sent to Duryodhana demanding their kingdom, according to his promise; but he returned no reply. So the brothers prepared for war. They had many friends among the kings of India, and were able to gather a great army together. Meanwhile the Kauravas (Duryodhana and his brothers) marshalled their own forces. The kings of all India, and even the Greeks, Bactrians and Chinese, took sides with one or other faction, and two enormous armies assembled on the plain of Kurukṣetra.

For eighteen days the battle raged, until at last no important chief was left alive but the five brothers and Kṛṣṇa. Yudhiṣṭhira was crowned king and for many years he and his brothers ruled peacefully and gloriously. At last Yudhiṣṭhira renounced the throne and installed Parikṣit, the grandson of Arjuna, in his place. With their joint wife the five brothers set out on foot for the Himālayas, where they climbed Mount Meru, and entered the City of the Gods.

If we ignore interpolations the style of the *Mahābhārata* is direct and vivid, though it contains many often repeated clichés and stock epithets, which are typical of traditional epic literature everywhere. The chief characters are delineated in very simple outline, but



Country Scene. Mural Painting, Ajantā. Gupta Period



Fighting Elephants. Mural Painting, Ajantā. Gupta Period

with an individuality which makes them real persons. The blind Dhṛtarāṣṭra is a weakling, anxious to do the right thing, but easily persuaded to evil. Of the five brothers the eldest, Yudhiṣṭhira, is pious, righteous and noble, but a little negative in character; Arjuna is the ideal knight, noble, generous and brave; while Bhīma is a rougher character, gluttonous and immensely strong, but not very intelligent, and completely lacking in guile. Draupadī, their wife, is a woman of spirit, who is not afraid to upbraid her five husbands on occasion. The villain Duryodhana and his associates, are not painted in the blackest of colours, but have elements of nobility and courage in their characters.

Some of the interpolated episodes are of much merit, while others are of no literary value. The longest is the *Śānti Parvan*, a dissertation on statecraft and ethics, recited by Bhīṣma, the elder statesman of the Kurus, as he lies dying on a pile of arrows after the great battle (p. 80). This has been treated elsewhere and has little merit as literature. The *Bhagavad Gītā*, the sermon of Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna before the great battle, has already been quoted (pp. 301, 340f). There are many other theological and ethical passages, as well as many narrative episodes. Some of the latter tell legends of the gods, but others are more or less secular, including the famous stories of Rāma and Sītā (p. 412f), Śakuntalā (p. 435f), and Sāvitrī (p. 181). The longest narrative episode is the story of Nala and Damayantī, told to Yudhiṣṭhira during his exile to convince him of the evils of gambling. It tells how King Nala won Princess Damayantī at a svayaṃvara, at which she chose him in preference to the gods themselves, and then lost both his queen and his kingdom at a gambling tournament, to regain them after many exciting adventures. This long story is probably as ancient as the main part of the epic, and is told in very simple verse. As a brief example of the *Mahābhārata's* narrative style we give the description of Damayantī's choice. Among the suitors at the svayaṃvara are four great gods, who, knowing that she is determined to choose Nala, have all taken his appearance, in the hope that she will choose one of them by mistake.

“Then, when the right time had come,
at the auspicious day and hour,
King Bhīma invited
the lords of earth to the bride-choice.

“When they heard, the lords of earth,
all sick at heart with love,
in haste assembled,
desiring Damayantī.

“Like great lions the kings entered
the hall, firmly founded,
with its splendid porch
and shining golden columns.

“There on their several thrones
the lords of earth sat down
all decked in fragrant garlands,
with bright gems in their ears.

“Their arms were thick
as iron bars,
shapely and smooth
as five-headed snakes.

“With lovely shining locks,
and well-formed noses, eyes and brows,
the faces of the kings were bright
as the stars in heaven.

“Then fair-faced Damayanti
entered the hall,
stealing with her splendour
the eyes and thoughts of the kings.

“When the glance of the noble
spectators fell on her limbs
there it was fixed,
and never wavered.

“Then, while the names of the kings
were being proclaimed,
the daughter of Bhīma saw
five men of the same form.

. . . .

“Whichever of them she looked at
she recognized as Nala.
Wondering in her mind,
the fair one was filled with doubt.

“‘Of all the signs of godhead
that I learned from the elders
I see not even one
in those who are standing here.’

“Thus thinking over and over,
and pondering again and again,
she resolved that the time had come
to take refuge in the gods.

“‘I heard from the mouth of the swans
that Nala had chosen me as his bride,
and so, if that be true,
may the gods show him to me!

“‘Never in word or deed
have I committed sin,
and so, if that be true,
may the gods show him to me!

“‘The gods have ordained
the king of Niṣadha to be my lord,
and so, if that be true,
may the gods show him to me!’

. . . .

“‘May the great gods, the world-protectors
take on their own true form,
that I may recognize
the king of men, of good fame!’

“When they heard Damayantī,
mournful and piteous
they did as she had asked,
and put on their true form.

“She saw the four gods
sweatless, not blinking their eyelids,
their garlands fresh and free from dust,
not touching the ground with their feet.

“But the king of Niṣadha had a shadow,
his garlands were withered,
his body bore dust and sweat,
and he blinked his eyelids.

“The modest long-eyed girl
seized the hem of his garment,
and on his shoulder she placed
the loveliest of garlands.

“She chose him for her lord,
she of the fair complexion,
and suddenly all the kings
together shouted and cheered.

“And all the gods and sages
thereupon cried bravo,
and shouted at the wonder,
praising Nala the king.”¹³

The second epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, is rather different from the *Mahābhārata* in style and content. It is little more than one quarter of the size of the other epic, and of its seven books the first and the last are certainly later additions. The poem, like the *Mahābhārata*, contains many interpolations, but they are much briefer and are mostly didactic. The main body of the poem gives the impression of being the work of a single hand, that of a poet whose style was based on that of the other epic, but showed some kinship to that of classical Sanskrit poetry.

Though the *Rāmāyaṇa* does not contain so many archaic features as the *Mahābhārata*, and gives the general impression of being the later of the two, the *Mahābhārata* contains as an episode the story of Rāma, in a form which suggests that the editor of the final version of the *Mahābhārata* knew the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The *Mahābhārata* as it is at present is probably later than the *Rāmāyaṇa*, but its main narrative portions are appreciably earlier.

The traditional author of the *Rāmāyaṇa* was the sage Vālmīki, a contemporary of its hero. In fact the legend was perhaps committed to verse in the form in which we have it, but excluding the first and last books, a little before the commencement of the Christian era. The central scene of the poem is Ayodhyā, the capital of the old kingdom of Kosala, and it evidently grew up in a milieu to the east of that of the *Mahābhārata*.

Daśaratha king of Kosala had four sons by his three wives; the sons' names were Rāma, Bharata, Lakṣmaṇa and Śatrughna. The four attended the court of King Janaka of Videha, where Rāma won the hand of Janaka's daughter, Sītā, at a great archery contest. Rāma and Sītā were married and for a time lived happily at the court of Daśaratha. (In this part of the story, contained in the first book of the epic, Rāma is explicitly described as an incarnation of the god Viṣṇu, and the original text has evidently been much added to and altered at a late period.)

When Daśaratha grew old he named Rāma as his heir; but his second queen, Kaikeyī, reminded her lord of a boon which he had promised her long since, and demanded its fulfilment in the banishment of Rāma and the installation of her own son, Bharata, as heir apparent. Daśaratha and Bharata both demurred, but Rāma insisted on his father fulfilling his promise, and went into voluntary exile with Sītā and his brother Lakṣmaṇa. When Daśaratha died Bharata took over the kingdom, but only as regent for the exiled Rāma.

Meanwhile Rāma, Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa dwelt as hermits in the forest of Daṇḍaka, where Rāma destroyed many demons who were harassing ascetics and villagers. Rāvaṇa, the demon king of Laṅkā (Ceylon), decided to avenge his fallen kinsmen, and, while Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa were on a hunting expedition, came to their hermitage in the guise of an ascetic, seized

Sītā, and carried her off to Laṅkā in his aerial car (*vimāna*). The brothers sought far and wide for Sītā, and enlisted the help of Sugrīva, the king of the monkeys, and his general, the brave and loyal Hanumant. Hanumant went in search of Sītā, and, leaping over the straits, at last found her in Rāvaṇa's palace. With the aid of a great army of monkeys and bears Rāma built a causeway of stones across the sea to Laṅkā. After a fierce battle Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and their allies slew Rāvaṇa and his hosts, and rescued Sītā.

Sītā had been treated with respect by her captor, and had in no way yielded to his blandishments. But she had dwelt under the roof of another man, and Rāma, in accordance with the Sacred Law, could do nothing but repudiate her. She threw herself on a funeral pyre, but the fire-god Agni refused to accept her. After this proof of her innocence she was reunited with Rāma, and the two returned to Ayodhyā, where Bharata renounced the throne and Rāma was crowned, to rule long and righteously.

The last book, certainly an addition, gives an unnecessary sequel to the story, which was probably added on account of growing prejudice, and misgivings about Sītā's lawful status after her unwilling residence in her captor's house. The people murmured because their queen had been forced to break her marriage vows, and suspicions as to her purity were not allayed, even by her ordeal by fire. Though he was quite convinced of her innocence Rāma, whose first duty was to "please the people", was regretfully forced to banish her, and she took refuge in Vālmiki's hermitage, where she gave birth to twins, Kuśa and Lava. Years later Rāma found Sītā again, and acknowledged her sons. As final proof of her innocence she called on her mother, the Earth,* to swallow her up. The earth opened, and she disappeared. Soon after this Rāma returned to heaven, and resumed the form of the god Viṣṇu.†

The style of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is less rugged than that of the *Mahābhārata*. The latter contains occasional grammatical and prosodical errors, the former few if any. It is a work of greater art, but less vigour, though it contains many dramatic passages, and beautiful descriptive writing, which the *Mahābhārata* lacks. We give a much abridged translation of the description of the death of Rāvaṇa, which is typical of the treatment of battle in both epics.

"Then Rāma, reminded
by the words of Mātali,
took his flaming arrow
like a hissing snake. . . .

* *Sītā* means "furrow", and the heroine of the epic has some of the attributes of an agricultural goddess. According to the story she was not the natural daughter of King Janaka, but sprang from his plough while he was working in the fields. This story evidently looks back to a time when the tribal chieftain was ready to lend a hand with the work of the tribe.

† This rather grim ending to the story did not satisfy some gentler spirits. Bhavabhūti's *Uttarāmacarita*, a drama of the 8th century, concludes with the full reconciliation of Rāma and Sītā.

“He spoke a mantra upon it
as the Vedas ordain.
The strong one placed in his bow
that great and mighty arrow. . . .

“Enraged he fiercely bent
his bow against Rāvaṇa,
and, intent on his mark, he shot
the entrail-tearing arrow. . . .

“Bearing the death of the body
the arrow flew with great speed,
and tore through the heart
of the evil-working Rāvaṇa.

“Then, red with his blood and rapid,
that arrow, destroyer of bodies,
robbing the life-breath of Rāvaṇa,
drove into the face of the earth. . . .

“Swiftly struck from his hand,
his bow and his arrow
dropped, with his life-breath,
upon the ground.

“Unbreathing, with awful speed,
the glorious lord of the demons
fell from his chariot to earth,
like Vṛtra struck by the thunderbolt.*

“When they saw him fallen to earth
the remaining demons of night
in terror, their lord destroyed,
fled in every direction. . . .

“Falling, struck down by the monkeys,
they fled to Laṅkā in terror,
their faces swimming in tears,
piteous at the loss of their refuge.

“And in joy the monkeys
roared a cheer of triumph
and proclaimed the victory of Rāma,
and his slaying of Rāvaṇa.

* See p. 400f above.

"In the sky there sounded
the lovely drums of the gods,
and there blew a pleasant wind
bearing a heavenly fragrance.

"A rain of flowers fell
from heaven upon earth,
flowers rare and lovely
bestrewing Rāma's chariot."¹⁴

The epic style and metre became usual for didactic literature of all kinds. Much of this, the Purāṇas, Dharma Śāstras, and other texts, has been referred to elsewhere. They contain passages of literary merit, but we must pass them over for the great body of courtly literature.

Classical Sanskrit Poetry

The earliest surviving Sanskrit poetry in the classical style is that of the Buddhist poet Āśvaghoṣa, who is believed to have lived at the end of the 1st century A.D., and who composed a metrical life of the Buddha (*Buddhacarita*) in a comparatively simple classical style. The Girnar Inscription of Rudradāman, dated A.D. 150, is the earliest surviving example of courtly Sanskrit prose. Thus the courtly style is a comparatively late development in Indian literature, although it must have had a long period of evolution before the dates which we have mentioned.

On the whole classical Sanskrit literature has not been well received in the West. Though the works of Kālidāsa delighted Goethe, the literature taken as a whole has been called artificial, over-ornate, lacking in true feeling, or even an example of wasted and perverted ingenuity. Indians themselves are not always satisfied with it. Thus a modern authority writes: "As a result of the particular demand in the court atmosphere the natural spontaneity of the poet was at a discount. . . . Learning and adaptation to circumstances were given more importance than the pure flow of genius. . . . As a result Sanskrit poetry not only became artificial but followed a traditional scheme of description. . . . The magic of the Sanskrit language . . . also led the poets astray and led them to find their amusement in verbal sonorousness."¹⁵

This judgement, which the author later qualifies, is in part correct. It is, besides, an indication of how deeply modern India has been affected by European æsthetic standards, judged by which much Indian classical literature is indeed artificial. It was written mainly for recitation or performance at court, or for comparatively small circles

of litterati, all well versed in the rigid canons of the literary convention and highly appreciative of verbal ingenuity. In such circumstances it would be futile to expect the native wood-notes of a Clare or the natural mysticism of a Wordsworth. The poets lived in a comparatively static society, and their lives were controlled in detail by a body of social custom which was already ancient and which had the sanction of religion behind it. They were never in revolt against the social system, and Indian Shelleys and Swinburnes are lacking. Most of this literature was written by men well integrated in their society and with few of the complex psychological difficulties of the modern literary man; hence the spiritual anguish of a Cowper, the heart-searchings of a Donne, and the social pessimism of an early T. S. Eliot, are almost entirely absent. Despite its reputation for pessimism in the West, Hindu thought and literature is fundamentally optimistic, and the tragic drama, or the story with an unhappy ending, was not looked on with favour.

The chief raw materials of the Indian poet were love, nature, panegyric, moralizing and story telling. Religious subjects, in the sense of legends of the gods, are common enough, but deep religious feeling is comparatively rare in courtly literature. A few poets, such as Bhartṛhari, wrote occasionally on religious themes with the intensity of deep faith, but for all its mythological trappings and polite invocations to deities classical Sanskrit poetry is predominantly secular. The gods, when they appear, have usually the character of enlarged human beings.

Love was passionately physical, and we have said something of the approach of the Indian poet to the subject in another chapter (p. 171f). As in most European literature of ancient and medieval times, nature was usually treated in its relation to man, and rarely described for its own sake. The phenomena of the seasons, day and night, birds and beasts and flowers, are employed to frame human emotions, or are personified as counterparts of the human subjects of the poet. But throughout the literature a deep love of nature is implicit, especially in Kālidāsa who, for this reason among others, has a higher reputation in the West than any other ancient Indian poet. Panegyrics, in praise of a king and his ancestors, are very numerous and form one of the chief sources of our historical knowledge. The element of moralizing is prominent in the writing of most poets. Kālidāsa was particularly fond of including generalizations of a sententious or moral nature in his verses, and this practice was recognized as one of the legitimate *alaṃkāras* ("adornments") of Sanskrit poetry. Gnomic verses, often of a dry worldly-wise humour, were very popular.

The technique of poetry was thoroughly studied and rules were

laid down in numerous textbooks. The purpose of poetry is usually described as emotive; the emotion aroused, however, is not the pity and terror of Aristotle, but a calmer experience, an æsthetic sensation based on feeling lifted to such a plane that grief is no longer felt as grief, and love no longer as love—according to one definition “impersonalized and ineffable æsthetic enjoyment from which every trace of its component . . . material is obliterated”.¹⁶ The basic *rasas* or “flavours” from which this æsthetic experience should arise are usually classified as eight—love, courage, loathing, anger, mirth, terror, pity and surprise. Theoretically every poem should contain one or more of these flavours.

An important element in Sanskrit poetic theory was *dhvani* (“reverberation”), the suggestion or incantation of words and phrases. Words have their denotations and their connotations, their primary meanings and their undertones, and it is with these latter that the poet has to do. By carefully choosing his words he can make them say far more than their bare meanings and induce a whole series of emotions by a single brief verse. Indian literary philosophers advanced far in this direction and produced theories on the psychology of poetic appreciation which, in broad outline, would not be unacceptable to many modern poets of the West.*

Perhaps the most important tool of the poet was *alaṃkāra*, or ornamentation, which included simile and metaphor, generalization, punning, alliteration of various kinds, and so on. This branch of poetic technique was also worked out in great detail by the theorists, and the free use of ornamentation resulted in poetry of great floridity. This was encouraged by the enormous number of synonyms and homonyms in Sanskrit, and by the very numerous and universally accepted stock epithets, such as “the mine of jewels” (*ratnākara*) for “the sea”, “the unmoving” (*acala*) for “mountain”, “sky-goer” (*khaga*) for “bird”, and “the frail” (*abalā*) for “woman”. The ancient Indian poet would have been quite at home with Pope’s “denizens of air” and “finny tribes”.

The unit of poetry is the stanza, usually grammatically complete in itself. The *mahākāvya*, loosely translated “epic”, often degenerated into a string of verses or groups of verses, linked only by a very slender thread of narrative. In the more ornate courtly literature plot and construction are in general weak, and there is little sense of balance. This is not the case with purely narrative poetry, as in such works as the “Ocean of Story”, the author of which tells his tales

* The most important and original literary theorists were Daṇḍin (p. 442ff) (*Kāvya-darśa*, 6–7th century), Bhāmaha (*Kāvyaālaṃkāra*, 7th century), Ānandavardhana (*Dhvany-āloka*, 9th century), Maṃmaṭa (*Kāvya-prakāśa*, early 12th century), and Viśvanātha (*Sāhityadarpaṇa*, 14th century).

with economy and restraint (p. 429ff). And often, even in the most ornate *kāvya*, the poet will from time to time rise to the occasion with vivid and dramatic description, though it must be admitted that the longer Sanskrit poem is usually prolix and shapeless.

On the other hand the individual verse is balanced and succinct. Single-verse poems, reminiscent of the Persian *rubā'i* or the Japanese *tanka*, were very popular, either standing alone or included in dramas and prose works. Many of these are very beautiful, and make an immediate appeal to the Western reader, even in translation. They were collected in anthologies, of which a number survive and have preserved many lovely verses which would otherwise have been lost.

Metrically Sanskrit poetry was quantitative, and rigidly regulated. The normal stanza was one of four quarters, each of length varying from eight to twenty-one syllables, generally equal and unrhymed. The Epics usually employed the metre called *śloka*, of eight syllables to the quarter, which allowed some scope for variation; but classical poets preferred metres of greater complexity and rigidity, of which many are listed in textbooks on poetics, though only a dozen or so were popular. These metres allowed little or no scope for variation and their syllables were arranged in complicated patterns, usually of great beauty.*

Owing to the structure of Sanskrit, literal translation of classical Indian poetry into English is quite impossible, and we cannot convey the æsthetic effect of a Sanskrit verse. The brief extracts here translated in rhythmic prose give but a faint impression of the rich and closely knit texture of the originals or of the wonderful sonority of the language, which, when well handled, with all the arts of prosody and ornamentation, surely has a splendour unsurpassed by any other language in the world. Classical Indian poetry, like Indian music and art, developed along lines of its own and its canons are not those of the West, but it has its own special merits and beauties.

Indian and European judges alike agree that Kālidāsa was the greatest Sanskrit poet. He probably flourished in the reigns of the emperors Candragupta II and Kumāragupta I (375-455), and thus saw ancient Indian courtly culture at its zenith. Like the murals of Ajantā, his work seems to reflect that culture completely and convincingly. Though deeply imbued in tradition, he carried tradition lightly, and throughout his work his personality breaks through. A few legends are told of him in late sources, but we have no reliable information about his life and character. From his work he seems to have been a happy and gentle man, sympathetic to sorrow, deeply understanding the moods of women and children, and loving flowers

* For further notes on Sanskrit prosody see Appendix, p. 508ff.

and trees, beasts and birds, and the pomp of court ceremonial. He was the author of three dramas (p. 485), two long poems, "The Birth of the War-god" (*Kumārasambhava*) and the "Dynasty of Raghu" (*Raghuvaṃśa*), and two shorter, the "Cloud-messenger" (*Megha-dūta*) and the "Garland of the Seasons" (*Ṛtusamhāra*), as well as of several other works which have not survived.

The "Cloud Messenger" is a work of little over 100 verses, which has always been one of the most popular of Sanskrit poems. Its theme has been imitated in one form or another by several later poets both in Sanskrit and the vernaculars. More than most Indian poems this work has unity and balance, and gives a sense of wholeness rarely found elsewhere. In its small compass Kālidāsa has crowded so many lovely images and word-pictures that the poem seems to contain the quintessence of a whole culture. It describes a yakṣa who dwells in the divine city of Alakā, in the Himālayas. He has offended his master Kubera (p. 313 f), and has been banished for a year to the hill of Rāmāgiri, in the modern Madhya Pradesh. The worst aspect of his exile is his separation from his beautiful wife, whom he has left behind in the mountain city. So, at the beginning of the rainy season, he sees a large cloud passing northward to the mountains, and pours out his heart to it. After a verse or two of introduction the rest of the poem consists of the yakṣa's address to the cloud.

First he tells it the route which it must take to reach the mountains; here Kālidāsa describes the lands, rivers and cities over which it must pass in very beautiful verses. We quote two describing the river Narmadā and the forests on its banks. Notable in the first verse is the bird's-eye-view implied in the simile.

"Stay for a while over the thickets, haunted by the girls of the hill-folk,
then press on with faster pace, having shed your load of water,
and you'll see the Narmadā river, scattered in torrents, by the rugged
rocks at the foot of the Vindhya,
looking like the plastered pattern of stripes on the flank of an elephant.*

"Note by the banks the flowers of the *nīpa* trees, greenish brown, with
their stamens half developed,
and the plantains, displaying their new buds.
Smell the most fragrant earth of the burnt out woodlands,
and as you release your raindrops the deer will show you the way."¹⁷

* The second line of the original of this verse ("press on with faster pace, having shed your load of water") is skilfully alliterated on the consonant *t*, giving an impression of haste to the slow metre and suggesting the patter of raindrops:

*Śhītvā tasmin vanacara-vadhū-bhukta-kuñje muhūrtaṃ,
toyotsarga-drutatara-gatis tatparam vartma tīrṇaḥ,
Revām drakṣyasy upala-viśame Vindhya-pāde viśrñāṃ,
bhakti-cchedair iva viracitāṃ bhūtim aṅge gajasya.*

Then the cloud is told to turn westward and visit the splendid city of Ujjayainī. Kālidāsa cannot long resist the *śṛṅgāra rasa*, the erotic sentiment, and this is evoked by his description of the city,

“where the wind from the Śiprā river prolongs the shrill melodious cry of the cranes,
fragrant at early dawn from the scent of the opening lotus,
and, like a lover, with flattering requests,
dispels the morning languor of women, and refreshes their limbs.

“Your body will grow fat with the smoke of incense from open windows where women dress their hair.
You will be greeted by palace peacocks, dancing to welcome you, their friend.
If your heart is weary from travel you may pass the night above mansions fragrant with flowers,
whose pavements are marked with red dye from the feet of lovely women.”¹⁸

Then, as the cloud nears the Himālayas, it will see the magic city

“where yakṣas dwell with lovely women in white mansions,
whose crystal terraces reflect the stars like flowers.
They drink the wine of love distilled from magic trees,
while drums beat softly, deeper than your thunder.”¹⁹

Then the yakṣa describes his home, and his lovely wife, weak from sorrow and longing. He gives the cloud a message to her, that his love is still constant and that the time of reunion is approaching.

“I see your body in the sinuous creeper, your gaze in the startled eyes of deer,
your cheek in the moon, your hair in the plumage of peacocks,
and in the tiny ripples of the river I see your sidelong glances,
but alas, my dearest, nowhere do I find your whole likeness!”²⁰

“The Birth of the War-god” may be described as a religious poem, but though all its characters are supernatural, and include Śiva himself, the atmosphere of the poem is essentially secular. It begins with a fine description of the Himālayas, from which we quote a few verses. The daring comparison of the chain of mountains to a surveyor’s measuring rod is worthy of John Donne, and gives another example of Kālidāsa’s bird’s-eye-view approach.

“In the northern quarter is divine Himālaya,
the lord of mountains,
reaching from Eastern to Western Oceans,
firm as a rod to measure the earth. . . .

- “There demigods rest in the shade of the clouds
 which spread like a girdle below the peaks,
 but when the rains disturb them
 they fly to the sunlit summits. . . .
- “The hollow canes are filled with the wind
 that bursts from the chasms,
 as though to provide an ostinato
 to the songs of heavenly minstrels. . . .
- “All through the night phosphorescent herbs
 shine in the caverns with their glimmering radiance,
 and light the loves
 of hill-women and their paramours. . . .
- “And the wind forever shaking the pines
 carries the spray from the torrents of the young Ganges
 and refreshes the hunting hillman,
 blowing among his peacock plumes.”²¹

The poem, which is a long one, describes the courtship and marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī (p. 309), and the birth of their son, Kumāra or Skanda, the war-god. As he grows to manhood Kumāra is appointed general of the gods, and he leads them forth to battle with the terrible demon Tāraka, who has long been afflicting the whole universe. Tāraka hears of their approach, musters his forces, and goes out to meet them; but terrible omens greet the army of demons. Here Kālidāsa embarks on a remarkable description, which reminds us of the more macabre work of Gustave Doré.

- “A fearful flock of evil birds,
 ready for the joy of eating the army of demons,
 flew over the host of the gods,
 and clouded the sun.
- “A wind continually fluttered their umbrellas and banners,
 and troubled their eyes with clouds of whirling dust,
 so that the trembling horses and elephants
 and the great chariots could not be seen.
- “Suddenly monstrous serpents, as black as powdered soot,
 scattering poison from their upraised heads,
 frightful in form,
 appeared in the army’s path.
- “The sun put on a ghastly robe
 of great and terrible snakes, curling together,
 as if to mark his joy
 at the death of the enemy demon.

- “And before the very disc of the sun
jackals bayed harshly together,
as though eager fiercely to lap the blood
of the king of the foes of the gods, fallen in battle.
- “Lighting heaven from end to end,
with flames flashing all around,
with an awful crash, rending the heart with terror,
a thunderbolt fell from a cloudless sky.
- “The sky poured down torrents of red-hot ashes,
with which were mixed blood and human bones,
till the flaming ends of heaven were filled with smoke
and bore the dull hue of the neck of an ass.
- “Like the thundered threat of the angry death-god
a great crash broke the walls of the ears,
a shattering sound, tearing the tops of the mountains,
and wholly filling the belly of heaven.
- “The host of the foe was jostled together.
The great elephants stumbled, the horses fell,
and all the footmen clung together in fear,
as the earth trembled and the ocean rose to shake the mountains.
- “And, before the host of the foes of the gods,
dogs lifted their muzzles to gaze on the sun,
then, howling together with cries that rent the eardrums,
they wretchedly slunk away.”²²*

The poem ends with the death of Tāraka in single combat with Kumāra.

We have no space to discuss the rest of Kālidāsa's poetry, all of which is of fine quality. “The Dynasty of Raghu” especially contains many passages of great beauty, including a concise version of

* The mastery of language in the last three stanzas quoted is so remarkable that it must impress even the reader who knows no Sanskrit. With brilliant use of assonance and alliteration Kālidāsa has wedded sound to sense in a way rarely achieved in the literature of the world.

*Nirghāta-ghoṣo giri-śrṅga-śātano
ghano 'mbarāśā-kuharodarambharīḥ
babhūva bhūmnā śruti-bhitti-bhedanaḥ,
prakopi-Kāl'-ārjita-garji-tarjanaḥ.*

*Skhalan-mahebhāṃ prapatat-turaṅgamaṃ
parasparāśliṣṭa-janaṃ samantataḥ.
prakṣubhyad-ambhodhi-vibhinna-bhūdharād
balaṃ dviṣo 'bhūd avani-prakampāt.*

*Ūrdhvikṛtāsyā ravi-datta-dr̥ṣṭayah
sametya sarve sura-vidviṣaḥ puraḥ,
śvānaḥ svareṇa śravaṇānta-śātina
mitho rudantaḥ karuṇena nirayayuḥ.*

the story of Rāma, but the work is apparently incomplete. "The Garland of the Seasons" describes the six seasons of the Hindu year in relation to *śṛṅgāra*, the erotic sentiment, but though charming it is slighter and less impressive than the rest of Kālidāsa's work.

Many other poets after Kālidāsa, wrote mahākāvya, or long courtly "epics", but none so ably as he. Kumāradāsa's "Rape of Sītā" (*Jānakī-haraṇa*) continues his tradition, while Bhāravi's "Arjuna and the Kirāta" (*Kirātārjunīya*), describing an encounter of the hero Arjuna and the god Śiva, in the guise of a Kirāta or wild mountaineer, is somewhat more florid. Bhaṭṭi, of the 7th century, wrote a remarkable poem on the story of Rāma, usually known as "Bhaṭṭi's Poem" (*Bhaṭṭikāvya*), containing passages of real beauty, as an exercise to illustrate rules of grammar. Even more ingenious was the 7th-century poet Māgha, who wrote a long poem on an incident in the life of Kṛṣṇa, the "Slaying of Śiśupāla" (*Śiśupāla-vadha*). Though the work contains many fine stanzas the story is so badly told that the poem as a whole has no semblance of unity. In the nineteenth canto, which describes the battle between Kṛṣṇa and his enemy, Māgha thought fit to display his mastery of language by inserting many stanzas of amazing ingenuity. We give an example of an *ekākṣara* stanza, employing only one consonant throughout:

*Dādado dudda-dud-dādī
dādādo dūda-dī-da-doh
dud-dādam dadade dudde
dad'-ādada-dado 'da-daḥ.*

This stanza, using very rare and obscure words, and exceedingly elliptical, may be translated as follows:

"The giver of gifts, the giver of grief to his foes,
the bestower of purity, whose arm destroys the givers of grief,
the destroyer of demons, bestower of bounty on generous and miser
alike,
raised his weapon against the foe."²³

The following is a *dvyaḥṣara*, containing only two consonants:

*Krūrāri-kārī kor eka-
kārakah kārīkā-karah
korakākāra-karakah
karīrah karkaro 'rka-ruk.*

"The destroyer of cruel foes, the only creator of the world,
bestower of woes on the wicked, with hands like the buds of lotuses,
the overthrower of elephants,
fierce in battle, shone like the sun."²⁴

The next stanza is called *sarvatobhadra* ("valid all ways"), and is a complicated mixture of syllabic palindrome and acrostic. Each quarter-stanza is a palindrome; the first four syllables of the first quarter are the same as the first syllables of each quarter, and in the same order; the first four syllables of the second quarter are the same as the second syllables of each quarter, and so on. This verse is positively startling in its ingenuity, and when read in the original produces an impression resembling that of complex polyphony.

*Sakāra-nān'-āra-kāsa-
kāya-sāda-da-sāyakā
ras'-āhavā vāha-sāra-
nādavāda-da-vādanā.*

"His army was eager for battle,
whose arrows destroyed the bodies of the varied hosts of his brave
enemies.
Its trumpets vied with the cries
of the splendid horses and elephants."²⁵

Finally a stanza called *gatapratyāgatam* ("gone and come back"). It is a perfect syllabic palindrome.

*Taṃ Śriyā ghanayā 'nasta-
rucā sāratayā tayā
yātayā tarasā cāru-
stanayā 'naghay' āśritam.*

"He who was eagerly and close embraced
by the fair-bosomed Śrī, the sinless goddess,
of never-failing beauty, and endowed
with every excellence."²⁶

After Māgha longer poems often became mere displays of verbal ingenuity. The narrative became progressively less important, and the style progressively more ornate, though there were important exceptions. The climax of the tendency came with the *dvyāśraya-kāvya*, telling two stories simultaneously, by deliberately utilizing the ambiguity of words and phrases. A well-known example of this genre is the *Rāmacarita* ("Deeds of Rāma") of the 12th-century poet Sandhyākara, which may be read as applying either to the legendary Rāma of Ayodhyā or to the historical king Rāmapāla of Bengal, who was the poet's contemporary and patron. Achievements like this are not to be disparaged, but they make little appeal to the European reader and are quite untranslatable.



A Persian Prince and Princess. Ajantā

b



Fighting Bulls. Ajantā



Seated Girl. Mural Painting, Ajantā. Gupta Period

The best things in medieval poetry are to be found in the single-stanza poems, of which there are many collections, either by one or many hands. The finest poet in this genre was Bhartṛhari, thought to have lived in the 7th century, who left no long poems, but only three centuries of separate stanzas on the subjects of worldly wisdom, love and renunciation respectively. These are masterpieces of concise expression, and, unlike most Sanskrit poems, tell us much about the personality of the author. We quote first two stanzas in an amusingly sententious vein.

“You may boldly take a gem from the jaws of a crocodile,
you may swim the ocean with its tossing wreath of waves,
you may wear an angry serpent like a flower in your hair,
but you’ll never satisfy a fool who’s set in his opinions!

“You *may*, if you squeeze hard enough, even get oil from sand,
thirsty, you *may* succeed in drinking the waters of the mirage,
perhaps, if you go far enough, you’ll find a rabbit’s horn,
but you’ll never satisfy a fool who’s set in his opinions!”²⁷

In his erotic verses Bhartṛhari often shows an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, as though trying to convince himself that love is not a futile waste of time after all. In the midst of his amours he feels the call of the religious life, and in one remarkable stanza he indulges in striking punning to this effect. The obvious meaning is:

“Your hair well combed, your eyes reaching to your ears,*
your mouth filled with ranks of teeth that are white by nature,
your breasts charmingly adorned with a necklace of pearls,
slim girl, your body, though at rest, disturbs me.”

But this might also be fancifully translated as:

“Your hair self-denying, your eyes understanding the whole of scripture,
your mouth full of groups of naturally-pure brāhmaṇs,
your breasts lovely from the presence of emancipated souls,
slim girl, your body, though free from passion, disturbs me.”²⁸

This is the sort of thing which most critics of Sanskrit poetry object to; but Bhartṛhari might justify his punning here, for by employing words with religious connotations he has given expression to his own divided mind. This is very forcibly expressed in another stanza, which we quote. “The forest” implies the life of the hermit.

* This is one of the conventions of poetry. The eyes of a pretty girl are so long that their corners almost touch her ears.

"What is the use of many idle speeches!

Only two things are worth a man's attention—
the youth of full-breasted women, prone to fresh pleasures,
and the forest."²⁹

It would seem that in the end Bhartṛhari gave up the love of women for the love of God, though the word which we here translate "God" is the impersonal Brahman (p. 250).

"When I was ignorant in the dark night of passion
I thought the world completely made of women,
but now my eyes are cleansed with the salve of wisdom,
and my clear vision sees only God in everything."³⁰

Bhartṛhari's religious experience was intense enough to produce the following splendid pæan, in which he addressed the five elements of Hindu physics.

"Oh Earth, my mother, Air, my father, Oh Fire, my friend,
Water, my kinsman, Space, my brother,
here do I bow before you with folded hands!
With your aid I have done good deeds and found clear knowledge,
and, glorious, with all delusion past, I merge in highest godhead."³¹

An erotic poet with none of Bhartṛhari's doubts was Amaru, also probably of the 7th century. His stanzas on love are often voluptuous, but they can be humorously tender, and always show a sound understanding of feminine psychology. Amaru loved to describe a poignant moment in a human relationship in a single verse, in which the reader is given only the climax of the story, the reconstruction of the rest being left to his imagination.

"'We'll see what comes of it,' I thought, and hardened my heart against her.

'What, won't the villain speak to me?' she thought, flying into a rage.

And there we stood, sedulously refusing to look one another in the face,
until at last I managed an unconvincing laugh, and her tears robbed me of my resolution."

. . . .

"'Why are your limbs so weak, and why do you tremble?

And why, my dear,' asked her lord, 'is your cheek so pale?'

The slender girl replied, 'It's just my nature!'

and turned away and sighed, and let loose the tears that burdened her eyelids."

. . . .

“Fool that I was, why didn't I clasp the lord of my life to my neck?
 Why did I turn my face away when he wanted to kiss me?
 Why did I not see? Why did I not speak?’ So, when love is first
 awakened,
 a girl is filled with remorse as she thinks of her childish shyness.”³²

We cannot devote much more space to the many brief poems of the Middle Ages, which are so full of charm and skill, and which need a competent translator to introduce them to the West. In passing, however, we would quote two stanzas contained in the prose work called “The Deeds of Harṣa”, by the 7th-century writer Bāṇa (p. 446ff), which are sung by a bard at dawn to rouse his companions. In our opinion these neglected verses are among the finest in Indian literature. Ostensibly they describe a great stallion waking from sleep, but it may be that the poet remembered the cosmic symbolism of the horse in Vedic times (p. 24f), and intended to speak of the universal in terms of the particular. Bāṇa had evidently carefully studied his subject, which he describes almost anatomically, in words which have few overtones of meaning; but he succeeds in conveying his own deep delight in the horse by subtle alliterative effects, by the heavy metre, which he handles with masterly skill, and by the implicit contrast of the tiny piece of chaff in the last line.

“He stretches his hind-leg, and, bending his spine, extends his body upwards.

Curving his neck, he rests his muzzle on his chest, and tosses his dust-grey mane.

The steed, his nostrils ceaselessly quivering with desire of fodder, rises from his bed, gently whinnies, and paws the earth with his hoof.

“He bends his back and turns his neck sideways, till his face touches his buttock,

and then the horse, the curls matted about his ears,
 rubs with his hoof the red corner of his eye, itching from sleep,
 his eye, struck by his dewdrop-scattering mane, waving and tossing,
 his eye, to the point of whose quivering eyelash there clings a tiny
 fragment of chaff.”^{33*}

* We quote the Sanskrit, in the hope that some of Bāṇa's wonderful sound effects, which seem so well to fit the sense of his verses, may be recognized.

*Pascād aṅghriṃ prasārya, trika-nati-vitataṃ, drāghayitvāṅgam uccair,
 āsajyābhugna-kaṇṭho mukham urasi, saṭā dhūli-dhūmrā vidhūya,
 ghāsā-grāsābhilāṣād anavarata-calat-protha-tuṇḍas turaṅgo,
 mandam śabdāyamāno, vilikhati, śayanād utthitah, kṣmāṇi khurena.*

*Kurvann ābhugna-prṣṭho mukha-nikaṣa-kaṭiḥ kandharām ā tiraścim
 lolenāhanyamānaṃ tuhina-kaṇa-mucā cañcatā kesareṇa
 nidrā-kaṇḍū-kaṣāyaṃ kaṣati, nīvidita-śrotra-śuktis, turaṅgas
 tvangat-pakṣmāgra-lagna-pratanu-busa-kaṇam koṇaṃ akṣṇaḥ khureṇa.*

Before leaving this style of poetry we should mention the Kashmīrī Bilhāṇa, of the 11th and 12th centuries, whose "Fifty Stanzas of the Thief" (*Caurapañcāśikā*), purporting to describe the secret love of a bold housebreaker and a princess, are full of intense emotion recollected without tranquillity. Each begins with the words "Even today".

"Even today I can see her, her slender arms encircling my neck,
my breast held tight against her two breasts,
her playful eyes half-closed in ecstasy,
her dear face drinking mine in a kiss.

"Even today, if this evening
I might see my beloved, with eyes like the eyes of a fawn,
with the bowls of her breasts the colour of milk,
I'd leave the joys of kingship and heaven and final bliss."³⁴

In a class of its own is Jayadeva's "Song of the Cowherd" (*Gīta Govinda*), written in Bengal in the 12th century. This is a series of dramatic lyrics intended for singing, and describes the love of Kṛṣṇa for Rādhā and the milkmaids (p. 304f). The poem is still sung at the festivals of the Bengālī Vaiṣṇavite sects, but though it begins with a beautiful invocation to the ten incarnations of Viṣṇu its inspiration to the Western mind seems rather erotic than religious. Unlike almost all other classical Sanskrit poetry Jayadeva's lyrics are rhymed, and look forward to the verse forms of vernacular literature. Each commences with an introductory stanza in one of the more usual Sanskrit metres, and the final stanza of each introduces the poet's name. The verses which we translate describe Kṛṣṇa's longings when separated from his beloved Rādhā. "The foe of Madhu" (a demon killed by Kṛṣṇa) and Hari are epithets of the god.

"Here I am dwelling. Go now to Rādhā,
console her with my message, and bring her to me.'
Thus the foe of Madhu commissioned her friend,
who went in person, and spoke to Rādhā thus:

"When the breeze blows from the Southern Mountains,
and brings the Love-god with it,
when masses of flowers burst forth
to rend the hearts of parted lovers,
he is grieved at separation from you, decked with his forest garland.

"Even the cool-rayed moon inflames him,
he is as if dead.
Struck by the arrows of love
he complains most wretchedly.
He is grieved . . .

- “When the swarming bees are murmuring
 he closes fast his ears.
 His heart is clenched by parting,
 he spends his nights in fever.
 He is grieved. . . .
- “He dwells in the depths of the forest,
 he has left his lovely home.
 He tosses in sleep on the earth
 and much he murmurs your name.
 He is grieved. . . .’
- “When the poet Jayadeva sings,
 through this pious description
 of the deeds of the parted lover,
 may Hari arise in hearts full of zeal.
 He is grieved at separation from you, decked with his forest gar-
 land.”³⁵*

Narrative Poetry

As well as various smaller collections there exists in various re-
 censions a large series of popular stories, the *Bṛhatkathā* (“Great
 Story”), boxed one within the other in the manner of “The
 Thousand and One Nights”. The most famous of these versions is
 Somadeva’s “Ocean of Story” (*Kathā-sarit-sāgara*), written in the
 11th century in easy but polished verse. The stories are told with
 comparative simplicity and directness, and with many touches of
 humour and pathos. We quote from the tale of the thief and the
 merchant’s daughter. A wealthy merchant, Ratnadatta, has no sons,
 and his only daughter, Ratnāvati, much loved and pampered by her
 father, refuses to marry, despite the pleading of her parents. Mean-
 while a desperate thief has been captured by the king, and is led
 through the streets to execution by impalement.

- “To the beat of the drum the thief was led
 to the place of execution,
 and the merchant’s daughter Ratnāvati
 sat on the terrace and watched him.
 He was gravely wounded and covered with dust,
 but as soon as she saw him she was smitten with love.

* The rhyme scheme varies from lyric to lyric. Here the second and fourth quarters
 end with a rhyme of two syllables, while the first and third quarters of each stanza end
 with the same syllable. The first and third quarters end in *e* throughout the poem. The
 refrain applies equally to the love of Kṛṣṇa for Rādhā and the love of God for the soul.
 We quote the last verse so that the reader may have some idea of the mellifluousness
 of the original:

*Bhaṇati kavi-Jayadeve
 virahi-vilasitena
 manasi rabhasa-vibhave
 Harir udayatu sukytena.
 Tava virāhe vanamālī sakhi sīdati.*

"Then she went to her father Ratnadatta, and said:

'This man they are leading to his death

I have chosen for my lord!

Father, you must save him from the king,

or I will die with him!'

And when he heard, her father said:

'What is this you say, my child?

You've refused the finest suitors,

the images of the Love-god!

How can you now desire

a wretched master-thief?'

"But though he reproached her thus

she was firm in her resolve,

so he sped to the king and begged

that the thief might be saved from the stake.

In return he offered

the whole of his great fortune,

but the king would not yield the thief

for ten million pieces of gold,

for he had robbed the whole city,

and was brought to the stake to repay with his life.

"Her father came home in despair,

and the merchant's daughter

determined to follow

the thief in his death.

Though her family tried to restrain her

she bathed,

and mounted a litter, and went

to the place of impalement,

while her father, her mother and her people

followed her weeping.

"The executioners placed

the thief on the stake,

and, as his life ebbed away,

he saw her come with her people.

He heard the onlookers speaking

of all that had happened,

For a moment he wept, and then,

smiling a little, he died.

At her order they lifted the corpse

from the stake, and took it away,

and with it the worthy merchant's daughter

mounted the pyre."³⁶*

* Stories such as this puzzle the social historian. If the texts on the Sacred Law have any relation to real life it is quite incredible that a girl of good class in the 11th century should have been given such freedom by her parents, or should even have thought of legally marrying a despised outcaste. The story probably looks back to a much earlier time, when social relations were very much freer.

The modern European reader would find this a conclusive ending to a tale of old, unhappy, far-off things; but to the Indian of medieval times such an ending would have been quite unsatisfactory, so a *deus ex machina* was brought in in the form of the god Śiva, who was so impressed by the girl's love and faithfulness that he restored the corpse of the dead thief to life. He reformed his ways and became the king's general, and the two were married and lived happily ever after.

In the category of narrative poems we must include Kalhaṇa's great chronicle of Kashmīr "The River of Kings" (p. 44), and several other medieval works of comparatively small literary value. Midway between the purely narrative poem and the courtly "epic" are a number of historical works partly descriptive, partly panegyric, and partly sober history. The most famous of these is "The Deeds of Harṣa", by Bāṇa, written in ornate poetic prose, which is discussed below (p. 447ff). Of some literary merit is "The Deeds of Vikramāṅka" (*Vikramāṅkadevacarita*), of Bilhaṇa (p. 428), dealing with the life and adventures of the great Cālukya emperor Vikramāditya VI (c. 1075-1125). Another example of this type is the *Rāmacarita*, already mentioned. Yet another is the work of a Jaina monk, Naya-candra Sūri, the *Hammīra-mahākāvya*, which is among the latest important works of Sanskrit literature. This beautiful but little known poem deals with the life of Hammīra, the last of the dynasty of the Cāhamāṇas, who was defeated and killed by the Delhī sultan Alā'-ud-dīn Khaljī in 1301, after a long siege of his capital Raṇasthambhapura (in the vernacular, Ranthambhor). As Hammīra was slain with all his followers the poet was forced by his theme somewhat to flout convention, but he managed to retain a semblance of the happy ending demanded by tradition by concluding his work with a description of the entry of Hammīra and his followers into heaven. Much of the poem, though not without beauty, is irrelevant to the main theme, but the description of the king's last days is direct and forceful.

Towards the end of the poem Naya-candra introduces a remarkable episode. We cannot say whether he consciously intended the beautiful dancer who died so tragically as a symbol of the courtly culture which fell to the invader, but it is thus that the passage, occurring so portentously just before Hammīra's death, strikes the reader. In the course of the siege a temporary truce has been arranged, and the Rājputs are making the most of it. On the battlements a musical entertainment is taking place, and Hammīra's favourite dancer, Rādhādevī, is performing for the king and his courtiers. A long bowshot away, on the other side of the moat, sits the sultan, also watching the dance with interest. He is referred to in the poem as the Lord of the

Śakas, a term at this time applied to all the invaders of the North-West. The first part of our extract is exceedingly florid, and full of untranslatable puns, but the style suddenly becomes simple and terse when the episode moves to its climax.

“In time the drummers beat their drums, the lutanists plucked their lutes,

the flautists blew their flutes.

Their voices in tune with the shrill flutes, the singers sang the glory and fame of the brave Hammīra. . . .

Then, the vine of her body entrancing her lovers, awakening passion with the glance of her half-closed eyes, to delight the hearts of the courtiers, came Rādhādevī the dancer, arrayed for the dance.

“The quivering buds of her fingers moved in the dance like tendrils of a vine, thrilling with passion. . . .

As the tips of her fingers bent, as though in a circle, with her grace and delicate beauty all other girls seemed her slaves. The moon, in the guise of the ring that trembled from the tip of her ear, said: ‘Your face is my likeness, the delusion even of sages!’

And as she danced she stirred the hearts of the young men watching—the hearts which lay like motes of camphor under her feet. . . .

With her gestures the necklace trembled on the tips of her breasts like a lotus twined in the beak of a swan.

When her body bent back like a bow in the dance like a bowstring the braid of her hair stretched down to her heel. . . .

“And as she danced, at every beat of the rhythm, she turned her back on the Śaka king below.

“Then in fury of soul the Lord of the Śakas spoke to his chamberlain: ‘Is there any bowman who can make her his mark?’

His brother said : ‘Sire, there is he whom you formerly threw into prison, Uḍḍānasimha—he is the only man who can do it!’

At once the Śaka king had him brought, and struck off his fetters, and arrayed the traitor finely, with double gift of affection.

And thus apparelled he took the bow which none but he could draw, and the sinner shot her, as a hunter shoots a doe.

“At the stroke of the arrow she fainted and fell in the moat, as lightning falls from heaven.”³⁷*

The Drama

The origin of the Indian theatre is still obscure. It is certain, however, that even in the Vedic period dramatic performances of some kind

* The simile is not unduly exaggerated, as the dancer was covered with jewellery, which glittered in the sunlight.

were given, and passing references in early sources point to the enactment at festivals of religious legends, perhaps only in dance and mime. Some writers have found elements in common between the Indian and the classical Greek theatre. The curtain at the back of the stage was called *yavanikā*, a diminutive form of the name by which the Greeks were generally known in India. One play at least, "The Little Clay Cart" (p. 441), has a superficial resemblance to the late Greek comedy of the school of Menander. We cannot wholly reject the hypothesis that Greek comedies, acted at the courts of the Greco-Bactrian kings of N.-W. India, inspired unknown Indian poets to develop their own popular stage into a courtly art form.

The surviving Sanskrit dramas are numerous and varied, ranging from short one-act playlets to very long plays in ten acts. They were normally performed by troupes of professionals of both sexes, but amateur dramatics were not wholly unknown, since we have occasional references to kings and the ladies of the harem performing dramas in the palace. There was no regular theatre, though it has been suggested that one of the caves of Rāmgarh (p. 185) was specially adapted for theatrical performances. Normally dramas were performed privately or semi-privately in palaces or the homes of the rich, or were given public showing in temple courts on days of festival.

A curtain (*yavanikā*) divided the stage (*raṅga*) from the back-stage (*nepathya*), and through this the actors made their entrances. There was no curtain between stage and auditorium. The drama was performed without scenery and with a minimum of properties; the absence of both was made up for by the highly developed gesture language of the dance, which we have discussed elsewhere (p. 385). Every part of the body was used to help tell the story, and the well-trained audience recognized from conventional movements of hands, limbs and features that the king was riding in his chariot, or that the heroine was caressing her pet fawn. The splendid attire of the actors was regulated by convention, so that heroes, heroines, gods, demons, villains, and so on were immediately recognizable.

The drama regularly began with an invocation to one or more of the gods, and a prologue, in which the chief actor and stage manager (*sūtradhāra*) humorously discussed with his wife, the chief actress, the occasion of the performance and the nature of the play to be performed.* The main dialogue of the play was in prose, but this was freely interspersed with verses, which were usually declaimed or intoned, but not sung. In this ancient Indian taste differed from that of

* This convention of the Indian stage was known to Goethe from Sir William Jones' translation of *Śakuntalā*, and was adapted by him for the prologue of *Faust*.

present-day India, which demands many songs in plays and films. The classical unities were not observed; years in time and a thousand miles in space might divide one scene from the next; but within the act unity of time and place was demanded. If in this respect the Indian dramatic convention differed from that of classical Europe, it agreed in forbidding the portrayal of acts of violence on the stage, though this and other rules were sometimes ignored. The act was often preceded by a prelude (*praveśaka*), in which one or two characters set the scene, and described what had gone before.

As in literature generally, so in the theatre Indian convention allowed no tragedy. Tragic and pathetic scenes were common enough, but endings were almost invariably happy. From the European point of view the insistence on the happy ending often led to the unnatural forcing of the plot. But if he rejected tragedy the ancient Indian playgoer delighted in melodrama and pathos. Though the emotion which the Indian writer sought to arouse was theoretically a sublimated one (p. 417), in fact the Sanskrit drama contains so many melodramatic scenes that the emotional Indian audience must often have been moved to tears. Noble heroes are led to execution for crimes they did not commit, declaiming their innocence to their sorrowing wives and children, to be saved from the stake at the last moment. Unhappy wives are unjustly expelled from their homes by their husbands. Long-lost children are reunited with their parents in the final act. Whatever the theorists, beginning with Bharata (p. 382), may have said, the sentiment of the Indian drama was warm and living, sometimes a little reminiscent of that of more popular English authors of the last century.

Like Greek and Elizabethan dramatists Indian writers usually borrowed their plots from earlier sources, often adapting them freely in the process. Legends of the gods and ancient heroes formed an inexhaustible mine of dramatic material. Other plays were written around popular tales of a secular type. There are also dramas of statecraft, based very freely on stories of historical kings of the past, and light comedies of harem intrigue, wherein the hero, a king, succeeds in pacifying the chief queen, who has set her heart against the promotion of the heroine, a servant girl (usually a princess in disguise), to queenly status and her husband's bed. There are also allegorical dramas, in which the characters are personified virtues and vices, and there are a few surviving examples of farces. Plays were classified by the theorists according to style and length into over a dozen categories.

The hero (*nāyaka*) and heroine (*nāyikā*) are inevitable characters in most types of drama, as is the villain (*pratināyaka*). An interesting

stock character is the *vidūṣaka*, who provides comic relief; he is an ugly and misshapen brāhmaṇ, the loyal friend of the hero, but invariably a figure of fun. Another stock character, occurring in one or two extant dramas and noted by the theorists, is the *viṭa*, the cultured but rather shallow man of the world who befriends the hero, and somewhat resembles the parasite of classical Greek comedy.

The earliest known dramas to have survived are fragments of plays by Aśvaghōṣa (p. 415), preserved in manuscripts found in the desert sands of Central Asia. The oldest complete plays are probably those attributed to Bhāsa, which seem to be earlier than those of Kālidāsa, though there is no complete unanimity of experts on this point. Bhāsa's thirteen surviving plays include several works of great merit, notably "The Vision of Vāsavadattā" (*Svapnavāsavadattā*) and "Yaugandharāyaṇa's Vows" (*Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa*). Bhāsa also wrote a number of short dramas based on epic stories in simple and vigorous style. Nowadays his plays are often the first introduction of the student of Sanskrit to dramatic literature. He excelled in portraying the heroic sentiment, and ably individualized his characters. More than once he broke the rules of later dramatic theory by permitting acts of violence on the stage.

As in English literature so in Sanskrit, the greatest poet was also the greatest dramatist. Three plays of Kālidāsa have survived: "Mālavikā and Agnimitra", a comedy of harem intrigue, its scene set in the Śuṅga period; "Urvaśi Won by Valour" (*Vikramorvaśi*), telling the ancient story of the love of Purūravas and Urvaśi (p. 405ff); and "The Recognition of Śakuntalā" (*Abhijñānaśakuntala*). At all times the last has been reckoned Kālidāsa's masterpiece, and merits special consideration. The plot is set in the days of legend, when gods and men were not so far apart as they later became. We give an almost complete translation of the fifth act, with a summary of the rest of the play.

The play opens with King Duṣyanta chasing the deer in the neighbourhood of a forest hermitage. He alights from his chariot to pay homage to the chief of the hermits, the sage Kaṇva. Kaṇva is not at home, but the king meets his foster-daughter, Śakuntalā, the illegitimate child of the nymph Menakā (p. 317), who runs on to the stage harassed by a bee, and is freed from its attentions by the gallant King. Naturally he falls in love with her, and with due modesty she shows that she returns his affection. The second act shows Duṣyanta in the throes of love. He cannot press his suit in the absence of Śakuntalā's foster-father, so he remains in the neighbourhood of the hermitage, ostensibly to defend it from wild elephants and demons. In the third act Śakuntalā is languid and sick with love. She confesses her feelings to her two friends, Anasūyā and Priyaṃvadā, who persuade her to

write a letter to the King. As she is writing, the King, who has heard everything from a nearby thicket, comes on the scene, and the two friends withdraw. He gives Śakuntalā a ring, and, by plighting their troth, they are married by the *gāndharva* rite (p. 168).

In the fourth act Duṣyanta has been recalled to his capital by affairs of state, leaving Śakuntalā behind. Kaṇva is still away. Meanwhile a great and irascible hermit, Durvāsas, visits the hermitage, and, as a result of a fancied slight, he curses Śakuntalā, saying that she will be forgotten by her husband until he sees the ring he gave her. Meanwhile Kaṇva returns. He knows already of what has happened, and decides to send the now pregnant Śakuntalā to the King. In a scene of great pathos she takes leave of her foster-father and her friends, and sets out for the capital in the care of two hermits and an elderly hermit-woman, Gautamī. The fifth act shows us the court of Duṣyanta. Śakuntalā, veiled, is ushered in with her attendants. She reminds the King of their love, and the attendants testify to her words; but the curse of Durvāsas has effaced all memory of her from the King's mind, and he does not recognize her.

GAUTAMĪ. Child! Put your modesty on one side a minute and take off your veil. Then His Majesty will recognize you. (*She does so.*)

THE KING (*looking at Śakuntalā, aside*).

This shape of untarnished beauty is offered me.

I ponder, whether or not I really wed her.

I am like a bee in a jasmine wet with the dawn dew—

I cannot now enjoy her, nor can I leave her.

(*He remains deep in thought.*)

THE DOORKEEPER (*aside*). How His Majesty respects the Sacred Law! Who else would think twice about a beauty so easily come by?

ŚĀRŔGARAVA (one of the ascetics). Your Majesty, why are you so silent?

THE KING. Hermits, I've been racking my brains, but I've no recollection whatever of marrying this lady. How can I accept her, . . . especially when she shows such obvious signs of pregnancy?

ŚAKUNTALĀ (*aside*). His Majesty doubts that we were ever married! What has become of my high-soaring hopes?

ŚĀRŔGARAVA. So you won't take her!

The sage indeed deserves your scorn,
for he respects his outraged daughter,
he gives to you the wealth you stole from him,
and treats a robber as an honest man!

ŚĀRADVATA (the other ascetic). That's enough, Śārṅgarava! Śakuntalā, we've said all we can say, and His Majesty has spoken! Now it's up to you! You must say something that will convince him.

ŚAKUNTALĀ (*aside*). When his passion has sunk to such depths what's

the good of reminding him of it! The only thing I'm sure of is that I'm to be pitied! (*Aloud.*) Your Majesty! (*Her voice drops to an undertone.*) Even though you doubt your marriage to me, this isn't the way you ought to receive me. I'm a girl who is naturally open-hearted. Is it right that you should make promises to me at the hermitage and then deceive me, and now use such harsh words to throw me aside?

THE KING (*putting his hands to his ears*). Heaven forbid!

Why do you try to sully your kin
and bring me to ruin,
as a river dashing against its banks
sullies its water and fells the tree on the shore?

ŚAKUNTALĀ. All right! If you really think I'm another man's wife I'll clear up your doubts by this token!

THE KING. That's a good idea!

ŚAKUNTALĀ (*feeling her ring-finger*). Oh dear! Oh dear!! The ring isn't on my finger! (*She looks at Gautamī in distress.*)

GAUTAMĪ. The ring must have slipped off your finger while you were bathing.

THE KING (*smiling*). There's a well-known saying—"A woman always has her wits about her"!

ŚAKUNTALĀ. Fate's against me again! One thing more I want to say.

THE KING. Very well! I'll listen!

ŚAKUNTALĀ. One day when we were in the bower of creepers you had a lotus leaf filled with water in your hand.

THE KING. I'm listening.

ŚAKUNTALĀ. Then my pet fawn Dīrghāpaṅga came up, and you held out the water and tried to get him to come to you, and said tenderly that he should have the first drink, but he wouldn't come near your hand because he didn't know you. So I held him, and he took the water from me, and you laughed and said, "Everyone trusts his own kind—after all, you're both children of the forest!"

THE KING. Those are the sort of sweet and lying phrases with which scheming women fool men of the world!

GAUTAMĪ. Good sir, you shouldn't say such things. This girl was brought up in a hermitage, and she knows nothing of deceit.

THE KING. Old woman!

Even in birds and beasts the female needs no lessons in deceit!

How much less she who has the power of reason!

Cuckoos, before they take to flight,

make sure that other birds will rear their chicks!

ŚAKUNTALĀ (*angrily*). You wretch! You judge me by the measure of your own heart! Was there ever a bigger hypocrite? You, in your cloak of righteousness—you're like a well covered over with grass!

THE KING (*aside*). Her anger seems quite genuine and makes me have second thoughts.

She must think my soul is vile in its forgetfulness,
and in not acknowledging our secret love.
At the knitting of the brows of her eyes red with anger
the bow of the Love-god is snapped in two.

(*Aloud*). Good woman. The movements of King Duṣyanta are common knowledge, and nobody knows anything about this.

ŚAKUNTALĀ. So be it! Here am I, turned into a wanton, and all because I trusted the race of Pūru, and fell into the clutches of a man who had honey on his tongue and poison in his heart. (*She covers her face with the end of her robe and weeps.*)

ŚĀRŅGARAVA. So you have to suffer for your own folly, when you don't keep a check on your impulses.

One should think hard before making love,
especially in secret.
Friendship to those whose hearts we know not
soon turns to hatred.

THE KING. What, do you trust this lady enough to attack me with your censorious words?

ŚĀRŅGARAVA (*scornfully*). You hear things upside down!

The word of one who from her birth
has learnt no guile carries no weight at all,
but they who have mastered the science of deceit
have power to speak words of authority.

THE KING. Honest sir, if for the sake of the argument I admit your accusation, tell me what good it would do me to deceive her.

ŚĀRŅGARAVA. You'd reap your own ruin.

THE KING. And surely it's unbelievable that a king of the line of Pūru should seek his own ruin?

ŚĀRADVATA. Śārṅgarava, what's the use of arguing with him? We've carried out the Teacher's command, now let's go home. (*To the King.*)

Here is Your Lordship's wife—
leave her or accept her.
It is said that the husband's power
over the wife is all-embracing.

Gautamī, let's go! (*They make for the door.*)

ŚAKUNTALĀ. Oh, how I've been cheated by this deceiver! You mustn't leave me! (*She follows them.*)

GAUTAMĪ. (*pausing.*) Look, Śārṅgarava, my child Śakuntalā is following us and crying pitifully. Oh, what will my little girl do, now that her husband has cast her off so cruelly?

ŚĀRṅGARAVA (*turning sternly*). Wanton, you are too independent! (*Śakuntalā trembles with fear.*)

ŚĀRṅGARAVA. Śakuntalā!

If you are what the king says you are
you are cast off by your family, and your father is nothing to you;
but if you know your vow to be true
even bondage in your husband's home is good.

You must stay behind, and we must go!

THE KING. Hermit, why do you delude this lady?

The moon awakens the night-flowering lotuses,
and the sun those that flower by day.

The way of the man of self-control
is to have no dealings with the wife of another.

ŚĀRṅGARAVA. When Your Majesty has such a short memory for his past deeds he does well to be so fearful of sin!

THE KING (*to the Chief Priest*). * I ask you the rights and wrongs of the matter.

I wonder, am I forgetful,
or has she told me lies?
Shall I abandon my own wife
or sin by touching another's?

THE CHIEF PRIEST (*thoughtfully*). If you ask me, this is what I think should be done.

THE KING. Command me, Your Honour!

THE CHIEF PRIEST. Let the lady stay in my home until the child is born. If you ask why, this is my reason—Long ago the wise men told you that your first son would become a universal emperor. If the son of the hermit's daughter bears the tokens of such kingship you should congratulate her and take her into your harem—otherwise send her back to her father.

THE KING. It shall be as my master pleases.

THE CHIEF PRIEST. Child, follow me!

* This stage direction is inserted by us. All the others are Kālidāsa's. In their comparatively full stage directions Sanskrit plays contrast strikingly with those of ancient Greece.

ŚAKUNTALĀ. O holy Earth, open for me! (*She starts to go, and leaves with the Chief Priest. The hermits depart. The King, his memory clouded by the curse, thinks about Śakuntalā.*)³⁸

Soon the Chief Priest returns. As he was leading Śakuntalā to his home a heavenly shape appeared and carried her up to heaven. It was her mother, the nymph Menakā, who had come to take her to her true parents' home for her confinement.

Act six introduces two policemen and a fisherman. He has found a precious ring in the maw of a fish, and is hauled before the king under the suspicion of having stolen it. As soon as Duṣyanta sees the ring he recognizes it as the one he gave Śakuntalā, and his memory returns. But Śakuntalā has vanished. For a while the King gives himself up to grief, for he has lost his wife and he has no heir. Soon he assuages his sorrow in action, for Mātali, the charioteer of Indra, brings him word that his help is needed in the long war between gods and demons.

The final act takes place several years later on the lower slopes of heaven, at the hermitage of the divine sage Mārīca. Duṣyanta is returning victorious from battle, when he sees a small boy, nobly wrestling with a tame lion cub. He stops his chariot to admire the child's courage and strength, and is told that he is Bharata, the son of Śakuntalā. The lovers are reunited, and all ends happily.

In many respects "Śakuntalā" is comparable to the more idyllic comedies of Shakespeare, and Kaṇva's hermitage is surely not far from the Forest of Arden. The plot of the play, like many of Shakespeare's plots, depends much on happy chances and on the supernatural, which, of course, was quite acceptable to the audience for which Kālidāsa wrote. Its characters, even to the minor ones, are happily delineated individuals. In the passage we have quoted the two hermits, who play no further part in the action, are sharply differentiated. Śārṅgarava is a brave and upright man, fearless in his denunciation of wickedness in high places, but rather stern and hard in his righteousness. Śāradvata, on the other hand, betrays himself in two lines as a moral weakling, anxious to escape from an unpleasant situation as quickly as possible. Kālidāsa makes no pretence to realism, but his dialogue is fresh and vigorous. In fact the dialogue of the better Sanskrit plays generally seems based on vernacular, and is full of idiomatic expressions. Indian playgoers did not demand the conflict of feelings and emotions which is the chief substance of serious European drama, but Kālidāsa was quite capable of portraying such conflict effectively. His beauties and merits are tarnished by any translation, but few who can read him in the original would doubt that, both as poet and dramatist, he was one of the great men of the world.



Elephant and Rider in Procession. Bāgh. 7th century



Flying Demigods. Bāmiyān, Afghānistān. 5th century A.D.

a

Messrs. Johnston & Hoffmann, Calcutta



Painted Cover of Palm-leaf Manuscript. Nepāl. 13th century

b

Messrs. Faber & Faber, Royal Academy Trustees and Museum of Central Asian Antiquities, New Delhi



Necklace of Gold, Garnets, and Faïence. Sirkap (Takṣaśilā).
c. 1st century A.D.

There were many other dramatists, of whom we can only mention a few. Śūdraka, probably Kālidāsa's approximate contemporary, has left only one play "The Little Clay Cart" (*Mṛcchakaṭika*). This is the most realistic of Indian dramas, unravelling a complicated story, rich in humour and pathos and crowded with action, of the love of a poor brāhmaṇ, Cārudatta, for the virtuous courtesan Vasantasenā; this story is interwoven with one of political intrigue, leading up to the overthrow of the wicked king Pālaka, and the play contains a vivid trial scene, after which the hero is saved from execution at the last moment. It is notable for its realistic depiction of city life, and for its host of minor characters, all of whom are drawn with skill and individuality. It has more than once been performed in translation on the European stage, and, to a Western audience, is certainly the most easily appreciated of Indian plays.

Viśākhadatta (?6th century) was the dramatist of politics. His only complete surviving play, "The Minister's Signet Ring" (*Mudrārāṣasa*), deals with the schemes of the wily Cāṇakya (p. 50) to foil the plots of Rāṣasa, the minister of the last of the Nandas, and to place Candragupta Maurya firmly on the throne. The plot is exceedingly complicated, but is worked out with great skill, and the play is beautifully constructed to lead up, like "The Little Clay Cart", to a pathetic scene where one of the chief characters is saved from death by impalement at the last moment. Another play by Viśākhadatta, "The Queen and Candra Gupta" (*Devicandragupta*), purporting to tell the story of the rise to power of Candra Gupta II (p. 65), exists only in fragments.

Three plays are ascribed to the great king Harṣa (p. 68f), though they may be the work of a "ghost writer". They are "Ratnāvalī", "Priyadarśikā", and "The Joy of the Serpents" (*Nāgānanda*). The first two, named after their heroines, are charming harem comedies, while the last is a play of religious purport, telling of prince Jimūtavāhana, who gives his own body to put a stop to the sacrifice of serpents to the divine Garuḍa (p. 300).

With Harṣa we may link his royal contemporary, the Pallava king Mahendravarman, who has left a one-act play "The Sport of the Drunkards" (*Mattavilāsa*). It treats of a drunken Śaivite ascetic, who loses the skull which he uses as a begging bowl, and accuses a Buddhist monk of stealing it. After much satirical dialogue, in which other dissolute ascetics of various persuasions and both sexes are involved, it is found that the skull has been stolen by a dog. This little farce, though slight, throws a flood of light on the life of the times and is full of Rabelaisian humour.

Second only to Kālidāsa in the esteem of the critics was Bhavabhūti,

who lived at Kānyakubja in the early 8th century. Three of his plays survive—"Mālatī and Mādhava", "The Deeds of the Great Hero" (*Mahāvīracarita*), and "The Later Deeds of Rāma" (*Uttararāmacarita*). The first is a love story with a pseudo-realistic background, full of incident of an exciting or horrific type, in which the heroine is more than once rescued from death, while the two latter plays tell the story of Rāma. By Western standards as a dramatist Bhavabhūti falls short of those we have mentioned earlier. His plots are weakly constructed and his characters lack individuality. His greatness rests on his deep understanding of sorrow; in his treatment of the pathetic and the terrible he perhaps excels Kālidāsa.

After Bhavabhūti the quality of Sanskrit drama declined. Playwrights of some merit, such as Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa (? 8th century), Murāri (early 9th century), Rājaśekhara (9th-10th centuries), and Kṛṣṇamiśra (11th century), continued to write dramas, but their work grew more and more literary, and was evidently often rather intended for reading than for performance. We have records of the occasional production of Sanskrit plays until the Muslim invasion, after which the Sanskrit theatrical tradition, though not forgotten, became a thing of the past.

Sanskrit Prose Literature

The earliest surviving prose stories are a few narrative episodes in the Brāhmaṇas (p. 405f), followed by the Pāli Jātakas (p. 454f). In the Gupta period, however, there developed a style of ornate prose narrative, which was very different from the simple Pāli stories, and was classed as *kāvya*. The chief writers in this genre were Daṇḍin, Subandhu and Bāṇa, all of whom lived in the late 6th and early 7th centuries.

Daṇḍin's "Tales of the Ten Princes" (*Daśakumāracarita*) is a collection of exciting and ingenious stories, held together by a framing narrative and all interwoven with great skill. The prose is comparatively simple. Long compounds are numerous, but the inordinately lengthy sentences of Bāṇa are not to be found. The stories are secular, often humorous, and sometimes amoral, while the characters are well delineated. Some of the interest of the "Ten Princes" lies in its comparative realism, for in their adventures the ten heroes come in contact with merchants and thieves, princesses and prostitutes, peasants and wild hillmen. Few works of Indian literature tell us so much about low life.

As examples of Daṇḍin's style we give two little stories which are contained within the larger tales, and are intended to show contrasting aspects of the character of the fair sex. The styles are sharply

differentiated to fit the themes; the grisly story of Dhūminī is told in crisp short sentences with great economy of detail, while in the domestic idyll of Gomini Daṇḍin lingers lovingly on his words, and describes the charming scene in leisurely periods.

“There is a country called Trigarta, where there lived three householders, who had accumulated a great fortune. They were brothers, called Dhanaka, Dhānyaka and Dhanyaka. In those days Indra gave no rain for twelve years. The corn withered, plants were barren, trees bore no fruit, and the clouds were impotent; water courses dried up, ponds became mere mud-holes, and the springs ceased to flow. Bulbs, roots and fruit became scarce, folk-tales were forgotten, and all festive merrymaking ceased. Robber bands multiplied, and people ate one another's flesh. Human skulls, white as cranes, rolled on the ground. Flocks of thirsty crows flew hither and thither. Villages, cities, whole districts, were deserted.

“The three householders first ate their store of grain and then one by one their goats, their sheep, their buffaloes, their cows, their maidservants, their menservants, their children, and the wives of the eldest and the middle brother. Finally they decided that next day they would eat Dhūminī, the wife of the youngest; but the youngest brother, Dhanyaka, could not bring himself to eat his darling, so that night he stole away with her.

“When she grew weary he carried her, until they came to a forest . . . and they walked on through it until at last they came upon a man who was writhing on the ground, with his hands, feet, ears and nose cut off. He compassionately supported this man too on his shoulder, and for a long time the three dwelt in a hut which he painstakingly built of leaves in a corner of the forest which abounded in edible bulbs, roots and game. He healed the man's wounds with almond and sesamum oil, and fed him with a full share of his own meat and vegetables.

“One day when the man had quite recovered and was restored to health, when Dhanyaka had gone hunting, Dhūminī approached the man with desire for pleasure, and though he upbraided her she compelled him to satisfy her. When her husband came back and asked for water she said, ‘Draw it from the well yourself, I've got a splitting headache’, and tossed him the bucket and rope. As he was drawing water from the well she crept up suddenly behind him and pushed him in.

“Supporting the cripple on her shoulder she wandered from land to land, and gained the reputation of a devoted wife, and was much honoured. Finally she settled in Avanti, and lived in great affluence, thanks to the generosity of the king. One day she heard that her husband had been rescued from the well by a band of thirsty merchants, and was now roaming about the land of Avanti, begging his food. So Dhūminī declared to the unwitting king that he was the villain who had crippled her husband, and he condemned the good man to death by torture.

“As Dhanyaka was being led to execution, knowing that his appointed time had not yet come, he boldly said to the officer in charge, ‘If the beggar

I'm supposed to have crippled is ready to condemn me I deserve my punishment!' The officer thought that no harm could come of testing [his words, so he sent for the cripple]. As soon as the cripple was brought and saw Dhanyaka his eyes filled with tears. He fell at the good man's feet, and, being a man of noble mind, he told of Dhanyaka's kindness and the false Dhūmini's wickedness. The enraged king had the wicked woman's face disfigured, and made her serve as a cook in his kennels, while he bestowed great favour on Dhanyaka. And that is why I say that women are hard-hearted."

"In the land of the Dravidians is a city called Kāñcī. Therein dwelt the very wealthy son of a merchant, by name Śaktikumāra. When he was nearly eighteen he thought: 'There's no pleasure in living without a wife or with one of bad character. Now how can I find a really good one?' So, dubious of his chance of finding wedded bliss with a woman taken at the word of others, he became a fortune-teller, and roamed the land with a measure of unhusked rice tied in the skirts of his robe; and parents, taking him for an interpreter of birthmarks, showed their daughters to him. Whenever he saw a girl of his own class, whatever her birthmarks, he would say to her: 'My dear girl, can you cook me a good meal from this measure of rice?' And so, ridiculed and rejected, he wandered from house to house.

"One day in the land of the Śibis, in a city on the banks of the Kāverī, he examined a girl who was shown to him by her nurse. She wore little jewellery, for her parents had spent their fortune, and had nothing left but their dilapidated mansion. As soon as he set eyes on her he thought: 'This girl is shapely and smooth in all her members. Not one limb is too fat or too thin, too short or too long. Her fingers are pink; her hands are marked with auspicious lines—the barleycorn, the fish, the lotus and the vase; her ankles are shapely; her feet are plump and the veins are not prominent; her thighs curve smoothly; her knees can barely be seen, for they merge into her rounded thighs; her buttocks are dimpled and round as chariot wheels; her navel is small, flat and deep; her stomach is adorned with three lines; the nipples stand out from her large breasts, which cover her whole chest; her palms are marked with signs which promise corn, wealth and sons; her nails are smooth and polished like jewels; her fingers are straight and tapering and pink; her arms curve sweetly from the shoulder, and are smoothly jointed; her slender neck is curved like a conch-shell; her lips are rounded and of even red; her pretty chin does not recede; her cheeks are round, full and firm; her eyebrows do not join above her nose, and are curved, dark and even; her nose is like a half-blown sesamum flower; her wide eyes are large and gentle and flash with three colours, black, white and brown; her brow is fair as the new moon; her curls are lovely as a mine of sapphires; her long ears are adorned doubly, with earrings and charming lotuses, hanging limply; her abundant hair is not brown, even at the tips,* but long, smooth, glossy and fragrant. The character of such a girl cannot but correspond to

* Though a fair complexion was much prized in ancient India a trace of brownness in the hair, fairly common in the North, was thought very unbeautiful and inauspicious.

her appearance, and my heart is fixed upon her, so I'll test her and marry her. For one regret after another is sure to fall on the heads of people who don't take precautions!' So, looking at her affectionately, he said, 'Dear girl, can you cook a good meal for me with this measure of rice?'

"Then the girl glanced at her old servant, who took the measure of rice from his hand and seated him on the veranda, which had been well sprinkled and swept, giving him water to cool his feet. Meanwhile the girl bruised the fragrant rice, dried it a little at a time in the sun, turned it repeatedly, and beat it with a hollow cane on a firm flat spot, very gently, so as to separate the grain without crushing the husk. Then she said to the nurse, 'Mother, goldsmiths can make good use of these husks for polishing jewellery. Take them, and, with the coppers you get for them, buy some firewood, not too green and not too dry, a small cooking pot, and two earthen dishes.'*

"When this was done she put the grains of rice in a shallow wide-mouthed, round-bellied mortar, and took a long and heavy pestle of acacia-wood, its head shod with a plate of iron. . . . With skill and grace she exerted her arms, as the grains jumped up and down in the mortar. Repeatedly she stirred them and pressed them down with her fingers; then she shook the grains in a winnowing basket to remove the beard, rinsed them several times, worshipped the hearth, and placed them in water which had been five times brought to the boil. When the rice softened, bubbled and swelled, she drew the embers of the fire together, put a lid on the cooking pot, and strained off the gruel. Then she patted the rice with a ladle and scooped it out a little at a time; and when she found that it was thoroughly cooked she put the cooking pot on one side, mouth downward. Next she damped down those sticks which were not burnt through, and when the fire was quite out she sent them to the dealers to be sold as charcoal, saying, 'With the coppers that you get for them, buy as much as you can of green vegetables, ghee, curds, sesamum oil, myrobalans and tamarind.'

"When this was done she offered him a few savouries. Next she put the rice-gruel in a new dish immersed in damp sand, and cooled it with the soft breeze of a palm-leaf fan. She added a little salt, and flavoured it with the scent of the embers; she ground the myrobalans to a smooth powder, until they smelt like a lotus; and then, by the lips of the nurse, she invited him to take a bath. This he did, and when she too had bathed she gave him oil and myrobalans [as an unguent].

"After he had bathed he sat on a bench in the paved courtyard, which had been thoroughly sprinkled and swept. She stirred the gruel in the two dishes, which she set before him on a piece of pale green plantain leaf, cut from a tree in the courtyard. He drank it and felt rested and happy, relaxed in every limb. Next she gave him two ladlefuls of the boiled rice, served with a little ghee and condiments. She served the rest of the rice

* The economics of this and the other transaction referred to are very hard to explain. No doubt the rice husks, so carefully threshed, had some commercial value, but it is hardly likely that it would have bought the wares mentioned. If this passage has any historical significance it confirms the evidence of other sources that in ordinary times the means of subsistence were plentiful and cheap.

with curds, three spices [mace, cardamom and cinnamon], and fragrant and refreshing buttermilk and gruel. He enjoyed the meal to the last mouthful.

"When he asked for a drink she poured him water in a steady stream from the spout of a new pitcher—it was fragrant with incense, and smelt of fresh trumpet-flowers and the perfume of full-blown lotuses. He put the bowl to his lips, and his eyelashes sparkled with rosy drops as cool as snow; his ears delighted in the sound of the trickling water; his rough cheeks thrilled and tingled at its pleasant contact; his nostrils opened wide at its sweet fragrance; and his tongue delighted in its lovely flavour, as he drank the pure water in great gulps. Then, at his nod, the girl gave him a mouthwash in another bowl. The old woman took away the remains of his meal, and he slept awhile in his ragged cloak, on the pavement plastered with fresh cowdung.

"Wholly pleased with the girl, he married her with due rites, and took her home. Later he neglected her awhile and took a mistress, but the wife treated her as a dear friend. She served her husband indefatigably, as she would a god, and never neglected her household duties; and she won the loyalty of her servants by her great kindness. In the end her husband was so enslaved by her goodness that he put the whole household in her charge, made her sole mistress of his life and person, and enjoyed the three aims of life—virtue, wealth and love. So I maintain that virtuous wives make their lords happy and virtuous."³⁹

Subandhu, the next of the three great prose writers, is known only from one work, called after its heroine *Vāsavadattā*, which tells of the vicissitudes of her love for the prince Kandarpaketu. Unlike Daṇḍin, Subandhu was quite unable to tell a story, and had no sense of character. His merits lie in his ornate descriptions and his mastery of language, and his work consists of a series of descriptive tableaux, linked by a thin thread of narrative, each long description told in a single sentence which covers two or more pages of type. The work abounds in flowers of speech of all kinds—puns, *doubles entendres*, alliterations and assonances, and is a typical example of the *Gauḍa* (Bengālī) style of literary composition, as distinguished from the simpler *Vaidarbha* (Berār) style, with shorter, less involved sentences, employed by Kālidāsa and Daṇḍin. It cannot be enjoyed in translation and its merits are only apparent in the framework of its own standards. Of European literature perhaps Lily's *Euphues* and similar late Renaissance prose works most closely approach it in style and spirit.

Bāṇa's style is similar to that of Subandhu, but his work is much more vital and congenial to Western taste. Not only do his elaborate descriptions show accurate and close observation, but throughout his two works, the "Deeds of Harṣa" (*Harṣacarita*) and *Kādambarī*, the personality of the author breaks through. In the former

work, moreover, he gives us a fragment of autobiography unparalleled in Sanskrit literature. Bāṇa was born of a well-to-do brāhman family, and his mother died in his early childhood. At the age of fourteen he lost his father also, and, after a period of mourning, he began to sow his wild oats. He names with evident affection the bosom friends of his dissolute youth, which was spent in wandering from city to city among the intellectual bohemians of the time. His circle was remarkably wide, including ascetics of various sects, both orthodox and otherwise, literary men, actors, musicians, entertainers, doctors, and even humble people of low caste. The list of Bāṇa's friends, mentioned in no special order, is in itself sufficient to show how lightly the rules of caste weighed on the educated man. The author gives us no details of his adventures, but it would seem that in the course of them he was received at the court of Harṣa, whom he offended in some way. Later he returned for a while to his home, and resumed the peaceful life of a country brāhman; but soon a message came from Harṣa, demanding his attendance at court. He was at first received coldly, but afterwards was restored to favour.

Though religiously minded, Bāṇa seems throughout his life to have transcended the bounds of orthodoxy and to have retained some of the unconventionality of his wild youth. He was not afraid to put forward opinions which might have made him unpopular with his royal patron—for instance he condemned the doctrine of royal divinity as gross sycophancy, and attacked the Macchiavellian system of statecraft associated with the name of Kauṭilya as immoral and inhuman. Here and there in his work occur passages which show implicit sympathy with the poor and humble—a sentiment rarely found in ancient Indian literature—and he is a master of exact observation. For all the floweriness of his style Bāṇa's outlook has more in common with that of the 20th century than that of any other early Indian writer.

Of his two works the "Deeds of Harṣa" tells of the events leading up to Harṣa's rise to power with general authenticity, but with some evident exaggeration, and with a lack of circumstantial detail which the historian finds irritating. The work was apparently unfinished, since when it concludes the hero's destiny is still somewhat in doubt. *Kādambarī* is perhaps a conscious and successful attempt to improve on Subandhu's *Vāsavadattā*. The story is a romance, told in a series of narrated episodes which link together to build up a complicated plot. This work also was unfinished, and was completed by the author's son, whose prentice hand is quite evident.

As an example of Bāṇa's style we give a somewhat abridged and adapted version of his description of Harṣa's army striking camp to march against his enemies. In the original the whole consists of a

single sentence, the basis of which is the phrase "the royal court was filled with chieftains" near the end of the passage. The separate sentences or clauses of our translation are single compound words in the original.

"Then it was time to go. The drums rattled, the kettledrums beat joyfully, the trumpets blared, the horns blew, the conches sounded. By degrees the hubbub of the camp grew louder. Officers busily roused the King's courtiers. The sky shook with the din of fast-hammering mallets and drumsticks. The generals assembled the ranks of the subordinate officers. The darkness of the night was broken by the glare of a thousand torches which the people lighted. Lovers were aroused by the tramping feet of the women who kept watch. The harsh shouts of the elephant-marshals dispelled the slumber of their drowsy riders as awakened elephants left their stables.

"Squadrons of horses woke from sleep and shook their manes. The camp resounded loudly as spades dug up the tent-pegs, and the tethering chains of elephants clinked as their stakes were pulled up. . . . As the foragers released the elephants all space was filled with the clanking of their fetters. Leather bags full to bursting were placed on their dusty backs, which had been rubbed down with tufts of hay. Servants rolled up the canvasses and awnings of tents and pavilions, and the bundles of tent-pegs were stored away in bulging leather sacks. Store-keepers assembled their stores, and many elephant-drivers loaded them. The dwellings of the vassals were cluttered with cups and cooking utensils, which were lifted on to the backs of elephants, steadied by their riders. The soldiers laughed as the fat strumpets were dragged away by force, resisting vigorously with feet and hands. The many mighty and savage elephants trumpeted, as the girthbands of their bright harness were tightened, and restricted the freedom of their limbs. . . . Camels neighed in annoyance as sacks were loaded on their backs.

"The wives of highborn gentlemen were visited in their carriages by go-betweens sent by princes. Elephant-captains, who had forgotten that it was time to go, looked for their servants. The splendid horses of the King's favourites were led by footmen wealthy with their masters' gifts. Troops of handsome warriors adorned their bodies with circles of unguent, scented with camphor. The harness of the marshals' horses was hung with bags of salted peas, little bells, and whistles.* Monkeys sat among the troops of horses, as the grooms straightened their tangled reins. Stablemen dragged sacks of musty fodder for the horses' morning meal. The calls of the grass-cutters grew louder and louder. There was uproar in the stables as young horses strained and reared and swerved at the confusion of starting. Girls hurried at the call of the riders of the harnessed horses with unguents for their faces. As the elephants and horses set out the poor folk of the

* Cowell and Thomas (The Harṣacarita of Bāṇa, p. 200) take *lavaṇakalāyī* as "wooden figures of deer" on the basis of a late commentary. *Lavaṇa* means salt, and *kalāya* a type of pea, and we believe the compound to mean a bag of salted peas, the horse's iron rations. The translation of *kinkīṇī-nālī-sanātha* as "bells with reeds attached" is equally improbable. The horse's harness would be hung with bells, but *nālī*, "reed" or "tube", may well mean a whistle attached to the harness by a cord, and used for signalling.

neighbourhood ran up to loot the remains of the heaped grain. Donkeys plodded on together, loaded with piles of clothing. The trampled roads were filled with carts with creaking wheels. Oxen were loaded with equipment which would suddenly fall off. The strong oxen, first to be driven away, lagged behind, drawn by the grass which grew by the roadside.

"In front went the field-kitchens of the chief vassals. Standard bearers led the ranks. As the troops left their small huts hundreds of their friends came out to meet them. The feet of the elephants trampled the hovels by the roadside, and the people came out and threw clods at their keepers, who called on the bystanders to witness their assaults. Poor families ran from their wrecked and ruined huts. Oxen, bearing the wealth of unfortunate merchants, fled from the hubbub. Clearing a path through the crowd with the glare of their torches, runners led the way for the elephants bearing the women of the harem. Horsemen shouted to the dogs running behind them. The veterans praised the tall Taṅgaṇa horses, which trotted so smoothly and quickly that they made travelling a pleasure. Unhappy Southerners upbraided their fallen mules. The whole world was swallowed in dust.

"The royal court was filled with chieftains who had come from every quarter, riding on cow-elephants, whose drivers bore bows adorned with stripes of gold-leaf. Seated within [the howdahs] their batmen carried their swords. Their betel-bearers fanned them with flywhisks. The soldiers seated in the rear bore bundles of javelins in cases. The trappings [of the elephants] bristled with curved sabres and gilded arrows. . . . The thighs [of the chieftains] were clothed in fine-patterned silk, but their legs were covered with mud-stained trousers. . . . Their tunics were decked with dark jewels, which glistened against their bodies. They wore Chinese cuirasses, doublets adorned with bright clusters of pearls. . . . and scarves as bright as a parrot's wing. All the ends of the earth were filled with knights and warriors, who hurried on with tossing shields and plumes. The ends of heaven were loud with the jingling golden ornaments on the harness of the prancing Kamboja steeds in their hundreds. The ear was deafened by the harsh booming of hundreds of large kettledrums, mercilessly beaten. The roll was called. With upturned faces the footmen awaited the order to march."⁴⁰

After Bāṇa similar prose romances were often written, as well as stories in mixed prose and verse (*campū*), but none is of much literary importance, and most are derivative, pedantic and dull.

Another branch of prose narrative literature was the fable, which we meet first in the Pāli Jātakas. These cheerful little stories, whose actors are often talking animals, have much in common with the fables popular in ancient Greece, and there has been some discussion on the question of influence. Direct borrowing is unlikely, though it may be that some of the tales were derived from a common source in the ancient Middle East. Whatever the origin of these stories Indian folklore did influence the literature of the West, for one of the most

famous Indian collections of fables, the *Pañcatantra*, was translated into Pahlavī, or Middle Persian, in the 6th century. Thence it was translated into Syriac, and thence again, in the 8th century, into Arabic. In various versions it appeared in Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and found its way all over Europe. The earliest English version is that of Sir Thomas North, called "The Morall Philosophie of Doni" after the name of the translator of the Italian version, which North used. This appeared in 1570, and was the earliest work of Indian literature (much garbled by successive translations) to be published in English. The fables of La Fontaine are admittedly based on "Pilpay", the form in which Vidyāpati, the title of the Indian sage who is said to have narrated the stories, reached Europe. As well as the fables of La Fontaine the stories of Reynard the Fox, popular in the folk literature of many parts of Europe and given finished form by Goethe, owe much to this source. Other Indian tales, including several from the *Bṛhatkathā* (p. 429), found their way westwards, and the "Arabian Nights" owes several of its stories and themes to India, including some of the marvels met by Sindbad the Sailor.

The *Pañcatantra* ("Five Treatises") is in theory a book of instruction in *nīti*, or the conduct of one's affairs, especially intended for kings and statesmen. The little stories are contained in a framing narrative which tells how a king was distressed at the evil and stupidity of his sons, and entrusted them to a sage who reformed them in six months by telling them a series of fables. The book exists in several versions of varying length and merit, mostly in prose, but with many verses of a gnomic type. The most famous of these versions is Nārāyaṇa's *Hitopadeśa* ("Salutary Instruction"), composed in Bengal in the 12th century. The work was intended as a "reader" for students of Sanskrit, and serves that purpose well down to the present day. Never was a school textbook better written. The author was compelled by his purpose to avoid the euphuisms and pedantries which affected most of the literature of his time, and he wrote lucidly and wittily, liberally including memorably terse gnomic stanzas. Ethically many of the stories are dubious, for they encourage caution and self-interest rather than altruism. The two stories we quote are boxed within others.

"It is said:

He who takes a well-spoken knave
to be a man of his own stamp
is fooled by rogues, like the brāhman
who was robbed of his goat.'

"How did that happen?' asked the King.

“‘In the forest of Gautama,’ said Meghavarṇa, ‘there lived a brāhmaṇ famous for his sacrifices. Once he went to a village and bought a goat for sacrifice, and as he was carrying it home on his shoulder he was seen by three rogues. “If we could find a way to get that goat,” they said to themselves, “it would be a fine trick!” So they stationed themselves each under a tree about a *krośa* apart. As the brāhmaṇ passed by, the first rogue said, “Why, brāhmaṇ, that’s a dog you’re carrying on your back!” “It’s not a dog,” replied the brāhmaṇ, “it’s a goat for sacrifice!”

“‘Then the next rogue addressed him with the same words. This time the brāhmaṇ put the goat on the ground and looked at it hard, and again slung it over his shoulder and went on, his mind wavering like a swing; for

The words of rogues make even the mind of a good man waver.
If he trusts them he dies like Pretty-ears.’

“‘How did that happen?’ asked the King.

“‘In a forest land,’ he said, ‘there lived a lion named Madotkaṭa, who had three servants, a crow, a tiger and a jackal. Once as the three were out walking they met a camel, and they asked him whence he came, and whether he had fallen out of a caravan. He told them his story, and they took him back and handed him over to the lion, who gave him his freedom and security; and he took the name of Pretty-ears.

“‘Later the lion was taken ill, and there was heavy rain and they were very distressed for want of food. So they agreed so to arrange matters that their lord should kill Pretty-ears. “Of what other use,” they said to themselves, “is that eater of thorns to us?” “But how can we manage it,” said the tiger, “when our master has given him a pledge of security and has him in his favour?” “At a time like this,” said the crow, “when the master is reduced to skin and bone, he won’t scruple at a sin; for

A woman torn by hunger will abandon her child.
A snake torn by hunger will eat its own eggs.
What evil will a hungry man not do?
Lean men are always pitiless!

And, what is more,

A drunkard, an imbecile, a lunatic,
a man tired out, an angry man, a hungry man,
a greedy man, a frightened man, a hasty man,
or a man in love never do the right thing.”

“‘After thus deliberating they all went to the lion. “Have you found anything to eat?” the lion asked. “We’ve done our best,” they replied, “but we haven’t found a thing!” “Well,” said the lion, “how are we to keep alive now?” “Sire,” said the crow, “if we don’t get our natural food we’ll all surely die.” “And what,” asked the lion, “is our natural food?” “Pretty-ears!” whispered the crow in the lion’s ear.

“‘The lion touched the earth and covered his ears in horror. “We’ve given him a pledge of security,” he said, “and we must stand by it. How can we eat him? For

Not gifts of land nor gifts of gold,
nor gifts of cattle nor gifts of food
are said to be the greatest gift.
Of all gifts greatest is the gift of safety.

Moreover

The merit of the horse-sacrifice,
the fulfilment of all desires,
comes to the man who protects
those who take refuge with him.”

““‘True!” said the crow. “Our lord must not kill him. But there’s no reason why we shouldn’t so arrange things that he offers his body voluntarily.” At this the lion kept silence. So when a suitable occasion offered the crow found a pretext to bring them all into the lion’s presence. “Sire,” he said, “however hard we try we can find no food. Your Majesty is weak from days of fasting. So now make a meal of my flesh, for

All subjects are dependent on their lord.
Only well-rooted trees bear fruit,
and only when the king is strong
do men’s works prosper.”

““‘I’d rather die myself than do such a thing!” said the lion.

““Then the jackal made the same offer. “Never!” the lion replied.

““The tiger next spoke up. “Let my lord live on my own body!” he said. “Such a thing can never be right!” the lion replied.

““Finally Pretty-ears, full of confidence, offered himself in the same way. And, in accordance with his offer, the lion ripped his belly open and they all ate him up.

““And that is why I say:

The words of rogues make even the mind of a good man waver.
If he trusts them he dies like Pretty-ears.

““Meanwhile the brāhmaṇ met the third rogue, who spoke to him in the same way. This time he decided that his senses were defective. So he abandoned the goat, took a ritual ablution, and went home, while the rogues took the goat away and ate it. And so I say:

He who takes a well-spoken knave
to be a man of his own stamp
is fooled by rogues like the brāhmaṇ
who was robbed of his goat.”⁴¹

Pāli Literature

The Pāli language was closer to the speech of the ordinary man than was Sanskrit, and its style was in general simpler; but though they contain many fine passages the Pāli scriptures are largely prosaic and repetitive. The same stock phrases and descriptions, often quite lengthy, occur again and again with a dull monotony which can only be circumvented by drastic abridgement. Yet the narrative portions of the Pāli canon are frequently of much merit. Here for instance, somewhat abridged, is the canonical account of the Buddha's "Great Retirement", a passage of intense dramatic force.

"Then lovely women, decked like the damsels of the gods with every kind of ornament and well trained in dance and song, began to perform. But the Bodhisattva had no taste for dancing, and for a while sleep overcame him. The women thought: 'He for whose sake we danced and sang has fallen asleep—why should we trouble ourselves further?' And they put up their instruments and lay down. The lamps of scented oil burned on.

"The Bodhisattva awoke and sat cross-legged on his couch. He saw the women with their instruments laid aside, fast asleep. Saliva trickled from the mouths of some; some were covered in sweat; some ground their teeth in sleep; some snored; the garments of some were in disarray, so that they repulsively showed their private parts. When he saw them thus in their dishevelment he was more than ever disgusted with the life of passion. The great hall, decked like the heavenly palace of Indra, seemed to him like a charnel ground full of scattered corpses. Life seemed as fleeting as a house on fire. 'How wretched it all is! How afflicted it all is!!' he cried, and his mind was set even more strongly on asceticism. 'Today I must go forth on the Great Retirement,' he thought, and he rose from his bed and went to the door.

"There lay Channa, his head on the threshold. 'Today I must go forth on the Great Retirement,' he said, 'get ready my horse'. . . . When he had thus sent Channa he thought 'I will see my son', and he went to the apartments of the Mother of Rāhula, and opened the bedroom door. A little lamp of scented oil burned in the inner room. The Mother of Rāhula was sleeping on a bed thickly strewn with flowers, with her son's head on her arm. The Bodhisattva set one foot on the threshold and stood gazing at them. 'If I move her hand and take up my son I shall waken the queen,' he thought, 'and then I shall not be able to go. When I am a Buddha I will come back and see my son.' And he left the palace."⁴²

As a further example of Pāli prose we give a Jātaka tale. This story, inculcating the fickleness of women, has of course no religious value, and its origin is certainly secular, but we give its framework, in order that the reader may see how the most unpromising material has been pressed into service for religious purposes. This story is typical of the terse dry style of the collection, and of the tales of

marvels which were very popular in India then as now. The reader will recall that the verses are the original, round which the story itself is built as a sort of commentary.

"The Master, who was living at Jeta's Grove at the time, told this story in connexion with a backsliding brother. The Master asked him if he wanted to return to the world and regretted taking orders. 'It's all because of the wiles of women,' the monk answered. 'Brother,' said the Master, 'it's impossible to keep on your guard against women! Wise men of old couldn't guard against them, even when they dwelt in the realms of the *suparṇas*.*' And when the brother pressed him the Master told an old story.

"In former times King Tamba ruled the kingdom of Banāras. He had a chief queen named Sussonḍī, a woman of the utmost beauty. The Bodhisattva was born then as a *suparṇa*. At that time there was an island of serpents called the Island of Seruma. In that island the Bodhisattva dwelt in a palace of *suparṇas*.

"One day he went to Banāras in human guise, and gambled with King Tamba. The attendants saw how fair he was, and told Sussonḍī that a handsome man was gambling with the King. She wanted to see him, so one day she put on all her ornaments and came to the gambling-hall, where, standing among her maids, she watched him. And then he saw the Queen. The two fell in love with one another. The King of the *Suparṇas* stirred up a magic wind in the city, and everyone rushed from the royal palace, fearing that it might fall. With his magic power he created darkness, seized the Queen, and flew to his palace in the Isle of Serpents.

"Nobody knew where Sussonḍī had gone, but the *Suparṇa* took his pleasure of her and went back to play with the King. Now the King had a minstrel named Sagga. Not knowing what had happened to the Queen he said to the minstrel, "Go and seek over land and sea, and find out where the Queen has gone." So he took money for his journey and, starting with the suburbs, he sought everywhere until he came to Bhṛgukaccha. Just then some merchants of Bhṛgukaccha were setting out by ship for the Land of Gold (Burma). He went up to them and said, "I'm a minstrel. If you'll remit my fare and take me with you I'll make music for you." They agreed, took him aboard, and set sail.

"When the ship was well under way they called him to make music for them. "I'd willingly make music for you," he said, "but if I did the fish would leap out of the water and smash your ship". "When a mere man makes music the fish don't get excited," they said, "so tune up!" "Then don't blame me for anything that may happen," he said, and he tuned his lute and made music, with strings and voice in perfect unison. The fish heard the sound, and leapt with excitement. Then a sea-monster (*makara*) leapt from the sea, fell on the ship, and smashed it to pieces. Sagga lay on a plank and drifted with the wind to the Isle of Serpents, and landed by a banyan tree near the palace of the King of the *Suparṇas*.

"Now the King of the *Suparṇas* had gone away to play dice, and so

* A class of large mythical bird, of whom Garuḍa (p. 300) is the chief.

Queen Sussondī had come down from the palace and was walking on the shore; and she saw and recognized Sagga the minstrel, and asked him how he came. He told her all his story. She told him not to be afraid, and comforted him, and clasped him in her arms, and had him taken to the palace, where she laid him on a couch. When he was revived she gave him fine food, bathed him in sweetly scented water, dressed him in fine clothes, adorned him with beautiful fragrant flowers, and again made him rest on the fine couch. So she cared for him, and whenever the King of the Suparṇas returned she hid him; then, as soon as he went again, she took passionate pleasure with him.

““When a month and half a month had passed, merchants from Banāras landed on that island at the foot of the banyan tree in search of fuel and water. He boarded their ship, went back to Banāras, and saw the King while he was gambling. Then he took his lute, and, making music, sang the first stanza:

“There blows the scent of timīra trees
with the sounding of the evil sea,
but Sussondī is far away.
Tamba, desires torment me!”

““When he heard this, the Suparṇa sang the second stanza:

“How did you cross the ocean?
How came you to see Seruma?
How was it, Sagga,
that she and you did meet?”

““Then Sagga sang three stanzas:

“From Bhṛgukaccha there sailed
traders in search of wealth.
A monster broke their ship.
I floated on a plank.

“In her soft and tender lap
ever fragrant with sandal
the gentle lady pillowed me,
as a mother her own son.

“This you should know, King Tamba,
the fair-eyed lady gave me
food with her own hands,
and drink, and raiment, and a bed.”

““Even as the minstrel sang the Suparṇa was filled with regret. “Though I dwelt in the Palace of the Suparṇas,” he thought, “I could not keep her! What is the wanton to me?” So he brought her back, gave her to the King, and went away. And he never came again.”

“When the story was over the Master declared the Four Noble Truths (p. 269), and identified the births. . . . ‘Ānanda (p. 261) was the King of Banāras, and I was the King of the Suparṇas.’”⁴³

As examples of Pāli poetry we give a few verses from the "Songs of the Elder Monks and Nuns" (*Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā*), a collection of poems ascribed, falsely no doubt, to the great disciples of the Buddha in the early days of the Order. The style of these poems is simpler than that of courtly Sanskrit literature, and suggests the influence of popular song. The first is attributed to Ambapālī, the beautiful courtesan of Vaiśālī who became a Buddhist nun.

"Black and glossy as a bee and curled was my hair;
now in old age it is just like hemp or bark-cloth.
Not otherwise is the word of the truthful. . . .

"My hair clustered with flowers was like a box of sweet perfume;
now in old age it stinks like a rabbit's pelt.
Not otherwise is the word of the truthful . . .

"Once my eyebrows were lovely, as though drawn by an artist;
now in old age they are overhung with wrinkles.
Not otherwise is the word of the truthful. . . .

"Dark and long-lidded, my eyes were bright and flashing as jewels;
now in old age they are dulled and dim.
Not otherwise is the word of the truthful. . . .

"My voice was as sweet as the cuckoo's, who flies in the woodland thickets;
now in old age it is broken and stammering.
Not otherwise is the word of the truthful. . . .

"Once my hands were smooth and soft, and bright with jewels and gold;
now in old age they twist like roots.
Not otherwise is the word of the truthful. . . .

"Once my body was lovely as polished gold;
now in old age it is covered all over with tiny wrinkles.
Not otherwise is the word of the truthful. . . .

"Once my two feet were soft, as though filled with down;
now in old age they are cracked and wizened.
Not otherwise is the word of the truthful. . . .

"Such was my body once. Now it is weary and tottering,
the home of many ills, an old house with flaking plaster.
Not otherwise is the word of the truthful."⁴⁴

Few ancient Indian poems show such a deep love of nature as some of these verses, ascribed to pious monks of the 5th century B.C.



Apsaras, with Attendant, drops Flowers upon the Earth. Mural painting on the rock-face of the fortress of Sīgiriya, Ceylon.
5th century, A.D



Euthydemus. Silver.
End of 3rd century,
B.C.



Demetrius, wearing
elephant headdress.
Silver. Early 2nd
century B.C.

Menander. Silver, bilingual.
2nd century B.C.



Antimachus, wearing
Macedonian headdress
(*kausia*). Silver. Early
2nd century B.C.



Kaniska. Gold. On the
reverse a standing Buddha
with Greek inscription
ΒΟΔΔΟ. End of 1st
century A.D.



COINS OF BACTRIA AND NORTH-WEST INDIA

a



Fighting Elephant

b



Iranian Goddess.

GRICO-BACTRIAN SILVER DISCS. 3RD-2ND CENTURY B.C.

“When the drum of the clouds thunders in heaven,
and all the ways of the birds are thick with rain,
the monk sits in the hills in ecstasy
and finds no joy greater than this.

“When by rivers covered with flowers,
and gaily adorned with reeds of varied hue,
the goodly monk sits on the bank in ecstasy
he finds no joy greater than this.

“When the rain pours down at night,
and elephants trumpet in the distant thickets,
the monk sits in the hills in ecstasy,
and finds no joy greater than this.”⁴⁵

“When the crane with clear pale wing
flies in fear from the black cloud,
seeking shelter and finding none,
The river Ajakaraṇī gives me joy.

“Who would not love
the rose-apple trees
fair on either bank
beside the great cavern?

“Freed from the fear of flocks of cranes
the frogs croak softly now.
This is no time to leave the hills and streams !
Safe, good and pleasant is Ajakaraṇī”.⁴⁶

As an example of Pāli descriptive poetry we give a stirring passage from the Ceylon Chronicle, the *Mahāvamsa*, describing the capture of Vijitanagara, the capital of the Tamil invader Eḷāra, by the Sinhalese national hero, King Duṭṭhagāmaṇī (161–137 B.C.), with the aid of his favourite elephant, Kaṇḍula.

“The city had three moats,
and was guarded by a high wall.
Its gate was covered with iron
hard for foes to shatter.

“The elephant knelt on his knees
and, battering with his tusks
stone and mortar and brick,
he attacked the iron gate.

“The Tamils from the watch-tower
threw missiles of every kind,
balls of red-hot iron
and [vessels of] molten pitch.

“Down fell the smoking pitch
upon Kaṇḍula’s back.
In anguish of pain he fled
and plunged in a pool of water.

“‘This is no drinking bout!’
cried Goṭhāimbara.
Go, batter the iron gate!
Batter down the gate!!’

“In his pride the best of tuskers
took heart and trumpeted loud.
He reared up out of the water
and stood on the bank defiant.

“The elephant-doctor washed away
the pitch, and put on balm.
The King mounted the elephant
and rubbed his brow with his hand.

“‘Dear Kaṇḍula, I’ll make you
the lord of all Ceylon!’
he said, and the beast was cheered,
and was fed with the best of fodder.

“He was covered with a cloth,
and he was armoured well
with armour for his back
of seven-fold buffalo hide.

“On the armour was placed
a skin soaked in oil.
Then, trumpeting like thunder,
he came on, fearless of danger.

“He pierced the door with his tusks.
With his feet he trampled the threshold.
And the gate and the lintel
crashed loudly to the earth.” 47

Prākṛit Literature

Space will not permit more than a brief reference to the Prākṛit scriptures of the Jainas, examples of which we have already quoted (p. 293f). In general they have little literary value. Like Jainism itself they tend to be arid, and, like the Pāli scriptures but in even greater measure, they repeat lengthy stock phrases and descriptions, which may have had some mnemonic value, but which to the modern reader are very irritating. Lengthy descriptions of the Tīrthaṅkaras, of pious monks, mighty kings, wealthy merchants, prosperous cities etc. occur over and over again, in exactly the same words throughout the canon, and give it a flavour of uninspired dryness. The style is somewhat more ornate than that of the Pāli scriptures, and closer to courtly Sanskrit.

The poetry of the Jainas is better than their prose. In this connexion we cannot refrain from quoting a remarkable poem, which is one of the most humorous things in ancient Indian literature, and which, by some lucky chance, has found its way into the Jaina canon, among the austere pages of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. It is intended as a warning of the grim fate in store for the backsliding monk, and throws a most unexpected light on one aspect of Indian marriage. Our translation is rather free, but we have tried to keep some of the lively vernacular style of the original.

“A celibate monk shouldn’t fall in love,
and though he hankers after pleasure he should hold himself in check,
for these are the pleasures
which some monks enjoy.

“If a monk breaks his vows,
and falls for a woman,
she upbraids him and raises her foot to him,
and kicks him on the head.

“‘Monk, if you won’t live with me
as husband and wife,
I’ll pull out my hair and become a nun,
for you shall not live without me!’

“But when she has him in her clutches
it’s all housework and errands!
‘Fetch a knife to cut this gourd!’
‘Get me some fresh fruit!’

“‘We want wood to boil the greens,
and for a fire in the evening!’
‘Now paint my feet!’
‘Come and massage my back!’ . . .

“‘Get me my lip-salve!’
 ‘Find my sunshade and slippers!’
 ‘I want a knife to cut this string!’
 ‘Take my robe and have it dyed blue!’ . . .

“‘Fetch me my tweezers and my comb!’
 ‘Get me a ribbon to tie my hair!’
 ‘Now pass me my looking-glass!’
 Put my toothbrush down beside me!’ . . .

“‘Fetch the pot and the drum and the rag-ball,
 for our little boy to play with!’
 ‘Monk, the rains are on the way,
 patch the roof of the house and look to the stores!’

“‘Bring me the chair with the twine seat,
 and my wooden-soled slippers to go out walking!’
 So pregnant women boss their husbands,
 just as though they were household slaves.

“‘When a child is born, the reward of their labours,
 she makes the father hold the baby.
 And sometimes the fathers of sons
 stagger under their burdens like camels.

“‘They get up at night, as though they were nurses,
 to lull the howling child to sleep,
 and, though they are shamefaced about it,
 scrub dirty garments, just like washermen. . . .

“‘So, monks, resist the wiles of women,
 avoid their friendship and company.
 The little pleasure you get from them
 will only lead you into trouble!’”⁴⁸

A number of medieval works of a secular nature were written in Prākṛit, chief of which are the poems “The Building of the Causeway” (*Setubandha*), describing Rāma’s invasion of Ceylon and falsely ascribed to Kālidāsa; “The Slaying of the King of Bengal” (*Gauḍa-radha*), a long panegyric by the 8th-century poet Vākpati, describing the exploits of Yaśovarman, king of Kānyakubja (p. 70); and a drama named after its heroine, Karpūramañjarī, by the 10th-century dramatist Rājaśekhara. These works, though not without merit, are indistinguishable in style and content from comparable Sanskrit productions, and need not detain us.

The most important literary work in Prākṛit is the "Seven Hundred" (*Saptasataka*) of Hāla. This is a large collection of self-contained stanzas of great charm and beauty, in the *Āryā* metre (p. 511f). Their traditional author was the shadowy Sātavāhana king Hāla, who ruled in the Deccan in the 1st century A.D., but in fact many of these verses seem considerably later, and they must be looked on as anonymous. They are notable for their conciseness; like Amaru, their authors were able to suggest a whole story in four short lines. This great economy of words and masterly use of suggestion would indicate that the verses were written for a highly educated literary audience; but they contain simple and natural descriptions and references to the lives of peasants and the lower classes, which point to popular influence. The treatment of the love affairs of country folk reminds us of early Tamil poetry, and suggests that "Hāla" may have tapped a widely diffused source in South Indian folksong.

"Last night with scorn the lady gave the wanderer
straw for his bed.
This morning she gathers it together,
weeping."

"This morning, my friend, I heard a man singing,
and his song reminded me of my lover,
and opened all the wounds
that the shafts of the Love-god had made in my heart."

"Waiting for you, the first half of the night
passed like a moment.
The rest was like a year,
for I was sunk in grief."

"When the season of rains, with its high clouds,*
has passed like youth,
the earliest single *kāsa* flower
comes, like a grey hair on the earth."

"Ungrateful lover, still I see the mud
in the village street,
which, on a rainy night,
I trod for your sake, shameless one!" 49

⚡ Tamil Literature

The oldest Tamil literature goes back to the early centuries of the Christian era. Its dating is still a matter of some dispute but it

* There is a pun here on *paohare*, which may mean either "clouds" or "breasts".

seems almost certain that the earliest stratum was composed before the great Pallava dynasty of Kāñcī became dominant in the Tamil Land in the 6th century, and it is probably some centuries older than this.

Tamil tradition tells of three literary academies (*śaṅgam*) which met at Madurai. The earliest of these was attended by gods and legendary sages, and all its works have perished. Of the second, there survives only the early Tamil grammar, *Tolkāppiyam*. The poets of the Third Śaṅgam, on the other hand, wrote the "Eight Anthologies" (*Ettutogai*), which are the greatest monument of ancient Tamil literature, as well as a number of later works. Some authorities have doubted the tradition of the Śaṅgams, and it is almost certain that the grammar *Tolkāppiyam*, attributed to the Second Śaṅgam, is later than many of the poems of the Third. But the tradition of the Śaṅgams, which is a strongly held one, has no parallel in Northern legend, and we may believe that the bards of the Tamil Land, who wandered over the country enjoying the patronage of chieftains and villagers alike, would meet from time to time in the city of Madurai for great festivals of poetry and music, and that many of the verses of the Anthologies were recited there.

The poetry of the "Eight Anthologies" is little known outside the land of its origin, and its language is so archaic that the modern educated Tamil cannot read it without special study. The relation of the language of the Śaṅgam literature to Tamil as it is now written is perhaps similar to that of *Piers Plowman* to modern English. The tradition of Tamil poetry at the time of the composition of these works must already have been a long one, for the poetic conventions finally fixed in the *Tolkāppiyam* had almost reached their finished form even in the earliest poems of the Anthologies. But their style is much nearer that of folk literature than is that of courtly Sanskrit verse. The life of the peasant and the scenes of the countryside, the bustle of the towns and the ruthlessness of war, are here depicted as though from direct experience, and with no formal unrealistic idealization.

Together the "Eight Anthologies"* make up a very large body of poetic literature, and contain well over 2,000 poems, ascribed to more than 200 authors. To them must be added "The Ten Songs" (*Patuppāṭṭu*), containing ten longer poems of similar style but somewhat later date. Until the end of the last century this great collection was

* *Narīṇai*: 400 short poems on love, each of from nine to twelve lines; *Kuruntogai*, 400 love poems of from four to eight lines each; *Aingurunūru*, 500 short erotic poems; *Padīrūppaṭṭu*, a short collection of eight (originally ten) poems, each of ten verses, in praise of the king of the Cēra country (Malabār); *Paripādal*, twenty-four (originally seventy) poems in praise of gods; *Kalittogai*, 150 love poems; *Aganānūru*, 400 love-lyrics of varying length; and *Puraṇānūru*, 400 poems in praise of kings.

almost forgotten, even by the Tamils themselves; only within the last fifty years have the rare manuscripts containing it been edited and given to the world. Much is still untranslated, and the full and thorough study of the Śaṅgam literature from the critical and historical point of view has yet to be made.

Very early the Tamils developed the passion for classification which is noticeable in many aspects of ancient Indian learning. Poetry was divided into two main groups: "internal" (*agam*), dealing with love, and "external" (*puṛam*), dealing with the praise of kings. A further division was made according to the region of the Tamil Land to which the poem referred or was most appropriate. Conventionally there were five regions (*tiṇai*): the hills (*kuriṇṇi*), the dry lands (*pālai*), the jungle and woodland (*mullai*), the cultivated plains (*marudam*), and the coast (*neydal*). Each was connected with some special aspect of love or war; thus the hills were the scene of poems on pre-nuptial love and cattle-raiding; the dry lands, of the long separation of lovers, and of the laying waste of the countryside; the jungle, of the brief parting of lovers, and of raiding expeditions; the valleys, of post-nuptial love or the wiles of courtezans, and of siege; and the seacoast, of the parting of fishermen's wives from their lords, and of pitched battle. To each region were attributed its own appropriate flowers, animals and people. Every poem of the "Eight Anthologies" was classified in one of the five sections, but much of the poetry was written with little regard for this formal classification.

A unique feature of Tamil poetry is the initial rhyme or assonance. This does not appear in the earliest Tamil literature, but by the end of the Śaṅgam period it was quite regular. The first syllable, or syllables, of each couplet must rhyme. Thus:

ISAIYĀD' eṇiṇum iyarrior ārrāl
AŚAIYĀDu nīrpadām āṇmai; isaiyuṅgal
KANDARirai alaikkūṇ kāṇal an taṇ śērppa
PENḌIRum vālārō marru."

"Though you fail, to work and struggle,
 unwaveringly steadfast—this is manliness.

Lord of the cool and lovely shore, where the waves shake the thorny
 groves!

Will not even women flourish in prosperity?"⁵⁰

This initial assonance, in some poems continued through four or more lines, is never to be found in the poetry of Sanskritic languages, or as far as we know, in that of any other language. Its effect, a little strange at first, rapidly becomes pleasant to the reader, and to the Tamil is as enjoyable as the end rhyme of European poetry.

We give a brief anthology of short poems and extracts from this wonderful literature.*

Here a mother tells of her son, who has gone to war.

“If you lean against the pillar of my little home
and ask the whereabouts of my son,
I reply, ‘I cannot tell you’.
Behold, like a tiger’s cavern of rock,
the womb that bore him!
You will find him on the field of war.”⁵²

The three following poems are attributed to the poetess Avvaiyār.

“It charms not like the harp,
it accords not with the time-beat,
it conveys no meaning,
but the prattling of a son
brings bliss to his father.
So, O King Neḍumāṇ Añji,
through the grace of your favour
my empty words are imbued with meaning.
O King, you have overcome the enemy’s forts,
though unscaleable were their walls.”⁵³

“To allow the little children of the village
to wash clean its white tusks,
the huge elephant will lie on the river bank.
O great King, you favour me like that!
But to approach an elephant in rut is death,
and you are death to your foes, O King!”⁵⁴

Here Avvaiyār compares the wealth of the luxurious king of Toṇḍai (Kāñcī) with that of her own warlike chief.

“Bedecked with peacock-feathers, garlanded with flowers,
fine are the Toṇḍai spears in the spacious armoury,
with their strong shafts, and sharp points bright with ghee.
The weapons of my king are blunt with fighting,
broken their points through parrying the thrusts of the foe.
The swordsmith’s forge is busy with repairs.
My king, when rich, freely gives food away,
when poor he messes with his men.
He is the head of the family of the poor,
yet great is he, with his sharp-pointed spear.”⁵⁵

* The first ten extracts are the work of Mr J. R. Marr, to whom we are much indebted for permission to use them. The other translations are our own, some made with the help of the many literal translations of Prof. P. T. S. Iyengar.⁵¹

"O bee, fair of wing, ever in search of flower-garlands,
tell me not what I fain would hear, but what you really saw!
Among all the flowers you know is any more fragrant
than the tresses of my lady of the close-set teeth?
Graceful as the peacock she dwells, rich in love, with me!"⁵⁶

"Ever anew aches my heart!
Again and again I brush off the burning tears.
My love, once peaceful at my side, grows restless.
My heart aches!"⁵⁷

"In the gathering night
hushed of speech all men sweetly sleep.
Devoid of wrath,
countless people in the world are resting.
I alone sleep not!"⁵⁸

Here a mother asks an ascetic the whereabouts of her daughter,
who has eloped with her lover. The sage offers her this consolation:

"Save to the wearer of its scent,
of what use is the sandalwood tree,
even to the mountains amid which it was born?
If you ponder the matter, it is so with your daughter.

"Except to the wearer of it
of what avail is the highly prized white pearl,
even to the sea in which it was reared?
If you ponder the matter, it is so with your daughter."⁵⁹

Here a girl speaks to her playmate:

"What bright bracelets you have! Do listen!
As I was playing in the road
he kicked over my mud castle with his foot,
and snatched the garland from my head,
and ran away with my striped ball.
How he teased me, the naughty boy!

"Another day my mother and I
were together, when a voice called out:
'Whoever's at home, please give me some water!'
Mother said to me: 'My dear,
fill the gilded vessel, and give him water to drink!'
I went out, not knowing who it was.
He caught my wrist, with the bangles on, and squeezed it,
and I was frightened, and cried out:

'Mother, just look what he's done!'
 She was very upset, and hurried down,
 but I told her he'd hiccups because of the water.
 He looked at me as if he could kill me,
 but then the rogue made friends with a smile."⁶⁰

Here a newly married girl makes her first attempts at cooking:

"Her fingers, slender as the *kāndaḥ* blossom, had been squeezing the new curds.

Her clothes had not been washed since she wiped her fingers on them.
 The appetizing steam had got into her lily-like eyes.

Yet, as she rubbed them, he just said, 'The curry you've cooked is delicious.'

He of the bright brow was most pleased with what he was eating."⁶¹

Striking touches of natural description often illumine the rather monotonous panegyrics:

"Though the milk turn sour, though day turn to night,
 though the path of the Vedas lead men astray,
 may you stand unshaken, long famed, with loyal
 supporters, that, in the foothills of the mountains,
 the large-eyed mother doe with her small-headed fawn
 may sleep secure at evening by the flame of the three fires
 of hermits who perform hard penances."⁶²

.

"Unfailing in the hard tasks of war,
 O king, like death, for whom there is no cure,
 though the earth be moved from her place, your name is eternal—
 you, whose legs wear golden anklets, whose broad breast
 is spread with drying sandal-paste!
 In an uninhabited land, a land of bitter hardship,
 a land without water, a land of long tracks,
 your valiant warriors fight, unerring in their archery,
 gazing afar, with their hands hung over their eyes.
 There, in the silk-cotton tree, where roads diverge,
 the eagle, with trim feathers and crooked beak,
 wails over the new cairns of those who have shot their arrows."⁶³

Here a girl consoles her lovelorn friend:

" 'The toiling fishermen catch the shoals
 in their close-meshed nets, and the soft-headed prawn,
 thin as the cassia bud in the forest.

" 'Like hunters who chase the deer in the woods
 young fishermen chase in the waste of the waters
 the saw-toothed shark, and return with meat.

“ ‘They return to the shore and unload on the sand,
where the wind plays wild across the salt pans,
and soon the street of the fishing village
will ring with the wheels of your lover’s chariot.’ ”⁶⁴

A young man praises his sweetheart’s cookery:

“ ‘At every post before the house
is tied the gentle calf of a crooked-horned buffalo.
There dwells my sweetheart, curving and lovely,
languid of gaze, with big round earrings,
and little rings on her tiny fingers.

“ ‘She has cut the leaves of the garden plantain
and split them in pieces down the stalk
to serve as platters for the meal.
Her eyes are filled with the smoke of cooking.
Her brow, as fair as the crescent moon,
is covered now with drops of sweat.
She wipes it away with the hem of her garment
and stands in the kitchen, and thinks of me.

“ ‘Come in then, if you want a good meal!
You’ll see her smile and show her tiny
sharp teeth, whom I long to kiss.’ ”⁶⁵

A village festival:

“The farmers who harvest rice in the hot sun
now leap into the waves of the clear sea.
The sailors, captains of stout craft,
drink strong liquor and dance for joy,
as they clasp the bright-bangled hands of women
who wear garlands of clustering *punnai*. . . .

“In the cool woods, where the bees seek flowers,
women, bright-bangled and garlanded, drink
the juice of the palm and the pale sugar-cane,
and the juice of the coconut which grows in the sand,
then running they plunge into the sea.”⁶⁶

A poignant description of famine:

“The hearth has forgotten cooking :
It is overgrown with moss and mould.
The woman, thin with hunger,
has breasts like wrinkled bladders.
Their nipples are quite dry,
but the child chews them, weeping.
She looks down at his face
and tears hang on her lashes.”⁶⁷

Our final quotation from the "Eight Anthologies" is the plaint of a neglected wife:

"My garment smells of ghee and frying curry,
and is stained with dirt and lampblack.

"My shoulders stink with the sweat of the child
whom I carry upon them and feed at my breast.

"I cannot face my lord, who, in gay attire,
rides in his car to the street of the harlots."⁶⁸

The next stratum of Tamil literature shows much greater Āryan influence. Āryan religious ideas and practices, not unknown even in the Eight Anthologies, had by now been thoroughly grafted on to the original Tamil heritage, and Jaina influence is prominent. "The Eighteen Minor Works" (*Padīṇṅkilkanakku*) are largely gnomic and moralizing in character, the two most famous being the *Tiruk-kural*, and the *Nālaḍiṻār*. The former, sometimes called the "Bible of the Tamil Land" is a series of brief metrical proverbs on many aspects of life and religion, and we have already quoted some of its aphorisms (p. 339). We add a few others of a more secular type.

"Vain is the kingdom where are all good things
but no love between ruler and ruled."

"Even the hermit ceases his penance
if the husbandman folds his arms."

"Earth laughs in scorn
at those who plead poverty."

"No food is sweeter than rice-gruel,
when you have worked for it."

"Wide as the sea is the joy of love,
but wider still the sorrow of parting."

"Love is stronger than wine,
for the very thought of it intoxicates."

"Sweethearts delight in a lover's quarrel
for the greater delight of making it up."⁶⁹

Nālaḍiṻār is more formal and literary in style, and contains verses of much merit and high ethical content.

- “Better hatred than the friendship of fools.
 Better death than chronic illness.
 Better to be killed than soul-destroying contempt.
 Better abuse than praise undeserved.”
-
- “True housekeeping is to eat a meal
 sharing, as far as may be, with friend and foe alike.
 The useless men who eat their food alone
 will never pass the gate of heaven.”
-
- “Though you feed him with care from a golden dish
 a dog will always prefer carrion.
 Though you deal with the base as you would with the good
 their deeds will always show them up.”
-
- “Hillmen remember their lovely hills.
 Farmers remember their fertile fields.
 The good remember another’s kindness.
 The base recall only fancied slights.”
-
- “As a scroll read by one who well understands it,
 as wealth to the man of generous spirit,
 as a sharp sword in a warrior’s hand,
 is the beauty of a faithful wife.”
-
- “To those who once embraced their lovers
 whose broad chests were hung with garlands,
 when their loved ones are away
 the thunder sounds like a funeral drum.” 70

By the 6th century Āryan influence had penetrated the whole of the Tamil land, and her kings and chiefs worshipped and supported the gods of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. The indigenous style of poetry was rapidly altering under the influence of Sanskrit, and Tamil poets took to writing long poems which they called by the Sanskrit name *kāvya*. The earliest and greatest of these is “The Jewelled Anklet” (*Śilappadigāram*), which is still very different from Sanskrit poetry. Though written for an educated audience and in faultless literary style it is near to the life of the people; it is by comparison realistic, dealing with the lives of two ordinary folk enmeshed in unhappy circumstance, and, unlike the Sanskrit courtly “epic”, it sounds a note of true tragedy.

The traditional author of the poem was Ilaṅgōvaḍigaḷ, a grandson of the great Cōḷa king Karikāḷaṅ, who lived in the 1st or 2nd century A.D. The tradition is certainly false, and the poem is several

centuries later. Its author, whoever he was, though a great poet, was not a great storyteller. His tale was well known to his hearers, and he could afford to be irritatingly allusive and terse in important narrative passages, and linger lovingly over interesting description. He successfully drew together all the themes of earlier Tamil poets and welded them into a whole, in the framework of the story of the luckless Kōvalaṇ and Kaṇṇagi. Rightly this poem and Kambaṇ's *Rāmāyaṇam* are looked on as the national Epics of the Tamil people. We give an outline of the story, with a translation, considerably abridged, of its climax, which has a grimly baroque force and splendour, unparalleled elsewhere in Indian literature. It is imbued with both the ferocity of the early Tamils and their stern respect for justice, and, incidentally, throws much light on the character of early Tamil kingship.

Kōvalaṇ, the son of a wealthy merchant of the city of Pugār or Kāviri-pattinam, married Kaṇṇagi, the lovely daughter of another merchant. For some time they lived together happily, until, at a festival at the royal court, Kōvalaṇ met the dancer Mādavi, and fell in love with her. He bought her favours and in his infatuation forgot Kaṇṇagi and his home. Gradually he spent all his wealth on the dancer, even to Kaṇṇagi's jewels. At last he was penniless, and returned repentantly to his uncomplaining wife. Their only fortune was a precious pair of anklets, which she gave to him willingly. With these as their capital they decided to go to the great city of Madurai, where Kōvalaṇ hoped to recoup his fortunes by trade.

On their arrival at Madurai they found shelter in a cottage, and Kōvalaṇ went to the market, to sell one of Kaṇṇagi's anklets. But the queen of Neduñjeliyaṇ, king of the Pāṇdyas, had just been robbed of a similar anklet by a wicked court jeweller. The jeweller happened to see Kōvalaṇ with Kaṇṇagi's anklet, and immediately seized it and informed the King. Guards were sent to apprehend Kōvalaṇ, who was cut down immediately, without trial. When the news was brought to Kaṇṇagi she fainted away; but she quickly recovered and, with her eyes ablaze with anger, she went out into the town, carrying the remaining anklet in her hand as proof of her husband's innocence.

“Chaste women of Madurai, listen to me!

Today my sorrows cannot be matched.

Things which should never have happened have befallen me.

How can I bear this injustice?’ . . .

“All the folk of the rich city of Madurai

saw her, and were moved by her grief and affliction.

In wonder and sorrow they cried:

‘Wrong that cannot be undone has been done to this lady!

- ““Our King’s straight sceptre is bent!
What can this mean?
Lost is the glory of the King Over Kings,
the Lord of the Umbrella and Spear! . . .
- ““A new and a mighty goddess
has come before us,
In her hand a golden anklet!
What can this mean?
- ““This woman afflicted and weeping
from her lovely dark-stained eyes
is as though filled with godhead!
What can this mean?’
- “Thus, raising loud accusing voices,
the people of Madurai befriended and comforted her,
and among the tumultuous throng
some showed her her husband’s body.
- “She, the golden vine, beheld him,
but her he could not see. . . .
- “Then the red-rayed sun folded his fiery arms
and hid behind the great mountain,
and the wide world
was veiled in darkness.
- “In the brief twilight
Kannagi cried aloud
and the whole city
echoed her wailing.
- “In the morning she had taken the wreath from his neck
and decked her hair with its flowers;
in the evening she saw him lying
in a pool of his own blood.
- “But he saw not the agony of her grief
as she mourned in sorrow and wrath. . . .
- ““Are there women here? Are there women
who could bear such wrong
done to their wedded lords?
Are there women here? Are there such women?

“‘Are there good men here? Are there good men
who cherish their children
and guard them with care?
Are there men here? Are there such men?’

“‘Is there a god here? Is there a god
in this city of Madurai, where the sword of a king
has slain an innocent man?
Is there a god here? Is there a god?’

“‘Lamenting thus she clasped her husband’s breast,
and it seemed that he rose to his feet and said,
‘The full-moon of your face has faded,’
and he stroked her face with his hands.

“‘She fell to the ground, sobbing and crying,
and clasped her lord’s feet with her bangled hands;
and he left behind his human form
and went, surrounded by the gods.

“‘And, as he went, he said,
‘My darling, you must stay!’
‘Surely this
was a vision,’ she cried.

“‘I will not join my lord
till my great wrath is appeased!
I will see the cruel King,
and ask for his explanation!’

“‘And she stood on her feet,
her large eyes full of tears,
and, wiping her eyes,
she went to the gate of the palace.

“‘I saw, alas, I saw in a dream
the sceptre fall and the royal umbrella.
The bell at the palace gate rang of itself,
while the whole heaven shook in confusion!

“‘A darkness swallowed the sun,
a rainbow glowed in the night,
and a burning meteor
crashed to the earth by day.’

“‘Thus spoke the Queen,
and took her maids and her bodyguard,
and went to the King on the lion-throne,
and told him her evil dream.

a



Marriage Feast, with Monkey-musicians

b



Cup with Floral Design

GRECO-BACTRIAN SILVER CUPS. 3RD-2ND CENTURY B.C.

a



Buddhist Relic-casket. Gold Repoussé, set with Rubies.
Bīmārān, Afghānistān. c. 2nd century A.D.

*Museum of Pompeii
& Herculaneum*

Musée Guimet, Paris

b



Indian Ivory Statuette,
found at Herculaneum.
1st century A.D.

c



Ivory Plaque. Bēgrām, Afghānistān.
2nd century A.D.

“Then came a cry from the gate:
 ‘Ho, Gatekeeper! Ho, Gatekeeper!!
 Ho, Gatekeeper of the King who has lost wisdom,
 whose evil heart has swerved from justice!!

“‘Tell the King that a woman with an anklet,
 an anklet from a pair of tinkling anklets,
 a woman who has lost her husband,
 is waiting at the gate.’”

“And the gatekeeper went to the King and said:
 ‘A woman waits at the gate.
 She is not Korravai, goddess of victory,
 with triumphant spear in her hand. . . .

“‘Filled with anger, boiling with rage,
 a woman who has lost her husband,
 an anklet of gold in her hand,
 is waiting at the gate.’”

Kaṇṇagi was then admitted to the King’s presence.

“‘Cruel King, this I must say. . . .

“‘My lord Kōvalaṇ came
 to Madurai to earn wealth,
 and today you have slain him
 as he sold my anklet.’

“‘Lady,’ said the King,
 ‘it is kingly justice
 to put to death
 an arrant thief.’”

Then Kaṇṇagi showed her anklet to the King. On comparing it very carefully with the remaining anklet of the pair belonging to the Queen, he realized that Kōvalaṇ had been innocent.

“When he saw it the parasol fell from his head
 and the sceptre trembled in his hand.
 “‘I am no king,’ he said,
 ‘who have heeded the words of the goldsmith.

“‘I am the thief. For the first time
 I have failed to protect my people.
 Now may I die!’
 [And he fell to the ground, dead.]

Then Kannagi said to the Queen:

“‘If I have always been true to my husband
I will not suffer this city to flourish,
but I will destroy it as the King is destroyed!
Soon you will see that my words are true!’

“And with these words she left the palace,
and cried out through the city, ‘Men and women
of great Madurai of the four temples,
listen! Listen you gods in heaven!

“‘Listen to me, you holy sages!
I curse the capital of the King
who so cruelly wronged
my beloved lord!’

“With her own hand she tore the left breast from her body.
Thrice she surveyed the city of Madurai,
calling her curse in bitter agony.
Then she flung her fair breast on the scented street. . . .

“And the burning mouth of the Fire-god opened
as the gods who guarded the city closed their doors. . . .

“The high priest, the astrologer and the judges,
the treasurer and the learned councillors,
the palace servants and the maids,
stood silent and still as painted pictures.

“The elephant-riders and horsemen,
the charioteers and the foot-soldiers
with their terrible swords, all fled from the fire
which raged at the gate of the royal palace. . . .

“And the street of the sellers of grain,
the street of the chariots, with its bright-coloured garlands,
and the four quarters of the four classes
were filled with confusion and flamed like a forest on fire. . . .

“In the street of the singing girls
where so often the tabor had sounded
with the sweet gentle flute and the tremulous harp . . .
the dancers, whose halls were destroyed, cried out:

“‘Whence comes this woman? Whose daughter is she?
A single woman, who has lost her husband,
has conquered the evil King with her anklet,
and has destroyed our city with fire!’” 71

At last the patron goddess of the city interceded with Kaṇṇagi, and she agreed to withdraw her curse, and the fire abated. Weak with loss of blood from her self-amputated breast, Kaṇṇagi struggled to a hill outside the city, where, after a few days, she died, and was reunited with Kōvalaṇ in heaven. Meanwhile the news of her death spread throughout the Tamil Land. She was deified, and temples raised and festivals held in her honour, and she became the patron goddess of wifely loyalty and chastity.

A little later than "The Jewelled Anklet" was composed its sequel *Maṇimēgalai*, attributed to the poet Śāttaṇ of Madurai. Though by tradition it is the earlier of the two all other evidence suggests the opposite, for it assumes the reader's knowledge of "The Jewelled Anklet", to which it is a sort of Buddhistic supplement. "The Jewelled Anklet", though containing many religious and moral lessons, was primarily written to tell a story, while in *Maṇimēgalai* the story is a mere framework for philosophical polemic, and the atmosphere of the narrative passages has some of the other-worldly formality of the courtly Sanskrit kāvya. The heroine, Maṇimēgalai, is the daughter of Kōvalaṇ, the hero of "The Jewelled Anklet", by the dancer Mādavi, who became a Buddhist nun on hearing of her former lover's death. The story tells of the love of Prince Udayakumāraṇ for Maṇimēgalai, and the miraculous preservation of her chastity. In the end she becomes a Buddhist nun like her mother, and most of the poem is taken up with her discussions with members of various sects, both Hindu and heterodox, and her triumphant refutation of their doctrines.

A third Tamil "epic", *Śivaga-sindāmaṇi*, describes the exploits of the hero Śivaga or Jivaka, a superman who excels in every art from archery to the curing of snake-bite, and who wins a new bride for his harem with every feat, only to become a Jaina monk after his many triumphs. The author was a Jaina, Tiruttakkadēvar. His work is fantastic and lacking in any contact with real life; its style is elegant and ornate, and much influenced by courtly Sanskrit. It is definitely later than the other two "epics".

By now Tamil poets were not satisfied with their own traditions, and translations and adaptations of many Northern works were made, the most notable of which is Kambaṇ's *Rāmāyaṇam*, composed in the 9th century. This great poem is still known and loved in the Tamil Land, and is by no means a mere translation of the original, for Kambaṇ adapts themes as he thinks fit, and here and there adds episodes of his own. It is noteworthy that in Kambaṇ's hands the demon Rāvaṇa frequently takes on the proportions of a heroic figure, and contrasts favourably with the rather weak and unimpressive Rāma. Like Milton, Kambaṇ was of the devil's party without knowing

it. The real glory of medieval Tamil literature, however, is undoubtedly the hymns of the Śaivite and Vaiṣṇavite devotional teachers, which are among the great religious literature of the world, and which we have discussed and quoted in another connexion (p. 330ff). Other than these, later Tamil literature produced little of the first order. The canon of the Tamil Śaivites contains work of merit (p. 334), but the adaptations of the Purāṇas and the lengthy commentaries on earlier literature, though not unimportant, need not be discussed here.*

The early literatures of Canarese, Telugu and Malayālam, which had begun to be written before the end of our period, are less important than that of Tamil, and need not detain us. They originated at a time when Āryan influence was already thoroughly entrenched, and, though containing many beauties, lack the originality of early Tamil poetry. Thus they cannot aspire to the importance of Tamil, which can claim one of the longest unbroken literary traditions of any of the world's living languages.

Folk Poetry †

The literatures which we have been discussing were all the work of literary schools with formal conventions and long traditions. Some poetry, obviously, is less formalized than that of classical Sanskrit, and here and there, notably in the verses of the Tamil anthologies and the Prākṛit *Saptaśataka*, we seem to catch echoes of folk-song and popular oral literature. No Indian writer, however, as far as we know, thought fit to record the folk-song of ancient India, which, if we are to judge by modern analogy, must have been plentiful and of high quality. But a few verses have been preserved in Chinese translation, which may well be the words of genuine folk-songs of pre-Gupta times.

That part of the Buddhist canon called *Samyutta Nikāya* (p. 267) was first translated into Chinese about A.D. 440, from a manuscript acquired in Ceylon by Fa-hsien in 411. At the end of the book occurs a section which is not to be found in the Pāli version as it exists at

* Perhaps the greatest literary figure in later Tamil was Vīramāmuṇivar (1680-1747), a pseudonym of Father Costanzio Beschi, an Italian Jesuit who taught for thirty-six years in the Tamil country. Like many early Christian missionaries, he lived in wholly Indian fashion and attained a complete mastery of the Tamil language and literary conventions. It is doubtful if any European before or since has gained so profound a knowledge of an Indian language. Beschi's long poem *Tēmbāvaṇi* tells stories from the Old and New Testaments in ornately beautiful Tamil. His style and the treatment of his themes were altogether in keeping with tradition, but the influence of Tasso has been traced in his work.

† The material for this section, together with the translations of the Chinese verses, has been provided by Dr Arthur Waley. We are much indebted to him for the honour of being permitted to publish them here for the first time.

present, but which must have been included in Fa-hsien's manuscript. Probably the verses here quoted were sung in India between the time of the codification of the Pāli canon in the 1st century B.C. (p. 266) and the beginning of the 5th century A.D.

The passage in question describes a monk, who hears the singing of various secular songs, and converts them to Buddhist purposes by comparatively slight alterations. Thus the first verse quoted is capped by the monk with a pious wish that he may gently flow to Nirvāṇa, and so on.

The song of a lady who got on badly with her "in-laws":

"O river Ganges, all I now want
is to go with your waters that flow gently to the sea;
that never again by my father- and mother-in-law
I may at every turn be scolded and abused."

The song of a melon-thief:

"Bright moon, I beg you not to come out.
Wait where you are till I have cut these melons.
But when I have got my melons safely away,
then come out or not, just as you please."

The song of a poor man:

"So long as I own just one pig,
and a single jar full of good wine,
one cup to pour the wine into,
and someone to fill my cup again and again—
so long as I own just as much as that,
there is nothing else that bothers me at all."

The song of a girl who, going to a tryst with her lover on a rainy night, slips and falls in the mud:

"The hair of my head is all loose and astray;
my lovely necklace has fallen in the deep mud.
My rings and bracelets are all broken and spoiled;
when I come to my lover, what shall I give him to wear?"

The song of a lover, picnicking with his mistress:

"With thoughts of love, all for our ease and pleasure,
we loiter under the shade of the green trees.
The running stream flows swift and clear,
the sound of my zither is very tuneful and sweet.
The spring weather is just right for our jaunt;
what happiness could there be greater than ours?"

Advice to a dove:

“Dove, my bird, you must lay up your stores—
sesamum-seed, rice, millet and the rest—
and take them to a tree on the very top of the hill,
and make yourself a nest-cavern high and bright.
Then when Heaven sends the rainy season
you will be sure of lodging, food and drink.”

X

EPILOGUE: THE HERITAGE OF INDIA

THE IMPACT OF THE WEST

INDIA'S ancient culture did not perish before the onslaughts of the Muslims, as did that of Persia. Under the rule of some of the Delhi sultans of the Middle Ages there was persecution, and we read of temples being razed to the ground and brāhmaṇs put to death for practising their devotions in public; but in general the Muslims were reasonably tolerant, and at all times Hindu chiefs continued to rule in outlying parts of India, paying tribute to their Muslim overlords. Conversions to Islām were numerous, though only in a few regions were the majority of Indians persuaded to embrace the new faith. Hindu and Muslim lived side by side and, after a few centuries, the Hindus in those parts of India dominated by Muslims often accepted the situation as normal. In such conditions mutual influence was inevitable. Hindus began to learn Persian, the official language of their Muslim rulers, and Persian words found their way into the vernaculars. Well-to-do Hindu families often adopted the system of "strict parda" from the Muslims, and made their womenfolk veil their faces in public. The surviving Hindu kings borrowed new military techniques from the Muslims, learnt to employ cavalry with greater effect, and to use heavier armour and new types of weapon. One great religious teacher of medieval India, Kabīr (1440-1518), a poor weaver of Banāras, taught the brotherhood of Hindu and Muslim alike in the fatherhood of God, and opposed idolatry and caste practices, declaring that God was equally to be found in temple and mosque. Later, Nānak (1469-1539), a teacher of the Panjāb, taught the same doctrine with even greater force, and founded a new faith, that of the Sikhs, designed to incorporate all that was best of both Hinduism and Islām.

Nevertheless the Muslim invasions, and the enforced contact with new ideas, did not have the fertilizing effect upon Hindu culture which might have been expected. Hinduism was already very conservative when the lieutenants of Muhammad of Ghor conquered the Ganges Valley. In the Middle Ages, for every tolerant and progressive teacher there must have been hundreds of orthodox brāhmaṇs, who looked upon themselves as the preservers of the immemorial Āryan Dharma against the barbarians who overran the holy

land of Bhāratavarṣa. Under their influence the complex rules of the Hindu way of life became if anything stricter and more rigidly applied.

In the 16th and 17th centuries the Mughal emperors unified practically the whole of North India and much of the Deccan, and built up an empire such as had not been seen since the days of the Guptas. The Mughal period was one of great splendour, which has left its mark on India in the form of many lovely buildings, wherein Islāmic and Hindu motifs often blended in a perfect unity. The Tāj Mahal at Āgrā, the Mughal capital, is of course the most famous memorial of the times. Akbar (1555–1606), the contemporary of Queen Elizabeth I and the first of the four great Mughal emperors, fully realized that the Empire could only stand on a basis of complete toleration. All religious tests and disabilities were abolished, including the hated poll-tax on unbelievers. Rājput princes and other Hindus were given high offices of state, without conversion to Islām, and inter-communal marriages were encouraged by the example of the Emperor himself. If the policy of the greatest of India's Muslim rulers had been continued by his successors, her history might have been very different.

The great-grandson of Akbar, Aurangzeb (1659–1707), reversed the policy of toleration. Restrictions were placed on the free practice of Hindu rites and preferment at court was confined to orthodox Muslims; later the tax on non-Muslims was reimposed. After nearly a century of equality this was bitterly resented by many Hindus, especially by the chiefs, many of whom had loyally served the earlier Mughals. The main resistance came from the Western Deccan where, around Poona, the Marāthā chief Śivājī (1627–1680) laid the foundations of a new Hindu empire. At about the same time the Sikhs of the Panjāb, incensed at the new policy and the persecution of their leaders, reformed their faith, and were welded into a closely-knit martial brotherhood. When the aged Aurangzeb died the Mughal empire was virtually at an end.

Politically the 18th century was one of Hindu revival. Though the Marāthā successors of Śivājī could not build up a large, closely-knit empire their horsemen ranged far and wide over India, levying tribute from local chiefs, Hindu and Muslim alike. In the Panjāb towards the end of the century the Sikhs built an important kingdom, and almost everywhere Islām was on the defensive. But there was still no real cultural revival in Hinduism. Śivājī, a brilliant leader, a just ruler, and a statesman of consummate craft, was conservative in his outlook, and appeared to his contemporaries rather as a restorer of the old than as a builder of the new. Unlike Akbar, he had no fresh vision of a state transcending religious differences, though he learnt

much from the Mughals in statecraft and military science and respected the faith of his adversaries. The Marāthās did not encourage reforms in Hindu society, and the India of the 18th century was if anything more conservative than it had been in the days of the first Muslim invasions.

It was through the influence of Europe that revival came. Early in the 16th century the Portuguese founded the first European trading stations and settlements. They were followed by Dutch, British, Danes and French, and throughout the 17th century the number of European "factories" increased. In the 18th century, with the break-up of the Mughal empire, the Europeans began to take greater interest in local politics, and by the early 19th century the British East India Company had virtually pushed out its rivals and dominated most of the sub-continent. The comparative ease with which the British established their supremacy is a measure of the political decadence of India at the time. By the middle of the 19th century the whole of India was either directly ruled by Britain, or governed indirectly through petty princes with local autonomy. A new conqueror had come, a conqueror far more alien to the Hindu than the Muslims had been, with an aggressive culture and immense technical superiority.

Hindu society reacted at first to the British rulers as it had done to the Muslims, tending to withdraw itself even more into the closed circle of its ancient traditions, and there was no realization of a fundamental break with the past. From the orthodox point of view the British rulers of India constituted a caste, low in the social scale, which had succeeded in gaining political power. This caste had its own rules and customs which were not those of the Āryan, and should therefore not be imitated. The British readily accepted this position, and, after the 18th century, made few attempts at social contact. Any real friendship between Englishman and Indian became more and more difficult as the century progressed—in fact the Englishman in India unconsciously tended to adopt the ideas of social stratification of the Indians whom he ruled, and to look upon his own people as members of a class so exalted above the Indians that any close association with them was taboo. This attitude was strengthened by the Mutiny of 1857.

Nevertheless the presence of Europeans could not but have its effect. Except in certain parts of South India missionary activity in the 18th century was insignificant; but early in the 19th century the British evangelical conscience awakened to India, and missions and mission schools sprang up in all the larger towns. Meanwhile the Company felt a growing need for subordinate officers and clerks trained in English. Just as, in Muslim times, the Hindu desirous of

government employment was compelled to learn Persian, so now he had to learn English. Middle class Hindu fathers began to send their sons to European schools, despite the dangers of ritual impurity, and Western ideas began to affect the well-to-do educated Indian.

The Portuguese had succeeded in "westernizing" many of their Indian and Sinhalese subjects, and to this day Indian blood flows in the veins of some old Portuguese families; a few Indians in the service of France came to understand and admire the culture of their conquerors; but perhaps the first Indian to learn enough from the West to be able to hold his own with the best minds of Europe, and yet still to love and respect his own culture, was the Bengālī Rām Mohan Roy, the friend of Jeremy Bentham. Rām Mohan Roy, who was born in 1772 and died in England in 1833, advocated the frank acceptance of all that Europe had to teach, and the sect which looked to him for inspiration, the Brāhma Samāj, was in many ways closer to Christianity than to Hinduism. Never large in numbers, its influence was widespread.

From the days of Rām Mohan Roy young Indians, at first very few, but soon in greater numbers, began to come to England for education. The little band of Hindus educated on western lines, first in Bengal and then in other parts of India, tended to go further in the rejection of their own culture than their descendants; they were fully conscious of the degeneracy which beset their land, and many seem to have been rather ashamed of their Hindu background. The Mutiny, which was fundamentally reactionary, found no support among the tiny westernized intelligentsia. The Universities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, founded in 1857, the year of the Mutiny, at first paid scant attention to the ancient culture of India, but taught a predominantly Western curriculum through Western staff.

By the end of the 19th century, however, the situation had changed. A new generation began to realize that Hindu culture had much of permanent value, and that the slavish imitation of the West could not solve India's problems. New organizations gave expression to this outlook. The Ārya Samāj claimed to reform Hinduism by purging it of all later degenerate features and by a return to the Vedas, very liberally interpreted, and had considerable success. The Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, became the mouthpiece of Indian public opinion. Newspapers in English and the vernaculars multiplied.

Not only was Hindu culture largely rehabilitated in the eyes of intelligent Hindus, but it even began to make counter-propaganda. A few learned Europeans and Americans had long recognized the nobility of much ancient Indian religious thought. Now, through the

Theosophical Society (which, despite its claim to represent the quintessence of all religions, propagates a modernized Hinduism) and the Rāmākṛishṇa Mission, the voice of Hinduism was heard in the West. Swāmī Vivekānanda (1862–1902), a splendid speaker of great spiritual power and personal magnetism, preached Hinduism to large audiences in Europe and America and found willing hearers. Here and there Indians abjured the West root and branch, and fanatically defended even those aspects of Hinduism which had completely outlived their usefulness; but, despite these reactionaries, the new Hinduism was very different from the old.

Rām Mohan Roy had sounded the theme with his passionate advocacy of social reform; Vivekānanda repeated it with a more nationalist timbre, when he declared that the highest form of service of the Great Mother was social service. Other great Indians, chief of whom was Mahātmā Gāndhī, developed the theme of social service as a religious duty, and the development continues under Gāndhī's successors.

Mahātmā Gāndhī was looked on by many, both Indian and European, as the epitome of Hindu tradition, but this is a false judgement for he was much influenced by Western ideas. Gāndhī believed in the fundamentals of his ancient culture, but his passionate love of the underdog and his antipathy to caste, though not unprecedented in ancient India, were unorthodox in the extreme, and owed more to European 19th-century liberalism than to anything Indian. His faith in non-violence was, as we have seen, by no means typical of Hinduism—his predecessor in revolt, the able Marāṭhā brāhmaṇ B. G. Tilak, and Gāndhī's impatient lieutenant Subhās Chandra Bose, were far more orthodox in this respect. For Gāndhī's pacifism we must look to the Sermon on the Mount and to Tolstoy. His championing of women's rights is also the result of Western influence. In his social context he was always rather an innovator than a conservative. Though some of his colleagues thought his programme of limited social reform too slow, he succeeded in shifting the whole emphasis of Hindu thought towards a popular and equalitarian social order, in place of the hierarchy of class and caste. Following up the work of many less well-known 19th-century reformers Gāndhī and his followers of the Indian National Congress have given new orientation and new life to Hindu culture, after centuries of stagnation.

Today there are few Indians, whatever their creed, who do not look back with pride on their ancient culture, and there are few intelligent Indians who are not willing to sacrifice some of its effete elements that India may develop and progress. Politically and

economically India faces many problems of great difficulty, and no one can forecast her future with any certainty. But it is safe to predict that, whatever that future may be, the Indians of coming generations will not be unconvincing and self-conscious copies of Europeans, but will be men rooted in their own traditions, and aware of the continuity of their culture. Already, after only seven years of independence, the extremes of national self-denigration and fanatical cultural chauvinism are disappearing. We believe that Hindu civilization is in the act of performing its most spectacular feat of synthesis. In the past it has received, adapted and digested elements of many different cultures—Indo-European, Mesopotamian, Iranian, Greek, Roman, Scythian, Turkish, Persian and Arab. With each new influence it has somewhat changed. Now it is well on the way to assimilating the culture of the West.

Hindu civilization will, we believe, retain its continuity. The *Bhagavad Gītā* will not cease to inspire men of action, and the Upaniṣads men of thought. The charm and graciousness of the Indian way of life will continue, however much affected it may be by the labour-saving devices of the West. People will still love the tales of the heroes of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and of the loves of Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā and Purūravas and Urvaśī. The quiet and gentle happiness which has at all times pervaded Indian life where oppression, disease and poverty have not overclouded it will surely not vanish before the more hectic ways of the West.

Much that was useless in ancient Indian culture has already perished. The extravagant and barbarous hecatombs of the Vedic age have long since been forgotten, though animal sacrifice continues in some sects. Widows have long ceased to be burnt on their husbands' pyres. Girls may not by law be married in childhood. In buses and trains all over India brāhmaṇṣ rub shoulders with the lower castes without consciousness of grave pollution, and the temples, are open to all by law. Caste is vanishing; the process began long ago, but its pace is now so rapid that the more objectionable features of caste may have disappeared within a generation or so. The old family system is adapting itself to present-day conditions. In fact the whole face of India is altering, but the cultural tradition continues, and it will never be lost.

THE WORLD'S DEBT TO INDIA

We have said much about India's debt to other cultures, but we must make it clear that she has given as much as or more than she has taken. Let us summarize the world's debt to India.

The whole of South-East Asia received most of its culture from India. Early in the 5th century B.C. colonists from Western India settled in Ceylon, which was finally converted to Buddhism in the reign of Aśoka. By this time a few Indian merchants had probably found their way to Malaya, Sumātra, and other parts of South-East Asia. Gradually they established permanent settlements, often, no doubt, marrying native women. They were followed by brāhmaṇs and Buddhist monks, and Indian influence gradually leavened the indigenous culture, until, by the 4th century A.D., Sanskrit was the official language of the region, and there arose great civilizations, capable of organizing large maritime empires, and of building such wonderful memorials to their greatness as the Buddhist stūpa of Borobodūr in Java, or the Śaivite temples of Angkor in Cambodia. Other cultural influences, from China and the Islāmic world, were felt in South-East Asia, but the primary impetus to civilization came from India.

Indian historians, proud of their country's past, often refer to this region as "Greater India", and speak of Indian "colonies". In its usual modern sense the term "colony" is hardly accurate, however. Vijaya, the legendary Āryan conqueror of Ceylon, is said to have gained the island by the sword, but beyond this we have no real evidence of any permanent Indian conquest outside the bounds of India. The Indian "colonies" were peaceful ones, and the Indianized kings of the region were indigenous chieftains who had learnt what India had to teach them.

Northwards Indian cultural influence spread through Central Asia to China. Faint and weak contact between China and India was probably made in Mauryan times, if not before, but only when, some 2,000 years ago, the Han Empire began to drive its frontiers towards the Caspian did India and China really meet. Unlike South-East Asia, China did not assimilate Indian ideas in every aspect of her culture, but the whole of the Far East is in India's debt for Buddhism, which helped to mould the distinctive civilizations of China, Korea, Japan and Tibet.

As well as her special gifts to Asia, India has conferred many practical blessings on the world at large; notably rice, cotton, the sugar cane, many spices, the domestic fowl, the game of chess (p. 208), and, most important of all, the decimal system of numeral notation, the invention of an unknown Indian mathematician early in the Christian era (p. 495f). The extent of the spiritual influence of India on the ancient West is much disputed. The heterodox Jewish sect of the Essenes, which probably influenced early Christianity, followed monastic practices in some respects similar to those of Buddhism. Parallels may be traced between passages in the New Testament

and the Pāli scriptures.¹ Similarities between the teachings of western philosophers and mystics from Pythagoras to Plotinus and those of the Upaniṣads have frequently been noticed. None of these similarities, however, is close enough to give certainty, especially as we have no evidence that any classical writer had a deep knowledge of Indian religion. We can only say that there was always some contact between the Hellenic world and India, mediated first by the Achæmenid Empire, then by that of the Seleucids, and finally, under the Romans, by the traders of the Indian ocean. Christianity began to spread at the time when this contact was closest. We know that Indian ascetics occasionally visited the West, and that there was a colony of Indian merchants at Alexandria. The possibility of Indian influence on Neo-platonism and early Christianity cannot be ruled out.

Many authorities may doubt that Indian thought had any effect on that of the ancient West, but there can be no doubt of its direct and indirect influence on the thought of Europe and America in the last century and a half, though this has not received adequate recognition. This influence has not come by way of organized neo-Hindu missions. The last eighty years have seen the foundation of the Theosophical Society, of various Buddhist societies, and of societies in Europe and America looking for inspiration to the saintly 19th-century Bengālī mystic, Paramahansa Rāmakrishna, and his equally saintly disciple, Swāmī Vivekānanda. Lesser organizations and groups have been founded in the West by other Indian mystics and their disciples, some of them noble, earnest and spiritual, others of more dubious character. Here and there Westerners themselves, sometimes armed with a working knowledge of Sanskrit and first-hand Indian experience, have tried to convert the West to a streamlined Yoga or Vedānta. We would in no way disparage these teachers or their followers, many of whom are of great intellectual and spiritual calibre; but whatever we may think of the Western propagators of Indian mysticism, we cannot claim that they have had any great effect on our civilization. More subtle, but more powerful, has been the influence of Mahātmā Gāndhī, through the many friends of India in the West who were impressed by his burning sincerity and energy, and by the ultimate success of his policy of non-violence in achieving India's independence. Greater than any of these influences, however, has been the influence of ancient Indian religious literature through philosophy.

The pioneers of the Asiatic Society of Bengal quickly gained a small but enthusiastic following in Europe, and Goethe and many other writers of the early 19th century read all they could of ancient Indian literature in translation. We know that Goethe borrowed a device

of Indian dramaturgy for the prologue to "Faust" (p. 433n), and who can say that the triumphant final chorus of the second part of that work was not in part inspired by the monism of Indian thought as he understood it? From Goethe onwards most of the great German philosophers knew something of Indian philosophy. Schopenhauer, whose influence on literature and psychology has been so considerable, indeed openly admitted his debt, and his outlook was virtually that of Buddhism. The monisms of Fichte and Hegel might never have taken the forms they did if it had not been for Anquetil-Duperron's translation of the Upaniṣads and the work of other pioneer Indologists. In the English-speaking world the strongest Indian influence was felt in America, where Emerson, Thoreau and other New England writers avidly read all they could of Indian religious literature in translation, and exerted immense influence on their contemporaries and successors, notably Walt Whitman. Through Carlyle and others the German philosophers in their turn made their mark on England, as did the Americans through many late 19th-century writers such as Richard Jeffries and Edward Carpenter.

Though in the contemporary philosophical schools of Europe and America the monistic and idealist philosophies of the last century carry little weight, their influence has been considerable, and all of them owe something at least to ancient India. The sages who meditated in the jungles of the Ganges Valley six hundred years or more before Christ are still forces in the world.

It is today something of an anachronism to speak of European civilization or Indian civilization. Until very recently cultures were sharply divided, but now, when India is but a thirty hours' journey from London, cultural divisions are beginning to disappear. If a *modus vivendi* is reached between liberal democracy and communism, and civilization survives, the world of the future will have a single culture with, it is to be hoped, many local differences and variations. India's contribution to the world's cultural stock has already been very large, and it will continue and grow as, in her new freedom, her prestige and influence increases. For this reason if for no other we must take account of her ancient heritage in its successes and its failures, for it is no longer the heritage of India alone, but of all mankind.

APPENDIX I

COSMOLOGY AND GEOGRAPHY



THE universe of the Vedas was a simple affair—a flat circular earth below, a heaven above, through which sun, moon and stars moved, and between them the middle air (*antarikṣa*), the abode of birds, clouds and demigods. This picture of the world was much complicated by later religious thought.

Indian ideas on the origin and evolution of the universe are rather a matter of religion than of science and are considered elsewhere (p. 320ff). All Indian religions, however, show certain concepts of cosmology in common, which were fundamental presuppositions of Indian thought, and were strikingly at variance with the Semitic ideas which long influenced the thinking of the West—the universe is very old; its evolution and decline are cyclic, repeated ad infinitum; it is immensely large; and there are other universes beyond our own.


The Hindus believed that the universe was shaped like an egg—the *Brahmāṇḍa*, or Egg of Brahmā—divided into twenty-one zones or regions, of which the earth was seventh from the top. Above the earth were six heavens (not, as with the Greeks, associated with the planets), of increasing beatitude. Below earth were the seven stages of *Pātāla*, the nether world, which were the abode of *nāgas* and other mythical beings and were not thought of as in any way unpleasant. Below *Pātāla* lay *Naraka*, or purgatory, also divided into seven zones, which were of increasing misery, and inhabited by souls in torment. The universe hung in empty space, and was virtually isolated from other universes.

The cosmic schemes of the Buddhists and Jainas differed from this in many details, but in fundamentals were the same. All originally postulated a flat earth, but this was recognized by Indian astronomers to be incorrect early in the Christian era, and, though the idea of a flat earth remained for religious purposes, the learned realized, perhaps through the influence of Greek astronomy, that it was in fact spherical. Various estimates of its size were made, the most popular being that of Brahmagupta (7th century A.D.), who gave its circumference as 5,000 *yojanas*. Assuming Brahmagupta's *yojana* to be the short league of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles, this figure is not far out, and is as accurate as any given by ancient astronomers.

The modest spherical earth of the astronomers did not satisfy the theologians, however, and even later religious literature described the earth as a flat disc of enormous size. In its centre was Mount Meru, round which sun, moon and stars revolved. Around Meru were four continents (*dvīpa*), separated from the central peak by oceans, and named according to the great trees which stood on their shores opposite Meru. The southern continent, on which human beings dwell, had a *jambu* (rose-apple) as its distinctive tree, and it was therefore called *Jambudvīpa*. The southern zone of this continent,



Ivory Combs. Ceylon and South India. c. 17th century



Copper-plate Charter of King Dadda III of Broach. Dated A.D. 675

separated from the rest by the Himālayas, was "the Land of the Sons of Bharata" (*Bhāratavarṣa*), or India. *Bhāratavarṣa* alone was 9,000 *yojanas* across, and the whole of *Jambudvīpa* 33,000, or, according to some sources, 100,000 *yojanas*.

This fantastic geographical scheme was not the only one. In the *Purāṇas* *Jambudvīpa* is described as a ring around *Meru*, separated from the next continent, *Plakṣadvīpa*, by an ocean of salt. *Plakṣadvīpa* in turn forms a concentric circle round *Jambudvīpa*, and so on to make a total of seven continents, each circular and divided from its neighbour by an ocean of different composition—starting with *Jambudvīpa*'s salt ocean and moving outwards, of treacle, wine, ghee, milk, curds and fresh water respectively. This brilliantly imaginative picture of the world, which aroused the scorn of Lord Macaulay, seems to have been implicitly believed in by later Hindu theologians, and even the astronomers could not emancipate themselves from it, but adapted it to their spherical earth by making *Meru* the earth's axis, and the continents zones on the earth's surface.

The oceans of butter and seas of treacle formed an effective barrier to the growth of a true science of geography. The seven continents cannot in any way have been related to actual portions of the earth's surface, though some modern students have tried to identify them with parts of Asia, and, as far as is known, no attempt was made to collate the experience of travellers as practical geography. The astronomers gave fairly accurate longitudes of important places in India. In the early centuries of the Christian era *Alexandria* was known, and there are vague references to the city of the *Romakas* in astronomical works; but the geographical knowledge of the learned was of the vaguest description. Even within India distances and directions, as given in texts, are usually very inaccurate and vague. The conquerors who led armies thousands of miles on their campaigns, the merchants who carried their wares from one end of India to the other, and the pilgrims who visited sacred places from the Himālayas to Cape Comorin must have had a sound practical knowledge of Indian geography, while that of the seamen who sailed the ocean from *Socotra* to *Canton* must have been even wider; but there are few echoes of this knowledge in the literature of the time.

APPENDIX II

ASTRONOMY

One of the subsidiary studies (*vedāṅga*) of Vedic lore was *jyotiṣa*, a primitive astronomy designed mainly for the purpose of settling the dates and times at which periodical sacrifices were to be performed. The existing literature on this topic is comparatively late, and gives no true indication of India's astronomical knowledge in the Vedic period, though it is quite clear

from passages in the Vedic texts themselves that it was adequate for the practical purposes of the time. It is probable that even at this early period there was some Mesopotamian influence on Indian astronomical ideas, but this cannot be established with certainty. Virtually certain, however, is the influence of classical European astronomy, which was felt in the early centuries of the Christian era, if not before.

Several Greek words have become common in Sanskrit and in later Indian vernaculars through astronomy (p. 230), and other technical terms, not so widely known, are indisputably of Greek origin. Of the five astronomical systems (*siddhānta*) known to the 6th-century astronomer Varāhamihira one is called the *Romaka Siddhānta* and another the *Paulīśa Siddhānta*, a title which can only be reasonably explained as a recollection of the name of the classical astronomer Paul of Alexandria.

The new astronomy was adopted chiefly for purposes of prognostication; for the establishment of dates the old luni-solar calendar, based on simpler observations, was quite adequate. In earlier times Indians, though no less interested than other ancient peoples in foretelling the future, preferred to do so by the interpretation of dreams and omens (*utpāta*), and by physiognomy, birthmarks, the shape and size of the features, and other signs which were believed to give tokens of an individual's fate. The older systems of prognostication were not forgotten, but from Gupta times onwards they gave pride of place to astrology, which from that day to this has been implicitly believed in by nearly all Indians.

Until this great development of astronomical knowledge the heavens had been charted by means of the lunar mansions or *nakṣatras*, which were apparently known even in the time of the *R̥g Veda*. The moon's relation to the fixed stars changes through a cycle of approximately 27 solar days and $7\frac{3}{4}$ hours, and thus the heavens were divided into 27 portions, named according to the group of stars on the ecliptic (the apparent orbit of the sun) near which the moon passes on each day of its cycle. As the sidereal month is in fact nearly eight hours more than 27 days a twenty-eighth intercalary *nakṣatra* was added by later astronomers to correct the error.*

Western astronomy brought to India the signs of the zodiac, the seven-day week, the hour, and several other ideas. Thanks to their achievements

* The *nakṣatras* were: (1) *Aśvinī* (β and γ Arietis), (2) *Bharanī* (35, 39, and 41 Arietis), (3) *Kṛttikā* (Pleiades), (4) *Rohiṇī* (Aldebaran), (5) *Mṛgaśīras* (λ, φ¹, and φ² Orionis), (6) *Ārdrā* (α Orionis), (7) *Punarvasū* (α and β Geminorum), (8) *Puṣyā* (γ, δ, and θ Cancri), (9) *Āśleṣā* (δ, ε, η, ρ, and σ Hydræ), (10) *Maghā* (α, γ, ε, ζ, η, and μ Leonis), (11) *Pūrva-phalgunī* (δ and θ Leonis), (12) *Uttara-phalgunī* (β and 93 Leonis), (13) *Hastā* (α, β, γ, δ, and ε Corvi), (14) *Citrā* (Spica, α Virginis), (15) *Svātī* (Arcturus), (16) *Viśākhā* (α, β, γ, and ι Libræ), (17) *Anurādhā* (β, δ, and π Scorpionis), (18) *Jyēṣṭhā* (α, σ, and τ Scorpionis), (19) *Mūlā* (ε, ζ, η, θ, ι, κ, λ, μ, and υ Scorpionis), (20) *Pūrvāṣādhā* (δ and ε Sagittarii), (22) *Śravaṇā* (α, β, and γ Aquilæ), (23) *Dhanīṣṭhā* or *Śraviṣṭhā* (α, β, γ, and δ Delphinis), (24) *Satābhīṣaj* (γ Aquarii etc.), (25) *Pūrva-bhadrāpadā* (α and β Pegasi), (26) *Uttara-bhadrāpadā* (γ Pegasi and α Andromedæ), and (27) *Revatī* (ζ Piscium, etc.). The 28th *nakṣatra* was *Abhijit* (α, ε, and ζ Lyræ), which was placed between *Uttarāṣādhā* and *Śravaṇā*. It will be seen from this list that the ancient Indian system of constellations differed widely from that of the West.

in mathematics Indian astronomers made some advances on the knowledge of the Greeks, and passed their lore, with that of mathematics, back to Europe by way of the Arabs. As early as the 7th century the Syrian astronomer Severus Sebokht knew of the greatness of Indian astronomy and mathematics (p. vi), and the caliphs of Bāghdād employed Indian astronomers. One word of the terminology of medieval European astronomy, *aux*, the highest point of a planet's orbit, is certainly borrowed from the Sanskrit *ucca* through Arabic.

Like all ancient astronomy, that of India was restricted owing to ignorance of the telescope; but methods of observation were perfected which allowed very accurate measurement, and calculations were aided by the decimal system of numerals. We know of no remains of observatories of the Hindu period, but those of the 17th and 18th centuries, at Jaipur, Delhi and elsewhere, with their wonderfully accurate instruments, constructed on an enormous scale to minimize error, may well have had their ancient counterparts.

With the naked eye as their sole means of observation the Indians knew only the seven planets (*graha*) of the ancients—Sun (*Sūrya*, *Ravi*), Moon (*Candra*, *Soma*), Mercury (*Budha*), Venus (*Śukra*), Mars (*Maṅgala*), Jupiter (*Bṛhaspati*) and Saturn (*Śani*);* to these *grahas* two more were added, *Rāhu* and *Ketu*, the ascending and descending nodes of the moon.† At the beginning of each æon all the planets were believed to commence their revolutions in line, and to return to the same position at the end of it. The apparently irregular course of the planets was explained on the hypothesis of epicycles, as in classical and medieval astronomy. Unlike the Greeks, the Indians believed that the planets had equal real motion, and that their apparently different angular motion was due to their different distances from the earth.

For purposes of calculation the planetary system was taken as geocentric, though Āryabhaṭa in the 5th century suggested that the earth revolved round the sun and rotated on its axis; this theory was also known to later astronomers, but it never affected astronomical practice. The precession of the equinoxes was known, and calculated with some accuracy by medieval astronomers, as were the lengths of the year, the lunar month, and other astronomical constants. These calculations were reliable for most practical purposes, and in many cases more accurate than those of the Greco-Roman world. Eclipses were forecast with accuracy and their true cause understood.

* The names of the planets had many synonyms, some of which were evidently borrowed from the Greek, e.g. *Ara*, *Ares*, or *Mars*.

† At the "Churning of the Ocean" (p. 302) a demon named *Rāhu* stole some of the *amṛta*. Viṣṇu destroyed his body, but as he had tasted of the divine drink he had become immortal. His head and tail survive for ever in the heavens, as *Rāhu* and *Ketu*, and the head causes eclipses by trying to swallow the planets. Of course the astronomers did not believe this myth, and some texts explicitly reject it.

APPENDIX III

THE CALENDAR

In recording dates the basic unit was not the solar day, but the *tithi*, or lunar day, approximately thirty of which formed a lunar month (i.e. the four phases of the moon) of about $29\frac{1}{2}$ solar days. The month was divided into two halves (*pakṣa*) of fifteen tithis each, beginning with the full (*pūrṇimāvāsya*) and new (*amāvāsya* or *bahulāvāsya*) moons respectively. The fortnight beginning with the new moon was called the bright half (*śuklapakṣa*) and the other the dark half (*kṛṣṇapakṣa*). According to the system followed in Northern India and much of the Deccan the month began and ended with the full moon, while in the Tamil country the month generally began with the new moon. The Hindu calendar is still in use throughout India for religious purposes.

The tithi might begin at any time of the solar day. For the practical purpose of recording dates that tithi current at sunrise was supposed to prevail for the whole day and gave that day its number in the pakṣa. If a tithi began just after sunrise and ended before the sunrise of the next day, it was expunged, and there was a break in the numerical sequence of days.

The year normally contained twelve lunar months:

Caitra (March–April), *Vaiśākha* (April–May), *Jyaiṣṭha* (May–June), *Āṣāḍha* (June–July), *Śrāvaṇa* (July–August), *Bhādrapada* or *Praṣṭhapada* (August–September), *Āśvina* or *Āsvayuja* (September–October), *Kārttika* (October–November), *Mārgaśīrṣa* or *Āgrahāyana* (November–December), *Pauṣa* or *Taiṣa* (December–January), *Māgha* (January–February) and *Phālguna* (February–March).^{*} According to the usual systems of reckoning the year began with Caitra, but it was sometimes taken as beginning with Kārttika or another month.

A group of two months formed a season (*ṛtu*). The six seasons of the Indian year were: *Vasanta* (Spring, March–May), *Grīṣma* (Summer, May–July), *Varṣā* (The Rains, July–September), *Śarad* (Autumn, September–November), *Hemanta* (Winter, November–January) and *Śiśira* (the Cool Season, January–March).

Twelve lunar months make only about 354 days, and the problem of the discrepancy between the lunar and solar years was solved very early; sixty-two lunar months are approximately equal to sixty solar months, and so every thirty months an extra month was added to the year, as in Babylonia. This leap-month was generally inserted after Āṣāḍha or Śrāvaṇa and called second (*dvitīya*) Āṣāḍha or Śrāvaṇa. Thus every second or third year contains thirteen months, and is some twenty-nine days longer than the others.

^{*} The names of the months in early times were as follows: *Madhu*, *Mādhava*, *Śukra*, *Śuci*, *Nabhas*, *Nabhasya*, *Iṣa*, *Ūrja*, *Sahas*, *Sahasya*, *Tapas*, *Tapasya*. The Vedic names are sometimes found in later poetry.

The Hindu calendar, though quite efficient, is thus rather cumbrous, and is so different from the solar calendar that it is impossible to reduce dates from one to the other without very complicated calculations or lengthy tables. It is even impossible to establish at a glance the month in which a given Hindu date falls with any certainty.

Indian dates are usually given in the order—month, pakṣa, tithi, the abbreviations *śudi* and *badi* being used for the bright and dark halves of the month; e.g. *Caitra śudi* 7 means the seventh day from the new moon of the month Caitra.

The solar calendar, imported with Western astronomy, was also known from Gupta times onwards though it did not oust the old luni-solar calendar until recent years. Where solar dates are given in early records they are usually mentioned for extra accuracy, with the prevailing nakṣatra of the day in question, after the regular luni-solar date. In the solar calendar the months are named after the signs of the zodiac, which are literal or nearly exact translations of their Greek originals: *Meṣa* (Aries), *Vṛṣabha* (Taurus), *Mithuna* (Gemini), *Karkāṭa* (Cancer), *Simha* (Leo), *Kanyā* (Virgo), *Tulā* (Libra), *Vṛścika* (Scorpio), *Dhanus* (Sagittarius), *Makara* (Capricornus), *Kumbha* (Aquarius) and *Mīna* (Pisces). With the solar calendar the seven-day week was also introduced, the days being named after their presiding planets as in the Greco-Roman system: *Ravivāra* (Sunday), *Somavāra* (Monday), *Maṅgalavāra* (Tuesday), *Budhavāra* (Wednesday), *Bṛhaspativāra* (Thursday), *Śukravāra* (Friday) and *Śanivāra* (Saturday).

ERAS

Until the 1st century B.C. there is no good evidence that India had any regular system of recording the year of an event by dating in a definite era like the *A.U.C.* of Rome or the Christian era of medieval and modern Europe. Early inscriptions are dated if at all in the regnal year of the ruling king. The idea of dating over a long period of time from a fixed year was almost certainly introduced into India by the invaders of the North-West, who have left the earliest inscriptions thus dated in India. Unfortunately the Indians did not adopt a uniform era, and a number of systems of dating were in use from that time onwards, the chief of which, in order of importance, are as follows:

The Vikrama Era (58 B.C.), traditionally founded by a king called Vikramāditya, who drove the Śakas out of Ujjayinī and founded the era to celebrate his victory. The only king who both took the title Vikramāditya and drove the Śakas from Ujjayinī was Candragupta II, who lived over 400 years later than the beginning of the Vikrama era, and so the legend is certainly false. In the earliest inscriptions using this era, all from Western India, it is called simply *Kṛta* ("established"), or "handed down by the Mālava tribe". Some authorities believe that many inscriptions of the Śakas

and Pāhlavas of North-West India are to be read in this era, and that it was founded by Azes, one of their early kings; but this is by no means certain. This era was most popular in North India. Its year began originally with the month Kārttika, but by medieval times Vikrama years began in the bright half of Caitra in the North, and in the dark half of the same month in the Peninsula.

The Śaka Era (A.D. 78) was, according to tradition, founded by a Śaka king who occupied Ujjayinī 137 years after Vikramāditya. This era may in fact have been founded by Kaniṣka, and was certainly used early in the 2nd century A.D. by the "Western Satraps", who ruled Mālwa, Kāthiāwār and Gujarāt. Thence the use of the era spread through the Deccan and was exported to South-East Asia.

The Gupta Era (A.D. 320) was probably founded by Candragupta I, and its use was continued by the Maitraka dynasty of Gujarāt for some centuries after the Gupta empire fell.

The Harṣa Era (A.D. 606), founded by Harṣavardhana of Kānyakubja, was popular in Northern India for a century or two after his death.

The Kalacuri Era (A.D. 248), perhaps founded by a small dynasty called the Traikūṭaka, was current in Central India down to the Muslim invasion.

Other eras of local or temporary importance were the *Lakṣmaṇa Era* of Bengal (A.D. 1119), wrongly said to have been founded by King Lakṣmaṇa Sena; the *Saptarṣi* or *Laukika Era*, current in Kashmīr in the Middle Ages, and recorded in cycles of one hundred years, each cycle commencing seventy-six years after each Christian century; the *Licchavi* and *Nevār Eras* of Nepāl (A.D. 110 and 878); the *Kollam Era* of Malabār (A.D. 825); and the *Era of Vikramāditya VI Cālukya* (A.D. 1075). The *Era of the Kaliyuga* (3102 B.C., v. p. 39 above) was often used for religious dates and rarely for political. In Ceylon a *Buddha Era* from 544 B.C. was in use from an uncertain date, when it probably replaced an earlier reckoning from 483 B.C. The Jains used an *Era of Mahāvīra*, reckoned from 528 B.C. The two latter eras, together with the *Vikrama* and *Śaka Eras*, are still in use for religious purposes, but the others are extinct.

In reducing dates in Indian eras to the Christian era it must be remembered that the year, according to most reckonings, begins with the month of Caitra, which usually commences in the middle of March. Thus the months Māgha and Phālguna, and generally the second half of Pauṣa, occur in the Christian year after that in which the Hindu year began. Dates were usually given in expired years; this was sometimes explicitly stated (e.g. "when 493 years had passed from the establishment of the tribe of the Mālavas"), but more often taken for granted. In medieval dates it is best to assume an expired year, even when this is not specified, unless there is special reason to believe otherwise.

The following table will be useful for reducing Indian dates to the Christian era:

Era	First 9½ months approx. (assuming the year to begin with Caitra)		Second (usually dark) half of Pausa, and the whole of Māgha and Phālguna
<i>Vikrama</i>	current	subtract 58	57
	expired	„ 57	56
<i>Śaka</i>	current	add 77	78
	expired	„ 78	79
<i>Kalacuri</i>	current	add 247	248
	expired	„ 248	249
<i>Gupta</i>	current	add 319	320
	expired	„ 320	321
<i>Harṣa</i>	current	add 605	606
	expired	„ 606	607

APPENDIX IV

MATHEMATICS

Through the necessity of accurately laying out the open-air site of a sacrifice Indians very early evolved a simple system of geometry, but in the sphere of practical knowledge the world owes most to India in the realm of mathematics, which were developed in Gupta times to a stage more advanced than that reached by any other nation of antiquity. The success of Indian mathematics was mainly due to the fact that the Indians had a clear conception of abstract number, as distinct from numerical quantity of objects or spatial extension. While Greek mathematical science was largely based on mensuration and geometry, India transcended these conceptions quite early, and, with the aid of a simple numeral notation, devised a rudimentary algebra which allowed more complicated calculations than were possible to the Greeks, and led to the study of number for its own sake.

In the earlier inscriptions of India dates and other numerals are written in a notation not unlike that of the Romans, Greeks and Hebrews, with separate symbols for the tens and hundreds. The earliest inscription recording the date by a system of nine digits and a zero, with place notation for the tens and hundreds, comes from Gujarāt, and is dated A.D. 695.* By this time, however, the new system had been heard of in Syria (p. vi),† and was being used as far afield as Indo-China. Evidently the system was in use among mathematicians some centuries before it was employed in inscriptions, the scribes of which tended to be conservative in their system of

* *Epigraphia Indica*, ii, 20.

† Some earlier authorities, disinclined to give India her due, have declared that none of these sources gives certain evidence of the existence of a sign for zero. But Āryabhaṭas' text implies a knowledge of it, and Severus Sebokht's "nine symbols" would be quite useless for expressing quantities over nine without a zero sign and place notation. The Maya of Central America had a vigesimal numeral system with positional notation long before this time, but it had, of course, no effect on the world at large (S. G. Morley, *The Ancient Maya*, London, 1946, p. 274).

recording dates; in modern Europe the cumbrous Roman system is still sometimes used for the same purpose. The name of the mathematician who devised the simplified system of writing numerals is unknown, but the earliest surviving mathematical texts—the anonymous “Bakshālī Manuscript”, which is a copy of a text of the 4th century A.D., and the terse *Āryabhaṭīya* of Āryabhaṭa, written in A.D. 499—presuppose it.

For long it was thought that the decimal system of numerals was invented by the Arabs, but this is certainly not the case. The Arabs themselves called mathematics “the Indian (art)” (*hindisat*), and there is now no doubt that the decimal notation, with other mathematical lore, was learnt by the Muslim world either through merchants trading with the west coast of India, or through the Arabs who conquered Sind in A.D. 712.

The debt of the Western world to India in this respect cannot be overestimated. Most of the great discoveries and inventions of which Europe is so proud would have been impossible without a developed system of mathematics, and this in turn would have been impossible if Europe had been shackled by the unwieldy system of Roman numerals. The unknown man who devised the new system was from the world’s point of view, after the Buddha, the most important son of India. His achievement, though easily taken for granted, was the work of an analytical mind of the first order, and he deserves much more honour than he has so far received.

Medieval Indian mathematicians, such as Brahmagupta (7th century), Mahāvīra (9th century) and Bhāskara (12th century), made several discoveries which in Europe were not known until the Renaissance or later. They understood the import of positive and negative quantities, evolved sound systems of extracting square and cube roots, and could solve quadratic and certain types of indeterminate equations. For π Āryabhaṭa gave the usual modern approximate value of 3.1416, expressed in the form of a fraction $\frac{62832}{20000}$. This value of π , much more accurate than that of the Greeks, was improved to nine places of decimals by later Indian mathematicians. Some steps were made in trigonometry, spherical geometry and calculus, chiefly in connexion with astronomy. The mathematical implications of zero (*śūnya*) and infinity, never more than vaguely realized by classical authorities, were fully understood in medieval India. Earlier mathematicians had taught that $\frac{x}{0} = x$, but Bhāskara proved that it was infinity. He also established mathematically what had been recognized in Indian theology at least a millenium earlier, that infinity, however divided, remains infinite, represented by the equation $\frac{\infty}{x} = \infty$.

APPENDIX V

PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY

Ancient Indian ideas of physics were closely linked with religion and theology, and differed somewhat from sect to sect. As early as the time of the Buddha, if not before, the universe was classified by elements, of which

all schools admitted at least four—earth, air, fire and water. To these orthodox Hindu schools and Jainism added a fifth, *ākāśa*, which is generally translated “ether”. It was recognized that air was not of infinite extension, and the Indian mind, with its abhorrence of a vacuum, found it hard to conceive of empty space. The five elements were thought of as the mediums of sense impressions—earth of smell, air of feeling, fire of vision, water of taste, and ether of sound. Buddhists and Ājīvikas rejected ether, but the latter added life, joy and sorrow, which were thought of as in some way material, making a total of seven elements.

Most schools believed that the elements other than ether were atomic. Indian atomism was certainly independent of Greek influence, for an atomic theory was taught by Pakudha Kātyāyana, an older contemporary of the Buddha, and was therefore earlier than that of Democritus. The Jains believed that all atoms (*aṇu*) were identical, and that differences of the character of the elements were due to the manner in which the atoms were combined. Most schools, however, maintained that there were as many types of atom as there were elements.

The atom was generally thought to be eternal, but some Buddhists conceived of it not only as the minutest object capable of occupying space, but also as occupying the minutest possible duration of time, coming into being and vanishing almost in an instant, only to be succeeded by another atom, caused by the first. Thus the atom of Buddhism in some measure resembles the quantum of Planck. The atom was quite invisible to the human eye; the orthodox Vaiśeṣika school believed the single atom to be a mere point in space, completely without magnitude.

A single atom had no qualities, but only potentialities, which came into play when the atom combined with others. The Vaiśeṣika school, which specially elaborated atomic doctrines, and was the school of atomism *par excellence*, maintained that, before combining to form material objects, atoms made primary combinations of diads and triads. This doctrine of molecules was developed differently by Buddhists and Ājīvikas, who taught that in normal conditions no atoms existed in a pure state, but only combined in different proportions in a molecule (*saṃghāṭa*, *kalāpa*). Every molecule contained at least one atom of all four types, and obtained its character from the predominance of a given element. This hypothesis accounted for the fact that matter might show characteristics of more than one element: thus wax might melt and also burn, because its molecules contained proportions of water and fire. According to the Buddhists the molecules cohered by virtue of the atoms of water in each, which acted as adhesive.

Indian atomic theories were not, of course, based on experiment, but on intuition and logic. They were not universally held. The great theologian Śāṅkara (p. 328) did not believe in atoms and argued strongly against their existence. But the atomic theories of ancient India are brilliant imaginative explanations of the physical structure of the world; though it is probably mere coincidence that they agree in part with the theories of modern physics, they are nevertheless much to the credit of the intellect and imagination of early Indian thinkers.

Beyond this ancient Indian physics developed little. Without knowledge of an all-embracing law of gravity it remained in a rudimentary state, like all the physical systems of the ancient world. It was generally believed that the elements of earth and water tended to fall, and fire to rise, and it was recognized that solids and fluids alike generally expanded on heating, but no serious effort was made to study such phenomena experimentally. In the science of acoustics, however, India made real discoveries based on experiment, and the ear, highly trained by the phonetic study necessary for the correct recitation of the Vedas, learned to distinguish musical tones far closer than those of other early musical systems. Before the Christian era the octave was divided into twenty-two *śrutis*, or quarter-tones (p. 382), and their proportions were measured with great accuracy. It was recognized that differences of timbre were caused by overtones (*anurāṇana*), which varied with different instruments.

We know from the evidence of the Iron Pillar of Delhī (p. 219 f) and other sources that Indian metallurgists gained great proficiency in the extraction of metal from ore and in metal-casting, and their products were known and valued in the Roman Empire and the Middle East; but their knowledge appears to have been largely pragmatic, and had no counterpart in a highly developed science of metallurgy. Chemistry in ancient India was the handmaid, not of technology, but of medicine; her chemists did not share the interest of medieval Europe in transmuting base metal into gold, but apparently devoted most of their attention to making medicines, drugs to promote longevity, aphrodisiacs, poisons, and their antidotes. These medical chemists did succeed in producing many important alkalis, acids and metallic salts by simple processes of calcination and distillation, and it has even been suggested, without good basis, that they discovered a form of gunpowder.

In the Middle Ages Indian chemists, like their counterparts in China, the Muslim World and Europe, became engrossed in the study of mercury, perhaps through contact with the Arabs. A school of alchemists arose, who experimented with the wonderful fluid metal, and decided that it was the specific for all diseases, the source of perpetual youth, and even the surest means to salvation. In this infatuation with mercury Indian chemistry foundered, but not before it had passed many ideas on to the Arabs, who gave them to medieval Europe.

APPENDIX VI

PHYSIOLOGY AND MEDICINE

The Vedas show a very primitive stage of medical and physiological lore, but the basic textbooks of Indian medicine—the compendia of Caraka (1st–2nd centuries A.D.) and Suśruta (c. 4th century A.D.)—are the products

of a fully evolved system which resembles those of Hippocrates and Galen in some respects, and in others has developed beyond them. We have no medical texts of the intervening period, but there is little doubt that two factors encouraged medical knowledge—the growth of interest in physiology through the phenomena of yoga and mystical experience, and Buddhism. Like the Christian missionary of later times the Buddhist monk often served as a doctor among the layfolk from whom he begged his food; moreover he was encouraged to care for his own health and that of his fellow-monks, and his creed tended towards rationalism and a distrust of the medical magic of earlier times. The development of medicine was also probably stimulated by contact with Hellenic physicians, and the resemblances between Indian and classical medicine suggest borrowing on both sides. After Sūśruta Indian medicine developed little, except in the growing use of mercurial drugs, and of others such as opium and sarsaparilla, which were introduced by the Arabs. In its essentials the system practised by the *ayurvedic* physician of present day India remains the same.

The basic conception of Indian medicine, like that of ancient and mediæval Europe, was the humours (*doṣa*). Most authorities taught that health was maintained through the even balance of the three vital fluids of the body—wind, gall and mucus, to which some added blood as a fourth humour. The three primary humours were connected with the scheme of the three *guṇas*, or universal qualities (p. 324 f), and associated with virtue, passion and dullness respectively.

The bodily functions were maintained by the five “winds” (*vāyu*): *udāna*, emanating from the throat, and causing speech; *prāṇa*, in the heart, and responsible for breathing and the swallowing of food; *samāna*, fanning the fire in the stomach which “cooked” or digested the food, and dividing it into its digestible and indigestible parts; *apāna* in the abdomen, and responsible for excretion and procreation; and *vyāna*, a generally diffused wind, causing the motion of the blood and of the body generally. The food digested by the *samāna* became chyle, which proceeded to the heart, and thence to the liver, where its essence was converted into blood. The blood in turn was in part converted into flesh and the process was continued through the series fat, bone, marrow and semen; the latter, when not expelled, produced energy (*ojas*), which returned to the heart and was thence diffused over the body. This process of metabolism was believed to take place in thirty days.

Ancient Indian doctors had no clear knowledge of the function of the brain, and believed with most ancient peoples that the heart was the seat of intelligence. They realized, however, the importance of the spinal cord (p. 326 f), and knew of the existence of the nervous system, though it was not properly understood. The progress of physiology and biology was impeded by the taboo on contact with dead bodies, which much discouraged dissection and the study of anatomy, although such practices were not completely unknown.

Despite their inaccurate knowledge of physiology, which was by no means inferior to that of most ancient peoples, India evolved a developed empirical surgery. The cæsarian section was known, bone-setting reached a high

degree of skill, and plastic surgery was developed far beyond anything known elsewhere at the time. Ancient Indian surgeons were expert at the repair of noses, ears and lips, lost or injured in battle or by judicial mutilation. In this respect Indian surgery remained ahead of European until the 18th century, when the surgeons of the East Indian Company were not ashamed to learn the art of rhinoplasty from the Indians.

Though Indians very early conceived of the existence of microscopic forms of life, it was never realized that these might cause diseases; but if Indian surgeons had no true idea of antisepsis or asepsis they encouraged scrupulous cleanliness as they understood it, and recognized the therapeutic value of fresh air and light. The pharmacopœia of ancient India was very large, and comprised animal, vegetable and mineral products. Many Asiatic drugs were known and used long before their introduction into Europe, notably the oil of the *chaulmugra* tree, traditionally prescribed as a specific for leprosy, and still the basis of the modern treatment of the disease.

The physician was a highly respected member of society, and the *vaidyas* rank high in the caste hierarchy to this day. The rules of professional behaviour laid down in medical texts remind us of those of Hippocrates and are not unworthy of the conscientious doctor of any place or time. We quote part of the sermon which Caraka instructs a physician to preach to his pupils at a solemn religious ceremony to be performed on the completion of their apprenticeship.

"If you want success in your practice, wealth and fame, and heaven after your death, you must pray every day on rising and going to bed for the welfare of all beings, especially of cows and brāhmaṇs, and you must strive with all your soul for the health of the sick. You must not betray your patients, even at the cost of your own life. . . . You must not get drunk, or commit evil, or have evil companions. . . . You must be pleasant of speech . . . and thoughtful, always striving to improve your knowledge.

"When you go to the home of a patient you should direct your words, mind, intellect and senses nowhere but to your patient and his treatment. . . . Nothing that happens in the house of the sick man must be told outside, nor must the patient's condition be told to anyone who might do harm by that knowledge to the patient or to another." *

Under the patronage of the more benevolent kings and religious foundations free medical aid was given to the poor. Aśoka took pride in the fact that he had provided medicines for man and beast, and the traveller Fa-hsien, in the early 5th century A.D., made special note of the free hospitals maintained by the donations of pious citizens. Unfortunately we have no detailed descriptions of such establishments.

Veterinary medicine was also practised. The doctrine of non-violence encouraged the endowment of animal refuges and homes for sick and aged animals, and such charities are still maintained in many cities of India. The horse and elephant doctors were members of skilled and respected professions, much in demand at court, and texts on veterinary science survive from the Middle Ages.

* *Caraka Saṃhitā*, iii, 8, 7.

APPENDIX VII

LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

With such an intense interest in metaphysical problems and a tradition of lively debate and discussion it is not surprising that India developed her own distinctive system of logic. The earliest logical text is the *Nyāya Sūtras* of Gautama, perhaps composed in the early centuries of the Christian era, a series of brief aphorisms much commented on by later writers, and the foundation-text of the Nyāya, one of the six schools of orthodox philosophy (p. 323). Logic was not, however, confined to this one school, but was utilized and adapted by Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina alike.

One of the most important topics of Indian thought in this field was the question of *pramāṇa*, which may be translated "means of reliable knowledge". According to the later Nyāya schools there were four *pramāṇas*, perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), inference by analogy or comparison (*upamāna*), and "word" (*śabda*), the pronouncement of a reliable authority, such as the Vedas. The Vedānta school added intuition or presumption (*arthāpatti*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), the latter an unnecessary scholastic refinement. The six categories overlapped somewhat, and the Buddhists generally included all forms of knowledge under the first two categories, while the Jains usually allowed only three, perception, inference and revelation. The materialists allowed only perception, and their opponents made short work of their efforts at proving by inference that inference could not give reliable knowledge.

It was probably in the study of the process of inference that schools of true logic arose. From the necessities of metaphysical discussion false arguments were analysed and classified; of these logicians recognized the chief fallacies of classical logic, such as *reductio ad absurdum* (*arthaprasaṅga*), circular argument (*cakra*), infinite regression (*anavasthā*), dilemma (*anyonyāśraya*), and *ignoratio elenchi* (*ātmāśraya*).

A correct inference was established by syllogism, of which the Indian form (*pañcāvayava*) was somewhat more cumbrous than the Aristotelian. Its five members were known as proposition (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*udāharaṇa*), application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*). The classical Indian example may be paraphrased as follows:

- (1) There is fire on the mountain,
- (2) because there is smoke above it,
- (3) and where there is smoke there is fire, as, for instance, in a kitchen;
- (4) such is the case with the mountain,
- (5) and therefore there is fire on it.

The third term of the Indian syllogism corresponds to the major premiss of that of Aristotle, the second to Aristotle's minor premiss, and the first to his conclusion. Thus the Indian syllogism reversed the order of that of classical logic, the argument being stated in the first and second

clauses, established by the general rule and example in the third, and finally clinched by the virtual repetition of the first two clauses. The "example" (in the above syllogism the kitchen) was generally looked on as an essential part of the argument, and helped to strengthen its rhetorical force. Evidently this elaborate system of syllogism is the outcome of much practical experience in discussion. Three-membered syllogisms were admitted by the Buddhists, who rightly rejected the fourth and fifth members of the orthodox syllogism as tautological.

The basis of the generalization (for example "where there is smoke there is fire") on which every inference rests was believed to be the quality of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*). The nature and origin of this quality was much discussed, and its consideration led to theories of universals and particulars, which are too recondite for consideration in this book.

No treatment of Indian thought is complete without a brief reference to the remarkable epistemological relativity of Jainism. Jaina thinkers, and some other heterodox teachers also, explicitly rejected what in classical logic is called the law of the excluded middle. For the Jaina there were not merely the two possibilities of existence and non-existence, but seven. Thus we may affirm (1) that an object, say a knife, exists as a knife. We may further say (2) that it is not something else, say a fork. But it exists as a knife and does not exist as a fork, and so we may declare of it (3) that in one aspect it is and in another it is not. From another point of view (4) it is indescribable; its ultimate essence is unknown to us and we cannot posit anything final about it—it is inexpressible. By combining this fourth possibility with the three former ones we obtain three further possibilities of predication—(5) it is, but its nature is otherwise indescribable, (6) it is not, but its nature is indescribable, and (7) it both is and is not, but its nature is indescribable. This system of seven aspects of predication is known as *syādvāda* ("the doctrine of 'maybe'"), or *saptabhaṅgi* ("the sevenfold division").*

As well as *syādvāda* the Jainas had another sevenfold system of predication known as *nayavāda*, the theory of standpoints, or ways of approaching an object of observation or study. The first three of these are connected with the object itself (*dravyārthika*), and the latter four with its modifications and the words used to describe it (*paryāyārthika*). (1) A mango tree may be considered simultaneously as an individual having a definite size and shape and as a member of the species "mango tree"; (2) it may be treated merely as a representative of the "universal" mango tree, and as corresponding to the general concept of a mango tree, without taking its individual qualities into account; or (3) it may be considered merely as an individual, without taking note of its specific qualities. Further it may be thought of (4) as it is at the present moment, for instance as bearing ripe fruit, without any regard to its past as a sapling or its future as firewood. (5) We may think of it from the point of view of its name "mango", considering all the

* The Sanskrit terms for the seven aspects are: (1) *syādasti*, (2) *syānnāsti*, (3) *syādaśtinnāsti*, (4) *syādavaktavya*, (5) *syādaśtyavaktavya*, (6) *syānnāstyavaktavya*, and (7) *syādaśtinnāstyavaktavya*.

synonyms of that name, and their implications. These synonyms may be subtly differentiated, and (6) we may consider their nuances and connotations. Finally (7) we may consider an object in its relation to a given epithet; thus by referring to a hero as a "lion" we mentally abstract all his unlionlike qualities, and think of him only as a being of strength and courage.* Some Jaina schools rejected the last three standpoints, which are hardly consistent with the first four, being rather semantic in character than epistemological.

Modern logicians might make short work of these rather pedantic systems of ontological and epistemological relativity, but they have a fundamental quality of breadth and realism, implying a full realization that the world is more complex and subtle than we think it, and that what is true of a thing in one of its aspects may at the same time be false in another.

APPENDIX VIII

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

MEASURES OF WEIGHT

The basic weight of ancient India was the *raktikā*, the bright red seed of the *guñja* (*abrus precatorius*), which was conventionally reckoned at about 1·83 grains (·118 grams). Many sources give series of weights rising from this, which are not wholly consistent, and show that standards varied very widely with time and place.

The goldsmith's scale given by Manu, which was probably the most widely followed, was:

5 <i>raktikās</i>	= 1 <i>māṣa</i> ,
16 <i>māṣas</i>	= 1 <i>karṣa</i> , <i>tolaka</i> , or <i>suvarṇa</i> ,
4 <i>karṣas</i>	= 1 <i>pala</i> ,
10 <i>palas</i>	= 1 <i>dharāṇa</i> .

The weight of the *pala* was thus approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ oz., or 37·76 gms. Of heavier weights the chief were the *prastha*, usually given as of 16 *palas*, and the *droṇa* of 16 *prasthas*. The *prastha* was thus approximately 21 oz., and the *droṇa* $21\frac{1}{4}$ lb.

MEASURES OF LENGTH

The commonest table, omitting microscopic measurements, was:

8 <i>yava</i> (barleycorns)	= 1 <i>aṅgula</i> (finger's breadth, $\frac{3}{4}$ in.)
12 <i>aṅgulas</i>	= 1 <i>vitasti</i> (span, 9 ins.)
2 <i>vitastis</i>	= 1 <i>hasta</i> or <i>aratni</i> (cubit, 18 ins.)
4 <i>hastas</i>	= 1 <i>daṇḍa</i> (rod) or <i>dhanus</i> (bow, 6 ft.)
2,000 <i>dhanus</i>	= 1 <i>krośa</i> (cry) or <i>goruta</i> (cow-call, $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles)
4 <i>krośas</i>	= 1 <i>yojana</i> (stage, 9 miles approx.).

* The Sanskrit names of the seven *nayas* are: (1) *naigama*, (2) *saṅgraha*, (3) *vyavahāra*, (4) *rjusūtra*, (5) *śabda*, (6) *samabhirūḍha*, and (7) *evambhūta*.

Though most sources give the *crośa* (in modern Indian languages *kos*) as of 2,000 *daṇḍas* the *Arthaśāstra* gives it as of only 1,000, the *yojana*, which was the commonest measure of long distances in ancient India, being thus of only $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles. It is therefore clear that there were at least two *yojanas*, and distances as given in texts are thus very unreliable. It would seem that for practical purposes the shorter *yojana* was more often used than the longer, especially in earlier times.

MEASURES OF TIME

Ancient Indian learned men devised a detailed terminology for minute intervals of time, which had little relation to everyday life and must be looked on as a flight of fancy. The longer measurements in most general use were:

18 <i>nimeśas</i> (winks)	= 1 <i>kāṣṭhā</i> ($3\frac{1}{5}$ secs.),
30 <i>kāṣṭhās</i>	= 1 <i>kalā</i> ($1\frac{3}{5}$ mins.)
15 <i>kalās</i>	= 1 <i>nāḍikā</i> or <i>nālikā</i> (24 mins.)
30 <i>kalās</i> or 2 <i>nāḍikās</i>	= 1 <i>muhūrta</i> or <i>kṣaṇa</i> (48 mins.)
30 <i>muhūrtas</i>	= 1 <i>aho-rātra</i> (day and night, 24 hours).

A measurement frequently used, but not consistent with this system, was the *yāma* or watch, one-eighth of a day and night, or three hours. In some sources, however, the *yāma* is given as three *muhūrtas*, or one-tenth of a day and night. The hour (*horā*) was introduced from the West in the Gupta period and was used in astronomy, but was not widely employed in everyday life.

For longer measures of time see p. 492 ff.

APPENDIX IX

COINAGE*

EARLY PUNCH MARKED COINS

Uninscribed punchmarked coins were minted from the 6th century B.C. onwards, and were in circulation for many centuries. Among the earliest silver specimens are those in the shape of a small bent bar, the largest of which, the *śatamāna*, weighed 180 grains. Half, quarter and half-quarter *śatamānas* are attested.

The basic silver punchmarked coin of the usual type was the *kārṣāpaṇa* or *paṇa*, of 57·8 grains. The *māṣa* or *māṣika* weighed one-sixteenth of this, or 3·6 grains. Various intermediate weights are attested, as well as large silver coins of 30 and 20 *māṣas* and small half-*māṣa* pieces.

Punchmarked copper coins were generally based on a different standard—a *māṣa* of 9 grains and a *kārṣāpaṇa* of 144. Quarter-*māṣas* in copper, or

* We are much indebted to Dr. A. K. Narain, Reader in Indology at Banāras Hindu University, for providing the material for this appendix.

kākiṇīs (2·25 grains) are attested, as well as large coins of 20, 30 and 45 copper *māṣas*.

Only one gold punchmarked coin is known, and it must be assumed that gold was very rarely minted before the beginning of the Christian era.

INDO-GREEK COINS

The earlier Greek kings minted coins according to the Attic standard, based on the drachm of 67·2 grains and the obol ($\frac{1}{8}$ drachm) of 11·2 grains. Silver coinage of this type ranges from hemiobols to the very large double decadrachms, struck by a king Amyntas, which have recently been found in Afghānistān. After their southward expansion the Greeks adopted a reduced weight, with silver coins of 152 and 38 grains.

The Greek kings issued numerous copper coins, but their metrology is not clear. Gold coins must have been very rare. There exist a very large 20 stater piece of the Bactrian usurper Eucratides and rare staters of a few other kings.

Śaka and Pahlava coins in silver and copper follow the reduced Indo-Greek standard.

KUṢĀṆA COINS

These were minted in gold and copper. The gold *dīnāras* or *suvarṇas* were based on the Roman denarius and were of 124 grains. Double and quarter *dīnāras* were also issued. The copper coins were large, of from 26 to 28 *māṣas*, or 240 to 260 grains.

PRE-GUPTAN AND GUPTAN COINS

A large range of coins in silver and copper, of very varied weight and character, was issued by the indigenous kings, tribes and cities of Northern India in the centuries immediately preceding and following the beginning of the Christian era. The Sātavāhanas of the Deccan also issued coins of lead and potin (base silver), while the Śakas of Gujarāt, Mālwa and the Western Deccan issued a distinctive series of coins in silver.

The gold coins of the Guptas (*dīnāra*) originally approximated to the Kuṣāṇa standard, but in the middle of the 5th century rose in weight to 144 grains, thus returning to the Indian standard of the copper *kāṣṭhapaṇa*. Gupta silver coins (*rūpaka*), based on those of the Śakas of Ujjayinī, weighed 32–36 grains. The metrology of Gupta copper coinage is obscure, and weights of from 3·3 to 101 grains are attested.

MEDIEVAL COINS

Gold coins (*suvarṇa*, *ṭaṅka*) were minted by only a few dynasties in the 11th century. These approximated to the Greek drachm standard of 67 grains. Silver coins (*dramma*, *ṭaṅka*) also conformed to this standard, and coins of $\frac{3}{4}$, $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$ *dramma* are attested. Numerous types of copper coin were issued, of diverse metrology. The coinage of the medieval dynasties of the Peninsula was very varied and a full study of its metrology is yet to be made.

APPENDIX X

THE ALPHABET AND ITS PRONUNCIATION

The alphabet devised by ancient Indian phoneticians and adapted to all the chief Indian languages except Urdū is as follows:

I. VOWELS

a. (*simple*)

	short	long
guttural . . .	(1) <i>a</i>	(2) <i>ā</i>
palatal . . .	(3) <i>i</i>	(4) <i>ī</i>
labial . . .	(5) <i>u</i>	(6) <i>ū</i>
retroflex . . .	(7) <i>ṛ</i>	(8) <i>ṝ</i>
dental . . .	(9) <i>ḷ</i>	(10) <i>ḹ</i> *

(b) *diphthongs*

palatal . . .	(11) <i>e</i>
	(12) <i>ai</i>
labial . . .	(13) <i>o</i>
	(14) <i>au</i>

II. CONSONANTS

(a) *visarga*(15) *ḥ*(b) *anusvāra*(16) *ṁ*(c) *stopped consonants*

	unvoiced	unvoiced aspirate	voiced	voiced aspirate	nasal
guttural . . .	(17) <i>k</i>	(18) <i>kh</i>	(19) <i>g</i>	(20) <i>gh</i>	(21) <i>ṅ</i>
palatal . . .	(22) <i>c</i>	(23) <i>ch</i>	(24) <i>j</i>	(25) <i>jh</i>	(26) <i>ñ</i>
retroflex . . .	(27) <i>ṭ</i>	(28) <i>ṭh</i>	(29) <i>ḍ</i>	(30) <i>ḍh</i>	(31) <i>ṇ</i>
dental . . .	(32) <i>t</i>	(33) <i>th</i>	(34) <i>d</i>	(35) <i>dh</i>	(36) <i>n</i>
labial . . .	(37) <i>p</i>	(38) <i>ph</i>	(39) <i>b</i>	(40) <i>bh</i>	(41) <i>m</i>

(d) *semivowels*

palatal . . .	(42) <i>y</i>
retroflex . . .	(43) <i>r</i>
dental . . .	(44) <i>l</i>
labial . . .	(45) <i>v</i>

(e) *sibilants*

palatal . . .	(46) <i>ś</i>
retroflex . . .	(47) <i>ṣ</i>
dental . . .	(48) <i>s</i>

(f) *aspiration*(49) *h*

* This vowel is the invention of the paṇḍits, and never occurs in practice. The short vocalic *ḷ* occurs only in the root *klp* and its derivatives.

To these letters the Dravidian languages and Sinhalese add the short vowels *ě* (between *ī* and *e*) and *ō* (between *e* and *o*). Sinhalese has also the additional vowels *ā* and *ā̃* (between *ā* and *i*). Tamil adds the consonants *l*, *ḷ* (not the same as the vocalic *ḷ* of Sanskrit), *r*, and *ṇ* at the end of the alphabet; these letters cannot stand at the beginning of a word. The Tamil alphabet omits the aspirate letters and several others, and the unvoiced letters serve to express the sound of the voiced. The system of transliteration used for Tamil words and quotations in this book does not show this peculiarity.

It will be seen that this alphabet is methodical and scientific, its elements classified first into vowels and consonants, and then, within each section, according to the manner in which the sound is formed. The gutturals are formed by the constriction of the throat at the back of the tongue, the palatals by pressing the tongue flat against the palate, the retroflex by turning up the tip of the tongue to touch the hard palate, the dentals by touching the upper teeth with the tongue, and the labials by pursing the lips.

The vowels *ā*, *i*, *ī*, *u*, *ū*, *e*, *ai*, *o*, and *au* are pronounced approximately as in German or Italian, *e* and *o* being "close" sounds, as in German *beten* and *boten*, but short *a* has the dull sound of the English *shut*. In very early times *r* and the vocalic *ḷ* were pronounced approximately as are the second syllables of the words *water* and *bottle* by Americans, but before the Christian era they were sounded as *ri* and *lri*. The Sinhalese *ā* and *ā̃* are pronounced approximately as the vowels in the English *hat* and *hair* respectively. According to traditional phonetics *e* and *o* are classed as diphthongs and in Sanskrit are invariably long.

Of the two first consonants *h*, occurring only at the end of words or syllables, is a rough breathing, replacing an original *s* or *r*. It is a distinct emission of breath, often followed by a faint continuation of the preceding vowel. *Anusvāra*, or *m*, written in Indian scripts as a dot, is in part a mere abbreviation, representing a nasal sound before a stopped consonant. Thus *saṃdhi* is pronounced as *sandhi*, and *aṃga* as *aṅga*. Before semi-vowels, sibilants or *h* it had the effect of nasalizing the preceding vowel, as in French or Portuguese; thus *aṃśu* was pronounced very approximately as the French *un chou*. By many modern speakers *m* in this position is pronounced as the English *ng* in *sang*.

The distinction between the aspirate and unaspirate consonants is not immediately recognized by the European, but it is clear to the Indian. *K*, for instance, is pronounced without any noticeable emission of breath, and *kh* (written as one letter in Indian scripts) with a strong emission, as in the usual pronunciation of the English *c* in *come*. Thus the reader should avoid the temptation to pronounce *th* and *ph* as the initial sounds of the English *thing* and *phial*; they approximate to the sounds in *pothook* and *shepherd*. *C* is pronounced approximately as the second consonantal sound in the English *church*, and *ch* as the first sound in the same word, i.e., with a stronger emission of breath. *J* is pronounced as in English, and not as in German or French. A clear distinction is made between the retroflex or cerebral

consonants and the dental, though it is not very evident to the untrained English ear. The English *t* and *d* are nearer to the Indian retroflex *ṭ* and *ḍ* than to the Indian dentals *t* and *d*, which approximate to the corresponding sounds in Italian.

Modern Indians do not generally differentiate in speaking between *ś* and *ṣ*, and inscriptions show that the two sounds began to be confused at an early date. Both resemble *sh* in the English *shut*. Originally *ṣ* was pronounced, like the other retroflex consonants, with the tip of the tongue touching the top of the hard palate.

Of the special Tamil letters *ḷ* has the sound of an *l* with the tongue turned as far back as possible. Many modern Tamil speakers pronounce this letter rather like the *s* in the English *measure* or the French *j*, but more harshly. The consonantal *ḷ* (which also occurs in Vedic and some Prākṛits) is pronounced by placing the tongue on the top of the hard palate and flapping it forward; *r* at the end of a syllable is often pronounced as *t*; between two vowels it is approximately *dr*, and when doubled *tr*, while *ṛṛ* is usually pronounced as *ndr*; though a distinction formerly existed Tamil *ṛ* is in modern speech indistinguishable from *n*.

We have seen that Vedic Sanskrit, like Greek, had a tonic accent, but this, again as in Greek, disappeared very early from ordinary speech, its place being taken by a stress accent, as in most European languages. The stress is placed on the last prosodically long syllable of a word (i.e. a syllable containing either a long vowel or a short vowel followed by two consonants) other than the final syllable, which never has the accent. In a word with no long syllables the accent is on the first syllable. E.g. *sābhā*, *Himālaya*, *Śakuntalā*, *dvayava*. The stress is not as marked as in English.

APPENDIX XI

PROSODY

Like those of classical Europe the metres of Indian poetry are quantitative, based on the order of long and short syllables, and not, as in English, on stress. As in classical European languages a syllable was counted as long if it contained a long vowel (*ā*, *ī*, *ū*, *ṛ*, *e*, *o*, *ai* or *au*), or a short vowel followed by two consonants. The favourite stanza form at all times was of four lines or "quarters" (*pāda*), usually equal, and varying in length from eight to over twenty syllables each, with a full cæsuræ between the second and third quarters. Most of the metres of classical poetry were set in rigid patterns and not divided into feet, but broken only by one or two cæsuræ in each quarter. The metres of the Veda, however, and the epic *śloka* metre, allowed considerable variation.

Though most of the Vedic hymns are in stanzas of four quarters there are some with three or five divisions. Of the former, one, called *Gāyatrī*, is common, and is that of the famous *Gāyatrī* verse quoted on p. 162. It

consists of three sections of eight syllables each, the first four of which are free, while the last four have the cadence $\cup - \cup \simeq$.

The commonest Vedic stanza is *Triṣṭubh*, consisting of four quarters of eleven syllables each. The quarter normally has a cæsura after the fourth or fifth syllable, and is prevailingly iambic. The last four syllables of each quarter have the cadence $- \cup - \simeq$. For example:

*Índrasya nu víriāṇi prá vocam
yāni cakāra prathamāni vajrī.
Āhann Āhim, anu apās tatarda,
pra vakṣāṇā abhinat párvatānām.**

Similar to this, but with an extra syllable in each quarter, was the twelve-syllabled *Jagatī*, with the cadence $- \cup - \cup \simeq$.

In the later hymns of the *Rg Veda* a stanza of four eight-syllable quarters, called *Anuṣṭubh*, became popular. This was much the same as *Gāyatrī*, with a fourth line added, but there was considerable variation in the final cadence. For example:

*Sahásra-śīrṣā Púruṣaḥ,
sahasrákṣāḥ, saháśrapāt.
Sá bhūmim viśvato vṛtvā
áty atīṣṭhad daśāṅgulám.†*

From the *Anuṣṭubh* of the Vedas developed the *Śloka*, the chief epic metre of later times. This consisted of four quarters of eight syllables each, the first and third normally ending with the cadence $\cup - - \simeq$, and the second and fourth with $\cup - \cup \simeq$. Certain specified variations were allowed. As an example we quote the first verse of the account of Damayanti's svayaṃvara, translated on p. 409.

*Atha kāle śubhe prāpte,
tithau puṇye kṣaṇe tathā,
ājuhāva mahipālān
Bhīmo rājā svayaṃvare.*

The *śloka* metre was widely used for poetry of all kinds, especially for didactic and narrative verse. The courtly poets, however, favoured longer metres, with their quantities rigidly fixed in complicated rhythmic patterns, some with regular cæsuræ. Textbooks describe over 100 metres of this kind, many with fanciful names, but only some twenty or thirty were popular. Of these we mention a few of the most common.

Indravajra ("Indra's Thunderbolt"):

4 × 11: $- - \cup - - \cup \cup - \cup - \simeq$.

*Bhāgīrathī-nīrjhara-sikarāṇām
voḍhā muhuḥ kampīta-devadāruḥ
yad vāyur anvīṣṭamṛgaiḥ kirātair
āsevya bhinna-śikhaṇḍi-barhaḥ.‡*

* The first verse of the hymn to Indra (*R.V.* i. 32) translated on p. 400.

† The first verse of the "Hymn of the Primeval Man" (*R.V.* x. 90), in part translated on p. 240).

‡ *Kumāra Sambhava*, i, 15, translated on p. 421—"And the wind forever . . ."

Upendravajra (Secondary *Indravajra*), a variant of the above, with the first syllable short:

4 × 11: ◡ — ◡ — — ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡.

Quarter lines of *Indravajra* and *Upendravajra* were often combined in mixed stanzas. Such stanzas of varying metres were called *Upajāti*.

Vaṃśastha:

4 × 12: ◡ — ◡ — — ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡ ◡.

Indravāṃśa: like *Vaṃśastha*, but with a long first syllable:

4 × 12: — — ◡ — — ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡ ◡.

Vaṃśastha and *Indravāṃśa* were often combined in an *Upajāti* metre, e.g. the verses of Kālidāsa quoted on p. 422, n.

Vasantatilakā ("The Ornament of Spring"):

4 × 14: — — ◡ — ◡ ◡ ◡ — ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡.

*Adyāpi tām praṇayinīm mṛgaśāvakaḥśim
pīyūṣa-varṇa-kuca-kumbha-yugaṃ vahantīm
paśyāmy ahaṃ yadi punar dīvasāvasāne
svargāpavarga-vara-rājya-sukhaṃ tyajāmi.**

Mālīnī ("The Girl wearing a Garland"):

4 × 15: ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ — — / — ◡ — — ◡ — ◡.

*Kim iha bahubhir uktair yukti-sūnyaiḥ pralāpair?
Dvayam api puruṣāṇāṃ sarvadā sevānīyam—
abhinava-mada-līlā-lālasaṃ sundarīnāṃ
stana-bhara-parikhinnaṃ yauvanaṃ vā vanaṃ vā.†*

Prthvī ("The Earth"):

4 × 17: ◡ — ◡ ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡ ◡ ◡ — ◡ — — ◡ ◡.

*Labheta sikatāsu tailam api yatnataḥ pīḍayan
pibec ca mṛgatṛṣṇikāsu salilaṃ pīpāsārditaḥ
kadācid api paryaṭaṇ chāṣa-viṣāṇam āśādayen,
na tu pratiniṣṭa-mūrkhā-jana-cittam ārādhayet.‡*

Mandākrāntā ("The Slow-stepper"):

4 × 17: — — — — / ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ — / — ◡ — — ◡ — ◡.

An example of this metre is given on p. 419, n.

Śikhariṇī ("The Excellent Lady"):

4 × 17: ◡ — — — — / ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ — — ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡.

*Yad' āsīd ajñānaṃ smara-timira-saṃskāra-janitaṃ
tadā dṛṣṭaṃ nārī-mayam idam aśeṣaṃ jagad api.
Idānim asmākaṃ paṭutara-vivekāñjana-juṣāṃ
samibhūtā dṛṣṭis tribhuvanam api Brahma manute.§*

* Bilhana, *Caurapañcāśikā*, 45, translated on p. 428: "Even today, if this evening . . ."

† Bhartṛhari, *Śṛṅgārasataka*, 53, translated on p. 426: "What is the use . . .?"

‡ Bhartṛhari, *Nīṭisataka*, 5: translated on p. 425: "You may if you squeeze hard enough . . ."

§ Bhartṛhari, *Vairāgyasataka*, 82, translated on p. 426: "When I was ignorant . . ."

Hariṇī ("The Doe"):

4 × 17: ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ — / — — — — / ◡ — ◡ ◡ — ◡ ◡.

*Apara-jaladher Lakṣmīm yasmin Purīm Purabhit-prabhe
mada-gaja-ghaṭākārair nāvām śatair avamṛdati
jalada-pāṭalānikākīrṇaṃ navotpala-mecakaṃ
jalanidhir iva vyoma vyomnaḥ samo 'bhavad ambudhiḥ.**

Sārdūla-vikṛīḍita ("The Tiger's Sport"):

4 × 19: — — — ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡ ◡ ◡ — / — — ◡ — — ◡ ◡.

*Keśāḥ saṃyaminaḥ, śruter api paraṃ pāraṃgate locane,
cāntarvaktram api svabhāva-sucibhiḥ kīrṇaṃ dvijānāṃ gaṇaiḥ,
muktānāṃ sataśādhivāsa-ruciraṃ vakṣoja-kumbhadvayaṃ
cetthaṃ tanvi vapuḥ praśāntaṃ api te kṣobhaṃ karoty eva naḥ.†*

Sragdharā ("The Girl with a Garland"):

4 × 21: — — — — ◡ — — / ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ — / — ◡ — — — ◡ ◡.

The verses of Bāṇa quoted on p. 427 are in this metre.

In a few rather rare metres the first and third quarters differ in length from the second and fourth. The commonest of these was *Puṣpitaṅgrā*:

2 × (12 + 13): ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡ — ◡ — ◡ /
◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ — ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡ — ◡ ◡.

*"Aham iha nivasāmi. Yāhi Rādhām,
anunaya madvacanena c' ānayethāḥ".
Iti Madhuripuṇā sakhī niyuktā,
svayam idam etya punar jagāda Rādhām.‡*

As well as metres of this type there are others, the scansion of which is based on the number of syllabic instants (*mātrā*) in each quarter-verse. The most common of these is *Āryā* ("The Lady"). This is divided into feet, each containing four instants, counting a prosodically short syllable as one and a long syllable as two instants (i.e. — —, — ◡ ◡, ◡ — ◡, ◡ ◡ —, or ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡). The first quarter of the *Āryā* stanza contains three such feet; the second, four and a half; the third, three, and the fourth three and a half, with an extra short syllable after the second foot. The whole of Hāla's *Saptaśataka* is written in this metre; for example:

*Bhaṇḍantīa taṇāim
sottuṃ diṇṇāi jāi pahīassa.
Tāi ccea pahāe
ajjā āaḍḍhaī ruantī.§*

* "Radiant as the god Śiva, he besieged Purī, the fortune of the Western Sea, with hundreds of ships, like elephants in rut, the dark blue sky, scattered with hosts of heavy clouds, looked like the sea, and the sea looked like the sky."

From a panegyric of King Pulakeśin II Cālukya in an inscription at Aihoḷe, Hyderābād, composed by Ravikīrti and dated A.D. 634 (*EI* vi, 8ff.).

† Bhartṛhari, *Śṛṅgāraśataka*, 12, translated on p. 425: "Your hair well combed . . ."

‡ The introductory verse to the lyric of Jayadeva's *Gīta Govinda*, translated on p. 428.

§ *Saptaśataka*, 379, translated on p. 461 "Last night with scorn . . ."

This verse is to be scanned as follows:

-- / - ◡ ◡ / -- /
 -- / -- / ◡ - ◡ / ◡ ◡ - / -
 -- / - ◡ ◡ / -- /
 -- / -- / ◡ / ◡ ◡ - / -.

The metres employed by Jayadeva in his *Gīta Govinda* are exceptional, although imitated by later poets. They are no doubt borrowed from popular song. The stanzas of the lyric quoted on p. 429, excluding the refrain, consist of four quarters of nine, eight, nine and ten syllables respectively, all of which are short except the last rhyming syllable in the first and third quarters and the penultimate in the second and fourth.

The prosody of Tamil poetry differs considerably from that of Sanskrit. In Tamil the basic unit is the "metrical syllable" (*aśai*), which may be a single syllable or a long syllable preceded by a short one. Two, three or four of these form a foot, of which a line of poetry may contain from two to six or occasionally more. Complicated rules, which cannot be discussed here, much restrict the order of syllables and feet in the line.

APPENDIX XII

THE GYPSIES

Among India's many gifts to the world we must include the Gypsies, who, with their music and dancing, have formed a romantic and colourful element in European life for over five centuries.

The European Gypsies have no recollection of their Indian origin, but have generally claimed to be Egyptians. The Russian Gypsies, it is said, even declare that their ancestors were a single soldier of the army of Pharaoh and a young girl, who escaped drowning when Moses led the Israelites over the Red Sea. This tradition of the Gypsies' Egyptian origin was for long taken at its face value, until, in 1763, a Hungarian protestant theological student, Stefan Vályi, published a brief paper pointing to the close similarity between the language of the Gypsies of his native plains and that of three Indian theological students whom he had met at the University of Leyden. It was long before the true significance of this fact was recognized, but it is now universally agreed that the Gypsy language, or Romani, is an Indo-Āryan one, and that the fact can only be accounted for by postulating that the Gypsies came from India.

The relationship of Romani to the languages of Northern India is very obvious, even to those with no linguistic training, for many of the commonest words of Romani are little different from those of India. Thus:

<i>Romani</i> *	<i>Indo-Aryan</i>	<i>English</i>
<i>Ek</i>	Sanskrit <i>eka</i> , Hindi <i>ek</i>	one
<i>dui</i>	Skt. <i>dva</i> , H. <i>do</i>	two
<i>trin</i>	Skt. <i>tri</i> , H. <i>tīn</i>	three
<i>štar</i>	Skt. <i>catvār</i> , H. <i>cār</i>	four
<i>pañci</i>	Skt. <i>pañca</i> , H. <i>pañc</i>	five
<i>šo</i>	Skt. <i>ṣaṣ</i>	six
<i>efta</i>	(Greek, ἑπτὰ)	seven
<i>ohto</i>	(Greek, ὀκτώ)	eight
<i>inea</i>	(Greek, ἐννέα)	nine
<i>deš</i>	Skt. <i>daśa</i>	ten
<i>biš</i>	H. <i>bīs</i>	twenty
<i>šel</i>	Skt. <i>śata</i>	hundred
<i>manuš</i>	Skt. <i>manuṣya</i>	man
<i>bal</i>	Skt. <i>bāla</i> , H. <i>bāl</i>	hair
<i>kan</i>	Skt. <i>kārṇa</i> , H. <i>kān</i>	ear
<i>nak</i>	H. <i>nāk</i>	nose
<i>yak</i>	Skt. <i>akṣa</i>	eye
<i>kalo</i>	Skt. <i>kāla</i>	black
<i>caco</i>	Skt. <i>satya</i> , H. <i>sac</i>	true, etc., etc.

Philologists have shown by the comparison of Romani with the Prākritis and modern Indian languages, that the Gypsies originated in the Ganges basin, which they left before the time of Aśoka (3rd century B.C.), to reside for several centuries in North-Western India. Probably even at this time they were wandering musicians and entertainers. In modern India there is a lowly caste of such people called *Doms*, attested since the early Middle Ages, and with this word the word *Rom*, by which the Gypsies universally designate themselves, is probably connected. In Syrian Romani it occurs as *Doum*, very close to the Indian form.

According to the 11th c. Persian poet Firdūsī, who collected many legends and traditions of pre-Muslim Persia in his "Book of Kings" (*Shāh-nāmah*), the 5th-century Sāsānian king Bahrām Gūr, invited ten thousand Indian musicians to his realm, and gave them cattle, corn and asses, that they might settle in the land and entertain his poorer subjects, who had been complaining that the pleasures of music and dance were reserved for the rich. But the musicians refused to settle; they ate the cattle and seed-corn which the king had given them, and wandered about the land like wolves or wild dogs.

Though Firdūsī's story may not be wholly accurate, it shows that low caste Indian musicians were well known in the Middle East at a very early time. With the Arab conquest of Sind in the early 8th century further groups of Indian entertainers must have found their way westwards and later have moved on to Africa and Europe. Folk called Athinganoi are recorded as living in Constantinople in A.D. 810, and later Byzantine records refer to these Athinganoi or Azinganoi as magicians and conjurors.

* These words are taken from Serboianu's grammar and glossary of Roumanian Romani (*Les Tsiganes*, Paris, 1930). His rather unscientific system of transliteration has been modified in accordance with the usual Indo-Āryan system.

These were probably the forerunners of the Tsigany bands who appeared in Central and Western Europe in the late Middle Ages. The earliest record of Gypsies in Europe other than in the Balkans is from the German city of Hildesheim, where a passing band is recorded in 1407. A great horde of Gypsies passed through Basel in 1422, under a chief who called himself Michael, Prince of Egypt. Within a few decades they had overrun all Europe; the earliest records show that they had all the characteristics of their descendants—they were careless, lazy, dirty and cheerful, skilled in metal work and tinkering, splendid musicians and dancers, their bodies bedecked with bright garments and jewellery, their menfolk cunning horse-dealers, their womenfolk telling fortunes, and both sexes losing no opportunity to pilfer from the unsuspecting *gorjo*. It was not long before the Gypsies began to feel the fierce persecution which they were to suffer in most parts of Europe down to the present day, when many Gypsies perished in the gas-chambers of the Third Reich.

From the many loan-words in the various dialects of Romani we may roughly trace the course of their migrations. All the Romani dialects of West and Central Europe contain many Greek and South Slavonic words, which prove that the ancestors of our western Gypsies dwelt long in the Balkans. The Spanish Gypsies appear to have arrived in their new homeland from two directions, a first immigration coming via Egypt and the north coast of Africa, no doubt during the Moorish occupation of southern Spain, and a second, later, over the Pyrenees.

Little but their language remains to connect the Gypsies with their original home, and even their speech is full of borrowings from almost every tongue of Europe and many of Asia. Though the Gypsies have always tended to marry their own kind, centuries of wandering have left their mark on the Gypsy type and there are now many fair Gypsies, though others, if suitably attired, would not seem out of place in a modern North Indian city. On analysis their music is that of the lands in which they dwell. Whether in Hungary, Roumania or Spain, it is based on local folk-song and dance. Unfortunately the English Gypsies have largely forgotten their traditional art, but when they sing they sing folk-songs and music-hall ballads; in Ireland the tinkers sing Irish folk-songs. Yet, wherever the Gypsies go, their musicians tend to give their music a character of its own. A predilection for ornamentation of the melody, especially with quarter-tones, a preference for the minor mode, a tendency to introduce progressions by augmented whole tones into their melodies, and a love of complex rhythm, are perhaps survivals of the Indian musical tradition which the first Romanis brought with them from their homeland. Some Gypsy folktales resemble those of India, but the same may be said of the traditional tales of every country of Europe. A few Gypsy customs and beliefs may be genuine Indian survivals. Though by no means a hygienically inclined people, the Gypsies have ideas of ritual purity and birth and death taboos which remind us of those of Hinduism. Thus a woman in childbirth is impure, and must bear her child outside her caravan or tent for fear of polluting it. Gypsy midwives are impure throughout their lives, and are taboo to all respectable

Gypsies, like the outcast village midwives of India. Corpses are also impure, and dying Gypsies are carried from their caravans to end their lives in the open air, for fear of pollution. The Gypsy taboo on horse-slaughters may have an Indian origin. But all these resemblances might well be accounted for otherwise.

The Gypsies have, in fact, forgotten their ancestry. In one respect, however, they have kept to the traditions of their homeland. Though they have adapted their ways to time and place, and have always been open to new influences, they are still governed by their own laws and their own code of morality. They have doggedly retained their individuality against persecution and persuasion alike—an independent social group, transcending regional and national boundaries, knit together by common customs, common means of livelihood, and common blood. In this respect they are Indian. They are a caste, as their Indian counterparts, the Doms, are a caste, and even the innovations of the Twentieth Century have not been able to destroy their caste solidarity.

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The following standard abbreviations are used:

- AI* *Ancient India* (the Journal of the Archæological Department).
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- AL* *Art and Letters* (Journal of the Royal India, Pākistān and Ceylon
 Society). London.
- ARSIE* *Annual Reports of South Indian Epigraphy.* Delhi.
- ASIAR* *Archæological Survey of India Annual Reports.* Delhi.
- AV* *Atharva Veda.*
- BhG* *Bhagavad Gītā.*
- Br.* *Brāhmaṇa.*
- BSOAS* *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.* London.
- CHI* *Cambridge History of India*, 6 vols. (vol. ii not yet published).
 Cambridge, 1922- .
- CII* *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, 3 vols. London, 1888-1929.
- DN* *Dīgha Nikāya* of the Pāli Canon.
- ed. Edited by, edition.
- EI* *Epigraphia Indica.* Calcutta and Delhi.
- IA* *Indian Antiquary.* Calcutta.
- IC* *Indian Culture.* Calcutta.
- IHQ* *Indian Historical Quarterly.* Calcutta.
- J* *Jātaka.*
- JA* *Journal Asiatique.* Paris.
- JAHS* *Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society.* Rājamundry.
- JAOS* *Journal of the American Oriental Society.* Baltimore.
- JIH* *Journal of Indian History.* Trivandrum.
- JNSI* *Journal of the Numismatic Society of India.* Calcutta.
- JRAI* *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.* London.
- JRAS* *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.* London.
- Mbh.* *Mahābhārata* (Poona edition unless otherwise stated).
- P.E.* Pillar Edict of Aśoka.
- PHAI* *Political History of Ancient India*, H. C. Raychaudhuri. 6th ed.
 Calcutta, 1953.
- R.E.* Rock Edict of Aśoka.
- RV* *Rg Veda.*
- SBE* *Sacred Books of the East*, 50 vols. Ed. F. Max Müller, Oxford,
 1879-1900.
- tr. Translated by, translation.
- Up.* *Upaniṣad.*
- ZDMG* *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.* Berlin.

A NOTE FOR THE READER WHO WISHES TO READ FURTHER

This book is primarily intended for those who know no Sanskrit; hence editions of original texts are not generally mentioned, but reference is made to translations wherever possible. As many Indian readers of this book will have little or no knowledge of European languages, English translations of works by continental scholars are referred to wherever they exist. Few of the books mentioned will be found in the ordinary English lending libraries, but most can be obtained by local librarians through the National Central Library for Students.

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* Exceptional among translations from Sanskrit into Western languages are the numerous works of the great German poet Friedrich Rückert, whose version of Jayadeva's *Gīta Govinda* especially is among the greatest masterpieces of the translator's art.

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NOTE. The following abbreviations are used: arch., archæological; c., city; dyn., dynasty; H., Hindi; k., king; leg., legendary; n., proper name; Pkt., Prākṛit; pl., place-name; reg., region; Skt., Sanskrit; Tam., Tamil.

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
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A STUDY OF HISTORY

VOLUME XII
RECONSIDERATIONS

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A STUDY OF HISTORY

BY
ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

VOLUME XII
RECONSIDERATIONS

He that refuseth instruction despiseth
his own soul, but he that heareth re-
proof getteth understanding.

Prov. xv. 32



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PREFACE

I AM very grateful for the generous help that I have received towards producing this volume.

The Rockefeller Foundation of New York gave my wife and me a travel grant for the purpose of seeing countries at first hand with an eye to revising the previous volumes of this book. Thanks to this, we have been able to visit a number of Asian and Latin American countries that we had previously known only from books, pictures, and maps. This experience has been an invaluable aid to the writing of this volume.

In July 1958, at Madame Heurgon-Desjardins's invitation, I had the pleasure of taking part in a 'décade', held at Cerisy-la-Salle in Normandy, at which my work was the subject of discussion. I could not have been given a more stimulating start for the writing of the present volume.

My wife has typed the whole of a much-corrected manuscript, and Miss Norah Williams has made a fair copy of this typescript after it had been extensively corrected again. To undertake this hard and exacting work was a great kindness.

My wife has also made the index for this volume, as she did for the previous three sets of volumes. Her indexes are not limited to words and names; they analyse ideas and structure too. They are an integral and indispensable part of the book.

Miss M. V. Stirling has settled queries and filled in blanks in the bibliography. If she had not been so resourceful and indefatigable, the bibliography could not have been completed.

Rabbi J. B. Agus and Professor G. R. Willey have kindly read parts of this volume in typescript and have given me their comments.¹ Their help has been most valuable to me, but it does not involve them in any responsibility for my final version, here printed. The responsibility for this is mine alone.

The Editor of *The Intent of Toynbee's History*, Professor Edward T. Gargan, kindly allowed me to see the typescript of this book before he sent it to the press. This has made it possible for me to make verbatim quotations from it, though not to give the printed page references for these.


I am also indebted to my critics. But for them, this volume would not have been written. My acknowledgements and thanks to them will be found in Chapter II, Annex, Section 1.

ARNOLD TOYNBEE

26 November, 1960

¹ Rabbi Agus's comments are printed in the present volume in full, with his permission, in the annexes to the chapters to which they refer.

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INTRODUCTION

IN publishing a book a writer is deliberately exposing his work to 'the wreckful siege of battering days'. This is his own doing. He has been under no compulsion, except an inner one. But, having once published, he must then choose between two alternative policies. He can say, 'What I have written, I have written', and spend the rest of his working life on trying to maintain his previous positions—for no better reason than that he happens once to have occupied them. Alternatively, he can think again; see whether or not he has changed his mind on this or that disputed point; publish the results of these second thoughts; and explain why, after reconsideration, he has in fact changed his mind in some cases and held to his previous opinion in others.

At a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society at which a critique of Ellsworth Huntington's work and mine had been presented by O. H. K. Spate, the Chairman is reported¹ to have remarked, at the close of the discussion: 'I always wish there was some way in the scientific world of retracting what one has said in the past.' Surely there is. *Solvitur ambulando*.

Justice Holmes once wrote that 'to have doubted one's own first principles is the mark of a civilized man'.² In quoting this passage a philosopher, M. R. Cohen, comments that men like Socrates and Einstein 'never outgrow a childlike curiosity about the Universe and continue, as long as they live, to ask questions of the World and to revise mistaken views'.³ The choice between following their example and following Pilate's is not a difficult one to make.

Pilate's stand would indeed be a particularly unreasonable one for me to take about the first ten volumes of this book. One of my critics has called it 'an intellectual autobiography'.⁴ A number of them have pointed out that, in the course of writing it, I have moved from one position to another at least once. If I had not, I should feel uneasy, for that would have meant that my mind had stood still during the thirty-three years (1921-54) that passed between my making of a first sketch for a plan of the book and the publication of volumes vii-x. In this last batch of volumes 'a hardening of the categories' has, indeed, been detected by one critic;⁵ and obviously it is probable that I may show

¹ *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 428.

² O. W. Holmes: 'Ideals and Doubts' in *Collected Legal Papers* (New York 1921, Harcourt Brace), p. 307.

³ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 175.

⁴ R. P. Blackmur in *The Kenyon Review*, Summer, 1955, pp. 357-90.

⁵ 'These last four volumes reveal an aspect of Toynbee which is inevitable in any scholar who has worked at a chosen subject for over a generation. It is what has been called a hardening of the categories. These four volumes are constructed on the framework made familiar in the previous six. . . . All of these concepts were introduced earlier as tentative, hypothetical ideas to be tested out to see how far they could serve in organizing the synoptic historian's material. Now, in the last volumes, they are all taken for granted as having been proved and established—as being, in fact, the framework within which the events of history do actually arrange themselves. What was once a subjective suggestion is now objective fact' (F. H. Underhill in *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. xxxvi, No. 3 (September, 1955), pp. 222-35).

symptoms of this intellectual malady. But the verdict of other critics makes it also probable that, during those thirty-three years, my mind did move considerably, and, if it did, I am glad of this. That means, however, that, if I now tried to maintain all my previous positions, I should find myself at war with myself as well as with my critics. It is more profitable to try to learn from one's critics than to try to fight them; and the avowal of one's own inconsistencies and changes of view is a small price to pay for the liberty that this gives one to try again and to attempt to do better. One reviewer of the first ten volumes has generously given me credit for changing my views and citing my critics.¹ This testimony is worth having. I shall do my best to continue to deserve it. If there is any treatment that can rejuvenate one's categories, it is the exercise of keeping one's mind open and making a habit of thinking again. Another reviewer has said that this book is my education.² I want to carry this education farther. To stop it would feel, to me, like committing intellectual suicide. So I do not quarrel with this reviewer for going on to say that I have not found my port.³ Another reviewer has called my work a 'quest' (*xetema*).⁴ He feels that my latest position, in the volumes published hitherto, is not a final one,⁵ and he finds a 'tension between the immanent logic of the *xetema* and Toynbee's unwillingness to pursue his search to the end'.⁶ I mean to go on pursuing my search, but I do not expect it to bring me to an 'end', and if I found myself 'in port' I should be distressed. Man's quest is really an attempt to probe to the heart of the mystery of the Universe, and I do not believe that human beings can attain that goal in this life. If a port on this side of death is unattainable, it is best to keep the seas. One does this, of course, at one's peril. 'Es irrt der Mensch, solang er strebt.'⁷

The present volume therefore makes no pretension to finality. It is merely a report of second thoughts. If the English-reading public still tolerated Latin titles, I could not find a better one for this piece of work than Saint Augustine's word *retractationes*. This means 'reconsiderations', not 'retractions', though it is unlikely that a writer will not retract some of his previous propositions if he has reconsidered them genuinely.

The first ten volumes of this book need to be reconsidered now because of the new knowledge and new thought that have been accumulating since the autumn of 1954, when volumes vii-x were published. Some of the new knowledge is new for everybody. During the intervening years there have been important archaeological discoveries and important current events. Some of it is new only for me. I have made good a few of the innumerable gaps in my own knowledge, mainly by travelling round the World and seeing, at first hand, a number of countries that I had previously known only from maps and descriptions.⁸

¹ F. Neilson in *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, supplement to vol. xiv, No. 3 (April, 1955), p. 3.

² A. Hourani: 'Toynbee's Vision of History' in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 386.

³ Ibid., p. 400.

⁴ E. Voegelin in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Goethe: *Faust*, I, 317.

⁸ See A. J. Toynbee, *East to West* (London 1958, Oxford University Press). I have been able to make this journey, and others, thanks to a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to my wife and me.

Meanwhile, current events have been following each other thick and fast. A reviewer, commenting in April 1955 on what I have written in volume ix about the prospects of the Western Civilization, remarks that 'perhaps it was written too soon'.¹ This is always true of all attempts at interpreting contemporary history, at whatever date they may have been written. The best that one can do in this field is to go on producing interim reports, and to take care, each time, to put one's provisional findings tentatively. Meanwhile, there has been progress in thought, and some of this, again, has been progress for everybody, while some of it has been peculiar to me. The public progress has been most striking, I should say, in the field of psychology; my private progress has been mainly owing to the critiques of my first ten volumes that have appeared since these were published. I have read, and thought about, as many of these criticisms as I have been able to track down, and have done my best to reconsider with an open mind those things in my work that the critics have questioned, challenged, or disputed. The ideal would be to be able to take one's second look at one's own work as if it were someone else's, and as if one were making one's first acquaintance with it for the purpose of reviewing it. This is the state of mind at which one should aim in order to draw the maximum profit from other people's criticisms. But, since an author is also a human being, it is unlikely that he will succeed in even approaching this degree of detachment.

I have tried especially to take to heart those criticisms in which there has been something like a consensus among critics who differ widely from each other in their temperaments, outlooks, and intellectual equipment. The most important point, I should say, that has been almost unanimously contested has been my claim that my method of inquiry has been an empirical one. Most of my critics evidently have the impression that it has been just the opposite. They feel that I have worked out an *a priori* scheme that is too clear-cut and too rigid to be likely to correspond to reality, and that I have then tried to force the phenomena to fit into this arbitrary framework at the cost of distorting the truth. This is, it seems to me, the most fundamental, and therefore the most serious, of all the criticisms of my work; so I have discussed it as fully and frankly as I have known how to do. I have also reconsidered with special care the other points that have drawn a converging fire; for example, my construction of the course of what I have called 'Hellenic' history to include the history of Rome (a number of critics have objected that the role which I have assigned to Rome is too subordinate a one); my use of this construction of Hellenic history as a pattern or key or 'paradigm' for analysing the histories of other civilizations (this has been cited as an instance of my tendency to force the facts); my construction of the course of what I have called 'Syriac' history, and my consequent handling of Islam and of the Jews.

If it is a good working rule for an author that, where he finds two or more critics agreeing, he should prick up his ears, I must also take notice of an impression that I have evidently made on some critics' minds. This is that I have sought to set myself up as a 'prophet', or,

¹ Neilson, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

short of that, that I have lapsed into playing the prophet unconsciously.

The word 'prophet' has, of course, two distinct meanings, owing to the fact that two different roles have sometimes been played simultaneously by the same person. The ordinary current meaning of the word in present-day English is someone who predicts the future, and on this head I have no need to try to exculpate myself. For one thing, prophecy in this sense is considered to be quite respectable when it is practised by students of the non-human sciences. Astronomers, for instance, prophesy boldly and successfully with impunity. In the second place, I myself believe that prediction is not possible in the field of human affairs. I believe that the outcomes of human choices, purposes, and plans are unpredictable intrinsically, however fully we may be informed about the relevant past facts up to date. And I also believe that these intrinsically unpredictable plans, purposes, and choices play a large enough part in every human situation to invalidate predictions based on other elements in human affairs that might perhaps be predictable if ever they could be isolated. I have set out my views on this explicitly in previous volumes¹ and need not go over the same ground again here. There is, however, also another meaning of the word 'prophet' in which the original Greek preposition 'pro' signifies not 'fore' but 'out'. The prophet in this other sense is not someone who predicts the future; he is someone who speaks out or promulgates the word of God. The prophets of Israel and Judah and the two gentile prophets Zarathustra and Muhammad have been *the* prophets in this sense. It is the official doctrine of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam alike that this series of promulgations of God's will has long since been closed; and, anyway, anybody who set up in the present-day world to be a prophet in this sense would rightly be treated as a figure of fun.² The imputation is difficult to deal with, because the next most ridiculous thing to saying 'I think I am a prophet' would be to say 'I really don't think I am.' Perhaps the best answer is not a verbal but a practical one. A readiness to believe that one may have been mistaken in the views that one has expressed is surely incompatible with believing that they are not one's own, but God's. So I hope this volume of reconsiderations may effectively dissipate the spectre of 'Toynbee the prophet'.³

¹ For instance, in i. 299-302, and in ix. 167-405.

² I admire Dean Inge, nevertheless, for having had the courage to write: 'The philosopher ought to be a prophet' ('The Place of Myth in Philosophy' in *Philosophy*, vol. xi, No. 42 (April, 1936), pp. 131-45, ad fin.).

³ Pieter Geyl, at any rate, seems to hold that playing the prophet and paying attention to criticisms are incompatible. In a critique in which he says that my work is vitiated by my thinking that I have a 'message' (M. F. Ashley Montague: *Toynbee and History*, p. 360), and that I am not an historian but a prophet (*ibid.*, p. 370), he complains that I do not reply to my critics and that I never will reply, because I am impervious to criticism (*ibid.*, pp. 375-6). I take this argument of Geyl's to hold good in reverse: in this volume I have replied to my critics; therefore I cannot be a prophet after all. Geyl is not implacable. In another critique, published in the same volume (p. 68), he says that my 'method, at any rate, is not intended to be that of the religious prophet'. He also lets me off rather lightly when he says (in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 372 and 377) that, if I labelled myself 'prophet' instead of 'historian', he would have no quarrel with me. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that, 'as a prophet, as a poet, Toynbee is remarkable' (P. Geyl, *Debates with Historians*, p. 143).

At the same time I am now uncomfortably aware that, without my having been conscious of this, there must have been things in the previous volumes of this book that raised this spectre in the minds of several critics.¹ One such thing may have been my declared belief that a study of human history up to date reveals a certain number of recurrent patterns. 'All cyclical theorists', H. Stuart Hughes says,² 'play the role of intuitive seers.' I need not repeat that I am not a determinist. I do not believe that any of these past recurrences were inevitable, nor do I believe that any of them, or any others, are bound to repeat themselves in the future. But my belief that I have descried recurrences in the past may have given me the air of being a 'seer', if Hughes is right. Another possible source of this impression is my belief—mentioned already in this chapter—that Man's quest cannot stop short of trying to probe the heart of the mystery of the Universe. But, if following this quest is tantamount to setting up as a prophet, then this offence is committed by every human being who passes through this life; for following Man's quest is, I believe, an inescapable part of being human.

A third possible source of the impression has been mentioned by Hourani.³ In volumes vii-x of *A Study of History* Hourani is conscious of 'a strange, exalted, excited note, more fitting to prophecy than to science'; and Sir Ernest Barker⁴ uses almost identical words. I write, he says, 'on a high and strained note'. Geyl too finds me 'high-strung'.⁵ I am conscious of this myself, and I think the explanation is not far to seek. It has, indeed, been detected by more than one of my critics. These four volumes were written after the atom bombs had been dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The note heard in volumes vii to x was already audible in volumes v and vi, which were written between the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the outbreak of the Second World War. In reviews of volumes iv-vi Sir Maurice Powicke noted that my mind struck him as being not a 'cool' one,⁶ and Sir Llewellyn

¹ Besides Pieter Geyl, who has been cited in the previous footnote, W. den Boer (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 238) and Albert Hourani (in loc. cit., pp. 399-400) record the same impression. F. H. Underhill finds that I escape from being caught in Spengler's determinism 'by soaring above history to become a metahistorian, a prophet, a theologian', and that it is my 'system-making, with its prophetic overtones of doom to come', that makes me 'attractive to the general public of the last ten or fifteen years' (*The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. xxxii, No. 3 (September, 1951), pp. 201-19. Underhill gives me to same label *ibid.*, vol. xxxvi, No. 3 (September, 1955), pp. 222-35). H. Trevor-Roper seems to think that I set myself up as a prophet in both senses of the word (*Toynbee and History*, p. 122). J. F. Leddy thinks that I oscillate between behaving like a prophet and claiming to be an empirical historian (*The Phoenix*, vol. 11 (Toronto 1957, University of Toronto Press), pp. 140-1). Father L. Walker, O.P., feels that I have not 'been content with being just a historian but have tried also to be a prophet and teacher' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 146). E. E. Y. Hales says: 'In reality he is a religious prophet, who uses his wide knowledge of history to exemplify and reinforce his religious teaching' (*History Today*, May, 1955, p. 322). This is L. C. Stecchini's impression too. 'Toynbee', he says, 'has gone so far as to try to reclaim for the historian the right to prophesy' (*Midstream*, Autumn, 1956, pp. 84-91). On the other hand, Crane Brinton finds that this book 'is not a prophetic work in the specific sense that word has in the Judaeo-Christian tradition' (*The Virginia Quarterly Review*, vol. 32, No. 3 (Summer, 1956), pp. 361-75). T. S. Gregory reports that, 'more or less deliberately, Mr. Toynbee refuses to be "the prophet of the World's final causes"' (*The Dublin Review*, vol. 220, No. 440 (Spring, 1947), pp. 74-87). A. L. Guerard pronounces that 'Spengler is a prophet; Toynbee is an inquirer' (*The Herald-Tribune*, 28th October, 1934).

² H. Stuart Hughes, *Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate* (New York 1952, Scribners), p. 164.

³ In loc. cit., p. 399-400.

⁴ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 93.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

⁶ *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th September, 1939.

Woodward that 'deep and genuine' emotions were manifest in my work.¹ Woodward pointed out, in the same context, that these volumes had been 'written, like the *De Civitate Dei*, under the strain of immediate social catastrophe'. Kohn has noticed² that the difference in outlook between volumes vii-x and volumes i-vi is a reflection of the course of public events between 1939 and 1954. Hofer makes the same point in general terms. He points out that the questions put to history by me, like those put by Alfred Weber, are no longer of the same kind as Ranke's questions. 'In their study of history (*Geschichtsbetrachtung*) they are consciously seeking to be serviceable to the needs of the time in which we are living by being of some help to it in its grave spiritual and political crisis (*Lebensnot*). One might put it that their recognition of the urgency of this crisis was the stimulus by which their questions were originally evoked.'³ Anderle observes⁴ that, in Tange Lean's account of my work,⁵ 'the prophetic note is not taken as being an aberration, as it is by Geyl, Barnes, and others. Lean presents Toynbee as the exponent of a given cultural situation, the embodiment of the anxiety of the age over the existential issue (*Verkörperung der Existentialangst der Epoche*), its obsession with the spectacle of decadence in the face of death, and its burning desire in some way or other to transcend transitoriness and to make sure of achieving immortality.'

The consequent note of urgency and anxiety may be unscientific, but I do not find it at all 'strange' in the circumstances. On the contrary, I think it would have been strange if I had not felt deeply enough about these tragic and ominous public events for my feeling to come out in what I was writing at the time. To be sensitive to what is going on in the World is, I should say, a mark just of being human. It ought not to put one under suspicion of setting up to be a prophet, but it may perhaps have contributed, all the same, to the creation of this impression about me. Anyway, all but, possibly, one of those critics who have indicted me for the offence of setting up as a prophet have, I am sure, made the charge in good faith. If anyone is at fault, it is I, for having unwittingly given them cause for misunderstanding me.⁶

The educational value of any critique depends on its spirit and its method. A few critics write with an animosity which suggests that their first concern is to draw blood from the colleague whose book they are reviewing. This spirit surely militates against the purpose for which books are given out for review. This purpose is the correction of error and the increase of knowledge and understanding. It is an impersonal purpose and one that the reviewer shares with the writer whose work he

¹ *The Spectator*, 18th August, 1939.

² H. Kohn in *Der Monat*, Berlin, August, 1955.

³ W. Hofer: *Geschichte zwischen Philosophie und Politik*, p. 129. Lewis Mumford, too, sees in *A Study of History* a piece of action—but, as he sees it, it is action that leads, like Reinhold Niebuhr's, to an 'other world' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 143).

⁴ In an unpublished paper.

⁵ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 12-38, especially pp. 35 seqq.

⁶ In reviewing vols. iv-vi of this book Sir Llewellyn Woodward remarked: 'It is, of course, impossible for a historian to insulate himself from the present, but at least he ought to be on his guard against putting himself in deliberate and unnecessary contact with lines of thought highly charged with emotion' (*The Spectator*, 18th August, 1939). There is justice in this counsel, and I recognize that it is good advice for me.

is appraising. To serve this purpose effectively, a review must, of course, be severe if severity is called for in the reviewer's judgement. I have profited particularly from reviews that have been severe without being hostile. The value of a review also depends on the reviewer's way of working. Some critics work with the road-metal-worker's hammer. Sometimes it is the stone that breaks, sometimes, perhaps, the hammer-head. In either case the result is on the small scale, and its value, while appreciable, is limited. A more creative kind of criticism is the kind that blows in like a sand-laden wind from the desert; for this usefully transforms the landscape. It finds out the softer rocks and scours them away, and it grinds down the harder rocks' sharp edges. Anything that still stands after this wind has done its testing work will be that much nearer to reality.¹

Books are expendable, like the man-hours that go to the making of them. A book that has been weathered away will have served its purpose if it provokes other minds to write other books that may perhaps prove less vulnerable. The one thing that matters is that inquiry shall go on; for, so long as it continues, there is hope that it may also get further.

I am, of course, a reviewer myself, besides being an author. Almost every writer is constantly alternating between the two roles. When I am playing the role of a reviewer I find it a useful rule to remind myself of the indubitable truth that a reviewer inevitably reviews himself, too, in the act of reviewing the author whose book lies on his dissecting table. Whenever a reviewer is tempted to treat an author as a dart-board he should remember that the missile which his hand is itching to lance is not a dart but a boomerang. Reviewing, as well as writing, is, in fact, a dangerous trade. But a reviewer can reduce the danger to which he is exposing himself. He can avail himself of safeguards that are at the same time virtues worth cultivating for their own sakes. These tutelary virtues are humility and generosity. The point has been put by H. J. Morgenthau in a critique of my work.²

'We can judge what others have tried to do and have done only if we ourselves have tried to do, or at least have dreamt of doing, what they have done.'

¹ I owe this simile to J. F. Leddy. The article, cited in footnote 1 on p. 5, ends as follows: 'His work might well remind us of one of those colourful outcroppings of rock to be seen sometimes in flat country, once much larger but still raising a sharp silhouette against the sky. As time has passed, the winds have eroded the softer layers of rock, crumbling them away, and so projecting the more durable veins of granite into greater prominence. Such may be the . . . fate awaiting Toynbee's . . . study when once the winds of criticism have worn away those lines of thought which do not deserve to remain, . . . and so have left in plainer view the . . . outlines of his reduced but still massive structure.'

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 191.

PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

I. THE INADEQUACY OF OUR MEANS OF
THOUGHT

I. APPREHENSION THROUGH ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION

A PHILOSOPHER will probably find little in this chapter except truisms and elementary errors, if he finds anything at all that is not a meaningless misuse of words. All the same, at my peril, I have to write it, because some of my critics have been philosophers who have taken issue with me on philosophical grounds. I exposed myself to this by raising philosophical questions. I did not seek these out. I found them arising out of a study of history. This is, I should say, to be expected, because, as I see it, the study of human affairs is really one and indivisible. The conventional academic dismemberment of the vast subject into 'disciplines' is a convenient, and perhaps unavoidable, educational device, but it is an arbitrary surgical operation, and this makes it a serious impediment to the gaining of knowledge and understanding.¹ It is true that any one mind can make itself thoroughly familiar with no more than some patch of the great forest. Yet, unless it also dares to venture out into the surrounding stretches that, for it, happen to be *terra incognita*, it cannot hope to understand the nature even of its own narrow beat.

All study, whether of human affairs or of non-human nature, is subject to the limitations of human thought; and the first and greatest of these is that thought cannot help doing violence to Reality in the act of trying to apprehend it.

For all that we know, Reality is the undifferentiated unity of the mystical experience. We cannot know whether it is or is not, because we cannot know anything without being in a state of consciousness, and we cannot be conscious without our mental image of Reality—or Reality's image of itself, mirrored in a human mind²—being diffracted or articulated into subject and object.³ This is the first link in a chain of articulations that we forge as fast as we go on thinking.

Our human consciousness, after its self-generating—or Reality's

¹ See further pp. 128–32.

² 'The consciousness of each of us is evolution looking at itself and reflecting' (Father Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J.: *The Phenomenon of Man* (London 1959, Collins), p. 221).

³ 'Almost incurably subject and object tend to become separated from each other in the act of knowing. We are continually inclined to isolate ourselves from the things and events which surround us, as though we were looking at them from outside, from the shelter of an observatory into which they were unable to enter, as though we were spectators, not elements, in what goes on' (Father Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J., *op. cit.*, p. 220).

generating—articulative act, goes on to dissect Reality farther into the conscious and the subconscious, soul and body, mind and matter, life and environment, freedom and necessity, creator and creatures, god and devil, good and bad, right and wrong, love and power, old and new, cause and effect, and so on. Such dichotomies are indispensable categories of thought; they are our means of apprehending Reality, as far as this is within our power. At the same time they are so many boundary-marks indicating the limits of human understanding, since they misrepresent Reality by breaking up its unity in our apprehension of it. They are as baffling as they are enlightening. We cannot do without them, yet cannot do with them either. We cannot afford either to discount them completely or to take them at their full face value.¹

We cannot think about the Universe without assuming that it is articulated; and, at the same time, we cannot defend the articulations

¹ It is, no doubt, difficult to use categories as instruments for trying to grasp Reality without falling into the error of treating them as if they were absolute realities in themselves. I have evidently fallen into this error myself. At least five critics have censured me for succumbing to dualism: Lewis Mumford (in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), pp. 22–23, and in *Toynbee and History*, p. 145); J. K. Feibleman (in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), pp. 13–14); Albert Hourani (in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470, p. 377); W. Altree (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 270); and Father L. Walker, O.P. (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 344). In Mumford's eyes this dualism has involved me in 'profound Augustinian pessimism' (*Diogenes*, loc. cit., p. 11) and in an unresolved contradiction between this mood and an incompatible 'thisworldliness' (*ibid.*, p. 21). Feibleman, in the passage cited above, writes that Toynbee 'sets up primary categories which immediately involve him in an ontological dualism, an epistemological subjective idealism, and a theological transcendentalism. The first is precarious and tentative, the second partial and tenuous, and the third total and absolute; all three are nominalistic.' In particular, he objects to my dichotomy between 'spirit' and 'matter', and adds, with justification, that I ought to have defined my use of these terms, but have failed to do this. Altree, too, objects to this dichotomy. Walker objects to my dichotomies between reason and the subconscious and between truths of science and truths of religion. Mumford finds that I have dug a gulf between the world of Nature and the world of Spirit. This gulf, he insists, must be closed (*Diogenes*, loc. cit., p. 24); I ought to rise to a holistic standpoint (*Toynbee and History*, p. 146). Feibleman deplores my 'old-fashioned kind of ascetic transcendentalism' (loc. cit., pp. 147 and 152) and urges me (*ibid.*, p. 142) to embrace the doctrine of immanence, which, as he points out on p. 157, I have, in fact, adopted in one passage (*A Study of History*, vol. iv, p. 647). Richard Pares feels that I have gone too far in dissecting the mind into different layers (*The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 258).

These charges of dualism might seem, at first sight, to be cancelled out by charges that, in my conception of history, 'the Deity becomes almost entirely immanent and loses all transcendent qualities' (C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 201); that 'Toynbee either fails to make necessary distinctions or blurs them' (M. A. Fitzsimons, in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*; that I have 'a passion for unity' (Fitzsimons in the same context, and Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 94–95); and that I have an impulse to push the process of synthesis and schematization farther than is warranted by the phenomena (e.g. Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, p. 95; K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 242–3; R. L. Shinn in *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 227; H. A. L. Fisher in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1934, p. 671; J. Vogt in *Saeculum*, No. 2 (1951), pp. 557–74; G. Weil in *Toynbee and History*, p. 285; A. Hourani in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 381; J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 23).

Though these two errors (if such they are) are in contrary directions, I think I have, in fact, probably fallen into both of them. But I also think that, if I have, this illogical commission of two contradictory offences is not peculiar to me, but is a weakness that is a consequence of the nature of thought. A human mind seeks unity, but cannot approach it without paving its path with dichotomies. 'Segmentation is humanly inevitable, i.e. essential to sane observation'; 'the problem of causation is . . . merely one aspect of the wider problem of individuation' (M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, pp. 107 and 108).

that we find, or make, in it against the charge that these are artificial and arbitrary, that they do not correspond to anything in the structure of Reality, or that, even if they do, they are irrelevant to the particular mental purpose for which we have resorted to them. It can always be shown that they break up something that is indivisible and let slip something that is essential. Yet, without mentally articulating the Universe, we ourselves cannot be articulate—cannot, that is, either think or will. And we cannot go on thinking or willing if we regain the unity of the mystical experience. So we have to dissect—and, in dissecting, misrepresent—Reality in order to be able to apprehend Reality sufficiently to be able to act and live in the light of the truth as far as we can discern it. Our inability to apprehend Reality completely is, of course, not surprising. It is a paradox that one part of a whole should be able to distinguish itself from the rest and should then be able to achieve even a partial apprehension of the whole, including itself. This feat is miraculous, however imperfect. How far it does fall short of attaining a true mental image of Reality it is impossible for a human mind to tell. 'We have a kind of knowledge, but it is of a kind which can be corrected or perfected.'¹

Thought has no sooner set itself going by mentally breaking Reality up than it gets to work to put Reality together again. After having analysed, thought operates by classifying: that is, by identifying a number of different objects as being specimens of one and the same kind.² These objects between which the mind finds sufficient resemblance to allow it to bring them mentally under some single head are no more than particular facets of phenomena.³ The facets of any phenomenon are innumerable, as is demonstrated by our ability to classify one and the same phenomenon in innumerable different ways, each corresponding to some different facet that it displays.⁴ So any one classification apprehends no more than a fraction of each of the phenomena that it brings together; and, when we have classified the same phenomenon under as many different heads as it displays facets whose like we can detect in other phenomena, we are still left with an unidentifiable residue.⁵ This residue is of unknown magnitude.

The human mind's mental categories are thus 'incomplete tools'.⁶ 'No conscious experience can grasp any object, not even ourselves, in all its completeness. . . . There is no knowledge, no matter how abstract, which does not point to some *it*.'⁷ This 'it' is not something positive that we can apprehend as being a phenomenon's 'essence'. It is the

¹ Father M. C. D'Arcy, S.J.: *The Sense of History*, p. 46. Cp. pp. 138–9.

² 'All mental phenomena—sense perceptions and images as well as the more abstract "concepts" and "ideas"—must be regarded as acts of classification' (F. A. Hayek: *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, p. 47).

³ 'All thought must be to some extent abstract. . . . All perception of Reality, including the simplest sensations, involves a classification of the object according to some property or properties' (*ibid.*, p. 68).

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 68–69 and 70.

⁵ 'The human mind can never grasp a "whole" in the sense of all the different aspects of a real situation' (*ibid.*, p. 70). On the other hand, C. B. Joynt contends, in a letter of 14th August, 1959, that 'any object has a certain unity or wholeness which characterises it'.

⁶ R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 19.

⁷ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 42.

residue of a phenomenon that has eluded all classification. This is what we mean when we say that in every phenomenon there is something 'unique'. This word 'unique' is a negative term signifying what is mentally inapprehensible. The absolutely unique is, by definition, indescribable.¹ In fact, the unique element in a phenomenon is like the intractable core of a Palaeolithic flint-knapper's nugget, which defies his skill after he has struck off flake after flake and blade after blade. These flakes and blades fly off in familiar standard shapes. The residual core's shape is all its own; no other core's shape is identical with it.

Why does a human mind employ a method of operation which is bound, by its very nature, to yield incomplete and imperfect results? Perhaps the answer is to be found in our minds' nature, which is finite, and in their purposes, which are primarily practical. Though the human brain is so superbly built and so cleverly packed into its case that it can register the maximum number of permutations and combinations of mental associations that is possible for an instrument of its volume, this number, though very great, must be finite, whereas the number of phenomena with which a mind has to deal is infinite. It is only by classifying this infinite host of phenomena under heads that the mind can attempt to cope with them. The price of classification is, no doubt, some degree of misrepresentation. But the alternative to the payment of this price would be intellectual paralysis; and, for most minds' usual purposes, the price is not inordinately high because the misrepresentation is not frustrating. It may be frustrating and even exasperating to minds, like my critics' and mine, that want knowledge for its own sake, are insatiable in seeking it, and cannot rest content while any residue of reality remains unknown to them. Such restless minds, however, are a small and almost freakish minority. Most minds do not want knowledge for its own sake; they want the minimum doses of knowledge that are sufficient for guidance in taking action in particular circumstances. Knowledge beyond that quantum is a matter of indifference to them. Indeed, besides being superfluous, it would be a positive impediment to them owing to its irrelevance.

'In theory we could describe every site on the Earth's surface as a unique thing-in-itself, as in strict logic it is. But, even if this were practically feasible, it would take us nowhere: the mere bulk of facts could not be grasped by the human mind; we must classify, and that implies evaluation.'²

'All description is necessarily selective.'³

Suppose that a human mind were to set itself to grasp every

¹ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 84. Philip Bagby points out in *Culture and History*, pp. 33-34, that this is demonstrated by the inability of historians ever to describe a unique event exhaustively. The logic of the mind's method of operation is put by Bagby, *ibid.*, p. 58, as follows: 'Absolute difference would eliminate all possibility of comparison. Absolute similarity would reduce all difference to identity and leave us nothing to compare.' The same point is made by R. Redfield in *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, p. 100. 'Absolute chaos is inconceivable. The notion of regularity, of what is called law, is inescapable. Yet it is probably also true that every world view combines with the idea of law or regularity the idea of capriciousness.' See also the present volume, p. 73.

² O. K. H. Spate in *Geographical Studies*, vol. iv, No. 1 (1957), p. 2.

³ K. R. Popper: *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 77.

phenomenon exactly in its unique entirety, without misrepresenting it by introducing any reference to, or mental association with, any other phenomena. It would be burdening its powers of memory with a Psyche's task—as if someone were to set himself to memorize the visual shapes of all the myriads of Chinese characters without deigning to make use of the radicals under which the characters have been rather artificially and arbitrarily grouped. And then, supposing that this illimitable and therefore impossible feat of memorization had been accomplished, of what practical use would it be? The normal purpose of trying to apprehend a phenomenon is not just to know it; it is to deal with it. And how can one deal with a phenomenon that one has come to know so perfectly that one has inhibited oneself from referring it to, or associating it with, any other phenomenon? A knowledge that was as theoretically complete as this would be equivalent to complete ignorance for practical purposes.

It seems as if one might almost say that the mind is an effective instrument for its usual purposes just because it is an imperfect one. Then how is a scholar to use this instrument for his peculiar purpose of study for study's sake? The obvious line for him to follow first is the line of least resistance; and the line of least resistance is to keep in step with the innate operational movement of the mind as far as the inquirer finds that this line will carry him. This is the policy that has been followed, with cumulative success, by students of non-human nature. Physical scientists 'are concerned . . . with formulating general propositions about the patterned interrelationships of . . . events', and 'science is the study of observed regularities'.¹ Have we any warrant for not following the same intellectual procedure when human nature is the object of our study? If it is contended that the drawing of an analogy between the processes of human history and those of non-human nature is inadmissible² or, short of that, hazardous,³ and that I, in particular, have applied to thought about human history a method appropriate to thought about non-human nature,⁴ it may be admitted that 'the simple repeatable patterns of physics or physical laws have not been discovered in human affairs',⁵ but, nevertheless, it must be pointed out that a human being possesses only one mind, and that this mind operates in only one way—that is, the analytical and classificatory way—whatever kind of phenomenon its owner may set it to work on. The onus of proof lies on those who deny the reality of the uniformity that is found in Reality by the analysing and classifying human mind.⁶ If the analytical and classificatory method that works well when we are studying non-human nature is to be ruled out when it is a question of studying human

¹ P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, pp. 4-5 and 84. He goes on to point out that 'comparative study' involves showing not only similarities but also consistent differences. These differences also constitute a kind of regularity (*ibid.*, p. 183).

² Geyl in P. Geyl; A. J. Toynbee; P. A. Sorokin: *The Pattern of the Past: Can We Determine It?*, pp. 84-85.

³ P. Geyl: *Debates with Historians*, p. 132.

⁴ A. Hourani in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 382. This is the charge that I myself have brought against the modern Western historians at the very beginning of this book.

⁵ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 116.

⁶ R. Caillois in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), pp. 2-3.

nature, we are left without any method for proceeding. Surely it is common sense to make a start in the study of human affairs by continuing to follow the mind's innate method, and to find out, by exploration, how far this method will carry one in this field. If and when we find ourselves brought to a standstill, with still unconquered ground ahead of us, we shall then be in the best possible position for examining whether any change of method is practicable, and, if it is, what our new method should be.

This is the policy that I myself have followed in the first ten volumes of this book. In Part XII I have tried to find the locus of a frontier dividing the realm of human affairs between a province of necessity and a province of freedom,¹ after having concentrated, in the preceding parts, on making as exhaustive an inquiry as I could into the regularities, uniformities, and recurrences that human affairs display. In the earlier of these two successive sections of the book I have deliberately pushed my exploration of regularities in human affairs to the limit; and, since, by temperament, I am, I believe, intellectually rash, I am willing to take it from my critics that I have not only reached the limit but have passed it. In a benevolent review of the first three volumes of the book, H. A. L. Fisher says that 'the generalisations are sometimes overdriven'.² Lewis Mumford says³ that I do not make enough allowance for what is non-repetitive and unique. K. D. Erdmann finds⁴ that, in my petrified schematization, I have come near to losing sight of the individuality of events.

2. THE HISTORIANS' PURSUIT OF THE UNIQUE

These excesses of mine—if I am guilty of excesses—evidently deserve the notice, and the reproof, that they have received. But my plan of work has not only drawn reasoned criticisms of the way in which I have carried it out; it has also provoked strong, and even violent, hostility among a considerable number of my fellow historians. It has been noted⁵ that in the United States I was ill received by extremely distinguished reviewers—e.g. Charles A. Beard and Lynn Thorndike—in the important professional journals. This reaction has not been peculiar to American scholars; I am conscious of an even stronger current of hostile feeling among British and Dutch scholars, and also of a more aloof distaste and disapproval among French scholars. This vein of emotion has surprised and puzzled me. At first sight it seems uncalled for in an intellectual argument; for in this field emotion is not only irrelevant but is notoriously inimical to clear thinking. On consideration I have come to the conclusion that—when full allowance has been made for the annoyance that my way of working evidently gives to scholars with a different temperament—the personal hostility that I have unintentionally drawn on myself is only a minor cause of the hostile

¹ A criticism, by C. B. Joynt, of my Biblical conception of the circumstances in which human wills have some freedom of choice is cited on p. 43, footnote 4.

² H. A. L. Fisher in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1934, p. 671.

³ In *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 25.

⁴ In *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 242–3.

⁵ By E. T. Gargan in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

emotion that the publication of my work has evoked. If the distinguished scholars who have hurled thunderbolts at me had merely felt annoyed with me personally, they would have just ignored me, which would have been a more effective way of trying to dispose of me than the policy of anathematizing me which they have actually adopted. I believe that the strength of their feeling reveals that they felt themselves to be fighting about something much more important than anything merely personal. They are, I think, up in arms in defence of the uniqueness of historical events and human personalities. This is, in their eyes, a treasure of supreme value; and my work has been a red rag to them because they have taken it as a symbol of an attack on the principle of respect for the element of uniqueness in history which they value so highly.¹ As a matter of fact I, too, value it; but at the same time I am conscious that, besides the element of uniqueness in human affairs, there is also an element of uniformity, and that, of the two, this is by far the less difficult for human minds to apprehend. This is, I think, why I have been misread as if I were denying the unquestionable truth that an element of uniqueness is to be found in human affairs.

A high valuation of this element of uniqueness within the realm of human nature is evidently what has made its status a burning question in the study of human affairs, while it is not one in the natural sciences. This also perhaps explains why it is that, among the various schools of students of human affairs—philosophers, theologians, logicians, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, historians—it is the historians who have made it their business to be not only the exponents of the element of uniqueness, but also its champions. The most obvious definition of an historian is to see in him a student of human affairs as these present themselves in motion through time; but a different definition has been proposed by A. L. Kroeber. The essence of the historian's approach, Kroeber suggests, is not the vision of human affairs as temporal events; it is 'the endeavour to achieve a conceptual integration of phenomena while preserving the integrity of the phenomena'.²

'The attachment to contiguity in space and time, to continuity of the spatial and temporal relations of the phenomena, coupled with attachment to the phenomena themselves, is what gives the historical aspects of phenomena their semblance of immediate reality. It is also the factor which prevents the historical approach as such from attaining to "laws", to general theory, to exactness of measurable findings, and to genuine verifiability by experiment. It is also what gives historical findings their quality of uniqueness, their individuation, their physiognomic property.'³

¹ W. H. McNeill notes, in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*, that I have 'the habit of mind which strives in the face of all the diversity of experience and of history to arrive at the interconnectedness of things—to see multiplicity and discrepancy reduced to unity and order, to see the whole in the parts, the One in the Many. This is, indeed, the most basic and fundamental quality of Toynbee's mind, a quality perhaps unusual in an historian, who is normally liable to be arrested and intrigued by the variety and multiplicity of things and take the data of history more or less for what they are—infinately various, changeable, shifting, and interesting.' The Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. finds, *ibid.*, that 'the composition' of this book 'is remarkably unified'. He generously adds that my 'central themes are really central'.

² A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 70. Cp. pp. 63, 102, 127.

³ Kroeber, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

'All recorded history [is] a series of objective unique events whose significance lies in their organisation into distinctive patterns and not in ill-defined formulas or generalised denominators.'¹

The same characteristic of history is singled out by F. A. Hayek and by Alan Bullock as being distinctive of it.

'In the social field [as contrasted with the fields of most of the natural sciences] a particular or unique event is often of such general interest, and at the same time so complex and so difficult to see in all its important aspects, that its explanation and discussion constitute a major task requiring the whole energy of a specialist.'²

'What the historian finds fascinating is to come as close as he can to the concrete and the individual, to try to get inside the skin of *the* man or group of men, . . . to trace the causes, the connections and consequences of this particular revolution . . . or a particular series of events. . . . History is always an attempt to explain the sequence and connection of events.'³

Bullock is careful not to overstate his point.

'The moment the historian begins to explain, he is bound to make use of general propositions of all kinds. . . . The historian gives a false account of his activity if he tries to deny the part that general ideas and assumptions play in his work. There is, however, a difference between the historian on the one hand and the metahistorian, seeking for patterns of historical evolution, or the sociologist, seeking for general laws, governing human development, on the other. This difference lies in their purpose and in the use that they make of such generalizations. What the metahistorian and the sociologist are trying to do is to clear away the confusion of facts and reveal the pattern, or establish the law, which lies beneath. But this is not the historian's purpose; what he wants to know is what happened. For him, general propositions are both necessary and illuminating, but they are not the essential purpose of his work.'

Joynt and Rescher make a point that bears out Bullock's thesis. 'Historians', they point out,⁴ 'tend to formulate, not general laws, but restricted generalizations, limited by spatio-temporal considerations, but fully valid and law-like within them.' Conversely, a sociologist, Michael Postan, commends me, in a review that is otherwise mostly critical, for pursuing historical information, not for its own sake, but for the purpose of using it as scientific evidence.⁵

The historians' approach to the study of human affairs, which Postan here deprecates, has merits to which Kroeber draws attention. Science, in pursuing its method of abstraction, resolves phenomena into 'metaphenomenal' formulas.⁶ But the higher the level of the phenomena under consideration, the more recalcitrant they are to this scientific treatment

¹ Ibid., p. 86.

² Hayek, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

³ Bullock in *History Today*, February, 1951, pp. 5-11.

⁴ C. B. Joynt and N. Rescher: 'On Explanation in History' in *Mind*, vol. 68, No. 271 (July, 1959), pp. 383-8.

⁵ M. Postan in *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), p. 53 (see further pp. 225-7). K. D. Erdmann, on the other hand, is critical of my treatment of history as a series of examples (*Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 203).

⁶ Kroeber, *The Nature of Culture*, p. 101.

that is designed to discover uniformities and repetitive regularities as a basis for prediction. On the other hand, phenomena of the higher kind yield readily to historical treatment.¹ My own approach to history is criticized by H. Frankfort² on the ground that

'his use of "species" and "genus" obscures the fundamental fact that science can study individuals as members of a species only by ignoring their individual characteristics. The historian, following this course, would defeat the very purpose of his work. In fact, Toynbee's vaunted empiricism is an attempt to transpose the method of the natural sciences, where experiment is essential and experience is reduced to figures, to history, where experiment is impossible and experience subjective.'

The historical outlook (*Historismus*) involves

'the recognition that a consideration of history that is obtained by factual research does not enable one to extract from it any consistently intelligible picture of universal history. So far from throwing light on concrete situations and events, interpretations of the general course of history that are based on theological or rationalist dogmas actually themselves require to be interpreted historically. In reaching this conclusion, the historical outlook has won for itself a standpoint of its own which is distinct not only from that of physical science but also from that of metaphysical and natural law.'³

'In recognizing the uniqueness of its subject matter and in failing to reduce it to instances of a law, the procedure of history differs from that of science.'⁴

Historians

'are convinced that the differences between civilizations are more significant than their likenesses, and that standardised causal patterns cannot logically be deduced from the facts of history'.⁵

This point has been driven home by Christopher Dawson:

'It is [the] mysterious and unpredictable aspect of history which is the great stumbling-block to the rationalist. He is always looking for neat systems of laws and causal sequences from which history can be automatically deduced. But history is impatient of all such artificial constructions. It is at once aristocratic and revolutionary. It allows the whole world situation to be suddenly transformed by the action of a single individual like Mohammad or Alexander.'⁶

¹ Kroeber, op. cit., pp. 122-3.

² In *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 26.

³ K. D. Erdmann: 'Das Problem des Historismus in der Neueren Englischen Geschichtswissenschaft' in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 170 (1950), p. 73. Cp. E. F. J. Zahn: *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 6.

⁴ M. C. Swabey: *The Judgment of History*, p. 113.

⁵ L. Stone in *Toynbee and History*, p. 111.

⁶ Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, ed. by J. J. Mallory, p. 257. Ibid., p. 90, Dawson writes: 'There is an unknown quantity in religious change which defies the most careful historic analysis'; and in illustration of his thesis in its application to religion he cites, here too, the epiphany of Islam and also the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity.

I myself believe that, in human affairs, something that we may well call 'creativity', in default of a more revealing word, is perpetually at work, and that this is constantly producing novelties that have not only not been predicted but have been intrinsically unpre-

These are impressive justifications for the historian's approach. At the same time this approach is open to challenge on two grounds. Its critics may contest the value of the element of uniqueness in human affairs, which historians prize so highly. And they may contend that, whatever its value may be deemed to be, the unique is not apprehensible by human minds.

The value of phenomenal human selves and of their experiences in the media of time and space has been rated low in Indian thought since at least as early as the sixth century B.C. This low valuation was common ground between the Buddha and the contemporary school of Indian philosophy with which he took issue. Both schools put their treasure in Absolute Reality. The school that the Buddha was opposing conferred value on phenomenal human selves by identifying them with Absolute Reality and giving them the good tidings that they could experience this truth for themselves by an act of intuition. The Buddha took the more radical line of analysing phenomenal human selves into discontinuous series of successive psychological states kindled by desire and kept alight

dictable. Thus I agree with Dawson in the point that he is making in the two passages here quoted. At the same time, I do not think that the cases which he has cited here really illustrate his thesis. I do not believe that either of the revolutions headed respectively by Muhammad and by Alexander can properly be described as 'the action of a single individual'. Surely both were the result of the interaction between a leader and his followers in a particular set of circumstances. Without the circumstances and the followers, the leader would not have found his opportunity; and, given the followers and the circumstances, the opportunity would have been found and taken by some leader or other, if Muhammad and Alexander had never been born. If Muhammad, for instance, had failed, Maslamah would have found his opportunity. This question of the relation of leading individuals and minorities to the rest of society is discussed further on pp. 125-7, 148-50, and 305-6. As for the circumstances, the conquests of the Roman and the Sasanian Empire by Muhammad's successors and of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander were surely not mysterious nor even unpredictable. In retrospect, both these revolutionary events look as if they had been more or less inevitable. When once the Achaemenian Empire had tried and failed to conquer the Hellenic World, it was probable that there would be an Hellenic counter-offensive, and that this would be successful as soon as it was made by the Hellenes' united forces under a single command. Similarly, the successful over-running of the south-eastern provinces of the Roman Empire by the Arab transfrontier barbarians might have been predicted from the previous success of the Teutonic and Eurasian Nomad barbarians in over-running the western provinces. The simultaneous overthrow of the Roman and the Sasanian Empire by the Arabs is explained by the exhaustion of the two empires as a result of their long series of wars with each other, culminating in the two particularly long-drawn-out and devastating wars of A.D. 572-91 and A.D. 603-28. The epiphany of Islam is explained by the radiation of the Syriac Civilization into Arabia during the preceding 2,000 years, and of the Hellenic Civilization during a period of about half that length. The attitude of Islam towards Hellenism had been foreshadowed in the attitudes of Monophysite and Nestorian Christianity. The rise of Islam is discussed further in Chapter XIV below, on pp. 461-76. As for the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity, this may no have been foreseen by Roman statesmen till half way through the third century of the Christian Era, but it was surely foreseeable long before that and had in fact been foreboded in the second century by Celsus. It was indeed the culmination of a victorious advance of Oriental religions into the Hellenic World which had begun at least as early as the fourth century B.C.—within a hundred years of the beginning of the Hellenic Time of Troubles.

Alexander illustrates Dawson's point not by the range and rapidity of his conquests but by the prematureness of his death. If Alexander had had as long a life as, say, his companion Ptolemy son of Lagus, who lived to be 84 and died in 284 B.C., the course of history might indeed have been different from what it has been. Yet the earliness of Alexander's death, though not inevitable, was also not mysterious and was even not unpredictable. If Alexander had truthfully filled in a life-insurance company's proposal-form at Susa in 324 B.C., the actuaries would certainly not have rated his expectation of life very high in the light of the way in which he had been taxing his stamina during the preceding ten years.

by action, and he prescribed for his disciples a course of ascetic spiritual exercises designed to burn these impurities away till nothing should be left but Absolute Reality in its negative aspect of 'extinguishedness' (*Nirvāṇa*). It is no accident that in India, where all indigenous schools of thought have agreed in disparaging the element of uniqueness in human affairs, there has been no notable indigenous school of historians. The first attempts, of any consequence, to write the history of India have been made by her Muslim and Christian invaders with their Judaic tradition of finding significance and value in temporal events. It is only in very recent times that, under Western inspiration, a Hindu school of historians on the present-day Western model has tardily come into existence.

Considering that some of the greatest historians who have made their appearance at any time and place have been Hellenic, it is remarkable that history should have been held in as low esteem in the Hellenic World, in theory at any rate, as it has been in India, and here, too, because of a contempt for what is unique.¹ This commonly accepted Hellenic view has been put pointedly by Aristotle in a famous passage.

'It is not the function of the poet to relate what *has* happened, but what *may* happen—what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity. The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. The work of Herodotus might be put into verse, and it would still be a species of history, with metre no less than without it. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history; for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages. The particular is—for example—what Alcibiades did or suffered.'²

After the renaissance of Hellenism in the modern Western World, this Hellenic attitude of mind survived Hellenism's discomfiture in the seventeenth-century 'Battle of the Ancients and Moderns' and was taken as a matter of course by the eighteenth-century school of Western philosophers. Though they had adopted the optimistic Confucian confidence in the perfectibility of human nature and had accordingly made a belief in 'progress' in human affairs into one of their cardinal doctrines, these eighteenth-century Western philosophers saw progress in terms solely of an impersonal movement on the grand scale. In their eyes the element of uniqueness in human affairs was something irrational, barbarous, and, above all, irrelevant. They regarded historians with the impatience that astronomers might feel towards geographers if these were to contend that it is more important to map out the mountains, valleys, and other minute irregularities in the conformation of the Earth's surface than it is to follow up the astronomical corollaries of the discoveries that our rough-coated planet is approximately spherical in

¹ This Hellenic attitude is touched upon again on pp. 124-5.

² Aristotle: *Poetics*, chap. 9 (1451 a-b), S. H. Butcher's translation (in his *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, 3rd ed. (London 1902, Macmillan), p. 35).

shape and that its orbit round the Sun describes a well-known mathematical figure.

This disparagement of uniqueness and irregularity, in favour of recurrence and uniformity, has been inherited from eighteenth-century Western philosophers by nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Western students of non-human nature. Natural science today has a great and growing prestige, and the method of analysis and classification, as opposed to the method of description and narrative, is now being applied to the study of human affairs in one province after another. Two distinguished living students of the archaeology of Nuclear America have declared that the ultimate purpose of archaeology is 'the discovery of regularities that are in a sense spaceless and timeless', and that the regularities investigated by archaeologists and by anthropologists are of one and the same order.¹ The method has even been winning converts in the historians' own camp. W. F. Albright has declared² that 'the historian of human culture . . . is just as much interested in discovering general laws as is the natural scientist, since every single phase of past—and present—culture has its own pattern of constituent elements'. It is not surprising that, at the present time, Western historians should be on the defensive, and should therefore be sensitive to any movement that looks to them like a fresh attack on their position with an eye to a further encroachment on the dwindling domain that still remains exclusively theirs.

At the same time they have to face the question whether their quest for the unique is a feasible one for human minds with their 'built-in' analytical and classificatory method of operation. Geyl insists³ that historical events are invincibly unique and asks⁴ whether the logic of class and instance is applicable to historical phenomena. This question has been answered conclusively in a report by the American Social Science Research Council's committee on historiography. 'Every historical event, however similar to others, is in some respects unique', because it has its own particular position in time. But,

'if every historical event were literally unique, history as science would be inconceivable. . . . No generalisations whatever would be possible; history and actuality would mean nothing, and any attempt to *understand* the past would be entirely futile.'⁵

This must be so, because

'To perceive is to assign to a familiar category; we could not perceive anything completely different from everything else that we have ever perceived before.'⁶ . . . All the unique objects of history which [the historian] studies are in fact either constant patterns of relations or repeatable processes in which the elements are of a generic character.'⁷

¹ G. R. Willey and P. Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), pp. 2-3.

² W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 114.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 69.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁵ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), pp. 24 and 25.

⁶ Hayek, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

'It is . . . only through some continuity and identity in the process that we are able to understand what the past is like. Some common ground inevitably serves as our bridge of interpretation.'¹

Geyl agrees² that 'the greatest function of the historian is to interpret the past'. Kroeber too points out³ that history aims at preserving the complexity of individual events 'while also constructing them into a design which possesses a certain coherence of meaning'. Deutsch points out that communications engineering 'does not transfer events'; it transfers information in the shape of 'a patterned relationship between events'.⁴ 'What interacts, has structure; and what has structure, can be known.'⁵ So

'Every historian has a philosophy of history, no matter how insipid or self-contradictory it may turn out to be if explicitly stated. . . . From the use of this kind of hypothesis [the vulnerable kind] no historian is or can be free, although historians differ in their awareness of their particular frame of reference.'⁶

'Any discipline of knowledge, whether theoretical or historical, can deal only with certain selected aspects of the real world.'⁷

'Like the natural sciences, history must be selective unless it is to be choked by a flood of poor and unrelated material. . . .'⁸

'Aiming at objectivity [the historians] feel bound to avoid any selective point of view; but, since this is impossible, they usually adopt points of view without being aware of them. This must defeat their efforts to be objective; for one cannot possibly be critical of one's own approach, and conscious of its limitations, without being aware of it.'⁹

'Uncritical analogies are the peculiar plague of the historian, and all too often insinuate themselves as ruling assumptions without the author's being aware of their dominance—hovering in the background of language beyond clear-cut intellectual or empirical check.'¹⁰ . . . Views of causal relations, social dynamics, and of the springs of human action tend to linger

¹ M. C. Swabey: *The Judgment of History*, p. 19. In Swabey's view 'the basic sameness in history which makes cross-reference possible would seem to be relational, a matter of scale and proportion, rather than of literal sameness of facts' (op. cit., p. 9). 'What appears as uniformity may be characteristic of the statistical method rather than characteristic of the individual originating phenomena' (ibid., p. 91). In the study of human affairs 'sooner or later retreat seems inevitable from empirical recurrence to relational common factors' (ibid., p. 91). 'It is because the World involves a unity of logical structure, a formal invariability through its varying content, that knowledge has power to survey and to connect the different domains of history' (ibid., p. 91). It will be seen that Swabey finds her uniformity in relations between phenomena, not in the phenomena themselves, and in the mind's procedure for dealing with these relations mentally rather than in an external world. But Swabey remains a believer in the reality of some kind of uniformity, nevertheless.

² In P. Geyl; A. J. Toynbee; P. A. Sorokin: *The Pattern of the Past: Can We Determine It?*, p. 84.

³ A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 79.

⁴ K. W. Deutsch in *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1951), p. 241.

⁵ Ibid., p. 231.

⁶ W. H. Coates: 'Relativism and the Use of Hypothesis in History' in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. xxi, No. 1 (March, 1949). Cp. the passage quoted from Hales on p. 26. C. Trinkaus seems inclined to think that I am an exception to Coates's rule. In my work, he finds, 'a purely negative critical method was pursued that had as its result a theory of the universal incomprehensibility of the past, and hence of its eternal sameness' (*Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), p. 221). Yet Trinkaus debits me with having a 'theory' of a sort.

⁷ F. A. Hayek, op. cit., p. 69.

⁸ K. R. Popper: *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 150.

⁹ Ibid., p. 152. ¹⁰ M. C. Swabey: *The Judgment of History*, p. 105.

in the background unaccredited and unannounced, while operating to control the narrative.¹

The truth is that 'no description of any individual object or event can dispense with predicates or abstract repeatable traits',² and that therefore 'no statement about the past can avoid some element of generality'.

'If . . . there is genuine novelty in the Universe and if events occur that have never occurred before, history must be an incomplete explanation of the present. In order to learn from the past there must be recurrences and similarities both throughout the past and between it and the present. There are enough recurrences and similarities to enable history to give us some account of the past and some explanation of the present. Thus our choices are at least partially illuminated and enlightened.'³

Change, novelty, and creation in human affairs are manifestations of the element of uniqueness in them, and one of the most cherished aims of historians is to catch creation, novelty, and change in their mental grasp; but they have to employ an instrument of thought which can analyse and classify points of likeness, but cannot cope with elements in phenomena that display no relation with any others. In seeking to apprehend what is unique, historians are, in fact, trying to swim against the current of the operational movement of the intellect.⁴ The gallantry of this endeavour deserves our sympathy, and its romance does not convict it of being a forlorn hope.

'Historical events and conditions are often unique simply in being different from others with which it would be natural to group them under a classification term—and different in ways which interest historians when they come to give their explanations. . . . It is thus misleading to say without qualification that the historian's use of classificatory words supports the thesis that, if historical events are to be explicable, they must be recurring phenomena.'⁵

If this is true, it is good news; for, if the historian's goal is an attainable one, this opens up a prospect of extending the bounds of human knowledge and understanding, by an intellectual *tour de force*, in a field that cannot be conquered by the straightforward scientific method of using the human mind's classificatory method of operation for classificatory purposes. It has been claimed that, at any rate since the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, human studies (*die Geisteswissenschaften*) have liberated themselves from the shackles of the natural sciences' method of thinking.⁷ Whether this claim is justified

¹ Swabey, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

² M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 42; cp. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 53.

³ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁴ Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 289–90. Cp. Bagby, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

⁵ 'The uniqueness of historical data poses a fundamental problem for the historian. His task is to describe and interpret. But to describe adequately he must necessarily understand what he wants to describe, and he cannot understand that which he cannot truly describe' (W. Altree in *Toynbee and History*, p. 243).

⁶ W. Dray: *Laws and Explanation in History*, pp. 47 and 48.

⁷ E. F. J. Zahn: *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 6. Cp. Erdmann in the passage quoted on p. 16.

or not, for practical purposes there is everything to be said in favour of acting as if it were. As Kroeber has wisely observed,¹ the historical approach and the scientific approach are both alike applicable to any kind of phenomena in principle. And our human intellectual equipment is not so lavish that we can allow ourselves the luxury of forgoing any possibly efficacious method of using it. 'For the understanding of any concrete phenomenon, be it in nature or in society, both kinds of knowledge . . . the historical and the theoretical . . . are equally required. . . .² Theoretical and historical work are . . . logically distinct but complementary activities.'³ The historical-minded student of human affairs and his scientific-minded confrère are really indispensable to each other as partners in their arduous common undertaking. Sir Maurice Powicke⁴ has counselled his fellow historians to face 'the discomfort of the historic generalisation'. This is surely good advice; and conversely the scientific-minded student of human affairs should be advised to face the discomfort of the quest for what is unique.⁵

3. THE MIND'S QUEST FOR EXPLANATION

If it is agreed that historians, as well as scientists, are bound to make generalizations—even though this may not be the historians' aim—because making them is of the essence of thinking, whatever may be the object of our thought, the next question that presents itself is: How, in fact, are generalizations made? Dilthey is quoted⁶ as saying that

'part of the method of those studies that are concerned with human affairs is to maintain a constant reciprocal action between experience and concept. In these studies, the consciousness should not entertain any concept that has not arisen from an exhaustive historical resuscitation of past experience. It should accept no generalisation that is not an expression of the inwardness of some historical reality.'

This is a statement of an ideal but not a prescription for achieving it. So I will start *ad hominem* by declaring, as accurately and candidly as I can, the process by which I believe that I myself have arrived at the numerous generalizations that I have made about human affairs. Usually, I think, the process has started by my noticing some striking and interesting apparent resemblance between two or more events, situations, institutions, or other phenomena. These now present themselves as instances of the generalization that has been made on the strength of them. The next step is to survey as wide a range as possible of other cases that seem likely to be relevant. The purpose of this survey is to

¹ A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 101.

² Hayek, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴ F. M. Powicke: 'After Fifty Years' (1st January, 1944), in *Modern Historians and the Study of History* (London 1955, Odhams Press). The sentence here quoted will be found on p. 234.

⁵ C. B. Joynt comments, in a letter of 14th August, 1959: 'The "unique" school is on the same footing as the "law" school at the level of epistemology. The question as to which describes situations more adequately is an empirical question. Until we know more about human culture and behavior, the former will be able to score easy debating triumphs. The future lies with those who realize that you do not have to choose between these two approaches. They are not and cannot be mutually exclusive.'

⁶ In a paper by Otto Höfer, of which he sent me a copy in typescript.

ascertain whether this widening of the field of evidence bears out or conflicts with the generalization drawn from the original instances. This account of my own procedure and experience agrees, as far as I can see, with a description of the nature of historical research that has been cited in a report by the American Social Science Research Council's committee on historiography:

'Historical Research consists essentially in application of empirically derived hypothetical generalisations and in testing the closeness of the resulting fit, in the hope that in this way certain uniformities, certain typical situations, and certain typical relationships among individual factors in these situations can be ascertained.'¹

If there is any truth in these two virtually identical accounts of the process of generalization,² it would appear that the detection of connexions is what makes generalizations possible.³ But how do we detect them? 'By what right do we ever generalise from our experience? And how can we tell when we have a right to do so?'⁴ It is easy to tell when we have not a right. 'An empirical generalisation is at once overthrown by a contradictory instance.'⁵ One is enough.⁶ One instance will disprove a proposition. On the other hand, no finite number of instances will prove it.

It is obvious that there is no logical cogency in an enumeration of affirmative instances that is not, and does not profess to be, complete.⁷ Most, if not all, of my own numerous surveys of historical phenomena, made with a view to ascertaining whether some hypothetical generalization of mine will or will not hold water, have been incomplete—or, as logicians call them, 'simple'—enumerations; and it has been correctly pointed out by many critics that such incomplete surveys are not demonstrative, even if they have brought no contradictory instances to light.⁸ It is also true, though this is perhaps not so obvious to laymen, such as me, at first sight, that there would be no logical cogency in a complete enumeration either. 'Induction by complete enumeration, if the conclusion be understood as a genuinely universal judgement, and not as an enumerative judgement about all of a limited number of things, has the character of induction by simple enumeration.'⁹ Conclusions based on complete enumeration 'would not be universal truths at all in

¹ American Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 156, quoting A. Gerschenkron: 'Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective', in *The Progress of Undeveloped Areas*, ed. by B. A. Hoselitz (Chicago 1952, University of Chicago Press), pp. 3-4.

² The process is discussed further on pp. 41-45, 158-66, 243-6.

³ See H. W. B. Joseph: *An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 427.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

⁵ R. B. Braithwaite: *Scientific Explanation*, p. 14.

⁶ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 392, footnote 1. 'The discovery of instances which confirm a theory means very little if we have not tried, and failed, to discover refutations. For, if we are uncritical, we shall always find what we want: we shall look for, and find, confirmations, and we shall look away from, and not see, whatever might be dangerous to our pet theories. In this way it is only too easy to obtain what appears to be overwhelming evidence in favour of a theory which, if approached critically, would have been refuted' (K. R. Popper: *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 134).

⁷ 'His laws are not universally true, and his proofs of them not convincing' (A. Hourani in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 382).

⁸ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 530.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 531.

the proper sense, but only truths about the whole of a limited number of particular facts'.¹ If complete enumeration of instances is held, as it was held by Aristotle, to be the only possible way of establishing general propositions, then 'we can never prove anything by reasoning until we already know it by direct experience'.² Anyway, there cannot be exhaustive enumeration where the units constituting the instances are individuals (individual things or persons or events or situations or institutions), not sub-classes of some class of individuals.³ All generalizations have the same status, whether their subject is human affairs or is physical nature. 'All scientific hypotheses will be taken to be generalisations with unlimited numbers of instances.'⁴ And, when the instances with which we are dealing are of a kind in which the number is apt to increase with the passage of time, we have to reckon, all the time, with an unknown future.

'It is a historic fact that the inductive policies of good scientific repute are effective-in-the-past policies; it is a general hypothesis that they are effective as well as being effective in the past.'⁵

This distinction is one of capital importance in any field of investigation—and therefore, among others, in the field in which the phenomena with which we are concerned are human affairs. I myself have never believed, and never contended, that the regularities, uniformities, and recurrences that, in my belief, are discernible in our record of the course of human affairs up to date are bound also to recur in the future. The most that I would infer from their past occurrence is that they *may* recur; we cannot, I believe, infer from it that they *must*. We must bear in mind all the time the possibility that

'an inductive policy . . . may fail in the future, either by its past successes turning out to be failures after all or by its failing to have future successes.'⁶

These considerations bring out the limitations of the scientific method, in whatever field it may be applied, as a strategy for trying to arrive at the truth about Reality.

'The imperfection attaching to the conclusions of inductive science—conclusions which are said to be reached by 'imperfect induction'—springs from the defective analysis of the instances cited, not from the failure to cite every instance; and it is a mistake to suppose that "perfect induction", if it could be employed—as it is acknowledged it cannot—would remove the defect of certainty attaching to scientific generalisations. For science seeks after the necessary and the universal, not after the merely exceptionless.'⁷

Joseph goes on to point out two of the weaknesses of scientific explanation:

¹ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

⁴ Braithwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁷ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 504. Philosophers of a different school might here comment that, if science does seek after the necessary and the universal, it is in quest of something that is unattainable.

² *Ibid.*, p. 381.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

'It often starts with principles or truths or laws which are neither accounted for nor in themselves self-evident,¹ but only warranted by the success with which they account for the facts of our experience; and these principles are not absolutely and irrefragably proved, as long as any others which might equally well account for the facts are conceivable.'²

Accordingly, while conceding that 'it would be foolish to let these considerations engage us in a general and indiscriminate distrust of scientific principles', Joseph concludes that 'it must be allowed that the scientific account of Reality cannot be the ultimate truth'.³ Braithwaite likewise finds that "the quest for certainty" is, in the case of empirical knowledge, a snare and a delusion.⁴ 'A scientific "law" merely states probabilities.'⁵

The truth seems to be that 'the empirical evidence of its instances never proves the hypothesis . . . in the sense that the hypothesis is a logical consequence of the evidence'.⁶ . . . Induction must be considered, not primarily as induction by simple enumeration, but as the method by which we establish hypotheses within scientific systems.⁷

'The use of . . . particulars is, not to serve as the proof of a principle, but to reveal it. . . . They are the means used because some countable material is necessary in order to realise the general truth; but the general truth is not accepted simply because it is confirmed empirically by every instance.'⁸

'The reasoning which infers general truths from the analysis of a limited number of particulars does not rely on enumeration and is not an operation of the same kind as that which proceeds by complete enumeration. . . . [What it relies on is] an attempt to establish connexions of a causal character by analysis and elimination.'⁹

The 'apprehension of the necessary relation between . . . two terms, which our familiarity with particulars makes possible, . . . is the work of the intellect'.¹⁰ But the torch that the intellect has snatched out of the senses' incompetent hands is snatched away, in turn, by another faculty of the psyche. In the act of establishing general propositions, 'an incommunicable intuition takes the place of any process of reasoning'.¹¹ 'The induction is now a psychological rather than a logical process.'¹²

Under the guidance of practised logicians we have cursorily examined the nature of inductive reasoning and have noted the formidable difficulties which it encounters in its attempts to arrive at cogent demonstrations. On our way we have now caught a glimpse of the possibility

¹ 'The first or fundamental principles of science are themselves insusceptible of scientific explanation, and they usually also do not appear to be self-evident' (Joseph, op. cit., p. 503). 'We give reasons if we can, and turn to empirical laws if we must' (W. Dray: *Laws and Explanation in History*, p. 138). C. B. Joynt points out, in a letter of 14th August, 1959, that to demand demonstrations of initial assumptions would involve an inquirer in an infinite regress. In a letter of 16th September, 1959, he makes the point that 'the laws of physics or of history must be irreducibly contingent logically'.

² Joseph, op. cit., p. 505.

³ Ibid., p. 505.

⁴ Braithwaite, op. cit., p. 163.

⁵ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 89.

⁶ Braithwaite, op. cit., p. 14.

⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

⁸ Joseph, op. cit., p. 383.

⁹ Ibid., p. 504.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 385. Cp. p. 391.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 385.

¹² Ibid., p. 384.

that proof, even of the uncontestedly cogent kind which it has been claimed that deductive reasoning produces,¹ may not, after all, be the human mind's main objective. The goal of human thought may turn out to be, not proof for its own sake, but explanation. 'A scientific problem, as a rule, arises from the need for an explanation';² and, in the study of human affairs, 'the scientific function involves not only identifying and describing temporal sequences; it also involves explaining them'.³ 'Some explanation, implied or stated, is firmly planted in every history',⁴ for example. And the search for explanation is a quest for intelligibility.

'All thinking is an attempt to make experience more intelligible, and, so far as it is not intelligible, we assume our account of it to be untrue. It is for this reason that we are always recasting in thought the account of what appears in our experience.'⁵

When we are confronted with something that we do not understand, we try to make it intelligible to ourselves by tracing a connexion between it and something else that we believe we understand better.⁶ Explanation is essentially an act or process of reference.⁷

One step towards explaining a phenomenon is to find its context. 'Research into meaning cannot be free from synthesis, for only by putting anything into a wider context can its meaning be seen.'⁸ A fact cannot be established or made intelligible unless it is related to other facts or is part of a larger system.⁹

If I may venture to illustrate this point from my own work, I should say that volumes i-x of *A Study of History* hinge on two attempts to find 'an intelligible field of study' as a framework for a narrower field that I had found unintelligible when taken by itself without looking beyond its limits. The starting-point of the inquiry was a search for a more or less self-contained field of historical study of which the contemporary Western historians' customary national units of study would turn out to be parts. I had felt these national units to be unsatisfactory

¹ As Joseph sees it, inductive reasoning differs from demonstration in not making connexions intelligible (Joseph, op. cit., pp. 398-9). But he holds that a general proposition can be established either by 'insight into the necessity connecting the terms of the system of nature' or by 'appeal to particular facts' (ibid., p. 399); so, on his view, deductive and inductive reasoning are different without being contrary (ibid., pp. 396-7). The difference itself ceases to be clear-cut if even mathematical axioms (e.g. Euclid's) turn out not, after all, to be self-evident, as they have traditionally been taken to be.

² K. R. Popper: *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 122.

³ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 86.

⁴ E. E. Y. Hales in *History Today*, May, 1955, p. 323. Cp. the passage quoted from Coates on p. 20.

⁵ Joseph, op. cit., p. 486, footnote 1.

⁶ Ibid., p. 502.

⁷ Presumably the act of referring something to something else implies that one has a better understanding of this other thing. The Israelites explained history to themselves by finding a meaning for it in God's purposes and in the action taken by Him for bringing about their fulfilment (R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 33). This was perhaps, as is claimed by L. C. Stecchini (in *Midstream*, Autumn, 1956, pp. 84-91), the earliest of any attempts to explain history that have been made anywhere. In a rationalist's eyes it is an explanation of *obscurum per obscurius*. In a trans-rationalist's eyes it is a recognition of the presence of a Reality that is only partially revealed in the phenomena. The usage of the terms 'rationalist' and 'trans-rationalist' in this volume is explained on p. 72, footnote 3, and on pp. 75-76.

⁸ Cohen, op. cit., p. 33.

⁹ Ibid.

because they seemed to me to be un-self-contained, which would mean that they must be fragments of something larger. I found this larger unit of study in a species of society that I labelled a 'civilization'. Civilizations proved, so it seemed to me, to be intelligible units of study so long as I was studying their geneses, growths, and breakdowns; but when I came to study their disintegrations I found that, at this stage, their histories—like those of the national subdivisions of the modern Western World—were no longer intelligible in isolation. A disintegrating civilization was apt to enter into intimate relations with one or more other representatives of its species; and these encounters between civilizations gave birth to societies of another species: higher religions. At the beginning of the inquiry I had tried to explain the higher religions, like the national and other varieties of parochial states, in terms of civilizations. The last stage of my survey of the history of civilizations convinced me that this way of looking at the higher religions did not, after all, give anything like an adequate explanation of them.

It was true that the higher religions had served as 'chrysalises' in which disintegrating civilizations had undergone a metamorphosis and from which new civilizations of a younger generation had emerged. It was also true that this had been the higher religions' role in the histories of civilizations. But, in the histories of the higher religions themselves, this role turned out to have been not only an incidental one but actually an untoward accident in the sense that it had been apt to divert them from their proper task of carrying out their own missions. If I was to continue to pursue my search for some intelligible field of study that would provide an adequate context, and therefore a satisfactory explanation, for units of other species than nations and of other magnitudes—for instance, an explanation of civilizations—I now had to ask myself whether I ought not to reverse my previous plan of operations. If one species of society was to be explained in terms of another, ought not the civilizations of the first and second generations to be explained as preliminaries to the rise of the higher religions? These second thoughts about the identification of 'the intelligible field' of historical study, to which I had been led in the course of my inquiry, gave me a new point of departure; and the change of outlook, demanded by the necessity for a change of explanation, was a radical one. Christopher Dawson is right in defining it as a change from a cyclical system to a progressive system.¹ It was indeed so radical that many critics have been struck by it and some of them have suggested that, at this point, I ought to have wound up my original comparative study of civilizations and to have started a new inquiry into the meaning of human history in terms of religion.²

¹ Chr. Dawson in *Toynbee and History*, p. 131. K. W. Thompson, *ibid.*, pp. 207-12, traces my change of standpoint in greater detail. See also W. H. McNeill in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*. Geyl sees it (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 360), 'the new system springs naturally from' the old one.

² See, for example, Hourani, in *loc. cit.*, pp. 387-8 and 384-5; A. G. Bailey in *Queen's Quarterly*, vol. lxii, No. 1 (Spring, 1955), pp. 100-10; E. Voegelin in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*; K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 228, 234-8, 241, and 247; H. Werner in *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 29. Jahrgang,

In explaining something in terms of its context one is explaining it in terms of another thing that is more intelligible in virtue of its larger scale, but not necessarily in virtue of being of a different and intrinsically more intelligible nature. An explanation of this second type is evidently more illuminating. 'To explain a law is to exhibit an established set of hypotheses from which the law follows.'¹

In this more illuminating type of explanation there are any number of possible gradations of achievement. At the bottom of the scale of intelligibility are those generalizations that rest merely on induction. 'From an empiricist point of view, all explanations of actual events or features of experience take the form of showing that what is to be explained is, in itself or with some of its attendant circumstances, an example of a regularly recurrent pattern of events or aspects of events.'² But 'inductive conclusions are never seen to be intrinsically necessary, but only to be unavoidable'.³ Accordingly, they 'present . . . a blank wall to our intelligence'.⁴ However, 'having explained some event or feature of an event as an instance of some recurrent regularity, it is always legitimate to go on and ask for an explanation of that regularity';⁵ and one may succeed in explaining it in terms of another regularity that is wider in its range or more lucid in its degree of intelligibility or has both these explanatory features.⁶ 'Complete explanation would only come if the law which the facts had forced us to recognise should, when considered, appear self-evident.'⁷ This ideal is most nearly approached in mathematical propositions. In these the necessity of the relations has been held to be transparent,⁸ and, even if this view of them is contested, it will probably be agreed that they stand at the top of the scale of intelligibility. Most of my own explanations of historical phenomena are of the comparatively opaque inductive kind. 'An historical pattern has been shown, but not a logical cause.'⁹

Mathematical relations are apparently transparent because mathematical entities are not phenomena but abstractions. Abstractions can be made simple and precise in the degree in which they eliminate the

xxix. Band (Stuttgart 1955, Metzler), p. 530; R. Pares in *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 264; O. F. Anderle, unpublished paper; L. Mumford in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 11; Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), pp. 320 and 331; M. Saville in *The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. xxv, No. 1 (February, 1956), pp. 55-67; A. N. Holcombe in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. xlix, No. 4 (December, 1955), pp. 1151-4; T. A. Sumberg in *Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267-84; K. Löwith: *Meaning in History*, pp. 12-17; G. Masur in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521-2; R. V. Chase in *The Partisan Review* (Winter, 1944), p. 51; B. D. Wolfe in *The American Mercury*, No. 64 (1947), pp. 755-6; G. Weil in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 285-6; and Anderle, commenting on Weil, in op. cit. See further p. 94, footnote 1, p. 100, footnote 3, and Chapter II, Annex, pp. 649-51.

¹ Braithwaite, op. cit., p. 343.

² P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 130. 'To explain with the aid of a theory is to do indirectly what the historian perhaps painstakingly and piecemeal . . . does directly: reduce what is puzzling to what is not' (W. Dray: *Laws and Explanation in History*, p. 81).

³ Ibid., p. 437.

⁴ e.g. Newton's laws, which were once believed to be all-inclusive, are now seen to be included in the theory of relativity.

⁵ Joseph, op. cit., p. 417.

⁶ J. K. Feibleman: 'Toynbee's Theory of History' in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 141. Cp. p. 16. Cp. also W. Dray, op. cit., pp. 61, 69, 97.

⁷ Ibid., p. 547.

⁸ Bagby, op. cit., p. 133.

unique essence of Reality. In mathematical abstractions this process of elimination is carried to extremes. By comparison with mathematical abstractions, phenomena, even those of the non-human kind, are complex and elusive. Human phenomena are more complex and elusive still. Bagby observes¹ that, in the comparative study of civilizations, 'qualitative rather than quantitative considerations play a primary role'. *Ad hominem*, it is not surprising that J. K. Feibleman is struck by 'the low abstractive level' of my work in earlier volumes of the present book. 'The result', he pronounces, 'is not the highly abstractive logical and quantitative structure which it ought to be, but something still qualitative and indeed almost literary in its approach.'² I do not question Feibleman's report, but I do demur to his requirement. What he is demanding is, I believe, a counsel of perfection for a student of human affairs. In attempts to explain human affairs, complete transparency is most unlikely to be attainable. I agree with another philosopher's dictum that we should be underestimating the limitations of finite human minds if we were to claim that our minds can find the whole of human history intelligible, even if we help ourselves out by trying to explain history in terms of God's sovereignty, instead of confining our horizon to the field of human action.³

4. THE RELATIVITY OF EXPLANATION TO OUTLOOK

It will be seen that the objective of both 'explanation' and 'demonstration' is intellectual satisfaction, and that the achievement of this is the warrant that the objective has been attained. In this sense 'demonstration', as well as 'explanation', is a subjective experience. On the other hand, 'demonstration', in contrast to non-demonstrative 'explanation', is objective in the sense that we do not regard a demonstration as being valid and authentic unless an identical intellectual satisfaction is found to be experienced by all minds that have followed out the particular train of reasoning in question,⁴ whereas an explanation may give different degrees of intellectual satisfaction to different minds and may, indeed, give full satisfaction to some minds while giving none at all to others, so that 'explanation' is not only subjective but is also relative.⁵

¹ In op. cit., p. 164.

² J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 20.

³ R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 45. Cp. C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), pp. 195-202.

⁴ 'Scientific proof is public, not private' (J. Needham: *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1956, University Press), p. 515). 'The burden of demonstrating the significance of the pattern he has selected is on the historian. . . Empirical hypotheses are not private visions but public assertions' (C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 202). In a letter of 14th August, 1959, Joynt points out that the meteorologist's and the shaman's explanations of a thunderstorm, cited below, differ in the point that the meteorologist's explanation is testable, whereas the shaman's is not. Even, however, if the meteorologist's explanation passes all tests available at the moment to the satisfaction of all minds that have followed this train of reasoning, its validity is still no more than provisional, as we have seen.

⁵ W. Dray insists on this point that explanation is not equivalent to prediction and verification (*Laws and Explanation in History*, p. 59). K. R. Popper appears to be making the same point when he says, with reference to the historians' approach to the study of human affairs, that 'there is necessarily a plurality of interpretations, which are fundamentally on the same level of both suggestiveness and arbitrariness' (*The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 131). In Popper's terminology, however, 'interpretation' and 'explanation' are not synonymous, and the word 'explanation' seems to be used (see *ibid.*,

This point is illustrated by the plurality of satisfying explanations of a thunderstorm. Minds educated to adopt the intellectual outlook that is customary in the present-day Western World will accept the explanation in terms of the regular and predictable working of inanimate physical forces—temperature, barometrical pressure, electricity, and so on—that is offered in a meteorological observatory's report. Perhaps only one layman in a thousand really understands the meaning of an explanation of this scientific kind; but the other nine hundred and ninety-nine accept it with little less confidence by taking it on faith. People living in a society with a non-scientific outlook will likewise take on faith the explanation of the same thunderstorm that is given to them by authorities who are the experts in their eyes. They will take it from these interpreters of the phenomenon that the thunderstorm is produced by the capricious and unpredictable whim of a god riding on the clouds, and that the 'thunderbolt' is this god's physical weapon with which he visits his anger on mankind. The meteorologist's explanation would seem not merely unilluminating but incredible to the shaman's clientele, just as the shaman's explanation would seem not merely incredible but ridiculous to the meteorologist's public. Here we see two incompatible explanations of the same phenomenon respectively giving intellectual satisfaction to two sets of human beings that share our common human nature but happen to have been brought up in two different cultural milieux.

It will be noticed that the relativity of intellectual satisfaction to the cultural milieu of the inquiring mind is something inherent in the human situation common to all men, and that this common mental limitation cannot be overcome by any increase in intellectual sophistication, however great.

'Even the physical sciences start with some assumptions concerning the nature of things.¹ Still more does any treatment of history. Empirical operations in history are always limited by the intellectual presuppositions of the author, and there is no escape from this rule.'²

5. THE EXPLANATORY USE OF ANALOGY

The relativity of the value of an explanation, in terms of giving or not giving intellectual satisfaction to different publics, or, for that matter, to different minds in one and the same cultural milieu, is also illustrated by differences of opinion about the explanatory value of the use of analogy.

Analogy, like all other kinds of attempts at explanation, is an interpretation of something that seems comparatively obscure in terms of

pp. 122-3) to mean something more cogent than 'interpretation'. In Popper's view 'the use of a theory for predicting some specific event is just another aspect of its use for explaining such an event' (ibid., p. 124) and 'there is no great difference between explanation, prediction, and testing' (ibid., p. 133). I am using the word 'explanation' to mean what Popper means by 'interpretation'.

¹ Cp. Joseph, quoted on pp. 24-25. C. B. Joynt, in a letter of 14th August, 1959, points out that presuppositions, assumptions, and hypotheses are, all alike, provisional, expendable, and replaceable.

² C. A. Beard in *The American Historical Review*, vol. xl, No. 2 (January, 1935), p. 309.

something else that seems comparatively transparent. Joseph brackets analogy with 'simple enumeration'. 'Both point to a general principle which, if it were true, would account for the facts from which we infer it.'¹ 'Neither', he continues, 'prove its truth.' But nevertheless he endorses a dictum of J. S. Mill's that 'there is no analogy, however faint, which may not be of the utmost value in suggesting experiments or observations that may lead to more positive conclusions'.²

The weakness of analogy as a method of thought seems to lie, not in the nature of the method itself, but in the nature of most of the phenomena to which it is applied. In mathematics the argument from analogy is accepted as being valid.³ Indeed, 'the most fruitful developments of modern mathematics can almost all be analysed into the application of old ideas to new fields'.⁴ This is because the entities with which mathematical thought operates are simple and precise abstractions, and the use of analogy in the sense of finding 'proportion' between different sets of such entities cannot lead the user intellectually astray. The possibility of error arises when the entities between which he is drawing an analogy are not mathematical abstractions but are observed phenomena. Two or more phenomena may have facets which genuinely correspond with each other and between which analogies can therefore properly be drawn. Here we may fall into error by failing to abstract the genuinely corresponding features precisely,⁵ or by making the unwarrantable assumption that an analogy which holds good just for these facets is also applicable to the phenomena in their entirety; for this means treating the non-comparable facets of these phenomena as if they too were comparable, when they are not.

A case in point is the kind of explanation of non-human phenomena of which my imaginary shaman's explanation is one example. Human beings find themselves buffeted by forces, some of which are exerted by their fellow human beings and others by non-human phenomena. Since the exertion of force is a common activity of both kinds of agency, and since, of the two, the human kind is the more familiar, and therefore seems the more transparently intelligible to human minds that have not been initiated into the science of psychology, people living in a non-scientific-minded cultural milieu explain the action of a thunderstorm, torrent, or bull in terms of the action of a strong and angry man. Their error, of course, lies in their uncritical assumption that all the external forces that they encounter are forces of one single kind, obeying one single set of laws, and that these universal laws of force are identical with the particular laws with which they are most familiar, namely the laws of the behaviour of human beings of like passions with themselves.

From the standpoint of those of us who have been brought up in a scientific-minded cultural milieu, this reading of human behaviour into the action of inanimate nature, and even the reading of it into the action of creatures that are alive but are not human, is an unwarranted use of

¹ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 540. Cp. p. 541.

² J. S. Mill: *System of Logic*, III. xx. 3 *med.*

³ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 532.

⁴ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

⁵ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 532.

analogy that makes nonsense of these phenomena.¹ We have labelled this error 'the pathetic fallacy' and the practice of it 'mythology'. But if we maintain that mythology is an erroneous use of analogy to which non-scientific-minded people are prone, we must also admit that there is an inverse error—let us call it 'the apathetic fallacy',² and call the practice of it 'counter-mythology'—which consists in interpreting human conduct in terms of the action of non-human animals and of inanimate nature.

This is an error into which we are prone to fall in our modern Western World. We have been dazzled by the successes of our men of science in explaining phenomena to us and in justifying their explanations by successfully bringing the phenomena under human control as a result of handling them on the assumption that the explanations correspond to the realities. The earliest successes of our modern Western scientists in finding explanations that proved to be keys to establishing control were in the field of inanimate nature. They then extended their operations to the study of the material structure and working of living organisms. Finally they have applied their method to the study of the spiritual constitution and conduct of human beings—the study of human affairs, as I have called it in this book. As a result of this course that the development of modern Western science has taken, the most familiar kind of phenomenon for a modern Western scientist is the inanimate kind. It is this kind that he has succeeded in explaining to himself the earliest, and also the most to his own satisfaction. It is therefore natural that, when he ventures into the, to him, comparatively unfamiliar field of human affairs, the scientist, like the shaman, and indeed like any other human being, should try to illuminate what is less familiar to him by putting it in terms of something that he feels he understands better. He is tempted to use his physiological, biological, chemical, physical, and mechanical terminologies for interpreting social and cultural phenomena, and this misuse of analogy is no less misleading than the shaman's. The obscurity of human affairs is intensified, instead of being clarified, when they are described in non-human terms—however familiar these terms may be and however well they may have served their users when they have been applied in their own proper contexts.³

¹ K. W. Deutsch in *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1951), pp. 230–52, points out on p. 231 that the use of a human society as a model for non-human nature leads to the practice of magic.

² See the present book, I, 7–8 and 271.

³ The classic example—dating from long before the rise of modern Western science—of an analogy applied to human affairs from a different level of phenomena is the description and explanation of society in terms of physiology. I myself believe that this particular analogy is wholly misleading (see pp. 268–9 and 271–2). In a letter to me of 8th January, 1936, F. J. Teggart writes: 'One of our habits of thought—and it is part and parcel of our intellectual make-up—is the use of the organic analogy in dealing with the problems of culture and society. The use of the analogy is as old as the beginnings of European thought; this is *not* a demerit, but the employment of the analogy means that our outlook on the world (of culture) is restricted to one way of looking at things.'

A sharp critique of the apathetic fallacy in the work of one school of recent Western historians will be found in M. C. Swabey: *The Judgment of History*, pp. 93–95 and 108–10. 'Who ever heard... of a mechanism without any consciously invented machinery? Of selection without purposive choice? Of warfare without cognisance or intent? Discredit is brought upon history by such wholesale borrowing from the blind, inhuman world for

Of course the conscientious use of human terms for describing human affairs is not, in itself, a safeguard against falling into error through a misuse of analogy. For instance, the hypothesis of a primordial 'social contract' as an explanation of the origin of human society is misleading, in spite of its being an interpretation of a human affair in human terms, because it seeks to explain an obscure event in one kind of social milieu by reference to an institution that is non-existent in this kind of milieu and is to be found only in a different one that happens to be more familiar to the inquirer. The making of contracts between human beings is possible only when these are already in social relations with each other and when their society has become well enough established and sophisticated enough to have inaugurated the reign of law over human relations. To project this rather mature social situation back into a pre-social state of affairs as an account of how society came into existence is an attempt to explain society's origin in terms of one of its eventual products. This is evidently an erroneous analogy from a social state of human affairs to a supposed pre-social state of them. It does not give the explanation that it purports to give. Yet the error involved in this misleading account of the obscure origin of human society in terms of a social contract is at any rate far less gross than the error involved in the 'counter-mythological' attempt to explain the same event by the use of terms applicable only to inanimate nature, such as 'gravitation', 'attraction', 'fusion', 'conglomeration', 'crystallization'.

A classical illustration of the 'counter-mythological' variation on the misuse of analogy is the conjuring up of the pseudo-science of astrology through the drawing of an unwarranted analogy between the movements of human affairs and those of the heavenly bodies. In Babylonia in the eighth century B.C. astronomers made the discovery that the relative positions of the Sun, the Moon, and the five then known planets in regard to each other at a particular moment recur regularly at a uniform interval of time which the discoverers labelled 'the Great Year'. This mighty manifestation of regularity, uniformity, and recurrence in the movements of the stellar cosmos was so impressive and exciting that its makers jumped to the conclusion that they had found the key to the workings of everything in the Universe. They would not have been far wrong if they had been content with concluding that everything—or almost everything—was subject, like the heavenly bodies, to some kind of 'law' in the sense of 'laws of Nature': that is, apparent regularities that have been revealed by observation, and, so far, have not been shown by it to be illusory. This has been the finding of modern Western science, and it has been found to hold good not only in the case of non-human nature but in the case of the sub-conscious element in human nature too—if we accept the findings of the newly fledged science of psychology. Where the Babylonians went astray was in their further assumptions that there was nothing in the Universe that was exempt from the rule of 'the laws of Nature', and that these laws were all

the interpretation of human happenings. . . . How much better, says common sense, for historians to choose their analogues from human life rather than from inhuman, impersonal worlds, thus avoiding far-fetched comparisons' (pp. 109-10).

comprised in a single code which governed all kinds of phenomena alike. Actually, it is non-proven that the apparent partial freedom of human consciousness, purpose, and will is illusory; and, in so far as human nature may be partially subject to 'laws', there is no warrant at all for assuming that the laws of psychology and the laws of physics are identical with each other or even similar to each other, or, short of this, that they are geared together in some mechanical way. So far from that, it looks as if the realm of 'laws of Nature' were articulated into a number of different provinces, each with its own provincial code of laws, so that, while the whole realm is under the reign of law of some kind, different codes of law are valid simultaneously in different areas.¹ The Babylonian astronomers who became the fathers of astrology went wrong, not in drawing their analogy, but in pressing it to unwarranted lengths.

Notwithstanding these monitory examples of the misuse of analogy, it is nevertheless true that a prudently discriminating use of it can be fruitful even in perilous fields as well as in the safe field of mathematics. One daring and, no doubt, hazardous use of it for the extension of the range of thought and language has been justified by its continued and cumulative success. As far as we can guess, the original vocabulary of human speech must have been limited to a number of ejaculations supplemented by a few imperatives and even fewer indicatives, and the earliest essays in these parts of speech must all have been expressions of an experience of those phenomena that are immediate data of the senses. In societies which have risen above the primitive cultural level and have started on the enterprise of civilization, this original nucleus of Man's vocabulary has been buried under the vast successive additions that have been made to it. We have built up our vocabulary—and, with it, the thoughts that it expresses—into a huge inverted pyramid, and the new materials for this invaluable mental structure have been produced by the use of analogy.

Our ideas of, and our words for, spiritual presences, actions, and experiences are derived from words and ideas denoting material things, sensations, and events. Our ideas of, and words for, abstractions are derived from concrete objects from which the abstractions have been elicited by an intellectual *tour de force*. In thinking and talking about what is abstract in terms of what is concrete, and about what is spiritual in terms of what is material, we must have been drawing an unwarranted analogy and therefore must have been exposing ourselves to the risk of misrepresenting and misunderstanding those elusive spiritual and abstract aspects of Reality that we have represented to ourselves in imagery borrowed from material and concrete aspects of it that are immediate data of the senses. This enormous extension of the range of human language and thought is, in fact, a product of analogy; yet, in this crucially important instance, the resort to analogy seems to have justified itself by its results. For example, we successfully make mathematical calculations with mental tools originally fashioned for other uses. The very word 'calculation' means playing about with pebbles as counters. Yet, in making the abstractions required for calculation, we

¹ See E. F. J. Zahn: *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, pp. 9-11.

have not lost touch with Reality, as is witnessed by the effectiveness of the application of mathematics in technology and also, far more convincingly, by the impression of self-evident truth that mathematical reasoning makes on our minds.

Cohen points out¹ that 'the number of available analogies is a determining factor in the growth and progress of science'.

'The ancient doctrine of atoms led to plausible speculations but became a useful scientific idea when the development of mechanics enabled us to apply the analogies of billiard balls and statistics to groups of atoms.'²

Cohen also reminds us that our mental picture of the internal structure of an atom is an analogy drawn from our knowledge of the solar system. We have constructed our theory of gases on the analogy of capillary action. The structure of star clusters has given us a clue for developing the electron theory of electricity. We have successfully explored the behaviour of electricity by thinking of it in terms of the behaviour of a fluid. We have discovered some of the physical properties of the planet on whose surface we live by thinking of it as if it were a magnet or the needle of a compass. Our notion of the independence of the biological cell and our theory of genes are analogies from our atomic theory. Our notion of the way in which natural selection 'works' is an analogy from our knowledge of the way in which a human breeder of animal livestock works.³

In this last instance we are taking the personal work of a human being endowed with a consciousness, a will, and a purpose as a clue for understanding the character of 'work' of another kind. This other kind of 'work' is, in the modern Western scientist's view, *ex hypothesi* something impersonal, unconscious, and unpurposive, in opposition to the Jewish-Christian-Muslim belief in acts of creation by a God conceived of in the likeness of an almighty human being. The analogy from a human breeder to an impersonal 'breeding force' may or may not bring us nearer to the truth⁴ than the older analogy from a human breeder to a superhuman 'creator', but this older analogy at least has the advantage of being the less far-fetched of the two, and it may be doubted whether the new analogy would have been attainable by human minds if they had not previously provided themselves with this older and nearer one to serve as a stepping-stone for their striding imagination.

To continue our recital,

'The discovery of the circulation of the blood by William Harvey was at any rate partly inspired by the known relation of the Sun to the meteorological water circulation cycle.'⁵

But Harvey also partly found his way to his discovery by thinking of the heart, arteries, and veins in terms of man-made pumps and valves. And other human artefacts have given clues for explaining, not only the

¹ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

³ All these examples of fruitful analogies in the field of science are given by Cohen in *op. cit.*, p. 250.

⁴ For an adverse verdict on it, see Swabey, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁵ J. Needham: *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. ii (Cambridge 1956, University Press), p. 298.

physical 'structure' and 'working' of living organisms, but also the ways of Man and even the ways of God. Analogies have been drawn from the wheel to explain the revolutions in human affairs as well as those in the movements of the heavenly bodies. The clock has been taken as a model not only in astronomy and physiology but also in political science and theology. Schiller wrote of 'the watch-spring of the Universe'. Tom Paine called God 'the first mechanic'. The Pyramids have provided a sensuous image of a hierarchical social structure. The potter has served as a prototype for a creator god. A pair of scales has become a symbol for justice. The weaver's thread and web have become symbols of Reality (*Wirklichkeit*) itself.¹

At the present moment we can watch the advance of technology once again giving Man the craftsman a new clue to a better understanding of his own psychic nature. Since the nineteen-forties 'a new science about an old subject' has made its appearance under the name of cybernetics. Today there is

'a growing division of labour between human minds and an ever-growing array of electronic or other communications, calculating, and control equipment. . . . By continuing to make . . . equipment which fulfils . . . functions of communication, organisation, and control, we cannot help in the long run but gain significant opportunities for a clearer understanding of those functions themselves. . . . [Cybernetics] uses the facilities of modern technology in order to attempt to map out, step by step, the sequence of actual events in getting these operations accomplished. . . . As simplified models, [calculating machines] can aid our understanding of more complex mental and social processes. [What this may give us is] a generalised concept of a self-modifying communications network or "learning-net".'²

No doubt, each time that we resort to the method of analogy, we are courting the risk of misapplying it.³ Yet the use of analogy has certainly been a fruitful device, and perhaps an indispensable one, for Man in his sustained mental endeavour to take his bearings in the mysterious Universe into which he finds himself born. He has wrested valuable results not only from analogies between kindred phenomena, but also from the more far-fetched 'mythological' analogies drawn from human conduct to the behaviour of non-human animals and to the processes of inanimate nature, as well as from 'counter-mythological' analogies drawn from the processes of inanimate nature to human affairs. I agree, for my part, with M. C. Swabey's dicta⁴ that, 'since all knowledge proceeds through the detection of resemblances, in dealing with objects largely beyond empirical check, analogy must be appealed to', and that, 'despite the pitfalls of analogy, history has its roots in it'.

¹ All but the first of the examples cited in this paragraph are given by K. W. Deutsch in 'Mechanism, Organism, and Society: Some Models in Natural and Social Science', in *Philosophy of Science*, vol. xviii, No. 3 (July, 1951), pp. 232-4.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 239-41.

³ 'The [analogical] method . . . comes from a dangerous and subtle form of mysticism which has been widespread in all ages. It makes it possible to prove and to believe almost anything. One of the best-known examples of its use was the proof of a whole cosmogony and religion from the analogy of a watch' (L. S. Woolf in *The New Statesman and Nation*, 23rd September, 1939).

⁴ In *The Judgment of History*, p. 75.

In the history of modern Western science there is one instance of the use of a 'mythological' analogy which is as famous as it has been fertile. Darwin has recorded that, at a stage in his inquiry into the origin of species at which he was making no further progress in the direct approach to his problem, he happened to read one of Malthus's works expounding his theory that, in human society, there is a tendency for the growth-rate of the population to forge ahead of the growth-rate of its food supply, and that this results in a struggle for life. In this celebrated economic hypothesis Darwin found the clue that led him to his own still more celebrated biological hypothesis. Conversely, Deutsch, the exponent of the new science of cybernetics who has been quoted just above, claims for it that it is a promising line of inquiry because it is throwing light on the working of human minds from the working of Man's latest artefacts. He finds that 'the striking parallels and suggestive insights' into the working of human affairs that are offered by concepts drawn from human history have 'remained empty of inner structure'. For example, my own "creative minorities" are unanalysed vessels of a creativity which itself has no intrinsic details that could be described and understood'. Deutsch finds Joseph Schumpeter's concepts of 'creativity' and 'innovation' in the field of economics likewise unfruitful for the same reason. Schumpeter and I, he suggests, have drawn blank because we have taken human society itself as our model for explaining processes of human organization.¹ Deutsch's point may be expressed analogically as the doctrine that, in the use of analogy, as in the process of evolution and in the practice of the breeder's art, in-breeding makes for sterility, cross-breeding for fertility.

Whether or not this particular analogy is justified by the evidence of results, I myself have been commended by some critics and censured by others on the ground that I have in fact used analogy in the cross-fertilizing way that Deutsch recommends.² I have also been censured for using analogy to excess,³ for using it in its mythological form

¹ Ibid., pp. 237-8.

² H. Kuhn notes in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 28th August 1947, pp. 489-99, on p. 497, that I use analogy both 'horizontally' (i.e. in the in-breeding way) and 'vertically' (i.e. in the cross-breeding way). 'Vertical' analogy, as Kuhn defines it, 'puts together phenomena of different types or of different structural levels'. He pronounces that 'denying the legitimacy of this second kind of analogical reasoning would be tantamount to denying the possibility of philosophy'. At the same time he stipulates that, 'in order to be legitimate, . . . the use of vertical analogy must strictly observe the rule of hierarchy'. On the other hand, Richard Pares (in *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 271) remarks that, 'if Dr Toynbee rejects mechanical analogies, he falls victim to the far more dangerous biological analogies'. O. H. K. Spate (in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 419) warns against 'the danger . . . of anthropomorphising nature'. C. A. Beard (in *The American Historical Review*, vol. xl, No. 2 (January, 1938), p. 309) objects that 'the introduction of analogies from biology and physics into historical thought (a practice which most of us are guilty of) does violence to the actuality of history and adds to confusion rather than to knowledge'. K. R. Popper quotes a passage of the present book (vol. i, p. 176) as an example of the misapplication of terms taken from physics to sociology (*The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 112). L. S. Woolf (in *The New Statesman and Nation*, 23rd September, 1939) objects to my fondness for 'comparing the phenomena observable in the growth or disintegration of civilizations to the phenomena observable in radiation or in the diffusion or diffraction of light'. On the other hand, John Strachey, in a letter to me of 3rd August, 1950, writes: 'I like best of all your "radiation" way of putting it.'

³ Analogies: 'Handle with caution' (P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, p. 66). Toynbee ought to chasten his metaphors and prune his analogies (Sir Ernest Barker, *ibid.*, p. 97).

concurrently with the scientific method of reasoning,¹ for using it as a substitute for reasoning,² and using it, in its mythological form, at all.³

Poetry, myth, and metaphor are over-used (M. S. Bates in *Christianity and Crisis*, vol. 15, No. 4, 21st March, 1955, pp. 27-30 and 32). There is too much intuition, mythology, and argument from analogy in Toynbee's work (O. H. K. Spate in *Toynbee and History*, p. 291, and in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 407). Toynbee goes too far in trusting analogy (Kuhn, in loc. cit., p. 492). 'Some analogies one feels to be strained or even false' (R. T. Clark in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, November, 1941). His use of analogy is an illustration of the recklessness of his ways of thinking (O. H. K. Spate in *Toynbee and History*, p. 303). Cp. A. Eban *ibid.*, pp. 330 and 331, and Sir Llewellyn Woodward in *The Spectator*, 6th July, 1934.

¹ Toynbee drives science and poetry in double harness (K. W. Thompson in *Toynbee and History*, p. 201). Zeus is not evidence (G. J. Renier, *ibid.*, pp. 74-75). Toynbee ought not to mix myth with scientific thinking (E. F. J. Zahn: *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 36). 'Arguments which . . . have a curious way of coalescing with their imaginative illustrations so as to form philosophical myths' (Kuhn in loc. cit., p. 489). One cannot be historian and philosopher simultaneously (D. B. Richardson in *The Thomist*, vol. xx, No. 2 (April, 1957), p. 164). 'His determination to mix genres' (W. Kaufmann in *Toynbee and History*, p. 306). 'In Toynbee's interpretation of history there is an uncertainty which in a way seems to mirror the mind of the author, who is at the same time both a mystic and a scholar proud of the capacity of the human intellect' (H. Holborn in *The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947). 'His myth of history' (E. E. Y. Hales in *History Today*, April, 1955, p. 322). 'There can be no compromise on such a vital point. Either we have history or we have myth. No half-way house is possible' (C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 200). According to O. F. Anderle in an unpublished paper nine-tenths of the criticism of my work is directed against my reunion of science with myth. In Anderle's own view, true myth embraces everything, including science. See further p. 130, footnote 3.

² 'At times . . . the constructive artist in him . . . triumphs over the carefully weighing historian.' A simile or metaphor may become an end in itself and be taken as an explanation or a 'law' into which facts can be forced (G. Weil in *Toynbee and History*, p. 282). There is an ambiguity between the use of analogy as illustration and the use of it as argument. Ought metaphors to be allowed to persuade and control, besides just illuminating? In Toynbee's work 'the form and the content are organically related. . . . Thus every aesthetic aspect of the work involves the question of truth' (E. Fiess, *ibid.*, pp. 282-3). Toynbee's images 'seem sometimes for their author to take on an independent life and vitality of their own' (W. H. McNeill in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). 'Analogy is not proof' (R. H. Tawney in *International Affairs*, November, 1939, p. 802). Toynbee's simile of the hedgehog illustrates but does not prove the continuity of the history of the Syriac Civilization (A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 376). 'Analogy is essential in history, but not all historians judge by analogy alone' (Pares, in loc. cit., p. 268). Visual images 'are often used, not as embellishments, but as structural parts of the arguments, not as aids to exposition, but as substitutes for thought' (M. Postan in *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), p. 57). 'Again and again, beginning with a suggestive simile or metaphor, he ends by accepting the metaphor as proof of identity' (L. S. Woolf in *The New Statesman and Nation*, 23rd September, 1939). 'His lavish metaphors and similes, allegories and parables, suggestive as they sometimes are, are too often assumed to possess evidential value' (R. K. Merton in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xlvii, No. 2 (September, 1941), pp. 205-13). Toynbee systematically falls into the confusion of historical illustration with historical proof (S. Hook in *The Partisan Review*, June 1948, p. 693). 'He is . . . doing what he censures in Spengler: that is, setting up a metaphor and then proceeding to treat it as a basis for argument' (A. R. Burn in *History*, February-October, 1956, p. 11). 'The exposition proceeds by analogies, by parables, and by quotations from philosophy and poetry. This method can never prove anything, for other parables, analogies, and quotations can, in the same way, prove the opposite' (O. Handlin in *The Partisan Review*, July-August, 1947, pp. 171-9). Toynbee has turned history into mythology (T. J. G. Locher in *De Gids*, May, 1948, p. 21).

³ Toynbee deals in myths (G. J. Renier in *Toynbee and History*, p. 74). In the present age people who take myth seriously are derided (Anderle, unpublished paper). 'Whatever else history is, it is not myth. The essence of mythology is an effort to state by means of metaphors and analogies experiences which transcend the senses. There can be a history of myths but there can be no history which consists of myths as part of its structure of meaning. At such a point, history becomes metaphysics, religion, or poetry' (Joynt in loc. cit., p. 201). This uncompromising view is not, however, taken by all rationalist-minded critics. For instance, F. H. Underhill generously declares (in *The Canadian*

I have also been offered an acquittal on condition of my agreeing to be labelled a poet, or even a musician, rather than an historian.¹

I plead guilty to having carried my use of analogy to excessive lengths. I should have guessed that I might have made this mistake, even if I had not been accused of it by a convincing consensus of critics. I am conscious that 'going too far' is a standing temptation for me, and that too often I have succumbed to it. I agree that analogies are not explanations, but are heuristic devices for seeking explanations.² I also confess myself in error if it has been proved against me that I have used mythological analogy as a substitute for scientific reasoning (i.e. used it in contexts in which scientific reasoning would have been not only feasible but also more enlightening). This would be wrong, because science and mythology are two different ways of trying to explain phenomena, and they ought not to be confused with each other or used in each other's place. Up to this point my critics and I agree. But some of them will certainly disagree with me when I go on to express my belief that neither of these two approaches can do duty for the other, and that scientific reasoning cannot serve as a substitute for mythology. In earlier passages of this chapter I have touched upon the universally admitted limitations of the human reason's power to apprehend Reality by its analytical and classificatory method of working. The method of mythological analogy is, no doubt, a still more imperfect instrument for trying to apprehend Reality

Historical Review, vol. xxxii, No. 3 (September, 1951), pp. 201-19) that Toynbee's 'profusion of colourful and stimulating metaphors and similes, his skillful use of myth and poetry, philosophy and religion, to throw light on the past experience of Man in society, all this has reminded us that Clio is a muse and not merely a pedestrian statistical social scientist'.

¹ Is Toynbee's use of myths meant to be merely confirmatory or is it meant to be evidential? The historians are left guessing. 'Is the historian's loss the poet's gain? . . . It is not a work of history. . . . Taken as a whole, it is a huge theological poem' (E. Fieiss in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 380 and 383). 'The historian is a poet and the history is his poem' (T. S. Gregory in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 220, No. 440 (Spring, 1947), pp. 74-87). 'His . . . insights are not those typical of the historian, but rather those of the prophet, the seer, the poet, the mystic' (F. H. Underhill in *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. xxxvi, No. 3 (September, 1955), pp. 222-35; cp. vol. xxxii, No. 3 (September, 1951), pp. 201-19). 'His Approach is poetic, intuitive' (Chr. Hill in *The Modern Quarterly*, Autumn, 1947, p. 295). 'His habit of mind is poetic, and it would be a mistake not to recognize his book as a prose epic, whatever else it may be besides' (W. H. McNeill in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). Toynbee's work is 'an imaginative vision of history having the same relation to fact as has poetry' (A. Hourani in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 382). 'Toynbee is writing history fundamentally as a poet and moralist and not as a scientific historian' (Hook in loc. cit., p. 692). 'At his best his theory is a kind of wild and tragic poetry softened by an ill-defined but clearly amiable religious faith and charity' (D. G. Macrae in *The Literary Guide*, January, 1955). 'The secret of Toynbee's greatness is that he is a poet and something of a mystic' (David Thomson in *The News Chronicle*, 14th October, 1954). 'As a poet, Toynbee is remarkable' (P. Geyl in *Debates with Historians*, p. 143). 'A . . . revival of . . . "the Christian Epic"' (H. E. Barnes in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, p. 719). 'Is Toynbee perhaps preparing the way for some future poet to write a new *Divina Commedia* or *Faust*?' (K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii, Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 236). Toynbee's history is a mythological drama (J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. ix, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 172). The intelligible unity that Toynbee finds in history is the unity of a drama (McNeill, op. cit.). 'He writes like a musician, developing his motifs in a series of academic variations' (R. H. S. Crossman in *The New Statesman*, 8th March, 1947). Crossman evidently does not think that this should earn me an acquittal; and M. Savelle concedes that there is poetry in history without conceding that an historian can be granted poetic licence (*The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. xxv, No. 1 (February, 1956), pp. 55-67).

² This distinction is drawn by C. B. Joynt in a letter of 14th August, 1959.

than scientific reasoning is; the gleams or hints given to us by mythology are unverifiable; but, in compensation for its greater weakness, mythology has a wider reach than science and a deeper penetrative power.¹ Moreover, if there is truth in the account, given above, of the part played by the use of analogy in the progressive extension of the range of language and thought, then it is no accident that mythology has arisen earlier than science as a means of explanation, and poetry earlier than prose as a vehicle of expression. It also seems likely that mythology has a role to play, as a means of explanation, always and everywhere, not only in fields which science has not yet succeeded in entering, but also in those in which science has now established itself. For, even in long-since occupied territory, science's hold is never more than partial and incomplete.²

I therefore join issue with critics who take me to task for driving science and mythology in double harness. So long as we recognize and advertise that this mental equipage is a carriage-and-pair and not a one-horse shay, I believe that we can use it without misleading either ourselves or the public. I also believe that the two steeds, side by side, can carry us farther than either steed can by itself, and that a reconnaissance made by this method will not turn out to be a wild-geese-chase. The method is Plato's,³ and his practice of it accounts for almost everything in his work that has proved to be of high enduring value. The Platonic conception of the place of myth in philosophy has been admirably expressed by Dean Inge:

'When the mind communes with the world of values, its inevitable language is the language of poetry, symbol, and myth. . . . Philosophy has to deal with a number of irreducible surds which cannot be rationalised. . . . Our reason . . . has reached its limits. We are driven to mythologize, confessing that we have left the realm of scientific fact.'⁴

As for being labelled a poet, I should be glad to be convinced that I deserve the title,⁵ but I should not take this as acquitting me of the charges made against me that I have cited. What matters is not the name by which one is called but the extent of one's failure or success under any name or none. In the study of human affairs one cannot afford to neglect any approach. One must be free to resort to the different methods of the poet, the historian, and the scientist in turn, according to the nature of each piece of the task;⁶ and, in order to enjoy this free-

¹ Like Vico, Toynbee has 'an understanding of myths as containing the essential truths of history' (J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), pp. 165-6). Bagby allows that 'myths seem to be an essential part of the fabric of social life', and his proviso that 'they should not be allowed to stand in the way of a more rational understanding of history' will not be disputed—at any rate, not by me. See P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 2.

² O. F. Anderle suggests that true myth embraces everything, including science (unpublished paper, cited already on p. 38, footnote 1).

³ W. H. McNeill observes that my use of myth and metaphor is in the Platonic tradition (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

⁴ W. R. Inge: 'The Place of Myth in History' in *Philosophy*, vol. xi, No. 42 (April, 1936), p. 131.

⁵ I have never written poetry in the formal sense in any other languages than Greek and Latin.

⁶ 'Historians must be both researchers and artists' (K. W. Thompson in *The Political Science Quarterly*, vol. lxxi, No. 3 (September, 1956), p. 367).

dom to use all the methods, it is best not to be tied to any of the corresponding names.

6. THE HEURISTIC USE OF HYPOTHESES

In the act of thinking we inevitably make two unprovable assumptions. One is that our thought apprehends, if only partially and imperfectly, a Reality that exists independently of it and is not just the mind's own mental construction.¹ Our second assumption is that Reality has some meaning for us which is accessible to us by the mental process of explanation.² We assume that Reality makes sense, even if perhaps not completely. That is to say, we assume that there is at least a certain amount of order and regularity in the relations between the myriad phenomena into which our image of Reality is dissected in our consciousness. 'We cannot treat the World as a mere succession of events.'³ 'Science and sanity postulate a World in which there are certain fixed characters.'⁴ 'All induction *assumes* the existence of connexions in Nature, and . . . its only object is to determine between what elements these connexions hold.'⁵ Two expressions of this assumption are the beliefs in the uniformity of Nature⁶ and in causation. Since this is true of all thought, it is true of thought about human affairs. 'The historian employs concepts and hypotheses because of the general assumption that underlies all social science: history is not exclusively chaos or chance: a degree of observable order and pattern, of partially predictable regularity, exists in human behaviour.'⁷

The assumption of the uniformity of Nature underlies all inductive reasoning—and much more of our stock of beliefs is based on inference than on experience. This assumption is not verifiable from experience. If we ask what justification we have for making it, all that we can say is that to deny the uniformity of Nature is to resolve the Universe into items that have no intelligible connexion with each other.⁸

One of the reasons why science has made unprecedented progress in modern Western hands is the practice, by scientists of this school, of virtues that are moral quite as much as intellectual. They have had the courage to create hypotheses for explaining the phenomena, the honesty to give their hypotheses up when these have not been borne out by the results of the investigations in which they have been used,⁹ and the versatility to exchange them for others when, without having been refuted, they have been utilized up to the limits of their usefulness. All

¹ 'The choice among rival lines of division is an essential part of the process of rational inquiry. But, once such choice has been made, it is the nature of the pie or the Universe that determines the content of each part or division' (Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68). Scientists act on 'a belief that the Universe is rational, not derived from experience, but controlling the interpretation of experience' (Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 506).

² R. L. Shinn makes the point that meaning is the basis, not the conclusion, of thought and definition (*Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 16).

³ Joseph, *op. cit.*, pp. 404-5. Cp. p. 426.

⁴ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁵ Joseph points out *ibid.*, pp. 402-3, that a belief in the uniformity of Nature is not inconsistent with a belief in Nature's variety.

⁷ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 95.

⁹ A classic example (cited by Bagby in *op. cit.*, p. 3) is Kepler's abandonment of Plato's *a priori* hypothesis that the orbits of the planets must be circular.

our currently accepted propositions, generalizations, and 'laws' are merely hypotheses that have not been discredited by experience so far.¹ 'All theories are trials: they are tentative hypotheses, tried out to see whether they work; and all experimental corroboration is simply the result of tests undertaken in a critical spirit, in an attempt to find out where our theories err.'² But 'theory is not necessarily bad because it is hypothetical, tentative, and not yet conclusively demonstrated or rejected'.³ And 'theory that runs beyond the established data is the source of fertility in cumulative scientific analysis'.⁴ The formation of an hypothesis may be likened to an act of artistic creation⁵ or to the manufacture of a tool.

'A calculus is an artefact, and the interpretation of a calculus is a resolution to employ this artificial tool in a particular way.'⁶

Kroeber uses the word 'tool' to describe his key-concept, 'culture', and adds that the word applies to every concept.⁷ One significant characteristic of tools is their number and variety.⁸ Each of them is designed for doing a particular job. No tool is omniscient. There is no such thing as a master-key that will unlock *all* doors.⁹ If we treat an hypothesis as a mental key, we shall discard it if we find that it unlocks no doors at all, and put it down for the moment in order to try another if, after having successfully opened a number of doors with its aid, we eventually come to a door into whose lock it does not fit.¹⁰ But, when we do lay aside a well-tried key, we must not forget that it did unlock the previous doors. While it is true that there is no hypothesis that explains everything, this does not mean that each of our hypotheses is not good as far as it goes.¹¹

This is what is meant by saying that the value and validity of hypotheses, and of those organized systems of hypotheses which we call

¹ 'The effectiveness of [an inductive] policy is an empirical proposition which does not logically follow from the policy's effectiveness-in-the-past' (Braithwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 269). This consideration governs the question of the validity of predictions made on the strength of scientific laws. 'The function of a scientific law . . . is . . . that of organising our empirical knowledge so as to give both intellectual satisfaction and power to predict the unknown. The nature of scientific laws cannot be treated independently of their function within a deductive system. The World is not made up of empirical facts with the addition of the laws of Nature: what we call the laws of Nature are conceptual devices by which we organise our empirical knowledge and predict the future' (*ibid.*, p. 339).

² K. R. Popper: *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 87.

³ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 139.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁵ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 525. It is noteworthy that this simile should have been adopted by an austere-minded logician.

⁶ R. B. Braithwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁷ A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 118.

⁸ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 459, points out that we need alternative classifications for different purposes; Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68, that we need to choose between alternative classifications for each particular purpose.

⁹ For instance, Geyl points out that it is impracticable to think of history exclusively in terms of the units that I call civilizations, and that this is demonstrated by my own practice of citing instances from the histories of smaller units, notwithstanding my contention that civilizations are the smallest units that are intelligible fields of study (*Toynbee and History*, pp. 71-72).

¹⁰ Romaine rightly insists that one ought to be prepared to drop a theory as soon as it has fulfilled its function (*ibid.*, p. 348).

¹¹ Braithwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 269, points out that there may be an exhaustion of the field for the profitable exploitation of a policy without the policy's past successes being impugned on this account.

sciences, is no more than 'heuristic' (i.e. exploratory)¹ and 'operational' and 'instrumental'. For instance, the usefulness of dialectical patterns, such as 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' and 'challenge-and-response', is 'heuristic and operational; it must depend on their effectiveness in suggesting new fruitful questions, experiments, or techniques in dealing with problems'.² In Deutsch's expectation, modern control engineering may give us other patterns that will be more fruitful and suggestive.³ 'An operational theory is one that is stated in such a way that it can conceivably be proved false by reference to empirical evidence.'⁴ The theories used in social science 'are not statements of eternal and immutable truths; they are, rather, statements that may possibly provide valid explanations'.⁵ 'Concepts are instrumental. They are formulated for the purpose of enlarging human understanding and are themselves subject to growth and change.'⁶ 'The formulation of a law is arrived at with the "implicit proviso to modify it on the basis of later experiences".'⁷ 'For the historian, . . . generalizations are hypotheses which he can use to open up a subject and suggest lines of approach, discarding, adapting, or continuing with them, as they prove fruitful.'⁸ 'The only ultimate test of such provisional instruments of thought is neither their clarity nor their truth, but whether they lead to any useful results.'⁹ 'No theory is definitive; every theory is provisional only. A theory will have yielded the best performance of which it is capable if it has kept going the flow of research.'¹⁰ 'To study history in terms of *problems*, some theoretical framework and *some* working hypotheses are unavoidable.'¹¹ The purpose of putting forward heuristic hypotheses is

¹ See Chapter VII, pp. 243-6, and Chapter II, Annex: *Ad Hominem*, pp. 641-2.

² Deutsch, loc. cit., p. 245. Cp. Zahn, op. cit., p. 9. ³ Deutsch, *ibid.*

⁴ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 28. In the same passage, Spengler's theories and mine are denied the benefit of this definition. 'Their theoretical structures should not be taken as examples of the use of social science methods' (*ibid.*, p. 28. Cp. pp. 92-93). 'Toynbee's generalisations . . . must be elaborated to be testable propositions—an elaboration that the author does not provide' (*ibid.*, p. 109). As O. F. Anderle puts it in his paper, my theorizing runs ahead of my verification of it. My verification of my hypotheses, he finds, is my obvious weak point. In K. R. Popper's view, this weakness is inherent in the historians' approach to the study of human affairs. 'As a rule, . . . historical "approaches" or "points of view" cannot be tested. They cannot be refuted, and apparent confirmations are therefore of no value, even if they are as numerous as the stars in the sky' (*The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 151). Here Popper is applying to the case of the historians a general proposition of his that has been quoted already on p. 23, footnote 7. An instance of a thesis that is intrinsically untestable, and is not merely so far untested, is found by C. B. Joynt in my Biblical conception of the freedom of human wills as being a freedom to obey or disobey 'laws of God' (*The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), pp. 195-202).

⁵ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 91. ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁷ G. Buchdahl in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 170, quoting M. Schlick: *Gesetz, Kausalität, und Wahrscheinlichkeit* (Vienna 1948, Gerold), p. 22.

⁸ A. Bullock in *History Today*, February, 1951, pp. 5-11.

⁹ G. A. Birks in *Philosophy*, October, 1950, pp. 336-40. *Ad hominem*, P. Kecskemeti observes, in *The Modern Review*, vol. 1, No. 4 (June, 1947), pp. 308-13, that 'the real test of Toynbee's theory is heuristic and empirical'. Kecskemeti judges that I am justified in my method, but that my basic concepts are too few to bear, without strain, the load that I have put upon them.

¹⁰ Anderle, op. cit. ¹¹ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 132. Bagby, in op. cit., p. 202, assigns this status to his 'conceptual framework'. Anderle points out, in his unpublished paper, that some of my critics do not seem to

to make approaches towards the attainment of new knowledge and understanding by a dialectical interplay of intellectual action and reaction.¹

have realized that, in the activity of thinking, hypotheses have a role that is not merely legitimate but indispensable. 'It is', he writes, 'astonishing to find—especially in Geyl and critics of his school—that they apparently dispute an inquirer's right to be convinced of the validity of his own observations, conclusions, and proofs and to build these into the process of his thinking. Criticism can, of course, demonstrate that this or that point is untenable and, in doing so, sometimes bring to the ground an entire theoretical structure. But criticism cannot object to the procedure in itself, since, without this procedure, there can be no progress in scientific thinking. In the criticism of Toynbee's work, a particularly great part has been played by the reproach that he has anticipated his conclusions (*der Antizipationsvorwurf*). . . . Yet not a single participant in the debate has gone into the underlying epistemological problem. All the critics who bring up against Toynbee the reproach that he works with "anticipatory schemas" (*antizipierende Schemata*) seem to be quite unconscious of the fundamental importance of this function of all thinking—including, of course, their own. They appear to hold the naïve view that complex ideas are arrived at by the additive process of stringing together ideas of a more or less elementary kind. This is a point of view that has been left behind long ago in the modern psychological study of thought. The field of inquiry has shifted to the discussion of heuristic and verifiatory method. The criticism directed against anticipating results seems to have overlooked this development, at any rate when it has been turned against Toynbee. Consequently it has missed fire.'

In another passage in his paper, Anderle makes the point that 'any man of learning is within his rights in arranging the material known to him in accordance with his theory, in order to see how far this will carry him. He has a right to do this without taking into consideration, for the moment, the possibility that contrary instances may come to light in the course of his researches.'

Of course, the inquirer ought to test the validity of his hypothesis or 'model' (see pp. 22–23 and 158–66) by applying it to all the apparently relevant evidence on which he can lay hands, and seeing whether it does or does not fit the phenomena. But, to apply an hypothesis or a 'model', one must have it in hand; one cannot have it without having first constructed it; and the materials out of which one constructs it cannot embrace all the evidence to which it is going to be applied after it has been constructed (see pp. cit.).

The line of criticism that Anderle criticizes may be illustrated by some examples. What Geyl says of me is that 'he introduces into his argument his own theoretical construction as an established datum' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 56). In M. A. Fitzsimons' view, my 'philosophy of history even dictates the organisation and selection of material' (*The Review of Politics*, October, 1957, pp. 554–5). In T. R. Fyvel's view, my work seems 'in the end frustrated, because it had always to be fitted into a pre-conceived brief' (*The Tribune*, 21st March, 1947). H. Werner finds in my work an 'external application of pre-fabricated schemata' (*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, No. 29 (1955), pp. 528–44). J. K. Feibleman compares 'the iron rigidity' of my system to 'the medieval torture device of the iron woman' (*T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 23). Patrick Gardiner compares my work to a jigsaw puzzle whose parts interlock only because they have been constructed to do so (*Time and Tide*, 30th October, 1954). See further p. 246, footnote 6.

On the other hand, Father M. C. D'Arcy holds that 'every great historian begins with a theory, and though he modifies it in the face of evidence, he is nevertheless driven by it to select his evidence and marshal his facts' (*The Sense of History*, p. 60). 'The function and gift of the historian is to ask questions' (*ibid.*, p. 59). E. E. Y. Hales holds that I am justified in contending 'that some interpretation, implied or stated, is firmly planted in every history' (*History Today*, May, 1955, p. 323). Father D'Arcy, too, maintains that 'history uses interpretation; it seeks for an intelligible pattern or whole' (*op. cit.*, p. 23). The true historian has a theme and finds significance (*ibid.*, p. 16). M. R. Cohen observes that 'philosophies of history are none the better for being held and transmitted unconsciously' (*The Meaning of Human History*, p. 5; *cp.* p. 35) and points out 'the essential role of ideas or hypotheses in the activity of the historian' (*ibid.*, p. 68; *cp.* p. 78). 'Effective investigation demands some previous division or classification' (*ibid.*, p. 65). 'The mere accumulation of facts will not indicate their significance. Some general idea or anticipatory hypothesis is necessary to define our field of investigation and to determine what facts are relevant to our inquiry' (*ibid.*, p. 204). 'Men generally observe only what their ideas have prepared them to observe' (*ibid.*, p. 204). In other words, if we did not have these antecedent ideas, we might fail to see anything at all; at the same time, we must be on guard against the danger that they may also limit our horizon.

¹ On this dialectical procedure, see further the Annex to Chapter II, pp. 641–2; E. F. J. Zahn in *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 15; H. Marrou in *Esprit*, July, 1952, p. 124. Zahn and Marrou are referring particularly to my treatment of civilizations. In Marrou's view (expressed *ibid.*) civilization looks more like a real entity in

This purpose presupposes a readiness to modify or abandon an hypothesis if sufficient cause for doing so has been shown as a result of the test of debate.

But, if the use of hypotheses is indispensable, it also has at least one besetting danger: 'the habit of treating a mental convenience as if it were an objective thing'—an error that, in academic language, is called 'the hypostatization of methodological categories'.¹ This is a confusion into which it is notoriously easy to fall unconsciously, because hypotheses and generalizations and concepts are, after all, realities, though they are realities of a different order from that of the phenomena which they are designed to apprehend, handle, and explain. This is, of course, a failure to distinguish between tools and their products or, to use broader terms, between means and ends.

In this connexion I have been accused of introducing into my argument my own theoretical construction, not just as a working hypothesis, but as an established datum,² and also of having 'an anthropomorphic conception of civilizations'.³ I confess to having frequently written of them in anthropomorphic language, but this is not because I conceive of them in anthropomorphic terms. I think of them as operational concepts—'intelligible fields of study'—which are useful for exploring and explaining some important provinces of the domain of history, though not the whole domain. I also think of them as institutions: that is, as networks of impersonal relations between human beings. It is possible for them to be both these things at once. But of course neither concepts nor institutions are persons.

The reason why I do, nevertheless, use anthropomorphic language in dealing with civilizations is because I am driven to it by the poverty of the English language so far—a poverty that it shares, I believe, with all other languages up to date. Even the most sophisticated languages hitherto evolved have continued to be prisoners of all language's sensuous and mythological past, and consequently have failed almost entirely to equip concepts and institutions with vocabularies of their own,

a still-life cross-section tableau than when we look at it on the move. "The essential point is that one should not make what is really a label or a classificatory concept into an idea or an ontological principle."

¹ P. Geyl: *Debates with Historians*, p. 133. Cp. R. Pares in *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), pp. 257-8; H. Tingsten in *Dagens Nyheter*, 16th January, 1949; A. R. Burn in *History*, February-October, 1956, pp. 2-3; W. O. Ault in *The Journal of Bible and Religion*, April, 1955.

² P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, p. 56 (quoted already in footnote 11 to p. 43); F. H. Underhill in *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. xxxvi, No. 3 (September 1955), pp. 222-35 (quoted already in the Introduction to this volume, p. 1, footnote 5). Cp. E. E. Y. Hales in *History Today*, May, 1955, p. 320: 'He writes as though the principles he thinks he perceives were laws in the Newtonian sense.' A. L. Guernard, in a review of vols. i-iii of this book in *The Herald-Tribune*, 28th October, 1934, writes that Toynbee 'seems to forget, and he makes us forget, that his "laws" are valid only as hypotheses and approximations'. The same indictment has been made against H. T. Buckle by M. C. Swabey. 'Loose generalisations are quickly converted into premises for arguments, and the mere plausibility of conjectures is taken for their substantiation' (*The Judgment of History*, p. 84).

³ W. Kaufmann in *Toynbee and History*, p. 310. H. D. Oakeley observes that 'there is a tendency in his work to "personify" civilization or treat it as something more than the individuals who, like many Atlases, "bear it up"' (*Philosophy*, vol. xi, No. 42 (April, 1936), p. 191). M. R. Cohen observes that to ascribe conscious purpose to groups is mythology (*The Meaning of Human History*, p. 125).

referring distinctively and exclusively to these two orders of reality. In the study of biological evolution, for example, the creation of a non-anthropomorphic vocabulary has been proving difficult, though it has been one of the main concerns of scientists in this field to dispense with the hypothesis of a creator god. The linguistic situation is even worse, if that is possible, in the field of human studies; but here the difficulty of avoiding the use of anthropomorphic language in writing about civilizations is, I should say, neither greater nor less than when one is writing about other institutions: states, peoples, churches, religions, classes, professions, and so on. I do not believe that any historian has, so far, ever managed to write more than a page or two of narrative without using 'anthropomorphic' or some other form of 'hypostatical' language in some degree. If I can be confronted with an instance to the contrary, I will admit that this verbal misrepresentation of the realities is avoidable and that, in so far as I have failed to avoid it, I deserve to be taken to task.

One test of whether the user of a concept or an hypothesis does think of it as being something more than a mental tool will be the degree of his readiness or unreadiness to drop it. In an appraisal of my work Kroeber writes, with characteristic generosity:

'His formal scheme presumably will mostly go the way of sociologic fit-alls. Actually, however he himself may regard it, this scheme has served him well as a scaffold from which to rear a most stimulating structure of further comparative interpretation of a large part of human history.'¹

Another critic has given the correct answer to Kroeber's query. He has reported that I do not claim to have discovered any absolute, universal laws.² Anderle, in his survey of criticisms of my work, has found that some critics have ignored my recognition of the truth that all historical work is no more than provisional.³ But at least one critic has testified in my favour on this point.

'One has the feeling that Toynbee, unlike Spengler, is really trying to subject his historical laws to empirical tests, and that he would have the integrity and the modesty, if given sufficient reason, to modify or abandon his laws.'⁴

I have done, and shall go on doing, my best to justify this good opinion of my intellectual honesty. In the first ten volumes of this book I have already given proof of my good faith in an instance which I apologize for mentioning again, after having cited it already, earlier in this chapter, in a different context. I laid aside my original hypothesis about the historical relation of 'higher religions' to 'civilizations' when I found that, while this might serve to explain the transition from an

¹ A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 378. Cp. R. Caillois in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 1.

² Father L. Walker, O.P., in *Toynbee and History*, p. 389.

³ O. F. Anderle in his unpublished paper.

⁴ W. H. Coates: 'Relativism and the Use of Hypothesis in History' in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. xxi, No. 1 (March, 1949), p. 27, footnote 14.

earlier civilization to a later one, the role of higher religions as 'chrysalises' for civilizations was, in their own histories, no more than an incidental one that did not explain their true mission. Accordingly, I tried a new hypothesis about the relation of civilizations to higher religions, to see if this would be more illuminating as an explanation of the higher religions' histories. This change of tools is, I should say, an indication that I have a greater respect for the historical evidence than I have for any particular hypothesis that I happen to have picked out of my tool-bag. A large part of the present volume is occupied by similar reconsiderations of concepts and hypotheses used in volumes i-x. I have reviewed my previous notions and, where I have found reason, have gone on to modify or abandon them. I have aimed at treating my own past work no more tenderly than I should have treated anyone else's. How far I have succeeded in achieving this ambitious aim will, no doubt, be easier for my critics to judge than it is for me.

II. THE RELATIVITY OF A HUMAN OBSERVER'S APPROACH TO HUMAN AFFAIRS

AT the beginning of the preceding chapter we have taken note of Reality's feat of looking at itself through a part of itself in the shape of a conscious human mind. This feat is achieved through a mental self-articulation of Reality into subject and object in the diffracting mind of a human observer. This is an indispensable condition for attaining consciousness and for thinking. 'It is methodologically impossible to dispense with the viewpoint of *some* observer.'¹

If this diffracting mental operation could have the effect of dividing Reality itself into two really separate entities, our human enterprise of finding our way about the Universe would be easier than it is. The supposedly actual division in Reality corresponding to the mental dissection of Reality in our consciousness would then be like the pane of glass in the window of a conning-tower. By looking out of its mental window the mind could observe the objective world; by turning round and looking inwards it could also observe itself; and it could conclude that, after having taken its observations in both directions, it had obtained an accurate picture both of itself and of external Reality. Unfortunately, in making our assumption that there is an effective division in Reality corresponding to our dissection of it, we are, as we know, doing violence to the very Reality that we are trying to apprehend. The pane of glass in our simile cannot really be an insulator. It is an inseparable part of the same Universe as the adjoining atmosphere in the landscape beyond its outer face and in the room inside its inner face. The glass, by its interposition, makes a link, not a break; and, if the glass is really there, this is evidence that room and landscape are both really parts of one and the same Universe, while, if the apparent presence of the glass pane between them is an hallucination, in that case they are still more obviously one

¹ H. and M. Sprout: *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context of International Politics*, p. 65.

and indivisible. The observing mind is, in fact, itself part of the Universe that it is trying to observe.¹ And this reading of our simile is borne out by everyday experience in a world in which there are more observing minds than one. Each mind is a subject only from its own individual standpoint. From the standpoint of every other mind, it is one of the objects in each of these other minds' objective world. And, if we found ourselves not being regarded by other minds as being objective realities, we should be astonished, affronted, and, even more, alarmed.

What are we to make of this undeniable truth that an observing human mind is itself part of the Universe, in spite of the Universe's appearing, as the mind surveys it, to lie outside the mind and, conversely, appearing to be observed by the mind from a mental standpoint outside the Universe? This truth means that the problem of observation is not an easy but a difficult one, and that, though it seems to be solved for practical purposes in the act of observation, this practical solution cannot be more than partial and imperfect. One necessary condition for perfect observation might appear, at first sight, to be that, during the act of observation, both the observer and his object should remain constant, without either of them being modified by the other or by any third agent. On second thoughts, however, it becomes evident in the first place that this condition is actually unattainable and in the second place that, if one could imagine it to have been attained, it would have defeated its own object by making the act of observation impossible to carry out. There cannot be observation without interaction between the observer and the object under his observation, and in interacting they are bound to affect each other reciprocally.² In terms of our simile of the conning-tower, the observer posted in it affects the degree of visibility in the landscape outside when he turns his search-light on it, and the vision of the landscape given by this illumination of it affects the image obtained by the observer's eye. Moreover, if this reciprocal disturbance of both parties' previous state did not take place, there could be no observation, because the disturbance is set up—and this unavoidably—by the establishment of communication, and it is only through this disturbing operation that the act of observation is achieved.

The logical puzzle here brought to light is also illustrated by another of the mind's dissections of Reality: the dichotomy between creatures and their creator. In seeking to explain to themselves how the phenomenal world can have come into existence, some human minds in some societies have been led to propose the hypothesis that there must have been a creator. But a creator must, *ex hypothesi*, be outside his handiwork, as a potter is outside his earthenware, while at the same time he must be in contact with it, as the potter has to be with his clay. This logical dilemma has caught on its horns the inquirers into the riddle of cosmogony when they have become sophisticated enough to begin to philosophize. A god who is credited with having been the creator of the phenomenal world has to be banished from it by being relegated into a state of transcendence; yet, when once he has been thus placed in a

¹ See the passage quoted from Teilhard de Chardin on p. 8, footnote 3.

² This point is noted by Bagby in *op. cit.*, p. 60.

possible position for performing the work of creation, he has thereby been deprived of the possibility of carrying the operation out. A complete insulation will have made him impotent, not omnipotent. If he is to create the Universe, he must be in contact with it. If he is to create it out of previously existing materials, he must be inside the same world as these; they themselves cannot be his handiwork; and their previous existence has then to be accounted for. On the other hand, if the creator has to create the phenomenal world out of nothing but himself, then in reality it will still remain a part of himself and the phenomena will be no more than unaccountable hallucinations in human minds that will also be unaccountably conscious.

Accordingly, the intellectual struggle with the problem of creation has made speculative minds first push God out of the phenomenal world and then pull Him back into it again. When He has been conceived of as being transcendent, He must also be conceived of as being immanent. If He is Brahṁā, He must be Vishnu as well. But God Incarnate in an avatar cannot be the creator of a Universe of which He has revealed himself to be a part, while, on the other hand, if it is one of the inalienable attributes of divinity to be parked quite out of contact with the phenomenal world, somewhere in inter-stellar space (Epicurus's hypothetical *intermundia*), then it follows inevitably that the gods cannot either affect or be affected by mundane affairs. The difficulty that is encountered by a would-be observer is, in fact, inherent in the nature of the genus of which the activities of observation and creation are two species. Both these kinds of activity are relations, and every relation sets up a mutual disturbance of the parties to it.

For a would-be observer of the phenomenal world this difficulty is aggravated by one of the World's apparent characteristics. Phenomena have the appearance of being on the move through time and space; and, since the observer himself is one of these apparently travelling phenomena that he is surveying, he must do his intellectual work in a fellow traveller's never stationary driving-seat. For example, in the astronomical province of the mental field in which the general object of study is the physical cosmos, human observers are at present confined to the surface of one of the travelling stars; and our astronomers will not find themselves in any better position for taking their observations if they manage, one day, to make their way to the Moon or to Mars or to some planet in another solar system than ours or even in another galaxy. As athletes, they will have been as clever as Baron Munchhausen was when he jumped off the cannon's mouth on to the cannon-ball that had just come whizzing out of it, and when he then changed cannon-ball mounts in mid-air. But like the Baron the astronomers will still be travelling inside the realm of time and space whose physical phenomena they are studying, and the relativity of their own physical track through time and space to the tracks of the heavenly bodies that they are observing will still be affecting their scientific findings. It must, indeed, be affecting these at each successive configuration of the perpetually changing network woven by the respective space-time points through which each of the heavenly bodies, including the observer's own vehicle,

is passing. It was a marvellous feat of intellectual imagination to realize that the actual astronomical observer, being imprisoned in space and time, could never take observations from the illusory vantage-point of an hypothetical observer inconceivably posted outside them. But thanks to Einstein's genius the point is now obvious to ordinary minds. It should be still more obvious when the phenomena that we are trying to observe are not the movements of the stars but are human affairs.

In this field of observation it is surely manifest that the observer himself is being carried, all the time, farther down the stream whose upper reaches he is attempting to survey from the crow's-nest on his travelling mast-head. The past course of the river of human history does not shift its bed. When once events have happened, they remain unchanged in fact. But they keep on changing their appearance because there are unceasing changes in the observer's own momentary position, which is the only position from which he can ever look back at the past.¹

'In the sciences of Man, the rational core, common to all science, is diminished, obscured, and distorted by the inevitably partial perspective of the observer.'²

This is why, for the last two hundred years or so, each successive generation of modern Western historians has rewritten the history of the Hellenic World. The facts of Greek and Roman history have remained, throughout, what they always were, and our information about these

¹ 'The history of history eludes historical inquiry (*Die Geschichte der Geschichte entsteht sich der Historie*). There can be no scientific pronouncement about the whence and whither of history. One has to be inside history for any such question to be possible.' The sense of freedom comes from a conscious questioning of the past and the future, and this presupposes that human souls, as we know them, are already in existence (K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 237 and 240). The historian is an observer who stands inside the framework of the events that he describes (K. W. Thompson in *The Political Science Quarterly*, vol. lxxi, No. 3 (September, 1956), p. 367). 'The meaning of the past is seen in the present, and, as the present changes, so does the meaning that we see in the past' (Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 23). This last point is also made by Bagby in *Culture and History*, p. 41.

² H. J. Morgenthau in *Toynbee and History*, p. 193. In the same context, Morgenthau points out that 'scientific' history is 'unproblematic in detail but a problem in its very conception of history'. It is, he suggests, an epistemological impossibility to study one civilization objectively from an observation-post in another civilization. If Burckhardt's idea of history is right, 'the great achievement of Mr. Toynbee as a historian lies in that very subjectivity that is the horror of scientific historiography'.

The would-be scientific and objective historians have, it would seem, been caught in a trap. Their pursuit of scientific objectivity has led them, as we have seen, to insist on the uniqueness of the human phenomena that they are studying. But, as Erdmann points out, a belief in the uniqueness of individuality implies a denial of the belief in the uniformity of human nature, and this denial, in its turn, leads to an affirmation of relativity that applies to the personality of the historian himself. 'Historiography becomes its own subject-matter (*Die Geschichtsschreibung wird sich selbst zum Gegenstand*)'—as it has become for Gooch and Butterfield and Collingwood, for instance. 'Historicism' (*Historismus*) and 'existential' philosophy are expressions of the same intellectual process in two different provinces of study' (K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 178–81).

In the same article (on p. 182) Erdmann remarks that the naïveté of my approach to history has saved me from inhibiting myself by 'ruminating in a broad way about the "ifs" and the "buts" of the [epistemological] problems involved in an undertaking like' mine. I admit to the naïveté of my first approach, and I agree with Erdmann's ironical comment that it gave me the hardihood to rush in where a philosophically sophisticated angel might have feared to tread. Now that my naïveté has allowed me to produce ten volumes, I can afford, in the present volume, to let myself consider the epistemological problem of relativity.

facts has not changed to anything like the extent that would be required if this change in our modern Western knowledge of the facts was to be taken as explaining the successive changes in the appearance of these facts to our modern Western eyes. There have been no losses of knowledge; we have preserved all our previous knowledge intact; and, in spite of our archaeologists' magnificent achievements in bringing to light buried buildings, works of art and technology, and inscriptions, the consequent additions to our knowledge have not been very great—at any rate not great enough to account for the continual changes in our view of Hellenic history. The changes in the appearance of the picture have been brought about, not by changes in the historical facts or in our knowledge of them, but by successive changes in the position of the modern observer. The only light that we can throw on the past is the light of our own experience. Any historian will inevitably be living and working in a particular social milieu at a particular stage of its development, and his own situation will make him sensitive to some features in a past situation and blind to others. In recent centuries our experience in the West has been changing, from one generation to another, sufficiently to produce appreciable changes in the distribution of our sensitive spots and our blind spots. Nineteenth-century Western students of Hellenic history were sensitive, for instance, to the constitutional aspect of Greek and Roman political life, and particularly to manifestations of democracy; their twentieth-century successor's eye is caught by the economic facet of Greek and Roman life and by manifestations of bureaucracy and dictatorship. Different features of an unchanging landscape appear to be the salient features in each successive generation. In each case these things that seem to stand out from the rest are things whose significance has been brought home to the historian by his own experience in his own day.¹

Westerners of the present generation feel that, in these recent centuries, the Western way of life has been changing at a pace that has been accelerating until it has now become uncomfortably fast. Yet the West has been singular, and fortunate, in having been free to move at its own pace. No outsiders have been setting its pace for it. In contrast to the Western peoples, all other peoples in the World have been having their pace set for them, during these same recent centuries, by the West. They have been having to try to catch up with the West in the field of the West's own special achievements in order to hold their own against the West. So in recent times the non-Western World's pace,

¹ This point has been well taken by Bagby, 'Every human activity must find its origin in present human needs' (op. cit., p. 48). 'Each generation must find its own interpreters, the historians who will show how the past can be related to the new needs and problems of the day' (ibid., p. 49). In other words, 'all true history is contemporary history' (B. Croce: *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia* (Bari 1917, Laterza), p. 4). F. A. Hayek, too, holds that 'we . . . study particular events because they have contributed to create the particular environment in which we live, or because they are part of that environment' (*The Counter-Revolution of Science*, p. 70). At the same time, Hayek rightly contests the doctrine that all historical knowledge is necessarily relative. 'The kernel of truth in the assertion about the relativity of historical knowledge is that historians will at different times be interested in different objects, but not that they will necessarily hold different views about the same object' (op. cit., p. 70). Yet, though this is not inevitable, it can happen and has, in fact, happened frequently.

by comparison with the West's pace, has been revolutionary. This means, among other things, that in our day a Russian or a Muslim or a Hindu or a Chinese or a Japanese has been having to make far more drastic revisions of his view of the past—particularly his own society's past—than any that a Westerner has had to make in his view of the Hellenic past. The facts of Russian, Muslim, Indian, and East Asian history have not changed, any more than the facts of Hellenic history have changed. But the modern African or Asian or Russian observer has had to move still faster and farther, between one generation and another, than the contemporary Western observer has.

This inherent relativity of the historical kind of observation has been brought to our attention by the world-wide acceleration of the pace of social and cultural change in the current age. But this is not the first instance within our knowledge. We know of previous revolutions that have produced comparable changes between the pre-revolutionary and the post-revolutionary view of the past. After the 'epoch-making' overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great and the consequent incorporation of Egypt and South-West Asia in the Hellenic World, Hellenic historians—for example, Polybius and Diodorus among those whose works have partially survived—looked back on the pre-Alexandrine age of Hellenic history with different eyes from Thucydides' or even Herodotus's. Herodotus had a lively curiosity about the ways of life in the regions that Alexander was subsequently to bring under Hellenic domination, but the pre-conquest and post-conquest Hellenic pictures of these non-Hellenic civilizations were not the same. After a subsequent religious revolution in the Hellenic World, Hellenic converts to Christianity conflated the traditional Hellenic picture of world history, as presented in the works of pre-Christian post-Alexandrine Hellenic historians, with the traditional Jewish picture of world history, as presented in the Jewish holy scriptures, which the Christian Church had incorporated in its Bible, and they transformed both these pictures not only by conflating them but also by reinterpreting them in terms of the Christian conception of God's plan leading from the Creation to the Last Things. After yet another religious revolution of comparable magnitude, Christian and Zoroastrian converts to Islam similarly reinterpreted in Islamic terms the traditional picture of pre-Islamic history that they had inherited from their non-Muslim forebears. At the present day we can watch converts to Communism at work on reinterpreting in Marxian terms the traditional pictures of past history that have hitherto held the field in the West and in the domains of the other living civilizations.

These kaleidoscopic changes in the appearance of the past illustrate the problem of relativity which besets historians, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and other students of human affairs—not least, perhaps, the psychologists. It is the same problem that besets astronomers, physicists, and other students of non-human nature. Whatever the nature of the object that is under observation, a human observer is incapable of seeing it with the imaginary detachment of an inconceivable outsider. If his study is physical science, he can see the

physical cosmos only with the eye of one mobile human participant in an apparent network of physical events that is perpetually changing its configuration in time-space. If he is a student of human affairs, he can see these only as a perpetually unfolding human drama. In every case his view of the past will be conditioned by the ever-changing position of his own present observation-point. Relativity is a limitation that is imposed on human studies in all fields by the very nature of the situation in which a conscious human mind finds itself; and it is a situation from which there is no escape.

In this matter of relativity the student of human affairs is in the same boat as the student of non-human nature; but the boat is partitioned by a bulkhead, and, on the humanist's¹ side of this, there are two holes in the boat's hull, not just one. Like the physicist, the humanist has the problem of relativity to cope with, but he has also to cope with the problem of bias; and from this the physicist seems to be exempt.

The physicist has to contend with the difficulty that the measurements which he registers of objects, events, or relations between objects or events in the physical cosmos will vary according to the speed with which he and his measuring-instrument are approaching towards, or receding from, the thing that he is trying to measure. This fluctuation that complicates the physicist's work is a mental occurrence, but it occurs only at the observational and interpretative level, that is to say at the intellectual level. The unavoidable play of relativity makes the physical objects of his study intellectually elusive for the physicist, as it also makes human affairs elusive for the humanist. But the physical scientist does not also have to contend, as the student of human affairs does, with discriminatory judgements of value and with partisan reactions of feeling for or against the objects of his study. In the physical scientist's field the objects are non-human, even when they are not inanimate, and this means that, in the psyche of a human student of them, they do not evoke 'affective' feelings or value judgements. The physical scientist is unlikely to catch himself admiring or loving this or that nebula, solar system, molecule, atom, or electron and despising or hating this or that other one. It requires quite a feat of scientific engineering to bring a remote nebula or even a close-up electron within the field of the observer's perception. Any specimen is welcome grist to his intellectual mill; but all specimens leave him emotionally and morally indifferent. On the level of feeling and valuation they are all one to him. By contrast, the student of human affairs has an ethical and emotional problem

¹ The word 'humanist' is used in this volume in its literal meaning of a 'student of human affairs', without the implication, which it sometimes carries, of a belief, in the humanist's mind, that human affairs can and ought to be studied in exclusively human terms, without taking account of religious beliefs in the existence and intervention of a spiritual presence or presences higher than Man. To describe this point of view, I shall be using the words 'rationalism' and 'rationalist'. Of course, a humanist can be a rationalist as well, just as a 'Germanist'—the German term for a student of Teutonic antiquities—can also be a holder of the belief that the Teutons are 'the master race' (*Herrenvolk*). The Germans' English fellow Teutons find this German belief quaint (though some English people actually hold it with an un-German unselfconsciousness). But if Teutonolatry is ridiculous, can anthropolatry escape the same charge? Does the notion of a *Herrenvolk* become any less fantastic when it is extended to the human race at large instead of being confined to the Teutonic fraction of it?

as well as an intellectual one to contend with. The objects of his study are human beings of like passions with himself. And it is impossible for one human being to think about another human being, present or absent, living or dead, without also having feelings about him and passing judgements on him. He either likes him or dislikes him; regards him as being either beneficent or maleficent; feels him to be either a friend or an enemy; judges his actions to have been either right or wrong; and appraises his character as being either good or bad, either righteous or wicked.¹

We may say with our lips that, when we are making an historical study of our fellow human beings, we suspend our moral judgements and suppress our feelings; but, if we fancy that we can do that, we are deceiving ourselves.² 'All interpretations of human events which profess to

¹ *Ad hominem*, the Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. notes that my 'historical and ethical judgements interlock. He is sure, for instance, that earthly militancy ruins a religion. As moral theologian he is sure that it ought to, and as historian he notes that it usually has' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). T. A. Sumberg observes that, 'by . . . yielding to the pressure of his personal predilections, Toynbee makes his reader acutely aware of how time and space limit a historian's vision—a fact which he laments so audibly with respect to other historians' (*Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267–84). F. Borkenau, too, criticizes me for moralizing ('in *Commentary*, May, 1955, pp. 241–2). A. L. Kroeber finds my mind old-fashioned 'in founding its system of the ultimate interpretation of human history on explanations through character and morals. Therefore the distinctive and differential qualities of his civilizations are largely missed or ignored' (*Style and Civilizations*, p. 127).

On the other hand, Father M. C. D'Arcy draws the distinction that I have drawn above. 'In science the subject matter does not call for moral judgment, and the emotions of the scientist are not engaged. But the subject matter of history is human conduct. Moreover, the historian cannot divest himself entirely of his feelings and beliefs; and, if he were to try to do so, he would blind himself to what is the nature of human action' (*The Sense of History*, p. 167).

Robert Redfield, too, holds that we cannot study human conduct without placing values on it (*The Primitive World and its Transformations*, pp. 139–41). 'It is easy enough to be objective towards objects; but the human individual refuses to be only an object. When he is there before you, he insists on being judged as human beings are judged in life, if not in science' (*ibid.*, p. 152). Redfield's view is derived from his own experience as a field anthropologist. 'In the very necessity to describe the native, one must feel for him—or perhaps against him. The feelings are mixed with valuations. In Indian communities in which I have worked, I have found myself constantly liking and disliking some people as compared with others, and some aspects of the total culture as compared with others. . . . Objectivity . . . requires me to become aware of the values I have that may lead me in one direction rather than another. . . . But I do not think that it asks me that I divest myself of the human qualities, including valuing. I could not do my work without them' (*ibid.*, p. 154). 'In me, man and anthropologist do not separate themselves sharply' (*ibid.*, p. 165).

On this point, M. C. Swabey takes the same view as Father D'Arcy and Robert Redfield. 'To a far greater extent than in science . . . the historian's compilation of facts reflects the social background and preferences of the compiler. Not only is he, like the scientist, part of the physical world, but in a far more intimate way he is part of a particular society' (*The Judgment of History*, p. 233). 'In a sense, history is always concerned with the preservation of values. . . . Everywhere scales of preference and importance are woven into its accounts' (*ibid.*, p. 55). The role that is characteristic of the historian is the judicial one (*ibid.*, p. 238). In Swabey's view, however, valuation is an inseparable concomitant of study even where the object of study is non-human nature. She pillories 'the falsity of trying to exclude values from the method and content of knowledge' (*ibid.*, p. 241). 'Valuation . . . is omnipresent in experience. . . . All alleged knowledge (not excepting the scientific) is essentially evaluative. . . . Acceptance of a framework of values as authentic presuppositions is the condition of natural knowledge' (*ibid.*, p. 250).

² 'The approach to history which will be advocated here is essentially aesthetic rather than moral. It involves a sympathy with things as they are, rather than as they ought to be. It is the point of view of the scientist or the saint as opposed to that of the political or religious reformer' (P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 48). In the present writer's judgement, Bagby usually fails to live up to this claim when he touches on the subject of

exclude ethics actually smuggle in uncritical ethical judgments.¹ Feelings and judgements are inherent in all relations between one human being and another.² This is, of course, generally recognized in the case of relations that are competitive: e.g. personal rivalries, business competition, litigation, political contests, war. Perhaps there is an element of competition in all the relations of practical life. But it may be asked whether it is really impossible to be unemotional and uncensorious in one's attitude towards one's fellow human beings when one's relation towards them takes the form, not of action, but of study. Is not this a relation in which the observer's personal interests are not engaged, even if the people whom he is studying are his living contemporaries? *A fortiori*, if they are now dead, and have been dead for hundreds or thousands of years, cannot the historian study them with the emotional and ethical indifference that comes so easy to the physicist in his study of his electrons and his galaxies?³ This question is answered in the

religion. In these passages there is an animus showing through a cloak of irony; Bagby has not really got rid of the religious reformer in himself; he has turned him inside out, but he is still transparently the Old Adam.

The approach attempted by Bagby is also proposed by G. A. Birks in a letter to me of 23rd January, 1949. He suggests 'eliminating all values' on the ground 'that they are irrelevant in any connexion in any scientific inquiry, and harmful both to the pursuit of truth and to its acceptance. Other sciences have found it difficult to eliminate them, but have found new vitality after doing so: e.g. chemistry (long preoccupied with the "precious" metals) and astronomy (with its former bias towards "perfect" circular motion).' It is undoubtedly true that, in the study of non-human affairs, the introduction of human values is out of place and that there is everything to be gained by getting rid of this incongruous and confusing importation. But it does not follow that human values can similarly be eliminated from the study of human affairs. In my belief the suggested analogy of the sciences dealing with non-human nature does not hold good on this point.

However, Trinkaus has criticized me on the ground that I have achieved what appears to me to be Bagby's aim. According to Trinkaus, the comparative method of study that I have followed has broadened the view of history, but this at the cost of taking the element of value and purpose out of our view of ourselves (*Science and History*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), p. 221). This judgement seems hardly compatible with Sumberg's cited on p. 54 in footnote 1. One of the two must surely be mistaken. I myself agree with Sumberg.

¹ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 287.

² Frederick Schuman is recognizing this truth when he commends me (in *The Nation*, 6th November, 1954) for 'boldly making judgments and seeking no refuge in specious detachment'.

³ Sorokin seems to imply that we can achieve this scientific detachment in studying human affairs, for he criticizes my account of the rises and falls of civilizations on the ground that I have presented evaluative formulae of progress and regress but not true formulae of change (P. A. Sorokin in *Toynbee and History*, p. 180. Cp. p. 183). Yet it is not easy to find formulae of change that do not carry connotations of value. In my series of four terms—'genesis', 'growth', 'breakdown', 'disintegration'—the last three, at any rate, obviously imply that the changes described by them involve gains or losses in value. In applying this scheme to Egyptian history, I applied my term 'breakdown' to the stage in which 'the Old Kingdom' went to pieces, and my term 'disintegration' to all that followed after—labelling 'the Middle Empire' and 'the New Empire' as 'rallies' which temporarily arrested the process of 'disintegration' but did not ultimately reverse it. This application of my scheme has been courteously but firmly rejected by J. A. Wilson in *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), p. 32, footnote 12. Wilson is one of the foremost living authorities on the Egyptian Civilization, and, in the light of his criticisms and others, I have reconsidered and revised, in the present volume, my previous view of the structure of Egyptian history. At the same time, I find that Wilson's own picture of this resembles mine in carrying with it connotations of value. In Wilson's morphology of Egyptian history, the two periods of political disunity between 'the Old Kingdom' and 'the Middle Empire' and between 'the Middle Empire' and 'the New Empire' are labelled respectively 'the First Intermediate Period' and 'the Second Intermediate Period'. These labels are, of course, correct in the sense that these two periods of political disunity were in truth intermediate between three periods of political unity. But it is equally true that those three periods of political unity were intermediate

negative by the evidence of a classical test case in which the conditions have been as favourable to the possibility of indifference as they could ever conceivably be. It is also answered in the negative by a consideration of the nature of Man and the consequent nature of relations between human beings.

This identical finding of deductive reasoning and empirical observation cannot, I believe, be gainsaid. But, if it cannot, that is not the last word; it is an indication that we are face to face with a problem that we can neither evade nor ignore. If we come to the conclusion that feelings and judgements cannot be eliminated from human relations, even when these take the relatively anodyne form of a scholar's academic exercise, this does not constrain us also to conclude that there are no steps that we can and ought to take for coping with this particularly awkward feature of the human situation. There are possible steps that can be at any rate partially effective; and we must consider these, with the earnest intention of taking them. But we shall be in a better position to do this when we have fully faced the difficulty of the task.

Let us examine, as our test case, whether it has actually proved possible to be emotionally and ethically indifferent when one is studying, and writing about, some controversial personality. Let us rule out the living: Mr. Khrushchév, for instance, and Mr. Nixon and Pandit Nehru and Colonel Gamāl 'Abd-al-Nāsir. The negative answer to our question would be obtained too easily on these tests. Let us also rule out the recently dead: John Foster Dulles, for instance, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Stalin, and Hitler. These personalities still arouse the feelings and evoke the judgements that they aroused and evoked in their lifetimes. Let us even rule out controversial figures that have been dead now for some time, but whose souls go marching on: such posthumously potent personalities as John Brown and Karl Marx and Calvin and Luther. Let us take the Egyptian Pharaoh Ikhnaton, who lived and died in the fourteenth century B.C., and let us remind ourselves of his extraordinary history.

Ikhnaton stood for a revolution² in every important sphere of cultural and spiritual life: in literature, in art, and, above all, in religion. This made him an acutely controversial figure in his lifetime; and, when his opponents regained the upper hand after his death, they vented their hatred of him by chiselling out his name from his inscriptions and

between four periods of political disunity. Thus it would have been equally logical to label the periods of unity 'intermediate', and to call the periods of disunity by some descriptive name: let us say, 'periods of local liberty'. Why has Wilson chosen to call these periods of local liberty 'intermediate' and given descriptive names to the intervening periods in which local liberty was restricted or even suppressed? Surely his terminology has been determined by an unspoken value-judgement. Wilson evidently thinks of the periods of political unity as being the 'great' periods of Egyptian history, and thinks of the periods of political disunity as being temporary lapses from the ideal.

² It is best to use this form of words, because it avoids begging the question whether Ikhnaton was the real author and initiator of the revolution associated with his name and his reign, or whether he was a stalking-horse, figure-head, or puppet who was manipulated and exploited by other people. The evidence for answering this question with certainty may never come into our hands. But it is certain that Ikhnaton became the symbol of the revolution in the minds of both his collaborators and his opponents, and this undisputed fact is all that is needed to make his history a relevant test case for our present purpose.

by blackening his memory. Ikhnaton was remembered vividly in his own world as an arch-criminal so long as the Egyptiac Civilization lasted. But it did not last for more than about sixteen hundred years after Ikhnaton's death. In and after the third century of the Christian Era, people in Egypt began to forget how to write and read any of their traditional scripts. The memory of the whole history of Pharaonic Egypt was almost entirely lost; and, for the next sixteen hundred years, there was no one alive in the World who knew that such a person as the once notorious Ikhnaton had ever existed. Then, in the nineteenth century, modern Western scholars deciphered the Egyptiac scripts, and in the eighteen-eighties they dug up Ikhnaton's archives and published them. So, after having been buried in oblivion for sixteen centuries, Ikhnaton became notorious again; and, as soon as this happened, the challenging personality that he had been, or at any rate had been taken to be by his contemporaries, quickly aroused something of the same passion, for him and against him, among modern scholars in Western countries as it had aroused in his lifetime in Egypt.

This example—and it is only one of a number that could be cited—shows that the problem presented to students of human affairs by feelings and judgements is not a problem that is solved automatically by the mere passage of time. We do not find it surprising that a challenging personality like Franklin D. Roosevelt's should still be arousing passionate feelings when the hero or villain has been dead for no more than sixteen years. But, if we assume that such feelings were then still haunting his memory simply because he had been in the land of the living so recently, we are not facing the problem of bias squarely. The case of Ikhnaton indicates that this problem will always dog the historian, however remote in time and place the human object of his study may be.

But we do not have to depend on an induction from historical evidence to convince us that, in the study of human affairs, the elimination of feelings and judgements is impracticable. The cogent proof of this proposition lies in the consideration that, if we did succeed in making ourselves emotionally and morally indifferent to a human being whom we were studying, we should have thereby made it impossible for us to go on studying him as a human being. To be human means being morally responsible and therefore responsive to moral judgements—other people's judgements and one's own judgements—about oneself. It also means being emotionally sensitive to feelings about oneself—one's own feelings and other people's. However exasperating or crushing other people's feelings and judgements about oneself may be, it is not so painful to have to bear them as it would be desolating to be relieved of them; for, however hostile and unfavourable they may be, they are certificates that one is still being regarded as human by one's fellow human beings; and, so long as one really is human, life would be intolerable if these certificates of one's humanity were to be withdrawn.

Human beings smile when they see a dog vindictively break his teeth on a stone against which he has stubbed his toe. Only a poor brute beast, we reflect, would be so irrational as to mistake an inanimate object for a responsible agent who could be taught a lesson or at least be

made to pay for his offence. Xerxes has earned undying derision by his canine folly in flogging the waters of the Dardanelles as a punishment for their having carried away his bridges. Such childishness, we feel, is beneath a grown-up human being's dignity. Human adults do not bite stones or flog waves. And, if they are attacked by a non-human living creature—a shark, say, or a man-eating tiger, or a bacillus—they do not feel the anger and indignation that they would feel if they were being attacked by a human assailant. They just try to save their lives, as they would if they were being imperilled by a fire or a shipwreck or an avalanche. Again, they do not think it reasonable to resent or condemn the behaviour of a fellow human being who has gone out of his mind or become senile, and they feel that allowances ought to be made for infants and invalids.

These attitudes are rational and humane, but they are not complimentary. They imply a recognition that the fellow human being who benefits by them has permanently or temporarily lost, or has not yet gained, the priceless gift of being completely human. As the invalid recovers and the infant grows up, the indulgence granted to them is progressively withdrawn, and its withdrawal is not an act of inhumanity; on the contrary, it is the recognition of the recovery or attainment of full human moral stature, with its corollary, full human moral responsibility. The spectacles of lunacy and dotage are harrowing because here there is no expectation of recovery; and, for human beings, the continuance of mere physical life without human rationality and responsibility is a fate far worse than physical death. Perhaps I have now demonstrated my thesis that complete emotional and moral indifference towards a human object of study would enable this study to become entirely objective at the cost of making it utterly impossible. It would mean that the object of study had ceased to be human in the student's eye, and this, in turn, would mean that there was no longer a human relation between the two parties. If, on these terms of emotional and moral indifference, the study could continue at all, it could only be on the basis of treating the object of study as an automaton, and this would surely deprive the study of all further significance and value.

How, then, are we to cope with our feelings and judgements about human beings whom we are trying to study, when we have faced the truth that we cannot cope with feelings and judgements by eliminating them? Clearly we cannot be content just to take note of this question without trying to find an answer to it. We must try, because these feelings and judgements that it is impossible to eliminate are not, on that account, necessarily justifiable. Perhaps they might be if the rationality that gives dignity to human nature were complete and all-pervasive. Unhappily, as we well know, rationality is only one facet of a human psyche; another of its facets is its self-centredness, and this is a vice which is capable of vitiating any feelings and judgements and which therefore renders all feelings and judgements suspect.

For example, a person's feelings and judgements about another person with whom he happens to be in competition or in conflict are rightly suspect in the eyes of everyone else, and also in the eyes of the

person who is experiencing the feelings and making the judgements, if he has any capacity at all for introspection and reflection. It is a sound working rule to presume, unless and until convincing evidence has been produced to the contrary, that a human being is self-centredly prejudiced in his own favour. But self-centredness in the singular is not the only form of the vice. There is also self-centredness in the plural.¹ In Arabic there is a word for it: *nahnayah*, which, in Western languages that draw on Latin to extend their vocabularies, can be translated literally by coining the word 'nosism', as a plural for the singular word 'egotism' which is already well established. Self-centredness is perhaps even more difficult to cope with in its plural form than it is in the singular, because in the plural it is both more insidious and more potent.

It is more insidious because, when a human being is acting self-centredly, not solely on his individual account, but in the name of his family, parish, nation, state, or church, he can delude himself into imagining that he is acting on behalf of something that is not only greater than himself but is outside himself, and that therefore he is acting altruistically and even self-sacrificingly—as, for instance, when he risks, and perhaps loses, his life by serving his country as a soldier. In reality, of course, when I have expanded my singular 'me' into our plural 'us', my singular is still contained in our plural. The act of changing the grammatical number of my self-centredness has not disengaged me from it; it has actually made it more difficult for me to cope with by giving me a plausible ground for imagining that I have disengaged myself from it, though I have not.

Self-centredness is also far more dangerous in the plural than it is in the singular. Someone who is pursuing his singular self-interest may be checked by a guilty conscience and a sense of shame in himself, even before he draws on himself the disapproval and opposition of his neighbours, who, collectively, are likely to be able and eager to keep him within bounds. Someone who is pursuing a plural self-interest will be more prone to feel self-righteous; he will also have collaborators whose fellow feelings will confirm his confidence in the righteousness of his cause; and the collective power that he and they can jointly apply for putting their self-centred aim into action will be immeasurably stronger than the power of each of them acting individually.

If it were conceivable that Man's pre-human ancestors could have become fully human without having become social beings in the process, a completely human but at the same time utterly solitary individual would be one of the weakest of living creatures, because, in isolation, he would not be able to take much advantage of the potentialities of power latent in the freedom and the grasp of his hands, in the stereoscopic vision of his co-ordinated pair of eyes, and in the intelligence of his exquisitely organized brain. Robinson Crusoe managed to bring

¹ This important point has been well taken by M. C. Swabey. 'Egoism . . . is by no means lacking in social scope, since a man's self-interest tends to be as wide as the circle on which he depends' (*The Judgment of History*, p. 230). 'Social consciousness is never free from self-love, and experience plainly shows how a man may be "socialised" in the service of a group without at all relinquishing self-love as his supreme value. . . . A great gulf separates our fellow-feeling for the existent members of our society from respect for the dignity of Man' (*ibid.*, p. 142).

ashore with him, out of the wreck, a fair sample of the material equipment that was the cumulative product of human co-operative enterprise up to date, and he also inherited the accumulated knowledge of the use of such tools as he had. Thus, even when marooned on his island, he was by no means isolated in reality; he was isolated only in the present; he still shared in the common heritage from the past. Yet, even so, he was constantly finding that the absence of present companions set disconcerting limits to his power—as, for instance, when he had used his tools and his skill successfully to build a big boat in the well-timbered interior of his island, without having remembered that it would need the muscle-power of more human beings than one to move the completed boat down to the water's edge.

Co-operation enormously increases the possibility of turning to account Man's potentialities for exerting power. Accordingly, a human being's self-centred pursuit of self-interest can be far more effective, besides being likely to be less conscience-stricken and therefore less hesitant, when the first person of the active verb is in the plural number. This consideration applies to relations of all kinds between human beings: to the study of human affairs no less than to the so-called practical kinds of human social activity. This point is particularly pertinent to our present inquiry, because so large a part of the study of human affairs is concerned with Man in the plural, not in the singular.

How are we to deal with these feelings and judgements that always assert themselves in us when we are studying human affairs, however apparently remote these may be from ourselves and from our own interests? We cannot afford not to do battle with our self-centredness in both the singular and the plural. The degree to which we succeed in extricating ourselves from it gives the measure of the level of our knowledge and understanding of a universe which, in reality, does not centre on us.¹ The first step is to try to drag our feelings and judgements up into the full light of our consciousness and to try to see them as they are.² The effort demanded by this undertaking is a moral as well as an intellectual one. Unless we can bear self-mortification, we shall not be able to carry self-examination to the necessary painful lengths. Without humility there can be no illuminating self-knowledge. In fact the moral and the intellectual effort must go hand in hand, and, in both aspects, the enterprise is difficult and strenuous. However able, open-minded,

¹ See M. C. Swabey: *The Judgment of History*, pp. 5-6.

² The need for such self-examination has been widely recognized. See, for instance, the passage quoted on p. 20 from K. R. Popper's *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 152. 'A perfect objectivity is, no doubt, impossible, but it must always be our goal, and we should do well to become fully conscious of our individual biases in order to be able to discount them ourselves and to help others to do so' (Bagby, op. cit., p. 4). 'The safeguard against bias is not to indulge in useless resolutions to be free from bias but rather to explore one's pre-conceptions, to make them explicit, to consider their alternatives, and thus to multiply the number of hypotheses available for the apprehension of historical significance' (Cohen, op. cit., p. 80. Cp. p. 115). 'The need for awareness of bias . . . rests on the widely accepted psychological theory that selectivity in the individual's response to any stimulus is unavoidable. The remedy proposed by psychologists is not to strive to eliminate the element of selectivity, not to assume that by careful attention one can become an objective recording machine, but rather to define the basis for selection' (Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 85).

and humble-hearted an inquirer may be in analysing himself, many of his fundamental prejudices—and these are the most warping prejudices of all—are likely to escape detection, just because they are buried at so deep a level of the subconscious abyss of the psyche. There are limits to a human being's ability to read the secrets of his own heart, however sincerely and valiantly he tries. So the enterprise of self-examination can never be carried through to complete success. This, however, is no argument for refraining from making the attempt; for it is not a case of all or nothing. Even the smallest advance in self-knowledge is so much to the good.

In any inquiry it is wise to make one's approach by starting from what is least obscure. On this principle the most promising starting-point for an attempt to examine oneself would be to consider how one's outlook has been affected by one's education. The word 'education' should, of course, be construed in a broad enough sense to include, not just formal schooling, but the whole influence of one's total social and cultural environment since one's birth: the civilization, country, parish, and family into which one happens to have been born; one's mother-tongue;¹ one's parents' religion, social class, and profession; one's personal education, in the narrower sense of the word,² and profession in after life; and the extent of one's acquaintance with other social and cultural milieux besides the one in which one has been brought up. One would then have to consider one's reactions to these divers influences. Has one accepted them unquestioningly and uncritically, or has one welcomed them enthusiastically, or has one resisted them, even to the extent of 'leaning over backwards' in a determination not to be governed by them? At this point one would be trying to observe the interaction between education and innate temperament. This interaction is so constant and so intense that it is not easy to distinguish and disentangle the two factors. As far as one could succeed in doing this, one would be able to insulate one's temperament and analyse it. This would obviously be the most difficult part of the inquiry. These psychological phenomena are obscure in themselves, and they concern the inquirer so intimately that, even if he were trying bona fide to bring them to light, he might misinterpret them unintentionally.

A self-survey on some such lines, however inadequate, would be likely to suggest several useful reflections. It would immediately make one aware of the relativity of one's outlook to one's temperament and one's environment. One's temperament is the product of a particular combination of genes from one's parents' respective genetic heritages. The number of alternative possible combinations was very great, and each one of them would have produced a different temperament from that with which one happens to have been endowed by Nature's

¹ Bagby points out that 'our own ideas and values are embodied in our language, and yet our language is the only tool we have with which to describe alien ideas and values' (*Culture and History*, p. 191).

² If one has had the 'classical' education that, in most of the civilizations, has been the usual form of higher education till quite recently, one would have to take account of the effect of an acquired classical language or languages on one's ideas and values, besides the effect of one's mother-tongue. On this, see further the Annex, *Ad Hominem*, to Chapter II, pp. 575-605.

mathematical game of permutations and combinations. One's actual temperament, which is the foundation of one's personality, has been allotted to one casually by a biological mechanism which, from the human product's standpoint, is a blind throw of the dice; and it has been singled out of a host of various possibilities ranging, perhaps, over most of the gamut of Theophrastus's characters and Jung's psychological types.

The allotment to one of one's social and cultural environment might, at first sight, seem less capricious. A child is the offspring of parents who must have been living in some particular environment at the time when the embryo was conceived; and, since most children are brought up by their parents, most of them also grow up in their parents' environment as a matter of course. This, however, is merely normal without by any means being inevitable. In the grim age through which people of our generation have been living since A.D. 1914, there have been many children in the World who, in early infancy, have lost their parents and have grown up as orphans, waifs, and strays, in quite different social and cultural surroundings from those in which their parents brought them into the World. It is a well-known fact that these changelings have been moulded by the actual environment in which they have grown up to just the same extent as their contemporaries who have grown up in the same environment, not in consequence of a catastrophe, but for the normal reason that this was their parents' environment. The Russian-born child of Russian-born parents that has been transported in early infancy to Portugal, and has been brought up there without any subsequent contact with parents and native land, will speak Portuguese as if that were its 'mother-tongue' and will take it for granted that Roman Catholic Christianity is the only true and saving faith. Conversely, the Portuguese-born child of Portuguese parents that has been transported in early infancy to Russia and has been brought up there in insulation from its Portuguese origins will speak Russian as if that were its 'mother-tongue' and will take it just as much for granted that the true and saving faith is Communism.

When once one has realized that one's own standards, values, and outlook are the product of one's heredity and one's environment, and that they could and would have been different if a different heredity and environment had fallen to one's lot, it becomes impossible to maintain a child's naive assumption that its feelings are right, its judgements just, and its beliefs true in some absolute sense. This recognition of the relativity of any set of human standards and values—whether it is common to a group or is peculiar to an individual—should make one more distrustful and critical of one's own set and at the same time more charitable and open-minded towards the sets that we find in other people. This may lead one to try to examine alien outlooks, values, and standards as dispassionately as one will have tried to examine one's own in the first stage of the inquiry.¹ One will now inquire, as one will have

¹ Bagby, in *op. cit.*, p. 3, submits that 'our personal prejudices, even if expressed in the form of moral judgments, are poor guides to the understanding of anything whatsoever'. This dictum is true if, for the word 'whatsoever', we substitute the words 'except oneself'. If we can detect our personal prejudices and face them, they will give us a clue

inquired in one's own case, what the circumstances were in which these standards were acquired, and one will probably find that the circumstances explain the standards to us by revealing to us why they seem right and just and reasonable to the people whose standards they are.¹

Any such change of attitude towards ourselves, and consequently towards our fellow human beings too, would evidently make for an improvement in human relations of all kinds. When the relation is an intellectual one—a study of human affairs by a human mind—it would be true to say that a recognition of the implications of relativity is a prerequisite for achieving any results at all. 'Moralising is incompatible with historic insight.'² So long as one is taking one's own standards as an absolute norm to which other people's standards must measure up, one cannot begin to see these other people as they really are, or to appraise their standards at their real worth.³ This is evident when one is trying to make a comparative study of two or more persons other than oneself, or of two or more societies, cultures, or religions other to the distortions in our mental picture of phenomena, and this clue will give us a means for trying to see the picture in something more like the true perspective.

The same point is made by Bagby in *Toynbee and History*, p. 108. Bagby's contribution to this volume originally appeared in *The Times Literary Supplement* and was therefore published anonymously in accordance with the usual practice of the *T.L.S.* On the day of publication, Bagby himself told me, at a public meeting, that he was the writer of the article. So I am free to make it known that this article comes from the same hand as *Culture and History*.

¹ 'If one man wishes to understand and predict another's behaviour, he does not consider his own preferences; he tries rather, in the common phrase, "to look at things from the other man's point of view", to appreciate and sympathise with his likes and dislikes rather than to project his own' (Bagby, op. cit., p. 3). In another passage (*ibid.*, pp. 45-46), Bagby acutely discerns the limits of this possibility. 'We may be able to describe more or less objectively the behaviour or even the motives of others to which we are indifferent; if we wish to feel their emotions, we must inevitably project into them something of ourselves. For this reason, our knowledge of human beings in the past, and for that matter in the present, is necessarily limited. We are inevitably outsiders and must resign ourselves to that fact.' Bagby also points out, however, that our own mental processes, including our ways of feeling as well as our ways of thinking, do provide us with a 'model' for interpreting the mental processes of other people (*ibid.*, p. 66). It goes without saying that this 'model' which is derived from one's own picture of oneself must be used discriminately and cautiously if we are to avoid being misled by it.

² W. den Boer in *Toynbee and History*, p. 240. Cp. p. 242.

³ This point is perhaps easier to take when the intellectual and moral misdemeanour is being committed, not by oneself, but by someone else. We rightly feel that a trick has been played on us when we discover that the only surviving account of some dead person or extinct people presents them, not as they really were, but as they have been portrayed by some vocal third party who has 'made a corner' in the telling of the tale and has innocently or deliberately taken advantage of this opportunity to blacken the face of his dumb neighbour in the picture of him that he has handed down to posterity.

Two classic examples are the Athenian picture of the Boeotians and the Israelite picture of the Philistines that have been transmitted to the Western World and have given the words 'Philistine' and 'Boeotian' uncomplimentary connotations in modern Western languages. The Philistines seem to have little chance of redress. Our modern archaeologists have not yet succeeded in giving us much independent evidence about them to set against the ugly picture given in the Old Testament. The Boeotians—branded by the Athenians as 'Boeotian swine'—have managed to bequeath to us some telling evidence on their own behalf. Read Pindar's odes and Plutarch's biographical and philosophical essays, and look at a collection of graceful terracotta Tanagran figurines in some modern museum, and you will be astonished that, in the teeth of this evidence of the true nature of Boeotian culture, the Athenians should have succeeded in establishing their *fable convenue*. What the Athenian fable truly tells us is, not what the Boeotians were like, but what their enemies the Athenians wished us to believe about them.

Another example is the Achaeans' picture of the Aetolians, as painted in the surviving parts of Polybius's work. The Aetolians' case has gone by default. There is no surviving picture, either of the Aetolians themselves or of their Achaean rivals, from an Aetolian pen.

than one's own.¹ And there is a valid and pertinent sense in which all study of human affairs is comparative study, for implicitly the inquirer is, all the time, comparing his human objects of study with his human self, singular or plural. Open-mindedness, charity, and sympathy are not only signs of grace; they are priceless virtues. But, if one manages in some measure to acquire these virtues and to practise them, they lead one to the threshold of a problem for which they themselves do not provide any automatic solution. For it is not true that 'tout comprendre est tout pardonner'.

Suppose that one has now recognized the fallibility of one's belief in the absolute rightness of one's own standards and in the consequent absolute wrongness of other people's conflicting standards, one is confronted with Pilate's question, 'What is truth?' It is clear that the two conflicting sets of standards cannot both be absolutely right, but this is no proof that either of them is absolutely wrong, and all standards cannot be absolutely wrong; for if they were there would be no such thing as truth and therefore no possibility of judging between one set of standards and another. Indeed, it seems impossible, *ex hypothesi*, that any set of standards can be totally wrong if it is the actual guiding rule of a group of human beings, or even just of one solitary individual. However perverse it may look in the sight of the rest of mankind, they cannot judge it to be totally wrong without judging the people who live by it to be insane, or in other words non-human and therefore incapable of having any standards of a human kind. This must, it would seem, be so; for to lack any recognizable moral standard would be tantamount to lacking the sense of a distinction between right and wrong; and this sense is surely part of the essence of being human. A sane human person will still retain it, even if his standards strike other people as being preposterously wrong, and even if he deliberately and consciously violates his own standards, such as they are.

It will be seen that the recognition of the relativity of human outlooks, standards, and values raises a difficult question. When one has admitted that his own standards are relative, can he have any intellectual basis or moral standing for passing judgements on someone else's standards? Logic answers this question in the negative; but experience rules this negative answer out by pointing to the unquestionable fact that Man is a social being; for there could be no human society if human beings had no capacity and no right to pass judgements on each other and, what is more, to put their judgements into action—and we should be inhibited from doing either of these things if we did not believe, or rather take for granted, that our own standards represent, however imperfectly, a generally valid standard, common to us and to our fellow human beings. If we believed that our own standards represented nothing but personal caprice or, at the widest, tribal custom, we should not have the face to make and execute judgements on the strength of them. This is obvious in the field of practical affairs; a belief in the general validity of moral standards is one of the necessary conditions for social relations; but it is also a necessary condition in the field of study; for study too is action in

¹ See A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 6.

a social setting.¹ It is true that we cannot study our fellow human beings' standards intelligently unless we recognize that these have a value of their own which we should be misrepresenting if we insisted on interpreting it in terms of ours. But it is also true that, if our recognition of the relativity of all sets of standards were to lead us to the conclusion that we are not entitled to pass judgements on any of them, we should be debarring ourselves from making any study of human affairs. 'The problem of the validity of any historical classification involves a question of values and cannot be solved on purely logical or metaphysical grounds.'² We can regard each other, and study each other, as fellow human beings only on the assumption that, underlying the equivocal differences between our relative points of view, there are some fundamental common standards in virtue of which we recognize each other as being members of one and the same human race.

'When we speak of Man, we necessarily imply the presence of certain familiar mental categories. . . . It follows, indeed, from the nature of the evidence on which all our historical knowledge is based, that history can never carry us beyond the stage where we can understand the working of the minds of the acting people because they are similar to our own. Where we cease to understand, where we can no longer recognize categories of thought similar to those in terms of which we think, history ceases to be human history.'³

'Just as facts cannot be divorced from some interpretation, so it seems impossible to divorce history from the imputation of values that are objective.'⁴ . . . Only by assuming an enveloping, transcultural pattern of values can we explain how judgments of praise and censure from ancient Egypt or Rome can be veridically comprehended by our contemporaries.'⁵

In what cases ought we to pass judgement on the strength of our belief in the existence of such common human standards, and in what cases ought we to suspend judgement in deference to our recognition that some human standards, including some of our own, have only a relative validity? Here there is no *a priori* rule to guide us; we can only feel our way; and, all the time, we are perpetually being forced into taking a line by the pressure of events. Were the Roman authorities justified in forcibly suppressing the practice of human sacrifice in North-West Africa, or the Spanish authorities in forcibly suppressing it in Middle America? Were the British authorities in India justified in suppressing infanticide, suttee, and the self-immolation of the devotees who used to throw themselves under the wheels of Juggernaut's car? From the point of view of the Punic, Aztec, and Hindu addicts to these rites, their alien conquerors were misusing their military power to

¹ Bagby, in *op. cit.*, p. 3, makes the point that 'it is only when some action is required that' one 'finds it necessary to judge other men's behaviour, and his action is all the more effective if he has first understood this behaviour in as cold and rational a manner as possible'.

The second statement in this sentence is indisputable; the preceding statement is uncontroversial if it is recognized that action takes more than one form, and that one of its forms is study.

² Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³ F. A. Hayek: *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, pp. 79 and 78-79.

⁴ M. C. Swabey: *The Judgment of History*, p. 242. Read the whole passage, pp. 242-54.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

suppress religious practices whose significance and value these aliens did not understand. Ignorant prejudice militant is certainly an ugly thing, and the Aztec citizens of Tenochtitlan can have seen nothing but an outrageous act of sacrilege in the overthrow of their gods' images and altars and the slaughter of their priests by Cortés's indignant soldiers. On the other hand, Cortés and his companions saw nothing but an atrocious barbarity in the tearing of human hearts out of living human bodies by priests whose locks were matted with their victims' blood. And the Spanish intruders had to take a line. Now that they were in Mexico and in power there, they must either suppress the local practice of human sacrifice or else condone it. How is the voice of humanity to decide between Spaniards and Aztecs in this case? Perhaps it has delivered its verdict already. If not, it will surely deliver it in time. A verdict that is both unanimous and enduring is the only conceivable last word that can be spoken in judgement between one relative set of human standards and another. And in our day the possibility of such unanimous judgements is only just coming within sight, for it is only in our day that mankind is beginning to grow together into a single family. 'The fundamental criterion . . . is generality.'¹ Generality is rooted in reasonableness.² And an all but unanimous consensus among people who recognize each other as being reasonable can be taken as being decisive, even if there are still some dissenting voices.³

It is not only conquerors and rulers who have found themselves forced to pass summary judgements on the respective merits of their own standards and those of alien peoples. Anthropologists and historians are in the same plight. Their hands too are forced by the relation into which they have entered with the human objects of their study. They cannot study without finding themselves also compelled to judge.⁴

¹ N. Rescher in *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. lv, No. 6 (13th March, 1958), pp. 243-55, on p. 252.

² Rescher, *ibid.*
³ Rescher in *loc. cit.*, p. 254. *Ibid.*, p. 255, Rescher points out that this criterion is not absolute. Justification in ethics is always reasoned, but it is not deductive. 'We are able to bring to light in a "dialectical" manner an increasingly firm basis of reason in justifying our moral judgments.'

⁴ Kroeber, in *The Nature of Culture*, p. 6, expresses the opinion that value judgements are possible as between the values of different cultures. Redfield holds that they are inevitable and desirable. 'It cannot be proved, from the proposition that values are relative, that we ought to respect all systems of values' (*The Primitive World and its Transformations*, p. 147). He recalls that the United Nations commission on human rights did not adopt a suggestion, made to them by American anthropologists, that they should recognize the right of men to live in accordance with their own traditions (*ibid.*, pp. 147-8). Redfield testifies that anthropologists implicitly assume that civilization is better than primitive life (*ibid.*, p. 158), and he explicitly makes this standpoint his own. 'I simply could not look neutrally at the ideas that move in history towards a more humane ideal and practice' (*ibid.*, p. 141).

In an article under the title 'Are Moral Problems Genuine?' in *Mind*, New Series, vol. lxv (1956), pp. 166-83, D. H. Munro raises the question whether 'there are several alternative ethical systems, each equally valid' (p. 176), and comes to the conclusion that we cannot escape asking and answering the question: Which of two ways of life is the better? (p. 179).

In an important article under the title 'Ethical Relativity: Sic et Non' in *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. lii, No. 23 (10th November, 1955), pp. 663-77, Clyde Kluckhohn draws attention to, and gives his own blessing to, a current turn of the tide of anthropological opinion against the extreme relativist position. As he puts it, ethical relativity still stands in certain contexts, but 'the areas of indeterminacy' have been narrowed (p. 663). 'There are pan-human universals as regards needs and capacities that shape, or could rightly shape, at least the broad outlines of a morality that transcends cultural difference'

The conclusion to which the foregoing discussion seems to point is that, in our dealings, academic as well as practical, with our fellow human beings, we must try to maintain all the time a difficult balance between two attitudes, both of which are indispensable on the evidence of experience, though they may be mutually exclusive in logic. On the one hand we have always to treat our neighbours' standards and values with the respect and tolerance that we crave for our own, notwithstanding our recognition of our own standards' relativity. On the other hand we have sometimes to pass judgements in the name of standards deemed by us, at our peril, to be common to all men. Such judgements are so hazardous that we should pass them only reluctantly and tentatively, but we must not flinch from making them in the last resort; for the price of refraining from them in all circumstances would be to break the moral bond of common humanity which is the necessary framework for any relations, academic or practical, with our fellow human beings. I therefore join issue with a scholar who maintains, without qualification, that 'we shall never be able to understand' history 'unless we first put aside all moral considerations' and that these 'must be as firmly put aside as in the study of physics and biology'.¹ In the study of non-human nature there is no question of putting moral considerations aside, because here these do not arise. In the study of human affairs it is impossible to ignore them, because they are inherent in the human observer's relation with his human subject; and there is no clear and simple rule for dealing with them. We shall go wrong if we refuse to make them, at our peril, when they do arise in this field, and we shall also go wrong if, in making them, we indiscriminately apply the relative standards of our own civilization, country, class, family, in our own personal version of them, as if these were identical with, and not, as they are, only approximations to, the fundamental common standards implicit in our having a common human nature.² I am sure that I myself have fallen into this error. Several critics have concurred in convicting

(p. 666). Cultures are not isolated monads, and some valid comparisons between them are possible (pp. 670-1). 'While the specific manifestations of human nature vary between cultures and between individuals in the same culture, human nature is universal' (p. 676). 'There are some moral standards that are 'altogether universal' (e.g. the distinction between 'murder' and killings that are felt to be justifiable) (pp. 671-2). 'Both within and between cultures moral behaviour in specific instances and in all its details must be judged within a wide context but with reference to principles which are not relative' (p. 674). 'The position of radical cultural relativity' is 'untenable' (p. 673).

These considerations against unmitigated relativism and in favour of a circumspect universalism are impressive. On the other hand, in *Toynbee and History*, Sir Ernest Barker (on pp. 101-2) and Philip Bagby (on p. 110) deprecate the condemnation of Man's past labours. A. J. P. Taylor finds (ibid., p. 121) that I am guilty of this offence. 'He lacks . . . the historian's characteristic piety towards the past.'

¹ Bagby in *Culture and History*, p. 3, and in *Toynbee and History*, p. 108. Cp. the passages quoted from Bagby and Birks on p. 54, footnote 2.

² Bagby points out, in *Culture and History*, p. 140, that modern Western psychologists have not entirely succeeded in making this necessary discrimination in their attempt to apprehend human nature in the sense of 'universal psychological traits hereditary in origin and present in every human being'. 'The formulations of the psychologists are based on their observations of their neighbours, that is, on the behaviour of bearers of Western European culture, and undoubtedly are largely tinged by the peculiarities of that culture. There can be no assurance that these generalizations apply to all mankind until all the immense variety of human behaviour has been studied.'

me of it.¹ At the same time, I believe that I should have erred no less if I had gone to equal lengths in putting moral considerations aside.

III. THE RELATIVITY OF A HUMAN OBSERVER'S APPROACH TO RELIGION

I. THE ISSUE BETWEEN TRANS-RATIONALISTS AND RATIONALISTS

IT will have become apparent, if it was not already, that a human observer's inescapable relativity is even more embarrassing for him when the object of his study is human affairs than when it is non-human nature. In the humanist's field, feelings and judgements, standards and values, assert themselves importunately and gravely complicate the inquirer's task. But this is only one of two complications that the humanist has to reckon with. For the knowledge of good and evil, with the attitudes and actions that follow from it, is one of two faculties that distinguish Man from all other creatures known to him. Since his second distinctive faculty is a controversial subject in the present-day world, perhaps the least controversial description of it will be a negative one. One may describe this second faculty as being a capacity for feeling that Man himself is not the highest spiritual presence in the Universe in which he finds himself. In fact, in entering the field of observation, Man does not come unaccompanied. He brings with him an intimation of the existence of a spiritual presence higher than his.

'There is a sense of significance beyond our feelings, of discovering something distinct and other than human experience. If consciousness means what it claims to mean, not everything of worth in the World is traceable to an origin with Man, reference to Man, or application to Man's use. The view which makes Man the measure of all things falsifies our attitudes in valuation.'²

To call this sixth sense a 'consciousness' or 'assurance' would be to beg the question, which is in dispute today, whether there is in truth a reality with which Man's religious sense puts Man in touch. The evidence is a matter of private individual experience. It cannot be verified by public observation, as we can verify the findings of physical and even social science. Yet the unverifiable findings of Man's religious sense give rise to attitudes and actions that have played at least as important a part in human affairs as the attitudes and actions arising from Man's moral faculty.

¹ Hourani, for instance, in loc. cit., p. 383, says that I have 'a moral vision of history'. Geyl, in *Toynbee and History*, p. 373, reproaches me for my 'spate of moral judgments'. Christopher Dawson notes that, in the earlier volumes of this book, 'the moral absolutism' of the author's 'judgements' clashes 'with the cultural relativism of his theory' (ibid., p. 13). Geyl (ibid., p. 372) finds that 'every age and every civilization is judged by a standard foreign to it'. This may be true in the sense that an historian cannot ever jump completely clear of the standards of his own time and place. But this is true of all historians, including Geyl himself.

² M. C. Swabey: *The Judgment of History*, p. 242. Illustrations of the point here made are given on pp. 185-7.

Thus Man's entry into the field of observation complicates the observer's vision of the Universe by introducing into it the vista of religion beyond the vista of ethics; and, if the problem of ethics is enigmatic, the problem of religion is more so. There is, indeed, no limit to the commitment incurred by the inquirer who ventures to be a student of human affairs, for, whether he has foreseen this or not, he has committed himself, in the act, to becoming a theologian too. In consternation he may try to beat a retreat from this perilously exposed position into the dead ground of 'comparative religion', in the hope that he can escape from theology under the scientific camouflage of anthropological research. But theology is an incubus that a humanist can never shake off. He may seek refuge from theism in atheism or from animism in materialism. But after each desperate twist and turn he will find himself committed to some theological position or other. Theology is inescapable, and it is dynamite. It will betray its identity through the camouflage by exploding in the end.

In most chapters of the histories of most of the human societies of which we have a record up to date, the position in regard to religion has been not unlike the position in regard to ethics. In the field of ethics, as we have seen, the differences between partially conflicting local standards and values have evoked violent feelings and sweeping judgements. The respective champions of the different sets of standards have each been apt to see in their own set the fundamental common standards of mankind, without recognizing the play of relativity or facing its implications. In this blind self-assurance and self-righteousness they have sometimes gone so far as to claim that their own code of morality was the only right one, and that variant codes were no true codes at all. But none of the belligerents in this intellectual warfare has ever denied that there is a distinction between right and wrong and an obligation to do right that is incumbent on all men *ex officio humanitatis*: they have merely denied the validity of any code of conduct except their own. In the greater part of the World for most of the time as far as our records go back, the position in regard to religion has been similar. There have been conflicts between different local practices and beliefs, and, since the first appearance of higher religions and philosophies in and after the last millennium B.C., claims have been made that this or that one of these is the only true and saving faith. But the fanatics who have denied that there is any truth or saving grace in any religion except their own, have, of course, never dreamed of denying the truth and efficacy of religion itself. So far from that, they have been eager to convert the rest of the human race to 'the true religion', with which their own religion is synonymous for them.

At this point, however, the history of religion and the history of ethics have diverged. So far there has been no known human society in which the distinction between right and wrong, and the obligation to do right, have been denied. But in more than one society, at some stage in its history, there have been sceptics¹ who have broken with the world-wide

¹ The word 'sceptic' is used in this volume in the meaning of 'disbeliever' in the tenets of religion and in the existence of the spiritual presence or presences, higher than

traditional belief that religion—at any rate one's own religion—is true and valuable. These sceptics have denied the reality of the spiritual presence or presences whose existence is the presupposition of all religions, lower or higher, including those religions that are 'false' in the eyes of some rival religion's adherents. This loss of belief in the reality of some trans-human presence or presences in the Universe leads to the conclusion that religion itself is either an hallucination or a fraud or else that it is the product of an unedifying interplay between false pretences and naïve credulity. A sceptic is bound to regard religion as a misapprehension or misrepresentation of Reality which hinders human minds from seeing and facing Reality as it is. He will, in fact, see in it 'an opiate of the people'.

Since sceptics, like other human beings, including believers, may be either idealists or cynics, their common disbelief in the tenets of religion and in the reality of religious experience will not make them all agree on the question of what their policy towards religion ought to be. Sceptical idealists will feel that religion is a scandalously fraudulent and obscurantist institution and that it is the duty of all enlightened and honest-minded men to do their utmost to liberate their fellow men's minds from the pernicious influence of this sinister social evil. A classical exposition of this point of view is the Roman Epicurean philosopher Lucretius's poem *De Rerum Natura*. Lucretius's missionary zeal to cure men of the belief in religion of any kind is as sincere and intense as a Buddhist, Christian, or Muslim missionary's zeal to convert unbelievers to his own religious faith. On the other hand, sceptical cynics may feel that the fraudulence and obscurantism of religion make this institution a convenient instrument for keeping in order such irrational and ill-behaved social animals as human beings are. A classical exposition of this point of view is the attitude and policy towards traditional Roman religion that is attributed to the Roman governing class in the second century B.C. by the Greek historian Polybius.¹ For the immediate purpose of our present inquiry, however, this difference between alternative policies to which scepticism may lead is of secondary importance compared to the intellectual problem that the phenomenon of scepticism itself creates for the student of human affairs when he has to reckon with it—and this he must do whenever and wherever scepticism asserts itself; for in this situation the humanist will either be a sceptic himself or will have to face sceptical criticism if he is a believer.

Man, which religion postulates. The word can also be used to mean a disbeliever in the whole of Man's mental image of Reality and in any possibility of apprehending Reality mentally by the use of the analytical and classificatory intellectual procedure that we call reasoning. Few philosophers have ever tried to be sceptics in this absolute sense, and none, perhaps, have ever succeeded. So far from being disbelievers in the reasoning powers of human minds, most disbelievers in religion have been convinced rationalists. These rationalist-minded disbelievers in religion have taken exception to religious beliefs, not because they have been sceptical about the possibility of any apprehension of Reality, but because they have believed in the efficacy of the human reason and have thought that the effective exercise of the reason was inexpediently inhibited by religious faith. In their eyes the objects of faith are figments of the imagination because they are data of private personal experience and therefore cannot be verified by the test of public observation and examination (see also p. 72, footnote 3, below).

¹ Polybius: *Historiae*, Book VI, chap. 56, quoted in v. 646-7.

This issue between sceptics and believers looms larger in the present-day world than in any other known society in any previous age as far as our records go back. Previous accesses of scepticism did not spread beyond rather narrow circles within the societies in which they made their appearance, and they were also relatively short-lived by comparison with the duration of those societies themselves. Each time, after a certain number of generations or centuries, this uninfected minority would die out, and society would revert to its usual state of almost universal and unchallenged belief in the reality of the objects or object of religious faith. In retrospect, however, from the standpoint of the present day, these previous cases take on significance as premonitory symptoms of a sceptical movement which started in the modern Western World in the seventeenth century of the Christian era and which, since then, has not only gone from strength to strength on its native ground but has spread over the rest of the World in the train of the Western Civilization's recent world-wide expansion. This modern Western sceptical movement originated in a moral reaction against the *odium theologicum* that had provided fuel for the so-called 'Wars of Religion'. *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*.¹ Men of good will deliberately took their treasure out of religious controversy and put it into scientific research, which seemed to promise to be a more innocent and also more fruitful activity. Since then, the findings of scientific research have seemed to undermine the intellectual foundations of traditional religion; and this second blow, following on the moral discredit that the Western Wars of Religion had brought upon religion itself, has now carried religious belief to a perhaps unprecedentedly low ebb.

The present-day world is divided by an intellectual barrier between the minds of believers and unbelievers which is as effective an insulator as 'the Iron Curtain' which divides a Communist from an anti-Communist ideological camp.² And we cannot tell how long this modern schism between believers and unbelievers is going to last or what its eventual outcome is going to be. It would be unwarrantable to assume that the modern sceptical movement is going to be as short-lived as its predecessors, and equally unwarrantable to predict that, if it persists, it will extinguish religious belief universally. Nor can it be foreseen what may happen eventually if unbelief and belief continue to coexist. It is conceivable that eventually both attitudes of mind might be superseded by some third outlook which would embrace both belief and unbelief and consequently exclude them both at the same time. It might, for example, come to be held, as a result of some advance in human powers of understanding, that the antithesis between 'reality' and 'unreality',

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book I, line 101. 'Such was the enormity of the evil that religion could make men do.'

² These two lines of division do not, of course, coincide. The ideological barrier runs along a sharply demarcated frontier between states of opposite ideological colours, yet even the 'Iron Curtain' has not completely sorted out the sheep from the goats. Non-Communist and Communist minorities are still to be found on what, from both standpoints, is the wrong side of the line. As for the barrier between believers and unbelievers, it does not correspond, even approximately, to any line that could be plotted on a map. All over the World today, believers and unbelievers are to be found living side by side in the same society, country, and even household.

which is a useful, or at least an unavoidable, category of thought for dealing mentally with our experience of phenomena, is inapplicable to experience of the religious kind. However that may turn out to be, the mental gulf between the believer's and the unbeliever's outlook is one of the unquestionable realities of the present-day world, and it therefore creates, for the present-day student of human affairs, a problem of relativity that is as unavoidable as it is acute.

The problem is acute because the sceptical-minded and the religious-minded student of human affairs are both living in the same world and addressing themselves to the same public, while at the same time the outlook of each of them seems, from the other's standpoint, to make human affairs unintelligible. For the religious-minded inquirer religion is the highest form of human activity. It offers Man the greatest opportunity of gaining insight into Reality, and of entering into contact with It, that is open to him in this life.¹ For anyone who holds this view, life is robbed of its purpose, and Reality of its meaning, by the sceptic's contention that religion is the shadow cast by an illusion.² Conversely, for the sceptical-minded inquirer a rational understanding of Reality is made impossible by the believer's contention that the essence of Reality is a spiritual presence which, from the rationalist's³ point of view, is imaginary, considering that its reality is vouched for only by a private personal experience that can never be verified by the test of public observation and examination.⁴

Can we find any common ground between two points of view when the assumptions in which these are respectively grounded are concerned with the very essence of Reality and at the same time appear, to human minds within the present limits of their powers of understanding, to be in diametrical opposition to each other? Perhaps a bare foothold of common ground can be obtained if we can win a concession from either side.

Believers might be asked to meet rationalists part-way by agreeing to leave the trans-human presence or presences, in whose existence and potency they believe, out of account when they are engaged in the common enterprise of trying to explain the course of human events and to analyse the structure of human society and the configurations of human culture. It is true that, in the pre-rationalist age, historians, as well as poets, treated the reported occurrences of allegedly 'supernatural' phenomena on a par with reports of human actions. Accounts of omens, miracles, and the epiphanies and physical intervention of gods were interwoven with accounts of human debates, decisions, agreements, conflicts, achievements, and failures, as if these two elements in the

¹ See, for example, Dawson, *The Dynamics of World History*, pp. 169, 171, 173.

² The Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. counts it as a merit in me that I recognize 'that religion cannot be studied purely as an objective phenomenon' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

³ The word 'rationalist' is used in this volume in the meaning of someone who believes in the efficacy of human reasoning powers to apprehend Reality at least to some extent and disbelieves in any alleged explanation of phenomena, or of the Reality underlying them, that is non-rational in the negative sense of not being vouched for by the findings of reasoning, as well as in the positive sense of being contradicted by these (see p. 69, footnote 1 above).

⁴ See, for example, Bagby, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 57, 149-50, *et alibi*.

pre-rationalist historians' picture of the course of events were, in principle, equally credible. The reality of the 'supernatural' element was simply taken for granted. But, when once the rationalists have challenged this assumption, the onus of proving it surely lies on the shoulders of the believers. They need not be asked to repudiate their traditional assumption; they need merely be asked to refrain—unless and until they can prove it—from continuing to make it when they are engaged in recording, examining, and analysing human affairs.¹

As a matter of fact this concession has been made, in practice, by historians who have not renounced their belief in the existence and potency of trans-human spiritual presences. The reports of miraculous occurrences in terms of polytheistic religious beliefs were repudiated by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim historians long before the modern Western rationalist movement started. Since then, modern historians who have continued to be believing monotheists have tacitly taken to treating the miraculous element in their own religions' picture of human affairs as they have long since treated it overtly in the polytheistic presentation of it. Without repudiating their own belief in the existence and potency of a spiritual presence higher than Man, they have given up their former practice of introducing, into their accounts and explanations of human affairs, elements of a 'supernatural' order: that is to say, elements that cannot be observed, verified, and explained by the use of human reasoning powers.

The reciprocal concession to believers that rationalists might be asked to make is to recognize that rational explanation is imperfect and incomplete not merely in practice but intrinsically. We have seen in the preceding chapter that thought operates by classifying phenomena according to their recognizable similarities. It follows from this, as Bagby points out,² that, while it is true 'that some order, some recurrent features, must occur in any homogeneous and interrelated field of events', it is also true 'that such a field of events cannot be fully ordered; there must be some features of it which are arbitrary, undetermined, and inexplicable', and 'these consequences arise from the very notion of comparison, which requires both similarity and difference'. Thinking is an attempt to apprehend Reality by catching it in a conceptual net, and a net is able to serve its purpose in virtue of having a texture which leaves gaps between the meshes. It is this open texture which gives a net its fling. If the net were made, not of an open network, but of a tightly woven cloth, the material would be too heavy to allow a net made of it to be effectively extensive. But the price of having a texture which makes it possible to catch something in the net's meshes is the inevitability that something else will slip out of the net through the gaps.

This paradox is the crux of the intellectual procedure of rational analysis and explanation. The objective of rational thought is to discover in phenomena an intelligible system of regular and therefore

¹ This is all that is demanded on behalf of rationalism by, for instance, Bagby in *Culture and History*, pp. 148–9, or by M. Saville in *The Pacific Review*, vol. xxv, No. 1 (February, 1956), pp. 55–67.

² In op. cit., p. 58. See also the passages quoted from Bagby, op. cit., and from Redfield on p. 11, footnote 10.

predictable uniformities and recurrences. But the very nature of the intellectual procedure by which this objective has to be pursued makes it inevitable that any system established by this procedure will not, after all, be really closed but will stay untidily open. And Heaven knows what may or may not slip out—or in—through the yawning gaps between the meshes of intelligibility. There are, in short, more things in Heaven and Earth than are dreamed of in the rationalist's philosophy,¹ and he cannot be sure that the draught which is let through by the chinks in his system may not be the importunate wind which bloweth where it listeth,² and which, though it may be invisible to the rationalist's eyes, makes in the believer's ear a sound that, for him, fills the World. It looks as if the believer may fairly ask the rationalist to meet him to the extent, not of renouncing his rational objective, but of making the negative concession of recognizing that human history 'is impatient of' the 'neat systems of laws and causal sequences' for which the rationalist 'is always looking', and that the 'mysterious and unpredictable aspect of history' is a genuine and irremovable 'stumbling-block' for him.³

On the other hand, I think that an inquirer who holds, as I myself hold, that rationalism is not enough ought, none the less, to follow the rationalists' good example of recognizing that the human reason's mental net is binding in so far as it is truly effective in apprehending Reality. If I stand convicted (and I have no doubt that I do) of having sometimes lapsed from reasoning into mythologizing when reasoning would have been capable of doing the job, I admit that I have been at fault. At the same time I am alive to the limitations of human reasoning power, and I am convinced that there are questions which reasoning cannot answer but which human beings are nevertheless bound to ask, because one would be less than human if one did not ask them and did not go on to try to answer them, even though one's answers to such 'trans-rational' questions will be, by definition, unverifiable.

Questions of this sort—and they are the most momentous questions with which human beings find themselves confronted—bombard us through the gaps between the meshes of reason's net. I do not believe that these gaps can be plugged, and, as far as I know, rationalists do not imagine that they can; so this is not one of the points in dispute between rationalists and 'trans-rationalists'. There are, however, rationalists who, while recognizing that they cannot plug the gaps, imagine that they can dispose of them by ignoring their existence and turning a deaf ear to any voices that may sound through them. With rationalists who adopt this 'know-nothing' policy I am in disagreement. Whether they can dull their senses successfully or not, I do not know. But I do feel sure that, if they did succeed, they would be defeating their own purpose of trying to comprehend Reality. They would have succeeded in preserving their cherished picture of Reality as a closed system, transparent to the human reason through and through, but, in the act, they

¹ One of these things is the entry of human souls on to the scene of this planet. Is a biological mutation sufficient to account for this? This question, which is a searching one, is asked by K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 237.

² John iii. 8.

³ Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 257, quoted already on p. 16.

would have been shutting their eyes to another vision of Reality that is, perhaps, likely to be rather less remote from the truth. Part of the truth about Reality, as it appears to the 'trans-rationalist' in his glimpse of it, is that it is boundless and mysterious and, for human eyes, not all of a piece. From this 'trans-rational' point of view, Reality looks like a house of many mansions, and our human reason's mansion does not seem to be self-contained, or, indeed, even semi-detached.

The point of view here described is, of course, a personal one,¹ but I have ventured to describe it, nevertheless, because I think that it brings out the point on which the current controversy between rationalists and 'trans-rationalists' turns. I am, myself, an ex-believer who first became a convert to rationalism with no reservations and has since become a convert to a 'trans-rationalist' standpoint with two reservations. One of my present reservations is in regard to rationalism. I am now more alive than I once was to the limitations of human reasoning powers. I believe that the answers to the questions that matter most to us can be found only beyond the reason's limits, if they can be found at all. So I am no longer entitled to call myself a rationalist if the label commits one to holding that human reasoning powers are capable of answering all questions that one needs to ask (capable of proving, for instance, or disproving, the existence of an absolute spiritual Reality beyond the phenomenal world). My second present reservation is in regard to religious belief. I do not think that unverifiable religious beliefs can stand against the findings of the reason within the field in which human reasoning powers are effective. So, if belief, in the religious meaning of the word, were to commit one to holding that the reason could and should be overridden on its own ground by an irrational faith, then I should be entitled, perhaps, to claim that I had become a 'trans-rationalist', but not to claim that I had again become a believer.² My present state of mind is, as far as I can judge, a common and characteristic one in the Western World in the generation into which I happen to have been born. It is an open state of mind, and the necessary price of this intellectual and moral boon is a partial break in one's vision and a certain tenseness in one's feelings. Finding myself in this situation does

¹ My point of view is personal in the sense that I cannot demonstrate its validity to someone who does not share it; but it is not personal in the other sense of being peculiar to me. It is, for example, identical with the point of view expressed in the following passage of a letter written by Gilbert Murray to Lord Russell on 26th July, 1954: "Then about faith. What I wrote about beauty, physical and moral, was, I think, based on some sort of faith: that is, on a strong consciousness that, beyond the realm of our knowledge, there was a wide region in which we had imperfect intimations or guesses or hopes. Most of the so-called faiths are these intimations worked up into the form of definite myths or dogmas, almost all of them anthropomorphic. The myth is mostly invented, but the faith at the back of it has at least a good deal of probability about it. . . . It is in some ways the most interesting part of life, the great region in which you must be agnostic, but nevertheless you must have something like conviction." The full text of this letter will be found in *Correspondence between Gilbert Murray, Lord Russell, and Bernard Shaw* (this has not yet been published). The passage here quoted will also be found in *Gilbert Murray: An Unfinished Autobiography* (London 1960, Allen & Unwin), p. 218. I am grateful to Sir Stanley Unwin for his permission to me to print the passage here.

² H. Kohn, in *Toynbee and History*, p. 354, notices that I do not believe in the feasibility or desirability of a return to traditional religious dogmas and institutions. I am, in fact, an agnostic in the sense in which the word is used by Gilbert Murray in the passage quoted in footnote 1. See further p. 98, footnote 2.

not strike me with dismay, because I do not feel that it puts me out of tune with Reality in so far as I have any intimation of what Reality may be like. I am also not aggrieved, because I feel grateful for the dark and broken glass that lets through to me my human glimmer of light. No doubt, a perfect lens would be better to have than a cracked one, but it is very much better to have a cracked one than not to have any lens of any kind. The mind's cracked lens is mankind's greatest treasure.

I have been trying to find terms for a 'gentlemen's agreement' between religious-minded and rationalist-minded participants in our present-day world-wide human society. This is probably the nearest approach that they can hope to succeed in making towards each other for the present. As far as one can see ahead, there seems to be no prospect of their being able to close the great gulf that has been opened between them by the relativity of their respective points of view to fundamental presuppositions that are in such stark disagreement as theirs are. But a gulf that cannot yet be closed can perhaps be bridged provisionally by a *modus vivendi* which may make it possible for the two parties to communicate, and even perhaps co-operate, with each other. The test of a bridge, of course, is its ability to bear the traffic. Let us now see whether the *modus vivendi* that I have suggested will hold firm or will break down if we try to make it serve as common ground for the study of human affairs in the particularly controversial field of the study of religion.

In setting out together on this inquiry, religious-minded and rationalist-minded explorers can at least find a common point of departure. For, differ as they may and will in their interpretations of the significance of religious experience, they will agree that the practices, beliefs, and institutions to which this experience has given rise always have been, and still are, a most important element in human affairs.¹ A test of whether they can travel together farther than just the first step will be their respective answers to two questions about the relation between religion and culture. If the rationalist asks the religious-minded party whether he agrees that religion is a part of human culture, this question, I should say, ought to receive the answer 'yes'. If the religious-minded party then asks the rationalist whether he agrees that religion is not only a part of culture but is also something more than that, the answer ought to be 'yes', I should say, again. If the two parties can both bring themselves to give their answers in the affirmative, they will be able to go on being travelling companions, and, what is more, they will, I should say, be taking together the road that leads towards a better understanding of Reality.

What do we mean by 'culture'? Let us use Bagby's clearly thought-out definition of it as 'regularities in the behaviour, internal and external, of the members of a society, excluding those regularities which are

¹ They can, of course, still differ in their estimate of religion's relative importance. For instance, Geyl, in *Debates with Historians*, pp. 138-9, maintains that I pay too much attention to religion and show too little concern for social betterment. In Geyl's opinion, my belief in the outstanding importance of religion is subjective: it cannot be proved by history or be disproved by it.

clearly hereditary in origin'.¹ Religious practices and institutions, and, by implication, also religious beliefs and experiences, are certainly a part of culture as thus defined, and in another passage² Bagby explicitly mentions religion, together with art, technology, and social structure, as examples of the elements of which culture consists. We can agree that religion is one of these elements without needing to try, at this point, to give either a complete list of them or a systematic account of their relations to each other.

Sorokin seems to hold that the culture elements that one finds present simultaneously in the participants in a society, collectively and individually, are merely casual conglomerations,³ but here he is surely flying in the face of the evidence presented by the phenomena. In the light of this evidence most sociologists and anthropologists hold that one of the intrinsic properties of culture is that its component elements are integrated in some degree—that culture has, in fact, what Kroeber has called 'configurations'. No doubt there are any number of possible degrees of integration in any number of possible varieties of pattern. In all cultures some of the elements may be more closely tied than others to each other and to the culture itself in virtue of their respective natures. Religion and art, for instance, have often been closely associated with each other, and art, at any rate, seems to be one of the clearest and most precise expressions of a culture's distinctive character. If one is trying to ascertain the duration of some particular culture and its geographical distribution at different times, the presence or absence of its distinctive style of art is one of the surest and most accurate clues. By contrast, technology is less informative. The partakers in some particular culture have sometimes made revolutionary changes in their technology without this having produced any immediate change of comparable magnitude in the culture as a whole or in any of its non-technological parts. It looks as if a culture's technology sits more loosely to it than its art sits. And, in fact, in the technological field there seems always to have been a great deal of give-and-take between different cultures. In whatever culture a technique may have originated, it has been apt to spread beyond the parent culture's limits, and the history of technology can perhaps be understood best by regarding technology as having been, from the start, a common achievement and possession of all mankind, and also one which, so far, has improved progressively while cultures, as integrated 'configurations', have been coming and going.

Thus different parts of culture seem to display intrinsic differences in the degree of their integration with each other and with the total configuration of the particular culture in question. There are, no doubt, also differences in the degree of overall integration as between one culture and another, and also as between one phase and another in the history of some single culture. In an agricultural village community or in a pastoral nomadic tribe, we should expect to find a more highly integrated state of culture than in a great cosmopolitan city at an advanced

¹ Bagby: *Culture and History*, pp. 84 and 95; cp. pp. 93–94. See further pp. 272–3 of the present volume.

² Bagby, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

³ Sorokin in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 180–1, 182, 188.

stage in the history of a civilization. It is here, if anywhere, that Sorokin's description of a culture as being a conglomeration of casual elements might come nearest to being a convincing account of the phenomena. Again, when an 'age of faith' begins to give way to an 'age of reason', as it did in the Hellenic World in the fifth century B.C. and in the Western World in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, art tends to dissolve its traditional association with religion and to strike out on an independent course of its own.

Religion is certainly one of those parts of culture that have usually been closest to the heart of it and also most closely associated with other parts; and this generalization becomes more clearly valid the farther we look back into the past. In all societies, including civilizations of the first and second generations, down to the rise of the 'higher religions' in and after the last millennium B.C., religion has been intimately connected, not only with art, but also with social structure, political organization, and economic activities. The connexion with economics seems to have come earliest. Before Man had gained the upper hand over non-human nature, the elements in his environment from which he was wresting a precarious livelihood were the medium through which he felt himself to be in touch with the spiritual presences, higher than himself, in whose existence and potency he believed.¹ It has been only in societies in which a considerable, and influential, minority of the population has been living an urban life for a considerable time that the worship of gods manifest in Nature has fallen into the background; and then, when Man has become confident enough in his own powers to begin to divest Nature of her aura of divinity, he has come to find a more impressive manifestation of the godhead in his own social organization and in the collective power which he has acquired through this. In this next stage religion comes to be connected with politics more pronouncedly than with economics. The gods who now inspire the strongest feelings of awe, fear, and love are manifestations of divinity seen through the medium of states. The god of the city-state of Nippur or goddess of the city-state of Argos now overshadows the storm-god or the corn-goddess; and Athene holds her worshippers' allegiance as the divinity manifest in Athens rather than as the one manifest in the olive-tree.

Eventually the advent of the higher religions brings with it a new vision of the trans-human spiritual presence. Whether this is experienced as being immanent or as being transcendent, as being personal or as being impersonal, in every mode it is now experienced direct, and not through either an economic or a political medium. But the higher religions have so far had to incorporate almost as much as they have been able to abolish in the traditions of the earlier religions that they have sought to supersede. In the annual cycle of the liturgy of the Christian Church, as this is still observed in many of the Church's present branches, the underlying annual cycle of agricultural operations is manifest. The most conspicuous manifestation is in the thanksgiving

¹ 'Even in primitive nature-worship, the object of religious emotion and worship is never the natural phenomenon as such, but always the supernatural power which is obscurely felt to be present and to be working through the natural object' (Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 173).

service for the harvest. Again, when in a Christian place of worship a *Te Deum* is sung to celebrate the victory of one professedly Christian state in a battle with another, the god to whom the thanks are given is manifestly the 'god of battles' who is the symbol of the collective power of a local political community, rather than the One True God who, according to Christian doctrine, is the common god not only of all Christians but of all human beings and all other created things.

It will be seen that, in the past, the association of religion with other parts of culture has been intimate. There has, it is true, been a tendency, in the histories of some civilizations, for art to part company with religion, and an inverse tendency, in the history of mankind as a whole, for religion to part company with economics and politics. But these dissociative movements have been tardy and gradual, and religion seems to have been less successful in achieving independence than art has been. The judgement that religion is a part of culture is confirmed and fortified by the evidence of religion's ancient and persistent connexion with other parts of culture whose status as such is not in dispute. If religious-minded students of human affairs can agree with their rationalist-minded confrères on this point, they will have found a piece of common ground. But this agreement on one important question of fact will have had the disconcerting effect of widening the area of their disagreement on a question of interpretation.

Let us suppose that they had been able to agree, instead, that religion was *not* a part of culture and was *not* connected with other phenomena that *are* parts of culture beyond dispute, then the disagreement between them over their respective interpretations of the significance of religion would have been confined to the topic of religion itself, and they could have agreed without reservation or ambiguity that culture, minus religion, is an exclusively human phenomenon that can be interpreted as such without any dispute over the question of the existence or non-existence of trans-human spiritual presences. On the other hand, when it has been agreed that, in the past, religion has not only been a part of culture but has been a highly pervasive part, intimately connected with a number of other parts, the dispute over the interpretation of the significance of religious experience extends itself, *pari passu* with religion's pervasive influence, over the whole field of culture. So the gulf between the two points of view yawns wider than ever; and this is, after all, only what is to be expected; for the cause of the gulf is the relativity of the two points of view to their respective fundamental presuppositions, and the conflict between these presuppositions will not have been overcome by an agreement on one question of fact. The only effective way of overcoming—or, short of that, of mitigating—this conflict is for each party to make the moral and intellectual effort to examine, analyse, and criticize his own bias.

The barrier of relativity—persisting, as it does, so long as it is left unanalysed—alienates the religious-minded and the rationalist-minded inquirer not only from each other but also from some of the common human objects of their study, since some of these will be in the opposite camp to the inquirer's, whichever of the two inquirers he may be. For

both inquirers this is an obstacle to achieving the sympathy without which there can be no understanding. But up to the present this handicap has been less formidable for the religious-minded student of human affairs than it has been for the rationalist, simply because, up to date, the vast majority of human beings have been religious-minded, whereas the rationalists, into whose state of mind it might be difficult for the religious-minded inquirer to enter sympathetically, have been comparatively few and far between. By contrast, the rationalist-minded humanist has to study a world of men with whom he is out of sympathy with the exception of a few kindred spirits that catch his eye here and there.

A classical example of the un-self-critically rationalist-minded observer's handicap is the limitation which this state of mind imposed on the achievements of so great a genius as Gibbon. Gibbon's case is an outstanding one, because he was a genius who was rationalist-minded to an almost naïvely un-self-critical degree and who chose for his field of study an epoch of history in which a temporary access of rationalism was engulfed by a resurgence of religious faith. In Gibbon's eyes the spirit of Hellenic rationalism was identical with the spirit of the Western rationalism of Gibbon's own day. It was the same intellectual light dispelling the same darkness of ignorance and superstition; and Gibbon's subject was the submergence of Hellenic rationalism by the rise of Christianity. He saw his theme as the story of a catastrophe. What had happened was shocking because it had condemned civilization to undergo a long-drawn-out eclipse, and it was also inexplicable because it was not consonant with the rationality which, as Gibbon saw it, is not only part but the whole of what is distinctively and creditably human in human nature.

In approaching this subject from this standpoint Gibbon could hardly help seeing almost all the characters on his stage in one or other of the two roles of fool or knave. If they were not cheats, they must be dupes. *Ex hypothesi*, a rational human being could not really believe in religion, so, if someone who was unmistakably rational professed to believe in it, he must be an imposter who was seeking to deceive his fellow men for his own self-interested purposes. Conversely, if someone was an unmistakably sincere believer, he must be an irrational fool. The psychological barrier that the relativity of Gibbon's outlook interposed between the historian and the great majority of the figures passing across his stage prevented Gibbon from entering into the true motives and feelings of many of these actors, and therefore also prevented him from gaining a really penetrating insight into the meaning of the play. Gibbon's failure in these two respects—and the two points are both crucial—strikingly illustrates the seriousness of the handicap imposed by relativity when this is not corrected by self-criticism; for Gibbon's mind was surely the most powerful and most lucid one that has appeared so far in the whole distinguished company of Western historians up to date.

2. THE HIGHER RELIGIONS' DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The un-self-critically rationalist-minded humanist is likely to run into still greater trouble if he is not content to have a consensus that religion is a part of culture, but goes on to insist that religion is merely this and nothing more. Romein and Bagby appear to take this second position if I have rightly interpreted their meaning.¹ It is a position that gets its holders into difficulties when they come to deal with cultural and social morphology; for, in this field, it is only, it seems to me, by forcing facts and begging questions that one can stow away all specifically religious institutions entirely inside the framework of other institutions which may have a tincture of religion in them, but which are not themselves primarily institutions of a religious kind. The impracticability of this procedure may not be apparent at first if one approaches one's morphological studies in historical order, starting with pre-civilizational societies and going on to civilizations. The difficulties come to light when one comes to higher religions.

The problem of morphology presents itself because 'culture' and 'society' are abstractions. It is possible to define them; 'Culture' can be defined, as we have seen, as 'regularities in human behaviour',² and 'society' perhaps as 'the total network of relations between human beings'.³ They can be defined, but the subjects of these definitions cannot ever be met with in real life. What we do meet with and are able to observe and examine are not 'culture' and 'society' but 'societies' and 'cultures'. Particular cultures are observable as regularities in the behaviour of human beings who are participants in particular societies, besides being partakers in the cultures that are respectively characteristic of these. A society, with its cultural expression, and a culture, in its social setting, are institutions that have structures. What is the relation of religion to these social and cultural structures? In the singular number 'religion', like 'society' and 'culture', is an abstraction. What we meet with in real life is not 'religion' but 'religions'; and 'religions', like 'societies' and 'cultures', have institutional structures. The question that arises is: Are these religious institutional structures nothing more than parts of other institutional structures that are not religious structures exclusively or even primarily? Can all the religious institutional structures that are now in existence, or are known to us from the historical record, be classified and explained satisfactorily as being parts of

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 348, Romein writes: 'From my viewpoint, all religious phenomena are part of the social whole, a product, an important product, no doubt, perhaps the most important, but nevertheless a product only of society itself.' Ibid., p. 107, Bagby writes: 'It [religion] is merely a part or aspect of civilization, one of those systems of practice and belief which go to make up a way of life. It cannot be isolated from its social and cultural context and turned into a primary agent.' In *Culture and History*, p. 175, Bagby writes: 'Religion is . . . only one aspect of culture and cannot give its name to the whole; we are no more and no less entitled to speak of "Christian civilization" than of "Democratic" or "Monarchical civilization" or, for that matter, of "Tea-drinking civilization".' These terms do not cover empirically discoverable entities; they are rather classes into which we put various cultures because they share a single culture-trait or complex.

² See further pp. 272-3.

³ See further pp. 271-2.

other institutional structures of other kinds? Or are there some religious institutional structures, at any rate, that can be classified and explained only as being representatives of a separate and independent institutional category?

Let us try the policy of treating religious practices and institutions simply as parts of the culture of some society, or some community within a society, that is not primarily, or at any rate not solely, religious in character. This policy seems to work so long as we are dealing with pre-civilizational societies and civilizations of the first generation. In these societies, as we have seen already, religion is closely connected, not only with art, but with economics, and, later on, with politics, and further inspection shows that religion also enters into almost every other kind of activity in which the participants in these societies engage: for instance, war, education, and recreation. These societies do, in fact, seem to be highly integrated and more or less self-contained; and their religious horizon seems to coincide with their boundaries on other planes.

This is obvious in the case of the political divinities; their respective realms do not even embrace the whole of the society in which their worshippers participate. A political god's writ runs only within the frontiers of the local state whose collective power he or she symbolizes; and, even in those rare cases in which a local state—say Babylon or the Thebaid or Rome—expands into a universal state, the realm of the presiding god or gods—Marduk or Amun or Dea Roma and Divus Caesar—expands only up to the limits of the worshippers' empire. It might seem, at first sight, as if the older gods, in whom the super-human spiritual presences manifest themselves through the medium of non-human nature, must, like this medium, have a more or less world-wide range. Olives grow in other countries besides Attica; Mother Earth yields corn at other places besides Eleusis; and the sea has no bounds. So how can the Attic olive-goddess Athene and the Eleusinian Earth-goddess Demeter and the Corinthian sea-god Poseidon be merely local divinities? Demeter of Eleusis did, as a matter of fact, extend her realm beyond Eleusis and beyond Attica to embrace the whole Hellenic World; but in this she was exceptional. Local nature-gods who reigned in principle wherever their natural media—sea, corn, olive-trees, and so on—were to be found, were in fact conscripted by their local worshippers to concentrate their attention on meeting local economic needs. In fact, economic as well as political divinities were community-bound. There were as many of each of them as there were communities to require their services. Even the goddess whose medium was the boundless Earth was not allowed to be one and indivisible. Every economically autarkic territory had, under some name or other, a Demeter of its own.

So long as the horizon of religion is thus bounded by the borders of regional societies, or even by the frontiers of states into which such societies are divided up or unified politically, it remains possible to treat religion just as a part of culture and as nothing more. But the possibility of continuing to take this line becomes doubtful and disputable when the 'higher religions' make their appearance.

Higher religions, as a class, may be defined by characteristics of theirs which are revolutionary new departures. They catch a new vision of the spiritual presences, higher than Man, in which these presences are no longer seen through the medium of human economic and political needs and activities but are seen direct as powers that are not implicated *ex officio* in their local worshippers' human concerns.¹ These powers may reveal themselves to human beings either as transcendent or as immanent in the inward experience of sensitively attuned human hearts. But, whichever way they choose, they make their presence felt as an act of grace towards human beings to whom they owe no obligation and on whom they are not in any way dependent. If the trans-human spiritual presence is experienced, not in Its personal aspect as God, but as an impersonal state of spiritual being, as It is in the experience of a Buddhist spiritual athlete, the quest for Nirvāna requires the arhat to extricate himself not only from society but from self-hood. In either case there is a disengagement of the trans-human spiritual presence—and, with It, of Its worshippers—from the highly integrated life of some particular local community, and this disengagement has the consequence that the presence's realm now comes to be thought of as being coextensive, not with some local state or some regional civilization, but with the entire Universe, while Its worshippers come to feel themselves members of a church that, in principle and in intention, embraces all men.

In short, the higher religions are entitled to their distinctive name because they have a vision of the godhead as being sovereignly self-sufficient and omnipresent, instead of any longer thinking of It, in traditional terms, as being indentured to the service of local worshippers, being tied down to their territory's soil, and being debarred from breaking bounds by the presence, in adjoining territories, of other local divinities of the same order, who have corresponding rights and duties on their own no less narrowly and jealously circumscribed home ground. If the trans-human spiritual presence, when It is experienced direct, is seen, as in the Buddha's vision of It, no longer as a personal godhead but as an impersonal Nirvāna, then Its disengagement from the traditional configurations of the particular culture of some particular society will be more radical than it will be if the direct vision of the presence does not obliterate the traditional anthropomorphic image of It as a divine person. Yet, even if the personal aspect of the presence survives the new experience of It, this new experience will have the revolutionary

¹ In the Weltanschauung of primitive societies, Man, Nature, and God are not differentiated from each other (R. Redfield: *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, p. 104). 'Neither an absolutely unconditioned God nor a wholly secular description of natural law is conceivable in a savage or barbaric settlement before the rise of cities' (ibid., p. 102). A spiritual tension over the difference between what is and what ought to be seems to have made itself felt first as a result of the experience of 'the First Intermediate Period' in both Egypt and Sumer (Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 116). The revolutionary spiritual event was the experience (authentic or illusory) of the establishment of direct communion between individual human souls and an Absolute Spiritual Reality transcending the world of Nature (and also the world of human society); and this dates from the last millennium B.C. (ibid., pp. 117-18; cf. p. 177). 'It was in India that the decisive step was first taken, and it was in India that the new view of Reality was followed out unwaveringly in all its practical implications' (ibid., p. 118).

cultural and social effect of breaking up the previous comprehensive cultural integration of the society in which the new vision is attained. In fact, the epiphany of a higher religion splits an integrated culture in a way that is comparable to the splitting of undifferentiated Reality by the awakening of consciousness.

If this is the higher religions' nature and effect, it will be inherent in their nature that they should find their social expression in independent organizations of their own and that they should engage in missionary activity. When the trans-human spiritual presence is seen direct instead of through the medium of human social needs and activities, human beings who have attained this new vision will be impelled to act on it in two new ways. They will want to enter into a new association with each other, independent of their traditional social ties; and they will want to communicate to the rest of mankind the saving truth about Reality that has been revealed to, or been discovered by, the adherents of the new religion in their belief. The emergence of this impelling sense of mission, with nothing short of the whole World for its field, raises the question whether the histories and institutions of the higher religions can really be stowed, like those of older religions, within the frameworks of the histories and institutions of particular pre-existing societies of a kind that is not primarily religious. May it not be found that the higher religions must be treated as societies of a new species, and must therefore be regarded as phenomena which cannot be dealt with in terms of any other species than their own if they are to be dealt with adequately—that is to say, intelligibly? This question can be brought into sharper focus. Can the higher religions be dealt with as if they were simply parts of the cultures of the civilizations, which were the highest species of society in existence at the time when the higher religions emerged? Can each of the higher religions be regarded as being one of the products and expressions of some particular civilization, and as being nothing more than that?

An orderly rationalist mind will be reluctant to be convinced that this question cannot be answered in the affirmative; for, if it can be, without doing violence to the phenomena, this will be a victory for simplicity and for clarity.¹ It will make for simplicity because it will allow the student of human affairs to go on dealing with human history, since the emergence of the earliest civilizations about five thousand years ago, in terms of a comparative study of this species of society and this one only. The subsumption of higher religions under civilizations will also make for clarity, because it will make it possible to go on treating religion simply as a part of human culture. It will make it possible still to avoid grappling with the controversial question whether the spiritual presence higher than Man, that is vouched for by unverifiable religious experience, is Reality itself or is a prodigious illusion. The powerful appeal of this rational quest for clarity and simplicity got the better of me, for one, when I was working out my original plan for this book. I decided to try to bring the whole field of human affairs,

¹ 'We are inclined to believe that the ultimate laws of Nature are not only few but simple' (H. W. B. Joseph: *An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed., pp. 506-7).

since the appearance of the earliest civilizations, within the framework of a comparative study of civilizations.¹ And, before I started to put this decision into action, I was reassured by the publication of the first volume of Spengler's work, in which I found that my own intended plan of operations had been anticipated, with apparently complete assurance, by an inquirer who was obviously a man of genius. The same plan of operations has since been followed by Bagby;² and I should guess that he, too, was attracted to it by the promise of clarity and simplicity that this plan appears to hold out before one has begun to put it to the test of applying it to the phenomena. This empirical test raises the question: Do the phenomena allow of this apparently clear and simple solution of the problem presented by the appearance of the higher religions? This is a difficult question to answer, because it is difficult to find anyone who is in a position to approach it impartially, without *parti pris*. The most that anyone can do is to get to grips with the phenomena in as open-minded a mood as he can muster up.

3. THE HIGHER RELIGIONS' STATUS IN THE LIGHT OF THE PHENOMENA

If we start by looking at the three oldest of the higher religions—Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Hinduism³—we may be inclined to judge that these can each be subsumed under a particular civilization more or less legitimately.

It is true that all three, like other representatives of the new species of religion, conceive of the godhead as being sovereignly self-sufficient and omnipresent. Brahmā, Ahuramazda, and Yahweh reign, each of them, over the whole of mankind and the whole of the Universe.⁴ They are not just the respective communal divinities of the Hindus, the Parsees, and the Jews. It is also true that the followers of all three religions have shown concern to propagate their faiths. The Jews converted to Judaism the royal family of the kingdom of Adiabene (in what is now

¹ Here, I think, I was committing the sin of pride of which several critics accuse me (see Chapter II, Annex: *Ad Hominem*, p. 638). I stand convicted, I am afraid; and this is, I also fear, presumptive evidence of conceitedness. The only defence that I can plead is that I have since changed my plan as a result of my experiences in trying to carry it out in its original form.

² In *Culture and History*.

³ For the purpose of the present argument, I am using the word Hinduism in its more usual sense as meaning the indigenous religion of India from the close of the interregnum following the dissolution of the Indus Culture down to the present day (the religion of the Indus Culture remains unknown to us so far, save for a few flashes of light that have been thrown upon it by some of its disinterested artefacts). In vols. i-x I have provisionally confined my usage of the word to mean only the post-Buddhaic indigenous religion of India. This usage of mine has been disputed, together with the chronological caesura, tentatively drawn by me in Indian history, with which it is connected. These points are discussed in the present volume on pp. 182-4, below.

⁴ Ahuramazda's omnipotence is, of course, contested by his adversary Angramainyush; Yahweh's omnipotence is defied by his adversary Satan; and Brahmā is made manifest to men in the form of a host of emanations, who, looked at historically, are survivors from a previous polytheism with which Hinduism has never made a break. On the other hand, in the Hindu vision of the godhead, its personal facet, Brahmā, has a complement in an impersonal facet, Brahman. And Brahman is more remote and farther withdrawn from implication in human affairs than either Yahweh or Ahuramazda, who have never been followed beyond the range of personality in their worshippers' vision of them.

'Iraqi Kurdistan), in the first century of the Christian Era, and the royal family of the Turkish Khazar horde, on the steppe between the Lower Volga and the Lower Don, in the eighth century; and, in the fastnesses of the Caucasus and of the Semyen Mountains in Abyssinia, there are today highland clans professing the Jewish religion whose ancestors must have been converted to Judaism by Jewish missionary enterprise. Zoroastrianism, again, was propagated in the time of the Achaemenian Empire (550/525-331 B.C.) to Cappadocia, and, in and after the time of the Sasanian Empire (A.D. 224-651/2), from Iran and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin across the Great Eurasian Steppe to Northern China. As for Hinduism, it was propagated eastwards from India as far across Indonesia as the island of Bali and, on the mainland, as far as what is now Southern Vietnam.

These three religions thus display the two distinctive marks of their class; 'an ancient civilization was transmuted by a series of challenges into a universal religion';¹ yet none of the three ever took the new road decisively; all three remained straddled ambiguously with one foot on either side of the line marking the new departure. In their conception of the role of Almighty God, their adherents became arrested in a state of double thinking which, to Christian and Muslim minds, seems paradoxically inconsistent. After they had come to think of God as the omnipresent lord of the Universe, they went on thinking of Him at the same time as still being the peculiar local god of the society or community in which He had originally been worshipped as such. Thus, each of these three religions, in becoming a higher religion, still also continued to be a part of the integrated culture of a particular community or society; and it has never become feasible to be converted to the Jewish, the Zoroastrian, or the Hindu religion without at the same time having to become a naturalized member of Jewish, Zoroastrian, or Hindu society.² Conversion to Judaism or Zoroastrianism has involved submission to a system of law³ in which religious observances are inextricably intertwined with what, to Christian and Muslim minds, would seem like purely secular regulations. Conversion to Hinduism has involved incorporation in a caste and submission to the restrictions that the Hindu caste system entails.⁴ This explains why conversions to these three religions have been rare, and why their adherents have been no more than half-hearted in their efforts to bring gentiles into their jealously guarded folds.⁵ The source of the perennial ill-feeling between

¹ Rabbi J. B. Agus, in *Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), p. 332.

² In Jewish history 'there resulted in the post-Biblical period a unique combination of a perfectly universalistic religion with an intensely nationalistic ethnic group' (Agus, in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 30).

³ 'To accept Judaism without accepting the Mosaic Law is a contradiction in terms' (E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?* p. 76).

⁴ All the same, when Hinduism was propagated into Indonesia and into continental South-East Asia, 'the Indian social structure, with its caste system, was less thoroughly absorbed than was the religious' (H. G. Quaritch Wales: *The Making of Greater India* (London 1951, Quaritch), p. 20).

⁵ Agus holds that ethnic loyalty diverted the Jews from missionary efforts, in spite of the fact that 'the Jewish religion was as universalistic in its teaching as Christianity or Islam. . . . The Talmud operates consistently on the supposition that a deep line of distinction must be drawn between the rights of Jews and non-Jews' (Agus in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 45; Cp. Juvenal: *Satura XIV*, ll. 101-4). At the same time Agus points out that, in

Jews and gentiles, and of the tragedies and atrocities in which this has repeatedly come to a head, is the inability of both gentiles and Jews to tell whether being a Jew means being an adherent of a religion or whether it means being a partaker in the culture of a community that, even in dispersion, has retained its original ethnic character.¹

The question whether Judaism is part of the culture of a community or whether it is a religion that can be embraced by anyone, whatever his ancestral culture or his local nationality may be, is the question that was at issue, in the first generation of Christianity, between the Jewish Christian church and the gentile Christian church created by the missionary work of Saint Paul. And it is significant that the secession of the Christian Church from Jewry, which followed in spite of Paul's and Peter's unanimous desire to avoid the breach, was not the only case of its kind. Six hundred years later another new religion inspired by Judaism, namely Islam, parted company with Jewry, as Christianity had done, on a mission to convert the gentiles to the saving truth which the Jews themselves had been keeping to themselves,² like the talent

the Gospels, the Pharisees are described as being eager to make converts. See, for example, Matt. xxiii. 15.

¹ The ambiguity of the attitude of some Jews, at any rate, on this point is illustrated by the following set of passages in M. Samuel's *The Professor and the Fossil*: 'When a Jew considers his Americanism or his Englishhood as a substitute for Judaism and a replacement for his feeling of participation in the Jewish peoplehood... he secularizes himself out of his Jewish identity' (p. 180). 'Neo-Zionism was an instinctive counter-move against the threat of assimilation presented by specific modern conditions' (p. 197). At the same time, Samuel maintains that to say that the Jewish ethos was incompatible with the functions of modern citizenship would be to declare the Jewish ethos immoral—a point of view not worth arguing with' (p. 196).

To judge by these passages, Samuel's position seems to be that a Jew would be failing to do his full duty towards Judaism if he were to decide to do his full duty as a citizen of the gentile country of which he is a citizen *de jure*, but that it would be offensive in a gentile to point out that a Jew who took this line was deliberately assuming two incompatible obligations and was trying to have the best of both worlds.

In another passage (p. 263), Samuel suggests that being a good Jew, in his sense, may be incompatible, not only with being a good citizen of a gentile state, but even with being a good human being. 'I have asked myself whether a strong feeling of history within one's own people makes it impossible to share in the general sense of history; whether this kind of belonging and inclusion must lead to a proportionate not-belonging and exclusion; whether, in short, this is a form of egocentricity destructive of one's all-human consciousness.'

If Samuel may be taken as being representative of one of several present-day Jewish states of mind, these passages suggest that, in some Jewish minds today, there is a still unclarified ambiguity on the questions what it means to be a Jew and what attitude towards gentiles this entails. If so, it is perhaps natural that some present-day gentiles—including, for instance, me—should also be somewhat in the dark on these points. Rabbi Agus is right in saying of me that 'his judgment derives from an ambiguity in the use of the term Judaism. At times he equates Judaism with the ethnic culture of Jewry; at other times he thinks of the Jewish faith as a separable pattern of ideas which is included more or less in our modern Western culture' (*Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), p. 321). 'He tends to lose sight of the distinction between Judaism and "Jewishness" or the national-cultural civilization of Jewish People' (*The National Jewish Monthly*, November 1956, p. 40).

² Rabbi J. B. Agus explains the secessions of Christianity and Islam from Judaism in terms of one of the ideas put forward by me in the present book (viii. 10): it was a case of barbarians capitulating to a superior culture by adopting it and at the same time still asserting their own cultural distinctiveness by adopting the superior alien culture in an heretical form (*Judaism*, 1956, p. 41). The combination of Jewish monotheism with Jewish nationalism inevitably produced this gentile reaction. In Christianity and Islam 'the [Jewish] message was twice accepted, but the messenger was twice rejected' (*ibid.*, p. 39. Cp. E. Berkovitz, *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, pp. 45-46 and 48-49).

Agus criticizes (*ibid.*, pp. 19-20) Klausner's view—shared by Dubnow and by contemporary Christian scholars, e.g. Wellhausen—that the reason why Jesus was rejected

wrapped in a napkin and buried in the earth by the servant in one of Jesus's parables. In the history of Zoroastrianism it has been the same story. During the age in which Zoroastrianism was the established national religion of the Sasanian Empire, Manichaeism seceded from it in the third century of the Christian Era and Mazdakism in the fifth century; and in the following age, when the Sasanian Empire, as well as half the Roman Empire, had been conquered by the Muslim Arabs, the new regime's Zoroastrian subjects in Iran were converted to Islam much more rapidly than were its Christian subjects in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. In the history of Hinduism again, Buddhism and Jainism seceded in the sixth century B.C.

These portentous secessions are evidence of an unresolved tension in the bosom of the Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Hindu societies between a will to transform the ancestral religion of one people into a religion for all men and a reluctance to cast before swine the pearls that were the spiritually privileged people's heirloom. The tension resulted in repeated secessions because, in each of these three cases, a people that had seen the vision of a higher religion could not bring itself to go the whole way either in accepting the consequences or in rejecting them. It shrank from paying the price of collective self-abnegation that has to be paid by a 'Chosen People' if they are to become the missionaries of a world-wide faith; yet, at the same time, it could never turn its back on this vision when once it had seen it. This indecision condemned each of these three peoples to become a house divided against itself.

This infirmity—common to Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Hinduism—of hovering on the borderline between two different ideals makes it just possible for a systematist to treat each of these three religions as being no more than the religious component (or part of this) in the culture of one of the civilizations. The same tendency to relapse from a universal into a communal outlook can also be observed in the histories of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. For instance, in Tibet, until the other day, the ecclesiastical institutions of Buddhism were being employed to serve as the political machinery for a national government. In Western Europe, for nearly a thousand years ending in the nineteenth century, many local states besides the Papal States were governed as prince-bishoprics. Trent, Salzburg, Passau, Mainz, Cologne, Trèves, Liège, and the County Palatine of Durham are examples. Conversely, there are still today a number of countries in which Christianity has been

by the Jews was because his teaching was supra-national. Klausner admits that all the *logia* attributed to Jesus appear in the rabbinical literature too; and the Pharisees, Agus here points out, were universalists, whereas at least one passage in the Gospels, Matt. xv. 21-28, is more contemptuous of gentiles than any passage in the Talmud. As Agus sees it, Jesus was rejected, not because he was not a nationalist, but because, in the eyes of contemporary pharisees, he did not make good his claim to be the Messiah.

On this showing, the true founder of Christianity, in its historic form as a universal religion, would be, not Jesus, but Paul, when he won his point that membership in the Christian community need not carry with it an obligation to observe the rules of the Mosaic Law.

Agus (*ibid.*, pp. 30-31) cites Y. Kaufman's thesis that the reason why Christianity failed to convert the Jews—whereas it did convert the World—was because the World needed monotheism, whereas the Jews already had it. According to Kaufman, 'the Jewish religion maintains automatically the wall of ethnic alienation between Jew and Christian', and therefore the Jews cannot accept assimilation wholeheartedly.

reduced to the status of a national religion incorporated in the establishment of some national government. This is, for instance, still the status of Episcopalian Protestantism in the Kingdom of England, minus Wales, and of Eastern Orthodox Christianity in every country, except those now under Communist rule, in which this form of Christianity is prevalent. In the Islamic World, again, the Shi'ite sect of Islam is today still the established national religion of the Kingdom of Iran; and a consideration of the early history of Islam, during the first century and a half after the opening date of Muhammad's preaching at Mecca, suggests that Islam as a whole nearly lapsed into becoming the national religion of the Arabs—a fate which would have prevented it from being, as it has been, a missionary religion with a world-wide appeal.¹

Is it possible, then, to dispose of Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism in the way in which it might conceivably be just possible to dispose of Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Hinduism? Can each of these other three religions, likewise, be assigned by a systematist to this or that civilization and be labelled as the religious component—or as part of the religious component—of the container-civilization's culture? Spengler has taken this line uncompromisingly. In his morphology of human affairs since the emergence of civilization, the higher religions find a place only as elements in the structures of the civilizations and as incidents in the histories of the civilizations' rises and falls. Bagby, in his prolegomena, follows Spengler's lead, apparently without misgivings. I took the same line myself till I was pulled up short by the intractability, as I saw it, of the phenomena when, in carrying out my plan of operations, I reached the point at which I had to come to grips with the problem of the higher religions' place in human affairs. Bagby would have been confronted by the same problem if he had lived to reach the same point in the testing of his original hypotheses.

In his prolegomena Bagby gives the same list of six higher religions that I have given in the present chapter, and he fits each of them into the framework of some one or other of the nine major civilizations in his list of civilizations.² Buddhism, as well as Hinduism, is taken as

¹ See Chapter XIV, pp. 470-1.

² The form of words which he uses is that these six religions each 'originated within a major civilization' (*Culture and History*, p. 173). This would be true and indisputable if, for the sake of the argument, we were to recognize the existence of Spengler's 'Magian Civilization', which Bagby has adopted under the name 'Near-Eastern Civilization' (see *ibid.*, pp. 167 and 168), and if we were also to concede Bagby's postulate (*ibid.*, p. 173) that the 'inventions' of Judaism and Zoroastrianism in or about the eighth century B.C. are to be attributed to the 'Near-Eastern Civilization', on the ground that these 'inventions' were 'premonitory developments prior to the rise of the Near-Eastern Civilization'—an event that Bagby dates some eight hundred years later, in about the first century of the Christian Era. Bagby holds, however, if I have read him correctly, not only that each of the higher religions originated within some single civilization, but also that none of them, at any stage in its history, was anything more than a part of the culture of some single civilization or other. This is implied in his thesis (see *Toynbee and History*, p. 107) that religion is merely a part or aspect of civilization, not a primary agent. In accordance with this thesis Bagby abstains from giving the higher religions any separate place of their own in the morphology of human affairs that he outlines in *Culture and History*. In his view the study of human affairs since the emergence of civilization is wholly covered by 'the comparative study of civilizations' that figures in the sub-title of his book, and he sets himself to fit all six higher religions into this morphological scheme.

being simply part of the Indian Civilization. The other four—Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam—are packed into a veritable hold-all for unwanted religions: the hypothetical 'Near-Eastern', alias 'Magian', Civilization that Bagby has taken over from Spengler.¹ The hypothesis that there has been, and still is, a real civilization corresponding to this label is a disputable one. This question is discussed at a later point in the present volume.² Undoubtedly it presents the most difficult of all the problems that confront anyone who tries to identify the civilizations that have arisen so far and to disentangle them from each other. My own attempt to solve this problem by the hypothetical construction of a 'Syriac Civilization' has drawn heavy fire from my critics. In the present volume I am making a second attempt to grapple with this problem,³ and I am in no mood to be censorious about other people's different approaches to it. Anyway, in this chapter we are not concerned with this problem on its own account. We are concerned with it here only in its bearing on the general question of the relations between civilizations and higher religions.

It should be noted that Spengler's and Bagby's system of cultural and social morphology takes for granted their thesis that each of the higher religions is wholly contained within one or other of the civilizations and that each of them is also wholly explicable in terms of its container-civilization. The system and the thesis on which it is based stand or fall together. If Spengler and Bagby found themselves forced, by the historical evidence, to admit that one of the higher religions had, at one or another time and place, been in some relation with two or more civilizations without ever losing its own identity, they would then be bound to admit that this particular higher religion was not, after all, wholly contained in one single civilization and wholly explicable in terms of this. To vindicate the validity of their morphology they must demonstrate either that each of the higher religions has run its course, so far, within the channel of some single civilization's history, or, alternatively, that, if a higher religion has apparently been in relations with more civilizations than one, this apparent historical datum is illusory. What has transcended the limits of a single civilization is merely a common name, with no common substance corresponding to it. The religion associated with each of the two or more different civilizations in question will, in Spengler's and Bagby's view, be found on inspection to be in reality a separate and different religion from any that is associated with any other of these civilizations. Even if it does bear the same name, the common label will prove to be incorrect and misleading.

In *Culture and History* Bagby does not go into this point in his reference to Buddhism,⁴ but in the light of his morphological analysis of Christianity we may assume, I think, that he regards the Buddhism of Eastern Asia (China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam) as being, in effect, a new religion that has nothing beyond the name in common with the earlier Buddhism of India. It is true that every higher religion—Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, or whichever it may be—tends both to retain some-

¹ See the preceding footnote.

³ See pp. 446-61.

² See pp. 443-6.

⁴ On p. 173.

thing of the distinctive colour of the social and cultural environment in which it has originated, and also to take on something of the colour of any other environment into which it may subsequently have made its way. This is to be expected, since the higher religions, whether or not they are 'of' the World, are unquestionably 'in' it, and 'the World' means, in this context, some particular regional culture. But when this has been granted it remains to be proved that the transforming effect upon a higher religion of the experience of entering a new cultural province is so radical as to produce a break with the migratory religion's own past that amounts to a change in its identity.

The test-case for Bagby's thesis, as presented in his published work up to the date of his untimely death, is his analysis of the relations between Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Christianity and his hypothetical 'Near-Eastern Civilization'. In recognizing¹ that the origins of Judaism go back to the eighth century B.C., Bagby is implicitly identifying it as part of the culture of the Syro-Phoenician civilization that figures² in his list of 'secondary' civilizations. This identification is obligatory if we apply Bagby's own morphological principles. This, however, would involve him in admitting that Judaism had been in relations with more civilizations than one, since he reckons present-day Jews as being partakers in the 'Near-Eastern Civilization'.³ His solution⁴ is to identify the religion of Israel and Judah, from the eighth century B.C. onwards, and Zoroastrianism too, from whatever the date of its origin may be, as 'premonitory developments prior to the rise of the "Near-Eastern Civilization"'. In doing this, he is setting back the origin of the 'Near-Eastern Civilization' itself by 800 years, to the eighth century B.C. from the first century of the Christian Era. This changes his 'Near-Eastern Civilization' from being one that arose *after* the intrusion of the Hellenic Civilization into South-West Asia and Egypt into being one that, like my 'Syriac Civilization', originated in South-West Asia before the intrusion of Hellenism there and survived the millennium of Hellenic domination there that was inaugurated by Alexander's overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire.

I do not quarrel with Bagby for doing this, but I do notice that, as a result of his effort to bring Judaism within the compass of a single civilization, he falls into an inconsistency with himself. A few pages farther on,⁵ in a criticism of my construction of a 'Syriac Civilization', he reasserts the separateness of his 'Syro-Phoenician Civilization' and his 'Near-Eastern Civilization' from each other. In this he may be right; but, if so, his previous modification of his own scheme so as to include his 'Syro-Phoenician Civilization' in his 'Near-Eastern' one, just for the sake of packing Judaism inside a single civilization only, suggests that here he may be forcing the facts; and this suggests, in turn, that the thesis for the sake of which he allows himself to fall into an inconsistency may not stand up to the test of being confronted with the historical phenomena.

This doubt becomes more insistent when we also find Bagby follow-

¹ In op. cit., pp. 167 and 173.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 167 and 173.

² Ibid., p. 169.

⁵ On pp. 178-9.

³ Ibid., p. 167.

ing Spengler¹ in treating Christianity in the Western World since the eleventh century of the Christian Era as being a different religion, in spite of the common label, from Christianity in the West before that date and from Christianity elsewhere down to the present day.² This contention is surely a paradoxical one; for surely Christianity, in all its later forms, bears not only a common name but a common character impressed on it by the experiences and achievements of the Christian Church during the first four and a half centuries of its existence. This age—the age of the Apostles, Martyrs, Fathers, Anchorites, and Creeds—has manifestly been the formative one. Compared to the decisive developments that occurred within that period, all subsequent developments in Christianity as a whole or in any of its branches have been no more than minor variations on the original theme; but the manifest formative period of Christianity was over, and the distinctive character of Christianity was firmly set, more than five hundred years before the emergence of the Western Civilization according to Spengler's chronology, which Bagby adopts.

Why then do Spengler, and Bagby following him, exert themselves to prove that Christianity in the West since the eleventh century is a new thing? The explanation is to be found in their inventory³ of the contents of their 'hold-all' civilization: the 'Magian' or 'Near-Eastern', whichever of the two labels may be preferred. This receptacle is so capacious and so elastic that they have managed to pack into it all peoples and communities that have ever professed Christianity down to the present day, with one single, and awkward, exception. After having packed in, along with the rest, the Christians of Western Europe from the conversion of Constantine down to the eleventh century, they have had to recoil from

¹ See Spengler: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i, p. 256. 'The penchant towards the infinite was present in the Northern landscape, in a state of deep slumber, long before the first Christian set foot there; and, when the Faustian soul awoke, it re-shaped both primitive Teutonic heathenism and western Christianity into conformity with its own primordial symbol. It did this just at the time when the German, French, English, and Italian nations emerged, as unities, each with a strongly characterised physiognomy of its own, out of the fugitive forms of the Goth, Frank, Lombard, and Saxon peoples. The Edda has preserved this earliest religious expression of the Faustian soul. It attained its inner completion just at the moment when Abbot Odilo of Cluny initiated the movement that transformed the Magian Christianity of the Oriental-Arab World into the Faustian Christianity of the Western Church. Round about the year 1000 there were two possible ways in which a Faustian religion could take shape. It could either adopt and re-interpret the Magian Christianity of the Fathers or it could develop the Teutonic forms. The Edda is evidence for what the second of the alternative possibilities was.'

² In Bagby's own words (in *Culture and History*, p. 175), Christianity 'was adopted by the Teutonic kingdoms of Western Europe along with a number of other features of Near-Eastern Civilization. When these kingdoms began to develop a distinct major civilization of their own around the beginning of the second millennium, they retained Christianity but modified it profoundly in accordance with their new ideas and values. . . . In accordance with the development of Western Europe, Western European Christianity has been even further modified and has now taken a secular and rationalist cast in accordance with the character of the present age. Though many of the forms of belief and practice, especially among Catholics, are similar to those of Oriental Christians, the spirit—the basic ideas and values—is quite different. . . . To an outsider it must be evident that Christ and his disciples were Near-Easterners, not Western-Europeans.' This last of the points here made by Bagby is certainly correct, but it does not prove that Christianity in the modern West is not still the Christianity that took shape during the first four and a half centuries of the Christian Era.

³ See Spengler: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. ii, chap. i B, pp. 49–51, especially p. 50, and chap. iii, pp. 225–399; Bagby, op. cit., p. 167.

trying to do the same with those earlier Western Christians' descendants. The Christianity of Western Europe from the fourth century to the eleventh can be labelled as part of the culture of a 'Near-Eastern Civilization' without creating a startling impression of incongruity. But it would be almost prohibitively incongruous to pack the Westerners of the last nine centuries into the same mixed bag as the Byzantines, Muslims, Armenians, Jews, Copts, Maronites, Parsees, and Nestorians—the more so, when the Abyssinians and the Russians have been tied on to the hold-all's outside.¹

It is hardly possible to label the culture of the modern West 'Near-Eastern'. But, when once it has been conceded that there are two different civilizations—first a 'Near-Eastern' Civilization and then a Western one—with which Christianity has been in relations, it must be argued, on Spengler's and Bagby's hypothesis, that there are two different Christianities—a separate religion to fit into each separate culture-frame. If this is not demonstrated it will have to be admitted that Christianity has been in relations with two different civilizations with no change in its own identity; and this, in its turn, would mean that Christianity is a phenomenon which cannot be classified in terms of any particular civilization and which must therefore be a representative of some different species of society.

This last-mentioned alternative is, I myself believe, the correct conclusion to draw from an examination of the difficulties into which Spengler and Bagby run when they attempt to deal with higher religions entirely in terms of civilizations. I ran into difficulties myself when I was taking the same line, and I concluded from my own experience that I had been on the wrong tack. One's recognition of an error is more convincing when the work in which one detects it is one's own and not somebody else's.

I, too, originally tried to account for the higher religions simply in terms of the civilizations. I took my cue from the relations, as I interpreted them, between the Christian Church on the one side and the Hellenic, Byzantine, and Western civilizations on the other, and I took this set of relations as my 'model' for interpreting the historical roles of other religions of the 'higher' species. I still think that, in the case that I took as my prototype, my interpretation was not incorrect as far as it went; and I think this case does throw some light on the way in which the transition between an earlier and a later civilization takes place when there is an historical connexion between them. At the same time, I now think that I went farther than is warranted by the historical phenomena in applying my prototype case to other cases.²

Following my clue, I saw a higher religion as a mechanism by which the species of society called civilizations had provided for its own repro-

¹ See Bagby, *op. cit.*, pp. 167, 171, 174. In terms of my classification, as revised in the present volume, Spengler's and Bagby's procedure might be salvaged by ruling that the whole of the crop produced by a common Syriac-Hellenic culture-compost (see pp. 446-61) constitutes a single civilization. But this ruling would debar the West from being counted as being a distinct and separate civilization from the rest.

² A reconsideration of my previous procedure will be found in the present volume on pp. 170-86.

duction. I thought of higher religions as being 'chrysalises' into which a disintegrating civilization entered in the last stage of its dissolution, and from which a new civilization subsequently emerged. This view of the historical role of the higher religions was, I now think, a variation on the same fundamental error that I see in Spengler's and Bagby's view. It assumed that the higher religions were significant solely on account of their serviceableness to societies of a different kind from their own.¹ Starting from my own taking-off point, I arrived at different findings from Spengler's and Bagby's over some points of detail. Instead of thinking that a higher religion always originated inside some single civilization, I thought that it always originated from an encounter between two civilizations or more, and that this encounter was always preceded by the breakdown and disintegration of at least one of the parties to it. One of the outward visible signs of social breakdown, as I saw it, was the spiritual secession of a proletariat from a ruling minority that could no longer maintain its dominant position by anything better than sheer force. I saw that in several cases the seceding minority met and mingled with fellow proletarians seceding from some other civilization, and I thought that higher religions were the offsprings of encounters between civilizations at this social level. Seeing Christianity as the offspring of an encounter between the Hellenic and the Syriac Civilization, and judging that both civilizations were in disintegration when this happened, I applied the same formula rightly, perhaps, to the history of the Mahayanian form of Buddhism,² and wrongly, as I am

¹ In retrospect I think that this mistake (as I now believe it to be) in my original diagnosis of the role of the higher religions in history was a consequence of my general outlook at that time. I readily fell into thinking of the higher religions' role as being simply a means towards a non-religious end because I was sceptical about religion in general. This attitude of mine is evidently apparent in earlier volumes of this book; for several critics have noticed it. John Strachey, for instance, in an unpublished critique of vols. i-vi, finds that my arguments for a return to religion are utilitarian and that I come near to thinking that religion is man-made. Lord Hailsham concurs with this criticism of Strachey's in a letter of 4th December, 1949, written to Strachey after he had read Strachey's critique of my attitude. J. K. Feibleman, in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 146, footnote 10, finds that my argument in favour of otherworldliness is a pragmatic one, on the lines of the fable of Solomon's choice. J. H. Nichols, too, suspects that, in the churches, and indeed in religion in all its manifestations, I see a means to a worldly end. This makes on Nichols' mind an unpleasant impression of utilitarianism, and reminds him of the spirit of the age of the restoration after the French Revolution and Napoleon (*The Journal of Religion*, No. 28 (1948), pp. 99-119; *Stadium Generale*, No. 4 (1951), pp. 175-182, ad fin.).

My original approach to the relation between religion and the secular side of life may, I fear, have given some justification for these criticisms. Since then my attitude has changed, as has been noticed by the critics cited on p. 27, footnote 2, p. 100, footnote 3, and pp. 649-51. If my attitude towards religion was formerly utilitarian, it is not so now. In any case, whatever the judgement on my present attitude may be, I agree that the utilitarian attitude towards religion is a wrong one. Religion is an end in itself, because it is concerned with things that matter more to human beings than anything else in the world. This is the discovery—or revelation—that was the origin of the higher religions. The utilization of a higher religion to serve non-religious purposes is a reversion to a primitive state of affairs in which religion is an integral part of the total configuration of culture. This social reversion seems to me to be also a spiritual regression.

² The Mahayana seems to have arisen in India, contemporaneously with the rise there of the modern form of Hinduism, after there had been an encounter between the Indic Civilization and the Hellenic. This encounter seems comparable to that between the Syriac Civilization and the Hellenic after the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great. India's Hellenic conqueror, Demetrius of Bactria, overran India in and after 183 B.C., just after the Maurya Empire had been overthrown by a usurper.

now convinced, to the history of the worship of Osiris¹—to take, as illustrations, two cases out of a number that I tried to identify, analyse, and interpret. These differences of detail do not acquit me from the charge that, in the earlier stages of my inquiry, I was making the mistake into which, as I now see it, Spengler and Bagby, too, have fallen. The view that I now hold has been exactly expressed by Dawson:

"The great civilizations of the World do not produce the great religions as a kind of cultural by-product; in a very real sense, the great religions are the foundations on which the great civilizations rest. . . . We shall never create a living religion merely as a means to an end."²

Religious faith comes by grace, not by will. Religion cannot be called to heel, like a dog, to suit human convenience.³

At certain times and places living religions have been tempted or driven into serving as means to non-religious ends; but to take these episodes of their history as being their *raison d'être*, as I have done in the past, is to misunderstand and misinterpret their mission. So far from this service of secular purposes being a fulfilment of their mission, it is a diversion from it; and, whenever a higher religion has allowed itself to be shunted into this side-track, there has always been a spiritual-minded minority among its adherents who have remained faithful to their religion's true purpose.

When, in the Roman Empire, the Christian Church was not only granted toleration but was made virtually a department of state, the anchorites withdrew into the Desert, and the Donatists, Nestorians, and Monophysites successively seceded from a church which the Monophysites branded as 'Imperialist' (Melchite). When, in the West, a

The Mahayana played the role of a 'chrysalis' during the interregnum in the history of China that followed the fall of the Han Dynasty at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era. In this series of events, the pattern of my prototype—the relations between the Hellenic and Syriac civilizations, Christianity, and the Western and Byzantine civilizations—is, I think, recognizable, though perhaps I have exaggerated the points of resemblance between the two episodes. The role of the Mahayana in Chinese history is reconsidered on pp. 176–80.

¹ See further pp. 184–5. Our pictures of the civilizations that have been rescued from oblivion by the work of modern archaeologists are apt to change more rapidly and more radically than our pictures of others—for example, the Hellenic—of which the memory has never been lost and from which we have a large body of surviving literature that gives us not only a record but a key to interpreting this. Our knowledge of the Egyptian Civilization has no such solid body of evidence to stabilize it, and the reading of Egyptian history by the Egyptologists therefore not only changes rapidly but also fluctuates disconcertingly. My original account of the worship of Osiris in i. 141–4 was given on the authority of J. H. Breasted's book *The Development of Religion in Ancient Egypt*, published in 1912. Breasted had been one of the leading Egyptologists of his generation, and in 1930, when I was writing those pages, it was not unreasonable to follow him with confidence. Breasted held that 'the worship of Osiris was a popular religion' (op. cit., p. 29) and that one of the results of its triumph was 'the democratisation of blessedness beyond the grave' (ibid., p. 252). This view of Breasted's has now been discarded by his successors (see, for example, pp. xi–xii of the introduction, dated March, 1959, by J. A. Wilson to a new edition of this book of Breasted's: New York 1959, Harper Torchbooks), and we have no guarantee that their view will stand the test of time any better than his has stood it. Meanwhile, the helpless outsider has to take it from the diadochi that the worship of Osiris was not a popular religion at all. The future opinion of the epigoni is anybody's guess.

² Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, pp. 128 and 168.

³ These points are made by H. J. Morgenthau (in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 198–9), among other people.

resuscitated imperial government tried to reduce the Roman See, and the rest of the Church within its reach, to the state of subordination to which the 'Melchite' Orthodox Church had already been reduced in the East Roman Empire, this secular challenge to the Church's freedom evoked the mighty resistance movement that was carried to a victorious conclusion, under the Papacy's auspices, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This was the original issue in the conflict between the Empire and the Papacy. When the Papacy had successfully asserted against the West Roman Empire its claim to be the presiding institution in the medieval Western Christian Commonwealth, its assumption of this quasi-political power provoked first the Conciliar Movement and eventually the Protestant Reformation. The Lutheran and Anglican Protestants jumped out of the frying-pan into the fire. They fell straight into the jaws of autocratic parochial princes; and the Calvinists, where they survived, avoided the fate of becoming the slaves of parochial governments only by resorting to Muhammad's expedient of acquiring political control. After the Anglican Protestant Church had been successfully reduced to subordination by the English Crown, the Church's true role was upheld in England by the secession of the Free Churches from the Establishment. Even in Eastern Orthodox Christendom, where the Church has been deprived of its independence more continuously than in any other part of the Christian World, there has been at least one great country, Russia, in which the movement of non-conformity has been as vigorous as it has been in the English-speaking countries.

Such assertions of a claim to independence, and refusals to acquiesce in seeing the Church being made to serve non-religious purposes, have not been exceptional incidents in the Christian Church's history; they have been vindications of the rule against exceptional breaches of it. The Hildebrandine movement in Western Christendom in the eleventh century was not the inauguration of a new religion. So far from being a breach with the spirit of the primitive Christian Church, it was a revival of this. And the nonconformist movement in Protestantism has not been a flash in the pan. Today England and Scotland are the only English-speaking countries in which there are still established churches; in all the rest, including the United States, all Protestant churches, as well as the Roman Catholic Church, are free from control by the state; and in Russia, since the Communist Revolution of 1917, the boon of hard liberty, that had previously been the dearly-bought privilege of the Russian nonconformists, has been thrust upon the Eastern Orthodox Church by a hostile political regime whose intention, in disestablishing the Church, was, no doubt, not a benevolent one. Through adversity even more than through prosperity, the free churches, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox, have been gaining ground in our day, while the established churches have been receding.¹

¹ This is not, of course, the last word on the relative merits of the Christian churches that are carried on the establishments of states and those that are free from this servitude; for the political status of churches is not the only measure of their prosperity and adversity. Another measure—and one which is no less informative—is the average level of the wealth and power of a church's individual members; and the readings on this gauge

The subordination of higher religions to states or other secular institutions is a relapse into the ancient dispensation—prevalent before the first emergence of higher religions—under which religion was an integral part of the total culture of some pre-civilizational society or early civilization. On the other hand the independence re-achieved by the Roman Catholic Christian Church since the eleventh century and, in more recent times, also by the free Protestant and free Eastern Christian churches is in the main line of advance, not only of Christianity itself, but of the higher religions as a class. For example, the establishment of the Shi'i form of Islam as the official religion of a Persian national state in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era has been followed, in the nineteenth century, by two secessions from the Shi'ah in Persia. The Babi movement, and its offspring the Baha'i movement, are missionary religions which address themselves not only to all Shi'is and to all Muslims but to all human beings of all religious denominations.

4. THE LIMITS OF PRESENT POSSIBILITIES OF AGREEMENT

The higher religions are bound always to strive to keep themselves disengaged from secular social and cultural trammels because this is an indispensable condition for the fulfilment of their true mission. This mission is not concerned directly with human beings' social or cultural relations with each other: its concern is the relation between each individual human being and the trans-human spiritual presence, of which the higher religions offer a new vision. We may believe that this vision is an hallucination or we may believe that it is a revelation or discovery of Reality; our choice between these two interpretations of the phenomena will be determined by, and relative to, our fundamental presuppositions. But, whichever interpretation we adopt, we can perhaps agree upon accepting four propositions about the phenomena themselves. The first of these surely uncontroversial propositions is that the believers in the higher religions are convinced that their religious experience is not illusory. The second is that this conviction, whether justified or not, has given them the faith to move mountains. The third proposition is that the deeds which the adherents of the higher religions have done, and the institutions which they have built up, loom large in the panorama of human affairs since the date when religions of this kind first appeared on the scene.¹ The fourth proposition—which has, I hope, been demonstrated more or less convincingly in this chapter—is that, in a study of human affairs, the higher religions cannot be dealt with intelligibly simply as products or parts of particular civilizations.

do not necessarily coincide with those on the other. A politically 'free' church may become the preserve of a privileged class, and may even become an instrument for protecting and promoting this class's worldly interests. The 'free' Protestant churches in the English-speaking countries and the Roman Catholic Church in France have, in our time, become, to some extent, the preserves and instruments of the Western middle class. Conversely, an 'established' church may be a seed-bed, not only for worldliness, but for spirituality. In England, since the Reformation, spiritual prowess, insight, and leadership have not been confined to adherents of the 'free' churches.

¹ But see p. 76, footnote 1.

They require to be dealt with, at least on a par with civilizations and with pre-civilizational societies, as primary phenomena that cannot be reduced to terms of anything other than themselves.

A rationalist-minded student of human affairs can, I believe, accept these propositions, including the fourth of them, without compromising his philosophical position or being untrue to his convictions. Acceptance still leaves open the question whether the unverifiable experiences, from which the higher religions have sprung, are or are not true insights. At the present day we cannot bring our conflicting answers to this question into agreement. This is beyond our power, because these various answers are relative to a still unreconciled difference in our fundamental pre-suppositions about Reality.

Indeed, there is disagreement not only between rationalists and 'trans-rationalists', but also inside the 'trans-rationalist' camp. This domestic disagreement among 'trans-rationalists', is, as I see it, a family quarrel. The differences of view from which it arises are conspicuous, but I do not believe that they are irreconcilable, because I do not believe that they are fundamental. But this, of course, is precisely the point of contention between orthodox adherents of the historic higher religions and ex-believers who have come again to believe that Man is not the highest spiritual presence in the Universe, yet have not returned to this belief in any of its traditional forms.¹ Such agnostic² 'trans-rationalists', of whom I am now one, are perhaps even fewer in number than the rationalists in the present-day world. At present we cannot tell whether one or other of these two present minorities, or the huge present orthodox majority,³ or some other sect, as yet not visible above the horizon, is 'the wave of the future'.

The unclosed rift between orthodox believers and unorthodox 'trans-rationalists' is not, of course, the first schism that there has ever been within the ranks of those who do not find in rationalism a convincing explanation of Reality. There are also the schisms between the different orthodoxies themselves, and these go back to the first appearance of the higher religions on the scene. Each of the Judaic higher religions has always been intolerant of all others, besides being intolerant of religions of the older 'pagan' kind; and this, though tragic, is not surprising; for intolerance is the defect of the higher religions' virtue. The direct

¹ See pp. 75-76.

² I say 'agnostic' (see p. 75, footnote 2) because Father Walker (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 343) and Strachey (in his unpublished critique) are right in their judgement that I do not hold the traditional view of revelation as being a 'release' by God of information telling the truth about Reality in some absolute sense. I believe that the Buddha's experience of enlightenment through His own spiritual exertions was as valid as Muhammad's experience of enlightenment through God's instructions dictated to him by the Archangel Gabriel. If the origin of the experience of enlightenment is divine, it is so, in my view, in a sense in which the same epithet can be applied, with equal truth, to all the rest of our experience. My belief on this point is exactly expressed in the following comment, by one of the contributors to the collected papers of the Hippocratean school of medicine, on the 'Holy Sickness': 'I too hold that these phenomena are divine, but I also hold that everything else is likewise, and that nothing is either more divine or more human than anything else. Each phenomenon has its own nature, and none occurs in any but a natural way' (*Effects of Differences in Atmosphere, Water, and Location*, chap. 22).

³ The orthodox adherents of historic higher religions are still in an overwhelming majority in the World as a whole; in a rather smaller majority in the West; and in a minority perhaps only in Western intellectual circles.

vision of Reality that each of them has caught is so much more convincing and inspiring than the older religions' vision of it that the adherents of each higher religion have jumped to the conclusion that their own religion is a unique discovery, or revelation, of absolute truth and a unique means of salvation. Only the adherents of higher religions of Indian origin have kept their minds open to the possibility that there may be more facets of truth and more ways of salvation than one.¹ The reason why they have remained comparatively tolerant is that they have made less sharp a break than the higher religions of the Judaic group have made with previous forms of religion; for the virtue of 'pre-higher' religion's defects is its readiness to 'live and let live'.²

It is, of course, impossible that each of the higher religions can be right in believing that it has a monopoly of truth and salvation, but it is not at all impossible that all of them should have found alternative roads to salvation and should have seen truth, 'through a glass, darkly', in one or other of truth's different facets. This is what I myself have come to believe. This belief does not necessarily involve the further belief that all the higher religions have seen the truth in equal measure and have found roads to salvation that are equally good. Nevertheless, I fear that Dawson will have been right in his forecast³ that orthodox theologians would find my position unacceptable. A belief in the relative truth and relative saving-power of all the higher religions alike will seem tantamount to unbelief in the eyes of an orthodox believer in any one

¹ In this context Dawson observes, in *Toynbee and History*, p. 135, that the religions of the Indian group and those of the Judaic group are as allergic to each other as oil and vinegar, and that, in the course of history up to date, the acid Judaic religions have been gaining ground at the milder Indian religions' expense.

² The comparative tolerance of the spirit of 'pre-higher' religion is noteworthy, considering that, as we have seen, the dominant divinities of 'pre-higher' religion in its latest phase have been apt to be associated with their worshippers' collective political power, and the parochial states, with which these political divinities have been associated, have by no means been willing to 'live and let live' in their political and military relations with each other. They have habitually gone to war with each other, and these fratricidal wars have tended to become more intense and more devastating until, in the end, all competitors but one have been wiped off the map by a sole surviving victor. It might have been expected that a victorious state would treat the gods symbolizing the collective political power of its conquered adversaries as ruthlessly as it has usually treated the political structures in which this power has been embodied. But, so far from that, the victor, in the age before the rise of the higher religions, has usually shown a prudent discrimination in giving differential treatment to his human enemy and to the enemy's national gods. He has taken it for granted that the enemy's gods, in their domain, are as living and as potent and as legitimately sovereign as the victor's own gods are in theirs; and the military defeat of the human enemy has not, in the victor's view, entailed the consequence that the enemy's gods have either lost their potency or forfeited their rights. A politic victor in this epoch has therefore usually treated the enemy's gods with consideration and even with deference. The Romans, who were past masters in the art of conquest, used to make it their practice, before delivering their final assault on the enemy's military defences, to address an invitation to the enemy's gods to come over to the Roman side, and the invitation was usually accompanied by the offer of attractive terms for admission to the Roman pantheon.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 134, Dawson forecasts that I shall be as unpopular with theologians as I am with historians. J. F. Leddy finds that, though I exalt religion, my form of it is not agreeable to the orthodox (*The Phoenix*, vol. 11, No. 4 (1957), pp. 141-2). K. Löwith finds that I am 'neither an empirical historian nor a good theologian' (*Meaning in History*, p. 14). Anderle reports, in his unpublished paper, that my approach to religion is too lay-minded to suit the theologians' taste, and too theological to be of much interest to the historians, sociologists, and philosophers.

of them.¹ A reverence for them all will seem to him to be what Taylor has nicknamed 'the religion of mish-mash'.²

It is sad to find oneself at variance with fellow human beings with whom one believes—withstanding their contrary belief³—that one

¹ 'To advocate religiousness is one thing; to advocate religious eclecticism is another' (H. J. Morgenthau in *Toynbee and History*, p. 197). As a result of not rejecting any of the religions, Toynbee remains outside them all. 'Toynbee is sensitive to the word of God in so far as it has become historically tangible in dogmatic symbols and ecclesiastic institutions, but... he does not hear the word as spoken to him personally' (E. Voegelin in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). The Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. is, I think, making the same point as Voegelin when (ibid.) he judges that, 'in the religious field, Toynbee is not sufficiently aware of his own limitations'. L. C. Stecchini (in *Midstream*, Autumn, 1956, pp. 84-91) points out that the 'essence' of Christianity, as I see it, is, in effect, the element that Christianity has in common with the Mahayana. Dawson (in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 134 and 130-1) finds my notion of 'philosophical equivalence' even more questionable when applied to higher religions than in its application to civilizations. As Dawson sees it, 'it is necessary to accept the Christian faith in order to understand the Christian view of history, and those who reject the idea of a divine revelation are necessarily obliged to reject the Christian view of history as well' (*The Dynamics of World History*, p. 235). I agree. Löwith (op. cit., p. 16) points out that I do not see history in its Christian framework (e.g. B.C.-A.D.).

In Dawson's opinion (*Toynbee and History*, loc. cit.), I am arguing that the living higher religions are identical with each other and in thus arguing, I am forcing the evidence. I agree that I should be forcing it if I were, in truth, arguing what Dawson thinks I am. On this point, he has not caught my meaning—I am sure, not through his fault but through mine, for having failed to express myself clearly enough. I do believe that all the higher religions, and, indeed, religions of all kinds, have in common an inkling of an identical truth about Reality and of an identical goal of salvation for human beings. But I do not hold that the religions themselves are identical; and, for as far into the future as we can see ahead, I do not expect that they will agree to make a merger of their different doctrines, practices, and institutions, in which their common spiritual treasure is diversely presented.

² A. J. P. Taylor in *Toynbee and History*, p. 117. Taylor's disapproval of my catholic piety towards the historic higher religions seems inconsistent with his accusation that I lack 'the historian's characteristic piety towards the past' (see footnote 4 to p. 66).

³ e.g.: 'Toynbee does not mean what the Church means at all' (Father L. Walker, O.P., in *Toynbee and History*, p. 341). 'It is necessary... to stress the radical unorthodoxy of Toynbee's position in terms of any of the established sacramental Christian churches' (Crane Brinton in *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, vol. 32, No. 3 (Summer, 1956), pp. 361-75). In *Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, 2. Jahrgang, Heft 4 (October, 1949), pp. 268-9, F. Engel-Janosi maintains that my dualism—as revealed in my adoption of the myth of God's encounter with the Devil—is incompatible with Christian doctrine. The idea that God needs the Devil's help in order to create is not compatible with the idea of creation *ex nihilo*. I think H. Baudet is making the same point in *Historie en Metahistorie*, p. 53, when he says that I have 'historicised', 'biologised', and 'secularised' an antique piece of mysticism by turning the Devil into a ubiquitous insect: i.e. into Nature trying to reassert herself against culture. In the same passage Baudet also says that I have replaced God by the Christian Church, 'which is of greater practical use in virtue of its social qualities, on which' I lay 'so much stress'. J. H. Nichols, too (see the *Journal of Religion*, No. 28 (1948), pp. 99-119, on pp. 118-19, and *Studium Generale*, No. 4 (1951), pp. 175-82, on p. 182) finds that I identify the Kingdom of God with the Church and thereby reduce Christianity to ecclesiasticism. R. L. Shinn finds that 'Toynbee's dangerous ecclesiasticism threatens to subdue his deeper insights' (*Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 241). Toynbee, contrary to his intentions, sometimes mistakes a universal church for religion, the institution for the spirit (M. C. Swabey: *The Judgment of History*, p. 223). In T. A. Sumberg's view, in *Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267-84, 'some of the insidious virus of modern paganism has penetrated the soul even of our modern historian'. Father G. F. Klenk, S.J., in *Stimmen der Zeit*, No. 145 (1949/50), pp. 376-84, on pp. 382 seqq., demurs to my explaining the rise of Christianity as a natural event—a result of syncretism—and thereby wiping out Christianity's supernatural character. Joynt remarks that 'in some ways the Toynbee view of the meaning of history is odd even by theological standards. The traditional Christian view is that the ultimate meaning of history is eschatological, i.e. it lies beyond itself. Toynbee claims to have used empirical methods, and produced not only "laws of Nature" but "laws of God" as well. In other words, the ultimate meaning of history is to be found in history. In this conception the Deity becomes almost entirely immanent and loses all transcendent qualities' (*The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956),

is really in agreement over the heart of the matter at issue. But I am anchored in my present moorings by two convictions that will not let go of me. I am convinced that the spiritual presence that is higher than Man is merciful and compassionate¹ in Its aspect in which It presents Itself to us as a person and in which we see It as God. And I am convinced that every human being is capable of catching a vision of the trans-human presence and of entering into communion with It, whether he finds It in Its personal aspect as Brahmā or in Its impersonal aspect as Brahman or as Nirvāna. Each of these two convictions can stand by itself; yet though they are independent they give each other mutual support; for each of them implies the other; so, if either of them is a true insight into Reality, the other cannot be a delusion. Together they give, for me, an assurance that the presence behind the phenomena is not capricious, and that the capacity to enter into communion with It is of the essence of human nature. I therefore believe that there never has been, and never will be, a 'chosen' people or sangha or church invested with a monopoly of truth and salvation. Any such monopoly, if it were conceivable (and it is not conceivable to me), would be invidious both for the recipient and for the donor of the privilege. It would not be consonant either with Man's nature or with God's nature as I see them. And, as long as I continue to see them as I do, I shall also continue, as

p. 201). Brinton in loc. cit., and J. H. Nichols, in *Studium Generale*, No. 4 (1951), p. 182, find that I am a Pelagian. The Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. finds that I am a semi-Pelagian (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

If the reader cares to compare the passages cited in this footnote with those cited on p. 27, footnote 2, p. 94, footnote 1, and pp. 649 and 656), he will see that my attitude and beliefs in regard to religion have been criticized, on a number of points, on grounds that are not merely different from each other but are diametrically opposite and are therefore presumably incompatible. I have been classified as being both a Pelagian and an Augustinian. I have been censured both for seeing God as more immanent and for seeing Him as more transcendent than is right in the critic's judgement. My attitude has been denounced as being both unduly 'otherworldly' and unduly 'thisworldly'. I have been charged both with valuing religion for utilitarian purposes and with denying value to the secular and material side of human life except in so far as this serves as a means to religious and spiritual ends. In H. E. Barnes's eyes I am 'a devout Christian mystic', and my 'imagination is primarily centred on the second coming of the Lord under Anglican auspices' (*An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, pp. 718 and 736). More discerningly, the Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. finds that my interpretation of world history is, in the last analysis, a devout one, but that, 'from the Christian point of view, the trouble with Toynbee's "true religion" is that it is too purely spiritual' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

Some of these mutually contradictory criticisms seem to cancel each other out. In so far as they do not, this must mean that there are inner contradictions in my position, or in my critics' positions, or in both. My position has certainly changed while I have been writing this book (see p. 27 above, and pp. 649-51 below). I have also, perhaps, been imprecise, in places, in setting out what my position is. At least, several critics have taken me to task on this account. I can only say that I am neither orthodox nor rationalist, and that my 'trans-rationalist' position, between these two poles, is clear to me, at any rate. In any case, whatever light my critics may or may not have thrown on my position, they have thrown much light, I should say, on a far more interesting point. They have brought out the truth that, at the present time, the Western World is a house divided against itself on the fundamental issue of religious attitude and belief.

I am all the more grateful to E. I. Watkin for the concluding paragraphs of his review of vols. iv-vi of this book in *The Tablet*, 12th August, 1939. 'Professor Toynbee's book', he generously writes, 'is a challenge to us [Catholics]. . . . Rather, it is the challenge, not of this book, which does but display it, but of history itself. . . . May he communicate to the readers of his . . . work the vision he has seen with the faith and hope which it inspires.'

¹ 'Misericors et miserator Deus'; 'Allāh ar-Rahmān ar-Rahīm'. This testimony from the harsh Judaic religions is impressive.

far as I can foretell, to remain in the theological position in which I now find myself.

This stand of mine may put me out of communion with the orthodox adherents of each of the higher religions (at any rate, each of those in the Judaic group). It lies with the orthodox, not with me, to decide whether, in their eyes, I am within their pale or am beyond it. But it lies with me, not with them, to feel the feelings that I, too, feel towards those sublime figures that are revered and adored by me as well as by their orthodox followers or worshippers. No human writ of excommunication can come between those saviours and me. My knee bows, like every Christian's knee, at the deed of self-sacrifice, done for love of us men and for our salvation, that is recited by Saint Paul to the Philippians.¹ For me, the doer of this deed is one presence in more than one epiphany. It is Christ, and, because it is Christ, it is also the Buddha and the bodhi-sattvas.

¹ Phil. ii. 10.

B

RECONSIDERATIONS OF STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

IV. THE PROBLEM OF QUANTITY IN THE STUDY OF HUMAN AFFAIRS

I. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF TEAM-WORK IN INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS

THE problem of quantity arises in the study of human affairs because it besets all intellectual inquiry, whatever the field. It is a consequence of the conjunction, in the structure of human minds, of two inescapable limitations. A mind has to operate by the method of analysis and classification, because it has no other method at its disposal. A mind has also to do whatever it is going to do within a single lifetime, and, what is more, within that span of it in which the mind is neither infantile nor senile. Thinking by means of analysis and classification takes time, and the process of apprehending Reality in this way breaks up the undifferentiated unity of the mystical experience into an innumerable host of phenomena. The quantity of the phenomena is out of all proportion to the capacity of any single mind to deal with them in a single working lifetime. *Ars longa, vita brevis*. This lapidary statement of the common human experience of the mind's inadequacy for carrying out its ambitious enterprises comes from the pen of an Hellenic student of medicine.¹ As soon as people began to try to make a systematic study of any fraction of the boundless field of the phenomenal universe, they found that they had set themselves Psyche's task.

Cannot her task be accomplished, and the problem be solved, by co-operation? Though the phenomena may be innumerable, human beings, too, are numerous—even though the number is limited, for practical purposes, to the roster of living participants in some particular society. Man is a social animal; co-operation has become a second nature to him; and, though practical co-operation has hitherto been limited to fractions of the whole living generation of mankind, it has nevertheless done marvels. Team-work has been the means by which Man has accomplished his enormous achievements in technology, economics, politics, war, and even religion on its institutional side. Could Man not obtain comparable results by resorting to the same device in other activities? The answer is that, up to now, creative acts in the fields of thought, art, and the personal side of 'higher religion' (as defined in this book) have been the achievements of single minds; and we do not yet know whether, in these fields, team-work is or is not

¹ ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή (Hippocrates: *Aphorisms*, i. 1).

possible. As far as we know at present, only single minds can think thoughts and express them. The squads, gangs, crews, and committees that have done, and are doing, so much of the World's work have never yet succeeded in doing this part of it. There have never been such things as collective thinking and collective writing. Any document that purports to be the product of a committee will prove—if it makes any genuine contribution to knowledge and understanding—to be the unacknowledged work of some anonymous single draftsman.¹ Accord-

¹ 'As every person with experience of committee work knows, its fertility is limited to what the best mind among its members can master; if the results of the discussion are not ultimately turned into a coherent whole by an individual mind, they are likely to be inferior to what would have been produced unaided by a single mind' (F. A. Hayek: *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, note 82 on p. 218). This is also my own considered belief. It was the starting-point of this book, and, on reconsideration, I find myself as firmly convinced of its truth as I was in 1925, when I wrote what are now the first pages of vol. i. I have been encouraged by finding that I share this belief with Father M. C. D'Arcy. Team-work, Father D'Arcy, too, holds, 'can never take the place of the great historian' (*The Sense of History*, p. 57). This is, however, a controversial belief, and my declaration of it in i. 4 has drawn the following comment from Sir George Clark in a paper on 'The Origin of the Cambridge Modern History' in *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, vol. viii, No. 2 (1945), pp. 57-64. 'The more we regard historical study as a methodical search for truth, the reader we must be to dispense with the smooth readable continuity which only an individual author can give to a whole work; and, if we look at *The Cambridge Modern History* from this point of view, we shall be impressed, not by the splitting up of the work among many authors, but by their thoroughness. The system is the exact opposite of industrialism; each writer made a fully articulated and finished piece of history which might have been published by itself. They worked like medieval craftsmen, some of them even grinding their own colours' (p. 58).

I agree, of course, with Sir George Clark's account of what has been achieved in *The Cambridge Modern History*—as well I may, considering that he is making my point for me. What he and I are both saying is that historical thought, like all thought, is the work of single minds, and that, when you put a number of minds to work on different sections of some epoch of history, what you get is a number of separate self-contained pieces of work—so effectively self-contained and separate that (to repeat Sir George's words) each piece 'might have been published by itself'. What you do not get by this division of intellectual labour is an organic whole in which the individual writers' contributions fall into place as integral parts of a unified structure. Each of the contributions may be a unity in itself, but they do not make a unity when they are strung together. Sir George's contributors are like performers in an orchestra who have each played a tune of his own, instead of executing an allotted part of some work by a single composer. As I see it, structural unity is the property with which the editors and writers of *The Cambridge Modern History*, and other symposia of the kind, have been ready to dispense, and in my view this readiness is a serious error.

In a work of thought, as in a work of art, of architecture, or of engineering, structural unity ought, I should say, to be one of the chief objectives, and this not only because it is an important end in itself, but even more because, in default of it in an intellectual enterprise, it is probable that some of the most important issues, problems, questions, and topics that ought to have been under consideration will have been passed over. This is likely because the most important points are usually general points. These do not come into view unless one takes a comprehensive survey of the whole field; and this is what will be lacking in a volume that is not a book but is an assemblage of booklets, each of which might just as well have been published separately. This point has been made by Polybius in the passages quoted here on p. 138, footnote 2.

For this reason I am not ready to dispense with the structural unity that can be produced only by a single mind (as is illustrated by the fact that each of the contributors to *The Cambridge Modern History* has successfully made a structural unity of his own contribution). I am as ready as Sir George and his contributors are to dispense with 'smooth readable continuity', and I am impressed, as Sir George is, by 'the laboriousness, the "factual" knowledge', and 'the mechanical skill' of the contributors (I am repeating the words that I used in the passage that he cites). But I am still more impressed by the inability of an intellectual engineering enterprise to achieve, by team-work, the result that mechanical engineering enterprises do achieve by it. A product of mechanical engineering team-work—a bridge, dam, liner, battleship, or skyscraper—is a structural unity. In work done by an intellectual team, the contributions of the single minds do not produce a structural unity, as Sir George himself points out.

The reason for this difference between the two results is to be found, I believe, in a

dingly, for as far as we can see ahead, the problem of quantity in intellectual work will continue to be one with which single minds must grapple as best they can. The enterprise courts failure and therefore requires audacity. In this field audacity is a virtue, not a vice. It does not, in itself, convict the intellectual adventurer of the self-centred sin of *hybris*. Being human, he may, of course, fall into this. But in plunging into the jungle he is performing a perilous public service. For the problem of quantity in intellectual inquiry is one that is not just personal to the inquirer; it is one of the important problems of society; and society's need to see this problem faced, and, if possible, solved, is a need that, at least for the present, only single minds can meet.

2. THE INORDINATE INCREASE IN THE QUANTITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT HUMAN AFFAIRS

The problem of quantity in intellectual inquiry is as old as human society itself. A society is a network of relations between individual human beings, and, even in the smallest and simplest society, the quantity of these relations is innumerable. Moreover, an individual human being is not 'individual' in the literal sense of being an unfissionable psychic unit. A personality is a network of relations between psychic events, and the quantity of these relations, too, is innumerable. So the intellectual problem of quantity has always been there. It has not, however, always been so strikingly and formidably manifest as it is in the present-day world. It is true that, at all times and places, including the present, the best-informed and wisest individual's knowledge and understanding of the phenomena, within his own psyche and outside it, is infinitesimally small compared with the infinite quantity of the myriad things that are demanding to be known and understood. But it is also true that, for practical purposes, the range of an individual's ignorance and knowledge is relative not so much to the infinite extent of the whole potential field as to the actual range of ignorance and knowledge in the culture in which this particular individual happens to partake. The extent of this common store of knowledge that is at the individual's disposal is, of course, like the extent of the individual's personal knowledge, always infinitesimal by comparison with the extent of mankind's universal and perpetual ignorance. At the same time, it varies enormously as between different cultures, and, within a single culture, as between its different phases, by comparison with the maximum capacity of an individual mind. This variability of the extent of the common store of knowledge is a point of great practical importance, because a society's common store of knowledge 'only exists in the dispersed, incomplete, and inconsistent

difference in the meaning of the word 'team' in the two contexts. The same word is being used as the label for two quite different social structures. An editor's 'team' is a number of independent creators; an engineer's or architect's team is like a composer's orchestra: it is a number of disciplined executants, each playing his allotted part in the performance of a piece previously composed by a single mind. Even the clerk-of-the-works, *alias* conductor, is merely an executant-in-chief. An editor's 'team' are not executants of the work of a single mind; each man is his own composer and is the executant of his own separate piece only.

form in which it appears in individual minds';¹ and it becomes coherent and consistent only in so far as some single mind succeeds in comprehending and unifying it.

If we may use the terms 'knowledge' and 'ignorance' in the second, and more practical, of the relative usages of their intrinsically relative meaning, it would be true to say that, in most societies at most times up to date, relative omniscience has not only been possible; it has been a normal attainment of any mind whose cumulative acquisition of knowledge has not been cut short by an early death. As Marcus Aurelius puts it,² 'any man of forty who is endowed with moderate intelligence has seen—in the light of the uniformity of Nature—the entire past and future'. This dictum was hardly true of the Hellenic World in Marcus's own day. Marcus himself, as his writings reveal, was the heir of a culture that, by his time, had been accumulating experience and knowledge over a period of more than twelve hundred years. Marcus's dictum would have been truer of the pre-Hellenic cultural interregnum. Relative omniscience will have been within men's reach in an age in which the art of writing in the Minoan scripts had been lost, and in which the Hellenes had not yet learnt the use of the Alphabet from the Phoenicians. Relative omniscience came within reach, again, during the post-Hellenic cultural interregnum in what, in Marcus's day, had been the western provinces of the Roman Empire. This time, it is true, the art of writing was not lost even in this culturally backward western penumbra of the former Hellenic World. But the common store of culture did dwindle, here and then, to a compass that made it possible for an individual to master the whole of it; and here it was some time before the achievement of this relative omniscience was made impracticable once more by the gradual rise of the Western Civilization. The whole of the common store of Western knowledge could still be known in the eighth century of the Christian Era by Bede and Alcuin, and almost the whole of it, even as late as the thirteenth century, by Saint Thomas Aquinas and Dante. We present-day Westerners, however, like the Hellenes in Marcus's day, have at our disposal a fund of experience and knowledge that has been accumulating for more than twelve hundred years, and this present-day Western fund is also at the disposal of the whole human race, since the Western Civilization has now grown to a stature at which it is offering itself as an initial framework for a future world-wide culture. So, today, both in the West and in the World as a whole, the individual once again finds himself living in the times of ignorance, in the sense that, in the present-day world, the common store of knowledge is vastly greater than the maximum that an individual can assimilate. In this sense a problem that is universal and perpetual is also peculiarly ours. In our case it has been aggravated to a degree that is perhaps without precedent.

This increase in the amount of what there is to know is overwhelming, even if we confine our horizon, for present purposes, to the field of human affairs. This dichotomy between what is human and what is

¹ F. A. Hayek: *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, pp. 29–30.

² Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book XI, chap. 1. Cp. Book VII, chap. 49.

non-human has, of course, always been arbitrary. Its arbitrariness is being shown up in our time by the rapid advances in the two sciences of psychology and biology. Advancing from opposite quarters, they are bridging the traditional gulf between soul and body, spirit and matter, organic and inorganic, animate and inanimate; and they are already pointing towards a future stage of understanding in which it will no longer be intellectually tolerable to diffract the concrete unity of psychosomatic phenomena. In fact, a day is now in sight at which the minimum 'intelligible field of study' will be nothing less than the whole of the phenomenal world in all its aspects.

Meanwhile, in the present psychic as well as in the present physical province of knowledge, there has been a sudden revolutionary increase in the quantity of data as the result of a great feat of analysis. The word 'individual' means in Latin what the word 'atom' means in Greek. It means a unit that cannot be subdivided and that therefore offers a solid foundation for research into the structure of the Universe. In our time this once supposedly solid ground has given way in both provinces of knowledge. While the physicists have been splitting 'atoms', the psychologists have been analysing 'individuals'. In both fields the former basic unit has been found, not merely to be fissionable, but to be a universe in itself: a microcosm that is as complex as the macrocosm built of hosts of these miniature worlds. The material atom has been proved to have an internal structure resembling a solar system, and the human individual to have an internal structure resembling a society. Like a society, an individual is a network of relations, and the individual's internal psychic relations have, in common with his external social relations, the awkward property of being innumerable.

This is not, of course, a new state of affairs; it is not even a new discovery. In the Indic World in the sixth century B.C. the Buddha made the discovery that the supposed indivisibility of an 'individual' personality was an illusion. With the discerning eye of intuition, He diagnosed a personality as being a fleeting series of innumerable successive psychological states. Each of these states, as He saw them, was discontinuous with both its predecessors and its successors. Two forces, and two only, held them together: the wind of desire, which drove them along in company like a herd of hurrying cloud-racks, and the load of *karma*—the cumulative balance of the self-recording moral profit-and-loss account to which desire gives rise in its vain attempt to satisfy itself. Modern Western psychology, approaching its subject of inquiry by the circuitous route of analogy from the procedure of modern Western physical science, has arrived at the Buddha's discovery about 2,400 years after the date at which the Buddha achieved it intuitively. Buddhists and modern Western psychologists agree in seeing the internal psychic structure of an individual human personality as a network of relations between innumerable psychic events and in finding that this net has some kind of structural pattern. But the objectives of these two schools of inquiry have been widely different, and consequently an identical discovery has not had the same effect, in the two cases, on the intellectual problem of quantity.

The Buddha's aim was austerely practical. He had no inclination to count or measure or classify the psychic cloud-racks; and He had no inclination, either, to study the texture and pattern of their relations with each other except to the minimum extent necessary for dissipating them. He was convinced that they could be dissipated by strenuous spiritual exertions, and He prescribed a plan of operations, based on His own spiritual experience and achievement. The goal was the liquidation of *karma* and the extinction of desire, and the reward for attaining it was that it would bring with it an exit from sensuous life into a state of 'extinguishedness' (*Nirvāṇa*). The spiritual residue, after the flame of desire had burnt out, would be immune from the malady of reacquiring personality in the form in which we know it, since it would be immune from being born again into this world. The Buddha's paramount concern, after His enlightenment, was to teach His fellow sentient beings the way of release that He had found for Himself. Since the way was hard and forbidding, He was vigilant in seeing to it that His disciples should not find excuses for diverging into easier paths. One insidious temptation, for which He was always on the look-out, was that of yielding to intellectual curiosity about the psychic landscape that was the setting of the spiritual enterprise on which He and His disciples had embarked. In the Buddha's eyes such curiosity was no better than camouflaged escapism, and He always firmly refused to satisfy it. His attitude towards knowledge was like that of a present-day Western civil servant, not like that of a present-day Western professor. The information that He gave about the fleeting psychological states and the way of release from them was the minimum amount needed for taking the necessary action. Accordingly, His discovery of the individual human being's inner psychic universe did not lead, in His world, to any revolutionary increase in the amount of what there was to know.

In the present-day world, on the other hand, the repetition of the Buddha's discovery has brought with it a revolutionary expansion of the intellectual horizon, because the aims and methods of modern Western psychologists have been unlike the Buddha's. The purpose that has inspired them has not been to help a human personality to extinguish itself; it has been, on the contrary, to help it to keep itself in psychic repair for the term of its natural life. The only things in common between this aim and the Buddha's are a disinterested compassion for the sufferings of fellow human beings and a benevolent concern to bring them relief. But, since there is a polar opposition between the Buddha's conception and a modern Western psychologist's conception of what it is that suffering souls need to be relieved of, it is no wonder that the two schools should have put an identical psychological discovery to entirely different uses. Since the modern psychologist's prescription for getting rid of suffering is not the radical Buddhist remedy of getting rid of oneself, but the mild palliative of preserving oneself by getting rid of one's psychic disorders, the modern psychologist is eager to know as much about the psyche's inner universe as possible. The maximum, not the minimum, amount of knowledge is what he needs for the pursuit of his un-Buddhist objective; and the duty of acquiring as much knowledge of

his subject as he can is enjoined upon him, not only by his approach to the practical problem of suffering, but also by his scientific method of work, which he has taken over from the older branches of modern Western science that are concerned with non-human nature. The modern Western school of science has been led by its experience to take up an attitude towards intellectual curiosity for its own sake which is the inverse of the Buddha's attitude. So far from looking on curiosity as a specious excuse for shirking present practical tasks, modern scientists look on it as a key to future practical successes; and this favourable view of theirs has certainly been justified by their experience during the last three centuries.

For these reasons the rediscovery, in our time, of the individual personality's inner psychic universe has already had the effect of vastly extending the range of what there is to know about human affairs. If it were practicable to make an exhaustive record of all the psychic events, sub-conscious and conscious, emotional and intellectual, that are now known to take place in a single psyche within the shortest span of time that a human mind can register, 'the World itself could not contain the books that should be written'.¹

While there has been this revolutionary increase, in our time, in the quantity of things to know about Man's psychic microcosm, there has also been a contemporaneous increase in the quantity of things to know about his social macrocosm. Indeed, the increase in this field, too, would have been sensational if the increase in our knowledge of the psychic universe had not put it in the shade. The multiplication of the volume of social data has been proceeding rapidly in several directions, and in all these directions it has been due to one or other of the many consequences of the unprecedented technological advance of the Western Civilization in its recent 'late modern' and its current 'post-modern' age.

One of these consequences has been to give the Western peoples an ascendancy over the rest of mankind. This ascendancy has been something abnormal, and it now looks as if it were going to be no more than a temporary episode in the World's history. But transitory events can produce lasting effects, and one effect of the recent world-wide Western ascendancy has been to knit together the whole habitable and navigable surface of the planet, with the air above it, into 'one world'. This effect seems likely to last, because it is a product of the Western technological achievement of 'annihilating distance'; and Western technology, unlike Western domination, does not look as if it were going to be ephemeral. So far from that, it looks as if it were going to become a common possession of the whole human race. This knitting together of all mankind into a single world-wide society is still only in its early stages. But already it has produced a vast increase in the amount of things to know about human affairs.

In the past, until quite recent times, a human being's horizon was more or less closely confined to the particular civilization in which he happened to have been born and brought up. Even if he had become

¹ John xxi. 25.

one of a small highly educated minority, the classical education that was the standard form of higher education in most civilizations till the other day would have expanded his horizon in the time dimension only. He would have acquired some familiarity with the culture of his own society in some earlier phase of its history, or with the culture of some earlier society to which his own was affiliated. This historical background might have been broadened and deepened if the civilization in which he was a participant had grown up under the aegis of one of the higher religions. He would then also have been instructed in this religion's tenets and history. But he would still have remained more or less ignorant of the rest of the contemporary world outside his own civilization and his own religion, and also ignorant not only of the present characters but of the historical backgrounds of the other civilizations and higher religions—not to speak of the pre-civilizational cultures—among which the rest of the human race was distributed. At the other extreme, if he happened to have been born and brought up in a society that was still in the pre-civilizational stage, his intellectual horizon would, of course, have been far more narrowly circumscribed than that.

This traditional state of mutual ignorance had at least one important intellectual advantage for human minds. It set some limits to the quantity of things to know. But these limits have been swept away by the revolutionary unification of the World as a consequence of its Westernization. One section of mankind after another has been constrained, by this levelling of previous barriers, to widen its mental horizon to embrace the whole World.

The first to be affected have been the people in leading positions in the non-Western civilizations. The force of the West's impact has compelled them to acquaint themselves with Western technology, Western languages, and, to some extent, also with Western manners and customs. They have had to do this if their country has been subjugated by some Western state, because they have had to accommodate themselves to the alien ways of their new Western rulers. But they have had to do the same if they have saved themselves from falling under Western rule and have been bent on continuing to preserve their independence; for the West's technological superiority has been so manifest, and has also so manifestly been the cause of the West's military and political ascendancy, that it has quickly become obvious that the only effective way of resisting the West is to do it with Western weapons, spiritual as well as material. This has meant, not merely acquiring these weapons, but also learning how to use them, service them, and make them; and that, in turn, has meant serving an apprenticeship in Western arts. Sooner or later it has become apparent that these arts cannot be mastered if one approaches the task from a narrowly utilitarian point of view. To acquire the Western art of war involves acquiring one element of Western culture after another, until the only practicable course comes to be the adoption of the Western Civilization in its entirety. This bitter pill may be sweetened by labelling the importunate alien civilization 'modern' instead of 'Western', and coming to look upon it as a common achievement and possession of all mankind rather than as something

imposed, either directly or indirectly, on the majority by an all-powerful Western minority. Whether sweet or bitter, the pill has had to be swallowed. It has been no more possible for non-Western diehards to reject the Western Civilization than it has been for non-Western defeatists. This Westernizing movement in the non-Western World began among the Eastern Orthodox Christian peoples—Greeks, Serbs, Rumans, and, above all, Russians—towards the end of the seventeenth century, in the generation of Peter the Great. During the quarter of a millennium that has elapsed since then, the movement has gathered momentum and has become world-wide. By now it would be near the truth to say that there is no longer any living society, however primitive, that has not been drawn into the Westernizing movement, at least to some extent.

This Westernizing movement among the non-Western majority of mankind has had its counterpart among the Western minority in an impulse to learn something about the rest of mankind. This movement in the inverse direction has been slower in getting under way. In any encounter between parties that are signally unequal in strength, the weaker party always has to come on to the stronger party's ground faster and farther than the stronger party finds it necessary to come on to the weaker party's. As the West progressively loses its temporary ascendancy, we may expect to see its approach towards the rest of the World gain in impetus.¹ Meanwhile the West has already gone far in making itself acquainted with the non-Western societies and their cultures. It has been impelled partly by practical needs; for the stronger party, too, has to know at least something about the party with which it is dealing. Without some knowledge of its weaker neighbours, it cannot trade with them or govern them or even make war on them efficiently. Such practical considerations, however, have been notably reinforced, in the West, by a disinterested intellectual curiosity that has been one of the cardinal virtues of the modern Western scientific movement. This curiosity has inspired a distinguished company of Western Orientalists, Americanists, and anthropologists. Between them they have won for the West an increasing knowledge of the higher religions (which are all Asian in origin), the non-Western civilizations of the Old World, the pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas, and the surviving pre-civilizational cultures all over the globe. The West's own store of knowledge has naturally been the first to be increased by this Western intellectual enterprise. But the new knowledge of non-Western religions and cultures that the West has won has quickly become the common possession of all men and women who have had a higher education on Western lines, including the Westernizing element among the leaders in the non-Western societies. In our generation some of these Westernizers are already looking at their own civilization and its historical background with new eyes, and are making original contributions

¹ Already, in Great Britain today, Oriental studies are being supported financially out of the public purse on a markedly more generous scale than in the days when what are now the independent states of India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon were being garrisoned by British, or British-officered, troops and were being governed by British officials in the higher ranks of the administrative hierarchy.

to the study of it by Western methods. Even Chinese scholarship, which has a critical tradition of at least two thousand years' standing, has probably gained much by adopting modern Western critical methods as a second string to its bow.

Thus, by our day, a knowledge of all the living religions and cultures and their backgrounds has become accessible to all 'modern-minded' people in all parts of the World.¹ This world-wide panorama of human affairs, which is now accessible to everyone, had not been within anyone's reach before. But the widening of our new common horizon in the field of human affairs has gone still farther than this. The new knowledge acquired by the Orientalists, Americanists, and anthropologists has reached back into the past no farther than the farthest reach of the living societies' unbroken traditions. But, in the meanwhile, the archaeologists have been acquiring knowledge of 'dead' civilizations that have no living heirs to keep their memory green.

Some of these 'dead' civilizations had been lying in complete oblivion for centuries or millennia, until modern Western archaeological enterprise brought them to light again. Others had been known to have existed without being known for what they really were. Memories of them had survived in second-hand accounts of them that were so ill-informed as to be misleading; or the remains of their monuments, still standing above ground, had gathered round them legends that were screens for ignorance. The retrieval of these long-lost civilizations was begun in earnest by the French scholars who accompanied Napoleon in his invasion of Egypt in 1798. Within the subsequent century and a half, archaeological excavations, conducted with ever greater technical skill, have thrown floods of light on the Egyptian and Sumero-Akkadian civilizations, which had always been known of at second hand through the Bible; on the Hellenic Civilization, which had been far better known through the continuous currency of a surviving remnant of its literature; and on the pre-Columbian civilizations of Middle America and Peru, whose last phases had been placed on record by the Spanish conquerors who put an end to them.² But archaeology has made still greater additions to knowledge by disinterring civilizations of which only the faintest memory, if any, had survived: for instance, the Hittite Civilization in Anatolia; the pre-Hellenic Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean Civilization in the Aegean; the pre-Aryan Indus Culture in North-Western India; the pre-Chou Shang Culture in Northern China.³ These archaeological additions to knowledge have also become the common possession of

¹ A. L. Kroeber points out that the whole contemporary and whole past world of art is now playing upon each single field of contemporary regional art (*Style and Civilizations*, p. 50).

² In the rediscovery of the pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas, archaeology is playing an overwhelmingly important part—partly because the Spaniards destroyed most of the destroyable indigenous records, and partly because these records, even before the Spaniards made havoc of them, were rudimentary by comparison with those of the literate civilizations of the Old World. The pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas reveal themselves mainly through their artefacts; and, for this reason, every Americanist has to be something of an archaeologist, and usually to be an archaeologist first and foremost.

³ Excavations carried out by Chinese archaeologists at Anyang, the capital of the Shang dynasty during the century or two before its overthrow by the Chou, have demon-

all modern-minded people; and already the present-day inhabitants of the countries in which the 'dead' civilizations once rose and fell are beginning to produce archaeologists trained in up-to-date archaeological technique and eager to take a share in bringing to light buried civilizations with which their own society is linked by the geographical bond of having a common home.

It will be seen that the quantity of things to know about human affairs has been increased in the social field—on a scale almost comparable with the increase in the psychic field—by the contributions to mankind's new common pool of knowledge that have been made by the Orientalists, Americanists, anthropologists, and archaeologists. As if this were not enough, there has been a vast simultaneous increase in the facilities for making and preserving documents, owing to the combined effects of several recent Western inventions—particularly the invention (or rather, in this case, re-invention) of the art of shorthand, which has made it possible to dictate letters, memoranda, and books instead of laboriously writing them by hand, and the invention of the typewriter, which has carried with it the device of automatically producing, in one operation, a number of carbon copies in addition to the 'top copy'. The first of these two inventions has led to a sharp increase in the volume of documentation, since, in dictating to a shorthand typist, to be long-winded requires less concentrated mental effort than to be concise, whereas in the old days, when even a grandee had to write his ukases with his own hand, his very sense of self-importance might prompt him not to waste his time by running to prolixity. The automatic multiplication of typewritten documents in carbon copies, some of which are likely to be filed in different registries in different places, now gives a document, once produced, a much greater chance of survival—perhaps even in an age of atomic weapons—than the unique hand-written original exemplar of a document ever had in the past.

Already, before these recent inventions gave the production of documents a sudden new impetus, documents had been piling up in increasing quantities and at an accelerating rate in the Western World. The archives of the Vatican had been supplemented by those of medieval Italian city-states, modern national states, aristocratic houses, private commercial and industrial corporations, and smaller business firms. Some of this material has, of course, already perished—partly through natural accidents, such as damage from fire or from damp, and partly through the wars and revolutions in which Man, the indefatigable builder, gives vent to his counter-impulse towards destructiveness. Up to date, however, a vast quantity has survived. Before the invention of atomic weapons it would have been thought safe to say that Man's capacity for producing documents had definitely won its age-old race with Man's and Nature's combined capacity for destroying them. In inventing atomic weapons we have armed ourselves with the means of disposing of our own vast documentation as the contents of the Library of Alexandria were eventually disposed of, according to the story, in the

strated that the Chinese classical tradition, in which the Shang figure as the Chou's predecessors, is not legend but is authentic history, on this point at least.

furnaces of the local public baths. So far, however, we have had the sense, or the grace, to refrain from getting rid of our gigantic archives by a method that would condemn us to getting rid of ourselves, too, in the process. The mass of documents has increased and is increasing. We do not hold that it ought to be diminished. At the same time we have not yet discovered how to cope with it.

The formidableness of the problem was brought home to me by hearing Sir Keith Hancock talk on the subject at a conference on the documentation of the Second World War that was held in Holland not long after the restoration of peace. Hancock spoke with authority, for he was in charge of the writing of official histories of the war-time acts of the departments of the Government of the United Kingdom. He also spoke with a wit that drove his point home. His point was that the scale of the war-time production of documents was unprecedented. One of the illustrations of this that he gave was that the volume of official documents produced by the United Kingdom Government and its agencies during the six war years 1939-45 equalled, in cubic content, the volume of all previous archives of the United Kingdom and of its constituent kingdoms England and Scotland that had survived down to the date of the outbreak of war in 1939. Another of his illustrations was the calculation that, if all the files produced in one particular ministry during the six war years were to be stacked on edge, jacket pressing against jacket, in a single continuous row, the length of this row would be seventeen miles. His comment on this was that the first thing needed by an historian nowadays was a motor-bicycle to cover the ground.

3. ATTEMPTS TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF PSYCHIC AND SOCIAL PHENOMENA AND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTS OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEINGS

This astonishing increase in the number of things to know, and in the quantity of information about them at an inquirer's disposal, has had a disconcerting effect on the relations between so-called 'individual' human beings and the myriad psychic and social actions and interactions in which each individual is involved. It is conceivable that an individual human being's existence consists in his serving as a node, or point of intersection, in two networks of relations between events: an 'inner' psychic network and an 'outer' social one. Events of both these kinds have now come within our cognizance in numbers that are legion; but in the process a great gulf has opened between the individual and both the 'inner' and the 'outer' events in which he is implicated. This consequence of our great increase in knowledge is paradoxical; for the individual is not merely 'implicated' in these events; his existence is bound up with them, and (in Buddhist terms) detachment from them would spell extinction for him. Gossamer threads, charged with coursing energy, must really extend, across both the psychic and the social gulf, between the individual and the innumerable psychic and social phenomena that are now visible to an observer's eye. Can the connecting

threads, in both directions, be brought into visibility too? Unless and until they can, it will be difficult to make much sense of human affairs.¹

On the psychological side this problem of tracing connexions is a new one. In the modern West the fleeting psychic cloud-racks, discerned long ago by the Buddha's inward eye, have only just begun to be charted. Till yesterday this inner psychic universe was beyond our Western science's horizon, and our ignorance of its existence exempted us from the task of trying to analyse its structure. It is to be expected that the psychologists, now that they have revealed the gulf, are going to bring to light the system of psychic relations by which it is bridged. Several hypotheses about the configuration of the human psyche have already been advanced. But these hypotheses conflict with each other, and the science of psychology itself is still too young for there to have been time yet for the debate between opposing schools to have produced even a minimum consensus. At the present moment, speculation as to how this gulf is eventually going to be closed would probably be premature even for psychologists, and would certainly be unprofitable, as well as presumptuous, if attempted by an outsider. It may be more profitable to concentrate our attention, for the present, on the gulf between individual human beings and social phenomena. Our awareness of this gulf is of longer standing; and the problem of tracing the connexions between social phenomena and the actions and interactions of individual human beings is the crux of the study of human affairs on its social side.

There is no difficulty about discerning social phenomena; it would, indeed, be difficult to ignore them, considering that their impact on each of us makes itself felt all the time and, at times, makes or mars an individual's fortunes. Each of us finds himself virtually at the mercy of the social setting in which he has been placed by the accidents of birth and upbringing.² Yet we know very well that these titanic social forces that bear down on each of us, apparently from outside, have no other origin than the acts of individual human beings,³ and no other source of energy than these individuals' respective psychic power-houses.⁴ Granting, as we must grant, that these obstreperous social phenomena are realities of some kind, we are aware, at the same time, that this kind of reality is of a different order from the reality of the puny human beings whose innumerable actions set these huge social forces in motion. We can also see that, by comparison with the reality of a human being, the reality of a social phenomenon is of a secondary order. A social phenomenon is a network of relations between human beings. Remove the

¹ 'Unless the specific structure of the social field is analysed and the mode of the relations between individuals, the actions of individuals . . . are incomprehensible accidents' (C. Trinkaus in *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), p. 229).

² 'While the source of action is in Man, the nature of human actions is determined by definite historical social structures within which men act' (Trinkaus in loc. cit., p. 228).

³ Cultures 'do not do anything; only people do things' (P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 116).

⁴ H. D. Oakeley rightly insists that, if there is one principle that shows itself to be absolute, it must lie in the nature of personality (*Philosophy*, vol. xi, No. 42 (April, 1936) p. 189). 'The deepest experiences of personality cannot be transferred to a group of persons as such' (ibid., p. 192). 'A group is essentially a set of interacting persons and their relationships, without the necessity of any tertium quid' (Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 64).

human beings, and the social phenomenon generated by their relations will vanish into thin air. But remove the social phenomenon, and the human beings that have been the authors of its existence will still be there. Being social animals they will not, of course, be able to go on existing in a complete social vacuum; but, if they are forcibly deprived of some particular social institution, or if they themselves forcibly liquidate it in disgust with it, they will live to equip themselves with some new institution to fill the gap. This seems to indicate that the reality of a human being is a reality of a more fundamental kind than the reality of a social institution. Yet social phenomena and their vicissitudes are visible to the intellect's naked eye,¹ whereas nearly all the actions and interactions of individuals, from which these phenomena and their vicissitudes arise, are invisible even under a sociologist's mental microscope.

For instance, in the event of a parliamentary general election we have no difficulty in ascertaining which party received a majority of the electors' votes; but, if we try to study the election in individual terms, instead of being content just to register the institutional result of it, we find ourselves groping in the dark. We know that the casting of the votes was determined by an interplay of thoughts and feelings in each individual elector's psyche, and that this psychic interplay was, to some extent, determined, in its turn, by social relations between each of the electors and other people. But so far it has been quite beyond our intellectual resources to trace, in detail and with precision, how the result of the election, in terms of the casting of votes, is related to the actions and interactions of all the individuals concerned. We know that the resulting social phenomenon is a resolution of these forces that have been exerted by individuals, but we do not know how to conduct an investigation that would bring to light, exactly and completely, how the single conspicuous resultant social phenomenon has been produced by the innumerable obscure generating actions of individual human beings. Similarly, in the event of a battle, we have no difficulty in ascertaining which side won, and we know that the military decision was the result of an interaction of the psycho-physical performances of each of the soldiers actively engaged on the two sides. But we do not know how to trace the relation between the military decision and the way in which each of the combatants conducted himself. This inability of ours to state the results of a battle or an election in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals, which were the real forces whose interplay made the battle or the election turn out as it did, is paradoxical but not exceptional. Whatever kind of social phenomenon we take, we shall find ourselves baffled in

¹ Trinkaus finds (in loc. cit., p. 228) that, in my account of human affairs, 'society disappears as an active structure'. If by 'an active structure' Trinkaus means an agent that takes the initiative, he is stating my view correctly here. On this point I agree with the authorities cited in the preceding footnote. It looks to me as if Trinkaus has fallen into the fallacy of anthropomorphism that is attributed by some other critics to me. I admit to having sometimes written about society and some of its component institutions in anthropomorphic language (see pp. 45-46). With the vocabulary that is at one's disposal, this is sometimes almost impossible to avoid. But my belief is that institutions are not active forces. At the same time, I believe that they are realities—though realities of a different order from human beings. I do not think that there is any contradiction between these two beliefs of mine.

the same way if we try to analyse the phenomenon in terms of the individual human beings who brought it about. 'The number of separate variables which in any particular social phenomenon will determine the result of a given change will, as a rule, be far too large for any human mind to master and manipulate them effectively.'¹

Here is a problem that has confronted all investigators of social human affairs since the moment when investigations were first attempted in this field. Our inability to trace the connexions between the social events that we observe and the actions of individuals by which we know that these events were generated is a gap in our knowledge and understanding that has always been there and has frequently been recognized. This gap has not been created by the recent multiplication of the social phenomena within our ken; it has merely been enlarged. But the enlargement of the gap has brought the problem to a head and is compelling us to face it.

How, in the past, have inquirers into social affairs managed to cope with this crucial hiatus in their intellectual operations? The hiatus is so paralysing that it seems a wonder that they should have succeeded in operating at all. In so far as they have 'got by', they have achieved this by papering over a gap that they found themselves unable to close. They have resorted to two makeshifts. They have made intuition serve in place of investigation, and mythology serve in place of analysis.

Intuition—whatever the nature of this mysterious mental faculty may be—has sometimes served inquirers well in a number of different fields. Intuition enabled the Buddha to anticipate modern Western science's discovery of the psychic universe within an 'individual' human being, and it enabled Democritus to anticipate the discovery of the physical universe's atomic constitution. Yet the results of intuition remain provisional and precarious until they are verified by investigation. As for the use of mythology, it would hardly be possible for a sociologist to write a line of description, or for an historian to write a line of narrative, without resorting to mythological language. Mythology, in the sense in which the term is being employed in this volume,² means a particular use of the mental operation that we call analogy. It means thinking and talking about phenomena that are not human beings as if that was what they were. In giving an account of social phenomena, an historian or a sociologist is constantly slipping into treating them as if they were persons, instead of rigorously treating them all the time as the enormously complex relations between an enormous number of persons which is what institutions really are, but which is also something beyond the human mind's present capacity to apprehend.

This procedure is as misleading as it is difficult to avoid. It is misleading because there is not, I believe, really any illuminating analogy between the psycho-somatic organism that we call a human being and the network of relations between human beings that we call a social phenomenon. If they have any points of likeness at all, they certainly have many more points of difference. Nevertheless, we talk glibly about

¹ F. A. Hayek: *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, p. 42.

² See pp. 250-2.

the actions¹, reactions, feelings, thoughts, intentions, and plans of governments, states, peoples, churches, and other institutions, as if 'legal personalities' were what they purport to be, instead of being the mental fictions that they are.² To ascribe conscious purpose to groups of human beings is mythology.³ We talk and think about institutions in these personalizing mythological terms because that is the nearest intellectual approach that we have been able to make to the elusive realities that lurk beneath these wraiths.

However, in our day we are being compelled to look for more efficient methods of coping with this intellectual problem because of the sudden great widening of our horizon. In the study of human affairs this challenge has had the same stimulating effect as it has had in the study of the physical universe. Physical 'science . . . has been obliged . . . to take account of parts of the Universe, the enormously great and the enormously small, which transcend the range of sizes for which the Newtonian world-picture was constructed'.⁴ In the field of social human studies a corresponding revolution in our vision of the phenomena has led sociologists to go in for minute analysis, and historians to go in for statistical 'prosopography' ('study of persons'). Each of these experiments is an attempt to bridge the great gap between social phenomena and human beings by a pontoon made of intellectually more respectable materials than intuition and mythology. Sociologists are trying to dissect the web of social relations, under a microscope, into smaller and smaller constituent parts, in the hope that these progressive diminutions in the scale of the investigator's observations will eventually bring into view the actions and interactions of individual human beings and, by displaying these in their social context, will reveal, in its concrete continuity, the whole of the hitherto obscure process by which the texture of social phenomena is woven out of raw materials of the personal

¹ See W. Dray: *Laws and Explanation in History*, p. 140.

² These fictitious personifications of non-personal social phenomena are least likely to mislead their users when their fictitiousness is conspicuous. Accordingly, the least objectionable form of this verbal trick is to describe the effects of an institution—say, a state—as acts of a god in whose name the institution is symbolized: 'Amun chastised the barbarians', 'Asshur triumphed over his enemies', and so on. The next least objectionable procedure is to personify the name of the state itself: 'Egypt', 'Assyria', 'Sparta', 'Athens', 'Rome', 'France', 'Britain'. To say 'the Lacedaemonians did it' or 'the Athenians did it' is a more insidious formula, because it implicitly lays claim to a non-existent knowledge of the process by which the resultant effect is related to the thoughts, feelings, and acts of all the individual Lacedaemonians and Athenians. Still more specious are such constitutional formulae as 'King Philip and the Macedonians' or 'the Roman Senate and People'. They purport to analyse the actors into their constituents, whereas in fact they leave the gap between social effects and individual originators of these effects still wide open. The most unsatisfactory usage of all is to ascribe political events to the personal action of an individual human being: 'Pharaoh', 'Caesar', 'the Queen'. This language might really mislead users of it into imagining that political events are the personal acts of the human being to whom they are ascribed; and that, of course, would give a wholly misleading idea of how political institutions work. The social operations that constitute the government of even the smallest and most simply organized state immensely exceed an individual human being's maximum capacity for action, however domineering, decisive, energetic, industrious, intelligent, physically strong, and long-lived the person in question may be. Of all the acts that are attributed to a ruler, only a small fraction can ever be genuinely his own; the majority of the acts done in his name will, in truth, have been the acts of other people. This is as true of a ruler who is theoretically an absolute autocrat as it is of one whose powers are constitutionally limited.

³ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of History*, p. 125.

⁴ J. Needham: *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. ii, p. 339, following Niels Bohr.

order of reality. From the opposite bank of the river of ignorance historians are trying to span the gap in the reverse direction. Starting, not from social phenomena, but from human beings, they are trying to trace how the ascertainable actions and interactions of individuals build up into social phenomena, and thus to find a way of describing, discussing, and explaining these phenomena in terms of human realities, in place of the language of social mythology, with which historians have hitherto found themselves unable to dispense.

On the sociological side one distinguished living authority, Michael Postan, goes almost to the length of identifying the microscopic method of sociological inquiry with sociology itself.

'What makes a question sociological is not only the nature of the problem it raises, but also the nature of the answer it requires. It is the great virtue of some questions that they can only be answered in a sociological way, by the laborious and painful process of social analysis, by defining and classifying social groups and institutions, by counting and measuring the differences in social arrangements from place to place and from time to time. . . .

'Sociological treatment . . . involves a difference in scale. . . . The scale of the social scientist is . . . infinitesimally small compared with that of Professor Toynbee's book. . . . He does not intend to solve the problems of civilization and society by a frontal attack on the massed evidence of all the historical societies. All he hopes to do is so to organise the study of his minute topic as to be able to answer, by the light of its evidence, at least some of the problems which are common to society in general. In this, he differs not only from the antiquarian, who is interested in his patch but has no questions to ask, but also from the philosophical historian like Professor Toynbee, who has all the questions in the world to ask but no patch on which even a single satisfactory answer can be raised.'¹

Will the sociologists succeed in carrying their pontoon from its taking-off point in the field of social phenomena to the farther shore, which they will have reached if and when they succeed in describing and explaining social phenomena in terms of the acts of individual persons? Their intellectual engineering technique of building each successive section of their pontoon of a shorter length than the preceding section might seem, to a lay spectator, to be unpromising. The problem with which they are contending is that of dealing with 'the enormously great', and they are seeking to solve this problem by a technique of *diminuendo*. This looks rather like courting the fate met by Achilles in the famous logical puzzle of his race with the tortoise. The logical conditions laid down for registering the runner's progress deny to him, *a priori*, the possibility of ever reaching his goal. The exclusive use of the microscope, on the unconvincing assumption that this, or any other, instrument is an omniscient tool, is, I should say, the fundamental and permanent weakness of sociology, if this assumption is really of the essence of its operational creed, as Postan seems to hold that it is. This is also a particularly serious weakness in an approach to

¹ M. Postan in *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), pp. 62-63.

the study of human affairs at a time when the problem of quantity is the major problem in this field. This point has been neatly put by Bagby.

'It would be a great thing if someone could invent a "macroscope", an instrument which would ensure that the historian would see only the larger aspects of history and would blind him to the individual details. It is only by remaining at this higher level of abstraction that we can hope to decipher the principal patterns of historical change, to identify the "forces", whatever they are, that have made the World what it is today. . . . It is the very broadest regularities for which we should first search, since these are likely to be necessary for the explanation of any smaller phenomena.'¹

These precepts apply, of course, not only to historians but to all students of human affairs, including sociologists.

Contemporary sociologists and social anthropologists have also been criticized by Bagby on several other grounds. One of these is that their

'studies have been primarily static in nature, more concerned with social structure in the present than with its development in time. Yet [as Bagby justly comments] it is precisely the developments, the changes in the lives of many human beings over the course of centuries, which are of major interest to the student of history.'²

They are, indeed, of major interest to all students of human affairs, under whatever label they happen to do their work, since human affairs are never visible except as being on the move, whatever may be the angle from which one is looking at them.

Bagby goes on to point out³ that the studies undertaken by contemporary sociologists 'are dependent on direct observation and tend to neglect some of the important aspects of group life', and that, 'in addition, while their science theoretically deals with the structure and functioning of all societies, in practice their studies have very largely been confined to European societies or those of European origin', and that 'their concepts and methods are therefore not, on the whole, designed for universal application'. All these observations of Bagby's may be valid as criticisms of current sociological practice. But there is not anything, inherent in sociology itself, to prevent sociologists from remedying the present defects in their work that Bagby criticizes. It is open to them to enlarge the scope of their operations. Bagby himself mentions⁴ that 'Max Weber . . . saw the necessity of comparing the social structure of our own with those of the other civilizations if we are to be able to make generalizations valid for all mankind', and that, although Weber's 'initial studies have never been followed up by the sociologists, . . . the social anthropologists . . . have begun to examine Chinese and Indian social structure in the last decade or two', and, 'in addition, . . . have made many synchronic [i.e. static] studies of this kind among individual primitive peoples'. It looks, in fact, as if sociology needed only the necessary time to extend its geographical horizon

¹ P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, pp. 128 and 158.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10. Cp. p. 185.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

from the West to the World as a whole. There also seems to be no reason why it should not replace the rather abstract method of studying social phenomena in cross-section by the more realistic one of studying them in time-depth. The crucial question for sociology would seem to be whether it is or is not indissolubly wedded to the use of the mental microscope as its exclusive instrument. It is to be hoped that it is not, since the study of human affairs cannot afford to see any of the present approaches to it stultified.

On the historical side the problem of bridging the gap between human beings and social phenomena in our intellectual comprehension of human affairs has been attacked in the present generation by a method which seems promising in itself and which has, in fact, been vindicated already by some brilliant successes. This 'prosopographical' method tries to bring social mythology down to earth by taking, for its initial units in a study of some social phenomenon, as large a number of the relevant acts of as large a number of participating individuals as the state of the extant information allows.¹ In this approach the ideal would be, presumably, to make an exhaustive survey of all relevant acts of all individuals concerned, and then to give an account of the social phenomenon in view in terms of generalizations from these data. But, apart from the philosophers' doubts about the logical validity of induction by complete enumeration,² it is, in practice, impossible, in any investigation into human affairs, to survey these exhaustively. Even where one is dealing with a small and more or less closed circle of *dramatis personae*, and where also the accessible information about each of them is comparatively copious, what remains undiscovered will still far exceed what has been brought to light, even if we have conducted our researches with the utmost possible skill and industry. Accordingly, when the prosopographical historian has built the first section of his pontoon to the maximum length allowed him by his supply of *personalia*, he has to prolong it by a different form of structure. If he is to give himself any chance of reaching the other side of the gap between the personal acts of individuals and social phenomena, he must extend the reach of his information about personalities by generalizing from this with the aid of such devices as sampling and statistics.

In this procedure the prosopographical historian's technique is the inverse of the sociologist's. It is one, not of *diminuendo*, but of *crescendo*.

¹ *Ad hominem*, I myself have been gently criticized in *The Japan Chronicle*, 29th July, 1934, for not having made enough use of this approach. 'If fault is to be found with Mr Toynbee's work, it is that he does not seem to give sufficient value to the individual element. . . . The individual merits the attention of the historian as well as the society of which he is an eminent unit.' I myself would go so far as to say that, even when he is not eminent (and the great majority of us are not), he still merits the historian's attention if the historian can lay hands on evidence about him and his acts and their effects. It seems likely that, in this book, I may have paid too little attention to individuals, since my first (though not my exclusive) concern here has been to try to trace regularities and uniformities in social phenomena. If I have been guilty of this neglect in practice, I have been failing to live up to my own principles. In principle, I hold that human beings are the source of all social phenomena, and are therefore realities of a higher order than these are. I believe that my contemporaries who have taken the prosopographical approach to history have chosen a promising (though not the only promising) line of work. And I much admire their achievements.

² See pp. 23-24.

The method would appear to be a more promising one, in itself, for grappling with the problem of quantity by which the historian and the sociologist are both confronted. It is also more promising because of the fortunate coincidence that, at the very time when historians have been taking to a method that has led to their seeking help from the procedures of sampling and statistics, these procedures have been gaining in potency through the acquisition of new experience and new equipment. In the present generation the art of sampling has been applied to human affairs in many fields—for instance, in the study of the preferences of consumers of goods and casters of votes with a view to trying to predict what their future choices are going to be. Contemporaneously, the science of statistics has been developing its mathematical apparatus and has been supplying itself with ministering *jinn*s in the shape of electronic computers. These electronic 'brains' cannot, it is true, serve as substitutes for human minds. They cannot take the initiative in propounding questions or in formulating problems. But when once a problem has been formulated by a human mind in the terms of binary arithmetic—giving the machine the simple choice of answering 'yes' or 'no'—the *jinn* can perform the calculations demanded of him by his human master on a colossal scale in almost no time. Thanks to the sudden rise of the new science of cybernetics, it now looks as if human ingenuity, with the leviathan-power of an electronic Briareus at its command, may eventually succeed in bridging the gap between social phenomena and the acts of individual human beings by starting from the prosopographical historian's point of departure and using the contrivances of sampling, statistics, and electronically-operated computers to carry the human mind across the gap between the two banks.

For making the prosopographical approach to the problem of bridging the gap between human beings and institutions, the most favourable situations are obviously those in which a relatively small minority of the participants in a society, constituting a more or less strictly closed social circle, control between them one or more of their society's more important institutions, or even the society's whole life. The smaller the number of both the human beings and the institutions that are involved, the simpler the prosopographical researcher's task will be, and this for several reasons. The number of the units, of both the personal and the institutional order of reality, with which the researcher will have to deal, is then likely to be manageable; and the persons concerned, being all of them privileged and some of them eminent, are likely to be fairly well documented. Prosopography lends itself, in fact, particularly well to the study of the management of social affairs by oligarchies—military, political, economic, or ecclesiastical. It has been applied, for instance, with notable success, to studies of the eighteenth-century political oligarchy in the United Kingdom and of the Roman aristocracy during the last two centuries of the republican regime, especially the final decades that are documented by Cicero's letters and speeches and by an increasing flow of Latin inscriptions. In these two fields brilliant pioneer work has been done in England by two scholars, born elsewhere, Sir Lewis Namier and Professor Sir Ronald Syme, who

have paid England the compliment of settling there and doing their life-work in an English intellectual environment. Two other oligarchies that have been studied in a comparable way are Alexander the Great's officers and the Prophet Muhammad's companions. The Venetian oligarchy and the Roman Curia would, no doubt, lend themselves to the same method of historical research. The richest mine of all is probably the series of Chinese dynastic histories, since these are on the grand scale and are organized partly on 'prosopographical' lines. A considerable section of each of them is allocated to biographical notices of distinguished persons, and these not only in the political line. A beginning has already been made with the use of these Chinese materials for a prosopographical approach to the study of Chinese social phenomena. The development of the relations between the Topa barbarian invaders of North China and the Confucian gentry within their domain has been studied in this way by W. Eberhard,¹ and the materials for a similar study of the corresponding relations of the Confucian gentry with the Manchu invaders have been sorted out and published by A. W. Hummel.²

Perhaps most human institutions, communities, and societies, at most times and places, have been managed by minorities of the total number of human beings concerned, even when and where the institutions have been officially democratic. Oligarchy has been common because the two antithetical human tendencies to take a lead and to follow one seem to be unevenly distributed as between different individuals, even though there may be something of either tendency in everyone.³ This question of leadership is discussed further at other points in this volume.⁴ Without needing to adopt any particular conclusion about it, we can see that, while a considerable sector of the total field of social affairs has been oligarchically managed in the past, there is also a large sector in which oligarchical management is at any rate less conspicuous. Moreover, this more democratic sector seems likely to increase relatively in the future, as hereditary privilege is progressively whittled away by the graduated taxation of wealth and by the free education of ability. Furthermore, even in the most oligarchically, or indeed monarchically, managed society, in which the material and spiritual amenities of culture are withheld from the majority of the participants in the society in question, every one of these obscure individuals will, nevertheless, make his or her influence felt, in some infinitesimal degree, in the shaping of social events by human action. Accordingly, if oligarchy were a necessary condition for making an episode of human affairs a suitable subject for prosopographical treatment, this method would not be an effective one for dealing with human affairs in general. Fortunately it is at this point that the new mathematical and electronic aids to the art of sampling and to the science of statistics will come to the prosopographer's rescue. They will enable him to cope with units in far greater

¹ W. Eberhard: *Das Toba Reich Chinas* (Leiden, 1949, Brill); *Conquerors and Rulers* (Leiden 1952, Brill).

² A. W. Hummel (ed.): *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (vol. i, London 1944, Kegan Paul; vol. ii, Washington D.C. 1945, U.S. Government Printing Office).

³ See p. 149.

⁴ On pp. 125-7, 148-50, and 305-6.

numbers than could ever be handled by single human minds that did not have this Briarean apparatus at their command. Present scientific and technological progress in this sphere makes it not unreasonable to expect that the prosopographical study of human affairs, after its brilliant start in a field in which the numbers are small enough to be manageable without the use of apparatus, will prove able, with the help of apparatus, to extend its operations into fields in which, without this help, the numbers would be unmanageably great.¹

It looks, then, as if there were fairly good prospects of bridging the gap between human beings and social phenomena from the prosopographical side, if not from the sociological side. In any case, whether the prospects are good or bad, we cannot afford to abandon our attempts to solve this problem, for that would mean abandoning the study of human affairs, and we certainly cannot afford to do that. To conduct this study successfully, we have to pursue three studies in conjunction: the study of human beings, the study of social affairs, and the study of the relations between these two different orders of reality. So we must resist any suggestion for abandoning any one of the three, whether the motive inspiring the suggestion is defeatism or is prejudice. We must resist the historians' prejudice against the analysis of social phenomena and the investigation of regularities and uniformities in these. Equally we must resist the social philosophers' prejudice against the narration of particular events and particular acts of particular individuals. Both lines of inquiry are indispensable; the two can, and in fact do, co-exist; and, unless they are simultaneously pursued, it will be impossible to make the study of human affairs intelligible; for these will not become intelligible till human beings and social phenomena have been brought into an intelligible relation with each other by either the prosopographical approach or the sociological approach or both.

4. THE DISTORTING EFFECTS OF DEVICES FOR REDUCING THE QUANTITY OF INFORMATION

Hellenic thinkers despised particulars in principle as being intellectually contemptible, and esteemed generalities as being intellectually admirable. In their practice they were more catholic than in their theory;² for they produced a galaxy of great historians, including eminent exponents of the prosopographical method, such as Plutarch, who presented the whole panorama of Graeco-Roman history in his series of parallel lives, and the 'doxographers', who recorded the doctrines of the Hellenic philosophers in their personal contexts. The Hellenic theory

¹ *Ad hominem*, I have been criticized (in the most friendly terms) by Lord Samuel, in *John o' London's Weekly*, 5th January, 1935, for having 'touched little upon the standards of life and thought of the average man' in vols. i-iii, and again by a reviewer in *The Economist*, 6th November, 1954, on the score that 'the common people do not receive the place or proportion' in my 'scheme of things which must surely be theirs on any transcendental view of history'. I admit the charge and plead, in my defence, that this grave omission on my part has been due to a lack of means, not to a lack of will. 'Give us the tools, and we will do the job.' Besides the modest motor-bicycle for which Sir Keith Hancock indents, every historian nowadays needs an electronic computer.

² This Hellenic attitude has been touched on already on p. 18.

on this issue was introduced into the modern Western World at the Italian Renaissance and was not jettisoned when Hellenism in general suffered its defeat in the seventeenth-century 'Battle of Ancients and Moderns'. The Hellenic prejudice against taking account of particulars and individuals in the study of human affairs was maintained by the Western philosophers of the eighteenth-century French school; and it was not killed by the reaction against it in the nineteenth-century Romantic Movement. It has still found active and able representatives in the present generation. Philip Bagby, for instance, suggests, in his prolegomena to the comparative study of civilizations,¹ that

'it is perfectly possible to admit that occasionally individuals do affect culture and still to maintain that the elucidation of cultural processes and the broader features of experience which affect them is the most promising method of making historical events intelligible. From this point of view, the part played by individuals will be seen as a random or inexplicable element.'

Bagby argues² that, though individuals may affect *what* other people do, they do not affect *the way in which* they do it. He also emphasizes the social, as opposed to the individual, contributions to inventions. It is well known that the last step in making an invention is often taken almost simultaneously, and apparently independently, by several individuals,³ and the reason is that all of them alike are really drawing much more on a collective and cumulative advance in knowledge and understanding than on their own individual genius. Cultural growth releases individual genius that is always potentially present.⁴ 'The man of genius . . . is, in an even more intimate sense than the ordinary man, the product of a society and a culture.'⁵ 'The dichotomy between great men and social forces is a false one. . . . Great men are precisely the points of intersection of great social forces.'⁶ 'The appearance of a succession of great philosophers, musicians, or artists in a given country and century appears to be an amazing coincidence unless we recognise the social character of these achievements, the social fund of knowledge, techniques, and aspirations which reach their summits in the careers of a few outstanding individuals.'⁷ 'Granted that gifts are individually congenital, it is the cultural setting into which they are born which makes or prevents their realisation.'⁸ 'What we are wont to call "great men" are those among many more individuals of above-average ability who happen to get born in a time and place and society the patterns of whose culture have formed with sufficient potential value and have developed into sufficient

¹ P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 156.

² In op. cit., pp. 150-7.

³ This is illustrated and discussed by A. L. Kroeber in *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 43-44, 45, and 128.

⁴ Kroeber, *ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵ Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 57. Cp. pp. 51-52.

⁶ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, pp. 220-1. The same point is made, in almost the same words, in the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 64.

⁷ Cohen, op. cit., p. 222.

⁸ Kroeber: *Style and Civilizations*, p. 61.

ripeness to allow the full capacities of these individuals to be realised and expressed.¹

Kroeber points out² that there is 'a correlation between realised genius and opportunity given by stage of a civilization's development'.³ If an individual genius does make a discovery for which society is not ready, this discovery will be ignored, as Mendel's was, till society has caught up with the genius intellectually.⁴ 'Watt's invention of the steam engine fitted into the practical needs of British industry in the eighteenth century far more than Hero's invention into the economy of Hellenistic or Saracen culture.'⁵

A. R. Burn suggests⁶ that the reason why the prophets of the 'Axis Age' made their appearance and won their followings more or less contemporaneously was that, by that time, large populations had been detribalized as a result of the development of towns in the Bronze Age, while traditional beliefs had been discredited by the subsequent decline and fall of the bronze-age civilizations. 'It was not the personalities of these great men that were unique, but the opportunity. If they had lived earlier, they could have been poets, but not the prophets that they were. The effectiveness in society of even the most original individual thought is a social achievement. The thought of a prophet cannot be preserved without disciples; and every gospel requires a *praeparatio evangelica*.' Burn goes on to suggest⁷ that 'the only two recorded higher religions to emerge in "primary" civilizations . . . were "abortive" . . . because the traditional polytheisms were not yet sufficiently discredited'. These two higher religions had been deliberately invented by two kings, the Pharaoh Ikhnaton and the Inca Viracocha, as responses to the challenge of their individual situations. At the beginning of the process of detribalization, 'among the first men to feel acutely the stresses, the loneliness, and the need for heroism in their position as individuals were kings and chiefs'. In these two cases the lonely individual's isolatedness defeated his attempt to cure his loneliness by communicating a consciousness of the same distress to his fellow human beings and persuading them to adopt a common remedy of his devising. 'Any fool can devise a more consistent system than exists, but even a despot rarely can institute one.'⁸

In general Bagby argues that the influence of so-called 'great men' on public affairs has been much exaggerated—e.g. the role of revolutionary leaders and military commanders.⁹ The Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography goes with him to the extent of reporting¹⁰ that 'to-day it is generally agreed that leadership is a relation to which the leaders, the followers, and the requirements of the

¹ Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 128.

² *Ibid.*, p. 128. Cp. p. 403.

³ Kroeber here gives the answer to Father G. F. Klenk's question how we are to explain the breakdowns and disintegrations of societies, considering that the capacities of individuals continue to be what they always have been (*Stimmen der Zeit*, No. 145 (1949/50), pp. 376-84).

⁴ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

⁵ See Kroeber, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45 and 158-9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁷ In *History*, February-October, 1956, p. 9.

⁸ Bagby, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-7.

⁹ Kroeber, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁰ The Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), pp. 64-65.

situation, including the traditions of the group, all contribute'. This is of course, true.¹ We seize upon the actions of 'great men' as explanations of social events because some of their acts are on record and are ascertainable, whereas most people's acts have passed into oblivion. To reduce the role ascribed to individuals to its true proportions is a valuable intellectual exercise. The distinction between an individual and his social and cultural environment is, in truth, an arbitrary and artificial one,² though the drawing of it is also the essential first step towards beginning to think about human affairs at all.³

In Bagby's mind an eighteenth-century depreciation of the role of individual human beings in social and cultural human affairs is reinforced by a twentieth-century pessimism about the practicability of coping with the problem of quantity if once the study of individual persons and particular events has been admitted to be necessary.

'It is . . . impossible as a practical matter to trace all the influences which have led to the formation of the character of an individual in the past. The evidence is simply not available. And, similarly, . . . the task of tracing individual interactions anywhere but in the very recent past far exceeds our powers.⁴ . . . We simply do not have sufficient evidence to establish the sequence of events at this level and, even if we had, we should not have the time to study it in all the necessary detail. . . . This is probably the major reason why history has proved unintelligible up to date. Our inveterate and natural habit of conceiving [of] human events at an individual level has led us to persist in a hopeless undertaking.'⁵

The undertaking is not truly a hopeless one if there is any force in the considerations that have been set out in the present chapter; and, if we were to be so faint-hearted as to abandon the undertaking, we should be landing ourselves in a truly hopeless situation. Bagby's solution for the problem of quantity in the study of human affairs is to exclude individual human beings from his purview.

¹ This point is made wittily in an anecdote recounted by Herodotus in Book VII, chap. 125. 'Timodemus of Aphidna was nagging Themistocles about his embassy to Lacedaemon, and was saying that it was for Athens' sake, not for his own, that the Lacedaemonians had paid him such honours. Timodemus kept on nagging like this, till at last Themistocles said to him: "Look! Certainly I would not have been treated with such distinction by the Spartans if I had been somebody from Belbina; but you, Sir, would not, in spite of your being an Athenian."'

The same anecdote is recorded by Plutarch in his *Life of Themistocles*, chap. 18, in a different version: 'A man from Seriphos once said to him that he owed his fame not to himself but to his country. "You are right", replied Themistocles. "I should not have become famous if I had been a Seriphian, but you would not if you had been an Athenian."'

² This is equally true of the distinction between an individual—or a group of human beings—and mankind's physical environment (see pp. 146-8 and 314-27).

³ If Bagby had confined himself to these empirical considerations, he would have been on strong ground. But he cuts this ground from under his feet by deliberately subordinating Reality to the exigencies of the pattern in his own mind. The explanation of culture by the actions of individuals is excluded, Bagby says, not by the fact that it is 'not sufficiently well-formulated, but by the nature of our theory, by the way in which we conceptualise the data. . . . We are engaged in theory-construction. . . . Individual actions are excluded *a priori*'.

I have some sympathy with Bagby in his commission of this intellectual sin. I have committed it myself, and have been censured for doing so by my critics—Bagby among them. It is a sin nevertheless. If Bagby had lived, perhaps he would have repented of it.

⁴ P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

'What we are talking about are regularities in the behaviour of groups of human beings, ways of doing things. . . . Individuals and their actions are abstractions on a different level from that on which we propose to conduct our investigations.'¹

Individual human beings and social human phenomena are certainly alike in being abstractions from Reality, and different in being abstractions from it on different levels. The making of abstractions is, as we have seen, of the essence of the activity of thinking. But this operational necessity brings with it distortions in our mental picture of Reality which we must be striving perpetually to correct, and we can correct them only in so far as we can achieve the intellectual *tour de force* of recombining what we have distortingly put asunder. We are depriving ourselves, in advance, of the possibility of performing this needful but particularly difficult intellectual operation if we rule out any one of our abstracted facets of Reality from further consideration. Historians are making this mistake if they propose to rule out the study of regularities and uniformities in social phenomena. Bagby is making the same mistake in reverse in his proposal to rule out individuals and their actions. Any inquirer, following any line of approach, is free—or it might be nearer the truth to say 'bound'—to make any abstraction that seems to him promising for operational purposes; but, if the investigation that he is trying to conduct is to be fruitful, he must eventually reassemble the fragments into which, for temporary working purposes, he has mentally dissected the really seamless web of human affairs.

Proposals to leave human beings out of account or to leave social patterns out of account in the study of human affairs are not the only variants of the idea of trying to cope with the problem of quantity by a recourse to intellectual surgery. There is also an old habit of cutting the study up into separate 'disciplines', and there have been a number of suggestions for cutting it down by cutting out of it all but some single one of Man's major activities, or all but one single track in mankind's multiple movement through space-time. All such attempts at a solution by simplification are defeatist in their spirit and distorting in their effects.

Ad hominem, I have noticed, in surveying criticisms of my own work, that a number of critics have used up a number of lines of print in discussing, in all earnestness, whether I am justified, as an historian, in dealing with theological, philosophical, and sociological issues, and conversely whether, if I do behave like a theologian or perhaps like a poet, I am entitled to call myself an historian.² These solemn discussions seem to me to make no sense apropos of intellectual work. They imply, I think, the tacit drawing of an analogy between intellectual work and public administration. As I see it, this analogy does not hold; and scholars who fancy that something is gained by drawing it are, I should say, convicting themselves of being intellectual mandarins. I speak from some experience of both worlds, since, in the course of the First and Second World Wars, I have spent nearly ten years of my working life, all told, as a temporary civil servant.

¹ Ibid., p. 150.

² Examples of such criticisms have been cited on pp. 37-41.

In this, to me, alien world I have had an experience that has been common to many outsiders who have had an inside glimpse of it. I have been partly amused and partly exasperated by the civil service's occupational disease of 'departmentalism'. 'This business is—or is not—our—or your—department's affair'; 'this file is—or is not—for my—or for your—attention'. Though officially just a department of one almighty sovereign state, each department is *de facto* an independent 'great power', and this not only in Japan, but also in the United States and the United Kingdom. Even over trivialities, and this even in war-time, departments conduct diplomatic negotiations with each other with portentous gravity and at extravagant length. Perhaps this departmentalism may have something to be said for it in public administration on an elephantine scale. On this scale orderliness is genuinely so important that it is not altogether paradoxical to argue that form matters more than substance and that the approved procedure must be followed even when this thwarts the achievement of desirable results. Short of admitting this, it is perhaps plausible to suggest, in the light of a formidably large dossier of experience, that this state of mind, which seems characteristically and reprehensibly 'bureaucratic' to outsiders, is in any case inevitable in a world of professional administrators on a large scale. My quarrel is not with the civil servants; it is with scholars who gratuitously import the bureaucratic state of mind into the field of intellectual inquiry.

In this field the bureaucratic approach is not only incongruous; it is obstructive; for, in intellectual inquiry, freedom is the breath of life and formalism is, not a safeguard, but a shackle. There is nothing to be said for breaking up the study of human affairs into the so-called 'disciplines'. These have grown up haphazard, independently of each other. In consequence there are overlaps between them and also gaps that are covered by none of them. The relations between them have never been reviewed or revised on a rational plan.¹ Indeed, any suggestion that this should be done would be likely to arouse hot opposition. The feeling between the votaries of the different intellectual disciplines is almost as bad as it is between the adherents of the different higher religions. There are historians, for instance, who do not admit that sociology is a legitimate form of study, or who, if they do admit this, do so only on the proviso that the two disciplines are to be deemed to have nothing to do with each other—a fantastic notion, considering that history and sociology are concerned with the study of the same affairs.² There are

¹ The best suggestion that I know is A. L. Kroeber's. He suggests that anthropology is the study of cultures, sociology that of societies, psychology that of individuals, history that of events (*The Nature of Culture*, p. 104). This is logical. Yet in practice it would be difficult to work in any of these four disciplines without trespassing on the fields of the other three as here defined.

² A common-sense verdict on this benighted feud has been pronounced by A. L. Kroeber. History, as Kroeber defines it, deals in phenomena, science in process. An interest in phenomena and an interest in process are both necessary. Which of the two a particular inquirer should concentrate on is a matter of temperament (A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 63 and 62). 'It is as one-sided, and ultimately sterile, to be exclusively occupied with structure as with function' (*ibid.*, p. 88). M. R. Cohen shows the same wisdom in observing that 'history is one [italics mine] of the ways of organizing human knowledge' (*The Meaning of Human History*, p. 41).

philosophers, again, who take up a corresponding attitude towards psychology.

Such attitudes are not only absurd but obscurantist if it is true that dialectical debate is the source of advances in knowledge and understanding,¹ and that, the wider the field of discussion, the greater the chance of striking out fruitful new ideas. When each discipline draws in its horns and tries to turn itself into a Leibnizian 'monad', intellectual progress is being sabotaged; for there can be no exchange of ideas between the inmates of windowless houses; and the cutting of inter-disciplinary communications is the more damaging because the traditional boundary walls between the disciplines are unplanned and arbitrary. 'If we throw aside . . . administrative considerations and look at the problem itself, we see that the difference between the philosopher and the historian can only be one of degree and emphasis.'² These conventional barriers are particularly cramping at a time, such as that through which we are now living, in which knowledge and understanding are in flux, and in which successive increases in both of them are making repeated revolutionary changes in the configuration of the whole of our intellectual landscape.

What is needed now is a ruthless demolition squad, armed with the intellectual equivalent of atomic artillery, to batter the traditional inter-disciplinary dividing walls down to the ground. This would restore the natural unity of the field that has been cut up, for so long, by these encroaching enclosures. No doubt, at all times and in all intellectual situations, the huge field of human studies needs to be parcelled out for operational purposes. But the partitions should be provisional only, and they should be demarcated by transferable hurdles, not by embedded stone walls. Or, if we think of the study of human affairs as being a house of many mansions, we should construct it, not like a Western house, but like a Japanese house, in which the internal arrangements can be given any number of alternative configurations, interchangeable at a moment's notice, because the interior is divided up by movable screens, not by walls that are 'permanent fixtures'.

Meanwhile, among some followers of each of the existing disciplines, there seems to be an increasing assertion of each discipline's claim to separateness and independence, and an increasing desire to keep their own discipline's monadic blank walls erect along their traditional alignments.³ This rising temper is significantly like that of some of the

¹ See pp. 41-45 and 641-2.

² M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 7.

³ This monadic-mindedness has entered into some of the criticisms of my work (see p. 38, footnote 1). Critics representing this school have taken the trouble to report that I am, or am not, this or that—apparently in the belief that the word written on the label of a jar has some power to affect the quality of the contents.

L. Stone would like to disallow my claim to be an historian because so much of the contents of vols. vii-x of this book is the kind of thing that requires a metaphysician, not an historian, to review it (*Toynbee and History*, p. 111). 'The questions Dr Toynbee asks are largely irrelevant to their [his "professional" colleagues'] concept of the proper study of history, which consists in studying the past for its own sake, in attempting to understand and differentiate, to arrange and classify, the discoverable facts about the nature of a given society in a given period. They are convinced that the differences between civilizations are more significant than the likenesses, and that standardised causal patterns cannot logically be deduced from the facts of history' (Stone, *ibid.*). 'If it is

nationals of each of the contemporary local states. On the plane of politics, states are counterparts of disciplines on the plane of intellectual inquiry. So perhaps this common temper gives the key to the anxiety that is being shown to preserve the traditional intellectual partitions from being demolished. This anxiety is manifestly perverse in an age in which these traditional partitions have become obvious impediments to the advancement of knowledge and understanding; and at first sight such perversity seems strange. It may be accounted for in the diehard champions of the departmental disciplines, as it certainly is accounted for in those of the parochial states, by a dread of the unknown situation that awaits them, out in the open, in boundless space, if the familiar walls of the present voluntary prison houses are torn down. This anxiety may be natural, but it is neither rational nor expedient. It offers no basis for a constructive policy. It needs to be combated and overcome. 'Specialisation has . . . prepared the way for a new universalisation, but there is not yet any recognition of this truth, and hardly any use is yet being made of this opportunity.'¹ The objective has been defined by

true that Mr Toynbee has tried to generalise Gibbon's inquiry, he has failed to notice that, in doing so, he has ceased to be an historian, except incidentally. . . . His comparative study of the rises and falls of civilizations should be taken as a contribution, not to history, but to "Social Dynamics". . . . His true predecessor here is not Gibbon but Auguste Comte' (W. H. Walsh in *Toynbee and History*, p. 126). 'When Mr Toynbee discusses questions about the meaning and point of the historical process as a whole, he writes, not as an historian or even a sociologist, but as a metaphysical philosopher. If in his early volumes he is in effect a successor of Comte, his models here [i.e. in vols. vii-x] are such writers as Vico, Herder, and Hegel' (Walsh, *ibid.*, p. 127). In proposing to present history as, in the end, a theodicy, 'it is surely clear that . . . he has travelled far . . . from what any normal historian would regard as history proper' (Walsh, *ibid.*, pp. 126-7). 'It is not objective, or even interpretative, history. It is theology' (H. E. Barnes: *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, p. 729). E. Berkovitz, too, finds that my work is not history but a philosophical and theological interpretation of history (*Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 9). G. J. Renier's pronouncement on my work is that 'it is the supreme embodiment of what I [i.e. Renier, not Toynbee] call "left-wing deviationism", the confusion between history and the philosophy of history' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 73). W. Kaufmann feels that my 'determination to mix genres' makes it enormously difficult to do me justice (*ibid.*, p. 306).

Critics of this school are, it seems to me, paying too much attention to labels, which, in my belief, are not either interesting or important. This preoccupation of theirs offers their human target an easy way of putting them out of action. He has merely to read the label on the critic's hat and affix a different label on his own. He will then be able, with impunity, to talk as much nonsense as he likes, as far as this particular critic is concerned. However outrageously he behaves, he can count on the critic's simply registering 'not my subject'.

Fortunately, there are other critics who rate labels at their true zero value and see human affairs as the unity that they really are. W. H. McNeill, for instance, after noting that 'Toynbee has felt himself free to connect his studies of history with ultimate philosophical and theological questions', suggests that this is a challenge to other present-day historians (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*) H. Kohn dismisses the criticisms of the present book that censure it for not being history. He submits that I am not trying to write history here, though I have done that in other books of mine, e.g. *The Survey of International Affairs* (*Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 464). K. W. Thompson suggests that I must be judged both as an historian and as a philosopher of history (*Toynbee and History*, p. 201). E. Fieser finds that the present book 'is not a work of history' and, 'a fortiori, not a work of archaeology, sociology, philosophy, theology, or even of all these combined; it enters into each one of these fields, but no man can be an authority in all of them. Taken as a whole, it is a huge theological poem in prose' (*ibid.*, p. 383). This last sentence of Fieser's has already been quoted on p. 39, footnote 1.

I like being called a poet. I do not suppose that any real poet would acknowledge me as being his confrère. Nevertheless, I will make no objection to having this label affixed to me by non-poets, if this will induce my critics to give up the unprofitable game of debating which, if any, of the 'disciplines' is my legal domicile.

¹ E. R. Curtius in *Mercur*, 1. Jahrgang, Viertes Heft [Heft 4] (1947), p. 493.

A. L. Kroeber in language that is less militant and more statesmanlike than mine. Kroeber believes 'the time to be near when efforts for closer federation in the united sciences may well come from students of culture'. 'This great unity', he declares, 'is the true study for the student of Man.'¹

If partition is a wrong way of trying to deal with the problem of quantity in the field of human studies, so is omission; and this applies equally to both the main devices for lightening the human mind's fast-increasing cargo. One of these is to pick out one of Man's plural activities—say, politics or economics or technology or religion—and to give this the status of a 'master-activity', with the implication that the other activities may and should be ignored except in so far as they can be treated as being subordinate to the single activity that has been given pride of place. This device would certainly simplify the problem of quantity by drastically reducing the number of phenomena to be taken into account.² It involves us, however, in insuperable difficulties as soon as we try to carry it out. These difficulties are discussed in the annex to the present chapter,³ so we need not go into details here. The other device is as old as human nature itself, or indeed as life, since it is a patent reflection of the self-centredness that is inborn in every living organism. It is based on the assumption that the inquirer's own religion, civilization, community, or parish in the inquirer's own generation is the culmination of all human history, without even adding the proviso 'up to date'.⁴ On this scheme the inquirer gives himself licence to ignore everything in human affairs that does not lead up to his own 'here and now'. This egocentric device would, of course, reduce the number of the phenomena as effectively as the 'master-activity' device would; but, like that device, this one, too, is impracticable. Now that all the histories of all the societies, in all ages and in all parts of the World, have been pooled in one all-inclusive intellectual heritage, accessible to the whole human race,⁵ it is no longer possible to present history as a single-track line reaching its terminus in the short-lived contemporary generation of a 'Chosen People'.

5. THE NEED FOR SIMULTANEOUS CULTIVATION OF PANORAMIC AND MYOPIC VISION

If the problem of quantity cannot be eluded by any device—not, for instance, by trying to narrow the field, and not by trying to subdivide it—we have to grapple with the stark difficulty of overcoming the disparity between the overwhelming mass of the data and the limited

¹ A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 10–11 and 19. Kroeber's suggestion that the anthropologists may be the pioneers in a coming general study of human affairs is taken up by Bagby. 'A future science of history must at first rely heavily on anthropology both for concepts and methods' (*Culture and History*, p. 20).

² This is why the 'master-activity' device is tempting (see Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, pp. 24–25).

³ See pp. 658–63.

⁴ F. Engel-Janosi observes that historians of the single-track school always think of themselves as 'being on the threshold of the Last Things' (*Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, 2. Jahrgang, Heft 4 (October, 1949), p. 270).

⁵ See pp. 110–13.

capacity of a single human mind. There is no escape from the formidable requirement that we must each of us attempt to take a panoramic view of the whole field;¹ and, considering how vast this is by comparison with our intellectual powers, we have to face the truth that our panoramic view is bound to be a superficial one.² Superficiality is a defect about which we cannot afford to be complacent, because it exposes us to the risk of misconstruing Reality,³ and the whole purpose of intellectual inquiry is to come as near as possible to seeing Reality as it is. How are we to correct our superficiality? The defeatist remedy is to avoid it by renouncing the panoramic view that exposes us to it; but this means renouncing the endeavour to arrive at any understanding of human affairs. A more constructive remedy is, not to seek to avoid superficiality at this prohibitive price, but to try to counterbalance it by aiming at thoroughness in some fraction of the total field.⁴ This fraction must be

¹ This point is well made by P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 158. Ranke declared his belief that 'the final goal—not yet attained—always remains the conception and execution of a history of mankind' ('Das letzte Ziel, ein noch unerreichtes, bleibt immer die Auffassung und Produktion einer Geschichte der Menschheit'). This passage occurs in a fragment, written by Ranke in the eighteen-sixties and left by him in manuscript, which has been printed by A. Dove on pp. xiii-xvi (the passage just quoted is on p. xv) of his preface to the Ninth Part, Second Section, of Ranke's *Weltgeschichte* (published in nine parts, Leipzig 1881-8, Duncker and Humblot). As Ranke sees it, 'to comprehend the whole without failing to meet the requirements of exact research will, of course, always remain an [unachieved] ideal. It would entail a solidly grounded understanding of the entire history of mankind' ('Das Ganze zu umfassen und doch dem Gesetz der Forschung gerecht zu werden, bleibt freilich immer ein Ideal: es würde das Verständniss der gesammten Menschheitsgeschichte auf festem Grund und Boden in sich schliessen') (*ibid.*, p. xvi). 'In conversation with intimate friends, I have often considered the question whether there is any possibility of composing a world history on these terms. The conclusion was that to satisfy the highest demands is, no doubt, not possible, but that it is imperative that the attempt should be made' ('Im Gespräch mit vertrauten Freunden habe ich öfter die Frage erwogen, ob es überhaupt möglich sei, eine Weltgeschichte in diesem Sinne zu verfassen. Der Schluss war: den höchsten Anforderungen zu genügen, sei wohl nicht möglich, aber notwendig, es zu versuchen' (Ranke's own introduction to his *Weltgeschichte*, First Part, p. ix).

² J. K. Feibleman notes that a large picture of world history is bound to be based on secondary sources of dubious validity (*T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 18). The Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr., too, observes that 'the impossibility of being equally expert in everything is a limitation that the universal historian must accept and work with. But', he continues *ad hominem*, 'I do feel that in the religious field Toynbee is not sufficiently aware of his own limitations.' 'In the field of religion it is not really possible to know more than one religion from the inside.' Toynbee has 'a sound textbook knowledge of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam; but is that really enough for writing with authority about their historical significance?' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). Apropos of my treatment of Indian history, culture, and religion, L. Renou sums up a friendly critique by pronouncing that I get at an external truth, but not at the 'vision' which comes from first-hand knowledge (*Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 79).

³ For instance, Owen Lattimore points out, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 181, No. 4 (April, 1948), pp. 104-5, that 'dependence on secondary sources implies loss of an absolutely sure touch in distinguishing between the best secondary authority and an inferior authority, or in discriminating between the strong and weak points of a secondary authority who is on the whole good. One of the foredoomed limitations of scholarship, unfortunately, is that, when a bold and adventurous thinker like Toynbee takes over not only the facts but the ideas of a secondary authority, and projects them further, the projection is apt to reveal the flaws and weaknesses of the adopted ideas more than it enhances their strength.' Lattimore illustrates his point from my use of some of Ellsworth Huntington's ideas about the relations between the Nomadic culture and its physical environment.

⁴ I am grateful to Michael Postan for giving this good advice to me. In reviewing the first three volumes of this book, Postan remarks that 'the bulk of his new inventions are too wide and too vague to lead to a true sociological discovery, while the few which happen to provide openings for a truly original and a perfectly definite enterprise are left

small enough for us to be able to achieve thoroughness here without having to devote so much of our energies to this that we have not enough left over for taking even the most superficial panoramic view as well.¹ 'Critical method, objective approach, and comprehensive synthesis can and must go together.'² 'Critical research on the one side and comprehensive understanding on the other side can be counted on to give each other mutual support.'³

If we agree that the solution of the problem of quantity lies in combining the panoramic with the myopic view, perhaps we shall also agree that, in the present state of intellectual knowledge, understanding, and technique, we must be prepared to go to extremes in each of these two antithetical lines of attack on our problem. Considering the vastness of the current increase in the amount of what there is to know, our panoramic view must have the sweep of the view caught from the window of an aeroplane aloft in the stratosphere. Considering the minuteness of the current work that is being done by both the sociologists and the psychologists, our counterbalancing view must penetrate to the depth that is reached by a well-drilling apparatus. Since the radius of our panorama will be almost infinitely long, that of our drill-hole will have to be almost infinitesimally short. After all, when one is using a power-drill in quest of oil or water, it is a matter of course that one's drill-hole should have a shorter diameter than the shaft of a spade-dug well.

This counterbalancing intellectual activity of doing microscopic work on a minute area ought to be an effective insurance against succumbing to the danger inherent in the panoramic view's inevitable superficiality. If we know, from practice, what thoroughness is, we shall not mistake superficiality for it; and, if we see our superficiality for what it is, we shall at least be on our guard against the misconstruction of Reality to which it lays us open. Conversely, in our microscopic work, we shall be put on our guard, by our concurrent use of the telescope, against the misconstruction of Reality to which we are exposed by myopia. The crux of microscopic work is that its thoroughness within its own tiny area does not give the inquirer any information about the relations between this area and its setting in the general field of which it is a part;

unexplored'. Postan concludes that, 'until he writes a work of sociology'—meaning, as the context shows, a work of the microscopic kind—'he will not be able to rid himself of his vague images or to meet the challenge of his fruitful ones' (*The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), pp. 56 and 63).

The same point is made in the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 109. 'Toynbee's generalisations . . . must be elaborated to be testable propositions—an elaboration that the author does not provide.'

¹ It is, of course, a difficult question of judgement for an inquirer to decide, in the light of his particular objective, how much of his energy he should spend on telescopic work and how much of it on microscopic work. Christopher Dawson finds that there is too much telescopic work and too little microscopic work in the previous volumes of this book (*Toynbee and History*, p. 139). L. Mumford finds that I have 'succeeded better than most scholars in combining the methods of the specialist with those of the "generalist"' (*Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 12).

² 'Kritik, objektive Auffassung und umfassende Combination zusammengehen können und müssen' (Ranke: fragment written in the eighteen-sixties, printed in *Weltgeschichte*, Ninth Part, Second Section, p. xvi).

³ 'Die kritische Forschung auf der einen, das zusammenfassende Verständniss auf der anderen Seite können einander nicht anders, als unterstützen' (Ranke: *Weltgeschichte*, First Part, p. ix).

and, unless and until one sees the object of one's study in its setting, one does not know or understand the object itself, however thoroughly one may have analysed its internal anatomy. An oil-pro prospector does not sink capital in a boring until he has made a wide geological survey of the whole region for which he holds a prospecting option. If he made a boring at random, and tried to judge its prospects exclusively on the materials brought to the surface by the drill out of this single narrow hole, he would soon lose his employer's money and his own job. A three-dimensional test would be a reckless undertaking without the guidance of a previous two-dimensional survey—just as, conversely, the two-dimensional survey would yield no precise knowledge of the contents of the sub-soil if it were not followed up by a three-dimensional test.

This means that the panoramic and myopic approaches do not only benefit, both alike, by being made concurrently, but need each other's complementary services so much that no inquirer can afford to neglect either of them. Either approach has its own inherent weaknesses; but the remedy for these weaknesses is, not to abandon the approach in which they arise, but to pursue the other approach as well. If we pursue both approaches at once, we shall be giving ourselves a chance of bringing the strong points of each of them to the rescue of the weak points of the other. On the other hand, if we sought to get rid of a weakness by abandoning the approach in which it arises, we should end by abandoning both approaches and consequently abandoning all inquiry.

This, in turn, means that inquirers who concentrate on the bird's-eye view and those who concentrate on the fly's-eye view are, not natural enemies, but natural, and indeed indispensable, allies. As Ranke puts it, 'research cannot be damaged by being brought into relation with a universal standpoint. Without the universal, research would lose its fire; without research, conception would degenerate into fantasy.'¹ If the specialist and the generalist were inevitable enemies, each would have to fight himself, as well as his colleague, since we have seen that, whichever of the two approaches may be the more attractive to a particular inquirer, he must also learn to follow the other approach, too, to some extent, as a means of insuring against falling into his preferred approach's pitfalls. Which of the two approaches is to be preferred by each of us is a matter of personal choice, and each of us will make his choice in accordance with his temperament. There is room, and need, for any number of inquirers of both schools. The one thing for which there is no room is civil war between them and within the bosoms of each of them. This necessity for concord and co-operation seems to be better understood, and better practised, at present by the students of non-human nature than it is by humanists. On this point, we humanists would be well advised to follow the good example set by inquirers in other fields.

¹ 'Die Beziehung auf ein Allgemeines kann der Forschung keinen Eintrag thun: ohne jenes würde diese erkalten, ohne diese die Auffassung in ein Hirngespinnst ausarten' (Ranke: fragment written in the eighteen-sixties, printed in *Weltgeschichte*, Ninth Part, second section, p. xvi).

V. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF HUMAN AFFAIRS

THE demand for a comprehensive study of human affairs is inspired by several motives. Some of these are permanent and some temporary; some are disinterested, some self-regarding. The strongest and most estimable of these is curiosity. This is one of the distinctive traits of human nature. No human being seems to be altogether without it, though the degree of its strength varies enormously as between different individuals. In the field of human affairs, curiosity prompts us to seek a panoramic view in order to gain a vision of Reality that will make it as intelligible as is possible for a human mind. 'History certainly justifies a dictum of Einstein, that no great discovery was ever made in science except by one who lifted his nose above the grindstone of details and ventured on a more comprehensive vision.'¹ A panoramic view will at any rate be a less misleading reflection of Reality than a partial view.² And, while it is true that in the search for knowledge and understanding, as in all human activities, human achievements are never complete, it is one of Man's virtues that he has the intelligence to be aware of this and the spirit to go on striving, with undiminished zest, to come as near to his goal as his endowment of ability will carry him.

Another motive for the quest for a panoramic view of human affairs, and indeed of the whole of the phenomenal universe, is more self-regarding. The phenomena appear to be innumerable, and the Universe infinite, to the diffracting human mind; and this experience of being adrift in a boundless sea, without chart or compass, is terrifying for a being whose powers are finite. In this disconcerting human situation our first recourse is to make believe that the ocean is not as big as it looks; we try to play on it those tricks of partition and omission that have been noticed in the preceding chapter; but, in playing them, we see through them, and then the only recourse left to us is the formidable one of trying to fling our mental net over the Universe as a whole. Needham points out³ that 'one of the greatest stimulatory factors of primitive science' was 'the need for at least *classing* phenomena and placing them in some sort of relation with one another, in order to conquer the ever-recurring fear and dread which must have weighed so terribly on early men'. In the Sinic World this universal human response to the psychological challenge of the consciousness of infinity took the form of the development of a set of symbols—eight trigrams and sixty-four hexagrams—generated by working out all the possible permutations and combinations of sets of lines, some unbroken and some broken. These lines seem to have represented sticks—some short, some long—that had been used originally for magical operations. 'Originating from what was probably a collection of peasant omen texts, and accumulating a mass of material used in the practices of divination', this scheme of

¹ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 210.

² See E. E. Y. Hales, quoted on p. 647.

³ J. Needham: *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. ii, p. 336.

visual configurations, in its canonical presentation in the classic called *The Book of Changes (I Ching)*, 'ended up as an elaborate system of symbols and their explanations'.¹ 'What seems to show through' a number of passages in the commentaries on the *I Ching* by Chinese philosophers

'is the effort made by the School of Naturalists and the Han Confucians to erect the figures made by the long and short sticks into a comprehensive system of symbolism containing in some way all the basic principles of natural phenomena. Like the Taoists, they were looking for peace of mind through classification.'²

Primitive societies are not the only societies, and the Sinic is not the only civilization, in which an anxiety in the presence of infinity has spurred human minds to try to bring infinity under mental control. In the rise of Hellenic science, as in the rise of its Sinic counterpart, one of the stimuli was the urge to set bounds (*perata*) to a Universe that presented itself as boundless (*apeiron*). In the modern Western World the same anxiety has been rekindled on the academic level since the introduction of the Chinese system of grading intellectual ability by the test of written examinations—the more so because this innovation in Western education coincided in date with the sudden rapid increase, discussed in the last chapter, in the amount of what there was for examinees to know. A Westerner nowadays may have been educated, during fourteen or fifteen impressionable years, with the immediate object of passing successive examinations, and he may emerge from this ordeal in the state of mind of a perpetual examinee with an infinite number of things to learn and only one working lifetime before him for learning them—a hopelessly short term for acquainting himself with infinity, even if he were to make this his exclusive life-work.

Ad hominem, I still vividly remember my discomfort in emerging in this state of mind, in the summer of 1911, from the final examination at Oxford for the School of *Literae Humaniores*. I immediately started out to read all the surviving sources for Hellenic history in the Greek and Latin languages that I had not read already while I was preparing for the examination that I had now passed. I soon realized that, even if I succeeded in reading every word that there was to be read about Hellenic history both in Greek and Latin and in the languages of the modern Western World, I should be chasing a receding horizon that would lead me on, beyond Hellenic history, into the histories of all the other human societies within Western knowledge. This time the term of my penal servitude would be, not just two and a half years or fourteen; it would be the rest of my life, with the culminating examination postponed to the other side of death. Must I really spend the rest of my life living in fear of a post-mortem examination by Rhadamanthus? This was a melancholy state of mind to have fallen into on the threshold of adult life. I was delivered from it unexpectedly by finding myself making something out of the new knowledge that I was taking on board.

In the course of my post-examinational reading I had been comparing

¹ Ibid., p. 304.

² Ibid., p. 328.

facts and figures mentioned in Xenophon's continuation of Thucydides' history with facts and figures mentioned by Thucydides himself. These were data about the numbers and organization of the Lacedaemonian army at successive dates. I had been looking at these data synoptically, trying to make out the relation in which they stood to each other, and I now found that I had been unconsciously producing the nucleus of a paper on 'the Growth of Sparta'. This was something that I had never done before, and the realization that I had been doing it gave me immediate psychological relief. In doing something with the innumerable phenomena, I had 'fixed' them in the American usage of the verb 'fix' as well as in its literal meaning. I had found a pattern in the apparent flux, and, in finding this, I had made the flux less menacing to me. Of course, the little batch of data that I had managed to deal with in this way covered only a tiny patch of the boundless field of human affairs, but I had made a beginning. Now that I had 'fixed' one bit, I need not despair of being able to do the same with the rest. Without knowing it, I had taken the first step towards producing, not only a paper on Sparta, but the present book.

This anxiety in face of the phenomena spurs human minds, always and everywhere, into 'fixing' the phenomena by finding a pattern in them; but it has been accentuated in the present-day world as a result of the World's sudden unification by means of modern science and technology. The same unprecedented scientific and technological advances that have unified the World by 'annihilating distance' have put it into mankind's power to annihilate itself by making war with atomic weapons. We are now waking up to the truth that we have unintentionally put ourselves in a new position in which mankind may have to choose between the two extreme alternatives of committing genocide and learning to live henceforward as a single family.¹ The human race's survival is now once again in doubt for the first time since Man established his ascendancy over non-human nature—a feat that he achieved part way through the Palaeolithic Age. This time it is human nature that threatens mankind with extinction. The recurrence of the ancient threat from this new quarter is a challenge to all human beings to subordinate their traditional parochial loyalties to a new paramount loyalty to mankind itself. The recurrent threat's source in human nature is a challenge to us to study human affairs in order to bring them under control.

In a world that has been unified in both space and time, a study of human affairs must be comprehensive if it is to be effective.² It must

¹ Among many other contemporary observers, J. Romein testifies that, in our day, 'one world or none' is the truth about our situation (*Toynbee and History*, p. 350).

² This point has been made by Polybius in several telling, though perhaps unnecessarily polemical, passages of his *Oecumenical History*. Book I, part of chap. 4, Book III, chap. 31, and Book VIII, chap. 2, have been quoted in the present book already (in iii. 317, footnote 5, and x. 65-66). The whole of Book I, chap. 4, may be quoted here.

The coincidence by which all the transactions of the World have been oriented in a single direction and guided towards a single goal is the extraordinary characteristic of the present age, to which the special feature of the present work is a corollary. The unity of events imposes on the historian a similar unity of composition in depicting for his readers the operation of the laws of Fortune on the grand scale, and this has been my own principal inducement and stimulus in the work which I have undertaken.

include, not only the whole of the living generation, but also the whole of the living generation's past. In order to save mankind we have to learn to live together in concord in spite of traditional differences of religion, civilization, nationality, class, and race. In order to live together in concord successfully, we have to know each other, and knowing each other includes knowing each other's past,¹ since human life, like the rest of the phenomenal universe, can be observed by human minds only as it presents itself to them on the move through time. Historical forces can be more explosive than atom bombs.² For our now urgent common purpose of self-preservation, it will not be enough to explore our common underlying human nature. The psychologist's work needs to be supplemented by the archaeologist's, the historian's, the anthropologist's, and the sociologist's. We must learn to recognize, and, as far as possible, to understand, the different cultural configurations in which our common human nature has expressed itself in the different religions, civilizations, and nationalities into which human culture has

'I have also been influenced by the fact that no contemporary writer has attempted to put together a comprehensive account of world affairs. If there had been anyone else in the field, I should have felt far less urge to enter it myself. Actually, however, I see many specialists writing works about local wars, including some of the political transactions connected with these, but, so far as I know, nobody even attempting to make a general examination and synthesis of the configuration of contemporary events by tracing these back to their origins and explaining how they reached their consummation. This spectacle has made me feel an imperative call not to leave unrecorded, and not to let slip unheeded, a transaction that is surely the foremost and the most beneficial of all that stand to Fortune's credit. No doubt she is never tired of innovating and is continually putting her spoke in the wheel of human affairs. But the *tour de force* that she has achieved in our time is quite without precedent; and it is also something that could never be gathered from a study of the works of the specialist historians.

'What should we say of somebody who visited the World's famous cities one by one—or, if you like, just took a look at separate pictures of them—and then immediately assumed that, by this process, he had acquired a knowledge of the physiognomy of the whole World, including its entire layout and structure? People who are convinced that historical specialisation will give them a fairly good synoptic view of the whole of history are, it seems to me, suffering from a delusion. They remind me of people who have taken a look at the *dissecta membra* of an organism that was once alive and beautiful, and who then imagine that they have had a first-hand view of this creature in all its activity and beauty. We have only to suppose that someone promptly rehabilitates the creature, body and soul, in its original unity and perfection, and then displays it again to the same spectators. Surely these would all then admit that, at the first view, their vision of the object had fallen far short of the reality and had been more like what one sees in a dream. The truth is that the part may give us a notion of the whole, but will never give us a genuine knowledge or an accurate appreciation of it.

'On these analogies, we must conclude that the work of the specialist historians makes a singularly small contribution to an intimate and trustworthy insight into history as a whole. The only way of arriving at this is to grasp the mutual inter-connexions and inter-relations of all the phenomena, together with their likenesses and differences. A panoramic view of this kind enables one to find utility as well as enjoyment in history.'

¹ This point is made by Diodorus of Agyrium in the following passages (Book I, chaps. 1 and 3) of the Preface to his *Library of Universal History*: 'We are indebted to these authors [i.e. the authors of universal histories] for their efforts to marshal the whole human race, who are all members one of another, in spite of the barriers of space and time, in one magnificent array. In attempting this, they have constituted themselves nothing less than the servants of Providence. God, in His Providence, has related in a single system the evolutions of the stars of heaven and the characters of men, and maintains them in perpetual motion to all eternity, imparting to each the lot which Destiny assigns; while the authors of universal histories, in their works, record the general transactions of the World as if it were a single community, and pass the works of Providence through the grand audit of their clearing-house. . . . In short, the superiority of this branch of history over the rest is to be measured by the superior utility of the whole to the part and of continuity to discontinuity.'

² L. C. Stecchini in *Midstream*, Autumn, 1956, pp. 84-91.

come to be articulated in the course of its history. 'All of human history is relevant to present and future human needs.'¹ 'The knowledge of the history of mankind should be one of mankind's common possessions.'²

We shall, however, have to do more than just understand each other's cultural heritages, and more even than appreciate them. We shall have to value them and love them as being parts of mankind's common treasure and therefore being ours too, as truly as the heirlooms that we ourselves shall be contributing to the common stock. Without the fire of love, the dangerous fissures in mankind's social solidarity cannot be annealed. Danger, even when it is as extreme as ours is today, is never a sufficient stimulus in itself to make men do what is necessary for their salvation. It is a poor stimulus because it is a negative one. A cold-blooded calculation of expediency will not inspire us with the spiritual power to save ourselves. This power can come only from the disinterested pursuit of a positive aim that will outrange the negative one of trying to avoid self-destruction;³ and this positive aim can be given to men by nothing but love.

In mankind's present situation a demand for a comprehensive view of human affairs is to be expected. Indirect evidence that this demand is, in fact, being made today comes to light incidentally in some of the critiques of earlier volumes of the present book. Some of this evidence carries conviction, because it is the testimony of critics who hold that the book has had a more favourable reception than it deserves. They explain this lack of judgement, as it seems to them, on the public's part by suggesting that people are now making this demand for a comprehensive view and that they have welcomed my work uncritically because they feel that it is at least giving them something of what they want.

R. V. Chase, for example, suggests⁴ that 'persuasive theorists do not . . . exert their strongest influence because of the logical air-tightness of their theories, but rather because they fill an unconsciously felt vacuum with the force and urgency of their moral passion'. Tangye Lean sees⁵ me performing the role of an exponent of a particular cultural situation, embodying my contemporaries' anxiety over the problem of existence, their obsession with the spectacle of decay, which brings them face to face with death, and their burning desire to find some way of overcoming their own transitoriness and securing immortality. As A. G. Bailey sees it,⁶ 'clearly this book answered a deep-felt need of people beset with the anxieties and uncertainties of the twentieth century'. Christopher Dawson suggests⁷ that one reason why my work has found some accept-

¹ R. Coulborn in *Phylon*, 1940, offprint, p. 62.

² 'Die Erkenntnis der Geschichte der Menschheit soll ein Gemeingut der Menschheit sein': a fragment, written by Ranke in the eighteen-sixties, printed on pp. xiii-xvi of A. Dove's preface to the Ninth Part, Second Section, of Ranke's *Weltgeschichte* (Leipzig 1881-8, Duncker and Humblot, 9 parts). The passage here quoted is on pp. xv-xvi.

³ In a critique of my work, J. Romein judges that I am right in thinking that the unity of the World is now in the making. As Romein puts it, world unity has been created by the technicians; we have now to raise this technological unity to the level of creativity (*Toynbee and History*, p. 350).

⁴ In *The American Scholar*, vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 1947), pp. 281-2.

⁵ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 35 ff., as summarized by O. F. Anderle.

⁶ In *Queen's Quarterly*, vol. lxii, No. 1 (Spring, 1955), pp. 100-10.

⁷ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 129.

ance is because it is a study of the civilizations. These have now become realities that cannot be ignored. J. F. Leddy suggests¹ that it is because people in our time want to see the World as a whole and to find some meaning in its history. J. Romein says² that my work is valuable in giving a real world-view, and that I have done something to help in overcoming the opposition between East and West. H. Kohn says³ that a sense of unity will be my contribution to an understanding of things. T. J. G. Locher finds⁴ that 'our age is asking for a total vision, now that the World has grown together into so close a unity. This super-human task is the one at which Toynbee has tried his hand.'⁵ Other critics, too, have made the point that I have tried to take a comprehensive

¹ In *The Phoenix*, vol. 11, No. 4, p. 140.

² In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 349-50.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

⁴ In *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 30.

⁵ If Pieter Geyl ever reads this page, the passages here quoted from observations made by some of his fellow critics of my work may throw light on something that has apparently puzzled him. He, too, has noticed that my work has been not badly received by the non-professional public, and this seems to have left him perplexed. 'This chorus of praise', he remarks, 'is a chastening reminder of the very restricted influence exercised by professional criticism' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 377). If the 'chorus of praise' has been evoked by my attempt to take a comprehensive view of history, this gives Geyl his cue. He and my other critics have only to try their hands at the same enterprise, and the chorus will give them the same grateful welcome, even if they make no more of a success than I have made of the effort to see human affairs as a whole and to find some meaning in them.

This suggestion, will, I fancy, draw from some of these critics the retort that they do not want praise from the public at any price, and certainly not at the price of doing anything so unprofessional as to take a panoramic view of things. In their eyes popularity is incriminating. My kind interpreter Crane Brinton has done his best to exonerate me from this imputation. 'It is quite clear', he testifies, 'that his fame is everywhere confined . . . to high-brows and middle-brows, and has not reached the low-brows, as it would have to do if he is to do the work of a major prophet. It is very hard indeed to think of Toynbee effectively translated to the many, as Marx has certainly been translated' (*The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Summer, 1956, pp. 361-75). Marx is vulgar indeed. His shamelessly panoramic view of human affairs has caught the *profanum vulgus's* imagination all over the World. I have not incurred that damning degree of popularity, anyway. Yet I fear that even a modest popularity among the high-brow and middle-brow fraction of the public is enough to ruin my reputation with the professionals. E. Fieser notes disapprovingly that 'popularity is no substitute for understanding', though he does concede that 'all discourse is in some sense a simplification' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 378). H. J. Morgenthau and A. J. P. Taylor draw attention (*ibid.*, pp. 196-7 and 115) to the contrast between a popularity that they ascribe to me with the public and the condemnation that I have received from my fellow historians. Both of them assume, without arguing the point, that, on any issue between public and professionals, the professionals must be right. Morgenthau chivalrously testifies that I am not being popular on purpose. 'This popularity is unjust', he writes, 'to Mr Toynbee's intent, but it illuminates the weakness of his achievement' (*ibid.*, p. 197). It is true that I have never set out to win popularity, any more than I have sought to avoid it. When I am writing, the reception that is awaiting me is not in my mind. I write as the subject moves me. But surely the truth about popularity is that, in itself, it is no evidence of merit or demerit. One must know the reason why a book is popular before one can judge whether, in the particular case in point, popularity damns the author or does him credit. Morgenthau evidently holds that popularity, whatever its cause, damns an author and his work automatically. This dogma seems to rest on two assumptions: that the judgement of the public must always be wrong, and that the judgement of the professionals must always be in conflict with it.

If these are the doctrines of a professional, they are unfortunate. In what we vaguely call 'the public', there are many different levels of intellectual cultivation; and, if a professional despises all these levels indiscriminately, he is putting himself in jeopardy, for at the higher levels he is likely to find his intellectual equals, and may even find his superiors in the field outside the contemptuous specialist's own chosen province. What is more, the contemptuous specialist is doing a disservice to the culture that ought to be common to the cultivated public and to him. When professional intellectual work becomes esoteric, this is a sign that culture is in a bad way. Culture flourishes only when there is an active and constant intellectual intercourse and exchange of ideas between cultivated people of all kinds.

view of history, without going into the question whether my work has been well received, or whether, if it has been, its attempt at comprehensiveness is what has won it favour. The purpose for which the point is made by most of them is to go on to say—as Locher does in the passage from which I have just quoted—that, in attempting this, I have obviously attempted the impossible, or that, for whatever reason, I have failed to achieve my aim.¹ If the critics quoted in the present paragraph are right in holding that my work has been well received and that its attempt at comprehensiveness accounts for this, then the other testimonies to this attempt at comprehensiveness indirectly give further support to the view that there is a genuine demand for such attempts in the present-day world.

One of my critics has compared earlier volumes of this book to a 'palace' in which 'the rooms . . . are over-furnished to the point of resembling a dealer's warehouse'.² This reviewer must also be a thought-reader; for I have often thought of myself as a man moving old furniture about. For centuries these lovely things had been lying neglected in the lumber-rooms and attics. They had been piled in there higgledy-piggledy, in utter disorder, and had been crammed so tight that nobody could even squeeze his way in to look at them and find out whether they were of any value. In the course of ages they had been accumulating there—unwanted rejects from a score of country houses. This unworthy treatment of these precious pieces came to trouble me more and more; for I knew that they were not really junk; I knew that they were heirlooms, and these so rare and fine that they were not just provincial curiosities; they were the common heritage of anyone who had any capacity for appreciating beauty in Man's handiwork. At last I found that I could not bear this shocking situation any longer, so I set my own hand to a back-breaking job. I began to drag out the pieces, one by one, and to arrange them in the hall. I could not pretend to form a final judgement on the order in which they should be placed. Indeed, there never could be a final judgement on this, for a number of attractive different orders could be imagined, each of them the right order from some particular point of view.³ The first thing to be done was to get as many of the pieces as possible out into the open and to assemble them in some order or other. If once I had them parked down in the hall, I could see how they looked and could shift them and re-shift them at my leisure. Perhaps I should not have the leisure; perhaps the preliminary job of extracting these treasures from the lumber-rooms and attics would turn out to be as much as I could manage with my single pair of hands.⁴ If so, this would not matter; for there would be plenty of time afterwards for other people to rearrange the pieces, and, no doubt, they would be doing this again and again as they studied them more closely and came to know more about them than would ever be known by me.

¹ See the passages quoted in the Annex to Chapter II, p. 647.

² *The Listener*, 19th October, 1939, in a review of vols. iv–vi.

³ See further p. 168.

⁴ 'His work is a gigantic labour—the labour of a comprehensive attempt to put things in order (*Die Riesenarbeit seines Werkes ist eine umfassende Ordnungsarbeit*)' (H. Werner in *Deutscher Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 29. Jahrgang, xxix. Band (1955), p. 544).

This furniture-shifting job is, of course, David's kind of work, not Solomon's; and the time when Solomon's achievement will be feasible is now only just dawning.

"There is as yet no history of humanity, since humanity is not an organised society with a common tradition or a common social consciousness. All the attempts that have hitherto been made to write a world history have been in fact attempts to interpret one tradition in terms of another, attempts to extend the intellectual hegemony of a dominant culture by subordinating to it all the events of other cultures that come within the observer's range of vision."¹

This has certainly been true up to now. It is true, for instance, of the presentation of world history in the Old Testament, in Hellenic literature, in the Chinese dynastic histories, and in Western historians' works. If a Western historian does not fall into the egocentric error of making all history lead up to the point reached in the West in his own generation, he is likely to fall into another error, only one degree less egocentric, with which I, for instance, have been charged, with some justice, by a number of my critics.² He is likely to use Hellenic history, which lies in the background of his own Western history, as an exclusive 'model', not just as one out of a number of alternative possible models, for elucidating the configuration of history in general in the current age of the civilizations.

Since the World is now being unified as a result of Western inventions, and therefore, initially, within a Western framework, one or other or both of these characteristic Western distortions of the true picture of world history are likely to persist for some time and to die hard. Nevertheless, it is already possible to look forward to a time when these Western distortions of the true picture, and all other distortions of the kind, will be replaced by a new vision of the past seen from the standpoint, not of this or that nationality, civilization, or religion, but of a united human race. If mankind does respond to the challenge of its present self-imposed ordeal by saving itself from self-inflicted genocide, this will have been the reward of a common effort to transcend all the traditional divisions and to live as one family for the first time since mankind made its first appearance on this planet. This *union sacrée* in the face of imminent self-destruction will be, if it is achieved, Man's finest achievement and most thrilling experience up to date. From the new position of charity and hope which Man will thereby have won for himself, all the past histories of the previous divisions of the human race will be seen, in retrospect, to be so many parts of one common historic heritage. They will be seen as leading up to unity, and as opening out, for a united human race, future prospects of which no human being could have dreamed in the age of unfettered parochialism.

¹ Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 273.

² See p. 161, footnote 1.

VI. THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZING A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF HUMAN AFFAIRS

I. THE USE AND ABUSE OF SIMPLIFICATIONS

THE enterprise of trying to organize a comprehensive study of human affairs is still in its pioneering stage. The pioneer's task is to open up the jungle by blazing trails. If he does this well, he will have opened the way for his successor the surveyor.

To do well in this preliminary reconnaissance work means satisfying two requirements. The trails must follow the lie of the land, and the blazing must be clear enough to give guidance to the next comer. The trails must link up the key points in the landscape by the shortest practicable routes. The blazing must be unmistakable. If the pioneer is literate, he will chart his trails and his blazes on a sketch-map; and as a map-maker he enjoys a licence. His task is the practical one of ensuring, as far as may be humanly possible, that the next comer shall not miss the way that the pioneer has found and has opened up. Therefore, in drawing his sketch-map for the next comer's use, the pioneer may take it upon himself, at his own discretion, to simplify the pattern and to exaggerate the prominence of the outstanding features of the landscape. He may take these liberties legitimately on two conditions. The first is that he must limit these deliberate cartographical distortions of Reality to the minimum necessary for his purpose of giving plain guidance. The second condition is that he must not try to pass his sketch-map off as being anything but what it is. He must make it clear that it is a sketch, not a survey, and that it is therefore not definitive but provisional. He must, in fact, note on it a warning for all future users that it not only may be superseded, but will be, and will be soon. It will be superseded the sooner, the better the pioneer has done his work; for, the better he has done it, the faster the legion of surveyors will be able to follow his reconnaissance up by triangulations that may prove to be at least 'semi-permanent'.

Pioneers are not the only map-makers to whom the pioneer's licence is customarily allowed. It is also granted to the modellers of relief-maps, though these, unlike pioneers in the wilderness, have all the resources of science and technology at their disposal in their workshops. Relief-map modellers sometimes deliberately misrepresent Reality by presenting altitude out of scale to area, and they do this for the reason that leads a pioneer to misrepresent Reality on his sketch-map by simplifying it. Their first concern, like his, is to give the users of their map clear guidance; and a relief-map that did not exaggerate altitude out of proportion to area would give little more guidance than a two-dimensional map would give. It is well known that a model of the globe, with the unevenness of its surface reproduced in scale with the extent of its area, would look no rougher than an unpeeled orange. The differences in altitude between mountains and valleys, plateaux and plains, would be difficult to discern without the aid of a powerful magnifying-glass

and would be less legible to the finger than the embossed lettering in a braille book. The heights and depths must be exaggerated, quite out of scale with the area of the globe's surface, if a relief-map is to be serviceable. It is therefore mere common sense to model a relief-map in these disproportionate dimensions. This is, however, legitimate only if the modeller takes care not to leave the prospective user under any misapprehension. He must make a declaration of the scale on which the heights and depths are shown in his model, and of how this stands to the scale as it is in Nature; and he must display this schedule prominently enough for it to be impossible for a user to overlook it.

In previous volumes of this book I have allowed myself the pioneer's and relief-map modeller's licence, and I make no apology for this. If I had not done it, I should not have been able to find my own way, not to speak of giving myself a chance of providing guidance for anyone else. I do, however, plead guilty to not having signalled to my readers what I was doing. I was hardly conscious of this myself, since my mind was all the time intent, first and foremost, on bringing out the salient features in the vast landscape that I was trying to explore. I have paid the penalty of being censured, both in general and over particular points, for having tacitly made the features more salient in my model than they are in Nature.

No doubt all thinking is a mental fission of a unitary Reality.¹ J. Romein recognizes² that 'every theory is simplifying and contracting', and E. Fiess, in still wider terms, that 'all discourse is in some sense a simplification'.³ But C. Trinkaus pronounces⁴ that the simplifications in my formulae are too crude; and T. J. G. Locher likewise finds⁵ that my presentation is too simple, one-sided, and subjective, and that I push my points too far. E. I. Watkin passes the same judgement⁶ with a philosopher's discrimination.

'We believe that there are patterns in human history, and we are convinced that Professor Toynbee has discerned a pattern, a rhythm which does in fact exist, and has assigned many true causes at work to produce it. But we also think that the complication of factors in human history is so great that no pattern is repeated so regularly and is so clearly discernible as Professor Toynbee maintains. . . . In many respects we prefer Mr Dawson's simpler scheme. . . . That is not to say that we think Christopher Dawson's scheme, or indeed any other, is to be simply accepted in place of Arnold Toynbee's. None is wholly false, none wholly true. All are more or less partial views of a pattern more complex than any, but also, for that very reason, more imperfect.'

I will give some examples, noticed by my critics or by me or by both, of distinctions, contrasts, or turning-points that come out sharper, in my presentation of them, than they are, perhaps, in reality.

The primordial dichotomy is the distinction between consciousness and the subconscious level of the psyche. It is primordial because it is

¹ See Chapter I, *ad init.*

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 347.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 378.

⁴ In *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), pp. 218-39.

⁵ In *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 15.

⁶ In *The Tablet*, 12th August, 1939.

consciousness that generates our awareness of the phenomenal universe. It would seem, then, that the frontier of consciousness ought to be delineated firmly, but 'firmly' is not, of course, the same thing as 'sharply'. The border between consciousness and the unconscious or subconscious may be, in reality, more like a threshold (*limen*) than like a demarcation line (*limes*). M. Savelle observes¹ that the line between subconscious impulse and purely intelligent choice or planning is not, in truth, a sharp one. M. R. Cohen notes² that we must not ignore either the unconscious or the states intermediate between unconsciousness and consciousness.

In applying the myth of challenge-and-response³ I may sometimes have drawn too sharply the distinction between the two parties to the encounter. I have, though, taken account of the truth that the parties are not necessarily in reality the separate individual personalities that they are represented as being when they are brought on to the stage as *dramatis personae* in a mythological drama. I have cited⁴ Saint Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*, chapter vii, verses 24-25, as an example of the drama's taking the form of an encounter between conflicting spiritual forces within a single soul. If we depersonalize the word 'encounter' by calling it 'dialectical interaction',⁵ it is evident that this can take place between two or more entities of a number of different kinds. It seems, indeed, to be one of the fundamental rhythms of Reality as this presents itself to human minds. It is also, I believe, characteristic of the pattern of dialectical interaction that it should be serial—one transaction leading on to another, and this to another again—and that, if and as the chain of dialectical interactions prolongs itself, there is a tendency for the field of action to be transferred from the outer to the inner world of the party responding to this succession of challenges.⁶

One of the types of encounter to which the myth of challenge-and-response applies is the interaction between Man and his environment, both human and non-human.⁷ M. Postan observes⁸ that the notion of challenge-and-response 'might have enabled Professor Toynbee to proceed much farther than the biologists and sociologists have so far done in abolishing the artificial abstraction of the object from the environment'. J. K. Feibleman remarks⁹ that I have discovered, in discussing the genesis of civilizations, that 'human society is only for certain narrow purposes a valid isolate', but that I then drop this discovery and try to explain all human affairs from inside. O. H. K. Spate makes the same criticism with greater precision. "Environment taken by itself" is a meaningless phrase; without Man, environment does not exist.¹⁰

¹ In *The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. xxv, No. 1 (February, 1956), pp. 55-67.

² M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of History*, p. 123.

³ My usage of this term is discussed and explained on pp. 254-63.

⁴ In i. 294.

⁵ See pp. 43 and 641-2.

⁶ See iii. 174-217.

⁷ This is discussed further in Chapter VIII, pp. 314-27.

⁸ In *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), p. 60.

⁹ In *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 25.

¹⁰ *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 419. The same point is made in the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 119. 'No product of Nature can be considered a natural resource until

There is a danger of setting up a false duality and so creating chicken-and-egg questions of priority.¹ Toynbee and Ellsworth Huntington 'both fall into the fallacy that there is, or can be, such a thing as environment "taken by itself"'.² 'The facts of geography are the facts as they are approached. . . . This world, without Man, is not environment, is not our world'³—and, in illustration of this point, Spate cites⁴ the 'piscine geography' so brilliantly and amusingly sketched by Rupert Brooke in a poem in which the key-note line is: "'There shall be no more land" say fish.' In reality, as Spate points out,⁵ 'environment' always means 'the environment of people x ', 'and x is a variable, even if the environment is not'.⁶ 'The environment affects us through the idea formed of it.'

Spate's critique is penetrating and conclusive. It immediately calls to mind a number of dramatic illustrations of its truth. For example, the nineteenth-century diplomatists' idea of a desert was that it was a region of no economic or political value because it was incapable of supporting life. Accordingly, while they were prepared to haggle, and, in the last resort, to go to war, over a few square metres in Alsace or Oregon, they amicably partitioned the Arabian Desert and the African Sahara by blithely drawing straight lines of enormous length across small-scale maps. In this cavalier way they disposed of the sovereignty over vast areas which, in the atlases of the day, were the 'perfect and absolute blank' commended as the ideal kind of map by the Bellman in Lewis Carroll's *The Hunting of the Snark*. During the late-nineteenth-century partition of Africa between European states there was an occasion on which Lord Salisbury—under fire in the House of Commons at Westminster for having acquiesced in the annexation of startling numbers of African square kilometres by France—made the celebrated reply that most of this territory that he had let slip was 'very light soil'. Some of it, however, was the soil under which the French oil-prospectors have recently discovered what they believe to be rich oil-bearing strata; and the time has long ago passed when diplomatists negotiating international frontiers in either the Sahara or Arabia were carefree. The desert-girt Buraymi oasis is at this moment an object of acrimonious dispute between the governments of Sa'udi Arabia and Great Britain. The 'idea formed' of a desert has in fact been transformed—in regions in which deserts overlie an oil-bearing subsoil—by the late-nineteenth-century discovery of the economic value of mineral oil and the twentieth-century development of techniques for tapping it at ever greater depths below surface-level. The Arabian desert is just as inhospitable to life today as it ever was, yet it has now become a key part of the environment of the peoples of Western Europe. Similarly, in the second

Man wants it for his use and has techniques for exploiting it. Thus rich, swampy land is not a natural resource unless men can drain it and cultivate it; nor were coal, gold, or uranium ore of any importance until Man worked them and had means of using them.'

¹ *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 419.

² *Ibid.*, p. 419. H. and M. Sprout also make the point that 'environment is a relative term, not an absolute one' (*Man-Milieu Relationship in the Context of International Politics*, p. 17).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 419, footnote 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Spate, loc. cit., p. 419.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 411.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 423.

century B.C., the forest-clad Po Basin, which had been a wilderness for Gallic squatters in its glades, was transformed into a new Italy by Roman peasant pioneers who approached it with the tools and the will to cut down the trees and plough the fertile soil that the Romans' Gallic predecessors had never dreamed of disputing with the native oakwoods.¹ This Old-World tale has been repeated in North America within the last three centuries. The forests in which the pre-Columbian human fauna had been content to cultivate the glades, and the prairies on which they had been content to hunt the buffalo, have been brought under the plough by Roman-hearted West European invaders. In truth, 'unto everyone that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath'.²

In reality, then, the distinction between a challenging environment and the people challenged by it is a fiction of mythology. 'The facts are as approached.'³ The environment is not just another name for its material constituents. It means these material constituents as they appear to human beings who have—or have not—the will and the means to master them. Everything within a human being's physical reach and mental range is part of that human being. His self is, in fact, potentially coextensive with the Universe.⁴ If Man's environment were really distinguishable as a separate entity from Man himself, Man's mastery of his environment—an achievement on which his existence depends—would never have been a possibility, any more than a human mind could apprehend phenomena, or God create the World, if there were really a great gulf fixed between the parties to these two other kinds of encounter. Logically, then, I have been put in the wrong. To draw the vulgar distinction between Man and his environment is scientifically inadmissible. I confess my sin, but must continue to commit it, and this for the reason that compels Spate himself to commit it in company with me. The reason is that, in the study of geography, as in all other kinds of thinking and creation, to tell the absolute truth about Reality is to say the last possible word, and therefore to debar oneself from all further research, discovery, and increase in understanding. Man and his environment are fictitious products of an unwarrantable mental fission of a monolithic Reality. This may be the truth, but the declaration of it puts a full stop to all further thinking about human affairs. In fact, the proof of Spate's proposition is double-edged. *Quod erat demonstrandum* turn out also to be *quod est absurdum*. The truth is that 'segmentation is humanly inevitable, i.e. essential to sane observation'.⁵

Five other distinctions that I have drawn too sharply—as I have now come to believe, on reconsideration—are those between leading minorities and the masses, between minorities that are creative and those that are merely dominant, between creativity itself and uncreativity, and

¹ See Polybius: *Historiae*, Book II, chaps. 15 and 35.

² Matt. xxv. 29. Cp. Matt. xiii. 12; Mark iv. 25; Luke viii. 18; and Luke xix. 26.

³ Spate in loc. cit., p. 423.

⁴ H. and M. Sprout point out, in *Man-Milieu Relationship in the Context of International Politics*, p. 18, that a single human being is the ultimate 'enviored unit'.

⁵ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 107.

between inspiration and mimesis, and between originality and diffusion. These distinctions, too, are, I believe, indispensable instruments for mental operations with human affairs.¹ I also believe that they are valid as far as they go, but I admit to having sometimes pushed them farther than is legitimate.² The differences between individuals in point of character and ability are evidently great enough to be a factor of capital importance in the determination of the course of human affairs. But all magnitudes are relative; and I could not maintain with any conviction, even if I wanted to, that the magnitude of these innate differences between individuals is so great as to require us to sort out mankind into what, in effect, would be two or more different species.³ I believe in the uniformity of human nature, as well as in the uniformity of Nature in general, and I hold this belief in two senses. I believe that the likenesses between the 'finest' and the 'crudest' specimens of the *genus homo*—supposing that we can define what we mean by 'fine' and 'crude' in this context—are greater and more pertinent to the conduct of social relations than are the differences between them. I also believe that these innate individual differences, such as they are, are distributed evenly, on the average, among all the so-called races into which mankind has been classified on the basis of physical criteria.⁴ It goes without saying that they are distributed evenly as between the members of different social classes;⁵ as between the partakers in the different cultures; and as between the adherents of the different higher religions. I also admit that

¹ E. F. J. Zahn judges that, in my handling of 'creative minorities', I have fallen into the error of 'hypostatizing an heuristic principle' (*Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 28). C. Trinkaus holds that I take refuge in 'the myth of creative personalities' and give 'no real analysis of social relations based on historical data' (*Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), pp. 218–39).

² C. Trinkaus makes a general indictment of the sharpness of my distinction between 'creative' and 'uncreative' in loc. cit. H. Becker judges that I give too much prominence to individuals and to minorities (*The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, vol. 210 (July, 1949), p. 161). A. H. Hanson rejects my concept of 'creative minorities' in toto (*Science and Society*, No. 13 (1949), pp. 118–35). Chr. Hill notes that the true creators are 'the inventors and artists whose brains [the] ruling class picks' (*The Modern Quarterly*, Autumn, 1947, p. 299).

³ E. F. J. Zahn, commenting on Henri Bergson, *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, p. 300, justly observes that there is dimorphism, in Bergson's meaning of this word, in each of us: i.e. each of us has something in him of the capacity to lead as well as of the capacity to follow (Zahn, op. cit., p. 28, footnote 62). I agree with R. Coulborn (in *Phylon*, 1940, reprint, pp. 35–36) that there is no sharp distinction between leaders and followers. Coulborn attributes to me (*ibid.*, p. 57) 'the false premise that ordinary men lack the power of creation'. I agree that this premise is false. I have never entertained it. But I may sometimes have used language that made it look as if I did. Coulborn is justified in asking (*ibid.*, p. 28) what I mean by saying that creative individuals 'are superhuman in a literal and no mere metaphorical sense' (iii. 232). Here I was echoing—but, in the act, exaggerating—Bergson's dictum that 'the apparition of each of these souls has been like the creation of a new species' (Bergson, op. cit., pp. 96–97)—and this dictum is itself an exaggeration, as, on reconsideration, I now believe (see p. 568 of the present volume, footnote 2). I have thus exposed myself to suspicions that I am a fascist, though, of all current ideologies, fascism is the most odious to me, and I entirely agree with Coulborn (*ibid.*, p. 58) in seeing, as the ideal, 'the maximum freedom for the creative urge of all men and the strongest unity of spirit between men'. Trinkaus, for instance, finds, in my theory of mass-mimesis, 'a disguised theory of social domination' (loc. cit.). F. Engel-Janosi, too, catches a fascist note in my accentuation of the role of minorities (*Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, 2. Jahrgang, Heft 4 (October, 1949), p. 269).

⁴ This point is made by A. L. Kroeber in *The Nature of Culture*, p. 42, and by W. Altree in *Toynbee and History*, p. 269.

⁵ R. Coulborn makes the perhaps rather obvious point that creativity is not confined to people who happen to be at the top of the social hierarchy (*Toynbee and History*, p. 182).

no minority that has taken a lead has ever succeeded in doing this solely in virtue of its creativity and through the charm exerted by the attractiveness of this. Even the least domineering leadership has never been able to dispense entirely with some element of force,¹ though it is also true that, conversely, even the most domineering leadership has never been able to maintain itself by force alone without some minimum degree of consent on the part of the governed. In previous volumes of this book I have, I think, underrated the effect of force in human affairs.² I need not go into this point here, as I deal with it in another place in this volume.³ For the same reason, I also need not here go into my antitheses between 'inspiration' and 'mimesis'⁴ and between originality and diffusion, except to mention, by anticipation, that both antitheses have been bridged by a middle term: A. L. Kroeber's suggestive concept of 'stimulus diffusion'. This, too, is dealt with in this volume in another place.⁵

I have also drawn too sharp a dividing line between 'civilizations' and 'primitive societies'⁶ and have confounded with each other, under the sweeping term 'primitive', different kinds of societies that have as good a claim as the civilizations have to be treated as distinct species.⁷ The development of human culture has, in fact, been a movement in which there have been more than just two steps. Civilization has been heralded in the Old World by a Neolithic type of culture, and in the Americas by a 'Formative' type, that were transitional between earlier types of culture and the civilization into which the Neolithic and the 'Formative' culture respectively blossomed.⁸ It might be judged—though such judgements are inevitably subjective—that the cultural transformation through which the Neolithic and the 'Formative' culture came to be superseded by the culture that we call 'civilization' was less revolutionary than the previous transformation through which these transitional cultures themselves had emerged from the Palaeolithic. The sharpness of the transition from the Neolithic culture to the Old-World civilizations of the first generation was mitigated by an intermediate culture, the Chalcolithic; and both the Old-World Neolithic culture and the

¹ I have been criticized for underrating the role of force in leadership by G. Masur in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 174 (1952), pp. 269-86, and by M. Watnick in *The Antioch Review*, No. 7 (Winter, 1947-8), pp. 587-602.

² A. H. Hanson submits that violence has been coeval with civilization (*Science and Society*, No. 13 (1949), pp. 118-35).

³ See the Annex to Chapter II, pp. 612-15.

⁴ O. Handlin rejects this antithesis (in *The Partisan Review*, July-August, 1947, pp. 371-9); and R. Coulborn makes the point that it is an unreal one (*Toynbee and History*, pp. 152-3). 'The whole art of moral education', he justly remarks, 'is to inspire and drill simultaneously'. We are all, all the time, seeking examples and at the same time serving as examples to other people (Coulborn in *Phylon*, 1940, offprint, pp. 21-30). My comment on this is that two different activities are not proved to be one and the same as a result of its being shown that they are carried on side by side.

⁵ See pp. 343-5.

⁶ See Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, pp. 423-4, and Toynbee and *History*, p. 137; A. L. Kroeber in *The American Anthropologist*, vol. 53, No. 2 (April-June, 1951), pp. 279-83; C. Trinkaus in *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1, p. 238.

⁷ I agree with P. Bagby (*Culture and History*, p. 159) that the distinction between 'civilized' and 'primitive' needs clarifying. J. K. Feibleman justly criticizes me (in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1-2 (1940), p. 24) for having ignored the possibility that there may have been an intermediate stage between primitive societies and civilizations.

⁸ See Chapter IX, pp. 327-43.

American 'Formative' culture were certainly more akin to the civilization by which they were followed than either of them was to the Early Palaeolithic Culture.¹ At this point again, however, the transition was not sharp. Between the Early Palaeolithic and the Neolithic culture there were at least two intermediate types: the Late Palaeolithic and the Mesolithic; in the Americas the Old-World Mesolithic culture has a counterpart in the 'Archaic' culture;² and at this stage the pace of cultural change—measured in terms of the average time-span of a single human generation—was immensely slower than it was at the stage in which the Neolithic culture was turning, through the Chalcolithic, into civilization.³

Measured in terms of this standard unit of the generation, the pace of cultural change has, in fact, been accelerating—and this at an accelerating rate of acceleration—since the earliest stage of human history so far known to us from disinterred relics of Man and his artefacts. In our generation the rate of acceleration has been keyed up to an unprecedented pitch; and we are having to face the questions whether there may not be a limit to the amount of cultural change to which human nature can adapt itself within a single lifetime, and whether we may not be approaching this limit or perhaps exceeding it.

In the past the impact of cultural change has been softened by a persistent survival of the old, side by side with the new. Each successive new type of culture has been embraced whole-heartedly and thoroughly by no more than a minority, and, even within this minority, ancient cultural habits have held their own. Hunting, for instance, which was one of Palaeolithic Man's two staple ways of winning his livelihood, has survived into the age of civilization as a highly appreciated form of 'sport'; and in the form of fishing, which has proved to be its most efficient and least rapidly exhaustible form, hunting has remained a staple part of Man's economy. Even now we are only just beginning to replace hunting in the sea by the method of deliberate cultivation that we have been following on the land since the Old-World Neolithic and the American 'Formative' age.⁴

In more general terms it may be said, with truth, that, although all but a tiny fraction of mankind is to be found today within the ambit of one or other of the living civilizations, the so-called 'dead' civilizations still survive in the legacies that they have bequeathed to the living civilizations and in the 'renaissances' that they have evoked in the

¹ A. R. Burn points out that 'there is no case on record of what we may perhaps call truly primitive societies, that is pure "food-gatherers"', being successfully brought within the orbit of a civilization, whereas so-called primitive peoples who have passed through the agricultural revolution often have so been. Food-gatherers find the strain of such forcible integration into an alien society too great, and die out, like the West Indian islanders and most of the North American Indians; while African slaves are successfully—from the invaders' point of view—introduced to replace them' (*History*, February–October, 1956, pp. 7–8). Burn cites other pertinent examples.

² According to Willey's and Phillips', as opposed to Spinden's, usage of the term 'Archaic' (see pp. 340–3).

³ See further Chapter IX, pp. 327–43.

⁴ Examples of this substitution of cultivation for hunting are the institution of hatcheries for fish, the laying-down of oyster-beds, and, in Japan, the cultivation of both oysters and edible seaweed on the grand scale on rafts moored in the sea in sheltered inlets. This Japanese pioneering enterprise in cultivating the sea may perhaps foreshadow what may become Man's main source of food if the planet's total human population ever reaches the numbers that have been forecast.

histories of these.¹ More than that, the Neolithic culture of the Old World and the 'Formative' culture of the Americas still survive in the living civilizations or—it might be more accurate to say—under their surface.² Something between two-thirds and three-quarters of the living generation of mankind is accounted for by a peasantry that is still in the Neolithic state of mind and is virtually still leading the Neolithic way of life,³ notwithstanding the fact that they have long since learnt to use some of the metal tools and other pieces of Post-Neolithic equipment that have been invented in the nurseries of civilization within the last five or six thousand years.⁴ Again, it may be said, with truth, that, though all but a tiny fraction of the living generation of mankind is to be found today within the ambit of one or other of the higher religions, even the minority that is not still living virtually in the Neolithic or 'Formative' age is virtually still living in the age of civilization as it was before the higher religions made their appearance. The higher religions have suffered many backslidings in their attempts to shake themselves free from the lower religions out of which they have sprung, and, in relapsing to this lower level, they have relapsed into being integral parts of societies that are not exclusively, or even primarily, of a religious nature.⁵ The effect produced on the majority of mankind by the higher religions, during the two and a half millennia of their existence up to date, has perhaps been still slighter than the effect of the civilizations during their five millennia.⁶

All the same, the influence of the civilizations and the higher religions has made up to some extent for its superficiality up to date by the speed and range of its diffusion. This point is illustrated by the very widespread present use of metal tools among a peasantry that is otherwise still Neolithic. Since a very early stage in the successive rises of civilization and higher religion, each of these two ways of life has made an impact on all surviving earlier ways, and has influenced all of them in some degree, without yet having completely put any of them out of

¹ P. A. Sorokin makes the point that many elements of civilizations that are customarily written off as being dead are, in truth, alive today (*Toynbee and History*, p. 184).

² This point is discussed further in the Annex to Chapter II, pp. 602-4. It is made in general terms by R. Coulborn in *Phylon*, 1940, offprint, p. 53. In the particular case of the Maya province of the Middle American Civilization it is debated by S. F. de Borhegyi in *American Antiquity*, vol. xxi, No. 4 (1956), pp. 343-56, and by G. R. Willey in *The American Anthropologist*, vol. 58, No. 5 (October, 1956), pp. 777-82.

³ This point is made by C. S. Coon in *The History of Man*, p. 151.

⁴ L. Mumford criticizes me for ignoring the primitive elements that survive in the living civilizations (*Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 14).

⁵ See pp. 85-97. There is this much justification in R. Coulborn's charge that I have drawn too sharp a line between 'higher religions' and others (*Toynbee and History*, pp. 155-6). It is true that in religion, as in everything else, the distinctions drawn by human minds are necessities of the process of thinking which misrepresent, to some extent, the Reality that we are trying to apprehend. In reality there are gradations and interpenetrations, not sharp dividing lines or clean cuts. All the same, the epiphany of the higher religions is, I should say, the most outstanding event in recorded human history up to date; and, if I am right in holding this controversial opinion, then the distinction that I have drawn between 'higher' and 'lower' religions will be a closer approximation to Reality than a view of religion in which different levels or species of it are not distinguished.

⁶ Chr. Dawson justifiably questions a suggestion of mine that the rise of the higher religions might lead to the civilizations withering away (*Toynbee and History*, p. 133). R. L. Shinn asks whether a church can really take the place of the civilizations (*Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 233).

action. Human culture is, in fact, now stratified, like the surface of the planet on which it subsists, in a heap of layers that still remain distinct enough from each other to provide a decipherable record of a series of passages of history. It has still to be seen whether our current 'post-modern' civilization, with its unprecedented penetrative power, will be able to perform the unprecedented feat of fusing all the diverse strata of society into a single homogeneous social magma with the consistency, and perhaps the savour, of processed cheese. Meanwhile, it is evident that the different strata of culture have not only been more numerous than I have allowed for, but have also been less sharply divided. They have coexisted with each other, and there has already been much mutual interpenetration. My over-simplified antithesis between just one age of primitive culture and just one succeeding age of civilization has to be corrected accordingly.

I have also been criticized for having exaggerated the sharpness of the demarcation between one civilization or higher religion and another. Here, I think, it is my critics who are in error. They have mistaken an operational procedure of mine for a definitive account of my view of Reality, and they have fallen into this error in spite of my having, in this case, certainly made it clear what I was doing. In introducing my notion of a civilization as being 'an intelligible field of study', and in illustrating this idea by taking the Hellenic example of a civilization as my working 'model', I took note, at the very beginning of this book, of the relativity of the separateness, in reality, of any unit that one might pick out. I noted, for instance, at this early stage, that the Hellenic and the Western civilizations were related to each other by a link which I labelled 'apparentation-and-affiliation'. I noted that the Christian Church had played something like the role of a chrysalis in the transition from the disintegration of the Hellenic Society to the genesis of the Western. I noted that Christianity itself had arisen out of an encounter between two civilizations, the Hellenic and the Syriac. I noted that, in modern times, the Western Civilization had had encounters with almost every other living civilization and pre-civilizational culture. I gave a plan of the whole book in which I showed that I did not intend to confine myself to a comparative study of civilizations in which I should be treating these, provisionally, not only as if they were so many specimens of their species, but also as if each specimen were entirely self-contained and therefore entirely intelligible if studied by itself. I announced my intention of going on to study the contacts between civilizations—both those between contemporaries and those between non-contemporaries that are commonly described as being renaissances of a 'dead' civilization in the course of the history of a living one. And I did eventually carry out this intention in volumes viii and ix. It is true that some of the charges against me, on the ground that I had treated civilizations as closed systems, were made in reviews of the first two batches of volumes. But in each batch the plan of the whole book was printed and displayed conspicuously, and this ought, I think, to have led the critics to suspend judgement on this point, pending the publication of the promised discussion of 'contacts'. On this point, therefore, I feel no conviction of sin.

I have also been criticized—in this case, rightly, I think—for having painted in too strong colours the contrast between the state of a civilization in its growth stage and its state after it has broken down, if it happens to be one of the civilizations that have come to grief. E. I. Watkin¹ and C. Trinkaus² contend that I distinguish these two stages from each other too sharply, and P. A. Sorokin³ that my ‘uniformities of growth and decline . . . are largely fantastic and are not borne out by the facts’. A. R. Burn contends⁴ that ‘there is no real distinction between’ my “growing” and “broken-down” civilizations in point of brutality or “radiation by charm”. He illustrates this contention from Hellenic history.

“The seventh and sixth centuries, the period of the most rapid growth of Greek culture, are known in political history as the “Age of the Tyrants”: a period of violent, often bloody, and at times atrocious class-conflict and revolution, affecting precisely those cities which took the most active part in the transformation of Greek society, and in the efflorescence of a new art.”⁵

Richard Pares, too, contends⁶ that periods of growth are not, in fact, periods of harmony; and other critics have made the same point with regard to particular features in my picture.

W. Altree observes,⁷ with regard to Sinic history, that the spirit of the Sinic Civilization was militaristic and aggressive throughout the Shang and Chou periods, and that the intensification of warfare in and after the seventh century B.C. was due, not to any spiritual change from bad to worse, but to an increase in the means of making war and in the prizes to be won by it (the introduction of iron tools, draft animals, irrigation, and manure strengthened the economic sinews of war by increasing productivity and so providing a larger surplus, beyond the requirements of bare subsistence, for expenditure on war, while the growth of cities created a market economy which, in its turn, accumulated stores of grain large enough to be worth raiding). M. Watnick contends⁸ that creative and uncreative minorities are not confined respectively to periods of social growth and periods of social disintegration in the senses in which I use these terms. J. K. Feibleman remarks⁹ that the social maladies, and the attempted remedies for them, that I depict, are not confined to periods of social disintegration. O. Handlin makes the same point, with regard, in particular, to archaism and futurism.¹⁰ A. H. Hanson makes the point that disturbances, unrest, and revolutions are normal elements in the process of history at all times.¹¹ P. A. Sorokin,¹² R. H. S. Crossman,¹³ and A. R. Burn¹⁴ point out

¹ In *The Tablet*, 12th August, 1939.

² In *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), pp. 218–39.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 185.

⁴ In *History*, February–October, 1956, p. 5.

⁵ Ibid. In *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 259.

⁶ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 257–8.

⁷ In *The Antioch Review*, No. 7 (Winter, 1947–8), pp. 587–602.

⁸ In *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 29.

⁹ O. Handlin in *The Partisan Review*, July–August, 1947, pp. 371–9.

¹⁰ A. H. Hanson in *Science and Society*, No. 13 (1949), pp. 118–35.

¹¹ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 185–6. ¹² In *The New Statesman*, 8th March, 1947.

¹³ In *History*, February–October, 1956, p. 4.

that barbarians have not been assimilated peacefully by expanding civilizations when these were in their growth-stage—for instance, not by the Hellenic Civilization before 431 B.C. Barbarians have always resisted attempts to subjugate or expropriate them, in whatever state the aggressive civilization may happen to have found itself at the time. This is true, and Burn is right in saying¹ that

'the hostility of the barbarian west towards Greek expansion, even while it continues to import and to be stimulated by Greek works of art, culminates in the "barbarian reaction" of the sixth century, in which members of every unconquered people with which the Greeks were in contact take part, as allies or hired warriors, in the concerted efforts of Carthage and the Etruscans to halt the Greek colonists . . . and to expel them.'

Burn here puts his finger on a distinction that I have missed, though it is essential for a proper presentation of the point that I have been trying to make about the difference in the attitude of the barbarians towards a neighbour civilization in different phases of this civilization's history. The point is that people feel and act differently on the cultural and on the political plane. The common experience of sharing, or appreciating, the same culture does not deter different political communities from fighting each other, and, conversely, fighting each other does not deter them from sharing, or appreciating, the same culture. Englishmen who were fighting Germans in the First and the Second World War did not lose their love of German music or cease to think of it as being *their* music; and Germans who were fighting Englishmen in the same wars did not lose their love of Shakespeare's plays or cease to think of these as being *theirs*. Similarly, the barbarians who resisted Greek aggression by force of arms in the 'growth-stage' of the Hellenic Civilization continued, as Burn testifies, to feel the attraction of the civilization and therefore went on Hellenizing themselves voluntarily. On the eve of Hellenism's fifth-century catastrophe, Ducetius, the Sicel patriot who had led his Sicilian fellow barbarians' last forlorn hope in their struggle to throw off the yoke of the aggressive colonial Greek city-state Syracuse, went into exile at Corinth, Syracuse's mother city in Continental Greece, and eventually returned to Sicily in order to found in his own country a city-state on the Hellenic pattern.

Other barbarians fought the Hellenes, as Ducetius fought them, from beginning to end of the long history of the Hellenic World's relations with its barbarian neighbours; but the Hellenic Civilization did not captivate all barbarian leaders of resistance movements in all chapters of the story, as, in the earlier chapters, it had captivated Ducetius and his predecessors. There came a time when barbarians became unwilling to receive the Hellenic Civilization without giving it a distinguishing twist of their own, or even unwilling to receive it at all. This change in the barbarians' attitude towards Hellenism is, I believe, a verifiable historical event, and an important one. I also believe that it was due, not to a change in the barbarians' own spirit, but to a change in the character of

¹ Ibid.

the Hellenic Civilization with which they were in contact. This change was, in fact, the change for the worse that I have sought to indicate in coining my terms 'growth' and 'disintegration'. On the level of feeling, the difference in the state of things before and after this change has been well put by D. B. Richardson.¹ Participants in a growing civilization feel, he notes, an 'exultation', based on their religious sense, which may be described as 'exaltation'. On the other hand, there is an absence of exultation among participants in a civilization that is in decline.

Besides being criticized for having drawn a distinction between 'growth-periods' and 'disintegration-periods', or at any rate for having painted the contrast between the two in excessively strong colours, I have been criticized for trying to determine too precisely the moment at which the change that I call the 'breakdown' of a civilization occurred. In general, Pieter Geyl, for example, finds the sharpness of my demarcations between different phases of history unconvincing.² In particular, I have been criticized—for example by H. Michell,³ P. A. Sorokin,⁴ W. den Boer,⁵ J. F. Leddy,⁶ M. S. Bates,⁷ D. M. Robinson,⁸ and A. R. Burn⁹—for having picked out the year 431 B.C. (the date of the outbreak of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War) as a moment at which the Hellenic Civilization brought upon itself a 'breakdown' from which it never succeeded in recovering. I have come across only one reviewer (J. Vogt)¹⁰ who has endorsed this date of mine, and he has endorsed it only after much hesitation.

Are 'epoch-making' events realities, or are they figments of the imagination? I do not know what has been the experience of other people, now alive, who were grown-up at the time of the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914. For me that moment has been 'epoch-making' ever since. My lifetime, viewed in retrospect, is still divided into a 'pre-1914' and a 'post-1914' period as sharply as the traditional Western scheme of chronology divides all history into 'B.C.' and 'A.D.' At the moment of the outbreak, in 1914, of a great and evidently fateful war in the society into which I happened to have been born, I felt myself suddenly understanding what (it seemed to me) Thucydides must have felt at the moment of the outbreak of war in his society in 431 B.C. Leddy suggests¹¹ that I have been too much impressed by 'Thucydides' point of view and that this is what has led me to make too much of the date 431 B.C.—as, in Leddy's opinion, I have done. Actually, it was my own experience in A.D. 1914 that made me appreciate what Thucydides had felt in 431 B.C., and made me endorse Thucydides' view of the importance of the great war whose history he resolved, there and then, to write. Whatever may be the verdict of posterity on the historical importance or unimportance of the year A.D. 1914 in Western

¹ In *The Thomist*, vol. xx, No. 2 (April, 1957), pp. 169-70.

² In P. Geyl, A. Toynbee, and P. A. Sorokin: *The Pattern of the Past: Can We Determine It?*, pp. 73-74.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 83.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁶ In *The Phoenix*, vol. 11, No. 4 (1957), p. 149.

⁷ In *Christianity and Crisis*, vol. 15, No. 4 (21st March, 1955), pp. 27-30 and 32.

⁸ In *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

⁹ In *History*, February-October, 1956, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰ In *Saeculum*, No. 2 (1955).

¹¹ In *loc. cit.*, p. 149.

history, I remain convinced, on reconsideration, that the verdict of history has already justified—and this conclusively—Thucydides' judgement of the importance of what happened to the Hellenic Civilization in the year 431 B.C. Moreover, 431 B.C. and A.D. 1914 are far from being the only dates that have been singled out by contemporaries and by posterity as being 'epoch-making'. Alexander's passage of the Hellespont, the nativity of Jesus, the *hijrah* of Muhammad, the first landfall of Columbus in the Americas, and the landfall of the *Mayflower* are a few of the more celebrated cases in point.

The criticism of my practice of singling out a definite date to mark the 'epoch-making' event of the 'breakdown' of a civilization has also been put in more general terms. Richard Pares castigates¹ my 'habit of pinning a long and complicated process to one or two salient events in order to dramatise it'. A. H. Hanson also objects² to my treating long chains of events as being consequences of particular decisions taken by particular individuals at particular moments. It is, for instance, an inadmissible simplification, Hanson considers, to trace back to something done by Pope Gregory VII in the year 1075 the character of all subsequent Western history.

'If one is prepared [he sums up] to reduce the complexity and variety of history to such a single cause-and-effect stream, any important decision can be made into the "first cause" of a whole series of events, within the category to which it applies.'

In a similar vein Sir Ernest Barker asks³ whether the West can really have been on the wrong track, as I suggest that it may have been, since the time of the Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen. J. F. Leddy pronounces⁴ that it is fantastic to suppose that events in the time of the Roman Empire could have been determined by things that had happened hundreds of years earlier. E. Dyason comments⁵ that, when one is called upon to regard, as the cause of the 'breakdown' of civilization in Egypt, events that occurred 1,700 years before its final dissolution, it is difficult to give the weight which Toynbee gives to their evidence. Philip Bagby enunciates⁶ a general law of historical causation to the effect that a cause must be proximate as well as adequate, and, like Leddy, he finds in this a ground for questioning my view that what happened in the Hellenic World in 431 B.C. exercised a continuing effect on the whole subsequent course of Hellenic history.

Bagby's law would seem to be difficult either to validate or to apply because of the intrinsic relativity of the key word 'proximate'. Its meaning depends entirely on the chronological horizon that we happen to choose, and we have a choice between any number of alternatives: there is no criterion for deciding that any one of these is the proper horizon, and that the others are inadmissible. If we take for our horizon

¹ In *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 260.

² In *Science and Society*, No. 13 (1949), pp. 118-35.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 96, 100, 101.

⁴ In *The Phoenix*, vol. 11, No. 4 (1957), p. 145.

⁵ In *The Australian Outlook*, March, 1949, p. 59.

⁶ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 107.

the beginning of the Modern Age of Western history, then only those events will be proximate that have been remembered and recounted to us by our grandparents, and this will limit the maximum run of historical causation to something like one hundred years. If we take the rise of the earliest civilizations some five thousand years ago, then any event since the emergence of the Western Civilization, some twelve hundred years ago, will be proximate for Westerners of the present generation. If we think in terms of the estimated age of life on Earth, then any event in human history since the first appearance of *homo sapiens* will be proximate. If we think in terms of the age, up to date, of this galaxy, then any event in the history of this planet will be proximate in this astronomical context. Each of these usages of the word 'proximate' is as legitimate as every other, because each of them depends directly on a particular choice of the time-span that is to be taken as our standard of measurement; and the choice is arbitrary because it is completely free. If, for the particular purpose of studying human affairs, we decide to choose for our standard one of the shorter time-spans—say, the age-of-civilization span or the age-of-mankind span—we shall get more closely to grips with Reality if we drop the inconclusive word 'proximate' and think of the time-factor in human relations in terms of an indefinite number of different definite time-scales, each governing some particular kind of relation at some particular level.

'In a civilization there are definite time-lags involved in the communication of knowledge and emotions between the thousands or millions of individual persons belonging to the commonwealth. . . . There are dialectics of ideas or concepts that unravel themselves in years, decades, and centuries. All these various time-lags are rather independent of the reason and the free will of Man.'¹

The Buddha's concepts and precepts, for example, are still actively communicating themselves to millions of His fellow human beings today, two and a half millennia after the date of His Enlightenment. What is more, the influence of every one of the forgotten human beings who have ever lived is still affecting everyone in the living generation to some infinitesimal degree.

2. THE UNAVOIDABLENESS OF COMPARATIVE STUDY BY MEANS OF MODELS

However, the problem of the nature and range of historical causation (if causation is the right word here) is not, I believe, the main question at issue between my critics and me in our debate about whether it is legitimate to draw sharp lines and to lay on strong colours when one is attempting to give a panoramic exposition of human affairs. The main question is whether one is justified in attributing to particular events a significance for the understanding of the course of events as a whole. Pares suggests, in a passage quoted above, that I pick my particular events out because they are 'salient', and that I do this in order to

¹ D. B. Richardson in *The Thomist*, vol. xx, No. 2 (April, 1957), p. 183.

'dramatise' a long and complicated process. I myself would maintain that I pick them out, not because they are salient, but because they seem to me to be illuminating, and that my objective, when I use this device, is explanation, not dramatization. My 'key' events, dates, periods, plots, and processes serve me as symbols: that is, as landmarks which, like a pioneer's blazes on tree-trunks, have a meaning that points to objects beyond themselves. These objects may be distant; a single blaze may guide a traveller who takes note of it to some spring, ford, pass, or shelter many days' march away. The token does not, of course, exhaust the meaning of the thing betokened by it; but, if it is well chosen, it will work as a key to turn a lock and thereby open a door.

An example of this intellectual operation is my use of the three-masted square-rigged sailing-ship as a symbol of the Western Civilization in its modern age (*circa* A.D. 1475-1875). John Strachey¹ has objected that the invention of this new type of ship in the West in the fifteenth century is only one among the factors which account for the West's acquisition, in this age, of an ascendancy over the rest of the World. He points out that the relation between these many various factors was intricate, and that to ascribe the whole result to the invention of the 'ship' would be to give a misleadingly simplified account of a process that was really very complicated. I should have been guilty of this error if I had sought to present the 'ship' as being the sole and whole cause of the West's rise, in the modern age, to a position of world-wide hegemony. My intention, however, was not that. For me the 'ship' is not so much a cause as a symbol—the most illuminating one within my knowledge—of the new spirit which made the West's modern triumphal progress possible.

Of course, this new spirit also manifested itself in a thousand other outward and visible signs, and some of these, too, could be used, and have been used, as symbols of it. It is in the nature of a symbol that it has no monopoly. It has none because it is not identical or coextensive with the object that it symbolizes. If it were this, it would be, not a symbol of the thing, but the thing itself. A critic is falling into an error if he supposes that a symbol is intended to be a reproduction of the thing that it is really intended, not to reproduce, but to illuminate. His shafts fly wide of the mark if they are launched under this misapprehension. The test by which a symbol stands or falls is not whether it does or does not faithfully reproduce the object to which it points; the test is whether it throws light on that object or obscures our understanding of it. The effective symbol is the illuminating one, and effective symbols are an indispensable part of our intellectual apparatus. This is the meaning of the at first sight paradoxical dictum that, in order to grasp the real context, we have to construct an unreal one.² Of course, the constructor of a symbol does not introduce unreality into it out of perversity. In so far as a symbol does depart from Reality, it falls into danger of defeating its constructor's purpose by becoming misleading. In my attempts to construct symbols in this book, I am sure to have made errors of this

¹ In unpublished correspondence.

² Max Weber, cited by J. Romein in *Toynbee and History*, p. 347.

kind. Some of these have, in fact, been pointed out by my critics. Having to make a symbol unreal at the risk of making it misleading is one of the awkward necessities of thought. It is necessary because, if a symbol is not simplified and sharpened to a degree that reduces it to something like a sketch-map of the piece of Reality on which it is modelled, it will not work as an instrument for intellectual action.

When a symbol is used as an instrument it becomes a 'model', in the sense in which this word has come to be used apropos of scientific investigation.

'Men think in terms of models. We may think of our thought as consisting of symbols which are put in relations or sequences according to operating rules. Together, a set of symbols and a set of rules may constitute what we call a calculus, a logic, a game, or a model. It will have some structure, i.e. some pattern of distribution of relative discontinuities, and some "laws" of operation.'¹

Whether a model resembles anything in the outside world can be discovered only by verification.² When we verify a model by testing how far it does or does not correspond to the phenomena, this is, of course, not an end in itself but only a means to an end. Our ulterior purpose is not to learn whether the model is or is not valid; it is to get new insight into the structure and nature of Reality by applying a model that is valid and is therefore an effective tool. How far the model is or is not valid is not a matter of any intrinsic interest in itself. As Bagby puts it,³

'It seems best to look on models as a heuristic device rather than as the goal of our studies. In so far as the models appear to be valid, we might look on them, not indeed as a description of the events, but as a description of the interrelationships of certain factors present in the events. A full understanding of the events would involve the elucidation of all the other factors present, factors which we may not be able to identify.'

In this context Bagby suggests that it might be useful to set up a model for the development of a major civilization. This is what I have done in previous volumes of this book, though I have done it without being altogether conscious of what I have been doing, and indeed without knowing, until recently, the current term of art for this intellectual operation. I have constructed my model from the pattern of Hellenic history and the pattern of its relations with the histories of Christianity and of the Western Civilization, as these patterns present themselves to me. The extensiveness of my use of this model has been noted by a number of my critics.⁴ A majority of them, in noting this, have pro-

¹ K. W. Deutsch in *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1951), p. 230.

² Ibid.

³ P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 201.

⁴ For instance, R. T. Clark in *The Nineteenth Century and After* (November, 1941); A. J. P. Taylor in *Toynbee and History*, p. 115; K. W. Thompson, *ibid.*, p. 215; W. den Boer, *ibid.*, p. 226; Granville Hicks, quoted by E. Fiess, *ibid.*, p. 380 (Hicks, as here quoted, speaks of my Hellenic 'paradigm'); J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 20; C. Trinkaus in *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), pp. 224 and 237; K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 191; Paul M. Sweezy in *The Nation*, 19th October, 1946; J. A. Tor-

nounced that I have worked this model to death or have made of it a bed of Procrustes into which I have fitted the histories of other civilizations by doing violence to them.¹ These criticisms would have led me to reconsider my use of this model, even if I had not felt myself moved to do so spontaneously. I am going to do this in the present chapter; but first I must explain why I believe that a model, or a set of models, is an indispensable instrument for anyone who is trying to organize a comprehensive study of human affairs.²

In setting out on this large enterprise the explorer can find guidance for the first stage of his course in a pair of instructions. He must recognize the truths that, since he is a human being, his standpoint will be a relative one and his attitude a self-centred one, and he must take account of these two truths in his policy for action. He must accept the limitations of relativity by starting operations, consciously and deliberately, from his own time and place. He must reject the limitations of self-centredness by seeing to it that he does not end up at the point from which he has started. One's own time and place are clearly not the culmination of all history.

I have tried to follow this pair of instructions in my own work. I am a Westerner born in A.D. 1889, so I took as my starting-point the recent Western practice of making all human history culminate in the Western inquirer's own country in his own time. If I had been an Englishman of an earlier generation—a contemporary of the Venerable Bede's or even

modsen and G. C. Wasberg in *Samtiden*, vol. 58, hefte 12 (Oslo 1949), pp. 647-60; H. Frankfort in *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 21-22 and 26-27; W. H. McNeill in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*; the Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr., *ibid.*

As Erdmann puts it, 'the Hellenic Civilization is', in my vision, 'not an exemplar, but an archetype. . . . It might be still truer to Toynbee's intent to say that, running through Hellenic history, the completed archetypal career of a civilization becomes visible, and that this civilization serves as a transparent medium through which the phenomenon of civilization itself can be apprehended in its archetypal form (*Die Antike . . . ist, nicht Vorbild, sondern Urbild. Oder vielleicht wird man der Absicht Toynbees noch gerechter, wenn man sagt, dass durch sie hindurch ein urbildlicher Kulturablauf abgeschlossen sichtbar werde, dass sie transparent sei für das Urphänomen der Kultur*).'

¹ For instance: Sir Ernest Barker finds that my analogies with Hellenic history are sometimes fanciful (*Toynbee and History*, p. 92). Chr. Hill finds that I devote 'enormous ingenuity to the task of discovering other "societies" which will fit into' my 'plan, and to working out parallels between them and' my 'norm' (*The Modern Quarterly*, Autumn, 1947, p. 292). W. den Boer finds that I force other civilizations into the framework of the Hellenic Civilization by Procrustean methods (*ibid.*, p. 226). H. E. Barnes finds that my use of the Hellenic model constrains me frequently 'to squeeze' my 'facts into a pattern and framework which they do not always fit' (*An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, p. 721). The same judgement is passed by J. K. Feibleman (*T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 20); A. Hourani (*The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December 1955), p. 381); W. Gurian (*The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1942), p. 512); T. J. G. Locher (*De Gids*, May 1948, offprint, pp. 6-8); K. D. Erdmann (*loc. cit.*, pp. 224-5), with particular reference to my use of the Roman Empire as a model for universal states; F. Hampl (*the Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 173, Heft 3 (1952), p. 458); R. K. Merton (*The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xlvii, No. 2 (September, 1941), pp. 205-13); Hajo Holborn (*The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947), with particular reference to my use of the Roman Empire; J. A. Tormodsen and G. C. Wasberg (*Samtiden*, vol. 58, hefte 12 (Oslo 1949), pp. 647-60); J. Bishko (*The Richmond News Leader*, 21st October, 1954); H. Frankfort (*The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 24, 30-31, 99).

E. Fieser declares that my Hellenic paradigm 'persuades as it pervades'. But Fieser is in a minority.

² Vico, for instance, found a model in the history of Italy, as Engel-Janosi points out in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

of Saint Thomas More's—I should, no doubt, have made history culminate, not in England, but in Western Christendom; for, at any date from the conversion of the English to Christianity down to the Reformation, the consciousness of being an adherent of the Western Christian Church would have overshadowed the consciousness of being a subject of the English Crown in the thoughts and feelings of an inhabitant of the Kingdom of England—or, rather, of one or other of the Roman Patriarchate's two arch-dioceses of Canterbury and York. The priority of ecclesiastical over political allegiance was symbolized locally in the shrine of the martyr Saint Thomas Becket, until King Henry VIII plundered and desecrated this shrine and sent another Saint Thomas to his death. If I had happened to live in an age in which the Western Christian Church, not the Kingdom of England, would have been my natural starting-point, I should have had a different experience in the later course of my explorations.¹ I should not have been pulled up short, and compelled to change my plan of operations, by finding, as I did find, that the higher religions could not be dealt with adequately within the framework of a comparative study of civilizations. On the other hand, I might then have found that the framework of a comparative study of higher religions, which I should have adopted if I had been doing my work in the eighth century or in the early decades of the sixteenth, was not entirely adequate for dealing with the civilizations, not to speak of the pre-civilizational societies.

However, I happened to be born in 1889, so, for me, there was no question of taking my ancestral religion as my starting-point. As a matter of course I took my native country. I then duly rejected the self-regarding hallucination of mistaking the England of my time for the culmination of history. I found that England, taken by itself, was not, in fact, an 'intelligible field of study' either in my time or at any earlier date since the time when such a thing as England had first become discernible on the political map. I therefore went in search of the minimum unit, of which England is a part, that might be found intelligible if treated as being self-contained, and I found this in the Western Civilization. Having thus identified my native specimen of a species of society that not only was larger than a nation-state but also was more intelligible, in virtue of approaching nearer to being self-contained, I became aware of the presence of the other living civilizations with which the West was in contact in my day. Between them, they and the West account for all but a fraction of the whole living generation of mankind. But, for the purpose of a comprehensive study of human affairs, the civilizations in this set have a common property which greatly detracts from their usefulness. Just because they are still alive, their histories are not yet finished; and at least one complete specimen of the history of a civilization is a necessary first piece of material evidence for a study of the species.

I therefore probed backwards in time, towards the origins of my own native Western Civilization, till I struck the latter end of an earlier one, the Hellenic, to which the Western Civilization is affiliated through

¹ This point is taken up again on p. 218.

the Christian Church. The history of this Hellenic Civilization was a complete specimen of its kind. It had certainly come to an end, for in my day there was no longer any Hellenic Civilization in existence. It had long ago been superseded by two successors: the Western Civilization and the West's sister and contemporary, the Byzantine Civilization. The history of the Hellenic Civilization also certainly did not extend backwards in time beyond our ken, for it was known to have had, not only successors, but also a predecessor, the Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean Civilization. Here, then, in the history of the Hellenic Civilization, was the specimen history of a civilization for which I was looking. It had one general merit and two special merits for a Western inquirer. Its general merit was its completeness. It had an identifiable beginning and end, and the whole story, in between, was on record, at least in outline. Its special merits for a Western inquirer were its link with Western history and its familiarity to a Westerner. Even if he had not been educated in the Greek and Latin classics, he would be likely to know more about Hellenic history than about the history of any other civilization outside his own.

Now that I had found my complete specimen of the history of a civilization, how was I to use it for my purpose? This purpose was to explore ways and means of organizing a comprehensive study of human affairs; and, from the start of my inquiry, I had rejected the customary presentation of history that leads the whole of it up to the inquirer's own time and place. This means rejecting a single-track chart of history; for it is only by making it all lead up to oneself that one can persuade oneself that history runs along a single line. From any non-self-centred standpoint it will be evident that history must run simultaneously along two separate lines as a minimum. Two is the minimum for the history of living beings of any species in which the mode of reproduction is the sexual one; and any such species that was actually represented by no more than one specimen of each sex would be, of course, on the verge of extinction. In order to have a reasonable prospect of survival, a species must have dozens of representatives or millions; and, whatever may be the species that we are studying, the number of representatives of it with which we shall have to reckon is sure to be of the plural order of magnitude, not the dual or the singular. In fact, a single-track chart of the history of anything whatsoever will be a false picture of Reality: a picture of it in which the truth has been distorted by the observer's uncorrected egocentricity. A multiple-track chart is the true picture of the movement of the phenomenal universe or of any part of it. This finding applies, of course, to the study of the histories of civilizations and of higher religions. It is impossible to force all the known specimens into a configuration that makes them all culminate in some single point-moment.

If we try, for instance, to make the histories of all the known civilizations lead up to the West in our time, we shall not be able to find any place for the Byzantine and Islamic civilizations at any date before the West impinged on them in the Crusades, or for the civilizations in India, Eastern Asia, and the Americas at any date before the landfalls of

Western ships on their coasts in and after the last decade of the fifteenth century. Alternatively, if we try to make them all lead up to China in our time, we shall not be able to find any place for the Indian, Islamic, Byzantine, Western, or pre-Columbian American civilizations. A single-track chart of history leading up to present-day China will be able to take account of Indian history only since the first century of the Christian Era, when Buddhism made its first lodgement on Chinese soil. It will be able to take account of Islamic history only since the thirteenth century, when Islam gained a foothold in north-western and south-western China in the wake of the Mongol conquest. It will be able to take account of Western history only since the sixteenth century, when the first Portuguese ships reached Chinese ports. Moreover, in so far as any of the alternative possible single-track charts does have to take account, however fragmentarily, of the parallel histories of contemporary civilizations, it is confessing its own invalidity; for it is admitting the existence of civilizations whose histories cannot be accommodated on its own single track.

Corresponding difficulties would arise from the use of a single-track chart if we were taking the histories of the higher religions as our units of study. For example, the traditional Christian chart of mankind's religious history makes the whole of it lead up to Christianity via Judaism from Abraham and via Abraham from Adam. But this Christian chart is, of course, unacceptable to the adherents of all the other higher religions. It is unacceptable to Muslims because their chart makes the whole lead up from Adam via Abraham to 'the pure religion of Abraham': that is to say, Islam. It is unacceptable to Jews because, for them, the single track reaches its divinely appointed terminus in themselves, and they reject, as preposterous, the Muslims' and the Christians' rival claims to have superseded the Jews in the role of being God's 'Chosen People'. Finally, the Christian chart is unacceptable to Zoroastrians, Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, and Confucians because it completely ignores their existence. But, if we were to try to appease feelings wounded by the Christian chart by substituting the Confucian or the Buddhist chart for it, we should run into the same trouble in reverse. We should be wounding the feelings of the adherents of all three religions of the Judaic family. In short, whether the units in terms of which we are thinking are higher religions or civilizations or entities of any other kind, single-track charts of history will not work. Multiple-track charts are the only kind that will fit the phenomena as we find them.

In a mental picture, fitting the phenomena is a supreme merit. It tells decisively in favour of multiple-track charts as against single-track charts. But the price of the intellectual gain won by rising from the singular to the plural is the consequent presentation of an intellectual problem that a single-track chart does not raise: the problem of organizing the data.

So long as one is following a single track, no problem of organization arises. The observer has merely to take events as he finds them; he finds them in a sequence; and a sequence can be reproduced in a narrative. But, as soon as he refuses to keep to a single track any longer, the

observer finds himself with a number of simultaneous phenomena on his hands. These cannot be dealt with in a single narrative, because they do not constitute a single sequence. A number of different narratives have now to be brought into some kind of relation with each other, and *ex hypothesi* this relation cannot be the narrational one, since it is not possible to be telling more than one story at a time. When we have to establish a relation between two or more series of concurrent events, this requires us to take a synoptic view of them, and that, in turn, requires us to study them comparatively. For example,

'The situations in from 13 to 48 states cannot be adequately described in a unified narrative; to have meaning, they need to be seen in an analytical structure.'¹

And we can have a history of particular monarchies or a sociology of monarchy, but not a history of monarchy.² The history of European literature, too, can be studied only analytically—that is, comparatively.³ In more general terms,

'An approach that uses the concepts of structure and process leads us to ask questions that cannot be answered merely by identifying the succession of events. Events are of the moment, episodic; process and structure have duration in time, recognisable patterns, and a high degree of continuity.'⁴

A comparative study of a number of specimens means noting their likenesses and differences with a view to discovering whether or not there is a standard type to which they conform, notwithstanding their individual peculiarities. But in order to make our comparison with any assurance we have also to satisfy ourselves that the specimens which we are proposing to compare are properly comparable.⁵ Here are two intellectual operations that are required of us as soon as we adopt a multiple-track chart of the phenomena in place of the self-regarding and misleading single-track one; and this is where the construction of a model can, I believe, serve us in good stead. My own use of my Hellenic model has been criticized by Erich Voegelin⁶ in the following terms:

'The construction of type-concepts, which should be based on the civilizational courses, slides over, in the practice of the operation, into the entirely different task of identifying societies as members of the species through the application of the type-concepts, developed from the limited basis, to data which are assumed to be fragments of civilizational courses of the same type.'

I do not dispute Voegelin's account of what I have done, but I do dispute the suggestion—if I am right in detecting this—that what I have

¹ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 161.

² A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 97.

³ E. R. Curtius in *Merkur*, 1. Jahrgang, Viertes Heft [Heft 4] (1947), p. 496.

⁴ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 97.

⁵ This obvious but fundamental point is made by H. E. Barnes in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, p. 732.

⁶ In *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

done is not intellectually legitimate. What Voegelin is describing is, I should say, the normal heuristic use of an hypothesis, and, if this is the use that I have made of my Hellenic model, as I believe it is, then I do not think that my practice needs reconsideration or revision.

It is true that the operation of constructing a model is different from the operation of testing whether it fits the phenomena.¹ But, so far from its being proper to dissociate the two operations from each other, it would seem to be impossible to obtain sure results from either of them if they are not carried out in conjunction. The model has to be constructed out of only a fraction of the total body of data, or we should never be able to mount it for use in investigating the remainder. But, just on this account, the structure will remain tentative and provisional until it has been tested by application to all the rest of the data within our knowledge.² Conversely, our picture of the data as a whole will remain chaotic until we have found a model that brings out in them a pattern of specimens of a species. Unless we bring these two operations into conjunction with each other by conducting them simultaneously and interdependently, we cannot tell whether or not our provisional model provides a genuine clue to some principle of order in the apparent chaos, or whether this particular model must be modified or supplemented or discarded in favour of another. Nor can we tell whether the items in a particular conglomeration of data that we have picked out of the chaos, like a child picking spillikins out of a heap, have any significant common features, or whether they merely happen to have hung together accidentally. In performing each of the two operations, we have provisionally to anticipate the results of the other operation. The untested results of each provide a test—and this the only test at our disposal—of the other operation's validity. This reciprocal checking and counter-checking of unchecked assumptions may or may not be a form of arguing in a circle; but, even if it can properly be convicted of being that, it is useless to condemn the procedure on that account, because it is impossible to renounce it without renouncing the whole activity of thinking.

There is nothing unfamiliar about this mental procedure. It is the analytical and classificatory procedure which, as has been noted at the beginning of this volume, is the human mind's fundamental mode of operation and is consciously and deliberately followed in scientific inquiry,³ including the scientific study of human affairs. This is, indeed, the only way in which our minds can work either in the scientific field or in the practical one, since in all fields we have to cope with simultaneous phenomena in large quantities. This problem of dealing with large quantities besets the student of human affairs when he is approaching them as an historian no less than when he is approaching them as a

¹ G. Buchdahl, in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 168, quotes a dictum of Newton's about Newton's own method of work: 'In this philosophy, propositions are deduced from phenomena and afterwards made general by induction.' Buchdahl labels Newton's first step 'the inductive process' and the second step 'the inductive inference'.

² I hold (see pp. 41-45 and 244-6), as Bagby holds, that 'we shall only be able to judge our scheme when we have applied it to the actual facts of history and seen what results it gives us' (*Culture and History*, p. 202).

³ See pp. 9-13.

sociologist or a psychologist. Why, then, do some historians feel a repugnance, which psychologists and sociologists do not share, to applying the analytical and classificatory procedure to human affairs? The reason for this repugnance is apparent if Kroeber is right, as I believe he is, in holding¹ that the essence of the historian's approach is a concern to preserve the integrity of events, in all their individual complexity, in his way of presenting and explaining them. In any case the repugnance is both unquestionable and characteristic. It is illustrated, for example, by a comment of Sir Ernest Barker's on my work.

'With the passion of unity there naturally goes a zest for schematization: a zest for seeing history and the whole past in abstract general terms: a zest, if the phrase may be used, for "botanising" history²—for classifying in *genera* and *species* all its multitudinous data. I am inclined to call this zest by the name of "Linnaeanism". Dr Toynbee imposes patterns on history, and gives the patterns names, much as Linnaeus classified and named plants. But this raises the question whether history is really like botany.'³

Barker's answer to this question is, like Hourani's,⁴ in the negative, and he gives his reason. 'Plants have a general uniformity'; history 'is infinitely multiform'. This distinction is surely disputable. The truth surely is that all phenomena—plants, human affairs, or whatever they may be—are both multiform in some respects and uniform in others as they present themselves to human minds, and that this is the problem of knowledge and understanding with which the mind always has to cope, no matter what may be the nature of the phenomena with which it happens to be dealing in any particular case. If this is correct, the crucial question is whether history is really unlike botany in respect of the epistemological problem with which the inquirer's mind has to wrestle, and the right answer to this question is in the negative in my belief.⁵ In the paper here quoted, Barker lets this question go by default. After denying the legitimacy of applying the method of science to human affairs, he does not go on to make any suggestion for an alternative method to which a student of human affairs can resort when—as, in practice, is always the case—the quantity of simultaneous phenomena exceeds the capacity of a single narrative to carry the freight. It is just because the data of history are 'multitudinous' (to quote Barker's own word) that a resort to the method of classification, in addition to the method of narration, is, as I see it, unavoidable. If the inquirer is unwilling to resort to it, his only alternative is to accept defeat and to

¹ See the passages quoted on pp. 14 and 20.

² Cp. C. A. Beard in *The American Historical Review*, vol. xl, No. 2 (January, 1935), pp. 307-9; also F. S. Marvin in *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1935, p. 623: 'The general plan of the work, as far as it is revealed in these first three volumes, is to collect, classify, and compare all the main types of civilization which his travel and study have brought to light; and then, as the result of this classification and comparison, to draw what conclusions are possible as to the laws of growth, spread, mixture, decay, and disappearance of the various species—treating, in fact, each separated and classified civilization much as a botanist or zoologist treats a species of animal or plant.'

³ Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, p. 95.

⁴ See p. 12.

⁵ I am not alone in holding this belief. W. F. Albright, for instance, likewise holds that 'there is . . . no basic epistemological difference between *comparable* fields of history and of science' (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 115).

renounce all attempt even to present the phenomena, not to speak of trying to give some explanation of them.

This is not, of course, to say that the comparative study of human affairs is as plain sailing as the comparative study of flora or even fauna.¹ While it is not evident that human affairs are 'multiform' in some sense in which plants are not, it seems indisputable that they are more intricate than plants are; and, the greater the intricacy of the phenomena, the more difficult the quest for a model becomes. E. Voegelin observes² that adequate descriptive type-concepts are more difficult to arrive at for civilizations than they are for botanical specimens; and M. R. Cohen warns the inquirer³ that the 'single repeatable patterns of physics or physical laws have not been discovered in human affairs'. Sir Llewellyn Woodward has acutely pointed out that

'we know so many facts which lend themselves to arrangements in patterns that we can make any number of such patterns; but we do not know enough to judge between these patterns or to be sure that we are doing more than pick out chance or superficial resemblances'.⁴

Applying this consideration to my work, he justly comments⁵ that

'it would be possible to make an entirely different selection of facts and, as a result, to give an entirely different version of the development of Western Civilization during the last fifteen centuries'.

The same point is made by K. W. Thompson:⁶

'The cauldron of history is so immense and limitless that the individual historian can serve up but a tiny spoonful, and whether this can symbolise or represent the full mixture of history is always a most doubtful issue.'

This embarrassing wealth of alternative possible choices besets the student of human affairs when dealing with phenomena of the lower orders of magnitude. On the other hand, when dealing with phenomena of higher orders of magnitude—for instance, with civilizations or with 'higher religions'—he is embarrassed by a problem arising from the

¹ In spite of the evident difficulty of the enterprise, I feel fortified in my determination to persevere in it when I notice the line taken, on this issue, by a critic who has not treated me so benevolently as Sir Ernest Barker has. Philip Bagby concedes (in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 106 and 108) that 'there certainly seems to be some evidence for Dr Toynbee's (and Spengler's) thesis that there is a regular pattern of development of civilizations' and that 'a morphology of cultural and social forms and a general theory of culture-change may serve to reduce many of the puzzling phenomena to order'. In his own book, *Culture and History*, he says: 'I shall have one primary end in view, one particular problem which I wish to attempt to solve. It is the same problem which has chiefly engaged the attention of recent philosophers of history such as Spengler and Toynbee: that is, whether there is any regularity in the development of civilizations, in their slow growth and their sometimes rapid decline.' Towards the end of this volume of 'prolegomena to the comparative study of civilizations', in a chapter in which he examines some examples of similarities in the development of civilizations, Bagby takes the history of the Hellenic Civilization as his principal model. He applies this model first to the history of the Western Civilization up to date (pp. 205-10) and then to the other civilizations on his list (pp. 212-17).

² In *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

³ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 116.

⁴ Sir Llewellyn Woodward in a letter of 25th July, 1952, to the writer of this Study (quoted in ix, 211, footnote 3). Cp. R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 15.

⁵ In *The Spectator*, 18th August, 1939.

⁶ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 219.

paucity of his data at this level.¹ J. Madaule notes² that the specimens with which I am working are more scarce, besides being more complex, than a botanist's, and that the margin of error in my comparative study must be proportionately greater. It is true that the maximum number of civilizations that I originally believed I had identified is less than thirty, and for operational purposes the figure may have to be reduced considerably for various reasons. The 'arrested civilizations', as critics have pointed out,³ are a rather arbitrary selection; and two of them—the Spartan and the Ottoman—are also included in other civilizations on my list. The development of both the 'arrested' and the 'abortive' civilizations breaks off short at so early a stage that their utility for purposes of comparison is slight. And so is the utility of several of the civilizations that the archaeologists have disinterred—in this case, not because of evidence that they prematurely went to pieces or became petrified, but because the material debris of their culture, which the archaeologists have brought to light, do not enable us to reconstruct their spiritual or even their political history.

The number of specimens will be further reduced if my critics are right in contesting one of the results of my application of my Hellenic model. This model shows an earlier civilization, the Hellenic, being succeeded by a later one, the Western, that is 'affiliated' to it through a 'higher religion', Christianity, which serves as a 'chrysalis' out of which the new civilization emerges. Applying this model to Eastern Orthodox as well as to Western Christendom, I have assumed that the civilization of the Byzantine World, as well as the civilization of the medieval and modern West, is not a continuation of the Hellenic Civilization but is a successor to it with a separate identity of its own. Again, on the analogy of the role played by Christianity as a 'chrysalis', I have assumed that the same role has been played by Christianity's sister religion, Islam, and that the Islamic civilizations in the Iranic and Arabic worlds are therefore two more separate civilizations, on a par with the two Christian civilizations of Byzantium and the West. When the Hellenic model is applied to the history of civilization in India and China, it brings to light counterparts of itself there too, with the Mahayana playing Christianity's role in China and the post-Buddhaic form of Hinduism playing it in India. In previous volumes I have assumed that in these two subcontinents there has been a succession of civilizations, on the analogy of the series at the western end of the Old World. I have also assumed that there has been a similar succession in the Tigris-Euphrates basin and in Middle America, though in these two areas the break in the continuity of history was not signalized by a religious revolution. I made this series of assumptions tentatively and provisionally, in order to test how far it was borne out by the facts.⁴ Now that it has been tested by me in previous volumes and has been contested by a number of my critics,⁵

¹ See ix. 210-11 and the present volume, p. 234.

² In *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), pp. 33-34.

³ See p. 548, footnote 5, and pp. 553-4.

⁴ See i. 117-18, 133-6, 146.

⁵ For example, my analysis of the histories of India and China into the histories of two distinct civilizations, one following the other in either case, has been rejected by M. Saville (*The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. xxv, No. 1 (February, 1956), pp. 55-67).

I must experiment with the alternative policy of assuming that in Middle America, the Tigris-Euphrates basin, India, and China, and perhaps in the domains of Byzantine Christendom and Islam as well, there has been, not a succession of civilizations, but a single continuous civilization in each case, as I have assumed that there has been in the Andean area down to the Spanish conquest and in Egypt down to its conversion to Christianity. After having operated with the maximum number of civilizations, it will be a useful check on the results of the manoeuvre to repeat the operation, this time with the minimum number. But this drastic reduction in the quantity of the specimens reinforces Madaule's point that the paucity of the data for the study of civilizations is a difficulty, besetting this study, with which botany, for example, does not have to contend.

The number of effective specimens would be reduced still farther if Dawson is right in challenging¹ my postulate of the 'philosophical equivalence' of all the civilizations, and my corresponding postulate in regard to the higher religions. In spite of my respect for Dawson's judgement, I should be reluctant to defer to it on this point. A specimen is a specimen, and, if we are satisfied that we have verified a particular specimen as being a genuine one, it seems hazardous to draw distinctions between this and other specimens on the ground of differential valuations that will inevitably be subjective and therefore disputable.² All civilizations and all higher religions alike, up to date, have fallen infinitely short of their ideals; all alike have risen far above the level of older species of human society. In this perspective it seems prudent to treat all specimens of each species as each other's equals.

3. A RETRIAL OF THE HELLENIC MODEL FOR CIVILIZATIONS

Under the new and more exacting conditions to which I have just committed myself, I will now repeat the experiment, made originally near the beginning of this book, of applying my Hellenic model to the rest of the field of the histories of civilizations. Before applying it, I will dissect it, and will then apply the component parts one by one. This procedure seems likely to be illuminating, because we shall find that and by E. I. Watkin (*The Tablet*, 12th August, 1939) in respect of both cases; by N. C. Chaudhuri in respect of the Indian case (in an unpublished communication to the writer); by W. Altree (*Toynbee and History*, p. 266), by E. C. Dyason (*The Australian Outlook*, March 1949), by M. S. Bates (*Christianity and Crisis*, vol. 15, No. 4 (2nd March, 1955), pp. 27-30 and 32), and by P. L. Ralph (in the *Saturday Review*, 16th October, 1954, p. 19) in respect of the Chinese case. Watkin also rejects (in loc. cit.) my distribution of the history of Islam between the histories of two series of civilizations, the Syriac followed by the Arabic and the Iranic. Chaudhuri regards civilization in India from about A.D. 1000 down to the beginning of the impact of the Western Civilization on India as being, not a new civilization, but a 'folk civilization' into which the previous classical civilization of India (the 'Indic' in my terminology) had lapsed.

An open-minded examination, by a specialist in Chinese history, of my analysis of this has been made in *The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. viii, No. 4 (December, 1939), under the title of 'A Bisection of Chinese History', by M. E. Cameron. After pointing out the number and importance of the strands of continuity in Chinese history, Cameron agrees (p. 411) that my "Far Eastern Civilization" does have a real character of its own as distinct from that of Chinese antiquity', though evidently she would not go as far as I have gone in drawing this distinction.

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 130-1 and 134. Cp. L. Mumford in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 17.

² This point is taken up again on pp. 551-3.

different parts fit the phenomena in different degrees and in different numbers of instances. I shall keep in mind M. R. Cohen's counsel: 'Give special note to those facts that fail to fit into preconceived patterns.'¹

My Hellenic model comprises more than the internal history of the Hellenic Civilization. It also includes this civilization's relations with contemporary civilizations whose participants it annexed to its internal proletariat; its relations with Christianity; and finally its relations, through Christianity, with the subsequent Orthodox Christian and Western civilizations. This configuration of historical events can be analysed into the following elements.

One element is the configuration of the Hellenic Civilization's own political history. At the earliest stage of Hellenic history of which we have any record, there is a sharp contrast between the cultural unity of the Hellenic World and its political disunity. We find it divided up politically into a number of sovereign independent states whose citizens recognize that they are all partakers in a common culture yet are not inhibited by this from going to war with each other. In the course of time these fratricidal wars become so devastating that they bring the civilization to grief. When it is on the point of dissolution it wins a reprieve through the belated political unification of the Hellenic World in the Roman Empire. This brings temporary peace and order, but at the prohibitive price of a series of 'knock-out blows' ending in the overthrow of all political powers except for the one surviving victor. By the time when the Hellenic 'universal state' is established by Rome, the Hellenic World is already so seriously exhausted and demoralized that it proves incapable of maintaining its universal state in perpetuity; and the break-up of the Roman Empire spells the Hellenic Civilization's dissolution.

A second element is the configuration of the Hellenic Civilization's social history after its 'breakdown'. The leading minority in the society comes to depend more and more on force, and less and less on attraction, for maintaining its ascendancy. This change in the character of its relation with the majority alienates both the dominant minority's subjects within the Hellenic Civilization's domain and the primitive peoples beyond its borders who have previously been attracted towards it. These two classes turn respectively into an internal and an external 'proletariat' (in the sense of a class that is 'in' society but not 'of' it). The internal proletariat is swollen in numbers by the addition of barbarians from the external proletariat and of representatives of foreign civilizations who are forcibly incorporated in the Hellenic Civilization's internal proletariat through military conquest.

A third element is the configuration of the Hellenic Civilization's religious history in the same phase. The internal proletariat creates a higher religion, Christianity,² that draws its inspiration from one of the

¹ *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 114. The same advice is given by W. Kaufmann in *Toynbee and History*, p. 311.

² The proletarian origin of Christianity has been contested. K. D. Erdmann, for instance, maintains that it was never a mass movement (*Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 225-6).

non-Hellenic civilizations whose representatives have been incorporated in the Hellenic internal proletariat. Christianity converts the Hellenic World and also its barbarian invaders. An attempt to organize a counter-religion, Neoplatonism, professedly drawing its inspiration from native Hellenic sources, is a failure. The Christian Church, in which the Christian religion has taken social form, serves as a chrysalis out of which two new civilizations, the Eastern Orthodox Christian (*alias* Byzantine) and the Western Christian, eventually emerge after a cultural interregnum.

A fourth element is the part played by 'the external proletariat' (the barbarians). Their creativity expresses itself in epic poetry, and their nationalism in the adoption of Christianity in heretical forms (e.g. Arianism and Islam). The barbarians conquer the Hellenic universal state militarily and establish successor-states on its domain. But their contribution to the creation of the new civilizations is slight compared to 'the internal proletariat's' contribution. The matrix of the new civilizations is the Christian Church, not the Roman Empire's barbarian successor-states.

A fifth element is a series of 'renaissances' of the Hellenic culture in the course of the histories of the two 'Hellenistic' civilizations: the Byzantine and the Western. These renaissances are attempts to draw inspiration from Hellenism direct, and not merely indirectly through the medium of the Hellenic element in Christianity.

Bagby has arrived at much the same results as mine in constructing a model out of a stage-by-stage comparison of Hellenic history with Western history up to date.¹ But he has also included one important further element. He sees the course of each of these two civilizations as exhibiting 'a gradual process of "rationalisation"', which 'seems to come in two pulses or phases, two ages, one of Faith and one of Reason'.²

'Essentially this movement is one of growing rationalism and individualism. It reaches its creative peak in the seventeenth century in France (the Age of Louis XIV) and the fifth century in Athens (the Age of Pericles). This is the period when faith and reason are perfectly balanced, the period of the great triumphs of art and thought, when the basic forms of the civilization are laid down once for all.'³

It will be seen that if Bagby's schematization is superposed on mine his 'creative peak' of Hellenic history comes shortly before my 'break-down', which I equate with the outbreak of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. It corresponds, in fact, with 'the Half Century' (*pentekontaetia*) that ended in this catastrophe and that had opened with the triumph of Hellenism over the Persian invaders of Continental European Greece in 480-479 B.C.

Let us now see how far these several elements in my Hellenic model fit the histories of civilizations other than the Hellenic.

The combination of cultural unity with political disunity, which we find in the Hellenic World at the dawn of its history, appears to be widespread. It is the situation in all known living pre-civilizational

¹ *Culture and History*, pp. 205-10.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 209.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 207.

societies, according to Bagby.¹ Its frequency is not surprising, for, after all, there are only two possible alternatives: if a society is not united politically, it is necessarily divided. So political disunity, taken by itself, is too general a feature to have much significance. The significant political configuration in my Hellenic model is the revolutionary change from disunity to unity as a result of a series of ever more devastating wars which have brought the civilization to grief before the political unity is achieved. And, in the histories of the civilizations, this configuration is a frequent one. For instance, it occurs—in unmistakable counterparts of the Hellenic pattern—in the histories of the Andean and Middle American civilizations (if we now regard civilization in Middle America as being continuous and unitary, and see the Aztec Empire as its universal state in the making). The same pattern is also unmistakable in the histories of the Syriac, Sinic, Indic, and Sumero-Akkadian civilizations, the Eastern Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia, and the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan. Syria was unified politically in the Assyrian Empire and its successors the Neobabylonian Empire and the Achaemenian Empire, China in the Ch'in (Ts'in) and Han Empire after the period of 'the Contending States', India in the Maurya Empire after a similar period of fratricidal inter-state warfare, the Sumero-Akkadian World in the Empire of Agade and in the subsequent empire established by the Third Dynasty of Ur and re-established momentarily by Hammurabi, Russia in the Muscovite Empire, Japan in the unitary regime established by the Tokugawa Shogunate.² In the anatomy of Indian history the thesis that, since the end of the Indus Culture of the third and second millennia B.C., there has been a succession of two civilizations in India is supported by a second occurrence, in Indian history, of the Hellenic political configuration. From the eighth to the sixteenth century of the Christian Era India was divided politically, except for an ephemeral unification under Muslim rule in A.D. 1318-36, among a number of contending states, as she had been during the age before the establishment of the Maurya Empire in the fourth century B.C. In the sixteenth century of the Christian Era India was united politically in the Mughal Raj, and in the nineteenth century this political unity was re-established in the form of the British Raj.

We have now found, on reconsideration, that the political configuration of our Hellenic model is plainly discernible in nine other instances. There would be a tenth instance if I have been right in assuming, as I have assumed in volumes i-x, that there was a second occurrence of this pattern in the history of the Tigris-Euphrates basin, as well as in the history of India. In these earlier volumes I cast the Neobabylonian Empire for the role of universal state of a Babylonian Civilization affiliated to the Sumeric, but this attribution is perhaps dubious. The Neobabylonian Empire was only one of four successor-states of the Assyrian Empire, and it was not even the largest and most powerful of these. It lived in fear of its neighbour the Median Empire, which had taken the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

² The role of the Tokugawa regime in Japanese history is discussed further on p. 207, footnote 2.

metropolitan provinces of Assyria as its share of the Assyrian spoils. Then should the Assyrian Empire itself be regarded as the universal state of a Babylonian Civilization? It was larger and longer-lived than any of its immediate successor-states, and its provincial administration was highly organized. Yet even the Assyrian Empire did not include the whole of the Babylonian World. It never succeeded in conquering the rival Empire of Urartu, which was a convert to the Babylonian culture. The Assyrian Empire has more in common with the abortive empire of the dynasty of Agade than it has with the Third Dynasty of Ur's and the First Dynasty of Babylon's Empire of Sumer and Akkad, which I have identified with the universal state of the Sumerian Civilization. To find a convincing universal state for a hypothetical independent Babylonian Civilization, we must wait for the Achaemenian Empire, and this, even if it started its career as a vehicle of the Babylonian Civilization, had become the vehicle of a different civilization, the Syriac, before its overthrow. It will be seen that we cannot identify a Babylonian universal state with confidence, and this tells against my earlier thesis that there was a Babylonian Civilization, separate from, and successive to, the Sumerian-Akkadian. An interpretation of the civilization of the Tigris-Euphrates basin at this later stage as being a continuation of the Sumerian-Akkadian Civilization might be less open to question.

In the history of the Egyptian Civilization the political configuration of our Hellenic model can be identified if it is accepted that there was a period in which the nomes (cantons) of Egypt were so many sovereign independent states, perpetually going to war with each other, and that this was followed by a period in which first Upper Egypt and then the whole of the Nile Valley below the First Cataract was united politically in the so-called 'Old Kingdom'.¹ This configuration conforms to the Hellenic model, but the chronology does not. In the history of the Hellenic Civilization the revolutionary change from disunity to unity on the political plane came in the last chapter of the story, after the warfare between the contending states had not only brought the Hellenic Civilization to grief but had carried it to the verge of dissolution. In the history of civilization in Egypt there was the same revolutionary change, but it came at the very beginning. The age, if there was one, of the contending Egyptian cantons was 'prehistoric' in the sense of being 'pre-civilizational'. In Egypt political unification was simultaneous with the dawn of civilization, and it was followed by the most creative period of Egyptian history instead of being followed by dissolution and preceded by breakdown and disintegration, as it was in Hellenic history. When we find an identical configuration in the histories of two civilizations appearing at two quite different stages and performing two quite different functions, this suggests that the common feature may mask a radical difference between the fundamental structures of the two histories.²

¹ This view has certainly been widely held among Egyptologists in the past. However, E. J. Baumgartel, in *The Cultures of Prehistoric Egypt*, revised edition, p. 12, maintains that 'it is not generally recognised that the nomes are survivals of pre-Menite states'.

² This radical difference is pointed out by Richard Pares in *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 262, by F. Borkenau in *Commentary*, May,

This impression is strengthened when we turn to a chapter in the history of China which, in the preceding volumes, I have treated provisionally as the history of a civilization separate from, and successive to, the Sinic. I have just reaffirmed my view that the configuration of Sinic history, down to and including the universal state established and maintained by the Ch'in (Ts'in) and Han dynasties, conforms closely to my Hellenic model. Moreover, the fall of the Han Empire, like the fall of the Roman Empire, was followed by a relapse into political disunity. But the emergence of the new Far Eastern Civilization—if a new civilization did emerge in China—was followed, almost as quickly as the emergence of the Egyptiac Civilization in Egypt, by the establishment of political unity. If the dawn of the Far Eastern Civilization is to be regarded as having been subsequent to the cultural interregnum following the break-up of the Han Empire at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era, then the empire in which China was united politically under the Sui and T'ang dynasties, from the close of the sixth century to the early years of the tenth, corresponds to the Old Kingdom in Egyptiac history. Thus, if there was such a thing as a separate Far Eastern Civilization that was not a mere continuation of the Sinic, the structure of this Far Eastern Civilization's history does not conform, as the structure of the preceding Sinic Civilization's history does, to my Hellenic model; it conforms to a different model presented by the political history of the Egyptiac Civilization. Moreover, the structure of the West's sister-civilization, the Eastern Orthodox Christian or Byzantine, conforms to the Egyptiac model likewise. In Eastern Orthodox Christendom the interregnum following the break-up of the Roman Empire was immediately succeeded by the establishment of political unity through a successful revival, here, of the Roman Empire—an achievement that presents a sharp contrast to the series of abortive revivals of the Roman Empire in the West from Charlemagne's attempt onwards.¹

The second element in my Hellenic model—the disintegration of a broken-down society into an internal and an external proletariat—does occur in a considerable number of non-Hellenic instances. These have been surveyed at length in volume v, and there is no need to recapitulate this survey here. In Hellenic history this second element is closely associated with the third: the creation, by the internal proletariat, of a 1955, p. 240 ('the universal state marks the beginning, not the end, of Ancient Egypt's history'), and by D. Halévy in a French journal that I have not been able to identify, p. 59. It has been noted by P. Bagby (in *Culture and History*, p. 219) and by F. Hampl (in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 173, Heft 3 (1952), p. 459) that the configuration of Egyptiac history will not conform to the Hellenic model. R. Coulborn (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 159) submits that The Old Kingdom of Egypt is clearly a universal state in the sense in which I use this term.

¹ These revivals of the Roman Empire in the West were so ineffective, and made so little mark on Western history as a whole, that K. D. Erdmann seems hardly warranted in maintaining, on the strength of them, that Western history begins with a universal state (*Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 243). A slightly better case might be made for the thesis that Chinese history begins with a universal state. Yet the Chou regime, even in its first phase, was hardly more effective than the resuscitated Roman Empire in the West; it is not comparable to the Ch'in (Ts'in), Han, Sui, and T'ang regimes in point of solidity. As for the Chou's predecessors the Shang, the progress of archaeological discovery has not yet revealed either the extent or the structure of their rule. See further p. 190.

higher religion in which the inspiration comes from a foreign source. This third element is a key-part of the model, since the church in which the higher religion embodied itself in the Hellenic case served as the chrysalis out of which two new civilizations emerged. It is therefore important to reconsider whether the pattern of the history of the Christian Church is a standard one which can be detected in a number of other instances, or whether it is something exceptional.

In order to test this we must first analyse this pattern into its elements. The Christian Church arose among the proletariat of one disintegrating civilization; its inspiration came from a different civilization; it easily overcame a counter-church professedly inspired by the native traditions of the civilization in whose domain the victorious church had made its appearance; the victorious church converted the world in which it had triumphed, and also this world's barbarian invaders. It brought to birth two new civilizations which can hardly be regarded as being mere continuations of the preceding Hellenic Civilization within whose bosom Christianity had made its first appearance. It is true that the Western and Byzantine civilizations are Hellenistic, but they are distinguished from the Hellenic Civilization itself by being also Christian, and Christian from the start.

Perhaps the closest parallel to the history of Christianity at the western end of the Old World is the history of the Mahayanian version of Buddhism at the eastern end of it. The source of the Mahayana's inspiration, like the source of Christianity's, was foreign to the world in which the rising religion made its fortune. Christianity made its fortune in the Hellenic World but drew its inspiration from a Syriac source; the Mahayana made its fortune in the Sinic World but drew its inspiration from an Indian source. Again, the Mahayana made its way among the proletariat of the Sinic society, in the sense that it attracted native Chinese who were in revolt against the Confucian tradition and barbarian invaders who were suspicious of it.¹ Furthermore, the progress of the Mahayana evoked a counter-church, the Taoist Church, which was remarkably similar to the Neoplatonist Church in being constructed out of a native philosophy to combat a foreign religion and in trying to steal

¹ 'Buddhism commended itself to the [barbarian] rulers because it was not Chinese' (A. F. Wright: 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture: Phases of Interaction', in *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. xvii, No. 1 (November, 1957), pp. 17-42, on p. 28; idem: *Buddhism in Chinese History* (1959), p. 57). Shih Hu, a barbarian ruler of the later Chao Dynasty, remarked in an edict that 'Buddha, being a barbarian god, is the very one we should worship' (Wright, 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture', p. 28). W. Altree points out (in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 260-1) that in China 'Buddhism received its support from emperors, scholars, and men of affairs', and on this ground he contests my description of it as being a proletarian movement. This is also contested by K. D. Erdmann (loc. cit., p. 226). Altree and Erdmann have not, however, taken the point, made by Wright (*Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 44), that, during the three centuries of political division (circa A.D. 300-600), Chinese civilization developed on different lines in the South and in the North, so that Buddhism had to adapt itself in China to two evolving cultures. In the South, during this age, an aristocracy was in political control (ibid., pp. 51-52); and Buddhism did here take its social impress from its aristocratic patrons. In the North, on the other hand, Buddhism 'cut across class lines and helped to unite a divided society' (ibid., p. 59). In the North the peasantry was converted to Buddhism *en masse* (ibid., p. 58). It is also significant, however, that 'an overwhelming majority of the literate class' stayed in the North (ibid., p. 55), in spite of the adverseness of conditions for them there under barbarian rule, and maintained themselves there in sufficient numbers to be able to reassert their power as soon as the opportunity came.

this foreign religion's thunder by imitating those features of it that made it attractive.¹ These resemblances between the Mahayana and Christianity are impressive; but beyond this point the histories of the two religions do not any longer run parallel.²

In the Western and Byzantine worlds Christianity won a monopoly which it retained for centuries, even if it is losing it now. The Neoplatonist counter-church, as well as the four established Hellenic philosophies—Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Epicureanism—have all been stone-dead by now for at least fourteen hundred years. Hellenism has survived only in so far as Christianity chose to incorporate it into itself. Byzantine and Western attempts at renaissances of Hellenism drawn direct from the fountain-head have been superficial and ephemeral. In so far as the Western and Byzantine societies are now ceasing to be Christian, they are still inescapably ex-Christian. Their cultural heritage is so thoroughly saturated with Christianity that it is impossible for them to disengage themselves from their Christian past (as is demonstrated, for example, by the transparentness of the Communist ideology's Judaeo-Christian origins). In Eastern Asia history has run a less revolutionary course. Here the Mahayana never succeeded, even at the height of its vigour and power,³ in driving off the field either the

¹ The Taoist counter-church differed, however, from the Neoplatonist counter-church in representing a popular movement of revolt against a decadent Confucian official regime (see, for example, Wright, 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture', p. 20; *Buddhism in Chinese History*, pp. 26-30), whereas Neoplatonism was the creation of a 'highbrow' minority. This is one of the reasons why Taoism survived, while Neoplatonism went under.

² 'The role of Buddhism in China is not fully comparable to that of Christianity in Europe' (M. E. Cameron in *The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. viii, No. 4 (December, 1939), p. 406). The Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. queries whether I do not 'look too eagerly for a period sometime when China was Buddhist in the same way that mediaeval Europe was Catholic' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

³ At its height, the vigour and power of the Mahayana in China was so great that, to a Western observer, it is surprising that in the end the Mahayana should have failed to win the decisive and definitive victory that Christianity did win in the Byzantine World and in the West. Buddhism interacted with the indigenous Sinic culture at all levels, among the peasantry as well as among the élite (Wright, 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture', p. 18). The Buddhist village clergy were recruited from the peasantry and remained in touch with it, and 'Buddhism became deeply interwoven with common life in the North' (*ibid.*, p. 30). Under the Sui and T'ang regimes the domesticated elements of Buddhism were accepted (pp. 31-32), and in the T'ang Age, in spite of an archaistic revival of Confucianism, 'Buddhism remained the dominant intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic interest of the educated' (p. 33). Metropolitan Buddhist clerics and government officials were social equals (p. 34). In the T'ang Age Buddhism was also practised by the peasantry *en masse*. 'For the peasantry, as for the gentry, Buddhism became an accepted part of individual and group life' (p. 34). Original and distinctively Chinese schools of Buddhism emerged: e.g. the 'Pure Land' school (Amidism), Ch'an (in Japanese, Zen), and T'ien-t'ai (in Japanese, Tendai) (pp. 34-36). On this evidence, Buddhism in China might have seemed to be carrying all before it, as Christianity did in the Byzantine and Western worlds.

From first to last, however, Buddhism had two serious handicaps to contend with, one political and the other intellectual. Chinese governments, even at their nadir, were jealous of possible rival authorities and were efficient enough to be able to take measures for keeping them in check. The northern governments' inclination towards Buddhism did not deter them from setting up a Buddhist clerical bureaucracy, responsible to the Crown, for keeping Buddhist institutions and property under the control of the state; and, in A.D. 446-52 and A.D. 574-8, attempts were made to impose drastic restrictions on Buddhist organizations and activities (*Buddhism in Chinese History*, pp. 60-61). These attempts ended in failure; yet the state's relation to Buddhism in the North was closer to Caesaro-papism than it was in the South (*ibid.*, p. 62). After the reunification of China the device of setting the Buddhist hierarchy to control itself on the state's behalf was taken over by the Sui and T'ang regimes (*ibid.*, p. 68; 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture',

Taoist counter-church or Confucianism, which was the established Sinic philosophy.¹ In China at the opening of the twentieth century Confucianism and Taoism, as well as the Mahayana, were still alive, and this was more than eighteen hundred years after the Mahayana had made its first lodgement in China, and more than a thousand years since the end of the Mahayana's partial ascendancy, which had lasted from the break-up of the United (Western) Chin (Tsin) regime early in the fourth century of the Christian Era down to the official persecution of Buddhism in A.D. 842-5.²

Taoism held its own against the Mahayana; Confucianism regained the upper hand over it. Confucianism had had a monopoly of being the official philosophy of the civil service of the Sinic universal state since the reign of the Prior Han Emperor Wu-ti (140 B.C.-87 B.C.). In the age of the Posterior Han Dynasty (A.D. 25-220) the Confucian-educated land-owning gentry, from which the civil service was recruited, had established its ascendancy in the Sinic society;³ and, from that time onwards till the abandonment in A.D. 1905 of the periodical examinations in the Confucian classics for candidates for entry into the civil service, this gentry kept itself in being.⁴ In the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, when the North was under the rule of Eurasian Nomad barbarians, the Confucian-educated indigenous Chinese gentry had an inviolate citadel in the South, which had been conquered and annexed by the Han Empire just at the time when Confucianism had been established as the official philosophy of the Sinic universal state. During the next four

p. 33). Under the T'ang, active persecution of Buddhism was resumed, and this time more effectively, in A.D. 842-5. Buddhism's intellectual handicap in China was even more formidable than its political one. The contrast between the structures of the Chinese and Sanskrit languages, and between the traditional styles of the two literatures, was extreme (*Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 33). The propagators of Buddhism in China 'all had a common inclination to graft the alien on to native roots' (ibid., p. 40). In China, Sanskrit never became a 'church language'. 'Most, if not all, of the seminal thinkers and founders of schools of Chinese Buddhism knew only Chinese' (ibid., p. 76).

¹ So far from that, the indigenous ideologies 'spoiled the Egyptians'. In the encounter between them and the Mahayana, 'the Taoists stole its ritual and the Neo-Confucians its philosophy' (V. K. Ting, quoted by Cameron, loc. cit., p. 408). From the fifth century of the Christian Era onwards, popular Taoism gradually ousted popular Buddhism by copying it (*Buddhism in Chinese History*, pp. 97-98). From about A.D. 900 onwards elements of Buddhism were appropriated by the Sinic culture by being fitted into the framework of the Confucian philosophy (Wright, *Buddhism in Chinese History*, pp. 89-90; 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture', pp. 38-39). The Neo-Confucian school gleaned 'from the Confucian tradition those ideas and formulae which answered, on the authority of native philosophers, many of the questions which Buddhism had raised in men's minds' (ibid., p. 38). Wright (ibid., p. 39) quotes G. E. Sargent for the view that 'Neo-Confucianism constitutes less an autonomous system than a complex of responses to Buddhist theories.' In fact the Neo-Confucians 'proved to be in many ways the captives of the tradition they sought to replace' (*Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 90). Wright agrees that Wang Yang-ming was truly a Buddhist in disguise; Wang's philosophy was Ch'an Buddhism in Confucian dress; but Wright comments that this Confucian disguise was all-important (ibid., pp. 91-92; 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture', p. 39).

² After that, Buddhism was never again regarded as being an essential adjunct of state power and 'Buddhist ideas ceased to be the common coin of intellectual life', while Taoism made inroads on popular Buddhism (Wright, 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture', p. 38).

³ See B. Watson: *Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Grand Historian of China*, pp. 37-38; A. F. Wright: *Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 9.

⁴ 'By the Later Han, the number of students enrolled in the State University had grown to over 30,000. It was from this group that officials were appointed' (A. F. Wright: *Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 15).

hundred years the South had been opened up and Sinified just sufficiently to provide an asylum for the traditional Chinese regime in its hour of need.¹ In the thirteenth century the Mongol barbarians conquered the whole of China, and Tongking and Upper Burma as well. But even without a southern citadel the gentry survived once again. Their close-knit network of family connexions was an invisible citadel in itself; and this, combined with a monopoly of the understanding of China's *arcana imperii*, made them indispensable and therefore invincible. The fourth-century barbarian rulers in the North tried to govern their Chinese subjects through the agency of Taoist and Buddhist administrators; the Mongols imported Muslim and Christian administrators;² but, sooner or later, all rulers of China before the Westernizing revolution of A.D. 1911 had to call in the Confucian-educated native Chinese gentry to make the wheels of public administration go on turning, however unsympathetic the rulers of the day may

¹ The importance, in Chinese history, of this southern citadel has been noticed in this Study already in vii. 357, footnote 1, and in ix. 655-7, 670-1, 675. In these passages I have recognized that the citadel enabled the gentry to survive and so eventually to re-emerge and recapture the administration of a reconstituted Sinitic universal state. Cameron has pointed out (loc. cit., p. 409) that at the close of the Han Age the South, though now politically part of China, was culturally virgin soil, and that it was the great migration to the South under pressure of the barbarian invasions of the North in the fourth century of the Christian Era that led to the South's being culturally assimilated. As she truly observes, the existence of this city of refuge in the South made the maintenance of cultural unity possible, and this accounts for the affinity of the T'ang culture with the Han culture.

Even so, the continuity was maintained only with difficulty. Wright points out that during the years A.D. 317-589, during which China was politically divided, 'two widely different cultures developed in North and South' ('Buddhism and Chinese Culture', p. 24; *Buddhism in Chinese History*, pp. 43-44). The members of the ruling class who fled to the South 'found themselves in a rich but recently colonial area, much of it still populated by aborigines. They felt themselves exiles and behaved like émigrés; their mood was a compound of chagrin, self-pity, and deep self-doubt' ('Buddhism and Chinese Culture', pp. 24-25). 'In climate, landscape, crops, diet, and architecture', the South 'contrasted sharply with the northern plains on which their ancestors had begun to shape a distinctive Chinese civilization' (*Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 43). The maze of waterways in the Hwai and Yangtse basins saved the southern citadel of Sinism from being overrun by the pursuing Nomad cavalry, but not from being exposed to the infiltration of the invading Indian religion. 'Many of the leading members [of the emigration] were born members of the aristocracy; they tended to move from "Confucian" basic education to an interest in neo-Taoism, and thence to Buddhism' ('Buddhism and Chinese Culture', p. 25). Neo-Taoism fitted into the South China landscape (*Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 45). It opened the way for Buddhism by breaking the shell of Confucianism and by raising questions that could not be answered from the Taoist scriptures (ibid., p. 46). The virtuous but aristocratic and worldly hero of contemporary Indian Buddhism, Vimalakirti, became for them the ideal hero, outshining the ideals of the Confucian gentleman and the Taoist sage (ibid., p. 52; 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture', p. 25). A new environment and a new religion worked together to produce cultural change. The emigrant society in the South made new contributions to Chinese culture: calligraphy, landscape painting, poetry, the drama, the novel, Neo-Confucianism, critical scholarship (Cameron, loc. cit., pp. 410-11). There is a Chinese saying that, 'with the southward migration, philosophy began' (ibid., p. 411). All this is like the effect on present-day Chinese civilization of the westward migration of the 'intellectuals' in A.D. 1936-45 under pressure of the invading Japanese armies.

Thus the cultural continuity which the existence of the southern citadel made possible in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries was a continuity shot through with change, rather than continuity pure and simple. Even so, it presents a contrast to what happened at the opposite end of the Old World after the barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire. Hellenism found no comparable citadel—for instance, not in Byzantine Anatolia, which was repeatedly overrun by Persians and Arabs and was partly repopulated by immigrant Armenians and Slavs. Consequently there was no comparable perpetuation of the Hellenic Civilization.

² e.g. Sayyid Ejell and the Polos.

have been towards Confucianism, and however reluctant they may have been to place themselves in the gentry's hands.¹

Though I happen to have been born in a former province of the Roman Empire, I was born there too late to have a chance of meeting a Stoic-educated Roman civil servant in the flesh. It would already have been too late in Britain if I had been born there, not in A.D. 1889, but in A.D. 489. But, if I had been born in 1889 in China, I should have seen Confucian-educated civil servants still administering the Sinic universal state. This universal state, the traditional system of administering it, the civil service which knew how to make the system work, and the Confucian-educated gentry that was the civil service's perennial source of recruitment constituted, together, one single great integrated institution. The continuity of this institution may be held to have counted for more than even the most violent of the breaches in the continuity of other elements of civilization in China; and, on this showing, my critics will have been right in maintaining that, notwithstanding the conformity of Chinese history to my Hellenic model down to, and including, the unitary regime of the Ch'in (T's'in) and Han dynasties, this is not enough to justify my provisional thesis that the history of civilization in China since the interregnum following the fall of the Han Empire has been the history of a new civilization,² in the sense in which the history of the West, since the interregnum following the fall of the Roman Empire, has been a new chapter of history that cannot be written off as being nothing but a continuation of the history of the Hellenic Civilization.

A denial of the separateness of the Western and Byzantine civiliza-

¹ 'The decisive factor' in the decline of Buddhism in China 'was the revival of the native tradition of Confucianism by an important segment of the Chinese élite. The Sui founder [Sui Wen-ti, originally Yang Chien] regarded Confucian teachings as arid and boring; many of the T'ang monarchs were personally Buddhists or Taoists. Yet from the time of reunification onwards the rulers adopted more and more of those measures of traditional Chinese statecraft which are usually associated with Confucianism; neither Taoism nor Buddhism had developed any such arsenal of social and political formulae. And one of the measures which [were] taken was the restoration of the examination system for the recruitment of officials. The content of the examination questions was, throughout most of the T'ang, intellectually trivial, anachronistic, and—since Confucian texts represented many stages of China's philosophical development—remarkably heterogeneous. Yet, from the beginning of the seventh century, young men were studying these texts in the hope of advancement, even though their intellectual interests might be in Buddhism or Taoism' (Wright: 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture', pp. 37-38; Cp. *Buddhism in Chinese History*, pp. 66, 86, 87).

As the same scholar puts it in another study, Sui ideology appealed to the ranking values of Buddhism and Taoism and to the residual values of endemic Confucianism (A. F. Wright: 'The Formation of Sui Ideology, 581-604', in *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, ed. by J. K. Fairbank (Chicago 1957; University of Chicago Press, pp. 71-104 and 352-63), on p. 73). Yang Chien was born in a Buddhist temple and was educated by a Buddhist monk up to the age of thirteen (*ibid.*, p. 77). His wife, too, was a devout Buddhist (*ibid.*, p. 78). The pair used to attend Buddhist services every night (p. 78). After his achievement of political reunification in A.D. 589, Yang Chien still relied chiefly on Buddhism (p. 93). Yet at the beginning of his reign he made use of Confucianism to consolidate his rule (p. 88), and thereby opened the door for the progressive re-establishment of a Confucian regime at Buddhism's expense. The T'ang emperors, in their turn, relied on Confucianism, though they preferred Taoism (Cameron, *loc. cit.*, pp. 407-8).

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 266, W. Altree lists, as being common to the two phases of history in China that I have labelled with the names of two different civilizations, the following major elements: 'Confucianism, the highly centralised state, the agrarian economy, the bureaucracy, the aristocracy founded on literary achievement.' Cp. E. Dyason in *The Australian Outlook*, March, 1949, p. 59, and M. S. Bates in *Christianity and Crisis*, vol. 15, No. 4 (21st March, 1955), pp. 27-30 and 32.

tions from the Hellenic Civilization would be the logical consequence of substituting a Sinic model for the Hellenic one that we are applying at the moment.¹ But an interpretation of the history of the western end of the Old World in Sinic terms will demonstrate that the Sinic model is not applicable here, any more than the Hellenic model is applicable to the history of Eastern Asia since the fall of the Han Empire. The divergence between the courses of the two streams of history from this point onwards turns on the difference between the subsequent fortunes of Christianity at the western end of the Old World and of Buddhism in Eastern Asia.

In analysing the interaction between Buddhism and the Sinic Civilization on which it impinged, Wright² presents the drama in four acts: a period of preparation (A.D. 65-317); a period in which the invading Indian religion became domesticated in its new Sinic environment (A.D. 317-589); a period in which it won acceptance in the Sinic Society and developed new, and specifically Chinese, schools of Buddhist thought and practice on Chinese soil (A.D. 589-circa A.D. 900); and a period in which it has been appropriated³ by the Sinic Civilization (circa A.D. 900 to the present day).

'We find the Chinese returning again and again to the ideal of a monolithic society, economy, and polity, supported and rationalised by a thought system that is wholly consistent with itself and with the institutions it supports. The Han order approximated this ideal, and, in the Sui and the T'ang, Buddhism was more or less successfully integrated into the effort to recapture the Han ideal. Later, however, when circumstances had changed, the Sung synthesis rejected any separate and distinctive Buddhism as in conflict with the ancient holistic ideal of Chinese civilization, and appropriated only such parts of the faith as were compatible with this ideal. . . .⁴

'Periods of disintegration and the loss of holistic and related ideals are the only periods in which Chinese have shown any responsiveness to alien ideas.'⁵

Let us apply the plot of this Sino-Buddhist drama, as Wright has presented it, to the history of the western end of the Old World, setting the dates forward by 200 years, since the Roman Empire took shape and broke up approximately that much later than the Han Empire. A period of preparation, dated A.D. 265-517, would fit well enough; and a period, dated A.D. 517-789, in which Christianity was domesticated in what had

¹ The unity of both the Byzantine and the Western Civilization with the Hellenic has, in fact, been affirmed by some scholars. E. R. Curtius, for instance, has pleaded for a study of the Hellenic and the Western civilizations as a unity, especially on the plane of literature. The field of literary study ought, Curtius maintains, to be 'from Homer to Goethe' (*Merkur*, 1. Jahrgang, Viertes Heft [Heft 4] (1947), pp. 492-3). But that would require us to ignore the Jewish vein in Western literature, and this is not less potent than the Hellenic vein. The Syriac-Hellenic culture-compost from which the Western Civilization has sprung is so closely compacted and so nicely balanced that it would be unrealistic to treat the Western Civilization or any of its four sisters as being either Hellenic or Judaic exclusively.

² In 'Buddhism and Chinese Culture', p. 19.

³ Wright has chosen this term carefully, and insists on its exact meaning. 'The appropriation of Buddhism was not a process of "absorption" in the sense of swallowing up, assimilation without a trace' (*Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 107. Cp. p. 125).

⁴ Wright: *ibid.*, pp. 123-4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

been the Hellenic World, would also pass muster. A period dated A.D. 789—*circa* A.D. 1100, in which Christianity was fully accepted and began to put forth new shoots, seems to fit extremely well. But what shall we say of a period, running from *circa* A.D. 1100 to the present day, in which Christianity is 'appropriated' by a resurgent Hellenic Civilization? We cannot bring this last of the four transferred Sinic formulae into any relation with the Western historical facts, even when we have made the most that can be made of the twelfth-century Western philosophical renaissance of Hellenism and the fifteenth-century Western literary, artistic, and political one. No presentation of Western history can make sense of the proposition that, in the course of the last eight and a half centuries, Christianity has been appropriated by the Hellenic Civilization on which it impinged in the days of the Roman Empire; for, whatever may have happened to Christianity during this latest age, it is certain that the Hellenic Civilization was extinct long before the beginning of the twelfth century. At the western end of the Old World the present age is a Post-Hellenic age. It is the age of two Hellenistic Christian or ex-Christian civilizations. It is evident that the Sinic model does not fit either the history of Christianity or the history of civilization at the western end of the Old World since the fall of the Roman Empire any better than the Hellenic model fits the history of Buddhism and the history of civilization in Eastern Asia since the fall of the Han Empire. In this chapter of history the two regions display two different historical configurations. In Eastern Asia continuity prevails, on the whole, over discontinuity; at the other end of the Old World it is the other way round.

This issue of continuity versus discontinuity is raised by the contrast between Christianity's triumph in the former domain of the Hellenic Civilization and Buddhism's failure to achieve the same apparently manifest destiny in Eastern Asia. The same issue is raised in regard to the history of civilization in India by a metamorphosis of indigenous Indian religion which was so revolutionary as to be comparable to the introduction of foreign religions—the Mahayana and Christianity—into China and the Hellenic World.

In the course of the last two centuries B.C. and the early centuries of the Christian Era, Indian religion underwent a transformation like the contemporary transformation of the Buddhist philosophy into the Mahayana. The religion that had been introduced into India by her Aryan invaders at some time during the latter part of the second millennium B.C. had much in common with the religion of the Aryas' kinsmen who had invaded Europe. The Aryan pantheon resembled the Hellenic: it was imagined in the likeness of a barbarian war-band. The Aryan religious ritual resembled the Roman: what mattered was correct procedure—the right form of words and the right physical gestures. The worshippers' approach to the gods was magical, or, in so far as it was rationalized, legalistic. But, before the close of the first millennium of the Christian Era, the Indian religious landscape had changed out of all recognition. The Aryan religious scriptures, while still nominally sacrosanct and authoritative, had practically been shelved in favour of

what purported to be no more than a commentary but was virtually a new canon. The gods were now represented in visual form in graven images, as the Buddha and the bodhisattvas had been represented since the irruption of the Hellenic Civilization into India in 183 B.C. after the fall of the Maurya Empire. These images of the gods were eventually housed in temples; and the gods were no longer conceived of as being a troop of superhuman military adventurers. The latter-day Hindu gods, whether they are survivors of the Aryan pantheon or revenants from the Pre-Aryan world of the Indus Culture, are awe-inspiring individual figures, each representing some facet of Absolute Reality. The relation between each of them and her or his worshippers is a personal one which is highly charged with emotion. The god is a fount of grace and the worshipper is the god's devotee. It is, in fact, the relation that, in the Buddhist fold, grew up simultaneously between the devotee and his chosen bodhisattva in the course of the evolution of the Mahayana.

This was a change of religious climate in India that was of the same order of magnitude as the change produced in Eastern Asia by the arrival of the Mahayana and at the western end of the Old World by the arrival of Christianity. Was the consequent break of historical continuity in India great enough to warrant us in regarding what followed as being the history of a new civilization affiliated to, but distinct from, the antecedent Indic Civilization, as the Byzantine and Western Christian civilizations are distinct from, though affiliated to, the Hellenic Civilization? Or shall we judge that in India, as in China, the break in continuity, while comparable, as far as it went, to the break separating the Hellenic Civilization from its successors, was more than offset by the survival of elements of the antecedent culture which managed to weather the religious revolution? In the history of civilization in China continuity prevailed over discontinuity, as we have seen, owing to the survival of a social class with a potent cultural heritage: the Confucian-educated gentry which was a potential seminary for civil servants capable of rehabilitating the Sinic universal state that had originally been established by the Ch'in (Ts'in) and Han dynasties. If we apply this Chinese clue to a further examination of Indian history, we shall find that, in India as in China, historical continuity was maintained by the survival of a social class occupying a key position.

In Indian society the master activity was not the civil administration, as it was in Chinese society; it was the religious ministry. The Brahman caste was therefore the Indian counterpart of the Chinese Confucian-educated gentry; and the Brahmans managed to maintain their monopoly of the religious ministry in India in spite of the radical transformation of the spirit, as well as the practice, of Indian religion in the course of a millennium running from the beginning of the second century B.C. In view of this parallel between Indian and Chinese history at this stage, it will perhaps be prudent to suspend my provisional division of the history of India into the histories of two civilizations, one following the other. There is perhaps more to be said in favour of this division in the Indian case than there is in the Chinese. We have seen that, in

addition to the religious revolution which Indian history has in common with Chinese history and with my Hellenic model, the political configuration of the Hellenic model—disunity eventually replaced by unity as a result of a long series of devastating wars—recurs in Indian history in the chapter following the religious revolution, in contrast to the corresponding chapter of Chinese history, which does not conform to the Hellenic pattern, but takes an Egyptiac course. All the same, the maintenance of the Brahmans' monopoly of the religious ministry gives Indian history a continuity,¹ throughout the period running from the Aryan invasion to the impact of the West, which is comparable to the continuity of Chinese history since the rise of the Confucian-educated gentry, and which has no parallel in the history of the western end of the Old World.

In 1930, when I was writing the first volume of this book, I believed, on the authority of a leading Egyptologist, J. H. Breasted, that the history of the Egyptiac Civilization afforded, in the worship of Osiris, an example of a religious movement which closely resembled the history of Christianity.² In the worship of Osiris 'we are confronted', according to Breasted,³ 'by a religion of the people, which made a strong appeal to the individual believer'—in contrast to the worship of Re the sun-god of Heliopolis, whose worship was part of the prerogative of Pharaoh and his court. Re was believed to bestow immortality on Pharaoh and his immediate entourage at the price of the building of pyramids. The labour required for this was a grievous burden on the people's shoulders, and it brought the labourers no return in the shape of immortality, which, for Egyptians of all ranks, was the supreme goal of human endeavours. The people gave their devotion to Osiris because he offered the possibility of immortality for all men. The Osirian religion, as presented by Breasted, has a striking resemblance to Christianity in its popular appeal; and the resemblance would be still closer if it were proven that the Osirian religion was not indigenous in Egypt but was a version of the Sumeric worship of Tammuz.

However that may be, the surviving Egyptiac literature of the age of the Middle Empire does testify that, in the latter days of the Old Kingdom, there had been a 'secession of the proletariat' in the sense in which the term is used in this Study. Later evidence—for instance, the Book of the Dead—also testifies that eventually the people did achieve their ambition of securing a possibility of immortality for all men, and achieved it through the worship of Osiris. Breasted's successors have, however, now rejected Breasted's theses that the Osirian religion was originally a specifically popular one, that there was an opposition, in the latter days of the Old Kingdom, between the worship of Osiris and the worship of Re, and that this religious conflict was the reflection of a

¹ The Rev. E. R. Hardy, Jr. queries whether I do not 'exaggerate the difference between modern Hinduism and previous stages of Indian religion' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

² See p. 95, footnote 1. Breasted's interpretation of this chapter of the religious history of the Egyptiac World is expounded in *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (London 1912, Hodder & Stoughton).

³ Op. cit., p. 140, quoted in the present work in i. 141.

social one.¹ On this now current interpretation of Egyptian religious history, my Hellenic model does not fit the Egyptian facts as closely as it would fit them if Breasted's account of them still held the field.

In analysing my Hellenic model I isolated two further elements. One of these was the barbarians, with their gift for epic poetry, their taste for adopting higher religions in heretical forms, and their failure to make substantial contributions to the creation of new civilizations. The other element was renaissances. In contrast to the element in our Hellenic model represented by the role of Christianity as the chrysalis of new civilizations, barbarians and renaissances occur frequently in non-Hellenic contexts. I have surveyed their occurrences already,² and therefore need not repeat the operation here.

Bagby has applied his Hellenic and Western pattern of an Age of Faith followed by an Age of Reason to the histories of the other civilizations on his list. His findings³ are that this pattern is plainly visible in early Chinese (in my terminology, 'Sinic') history and is also visible in early Indian ('Indic') history—in this case with a tendency towards over-elaboration, towards the close of the Age of Faith, which comes closer to the Western version of the pattern than to the Hellenic and Sinic versions. He finds traces of the process of rationalization in the histories of the Sumero-Akkadian, Egyptian, Andean, and Middle American civilizations.⁴

It will now be evident that the different elements in my Hellenic model are not all of equal service as keys for elucidating uniformities in the configuration of the histories of civilizations. In the cases of four elements out of my five, and of Bagby's further element, the Hellenic pattern is reproduced both closely and frequently. For instance, the process of rationalization indisputably occurred in the histories of the Western, Sinic, Andean, and Middle American civilizations. Renaissances on the pattern of the renaissances of Hellenism in the Western and Byzantine worlds indisputably occurred in the later phases of the history of civilization in China, India, the Tigris-Euphrates basin, and Egypt, whether we interpret these later phases as being the histories of separate civilizations or whether we interpret them as being merely a

¹ This change of view among Egyptologists has been noticed already on p. 95, footnote 1. Breasted's view, as reproduced by me, is criticized by L. Thorndike in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. vii, No. 3 (September, 1935), pp. 315-17, and by H. Frankfort in *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 27.

² For barbarians, see v. 194-337 and viii. 1-87; for renaissances, see ix. 1-166.

³ See *Culture and History*, p. 212.

⁴ I agree with these findings, and the correspondences seem to be both close and numerous enough to warrant our regarding this pattern as being one of the established uniformities in the configuration of the histories of civilizations. Bagby finds the same pattern in the history of his 'Near Eastern' (i.e. Spengler's 'Magian') Civilization. He sees here an age of faith in the first five centuries of the Christian Era, marked by Early Christianity, Neoplatonism, and the phases of Judaism and of Zoroastrianism that find their respective expressions in the Talmud and the Zend. His age of reason in this case is ushered in by the epiphany of Islam, whose role he equates with Protestant Christianity's in Western history, and it comes to maturity with the Islamic World's reception of Hellenic science and philosophy. Evidently there is something to be said for this interpretation. But, if we accept it, we shall have, on the analogy of it, to distinguish an age of faith and a subsequent age of reason within the medieval age of Western history, though this, as Bagby sees it, is all one age of faith. The reception of Aristotle in the medieval West was no less, and no more, a triumph of reason than the previous reception of him in Dār-al-Islām.

continuation of the preceding phase in each case. Barbarians break out in other times of trouble besides the Hellenic and break through the frontiers of other universal states besides the Roman Empire. The political configuration of our Hellenic model recurs, as we have already reckoned, in the histories of at least nine other civilizations.¹ On the other hand, this element in our Hellenic model entirely fails, as we have seen, to fit the political history of the Egyptiac World. The configuration of Egyptiac political history is not only different; it is antithetical. In Hellenic history the universal state is the last phase; in Egyptiac history it is the first. And, when we come to the procreation of affiliated civilizations through the agency of a higher religion serving as a chrysalis, we find our Hellenic model failing to provide a key more often than it succeeds.² This element in the model does recur, as we have seen, in Chinese and Indian history, and perhaps in Egyptiac history too; but, in each of these other instances, the break in continuity does not seem decisive enough to entitle me to confirm my provisional interpretation of what comes after the break as being the history of a new civilization.

4. A CHINESE ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR CIVILIZATIONS

We have now carried out our re-examination of the applicability of the Hellenic model as a key to the interpretation of the histories of other civilizations; and, as a result, the use of this model in previous volumes of this book has, I should say, vindicated itself. The Hellenic model evidently does throw considerable light on the historical structure of civilizations as a species; and the results of the re-examination indicate, it seems to me, that I have not gone astray in employing the model up to its full capacity. I have, however, I should now say, been at fault in having been content, up to this point, to operate with the Hellenic model only. Though this particular key has opened many doors, it has not proved omniscient. We have seen, for example, that it has not opened the door to an understanding of the structure of Egyptiac history. This and other cases in which it has proved not to fit ought to have made me aware of its limitations and to have led me, not to lose confidence in the results obtained with this key, as far as these results go, but to try other keys as well.³ 'The paranoiac or monomaniac has to fit all phenomena to a pet idea.'⁴ I do not want to cast myself for this self-defeating role. Perhaps I can avoid it if I take to heart two pieces of good advice that have been offered to me by W. Kaufmann.⁵ He warns me to pay attention to evidence that appears to contradict my theories, and to test my theories, where the evidence does seem to me to bear them

¹ See p. 173.

² T. A. Sumberg questions 'whether churches are universally the link between the death and birth of related civilizations' (*Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267-84).

³ This point has been taken by the Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. 'One wonders whether a scholar starting on the same enterprise from a Chinese or Indian, or even an Islamic, perspective might not have made something quite different and equally true' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

⁴ A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 81-82.

⁵ In Toynbee and History, p. 211. Cp. R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 15.

out, by considering whether the same evidence may not also bear out alternative constructions.¹ I will also recall a maxim of Cohen's that I have quoted already in a different context.²

"The safeguard against bias is . . . to explore one's preconceptions, to make them explicit, to consider their alternatives, and thus to multiply the number of hypotheses available for the apprehension of historical significance."³

Acting on these counsels in the present case means mounting other models besides the Hellenic-Byzantine-Western model and seeing what results we obtain by applying these, in turn, to the same body of evidence. Theoretically the Egyptian model might be the most illuminating, since the Egyptian Civilization is apparently the most recalcitrant of all to attempts to interpret its history in Hellenic terms. This choice, however, would have a practical drawback. The Egyptian culture became extinct as long ago as the fourth or fifth century of the Christian Era. An observer looking at history from the Egyptian standpoint would therefore not be in a position to take into account the fifteen or sixteen hundred years that have elapsed since then. It is true that he would have more than double that length of time to survey in looking backwards from the evening of the Egyptian Civilization to its dawn. All the same, his historical horizon would be a restricted one by comparison with the horizon of a present-day observer's field of vision. This tells in favour of retaining a present-day standpoint; and, if we are to shift our ground from a Western present-day standpoint to some other, a Chinese present-day standpoint is perhaps the most promising for our purpose.

Let me suppose, for instance, that China, not England, had been my own birthplace in A.D. 1889. I should then have had the Confucian equivalent of an Hellenic classical education. After having prepared myself to sit for the civil service examination, I should probably have been just too late to try my fortune before the abolition of this 1,300-years-old institution in A.D. 1905. But I should already have been drilled in the classics so thoroughly that they would have governed my outlook ever since, whatever might have been my experience since the Revolution of A.D. 1911. My picture of world history would, in fact, have been determined by my picture of Chinese history, and I should have seen Chinese history through the eyes of the first oecumenical Chinese historian, Ssu-ma Ch'ien (*vivebat circa* 145 B.C.-90 B.C.) and his continuators the compilers of the successive dynastic histories.

Looking at current events and the long vista of their antecedents through these classically trained eyes, I should not have been taken by surprise when, in 1911, the unitary regime of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, under which China had been living by then for more than a quarter of a millennium, dissolved into anarchy, nor again when, in 1948-9, this bout of anarchy was brought to an end by the establishment of another unitary regime. Both these revolutionary events would have

¹ Cp. Sir Llewellyn Woodward's observations quoted on p. 168.

² See p. 60, footnote 2.

³ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 80. Cp. p. 115.

conformed to the age-old pattern of Chinese history as this had been presented by Ssu-ma Ch'ien and his successors. In their view, which would consequently have been my view, Chinese history had run in a rhythmical series of alternations between bouts of unity and order and bouts of disunity and anarchy. No bout of either kind had ever come to stay; and it could be predicted with confidence that halcyon days would give way to rough weather, and that the roughest weather would give way in its turn, sooner or later, to halcyon days. These predictions could be made by induction from a canonical record that, by A.D. 1911, extended over a span of not much less than five thousand years.¹ An empirical verification of this alternating rhythm in Chinese history would, however, have seemed superfluous to a classically educated mind. The rhythm's presence here—and everywhere—was guaranteed by the fact that it was the fundamental rhythm of the Universe: the perpetual alternation of a Yin state of quiescence with a Yang burst of activity.² In the view of the Chinese *Weltanschauung*, the course of non-human nature and the course of human affairs are akin to each other not merely in the general sense that either realm is subject to a set of laws. Their relation to each other is, on this view, much more intimate than that. An identical set of laws governs them both and thereby gears them together.³

Looking at history with these Chinese eyes in the nineteen-twenties, when I was making my notes for this book, I should, of course, have taken Chinese, not Hellenic, history as my model, and I should have seen Chinese history as a series of successive realizations of the ideal of a universal state, punctuated by intermediate lapses into disunion and disorder. The phases of both kinds had varied considerably in length, so that, in the field of human history, the Yin-Yang rhythm would be cyclical without having any regular periodicity. The succession of unitary phases ran back from the Ch'ing (Manchu) regime, under which I had been born,⁴ to the Ming and the Yüan (Mongol), with intervening bouts of disunion that had been relatively brief. The pre-Yüan bout of disunion had lasted for about 150 years; the preceding unitary Sung regime for 167 years; the bout of disunion before that for about half a century; the unitary T'ang regime, with its Sui overture, for more than three centuries before that; the preceding bout of disunion for about four centuries (reckoning back, beyond the collapse of the United Chin

¹ The canon of Chinese history established by Ssu-ma Ch'ien purported to trace the origins of Chinese Civilization back to the early centuries of the third millennium B.C. Recent archaeological research traces these origins back no farther than the thirteenth century B.C., if they are to be equated with the transition, in China, to the Bronze Age from the Neolithic Age.

² This point has been taken by the Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. 'Perhaps . . . the Hindu or Buddhist view of world-cycles is a truer picture of what Indian or Chinese history feels like to the Indian or Chinese observer than our Western and Christian picture of successive stages leading to a definite end' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

³ Compare the view that became current in the Sumero-Akkadian World at least as early as the eighth century B.C. (see pp. 33-34).

⁴ According to the classical Chinese doctrine, I had been born under it wherever my birth-place happened to be, since all the kingdoms of the Earth were satellites of the Middle Kingdom, even if their rulers were unwilling to acknowledge this political verity, or were blankly ignorant of it.

(Tsin), to the collapse of the Posterior Han); the unitary Han regime, with its Ch'in (Ts'in) overture, for about four centuries before that, punctuated by two sharp but short bouts of anarchy in A.D. 9-25 and 207 B.C.-2 B.C.

From the fall of the Ch'ing unitary regime in A.D. 1911 back to the establishment of the Ch'in (Ts'in) unitary regime in 221 B.C., the traditional model of Chinese history corresponds to the historical facts. But, as A. F. Wright has pointed out,¹ this model is a myth created and propagated by the Confucian litterati. They have glozed over cracks, deviations, and tensions, and have ignored radical Chinese critics of the Chinese way of life. 'The result is a self-image of the civilization which has a deceptive symmetry, a self-consistency that belongs to its myth and not to its history.'² According to this myth, 'the history of China' has been 'the record of men striving to realise the ideals of the sages'.³ Simplified images tend to harden from hypotheses into articles of faith,⁴ and Chinese traditionalists have cajoled themselves into giving credence to a presentation of the Pre-Han history of China which bears little resemblance to the reality.

We have noticed⁵ that, from the Han Age inclusive back to the dawn of the Sinic Civilization, the configuration of Chinese history conforms to the Hellenic model. At the earliest date at which the record of Chinese history comes into clear focus—and this is no earlier than the ninth or eighth century B.C.—China makes her appearance on the scene as a politically disunited world of local states, and the political unity that she eventually attained under the Ch'in (Ts'in) and Han dynasties was the consequence of a long-drawn-out series of ever more devastating interstate wars. Throughout the age preceding the political unification of 221 B.C., China was, however, already a unity on the cultural plane; and on this plane her greatest intellectual creative work was done during the politically catastrophic period of the Contending States, before her political unity was achieved. This was the age of the founders of almost all the schools of Chinese philosophy, including Confucius himself, whose school was eventually canonized as the classical one. Confucius was a conservative. He never dreamed of an effective political unification of the Chinese World. Ch'in Shih Hwang-ti's work would have shocked him; and Han Liu P'ang's modification of it would have pleased him hardly any better. Confucius, like Plato and Aristotle, took political disunity for granted. This authentic configuration of early Chinese history—including the contemporaneity of political disunity and intellectual achievement—bears an unmistakable resemblance to the configuration of early Hellenic history, and differs entirely from the pattern of subsequent Chinese history that has been taken by Chinese scholars since the Han Age as their model for Chinese history as a whole. Consequently, this model could not be applied to early Chinese history

¹ In a paper on 'The Study of Chinese Civilization', presented to the Seminar on the Comparative Study of Civilizations at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, 4th March, 1958, p. 5.

² Loc. cit., p. 6. Cp. *Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 123.

³ 'The Study of Chinese Civilization', p. 7.

⁴ Ibid., p. 35.

⁵ On p. 173.

without doing violence to the facts; and the scholars did this violence rather than renounce their quest of self-consistency and symmetry.

Having correctly observed that the later unitary regimes were conscious and deliberate restorations of the Ch'in (Ts'in)-Han unitary regime, Chinese scholars assumed that this too must have been a restoration of some earlier regime, and accordingly they extrapolated their series of phases of unity, backwards in time, through a Chou and a Shang and a Hsia restoration of an ideal polity supposedly founded by primordial sages. These sages are perhaps gods reduced to human stature; the Hsia regime is legendary, so far as we know; the Shang and Chou regimes were realities; their historicity is attested by surviving material remains of their cultures, including such instructive contemporary documents as the Shang inscriptions on 'oracle bones'. But there is no evidence to suggest that either the Shang or the Chou regime was a polity of the same order as the Ch'in (Ts'in) and Han regimes and their subsequent avatars.¹ Our only sure evidence for conditions in China in the Shang age is that of the artefacts disinterred by modern archaeologists, and these give us no information about the political structure or the territorial extent of the Shang state. As for the Chou, when the curtain rises on the scene of Chinese history, they are no more than *rois fainéants*, like the Japanese Emperors during the seven centuries preceding the Meiji Restoration. Their political suzerainty over the contending local states was nominal. Their authority may have been greater before their disaster in 771 B.C., when a vassal prince combined with a barbarian war-band to sack their capital city. But it is unlikely that, even at the height of their power, the Chou were the rulers of an effective unitary empire comparable to the regime that was established by Ch'in Shih Hwang-ti in 221 B.C.² *Pace* the traditional presentation of Chinese history, the effective unification that Shih Hwang-ti achieved and that Liu P'ang salvaged must in truth have been an unprecedented achievement, as the work of Caesar and Augustus was in the Hellenic World.

The traditional presentation of Chinese history would have been impressed upon the mind of a Confucian-educated Chinese scholar born in 1889; and, if, having been born too late to sit for the last of the civil service examinations, he had made his way to one of the new American universities in China and had widened his historical horizon by adding some Western knowledge to his Chinese stock, probably he would still have applied the traditional Chinese model of the course of history in taking his bearings in his extended field of inquiry.

¹ This point has been made on p. 175, footnote 1. Bagby takes the same negative view of them (*Culture and History*, p. 219).

² In this point the early history of Japan perhaps comes nearer than the early history of China comes to fitting the traditional Chinese model. From the reorganization of the Japanese imperial regime in A.D. 645, on the pattern of the contemporary T'ang imperial regime in China, down to the triumph of feudalism over the imperial administration in the twelfth century, the Japanese imperial government does seem to have exercised some degree of effective power—though, no doubt, this was a wasting asset and was never anything like so effective as the Tokugawa regime and its successors have been. In copying the contemporary T'ang, the Japanese imperial government was modelling itself on a centralizing regime in contemporary China that certainly worked effectively in its earlier stages. There is no evidence that the Chou dynasty of China in its first phase had any similar model to serve it as a standard.

If he had begun by applying the traditional Chinese model to Egyptiac history, the result would have encouraged him to persevere; for the Chinese model fits the facts of Egyptiac history from beginning to end. In the Egyptiac Old Kingdom we have, at the dawn of history, a unitary regime which is neither legendary like the Hsia nor shadowy like the Chou, but is authentic and substantial. And, from that first beat of the Yin-Yang rhythm in the Old Kingdom, this rhythm marches on through the First Intermediate Period of Egyptiac history, the Middle Empire, the Second Intermediate Period, the New Empire, and a series of revivals of the New Empire in which, as in the corresponding stage of Chinese history, the empire-builders' role comes to be filled more and more frequently by foreigners—in the Egyptiac case, Libyans, Ethiopians, Assyrians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans—with indigenous dynasties putting in an appearance more and more rarely.

If our imaginary Chinese inquirer had turned his attention to the Tigris-Euphrates basin next, he would have found himself, to begin with, in a world divided politically among a number of local states, and he would not have been able to detect the expected rhythm till the rise of the dynasty of Agade; but, from that date onwards, he would have been able to trace a rhythmic alternation of political unifications and disruptions over an area that eventually expanded to embrace some of the Tigris-Euphrates basin's hinterlands. The series of unitary regimes here would run from the dynasty of Agade through the Third Dynasty of Ur, the First Dynasty of Babylon, the Assyrian Empire, the Neobabylonian Empire, the Achaemenian Empire, the Seleucid Monarchy, the Parthian Empire, the Sasanian Empire,¹ the Arab Caliphate, the Caliphate's Saljuq successor-state, the Mongol Il-Khanate, the Timurid Empire, the Safawi Empire, and finally the short-lived empire of Nadir Shah, an Afshar Turkish war-lord who was a veritable reincarnation of Naramsin or Tiglath-Pileser III. By Nadir's day the Sumerian language had been extinct for more than three thousand years and the Akkadian for nearly seventeen hundred years, and their cuneiform script had become a riddle of the Sphinx; but the military and political rhythm which the war-lords of Agade had started up had gone rolling on for more than four thousand years.

Turning from the Tigris-Euphrates basin to India, a Chinese student of the morphology of history might fail, at first glance, to detect here any trace of the Sinic pattern. In India, in contrast to the Tigris-Euphrates basin and its Iranian hinterland, the unitary political regimes are echeloned at long intervals down the corridors of time; and, when they make their appearance, they are short-lived. At first glance Indian history may look like a shapeless welter of disorder. Yet four plateaux stand out above the morass—the Maurya, the Gupta, the Mughal, and the British Raj—and these are enough to certify that the Chinese rhythm is in operation in India too, though here the rhythm labours like the engine of a car ploughing its way through a bog.

If our Chinese surveyor now switches to the western end of the Old

¹ The Parthian and Sasanian empires are assigned to a cycle of the history of the Tigris-Euphrates basin by R. Coulborn in *Toynbee and History*, p. 162.

World, he will find himself here in the dilemma that confronted his Chinese predecessors when they had to deal with the age of Chinese history before the unification of China by Ch'in Shih Hwang-ti. Either he must jettison a model derived from the configuration of Chinese history since the epoch-making year 221 B.C., or else he must invent a fictitious history of the pre-Augustan Hellenic World, as Chinese scholarship did invent a fictitious history of the pre-Shih Hwang-ti Sinic World, to fit a pattern to which the authentic configuration of this phase of history cannot be made to conform. A fictitious reconstruction of pre-Augustan Hellenic history on these traditional Chinese lines would have to be made of bricks without straw. The only potential materials would be the brief interlude of unity represented by Philip II of Macedon's League of Corinth, and, before that, a shadowy Minoan and a hardly more substantial Achaean thalassocracy, both of which antedate the dawn of Hellenic history. And, in this reconstruction of early Hellenic history, as in the corresponding reconstruction of early Chinese history, one would have to write off the most signal of the reconstructed civilization's creative intellectual achievements as being by-products of a bout of political disunity which was just one in a series of unfortunate lapses from the normal unitary regime. Evidently the application of the traditional Chinese model would make the same nonsense of early Hellenic history as it makes of early Chinese history.

On the other hand, the model fits well enough if, starting from the Roman Empire, the surveyor moves, not backward, but forward, in time from the year 31 B.C. and keeps his eye fixed on the Empire's central and eastern sections, which were the heart-land of this Hellenic universal state and came to be the seat of the imperial government after its location at Nicomedia by Diocletian in A.D. 284 and at Constantinople by Constantine I in A.D. 324-30. In this heart-land the Yin-Yang rhythm now promptly declares itself. The punctuations of disunity and disorder in A.D. 69 and A.D. 193-7 were repeated and intensified in an agonizing half-century of anarchy running from 235 to 285. The subsequent Diocletianic-Constantinian restoration was followed by a collapse after the imperial army's disastrous defeat by the Goths at Adrianople in 378. But this dangerous reverse, too, was quickly retrieved by a steady recovery in the course of the fifth century. A fresh collapse was brought upon the Hellenic universal state by Justinian I (*imperabat* A.D. 527-65). He overstrained it through his misguided attempt at re-expansion; and this over-exertion was followed by a fresh bout of anarchy, lasting from 602 to 717, which was at least as agonizing, and was twice as long, as the bout in the years 235-85. But in 717 the universal state was restored once more by Leo Syrus; and, after that, unity and order were maintained till 1071; were re-established in 1081; and were maintained again till 1186. The revolt of the Bulgars in that year, and the Western Christians' sack of Constantinople and partition of the East Roman Empire in 1204, precipitated a chaos that lasted for nearly two hundred years. But, in the later decades of the fourteenth century, unity was restored, yet again, by the 'Osmanlis. The new 'Caesar of Rome' (*Qaysar-i-Rum*) re-expanded the restored universal state up to

the limits in South-Eastern Europe and in the Tigris-Euphrates basin that had been attained by the Emperor Trajan (*imperabat* A.D. 98-117); and this Turkish Roman Empire maintained itself for some four hundred years (A.D. 1372-1774), with punctuations of disaster and disorder at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and again after the failure, in 1683, of the second Ottoman siege of Vienna. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-74 was the beginning of the end. Yet, even after that, there was a rally in the first half of the nineteenth century. In South-Eastern Europe the Ottoman Empire did not finally break up till 1878, and in South-West Asia not till 1918. The last Ottoman Qaysar-i-Rum was deposed—and the office abolished—by the Emperor's own subjects in A.D. 1922, 116 years after the renunciation of the title of Roman Emperor by the last holder of it in the West.

Here, in an epilogue to Hellenic history which has its starting-point in 31 B.C., we have a counterpart of the pattern of Chinese history since 221 B.C. which is almost as exact a replica of it as the course of Egyptian history is from beginning to end. And in the Levant, as in China, this persistent rhythm does not peter out till a date that, in 1961, was still within living memory. The Hellenic universal state, however, had some backward outlying provinces round the shores of the western basin of the Mediterranean, including Italy and Rome itself, the semi-barbarian city that had been the universal state's political nucleus. To complete our test of the applicability of the Chinese model to the history of the western end of the Old World, we must apply it in the extreme west too; and the experiment will show that here, from A.D. 378 onwards, the Chinese model fails to fit the historical facts as signally as it fails in the Hellenic World as a whole down to 31 B.C. and in China itself down to 221 B.C.

In the West the fifth century of the Christian Era, which was an age of recovery in the central and eastern sections of the Hellenic World, was an age of disintegration that ended, in A.D. 476, in the suppression of the imperial office here and in a nominal reunification of the whole empire under the imperial government at Constantinople. This was mere camouflage for a partition of the western provinces among a number of barbarian successor-states. In the sixth century Justinian—at an excessive cost to the stamina of the universal state's heart-land—turned the Constantinopolitan Government's title into a reality in Italy, part of North-West Africa, and a smaller part of Spain. But this re-expansion of the Hellenic universal state was ephemeral; it was all undone in the course of the two hundred years following Justinian's death in 565; and the West remained disunited and derelict till the later decades of the eighth century, when the Frankish Carolingians restored the empire in the West—as, in the Levant, in the later decades of the fourteenth century, it was restored by the 'Osmanlis.

After the coronation of Charlemagne at Rome on Christmas Day, A.D. 800, the former domain of the Hellenic Civilization harboured two effective states—one centred on Gaul and the other on Anatolia—each of which claimed to be the Hellenic universal state's legitimate

representative. This self-contradictory political situation would not perplex a Chinese scholar. In Chinese history it has at least two counterparts in the coexistence of the barbarian northern empire of the Wei with an indigenous southern empire (the Sung, Ch'i and Liang regimes) from A.D. 439 to A.D. 534, and again in the coexistence of the barbarian northern empire of the Kin, followed by the Mongols, with another indigenous southern empire (the Sung) from 1127 to 1279. In China on each of these occasions, the next phase was the re-establishment of unity as a result of an annexation of the south by the north. This was achieved by the Sui in A.D. 589 and by the Mongols (Yüan) in A.D. 1279. With these precedents in mind, a Chinese scholar, coming fresh to Western history, would wait expectantly for a political reunification of the entire Hellenic World in the ninth century of the Christian Era through a Carolingian conquest of the Constantinopolitan Roman Empire.¹ But in the ninth century, as in the fifth, the history of the West obstinately took an un-Chinese and un-Byzantine course.

So far from annexing Anatolia, the Carolingians lamentably failed to maintain their empire in Gaul. The West now went through another bout of political disunity and barbarian invasion; and, since the formal partition of the Carolingian Empire in 843, the reunification of most of the former western provinces of the Empire, which the Carolingians achieved but failed to maintain, has never been repeated effectively. In the West, from 888 to 962, even the title of Roman Emperor was sometimes in abeyance, and the occasional claimants to it were not in effective control of more than fragments of the whole territory. The Empire was restored again, in conformity with the Chinese pattern of history, in 962, when the Saxon Otto I was crowned Emperor at Rome, and it was once more a political reality from that date till the death of the Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen in 1250. But even the nominal suzerainty of this medieval Western Roman Empire was never recognized in France, which was the central and the leading country of the Western World—not to speak of Britain, which had not been incorporated in the Carolingian Roman Empire either—and, throughout the three centuries of its more or less effective existence, the nominal authority of 'the Roman Empire of the German People' was nebulous in Burgundia and was perpetually resisted, *de facto*, in Italy. Even in Germany and Lotharingia it was a wasting asset. After the death of Frederick II the Western Roman Empire was a farce. It is true that the title of Emperor was again held in a continuous succession from 1273 to 1806; but, in so far as its holders, in this phase, had any effective power, they had this in virtue of being also rulers of some local Western state, such as Luxembourg-Bohemia in the fourteenth century and the Hapsburg dominions from 1438 onwards. When the Emperor Francis II Hapsburg renounced the title on 6th August, 1806, he was not parting with any of his previous political power. The real basis of his power, which was that of a local ruler, was proclaimed in the solecism 'Hereditary

¹ The likenesses and differences between the sequel to the fall of the Han Empire in China and the sequel to the fall of the Roman Empire at the western end of the Old World have been discussed in this book in ix. 649-81.

Emperor of Austria'—a title that Francis II had already assumed on 10 August, 1804.

To apply the traditional Chinese model to the history of the West, we should have to take the Western wraith of the Roman Empire as being the key institution of the Western Civilization, and this would be to make nonsense of Western history, not only during the last century and a half, when even the name of the Roman Empire has been extinct on Western soil, but at least as far back as the disintegration of the Carolingian Roman Empire. The Western Roman Empire is not a key to any of the things that are characteristic or significant in Western history.

The Chinese model is equally inapplicable to the histories of the Middle American and Andean civilizations, which the Hellenic model fits so well. In the Andean World there is no evidence that there had ever been political unity before this was established by the Incas, and the Inca universal state had been in existence for only about forty years¹ by the date when it was overthrown by the Spanish *conquistadores*. In Middle America the Aztec Empire had not yet completed the political unification of its world by the date when it met the same fate at the same hands. The Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain might perhaps be regarded as being the consummation of the Middle American universal state that the Aztecs had been building up, and the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru as being a continuation of the Inca universal state in the Andean World. But the Spanish Empire of the Indies broke up into successor-states within three hundred years of its establishment, and there is no indication that the present regime in Latin America, in which this region is partitioned among twenty-one local republics, is an 'intermediate period' which is going to end in the re-establishment of political unity there.

Our survey of the histories of civilizations in terms of the traditional Chinese model has shown that this, like the Hellenic, fails to fit all cases. Indeed, its only perfect fit is its application to Egyptian history, and this only on condition that we leave the 'prehistoric' age out of account. The traditional Chinese model does not fit the early history of any other civilization, not even that of civilization in China itself. Paradoxically, it can give only a negative account of the age in which its own revered patron-philosopher Confucius lived, though Confucius was a child of his age, besides being an innovator under the guise of an archaist. The traditional Chinese model has to write the Confucian Age off as part of an intermediate period between the Western Chou and the Imperial Ch'in (Ts'in). From the date of the establishment of a universal state onwards, the Chinese model does fit Hellenic and subsequent Byzantine history well, the history of the Tigris-Euphrates basin and Iran passably, the history of India barely. But it does not fit Western, Middle American, or Andean history at all. And, in a pattern that presents history as an alternation of universal states and lapses from them, and ignores both local states and diasporas, there is no place for the Jews. The Jews lost their local state, never managed (as most other peoples have never managed) to become empire-builders, but have managed

¹ See p. 373.

(unlike most other peoples) to preserve their national identity without having a state or even a national home. In world history seen through Chinese spectacles, the Jews would pass unnoticed both in the age of the Prophets and in the age of the Pharisees.

It will be seen that the shortcomings of the Chinese model are at least as great as those of the Hellenic one. What conclusion are we to draw from this? Shall we jettison both models, and dismiss the policy of operating with models as an unprofitable wild-goose-chase? It seems more reasonable to conclude that the Chinese model, like the Hellenic model, is illuminating as far as it goes, and that the two models, looked at in relation to each other, are more than twice as illuminating as each of them is by itself.

The Chinese model has one clear advantage over the Hellenic, and that is its greater generality. This makes it possible to streamline the pattern of history by getting rid of distinctions, generated by the Hellenic model, that are perhaps artificial and superfluous.

For instance, the Hellenic model—at any rate as I have constructed it—distinguishes between several kinds of universal state. There are straightforward specimens (e.g. the Roman Empire in the Hellenic World and the Ch'in-Han Empire in China); there are rehabilitations after interruptions (e.g. the Gupta Empire figures as a rehabilitation of the Maurya Empire, and the Arab Caliphate as a rehabilitation of the Achaemenian Empire); and there are renaissances, when the universal state of an antecedent civilization is conjured up again in the history of an affiliated civilization (e.g. the T'ang Empire, the Carolingian Empire, and the East Roman Empire as reconstituted by Leo Syrus figure as rehabilitations of the Ch'in-Han Empire and the Roman Empire respectively). When we substitute the Chinese for the Hellenic model, these rather tiresome distinctions disappear, and we can treat on a parity, for purposes of comparative study, all states that embrace the whole geographical domain of a civilization. This simplification of the pattern and increase in the number of the specimens of it is a gain for the cause of knowledge and understanding. Gerhard Masur has criticized my list of universal states as being arbitrary.¹ I do not agree with all the particular points that Masur makes, but, in principle, I plead guilty to his charge; and I attribute my error, not to my having used the Hellenic model, but to my having used it exclusively, without also having used the Chinese model, or some other, as a check and a possible corrective.

The Hellenic model also suggests a distinction between three different kinds of 'intermediate period': a 'time of troubles', such as that which occurred in Hellenic history between the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization and the establishment of the Roman Empire; a lapse in the maintenance of a universal state, as exemplified in the temporary breakdowns of the Roman Empire in A.D. 69, A.D. 192-7, and A.D. 235-85; and an 'interregnum', such as that which occurred between the fall of the Roman Empire and the rise of the Western and Byzantine successors of the Hellenic Civilization. The Chinese model suggests that these

¹ In the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521-2.

three kinds of relatively anarchic interlude should all be treated as so many examples of the 'intermediate period' in the alternating Yin-Yang rhythm.¹ This more general way of looking at them may give us insights into their nature; but here we must be on our guard against being led into effacing distinctions that may be significant and important. The 'time of troubles' which the Hellenic model distinguishes from other anarchic interludes in Hellenic history was not, in fact, an intermediate period between two bouts of a universal state. It was the painful period of transition to a regime of political unity from a previous regime of political disunity that had broken down. This sequence—political disunity, breakdown, 'time of troubles', universal state—occurs, as we have seen, in at least nine other instances, including the history of the Sinic Civilization; and even Egyptian history will perhaps be found to conform to the Hellenic pattern if we take the pre-civilizational age of the history of Egypt into account.

5. AN HELLENO-SINIC STANDARD MODEL FOR CIVILIZATIONS

In fact, the Hellenic model is as widely applicable to the earlier phase in the histories of civilization as the Chinese model is to the later phase; and an improved model can be constructed by combining the later phase according to the Sinic model with the earlier phase according to the Hellenic.² This composite model for the histories of civilizations shows these societies starting as unities on the cultural plane without being united on the political plane. This regime is favourable to social and cultural progress; but its price is chronic warfare between the local states; this warfare becomes more intense and more devastating as the society grows in strength; and sooner or later it produces a social breakdown which, after a long-drawn-out 'time of troubles', is belatedly retrieved by the establishment of a universal state. This universal state is subject to recurrent lapses into anarchy; but, whether these intermediate periods are short or long, they are apt to be surmounted by the restoration of political unity. There must be some strong force making for the maintenance and, after lapses, for the restoration of unity, when once the original achievement of unity has come to pass; for the phenomenon of restoration occurs again and again, and this even after 'intermediate periods' that have been so long and so anarchic that they might have been expected to have made an irreparable break in the tradition.

This new model fits a great majority of the indisputable specimens of the species of society that we have called 'civilizations'. The Egyptian Civilization is unique in having achieved political unity at the opening

¹ The label 'time of troubles', which I have applied to the anarchic period of Hellenic history preceding the establishment of the Hellenic universal state, is in fact taken from the traditional Russian name for a lapse in the maintenance of the Russian universal state, i.e. the Muscovite Empire, between the extinction of the House of Rurik and the accession of the Romanovs.

² Sinic history, by itself, offers all the necessary data for constructing the improved model. If Chinese scholars had not done violence to early Chinese history in their excessive zeal for symmetry and self-consistency, it would not have been necessary to resort to an Hellenic model, as we have had to do, in order to correct the traditional Chinese misrepresentation of the configuration of early Chinese history.

of its history; but, as we have observed, there was an antecedent age of political disunity here too, if we take into account the pre-civilizational stage of history in Egypt. The Middle American, Andean, and Hellenic civilizations are exceptional in having experienced only a single spell of the universal-state stage instead of the normal experience of an initial spell followed by a series of restorations. But, in the Hellenic Civilization's case, this is true of the sequel only in the westernmost section of its domain. Western historians are apt to be preoccupied by what happened in these backward outlying territories, because this is the history of their own civilization. But the sequel to the fall of the Roman Empire in its central and eastern provinces is at least as significant; and in this area the sequel conformed to the Chinese pattern: there was a series of revivals of the universal state, beginning in A.D. 717 and not coming to a final close till 1922.

The composite Hellenic-Sinic model, which is evidently the standard pattern, is explicable in human terms in all its stages. For example, when we examine a civilization's age of growth, we shall not be surprised to find that a period in which a society is articulated into a number of politically separate local communities, all sharing one common culture, should be a time of creativity and progress. The stimulus that comes from direct personal intercourse works more powerfully in a small community than in a large one; life in a small community that is in active and competitive intercourse with neighbours of its own size and kind is more stimulating still, since this is a social structure that combines the stimulus of intimacy with the stimulus of a wider horizon. A classic exposition of the cultural advantages of a regime of political disunity within a unitary economic and cultural field has been given by Hume in his essay *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*.¹ But these blessings have their price in the currency of inter-state warfare; and a point may come when the toll taken by this is greater than any benefit that the stimuli of variety and competition can confer. If the balance becomes decidedly adverse, the society breaks down. It might be asked why a society does not forestall its breakdown, or at any rate retrieve it, by promptly applying the remedy of political unification to which it does eventually have recourse. Why do people put up with a long-drawn-out 'time of troubles' before bringing themselves to get rid of warfare by submitting to a universal state? The answer is that human beings are creatures of habit, and that the regime of local sovereignties has won such a hold on people's hearts in the age when it was producing a balance of advantage that it takes a long experience of its subsequent disastrous effects to induce its former beneficiaries to abandon their allegiance to it when they have become its victims.

When once, however, a universal state has been established, it is not surprising that this regime should win a hold on people's hearts in its turn. The peace and order that the achievement of political unity brings with it are appreciated by contrast with a foregoing 'time of troubles' that had become intolerable before it was transcended; and the loss of stimulus now seems a cheap price to pay for the inestimably precious

¹ This passage has been quoted in the present book in i. 473-4.

boon of being rescued from the jaws of destruction and guaranteed against a recurrence of this fearful threat so long as the universal state lasts.¹ With the passage of time, a universal state's hold over its subjects' hearts is apt to increase, unless the empire-builders have been aliens who have persistently made themselves odious.² It is easy to understand why a universal state, once established, should be restored again and again when it has broken down. But we still have to ask ourselves why, when once it has been established, there should be any 'intermediate periods'³ at all, considering that normally the maintenance of the universal state is desired by at least a majority of its subjects.

In previous volumes the declines and falls of universal states have been interpreted as being the after-effects of mortal wounds that had been inflicted by society on itself during the foregoing 'times of troubles'; and this lassitude, if not exhaustion, would explain the lapse in the maintenance of a universal state; but it would not explain how a society that has lacked the vitality to maintain its universal state can subsequently summon up enough vitality to re-establish it. In seeking to account for the Yin-Yang alternating rhythm that seems normally to prevail in the history of a civilization from the date of the first establishment of its universal state, we need not rest content with the Chinese account of this rhythm as being a manifestation, in human affairs, of a fundamental cosmic rhythm that is itself inexplicable and axiomatic.⁴

¹ H. Frankfort has criticized my previous treatment of Egyptian history on the ground that I have viewed it through Hellenic and Western spectacles and have consequently failed to see it as it really was (*The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 27-31). As Frankfort sees it, 'the ideal of a marvellously integrated society had been formed long before the Pyramids were built; it was as nearly realised, when they were built, as any ideal social form can be translated into actuality; and it remained continuously before the eyes of rulers and people alike during subsequent centuries. It was an ideal which ought to thrill a Western historian by its novelty, for it falls entirely outside the experience of Greek or Roman or modern man, although it survives, in an attenuated form, in Africa. It represents a harmony between Man and the divine which is beyond our boldest dreams, since it was maintained by divine power which had taken charge of the affairs of Man in the person of Pharaoh. Society moved in unison with Nature. Justice, which was the social aspect of the cosmic order, pervaded the commonwealth' (ibid., pp. 27-31). Frankfort's thesis that the Egyptians' 'polity was not imposed but evolved from immemorial predilections' (ibid., p. 99) is not, I think, contradicted by anything that I have written in previous volumes of the present book. On the other hand, when Frankfort goes on to say that this polity 'was adhered to, without protest, for almost three thousand years', his contention here is contradicted, not just by me, but by the evidence of the surviving Egyptian literature of the Age of the Middle Empire. This testifies that the ideology of the Old Kingdom regime, and the measures (e.g. pyramid-building) through which this ideology was put into practice, did eventually provoke a moral reaction that went to the length of political revolution in the last days of the Sixth Dynasty.

² This exceptional case is underlined by K. W. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 174-250, on pp. 224-5.

³ In a previous passage (p. 55, footnote 3) it has been noticed that a comparative value judgement is implicit in the ostensibly neutral term 'intermediate periods' which has been coined by the Egyptologists but is applicable also to the bouts of disorder and disunity in Chinese and in Byzantine history. The implicit judgement that political unity, embracing the whole domain of a civilization, is the normal, proper, and desirable state of affairs may or may not be objectively justifiable; but there is no doubt that it accurately represents the feelings of populations that have had experience of a universal state or have inherited a tradition of one from their ancestors.

⁴ H. A. L. Fisher has made fun of me for taking the Chinese concept of Yin and Yang seriously. 'In the great operatic performance of humanity he detects', Fisher says of me, 'the occurrence of this *Leitmotive* of Yin and Yang. Other ears will be less sensitive to the regularity of the Chinese beat' (*The Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1934,

The Yin-Yang rhythm does run through the histories of universal states, but there is a human explanation of it. It is an explanation in economic terms.

A universal state is a heavy charge on the economy of a civilization. It requires, for its maintenance, a well-paid professional civil service and professional defence force; and the cost of these services will rise if it is one of the laws of the history of a universal state that, with the passage of time, the administrative and military personnel is apt to become more numerous as the institutions of local self-government decay and as the pressure of the trans-frontier barbarians increases. If the universal state—and, with it, the society incapsulated in it—is to be able to meet these rising costs without being crushed by them, it must be able to draw upon a commensurately rising productivity; but, in the Age of the Civilizations up to date, the economy has been more or less static most of the time in the greater part of the *Oikoumenê*.

The deliberate application of science to technology in the West is something recent and unprecedented. Even today, when the Industrial Revolution has been in progress for some two hundred years and has spread from Britain, where it originated, to the ends of the Earth, the greater part of the human race is still in the pre-industrial stage. The last economic revolution before this was the enhancement of the productivity of agriculture through water-control, some time before the close of the fourth millennium B.C., which transformed inhospitable swamps and jungles into the cradles of the Sumero-Akkadian and Egyptian civilizations.¹ But only a fraction of the cultivable part of the Earth's surface is capable of being made to give a comparable yield. Moreover, even in the most favourable environments, the technique of agriculture remained virtually static until the beginning of the present application of science to the improvement of crops and livestock; and this, like the present Industrial Revolution, dates back only to eighteenth-century Britain. Thus the normal economic basis of civilization, till a very recent date, has been a static agriculture at a level of productivity that in most places has been not much higher than that attained in Neolithic societies in the Pre-civilizational Age. But a civilization is a much more costly social structure than a Neolithic society is, and its costs are perhaps at their maximum when the civilization is organized politically in a universal state, and when this universal state has been in existence for some time. The inability of a pre-scientific agricultural economy to bear this economic load is evidently one of the causes of the unwished-for collapses by which so many universal states have been overtaken so many times in succession.

The importance of the part played by the economic factor in determining whether a universal state is to collapse or is to survive can be gauged by comparing the respective fortunes of the Roman Empire in its different sections. The western provinces, in which the Empire

p. 672). On this I can only comment: 'They have ears, but they hear not' (Psalm cxxxv. 17). One can, however, be alive to the prevalence of the Yin-Yang rhythm in human affairs without having to renounce all attempt to explain this.

¹ This economic revolution was made possible by an advance, not in the realm of technology, but in the realm of politics (see pp. 338-9).

collapsed in the fifth century of the Christian Era, were relatively backward economically; the central and eastern provinces, in which, in the same century, the Empire survived, were the principal seats of the Hellenic World's industry and trade; and their relative economic strength more than counterbalanced the relative unfavourableness of their strategic position. Though the centre and the east were more directly exposed than the west was to assaults from the Eurasian Nomads of the Great Western Bay of the Steppe, and from the Sasanian power in Iran and 'Iraq, the Empire managed here to hold its own; and, though it did collapse, here too, in the seventh century, it might have continued to survive in these economically stronger sections if, in the sixth century, the Emperor Justinian had not taxed their strength too severely in attempting to reconquer the derelict west. Thereafter, when, in the eighth century, the Hellenic universal state was re-established in the two rival shapes of the East Roman Empire in Anatolia and the Carolingian Roman Empire in Gaul, history repeated itself through the operation of the same economic causes. The Carolingian Empire swiftly collapsed; the East Roman Empire survived, without any further collapse, for three and a half centuries (A.D. 717-1071). The reason for this diversity of fortunes, this time once again, was that Anatolia in this age was economically capable of carrying the load of a universal state, whereas contemporary Transalpine Western Europe was not. It is significant that in the East Roman Empire, during the century immediately preceding the disaster of A.D. 1071, there had been increasing symptoms of social and economic ill-health in the Empire's heart-land, Anatolia.

These are dramatic illustrations of the survival value of economic productivity for a universal state. Yet, hitherto, the rulers of universal states have seldom been alive to this. More often they have been either indifferent to possibilities of technological advance or positively hostile to these, on the reckoning that any technological change is a menace to economic equilibrium and hence also to the social and political stability that the founders of the universal state have established with such difficulty.¹ Certainly the Roman Imperial Government did not ever realize, at any stage of its history, that technology, as exemplified in Hero of Alexandria's invention of a turbine engine, could have solved the Hellenic universal state's intertwined problems of finance and defence. And in the western provinces in the fourth century of the Christian Era, when the Empire was fighting for survival there, no attention was paid to possibilities of dealing with manpower shortage and with defence logistics by mechanization, though a set of projects for this was published in an anonymous memorandum *De Rebus Bellicis*.² In universal states at both ends of the Old World the public authorities seem normally to have confined their action to collecting the land-tax and turning the screw harder on the taxable cultivators or their landlords when agricultural production has declined or public expenses have mounted.

¹ See the story, cited in ix. 613, footnote 2, of an early Roman emperor's reaction to the news of the invention of unbreakable glass.

² *A Roman Reformer and Inventor: De Rebus Bellicis*, ed. and tr. by E. A. Thompson (Oxford 1952, Clarendon Press).

It is significant that, in China, the local state Ch'in (Ts'in), which eventually established a universal state for the first time by overthrowing the last of its competitors in 221 B.C., was also the state which, in the fourth century B.C., had distinguished itself among its competitors by systematically revolutionizing its social and economic structure with a view to increasing the population's productivity and putting the increased product at the government's disposal. But it is also significant that, when this regime was extended to the whole of China by the founder of the universal state, Ch'in Shih Hwang-ti, it provoked vehement opposition. After Shih Hwang-ti's death his regime was quickly overthrown; and both he and the 'Legist' school of philosophers, whose theories had been the inspiration of the Ch'in government's practice, were execrated in the subsequently established Chinese tradition. The school of philosophy that was officially established by the Han Emperor Wu-ti (*imperator* 140 B.C.–87 B.C.), and that maintained its monopoly, off and on, from that time till A.D. 1911, was not the 'Legist' school, but the Confucian. And Confucianism has not been sympathetic towards non-agricultural economic enterprise, though it has understood the value of water-control for agriculture and for communications.

Wu-ti embarked on expensive military operations. He carried the southern border of the Sinic universal state to the 'natural frontier' of the south coast of China, while on the north he tried to subjugate the whole domain of the Hiongnu Nomads on the Eurasian Steppe. In order to meet his consequent heavy expenses, he revived the policy of the 'Legist' school. He put the imperial government into business and at the same time gave scope to non-agricultural private business enterprise.¹ Notwithstanding these efforts to stimulate production, Wu-ti over-taxed his empire's resources and so was perhaps responsible for the decline and fall of the Prior Han regime within the hundred years following the date of his death. But the opposite policy had no happier results. After the restoration of the universal state by the Posterior Han Dynasty, the Confucian landed gentry who staffed the imperial civil service gained the upper hand over the non-agrarian business interests.² And, when the universal state was thus put back on to an almost exclusively agricultural basis, it collapsed and remained in abeyance for four hundred years, save for the short interlude of the United Chin (Tsin) regime.

In China from the time of the Posterior Han dynasty (A.D. 25–220) until the enforced opening of treaty ports to Western economic enterprise in the nineteenth century, agriculture was the economic basis of the Sinic universal state, and the insufficiency of this economic foundation for this political structure was evidently one important cause of the repeated collapses of the Sinic universal state in the course of the intervening centuries. In discussing the most recent of these collapses, that of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, W. Altree notes³ that, during its tenure of power (A.D. 1644–1911), this dynasty increased the rate of the land-tax 'twenty to thirty times'.

¹ See B. Watson: *Ssu-ma Ch'ien*, pp. 31–33.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38, and A. F. Wright: *Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 9, cited already on p. 178, footnote 3.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 268.

'If any one reason accounts for the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty, it probably can be found in the mistaken policy of peasant exploitation that wrecked the economy of the country. This agrarian crisis was the issue of a basic contradiction in Chinese society that runs through the whole imperial history of China and far transcends in time Toynbee's Far Eastern Civilization. The Chinese administration, requiring intricate scribal techniques, depended upon scholar bureaucrats for effectiveness. These administrators were drawn from the wealthy landlord class which alone had the leisure to acquire the necessary academic preparation. Thus the government and its officials both competed through taxes or rents to preempt the basic form of wealth in the surplus production of the land. The gentry-administrator class used its strategic position in government to evade taxation by shifting it to the peasantry. Beset by the government demanding taxes and the landlords demanding rents, the peasantry was progressively impoverished, rebellion was a logical consequence, and a new regime would initiate this predatory system afresh.'¹

The sufferings inflicted on the peasantry by exploitation were aggravated by the exploiters' technological inefficiency.

'It is almost certainly untrue that, under the old regime, [conservancy works] were maintained so effectively as to prevent recurrent disasters. Both Chinese and European scholars have investigated the history of flood and famine in China. The conclusion suggested by their work is that those catastrophes occurred over large areas at short intervals for several—perhaps many—centuries before the present one; nor should that surprise Professor Toynbee, since elsewhere he assigns the Chinese "breakdown"² to a fairly early date—the last quarter of the ninth century. The most significant fact, indeed, is surely the opposite of that emphasized by him. It is the failure of a great civilization, in spite—or, perhaps, because—of all its brilliant achievements in other fields, to master the problem of taming an unfriendly Nature, which the West, in some other respects so inferior to China, has in recent times largely succeeded in solving. The point is not a trifling one, since it concerns the characteristics of two important cultural types, differing sharply from each other both in their virtues and their limitations.'³

These two passages, taken together, go far towards explaining the successive collapses of universal states, not only in China, but in other regions where they have been erected on the same economic and social

¹ Altree, *ibid.*, pp. 267–8. The cultural, social, and moral antagonism in China between the scholar-gentry and the peasantry had been mitigated by Buddhism, first in the North (see p. 176, footnote 1) and then, after political reunification, in China as a whole. Under the T'ang regime, Buddhism 'worked as a social cement, binding together all classes and races in common beliefs and activities' (A. F. Wright: *Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 74). Under the subsequent regime, when Confucianism regained the upper hand over Buddhism by appropriating it, the neo-Confucian officials acquired a touch of the Buddhist social conscience; and, on their initiative, the Sung imperial government organized charitable work on the grand scale (*ibid.*, pp. 92–94). But, 'in contrast to the earlier period in which Buddhism, in different forms, had formed a common bond between the two main classes of Chinese society, the modern period saw a striking cleavage between the rational ethic of the élite and the religious ethos of the peasantry' (*ibid.*, p. 97). The Neo-Confucian literati were contemptuous of the Buddhist and Taoist village priests (*ibid.*, p. 103).

² i.e. the breakdown of the post-Sinic 'Far Eastern Civilization' (A. J. T.).

³ R. H. Tawney in *International Affairs*, November, 1939, p. 803.

basis.¹ They explain, for instance, the collapse of the Old Kingdom of Egypt, the fifth-century collapse of the Roman Empire in its western provinces, the ninth-century collapse of the Carolingian avatar of the Roman Empire in the same region, and also the eleventh-century collapse of the Byzantine avatar of the Roman Empire in Anatolia. In all these four cases occurring at the opposite end of the Old World to China, the economic basis of the universal state was almost exclusively agricultural, and the burden on the peasantry of maintaining a universal state—a burden that is heavy even under the best regime—became intolerable when landlords armed with official authority shook off governmental control and added their private exactions to the government's demands. The technological history of the Egyptian Civilization is significant.²

This economic explanation of the recurrent re-establishment and recurrent collapse of a universal state provides a key to the Chinese myth of a 'mandate of Heaven' which is received and subsequently forfeited by one imperial dynasty after another. The mandate is forfeited when the numbers and demands of the dominant minority of the day rise to figures at which the sufferings imposed on the peasantry by this excessive tax on their limited productivity come to outweigh, in their estimation, the blessings of unity and peace which the maintenance of a universal state confers. There is a subsequent mandate to a new dynasty to re-establish the universal state that has been wrecked by the late dynasty's misdemeanours because the sufferings imposed by the return of disunity and disorder are no sooner re-experienced than they reactivate the longing for the blessings attending the maintenance of a universal state. The people's nostalgia is the new empire-builders' opportunity; and these *novi homines* usually succeed, not only in re-establishing the lapsed universal state, but also in maintaining it for a further spell. This initial success of theirs is due to the very fact that they are parvenus. At the beginning of their regime they will be fewer in numbers, more modest in their personal demands, and more energetic and efficient in performing their public services than the epigoni of the preceding dynasty whom they have replaced, and also than their own

¹ Philip Bagby has derided my description of the T'ang Empire as being 'a vampire state' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 105). If there is anything wrong about this description, it is that I have applied it only to the T'ang Empire and not also to every occurrence of a universal state both in China and elsewhere.

² The Egyptian Civilization's outstanding technological achievement was its discovery of how to quarry, transport, and dress huge blocks of masonry, and to build these into monuments of an architecture that was as accurate as it was colossal. On the other hand, this civilization lagged surprisingly in its adoption of several other technological devices that were of greater economic and social importance. The potter's wheel, for instance, was not adopted in Egypt before the age of the Third Dynasty, and then only in an inferior form (V. G. Childe: *What Happened in History*, pp. 86 and 122). Wheeled vehicles were not adopted there till the sixteenth century B.C., when the Egyptians mastered the art of chariotry in order to expel the Hyksos. From the fifth millennium B.C. till after the establishment of the Middle Empire at the close of the third, the Egyptians were content to make their metal tools of unalloyed copper (*ibid.*, pp. 122 and 157), and these copper tools continued to be luxuries. The peasants continued, till the time of the New Empire, to use Neolithic tools for the agricultural operations that were the basis of the whole Egyptian World's economy (*ibid.*, pp. 123 and 157). The bronze that had been introduced no earlier than about 2000 B.C. was not superseded by iron, for general purposes, till about 650 B.C. (*ibid.*, p. 192)—and this was three-quarters of a millennium after the discovery of the art of iron-working somewhere in Anatolia.

future epigoni, who are destined to forfeit Heaven's mandate in their turn.

It is noteworthy that this illuminating Chinese myth reappears in the work of the fourteenth-century Arabic Muslim statesman, jurist, historian, and philosopher Ibn Khaldūn. He had no knowledge of his Chinese confrères' ideas; yet, like them, he saw the pattern of history as an alternating rhythm in which the alternate periods of relative order and disorder were consequences of the successive rises and falls of a series of dynasties. In Ibn Khaldūn's view a dynasty normally brings itself to grief in the fourth generation, reckoning the founder's generation as being the first.¹ Ibn Khaldūn's myth was derived from a knowledge of the history of the Arab Caliphate and its successor-states over a period of some seven centuries ending in his own day. How is it that two different sets of historical data have given rise, independently of each other, to an identical account of how human affairs work? The answer is that there is an identical economic and social thread running through the history of China from 221 B.C. to A.D. 1911 and through the history of the Islamic World from the establishment of the Arab Caliphate in the seventh century of the Christian Era to the time in the fourteenth century when Ibn Khaldūn was writing his *Prolegomena to a History of Mankind*. This identical element is the peasant economy which has been the normal economic basis for political structures of all kinds since the beginning of the Age of the Civilizations.

The foregoing examination of the Yin-Yang alternating rhythm in the histories of universal states will now perhaps enable us to arrive at some general conclusions.

One is that the continuing recurrence of a universal state does not necessarily carry with it a continuance of the particular civilization whose vicissitudes originally brought the universal state into existence. For example, if our Chinese spectacles have not played us false in revealing to us, in the Tigris-Euphrates basin and Iran, a continuing recurrence of the same universal state from the second half of the third millennium B.C. down to the eighteenth century of the Christian Era,² we have here an instance of a universal state persisting through the histories of no less than four different civilizations: the Sumero-Akkadian, in which this one originated; the Syriac, which captured it from the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization while it was embodied in the Achaemenian Empire; the Hellenic Civilization, which captured it from the Syriac Civilization when the Achaemenian Empire was overthrown by Alexander and was replaced in Asia by the Seleucid Monarchy; and finally the Iranic Muslim Civilization, if we are right in assigning to this the Mongol Il-Khanate, the Timurid Empire, the Safawi Empire, and Nadir Shah's.³ Similarly, the universal states of the two pre-Columbian

¹ See Ibn Khaldūn: *The Muqaddimah*, translated from the Arabic by F. Rosenthal (London 1958, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 3 vols.), vol. I, pp. 278-82 (chap. II, section 14) and pp. 343-6 (chap. III, section 12). The cyclic rhythm of political history and the causes of it are the central theme of the whole work.

² See p. 191.

³ The accounts, given in previous volumes of this book, of the structure of Syriac history and the place of Islam in history are reconsidered in the present volume in Chapters XIII and XIV. Here there is a discussion of the cultural affinities of the

American civilizations, which were embodied originally in the Aztec Empire and in the Inca Empire respectively, were carried on, in the Spanish vicerealties of New Spain and Peru, under the auspices of the interloping Western Christian Civilization. Similarly, again, the Roman Empire, which had started life as an Hellenic universal state, was subsequently captured, in the avatars of it in its central and eastern provinces, by two different civilizations: first the Byzantine Christian Civilization that animated the East Roman Empire, and then the Iranic Muslim Civilization to which the Ottoman Turkish rebuilders of the East Roman Empire paid allegiance. This Christian and this Islamic civilization must each be regarded as being separate from the Hellenic; for the advent of Christianity and of Islam did make a decisive break in the history of civilization not only in the West but wherever it occurred. The breach of cultural continuity here is unmistakable, even though it may not be warrantable to assume, on this analogy, that comparable breaches of continuity were made in the history of Eastern Asia by the advent of the Mahayana and in India by the emergence of post-Buddhaic Hinduism there.

In the history of civilization in India, and in its history in China as well, the institution making for continuity has not been the recurring universal state. In India this has recurred only rarely and at long intervals. In both sub-continent the thread of continuity has been provided by the persistence of a dominant social class: the Brahman caste in India and the Confucian-educated gentry in China. In China from the turn of the second and the last centuries B.C. till A.D. 1911, the repeated restorations of the universal state were made possible by the scholar-gentry's survival as a source of recruitment for the civil service. But in 1911 the 2,000-years-long innings of this class came to an end; and, when, after a 38-years-long bout of disunity and disorder, the universal state was re-established according to precedent, it resumed its sway this time under non-Confucian auspices. In China Confucianism has now been replaced by Communism, and China has been converted from her traditional indigenous civilization to an exotic one inspired by a philosophy of Jewish-Christian origin that was incubated in nineteenth-century Western Europe.¹ Yet the momentum of the Chinese universal state is not yet exhausted.

We can also see that the series of alternating collapses and restorations of a universal state is not interminable. All known universal states have had a starting-point in a revolutionary change from a previous regime of political disunity. This can be seen to be true of the Chinese universal state, if we look at early Chinese history as it actually was, and not as it has been depicted in the traditional legendary misrepresentation of it. It can also be seen to be probably true of the Egyptian universal state, if we take into account the antecedent course of history in Egypt in its Parthian and Sasanian empires and the Arab Caliphate, which intervened chronologically between the Seleucid Empire and the Mongol Il-Khanate.

¹ J. Madaule judges that I have underestimated the importance of the Communist revolution of 1948 in China (*Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 43). If I have made this mistake, I take the present opportunity of correcting it. I expect that this revolution will prove to have been an epoch-making event, not only for China but for the whole World.

pre-civilizational stage. In China the universal state is still a going concern under a Communist regime. But, in most of the other regions where a universal state has made its appearance and has passed through the same characteristic series of collapses and restorations, it has now come to an end. The Ottoman Roman Empire expired, as we have seen, in 1922; the shadowy Western Roman Empire in 1806; the Spanish Empire of the Indies in the first quarter of the nineteenth century; the 'Iraqi-Iranian universal state in 1747, if we may take the date of Nadir Shah's death as marking its demise; the Indian universal state expired in 1947, when the British Raj in India was replaced by three successor-states.¹ The Egyptiac universal state expired unobtrusively in the third century of the Christian Era, when the Roman emperors changed the religious and constitutional basis of their dominion over Egypt. In the time of the principate they had ruled Egypt, like the Ptolemies and the Achaemenids before them, in the guise of Pharaohs who were sons of Re and gods incarnate. From the reign of Aurelian onwards, they ruled, no longer as gods in their own persons, but as vicegerents of a god who was lord of the whole Universe. If we may take this as being the date of the expiry of the Egyptiac universal state, this has been extinct, by now, for nearly seventeen hundred years. No doubt it is theoretically possible that both it and other representatives of this species of polity might revive again. But the evidence up to date suggests that immortality is not one of the specific properties of universal states. Though they run to longevity, and have frequently had more than a cat's proverbial nine lives, all but two or three of those representatives of the species that have made their appearance hitherto are now extinct, so far as we can tell. The only indisputably extant specimens are the Chinese and the Russian,²

¹ The Indian Union, Pakistan and Burma. Ceylon has derived its civilization from India, and, in the last stage of its political history before it attained its present independence, it shared with India the experience of being under British rule. But Ceylon was not included either in the British Indian Empire or in that empire's Mughal, Gupta, and Maurya predecessors.

² In previous volumes of this book I have taken the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan as being an offshoot of the main body, and have seen its history as following an independent course of its own. I identified the breakdown of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan with the victory of feudalism over the imperial regime in the twelfth century of the Christian Era, and I found its universal state in the Tokugawa Shogunate.

P. L. Ralph has pronounced (in the *Saturday Review*, 16th October, 1954, p. 19) that 'to characterise the Tokugawa Shogunate as the "universal state" of the Japanese branch of the Far Eastern Civilization is to push an abstraction to the point of fantasy'. The same criticism is made by M. S. Bates (in *Christianity and Crisis*, vol. 15, No. 4 (21st March, 1955), pp. 27-30 and 32). The equation of the Japanese Isles with the World might indeed appear to be a geographical absurdity. Yet every *soi-disant* universal state that has come and gone so far has fallen very far short of being literally world-wide. The universality of a universal state has, so far, been something subjective. It has been a state which, in the eyes of its inhabitants, has embraced the whole of the civilized world that has been within their ken. On this test, the Hellenic, Indian, and Chinese universal states unquestionably pass muster. The Tokugawa polity's claim to qualify for the title is, I agree, more disputable; for, throughout the Tokugawa period, Japan continued to live on cultural capital previously imported from China or via China: e.g. the Chinese characters, Confucianism, Buddhism. Yet the Tokugawa regime did succeed in stopping the importation of any fresh elements of culture from China—in contrast to what had happened in all previous phases of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan, when a series of Chinese styles of art and schools of Buddhism or of indigenous Chinese philosophy had successively been imported into Japan and been eagerly cultivated there. It was difficult to seal off a group of islands that was so close to the Continent, and equally difficult to make the population of so small a region feel themselves to be culturally self-sufficient. Yet that was the Tokugawa regime's aim. The severity

each of which has achieved its current avatar under the auspices of Communism.

If, however, we have been right in our economic diagnosis of the cause of the recurrent collapse of those universal states that have come and gone up to date, it would seem to follow that the recent change in mankind's economic situation, thanks to the modern Western Industrial Revolution, will have brought with it a change in the prospects of a future universal state—even if this were to differ from all its predecessors in being literally world-wide. It is true that a considerable majority of the human race is still living in the insufficiently productive Pre-industrial Age. It is also true that, in the present stage of human affairs, the cost of a literally world-wide universal state would be high. For, although an all-inclusive society would be relieved of the cost of frontier defence against outer barbarians, besides being relieved of the cost of the competition in armaments between local states, this saving would be more than offset by the cost of helping the economically backward majority of mankind to approximate towards the prosperous minority's standard of living. The present disparity has, at the least, to be drastically reduced if the human race is to live together as a single family; and the cost of this will be enormous, if we aim at the goal of bringing within the reach of every family in the World the material facilities and spiritual opportunities that a Western middle-class family already enjoys.

This is, in itself, a larger economic undertaking than any that has confronted any universal state in the past; and the economic aspect of the problem is not so formidable as its social and religious aspects. Modern technology is advancing so fast, and is spreading so rapidly from its Western originators to the rest of the human race, that the increase in mankind's productivity seems likely to go to formerly unimaginable lengths. The crucial question is whether the still poverty-stricken majority of the human race will be able and willing to make a revolutionary change in its habits and outlook that has already been made by the now relatively prosperous minority. In a society in which public hygiene has been achieving sensational progressive reductions in the death-rate, a reduction in the birth-rate on a corresponding scale is required if technology's potential gift of a higher standard of living,

of the measures that it took for achieving it testifies to the regime's determination to succeed, as well as to the difficulty of the undertaking.

On reconsideration, I think it would be nearer the truth to classify the Tokugawa regime as an attempt at a universal state which failed. It was defeated from within. Japanese inquirers were secretly studying Western science, at the risk of their lives, two generations before Commodore Perry's squadron made its first appearance in Yedo Bay. M. E. Cameron makes a telling point against my previous presentation of Japanese history when she says that my 'estimate of the significance of a universal state implies that it was moribund, yet he recognises that the intelligent and efficient response of the Japanese ruling class to the challenge of Western imperialism hardly seems to be the act of a dead or dying society' (*The Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. 1, No. 2 (February, 1942), pp. 150-60). This response was, indeed, the measure of the failure of the Tokugawas' attempt to 'freeze' Japanese life.

Yet, if the Tokugawas failed in the end to make a closed world of Japan, they do seem to have succeeded in making a political unity of her. The liquidation of the Tokugawa regime did not bring with it a return of the previous disunity and disorder. The only civil war in Japan since then has been the conflict between the Meiji regime and the Satsuma insurgents in 1877; and, since the defeat of this dissident movement, the maintenance of unity seems to have been taken as a matter of course.

spiritual as well as material, is not to be swallowed up by a sensational increase in the number of mouths to be fed. Hitherto the majority of mankind has, as a matter of course, always multiplied and replenished the Earth up to the limits allowed by its food-supply at a subsistence level only just above the starvation-line. Unless this habit is abandoned, modern technology will have brought with it, for the majority, no increase in well-being, but merely an increase in miserable numbers. On the other hand, modern technology accompanied by a deliberate reduction in the birth-rate as well as in the death-rate would give an unheard-of buoyancy to a future world-state's finances. Instead of being constrained to take an intolerable toll from a poor and static peasant economy, a future world-state could afford to subsidize a revolution in the peasantry's traditional Neolithic way of life through a world-wide application of science and technology to peasant agriculture.

If this is indeed the outlook for a future world-state, that is fortunate for the human race. For the same unprecedented scientific and technological progress that has opened up these prospects of higher production has already produced weapons that would turn war into genocide if they were ever to be used. And the possibility that they may be used will remain open so long as our present-day world remains divided on the political plane, as it now is, among a number of sovereign independent states. In our present situation we can no more afford than our predecessors could, in their 'times of troubles', to let this perilous political disunity continue. But we also cannot afford, in the age of atomic weapons, to let the now imperative political unification of all mankind come about, in the traditional way, through war *à outrance* ending in the destruction of all the competing powers but one. Mankind will have to reach political unity through agreement; and, if and when this unity has once been attained, we shall not be able to afford to see the old alternating rhythm of lapses and recoveries reassert itself. For, in the Atomic Age, any lapse into disunity and disorder would be a threat to the existence of the human race. This is an unprecedentedly difficult problem for statesmanship. But we may take heart if it is true that the technological revolution which has presented this problem to the future architects of a world-state is also going to ease for them the economic problem that has repeatedly worsted their predecessors.

6. A JEWISH ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR CIVILIZATIONS

The comparative study of civilizations evidently stands to benefit by our new departure of setting up a second model and combining it with the first. Between them the Hellenic and the Chinese model throw light on the configuration of the histories of civilizations which could not have been obtained from either of them applied in isolation. Our new composite model seems to fit the majority of our specimens and to give us new insight into their structure. This success will encourage us to set up a third model, with a view to exploring a phenomenon which our Hellenic-Sinic model does not illuminate.

When a number of mutually independent local communities have lost

their former political identities through being merged in a universal state, the merger has usually been complete and lasting. Even in those exceptional cases in which the duration of the universal state has been confined to a single spell, the short-lived universal state's local successor-states have usually had no continuity with the local states out of which the universal state was originally constituted. The Teutonic and Arab principalities among which the Roman Empire's former Western provinces were carved up were not revivals of the local states, occupying the same region, that the Romans had previously conquered and annexed.¹ The Hispano-American republics among which the former Spanish Empire of the Indies was carved up in the early nineteenth century were not revivals of the local states that had been conquered and annexed by the Aztecs and by the Incas. In China, where Ch'in Shih Hwang-ti's universal state fell to pieces again only fourteen years after its establishment, the attempt to revive the former local states was abortive. Within five years the universal state had been re-established by Han Liu P'ang; and, though this second founder felt it politic to allow some local states, labelled with traditional names, to retain a limited autonomy within his unitary political framework, both their prerogatives and their territories were progressively reduced until they had been completely *gleichgeschaltet* within less than a hundred years after Liu P'ang's accession. The local states into which China broke up again politically in the subsequent successive 'intermediate periods' were new growths, though some of these, too, assumed traditional names in the hope that these might give them an aura of legitimacy. In the history of the Achaemenian Empire it was the same story. The house of the founder, Cyrus II, was patently extinct after the assassination of the Smerdis who claimed to be—and perhaps truly was—this house's last surviving representative. This dramatic event occurred only about twenty-eight years after Cyrus had first set out on his career of conquest, and it was taken as a signal for the re-establishment of the local states that Cyrus had overthrown. But all these local insurrections were overcome by Darius I in little more than twelve months; and, when, 190 years later, the Achaemenian Empire was overthrown by Alexander, only one of the successor-states into which it was subsequently carved up by Alexander's officers had any continuity with a local state that had been in existence before the Persian conquests.²

Thus normally the establishment of a universal state, even for no longer than a single spell, has resulted in a permanent obliteration of the identities of the local states and peoples that have been incorporated in it. A classic case is that of 'the Lost Ten Tribes'. Today the population

¹ The names of the Post-Roman Jutish Kingdom of Kent and Anglian Kingdom of Bernicia may have been reminiscences of the two Pre-Roman Celtic kingdoms of the Cantii and the Brigantes, but there was no continuity here in substance. There was at least a partial change in the composition of the population, and there was a total change of language.

² This exception was, of course, the Ptolemaic Kingdom of Egypt. In the year of insurrections, 522 B.C., Egypt had kept quiet. On the other hand, it had afterwards repeatedly shaken off the Persian yoke in the course of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The latest of these spells of Egyptian independence had lasted from 404 to 343/2 B.C., and had thus come to an end only ten years before the restored Persian regime in Egypt was liquidated by Alexander.

of the Kingdom of Israel, which was wiped off the map by the Assyrian Empire in 722 B.C., is represented *in situ* only by a few hundred Samaritans in the neighbourhood of Nāblus. The Israelites who were deported were completely absorbed into the population of the countries in which they were settled. Their loss of identity was not an exception; it was the rule. It has become famous only because the rule was exceptionally broken by the history of the Israelites' kinsmen, the people of Judah, after their local kingdom, in its turn, had been wiped off the map by the Neobabylonian Empire in 586 B.C. The Jews were twice uprooted from their original homeland by Nebuchadnezzar and twice by the Romans. And, before their second uprooting by the Romans in A.D. 135, they had been subjects of five empires in turn: the Neobabylonian, the Achaemenian, the Ptolemaic, the Seleucid, and the Roman. From A.D. 135 to A.D. 1948 there was no such thing as a Jewish state¹ and not even such a thing as a Jewish 'national home' in the sense of a territory that was substantially Jewish in population without being under Jewish rule. Yet, without the political framework of a state or the territorial basis of a home, the Jews have managed to preserve their separate identity, as a people, from 586 B.C.—the year that saw the obliteration of the Kingdom of Judah—down to the present day. They have preserved it as a scattered minority (*diasporá*) living among non-Jewish majorities in countries outside the former frontiers of the extinct Kingdom of Judah and hundreds or thousands of miles away from its historic capital, Jerusalem.

This fact is remarkable and exceptional, but it is not unique.² The Jews are not the only uprooted people who have achieved it. For example, it has also been achieved by the Parsees since the destruction of the Sasanian Persian Empire by the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors;³ by the Monophysite Christians since the Muslim Arabs' conquest of Syria, Egypt, and Armenia; and by the Nestorian Christians since the fifth century, when they found asylum in the Sasanian Empire from their Orthodox Christian persecutors in the Roman Empire. From the completion of the Ottoman conquest of the former territories of the East Roman Empire down to the revolt of the 'Osmanlis' Greek subjects in the Morea in 1821, the Greek Orthodox Christians were partially uprooted and scattered, yet managed, in *diasporá*, to preserve their identity as a community, Jewish-fashion. In Russian Orthodox Christendom, members of some of the dissenting Christian sects have escaped from their Orthodox persecutors by migrating to the outer fringe of the

¹ During this period, there were states—e.g. the Kingdom of Adiabene and the Khazar Empire—in which the royal family and some of their grandees were converts to Judaism (see the present volume, pp. 85–86). There were also oases in the Hijaz and fastnesses in Abyssinia, the Caucasus, and the Crimea in which converts to Judaism held their own, perhaps with some admixture of Jewish refugees (see ii. 257 and 402–12). But only a minority of the Jews in the World ever lived, or ever could have lived, in these holes and corners.

² See also pp. 483–4.

³ 'Perhaps only the Parsees of India are comparable to the Jews of Europe in the perfect blending of their nationalism and their religion. The Parsees, too, represent a combination of extreme religious tenacity, economic specialisation, and cultural proficiency, even as the Jews, though it was not the sad lot of the Parsees to live among a people committed to a "heretical" form of their own faith' (Rabbi J. B. Agus: 'Towards a Philosophy of Jewish History', in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 42).

Russian Empire or to regions beyond the Russian frontiers. The Molokans have found asylum in Transcaucasia and Eastern Siberia, the Skoptsy in Rumania, the Dukhobors in Canada. In Western Christendom the members of the Society of Friends (the Quakers), whose earliest recruits came from rural districts in the north of England, have tended, in England at any rate, to move from their native countryside into the cities, because in an urban environment it has been easier for them to avoid a conflict with the authorities over their conscientious objection to paying tithes to the Episcopalian Established Church.¹ The migration of the Quakers into the cities has also been the story of the Huguenot refugees from France in Holland, Britain, and Germany. Another of the dissenting religious communities of Western Christendom, the Church of the Latterday Saints (the Mormons), escaped its nineteenth-century persecutors by trekking westward, beyond the advancing frontier of settlement in the United States, to Utah. Its missionaries have since won converts almost as far afield as the missionaries of the Baha'i faith.

These examples of a diasporá are numerous enough to make it useful to set up a model, in order to explore what the essential characteristics of a diasporá are and to what extent each of the apparent specimens of this species of community approximates to, or diverges from, the standard pattern. The Jewish diasporá evidently provides the best material for the construction. Of all the diasporás in our list it is the most famous, the most influential, and also perhaps the most unhappy, at least up to date, in its relations with the gentile majorities among whom it has been living. It has also been in existence longer than any of the others, and has been more completely divorced from the cultivation of the land in its original home. From A.D. 135 till the planting of the first Zionist Jewish agricultural colonies in Palestine in the eighteen-eighties, it would be approximately true to say that there was no Jewish agricultural population in what had once been the territory of the Kingdom of Judah. By contrast, the Parsees are still represented in Persia, and this on the land, in the surviving Zoroastrian villages in the oases of Yazd and Kirman. And the Zoroastrian refugees who found asylum in Western India after the fall of the Sasanian Empire replanted themselves on the soil in their new home. The present prominence of the Parsees' role in the industrial and business life of the Indian sub-continent dates from no farther back than the establishment of the British Raj, which brought India within the economic, as well as the political, ambit of the modern Western World and created in India the conditions required for doing business in the modern Western way. As for the Armenian Monophysites and the Greek Orthodox Christians, they have each succeeded, as the Zoroastrians have, in holding on to the cultivation of the land in a portion of their ancestral domain.

If, on these considerations, we take the Jewish diasporá as our model for this species of community, we shall find in it the following elements. First, there is the diasporá's determination to retain its historical identity in circumstances in which most communities have resigned themselves

¹ See ii. 220, footnote 2, and v. 173.

to losing theirs. Having been deprived of its state and its home and been reduced to living as a minority—and a scattered one—abroad, the uprooted community has found new means of maintaining its cohesion and continuity under these adverse conditions. It maintains them now through the voluntary observance of an exacting religious ritual and law. The second element is the diasporá's motive for being unwilling to merge itself in the majority among whom it has come to live. It cherishes its separate identity because it believes itself to be the depository of a religious revelation of unique significance and value. A third element in the configuration of the Jewish diasporá is its recognition of the truth that it will fail to survive if it does not provide itself with an adequate economic basis. Since it has no state of its own and no national home, economic power is the only form of power within its reach; and a community must command power of some kind in order to hold its own in the world. Even economic power is difficult for a diasporá to obtain. It has lost its hold on agriculture, which has been Man's primary and staple source of livelihood since the Neolithic Age, and, in the alien countries in which it has been scattered, it has been excluded, more often than not, from public life, and even from the liberal professions, as a penalty for its refusal to adopt the religion of the local majority. A diasporá must make its fortune out of whatever economic occupations the majority leaves open to it. The least obstructed opening has usually been retail trade. But, whatever the economic opportunity has been, the diasporá has always managed to win from it the economic resources required for its survival. On the economic as well as on the spiritual plane, penalization has proved to be an unusually powerful stimulus.¹

This model derived from the Jewish diasporá fits all the other specimens on our list more or less closely. In all these cases religion has supplied the motive for the will to preserve the scattered community's identity, while economic prowess in some non-agricultural occupation has provided the means of putting this will to survive into effect. If we now simplify the model, we shall find that the religious species of diasporá is one representative of a more comprehensive genus. Two of the most conspicuous diasporás in the present-day world are the Scottish and the Lebanese. Like the Jews, Parsees, Huguenots, and Quakers, the Lebanese and the Scots abroad are conspicuously successful in business; but the pressure that has moved them to seek their fortunes abroad has been economic, not religious or political. Neither the Lebanese nor the Scots have lost their country; both have been masters in their own house;² and neither have been persecuted, either at home or abroad, for clinging to their ancestral religion.³ They have been victims, not of their fellow men, but of Nature. Their native countries

¹ The stimulus of penalizations has been discussed in ii. 208-59.

² In the case of the Lebanese, this has been true *de jure* as well as *de facto* since the establishment, in 1861, of an autonomous vilayet of the Lebanon which became the Lebanese Republic in 1920.

³ The present world-wide Lebanese diasporá mostly dates from times subsequent to 1861, i.e. from the period in which the Lebanese people have had a state of their own. Since 1861, the one great ordeal to which they have been subjected has been the Turkish blockade during the First World War.

are poor countries, and they have been driven abroad by the difficulty of making a livelihood at home.¹

What is common to diasporas of the religious species represented by the Jews and the secular species represented by the Scots abroad is the transformation of a social structure. In both cases we are watching a community changing the basis of the cohesion that maintains its distinctive identity. It is changing over from an originally territorial basis, on which it has been held together by having a national home and a national government of its own, to a cultural and occupational basis, on which it is held together by having common memories, beliefs, manners and customs, and skills. Both the Jews and the Scots are on this road, though the Scots have not yet travelled far from the starting-point, while the Jews have long since reached the terminus. Looked at in a wider setting that includes the alien majority among whom the diaspora has been scattered, this change through which both Jews and Scots have been passing is a change from a vertical organization of society to a horizontal one. The communities into which society is articulated are undergoing a metamorphosis from having been so many local cells to becoming so many ubiquitous strata coexisting with each other over an identical area, which, in principle, may be coextensive with the whole habitable surface of the globe.

We can follow the history of this metamorphosis. 'Civilization is deracination.'² The Jewish diaspora was a product, in the Fertile Crescent, of two interrelated social developments: an intensification of social intercourse and an increase in urbanization. The growing social intercourse took the peaceful forms of commercial and cultural exchanges, as well as the violent forms of war and deportation; the growing cities served as melting-pots in which the intercourse could lead to fusion. As far as we know, this process started in the Fertile Crescent earlier than anywhere else. Indeed the relative facility of physical communications between the centres of settled life in this region in the Post-pluvial Age is, as will be noticed in another context,³ one of the factors that account for the Fertile Crescent's having been the cradle of civilization. Since the fifth and fourth millennia B.C., when civilization was incubating there, the Fertile Crescent has always been precocious. Time and again something that has made its first appearance in this nursery-garden of higher culture has eventually become world-wide. And the history of the diaspora type of social organization is an instance of the Fertile Crescent's habit of giving a lead to the rest of the World.

This is where the series of 'times of troubles' and universal states has had the longest history and where the social and cultural effects have therefore been the most intense. One landmark on this road has been the extinction of local states and the deportation of their former inhabitants by the builders of the Assyrian, Neobabylonian, and Achaemenian

¹ This has been one of the spurs by which the Irish, too, have been driven abroad. But, unlike the Scots and the Lebanese, the Irish have been driven by political oppression as well. The Irish diaspora belongs to the same class as the diasporas listed on pp. 211-12.

² R. Redfield: *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, p. 49.

³ On p. 336.

empires. Another landmark has been the reorganization, in diasporá, of the uprooted communities. This has usually started as a spontaneous movement of self-help on the part of the deportees, and has ended as an obligatory organization on which the imperial authorities have insisted for their own convenience. We can trace the evolution of these non-territorial communities backwards from its fully developed form in the Ottoman Empire to its rudiments in the Achaemenian Empire, and we can watch the official attitude changing from tacit toleration through explicit sanction to positive requirement, as the usefulness of this horizontal system of communal organization gradually becomes apparent to the administrators of universal states.

If we are right in looking upon the universal states that have already come and gone as having been the forerunners of a future world-state, the social structure for which the Jewish diasporá provides a model will have a practical, as well as an academic, interest for the living generation of mankind and our successors. 'Displaced persons' are the raw materials of a diasporá; and, since the expulsion of the United Empire Loyalists from the United States after the Revolutionary War,¹ 'displaced persons' have, unhappily, been becoming an ever larger and more important feature in the configuration of human society. It is a tragic paradox that, during the last 150 years, old-established diasporás have been uprooted and expelled—if they have had the good fortune to escape being extirpated—as a result of the ruthless application of the Western ideal of nationally homogeneous local states. This ideal is an attempt to restore the configuration of society as it was before local communities began to be mixed up and stratified in diasporás in the course of a long succession of 'times of troubles' and universal states. Such attempts to 'put back the clock' work havoc—as is illustrated by the atrocities and sufferings that accompanied the partitions of the Ottoman Empire between 1821 and 1924 and of the British Indian Empire in 1947. In the Second World War the crimes of deracination and genocide were committed on an Assyrian scale. If it were now possible for history to repeat itself, we should be today on the eve of a third world war in which our world would be unified politically by force to the accompaniment of atrocities such as we have not yet witnessed. Since, however, a third world war would be fought with atomic weapons, it looks as if the actual choices now before us were a unification of the World by consent and, alternatively, genocide on a colossal scale. So perhaps we may venture to hope that, in shrinking from genocide, mankind will save itself from further bouts of wholesale eviction and massacre.

If this hope were realized, would that mean that the transformation of local communities into world-wide diasporás would come to a halt? This seems unlikely, so long as technology continues to advance; and this is a movement that shows no sign of halting or even slowing down. The accelerating improvement in means of communication of all kinds may do more to promote the creation of diasporás by facilitating it than Assyrian war-lords were ever able to do by force. In a society that is

¹ This was an epoch-making event in modern history, as has been pointed out in iv. 165.

'annihilating distance', world-wide diasporas, rather than local national states, look like 'the wave of the future'.¹

No doubt, in a future world society, there will still be on the map a network of social units based on locality, as there has been in all the universal states that have come and gone so far. In the administrative organization of a universal state the local states that the empire-builders have overthrown have either been retained as provinces after having been deprived of their sovereignty or have been replaced by a new network of provinces with different areas but with the same function of serving as units for local administration. There are some indispensable social services—for instance, water-supply, drains, and light and power—that are bound, by their very nature, to be organized on the basis of neighbourhood. As technology continues to advance, the optimum area for such purposes may increase in size, but, at its maximum, it will still be small compared to the total area of the Earth's habitable surface. Thus we may expect to see units based on locality survive; but we may also expect to see these come to play a progressively less important part by comparison with units whose principle of association is, not physical neighbourhood, but a community of beliefs, ideas, aspirations, interests, or activities. This has been the tendency in the social history of universal states in the past; and in the current age this tendency seems likely to be reinforced by one of the characteristic movements of our time: the present-day world-wide drift into the cities.

Urbanization is going forward today in countries of the most diverse civilization and social structure. One can watch it happening in Japan, Indonesia, Iraq, Australia, Mexico, Peru. All over the World the rural population is flocking into the cities, even where the cities offer the eager immigrants nothing better than a life of unemployment and penury in shanty towns. In Japan the habitable part of the country has already become one continuous city, in which a minority of the urbanized population happens still to work in fields instead of in factories; and the present aspect of Japan gives an anticipatory view of what seems likely to be the future aspect of the World as a whole. Urbanization is being promoted by two consequences of the technological revolution that are both working in this direction. The reduction of the death-rate—especially the rate of infant mortality—by preventive medicine has resulted in an increase in the rural population beyond the numbers that agriculture either requires or is capable of supporting; and 'the annihilation of distance' has removed the ancient obstacles to migration. This transformation of the World into a cosmopolis favours social organization on a non-local basis. It is a well-known feature of urban life that city-dwellers associate, not with their next-door neighbours, but with kindred spirits scattered all over the metropolitan area. In a village one must consort with one's next-door neighbour, willy-nilly. In a great city with a highly developed transportation system, one has a far wider choice of friends and companions. Now that the World is becoming one city, we may expect to see associations based on neighbourhood come to be overshadowed by others based on spiritual affinity: that is to say, by

¹ See pp. 483-4.

diasporás in the broadest sense of the term in which this includes ubiquitous scattered minorities that are held together by religious and other ties of all kinds that are independent of locality.

If this forecast is justified, we need our Jewish model for a diasporá, as well as our Hellenic model for the transition from local states to a universal state and our Chinese model for the alternating rhythm of a universal state's successive lapses and rallies. Each of these models is an indispensable mental tool for the comparative study of civilizations, because each of them gives us the key to one of the major configurations of human society and culture during the Age of the Civilizations up to date. And each configuration is the product of a resolution of forces. In each case Man's attempt to achieve an aim that is of major importance to him can be seen contending with the problems and the penalties that his pursuit of this particular aim brings with it. In the Hellenic model we see Man in process of civilization pursuing the possibilities of creativity that are offered by a regime of extreme local diversity and independence, until the strife which is the price of this regime reaches a pitch of intensity at which society finds itself constrained to purchase peace through unity at the cost of resigning itself to an uninspiring uniformity. In the Jewish model we see Man in the same chapter of his history clinging to some revelation, discovery, achievement, or way of life that he feels to be of supreme significance and value, and therefore exerting himself to preserve the separate identity of the 'Chosen People' that is the custodian of this pearl of great price. The 'Chosen People's' belief in its national mission gives it the spirit to maintain itself in diasporá after losing its national state and even its national home—and this in a situation in which the rest of society has resigned itself to the merger of national individualities in the oecumenical unity that is the price of peace. In the Chinese model we see *soi-disant* civilized Man exerting himself to preserve this oecumenical unity, once established, and to restore it each time that it breaks up. He restores it because he cannot bear the strife and disorder that the return of disunity brings with it. Each of these endeavours is an attempt to satisfy one of Man's fundamental requirements. But the histories of civilizations up to date do not give us any assurance that these fundamental requirements can all be fulfilled simultaneously. The extent to which Man in process of civilization succeeds in reconciling these requirements with each other gives one measure of Man's capacity for living as the social animal that he has to be if he is to survive.

7. IS IT POSSIBLE TO CONSTRUCT A MODEL FOR HIGHER RELIGIONS?

The spiritual treasure that has inspired an uprooted people to preserve its separate identity in diasporá has, so far, usually been a higher religion. The higher religions have made their epiphany in the course of the Age of the Civilizations; and, if we take them at their adherents' valuation of them, we shall find in them alternative fields of study that will be more illuminating than civilizations because, in the higher

religions, we shall be studying Man's most important activity. Higher religions have, in fact, been taken as their fields by Christian and Muslim students of human affairs. But religion is at a discount in the present-day Western World; and at the beginning of this book, when I was looking for a field of study that would be more intelligible than a national state is, I took civilizations as my units without considering higher religions as a possible alternative. If it had occurred to me to take my cue from the earliest English historian, the Venerable Bede, I should have expanded my field of vision, not from England to the Western World, but from English Christians to the Church of which they are adherents and to the religion of which the Church is the social embodiment. This different approach to the study of human affairs would, no doubt, have yielded a different picture of them.¹ It is not too late to follow up the secular approach by now taking the religious one in turn. And this still open possibility raises the question whether, for a comparative study of higher religions, it is possible and necessary to set up a model—or more than one—as we have found it useful to do as an aid to our comparative study of civilizations.

In this volume² I have suggested two criteria for distinguishing higher religions from others. Higher religions are attempts to put individual human souls into direct communion with absolute spiritual Reality, without the mediation of either non-human nature or the human society—whichever it may be—in which the soul in search of God is a participant in consequence of Man's being a social creature. And, for this reason, the discoverers—or recipients—of a higher religion are moved to extricate it from religion's traditional social matrix and to embody it in new institutions—the Christian Church, the Buddhist Sangha, and the like—that will no longer be integral parts of the structure of some civilization but will be independent societies of a new kind. Taking these two criteria as our touchstones, we have detected³ a distinction between two sets of religions of the 'higher' category. In one set—represented by Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam—we have three higher religions that have extricated themselves more or less completely. In the other set—represented by Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Hinduism—we have three other higher religions that have started along this road but have halted, part way.⁴ Each of these other three displays the distinctive features of a higher religion, yet at the same time each of them has continued, so far, to be an integral part of the civilization within whose bosom it has arisen. In this situation would it be legitimate—and illuminating—to construct a model out of the common essential features of Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism, and to regard this as a standard that Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and Judaism have approached without having succeeded in attaining it completely? Before committing ourselves to this course, it may be prudent to take note of some other signifi-

¹ This point has been touched on already on pp. 161-2.

² On pp. 81-84.

³ See pp. 85-97.

⁴ The list of six higher religions with which I am operating in this volume is, of course, not exhaustive. But at any rate it is an improvement on the list of four with which I operated in vol. vii. Christopher Dawson has justly criticized me (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 134; cp. Father L. Walker, *ibid.*, p. 342) for not having included Judaism and the Hinayana.

cant differences that divide the higher religions on our list, and to observe whether, in all the possible alternative classifications, these six religions invariably fall into the same sets.

Assuming that the distinctive purpose of a higher religion is to establish and maintain direct communion between human souls and absolute spiritual Reality, we should expect it to announce a revelation or discovery of the truth about Reality and to give instructions for acting in the light of this truth. Since a higher religion's message is addressed to individuals, we should expect this also to be delivered by individual prophets, seers, or sages—whether it is revealed progressively by a succession of heralds, or is revealed by a single unique herald once for all. Since it is a revolutionary message, we should expect its heralds to proclaim and demand a more or less radical break with traditional religious practices and beliefs. Since the soul's whole destiny is in question, we should expect each higher religion to insist that it is the sole fount of truth, means of grace, and way of salvation for all men. We should expect these features to display themselves more clearly and amply in the higher religions that have established their independence completely than in those that have not shaken themselves free from the civilizations within which they have originally made their appearance. Let us see how far these *a priori* expectations are borne out by the facts.

The most precise and relevant statement of doctrine and set of instructions to individuals is to be found in the Hinayana school of Buddhism. The other higher religions, too, have creeds, with the exception of Hinduism, and all of them have sets of instructions. But in Christianity and Islam to some extent, as well as in the three incompletely independent higher religions to a larger extent, the instructions to individuals for the conduct of their direct personal relations with Reality are encumbered with ritual and social regulations. These are a legacy from the stage at which religion is merely one element among others in a culture, and is bound up with these other elements too intimately for it to be possible, at that stage, to draw a distinction between what is religious and what is secular. Only Buddhism—and this perhaps only in its original form, before the emergence of the Mahayana—has shaken itself entirely free from this legacy of an older dispensation.

When we look into the agency by which a higher religion's message has been delivered, we find that Zoroastrianism, as well as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, has a unique founder. Zarathustra, Gautama, Jesus, and Muhammad are, of course, recognized to have had both fore-runners and successors. But the founder's uniqueness is not impaired by this. In his followers' eyes his epiphany is the culminating event in human history; there will not be any future event of equal magnitude—at any rate, not before the winding-up of history at the end of time. The founder's epiphany divides all time and all history into two epochs. However, in the history of Buddhism, as we watch the Mahayana taking shape, we see the unique figure of the historical Buddha, Gautama, being gradually lost among a series of buddhas and a host of bodhisattvas, some of whom are now credited with greater potency, and are objects of greater devotion, than the historical founder himself. Here we see

Buddhism moving in the same direction as post-Buddhaic Hinduism, with its series of incarnations of Vishnu and its succession of sages. If we look for a founder of post-Buddhaic Hinduism, we may single out Śāṅkara—only to find that he has not acquired the status of the unique founders of Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam. Who would venture to maintain that Śāṅkara is in a totally different category from, say, his successor Ramanuja or even from his remote predecessor Yajñavalkya? And, when we turn to Judaism and seek to identify a founder here, we meet with the same difficulty. Shall we find the founder of Judaism in Abraham the recipient of the Promise, or in Moses the recipient of the Law, or in Johanan ben Zakkai the father of the present-day diaspora? Indeed, shall we find him in any individual human being? Was not all Israel, collectively, the human party to the Covenant made at Mount Sinai? And is a founder of any kind, individual or collective, really the central human figure in God's dispensation as seen through Jewish eyes? Instead of being turned backwards towards a founder, are they not directed forwards towards a future fulfiller? In Judaism does not the expected Messiah overshadow the patriarchs and prophets, as, in the Mahayana, the coming buddha overshadows the historical Gautama?

In making a revolutionary breach with tradition, Gautama and Zarathustra have been more uncompromising than Jesus or Muhammad. Jesus claimed that he was fulfilling the Scriptures, and Muhammad that he was restoring the pure religion of Abraham. Hinduism, like the English Common Law, goes still farther in asserting an unbroken continuity with the past. It innovates, not by abrogating the past, but by reinterpreting it. On the other hand, Judaism, which resembles Hinduism and Zoroastrianism in retaining a large and burdensome legacy of primitive ritual and social practice, is as uncompromising as Zoroastrianism and Buddhism in proclaiming its break with traditional polytheism.

It will be seen that the sets into which our six higher religions divide on these several different principles of classification are not always precisely the same. And, when we come to the distinction between exclusive-mindedness and embracing-mindedness, we find that, unexpectedly, this further division cuts across our original division between independence and an incomplete approximation to it. This is surprising, because the higher religions that have gone the farthest in extricating themselves might have been expected, *a priori*, to have become the most convinced of the uniqueness of their own truth and value. Yet, on the test of their degree of exclusive-mindedness, the higher religions divide on geographico-cultural lines, with the Judaic religions and Zoroastrianism on the exclusive-minded side, and the Indian religions on the other.¹

Hinduism is all-inclusive in its own estimation. Every religion and

¹ This contrast is underlined by Christopher Dawson in *Toynbee and History*, p. 135. He goes on, *ibid.*, p. 136, to express the view that Christianity's only effective rival today is Communism. He describes Communism as being a 'secular counter-religion'. It might also be described as being an heretical version of Christianity, in the sense in which Christianity itself and Islam are heretical versions of Judaism. Whatever label we may affix to it, Communism is unquestionably the offspring of Judaism and Christianity, and its characteristically Judaic exclusive-mindedness is an inheritance from its progenitors.

philosophy under the Sun is, in Hindu eyes, just one more interesting and valuable variation on Hinduism's inexhaustible theme. This is the truth about them all, as Hindus see it; and it remains the truth, however vehemently it may be denied by the blind-eyed devotees of certain fanatical sects. This is, of course, the attitude that we should expect to find Hinduism adopting; for, of all six higher religions, Hinduism is the one that has been the most frank in acknowledging its continuity with the past and the most pious in cultivating it; and one of the most prominent characteristics of religion everywhere, in the age before the higher religions made their appearance, was a spirit of live-and-let-live, which made possible the coexistence of a number of local pantheons, with a number of separate divinities in each of them. If, in the Hellenic World in the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era, Neoplatonism had got the better of Christianity, present-day Hinduism would have met with a kindred spirit in a Neoplatonist Church at the western end of the Old World. Even the historical victor here, Christianity, has been more Hindu-minded than it admits; for it conquered Neoplatonism and its other rivals—the worships of Mithras, Isis, Cybele, and the rest—at the price of unavowedly incorporating them in itself. Islam and Judaism, too, have incorporated elements of other religions to a lesser extent. But all three Judaic religions speak with one voice in denying these failures of theirs to live up to their principles completely.

This is what we should expect of Christianity and Islam, which have made themselves wholly independent of the civilizations in which they came to birth, and have made it their mission to convert the whole of Mankind. But the repudiation of the past is surprising in Judaism, which has so far remained attached to a particular 'Chosen People' whose cultural heritage goes back to a pre-prophetic, pre-Mosaic, and pre-Abrahamic antiquity. Conversely, it is surprising to find Buddhism, which resembles Islam and Christianity in the completeness of its independence and in the universality of its mission, nevertheless behaving in practice in a Hindu way over the all-important issue of its attitude towards other religions. In Eastern Asia, which has been its major mission-field, Buddhism has not seriously attempted to wipe its rivals off the map. It has been content with coexistence, and has not shrunk from making the necessary compromises.¹ In China it has acquiesced in being fought with its own weapons. It has suffered the Taoist counter-church to purloin its organization and ritual, and the Confucian philosophy to purloin its metaphysics, in either case without acknowledgedgements. In Japan, Buddhism has enlisted Shinto divinities as janitors for the bodhisattvas' temples, and has agreed upon an equal division of functions and emoluments—taking for itself the monopoly of officiating

¹ The position of the Tantric Mahayana in Tibet, Mongolia, and Zungaria and of the Hinayana in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia is superficially different. In these countries the local form of Buddhism is not just one of several coexisting religions and philosophies, as it is in China, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. It is *the* religion, in the sense in which, today, Christianity is *the* religion in Europe and the Americas, and Islam *the* religion in South-West Asia and North Africa. Yet, in the countries in which Buddhism has secured a local monopoly, it has bought it at the same price at which Christianity and Islam have bought theirs. It has prevailed by incorporating a great deal of the previous religion of the land.

at funerals, while leaving to Shinto the monopoly of officiating at marriages. If Buddhism had also disseminated itself in Western Asia and Europe, the Buddhist temple in a present-day English village would be rubbing shoulders with a Neoplatonist temple and a shrine of Odin or Thor, and the relations between the three non-Christian clergymen in the village would be decidedly more amicable than those between the actual Church of England parson, Methodist minister, and Roman Catholic priest.

Thus, when we try to classify the higher religions, we find ourselves confronted by an irreducible cross-division between two principles of classification that are both of major importance. On the test of the extent of the achievement of independence and universality, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity fall into one group and Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and Judaism into another. On the test of the degree of exclusive-mindedness, the three Judaic religions and Zoroastrianism fall into one group, as against the two Indian religions. On this evidence we can go no farther than to conclude that a tendency towards independence, universality, and exclusiveness is characteristic of the higher religions as a species. But we shall not find any particular specimen or specimens combining all three specific characteristics so markedly as to provide us with the materials for constructing a model applicable to all representatives of the class.

C

RECONSIDERATIONS OF PARTICULAR TOPICS

VII. EXPLANATIONS AND REVISIONS OF USAGES OF TERMS

I. DEFINITIONS

THERE is no need to revise my usage of the term 'definitions', since, so far, I have used it rarely, and then only, as far as I am aware, in the ordinary current meaning of it. I must, however, now explain what I believe this meaning to be, because I have been criticized, both in general and in particular, for not having defined my terms clearly in advance, before making use of them.

Christopher Hill, for example, finds that 'Mr. Toynbee eschews precise definition',¹ and Bagby pillories my work as 'an outstanding example of the difficulties and confusion into which a lack of clear definitions can lead us'.² A. Eban complains³ that my use of the word 'fossil' is never defined and adds that 'it is indeed a basic weakness of his work that it evades the definition of its fundamental terms'. Since 'civilization' and 'civilizations' (singular: 'a civilization') are key-terms of mine, I have been taken to task particularly for not defining these by critics who believe that preliminary definitions are desirable. K. W. Thompson has criticized me⁴ for not defining my use of this word in the singular, and explaining how it stands to my use of the word 'society'. M. Postan considers⁵ that I have used it in a great variety of senses. R. K. Merton,⁶ P. Gardiner,⁷ P. M. Sweezy,⁸ H. Marrou,⁹ W. H. McNeill,¹⁰ and A. Hourani¹¹ hold that I have not defined or elucidated my use of the word in the plural. R. T. Clark holds¹² that I have given a definition that is arbitrary and incomplete. Merton and Hourani find, as Bagby does,¹³ that my list of civilizations is arbitrary and that this is due to my failure to define what I mean by them. Granville Hicks

¹ *The Modern Quarterly*, Autumn, 1947, p. 295.

² *Culture and History*, p. 182.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 324.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 216. Cp. M. A. Fitzsimons in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Co-operative Appraisal*, and R. T. Clark in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. cxxx, No. 777 (1941), p. 297. See further the present volume, pp. 274-5.

⁵ In *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), p. 58.

⁶ In *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xlvii, No. 2 (September, 1941), pp. 205-13.

⁷ In *Time and Tide*, 30th October, 1954.

⁸ In *The Nation*, 19th October, 1946.

⁹ In *Esprit*, July, 1952, p. 123.

¹⁰ In *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Co-operative Appraisal*.

¹¹ In *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 380.

¹² See *The Nineteenth Century and After*, November, 1941, p. 297.

¹³ In *Culture and History*, pp. 177-81.

questions¹ whether 'a civilization' is definable, and, supposing that it is, whether it can be defined precisely enough to make it feasible to compare specimens of the class. I have also been criticized for not having defined what I mean by 'creativity',² by 'universal state',³ by 'culture',⁴ by 'sainthood',⁵ and by 'laws of God'.⁶

However, on this issue, the critics are not unanimous. G. A. Birks, for example, defends me⁷ against criticisms of me for not having defined my terms, and R. Coulborn finds⁸ that I have been right in principle in not trying to define the word 'civilizations' too tightly. H. W. B. Joseph gives the reason why. Definitions of kinds, he points out,⁹ cannot be demonstrated. They come from our experience of particular cases. And, since we cannot know beforehand how many more particular cases we may be going to encounter in the future, our definitions may, at any moment, become untrue to the facts if we have frozen these definitions so hard that we can no longer revise them. Here we put our finger on the weak point of definitions as instruments for acquiring knowledge and understanding of phenomena, human or non-human. Definitions are, by definition, hard-set. At least, the only definition of definitions that I can think of is that they are frozen 'models' (using the word 'models' in the sense in which it has been used in the preceding chapter). It is significant that definitions have scored their greatest successes in mathematics: for instance, in geometry. In mathematics the materials under investigation are also frozen hard, and therefore definitions, in spite of their rigidity, are effective tools for dealing with them. Mathematical entities are abstractions from phenomena; and their human makers take care to carry the process of abstraction to a degree at which the products will be incapable of committing irregularities. But phenomena, as we find them, are not equally docile. Even non-human phenomena are not amenable to complete *a priori* regimentation; human phenomena are elusively mobile. It is therefore hazardous to apply to the study of phenomena a mental instrument that has acquired its prestige through its effectiveness for the study of abstractions.

If definitions are to be used at all in the study of human affairs, they will be less hampering, and possibly more illuminating, if, instead of making them, *more mathematico*, at the beginning of our inquiry, we work them out retrospectively, as a check on the results that we have obtained by the application of ill-defined and therefore flexible 'models'. Bagby is an outstanding example of an inquirer who has pinned his faith on *a priori* definitions as being the most promising prolegomena to a comparative study of civilizations. Yet, when, in the ninth and last chapter of *Culture and History*, he sets out to give examples of similarities in the development of civilizations, he declares, to his credit,

¹ In *The New Leader*, 18th October, 1954.

² R. K. Merton in loc. cit.

³ R. K. Merton, *ibid.*

⁴ J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), pp. 21-22.

⁵ Hourani in loc. cit., p. 385.

⁶ C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1955), p. 106.

⁷ In *Philosophy*, October, 1950, pp. 336-40.

⁸ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 149, footnote 1.

⁹ *An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 81.

that 'precise and useful definitions of basic terms can only be formulated after, not before, the facts have been carefully examined'. If he had lived to write the further volumes that he was planning, one may guess that he would have had to spend many more pages in modifying the definitions given in his *prolegomena* than he has spent in this preliminary volume in setting them up.

2. HISTORY

The original meaning of the Greek word *historia* was inquiry or study. The Greek adjective *polyhistor* meant an inquirer whose curiosity had led him to study a wide range of subjects. There is a vestige of this original Greek usage in the current English term 'natural history' in the sense of a study of Nature (though the realm of Nature has come, in this context, to be conventionally restricted to the province of living creatures, and this to the exclusion of Man). The Greek word, however, came to be applied particularly to the study of human affairs, and this to the exclusion of the analytical and classificatory procedure that is the human intellect's characteristic method of operation. Hence it came to mean the study of human phenomena as we see them on the move through time and space; and from this, by analogy, it has also come to mean the study of phenomena on the move, whatever their nature: e.g. the phenomena studied in astronomy, geology, and biology, which, as A. L. Kroeber has pointed out,¹ are really not scientific but historical studies.² Kroeber has also pointed out³ that the true antithesis to the analytical and classificatory procedure is not the vision of human affairs as temporal events but 'the endeavour to achieve a conceptual integration of phenomena while preserving the integrity of the phenomena'. These two alternative definitions do not conflict with each other; and both bear out Kroeber's dicta⁴ that science and history differ, not in their field, but in their basic approach; that the historical approach is applicable to all phenomena; and that the material of history can be used for the scientific approach as well as for the historical. Even the two basic approaches have an underlying affinity. History, as well as science, reconstructs,⁵ though it does this only against the grain, and with the archaistic purpose of restoring dilapidated phenomena to their pristine integrity,⁶ whereas science reconstructs with the purpose of probing its way through the phenomena to the discovery of some non-phenomenal reality behind them.

Whether we adopt the popular definition of history or Kroeber's more penetrating definition of it or both, we are led to the conclusion that the distinction between the historical approach and other approaches

¹ In *The Nature of Culture*, p. 80 (see Chapter II, Annex, *Ad Hominem*, pp. 604-5, in the present volume).

² In modern Western languages the word 'history' is used in a secondary sense to mean the subject-matter of historical study. In this objective—or would-be objective—meaning the range of the word 'history' is usually confined to human affairs.

³ See the passages quoted on p. 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 73 and 74.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5. 'Historical determinations are in their essence subjective findings' (*ibid.*, p. 64).

⁶ The historical approach is always a reconstruction—of the phenomena themselves and of their dates and places (*ibid.*, p. 70; cp. pp. 79 and 101).

to the study of human affairs can be maintained only in the field of epistemological theory. 'History is one of the ways of organising human knowledge';¹ but we have already taken note² that the method of preserving the integrity of the phenomena by arranging them in the temporal sequence in which they present themselves to us is not adequate for coping with the phenomena without also resorting to alternative ways of handling them. Since the stream of events never, in fact, presents itself in the singular, as one solitary sequence, but always in the plural, as a number of sequences occurring simultaneously side by side, we cannot cope with the phenomena without also taking a synoptic comparative view of at least two, and usually many more, simultaneous sequences; and this means bringing to bear the method of analysis and classification. Accordingly, in practice, the followers of either method have always applied the other method as well. As Kroeber sees it, history deals in phenomena, and science in process, but an interest in phenomena and an interest in process are both necessary.³ 'If history has no end except the collection of facts for their own sake, it becomes merely an intellectual pastime, like stamp-collecting.'⁴ Laws cannot be eliminated from history. Conversely, historical elements are present in all sciences.⁵ Science has become historical in spirit,⁶ while 'history is . . . becoming the science of social development'.⁷ 'Sociology and history are two complementary parts of a single science—the science of social life.'⁸ We must apply the technique of the social anthropologists to the study of the higher civilizations' constituent cultures. 'Contemporary anthropologists, like Professor Evans-Pritchard, have accepted the principle of the essentially historical character of social anthropology, and in the same way it seems reasonable that historians should begin to pay more attention to the methods and the contribution of social anthropology.'⁹ 'If we throw aside . . . administrative considerations and look at the problem itself, we see that the difference between the philosopher and the historian can only be one of degree and emphasis.'¹⁰

Unfortunately the reaction of modern Western historians to the rise of the social sciences has, so far, been, for the most part, defensive and even hostile. This attitude of theirs has been noted in this book already in several places.¹¹ In the first of these passages I have criticized it, and, on reconsideration, I find myself confirmed in holding that my criticism is justified. I have, however, expressed myself there in Polybius's polemical vein, and polemical controversy is notoriously apt to defeat its own purpose by provoking opposition instead of winning assent. I will therefore now present the same criticism in the words of A. L. Kroeber, a scholar who has the art of being trenchant without being provocative.

¹ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 41, quoted already on p. 129, footnote 2.

³ Kroeber, *op. cit.*, pp. 63 and 62.

⁴ Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 19.

⁵ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁹ Chr. Dawson in *Toynbee and History*, p. 138.

¹⁰ Cohen, *op. cit.*, quoted on p. 130.

¹¹ e.g. in ix. 173–216, and in the present volume on pp. 13–14, 19 and 129–30.

² On pp. 158–70.

⁶ Dawson, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁸ *Ibid.*

'History does not know what to do with the flock of social sciences milling around her knees. She wavers between claiming them as offspring because they deal with her material, and repudiating them because they do not treat it historically. It is an attitude at once somewhat annoyed and disdainful.'¹

In the historians' reaction to science's invasion of what they consider to be their domain,

'there has been an inclination to cling to narrative as being least easily convertible into generalisation; to hug events rather than engage with their patterns; to resign the economic aspects of history to economists rather than include them; to ignore the results of ethnography, on the external ground that they are dateless and therefore non-historical; to allow the history of the great East Asiatic civilizations to settle behind watertight bulkheads; to view any larger culture history askance; to emphasize the mechanics of documentation as evidence that history, too, was objective and scientific.'²

This is a fair account of the attitude that has been adopted by contemporary Western historians—or at any rate by one school of them which, at present, probably represents the majority. We may perhaps expect to see this rigid posture gradually relax as the application of scientific method to the study of human affairs becomes more familiar, and as it continues, as, no doubt, it will, to vindicate itself by making important additions to our knowledge and understanding. In our time we are watching the merger of the old departmental 'disciplines' in a new comprehensive study of human affairs. This merger seems inevitable, because we not only have effective means of making it, but have an imperative need to make it, in the present situation of mankind.³ 'This great unity is the true study for the student of Man.'⁴ If the historians were to persist in holding aloof, their non-co-operation would not arrest the movement towards a unification of human studies; its effect would merely be to take out of the historians' hands the job of supplying the indispensable historical component of the new comprehensive study. This would be a loss to learning, since it is obvious that nobody else could supply this component so well as the historians themselves if they chose. Kroeber believes 'the time to be near when efforts for close federation in the united sciences may well come from students of culture'.⁵ So long as the goal is reached, it does not matter which of the 'disciplines' has the honour and glory of having taken the initiative. What matters is that all should co-operate whole-heartedly in a common enterprise in which an important interest of mankind is at stake.

3. METAHISTORY

The word 'metahistory' needs defining because it has become current only recently. Presumably it has been coined on the analogy of Aristotle's coinage of the word 'metaphysics'. If so, it would mean a field of study

¹ A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 73.

² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

³ See Chapter V.

⁴ Kroeber, *op. cit.*, p. 19, quoted already on p. 132.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11, quoted already on p. 132.

that comes 'after' the study of history and lies 'beyond' it (the Greek preposition 'meta' can mean both 'after' and 'beyond').

When Aristotle had completed his inquiry into physics, he found himself left with a number of unanswered questions that had arisen in the course of it. These questions were not about physics itself; they were about some hitherto nameless subject which was apparently the setting within which the inquiry into physics had been conducted. Thus the intellectual conquest of the field of physics opened up a further field of inquiry beyond it, and Aristotle labelled this 'what comes "after" or "beyond" physics' (*tà metὰ tà physiká*). This label might imply no more than that physics was the avenue along which Aristotle had arrived at the threshold of his new subject. It might also imply that, if one does not go on from physics (or history) to 'metaphysics' (or 'metahistory'), one will not be able to understand physics (or history) itself, or, in other words, that 'metaphysics' (or 'metahistory') is the field in which physics (or history) finds its explanation. These two implications are evidently not mutually exclusive.

Is there really a subject, analogous to Aristotle's *tà metὰ tà physiká*, that can properly be labelled 'what comes after history' (*tà metὰ tà historiká*)? If the word 'history' is defined narrowly as meaning 'the study of phenomena on the move' or 'the study of phenomena in their integrity', then the analytical and classificatory method of studying human affairs—the method applied in psychology and in the social sciences—would fall within the field of 'metahistory'. K. W. Thompson points out¹ that 'the philosophy of history', as metahistory has traditionally been called, 'has three possible meanings. It . . . may be construed as a *method* for dealing with the complexities of history or an interpretation of the *meaning* of history or a statement of the *laws* of history.' The main issue in the field of method is the question what should be the relation between the narrative method and the analytico-classificatory one—a question which has been discussed in this volume in Chapter VI and again in the present chapter under the heading of 'History'. Historical method would not usually be thought of as falling within the field of metahistory. At the same time it is impossible to take a synoptic comparative view of human affairs without taking account of regularities, recurrences, and 'laws'; 'laws', in their turn, involve meaning; and inquiries into the meaning of history certainly fall within the field of metahistory, since the meaning of a thing can be sought for only in some field outside the thing that we are trying to interpret and understand.

Metahistory, then, must mean the study of Reality in some higher dimension than that of human affairs as these present themselves to us in the phenomena and are then organized by our minds through the method of analysis and classification. This study, which arises out of the study of history, and so comes after it, must be akin to, if not identical with, metaphysics and theology.²

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 201.

² 'The Problem of Metahistory' has been discussed by Christopher Dawson in an essay reprinted in *The Dynamics of World History*, pp. 287-93. In this essay Dawson

A classic example of a work of metahistory, in this sense, is Saint Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*. As Kohn puts it, 'What Augustine wrote was not history, as Thucydides had written it; it was a study of history.'¹ Kohn goes on to point out² that what I am writing in the present book is also not history, though I have written history in other works of mine. I should say myself that the present book began as an analytical-classificatory comparative study of human affairs and turned into a meta-historical inquiry *en route*. In a review of volumes i-iii³ M. Postan has commended me for using historical information as evidence for scientific study, instead of seeking it as an end in itself.⁴ Later reviewers of volumes vii-x, or of the first ten volumes as a whole, have pointed out that, in the course of the book, I have made a change in my field and in my objective.⁵

4. FACTS

In a critique of my work, P. Geyl declares his belief that 'the facts are there to be used'.⁶ The same belief is mistakenly attributed to me, as well, by H. Holborn. 'To him, facts are ready-made objective elements.'⁷ This belief is also implied in Geyl's and Sir Ernest Barker's criticism of my presentation of what seem to be facts to me. 'They are not facts; they are subjective presentations of facts.'⁸ 'They are not primary and objective facts (so many stamens, so many pistils, and so on); they are secondary and subjective constructions.'⁹ As Barker and Geyl see it, the authentic historian is a collector. He is like a man scrambling up a torrent bed and picking up, on his way, the boulders that he finds lying there. They therefore look askance at me, because they see in me, not a collector, but at best a manufacturer and at worst a fabricator. Even on the kindest interpretation open to them on their conception of the nature of facts, I cannot be an authentic historian. But the conception on which this criticism is based is surely a mistaken one.

Facts are not really like boulders that have been detached and shaped and deposited exclusively by the play of the forces of non-human nature. They are like flaked and chipped flints, hewn stones, bricks, or briquettes. Human action has had a hand in making them what they are, and they would not be what they are if this action had not taken points out that 'metahistory' is not the same thing as 'universal history' (op. cit., p. 290) and that 'all historiography is pervaded by metahistorical influences' (ibid., p. 289). He then raises the question how one is to explain 'the strong reaction against metahistory which is now so common among English academic historians' (p. 289). Metahistory, Dawson notices, is even more unpopular with modern academic historians than universal history is (p. 290). Dawson cites the case of de Tocqueville as evidence that 'metahistory is not the enemy of true history but its guide and its friend, provided always that it is good metahistory' (p. 293). His conclusion is as follows: 'The experience of the great historians, such as Tocqueville and Ranke, leads me to believe that a universal metahistorical vision of this kind, partaking more of the nature of religious contemplation than of scientific generalisation, lies close to the sources of their creative power' (ibid., p. 293).

¹ H. Kohn in *Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 464.

² Ibid., cited in footnote 3 to p. 130.

³ In *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), p. 53.

⁴ See p. 15.

⁵ P. Geyl: *Debates with Historians*, p. 140.

⁶ *The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947, p. 29.

⁷ Geyl, op. cit., p. 141.

⁸ See Chapter II, Annex, pp. 649-51.

⁹ Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, p. 95.

place. 'The facts of history are not the brute things or events outside the mind, for they have filtered through minds before I have word of them.'¹ 'We can never catch pure facts apart from perspective.'² Facts are, in truth, exactly what is meant by the Latin word *facta* from which the English word is derived. They are 'things that have been made'—that is to say 'fictitious' things rather than 'factual' things—and this truth about them cannot be evaded by calling them 'data' ('gifts') instead. Gifts imply the existence of a giver, as inescapably as manufactures imply the existence of a maker. Whether we call phenomena data or call them facts, we are admitting that they have been given or have been made by somebody. We may attribute the maximum amount of credit for them to non-human nature or to God, but we shall not be able to clear ourselves of the charge that we, too, have had a hand in the transaction, and that our contribution, however small we may reckon it to have been, has nevertheless been an indispensable one. 'Facts do not "speak for themselves"'. Concepts do not "emerge" from the evidence.'³ 'The process of "establishing the facts" about an event involves theory.'⁴ 'The criterion of selection is not inherent in the data; it is applied by the historian.'⁵ 'History is the re-enactment of the past in the mind of the historian, and even "facts" exist only there.'⁶ 'All our impressions from the outer world of phenomena are, at the same time, thought, judgment, explanation.'⁷ 'What we call historic facts are the results of our interpretation of certain fragmentary data or remains. Our implicitly assumed principles determine the character of our interpretation.'⁸ Many of these principles are hypotheses accepted because of their relative success in explaining facts. 'They are not explained from the facts, but the facts from them.'⁹ No sharp distinction can be drawn between facts and their meanings.¹⁰ The meaning of a fact is found in one's conception of its relations to other facts.¹¹ 'Nature does not provide separately both facts and laws.'¹² No fact can be established or made intelligible unless it is closely related to other facts or is part of a larger system (though it is also true that no connexion between facts is purely man-made).¹³ 'The so-called facts of history are cross-sections or aspects of a world in process of change.'¹⁴ In a criticism of my work,¹⁵ G. J. Renier asks: 'Why not just one single fact?' in place of my welter of mythology, allegory, hypothesis, and what not. The answer is: 'No hypothesis, no fact.'

Moreover, since a fact cannot come into existence without the good

¹ Father M. C. D'Arcy: *The Sense of History*, p. 48.

² M. C. Swabey: *The Judgment of History*, p. 233.

³ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 131.

⁴ Ibid., p. 90.

⁵ H. Holborn in *The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947, p. 29.

⁶ J. Romein in *Toynbee and History*, p. 347.

⁷ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, pp. 4-5.

⁸ H. W. B. Joseph: *An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 513.

⁹ Cohen, op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁰ R. B. Braithwaite: *Scientific Explanation*, p. 367.

¹¹ Cohen, op. cit., p. 33.

¹² Ibid., p. 44.

¹³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 75.

¹⁴ Ibid.

offices of an hypothesis, the parent hypothesis cannot change without producing a corresponding change in the fact that it has engendered.

'History advances by changes in men's way of conceiving the relations of past facts to one another, as well as by changes in their view of what the facts were.'¹

'In the framing of hypotheses . . . we are called upon to regard facts in new ways and to suggest, not simply that certain facts are connected, but how, or in accordance with what principle, they are connected. And this often involves a radical transformation in our way of looking at the facts themselves; for a fact is not such an ascertainable thing as the language we sometimes use might seem to imply. In a sense facts are stubborn; in another sense they are pliant to our thought. They are stubborn as far as we have rightly apprehended them; but what we call fact is largely a matter of inference and interpretation, performed often unconsciously and often erroneously; there is room here for a re-interpretation, in accordance with the requirements of the rest of our knowledge; and, so far as what are called facts lend themselves to this, they may fairly be called pliant.'²

'The familiar facts take on a new appearance in the light of new theories.'³ . . . It is possible to bind facts together by a new conception and so place them in a different light and re-interpret them, without apparently generalising.'⁴

As examples, Joseph cites the transformation of the 'facts' as a result of the substitution of the Copernican theory of the movements of the heavenly bodies for the Ptolemaic,⁵ the substitution of the theory of the evolution of species for the theory of their separate simultaneous creation,⁶ and the substitution by Lavoisier of the hypothetical element oxygen for the hypothetical element phlogiston.⁷ In each of these celebrated instances the 'facts' changed when the theory changed because these 'facts' were changeable interpretations of unchanging phenomena.

If it is true that every fact is, as the etymology of the word implies, something that has been constructed, and if it is also true that part, at least, of the indispensable work of construction has been done by the apprehending human mind, it seems hazardous to try to classify some so-called facts as genuine on the illusory ground that they are objective, while rejecting other so-called facts as spurious on the solid ground that they are constructions of a human mind. If it is true that all facts are partly constructions of human minds, the presence or absence of this man-made element in them cannot be an effective criterion for distinguishing the spurious from the genuine.

Sir Ernest Barker's stamens and pistils are facts for him because his thinking makes them so. *A fortiori*, this is the reason why national states and national churches are also facts for him (if I interpret him right).⁸ These are human institutions; and, of all the myriad kinds of phenomena within human ken, human institutions are mind-made to the

¹ Joseph, op. cit., p. 467.

² Ibid., p. 468.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 470.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 468 and 470-1.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 468 and 473-5.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 472-3.

⁸ When he writes 'I believe in the national state (and, for that matter, in the national church)', the words 'I believe' signify, no doubt, approval, not credence. But one could hardly approve of an institution without also believing in its existence.

highest degree. Institutions are networks of relations between human beings; and these relations exist solely in human minds. When they fall out of mind, they cease to exist; and their existence is already imperilled when they fall out of favour. This is a characteristic feature of institutions; it is common to institutions of all kinds: cultures, societies, churches, states, clubs, rites, war, marriage, tabus, totems, and the rest. All alike are mind-made; and, if this were valid evidence of unreality, they would have, all alike, to be written off as being hallucinations.¹

At least two of my critics hold that one or more of the species of institutions with which I operate in this book are illusory, in contrast to others.² Barker, for instance, says of me:³

'He sees Brocken-spectres of superhuman dimensions ("civilizations", "laws", "dominant minorities", "internal proletariats", "Herodianisms" and "Zealotisms") walking along the ridges of history. May it not be better to see men like ourselves, rather than these great spectres? Of course, . . . groups too matter. . . . But . . . they must be studied in their human individuality, and in definite and visible terms—terms of territory, terms of nationality, terms of their state-systems, terms of their religious organisations. We live on Earth and not in cloudland; and we must study ourselves as we live on Earth, in terms of our earthly institutions.'

Henri Marrou makes the same point against me. A civilization, he submits, looks more like a real entity in a still-life cross-section than when we look at it on the move.⁴

'The twenty-one "objects" of which his theory seeks to give an account are nothing but abstractions treated as realities (*réifiées*); this powerful effort embraces nothing but phantoms.'

These two critics of mine seem to me to be confusing reality with familiarity. I think the reason why the institutions with which I operate look to them like phantoms is simply that these do not happen to be the institutions in which these two critics themselves are accustomed to deal. Is there any sense in which 'nationality', 'state-systems', and 'religious organisations' are 'visible', in which 'civilizations', 'laws', 'minorities', and 'proletariats' are not visible except as hallucinations? All these phenomena are institutions, and the visibility of all of them alike is in the mind's, not the body's, eye. We may call this mental realm 'Earth' or we may call it 'cloudland', but it is of the same order of reality in every case. This is true also of 'territory'; for the territory that, at the present moment, is British in nationality and is occupied by the state-system of the United Kingdom has in time past been occupied by a bevy of Welsh and English successor-states of the Roman Empire; by a province of the Roman Empire before that; and, before the Roman conquest, by a bevy of Celtic principalities. If 'territory' means the geographical environment of a nationality or a state, we may here recall Spate's dicta⁵ that 'this world, without Man, is not environment, is not our World', and that 'the facts of geography are the facts as they are approached.'

¹ This point is taken up again on pp. 270-1.

² This point is taken up again on pp. 288-92.

⁴ *Esprit*, July, 1952, p. 124.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 96.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁶ Quoted on pp. 146-7.

When Barker says that groups 'are groups of actual persons, engaged in actual personal relations',¹ there is no disagreement between him and me. I should add, for my part, that these actual persons are also engaged in the far more widely ramifying and more long-lasting impersonal relations that we call 'institutions'. Persons and relations between persons are phenomena of two different orders of reality. If Barker maintains that the reality of persons is of a higher, as well as a different, order than the reality of relations between persons, I agree with him on this point too. I disagree in holding, as I do hold, that, however high or low we rate the order of reality represented by institutions, it is the same for institutions of all species.

Another critic, H. J. Morgenthau, deprecates the choice of civilizations as units of study on the ground, not that they are unreal, but that they are a kind of concept which is not easily verifiable empirically.

'It is not by accident that there has been a tendency for history to be written in terms of political or geographic units rather than of civilizations; for the former lend themselves more readily to empirical verification than do the latter.'²

In this context Morgenthau cites China as a case in point for his thesis. Yet surely the range of the Chinese Civilization is less difficult to verify empirically, both in time and in space, than the range of a geographical unit called 'China' or of a state or states that can be labelled 'Chinese'. The range of the Chinese Civilization can be ascertained by clear and exact criteria. Wherever and whenever we find the Chinese characters being used and the Chinese style of art being cultivated, we can affirm confidently that the Chinese Civilization is present. On the other hand, China as a geographical unit is much more elusive. The area occupied by the Chinese Civilization has varied from age to age. At the earliest date to which our records go back, its geographical domain is confined to the middle section of the basin of the Yellow River; today it extends over Manchuria, Sse-chuan, Canton, and Singapore. The configuration of Chinese political units has been still more kaleidoscopic. The changing area of the domain of the Chinese Civilization has sometimes been divided among twenty or thirty states, sometimes among half-a-dozen, sometimes among three, sometimes between two. At other times the whole area has constituted a single political entity. The Chinese Civilization seems to lend itself to verification more readily than any political or geographical unit or units associated with the Chinese name.

Cohen remarks³ that 'a fact is simply the part of the picture on which we fix our attention'. And evidently we dilate the focus of our attention or contract it according to the particular purpose that we have in view in a particular inquiry. 'Two events which are separate for some purposes may be parts of a single event for other purposes to which the separation is irrelevant.'⁴ The same point is made by Willey and Phillips.⁵ The sizes of the units that are taken as objects for study are not

¹ *Toynbee and History*, p. 96.

² In *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 44.

³ G. R. Willey and P. Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II: Historical-Developmental Interpretation', in *The American Anthropologist*, New Series vol. 57, No. 4 (August, 1955), p. 724.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

'right' or 'wrong' in themselves; their usefulness depends on the inquirer's angle of vision and on the purpose that he has in hand. Facts have, indeed, a gamut of different orders of magnitude which is very wide and which thus gives room for a great number of gradations, though it does have limits at either end. At the upper end the largest fact comprehensible to a human mind must fall short of total and absolute Reality; for this would include the mind itself as well as the totality of its potential objects; and it would therefore be unknowable.¹ At the opposite end of the scale the smallest fact comprehensible to a human mind will not be infinitesimally minute. But between these two limits the range of possible magnitudes is obviously enormous. I therefore think that Geyl is right in criticizing me² for having picked out facts of the order of magnitude of civilizations as being 'significant' and 'integral' without qualification. They are integral and significant when one is making a comparative study of civilizations; but there are, of course, other operations, on both larger and smaller scales, on which a student of human affairs can embark, and the significant and integral order of facts will be a different one in each case. Tingsten points out³ that civilizations are not completely self-contained 'intelligible fields of study'; and I myself have implicitly admitted this in studying the contacts between different civilizations in both time and space, and finding, in these contacts, a setting for the study of the higher religions.⁴

In the passage⁵ that has drawn the just-quoted criticism from Geyl I have noted that the facts of the order of magnitude of civilizations, which happen to be of special interest for me, are 'not awkwardly abundant, but awkwardly scarce'. Spate points out⁶ that they are also awkwardly abundant when they are quarried on smaller scales. And Joseph observes, without qualification,⁷ that 'in social studies the special difficulty is the great number of the factors involved'. I have sought relief from my own opposite difficulty by freely drawing illustrations for the configuration of the histories of civilizations from the histories of social and cultural units of smaller orders of magnitude; and I have been criticized for this procedure on the ground that it conflicts with my contention that a civilization is the minimum field of study that is intelligible for my purpose. R. H. Tawney, for instance, observes that my method

'involves detaching particular developments or episodes from their context in the life of the society to which they belong, and then using them as evidence of the general conclusion which it is desired to establish. . . . These fragments do not always look the same on the dissecting table as when they formed part of the living organism. . . . The question inevitably arises: are they really evidence? Do they illustrate what they are intended to illustrate? Are they intelligible when removed from their historical

¹ See p. 8.

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 374.

³ In *Dagens Nyheter*, 16th January, 1949.

⁴ See pp. 26-27.

⁵ ix. 210-11. See also the present volume, pp. 168-70.

⁶ O. H. K. Spate in *Toynbee and History*, p. 290.

⁷ In *An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed., pp. 555-6.

setting and presented without reference to the past and future of the societies in which they occur?"¹

Geyl answers Tawney's question in the negative. He notes that I draw my data 'from national histories as if they were indisputably relevant to the history of Western Civilization';² and he takes my procedure in this point as demonstrating that I am 'putting forward an impossible, an impracticable, demand' in maintaining that a civilization is the smallest 'intelligible field of historical study'.³ This procedure of mine is also noticed by W. Kaufmann,⁴ T. J. G. Locher,⁵ and F. Hampl;⁶ and it is criticized, as involving an inconsistency, by R. Pares⁷ and by M. A. Fitzsimons,⁸ as well as by Geyl.

On this question of inconsistency, I myself should draw a distinction. I should agree that a part cannot properly be used to illustrate the whole of the entity to which it belongs if one is seeking to illustrate some feature of the total configuration of the whole. For instance, there is no reason to suppose that the total configuration of the history of the Western Civilization is mirrored in miniature in the configuration of the history of some particular Western people—the French, Germans, English, or whichever people one might happen to pick out. On the other hand, there are many interesting and significant features and phenomena, common to a civilization and its parts, which do not extend over the total configuration of either the whole or of any of the parts; and in such cases the use of the part to illustrate the whole is, I should say, certainly legitimate and possibly enlightening. It is so because the parts and the whole have in common the same cultural quality and the same social texture—not to speak of the common human nature that is at the bottom of all human behaviour.

5. LAWS

Laws, in the original and literal meaning of the word, are man-made rules for regulating the relations between human beings in matters in which human beings have the power to make a choice, and in which, accordingly, their course of action can be influenced by penalizing one or other of the alternatives that are open to them. Penalization can perhaps deter people from breaking a law or make them suffer for having broken it, but it cannot deprive them of their freedom to break it—or to try to break it—if they choose. Consequently the bearing of present human laws on future human action is predictable only in the sense that we can foresee how the laws will apply—and even this can be foreseen

¹ R. H. Tawney in *International Affairs*, November, 1939, pp. 801 and 804. Cp. L. Stone in *Toynbee and History*, p. 112: 'Historians argue that . . . arbitrarily selected facts torn out of their context . . . are of little help in advancing the frontier of knowledge or increasing the range of understanding.' Cp. W. Kaufmann, *ibid.*, p. 311.

² P. Geyl in *Debates with Historians*, p. 147. Cp. p. 149.

³ P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 71–72. Cp. *ibid.*, pp. 46–47.

⁴ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 311.

⁵ In *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 12.

⁶ In the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 173, Heft 3, p. 462.

⁷ In *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 264.

⁸ In *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

only so long as these laws remain unchanged. Laws are human conventions and, as such, lie within the realm in which Man's power of choice is effective. Since it is practicable to enact a law, it is also practicable to modify it or to repeal it and to replace it by a different one. 'The law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not',¹ is unalterable, not by necessity, but by convention. 'The law of the Medes and Persians is that no decree and statute which the King establisheth may be changed.'²

The word 'laws' is also used analogically in the term 'laws of God', and metaphorically in the term 'laws of Nature'.

In societies in which people have an anthropomorphic vision of absolute Reality, the gods or God have been imagined as including legislation among their manifold human-like activities. The supposed 'laws of God' naturally cover the whole sphere of human legislation; and divine legislators are believed to inflict penalties on human beings who break their laws, as human legislators try to do. But the divine legislation is deemed to extend, not only over the world of men, but over the whole Universe, including the realm of non-human nature; and here it is deemed to be more effective than either divine or human law is, or can be, in the field of human affairs.

If there are such things as 'laws of God' applying to human affairs, human beings are evidently free to break these divine laws, as well as human laws, at their peril. On the other hand, the population, animate and inanimate, of the realm of non-human nature seems to differ from mankind in not possessing the power to choose, which is one of Man's characteristics.³ And therefore the 'laws of God' applying to God's non-human subjects are laws which cannot be disobeyed because these subjects are not free to break them. In this realm the laws of God are, in fact, identical with the way in which things actually work. Here the bearing of present laws on future events is predictable, not merely in the sense that one can see that the laws will apply, but in the further sense that one can foresee what is actually going to happen in consequence of their operation, since in this realm there is nothing subject to God's laws that has power to defy them. Here again, however, prediction is possible only so long as God's laws remain unchanged—and, if human beings have power to alter or repeal man-made laws, this is, *a fortiori*, within the power of a God conceived of anthropomorphically, since He will be credited with a will that, like a human will, is free, but, unlike it, is omnipotent.

Thus the laws regulating the course of non-human nature are deemed, like human laws, to be open to change so long as they are deemed to have been enacted and to be enforced by a God who is a person in the human sense of the term. In the Western World, however, since the later decades of the seventeenth century, an increasing number of people have

¹ Dan. vi. 12.

² Dan. vi. 15.

³ Instead of 'seems', it might be more prudent, in the present state of knowledge, to write 'has seemed to human observers till recently, since the time when an anthropomorphic view of non-human natural phenomena was replaced by an anthropomorphic view of a divine power or powers to which Nature was believed to be subject'. If physical scientists come to believe that the movements of the smallest discernible bodies are indeterminate, this will, in one point, be a return to the pre-scientific and pre-theistic anthropomorphic vision of non-human nature.

ceased to believe in God's existence, or, short of that, in His effective activity. This eclipse of God leaves the laws of Nature without a legislator; and, if there has never been anybody who has enacted them, there will not be anybody, either, with power to repeal them if he chooses. At first sight this seems to make the laws of Nature irrevocable, inexorable, and therefore predictable with assurance. And the phrase 'laws of Nature' is, indeed, popularly associated today with the notion of determinism. In the popular mind they are laws of the Medes and Persians which are unalterable, not just by convention, but by some kind of intrinsic inevitability.

This apparent absoluteness of the laws of Nature is, however, conditioned by the fact that, in so far as they are discernible, they are discerned by human minds, and are therefore, like all the mind's 'data', at least partly mind-made. As has been noted already in the first chapter of this volume,¹ all our currently accepted propositions, generalizations, and 'laws' are merely hypotheses that have not been discredited by experience so far; and all predictions, in all realms of inquiry and all fields of phenomena, are subject to the proviso *rebus sic stantibus*.² Moreover, the things that have to remain constant if a prediction based on an hypothesis is to be valid are at least two in number: the hypothesis itself and the mind's picture of the set of phenomena to which the hypothesis is being applied. It will be seen that laws of Nature, even when declared independent of a divine legislator, do not, after all, acquire a sovereign impersonal inevitability. They exist in human minds; and, while we may feel sure that they have worked in the past so long as we still feel sure that our picture of the relevant past phenomena is correct, we can never feel sure that they are going to continue to work in the future—though we shall, and must, for practical purposes, make a bet with ourselves that they will.

This caution with regard to the validity of predictions applies *a fortiori* in the field in which human wills have an effective power of making choices. A particular choice that is going to be made by a particular individual in a particular situation may sometimes be guessed on the strength of an observer's estimate of this individual's character; but such guesswork is notoriously apt to be refuted by the event. The outcome of an encounter between two or three or three million individuals—in a parliamentary election, for instance, or in a revolution, or in a war—is still more difficult to forecast.³ Where no conflict of wills is involved and

¹ On pp. 41-45.

² This proviso surely governs H. W. B. Joseph's dicta that 'a statement of the way in which a cause does act is a statement of the way in which it must act' and that 'a true law is true unconditionally' (*An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 414).

³ See pp. 116-17. R. Pares, in loc. cit., p. 271, holds it against me that 'he dismisses in one short paragraph the conflicts between individual human wills, which are, for most historians, the whole of history and the true explanation of this recalcitrance' (i.e. the recalcitrance of human affairs to regularity). To this criticism I have three answers. (i) In the passage to which Pares refers, ix. 334-6, I give a reference to an earlier passage, iv. 133-584, in which I discuss the conflict of wills at considerable length (350 pages). Considering that the 'one short paragraph' caught Pares' eye, he ought to have noticed this reference in it, to have followed the reference up, and to have thought again before pronouncing that I had 'dismissed' this important subject. (ii) A conflict of wills is one of the two possible outcomes of an encounter between two or more personalities, and the drama of encounters ('challenge and response') is one of my important themes all

where the number of wills in question is large, the percentages of the respective options for alternative possible choices can be predicted statistically with remarkably close approximations to accuracy.¹ It is this possibility that enables caterers of all kinds to reduce the hazard arising from ignorance of the future to proportions that make it feasible to do profitable business. Yet the evidence on which statisticians make their predictions has all to be drawn from past experience exclusively; and the subtlest mathematical refinement of the statistician's technique cannot do more for him than enable him to interpret past experience with the utmost accuracy and relevancy. In applying this quintessence of past experience to a prediction about the future, he is in the same situation as the layman; he is making a bet with himself; and he may lose his bet through some sudden change of will, temper, taste, or fashion of which the evidence of past experience has given no warning.

These are the reasons why I myself hold, and have always held, that the future course of human affairs is unpredictable—and this intrinsically, by reason of the nature of human affairs and not just because we do not know enough, or have not an accurate enough knowledge of what we do know in some fashion, or have not worked out an adequate technique for applying our knowledge to the problem of prediction. I have stated this view emphatically at an early point in this book;² and K. W. Thompson has testified³ that I have maintained the proposition that history in general is unpredictable 'with unflagging steadiness'. When E. Berkovitz maintains⁴ that past failures tell us nothing about the future, and that the most that I might be able to show is that my 'laws' have not been contradicted by history so far, my answer is that I have never differed from him on these points. Hourani testifies⁵ that, in my work, 'there is nowhere a hint that the whole process *must* happen; on the contrary, there is every insistence that Man can always break the chains that seem to bind him, if he wills'. I do believe, like Rabbi J. B. Agus,⁶ that 'those who cannot rise above history are doomed to repeat it'.⁷ But, as F. Engel-Janosi⁸ and W. Höpker⁹ have noted, my attitude is tentative by comparison with Spengler's, and I have declared my disagreement with Spengler's determinism. Critics who assert that I believe in the possibility of prediction in the field of human affairs¹⁰ cannot have taken

through this book. (iii) In the passage to which Pares refers, ix. 334-6, I declare my belief that the mutual frustration of wills which results from conflicts between them opens the way for the irrational and emotional forces in the human psyche to get the upper hand and to run away with the course of events. This view may be right or wrong, but, since I hold it, I attach more importance to this positive consequence, as I see it, of conflicts of wills than to these conflicts themselves, which in themselves—again as I see it—are merely negative in their effect.

² In i. 300-1.

³ In *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, pp. x and xii.

⁴ In *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 378.

⁵ In *Judaism*, 1956, p. 3.

⁶ This carries one step farther a dictum of M. R. Cohen's that those who do not study history are doomed to repeat it (*The Meaning of Human History*, p. 260).

⁷ In *Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, 2. Jahrgang, Heft 4 (October, 1949), pp. 265-7.

⁸ In *Zeitwende*, August, 1949.

⁹ 'Can we prophesy the future from the past? Professor Toynbee, it is well known, thinks that we can' (H. Trevor-Roper in *Toynbee and History*, p. 122). According to P. Geyl (*ibid.*, p. 365), the attainment of 'reliable conclusions about the laws of mankind's historic life, with the help of which the future might be forecast', was 'the purpose

¹ See ix. 220-3.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 220.

the trouble to read what I have written on this point. Yet it is a point of capital importance, and therefore one on which a critic ought to be particularly sure of his ground before making a pronouncement.

I do believe that many students of human affairs, myself among them, have discerned genuine regularities and recurrences in the configuration of past events; but I do not believe either that these regularities were bound to occur when they did (in my belief) occur or that they are bound to recur in the future.¹ In their past occurrences I have tried to track them down with a view to seeing how often they have presented themselves and how far they have gone. I may sometimes have overdriven them in my pursuit of this inquiry, and I think this is what A. L. Guerard has in mind when he says of me² that 'he seems to forget, and he makes us forget, that his laws are valid only as hypotheses and approximations'. Sir Maurice Powicke is, I think, making the same point when he says³ that I am least convincing when I succumb to the temptation to treat my 'laws' as if they were 'laws in the sense of the law of gravitation'. As he goes on to say, 'they are generalisations about human behaviour'; and human behaviour is more recalcitrant to laws than the behaviour of physical phenomena, to which the law of gravitation applies, because in human behaviour there is consciousness, will, and purpose. I myself, however, would go on to say that Powicke's 'law' of gravitation is really no more than a generalization about the behaviour of material bodies, and has as little right as generalizations about human behaviour

for which we were assured [that Toynbee's] investigation was undertaken'. Neither Geyl nor Trevor-Roper cites any passage of my work in support of his statement.

¹ I therefore contest F. Hampl's contention that I have no business *not* to be a determinist on my own theory (the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 173, Heft 3 (1952), p. 465), and O. H. K. Spate's contentions that the tracing of a pattern in history implies determinism and that I am accordingly a determinist, notwithstanding my disavowal of this (*The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), pp. 406 and 407). H. Kuhn also maintains that I am more of a determinist than I think I am (*The Journal of Philosophy*, 28th August, 1947, p. 495), and P. Geyl that my system conflicts with my professed belief in free will (*Debates with Historians*, p. 136). According to E. F. J. Zahn, I do not succeed in saving freedom; I relapse into a new determinism (*Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, pp. 22 and 26). Anyway, I do not save individual freedom, because the responses to challenges are, in my view, collective (*ibid.*, p. 26). This is an incorrect account of what I believe. I believe that all human action is taken by individuals. I do not believe that there is such a thing as collective action. Responses to challenges are, I believe, the acts of individuals, as all human action is. K. D. Erdmann takes note that this is my view, and observes that there is a discrepancy between this view and my simile of the wheel and the wagon, according to which the successive failures of human beings are made by God to promote the progressive fulfilment of His purpose (*Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2, p. 228). There is, of course, a discrepancy between a belief in the freedom of human wills and a belief in God's overriding omnipotence. This puzzle has never yet been solved and is perhaps insoluble, since it arises from an anthropomorphic vision of God which is, no doubt, a misrepresentation of Reality.

J. K. Feibleman finds in my presentation of history 'a strict determinism of the temporal order' and condemns my thesis that there is an 'unknown quantity' in encounters as an attempt 'to raise accident into a causative factor' (*T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), pp. 16 and 25). O. H. K. Spate finds that I try to bring free will and ideas, as well as chance or accident, within the framework of my 'laws' (*The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 409). What I do think and say is that the outcome of encounters between personalities is intrinsically unpredictable because it is, I believe, not determined in advance. A critic could call this statement of belief the formulation of a law, and then say that I am regimenting freedom; but this line of argument would, I should say, be sophistical.

² In *The Herald-Tribune*, 28th October, 1934.

³ In *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th September, 1939.

have to be called a law of Nature—if, by this, we mean a regularity which is bound in principle to recur and which, unlike a human law, can never be modified or repealed. All that we know is that Newton's law of gravity has been verified by application to the phenomena up to date, subject to limiting conditions and qualifications that have since been formulated in further physical laws discovered by Einstein.¹

Besides being criticized for having been pressed too far, my 'laws' in the field of human affairs have also met with the opposite criticism that 'they are often so loosely formed that they can be expanded or contracted at will',² and 'are so vague that it is hard to see what kind of empirical evidence could possibly refute them'.³ I do not see how I can have erred in this direction as well as in the other. If I have, it is the less reprehensible error of the two, since human affairs are obviously less amenable to rigorous laws than tame planets or conditioned abstractions. Consequently, in human affairs, 'the differences will not be denied';⁴ and my 'professional colleagues . . . are convinced that the differences between civilizations are more significant than their likenesses'.⁵ The differences are, no doubt, more significant if one is focusing one's attention on one stream of phenomena as these present themselves, just as likenesses are more significant if one is concentrating one's effort on taking a synoptic view of a number of simultaneous streams. But it is perilous to turn a blind eye to either aspect of phenomena, since both likenesses and differences are always found coexisting in phenomena in so far as these are apprehended by human minds. Indeed, the notion of either likeness or difference is logically inconceivable without a correlative notion of its opposite, and so, too, is the notion of either necessity or freedom.⁶

¹ Apropos of the comparative study of civilizations, Bagby asks himself: 'If we cannot predict, can we call our study a science?' (*Culture and History*, p. 199). He then tentatively commits himself to a belief in the possibility of prediction in very general terms in the field of human affairs (*ibid.*, pp. 210-11). When he comes to the question of predicting the future of the Western Civilization (*ibid.*, p. 211), he is as cautious as I am. (He mistakenly attributes to me a belief that the dissolution of the Western Civilization is imminent—quoting vi. 312-22, especially 320. The opinion that I actually express in that passage is that the future of the Western Civilization is an open question, and that the obvious danger in which we stand is a challenge to us to save ourselves. He notices that I treat the question as an open one in ix. 406-644, and calls this a withdrawal.) H. Kuhn reports that I seem 'to set little store by' my 'attempts at prediction' (*The Journal of Philosophy*, 28th August, 1947, p. 499).

Bagby does not distinguish between prediction, made with a formula based on past experience, which has so far been vindicated by practical results, and prediction that is intrinsically valid for all time. I myself do not believe that this stricter form of prediction is possible except in the realm of pure mathematics. Prediction in the sciences dealing with non-human nature is, I should say, contingent and precarious, notwithstanding its imposing practical successes. I believe that even this laxer kind of prediction is impossible in the study of human affairs. And therefore, if it is held that a 'discipline' must be capable of making predictions of some kind in order to qualify for being called a science, I should prefer to call the disciplines dealing with human affairs by some other name: e.g. 'studies' or 'inquiries'.

A. R. Burn has made the interesting suggestion that someone should make a study of changes in the dominant ethos of a whole civilization that *cannot* be predicted statistically.

H. D. Oakeley suggests that 'the aim of historical prophecy would be to discern whether the real and inner sources of historic development are such as necessarily to operate in the future as in the past' (*Philosophy*, vol. xi, No. 42 (April, 1936), p. 186).

² P. Gardiner in *Time and Tide*, 30th October, 1954.

³ S. Hook in *The Partisan Review*, June, 1948, p. 693.

⁴ P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, p. 51.

⁵ L. Stone, *ibid.*, p. 111.

⁶ H. Kuhn has the impression that, in my work, 'of the two notes, the grandly monotonous one has an authentic ring, whereas the other soaring note seems the inter-

Hourani finds¹ that, in this book, 'there is no clear explanation of why, in spite of freedom, certain recurrences can be found in history'. No explanation, he continues, is given of the Yin-Yang rhythm, to which all others can be reduced; only a poetic description 'which, as in Plato, can be hinted at in myths but not elucidated by discursive reason'. As I see it, the rhythm of conflicting and alternating order and disorder, stability and explosion, cannot be elucidated by reason because it is one of the *a priori* categories through which reason operates. I do not see how a philosopher can expect to be able to step, like Alice, through the looking-glass. But I do see that human freedom, as far as it extends, is a prize won by human consciousness, will, and purpose. 'It is only in so far as some sort of order arises as a result of individual action but without being designed by any individual that a problem is raised which demands a theoretical explanation.'² Where I see undesigned regularities and recurrences in the ascendant in human affairs, I look for these in the medium of the subconscious,³ and am not surprised to find them particularly clearly pronounced in periods of social disintegration, since these, as I see them, are the periods when consciousness, will, and purpose

pretation of a well-meaning author' (*The Journal of Philosophy*, 28th August, 1947, p. 498). If the reader cares to check this impression of Kuhn's by reference to Part XI of this book which deals with 'Law and Freedom in History' (in vol. ix), he will find that my objective in trying to trace how far laws of Nature prevail in human affairs has been to find out the extent of the field in which Man has freedom. The word 'freedom' is, of course, notoriously difficult to define. It raises the same problem as the word 'new', which is discussed below under the heading 'creativity'. It is true, as Bagby says (in *Culture and History*, p. 63), that human beings 'choose what they prefer'; that 'their preference is not inexplicable or unintelligible' (ibid., pp. 63 and 65); and that it is intelligible in terms of the choosers' consistent dispositions and fundamental tendencies (ibid., p. 65). 'Always we choose in a context determined by our previous choices' (O. H. K. Spate in *Geographical Studies*, vol. iv, No. 1 (1957), p. 5). 'A choice is generally among different goods, each of which entails some evil' (F. Borkenau in *Commentary*, March, 1956, p. 242). Thus we can make reasonable guesses about the choice that somebody is going to make in a particular situation, because we can make them in the light of our knowledge of this person's experience, education, and temperament. Yet, as I believe, an exact and exhaustive knowledge of these factors in the determination of the person's choice would not enable us to turn our guesses into an infallible prediction. A human being is never completely the slave of his own past: 'a creature that moves in determinate grooves, in fact not a bus but a tram', as Mgr. Ronald Knox has put it. Even a drug-addict or an alcoholic can regain his freedom. And the majority of human beings, who have not succumbed to some compulsive habit, can surprise themselves, as well as their acquaintances, by making choices that could not have been predicted from a knowledge of their 'make-up' so far. Ninety per cent. of a person's action may be demonstrably conditioned by his past history, but never quite the whole.

Light on the problem of the nature of freedom may be hoped for from the progress of the technology of communications and the associated science of cybernetics. For instance, the invention of 'feedback' has produced what may prove to be a new concept.

'By "feedback" is meant a communications network which produces action in response to an input of information and includes the results of its own action in the new information by which it modifies its subsequent behaviour' (K. W. Deutsch in *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1951), pp. 245-6).

According to Deutsch (ibid., p. 245), 'feedback' is 'a basic pattern which minds, societies, and self-modifying communications networks have in common'.

¹ In *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 382.

² F. A. Hayek: *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, p. 39.

³ Hourani has taken note of this view of mine in loc. cit., p. 389. D. B. Richardson, like Hourani, notes that on this point I am a disciple of C. G. Jung, and that I do not explore the source of regularities farther than Jung's 'collective unconscious' (*The Thomist*, vol. xx, No. 2 (April, 1957), p. 158). R. Pares holds that I attribute too much importance to the subconscious and too little to the will (*The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 269).

are least, and the subconscious most, in the ascendant.¹ I agree with Spate² that the regularities and recurrences which we find—and seek—‘can hardly be a matter of the free choices of men accidentally converging’, and that their occurrence implies that there are ‘inherent limitations to Man’s free choice’.

T. J. G. Locher finds³ a discrepancy in my thinking between a belief that, after a breakdown, disintegration is inevitable, and a belief that the future is open at all times. The second of these two opinions is the one that I hold. I do not believe in the inevitability of disintegration after a breakdown. I do believe that a survey of the histories of civilizations up to date shows that, in a number of cases in the past, disintegration has, in fact, been the sequel to a breakdown; but I do not know of any evidence that this need have happened in these cases or need recur in others, and I cannot conceive of any possible cogent proof that, when the irrational forces of the subconscious have gained the upper hand through a mutual frustration of wills, it ceases to be possible for human beings to bring their common affairs under some degree of rational control again through agreement and co-operation. Our knowledge of what has happened in the past informs us merely of one among an unknown number of future possibilities; and, by informing us of this, it gives us a chance of avoiding a repetition of this particular outcome, if we wish to avoid it and if we make the necessary effort.

If, in the past, some particular course of events has occurred a number of times and displays more or less the same pattern in all these cases, one might take this as a ‘tip’ for betting on what the outcome of an apparently similar current episode was going to be. But it would be rash to count on winning a bet made on the strength of such evidence from the past. Of course, if the current episode, about the outcome of which one was betting, was now already at an advanced stage, and if, up to the present point, its course displayed a pattern that was also discernible in a number of past cases in which the end of the story was known, it would be less hazardous to bet that the current story was going to have the familiar ending towards which, so far, it had been leading up. Suppose, for instance, that the civilization into which the observer himself happened to have been born had already been united politically, after a long-drawn-out ‘time of troubles’, as a result of a ‘knock-out blow’ in which all but one of the former contending local states had been wiped off the political map by one sole victorious survivor. There might then seem to be little risk in betting that the civilization in question, having reached this advanced stage of disintegration, was now on the road towards eventual dissolution, and that it was not going to be able to escape from this rut, even if it were to succeed in making one or more temporary rallies. Still, however ‘safe’ a bet may seem to be, there is a great gulf fixed between a bet and a certainty.

¹ The same view is taken by D. B. Richardson. When a civilization is in decline, ‘social transactions begin to revolve abnormally . . . in exactly the same type of necessary cycles in which the animal, vegetable, and mineral worlds revolve’ (*The Thomist*, vol. xx, No. 2 (April, 1957), p. 180).

² See *Geographical Studies*, vol. iv, No. 1 (1957), p. 3.

³ In *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 27.

6. EMPIRICAL

This modern Western word is derived from the Greek adjective *empeirikós*, this from the Greek substantive *empeiria*, and this in turn from another substantive: *peíra*. The Greek word *peíra* means an attempt, a try, an experiment, a test, a temptation; *empeiria* means the experience that is the fruit of experimenting; *empeirikós* means believing in the value of experience and taking account of it.

In this book I have claimed throughout that I am using an empirical method of inquiry. A number of my critics have taken note of this claim of mine, and most of these have contested it.¹ I must therefore explain what I mean by the term.

I am not claiming that I approach the historical record of human experience without preconceptions; and I entirely agree with W. H. Walsh when he says that this would be 'a claim which could certainly not be sustained'.² 'Some theoretical framework and some working hypotheses are unavoidable',³ because the human mind's process of

¹ For instance, A. J. P. Taylor in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 120-1; H. Trevor-Roper, *ibid.*, p. 123; P. Geyl, *ibid.*, p. 36 ('the pretence of an empirical investigation') and p. 44 (in his claim 'that his whole argument is based on empirical methods', Toynbee 'is deceiving himself'); M. A. Fitzsimons in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*, and in *The Review of Politics*, October, 1957, pp. 554-5 ('the confusing profession of empiricism and scientific method and the obvious dominance of his philosophy of history'); E. E. Y. Hales in *History Today*, May, 1955, pp. 322 and 320 ('His myth of history' has no better claim than the Whig and Marxist myths have 'to be regarded as having an empirical basis. . . . He is misleading in treating his views about the births of civilizations as though they were laws, arrived at by empirical analysis'); E. F. J. Zahn in *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 39 ('What Toynbee calls empiricism is in reality speculation which misuses myth'); A. Hourani in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 388 ('The book is by no means empirical in its method'); W. H. McNeill in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal* ('His "empiricism" is an empiricism which already is keenly aware of what it is seeking.' The value of his generalizations does not rest upon his empirical surveys. 'The heart of Toynbee's intellectual procedure has always been the sudden flash of insight'); T. J. G. Locher in *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 16; C. A. Beard in *The American Historical Review*, vol. xi, No. 2 (January, 1935), p. 308; P. M. Sweezy in *The Nation*, 19th October, 1946 ('The historical uniformities which he believes he has discovered by empirical means are in reality imposed upon his materials from without'); J. A. Tormodsen and G. C. Wasberg in *Samtiden*, vol. 58, hefte 12 (1949), pp. 647-60; B. D. Wolfe in *The American Mercury*, No. 64 (1947), pp. 748-55 ('It becomes clear in volumes iv, v, and vi that his "empirical method" of studying history is only a pretence, an unconscious tribute to the secular, rational, scientific method which, at heart, he rejects' (p. 755)); H. Frankfort in *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 25-26 ('If he describes "the consummation of human history" as "accomplishing the transformation of Sub-man through Man into Superman" . . . we may respect his faith but can hardly accept it as the argument of "an empirical student of history"'); G. Lefebvre in *La Revue Historique*, January-March, 1949, pp. 109-13 (what passes for empiricism in Toynbee's work is merely a means of bringing forward a new Augustinianism).

Crane Brinton, in *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, vol. 32, No. 3 (Summer, 1956), pp. 361-75, convicts me with a recommendation for mercy. My constant appeal to 'our well-tried empirical method' infuriates the matter-of-fact mind, to the point that I seem to such a mind to be deliberately hypocritical. 'This', Brinton submits, 'is surely not so. Toynbee was trained as an historian, and he is an Englishman, heir to a long tradition of philosophical empiricism. He just hasn't solved the dichotomies of this world-the other world or real-ideal or body-soul—a predicament in which he is not alone.'

On the other hand, A. L. Guerard, in *The Herald-Tribune*, 28th October, 1934, pronounces that 'there is a radical difference, in spirit and method', between Spengler and me. 'Spengler is a prophet; Toynbee is an inquirer. In his boldest attempts the British scholar remains an empiricist, a Baconian.' A. L. Kroeber, too, judges, in *The Nature of Culture*, p. 373, that my procedure is empirical in the main.

² *Toynbee and History*, p. 128.

³ Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 132, quoted in this volume already on p. 43. See also footnote 11 to p. 43.

thought is analytical and classificatory.¹ If I have seemed, to so careful and discriminating a critic as Walsh, to be implying that I am approaching history without preconceptions, that must be my fault. It must mean that, in volumes i-x of this book, I have not made it clear that I agree with Walsh on this crucial point.² For reasons already set out in Chapter I of this volume, I disagree with Hales, when he talks of 'laws arrived at by empirical analysis'.³ I agree with E. Berkovitz that 'laws' cannot be derived from facts,⁴ and with Erdmann when he says, *ad hominem*, that my guiding ideas are not derived from the observation of history,⁵ though I do not agree with Mumford that my conclusions, as well as my hypotheses, 'for all his empiricism, are inevitably as much the product of his own ideology as of the situations that he "interprets"'.⁶ This point has been put in telling words by H. Baudet:⁷

'Many critics have censured Toynbee's primary vision on the theoretical ground that it is "apriori". Certainly it is, as they say. But, "epistemologically", is not an "apriori" of this kind a basis [of mental operations] which speaks for itself because it is unavoidable? Is it not a compelling necessity?

'All vision is engendered on an "apriori", and . . . an "apriori" of this kind has its roots—as all thinking has, *au fond*—in will and passion.'

The point is driven home by K. R. Popper. He rejects

'the view that science begins with observations from which it derives its theories by some process of generalization or induction'.⁸ 'I do not believe that we ever make inductive generalizations in the sense that we start from observations and try to derive our theories from them.'⁹ 'Before we can collect data, our interest in *data of a certain kind* must be aroused: the problem always comes first.'¹⁰ 'Theories are prior to observations as well as to experiments, in the sense that the latter are significant only in relation to theoretical problems.'¹¹

When Trevor-Roper says that, in my work, 'the theories are not deduced from the facts',¹² the answer is that neither my theories nor anyone else's are or ever have been or ever will be generated in that way. If being 'empirical' meant this, the word would have no counterpart in reality, and had better be struck out of the dictionary.¹³ On the other

¹ See Chapter I of this volume, *passim*.

² For instance, I have not made this clear to Father D'Arcy, to judge by his comment that what Geyl's criticism 'proves is that Toynbee should not have claimed to rest his case entirely on empirical methods' (M. C. D'Arcy: *The Sense of History*, p. 72).

³ E. E. Y. Hales in *History To-day*, May, 1955.

⁴ *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 10.

⁵ *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 246.

⁶ *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 13.

⁷ In *Historie en Metahistorie*, p. 46.

⁸ *The Poverty of Historicism*, p. 98. Cp. p. 121.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 121. Cp. p. 134.

¹² *Toynbee and History*, p. 123.

¹³ 'Is it true that Toynbee's asseveration of the empirical character of his method is in fact an untruth, because his work is fundamentally aprioristic? I cannot see that these two processes are mutually exclusive.'

'The process of apriori formulation and of working the proposition out is, in the second stage of the operation, undoubtedly an empirical process of work.' It is not a valid criticism of Toynbee, or of any other author of a book *de longue haleine*, that the author foresees at the beginning what he is going to write years later (Baudet, in loc. cit., pp. 46-47).

hand, when Trevor-Roper goes on to say that my theories are not tested by the facts either, he is laying down a legitimate requirement,¹ and my claim to be using an empirical method of inquiry does stand or fall according to the verdict on this count. I agree that my claim cannot be sustained if I have not tried to test my theories and hypotheses by the facts, or if I have tried but have not done the job properly or successfully.² For, while it is true that theories and hypotheses can never be deduced from facts, it is also true that they can be validated only if they are confronted with relevant facts and are confirmed by them. More than that, the whole purpose of formulating a theory or an hypothesis is the heuristic one of trying to increase our knowledge and understanding by applying the theory or hypothesis to the phenomena.³ I maintain my claim that I have tried to be empirical in this sense, which is, I believe, the correct usage of the word and does mean something that an inquirer not only can be but ought to be.

In making my claim to be empirical, I have been tacitly contrasting my approach with Dilthey's approach and with Spengler's.⁴ While the plan of the present book was brewing in my mind, the first volume of Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* was published, and, when I read it, my first impression was that, in Spengler's work, what I had been planning was already an accomplished fact. My second impression, however, was that Spengler's work suffered from being too dogmatic, in the sense that he was apt to enunciate his theories about the configuration of human affairs and to leave it at that, without putting these theories to sufficiently thorough tests on the touchstone of the phenomena.⁵ Having decided to go on with my own enterprise, I was told by a distinguished philosopher, the late Lord Lindsay of Birker, that I

The points here made by Baudet answer K. D. Erdmann's contention (in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 206) that, when I call my method 'empirical', the expression is a misapplication of the word, because 'there can be no question here of an inductive procedure'. Erdmann goes on to say, correctly, that 'the experience from which Toynbee obtains his pair of ideas is not historical but meta-historical in character'. But he is not correct in adding that Toynbee is a "realist" in the Schoolmen's usage of the term. Revelation, as fundamental religious experience (*Urerfahrung*), is [for him] the criterion of truth.' I take challenge-and-response, and any other ideas of mine that come from the Bible, not as revelation, but as hypotheses to be applied to the phenomena with a view to gaining knowledge and understanding. My criterion of truth is whether the hypotheses fit the phenomena. I maintain that this is the inductive method, and that, so far from induction being incompatible with having an *a priori* hypothesis, it is impossible without having one.

Again, when W. Gurian declares that my 'fundamental concepts' are 'means of subjective classification' (*The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4, p. 511), he misses the point that this is true of everyone's 'fundamental concepts' unless and until they have been tested by being confronted with as large an array of relevant phenomena as the inquirer is able to assemble. It is a more pertinent criticism of Gurian's, supposing that it is justified, when he says (*ibid.*) that my fundamental concepts 'appear as very thin'.

¹ Baudet observes, in *loc. cit.*, p. 47, that the process of proof must be kept clearly distinct from the original vision.

² 'Assuredly, if induction . . . were an invalid process, no process grounded on it would be valid. . . . But, though a valid process, it is a fallible one, and fallible in very different degrees' (J. S. Mill: *Philosophy of Scientific Method*, ed. by E. Nagel (New York 1950, Hafner), p. 290).

³ See pp. 22-23, 41-45, and 158-70.

⁴ My wish to distinguish my approach from Spengler's has been guessed by W. H. McNeill in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

⁵ This makes Spengler a poet, according to Holborn. 'History is the re-enactment of the past in the mind of the historian, and even "facts" exist only there. But, in contrast to poetry, they call for critical verification' (*The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947, p. 29).

should find in Dilthey's work the very thing that I was looking for. What I was looking for was a bridge between theory and fact. But, in Dilthey's work, I did not find even theories about the configuration of human affairs. I found nothing but epistemology. I was, and am, grateful to Dilthey for that, since the relation between theory and fact cannot be studied without taking epistemology into account. But the bridge for which I was looking was not to be found in Dilthey's work, and I had to try to build it without getting help from him.

Some critics have given me credit for making this attempt. Guerard, for instance, draws the same contrast between Spengler and me that I have drawn in my own mind.¹ Feibleman says of me² that 'he tries to analyse cultural structure, and, in doing so, takes the first step towards the establishment of the empirical field of human social structure as the empirical study of a science'. To try, however, is not enough. The attempt that I have made has been criticized on at least six counts. According to the critics, the examples that I have taken as test cases have been denatured by being taken out of their context.³ Some of these examples are ruled out of order because they are taken from phenomena of a different order of magnitude from the civilizations on which I am seeking to throw light.⁴ My citation of examples, relevant to whatever the point in question may be, is not exhaustive and is therefore unrepresentative and thus misleading. Alternatively, I cite so many examples that I clutter up my argument with an indigestible mass of details.⁵ Whether the number of examples that I cite is too small or too great, I am guilty of selecting them to fit my theories.⁶ When they will not fit,

¹ See p. 243, footnote 1.

² J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 171.

³ See pp. 234-5.

⁴ See p. 235.

⁵ The book is criticized in this sense by A. L. Guerard (in *The Herald-Tribune*, 28th October, 1934), by L. Mumford (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 141), and by P. Sorokin (ibid., p. 178). As Mumford puts it (ibid., p. 142), 'his Study of History . . . is . . . in its vastness, its complexity, its impenetrability, and its magnificent profusion and confusion, an image of that great overgrown megalopolis [London], stifled by its very success.'

⁶ 'He selects the instances which will support his theses, or he presents them in the way that suits him. . . . Those cases he does mention can be explained or described in a different way so as to disagree no less completely with his theses' (P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, p. 45). 'Often other and quite contrary examples are readily available' (P. Bagby, ibid., p. 105). W. H. McNeill observes that a frequent procedure of mine for trying to justify my generalizations is to select for attention only those bits and pieces that fit in with my notions (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). 'An apparently random citation of instances to illustrate patterns' (M. A. Fitzsimons in *The Intent*). 'Conclusions drawn from incomplete or partially selected evidence' (L. Stone, ibid., p. 112). My selection is arbitrary (Geyl in P. Geyl; A. J. Toynbee; P. A. Sorokin: *The Pattern of the Past: Can we Determine It?*, p. 85). 'Too many selected facts' (W. Gurian in *The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4, p. 511). T. J. G. Locher finds my procedure too selective, as well as too simple, subjective, and one-sided (*De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 15). H. Holborn observes that 'imagination by itself' cannot 'produce an objective selection and arrangement of facts' (*The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947, p. 29). P. Geyl finds a contradiction between my 'imaginative method and my empirical claims' (*Debates with Historians*, p. 154). O. H. K. Spate finds that my selectivity goes too far (*The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 409, and *Toynbee and History*, p. 291).

On the other hand, a number of critics point out that selection is, in itself, something inevitable.

'Any large hypothesis must go beyond immediately available data and is never completely verifiable' (Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 130). 'In history there is no possibility of making quantitative demonstrations' (Anderle's unpublished paper). While Geyl is right in saying that an *a priori*

I force them with Procrustean violence.¹ I have a rigid *a priori* scheme.² If even this Procrustean treatment cannot make awkward facts conform, I ignore them.³ Some of these charges cancel each other out, but what is left is still formidable.

involves predetermined selection, the truth is that historical writing is always selective (H. Baudet in *Historie en Metahistorie*, p. 46). 'Any problem of interpretation involves a selective evaluation of evidence' (R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 56); so 'historical method must be based on selection' (ibid., p. 7).

Ad hominem, Spate observes that 'even Toynbee's selectivity, so severely handled by Geyl, might be admitted within limits' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 290). I am content to accept Sir Llewellyn Woodward's comment that, 'for all the astonishing number of particular facts brought together, one may wonder whether Professor Toynbee (or any single man, in the present state of learning) can really be sure that his selection from the accumulated data about the past is not open to attack' (*The Spectator*, 6th July, 1934).

¹ 'Frequently his point is made at the price of a radical distortion of facts' (P. Bagby in *Toynbee and History*, p. 105). 'Dr. Toynbee imposes patterns on history' (Sir Ernest Barker, ibid., p. 95); and the facts rebel, like the flamingo-mallets, hedgehog-balls, and soldier-hoops in the famous game of croquet in *Alice in Wonderland* (P. Geyl, ibid., pp. 62 and 375). Facts are made to fit a Procrustean bed (L. Stone, ibid., p. 113). 'The Procrustean method of handling Chinese history' (W. Altree, ibid., pp. 266-71). 'Forcing it all into the scheme of a presumptuous construction' (Geyl, ibid., p. 373). I adapt fact to suit theory (R. H. S. Crossman in *The New Statesman*, 8th March, 1947). 'One of the dangers of "pattern history", if it may be so described, is that facts must be woven into the pattern. One of the advantages is that a good and attractive pattern prints itself upon the memory' (H. A. L. Fisher in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1934, p. 672). I impose my patterns by force (R. Pares in *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxii, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 262). 'His doctrine that facts are less important than the abstract system into which he herds them' (J. Bishko, in *The Richmond News Leader*, 21st October, 1954). 'Claiming to be an empiricist, he forces the facts to suit preconceived ideas' (H. Frankfort in *The Observer*, 31st January, 1954). 'He cannot resist the temptation to fit complex facts . . . into a Procrustean scheme' (Granville Hicks in *The New Leader*, 18th October, 1954, p. 23). 'He distorts some parts of [his] history by pushing it into his iron cubby-holes' (A. Nevins in *The New York World-Telegram and Sun*, 17th December, 1954). 'Sometimes Toynbee seems to force the pieces into place, whether they fit or not' (P. L. Ralph in *The Saturday Review*, 16th October, 1954, p. 19). 'The system sometimes makes a poor fit—for example, with the Arabian-Islamic' (J. A. Tormodsen and G. C. Wasberg in *Samtiden*, vol. 58, hefte 12 (1949), pp. 647-60). Other civilizations are more or less ruthlessly fitted into the Procrustean framework of the Hellenic Civilization (R. K. Merton in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xlvii, No. 2 (September, 1941), pp. 205-13). J. Vogt finds that I am arbitrary in my treatment of the material and that I distort the facts (*Saeculum*, No. 2 (1951), pp. 557-74). On this point my critics are unanimous, according to Anderle (in op. cit.). 'The point is put genially, as well as wittily, by the Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr.: 'His scheme is in some ways Procrustean, although the bed is comfortably furnished and the pulleys work smoothly' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

² 'The real rock of offence to many (including the present writer) is the somewhat rigid schematism' (O. H. K. Spate in *Toynbee and History*, p. 291). My scheme, like Ellsworth Huntington's, is too neat to be convincing (O. H. K. Spate in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 408). 'His main trouble is that he has explained too much' (A. L. Kroeber: *Style and Civilizations*, p. 121). 'It is all subordinated, and intended to contribute, to a system, a message.' Though Toynbee is obviously interested in the spectacle of the particular, 'not for one moment does it free him from the obsession of his dream' (P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 360-1). 'Has the [empirical] method been sacrificed to the design, or are we . . . dealing with a deeper question?' (E. Fieiss, ibid., p. 380). G. Weil finds a 'contradiction between the principles on which his scheme of the development of civilization is based and his personal judgment of historical phenomena as they really are', and he criticizes my 'scheme-bound point of view' (ibid., p. 285). J. K. Feibleman reproaches me for my 'iron rigidity' (*T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 23; cp. p. 20). A. Hourani judges that 'the schematism is too rigid' (*The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 381). J. Vogt criticizes my schematization in *Saeculum*, No. 2 (1951), pp. 557-74. A. Nevins finds that Toynbee 'makes history too schematic' (*The New York World-Telegram and Sun*, 7th December, 1954).

³ 'As for those items that just can't be made to fit, they are quickly tossed into the huge garbage heap of discarded facts' (L. Stone in *Toynbee and History*, p. 113). I ignore exceptions to my laws (R. Pares in *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279

The first of these indictments—that I have taken episodes out of their context—is evidently incompatible with the criticism that my work is superficial, and my spirit hybristic, because I attempt the impossible enterprise of trying to cover the whole history of the Age of the Civilizations.¹ It is true that I have attempted to do this; and it surely follows that my work, as a whole, is likely to have suffered less from distortion as a result of taking episodes out of their context than the work of many other present-day historians. I agree that taking things out of their context does distort them. In the first chapter of this volume I have argued that it is a grievous limitation and a radical defect of the human intellect that it is incapable of apprehending Reality as a whole, and has, perforce, to take it piecemeal at the cost of failing to see it as it truly is. When we are applying our minds to study, and not to practical action, we ought to contend against this inherent infirmity of theirs as far as is humanly possible. My own criticism of the present vogue for ‘specialization’ is that, so far from trying to combat and, to some extent, counteract this intellectual infirmity of ours, specialization gives way to it and thereby accentuates it. The charge of denaturing Reality by taking episodes out of their context does hit me, no doubt; but I should have thought that it hit, with rather greater force, the school of specialists which is the predominant school among present-day Western historians—a school in whose more polemical exponents’ eyes I am something of a heretic, just because I have been unwilling to follow this current fashion.

The charge that I draw many of my illustrations of features in the histories of civilizations from social units of a lower order of magnitude has been noticed and discussed already² and therefore need not be re-examined here.

The charge that my citation of examples is not exhaustive hits not only me but everyone who has ever sought to test an hypothesis by confronting it with relevant phenomena. It hits me perhaps less hard than some of my fellow prisoners in the dock, if it is true that I have surfeited my readers with examples *ad nauseam*. But it hits every student of phenomena, human or non-human, since phenomena, of whatever kind, are innumerable. The only class of things that could conceivably have a membership that was limited by its own nature would be some class, not of phenomena, but of mathematical abstractions that had been abstracted with the express design of creating a self-evidently closed class. Even if our momentary state of knowledge enabled us to enumerate every one of the representatives of some class of phenomena that were in existence at the moment, the exhaustive enumeration would be no better, in logic, than a ‘simple enumeration’, as has been noticed in Chapter I.³

(April, 1956), p. 262). I do this although ‘often other and quite contrary examples are readily available’ (P. Bagby in *Toynbee and History*, p. 105, quoted above). Other critics, e.g. Anderle in his paper, hold that this criticism is unjust. Mumford says of me that ‘he usually gives enough free play to the data to provide his reader with the necessary correction, and sometimes generously enlists the aid of other critical minds to correct his own bias’ (*Toynbee and History*, p. 143). And he recognizes my method as being ‘empirical’ in the sense of ‘qualifying doubtful conclusions in one place by contradictory data in another place’ (*Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 13).

¹ See p. 85, footnote 1, and Chapter II, Annex: *Ad Hominem*, p. 638, with footnote 2.

² On pp. 234–5.

³ See pp. 23–24.

If the charge that my citation of examples is selective has to be dropped because it applies, not just to me, but to everyone who tries to test a theory, I am still confronted with the further charge that I make my selection of examples with an eye to fitting my theories. This charge, too, applies to everyone who tries to test a theory.¹ For my part I certainly have not consciously made selections to suit my purposes, and I doubt whether any other scholar ever has either. To do this might be a temptation to a company-promoter, politician, barrister, or member of some other practical profession in which this form of cheating, if the fraud remained undetected, might reap lucrative material rewards. But what interest could a scholar have in spending laborious man-hours in deliberately trying to diminish the knowledge and understanding that he is concerned to increase? The charge is unconvincing—whoever may be the individual against whom it has been made.² At the same time it is hard to rebut, because it is always possible to switch the indictment from the offender's conscious self to the subconscious underworld of his psyche. However upright his conscious self may be admitted to be, his subconscious may be a rogue that has inveigled him into cheating and into doing this *bona fide*, inasmuch as he has never been conscious of what he is, in fact, doing.³ I do not know how to clear myself of a charge against my subconscious; but I do know that anyone else who was arraigned on account of alleged misdoings of his subconscious would find himself in the same plight.

The same defence holds for the charge that I force facts that will not fit. I can only reply, again, that I have never done so consciously. It is true that I start with a 'schema' in the sense of a formulated but still untested hypothesis or theory. But I plead 'not guilty' to the charge of being 'schema-bound'. Where I believe that I have found some pattern or regularity or recurrence, I have always tried to ascertain the limits of the realm in which this particular 'law' holds good—for instance, in volume ii, where I am dealing with a number of variations on the theme of challenge-and-response. So far from ignoring contradictory instances, I have always brought them up and discussed them when I have been aware of their existence. Of course, many will have escaped me, as also will many other instances that support my hypotheses instead of impugning them. In the numerous surveys made in the first ten volumes of this book, for the purpose of testing how far, if at all, my hypotheses might or might not be valid, I have always made my net as big, and its meshes as close, as I have been able. I am ready at any time to modify or abandon any of my hypotheses if I am given convincing reasons in the shape either of the citation of relevant phenomena previously unknown to me or of the reinterpretation of phenomena of which I am already

¹ 'However valid this criticism may be for Mr. Toynbee's empiricism in particular, it is unerringly true with respect to empiricism in general' (K. W. Thompson in *Toynbee and History*, p. 219).

² A propos of me, A. R. Burn observes: 'It would be unjust to say that he forces facts into his mould, and much more so to imply conscious lack of integrity' (*History*, February-October, 1956, p. 3). G. J. Renier thinks that 'this book cannot be a mystification' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 75).

³ 'Though there is no deception of others, there is the nearest approach to self-deception' (Renier, *ibid.*).

7. MYTH

My usage of the word myth certainly needs defining. The literal meaning of the Greek word *mythos* is 'story'. Like the word 'story' in colloquial English, the word *mythos* in Greek is used in two senses. One of these senses is the usual sense of the derivative word 'myth' in modern Western languages. But the sense in which I use the word 'myth' is that of the other usage of the word in Greek.

The distinction between the two meanings of 'myth' and the two meanings of 'story' is not the same. One kind of 'story' is fiction, the other kind is true to 'fact'. Neither kind of 'myth' is true to fact. One kind is a substitute for statements of fact where the facts are either unknown or ignored; the other kind is a story about a sphere of Reality that is of the highest significance and importance for human beings and is at the same time beyond the range of the 'factual' knowledge that human minds acquire through analytical and classificatory intellectual operations. This second kind of myth is the kind that plays so striking, and so illuminating, a part in Plato's *Dialogues*. Of all men that ever wrote in Greek, Plato has the best claim to be the father of the usage of the Greek word 'myth' in this second sense, because it was he who first consciously and deliberately used 'myth'—as many seers, in many societies, before him and after him have used poetry—to extend the range of human intuition and understanding beyond the limits of the knowledge attainable through logical processes of thought.

This Platonic meaning of the word 'myth' is the one that I have adopted; and, though I have explained this in more than one place in this book up to the present point, I fear that my usage, being not the usual one, has nevertheless caused some misunderstanding in some readers' minds, and has incidentally exposed me to criticism that may be only partly deserved.

Myth, in the sense of a fictitious substitute for the statement of facts, has been regarded in two lights, both in the Hellenic World and in its modern Western successor. It has been held to be not only innocent, but entertaining, in narrative poetry and in 'fairy-stories' told to children. It has been held—and rightly held, I too believe—to be pernicious where it has been brought in to fill a gap in our factual knowledge, and *a fortiori* where there is genuine factual knowledge on record which a mythical narrative has ousted. For instance, the Alexander Romance is so entertaining that it has been translated into a host of languages; but nobody

¹ 'The point is that one should recognise the fact and its difficulty, and should recognise its unavoidableness. The point is that, in and through the recognition of all this, one should strive, with a high and pure [resolve], to hold fast to "honnêteté"' (H. Baudet in *Historie en Metahistorie*, p. 46).

'One has the feeling that Toynbee, unlike Spengler, is really trying to subject his historical laws to empirical tests, and that he would have the integrity and the modesty, if given sufficient reason, to modify or abandon his laws' (W. H. Coates in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. xxi, No. 1 (March, 1949), p. 27, quoted already on p. 46). Cf. F. Neilson in *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Supplement to vol. xiv, No. 3 (April, 1955), p. 3, already cited in the Introduction to the present volume, p. 2.

would defend a self-styled historian who served up a paraphrase or résumé of this romance to his readers and told them that this was the true story. We should require the historian to base his paraphrase or résumé on Arrian's *Anabasis*, which is derived from the authentic narratives of two of Alexander's officers. Again, we should censure an historian who served up a paraphrase of the *Volsunga Saga* or the *Nibelungenlied* as a history of the fifth-century Huns or Burgundians. We should require him to base his résumé on the statements of fifth-century historical writers in Greek and Latin. As for periods of history that are not covered by any surviving contemporary or later historical records, an historian will handle mythical accounts of them, given in surviving epics or romances, with extreme caution and reserve, if he ventures to draw on these at all. For instance, he may believe, on their evidence, that there was such a person as King Atreus or King Arthur in real life, but he will be slow to accept either the deeds or the dates mythically attributed to them. He will be sceptical because, when the veracity or inveracity of myth can be tested by some scraps of historical record, the mythical story often turns out to bear little or no resemblance to the authentic one.

Here is the touchstone for criticisms of my use of myths. If critics prosecute me on the charge of using myths in substitution for statements of fact, I doubt whether they will get any convictions. For instance, when G. N. Renier objects¹ that 'what Zeus said or intended is not evidence' because 'there never was a Zeus', my answer is to ask him 'evidence for what?' If the action that I had attributed to Zeus had been military, political, economic, or any other kind of social action, I should, of course, stand convicted. But, in the passage of mine that Renier cites, 'Zeus' and 'Prometheus' are symbols for psychological forces that can be described only in symbolic language. It would be not more inept to say that 'the Oedipus complex' is not evidence because we do not know that an authentic king called Oedipus ever reigned in Thebes in the Mycenaean Age. Again, when T. J. G. Locher pronounces² that I have turned history into mythology, I think he means that I have made mistakes in my account of events, or have seen some pattern in events which really is not there. No doubt I have sometimes fallen into errors of both these kinds, as most historians have to some extent. But, if my interpretation of Locher's meaning is right, he has used the word 'mythology', which, for him, is evidently a term of abuse, to signify, not that I have substituted fairy-tale for fact, but that, in trying to present the facts, I have got them and their configurations wrong; and this is quite a different matter.

I use the word 'myth' in the Platonic sense and resort to myths in the same field, and for the same purpose, as Plato, if I have rightly understood his idea and intention when he does pass over to myth from reasoning.³ Plato does this when he feels that he has reached the limit beyond which his logical thinking will not carry him,⁴ and his aim is to

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 75.

² In *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 21.

³ W. H. McNeill finds that I resort to myths in Plato's way (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

⁴ E. F. J. Zahn quotes from R. Guardini: *Der Tod des Sokrates* (Bern 1945, Francke),

get some inkling of Reality beyond this range.¹ The pertinent question about my use of myth is therefore whether I do or do not use it in fields where reason would still serve, and whether, if I do use it for reconnoitring the trans-rational field of Reality, my use of it here is a legitimate one. E. Fiess observes² that

'Toynbee arrives at his . . . theory of challenge-and-response partly through an examination of myths involving an "encounter between two superhuman personalities". . . Yet the work never really makes clear to what extent these mythical patterns merely confirm what has been discovered by other means and to what extent they are themselves taken as evidence.'

The answer to Fiess's query does not correspond to either of his two alternatives. Myths, as I use them in this connexion and in others, are symbols of psychological phenomena.³ Being symbols, they are models, and, being models, they are heuristic hypotheses for exploring psychological dramas both within a single human soul and in the relations between two souls or more. J. K. Feibleman does me the honour of comparing me with Vico on the point that, like him, I have 'an understanding of myths as containing the essential truths of history'.⁴ He finds that my history is 'a mythological drama'.⁵ If 'psychology' were substituted for 'history' in the first of these two sentences, and 'psychological' for 'mythological' in the second, Feibleman's statements would have been equally apt as regards me and, I believe, as regards Vico too. W. den Boer asks:⁶ 'Why should the rhythm of civilizations correspond with the fluctuations in Man's inner life as seen by mythical speculation?' The reason is that civilizations are nothing but relations between individual persons. They are therefore effects and expressions of the workings of human nature, since human nature is to be found in human beings and nowhere else. What is distinctively human about a human being is his inner life. And the invisible world of the psyche can be explored and expressed only in the symbolic terms that we call myths when we use the word 'myth' in Plato's sense. As for mythical speculation, this is the necessary beginning, but only the beginning, of the work of exploration. Mythical models are heuristic instruments for probing psychological phenomena.

8. CREATION

Creation means the conjuring of something out of nothing. Experience tells us that this mysterious action—or happening—is always taking place everywhere, in the observer as well as in his surroundings. It is a

p. 41, the observation that a myth can express something that, in logic, would be self-contradictory. I have made the same observation in the passage (i. 279) cited by E. Fiess in the first of the sentences quoted below.

¹ 'This is why the expression of faith takes the form of mythology' (R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 18).

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 380.

³ I have said this explicitly in i. 294 and iii. 112 and 116-17.

⁴ *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1949), pp. 165-6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁶ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 230.

fallacy to suppose that there cannot be anything really new in any process of development.¹ Novelty is evidently of the essence of Reality. 'In an intelligent operation', for instance, 'there is an advance to something new, not the old in an equivalent form'; and a human being, 'unlike a machine, is a unity, whose later states and actions are not calculable from the earlier'.² But, while it is certainly impossible not to have the experience of novelty, it is perhaps also impossible for human minds, constituted as they are, to have an understanding of it, since the facet of Reality that minds can grasp is the pattern of regular recurrences in it, and a new thing is, by definition, not a recurrence and is therefore not classifiable, and therefore, in turn, not intelligible.³ This logical impasse cannot be eluded by suggesting that novelty means, not something coming out of nothing, but the rearrangement of things that are already there. For, when there is a rearrangement, the new arrangement is something coming out of nothing, even if the objects that have been rearranged are not new. F. Engel-Janosi takes issue⁴ with Goethe's idea, expressed in *Faust* in the Prologue in Heaven, that God needs the Devil's help for carrying on His work of creation. He points out that this idea is not compatible with the idea of creation being the conjuring of something out of nothing. This is, no doubt, true, but, since the idea of creation *ex nihilo* is logically unintelligible, Goethe has recourse to the Platonic expedient of using a myth to transcend the contradiction between logic and experience.

F. Neilson notes⁵ that I have not answered Martin Wight's challenge to me⁶ to declare whether I am an evolutionist or a creationist. My present answer is that, as I see it, this antithesis is not a fundamental one. The evolutionist is a creationist inasmuch as he shares with the believer in the existence of a creator God a belief that new things, or, alternatively, new patterns of old things, are constantly making their appearance, and human minds can explain this experience only as the work of a patterning presence in the Universe. The evolutionist may conceive of this presence as being impersonal instead of personal, and he may construe the participle 'patterning' intransitively instead of transitively, but, like the authors of the Book of Genesis, he is giving a mythical account of a datum of experience that cannot be expressed in terms of logical thought. R. Coulborn tries⁷ to laugh away the concept of creativity as being a freak of Bergson's when Bergson is performing, not as a philosopher, but as a poet. One may misconceive the sociology of human creativity, but that is another matter, and is discussed below under the heading 'Creative and Dominant Minorities'. But Coulborn, too, accepts the reality of creativity as a datum of experience, and he, too, offers no logical explanation of it. Daniel Halévy observes⁸ that I search

¹ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 139.

² H. W. B. Joseph: *An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 412.

³ See the passage from M. R. Cohen's *The Meaning of Human History*, pp. 289-90, quoted in this volume on p. 21.

⁴ In *Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, 2. Jahrgang, Heft 4 (October, 1949), p. 269.

⁵ In *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Supplement to vol. 14, No. 3 (April, 1955), p. 15.

⁷ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 151-2.

⁸ In a review, received by me on 23rd February, 1937, of vols. i-iii of this book in a French journal that I have not been able to identify.

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in history for 'the genesis of the creative acts', and, on this point, he contrasts me with Spengler, who, in his words, 'crushes history under the weight of the fatality of an inhuman order'.

K. W. Deutsch complains¹ that the creativity which I ascribe to creative minorities 'has no intrinsic details that could be described and understood'. This is inevitable, considering my belief that novelty is logically unintelligible. Deutsch is an exponent of the new science of cybernetics, which approaches the problem of epistemology through the equally new electronic technology of communications. If the idea of novelty were to be made even partially intelligible through this approach, that would be a great advance in our understanding of the nature of Reality.

J. K. Feibleman complains² that the loss of creativity is never explained in this book. Yet in volume iv, under the heading 'The Nemesis of Creativity', I have covered 339 pages (pages 245-584) in an attempt to explain this tragedy in human affairs. Briefly, my explanation is that creative achievement is apt—though not in the least bound—to produce self-conceit or self-complacency, and that either of these faults dries the springs of creativity up and thereby invites disaster and ruin. In terms of Chinese thought, a Yang movement of activity is apt to pass over into its opposite, a Yin state of rest. This covers the situation in which God the creator finds Himself in the Prologue in Heaven in Goethe's *Faust*; and, in Goethe's myth, God saves Himself, at Faust's expense, by deigning and daring to make His wager with Mephistopheles. This explanation is an attempt at answering merely the question 'How?', not the question 'Why?'. A genuine answer to the second of these questions would be nothing less than a reading of the riddle of Reality.

9. CHALLENGE-AND-RESPONSE

The idea of challenge-and-response, which plays a key-part in my picture of the course of human affairs, is not just a 'private interpretation' of my own. The pair of words came to me from the English poet Robert Browning, though I had forgotten that I had not coined the expression myself till I rediscovered the source of it by chance after I had published my first six volumes.³ The idea that the words express came to me, as I have always been aware, from the Old Testament;⁴ and, considering how overwhelming the influence of the Bible has been on all Western thought, including thought that has consciously been in revolt against the Bible's domination, I have no doubt that this was the source from which Browning, too, received the idea, and was also the source

¹ In *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1951), p. 238, quoted already on p. 37.

² In *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 28.

³ See x, 231-2.

⁴ In giving an account of my ideas, P. Bagby writes: 'Most prominent, perhaps, are the moral antitheses derived from mythology, poetry, and, in a few important instances, like "challenge-and-response" or "rout-rally-rout", from the ethics of the playing field—itsself, of course, a schoolboy version of Late Victorian muscular Christianity' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 104). I joyfully acknowledge my debt to poetry and mythology, but the idea that I am indebted to the playing field would make my school-fellows laugh. My dislike of the playing field was well known. It is most unlikely to have been even the subconscious source of any of my notions.

from which Hegel obtained his concept of dialectic, Malthus his concept of the struggle for existence, and Darwin, through Malthus, his concept of evolution. In the Old Testament, challenge-and-response is, indeed, the master motif; and it is this motif, running through it all, that gives the Old Testament the unity that it has. The Old Testament is a collection of books of many kinds, written and rewritten by many different hands over a period running to many centuries. But all these otherwise heterogeneous books, in all their successive recensions, are dominated by the same theme. All these writers see history as a series of acts in each of which God presents a challenge to some human being individually, or collectively to the participants in some human community or society.

The idea of challenge-and-response, as it has come to me, thus originates in the Israelites' anthropomorphic vision of God as a person with whom human persons have personal encounters. K. D. Erdmann recognizes¹ that I have 'taken the idea from the Bible, myth, and poetry'. O. H. K. Spate, discussing my application of the idea to the relation between Man and his geographical environment, is right in seeing in it an anthropomorphic image, and in pointing out² the 'danger, shared by possibilist and determinist alike, of anthropomorphising Nature'. Stone,³ Catlin,⁴ Zahn,⁵ Kuhn,⁶ Borkenau,⁷ and Pares⁸ are wrong in asserting that my source of the idea has been the modern Western science of biology. In so far as biologists operate with the idea of challenge-and-response, they too will have obtained it from the Old Testament, as I have independently of them. My image is not biological and not physical either; it is anthropomorphic;⁹ and this is explicitly and prominently stated in several passages of this book, in volumes that these critics profess to be reviewing. I have argued¹⁰ that 'the apathetic fallacy' of trying to deal with human nature in terms of inanimate nature leads to no less confusion and error than the converse 'pathetic fallacy' of treating inanimate nature as if it were animate. I have also argued, in introducing the idea of challenge-and-response,¹¹ that we shall not be able to obtain insight into the genesis of a human institution—

¹ In *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 206.

² In *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 419, quoted already in this volume on p. 37, footnote 2.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 113.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

⁵ E. F. J. Zahn points out, in *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 24, that 'interaction' is a biological idea. But it is one that the biologists have obtained by 'anthropomorphising Nature'; since action, in the literal sense, can be taken only by a person who has an intellect and a will.

⁶ H. Kuhn asserts, in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 28th August, 1947, that 'by origin the concept of challenge-and-response is unquestionably biological' (p. 496) and that, 'throughout these analyses, we never emerge out of the sphere of biological or quasi-biological periodicity' (*ibid.*).

⁷ Borkenau asserts, in *Commentary*, March, 1956, p. 249, that my formula of challenge-and-response is 'fundamentally a biological notion'.

⁸ R. Pares asserts, in *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 271, that, 'if Dr. Toynbee rejects mechanical analogies, he falls victim to the far more dangerous biological analogies'.

⁹ The antithesis between personal and impersonal, and the closely related antithesis between freedom and necessity, is perhaps distinctive of Western thought and is part of its heritage from Hellenism and Judaism. 'The concepts of stimulus and response are basic in Chinese naturalism' (J. Needham: *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. ii, p. 304). But the Chinese concept of Yin and Yang is neither anthropomorphic nor deterministic.

¹⁰ In i. 7-8.

¹¹ In i. 271.

civilizations—if we do not ‘shut our eyes, for the moment, to the formulae of science in order to open our ears to the language of mythology’. I have cited and opposed¹ the view, held by Herbert Spencer and by Oswald Spengler,² that human societies are organisms.³ I have quoted,⁴ as representing my own view, a dictum of G. D. H. Cole’s that society is not a mechanism, not an organism, and not a person; and I have gone on⁵ to give my own definition of society as being a relation between persons.

I am astonished that these passages should have been overlooked or ignored by critics who were intending to review my work seriously. I am also astonished at C. B. Joynt’s assertion⁶ that I cite no cases of the operation of challenge-and-response on the spiritual plane. There cannot be any cases on any other plane, since there can be no encounter in which at least one of the parties is not human. But I have discussed many cases in which all parties concerned are human. The whole of volume ii is occupied by a discussion of the range of challenge-and-response; but Joynt need not have read the volume in order to save himself from making his mistake. He could have avoided this by simply reading the table of contents and noticing that three out of seven sections in this volume are headed respectively ‘The Stimulus of Blows’, ‘The Stimulus of Pressures’, and ‘The Stimulus of Penalizations’. In the aggregate these three sections occupy 256 pages out of a total of 452 pages in the whole volume, and, out of the remaining 196 pages, 131 are also occupied by discussions of cases in which all the parties are human likewise.

Encounters taking the form of challenge-and-response are the most illuminating kind of events for a student of human affairs if he believes, as I believe, that one of the distinctive characteristics of Man is that he is partially free to make choices, and that this partial freedom is not merely apparent but is genuine.⁷ Encounters are the occasions in human life on which freedom and creativity come into play and on which new things are brought into existence.⁸ God reveals Himself in encounters, not in propositions;⁹ and acts of creation are one of the activities in which He thus manifests Himself. A. Hourani correctly notes¹⁰ that, as I see it, the challenger is God—that is, absolute Reality approached anthropo-

¹ In iii. 221.

² P. Bagby refrains from following Spengler on this issue (see *Culture and History*, pp. 209–10).

³ Christopher Dawson, in *Toynbee and History*, p. 130, and A. R. Burn, in *History*, February–October, 1956, p. 2, testify that I disagree with Spengler on this point. I cannot make out whether G. Catlin, in *Toynbee and History*, p. 169, is attributing to me a belief in ‘the old organic mythos, so attractive to the public’.

⁴ In iii. 22.

⁵ In iii. 223–30.

⁶ In *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 197.

⁷ I agree entirely, and heartily, with J. Maritain’s account of human freedom in his book *On the Philosophy of History*. ‘One of the deepest trends of human history is . . . to escape more and more from fate’ (p. 22). Some changes may be inevitable; yet there will be a choice between alternative ways of making them (pp. 20 and 22). And the difference in the consequences of these alternative choices between different ways of making an inevitable change may matter more to the human beings concerned than the inevitable change itself (p. 27).

⁸ Maritain holds that the recognition of both Man’s freedom and God’s existence is the necessary basis for a genuine philosophy of history (op. cit., pp. 26–27).

⁹ R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, pp. 17–18.

¹⁰ In *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), pp. 390–1.

morphically—even when the challenge comes ostensibly from Man or Nature.¹ When a challenge has been delivered, then, 'however scientifically exact the identity between two or more situations may be, we shall not expect the respective outcomes of these situations to conform with one another. . . . Even if we were exactly acquainted with all the racial, environmental, or other data that are capable of being formulated scientifically, we should not be able to predict the outcome of the interaction between the forces which these data represent.'² We should be unable because, on this plane of action, the 'forces' are persons. 'To say that the same thing acting on the same thing under the same conditions may yet produce a different effect is to say that a thing need not be what it is';³ and to say this about a thing is to say that this thing is a person, human or divine. Not needing to be what one is is a good definition of a personality's freedom. It follows that the response to a challenge is not the effect of a cause; for to say that a cause need not act uniformly is to deny causal connexions altogether.⁴

I believe that the outcome of a response to a challenge is not causally predetermined, is not necessarily uniform in all cases, and is therefore intrinsically unpredictable. But this is difficult to demonstrate empirically by applying to the phenomena the hypothesis that responses have varied in encounters in which the challenge and the circumstances have not. In previous volumes I have tried to demonstrate this by citing instances in which different responses to an apparently identical challenge have been made, in apparently identical circumstances, by different representatives of the same class of individual, community, or society. But, in contrast to mathematical abstractions, human phenomena are so complex and so mobile that it is always possible to represent that either the challengers or the respondents or the circumstances or all three elements were not, after all, exactly identical,⁵ and then to argue that the success of one response and the failure of another have been due precisely to these differences.⁶ Joseph points out⁷ that, if it is contended that no two things ever are the same, this commits one to the proposition that no one thing is the same for two successive moments. But a believer in the reality of human freedom of choice is debarred from using this conclusion as a *reductio ad absurdum* of a critic's argument. So this argument opens the way for a denial of freedom and an assertion that the different outcomes of the encounter in different cases have been the necessary effect of causes that could be seen to operate inevitably and uniformly if only we could isolate exactly identical elements for the purpose of our test. Since, however, the critic has implicitly denied the

¹ This truth is acknowledged in the Lord's Prayer, where the plea 'Do not subject us to ordeals (*peirasmon*)' is addressed to God, not to Satan. ² i. 300.

³ H. W. B. Joseph: *An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 408.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 406-7.

⁵ 'The differences will not be denied. . . . And the exceptions!' (P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, p. 51).

⁶ This line of argument has been pursued most effectively by O. H. K. Spate in his critiques of my attempt to demonstrate the unpredictability of the outcome in cases of challenge-and-response in which the challenge is presented by—or through—Man's geographical environment (see pp. 146-7 and 314-27 of the present volume). The same argument could be applied equally well in other fields—as, in fact, it has been by Geyl.

⁷ *An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 408.

possibility of this in the realm of human affairs, he, too, lacks the means of clinching his counter-argument; and the result of the debate between the determinist and the believer in the reality of freedom is bound to be inconclusive. It seems impossible to devise a test that will be objective in the sense of answering the question at issue in terms that are recognized as cogent by both parties. Either party is then likely to hold to his own view of the nature of Reality; and, on either side, this will be an act of faith. Here, once again, we are confronted with the relativity of an inquirer's picture of human affairs to his own fundamental beliefs about the nature of Reality, and, in this crucial case, the gulf that relativity has set between mind and mind appears to be unbridgeable.

The concept of challenge-and-response, as presented by me, has been criticized on several grounds. Encounters are fictitious, since the distinction between the alleged parties to them is artificial.¹ The concept is unanalysed, undefined, and vague.² It is a simplification, a truism, or a tautology.³ The argument implied in it is a circular one.⁴ It is incompatible with other hypotheses of mine.⁵

The first of these criticisms is discussed in this volume⁶ apropos of the case in which the challenge is presented to Man through his geographical environment, and I give my answer to it in that context. I admit that the distinction between the giver and the receiver of a challenge is a mental misrepresentation of Reality. This is true not only when the challenge comes through Man's non-human environment and not only when a mind is thinking in terms of challenge-and-response. All thought is a misrepresentation of Reality inasmuch as it mentally divides what, for all we know, is an indivisible whole. But, without this distorting mental division of Reality, there would be no thought at all. This inherent imperfection of Man's intellectual powers has been noted in the first chapter of this volume. In earlier volumes I have implicitly submitted to intellectual necessity by taking the phenomenon of encounters at its face value and inquiring into the operation of challenge-and-response in terms of encounters between God and a human being, between human beings and their non-human environment, between one human being and another, and between different elements within a single human psyche.⁷ I admit that I have misrepresented Reality in drawing my distinctions between creator and creature, environment and Man, soul and soul, psychic element and psychic element. But the price of restoring to

¹ E. F. J. Zahn: *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, pp. 25 and 32.

² P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, p. 5; K. W. Thompson, *ibid.*, p. 217; M. Postan in *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), p. 6; H. Frankfort in *The Observer*, 31st January, 1954; S. Hook in *The Partisan Review*, June, 1948, p. 692; Zahn, *op. cit.*, p. 27; T. J. G. Locher in *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 13; R. K. Merton in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xlvii, No. 2 (September, 1941), pp. 205-13.

³ P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, p. 49; K. W. Thompson, *ibid.* (formulating the objections of scientific historians); H. Werner in *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 29. Jahrgang, xxix. Band (1955), p. 529; P. Gardiner in *Time and Tide*, 30th October, 1954, p. 1456; M. C. Swabey in *The Judgment of History*, pp. 11-12.

⁴ R. H. S. Crossman in *The New Statesman*, 8th March, 1947; Werner in *loc. cit.*, p. 539; Postan in *loc. cit.*, pp. 54-55 and 59; Merton, *ibid.*; T. R. Fyvel in *The Tribune*, 21st March, 1947; F. Borkenau in *Commentary*, March, 1956, p. 242.

⁵ H. S. Warwick in *The Louisville Courier-Journal*, 14th November, 1954.

⁶ On pp. 148 and 314-27.

⁷ In, for example, i. 271-338; ii. *passim*; iii. 1-217; v. 35-568; vi. 1-175.

Reality its true undifferentiated unity is to renounce the possibility of thinking about it;¹ and, even at this price, it is impossible to deprive Reality of the vein of freedom that runs through it and that manifests itself in the play of challenge-and-response. Spate argues:²

'This unpredictable reaction we may grant; but then this unknowable human positive is not positive, but only potentially so, until it is matched with the environmental change, and we are back where we started.'

We are back in an integral and therefore incomprehensible Reality, but not back where we started; for, in analysing Reality into an observer and an observed encounter between two parties, we have put our finger on the vein of freedom in Reality, and a reintegration of Reality does not get rid of this discovery about its nature; it merely inhibits us from locating and defining the circumstances in which Reality's freedom comes into action; and this inhibition is an unnecessary restraint upon the advancement of knowledge and understanding.

The criticisms of my concept of challenge-and-response as being unanalysed, undefined, and vague are, in effect, demands (so it seems to me) that I should translate my non-deterministic reading of the movement of human affairs into a deterministic one. This cannot be done, since, in this antithesis between 'non-deterministic' and 'deterministic', the two terms are mutually exclusive—at any rate in my native Western way of thinking, though in the Chinese way this antithesis is, perhaps, transcended or eluded. Moreover, I would not turn my non-deterministic view into a deterministic one, even if this were in my power, since I believe that a partial freedom to choose is an essential and distinctive characteristic of human nature. When Thompson reminds me³ that 'the question that both spiritual and scientific interpretations of history have consistently asked has been, What is the true mechanism of history?', my answer is: 'There is no such thing. Human actions are not the mechanical effects of causes; they are purposive executions of decisions between alternative possible choices.' When Frankfort takes note⁴ that I do not explain 'the one fact which requires elucidation above all—that challenging conditions [have] worked as stimuli in certain cases and not in others'—my answer to this is that, when the cases that have fallen out differently have been truly comparable, the only possibility of elucidation lies in accepting, as correct, the hypothesis that human affairs are at least partly non-determined.

Hook declares⁵ that,

'unless we can define what constitutes a successful response, unless we can say in advance what kind of unsuccessful response to what kind of problem spells disaster for a culture, unless we can formulate a hypothesis

¹ I cannot follow M. Postan's reasoning when he says that the notion of challenge-and-response 'might have enabled Professor Toynbee to proceed much further than the biologists and the sociologists have so far done in abolishing the artificial abstraction of the object from the environment' (*The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), p. 60). Surely Spate is right in holding that a distinction between two parties is inherent in the notion of an encounter. I do not agree with either Spate or Postan in holding that this distinction can be dropped without stopping thinking.

² In *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 413.

³ In loc. cit.

⁴ In loc. cit.

⁵ In loc. cit.

concerning the determinate conditions under which a creative response will or will not be made, we have hardly made a beginning towards a scientific study of the rise, growth, and decline of cultures.¹

My answer is that I have given a definition of what constitutes a successful response in my view.² It is one that, in addition to merely surmounting the current challenge, surmounts it in a way that evokes a new challenge and thus keeps life on the move. In surveying the recorded past we can find instances in which this has happened; but we can never say in advance what the outcome of a challenge is going to be; and, if scientific knowledge and understanding is properly defined as being of a kind that makes prediction possible, then we have to acknowledge that there never has been, and never can be, such a thing as a scientific study of human affairs.

Postan, in his critique of my work, writes³ that,

'had he responded to the challenge of his own terminology, he would have tried to bring out the factors that make a challenge challenging. He would have given us the analysis of societies challenged, and would have tried to find by what social arrangements, by what changes in their material and spiritual equipment, some societies were made to feel a certain phenomenon as a moderate challenge, while others were either not challenged by it at all, or challenged only too severely. He would also have classified responses as well as challenges, and would have analysed the mechanism [*sic*] of response. Why did the Assyrians fail to respond to the Scythian challenge while the Medians succeeded? Why was the English response to the Scandinavian challenge different from that of the Irish? Why did the Zoroastrian and the Jewish societies fail while the Mohammedans succeeded in meeting the Hellenic challenge? How does the capacity for experiencing a challenge differ from the ability to respond to it successfully? Do the same social factors which determine the degree of the challenge also determine the quality of the response?'

I agree, of course, with the general point made by Postan in this passage. The sociologist's microscope is an invaluable instrument for the study of human affairs, and the use of it would give me a chance of pushing my inquiries farther than I have pushed them yet. I have, as a matter of fact, discussed—for instance, apropos of the primeval forest in the basin of the River Po and in Eastern North America³—the question why this presented an overwhelming challenge to a society with a certain organization and equipment, and a stimulating challenge to another society whose organization and equipment were different. A further use of this instrument would perhaps give me the means of meeting a challenge presented to me by Spate and Geyl. It would enable me to identify and dismiss those cases in which a difference in the responses to an identical challenge was due to a difference in the organization, equipment, and circumstances of the parties subjected to this common ordeal. I might then perhaps be able to confront Spate and Geyl with instances in which they would agree that two or more parties, confronted with an identical challenge, had been strictly uniform with each

¹ This definition will be found in iii. 119.

² In loc. cit.

³ See ii. 275-8 and the present volume, pp. 147-8.

other, and therefore properly comparable in all relevant points, and yet had responded differently. But we should then, I believe, still be left in the presence of differences in the response that would be explicable only on the hypothesis that, when there is an encounter between persons, a genuine freedom, inherent in the nature of Reality, comes into action. Postan's and Thompson's word 'mechanism', used apropos of responses to challenges, is, I should say, an inappropriate and misleading metaphor taken from the working of Reality on the inanimate level.

Challenge-and-response is a pattern in human life. It is a pattern with a texture of freedom, not of necessity; but, like other observable patterns, it is unlikely to be all-prevailing and ubiquitous. I have therefore spent volume ii of this book on trying to ascertain the range within which this particular pattern asserts itself. The question in my mind was whether or not every challenge in all circumstances evokes differing responses from different parties when these parties are uniform, and therefore comparable, in all relevant points. In putting my question to the phenomena of human history, over as wide a field as I could, I came to the conclusion that, at one end of the scale, there were some challenges that had been met so easily by all the parties confronted by them in some particular episode that they gave them no stimulus. At the other end of the scale I found that there were some challenges that had been so severe for all parties that all alike had been defeated by them. In between these two extremes there was a range of challenges which had been met successfully by some parties but not by others, in circumstances in which this difference between the responses could not be accounted for, as far as I could see, by any relevant difference between the parties whose respective responses had been successful and unsuccessful.

This conclusion is neither unexpected nor exciting,¹ but it is not a truism; for we have no warrant, *a priori*, for assuming that a pattern's range is limited; and therefore to ascertain that some particular pattern's range does have limits is always worth while. In me, at any rate, any attempt to do this is a merit, considering that I have been accused of pushing my ideas to extremes in some cases. I do not agree with Werner² that challenge-and-response are terms without content. As I see it, they have a content that is an important one. It consists in the establishment of the reality of freedom and the identification of one field in which freedom can be seen at work. Nor do I agree with Geyl³ that it is 'essential to define what is too much and what too little', and 'to stipulate where the golden mean lies'. I do agree with him that my 'law' has nothing to say about this. It could not have anything to say about it without substituting determinism for the belief in the reality of freedom which is the essence of the notion of challenge-and-response. The notion would be tautologous only if challenge-and-response were presented as being a species of cause-and-effect; and, if I have ever fallen into this misrepresentation of my own idea, I have thereby exposed myself—but not the idea—to Geyl's and Werner's criticisms.

¹ 'Robbed of Toynbee's profuse wealth of illustrations, this sounds painfully like common sense' (A. L. Guerard in *The Herald-Tribune*, 28th October, 1934).

² In loc. cit.

³ In loc. cit.

K. D. Erdmann judges¹ that I have tried to retranslate my idea into scientific terms; and, in the act, have fallen into a tautology—the golden mean—which throws no true light on historical causation. But he goes on to say that this scientific failure does not empty the idea of challenge-and-response of significance, so long as the critic remembers that the origin of the idea is non-empirical.

‘Does the pair of concepts “challenge-and-response” lose its importance on this account? To my mind the opposite is the truth. Let us not forget how Toynbee has obtained the concept. He has taken it from the Bible, myth, and poetry, and not from historical observation.’

I myself would add that I have tried to apply it to observed historical phenomena, and that I believe that my survey has brought to light empirical evidence for the view that there is an element of freedom in human life.

The criticism of my argument as being a circular one has been expressed most clearly, perhaps, by Werner.²

‘A challenge is that which has the capacity to evoke a civilization, and a civilization is that which follows a challenge.’

This account of my exposition would be correct if it were my thesis that the responses to challenges have invariably been successful; but my actual thesis is that the responses of comparable parties to an identical challenge have varied: they have been successes in some cases only, and have been failures in others; and there have also been challenges that have been met successfully by nobody and others that have been met successfully by everybody. Thus Werner’s attempt to formulate my thesis gets it wrong in every particular. If other criticisms of my argument, as being circular, are based on a similar misunderstanding, they are no more to the point than Werner’s criticism is. Postan, at any rate, appears to be in Werner’s company when he says³ that

‘a complete and impartial list of Professor Toynbee’s “successes” would be merely a list of events and situations which happen to have made sufficient splash to receive large notices in history books.’

This cannot be true, considering that the events and situations that have made a splash have been signal failures as often as signal successes. If my findings are to be judged by the conventional presentation of history caricatured in *1066 and All That*, Postan will have to make a complete and impartial list, not only of my ‘successes’, but also of my ‘failures’. If this list of both the two alternative possible kinds of response turns out to coincide with the list that is commonly accepted, this will surely be presumptive evidence in favour of mine.

Warwick⁴ argues that my concept of challenge-and-response, with its implication that freedom is a reality, applies to my account of the geneses of first-generation civilizations only. When I come to discuss the geneses of later civilizations, which are affiliated, in my view, to earlier civiliza-

¹ In *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 206.

² In loc. cit.

³ In loc. cit.

⁴ In loc. cit.

tions, I hold that the link has been provided by a higher religion which has served the nascent new civilization as a chrysalis; and Warwick maintains that 'the chrysalis metaphor is fatal to challenge-and-response', because 'an insect's pupal stage is one of suspended animation'.

My answer to this point is that, in an insect's career, the pupal state is followed by a bursting of the chrysalis, and that this, like the breaking of the egg-shell by a chick and like the birth of a mammal, is a manifest challenge, considering that it is an exposure of a previously sheltered creature to the buffets of an inclement world. But I would also remind Warwick that, in my presentation of the sequence of events when a disintegrating civilization is succeeded by a new one, the chrysalis from which the new creature eventually emerges is, itself, the result of a previous successful response to a previous challenge. In my picture the 'chrysalis' is the product of a 'higher religion'; this 'higher religion' is the product of an 'internal proletariat'; and this 'internal proletariat' has brought itself into existence by an act of secession from a 'dominant minority'. This act of secession has been a successful response to a challenge in the shape of a sinister change in the ruling minority's character. It has become a 'dominant minority', continuing to impose itself by sheer force, after having originally been a 'creative minority', leading the majority of the members of the society in virtue of its attractiveness. I have already noted¹ that I may have exaggerated the antithesis between the characters of the ruling minority in the earlier and in the later chapter of its history, and I recur to this again.² But I still maintain that, in the histories of civilizations that have broken down and disintegrated, there has been a change, of the kind that I have diagnosed, in the ruling minority's ethos; and I also still maintain that this change on the minority's part has been a challenge, and a severe one, to the majority.

10. WITHDRAWAL-AND-RETURN

I have suggested that one of the agencies of social change has been the withdrawal of an individual or a group from its social milieu, followed by a period of aloofness, during which the temporarily retiring group or individual incubates something new. As I see it, this period of withdrawal is eventually followed by a third stage, in which the party in question re-enters the society from which it has retired, but re-enters it in a new role, acquired during its temporary absence. In this new role it sometimes makes a greater impression than it had ever made in its original role, and this gives it a chance of converting the other members of the society to its own new ideas and ideals. I saw in this spiritual voyage of withdrawal-and-return one of the ways in which the recipient of a challenge has responded to it, and responded successfully. I suggested that a series of withdrawals and returns had played an important part in the growths of civilizations, and I cited³ a number of instances, some drawn from the lives of individuals, and some from the histories of groups. I also saw withdrawal-and-return as one particular form of a

¹ On pp. 149-50.

² On pp. 305-6.

³ In iii. 248-377.

more general pattern, in which—with or without an intervening withdrawal—a party to an encounter who has been worsted on one plane of activity makes a successful *riposte* by reacting on another plane on which the other party is not prepared for action.¹

The notion of withdrawal-and-return has been perhaps more sharply criticized than any other idea of mine,² and, on reconsideration, I am inclined to think that I have put more weight on it than it will bear. I would agree that it has not been a universal feature of responses to challenges. In whatever field one looks—for instance, the fields of religion, human studies, and politics—one will find that, while withdrawal-and-return has been one way of responding to a challenge, in every field there have also been other ways.³

In the fields of religion and of human studies withdrawal-and-return has, I still believe, been the course followed by some of the greatest and most influential figures.⁴ In the religious field, Paul withdrew after receiving the challenge of his vision on the road, and returned as a Christian apostle instead of a Jewish persecutor. Saint Ignatius Loyola withdrew after receiving his wound, and returned as a spiritual soldier instead of a military one. The Buddha withdrew after His experiences of the ills of life, and returned as a preacher instead of a prince. More prosaically, Confucius withdrew after failing to obtain permanent employment as a civil servant, and returned as a teacher of ethics instead of a would-be administrator of public business. Jesus withdrew into the wilderness after His experience at His baptism, and returned as a preacher and healer instead of a carpenter. Saint Benedict and Saint Gregory the Great received challenges of an inward spiritual kind, not signalized by any dramatic outward event, but their lives, too, followed the same pattern. Benedict withdrew as the child of well-to-do middle-class parents and returned as the founder and abbot of a monastic community. Gregory withdrew as a senior civil servant and returned as a

¹ See viii. 466–76.

² For instance, by Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 49–50; by K. W. Thompson, *ibid.*, pp. 216–17; by W. Kaufmann, *ibid.*, p. 311; by R. Coulborn in *Phylon*, 1940, offprint, p. 5; by R. H. S. Crossman in *The New Statesman*, 8th March, 1947; by W. Gurian in *The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1942), p. 512; by A. H. Hanson in *Science and Society*, No. 13 (1949), pp. 118–35. Crossman calls my presentation of the idea a pastiche. Hanson calls the idea itself 'mystic nonsense'. On the other hand, A. L. Guerdon finds my treatment of withdrawal-and-return the most interesting thing in vols. i–iii of this book (*The Herald-Tribune*, 28th October, 1934).

³ J. K. Feibleman comments: 'Is withdrawal from worldly affairs to a state of contemplation which constitutes a preparation for return with "new powers" to interference in those affairs a necessary pattern for the creative leader? It would hardly appear so. Napoleon and Abraham Lincoln are examples of men whose leadership, so far as it lay within their decision to control their own destiny, was unremitting, and there are many others who could be named. It may not always be necessary to withdraw; and, further, withdrawal may be fatal if there is no return' (*T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 27).

⁴ In H. Holborn's view, the concept of withdrawal-and-return 'is fairly well applicable to a long series of prophets and religious leaders. With regard to intellectual and political leaders it is of more questionable value' (*The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947, p. 12). K. D. Erdmann likewise judges that the concept ceases to work when the creative personalities to which it is applied are people whose field of action has been not religious but mundane (*Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 211). H. Frankfort finds that my illustrations of withdrawal-and-return 'rob it, not only of the obvious, but of all definite, meaning' (*The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 28–29. Cp. p. 24, footnote 1).

papal envoy and then as a pope. In the field of the study of human affairs Thucydides, Xenophon, Josephus, Ollivier,¹ Machiavelli, Polybius, Clarendon, and Ibn Khaldun were all men of action—statesmen or soldiers or both—who were put out of action permanently or temporarily by being disgraced or cashiered or exiled or deported, and who then returned as observers in the field in which they had previously been actors. Dante was one of this company. Exiled for life from Florence, he returned as a poet instead of a citizen.

Most of these examples are so eminent that, in these two lines at any rate, it looks as if withdrawal-and-return was really one kind—and an important kind—of prelude to outbursts of creativity. Yet in both these fields one could find other eminent representatives whose creative activities were not inaugurated by any conspicuous break in their lives. Conversely, in the field of politics, one can find striking instances of withdrawal-and-return. Muhammad, for instance, withdrew from Mecca as an unsuccessful prophet and returned as a triumphant statesman. But I admit the criticism that in politics this pattern of career has not been particularly outstanding. Thus, on reconsideration, I find myself still holding that withdrawal on one plane, followed by return on another plane, is one of the patterns that individual lives may take, but I no longer think it as important or as pervasive a pattern as I once thought it.

I also still believe that this pattern has displayed itself in the histories of peoples, as well as in the lives of individuals. Athens, for instance, played an important part in the life of the Hellenic World in the Dark Age of Hellenic history (*circa* 1125–725 B.C.). She served as a base of operations for the Greek colonization of Ionia, and her geometric pottery dominated the Hellenic market. Thereafter, in the ensuing age of Greek colonization in the western basin of the Mediterranean, Athens lapsed into comparative isolation and obscurity. After that, again, there was a third act, opening in the sixth century, in which Athens once more came to the front in politics, war, literature, and all the visual arts, including architecture and sculpture as well as pottery. And, in this age following the temporary withdrawal, she shone as she had never shone before. English history, too, displays the same pattern (I still maintain, in spite of Geyl's trenchant criticisms). From the Norman conquest to her eventual defeat in the last bout of the Hundred Years War, the rulers of England were bent on winning and holding a Continental European empire. After their discomfiture by Joan of Arc they renounced their continental ambitions and turned their energies to overseas enterprise; and this was the creative age of English history in literature and politics. After the Revolution of 1688 England re-entered the Continental European arena from which she had been evicted more than two hundred years back; but she returned in a new role. The English had not forgotten the lesson of their repeated loss of a continental empire—first in 1202–4 and then again in 1449–51. This had implanted in English minds a lasting inhibition against further attempts to acquire continental

¹ I have been criticized by Geyl, in *loc. cit.*, and by Guerard in *The Herald-Tribune*, 28th October, 1934, for including this relatively minor figure in my list. Yet a minor figure may be a significant instance.

territory. England now resumed her participation in European affairs, but no longer as an aspirant to a continental empire of her own; she returned as the protagonist in the opposition to successive attempts, by continental powers, to acquire empires on continental soil that might be a menace to England's security. Geyl's criticisms¹ of my account of English history² are telling, besides being witty. They prove me wrong on a number of incidental points, but, as far as I can see, they leave my thesis still standing. With Geyl's aid to help me steer clear of some pitfalls into which I have stumbled at my first attempt, I believe I could produce a revised version of my thesis that would be acceptable to Geyl himself.

II. PROGRESS

The Latin word *progressus* means literally an advance in whatever the direction may be. But it is also used metaphorically, and this metaphorical usage is the one that usually attaches to the transliterations or translations of the word in modern Western languages. In this metaphorical meaning the idea of progress is subjective in two senses. In the first place it implies a judgement of value in the mind of anyone who applies the idea to a series of phenomena. In declaring that the change between an earlier phase of something and a later phase of it is a case of progress, he is judging that the later phase is better than the earlier one from his point of view in that particular context. In the second place the idea of progress is relative to the kind of phenomena with which one happens to be concerned at the moment. Since the kinds of phenomena are infinite for practical human purposes, and since few movements, either physical or spiritual, are known to have gone forward in the same direction without stopping, veering, or backsliding sooner or later, the use of the word 'progress' in the absolute is meaningless.³ There have been bouts of progress in an almost infinite number of different fields; but progress in certain fields has often been accompanied by retrogression in other fields. Progress in the art of war, for instance, has sometimes been accompanied by retrogression in the spiritual sphere; retrogression in civilization has sometimes been accompanied by progress in religion.

For these reasons, I do not dispute W. Aلتree's judgement⁴ that

'Toynbee's depreciation of the material aspects of civilization and his mystical orientation deprive him of any set of objective criteria for the measurement of the progress of civilizations,'

and that this Study is 'a normative system based on a very private interpretation of human destiny'. But, in accepting Aلتree's verdict, I generalize it and apply it to him and to everyone else, as well as to myself. On Aلتree's showing, Aلتree's own valuation of the material aspects of civilization and his own orientation in regard to religion, whatever this may be, deprive him, too, of objective criteria for measuring progress;

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 53-55.

² In iii. 350-63.

³ Here I disagree with F. S. Marvin, who criticizes me for not believing that there has been progress in an absolute sense (*The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1935, pp. 624-5).

⁴ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 271.

and his or anyone else's interpretation of human destiny, if made in terms of progress, is bound, like mine, to be 'very private'. I am sceptical of Aلتree's apparent belief that 'a set of objective criteria for the measurement of the progress of civilizations' is obtainable. In my belief, every judgement of progress, in whatever field, is subjective intrinsically and incurably. C. Trinkaus¹ and F. S. Marvin² are right when they report that my theory implies a disbelief in progress, if they mean progress in the absolute. I do not disbelieve in the experience of progress in an immense number of different fields, in discontinuous bursts, each of limited duration and limited achievement. But this experience is, as I see it, determined by the particular criterion that one happens to be applying. If one looks for progress in human affairs in terms of technology, in terms of sociality, and in terms of spirituality, one will obtain a different chart of human history in each case. Therefore, when Trinkaus declares³ that history is progress or nothing, my answer is that it is neither. It is a kaleidoscopic panorama in which the patterns and colours change with each change in the viewer's focus of interest.

As Aلتree points out in the passage quoted above, I have (as he and everyone else has) a set of values that are personal—though the person in question may share them with a greater or a lesser number of his fellow human beings. My own set of values has led me to see progress in terms of progressive 'etherialisation',⁴ progressive power of self-determination,⁵ and progressive accessibility of means of grace.⁶ A. L. Kroeber rightly calls 'etherialisation' an 'unfortunate' word.⁷ It is unfortunate because it is a word of my own coinage, and is therefore unfamiliar and obscure. Kroeber has defined it for me, neatly as well as accurately, as meaning 'simplification with increased efficiency'. Each of my three criteria of progress has been disputed by inquirers whose own criteria are different. Mumford finds my valuation in terms of 'etherialisation' one-sided.⁸ 'In a healthy society', he maintains, 'the two processes of etherialisation and materialisation are—if my interpretation holds—in continuous interplay.'⁹ He also disputes¹⁰ my measurement of growth in terms of 'a progressive and cumulative self-articulation', a transfer of the field of action from the outer to the inner world, and the displacement of quantitative criteria of success by qualitative criteria. G. Masur calls my doctrine of progressive self-determination 'the most arbitrary and unsatisfactory part' of my whole undertaking.¹¹ Criticisms of my third criterion—a progressive increase in the means of grace—have, I should guess, been still more vehement and more frequent. Such differences between different inquirers' criteria of progress have arisen whenever and wherever the idea of progress has been current. They are one of the most striking evidences of the truth that a human being's judgements are relative to his personal outlook.

If I am right in holding that the criteria of progress are, by their very

¹ In *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), p. 223.

² In *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1935, pp. 624-5.

³ See iii. 174-92.

⁴ See vii. 562-8.

⁵ See *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), pp. 19-20.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁷ *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 373-4.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁹ *The Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521-2.

¹⁰ In loc. cit.

¹¹ See iii. 192-217.

nature, subjective, is it possible to arrive at an objective description of the process through which a bout of progress is achieved, irrespective of the standard that is being applied and of the field that is under consideration? This question has been raised, apropos of my work, by P. A. Sorokin.

'Toynbee's theory [he writes]¹ is not so much a theory of civilizational change as much as an evaluative theory of civilizational progress or regress. This clearly comes out in his formulae of "growth" and "disintegration". They are evaluative formulae of progress and regress but not the formulae of change.'

The two labels here cited by Sorokin are evaluative, I agree. They imply that one process of change in a network of relations of the species called civilization makes this network do better service for the human beings participating in it, and that another process of change in the same network has the contrary effect in terms of human interests. But the evaluative labels for processes are not the same thing as the processes themselves. In volume iii of this book² I have tried to analyse in psychological and social terms the process that, in 'evaluative' terms, I have appraised as growth or progress. I have seen it as a series of acts of the drama of challenge-and-response in which each act results in a successful response to the challenge with which this act has opened, while each of these successful responses results in the presentation of a new challenge which produces a further act. On this view, the rhythm of progress or growth is a repeated overbalance that gives the challenged party a continuing momentum; and this momentum carries him along from one act of challenge-and-response to another. There is no reason why the series of acts, thus generated, should ever come to an end. There is no pre-determined or fated limit to the number of the acts, and no fixed maximum time-span within which the drama must play itself out. There may be no known instance of a bout of progress that did not come to an end sooner or later. But the failure of a particular past bout of progress to perpetuate itself will not have been inevitable. It will have been a consequence of 'the nemesis of creativity'; and a successful creator is never fated, though always tempted, to allow this nemesis to overtake him.

12. INSTITUTIONS

Institutions, as I understand them, are relations between persons that have been systematized in a more or less formal pattern. Being relations between persons, institutions are not mechanized relations, if I am right in holding that, in encounters between persons, the play is not the mechanical play of cause-and-effect but the free play of challenge-and-response.³ For the same reason, institutions are not organic relations.⁴ A person is an organism, but a relation between persons is not. This last-mentioned fact about the nature of institutions means that, unlike organisms, they have no fixed and fated time-span, either maximum or

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 182. Cp. p. 188.

² iii. 112-27, especially 119-20.

³ See pp. 255-7.

⁴ See *ibid.*

minimum. Since an institution is the product of a consensus of human wills, it can be dissolved by a consensus at any moment, however soon, after it has been created. On the other hand, there is no reason in principle why any institution, once established, should not last for an indefinite time to come—in fact, as long as mankind itself.¹ Institutions have no maximum time-span because the human participants in a systematic relation, or set of relations, may change, and change entirely and repeatedly, without this bringing the institution to an end. *Le roi est mort, vive le roi!* The office survives the death of each of its successive human occupants.² Again, there is no fixed number, either minimum or maximum, for the participants in an institution. At one extreme they may run to hundreds of millions. The missionary religions, which are the largest and most enduring institutions that have made an appearance so far, have had, as one of their objectives, the permanent conversion of the whole human race; and today we can foresee the possibility that the whole of mankind may come to form a single society, and perhaps even a single political community. At the other extreme the participants in an institution may form a narrower circle than that of each participant's personal acquaintances.

The existence of an institutional relation between two or more human beings does not preclude the existence of a personal relation between them as well.³ On the other hand, the absence of a personal relation does not preclude the existence of an institutional relation. This, being a systematic kind of relation, can subsist between people who have not ever met and are not likely ever to meet each other. Indeed, it can subsist between non-contemporaries. At this moment, for example, a

¹ This conclusion of mine strikes W. Höpker as being an extreme one (*Zeitwende*, August, 1949, p. 136).

² G. A. Birks and P. Bagby are stating what is my belief, too, when Birks says that a society (which is one species of institution) differs from an organism in not having any definite birth or death (*Philosophy*, October, 1950, pp. 336–40) and when Bagby says that civilizations (which are one species of society) 'do not die at all' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 106; cp. *Culture and History*, p. 116). When Bagby goes on to say (*Toynbee and History*, loc. cit.) that I have 'not it seems, done away with every vestige of the organic analogy', my answer is that I have done away with every vestige of it in my thinking, but that, in writing about civilizations and other institutions, I have not managed to get rid of every vestige of anthropomorphic language. To do that would be the ideal, but the poverty of the vocabulary at our disposal makes this difficult to achieve. This unavoidable use of anthropomorphic language is, no doubt, insidious. Birks (*ibid.*) finds that, as a result of using such terms as 'rise and fall' and 'growth and decline', I slip into thinking of societies as organisms subconsciously.

³ A good illustration of this is the institution of marriage (irrespective of whether the prevailing marriage system happens to be polyandrous, polygynous, or monogamous). In one aspect, marriage, under whatever system, is a pre-eminently personal relation; indeed, there could not be such a thing as marriage without this; and, so long as the relation between married people is harmonious, no other aspect of marriage except its personal aspect arises either for the married people themselves or for any other participants in the same society. On the other hand, if a marriage goes wrong enough to lead one or other party to go to law about it, it immediately becomes evident that this is an institution in which all participants in the society feel a concern and, through the law, assert it. A marriage cannot be dissolved without the law's sanction. Nor can it be contracted without being 'solemnized' in either a religious or a civil ceremony, the effects of which are binding on the parties. The parties can neither become nor cease to be man and wife just by their own private common consent. Society, acting through the law, insists that, besides being a private affair, a marriage is a public one. Even if the marriage has been duly solemnized and is harmonious, the law may intervene if some third party alleges that the marriage is, after all, unlawful in terms of the legislation, civil or ecclesiastical, that is in force at the particular time and place.

Buddhist, a Christian, or a Muslim is linked by an effective institutional relation, not only with his living co-religionists in the antipodes, but with his dead co-religionists in every generation right back to the founder of his faith. This capacity of institutions for linking human beings with each other by an impersonal bond, without the support of any personal relation between them, is the reason why mankind has found institutions indispensable. Man is not merely a social animal; he is one that could not survive if his society had to be confined to the inevitably narrow circle of living human beings who are in personal relations with each other. The simplest and most rudimentary society has to extend farther than that in both space and time, and it cannot extend beyond the range of personal acquaintance except by availing itself of institutions.¹

It is true, at the same time, that impersonal institutional relations are morally, and therefore socially, a poor second-best by comparison with personal relations. If the parties to a marriage ever come to deal with each other only in terms of legal or customary rights and duties, without being animated by any mutual love, the marriage may still be legally valid but it will be spiritually dead. It is also unfortunately true that most people usually behave more callously and less responsibly as committee men, citizens, or churchmen than they behave as human beings in personal relations with their neighbours. Next to the innate self-centredness that afflicts human beings like other living organisms, the relatively low level of feeling and conduct in institutional relations, as contrasted with personal relations, is perhaps the second most potent cause of mankind's miserable failure in the field of human relations, in contrast to its brilliant success in the fields of science and technology, in which Man has the relatively easy task of dealing with non-human nature.² For this reason I have labelled institutions 'slums'; and, on reconsideration, I do not see any reason to withdraw the word, though I am ready to consider substitutes for it, to meet the protest that my word has drawn from Sir Ernest Barker.³

Whatever may be one's judgement on the moral standing of institutions by comparison with human beings, it must be agreed that institutions, as well as human beings, are realities.⁴ They are, of course,

¹ R. Redfield holds that, till the rise of civilization, communities were so small that all the participants in a community knew each other personally (*The Primitive World and its Transformations*, p. 7). But they did not, and could not, know their ancestors personally, and the bond between the living and the dead has been stronger in pre-civilizational societies than in the civilizations.

² In this field, too, of course, Man cannot get far without co-operation; and this means that human relations are the crucial factor in everything whatsoever that Man does.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 96. On this, see further Chapter II, Annex, pp. 636-8.

⁴ This point has been made already on pp. 231-4. I cannot follow C. Trinkaus' reasoning in *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), pp. 218-39. Commenting on my definition of society as being the common ground of the respective fields of action of a number of human beings, Trinkaus declares that 'this notion . . . abandons his conception of society as objectively existing and leads back to what is a more elaborate atomic conception. . . . Society disappears as an active structure and becomes the mere resultant of the socially undetermined individual actions emanating from each point on the plane.' Here Trinkaus seems to be maintaining that society cannot have an objective existence if it is not 'an active structure'. On this line of reasoning, inanimate nature would not have an objective existence. Trinkaus goes on to say that, as a result of my conception of society as being a network of relations between individuals, I completely ignore society's influence on, and importance for, the individual and am therefore not in a position to do

realities of a different order.¹ They are the products of continual encounters between the feelings, thoughts, and wills of a number of persons, and they cease to exist if there is no one who is any longer wanting to maintain them or is any longer having any feelings or thoughts about them.² But the fact that they exist in a psychic, not a physical, medium does not make them unreal. All that is distinctively human about a human being exists in a psychic medium likewise; and institutions prove their potency by dealing death and misery or life and happiness to myriads of human beings. Thus institutions, too, are realities, though not of the same kind as the human beings who create and maintain them. There is, however, no difference in either the kind or the degree of the reality of any one species of institution as contrasted with any other species. All institutions are on the same plane of reality in consequence of their all being psychic relations between human beings. This is the common nature of all of them: totems, tabus, marriage, war, rites, cultures, languages, nationalities, communities, states, societies, civilizations, higher religions, and so on.

Even an institution that has only a small number of participants and a relatively simple structure is the product of innumerable encounters between the human beings concerned; and the consequent problem of quantity in the study of human affairs has baffled human intellects so far. This is a point of capital importance; but it need not be discussed further here, since it has been examined in Chapter IV.³

13. SOCIETY

Society is the total network of relations between human beings.⁴ The components of society are thus not human beings but relations between them. In a social structure 'individuals are merely the foci in the network of relationships'.⁵ The famous frontispiece of Hobbes' *Leviathan*, displaying society as a gigantic human figure composed of a multitude of life-sized human figures, is an anthropomorphic misrepresentation of reality;⁶ and so is the practice⁷ of speaking of human beings as 'members'⁸ justice to society's historical importance. This, again, seems to me to be a non-sequitur. A thing—inanimate nature, for example—can have an influence on, and importance for, human beings without having the 'active structure' that a human being has. Nature does not cease to be important for human beings if and when they grow out of taking an animistic or an anthropomorphic view of her. For the word 'nature' substitute the word 'society', and Trinkaus's argument evaporates, so it seems to me.

¹ See pp. 115–16 and 128. Bagby, in *Culture and History*, pp. 127–8, rightly combats the view 'that only individual actions are real and that the common or regular aspect of these actions is somehow tenuous, elusive, a construction of the human mind, and therefore unreal'. He points out that individual human beings and their actions, as well as 'regularities' in the behaviour of groups, are abstractions, though they are abstractions on different levels.

² F. A. Hayek points out that institutions, 'though in a sense man-made, i.e. entirely the result of human actions, . . . may yet not be designed, not be the intended product of these actions' (*The Counter-Revolution of Science*, p. 83).

³ See p. 81.

⁴ F. A. Hayek: *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, p. 34.

⁵ P. Bagby has made the same mistake. In *Culture and History*, p. 84, he defines society as being 'a number of people' and endorses the statement 'a society is composed of people', which he quotes from M. J. Herkovitz: *Man and His Works* (New York 1948, Knopf), p. 29.

⁶ Presumably derived from the simile in the New Testament in which the adherents of the Christian Church are spoken of as members of the body of Christ (e.g. 1 Cor. vi. 15; Eph. v. 30).

⁸ i.e. limbs, according to the literal meaning of the Latin word *membra*.

of society or of one or other of its component institutions (e.g. a club, a church, a class, a family, a 'corporation'). A visible and palpable collection of people is not a society; it is a crowd. A crowd, unlike a society, can be assembled, dispersed, photographed, or massacred. Of course, the human beings composing a crowd may also be in social relations with each other. They may all be voters in the same electorate, or soldiers in the same army. But the army or the electorate, unlike a crowd of the human participants in the institution, is itself impalpable and invisible. An army cannot be massacred; the corpses on a battlefield are those of men of flesh and blood who have been brought to the shambles by the incorporeal social bond of military service.

14. CULTURE

I have already¹ adopted P. Bagby's definition of culture as being 'regularities in the behaviour, internal and external, of the members of a society, excluding those regularities which are clearly hereditary in origin'. Bagby adds² that, in virtue of being 'the patterned or repetitive element in history', 'culture is history's intelligible aspect'. A. L. Kroeber proposes³ a definition in four points, of which the first three agree with Bagby's definition. According to Kroeber, culture is transmitted by the inter-conditioning of zygotes;⁴ it is suprapersonal and anonymous; and it falls into patterns or regularities of form, style, and significance. Kroeber's fourth point is that culture embodies values; and this is a thesis that Bagby rejects. 'Culture', Bagby maintains,⁵ 'includes modes of thinking and feeling and modes of behaviour, but not any of the invisible entities, whatever they may be, which determine these modes.' The entities to which he is here referring are 'beliefs, values, and so forth'.⁶ If one of the included modes of feeling is value-judgements, as Bagby's words seem to imply, the exclusion of the values that are asserted in such judgements seems to introduce an unnecessary complication. Moreover, Bagby finds, at a later point in his inquiry,⁷ that 'it is ideas and values . . . which provide the basis for differentiation between cultures'.⁸ Bagby's argument here is, for me, too fine-drawn to carry conviction. It does not seem to me to refute Kroeber's downright statement that culture embodies values. So I prefer, *pace* Bagby, to add this to Bagby's definition in working out my own.⁹

¹ On pp. 76-77. The reference is to *Culture and History*, pp. 84 and 95.

² In *op. cit.*, p. 124.

³ In *The Nature of Culture*, p. 104.

⁴ I take this to mean: by the influence on each other of human beings who are in social relations with each other, in contrast to biological transmission through the physical process of reproduction.

⁵ In *Culture and History*, p. 80.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁸ Cultures in the plural mean the different historical exemplifications of the general idea of culture. See p. 282, footnote 2.

⁹ In previous volumes (e.g. iii. 151-2, v. 199-201, viii. 495-521) I have used the word 'culture' in two different senses: (i) the comprehensive sense in which it is used by Kroeber and Bagby, in the passages cited here, and, in general, by cultural anthropologists; (ii) in an exclusive sense, in which the word has been current in contemporary English since the time of Matthew Arnold. In this narrower usage, 'culture' means spiritual, in contrast to material, activities and interests, or, in more precise terms, religion, philosophy, science, literature, and the visual arts in contrast to politics and economics (A. L. Kroeber observes, in *The Nature of Culture*, p. 155, that 'the cultural

Kroeber insists¹ that culture is a reality that cannot be explained in terms of anything but itself, and that what is cultural must be distinguished from what is social.² He points out³ that the social insects (ants, termites, and the rest) possess society but not culture; and this is, of course, true if one accepts Bagby's definition of culture, which excludes from it regularities that are hereditary, and also accepts the first point in Kroeber's definition, according to which the means by which culture is transmitted is education in the broad sense of the word. On the other hand, 'culture can exist only when a society exists; and, conversely, every human society is accompanied by a culture'.⁴ Thus, while it is true that the ideas of culture and society refer to realities of two different orders that ought not to be confused with each other, it is also true that, when we come to study the 'cultures' and 'societies' that have been the historical exemplifications of these two general ideas, it proves impossible, in practice, to study either apart from the other. 'The subject matter of anthropology is both society and culture', and the two things are, in fact, inseparable.⁵

15. CIVILIZATION

This is a hybrid modern Western word, compounded of a Latin adjectival stem, a French verbal affix, and a Latin abstract substantival suffix indicating, not a static condition, but a process that is still going on. Interpreted literally, the word ought to mean an attempt to attain the kind of culture that had been attained by citizens of a Graeco-Roman (in my terminology, Hellenic) city-state. The word 'civilization', in its literal meaning, would, in fact, accurately describe the process of Hellenization that played so important a part in the history of the Hellenic Society and of that society's relations with its non-Hellenic neighbours. This was the process to which the rural population of, for example, Pontic Cappadocia was subjected—or a privilege to which it was admitted—by Pompey when, after his annexation of this kingdom to the dominions of Rome, he attached the rural districts to one or other of the rare local Hellenic cities.

Actually, the word was never introduced into the Latin language. It is a modern French coinage, and Dr. Johnson refused to include the English counterpart of it in his dictionary of the English language.⁶ Since then, this pseudo-Latin word, or some equivalent for it, has become current in all modern languages in the meaning of a particular kind or phase of culture that has been in existence during a particular

portion of culture' has religion, philosophy, and art as its core). This use of the word culture to include everything in human life that is both non-political and non-economic is inexact, and the exclusion of politics and economics is confusing, because these are not excluded in the anthropologists' usage of the word 'culture'. I therefore propose to stop using the word in my previous way, and to refer to religion, philosophy, science, literature, and the visual arts each under its own proper name, without bundling them together.

¹ In op. cit., p. 113. Cp. Bagby, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

² Kroeber, op. cit., p. 118. Cp. Bagby, op. cit., pp. 92-94 and 115.

³ Kroeber, op. cit., pp. 22 and 52.

⁴ Kroeber, op. cit., p. 118. Cp. p. 162.

⁵ G. R. Willey and P. Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), pp. 2-3.

⁶ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 230.

age. In the present stage of knowledge the Age of Civilization appears to have begun approximately five thousand years ago. But these words were written in January 1959; and, at this time, the progress of archaeology was so rapid that the figure might have to be raised—and this, perhaps, drastically—before the end of the calendar year. Another season's excavations in the tell at Jericho, for example, might set back the date of the beginnings of the Age of Civilization by several millennia.

When one has described civilization as being a kind or a phase of culture, and when one has discussed the date at which it made its first appearance, one has perhaps implied that one has already arrived at a definition of what civilization is. I myself have been criticized for having operated with the idea without having defined my usage of the word explicitly.¹ I did raise, in volume 1² of this book, the question whether one could identify the features in which the difference between civilization and the pre-civilizational stage or stages of culture resides,³ and I concluded that the difference did not consist in the presence or absence of institutions or of the division of labour or of the practice of social imitation (mimesis). These features, I found, were common to the culture of human society in all phases. I put my finger on the point that, in the present-day life of surviving pre-civilizational societies, mimesis is directed towards the ancestors, whereas, in the present-day life of societies now in process of civilization, it is directed towards creative personalities who are leaders on the road towards a goal in the future.⁴ I admitted that this observable present-day difference did not provide the definition for which I was in search.⁵ Though stationary now, the surviving pre-civilizational societies must have been on the move once,⁶

¹ See, for instance, R. T. Clark in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. cxxx, No. 777 (1941), p. 297; and the references to a number of criticisms on this account in Anderle's unpublished paper. See also the present volume, pp. 223-4.

² On pp. 188-204.

³ R. Coulborn (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 149, footnote 1) notes that K. W. Thompson (in *Ethics*, No. lxxv (1955), p. 299) 'complains that Toynbee never defines his concept of civilization "by more than a few illustrations"'. Coulborn comments: 'I feel that Toynbee's looseness is right in principle. There are many conflicting uses of the term, and, rather than a formal definition, I find it practical to offer a historical one, namely that civilized societies are those societies, of magnitude far greater than earlier primitive societies and surviving primitive societies, which arose, by reason of special climatic conditions, at the end of the Quaternary Ice Age . . . and all those societies which have been derived from them. This kind of definition suits Toynbee's use and could be said to be implied by it.'

⁴ This point has since been made, with much greater knowledge and authority, by R. Redfield in *The Primitive World and its Transformations*. 'The preacher of conversion and the preacher of moral regeneration are creatures of civilization' (p. 55). 'In the folk societies men do not seek to make over their own natures' (p. 112). 'Man makes himself (to use Childe's phrase) in two senses: (i) in primitive life unintentionally and unconsciously, (ii) in civilization intentionally and consciously' (p. 113). 'Civilization is the cultivation of our ultimate purposes' (p. 119). 'Primitive people see life as being static; they expect the immediate future to be like the immediate past' (p. 120). 'Primitive education is conservative' (pp. 120-1). By contrast, Redfield endorses Margaret Mead's observation (in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xviii (1943), p. 9) that 'modern education includes a heavy emphasis upon the function of education to create discontinuities', and that, in this phase of culture, 'education becomes a mechanism of change'. In short, civilization, as Redfield sees it, 'is breakdown of old ways' (p. 136). A present-day inquirer can catch this process at work in his own world in his own generation if he visits any village in India in which the community development project is in operation.

⁵ Here I anticipated one of G. Lefebvre's criticisms in *La Revue Historique*, January-March, 1949, pp. 109-13.

⁶ Here I anticipated another of Lefebvre's criticisms in loc. cit.

while, on the other hand, there was no warrant for assuming that the surviving civilizations would always continue to be on the move. Indeed, some of them had already lapsed into stationariness, like the survivors of the societies of the pre-civilizational kind. At this point I broke off my search for a definition of the idea of civilization in the singular, and set myself, instead, to study the rhythm of the histories of civilizations in the plural. This inquiry has occupied most of the rest of the first ten volumes of this book. I believe that this was the more promising procedure. To propound a definition before one has surveyed the phenomena to which it applies is to expose oneself to the risk of seeing one's preliminary labour lost. It is now time for me to try to respond to my critics' challenge. But first I will report some definitions of civilization that have been offered by other inquirers.

A. H. Hanson, for example, brings up¹ a number of changes that, in his view, have been decisive factors in the metamorphosis of a pre-civilizational culture into a civilization. He mentions the discovery of new techniques, the introduction of the division of labour,² the emergence of economic inequality, the division of society into classes, the opposition between these new phenomena and the structure of the primitive tribe, and the emergence of the state as a means of transcending this opposition. R. J. Braidwood proposes³ a combination of eight criteria: fully efficient food production, urbanization, a formally organized political state or states, formal laws (implying a new sense of moral order), formal public projects and works, social classes and hierarchies, literacy, and monumentality in art. Bagby reviews several proposed criteria for classifying a culture as being a civilization, and rejects magnitude of population, complexity, in the sense of far-going division of labour, and literacy. He rightly argues that the first two criteria out of these three demand the drawing of lines that would be arbitrary. In discussing the proposed criterion of literacy, he points out that at least one culture that is usually recognized as being a civilization, namely the Andean, was non-literate, whereas there are some living societies that possess scripts but are in other respects pre-civilizational. Moreover, the Incas did have, in the quipu, a method of keeping records in a non-literary form.⁴

It may be added that at least one literate society, the Western, made an extensive use of a similar non-literary method of keeping records in the shape of the tallies used in the Exchequer in the medieval chapter of the administrative history of the Kingdom of England; and also that many pre-civilizational societies, and some of those in process of civilization, have done without any system of physical mnemonics—written, painted, or inscribed characters, knotted cords, notched sticks, or what not—and have relied on the human memory. When the use of the

¹ In *Science and Society*, No. 13 (1949), pp. 118–35.

² Hanson asserts that I have not even mentioned, let alone described, any of the things that he mentions in this passage. Actually, I have spent two pages (i. 189–91) on discussing whether the division of labour provides a criterion for distinguishing between civilizations and pre-civilizational societies, and have come to the conclusion (for the reason here recalled) that it does not.

³ In *The Near East and the Foundations of Civilization*, p. 2.

⁴ P. Bagby, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

memory is not made superfluous by visual mnemonic devices, it is capable of feats that seem extraordinary to people who have become accustomed to rely on visual forms of records. The extensive scriptures of Hinduism have been preserved and transmitted for centuries by memorization, as well as the long genealogies of Arab and Polynesian clans; and in the Islamic World a *hāfiz*—meaning a man who knows the Qur'ān by heart¹—is still a familiar figure. In once non-literate societies that have eventually acquired a script, there has often been a significant reluctance to use this for recording anything but prosaic business documents. Law and poetry, secular as well as religious, have sometimes been handed down orally long after the means of committing this lore to writing have been at the disposal of the lore's traditional guardians.

Bagby proposes² that we should take our cue from the etymology of the word 'civilization' and should define civilization as 'the kind of culture found in cities'. And he proposes to define 'cities' as being 'agglomerations of dwellings many (or, to be more precise, a majority) of whose inhabitants are not engaged in producing food'. Lewis Mumford, whose most brilliant work has been his study of the relation between the development of civilization and the development of urban life, has accused me,³ perhaps justly, of ignoring the role that cities have played in history. In attaching importance to their role, Bagby is, I feel sure, on the right scent. One effect of the change from rural to urban life will have been to break 'the cake of custom'.⁴ Even a city such as Jericho at its earliest hitherto disintegrated level—a city that, by present-day standards, was tiny—will have had a revolutionary effect on the lives and outlook of the people who left their previous homes and occupations in the countryside in order to settle there. The migration involved may have been one of no more than a few hours' or a few minutes' walk. Yet it will have detached the people who ventured to make it from an age-old social and cultural setting; it will have thrown them together with migrants from other villages and tribes; and it will have required them to master new, non-agricultural, ways of earning their living. This process of deracination will have facilitated the psychological and social revolution which, if a suggestion of mine is right, marks the transition, *de facto*, to civilization from the pre-civilizational phase of culture. It will have provided the conditions under which the majority of the participants in the changing society reoriented their mimesis away from the ancestors towards living leaders pointing towards new goals in the future.

Bagby points out⁵ that, while agricultural communities are a necessary part of every civilization, 'their character is substantially altered by the fact that they have become culturally dependent on cities'.⁶ Today

¹ The Qur'ān is longer than the Bible.

² In *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 16.

³ See i. 192, footnote 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

⁶ The same point has been made in more circumstantial terms by R. Redfield in *The Primitive World and its Transformations*. 'There were no peasants before the first cities. And those surviving primitive peoples who do not live in terms of the city are not peasants' (p. 31). The peasantry is linked to the cities by money transactions (pp. 31-33). 'The peasant knows himself as part of a moral world in which the city man is also included' (p. 38).

we are fast approaching a state of affairs in which the food-producers will have shrunk in numbers to being only a minority—and this a small one—of the World's population, and in which they too will be urban in spirit. But even the earliest and the smallest cities must have exerted a potent transforming influence on an agricultural population that, in their day, was still in an overwhelming numerical majority. H. Frankfort notes¹ that, in the Sumeric and Hellenic worlds, and in the Western World, too, until a recent date, the present-day Western contrast between town and country was non-existent, and that the townsmen worked in the fields—at least at harvest-time—as well as at their urban crafts.² But this does not invalidate Bagby's point; and Frankfort himself points out³ that, in the cities of Sumer and Akkad, as in those of the Hellenic World and the medieval West (above all, in medieval Italy), 'the physical existence of the city is but an outward sign of close communal affinities which dominate the life of every dweller within the walls. The city sets its citizens apart from the other inhabitants of the land. It determines their relations with the outside world. It produces an intensified self-consciousness in its burghers.'

Bagby's definition thus comes near to hitting the mark. Yet it will not quite serve. Nor will V. G. Childe's coinage of the phrase 'the Urban Revolution' (on the analogy of 'the Industrial Revolution') as a synonym for the emergence of the species of culture known as 'civilization'.⁴ There have been city-less societies that have nevertheless been in process of civilization. In the Mayan province of the Middle American World, for instance, the imposing conglomerations of temples and other public buildings are held by at least one—and this perhaps the predominant—school of present-day archaeologists to have been ceremonial centres only, with no permanent inhabitants except a small number of priests and rulers and their immediate attendants. It is still more to the point that 'in Egypt the great change did not lead to a concentration of social activity in urban centres. It is true that there were cities in Egypt; but, with the single exception of the capital, these were no more than market towns for the countryside'.⁵ Nomadic culture, again, would be a case of civilization without cities, if I am right in reckoning this among the civilizations—though it is true, I believe, that, on the economic plane, there has always been a symbiosis between the Nomadic societies and one or other of the sedentary societies that have possessed both cities and agriculture. Both these instances of city-less civilizations are perhaps controversial. Nevertheless, they suggest that the definition of civilization as being 'the kind of culture found in cities' is not quite exact. Bagby is, no doubt, right, as far as he goes, in

¹ In *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 57-58.

² In Southern Italy and Sicily in 1959, there were still large agglomerations of dwellings most of whose inhabitants were engaged in producing food—in many cases from fields that, according to a motorized Westerner's standards of walking, were fantastically distant from the place where the people who cultivated them passed the night. These pseudo-cities were agricultural counterparts of the 'dormitory towns' that surrounded the contemporary Western hives of business and industry.

³ In *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁴ See H. Frankfort's criticism of Childe's phrase in *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58 and p. 57, footnote 2.

⁵ Frankfort, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

his observation¹ that it is 'freedom from the need of directly producing their own food which presumably enables the inhabitants of cities to devote all their time to specialization, and so to complicate their culture'. But we have, I believe, to go farther, and to equate civilization with a state of society in which there is a minority of the population, however small, that is free from the task, not merely of producing food, but of engaging in any other of the economic activities—e.g. industry and trade—that have to be carried on to keep the life of the society going on the material plane at the civilizational level.

'So important . . . is surplus and its effects on society that a striking convergence may be found between the peaks of civilization and peaks of economic well-being. . . . Without surplus, members of a society have no time for contemplation, experimentation, or the exchange of ideas—the very well-springs of change—and tend to remain in a static condition.'²

These non-economic specialists—professional soldiers, administrators, and perhaps, above all, priests—have certainly been city-dwellers in the cases of most of the civilizations known to us.³ But the Maya priesthood, with its advanced astronomical knowledge and its complicated calendrical technique, may have been an instance of a body of non-economic specialists in a non-urban social milieu. On this view, civilization would have originated in the emergence, not of cities, but of economic inequality and the division of society into classes—two of the factors in Hanson's list.

If this is the correct diagnosis, it is a tragic one; for it means that civilization will have originated in social injustice, and that, as far as we know, it could not have come into existence in any other way. Social injustice has been one of the two specific diseases of civilization since the earliest date to which our surviving records of it go back. Its other specific disease has been war. In our own day, civilization has reached a crisis as a result of the unprecedented advance of technology in the Western World in recent times. Used for constructive purposes, technology has now, for the first time since civilization began, opened up a prospect of our being able soon to provide the whole of mankind with the amenities of civilization, which, hitherto, have been the monopoly of a small minority. Used for destructive purposes, it has now also opened up the unprecedented prospect of our being able soon to wipe mankind, and perhaps all other extant forms of life, off the face of the Earth. This pair of alternative prospects suggests that civilization has now arrived at a fateful parting of the ways. If we are not now to let civilization become an instrument in our hands for its own destruction—and perhaps for our destruction too—we shall have to abolish the institution of war and to achieve a radical reform of social injustice. And either of these tasks, by itself, would be a gigantic one.

¹ Op. cit., p. 162.

² Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954), p. 115.

³ Redfield, in *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, equates civilization with the rise of cities (p. ix) on the ground that it was in the cities that 'the administrative élite', 'the literate priest', and 'the specialized artisan' made their first appearance (p. 30).

Mankind's present situation raises the question what the goal of civilization is, and the further question whether or not civilization can be reformed and salvaged by drawing solely on the resources of this particular species of culture. On the first of these questions, I agree with H. Frankfort¹ in rejecting the view that 'such changes as an increase in food-production or technological advances (both, truly enough, coincidental with the rise of civilization) . . . explain how civilization became possible'. A. N. Whitehead surely hits the truth in a passage,² quoted by Frankfort in this context, in which he declares that

'in each age of the World distinguished by high activity, there will be found at its culmination, and among the agencies leading to that culmination, some profound cosmological outlook, implicitly accepted, impressing its own type on the current springs of action.'

Christopher Dawson is making the same point when he says that 'behind every civilization there is a vision'.³ On this view, to which I adhere, the presence in a society of a minority liberated from economic activities is an identification-mark of civilization rather than a definition of it. Following Whitehead's lead, I should define civilization in spiritual terms. Perhaps it might be defined as an endeavour to create a state of society in which the whole of mankind will be able to live together in harmony, as members of a single all-inclusive family. This is, I believe, the goal at which all civilizations so far known have been aiming unconsciously, if not consciously.

The second question—whether civilization can save itself solely out of its own resources—is a controversial one; and, on this issue, my considered answer is in the negative. I believe that civilization can be saved only by drawing on the resources of the higher religions as well as on those of civilization itself. I believe that human beings *can* save civilization by thus rising above it, but I do not believe that, if they do turn again for help to the higher religions, this is bound to secure a future for civilization or for religion or for the human race. I believe that, now and always, the future is open for human beings, and that it lies at least partly in our own hands to make of it what we choose.

Hourani is right in finding⁴ that, in the first six volumes of this book, there are two different answers to the question: What is the goal of human endeavours? 'On the one hand, "civilization" is seen as ultimate.' On the other hand, 'all growth in civilization is equated with progress towards sainthood'. The second of these two answers of mine is, in effect, the declaration of a belief that the goal of human endeavours, which is being aimed at in the particular endeavour that we call 'civilization', is something beyond and above civilization itself. This second answer is my considered answer, and further consideration has not led me to change it.

¹ In *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 7-8.

² A. N. Whitehead: *Adventures in Ideas* (Cambridge 1933, University Press), pp. 13 and 14.

³ *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 41.

⁴ In *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), pp. 384-5.

16. SOCIETIES

I use the words 'societies' in the plural and 'a society' in the singular to mean particular historical exemplifications of the abstract idea 'society' which has been examined above. The relation of 'societies' or 'a society' to 'society' is the relation of one or more representatives of a class of phenomena to the class that it represents.

Since I use the word society to mean the total network of relations between human beings, I use the words 'societies' and 'a society' to denote particular networks that can be analysed as being combinations of a number of institutions that are their components, but which cannot be identified as being, themselves, components of any more comprehensive network. If one defines societies in these terms, one finds that there are several kinds of them. In other words, one finds that the genus 'society' consists of several species. There are, for instance, pre-civilizational societies, societies in process of civilization, and societies that are embodiments of higher religions. The pre-civilizational societies, again, fall into a number of different sub-classes: Lower Palaeolithic, Upper Palaeolithic, Mesolithic, Neolithic, Chalcolithic. The last three of these sub-classes, or at any rate the last two, have more in common with civilizations than they have with their Palaeolithic predecessors.

Societies of all these different species of the genus have in common the generic characteristic that they are not identifiable as being components of any network of relations between human beings that is more comprehensive than these societies themselves. It is true that some of the higher religions are professed by participants in two or more civilizations of the third generation. But this does not mean that these civilizations are parts of those churches. We have seen¹ that the appearance of the higher religions on the scene has brought with it a fission of the previous unity of culture in the form of a separation between 'church' and 'state'. In consequence, since that time there have been in existence, side by side, societies of two species—higher religions and civilizations—consisting of networks of relations that are specifically different in nature and pattern; and the networks of either kind are not components of other networks, either of the second kind or of any different kind.

Though, according to my definition, societies are systems of relations that are not components of other societies, they are not, in my view, Leibnizian monads. All societies exert a constant reciprocal influence on each other. The extant representatives of the species are being influenced, in different degrees, not only by all their surviving contemporaries but also by the legacies of all societies that have come and gone up to date.

Every social network is the carrier of a culture, and it is impossible in practice to study a society and its culture apart from each other.

17. COMMUNITIES

I use the words 'communities' in the plural and 'a community' in the singular to mean a network of relations which—in contrast to the networks that I call 'societies'—are components of some more comprehen-

¹ On pp. 76–85.

sive network in the shape of a society. A community is like a society in being a combination of a number of component institutions, but a community's set of institutions will not be identical with its society's set. If it were, it would not be possible to distinguish the community as being a recognizable sub-network within the society. Participants in a community may have a distinctive religion, language, state, or other institution that is not shared with them by other participants in the same society. For example, the English people are a community within the Western Society; but other Westerners are not natives of the Kingdom of England, do not have the English Episcopalian Church as the established church in their respective states, and do not speak the *cis-Tweed cis-marine* dialects of English. Conversely, a society may have distinctive institutions that are not contained in the network of any of its component communities. In the Hellenic World, for example, the Olympian pantheon, the Homeric epic, the Delphic oracle, and the four Panhellenic festivals were institutions that meant much to every Hellene, but he partook in them in virtue of being a participant in the Hellenic Society. They were not the institutions of any particular Hellenic city-state, and a Hellene could not partake in them if he chose—or was constrained—to confine his activities within the bounds of his own community. At a certain stage of Hellenic history Lacedaemonian men (not women) were debarred, by a standing order of the Lacedaemonian Government, from competing at the Panhellenic festivals. In imposing this prohibition on its citizens, this government was deliberately seeking to cut off their relations with non-Lacedaemonian Hellenes and, whether consciously or not, was turning Lacedaemon into a separate society, outside the Hellenic pale.

Communities and societies are not distinguished from each other by being networks of relations of different kinds. For instance, it would not be true to say that the relations constituting a community are political, and those constituting a society non-political. This point can be illustrated from the history of the Hellenic World. Before the establishment of an Hellenic world-state by the Romans, the communities within the Hellenic Society were sovereign city-states, confederacies, and kingdoms (i.e. political entities of various types), while the institutions in which the Hellenic Society itself was embodied were non-political (some of them religious, some literary, some athletic). On the other hand, after the establishment of the world-state, the situation was reversed. The Hellenic Society, as such, now had a political embodiment in the shape of the Roman Empire, while the distinctive institutions of the Hellenic Society's component local communities were now non-political (e.g. cults, shrines, dialects). Moreover, at this stage of Hellenic history, the most characteristic and significant communities in the Hellenic World were so far from being even the ghosts of once sovereign independent states that they had no piece of territory of their own in which the participants in them were in a local majority. They were religious denominations—the Jewish, Christian, Mithraic, Isiac, and others—whose adherents were scattered over the Hellenic World and were everywhere locally in a minority.

Some word is needed to denote what I mean by 'communities'. But I confess that my definition of both 'communities' and 'societies' is arbitrary. Every definition of them is and must be. The popular usage of both words is vague, yet at the same time it is almost impossible to avoid conscripting and regimenting both words for use as more precise instruments if one is trying to make a systematic study of human affairs. In most usages, popular or technical, the word 'societies' seems to stand for larger and looser networks, and 'communities' to stand for smaller and tighter networks. K. W. Deutsch, for instance, who is thinking in terms of the technology of man-made communications-networks and of the associated science of cybernetics, defines a society, for his purpose, as 'a group of persons who "have learnt to work together"', and a community as 'a group of persons united by their ability to exchange information'.¹

18. CIVILIZATIONS

I use the word 'civilizations' in the plural and 'a civilization' in the singular to mean particular historical exemplifications of the abstract idea 'civilization' which has been examined above. The relation of 'civilizations' or 'a civilization' to 'civilization' is the relation of one or more representatives of a class of phenomena to the class that it represents. The class represented by civilizations is one species of the genus 'culture'.² Every civilization is carried on the network of a society, and it is impossible in practice to study a civilization and its society apart from each other.

Before examining criticisms of my definitions of what I mean by a civilization, we must consider the thesis, put forward by several of my critics, that there is not, and never has been, more than one single representative of this class of culture and society. An uncompromising declaration of the unity of civilization, not merely as an abstract concept but also as a concrete phenomenon, has been made by a Communist critic, B. Bykhovsky.³

'Professor Toynbee's philosophy of history . . . discountenances the idea of an integral world history. As against the unity and historical continuity of civilization, Toynbee sets up a scheme of numerous segregated civilizations, each of which bears throughout the whole cycle of its development the impress of specific and immutable characteristics. From this viewpoint the integral and natural process of development of universal history breaks down into separate and discrete parts, and historical science becomes the comparative history of different and distinct civilizations.'

¹ *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1951), p. 243. It will be noticed that Deutsch, like Hobbes and Bagby, thinks of societies and communities as being composed of persons, not of relations between persons. On this rather crucial point, they all go wrong, I believe.

² G. R. Willey and P. Phillips use the word 'cultures' to describe the maximum units, according to their system of classification, up to the New-World Formative stage inclusive, and reserve the word 'civilizations' for the maximum units in their Classic and Postclassic stages (*Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), p. 48).

³ In *New Times*, 12th November, 1947, p. 27.

The same point has been made, with greater discrimination, by a liberal critic, F. S. Marvin.¹

'There is a unity in civilization as well as different types of civilization; and, from the point of view of both philosophy and religion, it is still more important to seek the unifying than the distinctive features.'

In this context, Marvin notes that

'much in this whole discussion is purely verbal. We may speak of as many distinctive civilizations as we please, so long as we make clear what our dividing canons are and so long as they can be consistently maintained.'

The notions of 'distinctiveness' and 'unity' are, indeed, relative in their application to human affairs. Every human being now alive has links, however tenuous, not only with every one of his contemporaries but also with every other human being that has ever lived. In this sense human history is one single seamless web, and any dissection of it is an arbitrary misrepresentation of Reality. The unity and continuity of civilization as a concrete historical phenomenon are most apparent on the technological and scientific planes.² Yet, even on these planes, there has never, as far as our knowledge reaches back, been a simultaneous advance of the whole human race all over the World. Both the two great technological and economic revolutions up to date have been made by a small minority of the human race in a particular limited area. The Neolithic Revolution was made on the outer rim of 'the Fertile Crescent' in South-West Asia; the Industrial Revolution was made in Great Britain. The achievements of these two revolutions have been spreading from their places of origin to other parts of the World; but even the Neolithic Revolution has not yet reached the whole human race. There are still some food-gathering communities extant today, some ten or twelve thousand years later than the date of the earliest of the Neolithic strata so far unearthed at Jericho.

Moreover, even if we hold, as Marvin holds,³ that, in human affairs, the identities are more fundamental than the differences, it is, as he judiciously concedes, 'always instructive to discover, and to attempt to explain, differences'. The question is really a practical one. Does the study of the phenomenon of civilization in its unitary aspect throw more light on this phenomenon than the study of it in its multiple aspect? In practice we are compelled, as we have already found,⁴ by the multiplicity of the manifestations of a theoretically unitary phenomenon to break it up mentally into a number of simultaneous and parallel streams of events, and to reunify these by resorting to the comparative method of study that Bykhovsky deprecates. For heuristic purposes, at any rate, we have to think in terms of 'civilizations' in the plural; but, if we do use 'civilizations' as an indispensable piece of intellectual apparatus, this imposes on us, as Marvin points out, an obligation to give a tenable definition or definitions of what we mean by 'a civilization'.

¹ In *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1935, p. 623.

² This point is made by K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 240.

³ See loc. cit.

⁴ See pp. 163-8.

Some critics have asserted, mistakenly, that I have not tried to define what I mean by a civilization.¹ Granville Hicks raises the question whether a civilization can be defined with enough precision to make the concept useful.² Other critics³ have noted that, in previous volumes of this book, I have given several definitions of what I mean by a civilization. I have defined it as being 'an intelligible field of study'; as being the common ground between the respective individual fields of action of a number of different people; and as being a representative of a particular species of society. So far as I can see, these definitions are compatible with each other, and something essential would be missing if any of them were left out.

The first of these definitions is, of course, put in subjective terms. Its approach to the definition of a civilization is epistemological. The other two definitions are objective. They are attempts to describe the reality that the inquirer's mind believes (and believes correctly, in my view) that it has apprehended in the phenomena. Ideally, any definition that we make of anything whatsoever ought to be made in this dual form, considering that the duality of subject and object, and the problem of what the true relation between them is, are inherent in all thinking. Anyway, it cannot be wrong to do this; and one would surely be remiss if one did not do it when one is trying to define something that is a key idea in one's particular field of study, as the idea of 'a civilization' is in my study of history.

M. Watnick finds⁴ that my definition of a civilization as being 'an intelligible field of study' is 'completely lacking in operational utility', because I do not say when a field is intelligible and what makes it so. He calls this definition 'a jejune and unenlightening tautology'. A society, as he interprets my train of thought, becomes an intelligible field in virtue of being a society. O. Handlin, too, finds this definition 'circular and tautological'.⁵ These criticisms might perhaps have hit the mark if I had propounded this definition of mine *in vacuo*. Actually, I arrived at it⁶ by way of an inquiry in terms that were concrete and also, I think, practical.

I started—reasonably, I should say—by looking at 'what is the usual field of vision of contemporary Western historians'. I found this—correctly, I should say—to be 'some national state'. I then asked myself whether a national state was an intelligible field of study in isolation. As a test case I took Great Britain, on the ground that this national state, if any, ought to be an intelligible field in isolation in virtue of its insularity, and that, if Great Britain proved not to meet the test, it would seem unlikely that any other national state would meet it. Running through the principal chapters of Great Britain's, and her principal constituent, England's, history, I found that none of these episodes

¹ e.g. Chr. Hill in *The Modern Quarterly*, Autumn, 1947, p. 293; M. A. Fitzsimons in *The Review of Politics*, October, 1957, pp. 544-53.

² *The New Leader*, 18th October, 1954, p. 22.

³ e.g. R. T. Clark in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. cxxx, No. 777 (1941), p. 297; L. Mumford in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 14; P. A. Sorokin in *Teynbee and History*, pp. 179-80.

⁴ In *The Antioch Review*, No. 7 (Winter, 1947-8), pp. 587-602.

⁵ *The Partisan Review*, July-August, 1947, pp. 371-9.

⁶ In i. 17-50.

were intelligible if one tried to limit one's historical horizon to the shores of this island. At the same time, in expanding my field of vision outwards in space and backwards in time, I found myself, in both dimensions, eventually reaching limits beyond which, on the criterion of intelligibility, this expansion of the field began to bring in diminishing returns. This line gave me the boundary of the field of vision within which the intelligibility of the history of one national state, Great Britain, was at its maximum. I found that this spatio-temporal field included the histories of all the present-day Roman Catholic and Protestant Christian nations back to the origins of the Christian Church among the 'internal proletariat' of a society that, at the time when Christianity made its first appearance, was embodied politically in the Roman Empire. Looking next for the origins of this proletariat, I traced these back, provisionally, as far as the Hannibalic War. Looking for a name for this field of study within which the study of the history of Great Britain seemed to be at its maximum of intelligibility, I found that the most informing label for it would be 'Western Christendom' or simply 'the West' when one came to consider the latest chapter in its history. While including the Catholic and Protestant—or ex-Catholic and ex-Protestant—nations, it did not include the Eastern Orthodox Christians or the Muslims or any other societies to the east of these. Within this line, the network of relations was so closely knit that the histories of Great Britain, France, the United States, and the other Western Christian or ex-Christian national states were intelligible if studied synoptically but not intelligible if one tried to study each of them in isolation. Outside the same line, Eastern Orthodox Christian history and Islamic history had followed different courses. This pointed to the likelihood that there were at least two living societies of the same species as the Western Society, as well as at least one no longer extant society—namely the Graeco-Roman or Hellenic, among whose proletariat Christianity had made its first appearance.

On reconsideration, I still do not think that this intellectual operation of mine was an argument in a circle, or that it was not of any use for the purpose of increasing one's understanding of history. As an 'heuristic' reconnaissance, I think it was both legitimate and rewarding. It led to the identification of a unit of study—societies of this species that I call civilizations—which, in my belief, is a more practical tool for the study of human affairs during the last five thousand years than national states of the Western type seem to me to be. While I was growing up, a firm of British publishers, Fisher Unwin, was bringing out a series of volumes under the general title of 'the Story of the Nations'. Many of these volumes were excellent pieces of work. Several of them had, incidentally, a great and lasting influence on me, in helping me to enlarge my historical outlook. All the same, I think that 'the Story of the Civilizations' would have been a better series for Fisher Unwin's purpose of giving a comprehensive account of the latest phase of the history of mankind.

This is my case for holding that civilizations are 'intelligible fields of study'. But, as my way of arriving at this conclusion shows, the word

'intelligible' has, for me, a connotation of relativity. A civilization is an intelligible field by comparison with its component communities—nations, city-states, millets, castes, or whatever else these components may happen to be in different instances. In general, a larger unit of study is likely to be more intelligible than a smaller one, considering that nothing can be completely intelligible short of the sum total of Reality. This, however, cannot be intelligible either, because things are intelligible only to minds, and, *ex hypothesi*, there would be no mind, outside the sum total of Reality, to be the subject of this object. Accordingly, as I have noted in this volume from the first chapter onwards, the intelligibility of phenomena, on whatever scale, can never be more than partial and imperfect.

This, again, indicates, from another angle, that a civilization is 'an intelligible field of study' in a relative sense only. In my process of identifying the Western Civilization, I was already finding that this was no completely self-contained Leibnizian monad. In the course of the reconnaissance in which I hit on it, I also hit on two other contemporary units of the same species—the Eastern Orthodox Christian and the Islamic—and on one extinct unit, the Hellenic. It was true that the network of external relations linking the civilizations with each other had proved to be significantly more tenuous than the network of internal relations between the participants in any one of them. Yet the proletariat among whom Christianity had made its appearance had been recruited from participants in more civilizations than one, and this indicated that trans-civilizational relations must be important. Thus, from the outset, I was committed to something more than a comparative study of the histories of civilizations regarded as so many separate representatives of their species. I had also to study the encounters, in the two dimensions of time and space, between human beings who were participants in different civilizations. And I had to study the higher religions as a distinct species of society. For Christianity was an example of a higher religion that had broken out of the framework of one society, the Hellenic, and had broken down the barriers between this society and others, both contemporary with it and subsequent to it. These topics were set out in the plan of the book, printed at the beginnings of volumes i, iv, and vii, and they have all been dealt with—though, of course, not exhaustively and not adequately—in volumes i–x.¹

¹ I therefore think that I do not deserve Lynn Thorndike's comment that it does not 'seem quite consistent for such a doughty defender of internationalism so to segregate civilizations in separate compartments and almost deny the possibility of any such thing as intercivilization' (*The Journal of Modern History*, vol. vii, No. 3 (September, 1935), pp. 315–17). Studies of 'intercivilization' occupy the whole of volume viii and a large part of vol. ix. It is true that Thorndike was reviewing vols. i–iii at a date when only these three had yet been published. Yet he might have looked at the plan on p. vi of vol. i before committing himself to his anticipatory judgement.

In his review of the same first batch of three volumes in *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1935, pp. 622–5, F. S. Marvin has, I should say, better warrant when he criticizes me for denying the unity of civilization in treating it as a species represented by a number of different specimens. This is, of course, one of the things that I do, and, *pace* Marvin, I still believe that I am right in doing it. But I should agree that I should have been wrong if I had limited my study to this, and had treated the separateness of the different civilizations as if it were, not relative, but absolute.

K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 174–

So much for my subjective definition of what a civilization is. As for my two objective definitions of this, they seem to me to be not only compatible but complementary. The common ground between a number of different people's individual fields of action is an alternative phrase for describing what, in this chapter, I have called a network of relations between a number of human beings.¹ I have already made the point that relations between people, as well as the people who have these relations with each other, are realities, though people and relations are not realities of the same order. And a reality means something that is apprehended by human minds as being a reality, and is therefore apprehended by them as being a representative of a class—the only mode in which human minds can apprehend anything. The class here in question is a species of the genus society, which I have defined² as being the total network of relations between human beings. A specimen of this species will be a particular network that is not a component of any other network. A network of relations, being a phenomenon in the time-dimension as well as in the space-dimension, will have phases. The civilizations whose histories are on record up to date are objective realities that have all had geneses; most of them have also grown, over various periods of time, to various extents; some of them have had breakdowns; and some of them have then gone through a process of disintegration ending in dissolution.

In crediting civilizations with histories in a pattern of phases, I am not personifying them or conceiving of them in anthropomorphic terms.³ A non-human intelligible field of study—for instance, a crystal—can also be an objective reality that changes in a regular pattern of phases. But it is, of course, true that any concept of an entity, human or non-human, that appears to some particular mind to be a real, as well as an intelligible, field of study may be an hallucination or illusion of that particular mind. Our concepts are no more than working theories or hypotheses so long as we have not tested them adequately by applying them to the phenomena and ascertaining whether they do or do not fit.⁴ Till we feel sure that they have satisfied this test, we have no warrant for assuming that there are objective realities corresponding to them.

250, and C. Trinkaus in *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), pp. 218–39, criticize me, in particular, for exaggerating the degree of the separateness of the Western Civilization from the Hellenic. I may perhaps have underestimated the closeness of the network of relations between them, but I have not ignored it. As early in this Study as i. 44 I coined the phrase appresentation-and-affiliation to describe the relation in which these two civilizations, and several other pairs, seemed to me to stand to each other. On reconsideration, I find myself still holding that the Western, Orthodox Christian, and Islamic civilizations are distinct representatives of the species and not just later phases of the older civilizations to which, in my view, they are 'affiliated'. On the other hand, I am convinced by Erdmann's and Trinkaus' thesis of continuity in the cases of the history of civilization in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, India, and China; and accordingly I have struck my supposed Babylonian, Hindu, and Far Eastern (main body) civilizations out of my list. My Mexic and Yucatec civilizations, too, have been abolished by the progress of archaeological discovery. For these changes in my list of civilizations, see further pp. 549–51.

¹ H. Werner, however, finds that I have no insight into what it is that holds a civilization together internally (*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 29. Jahrgang, xxix. Band (1935), p. 543).

² On p. 271.

³ See p. 45, with footnote 3.

⁴ See pp. 42–45.

Does my concept 'civilizations', as I have defined it, have realities corresponding to it or not?

This has been denied by P. A. Sorokin in a critique of the first six volumes of this book. Toynbee assumes, Sorokin writes,¹ that his 'civilizations' are 'a real system and not mere congeries or conglomerations of various cultural (or civilizational) phenomena and objects adjacent in space or time but devoid of any causal or meaningful ties'. This account of my view, which Sorokin supports by a quotation and by further references, is correct except in one important point. I believe, and have repeatedly declared my belief, that the ties between the different relational strands in the network of a civilization are 'meaningful', but I do not believe that they are causal, because I believe that human relations take the form of free responses to challenges, not the form of inevitable effects of causes. Subject to this vital reservation,² I acknowledge that the rest of Sorokin's account of my assumption is correct. Sorokin then asks whether this assumption is valid, and answers his question emphatically in the negative.

'His "civilizations" are not united systems but mere conglomerations of various civilizational objects and phenomena (congeries of systems and singular cultural traits) united only by spatial adjacency but not by causal or meaningful bonds. For this reason, they are not real "species of society";³ therefore they can hardly be treated as unities and can hardly have any uniformities in their genesis, growth, and decline. These concepts cannot even be applied to the congeries, because congeries do not and cannot grow or decline. Like the components of a dumping place, they can only be re-arranged, added to, or subtracted from. . . . The total civilization of even the smallest possible civilizational area—that of a single individual—is but a coexistence of several and different systems and congeries unrelated with one another in any way except spatial adjacency in a biological organism.'⁴ 'The Spenglerian-Toynbee ascription of some periodic perennial tendency to this or that civilization, regardless of the period of its history, is misleading and inaccurate.'⁵

As far as I can make out from these passages, Sorokin does not, after all, differ from me in principle, since he seems to hold that there are some genuine congeries of 'systems', as well as congeries of single cultural traits. What he is disputing so vigorously is the reality of systems of relations of a particular species—the species that I call civilizations and in whose reality I believe. This dispute is not just a duel between Sorokin and me. Sorokin frankly acknowledges⁶ that my

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 180.

² Sorokin's mistaken impression that I think of the interconnexions between the different elements in a civilization as being causal has led him (*ibid.*, pp. 180-1) to suppose that I myself have refuted my own belief that civilizations are systems by demonstrating that two of the components of a civilization, technique and economy, 'are causally unrelated to the rest of the "whole"'. Sorokin would indeed have caught me out here if I were a determinist who held that the system in a civilization was a system of causes and effects. My actual belief is that it is a system of challenges and responses and that it is therefore one in which there is some free play and some possibility of change.

³ Sorokin means, I think, 'not specimens of a real species of society'. A particular civilization cannot, itself, be a species.

⁴ Sorokin in *loc. cit.*, pp. 180-1. Cp. p. 182.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

position is that of the 'so-called "functional anthropologists"'. A belief that the concept of a culture corresponds to a significant and important reality seems, in fact, to be prevalent among present-day anthropologists. 'A civilization' is a representative of one species of culture; and most modern Western historians who deal with the history of Man in process of civilization seem to take the reality of at least some civilizations for granted:¹ for instance, their own Western Civilization and the Graeco-Roman (in my terminology, 'Hellenic') Civilization at any rate. Indeed, most Westerners today are up in arms for the defence of 'the values of Western Civilization' against threats from a traditional enemy, 'Oriental despotism', and a new enemy, 'Communism', to which the Western Civilization is exposed in their opinion. This militant expression of what is certainly a genuine anxiety surely implies a belief that the Western Civilization is a reality, and that there are alternative realities of the same order which are presumably real since they are felt to be menacing.

Of course, even if the validity of an hypothesis has been verified, up to the hilt, by the test of a thorough application of it to the phenomena, it is improbable that its validity will not be subject to any limitations. Kroeber notes,² with characteristic good sense, that 'a culture is always, so far as we can judge, highly composite in the origin of its constituent materials'. He compares cultures to ecological aggregates.³ And he points out⁴ that, while cultures tend towards integration, they never achieve total integration, and that 'there is almost nothing in culture to correspond to . . . organic repetitiveness'. Albright, too, suggests⁵ that 'a culture represents an empirico-adaptive system' and that 'inner bonds are, in general, quite secondary'. But this recognition that the interdependence of the different elements in a culture is not absolute and unqualified is a decidedly different position from Sorokin's uncompromising denial of any interdependence between them whatsoever (a denial that is compromised, nevertheless, by his admission that some of the components of the 'congeries' are 'systems').

If Sorokin's thesis were right, it would prove that not only civilizations, but all institutions of all kinds, were figments of other people's imaginations that had nothing corresponding to them in reality. This would follow because the reality of institutions, if they are real, is of one and the same order.⁶ They exist in the psychic medium of human thoughts and feelings and wills. I can see no rational basis for the apparently rather common assumption that institutions which have an

¹ In his unpublished paper, Anderle comments as follows on Sorokin's thesis that civilizations are not real unities. 'It is obviously a very arbitrary, controversial, and, above all, unproven, assertion; and to prove it in its negative form would be extremely difficult. Sorokin's dumping-place theory is also not likely to win the approval of historians—at any rate, those of them who study whole cultures and their total aspects and who therefore presumably cannot refuse to take account of the overwhelming impression of compactness (*Geschlossenheit*), inner cohesion (*Zusammenhang*), and consequentiality (*Folgerichtigkeit*) which even the layman receives when he strolls through the galleries of the Egyptian, Chinese, and Graeco-Roman departments of a museum.'

² In *The Nature of Culture*, p. 93.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 131. Cp. p. 148.

⁵ In *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 125. Cp. p. 104.

⁶ This point has been made already on pp. 232-3.

administrative structure are realities but that those which do not have this feature are hallucinations. This assumption is made by, for instance, K. D. Erdmann.¹ The true units of history, he maintains, are not civilizations, but states, because states, he holds, are 'the units in which an operative will crystallizes itself in institutional form'. H. J. Morgenthau likewise maintains² that political and geographical units 'lend themselves more readily to empirical verification' than civilizations do, and therefore, as he sees it, 'it is not by accident that there has been a tendency for history to be written in terms of political and geographical units rather than of civilizations'. The same assumption seems to be made by Sir Ernest Barker when he labels civilizations 'Broken-spectres', while describing state-systems and religious organizations as being 'definite and visible'.³

Is not Barker here falling into the mistake—which he attributes to me on the next page—of confusing metaphors with arguments? Was the Kingdom of Prussia or the Christian Church, for instance, really ever 'visible' or 'definite' in any sense in which these terms are not equally true of the Western Civilization or of Hellenism? Surely neither Prussia nor the Church has ever been visible at any time. Prussia has been consistently invisible. Obviously it is invisible at the present time, when there is no longer a Prussian state to be displayed in symbolic lines and colours on a map; obviously, too, it was invisible in the year A.D. 1, when no such state had yet been dreamed of; but it was also invisible during the reign of King Frederick the Great and during the chancellorship of Prince Bismarck. The Prussian state was more potent in Frederick's and Bismarck's generations than in others, but its potency was exercised in the invisible realm of psychic relations between the thoughts, feelings, and actions of human beings. The human beings labelled 'King' and 'Chancellor' were visible, certainly; but, notwithstanding Louis XIV's famous dictum, a ruler—even as absolute a one as any human being can be—can never be an incarnation of a state; his title does no more than make him a symbol, and his personality, however commanding, can make him no more than the most prominent, and perhaps the most effective, among a vast number of persons whose relations with each other weave the pattern called, say, the Kingdom of Prussia. We can see the King, the Chancellor, the civil servants at their desks in government offices, the soldiers in uniform on parade-grounds or on battlefields; we can see the flags displaying, in conventional colours, the heraldic device that is the Kingdom's emblem; we can see the posts and barriers, delimiting the frontiers, also painted in the Kingdom's conventional colours. But the one thing that we can never see is the Kingdom itself. The same is true of the Church. We can never see the Church itself; we can see only its places of worship, its altars, crosses, and monstres, its clerics in their vestments. We can, of course, feel its influence. The influence of a higher religion is more potent than that of any state has ever been, but a church's influence, like a state's, is exer-

¹ In *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 244.

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 194, quoted already on p. 233. G. Catlin, *ibid.*, p. 169, suggests that cultures are entities of a different order from both governments and human beings. I do not dispute this.

³ *Toynbee and History*, p. 96.

cised in the invisible realm of psychic relations. It, too, is a network of relations between human beings.

And what about the British and the American Constitution, which are respectively key-parts of the state-systems of the United Kingdom and the United States? The British Constitution is invisible by definition, since it has been left unwritten. But has the American Constitution really been made visible in the celebrated document that has been duly drafted, agreed, enacted, and promulgated? Are we seeing the Constitution of the United States when we read in print the words of a text bearing that title? No, this 'written' constitution is no more visible than the 'unwritten' one or than the United States of North America themselves or than the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. A constitution is not a series of ink marks on paper. These visible marks are merely a mnemonic device for recording an agreement between a number of human beings about the terms on which they are going to regulate their political relations with each other. The agreement, its terms, and the relations between people through which these terms are put into effect are invisible, all alike.

Civilizations are invisible, just as constitutions, states, and churches are, and this for just the same reasons. But civilizations, too, have manifestations that are visible, like the Prussian state's gold-crowned eagles and spiked helmets, and like the Christian Church's crosses and surplices. Set side by side an Egyptian, an Hellenic, and a pre-Renaissance¹ Western statue. It will be impossible to mistake which of these is the product of which school of sculptors. The distinctiveness of each of the three artistic styles is not only visible; it is definite—more definite than any of the visible products or emblems of any church or state. By exploring the range, in space and time, of a civilization's distinctive artistic style, one can ascertain the spatial and temporal bounds of the civilization that this style expresses. As Kroeber points out,² an artistic style is a sensitive indicator of historical connexions. Within the ambit of any one civilization the various styles 'tend towards a certain consistency among themselves',³ and 'styles are the very incarnation of the dynamic forms taken by the history of civilization'.⁴ Our ability, Kroeber adds, to locate an unassigned work of art to its place in a style sequence implies that the development of a style follows a one-way course. 'A style is a strand in a culture. . . . It is also a selective way. . . . Where compulsion or physical or physiological necessity reign, there is no room for style.' In being selective, a style, as well as a state, is an expression of will.⁵ Bagby, too, observes⁶ that 'the art-historians have shown that the styles of works of art are not absolutely indefinable', and that 'something of the same kind is done by the anthropologist and the culture historian. He, too, feels a common

¹ The Western statue must be pre-Renaissance if it is to be characteristic and distinctive. It must antedate the Western reception, at 'the' Renaissance, of the Hellenic style of visual art.

² In *Style and Civilizations*, pp. 2-3 and 155-6.

³ *The Nature of Culture*, p. 402.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 403. Cp. Anderle, in the passage quoted on p. 289, footnote 1.

⁵ *Style and Civilizations*, p. 150. This is the answer to Erdmann's contention, cited on p. 290, that states are the only kind of institution in which the human will finds expression.

⁶ In *Culture and History*, p. 108.

flavour in the diverse features of a culture or a period; he too tries to point out the observable qualities which give rise to this feeling.¹ Frankfort points out² that 'we recognise . . . the character of a civilization . . . in a certain coherence among its various manifestations, a certain consistency in its orientation, a certain cultural "style" which shapes its political and its judicial institutions, its art as well as its literature, its religion as well as its morals.' He illustrates his point by a masterly characterization³ of the Sumero-Akkadian and Egyptian civilizations, in which he brings out the fundamental features of each and the differences in their respective ways of pursuing the common endeavour of civilization.

The visible works of art that reveal so much about their civilization are merely expressions of it. They are not the civilization itself. That remains invisible, like a church or a state. When the anthropologist or the cultural historian tries to analyse the observable qualities that have been his clues to the diagnosis of a culture, he analyses them, as Bagby notices,⁴ in terms of ideas and values. Invisibility is, indeed, a common characteristic of all forces that are potent in human affairs. Even in the realm of non-human nature, over which Man has now established his mastery, invisible microbes and protons are more potent than visible lions and flashes of lightning. In the spiritual realm, where Man is not master, he has to cope with an invisible network of relations between elements in his own psyche, and with another invisible network of relations between himself and his fellow human beings. And the most potent of the forces that move human souls is the spirit that blows like the incalculable wind whose passage is audible but invisible.⁵

19. 'FOSSILS'

In the process of identifying systems of human relations of the kind that I have called 'civilizations', I found that the specimens of the species were not all of the same generation and not all even partially contemporaneous. For instance, the still extant Western Civilization has, in its historical background, an extinct civilization, the Hellenic, to which the Western Civilization is related in a way that I have called 'affiliation'. I went on to identify other civilizations that are now extinct, as the Hellenic is. I identified some of these by the procedure by which I had identified the Hellenic. I delved back into the origins of some extant civilization till I struck (so I believed) an earlier civilization, distinct from the extant one, though this was obviously affiliated to it. In two cases, however, I identified an extinct civilization by a different clue in the present-day world. Instead of ascertaining the former existence of an extinct civilization through the present existence of an extant civilization, I ascertained it, in a more direct way, through the present existence of what appeared to me to be extant relics of a civilization that, but for these, was extinct. 'One set' of extant communities—including the Monophysite Christians of Armenia, Mesopotamia,

¹ *Culture and History*, pp. 108-9.

² In *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 16.

⁴ In *Culture and History*, p. 109.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

⁵ John iii. 8.

Egypt, and Abyssinia and the Nestorian Christians of Kurdistan and Malabar, as well as the Jews and the Parsees¹—seemed to me to be relics of an otherwise extinct Syriac Civilization. 'A second set—including the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia and the Hinayanian Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma and Siam,² as well as the Jains in India'³—seemed to me to be relics of an otherwise extinct Indic Civilization. I may or may not have been right in my identifications of the civilizations represented by these two sets of extant communities, but I do not think I was wrong in diagnosing these communities as being relics of something that is otherwise no longer in existence today. If the societies represented by these extant communities are not extinct civilizations, they are at any rate extinct phases of civilizations that are still extant in later forms.⁴

These extant communities that I have labelled 'fossils' interested me for the reason that literal fossils interest palaeontologists. They seemed to me to be clues to something in the past which I was eager to rediscover and reconstruct. I seized on as many of them as I could find, and used them for tracking down civilizations, or phases in the histories of civilizations, which did not seem to have any other representatives than these in the present-day world. The fact that my 'fossils' were not just isolated phenomena but presented themselves in sets and sub-sets seemed to me to enhance their value as evidence. In one set the Jews and the Parsees seemed to me to be relics of the Syriac Civilization as it had been developing before this development was interrupted by the intrusion of Hellenism on the Syriac World; the Nestorian and Monophysite Christians seemed to be relics of the same Syriac Civilization as it was when it was reacting against the Hellenic Civilization's ascendancy. The Hellenic Civilization intruded on India too, and the second set of 'fossils' seemed to fall into two sub-sets, like the first. The Jains and the Hinayanian Buddhists seemed to be relics of civilization in India as this had been developing before the intrusion of Hellenism. The Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists seemed to be relics of civilization in India as it was when it was reacting against Hellenism's ascendancy there.⁵

One Jewish critic of my work, E. Berkovitz, has noted that, in my view of history, 'fossils' are apt to come in clusters.

'One of the charms of the *Study* is that it prevents Jews, as well as Judaism, from falling into the sin of vain conceit by imagining that there

¹ i. 35. Cp. i. 51 and i. 90-92. I noted that the former Nestorians of Malabar had now become Monophysites.

² Cambodia ought to have been included in the list of countries in which the Hinayana is now practised.

³ i. 35.

⁴ As a result of the reconsiderations set out in the present volume, I now think that there is more continuity than discontinuity in the history of civilization in India since after the disappearance of the Indus Culture there, and that it is therefore truer to reality to treat this as the history of one single civilization, instead of treating it as the history of an 'Indic' Civilization followed by an affiliated 'Hindu' Civilization. On the other hand, I find myself confirmed in my previous view that there is a break of historical continuity between the now extinct Syriac Civilization and the still extant Islamic Civilization. Most of my critics seem to hold that this break is still greater than I judge it to be.

⁵ This is a recapitulation of what has been set out more fully in i. 90-92.

could be anything unique about either of them. In good and bad fortune, in their greatness as well as in their fall, they have for their yoke-fellows of destiny the Parsees and Zoroastrianism.¹

This is a correct account of my view. I do see the Jews and the Parsees as a pair of peoples who have had an identical experience and have reacted to it in an identical way. And I do see Judaism and Zoroastrianism as a pair of religions that are like each other in each being Janus-faced.² One face is turned outwards towards the whole of mankind, for whom the religion has a message of universal significance and value. The other face is turned inwards towards the nation among whom this potentially universal religion originated. Paradoxically—so it seems to an observer from outside—the potentially universal religion has been turned by its original discoverers or recipients into an instrument for keeping alive their distinctive national consciousness as a peculiar people who deliberately hold themselves apart from the rest of mankind, though this costs them a constant effort of will and also exposes them to a constant threat of being severely penalized on this account.³ Having lost not only their historic national state but also their historic national home, and finding themselves scattered abroad as a minority in an alien world, both the Parsees and the Jews have devised an alternative kind of social cement for holding their community together in these unusually difficult circumstances. They have elaborated the traditional rites and tightened up the traditional rules of their ancestral religions to a degree that has made these religions into effective instruments for accomplishing their adherents' secular social purpose.⁴ But the consequent host of

¹ E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, footnote 31 on p. 149. See also Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), p. 320.

² This characteristic, which Hinduism shares with Zoroastrianism and Judaism to some extent, has been noticed on pp. 85–88.

³ I agree with E. Berkovitz that, in this sense, 'exile has been the highest form of activism' (op. cit., p. 123), and with M. Samuel that 'the endurance of the Jewish people is a continuous exertion of the will in the face of adversity' (*The Professor and the Fossil*, p. 182). As Berkovitz finely expresses it: 'While the others persecuted, the Jews chose' (op. cit., loc. cit.).

⁴ Their effectiveness for this purpose is graphically illustrated by Samuel in op. cit., pp. 177–8. As he puts it, 'these practices kept the people alerted, as it were, for the restoration and for a resumption of life in Palestine'. In other words, it fortified their tribal consciousness, as exiles who had once had a state of their own in a country of their own, as against their universal consciousness as worshippers of a God who is absolute spiritual Reality and whose worshippers can therefore worship Him equally well, wherever they may find themselves—being, as they are, representatives of a church that, in God's eyes, must embrace all mankind. Rabbi Agus notes, in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 10, that, according to Achad Ha'am, 'the cumbersome rites of Judaism constituted the "exilic garments" for the bruised body of the national soul'.

R. Travers Herford, too, notes that 'the *halachah* served as the chief bond to hold the Jewish community together when every other bond of national life was broken and Jews were scattered wide over the face of the Earth' (*The Pharisees*, p. 106). 'It acted . . . also as an external protective covering, within which the spirit of Judaism could maintain its strength and vitality' (ibid., p. 237). 'Wherever a Jew lived in the same locality with gentiles, his observance of the *halachah* would at once draw attention to him. The gentile would notice that the Jew did many special acts as a religious duty, that he made a point of doing many things, in themselves apparently trivial, in a particular way, and that he refrained from doing other things which to the gentile seemed harmless or indifferent' (ibid., p. 77). Herford, being both a gentile and a life-long student of the Rabbinical Jewish literature, warns his fellow gentiles that the *halachah*, besides being the most conspicuous factor in Pharisaism to the outsider, is also one 'whose inner meaning is usually hidden from him' (ibid., p. 107). 'The essence of the *halachah* was the doing of an action exactly in the appointed way because that was what God com-

meticulous observances seems, to an outside observer, not only to be irrational and spiritually unprofitable in itself; it seems also to be a strangely incongruous accompaniment of the spiritual insight or revelation that has been attained in these religions and that, in an outsider's eyes, is their essence.

These seem to me to be cogent reasons for coupling the Parsees and Zoroastrianism with the Jews and Judaism. Yet the ironical language in which my practice is reported by the Jewish critic whom I have quoted shows that my bracketing of these two peoples and two religions is distasteful to him.¹ At the same time, both Berkovitz and other Jewish critics have attacked me for my use of the word 'fossil' as if I had applied it to the Jews alone, and had applied it to them as a term of abuse, or at least of depreciation. This would have been a left-handed way of recognizing the validity of the Jewish claim that the Jewish people and Jewish religion are unique. Actually, I have invariably thought and written of them as being representatives of a class, and have thereby also incurred their displeasure—though the class of communities that I have labelled 'fossils' is one whose characteristic tenacity I admire, in spite of my opposition to the nationalism to which this specific virtue of theirs is dedicated.

Since my use of the word 'fossil' has been so hotly attacked by Jewish critics, I have asked myself the questions: Is the word offensive? And does it accurately convey what I mean by it?

The criticisms of my use of it that have come to my notice have all come from Jews. I know of no Parsee, Nestorian, Monophysite, Jain, Hinayanian Buddhist, or Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist objectors to it. I can only declare—and I do this with complete sincerity—that, when I coined the word, I neither intended it to be offensive nor foresaw that anyone would take it as being so.² The question whether the word conveys my meaning is, in my opinion, the more important of the two.

Berkovitz has saved me work by giving a clear and accurate statement of what my meaning is; and, though he gives it apropos of the Jews alone, it applies equally to all the other 'fossils' on my list. I mean, he correctly writes,³ 'that Jewry does not really belong to the West, or to the other dominant civilizations of the East, though it once did belong to a civilization of a category similar to the now "living" ones; there is therefore something "abnormal" about Jewry'.⁴ Berkovitz goes on to

manded. . . . The question did not arise for the Pharisee whether the prescribed action in a given case was trivial or important. . . . The action by itself, without the conscious intention of serving God by the doing of it, was worthless' (*ibid.*, pp. 76-77).

Thus the spiritual power of a sublime conception of, and attitude towards, absolute Reality was harnessed to the devoted performance of hereditary tribal observances in which ethical commandments were yoked incongruously—as it looks to an outsider—with regulations that had been retained and embroidered after they had become purposeless and meaningless in themselves.

¹ I myself should be gratified, as an Englishman from the Danelaw, to find myself bracketed with representatives of any of the historic communities that I have labelled 'fossils'.

² I now recognize, however, that it must seem offensive, since Rabbi Agus finds the phrase 'distressing' (*Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), p. 320), and no critic could be more temperate and objective-minded than he is.

³ In *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

⁴ Rabbi J. B. Agus observes (in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 10) that Jewish history in its diasporá phase was 'abnormal' in the eyes of Jews, too, of the nationalist school. As they

say¹ that I regard Judaism, as well as Jewry, as being a fossil. I describe Judaism sometimes, he says, as being a fossil of the Syriac Civilization, and sometimes as being a fossil of Syriac religion. He comments:²

'A fossilised community is not the same as a fossilised religion; nor is it understandable how Judaism may be, at the same time, a fossil of a civilization as well as a religion.'

I do hold that Judaism, as well as Jewry, is a fossil both of the Syriac Civilization and of Syriac religion. The ambiguity which has been remarked by Berkovitz has also been remarked by Rabbi J. B. Agus in an unpolemical and constructive critique of my work. Commenting on my view of Jewry as being a fossil, Rabbi Agus observes:

'His judgment derives from an ambiguity in the use of the term Judaism. At times he equates Judaism with the ethnic culture of Jewry; at other times he thinks of the Jewish faith as a separable pattern of ideas, which is included more or less in our modern Western culture. The elements of nationality—language, political organisation, common sovereignty, sense of ethnic kinship—he regards as a fossilised part of the larger whole of the ancient Syriac Civilization. The faith of Judaism is embraced for him within the general context of Christianity. . . . More recently, he has begun to speak of Judaism as one of the great religions of mankind. But the ambiguity of his original judgment persists—largely because he does not always bear in mind his own distinction between Judaism as a "higher religion" and the outer, civilizational elements of Jewish life.'

This is an accurate, as well as scrupulously fair-minded, résumé of my ideas.⁴ I agree that there is an ambiguity. As I see it, however, this lies, not in my judgement of Jewry and Judaism, but in the nature of Jewry and Judaism themselves. My judgement reflects, I believe, not a confusion in my mind, but my recognition of an ambiguity that has been characteristic of the attitude of the Jews since the Exile.

The different points in my position are not incompatible with each other, as far as I can see. There is surely no reason why a religion, as well as a community, should not be a survival of something that is otherwise extinct, and no reason either why Judaism should not be a survival both of the otherwise extinct Syriac Civilization and of this civilization's otherwise extinct religion. In the age before the Syriac Society was

saw it, in this phase 'the Jews were an "abnormal" nation preserving its identity and cherishing its institutions under the protective covering of a religious faith'. He also observes (in *The National Jewish Monthly*, November, 1956, p. 41) that Jewish historians of the Idealistic or Classical Reform School thought of the Jews as being what I have called 'fossils', 'though the terms they employed were free of the derogatory connotations' of this word. 'The historians Yost and Geiger believed that Jewish national life ended with the destruction of Jerusalem. Thereafter, only a religious community continued to live, within a shell, as it were, composed of petrified forms of communal institutions and customs.'

² Ibid., p. 84.

³ *Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), p. 321.

⁴ In a review of Samuel's book in *The National Jewish Monthly*, November, 1956, Rabbi Agus notes that he had 'pointed out, more than a year ago, the several errors that are contained in the phrase "fossil of Syriac Civilization", but without attributing to Toynbee either malevolence or confusion. In acknowledging this critique, Professor Toynbee stated that he was preparing to re-evaluate his findings.' I have now done this in the present volume, pp. 85-88, the present passage, and Chapters XIII and XV.

uprooted by Assyrian and Babylonian militarism and was subsequently penetrated by the radiation of Hellenism, it was still in the stage—characteristic of societies of all kinds and all dates before the rise of the higher religions—in which religion is an integral part of culture and is intimately associated with the non-religious elements in it. At this stage the gods of the Syriac World—Melkart of Tyre, Rimmon of Damascus, Yahweh of Israel, Judah, and Edom, Dagon of Gaza, Milcom of Ammon, Chemosh of Moab, and the rest—were none of them identified by their respective worshippers with an absolute spiritual Reality beyond the phenomenal universe. They were each identified with some local Syriac community, and indeed identified with every aspect of that community's life in an age in which a distinction had not yet been drawn between what was religious or sacred and what was secular or profane.¹ In this volume it has been noticed² that, down to this day, Judaism has never ceased to be a religion of this antique kind—never ceased, that is to say, to be the tribal worship of a particular single community, and never ceased to be an integral part of this community's particular culture—notwithstanding the fact that, since the deportation of the notables of the Kingdom of Judah to Babylon, Judaism has come to be also a universal religion which identifies Yahweh with absolute spiritual Reality and which therefore has a meaning and a message for all mankind. Thus Post-Exilic Judaism is a fossil both of the Syriac Civilization and of the religion that was an integral part of that civilization in the Pre-Exilic Age, besides being a 'higher religion' with a message for all men. This duality of Judaism may seem paradoxical, but it is a paradox which is an historical fact.

I have still to ask myself whether the word 'fossil', when applied either to a religion or to a community, is an apt word for conveying what I mean by it. In the two cases of the Jewish community and Judaism and the Parsee community and Zoroastrianism, the word 'fossil' evidently does provide an apt metaphor for conveying the two important facts that the religious observances of the two communities have become ossified and that these ossified observances have served as an effective social cement. They have enabled the participants in each of these two communities to keep their communities in existence, and this for many centuries running, without having a state of their own or even a country in which they were at home and in a majority. Most communities that have been exposed to these adverse conditions have failed to preserve their identities.³ The ossification of Jewish and Parsee

¹ 'All law in ancient pre-Mosaic Israel, as among all the Semites, was originally based on tribal custom. . . . A great deal of what was contained in the Hebrew Law during all periods of Israelite history had its source in the earliest ages. Moreover, as is well known, tribal custom was inseparable from religious custom because the tribe was under the special protection of its god, who was looked upon as directing the life of his worshippers in every sphere' (W. O. E. Oesterley: *The Jews and Judaism during the Greek Period* (London 1941, S.P.C.K.), p. 56).

² On pp. 85-88 and 294-5.
³ M. Samuel declares that there is only one people—the Jews—whom Time has never yet succeeded in selling to Oblivion (*The Professor and the Fossil*, p. 163). If he had said 'there are only one or two peoples' he would have been nearer to the truth; for, as Berkovitz notes that I note, the Jews 'have as their yoke-fellows of destiny the Parsees'. In Chinese eyes, no doubt, both Parsees and Jews are rather late competitors who have hardly yet had time to begin to show their mettle.

religious observances is at least one important factor that has enabled these two communities to make themselves exceptions to the usual rule. 'Fossilization' is surely an informative word for describing this social expedient.

Does the concept of 'fossilization' apply equally well to the other 'fossils' on my list? It seems to apply to those that, like the Parsees and the Jews, are 'dispersed abroad' among alien populations. The observances of Nestorian and Monophysite Christianity, for instance, seem already to be in process of becoming a social cement as tough as Zoroastrianism and Judaism. If the Nestorian and Monophysite 'diasporas' were to manage to survive as long as the Parsees and Jews have survived up to date, a comparable degree of ossification in their religious institutions would probably be the price that they would have to pay. On the other hand the word 'fossil' is less apt as a label for the Hinayanian and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhists. It is true that these Buddhist communities outside India represent a phase of Indian civilization that is otherwise extinct. But, unlike the Monophysites, Nestorians, Parsees, and Jews, the Tibetans, Mongols, Sinhalese, Burmans, Siamese, and Cambodians are not 'diasporas'. They are all geographically more or less compact peoples with countries and governments of their own. In Tibet, before the recent Chinese reoccupation and the abortive insurrection against it in 1959, the government was actually in the hands of the local Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist monks; in the South-East Asian countries Hinayanian Buddhism is the established religion. In Tibet and Mongolia religious observances have become ossified; but in the Hinayanian Buddhist countries some of the monks, at any rate, are still genuinely practising the strenuous spiritual exercises prescribed in the Hinayana as the way of release from desire, from feeling, and from self-hood; and this form of practical religion or philosophy is, of course, the extreme antithesis of 'fossilization'.¹ On the whole, it seems more enlightening to think of both the present-day Hinayanian Buddhist communities in South-East Asia and the present-day Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist communities in Central Asia as being, not fossils of the civilization of India in one or other of its past phases, but satellites of it that have developed distinctive characteristics of their own.²

One misfit, in my use of the word 'fossil', which applies to all the specimens in my list, is the implication that the life has gone out of them. A literal fossil is dead *ex hypothesi*; it is a dead relic of a once living organism. The communities and religions that I have labelled 'fossils' are also not alive; only organisms can be that. But they are going concerns, consisting of networks of relations between a number of living

¹ No doubt, there is also spiritual life in other 'fossils' on my list. For example, Rabbi J. B. Agus observes that 'the atrophy of the outer civilizational elements in Jewish life, giving the appearance of fossilisation to an outside observer, was itself due to the intense moralistic and pietistic standards of value that prevailed within it' (*Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), p. 322). Berkovitz makes the sweeping claim that 'the vitality of a higher religion is of the spirit; it can never become fossilised' (*Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 88). Unhappily, this dictum is contradicted by history, which is full of records of the spirit being killed by the letter. Rabbi Agus notes that 'the spectre of slow stagnation and even fossilisation is always present in Jewish life as a warning and as a challenge'—since the dogmatic assertion of the will of God puts a stop to all inquiry (*Judaism*, 1956, p. 37).

² See pp. 552-3, and the table facing p. 558.

people.¹ I am conscious that any metaphor taken from organic life is inadequate for conveying the nature of a social phenomenon, but at least it would make a better fit if I called these communities that have survived from some extinct phase of social life by the name of some antediluvian living organism. The word 'Coelacanthus', for instance, would not be open to the objection of implying, as the word 'fossil' implies, that the object designated by it no longer has any life in it. I should have no objection to substituting 'coelacanthus' for 'fossil' in my terminology. What I want is the aptest possible short title for a definition which, if written out, will run, as Berkovitz's succinct version of it shows, to far too many words for anyone to repeat each time that he needs to employ the concept.

Like organisms that, in the struggle for survival, have contrived to encase themselves in natural armour, the communities in diasporá, within their protective integument of ossified religious observances, have, of course, an active internal life of their own. Like all communities and societies, they are networks of relations between people, and the fossilization of people's institutions does not make fossils of the human beings whose institutions these are.² Berkovitz asks:³ 'How can human beings . . . be fossils?' As far as I know, they cannot be, though it is obvious that their institutions can. It is one of the characteristic virtues of human beings whose communities are scattered minorities that they have, on the average, a higher standard of mutual aid and mutual loyalty than people whose communities are in less precarious circumstances. They may also be active on the plane of the individual's inner spiritual life, as well as on the social plane.

Moreover, their own separate communal life is not the only network of social relations in which the representatives of a diasporá are engaged. Since they are scattered among alien populations, and since, like other human beings, they have to earn their living, they could not survive if they did not do business with representatives of the majorities in whose midst they live. Since, moreover, they have frequently been penalized by being prohibited, or anyway prevented, from engaging in certain staple occupations (e.g. agriculture and public administration), they have been stimulated to acquire greater skill than their neighbours in such professions as have been left open to them⁴—for instance, retail trade, with the opportunities that this has given to an outstandingly able few to become financiers on the grand scale. Thus, in certain fields of social activity, the representatives of 'fossil' diasporás are, and always have been, full participants in the life of the alien societies in whose midst they have been living. Nor have they confined this participation to the economic plane when they have been permitted by the alien

¹ M. Samuel is mistaken in thinking that I mean that the Jewish people 'is completely dead as a spiritually functioning entity' (*The Professor and the Fossil*, p. 20). But I think his mistake may be partly due to the inadequacy of the word 'fossil'—which does mean something dead—for expressing my exact meaning.

² On this point M. Samuel has caught my meaning correctly. 'He is not referring', he says, 'to individual Jews. . . . He is referring to the corporate personality' (*The Professor and the Fossil*, p. 20).

³ In op. cit., p. 84.

⁴ M. Samuel justifiably credits the Jews with 'a continuous exertion . . . of creative ingenuity in the midst of change' (*The Professor and the Fossil*, p. 182).

majority to take part in this majority's life on other planes as well. The abrogation of previous legal or customary prohibitions is what, in the recent history of Jewry in the West, has been called 'emancipation'. The Jews in the West have been 'emancipated' in this sense since Napoleon's time, the Parsees in India since the contemporary establishment there of the now defunct British Raj. Since the opening of these doors, very many Jews in the West and many Parsees in India have taken not only active but eminent parts in Western and Indian cultural and political activities of many kinds.¹

I have now admitted that the word 'fossil' describes only partially and inadequately what I mean by it. But it does express important parts of my meaning, and I still have not found an apter word to replace it. If some Jewish, Parsee, Armenian, or Assyrian reader of this book can supply me with a word that does fit better the social, cultural, and religious phenomena for which I need a label, I will adopt his golden word with alacrity.

20. BREAKDOWNS

In ordinary usage the English word 'breakdown' is employed in two different spheres: the world of man-made machinery and the world of Man himself; and, in the human sphere, it is employed in two different provinces: the life of an individual human being and the network of relations between a number of people. We speak of the breakdown of a motor-car, a railway-engine, or a generator in a power-station; the breakdown of a human being's physical or mental health or of his will-power; and the breakdown of some standing arrangement of relations between human beings: a system of government or of communications; an organization for the distribution of milk or of newspapers. This last-mentioned sense is the one in which I use the word breakdown in this Study. I use it specifically to mean the breakdown of a network of human relations of the kind that we call a society in process of civilization, and also to mean the accompanying breakdown of the pattern of ideas and values and consequent behaviour that is carried on a social network and is known as a culture.²

¹ Rabbi Agus, in *Judaism*, 1956, pp. 320-1, points out that in pre-emancipation days already there was a 'dynamic impulse' in Jewish spiritual and intellectual life and that, though the main expressions of this occurred within the interior life of Jewry, they were answers to the challenge of the contemporary climate of ideas and sentiments in the encompassing Islamic and Christian worlds. In Jewish history there has been a tension between a process of 'fossilization' and a process of spiritualization. On this, see the passages quoted on p. 514 from works of Rabbi Agus's, and also his comments printed in the annexes to the present chapter and to Chapters XIII and XV.

² On pp. 156-7 I have already discussed criticisms of my practice of dating a breakdown by some precisely datable event, such as the outbreak of a war, that I have taken as a symbol of it. An event may, of course, aptly symbolize a social breakdown without being more than a symptom of a more gradual change beneath the surface. I agree with Coulborn (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 151) that wars, for example, are symptoms of social breakdown rather than causes of it. But I would add that they have often been potent agencies in carrying a broken-down society along the road to disintegration.

Though I do not think of the breakdown of a civilization as being an instantaneous occurrence, I also do not use the word to include the long-drawn-out process of disintegration which has often, and perhaps usually, followed when a civilization has broken down. P. Geyl notes that, in my usage, 'breakdown' means only the beginning of the

The breakdowns of institutions—particularly those that are as comprehensive as societies and cultures are—can inflict loss and suffering on individual human beings in vast numbers and to an extreme degree; but these human beings do not have to break down themselves because one of their institutions—however important a one—has miscarried. Except in so far as the number of physical and mental breakdowns of individuals per thousand is reduced by progress in medical science, or the number of moral breakdowns by increase in accessible means of spiritual grace, there is no evidence, so far as I know, that the rate of individual breakdowns varies in accordance with differences in the population's social circumstances. We must presume that, on the average, approximately the same number of people per thousand retain, in all social circumstances, their normal human faculties, including normal moral stamina and normal creative power. These two faculties are the fundamental endowment of human nature. They are the ultimate source of all human achievement. So, as long as normal human beings survive in conditions in which they can still propagate their kind and pass on a social and cultural heritage of some sort to posterity, the cause of mankind is not lost and the door opening into the future still stands open. K. D. Erdmann is right in saying¹ that, in my eyes, history is the tragedy of civilization. But I must add that, in my eyes, the tragedy of civilization is not necessarily a tragedy for the human race.

Thus the breakdown of an institution, however comprehensive and however valuable that institution may have been, means no more than that the human race, or some portion of it, has shot one of its bolts. It will still have others in its quiver. At a cost—which may, of course, be a very high one—a broken-down institution can be replaced eventually by another one. Moreover, when a social disaster occurs, the account will not necessarily show no profit to be set against the loss. One of the truths about human nature is *pathei mathos*.² Human beings are capable of learning through suffering, and in this hard way they have often learnt lessons that they have been unable or unwilling to learn at less cost to themselves. The suffering that the breakdown of a civilization brings upon people inevitably, whatever may be the eventual outcome

end (*Debates with Historians*, p. 136). O. H. K. Spate objects (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 293) to 'the use of the word "breakdown" for the initial false step which sets a civilization on the road to breaking down'. I myself should say here: 'on the road, via disintegration, to dissolution'. I believe that my usage of the word 'breakdown', not Spate's, is the usual one. In ordinary parlance, a 'breakdown' is something that has a sequel. It is the beginning of a drama, not the whole play, and certainly not the denouement to the exclusion of its antecedents.

F. Creedy has suggested, in an unpublished letter to me, that I should substitute for the word 'breakdown' some non-committal phrase such as 'cessation of growth on the old lines' or 'change of form'. This might shield me from criticism, but it would not convey my meaning—which is that there has been a real breakdown of something: viz. a civilization. John Strachey has suggested, in an unpublished letter, that I should substitute the word 'crisis'. This word has the merit of implying that what has gone wrong is not necessarily irretrievable. If irretrievability is part of the connotation of the word 'breakdown', the word 'crisis' would be preferable from my point of view. I do not believe that any of the recorded breakdowns of civilizations have been irretrievable, though I can think of a number that have not, in fact, been subsequently retrieved.

¹ In *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 190.

² Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 177-8 (see pp. 580-1, 609, 617). P. Sorokin maintains that this is 'a one-sided pseudo law' and that it 'does not stand an elementary empirical test' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 189).

of the calamity, is thus a challenge to human souls. The challenge may not evoke any creative response, and then the result of the calamity will be uncompensated suffering, loss, and setback. But, as a matter of historical fact, some of the breakdowns of civilizations whose histories are known to us have evoked mighty creative responses in the forms of philosophies, higher religions, and universal states¹—these last being political expressions of a social rally that are also, as the higher religions are, symbols of the ideal unity of mankind and auguries of a future practical achievement of this unity once for all on a literally world-wide scale.²

¹ Hourani rightly interprets me as holding that, when a civilization is disintegrating, the conflict between a dominant minority and an internal and an external proletariat 'is not the whole story; for, at the moment when the three classes by the violence of their conflict are destroying both themselves and the civilization as a whole, all three of them explode in acts of creation which light up the dying world' (*The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 379). R. Coulborn notes that it is in times of social decline that great men seem to stand out from the mass (*Phylon*, 1940, offprint, p. 36).

² These creative responses to breakdowns have been a stumbling-block for several critics. For instance, O. H. K. Spate quotes a note of Somervell's on my usage of the word 'breakdown' in which Somervell points out that, 'when the term is used in this sense, some of the most fruitful, illuminating, and celebrated achievements in the history of a civilization may come after the breakdown and, indeed, in consequence of it'. Spate's comment is that I am using the word 'breakdown' with a 'Humpty-Dumptyish licence'. O. Handlin is equally caustic in *The Partisan Review*, July-August, 1947. 'The disintegration of a civilization is', he writes, 'very sad from the point of view of the creative minority. Yet we also learn that the process of decay is often marked by a rapid expansion of productive techniques, by a flourishing of the arts, and by the development of science, philosophy, and religion. To some readers and, no doubt, to many people who participate in the process, this turn of events seems almost desirable. If such is decay and such is growth, then it is clear that decay and growth have meaning only in terms of the artificial devices of the author's system. Since these processes have no relevance to the historical fate of human beings, the system itself can hardly contribute to an understanding of what happened to the real lives of the people of the past.' C. Trinkaus makes a similar comment in *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), p. 226. Toynbee, he says, equates growth with stability and disintegration with 'that dynamic phase where the most enormous leaps forward in human history are taking place'. Handlin's account of my position is, of course, a caricature. I have never suggested that the geneses, growths, breakdowns, and disintegrations of civilizations have had 'no relevance to the historical fate of human beings'. I believe that they have had a profound effect on the fate, not just of 'creative minorities', but of all the participants in the civilizations that have passed through these phases. Subject to these important reservations, I agree that his and Spate's and Trinkaus's strictures would have been to the point if I had been discussing 'breakdowns' in some absolute sense of the word. Actually, of course, there can only be breakdowns of something or other. In this book I am concerned with breakdowns of civilizations. And there is no reason whatever why these should not be followed by creative achievements. Indeed, it would be strange if this were not the sequel, if I am right, *pace* Sorokin, in believing that *pathei mathos* is one of the fundamental truths about human nature.

In an unpublished letter John Strachey has noted that, in my view, the miscarriages of civilizations, which have brought so much suffering on the human beings who have been their perpetrators and their victims, have in some cases been more fruitful for mankind than these civilizations' previous halcyon days. But, no doubt, L. Mumford (in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 28) and G. Masur (in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521-2) may be right in judging that I exaggerate the relative importance and value of the role of the disintegrations of civilizations in human history. However, Frankfurt, too, may be right in holding that 'a preoccupation with decay, such as underlies Toynbee's work, need not in itself vitiate study of the birth of civilization' (*The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 23).

Some comments of Feibleman's are telling, as well as witty. In my view, he says, 'the failure of human culture is the salvation of mankind' (*T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 22). 'It is in . . . civilization's decline that all the good things for which civilization deserves its name take their start' (*ibid.*, p. 140). 'There is really nothing that a civilization can do that will please Toynbee except to collapse and then, after having given birth to a universal church, to get out of the way!' (*ibid.*, p. 144). I cannot re-read this without bursting out laughing and crying 'touché'. I have not, after all,

Consequently, the sequel to the breakdown of a civilization has usually had two sides to it. On the one hand the breakdown of any institution must bring with it, for the people involved in it, a loss, to some degree, of rational and purposeful control over their own collective destiny. This must be so, because rational and purposeful control of common affairs requires effective arrangements for co-operation, and such arrangements require a systematic organization of relations. An emergency in which an established pattern of relations goes wrong will inflict loss and suffering on all concerned; it will block some previous opportunities, and will deprive some people of an initiative that was formerly in their hands. At the same time, the same emergency may transfer the initiative to other hands that did not previously hold it, and it may open up new opportunities that will not be the same as those that have been blocked, yet may be not less valuable.¹

The loss of rational and purposeful control over common affairs arises from the mutual frustration of conflicting wills. The effect of this is to shift the ever oscillating psychic frontier between the realm of the reason and will and the realm of the irrational and emotional underworld of the psyche, and to shift it, in this event, in the subconscious psychic underworld's favour. In contrast to the psyche's conscious surface, its underworld is subject to 'laws of Nature' of the kind that govern non-human fauna and flora and inanimate matter. Accordingly, when the psychic frontier shifts markedly in the subconscious underworld's favour, as it does when any important institution breaks down, one of the symptoms in which this shift reveals itself is a marked increase in the vein of regularity in the course of social and cultural history. This is the explanation, as I see it, of a difference that I believe that I have observed between the patterns in the history of a broken-down civilization before its breakdown and the patterns in it after the disaster has occurred. Institutions, unlike organisms, have no inherent predetermined maximum duration.² There is no reason, in principle, why an institution, once established, should not last as long as the human race. But in fact we know of no institution that has not broken down sooner or later; and the histories of institutions seem to display more conspicuous regularities after a breakdown than before it. If this observation is correct, the change observed is explicable as a consequence of a recession of the realm of reason and will and an extension of the realm of the subconscious—bringing with it, as this does, an extension of the realm of 'laws of Nature'.

In previous volumes of this book I took the history of the Hellenic Civilization and its relation to the subsequent Western Civilization as my 'model' for the histories of other representatives of the same species of society. In Hellenic history I analysed the post-breakdown phase of it as falling into three periods: a 'time of troubles' lasting for approxi-

succeeded in jumping clear of a standpoint that I have inherited from my ancestral religion.

¹ C. Trinkaus asks why the secession of the proletariat should not be regarded as being a movement of liberation and progress and integration (*Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), p. 237). Why not, indeed?

² See p. 269.

mately four hundred years; a 'universal state' lasting for approximately another four hundred years; and an 'interregnum' lasting for approximately three hundred years, between the dissolution of the Hellenic Civilization in the western provinces of the Roman Empire and the emergence, in the same region, of a Western Christian Civilization—a society of the same species as its Hellenic predecessor, to which it is affiliated. Applying this model to the histories of other civilizations, I found the Hellenic-Western chronological pattern recurring clearly enough and often enough—so it seemed to me—to make me think of it as a specific pattern in the histories of civilizations in general. Now that I have replaced my former Hellenic-Western model by an Helleno-Sinic model,¹ I have, of course, to reconsider the chronological pattern that I derived originally from an analysis of my former Hellenic-Western model.

As far as I can see, an approximately four-hundred-years-long 'time of troubles' still stands as the usual immediate sequel to a breakdown.² On the other hand, I feel less certain now about my supposed four-hundred-years' span for the duration of universal states. The Ch'in-Han first bout of the universal state in China did have this duration, like the Roman Empire in the West. But the Roman Empire itself lasted about two hundred years longer in its more important central and eastern provinces than it lasted in its outlying western provinces; and, in re-examining my list of universal states, I find too many exceptions to my supposed normal span of four hundred years to allow this supposed norm to stand. As for the three-hundred-years-long interregnum between the dissolution of the Hellenic civilization in the west and the emergence of Western Christendom there, the application of a Chinese or a Helleno-Sinic model suggests that the course taken by events in the West was not the most usual one.³ Usually the end of the first bout of a universal state has been followed, not by the dissolution of the civilization politically embodied in it and by a consequent inter-civilizational interregnum, but by a less violent social and cultural break. The usual sequel has been a bout of anarchy followed by a revival of the previous universal state. This is the pattern, not only of Chinese history after the fall of the Ch'in-Han Empire, but also of Eastern Orthodox Christian history after the fall of the Roman Empire in its central and eastern provinces. Other instances of this pattern have been noticed in this volume in the passage just cited. This pattern is strongly pronounced and is also frequent in its occurrence. At the same time, there does not seem to be any correspondingly exact chronological regularity. The lengths of the alternating bouts of anarchy and oecumenical order seem to vary.

The results of my reconsiderations in this field may be summed up as follows. It still seems to me that there is a common pattern in the post-breakdown phases of the histories of those civilizations that have broken

¹ See pp. 197–204.

² This four-hundred-years-long 'time of troubles' has sometimes been punctuated by a first attempt at a universal state. In the Hellenic 'time of troubles' this role was played by Alexander's abortive empire; in the Sumeric 'time of troubles' it was played by the less ephemeral empire of the dynasty of Agade.

³ See pp. 186–97.

down up to date; and I also still think that the first stock episode after the breakdown in this recurring pattern of events—namely the bout of anarchy that I have called a ‘time of troubles’—has had an approximately uniform duration as well as an approximately uniform plot. But I no longer think that this uniformity of duration extends to the subsequent episodes in the common pattern of disintegration as this has now been revised in the light of my replacement of my former Hellenic-Western model by a new Helleno-Sinic one.

Thus I have retained my previous belief that the sequel to the breakdowns of civilizations follows a standard pattern, but I have abandoned my previous belief that it also has a standard time-span. I have never believed that there is either a standard pattern or a standard time-span for the history of a civilization that has not yet broken down. I have never believed, either, that every civilization is predestined to break down. Consequently I have never believed that there is a uniform maximum time-span for the duration of all societies of the species ‘civilizations’, as there is for all specimens of any species of living organism. On this issue I always have differed, and still do differ, *in toto*, from that great man of genius Oswald Spengler. I am surprised to find Philip Bagby following Spengler to the length of suggesting¹ that ‘we may say, with a fair degree of certainty, that the whole process of development from the beginnings of a civilization to the beginnings of a “universal state” . . . takes between a thousand and fifteen hundred years’, and even looking forward to being able eventually to pin the standard duration of this period down to something ‘between 1100 and 1300 years’. I do not find Bagby’s arguments in favour of this unqualified chronological determinism convincing. The calculations by which he arrives at this result are, it seems to me, of the ‘Procrustean’ kind of which I, too, have been accused.

21. CREATIVE AND DOMINANT MINORITIES

By a creative minority I mean a ruling minority in which the creative faculty in human nature finds opportunities for expressing itself in effective action for the benefit of all participants in the society. I do not believe that, in a creative minority, there is a higher percentage of creative individuals, endowed with a larger fund of creativity on the average, than there is in any other section of the population. What distinguishes a creative minority, and wins goodwill towards it among participants in society outside the creative minority’s ranks, is that it is a ruling minority in which the creative faculty has free play and in which it is exercised in the public interest.

By a dominant minority I mean a ruling minority that rules less by attraction and more by force. As I see it, this change in emphasis—from ruling mainly by attraction to ruling mainly by force—occurs when a creative minority, in my sense of the term, loses its opportunities for creative action. It may forfeit these by its own fault, by falling into one of the snares by which the path of creativity is beset. It may be tempted

¹ In *Culture and History*, p. 221.

by success either into losing its head or into resting on its oars. Alternatively, a creative minority may be deprived of its opportunities for creative action by changes in social and cultural circumstances for which the representatives of the minority have had little or no moral responsibility. In whichever of these ways the minority may have lost its opportunities for creative action, it will arouse resentment, opposition, and resistance among the rest of the population if it tries to cling to power by force after having ceased to perform for society as a whole the services that previously made its rule acceptable.

On reconsideration, I think that, in previous volumes, I have painted the contrast between the 'creative' and the 'dominant' phase in the rule of a minority in too strong colours. I have painted it white in its 'creative' phase and black in its 'dominant' phase, whereas the true colours are a lighter and a darker shade of grey. Perhaps I also drew too sharp a dividing line between a ruling minority of either kind and the rest of the population. I have discussed these points earlier in this volume,¹ and therefore need not go into them further here.

22. THE PROLETARIAT

I defined my usage of this word at an early point in this Study.² I meant, and mean, by it 'any social element or group which in some way is "in" but not "of" any given society at any given stage of such society's history'. I have, I believe, kept to this usage consistently. It is based on the literal sense of the Latin word *proletarii*, and it coincides with the usage of this word in the terminology of Roman constitutional law. On the other hand, it does not coincide with the celebrated Marxian modern usage. In this Marxian usage 'the proletariat' means a labouring population employing a technique called 'machine industry' under a regime called 'capitalism'. People working under these conditions may, of course, be proletarians in my sense too. Many, indeed perhaps most, of them were that in Marx's and Engels' generation. Today probably a majority of the World's industrial workers have ceased to be proletarians in my sense through having acquired a stake in society. In 1961 this would, I should guess, be the situation in most parts of the Soviet Union, as well as in most, though not in all, Western countries. On the other hand, the proletariat in my sense includes people of many kinds who are not proletarians in the Marxian sense. It includes anyone who is penalized in any respect—economically, politically, or socially. A person's material standard of living is not the criterion. A pauper freeman—e.g. an Egyptian peasant—is a proletarian, but so too is a Roman magnate's confidential slave who has been permitted by his master to accumulate a large *peculium*; for the well-to-do slave is penalized by being kept in a sub-human juridical status. But a millionaire can still be proletarian, even if he is a freeman: for instance, a New Yorker Jewish millionaire who is a citizen of the United States but whose candidature for election to membership in a club has been rejected because he is a Jew and not because there is anything personally objectionable about

¹ On pp. 124-7 and 148-50.

² In i. 41, footnote 3.

him. The term, as I use it, includes all 'displaced persons' (refugees, exiles, and deportees), however highly gifted and distinguished; all mercenary soldiers, however highly paid and however formidable, from Cyrus the Younger's ten thousand Greeks to the French Crown's Swiss Guard; all subject peoples (e.g. the Bantu in South Africa and Kenya); all insurgents (e.g. those that, at the time when I was writing these words, were under arms in Cyprus and in Algeria), so long as they have not yet turned the tables on the powers that be, as the Coelestrian Jewish insurgents against the Seleucid monarchy did in the second century B.C.; and all barbarians beyond the pale, such as the Pathan tribesmen in the unadministered areas of Western Pakistan used to be before the Pakistan Government began to convert them, by methods of civilization, into voluntary citizens of the country.

23. HIGHER RELIGIONS

By higher religions I mean religions designed to bring human beings into direct communion with absolute spiritual Reality as individuals, in contrast to earlier forms of religion that have brought them only into indirect communion with It through the medium of the particular society in which they have happened to be participants.¹ Religion, in these earlier forms, is an integral part of the culture of some particular society. On the other hand the higher religions have broken—some partially, some completely—out of the configuration of the particular cultures in which they originated. They have become separate systems of specifically religious culture, in a state of tension with the systems of secular culture with which they have parted company. The advent of a higher religion thus brings with it the distinction—previously unknown—between 'religious' and 'secular', 'spiritual' and 'temporal', 'sacred' and 'profane'.

A religion cannot be extricated from the non-religious elements in culture without being divorced from the society that carries these non-religious elements on its network of relations between people. But no form of culture, secular or religious, can subsist without a social setting; and therefore the adherents of a higher religion cannot assert its independence of secular culture without at the same time incorporating it in an independent society. Every higher religion is carried on a network of social relations of its own.² This is a specific form of society, distinct from both civilizations and pre-civilizational societies. A name is needed for a society of this religious species, and it would be convenient if we could label it 'a church'. I have sometimes used the word 'church' in this wide sense; but this usage has been contested by several of my critics, and they are, I think, right. The word 'church' implies a unified ecclesiastical government, and this is possessed by perhaps no more than two of the extant higher religions: the Tantric Mahayana and the Roman Catholic denomination of Christianity. The Christian churches of the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Protestant Episcopalian

¹ A fuller definition has already been given on pp. 83-84.

² See p. 84.

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denomination are respectively in communion with each other without having any common organs of ecclesiastical government. The ecclesiastical organization of most other extant higher religions is still less formal and more loose.

24. UNIVERSAL STATES¹

A state may be defined as a non-voluntary system of impersonal relations that is maintained partly by force exercised by a governing minority and partly by the consent, or at least the acquiescence, of this governing minority's subjects.² I cannot think of any state in which either of these bases of state authority has been completely lacking, and there are countless historical examples of states being wrecked either by the government's failing to muster the minimum necessary amount of force or by their subjects' ceasing to have the minimum necessary feeling of obligation to obey the powers that be.

If a state may be defined in these terms, it is obvious that, up to date, there has never been a universal state in the literal sense of one whose government has exercised effective authority over the whole living generation of mankind in all the habitable lands and navigable seas and air levels of this planet.³ At the same time it is also obvious that in our day, for the first time in history, human beings have it in their power to establish a world government. The less than world-wide empires of the past have mostly been established by military conquest; and the invention of atomic weapons has made it practicable now for some single local state to conquer and hold down the whole world. It is true that the cost, in terms of spiritual as well as material devastation, of conquering the World in an atomic war looks as if it would be prohibitively high; and this consideration is already acting as a perceptible deterrent to any impulses to try to impose political unity by the traditional military method. Military conquest, however, has never been the exclusive means by which empires have been established, and it may be doubted whether any of them could have been established by force alone, without the support of other agencies. The use of military force on a large scale would not be possible without the previous establishment of a well-developed system of communications, mental as well as physical; and the development of any such system has many effects besides that of enabling staff officers to solve their logistical problems. Long before it has reached the point at which it is of practical military

¹ This subject has been touched upon already on pp. 186-204.

² It is not easy to draft a definition of the state that distinguishes it from another ancient institution: slavery. The distinction would be drawn if one could say that slavery is 'a non-voluntary system of personal relations resting wholly upon force'. But slavery, too, can be a system of impersonal relations when it takes the form of labour on plantations or in factories or the form of public penal servitude; and, on the other hand, when slavery is domestic, it may be maintained partly, or even mainly, by consent on the slave's part. In the Roman and the Islamic versions of the institution there was not much difference in practice between the relations of the head of a family with his slaves and his relations with his children.

³ This is, perhaps, what G. Masur has in mind when he dismisses my concept of 'universal states' as being illogical (the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521-2).

value, it will have gone far towards producing a consensus of feelings, minds, and wills by making people familiar with each other across the traditional barriers between different societies and different cultures. Without some such consensus on the part of its potential subjects, a state, even on the smallest scale, could never be established and certainly could not be maintained.

The particular point of consensus that has made the establishment and maintenance of relatively large empires psychologically possible has been a recognition, however reluctant, that a continuance of war, revolution, and anarchy in a crescendo movement is a greater evil than the forfeiture of cherished peculiarities such as national states, religions, languages, and other national manners and customs. In our world in our time we can see this recognition gaining ground, and this time over a literally world-wide field. It is true that non-Western subject peoples are asserting claims to national independence as against the less than world-wide Western colonial empires that, between them, have been ruling over so large a part of the human race in recent times. But these revolts of the previously subject majority against Western rule are being made in the name of Western political and moral principles, and the formerly subject non-Western peoples that have already achieved national independence are all using their newly won power of self-determination to Westernize their social structures and their cultural configurations of their own accord. In doing this, they are laying the foundations for a single world-wide society and for a uniform world-wide culture that will take its first shape within a Western-made framework—though, no doubt, it will become less specifically Western in complexion as all the cultural heritages of all the extant societies come to be the common possession of the whole of mankind. This progressive cultural and social unification of the whole human family is bound to find some expression on the political plane. The political expression need not necessarily take the form of a central government of the kind that has been established in the past as the result of less than world-wide wars of conquest. The most likely nucleus of a future political world order is perhaps a central authority exercising an effective world-wide control over the use of atomic energy and thereby making it impossible for any of the atomically armed local states to attack and conquer the rest.

The present movement of world affairs makes the study of past empires a matter of practical as well as theoretical interest for us in our generation. The empires that have most significance as pointers to the possible destiny of mankind are not those established by local states within the body social of some single civilization, such as the recent colonial empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and other modern Western local states, or the similar empires carved out of the carcass of the Achaemenian Empire by the successors of Alexander the Great. They are those that, like the Roman Empire in the Hellenic World or the Maurya Empire in India or the Ch'in-Han Empire in China, have given political unity to the whole, or almost the whole, of the domain of an entire civilization at a stage when this

civilization has been brought within sight of dissolution by a series of wars and revolutions on a progressively increasing scale of spiritual and material destructiveness.

None of these empires, up to date, has been a 'universal state' in the literal sense, and John Strachey has suggested¹ that 'single state' would be a more informative label for them. The word 'single' would, indeed, convey the important historical fact that the means by which peace and order have been established has been the replacement of a number of warring local states by one state embracing all their former territories and populations. The word 'universal' does, however, convey the further important historical fact that these states have actually been world-wide—not objectively, but in the significant subjective sense that they have looked and felt world-wide to the people living under their regime. It is, of course, one of the radical infirmities of human nature that each of us is under constant temptation to equate himself and his society and his culture with the Universe. He will be particularly prone to fall into this illusion when the society in which he is a participant happens, as it does in these cases, to be the carrier of a civilization, since, until the advent of the higher religions, civilizations were the finest, as well as the most widely extended, configurations of culture that mankind had achieved so far. The Ch'in-Han, Maurya, and Roman empires, and all the other known representatives of the same kind of state, did seem, to a majority of their respective subjects, to embrace all peoples in the World that were of any account. The Hellenes thought of the Roman Empire as being 'the entire inhabited world' (*hē oikoumenē*); the Chinese thought of the Ch'in-Han Empire and its successive avatars as being 'all that is under Heaven' (*T'ien Hsia*), or, short of that, as being 'the middle kingdom', surrounded by a superfluous fringe of barbarians and hardly less barbarous exponents of civilizations other than the Chinese.²

Most 'universal states', in my sense of the term, have, in fact, been heralds of a potential world-state. Besides being 'single states' from the standpoint of participants in the particular civilization whose domain has been united politically by one of the states of this kind, most of them have included portions of the domain of one or more other civilizations, and also portions of their own society's barbarian hinterlands. Moreover, in the course of time, their originally heterogeneous subjects have tended to acquire a sense of solidarity with each other as children of a common human family whose unity has been symbolized for them politically in the world-state in which they have had the good fortune to have been living. From our point of view in our day, the historic 'universal states' may be seen, in retrospect, as having been so many preparatory exercises for the eventual establishment of a literal universal state which, though still unachieved, is now, at last, no longer below our horizon.

K. D. Erdmann³ correctly observes that my concept of a 'universal

¹ In an unpublished letter.

² The case of Japan under the Tokugawa regime has been discussed on p. 207, footnote 2.

³ In *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 224-5.

state' was originally derived from an Hellenic model, and he contends that this model—i.e. a 'universal state' on the pattern of the Roman Empire—is not applicable to empires imposed by conquerors who, in their culture, have been aliens from the standpoint of the society to which they have given political unity. Presumably Erdmann has in mind such 'universal states' on my list as the Mongol and Manchu empires in China, the Mughal and British empires in India, the Spanish Empire in Mexico and Peru, and the Ottoman Empire in Orthodox Christendom (apart from Russia), and is contrasting these with the Muscovite Empire in Russia, the Aztec and Inca empires in pre-Columbian America, the Maurya and Gupta empires in India, and the Ch'in-Han, T'ang-Sung, and Ming empires in China, as well as the Roman Empire in the Hellenic World.

No doubt it is true that the resistance always aroused by empire-builders is intensified when, in addition to being enemies of a traditional parochialism, they also present themselves as aliens who do not appreciate or even understand the traditional common culture of the communities that they are subjugating. But the last column in my table of universal states,¹ in which I have noted the provenance of their respective founders, continuators, and restorers, brings out the truth that the founders have been 'metropolitans', from the heart of the world to which they have given political unity, still less frequently than they have been 'aliens' in the sense of representatives of some other civilization. Usually they have been either barbarians, from just outside the pale of the society that they have united politically, or else 'marchmen', from just inside it. The Romans, for instance, were marchmen of the Hellenic World, and so were the Illyrians, who re-established the Roman Empire after its first collapse. The Ch'in were marchmen of the Sinic World; the successive Theban founders of the Egyptiac Middle Empire and New Empire were marchmen of the Egyptiac World; the Incas were marchmen of the Andean World; the Akkadian founders and the Babylonian Amorite restorers of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad were marchmen of the Sumero-Akkadian World, and so were the Chaldaeans who restored this empire again, some eleven hundred years after the time of Hammurabi.

The second founders of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad were 'metropolitans', and so were the Maurya founders and the Gupta restorers of a universal state in India. The Mauryas and the Guptas both came from Magadha; Ur-Nammu came from Ur. But 'metropolitan' founders of universal states have been rare exceptions, and it is not difficult to see the reason for this. Communities in the heart of a society's domain are likely to have played prominent parts in its history since an early date, and later generations of their human representatives are therefore likely to have accumulated arresting memories of the community's past glories as a parochial state. Such memories are an incubus; and people who are haunted by them are thereby inhibited from casting themselves for a new role that will enable them to cope with a new situation. The people who find no difficulty in adapting

¹ Printed in vi. 327 and in vii. 769.

themselves to a new situation are those who have no anachronistic memories to paralyse them. In view of this it is not surprising that the Hellenic universal state should have been founded, not by the Spartans or by the Athenians, but by the Romans, and the Sinic universal state not by Ch'i but by Ch'in. On the contrary, it is surprising that the second founder of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad should have come from Ur and not from Asshur, and that the non-alien founders and restorers of a universal state in India should have come from Bihar and not from the Panjab.

Marchmen are not aliens, but they are the nearest thing to being this that it is possible to be for any individual or community within a civilization's pale. Accordingly, marchmen empire-builders draw on themselves, from their metropolitan subjects, a large measure of the odium that is incurred by empire-builders who are complete outsiders. After the Romans had established an unchallengeable ascendancy over the rest of the Hellenic World in the course of the years 218-168 B.C., it took the Hellenic public more than a quarter of a millennium to reconcile itself to Roman rule, and nearly a hundred years more passed before an Hellenic man of letters with a Graeco-Roman name, Publius Aelius Aristides, saluted the Roman Empire, in his classic encomium *In Romam*, as the beneficent universal state that had providentially saved the Hellenic World when it had been on the verge of self-destruction. As for the Ch'in regime in China, it made itself so odious that it survived for only fourteen years after its redoubtable founder had overthrown the last of the other independent states of the Sinic World, and for only three years after the founder's death. And, though, by that time, a universal state had become such an imperious necessity for the Sinic Civilization that it had immediately to be rehabilitated, it is significant that it was deliberately reconstituted on ostensibly different lines, and that the founder of this new and far longer-lived Han regime was a peasant from the interior.

The Persians, again, made their entry into civilization as marchmen of the Sumero-Akkadian World and as proselytes to its civilization; yet this civilization's contemporary representatives the Babylonians revolted against the Achaemenian 'Realm of the Lands' again and again; were finally crushed without ever being reconciled; and eventually welcomed Alexander the Great as a liberator. The Egyptians, for whom the Persians were outright aliens, did not react against them more vigorously than the Babylonians did. The Romans, too, were outright aliens for the Egyptians, Jews, Syrians, and other non-Hellenic peoples south-east of Taurus who had been forcibly incorporated in the Hellenic World by Alexander and had afterwards been forcibly prevented by Alexander's Roman successors from breaking away from it. When they did at last succeed, in the course of the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries of the Christian Era, in shaking off Roman rule, their long-repressed resentment burst out as furiously as the Eastern Orthodox Christian peoples' resentment against Ottoman rule when they succeeded in shaking this off in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹

¹ In both these cases the successful insurgent movements found their inspiration in

In the light of this analysis, Erdmann's distinction between universal states of indigenous origin and those of alien origin turns out, I should say, not to have the significance that Erdmann attaches to it. All universal states have provoked both resentment and gratitude in different quantities at different stages; and, though the differences between their respective experiences in this matter have been great, they have been not more than differences of degree. The criterion by which universal states should be appraised and classified is not the provenance of their founders; it is the service that they have performed for their subjects.

25. UNIVERSAL CHURCHES

Like the historic 'universal states', the historic 'universal churches' have been universal, so far, not in the literal meaning of the word, but in the belief and expectation of their adherents. They have been the institutional vehicles of missionary religions whose exponents have set out to convert the whole of mankind. The vigour and success of their missionary work has been proportionate to the degree in which their adherents have succeeded in changing over from a traditional national outlook to a revolutionary oecumenical one.¹

A generic application of the word 'church' is convenient, but is perhaps misleading, for the reasons that have been suggested already.²

26. SCEPTICISM

I have already defined my usage of this word in this volume.³ I mean by it, not disbelief in the human intellect's capacity to apprehend Reality, but disbelief in the existence of any alleged element in Reality, or aspect of it, that cannot be apprehended by reasoning. In this usage 'scepticism' is a synonym for 'rationalism', which brings out 'rationalism's negative side.

27. RATIONALISM

I have already defined my usage of this word, too, in this volume.⁴ I mean by it a belief in the human intellect's capacity to apprehend Reality, coupled with a disbelief in the validity of any alleged knowledge that has not been, and could not have been, acquired in the first place, and subsequently verified, by reasoning.

28. AGNOSTICISM

I have already defined my usage of this word, too, in this volume.⁵ I mean by it a recognition and acknowledgement of ignorance about

new ideologies. The Greeks and Serbs revolted from the Ottoman Empire and against Islam in the name of modern Western nationalism; the Egyptians and Syrians revolted against the Roman Empire and against the 'Melchite' ('Imperialist') version of Christianity in the successive names of Nestorian Christianity, Monophysite Christianity, and Islam.

¹ On p. 69, footnote 1.

² On p. 98, footnote 2.

³ See pp. 84 and 85-88.

⁴ On pp. 307-8.

⁵ On p. 72, footnote 3.

Reality, not in so far as the human intellect is able to apprehend Reality by reasoning, but about Reality beyond the limits of the human intellect's reach through the operations of which it is capable. In regard to this unknown possible sphere, or dimension, of Reality, rationalism, as I have defined rationalism, is dogmatically sceptical. The rationalist's stand is accurately described, in caricature, in words that are put into Benjamin Jowett's mouth in a celebrated rhyme: 'What I don't know is not knowledge.' The agnostic agrees with the rationalist in holding that what I do know is knowledge, but holds, in opposition to the rationalist, that what I do not and cannot 'know'—in the sense of 'apprehend by reasoning'—may, nevertheless, be real, and, what is more, may be the essence of Reality and the hidden key to the full understanding of those fragments of it that the human reason can grasp. While agreeing with the rationalist that we cannot know the unknowable, the agnostic does not think that our knowledge, so far as this extends, warrants a denial of the possibility that human beings may receive genuine intimations of the unknowable through non-intellectual channels—for instance, those channels, whatever they may be, that are the founts of poetry and of prophetic vision. The agnostic recognizes that the genuineness of such intimations cannot be 'proved' by reasoning; but, for this very reason, he holds, as against the dogmatic rationalist, that it also cannot be 'disproved' by reasoning. I have called the agnostic in my sense of the word a 'trans-rationalist', because he goes with the rationalist all the way that the rationalist goes, but does not believe that the limits of the human reason's reach are necessarily the limits of the human soul's possibilities of understanding. A more familiar synonym for 'agnostic' in my sense would be 'Platonist'.

VIII. THE RELATION BETWEEN MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

IN a previous chapter¹ I have taken note of criticisms of my practice (one not peculiar to me) of treating Man and his environment as two distinct entities. I have agreed that, in reality, they constitute one indivisible whole, and that it is a misrepresentation of Reality to draw the distinction between them. But, while admitting this, I have made the proviso that we must continue to distinguish them from each other if we are to continue to study the monolithic reality that is analysed, for 'operational' purposes, into these two components. 'It is only in the interaction of Man and his environment that the basic elements of history can be found.'² At the same time I have taken Spate's point that 'the facts of geography are the facts as they are approached'.³ 'The term

¹ Chapter VI, pp. 146-8.

² M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 171.

³ O. H. K. Spate in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 419, quoted on p. 147.

environment refers always to a body of facts relative to a particular focus or perspective.¹

An objectively identical geographical 'set-up' will offer a promising environment to one group of human beings, whose social structure and cultural configuration put it within their power to turn this particular geographical 'set-up' to account, while it will offer only a bleak and niggardly environment, or no environment at all, to other groups with other organizations and equipments. These other groups may be at opposite extremes of the social and cultural scale from each other. They may be either too poorly equipped or too demanding in their expectations to make anything of what might be a golden opportunity for some third party. For instance, both a New York business man and a Palaeolithic hunter or food-gatherer would be in danger of starving if marooned on a derelict Javanese paddyfield. Neither of them would be able to make anything of what had been a cornucopia for a rice-cultivating Javanese peasant. Though one cannot in practice treat Man's environment as being indistinguishable from Man himself, one can and must regard the potentialities of a geographical 'set-up' as being relative to a particular human group's capacity for making something of them.²

This point has been made by Spate apropos of Man's relation to non-human nature; but it is equally pertinent to Man's relation to his fellow human beings. A human being's environment can be analysed into two sectors, the geographical and the social. This analysis, like all analyses, may be misleading. 'The environment of every human being and the context of every human action contains human and non-human elements inextricably intertwined.'³ Yet the distinction is also perhaps useful and certainly necessary. In any case it is true of the social, no less than of the geographical, sector of Man's environment that the facts 'are the facts as they are approached'. An objectively identical social 'set-up' will offer a promising environment to one individual,⁴ or to one group or class of people, while others will be able to make little or nothing of it. The potentialities will be relative to the character, ability, social and cultural heritage, education (in the broadest sense), and personal experience of each individual who finds himself in this situation.

If we accept this point, it raises a question. Suppose that we had an exhaustive knowledge of both the geographical or social 'set-up' and the person or people encountering it: a knowledge, that is to say, which covered everything in each of the two parties that was relevant to the encounter between them: Should we then be able to predict the outcome of this encounter? I myself do not believe that we should. I believe that necessity, in the sense of a predetermined and therefore potentially predictable nexus of cause and effect, is not all-pervasive in the structure of Reality. I believe that Reality has in it a vein of something genuinely unpredetermined and therefore intrinsically unpredictable.

¹ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

² This has been observed not only by Spate but also by M. R. Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-3.

³ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁴ 'A single human being is the ultimate "enviroment unit"' (H. and M. Sprout: *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context of International Politics*, p. 18).

At the inanimate level this can perhaps be described only negatively as a vein of indeterminacy. At the human level, in beings endowed with a measure of consciousness, reasoning power, and will, the same vein displays itself as freedom of choice. This freedom is not, of course, absolute. It is limited by the pressure of external forces, non-human and human, that are not under the control of the human party to the encounter. It is also limited by the spiritual history, up to date, of the person to whom the choice is offered. As Bagby points out, in the train of many previous students of ethics, human freedom is not non-determination; it is self-determination.¹ 'We choose what we prefer; it is meaningless to say that we can choose what we do not prefer.'² Indeed, if we could, it is difficult to see what would distinguish human choice from the sheer senseless haphazard indeterminacy that is the form apparently taken by non-necessity when this displays itself in inanimate nature. Thus human freedom is in any case limited. But its apparent play, within these limits, raises the question whether it is genuine as far as it goes or whether it is altogether illusory.

I myself believe that it is genuine within its apparent limits. I also believe that the occasions on which it comes into play are laid bare by the 'heuristic' intellectual operation of mentally dissecting an indivisible reality into two entities, 'Man' and 'environment', that have encounters with each other. In laying bare these occasions of freedom, this particular mental dichotomy does, I believe, bring to light a genuine—and, if genuine, evidently most important—feature in the nature of Reality. Choice means the creation of something new.³ In the first volume of this book I illustrated the ideas of novelty, creation, and choice from mythology,⁴ and I declared my conviction that, on these points, mythology is illuminating.⁵ In thus avowing myself to be a believer in an at least partial freedom of human wills, I was, of course, taking sides in an ancient but so far undecided philosophical controversy.

In another chapter of the same volume⁶ I tried to prove my case. I tried to demonstrate, by examples, that the challenge of an identical 'set-up' did not invariably evoke an identical response from identically endowed and equipped human beings to whom this 'set-up' offered a potential environment. If this attempted demonstration of mine had held water, it would, I should say, have proved that, in an encounter, something comes into play that is not present in the previous 'make-up' of either party to the encounter, and that this intervention of something new is the decisive factor in determining the outcome. I am still convinced that this is the truth, but I have also been convinced, partly by new archaeological evidence, and partly by criticisms from Spate,⁷ that I have not succeeded in giving a cogent demonstration of the validity of my tenet.

For example, I tried to demonstrate⁸ that the particular potential

¹ *Culture and History*, p. 63.

² The concept of 'creation', which involves the meaning of the word 'new', has been discussed on pp. 252-4.

³ i. 299-302.

⁴ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 287-304, and in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), pp. 406-28.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁶ i. 271-99.

⁷ i. 249-71.

⁸ In i. 256-8.

environment offered by the Nile in Egypt was not the positive factor to which the genesis of the Egyptian Civilization was due. I argued this by citing what I then believed to be evidence that there were other river valleys, offering potential environments similar to that offered by the lower Nile valley, in which no civilization had ever come to birth, though some of them had eventually been turned to account by pioneers of civilizations that had come to birth elsewhere. I observed that the lower valley of the Tigris and Euphrates did offer a similar potential environment; that here an independent civilization, similar to and more or less coeval with the Egyptian, had come to birth; and that this was evidence, so far as it went, in favour of the thesis that civilizations are products of geographical 'set-ups'. But, taking a cue from Eduard Meyer,¹ I went on to say that no independent civilization had come to birth in the Jordan valley, in the lower Mississippi valley and delta, or in the valleys of the Colorado and the Rio Grande. Apropos of the Jordan valley, I quoted Meyer's statement that

'the Jordan valley between Betš'e'an and Pella, the Ghor, a broad deep rift between mountain walls, with a glowing hot climate, lay completely desolate [in the sixteenth century B.C.] and has remained as good as uninhabited to-day'.

I then quoted Meyer's judgement that

'much light is thrown on national character (*Volkscharakter*)² by the fact that here the attempt has never been made—as it has been made under the substantially similar conditions in the Nile valley—to take advantage of the soil and to render it productive by systematic irrigation. It is only when we draw this comparison that we become fully able to appreciate the energy with which the Egyptians have made their country the most productive agricultural country in the World for thousands of years on end.'

On reconsideration, I do not think I am to blame for having accepted Eduard Meyer's statement and judgement at the time. I was writing my first volume in 1930, two years after the publication of the volume of Meyer's book from which I was quoting, sixteen years before the publication of Nelson Glueck's *The River Jordan*, and twenty-two years before the beginning of Miss Kenyon's work at Jericho. The point that Meyer was making, as I interpret the passage, was that, notwithstanding the formidable heat in a rift valley far below sea-level, it is likely that the prehistoric ancestors of the historical Egyptians would have made of the Jordan valley something like what they did make of the lower Nile valley if the bluffs on which they had settled had happened to be those overlooking the Ghor and not those overlooking the section of the Nile valley that their historical labours eventually transformed into Upper Egypt. Here Meyer was showing an

¹ In *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii (1), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 96, and in vol. i (1) 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 65.

² As I mentioned in quoting Meyer in the first volume of this book, I myself would attribute the successful human response to the challenge of the lower Nile valley, not to a hypothetical fixed 'national character', but to a particular human effort to cope with a particular emergency.

intuition which was not put off the scent by his (to my mind, unwarrantable and mistaken) postulate of a fixed Egyptian national character. He was showing surprise that the Jordan valley should not (as he believed) have been turned to account by human enterprise, in spite of its daunting climate. Accepting the contrast, as Meyer had stated it, between the respective histories of the Jordan valley and the Nile valley, I interpreted this as indicating that the outcome of an encounter between human enterprise and a difficult geographical environment has, in at least one pair of instances, been non-uniform, and that it is therefore intrinsically unpredictable. In the light of the state of knowledge at the time, I do not think that either Meyer's statement, or my reading of its significance, was unreasonable.

Meyer, however, has been taken to task by a great scholar of my generation, W. F. Albright, in a book published in 1949,¹ at a date when Glueck had carried out his explorations and had published the results.

'In 1928 [Albright writes], the greatest ancient historian of modern times, Eduard Meyer, wrote, two years after visiting the Jordan valley for the first time in his life—unfortunately in the early autumn—that the Jordan valley south of Beth-shan and Pella was absolutely barren, "burning hot between its mountain walls", and that no attempt had ever been made in pre-Roman times to make the soil productive by systematic irrigation! No one who reads Nelson Glueck's vivid account of the very same district . . . can fail to see how completely archaeological research has disproved this off-hand impression of the great historian.'²

This criticism of Meyer's dictum has been justified, more sensationally than Albright could have foreseen when he wrote and published it, by Miss Kenyon's subsequent discoveries at Jericho. So far from having been left undeveloped till the sixteenth century B.C. or till the Roman Age, the Jordan valley has been occupied and cultivated by irrigation for at least twice as long, up to date, as either the lower Nile valley or the lower valley of the Tigris and Euphrates. Miss Kenyon finds³ that the beginnings of Jericho must have been not much later than the end of the pleistocene period—that is to say, not much later than 10,000 B.C. The Jordan valley has been cultivated, on and off, from that day to this, and the interruptions are attributed, by both Miss Kenyon and Dr. Albright, not to oscillations in the local climate, but to barbarian invasions from the eastern desert. In other words, the history of the Jordan valley, like the history of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, tells against, not for, my hypothesis that encounters between comparable parties under comparable conditions have not always had similar outcomes.

Spate has taken issue with me over this question of the significance of the Jordan valley's history, but here he, too, has gone astray—and this with less excuse, I should say, than I or Eduard Meyer had, since Spate published his two critiques of my work in 1952 and 1953 when both Glueck's and Albright's books were already accessible to him, and

¹ *The Archaeology of Palestine* (Harmondsworth 1949, Penguin).

² Albright, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-2.

³ K. Kenyon: *Digging up Jericho*, p. 75.

when the main findings of the excavations at Jericho were already public knowledge thanks to progress reports in the press. Yet Spate in 1952 and 1953 accepted Meyer's statement as correct, as I had accepted it in 1930-4. He, too, assumed that the Jordan valley had never been irrigated, and found the explanation of this in the climate of the Ghor and in the physiography of the Jordan valley, which he contrasts with the situation in Egypt.

'The Jordan . . . has only 1 per cent of the annual discharge of the Nile, with nothing comparable to the Nile flood regime, while its valley is far less well endowed than that of the Nile as regards both terrain (much of which is dissected) and soils. Many of these are coarse and porous and lie on terraces well out of reach of irrigation; to say nothing of the stimulating climate of a walled-in valley 1000 feet below sea-level. All Palestine has about 1000 cubic metres of water per inhabitant (about 1½ millions), against 5000 cubic metres of Nile water for each of Egypt's 17 million people.¹ The further comparisons with the Nile overlook the structure of its valley, in which coarser sediments are trapped in the upper basins, but not the fine basaltic silts brought by the Blue Nile. . . . The uniqueness of the Nile flood region and the Etesian winds, so important to the navigation which held together the Egyptian Civilization, are not so much as mentioned: perhaps for good reason; for, once the Nile is recognised as unique, one of Toynbee's main arguments against environmentalism falls to pieces forthwith.² Even the Euphrates-Tigris environment is only generically, not specifically, akin to the Nilotic.'³

In these passages Spate shoots wide of the mark in one case and overplays his hand in another.

His ironical quip about 'the stimulating climate of a walled-in valley 1000 feet below sea-level' invites the crushing retort that, during the first 6,000 of the last 12,000 years, Jericho was, so far as we yet know, the only place in the World where a state of culture that might be called civilization was already a going concern. His facts and figures are beside the point. He has overlooked the obvious consideration that, after the Ghassulian period, i.e. since about 3500 B.C.,

'settlements in the Jordan valley were nearly always established at the entrances of the valleys, near perennial streams and springs which are still sources of water.'⁴

The cultivation of a piece of the Jordan valley by irrigation from the spring at Jericho antedates the cultivation of another piece of it at Ghassul by some five or six thousand years. The water that irrigated the fields round Ghassul may have been drawn from the Jordan, which flows between flat banks for those last few miles above its debouchure into the Dead Sea, but it may also have been drawn from a lateral stream that flowed out farther into the Jordan valley in the first half of the fourth millennium B.C. than at any time since. The abandonment of Ghassul may have been due to increasing difficulties in drawing the

¹ E. C. Willatts: "Some Geographical Factors in the Palestine Problem", in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cviii (1947), pp. 145-79; reference at p. 166.

² *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 410.

³ *Toynbee and History*, p. 299.

⁴ Albright, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

water, whatever its source, or it may have been due to a barbarian invasion.¹ In any case, archaeological exploration has now made it clear that the water with which the Jordan valley has been irrigated, on and off, for the last twelve thousand years has seldom, if ever, been drawn from the Jordan River. I took this point myself when, in July 1957, I had an opportunity of crossing the Jordan valley several times at different places, and visiting Jericho among other sites on its floor. By that date I could already have learnt the facts, as Spate could have learnt them in 1952, from authoritative accounts of them in accessible publications. Geographers, as well as historians, are fallible; and Spate's failure to keep his knowledge of the Jordan valley's history up to date would have been venial if the tone of his criticism had not been supercilious.

Again, Spate's assertion² that the geographical 'set-up' in the Nile valley is 'unique' seems to be unwarrantably sweeping. V. G. Childe points out³ that the lower Tigris-Euphrates valley, too, was 'periodically inundated by floods', though he also notes⁴ that these were not so regular or so well-timed for agricultural operations as the annual inundation of the Nile was, and that 'only the wide marshy delta offered the challenge and reward that had evoked the artificial environment of Sumerian cities. . . . South of Cairo the narrow valley through the barren desert plateaux has analogies, real but remote, with Sumer.' If the picture here drawn by Childe is correct, Egypt and Sumer, in their respective states of nature, had too much in common with each other to warrant our considering either of them to have been unique. Moreover, if Spate were right in claiming uniqueness for Egypt, we should have to conclude that what is unique about the Nile valley is what determined the birth of a civilization there, and consequently that the British school of diffusionists were right in holding that the genesis of civilization in Egypt was a unique event and that all the civilization that there has ever been, either in the Old World or in the New World, has been propagated by prospectors fanning out from an original base of operations in the unique Egyptian cradle of civilization.⁵ By the years 1952-3, when Spate was writing the two papers from which I have been quoting, the progress of archaeological discovery was already pointing in other directions. It was proving that, in the Jericho oasis in the Jordan valley, civilization is twice as old as it is anywhere else in the World, not excluding the lower valleys of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates. And it was also showing that in the lower Nile valley, when the local Neolithic culture did at last blossom into civilization, it did so under a stimulus from an already achieved civilization in the lower Tigris-Euphrates valley. Thus, if it were true that the geographical 'set-up' in the lower Nile valley offered a 'unique' opportunity for transforming it into an environment for a civilization, this would have to be reconciled with the fact that the human occupants of other, in themselves less favourable, geographical 'set-ups' were the first in the race.⁶

¹ Albright, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 300, as well as in *The Geographical Journal*, loc. cit.

³ In *What Happened in History*, p. 89.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁵ A critique of this theory will be found in this book, i. 221-3.

⁶ Spate himself, in the passages quoted above, has pointed out the advantages offered

However, my concern with Spate is, not to return his fire, but to follow out the second thoughts into which I have been stung by the stimulating shot with which he has peppered me. He has given me food for thought; for, though his criticism of my reading of the Jordan valley's history misses fire, he has made effective criticisms of my attempt¹ to reconstruct the state of the lower Nile valley as it was before Man cleared, drained, and cultivated it, on the analogy of the present state of the upper basin of the White Nile along the Bahr-al-Jabal and the Bahr-az-Zaraf.

'There is obviously a good deal in this, but is the emphasis on the severity of the challenge, one of Toynbee's leading motifs, really valid? Assuming that the ecological reconstruction is correct, the comparison of the valley bottom in Egypt with the swamps of the Bahr-el-Ghazal leaves out of the reckoning the all-important difference in scale between a strip of marsh 10 or 15 miles wide, which can actually be overlooked from the firm ground on either side (ground which provided settlement-sites with tool- and building-stone), and on the other hand vast swamps ten times as wide and with no compensating advantages. There is an obvious difference in tractability, not to mention the point already made about the river navigation, and later the accessibility of copper and other minerals lacking in the Sudan.'²

Spate also draws a telling contrast between the geographical 'set-up' in the Nile basin on the one hand and in the Colorado and Rio Grande basins on the other, in opposition to Eduard Meyer's thesis, adopted by me, that 'the great river valleys of America . . . could just as well have become centres of the development of higher civilization as the valleys of the Nile, Euphrates, and Hwangho'.

'Hardly any of the basin of the 1750 miles long Colorado has over 20 inches of rain; contrast this with the 40-80 inches of the Blue and White Nile catchments in Abyssinia and Uganda. The topography of the Nile and the Colorado basins is different in the extreme; the Colorado is much more broken, but there is nothing like the staggered series of tributaries above Khartoum, with the Blue Nile ponding back the White and prolonging the period of high water. The vegetation cover of the more humid parts of the Nile basin, and its lakes and marshes, are far more efficient regulators of runoff than the vegetation of the Colorado. In the Nile basin rainfall is either almost non-existent or falls fairly steadily in well-defined seasons; in the Colorado as a whole there is more rain than on the lower Nile, but much of it falls in irregular violent downpours, and erosion is intense. The Rio Grande approximates more nearly to the Colorado than to the Nile, though it is not a very close approximation. Neither the Colorado (obviously) nor the

by Upper Egypt as a site for the establishment of a civilization: an abundant water supply; a navigable river with a prevailing up-stream wind; a manageably limited area of potentially cultivable land to reclaim; a rocky rim, affording sites for habitation above flood-level and stone for making tools. Of these advantages, the Jordan valley offered the last two only; the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin the first only. The lower Tigris-Euphrates basin was so distant from sources of stone and metal that the pioneers on this vast expanse of alluvium were reduced to making their tools out of ultra-hard-baked clay in an age when the older seats of culture to the north were already using metal tools (R. J. Braidwood: *The Near East and the Foundations of Civilization*, p. 33). Yet Jericho, in the Jordan valley, won the race for civilization; Sumer came in second; Egypt came in only third.

¹ In i. 311-15.

² *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 412. Cp. Toynbee and History, pp. 298 and 300-1.

Rio Grande offers anything like the potentialities for navigation which are found on the Nile, with its peculiar advantage of the Etesian winds blowing upstream; and the role of the river as a highway (which Toynbee does not so much as mention)¹ was only second to its value for irrigation in the development of Egyptian civilization.

In both the Colorado and the Rio Grande there are doubtless some broad and general analogies to the Nile; but they are far from "offering the environmental conditions" of Egypt, and the differences are very significant from the cultural point of view. The most fundamental are that the Nile has a unique advantage in its flood-regime, and that in its Nile basin "the coarse stuff is caught in the sunken fault-block depressions into which the Upper Nile flows" (the fine and fertile basaltic silt of the Blue Nile passes on), while "the Tigris and the Colorado, fresh from the canyon, are ditch-chokers".²

Thus Spate's pair of papers raises for me the question: Where have I gone wrong? In choosing river valleys as my field for investigation, did I make a good choice, and is the reason why the result has been unsatisfying, nevertheless, because, as Spate has shown, 'the essential step of detailed verification of hypothesis against fact has been sketchy'?³ Or has my error lain in not taking account of all the elements in this 'set-up' and of their relations with each other? Or did I make a bad choice, in the sense that I chose a 'set-up' that was highly complex, when I could have found a simpler one, in which it might have been less difficult to make sure that one had isolated all the relevant elements and had taken adequate account of all of them in their mutual relations? Did I also make a bad choice in choosing a field in which we do not know enough about the several human parties to the encounter in the several different instances to be able to tell whether or not they were truly comparable in endowment and equipment at the time when their respective encounters with a river valley took place? Or is demonstration by this comparative method inherently impossible because, when one is dealing in terms of human beings and of geography, it is never possible to be sure that, in reconstructing the parties to the encounter in a number of different cases, one has really isolated properly comparable examples on either side?

I plead guilty to the charge of not having carried out a detailed verification on the lines that Spate indicates, and also to the charge that in any given case I have taken into consideration only one or two of the factors in the physical setting, and that 'the idea of the environment as an indivisible complex of all these factors . . . hardly ever appears'.⁴ I leave it as an open question whether, if my investigation had not been inadequate, as it has been, in these two ways, my choice of river valleys for my field would have been a specially good or bad one. The fourth question is the fundamental one, and I will approach it by applying the same train of reasoning in two other fields, in order to counteract

¹ It is mentioned in vol. vii, p. 81, footnote 1.—A. J. T.

² *Toynbee and History*, pp. 299–300, quoting J. Russell Smith and M. Ogden Phillips: *North America* (New York 1942, Harcourt Brace), p. 599, footnote 16.

³ *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 410. Like a boomerang this criticism hits the critic as well as his target in their encounter over the Jordan valley.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. cit., p. 412.

the chance that the field of river valleys may have been an unusually complex one. Let us see how we fare if we apply the same method of reasoning to the opening up of the western basin of the Mediterranean in the last millennium B.C. and to the Western Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era.

In each of these two fields we have the advantage of dealing with a single 'set-up'—a geographical one in the first field and a socio-economic one in the second—which confronted all the human competitors alike and in which all of them alike were free to try their fortunes. Obviously this is, in itself, a simpler situation than that of the river valleys. In these the several competitors were confronted with different river valleys which were deemed by Eduard Meyer and by me to be uniform in all points relevant to their human occupants' encounters with them, but which, as Spate has shown, may have differed from each other in points that made all the difference to the circumstances of the encounter in each case. In the opening-up of the Western Mediterranean and in the making of the Industrial Revolution some of the human competitors were conspicuously more successful than others. If it were to be ascertained that the successful and unsuccessful competitors all had the same endowment and equipment for meeting what, in these two fields, really was an identical challenge, then it would have been demonstrated that, with uniformly identical conditions on both sides, the result of the encounter was different in different instances: in other words, that the relation between the factors in the encounter and the outcome of the encounter was not a relation of cause and effect.

In the opening up of the Western Mediterranean the Canaanite and the Hellenic competitors (leaving the enigmatic Etruscans out of account) were like each other in being people with a maritime tradition who were organized politically in city-states. Why, then, were some active, and others inactive, in the West Mediterranean maritime enterprise? The Phoenicians embarked on it, but not their neighbours the Philistines farther down the coast of Canaan, though the Philistines had been one of the 'Sea Peoples' who had made the *Völkerwanderung* in the early years of the twelfth century B.C. The Achaeans took part, but not the Eleans; the Locrians, Chalcidians, and Eretrians, but not the Boeotians; the Megarians, but not the Athenians; the Corinthians, but not the Argives; the Phocaeans, but not the Erythraeans; the Milesians, but not the Ephesians. We cannot explain why some of these communities did and others did not take part in the overseas enterprise by the hypothesis that those who abstained were relatively rich, and those who participated were relatively poor, in agricultural resources at home. This hypothesis will not fit the facts. It is true that the enterprising Phoenicians, Achaeans, Locrians, Corinthians, Phocaeans, and Milesians had comparatively small agricultural resources, and also true that the unenterprising Philistines, Boeotians, Argives, and Ephesians had comparatively large agricultural resources. But so had the enterprising Chalcidians and Eretrians (they kept on fighting each other for the rich Lelantine Plain in their homeland Euboea); and the Megarians, too, were not badly off for good agricultural land at home. On the other hand, the

Athenians, who were conspicuously unenterprising in this period of Hellenic history, though ultra-enterprising both before and after, were also conspicuously badly off, in all periods, for good agricultural land at home. In short, in the Hellenic case, at any rate, the enterprising group and the unenterprising group each included both agriculturally poor and agriculturally rich communities. Each of these groups, therefore, may be taken as being a fair sample of its society in that age. And, if this is granted, then we do seem to have, here, a case in which an identical challenge did evoke non-identical responses from different sets of recipients of the challenge who, at any rate on the average, had an identical social and cultural 'make-up'.

The same train of reasoning may be applied in the field of the modern Western Industrial Revolution. Eighteenth-century Western Europe was inhabited by a number of peoples with approximately the same endowment and the same equipment, cultural and technological. The intercourse between them at the time was active and intense, so that the achievements of any one of them could be adopted rapidly by any of the rest. Why, then, was the Industrial Revolution made in Britain, not in France, and in Belgium, not in Holland? And why was Germany, with the Ruhrgebiet and Upper Silesia in her pocket, so slow in pulling them out and turning their industrial potentialities to account? If we have made sure that the late-eighteenth-century West European peoples are truly comparable in all points that are relevant to the making of the Industrial Revolution or to the failure to make it, then we seem, here, to have another field in which uniform antecedents have been followed by diverse consequences.

But can we guarantee in this case that the endowments and equipments of the human parties were truly identical for the purpose of our particular comparison of them? I myself have cited¹ the well-known fact that 'in the eighteenth century, after the union of England and Scotland in A.D. 1707, Great Britain was the largest single free-trade area in the World', and have made, in my turn, the well-worn point that 'undoubtedly this was one of the principal reasons why Great Britain forged ahead of all her neighbours in her economic development before the eighteenth century was over'. In fact, closer inspection shows that, after all, the France of the *ancien régime* was not on a par with Great Britain in a matter that goes at least some way towards explaining why Great Britain, not France, was the European country in which the Industrial Revolution was made.

If we apply the moral of this conclusion to the geographical field of investigation, it justifies Spate's observation² that, in order to carry out my test under conditions in which its results would have validity, 'it would be essential to construct a model (in the economists' sense) in which all variables except physical setting are reduced to uniformities, and moreover the variations in the physical setting are themselves merely and strictly repetitive'. Spate and, indeed, any other critic will always be able to show that this requirement has not been met by me or, indeed, by any other inquirer.

¹ In *iv*. 170.

² In *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 411.

Spate has, so it seems to me, done more than show that one particular believer in the genuineness of freedom has failed to prove his case. He has shown, I should say, that this case is intrinsically unprovable, and, if he has indeed shown this, he has also shown that, for the same reason, the determinist's case, too, is intrinsically unprovable.¹

Spate's logical weapon is a penetrating and far-ranging one. It is a reminder that, when we are reasoning in terms, not of abstractions, but of phenomena, we are never in a position to guarantee that we have succeeded in insulating the relevant points, all of these, and nothing but these, and are consequently never in a position to guarantee that the entities which we are bringing into comparison are properly comparable for the purpose of our investigation. When the phenomenon with which we are concerned is an encounter, our difficulties are doubled, because here there are two sets of entities within each of which a uniformity, in all points relevant to the encounter, has to be guaranteed, as between the several examples in each set, if our reasoning is to hold good. On the one side we must be able to guarantee that the human individuals, communities, or societies that receive, and respond to, a challenge have identical endowments and equipments for dealing with the 'set-up' that offers itself as a potential environment for them. On the other side we must be able to guarantee that this 'set-up' offers itself in an identical form in each case. However far we may succeed in going in our search for sets of identical examples on either side, we shall never be

¹ In these two papers about my work Spate does not disclose where he himself stands in the controversy. He is critical of 'possibilism', which is, if I understand right, the doctrine of a school of geographers who hold that Man has a considerable latitude of choice in responding to the challenge of a geographical 'set-up'. As H. and M. Sprout put it, possibilists believe that the environment contains both opportunities and limitations—neither of them more than potential till Man takes action (op. cit., p. 40). 'Calculation of what is possible is not to be compared with prediction of what will be attempted' (ibid., p. 44). 'Possibilism does not provide any approach whatever to explanation or to prediction of motivation, choice, and decision' (ibid., p. 48). At the same time, it evidently does allow room for some measure of free play of human wills. In Spate's view 'it does not seem certain that "possibilism", as often understood (or misunderstood), is the automatic alternative to a rigorous environmentalism. There may be a middle term, which one might call "probabilism"' (*The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 419). Quoting Febvre's dictum that 'there are no necessities but everywhere possibilities', Spate comments that Febvre ought to have added: 'of which some are more possible than others' (ibid., p. 420). He finds that 'the emphasis on human initiative, though correct in itself, has sometimes been' allowed to go too far in practice, and that this leads to vagueness of thinking which is as deplorable as the narrowness induced by rigorous environmentalism (ibid., p. 420). He commits himself to concluding that 'we may find ourselves left with a considerable residue of determinism' (ibid., p. 423). The Sprouts concede (in op. cit., p. 31) that strict environmental determinism may explain some small part of human behaviour. P. Bagby (in *Culture and History*, p. 147) makes the point that the environment 'cannot be a fully determining factor, as some authors, notably Montesquieu and Buckle, have supposed. After all, Nature simply lies there passively. It is up to the human beings to decide whether, and in what way, they are going to use it.'

Spate recognizes that 'the problems of chance or free will or necessity must be faced in some fashion', because a geographer's 'attitude on this most fundamental general problem can hardly fail to have its effect upon his thinking on the more restricted question of geographical determinism versus possibilism' (ibid., p. 408). But he adds that, 'though these matters are not so irrelevant as may seem', it would be 'folly' on his part to proceed into them very far. 'It is not the function of the geographer to write philosophy' (ibid., p. 408). A philosopher might ask how, if one steered clear of philosophy, one would be able to inquire into human affairs at all, in either their geographical aspect or any other. Spate does go rather farther into the philosophical issue in a later paper with the title 'How Determined is Possibilism?' (*Geographical Studies*, vol. iv, No. 1 (1957), pp. 1-10). Here he looks for a *modus vivendi* between determinism and possibilism, inclining more towards determinism, but this not so far as to commit himself to it.

able to prove that there is not some non-identical feature that we have overlooked, and that this non-identical feature is not the decisive factor that accounts for the different outcomes in different cases of what has looked to us like an identical situation but may not have been this in truth. This point is made very clearly in the following passage of an unpublished letter written to me by Gilbert Murray on 8th April, 1932, after he had read volume i of this book in typescript.

'In all this argument to show that similar conditions do not produce similar results, I kept feeling that the reasoning did not convince because you never had *all* the conditions nor exactly similar conditions. E.g., conditions on the Jordan and the Nile may have been generally similar, but no-one would say that the human result in civilization must be exactly proportionate to the geographical data. You speak of the "total environment", but I did not feel as if I had ever been given the total environment.'

This comment anticipates Spate's, quoted above,¹ and, if I had been moved by it, as I ought to have been, to do some further thinking before publication, perhaps I might not have offered so vulnerable a target, twenty years later, for Spate's shot-gun.

Thus the believer in free will can never demonstrate, to a determinist's satisfaction, that he is presenting water-tight evidence of an identical situation having a different outcome in different cases. Conversely, the determinist can never demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the believer in free will, that an identical situation invariably has the same outcome in different cases. His non-determinist opponent can block his attempted demonstration that the same cause invariably produces the same effect by either admitting, for the sake of the argument, the sameness of the effect and challenging the determinist to guarantee the sameness of the cause in the cases that he cites, or, conversely, the believer in free will can admit the sameness of the cause and contest the sameness of the effects in the different cases cited. Whichever tactics the believer in free will adopts, the determinist will never be able to demonstrate that the same cause invariably produces the same effect—unless, of course, he takes refuge in defining the words 'cause' and 'effect' to mean phenomena that are invariably linked together.

This is another way of saying that, to demonstrate any proposition conclusively, one must transfer it from the field of phenomena to the field of mathematics. Mathematical entities are abstractions so drawn as to be self-evidently identical with or different from each other. In mathematics, therefore, it is possible to make demonstrations that an opponent will be bound to recognize as being valid. But the possibility of conclusive demonstration dwindles if we retrace our course from the world of mathematics towards the world of phenomena. In physics, perhaps, conclusive demonstration may be nearly attainable. In chemistry it will be less nearly within reach; in physiology, biology, botany, and zoology less so again; and least of all in the study of human affairs. 'One has to expect a certain degree of inconclusiveness in any exploration of complex states of human affairs.'² In this field, which is the one

¹ On p. 322.

² H. and M. Sprout in *op. cit.*, p. 83.

that has the greatest practical importance for us human beings, perhaps the nearest approach to certain knowledge that is possible for us is an interim report in terms of percentages yielded by the retrospective analysis of statistical records.

Judged by a mathematician's standards, this level of knowledge might seem so low as to make the study of human affairs a futile pursuit. Yet, in practical life, statistical knowledge enables business men to make predictions that come near enough to the mark to allow of profits being made on the strength of them.¹ And, when our study is for the sake of gaining profits that are, not monetary, but intellectual, our understanding of what lies behind and beyond the phenomena may be valuably increased by conclusions that get no farther than being probable, or even than being no more than possible, approximations to the truth. Such inexact results might move a mathematician to throw up his profession in disgust. They will move a student of human affairs to pursue his with zest. Meanwhile, the respective believers in the genuineness of freedom in human affairs and in the illusoriness of the appearance of it must be content to go on waging an indecisive warfare with each other. A decision that neither party can contest is not to be expected in this arena unless and until the progress of human understanding on some different level—perhaps the psychological—enables us to see this pair of so far unreconciled standpoints in the light of a new concept that transcends them both.

IX. THE TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES

IN an earlier chapter² I have already noticed, in passing, that the distinction between 'primitive societies' and 'civilizations', which I have drawn in the first volume of this book, is too sharp, because it is too simple. As I then saw it, human history, so far, can be analysed into a sequence of two enterprises—the first already achieved, the second now in course of being attempted, with no certainty that it, in turn, is going to succeed. On this view the already accomplished enterprise is the transformation of Sub-Man into Man; the enterprise on which Man is now engaged is the raising of human life from its primitive level to a higher one which is the goal of the endeavour that we call 'civilization'.³ The nature of this goal, and the kind of change in human life, as hitherto experienced, that is practicable and desirable, are reconsidered in Chapter XIX of this volume. In the present chapter I want to reconsider my previous, too simple, account of the circumstances in which civilization first got on the move.

¹ See ix. 220-3.

² On pp. 150-3.

³ See i. 191-6. This classification of human societies into two classes only—'primitive societies' and 'civilizations'—is justly criticized by Chr. Dawson in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 137-9. O. Höfer criticizes me, also justly, in an unpublished paper for my failure to appreciate sufficiently the importance of the Neolithic revolution. See also eundem: 'Buchführung und Bilanz der Weltgeschichte: zu A. Toynbees Deutung des Frühzeitlichen Menschengeschens', in *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Jahrgang 2, Heft 3 (1949/50), pp. 247-59.

I saw the rise of civilization as a consequence of one of the responses made by Upper Palaeolithic Man, in the region that is now the arid zone of the Old World in the northern hemisphere, to the challenge presented to him there by the recession of the latest in a succession of glacial-pluvial ages.¹ The changes in the flora and fauna of the north-western quarter of the Old World that followed in the train of this change of climate did indeed threaten the human inhabitants of this quarter with starvation and extinction through the loss of their previous means of livelihood. The geographical range of the challenge was even wider than I had originally realized. The recession of the ice not only turned what had been the savannahs of North Africa and South-West and Central Asia into steppes and deserts; it turned what had been the tundras of Northern Europe, at the foot of the ice-cap, into forests; and both these changes killed out or drove out the game that had provided food for the Upper Palaeolithic inhabitants of these two regions. In Northern Europe that once mighty hunter, Magdalenian Man, apparently failed to survive the disappearance of his big game. During the latest glaciation the game had been so abundant, and his skill in dispatching it so great, that he had acquired a surplus of food and energy which gave him the opportunity to leave behind him a memorial in the shape of his wonderful paintings on the walls of caves. But the high degree of specialization that had rewarded him with a temporary prosperity was his undoing when his environment played him false. He did not succeed in adapting himself, and consequently died out, or at any rate dwindled to a remnant living on in misery.² Magdalenian Man's humbler contemporaries to the south and south-east partly died out and partly decamped still farther southwards, in step with the southward drift of the savannahs at the expense of the tropical forest. But some of them stood their ground and made history.³

In giving this account of the response made by the Upper Palaeolithic inhabitants of the former savannahs to the challenge of desiccation, and in suggesting that civilization had been an outcome of this response, I was not wrong.⁴ But I did go wrong in carrying history from the Upper Palaeolithic hunter's way of life to civilization at one bound. Actually, this immense revolution was achieved, not at one bound, but in two great steps. In my previous account of the transition from the higher hunting and food-gathering culture to civilization, I telescoped two stages into one. Palaeolithic hunters and food-gatherers did not, as I

¹ i. 302-21.

² See V. G. Childe: *Man Makes Himself*, p. 73; *What Happened in History*, pp. 41-43. On the Great Plains of North America a change of climate seems likewise to have been followed by the extinction of the big game that had been hunted by Early Lithic (corresponding to Old-World Palaeolithic) Man. Here, however, the hunting economy (now based on the bison) continued until the pre-Columbian population was supplanted by settlers of European origin in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era (G. R. Willey and P. Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), pp. 86-88 and 107).

³ In the Americas, too, there were people who made history by advancing from hunting through mainly depending on food-gathering to partly depending on agriculture; and here, similarly, these people seem to have been relatively backward representatives of the Archaic (i.e. Postlithic and Preformative) stage of culture (Willey and Phillips, op. cit. (1958), pp. 107, 127-8, 145, and 201).

⁴ See V. G. Childe: *Man Makes Himself*, p. 86; H. Frankfort: *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 33-34.

had pictured them,¹ plunge straight into the jungle-swamps of the lower Nile valley and the lower basin of the Tigris and Euphrates and convert these into fertile fields by hydraulic engineering on the grand scale. The challenge presented by the jungle-swamp to a pre-agricultural society would have been altogether too severe to allow of these potential granaries being used as experimental stations for the discovery of the art of agriculture.² The stations in which the hunters pioneered in this new act were not the formidable jungle-choked river valleys; they were other green patches, of more tractable kinds, that also held out against the onset of desiccation: for instance, oases watered by springs, and the flood-plains of fertile soil deposited by lesser streams at the foot of their parent mountains before they ran out into the spreading sands.

Famous examples of these two types of geographical 'set-ups' that could be, and were, converted into nursery gardens are the oasis of Jericho and the ghutah of Damascus watered by the rivers Abarna (Barada) and Pharpar (Nahr al-Awaj). Early cultivators did also settle in, or on the brows of, the side valleys, not only of the Jordan valley, but of the lowest section of the Nile valley that later generations eventually transformed into Upper Egypt. But the oases and flood-plains in which agriculture was invented seem to have been those on the outer rim of 'the Fertile Crescent' of South-West Asia and farther east in what are now Iran and Türkmenistan (Transcaspiia). This region, unlike both the heart of 'the Fertile Crescent' and the valley of Upper Egypt, was a rainfall zone. It is so still.³ But Iran was better watered in the Post-glacial Age than it is today, and its flood-plains and oases are thought to have been the training ground of the agriculturists who eventually reclaimed the lower basin of the Tigris and Euphrates⁴—a larger and proportionately more difficult task than the later reclamation of the Nile swamps in the narrow valley of Upper Egypt.⁵ As for the provenance

¹ In i. 305-6.

² 'For the understanding of the genesis of civilization in the Near East, nothing is more important than a knowledge of the vigorous and progressive Neolithic cultures of the fifth and fourth millennia B.C. However great the credit due to the Sumerians for their response to the challenge of the untamed Mesopotamian landscape, it would have been impossible without the prior achievements of what Gordon Childe has called "the Neolithic Revolution". In this connexion it is significant that there is no case on record of what we may perhaps call truly primitive societies, that is pure "food-gatherers", being successfully brought within the orbit of a civilization, whereas so-called primitive peoples who have passed through the agricultural revolution often have so been, even if often as hewers of wood and drawers of water under civilized oppression. Food-gatherers find the strain of such forcible integration into an alien society too great, and die out, like the West Indian islanders and most of the North American Indians, while African slaves are successfully—from the invaders' point of view—introduced to replace them. The Maori have been integrated into a civilized society, but not the Australian Blacks, while the Tasmanians have been totally destroyed. The Bantu multiply throughout South Africa; the Bushmen survive precariously in the Kalahari' (A. R. Burn in *History*, February–October, 1956, pp. 7-8).

³ R. J. Braidwood: *The Near East and the Foundations of Civilization*, p. 11. See also *ibid.*, p. 12, the instructive map: 'Fig. 4: Physiographical and rainfall map of Nuclear Western Asia, with the major sites of occurrence of terminal food-gathering and of earliest food-producing (pre-Late Hassuna phase) antiquity.'

⁴ See H. Frankfort: *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 44.

⁵ See W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 146. Frankfort notes, in *op. cit.*, p. 45, that the reclamation of what became the land of Sumer was comparable, in scale and in difficulty, to the reclamation, not of Upper Egypt, but of the Nile Delta. On the evidence of landscapes portrayed on reliefs in Egyptian tombs dating

of the people who eventually did for Upper Egypt what had, by then, already been done for Sumer, they seem not to have been descended—anyway, not directly—from previous occupants of the bluffs, overhanging the Nile valley in Upper Egypt, where we find these earliest local agriculturists first installed. Though the Lower Palaeolithic culture is well represented by remains found on these bluffs, the Upper Palaeolithic and Mesolithic cultures are not, so that there is a signal break of continuity between the latest Palaeolithic remains here and the earliest of those left by an agricultural population.¹

'The early stages of the culture which develops into the civilization of dynastic Egypt is [*sic*] . . . not in the line of evolution of the Mesolithic or Upper Palaeolithic of the Nile valley, but is fundamentally different from it, as well as from the Capsian of North Africa and the Natufian of Palestine.'²

The earliest local pre-dynastic cultures are post-Sebilian³—i.e. they date from an age in which the physiography, though not yet the flora and fauna, of Upper Egypt was already approximately what it has been during the present Age of Civilization.

'This . . . does away with the story of hordes roaming through North Africa and eventually settling in the Nile valley because desiccation had made life impossible there.'⁴

The predynastic agricultural age on the fringes of what was to become Egypt began only a few centuries before 4000 B.C., and it began in a period, not of increasing aridity, but of increasing humidity,⁵ which made the bluffs above the Nile valley cultivable while making the jungle-choked valley bottom more forbidding, for the time, than ever. 'Not before Nakāda II [*alias* Gerzean] did the first settlers venture down into the valley itself.'⁶ All the same, the revolutionary progress of archaeological discovery in, and on the fringe of, Egypt has not done away with the story of hordes roaming through North Africa and South-West and Central Asia which eventually settled somewhere and responded to the challenge of desiccation by making the economic transition from food-gathering to agriculture and from hunting to the domestication of animals. Though the scene of this revolution in human history proves not to have been the north-east corner of Africa, the revolution did take place; and it happened in Asia, as is indicated by the amazing discoveries at Jericho, as well as by the now apparently proven priority of Sumer over Egypt as the seat of an irrigational civilization on the grand scale. Baumgartel points out⁷ that the Badarians, who were the earliest of the

from the Age of the Old Kingdom, E. J. Baumgartel holds, in *The Cultures of Prehistoric Egypt*, p. 3, that the Delta was then still largely unreclaimed.

¹ Baumgartel, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* In the course of the present Post-glacial or Inter-glacial Age up to date, there have been a number of minor oscillations of climate which are perhaps of the same nature, though not on the same scale, as the previous series of glacial-pluvial peaks and troughs. There seems to have been 'some increase in moisture at the end of the Pleistocene' (Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 11).

⁶ Baumgartel, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Cp. p. 28.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

pre-dynastic agricultural societies on the fringe of Upper Egypt, possessed domesticated cattle, sheep, and goats; that sheep and goats are not indigenous in Africa;¹ and that the pre-dynastic Egyptians' sheep seem to have been of South-West Asian breeds. My error in volume I lay in presenting the transition from the Upper Palaeolithic culture to river-valley irrigational civilization as having taken place at one bound, and in taking the eventual reclamation of Egypt as my principal illustration for my thesis. What Egypt does illustrate is the transition to river-valley irrigational civilization from a culture, of apparently Asian origin, based economically on the cultivation of small flood-plains and oases.

The type or phase of culture that was transitional between the Upper Palaeolithic and the civilizations of the first generation which arose in the Lower Tigris-Euphrates valley and the lower Nile valley *circa* 3000 B.C. is commonly known as Neolithic, in allusion to its characteristic tool, the ground-stone axe, which was much more potent than even the finest of Upper Palaeolithic Man's chipped or flaked flints. The practice of labelling phases of culture by technological inventions that are characteristic, or at least symbolic, of their specific genius has the advantage of being applicable to all manifestations of human culture at all times and places. Technology is perhaps the one product of human activity in which there has been continuous progress,² and it has also been a province in which the network of human relations has always embraced the whole human race; for, though every technological invention must have been made at some particular place at some particular moment, a type of tool or a process of work, once invented, has been apt to spread, in course of time, to the ends of the Earth, so that, by the present day, most societies in the World, however isolated or backward, have progressed technologically and economically at least as far as the pre-civilizational agricultural phase, though they may have entered it as much as ten or twelve thousand years later than the pioneer inventors of it. The ground-stone axe was, indeed, a key tool of the Neolithic culture, since it enabled its possessors to master the trees that were invading post-glacial Northern Europe and were only slowly receding from post-glacial Afrasia.³ But it is not a quite accurate hall-mark of the Neolithic culture. For instance, it was not possessed by the Palestinian Natufians, who were early semi-agriculturists, while, on the other hand, it had been acquired by the North Europeans in advance of their acquisition of the art of agriculture.⁴ Moreover, the purpose of cutting down the scrub in an Afrasian oasis, or the trees in a northern forest, was not just to use the timber for making tools or utensils; it was to clear the ground for cultivation.

'The outstanding new feature of the Neolithic Age is agriculture',⁵ and it is still the key activity of this culture in the places where it survives. The earliest known Neolithic societies in South-West Asia

¹ Cp. V. G. Childe: *Man Makes Himself*, p. 86.

² See, for instance, A. L. Kroeber: *Style and Civilizations*, pp. 62-64.

³ Childe: *Man Makes Himself*, p. 99; *What Happened in History*, p. 44.

⁴ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 100; *What Happened in History*, p. 50.

⁵ H. Frankfort: *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 35.

and in the countries round the Mediterranean Sea possessed domestic animals besides cultivating domestic plants.¹ But elsewhere there are, even today, some Neolithic agricultural societies without domestic animals;² and it is easier to imagine how, in an age of increasing desiccation, wild animals could have been domesticated by human beings who were already cultivators of crops than it is to see how this marvellous feat could have been achieved by people who were still hunters.³ As for the two arts of pottery and spinning and weaving, which are characteristic of the full-blown Neolithic culture in the New World⁴ as well as in the Old World, neither of them is coeval with agriculture. There is a pre-pottery agricultural stage at Jericho, for instance, and likewise in Peru as Huaca Prieta, at the mouth of the Chicama valley.⁵ Agriculture and, to an almost equal degree, the keeping of domestic animals, which was the normal concomitant of agriculture in the region where the agriculture of the Old World originated, are the essence of the Neolithic culture and are its greatest enduring legacy to cultures of subsequent phases that are 'higher' in the sense of having been built up on Neolithic foundations, whether or not they are higher in terms of spiritual achievement and value.

By achieving the agricultural-pastoral revolution,⁶ human beings made themselves into active partners of Nature instead of continuing to be parasites on her like their human predecessors and like all other kinds of living creatures except some of the social insects.⁷ Both vegetable and animal husbandry are fruits of foresight, forethought, perseverance, and self-control, and require an unfailing practice of these virtues to keep them going.⁸ Husbandmen have to take thought, not only for the morrow, but for next year; and, however hungry they may be, they must not eat the seed-corn or slaughter the cows, ewes, and she-goats that yield them milk, besides replenishing their herds and flocks. The reward of husbandry is the production of a food supply that can maintain a denser population in greater security than hunting and food-gathering can. But to describe this revolution solely in technological and economic terms would be to give an inadequate account of it. In an earlier chapter we have noted⁹ that, before the epiphany of higher religion led to the extrication of the religious from the secular side of life, all social and cultural activities were religious activities as well. Husbandry, both vegetable and animal, certainly had a religious, as well

¹ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 85; *What Happened in History*, p. 49.

² *Man Makes Himself*, p. 75.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁴ The Formative stage of culture in the Americas, as defined by Willey and Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), seems to correspond approximately (at any rate in its earlier phases) to the stage labelled 'Neolithic' by students of Old-World history. According to Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 3, Middle American Later Formative (beginning *circa* 500 B.C.) corresponds to the Protoliterate stage of culture in the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin (beginning *circa* 3500 B.C.).

⁵ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 31.

⁶ R. Redfield prefers to use the word 'transformation'. He points out that the word 'revolution' has associations, in present-day minds, with famous and controversial events in Western history—e.g. 'the Industrial Revolution'. The use of the word 'revolution' is therefore likely to import something alien and irrelevant into our picture of the changes brought about by the invention of agriculture (*The Primitive World and its Transformations*, pp. ix-x).

⁷ *What Happened in History*, p. 48.

⁸ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 93.

⁹ On pp. 78-79.

as an economic, aspect to begin with; and the agricultural-pastoral revolution might never have been achieved if it had not been a religious revolution in one of its aspects.

'The period when the food-producing economy became established was one of climatic crises adversely affecting precisely that zone of arid sub-tropical countries where the earliest farmers appear and where the wild ancestors of cultivated cereals and domestic animals actually lived.'

These farmers were not descended from the magnificent Magdalenian hunters who had flourished at the foot of the ice-cap, but from the less successful, because less specialized, Upper Palaeolithic hunters on the Afrasian savannahs.² 'Nowhere has a series of continuous remains covering the transition been recognised.'³ The Natufian Palestinians used sickles set with flint teeth, but this proves merely that they reaped, not that they sowed. They may have been reapers of grass that grew wild,⁴ and, whether or not they were still food-gatherers, they were certainly still hunters,⁵ and their cereals, even if cultivated, may have been no more than a supplementary and subsidiary part of their food supply. Food-gatherers may not only reap; they may also practise artificial irrigation. Frankfort⁶ cites a case of this from the Great Basin of Western North America. Conversely, cultivators of crops may take advantage of the natural irrigation of the flood-plains of small streams—a source of water-supply that confers the additional benefit of renewing the fertility of the soil. At Tepe Sialk—a tiny oasis, watered by a spring, on the western edge of the Central Desert of Iran, near Kashan—hunting continued to be an important economic activity when the local people were already cultivating the soil by irrigation, maintaining domestic animals, and practising the arts of spinning and weaving and pottery.⁷ In the Fayyum and at Merimde, on the western brow of the Nile Delta, the earliest state of affairs in the Neolithic Age seems to have been like that at Tepe Sialk; agriculture, there too, was still subsidiary.⁸ Yet, once introduced, it everywhere grew steadily in relative importance,⁹ and this without depending on irrigation.

Though artificial irrigation was the key to the eventual reclamation and cultivation of the great river valleys and basins of Afrasia, it seems likely that the Neolithic inventors of farming in Afrasia depended on a natural supply of water from floods or springs or rains or combinations

¹ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 86.

² *What Happened in History*, p. 48.

³ Frankfort, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–35.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵ *What Happened in History*, p. 48.

⁶ *In op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁷ *What Happened in History*, p. 52.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁹ In the Americas, too, there is archaeological evidence for a stage in which agriculture was known and practised without yet having become the staple means of subsistence. Willey and Phillips report (*Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), p. 145) that, on second thoughts, 'we found that agriculture *per se* was not the explosive stimulus to cultural development that we had supposed it to be. The early evidences of plant domestication seem to be associated with cultures that we should be inclined to think of as "lower" Archaic if we had such a division.' They note (*ibid.*, p. 135) that these cultures were equalled or surpassed in well-being and in stability by others that still depended wholly on hunting, fishing, or food-gathering. At the same time they also note that no wholly non-agricultural American culture proved capable of advancing to the Classic stage of civilization (*ibid.*, pp. 144–5 and 203).

of these different natural sources.¹ Certainly the Neolithic agriculture that was propagated, from its original seed-bed in the Afrasian oases, to Europe and North-West Africa in one direction and to North-West China in another did depend on rainfall and therefore had to be constantly moving on from old fields to new fields.² It went on moving, and therefore also spreading, till its practitioners discovered how to restore the fertility of the soil by manuring it with cattle dung and by letting it lie fallow for alternating periods. This was a more efficient alternative to the primitive practice of fertilizing a patch of cleared woodland with the ash obtained by burning the felled trees, and then leaving that season's field untouched till it had become covered by a second growth that could be felled and burnt in its turn.³ Yet even this 'slash-and-burn', 'reap-and-run' kind of agriculture was effective enough to become a staple source of food-supply. The Danubian Neolithic pioneers of agriculture in Europe in the fourth and third millennia B.C., who discovered and exploited the patches of loess soil among the European forests, already depended on agriculture exclusively.⁴

How early in the present Post-glacial or Inter-glacial Age was agriculture started? The length of our vista of agriculture's past history has been doubled by the discoveries at Jericho since the end of the Second World War. Before that, other South-West Asian Neolithic sites seemed ancient. At Tepe Sialk seventeen layers of deposit, to a total height of ninety-one feet, had been laid down by 3000 B.C.⁵ At Tepe Gawra, near Mosul, the pre-civilizational deposit was 104 feet thick in twenty-six layers.⁶ At Ras ash-Shamrah it was forty feet thick.⁷ K. Kenyon,⁸ on the strength of carbon-14 tests, dates the pre-pottery stage at Jarmo, in North-Eastern Iraq, *circa* 4750 B.C.⁹ Braidwood, publishing in 1952 before Miss Kenyon's excavations at Jericho, considered Jarmo to be the earliest of the fully Neolithic village sites.¹⁰ He distinguishes five groups of these: Tepe Sialk in North Central Iran; Hassuna in Northern Iraq; 'Amuq, Saqja Gözü and Mersina in Northern Syria and Cilicia; Jericho XVII-IX; Fayyum A and Merimde.¹¹ He dates Hassuna *circa* 4400 B.C.;¹² Fayyum A 4145 B.C. \pm 250 years (by a carbon-14 test);¹³ and the pre-Neolithic Natufian stage of culture in Palestine *circa* 6000 B.C.¹⁴ Frankfort¹⁵ dates Tepe Sialk and also Hassuna in Northern Iraq as early as *circa* 5000 B.C., and the Palestinian Natufians about a thousand years earlier than that (thus agreeing, as regards the date of the Natufian culture, with Braidwood). But these and all other Neolithic and immediately pre-Neolithic sites so far discovered and explored are of relatively recent origin compared with Jericho.

¹ See Frankfort, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

² See *Man Makes Himself*, p. 96.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 80-84 and 96.

⁴ *What Happened in History*, p. 54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 51 and 52.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

⁸ *Digging up Jericho*, pp. 52 and 90.

⁹ According to Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 31, the earliest carbon-14 dates from Jarmo are 4758 B.C. \pm 300 years (obtained from shell); 4743 \pm 360 and 4654 \pm 340 years (obtained from charcoal).

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁵ In *op. cit.*, p. 35.

The third level at Jericho corresponds to the first level at most other Afrasian sites,¹ and the first level at Jericho is 3,000 years older.² The end of the pre-pottery age at Jericho is dated *circa* 5000 B.C.³ The aggregate height of the layers deposited on the *tell* by this date is already forty-five feet,⁴ and it may prove not to have been the first stage.⁵ The origins of Jericho must be not much later than the end of the Pleistocene (that is, the end of the Palaeolithic) Age, *circa* 10000 B.C.⁶ The pre-pottery Neolithic settlement at Jericho may have been larger than the subsequent Bronze-Age town.⁷ Its area was at least eight acres, and, on the basis of present-day local density of urban settlement, this area would imply a population of about three thousand.⁸ This settlement had a massive defensive wall of large undressed stones.⁹ A still earlier, and also still finer, wall was found below the one first discovered.¹⁰ A ditch, nine metres wide and three deep, has been cut out of the solid rock.¹¹ There is a tower, nine metres in diameter, with a staircase inside.¹² This tower has two outer skins, and there is a still earlier wall in its core.¹³ The system of defences of which the tower is part belongs to the earliest phase so far discovered.¹⁴

When one stands on the brow of Miss Kenyon's great trench, as I did on 24th July, 1957, and gazes at that magnificently built tower at the bottom, one has the extraordinary sensation of reading the history of civilization, at one glance, back to a date which may be as far removed from the date of the beginning of civilization elsewhere *circa* 3000 B.C. as the year 3000 B.C. is from our own day. Who can deny that there was such a thing as civilization at Jericho at the time when the tower was built, if I have been right in defining civilization as a state of society in which there is a minority that is free from the task of keeping life going from day to day, and that therefore has leisure to think and plan and direct the work of the community as a whole?¹⁵ Without the presence and activity of such a minority, the execution of those arduous and skilful public works is inconceivable. Therefore something that we are bound to call civilization existed about twice as long ago at Jericho as anywhere else that we know of. Yet Miss Kenyon holds¹⁶ that 'Jericho cannot have been unique'. And indeed the sequel, at Jericho itself, to the pre-pottery stage shows that there must have been at least one contemporary civilization that was not only independent but was, in at least one technological respect, farther advanced. The earliest users of pottery at Jericho came from outside, ousted the pre-pottery population, and brought in the art of pottery with them ready-made.¹⁷ There was a complete break in the history of Jericho at this stage.¹⁸ Pre-pottery urban Jericho has no heirs. It was the later and cruder Neolithic cultures of Afrasia that developed, without a break, into the historic civilizations that arose in the great Afrasian river valleys *circa* 3000 B.C.¹⁹

The Afrasian inventors of agriculture turned their energies to two

¹ Kenyon, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 79, 81, 82-83.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁵ See p. 278.

different purposes, with two different consequences. Some of them, as we have seen, moved out as pioneers and won new lands for agriculture without being stimulated to improve upon the Neolithic cultivators' basic technological equipment: the ground-stone axe, the flint-toothed sickle,¹ domestic animals, the arts of spinning and weaving and pottery, and the primitive agricultural technique of 'slash-and-burn', which compelled people who depended on it for their livelihood to be continually moving on. With this equipment the great continental hinterlands of the Afrasian 'Nuclear Old World' were won for agriculture as far afield as North-West Africa and Europe and North-West China² in the course of the fourth and third millennia B.C.³ Other Afrasian agriculturists were content to stay at home, and therefore could not remain content to make no improvements on their primitive equipment. In the Afrasian oases the fourth millennium B.C. was rich in inventions:⁴ the working of copper, the making of bronze, the inventions of animal traction, and of wheels, bricks, and seals.⁵ Copper was already known to the Badarians, who were the earliest agriculturists in Upper Egypt;⁶ and E. J. Baumgartel goes so far as to say that 'we do not know of any period in pre-dynastic Egypt (apart from Palaeolithic times) when metal was certainly absent'.⁷ Inventiveness was stimulated by intercourse between local cultures with different ways of doing things, and here desiccation proved a help to Afrasian man, besides being a challenge to him. 'Only in the arid zone round the Mediterranean and east thereof was intercourse at all rapid and extensive'.⁸ Even so, the wheel, which

¹ This Natufian tool turns up in pre-pottery Jericho (K. Kenyon: *Digging up Jericho*, pp. 56-57). It is also found at Tepe Sialk and at Hassuna; and the flint teeth, though not complete blades, have been found in Southern Russia and the Danube basin, in Anatolia, in North-West Africa, and at Almeria on the south-east coast of Spain (H. Frankfort: *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 35-36).

² It is easy to see how agriculturists from the oases of Iran and Transcaspiia could have drifted north-eastwards across Asia to North-Western China—especially in an age before the rise of the pastoral Nomads had begun to make the steppes dangerous for anyone else. But by what route did other agriculturists spread from Afrasia into Europe? Anatolia is the obvious bridge, and the Dardanelles and Bosphorus have never been serious obstacles to migration. But according to Seton Lloyd, *Early Anatolia*, p. 53, Anatolia was uninhabited at the time of the Neolithic Revolution in the adjoining 'Fertile Crescent'; it remained a *terra incognita* until almost the end of the Chalcolithic Age in 'the Fertile Crescent' (p. 58; cp. p. 74); there was an unsurmounted barrier along the 2,000-foot contour-line along the southern slopes of the Taurus (p. 59); the earliest Chalcolithic culture in Anatolia, at the close of 'the Fertile Crescent's' Chalcolithic Age, is uniform all over the peninsula, including the west coast (pp. 60-61); and Lloyd suggests that Anatolia may have been first populated, not from 'the Fertile Crescent', but from the Danube basin (p. 61). This indicates that the Danubian pioneers of agriculture in Europe must have come from Afrasia by a route running north of the Black Sea; and indeed the Kuban valley is known to have been a relatively early seat of an agricultural culture. The route by which agriculture reached North-West Africa and, from there, the Atlantic coast of Europe is an even greater puzzle, if E. J. Baumgartel is right in her contention that the Nile Delta remained an unreclaimed swamp until the Age of the Old Kingdom. This would rule out a route from or via Palestine along the north coast of Africa. In, say, the fourth millennium B.C., was what is now the Libyan Desert still hospitable enough to allow primitive cultivators to snatch a living from it while drifting across it from Upper Egypt or Nubia towards the Atlas?

³ *What Happened in History*, p. 57; *Man Makes Himself*, p. 96. See also Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 22, 'Fig. 11: the spread of the food-producing economy out of the Nuclear Near East, from an assumed beginning at circa 6000 B.C., suggested by means of isochronic lines.'

⁴ *What Happened in History*, p. 69.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75. Cp. *Man Makes Himself*, pp. 118 and 257.

⁶ E. J. Baumgartel: *The Cultures of Prehistoric Egypt*, p. 22.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁸ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 98.

had been invented in Sumer about 3500 B.C., and had been applied there to traction as well as to pottery-making, was not applied to traction in Egypt till about 1650 B.C.¹

Primitive agriculture had produced no surplus of food and therefore no reserves for maintaining specialists.² The only division of labour had been between men and women, and each local community had been self-sufficient.³ The new arts that arose in the Afrasian oases during the fourth millennium B.C. required male specialists,⁴ and this indicates that a certain surplus must by then have been accruing.⁵ Metallurgy is a full-time occupation;⁶ 'metallurgical lore is the first approximation to international science';⁷ and metallurgy destroys Neolithic self-sufficiency⁸—requiring, as it does, not only smiths, but miners, smelters, and carriers. 'Potters who use the wheel are normally male specialists.'⁹ 'By relieving women of a lot of heavy but essential tasks in the way of hoeing, carrying burdens, and making pots', these new male avocations—metallurgy, casting, ploughing, and making pottery on the wheel—'cut away the economic foundations of mother-right'.¹⁰ The fourth-millennium masculine inventions—metallurgy, the wheel, the ox-cart, the pack-ass, the sailing-ship—provided the technological foundations for a new economic organization which could undertake a task that Afrasian man had not yet attempted: the reclamation, for agriculture, of the jungle-swamps in the great Afrasian river basins and valleys.¹¹ The Afrasian oasis-cultivator had already mastered the art of water-control on the small scale.¹² 'The economic organisation and social framework were alone deficient',¹³ but they were indispensable, since without them there could be no public works,¹⁴ and without these the fourth-millennium technological inventions would not have enabled Afrasian man to achieve his great new enterprise.

No doubt every technological revolution is also a social one in the sense that technological changes are both consequences and causes of social changes. R. J. Braidwood points out¹⁵ that the nature of the surviving evidence for pre-civilizational culture yields a picture in which technology looms too large. But, in contrast to the Neolithic revolution, which had been a technological one first and foremost, the civilizational revolution was a social and cultural one in its essence. The technological stages of history—food-gathering, food-production, industrialism—do

¹ Ibid., p. 140. It was used in Egypt for pottery-making from the time of the Third Dynasty onwards (*What Happened in History*, p. 86).

² *What Happened in History*, p. 68.

³ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 94.

⁴ Even in the technologically simpler Andean World, the transition from the Formative to the Classic stage of culture was accompanied, in the Moché valley, by a specialization of professions and classes (Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 6; Bennett in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 6).

⁵ An increase in the amount and variety of food is also attested directly by an increase in average human stature between the Mesolithic and the Chalcolithic Age (W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 145).

⁶ *What Happened in History*, p. 77.

⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

⁸ Ibid., p. 79.

⁹ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 86.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 89.

¹² 'Chalcolithic culture may . . . be justly called "irrigation culture"' (W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 144. Cp. p. 137).

¹³ *What Happened in History*, p. 75.

¹⁴ Braidwood, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁵ In op. cit., p. 8.

not correspond to its cultural stages.¹ The Neolithic technological revolution, in which food-production supplanted food-gathering, was a technological change of the same order of magnitude and momentousness as the modern Western Industrial Revolution in which muscle-power was replaced by harnessed inanimate power as Man's material means of manufacture and locomotion.² There was no comparable technological change during the intervening age. 'The technological and economic differences between civilization and the pre-civilizational phases of food-production were differences of degree.'³ On the other hand, this intervening age saw, in the emergence first of civilization and then of higher religion, the two greatest single cultural changes in human history so far. The civilizational stage of culture could not have been achieved if it had not been preceded by the invention of food-production and the other concomitant and subsequent technological advances that have been noticed just above. But the emergence of civilization was, in itself, an event on a non-technological plane. It was brought about by developments on the spiritual plane.⁴ So far from being caused, or accompanied, by any fresh technological advance, it was soon followed by an arrest of the movement of technological advance that had been set going in the Neolithic technological revolution.⁵ Conversely, the Neolithic technological revolution had cost a spiritual price. It had been accompanied by an arrest of the movement of spiritual advance that had been set going in the technologically more backward Upper Palaeolithic Age. 'The hunter's wide-ranging life had freed Man's spirit; agriculture made it a prisoner of the clod.'⁶

'All through the Near East the best sites were reclaimed with toil.'⁷ The undertaking required the production, collection, and storing of a large food-surplus to feed a great labour-force diverted from food-production to large-scale public works bringing in no immediate return in the form of foodstuffs. This labour-force had to be raised, controlled, and directed. Neither task would have been possible without a governing minority possessed of both immense ability and immense authority;⁸ for the task was heart-breaking as well as back-breaking, and the scale of it was so vast that the ordinary labourer can hardly have foreseen in imagination the fruits of his efforts.⁹ He must have worked in faith or under coercion or, more probably, have been driven by both these forces simultaneously. It is significant that, in both Sumer and Egypt at the dawn of history, the reclaimed land is the property of a god,¹⁰ and

¹ Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

² F. Borkenau in *Merkur*, 3. Jahrgang, 7. Heft (July, 1949), p. 629.

³ Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁴ Braidwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6 and 42.

⁵ Borkenau, *op. cit.*, p. 631. It is noteworthy that, in Peru likewise, technological progress was characteristic of the Formative Age (Bennett in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 6), and that the subsequent Classic Age 'was an era of realisation in terms of techniques already known' (R. G. Willey, *op. cit.*, p. 12).

⁶ Borkenau, *op. cit.*, p. 630.

⁷ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 122.

⁸ In the Andean World likewise, the transition from the Formative Age to the Classic Age, in which the valley bottoms in coastal Peru were mastered and irrigated, was accompanied by a shift of interest from technology to the social and political enterprise of manipulating manpower (Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, pp. 181-2; Bennett in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 6).

⁹ See *Man Makes Himself*, pp. 120-2.

¹⁰ In Egypt the whole land was owned by a single god incarnate, Pharaoh. In Sumer

that this god is represented by effective economic and political institutions managed by a ruling minority.

'Conditions of life in a river valley or other oasis place in the hands of society an exceptional power for coercing its members; the community can refuse a recalcitrant access to water and can close the channels that irrigate his fields. . . . The social solidarity needed by irrigators can thus be imposed owing to the very circumstances that demand it.'

It was this disciplined corporate effort, with a religious faith as its inspiration and with the necessary political authority and technological equipment at its command, that reclaimed the Afrasian river basins and valleys for agriculture. 'Unless a markedly different rainfall and weather pattern could be postulated for four or five thousand B.C., which we doubt, extensive life in alluvial Mesopotamia would have been literally impossible without irrigation.'² 'The alluvial valleys of the great rivers offered a more exacting environment, but also greater material rewards for its exploitation. In them, Copper-Age villages turned into Bronze-Age cities.'³ 'The food-producing revolution was perhaps the turning-point in the human career, but it was through the urban revolution that the consequences of the turn were realised.'⁴ 'The biggest and most difficult of the primary feats of civilization—the creation of the land of Sumer out of the marshes of the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin—was also the earliest. Sumer was about the size of Denmark, and by about 2500 B.C. the yield from the crops grown on these ex-marshes was eighty-six-fold.'⁵ 'The limited enterprise of creating Upper Egypt out of the Lower Nile valley seems to have been achieved later—possibly to some extent under the stimulus of what the Sumerians had already accomplished.'⁶ 'The reclamation of the Nile Delta—a task on the scale of the creation of Sumer—may have been completed only in the Age of the Egyptian Old Kingdom. If so, it will have been little earlier than the reclamation of the Indus valley.'⁷ 'The reclamation of the marshlands in the basins of the East Asian rivers seems to have come decidedly later.'⁸

Thus the reclamation of the river valleys of Afrasia for agriculture was in truth a response to the challenge of the progressive desiccation of Afrasia in the present Post-glacial or Inter-glacial Age. The cultivation of the minor oases, which had been the first response to this challenge, had turned out not to be enough in itself to make Afrasia permanently habitable by Man under post-pluvial conditions. In the end he was confronted with a choice between emigrating, as was done by the pioneers who carried agriculture from Afrasia to the ends of the Old World, and reclaiming the Afrasian swamps, as was done eventually

it was parcelled out among the territories of a number of independent city-states, and each of these city-state territories contained the estates of several gods. These Sumerian gods were not incarnate.

¹ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 123.
² Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 37. Cp. p. 39 and also p. 35: 'Fig. 25: Physiographical and rainfall map of Nuclear Western Asia, with major sites of occurrence of Ubaid phase antiquities or of materials judged to be contemporary with the Ubaid phase.' This was the phase in which the alluvium of the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin was occupied by Man (*ibid.*, p. 36).
³ *What Happened in History*, p. 59.

⁴ R. Redfield: *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, p. 6.

⁵ *What Happened in History*, pp. 89-90.

⁷ See p. 348.

⁶ See pp. 345-8.

⁸ See pp. 348-54.

by the makers of the earliest Old-World civilizations. The reclamation of the swamps was a permanent solution, because the new fields thus brought under cultivation were irrigated perennially by rivers whose sources rose outside the arid zone, and whose waters continually refertilized the soil with silt drawn by erosion from a virtually inexhaustible supply. In the reclaimed river valleys Man could be sure of making a livelihood so long as he continued to do organized and disciplined hard labour. Desiccation was the challenge; the lands of Sumer and Egypt were the response. But this bare statement would be a misleading simplification of the story. It does not become intelligible until we have also taken account of the primitive agricultural societies that made the transition to the earliest of the civilizations from the latest of the Upper Palaeolithic food-gathering and hunting societies. Even higher Primitive Man lacked the technology, as well as the organization, for coping with the jungle-swamps. Man had to put himself through a transitional apprenticeship before he could venture on the enterprise of civilization.

The intervention of this transitional stage between the primitive level of culture and the higher level that we call 'civilization' is not peculiar to the Old World; we find the same phenomenon in the history of the Americas. In the present chapter all that we need to do is to take note of this significant fact, leaving over, for the next chapter, the discussion of the question whether there was or was not any diffusion of culture, or of elements of it, from the Old World to the Americas at the transitional stage or at some later one.

In 1917 a distinguished student of Middle American archaeology, H. T. Spinden, threw out the idea that the Neolithic stage of Old-World culture had a counterpart in America in an 'Archaic' culture there which had originated in Middle America and had spread thence, as we now know that the Neolithic culture spread from Afrasia. This 'Archaic' American culture constituted a 'platform' on which the subsequent civilizations of Middle America and Peru reared themselves.¹ Willey testified in 1955² that this idea of an archaic cultural sub-stratum still stood, and that 'significant portions of this constant were diffused widely beyond the geographical boundaries of the later civilizations'. In some regions, e.g. Chile and Brazil, the 'Archaic' culture—in Willey's and Phillips's transference of Spinden's term to denote a transitional stage immediately preceding Spinden's 'Archaic'—seems actually to have been the earliest of any. At any rate, in these two regions there are no surviving traces of the 'Early Lithic' that corresponds in the Americas to the Palaeolithic stage of culture in the Old World.³

In terms of the classification of stages of culture in the Americas

¹ G. R. Willey: 'The Inter-related Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', in *The Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Volume of the Anthropological Society of Washington*, pp. 28-45. The reference here is to p. 29.

² G. R. Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', in *The American Anthropologist*, vol. 57, No. 3, Part 1 (June, 1955), pp. 571-93. The reference here is to p. 572.

³ G. R. Willey and P. Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II', in *The American Anthropologist*, vol. 57, No. 4 (August, 1955), pp. 723-819. The reference here is to p. 753. Cp. eosdem, 1958, p. 141.

proposed by Willey and Phillips in 1955, Spinden's 'Archaic' stage was represented approximately by the later phase of their 'Preformative' stage together with their 'Formative' stage. In terms of the revised classification proposed by them in 1958, it corresponds to their Formative stage.¹ In both of their classifications the term 'Archaic' is used to describe, not Spinden's 'Archaic' stage, but an earlier stage immediately preceding it and making the transition to it from Willey's and Phillips's 'Lithic' stage; the 'Archaic' stage of culture in the Americas, in Willey's and Phillips' usage of the term, would thus appear to correspond to the Mesolithic stage in the Old World. It is characterized by the grinding and polishing of stone tools, in addition to the use of the processes of percussion and pressure flaking.² In the 'Archaic' culture in this usage of the term, tools made of bone and horn and ivory were also important.³ Fishing and shell-hunting had made sedentary life possible,⁴ and in the Americas in this stage, as in the Old World at the corresponding stage, food-gathering and hunting continued to be staple occupations after agriculture had emerged.⁵ Agriculture brought with it no new implements; it used those that had been used already in a gathering economy.⁶ On the Pacific slope of Peru the earliest cultivators lived on the edges of the valleys,⁷ as in the lower Nile valley they lived on the bluffs and in the lateral ravines. The Peruvian Pacific-slope rivers are, of course, puny compared to the Nile; but the jungle-swamps with which their valleys, too, were choked in their original state of nature proved a formidable obstacle here also.⁸ The draining and irrigation of the valleys themselves, as distinct from their margins, was an achievement, here too, of the subsequent Age of Civilization.⁹ The emergence of agriculture, combined with stable settlement, technological specialization, and some degree of ceremonialism, are characteristic of the 'Preformative' stage,¹⁰ or, in terms of Willey's and Phillips' revised classification, of the transition to the 'Formative' from the 'Archaic'. At this transitional stage there was no functional relationship between agriculture and pottery,¹¹ and in the Americas, as in the Old World, there was a pre-pottery stage of agricultural culture. But some cultures of the 'Archaic' type (in Willey's and Phillips's usage of the term 'Archaic') had already acquired the art of pottery-making.¹² It was acquired by the 'Preformative' culture at Huaca Prieta, in Northern Peru, before its close,¹³ though, in its stone-work, this culture was still primitive: it was ignorant of both grinding and pressure-flaking.¹⁴ The 'Preformative' (in

¹ Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 105, footnote 8.

² Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 740.

³ Ibid., p. 741.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 755.

⁶ Ibid., p. 756.

⁷ See G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 42; Bennett and Bird: *Andean Cultural History*, p. 125.

⁸ In the Chicama valley, for instance, in the Pre-agricultural Age, 'the river probably meandered back and forth more freely than at present, forming lagoons and swamps and supported a dense undergrowth' (Bennett and Bird, op. cit., p. 118).

⁹ Irrigation in coastal Peru was achieved first in the narrow upper valleys of the rivers (ibid., p. 142). Eventually the flatter and broader lower valleys were mastered and became the centres of population (ibid., p. 157).

¹⁰ Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 755.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 756.

¹² Ibid., p. 741.

¹³ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 577.

¹⁴ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, pp. 31 and 33.

the revised terminology, 'Late Archaic') culture developed into the 'Formative' gradually, not suddenly.¹

The picture of American facts and events, given in the preceding paragraph on the authority of Willey and Phillips, was still maintained by them, as far as I know, at the time of writing in 1959. But, as has been noted, Willey and Phillips had revised their terminology between 1955 and 1958; and, already by 1955, they had, as has also been noted, changed the usage of the word 'Archaic' that had been brought into currency by Spinden in 1917. Since these successive changes in the usage of terms are both confusing and important, it may be as well to recapitulate them. In 1955 Willey and Phillips were already using 'Archaic' as a label for a stage between their 'Preformative' and their 'Early Lithic', instead of using it, in accordance with Spinden's usage, to cover the two stages labelled by them 'Late Preformative' and 'Formative'. In 1958 they eliminated their previous 'Preformative' stage and distributed its phases between 'Formative' and 'Archaic'; and, in their present classification, Spinden's 'Archaic' is represented, not by their 'Archaic', but by their 'Formative'.² Their language in passages quoted from the joint study that they published in 1955 must be revised accordingly to bring it up to date. Their 1958 classification articulates Spinden's 'Archaic' platform into two tiers: an 'Archaic' tier with a 'Formative' tier above it, and with the two classic pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas springing from this upper tier.

'Cultures of the Formative stage occupy a geographically central position in the Western Hemisphere. They are found throughout much of Middle America and most of Andean South America.³ From these areas they extend northward, with some lacunae, into the south-western and eastern United States, and in South America they run down the Cordillera to central Chile and eastward along the Amazon and Orinoco drainages of the lowlands.'⁴

A culture of the Formative level has been identified at the mouth of the Amazon.⁵

This change of labels is less important, in itself, than one of the reasons for it. In their revised version of their study, Willey and Phillips classify less than before by material traits (e.g. types of tool and kinds of technique) and more by ways of life. They now equate their 'Formative' stage with village life and their 'Classic' stage with urban life. They still hold⁶ that the change from hunting and food-gathering to agriculture is more profound and significant than any other at any point in the whole

¹ Willey and Phillips, *op. cit.*, 1955, pp. 755 and 765; Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', pp. 577-8.

² G. R. Willey and P. Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology*, 1958, p. 105, footnote 8. 'Archaic', as defined by these two authorities in 1958, is 'the stage of migratory hunting and gathering cultures continuing into environmental conditions approximating those of the present' (*ibid.*, p. 107). In the Archaic stage 'there is no important shift in economic and social patterns from the previous Lithic stages' (*ibid.*, p. 106). 'Archaic', as thus redefined, seems to correspond to the 'Mesolithic', not to the 'Neolithic', of Old-World archaeology.

³ And also, of course, in the region between, though this is not mentioned in the present passage (A. J. T.).

⁴ Willey and Phillips, 1958, pp. 146-7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

series of Pre-Columbian American stages of culture. But they now also hold¹ that 'the settlement patterns, etc.—not the agriculture—are the effective criteria for classification'. They declare² that they 'are not retreating from the position that agriculture was the principal *formative* agent in the development of "Formative" cultures, but only from a rigidity that makes it the indispensable agent'.

'Therefore, we now define the New-World "Formative" by the presence of agriculture or any other subsistence economy of comparable effectiveness, and by the successful integration of such an economy into well-established, sedentary village life.'³

In taking up this position, Willey and Phillips have Redfield's support. He has noted⁴ that 'a sedentary life is possible to a people who know nothing of agriculture or animal husbandry'.

Whatever criteria may be the most illuminating for defining the 'Formative' stage of culture in the Americas, it looks as if this stage of Pre-Columbian American history, as now defined, corresponds structurally to what happened in the Old World, in the Afrasian oases, in the course of the fifth and fourth millennia B.C. In the Americas there was nothing at this stage to compare with the enormous technological advances that were achieved in the Old World on the eve of the genesis of the earliest Old-World civilizations. Nevertheless, it is evident that in the Americas, as in the Old World, the dawn of civilization was separated culturally, as well as chronologically, from the end of the Palaeolithic Age by a transitional series of cultures. This series straddles the 'Archaic' and the 'Formative' stages in terms of Willey's and Phillips's most recent classification. The corresponding stages in Old-World terminology would be the 'Mesolithic', 'Neolithic', and 'Chalcolithic'.

X. ORIGINALITY VERSUS MIMESIS

I. STIMULUS DIFFUSION

I HAVE noted already in this volume⁵ that, in previous parts of this work, I have tended to over-simplify, and hence to exaggerate, the contrast between original creation and 'mimesis', meaning the reception and adoption of elements of culture that have been created elsewhere and have reached the recipients by a process of diffusion. In 1930, when I was writing volume i, the British Diffusionists, led by W. H. Perry and G. Elliott Smith, had just published their rather provocative works.⁶ Like many other students of human affairs, I reacted strongly against them.⁷ In the perspective given by a further thirty years of discovery and discussion, the general verdict now does seem to be that they pushed their claims on behalf of the role of diffusion to excessive lengths; and their particular theory that Egypt was the centre from which civilization

¹ Ibid., p. 145.

² Ibid., p. 146. Cp. p. 202.

³ Ibid., p. 146.

⁴ R. Redfield: *The Primitive World and Its Transformations*, p. 5.

⁵ On pp. 145-8.

⁶ See the references in i. 425, footnote i.

⁷ See i. 221-3 and 425-40.

was diffused all over the World has now been refuted by the apparently well-established discovery that civilization in Egypt itself was a product of 'stimulus diffusion' from Sumer. Thus my negative reaction to the British Diffusionists' theory was not mistaken. But the effect on me at the time was certainly to make me 'lean over backwards' in emphasizing the part played by original creation and therefore to under-estimate the role of diffusion and mimesis. I afterwards corrected this original bias to some extent in volume viii, in which I have dealt with two types of contact between societies that are each other's contemporaries: the contact between a civilization and the barbarians beyond its frontiers (Part VIII) and the contact between one civilization and another (Part IX). Nevertheless, I still need to reconsider the whole question in the light of the new knowledge and new ideas that the last thirty years have brought with them.

Neither the concept of originality nor the concept of mimesis can ever be dispensed with in the study of human affairs. Creation and innovation are realities, even if we cannot give a logical account of what we mean by these terms.¹ If they were not realities, no changes could ever have occurred. And, if creation and innovation are realities, every act of creation and innovation must have been achieved by some agent at some particular point of space-time. On the other hand, if diffusion and mimesis were not realities too, this again would make human history inexplicable. If the only possible form of human action were original creation, a human being's whole energies would have to be taken up, from birth to death, in willing each pulsation of his heart and each inflation of his lungs. So far from this being characteristic of human nature, one of its distinctively human features is its capacity for learning and for translating what it learns into habits organized in those patterns of relations between people that we call 'institutions'. Besides the psycho-physical heritage that Man, like all other living creatures, transmits to his offspring automatically and involuntarily, he transmits a cultural heritage by the social process of teaching and learning; and it is this second capacity that makes and keeps Man human. G. R. Willey is therefore surely right in saying that 'diffusion and independent invention are, after all, polar abstractions concerning complex human events, and the two processes work in concert'.² Meanwhile, A. L. Kroeber has transformed our whole approach to the question by showing that an antithesis between two terms—originality and mimesis—does not cover all the phenomena. There is at least one more alternative, which Kroeber calls 'stimulus diffusion'.³

'Stimulus diffusion might be defined as new pattern growth initiated by precedent in a foreign culture. . . . A goal or objective was set by something previously existing in another culture; the originality was limited to achieving the mechanisms by which this goal could be attained.'⁴

¹ See pp. 252-4.

² *The Seventy-fifth Anniversary Volume of the Anthropological Society of Washington* (1955), p. 29.

³ See A. L. Kroeber: 'Stimulus Diffusion', in *The American Anthropologist*, New Series, vol. 42, No. 1 (January-March, 1940), republished in *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 344-57. ⁴ Kroeber, *The A.A. num. cit.*, pp. 20 and 2; *The N. of C.*, pp. 357 and 345.

Kroeber demonstrates his case by bringing forward illustrations from the most diverse fields of human activity. Since then his new concept has been employed to account for the genesis of the Egyptiac Civilization as a creative response to a stimulus received from the Sumeric Civilization. If this explanation of the origins of the Egyptiac Civilization had come from the Assyriologists, it might perhaps have been dismissed as being just an amusing example of academic imperialism. But it has been put forward by the Egyptologists themselves, and therefore has presumably found favour on its merits. One of its merits is its possible applicability to other cases. In the Egyptiac case it is supported by definite archaeological evidence; but, even without the support of this, it might also throw light on the origins of civilization in the Indus basin and in China. A stimulus from the Sumeric World may have struck the spark here too. Similarly, in the Americas, the Andean Civilization may have arisen through stimulus diffusion from Middle America. Kroeber's fruitful idea may even eventually help to solve the hotly debated problem of the extent and influence of the Pre-Columbian cultural relations between the Americas and the Old World.

Kroeber himself draws one conclusion that is of great importance. 'Independent origins are not necessarily proved because we are unable to prove specific connexion by specific historical documents.'¹ The hypothesis of the common psychic structure of mankind—the so-called uniformity of human nature—is no explanation of specific cultural manifestations.² Where strikingly similar cultural manifestations recur, and specially where a number of them recur in association, the presumption is that there is an historical link between the several cases: that is to say, that one case only is original and that the rest are derivative. Since it would be difficult to produce evidence that would rule out this possibility, the independent origin of similar cultural and social phenomena is difficult to establish conclusively, even in cases where all the positive evidence hitherto brought forward in support of the hypothesis of diffusion has proved unconvincing.

2. THE GENESIS OF THE EGYPTIAC CIVILIZATION

The style of the Egyptiac Civilization was unquestionably distinctive, and this in all facets of cultural and social life: art, architecture, writing, religion, government. Yet there is convincing evidence that this distinctive style took shape suddenly³ under a stimulus from an alien style, the Sumerian, which was equally distinctive and which had taken shape, not suddenly, but gradually, in a series of stages of which the record has now been recovered by the progress of archaeological discovery in Iraq. The period during which the Egyptiac Society was open to Sumeric influences was short, but it was crucial. It not only saw the formation of the distinctive Egyptiac cultural style, a style that was to maintain itself for more than three thousand years; it also saw the

¹ 'Stimulus Diffusion', p. 16. Cp. W. Koppers' 'Der Historische Gedanke in Ethnologie und Prähistorie', in *Kultur und Sprache*, pp. 15 and 23-24.

² A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 60-61. Cp. pp. 58 and 390-1.

³ Frankfort: *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 50.

reclamation of the lower Nile valley for agriculture,¹ and the political unification of this reclaimed land of Upper Egypt with the still mostly unreclaimed Delta in a united kingdom. The opening of Egyptian hearts and minds to Sumeric influences began only towards the end of the latest pre-dynastic period, the so-called 'Nakāda II' or 'Gerzean'; and this state of receptivity came to an end soon after the establishment of the First Dynasty. In the meantime this exceptionally receptive mood had made history.

Fields in which Sumerian influence made itself felt in Egypt during this formative age were the practice of sealing with engraved cylinders, a recessed style of brick building, a Sumerian build of ship, a number of artistic motifs—for instance, symmetrical patterns of fantastic animals—and the art of writing.² The build of ship, taken together with the probability that the Nile Delta remained an impassable swamp until far on in the Age of the Old Kingdom, is the most significant pointer to the route by which these Sumeric influences may have reached Upper Egypt. 'In Egypt, signs of contact with Sumer almost cease after Narmer's reign; and, since contact with Syria increased rather than diminished during the First Dynasty, it seems unlikely that the Mesopotamian influences reached Egypt from the North'³—though it is true that it is no far cry from Byblos, on the Phoenician coast, with which Egypt was trading from the time of the Old Kingdom onwards, to Brak, on the River Khabur in Mesopotamia,⁴ where a Sumeric temple had been founded in the Protoliterate Age of Sumeric history. Frankfort conjectures⁵ that the place where the Egyptians encountered the Sumeric Civilization may have been a common source of frankincense somewhere in South Arabia.

Whatever the route, the reality of the contact seems to be indubitable. 'The strongest evidence . . . is supplied by three cylinder seals shown by their very material and by their designs to have been made in Mesopotamia during the second half of the Protoliterate period, but found in Egypt.'⁶ 'In view of [the] great variety of detailed resemblances, there can be no reasonable doubt that the earliest monumental brick architecture of Egypt was inspired by that of Mesopotamia, where it had a long previous history.'⁷ But the most remarkable evidence is in the field of writing. In Sumer the gradual evolution of the Sumeric script can be traced from its very beginnings,⁸ and 'it has been customary to postulate prehistoric antecedents for the Egyptian script, but this hypothesis has nothing in its favour'.⁹

¹ Frankfort: *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 43. 'The Nile valley north of Asyut itself was not inhabited prior to Nakāda II' (E. J. Baumgartel: *The Cultures of Prehistoric Egypt*, p. 25). The Nakāda II people were the first to drain and irrigate Upper Egypt (*ibid.*, p. 46).

² See the Appendix on 'The Influence of Mesopotamia on Egypt towards the end of the Fourth Millennium B.C.' in H. Frankfort: *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 100–11, especially the table on p. 109.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 110.
⁴ This word 'Mesopotamia' is used here in its strict meaning, to denote the country between the middle courses of the Tigris and Euphrates north-west of, and exclusive of, Babylonia. Frankfort uses the word to denote 'Iraq minus 'Iraqi Kurdistan but with the addition of the territory, east of Euphrates, that is included in the present state of Syria.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 55–56. Cp. Baumgartel, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 110–11.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁹ Frankfort, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

'In the annals of the kingdom (which happen to survive in a version of the Fifth Dynasty), events are recorded only from the First Dynasty onwards, a fact suggesting that no records of earlier times existed. . . . But the writing which appeared without antecedents at the beginning of the First Dynasty was by no means primitive. It has, in fact, a complex structure. It includes three different classes of signs: ideograms, phonetic signs, and determinatives. This is precisely the same state of complexity that had been reached in Mesopotamia at an advanced stage of the Protoliterate period. There, however, a more primitive stage is known in the earliest tablets, which used only ideograms.'¹

Frankfort reasonably concludes that the Egyptian script cannot have been invented without knowledge of the Sumeric, but he hastens to add² that 'the Egyptians did not copy the Mesopotamian system slavishly; they were merely stimulated to develop a script of their own, once the notion that language could be rendered graphically had been conveyed'.

Baumgartel, too, points out³ that

'only at the end of Nakāda II [the Gerzean period], shortly before the rise of the dynasties, do we find writing established in Egypt also [i.e. as well as in Sumer]. The system employed is too similar to that of the Sumerian script to make an independent origin likely, yet the repertory of signs is derived entirely from the surroundings of the Nakāda II people. There is no evidence of a gradual development of script in Egypt, as there is in Mesopotamia. The system appears from the first ready-made, much the same as it was throughout Egyptian history.'

Baumgartel holds⁴ that 'certain hieroglyphs originally had Semitic values, to which were later added the commonly used names of the objects represented'. 'It follows', she concludes, 'that the Nakāda II people spoke a Semitic language different from that of the Nakāda I people', whose language, in her opinion, was Hamitic. As she sees it,⁵ the Nakāda II people were Asiatic invaders who brought in with them painted pottery⁶ and a blade technique of stone-working in place of their local predecessors' bifacial technique.⁷ She points out that in Sumer the blade technique was the predominant one.⁸ Frankfort is more guarded in his judgement.

'It would [he sums up]⁹ be an error to see the birth of Egyptian civilization as a consequence of contact with Mesopotamia. The signs of change accumulating towards the end of the Predynastic Age are too numerous, and the outcome of the change is too emphatically Egyptian, in its general character and its particulars, to allow us to speak of derivation or dependence. . . . We observe that Egypt, in a period of intensified creativity, became acquainted with the achievements of Mesopotamia; that it was stimulated; and that it adapted to its own rapid development such

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

² *Ibid.*, p. 107.

³ *In op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39 and 50.

⁶ According to Baumgartel, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 and 53, all painted pottery, anywhere in the Old World, originated in Asia.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39. Frankfort, *in op. cit.*, pp. 42-43, suggests, more cautiously, that, while the Gerzean culture included Asian elements, it was still predominantly African.

⁸ Baumgartel, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁹ *In op. cit.*, p. 110.

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elements as seemed compatible with its efforts. It mostly transformed what it borrowed and after a time rejected even these modified derivations.'

It will be seen that the role of Sumeric influence in the genesis of the Egyptiac Civilization, as described by Frankfort in this passage, is a classic illustration of Kroeber's concept of 'stimulus diffusion'.

3. THE GENESIS OF THE INDUS CULTURE

The archaeological record of the Indus Culture that has been recovered in our time gives the impression that this civilization, like the Egyptiac, made a sudden appearance in the river valley in which it found a home for itself. It does not seem to have developed out of the Neolithic and Chalcolithic cultures in the adjacent highlands of Eastern Iran. It would seem to have entered the Indus valley from elsewhere, with its script and its advanced technique of brick architecture ready-made. On the analogy of what we now know about the genesis of the Egyptiac Civilization, one obvious hypothesis for explaining the genesis of the Indus Culture is that it, too, was brought to a head by the influence of the Sumeric Civilization on some people who, like the 'Gerzean' (*alias* Nakāda II) invaders of Upper Egypt, were within Sumer's cultural range, and who, in response to this stimulus, created an independent civilization of their own in a new country that they brought into existence by reclaiming a hitherto virgin tract of jungle-swamp. In the case of the Indus Culture, however, we lack the archaeological evidence which substantiates the parallel hypothesis in the Egyptiac case. Above all, the Indus script still remains undeciphered, so that we do not yet know, as we do know about the Egyptiac script, how it compares in point of structure with the Sumeric script. We do know that, after the establishment of the Indus Culture in the Indus basin about half-way through the third millennium B.C., there was commercial contact between it and the Sumeric World. Seals inscribed in the Indus script have been found in 'Iraq on Sumeric sites. This archaeological evidence for subsequent intercourse does not, however, throw light on the question whether the Sumeric Civilization exerted any stimulus on the Indus Culture in its formative stage. Still less does it throw light on the question of the region in Afrasia from which the founders of the Indus Culture originally came.

4. THE GENESIS OF CIVILIZATION IN CHINA

Today China, like the Indus valley, 'Iraq, and Egypt, is an agricultural country in which the bulk of the produce comes from drained and irrigated land that has been reclaimed from the primaeval swamps of great river valleys, and in which the greater part of the population works and lives on these reclaimed fields. Present-day China is, in economic terms, virtually identical with the lower basin of the Yellow River, the basin of the Hwai River, the lower basin of the Yangtse, together

with its upper basin in Szechwan, and the basins of the East and West rivers, opening on to the south-west coast. In the first volume of this book I assumed that, in China, history had followed the same course as in the other three regions, above-mentioned, in which the present-day basis of economic life is, as in present-day China, a system of agriculture based on water-control. I assumed that in China, as in these three other regions, the reclamation of the river-valley swamps had been the economic aspect of the local genesis of civilization. I had thought of civilization as being a state of society in which there is a ruling minority that is exempt from the common tasks of food-production and technology, on which the majority of the human race have hitherto had to spend all their working time in order to keep life going. I had supposed that in China, as elsewhere, this leisured class, which is the distinctive index of civilization,¹ had been coeval with the reclamation of the swamps. These had been reclaimed under its direction, and at the same time this achievement had brought with it the surplus of food production which had made it possible for society to support a governing class that did not have to take its share in mankind's daily work.

This picture of the genesis of civilization in China was not my private fancy. It was the established doctrine of the official Chinese account of Chinese history that began to take shape in the time of Confucius (*vivebat circa* 551-479 B.C.) and that finally crystallized in the hands of the father of Chinese history, Ssu-ma Ch'ien (*vivebat circa* 149-90 B.C.). In this tradition the reclamation of the swamps in the river basins of China was attributed to a legendary culture-hero, Yü the Great. Yü was eventually taken to have been a human being who had founded the pre-Shang Hsia dynasty. The historicity of this dynasty has not been confirmed, up to date, as the historicity of the Shang dynasty has been, by the progress of archaeological discovery. In making Yü the founder of the Hsia dynasty, the authors of the official legend were intending to imply that he was the creator of civilization in China. The official legend, after maintaining itself for not much less than two thousand years, has now been exploded, partly by archaeological discovery and partly by a critical examination of the earliest surviving Chinese literature. It appears that, in the early Chou period, Yü was held to be, not a human being, but a god, who had made the earth rise above the surface of the water.² The Chinese official legend has now been recognized to be unhistorical. Yet the idea that the reclamation of the swamps and the beginning of civilization in China were coeval, and were, in fact, simply two facets of a single event, was retained by as great and as recent a modern Western Sinologist as H. Maspéro. It was on Maspéro's authority³ that I equated the genesis of civilization in China with a response to a particular physiographical challenge—the challenge of the swamps—that admittedly accounts for the genesis of civilization in the Indus valley, Sumer, and Egypt.

Meanwhile, within the last thirty years, the traditional picture of the

¹ See p. 278.

² J. Needham, in a letter to me of 26th October, 1958.

³ See H. Maspéro: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), pp. 20-26, quoted in this book in i. 318-20.

genesis of civilization in China, which Maspéro rationalized, has come under fire. It has been suggested that the reclamation of the river-valley swamps, which is the dominant factor in China's present-day economic configuration, did not come at the beginning of the history of civilization in China but has been a gradual achievement and a comparatively late one. It is now suggested that the origins of civilization in China, on their technological and economic side, are more like its origins in Europe than like its origins in the valleys of the Indus, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Nile.

P. M. Roxby¹ has put forward the thesis that

'the essential geographical element in the rise of early Chinese civilization would seem to have been the existence of an almost continuous west-east belt of relatively forest-free and fertile loess soil, initially favourable, in spite of some handicaps, which admittedly may have acted as a spur, to agricultural development, and also open on its continental side to the entry of fresh cultural stimulus from Western Asia.'²

The primary loess of the western highlands has to be distinguished from the redeposited and reassorted loess of the eastern plains.³ The loess is thick in Kansu, round Lanchow, and westward along the Kansu corridor.⁴ North-westward it stops at what is now the line of the Great Wall,⁵ and there is also no loess south of the Tsin-ling Range; but the redeposited loess does extend south-eastward into southern Honan and eastward as far as Kai-fêng.⁶ There are, indeed, two belts of redeposited loess between the western and the Shantung highlands.⁷ The more northern part of the Eastern Plain, corresponding to the modern province of Hopeh, was originally occupied by rivers and swamps.⁸ But the central portion of the Great Plain, lying between this Hopeh basin in the north and the swamps of the lower Hwai in the south, is much higher. It has been the scene of maximum sedimentation by the Yellow River where it emerges from the Tung-Kwan gorge.⁹ Roxby labels this comparatively high ground 'the Honan Water-Parting'. It closely coincides with the more northerly of the two bands of redeposited loess that extend across the Eastern Plain.¹⁰ Following V. K. Ting,¹¹ Roxby notes¹² that the loess is essentially a valley-filling deposit and is not sufficiently hard to obstruct drainage, so that in the loess belt there cannot have been swamps of the kind that filled the alluvial plains. Ting maintains that the loess area has always been a semi-steppe and that there has never been any forestation there; and Roxby, too, holds¹³ that, in Northern China, there was almost certainly no post-glacial pine-forest phase of the kind that impeded agriculture in Europe.

'All this applies, of course, primarily to the loessial plateaux of the west, but in large measure also to the Honan Water-Parting extending east-

¹ In 'The Terrain of Early Chinese Civilization', in *Geography*, the quarterly journal of the Geographical Association, vol. 23 (Manchester, 1938), pp. 225-36. Cp. eundem: 'The Major Regions of China', *ibid.*, pp. 9-14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

² *Ibid.*, p. 236.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 227-8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

¹⁰ In *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. 15 (1931), pp. 265-90.

¹¹ In *Geography*, vol. 23, p. 228.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 231.

wards towards the foothills of the Shantung highlands and particularly to the higher western margins of the Plain and the headwaters of the Hwai. This extension is postulated in the important generalisation of Dr. Ting that "this continuous semi-steppe stretching from the sea to Turkestan, free from both forest and marsh and favourable to agriculture and to wheeled vehicles, made early settlement and continuous diffusion of culture possible".¹

The waist of the plain, between the Shansi and Shantung highlands, mostly consists of calcareous alluvium, alluvioloess, with only small patches of saline alluvium.²

'It is an unleached soil of great fertility, and both the re-sorting process of the wind and human agency can expose new surfaces, producing much the same effects as the renewal of the soil by the Nile floods. The loess in all its direct and indirect effects must be reckoned as a positive factor of the greatest importance in the environment of the Yellow River basin. In contrast, the non-lime-accumulating soils and the semi-tropical climate of the Yangtse basin were essentially favourable to marsh and forest. That must indeed have been real jungle, as all the references to it in the Tribute of Yü, and the name Ch'u (meaning jungle-land) of the first important Chinese or semi-Chinese principality which developed in it, suggest. The Yangtse region was very far from being "gracious" to the early cultivators. It required many centuries of human effort before it became the fertile region which it is to-day.'³

The non-calcareous alluvium and rice paddy-fields of the middle and lower Hwai valley and the saline alluvium soils of the coastal regions north and south of Shantung likewise 'indicate areas of former swamp, and much of the saline alluvium has only recently been reclaimed and put under cultivation'.⁴

By what stages, then, did the Chinese World's agricultural centre of gravity shift from the loess lands, where rainfall agriculture could be practised without any preliminary task of clearing forests or draining swamps, to the former swamp-lands in the river valleys which have been reclaimed at some date between the dawn of Chinese history and the modern age? J. Needham suggests⁵ that the establishment of water-control in China began in the Chou Age, and that the most important features were probably not the reclamation of swamp-land by drainage but rather the impounding of run-off water from hill valleys in tanks,⁶ the digging of navigation canals, and the building of dykes along the great rivers. Perhaps the earliest record is a reference to the irrigation of rice-fields in a song in the *Shih Ching* which may date from the eighth century B.C. The first dykes along the lower course of the Yellow River seem to have been built during the first half of the seventh century B.C. by Duke Hwan of Ch'i. The earliest known irrigation tank, the Anfêng

¹ Ibid., p. 228.

² Ibid.

³ In a letter to me of 26th October, 1958.

⁴ Needham mentions the analogy of the tanks in Ceylon. Perhaps both these and the similar works in China were ultimately inspired by the small-scale irrigation works in the Afrikan oases in the age before the reclamation of Sumer, Egypt, and the Indus valley.

⁵ Ibid., p. 229.

⁶ Ibid.

T'ang in the present-day province of Anhui, which eventually watered six million acres of land, is said to have been constructed in the sixth century B.C. by the government of the state of Ch'u. The Hung Kou (Canal of the Wild Geese), linking the Yellow River, at a point near Kai-fêng, with the Pien River, may have been dug about 500 B.C. In 483 B.C. King Fu Ch'ai of Wu dug the Han Kou canal to link the Hwai River with the Yangtse. In the fourth century B.C. the Chang River was diverted to flow into the Wei River instead of flowing into the Yellow River. In the third century B.C. in Szechwan an artificial arm of the River Min was carried through a cutting in a mountain-side to irrigate a great area in the Ch'êngtu plain. These notices, which I owe to Dr. Needham's kindness, indicate that in China the establishment of water-control was a gradual process, as it may have been in Sumer and in the Nile Delta, in contrast to its apparently sudden establishment in Upper Egypt and perhaps also in the Indus valley. This is the physiographical background to the genesis of civilization in China.

China has yielded relics of the late Neolithic stage of culture, but none of the middle or the early stage.¹ The oldest Neolithic culture in China is the Painted Pottery Culture. It extended as far east as Honan, and has been labelled with the name of a site at Yang Shao in that province; but it seems to have started earlier and lasted longer in Kansu, and its affinities are with Neolithic cultures in Transcaspia (at Anau), in South-West Asia, and in the Danube basin.² This Yang Shao culture never occupied Shantung,³ and, in its lodgements in the Eastern Plain, it succumbed to a later and more advanced Neolithic culture, the Black Pottery Culture,⁴ using the potter's wheel, which is labelled with the name of a site at Ch'eng Tzū Yui, east of Tsinan.⁵ The sequence of archaeological strata is: Yang Shao Painted Pottery Neolithic Culture, Ch'eng Tzū Yui (*alias* Lungshan) Black Pottery Neolithic Culture, Shang Bronze Age Culture.⁶ At each stage the range of domestic animals increased. The Painted Pottery people had only pigs, dogs, and cattle; the Black Pottery people had also sheep and horses. The Shang had also buffaloes and goats. The Shang had two breeds of pig, and they hunted many kinds of game (they were passionate hunters, in contrast to their Neolithic predecessors of both phases).⁷ The Black Pottery Culture site at Ch'eng Tzū Yui was a rectangular walled city, measuring 450 by 390 metres,⁸ with walls of pounded earth.⁹ This latest Neolithic culture in China had in common with the succeeding Bronze-Age Shang Culture these pounded earth walls, tripods of the 'li' shape, horses, cattle, white pottery made of porcelain clay, and divination bones

¹ H. G. Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 42.

² Roxby in loc. cit., p. 232; Li Chi: *The Beginnings of Chinese Civilization*, p. 12; Creel, op. cit., p. 45.

³ Li Chi, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴ Roxby, loc. cit., pp. 230-1 and 232.

⁵ Creel, op. cit., p. 48; idem: *Studies in Early Chinese Cultures, First Series*, p. 176; Roxby, loc. cit., p. 231.

⁶ Li Chi, op. cit., p. 14.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 22-23 and 23-25. Roxby, loc. cit., p. 231, says that cattle, as well as horses and sheep, make their first appearance in China in the Black Pottery Age. See also Creel: *Studies*, pp. 182-3 and 189, and *The Birth of China*, p. 49.

⁸ Creel: *Studies*, p. 176.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 177-82; *The Birth of China*, p. 48; Roxby, op. cit., p. 231.

(though, in the Black Pottery Age, these were not inscribed).¹ The Shang pottery technique was a continuation of the Black Pottery technique; the Black Pottery Culture 'li'-shaped tripods set the pattern for the subsequent Shang bronze sacrificial vessels; and Creel sees in the Black Pottery Culture the link between the Neolithic Age and the Bronze Age in China.² Moreover, the area occupied by the Shang Culture, before the removal of the capital to Anyang *circa* 1384 B.C., seems to have coincided with the area previously occupied by the Black Pottery Culture—unlike the course of events in Afrasia, where the passage from Neolithic-Chalcolithic cultures to Bronze Age civilizations was accompanied by a change of location from the oases to the river valleys. On the other hand, Li Chi lays stress³ on the discontinuity between the Black Pottery Culture and the Shang Culture. He names⁴ six features of the Shang Culture that were innovations: a new development of the pottery industry; the use of bronze for casting tools, weapons, and sacrificial vessels; the possession of a highly developed system of writing; chamber burials and human sacrifices; the use of chariots; and advanced stone carvings.

In the Shang script and the Shang bronze technique we are confronted with the same puzzle as at the geneses of the Egyptian Civilization and the Indus Culture. These achievements burst upon us full-blown. Each of them must have had a long back-history.⁵ The Shang style, like the Egyptian and Indus styles, is quite distinctive; yet, in the light of what we know about the genesis of the Egyptian Civilization, we can guess that the Shang Culture may have come to birth under the stimulus of some older culture whose influence we cannot detect because it inspired the fathers of the Shang Culture, not to imitate it, but to make something original of their own. 'Certainly the superlative technique of Shang bronze-casting must have represented the end point of a course of evolution, from the first discovery of the process, requiring many centuries, if not millennia.'⁶ The tin content of Shang bronze amounts to 17 per cent.⁷ As for the script, it was not crude or primitive.⁸ No traces of primitive Chinese writing have been recovered up to date.⁹ 'Every important principle of the formation of modern Chinese characters was already in use.'¹⁰ It is now possible to read most of the characters in any oracle-bone inscription, and to date a large proportion of them with a margin of error of only a few decades.¹¹ Great progress was made during the 300 years during which we can follow the development of the script on the Shang oracle bones.¹² Conventionalized ideograms predominate; and, though some characters are borrowed for phonetic use, the Chinese scribes, like their Sumerian and Egyptian predecessors, held back from going over to a completely phonetic system of writing.¹³

How are we to account for the genesis of civilization in China in the form of the Shang Culture? Was it an independent local development

¹ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 50. Cp. *Studies*, p. 191.

² *The Birth of China*, p. 50; *Studies*, pp. 190-1.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Creel: *Studies*, p. 225.

⁵ Li Chi, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17; Roxby, *loc. cit.*, p. 230.

⁶ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 159.

⁷ C. S. Coon: *The History of Man*, p. 330.

⁸ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 160.

⁹ Creel: *Studies*, p. 34.

¹⁰ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 159; *Studies*, p. 39.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹² Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 159; *Studies*, p. 39.

out of the Neolithic Black Pottery Culture, which was, itself, apparently, less dependent on western influences than the older Neolithic Painted Pottery Culture? Braidwood considers¹ it to be non-proven that civilization in Eastern Asia is an independent development. Then was the Shang Culture imported, ready-made, by invaders from abroad? If it was, was it brought in from the west or from the south, or partly from each of these two quarters? Or was it a local creation under inspiration from outside? These several possible explanations are not mutually exclusive, and perhaps the truth is to be found in a combination of them.

Rice seems to have been cultivated in Northern Honan as early as the Painted Pottery phase of the Neolithic Age, though at this stage without being accompanied by the buffalo.² Rice cultivation implies irrigation. It also implies an origin in the south.³ According to Coon,⁴ there is a consensus among botanists that rice, both wet and dry, was first cultivated somewhere in the tropical monsoon forests, and he raises the question whether the invention of agriculture in South China and South-East Asia may not have been independent of its invention in Afrasia.⁵ Rice, as well as wheat and millet, was cultivated by the Shang people in the Anyang period.⁶ They also had the water buffalo, though it was less common than ordinary cattle.⁷ The additional breed of pig possessed by the Shang people, *sus vittatus*, was also of southern origin, in contrast to the original Chinese pig, which came from the north.⁸ The Shang people's cowrie shells and pottery must also have come from the south.⁹ Moreover, the nearest sources of tin for Shang bronze, with its high tin content, were in Yunnan and Malaya.¹⁰

It thus looks as if elements of culture had seeped into the birth-place of the Neolithic and Bronze-Age cultures of China, on the Honan Water-Parting, from the south as well as from the west, and this from the beginning of the local Neolithic Age, some time in the third millennium B.C. This southern source of culture in Northern China is mysterious in the present state of our knowledge. It is easy to see how cultural influences originating in Afrasia could have reached China from the north-west. But, to the south and south-west, the nearest centre of civilization to North China was the Indus valley, and the obstacles to the radiation of culture from there to China by an all-tropical route, south of the Tibetan plateau, were enormous. South-East Asia was one of the latest parts of the Old World to be brought within the *Oikoumenê*. The civilizations of India and China did not make contact in that quarter till the second century of the Christian Era, about 250 years later than the date of their earliest meeting via the steppes and oases of Central Asia. The southern provenance of important elements in the civilization of China seems to be unquestionable, but it presents us with a baffling problem.

¹ R. J. Braidwood: *The Near East and the Foundations of Civilization*, pp. 2-3.

² Li Chi, op. cit., p. 35; Creel: *Studies*, p. 175.

³ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 51.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 333.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 149 and 320.

⁶ Roxby, loc. cit., p. 234.

⁷ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 80; *Studies*, p. 251.

⁸ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 78; Coon, op. cit., p. 331.

⁹ Coon, *ibid.*

¹⁰ Coon, op. cit., p. 330.

5. THE GENESIS OF THE ANDEAN CIVILIZATION

The style of the Andean Civilization—if we use the word 'style' in the broadest sense to cover cultural activities of all kinds—is as distinctive as the style of the Egyptian Civilization. Yet in this case, as in that, the archaeological evidence suggests that this distinctive civilization came to birth under the stimulus of a different, and equally distinctive, civilization with whose domain it was not immediately contiguous, though the domains of both civilizations were contained in one geographically continuous *Oikoumené* in which the intervening regions were at a transitional stage of culture. In the Americas the civilization that played the role of the Sumeric civilization in the Old World was the Middle American Civilization, and the transitional culture that was the Middle American and Andean civilizations' common platform—from which they rose like two peaks¹—was the one that Spinden labelled 'Archaic' and that Willey and Phillips now label 'Formative'.

The evidence linking Middle America and Peru is in the sphere of culture contact, not of style;² and 'the story is obviously not one of diffusion alone'.³

'In style and patterning the arts and institutions of the two areas are quite distinct. This distinctiveness is more pronounced in the Classic and Postclassic cultures than in those of the Formative. There is little question but what styles and patterns resulted from local creativeness and inventiveness in each area and within smaller regions of each area.'⁴

There is no good evidence of diffusion between Middle America and Peru before about 1000 B.C.;⁵ but it does seem to have occurred during the last millennium B.C.⁶ During this period the main movement seems to have been from north to south, considering that the Formative cultures arose earlier in Middle America than in Peru⁷ and that the development of culture at the southern end of the Pacific coast of Peru lagged several centuries behind its development at the northern end.⁸ The most convincing single proof of Middle America's priority is to be found in the history of the diffusion of maize, which eventually became the staple crop of all agricultural societies in America living in climatic and physiographical conditions that allowed of maize being cultivated. It may be true that pre-maize root-crop horticulture was

¹ A. L. Kroeber, quoted by G. R. Willey in 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America: Its Prehistoric Relationships to Middle America and Peru', a paper read to the Thirty-Third International Congress of Americanists, held at San José, Costa Rica, in July, 1958: *Actas del XXXIII Congreso Internacional de Americanistas*, vol. i (San José, Costa Rica, 1959), pp. 184-94.

² G. R. Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', in *The American Anthropologist*, vol. 57, No. 3, Part 1 (June, 1955), pp. 571-93. The present reference is to p. 580. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 588. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 589. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 581.

⁶ G. R. Willey: 'Estimated Correlations and Dating of South and Central American Culture Sequences', in *American Antiquity*, vol. 23, No. 4 (April, 1958), pp. 353-78. The present reference is to p. 358.

⁷ Willey: 'The Intermediate Area', p. 7. According to Willey and Phillips, 1958, the carbon-14 test has given 1359 ± 250 B.C. as the date for the Early Zacatenco culture in the valley of Mexico, and 714 ± 200 B.C. for the coastal Chavín culture in North-Western Peru. ⁸ Willey: 'Estimated Correlations', p. 356.

invented in Peru, at the north-western end of the Peruvian coast;¹ but 'sedentary agriculture-based village life and well-developed ceramics have been dated back to 1500 B.C. in Middle America... and cultivated maize is considerably earlier than this'.² Willey and Phillips raise the question: 'Was the challenge of unfavourable environment a significant factor in the development of early maize culture? The earliest known Preformative³ developments are in semi-arid regions.'⁴ According to J. A. Mason, the carbon-14 test dates maize found in Bat Cave, New Mexico, to as early as 3650 B.C., with a margin of error of ± 290 years. And maize pollen found in the valley of Mexico, 200 feet below the surface, must be at least 60,000 years old.⁵ The domestication of maize was taking place in San Agostin, in West Central New Mexico, by about 3000 B.C.⁶ It was being cultivated in Middle America by 2500 B.C.⁷ But maize does not appear in Peru—not even in Northern Peru—till after the end of the Huaca Prieta Age, that is to say till after about 1250 B.C.⁸ In Northern Peru in the Virú valley the carbon-14 test indicates that plain pottery came in about 1200 B.C. and maize perhaps not till about 848 B.C.⁹ or perhaps even not till about 715 B.C., which appears to be the carbon-14-test mean date for the Cupisnique phase of North Peruvian coastal culture.¹⁰

Maize cultivation and the art of pottery are not the only elements of culture that appear to have been diffused from Middle America to the Andean World during the last millennium B.C. The idea of the platform mound seems to have been diffused in this direction between 1000 and 500 B.C.¹¹ Rocker-stamped decoration of pottery appears in Mexico *circa* 1000–500 B.C. and in North-West Peru *circa* 700 B.C.¹² Rocker-stamped decoration and the platform mound and maize appear in North-West Peru simultaneously.¹³ The diffusion of 'resist-dye' painting is another example.¹⁴ In general, during the last millennium B.C., there seems to have

¹ Willey: 'Estimated Correlations', p. 372; 'The Intermediate Area', p. 7. According to J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 30, more than a hundred food plants were cultivated in the Americas and more than thirty of these in Peru. Cp. G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 36. A list of pre-Columbian domesticated plants in the Andean highlands is given by W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird in *Andean Culture History*, pp. 30–31. These two authorities claim, *ibid.*, p. 29, that the cultivation of the potato, coca, quinoa, and oca originated in the Andean area.

² Willey: 'The Intermediate Area', p. 7. Cp. G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 41.

³ i.e. late Archaic in terms of Willey's and Phillips' revised classification (A. J. T.).

⁴ 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 792.

⁵ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 30. Willey, however, gives the carbon-14 date of the maize in Bat Cave as *circa* 2500 B.C. ('The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 33).

⁶ Willey and Phillips, 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 756–7. C. S. Coon, *The History of Man*, p. 353, gives the date as 5000 B.C.

⁷ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 581.

⁸ Mason, *op. cit.*, pp. 31 and 35. Cp. W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 126.

⁹ G. R. Willey: *Prehistoric Settlement Patterns in the Virú Valley, Peru*, p. 34.

¹⁰ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 581. On p. 577, *ibid.*, Willey dates the beginning of the Cupisnique phase *circa* 1000 B.C. Bushnell, *Peru*, p. 41, places the arrival of maize in Peru about 1000 B.C. Willey dates it *circa* 700 B.C. in 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 33.

¹¹ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 583; *idem*: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', pp. 36–37.

¹² Willey: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', pp. 34–36.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁴ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', pp. 583–4.

been a diffusion of the Middle American Formative stage culture of Tlatilco, on the Mexican plateau near the present-day Mexico City, to Chavín, in the north-western highlands of the Andean World,¹ as well as to the north-west coast of Peru in the Cupisnique (Coastal Chavín) phase of culture there. There are geographical links between Tlatilco and Chavín in Honduras at Playa de los Muertos in the Ulua Valley and on the Babahoyo River in coastal Ecuador.² Among the features shared with the Tlatilco culture by the Chavín and Cupisnique cultures, Willey mentions³ (in addition to the rocker-stamped decoration) incised colour zones in pottery decoration, stirrup-spouted vessels, pottery stamps, whistling jars, the jaguar motif, and a concept of dualism. On the other hand, there is no parallel in the Tlatilco culture to the massive buildings at Chavín, and none in the Chavín culture to the Tlatilco culture's pottery figurines.⁴

The technique of making figurines in moulds seems to have spread from the Teotihuacán Classic culture of Middle America to the Andean World early in the first millennium of the Christian Era.⁵ Willey conjectures⁶ that the mould technique may have travelled by sea from Middle America to Ecuador. And it seems certain that a sea-passage, based on ports on the north-west coast of Ecuador, was at least one of the routes by which metallurgy was diffused to Middle America from the Andean World.⁷

6. WHAT WERE THE EXTENT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRE-COLUMBIAN CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OLD WORLD AND THE AMERICAS?

It seems certain that the first human occupants of the Americas came, like their successors, from the Old World, and that this happened at what is a relatively late date in the time-scale of Old-World human history. In the Americas no trace has been found of anthropoid apes, and none of any kinds of hominid other than *homo sapiens*.⁸ The predominant type of

¹ G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, pp. 52-53.

² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

³ In 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America' p. 35; and in 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 581.

⁴ Bushnell, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁵ Willey: 'The Intermediate Area', p. 9.

⁶ In 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', pp. 583-4.

⁷ Willey, *op. cit.*, p. 584. According to Willey, 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 41, 'American metallurgical techniques were first developed in South America.' Gold work is found in North-West Peru (in the Lambayeque valley) as early as the Coastal Chavín horizon, copper work in the Gallinazo period, i.e. the transition from the Formative to the Classic. Metal was first used for weapons and tools in North-West Peru in the Mochica period (*ibid.*, p. 41). Bronze was invented in the south-east highlands of the Andean World in the classic Tiahuanaco period, and was eventually diffused to Ecuador by the Incas (*ibid.*, p. 42). Copper tools had been in use in Ecuador as early as the Mochica period of North-West Peru (*ibid.*, p. 42). On the other hand, in the Maya cultural province of Middle America metal objects were not in circulation before the Late Classic period, circa A.D. 900-1000, and then only as foreign imports (*ibid.*, p. 42). Copper tools seem to have come to the south-west coast of Mexico in the Late Postclassic period direct by sea from Ecuador, and Ecuadorian mariners seem to have been the middlemen between the Andean World and Middle America (*ibid.*, pp. 42-43). According to Willey, 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 584, metallurgy arrived in Middle America from the Andean World within the last five centuries before the Spanish conquest; according to C. S. Coon, *The History of Man*, pp. 345-6, it arrived only within the last three centuries before that date.

⁸ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 20.

pre-Columbian *homo sapiens* in the Americas is Proto-Mongoloid, but the oldest skulls found in the Americas are dolichocephalic, of an Australoid-Melanesoid type.¹ These various pre-Columbian representatives of *homo sapiens* entered the Americas via Alaska, during the latest (so far) of the glaciations. In that age, sea-level may have been 300 feet lower than it is now. The present Behring Straits will have been an isthmus. And the geological evidence indicates that this isthmus and the Mackenzie River basin were unglaciated at the time.² 'Early migration southward from Alaska was mainly in the intermontane and High Plains "corridors" on either side of the Rocky Mountains.'³ Along the Pacific coast of North America remains dating back to the 'Lithic' Age are relatively rare.⁴ They are also rare in Peru and Bolivia.⁵ In South America 'Lithic' remains are concentrated in temperate and arid areas—perhaps because these provided better hunting.⁶ The earliest human entrants into the Americas from the Old World brought their Old-World Palaeolithic tools with them. The carbon-14 test gives an antiquity of 9,000 years to a pair of sandals found in a cave in Oregon, and an antiquity of 8,630 years for the human occupation of a cave near the southern tip of South America.⁷ On the High Plains of central and southern North America the date of 'Early Lithic' (i.e. late Pleistocene and early Post-Pleistocene) remains is *circa* 8000–4000 B.C.⁸ 'Early Lithic' remains astride the Straits of Magellan are dated, by the carbon-14 test, 6688 B.C., with a margin of error of ± 450 years.⁹ Willey and Phillips date the Lithic Age in the Americas *circa* 20000–5000 B.C.¹⁰ 'By 5000 B.C. or before, Man had found his way over most of the New World.'¹¹ In fact, as C. S. Coon puts it,¹² a single migration across the Behring Straits in the Fourth Glacial Age suffices to explain the human occupation of all the Americas except the Eskimo region by about 5000 B.C.

This first chapter of the history of Man in the Americas is not controversial. The controversies arise over the question of later contacts, and the related question whether such contacts, if they occurred, were made by sea across the breadth of the Pacific Ocean and whether, if so, the traffic was one-way or was reciprocal.

Braidwood holds¹³ that civilization has arisen independently in two places: the Tigris-Euphrates basin and the New World. Kroeber, too, judges¹⁴ that,

'all in all' the Americas' 'culture has evidently both developed and crystallised independently of that of the [Old-World] *Oikoumenê*. The New World possesses its own heartland of civilization, stretching from Central

¹ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, pp. 25–27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ Willey and Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), p. 96.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁷ Mason, *op. cit.*, p. 21. Willey, however, dates the earliest human occupation of South America as late as 7500–5000 B.C. in 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 43.

⁸ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 731.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 737–8.

¹⁰ Willey and Phillips (1958), p. 201.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² In *The History of Man*, p. 352.

¹³ R. J. Braidwood: *The Near East and the Foundations of Civilization*, p. 1.

¹⁴ In *The Nature of Culture*, p. 394.

Mexico to somewhat beyond Peru. The axis of this cultural Nuclear America is oriented without reference to that of the ancient *Oikoumenê*. It is both well separated from it and pointed in a different direction.¹

In Kroeber's view² the histories of the Old-World civilizations and the New-World civilizations 'are not, as far as we can see, parts of a single plot. Resemblances are either analogies instead of homologies; or, where they are the latter, they are also *dissecta membra*.' Willey, too, holds³ that Nuclear America, to the best of our knowledge, 'stands clearly apart and essentially independent from the comparable culture core of the Old World'. Nuclear America and the Old-World *Oikoumenê* are parallel cultural structures. 'Within each, diverse civilizations (or styles) have sprung up as unique re-workings of a common cultural content held within the *Oikoumenê*.'⁴ As Kroeber sees it,⁵ the independence of the Pre-Columbian American civilizations is made probable by the absence, in them, of iron, wheels, ploughs, the usual grains and domestic animals, stringed instruments, ordeals, and proverbs. In plough-agriculture Kroeber sees⁶ a specific cultural pattern, which is unlikely to have been invented more than once. He does not feel the same about agriculture itself, and he points out that the pattern of agriculture in the Americas and in the Old World is not the same. Kroeber's view on this point is shared by J. A. Mason. More than a hundred food plants, Mason notes,⁶ were cultivated in the Americas, and,

'of these, only very few, such as gourds, cotton, sweet potatoes, possibly plantains, peanuts, and coconuts, have close enough relatives in the Old World to suggest importation (and the sweet potato almost certainly was of American origin); the great majority have no foreign congeners, but rather close wild relatives in America.'

That bronze should have been invented twice over—once in Sumer and then independently in the Andean highlands—is surprising, if true. Kroeber submits⁷ that, all the same, it seems probable that bronze was invented independently in the New World when one takes into consideration all the associated data, such as the shapes and uses of the objects made of it. He notes⁸ that the Sumerians and the Chinese used their bronze for making swords and ritual vessels and that the Andeans did not.

Neither Kroeber nor Willey seeks to deny that there was some diffusion of elements of culture from the Old World to the Americas in the Post-Palaeolithic Age. Willey states his position as follows:⁹

'I am unconvinced of the linkages of style, in art and architecture, which have been advanced (Heine-Geldern and Eckholm 1951; Eckholm 1953). On the other hand, certain technical inventions, modes, or complex features do argue for pre-Columbian contact.'

¹ Ibid.

² 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 571.

³ Ibid.

⁴ In op. cit., p. 60.

⁵ Ibid., p. 91.

⁶ In *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 30.

⁷ Ibid., p. 60.

⁹ In 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 585.

⁸ Ibid., p. 91.

'The Early Lithic and Archaic reflect a general situation of marginal dependence on the Old World.'¹ Willey and Phillips consider² the possibility that the 'Archaic' culture of the Americas may have been derived from Northern Eurasia. The culture of the north-west coast of North America appears to be 'Archaic' in all its phases;³ and here 'Asiatic and possibly Oceanic influences played a more decisive role than those from more southerly parts of the North American continent'.⁴ Kroeber notes⁵ that northern North America has received by import from Asia a number of non-mutually related items: e.g. the composite bow, slat-armour, conical tents, scapulomancy, bear rituals, the shamanistic tambourine drum, the magic flight story, and so on. But, in his view,⁶ this indicates that North America was *not* a passage-way for historic continuity between the Old-World *Oikoumenê* and Nuclear America. North America has *not* played the transmissional role that has been played by Turkestan. The same point is made in another form by Willey and Phillips.⁷ As they put it, the fact of diffusion 'does not deny that the cultures of human societies are integrated functioning wholes rather than random assemblages of elements, but it does negate the theory that such cultures, or institutions within cultures, are necessarily transmitted as integrated wholes'.

Willey and Phillips also insist⁸ that the independence of the pre-Columbian American civilizations increased *pari passu* with their development.

'With the Preformative⁹ . . . we begin to reckon with elements that have no specific Old-World parallels. . . . Asiatic influences may have continued to filter through from the North, or directly across the Pacific, but these influences were never again paramount except on the periphery of the North American continent. Leaving aside the important but unresolved question of whether or not trans-Pacific influences were significant forces in the rise of American agricultural civilizations,¹⁰ there can be no doubt that the Nuclear American centers (Middle America to Peru) were culturally dominant in the later stages of New World development.'

These general considerations, put forward by Kroeber, Willey, and Phillips, seem decisive. They hold good in the face of evidence that particular elements of culture were diffused from the Old World to the Americas and also, in a much smaller number of instances, in the opposite direction. The evidence cited for these cultural contacts and interchanges looks as if it were very uneven in value. There are sweeping dogmatic assertions that can be discounted, but there are also well-attested facts that cannot be explained away, and some of these are enigmas in our present state of knowledge. The difficulty of the problem

¹ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 794. ² *Ibid.*, p. 744. ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 750-1. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 751.

⁵ In *The Nature of Culture*, p. 394.

⁷ 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 729-30.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 794.

⁹ i.e. Late Archaic and Early Formative, in Willey's and Phillips's own revised terminology (A. J. T.).

¹⁰ Willey is sceptical about the possibility of identical culture traits having been introduced separately into Middle America and into Peru by diffusion across the Pacific ('The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 586).

has been accentuated by the results of the application of the carbon-14 test in the field of Pre-Columbian American archaeology. This has consistently set back the dates of the earlier phases of Pre-Columbian American history as compared with the previous datings obtained by dead-reckoning on the basis of estimates of the time required for the depositing of such-and-such a thickness of stratum of human refuse. The results of the carbon-14 test may be surprising, and they are subject to many possibilities of error, so that they have to be accepted with some reserve unless and until we obtain a large enough number of them to be able to arrive at a statistical average. On the other hand, datings based on a supposed correlation between thickness of deposit and passage of time are incurably subjective.

When we have reduced the alleged correspondences between particular Old-World and New-World culture elements to a minimum, what remains is still impressive.

The greatest puzzle of all is presented by the history of cotton. The earliest known Old-World cotton fabrics come, it is said,¹ from Mohenjodaro. According to Kroeber,² cotton originated in India and spread from there till, in the end, it largely replaced wool in 'Iraq, linen in Egypt and Europe, hemp in China and Japan. 'Its abundant growth and use in Peru precedes that in either China or the West.'

'It has been established that the cultivated New-World cottons resulted from the hybridisation of Old-World cotton and a wild American cotton plant,³ probably *Gossypium raimondii* of Peru.'⁴

And it is the unanimous conclusion of botanists 'that Old-World cotton could have been introduced into America only by human agency'.⁵

'Aboriginal American cultivated cotton has recently been indicated to the satisfaction of botanists to be a hybrid between Asiatic cultivated and American wild cotton. Cotton was present in the lowest agricultural, pre-ceramic horizons of coastal Peru. Carriage by human hands across the Pacific at this early period would appear to be the only explanation.'⁶

The carbon-14 test has now set back the date of this pre-maize and pre-pottery, but not pre-cotton, stage of culture in Peru to 2550-1250 B.C.⁷ According to R. Heine-Geldern,⁸ J. R. Bird found crude cotton textiles at the pre-ceramic site of Huaca Prieta, in North-West Peru, which he dates *circa* 2575-2370 B.C. by the carbon-14 test. In fact, by 2500 B.C. cotton was being cultivated in both the Indus valley and Peru.⁹

At Huaca Prieta at this period a species of gourd was being cultivated that was practically identical with one cultivated in Polynesia.¹⁰ According to Coon,¹¹ gourds were originally domesticated in Africa or India.

¹ R. Heine-Geldern: 'Some Problems of Migration in the Pacific', in *Kultur und Sprache* (Vienna 1952, Herold), p. 346.

² *The Nature of Culture*, p. 388.

³ According to Coon: *The History of Man*, p. 255, cultivated American cotton has thirteen large chromosomes, like wild American cotton, and also thirteen small chromosomes, like both wild and cultivated Indian cotton.

⁴ Heine-Geldern, *ibid.*, p. 346.

⁵ Mason, *op. cit.*, p. 24; *cp.* p. 32. See also G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 26.

⁶ Mason, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁷ Coon: *The History of Man*, pp. 304-5.

⁸ Mason, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

⁹ Heine-Geldern, *ibid.*

¹⁰ In *loc. cit.*, pp. 346-7.

¹¹ In *op. cit.*, p. 354.

Coon concludes¹ that, if cotton and gourds were brought to America by human agency, this must have been the work of Neolithic navigators. This is as much as to say that the evidence forces upon us a *reductio ad absurdum*. But so incredible a conclusion is surely not necessary. If there is a possibility that the archaeologically well attested influence of the Sumeric Civilization on the late predynastic culture of Upper Egypt towards the end of the fourth millennium B.C. was diffused by sea via the Indian Ocean, it is perhaps just conceivable that Sumerian or Indian navigators may have found their way across the Pacific (no doubt unintentionally and accidentally) 500 or 1,000 years later. In any case the carriers cannot have been the Micronesians or the Polynesians. The carbon-14 test dates the first human occupation of Western Micronesia between 1727 and 1327 B.C., the occupation of the Marianas *circa* 1500 B.C., and the occupation of Hawaii *circa* A.D. 825-1125.² Yet

'While it is certain that the Polynesians did not carry the cultivated cotton plant from the Old World to America, it is equally certain that it was American cultivated cotton which subsequently was introduced into the Polynesian islands.'³

The sweet potato also seems to have come to Polynesia from America before the arrival of European mariners in the Pacific. It was found already being cultivated in Polynesia by the eighteenth-century European explorers.⁴ It was found in Easter Island, Hawaii, and New Zealand,⁵ and in both Easter Island and New Zealand there were a great number of varieties. The name by which it is known in Polynesia also points to a South American origin. In the Quechua language of the Andean World the sweet potato is called *kumar*, *komal*, *kumal*. It is called *kumara* in New Zealand, Raratonga, the Tuomotos, Mangareva, Easter Island; *umara* or *umaa* in Tahiti; *kumala* in Tonga; *'umala* in Samoa; *uala* or *uwala* in Hawaii; *kumaa* in the Marquesas; *ku'a'ra* in Mangaia.⁶

The question whether the mariners who brought the sweet potato and cotton from America to Polynesia were Americans or Polynesians is one that is notoriously still in dispute. Hornell stresses the efficiency that had been attained in the technique of shipbuilding in both Polynesia and South America before the advent of the Europeans. In Polynesia 'double canoes of large carrying capacity were possessed by the people of every principal island group'.⁷ In A.D. 1526 Pizarro's pilot Bartolomeo Ruiz captured, *en route* between the Isthmus of Panamá and Peru, a thirty-ton balsa raft with bipod masts (like Burman and Indonesian boats), cotton sails, and hennequen rigging.⁸ Mason holds⁹ that the

¹ In op. cit., p. 59.

² A. Sharp: *Ancient Voyagers in the Pacific*, pp. 84 and 100.

³ Heine-Geldern, *ibid.*, p. 347.

⁴ R. B. Dixon: 'The Problem of the Sweet Potato in Polynesia', in *The American Anthropologist*, New Series, vol. 34, No. 1 (January-March, 1932), p. 40. Cp. J. Hornell: 'Was there pre-Columbian Contact between the People of Oceania and South America?' in *The Journal of the Polynesian Society*, vol. 54 (Wellington, N.Z., 1945), pp. 186-7.

⁵ Dixon in loc. cit., p. 44; Coon, op. cit., p. 357.

⁶ Hornell, *ibid.*, p. 175. Cp. Mason, op. cit., p. 23; A. Sharp: *Ancient Voyagers in the Pacific*, p. 87.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁷ Hornell in loc. cit., p. 169.

⁹ In op. cit., p. 21.

elements of culture shared by the American societies with Polynesia, Melanesia, and South-East Asia are too many, and the correspondences too close, to be dismissed as being accidental coincidences. At the same time he points out that 'Polynesians did not reach Easter Island before the fourteenth century A.D.', and that there is no evidence that they had any predecessors who were their equals in navigational skill.¹ He also notes that there is no trace of any infusion of Polynesian blood in the Pre-Columbian population of the Americas.² Indeed, as we have seen, chronology rules out the possibility that the Polynesians can have played any appreciable part in conveying elements of Old-World culture to the Americas, even if we accept Hornell's thesis³ that the Polynesians made systematic long-distance voyages of exploration. But account should also be taken of A. Sharp's thesis that there were no deliberate voyages, even between Eastern and Western Polynesia;⁴ that 'all these separate worlds were settled by one-way voyages of isolated canoes';⁵ and that 'no accounts of deliberate two-way contact have been found'.⁶

A number of miscellaneous culture elements common to the Old World and the Americas have been noticed. H. G. Creel, for instance, notices that a particular make of stone knife, which is characteristic of the Shang Culture in China, as well as the composite bow and the sleeved coat, has a circum-polar diffusion, and that the knife is found in the New World as far afield as South America.⁷ He draws attention to the affinity between the art of the Shang and that of the Pre-Columbian peoples along the north-west coast of North America.⁸ In particular he mentions the motif of bisected animals, joined only at the nose.⁹ Willey notes that the rocker-stamped decoration, which was eventually diffused to Peru from Mexico,¹⁰ had previously been diffused to Mexico from North-East Asia.¹¹ Mason notes¹² that 'on the coast of Chile characteristic stone implements have been found that must have come from Easter Island'. The pan-pipes in use in early China and in Peru are identical in detail.¹³ The chewing of betel nut in Malaya, Indonesia, and the Pacific has its counterpart in the chewing of coca in the Andean World, and in both cases the drug is chewed with an admixture of lime.¹⁴ Bark cloth and feather mosaics were manufactured on both sides of the Pacific by identical processes.¹⁵ Weaving was done by the same processes, including methods of keeping part of the fabric untouched by the dye (the 'resist-dye' process).¹⁶ Heine-Geldern's list¹⁶ of culture elements common to the Old World and the Americas includes the *cire perdue* process of casting metal; the use of tin; the colouring of gold by chemical processes; methods of weaving; tie-dyeing (i.e. 'resist-dyeing'); batik;

¹ Ibid., p. 23.

² Ibid., p. 25.

³ In op. cit., p. 168.

⁴ A. Sharp: *Ancient Voyagers in the Pacific*, p. 12.

⁵ Ibid., p. 30.

⁶ Ibid., p. 78.

⁷ Creel: *Studies*, pp. 173-4 and 246-7; *The Birth of China*, p. 97.

⁸ *Studies*, p. 249.

⁹ *Studies*, p. 248.

¹⁰ See p. 356.

¹¹ G. R. Willey: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 35; idem: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 585.

¹² In op. cit., pp. 24-25.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 24-25 and 231.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 24-25 and 142.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

¹⁶ In *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), pp. 91-92.

the parasol as an emblem of royalty; the ball-game;¹ the symbolization of the points of the compass by colours—and these the same colours on both sides of the Pacific. Another list of Heine-Geldern's² is longer.

'To mention only a few out of many items of Asiatic cultural elements we find in Peru: Highly characteristic art motifs of the Late Chou period of China in the Chavín culture; an Asiatic form of the loom; gauze weaving and other Asiatic weaving techniques; the lost-wax (*cire perdue*) process of metal-casting; cormorant fishing; metal mirrors; star-shaped clubs (found also in Eastern Asia); the use of the throne, the litter, and the umbrella as insignia of rank and royalty, the umbrella being of a very unusual type, known only from Peru and from China, where it appears already in the second century A.D.'

So long as Heine-Geldern is dealing in terms of particular elements of culture, he is on uncontroversial ground in so far as he can bring forward convincing evidence that the elements that he pronounces to be identical really are so. Mason and Willey and Kroeber agree that a number of elements were diffused from the Old World to the Americas, and a smaller number in the opposite direction. Such facts, when demonstrated, have to be accepted, even though the dates and circumstances and agencies of the transmission remain obscure. But Heine-Geldern plunges into deeper waters when he suggests that the whole configuration of an Old-World culture made its way into the Americas complete. In another context³ he maintains that the motifs of Andean sculpture of the Chavín horizon echo those of the Chinese sculpture of the eighth century B.C., and that the motifs of the Andean Salinar culture echo those of the Chinese culture of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.⁴ He holds that the influence of the subsequent Dong-son culture of North-Eastern Indochina was still more potent in the Americas from Panamá to Northern Chile and North-Western Argentina—especially in metallurgical designs and processes.⁵ As for the Tajín culture of Eastern Mexico, he writes⁶ that 'one would be justified in speaking of a local variant of the Chinese art of the seventh to the fourth centuries B.C.'. He suggests⁷ that the Hindu-Buddhist culture of South-East Asia influenced the architecture, art, symbols, cosmological ideas, institutions, insignia, and games of Middle America—especially in its Olmeca and Maya cultural provinces—in the seventh to tenth centuries A.D. And he concludes⁷ that

'the processes involved in the formation of the Meso-American and Andean civilizations can be compared to those which resulted in the Hinduisation of South-East Asia'.

This daring parallel surely refutes itself. The Indian origin of the culture that was diffused over South-East Asia in and after the early centuries of the Christian Era is attested, not only by styles of art and architecture and by forms of social organization and government, but by

¹ Also mentioned by Willey in 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', pp. 29-31.

² In *Kultur und Sprache*, p. 346.

³ *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956).

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 93.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

the introduction of Indian scripts and Indian literary languages; and this latter evidence would remain uncontroversial, even if it were to be argued that the attribution of the new styles of South-East Asian art to an Indian origin is, by its very nature, subjective and therefore disputable.

During the span of perhaps ten or twelve thousand years that intervened between the arrival of Palaeolithic Man in the Americas via Alaska and the eventual arrival of Modern Western Man there via the Atlantic, there is evidence that particular elements of culture made their way, by whatever routes, to the Americas from the Old World. But the thesis that the same transit was made by complete configurations of culture seems to go far beyond the attested facts. If this finding is the right one, the pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas must be regarded as having been original creations of the descendants of those representatives of *homo sapiens* who had entered the Americas from the Old World in the last phase of the Palaeolithic Age. 'Almost every element of culture in the New World can be explained on the basis of a purely local growth.'¹

XI. THE CONFIGURATION OF MIDDLE AMERICAN AND ANDEAN HISTORY

PRE-COLUMBIAN American archaeology has made enormous advances since the years 1927-33, when I was planning the first ten volumes of this book and writing the first three. But the effect on the pictures of Andean history and of Middle American history has not been the same. The general configuration of Andean history remains much what it was, in spite of the filling in of details and the lengthening of the chronological vista.² On the other hand the general configuration of Middle American history has been transformed out of all recognition.

In the late nineteen-twenties the picture of Middle American history was dominated by the Maya Classic Civilization in the tropical lowlands of Northern Guatemala and in the Mexican territories adjoining it on the north-west (as, in the same years, the picture of Pre-Hellenic Aegean history was dominated by the Minoan Civilization of Crete). The Olmeca cultural province of Middle America, in the tropical lowlands along the Atlantic coast of Mexico south of Vera Cruz, was still quite out of the picture, though subsequent archaeological discoveries here have led one school of archaeologists to see in the Olmeca province the

¹ C. S. Coon: *The History of Man*, p. 351.

² The vista of both Andean and Middle American history has been lengthened partly by new discoveries, and partly by the redating of already known artefacts by the carbon-14 test. This test seems, more or less consistently, to give dates that are earlier than those previously guessed, by dead reckoning backwards from the advent of the Spaniards, on the basis of estimates of the time that would have been taken to lay down such and such a thickness of debris. This conversion of strata into time-spans is, of course, highly conjectural. On the other hand, the carbon-14 test's margin of error is also high, unless and until a great enough number of tests have been made to produce a statistical average.

birthplace of the whole Middle American Civilization.¹ Again, the cultural province on the plateau, including the Valley of Mexico, and the cultural province in Yucatan, did not, in the nineteen-twenties, enter into the picture until after the mysterious abandonment of the Classic Maya sites. Archaeologists accepted the tradition presented in the Yucatec Mayan codices and in the information gathered by the earliest Spanish inquirers. And this tradition was that the Mayan civilization in Yucatan was started there by migrants from the already abandoned Classic sites to the south and south-west. As for the plateau, history here began, in the nineteen-twenties, with the arrival of the Toltecs from the north. The civilization of the Classic stage and age at Teotihuacán was still below the archaeological horizon, though the pyramids of the Sun and Moon had been towering into the sky ever since the days of their Classic builders.

Using, as I did, an Hellenic model to interpret the histories of non-Hellenic civilizations, I concluded, from the picture presented by the archaeologists at the time, that in Middle America there had been two generations of civilizations. The first generation had been represented by the Maya Classic Civilization of the tropical lowlands; and, when this had mysteriously come to an end, it had been followed by two new civilizations that were affiliated to it in the sense in which the Western and Byzantine civilizations were affiliated to the Hellenic. One of these two affiliated civilizations of the second generation in Middle America was that of the Postclassic Maya, followed by Toltec, immigrants into Yucatan; the other was that of the Toltecs and their Aztec successors on the plateau.

Thirty years' progress in Middle American archaeology has effaced the picture on which this construction of mine was based. The Middle American World now appears as a geographical unity with much the same area from beginning to end. The tropical lowland Maya region, in which the Maya Classic Civilization rose and fell, turns out to be only one Middle American cultural province out of five; and the conquest of the tropical forest here for civilization turns out to be a relatively late event in the long course of Middle American history. The Middle American Civilization had almost as old a footing in Yucatan as in the forested lowlands farther south, and perhaps an older footing on the highlands of Southern Guatemala, on the Mexican plateau, and in the 'Olméca' cultural province in the tropical lowlands round Vera Cruz.²

In the light of this new knowledge I now have to abandon my previous construction of three distinct civilizations in the Middle American cultural area, and to think in terms of a single civilization here, as in the Andean World.

One general effect of the progress of archaeological discovery in both these Pre-Columbian American worlds has, indeed, been to bring out points of resemblance between the cultural configurations and the histories of their respective civilizations, and at the same time to bring

¹ G. R. Willey and P. Phillips suggest, with greater caution, that the Middle American Classic Civilization may have started slightly earlier in the Olméca cultural province than elsewhere (*Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), p. 185).

² See G. R. Willey: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 39.

out points of difference between their respective styles. Though there is, as we have seen,¹ good archaeological evidence for the diffusion of elements of culture from Middle America to North-West Peru at a time when the Andean World was still in the late 'Archaic' (ex-'Preformative') stage of culture, the style of each of the two civilizations is quite distinctive and the most striking likenesses between them are in their total cultural configuration.² Moreover, though the diffusion of culture elements between these two worlds occurred at least twice—first during the late 'Archaic' (ex-'Preformative') stage of Andean history and again during the last few centuries before the Spanish conquest—the two worlds were not, and never became, geographically contiguous with each other. From first to last they were separated by a region in South-Eastern Central America and North-Western South America, extending from the present-day Honduras and Salvador to the present-day Colombia and highland Ecuador, which kept in step with them only as far as the 'Formative' stage³ of culture and fell out of the running when Middle America and the Andean World each went on to rise to the Classic level.⁴ This makes the similarities between the configurations of the two Pre-Columbian American civilizations all the more remarkable. These similarities are both geographical and historical.

Geographically, each of these two worlds consisted of a number of distinct cultural provinces, in each of which a common civilization was given a particular local colour.⁵ In either world these different provinces were always in communication with each other. In general the more

¹ On pp. 355-7.

² Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 586.

³ See Willey: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 28; eundem: 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America', p. 11; Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 778; eodsem, 1958, pp. 171-4. Honduras and Salvador never rose to the Classic level. Nicaragua and Costa Rica, too, did not rise above Formative, though their relations with Middle America were with Middle American late Classic and Postclassic. The cultures of Panamá never rose above Formative, though they were late. Nor did the cultures of the Colombian and Ecuadorian highlands. Even in the southernmost of the ten intermont basins of highland Ecuador, civilization was not very old (W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 84). In both Ecuador and Colombia, Pre-Inca culture was pluralistic and was quite distinct from the culture of the central Andean region (ibid., p. 86). 'Ecuador has little stone-carving (except in Manabí), a weak development of architecture and little use of stone buildings, only slight development of terracing and irrigation systems, and little use of the llama. Lacking are highly concentrated populations, large ceremonial centers (except possibly on the coast), cities, and wide political integration' (D. Collier, in W. C. Bennett [ed.]: *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, pp. 85-86). The relative cultural backwardness of even the southern end of highland Ecuador is not surprising, considering the formidableness of the physical barrier separating the Ecuadorian highlands from the cradle of the Andean Civilization in Peru. Cajamarca in Peru is insulated from Loja in Ecuador by 400 kilometres of rough, forest-covered mountains (W. C. Bennett in op. cit., p. 3). Moreover, in the Northern Andes, including the North Peruvian highlands, there is a double rainy season. This enables a rain-forest to occupy the zone between the 10,000-foot contour line and the snow-line; and this excludes llamas and alpacas (ibid., p. 3; W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 16). On the other hand, the Ecuadorian coast did rise to the Classic and Postclassic levels. At Manta, for instance, there was a true Postclassic urban centre (Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 772-4; eodsem, 1958, p. 175). Willey and Phillips (1955, pp. 775 and 788) raise the question whether the Ecuadorian coast may perhaps have risen, at one move, from Formative to Postclassic as a result of trading with Postclassic coastal Peru.

⁴ 'The Classic stage in the New World is limited to Middle America and the central Andes' (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 183).

⁵ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 780.

active the communication between the provinces the higher rose the level of the civilization as a whole. In the Middle American World there were five provinces: the Olmeca region along the Atlantic coast south of Vera Cruz; the Valley of Mexico; Oaxaca; the Guatemalan highlands; and the tropical lowlands (Petén, the Usumacinta River valley, and the Motagua River valley in Guatemala).¹ In Peru there were only two major provinces: the lowlands along the Pacific coast and the highlands overhanging them.² But within each of these there were sharply defined subdivisions. In the coastal lowlands in the earlier stages of Andean history almost every river valley, however small—and, in all, there are about twenty-five of these³—developed the common civilization on distinctive lines of its own. The stretches of desert between the ribbons of green were barriers to intercourse that were not easily or quickly overcome. In the highlands there were six subdivisions: the Cajamarca basin; the Callejón de Huaylas; a portion of the Montaro River valley; the Cuzco basin; the plateau north-west of Lake Titicaca, in what is now Peru; and the plateau south-east of the lake, in what is now Bolivia.⁴

'Two fundamental forces were at work in [the] Classic cultures [of Middle America]. Intercommunication existed among them and was an important factor in their growth. They profited from being a part of a larger community of ideas than did the various cultures of the Middle American Formative. . . . The intertwining of the many varied [regional] strands produced the Classic.⁵ . . . Regionalism persisted, but it was a regionalism in which the various Classic cultures had assimilated sufficient from each other so that all drew upon a common fund of great depth and richness. . . . Yet this intercommunication and interchange were by no means all-embracing. Technologies, elements, things—these were exchanged, but complete idea systems remained regionalised.'⁶

There was inter-regional interaction in Peru as well.⁷ In fact, in both worlds there was a combination of active inter-regional trade with regional ethnocentrism.⁸ In Peru, horizon styles—i.e. styles transcending the provincial and sub-divisional boundaries—are much more frequent than they are in Middle America.⁹ The count of them in Peru runs to five¹⁰ or six.¹¹

¹ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 779; *ibidem*, 1958, p. 184.

² Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 577.

³ W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 96.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 97–99; Bennett in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, pp. 4–5; G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 14. The eastern cordillera of Bolivia did not come within the Peruvian cultural area (*Andean Culture History*, p. 99; *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 4).

⁵ 'Individually, these strands would have supported nothing of greater moment than a culture like the Mississippian of the eastern United States, with its temple mounds, or the Coclé culture of Panamá, with its fine pottery and metal craft. Together, they emerge as Middle American Civilization' (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 151). The failure of the Formative-stage cultures of the south-western United States to rise to the Classic level, notwithstanding the early date of the maize found in Bat Cave, is perhaps to be explained by the lack, here, of the stimulus of intercourse between different local cultural provinces (*ibid.*, p. 155).

⁶ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 780; see also p. 767. *Cp. eodidem*, 1958, pp. 151 and 187.

⁷ *Ibidem*, 1955, p. 775.

⁸ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 577.

⁹ Willey in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 9.

¹¹ Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, pp. 108–10.

'The two configurations of culture-growth are not only similar but synchronous'—and this over a period of 2,000 years.¹

'The carbon-14 dates tend to make the full flowering of Meso-American and Andean cultures in general coeval, the [Meso-American] Early Classic contemporaneous with Nazca "A", and the Late Classic with Nazca "B", Mochica, and Classic Tiahuanaco.'²

Coon notes³ that the American civilizations resemble those Old-World civilizations that grew up gradually (e.g. the Sumeric Civilization), not those that were transformed by sudden impacts from outside (e.g. the Egyptian Civilization). This makes it difficult to delimit the phases of the two Pre-Columbian American civilizations precisely; but most archaeologists now seem to find in both worlds an identical series of four phases: Archaic (ex-'Pre-Formative'); Formative; Classic; and Postclassic.⁴

In the Formative period there is, as we have seen, linkage, as well as synchronicity, between Middle America and Peru.⁵ 'The Peruvian Formative has a closer configurational resemblance to the Middle American Late Formative.'⁶ In Middle America the Formative begins in the second millennium B.C., and in Peru soon after.⁷ The Chavín horizon in the Andean World was contemporary with the Olmeca horizon in Middle America and is to some extent parallel with it. Both horizons were expansive.⁸ The feline motif appears in the artistic expression of Olmeca as well as Chavín religion.⁹ The Formative styles of Middle America and Peru were more like each other, besides being each internally more homogeneous, than the subsequent Classic styles.¹⁰

'The subsequent Classic civilizations of Middle America—Lowland and Highland Maya, Monte Albán, Tajín, Teotihuacán—all drew upon this Formative period art and intellectual achievement. It is as though, from Late Formative times forward, Middle American societies were participating not only in common technical traditions but in an ideational heritage.'¹¹

In the Peruvian Classic, on the other hand, regional differences crystallized into what amounted to distinctive civilizations.¹²

¹ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 588.

² R. Wauchoppe: 'Implications of Radiocarbon Dates from Middle and South America', in Publication No. 18 (1954), p. 25, of the Middle American Research Institute of Tulane University, New Orleans.

³ In *The History of Man*, p. 353.

⁴ See Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', pp. 573 and 577.

⁵ Willey: 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America', p. 2.

⁶ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 586.

⁷ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 765. Cf. eodidem, 1958, p. 147. Here, on the basis of carbon-14 tests, more precise dates are given: 1359±250 B.C. for Middle American Formative, 714±200 B.C. for Peruvian.

⁸ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 586; idem: 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America', p. 10.

⁹ Wauchoppe, loc. cit., p. 32.

¹⁰ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 788.

¹¹ Willey: 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America', p. 10.

¹² Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 782.

The Classic is easy to identify and even to date,¹ but it is difficult to define. Its criteria are qualitative and relative: aesthetic excellence, religious climax, general florescence,² and differentiation between the cultures of the different provinces of each of the two worlds.³ The Middle American and Peruvian Classic cultures were approximately contemporary.⁴ But in the Classic Age the two civilizations diverged,⁵ to reconverge in the Postclassic.⁶ In the Classic period the differences were, indeed, sharp. Metallurgy was by then already common in the Andean World but was still rare in Middle America. There was already irrigation in coastal Peru, but not yet in Middle America. There was already organized warfare and conquest in North-West Peru,⁷ but not yet in Middle America. On the other hand, in the Andean World there was no calendar and no system of writing.⁸

The Classic Age ended in catastrophe, apparently in most cases in the form of war, though war does not seem to account for the abandonment of the lowland Maya Classic sites that had been won with such labour from the tropical forest.⁹

¹ On the north-west coast of Peru, Formative turns into Classic during the Gallinazo period. Gallinazo III may rank as being Classic (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 177). Carbon-14 tests have pushed the beginning of Peruvian Classic back towards the beginning of the Christian Era and have made it approximately contemporary with the beginning of Middle American Classic (ibid., p. 189). This begins *circa* A.D. 300, or 260 years earlier according to Spinden's chronology. The carbon-14 tests support Spinden's system (ibid., pp. 184-5).

² Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 778.

³ Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 191. These two authorities also observe (ibid., p. 182) that 'the Classic stage in native New World cultures marks the beginning of urbanism', and that this 'overrides in importance' the criteria listed by them in 1955. There is material evidence for urbanism at Teotihuacán in its Classic Age and in coastal North-West Peru in the Gallinazo III period. But they admit that 'in other cases . . . of which the Classic Maya of the Petén lowlands is a prime example, urban dwelling clusters are either lacking or undiscovered'. And the case of the Maya Classic Civilization compels them (ibid., p. 183, footnote 2) to emphasize 'the functional, rather than the purely formal, definition of urbanism. . . . The crucial factor', they here suggest, 'is the number of people who could be drawn upon and organised in the interests of the society and the culture. Maya society undoubtedly drew upon and coordinated the energies of a great many people.' The words 'Maya society' in this context presumably mean a directing minority of the participants in the society. This minority will have had the leisure to direct because it will have been exempt from spending its time and energy on day-to-day economic tasks. This brings us back to my suggestion, on p. 278, that the presence of a leisured minority is a more accurate and illuminating criterion of civilization than urbanism is.

⁴ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 782.

⁵ The Middle American and Andean civilizations were more different from each other in the Classic Age than either before or after (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 192).

⁶ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 783-4.

⁷ Mochica representative art is a testimonial to warfare' (Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 579). 'Militarism seems to have been a force in old Peruvian society from an early time. In this . . . Peru differs from Middle America' (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 106).

⁸ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 587; Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 783.

⁹ There is still no agreement about the answer to this baffling question.

Some scholars have sought to account for the abandonment of the ceremonial centres by the hypothesis of a loss of faith, among the peasantry, in the efficacy of the priests' burdensome prescriptions for bringing rain to make the crops grow. This hypothesis is advocated by, for example, S. F. de Borhegyi, 'The Development of Folk and Complex Cultures in the Southern Maya Area', in *American Antiquity*, vol. xxi, No. 4, pp. 343-56. De Borhegyi maintains (ibid., pp. 343-4) that there is archaeological evidence for the

'The carbon-14 dating of previous periods and the known dates of the proto-historic horizon tend to indicate that socio-political upheavals followed the full flowering of high culture in both Middle and South America at about the same time.'

In Middle America one of the most striking pieces of evidence for this is the apparently violent destruction of Classic Teotihuacán. In the Andean World the corresponding symptom is the sudden, and apparently violent and catastrophic, expansion of the Tiahuanaco horizon from the south-easternmost subdivision of the highland province over most, though not the whole, of the rest of the Andean World²—perhaps via a secondary centre of diffusion at Huari (Wari) in the Mantaro River basin, in the highlands farther north-westwards.³ The Tiahuanacoid is comparable to the previous Chavinoid and to the later Inca horizon. Yet 'the Tiahuanaco influence, while strong, was not an engulfing or permanent one'.⁴ In the highlands the Tiahuanaco style had less influence in the almost adjacent Cuzco district than anywhere else in Peru.⁵ Along the coast the Huari-Tiahuanaco influence swamped the South-East (the Nazca sub-division),⁶ but north-westward it spread as far as Chicama only, not to Lambayeque, and it was soon thrown off by Moche.⁷

The salient features of the Postclassic Age in both worlds were militarization, secularization, urbanism,⁸ standardization, and mass produc-

existence of a folk culture in this region, side by side with a sophisticated one, for more than two thousand years. After the Early Formative, he holds (p. 352), each folk society 'existed in a symbiotic relationship with the more complex urban component'. But, at the end of the Late Classic period in this region, folk-cult objects reassert themselves (p. 350). 'Recent evidence points towards the possibility of a revolt of the food-producing classes against the exploitative abuses of the theocrats' (p. 350). De Borhegyi suggests that there was a chain-reaction of revolt which spread all through the Maya region and took a violent form in the north-west, at Bonampak and at Piedras Negras (p. 350).

On the strength of archaeological evidence from the opposite side of the Maya region in southern Belice (British Honduras), this hypothesis is rejected by G. R. Willey: 'The Structure of Ancient Maya Society', in *The American Anthropologist*, New Series, vol. 58, No. 5 (October, 1956), pp. 777-82. Willey here raises the question: How deep was the gulf between the peasantry and the élite in the Maya culture? In this connexion he notes that, in Southern Belice, one finds clusters of house-mounds with small pyramid bases among them. This suggests, to his mind, that the culture was not confined to the great ceremonial centres. Luxury pottery, known from the ceremonial centres, is also found in the refuse in these house-clusters. 'All these British Honduran discoveries add up, I think, to a conception of a Maya peasant class that was reasonably prosperous and participating in a cultural tradition not markedly apart from the inhabitants of the great religious centers.' Moreover, in the Belice Valley in the Post-classic age the peasantry disappeared simultaneously with the great ceremonial centres. This archaeological evidence impugns, in Willey's view, the theory that the fall of the Maya Classic Civilization was due to an internal revolt.

P. Armillas holds 'that the movements of people were the result and not the cause of the crisis. The disintegration was from within, and the internal factor causing the decline was probably an economic crisis' (*A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 108).

Thus there is still no generally accepted explanation of the mystery.

¹ Wauchope, in loc. cit., p. 27.

² J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, pp. 88-89; G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 92.

³ Mason, op. cit., p. 93; Bushnell, op. cit., p. 94; Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 194.

⁴ Mason, op. cit., p. 89.

⁵ Mason, *ibid.*, p. 92; Bushnell, *ibid.*, p. 102; Bennett and Bird, op. cit., p. 200.

⁶ Mason, op. cit., p. 94; Bushnell, op. cit., p. 94.

⁷ Mason, op. cit., p. 94; Bushnell, op. cit., p. 99.

⁸ Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 784. Willey in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, pp. 13-14.

tion.¹ Postclassic militarism developed more abruptly in Middle America than in Peru.² In Peru it was intensified in this age, but there it had already been asserting itself, not merely since the Classic,³ but since the Late Formative.⁴ In the Postclassic age the imposition of ways of life by military conquest was a common phenomenon.⁵ There were 'wide-spread movements of peoples and idea systems throughout each of the two major areas'.⁶ Successive waves of 'Chichimec' barbarians from the north descended on Middle America. The Toltec wave penetrated not only eastwards into Yucatan but also southwards into the Guatemalan highlands.⁷ The following Aztec wave was flooding still more widely when it was suddenly broken by the Spanish conquest. In the Andean World there is no evidence that the wave of violent disturbance represented by the spread of the Tiahuanaco horizon took the form of military conquest resulting in the establishment of an empire.⁸ On the other hand the subsequent Inca horizon is known, from historical records, to be the archaeological imprint of an Andean universal state that was established by force of arms. In both worlds in the Postclassic Age the tendency towards standardization and mass-production was accompanied by a decline in the level of art.⁹

'The native city of the New-World Postclassic had large population aggregates, was the economic (and probably social, political, and religious) hub for outlying populations, maintained complex and diverse divisions of labor among its citizens, and was a sort of politico-religious power.'¹⁰

In Peru the Postclassic cities, unlike the Classic, had a planned layout, especially those along the north-west coast.¹¹ In Postclassic Middle America there were two series of cities: in the first series, Tula on the plateau and Chichén Itzá in Yucatan; in the second series, Tenochtitlan in the Valley of Mexico, Mitla in the Oaxaca cultural province, Tzintzuntzan in Tarasco, west of the Valley of Mexico, Totonacan Cempoala in Vera Cruz, Mayapan in Yucatan.¹² Tenochtitlan had 60,000 inhabitants. These received their supplies by water transport, and part of their food was grown on floating gardens.¹³ Neither Mayapan nor Chichén

¹ Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 193.

² Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 587. 'It is not likely that the replacement of the priest-controlled society by the war-state was marked by an actual schism. The pyramid and temple centre, symbols of authority in the old system, were retained, enlarged, and glorified. The transfer from sacred to secular was probably accomplished by a gradual shifting in the nature of the powers exercised by public leaders' (Willey in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 12).

³ In the Classic Age in Peru, not only Moche but all Andean communities except Nazca had turned militarist (Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, pp. 179 and 182).

⁴ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 786-7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 788. *Ibidem*, 1958, p. 199.

⁶ Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 784.

⁷ See S. F. de Borhegyi: 'The Development of Full and Complex Cultures in the Southern Maya Area', pp. 350-1.

⁸ On this point see Mason, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

⁹ Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 784. Cp. Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 208; Bennett [ed.]: *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 14.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 785.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 785-6; *idem*, 1958, p. 195.

¹² *Ibidem*, 1955, p. 784; 1958, pp. 196-7.

¹³ *Ibidem*, 1955, p. 787; 1958, p. 197.

Itzá could compare with Tenochtitlan, and 'we can conclude that urbanisation was decidedly less successful in the Maya lowlands than in the Valley of Mexico'.¹

In coastal Peru, at any rate, the advances in technology during the Formative and Classic periods that made it possible to irrigate and cultivate entire valleys, instead of just their fringes,² were accompanied by increases in population, concentrations of political power, and an exacerbation of warfare and class-divisions. 'Gallinazo is the first Virú period at which we can say, for certain, that there was both large-scale irrigation and extensive wall construction.'³ And irrigation implies political unification of the valley from at least as early as Late Gallinazo.⁴ In the Virú Valley in the Classic period (labelled in this valley 'Late Gallinazo') there were settlements all over the valley; 'both the castillos and the big pyramids represent millions of man-hours of labor'; and the irrigated area was 40 per cent. as large again as it is at the present day.⁵ In the Andean World there was a sharp increase in the size of the states, and consequent diminution in their number, during the second phase of the Postclassic period, which occupied the last four and a half centuries, according to the carbon-14 dating, or the last one and a half, according to the shorter reckoning,⁶ before the political unification of the whole Andean World in the Inca universal state. In this age the whole series of valleys from the north-western to the south-eastern end of the Peruvian coast was divided politically between no more than four states, with formidable fortresses guarding their frontiers. The Chimú Empire, with its capital at Chanchán, laid out on a rectangular plan covering eight, or even eleven, square miles, ruled from the Lambayeque Valley to the Casma Valley. The Cuismanco Empire, with its capital at Cajamarquilla, held the Chancay, Lurín, and Rimac valleys; south-east of this lay the relatively small Chuquimancu state. The south-easternmost of the four coastal states was the Chincha Empire, which held the Chincha, Pisco, Ica, and Nazca valleys.⁷ If we translate Andean history into terms of Hellenic history and equate the Inca Empire with the Roman Empire, the Pre-Inca regional empires along the coast will correspond to the empires established by Alexander's successors which were eventually extinguished by Roman conquest. The Incas may have borrowed much of their imperial organization and institutions from Chimú,⁸ as the Romans certainly did borrow much of theirs from the Post-Alexandrine Hellenic monarchies.

The Inca conquest of the Andean World was sudden and rapid. According to the chronology now in favour, it was accomplished between the years 1438 and 1493, and within the last thirty of those years (1463-93) the area of the Inca Empire was increased by 1,000 per cent.⁹ Thus the Andean universal state had been in existence for only about forty years by the time of its sudden overthrow by the Spaniards. Yet it

¹ Ibid., 1958, p. 199.

² See p. 341, footnotes 7, 8, 9.

³ G. R. Willey: 'Prehistoric Settlement Patterns in the Virú Valley, Peru', p. 362.

⁴ Ibid., p. 381.

⁵ Ibid., p. 393.

⁶ Mason, op. cit., p. 96.

⁷ See J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, pp. 96-102; G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, pp. 103-11; Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 203.

⁸ Bushnell, op. cit., p. 106.

⁹ Mason, op. cit., pp. 116-22. Cp. Bushnell, op. cit., pp. 116-18.

left an impress on the Andean World which even the Spaniards could not efface. The Inca Empire had its counterpart in Middle America in the universal state that the Aztecs were in process of establishing when the arrival of the Spaniards cut this short. At the time of the Spaniards' arrival in Middle America, not only the little state of Tlaxcála, to the east of Tenochtitlan, but the great state of Tarasco, to the west of it, was still holding out. The Aztecs were more atrocious than the Incas, and the resistance to their empire-building was correspondingly more stubborn. Moreover, even as far as they had gone in building their empire up, they had established nothing like the Inca Imperial Government's centralized control over economic and social life. In Middle America under the Aztec regime, the artisans and merchants were still largely independent forces in society.¹

Nevertheless, the general resemblance between the configurations of Middle American and Andean history is striking. And there is also a notable resemblance between the histories of these two pre-Columbian American civilizations and those of a number of civilizations in the Old World. Down to the point where the histories of Middle America and the Andean World are cut short by the Spanish conquest, their pattern is recognizably similar to the patterns of Sumeric, Hellenic, and Sinic history. The pre-Columbian American pattern resembles the Sumeric pattern, in particular, in the gradual rise of civilization out of a pre-civilizational stage of culture.² It resembles both this and the Hellenic and Sinic patterns in the subsequent accentuation of militarism and the consequent eventual unification of society through the overthrow of all the warring states except one by the military might of this sole survivor. In the Andean World this denouement had been reached before the arrival of the Spaniards; in the Middle American World it was within sight.

This resemblance between configurations of history in the Americas and in the Old World is of great significance for the study of human affairs, because the Old-World and the New-World series of events unquestionably occurred quite independently of each other. The resemblance therefore suggests that there must be something in human nature—or at any rate in human circumstances—which has made events take these parallel courses in the Age of the Civilizations. J. A. Mason maintains³ that, 'with only minor deviations, practically all of the great ancient civilizations of the World developed along more or less the same lines'. As he sees it, the drama has been a tragedy in three acts. The first act sees the economic revolution in which agriculture supersedes food-gathering and hunting, and this produces a 'golden age'. In the second act the pressure of increasing population produces conflicts. In the third act the contending states are united by military force. If this has indeed been the plot of the play up to date, can we liberate ourselves from it? Man's recent technological progress has no precedent; yet, by itself, it

¹ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 587.

² The Hellenic Civilization had a previous one, the Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean, in its historical background. Similarly the Sinic Civilization of the Chou period and after had in its historical background the civilization of the Shang period.

³ In *op. cit.*, p. 14. Cp. p. 96.

will not suffice to solve the problem of civilization. Unprecedentedly potent technology may be misused for waging unprecedentedly destructive warfare; or, if it is used for increasing the production of the necessities of life, the additional product may be swallowed up by an unplanned and aimless increase in population, without any rise in the average standard of living, either material or spiritual. Thus now, as always, the spiritual virtues of imagination, wisdom, self-control, and, above all, good intent, are the keys to mankind's destiny.

XII. ROME'S PLACE IN HISTORY

AS I see the history of Rome, it is part of the history of what I call 'the Hellenic Civilization', and it is intelligible only in this historical setting. One cannot understand the history of Rome without taking into account the history of the Hellenic World before as well as after Rome began to play her part in it. One can imagine Hellenic history without Rome. Some other Hellenic or Hellenized state might have performed for the Hellenic Society the function that Rome eventually did perform for it. Sparta, Athens, Olynthus, Macedon, Syracuse were all in the running, at different stages of Hellenic history, for being the state that was going to unite the Hellenic World politically. But Roman history without the Hellenic Society and Civilization is not imaginable. There was never any such thing as a self-contained Roman society and civilization, and to try to divorce Rome from Hellenism and to treat Rome as an independent historical entity would make nonsense of Roman history by placing it in an historical vacuum. J. F. Leddy has interpreted my view correctly in saying¹ that

'What is all-important to Toynbee in the history of Rome is her Hellenization, and he seems to think of this cultural conquest almost as the filling of a vacuum. Throughout *A Study of History* we see Rome only in the shadow of Greece, only as the protector of the Greek legacy, always in a Greek context, and (in his technical sense) as the "universal state" briefly sustaining Hellenic Civilization before its final and inevitable collapse.'

The same point is being made by Fyvel when he says² of me that 'he telescopes Greece and Rome into a single Hellenic Society in which all Roman history masks mere disintegration'.

I accept Leddy's interpretation subject to the substitution of the words 'Hellas' or 'Hellenic World' for 'Greece' and the word 'Hellenic' for 'Greek'. In the English language the word 'Greece' suggests a geographical area, more or less conterminous with the present-day Kingdom of Greece, which was never more than part, and originally not the most important part, of the Hellenic World. The most important part of the original Hellas was the west coast of present-day Turkey, and the Hellenic World expanded in the course of its history till, at the

¹ In *The Phoenix*, vol. 11 (1957), No. 4, p. 144.

² T. R. Fyvel in *The Tribune*, 21st March, 1947, p. 20.

time of the establishment of the Augustan Peace in 31 B.C., it extended from Alexandria-on-Nile eastward to Central Asia and the Panjab and westward to the Atlantic coasts of North Africa and Europe. The word 'Greek', too, is a misnomer, because in English it suggests the Greek language, and the domains of the Greek language and of the Hellenic Civilization were never conterminous. From the beginning the Hellenic Society included non-Greek-speaking peoples: for instance, the Luvian-speaking Carians and Lycians; and, as it expanded, it converted many more: for instance, the Lydians, Messapians, Apulians, Etruscans, and, most notable converts of all, the Latin-speaking Romans. On the other hand, in Northern Continental European Greece, north and west of a line joining Thermopylae to Delphi, there were Greek-speaking semi-barbarians and barbarians, some of whom were not Hellenized till a late date in Hellenic history. The Greek-speaking Agrianes and Dentheletae round the head-waters of the Rivers Strymon (Struma) and Oescus (Isker) were not brought within the pale till the kingdom of the Thracian Odrysae was annexed to the Roman Empire by the Emperor Claudius and was then deliberately Hellenized by him and his successors. Subject, however, to this verbal *caveat*, I accept the passage that I have quoted from Leddy's paper as being an accurate statement of my point of view.

This point of view has been vigorously criticized, not only by Leddy, but by other critics as well. J. Vogt, for instance, maintains¹ that it is inadmissible to treat the Roman Age as an appendage to the Hellenistic Age, as if the Roman Age's destiny were determined in advance. In Roman history, he holds, a new force made itself felt. This gave the Roman way of life a distinctive character of its own, and that puts the Roman way, in its own fashion, on a level with the Hellenic way. Rome, according to Vogt, created a new and more profound ideal of human personality. W. den Boer maintains² that,

'though, in the words of Horace, the vanquished triumphed over the victor, the interpretation which considers the history of Italy and Latium to be bound up with Greece even before this victory is alien to historical reality.'

H. Baudet judges³ that I under-estimate Rome, perhaps partly because, for me, Rome is a symbol of unacceptable materialism. H. Marrou suggests⁴ that I am too Athenian-minded to appreciate the Roman Empire at its proper value. H. Holborn makes the same point.⁵

'The Roman Empire receives no praise. . . . Rome's capacity to create law and unity in a chaotic world was her own genius, and it seems arbitrary to disregard her contribution and see in her history a senescent continuation of Hellenic life.'

Leddy, too, takes me to task⁶ for describing the age extending from the

¹ In *Saeculum*, No. 2 (1951), pp. 557-74.

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 236.

³ In *Historie en Metahistorie*, p. 57.

⁴ In *Esprit*, July, 1952, pp. 120-1.

⁵ In *The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947, p. 12.

⁶ In loc. cit., pp. 146-7.

reign of the Emperor Nerva to the reign of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius inclusive as being 'the Indian Summer' of Hellenic history. He considers that I am denigrating that age in giving it this label. W. Gurian finds me inconsistent¹ in bracketing Greeks and Romans together when I draw a distinction between the Irish society of the Post-Graeco-Roman Age and the contemporary Latin West. D. M. Robinson concedes that Rome owed much to Greece; that the changes in Roman society after the Hannibalic War 'resulted from foreign conquests and the economic consequences of imperial expansion'. Italy was not 'a separate and independent entity'. 'Rome and Italy became a part of the Mediterranean economic system.' Yet Robinson, too, protests, in opposition to my treatment of Rome, that 'the Romans were an original people with a capacity for world government and with powers of organisation and unification rarely excelled in all history'.²

What are the Roman achievements that have moved some scholars, at any rate in the Western World, to insist that Rome ought to be treated as a separate historical entity in its own right, rather than as an element, however important, in the history of the Hellenic Civilization? There are two achievements on which, above all, this claim on Rome's behalf is based. One of these is Roman law; the other is Rome's political feat of eventually uniting, in a single 'universal state', the whole of the Hellenic World west of 'Iraq and Iran. The second of these two achievements was, I should say, the key to the first. When once Rome had won for herself the role of being the Hellenic World's unifying state, Roman law was bound to become the oecumenical law of the Hellenic Society, and was consequently bound to undergo something like the evolution and transformation that made it what it eventually came to be. On the other hand, if the Hellenic World had been united politically by some other state, and if Rome had remained the small, obscure, and backward state that she originally was, on the Hellenic World's outer fringe, there is no reason to suppose that Roman law would ever have got far beyond a primitive and rudimentary stage before being replaced—as eventually it would have been in these political circumstances. It would have been replaced by the oecumenical law of the other state—whichever it might have been—by which the Hellenic World's political unity would have been achieved if history had taken this non-Roman course.³

¹ *The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1942), p. 513.

² *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

³ This is indicated by what happened when Roman Law did come into contact with more advanced legal systems: for instance, with Egyptian and Greek law in Egypt. By the beginning of the second century B.C., Egyptian and Greek private law in Egypt had become assimilated to each other. Both these systems had carried juridical individualism to a high point. Of the two, the Egyptian was the more advanced, especially in the status that it gave to women. But, 'notwithstanding fairly strongly pronounced formal differences, the Egyptian and the Greek juridical modes are not differentiated by incompatibilities of the same gravity as those which, for several centuries, prevented a Hellenised Egypt from "receiving" from the Romans a law that was more archaic than hers' (C. Préaux: *L'Économie Royale des Lagides* (Brussels, 1939, Fondation Égyptologique Reine Elisabeth), p. 23).

This is significant, considering that, in Egypt, Roman Law had the advantage of being the legal system of the ruling power, and also that, by the date of the annexation of Egypt, Roman Law had already been in process of Hellenization for more than a hundred years.

his observation' that it is 'freedom from the need of directly producing their own food which presumably enables the inhabitants of cities to devote all their time to specialization, and so to complicate their culture'. But we have, I believe, to go farther, and to equate civilization with a state of society in which there is a minority of the population, however small, that is free from the task, not merely of producing food, but of engaging in any other of the economic activities—e.g. industry and trade—that have to be carried on to keep the life of the society going on the material plane at the civilizational level.

'So important . . . is surplus and its effects on society that a striking convergence may be found between the peaks of civilization and peaks of economic well-being. . . . Without surplus, members of a society have no time for contemplation, experimentation, or the exchange of ideas—the very well-springs of change—and tend to remain in a static condition.'²

These non-economic specialists—professional soldiers, administrators, and perhaps, above all, priests—have certainly been city-dwellers in the cases of most of the civilizations known to us.³ But the Maya priesthood, with its advanced astronomical knowledge and its complicated calendrical technique, may have been an instance of a body of non-economic specialists in a non-urban social milieu. On this view, civilization would have originated in the emergence, not of cities, but of economic inequality and the division of society into classes—two of the factors in Hanson's list.

If this is the correct diagnosis, it is a tragic one; for it means that civilization will have originated in social injustice, and that, as far as we know, it could not have come into existence in any other way. Social injustice has been one of the two specific diseases of civilization since the earliest date to which our surviving records of it go back. Its other specific disease has been war. In our own day, civilization has reached a crisis as a result of the unprecedented advance of technology in the Western World in recent times. Used for constructive purposes, technology has now, for the first time since civilization began, opened up a prospect of our being able soon to provide the whole of mankind with the amenities of civilization, which, hitherto, have been the monopoly of a small minority. Used for destructive purposes, it has now also opened up the unprecedented prospect of our being able soon to wipe mankind, and perhaps all other extant forms of life, off the face of the Earth. This pair of alternative prospects suggests that civilization has now arrived at a fateful parting of the ways. If we are not now to let civilization become an instrument in our hands for its own destruction—and perhaps for our destruction too—we shall have to abolish the institution of war and to achieve a radical reform of social injustice. And either of these tasks, by itself, would be a gigantic one.

¹ Op. cit., p. 162.

² Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography's Report (1954),

p. 115.

³ Redfield, in *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, equates civilization with the rise of cities (p. ix) on the ground that it was in the cities that 'the administrative élite', 'the literate priest', and 'the specialized artisan' made their first appearance (p. 30).

Mankind's present situation raises the question what the goal of civilization is, and the further question whether or not civilization can be reformed and salvaged by drawing solely on the resources of this particular species of culture. On the first of these questions, I agree with H. Frankfort¹ in rejecting the view that 'such changes as an increase in food-production or technological advances (both, truly enough, coincidental with the rise of civilization) . . . explain how civilization became possible'. A. N. Whitehead surely hits the truth in a passage,² quoted by Frankfort in this context, in which he declares that

'in each age of the World distinguished by high activity, there will be found at its culmination, and among the agencies leading to that culmination, some profound cosmological outlook, implicitly accepted, impressing its own type on the current springs of action.'

Christopher Dawson is making the same point when he says that 'behind every civilization there is a vision'.³ On this view, to which I adhere, the presence in a society of a minority liberated from economic activities is an identification-mark of civilization rather than a definition of it. Following Whitehead's lead, I should define civilization in spiritual terms. Perhaps it might be defined as an endeavour to create a state of society in which the whole of mankind will be able to live together in harmony, as members of a single all-inclusive family. This is, I believe, the goal at which all civilizations so far known have been aiming unconsciously, if not consciously.

The second question—whether civilization can save itself solely out of its own resources—is a controversial one; and, on this issue, my considered answer is in the negative. I believe that civilization can be saved only by drawing on the resources of the higher religions as well as on those of civilization itself. I believe that human beings *can* save civilization by thus rising above it, but I do not believe that, if they do turn again for help to the higher religions, this is bound to secure a future for civilization or for religion or for the human race. I believe that, now and always, the future is open for human beings, and that it lies at least partly in our own hands to make of it what we choose.

Hourani is right in finding⁴ that, in the first six volumes of this book, there are two different answers to the question: What is the goal of human endeavours? 'On the one hand, "civilization" is seen as ultimate.' On the other hand, 'all growth in civilization is equated with progress towards sainthood'. The second of these two answers of mine is, in effect, the declaration of a belief that the goal of human endeavours, which is being aimed at in the particular endeavour that we call 'civilization', is something beyond and above civilization itself. This second answer is my considered answer, and further consideration has not led me to change it.

¹ In *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 7-8.

² A. N. Whitehead: *Adventures in Ideas* (Cambridge 1933, University Press), pp. 13 and 14.

³ *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 41.

⁴ In *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), pp. 384-5.

Some word is needed to denote what I mean by 'communities'. But I confess that my definition of both 'communities' and 'societies' is arbitrary. Every definition of them is and must be. The popular usage of both words is vague, yet at the same time it is almost impossible to avoid conscripting and regimenting both words for use as more precise instruments if one is trying to make a systematic study of human affairs. In most usages, popular or technical, the word 'societies' seems to stand for larger and looser networks, and 'communities' to stand for smaller and tighter networks. K. W. Deutsch, for instance, who is thinking in terms of the technology of man-made communications-networks and of the associated science of cybernetics, defines a society, for his purpose, as 'a group of persons who "have learnt to work together"', and a community as 'a group of persons united by their ability to exchange information'.¹

18. CIVILIZATIONS

I use the word 'civilizations' in the plural and 'a civilization' in the singular to mean particular historical exemplifications of the abstract idea 'civilization' which has been examined above. The relation of 'civilizations' or 'a civilization' to 'civilization' is the relation of one or more representatives of a class of phenomena to the class that it represents. The class represented by civilizations is one species of the genus 'culture'.² Every civilization is carried on the network of a society, and it is impossible in practice to study a civilization and its society apart from each other.

Before examining criticisms of my definitions of what I mean by a civilization, we must consider the thesis, put forward by several of my critics, that there is not, and never has been, more than one single representative of this class of culture and society. An uncompromising declaration of the unity of civilization, not merely as an abstract concept but also as a concrete phenomenon, has been made by a Communist critic, B. Bykhovsky.³

'Professor Toynbee's philosophy of history . . . discountenances the idea of an integral world history. As against the unity and historical continuity of civilization, Toynbee sets up a scheme of numerous segregated civilizations, each of which bears throughout the whole cycle of its development the impress of specific and immutable characteristics. From this viewpoint the integral and natural process of development of universal history breaks down into separate and discrete parts, and historical science becomes the comparative history of different and distinct civilizations.'

¹ *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1951), p. 243. It will be noticed that Deutsch, like Hobbes and Bagby, thinks of societies and communities as being composed of persons, not of relations between persons. On this rather crucial point, they all go wrong, I believe.

² G. R. Willey and P. Phillips use the word 'cultures' to describe the maximum units, according to their system of classification, up to the New-World Formative stage inclusive, and reserve the word 'civilizations' for the maximum units in their Classic and Postclassic stages (*Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), p. 48).

³ In *New Times*, 12th November, 1947, p. 27.

The same point has been made, with greater discrimination, by a liberal critic, F. S. Marvin.¹

'There is a unity in civilization as well as different types of civilization; and, from the point of view of both philosophy and religion, it is still more important to seek the unifying than the distinctive features.'

In this context, Marvin notes that

'much in this whole discussion is purely verbal. We may speak of as many distinctive civilizations as we please, so long as we make clear what our dividing canons are and so long as they can be consistently maintained.'

The notions of 'distinctiveness' and 'unity' are, indeed, relative in their application to human affairs. Every human being now alive has links, however tenuous, not only with every one of his contemporaries but also with every other human being that has ever lived. In this sense human history is one single seamless web, and any dissection of it is an arbitrary misrepresentation of Reality. The unity and continuity of civilization as a concrete historical phenomenon are most apparent on the technological and scientific planes.² Yet, even on these planes, there has never, as far as our knowledge reaches back, been a simultaneous advance of the whole human race all over the World. Both the two great technological and economic revolutions up to date have been made by a small minority of the human race in a particular limited area. The Neolithic Revolution was made on the outer rim of 'the Fertile Crescent' in South-West Asia; the Industrial Revolution was made in Great Britain. The achievements of these two revolutions have been spreading from their places of origin to other parts of the World; but even the Neolithic Revolution has not yet reached the whole human race. There are still some food-gathering communities extant today, some ten or twelve thousand years later than the date of the earliest of the Neolithic strata so far unearthed at Jericho.

Moreover, even if we hold, as Marvin holds,³ that, in human affairs, the identities are more fundamental than the differences, it is, as he judiciously concedes, 'always instructive to discover, and to attempt to explain, differences'. The question is really a practical one. Does the study of the phenomenon of civilization in its unitary aspect throw more light on this phenomenon than the study of it in its multiple aspect? In practice we are compelled, as we have already found,⁴ by the multiplicity of the manifestations of a theoretically unitary phenomenon to break it up mentally into a number of simultaneous and parallel streams of events, and to reunify these by resorting to the comparative method of study that Bykhovsky deprecates. For heuristic purposes, at any rate, we have to think in terms of 'civilizations' in the plural; but, if we do use 'civilizations' as an indispensable piece of intellectual apparatus, this imposes on us, as Marvin points out, an obligation to give a tenable definition or definitions of what we mean by 'a civilization'.

¹ In *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1935, p. 623.

² This point is made by K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 240.

³ See loc. cit.

⁴ See pp. 163-8.

Some critics have asserted, mistakenly, that I have not tried to define what I mean by a civilization.¹ Granville Hicks raises the question whether a civilization can be defined with enough precision to make the concept useful.² Other critics³ have noted that, in previous volumes of this book, I have given several definitions of what I mean by a civilization. I have defined it as being 'an intelligible field of study'; as being the common ground between the respective individual fields of action of a number of different people; and as being a representative of a particular species of society. So far as I can see, these definitions are compatible with each other, and something essential would be missing if any of them were left out.

The first of these definitions is, of course, put in subjective terms. Its approach to the definition of a civilization is epistemological. The other two definitions are objective. They are attempts to describe the reality that the inquirer's mind believes (and believes correctly, in my view) that it has apprehended in the phenomena. Ideally, any definition that we make of anything whatsoever ought to be made in this dual form, considering that the duality of subject and object, and the problem of what the true relation between them is, are inherent in all thinking. Anyway, it cannot be wrong to do this; and one would surely be remiss if one did not do it when one is trying to define something that is a key idea in one's particular field of study, as the idea of 'a civilization' is in my study of history.

M. Watnick finds⁴ that my definition of a civilization as being 'an intelligible field of study' is 'completely lacking in operational utility', because I do not say when a field is intelligible and what makes it so. He calls this definition 'a jejune and unenlightening tautology'. A society, as he interprets my train of thought, becomes an intelligible field in virtue of being a society. O. Handlin, too, finds this definition 'circular and tautological'.⁵ These criticisms might perhaps have hit the mark if I had propounded this definition of mine *in vacuo*. Actually, I arrived at it⁶ by way of an inquiry in terms that were concrete and also, I think, practical.

I started—reasonably, I should say—by looking at 'what is the usual field of vision of contemporary Western historians'. I found this—correctly, I should say—to be 'some national state'. I then asked myself whether a national state was an intelligible field of study in isolation. As a test case I took Great Britain, on the ground that this national state, if any, ought to be an intelligible field in isolation in virtue of its insularity, and that, if Great Britain proved not to meet the test, it would seem unlikely that any other national state would meet it. Running through the principal chapters of Great Britain's, and her principal constituent, England's, history, I found that none of these episodes

¹ e.g. Chr. Hill in *The Modern Quarterly*, Autumn, 1947, p. 293; M. A. Fitzsimons in *The Review of Politics*, October, 1957, pp. 544-53.

² *The New Leader*, 18th October, 1954, p. 22.

³ e.g. R. T. Clark in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. cxxx, No. 777 (1941), p. 297; L. Mumford in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 14; P. A. Sorokin in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 179-80.

⁴ In *The Antioch Review*, No. 7 (Winter, 1947-8), pp. 587-602.

⁵ *The Partisan Review*, July-August, 1947, pp. 371-9.

⁶ In i. 17-50.

were intelligible if one tried to limit one's historical horizon to the shores of this island. At the same time, in expanding my field of vision outwards in space and backwards in time, I found myself, in both dimensions, eventually reaching limits beyond which, on the criterion of intelligibility, this expansion of the field began to bring in diminishing returns. This line gave me the boundary of the field of vision within which the intelligibility of the history of one national state, Great Britain, was at its maximum. I found that this spatio-temporal field included the histories of all the present-day Roman Catholic and Protestant Christian nations back to the origins of the Christian Church among the 'internal proletariat' of a society that, at the time when Christianity made its first appearance, was embodied politically in the Roman Empire. Looking next for the origins of this proletariat, I traced these back, provisionally, as far as the Hannibalic War. Looking for a name for this field of study within which the study of the history of Great Britain seemed to be at its maximum of intelligibility, I found that the most informing label for it would be 'Western Christendom' or simply 'the West' when one came to consider the latest chapter in its history. While including the Catholic and Protestant—or ex-Catholic and ex-Protestant—nations, it did not include the Eastern Orthodox Christians or the Muslims or any other societies to the east of these. Within this line, the network of relations was so closely knit that the histories of Great Britain, France, the United States, and the other Western Christian or ex-Christian national states were intelligible if studied synoptically but not intelligible if one tried to study each of them in isolation. Outside the same line, Eastern Orthodox Christian history and Islamic history had followed different courses. This pointed to the likelihood that there were at least two living societies of the same species as the Western Society, as well as at least one no longer extant society—namely the Graeco-Roman or Hellenic, among whose proletariat Christianity had made its first appearance.

On reconsideration, I still do not think that this intellectual operation of mine was an argument in a circle, or that it was not of any use for the purpose of increasing one's understanding of history. As an 'heuristic' reconnaissance, I think it was both legitimate and rewarding. It led to the identification of a unit of study—societies of this species that I call civilizations—which, in my belief, is a more practical tool for the study of human affairs during the last five thousand years than national states of the Western type seem to me to be. While I was growing up, a firm of British publishers, Fisher Unwin, was bringing out a series of volumes under the general title of 'the Story of the Nations'. Many of these volumes were excellent pieces of work. Several of them had, incidentally, a great and lasting influence on me, in helping me to enlarge my historical outlook. All the same, I think that 'the Story of the Civilizations' would have been a better series for Fisher Unwin's purpose of giving a comprehensive account of the latest phase of the history of mankind.

This is my case for holding that civilizations are 'intelligible fields of study'. But, as my way of arriving at this conclusion shows, the word

'intelligible' has, for me, a connotation of relativity. A civilization is an intelligible field by comparison with its component communities—nations, city-states, millets, castes, or whatever else these components may happen to be in different instances. In general, a larger unit of study is likely to be more intelligible than a smaller one, considering that nothing can be completely intelligible short of the sum total of Reality. This, however, cannot be intelligible either, because things are intelligible only to minds, and, *ex hypothesi*, there would be no mind, outside the sum total of Reality, to be the subject of this object. Accordingly, as I have noted in this volume from the first chapter onwards, the intelligibility of phenomena, on whatever scale, can never be more than partial and imperfect.

This, again, indicates, from another angle, that a civilization is 'an intelligible field of study' in a relative sense only. In my process of identifying the Western Civilization, I was already finding that this was no completely self-contained Leibnizian monad. In the course of the reconnaissance in which I hit on it, I also hit on two other contemporary units of the same species—the Eastern Orthodox Christian and the Islamic—and on one extinct unit, the Hellenic. It was true that the network of external relations linking the civilizations with each other had proved to be significantly more tenuous than the network of internal relations between the participants in any one of them. Yet the proletariat among whom Christianity had made its appearance had been recruited from participants in more civilizations than one, and this indicated that trans-civilizational relations must be important. Thus, from the outset, I was committed to something more than a comparative study of the histories of civilizations regarded as so many separate representatives of their species. I had also to study the encounters, in the two dimensions of time and space, between human beings who were participants in different civilizations. And I had to study the higher religions as a distinct species of society. For Christianity was an example of a higher religion that had broken out of the framework of one society, the Hellenic, and had broken down the barriers between this society and others, both contemporary with it and subsequent to it. These topics were set out in the plan of the book, printed at the beginnings of volumes i, iv, and vii, and they have all been dealt with—though, of course, not exhaustively and not adequately—in volumes i-x.¹

¹ I therefore think that I do not deserve Lynn Thorndike's comment that it does not 'seem quite consistent for such a doughty defender of internationalism so to segregate civilizations in separate compartments and almost deny the possibility of any such thing as intercivilization' (*The Journal of Modern History*, vol. vii, No. 3 (September, 1935), pp. 315-17). Studies of 'intercivilization' occupy the whole of volume viii and a large part of vol. ix. It is true that Thorndike was reviewing vols. i-iii at a date when only these three had yet been published. Yet he might have looked at the plan on p. vi of vol. i before committing himself to his anticipatory judgement.

In his review of the same first batch of three volumes in *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1935, pp. 622-5, F. S. Marvin has, I should say, better warrant when he criticizes me for denying the unity of civilization in treating it as a species represented by a number of different specimens. This is, of course, one of the things that I do, and, *pace* Marvin, I still believe that I am right in doing it. But I should agree that I should have been wrong if I had limited my study to this, and had treated the separateness of the different civilizations as if it were, not relative, but absolute.

K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 174-

So much for my subjective definition of what a civilization is. As for my two objective definitions of this, they seem to me to be not only compatible but complementary. The common ground between a number of different people's individual fields of action is an alternative phrase for describing what, in this chapter, I have called a network of relations between a number of human beings.¹ I have already made the point that relations between people, as well as the people who have these relations with each other, are realities, though people and relations are not realities of the same order. And a reality means something that is apprehended by human minds as being a reality, and is therefore apprehended by them as being a representative of a class—the only mode in which human minds can apprehend anything. The class here in question is a species of the genus society, which I have defined² as being the total network of relations between human beings. A specimen of this species will be a particular network that is not a component of any other network. A network of relations, being a phenomenon in the time-dimension as well as in the space-dimension, will have phases. The civilizations whose histories are on record up to date are objective realities that have all had geneses; most of them have also grown, over various periods of time, to various extents; some of them have had breakdowns; and some of them have then gone through a process of disintegration ending in dissolution.

In crediting civilizations with histories in a pattern of phases, I am not personifying them or conceiving of them in anthropomorphic terms.³ A non-human intelligible field of study—for instance, a crystal—can also be an objective reality that changes in a regular pattern of phases. But it is, of course, true that any concept of an entity, human or non-human, that appears to some particular mind to be a real, as well as an intelligible, field of study may be an hallucination or illusion of that particular mind. Our concepts are no more than working theories or hypotheses so long as we have not tested them adequately by applying them to the phenomena and ascertaining whether they do or do not fit.⁴ Till we feel sure that they have satisfied this test, we have no warrant for assuming that there are objective realities corresponding to them.

250, and C. Trinkaus in *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), pp. 218-39, criticize me, in particular, for exaggerating the degree of the separateness of the Western Civilization from the Hellenic. I may perhaps have underestimated the closeness of the network of relations between them, but I have not ignored it. As early in this Study as i. 44 I coined the phrase apparation-and-affiliation to describe the relation in which these two civilizations, and several other pairs, seemed to me to stand to each other. On reconsideration, I find myself still holding that the Western, Orthodox Christian, and Islamic civilizations are distinct representatives of the species and not just later phases of the older civilizations to which, in my view, they are 'affiliated'. On the other hand, I am convinced by Erdmann's and Trinkaus' thesis of continuity in the cases of the history of civilization in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, India, and China; and accordingly I have struck my supposed Babylonian, Hindu, and Far Eastern (main body) civilizations out of my list. My Mexic and Yucatec civilizations, too, have been abolished by the progress of archaeological discovery. For these changes in my list of civilizations, see further pp. 549-51.

¹ H. Werner, however, finds that I have no insight into what it is that holds a civilization together internally (*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 29. Jahrgang, xxix. Band (1935), p. 543).

² On p. 271.

³ See p. 45, with footnote 3.

⁴ See pp. 42-45.

Does my concept 'civilizations', as I have defined it, have realities corresponding to it or not?

This has been denied by P. A. Sorokin in a critique of the first six volumes of this book. Toynbee assumes, Sorokin writes,¹ that his 'civilizations' are 'a real system and not mere congeries or conglomerations of various cultural (or civilizational) phenomena and objects adjacent in space or time but devoid of any causal or meaningful ties'. This account of my view, which Sorokin supports by a quotation and by further references, is correct except in one important point. I believe, and have repeatedly declared my belief, that the ties between the different relational strands in the network of a civilization are 'meaningful', but I do not believe that they are causal, because I believe that human relations take the form of free responses to challenges, not the form of inevitable effects of causes. Subject to this vital reservation,² I acknowledge that the rest of Sorokin's account of my assumption is correct. Sorokin then asks whether this assumption is valid, and answers his question emphatically in the negative.

'His "civilizations" are not united systems but mere conglomerations of various civilizational objects and phenomena (congeries of systems and singular cultural traits) united only by spatial adjacency but not by causal or meaningful bonds. For this reason, they are not real "species of society";³ therefore they can hardly be treated as unities and can hardly have any uniformities in their genesis, growth, and decline. These concepts cannot even be applied to the congeries, because congeries do not and cannot grow or decline. Like the components of a dumping place, they can only be re-arranged, added to, or subtracted from. . . . The total civilization of even the smallest possible civilizational area—that of a single individual—is but a coexistence of several and different systems and congeries unrelated with one another in any way except spatial adjacency in a biological organism.'⁴ 'The Spenglerian-Toynbee ascription of some specific perennial tendency to this or that civilization, regardless of the period of its history, is misleading and inaccurate.'⁵

As far as I can make out from these passages, Sorokin does not, after all, differ from me in principle, since he seems to hold that there are some genuine congeries of 'systems', as well as congeries of single cultural traits. What he is disputing so vigorously is the reality of systems of relations of a particular species—the species that I call civilizations and in whose reality I believe. This dispute is not just a duel between Sorokin and me. Sorokin frankly acknowledges⁶ that my

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 180.

² Sorokin's mistaken impression that I think of the interconnexions between the different elements in a civilization as being causal has led him (*ibid.*, pp. 180-1) to suppose that I myself have refuted my own belief that civilizations are systems by demonstrating that two of the components of a civilization, technique and economy, 'are causally unrelated to the rest of the "whole"'. Sorokin would indeed have caught me out here if I were a determinist who held that the system in a civilization was a system of causes and effects. My actual belief is that it is a system of challenges and responses and that it is therefore one in which there is some free play and some possibility of change.

³ Sorokin means, I think, 'not specimens of a real species of society'. A particular civilization cannot, itself, be a species.

⁴ Sorokin in *loc. cit.*, pp. 180-1. Cp. p. 182.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

position is that of the 'so-called "functional anthropologists"'. A belief that the concept of a culture corresponds to a significant and important reality seems, in fact, to be prevalent among present-day anthropologists. 'A civilization' is a representative of one species of culture; and most modern Western historians who deal with the history of Man in process of civilization seem to take the reality of at least some civilizations for granted:¹ for instance, their own Western Civilization and the Graeco-Roman (in my terminology, 'Hellenic') Civilization at any rate. Indeed, most Westerners today are up in arms for the defence of 'the values of Western Civilization' against threats from a traditional enemy, 'Oriental despotism', and a new enemy, 'Communism', to which the Western Civilization is exposed in their opinion. This militant expression of what is certainly a genuine anxiety surely implies a belief that the Western Civilization is a reality, and that there are alternative realities of the same order which are presumably real since they are felt to be menacing.

Of course, even if the validity of an hypothesis has been verified, up to the hilt, by the test of a thorough application of it to the phenomena, it is improbable that its validity will not be subject to any limitations. Kroeber notes,² with characteristic good sense, that 'a culture is always, so far as we can judge, highly composite in the origin of its constituent materials'. He compares cultures to ecological aggregates.³ And he points out⁴ that, while cultures tend towards integration, they never achieve total integration, and that 'there is almost nothing in culture to correspond to . . . organic repetitiveness'. Albright, too, suggests⁵ that 'a culture represents an empirico-adaptive system' and that 'inner bonds are, in general, quite secondary'. But this recognition that the interdependence of the different elements in a culture is not absolute and unqualified is a decidedly different position from Sorokin's uncompromising denial of any interdependence between them whatsoever (a denial that is compromised, nevertheless, by his admission that some of the components of the 'congeries' are 'systems').

If Sorokin's thesis were right, it would prove that not only civilizations, but all institutions of all kinds, were figments of other people's imaginations that had nothing corresponding to them in reality. This would follow because the reality of institutions, if they are real, is of one and the same order.⁶ They exist in the psychic medium of human thoughts and feelings and wills. I can see no rational basis for the apparently rather common assumption that institutions which have an

¹ In his unpublished paper, Anderle comments as follows on Sorokin's thesis that civilizations are not real unities. 'It is obviously a very arbitrary, controversial, and, above all, unproven, assertion; and to prove it in its negative form would be extremely difficult. Sorokin's dumping-place theory is also not likely to win the approval of historians—at any rate, those of them who study whole cultures and their total aspects and who therefore presumably cannot refuse to take account of the overwhelming impression of compactness (*Geschlossenheit*), inner cohesion (*Zusammenhang*), and consequentiality (*Folgerichtigkeit*) which even the layman receives when he strolls through the galleries of the Egyptian, Chinese, and Graeco-Roman departments of a museum.'

² In *The Nature of Culture*, p. 93.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 131. Cp. p. 148.

⁵ In *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 125. Cp. p. 104.

⁶ This point has been made already on pp. 232-3.

administrative structure are realities but that those which do not have this feature are hallucinations. This assumption is made by, for instance, K. D. Erdmann.¹ The true units of history, he maintains, are not civilizations, but states, because states, he holds, are 'the units in which an operative will crystallizes itself in institutional form'. H. J. Morgenthau likewise maintains² that political and geographical units 'lend themselves more readily to empirical verification' than civilizations do, and therefore, as he sees it, 'it is not by accident that there has been a tendency for history to be written in terms of political and geographical units rather than of civilizations'. The same assumption seems to be made by Sir Ernest Barker when he labels civilizations 'Brocken-spectres', while describing state-systems and religious organizations as being 'definite and visible'.³

Is not Barker here falling into the mistake—which he attributes to me on the next page—of confusing metaphors with arguments? Was the Kingdom of Prussia or the Christian Church, for instance, really ever 'visible' or 'definite' in any sense in which these terms are not equally true of the Western Civilization or of Hellenism? Surely neither Prussia nor the Church has ever been visible at any time. Prussia has been consistently invisible. Obviously it is invisible at the present time, when there is no longer a Prussian state to be displayed in symbolic lines and colours on a map; obviously, too, it was invisible in the year A.D. 1, when no such state had yet been dreamed of; but it was also invisible during the reign of King Frederick the Great and during the chancellorship of Prince Bismarck. The Prussian state was more potent in Frederick's and Bismarck's generations than in others, but its potency was exercised in the invisible realm of psychic relations between the thoughts, feelings, and actions of human beings. The human beings labelled 'King' and 'Chancellor' were visible, certainly; but, notwithstanding Louis XIV's famous dictum, a ruler—even as absolute a one as any human being can be—can never be an incarnation of a state; his title does no more than make him a symbol, and his personality, however commanding, can make him no more than the most prominent, and perhaps the most effective, among a vast number of persons whose relations with each other weave the pattern called, say, the Kingdom of Prussia. We can see the King, the Chancellor, the civil servants at their desks in government offices, the soldiers in uniform on parade-grounds or on battlefields; we can see the flags displaying, in conventional colours, the heraldic device that is the Kingdom's emblem; we can see the posts and barriers, delimiting the frontiers, also painted in the Kingdom's conventional colours. But the one thing that we can never see is the Kingdom itself. The same is true of the Church. We can never see the Church itself; we can see only its places of worship, its altars, crosses, and monstrances, its clerics in their vestments. We can, of course, feel its influence. The influence of a higher religion is more potent than that of any state has ever been, but a church's influence, like a state's, is exer-

¹ In *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 244.

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 194, quoted already on p. 233. G. Catlin, *ibid.*, p. 169, suggests that cultures are entities of a different order from both governments and human beings. I do not dispute this.

³ *Toynbee and History*, p. 96.

cised in the invisible realm of psychic relations. It, too, is a network of relations between human beings.

And what about the British and the American Constitution, which are respectively key-parts of the state-systems of the United Kingdom and the United States? The British Constitution is invisible by definition, since it has been left unwritten. But has the American Constitution really been made visible in the celebrated document that has been duly drafted, agreed, enacted, and promulgated? Are we seeing the Constitution of the United States when we read in print the words of a text bearing that title? No, this 'written' constitution is no more visible than the 'unwritten' one or than the United States of North America themselves or than the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. A constitution is not a series of ink marks on paper. These visible marks are merely a mnemonic device for recording an agreement between a number of human beings about the terms on which they are going to regulate their political relations with each other. The agreement, its terms, and the relations between people through which these terms are put into effect are invisible, all alike.

Civilizations are invisible, just as constitutions, states, and churches are, and this for just the same reasons. But civilizations, too, have manifestations that are visible, like the Prussian state's gold-crowned eagles and spiked helmets, and like the Christian Church's crosses and surplices. Set side by side an Egyptian, an Hellenic, and a pre-Renaissance¹ Western statue. It will be impossible to mistake which of these is the product of which school of sculptors. The distinctiveness of each of the three artistic styles is not only visible; it is definite—more definite than any of the visible products or emblems of any church or state. By exploring the range, in space and time, of a civilization's distinctive artistic style, one can ascertain the spatial and temporal bounds of the civilization that this style expresses. As Kroeber points out,² an artistic style is a sensitive indicator of historical connexions. Within the ambit of any one civilization the various styles 'tend towards a certain consistency among themselves',³ and 'styles are the very incarnation of the dynamic forms taken by the history of civilization'.⁴ Our ability, Kroeber adds, to locate an unassigned work of art to its place in a style sequence implies that the development of a style follows a one-way course. 'A style is a strand in a culture. . . . It is also a selective way. . . . Where compulsion or physical or physiological necessity reign, there is no room for style.' In being selective, a style, as well as a state, is an expression of will.⁵ Bagby, too, observes⁶ that 'the art-historians have shown that the styles of works of art are not absolutely indefinable', and that 'something of the same kind is done by the anthropologist and the culture historian. He, too, feels a common

¹ The Western statue must be pre-Renaissance if it is to be characteristic and distinctive. It must antedate the Western reception, at 'the' Renaissance, of the Hellenic style of visual art.

² In *Style and Civilizations*, pp. 2-3 and 155-6.

³ *The Nature of Culture*, p. 402.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 403. Cp. Anderle, in the passage quoted on p. 289, footnote 1.

⁵ *Style and Civilizations*, p. 150. This is the answer to Erdmann's contention, cited on p. 290, that states are the only kind of institution in which the human will finds expression.

⁶ In *Culture and History*, p. 108.

flavour in the diverse features of a culture or a period; he too tries to point out the observable qualities which give rise to this feeling.¹ Frankfort points out² that 'we recognise . . . the character of a civilization . . . in a certain coherence among its various manifestations, a certain consistency in its orientation, a certain cultural "style" which shapes its political and its judicial institutions, its art as well as its literature, its religion as well as its morals.' He illustrates his point by a masterly characterization³ of the Sumero-Akkadian and Egyptian civilizations, in which he brings out the fundamental features of each and the differences in their respective ways of pursuing the common endeavour of civilization.

The visible works of art that reveal so much about their civilization are merely expressions of it. They are not the civilization itself. That remains invisible, like a church or a state. When the anthropologist or the cultural historian tries to analyse the observable qualities that have been his clues to the diagnosis of a culture, he analyses them, as Bagby notices,⁴ in terms of ideas and values. Invisibility is, indeed, a common characteristic of all forces that are potent in human affairs. Even in the realm of non-human nature, over which Man has now established his mastery, invisible microbes and protons are more potent than visible lions and flashes of lightning. In the spiritual realm, where Man is not master, he has to cope with an invisible network of relations between elements in his own psyche, and with another invisible network of relations between himself and his fellow human beings. And the most potent of the forces that move human souls is the spirit that blows like the incalculable wind whose passage is audible but invisible.⁵

19. 'FOSSILS'

In the process of identifying systems of human relations of the kind that I have called 'civilizations', I found that the specimens of the species were not all of the same generation and not all even partially contemporaneous. For instance, the still extant Western Civilization has, in its historical background, an extinct civilization, the Hellenic, to which the Western Civilization is related in a way that I have called 'affiliation'. I went on to identify other civilizations that are now extinct, as the Hellenic is. I identified some of these by the procedure by which I had identified the Hellenic. I delved back into the origins of some extant civilization till I struck (so I believed) an earlier civilization, distinct from the extant one, though this was obviously affiliated to it. In two cases, however, I identified an extinct civilization by a different clue in the present-day world. Instead of ascertaining the former existence of an extinct civilization through the present existence of an extant civilization, I ascertained it, in a more direct way, through the present existence of what appeared to me to be extant relics of a civilization that, but for these, was extinct. 'One set' of extant communities—including the Monophysite Christians of Armenia, Mesopotamia,

¹ *Culture and History*, pp. 108-9.

² In *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 16.

⁴ In *Culture and History*, p. 109.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

⁵ John iii. 8.

Egypt, and Abyssinia and the Nestorian Christians of Kurdistan and Malabar, as well as the Jews and the Parsees'¹—seemed to me to be relics of an otherwise extinct Syriac Civilization. 'A second set—including the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia and the Hinayanian Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma and Siam,'² as well as the Jains in India'³—seemed to me to be relics of an otherwise extinct Indic Civilization. I may or may not have been right in my identifications of the civilizations represented by these two sets of extant communities, but I do not think I was wrong in diagnosing these communities as being relics of something that is otherwise no longer in existence today. If the societies represented by these extant communities are not extinct civilizations, they are at any rate extinct phases of civilizations that are still extant in later forms.⁴

These extant communities that I have labelled 'fossils' interested me for the reason that literal fossils interest palaeontologists. They seemed to me to be clues to something in the past which I was eager to rediscover and reconstruct. I seized on as many of them as I could find, and used them for tracking down civilizations, or phases in the histories of civilizations, which did not seem to have any other representatives than these in the present-day world. The fact that my 'fossils' were not just isolated phenomena but presented themselves in sets and sub-sets seemed to me to enhance their value as evidence. In one set the Jews and the Parsees seemed to me to be relics of the Syriac Civilization as it had been developing before this development was interrupted by the intrusion of Hellenism on the Syriac World; the Nestorian and Monophysite Christians seemed to be relics of the same Syriac Civilization as it was when it was reacting against the Hellenic Civilization's ascendancy. The Hellenic Civilization intruded on India too, and the second set of 'fossils' seemed to fall into two sub-sets, like the first. The Jains and the Hinayanian Buddhists seemed to be relics of civilization in India as this had been developing before the intrusion of Hellenism. The Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists seemed to be relics of civilization in India as it was when it was reacting against Hellenism's ascendancy there.⁵

One Jewish critic of my work, E. Berkovitz, has noted that, in my view of history, 'fossils' are apt to come in clusters.

'One of the charms of the *Study* is that it prevents Jews, as well as Judaism, from falling into the sin of vain conceit by imagining that there

¹ i. 35. Cp. i. 51 and i. 90-92. I noted that the former Nestorians of Malabar had now become Monophysites.

² Cambodia ought to have been included in the list of countries in which the Hinayana is now practised.

³ i. 35.
⁴ As a result of the reconsiderations set out in the present volume, I now think that there is more continuity than discontinuity in the history of civilization in India since after the disappearance of the Indus Culture there, and that it is therefore truer to reality to treat this as the history of one single civilization, instead of treating it as the history of an 'Indic' Civilization followed by an affiliated 'Hindu' Civilization. On the other hand, I find myself confirmed in my previous view that there is a break of historical continuity between the now extinct Syriac Civilization and the still extant Islamic Civilization. Most of my critics seem to hold that this break is still greater than I judge it to be.

⁵ This is a recapitulation of what has been set out more fully in i. 90-92.

mately four hundred years; a 'universal state' lasting for approximately another four hundred years; and an 'interregnum' lasting for approximately three hundred years, between the dissolution of the Hellenic Civilization in the western provinces of the Roman Empire and the emergence, in the same region, of a Western Christian Civilization—a society of the same species as its Hellenic predecessor, to which it is affiliated. Applying this model to the histories of other civilizations, I found the Hellenic-Western chronological pattern recurring clearly enough and often enough—so it seemed to me—to make me think of it as a specific pattern in the histories of civilizations in general. Now that I have replaced my former Hellenic-Western model by an Helleno-Sinic model,¹ I have, of course, to reconsider the chronological pattern that I derived originally from an analysis of my former Hellenic-Western model.

As far as I can see, an approximately four-hundred-years-long 'time of troubles' still stands as the usual immediate sequel to a breakdown.² On the other hand, I feel less certain now about my supposed four-hundred-years' span for the duration of universal states. The Ch'in-Han first bout of the universal state in China did have this duration, like the Roman Empire in the West. But the Roman Empire itself lasted about two hundred years longer in its more important central and eastern provinces than it lasted in its outlying western provinces; and, in re-examining my list of universal states, I find too many exceptions to my supposed normal span of four hundred years to allow this supposed norm to stand. As for the three-hundred-years-long interregnum between the dissolution of the Hellenic civilization in the west and the emergence of Western Christendom there, the application of a Chinese or a Helleno-Sinic model suggests that the course taken by events in the West was not the most usual one.³ Usually the end of the first bout of a universal state has been followed, not by the dissolution of the civilization politically embodied in it and by a consequent inter-civilizational interregnum, but by a less violent social and cultural break. The usual sequel has been a bout of anarchy followed by a revival of the previous universal state. This is the pattern, not only of Chinese history after the fall of the Ch'in-Han Empire, but also of Eastern Orthodox Christian history after the fall of the Roman Empire in its central and eastern provinces. Other instances of this pattern have been noticed in this volume in the passage just cited. This pattern is strongly pronounced and is also frequent in its occurrence. At the same time, there does not seem to be any correspondingly exact chronological regularity. The lengths of the alternating bouts of anarchy and oecumenical order seem to vary.

The results of my reconsiderations in this field may be summed up as follows. It still seems to me that there is a common pattern in the post-breakdown phases of the histories of those civilizations that have broken

¹ See pp. 197–204.

² This four-hundred-years-long 'time of troubles' has sometimes been punctuated by a first attempt at a universal state. In the Hellenic 'time of troubles' this role was played by Alexander's abortive empire; in the Sumeric 'time of troubles' it was played by the less ephemeral empire of the dynasty of Agade.

³ See pp. 186–97.

down up to date; and I also still think that the first stock episode after the breakdown in this recurring pattern of events—namely the bout of anarchy that I have called a ‘time of troubles’—has had an approximately uniform duration as well as an approximately uniform plot. But I no longer think that this uniformity of duration extends to the subsequent episodes in the common pattern of disintegration as this has now been revised in the light of my replacement of my former Hellenic-Western model by a new Helleno-Sinic one.

Thus I have retained my previous belief that the sequel to the breakdowns of civilizations follows a standard pattern, but I have abandoned my previous belief that it also has a standard time-span. I have never believed that there is either a standard pattern or a standard time-span for the history of a civilization that has not yet broken down. I have never believed, either, that every civilization is predestined to break down. Consequently I have never believed that there is a uniform maximum time-span for the duration of all societies of the species ‘civilizations’, as there is for all specimens of any species of living organism. On this issue I always have differed, and still do differ, *in toto*, from that great man of genius Oswald Spengler. I am surprised to find Philip Bagby following Spengler to the length of suggesting¹ that ‘we may say, with a fair degree of certainty, that the whole process of development from the beginnings of a civilization to the beginnings of a “universal state” . . . takes between a thousand and fifteen hundred years’, and even looking forward to being able eventually to pin the standard duration of this period down to something ‘between 1100 and 1300 years’. I do not find Bagby’s arguments in favour of this unqualified chronological determinism convincing. The calculations by which he arrives at this result are, it seems to me, of the ‘Procrustean’ kind of which I, too, have been accused.

21. CREATIVE AND DOMINANT MINORITIES

By a creative minority I mean a ruling minority in which the creative faculty in human nature finds opportunities for expressing itself in effective action for the benefit of all participants in the society. I do not believe that, in a creative minority, there is a higher percentage of creative individuals, endowed with a larger fund of creativity on the average, than there is in any other section of the population. What distinguishes a creative minority, and wins goodwill towards it among participants in society outside the creative minority’s ranks, is that it is a ruling minority in which the creative faculty has free play and in which it is exercised in the public interest.

By a dominant minority I mean a ruling minority that rules less by attraction and more by force. As I see it, this change in emphasis—from ruling mainly by attraction to ruling mainly by force—occurs when a creative minority, in my sense of the term, loses its opportunities for creative action. It may forfeit these by its own fault, by falling into one of the snares by which the path of creativity is beset. It may be tempted

¹ In *Culture and History*, p. 221.

by success either into losing its head or into resting on its oars. Alternatively, a creative minority may be deprived of its opportunities for creative action by changes in social and cultural circumstances for which the representatives of the minority have had little or no moral responsibility. In whichever of these ways the minority may have lost its opportunities for creative action, it will arouse resentment, opposition, and resistance among the rest of the population if it tries to cling to power by force after having ceased to perform for society as a whole the services that previously made its rule acceptable.

On reconsideration, I think that, in previous volumes, I have painted the contrast between the 'creative' and the 'dominant' phase in the rule of a minority in too strong colours. I have painted it white in its 'creative' phase and black in its 'dominant' phase, whereas the true colours are a lighter and a darker shade of grey. Perhaps I also drew too sharp a dividing line between a ruling minority of either kind and the rest of the population. I have discussed these points earlier in this volume,¹ and therefore need not go into them further here.

22. THE PROLETARIAT

I defined my usage of this word at an early point in this Study.² I meant, and mean, by it 'any social element or group which in some way is "in" but not "of" any given society at any given stage of such society's history'. I have, I believe, kept to this usage consistently. It is based on the literal sense of the Latin word *proletarii*, and it coincides with the usage of this word in the terminology of Roman constitutional law. On the other hand, it does not coincide with the celebrated Marxian modern usage. In this Marxian usage 'the proletariat' means a labouring population employing a technique called 'machine industry' under a regime called 'capitalism'. People working under these conditions may, of course, be proletarians in my sense too. Many, indeed perhaps most, of them were that in Marx's and Engels' generation. Today probably a majority of the World's industrial workers have ceased to be proletarians in my sense through having acquired a stake in society. In 1961 this would, I should guess, be the situation in most parts of the Soviet Union, as well as in most, though not in all, Western countries. On the other hand, the proletariat in my sense includes people of many kinds who are not proletarians in the Marxian sense. It includes anyone who is penalized in any respect—economically, politically, or socially. A person's material standard of living is not the criterion. A pauper free-man—e.g. an Egyptian peasant—is a proletarian, but so too is a Roman magnate's confidential slave who has been permitted by his master to accumulate a large *peculium*; for the well-to-do slave is penalized by being kept in a sub-human juridical status. But a millionaire can still be proletarian, even if he is a freeman: for instance, a New Yorker Jewish millionaire who is a citizen of the United States but whose candidature for election to membership in a club has been rejected because he is a Jew and not because there is anything personally objectionable about

¹ On pp. 124-7 and 148-50.

² In i. 41, footnote 3.

him. The term, as I use it, includes all 'displaced persons' (refugees, exiles, and deportees), however highly gifted and distinguished; all mercenary soldiers, however highly paid and however formidable, from Cyrus the Younger's ten thousand Greeks to the French Crown's Swiss Guard; all subject peoples (e.g. the Bantu in South Africa and Kenya); all insurgents (e.g. those that, at the time when I was writing these words, were under arms in Cyprus and in Algeria), so long as they have not yet turned the tables on the powers that be, as the Coelesyrian Jewish insurgents against the Seleucid monarchy did in the second century B.C.; and all barbarians beyond the pale, such as the Pathan tribesmen in the unadministered areas of Western Pakistan used to be before the Pakistan Government began to convert them, by methods of civilization, into voluntary citizens of the country.

23. HIGHER RELIGIONS

By higher religions I mean religions designed to bring human beings into direct communion with absolute spiritual Reality as individuals, in contrast to earlier forms of religion that have brought them only into indirect communion with It through the medium of the particular society in which they have happened to be participants.¹ Religion, in these earlier forms, is an integral part of the culture of some particular society. On the other hand the higher religions have broken—some partially, some completely—out of the configuration of the particular cultures in which they originated. They have become separate systems of specifically religious culture, in a state of tension with the systems of secular culture with which they have parted company. The advent of a higher religion thus brings with it the distinction—previously unknown—between 'religious' and 'secular', 'spiritual' and 'temporal', 'sacred' and 'profane'.

A religion cannot be extricated from the non-religious elements in culture without being divorced from the society that carries these non-religious elements on its network of relations between people. But no form of culture, secular or religious, can subsist without a social setting; and therefore the adherents of a higher religion cannot assert its independence of secular culture without at the same time incorporating it in an independent society. Every higher religion is carried on a network of social relations of its own.² This is a specific form of society, distinct from both civilizations and pre-civilizational societies. A name is needed for a society of this religious species, and it would be convenient if we could label it 'a church'. I have sometimes used the word 'church' in this wide sense; but this usage has been contested by several of my critics, and they are, I think, right. The word 'church' implies a unified ecclesiastical government, and this is possessed by perhaps no more than two of the extant higher religions: the Tantric Mahayana and the Roman Catholic denomination of Christianity. The Christian churches of the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Protestant Episcopalian

¹ A fuller definition has already been given on pp. 83-84.

² See p. 84.

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denomination are respectively in communion with each other without having any common organs of ecclesiastical government. The ecclesiastical organization of most other extant higher religions is still less formal and more loose.

24. UNIVERSAL STATES¹

A state may be defined as a non-voluntary system of impersonal relations that is maintained partly by force exercised by a governing minority and partly by the consent, or at least the acquiescence, of this governing minority's subjects.² I cannot think of any state in which either of these bases of state authority has been completely lacking, and there are countless historical examples of states being wrecked either by the government's failing to muster the minimum necessary amount of force or by their subjects' ceasing to have the minimum necessary feeling of obligation to obey the powers that be.

If a state may be defined in these terms, it is obvious that, up to date, there has never been a universal state in the literal sense of one whose government has exercised effective authority over the whole living generation of mankind in all the habitable lands and navigable seas and air levels of this planet.³ At the same time it is also obvious that in our day, for the first time in history, human beings have it in their power to establish a world government. The less than world-wide empires of the past have mostly been established by military conquest; and the invention of atomic weapons has made it practicable now for some single local state to conquer and hold down the whole world. It is true that the cost, in terms of spiritual as well as material devastation, of conquering the World in an atomic war looks as if it would be prohibitively high; and this consideration is already acting as a perceptible deterrent to any impulses to try to impose political unity by the traditional military method. Military conquest, however, has never been the exclusive means by which empires have been established, and it may be doubted whether any of them could have been established by force alone, without the support of other agencies. The use of military force on a large scale would not be possible without the previous establishment of a well-developed system of communications, mental as well as physical; and the development of any such system has many effects besides that of enabling staff officers to solve their logistical problems. Long before it has reached the point at which it is of practical military

¹ This subject has been touched upon already on pp. 186-204.

² It is not easy to draft a definition of the state that distinguishes it from another ancient institution: slavery. The distinction would be drawn if one could say that slavery is 'a non-voluntary system of personal relations resting wholly upon force'. But slavery, too, can be a system of impersonal relations when it takes the form of labour on plantations or in factories or the form of public penal servitude; and, on the other hand, when slavery is domestic, it may be maintained partly, or even mainly, by consent on the slave's part. In the Roman and the Islamic versions of the institution there was not much difference in practice between the relations of the head of a family with his slaves and his relations with his children.

³ This is, perhaps, what G. Masur has in mind when he dismisses my concept of 'universal states' as being illogical (the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521-2).

value, it will have gone far towards producing a consensus of feelings, minds, and wills by making people familiar with each other across the traditional barriers between different societies and different cultures. Without some such consensus on the part of its potential subjects, a state, even on the smallest scale, could never be established and certainly could not be maintained.

The particular point of consensus that has made the establishment and maintenance of relatively large empires psychologically possible has been a recognition, however reluctant, that a continuance of war, revolution, and anarchy in a crescendo movement is a greater evil than the forfeiture of cherished peculiarities such as national states, religions, languages, and other national manners and customs. In our world in our time we can see this recognition gaining ground, and this time over a literally world-wide field. It is true that non-Western subject peoples are asserting claims to national independence as against the less than world-wide Western colonial empires that, between them, have been ruling over so large a part of the human race in recent times. But these revolts of the previously subject majority against Western rule are being made in the name of Western political and moral principles, and the formerly subject non-Western peoples that have already achieved national independence are all using their newly won power of self-determination to Westernize their social structures and their cultural configurations of their own accord. In doing this, they are laying the foundations for a single world-wide society and for a uniform world-wide culture that will take its first shape within a Western-made framework—though, no doubt, it will become less specifically Western in complexion as all the cultural heritages of all the extant societies come to be the common possession of the whole of mankind. This progressive cultural and social unification of the whole human family is bound to find some expression on the political plane. The political expression need not necessarily take the form of a central government of the kind that has been established in the past as the result of less than world-wide wars of conquest. The most likely nucleus of a future political world order is perhaps a central authority exercising an effective world-wide control over the use of atomic energy and thereby making it impossible for any of the atomically armed local states to attack and conquer the rest.

The present movement of world affairs makes the study of past empires a matter of practical as well as theoretical interest for us in our generation. The empires that have most significance as pointers to the possible destiny of mankind are not those established by local states within the body social of some single civilization, such as the recent colonial empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and other modern Western local states, or the similar empires carved out of the carcass of the Achaemenian Empire by the successors of Alexander the Great. They are those that, like the Roman Empire in the Hellenic World or the Maurya Empire in India or the Ch'in-Han Empire in China, have given political unity to the whole, or almost the whole, of the domain of an entire civilization at a stage when this

civilization has been brought within sight of dissolution by a series of wars and revolutions on a progressively increasing scale of spiritual and material destructiveness.

None of these empires, up to date, has been a 'universal state' in the literal sense, and John Strachey has suggested¹ that 'single state' would be a more informative label for them. The word 'single' would, indeed, convey the important historical fact that the means by which peace and order have been established has been the replacement of a number of warring local states by one state embracing all their former territories and populations. The word 'universal' does, however, convey the further important historical fact that these states have actually been world-wide—not objectively, but in the significant subjective sense that they have looked and felt world-wide to the people living under their regime. It is, of course, one of the radical infirmities of human nature that each of us is under constant temptation to equate himself and his society and his culture with the Universe. He will be particularly prone to fall into this illusion when the society in which he is a participant happens, as it does in these cases, to be the carrier of a civilization, since, until the advent of the higher religions, civilizations were the finest, as well as the most widely extended, configurations of culture that mankind had achieved so far. The Ch'in-Han, Maurya, and Roman empires, and all the other known representatives of the same kind of state, did seem, to a majority of their respective subjects, to embrace all peoples in the World that were of any account. The Hellenes thought of the Roman Empire as being 'the entire inhabited world' (*hē oikoumenē*); the Chinese thought of the Ch'in-Han Empire and its successive avatars as being 'all that is under Heaven' (*T'ien Hsia*), or, short of that, as being 'the middle kingdom', surrounded by a superfluous fringe of barbarians and hardly less barbarous exponents of civilizations other than the Chinese.²

Most 'universal states', in my sense of the term, have, in fact, been heralds of a potential world-state. Besides being 'single states' from the standpoint of participants in the particular civilization whose domain has been united politically by one of the states of this kind, most of them have included portions of the domain of one or more other civilizations, and also portions of their own society's barbarian hinterlands. Moreover, in the course of time, their originally heterogeneous subjects have tended to acquire a sense of solidarity with each other as children of a common human family whose unity has been symbolized for them politically in the world-state in which they have had the good fortune to have been living. From our point of view in our day, the historic 'universal states' may be seen, in retrospect, as having been so many preparatory exercises for the eventual establishment of a literal universal state which, though still unachieved, is now, at last, no longer below our horizon.

K. D. Erdmann³ correctly observes that my concept of a 'universal

¹ In an unpublished letter.

² The case of Japan under the Tokugawa regime has been discussed on p. 207, footnote 2.

³ In *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 224-5.

state' was originally derived from an Hellenic model, and he contends that this model—i.e. a 'universal state' on the pattern of the Roman Empire—is not applicable to empires imposed by conquerors who, in their culture, have been aliens from the standpoint of the society to which they have given political unity. Presumably Erdmann has in mind such 'universal states' on my list as the Mongol and Manchu empires in China, the Mughal and British empires in India, the Spanish Empire in Mexico and Peru, and the Ottoman Empire in Orthodox Christendom (apart from Russia), and is contrasting these with the Muscovite Empire in Russia, the Aztec and Inca empires in pre-Columbian America, the Maurya and Gupta empires in India, and the Ch'in-Han, T'ang-Sung, and Ming empires in China, as well as the Roman Empire in the Hellenic World.

No doubt it is true that the resistance always aroused by empire-builders is intensified when, in addition to being enemies of a traditional parochialism, they also present themselves as aliens who do not appreciate or even understand the traditional common culture of the communities that they are subjugating. But the last column in my table of universal states,¹ in which I have noted the provenance of their respective founders, continuators, and restorers, brings out the truth that the founders have been 'metropolitans', from the heart of the world to which they have given political unity, still less frequently than they have been 'aliens' in the sense of representatives of some other civilization. Usually they have been either barbarians, from just outside the pale of the society that they have united politically, or else 'marchmen', from just inside it. The Romans, for instance, were marchmen of the Hellenic World, and so were the Illyrians, who re-established the Roman Empire after its first collapse. The Ch'in were marchmen of the Sinic World; the successive Theban founders of the Egyptian Middle Empire and New Empire were marchmen of the Egyptian World; the Incas were marchmen of the Andean World; the Akkadian founders and the Babylonian Amorite restorers of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad were marchmen of the Sumero-Akkadian World, and so were the Chaldaeans who restored this empire again, some eleven hundred years after the time of Hammurabi.

The second founders of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad were 'metropolitans', and so were the Maurya founders and the Gupta restorers of a universal state in India. The Mauryas and the Guptas both came from Magadha; Ur-Nammu came from Ur. But 'metropolitan' founders of universal states have been rare exceptions, and it is not difficult to see the reason for this. Communities in the heart of a society's domain are likely to have played prominent parts in its history since an early date, and later generations of their human representatives are therefore likely to have accumulated arresting memories of the community's past glories as a parochial state. Such memories are an incubus; and people who are haunted by them are thereby inhibited from casting themselves for a new role that will enable them to cope with a new situation. The people who find no difficulty in adapting

¹ Printed in vi. 327 and in vii. 769.

themselves to a new situation are those who have no anachronistic memories to paralyse them. In view of this it is not surprising that the Hellenic universal state should have been founded, not by the Spartans or by the Athenians, but by the Romans, and the Sinic universal state not by Ch'i but by Ch'in. On the contrary, it is surprising that the second founder of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad should have come from Ur and not from Asshur, and that the non-alien founders and restorers of a universal state in India should have come from Bihar and not from the Panjab.

Marchmen are not aliens, but they are the nearest thing to being this that it is possible to be for any individual or community within a civilization's pale. Accordingly, marchmen empire-builders draw on themselves, from their metropolitan subjects, a large measure of the odium that is incurred by empire-builders who are complete outsiders. After the Romans had established an unchallengeable ascendancy over the rest of the Hellenic World in the course of the years 218-168 B.C., it took the Hellenic public more than a quarter of a millennium to reconcile itself to Roman rule, and nearly a hundred years more passed before an Hellenic man of letters with a Graeco-Roman name, Publius Aelius Aristides, saluted the Roman Empire, in his classic encomium *In Romam*, as the beneficent universal state that had providentially saved the Hellenic World when it had been on the verge of self-destruction. As for the Ch'in regime in China, it made itself so odious that it survived for only fourteen years after its redoubtable founder had overthrown the last of the other independent states of the Sinic World, and for only three years after the founder's death. And, though, by that time, a universal state had become such an imperious necessity for the Sinic Civilization that it had immediately to be rehabilitated, it is significant that it was deliberately reconstituted on ostensibly different lines, and that the founder of this new and far longer-lived Han regime was a peasant from the interior.

The Persians, again, made their entry into civilization as marchmen of the Sumero-Akkadian World and as proselytes to its civilization; yet this civilization's contemporary representatives the Babylonians revolted against the Achaemenian 'Realm of the Lands' again and again; were finally crushed without ever being reconciled; and eventually welcomed Alexander the Great as a liberator. The Egyptians, for whom the Persians were outright aliens, did not react against them more vigorously than the Babylonians did. The Romans, too, were outright aliens for the Egyptians, Jews, Syrians, and other non-Hellenic peoples south-east of Taurus who had been forcibly incorporated in the Hellenic World by Alexander and had afterwards been forcibly prevented by Alexander's Roman successors from breaking away from it. When they did at last succeed, in the course of the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries of the Christian Era, in shaking off Roman rule, their long-repressed resentment burst out as furiously as the Eastern Orthodox Christian peoples' resentment against Ottoman rule when they succeeded in shaking this off in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹

¹ In both these cases the successful insurgent movements found their inspiration in

In the light of this analysis, Erdmann's distinction between universal states of indigenous origin and those of alien origin turns out, I should say, not to have the significance that Erdmann attaches to it. All universal states have provoked both resentment and gratitude in different quantities at different stages; and, though the differences between their respective experiences in this matter have been great, they have been not more than differences of degree. The criterion by which universal states should be appraised and classified is not the provenance of their founders; it is the service that they have performed for their subjects.

25. UNIVERSAL CHURCHES

Like the historic 'universal states', the historic 'universal churches' have been universal, so far, not in the literal meaning of the word, but in the belief and expectation of their adherents. They have been the institutional vehicles of missionary religions whose exponents have set out to convert the whole of mankind. The vigour and success of their missionary work has been proportionate to the degree in which their adherents have succeeded in changing over from a traditional national outlook to a revolutionary oecumenical one.¹

A generic application of the word 'church' is convenient, but is perhaps misleading, for the reasons that have been suggested already.²

26. SCEPTICISM

I have already defined my usage of this word in this volume.³ I mean by it, not disbelief in the human intellect's capacity to apprehend Reality, but disbelief in the existence of any alleged element in Reality, or aspect of it, that cannot be apprehended by reasoning. In this usage 'scepticism' is a synonym for 'rationalism', which brings out 'rationalism's negative side.

27. RATIONALISM

I have already defined my usage of this word, too, in this volume.⁴ I mean by it a belief in the human intellect's capacity to apprehend Reality, coupled with a disbelief in the validity of any alleged knowledge that has not been, and could not have been, acquired in the first place, and subsequently verified, by reasoning.

28. AGNOSTICISM

I have already defined my usage of this word, too, in this volume.⁵ I mean by it a recognition and acknowledgement of ignorance about

new ideologies. The Greeks and Serbs revolted from the Ottoman Empire and against Islam in the name of modern Western nationalism; the Egyptians and Syrians revolted against the Roman Empire and against the 'Melchite' ('Imperialist') version of Christianity in the successive names of Nestorian Christianity, Monophysite Christianity, and Islam.

¹ See pp. 84 and 85-88.

³ On p. 69, footnote 1.

⁵ On p. 98, footnote 2.

² On pp. 307-8.

⁴ On p. 72, footnote 3.

Reality, not in so far as the human intellect is able to apprehend Reality by reasoning, but about Reality beyond the limits of the human intellect's reach through the operations of which it is capable. In regard to this unknown possible sphere, or dimension, of Reality, rationalism, as I have defined rationalism, is dogmatically sceptical. The rationalist's stand is accurately described, in caricature, in words that are put into Benjamin Jowett's mouth in a celebrated rhyme: 'What I don't know is not knowledge.' The agnostic agrees with the rationalist in holding that what I do know *is* knowledge, but holds, in opposition to the rationalist, that what I do not and cannot 'know'—in the sense of 'apprehend by reasoning'—may, nevertheless, be real, and, what is more, may be the essence of Reality and the hidden key to the full understanding of those fragments of it that the human reason can grasp. While agreeing with the rationalist that we cannot know the unknowable, the agnostic does not think that our knowledge, so far as this extends, warrants a denial of the possibility that human beings may receive genuine intimations of the unknowable through non-intellectual channels—for instance, those channels, whatever they may be, that are the founts of poetry and of prophetic vision. The agnostic recognizes that the genuineness of such intimations cannot be 'proved' by reasoning; but, for this very reason, he holds, as against the dogmatic rationalist, that it also cannot be 'disproved' by reasoning. I have called the agnostic in my sense of the word a 'trans-rationalist', because he goes with the rationalist all the way that the rationalist goes, but does not believe that the limits of the human reason's reach are necessarily the limits of the human soul's possibilities of understanding. A more familiar synonym for 'agnostic' in my sense would be 'Platonist'.

VIII. THE RELATION BETWEEN MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

IN a previous chapter¹ I have taken note of criticisms of my practice (one not peculiar to me) of treating Man and his environment as two distinct entities. I have agreed that, in reality, they constitute one indivisible whole, and that it is a misrepresentation of Reality to draw the distinction between them. But, while admitting this, I have made the proviso that we must continue to distinguish them from each other if we are to continue to study the monolithic reality that is analysed, for 'operational' purposes, into these two components. 'It is only in the interaction of Man and his environment that the basic elements of history can be found.'² At the same time I have taken Spate's point that 'the facts of geography are the facts as they are approached'.³ 'The term

¹ Chapter VI, pp. 146-8.

² M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 171.

³ O. H. K. Spate in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), p. 419, quoted on p. 147.

environment refers always to a body of facts relative to a particular focus or perspective.¹

An objectively identical geographical 'set-up' will offer a promising environment to one group of human beings, whose social structure and cultural configuration put it within their power to turn this particular geographical 'set-up' to account, while it will offer only a bleak and niggardly environment, or no environment at all, to other groups with other organizations and equipments. These other groups may be at opposite extremes of the social and cultural scale from each other. They may be either too poorly equipped or too demanding in their expectations to make anything of what might be a golden opportunity for some third party. For instance, both a New York business man and a Palaeolithic hunter or food-gatherer would be in danger of starving if marooned on a derelict Javanese paddyfield. Neither of them would be able to make anything of what had been a cornucopia for a rice-cultivating Javanese peasant. Though one cannot in practice treat Man's environment as being indistinguishable from Man himself, one can and must regard the potentialities of a geographical 'set-up' as being relative to a particular human group's capacity for making something of them.²

This point has been made by Spate apropos of Man's relation to non-human nature; but it is equally pertinent to Man's relation to his fellow human beings. A human being's environment can be analysed into two sectors, the geographical and the social. This analysis, like all analyses, may be misleading. 'The environment of every human being and the context of every human action contains human and non-human elements inextricably intertwined.'³ Yet the distinction is also perhaps useful and certainly necessary. In any case it is true of the social, no less than of the geographical, sector of Man's environment that the facts 'are the facts as they are approached'. An objectively identical social 'set-up' will offer a promising environment to one individual,⁴ or to one group or class of people, while others will be able to make little or nothing of it. The potentialities will be relative to the character, ability, social and cultural heritage, education (in the broadest sense), and personal experience of each individual who finds himself in this situation.

If we accept this point, it raises a question. Suppose that we had an exhaustive knowledge of both the geographical or social 'set-up' and the person or people encountering it: a knowledge, that is to say, which covered everything in each of the two parties that was relevant to the encounter between them: Should we then be able to predict the outcome of this encounter? I myself do not believe that we should. I believe that necessity, in the sense of a predetermined and therefore potentially predictable nexus of cause and effect, is not all-pervasive in the structure of Reality. I believe that Reality has in it a vein of something genuinely unpredetermined and therefore intrinsically unpredictable.

¹ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

² This has been observed not only by Spate but also by M. R. Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-3.

³ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁴ 'A single human being is the ultimate "enviroment unit"' (H. and M. Sprout: *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context of International Politics*, p. 18).

At the inanimate level this can perhaps be described only negatively as a vein of indeterminacy. At the human level, in beings endowed with a measure of consciousness, reasoning power, and will, the same vein displays itself as freedom of choice. This freedom is not, of course, absolute. It is limited by the pressure of external forces, non-human and human, that are not under the control of the human party to the encounter. It is also limited by the spiritual history, up to date, of the person to whom the choice is offered. As Bagby points out, in the train of many previous students of ethics, human freedom is not non-determination; it is self-determination.¹ 'We choose what we prefer; it is meaningless to say that we can choose what we do not prefer.'² Indeed, if we could, it is difficult to see what would distinguish human choice from the sheer senseless haphazard indeterminacy that is the form apparently taken by non-necessity when this displays itself in inanimate nature. Thus human freedom is in any case limited. But its apparent play, within these limits, raises the question whether it is genuine as far as it goes or whether it is altogether illusory.

I myself believe that it is genuine within its apparent limits. I also believe that the occasions on which it comes into play are laid bare by the 'heuristic' intellectual operation of mentally dissecting an indivisible reality into two entities, 'Man' and 'environment', that have encounters with each other. In laying bare these occasions of freedom, this particular mental dichotomy does, I believe, bring to light a genuine—and, if genuine, evidently most important—feature in the nature of Reality. Choice means the creation of something new.³ In the first volume of this book I illustrated the ideas of novelty, creation, and choice from mythology,⁴ and I declared my conviction that, on these points, mythology is illuminating.⁵ In thus avowing myself to be a believer in an at least partial freedom of human wills, I was, of course, taking sides in an ancient but so far undecided philosophical controversy.

In another chapter of the same volume⁶ I tried to prove my case. I tried to demonstrate, by examples, that the challenge of an identical 'set-up' did not invariably evoke an identical response from identically endowed and equipped human beings to whom this 'set-up' offered a potential environment. If this attempted demonstration of mine had held water, it would, I should say, have proved that, in an encounter, something comes into play that is not present in the previous 'make-up' of either party to the encounter, and that this intervention of something new is the decisive factor in determining the outcome. I am still convinced that this is the truth, but I have also been convinced, partly by new archaeological evidence, and partly by criticisms from Spate,⁷ that I have not succeeded in giving a cogent demonstration of the validity of my tenet.

For example, I tried to demonstrate⁸ that the particular potential

¹ *Culture and History*, p. 63.

³ The concept of 'creation', which involves the meaning of the word 'new', has been discussed on pp. 252-4.

⁵ i. 299-302.

⁷ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 287-304, and in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), pp. 406-28.

² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁴ i. 271-99.

⁶ i. 249-71.

⁸ In i. 256-8.

environment offered by the Nile in Egypt was not the positive factor to which the genesis of the Egyptiac Civilization was due. I argued this by citing what I then believed to be evidence that there were other river valleys, offering potential environments similar to that offered by the lower Nile valley, in which no civilization had ever come to birth, though some of them had eventually been turned to account by pioneers of civilizations that had come to birth elsewhere. I observed that the lower valley of the Tigris and Euphrates did offer a similar potential environment; that here an independent civilization, similar to and more or less coeval with the Egyptiac, had come to birth; and that this was evidence, so far as it went, in favour of the thesis that civilizations are products of geographical 'set-ups'. But, taking a cue from Eduard Meyer,¹ I went on to say that no independent civilization had come to birth in the Jordan valley, in the lower Mississippi valley and delta, or in the valleys of the Colorado and the Rio Grande. Apropos of the Jordan valley, I quoted Meyer's statement that

'the Jordan valley between Betše'an and Pella, the Ghor, a broad deep rift between mountain walls, with a glowing hot climate, lay completely desolate [in the sixteenth century B.C.] and has remained as good as uninhabited to-day'.

I then quoted Meyer's judgement that

'much light is thrown on national character (*Volkscharakter*)² by the fact that here the attempt has never been made—as it has been made under the substantially similar conditions in the Nile valley—to take advantage of the soil and to render it productive by systematic irrigation. It is only when we draw this comparison that we become fully able to appreciate the energy with which the Egyptians have made their country the most productive agricultural country in the World for thousands of years on end.'

On reconsideration, I do not think I am to blame for having accepted Eduard Meyer's statement and judgement at the time. I was writing my first volume in 1930, two years after the publication of the volume of Meyer's book from which I was quoting, sixteen years before the publication of Nelson Glueck's *The River Jordan*, and twenty-two years before the beginning of Miss Kenyon's work at Jericho. The point that Meyer was making, as I interpret the passage, was that, notwithstanding the formidable heat in a rift valley far below sea-level, it is likely that the prehistoric ancestors of the historical Egyptians would have made of the Jordan valley something like what they did make of the lower Nile valley if the bluffs on which they had settled had happened to be those overlooking the Ghor and not those overlooking the section of the Nile valley that their historical labours eventually transformed into Upper Egypt. Here Meyer was showing an

¹ In *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii (1), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1928, Cotta), p. 96, and in vol. i (1) 4th ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 65.

² As I mentioned in quoting Meyer in the first volume of this book, I myself would attribute the successful human response to the challenge of the lower Nile valley, not to a hypothetical fixed 'national character', but to a particular human effort to cope with a particular emergency.

intuition which was not put off the scent by his (to my mind, unwarrantable and mistaken) postulate of a fixed Egyptian national character. He was showing surprise that the Jordan valley should not (as he believed) have been turned to account by human enterprise, in spite of its daunting climate. Accepting the contrast, as Meyer had stated it, between the respective histories of the Jordan valley and the Nile valley, I interpreted this as indicating that the outcome of an encounter between human enterprise and a difficult geographical environment has, in at least one pair of instances, been non-uniform, and that it is therefore intrinsically unpredictable. In the light of the state of knowledge at the time, I do not think that either Meyer's statement, or my reading of its significance, was unreasonable.

Meyer, however, has been taken to task by a great scholar of my generation, W. F. Albright, in a book published in 1949,¹ at a date when Glueck had carried out his explorations and had published the results.

'In 1928 [Albright writes], the greatest ancient historian of modern times, Eduard Meyer, wrote, two years after visiting the Jordan valley for the first time in his life—unfortunately in the early autumn—that the Jordan valley south of Beth-shan and Pella was absolutely barren, "burning hot between its mountain walls", and that no attempt had ever been made in pre-Roman times to make the soil productive by systematic irrigation! No one who reads Nelson Glueck's vivid account of the very same district . . . can fail to see how completely archaeological research has disproved this off-hand impression of the great historian.'²

This criticism of Meyer's dictum has been justified, more sensationally than Albright could have foreseen when he wrote and published it, by Miss Kenyon's subsequent discoveries at Jericho. So far from having been left undeveloped till the sixteenth century B.C. or till the Roman Age, the Jordan valley has been occupied and cultivated by irrigation for at least twice as long, up to date, as either the lower Nile valley or the lower valley of the Tigris and Euphrates. Miss Kenyon finds³ that the beginnings of Jericho must have been not much later than the end of the pleistocene period—that is to say, not much later than 10,000 B.C. The Jordan valley has been cultivated, on and off, from that day to this, and the interruptions are attributed, by both Miss Kenyon and Dr. Albright, not to oscillations in the local climate, but to barbarian invasions from the eastern desert. In other words, the history of the Jordan valley, like the history of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, tells against, not for, my hypothesis that encounters between comparable parties under comparable conditions have not always had similar outcomes.

Spate has taken issue with me over this question of the significance of the Jordan valley's history, but here he, too, has gone astray—and this with less excuse, I should say, than I or Eduard Meyer had, since Spate published his two critiques of my work in 1952 and 1953 when both Glueck's and Albright's books were already accessible to him, and

¹ *The Archaeology of Palestine* (Harmondsworth 1949, Penguin).

² Albright, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-2.

³ K. Kenyon: *Digging up Jericho*, p. 75.

when the main findings of the excavations at Jericho were already public knowledge thanks to progress reports in the press. Yet Spate in 1952 and 1953 accepted Meyer's statement as correct, as I had accepted it in 1930-4. He, too, assumed that the Jordan valley had never been irrigated, and found the explanation of this in the climate of the Ghor and in the physiography of the Jordan valley, which he contrasts with the situation in Egypt.

'The Jordan . . . has only 1 per cent of the annual discharge of the Nile, with nothing comparable to the Nile flood regime, while its valley is far less well endowed than that of the Nile as regards both terrain (much of which is dissected) and soils. Many of these are coarse and porous and lie on terraces well out of reach of irrigation; to say nothing of the stimulating climate of a walled-in valley 1000 feet below sea-level. All Palestine has about 1000 cubic metres of water per inhabitant (about $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions), against 5000 cubic metres of Nile water for each of Egypt's 17 million people.¹ The further comparisons with the Nile overlook the structure of its valley, in which coarser sediments are trapped in the upper basins, but not the fine basaltic silts brought by the Blue Nile. . . . The uniqueness of the Nile flood region and the Etesian winds, so important to the navigation which held together the Egyptian Civilization, are not so much as mentioned: perhaps for good reason; for, once the Nile is recognised as unique, one of Toynbee's main arguments against environmentalism falls to pieces forthwith.'² 'Even the Euphrates-Tigris environment is only generically, not specifically, akin to the Nilotic.'³

In these passages Spate shoots wide of the mark in one case and overplays his hand in another.

His ironical quip about 'the stimulating climate of a walled-in valley 1000 feet below sea-level' invites the crushing retort that, during the first 6,000 of the last 12,000 years, Jericho was, so far as we yet know, the only place in the World where a state of culture that might be called civilization was already a going concern. His facts and figures are beside the point. He has overlooked the obvious consideration that, after the Ghassulian period, i.e. since about 3500 B.C.,

'settlements in the Jordan valley were nearly always established at the entrances of the valleys, near perennial streams and springs which are still sources of water.'⁴

The cultivation of a piece of the Jordan valley by irrigation from the spring at Jericho antedates the cultivation of another piece of it at Ghassul by some five or six thousand years. The water that irrigated the fields round Ghassul may have been drawn from the Jordan, which flows between flat banks for those last few miles above its debouchure into the Dead Sea, but it may also have been drawn from a lateral stream that flowed out farther into the Jordan valley in the first half of the fourth millennium B.C. than at any time since. The abandonment of Ghassul may have been due to increasing difficulties in drawing the

¹ E. C. Willatts: "Some Geographical Factors in the Palestine Problem", in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cviii (1947), pp. 145-79; reference at p. 166.

² *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 410.

³ *Toynbee and History*, p. 299.

⁴ Albright, op. cit., p. 69.

water, whatever its source, or it may have been due to a barbarian invasion.¹ In any case, archaeological exploration has now made it clear that the water with which the Jordan valley has been irrigated, on and off, for the last twelve thousand years has seldom, if ever, been drawn from the Jordan River. I took this point myself when, in July 1957, I had an opportunity of crossing the Jordan valley several times at different places, and visiting Jericho among other sites on its floor. By that date I could already have learnt the facts, as Spate could have learnt them in 1952, from authoritative accounts of them in accessible publications. Geographers, as well as historians, are fallible; and Spate's failure to keep his knowledge of the Jordan valley's history up to date would have been venial if the tone of his criticism had not been supercilious.

Again, Spate's assertion² that the geographical 'set-up' in the Nile valley is 'unique' seems to be unwarrantably sweeping. V. G. Childe points out³ that the lower Tigris-Euphrates valley, too, was 'periodically inundated by floods', though he also notes⁴ that these were not so regular or so well-timed for agricultural operations as the annual inundation of the Nile was, and that 'only the wide marshy delta offered the challenge and reward that had evoked the artificial environment of Sumerian cities. . . . South of Cairo the narrow valley through the barren desert plateaux has analogies, real but remote, with Sumer.' If the picture here drawn by Childe is correct, Egypt and Sumer, in their respective states of nature, had too much in common with each other to warrant our considering either of them to have been unique. Moreover, if Spate were right in claiming uniqueness for Egypt, we should have to conclude that what is unique about the Nile valley is what determined the birth of a civilization there, and consequently that the British school of diffusionists were right in holding that the genesis of civilization in Egypt was a unique event and that all the civilization that there has ever been, either in the Old World or in the New World, has been propagated by prospectors fanning out from an original base of operations in the unique Egyptian cradle of civilization.⁵ By the years 1952-3, when Spate was writing the two papers from which I have been quoting, the progress of archaeological discovery was already pointing in other directions. It was proving that, in the Jericho oasis in the Jordan valley, civilization is twice as old as it is anywhere else in the World, not excluding the lower valleys of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates. And it was also showing that in the lower Nile valley, when the local Neolithic culture did at last blossom into civilization, it did so under a stimulus from an already achieved civilization in the lower Tigris-Euphrates valley. Thus, if it were true that the geographical 'set-up' in the lower Nile valley offered a 'unique' opportunity for transforming it into an environment for a civilization, this would have to be reconciled with the fact that the human occupants of other, in themselves less favourable, geographical 'set-ups' were the first in the race.⁶

¹ Albright, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 300, as well as in *The Geographical Journal*, loc. cit.

³ In *What Happened in History*, p. 89.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁵ A critique of this theory will be found in this book, i. 221-3.

⁶ Spate himself, in the passages quoted above, has pointed out the advantages offered

However, my concern with Spate is, not to return his fire, but to follow out the second thoughts into which I have been stung by the stimulating shot with which he has peppered me. He has given me food for thought; for, though his criticism of my reading of the Jordan valley's history misses fire, he has made effective criticisms of my attempt¹ to reconstruct the state of the lower Nile valley as it was before Man cleared, drained, and cultivated it, on the analogy of the present state of the upper basin of the White Nile along the Bahr-al-Jabal and the Bahr-az-Zaraf.

'There is obviously a good deal in this, but is the emphasis on the severity of the challenge, one of Toynbee's leading motifs, really valid? Assuming that the ecological reconstruction is correct, the comparison of the valley bottom in Egypt with the swamps of the Bahr-el-Ghazal leaves out of the reckoning the all-important difference in scale between a strip of marsh 10 or 15 miles wide, which can actually be overlooked from the firm ground on either side (ground which provided settlement-sites with tool- and building-stone), and on the other hand vast swamps ten times as wide and with no compensating advantages. There is an obvious difference in tractability, not to mention the point already made about the river navigation, and later the accessibility of copper and other minerals lacking in the Sudan.'²

Spate also draws a telling contrast between the geographical 'set-up' in the Nile basin on the one hand and in the Colorado and Rio Grande basins on the other, in opposition to Eduard Meyer's thesis, adopted by me, that 'the great river valleys of America . . . could just as well have become centres of the development of higher civilization as the valleys of the Nile, Euphrates, and Hwangho'.

'Hardly any of the basin of the 1750 miles long Colorado has over 20 inches of rain; contrast this with the 40-80 inches of the Blue and White Nile catchments in Abyssinia and Uganda. The topography of the Nile and the Colorado basins is different in the extreme; the Colorado is much more broken, but there is nothing like the staggered series of tributaries above Khartoum, with the Blue Nile ponding back the White and prolonging the period of high water. The vegetation cover of the more humid parts of the Nile basin, and its lakes and marshes, are far more efficient regulators of runoff than the vegetation of the Colorado. In the Nile basin rainfall is either almost non-existent or falls fairly steadily in well-defined seasons; in the Colorado as a whole there is more rain than on the lower Nile, but much of it falls in irregular violent downpours, and erosion is intense. The Rio Grande approximates more nearly to the Colorado than to the Nile, though it is not a very close approximation. Neither the Colorado (obviously) nor the

by Upper Egypt as a site for the establishment of a civilization: an abundant water supply; a navigable river with a prevailing up-stream wind; a manageably limited area of potentially cultivable land to reclaim; a rocky rim, affording sites for habitation above flood-level and stone for making tools. Of these advantages, the Jordan valley offered the last two only; the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin the first only. The lower Tigris-Euphrates basin was so distant from sources of stone and metal that the pioneers on this vast expanse of alluvium were reduced to making their tools out of ultra-hard-baked clay in an age when the older seats of culture to the north were already using metal tools (R. J. Braidwood: *The Near East and the Foundations of Civilization*, p. 33). Yet Jericho, in the Jordan valley, won the race for civilization; Sumer came in second; Egypt came in only third.

¹ In i. 311-15.

² *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 412. Cp. Toynbee and History, pp. 298 and 300-1.

Rio Grande offers anything like the potentialities for navigation which are found on the Nile, with its peculiar advantage of the Etesian winds blowing upstream; and the role of the river as a highway (which Toynbee does not so much as mention)¹ was only second to its value for irrigation in the development of Egyptian civilization.

'In both the Colorado and the Rio Grande there are doubtless some broad and general analogies to the Nile; but they are far from "offering the environmental conditions" of Egypt, and the differences are very significant from the cultural point of view. The most fundamental are that the Nile has a unique advantage in its flood-regime, and that in its Nile basin "the coarse stuff is caught in the sunken fault-block depressions into which the Upper Nile flows" (the fine and fertile basaltic silt of the Blue Nile passes on), while "the Tigris and the Colorado, fresh from the canyon, are ditch-chokers".'²

Thus Spate's pair of papers raises for me the question: Where have I gone wrong? In choosing river valleys as my field for investigation, did I make a good choice, and is the reason why the result has been unsatisfying, nevertheless, because, as Spate has shown, 'the essential step of detailed verification of hypothesis against fact has been sketchy'?³ Or has my error lain in not taking account of all the elements in this 'set-up' and of their relations with each other? Or did I make a bad choice, in the sense that I chose a 'set-up' that was highly complex, when I could have found a simpler one, in which it might have been less difficult to make sure that one had isolated all the relevant elements and had taken adequate account of all of them in their mutual relations? Did I also make a bad choice in choosing a field in which we do not know enough about the several human parties to the encounter in the several different instances to be able to tell whether or not they were truly comparable in endowment and equipment at the time when their respective encounters with a river valley took place? Or is demonstration by this comparative method inherently impossible because, when one is dealing in terms of human beings and of geography, it is never possible to be sure that, in reconstructing the parties to the encounter in a number of different cases, one has really isolated properly comparable examples on either side?

I plead guilty to the charge of not having carried out a detailed verification on the lines that Spate indicates, and also to the charge that in any given case I have taken into consideration only one or two of the factors in the physical setting, and that 'the idea of the environment as an indivisible complex of all these factors . . . hardly ever appears'.⁴ I leave it as an open question whether, if my investigation had not been inadequate, as it has been, in these two ways, my choice of river valleys for my field would have been a specially good or bad one. The fourth question is the fundamental one, and I will approach it by applying the same train of reasoning in two other fields, in order to counteract

¹ It is mentioned in vol. vii, p. 81, footnote 1.—A. J. T.

² *Toynbee and History*, pp. 299–300, quoting J. Russell Smith and M. Ogden Phillips: *North America* (New York 1942, Harcourt Brace), p. 599, footnote 16.

³ *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 410. Like a boomerang this criticism hits the critic as well as his target in their encounter over the Jordan valley.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. cit., p. 412.

the chance that the field of river valleys may have been an unusually complex one. Let us see how we fare if we apply the same method of reasoning to the opening up of the western basin of the Mediterranean in the last millennium B.C. and to the Western Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era.

In each of these two fields we have the advantage of dealing with a single 'set-up'—a geographical one in the first field and a socio-economic one in the second—which confronted all the human competitors alike and in which all of them alike were free to try their fortunes. Obviously this is, in itself, a simpler situation than that of the river valleys. In these the several competitors were confronted with different river valleys which were deemed by Eduard Meyer and by me to be uniform in all points relevant to their human occupants' encounters with them, but which, as Spate has shown, may have differed from each other in points that made all the difference to the circumstances of the encounter in each case. In the opening-up of the Western Mediterranean and in the making of the Industrial Revolution some of the human competitors were conspicuously more successful than others. If it were to be ascertained that the successful and unsuccessful competitors all had the same endowment and equipment for meeting what, in these two fields, really was an identical challenge, then it would have been demonstrated that, with uniformly identical conditions on both sides, the result of the encounter was different in different instances: in other words, that the relation between the factors in the encounter and the outcome of the encounter was not a relation of cause and effect.

In the opening up of the Western Mediterranean the Canaanite and the Hellenic competitors (leaving the enigmatic Etruscans out of account) were like each other in being people with a maritime tradition who were organized politically in city-states. Why, then, were some active, and others inactive, in the West Mediterranean maritime enterprise? The Phoenicians embarked on it, but not their neighbours the Philistines farther down the coast of Canaan, though the Philistines had been one of the 'Sea Peoples' who had made the *Völkerwanderung* in the early years of the twelfth century B.C. The Achaeans took part, but not the Eleans; the Locrians, Chalcidians, and Eretrians, but not the Boeotians; the Megarians, but not the Athenians; the Corinthians, but not the Argives; the Phocaeans, but not the Erythraeans; the Milesians, but not the Ephesians. We cannot explain why some of these communities did and others did not take part in the overseas enterprise by the hypothesis that those who abstained were relatively rich, and those who participated were relatively poor, in agricultural resources at home. This hypothesis will not fit the facts. It is true that the enterprising Phoenicians, Achaeans, Locrians, Corinthians, Phocaeans, and Milesians had comparatively small agricultural resources, and also true that the unenterprising Philistines, Boeotians, Argives, and Ephesians had comparatively large agricultural resources. But so had the enterprising Chalcidians and Eretrians (they kept on fighting each other for the rich Lelantine Plain in their homeland Euboea); and the Megarians, too, were not badly off for good agricultural land at home. On the other hand, the

Athenians, who were conspicuously unenterprising in this period of Hellenic history, though ultra-enterprising both before and after, were also conspicuously badly off, in all periods, for good agricultural land at home. In short, in the Hellenic case, at any rate, the enterprising group and the unenterprising group each included both agriculturally poor and agriculturally rich communities. Each of these groups, therefore, may be taken as being a fair sample of its society in that age. And, if this is granted, then we do seem to have, here, a case in which an identical challenge did evoke non-identical responses from different sets of recipients of the challenge who, at any rate on the average, had an identical social and cultural 'make-up'.

The same train of reasoning may be applied in the field of the modern Western Industrial Revolution. Eighteenth-century Western Europe was inhabited by a number of peoples with approximately the same endowment and the same equipment, cultural and technological. The intercourse between them at the time was active and intense, so that the achievements of any one of them could be adopted rapidly by any of the rest. Why, then, was the Industrial Revolution made in Britain, not in France, and in Belgium, not in Holland? And why was Germany, with the Ruhrgebiet and Upper Silesia in her pocket, so slow in pulling them out and turning their industrial potentialities to account? If we have made sure that the late-eighteenth-century West European peoples are truly comparable in all points that are relevant to the making of the Industrial Revolution or to the failure to make it, then we seem, here, to have another field in which uniform antecedents have been followed by diverse consequences.

But can we guarantee in this case that the endowments and equipments of the human parties were truly identical for the purpose of our particular comparison of them? I myself have cited¹ the well-known fact that 'in the eighteenth century, after the union of England and Scotland in A.D. 1707, Great Britain was the largest single free-trade area in the World', and have made, in my turn, the well-worn point that 'undoubtedly this was one of the principal reasons why Great Britain forged ahead of all her neighbours in her economic development before the eighteenth century was over'. In fact, closer inspection shows that, after all, the France of the *ancien régime* was not on a par with Great Britain in a matter that goes at least some way towards explaining why Great Britain, not France, was the European country in which the Industrial Revolution was made.

If we apply the moral of this conclusion to the geographical field of investigation, it justifies Spate's observation² that, in order to carry out my test under conditions in which its results would have validity, 'it would be essential to construct a model (in the economists' sense) in which all variables except physical setting are reduced to uniformities, and moreover the variations in the physical setting are themselves merely and strictly repetitive'. Spate and, indeed, any other critic will always be able to show that this requirement has not been met by me or, indeed, by any other inquirer.

¹ In iv. 170.

² In *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 411.

Spate has, so it seems to me, done more than show that one particular believer in the genuineness of freedom has failed to prove his case. He has shown, I should say, that this case is intrinsically unprovable, and, if he has indeed shown this, he has also shown that, for the same reason, the determinist's case, too, is intrinsically unprovable.¹

Spate's logical weapon is a penetrating and far-ranging one. It is a reminder that, when we are reasoning in terms, not of abstractions, but of phenomena, we are never in a position to guarantee that we have succeeded in insulating the relevant points, all of these, and nothing but these, and are consequently never in a position to guarantee that the entities which we are bringing into comparison are properly comparable for the purpose of our investigation. When the phenomenon with which we are concerned is an encounter, our difficulties are doubled, because here there are two sets of entities within each of which a uniformity, in all points relevant to the encounter, has to be guaranteed, as between the several examples in each set, if our reasoning is to hold good. On the one side we must be able to guarantee that the human individuals, communities, or societies that receive, and respond to, a challenge have identical endowments and equipments for dealing with the 'set-up' that offers itself as a potential environment for them. On the other side we must be able to guarantee that this 'set-up' offers itself in an identical form in each case. However far we may succeed in going in our search for sets of identical examples on either side, we shall never be

¹ In these two papers about my work Spate does not disclose where he himself stands in the controversy. He is critical of 'possibilism', which is, if I understand right, the doctrine of a school of geographers who hold that Man has a considerable latitude of choice in responding to the challenge of a geographical 'set-up'. As H. and M. Sprout put it, possibilists believe that the environment contains both opportunities and limitations—neither of them more than potential till Man takes action (op. cit., p. 40). 'Calculation of what is possible is not to be compared with prediction of what will be attempted' (ibid., p. 44). 'Possibilism does not provide any approach whatever to explanation or to prediction of motivation, choice, and decision' (ibid., p. 48). At the same time, it evidently does allow room for some measure of free play of human wills. In Spate's view 'it does not seem certain that "possibilism", as often understood (or misunderstood), is the automatic alternative to a rigorous environmentalism. There may be a middle term, which one might call "probabilism"' (*The Geographical Journal*, vol. cit., p. 419). Quoting Febvre's dictum that 'there are no necessities but everywhere possibilities', Spate comments that Febvre ought to have added: 'of which some are more possible than others' (ibid., p. 420). He finds that 'the emphasis on human initiative, though correct in itself, has sometimes been allowed to go too far in practice, and that this leads to vagueness of thinking which is as deplorable as the narrowness induced by rigorous environmentalism' (ibid., p. 420). He commits himself to concluding that 'we may find ourselves left with a considerable residue of determinism' (ibid., p. 423). The Sprouts concede (in op. cit., p. 31) that strict environmental determinism may explain some small part of human behaviour. P. Bagby (in *Culture and History*, p. 147) makes the point that the environment 'cannot be a fully determining factor, as some authors, notably Montesquieu and Buckle, have supposed. After all, Nature simply lies there passively. It is up to the human beings to decide whether, and in what way, they are going to use it.'

Spate recognizes that 'the problems of chance or free will or necessity must be faced in some fashion', because a geographer's 'attitude on this most fundamental general problem can hardly fail to have its effect upon his thinking on the more restricted question of geographical determinism versus possibilism' (ibid., p. 408). But he adds that, 'though these matters are not so irrelevant as may seem', it would be 'folly' on his part to proceed into them very far. 'It is not the function of the geographer to write philosophy' (ibid., p. 408). A philosopher might ask how, if one steered clear of philosophy, one would be able to inquire into human affairs at all, in either their geographical aspect or any other. Spate does go rather farther into the philosophical issue in a later paper with the title 'How Determined is Possibilism?' (*Geographical Studies*, vol. iv, No. 1 (1957), pp. 1-10). Here he looks for a *modus vivendi* between determinism and possibilism, inclining more towards determinism, but this not so far as to commit himself to it.

able to prove that there is not some non-identical feature that we have overlooked, and that this non-identical feature is not the decisive factor that accounts for the different outcomes in different cases of what has looked to us like an identical situation but may not have been this in truth. This point is made very clearly in the following passage of an unpublished letter written to me by Gilbert Murray on 8th April, 1932, after he had read volume i of this book in typescript.

'In all this argument to show that similar conditions do not produce similar results, I kept feeling that the reasoning did not convince because you never had *all* the conditions nor exactly similar conditions. E.g., conditions on the Jordan and the Nile may have been generally similar, but no-one would say that the human result in civilization must be exactly proportionate to the geographical data. You speak of the "total environment", but I did not feel as if I had ever been given the total environment.'

This comment anticipates Spate's, quoted above,¹ and, if I had been moved by it, as I ought to have been, to do some further thinking before publication, perhaps I might not have offered so vulnerable a target, twenty years later, for Spate's shot-gun.

Thus the believer in free will can never demonstrate, to a determinist's satisfaction, that he is presenting water-tight evidence of an identical situation having a different outcome in different cases. Conversely, the determinist can never demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the believer in free will, that an identical situation invariably has the same outcome in different cases. His non-determinist opponent can block his attempted demonstration that the same cause invariably produces the same effect by either admitting, for the sake of the argument, the sameness of the effect and challenging the determinist to guarantee the sameness of the cause in the cases that he cites, or, conversely, the believer in free will can admit the sameness of the cause and contest the sameness of the effects in the different cases cited. Whichever tactics the believer in free will adopts, the determinist will never be able to demonstrate that the same cause invariably produces the same effect—unless, of course, he takes refuge in defining the words 'cause' and 'effect' to mean phenomena that are invariably linked together.

This is another way of saying that, to demonstrate any proposition conclusively, one must transfer it from the field of phenomena to the field of mathematics. Mathematical entities are abstractions so drawn as to be self-evidently identical with or different from each other. In mathematics, therefore, it is possible to make demonstrations that an opponent will be bound to recognize as being valid. But the possibility of conclusive demonstration dwindles if we retrace our course from the world of mathematics towards the world of phenomena. In physics, perhaps, conclusive demonstration may be nearly attainable. In chemistry it will be less nearly within reach; in physiology, biology, botany, and zoology less so again; and least of all in the study of human affairs. 'One has to expect a certain degree of inconclusiveness in any exploration of complex states of human affairs.'² In this field, which is the one

¹ On p. 322.

² H. and M. Sprout in *op. cit.*, p. 83.

that has the greatest practical importance for us human beings, perhaps the nearest approach to certain knowledge that is possible for us is an interim report in terms of percentages yielded by the retrospective analysis of statistical records.

Judged by a mathematician's standards, this level of knowledge might seem so low as to make the study of human affairs a futile pursuit. Yet, in practical life, statistical knowledge enables business men to make predictions that come near enough to the mark to allow of profits being made on the strength of them.¹ And, when our study is for the sake of gaining profits that are, not monetary, but intellectual, our understanding of what lies behind and beyond the phenomena may be valuably increased by conclusions that get no farther than being probable, or even than being no more than possible, approximations to the truth. Such inexact results might move a mathematician to throw up his profession in disgust. They will move a student of human affairs to pursue his with zest. Meanwhile, the respective believers in the genuineness of freedom in human affairs and in the illusoriness of the appearance of it must be content to go on waging an indecisive warfare with each other. A decision that neither party can contest is not to be expected in this arena unless and until the progress of human understanding on some different level—perhaps the psychological—enables us to see this pair of so far unreconciled standpoints in the light of a new concept that transcends them both.

IX. THE TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES

IN an earlier chapter² I have already noticed, in passing, that the distinction between 'primitive societies' and 'civilizations', which I have drawn in the first volume of this book, is too sharp, because it is too simple. As I then saw it, human history, so far, can be analysed into a sequence of two enterprises—the first already achieved, the second now in course of being attempted, with no certainty that it, in turn, is going to succeed. On this view the already accomplished enterprise is the transformation of Sub-Man into Man; the enterprise on which Man is now engaged is the raising of human life from its primitive level to a higher one which is the goal of the endeavour that we call 'civilization'.³ The nature of this goal, and the kind of change in human life, as hitherto experienced, that is practicable and desirable, are reconsidered in Chapter XIX of this volume. In the present chapter I want to reconsider my previous, too simple, account of the circumstances in which civilization first got on the move.

¹ See ix. 220-3.

² On pp. 150-3.

³ See i. 191-6. This classification of human societies into two classes only—'primitive societies' and 'civilizations'—is justly criticized by Chr. Dawson in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 137-9. O. Höfer criticizes me, also justly, in an unpublished paper for my failure to appreciate sufficiently the importance of the Neolithic revolution. See also eundem: 'Buchführung und Bilanz der Weltgeschichte: zu A. Toynbees Deutung des Frühzeitlichen Menschengeschens', in *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Jahrgang 2, Heft 3 (1949/50), pp. 247-59.

I saw the rise of civilization as a consequence of one of the responses made by Upper Palaeolithic Man, in the region that is now the arid zone of the Old World in the northern hemisphere, to the challenge presented to him there by the recession of the latest in a succession of glacial-pluvial ages.¹ The changes in the flora and fauna of the north-western quarter of the Old World that followed in the train of this change of climate did indeed threaten the human inhabitants of this quarter with starvation and extinction through the loss of their previous means of livelihood. The geographical range of the challenge was even wider than I had originally realized. The recession of the ice not only turned what had been the savannahs of North Africa and South-West and Central Asia into steppes and deserts; it turned what had been the tundras of Northern Europe, at the foot of the ice-cap, into forests; and both these changes killed out or drove out the game that had provided food for the Upper Palaeolithic inhabitants of these two regions. In Northern Europe that once mighty hunter, Magdalenian Man, apparently failed to survive the disappearance of his big game. During the latest glaciation the game had been so abundant, and his skill in dispatching it so great, that he had acquired a surplus of food and energy which gave him the opportunity to leave behind him a memorial in the shape of his wonderful paintings on the walls of caves. But the high degree of specialization that had rewarded him with a temporary prosperity was his undoing when his environment played him false. He did not succeed in adapting himself, and consequently died out, or at any rate dwindled to a remnant living on in misery.² Magdalenian Man's humbler contemporaries to the south and south-east partly died out and partly decamped still farther southwards, in step with the southward drift of the savannahs at the expense of the tropical forest. But some of them stood their ground and made history.³

In giving this account of the response made by the Upper Palaeolithic inhabitants of the former savannahs to the challenge of desiccation, and in suggesting that civilization had been an outcome of this response, I was not wrong.⁴ But I did go wrong in carrying history from the Upper Palaeolithic hunter's way of life to civilization at one bound. Actually, this immense revolution was achieved, not at one bound, but in two great steps. In my previous account of the transition from the higher hunting and food-gathering culture to civilization, I telescoped two stages into one. Palaeolithic hunters and food-gatherers did not, as I

¹ i. 302-21.

² See V. G. Childe: *Man Makes Himself*, p. 73; *What Happened in History*, pp. 41-43. On the Great Plains of North America a change of climate seems likewise to have been followed by the extinction of the big game that had been hunted by Early Lithic (corresponding to Old-World Palaeolithic) Man. Here, however, the hunting economy (now based on the bison) continued until the pre-Columbian population was supplanted by settlers of European origin in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era (G. R. Willey and P. Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), pp. 86-88 and 107).

³ In the Americas, too, there were people who made history by advancing from hunting through mainly depending on food-gathering to partly depending on agriculture; and here, similarly, these people seem to have been relatively backward representatives of the Archaic (i.e. Postlithic and Preformative) stage of culture (Willey and Phillips, *op. cit.* (1958), pp. 107, 127-8, 145, and 201).

⁴ See V. G. Childe: *Man Makes Himself*, p. 86; H. Frankfort: *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 33-34.

had pictured them,¹ plunge straight into the jungle-swamps of the lower Nile valley and the lower basin of the Tigris and Euphrates and convert these into fertile fields by hydraulic engineering on the grand scale. The challenge presented by the jungle-swamp to a pre-agricultural society would have been altogether too severe to allow of these potential granaries being used as experimental stations for the discovery of the art of agriculture.² The stations in which the hunters pioneered in this new act were not the formidable jungle-choked river valleys; they were other green patches, of more tractable kinds, that also held out against the onset of desiccation: for instance, oases watered by springs, and the flood-plains of fertile soil deposited by lesser streams at the foot of their parent mountains before they ran out into the spreading sands.

Famous examples of these two types of geographical 'set-ups' that could be, and were, converted into nursery gardens are the oasis of Jericho and the ghutah of Damascus watered by the rivers Abarna (Barada) and Pharpar (Nahr al-Awaj). Early cultivators did also settle in, or on the brows of, the side valleys, not only of the Jordan valley, but of the lowest section of the Nile valley that later generations eventually transformed into Upper Egypt. But the oases and flood-plains in which agriculture was invented seem to have been those on the outer rim of 'the Fertile Crescent' of South-West Asia and farther east in what are now Iran and Türkmenistan (Transcaspi). This region, unlike both the heart of 'the Fertile Crescent' and the valley of Upper Egypt, was a rainfall zone. It is so still.³ But Iran was better watered in the Post-glacial Age than it is today, and its flood-plains and oases are thought to have been the training ground of the agriculturists who eventually reclaimed the lower basin of the Tigris and Euphrates⁴—a larger and proportionately more difficult task than the later reclamation of the Nile swamps in the narrow valley of Upper Egypt.⁵ As for the provenance

¹ In i. 305-6.

² For the understanding of the genesis of civilization in the Near East, nothing is more important than a knowledge of the vigorous and progressive Neolithic cultures of the fifth and fourth millennia B.C. However great the credit due to the Sumerians for their response to the challenge of the untamed Mesopotamian landscape, it would have been impossible without the prior achievements of what Gordon Childe has called "the Neolithic Revolution". In this connexion it is significant that there is no case on record of what we may perhaps call truly primitive societies, that is pure "food-gatherers", being successfully brought within the orbit of a civilization, whereas so-called primitive peoples who have passed through the agricultural revolution often have so been, even if often as hewers of wood and drawers of water under civilized oppression. Food-gatherers find the strain of such forcible integration into an alien society too great, and die out, like the West Indian islanders and most of the North American Indians, while African slaves are successfully—from the invaders' point of view—introduced to replace them. The Maori have been integrated into a civilized society, but not the Australian Blacks, while the Tasmanians have been totally destroyed. The Bantu multiply throughout South Africa; the Bushmen survive precariously in the Kalahari' (A. R. Burn in *History*, February–October, 1956, pp. 7-8).

³ R. J. Braidwood: *The Near East and the Foundations of Civilization*, p. 11. See also *ibid.*, p. 12, the instructive map: 'Fig. 4: Physiographical and rainfall map of Nuclear Western Asia, with the major sites of occurrence of terminal food-gathering and of earliest food-producing (pre-Late Hassuna phase) antiquity.'

⁴ See H. Frankfort: *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 44.

⁵ See W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 146. Frankfort notes, in *op. cit.*, p. 45, that the reclamation of what became the land of Sumer was comparable, in scale and in difficulty, to the reclamation, not of Upper Egypt, but of the Nile Delta. On the evidence of landscapes portrayed on reliefs in Egyptian tombs dating

of the people who eventually did for Upper Egypt what had, by then, already been done for Sumer, they seem not to have been descended—anyway, not directly—from previous occupants of the bluffs, overhanging the Nile valley in Upper Egypt, where we find these earliest local agriculturists first installed. Though the Lower Palaeolithic culture is well represented by remains found on these bluffs, the Upper Palaeolithic and Mesolithic cultures are not, so that there is a signal break of continuity between the latest Palaeolithic remains here and the earliest of those left by an agricultural population.¹

'The early stages of the culture which develops into the civilization of dynastic Egypt is [*sic*] . . . not in the line of evolution of the Mesolithic or Upper Palaeolithic of the Nile valley, but is fundamentally different from it, as well as from the Capsian of North Africa and the Natufian of Palestine.'²

The earliest local pre-dynastic cultures are post-Sebilian³—i.e. they date from an age in which the physiography, though not yet the flora and fauna, of Upper Egypt was already approximately what it has been during the present Age of Civilization.

'This . . . does away with the story of hordes roaming through North Africa and eventually settling in the Nile valley because desiccation had made life impossible there.'⁴

The predynastic agricultural age on the fringes of what was to become Egypt began only a few centuries before 4000 B.C., and it began in a period, not of increasing aridity, but of increasing humidity,⁵ which made the bluffs above the Nile valley cultivable while making the jungle-choked valley bottom more forbidding, for the time, than ever. 'Not before Nakāda II [*alias* Gerzean] did the first settlers venture down into the valley itself.'⁶ All the same, the revolutionary progress of archaeological discovery in, and on the fringe of, Egypt has not done away with the story of hordes roaming through North Africa and South-West and Central Asia which eventually settled somewhere and responded to the challenge of desiccation by making the economic transition from food-gathering to agriculture and from hunting to the domestication of animals. Though the scene of this revolution in human history proves not to have been the north-east corner of Africa, the revolution did take place; and it happened in Asia, as is indicated by the amazing discoveries at Jericho, as well as by the now apparently proven priority of Sumer over Egypt as the seat of an irrigational civilization on the grand scale. Baumgartel points out⁷ that the Badarians, who were the earliest of the

from the Age of the Old Kingdom, E. J. Baumgartel holds, in *The Cultures of Prehistoric Egypt*, p. 3, that the Delta was then still largely unreclaimed.

¹ Baumgartel, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* In the course of the present Post-glacial or Inter-glacial Age up to date, there have been a number of minor oscillations of climate which are perhaps of the same nature, though not on the same scale, as the previous series of glacial-pluvial peaks and troughs. There seems to have been 'some increase in moisture at the end of the Pleistocene' (Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 11).

⁶ Baumgartel, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Cp. p. 28.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

pre-dynastic agricultural societies on the fringe of Upper Egypt, possessed domesticated cattle, sheep, and goats; that sheep and goats are not indigenous in Africa;¹ and that the pre-dynastic Egyptians' sheep seem to have been of South-West Asian breeds. My error in volume I lay in presenting the transition from the Upper Palaeolithic culture to river-valley irrigational civilization as having taken place at one bound, and in taking the eventual reclamation of Egypt as my principal illustration for my thesis. What Egypt does illustrate is the transition to river-valley irrigational civilization from a culture, of apparently Asian origin, based economically on the cultivation of small flood-plains and oases.

The type or phase of culture that was transitional between the Upper Palaeolithic and the civilizations of the first generation which arose in the Lower Tigris-Euphrates valley and the lower Nile valley *circa* 3000 B.C. is commonly known as Neolithic, in allusion to its characteristic tool, the ground-stone axe, which was much more potent than even the finest of Upper Palaeolithic Man's chipped or flaked flints. The practice of labelling phases of culture by technological inventions that are characteristic, or at least symbolic, of their specific genius has the advantage of being applicable to all manifestations of human culture at all times and places. Technology is perhaps the one product of human activity in which there has been continuous progress,² and it has also been a province in which the network of human relations has always embraced the whole human race; for, though every technological invention must have been made at some particular place at some particular moment, a type of tool or a process of work, once invented, has been apt to spread, in course of time, to the ends of the Earth, so that, by the present day, most societies in the World, however isolated or backward, have progressed technologically and economically at least as far as the pre-civilizational agricultural phase, though they may have entered it as much as ten or twelve thousand years later than the pioneer inventors of it. The ground-stone axe was, indeed, a key tool of the Neolithic culture, since it enabled its possessors to master the trees that were invading post-glacial Northern Europe and were only slowly receding from post-glacial Afrasia.³ But it is not a quite accurate hall-mark of the Neolithic culture. For instance, it was not possessed by the Palestinian Natūfians, who were early semi-agriculturists, while, on the other hand, it had been acquired by the North Europeans in advance of their acquisition of the art of agriculture.⁴ Moreover, the purpose of cutting down the scrub in an Afrasian oasis, or the trees in a northern forest, was not just to use the timber for making tools or utensils; it was to clear the ground for cultivation.

'The outstanding new feature of the Neolithic Age is agriculture',⁵ and it is still the key activity of this culture in the places where it survives. The earliest known Neolithic societies in South-West Asia

¹ Cp. V. G. Childe: *Man Makes Himself*, p. 86.

² See, for instance, A. L. Kroeber: *Style and Civilizations*, pp. 62-64.

³ Childe: *Man Makes Himself*, p. 99; *What Happened in History*, p. 44.

⁴ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 100; *What Happened in History*, p. 50.

⁵ H. Frankfort: *The Rise of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 35.

and in the countries round the Mediterranean Sea possessed domestic animals besides cultivating domestic plants.¹ But elsewhere there are, even today, some Neolithic agricultural societies without domestic animals;² and it is easier to imagine how, in an age of increasing desiccation, wild animals could have been domesticated by human beings who were already cultivators of crops than it is to see how this marvellous feat could have been achieved by people who were still hunters.³ As for the two arts of pottery and spinning and weaving, which are characteristic of the full-blown Neolithic culture in the New World⁴ as well as in the Old World, neither of them is coeval with agriculture. There is a pre-pottery agricultural stage at Jericho, for instance, and likewise in Peru as Huaca Prieta, at the mouth of the Chicama valley.⁵ Agriculture and, to an almost equal degree, the keeping of domestic animals, which was the normal concomitant of agriculture in the region where the agriculture of the Old World originated, are the essence of the Neolithic culture and are its greatest enduring legacy to cultures of subsequent phases that are 'higher' in the sense of having been built up on Neolithic foundations, whether or not they are higher in terms of spiritual achievement and value.

By achieving the agricultural-pastoral revolution,⁶ human beings made themselves into active partners of Nature instead of continuing to be parasites on her like their human predecessors and like all other kinds of living creatures except some of the social insects.⁷ Both vegetable and animal husbandry are fruits of foresight, forethought, perseverance, and self-control, and require an unfailing practice of these virtues to keep them going.⁸ Husbandmen have to take thought, not only for the morrow, but for next year; and, however hungry they may be, they must not eat the seed-corn or slaughter the cows, ewes, and she-goats that yield them milk, besides replenishing their herds and flocks. The reward of husbandry is the production of a food supply that can maintain a denser population in greater security than hunting and food-gathering can. But to describe this revolution solely in technological and economic terms would be to give an inadequate account of it. In an earlier chapter we have noted⁹ that, before the epiphany of higher religion led to the extrication of the religious from the secular side of life, all social and cultural activities were religious activities as well. Husbandry, both vegetable and animal, certainly had a religious, as well

¹ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 85; *What Happened in History*, p. 49.

² *Man Makes Himself*, p. 75.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁴ The Formative stage of culture in the Americas, as defined by Willey and Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), seems to correspond approximately (at any rate in its earlier phases) to the stage labelled 'Neolithic' by students of Old-World history. According to Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 3, Middle American Later Formative (beginning *circa* 500 B.C.) corresponds to the Protoliterate stage of culture in the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin (beginning *circa* 3500 B.C.).

⁵ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 31.

⁶ R. Redfield prefers to use the word 'transformation'. He points out that the word 'revolution' has associations, in present-day minds, with famous and controversial events in Western history—e.g. 'the Industrial Revolution'. The use of the word 'revolution' is therefore likely to import something alien and irrelevant into our picture of the changes brought about by the invention of agriculture (*The Primitive World and its Transformations*, pp. ix-x).

⁷ *What Happened in History*, p. 48.

⁸ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 93.

⁹ *On pp. 78-79.*

as an economic, aspect to begin with; and the agricultural-pastoral revolution might never have been achieved if it had not been a religious revolution in one of its aspects.

"The period when the food-producing economy became established was one of climatic crises adversely affecting precisely that zone of arid sub-tropical countries where the earliest farmers appear and where the wild ancestors of cultivated cereals and domestic animals actually lived."

These farmers were not descended from the magnificent Magdalenian hunters who had flourished at the foot of the ice-cap, but from the less successful, because less specialized, Upper Palaeolithic hunters on the Afrasian savannahs.² 'Nowhere has a series of continuous remains covering the transition been recognised.'³ The Natufian Palestinians used sickles set with flint teeth, but this proves merely that they reaped, not that they sowed. They may have been reapers of grass that grew wild,⁴ and, whether or not they were still food-gatherers, they were certainly still hunters,⁵ and their cereals, even if cultivated, may have been no more than a supplementary and subsidiary part of their food supply. Food-gatherers may not only reap; they may also practise artificial irrigation. Frankfort⁶ cites a case of this from the Great Basin of Western North America. Conversely, cultivators of crops may take advantage of the natural irrigation of the flood-plains of small streams—a source of water-supply that confers the additional benefit of renewing the fertility of the soil. At Tepe Sialk—a tiny oasis, watered by a spring, on the western edge of the Central Desert of Iran, near Kashan—hunting continued to be an important economic activity when the local people were already cultivating the soil by irrigation, maintaining domestic animals, and practising the arts of spinning and weaving and pottery.⁷ In the Fayyum and at Merimde, on the western brow of the Nile Delta, the earliest state of affairs in the Neolithic Age seems to have been like that at Tepe Sialk; agriculture, there too, was still subsidiary.⁸ Yet, once introduced, it everywhere grew steadily in relative importance,⁹ and this without depending on irrigation.

Though artificial irrigation was the key to the eventual reclamation and cultivation of the great river valleys and basins of Afrasia, it seems likely that the Neolithic inventors of farming in Afrasia depended on a natural supply of water from floods or springs or rains or combinations

¹ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 86.

² *What Happened in History*, p. 48.

³ Frankfort, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–35.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵ *What Happened in History*, p. 48.

⁶ *In op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁷ *What Happened in History*, p. 52.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁹ In the Americas, too, there is archaeological evidence for a stage in which agriculture was known and practised without yet having become the staple means of subsistence. Willey and Phillips report (*Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), p. 145) that, on second thoughts, 'we found that agriculture *per se* was not the explosive stimulus to cultural development that we had supposed it to be. The early evidences of plant domestication seem to be associated with cultures that we should be inclined to think of as "lower" Archaic if we had such a division.' They note (*ibid.*, p. 135) that these cultures were equalled or surpassed in well-being and in stability by others that still depended wholly on hunting, fishing, or food-gathering. At the same time they also note that no wholly non-agricultural American culture proved capable of advancing to the Classic stage of civilization (*ibid.*, pp. 144–5 and 203).

of these different natural sources.¹ Certainly the Neolithic agriculture that was propagated, from its original seed-bed in the Afrasian oases, to Europe and North-West Africa in one direction and to North-West China in another did depend on rainfall and therefore had to be constantly moving on from old fields to new fields.² It went on moving, and therefore also spreading, till its practitioners discovered how to restore the fertility of the soil by manuring it with cattle dung and by letting it lie fallow for alternating periods. This was a more efficient alternative to the primitive practice of fertilizing a patch of cleared woodland with the ash obtained by burning the felled trees, and then leaving that season's field untouched till it had become covered by a second growth that could be felled and burnt in its turn.³ Yet even this 'slash-and-burn', 'reap-and-run' kind of agriculture was effective enough to become a staple source of food-supply. The Danubian Neolithic pioneers of agriculture in Europe in the fourth and third millennia B.C., who discovered and exploited the patches of loess soil among the European forests, already depended on agriculture exclusively.⁴

How early in the present Post-glacial or Inter-glacial Age was agriculture started? The length of our vista of agriculture's past history has been doubled by the discoveries at Jericho since the end of the Second World War. Before that, other South-West Asian Neolithic sites seemed ancient. At Tepe Sialk seventeen layers of deposit, to a total height of ninety-one feet, had been laid down by 3000 B.C.⁵ At Tepe Gawra, near Mosul, the pre-civilizational deposit was 104 feet thick in twenty-six layers.⁶ At Ras ash-Shamrah it was forty feet thick.⁷ K. Kenyon,⁸ on the strength of carbon-14 tests, dates the pre-pottery stage at Jarmo, in North-Eastern Iraq, *circa* 4750 B.C.⁹ Braidwood, publishing in 1952 before Miss Kenyon's excavations at Jericho, considered Jarmo to be the earliest of the fully Neolithic village sites.¹⁰ He distinguishes five groups of these: Tepe Sialk in North Central Iran; Hassuna in Northern Iraq; 'Amuq, Saqja Gözü and Mersina in Northern Syria and Cilicia; Jericho XVII-IX; Fayyum A and Merimde.¹¹ He dates Hassuna *circa* 4400 B.C.;¹² Fayyum A 4145 B.C. \pm 250 years (by a carbon-14 test);¹³ and the pre-Neolithic Natufian stage of culture in Palestine *circa* 6000 B.C.¹⁴ Frankfort¹⁵ dates Tepe Sialk and also Hassuna in Northern Iraq as early as *circa* 5000 B.C., and the Palestinian Natufians about a thousand years earlier than that (thus agreeing, as regards the date of the Natufian culture, with Braidwood). But these and all other Neolithic and immediately pre-Neolithic sites so far discovered and explored are of relatively recent origin compared with Jericho.

¹ See Frankfort, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

² See *Man Makes Himself*, p. 96.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 80-84 and 96.

⁴ *What Happened in History*, p. 54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 51 and 52.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁷ *Digging up Jericho*, pp. 52 and 90.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

⁹ According to Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 31, the earliest carbon-14 dates from Jarmo are 4758 B.C. \pm 300 years (obtained from shell); 4743 \pm 360 and 4654 \pm 340 years (obtained from charcoal).

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁵ *In op. cit.*, p. 35.

The third level at Jericho corresponds to the first level at most other Afrasian sites,¹ and the first level at Jericho is 3,000 years older.² The end of the pre-pottery age at Jericho is dated *circa* 5000 B.C.³ The aggregate height of the layers deposited on the *tell* by this date is already forty-five feet,⁴ and it may prove not to have been the first stage.⁵ The origins of Jericho must be not much later than the end of the Pleistocene (that is, the end of the Palaeolithic) Age, *circa* 10000 B.C.⁶ The pre-pottery Neolithic settlement at Jericho may have been larger than the subsequent Bronze-Age town.⁷ Its area was at least eight acres, and, on the basis of present-day local density of urban settlement, this area would imply a population of about three thousand.⁸ This settlement had a massive defensive wall of large undressed stones.⁹ A still earlier, and also still finer, wall was found below the one first discovered.¹⁰ A ditch, nine metres wide and three deep, has been cut out of the solid rock.¹¹ There is a tower, nine metres in diameter, with a staircase inside.¹² This tower has two outer skins, and there is a still earlier wall in its core.¹³ The system of defences of which the tower is part belongs to the earliest phase so far discovered.¹⁴

When one stands on the brow of Miss Kenyon's great trench, as I did on 24th July, 1957, and gazes at that magnificently built tower at the bottom, one has the extraordinary sensation of reading the history of civilization, at one glance, back to a date which may be as far removed from the date of the beginning of civilization elsewhere *circa* 3000 B.C. as the year 3000 B.C. is from our own day. Who can deny that there was such a thing as civilization at Jericho at the time when the tower was built, if I have been right in defining civilization as a state of society in which there is a minority that is free from the task of keeping life going from day to day, and that therefore has leisure to think and plan and direct the work of the community as a whole?¹⁵ Without the presence and activity of such a minority, the execution of those arduous and skilful public works is inconceivable. Therefore something that we are bound to call civilization existed about twice as long ago at Jericho as anywhere else that we know of. Yet Miss Kenyon holds¹⁶ that 'Jericho cannot have been unique'. And indeed the sequel, at Jericho itself, to the pre-pottery stage shows that there must have been at least one contemporary civilization that was not only independent but was, in at least one technological respect, farther advanced. The earliest users of pottery at Jericho came from outside, ousted the pre-pottery population, and brought in the art of pottery with them ready-made.¹⁷ There was a complete break in the history of Jericho at this stage.¹⁸ Pre-pottery urban Jericho has no heirs. It was the later and cruder Neolithic cultures of Afrasia that developed, without a break, into the historic civilizations that arose in the great Afrasian river valleys *circa* 3000 B.C.¹⁹

The Afrasian inventors of agriculture turned their energies to two

¹ Kenyon, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 79, 81, 82-83.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁵ See p. 278.

different purposes, with two different consequences. Some of them, as we have seen, moved out as pioneers and won new lands for agriculture without being stimulated to improve upon the Neolithic cultivators' basic technological equipment: the ground-stone axe, the flint-toothed sickle,¹ domestic animals, the arts of spinning and weaving and pottery, and the primitive agricultural technique of 'slash-and-burn', which compelled people who depended on it for their livelihood to be continually moving on. With this equipment the great continental hinterlands of the Afrasian 'Nuclear Old World' were won for agriculture as far afield as North-West Africa and Europe and North-West China² in the course of the fourth and third millennia B.C.³ Other Afrasian agriculturists were content to stay at home, and therefore could not remain content to make no improvements on their primitive equipment. In the Afrasian oases the fourth millennium B.C. was rich in inventions:⁴ the working of copper, the making of bronze, the inventions of animal traction, and of wheels, bricks, and seals.⁵ Copper was already known to the Badarians, who were the earliest agriculturists in Upper Egypt;⁶ and E. J. Baumgartel goes so far as to say that 'we do not know of any period in pre-dynastic Egypt (apart from Palaeolithic times) when metal was certainly absent'.⁷ Inventiveness was stimulated by intercourse between local cultures with different ways of doing things, and here desiccation proved a help to Afrasian man, besides being a challenge to him. 'Only in the arid zone round the Mediterranean and east thereof was intercourse at all rapid and extensive'.⁸ Even so, the wheel, which

¹ This Natufian tool turns up in pre-pottery Jericho (K. Kenyon: *Digging up Jericho*, pp. 56-57). It is also found at Tepe Sialk and at Hassuna; and the flint teeth, though not complete blades, have been found in Southern Russia and the Danube basin, in Anatolia, in North-West Africa, and at Almeria on the south-east coast of Spain (H. Frankfort: *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 35-36).

² It is easy to see how agriculturists from the oases of Iran and Transcaspiia could have drifted north-eastwards across Asia to North-Western China—especially in an age before the rise of the pastoral Nomads had begun to make the steppes dangerous for anyone else. But by what route did other agriculturists spread from Afasia into Europe? Anatolia is the obvious bridge, and the Dardanelles and Bosphorus have never been serious obstacles to migration. But according to Seton Lloyd, *Early Anatolia*, p. 53, Anatolia was uninhabited at the time of the Neolithic Revolution in the adjoining 'Fertile Crescent'; it remained a *terra incognita* until almost the end of the Chalcolithic Age in 'the Fertile Crescent' (p. 58; cp. p. 74); there was an unsurmounted barrier along the 2,000-feet contour-line along the southern slopes of the Taurus (p. 59); the earliest Chalcolithic culture in Anatolia, at the close of 'the Fertile Crescent's' Chalcolithic Age, is uniform all over the peninsula, including the west coast (pp. 60-61); and Lloyd suggests that Anatolia may have been first populated, not from 'the Fertile Crescent', but from the Danube basin (p. 61). This indicates that the Danubian pioneers of agriculture in Europe must have come from Afasia by a route running north of the Black Sea; and indeed the Kuban valley is known to have been a relatively early seat of an agricultural culture. The route by which agriculture reached North-West Africa and, from there, the Atlantic coast of Europe is an even greater puzzle, if E. J. Baumgartel is right in her contention that the Nile Delta remained an unreclaimed swamp until the Age of the Old Kingdom. This would rule out a route from or via Palestine along the north coast of Africa. In, say, the fourth millennium B.C., was what is now the Libyan Desert still hospitable enough to allow primitive cultivators to snatch a living from it while drifting across it from Upper Egypt or Nubia towards the Atlas?

³ *What Happened in History*, p. 57; *Man Makes Himself*, p. 96. See also Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 22, 'Fig. 11: the spread of the food-producing economy out of the Nuclear Near East, from an assumed beginning at circa 6000 B.C., suggested by means of isochronous lines.'

⁴ *What Happened in History*, p. 69.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75. Cp. *Man Makes Himself*, pp. 118 and 257.

⁶ E. J. Baumgartel: *The Cultures of Prehistoric Egypt*, p. 22.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁸ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 98.

had been invented in Sumer about 3500 B.C., and had been applied there to traction as well as to pottery-making, was not applied to traction in Egypt till about 1650 B.C.¹

Primitive agriculture had produced no surplus of food and therefore no reserves for maintaining specialists.² The only division of labour had been between men and women, and each local community had been self-sufficient.³ The new arts that arose in the Afrasian oases during the fourth millennium B.C. required male specialists,⁴ and this indicates that a certain surplus must by then have been accruing.⁵ Metallurgy is a full-time occupation;⁶ 'metallurgical lore is the first approximation to international science';⁷ and metallurgy destroys Neolithic self-sufficiency⁸—requiring, as it does, not only smiths, but miners, smelters, and carriers. 'Potters who use the wheel are normally male specialists.'⁹ 'By relieving women of a lot of heavy but essential tasks in the way of hoeing, carrying burdens, and making pots', these new male avocations—metallurgy, casting, ploughing, and making pottery on the wheel—'cut away the economic foundations of mother-right'.¹⁰ The fourth-millennium masculine inventions—metallurgy, the wheel, the ox-cart, the pack-ass, the sailing-ship—provided the technological foundations for a new economic organization which could undertake a task that Afrasian man had not yet attempted: the reclamation, for agriculture, of the jungle-swamps in the great Afrasian river basins and valleys.¹¹ The Afrasian oasis-cultivator had already mastered the art of water-control on the small scale.¹² 'The economic organisation and social framework were alone deficient',¹³ but they were indispensable, since without them there could be no public works,¹⁴ and without these the fourth-millennium technological inventions would not have enabled Afrasian man to achieve his great new enterprise.

No doubt every technological revolution is also a social one in the sense that technological changes are both consequences and causes of social changes. R. J. Braidwood points out¹⁵ that the nature of the surviving evidence for pre-civilizational culture yields a picture in which technology looms too large. But, in contrast to the Neolithic revolution, which had been a technological one first and foremost, the civilizational revolution was a social and cultural one in its essence. The technological stages of history—food-gathering, food-production, industrialism—do

¹ Ibid., p. 140. It was used in Egypt for pottery-making from the time of the Third Dynasty onwards (*What Happened in History*, p. 86).

² *What Happened in History*, p. 68.

³ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 94.

⁴ Even in the technologically simpler Andean World, the transition from the Formative to the Classic stage of culture was accompanied, in the Moché valley, by a specialization of professions and classes (Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 6; Bennett in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 6).

⁵ An increase in the amount and variety of food is also attested directly by an increase in average human stature between the Mesolithic and the Chalcolithic Age (W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 145).

⁶ *What Happened in History*, p. 77.

⁷ Ibid., p. 79.

⁸ Ibid., p. 85.

⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 86.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 89.

¹² 'Chalcolithic culture may . . . be justly called "irrigation culture"' (W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 144. Cp. p. 137).

¹³ *What Happened in History*, p. 75.

¹⁴ Braidwood, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁵ In op. cit., p. 8.

not correspond to its cultural stages.¹ The Neolithic technological revolution, in which food-production supplanted food-gathering, was a technological change of the same order of magnitude and momentousness as the modern Western Industrial Revolution in which muscle-power was replaced by harnessed inanimate power as Man's material means of manufacture and locomotion.² There was no comparable technological change during the intervening age. 'The technological and economic differences between civilization and the pre-civilizational phases of food-production were differences of degree.'³ On the other hand, this intervening age saw, in the emergence first of civilization and then of higher religion, the two greatest single cultural changes in human history so far. The civilizational stage of culture could not have been achieved if it had not been preceded by the invention of food-production and the other concomitant and subsequent technological advances that have been noticed just above. But the emergence of civilization was, in itself, an event on a non-technological plane. It was brought about by developments on the spiritual plane.⁴ So far from being caused, or accompanied, by any fresh technological advance, it was soon followed by an arrest of the movement of technological advance that had been set going in the Neolithic technological revolution.⁵ Conversely, the Neolithic technological revolution had cost a spiritual price. It had been accompanied by an arrest of the movement of spiritual advance that had been set going in the technologically more backward Upper Palaeolithic Age. 'The hunter's wide-ranging life had freed Man's spirit; agriculture made it a prisoner of the clod.'⁶

'All through the Near East the best sites were reclaimed with toil.'⁷ The undertaking required the production, collection, and storing of a large food-surplus to feed a great labour-force diverted from food-production to large-scale public works bringing in no immediate return in the form of foodstuffs. This labour-force had to be raised, controlled, and directed. Neither task would have been possible without a governing minority possessed of both immense ability and immense authority;⁸ for the task was heart-breaking as well as back-breaking, and the scale of it was so vast that the ordinary labourer can hardly have foreseen in imagination the fruits of his efforts.⁹ He must have worked in faith or under coercion or, more probably, have been driven by both these forces simultaneously. It is significant that, in both Sumer and Egypt at the dawn of history, the reclaimed land is the property of a god,¹⁰ and

¹ Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

² F. Borkenau in *Merkur*, 3. Jahrgang, 7. Heft (July, 1949), p. 629.

³ Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁴ Braidwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6 and 42.

⁵ Borkenau, *op. cit.*, p. 631. It is noteworthy that, in Peru likewise, technological progress was characteristic of the Formative Age (Bennett in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 6), and that the subsequent Classic Age 'was an era of realisation in terms of techniques already known' (R. G. Willey, *op. cit.*, p. 12).

⁶ Borkenau, *op. cit.*, p. 630.

⁷ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 122.

⁸ In the Andean World likewise, the transition from the Formative Age to the Classic Age, in which the valley bottoms in coastal Peru were mastered and irrigated, was accompanied by a shift of interest from technology to the social and political enterprise of manipulating manpower (Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, pp. 181-2; Bennett in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 6).

⁹ See *Man Makes Himself*, pp. 120-2.

¹⁰ In Egypt the whole land was owned by a single god incarnate, Pharaoh. In Sumer

that this god is represented by effective economic and political institutions managed by a ruling minority.

'Conditions of life in a river valley or other oasis place in the hands of society an exceptional power for coercing its members; the community can refuse a recalcitrant access to water and can close the channels that irrigate his fields. . . . The social solidarity needed by irrigators can thus be imposed owing to the very circumstances that demand it.'¹

It was this disciplined corporate effort, with a religious faith as its inspiration and with the necessary political authority and technological equipment at its command, that reclaimed the Afrasian river basins and valleys for agriculture. 'Unless a markedly different rainfall and weather pattern could be postulated for four or five thousand B.C., which we doubt, extensive life in alluvial Mesopotamia would have been literally impossible without irrigation.'² 'The alluvial valleys of the great rivers offered a more exacting environment, but also greater material rewards for its exploitation. In them, Copper-Age villages turned into Bronze-Age cities.'³ 'The food-producing revolution was perhaps the turning-point in the human career, but it was through the urban revolution that the consequences of the turn were realised.'⁴ The biggest and most difficult of the primary feats of civilization—the creation of the land of Sumer out of the marshes of the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin—was also the earliest. Sumer was about the size of Denmark, and by about 2500 B.C. the yield from the crops grown on these ex-marshes was eighty-six-fold.⁵ The limited enterprise of creating Upper Egypt out of the Lower Nile valley seems to have been achieved later—possibly to some extent under the stimulus of what the Sumerians had already accomplished.⁶ The reclamation of the Nile Delta—a task on the scale of the creation of Sumer—may have been completed only in the Age of the Egyptian Old Kingdom. If so, it will have been little earlier than the reclamation of the Indus valley.⁷ The reclamation of the marshlands in the basins of the East Asian rivers seems to have come decidedly later.⁸

Thus the reclamation of the river valleys of Afrasia for agriculture was in truth a response to the challenge of the progressive desiccation of Afrasia in the present Post-glacial or Inter-glacial Age. The cultivation of the minor oases, which had been the first response to this challenge, had turned out not to be enough in itself to make Afrasia permanently habitable by Man under post-pluvial conditions. In the end he was confronted with a choice between emigrating, as was done by the pioneers who carried agriculture from Afrasia to the ends of the Old World, and reclaiming the Afrasian swamps, as was done eventually

it was parcelled out among the territories of a number of independent city-states, and each of these city-state territories contained the estates of several gods. These Sumerian gods were not incarnate.

¹ *Man Makes Himself*, p. 123.
² Braidwood, *op. cit.*, p. 37. Cp. p. 39 and also p. 35: 'Fig. 25: Physiographical and rainfall map of Nuclear Western Asia, with major sites of occurrence of Ubaid phase antiquities or of materials judged to be contemporary with the Ubaid phase.' This was the phase in which the alluvium of the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin was occupied by Man (*ibid.*, p. 36).
³ *What Happened in History*, p. 59.

⁴ R. Redfield: *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, p. 6.

⁵ *What Happened in History*, pp. 89-90.

⁷ See p. 348.

⁶ See pp. 345-8.

⁸ See pp. 348-54.

by the makers of the earliest Old-World civilizations. The reclamation of the swamps was a permanent solution, because the new fields thus brought under cultivation were irrigated perennially by rivers whose sources rose outside the arid zone, and whose waters continually refertilized the soil with silt drawn by erosion from a virtually inexhaustible supply. In the reclaimed river valleys Man could be sure of making a livelihood so long as he continued to do organized and disciplined hard labour. Desiccation was the challenge; the lands of Sumer and Egypt were the response. But this bare statement would be a misleading simplification of the story. It does not become intelligible until we have also taken account of the primitive agricultural societies that made the transition to the earliest of the civilizations from the latest of the Upper Palaeolithic food-gathering and hunting societies. Even higher Primitive Man lacked the technology, as well as the organization, for coping with the jungle-swamps. Man had to put himself through a transitional apprenticeship before he could venture on the enterprise of civilization.

The intervention of this transitional stage between the primitive level of culture and the higher level that we call 'civilization' is not peculiar to the Old World; we find the same phenomenon in the history of the Americas. In the present chapter all that we need to do is to take note of this significant fact, leaving over, for the next chapter, the discussion of the question whether there was or was not any diffusion of culture, or of elements of it, from the Old World to the Americas at the transitional stage or at some later one.

In 1917 a distinguished student of Middle American archaeology, H. T. Spinden, threw out the idea that the Neolithic stage of Old-World culture had a counterpart in America in an 'Archaic' culture there which had originated in Middle America and had spread thence, as we now know that the Neolithic culture spread from Afrasia. This 'Archaic' American culture constituted a 'platform' on which the subsequent civilizations of Middle America and Peru reared themselves.¹ Willey testified in 1955² that this idea of an archaic cultural sub-stratum still stood, and that 'significant portions of this constant were diffused widely beyond the geographical boundaries of the later civilizations'. In some regions, e.g. Chile and Brazil, the 'Archaic' culture—in Willey's and Phillips's transference of Spinden's term to denote a transitional stage immediately preceding Spinden's 'Archaic'—seems actually to have been the earliest of any. At any rate, in these two regions there are no surviving traces of the 'Early Lithic' that corresponds in the Americas to the Palaeolithic stage of culture in the Old World.³

In terms of the classification of stages of culture in the Americas

¹ G. R. Willey: 'The Inter-related Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', in *The Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Volume of the Anthropological Society of Washington*, pp. 28-45. The reference here is to p. 29.

² G. R. Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', in *The American Anthropologist*, vol. 57, No. 3, Part 1 (June, 1955), pp. 571-93. The reference here is to p. 572.

³ G. R. Willey and P. Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II', in *The American Anthropologist*, vol. 57, No. 4 (August, 1955), pp. 723-819. The reference here is to p. 753. Cp. *ibidem*, 1958, p. 141.

proposed by Willey and Phillips in 1955, Spinden's 'Archaic' stage was represented approximately by the later phase of their 'Preformative' stage together with their 'Formative' stage. In terms of the revised classification proposed by them in 1958, it corresponds to their Formative stage.¹ In both of their classifications the term 'Archaic' is used to describe, not Spinden's 'Archaic' stage, but an earlier stage immediately preceding it and making the transition to it from Willey's and Phillips's 'Lithic' stage; the 'Archaic' stage of culture in the Americas, in Willey's and Phillips' usage of the term, would thus appear to correspond to the Mesolithic stage in the Old World. It is characterized by the grinding and polishing of stone tools, in addition to the use of the processes of percussion and pressure flaking.² In the 'Archaic' culture in this usage of the term, tools made of bone and horn and ivory were also important.³ Fishing and shell-hunting had made sedentary life possible,⁴ and in the Americas in this stage, as in the Old World at the corresponding stage, food-gathering and hunting continued to be staple occupations after agriculture had emerged.⁵ Agriculture brought with it no new implements; it used those that had been used already in a gathering economy.⁶ On the Pacific slope of Peru the earliest cultivators lived on the edges of the valleys,⁷ as in the lower Nile valley they lived on the bluffs and in the lateral ravines. The Peruvian Pacific-slope rivers are, of course, puny compared to the Nile; but the jungle-swamps with which their valleys, too, were choked in their original state of nature proved a formidable obstacle here also.⁸ The draining and irrigation of the valleys themselves, as distinct from their margins, was an achievement, here too, of the subsequent Age of Civilization.⁹ The emergence of agriculture, combined with stable settlement, technological specialization, and some degree of ceremonialism, are characteristic of the 'Preformative' stage,¹⁰ or, in terms of Willey's and Phillips' revised classification, of the transition to the 'Formative' from the 'Archaic'. At this transitional stage there was no functional relationship between agriculture and pottery,¹¹ and in the Americas, as in the Old World, there was a pre-pottery stage of agricultural culture. But some cultures of the 'Archaic' type (in Willey's and Phillips's usage of the term 'Archaic') had already acquired the art of pottery-making.¹² It was acquired by the 'Preformative' culture at Huaca Prieta, in Northern Peru, before its close,¹³ though, in its stone-work, this culture was still primitive: it was ignorant of both grinding and pressure-flaking.¹⁴ The 'Preformative' (in

¹ Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 105, footnote 8.

² Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 740.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 755.

³ Ibid., p. 741.

⁶ Ibid., p. 756.

⁷ See G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 42; Bennett and Bird: *Andean Cultural History*, p. 125.

⁸ In the Chicama valley, for instance, in the Pre-agricultural Age, 'the river probably meandered back and forth more freely than at present, forming lagoons and swamps and supported a dense undergrowth' (Bennett and Bird, *op. cit.*, p. 118).

⁹ Irrigation in coastal Peru was achieved first in the narrow upper valleys of the rivers (*ibid.*, p. 142). Eventually the flatter and broader lower valleys were mastered and became the centres of population (*ibid.*, p. 157).

¹⁰ Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 755.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 756.

¹² Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 577.

¹³ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, pp. 31 and 33.

¹² Ibid., p. 741.

the revised terminology, 'Late Archaic') culture developed into the 'Formative' gradually, not suddenly.¹

The picture of American facts and events, given in the preceding paragraph on the authority of Willey and Phillips, was still maintained by them, as far as I know, at the time of writing in 1959. But, as has been noted, Willey and Phillips had revised their terminology between 1955 and 1958; and, already by 1955, they had, as has also been noted, changed the usage of the word 'Archaic' that had been brought into currency by Spinden in 1917. Since these successive changes in the usage of terms are both confusing and important, it may be as well to recapitulate them. In 1955 Willey and Phillips were already using 'Archaic' as a label for a stage between their 'Preformative' and their 'Early Lithic', instead of using it, in accordance with Spinden's usage, to cover the two stages labelled by them 'Late Preformative' and 'Formative'. In 1958 they eliminated their previous 'Preformative' stage and distributed its phases between 'Formative' and 'Archaic'; and, in their present classification, Spinden's 'Archaic' is represented, not by their 'Archaic', but by their 'Formative'.² Their language in passages quoted from the joint study that they published in 1955 must be revised accordingly to bring it up to date. Their 1958 classification articulates Spinden's 'Archaic' platform into two tiers: an 'Archaic' tier with a 'Formative' tier above it, and with the two classic pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas springing from this upper tier.

'Cultures of the Formative stage occupy a geographically central position in the Western Hemisphere. They are found throughout much of Middle America and most of Andean South America.³ From these areas they extend northward, with some lacunae, into the south-western and eastern United States, and in South America they run down the Cordillera to central Chile and eastward along the Amazon and Orinoco drainages of the lowlands.'⁴

A culture of the Formative level has been identified at the mouth of the Amazon.⁵

This change of labels is less important, in itself, than one of the reasons for it. In their revised version of their study, Willey and Phillips classify less than before by material traits (e.g. types of tool and kinds of technique) and more by ways of life. They now equate their 'Formative' stage with village life and their 'Classic' stage with urban life. They still hold⁶ that the change from hunting and food-gathering to agriculture is more profound and significant than any other at any point in the whole

¹ Willey and Phillips, *op. cit.*, 1955, pp. 755 and 765; Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', pp. 577-8.

² G. R. Willey and P. Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology*, 1958, p. 105, footnote 8. 'Archaic', as defined by these two authorities in 1958, is 'the stage of migratory hunting and gathering cultures continuing into environmental conditions approximating those of the present' (*ibid.*, p. 107). In the Archaic stage 'there is no important shift in economic and social patterns from the previous Lithic stages' (*ibid.*, p. 106). 'Archaic', as thus redefined, seems to correspond to the 'Mesolithic', not to the 'Neolithic', of Old-World archaeology.

³ And also, of course, in the region between, though this is not mentioned in the present passage (A. J. T.).

⁴ Willey and Phillips, 1958, pp. 146-7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

series of Pre-Columbian American stages of culture. But they now also hold¹ that 'the settlement patterns, etc.—not the agriculture—are the effective criteria for classification'. They declare² that they 'are not retreating from the position that agriculture was the principal *formative* agent in the development of "Formative" cultures, but only from a rigidity that makes it the indispensable agent'.

'Therefore, we now define the New-World "Formative" by the presence of agriculture or any other subsistence economy of comparable effectiveness, and by the successful integration of such an economy into well-established, sedentary village life.'³

In taking up this position, Willey and Phillips have Redfield's support. He has noted⁴ that 'a sedentary life is possible to a people who know nothing of agriculture or animal husbandry'.

Whatever criteria may be the most illuminating for defining the 'Formative' stage of culture in the Americas, it looks as if this stage of Pre-Columbian American history, as now defined, corresponds structurally to what happened in the Old World, in the Afasian oases, in the course of the fifth and fourth millennia B.C. In the Americas there was nothing at this stage to compare with the enormous technological advances that were achieved in the Old World on the eve of the genesis of the earliest Old-World civilizations. Nevertheless, it is evident that in the Americas, as in the Old World, the dawn of civilization was separated culturally, as well as chronologically, from the end of the Palaeolithic Age by a transitional series of cultures. This series straddles the 'Archaic' and the 'Formative' stages in terms of Willey's and Phillips's most recent classification. The corresponding stages in Old-World terminology would be the 'Mesolithic', 'Neolithic', and 'Chalcolithic'.

X. ORIGINALITY VERSUS MIMESIS

I. STIMULUS DIFFUSION

I HAVE noted already in this volume⁵ that, in previous parts of this work, I have tended to over-simplify, and hence to exaggerate, the contrast between original creation and 'mimesis', meaning the reception and adoption of elements of culture that have been created elsewhere and have reached the recipients by a process of diffusion. In 1930, when I was writing volume i, the British Diffusionists, led by W. H. Perry and G. Elliott Smith, had just published their rather provocative works.⁶ Like many other students of human affairs, I reacted strongly against them.⁷ In the perspective given by a further thirty years of discovery and discussion, the general verdict now does seem to be that they pushed their claims on behalf of the role of diffusion to excessive lengths; and their particular theory that Egypt was the centre from which civilization

¹ Ibid., p. 145.

² Ibid., p. 146. Cp. p. 202.

³ Ibid., p. 146.

⁴ R. Redfield: *The Primitive World and Its Transformations*, p. 5.

⁵ On pp. 145-8.

⁶ See the references in i. 425, footnote i.

⁷ See i. 221-3 and 425-40.

was diffused all over the World has now been refuted by the apparently well-established discovery that civilization in Egypt itself was a product of 'stimulus diffusion' from Sumer. Thus my negative reaction to the British Diffusionists' theory was not mistaken. But the effect on me at the time was certainly to make me 'lean over backwards' in emphasizing the part played by original creation and therefore to under-estimate the role of diffusion and mimesis. I afterwards corrected this original bias to some extent in volume viii, in which I have dealt with two types of contact between societies that are each other's contemporaries: the contact between a civilization and the barbarians beyond its frontiers (Part VIII) and the contact between one civilization and another (Part IX). Nevertheless, I still need to reconsider the whole question in the light of the new knowledge and new ideas that the last thirty years have brought with them.

Neither the concept of originality nor the concept of mimesis can ever be dispensed with in the study of human affairs. Creation and innovation are realities, even if we cannot give a logical account of what we mean by these terms.¹ If they were not realities, no changes could ever have occurred. And, if creation and innovation are realities, every act of creation and innovation must have been achieved by some agent at some particular point of space-time. On the other hand, if diffusion and mimesis were not realities too, this again would make human history inexplicable. If the only possible form of human action were original creation, a human being's whole energies would have to be taken up, from birth to death, in willing each pulsation of his heart and each inflation of his lungs. So far from this being characteristic of human nature, one of its distinctively human features is its capacity for learning and for translating what it learns into habits organized in those patterns of relations between people that we call 'institutions'. Besides the psycho-physical heritage that Man, like all other living creatures, transmits to his offspring automatically and involuntarily, he transmits a cultural heritage by the social process of teaching and learning; and it is this second capacity that makes and keeps Man human. G. R. Willey is therefore surely right in saying that 'diffusion and independent invention are, after all, polar abstractions concerning complex human events, and the two processes work in concert'.² Meanwhile, A. L. Kroeber has transformed our whole approach to the question by showing that an antithesis between two terms—originality and mimesis—does not cover all the phenomena. There is at least one more alternative, which Kroeber calls 'stimulus diffusion'.³

'Stimulus diffusion might be defined as new pattern growth initiated by precedent in a foreign culture. . . . A goal or objective was set by something previously existing in another culture; the originality was limited to achieving the mechanisms by which this goal could be attained.'⁴

¹ See pp. 252-4.

² *The Seventy-fifth Anniversary Volume of the Anthropological Society of Washington* (1955), p. 29.

³ See A. L. Kroeber: 'Stimulus Diffusion', in *The American Anthropologist*, New Series, vol. 42, No. 1 (January-March, 1940), republished in *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 344-57. ⁴ Kroeber, *The A.A. num. cit.*, pp. 20 and 2; *The N. of C.*, pp. 357 and 345.

Kroeber demonstrates his case by bringing forward illustrations from the most diverse fields of human activity. Since then his new concept has been employed to account for the genesis of the Egyptian Civilization as a creative response to a stimulus received from the Sumerian Civilization. If this explanation of the origins of the Egyptian Civilization had come from the Assyriologists, it might perhaps have been dismissed as being just an amusing example of academic imperialism. But it has been put forward by the Egyptologists themselves, and therefore has presumably found favour on its merits. One of its merits is its possible applicability to other cases. In the Egyptian case it is supported by definite archaeological evidence; but, even without the support of this, it might also throw light on the origins of civilization in the Indus basin and in China. A stimulus from the Sumerian World may have struck the spark here too. Similarly, in the Americas, the Andean Civilization may have arisen through stimulus diffusion from Middle America. Kroeber's fruitful idea may even eventually help to solve the hotly debated problem of the extent and influence of the Pre-Columbian cultural relations between the Americas and the Old World.

Kroeber himself draws one conclusion that is of great importance. 'Independent origins are not necessarily proved because we are unable to prove specific connexion by specific historical documents.'¹ The hypothesis of the common psychic structure of mankind—the so-called uniformity of human nature—is no explanation of specific cultural manifestations.² Where strikingly similar cultural manifestations recur, and specially where a number of them recur in association, the presumption is that there is an historical link between the several cases: that is to say, that one case only is original and that the rest are derivative. Since it would be difficult to produce evidence that would rule out this possibility, the independent origin of similar cultural and social phenomena is difficult to establish conclusively, even in cases where all the positive evidence hitherto brought forward in support of the hypothesis of diffusion has proved unconvincing.

2. THE GENESIS OF THE EGYPTIAN CIVILIZATION

The style of the Egyptian Civilization was unquestionably distinctive, and this in all facets of cultural and social life: art, architecture, writing, religion, government. Yet there is convincing evidence that this distinctive style took shape suddenly³ under a stimulus from an alien style, the Sumerian, which was equally distinctive and which had taken shape, not suddenly, but gradually, in a series of stages of which the record has now been recovered by the progress of archaeological discovery in Iraq. The period during which the Egyptian Society was open to Sumerian influences was short, but it was crucial. It not only saw the formation of the distinctive Egyptian cultural style, a style that was to maintain itself for more than three thousand years; it also saw the

¹ 'Stimulus Diffusion', p. 16. Cp. W. Koppers' 'Der Historische Gedanke in Ethnologie und Prähistorie', in *Kultur und Sprache*, pp. 15 and 23-24.

² A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 60-61. Cp. pp. 58 and 390-1.

³ Frankfort: *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 50.

reclamation of the lower Nile valley for agriculture,¹ and the political unification of this reclaimed land of Upper Egypt with the still mostly unreclaimed Delta in a united kingdom. The opening of Egyptian hearts and minds to Sumeric influences began only towards the end of the latest pre-dynastic period, the so-called 'Nakāda II' or 'Gerzean'; and this state of receptivity came to an end soon after the establishment of the First Dynasty. In the meantime this exceptionally receptive mood had made history.

Fields in which Sumerian influence made itself felt in Egypt during this formative age were the practice of sealing with engraved cylinders, a recessed style of brick building, a Sumerian build of ship, a number of artistic motifs—for instance, symmetrical patterns of fantastic animals—and the art of writing.² The build of ship, taken together with the probability that the Nile Delta remained an impassable swamp until far on in the Age of the Old Kingdom, is the most significant pointer to the route by which these Sumeric influences may have reached Upper Egypt. 'In Egypt, signs of contact with Sumer almost cease after Narmer's reign; and, since contact with Syria increased rather than diminished during the First Dynasty, it seems unlikely that the Mesopotamian influences reached Egypt from the North'³—though it is true that it is no far cry from Byblos, on the Phoenician coast, with which Egypt was trading from the time of the Old Kingdom onwards, to Brak, on the River Khabur in Mesopotamia,⁴ where a Sumeric temple had been founded in the Protoliterate Age of Sumeric history. Frankfort conjectures⁵ that the place where the Egyptians encountered the Sumeric Civilization may have been a common source of frankincense somewhere in South Arabia.

Whatever the route, the reality of the contact seems to be indubitable. 'The strongest evidence . . . is supplied by three cylinder seals shown by their very material and by their designs to have been made in Mesopotamia during the second half of the Protoliterate period, but found in Egypt.'⁶ 'In view of [the] great variety of detailed resemblances, there can be no reasonable doubt that the earliest monumental brick architecture of Egypt was inspired by that of Mesopotamia, where it had a long previous history.'⁷ But the most remarkable evidence is in the field of writing. In Sumer the gradual evolution of the Sumeric script can be traced from its very beginnings,⁸ and 'it has been customary to postulate prehistoric antecedents for the Egyptian script, but this hypothesis has nothing in its favour'.⁹

¹ Frankfort: *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, p. 43. 'The Nile valley north of Asyut itself was not inhabited prior to Nakāda II' (E. J. Baumgartel: *The Cultures of Prehistoric Egypt*, p. 25). The Nakāda II people were the first to drain and irrigate Upper Egypt (*ibid.*, p. 46).

² See the Appendix on 'The Influence of Mesopotamia on Egypt towards the end of the Fourth Millennium B.C.' in H. Frankfort: *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 100–11, especially the table on p. 109.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁴ This word 'Mesopotamia' is used here in its strict meaning, to denote the country between the middle courses of the Tigris and Euphrates north-west of, and exclusive of, Babylonia. Frankfort uses the word to denote 'Iraq minus 'Iraqi Kurdistan but with the addition of the territory, east of Euphrates, that is included in the present state of Syria.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 110–11.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 55–56. Cp. Baumgartel, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁹ Frankfort, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

'In the annals of the kingdom (which happen to survive in a version of the Fifth Dynasty), events are recorded only from the First Dynasty onwards, a fact suggesting that no records of earlier times existed. . . . But the writing which appeared without antecedents at the beginning of the First Dynasty was by no means primitive. It has, in fact, a complex structure. It includes three different classes of signs: ideograms, phonetic signs, and determinatives. This is precisely the same state of complexity that had been reached in Mesopotamia at an advanced stage of the Protoliterate period. There, however, a more primitive stage is known in the earliest tablets, which used only ideograms.'¹

Frankfort reasonably concludes that the Egyptian script cannot have been invented without knowledge of the Sumeric, but he hastens to add² that 'the Egyptians did not copy the Mesopotamian system slavishly; they were merely stimulated to develop a script of their own, once the notion that language could be rendered graphically had been conveyed'.

Baumgartel, too, points out³ that

'only at the end of Nakāda II [the Gerzean period], shortly before the rise of the dynasties, do we find writing established in Egypt also [i.e. as well as in Sumer]. The system employed is too similar to that of the Sumerian script to make an independent origin likely, yet the repertory of signs is derived entirely from the surroundings of the Nakāda II people. There is no evidence of a gradual development of script in Egypt, as there is in Mesopotamia. The system appears from the first ready-made, much the same as it was throughout Egyptian history.'

Baumgartel holds⁴ that 'certain hieroglyphs originally had Semitic values, to which were later added the commonly used names of the objects represented'. 'It follows', she concludes, 'that the Nakāda II people spoke a Semitic language different from that of the Nakāda I people', whose language, in her opinion, was Hamitic. As she sees it,⁵ the Nakāda II people were Asiatic invaders who brought in with them painted pottery⁶ and a blade technique of stone-working in place of their local predecessors' bifacial technique.⁷ She points out that in Sumer the blade technique was the predominant one.⁸ Frankfort is more guarded in his judgement.

'It would [he sums up]⁹ be an error to see the birth of Egyptian civilization as a consequence of contact with Mesopotamia. The signs of change accumulating towards the end of the Predynastic Age are too numerous, and the outcome of the change is too emphatically Egyptian, in its general character and its particulars, to allow us to speak of derivation or dependence. . . . We observe that Egypt, in a period of intensified creativity, became acquainted with the achievements of Mesopotamia; that it was stimulated; and that it adapted to its own rapid development such

¹ Ibid., p. 106.

² Ibid., p. 107.

³ In op. cit., p. 48.

⁴ Ibid., p. 48.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 38-39 and 50.

⁶ According to Baumgartel, op. cit., pp. 29 and 53, all painted pottery, anywhere in the Old World, originated in Asia.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 38-39. Frankfort, in op. cit., pp. 42-43, suggests, more cautiously, that, while the Gerzean culture included Asian elements, it was still predominantly African.

⁸ Baumgartel, op. cit., p. 39.

⁹ In op. cit., p. 110.

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elements as seemed compatible with its efforts. It mostly transformed what it borrowed and after a time rejected even these modified derivations.'

It will be seen that the role of Sumeric influence in the genesis of the Egyptiac Civilization, as described by Frankfort in this passage, is a classic illustration of Kroeber's concept of 'stimulus diffusion'.

3. THE GENESIS OF THE INDUS CULTURE

The archaeological record of the Indus Culture that has been recovered in our time gives the impression that this civilization, like the Egyptiac, made a sudden appearance in the river valley in which it found a home for itself. It does not seem to have developed out of the Neolithic and Chalcolithic cultures in the adjacent highlands of Eastern Iran. It would seem to have entered the Indus valley from elsewhere, with its script and its advanced technique of brick architecture ready-made. On the analogy of what we now know about the genesis of the Egyptiac Civilization, one obvious hypothesis for explaining the genesis of the Indus Culture is that it, too, was brought to a head by the influence of the Sumeric Civilization on some people who, like the 'Gerzean' (*alias* Nakāda II) invaders of Upper Egypt, were within Sumer's cultural range, and who, in response to this stimulus, created an independent civilization of their own in a new country that they brought into existence by reclaiming a hitherto virgin tract of jungle-swamp. In the case of the Indus Culture, however, we lack the archaeological evidence which substantiates the parallel hypothesis in the Egyptiac case. Above all, the Indus script still remains undeciphered, so that we do not yet know, as we do know about the Egyptiac script, how it compares in point of structure with the Sumeric script. We do know that, after the establishment of the Indus Culture in the Indus basin about half-way through the third millennium B.C., there was commercial contact between it and the Sumeric World. Seals inscribed in the Indus script have been found in 'Iraq on Sumeric sites. This archaeological evidence for subsequent intercourse does not, however, throw light on the question whether the Sumeric Civilization exerted any stimulus on the Indus Culture in its formative stage. Still less does it throw light on the question of the region in Afrasia from which the founders of the Indus Culture originally came.

4. THE GENESIS OF CIVILIZATION IN CHINA

Today China, like the Indus valley, 'Iraq, and Egypt, is an agricultural country in which the bulk of the produce comes from drained and irrigated land that has been reclaimed from the primaeval swamps of great river valleys, and in which the greater part of the population works and lives on these reclaimed fields. Present-day China is, in economic terms, virtually identical with the lower basin of the Yellow River, the basin of the Hwai River, the lower basin of the Yangtse, together

with its upper basin in Szechwan, and the basins of the East and West rivers, opening on to the south-west coast. In the first volume of this book I assumed that, in China, history had followed the same course as in the other three regions, above-mentioned, in which the present-day basis of economic life is, as in present-day China, a system of agriculture based on water-control. I assumed that in China, as in these three other regions, the reclamation of the river-valley swamps had been the economic aspect of the local genesis of civilization. I had thought of civilization as being a state of society in which there is a ruling minority that is exempt from the common tasks of food-production and technology, on which the majority of the human race have hitherto had to spend all their working time in order to keep life going. I had supposed that in China, as elsewhere, this leisured class, which is the distinctive index of civilization,¹ had been coeval with the reclamation of the swamps. These had been reclaimed under its direction, and at the same time this achievement had brought with it the surplus of food production which had made it possible for society to support a governing class that did not have to take its share in mankind's daily work.

This picture of the genesis of civilization in China was not my private fancy. It was the established doctrine of the official Chinese account of Chinese history that began to take shape in the time of Confucius (*vivebat circa* 551-479 B.C.) and that finally crystallized in the hands of the father of Chinese history, Ssu-ma Ch'ien (*vivebat circa* 149-90 B.C.). In this tradition the reclamation of the swamps in the river basins of China was attributed to a legendary culture-hero, Yü the Great. Yü was eventually taken to have been a human being who had founded the pre-Shang Hsia dynasty. The historicity of this dynasty has not been confirmed, up to date, as the historicity of the Shang dynasty has been, by the progress of archaeological discovery. In making Yü the founder of the Hsia dynasty, the authors of the official legend were intending to imply that he was the creator of civilization in China. The official legend, after maintaining itself for not much less than two thousand years, has now been exploded, partly by archaeological discovery and partly by a critical examination of the earliest surviving Chinese literature. It appears that, in the early Chou period, Yü was held to be, not a human being, but a god, who had made the earth rise above the surface of the water.² The Chinese official legend has now been recognized to be unhistorical. Yet the idea that the reclamation of the swamps and the beginning of civilization in China were coeval, and were, in fact, simply two facets of a single event, was retained by as great and as recent a modern Western Sinologist as H. Maspéro. It was on Maspéro's authority³ that I equated the genesis of civilization in China with a response to a particular physiographical challenge—the challenge of the swamps—that admittedly accounts for the genesis of civilization in the Indus valley, Sumer, and Egypt.

Meanwhile, within the last thirty years, the traditional picture of the

¹ See p. 278.

² J. Needham, in a letter to me of 26th October, 1958.

³ See H. Maspéro: *La Chine Antique* (Paris 1927, Boccard), pp. 20-26, quoted in this book in i. 318-20.

genesis of civilization in China, which Maspéro rationalized, has come under fire. It has been suggested that the reclamation of the river-valley swamps, which is the dominant factor in China's present-day economic configuration, did not come at the beginning of the history of civilization in China but has been a gradual achievement and a comparatively late one. It is now suggested that the origins of civilization in China, on their technological and economic side, are more like its origins in Europe than like its origins in the valleys of the Indus, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Nile.

P. M. Roxby¹ has put forward the thesis that

'the essential geographical element in the rise of early Chinese civilization would seem to have been the existence of an almost continuous west-east belt of relatively forest-free and fertile loess soil, initially favourable, in spite of some handicaps, which admittedly may have acted as a spur, to agricultural development, and also open on its continental side to the entry of fresh cultural stimulus from Western Asia.'²

The primary loess of the western highlands has to be distinguished from the redeposited and reassorted loess of the eastern plains.³ The loess is thick in Kansu, round Lanchow, and westward along the Kansu corridor.⁴ North-westward it stops at what is now the line of the Great Wall,⁵ and there is also no loess south of the Tsin-ling Range; but the redeposited loess does extend south-eastward into southern Honan and eastward as far as Kai-fêng.⁶ There are, indeed, two belts of redeposited loess between the western and the Shantung highlands.⁷ The more northern part of the Eastern Plain, corresponding to the modern province of Hopeh, was originally occupied by rivers and swamps.⁸ 'But the central portion of the Great Plain, lying between this Hopeh basin in the north and the swamps of the lower Hwai in the south, is much higher. It has been the scene of maximum sedimentation by the Yellow River where it emerges from the Tung-Kwan gorge.'⁹ Roxby labels this comparatively high ground 'the Honan Water-Parting'. It closely coincides with the more northerly of the two bands of redeposited loess that extend across the Eastern Plain.¹⁰ Following V. K. Ting,¹¹ Roxby notes¹² that the loess is essentially a valley-filling deposit and is not sufficiently hard to obstruct drainage, so that in the loess belt there cannot have been swamps of the kind that filled the alluvial plains. Ting maintains that the loess area has always been a semi-steppe and that there has never been any forestation there; and Roxby, too, holds¹³ that, in Northern China, there was almost certainly no post-glacial pine-forest phase of the kind that impeded agriculture in Europe.

'All this applies, of course, primarily to the loessial plateaux of the west, but in large measure also to the Honan Water-Parting extending east-

¹ In 'The Terrain of Early Chinese Civilization', in *Geography*, the quarterly journal of the Geographical Association, vol. 23 (Manchester, 1938), pp. 225-36. Cp. eundem: 'The Major Regions of China', *ibid.*, pp. 9-14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 227-8.

¹¹ In *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. 15 (1931), pp. 265-90.

¹² In *Geography*, vol. 23, p. 228.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

⁷ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 236.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 231.

wards towards the foothills of the Shantung highlands and particularly to the higher western margins of the Plain and the headwaters of the Hwai. This extension is postulated in the important generalisation of Dr. Ting that "this continuous semi-steppe stretching from the sea to Turkestan, free from both forest and marsh and favourable to agriculture and to wheeled vehicles, made early settlement and continuous diffusion of culture possible".¹

The waist of the plain, between the Shansi and Shantung highlands, mostly consists of calcareous alluvium, alluvioleoss, with only small patches of saline alluvium.²

'It is an unleached soil of great fertility, and both the re-sorting process of the wind and human agency can expose new surfaces, producing much the same effects as the renewal of the soil by the Nile floods. The loess in all its direct and indirect effects must be reckoned as a positive factor of the greatest importance in the environment of the Yellow River basin. In contrast, the non-lime-accumulating soils and the semi-tropical climate of the Yangtse basin were essentially favourable to marsh and forest. That must indeed have been real jungle, as all the references to it in the Tribute of Yü, and the name Ch'u (meaning jungle-land) of the first important Chinese or semi-Chinese principality which developed in it, suggest. The Yangtse region was very far from being "gracious" to the early cultivators. It required many centuries of human effort before it became the fertile region which it is to-day.'³

The non-calcareous alluvium and rice paddy-fields of the middle and lower Hwai valley and the saline alluvium soils of the coastal regions north and south of Shantung likewise 'indicate areas of former swamp, and much of the saline alluvium has only recently been reclaimed and put under cultivation'.⁴

By what stages, then, did the Chinese World's agricultural centre of gravity shift from the loess lands, where rainfall agriculture could be practised without any preliminary task of clearing forests or draining swamps, to the former swamp-lands in the river valleys which have been reclaimed at some date between the dawn of Chinese history and the modern age? J. Needham suggests⁵ that the establishment of water-control in China began in the Chou Age, and that the most important features were probably not the reclamation of swamp-land by drainage but rather the impounding of run-off water from hill valleys in tanks,⁶ the digging of navigation canals, and the building of dykes along the great rivers. Perhaps the earliest record is a reference to the irrigation of rice-fields in a song in the *Shih Ching* which may date from the eighth century B.C. The first dykes along the lower course of the Yellow River seem to have been built during the first half of the seventh century B.C. by Duke Hwan of Ch'i. The earliest known irrigation tank, the Anfêng

¹ Ibid., p. 228.

² Ibid.

³ In a letter to me of 26th October, 1958.

⁴ Needham mentions the analogy of the tanks in Ceylon. Perhaps both these and the similar works in China were ultimately inspired by the small-scale irrigation works in the Afrikan oases in the age before the reclamation of Sumer, Egypt, and the Indus valley.

² Ibid., p. 229.

⁴ Ibid.

T'ang in the present-day province of Anhui, which eventually watered six million acres of land, is said to have been constructed in the sixth century B.C. by the government of the state of Ch'u. The Hung Kou (Canal of the Wild Geese), linking the Yellow River, at a point near Kai-fêng, with the Pien River, may have been dug about 500 B.C. In 483 B.C. King Fu Ch'ai of Wu dug the Han Kou canal to link the Hwai River with the Yangtse. In the fourth century B.C. the Chang River was diverted to flow into the Wei River instead of flowing into the Yellow River. In the third century B.C. in Szechwan an artificial arm of the River Min was carried through a cutting in a mountain-side to irrigate a great area in the Ch'êngtu plain. These notices, which I owe to Dr. Needham's kindness, indicate that in China the establishment of water-control was a gradual process, as it may have been in Sumer and in the Nile Delta, in contrast to its apparently sudden establishment in Upper Egypt and perhaps also in the Indus valley. This is the physiographical background to the genesis of civilization in China.

China has yielded relics of the late Neolithic stage of culture, but none of the middle or the early stage.¹ The oldest Neolithic culture in China is the Painted Pottery Culture. It extended as far east as Honan, and has been labelled with the name of a site at Yang Shao in that province; but it seems to have started earlier and lasted longer in Kansu, and its affinities are with Neolithic cultures in Transcaspia (at Anau), in South-West Asia, and in the Danube basin.² This Yang Shao culture never occupied Shantung,³ and, in its lodgements in the Eastern Plain, it succumbed to a later and more advanced Neolithic culture, the Black Pottery Culture,⁴ using the potter's wheel, which is labelled with the name of a site at Ch'eng Tzū Yui, east of Tsinan.⁵ The sequence of archaeological strata is: Yang Shao Painted Pottery Neolithic Culture, Ch'eng Tzū Yui (*alias* Lungshan) Black Pottery Neolithic Culture, Shang Bronze Age Culture.⁶ At each stage the range of domestic animals increased. The Painted Pottery people had only pigs, dogs, and cattle; the Black Pottery people had also sheep and horses. The Shang had also buffaloes and goats. The Shang had two breeds of pig, and they hunted many kinds of game (they were passionate hunters, in contrast to their Neolithic predecessors of both phases).⁷ The Black Pottery Culture site at Ch'eng Tzū Yui was a rectangular walled city, measuring 450 by 390 metres,⁸ with walls of pounded earth.⁹ This latest Neolithic culture in China had in common with the succeeding Bronze-Age Shang Culture these pounded earth walls, tripods of the 'li' shape, horses, cattle, white pottery made of porcelain clay, and divination bones

¹ H. G. Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 42.

² Roxby in loc. cit., p. 232; Li Chi: *The Beginnings of Chinese Civilization*, p. 12; Creel, op. cit., p. 45.

³ Roxby, loc. cit., pp. 230-1 and 232.

³ Li Chi, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵ Creel, op. cit., p. 48; idem: *Studies in Early Chinese Cultures, First Series*, p. 176; Roxby, loc. cit., p. 231.

⁶ Li Chi, op. cit., p. 14.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 22-23 and 23-25. Roxby, loc. cit., p. 231, says that cattle, as well as horses and sheep, make their first appearance in China in the Black Pottery Age. See also Creel: *Studies*, pp. 182-3 and 189, and *The Birth of China*, p. 49.

⁸ Creel: *Studies*, p. 176.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 177-82; *The Birth of China*, p. 48; Roxby, op. cit., p. 231.

(though, in the Black Pottery Age, these were not inscribed).¹ The Shang pottery technique was a continuation of the Black Pottery technique; the Black Pottery Culture 'li'-shaped tripods set the pattern for the subsequent Shang bronze sacrificial vessels; and Creel sees in the Black Pottery Culture the link between the Neolithic Age and the Bronze Age in China.² Moreover, the area occupied by the Shang Culture, before the removal of the capital to Anyang *circa* 1384 B.C., seems to have coincided with the area previously occupied by the Black Pottery Culture—unlike the course of events in Afrasia, where the passage from Neolithic-Chalcolithic cultures to Bronze Age civilizations was accompanied by a change of location from the oases to the river valleys. On the other hand, Li Chi lays stress³ on the discontinuity between the Black Pottery Culture and the Shang Culture. He names⁴ six features of the Shang Culture that were innovations: a new development of the pottery industry; the use of bronze for casting tools, weapons, and sacrificial vessels; the possession of a highly developed system of writing; chamber burials and human sacrifices; the use of chariots; and advanced stone carvings.

In the Shang script and the Shang bronze technique we are confronted with the same puzzle as at the geneses of the Egyptian Civilization and the Indus Culture. These achievements burst upon us full-blown. Each of them must have had a long back-history.⁵ The Shang style, like the Egyptian and Indus styles, is quite distinctive; yet, in the light of what we know about the genesis of the Egyptian Civilization, we can guess that the Shang Culture may have come to birth under the stimulus of some older culture whose influence we cannot detect because it inspired the fathers of the Shang Culture, not to imitate it, but to make something original of their own. 'Certainly the superlative technique of Shang bronze-casting must have represented the end point of a course of evolution, from the first discovery of the process, requiring many centuries, if not millennia.'⁶ The tin content of Shang bronze amounts to 17 per cent.⁷ As for the script, it was not crude or primitive.⁸ No traces of primitive Chinese writing have been recovered up to date.⁹ 'Every important principle of the formation of modern Chinese characters was already in use.'¹⁰ It is now possible to read most of the characters in any oracle-bone inscription, and to date a large proportion of them with a margin of error of only a few decades.¹¹ Great progress was made during the 300 years during which we can follow the development of the script on the Shang oracle bones.¹² Conventionalized ideograms predominate; and, though some characters are borrowed for phonetic use, the Chinese scribes, like their Sumeric and Egyptian predecessors, held back from going over to a completely phonetic system of writing.¹³

How are we to account for the genesis of civilization in China in the form of the Shang Culture? Was it an independent local development

¹ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 50. Cp. *Studies*, p. 191.

² *The Birth of China*, p. 50; *Studies*, pp. 190-1.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Creel: *Studies*, p. 225.

⁵ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 159.

⁶ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 160.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁸ In op. cit., p. 15.

⁹ Li Chi, op. cit., pp. 16-17; Roxby, loc. cit., p. 230.

¹⁰ C. S. Coon: *The History of Man*, p. 330.

¹¹ Creel: *Studies*, p. 34.

¹² Creel: *Studies*, p. 16.

¹³ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 159; *Studies*, p. 39.

out of the Neolithic Black Pottery Culture, which was, itself, apparently, less dependent on western influences than the older Neolithic Painted Pottery Culture? Braidwood considers¹ it to be non-proven that civilization in Eastern Asia is an independent development. Then was the Shang Culture imported, ready-made, by invaders from abroad? If it was, was it brought in from the west or from the south, or partly from each of these two quarters? Or was it a local creation under inspiration from outside? These several possible explanations are not mutually exclusive, and perhaps the truth is to be found in a combination of them.

Rice seems to have been cultivated in Northern Honan as early as the Painted Pottery phase of the Neolithic Age, though at this stage without being accompanied by the buffalo.² Rice cultivation implies irrigation. It also implies an origin in the south.³ According to Coon,⁴ there is a consensus among botanists that rice, both wet and dry, was first cultivated somewhere in the tropical monsoon forests, and he raises the question whether the invention of agriculture in South China and South-East Asia may not have been independent of its invention in Afrasia.⁵ Rice, as well as wheat and millet, was cultivated by the Shang people in the Anyang period.⁶ They also had the water buffalo, though it was less common than ordinary cattle.⁷ The additional breed of pig possessed by the Shang people, *sus vittatus*, was also of southern origin, in contrast to the original Chinese pig, which came from the north.⁸ The Shang people's cowrie shells and pottery must also have come from the south.⁹ Moreover, the nearest sources of tin for Shang bronze, with its high tin content, were in Yunnan and Malaya.¹⁰

It thus looks as if elements of culture had seeped into the birth-place of the Neolithic and Bronze-Age cultures of China, on the Honan Water-Parting, from the south as well as from the west, and this from the beginning of the local Neolithic Age, some time in the third millennium B.C. This southern source of culture in Northern China is mysterious in the present state of our knowledge. It is easy to see how cultural influences originating in Afrasia could have reached China from the north-west. But, to the south and south-west, the nearest centre of civilization to North China was the Indus valley, and the obstacles to the radiation of culture from there to China by an all-tropical route, south of the Tibetan plateau, were enormous. South-East Asia was one of the latest parts of the Old World to be brought within the *Oikoumenê*. The civilizations of India and China did not make contact in that quarter till the second century of the Christian Era, about 250 years later than the date of their earliest meeting via the steppes and oases of Central Asia. The southern provenance of important elements in the civilization of China seems to be unquestionable, but it presents us with a baffling problem.

¹ R. J. Braidwood: *The Near East and the Foundations of Civilization*, pp. 2-3.

² Li Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 35; Creel: *Studies*, p. 175.

³ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 51.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 333.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 149 and 320.

⁶ Roxby, *loc. cit.*, p. 234.

⁷ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 80; *Studies*, p. 251.

⁸ Creel: *The Birth of China*, p. 78; Coon, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

⁹ Coon, *ibid.*

¹⁰ Coon, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

5. THE GENESIS OF THE ANDEAN CIVILIZATION

The style of the Andean Civilization—if we use the word 'style' in the broadest sense to cover cultural activities of all kinds—is as distinctive as the style of the Egyptiac Civilization. Yet in this case, as in that, the archaeological evidence suggests that this distinctive civilization came to birth under the stimulus of a different, and equally distinctive, civilization with whose domain it was not immediately contiguous, though the domains of both civilizations were contained in one geographically continuous *Oikoumenê* in which the intervening regions were at a transitional stage of culture. In the Americas the civilization that played the role of the Sumeric civilization in the Old World was the Middle American Civilization, and the transitional culture that was the Middle American and Andean civilizations' common platform—from which they rose like two peaks¹—was the one that Spinden labelled 'Archaic' and that Willey and Phillips now label 'Formative'.

The evidence linking Middle America and Peru is in the sphere of culture contact, not of style;² and 'the story is obviously not one of diffusion alone'.³

'In style and patterning the arts and institutions of the two areas are quite distinct. This distinctiveness is more pronounced in the Classic and Postclassic cultures than in those of the Formative. There is little question but what styles and patterns resulted from local creativeness and inventiveness in each area and within smaller regions of each area'.⁴

There is no good evidence of diffusion between Middle America and Peru before about 1000 B.C.;⁵ but it does seem to have occurred during the last millennium B.C.⁶ During this period the main movement seems to have been from north to south, considering that the Formative cultures arose earlier in Middle America than in Peru⁷ and that the development of culture at the southern end of the Pacific coast of Peru lagged several centuries behind its development at the northern end.⁸ The most convincing single proof of Middle America's priority is to be found in the history of the diffusion of maize, which eventually became the staple crop of all agricultural societies in America living in climatic and physiographical conditions that allowed of maize being cultivated. It may be true that pre-maize root-crop horticulture was

¹ A. L. Kroeber, quoted by G. R. Willey in 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America: Its Prehistoric Relationships to Middle America and Peru', a paper read to the Thirty-Third International Congress of Americanists, held at San José, Costa Rica, in July, 1958: *Actas del XXXIII Congreso Internacional de Americanistas*, vol. i (San José, Costa Rica, 1959), pp. 184-94.

² G. R. Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', in *The American Anthropologist*, vol. 57, No. 3, Part 1 (June, 1955), pp. 571-93. The present reference is to p. 580. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 588. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 589. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 581.

⁶ G. R. Willey: 'Estimated Correlations and Dating of South and Central American Culture Sequences', in *American Antiquity*, vol. 23, No. 4 (April, 1958), pp. 353-78. The present reference is to p. 358.

⁷ Willey: 'The Intermediate Area', p. 7. According to Willey and Phillips, 1958, the carbon-14 test has given 1359 ± 250 B.C. as the date for the Early Zacatenco culture in the valley of Mexico, and 714 ± 200 B.C. for the coastal Chavín culture in North-Western Peru. ⁸ Willey: 'Estimated Correlations', p. 356.

invented in Peru, at the north-western end of the Peruvian coast;¹ but 'sedentary agriculture-based village life and well-developed ceramics have been dated back to 1500 B.C. in Middle America... and cultivated maize is considerably earlier than this'.² Willey and Phillips raise the question: 'Was the challenge of unfavourable environment a significant factor in the development of early maize culture? The earliest known Preformative³ developments are in semi-arid regions.'⁴ According to J. A. Mason, the carbon-14 test dates maize found in Bat Cave, New Mexico, to as early as 3650 B.C., with a margin of error of ± 290 years. And maize pollen found in the valley of Mexico, 200 feet below the surface, must be at least 60,000 years old.⁵ The domestication of maize was taking place in San Agostin, in West Central New Mexico, by about 3000 B.C.⁶ It was being cultivated in Middle America by 2500 B.C.⁷ But maize does not appear in Peru—not even in Northern Peru—till after the end of the Huaca Prieta Age, that is to say till after about 1250 B.C.⁸ In Northern Peru in the Virú valley the carbon-14 test indicates that plain pottery came in about 1200 B.C. and maize perhaps not till about 848 B.C.⁹ or perhaps even not till about 715 B.C., which appears to be the carbon-14-test mean date for the Cupisnique phase of North Peruvian coastal culture.¹⁰

Maize cultivation and the art of pottery are not the only elements of culture that appear to have been diffused from Middle America to the Andean World during the last millennium B.C. The idea of the platform mound seems to have been diffused in this direction between 1000 and 500 B.C.¹¹ Rocker-stamped decoration of pottery appears in Mexico *circa* 1000–500 B.C. and in North-West Peru *circa* 700 B.C.¹² Rocker-stamped decoration and the platform mound and maize appear in North-West Peru simultaneously.¹³ The diffusion of 'resist-dye' painting is another example.¹⁴ In general, during the last millennium B.C., there seems to have

¹ Willey: 'Estimated Correlations', p. 372; 'The Intermediate Area', p. 7. According to J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 30, more than a hundred food plants were cultivated in the Americas and more than thirty of these in Peru. Cp. G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 36. A list of pre-Columbian domesticated plants in the Andean highlands is given by W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird in *Andean Culture History*, pp. 30–31. These two authorities claim, *ibid.*, p. 29, that the cultivation of the potato, coca, quinoa, and oca originated in the Andean area.

² Willey: 'The Intermediate Area', p. 7. Cp. G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 41.

³ i.e. late Archaic in terms of Willey's and Phillips' revised classification (A. J. T.).

⁴ 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 792.

⁵ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 30. Willey, however, gives the carbon-14 date of the maize in Bat Cave as *circa* 2500 B.C. ('The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 33).

⁶ Willey and Phillips, 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 756–7. C. S. Coon, *The History of Man*, p. 353, gives the date as 5000 B.C.

⁷ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 581.

⁸ Mason, *op. cit.*, pp. 31 and 35. Cp. W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 126.

⁹ G. R. Willey: *Prehistoric Settlement Patterns in the Virú Valley, Peru*, p. 34.

¹⁰ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 581. On p. 577, *ibid.*, Willey dates the beginning of the Cupisnique phase *circa* 1000 B.C. Bushnell, *Peru*, p. 41, places the arrival of maize in Peru about 1000 B.C. Willey dates it *circa* 700 B.C. in 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 33.

¹¹ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 583; *idem*: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', pp. 36–37.

¹² Willey: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', pp. 34–36.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁴ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', pp. 583–4.

been a diffusion of the Middle American Formative stage culture of Tlatilco, on the Mexican plateau near the present-day Mexico City, to Chavín, in the north-western highlands of the Andean World,¹ as well as to the north-west coast of Peru in the Cupisnique (Coastal Chavín) phase of culture there. There are geographical links between Tlatilco and Chavín in Honduras at Playa de los Muertos in the Ulua Valley and on the Babahoyo River in coastal Ecuador.² Among the features shared with the Tlatilco culture by the Chavín and Cupisnique cultures, Willey mentions³ (in addition to the rocker-stamped decoration) incised colour zones in pottery decoration, stirrup-spouted vessels, pottery stamps, whistling jars, the jaguar motif, and a concept of dualism. On the other hand, there is no parallel in the Tlatilco culture to the massive buildings at Chavín, and none in the Chavín culture to the Tlatilco culture's pottery figurines.⁴

The technique of making figurines in moulds seems to have spread from the Teotihuacán Classic culture of Middle America to the Andean World early in the first millennium of the Christian Era.⁵ Willey conjectures⁶ that the mould technique may have travelled by sea from Middle America to Ecuador. And it seems certain that a sea-passage, based on ports on the north-west coast of Ecuador, was at least one of the routes by which metallurgy was diffused to Middle America from the Andean World.⁷

6. WHAT WERE THE EXTENT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRE-COLUMBIAN CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OLD WORLD AND THE AMERICAS?

It seems certain that the first human occupants of the Americas came, like their successors, from the Old World, and that this happened at what is a relatively late date in the time-scale of Old-World human history. In the Americas no trace has been found of anthropoid apes, and none of any kinds of hominid other than *homo sapiens*.⁸ The predominant type of

¹ G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, pp. 52-53.

² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

³ In 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 35; and in 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 58x.

⁴ Bushnell, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁵ Willey: 'The Intermediate Area', p. 9.

⁶ In 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', pp. 583-4.

⁷ Willey, *op. cit.*, p. 584. According to Willey, 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 41, 'American metallurgical techniques were first developed in South America.' Gold work is found in North-West Peru (in the Lambayeque valley) as early as the Coastal Chavín horizon, copper work in the Gallinazo period, i.e. the transition from the Formative to the Classic. Metal was first used for weapons and tools in North-West Peru in the Mochica period (*ibid.*, p. 41). Bronze was invented in the south-east highlands of the Andean World in the classic Tiahuanaco period, and was eventually diffused to Ecuador by the Incas (*ibid.*, p. 42). Copper tools had been in use in Ecuador as early as the Mochica period of North-West Peru (*ibid.*, p. 42). On the other hand, in the Maya cultural province of Middle America metal objects were not in circulation before the Late Classic period, circa A.D. 900-1000, and then only as foreign imports (*ibid.*, p. 42). Copper tools seem to have come to the south-west coast of Mexico in the Late Postclassic period direct by sea from Ecuador, and Ecuadorian mariners seem to have been the middlemen between the Andean World and Middle America (*ibid.*, pp. 42-43). According to Willey, 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 584, metallurgy arrived in Middle America from the Andean World within the last five centuries before the Spanish conquest; according to C. S. Coon, *The History of Man*, pp. 345-6, it arrived only within the last three centuries before that date.

⁸ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 20.

pre-Columbian *homo sapiens* in the Americas is Proto-Mongoloid, but the oldest skulls found in the Americas are dolichocephalic, of an Australoid-Melanesoid type.¹ These various pre-Columbian representatives of *homo sapiens* entered the Americas via Alaska, during the latest (so far) of the glaciations. In that age, sea-level may have been 300 feet lower than it is now. The present Behring Straits will have been an isthmus. And the geological evidence indicates that this isthmus and the Mackenzie River basin were unglaciated at the time.² 'Early migration southward from Alaska was mainly in the intermontane and High Plains "corridors" on either side of the Rocky Mountains.'³ Along the Pacific coast of North America remains dating back to the 'Lithic' Age are relatively rare.⁴ They are also rare in Peru and Bolivia.⁵ In South America 'Lithic' remains are concentrated in temperate and arid areas—perhaps because these provided better hunting.⁶ The earliest human entrants into the Americas from the Old World brought their Old-World Palaeolithic tools with them. The carbon-14 test gives an antiquity of 9,000 years to a pair of sandals found in a cave in Oregon, and an antiquity of 8,639 years for the human occupation of a cave near the southern tip of South America.⁷ On the High Plains of central and southern North America the date of 'Early Lithic' (i.e. late Pleistocene and early Post-Pleistocene) remains is *circa* 8000–4000 B.C.⁸ 'Early Lithic' remains astride the Straits of Magellan are dated, by the carbon-14 test, 6688 B.C., with a margin of error of ± 450 years.⁹ Willey and Phillips date the Lithic Age in the Americas *circa* 20000–5000 B.C.¹⁰ 'By 5000 B.C. or before, Man had found his way over most of the New World.'¹¹ In fact, as C. S. Coon puts it,¹² a single migration across the Behring Straits in the Fourth Glacial Age suffices to explain the human occupation of all the Americas except the Eskimo region by about 5000 B.C.

This first chapter of the history of Man in the Americas is not controversial. The controversies arise over the question of later contacts, and the related question whether such contacts, if they occurred, were made by sea across the breadth of the Pacific Ocean and whether, if so, the traffic was one-way or was reciprocal.

Braidwood holds¹³ that civilization has arisen independently in two places: the Tigris-Euphrates basin and the New World. Kroeber, too, judges¹⁴ that,

'all in all' the Americas' 'culture has evidently both developed and crystallised independently of that of the [Old-World] *Oikoumenē*. The New World possesses its own heartland of civilization, stretching from Central

¹ J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, pp. 25–27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ Willey and Phillips: *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), p. 96.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁷ Mason, *op. cit.*, p. 21. Willey, however, dates the earliest human occupation of South America as late as 7500–5000 B.C. in 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 43.

⁸ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 731.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 737–8.

¹⁰ Willey and Phillips (1958), p. 201.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² In *The History of Man*, p. 352.

¹³ R. J. Braidwood: *The Near East and the Foundations of Civilization*, p. 1.

¹⁴ In *The Nature of Culture*, p. 394.

Mexico to somewhat beyond Peru. The axis of this cultural Nuclear America is oriented without reference to that of the ancient *Oikoumenê*. It is both well separated from it and pointed in a different direction.'

In Kroeber's view¹ the histories of the Old-World civilizations and the New-World civilizations 'are not, as far as we can see, parts of a single plot. Resemblances are either analogies instead of homologies; or, where they are the latter, they are also *disjecta membra*.' Willey, too, holds² that Nuclear America, to the best of our knowledge, 'stands clearly apart and essentially independent from the comparable culture core of the Old World'. Nuclear America and the Old-World *Oikoumenê* are parallel cultural structures. 'Within each, diverse civilizations (or styles) have sprung up as unique re-workings of a common cultural content held within the *Oikoumenê*.'³ As Kroeber sees it,⁴ the independence of the Pre-Columbian American civilizations is made probable by the absence, in them, of iron, wheels, ploughs, the usual grains and domestic animals, stringed instruments, ordeals, and proverbs. In plough-agriculture Kroeber sees⁵ a specific cultural pattern, which is unlikely to have been invented more than once. He does not feel the same about agriculture itself, and he points out that the pattern of agriculture in the Americas and in the Old World is not the same. Kroeber's view on this point is shared by J. A. Mason. More than a hundred food plants, Mason notes,⁶ were cultivated in the Americas, and,

'of these, only very few, such as gourds, cotton, sweet potatoes, possibly plantains, peanuts, and coconuts, have close enough relatives in the Old World to suggest importation (and the sweet potato almost certainly was of American origin); the great majority have no foreign congeners, but rather close wild relatives in America.'

That bronze should have been invented twice over—once in Sumer and then independently in the Andean highlands—is surprising, if true. Kroeber submits⁷ that, all the same, it seems probable that bronze was invented independently in the New World when one takes into consideration all the associated data, such as the shapes and uses of the objects made of it. He notes⁸ that the Sumerians and the Chinese used their bronze for making swords and ritual vessels and that the Andeans did not.

Neither Kroeber nor Willey seeks to deny that there was some diffusion of elements of culture from the Old World to the Americas in the Post-Palaeolithic Age. Willey states his position as follows:⁹

'I am unconvinced of the linkages of style, in art and architecture, which have been advanced (Heine-Geldern and Eckholm 1951; Eckholm 1953). On the other hand, certain technical inventions, modes, or complex features do argue for pre-Columbian contact.'

¹ Ibid.

² 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 571.

³ Ibid.

⁴ In op. cit., p. 60.

⁵ Ibid., p. 91.

⁶ In *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, p. 30.

⁷ Ibid., p. 60.

⁸ Ibid., p. 91.

⁹ In 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 585.

'The Early Lithic and Archaic reflect a general situation of marginal dependence on the Old World.'¹ Willey and Phillips consider² the possibility that the 'Archaic' culture of the Americas may have been derived from Northern Eurasia. The culture of the north-west coast of North America appears to be 'Archaic' in all its phases;³ and here 'Asiatic and possibly Oceanic influences played a more decisive role than those from more southerly parts of the North American continent'.⁴ Kroeber notes⁵ that northern North America has received by import from Asia a number of non-mutually related items: e.g. the composite bow, slat-armour, conical tents, scapulomancy, bear rituals, the shamanistic tambourine drum, the magic flight story, and so on. But, in his view,⁶ this indicates that North America was *not* a passage-way for historic continuity between the Old-World *Oikoumenê* and Nuclear America. North America has *not* played the transmissional role that has been played by Turkestan. The same point is made in another form by Willey and Phillips.⁷ As they put it, the fact of diffusion 'does not deny that the cultures of human societies are integrated functioning wholes rather than random assemblages of elements, but it does negate the theory that such cultures, or institutions within cultures, are necessarily transmitted as integrated wholes'.

Willey and Phillips also insist⁸ that the independence of the pre-Columbian American civilizations increased *pari passu* with their development.

'With the Preformative⁹ . . . we begin to reckon with elements that have no specific Old-World parallels. . . . Asiatic influences may have continued to filter through from the North, or directly across the Pacific, but these influences were never again paramount except on the periphery of the North American continent. Leaving aside the important but unresolved question of whether or not trans-Pacific influences were significant forces in the rise of American agricultural civilizations,¹⁰ there can be no doubt that the Nuclear American centers (Middle America to Peru) were culturally dominant in the later stages of New World development.'

These general considerations, put forward by Kroeber, Willey, and Phillips, seem decisive. They hold good in the face of evidence that particular elements of culture were diffused from the Old World to the Americas and also, in a much smaller number of instances, in the opposite direction. The evidence cited for these cultural contacts and interchanges looks as if it were very uneven in value. There are sweeping dogmatic assertions that can be discounted, but there are also well-attested facts that cannot be explained away, and some of these are enigmas in our present state of knowledge. The difficulty of the problem

¹ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 794. ² *Ibid.*, p. 744. ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 750-1. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 751.

⁵ In *The Nature of Culture*, p. 394.

⁷ 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 729-30.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 794.

⁹ i.e. Late Archaic and Early Formative, in Willey's and Phillips's own revised terminology (A. J. T.).

¹⁰ Willey is sceptical about the possibility of identical culture traits having been introduced separately into Middle America and into Peru by diffusion across the Pacific ('The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 586).

has been accentuated by the results of the application of the carbon-14 test in the field of Pre-Columbian American archaeology. This has consistently set back the dates of the earlier phases of Pre-Columbian American history as compared with the previous datings obtained by dead-reckoning on the basis of estimates of the time required for the depositing of such-and-such a thickness of stratum of human refuse. The results of the carbon-14 test may be surprising, and they are subject to many possibilities of error, so that they have to be accepted with some reserve unless and until we obtain a large enough number of them to be able to arrive at a statistical average. On the other hand, datings based on a supposed correlation between thickness of deposit and passage of time are incurably subjective.

When we have reduced the alleged correspondences between particular Old-World and New-World culture elements to a minimum, what remains is still impressive.

The greatest puzzle of all is presented by the history of cotton. The earliest known Old-World cotton fabrics come, it is said,¹ from Mohenjodaro. According to Kroeber,² cotton originated in India and spread from there till, in the end, it largely replaced wool in 'Iraq, linen in Egypt and Europe, hemp in China and Japan. 'Its abundant growth and use in Peru precedes that in either China or the West.'

'It has been established that the cultivated New-World cottons resulted from the hybridisation of Old-World cotton and a wild American cotton plant,³ probably *Gossypium raimondii* of Peru.'⁴

And it is the unanimous conclusion of botanists 'that Old-World cotton could have been introduced into America only by human agency'.⁵

'Aboriginal American cultivated cotton has recently been indicated to the satisfaction of botanists to be a hybrid between Asiatic cultivated and American wild cotton. Cotton was present in the lowest agricultural, pre-ceramic horizons of coastal Peru. Carriage by human hands across the Pacific at this early period would appear to be the only explanation.'⁶

The carbon-14 test has now set back the date of this pre-maize and pre-pottery, but not pre-cotton, stage of culture in Peru to 2550-1250 B.C.⁷ According to R. Heine-Geldern,⁸ J. R. Bird found crude cotton textiles at the pre-ceramic site of Huaca Prieta, in North-West Peru, which he dates *circa* 2575-2370 B.C. by the carbon-14 test. In fact, by 2500 B.C. cotton was being cultivated in both the Indus valley and Peru.⁹

At Huaca Prieta at this period a species of gourd was being cultivated that was practically identical with one cultivated in Polynesia.¹⁰ According to Coon,¹¹ gourds were originally domesticated in Africa or India.

¹ R. Heine-Geldern: 'Some Problems of Migration in the Pacific', in *Kultur und Sprache* (Vienna 1952, Herold), p. 346.

² *The Nature of Culture*, p. 388.

³ According to Coon: *The History of Man*, p. 255, cultivated American cotton has thirteen large chromosomes, like wild American cotton, and also thirteen small chromosomes, like both wild and cultivated Indian cotton.

⁴ Heine-Geldern, *ibid.*, p. 346.

⁵ Heine-Geldern, *ibid.*

⁶ Mason, *op. cit.*, p. 24; *cp.* p. 32. See also G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 26.

⁷ Mason, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁸ *In loc. cit.*, pp. 346-7.

⁹ Coon: *The History of Man*, pp. 304-5.

¹⁰ Mason, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

¹¹ *In op. cit.*, p. 354.

Coon concludes¹ that, if cotton and gourds were brought to America by human agency, this must have been the work of Neolithic navigators. This is as much as to say that the evidence forces upon us a *reductio ad absurdum*. But so incredible a conclusion is surely not necessary. If there is a possibility that the archaeologically well attested influence of the Sumeric Civilization on the late predynastic culture of Upper Egypt towards the end of the fourth millennium B.C. was diffused by sea via the Indian Ocean, it is perhaps just conceivable that Sumerian or Indian navigators may have found their way across the Pacific (no doubt unintentionally and accidentally) 500 or 1,000 years later. In any case the carriers cannot have been the Micronesians or the Polynesians. The carbon-14 test dates the first human occupation of Western Micronesia between 1727 and 1327 B.C., the occupation of the Marianas *circa* 1500 B.C., and the occupation of Hawaii *circa* A.D. 825-1125.² Yet

'While it is certain that the Polynesians did not carry the cultivated cotton plant from the Old World to America, it is equally certain that it was American cultivated cotton which subsequently was introduced into the Polynesian islands.'³

The sweet potato also seems to have come to Polynesia from America before the arrival of European mariners in the Pacific. It was found already being cultivated in Polynesia by the eighteenth-century European explorers.⁴ It was found in Easter Island, Hawaii, and New Zealand,⁵ and in both Easter Island and New Zealand there were a great number of varieties. The name by which it is known in Polynesia also points to a South American origin. In the Quechua language of the Andean World the sweet potato is called *kumar*, *komal*, *kumal*. It is called *kumara* in New Zealand, Raratonga, the Tuomotos, Mangareva, Easter Island; *umara* or *umaa* in Tahiti; *kumala* in Tonga; *'umala* in Samoa; *uala* or *uwala* in Hawaii; *kumaa* in the Marquesas; *ku'a'ra* in Mangaia.⁶

The question whether the mariners who brought the sweet potato and cotton from America to Polynesia were Americans or Polynesians is one that is notoriously still in dispute. Hornell stresses the efficiency that had been attained in the technique of shipbuilding in both Polynesia and South America before the advent of the Europeans. In Polynesia 'double canoes of large carrying capacity were possessed by the people of every principal island group'.⁷ In A.D. 1526 Pizarro's pilot Bartolomeo Ruiz captured, *en route* between the Isthmus of Panamá and Peru, a thirty-ton balsa raft with bipod masts (like Burman and Indonesian boats), cotton sails, and hennequen rigging.⁸ Mason holds⁹ that the

¹ In op. cit., p. 59.

² A. Sharp: *Ancient Voyagers in the Pacific*, pp. 84 and 100.

³ Heine-Geldern, *ibid.*, p. 347.

⁴ R. B. Dixon: 'The Problem of the Sweet Potato in Polynesia', in *The American Anthropologist*, New Series, vol. 34, No. 1 (January-March, 1932), p. 40. Cp. J. Hornell: 'Was there pre-Columbian Contact between the People of Oceania and South America?' in *The Journal of the Polynesian Society*, vol. 54 (Wellington, N.Z., 1945), pp. 186-7.

⁵ Dixon in loc. cit., p. 44; Coon, op. cit., p. 357.

⁶ Hornell, *ibid.*, p. 175. Cp. Mason, op. cit., p. 23; A. Sharp: *Ancient Voyagers in the Pacific*, p. 87.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁷ Hornell in loc. cit., p. 169.

⁹ In op. cit., p. 21.

elements of culture shared by the American societies with Polynesia, Melanesia, and South-East Asia are too many, and the correspondences too close, to be dismissed as being accidental coincidences. At the same time he points out that 'Polynesians did not reach Easter Island before the fourteenth century A.D.', and that there is no evidence that they had any predecessors who were their equals in navigational skill.¹ He also notes that there is no trace of any infusion of Polynesian blood in the Pre-Columbian population of the Americas.² Indeed, as we have seen, chronology rules out the possibility that the Polynesians can have played any appreciable part in conveying elements of Old-World culture to the Americas, even if we accept Hornell's thesis³ that the Polynesians made systematic long-distance voyages of exploration. But account should also be taken of A. Sharp's thesis that there were no deliberate voyages, even between Eastern and Western Polynesia;⁴ that 'all these separate worlds were settled by one-way voyages of isolated canoes';⁵ and that 'no accounts of deliberate two-way contact have been found'.⁶

A number of miscellaneous culture elements common to the Old World and the Americas have been noticed. H. G. Creel, for instance, notices that a particular make of stone knife, which is characteristic of the Shang Culture in China, as well as the composite bow and the sleeved coat, has a circum-polar diffusion, and that the knife is found in the New World as far afield as South America.⁷ He draws attention to the affinity between the art of the Shang and that of the Pre-Columbian peoples along the north-west coast of North America.⁸ In particular he mentions the motif of bisected animals, joined only at the nose.⁹ Willey notes that the rocker-stamped decoration, which was eventually diffused to Peru from Mexico,¹⁰ had previously been diffused to Mexico from North-East Asia.¹¹ Mason notes¹² that 'on the coast of Chile characteristic stone implements have been found that must have come from Easter Island'. The pan-pipes in use in early China and in Peru are identical in detail.¹³ The chewing of betel nut in Malaya, Indonesia, and the Pacific has its counterpart in the chewing of coca in the Andean World, and in both cases the drug is chewed with an admixture of lime.¹⁴ Bark cloth and feather mosaics were manufactured on both sides of the Pacific by identical processes.¹⁵ Weaving was done by the same processes, including methods of keeping part of the fabric untouched by the dye (the 'resist-dye' process).¹⁵ Heine-Geldern's list¹⁶ of culture elements common to the Old World and the Americas includes the *cire perdue* process of casting metal; the use of tin; the colouring of gold by chemical processes; methods of weaving; tie-dyeing (i.e. 'resist-dyeing'); batik;

¹ Ibid., p. 23.

² Ibid., p. 25.

³ In op. cit., p. 168.

⁴ A. Sharp: *Ancient Voyagers in the Pacific*, p. 12.

⁵ Ibid., p. 30.

⁶ Ibid., p. 78.

⁷ Creel: *Studies*, pp. 173-4 and 246-7; *The Birth of China*, p. 97.

⁸ *Studies*, p. 249.

⁹ *Studies*, p. 248.

¹⁰ See p. 356.

¹¹ G. R. Willey: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 35; idem: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 585.

¹² In op. cit., pp. 24-25.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 24-25 and 231.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 24-25 and 142.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

¹⁶ In *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), pp. 91-92.

the parasol as an emblem of royalty; the ball-game;¹ the symbolization of the points of the compass by colours—and these the same colours on both sides of the Pacific. Another list of Heine-Geldern's² is longer.

'To mention only a few out of many items of Asiatic cultural elements we find in Peru: Highly characteristic art motifs of the Late Chou period of China in the Chavín culture; an Asiatic form of the loom; gauze weaving and other Asiatic weaving techniques; the lost-wax (*cire perdue*) process of metal-casting; cormorant fishing; metal mirrors; star-shaped clubs (found also in Eastern Asia); the use of the throne, the litter, and the umbrella as insignia of rank and royalty, the umbrella being of a very unusual type, known only from Peru and from China, where it appears already in the second century A.D.'

So long as Heine-Geldern is dealing in terms of particular elements of culture, he is on uncontroversial ground in so far as he can bring forward convincing evidence that the elements that he pronounces to be identical really are so. Mason and Willey and Kroeber agree that a number of elements were diffused from the Old World to the Americas, and a smaller number in the opposite direction. Such facts, when demonstrated, have to be accepted, even though the dates and circumstances and agencies of the transmission remain obscure. But Heine-Geldern plunges into deeper waters when he suggests that the whole configuration of an Old-World culture made its way into the Americas complete. In another context³ he maintains that the motifs of Andean sculpture of the Chavín horizon echo those of the Chinese sculpture of the eighth century B.C., and that the motifs of the Andean Salinar culture echo those of the Chinese culture of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.⁴ He holds that the influence of the subsequent Dong-son culture of North-Eastern Indochina was still more potent in the Americas from Panamá to Northern Chile and North-Western Argentina—especially in metallurgical designs and processes.⁵ As for the Tajín culture of Eastern Mexico, he writes⁶ that 'one would be justified in speaking of a local variant of the Chinese art of the seventh to the fourth centuries B.C.'. He suggests⁶ that the Hindu-Buddhist culture of South-East Asia influenced the architecture, art, symbols, cosmological ideas, institutions, insignia, and games of Middle America—especially in its Olmeca and Maya cultural provinces—in the seventh to tenth centuries A.D. And he concludes⁷ that

'the processes involved in the formation of the Meso-American and Andean civilizations can be compared to those which resulted in the Hinduisation of South-East Asia'.

This daring parallel surely refutes itself. The Indian origin of the culture that was diffused over South-East Asia in and after the early centuries of the Christian Era is attested, not only by styles of art and architecture and by forms of social organization and government, but by

¹ Also mentioned by Willey in 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', pp. 29-31.

² In *Kultur und Sprache*, p. 346.

³ *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956).

⁴ Loc. cit., p. 93.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

the introduction of Indian scripts and Indian literary languages; and this latter evidence would remain uncontroversial, even if it were to be argued that the attribution of the new styles of South-East Asian art to an Indian origin is, by its very nature, subjective and therefore disputable.

During the span of perhaps ten or twelve thousand years that intervened between the arrival of Palaeolithic Man in the Americas via Alaska and the eventual arrival of Modern Western Man there via the Atlantic, there is evidence that particular elements of culture made their way, by whatever routes, to the Americas from the Old World. But the thesis that the same transit was made by complete configurations of culture seems to go far beyond the attested facts. If this finding is the right one, the pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas must be regarded as having been original creations of the descendants of those representatives of *homo sapiens* who had entered the Americas from the Old World in the last phase of the Palaeolithic Age. 'Almost every element of culture in the New World can be explained on the basis of a purely local growth.'¹

XI. THE CONFIGURATION OF MIDDLE AMERICAN AND ANDEAN HISTORY

PRE-COLUMBIAN American archaeology has made enormous advances since the years 1927-33, when I was planning the first ten volumes of this book and writing the first three. But the effect on the pictures of Andean history and of Middle American history has not been the same. The general configuration of Andean history remains much what it was, in spite of the filling in of details and the lengthening of the chronological vista.² On the other hand the general configuration of Middle American history has been transformed out of all recognition.

In the late nineteen-twenties the picture of Middle American history was dominated by the Maya Classic Civilization in the tropical lowlands of Northern Guatemala and in the Mexican territories adjoining it on the north-west (as, in the same years, the picture of Pre-Hellenic Aegean history was dominated by the Minoan Civilization of Crete). The Olmeca cultural province of Middle America, in the tropical lowlands along the Atlantic coast of Mexico south of Vera Cruz, was still quite out of the picture, though subsequent archaeological discoveries here have led one school of archaeologists to see in the Olmeca province the

¹ C. S. Coon: *The History of Man*, p. 351.

² The vista of both Andean and Middle American history has been lengthened partly by new discoveries, and partly by the redating of already known artefacts by the carbon-14 test. This test seems, more or less consistently, to give dates that are earlier than those previously guessed, by dead reckoning backwards from the advent of the Spaniards, on the basis of estimates of the time that would have been taken to lay down such and such a thickness of debris. This conversion of strata into time-spans is, of course, highly conjectural. On the other hand, the carbon-14 test's margin of error is also high, unless and until a great enough number of tests have been made to produce a statistical average.

birthplace of the whole Middle American Civilization.¹ Again, the cultural province on the plateau, including the Valley of Mexico, and the cultural province in Yucatan, did not, in the nineteen-twenties, enter into the picture until after the mysterious abandonment of the Classic Maya sites. Archaeologists accepted the tradition presented in the Yucatec Mayan codices and in the information gathered by the earliest Spanish inquirers. And this tradition was that the Mayan civilization in Yucatan was started there by migrants from the already abandoned Classic sites to the south and south-west. As for the plateau, history here began, in the nineteen-twenties, with the arrival of the Toltecs from the north. The civilization of the Classic stage and age at Teotihuacán was still below the archaeological horizon, though the pyramids of the Sun and Moon had been towering into the sky ever since the days of their Classic builders.

Using, as I did, an Hellenic model to interpret the histories of non-Hellenic civilizations, I concluded, from the picture presented by the archaeologists at the time, that in Middle America there had been two generations of civilizations. The first generation had been represented by the Maya Classic Civilization of the tropical lowlands; and, when this had mysteriously come to an end, it had been followed by two new civilizations that were affiliated to it in the sense in which the Western and Byzantine civilizations were affiliated to the Hellenic. One of these two affiliated civilizations of the second generation in Middle America was that of the Postclassic Maya, followed by Toltec, immigrants into Yucatan; the other was that of the Toltecs and their Aztec successors on the plateau.

Thirty years' progress in Middle American archaeology has effaced the picture on which this construction of mine was based. The Middle American World now appears as a geographical unity with much the same area from beginning to end. The tropical lowland Maya region, in which the Maya Classic Civilization rose and fell, turns out to be only one Middle American cultural province out of five; and the conquest of the tropical forest here for civilization turns out to be a relatively late event in the long course of Middle American history. The Middle American Civilization had almost as old a footing in Yucatan as in the forested lowlands farther south, and perhaps an older footing on the highlands of Southern Guatemala, on the Mexican plateau, and in the 'Olméca' cultural province in the tropical lowlands round Vera Cruz.²

In the light of this new knowledge I now have to abandon my previous construction of three distinct civilizations in the Middle American cultural area, and to think in terms of a single civilization here, as in the Andean World.

One general effect of the progress of archaeological discovery in both these Pre-Columbian American worlds has, indeed, been to bring out points of resemblance between the cultural configurations and the histories of their respective civilizations, and at the same time to bring

¹ G. R. Willey and P. Phillips suggest, with greater caution, that the Middle American Classic Civilization may have started slightly earlier in the Olméca cultural province than elsewhere (*Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), p. 185).

² See G. R. Willey: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 39.

out points of difference between their respective styles. Though there is, as we have seen,¹ good archaeological evidence for the diffusion of elements of culture from Middle America to North-West Peru at a time when the Andean World was still in the late 'Archaic' (ex-'Preformative') stage of culture, the style of each of the two civilizations is quite distinctive and the most striking likenesses between them are in their total cultural configuration.² Moreover, though the diffusion of culture elements between these two worlds occurred at least twice—first during the late 'Archaic' (ex-'Preformative') stage of Andean history and again during the last few centuries before the Spanish conquest—the two worlds were not, and never became, geographically contiguous with each other. From first to last they were separated by a region in South-Eastern Central America and North-Western South America, extending from the present-day Honduras and Salvador to the present-day Colombia and highland Ecuador, which kept in step with them only as far as the 'Formative' stage³ of culture and fell out of the running when Middle America and the Andean World each went on to rise to the Classic level.⁴ This makes the similarities between the configurations of the two Pre-Columbian American civilizations all the more remarkable. These similarities are both geographical and historical.

Geographically, each of these two worlds consisted of a number of distinct cultural provinces, in each of which a common civilization was given a particular local colour.⁵ In either world these different provinces were always in communication with each other. In general the more

¹ On pp. 355-7.

² Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 586.

³ See Willey: 'The Interrelated Rise of the Native Cultures of Middle and South America', p. 28; eundem: 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America', p. 11; Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 778; eodsem, 1958, pp. 171-4. Honduras and Salvador never rose to the Classic level. Nicaragua and Costa Rica, too, did not rise above Formative, though their relations with Middle America were with Middle American late Classic and Postclassic. The cultures of Panamá never rose above Formative, though they were late. Nor did the cultures of the Colombian and Ecuadorian highlands. Even in the southernmost of the ten intermont basins of highland Ecuador, civilization was not very old (W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 84). In both Ecuador and Colombia, Pre-Inca culture was pluralistic and was quite distinct from the culture of the central Andean region (ibid., p. 86). 'Ecuador has little stone-carving (except in Manabí), a weak development of architecture and little use of stone buildings, only slight development of terracing and irrigation systems, and little use of the llama. Lacking are highly concentrated populations, large ceremonial centers (except possibly on the coast), cities, and wide political integration' (D. Collier, in W. C. Bennett [ed.]: *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, pp. 85-86). The relative cultural backwardness of even the southern end of highland Ecuador is not surprising, considering the formidableness of the physical barrier separating the Ecuadorian highlands from the cradle of the Andean Civilization in Peru. Cajamarca in Peru is insulated from Loja in Ecuador by 400 kilometres of rough, forest-covered mountains (W. C. Bennett in op. cit., p. 3). Moreover, in the Northern Andes, including the North Peruvian highlands, there is a double rainy season. This enables a rain-forest to occupy the zone between the 10,000-foot contour line and the snow-line; and this excludes llamas and alpacas (ibid., p. 3; W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 16). On the other hand, the Ecuadorian coast did rise to the Classic and Postclassic levels. At Manta, for instance, there was a true Postclassic urban centre (Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 772-4; eodsem, 1958, p. 175). Willey and Phillips (1955, pp. 775 and 788) raise the question whether the Ecuadorian coast may perhaps have risen, at one move, from Formative to Postclassic as a result of trading with Postclassic coastal Peru.

⁴ 'The Classic stage in the New World is limited to Middle America and the central Andes' (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 183).

⁵ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 780.

active the communication between the provinces the higher rose the level of the civilization as a whole. In the Middle American World there were five provinces: the Olmeca region along the Atlantic coast south of Vera Cruz; the Valley of Mexico; Oaxaca; the Guatemalan highlands; and the tropical lowlands (Petén, the Usumacinta River valley, and the Motagua River valley in Guatemala).¹ In Peru there were only two major provinces: the lowlands along the Pacific coast and the highlands overhanging them.² But within each of these there were sharply defined subdivisions. In the coastal lowlands in the earlier stages of Andean history almost every river valley, however small—and, in all, there are about twenty-five of these³—developed the common civilization on distinctive lines of its own. The stretches of desert between the ribbons of green were barriers to intercourse that were not easily or quickly overcome. In the highlands there were six subdivisions: the Cajamarca basin; the Callejón de Huaylas; a portion of the Montaro River valley; the Cuzco basin; the plateau north-west of Lake Titicaca, in what is now Peru; and the plateau south-east of the lake, in what is now Bolivia.⁴

'Two fundamental forces were at work in [the] Classic cultures [of Middle America]. Intercommunication existed among them and was an important factor in their growth. They profited from being a part of a larger community of ideas than did the various cultures of the Middle American Formative. . . . The intertwining of the many varied [regional] strands produced the Classic.⁵ . . . Regionalism persisted, but it was a regionalism in which the various Classic cultures had assimilated sufficient from each other so that all drew upon a common fund of great depth and richness. . . . Yet this intercommunication and interchange were by no means all-embracing. Technologies, elements, things—these were exchanged, but complete idea systems remained regionalised.'⁶

There was inter-regional interaction in Peru as well.⁷ In fact, in both worlds there was a combination of active inter-regional trade with regional ethnocentrism.⁸ In Peru, horizon styles—i.e. styles transcending the provincial and sub-divisional boundaries—are much more frequent than they are in Middle America.⁹ The count of them in Peru runs to five¹⁰ or six.¹¹

¹ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 779; *ibidem*, 1958, p. 184.

² Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 577.

³ W. C. Bennett and J. R. Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 96.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 97–99; Bennett in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, pp. 4–5; G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 14. The eastern cordillera of Bolivia did not come within the Peruvian cultural area (*Andean Culture History*, p. 99; *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 4).

⁵ 'Individually, these strands would have supported nothing of greater moment than a culture like the Mississippian of the eastern United States, with its temple mounds, or the Coclé culture of Panamá, with its fine pottery and metal craft. Together, they emerge as Middle American Civilization' (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 151). The failure of the Formative-stage cultures of the south-western United States to rise to the Classic level, notwithstanding the early date of the maize found in Bat Cave, is perhaps to be explained by the lack, here, of the stimulus of intercourse between different local cultural provinces (*ibid.*, p. 155).

⁶ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 780; see also p. 767. Cp. *ibidem*, 1958, pp. 151 and 187.

⁷ *Ibidem*, 1955, p. 775.

⁸ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 577.

⁹ Willey in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 9.

¹¹ Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, pp. 108–10.

'The two configurations of culture-growth are not only similar but synchronous'—and this over a period of 2,000 years.¹

'The carbon-14 dates tend to make the full flowering of Meso-American and Andean cultures in general coeval, the [Meso-American] Early Classic contemporaneous with Nazca "A", and the Late Classic with Nazca "B", Mochica, and Classic Tiahuanaco.²

Coon notes³ that the American civilizations resemble those Old-World civilizations that grew up gradually (e.g. the Sumeric Civilization), not those that were transformed by sudden impacts from outside (e.g. the Egyptian Civilization). This makes it difficult to delimit the phases of the two Pre-Columbian American civilizations precisely; but most archaeologists now seem to find in both worlds an identical series of four phases: Archaic (ex-'Pre-Formative'); Formative; Classic; and Postclassic.⁴

In the Formative period there is, as we have seen, linkage, as well as synchronicity, between Middle America and Peru.⁵ 'The Peruvian Formative has a closer configurational resemblance to the Middle American Late Formative.'⁶ In Middle America the Formative begins in the second millennium B.C., and in Peru soon after.⁷ The Chavín horizon in the Andean World was contemporary with the Olmeca horizon in Middle America and is to some extent parallel with it. Both horizons were expansive.⁸ The feline motif appears in the artistic expression of Olmeca as well as Chavín religion.⁹ The Formative styles of Middle America and Peru were more like each other, besides being each internally more homogeneous, than the subsequent Classic styles.¹⁰

'The subsequent Classic civilizations of Middle America—Lowland and Highland Maya, Monte Albán, Tajín, Teotihuacán—all drew upon this Formative period art and intellectual achievement. It is as though, from Late Formative times forward, Middle American societies were participating not only in common technical traditions but in an ideational heritage.'¹¹

In the Peruvian Classic, on the other hand, regional differences crystallized into what amounted to distinctive civilizations.¹²

¹ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 588.

² R. Wauchope: 'Implications of Radiocarbon Dates from Middle and South America', in Publication No. 18 (1954), p. 25, of the Middle American Research Institute of Tulane University, New Orleans.

³ In *The History of Man*, p. 353.

⁴ See Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', pp. 573 and 577.

⁵ Willey: 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America', p. 2.

⁶ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 586.

⁷ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 765. Cf. *ibidem*, 1958, p. 147. Here, on the basis of carbon-14 tests, more precise dates are given: 1359±250 B.C. for Middle American Formative, 714±200 B.C. for Peruvian.

⁸ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 586; *idem*: 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America', p. 10.

⁹ Wauchope, *loc. cit.*, p. 32.

¹⁰ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 788.

¹¹ Willey: 'The Intermediate Area of Nuclear America', p. 10.

¹² Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 782.

The Classic is easy to identify and even to date,¹ but it is difficult to define. Its criteria are qualitative and relative: aesthetic excellence, religious climax, general florescence,² and differentiation between the cultures of the different provinces of each of the two worlds.³ The Middle American and Peruvian Classic cultures were approximately contemporary.⁴ But in the Classic Age the two civilizations diverged,⁵ to reconverge in the Postclassic.⁶ In the Classic period the differences were, indeed, sharp. Metallurgy was by then already common in the Andean World but was still rare in Middle America. There was already irrigation in coastal Peru, but not yet in Middle America. There was already organized warfare and conquest in North-West Peru,⁷ but not yet in Middle America. On the other hand, in the Andean World there was no calendar and no system of writing.⁸

The Classic Age ended in catastrophe, apparently in most cases in the form of war, though war does not seem to account for the abandonment of the lowland Maya Classic sites that had been won with such labour from the tropical forest.⁹

¹ On the north-west coast of Peru, Formative turns into Classic during the Gallinazo period. Gallinazo III may rank as being Classic (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 177). Carbon-14 tests have pushed the beginning of Peruvian Classic back towards the beginning of the Christian Era and have made it approximately contemporary with the beginning of Middle American Classic (ibid., p. 189). This begins *circa* A.D. 300, or 260 years earlier according to Spinden's chronology. The carbon-14 tests support Spinden's system (ibid., pp. 184-5).

² Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 778.

³ Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 191. These two authorities also observe (ibid., p. 182) that 'the Classic stage in native New World cultures marks the beginning of urbanism', and that this 'overrides in importance' the criteria listed by them in 1955. There is material evidence for urbanism at Teotihuacán in its Classic Age and in coastal North-West Peru in the Gallinazo III period. But they admit that 'in other cases . . . of which the Classic Maya of the Petén lowlands is a prime example, urban dwelling clusters are either lacking or undiscovered'. And the case of the Maya Classic Civilization compels them (ibid., p. 183, footnote 2) to emphasize 'the functional, rather than the purely formal, definition of urbanism. . . . The crucial factor', they here suggest, 'is the number of people who could be drawn upon and organised in the interests of the society and the culture. Maya society undoubtedly drew upon and coordinated the energies of a great many people.' The words 'Maya society' in this context presumably mean a directing minority of the participants in the society. This minority will have had the leisure to direct because it will have been exempt from spending its time and energy on day-to-day economic tasks. This brings us back to my suggestion, on p. 278, that the presence of a leisured minority is a more accurate and illuminating criterion of civilization than urbanism is.

⁴ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 782.

⁵ The Middle American and Andean civilizations were more different from each other in the Classic Age than either before or after (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 192).

⁶ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 783-4.

⁷ Mochica representative art is a testimonial to warfare' (Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 579). 'Militarism seems to have been a force in old Peruvian society from an early time. In this . . . Peru differs from Middle America' (Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 196).

⁸ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 587; Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), p. 783.

⁹ There is still no agreement about the answer to this baffling question.

Some scholars have sought to account for the abandonment of the ceremonial centres by the hypothesis of a loss of faith, among the peasantry, in the efficacy of the priests' burdensome prescriptions for bringing rain to make the crops grow. This hypothesis is advocated by, for example, S. F. de Borhegyi, 'The Development of Folk and Complex Cultures in the Southern Maya Area', in *American Antiquity*, vol. xxi, No. 4, pp. 343-56. De Borhegyi maintains (ibid., pp. 343-4) that there is archaeological evidence for the

'The carbon-14 dating of previous periods and the known dates of the proto-historic horizon tend to indicate that socio-political upheavals followed the full flowering of high culture in both Middle and South America at about the same time.'¹

In Middle America one of the most striking pieces of evidence for this is the apparently violent destruction of Classic Teotihuacán. In the Andean World the corresponding symptom is the sudden, and apparently violent and catastrophic, expansion of the Tiahuanáco horizon from the south-easternmost subdivision of the highland province over most, though not the whole, of the rest of the Andean World²—perhaps via a secondary centre of diffusion at Huari (Wari) in the Mantaro River basin, in the highlands farther north-westwards.³ The Tiahuanacoid is comparable to the previous Chavinoid and to the later Inca horizon. Yet 'the Tiahuanáco influence, while strong, was not an engulfing or permanent one'.⁴ In the highlands the Tiahuanáco style had less influence in the almost adjacent Cuzco district than anywhere else in Peru.⁵ Along the coast the Huari-Tiahuanáco influence swamped the South-East (the Nazca sub-division),⁶ but north-westward it spread as far as Chicama only, not to Lambayeque, and it was soon thrown off by Moche.⁷

The salient features of the Postclassic Age in both worlds were militarization, secularization, urbanism,⁸ standardization, and mass produc-

existence of a folk culture in this region, side by side with a sophisticated one, for more than two thousand years. After the Early Formative, he holds (p. 352), each folk society 'existed in a symbiotic relationship with the more complex urban component'. But, at the end of the Late Classic period in this region, folk-cult objects reassert themselves (p. 350). 'Recent evidence points towards the possibility of a revolt of the food-producing classes against the exploitative abuses of the theocrats' (p. 350). De Borhegyi suggests that there was a chain-reaction of revolt which spread all through the Maya region and took a violent form in the north-west, at Bonampak and at Piedras Negras (p. 350).

On the strength of archaeological evidence from the opposite side of the Maya region in southern Belice (British Honduras), this hypothesis is rejected by G. R. Willey: 'The Structure of Ancient Maya Society', in *The American Anthropologist*, New Series, vol. 58, No. 5 (October, 1956), pp. 777-82. Willey here raises the question: How deep was the gulf between the peasantry and the élite in the Maya culture? In this connexion he notes that, in Southern Belice, one finds clusters of house-mounds with small pyramid bases among them. This suggests, to his mind, that the culture was not confined to the great ceremonial centres. Luxury pottery, known from the ceremonial centres, is also found in the refuse in these house-clusters. 'All these British Honduran discoveries add up, I think, to a conception of a Maya peasant class that was reasonably prosperous and participating in a cultural tradition not markedly apart from the inhabitants of the great religious centers.' Moreover, in the Belice Valley in the Post-classic age the peasantry disappeared simultaneously with the great ceremonial centres. This archaeological evidence impugns, in Willey's view, the theory that the fall of the Maya Classic Civilization was due to an internal revolt.

P. Armillas holds 'that the movements of people were the result and not the cause of the crisis. The disintegration was from within, and the internal factor causing the decline was probably an economic crisis' (*A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 108).

Thus there is still no generally accepted explanation of the mystery.

¹ Wauchope, in loc. cit., p. 27.

² J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, pp. 88-89; G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, p. 92.

³ Mason, op. cit., p. 93; Bushnell, op. cit., p. 94; Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 194.

⁴ Mason, op. cit., p. 89.

⁵ Mason, *ibid.*, p. 92; Bushnell, *ibid.*, p. 102; Bennett and Bird, op. cit., p. 200.

⁶ Mason, op. cit., p. 94; Bushnell, op. cit., p. 94.

⁷ Mason, op. cit., p. 94; Bushnell, op. cit., p. 99.

⁸ Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 784. Willey in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, pp. 13-14.

tion.¹ Postclassic militarism developed more abruptly in Middle America than in Peru.² In Peru it was intensified in this age, but there it had already been asserting itself, not merely since the Classic,³ but since the Late Formative.⁴ In the Postclassic age the imposition of ways of life by military conquest was a common phenomenon.⁵ There were 'wide-spread movements of peoples and idea systems throughout each of the two major areas'.⁶ Successive waves of 'Chichimec' barbarians from the north descended on Middle America. The Toltec wave penetrated not only eastwards into Yucatan but also southwards into the Guatemalan highlands.⁷ The following Aztec wave was flooding still more widely when it was suddenly broken by the Spanish conquest. In the Andean World there is no evidence that the wave of violent disturbance represented by the spread of the Tiahuanáco horizon took the form of military conquest resulting in the establishment of an empire.⁸ On the other hand the subsequent Inca horizon is known, from historical records, to be the archaeological imprint of an Andean universal state that was established by force of arms. In both worlds in the Postclassic Age the tendency towards standardization and mass-production was accompanied by a decline in the level of art.⁹

'The native city of the New-World Postclassic had large population aggregates, was the economic (and probably social, political, and religious) hub for outlying populations, maintained complex and diverse divisions of labor among its citizens, and was a sort of politico-religious power.'¹⁰

In Peru the Postclassic cities, unlike the Classic, had a planned layout, especially those along the north-west coast.¹¹ In Postclassic Middle America there were two series of cities: in the first series, Tula on the plateau and Chichén Itzá in Yucatan; in the second series, Tenochtitlan in the Valley of Mexico, Mitla in the Oaxaca cultural province, Tzintzuntzan in Tarasco, west of the Valley of Mexico, Totonacan Cempoala in Vera Cruz, Mayapan in Yucatan.¹² Tenochtitlan had 60,000 inhabitants. These received their supplies by water transport, and part of their food was grown on floating gardens.¹³ Neither Mayapan nor Chichén

¹ Willey and Phillips, 1958, p. 193.

² Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 587. 'It is not likely that the replacement of the priest-controlled society by the war-state was marked by an actual schism. The pyramid and temple centre, symbols of authority in the old system, were retained, enlarged, and glorified. The transfer from sacred to secular was probably accomplished by a gradual shifting in the nature of the powers exercised by public leaders' (Willey in *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 12).

³ In the Classic Age in Peru, not only Moche but all Andean communities except Nazca had turned militarist (Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, pp. 179 and 182).

⁴ Willey and Phillips: 'Method and Theory in American Archaeology, II' (1955), pp. 786-7.

⁵ Ibid., p. 788. Ibidem, 1958, p. 199.

⁶ Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 784.

⁷ See S. F. de Borhegyi: 'The Development of Full and Complex Cultures in the Southern Maya Area', pp. 350-1.

⁸ On this point see Mason, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

⁹ Willey and Phillips, 1955, p. 784. Cp. Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 208; Bennett [ed.]: *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology*, p. 14.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 785.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 785-6; ibidem, 1958, p. 195.

¹² Ibidem, 1955, p. 784; 1958, pp. 196-7.

¹³ Ibidem, 1955, p. 787; 1958, p. 197.

Itzá could compare with Tenochtitlan, and 'we can conclude that urbanisation was decidedly less successful in the Maya lowlands than in the Valley of Mexico'.¹

In coastal Peru, at any rate, the advances in technology during the Formative and Classic periods that made it possible to irrigate and cultivate entire valleys, instead of just their fringes,² were accompanied by increases in population, concentrations of political power, and an exacerbation of warfare and class-divisions. 'Gallinazo is the first Virú period at which we can say, for certain, that there was both large-scale irrigation and extensive wall construction.'³ And irrigation implies political unification of the valley from at least as early as Late Gallinazo.⁴ In the Virú Valley in the Classic period (labelled in this valley 'Late Gallinazo') there were settlements all over the valley; 'both the castillos and the big pyramids represent millions of man-hours of labor'; and the irrigated area was 40 per cent. as large again as it is at the present day.⁵ In the Andean World there was a sharp increase in the size of the states, and consequent diminution in their number, during the second phase of the Postclassic period, which occupied the last four and a half centuries, according to the carbon-14 dating, or the last one and a half, according to the shorter reckoning,⁶ before the political unification of the whole Andean World in the Inca universal state. In this age the whole series of valleys from the north-western to the south-eastern end of the Peruvian coast was divided politically between no more than four states, with formidable fortresses guarding their frontiers. The Chimú Empire, with its capital at Chanchán, laid out on a rectangular plan covering eight, or even eleven, square miles, ruled from the Lambayeque Valley to the Casma Valley. The Cuzimancu Empire, with its capital at Cajamarquilla, held the Chancay, Lurín, and Rimac valleys; south-east of this lay the relatively small Chuquimancu state. The south-easternmost of the four coastal states was the Chincha Empire, which held the Chincha, Pisco, Ica, and Nazca valleys.⁷ If we translate Andean history into terms of Hellenic history and equate the Inca Empire with the Roman Empire, the Pre-Inca regional empires along the coast will correspond to the empires established by Alexander's successors which were eventually extinguished by Roman conquest. The Incas may have borrowed much of their imperial organization and institutions from Chimú,⁸ as the Romans certainly did borrow much of theirs from the Post-Alexandrine Hellenic monarchies.

The Inca conquest of the Andean World was sudden and rapid. According to the chronology now in favour, it was accomplished between the years 1438 and 1493, and within the last thirty of those years (1463-93) the area of the Inca Empire was increased by 1,000 per cent.⁹ Thus the Andean universal state had been in existence for only about forty years by the time of its sudden overthrow by the Spaniards. Yet it

¹ Ibid., 1958, p. 199.

² See p. 341, footnotes 7, 8, 9.

³ G. R. Willey: 'Prehistoric Settlement Patterns in the Virú Valley, Peru', p. 362.

⁴ Ibid., p. 381.

⁵ Ibid., p. 393.

⁶ Mason, op. cit., p. 96.

⁷ See J. A. Mason: *The Ancient Civilizations of Peru*, pp. 96-102; G. H. S. Bushnell: *Peru*, pp. 103-11; Bennett and Bird: *Andean Culture History*, p. 203.

⁸ Bushnell, op. cit., p. 106.

⁹ Mason, op. cit., pp. 116-22. Cp. Bushnell, op. cit., pp. 116-18.

left an impress on the Andean World which even the Spaniards could not efface. The Inca Empire had its counterpart in Middle America in the universal state that the Aztecs were in process of establishing when the arrival of the Spaniards cut this short. At the time of the Spaniards' arrival in Middle America, not only the little state of Tlaxcala, to the east of Tenochtitlan, but the great state of Tarasco, to the west of it, was still holding out. The Aztecs were more atrocious than the Incas, and the resistance to their empire-building was correspondingly more stubborn. Moreover, even as far as they had gone in building their empire up, they had established nothing like the Inca Imperial Government's centralized control over economic and social life. In Middle America under the Aztec regime, the artisans and merchants were still largely independent forces in society.¹

Nevertheless, the general resemblance between the configurations of Middle American and Andean history is striking. And there is also a notable resemblance between the histories of these two pre-Columbian American civilizations and those of a number of civilizations in the Old World. Down to the point where the histories of Middle America and the Andean World are cut short by the Spanish conquest, their pattern is recognizably similar to the patterns of Sumeric, Hellenic, and Sinic history. The pre-Columbian American pattern resembles the Sumeric pattern, in particular, in the gradual rise of civilization out of a pre-civilizational stage of culture.² It resembles both this and the Hellenic and Sinic patterns in the subsequent accentuation of militarism and the consequent eventual unification of society through the overthrow of all the warring states except one by the military might of this sole survivor. In the Andean World this denouement had been reached before the arrival of the Spaniards; in the Middle American World it was within sight.

This resemblance between configurations of history in the Americas and in the Old World is of great significance for the study of human affairs, because the Old-World and the New-World series of events unquestionably occurred quite independently of each other. The resemblance therefore suggests that there must be something in human nature—or at any rate in human circumstances—which has made events take these parallel courses in the Age of the Civilizations. J. A. Mason maintains³ that, 'with only minor deviations, practically all of the great ancient civilizations of the World developed along more or less the same lines'. As he sees it, the drama has been a tragedy in three acts. The first act sees the economic revolution in which agriculture supersedes food-gathering and hunting, and this produces a 'golden age'. In the second act the pressure of increasing population produces conflicts. In the third act the contending states are united by military force. If this has indeed been the plot of the play up to date, can we liberate ourselves from it? Man's recent technological progress has no precedent; yet, by itself, it

¹ Willey: 'The Prehistoric Civilizations of Nuclear America', p. 587.

² The Hellenic Civilization had a previous one, the Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean, in its historical background. Similarly the Sinic Civilization of the Chou period and after had in its historical background the civilization of the Shang period.

³ In *op. cit.*, p. 14. *Cp.* p. 96.

will not suffice to solve the problem of civilization. Unprecedentedly potent technology may be misused for waging unprecedentedly destructive warfare; or, if it is used for increasing the production of the necessities of life, the additional product may be swallowed up by an unplanned and aimless increase in population, without any rise in the average standard of living, either material or spiritual. Thus now, as always, the spiritual virtues of imagination, wisdom, self-control, and, above all, good intent, are the keys to mankind's destiny.

XII. ROME'S PLACE IN HISTORY

AS I see the history of Rome, it is part of the history of what I call 'the Hellenic Civilization', and it is intelligible only in this historical setting. One cannot understand the history of Rome without taking into account the history of the Hellenic World before as well as after Rome began to play her part in it. One can imagine Hellenic history without Rome. Some other Hellenic or Hellenized state might have performed for the Hellenic Society the function that Rome eventually did perform for it. Sparta, Athens, Olynthus, Macedon, Syracuse were all in the running, at different stages of Hellenic history, for being the state that was going to unite the Hellenic World politically. But Roman history without the Hellenic Society and Civilization is not imaginable. There was never any such thing as a self-contained Roman society and civilization, and to try to divorce Rome from Hellenism and to treat Rome as an independent historical entity would make nonsense of Roman history by placing it in an historical vacuum. J. F. Leddy has interpreted my view correctly in saying¹ that

'What is all-important to Toynbee in the history of Rome is her Hellenization, and he seems to think of this cultural conquest almost as the filling of a vacuum. Throughout *A Study of History* we see Rome only in the shadow of Greece, only as the protector of the Greek legacy, always in a Greek context, and (in his technical sense) as the "universal state" briefly sustaining Hellenic Civilization before its final and inevitable collapse.'

The same point is being made by Fyvel when he says² of me that 'he telescopes Greece and Rome into a single Hellenic Society in which all Roman history masks mere disintegration'.

I accept Leddy's interpretation subject to the substitution of the words 'Hellas' or 'Hellenic World' for 'Greece' and the word 'Hellenic' for 'Greek'. In the English language the word 'Greece' suggests a geographical area, more or less conterminous with the present-day Kingdom of Greece, which was never more than part, and originally not the most important part, of the Hellenic World. The most important part of the original Hellas was the west coast of present-day Turkey, and the Hellenic World expanded in the course of its history till, at the

¹ In *The Phoenix*, vol. 11 (1957), No. 4, p. 144.

² T. R. Fyvel in *The Tribune*, 21st March, 1947, p. 20.

time of the establishment of the Augustan Peace in 31 B.C., it extended from Alexandria-on-Nile eastward to Central Asia and the Panjab and westward to the Atlantic coasts of North Africa and Europe. The word 'Greek', too, is a misnomer, because in English it suggests the Greek language, and the domains of the Greek language and of the Hellenic Civilization were never conterminous. From the beginning the Hellenic Society included non-Greek-speaking peoples: for instance, the Luvian-speaking Carians and Lycians; and, as it expanded, it converted many more: for instance, the Lydians, Messapians, Apulians, Etruscans, and, most notable converts of all, the Latin-speaking Romans. On the other hand, in Northern Continental European Greece, north and west of a line joining Thermopylae to Delphi, there were Greek-speaking semi-barbarians and barbarians, some of whom were not Hellenized till a late date in Hellenic history. The Greek-speaking Agrianes and Dentheletae round the head-waters of the Rivers Strymon (Struma) and Oescus (Isker) were not brought within the pale till the kingdom of the Thracian Odrysae was annexed to the Roman Empire by the Emperor Claudius and was then deliberately Hellenized by him and his successors. Subject, however, to this verbal *caveat*, I accept the passage that I have quoted from Leddy's paper as being an accurate statement of my point of view.

This point of view has been vigorously criticized, not only by Leddy, but by other critics as well. J. Vogt, for instance, maintains¹ that it is inadmissible to treat the Roman Age as an appendage to the Hellenistic Age, as if the Roman Age's destiny were determined in advance. In Roman history, he holds, a new force made itself felt. This gave the Roman way of life a distinctive character of its own, and that puts the Roman way, in its own fashion, on a level with the Hellenic way. Rome, according to Vogt, created a new and more profound ideal of human personality. W. den Boer maintains² that,

'though, in the words of Horace, the vanquished triumphed over the victor, the interpretation which considers the history of Italy and Latium to be bound up with Greece even before this victory is alien to historical reality.'

H. Baudet judges³ that I under-estimate Rome, perhaps partly because, for me, Rome is a symbol of unacceptable materialism. H. Marrou suggests⁴ that I am too Athenian-minded to appreciate the Roman Empire at its proper value. H. Holborn makes the same point.⁵

'The Roman Empire receives no praise. . . . Rome's capacity to create law and unity in a chaotic world was her own genius, and it seems arbitrary to disregard her contribution and see in her history a senescent continuation of Hellenic life.'

Leddy, too, takes me to task⁶ for describing the age extending from the

¹ In *Saeculum*, No. 2 (1951), pp. 557-74.

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 236.

³ In *Historie en Metahistorie*, p. 57.

⁴ In *Esprit*, July, 1952, pp. 120-1.

⁵ In *The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947, p. 12.

⁶ In loc. cit., pp. 146-7.

reign of the Emperor Nerva to the reign of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius inclusive as being 'the Indian Summer' of Hellenic history. He considers that I am denigrating that age in giving it this label. W. Gurian finds me inconsistent¹ in bracketing Greeks and Romans together when I draw a distinction between the Irish society of the Post-Graeco-Roman Age and the contemporary Latin West. D. M. Robinson concedes that Rome owed much to Greece; that the changes in Roman society after the Hannibalic War 'resulted from foreign conquests and the economic consequences of imperial expansion'. Italy was not 'a separate and independent entity'. 'Rome and Italy became a part of the Mediterranean economic system.' Yet Robinson, too, protests, in opposition to my treatment of Rome, that 'the Romans were an original people with a capacity for world government and with powers of organisation and unification rarely excelled in all history'.²

What are the Roman achievements that have moved some scholars, at any rate in the Western World, to insist that Rome ought to be treated as a separate historical entity in its own right, rather than as an element, however important, in the history of the Hellenic Civilization? There are two achievements on which, above all, this claim on Rome's behalf is based. One of these is Roman law; the other is Rome's political feat of eventually uniting, in a single 'universal state', the whole of the Hellenic World west of 'Iraq and Iran. The second of these two achievements was, I should say, the key to the first. When once Rome had won for herself the role of being the Hellenic World's unifying state, Roman law was bound to become the oecumenical law of the Hellenic Society, and was consequently bound to undergo something like the evolution and transformation that made it what it eventually came to be. On the other hand, if the Hellenic World had been united politically by some other state, and if Rome had remained the small, obscure, and backward state that she originally was, on the Hellenic World's outer fringe, there is no reason to suppose that Roman law would ever have got far beyond a primitive and rudimentary stage before being replaced—as eventually it would have been in these political circumstances. It would have been replaced by the oecumenical law of the other state—whichever it might have been—by which the Hellenic World's political unity would have been achieved if history had taken this non-Roman course.³

¹ *The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1942), p. 513.

² *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

³ This is indicated by what happened when Roman Law did come into contact with more advanced legal systems: for instance, with Egyptian and Greek law in Egypt. By the beginning of the second century B.C., Egyptian and Greek private law in Egypt had become assimilated to each other. Both these systems had carried juridical individualism to a high point. Of the two, the Egyptian was the more advanced, especially in the status that it gave to women. But, 'notwithstanding fairly strongly pronounced formal differences, the Egyptian and the Greek juridical modes are not differentiated by incompatibilities of the same gravity as those which, for several centuries, prevented a Hellenised Egypt from "receiving" from the Romans a law that was more archaic than hers' (C. Préaux: *L'Économie Royale des Lagides* (Brussels, 1939, Fondation Égyptologique Reine Elisabeth), p. 23).

This is significant, considering that, in Egypt, Roman Law had the advantage of being the legal system of the ruling power, and also that, by the date of the annexation of Egypt, Roman Law had already been in process of Hellenization for more than a hundred years.

Considerable elements of an original barbaric parochial Roman law did, even as it was, survive Rome's reception of Hellenism and simultaneous establishment of her political supremacy over the Hellenic World, and these intractable relics of barbarism were not trivial; they were concerned with some of the most important and fundamental relations between one human being and another. The most notorious of them is the tyrannical power that Roman law left in the hands of the father of a family—a power which placed the free male members of his household at his mercy, as well as the women and the slaves. A remnant of this original barbaric *patria potestas* survived the seven centuries of progressive modernization and humanization which Roman law underwent from the second century B.C. onwards until its eventual codification in the reign of the Emperor Justinian. This is remarkable, considering that, since the miscarriage of the city-state regime in the Hellenic World in and after the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War that had broken out in 431 B.C., the moral climate of the Hellenic Civilization had become increasingly favourable to the rights of individuals, and of women in particular, and that the status of women had been still further improved in the Hellenic World by the spread of Judaism and the subsequent far wider spread of Christianity. Other primitive survivals were the antique Roman forms of procedure for marriage and for sale and purchase—though, in these fields, less clumsy and more practical alternative procedures had been introduced in the course of time.

On the whole, Roman law was successfully developed into a modern oecumenical law, adapted to the needs of the Hellenic World, by the interpretative work of Roman jurists over a period of about four hundred years, running from the second century B.C. to the third century of the Christian Era. The jurists who initiated this great work of transformation were, of course, native Romans who had imbibed a tincture of Hellenic culture. But, as Roman rule spread more widely over the Hellenic World, and as this was followed by the progressive grant of Roman citizenship to Rome's allies and subjects, the development of Roman law became more and more a common Hellenic enterprise, in which Roman citizens from all quarters of the Hellenic World played an increasingly active part. The school of Roman law at Bayrūt (Bêrÿtus) came more and more to the fore, and its professors played a dominant part in the Justinianean codification. An authentic Roman colony of Latin-speaking Italians had been founded at Bayrūt by Augustus not long after the year 20 B.C.¹ This had been a Latin-speaking bridgehead in a Levant in which Greek was the oecumenical language of administration and culture for nearly a thousand years, running from the generation of Alexander the Great to the seventh century A.D., when the Arabs overran the provinces of the Roman Empire south-east of Taurus. The Bayrūt school of Roman law was thus in a particularly favourable position for carrying on the work of transforming Roman law by 'receiving' into it Hellenic legal principles—and philosophical principles too.

¹ See A. H. M. Jones: *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press), p. 272.

In a criticism of my point of view, Leddy writes¹ that Toynbee

'glances at the celebrated Roman jurists, calls them Stoics, and, having thus thrown them back under a Greek classification, is absolved from any necessity of seeking to account for their unique contribution to civilization.'

This criticism misses its mark; for I agree with Leddy regarding the Roman jurists' contribution to civilization as having been unique, and I do seek to account for it by seeing in it a common achievement of the whole Hellenic World after this had been united politically under Roman rule. But I disagree with Leddy—and with Maine, whose *Ancient Law* he cites² in support of his view—when they maintain that this 'unique contribution to civilization' was the work of the original native Romans, to the exclusion of other Hellenic or Hellenized populations that were brought within the Roman polity through the Romans' feat of turning their polity into an Hellenic universal state. In the passage here quoted by Leddy, Maine maintains that

'neither the Greeks nor any society thinking and speaking in their language ever showed the smallest capacity for producing a philosophy of law. Legal science is a Roman creation.'³

My comment on this thesis of Maine's would be that the Romans who created legal science were, many of them, also Greeks and Syrians too, and that, in the later stages of the Bayrūt Law School's history, during which its influence was at its zenith, the Roman jurists there were speaking Greek and thinking in Greek, as is testified by their surviving works of this date. I should go on to contend that the same great work of producing a scientific and philosophical system of law would inevitably have been carried out in any case, and this by the same cooperation among jurists from all quarters of the Hellenic World, if the state that gave the Hellenic World its political unity had been, not Rome, but some other.

Let us suppose that the partial political unification of the Hellenic World that was achieved by Athens in the fifth century B.C. had lasted, not for a bare half-century, but for a length of time of the order of magnitude of the actual duration of the Roman Empire. And let us suppose that Athens had succeeded, as Rome eventually did succeed, in extending the process of political unification round all the shores of the Mediterranean. Is it credible that, if Athenian, instead of Roman, law had been given this uniquely favourable political opportunity, Athenian law would not have become the scientific and philosophical system that Roman law actually became as a result of Rome's historical political achievement? Even during the forty-eight years between the common Hellenic victory over Xerxes in 480-479 B.C. and the outbreak of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. Athenian law made some progress towards becoming the oecumenical law of all the maritime states round the shores of the Aegean that were under Athenian

¹ In loc. cit., pp. 149-50.

² Ibid., p. 150, footnote 24.

³ Leddy quotes this passage from p. 375 of a revised edition of Sir Henry Maine's *Ancient Law* (London 1930, John Murray).

domination during that brief period. In the fifth-century Hellenic World there was already a crying need for an oecumenical law, in the province of commercial law at any rate. As Athens came more and more to be the commercial centre of the Aegean, she also came more and more to be the place where commercial contracts were made and where litigation arising out of them was conducted. The benefit of doing business under a common law at least partly offset the hardship, for non-Athenian litigants, of having to go to Athens for the trial of their cases; and their resentment might not have been great if the Athenians had dealt fairly with them. The normal principle informing Hellenic international treaties for the legal settlement of disputes between citizens of different states was that a case should be tried in the court of the defendant. Considering the progressive increase in the concentration of business in Athens, this principle, scrupulously applied, would have tended also to bring an increasing volume of international commercial litigation to the Athenian courts.

The Athenians, however, were not content to play fair. They misused their political power to bring to Athens litigation—including criminal as well as civil cases—that, according to the treaties, ought to have come before the courts of other states. They did this partly in order to provide work, and consequently pay, for Athenian jurymen, and partly—which was still worse—in order to favour their political supporters and penalize their political opponents in the states that were subject to them. This was a grievance indeed. It was one of the causes of the overthrow of the Athenian Empire into which the Athenians had perverted the Delian League. In throwing away her opportunity to become the political unifier of the Hellenic World, Athens forfeited her opportunity to develop Athenian law into an oecumenical Hellenic law. Her political failure explains why her law did not have a Roman success. Conversely, if Athens had achieved the political success that Rome did achieve, it seems most improbable that, in these political circumstances, Athenian law would not have become the scientific and philosophical system that Roman law did become in the course that history actually took.

The key to Rome's legal achievement is, in fact, her political achievement. Was this a unique product of a distinctively Roman genius for political construction? The answer to this question will be decisive for or against the claim, put forward by some Western scholars on Rome's behalf, that she is entitled to be treated as a cultural and historical entity in her own right, independent of the Hellenic World.

What were the causes of Rome's political success? There are five that are conspicuous.

In the first place, Rome was fortunate in her geographical location. She herself was a city-state in a world of city-states. She possessed the political cohesion and vitality that a city-state constitution gave to a community. But in her immediate hinterland in the highlands of Central Italy there was a world of communities that were still in the pre-city-state stage of political development. Their people had not yet acquired the political self-consciousness and the political memories that made the citizens of city-states reluctant voluntarily to renounce their sovereign

independence. Rome found it as difficult as Sparta and Athens found it to reduce ancient and famous city-states to a position of subordination to her, however mild the terms. Capua, Tarentum, and Syracuse, for example, all kicked against the pricks and were finally subdued only by extreme measures of coercion. By contrast, the highlanders could still be induced to merge themselves, without much recalcitrance, in a more advanced polity representing a higher level of culture. Rome took full advantage of this opportunity, at her doors, of bringing proselytes into her commonwealth. But even these backwoodsmen would not have been willing proselytes if Rome had not shown political generosity.

The second cause of Rome's political success was that she was politically generous to peoples that became her allies on the basis of their accepting her political paramountcy. Unlike Athens, she did not exact tribute from them. Like Sparta in her treatment of her satellites (*perioeci*) and her Peloponnesian allies—at least down to the time when the Spartans were demoralized by their dearly bought victory in the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431–404 B.C.—Rome demanded of her allies no more than that they should follow her lead in foreign policy and should send contingents of troops to reinforce her armies when she went to war.

The third cause of Rome's success was her generosity in granting Roman citizenship to her allies and her subjects. She was conspicuously generous in doing this during the century (*circa* 340¹–241 B.C.) that saw the political unification of Italy under Roman supremacy and the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily in the First Romano-Carthaginian War.² There were two different sets of conditions on which the grant of Roman citizenship was made. The less favourable terms of admission imposed all the duties of Roman citizenship without simultaneously granting the right to vote or the right to stand for election. The more favourable terms gave the rights, as well as imposing the duties. But communities that had originally been given the citizenship on the less favourable terms were eventually given the full franchise sooner or later. Generosity in the matter of enfranchisement was, indeed, the long-term tendency of Roman policy, and it eventually reached its logical conclusion in the *Constitutio Antoniniana* of A.D. 212. This ordinance enfranchised all but a small residual minority of the still unenfranchised inhabitants of the Roman Empire; and at that date the Empire included the whole contemporary Hellenic World west of Iraq and Iran and embraced the whole circuit of the Mediterranean.

This generous policy did not prevail, however, without halts and pauses during which the contrary policy of treating Roman citizenship as a privilege, and jealously confining it to the existing citizen body, temporarily gained the upper hand. The narrow-hearted attitude was the normal one in Hellenic city-states that had acquired an ascendancy over their neighbours. At Athens, for instance, in the heyday of the fifth-century Athenian Empire, a law was passed in 451 B.C. confining

¹ Or 336, if the dictatorships occupying 333, 324, 309, and 301 B.C. are fictitious.

² This Roman policy was cited by King Philip V of Macedon as an example in his two letters to the Larisaeans (texts in W. Dittenberger: *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1898–1901, Hirzel, 3 vols.), Nos. 238–9, in vol. i, pp. 381–4; 3rd ed. (1915–1923, reprinting in 1959, 4 vols.), p. 543).

Athenian citizenship to persons who could prove that both their parents possessed it; and, on the strength of this law, an investigation was made in 445 B.C. and was followed by a drastic purge which was carried out very harshly. At Rome this narrow-hearted spirit prevailed during the 160 years running from the close of the First Romano-Carthaginian War till the year 80 B.C., when a majority of Rome's allies in Central and Southern Italy took the extreme measure of seceding from the Roman alliance, going to war with Rome, and setting up a counter-confederacy of their own. This political catastrophe brought the Roman Commonwealth into imminent danger of destruction, and the Roman Government capitulated. It now offered the Roman citizenship to all allied states in Italy that had not taken up arms or were willing, if they had, to lay them down. But this concession, having been extorted by extreme military pressure, was made against the grain and on petty-minded terms. There seems to have been an attempt to neutralize the newly enfranchised citizens' votes by enrolling them either in only eight of the thirty-five constituencies among which the pre-war Roman voters were already distributed, or else only in ten new constituencies that were to be created to contain the new citizens. Moreover, the Italian communities north of the River Po were fobbed off with the status of Latin city-states—the highest category of allied communities, but a poor consolation prize for a continued refusal to give the Transpadanes the status of Roman citizens.

The generous attitude that had been prevalent down to 241 B.C., and that had made Rome's political fortune, did not prevail again till Caesar made himself master of the Roman state. Caesar not only enfranchised the Italians beyond the River Po but started giving Roman citizenship to Roman subjects outside Italy. Augustus followed this course more slowly and cautiously than his adoptive father; but Caesar had given Roman policy in the matter of the Roman franchise a decisive turn in the direction of renewed generosity. From Caesar's time onwards it was certain that the general enfranchisement, eventually conferred by the *Constitutio Antoniniana* of A.D. 212, was going to come sooner or later. Thus in spite of the disastrous delays during the last two centuries of the Roman republican regime—centuries that were an age of agony for the Hellenic World—the generous policy inaugurated in the century ending in 241 B.C. did prevail in the long run.

The fourth cause of Rome's political success was her adoption of the liberal institution of dual citizenship. When she gave Roman citizenship to foreign communities either on the less or on the more favourable of the two alternative sets of conditions, she did not dissolve their previous political institutions and simply merge them in the Roman body politic. She allowed an incorporated foreign state to retain its former local political organization, no longer, of course, in the form of a sovereign independent state, but in the form of a self-governing municipality of Roman citizens, still managing their own local affairs through locally elected magistrates of their own. These municipal Roman citizens were thus, in effect, citizens of two city-states: their own local city-state and the oecumenical city-state Rome. This liberal dispensation gave them

the best of two worlds: they were now citizens of a local state and of a world-state as well. As Rome extended her rule over the Hellenic World and followed this up by eventually, though at some stages tardily, giving Roman citizenship to her allies and subjects, dual citizenship became the standard form of political status in the Roman Commonwealth.¹

The fifth cause was Rome's policy of planting colonies in the new territories that she brought under her control.² These colonies were of two kinds. There were colonies with the status of the Latin city-states allied to Rome—the highest category of Rome's Italian allies. There were also colonies of Roman citizens. Originally the Latin colonies were much more important than the Roman colonies. The Latin colonies served both as fortresses for maintaining Rome's hold on her other allies and as outlets for agricultural settlement. The colonists were recruited from the Roman citizen body, as well as from among the citizens of the existing Latin city-states. Roman citizens who enrolled themselves in a Latin colony lost their Roman citizenship, for the Latin colonies were juridically sovereign independent city-states bound to Rome by a perpetual alliance on the usual terms. The colonies of Roman citizens were originally small settlements of coastguards, but they were each organized as a miniature city-state within the Roman city-state, and they thus enjoyed the privilege of possessing 'dual citizenship', like the formerly foreign communities that were granted the Roman franchise.

As the value of Roman citizenship increased, Roman citizens became more and more reluctant to forfeit their status, even in exchange for obtaining a large allotment of land in a Latin colony. Accordingly, when, after the Hannibalic War, Rome resumed her interrupted enterprise of subduing and colonizing the basin of the River Po, the Roman Government soon found itself constrained to give the status of Roman colonies to new foundations between the Appennines and the south bank of the Po in order to attract Roman citizens to these new foundations in sufficient numbers.

Rome's political success is adequately accounted for by these five causes. We have now to ask ourselves whether there was or was not something uniquely Roman and specifically un-Hellenic about Rome's situation and policy.

Rome was certainly un-Athenian in her generosity towards her allies. Athens' constant and incorrigible narrow-heartedness had quickly put her out of the running in the competition for becoming the Hellenic World's unifying state. On the other hand, Rome's early generosity towards her allies had, as has already been noted, an Hellenic precedent in Sparta's early generosity towards her allies and satellites. At the same time Rome refrained from making the capital blunder—a moral

¹ This constitutional arrangement, under which a citizen of Rome itself and a citizen of a Roman municipality each enjoyed equal civic rights, at least of the passive kind, in the other's city-state, was called *isopoliteia* (equality of civic rights) in Greek. Vogt, *op. cit.*, points out how important this institution was in the building of the Roman Empire. I agree, and have never dissented.

² The Romans' activity in founding colonies, as well as their generosity in granting Roman citizenship to aliens, was cited by King Philip V of Macedon as an example in his two letters to the Larisacans (see p. 381, footnote 1).

aberration as well as a political folly—through which Sparta had thrown away her chance of becoming the political unifier of the Hellenic World. When the Spartans conquered the lower Eurotas basin and subsequently went on to conquer Messenia, they reduced their fellow Hellenes in these territories to serfdom, and, in consequence, had to spend the greater part of their energy, ever afterwards, on holding them down. Thereafter they could never conduct diplomacy or war beyond the borders of their home territory without having to look back, all the time, over their shoulders for fear that their helots might seize the opportunity to make another of their repeated revolts. Let us suppose that, instead of reducing the South Laconians and Messenians to serfdom, the Spartans had granted them the status of satellites (*perioeci*), retaining self-governing city-states of their own, that the Spartans did give to the highlanders on either side of the Eurotas Valley. In that event Sparta might have given political unity to at least the whole of Continental European Greece with the consent and good will of her neighbours. She did in fact succeed—even with the incubus of her helot population weighing upon her—in unifying the greater part of the Peloponnese politically with the consent and good will of her satellites inside Laconia and of her Peloponnesian allies beyond Laconia's frontiers. If she had treated the South Laconians and Messenians as generously as she treated her *perioeci* in the Eurotas basin, she might have achieved union on the larger scale before the Achaemenian Empire appeared above the Hellenic World's horizon mid-way through the sixth century B.C. In that event the Hellenic World would have been spared the fatal division of leadership between Sparta and Athens. If the constant menace of the helots at home had not so severely limited Sparta's capacity for effective action abroad, Athens would, no doubt, have been brought back into the Spartan Confederacy in 508 B.C. and would not have been in a position to organize a separate and rival confederacy of her own in 478 B.C.

Rome distinguished herself by resisting the temptation to reduce conquered or reconquered peoples to serfdom, even when they had given her serious provocation. The Hannibalic War was the emergency in which Rome's political self-restraint was put to the severest test. In this war on Italian soil, in which Rome was fighting for her existence, a number of South Italian communities seceded from the Roman Commonwealth and took up arms against Rome on Hannibal's side. After Hannibal's eventual evacuation of Italy the Romans punished some of these secessionist communities by sweeping confiscations of land at their expense; and Rome did then reduce one of them—the southern Bruttians in the toe of Italy—to the status of *dediticii* (enemies who had surrendered at discretion), which was perhaps comparable to the status of Sparta's helots. On the other hand, the Romans showed decided restraint in their treatment of Capua after they had reconquered her.

At the time of the Hannibalic War, Capua was, next to Rome herself, the most important city in all Italy, with the possible exception of Tarentum. Moreover, Capua's territory was one of the most productive regions of the peninsula. Her secession was thus a material blow of the

first magnitude for Rome, and it was also a moral blow of comparable severity. For 122 years¹ before Capua's secession in 216 B.C. after the Battle of Cannae, the Capuans had been Roman citizens, albeit in the less favourable of the two categories. Thus from the Roman point of view Capua's secession was a more heinous offence than the breach of treaty of which Rome's seceding South Italian allies were guilty. It was treason committed against Rome by Roman citizens. After the capitulation of Capua in 211 B.C. there were executions of leading secessionists, and others were permanently deported to places north-west of the River Tiber. Capua was deprived of her municipal constitution and reduced juridically to the status of a village. Her territory was confiscated by the Roman state, and the agricultural population had, thenceforth, to cultivate their land as tenants of the Roman Government. Municipal self-government and property rights were restored to the Capuans only in 59 B.C., by an agrarian law carried through in that year by Caesar. But in the meanwhile the native agricultural population does not seem to have been either evicted from its land or deprived of the second-class Roman citizenship that had been its status before secession. The treatment of Capua was mild according to the standards of the time, and was to that degree to Rome's credit.

Thus Rome refrained, even under provocation, from creating helots, whereas Sparta never learnt the lesson that the wrong which she had done to her helots was the cause of her perennial weakness. Under the stress of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War and the subsequent military commitments in which her eventual victory in that war involved her, Sparta did emancipate a few thousand helots in return for their doing military service as heavy-armed infantry. But these 'new nationals' (*neodamodeis*), as they were called, were not given the Spartan citizenship, and they were got rid of as quickly as possible—partly by foul means, so it was said. In the matter of Spartan citizenship the revolutionary King Cleomenes III (*regnabat* 237–222 B.C.) did show a Roman generosity towards Sparta's satellites (*perioeci*). He swamped the existing Spartiate citizen body, whose numbers had dwindled to about seven hundred, by granting the Spartan citizenship to *perioeci* in sufficient numbers to give Sparta 4,000 citizens of military age in the heavy-armed infantry class; and these new Spartan citizens received allotments of land on the territory of Sparta herself. But even Cleomenes III never thought of emancipating and enfranchizing the helots who still remained in the lower Eurotas Valley, 140 years after Messenia had recovered her independence.

Thus the Romans did show greater statesmanship in building up their commonwealth than either the Athenians or the Spartans. But did they show greater statesmanship than the Olynthians? The Olynthians were fifty or sixty years ahead of the Romans in starting to build, in northern Continental European Greece, a commonwealth² of the kind that Rome began to build in Central Italy in and after the years 340–338 B.C.³ Olynthus enjoyed the geographical advantage, enjoyed by Rome, of being a city-state that had in her immediate hinterland a number of

¹ Or possibly 118 years.

² See iii. 477–89.

³ Or 336–334 B.C.

communities that were still in the pre-city-state stage of development and were therefore amenable, if generously treated, to being assimilated by a city-state community with a more effective political organization and a higher culture than theirs. *Circa* 385–383 B.C. the Olynthians, like the Romans in 340–338 (or 336–334) B.C., embarked on an ambitious forward policy. They incorporated in their own state large adjoining tracts of the Kingdom of Macedon, which had fallen into anarchy after the death of King Archelaus in 399 B.C., and at the same time they forced a number of the neighbouring colonial Hellenic city-states along the north coast of the Aegean to become their allies.

The Olynthians' power to take advantage of this opportunity was the outcome of their having adopted, perhaps as early as 432 B.C., the institution of 'dual citizenship', which was subsequently adopted by Rome and which had made its first known appearance in the Hellenic World in the federal constitution devised by the Boeotians after the liberation, in 447 B.C., of the Boeotian city-states that had been temporarily under Athenian rule. Olynthus was no ordinary city-state. She had been created by the Chalcidian colonial city-states along the adjacent coast as a new common Chalcidian body politic of which every Chalcidian became a citizen, while continuing to be a citizen of his own local Chalcidian city-state—Torone or Methone or whichever other one it might happen to be. The closeness of the parallel between the building of the Olynthian Commonwealth *circa* 385–383 and the building of the Roman Commonwealth after the Romano-Latin War is remarkable. There is no evidence to show whether Rome re-invented the institution of 'dual citizenship' independently or whether she borrowed the idea from the Chalcidians or from the Boeotians or from both. The relevant point is that in the Olynthian commonwealth this institution was already in operation, and was already producing striking constructive political effects, more than forty years before Rome started on her own commonwealth-building career in Central Italy. It is also noteworthy that, as near to Rome as Sicily, and this in the years 342–336 B.C., the Corinthian statesman Timoleon was successfully persuading the Sicel and Siceliot Greek city-states to receive and enfranchise large numbers of immigrants from Greece and Italy, as well as from other parts of Sicily, and apparently also to make reciprocal grants of civic rights in one state to the citizens of another (e.g. as between Syracuse and Agrigum).¹

Fortunately for Rome, Central Italy lay on the outer edge of the Hellenic World. The nearest Greek states, Syracuse and Tarentum, could not intervene to checkmate Rome's ambitious designs, and the expeditionary forces from Continental European Greece that came to the rescue of Hellenism in Sicily and Magna Graecia in 344 and 342 and 333 and 303 B.C.² found it as much as they could do to give a temporary check to Carthaginian and Oscan assaults. Central Italy was beyond their horizon; and when, in 280–274 B.C., Pyrrhus did attempt, with stronger forces, to achieve the more ambitious double feat of expelling the Carthaginians from Sicily and breaking the Roman

¹ See N. G. L. Hammond: *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford 1959, Clarendon Press), p. 579.

² See iv. 589.

Commonwealth, it was too late. Rome alone, without her ally Carthage, was far more than a match for Molossia. Unfortunately for the Chalcidians, their field of operations lay much nearer to the heart of the Hellenic World, and they embarked on their commonwealth-building enterprise at a time when Sparta was a great enough power to be able to strike effectively as far afield as northern Continental European Greece. In 382-379 B.C. a Lacedaemonian expeditionary force brought Olynthus to her knees and broke her commonwealth up.

This opened the way for Philip of Macedon. It gave him the chance of constructing a great power in Northern Greece based not on city-state institutions but on monarchy; and the decisive step in Philip's career was his destruction of Olynthus in 348-347 B.C. In thus unintentionally opening the way for Macedon, Sparta had opened it eventually for Rome. For the Macedonians did not prove equals of either the Olynthians or the Romans in political common sense. Under Alexander's romantic leadership, they exhausted themselves in the *tour de force* of overrunning the whole of the Achaemenian Empire and thereby opening up for Hellenism a far larger *Lebensraum* than could be incorporated in the Hellenic World permanently. Through this impolitic diversion of their energies the Macedonians deprived themselves of the power to complete and consolidate Philip's work. They lost their chance of building, in Continental European Greece and its hinterland, a commonwealth that, in spite of the weakness of its monarchical basis, might have come to be not much less strongly knit than the one that, by Alexander's time, the Romans were already building in Italy.

As for the colonies founded by Rome as a device for maintaining her hold on foreign territories that she had brought under her control, there was nothing uniquely Roman about these. During the same period of Hellenic history this institution was being used, for the same purpose, by Alexander the Great, and, after him, by the governments of most of the Macedonian or Greek successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire. In these Hellenic foundations in the East there was the same distinction as in the Roman foundations in Italy between two categories of colonies. There were military cantonments of Macedonian soldiers and their descendants, corresponding to Rome's colonies of Roman citizens; and there were full-fledged colonial city-states, juridically sovereign and independent, but actually bound to the founding monarchy by permanent ties like those which bound Rome's Latin colonies to Rome. There is no evidence to show whether Rome's policy of founding colonies was inspired by these Hellenic examples or whether it was devised by the Romans independently. The relevant point is that, in founding colonies, the Romans were doing something that was the general practice of contemporary Hellenic states.

Of all the Macedonian successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire, the Seleucid Monarchy in South-West Asia was the most active in founding colonies on the grand scale. If the power of the Monarchy had not been broken as a result of King Antiochus III's impolitic decision to go to war with Rome, the Seleucid Monarchy might eventually have grown into what the Roman Empire eventually became: a confederation

of autonomous city-states held together by an oecumenical government.¹ The loyalty of the Seleucid city-states to the Monarchy was demonstrated more than once when the Monarchy temporarily recovered parts of its dominions that had been overrun by the Parthians. This loyalty was the more remarkable considering that the Parthians were careful to give considerate treatment to colonial Hellenic city-states that came under their rule. They left them in full possession of their municipal autonomy.

From the military point of view the Seleucid Monarchy was proved, by the disastrous results of its collision with Rome in 192-190 B.C., to be a giant with feet of clay. From the political point of view, on the other hand, the Monarchy was a serious candidate for the role of being a unifying state. Let us suppose that Antiochus III had accepted the Roman suggestion that Rome might abandon her support of the city-states on the west coast of Anatolia which were refusing to accept Antiochus' suzerainty, if Antiochus would abandon his claim to the recovery of former Seleucid possessions on the European side of the Dardanelles.² If Antiochus III had had the wisdom to close with this tentative Roman offer, the Seleucid Monarchy might have survived, and the Asiatic domain of Hellenism, from the east shore of the Aegean as far east as the Caspian Gates, might have been consolidated politically under Seleucid auspices.

What conclusion are we to draw from this comparison between Rome's political achievement and the attempts made by the Seleucid Monarchy, Macedon, Olynthus, Syracuse, Sparta, and Athens to give the Hellenic World political unity? Of course these other attempts were unsuccessful, whereas Rome's enterprise was a success. Yet, when we compare the enterprises, the points in common—such points as geographical opportunity, generous statesmanship, and constructive institutions (above all, 'dual citizenship' and colonies)—are surely too numerous and too important to permit the thesis that Rome's political genius was something uniquely her own. Her opportunity, her generosity, her institutions of 'dual citizenship' and colonies, which, between them, account for her success, were not hers exclusively. All were common to Rome and at least one other of the competitors for the prize of being the political unifier of the Hellenic World. Olynthus would surely have anticipated Rome in performing this feat if her career had not been cut short at an early stage by the intervention of Sparta. Conversely, Rome's career would surely have been cut short, too, whatever Livy may say,³ if Alexander of Macedon had chosen to join forces with his kinsman Alexander of Epirus for an invasion of Italy instead of Asia, or if, after having overrun the Achaemenian Empire, he had lived

¹ Vogt, in loc. cit., challenges my comparison between the respective constitutional structures of the Seleucid Monarchy and the Roman Commonwealth on the ground that, in the Monarchy, the local city-states were not linked to the central government by the institution of *isopoliteia* (i.e. dual citizenship), as they were in the Commonwealth. This goes without saying, considering that the central power in the Seleucid Empire was not a city-state but a crown. The Seleucid crown did, however, provide an effective bond, as Vogt himself concedes.

² For this proposal, see Livy, Book XXXIV, chap. 58.

³ See Livy, Book IX, chaps. 17-19.

to spend the resources that he had acquired in the East for a subsequent attack upon the West. In this perspective Rome presents herself, not as an historical force outside the Hellenic Society and on a par with it, but as the eventually successful competitor among a number of states that each, in turn, made the attempt to give the Hellenic World political unity.

If this is, as I believe it is, the true historical setting of Rome, of Roman law, and of the Roman political achievement, why are so many Western historians apparently bent on awarding to Rome an even greater historical role than is hers in the picture that I have drawn? I suspect that the motive behind this Western insistence on magnifying Rome's place in history is a covert Western chauvinism. If the West is to be credited with a major role in history, Rome must be credited with a major role too. Rome gave the West its first lessons in civilization, laid the foundations in the West for the building of a new and distinctively Western civilization there, and left a permanent Roman imprint on what was otherwise a new creation. Roman law still inspires awe in Western minds because most modern Western systems of law except the English common law are deeply indebted to it. Even the Scottish common law has a tincture of Roman law in it. Napoleon's jurists would hardly have been able to elicit the Napoleonic Code out of medieval French customary law if the resources of Roman law had not been at their disposal. In Roman-Dutch law Roman law itself is still a living force in the present-day Western World. Again, Latin is the liturgical language of the Roman Catholic Church, to which one half of modern Western Christendom adheres. The Roman Church's official text of the Christian Bible is the Vulgate Latin version.

When, however, these legal and literary contributions of Rome to the present-day Western Civilization are analysed, they prove to be Hellenic contributions in Latin dress. If Rome had not herself previously received Hellenism, she would have had little or nothing to pass on to the Western barbarians. She was an intermediary transmitter of Hellenism in a Latin dress. The West European barbarians might have had a better start in civilization if they had received Hellenism in its original Greek dress from one of the colonial Hellenic outposts in the Western Mediterranean: Massilia or Cumae or Tarentum or Syracuse. But the historical fact is that they received it at second hand through the agency of Rome, and the agent has eclipsed the principal in the historical vista seen by the West European barbarians' descendants. Rome's transmission of the Hellenic heritage to their forebears in Latin dress looms larger in their eyes than Rome's previous acquisition of this heritage from the heart of Hellas.

The Hellenic colonial outposts—Syracuse, Tarentum, Cumae, Massilia—were not powerful enough to radiate their cultural influence deep into Western Europe. The Canaanite colonial outposts—Utica and Carthage and Gades—were no more effective. The incorporation of Western Europe in the *Oikoumenê* was accomplished by Rome during the three hundred years running from the first Roman campaigns in Spain during the Second Romano-Punic War to Agricola's campaigns in

North Britain in A.D. 78-85. This pacification and rudimentary education of Western Europe was, no doubt, a considerable achievement, in whatever historical perspective it is viewed. It is, inevitably, an achievement of capital importance from a standpoint which sees the culmination of all previous history in the present-day Western World;¹ for this Roman enterprise was the means by which the West was first brought within the field of any civilization. Yet these Roman activities in the West had little effect, and consequently made little impression, on the heart of the Hellenic World. Hellenes in the heart-land hardly noticed this enormous westward expansion of their world by Roman hands, and they were also little affected, and therefore hardly aware, when, in the fifth century of the Christian Era, this semi-civilized western fringe of the latter-day Hellenic World relapsed into the barbarism from which it had only recently and only partially been extricated. The loss of Sicily, Italy, and the North-West African region round Carthage that is now Tunisia did, no doubt, give a shock to the public in Alexandria, Antioch, and Ephesus, as well as to the Imperial Government at Constantinople. The recession of civilization farther to the west can have made little difference to anyone living east of the Syrtes and the Adriatic.

The perspective in which Rome has appeared to Greek-speaking Hellenes and Orientals and their successors since the last thirty years of the third century B.C., when Rome first began to make her power felt east of the Adriatic, is piquantly different from the perspective in which Rome appears to a modern Western historian; and this difference of outlook is an historical consequence of a differential Roman policy.

Towards the west the Romans insisted on making their native Latin language the linguistic and literary medium for the transmission of the Hellenic culture that they themselves had drawn from a Greek fountain-head. They deliberately overlaid with Latin the Etruscan language north-west of the Tiber, the Canaanite language in North-West Africa, and the Greek language in its surviving bridgeheads along the coasts of Southern Italy. But, in revenge, the Greek language half captured Rome itself from the second century B.C. to the third century of the Christian Era; and, with the one exception of Southern Italy, the Romans never deliberately attempted to dislodge the Greek language in favour of Latin in any country in which Greek had already established itself as the people's mother-tongue, or even merely as a *lingua franca* for purposes of public administration and private business. Even the island of Sicily, wedged in between an already Latinised Italy and a progressively Latinized North-West Africa, remained, through seven centuries of Roman rule, the Greek-speaking country that the native interior as well as the Hellenic colonial fringe along the coasts had come to be before

¹ This point is made, from this standpoint, by Vogt in loc. cit. and by F. H. Underhill in *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. xxxii, No. 3 (September, 1951), pp. 201-19. Vogt suggests that the point has been overlooked by me. It could hardly be overlooked by anyone who has had a Western education, since Rome's role as the layer of the foundations for the subsequent Western Civilization is the first and last thing about Rome that is impressed upon the mind of a Western school-child. I agree, of course, that the West owes this debt to Rome, and I have not overlooked the point. It has, however, no relevance to the question of what Rome's relation to the Hellenic Civilization was.

the date of the Roman conquest. In all regions, east of the Adriatic and the Syrtes, in which the Greek language had already established itself, the Roman Government accepted Greek, as a matter of course, as the administrative language of the world-state. In the Aegean and Levantine heartland of the Hellenic World, Greek, under the Roman regime, was officially on a par with Latin, and in practice it continued here to enjoy the almost exclusive currency for administrative and business purposes that it had previously enjoyed in the states founded by the successors of Alexander. When Thrace, which Alexander's successors had failed to hold and Hellenize, was eventually converted into a Roman province, the Roman Imperial Government chose Greek, not Latin, to be the linguistic medium for the tardy Hellenization of this obstinate outpost of barbarism. The only region, east of the Adriatic, in which Latin was allowed to propagate itself was the Balkan Peninsula beyond the northern borders of Thrace and Macedon; and this region—close to the heart of Hellas though it was—was still culturally virgin soil at the date of its annexation by the Emperor Augustus.

In spite of the liberality of Rome's linguistic policy the Greek-speaking intelligentsia was not reconciled to Roman rule till the age of enlightened Roman government extending from the reign of Nerva to the reign of Marcus Aurelius. And they did not begin to feel themselves to be Romans till after the world-wide grant of Roman citizenship in A.D. 212. East of the Adriatic the Latin language attained its maximum currency in and after the revolutionary convulsions in the third century of the Christian Era, when the Roman Empire and the Hellenic Civilization were rescued from the jaws of destruction by Illyrian soldiers whose passport to civilization was the Latin language and who knew no Greek, unlike the cultivated Roman aristocrats whom they had superseded. In the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era Latin was temporarily cultivated in the Levant for literary as well as for administrative use. It was used by the fourth-century Antiochene historian Ammianus Marcellinus, and by the fifth-century Alexandrian poet Claudius Claudianus. But after the loss, in the fifth century, of all the Latin-speaking provinces of the Empire except those in the Balkan Peninsula, the use of Latin east of the Adriatic soon evaporated even at Constantinople, with its imperial administrative bureaux and its Balkan Latin-speaking hinterland. The Emperor Justinian came from a district in Latin-speaking Dardania round the head-waters of the River Axios (Vardar); and he used the Latin language for his codification of Roman law. But even Justinian promulgated his own subsequent supplementary laws in Greek, in order to make them intelligible to the majority of his subjects; and Latin had almost ceased to be current in Constantinople before the end of the sixth century.

The Greek-speaking Hellenes had no sooner accepted Rome than they absorbed her. After the conversion of the majority of the population of the world-state to Christianity, the famous and ancient word 'Hellene' inevitably changed its connotation. Previously it had meant someone inside the pale of the only true civilization, in contrast to a barbarian. Now it came to mean someone outside the pale of the only true religion,

in contrast to a Christian. Since Greek-speaking Christians could no longer call themselves Hellenes, they took to calling themselves Romans instead. The name 'Roman' was unobjectionable, because it had not acquired the religious associations of the name 'Hellene'. In the authentic popular form of the Modern Greek language, 'Roman' (*Romaíos*, pronounced *Romyós*) still means today a Greek-speaking Eastern Orthodox Christian, while 'the Roman language' (*Romaïká*) means Modern Greek. In Italy today there is a province called Romagna, but the district that bears this name is not the country round the city of Rome: it is the country round the city of Ravenna, where the Greek-speaking Romans of Constantinople and Anatolia held a bridge-head for the Roman Empire against the Lombard invaders of Italy from A.D. 568 to A.D. 750.

The Muslims have taken their cue from the Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians. In the languages of the Islamic World 'Rum' means the Greek-speaking remnant of the Roman Empire that maintained itself after the Latin, Syriac, Coptic, and Armenian-speaking provinces had been lopped off by German and Arab barbarian invaders. Alexander the Great is known, in these languages, as a 'Rumi' by anticipation, or perhaps rather because, in Islamic, as in Modern Greek, eyes, 'Roman' just means 'Greek'. As the successor of the Greek-speaking Roman emperors at Constantinople, the Ottoman Padishah was styled 'the Qaysar-i-Rum' (the Caesar of Rome);¹ and 'millet-i-rum' (the Roman nation) was the official name of the autonomous Eastern Orthodox Christian community within the Ottoman Empire.

Thus conquered Greece did indeed take her ferocious Roman conqueror captive. She annexed him in the most complete way possible by identifying him outright with herself. The outstanding event in Rome's history is Rome's absorption by Hellenism, not the Hellenization of barbarian Western Europe by Rome through a Latin medium; and this is the perspective in which Rome's history ought to be viewed and interpreted. Rome's Hellenic destiny is portended in one of the earliest historical notices of her existence. A pupil of Plato's and Aristotle's, Heracleides Ponticus, reports, in a passage cited by Plutarch,² that 'an Hellenic city called Rome', which lay 'somewhere in the direction of the Atlantic', has been captured, according to rumour, by a horde of Hyperboreans. This vague report is a faint echo of the historical capture of Rome by a Gallic war-band *circa* 390-383 B.C.; but, in contrast to his general lack of precision, the Hellenic scholar has got one point clear and correct. In calling Rome 'an Hellenic city' he is telling the fundamental truth about her.

¹ See p. 192.

² Plutarch's *Life of Camillus*, chap. 22, quoted in v. 212, footnote 3.

XIII. THE CONFIGURATION OF SYRIAC HISTORY

I. THE PROBLEM

THE word 'Syriac' is commonly used as a label for a language, an alphabet, and a literature written in these. The Syriac language and alphabet are late phases of the Aramaic, and both developed out of the local Aramaic dialect and script of North-Western Mesopotamia (Osroene).¹ On the other hand, the Syriac literature is a new departure² in as much as it shows few traces of its pre-Hellenic Aramaic past, while it has a partially Hellenic cultural background. Most of it is Christian, and this includes translations from the Greek Christian Fathers, as well as original works. Much of the rest consists of translations of Greek works of philosophy and science written in the Hellenic Age.

In this book the word 'Syriac' has been borrowed to serve the different purpose of labelling a civilization, approximately contemporary with the Hellenic, that originated in Syria.³ Some distinctive word is required, and the word 'Syrian' has a primarily geographical connotation and is therefore applicable to Syria at any period of Syria's history, from the time when the Earth's surface first arrived at its present configuration down to the present day.

The Syria that was the original home of the 'Syriac' civilization is Syria in the broadest usage of the word: that is to say, the whole region between the domain of the Egyptiac Civilization on the south-west and the domain of the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization on the south-east. *Vis-à-vis* Egypt the boundary is clearly marked by a stretch of desert, about a hundred miles broad, that insulates Rafa (Raphia), the south-westernmost habitable point in Greater Syria, from Pelusium, the former fortress covering the north-easternmost corner of the Nile Delta. *Vis-à-vis* the Sumero-Akkadian World the boundary is vaguer; but Syria's extreme limits in this direction can be defined as anyway excluding the alluvial country in the lower basin of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, and also the fertile rain-watered lands of Assyria, between the Tigris, in the latitude of the city of Mosul, and the south-western rim of the Iranian plateau in this quarter. On the north the boundary of Greater Syria is well defined by the southern rim of the Armenian-Anatolian plateau, which is continuous with the south-eastern rim of the Anatolian plateau. The upper basin of the River Tigris, as well as Commagênê and Eastern (Lowland) Cilicia, would fall within the limits of Syria as thus defined. On the south, on the other hand, the boundary is indefinite. Here Syria melts into Arabia. The plateau of Gilead, in Transjordan, extends southward and south-eastward without a break, through Ammon, Moab, Midian, the Hijâz, Asîr, and the Yaman almost to within sight of Aden. The Syriac Civilization that, as I see it, took shape in Greater Syria during the second half of the second millennium

¹ See pp. 442-3.

² See W. F. Albright: *The Archaeology of Palestine*, pp. 202-3.

³ See i. 82, footnote 2.

B.C. subsequently spread all the way down this long south-eastward extension of Syria. This happened soon after the beginning of the last millennium B.C.,¹ to judge by recent estimates of the dates of the earliest inscriptions written in the South Arabian version of the Alphabet.² It will be seen that the Syria which was the original home of the 'Syriac' Civilization is approximately coincident with the combined areas of the present states of Syria,³ Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel, together with a strip of Southern Turkey, from Mersina eastwards to the upper basin of the Tigris, and with a southern hinterland in Western Arabia.

Some scholars do not admit that there was any unity in the civilization in Syria which was contemporary with the Hellenic Civilization in the Aegean area. This question is discussed at a later point in the present chapter.⁴ On the other hand, no scholar would deny that Syria in this age was the seat and source of civilizing enterprises and achievements which—whether unitary or multiple—were in any case fruitful and potent. For example, it is impossible to trace the course of Hellenic history without recognizing both the potency and the fatefulness, at almost every stage, of influences that played upon the Hellenic World from Syrian sources. In, if not before, the eighth century the Hellenes adopted from Syria the Phoenician invention of the Alphabet, including not only the shapes but the names of the Phoenician letters. From the eighth century onwards they entered into competition with the Phoenicians for the domination of the western basin of the Mediterranean, and this competition went on for more than 500 years, until the issue was finally decided in favour of Hellenism as a result of Rome's victories in the First and the Second Romano-Carthaginian War. In the seventh century Hellenic art drew inspiration from an 'Oriental' style that the Phoenicians transmitted to Hellas.

The most fateful single event in all Hellenic history was the ideological and religious collision, in Coele Syria in the second century B.C., between Hellenism and Judaism. The Jewish anti-Hellenic resistance movement in Judaea proved strong enough to overcome the attempt of the Judaeans Jewish Hellenists, backed by the military and political power of the Seleucid Monarchy, to convert Judaea to Hellenism from its native Jewish tradition; and the encounter was fateful because the story did not end in Hellenism's second-century cultural and political defeat. The political defeat was ephemeral; for the Judaeans Jewish state which won its independence from the Seleucid Government first in 142-141 and finally in 129 B.C. became subject to Rome in 63 B.C., and

¹ It was, no doubt, a consequence of the domestication of the Arabian camel, which W. F. Albright, in *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 227, dates between the sixteenth and the twelfth century B.C. on the authority of R. Walz in the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. 101 (1951), pp. 29-51. See also Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., pp. 165-6. The intercourse between the heart of the Syriac World and South Arabia was intensified when a sea-route from the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah through the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean was opened—or re-opened—in the tenth century B.C. by joint Phoenician and Judahite enterprise.

² See W. F. Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., pp. 56-57 and 225. In Qatabān the earliest rock inscriptions may be dated about 1000 B.C., though the earliest monumental inscriptions are thought to date only from the eighth century B.C.

³ Now a component of the United Arab Republic.

⁴ On pp. 411-30.

Jewish political nationalism in Palestine was eventually crushed—and this decisively—in the Romano-Jewish wars of A.D. 66–70 and A.D. 132–5. But conquered Judaea took its Hellenic conquerors captive on the religious plane. The Hellenic World was eventually converted to a religion of Jewish origin that was, and remained, essentially Judaic in its inspiration and its principles, notwithstanding its compromises with Hellenism in the fields of theology and visual art. And this conversion of the Hellenic World to Christianity was the end of the Hellenic Civilization. As a result of the conversion, Hellenism lost its identity.

2. RESULTS OF USING THE HELLENIC MODEL AS A KEY TO THE SOLUTION OF THE SYRIAC PROBLEM

What was the configuration of the history of this Syriac Civilization which, whether unitary or multiple, unquestionably had a fateful influence on the course of Hellenic history? In seeking to trace this I used the same Hellenic model¹ as in my attempts to identify other civilizations. In the early chapters of the story the courses of Syriac and Hellenic history seemed to me to run parallel, at least on the political plane. In the background of both histories there was an identical *Völkerwanderung*—the huge upheaval that racked the whole of the Levant during the fourteenth, thirteenth, and twelfth centuries B.C. After the dust raised by the feet of the migrants and conquerors had settled, the political configuration of the emergent civilizations in the Syriac and Hellenic worlds was similar. At this stage, when the history of both worlds begins to become clearer, we find them both divided up politically among a host of petty states. These states were constantly going to war with each other, yet their peoples displayed some consciousness of having a common culture, and, at moments of extreme peril from powerful foreign aggressors, they temporarily put their local quarrels aside and made common cause to defend their threatened independence. The Mesopotamian Aramaeans, who had pressed Assyria hard in the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C., were conquered and annexed by Assyria between 932 and 859 B.C.;² and in 858–856 B.C. Assyria conquered and annexed the state of Bit Adini, which commanded the crossings of the Euphrates at its westward elbow, after defeating a coalition of North Syrian states that had attempted to save Bit Adini from its fate.³ But in 853 B.C. the Assyrians' first serious attempt to conquer Syria west of the Euphrates⁴ was foiled by the united forces of a coalition of Syrian states, ranging from Qu'e in the north-west to Ammon in the south-east, in which King Ahab of Israel served under the high command of his perennial rival and enemy the King of Damascus. This is a striking Syriac parallel to the Hellenic feat of foiling the Achaemenian Persian Empire's attempt to conquer Continental European Greece in 480–479 B.C., when the Athenians served under the high command of Sparta.⁵

¹ See i. 73.

² See A. Dupont-Sommer: *Les Araméens*, pp. 31–32.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 35.

⁴ Tiglath-Pileser I's march to the sea circa 1060 B.C. had been no more than a raid.

⁵ The Assyrians were more persistent than the Persians in returning to the charge. Shalmaneser III crossed the Euphrates again in 849, 848, and 845, but each time he

After that, however, the two histories took different courses. The Hellenes were never conquered by an alien power (Macedon and Rome were already more or less Hellenized before they imposed their political domination on other Hellenic states). The plane on which the Hellenic Civilization was eventually conquered and dissolved was the religious plane, not the political or the military. On the other hand the states of the Syriac World all lost their political independence to alien powers in and after the eighth century B.C., when Assyria resumed her career of aggression with greater driving force than she had ever shown before. By the time of Assyria's fall in 612 B.C. the only states in the Syriac World that had not been liquidated were Arvad (Aradus), Byblos, Tyre, Ekron, Ashdod, Ascalon, Gaza, and Judah; these had escaped only by abject submission; and in the sixth century B.C. these, too, were swept off the board by one of the Assyrian Empire's successor-states, the Neobabylonian Empire. This empire, in turn, including its subject peoples, was conquered and annexed in 538 B.C. by the Achaemenian Persian Empire. The colonial extension of the Syriac World in the western basin of the Mediterranean was the only part of it that remained politically independent after the sixth century B.C. Independence was preserved here by the sixth-century political unification of all the colonial Phoenician city-states under the hegemony of Carthage. The establishment of the Carthaginian Empire saved this colonial Canaan from being submerged under the tide of Hellenic colonial expansion. The Carthaginian Empire was a great power in the Mediterranean for three hundred years. But it, too, eventually succumbed to Rome, and in 146 B.C. Carthage itself was erased much more thoroughly than Judah had been in 587 or 586 B.C.

What is one to make of the history of the Syriac Civilization after the disappearance of the states that had originally represented it on the political plane? The loss of political independence was certainly not the end of the story.

Judah, which was one of the original states of the Syriac World, and which lost its independence in 587/6 B.C., is still represented in the present-day world by a living community, the Jewish diasporá. The deportees from the extinguished Kingdom of Judah quickly discovered, in their Babylonian exile, how to keep their community in existence, not only without possessing a state of their own, but even without having a country in which they were in a local majority. The Jewish diasporá has maintained itself from that day to this. In the course of 2,500 years it has spread from Babylonia and Egypt, first over the Hellenic World, and then over the still wider areas of the Christian and Islamic worlds. And its fortunes have not been dependent on those of its country of origin. Twice, so far, in the course of subsequent history, the Jewish diasporá has re-established a Jewish community in Palestine: first in the Age of the Achaemenian Empire and then again in our own day. But the Jewish diasporá lived on when the Neo-Judaean Jewish community, founded

seems to have been foiled again by the same coalition of Syrian states. In 841 and 834 he attacked the Kingdom of Damascus, but he failed to capture the capital and to destroy the Kingdom's military power (see A. Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-39).

under the aegis of the Achaemenian regime, lost its independence to Rome in 63 B.C. after having won it from the Seleucid Monarchy in 142-1 and 129 B.C.; and it lived on again when the Judaean Jewry was crushed in its hopeless trials of strength with Rome in A.D. 66-70 and A.D. 132-5.

The survival of the Jews and Judaism is such a signal example of the continuance of the Syriac Civilization after the loss of political independence that it is apt to eclipse other examples that are hardly less remarkable. In North-West Africa, for instance, the Canaanite language, religion, and culture survived the destruction of Carthage and continued to spread ever more widely among the native Berber population in an advancing wave with which the pursuing wave of Latinization never succeeded in catching up. Indeed, the Canaanite language—better known today as 'Hebrew'¹—may have held out longer than Latin did against the Arabic language that eventually replaced both Latin and Canaanite in North-West Africa after the Muslim Arab conquest.² Yet a thousand years before Canaanite became extinct in North-West Africa it had yielded in its Asiatic homeland to another of the languages of the Syriac World, Aramaic.³

The fortunes of the Aramaic language and alphabet were made by the Assyrian conquest that wiped the Aramaic-speaking peoples' as well as

¹ We think of the Canaanite language as being 'Hebrew' because by far the largest, most important, and most famous body of literature, written in it, that we possess is the collection of scriptures composed and preserved by the peoples of Israel and Judah and their heirs the Jews; and the Israelites were one of a group of Hebrew peoples from the North Arabian steppe who had gained a foothold in South-East Syria in the thirteenth century B.C. (other Hebrew peoples were the Edomites, Kenites, Moabites, and Ammonites).

However, to call the Canaanite language 'Hebrew' is really misleading, since it is improbable that the Hebrews were already Canaanite-speaking when they first occupied those parts of Canaan in which we find them subsequently settled. The Canaanite language had been current in Canaan for something like two thousand years before the Hebrews' arrival (see W. F. Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 69); and it therefore seems probable that the Hebrews learnt to speak Canaanite from the native population whom they conquered and with whom they subsequently coalesced. The Hebrews themselves were part of a wave of Nomad or semi-Nomad invaders which broke upon all the steppe-coasts of the Fertile Crescent during the centuries round about the turn of the second and the last millennium B.C. The wave broke in an arc, with the Hebrews on the south-west wing, the Chaldeans on the south-east wing, and the Aramaeans in the centre. The Aramaeans penetrated farthest, and would appear to have been the most numerous people in the whole of this Völkerwanderung. We may conjecture that the Aramaic language, which the Aramaeans themselves retained after their settlement, was the original language of the Hebrews too (A. Dupont-Sommer: *Les Araméens*, pp. 81-82). According to the Israelite tradition, the Hebrew Patriarchs were kinsfolk of the Aramaeans and married Aramaean wives (*ibid.*, pp. 15-16), and Jacob himself is called an Aramaean outright in the commemorative formula in Deut. xxvi. 5.

The nomenclature of the political map of post-Völkerwanderung Syria suggests that, at the time of the incoming Hebrew and Aramaic tribes' settlement, they were conscious of their unity. The Aramaean state astride the Amanus called Sam'al, meaning 'the left-hand', i.e. 'the North', has its 'opposite number' in the Israelite tribe called Benjamin, meaning 'the right-hand', i.e. 'the South'. It looks as if all the tribes that had broken out of the desert into Syria between the north end of the Dead Sea and the south face of the Taurus had originally constituted a single confederacy (see S. A. Cook in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii (1925), p. 425). Sam'al's proper name was Ya'udi, which sounds as if it were the same word as 'Judah' (see p. 421).

If this is the truth, then the Jews were reverting, without knowing it, to the original language of their forefathers when they took to speaking Aramaic instead of Canaanite, as they did in the course of the Achaemenian Age.

² See iii. 138, footnote 3.

³ See i. 80-81; v. 499-500; and vi. 70, footnote 3.

the Canaanite-speaking peoples' states off the political map. In the next chapter of the story 'Aramaean merchants were replacing Phoenician traders, and a new Aramaic culture, composed of Canaanite and Neo-Assyrian with the latter dominant, was spreading rapidly over the West, strongly supported by Assyrian military power.'¹ The conquered Aramaeans' language and alphabet steadily gained ground on the conquering Assyrians' and Babylonians' Akkadian language and clumsy cuneiform script, till, by the first century of the Christian Era, these became extinct. Aramaic eventually became the vernacular language of the whole of the Fertile Crescent, including Palestine² and Phoenicia. In the fifth century B.C. Aramaic was spoken and written by the Jewish military colony at Elephantinê, on the Ethiopian frontier of Egypt.

As a *lingua franca* for international commerce, diplomacy, and public administration, Aramaic had a still wider currency in a standardized form comparable to the Attic Greek *koinê* which served the same purpose in the same area in the Post-Alexandrine Age. Before the end of the eighth century B.C. this Aramaic *koinê* had been substituted for the local dialect in the official inscriptions of the North-West Syrian state of Ya'udi (Sam'al).³ An international language written in a simple script was a convenient instrument for the administration of a multi-national empire. A fresco dating from the Assyrian Age (ninth or eighth century B.C.) at Til-Barsip, the former capital of the Aramaean state of Bit Adini, astride the elbow of the Euphrates, shows a pair of secretaries standing side by side and taking notes, one on a clay tablet (i.e. in cuneiform) and the other on a sheet of papyrus or parchment (i.e. in the Aramaic alphabet).⁴ Towards the end of the eighth century B.C. an Assyrian high official, the rabshakeh, and the official representatives of the state of Judah could have communicated with each other in Aramaic, if the rabshakeh had not preferred to make his speech in Canaanite, in order to appeal, over the officials' heads, to the people—who, at this date, had not yet acquired the Aramaic language.⁵ An ostrakon found at Asshur, dating from about 650 B.C., is inscribed with a letter, written in the Aramaic *koinê* with a few Akkadianisms, from one Assyrian official to another. There are bilingual inscriptions in Aramaic and Akkadian dating from the reigns of the Assyrian Kings Shalmaneser V, Sargon, and Sennacherib (727–681 B.C.) and also from the time of the Neo-babylonian Empire.⁶ Before the end of the seventh century B.C. Aramaic had supplanted Akkadian for serving as the diplomatic language of South-West Asia and Egypt—a role which had been the Akkadian language's for at least a thousand years. Aramaic is the language of a letter, written about 605 B.C. by a Phoenician King Adon to the King of Egypt, asking for help against the Babylonians.⁷ The Achaemenian

¹ W. F. Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 161.

² In Judah, Canaanite was not replaced by Aramaic as the local vernacular language until after the liquidation of the Kingdom in 587/6 B.C. The Lachish ostraka, which were written in the autumn of 589 B.C. (see W. F. Albright, *op. cit.*, p. 41), are all in Canaanite (Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 88). At Samaria, Aramaic was replacing Canaanite in the Achaemenian Age, on the evidence of Aramaic inscriptions on jars dating from this period (*ibid.*, p. 92).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁶ Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, pp. 86 and 89.

³ Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁵ 2 Kings xviii. 26–28.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

Imperial Government gave the Aramaic *koiné* the status of an official language in all provinces of the Empire west of Iran, at any rate.¹ In Egypt, Persian officials used Aramaic in their correspondence both with Egyptians and with each other;² and Aramaic texts, dating from the Achaemenian Age, have been found all over the country.³ In the same age Aramaic appears in inscriptions and in coin-legends in Anatolia.⁴ It is still more significant that about five hundred documents written in Aramaic have been found at Persepolis.⁵ These conquests made by the Aramaic language were far outranged by those made by the Aramaic alphabet as an instrument for conveying non-Aramaic languages of many different families. The Aramaic alphabet spread eastwards across Iran to the Panjab, and also, via Central Asia, to the northern marches of China. At the present day it is used for writing the Mongol and Manchu languages.⁵

This genius for not merely surviving, but actually prospering and expanding, after the loss of political independence is thus not something that is peculiar to the Jews and Judaism. All the other states of the Syriac World shared the political fate that overtook Judah in 587/6 B.C.; and other disinherited Syriac peoples, besides the Jews, responded to this challenge triumphantly. There were, of course, some—notably the deportees from the Kingdom of Israel—who succumbed to adversity and lost their identity. Yet even the Israelites are still represented today by a few hundred Samaritans in the neighbourhood of Nablūs in the former hill country of Ephraim. And on the whole, taking the Aramaeans and the colonial Phoenicians into account, as well as the Jews, we may conclude that the capacity for living and growing in diasporá was a distinctive common characteristic of the peoples that were partakers in the civilization or civilizations of the Syriac World in and after the last millennium B.C. If we accept this conclusion, it raises a difficult historical question. Except for the Jews and the Samaritans, all the peoples of the original Syriac World are now extinct. No others survive, even in diasporá, today. How long, then, did the rest outlive the loss of their political independence? And when did the Syriac Civilization as a whole lose its identity?

In searching for answers to these questions in earlier volumes of this book, I applied my Hellenic model,⁶ as I had applied it in trying to elucidate the early chapters of Syriac history in which the states of the Syriac World had not yet lost their independence. The configuration of the last phase of Hellenic history is clear. The warring local states of the Hellenic World were eventually united politically in a universal state. Within this unitary political framework, a higher religion, embodied in a universal church, had eventually converted to itself the whole population of the Hellenic World before the universal state collapsed and fell a prey to barbarian invaders from beyond its frontiers. Could one put one's finger on any parallel configuration which might give one the clue

¹ Ibid., pp. 89-90.

² Ibid., pp. 90-91.

³ Ibid., p. 94.

⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

⁵ The histories of the Aramaic language and the Aramaic alphabet have been taken, in i. 79-82, as clues to the expansion and the duration of the Syriac Civilization.

⁶ See i. 73.

for identifying the last phase of Syriac history? In other words, could one find, associated with each other in what had been the Syriac World, any counterparts of the Roman Empire, Christianity, and the barbarians who eventually overran the Roman Empire's former territory?

Christianity has a conspicuous counterpart in Islam. Both religions were derived from Judaism, and both parted company with Judaism in order to preach Judaic monotheism to the non-Jewish world. Islam developed and spread within the framework of the Caliphate under the Umayyad and 'Abbasid regimes; so, in this point at least, the Caliphate might be taken to be a counterpart of the Roman Empire.¹ Moreover, the Caliphate, like the Roman Empire, fell a prey to barbarian invaders in the end. The German, Sarmatian, Hun, Slav, Berber, and Arab invaders of the former domain of the Roman Empire have obvious counterparts in the Turkish, Mongol, Arab, Berber, and Frankish invaders of the former domain of the Caliphate.² If one provisionally took the post-'Abbasid *Völkerwanderung*, the Caliphate, and Islam, as being symptoms of the last phase of Syriac history, could one then trace Syriac history back from this point to the time at which the local states of the early Syriac World had lost their independence?³ If this were to prove possible, the application of the Hellenic model would have enabled one to identify the whole course of Syriac history.

When, however, one recalled the immediate antecedents of the Caliphate, it was obvious that they were quite different from those of the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire had united the Hellenic World politically by suppressing its warring local states; but the warring local states of the Syriac World had not been suppressed by the Caliphate. They had been suppressed by the Assyrian and Neobabylonian empires, twelve or thirteen hundred years before the Caliphate had come into existence. The Caliphate had established itself not, like the Roman Empire, by suppressing a considerable number of relatively small states, but by conquering the whole of one great state, the Sasanian Persian Empire, and the best part of another, the Roman Empire. So, in the immediate antecedents of the Roman Empire and of the Caliphate, there was no correspondence at all between Hellenic history and the history of the civilization to which Islam, the Caliphate, and the post-'Abbasid *Völkerwanderung* were to be attributed.

At this point I recollected that it was, after all, improbable that the course of Syriac history had run parallel to the course of Hellenic history from beginning to end, considering that the Syriac World had had an

¹ K. D. Erdmann remarks (in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 243) that Islam begins with a universal state as well as with a religion. This is true, but it is also true of Christianity, as was noticed by a series of Christian apologists and theologians who were writing under the Roman imperial regime. The Roman Empire was already serving, unconsciously and unintentionally, in its Pre-Constantinian Age as a political framework for the propagation of Christianity. We must agree with the Christian writers of that age in recognizing this as being a matter of historical fact, even if we do not share their belief that the establishment of the Roman Empire in the generation of Augustus was ordained by God's providence for the Christian Church's benefit.

² See i. 72.

³ I have been criticized for thus arguing backwards from the Caliphate by F. Hampl in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 173, Heft 3 (1952), p. 461.

experience which the Hellenic World had been spared. The Syriac World had been overrun by Hellenic invaders in the generation of Alexander the Great, and this forcible Hellenic intrusion upon it had lasted in Syria itself for nearly a thousand years. The intruders had not been completely expelled till Alexander's sweeping conquests in the fourth century B.C. had been finally annulled, in the seventh century of the Christian Era, by the sweeping counter-conquests of the Muslim Arabs.¹ Perhaps it was conceivable that, during this millennium of alien domination, the Syriac Civilization had kept itself alive underground, till at last it had emerged again on the religious plane in Islam and on the political plane in the Caliphate. If so, perhaps the Caliphate might be regarded as being a resumption of the Achaemenian Empire—a universal state in which the Syriac World had been united politically before Alexander's assault had overthrown it.² The Achaemenian Empire, unlike the Caliphate, did stand in an historical relation to the warring local states of the early Syriac World that was comparable to the Roman Empire's historical relation to the warring local states of the Hellenic World. The Achaemenian Empire had given the Syriac World, at last, the unity and peace that the Assyrian and Neobabylonian empires had failed to establish. So perhaps, after all, the course of Syriac history down to the beginning of the Hellenic intrusion on the Syriac World and the consequent break-up of the Achaemenian Empire in the fourth century B.C. did run parallel to the course of Hellenic history down to, say, the temporary break-up of the Roman Empire in the third century of the Christian Era, and then eventually ran parallel to it again from the date of the final liquidation of the Hellenic intrusion onwards. On this analysis the Caliphate would be the belated counterpart, in Syriac history, of the Diocletianic and Constantinian Roman Empire in Hellenic history.

This reading of Syriac history seemed to be supported by the configuration of Indian history and also by a series of events in the Syriac World itself during the age of the Hellenic Civilization's intrusion on it.

The eastward expansion of the Hellenic World initiated by Alexander did not hit the Syriac World alone; it also hit India; for, though Alexander's own raid into India had no lasting effects, it was followed up, *circa* 183 B.C., by a more effective intrusion based on an Hellenic state that had established itself in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin. This Bactrian Greek intrusion brought the Panjab, at least, and possibly a wider area in North-West India, under an Hellenic rule that lasted for about two hundred years, and the end of this Hellenic political regime in India was not the end of Hellenic cultural influence there. The Bactrian Greek wave of invasion was followed by a Eurasian Nomad wave—Sakas and Partho-Sakas and Kushans—which lasted longer and penetrated deeper into the Indian sub-continent. Though these Nomad invaders of India were Iranians, not Greeks, they were nevertheless Philhellenes. In occupying the Greeks' former domain in Bactria and India, they had encountered Hellenism and had been attracted by it;

¹ This chapter of Hellenic history has been discussed in i. 73-76.

² This interpretation of the Caliphate has been suggested in i. 76-78.

and, in the Kushan Age (first to third century of the Christian Era) this original influence of local Hellenism upon them was reinforced by maritime intercourse between the Kushan Empire in India and the Roman Empire via Alexandria. Hellenism was, in fact, protected and fostered in India by the Kushans in somewhat the same way as it was by the Romans in the Levant. In India the Hellenic intrusion lasted for about five hundred years. It was finally liquidated here in the fourth century of the Christian Era by the establishment of an Indian universal state, the Gupta Empire, and the Gupta Empire might be regarded as being a resumption of an earlier Indian universal state, the Maurya Empire, whose collapse had opened the way for the Greek Prince of Bactria, Demetrius, to invade India *circa* 183 B.C.¹

The configuration of Indian history in this chapter, in which an Hellenic intrusion is both preceded and followed by a universal state, is evidently the same as the configuration of a chapter of history in South-West Asia and Egypt in which an Hellenic intrusion is likewise both preceded and followed by a universal state. This Indian parallel is illuminating for the interpretation of Syriac history. It has not ever been suggested, as far as I know, by any student of Indian history that the continuity of this was broken by the Hellenic intrusion, and that the period of Indian history following the intrusion is to be regarded as being the story of a different civilization from the one that was current in India during the period preceding the intrusion. Most students of Indian civilization seem to hold that this has been continuous from at least as early as the time of the arrival of the Aryas in India down to the present day. Some of them have been critical of my division of Indian history since the disappearance of the Indus Culture into the histories of two civilizations that I have distinguished from each other.² But the event in the history of India which seemed to me to mark a break in its social and cultural continuity was not the intrusion of Hellenism into India; it was the victory of the Post-Buddhaic form of Hinduism over Buddhism in India during and after the Gupta Age, together with the contemporary *Völkerwanderung* of the Hun and Gurjara barbarians from Central Asia. In my interpretation of the Hellenic intrusion into India I never thought of dissenting from what may perhaps be called the orthodox view that the Pre-Hellenic Maurya period of Indian history and the Post-Hellenic Gupta period are chapters in the history of one and the same civilization.

If, however, this is the agreed verdict in the case of the Hellenic episode in India, it seems inconsistent to pronounce a contrary verdict in the case of the Hellenic episode in the Syriac World. If the Hellenic incursion is held not to have made a caesura in Indian history, it seems illogical to hold that it made one in Syriac history nevertheless. It is true that in India the Hellenic intrusion lasted for only about half the time-span of its duration in South-West Asia and Egypt. It is also true that India is a more clearly pronounced and clearly demarcated geographical entity than Syria—and, *a fortiori*, than the Syriac World after its states

¹ This chapter of Indian history has been discussed in i. 85-86.

² See p. 169, footnote 5.

had disappeared from the political map and after its culture had simultaneously begun to spread. But these are differences of degree only, not differences of kind that might be expected to give different turns to the course of history. Accordingly, the consensus in favour of continuity in the Indian case does call in question the validity of a dissenting verdict in the Syriac case.

Moreover, the case for the continuity of history in South-West Asia and Egypt from the Pre-Hellenic to the Post-Hellenic chapter of the story does not rest solely on an analogy from the less obscure course of history in India. There is internal evidence for it as well.

When we look back to the antecedents of the seventh-century eruption of Islam, which completed the expulsion of Hellenism from countries south-east of Taurus, we can see that the Islamic reaction against Hellenism was the last and most successful one in a series that had punctuated the whole period of Hellenic ascendancy in this area. Though the Islamic reaction operated on the military and political as well as on the religious plane, it is manifest that it had precursors in the non-military Monophysite and Nestorian Christian reactions against the 'Melchite' Christian Church, the Greek language, and the Roman imperial regime. Measured in terms of relative effectiveness, this series of reactions is a *crescendo* movement; and, each time, the dominant Catholic Christian Roman regime found it more difficult to cope with the mounting opposition to it. When the Nestorians challenged its authority, it succeeded in expelling them from its dominions and forcing them to take asylum in the Sasanian Empire. When the Monophysites challenged its authority, it found them too numerous and too solidly united for it to be possible to expel them or even to prevent them from setting up a dissident ecclesiastical organization underground, but it was still able to maintain its own military and political control over the provinces in which the Monophysites were in a majority. When the Muslim Arabs attacked the Roman Empire, the imperial government was worsted. It soon had to give up the struggle to hold its Monophysite provinces.¹

Moreover, this series of three reactions on an ascending scale of vigour was not an isolated episode. It was only the tail-end of a longer series stretching back in time to within less than a hundred years of the date of the conquest of South-West Asia and Egypt by Alexander the Great. The first of these anti-Hellenic moves in the conquered countries was the occupation of the Seleucid Monarchy's province of Parthia by a Eurasian Nomadic horde, the Parni, not much later than half way through the third century B.C. Before the end of the same century the Ptolemaic Monarchy began to lose control over its Egyptian subjects. In the second decade of the last century B.C., when King Tigranes of Armenia occupied the Seleucid Monarchy's capital, Antioch, and when King Mithradates of Pontic Cappadocia pushed his way as far into Continental European Greece as the Achaemenian Emperor Xerxes had penetrated in 480-479 B.C., it looked for a moment as if the whole of Alexander's achievement was on the point of being undone. At this

¹ This *crescendo* movement has been noticed in ii. 286-8.

critical moment the Hellenic ascendancy in the Levant was given a new lease of life by the Romans,¹ who played here the part that the Kushans played, about a hundred years later, in India. The power of Rome was much greater than that of the Macedonian successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire into whose shoes Rome stepped; and, after Rome had ousted Tigranes and Mithradates, no opposition in the Levant was a match for her till, 500 years later, in the fifth century of the Christian Era, the struggle here was transferred to the religious plane. Yet Rome did not go unchallenged in the Levant during these five centuries of her overwhelming supremacy there. The Palestinian Jews, who had shaken off the Seleucid Monarchy's control in the second century B.C. and had then lost their independence to Rome in 63 B.C., dared to measure their strength against Rome, though this with disastrous consequences for themselves, in A.D. 66-70 and again in A.D. 132-5. And, from the third century of the Christian Era onwards, Rome's hold on the portion of Alexander's conquests that she had salvaged for Hellenism was challenged repeatedly during the next four hundred years, though this without any ultimate success, by the sluggish Parthian Empire's dynamic Sasanid Persian successors.²

Thus the Hellenic ascendancy in South-West Asia and Egypt met with constant opposition throughout all but the first ninety years of its millennium. Opposition implies the existence of an opponent; and, since the opposition to Hellenism extended, at one time or another, over most of the area over which the Syriac Civilization had previously expanded, this opposition is presumptive evidence that the Syriac Society was still in existence throughout this period.

On the strength of these indications that the Syriac Civilization had survived the Hellenic intrusion, long-drawn-out though this had been, I analysed the structure of Syriac history in terms of my Hellenic model, though with an allowance for the difference in the course of Syriac history that the Hellenic intrusion had made. Looking back to the earlier chapters of the story, I found the beginning of a Syriac 'time of troubles' in the intensification of the fratricidal warfare between the local states of the Syriac World after the break-up, at Solomon's death, of the South Syrian Empire that David had built. Even after Assyria had cast her shadow over the Syrian states west of the Euphrates, these continued to fight each other during the ever-shortening intervals between the successive Assyrian attacks; and, by weakening each other in this way, they facilitated the Assyrian and subsequent Babylonian conquest of them all. I found the end of the Syriac Civilization's 'time of troubles' in the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire. This, as I saw it, served the Syriac World as its universal state. And I saw a resumption of this universal state in the Caliphate. The Achaemenian Empire had been overthrown by Alexander before it had had time to complete the social and cultural unification of its people and to enable a higher religion to make headway in converting them. If the Achaemenian

¹ See i. 75-76.

² The Jewish and Sasanian Persian challenges to Rome have been noticed in ii. 285-6.

Empire had been allowed to reach the term of its natural expectation of life, either Zoroastrianism or Judaism might perhaps have played the part that was played later by Christianity and Islam. But, after the establishment of the Hellenic ascendancy over South-West Asia, Judaism and Zoroastrianism were diverted to serving as militant anti-Hellenic movements. Thus Alexander's conquest had overtaken the Achaemenian Empire before its historical task had been accomplished. And, after the expulsion of Hellenism from Syria and Egypt by the Arabs and the reunion of most of the dominions of the Achaemenian Empire in the Caliphate, this avatar of the Achaemenian Empire had (so it looked to me) taken up and completed the Achaemenian Empire's uncompleted work. The re-established Syriac universal state had provided a political framework for the development and spread of a Syriac universal church in the shape of Islam. The subsequent decline of the Caliphate had been followed by a *Völkerwanderung*.

3. REASONS FOR RECONSIDERING THESE RESULTS

One obvious weak point in this analysis of the configuration of Syriac history is the implicit assumption that it must have had the same pattern as the configuration of Hellenic history, except for the difference arising from the Hellenic intrusion on the Syriac World. On reconsideration, I do not think that I was at fault in applying the Hellenic model as an instrument for trying to elucidate the structure of Syriac history. I do think, however, that I ought to have drawn a distinction, which I did not draw, between the use of a model for the purpose of exploration and the assumption—which is undemonstrable and therefore arbitrary—that the structure of the history of one civilization will prove to be reproduced in the structure of the history of another civilization. A recognition of this weakness in my construction of Syriac history counsels me now to take very serious account of the criticisms that this construction of mine has evoked.¹ Many of these criticisms have been vigorous, and some of them have been telling. In the light of them, I must reconsider the whole of my construction of Syriac history, point by point.

This renewed inquiry can be handled most conveniently by breaking it up into the following questions: What was the historical background to the distinctive civilization or civilizations that emerged in Syria at some date during the last few centuries of the second millennium B.C.? Was this new cultural configuration a single civilization or was it a cluster of two civilizations or perhaps more? What was the extent of the Syriac Society's expansion on the cultural plane after its loss of independence on the political plane; and, in particular, what was the history of the relations, at this stage, between Syriac and Iranian culture

¹ These criticisms have been summarized by O. Anderle in an unpublished paper. One point that has been criticized particularly vigorously is my treatment of the Arab Caliphate as being a reintegration or resumption of the Achaemenian Empire. See, for instance, W. H. McNeill in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*; G. E. von Grunebaum, *ibid.*, the Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr., *ibid.*

and religion? After the Syriac Society's loss of its political independence, how far down through the ensuing centuries can we trace its continuing history on non-political planes of activity, considering that no representatives of original Syriac communities except the Jews and the Samaritans have survived right down to the present day? What are we to say to Spengler's hypothesis that, at about the beginning of the Christian Era, a new civilization—the 'Magian' Civilization, as he calls it—arose and made headway in South-West Asia and Egypt under an Hellenic camouflage that made it invisible? Is this hypothesis illuminating or is it an hallucination? If it has to be discarded, what were the real results of the Syriac Society's encounter with the Hellenic Society? How are Christianity and Islam related to the Syriac Civilization? How are the present-day Christian and Islamic civilizations related to the Syriac Civilization?

4. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE HISTORY OF SYRIA IN THE LAST MILLENNIUM B.C.

The civilization (whether unitary or multiple) that we find in Syria in the last millennium B.C. was not only contemporary with the Hellenic Civilization; it also displays some striking resemblances to it. In contrast to the irrigational civilizations in the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin, the lower valley and the delta of the Nile, and the Indus basin, the Syriac World resembled the Hellenic World in depending on rain for the watering of its rare fields and in eking out its scanty agricultural resources by long-distance maritime enterprise. (Even the landlocked highland canton of Judah took the Phoenicians into partnership for opening up sea-borne trade with countries on the Indian Ocean as soon as Judah had acquired a south-sea port at Elath at the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah.) The Syriac World in this age also resembled the Hellenic World in its political configuration. It too presents itself, when the curtain rises on its history, as a mosaic of small sovereign independent states. These Syriac statelets, like their Hellenic counterparts, were perennially at war with each other; and, though they occasionally made common cause against formidable aggressors from outside, they too were eventually extinguished, as the Hellenic statelets were, by empire-builders on the grand scale.

Was the relation between the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations even closer than this? Was it a relation, not only of resemblance, but of affinity? In previous volumes of this book,² I suggested that the Syriac Civilization might prove to be the Hellenic Civilization's 'sister', in the sense of being affiliated, as the Hellenic Civilization was, to the antecedent Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean Civilization in the Aegean area. Indisputably the Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean Civilization was one of the Syriac Civilization's sources. From at least half-way through the second millennium B.C. onwards, until the Mycenaean Civilization

¹ A. L. Kroeber finds my previous account of the relation of Islam to the Syriac Civilization ambiguous (*The Nature of Culture*, p. 376).

² In i. 102-3; ii. 386.

founded, Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean cultural influences had been playing on the coast of Syria with increasing intensity; and, after that, the Völkerwanderung of the 'Sea Peoples', which had been set in motion soon after the beginning of the twelfth century B.C. by the Mycenaean Civilization's last convulsions, had deposited two peoples from the Aegean or from its hinterlands, the Zakkaru (Teucrians) and the Philistines, along the southernmost stretch of the Syrian coast, from the south side of Mount Carmel to the north-east frontier of Egypt. These historical facts are impressive, and, when I was writing volume i of this book, I was also impressed by Sir Arthur Evans' conjecture that the linear Minoan scripts might turn out to be parents of the Phoenician alphabet.¹ At that time the Minoan, like the Mayan, Civilization stood at the zenith of its prestige, and it was easy to fall into the mistake of attributing to it a greater role in history than is attributed to it today in the light of the additional knowledge gained through the continuing progress of archaeological discovery. On reconsideration, I now think that I over-estimated the importance of the Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean contribution to the civilization or civilizations that arose in Syria towards the end of the second millennium B.C.²

For example, Evans' conjecture about the origin of the Phoenician Alphabet has now been put out of court by Ventris' decipherment of the Minoan 'Linear B' script. This script turns out to be, after all, not alphabetic, but syllabic, and this discovery creates the assumption that 'Linear A', and the antecedent Minoan pictographic scripts, would prove to be syllabic too, if we were to succeed in deciphering these in turn. Meanwhile, scholars seem to be inclining towards the view that the script of the enigmatic Sinai inscriptions, whose date is at least as early as 1500 B.C., is alphabetic, and that it is also an early form of the historic Phoenician alphabet.³ Moreover, the Phoenicians at Ugarit, towards the north end of the Syrian coast, were writing, during the early years of the fourteenth century B.C.,⁴ in an alphabet in which Sumero-Akkadian cuneiform characters were used to represent the letters. These clumsy notations of the letters of the Alphabet were afterwards driven out of currency by the simpler set of Phoenician letters, perhaps derived from the Sinaitic, that is the ancestor of all alphabets current today. It seems evident that the analysis of the sounds of human speech into their primary elements, which is the principle of an alphabetic script, was an original invention of the Canaanites', and that they were experimenting in the use of at least two different sets of characters

¹ See i. 102, footnote 3; ii. 50; ii. 386, footnote 2.

² I have been criticized on this ground by R. Coulborn in *Toynbee and History*, p. 160; by M. Samuel: *The Professor and the Fossil*, pp. 56-64; and by A. R. Burn in *History*, February-October, 1956, p. 7.

³ According to W. F. Albright in *The Archaeology of Palestine* (1949), p. 188, the Sinaitic inscriptions 'prove to date from circa 1500 B.C., and to be written in a good Canaanite dialect'; and three short inscriptions, written in a Pre-Sinaitic alphabetic script and dating perhaps from 1800-1500 B.C., have turned up at Gezer, Shechem, and Lachish (*ibid.*, pp. 189-190). In *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed. (1956), p. 40, Albright maintains his opinion that the Sinaitic script is alphabetic and dates the Sinai inscriptions 1800-1500 B.C.

⁴ According to Albright, *The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 187, all datable texts found at Ugarit date from the first third of the fourteenth century B.C. Cf. eundem, *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 38.

for conveying the Alphabet during the second half of the second millennium B.C. There is no evidence to suggest that the Minoan scripts contributed in any way to this Canaanite achievement. Indeed, their syllabic structure is good evidence that they had nothing to do with it.

The Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean Civilization did play upon Syria during the latter half of the second millennium B.C.¹ But its influence on Syria was slight compared with the Egyptian Civilization's, and slighter still compared with the Sumerian-Akkadian Civilization's. In Palestine, Mesopotamian [i.e. Sumerian] influence is manifest in the Esdraclon culture, which is dated in the last quarter of the fourth millennium B.C.² 'The influence of Mesopotamia [i.e. Sumer and Akkad and Assyria] on Canaan was practically continuous during the last 3,000 years B.C.'³ In Palestine, Middle Bronze Age I (twenty-first to nineteenth centuries B.C.) saw a 'diffusion of the Syro-Mesopotamian culture of the period immediately preceding the Third Dynasty of Ur (circa 2070-1960 B.C.)'.⁴ In Palestine in the Late Bronze Age (fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C.), among the five scripts then in use there side by side,⁵ the Akkadian cuneiform was the script in common use, and the language that was written in cuneiform in Syria, as in Babylonia and Assyria, was also Akkadian,⁶ not Canaanite-Amorite.⁷ The Sumerian-Akkadian Civilization was more potent in Syria than the Egyptian Civilization was.⁸ For instance, Canaanite religion had much closer ties with Sumerian-Akkadian religion than it had with Egyptian.⁹ This is remarkable, considering that Egypt was closer to Syria than Akkad was geographically, and also considering that Syria was under Egyptian military and political control more frequently, and for longer periods at a time,¹⁰ than she

¹ Late Mycenaean pottery was imported into Palestine circa 1400-1200 B.C. (Albright, *The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 99).

² Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 144.

³ Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 44.

⁴ Albright: *The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 80.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-3.

⁷ Except for glosses in Canaanite on some of the Amarna documents (W. O. E. Oesterley and T. H. Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, p. 39).

⁸ Oesterley and Robinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 40-1.

⁹ Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 44.

¹⁰ An Egyptian Empire was established in Western Palestine, Phoenicia, the Baqā', and the oasis of Damascus by the Pharaohs of the Twelfth Dynasty (circa 1991-1786 B.C.). This empire did not outlive the Twelfth Dynasty itself; but these parts of Syria were dominated by the material culture of the Egyptian Civilization throughout the Syro-Palestinian Middle Bronze Age IIA (i.e. the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries B.C.) (Albright: *The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 85); and there was a brief restoration of Egyptian political authority there circa 1750 B.C. (*ibid.*, p. 85). As far as Ugarit, on the northern stretch of the Syrian coast, and Qatna, in the middle reach of the Orontes Valley, there are traces of Egyptian influence as far back as the nineteenth century B.C. (*ibid.*, p. 85).

The Egyptian dominion in Syria in the Age of the New Empire of Egypt extended farther and lasted longer. Both Thothmes I and Thothmes III carried Egyptian arms up to the west bank of the Euphrates at the river's westward elbow. And, though the northern half of this dominion was lost to Egypt for ever in the time of Ikhnaton (*regnabat circa 1380-1362 B.C.*), his successors succeeded in recovering territory in South Syria that was approximately coextensive with the Twelfth Dynasty's Syrian Empire. Even after the 'Sea Peoples' had migrated, in force, through Syria as far as the north-east corner of the Nile Delta in the early twelfth century B.C., the Egyptians managed to retain, or subsequently reoccupy, some of their South Syrian fortresses. If T. H. Robinson is right in thinking that an Egyptian garrison held Bethshean till the Philistines occupied this fortress circa 1050 B.C. (see Oesterley and Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, p. 133), the New Empire of Egypt's military and political hold on parts of Syria

was ever under the control of any power to the east of her until, towards the end of the tenth century B.C., Assyria started on a course of westward expansion which, in spite of intermissions and set-backs, eventually brought almost all Syria under her rule. Yet the Egyptian Civilization's influence on Syria was second only to the Sumero-Akkadian's, and it was probably the older of the two. Intercourse between Egypt and Byblos seems to have begun soon after the establishment of the Egyptian United Kingdom;¹ and the Egyptian culture that made such a conspicuous impression on Byblos itself must have penetrated from this bridgehead into the interior.² Anyway, Egyptian, as well as Sumero-Akkadian, cultural influence in Syria was much greater than Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaeen.

Nor did the settlement of the Philistines and Teucrians in the Plain of Sharon in the early twelfth century B.C. make the Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaeen contribution to civilization in Syria the preponderant one. The migration of the 'Sea Peoples' was only one incident in the thirteenth-century and twelfth-century Völkerwanderung in the Levant. In falling upon and overthrowing the Hatti Empire on their way, the 'Sea Peoples' themselves had set in motion a southward migration of Hittite refugees. These reinforced, and perhaps extended, the Hittite settlements that had been planted in Northern Syria previously. At any rate, Hamath, as well as Carchemish, was a Hittite state in the Post-Völkerwanderung Age. But both the Hittite and the Philistine settlements in Syria were surpassed in extent by previous Hebrew and Aramaean settlements.³ The Hebrews occupied Transjordan (Moab, lasted about 420 years, reckoning back to Thothmes III's first Syrian campaign, or perhaps as much as about 475 years, reckoning back to Thothmes I's. Albright does not retain the Egyptian garrison in Bethshean beyond the twelfth century B.C. (*The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 40).

¹ The last king of the Second Dynasty of Egypt is known to have sent offerings to Byblos (Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 158).

² Egyptian artefacts dating from the time of the Old Kingdom have been found at Ai (*ibid.*, pp. 158 and 163).

³ The question of the date, or dates, of the Israelite settlements in Palestine is now no longer complicated by Garstang's belief that, in his excavations at Jericho in 1930-6, he had identified the walls that fell for Joshua's benefit. These particular walls have proved to date, not from the late, but from the early, Bronze Age, and the latest (i.e. topmost) Bronze Age strata have been carried away by erosion. 'The excavation of Jericho, therefore, has thrown no light on the walls of Jericho of which the destruction is so vividly described in the Book of Joshua' (K. Kenyon: *Digging up Jericho*, p. 262).

H. H. Rowley holds that the accounts of the invasion of Palestine from the adjoining desert in the 'Amarnah archives and in the Book of Joshua refer to two different sets of events (*From Joseph to Joshua*, pp. 38-45). He thinks that in the Pharaoh Ikhnaton's time (*imperator circa* 1380-1362 B.C.) the Habiru succeeded in occupying the hill countries of Galilee and Judah, but failed to occupy the hill country of Ephraim (*ibid.*, pp. 110-12 and 164). The 'Aseru (i.e. the Israelite tribe Asher) are mentioned as being already settled in Palestine in the time of the Pharaohs Seti I and Ramses II (*ibid.*, pp. 3, 109, and 113). The archaeological evidence suggests that there was an occupation of the hill country of Ephraim in the second half of the thirteenth century B.C., and this may be identified with the conquest traditionally ascribed to Moses' successor Joshua. There is strong evidence for a break in the continuity of history in Palestine in the thirteenth century (*ibid.*, pp. 23 and 109). There is a consensus among the archaeologists that Bethel fell in the thirteenth century B.C. (*ibid.*, p. 19), and that Lachish fell at some date during the second half of that century (*ibid.*, pp. 17-18). The fall of Tell Beit Mirsim, which may be the Biblical Debir, seems to have been more or less contemporaneous with the fall of Lachish (*ibid.*, p. 18). W. F. Albright dates the fall of Lachish *circa* 1220 B.C. or a little later, and the fall of Bethel before the fall of Lachish, in *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 278. The Pharaoh Merneptah claims to have destroyed Israel, among his other achievements in his military expedition to Palestine and Syria. This

Ammon, Gilead), the Negeb (Edom), and, west of Jordan, the hill country of Ephraim and the hill country of Galilee (Naphthali, Zebulon, Asher). The Aramaeans occupied the Hawran and the Damascus oasis (later known as *Aram par excellence*), the Baqā' (Sobah), the Aleppo district (Bit Agushi and Bit Adini), and even the district round the present-day Zenjirli, astride the Northern Amanus (Ya'udi, *alias* Sam'al, meaning 'the left-hand', i.e. 'the North').¹ There was another northerly Aramaean state called Musri (meaning 'the border')² whose exact location is, so far, unknown. The important Aramaean state called Bit Adini bestrode the elbow of the Euphrates; and other Aramaean peoples occupied the whole of Transeuphratean Syria, up to the north-western borders of Babylonia and the western borders of Assyria. Eastwards they crossed the Tigris, between Assyria and Babylonia, and occupied the steppes north-east of Babylonia up to the foot of the Iranian plateau. North-eastwards they pushed their way into the upper basin of the Tigris (Bit Zamani).

In the course of the last millennium B.C. these Aramaean settlers in Syria, as we have seen,³ slowly but surely imposed their language on the Hittite and Philistine settlers, and also on the native Canaanites and on the Aramaeans' own Hebrew kinsmen, who had taken to speaking Canaanite after their settlement in the south-east of the Syriac World.⁴

It will be seen that the cultural heritage of the civilization or civilizations in Syria with which the Hellenic Civilization was contemporary was both richer and older than the Hellenic Civilization's was. Hellenism had little behind it beyond the Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean Civilization, and the loss of the Minoan art of writing shows how great the breach of cultural continuity in the Aegean was at the time of the Post-Minoan Völkerwanderung. Contemporary civilization in Syria was the heir of four older civilizations: the Sumero-Akkadian, the Egyptian, the Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean, and the Hittite. Civilization had reached a peak in Palestine in the third millennium B.C.⁵ At Jericho civilization was about twice as old as at any other hitherto explored site in the World. Perhaps we ought not to count the pre-pottery Neolithic culture of Jericho as being part of later Syria's cultural heritage, since there seems to have been a complete break, even at Jericho itself, between this culture and its successors. Even so, the antiquity of civilization in Syria is comparable to its antiquity in Sumer and Egypt.

It was not, however, till the later centuries of the second millennium B.C. that civilization in Syria became something distinctively Syriac. After the extinction of the pre-pottery Neolithic culture at Jericho, the Alphabet is the first original invention in Syria on which one can put

expedition—which Albright dates *circa* 1219 B.C. (op. cit., p. 255)—was presumably an abortive retaliation for the recently accomplished Israelite occupation of the hill country of Ephraim.

On this evidence, the second Hebrew invasion of Palestine was the main one, and it took place about forty or fifty years before the Philistine and Teucrican occupation of the coast south of Mount Carmel.

¹ See S. A. Cook in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii (1925), p. 425.

² See p. 397, footnote 1, and pp. 397-9.

³ K. Kenyon: *Digging up Jericho*, p. 101.

⁴ See p. 397, footnote 1, above.

one's finger; and, in the field of art, Syria never achieved originality¹—though, even so, the syncretism of Babylonian and Egyptian art which the Phoenicians introduced into the Hellenic World in the seventh century B.C. had an enormous influence there. Syria's difficulty in achieving cultural originality is perhaps partly accounted for by the very wealth of the cultural gifts that she had been receiving from all quarters since the third millennium B.C.;² and, conversely, the eventual rise of a distinctive Syriac civilization or civilizations during the last half of the second millennium B.C. is no doubt partly accounted for by the relaxation, in that age, of the previous pressure on Syria from her two most potent neighbours.³

The Sumero-Akkadian World fell into adversity when, in the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C., the First Dynasty of Babylon decayed after the death of Hammurabi. Babylonia was then occupied by the Kassite barbarians from the Zagros highlands, while Assyria was encircled by the Mitanni barbarians from the Eurasian steppe; and, after a brief recovery in and after the fourteenth century B.C., Assyria was driven to the wall again by the thirteenth-century and twelfth-century Völkerwanderung. The Aramaeans now pressed upon her from the south-west, the Phrygians from the north-west, the Iranians from the east. It was not till towards the end of the tenth century that Assyria was able to start the counter-offensive that made her the mistress of the whole of the Fertile Crescent in the course of the next 200 years. As for Egypt, she was exhausted by her hundred years' war with the Hittites, and the last straw was the supreme effort that she made when the 'Sea Peoples' reached the Delta in 1188 B.C. She just succeeded in repulsing them, but she herself was left prostrate. Later Egyptian incursions into Syria in the tenth century and again in the seventh century B.C. were ineffectual. Thus from 1188 to 932 B.C. there was no great power within range of Syria.⁴ This unprecedented relief from external pressure explains why a distinctive Syriac culture was able to flower in this age. The respite was only about two hundred and fifty years long, but Syria took advantage of it to make a permanent mark on mankind's history.

5. WAS THERE ONE ONLY, OR MORE THAN ONE, CIVILIZATION IN SYRIA IN THE LAST MILLENNIUM B.C.?

No one disputes that in Syria, during and on the eve of the last millennium B.C., things were achieved that are evidence of the presence of high civilization there at the time, and are, indeed, among the greatest of mankind's achievements up to date since civilization began. The

¹ F. Hampl, among others, has made this point (see the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 173, Heft 3 (1952), p. 452). Albright notes that the Samaria ivories of the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. are entirely Egyptian in their style (*The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 137).

² The failure of Syria to create a distinctive civilization of her own in the Hyksos Age has been discussed in ii. 388-91.

³ This point has been made already in ii. 387-8.

⁴ See W. O. E. Oesterley and T. H. Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, pp. 141-2 and 174-5.

Phoenician alphabet invented by the native Canaanite people of Syria before the arrival of the new-comers in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. is the ancestor of all the systems of writing that are in use in the World today outside the domain of the Chinese characters in Eastern Asia. The contemporary domestication of the Arabian camel gave Man the mastery of the steppes and deserts, not only in the southern hinterland of the Fertile Crescent, but eventually in North Africa as well. The exploration of the western basin of the Mediterranean by the Phoenicians in and after the tenth century B.C.¹ was crowned by the discovery of the Atlantic and thus led eventually to the discovery of the Americas by Transatlantic voyagers from the Old World. The revolutionary change in the conception of the nature of Yahweh, the god of Israel and Judah, which was started in these two countries in the eighth century B.C. by prophets of a new kind, was a first step towards Post-Exilic Jewish monotheism and hence towards Christian and Islamic monotheism as well.

Are these achievements in Syria in this age to be attributed to a single civilization or to more than one? They are heterogeneous, in the sense that they are achievements in different fields of activity. But this is also true of the great achievements of the contemporary Hellenic Civilization; and no one would think of denying the unity of the Hellenic Civilization on this account. Nor indeed is this the reason why the unity of the Syriac Civilization has been contested. The reason is an unwillingness to admit that Judaism and its antecedents, as far back as these can be traced in the histories of Judah and Israel, is a part of some larger whole and is therefore not something quite distinct, separate, and unique. It is the Canaanite-speaking peoples of Judah and Israel, not the non-Semitic-speaking Philistines and Hittites, whom scholars of this school refuse to associate with the Canaanite Phoenicians. This position is put clearly by A. R. Burn:

'It is open to argument whether a distinctive "Syriac" Civilization, as opposed to several different civilizations of much interest and originality, ever existed. There is as much difference between the cultures of the Phoenicians and Hebrews, in spite of their kinship in blood and language, as between either of them and that of the Hittites. . . . The history of the Hebrews *alone* comes nearer to being "an intelligible field of study" than that of Syria at large; and, if we seek a larger field, there is no stopping-place short of the limits of the history of civilization in South-Western Asia from the Neolithic Age onwards.'²

Burn is not alone in taking this view.³ Yet the thesis is suspect because

¹ Albright notes that the Phoenicians acquired their overseas realm suddenly, after the Philistines had been crushed by David's victories over them in 990-980 B.C. (*The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 122). The Phoenician ivories found in Spain at Carmona, and the oldest painted pottery from the Tanit cemetery at Carthage, are of the archaeological period 'Megiddo V', circa 1050-975 B.C. A ninth-century Phoenician inscription has been found at Nora in Sardinia, and a ninth-century Phoenician tomb in Cyprus (*ibid.*, pp. 122-3). Cp. *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., pp. 131-2.

² *History*, February-October, 1956, p. 6.

³ M. Samuel, for instance, maintains that the Israelites were not participants in a Syriac Civilization (*The Professor and the Fossil*, pp. 68-70); Rabbi J. B. Agus that it makes 'little sense to speak of Jewry as part of the Syriac Civilization' (*Judaism*, vol. 4,

it has not been arrived at exclusively by a disinterested and detached appraisal of the historical evidence. It is at least partly a corollary of the Jewish and Christian religious conviction that the Israelites' god Yahweh is the One True God and that the Israelites and their heirs the Jews are—or were—His 'Chosen People'.¹ Scholars with a Jewish or Christian background who do not hold this conviction may still remain under the influence of the interpretation of history to which their ancestral religious outlook has given rise. They may find it difficult to break away from the habit of reading back into the age of Moses, or even of Abraham, conceptions of the nature of the Israelites' god and of the status of the Israelites themselves which did not begin to take shape before the eighth century B.C., and did not reach their final shape till they had passed through many stages of gradual evolution, according to the picture presented by a critical sifting of the historical evidence.

In truth, of course, a thing need not always have been what it has eventually become. Indeed, it is impossible that anything within human experience should have had an unchanging identity since an infinitely long time ago, if it is true that this planet and everything on it and all the rest of the cosmos within an astronomer's ken is a metamorphosis of some *primaeva* nebula. The concept of unchangingness is chimerical; but it is attractive to human minds for two reasons. One reason is that change—i.e. the emergence of something new—cannot be expressed in logical terms and is therefore intellectually incomprehensible,² however forcibly its reality may be attested by experience. The other reason for the widespread unwillingness to acknowledge the reality of change is the notion that one is being disrespectful to what is worthy of respect if one admits that it can have emerged, in the course of time, out of something inferior to itself. This notion is surely the exact opposite of the truth; for in truth nothing is so remarkable or sublime as the fact of rising, or raising oneself, from a lower level to a higher one; and therefore the recognition that some thing or person has achieved this feat, so far from being insulting, is the greatest honour that one can pay to him or it.

If this is the truth, it is neither blasphemous towards the Jewish-Christian-Muslim One True God (if one believes in His reality) nor derogatory to the prophets of Israel and Judah and their Jewish, Christian, and Muslim successors to hold that the present Judaic conception of God—whether revealed by God or discovered by Man progressively—is so much higher than the picture of Yahweh presented in the earliest strata of the Israelitish scriptures that we should hardly guess that there was any connexion between the two pictures if we were

No. 4 (Fall, 1955), p. 320), and that, indeed, there was no such thing as a Syriac Civilization, though the progress of archaeology is bringing to light the Canaanite background of the origins of Israelite culture (*The National Jewish Monthly*, November, 1956, pp. 41-42); K. D. Erdmann that Jewish history cannot be expressed in terms of Syriac (*Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 244); J. L. Talmon that a wider Syriac context is hardly relevant to Jewish history (*Commentary*, July, 1957, p. 7); F. Hampl that I ought to have discriminated between the monotheistic Israelites and their polytheistic neighbours (*Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 173, Heft 3 (1952), p. 452).

¹ The official Christian belief is that the Jews forfeited this privilege through their refusal to recognize Jesus as being the Messiah and the Son of God, and that the role then passed to the Christian Church.

² See pp. 252-4.

not informed, by a continuous chain of historical evidence, that the later picture has, in fact, grown out of the earlier one.¹ As for the distinctiveness of Judaism, this has been manifest since the conversion of the western end of the Old World to Christianity and Islam; for, since then, Judaism has been the only other religion of any account that has survived to the west of India; but a recognition of the fact that Judaism had become a distinctive religion by this date does not commit one to having to believe, in consequence, that the religion of Israel must have been distinctive in the ninth or in the thirteenth century B.C. Similarly, we may recognize that the Jewish people has distinguished itself by having contrived to survive in diasporá for 2,500 years, up to date, after having lost its state and country in Palestine in the sixth century B.C.; but this, again, does not commit us to having to believe that Judah was already peculiar when she was in existence as a statelet rubbing shoulders with Edom, Moab, Ammon, Israel, and the five Philistine city-states. Nor does it commit us to having to believe that the Jewish diasporá is as peculiar today as it may have been at an earlier stage of its already long history. The Jewish diasporá may have been the earliest community to discover how to maintain itself in existence after having been uprooted; but in the meantime this pioneer achievement has proved to be 'the wave of the future'.²

In this historical perspective the peculiarity of the Post-Exilic Jewish diasporá, like the distinctiveness of Post-Exilic Judaism, looks as if it were no more than a passing phase. Distinctiveness was not an original characteristic of either the people or its religion; for their present distinctiveness can be seen to have originated in particular social and religious innovations that are of relatively recent date; and it is not a permanently acquired characteristic; for the monotheism that is the essence of Judaism has already become the religion of half the World in its Christian and Islamic versions, while the social structure that is characteristic of the Jewish diasporá seems to be now on the way to becoming the standard pattern for all mankind.

The Jews themselves have never maintained that the division between gentiles and Jews, and the corresponding gulf between the worship of false gods and the worship of the One True God, goes back to the beginning of time. They do not trace this dichotomy of mankind and its religion back to Adam, or even to Noah, but only to Abraham; and they do not date earlier than the time of Moses the covenant between Yahweh and Israel in which Yahweh is believed to have chosen Israel to be his people, and Israel to have adopted Yahweh to be its god.³ Yahweh is tacitly identified with the god of the Israelites' forefathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.⁴ Yet, according to the account given by

¹ See pp. 488-96.

² See pp. 209-17 and 484.

³ For all that we know, the god of the Covenant may originally have been, not Yahweh, but a pre-Hebrew 'Baal Berith' at Shechem (see p. 420, footnote 3, and pp. 489-90), where, according to the Book of Joshua, chap. xxiv, the Israelites pledged themselves to their god after the completion of their conquest of Canaan (see H. H. Rowley: *From Joseph to Joshua*, pp. 125-9, for a full discussion of this).

⁴ Can the Hebrew Patriarchs' god be identified? T. H. Robinson points out that both Ur and Haran were seats of the worship of the Sumero-Akkadian moon-god whom the Akkadians called Sin, and he conjectures that this god's name may be contained in the

two of the three oldest main sources of the Pentateuch,¹ even in the assiduously revised form in which we now have it, the Israelites did not know Yahweh's name before he revealed himself to Moses and commissioned Moses to be his messenger to them.²

Down to this point the traditional Jewish account of the relations between Yahweh and Israel and between the Israelites and the rest of mankind represents these as having developed progressively. The anonymous god who has called Abraham reveals his name to Abraham's descendants at Sinai. The children of Israel, who at Sinai become Yahweh's 'Chosen People', are kinsmen, through Isaac, of the children of Esau; through Abraham, of the children of Ishmael; and, through Terah, of the children of Lot. Through Noah's son Shem ('the name') they are kinsmen of all the other Hebrew and Aramaean peoples who erupted out of Arabia into the Fertile Crescent in the Völkerwanderung of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. On the other hand, it is the official Jewish view that the whole of the Pentateuch, and this in the form in which we now have it, was revealed by Yahweh at Sinai to Moses, together with an accompanying revelation that was not committed to writing but was transmitted orally.³ It is also the official view that this Mosaic revelation was, and is, definitive.⁴ The rest of the Torah (Yahweh's teaching, known by Christians as 'the Old Testament') is officially held to be, not only consistent with the Pentateuch, but also demonstrably implicit in it, when the two bodies of scripture are interpreted in the light of the traditional unwritten revelation. The

name of Mount Sinai (W. O. E. Oesterley and T. H. Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, p. 90). This conjecture is rejected by W. F. Albright (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 263).

¹ E and P as opposed to J (Oesterley and Robinson, op. cit., vol. i, p. 83).

² Robinson suggests (*ibid.*, p. 82) that the god who spoke to Moses from the burning bush was the god of the priest in Midian whose daughter Moses had married. He suggests that Yahweh was a Midianite or Kenite god (*ibid.*, p. 88). Yahweh was a fire-god, and the Kenites were smiths (*ibid.*, p. 92). This is also H. H. Rowley's view (see *From Joseph to Joshua*, pp. 149-56). Rowley points out (*ibid.*, p. 152) that Jethro and Moses' brother-in-law Hobab are both called Midianites as well as Kenites.

Albright finds Egyptian elements in Yahweh-worship. He suggests that the word 'Yahweh' itself may originally have been the first word in a formula meaning 'He causes to be what comes into existence'; and he points out that this formula occurs in Egyptian religious texts of the second millennium B.C., e.g. a hymn to Amun (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 261). He also points out (*ibid.*, p. 270) that 'sbäyet', the Egyptian name for Ikhnaton's monotheistic doctrine, has the same meaning, i.e. 'teaching', as the Hebrew word 'torah'.

Believing, as he does, that Moses was a monotheist in the full sense of the word (see, for instance, his *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 96), Albright conjectures that he may have derived from Egyptian sources the concepts that Yahweh was the sole creator, the sole god in the Universe, and the master of the whole of it (*ibid.*, p. 270). It is credible that Ikhnaton's monotheism might have influenced the Kenite and Midianite barbarians on or just beyond the south-eastern fringe of the Egyptian New Empire's dominions in Syria. It is also credible that a new religion which, in Egypt, had been invented and imposed by a sovereign, and which did not, there, outlast its author's lifetime, should have survived, outside Egypt, among non-Egyptian voluntary converts. The Druz religion, invented by the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, Hâkim bi 'amr'illâh (*imperabat* A.D. 996-1020), survives today in Syria and the Lebanon, more than nine hundred years after its death in Egypt, where it died with Hâkim himself. If the Yahweh-worship that Moses found in vogue among the Kenites and Midianites was an echo of Atonism, and if Moses himself was born and brought up in Egypt, he might have been predisposed in this originally Egyptian religion's favour by some echo of it that might have come to his ears in Egypt when he was a child.

All this, however, is sheer conjecture.

³ See pp. 506 and 508.

⁴ See p. 506.

rules of conduct implicitly prescribed in the Torah have been elicited in the *halachoth* (formulations that have been approved by a consensus of the recognized rabbinical authorities);¹ the *halachoth* have been codified in the Mishnah; and the Mishnah has been expounded in the Gemara.² The Talmud (i.e. the Mishnah plus the Gemara) and the Torah constitute a monolithic unity. The core of the monolith and the principle of its unity is to be found in the Pentateuch.

Thus the official Jewish view is that the Jewish religion and the Jewish people have been what they now are ever since the time of Moses. But this thesis is incompatible with known historical facts, many of them attested by the internal evidence of the Jewish scriptures themselves. Moses may be an historical character;³ but, even if he is not legendary, his alleged literary work is. A critical analysis of the Pentateuch shows that it is a composite work; that each of the books in which it is now arranged has been spliced together out of pieces of older written documents; and that these sources are not older than the ninth century B.C., or the tenth century at the earliest.⁴

Moses is not mentioned in connexion with the Torah by the eighth-century prophets of Israel and Judah. They used the word 'torah' as a name for their own utterances.⁵ The first authority to ascribe the authorship of the Torah to Moses was Ezra,⁶ who went on his mission from Babylonia to Judaea in either 458 or 397 B.C.⁷ The canon of the Torah was probably not fixed and closed till after the Romano-Jewish war of A.D. 66-70.⁸ The composition of the whole corpus of authoritative Jewish religious literature, from the earliest strata of the Torah to the final form of the Babylonian Talmud, was a long-drawn-out process. Its time-span may be not less than fourteen hundred years (circa 925 B.C.-A.D. 475).

It would be surprising if, in the course of this long period, there had been no changes in the religious conceptions, outlook, and beliefs of the Israelites and their Jewish heirs. In truth, there were great and continuous changes from the days of the eighth-century prophets onwards; the changes introduced by the Pre-Exilic prophets themselves were both revolutionary and creative; the subsequent changes associated with

¹ See pp. 508-9.

² See pp. 480, 488, and 508.

³ One piece of presumptive evidence for the historicity of Moses is his name. This looks like the second half of an Egyptian compound theophoric name of the type Ahmose, Tutmose, Ramose, Graecised as Ramesses or Ramses (see W. O. E. Oesterley and T. H. Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, p. 81). The Israelites would hardly have given an Egyptian name to their national hero if he was not an authentic historical figure by whom this name had actually been borne. On the other hand, if their historical leader did bear an Egyptian compound theophoric name, they might well have doctored the name, retrospectively, of its first element, since this would have been the name of some Egyptian god. Robinson (in loc. cit., p. 81, footnote 4) conjectures that the story of the preservation of the infant Moses' life may have been transferred to the Israelite national hero from the Egyptian national hero Ahmose. In the original Egyptian version of the story the wicked Pharaoh would have been a Hyksos king, not one of the Hyksos' native Egyptian xenophobe successors.

Albright points out that, in the House of Aaron, Egyptian personal names were in use for at least two hundred years after Moses' probable date: e.g. the names of Eli's two sons, Hophni and Pinehas. Pinehas means Pi-nehase: 'the Nubian' (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., pp. 254 and 282.)

⁴ See p. 506.

⁵ G. F. Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. 263.

⁶ R. Travers Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 55.

⁷ See p. 484, footnote 2.

⁸ See p. 480.

the names of Ezekiel, Ezra, and the Pharisees, if not equally creative, were equally revolutionary (e.g. the Pharisees' postulate that, besides the written revelation to Moses, there must have been an oral one represented by traditions still alive in their day). These changes were the product of spiritual travail that was a response to shattering experiences: the eighth-century social revolution and Assyrian conquest; the sixth-century deportation to Babylonia; the second-century collision with Hellenism; and the two disastrous wars with the Romans in A.D. 66-70 and A.D. 132-5. Judaism and the Jewish people, as we know them now, are products of these experiences in and after the eighth century B.C. The official Jewish thesis that they have been what they now are since a Mosaic Age, before the Israelites' settlement in Palestine in the thirteenth century B.C., is not only irreconcilable with the historical evidence; it makes the course of Israelite and Jewish history since that date unintelligible. Accordingly, we must put this official Jewish thesis out of our minds in considering the question whether the civilization that emerged in Syria after the dust of this *Völkerwanderung* had settled was multiple or unitary.

There are at least three cogent pieces of evidence which indicate that, whatever may have happened to the Aramaeans, Philistines, and Hittites after their settlement in Syria at this time, the Israelites, at any rate, mixed with the older inhabitants of the country that they occupied. In the first place the Israelites went over from a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life to agriculture; and, since agriculture was (and, even now, to some extent still is) a religious activity as well as an economic one, they adopted the indigenous agricultural religious rites and festivals. Since the earliest times after the Israelites' settlement to which their own historical records go back, we find this Canaanite religious practice associated with the worship of the god Yahweh¹ which, according to their tradition, they brought in with them. In the second place the Israelites took to speaking the indigenous Canaanite language,² and this so rapidly that, perhaps before the end of the tenth century B.C., they were already writing magnificent literary works in the borrowed language that, in virtue of these monuments of it, we call 'Hebrew'. This swift and thorough change of language indicates that the settlers and the early generations of their descendants must have made a frequent practice of marrying Canaanite women. In the third place the Israelites acquired the physiognomy that is now associated with Jews in Western minds, though it is at least as characteristic of present-day Armenians and Anatolian Turks, and also of the Assyrians in the first half of the last millennium B.C. as these have portrayed themselves on bas reliefs and in statues. Neither the Assyrians nor the Jews' forefathers, the people of Judah, can have brought this physiognomy with them from their original home in Arabia; for the characteristic physiognomy of the present-day Semitic-speaking inhabitants of Arabia is not 'Jewish' but Mediterranean. The people of Judah must have acquired the 'Jewish' physiognomy in Palestine, after their settlement there; and this acquisition

¹ See Oesterley and Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, pp. 167-8.

² See p. 397, footnote 1.

of an exotic physiognomy is another indication of inter-marriage with older elements in the population that had come in, not from Arabia, but from what is now Eastern Turkey.¹ We know of two waves of immigration that had entered Syria from the north before the Israelites' arrival there: a Hurrian wave in the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C.² and a Hittite wave in the fourteenth century. The Hurrian wave was evidently a big one,³ and the subsequent Hittite wave was reinforced, soon after the Israelites' arrival, by Hittite refugees driven out of Anatolia by the 'Sea Peoples' who had overthrown the Khatti Empire and by the Phrygians who had flooded into Anatolia in the Sea Peoples' wake. A memory of the Israelite settlers' racial fusion, in Palestine, with Amorites⁴ and Hittites is preserved in Ezekiel's taunt: 'the Amorite was thy father, and thy mother was a Hittite'.⁵

Let us now try to look, without Jewish-Christian prepossessions, at the course of history in Syria from the time of the Völkerwanderung of the Aramaeans and Hebrews and Philistines⁶ down to the later decades of the eighth century B.C., when the majority of the Syrian states west of Euphrates were extinguished, as those east of the river had been in the ninth century, by the Assyrians. We shall find that the plot of the historical drama during this period is the same in Syria as in the contemporary Hellenic World. In a world in which society has been broken up, and civilization set back, by the impact of the Völkerwanderung, a new social unity and a new civilization emerge. The main source of both is the remnant of a previous society that has survived the devastating experience of being invaded and overrun and has salvaged enough of its cultural heritage to provide the nucleus for the creation of a new culture which is the common achievement and possession of all elements, old and new, in the population.

Albright points out that there was a major break in the continuity of Canaanite history in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. Within a span of only fifty years (? *circa* 1230-1180 B.C.), the Canaanites lost over nine-tenths of their former territory to the Aramaeans, Hebrews,

¹ See W. O. E. Oesterley and T. H. Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, pp. 41 and 46.

² For the Hurrians, see, among others, W. F. Albright: *The Archaeology of Palestine*, pp. 183-4. The Hurrians are the Biblical 'Horites'. This name has been preserved correctly in the Septuagint Greek text, but has been corrupted to 'Hivites' in the canonical Hebrew text, owing to the similarity of the letters R and W in the 'square' form of the Aramaic alphabet which the Jews eventually adopted for the writing of Hebrew (i.e. Canaanite).

³ In records dating from the period *circa* 2000-1750 B.C. all personal names in Syria south of Carchemish are exclusively Canaanite or Amorite. When, after a break corresponding to the Hyksos Age, the records begin again in the time of the New Empire of Egypt, there are Indo-European and Hurrian personal names, too, in this region. 'There must have been a great barbarian irruption from the north-east into the Fertile Crescent in the course of the eighteenth century B.C.' (W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 205). At Megiddo brachycephalic people replaced dolicocephalic people at the same date (*ibid.*, p. 206).

⁴ The Amorites were the last arrivals in the Fertile Crescent from Arabia before the Aramaeans, Hebrews, and Chaldaeans. They appear to have come in before the end of the third millennium B.C. (Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., pp. 151-2 and 164), whereas the Canaanites had been in Syria since the early centuries of the third millennium B.C. at least (*ibid.*, p. 163). But the Amorites spoke, or learnt from the Canaanites to speak, a language that was virtually identical with Canaanite; and, by the time of the Hebrew-Aramaean invasion of Syria, Canaanites and Amorites must have become indistinguishable.

⁵ Ez. xvi. 3, repeated in 45.

⁶ See pp. 409-10.

and Philistines.¹ There was a sharp decline in material culture;² and the Canaanite language did not come out unscathed. The case-endings, which are intact in the Ugaritic literature of the fourteenth century B.C., were being lost in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries, on the evidence of Phoenician inscriptions of that age. The language is without case-endings in the earliest monuments of Israelitish literature.³ The effects of the inroads of new-comers into Syria were thus disruptive. But they were not more disruptive than the effects of the contemporary upheaval in the Aegean World. Here, too, the previous population—in this case, the Greek-speaking participants in the Mycenaean Civilization—was dispossessed and uprooted on the grand scale. Luvian-speaking Carians—jetsam from the same shattered Hittite World as the Hittite refugees in Syria—broke their way into the Aegean basin from the north-east. A far larger wave of North-West-Greek-speaking barbarians washed across Continental European Greece and on overseas as far as Crete and Rhodes. On the European mainland, the descendants of the earlier Greek-speaking stratum preserved their independence in only a few pockets of territory: Arcadian-speakers in the central highlands of the Peloponnese and in Triphylia; Aeolic-speakers in Boeotia and Thessaly; Ionic-speakers in Attica. It was no consolation for them that the barbarian invaders from the north-west spoke a dialect of their own Greek tongue, any more than it was a consolation for their Canaanite companions in misfortune that the Hebrew and the Aramaean barbarian invaders of Syria spoke a language that, like Canaanite, was Semitic. Yet, in Syria and in the Aegean alike, society recovered from the shock and a new civilization eventually blossomed.

Albright holds⁴ that the unsubmerged minority of the Canaanites was already rallying in the twelfth century B.C. Still more important, possibly, was the influence of a Canaanite majority that had been subjugated but had not been exterminated. The genocide committed by the new-comers may not have been extensive.⁵ The Israelites, for instance,

¹ W. F. Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., pp. 68–69. Presumably Albright is here counting as Canaanites the Amorites who at this date were established in those north-eastern districts of Syria that were now occupied by the Aramaeans.

² Albright: *The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 119.

³ W. F. Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 181.

⁴ Op. cit., 4th ed., p. 69.

⁵ Albright brings forward archaeological evidence to this effect—some of it discovered by himself—which is cited in the next paragraph of the present chapter. Yet his inflexible will to believe that the Israelites were pure monotheists from the time of Moses onwards has moved him to fly in the face of his own evidence and to paint the thirteenth-century B.C. Israelite invaders of Palestine blacker than they deserve on his own showing. In *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 281, he has written: 'It was fortunate for the future of monotheism that the Israelites of the Conquest were a wild folk, endowed with primitive energy and ruthless will to exist, since the resulting decimation of the Canaanites prevented the complete fusion of the two kindred folk which would almost inevitably have depressed Yahwistic standards to a point where recovery was impossible. Thus the Canaanites, with their orgiastic nature-worship, their cult of fertility in the form of serpent symbols and sensuous nudity, and their gross mythology, were replaced by Israel, with its pastoral simplicity and purity of life, its lofty monotheism, and its severe code of ethics.' This passage invites several obvious comments. First: monotheism may be worth a mass, but it is certainly not worth a massacre. 'By their fruits ye shall know them' is as true of ideologies as it is of human beings. Second: the primitive Israelite code of ethics was not severe enough to restrain the Israelites from seizing by force a country that did not belong to them and decimating its inhabitants in order to make room for themselves. Third: the religion that led from the Stone

settled west of Jordan, largely in territory—the hill country of Ephraim—that had previously been only thinly occupied. The recent invention of waterproof plaster lining for cisterns enabled them to settle wherever there was rainfall, whereas, before this invention, settlements had necessarily been confined to the neighbourhood of springs and rivers.¹

Thus the now dominant Hebrews came to live side by side with the conquered Canaanites. The two peoples were intermingled geographically at close quarters; and this favoured both racial and cultural fusion. 'Progress was made through a gradual assimilation, not through military conquest.'² Canaanite cities came to be incorporated in Israelite tribes. Shechem,³ Hopher, Tirzah, Zaphron, and the four towns of the Gibeonite confederacy are examples.⁴ At the time of the war, commemorated in the Song of Deborah, between a muster of Israelite tribes and a league of Canaanite city-states in the plain of Jezreel, this stretch of fertile agricultural land had not yet lost its independence; and the contemporary Israelite poem, which celebrates Israel's victory and the Canaanite leader Sisera's death, does not claim that, as a result of this victory, the plain fell into the Israelites' hands. The Philistines held it for a time in the eleventh century B.C. Yet, by the date of Israel's secession from Judah in 936 B.C., this former enclave of Canaanite territory was, apparently, already incorporated in Israel, and one of the capitals of the new kingdom, Jezreel, was situated there.

The latest and most momentous instance of the incorporation of a Canaanite city in a Hebrew state was the annexation of the Jebusite city-state of Jerusalem to the Kingdom of Judah by David at some date early in the tenth century B.C. David not only made this Canaanite city the political capital of a Hebrew state whose frontiers he eventually carried southward to the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah and northward to the Baqa' and the oasis of Damascus. He also made it the central shrine for the worship of Yahweh in his dominions. He gave this privileged status to Jerusalem deliberately,⁵ just because it was a piece of Canaanite neutral ground between Judah and Israel.⁶ 'On the distaff side the House of David was . . . shot through with pagan elements.'⁷ In

Age to Christianity was not the pastoral religion of Israel; it was the agricultural religion of Canaan. It was a Canaanite vegetation-god who sacrificed himself for his people in order that they might draw life from eating his flesh and drinking his blood. The Ugaritic Baal and the Byblian Adonis, not the Israelite Yahweh, were the historic models for the Galilean Jesus Christ. This side of the Canaanite agricultural religion has to be taken into consideration as well as the figurines of the naked fertility goddess, which are found in sites that are indubitably Israelite (Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 311).

The passage here criticised reveals the strength of ancestral religious prejudice. The writer of it is not only a particularly eminent scholar; he is also a singularly open-minded man on all points but this.

¹ *The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 113; *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 279.

² Oesterley and Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, p. 138.

³ The Shechemite Canaanites called themselves Beni Hamar ('Sons of the Ass': see Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 279; *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 113) and their god was Baal Berith ('the Lord of the Covenant': see the present chapter, p. 414, footnote 3, and pp. 489-90).

⁴ *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 102; *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 279.

⁵ Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 138.

⁶ Oesterley and Robinson, op. cit., vol. i, p. 217.

⁷ Albright, op. cit., 4th ed., p. 158.

936 B.C. the House of David lost all its northern dominions to within a few miles' distance of Jerusalem itself. But Jerusalem remained the religious as well as the political capital of Judah for 350 years after that; and, though it was not till 621 B.C. that Jerusalem was given the privilege of being the only place in Judah where the public worship of Yahweh could thenceforth be performed legitimately, the native Jebusites and their ancestral religion must have been having a profound influence on the worship of Yahweh, not only at Jerusalem, but throughout Judah, ever since David's day. The sacrificial ritual described and prescribed in the Priestly Code has Canaanite counterparts in archaeological evidence dating from the thirteenth century B.C. in Syria and from the fourth century B.C. at Carthage.¹ The process of intermingling and fusion followed the same course farther north. The north-western Aramaean state Ya'udi (Sam'al) was an enclave established in the heart of the Syrian Hittites' domain. The Aramaeans also supplanted the Hittites at Hamath shortly before 1000 B.C. But, in both Ya'udi and at Hamath, the Hittite culture survived the Aramaean occupation.²

Ya'udi and Judah look like variants of the same tribal name.³ If they are, this tribe will have been split into two splinters in the course of the Aramaean-Hebrew Völkerwanderung, and these fragments will then have been pushed into opposite corners of the territory occupied by the incomers west of Euphrates. Presumably the Judah-splinter entered Cis-Jordanian Syria from the south, while the Ya'udi-splinter entered it from the west, on the northernmost wing of a group of tribes whose southernmost wing was Benjamin,⁴ from whom Judah was insulated by the Canaanite stronghold Jerusalem until its capture by David in the tenth century B.C. If this explanation of the resemblance between the two names Ya'udi and Judah is correct, it tells against Robinson's conjecture⁵ that Judah was a Canaanite people that was eventually admitted to membership of the Israelite amphictyony after having been converted to the worship of Yahweh by Kenite and Kenizzite Yahweh-worshippers who had seeped into Judah from the south. H. H. Rowley's view⁶ that Judah was an originally Hebrew people that had fused with a previous Canaanite population seems more credible in the light of the existence, at the opposite end of Cis-Euphratean Syria, of an Aramaic-speaking Ya'udi that is proved by archaeological evidence to have fused with the local Hittite population there.

Rowley and Robinson both hold that the fusion between native Canaanite elements and immigrant elements in Judah, and the subsequent association of Judah with Israel, were promoted by the pressure of the Philistines in the eleventh century. And threats from common enemies seem to have been a major factor in producing fusion in other cases too. 'The Book of Judges makes it clear that it was not by defeating

¹ Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 294.

² A. Dupont-Sommer: *Les Araméens*, pp. 24-25.

³ See p. 397, footnote 1.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ In Oesterley and Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, pp. 49, footnote 1, 60, footnote 1, 100, 112, 119, 120, 134-5, 169-70.

⁶ See *From Joseph to Joshua*, p. 5, footnote 3. Rowley agrees (ibid., pp. 153-4) with Robinson in thinking that Judah and the rest of the southern group of Hebrew tribes had been converted to Yahweh-worship gradually by the Kenites.

the Canaanites, but by defending them, that Israel obtained a dominant position in Palestine.¹ The common enemy in this chapter of history was the Nomad peoples who were now trying to force their way into Palestine at the Israelites' heels. In the period following the end of the Hebrew-Aramaean *Völkerwanderung* the Israelites were in danger of suffering the fate of being invaded and overrun that they had inflicted on the Canaanites²—the more so because the domestication of the camel had given the Israelites' successors on the North Arabian steppe a new weapon that the Israelites themselves had never possessed. The Israelites, before becoming peasants, had been mere ass-nomads without prestige.³ The first recorded eruption of camel-nomads out of the desert into the sown is a Midianite raid on Palestine in the early eleventh century B.C.⁴ In the next chapter of history in Syria the pressure from the Philistines, that fused Judah into a unity and pushed her into association with Israel, led her war-lord David⁵ to make an alliance with Tyre.⁶ In the ninth century the pressure from the Assyrians moved Tyre and the Kingdom of Israel to make a similar alliance and to cement it by a royal marriage (Ahab and Jezebel).⁷ The extensive, though ephemeral, coalitions of Syrian states against Assyria have been noticed already.⁸

In these conducive circumstances the intercourse between the different local peoples in Syria became both more intensive and more intimate in all the main fields of social and cultural activity. The local princes and their professional officials and officers might go to war with each other besides fighting side by side against common enemies; but all the time they were evidently on familiar terms with each other, and this familiarity was not confined to the diplomatic level. Before David made his political treaty with Tyre, the north-western Israelite tribes in the highlands of Galilee may already have been finding an economic outlet in Phoenicia. The Song of Deborah chides Dan for staying on board ship and Asher for sitting on the sea-shore instead of responding to the call to arms against Sisera.⁹ Solomon and Hiram went into partnership in maritime ventures in the Indian Ocean.¹⁰ In ninth-century treaties between the states of Damascus and Israel it was stipulated by the state which momentarily had the upper hand that the weaker contracting party should assign a quarter in its capital city to the stronger party's merchants.¹¹ Solomon's temple at Jerusalem and the works of art with which it was adorned were made for him by Phoeni-

¹ Oesterley and Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, p. 140.

² There is archaeological evidence that Bethel was destroyed four times between 1200 and 1000 B.C. (Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 287).

³ W. F. Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., pp. 96-97 and 101; *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., pp. 65-66.

⁴ *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 132, following Judges vi-vii. Cp. *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 287. See also the present chapter, p. 394, footnote 1, and p. 412.

⁵ 'David' is said to mean 'war-lord', and not to be a proper name.

⁶ Oesterley and Robinson, op. cit., vol. i, p. 222.

⁷ Ibid., p. 290.

⁸ e.g. on p. 395.

⁹ Judges v. 17. The difficulties with which this passage bristles are discussed by Rowley in op. cit., pp. 81-84.

¹⁰ See p. 394, footnote 1.

¹¹ 1 Kings xx. 34, as interpreted by Oesterley and Robinson, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 292, 294, 313, and by A. Dupont-Sommer: *Les Araméens*, pp. 34-35.

cian craftsmen lent by Hiram.¹ And 'Israelite art, from the ninth to the early sixth century B.C., reflects a stage of Phoenician art during which the latter was diffused throughout the Mediterranean, transforming Greek art completely.'²

We can follow the process of fusion in the field of language and literature too. The Hebrews (including the Moabites) adopted not only the Canaanite language but also the Phoenician alphabet for writing it. The Aramaeans kept their own language; but they too borrowed the Phoenician alphabet and adapted it to Aramaic by using four of the Phoenician consonants to stand for vowels as well.³ The discovery of the Ugarit texts shows that the Biblical Psalms, whatever their date, are indebted to a Phoenician hymnology that had a long tradition behind it.⁴ The Phoenicians also seem likely to have been the intermediaries through whom some of the Egyptian proverbs of Amenemope found their way into the Biblical Book of Proverbs almost verbatim.⁵ And the Canaanite origin of chapters viii-ix of the Book of Proverbs, on the theme of Wisdom, is attested by echoes here of themes in the Phoenician literature disinterred at Ugarit.⁶ The Sumero-Akkadian story of the creation of the World must have found its way to Palestine long before the Israelites' advent there, and must have been learnt by them from the Canaanites on whom they imposed themselves.⁷ Canaanite elements have not been detected in the eighth-century B.C. prophetic literature of Israel and Judah. But they reappear thereafter.⁸ 'There is a veritable flood of allusions to Canaanite (Phoenician) literature in Hebrew works composed between the seventh and the third century B.C.:⁹ e.g. in Job, Deutero-Isaiah, Proverbs, Ezekiel, Habakkuk, the Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes, Jubilees, and part of Daniel. Albright sees in this a consequence of a Phoenician literary renaissance associated with the name of Sanchuniathon—a Phoenician historian whose date, in Albright's belief, is either the seventh or the sixth century B.C.¹⁰

Robinson holds¹¹ that the Israelites also acquired the 'Mosaic' Law from the same source at the same stage in their history.

'Not only are many of the laws designed for an agricultural and commercial community, and none of them confined to a nomad tribe, but they

¹ According to Albright, the architecture and furniture of Solomon's temple were Canaanite. The word used for it—*hēkhal*—is a Canaanite word that had been borrowed from the Sumerians circa 2500 B.C. (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 294). Both the Israelites and the Greeks derived their style of temple-building from Syria, as has been demonstrated by the excavation of a ninth-century B.C. temple at Tell Taynât in Northern Syria (*Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 143). Solomon's temple and its appurtenances presented an elaborate cosmic symbolism of ultimately Sumerian origin (*ibid.*, p. 154).

² Albright, *op. cit.*, 4th ed., p. 15.

³ Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

⁴ Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*; cp. p. 191, footnote 70.

⁶ Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., pp. 367-8. There are also parallels in (i) the Aramaic proverbs of Akhiqar, dating from the sixth century B.C.; (ii) the Book of Enoch xlii. 1-2, dating from the second century B.C.; (iii) Ben Sira xxiv. 3-4; (iv) the Wisdom of Solomon vii. 25; (v) Philo (*Albright, ibid.*, pp. 368-9).

⁷ Oesterley and Robinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 34.

⁸ Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 128.

⁹ Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 318; cp. p. 374.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17, with note 57.

¹¹ Oesterley and Robinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 34, 95, 327-9.

closely resemble that type of code which we know to have been generally current in Western Asia. Four forms are known: a fragmentary Sumerian code, that of Hammurabi, proper to Babylonia, an Assyrian code, and a Hittite code.¹ . . . A comparison of these with the Israelite code shows that they cannot be independent of each other.² . . . [But] none of them is directly derived from one of the others.³ . . . As compared with the other codes, those of Israel were closely adapted to an agricultural community rather than to a commercial people.⁴

This brings us to the crucial and controversial question whether the religion of Israel and Judah, in the age between the immigrant peoples' settlement on the land as cultivators and the rise of the revolutionary prophets about half-way through the eighth century B.C., differed in any significant way from the religion of the other contemporary communities in Syria. If a pilgrim from Ya'udi or Hamath or Damascus had visited a tenth-century or ninth-century rural shrine in Israel, or, *a fortiori*, the temple at Jerusalem that had been built and furnished for Solomon by Tyrian artificers, would he have been conscious of any striking contrast with the shrines of his own country? The accounts, in the Second Book of Kings, of the successive purges of Solomon's Temple by Hezekiah⁵ in 705 B.C. and by Josiah⁶ in 621 B.C. show that, down to Hezekiah's time, the brazen serpent Nehushtan had held its own in the sanctuary of Jerusalem side by side with Yahweh's ark, and that in Josiah's time Yahweh shared the temple with the god Baal, the goddess Asherah (whose symbol Hezekiah was said to have cut down), and the heavenly bodies—in particular the Sun, to whom chariots and horses were dedicated there as votive offerings. In 621 B.C. the temple at Jerusalem also housed consecrated prostitutes, male as well as female;⁷ and in the valley of Hinnom, below Jerusalem on the city's south side, was a 'tophet' where children were sacrificed by being burnt alive⁸—a cult to which the Carthaginians, too, were addicted.

Ritual prostitution was an agricultural fertility rite which was common to Syria and the Sumero-Akkadian World; and it may have come to Syria from there. Human sacrifice was an atrocity of Syria's own.⁹ If it had ever been practised in Sumer and Akkad or in Egypt, it was extinct there in historical times. The Assyrians were innocent of it. The slaughter and torture of which they were guilty had no religious sanction or excuse. In the Syriac World, both at home and overseas, human sacrifice was practised as a last resort in a public crisis. In the ninth century B.C. King Mesha of Moab sacrificed his eldest son on the wall of his capital city when the combined forces of Israel, Judah, and Edom were at the gates.¹⁰ In similar circumstances King Ahaz of Judah 'caused his son to pass through the fire'¹¹ when Jerusalem was being besieged by the combined forces of Damascus and Israel in the eighth century. King Manasseh of Judah—Hezekiah's son and Josiah's

¹ p. 95.² p. 127.³ p. 128.⁴ p. 128.⁵ 2 Kings xviii. 4.⁶ 2 Kings xxiii. 4-7 and 11.⁷ 2 Kings xxiii. 7.⁸ 2 Kings xxiii. 10.⁹ For this rite see Oesterley and Robinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 375, and Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., pp. 162-3. There is, however, no mention of it in any of the Ugaritic texts so far discovered (*ibid.*, p. 92). Did it come in with the Völkerwanderung?¹⁰ 2 Kings iii. 27.¹¹ 2 Kings xvi. 3.

grandfather—'made his son to pass through the fire'¹ without, as far as we know, having Mesha's and Ahaz's occasion for performing the rite.²

The Torah as we have it today has been edited and re-edited to make it conform with successive phases through which religion passed in Judah and in the subsequent Jewish diaspora in and after the eighth century B.C. Hence the recorded identification of Yahweh with other gods, and association of other gods with him, are represented in retrospect as having been lapses from a previous strict Mosaic monotheism, while purges such as Hezekiah's and Josiah's are represented as having been reformatations. Considering that syncretism and polytheism seem to have been the normal practice in Israel and Judah, as well as in other Syriac communities, in this age, it might be nearer to the historical truth to think of Hezekiah and Josiah as having been iconoclastic innovators, and of Manasseh and Amon as having been pious conservatives. At any rate, this is how these posthumously anathematized religious reactionaries must have appeared to themselves; and they had history on their side. Among the theophoric names given to members of Saul's and David's families, there were names compounded with 'Baal' as well as names compounded with Yahweh.³ On the other hand, 'Yahweh', not 'Baal', was the god-compound in the names of all the three children of Ahab,⁴ the King of Israel who tolerated his Tyrian wife's propagation in his kingdom of the cult of her own national god. Ahab evidently did not agree with Elijah that, in showing this tolerance to Melkart, he was being disloyal to Yahweh. Of the personal names inscribed on *ostraka* found at Samaria and dating from the years 778-770 B.C., the ratio of personal names compounded with 'Yahweh' to those compounded with 'Baal' is 11:7.⁵ Conversely, names compounded with 'Yahweh' appear in kingdoms in which Yahweh was not the national god. An Azriyahu king of Ya'udi, who figures in the Assyrian records in the years 740-738 B.C., is an Azariah, but his kingdom is not Judah but Sam'al.⁶ A king of Hamath who was flayed alive by Sargon in 720 B.C. bore the name of Yahu-bi'di (alias Ilu-bi'di).⁷ Azriyahu's contemporary and neighbour, King Bar-Ga'yah of Katka, may also have borne the mark of Yahweh in the second half of his name.⁸ Already in the tenth century B.C. the son of David's friend King To'i of Hamath had borne the name Joram.⁹

At this stage of religious development it was natural that the peoples of Syria, including those that were Yahweh-worshippers, should each tolerate and even welcome the association of its neighbour's gods with its own national god, so long as the national god's primacy on his own

¹ 2 Kings xxi. 6.

² A striking conspectus of the points in common between the Israelites' religion and that of their neighbours before the prophetic revolution in the eighth century B.C. is given by S. A. Cook in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii (1925), pp. 426-32.

³ Oesterley and Robinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 193, footnote 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

⁵ Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 160.

⁶ Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, pp. 61 and 115; Oesterley and Robinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 374.

⁷ Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69 and 115; Oesterley and Robinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 380, footnote 1.

⁸ Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁹ *Ibid.*

ground was not challenged. Subject to this, it was felt to be prudent to conciliate the neighbours' gods, since all agreed in believing, not merely in the existence of each local god, but in the potency of each of them in his own national domain. The Yahweh-worshipping besiegers of Qir-Hareseth evidently believed in the potency of Chemosh within the frontiers of Moab; for Mesha's counter-move of conjuring Chemosh by the sacrifice of his eldest son caused them to beat a hasty retreat in the belief that Mesha's action had been efficacious in calling down on them Chemosh's wrath.¹ This is surely the light in which we have to interpret Elijah's opposition in Israel to the Tyrian queen Jezebel's attempt to impose her national god Melkart on her husband's Yahweh-worshipping subjects, and the subsequent revolution in which Jehu stamped out the Tyrian cult by ruthless massacres. Seen in retrospect through Jewish eyes, this counter-movement was interpreted as a return to a temporarily compromised Mosaic monotheism. Probably it would be nearer the truth to see in it an outbreak of national chauvinism of the kind that, at Athens in 399 B.C., inspired the prosecution of Socrates on a charge of addiction to new gods, and that repeatedly inspired the Roman Government to purge Rome and her territory of foreign cults. If an Israelite queen, married to a Tyrian king, had tried to impose the cult of Yahweh on her husband's Melkart-worshipping subjects, we may guess that she would have roused a Tyrian Elijah and a Tyrian Jehu to action.

Moreover, the issue that was fought out in Israel on this historic occasion was not simply one between Yahweh and Melkart; it was also an issue between Yahweh and Yahweh. The Yahweh of Jezreel might perhaps have co-existed amicably with Melkart; for this Yahweh, like Melkart, was the god of an agricultural and urban people. He and Melkart alike were defeated by a Yahweh from Israel's still semi-nomad desert fringe, which was the homeland of both Elijah and Jonadab. The struggle between the contending gods was an expression of the semi-nomad Gileadites' revolt against the process of settlement on the land and in the cities that had been transforming Israel west of Jordan at an accelerating pace.² The Gileadite form of Yahweh-worship that now temporarily triumphed was provincial, fanatical, and archaistic; but there is no evidence that it was monotheistic in the eventual Jewish sense of the word.

In Jewish and Christian minds today prophets are associated particularly with Israel and Judah, but this is not warranted by the evidence. In the history of Israel prophets make their first recorded appearance about half-way through the eleventh century B.C. as bands of devotees falling into infectious ecstasies. Saul caught the infection from a band with which he fell in on the first day of his political career,³ and he remained prone to prophetic fits for the rest of his life; but the phenomenon was not just a local one. At about the same date an Egyptian envoy,

¹ 2 Kings iii. 27.

² See W. O. E. Oesterley and T. H. Robinson: *A History of Israel*, vol. i, pp. 303-4 and 345-6. Compare the tension between the nomad and the peasant element in present-day Jordan.

³ 1 Sam. x. 10-13.

Wen Amon, came across the same phenomenon at Byblos.¹ Anatolia may have been the source from which Syria acquired the institution of congregational ecstatic prophesying.² At any rate, in Anatolia this institution has a long history. In the Hellenic Age it is represented there by the bands of 'galli' who were devotees of the goddess Cybele; in the Christian Age by the Montanists; in the Islamic Age by the Mevlevi dervishes, who carried on this ancient Anatolian tradition on its native ground till A.D. 1925, when the Islamic religious orders were suppressed in Turkey.³

In Syria in the ninth century B.C. we find ecstatic prophets still operating in bands—by this date more or less under royal control. Ahab has his band of prophets of Yahweh;⁴ Jezebel has her band of prophets of Baal. But at this stage individual prophets stand out from the mass—for instance, Micaiah, Elijah, and Elisha in Israel—and these engage in politics as independent and redoubtable powers. Was this second phase in the evolution of the prophet confined to Israel? We do not hear, in the Israelite scriptures, of individual prophets who were Tyrians or Damascenes. But the *argumentum ex silentio* is hazardous where one party has monopolized the telling of the story. It is more prudent to suspend judgement in the expectation that the Israelite scriptural monopoly may one day be broken, in this chapter too, by the progress of archaeological discovery. The Israelite scriptures themselves testify that Elisha, at any rate, did not confine his activities to his own country. According to this testimony,⁵ Elisha engineered a political revolution in Damascus before engineering one in Israel. The usurper Hazael as well as the usurper Jehu is said to have committed his act of high treason at Elisha's instigation. In the next phase, too, the prophets played their parts on an international stage. When Amos of Tekoa made his pronunciamiento *circa* 760 B.C., he made it in Israel,⁶ which was a bigger forum than his native Judah.

Prophets, as well as courtiers, craftsmen, and traders, felt themselves at home in any of the statelets among which the Syrian World was divided politically.

'Except for the Philistines, all the tribes and principedoms involved recognised a certain kinship one with another, though only two had the uniting bond of a common worship. Damascus, Israel, Judah, Ammon, Moab, and Edom all belonged to the same racial group, and the traditions preserved in Israel . . . asserted a common ancestry for all.'⁷

On the eve of the Assyrian conquest of Syria west of Euphrates, King Bar-Ga'yah of Katka made an anti-Assyrian treaty with 'all Aram'. This phrase

'denotes the Aramaean states collectively. Notwithstanding the looseness

¹ Oesterley and Robinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 179, footnote 1. Cp. Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 120; *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 304.

² Albright conjectures that the prophetic movement in Palestine and the Bacchic movement in the Hellenic World may have had a common origin (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., pp. 304-5). Anatolia seems the most likely common source.

³ As a result of three decrees dated 2nd September, 1925.

⁴ 1 Kings xxii. 6.

⁵ 2 Kings viii. 7-ix. 37.

⁶ Oesterley and Robinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 370, footnote 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 266. The worship of Yahweh was common to three of these communities not two only. Yahweh was the god of Edom as well as of Judah and Israel.

of the links between them and notwithstanding their mutual conflicts, these states retained a certain consciousness of their community, both racial and political. In grave circumstances they instinctively came together to present a common front.¹

Thus in the Syriac World during its five centuries of political independence the prevailing social and cultural tendency was already the movement towards fusion that subsequently went with a run after the local political barriers to it had been swept away by the Assyrians. The subsequent process of standardization, in which the most impressive single development was the triumphal progress of the Aramaic *koiné*, had already been foreshadowed in the tendency of the preceding age, and it merely carried this tendency towards its logical conclusion.

The deportees from the Kingdom of Israel went the whole way. In exile they lost their distinctive communal identity completely and once for all. So too, we may guess, did those Judahite refugees in Egypt who saw in the liquidation of the Kingdom of Judah by Nebuchadnezzar a retribution for their neglect, not of Yahweh, but of the Queen of Heaven. They sharply rejected Jeremiah's thesis that their apostasy from Yahweh had been the cause of Judah's national disaster, and they were unmoved by the prophet's threat that, if they remained obdurate, another stroke of Yahweh's vengeance would overtake them in their Egyptian asylum. The lesson that these Judahites had learnt from the disaster was to beware of ever neglecting the Queen of Heaven again.² In this case we have no information about the sequel; but the Aramaic documents, dating from the fifth century B.C., which give us a glimpse of the life and outlook of a Judaeo-Aramaean military colony at Elephantinê in Upper Egypt under the Achaemenian regime, enable us to catch another expatriated Syriac community at a point part way along the road that the deportees from Israel undoubtedly travelled to the end. This colonial Jewish community followed Solomon, Ahab, Athaliah, and Manasseh in feeling it no disloyalty to Yahweh to associate other gods with him. Out of a fund of 628 (or 626) shekels collected by the colonists in 419 B.C., 246 shekels were allocated to Yahweh, 140 to Eshem Bethel, and 240 to 'Anath Bethel.³ Here we see a new cult arising within Yahweh's own domain. Archaeological investigation has shown that the sanctuary at Bethel was prosperous in the sixth century B.C.; and, though it was burned down towards the end of the Neobabylonian period,⁴ the cult, which found a secondary focus in Babylonia, attained its maximum diffusion in the fifth century B.C.⁵ Theophoric names containing 'Bethel' as one of their components begin to appear about 600 B.C.⁶ They are

¹ Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

² Jer. xlv. 'The refugees' truculent reaction to Jeremiah's expostulations is reported in Jeremiah's own account of the affair. 'As for the word that thou hast spoken unto us in the name of the Lord, we will not hearken unto thee; but we will certainly do whatsoever thing goeth forth out of our own mouth, to burn incense unto the Queen of Heaven and to pour out drink offerings unto her, as we have done—we and our fathers, our kings and our princes—in the cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem. For then had we plenty of victuals, and were well and saw no evil. But since we left off to burn incense to the Queen of Heaven and to pour out drink offerings unto her, we have wanted all things and have been consumed by the sword and by the famine' (Jer. xlv. 16-18).

³ Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., pp. 168-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

all either Aramaic or Neobabylonian, and none are earlier than the reign of Nebuchadnezzar.¹

In the former territory of Judah the peasantry, whom Nebuchadnezzar had not uprooted, started on the same road, and their drift towards fusion was not reversed by the return of a batch of exiles immediately after the fall of the Neobabylonian Empire. It needed the subsequent missions of Nehemiah and Ezra, backed by the Achaemenian Imperial Government's authority, to make them ruefully conform to the new ideals of monotheism and nationalism that had been conceived in adversity by the diasporá in Babylonia. An effective agency of religious fusion between the un-uprooted Judaeans and their Palestinian neighbours had been intermarriage. The foreign wives were carriers of their ancestral religions. The Babylonian Jewish innovators closed this avenue to fusion by insisting on the dissolution of mixed marriages and prohibiting them for the future. This was a high price to pay for satisfying the requirements of a new-fangled orthodoxy; and the Judaeans' reluctant submission did not save these authentic heirs of the defunct Kingdom of Judah from being written off by the Babylonian Jewish puritans as 'the people of the land' (*'am ha-aretz*)—a label which carried the contemptuous connotation of the English word 'natives'.²

The revolutionary social and religious ideals that the Babylonian Jewish diasporá thus imposed on Judaea were partly the product of an unusual response that this particular uprooted community had made to the experience of deportation. Other deported Syriac communities had bowed to fate and had reconciled themselves to being assimilated. The Jewish diasporá had been peculiar in determining to maintain its distinctive communal identity in circumstances in which most of its fellow deportees had felt assimilation to be inevitable. This exceptional Jewish reaction is partly accounted for by the exceptional history of Judah in the preceding age of Assyrian and Neobabylonian militarism. The states of Damascus and Israel had been wiped off the map, and the social structure of their people had been broken up, within thirty or forty years of the first appearance of prophets of a new kind, whose first representative had been Amos. The state of Judah had survived for nearly a hundred and fifty years longer, and a succession of great prophets had arisen within her borders before she, in her turn, was *gleichgeschaltet*.

The prophets of this third kind were politicians, like Elijah and Elisha. Unlike these predecessors of theirs, they were also social reformers. But their distinctive and revolutionary new departure was their new vision of the nature and the potency of Judah's national god Yahweh. They started a spiritual and intellectual revolution which was to end in a conception of this national god of Judah and Israel as being also the only true god in the Universe,³ and as being righteous and loving, not capricious and violent-tempered.⁴ While the prophets of Amos' line

¹ Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 168.

² See further pp. 501-3.

³ Albright holds (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 327) that Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah were monotheists already as fully as the post-Exilic Deutero-Isaiah. This view is almost required by Albright's belief that Moses, too, was a monotheist in the strict sense of the word.

⁴ See further pp. 488-96.

lived and while the Kingdom of Judah lasted, these prophets' words—political, ethical, and religious—mostly fell on deaf ears. But, unlike their predecessors, they put their oracles in writing; and the written word made its effect posthumously. The sixth-century Jewish deportees to Babylonia had to leave behind them the ruins of the temple at Jerusalem, as well as their houses and fields. Their chief portable treasure was their books, and these, including the books of the Prophets, fructified in exile.¹

Thus, from the time of the loss of political independence onwards, the Syriac Civilization did divide into two streams. There was a stream heading towards nationalism and monotheism, and a stream heading towards social and cultural fusion and religious syncretism. Both streams flowed from a common fount. Their common source was the unitary culture which had developed in Syria during the preceding five centuries. In the subsequent Achaemenian Age the stream represented by the Jewish diaspora was a mere trickle, while the stream represented by the Aramaic *koiné* was a flood. Yet at the present day the only surviving representatives of the Syriac Civilization of the first half of the last millennium B.C. are the Jews and the Samaritans.² This historical fact confronts us with the questions: How widely did the flood of the cosmopolitan Syriac Civilization spread, and when and why did it lose itself in the sands?

6. THE EXTENT OF THE SYRIAC SOCIETY'S CULTURAL EXPANSION AFTER THE LOSS OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

In a previous section of this chapter³ we have noticed that, after the states of the Syriac World had been overthrown, and their territories annexed, by the Assyrian and Neobabylonian empires, the Aramaic language and alphabet rapidly gained ground at the expense of cunei-

¹ See further pp. 496-9.

² The present-day Samaritans have more in common with the present-day Jews than just the common feat of surviving. They too preserve and revere the Torah; they too believe that Yahweh is the One True God; they too hold that the public cult of this One God ought to be carried on in one place only (see G. F. Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. 1, pp. 24-25). The issue that has kept Samaritans and Jews apart for more than two thousand years is over the question of what place should have the privilege of possessing this liturgical monopoly. The Samaritans contend for Mount Gerizim, on the strength of chap. xxiv of the Book of Joshua, the Jews for Jerusalem, on the strength of David's having brought the Ark there and Solomon's having built the Temple there and Josiah's having suppressed the worship of Yahweh at all other sanctuaries within his political jurisdiction.

These are indisputable facts, and the Jewish account of the Samaritans in 2 Kings xvii. 24-41 can neither be reconciled with them nor be maintained in the teeth of them.

According to this story the Samaritans are descended, not from the population of Israel, but from a mixed multitude of settlers whom the Assyrians planted in the previous population's place. It is no doubt likely that the Assyrians did bring in non-Israelite colonists; but it is also likely that in Israel, as in Judah, a portion, at least, of the previous population was left undisturbed. According to the Jewish story, again, the immigrants began by worshipping their own ancestral gods only; took to worshipping Yahweh as well when they were plagued by lions; but worshipped him side by side with ancestral gods, whom they were unwilling to abandon.

This picture of the second phase of Samaritan religion is not unlike the picture of Jewish religion in fifth-century Elephantine which the Aramaic papyri, discovered there, have revealed to us. But, if the religion of the Samaritans ever did pass through this phase of syncretism, it has since been purged of it as thoroughly as Judaism has been. The present-day religion of the Samaritans, like present-day Judaism, is strictly monotheistic.

³ On pp. 397-9.

form and Akkadian. The cuneiform script had fallen completely out of use before the end of the first century of the Christian Era, and, long before that, the Akkadian language conveyed in it must have passed out of ordinary currency and have lingered on only as a learned language mastered by a few specialists. In fact the Syriac Civilization had absorbed and supplanted the 3,000-years-old civilization of Sumer and Akkad and Babylon and Assyria.

This was an impressive feat of cultural assimilation; but there are several obvious factors that, between them, go some way towards accounting for it. Aramaic-speaking peoples had encircled Babylonia as long ago as the time of the Völkerwandering at the turn of the second and the last millennium B.C. The Aramaeans themselves, as we have noticed,¹ had pushed their way into the steppe-country, north-east of Babylonia, between the River Tigris and the Iranian plateau; their Chaldaean kinsmen had established themselves on Babylonia's southern fringe.² And this Aramaic-speaking population in the Sumero-Akkadian World was reinforced, from the ninth century B.C. onwards, by Assyrian conquests and deportations of Aramaean peoples. Moreover, the Akkadian language, which had driven Sumerian out of ordinary currency, even in Sumer itself, before the age of Hammurabi, was a language of the same Semitic family as Aramaic, so that it was comparatively easy for Akkadian-speakers to acquire a sister Semitic dialect. As for the Aramaic alphabet, it was attractive because of its enormous superiority over cuneiform in both simplicity and clarity.

These propitious circumstances go far towards explaining the Syriac Civilization's success in swamping and assimilating the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization. Its feat of drawing the Iranian peoples, too, into its sphere of influence is more remarkable. The Iranian languages—belonging, as they do, not to the Semitic, but to the Indo-European family—were no more akin to Aramaic than the Sumerian language was. The Iranian plateau and the Oxus-Jaxartes basin, which were the homelands of the non-Nomadic Iranian peoples, were more remote geographically from the heart of the Syriac World than Babylonia and Assyria were. Moreover, Babylonia and Assyria lay between Iran and Syria; and therefore the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization of these countries was the first civilization with which the Iranians came into contact while they were still impressionable semi-barbarians. Both the geographical proximity of the Sumero-Akkadian Society and the prestige that it had acquired in virtue of its antiquity gave it a unique opportunity for converting the Iranians and so perhaps saving itself, through this eastern reinforcement, from succumbing to the Syriac Civilization that was expanding at its expense from the west. The Sumero-Akkadian Civilization did impress and influence the Iranians at their first contact with it. But they afterwards transferred their cultural allegiance to the more vital and more convenient Syriac Civilization in its Post-Assyrian Aramaic dress; and this change in the Iranians' cultural orientation expanded the

¹ On p. 410.

² This point is noticed by W. F. Albright in *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 340.

Syriac Civilization's cultural domain eastwards as far as Western India and Central Asia.

In geographical terms the Achaemenian Persian Empire was, as we have now noted,¹ one representative of a long series of universal states, beginning with the empire of the dynasty of Agade (*circa* 2360-2180 B.C.), that were based on the alluvial basin of the lower Tigris and Euphrates. In terms both of economics and of communications the Achaemenian Empire was the heir of the Neobabylonian Empire rather than of the Median Empire. Though it dwarfed the Neobabylonian Empire in its total area, Babylonia was its main source of supply, and was also the centre from which all its roads radiated. The founders of the Achaemenian Empire were naturally conscious of having entered into the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization's political heritage; and their first impulse was to adopt the Sumero-Akkadian culture as well.

For instance, their first experiment in providing their own language with a script took the same form as the experiment made in the Phoenician city of Ugarit eight or nine hundred years earlier. Though the Achaemenidae did not adopt the clumsy Sumerian system of writing (a system in which some characters were used ideographically and others phonetically side by side), they did use selected cuneiform characters to stand for a purely phonetic, and all but alphabetic, syllabary for conveying the West Iranian (Medo-Persian) language; and their first intention seems to have been to give parity of official status to three languages, all conveyed in cuneiform characters used in different ways. These original three official languages of the Achaemenian Empire were Medo-Persian (the language of the pair of ruling peoples), Elamite (the language of the chief imperial capital, Susa), and Akkadian (the language of Babylonia, the Empire's geographical and economic heart). Darius I's trilingual inscription on the cliff-face at Behistan is the chief monument of this linguistic policy. Another striking piece of evidence for it is the collection of archives, written on clay tablets in the cuneiform script and mostly in the Elamite language, that has been disinterred at Persepolis—the Persians' national capital in their own home territory. Yet the Medo-Persian syllabary conveyed in cuneiform characters never caught on; it seems to have been passing out of use even before the Achaemenian Empire was overthrown by Alexander, and it certainly did not survive that catastrophe. Soon after, if not simultaneously with, the official adoption of the three languages written in cuneiform, the Achaemenian authorities gave official currency, as we have seen, to the Aramaic *koiné* written alphabetically on papyrus or on parchment. Apparently Aramaic was given this status not only in the Semitic-speaking provinces of the Empire, but in all its dominions, including Anatolia and Egypt on the west and Iran, the Oxus-Jaxartes basin, and the Panjab on the east. With this official backing, the handy Aramaic language and alphabet inevitably prevailed over the three official languages conveyed in the cumbersome cuneiform script. In thus prevailing, the Aramaic language and alphabet also served as spear-heads which opened the way for the Syriac culture to win the allegiance of the Iranian-speaking peoples.

¹ On p. 191.

This process of cultural assimilation can be followed in the history of the Aramaic language and alphabet on Iranian ground. After the break that the Hellenic conquest made in Iranian cultural history, we find the Iranian languages being written in variants of the Aramaic alphabet with an infusion of Aramaic words that are thought to have been read, not phonetically, but as ideograms standing for Iranian words of the same meaning, so that the whole text, including this minority of Aramaic words in it, would have been read uniformly as Iranian. This system of writing seems peculiar, and it seems still more peculiar that there should be at least three variants of it, each of which made up its own set of Aramaic ideograms differently from, and therefore independently of, each of the others. There is a northern Pehlevi (i.e. 'Parthian'), which must have been the official script and language of the Parthian Empire; a southern Pehlevi, which must have been developed in Fars, the Persian imperial people's homeland, when this secluded highland country shook itself free from Seleucid Macedonian rule; and a Sogdian, which was the local form taken by the same peculiar system in the Oxus-Jaxartes basin, where it developed on its own lines after this region had been insulated politically and culturally from the Iranian plateau as a result of the Eurasian Nomad Völkerwandering in the second century B.C. A bilingual inscription of the Sasanian Emperor Narse (*imperabat* A.D. 293-302), in which the same text is given in the northern as well as in the southern Pehlevi, has been found at Paikuli on the Great North-East Road, a short distance north of Qasr-i-Shirin.¹

How are we to explain these at first sight strange phenomena? Dupont-Sommer seems to have found the key. The Aramaic words used as ideograms in texts written in the Aramaic alphabet in these three Iranian languages are survivals—the only Post-Achaemenian survivals—of the Aramaic *koiné* that had become the prevailing official language of the Achaemenian Empire before its overthrow.² Dupont-Sommer suggests³ that, under the Achaemenian regime, Iranian-speaking imperial officials used to dictate—each in his own Iranian dialect—to bilingual secretaries, who translated the Iranian words instantaneously into Aramaic and wrote them down in the Aramaic language and alphabet. It was not difficult to discover that this convenient alphabet would serve equally well for taking down the original Iranian words, without these having to be translated into the Aramaic language *en route*. This simplification of the secretary's task would naturally become the ordinary practice in a state in which not only the administrators but the population that they were administering spoke one and the same Iranian language and no other. This was never the situation in the multi-lingual Achaemenian Empire; but it was the situation in the independent principality of Fars in and after the third century B.C., and likewise in the contemporary Parthian Empire before it conquered Babylonia and transferred its headquarters to Ctesiphon. This hypothesis of Dupont-Sommer's does give a satisfactory explanation of the origin of the Pehlevi

¹ See A. Christensen: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin and Munksgaard), pp. 46-47, and A. Dupont-Sommer: *Les Araméens*, p. 96.

² Dupont-Sommer, *op. cit.*, pp. 95 and 97-98.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

and Sogdian scripts in which Iranian languages are written phonetically in variants of the Aramaic alphabet, with an admixture of Aramaic words apparently used as ideograms for Iranian words. On this interpretation these Aramaic ideograms are survivals of an original procedure in which the whole document would have been recorded in the Aramaic *koiné*.

Without prejudice to the question of the relation of Islam to the Syriac Civilization, we can follow into the Islamic Age the further progress of the cultural tendency revealed in the method of writing Sogdian and Pehlevi. Except for the ideograms in the Aramaic *koiné* that survived in the writing of these Post-Achaemenian languages, the Aramaic *koiné* did not outlast the fall of the Achaemenian Empire. Its role was taken over by the Attic Greek *koiné* in the Achaemenian Empire's Hellenic successor-states; and, after the whole of Iran and Babylonia had been liberated from Hellenic rule in the second century B.C., South-West Asia and Egypt had no *lingua franca* with the range either of the Aramaic or of the Attic *koiné* before that date, until Arabic came to perform the old function on the old scale after the reunion of most of the Achaemenian Empire's former dominions in the Caliphate. Arabic, like Aramaic, is a Semitic language, and the Arabic alphabet, like the 'square' alphabet now used for writing Hebrew, is a variety of the Aramaic alphabet. The overthrow of the Sasanian Persian Empire by the Muslim Arabs made another break in Iranian cultural history, comparable in magnitude to the break that had been made by the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander. Thereafter the New Persian (i.e. Islamic Persian) language came to be written, as might be expected, in the Arabic form of the Aramaic alphabet in place of the forms used for conveying Pehlevi and Sogdian; and, with the Pehlevi and Sogdian alphabets, the Aramaic ideograms dropped out. But this did not mean the end of Semitic influence on the Iranian vocabulary. So far from that, the Arabic alphabet and Islam, between them, imported into New Persian a vast vocabulary of Arabic words; and these, unlike the Aramaic words in Pehlevi and Sogdian, are not used as ideograms for Iranian words. They are pronounced in New Persian as they are written, like the French, Latin, and Greek words in Modern English.¹ Like these, they have half swamped the native vocabulary, and all the patriotic endeavours of the New Persian purists, from Firdawsi onwards, have not availed to purge this Iranian language of its Arabic alloy.

If the history of the Pehlevi and Sogdian scripts may be taken as an indication of the expansion of the Syriac Civilization's influence over the Iranian World, we may next inquire whether this movement, which we have now observed in the field of language, can also be detected in other fields—for instance, in the field of religion.

Was the religion founded by Zarathustra an entirely indigenous creation of the Iranian World's, or was Zarathustra inspired, at least in part, by some stimulus from outside his own semi-barbarian cultural milieu? The question arises because Zarathustra's conception of God and Man

¹ If Modern English were written on the Pehlevi system, the word written 'commence' would be read as 'begin', and the word written 'serviette' would be read as 'napkin'.

and of Good and Evil, as revealed in the Gathas, are so lofty, and also so abstract, that it is not easy to believe that he could have arrived at them, unprompted by inspiration from abroad, in the otherwise rustic and unsophisticated social and cultural milieu that the Gathas also reveal to us as being Zarathustra's environment. Moreover, Zarathustra's message, like Muhammad's, seems to have been revolutionary. He rejected, deposed, and renounced his people's traditional pantheon, and substituted for it a One True God who is righteous and loving. Whether we classify the Zoroastrianism of the Gathas as being monotheistic or as being dualistic, it is certainly not either polytheistic or parochial. Whether Ahuramazda and his adversary Angramainyush are to be regarded as being equals in power or not, the power of each is universal in its range, and Angramainyush, as well as Ahuramazda, is a being of a different order from the former gods whom Zarathustra degraded to the rank of demons. Can this revolutionary universalism, and this ethical interpretation of the nature of absolute Reality, be credited exclusively to Zarathustra's native genius, or is it reasonable to guess that influences from abroad may have played a part in the formation of his ideas and ideals?

If Zarathustra is indebted in some measure to foreign religious influences, these must have come, not from India, but from the Fertile Crescent. His revolution carried Iranian religion in an anti-Indian direction. He turned his back on the traditional Irano-Aryan pantheon. He saw the godhead as being singular, not plural, and as being righteous, not as being the morally indifferent source of Evil as well as Good. This was the conception of the godhead towards which the prophets of Israel and Judah had begun to move in the eighth century (though, unlike Zarathustra, they did not face the problem of the incompatibility between divine goodness and divine omnipotence). After the liquidation of Israel, the prophets of Judah and their Post-Exilic Jewish successors carried the movement farther till, about half-way through the sixth century, on the eve of the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire, Deutero-Isaiah attained a vision of Yahweh not only as being righteous and loving, but also as being the One True God of the Universe. In Deutero-Isaiah's eyes all other gods were not simply inferior; they were non-existent, and the belief in their reality and their efficacy was a delusion. Is it possible, and, if so, is it probable, that Zarathustra was inspired, if only indirectly, by this progressive revolution in the concept of the godhead in one of the uprooted communities of the Syriac World?

The answer to this question partly depends on the answer that we give to another. What were Zarathustra's place and date? Henning has argued convincingly in favour of accepting the Zoroastrian tradition that Zarathustra's ministry had begun 258 years before the coming of Alexander.¹ If the second of these two events is equated with the death of the last Darius in 330 B.C., we have 588 B.C. as the traditional date of the beginning of Zarathustra's ministry—whether this event is to be equated with the date of his receiving his first revelation at the age of thirty, or with the date of his first success at the age of forty, or with the date of his

¹ W. B. Henning: *Zoroaster*, p. 38.

conversion of King Vištāspa at the age of forty-two. The years in which Zarathustra's creative ideas were germinating would thus be either just before or just after 600 B.C.¹ This dating would rule out the identification of the Vištāspa who was Zarathustra's royal convert with the one who was the father of the Achaemenian Emperor Darius I. Henning points out² that the fathers of the two Vištāspas had different names, and that they came from different families. He suggests that Zarathustra's Vištāspa, who is traditionally represented as having had no successors,³ was the last prince of a Khwarizmian empire that coexisted with the Median Empire and embraced the Iranian plateau north-east of the Caspian Gates (the present-day Khorasan), as well as the Oxus-Jaxartes basin.⁴ Henning conjectures⁵ that this Khwarizmian empire was conquered and annexed by Cyrus after he had liquidated the Median, Lydian, and Neobabylonian empires.

Henning's dating of Zarathustra's ministry and his location of its field are compatible with a conjecture of mine that I threw out tentatively in my first attempt to identify the Syriac Civilization and to ascertain the Iranian World's relation to it. I suggested⁶ that Zarathustra might have been influenced by the Israelite deportees who, according to Jewish tradition,⁷ were planted by the Assyrians in 'the cities of the Medes' after the capture of Samaria and liquidation of the Kingdom of Israel in 722 B.C. These deportees from the west would probably have been planted on the Assyrian Empire's eastern frontier; and, up the Great North-East Road, the Assyrian outposts may have been pushed forward, at their farthest, as far as Hamadan.

On Henning's dating of Zarathustra, the influence of these expatriated Israelites would have had more than a century—reckoning from the time

¹ Henning, *Zoroaster*, p. 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴ This suggestion is based on Herodotus's statement (Book III, chap. 117) that the Achaemenian Imperial Government had inherited from the Khwarizmiens an engineering system that controlled the distribution of the waters of the River Aces to the Khwarizmiens themselves, and also to the Hyrcanians, Parthians, Sarangians, and Thamanacans (i.e. Arachosians). Henning identifies the Aces with the Heri Rud, and thinks that this list of five nations, formerly under the rule of one of their number, the Khwarizmiens, informs us of the existence and extent of a Khwarizmian Empire, contemporary with the Median Empire, which eventually suffered the same fate of being annexed by the Achaemenian empire-builder Cyrus to his universal state (Henning, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43). This pre-Cyrus Greater Khwarizm would be the Khwarizm that is identified, both in the Avesta and in the later Zoroastrian tradition, with the region called Airyanam Vaejo in which Zarathustra and his convert King Vištāspa lived according to the Avesta. (The 'Ariana' of the Post-Alexandrine Hellenic geographers includes approximately the same area.)

Henning points out (*ibid.*, p. 43) that in the Avesta 'we find references to such regions as Seistan, Arachosia, the Hindu Kush, Bactria, Sogdiana, Marv, Herat, Hyrcania; but the very name of Media is not mentioned in the whole of it (nor, incidentally, is the name of Persia or the Persians mentioned). Only Raghā, the north-easternmost town of Media, the first town entered by a traveller from the east, occurs in two particularly late passages. Moreover, one can say confidently that any unbiased reading of the Gathas always has given, and always will give, the impression that their author was untouched by urban civilization.'

The picture of Zarathustra's world that the Gathas do give is one of a predominantly pastoral society—but this a sedentary one that found itself at close quarters with the different pastoral society of the Eurasian Nomads and was bitterly hostile to it. This picture corresponds to what we should expect in the settled districts of Ariana in the age of the Nomadic Völkerwanderung of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.

⁵ Henning, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁶ In i. 81, footnote 1.

⁷ 2 Kings xvii. 6 and xviii. 11.

of their arrival in Media to the time of Zarathustra's inspiration—to seep into the Iranian countries on the far side of the Caspian Gates; so my conjecture is chronologically possible. Its weak point is the doubt whether the religion that the Israelite deportees brought away with them when the prophetic movement in Israel and Judah was still in its early days would have been exalted enough to have been the inspiration of Zarathustra's sublime conception of the nature of the godhead. Moreover, we have to reckon with the possibility that, after 120 years in exile, the Israelites marooned in Media may have been on a lower level of religious enlightenment in 600 B.C. than their level in 722 B.C. We know that they eventually lost their communal identity, and, in the process of becoming assimilated to the population among whom they had been settled, they presumably relapsed into polytheism sooner or later. It is conceivable that, by 600 B.C., their religion had come to be not unlike that of the Judaeo-Aramaean colony at Elephantinê in the fifth century B.C., and there would have been no inspiration for Zarathustra in that.

There would, of course, have been inspiration for him in the religion of Israel and Judah in the form that this eventually took among the Judahite deportees in Babylonia. But, if we look in this alternative direction for a possible source of Zarathustra's inspiration, we run into a chronological difficulty. In the history of the evolution of the Jewish religion we have to come down to Deutero-Isaiah in order to find a Jewish prophet whose vision of the nature of God can compare with Zarathustra's. But Deutero-Isaiah must have been only at the beginning of his mission by the time when Zarathustra was nearing the end of his. If there is any internal evidence in the literary remains of either prophet for the transmission of ideas between one and the other, it points to Deutero-Isaiah's having been influenced by Zarathustra and not the other way round.¹ Moreover, even if we hold that Deutero-Isaiah worked in Babylonia and not in Judaea,² the distance from Babylon to the far side of the Caspian Gates is much greater than the distance from Hamadan—even allowing for the improvement in both the speed and the security of communications that must have resulted from the political union of Babylonia, Media, and the North-East Iranian countries under an all-embracing *Pax Achaemenia*.

These considerations do not, I think, tell conclusively against the possibility that Zarathustra may have been inspired by the prophetic movement in Israel through contact with descendants of Israelite deportees. In the case of the Judahite deportees, whose spiritual history after their expatriation is recorded in surviving books of theirs, we know that the challenge of being uprooted evoked a spiritual response that was immediate, powerful, and far-going. For all that we know, the Israelite deportees' undocumented response to the same challenge 150 years earlier may have been comparable to the well-known subsequent response

¹ C. F. Whitley: *The Exilic Age*, pp. 144–5, quoting Isaiah xlv. 6–7. Whitley takes this passage as a reference to the dualistic element in Zarathustra's theology and an insistence on the omnipotence of Yahweh at the cost of recognizing in him the creator of Evil as well as of Good.

² Considerations in favour of Babylonia's having been his mission-field are set out by Whitley, *ibid.*, pp. 126–7.

of their Judahite kinsmen and co-religionists. This possibility is not incompatible with the known historical fact that the Israelite, unlike the Judahite, deportees eventually failed to preserve their communal identity, and therefore failed to hand down to posterity any Exilic Israelite literature, if there was any. Even if there was none, there may have been Israelite deportees in the first few generations after the Exile whose reaction to the ordeal of expatriation resembled Deutero-Isaiah's rather than the Elephantinians'. And, if there were any such forgotten Israelite men of vision marooned on the Median frontier of the Assyrian Empire in the seventh century B.C., it was certainly possible for Zaratustra to be influenced by them directly or indirectly. In our present ignorance of the Israelite deportees' history we cannot rule out this possibility, any more than we can convert it into a certainty. The question remains an open one, and therefore I neither press nor renounce my conjecture that this transmission of influence may have taken place.

I do, however, accept A. R. Burn's criticism that, in previous volumes, I have not made enough allowance for the originality of the Iranian culture in general and of Zoroastrianism in particular,¹ and I therefore also keep an open mind towards an alternative suggestion that I made in the same place.² The similarity between Zaratustra's vision and Deutero-Isaiah's can also be explained, not as a result of stimulus diffusion in either direction, but as a result of independent similar reactions to similar experiences. Unlike Syria, and like the Hellenic World, the North-East Iranian countries had lain beyond the range of Assyrian militarism. On the other hand they had had a double measure of tribulation from the Eurasian Nomad Völkerwandering of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., which had rolled across the Oxus-Jaxartes basin on its way to India as well as on its way to South-West Asia.

One thing that does seem quite certain is that the respective lines of development of Judaism and Zoroastrianism converged, and that this convergence was eventually followed by contact. I accept R. Coulborn's criticism³ that there is no evidence for contact earlier than the Achaemenian Age. Indeed, 'there is no clear evidence of Iranian influence on Judaism before the second century B.C.',⁴ some two hundred years after the Achaemenian Empire's fall. By that time Judaism had borrowed from Zoroastrianism some beliefs on the fringe of religion—for instance, in the field of angelology and demonology,⁵ including the figure of the Son of Man, whom Albright identifies⁶ with the Iranian Gayomart. Eventually Judaism and Zoroastrianism came also to share such crucial doctrines as those of immortality, the Last Judgement,⁷ and God's operation through the Holy Spirit. It may be debated whether either religion borrowed these doctrines from the other and, if there was borrowing, which of the two borrowed from which. But it can hardly be disputed that Zoroastrianism and Judaism had become assimilated to

¹ See *History*, February–October, 1956, p. 7.

² i. 81, footnote 1.

³ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 160.

⁴ Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 360.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 362–3; W. O. E. Oesterley: *The Jews and Judaism during the Greek Period*, pp. 270–87.

⁶ Albright, *op. cit.*, p. 378; Oesterley, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁷ Albright holds (*ibid.*, p. 363) that the picture of the Last Judgement in the Book of Enoch is Iranian, but not the picture of it in the Book of Daniel.

each other long before the third century of the Christian Era, when the 'Iraqi Iranian prophet Mani created a synthetic religion of his own out of elements drawn from Zoroastrianism direct and drawn from Judaism through the medium of its daughter religion Christianity.¹ By Mani's time the Syriac and Iranian worlds had coalesced on the plane of religion as well as on the plane of language and script; and at the present day the Jewish diasporá in the Christian and Islamic worlds and the Zoroastrian diasporá in India are manifestly two specimens of an identical species of non-territorial community that has learnt how to preserve its identity in an alien social and cultural environment by strictly observing a distinctive religious law.

7. THE DURATION OF THE SYRIAC SOCIETY'S CULTURAL CONTINUITY AFTER ITS LOSS OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

In the present-day Jewish and Zoroastrian communities the Syriac Civilization of the age before the Assyrian conquest has living representatives who are linked with it—and linked consciously—by an unbroken chain of tradition which these two communities have deliberately maintained in a continuous effort to preserve their communal identities. On the other hand, all other Syriac communities except this minority have lost their identities at some date between the Assyrian conquest and the present day. The classic case of this is the disappearance of those Israelite kinsmen of the Samaritans whom the Assyrians deported. At what point in history are we to place the disappearance of the Syriac Society in general, apart from the Samaritans and the Jews?

Our answer to this question will depend on our conception of the nature of civilization. Do we see it, with Spengler's eyes, as being an unconscious physical life-process? Or do we see it, with Collingwood's eyes, as being a spiritual movement of ideas?² Evidently Collingwood's conception is more strict and more exacting than Spengler's is. My own conception, originally put forward in volume iii of this book³ and reaffirmed in the present volume,⁴ is that a culture is carried by a society, and that a society is the common ground between the individual fields of action of a number of human beings. Human nature is, no doubt, partly subconscious, instinctive, and automatic, but the distinctive mark of being human is to will and to plan, and to do this consciously. My position is thus nearer to Collingwood's than it is to Spengler's, and one of my critics⁵ has shrewdly questioned whether my general definition of the nature of human society does not rule out my particular reading of the history of the Syriac Society. In the previous

¹ Another 'Iraqi synthetic religion, Mandaeanism, has proved to have arisen under Manichaean influence, now that the Coptic corpus of Manichaean scriptures has been discovered (Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 366). Albright conjectures (ibid., p. 366) that Mandaeanism originated in Southern 'Iraq in the fifth century of the Christian Era. 'The Mandaeans inherited the debris of Canaanite and Aramaean mythology on the one hand and of Babylonian mythology and folklore on the other.'

² The antithesis between these two conceptions is pointed out by Chr. Dawson in *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 387.

³ iii. 230.

⁴ On pp. 272-3.

⁵ K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 243.

volumes of this book, I have suggested that the Syriac Society remained in being until the decline and fall of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, and that it dissolved in the course of the Post-'Abbasid *Völkerwanderung* (circa A.D. 975-1275). Erdmann raises the question whether there was any common ground between the fields of action of the adherents of Islam, even in the first phase of Islamic history, and the participants in the Syriac Society in the Achaemenian and the Pre-Achaemenian Age. Of course, neither Erdmann nor anyone else would deny that the Muslims are, and always have been, conscious of Islam's continuity with Judaism. But the Jews and their predecessors the people of Judah and Israel are only a fraction of the original Syriac World. Are the Muslims also conscious of being heirs of the non-Jewish majority of the Syriac Society in, let us say, the Achaemenian Age? I agree with Erdmann that, when the question is put in these terms, the answer to it is in the negative.

I also agree with him in his general contention that 'common ground', in the sense in which I have used this phrase in my definition of what a society is, implies, in the time-dimension, not merely historical continuity but a consciousness of it¹ and a desire and endeavour to preserve and hand on the cultural tradition that one is conscious of having inherited. The Pharisees were consciously trying to carry out the commandments of the Torah; the Neoplatonists to be true to Plato's philosophy; the Egyptians of the Post-Assyrian Age of Egyptiac history to follow in the footsteps of their predecessors (they singled out as their chief exemplars the particularly impressive, but also particularly ancient, worthies of the Age of the Old Kingdom).² The maintenance of a tradition is not, of course, the same thing as the integral conservation of a past state of society and culture. It cannot be, since change is of the essence of life. If Plotinus and Plato could have met, Plotinus would not have known what to make of his revered master, any more than Plato would have known what to make of his devout disciple. All the same, the continuity of the history of the Hellenic Civilization between Plato's day and Plotinus's is indisputable. Plotinus was not merely aware that Plato had existed; he was a diligent reader of Plato's works and a keen student and practitioner of his philosophy as he interpreted it. The probability that Plotinus's interpretation would have seemed quaint to Plato if Plato could have been cognisant of it does not mean that there had been any break in the golden chain of the Platonic tradition.

This recognizable continuity in the traditions of the Hellenic and the Egyptiac societies gives us a standard for testing how long the Syriac Society (apart from the invincible Jews and Samaritans) succeeded in maintaining the continuity of its tradition unbroken.

Did it maintain it throughout the millennium of the Hellenic Society's intrusion on South-West Asia and Egypt? We should have no difficulty

¹ G. R. Willey and P. Phillips, approaching the same question in regard to the Pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas, suggest that 'a consciousness of a larger social order is ... a feature of civilization' (*Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), p. 56).

² On the archaism of the Saïte Age of Egyptiac history, see, for example, W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 316.

in answering this question if the civilization whose continuity we were trying to test were not the Syriac but the Egyptiac. The participants in the Egyptiac Civilization consciously and deliberately kept up the Egyptiac tradition till they were converted to Christianity. This happened between the third and the sixth century of the Christian Era—the fourth century being the critical one in which, in Egypt, Christianity achieved a decisive predominance. Thus the Egyptiac Civilization went into dissolution at the same time as the Hellenic, and it succumbed to the same solvent. Down to the time when these two civilizations simultaneously disappeared, one of the expressions of an Egyptiac cultural consciousness was the negative one of unremitting opposition and resistance to the Hellenic ascendancy that had been inaugurated, more than three hundred years before the establishment of the Ptolemaic regime, by the seventh-century Saïte Pharaoh Psammetichus I's hazardous policy of hiring Carian and Ionian mercenaries; and it is noteworthy that this Egyptiac Hellenophobia outlived the Egyptiac Civilization itself.

The conversion of the Egyptians to Christianity brought with it a revolutionary break with their cultural past. Besides substituting the Christian Trinity, angels, saints, and martyrs for the Egyptiac pantheon, the Egyptians also now substituted an alphabet, modelled on the Greek alphabet, for all forms of the traditional Egyptiac script, and thereby obliterated even their memory of their Pre-Christian past. Their inveterate Hellenophobia was the only relic of the past that survived this great cultural revolution; and it now found for itself a new expression in Christian terms. The descendants of the Egyptians who had combated the Hellenes in the names of Amun-Re and Apis now combated those Hellenes' 'Melchite' ('Imperialist') Christian successors in the cause of a Monophysite doctrine of the relation between the divine and human natures in Christ.

The fifth-century and sixth-century Coptic-speaking Monophysites in Egypt were hand in glove with their Syriac-speaking Monophysite contemporaries in Syria. In Syria, as in Egypt, the anti-Melchite feeling that expressed itself in these theological terms in these centuries was the conscious expression of a regional tradition. In Egypt, as we have seen, this Christian regional tradition was a recently established one, and it was dissevered from the pre-Christian Egyptiac tradition by a revolutionary break in cultural continuity. Was it the same story in Syria? Or can the opposition to the Melchite ascendancy be traced back, in Syria, without a break in continuity of consciousness, to the beginning of the Graeco-Roman domination? In other words, can the distinctive Syriac consciousness expressed in Monophysitism be traced back continuously to the age when the Aramaic *koiné* was the *lingua franca* of the Achaemenian Empire? We may assume that the users of the Aramaic *koiné*, so long as it remained in use, were conscious, in virtue of their using it, that they were partakers in a common culture—as the use of the subsequent Attic Greek *koiné* gave its users a sense of being partakers in a common Hellenism. Do this Aramaic linguistic consciousness and the Monophysite religious consciousness, between them, span the chronological gulf between the fourth century B.C. and the fifth century of the

Christian Era? Or is there a break in the continuity of history in the Syriac World between these two dates? The evidence suggests that there is a break, and that in the history of Syria the chronological interval between the old civilization and Monophysite Christianity is considerably longer than the corresponding interval in the history of Egypt.

The Aramaic *koiné* was hard hit by Alexander's destruction of the Achaemenian Empire. It not only lost its privileged status of being an official *lingua franca*; it was deliberately replaced, in this role, by the Attic Greek *koiné* in the Achaemenian Empire's Hellenic successor-states;¹ and, during the Seleucid regime in South-West Asia, Aramaic was under eclipse. Few Aramaic inscriptions dating from this period have been found except in Transjordan and Arabia,² and no Aramaic literary works are extant that date from the time between the third or second century B.C. and the second or third century of the Christian Era.³ During this dark age the Aramaic language was contaminated by the intrusion of Hellenisms,⁴ and the standard language and alphabet of the Aramaic *koiné* broke up into different local varieties.⁵ The two dialects that remained the closest to the Aramaic *koiné* were the Nabataean and the Palmyrene; but Nabataean Aramaic was contaminated with Arabisms, and Palmyrene Aramaic with the Eastern Aramaic dialect of the region on the farther side of the River Euphrates.⁶ The continuing advance of the Aramaic language in Palestine at the expense of Canaanite, even in this age of adversity, is attested by the fact that about half the Book of Daniel is in Aramaic,⁷ and this book is thought to have been published in 164 B.C.; but the Biblical Aramaic is already a local dialect.

The chief literary monuments of Palestinian Aramaic are the Samaritan translation of the Pentateuch and the Jerusalem Talmud⁸ (including the Mishnah). The future lay with the Eastern Aramaic dialect of Mesopotamia and Babylonia; and this stemmed, not from the *koiné*, but from dialects, current east of the Euphrates, which had not been used for literary purposes in the Assyrian and Achaemenian Age.⁹ The chief literary monuments of Eastern Aramaic—all dating from after the beginning of the Christian Era—are the Babylonian Talmud, the scriptures of the Mandaeen religion, and the Christian literature in the dialect of Urfa (better known by its Macedonian name 'Edessa') in North-Western Mesopotamia.¹⁰ This Osrohenian dialect is known as

¹ The Attic Greek *koiné*, together with other elements of Hellenism, naturally made its most rapid conquests on Syriac ground in the Phoenician and Philistine maritime cities along the Mediterranean coast, since these were within easier reach of the Hellenic World than the interior was. The early Hellenization of the Phoenician cities, in particular, did much to break the continuity of the Canaanite Syriac tradition in its homeland. The Phoenician states had recovered, under the Achaemenian regime, something of what they had lost in the preceding Assyrian and Neobabylonian Age. The Achaemenian Government had not only granted them autonomy, but had bestowed on them miniature local empires of their own—of course, under Achaemenian suzerainty. After the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire the Phoenician city-states retained these privileges under the subsequent Ptolemaic and Seleucid regimes, and they even recovered complete independence during the brief interval (*circa* 129 B.C.–63 B.C.) between the break-up of the Seleucid Empire and its replacement by Roman rule. But, in the Post-Alexandrine Age, they soon became virtually part of the Hellenic World.

² W. F. Albright: *The Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 208.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 201–2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁶ A. Dupont-Sommer: *Les Araméens*, p. 98.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 101–2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 100–1.

'Syriac' *par excellence*, and it won the standing of an unofficial *koiné* for Aramaic-speaking Christians of all sects; but both the language itself and the literature written in it are rather remote from the *koiné* of the Achaemenian Age and from the literary monuments of that.

Each of these dialects that thus asserted themselves against the former *koiné* developed its own variation on the *koiné*'s standard alphabet. Separate Syriac, Mandaean, Palmyrene, Nabataean, Jewish, and Samaritan alphabets established themselves. The Jewish variation on the original Aramaic alphabet is the one that is now familiar under the name of 'Square Hebrew'.¹

We must conclude that the conscious continuity of the Syriac Civilization did not long survive the fall of the Achaemenian Empire²—always excepting the still unbroken tradition of the Jews and the Samaritans.

8. SPENGLER'S HYPOTHETICAL 'MAGIAN CIVILIZATION'

In previous sections of this chapter we have taken note of the dissolution of no less than four civilizations. We have seen that, except for a lingering survival here and there,³ the Sumerio-Akkadian Civilization had disappeared by about A.D. 100, the Egyptiac and Hellenic civilizations by about A.D. 400,⁴ and the Syriac Civilization, as we have now found, as early as the third or second century B.C. These are portentous historical events—particularly the disappearance of the Sumerio-Akkadian and Egyptiac civilizations after they had each succeeded in maintaining their identity for more than three thousand years. Within the relatively short span of some five centuries, round about the beginning of the Christian Era, we find ourselves deprived of four of the principal landmarks on our chart of history. The Sumerio-Akkadian and Egyptiac civilizations have been with us since the dawn of civilization itself, the Hellenic and Syriac civilizations since the later centuries of the second millennium B.C. Their departure leaves what looks, at least at first sight, like 'a perfect and absolute blank' on the chart in the space that should be occupied by the history of the heart of the *Oikoumené* in its ensuing chapter. It is true that, farther east, we can continue to follow the threads of history continuously in India and in Eastern Asia. Farther west, again, we obtain a new landmark when the Western Civilization, which

¹ A. Dupont-Sommer: *Les Araméens*, p. 99.

² H. Werner has made the point that I have not succeeded in demonstrating that there was any *inner* connexion between the Achaemenian Empire and the Caliphate (*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 29. Jahrgang, xxix. Band (1955), p. 543).

³ e.g. the Sumerio-Akkadian Civilization survived in the Aramaic-speaking community at Harran, on the River Balikh, which was still worshipping the gods of the Sumerio-Akkadian pantheon in the ninth century of the Christian Era, though it was within a stone's throw of the Syriac Christian metropolis Urfa (see viii. 408, footnote 5). Harran had been an early north-western outpost of the Sumeric Civilization and a seat—only second in prestige to Ur itself—of the worship of the Sumeric moon-god Nanna (Nannar) under his Akkadian name Sin.

⁴ The Hellenic Civilization, too, survived here and there until the ninth century of the Christian Era. In A.D. 800 the Olympian gods were still being worshipped in the Mani (the Taenarum peninsula of the Peloponnese); and Chersonesus Taurica in the Crimea (on the site afterwards occupied by the Russian fortress of Sebastopol) was still an independent Greek city-state, though, by this date, a Christian one.

is still alive today, looms up above the historian's horizon. But Spengler, and Bagby following him, date the emergence of a distinctive Western Civilization no earlier than the eleventh century of the Christian Era; and, even if one dates it, as I do, before the end of the seventh century, there is still an interregnum of about three hundred years between the disappearance of the Hellenic Civilization and the emergence of the Western Civilization, and one of not less than about seven hundred years, on the shortest count, if we reckon back from the emergence of the Western Civilization to the submergence of the Syriac Civilization in the third or second century B.C.

What, then, is the configuration of history during this intervening period in the vast region extending from the western borders of India to the Pillars of Hercules? This region includes the heart of the *Oikoumenê* and the cradle of civilization in the Fertile Crescent, as well as the *Oikoumenê*'s westward extensions; and the period during which the configuration of its history is enigmatic is the crucial one that saw the epiphany first of Christianity and then of Islam, followed in either case by the conversion of a large part of the human race to the new religion. Evidently this period in the history of this portion of the *Oikoumenê* cannot in truth be void and without form. If one is trying to make a comprehensive study of human affairs, one cannot resign oneself to leaving this vast and vital tract of one's chart unmapped. How, then, ought the apparently blank space to be filled?

Spengler proposes to fill it by a characteristically original and audacious operation. He posits the presence here of an independent civilization with a distinctive character of its own which he indicates by labelling this hypothetical civilization the 'Magian' one.¹ He suggests, persuasively, that this civilization's existence had remained unrecognized until he dragged it up into the light, because it made its first appearance in disguise and has led a subterranean existence since then. It has not ever quite avowed its identity, and consequently has not ever been acknowledged to be a separate, independent, and distinctive civilization in its own right.

The 'Magian Civilization' comes on to the stage of history as a 'pseudomorphosis' (a concept that is one of the most brilliant of Spengler's innumerable flashes of insight).² After Alexander had forcibly imposed the Hellenic Civilization's ascendancy on Egypt and South-West Asia, social and cultural activities in this region assumed an Hellenic form for the next thousand years. But Spengler finds that this imported Hellenism never penetrated more than skin-deep. From first to last, he maintains, it was a deceptive veneer, and the underlying reality, masked by it, was the genesis and growth of a new civilization. The progress of this can be traced, he suggests, in the history of the progressive Oriental reactions against Hellenism, not just on the military and political plane but, more significantly, on the cultural plane—above all, in the field of religion taken in the broadest sense of the word. Following the scent that

¹ See O. Spengler: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. ii, chap. 3: A. 'Historische Pseudomorphosen'; B. 'Die Magische Seele'.

² See further the Annex to Chapter XVIII on pp. 670-4.

Spengler has signalled to us, we may perhaps find the first germ of the Magian Civilization sprouting within Alexander's lifetime—if we can detect this in the foundation of the Stoic school of *soi disant* Hellenic philosophy by the Phoenician Zeno of Citium (*vivebat circa* 335/3-261 B.C.).¹ At any rate, Zeno's Syrian successor, Poseidonius of Apamea (*vivebat circa* 135 B.C.—51 B.C.), is at least a precursor of the Magian style of culture as Spengler portrays it. This new civilization eventually flowers, according to Spengler, in Christianity and Islam; but it also embraces Judaism and Zoroastrianism; in Spengler's view they have been swept into the Magian Civilization's net, though they have been in existence since, at latest, the sixth century B.C., and one of the two, Judaism, has antecedents in Judah and Israel that can be traced back to the latter part of the second millennium B.C. The Magian Civilization is, in fact, capacious. It can be made to hold all religions and all peoples in the *Oikoumenê*, west of the Hindu World, since the beginning of the Christian Era at the latest. The one exception is the Western Civilization. This cannot be retained within Magian meshes, and therefore it has to be allowed its independence.²

In this reading of history, Spengler has put his finger on some unquestionable and important historical truths. It is true that there was a series of Oriental reactions against the Hellenic ascendancy, and that these culminated in the conversion of the Hellenic World to Christianity and in the subsequent conversion of about half the Christian World to Islam. It is also true that Christianity, as well as the other Oriental religions that competed with it in the Hellenic mission-field, commended itself to the Hellenes by presenting itself to them in Hellenic dress, though the living body which this tactful and attractive dress concealed was so alien to Hellenism that conversion to Christianity spelled the dissolution of the Hellenic Civilization. Finally, it is true, as we have seen in the preceding section of this chapter, that something new did arise in South-West Asia soon after the beginning of the Christian Era. The eastern dialect of the Aramaic language became a literary vehicle for three South-West Asian religions: Judaism (in its Babylonian wing), Christianity, and Mandaeanism. We may add that the Pehlevi alphabet was the script in which the Zoroastrian scriptures (the Avesta) were eventually committed to writing, and that the Pehlevi language was used for the writing of the commentaries that were the Zoroastrian equivalent of the Jewish Talmud. Zoroastrianism, which seems to have arisen in the Iranian-speaking countries north-east of the Caspian Gates,³ found a second home in North-West Iran. From about the beginning of the Christian Era onwards the Arsacid Parthian emperors seem to have

¹ W. F. Albright points out that two of Zeno's disciples, including his successor, Chrysippus, were Cilicians. Chrysippus's fellow Cilician, Antipater, came from Tarsus, which was afterwards to produce Saint Paul. Another of Zeno's disciples, Diogenes, was a Babylonian (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 339). In the second century B.C. the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus came from Gadara or, more probably, from Gezer, and the Platonic philosopher Antiochus from Ascalon. The Epicurean philosopher Zeno came from Sidon (*ibid.*, p. 344). The Platonic philosopher Cleitomachus-Hasdrubal, the disciple and successor of Carneades, was a Carthaginian who came to Athens in the fortieth year of his age.

² See pp. 89-90 and 92-93.

³ See p. 436, footnote 4.

been more or less devout Zoroastrians; and, after the overthrow of the Arsacids by the Sasanids in the third decade of the third century of the Christian Era, Zoroastrianism became the established religion of the Sasanian Persian Empire until this, in its turn, was overthrown in the seventh century by the Muslim Arabs.

Do these symptoms of new life in the regions under Hellenic ascendancy bear out Spengler's hypothesis? An objection brought forward by Christopher Dawson is, surely, unanswerable. In discussing whether Spengler's construction of a 'Magian Civilization' can stand up to criticism, Dawson observes that

'certainly the new elements in later Hellenistic civilization may be explained as due to Oriental influences, but these influences come, not from the budding energies of a new people, but from older peoples whose cultural development was even older than that of the Hellenes.'¹

As Dawson sees it,² and in this he is surely right,

'the Gospels and Primitive Christianity belong rather to the last stage of the Judaeo-Aramaean culture³—a culture which had expressed its "heroic" phase a thousand years earlier in the sagas of Sampson, of Deborah, of Gideon, and the like.'

The Zoroastrianism of the Christian Era likewise has antecedents that can be traced back, as we have seen, at least as far as the beginning of the sixth century B.C. In fact, all the main elements from which Spengler has compounded his 'Magian Civilization' have a continuity with the Syriac and Iranian civilizations which is not only recognizable by the historian but—what is still more to the point—is, and always has been, recognized by the communities that are assigned to the 'Magian Civilization' on Spengler's hypothesis.

Thus, whatever label we give to the civilization of which the Jews and the Zoroastrians are representatives, it cannot have been one that was non-existent before the beginning of the Christian Era. And, since the Zoroastrians, the Jews, and the adherents of religions derived from Judaism are the principal participants in the 'Magian Civilization' in Spengler's picture of it, we must conclude that there never was such a thing. We are therefore still left with the problem of filling the apparent blank in the chart of history which Spengler has sought to fill by an hypothesis that is brilliant but untenable.

9. A SYRIAC-HELLENIC CULTURE-COMPOST

The apparent blank in the chart must be an illusion. It must conceal some positive historical reality. If this reality is not a new independent and distinctive civilization, it must be some socio-cultural phenomenon of some other kind. Can we now identify this? Dawson has, I think, found the clue⁴ in observing that the distinctive feature of the last stage

¹ *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 382.

² *Ibid.*

³ Dawson's 'Judaeo-Aramaean culture' would seem to be more or less equivalent to my 'Syriac Civilization' (A. J. T.).

⁴ In *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 385.

of culture is not decay but syncretism. Perhaps one may modify Dawson's dictum by putting it that 'decay' and 'syncretism'—or, in Borkenau's terms, 'decay' and 'creation'¹—are two aspects of one process. The process is the mysterious one that we call change. Its nature eludes logical formulation, as we have seen.² But at least this much is clear: there can be no new crop without a fertile soil to nourish it; and the best fertilizer for fostering new life is the dead and decaying refuse bequeathed by an old crop.

Cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas
semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest. . . .
materies opus est ut crescant postera saecula. . . .
sic alid ex alio nunquam desistet oriri.³

In and immediately around the Fertile Crescent, civilizations have jostled each other at exceptionally close quarters, and their remains have therefore lain thick on the ground. Here, therefore, we may expect to find the cumulative deposits of culture piling up to an exceptional thickness. This will be comparable to the literal thickness of the pile of strata, deposited by the debris of successive occupations, that has built itself up, in the course of ages, into an artificial miniature mountain such as is the *tell* at Jericho or the *tell* at Ur. We may also expect to find that the culture-deposits are not homogeneous, but have the consistency of a compost in which the decaying remains of more than one culture have mixed and blended. On the analogy of the physical phenomena of the vegetation-cycle, we may expect, in the third place, to find that a culture-compost, compounded of the remains of several cultures, is a richer fertilizer than the remains of a single culture, and that a proportionate vitality and luxuriance is exhibited by a crop that has sprung from this exceptionally nourishing soil.⁴ In the chapter of history that we are now trying to elucidate the salient event is the contemporaneous decay of no less than four civilizations. The culture-compost deposited by them in the process must have been particularly thick and rich. Perhaps here we have the historical substance that really fills our history-book's apparently blank pages.

Of the four civilizations that decomposed in the course of about five centuries running from the second century B.C. to the fourth century of the Christian Era, the Syriac and the Hellenic manifestly played a more active part than the Sumero-Akkadian and the Egyptiac. The huge dead trunks of these two ancient and gigantic trees provided, between them, a prodigious quantity of potentially fertile decaying organic matter. But

¹ 'It is only when petrification has been followed by collapse that the creative process of recasting begins' (F. Borkenau in *Merkur*, July, 1949, p. 635).

² On pp. 252-4.

³ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, ll. 964-5, 967, 970. 'Something old is always giving way; it is always being pushed aside by something new. Everything has to be built up out of something else. . . . Nature needs matter to enable future generations to grow. . . . This process by which one thing arises out of another will never cease.'

⁴ In this context richness and vitality have to be measured by spiritual standards. Christopher Dawson makes the point that 'the fate of a civilization is not determined solely, or even predominantly, by political and economic causes. The age of the decline of the Roman Empire was also an age of spiritual rebirth, which prepared the way, not only for the coming of mediaeval [Western] Christendom, but also for the civilizations of Byzantium and Islam' (*The Dynamics of World History*, p. 408).

the conversion of dead matter into a fertilizer requires the action of solvents, and this was evidently the particular contribution of the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations to the total result. Each of them was a potent solvent by itself, as their individual catalytic feats testify. In combination, their potency was more than doubled; and they entered into a more and more intimate combination with each other in the course of their histories. Indeed, in each of the two histories, this tendency towards syncretism seldom faltered, and it persistently increased in intensity.

One of the Syriac Society's feats has been noticed already in this chapter. Before it succumbed, in its turn, to the solvent action of the Hellenic Civilization, the Syriac Civilization had gone so far towards dissolving the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization that the process went on to its conclusion even after the participants in the Syriac Civilization had lost consciousness of their society's distinctive cultural identity. It is easy to see that, when a culture has gone this far along the road towards disintegration, its potency as a solvent may be greater than in the earlier stage of its history in which its own fabric was still more or less intact.¹ However, this was not the first time that the Syriac Civilization had taken a conqueror captive.

Before its forcible incorporation in the Sumero-Akkadian World as a result of Assyrian and Neobabylonian annexations and deportations in and after the eighth century B.C., the Syriac Society had been similarly incorporated in the New Empire of Egypt in the second half of the second millennium B.C. At that time the Syriac Civilization was only in its formative stage; yet even at this early stage the Syriac culture made an impression on the Egyptiac culture, though this had a harder grain than the Sumero-Akkadian culture had. In this period of Egypt's political domination over Syria the Egyptians not only adopted Canaanite musical instruments² (and presumably the style of music that was played on them). They received numerous Canaanite words (including the Canaanite names of the borrowed musical instruments) into their vocabulary. More significant still, they received into their pantheon a number of Canaanite goddesses and gods: e.g. Ashtart (Astarte), 'Anath, Hauron, Rashap.³ This penetration of the Egyptiac culture by elements of the Syriac culture was remarkable in a period of Egyptiac history in which the conscious attitude of the Egyptians was a chauvinistic reaction against Asian influences that were associated in Egyptian minds with the bitter memories of the Hyksos conquest and domination of Egypt.

The foothold in the Egyptiac World that was gained, nevertheless, by Canaanite influences in the Age of the New Empire was the first stage in the dissolution of the Egyptiac culture by exotic solvents, though it needed the reinforcement of the Syriac solvent by the Hellenic one to overcome the Egyptiac Civilization's immense capacity for self-conservation, and the process was not completed till the Egyptians eventually adopted the Christian religion and the Coptic version of the Greek

¹ See viii. 501-8.

² W. F. Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 4th ed., p. 14.

³ W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., pp. 12 and 112.

alphabet. The task of dissolving the monolithic Egyptian Civilization required, in fact, the combined action of the Syriac Civilization, the Hellenic Civilization, and a higher religion, rooted in a Syriac-Hellenic culture-compost, that was a more powerful solvent than either the Syriac or the Hellenic Civilization operating separately.

The reciprocal influence and counter-influence of the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations on each other was also exerted over a long period of time, and, as time went on, ever more intensively. The eventual effect was to decompose each of the two, and to compound their tissues into a new fabric, which, though composite, was so closely compacted that its original components came to be almost indistinguishable. At least as early as the eighth century B.C. the Syriac Civilization produced a permanent effect on the Hellenic by giving it the Phoenician alphabet. In the seventh century it gave it a Phoenician style of art which was itself an amalgam of the Egyptian and Akkadian styles. In the fourth century it gave it a Phoenician code of ethics and system of cosmology: the Stoic philosophy, whose founder, Zeno, was a citizen of the Cypriot Phoenician city-state Citium. The cultural intercourse between the Syriac and Hellenic worlds was reciprocal, and Hellenism was radiating into Syria long before the time of Alexander the Great.¹ By the fifth century B.C. Syria was importing Hellenic pottery and other Hellenic wares and works of art, and was also adopting the Attic standard of coinage. 'By the middle of the fourth century Greek coins were being imitated by the Persian satraps and local rulers of Cilicia, Syria, and Palestine'² (including the priest-presidents of the autonomous Jewish state in Judaea). Even at the opposite extremity of the Syriac World from its Phoenician façade facing the Hellenic World, 'the South Arabians then fashioned crude imitations of Attic coins'.³ The potency of this previous radiation of Hellenic culture into the Syriac World goes far towards explaining the rapidity with which the Syriac World succumbed to Hellenism after Alexander's military conquest of the Achaemenian dominions in South-West Asia and Egypt. The eventual result, however, was the decomposition of Hellenism as well.

The Syriac Civilization did not achieve this posthumous revenge by assaulting Hellenism single-handed. It was, indeed, no longer in a position to mount a counter-offensive, since by this time it was no longer in being. Anyway, a single-handed assault on Hellenism by an alien culture would have courted a repulse at any time from the fifth century B.C. onwards. From that time on, the Hellenes were so strongly convinced of the superiority of their own civilization over all others that they were no longer in the mood, as they had been in earlier days, to accept gifts from an alien culture that presented itself as such. In the Post-Alexandrine Age the alien cultural agencies that eventually brought Hellenism down found that they could not stalk their quarry with any hope of success unless they disguised themselves in Hellenic dress. Stoicism, for example, presented in terms of Hellenic philosophy a *Weltanschauung* that was akin to that of the prophets of Israel and Judah. But this self-transformation

¹ See Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., pp. 337-8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³ *Ibid.*

was no mere sly and superficial masquerade; it was a genuine metamorphosis; and the decomposition of Hellenism was achieved by an instrumentality that was, itself, already semi-Hellenic. When the Hellenic Civilization that had decomposed the Syriac Civilization was hoist with its own petard, there was an Hellenic as well as a Syriac ingredient in the lethal charge of gunpowder. The final dissolution of Hellenism was the work of Christianity; and it is significant that, of all the non-Hellenic religions that competed for the conversion of Hellenic souls in the age of the Hellenic universal state, Christianity went the farthest in Hellenizing itself. Besides presenting itself visually in the established forms of Hellenic art, Christianity, like its forerunner Stoicism, expressed itself intellectually in terms of Hellenic philosophy. More than that, its crucial departure from its parent religion, Judaism—namely, the belief that Jesus was the Son of God and was, in fact, one of the three persons in a triune godhead—was, from the standpoint of Jewish monotheism, a shocking concession to two Hellenic religious aberrations: man-worship and polytheism.

It is also significant that Islam, which was a conscious and deliberate reaction against Christianity's Hellenizing departure from Jewish monotheism, did not revert to Judaism's strictly un-Hellenic tradition. When Islam was confronted with the need to equip itself with a systematic theology, it worked this out on the pattern of Christian theology;¹ and the Islamic theologians found, as their Christian predecessors had found, that they needed to draw upon Hellenic philosophy for their theological purpose and that they could not do this effectively without going back to the Hellenic fountain-head. From the ninth century of the Christian Era onwards the works of the Hellenic philosophers and scientists themselves became part of the recognized, and even obligatory, apparatus of Islamic culture,² as they had become part of the apparatus

¹ This work was done for Islam by converts from Christianity and Zoroastrianism. See pp. 467, 471, and 671, footnote 1.

² Any selection of references to the extensive literature on this subject is inevitably arbitrary. Among many other works, see D. S. Margoliouth: *The Early Development of Mohammedanism* (London 1914, Williams & Norgate); J. W. Sweetman: *Islam and Christian Theology* (London, Lutterworth Press: Part I, vol. i, 1945; Part I, vol. ii, 1947; Part II, vol. i, 1955); De Lacy O'Leary: *How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs* (London 1948, Routledge & Kegan Paul); A. J. Wensinck: *La Pensée de Ghazālī* (Paris 1940, Adrien-Maisonneuve); W. Montgomery Watt: *The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazālī* (London 1953, Allen & Unwin); A. J. Arberry: *Avicenna on Theology* (London 1951, John Murray); L. Gardet and M.-M. Anawati: *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane* (Paris 1948, Vrin), pp. 220-4 ('Intégration de l'Hellénisme').

This last-mentioned work brings out the conditions and the limitations of Islam's reception of Hellenism.

'C'est avant tout à titre d'arme défensive . . . que le kalām demandera à l'apport hellénistique certaines lignes au moins de son armature intellectuelle' (p. 222). 'Né d'une réflexion plus poussée des docteurs musulmans sur les sciences religieuses qu'il s'agissait de défendre, c'est grâce à l'influence de la philosophie grecque venue du dehors que le kalām put cependant se constituer: tout à la fois en luttant contre elle et en lui empruntant . . . la méthode argumentative qui lui manquait' (p. 224).

The authors point out, *ibid.*, that the relation of Christian theology to Hellenism was more positive and more intimate; yet its relation, too, was partly defensive.

In marking the distinction of its doctrine from the rationalisations by which it felt the faith was threatened, the Church was forced, in order that the distinction should be apparent, to define its dogma in the same kind of language as that in which the heresies themselves were framed; it was forced, that is, to use the language of philosophy, to adapt for its own use expressions and phrases which belonged precisely to that world of

of Christian culture since the fourth century. Dawson is right in pointing out¹ that Islam and Christianity both have roots in a composite Helleno-Judaic soil.

The compositeness of the soil in which Islam and Christianity both germinated is one key to the explanation of the fission of Judaic religion into three separate and rival sects. Why did Christianity break away from Judaism in the first instance? And why, when Islam, in its turn, had broken away from Christianity in the direction of Judaism, did Islam not revert to Judaism? Why did it set itself up as a separate sect that was not Christian but was not Jewish either? Part, at least, of the explanation² of this unhappy course of Judaic religious history is to be found in a residual incompatibility between the Syriac and the Hellenic element in the Syriac-Hellenic culture-compost that had been compounded in the course of the five centuries ending with the fourth century of the Christian Era. The coalescence of the two elements had been nearly complete but not quite; and the resulting cultural amalgam had been acceptable to nearly, but not quite, all the peoples in the section of the *Oikoumenê* between India and the Atlantic. Thus the psychological harmony produced by this all but completely successful feat of cultural fusion had been subject to strains, and these strains partly account for the subsequent religious schisms.³

Why did not Judaism, which was the first of the three Judaic religions, seize the opportunity for becoming the missionary religion, addressing itself to all mankind, that its two daughter religions, Christianity and Islam, have each since become? Why did it leave this great field free for these upstart travesties of itself, when it might have occupied the field in advance? Judaism did take a step in this direction. The Aramaic-speaking Galilaean-Jewish religious teacher Jesus had a Greek-speaking Alexandrian Jewish contemporary, Philo, who was even more at home in the world of Hellenic thought than he was in the world of Jewish religious faith. Philo devoted his intellectual powers to working out a concordance between the Torah and Hellenic philosophy. Perhaps he may have looked forward to accomplishing what Paul eventually achieved: the creation of a church, open to all mankind, through an unlimited increase in the number of the non-Jewish adherents of Judaism—marginal 'God-fearers' as well as thorough-going proselytes—who had already gathered round the Jewish communities dispersed through the Hellenic World. As it turned out, Philo proved to have worked, not for Jewry or for Judaism, but for a nascent Christian Church. Gentile Christianity, not

concepts against whose dominance it was most anxious to protect its own doctrine' (P. Sherrard: *The Greek East and the Latin West* (London 1959, Oxford University Press), pp. 57-58).

¹ In *The Dynamics of World History*, pp. 385-6.

² The secessions of Christianity and Islam from Judaism are also partly explicable as reactions to Jewish nationalism (see pp. 85-88 and 511-17).

³ With this qualification we can perhaps accept Father G. F. Klenk's dictum (in *Stimmen der Zeit*, No. 145 (1949-50), pp. 376-84) that it would be an error, at least in the field of religion, to talk of a fundamental opposition between Hellenism and the Syriac way of life. An opposition of this kind between East and West did not declare itself, Father Klenk maintains, till much later, when it made its appearance in the form of the schism between the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Christian Church. My comment would be that this opposition had already declared itself, long before that, in the previous schisms between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Rabbinical Judaism, was Philo's heir. Without having to answer the question whether the Palestinian Pharisees could have been won over to Philonism in any circumstances, we can say for certain that any such possibility vanished for ever after the disastrous military collision between Palestinian Judaism and Hellenism in the Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70. After Jewry had suffered that crushing material disaster, it turned inwards on itself; and the Hellenizing Jews of the diasporá, as well as their gentile proselytes and outer fringe, had to choose between the two extremes of abandoning Judaism for gentile Christianity and embracing a now deliberately anti-Hellenic Palestinian Pharisaism. The only Jews who survived in diasporá were those who made the second of these two choices, and their choice carried the Aramaic and Hebrew (i.e. Canaanite) languages and alphabets all over the Greek-speaking and Latin-speaking world. Thus at this critical point in history the Jews shook the Syriac-Hellenic culture-compost from off their feet and made up their minds to live thenceforward as exclusively Syriac dissenters in a Syriac-Hellenic cultural environment.

A parallel decision had been taken, long since, by the Iranians. The destruction of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander had been, for them, as great a material disaster as the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 was for the Jews, and they had already reacted to this as the Jews reacted to that. Alexander had seen through the Hellenic prejudice against Iranians when he had met these in personal intercourse, and he had dreamed of an Helleno-Iranian partnership, on a footing of equality, for the government of the *Oikoumené*. Alexander's attempts to translate this generous dream into a reality fell flat—except in Zarathustra's country, where the Iranian natives and Hellenic settlers in the Bactrian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire did, apparently, fraternize, perhaps because both alike were threatened by a common danger from the adjacent Eurasian Nomads.¹ Except in Bactria, the Iranians, like the Jews, rejected the Syriac-Hellenic cultural syncretism that most of the *Oikoumené* west of India was finding acceptable in the Post-Alexandrine Age.²

¹ A common interest in parrying this same threat induced the Iranian natives and the Arab settlers in Khurāsān to fraternize in the eighth century of the Christian Era (see ii. 141, footnote 3).

² The cause of this failure of Alexander's policy of political reconciliation and cultural fusion to capture the imagination and allegiance of the Iranian peoples on the plateau was not solely an attitude of resentment and hostility on the Iranian side. The failure was due also, in large part, to the repudiation, or at least neglect, of Alexander's policy by the Macedonian war-lords who emerged as the survivors from the forty-years-long struggle for existence for the possession of Alexander's heritage. It is true that the Seleucidae, who acquired the Iranian provinces, were the least illiberal of Alexander's successors in their treatment of the alien peoples under their rule. Seleucus I Nicator, for instance, was singular in remaining faithful to his Iranian wife Apame when, after Alexander's death, other Macedonian grandees repudiated the Iranian wives whom Alexander had wished upon them in 324 B.C. in his pursuit of his policy of a union of hearts. Yet the Seleucid Monarchy was based on an ascendancy of the Macedonian military settlements (*katoikiai*) and non-Macedonian Greek colonial city-states, which the Seleucidae sowed thick throughout their dominions, over the vast non-Hellenic majority of the population.

The Post-Alexandrine chapter of history in Iran might perhaps have taken a different turn if Alexander's eventual successors there had been animated by the spirit of Peucestas, who was appointed satrap of Persis (Fars) by Alexander in 324 B.C. and held this position till 316 B.C. Alexander chose Peucestas for this delicate mission of governing

This synthetic culture prevailed, in the course of that age, from the south-west foot of the Iranian plateau westwards to the Atlantic, save for one pocket of dissident Jews in Babylonia and another in Palestine which after the second Romano-Jewish War (*debellatum* A.D. 132-5), was reduced to a remnant in Galilee. When the cultural unification of the *Oikoumenê*, west of Iran, had found religious expression and institutional form in a common Christianity in which the Syriac and the Hellenic element were nicely balanced, it must have looked to contemporaries as if the unity, established on this basis, had a long future ahead of it. However, even a common adherence to Christianity did not avail to relax completely the tension between the descendants of the people whom Alexander had forcibly annexed to the Hellenic World and the descendants of these people's Greek, and subsequently also Roman, rulers.¹ This residual tension declared itself, as we have seen, in the successive schisms between the Graeco-Roman ('Melchite') Church and the Nestorians, and between the same officially established church and the Monophysites. These resistance movements within the Christian Church were a continuation, on the theological and linguistic planes, of a struggle that had been waged in previous centuries by force of arms. The military resistance was resumed, and was carried this time to a successful conclusion, by the Muslim Arabs. The Arab conquest was eventually followed by the conversion to Islam of the majority of the population of the Caliphate, except for a remnant of Jews, Zoroastrians, and Christians who succeeded in still maintaining their communal identity in diaspora.

This left the *Oikoumenê*, west of India, partitioned between Dar-al-Islam and Christendom, but this fission did not have the effect of reproducing what had been the state of affairs during the early centuries of the last millennium B.C., when the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations had coexisted as two separate and distinct cultures. It was impossible to undo the effects of the fusion between them which had begun as far back as the eighth century B.C. and which had reached its climax, after each of them had lost its identity, in the union of their two former domains in the oecumenical Christendom of the fourth to the seventh century of the Christian Era. Islam and the half of Christendom that survived its inroads might seem irreconcilable to their respective adherents; yet both were products of a combination of two identical elements—a Syriac element and an Hellenic one—and neither Christianity nor Islam could

the home-land of the deposed Persian imperial people because Peucestas had already shown a liking for them and for their way of life. He had taken the trouble to learn the West Iranian language, and he had no inhibition against wearing Persian dress. Peucestas's Persophilism did, in fact, win for him the loyalty, and even affection, of his Persian subjects, and at least one Farsi notable protested when Peucestas was deprived of the governorship of Persis by Antigonus. In consulting his own personal interests at the expense of the interests of Macedon and Hellas, Antigonus made history. Persis was one of the first Iranian countries to shake off Macedonian rule; and, in the third century of the Christian Era, it did again what it had done in the sixth century B.C. For the second time it gave birth to a Persian Empire.

¹ Roman rule was never successfully established over 'Iraq (Babylonia). The Emperor Trajan's momentary success and swiftly following failure demonstrated that a permanent incorporation of Babylonia in the Roman Empire was beyond Rome's power. On the other hand, Christianity had become the predominant religion in 'Iraq before the date of the Muslim Arab conquest in the seventh century of the Christian Era.

—or can—purge itself of either element without committing suicide. The Syriac and the Hellenic element are both ineradicable, not only in Christianity and Islam themselves, but also in the Christian and Islamic civilizations for which they have respectively served as chrysalises.

10. THE SYRIAC-HELLENIC CULTURE-COMPOST'S HARVEST

What has been the sequel to the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations' decomposition and amalgamation? This question does not arise if one follows Spengler in seeing the culture of the *Oikoumenê*, west of India, in the first millennium of the Christian Era as being a separate and distinctive civilization. As we have noted in another chapter,¹ civilizations are not organisms, and one of the differences between a civilization and an organism is that a civilization has no fixed maximum life-span. There is no reason why a civilization should not remain in existence for more than three thousand years. We know of two in the Old World, the Sumero-Akkadian and the Egyptian, which did each remain in existence for more than three thousand years. Accordingly, if we accepted Spengler's hypothesis, we could imagine his hypothetical 'Magian Civilization' surviving, as a going concern, down to the present day, and we could use it, as he and Bagby do, as a hold-all.² We could stow away in it every cultural phenomenon at the west end of the Old World, since the beginning of the Christian Era, which we do not see how to dispose of otherwise. If, however, we think of the Syriac-Hellenic syncretism, not as being a new civilization, but as being a culture-compost compounded from intermingled fibres of two old civilizations as a result of their decomposition, then we do have to ask ourselves: What happened after that? This question now forces itself upon us because a compost—whether vegetational or cultural—is inevitably a transitory state of things. A compost is created by a combination of decaying remnants of last year's crop; it is exhausted in the process of giving sustenance to this year's crop. Therefore, if we find that there has been a compost, we have to expect that it will have produced a harvest. What, then, has been the Syriac-Hellenic cultural syncretism's harvest? The answer is: two missionary religions and several civilizations which these two religions have incidentally mothered.

Christianity and Islam are manifestly two specimens of one and the same species. Both have sprung from the same syncretism of the debris of two extinct civilizations. Both address themselves to all mankind and aim at nothing short of the conversion of the whole World. Both established themselves first within the framework of a universal state, progressively converted this state's population, and survived its fall, to go on spreading, far and wide, into regions beyond the fallen state's horizon. As far as I can see, this parallelism in the histories of Christianity and Islam is indisputable; and, if it is, I did not go astray in pointing it out in previous volumes. But I was, I now think, mistaken in associating Christianity more closely than Islam with the antecedent Hellenic Civilization and in associating Islam more closely than Christianity with

¹ Chapter VII, section 12, pp. 268-9.

² See pp. 89-90.

the antecedent Syriac Civilization. Both religions have both Syriac and Hellenic antecedents; and in both religions both these elements are of capital importance. It is therefore an error to think of Christianity and the Christian and Post-Christian civilizations as stemming primarily from the Hellenic Civilization, and to think of Islam and the Islamic Civilization as stemming primarily from the Syriac Civilization. Islam, Christianity, and the several civilizations that these two religions have mothered, are all products, direct or indirect, of an identical compost consisting of both Syriac and Hellenic elements.

My error on this point led me into another. As a result of deriving Islam from the Syriac Civilization exclusively, I thought of the Caliphate, within which Islam developed in its formative stage, as being a Syriac institution—a Syriac universal state—on the analogy of the Hellenic universal state embodied in the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire certainly played the same part in the early history of Christianity that the Caliphate played in the early history of Islam;¹ and the Roman Empire was, as I saw it and still see it, an Hellenic institution: the Hellenic universal state. But it does not follow that the Caliphate played an analogous part in Syriac history, just because it did play an analogous part in the history of Islam. I still think that I was right in connecting the Caliphate with the Achaemenian Empire, and in seeing the Caliphate as a resumption of this earlier polity. Their areas were approximately coincident, and each of them found its centre of gravity in 'Iraq (Babylonia), though the empire-builders who founded each of these two polities came from elsewhere (from Iran in the earlier case and from Arabia in the later one). But I now hold that the Achaemenian Empire and the Caliphate are, not two phases of a Syriac universal state, but two representatives of a long series of empires based on the agricultural productivity of the alluvial soil of the lower basin of the Tigris and Euphrates.

This series begins, as I now see it, with the Empire of Agade (*circa* 2360–2180 B.C.) and ends, perhaps, with the Safawi Empire (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era), which failed in the end to hold 'Iraq against the 'Osmanli successors of the Roman Empire, or with the ephemeral eighteenth-century empire of Nadir Shah—the Afshar war-lord who succeeded in momentarily reuniting 'Iraq with Iran.² The Seleucid, Parthian, and Sasanian empires, which were all likewise based on 'Iraq, are other links in the chain. These three last-mentioned empires cover continuously the whole chronological interval between the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire and the establishment of the Caliphate. The recognition of these connecting links makes my association of the Caliphate with the Achaemenian Empire more convincing; but in doing that it refutes my hypothesis that the Achaemenian Empire and the Caliphate were products of the Syriac Civilization—in fact, successive embodiments of a Syriac universal state. The series of empires based on 'Iraq can be interpreted, more convincingly, as being products of the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization. This interpretation of them is self-evident down to the date of the extinction of the

¹ See p. 400, footnote 1.

² See pp. 191 and 207.

Sumero-Akkadian Civilization in the later days of the Parthian Empire; but it is also reasonable to suppose that an institution may have a momentum that carries it on after the civilization that generated it has passed out of existence. This is still easier to imagine if the institution in question has, as it has in this case, an enduring¹ geographical, as well as an ephemeral cultural, basis. And this would explain the continuing recurrence of empires based on 'Iraq down to the seventeenth century of the Christian Era.

In assigning the Achaemenian Empire to the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization and seeing in the Caliphate one of the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization's posthumous political products, one is, of course, implying that the Syriac Civilization did not ever produce a universal state of its own. This is, after all, what we should expect *a priori*, considering the comparative earliness of the stage in Syriac history at which the local states of the Syriac World lost their independence and were liquidated. After that, the Syriac Society had to live as a hermit crab within political frameworks that were not of its own making. Its success in maintaining its cultural identity under these adverse political conditions is one of the most remarkable of the Syriac Civilization's many remarkable feats. The uprooted and scattered speakers of the Aramaic *koiné* lived to see the Persian builders of the Achaemenian Empire prefer the Aramaic *koiné* to both Medo-Persian and Akkadian for use as an imperial *lingua franca*; and this oecumenical Aramaic language and alphabet had drawn the Iranian peoples into the Syriac Civilization's field before this civilization lost its identity except for the survival of the Samaritans and the Jews. The Jews and the Samaritans have outdone all other Syriac communities in managing to survive, as distinct communities, right down to the present day.²

The interpretation of history that has been given in this chapter up to this point maintains the historical connexion between the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations on the one hand, and the Christian and Muslim religions on the other, that I have assumed in volume i of this book. But the configuration of this passage of history that emerges from my present reconsideration of it is materially different. In my revised picture, Christianity and Islam are each derived from both the Syriac and the Hellenic Civilization, but neither religion is derived from either of these two civilizations direct. The immediate origin of both lies in a compost compounded of elements of the two civilizations after the civilizations themselves had both decomposed.

We have still to consider the affiliations and the status of the civilizations now in existence in that part of the *Oikoumenê* that lies to the west of the Hindu World. This question need not arise for anyone who is convinced of the reality of Spengler's hypothetical 'Magian Civilization'. He might simply take it for granted that this civilization is still a

¹ 'Enduring', not 'permanent', since the agricultural potential of 'Iraq, like that of Egypt, is a creation of human imagination, enterprise, organization, and industry; and, having been wrung from Nature by Man's efforts, it can revert to its original state of Nature if these efforts relax (see i. 315-18; ii. 42-43).

² A Jewish model for civilizations, in which the key institution is a diasporá, not a universal state, has been sketched on pp. 209-17.

going concern today and that what we think of as the Christian and Islamic worlds are really just two provinces of the 'Magian Civilization's' present-day domain. However, Spengler himself, and Bagby following him, shy away, as we have seen,¹ from labelling the civilization now existing in the West as a phase of the 'Magian Civilization' (or the 'Near Eastern Civilization', as Bagby has re-labelled it). Such a dismissal of the Western Civilization, and denial of its title to be regarded as being a separate and distinctive civilization in its own right, would fly too flatly in the face of manifest and intractable facts. The civilization that is in existence today in the West has distinctive characteristics of its own which are as definite as those of, say, the Hellenic Civilization or the Egyptian or the Sumero-Akkadian or the Indian or the Chinese. The reality of each of these five specimens, at any rate, is indisputable, even if the status of others—the 'Magian' and the 'Syriac' among them—may be in doubt. To deny the reality of the Western Civilization would impugn the reality of all civilizations, and would thus be tantamount to denying the existence of the species itself. Students of history may discuss the date at which the distinctive lineaments of the Western Civilization first become discernible. Can we trace this civilization's distinctive identity back to the seventh century of the Christian Era or only to the eleventh century or the fifteenth or the seventeenth or the eighteenth? However late we may place the date of a distinctive Western Civilization's emergence, we shall be admitting that there is a Western Civilization today. The truth is that, today, this civilization not only exists but overshadows the rest of the World.

Spengler and Bagby have admitted the Western Civilization's reality and distinctiveness, but they have not realized that, in making this admission, they have implicitly acknowledged the existence, not just of the Western Civilization itself, but of a number of others as well which they leave unrecognized, packed away in the 'Magian' or 'Near Eastern' Civilization's capacious hold-all. The recognition of these other civilizations follows automatically from a recognition of the Western Civilization, because these other civilizations have the same title to be recognized that the Western Civilization has.

The Western Civilization has a Christian origin. The Christian religion has mothered it; and the Christian Church has served as the chrysalis from which it has emerged. But it is not the only civilization that stands in this relation to Christianity. The ecclesiastical chrysalis of the Western Civilization has been the Roman See, but the Roman Patriarchate is one of five. Rome has not ever succeeded in winning more than a temporary and local acceptance of her claim to supremacy over the entire Christian Church. This claim is rejected today by all the four Eastern Orthodox patriarchates—Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem—and by the autocephalous Eastern Orthodox churches that are in communion with them. Moreover, the Eastern Orthodox Church's possession of two of its patriarchates is disputed by other Christian churches. There is a Coptic Monophysite, as well as an Orthodox, Patriarchate of Alexandria. There is both a Jacobite Monophysite

¹ On pp. 92-93.

and a Nestorian Dyophysite, as well as an Orthodox, Patriarchate of Antioch. This fission of the Christian Church has produced a plurality of Christendoms and Christian civilizations; and the Western Civilization is only one among them.

The West has been fond of imagining that it is the only civilization in Christendom. It has arrived at this picture of itself by ignoring the Nestorian and Monophysite Christendoms and by thinking of Eastern Orthodox Christendom as having been first subordinate to the West and then superfluous to it. Medieval Westerners wrote off the Eastern Orthodox Christians as being rebellious ecclesiastical subjects of the Roman See. Modern Western historians have followed this Western tradition. They have interpreted the history of the Eastern Orthodox Christian Byzantine (alias East Roman) Empire in Western terms. They have seen it as a temporary carapace which served to shield the Western World's eastern flank from Muslim assaults in the Western Civilization's early days, when it might have succumbed altogether to these attacks if it had been exposed to them at short range, as it did succumb in the Iberian Peninsula to a Muslim attack delivered at very long range from the Muslim Arabs' base. When the Byzantine carapace had served its purpose of allowing the Western Civilization time to grow strong enough to defend itself, it crumpled up, worsted at last by the blows that the Muslims had been raining on it all this time. The Western view about this is much the same today as it was in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Sentimentally the East Roman Empire's fall was regrettable; practically, it did not now matter.

The Western reading of Eastern Orthodox history is, of course, belied by the historical facts. The Greek Christian Roman Empire fell to rise again in the shape of a Turkish Muslim Roman Empire; and the Eastern Orthodox Christian peoples' loss of their political independence did not bring either their existence or their civilization to an end. Moreover, one Eastern Orthodox country, Russia, never did lose its independence, and today Russia is challenging the West's ascendancy over the rest of the World. The West's attempt to read the history of this sister Christian civilization in Western terms, and to treat it as subordinate to the West, is, in fact, preposterous. Its preposterousness can be measured by a Westerner if he reminds himself of Eastern Orthodox Christendom's treatment of the Westerner's own civilization. In Eastern Orthodox Christian eyes the Western peoples have been semi-barbarian schismatics living in the penumbra of civilization. To an Orthodox theologian's mind the difference between Catholic and Protestant Western schismatic Christians is obscure, and anyway it is not significant, since they agree in holding the same aberrant Western doctrine about the Procession of the Holy Spirit. This Byzantine caricature of the West is no more preposterous than the Western caricature of Byzantine civilization and history.

The story of Christendom has repeated itself in Dar-al-Islam. Here, too, there have been, and are, more Islamic civilizations than one, and the cultural consequences of the break-up of the Caliphate are comparable to those of the break-up of the Roman Empire.¹ The subsequent

¹ The configuration of Islamic history has been dealt with in some detail in i. 67-72

division between an Eastern Orthodox Christian Civilization and a Western Christian Civilization, with Greek and Latin as their respective classical languages, has had its counterpart in a division between a distinctively Arabic Muslim Civilization and a distinctively Iranic Muslim Civilization whose classical language is, not Arabic, but New Persian. The fission of Dar-al-Islam into the domains of two distinct Islamic civilizations was confined to the linguistic and cultural plane. Unlike the corresponding fission in Christendom, it was not accompanied by an ecclesiastical schism over points of jurisdiction and of doctrine. But, when we have recognized the titles of each of the two Christian civilizations, it would be inconsistent to refuse to recognize that there have also been two distinct Islamic civilizations.¹

At the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era the religious, as well as the cultural, configuration of the Islamic World underwent a revolutionary transformation. There was then a sudden and surprising revival of the military and political power of the Shi'ah, which had been dormant during the previous four or five hundred years. A Shi'i empire-builder, Isma'il Shah Safawi, now rapidly made himself master of Iran and 'Iraq, imposed his own ancestral variety of the Shi'ah on his subjects, and thereby split the Iranic Muslim World into mutually hostile fragments. Since then, the main division in the Islamic World has not been one between two cultures differentiated by their cultivation of two different classical languages. It has been a division between two incompatible views on a jurisdictional question that had split the Islamic World during the first four centuries of Islamic history. Today there are still two Islamic civilizations, as there were during the five centuries ending *circa* A.D. 1500; but they are no longer an Arabic and an Iranic one; they are a Sunni and a Shi'i one. Of these two, the Shi'i is relatively parochial. Today it is more or less confined to Iran, the north-western corner of Afghanistan, the Lebanon, and the Yaman, with a diasporá in Pakistan and India, and the Yamani Shi'is are not of the same sect as the Lebanese and the Iranian. The recrudescence of the Shi'ah in the heart of the Islamic World, followed by the pressure of the West in more recent times, has had the effect of drawing all the Sunnis together. Their sense of doctrinal unity has proved stronger than their linguistic and cultural differentiation. In the light of this, it might be nearest to the truth to say that today there is a unitary Islamic civilization based on the Sunnah, and to think of the Shi'i enclaves in present-day Islam as being no more than islands of dissent.

Even so, we are left with three civilizations—the Islamic, the Byzantine, and the Western—in the *Oikoumené* west of the Hindu World; and we have still to consider the diasporás that survive in these three civilizations' domains.

The Jewish diasporá and the tiny remnant of the Samaritans in and 347-402. I still hold the views there propounded. See further Chap. XIV of the present volume, pp. 461-76.

¹ In G. E. von Grunebaum's eyes, this conclusion 'is a lapse from historical perceptiveness induced by the temptations of a self-devouring system'. But he concedes that it is legitimate, and even convenient, to distinguish an Iranic and an Arabic 'segment' of the Islamic World as 'interacting groups within one and the same continuum' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

Palestine, round Nablûs, are clearly survivals of the Syriac Civilization. The Jews and the Samaritans refused to allow themselves to be swallowed up in the Syriac-Hellenic cultural amalgam. They have preserved their identity, without a break, since the age of Syriac history before the political extinction of Israel, Judah, and the other independent states of the Syriac World. The Zoroastrian diasporâ has likewise preserved its identity by refusing to be drawn into the Syriac-Hellenic syncretism. We shall reckon the Parsee community as being a third living representative of the Syriac Civilization if we consider that the convergence of the Syriac and the Iranian culture and their reciprocal influence on each other, in and after the Achaemenian Age, went to the length of cultural fusion. Otherwise, we must regard the Parsees as being living representatives of a separate civilization, which we shall have to label the 'Pre-Islamic Iranian'.

How are we to classify the surviving Nestorian and Monophysite Christian diasporâs, and the two Monophysite Christian nations—the Armenians and the Amharas—that still possess national states of their own: the Republic of Erivan and the Empire of Ethiopia? When we have conceded that there are a Byzantine and a Western Christian Civilization, we can hardly refuse to give an equal status to the Monophysite and Nestorian quarters of Christendom. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era, Nestorian Christendom was sprinkled across the breadth of Asia from the Euphrates to the Yellow River, and Monophysite Christendom still extends from the Caucasus to the headwaters of the Blue Nile, with a solid link at each end of the chain, though the intermediate links in Syria and Egypt have now worn thin and the former link in Nubia has quite rusted away. These two quarters of Christendom have each played an important part in history; and an historian who ignores or depreciates them does this at the risk of falsifying his picture of both past and present. If we choose, we may classify them as 'abortive civilizations'¹ on the ground that they failed to fulfil the role for which their adherents had cast them, and therefore forfeited this role to the younger Islamic Civilization. Yet 'abortive', as well as effective, civilizations are specimens of the species; and, as such, they have to be taken into account.

If the foregoing survey is correct, an impressive crop of higher religions and civilizations has sprung from the culture-compost deposited by the decomposition and amalgamation of the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations. The higher religions in this cultural harvest are Christianity and Islam; the civilizations are those of the four Christendoms, together with an Islamic Civilization that first divided into two and then re-coalesced except for a Shi'i minority.²

¹ For my use of this term, see ii. 322-94 and 424-52, and the present volume, Chapter XVIII, p. 554.

² This picture of the configuration of the histories of civilizations in the Old World, west of India, since the last millennium B.C., seems to me to fit the complicated facts rather better than Spengler's picture fits them. But Spengler's attempt to solve the problem has found able supporters. Bagby swallows it whole, as has been noted, and Borkenau finds it at any rate more convincing than mine. Borkenau inclines to Spengler's and Bagby's view that a single civilization only, and not a litter of civilizations, has been generated by the coalescence of the Hellenic Civilization and the Syriac. 'One

These second thoughts on the configuration of the Syriac Civilization have inevitably run to some length because the subject of the inquiry is a complicated and a difficult one. We are dealing here with the history of the heart of the *Oikoumenê* in its most critical, and also most creative, phase. It will be seen that I have revised my original picture considerably. I shall not be surprised if my second picture is criticized as vigorously as my first has been; but I hope that, in any case, the reconsideration of the whole question in this chapter may at least help to elucidate a passage of history which is as important as it is enigmatic.

XIV. ISLAM'S PLACE IN HISTORY

ISLAM's epiphany was dramatic by comparison with Christianity's and Buddhism's. Jesus's life and death passed unnoticed at the time, except among the obscure and tiny band of His Galilean Jewish disciples. Our information about His ministry comes exclusively from the scriptures of the Christian Church. We should know next to nothing about it if our only sources were the Hellenic literature in Greek and Latin and the Jewish literature in Aramaic of the first century of the Christian Era. Siddhārtha Gautama's ministry, likewise, is known only from the Pali scriptures of the Hinayana, though, according to these records, Gautama, unlike Jesus, was something of a public figure in His own lifetime. He was a king's son; and, after He had renounced His worldly heritage, He still consorted with kings during His ministry. Yet Buddhism did not make a political impact on the World on a grand scale till about two hundred years, and Christianity not till about three hundred years, after the founder's day, when their respective political fortunes were made by the conversions of AçoKa and Constantine. On the other hand, Islam made a comparable impact during the founder's own lifetime, and its political fortunes were made by the founder himself.

Muhammad yielded, in the thirteenth year of his ministry, to the temptation which, according to the Gospels, was resisted by Jesus at the beginning of His. For twelve years Muhammad had been a sincere and intrepid but utterly unsuccessful prophet.¹ He had won only a tiny band might conclude', he writes, 'that Alexander's conquests and the ensuing Hellenisation of the Middle East masked the death of this [i.e. the Syriac] Civilization and the emergence of a new affiliated civilization from the fusion of the East and Hellas' (F. Borkenau in *Commentary*, March, 1956, p. 247). Borkenau holds that Spengler is right, as against me, in assigning to this single Magian Civilization all those communities that have lost their territorial bases but have nevertheless preserved their distinctive communal identities in the form of millets (*ibid.*).

¹ Philip Bagby has derided me (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 105) for stating this notorious fact in previous volumes of this book (e.g. iii. 467; v. 128 and 676), as if I had made a ludicrous gaffe. The statement is, of course, a commonplace. It will be found in every serious account of Muhammad's career. Muhammad was, in the end, a conspicuously successful man, but he succeeded, not as a prophet, but as a statesman. Islam, too, was, in the end, a conspicuously successful religion, but its spiritual fortune was made by the converted descendants of Christians and Zoroastrians who had become political subjects of the militant Islamic state. These equally notorious facts are also mentioned by me in the contexts cited in the present footnote. In order to understand the character and career of Muhammad and the history of the religion that he founded, we have to distinguish (i) between Muhammad's success as a statesman and his failure as a prophet, and (ii) between the immediate success of his Islamic state and the eventual success of Islam itself as a universal religion.

of converts; most of these had had eventually to take asylum in Abyssinia; and Muhammad himself was in daily danger of meeting Jesus's fate. After his acceptance of the invitation from the people of Yathrib (subsequently known as Medina)¹ to become the head of their state, Muhammad proved to be not only a prophet but also a political genius. Before his death he had compelled the commercial oligarchy of his native city-state Mecca to capitulate to him, and had shown his statesmanship—and also the generosity of his character—in the moderateness of the terms with which he had contented himself. In addition he had extended his rule from the city-state of Yathrib over a large part of the Arabian Peninsula besides Mecca, and his troops had made a probing raid on the Roman Empire's dominions in Transjordan. This piece of audacity had met with prompt chastisement, but it was premonitory of the sweeping conquests that were to be made by Muhammad's immediate political successors. Within less than twenty years of his death they had conquered the whole of the Sasanian Persian Empire and the best part of the Roman Empire: that is to say, Syria, in the broadest sense of the word, and also Egypt.

These dramatically rapid military and political successes of early Islam have given some Western students of history the impression that the epiphany of Islam made an unusually sharp break in the history of the Old-World *Oikoumenē* and that it had no antecedents and no precedents. Christopher Dawson's dictum² that history 'allows the whole world situation to be suddenly transformed by the action of a single individual like Muhammad or Alexander' has already been quoted in this volume.³ A. L. Kroeber has expressed the same view. 'Islam', he says,⁴ 'had no infancy and no real growth, but sprang up, Minerva-like, full-blown with the life of one man.'

If this were the truth, Islam's lack of antecedents could not be due just to the suddenness of its epiphany. This was neither more nor less sudden than the epiphanies of other religions and philosophies which, like Islam, had single historical founders, but whose founders—unlike what is alleged of Muhammad—had a long tradition behind them, as, for instance, Jesus had in the history of Judaism and in the antecedent religion of Israel, and as Gautama had in the previous development of Indian philosophy. The alleged lack of antecedents in Muhammad's case would be inexplicable. The simple and adequate explanation is that this Western picture is an hallucination. In reality there were substantial antecedents to Islam's epiphany and a number of precedents for it, as will be argued in the present chapter. Meanwhile, it is worth pausing to examine how the prevalent Western impression to the contrary arose.

One of the historical phenomena that have created this erroneous impression is the scale, speed, and revolutionariness of Islam's military and political impact on the World within the thirty years beginning with Muhammad's withdrawal from Mecca to Medina in A.D. 622. Within

¹ i.e. *Madinat-an-Nabī*, meaning 'the city of the Prophet'.

² In *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 257.

³ On p. 16. See also p. 16, footnote 6.

⁴ A. L. Kroeber: *The Nature of Culture*, p. 388.

those thirty years the Islamic state incorporated, as has just been noted, the whole of Arabia, the whole of the Sasanian Persian Empire, and the Roman Empire's dominions in Syria and Egypt. These immense political successes are apt to impress modern Western scholars in particular, because modern Western Society is particularly political-minded. The Islamic state conquered vast territories and populations almost at one blow; but, in the subsequent transformation of the conquered peoples' religious, artistic, and intellectual outlook, Islam was no swifter and no more revolutionary than Christianity and Buddhism had been. Subjects can be won more quickly and easily than converts. The conversion of the Islamic state's subjects to Islam was a gradual process.¹ It took at least six centuries, and even then it was not complete. Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian minorities have survived in the Islamic World down to this day—partly thanks to the toleration that Muhammad himself enjoined upon Muslims, in the Qur'ān,² in their dealings with non-Muslim 'People of the Book' who had submitted to the rule of the Islamic state. Moreover, in so far as Islam won its way, it won it, like the other missionary religions, by unavowedly receiving into itself many of the elements in its converts' previous religions. In this case, as in those, the price of converting was compromise.

Another historical phenomenon that has given Western minds the impression that the advent of Islam brought with it a sharp break in historical continuity is the sudden accompanying elevation of the Arabic language to a dominating position. In the reign of the Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik (*imperabat* A.D. 685–705) Arabic was substituted for Greek as the official language of administration in those dominions of the Islamic state that had formerly belonged to the Roman Empire. But the Arabic language's chief triumph was in the unofficial realm of literature. The sources for the study of Islamic history, from Muhammad's lifetime onwards, are copious, and many of them are of first-rate value from the historian's professional point of view. Muhammad's career, unlike Jesus's, can be followed point by point—and, in some of its chapters, almost day by day—in the full light of history. But these valuable historical records are all in Arabic; and this pulls up short the Western historian who has been following the history of South-West Asia and Egypt in Greek and Latin records over a span of nearly twelve hundred years, beginning with the antecedents of the establishment of the Achaemenian Persian Empire, as recorded in Greek by Herodotus, and coming down to the campaigns of the Roman Emperor Heraclius as recorded in the same language by George the Pisidian (who would have been Herodotus the Carian's neighbour if they had been contemporaries). Then, at the advent of Islam before the end of Heraclius's reign, the Greek-reading Western historian suddenly finds that the language that has served as his key to the history of twelve centuries no longer suffices. This confirms

¹ Accounts of it will be found in T. W. Arnold: *The Preaching of Islam*, 2nd ed. (London 1913, Constable); A. S. Tritton: *The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects* (London 1930, Milford); L. E. Browne: *The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia* (Cambridge 1933, University Press).

² e.g. Surah xxii. 17, quoted in v. 674, footnote 1.

his impression that, at this point, he is confronted with a break in the continuity of history.¹

This is how it looks to a Western historian, educated in the Greek and Latin languages and literatures, whose point of departure is the Pre-Alexandrine Hellenic World and who views the adjacent Achaemenian Empire and its Hellenic successor-states from the Hellenic angle. He does not realize that this Hellenic point of view gives an inadequate picture of South-West Asian and Egyptian history from first to last; and so, when he is confronted with the manifest indispensability of historical records in the Arabic language for the history of the core of the *Oikoumenê* from the seventh century of the Christian Era onwards, he does not see the significance of this baffling experience. What it signifies is that other languages besides Greek are indispensable for a study of the history of the preceding twelve centuries as well.

Even if the historian confines his attention to the political surface of history, he ought to check the veracity of Herodotus's Greek narrative by comparing it with the Achaemenian emperors' surviving official documents in the Medo-Persian, Elamite, Akkadian, Aramaic, and Egyptian languages and scripts. If he wants to probe down below the political surface to the economic level, he must study the voluminous cuneiform records of private business transactions in the Akkadian language, produced under the Achaemenian and Seleucid regimes, that have been unearthed in Babylonia. The irrigated alluvium of the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin was the economic power-house of each of these empires in turn; and Akkadian, not Greek, is the key language for any study of the economic history of South-West Asia in this age—even for the time when, on the political plane, the Achaemenidae had been supplanted by the Greek-speaking Seleucid dynasty. If the inquirer wants to probe down below the economic level to the religious, then he must read Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac, Avestan, and Pehlevi—and Pali and Sanskrit too, if he is going to invade India at Demetrius of Bactria's heels. In fact, for any inquirer into Egyptian and South-West Asian history who takes a comprehensive view of history, languages other than Greek are of capital importance throughout, and not merely since the advent of Islam and of the Arabic language in Islam's train. In this perspective the obvious indispensability of Arabic and inadequacy of Greek from the seventh century of the Christian Era onwards will be seen to be no sudden revolutionary new departure. The self-assertion of Arabic merely makes it impossible to continue to turn a blind eye to a situation that has been confronting the inquirer all the time.

Let us suppose that the Roman Empire had not recovered from the

¹ J. B. Bury's first edition of *A History of the Later Roman Empire* carried the story down almost to the end of the eighth century of the Christian Era. The second edition breaks off at A.D. 565, the date of the death of the Emperor Justinian, and a few years before the date of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. After the second edition had been published, Bury told the present writer that he now looked back on the first edition as an act of youthful rashness. He had ventured to deal with the history of the seventh and eighth centuries without having mastered the Arabic language. By the time when he was producing his second edition, he could not face either trying to master Arabic or trying, without having done this, to rewrite the history of those two centuries. So, this time, he had laid down his pen at the latest convenient stopping-place before the date of the beginning of Muhammad's career.

bout of anarchy and disruption into which it fell in A.D. 235. Let us suppose, in fact, that Zenobia, the queen of the North Arabian city-state of Palmyra, had been able to retain the territories that she had acquired, at lightning speed, at the Roman Empire's expense. Her dominions extended, at their widest, over the whole eastern third of the Roman Empire. They stretched north-westward to the Black Sea Straits and south-westward to the Syrtes. Let us suppose, further, that Zenobia had been a Christian, and that she had derived her Christianity from the Mesopotamian Christian kingdom of Osroene, and had therefore acquired it in the Syriac language, not in the Greek. And, finally, let us suppose that she had been half a century ahead of Constantine in giving Christianity an official status in her dominions. None of these suppositions is extravagant. History could easily have taken this turn. And, if it had, then Christianity would have made the same impression on Western historians that Islam now makes. It would have seemed to them suddenly and unforeseenly to have changed the face of the World by depriving the Western historian of his linguistic key to an understanding of the World's history. Zenobia's hypothetical Christianity would have enthroned the Syriac language in the Greek language's place, as Muhammad's historical Islam did enthrone Arabic in its place some four hundred years later. This would have created, in Western eyes, the same impression of a revolutionary break; and in this imaginary event, as in the historical event, the impression would have been illusory. All that would then have happened in the third century would have been merely what did happen in the seventh century. A 'pseudomorphosis', in Spengler's usage of the term,¹ would have been convicted of being the camouflage that it always had been in reality. The presence of the ever-present non-Hellenic core of South-West Asian life, beneath the Hellenic veneer, would have been exposed some four hundred years earlier than the actual date at which the veneer was stripped off. But this exposure would not have made a revolutionary break in the continuity of history if it had occurred in the third century, any more than it made one in the seventh century. Islam's alleged lack of antecedents turns out to be nothing more substantial than a Western Hellenist's illusion.

If we look at Pre-Islamic history again, and look, this time, with non-Hellenic eyes, we shall find abundant antecedents and precedents for all the main phenomena that constitute, in combination, the epiphany of Islam.

The non-Arab world was first apprised of the new religion's epiphany by a militant outbreak of Semitic-speaking Nomads from the Arabian Peninsula; but the Arab *Völkerwanderung* in the seventh century of the Christian Era was not the first eruption of its kind, any more than it was the last. The Arabs themselves had erupted out of Arabia twice before: in the second century B.C., when the Seleucid Empire was losing its grip on the Fertile Crescent, and, before that, in the seventh century B.C., when the Assyrian Empire was beginning to labour under the weight of its self-imposed military burdens. The Aramaean-Chaldaean-Hebrew eruption in the thirteenth century B.C., when the New Empire of Egypt

¹ See Chapter XVIII, Annex, pp. 670-4.

was in decline, is comparable to the Muslim Arab eruption in point of magnitude and vehemence. Round about the beginning of the second millennium B.C. the Amorites had erupted as far afield as their Aramaean successors penetrated. Five or six hundred years earlier the Akkadians had thrust their way out of the desert on to the alluvium, to the north-west of Sumer, and had pressed on, up the Tigris, into the country that they made into Assyria. The Canaanites must have erupted out of Arabia no later than the Akkadians, and their occupation of Syria may have been still earlier.

The vast Islamic empire expanded, within the span of a single generation, out of a tiny nucleus: a single city-state commanding a single oasis. But Muhammad's Yathrib had its predecessors in Zenobia's Palmyra and, on a smaller scale, in Petra and in Hatra. In each of these earlier cases, too, a city-state in an Arabian oasis had generated a notable political power. The Roman Emperor Trajan liquidated the miniature empire of Petra and annexed its territories; but he was defeated in his attempt to capture Hatra. The lines of the Roman invader's unsuccessful circumvallation surround the inviolate walls of Hatra to this day. Hatra had been under the protection of the trinity of goddesses who, in Muhammad's day, were the protectresses of Mecca. Their potency was so great that Muhammad almost succumbed to the temptation to stultify his mission by proclaiming them to be daughters of the One True God of the pure religion of Abraham.

Under the Umayyad regime, which centred itself on Syria and chose Damascus for its capital, the Islamic state was, first and foremost, a successor-state of the Roman Empire. In this role it had been anticipated, in the sixth and seventh centuries of the Christian Era, by the principality of the Banu Ghassān, who had guarded the Roman Empire's desert marches, and in the third century by the wide, though short-lived, empire that Zenobia had ruled from Palmyra. The Umayyads (with the single exception of 'Umar II) found Hellenism more to their taste than Islam—as witness the Hellenic decorations of Hishām's palace on the northern outskirts of Jericho. In this philhellenism they had been anticipated by earlier barbarian conquerors of previously Hellenized ground: for instance, the Parthians in Iran and 'Iraq and the Kushans in Bactria and India.

By conquering 'Iraq and Iran as well as Syria and Egypt, the Islamic state had made itself a successor-state of the Sasanian Empire as well as of the Roman Empire. The economic pull of 'Iraq on its Arab conquerors made itself felt when the Umayyad regime was replaced by the 'Abbasid regime, and when the capital of the Islamic state was moved from Damascus to the new city of Baghdad. Under the 'Abbasids the Islamic state took its place in the long series of empires based on 'Iraq's economic resources. The series stretched back through the Sasanian, Parthian, Seleucid, Achaemenian, and Neobabylonian empires to the Empire of Agade, which had given political unity to the Fertile Crescent in the third millennium B.C.

The Islamic state, in the first chapter of its history, was up in arms against the political ascendancy of Hellenism in South-West Asia and

Egypt—an ascendancy that had been upheld there by Roman power since the last century B.C. On the cultural plane, on the other hand, Islam eventually equipped itself for playing its part as a universal religion by drawing on Hellenic intellectual resources.¹ Thus its attitude towards Hellenism was the ambivalent one of attraction towards it on the cultural plane coexisting with hostility towards it on the political plane. But this ambivalence towards Hellenism was not peculiar to Islam. It was the attitude of both Monophysite and Nestorian Christianity at the time when Islam first took the field; and, before that, it had been the attitude of Catholic Christianity until the concordat with the Roman Imperial Government had degraded this into being the 'Imperialist' (Melchite) Church in the eyes of the Roman Empire's disaffected Syrian and Egyptian Christian subjects. Before the days of Constantine and Theodosius, the Catholic Christian Church had been anti-Hellenic and philhellene simultaneously. It had won its converts from Hellenism by presenting itself to them in an Hellenic dress. Islam was following these Christian precedents when, after completing the expulsion of Hellenism from South-West Asia and Egypt on the political plane, it proceeded to provide itself with a theology by having recourse to Hellenic philosophy.

The various aspects of the epiphany and early subsequent history of Islam thus turn out to have antecedents and precedents, like other historical phenomena. More than that, they can be satisfactorily explained. We can see why Muhammad, in his particular generation, was moved to engage in his religious mission. We can see why he was compelled to become a politician as well as a prophet. We can see why the Islamic state, in the first chapter of its history, was able to make its swift and sweeping military conquests. Finally, we can see how, after the establishment of the Islamic world-state, Islam developed into a universal religion of the same order as Christianity and on a par with it.

Muhammad's prophetic mission can be explained as a consequence of the cumulative effect of a gradual but progressive penetration of Arabia by the influences of civilization.² This process may have begun before the close of the second millennium B.C., when the domestication of the camel made all but the greatest of the Arabian deserts traversable by Man. Before the end of the last millennium B.C. the Yaman had, as we have seen,³ been drawn into the field of the Syriac Civilization. In the sixth century B.C. the Neobabylonian Emperor Nabunaid had established an outpost of the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization in the North-West Arabian oasis of Taymā. By Muhammad's time, Judaism and Christianity were radiating their influence into the Arabian Peninsula vigorously from the north-west, the south-west, and the north-east. There were well-established Jewish communities at Khaybar and Yathrib, and Christian communities in the Yaman. In the Arabia of Muhammad's day there was a widespread feeling that it was high time for the Arabs to become 'People of the Book', such as the Jews and the Christians were. Muhammad had equally sincere, though less articulate,

¹ See p. 450, with footnote 2, above, and also pp. 471 and 671, footnote 1.

² This point has been noticed in iii. 277.

³ On pp. 393-4.

predecessors in the hanifs, and he had a contemporary and a potential rival in the Prophet Maslamah. If the Hijazi prophet Muhammad had failed, the Najdi prophet Maslamah might have done the equivalent of Muhammad's work; and, if Maslamah, too, had failed, some other prophet would have arisen, in some other part of Arabia, to step into Maslamah's and Muhammad's shoes. So far from springing up 'Minerva-like, full-blown, with the life of one man',¹ Islam, like Christianity, had a long pre-natal history. A normal birth offers an apter simile for the epiphany of Islam than the legendary birth of the goddess Athene. A normal birth is a sudden and dramatic event, but it does not come out of the blue and is therefore not inexplicable.

In the second part of his public career, beginning with his withdrawal from Mecca to Medina, Muhammad successfully played the military and political part for which the Jews, after their loss of their political independence, had cast their expected Messiah.

The Jewish Messiah's designated task was, humanly speaking, a forlorn hope. He was to overthrow a world-empire to which the Jews were subject, and was to establish a Jewish world-empire in its place. It was recognized that the Messiah could succeed only in virtue of his being supported by Yahweh's almighty power. Left to his own human resources he would be foredoomed; and, in fact, as long as the Roman Empire lasted, every Jewish political leader who tried to play the conventional Messiah's part brought a crushing disaster on himself and on his community. The Roman power was invincible and ubiquitous. The mere accusation of aspiring to be the Messiah was enough to procure a death-sentence—as Jesus's Jewish enemies knew when they brought this charge against Him in Pilate's court. As the story is told in the Gospels, the charge against Jesus was groundless. Either He had not claimed to be the Messiah in any sense, or He had made the claim in a non-political and non-militant sense that changed the conventional concept of the Messiah's role out of all recognition. Nevertheless, Jesus was put to death by the Roman authorities. They were taking no chances. In fact, under the regime of the Roman world-state, a prophet was doomed if he was even falsely accused of intending to go into politics and to take up arms. His only hope lay in a policy of strict non-violence, and even this might not save him.

The regime under which Muhammad entered on his prophetic mission was entirely different. He was a citizen of a turbulent city-state. In the Mecca of his day non-violence certainly would not save the life of a prophet who was preaching a doctrine that was objectionable to the local ruling oligarchy. But, unlike the Roman Empire, the Meccan city-state was not ubiquitous. Its jurisdiction was limited to a single oasis. It was practicable to withdraw beyond the reach of the Quraysh's not very long arm; and thus, when Muhammad was offered the political headship of the independent city-state of Medina, he had found his effective retort to the Meccan oligarchy's hostility. Since Muhammad at Medina turned out to be a political genius, his retort, before long, became not merely effective but crushing. His political career need not be considered

¹ Kroeber, quoted on p. 462.

further in this present context, as it has been discussed at some length in a previous volume.¹ It is sufficient here to note that there is nothing inexplicable in it.

Nor is there any mystery about the causes of the early Islamic state's swift and sweeping military successes. The key is to be found in the division of the territories once conquered from the Achaemenidae by Alexander between two rival empires: one of them based on 'Iraq and the other centred on the Mediterranean. This political constellation had been in existence for 700 years by the time when Muhammad's second political successor, the Caliph 'Umar I (*imperabat* A.D. 634-44) overthrew the Sasanian Persian Empire and wrested from the Roman Empire its dominions south-east of Taurus. The two empires had brought these disasters upon themselves by allowing the chronic border-warfare between them to boil up, from a limited competition for the possession of frontier fortresses and provinces, into a life-and-death struggle in which the very existence of both powers was at stake. Most of Muhammad's lifetime (*vivebat circa* A.D. 570-632) was occupied, in the heart of the *Oikoumenê* immediately to the north of Arabia, by two long-drawn-out and devastating Romano-Persian wars (*gerebantur* A.D. 572-91 and 603-28) that ended, as far as the two belligerents' mutual relations were concerned, in nothing more constructive than a re-establishment of the *status quo ante*. The effective consequent change was in the balance of power between the two empires and the Arab barbarians beyond their southern frontiers. Both empires emerged from this double great war exhausted. By contrast, the Arabs emerged notably enriched and instructed. They had earned money by serving as mercenaries on both sides; they had invested much of it in buying up-to-date military equipment; and, most important of all, they had learnt by practice how to use this equipment and how to conduct military operations with large forces on the grand scale. This speeded up and completed a process that had been going on for some centuries past. For religion was not the only element of 'civilization' that had been seeping into Arabia. Military equipment and skill had been seeping in as well, even before the long history of Romano-Persian warfare had mounted to its fatal climax. The most potent new weapon that the Arabs had acquired in the Pre-Islamic Age was the horse,² and horsemanship had made the Arabs militarily formidable—as it was to make the Plains Indians of North America when they had acquired the horse from the Spaniards.³

Thus, by the time of Muhammad's *hijrah* to Medina, the Arabs already possessed all the requisites for becoming world-conquerors except one, and that was political unity. When Muhammad had given them this it was inevitable that they should erupt and that their eruption should sweep away everything in its path. Few Arabs ever became devotees of Islam for its own sake, and most Arabs strongly objected, at first, to having the political rule of the Islamic state imposed on them. Why should they submit to being ruled by the people of Yathrib in league

¹ iii. 466-72.

² See L. Caetani: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. i (Milan 1911, Hoepli), p. 346, cited already in viii. 17, footnote 5.

³ See viii. 637-9.

with a handful of Meccan refugees? The news of Muhammad's death in A.D. 632 was the signal, in Arabia, for a widespread war of secession (*riddah*); and this might have been difficult for Muhammad's political successors to suppress by force of arms alone. The dissident Arabs were reconciled to the rule of the Islamic state by the realization that, under this unified command, they had it in their power to conquer the *Oikoumenê* and plunder it. The misery of the war-stricken Persian and Roman empires, which was so keenly felt by their subjects, represented incredible wealth when appraised by the standards of their starveling Arab conquerors.

In making the Arabs' potential military ascendancy tell by giving them political unity, Muhammad did for them what Philip of Macedon had done for the Hellenes. These had established their military ascendancy over the Achaemenian Persian power as far back as the years 480-479 B.C., when they had so signally defeated Xerxes' attempt to conquer Continental European Greece. The successful march of Cyrus the Younger's 10,000 Hellenic mercenaries from Babylonia to the Black Sea coast of Anatolia in 401-400 B.C., in defiance of the Achaemenian Empire's military power, and the Lacedaemonians' successful campaigns in Western Anatolia in 399-393 B.C., had indicated what might be achieved by a Panhellenic military effort. Indeed, the Spartan King Agesilaus might have anticipated Alexander by sixty years if, in 395 B.C., Athens and Thebes had not joined hands to take the Lacedaemonians in the rear. The Hellenes had to wait until Philip of Macedon had imposed political unity on them in order to reap the harvest of the military ascendancy over the Achaemenian Empire that they had established 145 years before Philip's successor Alexander—the Hellenic 'Umar—crossed the Hellespont.

Kroeber's dictum¹ that 'Islam had no infancy and no real growth' is also irreconcilable with the historical facts. The truth surely is that Islam had an infancy which was unpromising, and was redeemed from this by a growth which was remarkable.

It is true that Islam, as preached by its founder Muhammad, was essentially a 'higher religion'. Muhammad summoned his fellow countrymen the people of Mecca to abandon the worship of their local pantheon, domiciled in the Ka'bah, and to submit themselves to a god who was proclaimed by his Meccan prophet to be the One True God of all men and of the whole Universe. It was this that got Muhammad into trouble with the ruling oligarchy of the Meccan city-state. At the same time, Muhammad's horizon was bounded by the limits of his own nation, as Jesus's horizon was, according to the passages in the Gospel according to St. Matthew² in which He is reported to have instructed His emissaries not to visit the gentiles or the Samaritans, but to go rather to 'the lost sheep of the house of Israel'. The Arabs' aspiration to become 'People of the Book', like the Jews and the Christians, was a nationalistic one; and it took a form that is characteristic of barbarians camped on the

¹ Quoted on p. 462.

² Matt. x. 5-6; xv. 21-28. In Mark vii. 24-30, Jesus is reported to have taken the same line—and this in harsh and wounding language—in His negative first reaction to a Canaanite woman's appeal to Him.

fringe of a civilization.¹ The Arabs were sufficiently impressed by the culture of the Roman Empire to hanker after a religion of the kind professed by the Empire's inhabitants; yet at the same time they were sufficiently independent-minded to be unwilling simply to adopt their impressive neighbours' religion as it stood without giving it an Arab national colouring. In the eyes of Arabs of Muhammad's generation, Christianity was the national religion of the Romans and Judaism the national religion of the Jews; and the picture of the One True God that Muhammad presented to his countrymen was, like the Jewish picture of Him, equivocal. Besides being the God of the Universe, He was to be the national god of the Arabs. Islam was to be a revival of the pure religion of Abraham, and this time 'the Chosen People' of Abraham's lineage were to be the Arab offspring of his son Ishmael instead of the Jewish offspring of his son Isaac.

In having this tincture of barbarian nationalism, Islam resembled the Arian form of Christianity which, three centuries earlier, had been adopted by the East German barbarians on the eve of their own invasion of the Roman Empire from the opposite quarter. This element of nationalism in Islam was, of course, greatly reinforced when Muhammad extended the territory of his Medinese state not only over Mecca but over the whole of Arabia. As has been noted already, the Arabs were indifferent to their prophet's religious ideas and ideals, but they appreciated the military power which he had conferred on them by uniting them politically in a Pan-Arabian Islamic Commonwealth, and Islam was carried out of Arabia into the former dominions of the Roman and Sasanian empires as the national religion of the conquering Arab armies.

The conquerors did not much want non-Arab converts. The conquered peoples seemed to them more valuable as surtax-payers than as co-religionists. It was their Zoroastrian and Christian non-Arab subjects who took the Arabs' kingdom by storm. They forced their way into the fold of Islam, deposed the Arabs from their political ascendancy in the Islamic state, and gave Islam itself an organization and a theology² which removed, once for all, the ambiguity that, till then, had kept it hovering between the two incompatible ideals of nationalism and universality. Thus the non-Arab converts to Muhammad's religion eventually saved for Islam a situation that the founder himself had compromised. But for these converts, it seems probable that Islam would have gone the way that Arian Christianity went. Like the Burgundians, the Visigoths, and the Lombards, the Arabs would have abandoned their barbarian national religion, sooner or later, for the universal religion of their Christian subjects, if these subjects had not, meanwhile, insisted on making of Islam a new higher religion for all men on the pattern of the Christianity that the Christian converts to Islam had formerly professed.

This eventual harvesting of Islam's potentialities as a universal religion was an immense cultural, as well as religious, achievement. It was comparable to what had previously been done for Christianity; and it

¹ This point has been made by R. Coulborn in *Toynbee and History*, p. 165. Cp. the present book, v. 230.

² See p. 450, with footnotes.

was done by the same people and by the same means. The people whose good offices enabled Islam, as well as Christianity, to grow to its full spiritual and cultural stature were the South-West Asian heirs of the combined Syriac and Hellenic heritages. As we have seen in the preceding chapter,¹ both the Syriac and the Hellenic Civilization's continuity had been broken—the Syriac Civilization's by the impact of Hellenism, and the Hellenic Civilization's by the impact of a Syriac-Hellenic religion, Christianity. The former participants in the two civilizations had lost their consciousness of their distinctive cultures, but they had not lost their cultural fertility. On the contrary, the Syriac and Hellenic cultures, in losing their distinctive identities, had blended into a culture-compost which had an unrivalled nutritive power. The feat of nursing not only one but two higher religions into a maturity at which each of them makes a universal appeal is an achievement that it would be hard to match.

The prevalent depreciation of Islam in the West is a relic of anti-Islamic Christian prejudice. This stubbornly survives even in modern Western minds that feel an obligation, in their intellectual work, to correct the Christian bias in their cultural heritage, and that imagine themselves, in their unfavourable appraisal of Islam, to be acting up to their own high standard of detachment and to be condemning Islam objectively, on its own demerits. Kroeber, for example, has given an interpretation of Islam as an historical phenomenon in the light of an hypothesis of his about the history of the course of civilization in the Old World. Kroeber likens Old-World civilization to a fire that started in the Fertile Crescent and that then spread, as fires are apt to spread, in a progressively widening circle from its point of origin. The flame keeps alight round the circle's ever-advancing circumference, long after it has died away and left nothing but cold grey ashes on the spot which was its original hearth. This hypothesis has some notable merits. The greatest of these is that it fits a number of the historical facts. An almost equal merit is that it rises superior to the one-sided conventional Western prejudice that takes account solely of the westward spread of civilization from Sumer and Egypt through the Mediterranean into Europe, and thence eventually into the Americas, and ignores its contemporaneous spread into India and Eastern Asia. The progress of a movement on its outer edge after it has died down at its original point of departure is a phenomenon that can be observed in a number of situations in non-human nature and also in human affairs. The outward-moving circle of flame has one parallel in the circular wave set in motion by throwing a stone into a pond. The wave continues to travel outwards after the spot where the stone hit the water has become still again. A city, likewise, sometimes continues to grow round its edges after its original core, which was once the heart of its life, has fallen into squalor or even into desolation. And the *Oikoumenê* is, in a sense, one great city: the City of Zeus in which the City of Cecrops is reproduced on the grand scale.² This, however, is only a poetic simile; and Kroeber

¹ On pp. 446-54.

² Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: *Meditations*, Book IV, chap. 23.

himself has warned me¹ that a simile is not the same thing as a demonstration.

It is true, as we have noticed,² that, within the span of half a millennium ending in the fourth century of the Christian Era, four civilizations—three of them at home in the heart of the *Oikoumenē* and the fourth, the Hellenic Civilization, also long since established there—dissolved, in the sense that the former participants in them lost their consciousness of continuity with their cultural heritage. It is also true that Islam subsequently established itself in this region in succession to Christianity. Kroeber is, of course, right in saying³ that 'Islam arose in the very region of the first hearth of all higher civilization: . . . in the Near Eastern area of the Neolithic Revolution, of the first farming and towns and kings and letters.' But he is surely wrong in going on to say⁴ that 'it arose at a time when constructive cultural impulses had long since moved out from that hearth'. The loss of consciousness of cultural continuity is not the same thing as a loss of power of cultural creativity. The fusion of the diverse elements of the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations had already provided a fertile compost from which Christianity had sprung; and its fertility now proved great enough to produce a second crop, of comparable value, in the shape of Islam. Have there ever anywhere been 'constructive cultural impulses' that have produced finer fruits than this pair of higher religions with a message for all men?

Islam, in succession to Christianity, came to maturity in the heart of the *Oikoumenē* in an age in which this heart was still beating as vigorously as ever. If Kroeber had been willing to recognize Islam as being the peer of Christianity that it is, he would not have seen it, through jaundiced eyes, as a 'reduced, retractile, civilization, an anti-Hellenic, anti-Sasanian, anti-Christian civilization . . . without art, without much intellectual curiosity or profundity, without many of the aspirations customary in civilizations'.⁵ He would not then have been led to explain Islam's imaginary inferiority by making the unwarranted assumption that the region in which Islam came to maturity was by that time a cultural waste land. Whether or not we accept his simile of the outward spread of a fire, leaving a burnt-out centre, as a valid key to the geographical history of civilization in the Old World, it is certain that the fire had not been extinguished in its original hearth either before the conquest of South-West Asia and Egypt by the primitive Muslim Arabs or during the subsequent formative centuries when Islam was being brought to maturity there by local non-Arab converts from among the conquered Christian and Zoroastrian population. Even during the previous age of political division, 'Iraq had been the power-house of the Sasanian Empire, and Syria and Egypt of the Roman Empire. The potency of all three countries was notably enhanced when the Arab conquest reunited them politically for the first time since the break-up of the Achaemenian Empire, nearly a thousand years back. Under the Umayyad and 'Abbasid regimes, South-West Asia and Egypt were still the heart of the *Oikoumenē*, as they had been during the previous three or four thousand years.

¹ In *The Nature of Culture*, p. 376, quoted in this volume on p. 38, footnote 2.

² On pp. 447-8.

³ In op. cit., p. 381.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Op. cit., pp. 381-2.

This historic region did eventually fall into adversity and suffer an eclipse from which it is re-emerging in our time. But this did not happen till after Islam had come to maturity there; and Islam was not the cause of it.

The potency of this region was derived, and is derived once again today, from two assets: its local productivity and its geographical location at the centre of the *Oikoumenê*'s network of communications. In the past its staple production was agricultural: the crops raised on its irrigated fields. Today its staple production is mineral: the oil got from below its surface. The region is estimated to contain the major part of the World's oil reserves, as, in the past, it produced the major part of the World's annual cereal harvest. As for this region's geographical role as the central node of the World's communications, the permanent features of the World's geography are so favourable to South-West Asia and Egypt that this region is now recovering its natural position as the mid-point of the *Oikoumenê* less than four hundred years after the date at which the *Oikoumenê* was thrown out of its normal geographical balance by two almost simultaneous revolutionary Western achievements: the discovery of a New World west of the Atlantic and the discovery of the uninterrupted sea-route from the Atlantic coast of Western Europe to Southern and Eastern Asia round the Cape of Good Hope. Since 1869 this roundabout route has been short-circuited by the cutting of the Suez Canal. This has reopened the direct passage for ships between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean which existed in the Achaemenian Age after the Emperor Darius I's engineers had cut his canal from Suez to the head of the Nile Delta. The Suez Canal offers the shortest sea-route between the two main concentrations of population in the twentieth-century world: one in Southern and Eastern Asia and the other in Europe and North America; and in our day it has been supplemented by a bundle of air-routes which bunch together where they traverse the land-bridge between Eurasia and Africa.

Thus the heart of the *Oikoumenê* has now surmounted the crisis by which it was overtaken when the fifteenth-century Western maritime adventurers made their momentous geographical discoveries. Thanks to the striking of oil, South-West Asia is now well on the way towards recovering from the previous blow that it had suffered in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era when the Mongols had committed genocide against its population and had also cut the roots of its agricultural productivity by giving the *coup de grâce* to the 4,000-years-old water-control system in 'Iraq.¹ The degree of the devastation that was inflicted by the Mongols on South-West Asia east of Euphrates can be measured by the contrast between present-day agricultural Egypt, which has continued, without a break, to be a going concern since the unification of its water-control system round about 3000 B.C., and present-day agricultural 'Iraq, which even today is only just beginning to recover from the blow dealt to it by the Mongols 700 years ago. The wholesale destruction of human life was still more disastrous than the wrecking of Man's engineering works. Visit Khurāsān, the north-

¹ See iv. 42-43.

easternmost province of the present kingdom of Persia, and take your stand in the vast empty space within the four-square walls of the Pre-Mongol city of Tus or the Pre-Mongol city of Nishāpūr. You will realize that, even after the passage of 700 years, South-West Asia is still prostrate under the blow that it received from the Mongols in the thirteenth century. The thirteenth-century Mongol devastation of South-West Asia, followed by the fifteenth-century West European diversion of the World's sea-routes away from the Levant and the Red Sea, explain, between them, the decline and eclipse of South-West Asia and Egypt in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. This makes the recovery of this region in the nineteenth century and thereafter all the more remarkable and impressive. In the present context the significance of this temporary eclipse and subsequent recovery is that both events have been subsequent to the epiphany and maturation of Islam. And this matter of chronological fact would appear to refute, decisively, Kroeber's imaginative thesis that Islam is Dead Sea fruit grown on waste land.

What is the relation of Islam, as a religion, to the Islamic Civilization that is so prominent a feature in the cultural map of the present-day world? Rushton Coulborn makes the point¹ that 'Islamic Civilization, when it arises, is obviously something new. Its rise was mediated by Islam as a religion.' This dictum is, in my judgement, unexceptionable. I myself have certainly never written anything to the contrary, and would not ever oppose it so long as it is taken as implying no more than it says. I have the impression, however, that Coulborn is intending to imply that the Islamic Civilization came into existence simultaneously with Islam itself, and that in this point its relation is different from that of the Christian civilizations to Christianity. If, in interpreting him in this sense, I have correctly caught his meaning, then he and I disagree. As I see it, the relation of the Islamic Civilization to Islam is the same as that of the Christian civilizations to Christianity. In both cases, as I see them, the religion made its appearance in the World and proceeded to grow to maturity within a social and cultural framework that was older and was also at least partly alien. It was only after this older alien civilization or civilizations had weathered away that the new religion incidentally mothered a new civilization which is legitimately called by its name because it bears its unmistakable stamp.

This construction of the course of events would not, I think, be disputed by any student of the relation between Christianity and the Christian civilizations. It would be recognized that Christianity appeared and matured within the framework of the Hellenic Civilization, and that the Christian civilizations did not begin to come to the surface before the period, running approximately from the latter part of the fourth to the latter part of the seventh century of the Christian Era, when the Hellenic Civilization was dissolving. Christianity in its formative age was the religion of a minority living as strangers and sojourners in a world that was not their own. Islam in its formative age was, as I see it, in the same situation. It came to maturity within the framework of alien

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 163.

civilizations—in this case, not the Hellenic Civilization but the Nestorian Christian, the Monophysite Christian, and the Zoroastrian Iranian. It is true that the Christian minority in the Roman Empire lived in the catacombs, whereas the Muslim minority in the Islamic world-state lived in the camps and the palaces. But this Muslim minority was in the same position as the Christian minority in the essential point that it was living in a world that it had not created and in which it was not at home.

After the epiphany of Islam, as after the epiphany of Christianity, centuries had to pass before the new religion could mother a new civilization; for the necessary pre-condition for that was that the minority should have become the majority. In the circum-Mediterranean world this happened in the course of the three centuries ending in the seventh century of the Christian Era; in South-West Asia and Egypt it happened in the course of the three centuries ending in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era. Before that, the Muslims—including the Arabs' converted non-Arab subjects as well as the Arabs themselves—had been only a minority in the dominions of the Islamic world-state. The Islamic state's Zoroastrian subjects in Iran and in the Oxus-Jaxartes basin had gone over to Islam more quickly, in larger numbers, than its Christian subjects west of Zagros. But the mass-conversions to Islam did not begin to take place in any of the Islamic world-state's dominions till the Islamic state was harried by barbarian invasions. It was the Crusades and the subsequent irruption of the Mongols that moved the mass of the population of South-West Asia and Egypt to rally to Islam as a spiritual force that might perhaps hold society together in a cataclysm in which 'Earth's foundations fled'.

I therefore continue, on reconsideration, to maintain that the Islamic Civilization—or civilizations—arose after the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, when the last remnant of the 'Abbasid world-state had been extinguished by the Mongol war-lord Hūlāgū. In order to locate the place of Islam in history, we have to distinguish clearly between three different things: the Islamic religion that was founded and compromised by the Prophet Muhammad and was then salvaged by his political successors' converted non-Arab subjects; the Islamic state that was founded by the statesman Muhammad and that swiftly grew, like the proverbial grain of mustard-seed, into a tree that overshadowed the Earth;¹ and the Islamic Civilization (or civilizations) that has been a cultural by-product of Islam in the same sense in which the Christian civilizations have been cultural by-products of Christianity. If we do not keep these three different things clearly distinct in our minds, we are likely to go astray in our interpretation of Islam and of its political and cultural by-products.

¹ The personal union of absolute political with absolute religious authority in the person of Muhammad died with him. His political successors did not inherit his prerogatives in the field of religion. Decisions about Islamic practice and doctrine on the basis of the Qur'ān and the traditions are reached by a consensus (*ijmā'*) of the learned (*ulamā'*) in the sacred law. Their role and standing correspond to those of the rabbis in Judaism.

XV. THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE JEWS

I. THE RELATIVITY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF JEWISH HISTORY

THE interpretation of Jewish history is a classic illustration of the relativity of an observer's report to his personal relation with his human subject.

The Jews have told their own story from the standpoint of a self-proclaimed 'Chosen People' in whose eyes all other human beings are 'gentiles' (i.e. 'lesser breeds without the law', in Kipling's paraphrase). In the Christian-Muslim half of the present-day world this Jewish standpoint has been accepted by the present-day non-Jewish gentile majority in regard to Jewish history in the Pre-Christian, or, alternatively, the Pre-Muslim, Age.

The Christian Church, for instance, has taken over uncritically the Jewish version of the history of the Jews' predecessors, the peoples of Judah and Israel, as this is presented in the written Torah (in Christian terminology, 'the Old Testament'). Christians, and ex-Christians too, see the Phoenicians, Philistines, Edomites, Moabites, Ammonites, and Damascenes as these are portrayed in the historical books of the Torah; and they see the Seleucid King Antiochus IV and his policy as these are portrayed in the First and Second Books of Maccabees. If the Tyre and Gaza of the last millennium B.C. had living representatives to speak for them today, as Israel and Judah have, they would, no doubt, give a version of the story of their relations with the two highland communities in their hinterland which would hardly be recognizable as being an account of the events that, in the highlanders' version, are familiar to Christians from the Bible. Yet in the established Christian version of this chapter of history the Jews have things all their own way—pending the discovery, by archaeologists, of documents written in the Syriac World, outside Judah and Israel, in the last millennium B.C. that might be of comparable historical value to the documents written in the fourteenth century B.C. that have already been unearthed at Ras ash-Shamrah.

In the established Islamic version of Old-Testament history the Jews have not come off quite so well. Muhammad did follow the lead of the Christian Church in accepting the Jewish thesis that the written Torah is the word of God; but, when the Jews pointed out that some of Muhammad's renderings of Old-Testament stories had got these stories wrong in important particulars, Muhammad accounted for the discrepancy by declaring that the Jews had falsified their own holy scriptures. The Qur'anic version was a restoration of the original, and Islam was 'the pure religion of Abraham'. Thus Muhammad's concession to Jewish claims was partly discounted, even in regard to the age before the new dispensation, by a serious imputation on the Jews' good faith. Yet Muhammad, like the Christian Church, recognized the authority of the written Torah, as being a book inspired by God, in so far as its text

might be endorsed by Muhammad as being authentic; and the charge that he made against the Jews did not implicate their forefather Abraham. Like the Jews themselves and like the Christians, Muslims trace their own religious origins back to the revelation that Abraham received from God according to the Jewish tradition. Like Christianity, Islam presupposes Judaism and could never have come into existence if Judaism had not been in existence already.

Thus the Muslims, as well as the Christians, accept, in principle, the Jews' belief in the divine inspiration of the Torah and the consequent belief in the Jews' special status as the recipients of this divine revelation. On the other hand the tables have been turned on the Jews by the Christians and the Muslims in their appraisal of Jewish history since the beginning of the Christian or, alternatively, the Islamic Era.

Christians—and Muslims too, subject to Muhammad's reservation—accept the Jewish account of Jewish history, and of its antecedents in the histories of Judah and Israel, down to the respective beginnings of the Christian and Muslim eras, with the proviso that Judaism was designed, in the Jewish god Yahweh's providence, to be the preparation for Christianity or, alternatively, for Islam, and that the Israelites and their successors the Jews were 'chosen' by God to be the forerunners of His eventual 'Chosen People' the Christians or, alternatively, the Muslims. Upon the advent of Christianity or, alternatively, of Islam, the 'mandate' of Judaism and the Jews 'was exhausted' (to use an apt Chinese formula). Now, in God's own good time, the true 'Chosen People' had arrived on the scene, and the Jews' duty was clear. They ought to have accepted Jesus or, alternatively, Muhammad, at the valuation placed on him in the official doctrine of the Judaic religion of which he was the founder. In declining to accept him on these terms, the Jews were failing to respond to the supreme challenge in their history, and were thereby putting themselves permanently in the wrong and on the shelf. Jewish history and its Israelitish antecedents down to the beginning of Jesus's or, alternatively, Muhammad's ministry still has validity and value as the prelude, arranged by God, to the Christian or, alternatively, to the Muslim, dispensation. Jewish history since one or other of those two climactic dates is without significance except as a classic example of perversity on the part of a people that, of all peoples, ought to have known better.

It is difficult for anyone brought up in the Christian tradition to shake himself free from the official Christian ideology. He may have discarded Christian doctrine consciously on every point; yet on this particular point he may find that he is still being influenced, subconsciously, by the traditional Christian view in his outlook on Jewish history. Voltaire's outlook is a classic case.¹ I am conscious that my own outlook has been affected in this way. If I had happened to be brought up in the Muslim tradition instead of the Christian one, no doubt my outlook would have been affected correspondingly.

This Christian-Muslim reading of Jewish history is irritating to Jews

¹ This is recalled by Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 2. In *The National Jewish Monthly*, November, 1956, Rabbi Agus makes the same point in general terms, with reference to non-orthodox Jews as well as to non-orthodox Christians.

—partly because of the grain of truth that it contains, and partly because of the larger measure of misrepresentation that there is in it.

The grain of truth lies in the fact that the advents of Christianity and Islam, and the subsequent histories of these two religions, are unquestionably two major events in the main course of mankind's history—at least in that half of the *Oikoumenê* that lies to the west of India. Israel, Judah, the Jews, and Judaism did not play major parts in the history of mankind before they gave birth to the two 'deviationist' Judaic world-religions. If Christianity and Islam had never been generated by Judaism's involuntary but undeniable paternity, Judaism would be surviving today in an environment of Hellenic 'paganism', as Zoroastrianism does survive today in an environment of Hindu 'paganism'. We may guess that, in that event, the Jews' position in the World today would have been more like the actual position of the Parsees¹ than like the actual position of the Jews themselves. The Jews would have been more obscure than they now are, but they would also have been more comfortable. The Jews' present-day importance, celebrity, and discomfort all derive from the historic fact that they have involuntarily begotten two Judaic world-religions whose millions of adherents make the preposterous but redoubtable claim to have superseded the Jews, by the Jewish god Yahweh's dispensation, in the role of being this One True God's 'Chosen People'.

The Jews are also genuinely 'a back number' in another sense. Like the Samaritans, they are surviving representatives of a Syriac civilization that otherwise became extinct as long ago as the third or second century B.C., if the disuse of the Aramaic *koinê* may be taken as a criterion of the date at which the Syriac Civilization faded out of existence.² The Syriac Civilization as a whole, like its contemporary the Hellenic Civilization, is otherwise 'dead' today except in so far as it still lives in its legacy to the present-day Christian and Islamic civilizations. If it is true—as it seems to be true—that at the western end of the Old World, in contrast to its eastern end, there has been a series of successive 'generations' of civilizations since the species of human society that we call 'civilization' made its first appearance, then it is true that the Jews and Judaism are a relic of a 'generation' that, except for the Samaritans³ and the Parsees, is otherwise extinct. This is the historical fact that I had in mind when, in volume I of this book, I docketed the Parsees⁴ and the Jews (among other present-day communities) with the label 'fossils'. My choice of this particular word may not have been a felicitous one for conveying the historical fact that I wanted to describe. But the fact is a fact, and some name or other for describing it is needed.⁵

At the same time it is, of course, untrue that Jewish history since the advent of Christianity or, alternatively, of Islam is of no account. In refusing to be *gleichgeschaltet* by either of the two 'deviationist' Judaic world-religions, and in surviving as a persistent minority in a Christian

¹ See the passage from a work of Rabbi J. B. Agus's, quoted on p. 211, footnote 3.

² On this question see pp. 292–3.

³ See p. 430, footnote 2.

⁴ It is a moot question whether the Parsees are to be regarded as surviving representatives of a distinctive Pre-Islamic Iranian culture, or whether we are to hold that this Iranian culture was gradually drawn into the field of the Syriac Civilization in and after the Achaemenian Age (see pp. 431–9 and 460).

⁵ See pp. 292–300.

and a Muslim environment, the Jews have made a deep mark on both Christian and Islamic history as living Jews and not merely as dead Jewish forerunners of Christianity and Islam. Thus the Jews have not ceased to count, even in terms of Christian and Islamic history; and, *à fortiori*, they have not ceased to count in terms of their own history. While the Jews' relations with their gentile environment have been notably affected by the advents of Christianity and Islam, these two world-shaking events have had hardly any perceptible effect on the inner life of Jewry or on the evolution of Judaism. In and after the first century of the Christian Era the stream of Jewish religious literature flowed more copiously than ever before. For this period of Jewish religious history we are abundantly documented; and one remarkable feature of this contemporary Jewish documentation is the faintness of the marks that have been made on it by Jesus and by Christianity.

The main source of the impetus that transformed the primitive religion of Israel and Judah into Judaism was the 'traumatic twist' that 'the Jewish psyche received when the Jewish belief in chosen-ness sustained the terrible shock of national disaster and exile'.¹ This shock was administered to the Jews several times over: by Nebuchadnezzar in the second decade of the sixth century B.C., by Antiochus IV in the fourth decade of the second century B.C.; by the Romans in the Romano-Jewish wars of A.D. 66-70 and A.D. 132-5. The Jews' disastrous conflict with the Romans in the first two centuries of the Christian Era had far more effect on the history of Judaism than the advent of Christianity had.² It set Judaism hard. It precipitated the closing of the canon of the written Torah, the codification of a commentary on the Torah (the Mishnah), and the production of a commentary (the Gemara) on this commentary, which, together with it, constitutes the Talmud. The period from the time of Herod the Great (*regnabat* 40 B.C.-4 B.C.) to the generation of the Patriarch Jehudah, who codified the Mishnah *circa* A.D. 220, was the age of the Tannaim.³ Judaism assumed its definitive form during the 150 years beginning with the generation of Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai, who established his school at Jamnia, with the Romans' leave, in A.D. 70.⁴ The canon of the written Torah seems to have been fixed by the Sanhedrin (a non-political body, not to be confused with the pre-war Sanhedrin) that Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai had set up at Jamnia.⁵ The codification of *hălāchōth* (agreed interpretations of the injunctions contained explicitly or implicitly in the written Torah) was started by Rabbi Akiba,⁶ who met his death in A.D. 135, and its completion by the Patriarch⁷ Jehudah was attained *circa* A.D. 220.⁸ The Mishnah was the Pharisees' answer to the disasters of A.D. 70 and A.D. 135.⁹ As for the shock administered by Nebuchadnezzar, this had

¹ J. L. Talmon in *Commentary*, July, 1957, p. 3.

² See R. Travers Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 12.

³ G. F. Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. vii.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ W. O. E. Oesterley: *The Jews and Judaism during the Greek Period*, p. 45.

⁶ R. Travers Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 73.

⁷ Patriarch of the Palestinian Jewish community that survived in Galilee after A.D. 135.

⁸ R. Travers Herford: *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, p. 17.

⁹ R. Travers Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 192.

inspired Ezekiel, Deutero-Isaiah, and eventually also Ezra. The shock administered by Antiochus IV had inspired the Pharisees. The development of Judaism under the impetus given by these successive shocks was in process for nearly a thousand years (sixth century B.C. to fifth century of the Christian Era). But the advent of Christianity did not administer one of the propelling shocks.

It is 'a mistake to suppose that the rabbis took much interest in Jesus or cared to know much about him'.¹ The Mishnah does not contain the name Jesus or even the disparaging synonyms Ben Stada and Ben Pandira.² The rabbinical tradition about Jesus, such as it is, seems to have begun with Rabbi Eliezer ben Horqenos, who was a pupil of Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai,³ and whose working life therefore fell in the generation following the Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70. The rabbinical tradition hardly implies knowledge of the Gospels,⁴ and 'gospel teaching had no influence upon rabbinic teaching'.⁵ 'It is remarkable how very little the Talmud does say about Jesus'.⁶ According to the Talmud, Jesus was born out of wedlock. His mother Miriam was a ladies' hairdresser. Her husband was Pappos ben Jehudah. Her paramour was Pandira. Jesus mocked at the words of the wise. He called himself God and said that he would ascend into Heaven. He was tried and executed, by stoning, at Lydda.⁷ The guilt—or merit—of having put Jesus to death is ascribed in the Talmud to the Jews, not to the Romans.⁸ There is no mention of any claim, on Jesus's part, to be the Messiah.⁹

The Talmud does display some anxiety for fear that Judaism might be undermined from within by an heretical sect labelled 'the Minim', which seems to have been a disparaging nickname for the Jewish Christians.¹⁰ From circa A.D. 80 onwards anyone who volunteered, at the sabbath service in a synagogue, to read a passage of the Torah and expound it was required, as a precaution against covert indoctrination of the orthodox by a crypto-Min, to recite the formula, drafted by Rabbi Shemuel ha-Qaton: 'May there be no hope for the Minim.'¹¹ The rabbis' anxiety about the Minim subsided as the Jewish Christian Church faded out. Considering that this unfortunate community was looked askance at by gentile Christians as well as by orthodox Jews, its prospects had been bleak since the date of Paul's first mission to the gentiles. The rabbinical literature ignores gentile Christianity;¹² and indeed the Jewish religious authorities could feel sure that the Jewish people would be impervious to an heretical form of Judaism when its representatives and advocates were not their fellow Jews, as the Minim were, but were gentiles whose religion would be ruled out of consideration automatically by Post-Exilic

¹ R. Travers Herford: *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, p. 359. This book is an authoritative and exhaustive examination of the subject by a distinguished Unitarian scholar.

² Ibid., p. 351.

³ Ibid., pp. 351-2.

⁴ Ibid., p. 357.

⁵ C. G. Montefiore: *Rabbinic Literature and Gospel Teachings*, p. xvii.

⁶ Herford, op. cit., p. 347.

⁷ Ibid., p. 348.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 84 and 86.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 349 and 380-1.

¹⁰ See op. cit., especially pp. 321-41. G. F. Moore notes, in *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. iii, p. 68, that in the talmuds and the midrashim the word 'minim' does not always mean Jewish Christians. The literal meaning of 'minim' is 'species', 'kinds' (i.e. peculiar kinds), and it was a generic term for Jewish heretics.

¹¹ Herford: *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, pp. 135 and 388.

¹² Ibid., p. 393.

Jewish minds simply by reason of its gentile provenance.¹ In short, neither Jewish nor gentile Christianity made any mark on Judaism.²

Thus, if one looks, as one ought to look, at the history of Judaism from inside³ as well as from outside, it is evidently absurd to imagine that its history has ceased to be significant since the moment of Christianity's advent. During the early centuries of the Christian Era the development of Judaism was still in full swing. The Palestinian Talmud was not completed till the last quarter of the fourth century of the Christian Era, the Babylonian Talmud not till about one hundred years later.⁴ This contrast between the historical facts and the conventional Christian and ex-Christian view of the history of the Jews and Judaism shows how difficult it is for anyone brought up with a Christian background to look at Jewish history objectively. An observer with an Islamic background is no less badly placed. An observer with a Jewish background is at an equal disadvantage, since the bias with which he will have to contend will be no less great, though it will, of course, incline him towards the opposite side. Among both Jewish and gentile scholars there have, it is true, been souls that have risen above the prejudices of their ancestral tradition. C. G. Montefiore, J. B. Agus, and G. F. Moore are notable examples.⁵ The requisite degree of broad-mindedness and generosity is, however, rare in the human race. And, in order to obtain a fully objective and illuminating study of Jewish history, we may have to wait for the appearance of some Hindu or East Asian scholar who has mastered this difficult subject under the spur of a disinterested intellectual curiosity. For the majority of mankind, which lives east of the Sulej, the Jews and Judaism are not a practical problem, so a scholar from somewhere in this major part of the *Oikoumenê* would not have imbibed any anti-Jewish prejudice from his social and cultural environment—nor any pro-Muslim or pro-Christian

¹ The Jews and their predecessors the peoples of Judah and Israel have not, of course, always been proof against gentile religions and ideologies. From the time of their first invasion of Palestine down to the time of the extinction of the Kingdom of Judah, they were constantly attracted by the religion of the Canaanites (see Chapter XIII, *passim*). This was natural, since the culture of the Phoenicians, Jebusites, and other Canaanites was certainly higher than that of the Syriac communities of Hebrew origin in non-religious fields, and was not certainly lower in the religious field until the beginning of the Prophetic movement in Israel and Judah in the eighth century B.C. Judaism has been in danger of corrosion by alien ideologies once again in the Christian and Islamic worlds, since the time when Christianity and Islam themselves began to lose their hold on their adherents. In Western Christendom this began to happen towards the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, and, during the last quarter of a millennium, this Western tendency towards agnosticism, rationalism, and secularization has been affecting, progressively, the whole of the rest of mankind, not excluding the Jews. Between the sixth century B.C. and the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, Judaism was relatively immune against the contagion of alien faiths and ways of life. The big exception, within this long period, was the influence of Zoroastrianism on Judaism during and after the Achaemenian Age (see p. 438).

² G. F. Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. 92.

³ 'Toynbee can greatly improve his . . . achievement by making use of the insights of Jewish experience, as indeed he has pledged to do' (Rabbi J. B. Agus in *The National Jewish Monthly*, November, 1956, p. 44).

⁴ G. F. Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. 4.

⁵ R. Travers Herford is as fine a scholar as G. F. Moore, and is also as sympathetic, as well as fair, to the Jews and Judaism as Moore is. At the same time, Herford is not entirely detached in his judgements on the quarrel between the Pharisees and Jesus. When he is dealing with this topic, the reader is aware of another quarrel—that between Unitarianism and Trinitarian Christianity.

prejudice either, since, east of the Sulej, the two 'deviationist' Judaic world-religions have been aggressive and disturbing spiritual forces by reason of their missionary zeal.

2. THE JEWS' PARAMOUNT AIM AND THE RELIGIOUS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING IT

The Jews may be defined as being the conscious and deliberate heirs and representatives of the people of the Kingdom of Judah, which was extinguished by the Neobabylonian Emperor Nebuchadnezzar in the second decade of the sixth century B.C. Ever since that fearful national disaster the paramount aim of the Judahites deported to Babylon and their Jewish descendants has been to preserve, unbroken, their distinctive national identity. In this they have been brilliantly successful. The Jewish people has managed to survive, as a people, a long series of successive ordeals: the extinction of the Kingdom of Judah and the deportation of the skilled and literate *élite* of its population to Babylon; the attraction, in Babylonia, of the Sumero-Akkadian Civilization, which was superior to the Judahite variety of the Syriac Civilization in everything except its religion and its script; Antiochus IV's attempt to merge Jewry—by force, after persuasion had failed—in an Hellenic Society with a standardized ideology and way of life; the deracination of Palestinian Jewry by the Romans in and after the two great Romano-Jewish wars of A.D. 66–70 and A.D. 132–5; the attraction of the Hellenic Civilization, which was felt even by Palestinian Jews in the third and fourth decades of the second century B.C., and which had a far greater effect on the Jewish diaspora in the cities of the far-flung Hellenic World, particularly in Alexandria-on-Nile; the successive pressures brought to bear on the Jews by Christianity and (more mildly) by Islam to merge themselves in one or other of these two gigantic 'deviationist' Judaic religious communities; the attraction of the Islamic, Byzantine, and Western civilizations. This record is recognized, by friendly and hostile observers alike, as being an extraordinary monument of steadfastness or obstinacy—whichever of the two words the observer may feel inclined to use. The achievement has been possible only because the Jews have always consistently given priority over other aims of theirs to this aim of preserving their distinctive national identity. A Jewish observer has called it 'the stiff-necked Jewish insistence on remaining Jewish under all circumstances'.¹

One of these other aims has been to return to the country of Judah and to re-establish there a state which should embrace, not only the historic domain of the Kingdom of Judah, but the whole of Eretz Israel, meaning the combined domains of the two kingdoms of Judah and Israel up to the frontiers of the short-lived empire of the two Judahite kings David and Solomon. The aim of re-establishing the state of Judah, at any rate, was a natural corollary of the Jews' paramount aim of preserving their distinctive national identity. Since the invention of agriculture

¹ F. Borkenau in *Commentary*, May, 1955, p. 425.

first rooted the peoples who adopted it to particular patches of the Earth's surface, the possession of a distinctive national identity has, so far, usually been accompanied by the possession of a local national territory. This territorial substructure for the support of a distinctive national identity has, however, been progressively proved not to be indispensable ever since the dawn of civilization brought with it an accelerating improvement in all kinds of means of communication (mental as well as material), and also the establishment of cities, which have been growing in size at an accelerating pace. Looking back on the course of the history of civilization during the last 5,000 years, and paying particular attention to its history in 'the Fertile Crescent', where it made its first appearance, we can see, in retrospect, that communities of a new, non-agricultural, type have been arising. These new-model communities are post-agricultural in their means of livelihood; they live by urban trade and industry; but they resemble the pre-agricultural food-gathering communities in not being bound to some particular patch of the Earth's surface and in being held together socially and culturally by bonds that are not territorial but are cultural and ideological—a distinctive common way of life and common religion. Communities of this new type, capable of preserving their identities in diasporá, made their first appearance, as was to be expected, in the region in which civilization itself made its first appearance. Gradually they have been increasing in numbers and have been spreading, with civilization, over the face of the Earth.¹ The Post-Exilic Jewish diasporá has been one of the most successful of them. The vitality of the Jewish diasporá, and its significance, for mankind as a whole, as being the probable 'wave of the future', is brought out by the contrast between the steady success of the diasporá in surviving—in spite of penalizations, persecutions, and massacres—and the unsatisfactoriness of all attempts up to date, since the Babylonish Captivity, to re-establish a Jewish state on Palestinian soil.

The first of these attempts was made—with the permission and good will of the founder of the Achaemenian Empire, Cyrus—within less than half a century after Nebuchadnezzar had extinguished the Kingdom of Judah and had deported its notables to Babylonia. The latest attempt is being made in our day. It is noteworthy, however, that at all times when it has been open to the Jews in diasporá to emigrate to a Jewish state in Palestine, a great majority of them have invariably preferred to remain in diasporá. This was so in the year 539–538 B.C.; it is so today; and it has always been so all through the intervening twenty-five centuries. At any time between 538 B.C., when Cyrus gave the Babylonian diasporá leave to return, down to, at any rate, the outbreak of the first Romano-Jewish War in A.D. 66, it was open to any member of the Jewish diasporá in Babylonia to return to Palestine. But the number that returned with Zerubbabel in 538 B.C., with Ezra in 458 or 397 B.C., and with Nehemiah in 445 or 384 B.C.,² was insignificant compared with the total numbers

¹ This has been noticed already on pp. 209–17.

² The dates of Nehemiah's and Ezra's respective missions, and their chronological relation to each other, are uncertain, because each mission is dated solely by a regnal year of an Achaemenian Emperor Artaxerxes; and we do not know in either case whether

of the diasporá in Babylonia, which was the diasporá's centre of gravity throughout the Achaemenian, Macedonian, and Roman ages of South-West Asian history. Within the half-century of the Babylonish Captivity, the Jewish exiles had not only created a new way of life and a new set of institutions for themselves in diasporá; they had become so strongly attached to these and so confident that they had discovered effective means for preserving their distinctive national identity in diasporá, that they could not bring themselves to pull up the new roots that they had struck in Babylonian soil, recent though these new roots were. Indeed, so far from the Jewish diasporá in Babylonia re-emigrating *en masse* to Judaea, there was a fresh emigration of Jews from Judaea—this time into the cities, old and new, of the Hellenic World with which the Judaeans Jews were brought into contact as a result of the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire's Hellenic successor-states. The Jewish community in Alexandria-on-Nile was merely the most important and conspicuous among a number of new Jewish communities that seeded themselves as far westwards as Rome inclusive. This new Greek-speaking Jewish diasporá in the Hellenic World west of Palestine came to rival, in numbers and importance, the older Aramaic-speaking diasporá in Babylonia. And the emigrants from Judaea into the Hellenic world were, for the most part, not deportees but voluntary settlers.

The present-day Jewish diasporá in the United States, which is the living counterpart, in importance, of the Jewish diasporá in Babylonia from the sixth century B.C. to the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, is reacting in just the same way towards the state of Israel that has been in existence in the former Philistine, Teucrian, and Jebusite districts of Palestine since A.D. 1948. Like their Babylonian predecessors and counterparts, the American Jews today are zealous in fostering a Jewish state in Palestine by contributing money and exerting political influence; but only an insignificant minority of American Jews, and of European Jews in European countries west of Germany, has been showing itself willing to emigrate to Israel. There is also already a perceptible trickle of re-emigration out of Israel into the Western World.

Thus the situation as it was in the Kingdom of Judah before the year 586 B.C. has never been restored in effect, in spite of the repeated efforts—which started within half a century of that date—to re-establish a Jewish community and Jewish state on Palestinian soil. Before 586 B.C. the Judahite community in the World was identical with the population of the Kingdom of Judah. Since then there has never been a Jewish community in Palestine that has been co-extensive with the Jewish community in the World or has even been the most important part of it. The Jewish community re-established in Palestine in and after 539-538 B.C., like its successor in our own day, was a child, protégé, and pensioner—in fact, a by-product—of the Jewish diasporá. Ever since the beginning of the Babylonish Captivity, the diasporá has been Jewry's citadel and

the Artaxerxes in question is Artaxerxes I (*imperabat* 465-424 B.C.) or Artaxerxes II (*imperabat* 404-359 B.C.). So we do not know whether the date of Ezra's mission was 458 B.C. or 397 B.C., or whether the date of Nehemiah's mission was 445 B.C. or 384 B.C. (see G. F. Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. 5). Nehemiah may have preceded Ezra.

arsenal.¹ In A.D. 70 and in A.D. 135, as in 586 B.C., the diasporá survived, triumphantly, the destruction of a Jewish community on the soil of Judah. There has been no time since then—not even the eighty years of the Maccabaeen Kingdom's sovereign independence (142/1 B.C.–63 B.C.) or the 37 years of Herod the Great's reign (40 B.C.–4 B.C.) by grace of Rome—when a Jewish community in Palestine could have stood on its own feet without financial and diplomatic support from the diasporá. Even in the field of religion the diasporá's role has been dominant. Judaism is a development of the Pre-Exilic religion of Judah that was created in and by the Babylonian diasporá and was imposed by it on the Jewish population in Judaea. The Babylonian Jew Ezra gave Judaism in Palestine the decisive impulse that eventually produced the Pharisaic movement and the rabbinical system.² The survival and vitality of the diasporá has been a *tour de force*; but, just on this account, the diasporá has been, and still is, the supreme and characteristic instrument and monument of the Jewish people's persistent will to maintain its distinctive communal identity.

This will to survive as a community anywhere and under any conditions has, since 586 B.C., been paramount over the will to survive as a community on the Palestinian soil once occupied by Judah and Israel. By comparison with survival itself, Zionism has been a secondary Jewish aim. There has also been the aim of converting the gentile world to the worship of Yahweh under the aegis of a world-empire centred on Eretz Israel and ruled by 'the Lord's Anointed': a coming human king of Davidic lineage. This third aim has, hitherto, been half-hearted. The hope of it has been dubious³ and the pursuit of it has been spasmodic—in contrast to the persistence of the effort to secure the Jewish people's survival. All the same, the expectation of the Messianic Kingdom seems to have been one of the sources of the eventual Jewish belief in the resurrection of the body—a belief that became an obligatory doctrine, and was taken over, as such, from Judaism by Christianity.⁴

¹ The greatness of the diasporá's destiny was foreseen already by Jeremiah. He sent a message to the Jewish deportees in Babylonia urging them to make themselves at home there and to pray to Yahweh for Babylon's welfare (Jer. xxix. 4–7, cited by C. F. Whitley, *The Exilic Age*, p. 52). Ezekiel, too, believed that the future lay with the deportees (ibid., p. 93).

² Ezra set himself to make the Torah the governing force in Jewish life. In virtue of this, 'he was in a real sense the true founder of Judaism' (R. Travers Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 370. Cp. eundem: *The Pharisees*, pp. 56–57).

³ 'If the World hath indeed been created for our sakes, why do we not enter into possession of our world?' (2(4) Esdras, vi. 56–59, cited by W. O. E. Oosterley: *The Jews and Judaism during the Greek Period*, p. 117).

⁴ The question how the belief in the resurrection of the body came to be a cardinal doctrine for Judaism is discussed by G. F. Moore in *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. ii. The traditional Jewish notions about the fate of the dead had been like those of the Hellenic World in its early days, as recorded in the Homeric epic. The ghosts of the dead lead a shadowy existence either in their tombs or in an underworld called Sheol, which is a counterpart of the Hellenic Hades (Moore, op. cit., pp. 289–90). The problem of a human being's fate was slow in catching the attention of a people whose efforts were concentrated on preserving the continuous existence of a community in this world. The expectation of a resurrection is not to be found in the Book of Job (ibid., p. 291); and Ecclesiastes holds that, at death, human beings perish like animals (Eccl. iii. 18–21; ix. 5–6; and, in fact, *passim*). The expectation seems to have made its entry into the Jewish outlook at the time of the resistance to Antiochus IV in the fourth decade of the second century B.C. The Book of Daniel xii. 2–3 expects the resurrection of some Jews, both good and bad, and the Seven Brethren are represented, in

Throughout, the Jews have concentrated on their paramount aim of preserving their distinctive national identity. This focusing of Jewish efforts has been rewarded by success for more than two thousand five hundred years up to date. And this success, in turn, has had revolutionary religious and psychological consequences. It has produced a radical change in the Jews' concept of the character of their national god Yahweh and a radical reinterpretation of the Pre-Exilic literature of Israel and Judah.¹ These two religious changes—especially the change in the concept of the character of Yahweh—have set up a psychological tension in Jewish souls between the nationalism to which they are devoted, heart and soul, and a universalism that has been a by-product of their nationalism—a by-product that has been unintended and undesired but has at the same time been the inescapable price of their maintaining their faith in their nationalism in spite of the trauma inflicted by the experience of losing their political existence and being carried away captive. The tension—which is still unresolved today—is a spiritual struggle between the conflicting claims of two incompatible objects of worship. Which of the two is finally to win the Jews' allegiance? Their worship of their own community, served by and symbolized by their Pre-Exilic ancestors' national god? Or their worship of the One True God—absolute spiritual Reality in Its personal aspect²—into whom their national god has been transfigured, in their vision of Him, as a result of the revolutionary change in their concept of Him in the light of their harrowing experiences? 'Decisive in the psychological make-up of the individual is the question whether the group was selected for the sake of universal ideals, or whether those ideals were important because they emerged out of the life of the group.'³

If the Jews' worship of Jewry were finally to prevail over their worship of God, then their extraordinary feat of preserving their distinctive national identity in diasporá for 2,500 years would have been unprofitable 2 Maccabees, vi-vii, as looking forward to rising again. This expectation of a bodily resurrection for human beings seems to have been a corollary of the expectation of a Messianic Kingdom. This kingdom—whose coming was equated with 'salvation'—was to be an earthly one (Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 19); and the righteous dead, especially martyrs for the faith, must rise again in order to participate in it (Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 173; Moore, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 312-13). This expectation of a resurrection to life on Earth in the Messianic Kingdom was eventually followed by an expectation of a resurrection to life in Heaven (Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 116). But its original role was to give the individual Jew a share in the eventual glorious rehabilitation of the Jewish community and state on the soil of Judah (ibid., pp. 112-13).

The belief in the resurrection was an innovation of the Pharisees'. It had no authority in Scripture (ibid., loc. cit.) and it was not accepted by the Sadducees. The Sadducees, however, disappeared, with the Temple, in A.D. 70 (ibid., p. 121), and thereafter the Pharisees had the field to themselves, save for the transient and ineffectual movement of the Minim. According to the orthodox Jewish faith, as this was eventually established by the decisions of Pharisaic rabbis, people who deny that the resurrection is deducible from the Torah are one of three classes that are excluded from the world to come (Moore, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 388).

¹ The religion of Israel became Judaism in consequence of the Exile (Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. 3; Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 14): It 'grew out of' the religion of Israel, but was not identical with it (Herford, ibid., p. 20). The change was gradual (ibid.). 'Judaism was continuous throughout its history' (p. 13).

² 'The personality of God was as integral as His unity' (G. F. Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. 115).

³ Rabbi J. B. Agus, in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 34.

as far as the Jews themselves were concerned. Self-worship in the first person plural—*nahnīyah* ('nosism') as it is called in Arabic—has been one of the commonest—indeed, most commonplace—of all mankind's religions ever since Man learnt how to mobilize his collective power by means of political organization. This has been the paramount religion of the Egyptian and Andean worlds; of Umma and Uruk and Ur; of Sparta and Athens and Rome; of Venice and Milan and Florence; of France and England and Germany. If the Jews were finally to put their treasure in this familiar idol, they would be justifying the Christians' and Muslims' judgement on them. The vision of the One True God would have been an involuntary product of Jewry's tribulations, as a pearl is an involuntary product of some irritant that has lodged itself inside the shell of an oyster. The Jewish soul would be a spiritually barren field; and the Christians and Muslims would have been, as they claim to be, the spiritually alert and enlightened seekers after God who had discovered the pearl of great price and had made this neglected treasure their own. This issue has been confronting the Jews for some two thousand five hundred years, since the date when the full vision of the One True God was attained by Deutero-Isaiah. 'Judaism, in one of its aspects, was, and is, a universal religion, while in another aspect it was, and is, a national religion.'¹ The Jews have not yet made their choice between these two incompatible alternatives.

3. THE CHANGE IN THE JEWS' CONCEPT OF THE CHARACTER OF YAHWEH

A radical change in the concept of the character of Yahweh is recorded in the religious literature that the Jews inherited from Israel and Judah and supplemented by their own commentaries on this Pre-Exilic heritage. This literature was precipitated over a period of fourteen hundred years or more, if the oldest strata of the historical books of the Torah are to be dated as early as the tenth century B.C., since the compilation went on till the completion of the Babylonian Talmud in the latter part of the fifth century of the Christian Era.² It is not surprising that a radical change should have taken place over a period of this length, in the course of which the worshippers of Yahweh met with a series of momentous experiences and underwent far-reaching changes in the social and cultural conditions of their life. In the accompanying changes in their concept of the character of Yahweh there was not a revolutionary break at any point; and, though the cumulative change in the picture was radical, there were at least two features, and these both important, that remained constant throughout. From the date of our earliest evidence down to the present day, the Israelite, Judahite, and Jewish worshippers of Yahweh have seen him in the form of a person, and they have believed that this divine person demands exact and unquestioning obedience from his human associates. This view of Yahweh is common

¹ R. Travers Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 89. Cp. p. 96.

² G. F. Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. 4. The Palestinian Talmud was completed in Galilee in the last quarter of the fourth century of the Christian Era.

to the crudest Israelite and to the most sublime Jewish conceptions of his nature. The Jews did not come to think of him in impersonal terms when they came to identify him with absolute spiritual Reality. The transfiguration of the national war-god of Israel into the One True God of all mankind and the whole Universe left the antique deity's imperious personality intact—in contrast to the depersonalization that overtook Zeus the sky-god of the Hellenes and T'ien the sky-god of the Post-Shang Chinese when he was identified with absolute Reality by the philosophers. Jewish monotheism was not metaphysical. It was moral and therefore personal.¹

In the evolution of the concept of Yahweh there was this important element of permanence which persisted throughout the radical changes in the rest of the picture of Yahweh's nature. In the course of the formative fourteen or fifteen centuries there was, however, a great divide. The decisive changes took place within a span of not more than two centuries, running from the generation of the prophet Amos in the eighth century B.C. to the generation of Deutero-Isaiah on the eve of the conquest of the Neobabylonian Empire by Cyrus. This 'axis age' in the history of the concept of Yahweh is an exemplification of Aeschylus's insight that 'learning comes through suffering'.² This period of rapid and creative change in the outlook of the leading spirits in the religious life of Israel and Judah was also a period in which these two peoples went through three harrowing experiences: the economic and social revolution of the eighth century B.C.; the loss of their political independence and the destruction of their state, which overtook Israel in 722 B.C. and Judah in 586 B.C.; and the deportation of the leading elements in the population which followed in either case—a turn of the screw to which the Israelite diasporá succumbed but which the Jewish diasporá survived. Each of these experiences had its effect on the concept of the character of Yahweh.

Yahweh, as he is presented in the strata of the Torah that are older than the books of the eighth-century prophets, is a national war-god of a familiar type. He is the local god of three communities of Hebrew origin—Israel, Judah, and Edom—and he has his counterparts in Chemosh of Moab, Milcom of Ammon, Athene Poliûchus of Athens, Athana Chalcioecus of Sparta, and for that matter also in those unavowed but zealously worshipped deities Britannia, France, Deutschland and the other collective idols of the Post-Christian West. Yahweh's origin is obscure. It is clear that he was not originally a god of agricultural fertility. Perhaps he may have been the smithy-god of the Midianites, Kenites, or some other Nomad people of the North Arabian desert.³ His recorded history begins when he becomes the political divinity of Israel. How and when this happened is also obscure. The story of the covenant made between him and Israel at Sinai, which eventually became the orthodox account of the beginning of his association with this people, is not the only account given in the Torah. Alternatively the covenant is said to have been made between Yahweh and

¹ G. F. Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 260-1.

² 'Pathei mathos' (Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 177-8). ³ See p. 415, footnote 2.

Joshua at Shechem;¹ and at Shechem the god of the covenant may, in truth, have ante-dated the Israelite occupation.² In any case, Yahweh comes on to the stage of history as a political god worshipped by three of the Hebrew communities that had lodged themselves in Canaan in or before the thirteenth century B.C.

In the pre-eighth-century books of the Torah, Yahweh is presented as a divinity of a well-known barbaric type. In the traditional account of the making of the covenant between Yahweh and Israel, his *quid pro quo*, in return for Israel's allegiance to him, is to give Israel possession of a land that was neither his to give nor Israel's to take. The Hebrew invaders of Canaan had to lodge themselves there by force of arms, and Yahweh's supreme value to them lay in his military prowess. 'The Lord is a man of war.'³ 'The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle.'⁴ 'Blessed be the Lord my strength, which teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight.'⁵ This potency of Yahweh's was, however, double-edged. He was as vindictive in punishing his adherents for acts of disobedience as he was effective in giving them military victory at times when they had not incurred his displeasure. The common theme running through the series of incidents in the book of Judges, in the edition in which this has come down to us, is that Yahweh has repeatedly delivered a disobedient Israel into the hands of its enemies, and has then sent the Israelites a rescuer each time that they have repented of their offence. But this primitive Yahweh is worse than vindictive; he is moody, capricious, and impulsive. Many of his acts are so arbitrary as to be unaccountable. He is also physically dangerous to human life, like some blind material force—for instance, a present-day high-tension electrified cable. If this Yahweh had chosen to swoop from Mount Sinai on to Mount Olympus, he would have been a match for the whole war-band of Homeric gods. His character, as depicted at this stage, is, no doubt, a reflection of the temper and outlook then prevalent among his worshippers. If so, the subsequent changes in the picture will be reflections of changes in his worshippers' temper and outlook—spiritual changes that were, themselves, responses to the challenge of harrowing experiences.

The first of these experiences was the economic and social revolution that overtook Israel and Judah in the eighth century B.C. The money economy that had previously established itself in the Phoenician and Philistine cities along the coast of Canaan, and the urban way of life that had been practised there for ages past, now invaded—or reinvaded—the highland cantons in the maritime cities' hinterland. This revolution was comparable to the one that overtook Attica in the next century, when the

¹ Joshua xxiv.

² See p. 414, footnote 3, and p. 420, footnote 3. On the other hand, Moore holds that the notion of a covenant between Yahweh and Israel is no older than the eighth century B.C., and that it was the introduction of this idea that made the Israelites' and Judahites' relation to Yahweh begin to become different from the neighbouring peoples' relation to their respective gods (*Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. 220).

³ Exod. xv. 3.

⁴ Ps. xxiv. 8.

⁵ Ps. cxliv. 1. The dating of the Psalms is still in dispute, but, whatever may have been the date at which the two passages here quoted were written, they represent the picture of Yahweh as it was in the age before Amos and Hosea.

same more sophisticated way of life came in from Ionia and from the commercial cities clustered round the Isthmus of Corinth. In the Syriac World the social consequences of this economic revolution were the same as in the Hellenic. The countryside now had to carry the load of a growing capital city: Samaria in Israel and Jerusalem in Judah. The rich minority of the population, which now gathered in the capital to enjoy its amenities, became richer, partly through usury, while the poor rural minority became poorer. The community was now morally divided, and this raised a question about Yahweh's judgement that had not arisen as long as he had been the war-lord of a community that was held together internally by hostile relations with its neighbours. Now that Yahweh's people was divided against itself on a moral issue, Yahweh must take a line as between one faction and the other; and the eighth-century prophets confidently and eloquently declared Yahweh's judgement in his name. They declared that he stood for justice (as the sun god already stood in Egypt and was to stand in Anatolia, 600 years later, when Aristonicus called the oppressed to arms in Helios' name). The Prophets predicted that, if the oppressors in Israel and Judah did not repent and mend their ways, Yahweh would requite their injustice with a punishment that would involve the community as a whole. At the time, these prophecies fell on deaf ears. The subsequent calamities—the extinction of the state and the deportation of the oppressive notables—recalled the eighth-century prophecies to mind and branded them indelibly on the memories of the conscience-stricken deportees and their descendants. From the time of the Babylonish Captivity onwards, Yahweh, in the Jews' conception of him, was an all-powerful dispenser of justice instead of being an all-powerful tyrant giving rein to his whims.

The eighth century B.C. also saw the beginning of the end of the independence, and indeed of the existence, of the states of the Syriac World. The fourth and last, but also the most virulent, bout of Assyrian militarism was started by King Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 747–727 B.C.). After he had decisively defeated the united forces of Urartu, Assyria's most formidable rival at the time, and her East Anatolian and North Syrian allies, the whole Syriac World lay at his and his successors' mercy. Israel was obliterated by his immediate successor Sargon in 722 B.C., and the Assyrian sword hung suspended over Judah's head for a century, before Judah, in her turn, suffered Israel's fate in 586 B.C. at the hands of Assyria's Neobabylonian successor-state. Nor was this the end of the story of political disaster. From the date of Tiglath-Pileser III's accession onwards the peoples of Israel and Judah and the Judahites' Jewish heirs found themselves politically impotent in face of a series of overwhelming imperial powers; and, as far as the Jews were concerned, the situation remained the same when one empire gave way to another. The Assyrian Empire was followed successively by the Neobabylonian, the Achaemenian, the Ptolemaic, the Seleucid, the Roman. The imperial regimes varied from time to time in their treatment of the Jews; there were alternating periods of relative leniency and relative oppressiveness; but, throughout the age that saw the progressive change in the Jewish conception of Yahweh, the Jews were always at

some empire's mercy—and this not only in Palestine but also in the vast regions, east and west, in which they came to be scattered as a local minority in diasporá.

The reduction of Yahweh's worshippers to a condition of permanent political nullity raised, for them, an agonizing question about the status of their god. In a world of political gods each symbolizing the collective human power of some local community, the gods' fates were implicated in the fates of their local adherents. A war between Israel and Assyria was at the same time a war between the god Yahweh and the god Asshur; and, when Assyria annihilated Israel, the logical inference was that this human military decision also signified that Asshur had overthrown Yahweh. The common-sense conclusion to be drawn from this was that the discomfited god's former worshippers should now transfer their allegiance to the victor god, either abandoning the worship of their own ancestral god altogether or, short of that, continuing to worship him as merely a subordinate member of a pantheon on which the victor god had imposed his supremacy. This was, indeed, the line taken by the defeated and uprooted peoples of Judah's neighbour states: for instance, by the deported Israelites. This was also the reaction of the Judahite refugees in Egypt after the liquidation of the Kingdom of Judah by Nebuchadnezzar. In spite of the prophet Jeremiah's protests they refused to retransfer their allegiance to Yahweh from the Queen of Heaven.¹ Was it not, indeed, mere common sense for the Jews, now that they had felt the full power of Babylon's arm, to become worshippers of Babylon's puissant gods Ishtar and Marduk-Bel?

Here was a crux for worshippers of Yahweh who, in spite of all, could not bear to abandon the worship of their ancestral god. There was, however, one way out of these straits. If Yahweh was not to be written off as having ceased to be mighty in battle, he must be credited with a far greater might and a far longer arm than the defeated Jews' ancestors had dreamed of attributing to him. In the Pre-Exilic Age, Yahweh's kingdom, as his contemporary worshippers had conceived of it, had been confined to the territories of these worshippers' states.² The Pre-Exilic peoples of Israel and Judah, including their prophets, had recognized the existence of other gods with political domains of their own in which, presumably, they were not less potent than Yahweh was in his domain.³ Moab, Ammon, and Tyre, like Israel, Judah, and Edom, might each have been more or less loyal to its own national gods, but worshipping only the god of one's own country is not the same thing as believing that he is the only god in the World.⁴ But suppose that one's national god did, in truth, have dominion, not only over one's own nation and national territory, but also over other nations with whom one's own nation had come into disastrous collision. Then one's own nation's defeat and humiliation at foreign hands would leave one's national god's power intact, and would, indeed, be a demonstration that his power was greater than one had

¹ Jer. xliv, cited already on p. 428, with footnote 2.

² W. O. E. Oesterley: *The Jews and Judaism during the Greek Period*, pp. 124-5. Oesterley mentions Israel and Judah. Edom, too, should be included in the list.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁴ G. F. Moore: *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. i, p. 222.

previously imagined. Israel's and Judah's overthrow would have been brought about, not by the Babylonian conqueror's god Marduk-Bel, but by the conquered people's god Yahweh himself. The Babylonian conquerors would then be unintentional and unconscious instruments that had been used by Yahweh for his purpose. Yahweh's omnipotence 'is interlocked with the teleology of history'.¹

This novel belief in Yahweh's potency beyond the confines of his worshippers' states, which had been forced on these worshippers by the experience of political disaster inflicted by foreign powers, was confirmed and reinforced by the experience of exile. However far the Jews might be deported from the temple at Jerusalem, which had recently become for them the only shrine anywhere in the World where the prescribed ritual worship of Yahweh could be performed legitimately, they still found themselves in Yahweh's presence. When Yahweh had thus proved to be omnipresent² as well as almighty,³ was it any longer conceivable that the gods worshipped by the gentile peoples had any real existence? By the end of the fifty years of compulsory exile under the regime of the Neobabylonian Empire, Deutero-Isaiah had moved on from henotheism—the belief that Yahweh had an exclusive claim on Israel's allegiance—to monotheism: the belief that he was the One True God whose kingdom included all mankind and was coextensive with the Universe itself.⁴ But, if it was in truth this almighty god Yahweh himself, not Asshur or Marduk-Bel, who had afflicted Israel and Judah, how could it be that a god who was still the god of Israel and Judah, and who was bound to them by a covenant, had brought himself to inflict these crushing calamities on his own peoples? It was true that they had now recognized that he was a just god, and also true that at least a minority among them had committed injustices which deserved punishment. But the chastisement that they had now received was so disproportionately heavy by comparison with the degree of their offence that it would be a shocking injustice on Yahweh's part if this were the end of the transaction. Therefore it could not be the end. Yahweh must have punished his people, not for his satisfaction, but for their good. He must have punished them in order to give them a chance of repentance; and, if they did repent, he would surely remit their penalty and restore them to their former state of relative well-being. On this interpretation of the motive of Yahweh's acts, he was not only just but was merciful, besides being all-powerful. The classical formulation of this Post-Exilic Jewish theodicy was to be made, centuries later, by a Christian Jewish 'deviationist':

¹ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 375. Rabbi J. B. Agus observes that 'Judaism taught a ready-made interpretation of history, but not an objective understanding of it. So profoundly were the Jewish people convinced that the will of God accounted for all events that their interest in the actual events of history was all but extinguished' (*Judaism*, 1956, p. 30).

² See Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 370-1.

³ Both the omnipotence and the omnipresence of Yahweh were proclaimed by Jeremiah (C. F. Whitley: *The Exilic Age*, p. 49). 'Jeremiah was the first of the Hebrew prophets to declare that he could be worshipped wherever he was sought in sincerity of spirit' (*ibid.*, p. 54).

⁴ Oesterley, *op. cit.*, pp. 95 and 110-12. C. F. Whitley likewise holds that Deutero-Isaiah was the first of the Prophets to declare that Yahweh was the *sole* true god (*The Exilic Age*, p. 135). But he also holds that Yahweh was clearly a universal god for Ezekiel (*ibid.*, pp. 100-1), and that Amos represents Yahweh as having power outside the frontiers of Israel (*ibid.*, p. 134).

'Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth.'¹

It may be true that, for the Jews, justice, not love, is Yahweh's predominant characteristic.² But, in the Jews' vision of him, there is a harmony, not a tension, between the two. 'Justice and mercy were not attributes of a divine being, but the character of a personal god, whom they could not imagine as either unjust or unmerciful.'³ Mercy and, above and beyond mercy, love were ascribed to him in the eighth century B.C. by the Prophets; and both these qualities were proclaimed with ever-growing insistence and confidence, during the next 1,400 years, in the successive accretions to the corpus of Jewish religious literature.⁴ This vision of Yahweh's nature was expressed by thinking of him as being like a father and a mother,⁵ and by calling him 'Father in Heaven'. This phrase was coined by the Pharisees,⁶ who made their appearance before the end of the second century B.C. It is a familiar rabbinical term.⁷ It became an increasingly common form of address,⁸ and this always with a personal reference.⁹

This mature Jewish picture of God as our Father in Heaven, *miseri-cors et miserator*, *ar-rahmān ar-rahīm*, is at the opposite pole from the primitive Israelite picture of a wild, capricious, vindictive Yahweh. 'An ancient civilization was transmuted into a universal religion.'¹⁰ In Jewish minds, under the stress and stimulus of Jewish experiences, the god of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob has become transfigured in Deutero-Isaiah's vision into the god of Ikhnaton, Jesus, and Muhammad. One consequence of this transfiguration was that this god lost his name—at least in the sense that the utterance of it became tabu in Jewish mouths. To be called by a personal name implies being a representative of a class, from whose other representatives one needs to be distinguished. The name 'Yahweh' implies the names 'Milcom', 'Chemosh', and the rest; and this consecration of their names, through their being put on a par with Yahweh's, implies a recognition of these neighbour gods' reality. When the god of Israel, Judah, and Edom came to be thought of, by Jews, as being the One True God, he also came to be referred to by epithets and periphrases.

The transfiguration also had another consequence which was more momentous. In the Jews' own changed conception of Him, God had become too great, too just, too sublime, too benign for it to be possible to confine Him any longer to His traditional task of serving as the national god of a 'Chosen People'.¹¹ If He is the creator and lord of the

¹ Heb. xii. 6. This is a reminiscence of Prov. iii. 12.

² R. Travers Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 126. Cp. p. 154.

³ Moore, op. cit., vol. i, p. 393.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 116 and 396-9; C. G. Montefiore: *Rabbinical Literature and Gospel Teachings*, pp. 109 and 312-13.

⁵ Moore, op. cit., vol. i, p. 395.

⁶ R. Travers Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 88; *idem: The Pharisees*, p. 151.

⁷ Montefiore, op. cit., pp. 125-9. Moore, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 204, notes that it is rabbinical, not apocalyptic.

⁸ Moore, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 202.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

¹⁰ Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), p. 332.

¹¹ 'In asserting the oneness of God and His justice, the Israelites made certain that their reach would always out-distance their grasp' (Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, 1956,

p. 38).

Universe, all His creatures must be His concern. If He is good as well as almighty, He cannot have limited His loving care to a tiny minority of His human creatures and have turned His back on the rest.¹ If the whole World is His and is embraced in His plans, the supreme objective of these plans cannot be the re-establishment of a Jewish state on Palestinian soil. This could be the supreme objective only for a god who was merely a national god, and had therefore lost his kingdom, vocation, and *raison d'être* when the nation on whose worship he had depended had lost its political existence and had been scattered to the four winds. The One True God into whom the god of Israel and Judah had been transfigured could, at will, restore both kingdoms in a trice, and would, no doubt, restore them in His own good time. But, if and when He did perform this provincial act of justice and mercy, it would be incidental to the execution of a universal plan in which such details would be insignificant.

Thus the Jews' theodicy had led them into an impasse. In justifying the ways of Yahweh to Jewry, they had discovered a spiritual treasure of inestimable value for the whole human race. Their god, as He had been transfigured in their hearts and minds as a result of their sufferings, could no longer be their god exclusively;² and His transfiguration could not be kept secret from the gentiles, since it was implied in new Jewish forms of worship and was explicitly proclaimed in new Jewish books. How, then, in face of this transfigured godhead, were the Jews to pursue their paramount aim of maintaining the Jewish community's distinctive national identity in a state of exile and political nullity?

There was no possibility of their making a spiritual retreat. It might be tempting, on first thoughts, to reduce the One True God again to the minor dimensions of the national god of Judah that had been His embryo. But this could not be done without at the same time depotentiating Yahweh *redivivus*; for if, after all, the Jews' god was no more than a national god, then he was not even one who was any longer mighty in battle. He was the prostrate adversary of Asshur and Marduk-Bel—at best, defeated; at worst, proved non-existent by the verdict of military history. The only way in which the Jews could save their national god was to lose their national monopoly of him; and, if they were now bound to lose this monopoly, they were faced with a choice between two alternative ways in which this inevitable result might be brought about. Either the Jews themselves might take the initiative in voluntarily sharing their new-found spiritual treasure with the rest of mankind; or they might leave it to the rest of mankind to take the initiative by snatching the treasure out of Jewish hands and running away with it. If the first of these two alternative courses were not taken, the second was bound to be. The treasure brought to light by the Jews was so inestimably valuable that sooner or later, by one means or another, it was sure to become the common treasure of mankind.

This spiritual crux has been a greater challenge to the Jews than the

¹ The rabbis have sought to get over this difficulty by supposing that, at Sinai, the Torah was offered to all mankind but was accepted by Israel alone (Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 277).

² This point is made by Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 223 and 226.

challenges of loss of independence and deportation to which the change in the Jews' conception of their god's character was a response. There is only one solution for the antinomy¹ between the nationalism which is the Jews' will and the universalism which is an involuntary but inevitable corollary of their nationalism. The Jews must constitute themselves the One True God's missionaries to the rest of mankind,² and must make it their paramount aim to convert the World to the vision that has been vouchsafed to the Jews themselves. But the pursuit of this aim by the Jews would require them to unite with their gentile converts in a world-wide religious community of followers of the pure religion of Deutero-Isaiah, and this transformation of a closed national community into an open religious community would run counter to the Jews' hitherto paramount aim of preserving their community's distinctive identity in the form of a nation. The Jews have been racked by this crux for 2,500 years up to date, and they have still to make the choice with which it has confronted them. Happily the way is still open for them. It has not been closed by the advents of Christianity and Islam, as Christians and Muslims severally maintain. For the Jews, these gentile homages to the Jews' transfigured god may be portents and warnings; but they are not more than that; they are not irrevocable cancellations of the Jews' own manifest destiny. This is still intact, for the Jews to embrace, if they will.

4. THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF ISRAEL'S AND JUDAH'S PRE-EXILIC LITERATURE

(i) *General Effects of the Extinction of the Kingdom of Judah and Deportation of the Jews to Babylonia*

When a community migrates slowly and gradually overland, it is possible for it to bring with it many, or even most, of its ancestral institutions unimpaired, even when its migration eventually carries it a long distance from its starting-point. For instance, the Indo-European-speaking peoples who moved south-eastward right across the Eurasian steppe and found new homes on the Iranian plateau and in India, retained a large fund of ancestral culture in common with those other Indo-European-speaking peoples who made shorter treks in the opposite direction and found new homes in Europe and, from there, in Anatolia. By contrast, a sudden forcible deportation has the same effect as a sea-passage.³ Only the more easily portable elements of the deportees' culture can be carried with them. Impedimenta have to be left behind, however important they may have been and however painfully the loss of them may be felt. The elements that the deportees manage to take with them are only a selection from a former whole; and this selection has not been chosen by the deportees; it has been imposed on them by necessity. The portable elements of their culture may be casual frag-

¹ This antinomy has been noticed already on p. 487.

² This point is made by Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 228-9.

³ For this, see ii. 84-100.

ments. Yet, however casual, they are precious, because they are a salvaged remnant of the deportees' cultural past. Accordingly, they are now treated with greater veneration and solicitude than they ever received before the catastrophe of deportation shattered the integral unity of the culture in which these surviving elements originally inhered. What has survived is now progressively elaborated and developed, until these new accretions come to fill the gaps left by the disruption of the displaced culture's original pattern.

When the Jews were deported from Judah to Babylonia, the most important of the cultural impedimenta that they had to leave behind was the ritual worship of Yahweh in the temple at Jerusalem.¹ The consequent break in their religious history would not have been as great as it was if their deportation had taken place before, instead of after, the synœcism of Judah in the ancient Jebusite city that had been conquered and then been transformed into Judah's capital by David. By the year 586 B.C. the process of centralizing Judah's life in Jerusalem had been going on for 400 years. David had made Jerusalem the capital of the kingdom; Solomon had made its temple the principal shrine for the worship of Yahweh; Josiah had given Yahweh's temple at Jerusalem a monopoly of the cult of him at the expense of the former rural shrines. The extinction of the Kingdom of Judah and the deportation of its notables reversed this long-continuing centripetal movement abruptly and violently. A high proportion of the deported notables were doubtless former residents in Jerusalem. They included priests as well as laymen; and, of the two classes, the priests were the harder hit. As a result of Josiah's innovations, which had made the ritual worship of Yahweh illegitimate anywhere except in his temple at Jerusalem, the deported priests found themselves automatically debarred from performing their professional functions. They therefore, at one stroke, forfeited their religious and social importance within the deported Jewish community. The deportees' determination to preserve their distinctive national identity in exile required, first and foremost, a redoubled loyalty and obedience to their national god; but, in exile, new ways of honouring him had to be improvised; and, in the invention and operation of these new Jewish religious institutions, priests were not privileged any more than they were penalized. They were on a par with the laity.² Authority now accrued to individuals, whether priests or laymen, who had the vision to see how to keep the Jews' relation to Yahweh alive in the utterly unforeseen and strange circumstances of the diaspora.

For the creation of new Jewish religious institutions, two materials were at the diaspora's disposal: human beings and books. The human beings had been brought by force to Babylonia, and they had been able to bring their books with them. The new master-institution in which the deported Jews and their Pre-Exilic literature worked together to create something new was the synagogue. This was a weekly meeting on the sabbath day for mutual adult education in the Torah: that is, in Yahweh's

¹ C. F. Whitley underlines Jeremiah's role in cutting Yahweh-worship loose from Jerusalem (*The Exilic Age*, p. 6). Jeremiah condemned not only sacrifice but the Temple (pp. 48-49) and prophesied the Temple's destruction (p. 50).

² Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 42.

teaching, which the Pre-Exilic literature was held to contain. The synagogues became not merely meetings but meeting-houses with more or less permanent and regular congregations and administrators. The re-interpretation of the Scriptures led, in the second century B.C., to the emergence of the Pharisees: a movement, group, or party which was originally a small minority in the Jewish community and was, in its own estimation, a religious *élite*. The Pharisees devoted their lives to the elucidation of the Torah according to a method of their own; and this Pharisaic method eventually prevailed over all others. It became the only recognized method for the whole of Jewry. Non-Pharisaic renderings of Judaism made their fortunes in the shapes of Christianity and Islam; but they were abandoned or suppressed within the Jewish community. This was the common fate of Judaism as interpreted by the Sadducees (the name given to the priests' party in the Pharisaic Age), the Zealots (the contemporary militant party), and the Galilean Jewish teacher Jesus. These three interpretations of Judaism differed greatly from each other; but all three alike succumbed to Pharisaism in the competition for winning the Jewish people's adherence.

As for the priests, their traditional authority was already undermined irretrievably by the time (*circa* 520-516 B.C.)¹ when the temple at Jerusalem was rebuilt and the ritual worship of Yahweh was restarted there in what had been the only legitimate practice of it since the time of Josiah. From 516 B.C. to A.D. 70, this ritually correct worship of Yahweh continued to be carried on in the ritually correct place, except for a short break of four or five years (168-164 B.C.) during which the Temple was appropriated by Antiochus IV to the worship of Olympian Zeus. Throughout this period the Jews believed that the Temple ritual was incumbent on them, and they continued dutifully to take part in it and to support it financially. But their spiritual treasure had already been transferred from the Temple to the synagogue and to the Torah; and therefore, throughout this period, the influence of the priesthood steadily declined.

The Book of Deuteronomy, which had been the manifesto of the innovations in Josiah's reign, instructed the people² to consult the priests when they needed rulings as to how the Torah was to be interpreted. From Ezra's day onwards the priests lost this key function to the scribes,³ though Ezra was legislating in and for Judaea at a time when the Temple ritual in Jerusalem was once again a going concern. This enabled the scribes to make themselves independent of the priests.⁴ Moreover, these Post-Exilic scribes were not the same as the Pre-Exilic scribes from whom they had taken their name *Sôpherim*. The original scribes had been government officials;⁵ their new namesakes were a body of private individuals that was recruited by informal cooptation; and any Jew could be coopted if the fraternity considered that he had the requisite ability in the highly-esteemed new art of re-interpreting the Torah. The priests were the leaders of the opposition to the new scribes' creative but

¹ W. O. E. Oesterley: *The Jews and Judaism during the Greek Period*, p. 199.

² Deut. xvii. 9-11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

³ Oesterley, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 227 and 250-1.

audacious concept of an unwritten Torah by which the written Torah was to be interpreted. This was, for the priests, 'an annoying innovation'.¹ But, on this capital question, the priests were overruled and overborne. The Pharisees actually succeeded in forcing on the priests a new redaction of the Temple ritual corresponding to Pharisaic ideas.² The Sadducees disappeared with the Temple in A.D. 70.³ The destruction of the Temple, together with the rest of Jerusalem, in that year was an immense political disaster for Jewry; but, in the history of Judaism as a religion, the cessation of the Temple ritual caused no crisis.⁴ By that date the lifeblood of Judaism had long been flowing in other channels.

The priest's loss was the individual's gain. In a situation—and this was the diaspora's situation—in which Jewry's relations with Yahweh could not be maintained through the performance of the priests' professional function, the individual Jew had to be invited, and indeed be conscripted, to step into the breach. Though the Temple ritual at Jerusalem might be in abeyance, it was still possible for Yahweh to be served by his people. The individual could serve him by obeying his commands as these had been revealed by him in the Torah. The god-fearing Jew might, of course, be a priest, but it was in virtue of being simply a Jew, not particularly a priest, that he was called to his new vocation. The personal responsibility of the individual Jew for carrying out Yahweh's teaching, the Torah, was preached during the Babylonish Captivity by Ezekiel,⁵ and this idea of Ezekiel's was translated into practice later by the Babylonian Jewish reformer of Judaeen Jewry, Ezra.⁶ Thus the experience of exile made religion a personal concern for Jews as well as a social one;⁷ and, as Judaism became a religion for the individual, the individual became the recipient of God's love.⁸ 'Judaism became in the full sense personal religion without ceasing to be national religion.'⁹ The relation between God and the individual was stressed by the Pharisees.¹⁰ At the same time, this individualizing of religion in the development of Judaism 'was accomplished beside, not in place of', national and religious solidarity.¹¹ A distinguished modern Jewish authority on the history of the Jews holds that 'what really matters in the Jewish religion is not the immortality of the individual Jew, but that of the Jewish people'.¹²

(ii) *The Synagogues*

Though there is no surviving record of the origin of the institution of synagogues, it can be inferred that it dates back to the Age of the

¹ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 48–50.

² Herford: *The Pharisees*, pp. 47–48.

³ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 121.

⁴ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 114.

⁵ C. F. Whitley: *The Exilic Age*, pp. 6–7, 99, 109–13.

⁶ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 21–22 and 32–33.

⁷ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 224–5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 397.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹⁰ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 87–88 and 92.

¹¹ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 311.

¹² S. W. Baron: *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 2nd ed., vol. i, p. 12.

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Babylonish Captivity.¹ It can also be inferred that it was introduced into the Jewish community in Palestine from the diaspora.²

'When the synagogue was established there was nothing like it in connexion with any form of religion then known, and there has been nothing like it ever since, except its two descendants the Christian church and the Mohammedan mosque. To have created the synagogue is perhaps the greatest practical achievement of the Jews in all their history.'³

'The essence of the synagogue is congregational worship and edification conducted by the congregation through its own members and not by priests on their behalf.'⁴

Nation-wide instruction in religion was something specifically Jewish.⁵ In the daily religious life of the Post-Exilic Jews 'the synagogue counted for much more than the Temple did'; and the religion of the synagogue 'suffered no injury through the fall of the Temple'.⁶ There was a synagogue within the Temple precincts for perhaps a hundred years before the Temple was destroyed.⁷ It may have been planted there in the reign of the philo-Pharisee Hasmonaean queen Alexandra (*regnabat* 75/4-67/6 B.C.).⁸ The Pharisees imposed themselves on the Temple, 'but they were at home in the synagogue'.⁹ The procedure in the synagogue was not modelled on that in the Temple.¹⁰ In the synagogue service, instruction loomed larger than prayer.¹¹ The synagogue was used by the Pharisees as their forum for bringing the Torah to the people.¹² Popular religion was a product of the synagogues in the time of Jesus,¹³ and it was from the synagogue that Jesus himself obtained his knowledge of scripture.¹⁴

(iii) *The Pharisees*

The name 'Pharisees' makes its first appearance in the records of Jewish history in the reign of the Hasmonaean king John Hyrcanus (*regnabat* 135-105/4 B.C.),¹⁵ and there is some doubt about the meaning of the word. It is a participle of an Aramaic verb meaning to 'separate'. The 'Pharisees' might be separators or distinguishers of meanings, that is to say interpreters of the Torah,¹⁶ or they might be people who separated themselves from other members of their community whose religious performance fell short, in their eyes, of coming up to the requisite standard of holiness.¹⁷ On this second rendering of the word's meaning, which seems to be the more likely to be the right one, the name 'Pharisees' would signify the same thing as the name 'Kharijites';

¹ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 23; idem: *The Pharisees*, pp. 89-90.

² Oesterley, *op. cit.*, p. 213; Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 321.

³ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 26. Cp. Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 114-15 and 281 seqq.

⁴ Herford, *op. cit.*, p. 23. Cp. Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 114-15 and 281 seqq.

⁵ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 281.

⁶ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 28 and 29.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 30 and 146.

⁸ Ibid., p. 88. ¹⁰ Ibid., p. 90.

⁹ Ibid., p. 88. ¹¹ Oesterley, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

¹² Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 73 and 134; idem: *The Pharisees*, p. 98.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 288-9.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 288-9.

¹⁵ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 62.

¹⁶ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 518.

¹⁷ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 29.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 61.

and the Jewish Pharisees did have the same historical origin that the Muslim Kharijites had.¹ They were a fanatically scrupulous minority who separated themselves, on this account, from the majority of their co-religionists who took their religion in less deadly earnest.²

The Pharisees separated themselves, in fact, from almost every other element in the Jewish community. Their earliest quarrel was with the Hasmonaeen dynasty and its allies the Sadducees. The precursors of the Pharisees had cooperated with them both during the twenty-six-years-long struggle of Judaeen Jewry against the Seleucid power's attempt to Hellenise Judaea (168-142/1 B.C.). But, as soon as the Seleucid Government had acknowledged its defeat, the allied Jewish factions fell out with each other. The purpose for which the rigorists had cooperated with the Hasmonaeans and the Sadducees had not been to set the Hasmonaeans on a throne or to make the Temple safe for the conduct of the ritual worship of Yahweh there according to the Sadducees' traditional practice. Their purpose in taking part in the struggle had been to make Judaea safe for the exact fulfilment of Yahweh's ordinances as revealed in the Torah³ when this was interpreted according to the method adopted by the new order of scribes that had been instituted by Ezra. After the Seleucid Government's recognition, in 142/1 B.C., of the Hasmonaeen House's sovereignty over Judaea, the Pharisees quickly fell out with the Hasmonaeen kings John Hyrcanus (*regnabat* 135-105/4 B.C.) and Alexander Jannaeus (*regnabat* 102-76/5 B.C.);⁴ and they seem to have become a self-conscious party, with a party name, in the course of this conflict. There was a Pharisaic insurrection against John Hyrcanus,⁵ and a riot against Alexander Jannaeus in the Temple at one of the annual celebrations of the Feast of Tabernacles. Six thousand of the demonstrators are said to have been massacred, within the Temple precincts, by Alexander's Pisidian guard.⁶ This incident was followed by a six years' civil war in the Hasmonaeen Kingdom.⁷ The insurgents were not labelled Pharisees;⁸ and, indeed, militancy was contrary to Pharisaic principles. But the Pharisees were the beneficiaries of this upheaval. Alexander's widow and successor Alexandra (*regnabat* A.D. 75/4-67/6) capitulated to them. From that time onwards their position in Jewry was established, and, through all the subsequent military and political vicissitudes of the Jewish community in Palestine, the Pharisees went from strength to strength.

Though the Pharisees had separated themselves from the Hasmonaeans and the Sadducees so emphatically, this does not seem to have been the separation to which they were referring when they took their name. The implied antithesis to the Pharisaic party is not the Sadducee party and not the Hasmonaeen dynasty; it is 'the people of the land'

¹ Ibid., pp. 61-62, citing Eduard Meyer: *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii (Stuttgart and Berlin 1921, Cotta), p. 284.

² Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 46.

³ Herford, op. cit., p. 53.

⁴ Oesterley, op. cit., p. 37; Herford: *The Pharisees*, pp. 36-39.

⁵ Josephus: *The Great Romano-Jewish War*, Book I, chaps. 2, 8, and 67, cited by Moore, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 62-63.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., p. 64.

('am ha-aretz).¹ The phrase means 'natives', and it had the same opprobrious connotation as this English word in its present usage. It also carried with it several offensive historical reminiscences. It recalled the disgust shown by Ezra and his fellow Babylonian Jewish purists at the laxity of the observance of the Torah in the Palestinian Jewish community of their day. It also recalled the contempt and harshness shown by the Babylonian Jewish diaspora's ancestors, the wealthy urban minority in the Judah of the eighth century B.C., towards the unsophisticated peasantry in the countryside. Finally, it recalled the ruthless expropriation of the previous Canaanite owners of Palestine by the Hebrew barbarian invaders in or before the thirteenth century B.C. Evidence for the Pharisees' hostility to the 'am ha-aretz is to be found in their writings.² Hillel, for instance, pronounced that 'no [member of the] 'am ha-aretz is religious'.³ Johanan ben Zakkai exclaimed: 'Galilee! Galilee! Thou hatest the Torah. Before long thou will make common cause with the tax-assessors.'⁴ The Pharisees' opposition to the 'am ha-aretz was due to the Pharisees' passion for the correct observance of the Torah.⁵ Defensive precautions were taken by the Pharisees against being involved, through intercourse with the 'am ha-aretz, in breaches of the Torah.⁶

In the Pharisees' minds the 'am ha-aretz no doubt included all Jews who did not come up to the Pharisees' own standards. The term would have been applicable, in fact, to the Hasmonaeans and the Sadducees, as well as to the lax and ignorant mass of the common people. The numbers of the 'am ha-aretz had been increased by the Hasmonaean dynasty's conquests beyond the borders of Judaea. The Samaritans, who were conquered by John Hyrcanus, were proof against the Jewish version of Israel's and Judah's common ancestral religion. John Hyrcanus's destruction of the Samaritans' temple in 128 B.C.⁷ merely clinched the Samaritans' loyalty to their own version of the religion of Israel. The citizens of the Hellenic city-states conquered by Alexander Jannaeus preferred death to conversion to Judaism. But the conquered Idumaeans, Galileans,⁸ and Ituraeans were forcibly circumcised,⁹ and only a small minority of them will have been drawn into the Pharisees' camp by the zeal of the convert. The majority will have swollen the numbers of the 'am ha-aretz. The Idumaeans gave Jewry Herod; the Galilean contingent gave it Jesus.

Thus the Pharisees were a tiny minority in the Jewish community of their age. Josephus reckons their total numbers at not more than about six thousand;¹⁰ and he was writing of the situation on the eve of the Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70, when Palestinian Jewry included the

¹ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 59 and 72; idem: *The Pharisees*, pp. 31-32.

² Montefiore op. cit., pp. 6-7.

³ Moore, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 160.

⁴ S. W. Baron: *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 2nd ed., vol. i, pp. 278-9.

⁵ Montefiore, op. cit., p. 15.

⁶ Moore, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 159.

⁷ Moore, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 26 and 56.

⁸ Idumaea was finally conquered by Aristobulus in 104 B.C. after a first conquest by John Hyrcanus (Moore, op. cit., vol. i, p. 56); Galilee was conquered in 104-102 B.C. (Oesterley, op. cit., p. 37).

⁹ Moore, op. cit., vol. i, p. 336.

¹⁰ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 60; idem: *The Pharisees*, p. 34.

Idumaeans and Galilaeans as well as the Judeans, and when the population of the Jewish districts of Palestine had increased as a result of the century of peace and prosperity that the country had been enjoying since the beginning of the reign of Herod the Great (*accessit* 40 B.C.). Moreover, the Pharisees were not only a minority; they were a censorious one; and they frankly displayed their feelings. They had shown their disapproval of the Hasmonaeans when these had been at the height of their power. After the liquidation of the Hasmonaean regime by Pompey in 63 B.C., the Pharisees did not conceal their disapproval of Herod the Great and his successors. They also disapproved of the Zealots, who stood, in the age of Roman ascendancy, for the former Hasmonaean policy of armed resistance to domineering gentile powers.¹ In the Talmud, which is the Pharisees' literary legacy, the Hasmonaeans are ignored and the Zealots are condemned.² The Zealots' outlook and temper are reflected in the apocalyptic Jewish literature,³ and this too—and the apocryphal writings as well—are ignored in the Pharisaic literature.⁴

'The non-Pharisaic literature represents, both on its good and on its bad side, the religious ideas of the large majority of Jews in the period which it covers, while yet it does not represent that which was really vital, creative, and progressive in the Judaism of that period.'⁵

This passage perhaps fully explains the apparent paradox of the Pharisees' eventual triumph. Montefiore raises the question how the rabbis' recorded hostility to the '*am ha-aretz*' is compatible with the historical fact that they received popular support.⁶ This censorious minority had no coercive power over the masses whom they openly despised.⁷ There is some evidence that the hostile feeling was mutual.⁸ Yet the Pharisees had great influence over these at least partly hostile masses.⁹ Indeed, popular Judaism 'was Pharisaic as far as it went'.¹⁰ 'The people followed the Pharisees.'¹¹ Present-day Judaism is Pharisaic Judaism.¹² In fact 'Judaism is the monument of the Pharisees.'¹³ By contrast, the Hasmonaeans and the Herods, wielding their military and political power, and the Sadducees, wielding their ecclesiastical power,

¹ In deploring the militancy of the Zealots, the Pharisees were in agreement with both Herod and Jesus; and this consensus is not surprising. For the Palestinian Jews to challenge Rome in war was criminal folly—as was demonstrated by the outcome of the wars of A.D. 66–70 and A.D. 132–5. The Hasmonaean resistance to the Seleucid Monarchy had been heroic but not foolhardy. The Seleucid power had been an idol whose feet were 'part of clay' (Dan. ii. 33). The Roman power was all of iron. Tacitus (*Historiae*, Book V, chaps. 8–10) draws attention to the Jews' (i.e. the Zealots') miscalculation in imagining that they could deal with the Romans as the Hasmonaeans had dealt with the Seleucidae in the age when the Seleucid power had already been broken by its collision with Rome.

² Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 18.

³ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 127; idem: *The Pharisees*, p. 188.

⁴ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 125.

⁵ Ibid., p. 130.

⁶ Montefiore, op. cit., p. 11.

⁷ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 137.

⁸ S. W. Baron: *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 2nd ed., vol. i, p. 278.

⁹ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 77–78.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 80.

¹¹ E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 117. Cp. p. 123.

¹² D. W. Riddle: *Jesus and the Pharisees*, p. 3.

¹³ Moore, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 193.

did not gain any hold over Jewish hearts; nor did Jesus nor Christianity—not even Jewish Christianity. The Jewish Christians were branded as odious heretics; and even the Sadducees, after they had faded out in A.D. 70, became heretics posthumously on account of their disbelief in the resurrection,¹ after the Pharisees had made the belief in it a *conditio sine qua non* for being accepted as an orthodox Jew. The Zealots alone were able, in their day, to compete with the Pharisees for the allegiance of the masses;² but the Zealots' influence was temporary, the Pharisees' influence was permanent.³

What were the reasons for the Pharisees' eventual triumph? In the first place, the Pharisees had a creative aim that answered to the Jewish people's needs, and was within their reach, in the situation in which they found themselves in the Post-Exilic Age. 'Pharisaism was the application of Prophetic teaching to life.'⁴ In the second place, the Pharisees had a method for translating the aim into action. In the third place, they were single-minded. They were devoted to their aim and they never flagged in their efforts to put it into effect in accordance with their own prescriptions. Pharisaism won the Jewish people's allegiance both because of the intrinsic spiritual value of its aim and because of the sincerity of the Pharisees in practising what they preached.⁵

Another, though secondary, reason for the Pharisees' success was their pacifism. Their political requirement was negative and modest. They required freedom for themselves to carry out God's commandments, as revealed in His Torah, according to their own method of interpreting the Torah. They would submit to any political regime, Jewish or gentile, that met this minimal demand of theirs.⁶ On this condition they were prepared to put up with Herod's government⁷ or with the Roman

¹ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 86.

² Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 77-78.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁴ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 238. The influence of the Prophets on the people's religion was in fact greatest in the Post-Exilic Age (Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 15). Ezraic Judaism was bent on putting Prophetic teaching into practice (Herford: *The Pharisees*, pp. 136-7). 'If there had been no Prophets, there would have been no Pharisees, the Prophets would have perished' (*ibid.*, p. 138). Better late than never. Belated recognition and veneration is praiseworthy, not criminal. The Gospels admit the contemporary Pharisees' regard for the Prophets in twisting it into a criminal offence (Matt. xxiii. 29-32; Luke xi. 47).

⁵ In the Gospels the Pharisees are denounced as hypocrites (e.g. in Matt. vi. 3-9 and xxi. 23; Mark xii. 38-40; Luke xi. 39-52). This accusation is unjust, for the Pharisees did not only practise what they preached, they also believed in it. They can perhaps fairly be accused of self-righteousness and self-complacency, and also of formalism. Their formalism was indeed an inevitable consequence of their conception of the nature of the Torah and of the method by which the Torah was to be interpreted. In their belief the Torah was God's teaching, and was therefore to be obeyed precisely, totally, and unquestioningly. They also believed that they had a method of interpreting the Torah by which they could elicit the commandments contained in it. Their whole duty, as they saw it, was to obey these commandments as they were revealed by applying to the Torah the Pharisaic method of interpretation. To draw distinctions between commandments, and to judge that some of these were more important, and therefore more imperative, than others, would have seemed to them, not merely presumptuous, but positively impious. The questionable feature of Pharisaism is its intellectual premises. There can be no doubt that the Pharisees were sincere in acting on them. Hypocrisy is denounced by the rabbis themselves (C. G. Montefiore: *Rabbinical Literature and Gospel Teachings*, pp. 118-19; Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 55).

⁶ Rabbi J. B. Agus points out that the Jews have not only been ready to forgo self-government. They have also been ready to lose their cultural identity as well (e.g. their ancestral language). They have concentrated on preserving their religious identity (*Judaism*, 1956, p. 18).

⁷ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 77.

government, though these were, in themselves, no less distasteful to Pharisees than they were to other Jews. The Pharisees tried to keep out of politics,¹ and in principle they were pacifists.² 'The whole Zealot movement was contrary to the ground principles of Pharisaism'.³ For the Pharisees, 'fidelity to their religion and the authority of the interpreters of the Law had completely displaced political loyalty and the sense of civic duty'.⁴ 'It was true that', in their view, 'there was and could be only one rightful king over Israel, viz. God; but, until He saw fit to send His messiah to establish His Kingdom, no attempt ought to be made by human action to force His hand'.⁵ The right human contribution towards bringing the messianic kingdom into existence was repentance, not violence.⁶ Two acts may be cited as being characteristically Pharisaic: the Jewish petition in 63 B.C. to Pompey to abolish the Hasmonaean monarchy,⁷ and Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's concordat with the Roman military authorities on the eve of the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. Johanan, on his part, agreed to submit to Roman rule; the Romans, on their part, agreed to let him move, unmolested, from Jerusalem to Jamnia, behind the Roman lines, and to establish there his school of rabbinical research.⁸

In maintaining this non-militant political attitude the Pharisees were at one with Jesus and with the Christian Church; and it is no accident that both Pharisaic Judaism and Christianity have survived and that Hasmonaean and Zealot Judaism have perished. This Pharisaic-Christian pacifism was practical common sense in an age in which the historic heart of the *Oikoumenê* was dominated by a series of overwhelmingly powerful and aggressive military empires. But pacifism is also the right policy for a higher religion in all ages and all circumstances, and this for a spiritual reason that is always valid. When the adherents of a higher religion go into politics and take up arms, they thereby stultify their religion and sterilize it—and this the more grievously the more successful they are in achieving the worldly aims into which they have diverted their energies. This truth is illustrated in the histories, not only of Judaism, but of Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrianism, and Sikhism. The Pharisees' pacifism saved Judaism from perishing with the Zealots.

(iv) *The Pharisees' Conception of the Nature of the Jewish Scriptures*

To a sceptical outsider's mind, the Jewish Scriptures are a heterogeneous collection of books, fragments of books, and centos composed

¹ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 45.

² *Ibid.*, p. 190. Cp. *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 60, 69, 77; Montefiore: *Rabbinic Literature and Gospel Teachings*, pp. 27-30.

³ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 189.

⁴ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 113.

⁵ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 69.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁷ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 113.

⁸ I have been criticized—I think justifiably—by at least two Jewish writers for taking Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's concordat with the Romans as a new departure in the history of Judaism and therefore giving Johanan himself too great prominence. E. Berkovitz points out that 'he does not represent a new departure in Judaism; he is only one link, though a very important one' (*Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 118, Cp. p. 44, footnote 25). M. Samuel points out that Rabbi Johanan needed no conversion; he was in the main stream of Pharisaic tradition (*The Professor and the Fossil*, pp. 86-87).

of fragments. The only thing that all components of the collection have in common is that they are the work of human authors. In genre and subject and, still more, in literary and spiritual value, they differ enormously. The set of books that was eventually made canonical contains mythology, folk-lore, history, law (secular as well as religious), lyric and elegiac poetry, politico-religious prophetic manifestos, additions to these manifestos by anonymous hands in the original authors' names, one problem play (the Book of Job), and, latest in date, one apocalypse (the Book of Daniel). The canonical collection ranges in date over about eight centuries (tenth to second century B.C.). The Pentateuch alone, which was all that was ever accepted as being canonical by the Samaritans,¹ ranges over two or three centuries (not reckoning in the earlier dates of the traditional materials out of which it was composed). The collection, so it appears to the outsider, has no unity. As he sees it, it is certainly not a self-consistent, uniformly authoritative, and all-sufficing divine revelation of what is true and right. This, however, is what the Pharisees saw in it,² and the vision possessed them heart and soul. For them their Scriptures were a written revelation of God's teaching (Torah).³ It was their duty to do what the Torah told them. It was, therefore, also their duty to interpret it right, so far as this could be done by taking unlimited pains. 'Religion, for them, was the realisation, in thought and in act, of all that the Torah revealed, so far as it was given to them to apprehend its meaning.'⁴

'The foundation of Judaism is the belief that religion is revealed.'⁵ This belief is, indeed, Judaism's distinctive mark.⁶

'It might be a reasonable religion, but it was in an eminent degree a religion of authority; a revealed religion, which did not ask Man's approval, but demanded obedience to the whole and every part, reason and inclination to the contrary notwithstanding; an exclusive religion which tolerated no divided allegiance.'⁷

The Torah was God's wisdom (*hokmah*).⁸ It had been created before the World,⁹ and it was unchangeable.¹⁰ It was also deemed to contain an inexhaustible store of still unelicited truth.¹¹ So, in theory, the possibility of progressive revelation was excluded.¹² Yet even religious beliefs cannot be frozen permanently, however conservative the believers' attitude and intentions may be. A method of unavowedly progressive interpretation of the theoretically unchangeable but at the same time inexhaustible written Torah kept Judaism on the move, and thereby kept it alive.

This way out had to be found and taken because the belief that the

¹ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 239. Cp. p. 245, footnote 1, and pp. 247-8 and 358.

³ 'Torah means teaching. . . . Torah does not mean law and never did' (Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 30-31. Cp. eundem: *The Pharisees*, p. 54; Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 262; Oesterley, *op. cit.*, p. 56).

⁴ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 47.

⁵ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 112.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁸ Oesterley, *op. cit.*, p. 61; Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 263-5.

⁹ Oesterley, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.

¹⁰ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 239 and 269.

¹¹ Herford: *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, p. 10.

¹² Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 239.

revelation of God's will was contained in the written Torah had a corollary that was as inescapable as it was awkward. All God's revealed injunctions are, in virtue of their origin, absolutely, and therefore equally, authoritative and obligatory.¹ The belief in verbal inspiration leads to 'an atomistic exegesis'.² Every injunction that can be elicited from the text of the written Torah by the agreed method of interpretation stands on its own feet with sovereign authority as one of God's absolute commands. The act of observance is worthless in itself; its intrinsic value and its practical effect are irrelevant; it is valuable solely because it is an act of obedience to God's will.³ 'A river will carry on its surface sticks and straws and the refuse from its banks; but it is the river which matters, and, without it, the trifles it carries down would never have been noticed.'⁴ Accordingly, primitive ritual rules embedded in the older strata of the Pre-Exilic Scriptures were accepted blindly as being God's commands.⁵ No incompatibility was felt as between ritual minutiae and ethical principles.⁶ 'Conformity to the revealed will of God is the essence of religion.'⁷ There is no warrant in Judaism for dissecting the law into a 'ceremonial' and a 'moral' section.⁸ For the rabbis, 'right and wrong were . . . not defined by the reason and conscience of men . . . but by the revealed will of God'.⁹ Pre-Exilic 'sin offerings' had been expiations for acts that had no moral significance.¹⁰ 'The specific purifications and expiations of the Law apply almost solely to cases which have intrinsically no moral quality';¹¹ and, in the Post-Exilic rabbis' eyes, breaches of morally indifferent laws were as sinful as breaches of morals.¹² In the rabbis' view it was possible to sin without knowledge or intention.¹³ Sin means a breach of God's law.¹⁴ 'The legal righteousness of the rabbis was, in frequent practice, an odd combination of minute "ceremonial" and outward observances and of the most delicate loving-kindness and the sweetest piety.'¹⁵

Thus, for the rabbis, 'the Pentateuch was both an inspiration and a bondage'.¹⁶

'By the terms of their faith, they could not distinguish between one verse and another. . . . Yet the rabbis struggle (unconsciously) in their chains and against their limitations; for all these distinctions between light and heavy commands, all this insistence on "for its own sake", "all for love", all this special stress on "moral" commands such as chastity and love of neighbours and so on, are extra-Pentateuchal; they are read into the text, and are not to be found *in* the text.'¹⁷

Montefiore draws attention¹⁸ to the extent to which the Rabbis transcended the text of the written Torah. This was made possible by the Pharisaic method of interpreting it.

¹ Ibid., p. 235.

³ Herford: *The Pharisees*, pp. 76-77. Cp. pp. 116-17, 118, 120.

⁴ Ibid., p. 69.

⁶ Op. cit., vol. i, p. 18.

⁸ Ibid., p. 79.

¹⁰ Op. cit., vol. i, p. 461.

¹² Ibid., p. 462.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 116-17.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 319.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 294.

² Ibid., p. 248.

⁵ Moore, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 76-77.

⁷ Op. cit., vol. ii, p. 78.

⁹ Ibid. Cp. pp. 82 and 89.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 494.

¹³ Ibid., p. 463.

¹⁵ Montefiore, op. cit., p. 198.

¹⁷ Ibid. Cp. p. 351.

(v) *The Pharisees' Method of interpreting the Written Torah*

The basis of the Pharisaic interpretation of the written Torah was the doctrine that an unwritten Torah, besides the written Torah, had been given to Moses by God; that this had been handed down, by an authentic oral tradition, to the Post-Exilic scribes; that this unwritten Torah, in which the scribes were versed, was as authoritative as the written Torah; and that it could therefore be used legitimately by the scribes as a key for interpreting both the written Torah and the priests' ordinances (*gēsērōth*) by which the gaps and obscurities in the written Torah had been inadequately supplemented.¹ This audacious new Pharisaic doctrine had been rejected by the Sadducees,² but that did not deter the Pharisees from systematically reinterpreting the Torah by means of their revolutionary hermeneutical instrument. The process went on for not less than six hundred years, till it came to an end with the completion of the Babylonian Talmud. 'This conception of the unwritten Torah proved to be the means of saving Judaism from decay.'³ Scripture unaided by tradition had never been adequate.⁴ The new doctrine opened the way for what was, in effect, though not avowedly, a claim on the rabbis' part to be receiving continual inspiration.⁵

'The religious life of the Jewish people was saved by the exaltation of the Torah from being a closed revelation to an open one, from a dead letter to a letter made alive again, from a text long ago set and hardened, whose meaning could never change and which could say nothing new, to a text whose meaning was plastic because freshly interpreted in the light of the growing moral discernment of religious teachers, age after age.'⁶

Thus, in effect, the Post-Exilic scribes had given themselves a free hand. The use that they made of this was to elicit from the text of the written Torah two kinds of sentences: the one kind imperative, the other indicative.⁷ A sentence of the imperative kind was called a *hālāchāh* (in the plural, *hālāchōth*). The literal meaning of the word is 'walk'; its technical meaning is a divine command elicited from the written Torah by applying the unwritten Torah to the interpretation of it.⁸ The corpus of *halachoth* is what is meant, in the Gospel according to St. Matthew (xv. 2-3), by 'the tradition of the elders'.⁹ A sentence of the indicative kind was called a *haggādāh*. It was a statement of matters of fact in such fields as those of theology, ethics, psychology, and metaphysics.¹⁰ A *halachah* was a much more serious matter than a *haggadah* in the rabbis' estimation. It was serious because, if and when it had been ratified by the recognized procedure, obedience to it became absolutely obligatory for

¹ For this doctrine of the unwritten Torah, see Oesterley, *The Jews and Judaism during the Greek Period*, p. 58; Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 42-43; eundem: *The Pharisees*, p. 63; Moore, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 253-4.

² Oesterley, op. cit., pp. 250-1; Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 46.

³ Herford, op. cit., p. 44.

⁴ Moore, op. cit., vol. i, p. 251.

⁵ Herford: *The Pharisees*, pp. 65-66.

⁶ Ibid., p. 66. Cp. p. 144.

⁷ See Herford: *The Pharisees*, pp. 70-71.

⁸ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 54.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 56. Cp. p. 83. Idem: *The Pharisees*, p. 79.

all Jews. The *halachoth*, being binding, must be consistent with each other; the *haggadoth* were not binding and therefore might be mutually contradictory.¹ An accredited teacher could pronounce a *haggadah* on his own individual authority.² On the other hand the definition of a *halachah* was the corporate concern of the whole order of rabbis, and it did not become valid unless it had been adopted by a majority vote,³ or at least by an informal consensus.⁴ All *halachoth* were deemed to be implicitly contained in the text of the written Torah.⁵ Yet the rabbis sometimes went so far as to set the written Torah aside.⁶ 'The ethics of the *halachah* was not identical with the ethics of the Old Testament, and the change from one to the other was deliberately made.'⁷ Moreover, the breach of a *halachah* was treated by the rabbis as being a graver offence than disobedience to the Scriptures.⁸ An established *halachah* could, however, be modified by subsequent decisions taken in proper form;⁹ and thus the corpus of *halachoth* remained plastic until the completion of the Babylonian Talmud. By contrast, the corpus of *haggadoth* did not evolve, and in this it differed from Christian theology.¹⁰ The rabbis' theology remained unsystematic;¹¹ they did not go in for theological definitions.¹² 'From first to last, they were religious teachers, and neither theologians nor philosophers.'¹³

Herford points out¹⁴ that the Pharisees quarrelled with Jesus because he taught the people 'as one having authority, and not as the scribes'.¹⁵ In other words, he pronounced *halachoth* on his own authority as if they were *haggadoth* and as if he were an accredited rabbi, recognized by the established members of the order. He did not have this status, and, even if he had had it, he would not have been entitled to promulgate *halachoth* of his own unless and until these had been adopted and ratified by a consensus of his colleagues in accordance with the established rabbinical procedure.

'He repudiated the whole system of the *halachah*; and he criticised, and on occasion rejected, the Torah on which the *halachah* was based.'¹⁶ . . . What is recorded shows clearly that Jesus had no close acquaintance with the *halachah* which he denounced, and none at all with the theory of it. . . . If he had had such knowledge, he would not have used the case of Corban as a weapon, for the case on that subject was quite other than he supposed.'¹⁷

¹ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 57; idem: *The Pharisees*, pp. 81 and 147-8.

² Ibid., pp. 74, 108, 109; *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 54.

³ There is a parallel to this in Islam. Here, too, rulings become valid through an informal consensus (*ijmā'*) among the doctors of the *Shari'ah*.

⁴ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 85.

⁵ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 111.

⁶ Herford: *The Pharisees*, pp. 110-13.

⁷ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 84.

⁸ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 79.

⁹ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 85.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 86. Cp. pp. 91-92. Herford makes the point that Christianity allows freedom in moral theology (i.e. in *halachah*) but not in doctrinal theology (i.e. in *haggadah*), whereas in Judaism it is the other way round (*The Pharisees*, p. 105).

¹¹ In *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 205-8, and *The Pharisees*, p. 204.

¹² Matt. vii. 29.

¹³ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 205.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 208. Cp. *The Pharisees*, pp. 205-7.

It is no wonder that the people 'were astonished at his doctrine',¹ or that the rabbis were not only surprised² but were also incensed and alarmed by it. If Jesus had won the people's allegiance, his victory would have spelled the overthrow of the whole system that the scribes had so carefully constructed and were so laboriously putting into effect. Conversely, 'if there had been no Pharisees, the Church would have met with little or no opposition'.³ The encounter between the Pharisees and Jesus was 'the mutual impact of two irreconcilable conceptions of religion', and 'there was never any attempt at a reconciliation'.⁴ The Pharisaic literature does not show any recognition of Jesus's greatness.⁵

The quarrel was the more tragic because, apart from this crucial issue, there was much in common between the two parties. For instance, 'there was a very considerable extent of common ground in the two bodies of teaching. . . . Parallels can be found in the rabbinical literature for perhaps as much as 90 per cent. of the recorded sayings of Jesus'.⁶ Neither party borrowed the 'common ground' from the other. 'The most natural and obvious source for the common teaching is the synagogue'.⁷ Parables were used in the synagogue teaching.⁸ 'Most of what' Jesus 'taught was not original, since he gave for the most part only what was the current teaching of the synagogue'.⁹ 'His originality showed itself elsewhere than in the teaching which was common to him and the Pharisees'.¹⁰ Again, there was no quarrel between Jesus and the Pharisees over the issue of nationalism versus universalism, which has been exercising Jewish minds ever since Deutero-Isaiah attained his vision of Yahweh as being the One True God. Though Christianity ceased to be merely a Jewish sect and became a universal religion within a few years of Jesus's death, Jesus himself is represented in the Gospel according to St. Matthew (x. 5-6 and xv. 21-28) as expressly limiting his own mission to Jewry and as excluding the Samaritans and the gentiles from his field of concern; and the harshness of the language here used can have few, if any, parallels in the rabbinical literature.¹¹

Nor was there any quarrel over a claim, on Jesus's part, to be the Messiah. There is no mention of such a claim in the rabbinical literature;¹² and 'the claim to be the Messiah was not in itself an offence at all' in the sight of the Jews—though it was in the sight of the Romans.¹³ The Jewish Christians' recognition of Jesus as the Messiah did not conflict with Pharisaic orthodoxy.¹⁴ There was no obligatory orthodox doctrine of the Messiah or of the last things.¹⁵ Any Jew could declare himself to be the Messiah at his own peril. The verdict on his claim would be given by

¹ Matt. vii. 28.

² Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 201.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 208. Cp. *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 207.

⁵ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 212.

⁶ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 187.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 202. Herford notes (*ibid.*, p. 196) that Jesus preached mainly outside the synagogues, and that this was something new.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

¹¹ This is pointed out by K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 294. Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 186, notices that Matthew is the most Jewish, as well as the most anti-Pharisaic, of the gospels.

¹² Herford: *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, pp. 349 and 380-1; *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, pp. 218-19.

¹³ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 214.

¹⁴ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 90.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

history. Some claimants' claims have been recognized by some Jews for shorter or longer periods; but, up to date, no claimant has ever obtained permanent recognition from Jewry as a whole. The most sensational case was Rabbi Akiba's recognition of Bar Cochbah. This rash act proved Akiba fallible, without having done Bar Cochbah any good. Bar Cochbah's insurrection against Roman rule failed; both he and Akiba met their deaths at Roman hands; and in Jewish eyes the event proved that both men had been mistaken on a point of fact—Bar Cochbah in claiming to be the Messiah, and Akiba in endorsing his claim. The outcome must have deterred other eminent rabbis from following Rabbi Akiba's example, but Rabbi Akiba was not condemned for having committed himself.¹ His act and Bar Cochbah's, which in Roman eyes were high treason, were not religious offences in the sight of Rabbi Akiba's fellow doctors of the law. They were unfortunate errors of intellectual judgement.

As for the case of Jesus, Herford holds² that there is no evidence that Jesus did claim to be the Messiah, though he evidently thought that he had some kind of divine commission. 'While there was a considerable range of meanings in which the term Messiah could be understood, it is quite evident that Jesus did not identify himself with any of them.'³ 'In any sense commonly recognized at the time, he was not the Messiah.'⁴ It would, indeed, have been a contradiction in terms for the Messiah to declare, as Jesus is said to have declared to Pilate: 'My kingdom is not of this World', with the corollary that his servants would not fight.⁵ This pacifism, which put out of court any claim on Jesus's part to be the Messiah in the currently accepted sense, should have commended itself to the Pharisees; for they, too, were pacifists and disapproved of the Zealots just because of the Zealots' militancy.

Thus it would appear that, but for the issue over the *halachah*, the Pharisees and Jesus had no reason for falling out with each other. If this is true, it is a further proof of the importance, in the Pharisees' eyes, of the procedure by which *halachoth* were established.

5. THE ISSUE BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND UNIVERSALISM

Moore truly describes Judaism as being 'the first great missionary religion of the Mediterranean World'.⁶ Zoroastrianism and Buddhism were perhaps no later than Judaism in starting on their missionary careers, and Zoroastrianism's mission-field overlapped with Judaism's in South-West Asia. But, at the western end of the Old World, Judaism was certainly the earliest missionary religion in the field. Some of its more notable missionary achievements have been noticed at an earlier point in this volume.⁷ It was bound to become a missionary religion when Deutero-Isaiah had seen in the national god of the Jews the One True God of all mankind and the whole Universe. Yet 'the pregnant idea of the mission of Israel found little comprehension or response in

¹ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 218.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 324.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

⁶ John xix. 36.

⁷ *On pp. 85-86.*

the centuries that immediately followed'.¹ Two of the products of the Exile—the diasporá and the synagogue—were magnificent potential instruments for converting the World. The diasporá eventually spread westwards along the Mediterranean, as well as eastwards into Iran. Every city of any importance in the Old-World *Oikoumené* west of India came to contain a local Jewish community, and each of these communities would maintain at least one synagogue. The institution of synagogues had not been invented for missionary purposes; its purpose had been to preserve, in diasporá, the relation between the Jews themselves and their god; but, though this was not the inventors' intention, the synagogue was so attractive that it gathered a circle of gentiles round its Jewish nucleus.² When Paul set out to convert the Hellenic World to Christianity, he found, round every Jewish synagogue, an inner circle of gentile proselytes and an outer circle of 'god-fearing' adherents (*sebómenoi*).³ Judaism had attracted them, yet Christianity captivated them when it appeared on the scene. These gentile converts and semi-converts to Judaism were the first recruits whom the Christian missionaries won for their own faith. Why were Judaism's gentile adherents captured for Christianity so easily? And why, since then, has the western half of the Old World been converted, not to Judaism, but to two 'deviationist' Judaic religions, Christianity and Islam? The answer is that Christianity and Islam each quickly rid itself of the handicap of being a Jewish national religion and an Arab national religion respectively, whereas Judaism has never ceased to be a Jewish national religion, in spite of its having become also a universal religion some two thousand five hundred years ago. 'The Jew is part of a collective destiny, even when he does not know it or is unwilling to share it.'⁴ But 'the group distinctiveness of the "peculiar" people is the ever-menacing pitfall for its universal responsibility'.⁵

To convert people to a religion, the missionary must identify himself with them and take them to his bosom on the sole condition that their acceptance of the religion that he has presented to them has been genuine and whole-hearted. The common bond that their conversion has established between the missionary and them should overcome all previous differences of nationality or culture and should place the converts on a footing of complete equality with the messenger whose religion has now become theirs as much as his. The Islamic missionary comes near to living up to this ideal. But the Jewish missionary has hitherto been inhibited from going to this winning length by his over-riding anxiety to preserve his community's distinctive identity in the form of a nation. Since Deutero-Isaiah's day the Jews have recognized that God is the father of all men, and not only of Israel.⁶ But their recognition of this truth has been prevented from bearing its full fruit by the persistence of a nationalistic conviction that 'the relation of children was only effectively realised by those who belonged to the community of Israel'.⁷ The Jews have realized that, since their god is the father of

¹ Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 229.

² See Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 75.

³ J. L. Talmon in *Commentary*, July, 1957, p. 4.

⁴ E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?* p. 130.

⁵ Herford: *The Pharisees*, pp. 157-8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

all men, the conversion of the gentiles is their mission.¹ But this same god, being also theirs, is, in their eyes, Israel's lover; and, if the gentiles ask to share the lover, Israel's reply is: 'You have no part in him.'²

This narrow-hearted and ungenerous spirit has led the Jews to offer uninviting alternatives to gentiles who have been attracted towards the religion of Deutero-Isaiah. One alternative was to become a proselyte, but this involved becoming not only a convert to Judaism but also a naturalized member of the Jewish community.³ According to Philo⁴ a proselyte severs all his previous social, as well as religious, ties. The proselyte, if a male, had to submit to circumcision, besides receiving baptism and making a gift to the Temple.⁵ It is not surprising that, among the proselytes, women were in a great majority. They were also in a majority among the 'god-fearing' adherents in the outer circle.⁶ Gentiles who joined this outer circle were not required, as proselytes were, to take on their shoulders the whole burden of the Torah as interpreted by the Pharisees.⁷ But the price of their being let off relatively lightly was that they were kept at arm's length as semi-outsiders: 'second-class citizens' of the Jewish community. It is not surprising that Paul and his fellow Christian missionaries found it easy to draw Judaism's gentile adherents into the fraternity of a rival Judaic religion in which they could still worship Deutero-Isaiah's One True God without being penalized on account of their gentile origin.

In their attitude towards gentiles, Jews today are still the prisoners of the masterful Babylonian Jewish reformer Ezra. His objective was to make the Jews obey the Torah; and, as a necessary means to this end, he took drastic steps to segregate them from their gentile neighbours.⁸ 'The general result of his policy was to draw a sharp line of division between Jew and gentile, and to make for the Jewish community a sort of enclosure in the midst of the gentile world.'⁹ This was an inevitable effect of enforcing the observance of the Torah as Ezra understood it.¹⁰ But the observance of the Torah as understood by Ezra and by his successors the Pharisees is not an inevitable accompaniment of the religion of Deutero-Isaiah. Ezra raised an issue. He did not settle it. And the debate that he started has been continuing in Jewish hearts and minds ever since.

Montefiore observes that particularism was the rabbis' prevailing mood,¹¹ and that they were frank in revealing this.¹² 'Yet flashes of universalism break and shine through the darkness':¹³ and his comment is that 'somehow the universalist passages of the rabbis seem to me all the more remarkable in view of their prevailing particularism'.¹⁴ In the Modern Age, and above all in the present generation, the debate has become active. In this age, as in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B.C.,¹⁵ the Jews have been meeting with momentous experiences and have been

¹ Herford, *The Pharisees*, op. cit., pp. 158-9.

² Moore, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 396-7.

³ Ibid., pp. 232 and 326-8.

⁴ Philo: *De Monarchiâ*, chap. vii, §§ 51-53, cited by Moore, *ibid.*, p. 327.

⁵ Moore, op. cit., p. 331.

⁶ Ibid., p. 325.

⁷ Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 34.

⁸ Ibid., p. 35.

⁹ Ibid., p. 207.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 107.

¹¹ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 19.

¹² Montefiore, op. cit., p. 69. Cp. p. 81.

¹³ Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁴ See p. 490.

undergoing far-reaching changes in the social and cultural conditions of their life; and it is therefore not surprising that now, once again, their hearts and minds should be on the move.

The first of these great modern changes in the social and cultural conditions of the Jews' life was their 'emancipation' in the Western World in application of the ideas of the French Revolution. Rabbi Agus recalls that, in the Age of Emancipation, Jews in the West have been struggling, in spite of the opposition of Jewish nationalists, to win the status of a religious community, and that this choice has been made, not once, but many times, in many parts of Europe. He cites the line taken by Napoleon's 'sanhedrin' in Paris, which included some distinguished rabbis among its members. This body, representing the Jews of France, renounced the French Jews' previous quasi-national status and also their hope of a return to Eretz Israel. It accepted for them the new status of being 'Jewish Frenchmen'.¹ Rabbi Agus points out² that, in the present generation,

'the disappearance of the Jewish "heart-land" in Central Europe, the rise of the state of Israel, and the emergence of American Jewry as the massive centre of the global fellowship of Israel are all decisive factors which imply the opening of a new and completely unprecedented era.'

In other passages Rabbi Agus draws attention to the tenseness of the debate in this new era of Jewish history, and at the same time finds the causes of this tension in human nature and traces its origins back into the Jews' past. Rabbi Agus sees 'the dynamic ideas of history as vertical fields of force between an ideal pole and an instinctive drive'.³ He puts his finger on the tension between Jewish nationalism and Jewish monotheism,⁴ and on the tension, within Jewish nationalism, between instinctive forces of self-assertion and ideal elements of self-transcendence.⁵ 'In a religious community, as in an historical nation, we encounter the same tension between self-assertion and self-transcendence.'⁶ In Judaism 'there emerged a quadri-polar field of consciousness which was both unprecedented and unparalleled'.⁷ 'Each of the four poles of Jewish consciousness—the self-transcendence of religion and its self-satisfied dogmatism, the spiritualization of national feeling and its degeneration into nihilistic chauvinism—could achieve dominance in the soul of the Jew.'⁸

Rabbi Agus's diagnosis can be illustrated from the writings of other contemporary Jewish thinkers. For example, Berkovitz holds that Judaism has no world-wide other-worldly mission.⁹ Baron holds that 'the Jewish religion without the "Chosen People" is unthinkable, neither could it, like the other religions, be transplanted from the Jewish to another people'.¹⁰ Berkovitz declares,¹¹ in Ezra's vein, that 'to accept

¹ Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, 1956, pp. 20–21.

² In *Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), p. 319.

³ *Judaism*, 1956, p. 33.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁶ E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?* pp. 124–5.

⁷ Baron: *op. cit.*, 2nd ed., vol. 1, p. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹¹ In *op. cit.*, p. 76.

Judaism without accepting the Mosaic Law is a contradiction in terms'. Eban sees 'the wave of the future' not in the diasporá but in the recently established state of Israel. In his view the present century is signalized by the triumph of national states and is the burial-ground of broader associations.¹ Yet in the same essay² the same Jewish writer finds that the characteristics of Judaism are a belief in the possibility of moral choice, a belief in social justice, and a belief in universal peace; and he holds that the Jewish people have conserved their 'union and identity, not for their own sake, but in order to maintain trusteeship over these revolutionary ideals'.³ Samuel holds⁴ that the Jewish people 'is a continuing association of individuals . . . working out an experiment in the relationship to God. . . . When the Messiah will have come, when all peoples will have accepted the faith, the experiment will have been successfully concluded.' The following beautiful and moving passage is part of a Jewish prayer that is prayed by a Jewish congregation today.⁵

'Our guardian, gird us with strength and patience for our holy mission. Grant that all the children of Israel may recognise the goal of Israel's changeful career, so that they may exemplify by their zeal and love for mankind the truth of Israel's watchword: One humanity on earth, even as there is but one God in heaven. Enlighten all that call themselves by thy name with the knowledge that the sanctuary of wood and stone which once crowned Zion's hill was but a gate, through which Israel stepped out into the world to lead mankind nearer unto thee.

'Thou alone knowest when this work of atonement shall be completed; when the day shall dawn in which the light of thy truth shall illumine the whole earth. But that great day of universal reconciliation shall come, as surely as none of thy words return void except it have done that for which thou didst send it.'

The Jewish faith is the vision of the character of the One True God that was caught by the Prophets progressively from Amos to Deutero-Isaiah. The 'experiment' in the relationship to God is 'the application of Prophetic teaching to life' which is Herford's definition of Pharisaism.⁶ This is a great spiritual treasure which the Jews have to give to all peoples. But one cannot give a treasure and at the same time keep it to oneself. If the giving of this treasure is the Jews' mission, as it surely is, then this mission requires them, now at last, to make that their paramount aim in place of the incompatible aim that they have always put first, so far, ever since their experience of the Babylonish Captivity. They will have to give up the national form of the Jewish community's distinctive identity in order to become, without reservations, the missionaries of a universal church that will be open, on an equal footing, to anyone, Jew or gentile, who gives his allegiance to Deutero-Isaiah's God and seeks to do His will. In our time the Zionist movement has been travelling in just the opposite direction to this. It has not only clung to, and accentuated, the national form of Jewish communal life. It has also put it back on to a

¹ A. Eban in *Toynbee and History*, p. 336.

² Ibid.

³ M. Samuel: *The Professor and the Fossil*, p. 176.

⁴ *Liberal Jewish Prayer Book*, vol. ii: Services for the Day of Memorial (Rosh Hashanah) and the Day of Atonement (London, 1937, Liberal Jewish Synagogue), pp. 280-1.

⁵ Herford: *The Pharisees*, p. 238, quoted already on p. 504.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 321-2.

territorial basis. On the other hand, the contemporary Reform, Conservative, and Liberal movements in the Jewish diaspora have been 'defossilising' their practice of Judaism.¹ They have already travelled far from the Pharisees' interpretation of the Torah and from the indiscriminating obedience to all *halachoth* which this interpretation demands.²

It is difficult and painful to renounce aims and practices to which one has remained faithful, at the cost of penalization and persecution, for hundreds of years. But the Jews have at their command a spiritual instrument that, in the past, has enabled them to perform feats as difficult as this. The unwritten Torah was dormant for 1,400 years, from the date of the closing of the Babylonian Talmud till the 'emancipation' of the Jews in the West in the Napoleonic Age. Yet, considering that it proved possible to bring the unwritten Torah to life in Ezra's time, and again in the Age of the Pharisees, it is not surprising that it should also be proving possible to revive it today; and it is an instrument that is equal to the task that has been confronting Jewry by now for 2,500 years. The treasure that the Jews have to give is not the Talmud or the written Torah or the Jewish diaspora or a Jewish national state in Palestine. It is the Prophets' vision of God's character; the relation of human souls to God as the Prophets have seen Him; and the ideals of human conduct that follow from this.

In equipping itself for its universal mission, Judaism might have something to learn from two great Jews whom it has disowned hitherto. It might recall that, at the zenith of the Pharisaic Age, one Pharisee, Paul, was singular in already anticipating the change of outlook that is perceptible among Jews today on a broader front. Paul perceived that the Torah, which had once been a spiritual canopy for the preservation of Judaism, had latterly become a spiritual impediment to the propagation of the Jewish faith, and that therefore the time had come for the Torah to be reinterpreted again. Present-day Jews could recognize in Paul a forerunner of theirs in this field, without having also to accept Paul's belief that Jesus was a divine being. The Jews might also at last lay claim to Jesus, whom they have allowed the Christians to appropriate without any Jewish protest. Jesus was not a Christian; he was a Jew in belief and practice, though, being a Galilaean, he may have been a gentile by descent. There is no evidence that he was not an orthodox Jew. The claims to divinity that are put into his mouth in the Gospels are not evidence of this; they are evidence only of what his Christian adherents in the next generation believed about him. This belief is blasphemous in terms of Judaism; but the blasphemy is Christian: Jesus himself cannot be convicted of it. Jesus was not a Pharisee; but a Jew could be an orthodox Jew without being a Pharisee in Jesus's time, as he can today. On this point, Jesus's Sadducee and Zealot contemporaries were in the same position as Jesus. Moreover, the quarrel between Jesus and the

¹ See Rabbi J. B. Agus's comments in the Annex to the present chapter.

² 'It has been a disadvantage for Judaism to have for generations, as its second sacred book—for I suppose the Talmud must be more or less so regarded—one which is so long and so composite, so inedited, as it were, and unpurged, so full of "high and low", so completely in "undress", as I have often called it, so naively and simply compiled' (C. G. Montefiore: *Rabbinic Literature and Gospel Teachings*, pp. 352-3).

Pharisees is progressively losing its meaning as the *halachoth*, after having been kept frozen for so many centuries, are being at last progressively transmuted.¹ To accept Jesus as a Jewish teacher who taught as one having authority does not involve acceptance of the Christian belief in Jesus's divinity.

The Jewish religion is meant for all mankind. So far from its being 'unthinkable' without the 'Chosen People', it cannot fulfil its destiny of becoming a universal religion unless and until the Jews renounce the national form of their distinctive communal identity for the sake of fulfilling their universal religious mission. To accept Judaism without accepting the Mosaic Law is not 'a contradiction in terms', if by 'the Mosaic Law' one means the Torah as reinterpreted by the Pharisees' method. A new Jewish reinterpretation of the Torah—this time as being a symbolic expression of the religious ideals of Judaism—is a necessary condition for Judaism's achievement of its destiny. Judaism's destiny is to be accessible to, and accepted by, the gentiles. It may be true that, without the carapace of the Torah and the Talmud, it is impossible for the Jews to maintain in diasporá their distinctive communal identity in its national form; but there are two ways in which a community's distinctive national identity may disappear: the Israelite way and the Roman. The Ten Tribes lost their national identity through being assimilated by peoples into whose countries they had been deported; the Romans gave up theirs by incorporating in their community the peoples whose countries they had united with their own. The two ways are antithetical in several senses. The Ten Tribes' way is passive, involuntary, and inglorious, and it is natural that the Jews should be on their guard against meeting the fate of their lost kinsmen. On the other hand the Roman way is active, deliberate, and noble, and the renunciation of communal identity in its national form does not involve the loss of communal identity itself when 'an ancient civilization' has been 'transmuted into a universal religion'.²

Today the Jews in the diasporá are being told by some Israelis that they are doomed to suffer the fate of the Ten Lost Tribes if they do not emigrate to the present Israeli state. But, in truth, the choices open to the Jews in the diasporá are not confined to these two alternatives. There is a third choice: the Roman choice of incorporating instead of being assimilated. The assimilation of the Jewish diasporá by the surrounding gentile majority is thus not their only alternative to emigration to Israel. Another possibility is that the Jewish diasporá might win converts to a denationalized and defossilized Judaism among the gentile majority around them. What the Romans did on the political plane, the Jews could do on the religious. They could incorporate gentiles in a Jewish religious community by converting them to the religion of Deutero-Isaiah. The greatest of the Prophets up to date, though not necessarily the last of them, would be, not Muhammad, but a Jewish seer who inspired his fellow Jews at last to dedicate themselves to their universal mission wholeheartedly. The World has been waiting for this prophet for 2,500 years.

¹ See Rabbi Agus's comments in loc. cit.

² Rabbi Agus, quoted on p. 494.

XVI. THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE WEST

THE subject of this chapter is a big one, but the chapter need not be long, since the history and prospects of the West have been discussed at some length in a previous volume.¹ Critics of what I have written about the West there, and in other passages, have dealt, not only with the substance of the subject, but with my views about it. These are of minor interest in themselves, but, since my critics have paid attention to them, and in some cases have apparently misunderstood them, I have dealt briefly with this personal aspect of the subject too in the Annex to Chapter II of the present volume.² I therefore need not say much in this chapter about the discussion of my own views.

Unlike the histories of a majority of the civilizations known to us, the history of the West is to-day still an unfinished story. It is therefore hazardous to try to forecast its prospects, even in the form of suggesting a number of alternative possibilities.³ Even if we were satisfied that the pattern of Western history, up to date, has been more or less the same as that of some other civilization—say, the Hellenic or the Sinic—whose history is over and is therefore known to us from beginning to end, we should have no warrant for forecasting that the future course of Western history will follow Hellenic or Sinic lines, if I am right—as I believe I am—in holding that patterns in the course of human affairs are not predetermined or inevitable, and that therefore past patterns afford no basis for predictions about the future.⁴ If this is the truth, we cannot foretell whether or not the Western Civilization is ever going to enter into a universal state, as both the Hellenic and the Sinic did. Still less can we foretell whether, if the future course of Western affairs were to follow the pattern that is a common Helleno-Sinic one up to that point, the West's universal state would be as short-lived as the Hellenic Civilization's was in the western provinces of the Roman Empire, or as long-lived as the Sinic universal state has been.

In the Atomic Age, into which the West—and, with it, the World—has entered in our lifetime, it now looks as if a universal state could not be established again—at any rate not in the standard way, and therefore not in the standard form which that way produced. In the past, universal states have been established as the result of successive wars ending in the overthrow of all great powers except one surviving victor. Even in the age of pre-atomic weapons this way of arriving at political unity was so destructive—psychologically still more than materially—that civilizations which had passed through this harrowing experience usually emerged from it incurably damaged. In the age of atomic weapons no

¹ vol. ix, pp. 406-644.

² On p. 629, footnote 2.

³ *Ad hominem*, E. Gargan, writing in March, 1955, in *Books on Trial*, finds, not surprisingly, that "Toynbee, from the start of his work, has rendered judgments on the history of the West which have proved startlingly wrong" (p. 265). In general Gargan is critical of my "vision of the Western past and future".

⁴ O. Halecki, in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Co-operative Appraisal*, has given me credit for having avoided any deterministic interpretation of the history of the West in particular and of mankind in general.

power would reach the final round. There would be no victor; all belligerents alike would be vanquished; and even the first round of atomic warfare might wipe out, not only the belligerent states, but civilization, the human race, and perhaps all life on this planet. It does not follow that mankind cannot and will not attain unity. Now that, for the first time in history, the whole human race has been united on the military plane, the choice confronting us may be one between going all the way to unity or going under. What seems improbable is that a society can ever again be united by force. This seems improbable because the force used in future warfare would be atomic force, and this would annihilate the society, leaving nothing in existence to unite.

Such considerations as these have made me wary of offering predictions—above all about the future of the West. When critics point this out,¹ I take that as commendation and not as censure. And their criticism misses the mark when they go on to accuse me of inconsistency in shrinking from applying to the Western Civilization a pattern of decline and fall that, according to them, I believe to be the inevitable fate of all civilizations.² It is true that I should feel rueful if I were convinced that the particular living civilization into which I have been born is bound to break down and disintegrate on the lines on which other civilizations have gone to pieces in the past. It is also true that I think that a pattern of breakdown and disintegration, common to the histories of a number of past civilizations, can be detected when we make a comparative study of them. But I do not believe that this pattern was predetermined or inevitable in any single past case; and therefore, *a fortiori*, I do not believe that it can be projected into a prediction about the future of a civilization that is still a going concern.³ I do not believe, as Spengler believes, that there is a fixed pattern to which the history of every civilization is bound to conform. My unwillingness to predict that the Western Civilization will go the way that a number of its predecessors have gone is a consistent application of my conviction that the course of human affairs is not predetermined. It is not a sentimental refusal to apply to the prospects of my own civilization some pattern of breakdown and disintegration that I unavowedly believe to be every civilization's inevitable fate. I have no such cast-iron pattern in my bag of intellectual tools.

As I see it, the fact that the Western Civilization's history is still unfinished not only makes it impossible to predict its future course but also makes it difficult even to discuss the pattern of its past history as far as this has gone up to date. Sir Llewellyn Woodward has pointed out that any number of patterns can be found in history.⁴ Even if we manage to see through and discard those that are imaginary, the number of those admitted, by general consensus, to be genuine will still be great. There is room for many patterns; they are not mutually exclusive. The problem

¹ e.g. T. J. G. Locher in *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 26; Crane Brinton in *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, vol. 32, No. 3 (Summer, 1956), pp. 361-75.

² See Locher, *ibid.*, p. 27; Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 67-68; K. W. Thompson, *ibid.*, p. 216; Spate, *ibid.*, p. 303; B. Prakash in *The Modern Review*, November, 1953, p. 403; Chr. Hill in *The Modern Quarterly*, Autumn, 1947, p. 291.

³ 'Even if we could claim that all past societies have perished, it would not prove that all future ones must' (J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 16).

⁴ See the passage quoted on p. 168.

raised by their number is that of their relation to each other. When the history of a civilization, or of some greater or lesser historical episode, is complete, it may be practicable, in retrospect, to make out which of the patterns in it is the dominant pattern to which the others are subordinate. But, when the story is still unfinished, the clue is much harder to find. If one looks at a Persian carpet at the stage at which the strip that has already been knotted runs to only a few inches out of an ultimate length of, say, twenty feet, we can perhaps identify the motifs that the total pattern of the finished carpet is going to develop; but we cannot yet single out the master-motif that is going to give form and unity to the whole.

This point may be illustrated from a past chapter of Western history. An observer looking at the Western World at some date early in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era might reasonably have guessed that its master-institution was going to be city-states. At that date the city-states of Northern and Central Italy were masters of the industry and commerce of the Mediterranean. The league of Hansa towns was dominating the Baltic and Scandinavia; the Flemish city-states were a potent force in the economy of England and Northern France. It might well have seemed that the rustic kingdoms, surviving from an earlier phase of the history of the medieval West, were destined to fall entirely under the ascendancy of the pullulating cosmos of city-states, and perhaps eventually to be absorbed into it. An observer acquainted with Hellenic history would recall that this had been the pattern which it had followed; and this might have confirmed his expectation that the pattern of Western history was going to be the same. It would have seemed natural that a later civilization should follow the same course as an older one to which it was affiliated. Yet before the fourteenth century was over the city-states of the medieval Western World had already missed what had seemed, so short a time before, to be their manifest destiny. The War of Chioggia between Venice and Genoa (*gerebatur* A.D. 1378-81) may be taken as the counterpart, in their history, of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C., which marked the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization.¹ Before the close of the fifteenth century it would have been evident to any observer that the key political institution of the Western World was going to be, not city-states, but nation-states conjured out of the old-fashioned feudal kingdoms by an infusion of city-state efficiency and vitality. The lapse of two more centuries had shown that the picture of the West's future which had seemed so convincing at the beginning of the fourteenth century had been an illusion—though a natural and perhaps an inevitable one at that earlier date.

If we think in terms of breakdown and disintegration, we can see, in Western history up to date, several alternative historical patterns, each with its own chronology, any one of which, looked at from some particular point in Western history, might be deemed to mark the breakdown and disintegration of the Western Civilization.

If the medieval Western city-state cosmos could properly be identified—as a fourteenth-century Fleming or Northern Italian might have

¹ See iii. 348.

identified it—with the Western World as a whole, then the date of the Western Civilization's breakdown would have to be placed in the last quarter of the fourteenth century,¹ and the chronology of Western history would correspond almost precisely to the chronology of Hellenic history, with a time-interval of about eighteen hundred years between the two. The growth-stage of both civilizations would have lasted for about seven hundred years (*circa* 1125–425 B.C. in Hellenic history and *circa* A.D. 675–1375 in Western). The respective breakdowns would have occurred in the closing decades of the fifth century B.C. and in the closing decades of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era. The ensuing 'time of troubles' would have lasted, in either case, for about four hundred years (431 B.C.–31 B.C. and A.D. 1379–1797). And in either case it would have been ended by the establishment of a universal state. Augustus's achievement would have had its Western counterpart in Napoleon's; for the Napoleonic Empire, like the Augustan, brought peace to a broken-down city-state cosmos by imposing political unity on it.² Yet, together with these striking points of both structural and chronological similarity between the histories of the Hellenic World and the medieval city-state cosmos, there are no less striking points of difference; and the non-Hellenic features in this episode of Western history make it clear that the breakdown of the Western city-state cosmos was not, after all, tantamount to a breakdown of the Western World as a whole, and that consequently its dissolution was not the end of Western history.

The medieval Western city-states did have one other important experience in common with the Pre-Alexandrine Hellenic city-states and also with the Pre-Confucian states in China. They came to be surrounded by a ring of outer states that were on a lower cultural level but of a higher military calibre; and the parvenu giant powers in this outer ring competed for the hegemony over Italy and Flanders, as the giant powers of the Post-Alexandrine Hellenic World competed for the hegemony over the Aegean and over Sicily.³ Charles V and Francis I and Henry VIII are recognizable counterparts of Alexander's diadochi. But here the two histories take decisively different turns. In the course of Hellenic history, one of the new great powers of the outer ring, Rome, succeeded in overthrowing or dominating all its rivals within 263 years of the beginning of the Hellenic 'time of troubles', if its beginning is to be dated in the year 431 B.C.; and Rome's thenceforth unchallengeable power was at Augustus's command when, 137 years after the overthrow of Macedon at Pydna, his victory at Actium gave him a free hand to make a political unity of the whole Hellenic World west of Euphrates. Napoleon had at his disposal the power of France; but France had not previously succeeded in making herself the sole surviving power in the Western World; and therefore Napoleon's empire, unlike Augustus's, was not unchallengeable and did not endure.⁴ The Napoleonic Empire's historical mission—which it accomplished in spite of the shortness of its duration—was a quite different one from the Augustan Empire's. It was

¹ See iii. 348–50.

² See the essay on 'The Napoleonic Empire as a Universal State' in v. 619–42.

³ See iii. 299–306.

⁴ See v. 627–33.

to reabsorb the debris of the medieval Western city-state cosmos into the modern Western World¹ which had been called into existence by a spiritual and intellectual revolution towards the close of the seventeenth century. This final liquidation of the abortive Western city-state cosmos was not a liquidation of the Western Civilization; it was a reinforcement of it.

These considerations indicate that the rise and fall of the medieval Western city-state cosmos has, in truth, been a subordinate episode in Western history, and that its breakdown and disintegration therefore do not spell the breakdown and disintegration of the Western Society as a whole.² Yet this conclusion leaves open the possibility that this society as a whole may likewise already have broken down in its turn. One can think of several events in the main course of Western history, each of which might conceivably signify the Western Civilization's breakdown. One such event is the Reformation. This broke the ecclesiastical unity that the West had previously enjoyed under the presidency of the Papacy. The Western Christian ecclesiastical commonwealth had been the master-institution of Western Christendom up to that date. Its destruction through the Reformation might therefore reasonably be held to mark the Western Civilization's breakdown. Alternatively, this might be marked by the outbreak, later on in the sixteenth century, of the Catholic-Protestant Wars of Religion, civil as well as international; for in these wars the Reformation bore its harvest of violence and bitterness. Another alternative date for the breakdown of the Western Civilization would be the *levée en masse* in France in A.D. 1792, which inaugurated a Western age of total war.³ Another would be the outbreak of the First World War in A.D. 1914, which armed total war with weapons forged, since Carnot's day, by the Industrial Revolution. Another would be A.D. 1945, which saw the dropping of the first atomic bomb.

Each of these alternative dates has serious claims to be regarded as marking the breakdown of the Western Civilization, yet none of these rival claims could be established convincingly by an observer taking his bearings in the year 1961. A recurring past pattern of disintegration emerges from a comparison of the declines and falls of civilizations that have already declined and fallen. A synoptic view of these indicates that, in the past, the usual interval between the breakdown of a civilization and the establishment of its universal state has been approximately four hundred years. The past frequency of an interval of this span is not presumptive evidence that the same chronological pattern is reappearing, or is going to re-appear, in another civilization's still unfinished history. But, with this caveat, it is perhaps legitimate to apply this measure—

¹ See v. 633-41.

² In previous volumes I have been careful to distinguish between the history of the medieval Western city-state cosmos and the history of the Western Civilization as a whole. The patterns and chronologies of the two histories are not the same. This distinction that I have drawn seems to have been overlooked by K. W. Thompson and by B. Prakash. Thompson supposes that the 'time of troubles' that I have dated 1378-1797 in vi. 326 is there presented by me as being the Western Civilization's (*Toynbee and History*, p. 216). Prakash also takes me to be referring here to the Western Civilization, though only to its western half (*The Modern Review*, November, 1953, p. 402). Actually, I have attributed a 'time of troubles', with these dates, to the Western city-state cosmos only.

³ See iv. 151-2.

which is the only one that we have—to see how it works out in the West's case. If we apply it to our alternative dates, before our own day, for the possible breakdown of the Western Civilization, the equation of the Reformation with the breakdown would require the establishment of a Western universal state to be a *fait accompli* already by now. It should, in fact, have been established by Germany as a result of the two world wars. But in both world wars Germany suffered defeat, and in the second her defeat was more shattering than it had been in the first. In any case the Western World was certainly not in a universal state in 1961. This was one thing that could be said with assurance about the pattern of Western history up to that date. There had been no Western universal state so far. If we were to take the outbreak of the Wars of Religion, instead of the Reformation, as marking the breakdown, and were to measure our 400-years-long 'time of troubles' from that date, the establishment of a Western universal state would have to be expected in the late nineteen-sixties or the early nineteen-seventies; but this would already be too late for that to be a practical possibility, considering that the atomic weapon was invented in 1945, and that this invention has made the forcible unification of the Western Society or any other society impossible because an attempted unification by means of atomic warfare would annihilate the society itself.

The conclusion seems to be a negative one. We have considered five alternative epochs for the establishment of a Western universal state: the Napoleonic Age, the period covered by the two world wars, a date just before or after 1970, and two more distant future dates: *circa* 2192 (i.e. 1792+400 years) and *circa* 2314 (i.e. 1914+400 years). The first two of these five speculative predictions have already been discredited by the non-occurrence of the expected event at the predicted date; the last three seem to have been put out of court through having been anticipated by the invention of the atomic weapon.

Up to date the Western World has twice eluded, in its Modern Age, the threat of being forcibly united in a universal state; and on each of these two occasions its escape has been due to the same cause. Each time the Western World had expanded, before the attempt was made, to dimensions that made the attempt a forlorn hope. If, in Napoleon's time, the Western World had still been confined to Western Europe, Napoleonic France might have succeeded in forcibly uniting the West by overthrowing the other contemporary West European powers of France's own calibre: the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, Great Britain, Prussia. The reason why Napoleon's undertaking proved to be beyond even Napoleonic France's strength was that, by Napoleon's time, France's competition with rival powers had been going on for about three hundred years, and, in the meantime, the Western World had enlarged its borders. On the east, a non-Western power, Russia, had stepped into the Western military and political arena and had thrown a new weight into the balance of power; on the west, Britain had vastly increased her strength by gaining naval command of the oceans and consequently commanding the resources of the huge overseas territories that had been added progressively to the Western World since the

closing decades of the fifteenth century. This new overseas extension of the Western World had been developing economically *pari passu* with its growth; and in the Napoleonic Age Britain held the key to it. Napoleon might have succeeded if he had had to deal solely with the Hapsburg Monarchy, Prussia, and a Britain whose resources were no more than those of the British Isles. He was foiled by having also to meet the combination of Russia, with her continental hinterland, and Britain with her overseas hinterland. Germany's failure in the two world wars was due to the same cause as France's failure in the Napoleonic wars. In the course of the hundred years that had elapsed between 1815 and 1914 the opening up and development of North America north of the Rio Grande had raised the war potential of the overseas part of the Western World to a level at which no European power, or combination of European powers, was any longer a match for it.

By the end of the Second World War the expansion of the Western World had gone to extremes on the technological planes of communications and warfare. On these planes the Western system had become, by then, coextensive with the whole habitable and traversable surface of the planet. By the same date a new weapon had been invented that, for the first time in Western history, made it possible for a Western power to unite by force even a Western World that had now become coextensive with the World itself. Since, however, this new weapon was the annihilating atomic one, the condition for its possible use for the old-fashioned purpose of eliminating all competing powers but one was that the user should not merely possess the new weapon but should have a monopoly of it. This condition was fulfilled during the years 1945-9. During those years the atomic weapon was possessed by the United States, and by it alone. If either Germany or Japan had emerged from the Second World War victorious, with the atomic weapon in her hands and with a monopoly of it, we may guess that she would have taken advantage of this unique military opportunity and would have established, by the traditional military method, a universal state that, this time, would have been literally world-wide. The people and administration of the United States did not do this and were not tempted to do it. They would have been horrified if the project had been suggested to them by some American Themistocles. The possibility passed away when the Soviet Union, in its turn, acquired the atomic weapon in 1949. Since then, this weapon has ceased to be a practicable means of imposing political unity on mankind; it has become, instead, a threat to the survival of civilization, of the human race, and of life itself.

Thus the apparent elimination of the possibility of imposing unity by force has made it a matter of life and death for mankind to achieve unity by agreement. The year 1949 opened a new era in human history. Before that date the survival of the human race had been assured ever since the time, part way through the Palaeolithic Age, when mankind had won a decisive and unchallengeable ascendancy over all other forms of life on this planet as well as over inanimate nature. Between that time and the year 1949 Man's crimes and follies could and did wreck civilizations and bring unnecessary and undeserved sufferings upon countless numbers of

men, women, and children. But the worst that Man could do with his pre-atomic technology was not enough to enable him to destroy his own race. Genocide, at least, was beyond his power until the atomic weapon had been invented and had been acquired by more states than one in a society that was still partitioned politically among a number of local states and in an age in which states were still in the habit of going to war with each other.

The unprecedented situation arising from the acquisition of the atomic weapon by the Soviet Union as well as by the United States does seem to have made an impression on the minds and imaginations of governments as well as peoples. Between 1949 and 1961 a number of international incidents and crises that, in the past, would have been likely to lead to war were surmounted without a breach of the peace; and the local wars that did flare up in Korea and Vietnam were brought to an end by negotiated settlements on terms that were distasteful to both parties. This indicates that, under the threat of atomic warfare, both the governments and the peoples had become more prudent in their conduct of their relations with their adversaries, and had schooled themselves to exercise an unaccustomed self-restraint. This, in turn, made the continuance of 'co-existence' seem more probable; and mere coexistence, accepted sullenly on both sides as being the less bad of two bad alternatives, was a boon that was not to be despised. It promised to give mankind at least a temporary reprieve; and, in a bad situation, the mere passage of time may bring relief, since human affairs are always on the move and can never be frozen into fixity.

Time could bring relief by altering the balance of power and by shifting people's attention and emotions into new channels. A continuing increase in China's power, for instance, might one day make the Soviet Union and the United States huddle together for mutual protection. (In the recent past they had been drawn together by the menace, to both of them, of the lesser power of Japan.) A continuing rise in West Germany's power might make Czechoslovakia and Poland come to feel that Russia's hegemony was not too high a premium to pay for insurance against the risk of a German *revanche*. West Germany's recovery might also make Russia's existence seem a welcome political and military asset to West European countries that, within living memory, had been victims of German aggression in two world wars. In fact, it seemed probable that, under a continuing regime of coexistence, old feuds would gradually have their edge taken off them by new anxieties, new quarrels, and new enthusiasms. There were encouraging precedents in the history of the coexistence of Protestantism with Catholicism and of Islam with Christianity since the dates at which the Catholic-Protestant and the Christian-Muslim Wars of Religion had petered out. These wars had come to an end because it had become evident to both belligerent parties simultaneously that it was beyond the power of either of them to wipe its adversary off the map. After this recognition, on both sides, of the inevitability of coexistence, the old quarrel between them had gradually become less acrimonious and less absorbing.

These considerations indicated that even a sullen acquiescence, on

both sides, in a state of coexistence between the two power-blocs commanded respectively by the United States and by the Soviet Union was all to the good; but this was not a state of human affairs about which mankind could afford to feel complacent. It could not be anything more than a temporary reprieve, and a precarious one at that. Even though no government or people might wish or intend to start an atomic war, one might be started by accident (for instance, by a misunderstanding of orders, or by a sheer loss of nerve, on the part of some junior officer). The power to discharge an atomic weapon might also come within the reach of irresponsible criminals or lunatics as the manufacture of atomic weapons became easier and cheaper and as one state after another succeeded in equipping itself with at least a few of them. Prompt positive action, by international agreement, was therefore imperative.

The first step required was the renunciation of all further tests of new atomic weapons by all states without exception; and a necessary corollary of this was the establishment of an effective system of international control, including inspection, to make sure that all parties were carrying out the self-denying ordinance in good faith. The next step would be an agreement that atomic weapons should not be possessed by any states except the United States and the Soviet Union—with effective arrangements for ensuring that this agreement, too, was carried out. The next step would be that the Soviet Union and the United States themselves should join the no-atomic-weapons club. Some such series of international arrangements might perhaps exorcise the danger of atomic warfare. But there would still remain the problem of regulating the beneficent use of atomic power for human welfare. Whatever might or might not happen in the military field, it seemed certain that there would be a rapid increase in the use of atomic power for constructive peaceful purposes. This probability was, of course, to be welcomed. It opened up the prospect that, for the first time, the amenities of civilization might now be brought within the reach of the whole human race, instead of continuing to be monopolized, as they had been so far, by a small minority of privileged people in the population of a small minority of privileged countries. This boon, however, would have its price. The products of the fission of atoms were not only potent for good or evil; they were also poisonous, for whatever purpose they might be used. Elaborate and costly precautionary measures were needed to preserve the habitat of life on this planet from being contaminated by the poison that the tapping of atomic energy released. Carelessness or callousness about taking the necessary precautions in any one country or province would be a menace to public health all over the World. And this potential menace called for the establishment of a single international authority, with a world-wide jurisdiction, to regulate the peaceful uses of atomic power.¹

It remained to be seen whether arrangements on the lines sketched above would be made by international agreement, and, if they were achieved, how long the negotiation of them would take. But it was clear that, if and when some such arrangements were brought into operation, the operating authority, or network of authorities, would, in effect, be

¹ See p. 309.

a world government empowered to deal with mankind's most pressing common problem. Unlike the governments of the universal states of the past, this world government would, *ex hypothesi*, have been set up by agreement, instead of being imposed by force. But it would be a world government all the same. If it were agreed that, in the Atomic Age, at least this minimum of world government by mutual consent was the only practical alternative to eventual genocide,¹ this conclusion would raise a searching question. In the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, did mankind possess the resources for creating the revolutionary new institution that had suddenly become necessary if mankind was to save itself from the fatal possibilities inherent in the sudden portentous increase in its command over physical nature?

The resources required were of two kinds—intellectual and moral—and the necessary intellectual resources were manifestly at mankind's disposal in this age in sufficient measure. Human intellectual prowess had tuned up the social technique of organizing co-operative human enterprises, and the subsidiary physical technique of providing the necessary material means of communication, to a pitch at which world government had become a practical administrative possibility. Moral resources were the limiting factor, and these were therefore the crux. Without the modicum of good will in individual souls that would be required for creating the necessary degree of concord between them, co-operation even on the smallest scale would be impracticable;² and thus the adequacy or inadequacy of mankind's moral resources would decide whether the vast new material power that had now fallen into human hands was going to be used for good or for evil.

This question had to be asked, in general, about mankind's common human nature; but, in twentieth-century circumstances, it had also to be asked in particular about the habits and outlook induced in human nature by the Western Civilization. It was true that this was only one out of a number of civilizations that had been created by human beings within the past 5,000 years. On the spiritual plane the Western Civilization had not been embraced, so far, by more than a minority of the human race. And, since the Communist Revolution in Russia in 1917, the West had been rapidly losing the technological, military, political, and economic ascendancy over most of the rest of the World which it had enjoyed, before that, since the failure of the 'Osmanlis' second siege of Vienna in 1683. By the year 1961 the West's former ascendancy was manifestly passing away. Yet during the preceding quarter of a

¹ This thesis was not, of course, generally accepted, though, as I see it, its truth was demonstrated by the considerations set out above. Hans Kohn, for example, holds that I overstress the need for a political unification of the World (*Toynbee and History*, p. 21). In Kohn's view 'a world-state is neither necessary nor desirable' (*Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 468). If, by a 'world-state', Kohn means one of the traditional type, established by conquest and maintained by force, I hold that, in the Atomic Age, this is, not only unnecessary and undesirable, but impracticable. On the other hand, if Kohn includes, in his usage of the term, a world authority, set up by international agreement, for the control of the use of atomic power, I hold that a world-state in this sense is, for the reasons that I have suggested, the only alternative to mass suicide in the long run.

² I agree with R. Coulborn that the criterion of progress in history is harmony, and that 'a working measure of agreement upon the objects of life must continue between all men in a civilised society if that society is to continue to grow' (*Phylon*, 1940, offprint, pp. 50 and 56).

millennium this temporary ascendancy of the West had set a stamp on the rest of the World which seemed likely to last long after the West's ascendancy had disappeared.

During its brief period of ascendancy the West had unified the World on the technological plane, and the process of unification could not remain confined to this plane, since technology included military technology, and military technology had now produced the atomic weapon. Technology seems to be difficult to invent but relatively easy to acquire from its inventors by mimesis. An ascendancy based on superiority in technology is therefore a wasting asset. The reason why the West's ascendancy was ebbing away was that the non-Western peoples, beginning with the Russians but not ending with them, had been learning to rival the West in the mastery and use of weapons and other tools of Western origin. But Western technology was not the only element in the Western Civilization that non-Western peoples had been appropriating. Most of them had realized that they could not master Western technology without also mastering Western science.¹ But the Westernizers had not limited their borrowings from the West to Western science and its practical applications. Some of them had also become converts to Western ideologies. The Communist ideology that had been adopted by the Russians and the Chinese, as well as the parliamentary ideology that had been adopted by the Indians, had been made in Britain. (The workshop in which Karl Marx had manufactured Communism had been the British Museum.) Parliamentarism and Communism are political systems, but they are also something more than that. Just as Western technology involves Western science, so Western political systems imply Western moral ideals—conflicting ideals reflected in conflicting systems. Ideologies and ideals cannot be understood or appraised without taking some account of their history. The spiritual history of the West had therefore to be taken into consideration in any twentieth-century estimate of the prospects of the World as a whole.

By the middle decades of the twentieth century the Western Society had passed through a number of revolutions on a number of different planes since it had emerged out of the social and cultural interregnum that had followed the preceding Hellenic Civilization's dissolution. Among all these successive Western revolutions the spiritual revolution during the closing decades of the seventeenth century had been perhaps the most decisive and the most significant up to date.² At any rate, this was certainly the revolution that, in the twentieth century, was exerting the greatest continuing influence, not only on the West itself, but on the

¹ F. Borkenau maintains that Western technology is the parent of Western science and the child of a Western passion for freedom (*Merkur*, July, 1949, pp. 626 and 632).

² I agree with H. Kohn (in *Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 466) that the Modern World originated, not in fifteenth-century Portugal and Spain, but in seventeenth-century Holland and England (and, I would add, seventeenth-century France as well). Kohn (*ibid.*, p. 467, and in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 356-7 and 359) goes so far as to describe this seventeenth-century spiritual revolution as being the rise of a new civilization bearing the same relation to the preceding Western Christian Civilization that this had borne to the Hellenic. I should be inclined to say rather that it opened a new chapter in Western history, and that it prepared the way for the eventual rise of an oecumenical civilization. Kohn himself says something like this in *The Nation*, 17th February, 1940, p. 257.

rest of the World as well. The seventeenth-century revolution had given the Western Civilization a new form, and, above all, a new spirit, which, for the first time in history, had made the heirs of non-Western civilizations willing to embrace the Western Civilization in exchange for their ancestral heritages. The seventeenth-century Western revolution had thus opened the way for a cultural development of world-wide importance: the Westernization of the World. This, in turn, had opened the way for the transformation of the post-seventeenth-century Western Civilization into a common civilization for the whole human race. This coming oecumenical civilization would necessarily start its career within a Western framework and on a Western basis, by reason of its Western origin; and it seemed likely that this initial Western contribution to it would continue to be important for a long time to come. It also seemed likely, however, that, as time went on, the contributions made by the other pre-oecumenical civilizations would come to be increasingly important.¹ It might be hoped that eventually the ex-Western oecumenical civilization would appropriate and assimilate and harmonize all that was best in all the heritages of all the civilizations that had preceded it.²

The seventeenth-century Western revolution that promised to produce such a far-reaching positive result had begun as a negative movement. It had started as a moral reaction against the wickedness, destructiveness, and senselessness of the Catholic-Protestant Wars of Religion, and against the barrenness and inconclusiveness of the accompanying theological controversies that had been fanning political rivalries into military flames. The fathers of the seventeenth-century revolution were not anti-religious, as some of their eighteenth-century successors were. So far from that, one of their objectives was to save religion from being wholly discredited and abandoned. They sought to save it by putting an end to the abuse of it for non-religious purposes. They therefore stood for religious toleration, and, as one means towards this end, they set themselves to divert people's interest from pernicious theological controversy to harmless scientific research and to the useful application of scientific discoveries for the practical purpose of improving technology.

As against my emphasis on the original negativeness of the seventeenth-century Western revolution, Hans Kohn emphasizes the positiveness of the virtues that it developed.³ On this point I agree with Kohn. I ought to have done more justice to this revolution's positive side. In the light of Kohn's critique I will try to make amends now. Toleration spelled freedom of conscience, and the new respect for this spelled a respect for the rights and dignity of human beings. This brought with it a new standard of social responsibility, social justice, and humane feeling. Noble monuments of this new ideal of human fraternity have been the abolition of the slave-trade and of slavery itself and the legislation for the

¹ "The dissemination of modern Western civilization over the face of the globe is... fraught with the possibility of the rise of new systems of thought and belief which are likely to overshadow and eclipse this very civilization (B. Prakash in *The Modern Review*, November, 1953, p. 402).

² Chr. Dawson sees in the past civilizations so many models for the construction of a future oecumenical society (*The Dynamics of World History*, p. 44).

³ See H. Kohn in *Toynbee and History*, p. 353; *Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 467.

protection of the poor and weak that has eventually been consolidated in 'the welfare state'. This has had the beneficent positive effect of spreading the amenities of civilization more widely, and that has been made practically possible by the increase in wealth resulting from progress in technology. But Kohn is maintaining that there is something more in the modern Western Civilization than just its technological prowess.¹ The West's technological triumphs have been 'a by-product of the Western freedom of inquiry and the Western sense of personal initiative. They are unthinkable without respect for individual liberty and tolerance of diversity.'² Non-Westerners have not always been alive to the spiritual causes of the West's technological success.³

Moreover, this success has had an intellectual as well as a moral cause. Intellectually, the progress of Western technology has been due to the application of science to it. And the modern Western cultivation of science, which had started negatively as a diversion from the cult of theology, bred a heightened sense of curiosity and a new spirit of critical inquiry. Neither the Renaissance nor the Reformation had liberated Western minds from their medieval subservience to external authority. The Renaissance had abrogated the intellectual authority of the Christian religion in favour of that of the Greek and Latin classics. The Reformation had substituted the intellectual authority of the text of the Bible and the ecclesiastical authority of the local secular governments (*cuius regio, eius religio*) for the authority of the Catholic Church. Perhaps the most fundamental and radical feature of the seventeenth-century Western revolution was that now, for the first time, Western minds dared consciously and deliberately to think for themselves. In the Battle of the Ancients and Moderns, Westerners made a declaration of their independence from their Hellenic cultural heritage; and this time they did not exchange one mental servitude for another, as their forefathers had done in the Renaissance. Truly 'there is in modern Western Civilization a vital spiritual force which, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has helped to revitalise other civilizations and to enhance their self-awareness'.⁴

It may also be true that I 'underestimate the newness, the greatness, and the originality of the modern West',⁵ and this because I lack 'sympathy with the secular ideals which our modern world inherited from

¹ Kohn in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*, and in *Die Deutsche Rundschau*, 82. Jahrgang, Heft 3 (March, 1956), p. 262. On the other hand, Pope Pius X, in his address to the Tenth International Congress of Historical Sciences, held in Rome in the autumn of 1955, remarked that what the Western countries are giving to the whole World today is 'modern science and technology' (*Discours de S. S. Pie X au Xème Congrès International des Sciences Historiques* (Cité du Vatican, 1955), p. 21).

² Kohn in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

³ Kohn in *Die Deutsche Rundschau*, loc. cit., pp. 262-3.

⁴ Kohn in *Toynbee and History*, p. 353. Cp. *Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 467. This point of Kohn's has also been made by Chr. Dawson. 'The permanent inheritance of Europe, like that of Hellenism, is a spiritual and intellectual one. It has changed the World because it has changed men's minds' (*The Dynamics of World History*, p. 412). Dawson, too, also points out (*ibid.*, p. 411) that the work of modern Western Orientalists and archaeologists has given the non-Western peoples a new understanding of their own past.

⁵ Kohn in *Der Monat*, loc. cit., p. 467. Cp. eundem in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 353 and 357, and Geyl, *ibid.*, pp. 363 and 368.

the enlightenment of the eighteenth and the liberalism of the nineteenth centuries'.¹ It may also be true that I am flogging a dead horse in putting the West in its place, as Kohn finds that I am constantly doing.² The West, Kohn holds,³ has already been cured of its hybris. Certainly I am perpetually on guard against the danger of myself succumbing to the insidious vice of 'nosism'. This, no doubt, inclines me to 'lean over backwards'. I am drawn farther in this direction by the effects of a fifteenth-century Italian education in the Greek and Latin classics, since this puts my heart, though not my head, on the side of 'the Ancients' in the Battle of the Books. There may therefore be some justification for Kohn's and Geyl's charge that I depreciate the West unduly. I shall be well advised to take their criticism to heart. At the same time I venture to suggest to them that, in their attitude to the West, they, too, perhaps, lean too far—their inclination being in the opposite direction to mine.

Kohn and Geyl seem to me to flinch from facing the truth that, in the course of the quarter of a millennium that has now passed since the seventeenth-century Western revolution, the modern Western Civilization has displayed not only a bright side but a dark one, and that in our time this dark side has been darker than the darkest stain on the pages of Western history in the Middle Ages or even in the Age of the Wars of Religion. Modern Western technology has now acquired the power to wipe out the human race, simultaneously with the power to bring the amenities of civilization to the whole of it. The advance in humane feeling has been offset by the degeneration of war into an indiscriminate assault on civilians, after it had been reduced in the eighteenth century to a conflict confined to professional combatants and conducted according to agreed rules.⁴ The advance in the recognition of the rights and dignity of human beings has been offset by the imposition of the worst tyrannies that the Western Society has ever yet produced.⁵ In fact, the history of the Western Civilization during the last quarter of a millennium bears out Shinn's suggestion that 'perhaps . . . the main effect of progress in history is to heighten the possibilities both for achievement and for disaster'.⁶

Geyl maintains⁷ that the German National Socialist movement ought not to be debited to the West's account. Kohn likewise maintains⁸ that Fascism and Communism are not products of the modern Western

¹ F. H. Underhill in *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. xxxii, No. 3 (September, 1951), pp. 201–19. Underhill holds that this lack of sympathy disqualifies me 'from making an adequate analysis of the strength and weakness of our civilization'. It is never too late to try to qualify.

² In *Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 466.

³ *Toynbee and History*, p. 353.

⁴ See iv. 141–55.

⁵ E. Gargan finds that, on this point, I myself have been guilty of the wilful blindness of which I have just been accusing Geyl and Kohn. He quotes a passage in a volume of mine published in 1928—*The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, p. 36, footnote 1—in which I forecast that the inter-war phenomenon of dictatorship 'was likely, according to all historical precedents, to be ephemeral'. Gargan adds that 'Toynbee's unwillingness to recognise the phenomenon of modern totalitarianism as a unique development, without historical precedent, has continued through the completion of the ten volumes of *A Study of History*' (*Books on Trial*, March, 1955, p. 266).

⁶ R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 255.

⁷ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 370.

⁸ In *Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 467, and in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

Civilization; they are rejections of it—a return to the Middle Ages. This is surely just a refusal to face painful but undeniable facts. If these ideologies that are so abhorrent to modern Western liberals such as Kohn, Geyl, and me are not products of the modern Western Civilization, as our liberalism is, where have they come from? They have not come from Russia or India or China or the Islamic World or a no longer darkest Africa. Hitler was a Sudetenlander; Mussolini was a Romagnol; Marx and Engels were Rhinelanders who settled in England and did their life-work there. The Russians and Chinese would never have invented Communism for themselves. The reason why they are living under Communist regimes today is because Communism was invented in the West and was lying there, ready-made, for non-Westerners to take over. Moreover, the modern ideologies bear the unmistakable stamp of the modern West in some of their most characteristic and most repulsive features: for instance, their cold-bloodedness and their high-powered organization. They do, however, combine cold-bloodedness with fanaticism, in Robespierre's vein. And the second element in this incongruous combination can perhaps properly be described as a return to the spirit of the age of Western history that preceded the seventeenth-century Western revolution.

If Kohn is right on this point, it follows that the modern phase of the Western Civilization must suffer from some inadequacy or deficiency or weakness that has eventually provoked a reaction towards even the vices of a previous phase which the modern phase had temporarily repressed and superseded. And this would mean that a revival of the seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century 'Enlightenment', in which Sumberg sees the West's hope of salvation,¹ will not be enough. There is, indeed, one vital point in which the modern phase of the Western Civilization has remained negative ever since its beginning at the close of the seventeenth century, and that is its attitude towards religion. The liberalism and humanitarianism that have been the positive fruits of the seventeenth-century Western spiritual revolution have derived their spiritual impetus from Christian moral values.² But,

'now that liberalism is in eclipse and no longer possesses the power to unite the World, the cosmopolitan culture of the Modern World is like a body without a soul. . . . What has expanded has been: first, Western political and economic power; secondly, Western technology and science; and, thirdly, Western political institutions and social ideals. Christianity has also expanded, but in a far lesser degree.'³

It is true that, even in the religious field, the achievement of the modern phase of the Western Civilization has been respectable. It can truly be said that Westerners have never before come so near to acting

¹ T. A. Sumberg in *Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267–84, ad fin.

² This point is made by Chr. Dawson in *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 410.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 408. Cp. T. A. Sumberg, loc. cit. I, too, have noted this in *The World and the West*, as B. Prakash points out (*The Modern Review*, November, 1953, p. 403). Prakash also suggests (*ibid.*) that Christianity, at any rate in its Protestant Western form, has become too closely associated with capitalism to be able to adapt itself to any other economic regime. This seems a hazardous guess, considering how many successive economic regimes Christianity in the West has already outlived.

up to Christian standards of moral conduct as they have in this modern age in which the official tenets of Christianity have been progressively losing their hold on the intellectual allegiance of an ever-growing minority of educated Western men and women.¹ All the same, a quarter of a millennium of religious toleration has, after all, not availed to rehabilitate the West's ancestral religion from the moral discredit brought upon it by the Wars of Religion; and the corrosive effects of this moral discredit have been reinforced by the intellectual scepticism that the triumph of the scientific outlook has brought with it. The tenets of Christianity, and those of other living higher religions too, are incompatible, in their traditional form, with the scientific vision of the nature of the Universe. It seems improbable that, in this traditional form, they can ever recapture their former hold on hearts and minds; and, if this were possible, surely it would not be desirable.²

The rising gale of scientific discovery has blown away the chaff of traditional religion, and in doing this it has done mankind a service; but it has blown so hard that it has blown away the grain with the husk; and this has been a disservice, since neither science nor the ideologies have grain of their own to offer as a substitute. Their horizons, unlike those of the higher religions, fall far short of the bounds (if there are bounds) of the Universe, and what lies hidden beyond these restricted horizons is the heart of this mysterious and formidable Universe—the very part of it that is of the greatest moment to human beings. Science's horizon is limited by the bounds of Nature, the ideologies' horizon by the bounds of human social life, but the human soul's range cannot be confined within either of these limits. Man is a bread-eating (and rice-eating) social animal; but he is also something more. He is a person, endowed with a conscience and a will, as well as with a self-conscious intellect. This spiritual endowment of his condemns him to a life-long struggle to reconcile himself with the Universe into which he has been born. His inborn instinct is to try to make the Universe revolve round himself; his spiritual task in life is to overcome his self-centredness in order to put himself in harmony with the absolute spiritual Reality that is the true centre of everything in the phenomenal world. This 'flight of the alone to the alone'³ is the goal of Man's endeavours. His yearning to reach this goal is the only motive strong enough to break through the barrier of self-centredness that stands in the way. Neither science nor the ideologies have anything to say about this spiritual crux.⁴ On the other hand, all the

¹ I do not disagree with Chr. Dawson when he says that the social dynamism implicit in Christianity began to assert itself in the West from the time of Saint Francis of Assisi onwards (*The Dynamics of World History*, p. 461). One might carry the initial date back to the time of Saint Benedict, and might say that Saint Francis did for the new urban way of Western life what Saint Benedict had done for its older rural way. But it is also true, I think, that the social implications of Christianity had never before been so widely recognized or so genuinely put into practice in the West as they have been in the secular-minded age that has followed the seventeenth-century Western spiritual revolution.

² Kohn notices that I do not expect or desire a return to religion in its traditional form (*Toynbee and History*, p. 354).

³ Plotinus: *Enneades*, IV. ix. 11.

⁴ For this reason, and not because I fight shy of the logical results of my philosophy of history, I think it unlikely that Communism will play in Western history the part that was played in Hellenic history by Christianity (see B. Prakash in *The Modern Review*, November, 1953, p. 402).

higher religions and philosophies are concerned with it. Their visions may be partly delusions; their counsels may be partly misguided; their very concern with the soul's ultimate problem and task may be almost smothered under a heap of irrelevant accretions: ritual observances, social regulations, astronomical theories, and what not. Yet in spite of all their manifest weaknesses the higher religions are the only ways of life, known to Man so far, that do recognise what is the soul's true problem and true quest, and do offer Man some guidance for reaching his spiritual goal.

This means that, however grievously the trustees of the historic higher religions may have abused these religions' mandate, the mandate itself has not been forfeited. It cannot be forfeited unless and until mankind is presented with some new way or ways of life that offer to human souls more effective spiritual help than the historic higher religions can give them. Kohn is unwilling to concede that the Western Civilization is now in decline and that a return to religion is the remedy for this.¹ On this my comment would be that these two theses, both of which Kohn rejects, are not interdependent. The Western Civilization may or may not be in decline in our time; contemporary Westerners are not in a position to diagnose their own civilization's prospects. But, whatever this particular civilization's present prospects may be, a recovery of the essence of religion, if this has been lost, is needed at all times and in all social situations. It is needed because human beings cannot live without it. In order to recover the essence we have to distinguish it and to disengage it from non-essential accretions. This is a task that we undertake at our peril. It is also a task that we dare not shirk on that account. To shirk it is the one course that is undoubtedly more dangerous than to attempt to carry it out. This sifting is a task that can never be accomplished once for all. Each successive generation has to repeat the attempt on its own account. In setting our hand to this perennial human task in our day, we can find some light in modern science; but this glimmer is faint, and may be misleading. Like our predecessors, we have to work in the twilight. We should be fortunate if our gropings were to lead us to the Buddha's approach to Nirvāna or to Deutero-Isaiah's vision of the One True God.²

The struggle with self-centredness and the quest for harmony with God are issues between a human soul and God. These personal encounters between God and human beings are religion's true concern; and it is a misuse of religion to try to turn it to account for secular social purposes, even when these are innocent and expedient in themselves. All the same, mankind's collective history does have a bearing on the spiritual demands that are made on individual men and women. It is true that actions, right or wrong, are the acts of individuals and that, through all changes in social circumstances, right and wrong continue to be what they always are. But one social change that seems to have been continuing steadily in one unchanging direction since the beginning of

¹ H. Kohn in *Toynbee and History*, p. 351: *Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 465.

² The points made in this paragraph have been considered at greater length in *An Historian's Approach to Religion* (London 1956, Oxford University Press), pp. 261-83.

human history is the cumulative increase in mankind's collective power. This brings with it a cumulative increase in the magnitude of the consequences of doing either wrong or right; and, since doing wrong or right has consequences for other people besides the doer, this social change increases each individual's personal load of moral responsibility.¹ The more portentous the consequences of his acts, the greater the demand upon him to act righteously. In an age in which mankind's collective power has suddenly been increased, for good or evil, a thousand-fold through the tapping of atomic energy, the standard of conduct demanded from ordinary human beings can be no lower than the standard attained in times past by rare saints.

In the Atomic Age cold considerations of mere expediency call for an arduous rise in standards of behaviour. As we have noticed, the peoples and governments had become aware of this, and their awareness was reflected in an increase in the degree of prudence and self-restraint with which international relations had been conducted since the acquisition of the atomic weapon by more than one out of the post-war world's legion of local states. It had been recognized that the price of self-preservation was a mutual acquiescence in co-existence, and the concern for self-preservation had proved strong enough to move mutually hostile peoples, armed with the atomic weapon, to pay this price grudgingly. Yet the calculations of expediency could do no more than postpone the evil day. The negative deterrent provided by mutual fear would have to be replaced by the positive bond of mutual love if the human race was to regain the certitude of survival that, before the fateful years 1945-9, it had been enjoying since some date in the Palaeolithic Age. A critic has reported me correctly as arguing 'that only through a harmonisation of human wills, in a compact freely entered into in the light of divine necessity, can peace prevail among men'.² This is, indeed, my belief, but of course it is not my discovery. It is a message handed down to our generation by a golden chain of sages and seers. There is a classical statement of it in Boethius's *Consolations of Philosophy*:³ the last testament of one of the last custodians of the Hellenic tradition in what had once been the western part of the Roman Empire.

Hanc rerum seriem ligat
 terras et pelagus regens
 et caelo imperitans, Amor.
 Hic si frena remiserit,
 quidquid nunc amat invicem
 bellum continuo geret,
 et quam nunc socia fide
 pulchris motibus incitant
 certent solvere machinam.
 Hic sancto populos quoque
 iunctos foedere continet,
 hic et coniugii sacrum

¹ On this, see E. Gûrster: 'Die Atombombe, Schrittmacherin der Welteinigung', in *Die Neue Rundschau*, 13 Heft (Winter, 1949), pp. 134-5.

² A. G. Bailey in *Queen's Quarterly*, vol. lxii, No. 1 (Spring, 1955), pp. 100-10.

³ A. M. S. Boethius: *Philosophiae Consolatio*, Book II, Ode 8.

castis nectit amoribus,
 hic fidis etiam sua
 dictat iura sodalibus.
 O felix hominum genus
 si vestros animos Amor,
 quo caelum regitur, regat.¹

XVII. RUSSIA'S PLACE IN HISTORY

A DISCUSSION in 1961 of the history and prospects of the West would have been left hanging in the air if it had not been followed up by a discussion of Russia's place in history. Since the Communist revolution that had trodden on the heels of the Liberal revolution in Russia in 1917, Russia had been challenging the West as it had not been challenged since the recession of the Ottoman Islamic power after the failure of the second Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683. The Communist Russian challenge to the West was not merely a challenge to the West's former ascendancy over the rest of the Non-Western World; it was also a challenge to Western Liberalism in the name of a Western ideology which had now found a base of operations in a great non-Western country. Under Russian leadership, Communism had set out to compete with Liberalism for the adherence of the non-Western majority of mankind that was not yet committed to either of these two rival Western ways of life. Russian Communism was also challenging Liberalism on its home ground in Western countries. Before 1917 the West had been winning converts all over the World to the ideology of the seventeenth-century Western spiritual revolution. Since 1917 the West had been on the defensive against an ideological counter-offensive. The weapon with which this counter-offensive was being conducted was an ideology of Western origin, but this weapon was now being trained against the West by non-Western hands. These hands were Russian; and this meant that Russia had now come to play a part of capital importance in the decision of the West's destiny.

Considering how overwhelming the West's ascendancy over most of the rest of the World had been during the preceding quarter of a millennium, Communist Russia's feat of turning the tables on the West was impressive. Indeed, in the eyes of anti-Western-minded Asians, Africans, and Indian Americans, looking at history in A.D. 1961, Russia's role in history would probably have seemed to be just this. As they would have seen it, Russia was an example and an inspiration to the rest of the non-Western world because Russia had been the first non-Western country

¹ . . . Love ruling heaven and earth and seas, them in this course doth bind.
 And if it once let loose their reins, their friendship turns to war,
 Tearing the world whose ordered form their quiet motions bear.
 By it all holy laws are made and marriage rites are tied,
 By it is faithful friendship joined. How happy mortals were
 If that pure love did guide their minds which heavenly spheres doth guide.

(Anonymous translation published in 1609, as revised in H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand's edition in the Loeb Classical Library, first published in 1918.)

that had had the courage to stand up to the modern West and the ability to beat it at its own game by mastering Western weapons and doing better than their Western originators in the use of them.¹

Russia's victory in 1957 in the competition between her and the United States for launching the first man-made satellite was, no doubt, hailed all over the Non-Western World as an inspiring symbolic event. It seemed to signify the end of the West's technological superiority, and therefore also the end of the ascendancy which this technological superiority had brought with it. An observer who was acquainted with Russian history would have recalled that Russia's technological competition with the West, which had reached such a dramatic culmination in 1957, had also had a long history. It had started, not in 1917, but in 1689. Lenin had inherited his policy from Peter the Great. And Peter's adoption of the Western technology of his day had been so effective that it had enabled him to defeat decisively one of the great powers of the contemporary Western World, Sweden. His historic victory over Charles XII at Poltava in 1709 had been won within twenty years of the initiation of Peter's Westernizing programme, and within twenty-six years of the historic defeat of the 'Osmanlis under the ramparts of Vienna in 1683. This decisive battle in 1683 had inaugurated a Western ascendancy that had lasted for a quarter of a millennium in the World as a whole. Russia, alone of all the non-Western countries, had succeeded throughout in maintaining her independence. And the decisive battle that had signalized this Russian achievement had been won by Russia near the start. On this interpretation, Russia's role in history was that of serving as the leader in a world-wide resistance movement to the modern West's world-wide aggression.

It would, however, be an inadequate and misleading approach to an examination of Russia's place in history if we were to consider this solely in terms of a technological competition between Russia and the West,² and of the effect of this on Western fortunes. It was true that, by 1961, Russia was closely knit up with the West. Communism was a potent Russian import from the West; but, as has been noted, it was far from being the first. The deliberate Westernization of Russian life had been started by Peter the Great 228 years before the Russian Communist revolution, and 1689 was as epoch-making a date in Russian history as 1917. Yet Peter the Great's assertion of his sovereignty and his policy in

¹ H. Kohn points out, in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*, that Prussia after 1806 and Japan after 1868 adopted Western technology and Western methods of administration and education, as Russia has done, and that, in these two cases, one of the purposes was to combat contemporary Western Liberal ideas and ideals.

² Commenting on a passage in a previous volume of this book (iii. 200-2), B. O'Kennedy remarks that 'it seems an over-simplification to assert that the Soviet experiment is an attempt to turn a nation of peasants into a nation of mechanics, to substitute a new America for the old Russia. Moreover, Professor Toynbee's view of that experiment as a conflict between the ideals of Lenin and the methods of Ford may be a paradoxical confirmation of the ascendancy of Western over Russian civilization, but it fails to explain a great deal that has happened' (*The Irish Times*, 1st March, 1947). I agree.

O'Kennedy's point has also been made apropos of the Westernization, not only of Russia, but of the Non-Western World in general, by I. Neander in *Finanz-Archiv*, Neue Folge, 13 (151/2), pp. 168-78, and in *Grundzüge der Russischen Geschichte* (Darmstadt 1955, Gentner).

1689 was far from being the beginning of Russian history. Seven hundred years before Peter the Great had imposed on Russia the Western Civilization in the modern secular version of it that had just taken shape in his generation, his predecessor Vladimir had imposed on her the Byzantine Civilization in the act of forcibly converting his subjects to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. For nearly two hundred years before that, Russia had been part of the far-flung Scandinavian World, as a result of having been opened up commercially and organized politically by bands of Swedish military adventurers.

The Scandinavian Civilization was abortive; and, after the conversion of the whole Scandinavian World to one or other form of Christianity, the Pre-Christian Scandinavian culture was obliterated. On the other hand the Byzantine Christian Civilization that captivated Russia in and after A.D. 989 made as deep and as enduring a mark on this colonial annex of the Scandinavian World as Western Christianity made on Scandinavia Proper.¹ The modern Western Civilization that was imposed on Russia by Peter the Great and his successors was a veneer. Russia remained Byzantine under the surface. The second bout of Westernization inaugurated by the Communist revolution in 1917 had obviously penetrated deeper down into Russian life than the Petrine revolution, and it had, no doubt, produced a greater disturbance in Russian life's Byzantine depths. Yet, nearly half a century after this latest Westernizing revolution in Russia, the Eastern Orthodox Church was still a powerful force in Russia, and its survival there implied that the Byzantine outlook had survived there too. In 1961 it was not yet possible to guess whether, eventually, the twentieth-century Western Communist ideology would or would not be more successful than the seventeenth-century Western Liberal ideology had been in supplanting the Byzantine Civilization in Russia.² All that could be said at that date

¹ See viii. 676-8.

² My conception of Russia's Byzantine heritage has been set out in a lecture, originally delivered in Canada, which was afterwards published in *Horizon*, August, 1947, and then in *Civilization on Trial* (New York 1948, Oxford University Press), pp. 164-83. This paper has drawn criticisms from B. Bykhovsky in *New Times*, No. 46 (12th November, 1947), pp. 27-31, and from J. D. Clarkson in an article in *The Russian Review*, vol. 15, No. 3 (July, 1956), pp. 165-72, based on a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Society in Washington, D.C., on 28th December, 1955.

Bykhovsky agrees that Russia did adopt Byzantine culture in the tenth century, but he denies that there is such a thing as a separate Byzantine Civilization. 'Generally known historical facts', he holds, 'incontrovertibly prove... the integrality of European (and World) culture' (p. 28). Clarkson sees eye to eye with Bykhovsky on this point. 'Toynbee's fundamental premise that Russia and the West represent two distinct civilizations, set apart by religion', is, Clarkson holds, 'a basic misconception'. I. Neander makes the same point in *Finanz-Archiv*, Neue Folge 13 (1951/2), pp. 168-78, and in *Grundzüge der Russischen Geschichte* (Darmstadt 1955, Gentner), and so does Chr. Hill in *The Modern Quarterly*, Autumn, 1947, p. 306. L. Thorndike, too, upholds the unity of civilization in general terms (*The Journal of Modern History*, vol. vii, No. 3 (September, 1935), pp. 315-17).

Bykhovsky accuses me of falsifying history in order to make of it an engine of ideological controversy. In particular, he castigates me for my 'preposterously absurd and amazingly ignorant identification of the Socialist system established in Russia after the Great October Revolution with the medieval Byzantine state' (p. 29). I do not, of course, identify the two, but I do maintain that the Byzantine Civilization is still alive in Russia below the surface, and that the underlying structure of the Byzantine state can still be discovered beneath the veneer of successive imported Western regimes: first the enlightened autocracy imported from the West by Peter the Great, and then the Communist regime imported by Lenin and his companions. Here, again, however, Bykhovsky

was that the issue had not yet been decided. Meanwhile, this brief recital of familiar historical facts will have indicated that Russia's place in history was not just that of a convert—however important and successful a convert—to the modern Western way of life.

Russia's cultural history, up to date, had followed an unusual course. Since she had made her way into the *Oikoumenê* about eleven hundred years back, she had played a prominent role, cultural as well as political and military, in the World's affairs. Yet so far she had not ever created an original civilization of her own. Three times over within these 1,100 years she had received an alien civilization from abroad: first the Scandinavian, then the Byzantine, and then the Western, and this first in its Liberal and afterwards in its Communist form. On the cultural plane hitherto she had always been a satellite, yet always one of an unusual kind. She had been a satellite that, each time, had more than held its own against the foreign body that had drawn her into its field of attraction. The Scandinavian Civilization was overwhelmed so soon after Russia had been annexed by it that there was no time, in this brief first chapter of Russian history, for Russia to react powerfully on Scandinavia Proper. Russia's association with the Byzantine World and with the West had been longer, and, in each of these two other encounters, the civilization that had attracted Russia had eventually found itself engaged in a tug-o'-war in which the satellite had threatened to reverse the roles of the two parties by usurping the sun's place and reducing the original sun to the subordinate status of a satellite.¹

and Clarkson see eye to eye. Clarkson says of me that 'he simply does not understand what his friendly critics, Obolensky and Sumner, have written' (see vii. 31-40 and 577-9; viii. 676-8) 'about his notion of a dominating Byzantine political *êthos* running through Russian history'.

This consensus between a Communist Russian and an American critic is impressive. It is obviously possible that I have over-emphasized the distinctiveness of each of the civilizations in the Syriac-Hellenic family. The sharpness of the dividing line that I have drawn has been noticed by T. R. Fyvel in *The Tribune*, 21st March, 1947, p. 20. It might be more instructive (though I do not think it is) to treat all four Christian civilizations and the Islamic Civilization as being no more than so many variations on one single civilization. My contention may be less convincing than Clarkson's and Bykhovsky's, I concede. But I do not admit that, in making it, I have been influenced by any ideological prejudices. In my view it is no insult either to the Byzantine Civilization or to Russia to label them as being 'non-Western'. On the other hand, I have an impression that this is felt to be an insult by Bykhovsky, Clarkson, and Hill, and possibly by Obolensky and Sumner too; and that their insistence on their thesis that there is no dividing line between Russia and the West is partly inspired by a wish to vindicate Russia's good name, as well as by a dispassionate study of the historical facts. I detect the same feeling in Neander (*loc. cit.*) and in Spuler (in *Islam*, No. 30 (1952)) when they insist that the Westernization of Russia is not on a par with the Westernization of Asian countries because Russia was already so much closer, culturally, to the West to begin with.

¹ If Russia's cultural history has any counterpart, this is to be found in the cultural history of Iran. Like Russia, Iran received successive alien civilizations from abroad: first the Sumero-Akkadian, then the Syriac, and eventually the Islamic; and, in the last two of her three encounters, Iran—again like Russia—reacted powerfully upon the civilization into whose field she had been drawn. In coalescing with the Syriac Civilization in and after the Achaemenian Age, the Iranian culture was not a passive party. It gave, besides receiving. Its attractiveness is attested by the history of Judaism. An Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism, was the only alien spiritual force that made a mark on Judaism in this age; and this Iranian religion displayed this vitality after Iran had suffered a crushing political disaster in the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander. The overthrow of the Sasanian Empire by the Arabs a thousand years later was a disaster for Iran of comparable magnitude. Yet, this time again, Iran reasserted herself on the cultural plane while she was still politically prostrate. The religious

This reversal of relations had taken place in the Byzantine World before the end of the four and a half centuries that elapsed between the conversion of Russia to Eastern Orthodox Christianity in A.D. 989 and the extinction of the last remnants of the East Roman Empire in 1453-61. In the course of this age the whole of Eastern Orthodox Christendom, Russia included, was successfully attacked and overrun by foreign conquerors on two fronts. The East Roman Empire was assaulted by Western Christians and Turkish Muslims, Russia by Western Christians and Eurasian Nomad Tatars. Both the East Roman nucleus and the Russian annex of the Byzantine World were submerged; but their subsequent fortunes were not the same. The East Roman Empire foundered, and the Greeks, and, with them, the other Orthodox Christian peoples of Anatolia, Transcaucasia, and South-East Europe, remained under Ottoman Turkish rule till the nineteenth century. By contrast, from the fourteenth century onwards, Russia re-emerged, and this time as an effectively centralized state that was capable of holding its own against all comers. Accordingly, after Bulgaria, Serbia, and the East Roman Empire had been erased from the political map, Muscovy lived on as the sole surviving representative of Byzantine Christendom and sole surviving guardian of the Eastern Orthodox Christian faith. The Muscovite branch of the Eastern Orthodox Church repudiated the union with the Roman Church that had been accepted in 1439, at the Council of Florence, by an East Roman Imperial Government that was then in its last agonies. In the next chapter of the Byzantine World's history the Muscovite Government may or may not have taken seriously the theory that, after Constantinople—the Second Rome—had betrayed the Orthodox Christian faith and had been punished for this by being conquered by the 'Osmanlis, faithful Moscow had become the Third Rome.¹ But it seems unquestionable that the experience of being left, from 1461 onwards, as the sole remaining independent champion of Orthodoxy did instil into the Russians a sense of Russia's being a holy country with a unique destiny;² and Russia had become this in virtue of having become

conversion of the Iranian people to Islam was accompanied, from the beginning of the 'Abbasid Age onwards, by an Iranianization of Islam on Iranian ground; and this Iranian cultural counter-offensive eventually culminated in the emergence of a distinctive Iranic version of the Islamic Civilization.

¹ This question has been touched upon in vii. 31-40 and 577-9. See the passage there quoted from an unpublished letter of 25th January, 1951, from B. H. Sumner to A. J. Toynbee, and from an unpublished note of 1st June, 1951, by Prince Dmitri Obolensky. See also a paper by Prince Obolensky on 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage' in *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. i (Oxford 1950, Clarendon Press), pp. 37-63. Sumner and Obolensky both hold that the pretension that Moscow was 'the Third Rome' should be taken with a grain of salt. As they see it, it was little more than an academic conceit, which had no great effect either on popular feeling in Russia or on governmental policy.

² A suggestion that the Russians have come to regard themselves as being 'the Chosen People' is contested in a letter written to me on 6th March, 1951, by J. Stolnikoff (on this point, see further chapter II, Annex, p. 626, footnote 2). 'Your theory of the "Chosen People",' Stolnikoff writes, 'corresponds only very remotely with the well-established fact of the Russians' freedom from all idea of superiority and disdain in their attitude towards other nations. . . . I suppose that this misunderstanding goes no deeper than a mistaken use of the word "Russian" instead of the word "Sovietic".' I cannot be let off so lightly. I believe that the Russian people's sense of having a special mission dates from A.D. 1453, not just from A.D. 1917. From all accounts, what Stolnikoff says is true of the Russians as individuals in their personal relations with non-Russians; and this is an amiable and admirable Russian tradition. But it is not

the heart and citadel of Orthodox Christendom instead of remaining the outlying province that she had originally been.

This Russian belief in Russia's holiness, orthodoxy, and destiny survived the reception of the modern Western Civilization in Russia in and after the time of Peter the Great. In this Westernizing age it had already asserted itself twice—now clothed, each time, in a Western ideology that, in Russian hands, had been adapted to serve Russian purposes. The nineteenth-century Western Romantic Movement was, in its Western birth-place, no more than a Western family affair. It was the expression of an insistence, on the part of the Germans and other Western peoples, upon the reality and the value of their distinctive national contributions to their common Western Civilization. The movement had been evoked by a French pretension to impose the French national contribution upon the other Western peoples as a standard form for the modern phase of the Western Civilization that had been inaugurated by the seventeenth-century Western cultural revolution. This nineteenth-century Western Romantic Movement inspired the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophiles; but, in taking it over, they gave it a new turn. The Slavophile version of Romanticism was an assertion that the Western Civilization was decadent and that the Russian Civilization was 'the wave of the future'. In the twentieth century the Russian converts to a later Western ideology, Communism, had turned this to the same account. Communism was now 'the wave of the future'; Capitalism was doomed to collapse. Since the West was given over to Capitalism, while Russia had shaken off its toils in the act of embracing the Communist faith, the West was bound to go under and Russia was bound to triumph. Twentieth-century Russian Communism, nineteenth-century Russian Slavophilism, and the fifteenth-century Russian championship of Orthodox Christianity were evidently successive expressions of an identical conviction. This conviction was that Russia had seen the truth and would prosper in virtue of acting on it, while the West had persisted in error and had thereby condemned itself to come to grief.

This Russian belief was not, of course, an original Russian idea. The Russians took it over from their instructors the Byzantine Greeks. In Byzantine Greek eyes the Western Christians were already schismatics, and the Eastern Orthodox Christians were the sole remaining repositories of the true Christian faith. This sense of uniqueness was part of the spoils that the Christian Church had taken from the Jews. It was, in fact, a Jewish pretension that had been purloined from the Jews by gentiles who had become converted to 'deviationist' Judaic religions. In 1961 it could not yet be foreseen whether Russia was going to remain fundamentally Byzantine, or whether she was going to become thoroughly Western in the Communist form of the modern Western Civilization. But, whatever might happen, it seemed certain that, for a long time to come, the Russian spirit and outlook would continue to be Judaic, since this Judaic ethos was common to the Byzantine and the Western tradition. Communism was as patently Judaic in its ideology as

incompatible with a feeling that Russia, as distinguished from individual Russians, has a greater destiny than other countries have.

Eastern Orthodox Christianity was; and, though the modern version of the Western culture, dating from the seventeenth-century spiritual revolution, represented a resolute attempt to purge the Western tradition of its ancestral Judaic fanaticism and intolerance, we have seen that this vein in the Western tradition was not, after all, driven off the field but was merely driven underground, to erupt, in our day, in such ideologies as Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism.

It is thus clear that, within the species of the genus society that we label 'civilizations', the Russian Civilization falls within the same sub-species as the Byzantine, the Western, and the Islamic. Whether we classify it as a variant of the Byzantine or as a variant of the Western or as a separate civilization with a distinctive character of its own, it was undoubtedly part of the crop that had sprung from the blending of the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations in a 'culture-compost'.¹

If it was true that the world-wide dissemination of the Western Civilization in its modern form had provided the basis and the framework for the formation of an oecumenical civilization, what was Russia's contribution to this coming oecumenical civilization going to be? Perhaps Russia's most important role in this next chapter of mankind's history would be to serve as a medium for the modernization of non-Western peoples that were less far advanced along the path of modernization than Russia herself was.

When we survey the attitudes of the non-Russian peoples who in 1961 were under Russian ascendancy, we find that there were several different categories of them and that these were reacting in different ways.

Russification was being obstinately resisted by subject or satellite or ex-satellite peoples whose cultural background was either Western or Non-Russian Byzantine. The first of these two categories was represented by the Slovenes, Croats, Magyars, Czechoslovaks, Poles, Lithuanians, Letts, and Ests; the second by the Serbs, Rumans, Bulgars, and Georgians. Even the Ukrainians, who are one of three sub-groups within the Russian people itself, were up in arms against being dominated by the Great Russians. These peoples' resistance to Russification was not an anti-Communist movement; it was an anti-Russian movement which antedated the Russian Communist revolution of the year 1917. Under the preceding Imperial Russian regime, Russification had been resisted just as obstinately by the Poles in Congress Poland and by the Finns. Both Congress Poland and Finland were under Russian domination for a hundred years ending in the First World War; yet both countries emerged from this century-long ordeal still un-Russified. The nineteenth-century Georgians, Rumans, and Bulgars also reacted violently against the domination of the Pre-Communist Russians. Though these had represented themselves as 'liberators' from Muslim rulers, these liberated Orthodox Christian peoples became hardly less anti-Russian than the Magyars, a Western people who were re-subjected to Hapsburg rule by invading Russian armies in 1849. The same attitude had been displayed by at least one of the Russians' Muslim subject peoples, the

¹ See pp. 454-61.

Qazan Tatars; and these anti-Russian resistance movements all had the same explanation. The peoples that had resisted Russification were peoples that had felt themselves to be farther advanced than the Russians in civilization. They had therefore been unwilling to receive civilization through a Russian channel. If they were ready to adopt the modern version of the Western Civilization, they wanted to draw this for themselves from its Western fountain-head. They wanted to do that, whichever of the alternative forms of the modern Western Civilization happened to attract them. For example, a Communist Yugoslav, just as much as a Liberal Yugoslav, would want to work out his chosen way of life independently. He would object to having it imposed on him by Russian dictation.

There were, however, other subjects and satellites of Russia who did not feel themselves to be so far advanced in civilization as they felt the Russians to be. The peoples in this category might resent Russian domination and exploitation as hotly as the Yugoslavs, Magyars, and Poles; but they did not feel the same repugnance to receiving modern civilization through a Russian duct. So far from that, they felt that, on the cultural plane, Russia offered them their nearest and most easy access to the Modern World, and that the Russian language was the best vehicle, within their reach, for bringing to them modern knowledge and ideas. Therefore the ablest and most ambitious of their young men and women would be tempted to learn Russian and to complete their education in Moscow or Leningrad. They might feel hostile to Russia politically and might have no inclination towards Russification for its own sake. But they would put up with it as an unpalatable but necessary means towards the end that they had in view; and that was to become first-class citizens of the rising modern oecumenical society. The peoples in this second category included the Turkish-speaking and Finnish-speaking peoples in the Urals (Bashkirs, Voguls, Ostiaks, and the rest), together with the Turkish-speaking and Iranian-speaking peoples of Central Asia (Qazaqs, Uzbeks, Türkmens, Kirghiz, Tajiks) and the Mongol-speaking peoples of Eastern Siberia (the Buriats and the Mongols in Outer Mongolia).

In 1961 this category accounted for no more than a small fraction of the human race, even reckoning in a satellite state like Outer Mongolia, which lay outside the Soviet Union's frontiers. However, the numbers in this category might be expected to increase; for there were vast populations in Asia and Africa, besides the peoples mentioned above, for whom Russification would spell modernization in the form that would be most feasible for them. China, who was not the Soviet Union's satellite, but was her principal Communist ally, was not likely to figure in this list. The Chinese, like the Western and the non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples, felt themselves to be superior to the Russians in civilization, and the motive that had led them to accept a Communist regime was not a wish to gain entry into the Modern World through a Russian door. The Chinese people's objective was to recover for China her historic cultural and political primacy at the eastern end of the Old-World *Oikoumenê*. But, short of being able to attract China into her

cultural field, Russia seemed to have a fair prospect of being able to attract a number of the more backward among the still uncommitted nations.

This prospect suggested that, in the formation of the coming oecumenical society, the Russian culture and language might play, in large tracts of Asia, and possibly of Africa too, the role that was already being played by the Arabic language and culture in Africa, and by the Spanish in the tier of Indian American republics extending from Mexico to Paraguay inclusive. Russification would then be one of several alternative forms of modernization. Its contribution might not be so great as that of the English language or as that of the modern Western Civilization drawn straight from its Western fountain-head; but Russian, like Arabic and Spanish, cultural influence might succeed in pushing its way into regions that were less easily accessible to the modern Western Civilization in its native form.

In the current chapter of history, Russian culture would carry Communism with it; and this ideological concomitant of Russification would either promote the progress of Russification or obstruct it, according to what was the situation at the time in the country in question.

The Communist form of the modern Western Civilization had, so far, seldom or never been the first choice of non-Western peoples that had opted for Westernization in some form or other.¹ Usually their ambition had been to Westernize on Liberal lines—that is, on parliamentary lines on the political plane. It was significant that, in both Russia itself and in China, the eventual Communist revolution had been preceded by an attempt at a Liberal revolution, and had not found its opportunity until this antecedent Liberal revolution had been discredited by having unmistakably miscarried. Russia in 1917 had been in the last throes of a disastrous war, and there the Communist revolution had followed at the Liberal revolution's heels after only a few months' interval. In China the Kuomintang was given a nineteen-years-long run (reckoning from its nation-wide triumph in 1929) before it was convicted of having exhausted its mandate. As for the non-Western peoples who had been under Western rule, their struggles to throw this off had been made in the name of modern Western Liberal principles; and, when they had recovered their political independence, their first impulse, even in cases where their former Western rulers had abdicated only unwillingly and with a bad grace, had been to exercise their new freedom of choice by adopting the Liberal Western way of life, not only on the political plane, but on all planes. In 1961 this could be verified in Southern Vietnam, as well as in India.

This general preference for the Liberal way of life evidently made the association of Communism with Russification a handicap for Russia in her efforts to extend her influence into non-Western countries, beyond her own borders, where she had to deal with countries that were trying to live the Liberal Western way of life and had not, so far, been discouraged by disillusioning experiences. Disillusionment, however, did often follow; and, in a country that had been overtaken by it,

¹ See p. 309.

Communism would be, not a handicap to the entry of Russian influence, but a powerful aid to it.

The experiment of Westernization on Liberal lines was apt to be followed by disillusionment because this experiment was an ambitious one. It was ambitious because the Liberal way of life required and presupposed the existence of able, experienced, and public-spirited citizens in large numbers; and, in most non-Western countries, there was a scarcity of this indispensable human asset. For this reason, parliamentary government had broken down in one after another of these countries when too many of the people who had been entrusted with the working of it had proved incompetent or corrupt or both. The sequel had been a dictatorship, of the kind that, for the same reason, had so often prevailed in the Americas in many of the successor-states of the former Spanish Empire of the Indies. In the Asian and African successor-states of the former Dutch, French, and British colonial empires, many of the dictatorships that followed miscarriages of parliamentary institutions were military. The professional military officers in these countries had been trained in a Western school, and their standards of honesty and public spirit were, in some cases, higher, on the average, than those of the local politicians. On the other hand, these soldiers' experience was limited to their own professional field, and in politics they were novices. The one substantial advantage of dictatorship over parliamentary government in countries in this situation was that the number of able and honest people required for working a dictatorship efficiently was a much smaller one. But this advantage was not a monopoly of the military variety of dictatorship; the Communist variety possessed it too, and it also possessed many other advantages that a military dictatorship lacked.

The Communist ideology was a Christian heresy¹ in the sense that it had singled out several of the elements in Christianity and had concentrated on these to the exclusion of the rest. It had taken from Christianity its social ideals, its intolerance, and its fervour. It was therefore a far more dynamic spiritual force than the conventional sense of professional honour that was the inspiration of public-spirited military dictators. A believing Communist was a dedicated soul, and he could justify his faith by pointing to impressive works. He could point out that the conversion of Russia to Communism had been followed, within forty years, by a technological triumph which might be taken as signifying that Russia had now outstripped the West in the very field in which the West had previously excelled. Russia's example, he could claim, had now demonstrated that, for a poor, uneducated, agricultural people, Communism offered an effective short-cut for catching up with the West in the competition for power; and one of the ambitions of every non-Western country that had felt the weight of the West's former ascendancy was to recover its own traditional position of eminence—historical or legendary. Communism, thus presented, would therefore make a powerful appeal to a non-Western people that had tried, and failed, to catch up with the West by taking the other of the two alternative modern Western roads.

¹ This interpretation of Communism has been disputed by Father G. F. Klenk, S.J., in *Stimmen der Zeit*, No. 145 (1949-50), pp. 376-84.

In 1961 mankind was wondering which of these two roads, the Liberal or the Communist, was going to become the high road leading towards a future oecumenical civilization; and at that date the choice between these two alternatives seemed, to many minds, as if it would make all the difference in the world. Yet Communism, as well as Liberalism, was a product and expression of the modern Western Civilization,¹ and the difference between the Liberal and the Communist way of Western life might be expected to diminish progressively with each additional decade of 'coexistence'. The ideological feud that in 1961 was obsessing nearly half the human race might have become no more than an academic issue in the life of an oecumenical society a hundred years later.

XVIII. A RE-SURVEY OF CIVILIZATIONS

IN the course of the first ten volumes of this book I arrived at a list of twenty-three full-blown civilizations, four that were arrested at an early stage in their growth, and five that were abortive. The twenty-three full-blown civilizations on this former list were distributed between a number of different series running, some to three generations of civilizations, some to two, some to one generation only; and, in any series that ran to more than a single generation, the relation of the later civilization or civilizations in this series to its or their immediate predecessor was labelled 'affiliation'. These series were parallel but were not synchronous. The earliest of the Pre-Columbian civilizations in the Americas were perhaps as much as three thousand years later in emerging than the earliest of the civilizations in the Old World. In the Old-World group there was one series, that represented by the Egyptiac Civilization, which ran to a single generation only, yet had a time-span which was of the same order of magnitude as the combined time-spans of the first two generations in the parallel series initiated respectively by the Sumeric, Minoan, Indus, and Shang civilizations.

Thus classified, the list of civilizations worked out as follows:

I. Full-blown Civilizations

A. First Generation, Unrelated to others

Egyptiac
Andean

B. First Generation, Unaffiliated to another

Sumeric
Minoan

¹ This point is made by Bykhovsky. 'Marxism-Leninism is not a weapon against Western Civilization—as Mr. Toynbee falsely asserts; it is a weapon against anti-democratic imperialist reaction, which acts as a tremendous break on the development of European and world civilization. The Soviet people treasure every progressive step in the history of the British, French, and every other national culture' (*New Times*, No. 46 (12th November, 1947), p. 30). A Western observer can agree with the substance of what Bykhovsky here says, if he can discount Bykhovsky's polemical way of saying it.

Indus¹Shang¹

Mayan

C. *Second Generation, Affiliated to another*

Babylonian (to Sumerian)

Hittite (to Sumerian)

Hellenic (to Minoan)

Syriac (to Minoan)

Indic (to Indus)

Sinic (to Shang)

Yucatec (to Mayan)

Mexican (to Mayan)

D. *Third Generation, Affiliated to another*

Orthodox Christian, main body (to Hellenic)

Orthodox Christian, Russian offshoot (to Hellenic)

Western (to Hellenic)

Arabic Muslim (to Syriac)

Iranic Muslim (to Syriac)

Hindu (to Indic)

Far Eastern, main body (to Sinic)

Far Eastern, Japanese offshoot (to Sinic)

II. *Arrested Civilizations*Eskimo²Nomadic³'Osmanli⁴Spartan⁵III. *Abortive Civilizations*First Syriac⁶Far Eastern Christian⁷Far Western Christian⁸Scandinavian⁹Medieval Western City-State Cosmos.¹⁰

By the time (1958-9) when the present volume was being written, this list had come to need revision. There had been criticisms of the method—or lack of method—by which I had arrived at it.¹¹ There had also been changes in parts of the picture of the historical facts. These changes had been due to increases in knowledge and understanding, mainly

¹ The Indus and Shang civilizations appear in the list in the form of a genealogical table in vol. vii, opposite p. 772, but not in the lists in vol. i, pp. 131-3. During the twenty years (1934-54) between the dates of publication of vols. i-iii and vols. vii-x, the Indus and Shang cultures had come—as a result of increasing knowledge of them—to look as if they both qualified for being given the status of full-blown civilizations.

² See iii. 4-7.

³ See iii. 7-22.

⁴ See iii. 22-50.

⁵ See iii. 50-79.

⁶ See ii. 388-91.

⁷ See ii. 322-40 and 421-37.

⁸ See ii. 369-85 and 446-52.

⁹ See ii. 340-60 and 434-45.

¹⁰ See iii. 299-306 and v. 619-42.

¹¹ These have been summarized by Anderle in an unpublished paper.

thanks to new archaeological discoveries and new interpretations of previously known facts. In the light of what my critics have written and what the archaeologists have brought to light since the publication of volumes i-iii of this book, I have reconsidered a number of my previous conclusions already in earlier chapters of this volume. The purpose of the present chapter is to bring together and complete the results of these reconsiderations in the form of a new list of civilizations. The best approach to this will be to examine first the criticisms and then the changes in the archaeologists' picture, with a view to seeing what changes in my list are required.

Most of the criticisms fall under one or other of five heads. The first is a sweeping one. 'Toynbee's list . . . is a peculiar jumble of incompatible and incomparable entities.'¹ My criterion for identifying civilizations is not uniform. In some cases it is material culture, in others religion, in others race.² The second line of criticism is that my identifications of civilizations and my demarcations between those that I claim to have identified are subjective.³ The third is that I have failed to distinguish between major civilizations and those that are 'secondary or peripheral'.⁴ The fourth is that my list of 'arrested civilizations' is capricious.⁵ The fifth is that my list of abortive civilizations is incomplete.⁶ The comprehensive criticism can perhaps be dealt with best by examining each of the others.

The method that I used in identifying the civilizations on my list was to take one instance as a model and apply this to the rest of the field. This method was, I should say, objective in two senses. My model was not an imaginary one; it was an authentic piece of history; and I applied it, I believe, systematically and consistently. At the same time my procedure was, I agree, subjective in some other respects. The model that I used was the history of the Hellenic Civilization and of the Western Civilization's affiliation to the Hellenic through the Christian Church. Evidently the reason why I used this particular model was that I myself happened to be a Westerner who had been educated in the Greek and Latin classics. I should, no doubt, have used another model if I had been either a Chinese, brought up on the Confucian classics, or a Jew brought up on the Torah and the Talmud.⁷ Moreover, I was led into misconstruing my model, in at least one important point, by a pre-

¹ P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 177.

² W. F. Albright: *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., pp. 97-98.

³ K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 245; A. R. Burn in *History*, February-October 1956, p. 6; R. K. Merton in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xlvii, No. 2 (September, 1941), pp. 205-13; P. Gardiner in *Time and Tide*, 30th October, 1954. Gardiner observes that 'some of the divisions' Toynbee 'makes between temporarily adjoining civilizations seem to be determined by considerations of what course a civilization must pursue. . . . In so far as he does this, the conclusions at which he arrives concerning the similar paths followed by different societies . . . merely reflect the method of classification initially employed.' A survey of criticisms of my attempt to identify civilizations is given by Anderle in an unpublished paper.

⁴ Bagby, op. cit., p. 179.

⁵ Bagby, op. cit., p. 180; H. Marrou in *Esprit*, July, 1952, p. 123; A. L. Kroeber: *Style and Civilizations*, pp. 124-5.

⁶ Kroeber, *ibid.* (Kroeber includes, I think, the 'abortive' as well as the 'arrested' civilizations among what he here calls the 'minor' civilizations on my list); R. Coulborn in *Toynbee and History*, p. 163; Bagby, op. cit., pp. 179-80.

⁷ See Chapter VI, pp. 170-217.

occupation with Hellenism that was one result of my education in Hellenic literature and history. I thought of the Western Civilization as being affiliated to the Hellenic Civilization exclusively—and this after I had taken note, at an early stage in my inquiry,¹ of the obvious fact that, in Christianity, which was the Western Civilization's historical link with the Hellenic, the Hellenic element was combined with, and dominated by, a Judaic one. I ought to have seen that the Western Civilization was affiliated to both civilizations or—to describe the actual course of historical events more accurately—that it had sprung from soil fertilised by a fusion of the two. This misconstruction of my Hellenic model led me to assume that 'affiliated' civilizations were in all cases affiliated to some single antecedent civilization exclusively; and this led me astray in, for example, my tracing of the affiliation of the Syriac Civilization. I saw this as being affiliated to the Minoan Civilization alone, when in truth it was affiliated to three others as well: the Sumeric, Egyptian, and Hittite. Multiple affiliations have been at least as common as exclusive affiliations to some single predecessor.²

I have tried to correct these errors in earlier chapters of this volume. For instance, I have now checked the results of applying my Hellenic model by applying a Sinic model and a Jewish one as well, and comparing the likenesses and differences of the results.³ I have recognized the four affiliations of the Syriac Civilization.⁴ I have also recognized that the Western Civilization is the product of a Syriac-Hellenic 'culture-compost',⁵ and that the same blend of the same two antecedent civilizations has also produced the Orthodox Christian and Islamic civilizations.⁶

There is another subjective element in my original identification and demarcation of civilizations which is more difficult to correct because it has not been imported by me but is inherent in the phenomena themselves.

When I applied, in the rest of the field, the concept of 'affiliation' that I had derived from my picture of the historical relation of the Western Civilization to the Hellenic, I found a number of cases in which the same pattern did, indeed, seem to recur, but this only partially or only faintly. In these cases the question arose whether the evidence for a relative break in continuity was sufficient to warrant the identification of what followed the break as being the history of a new civilization, affiliated to a predecessor in the sense in which the Western Civilization is affiliated to the Hellenic. In spite of the traces of a break, it might, in these cases, be more illuminating to interpret the subsequent period as being continuous with the previous period: in other words, to treat the two periods as being successive chapters in the history of one and the same civilization. In one case—the Egyptian—I came, in my original survey of civilizations, to the conclusion that here the continuity was more significant than the discontinuity, and that therefore the history of civilization in Egypt before its conversion to Christianity ought to be regarded as being the history of a single continuous civilization and not

¹ See i. 40-41 and 57.

² This point is made by F. Borkenau in *Merkur*, July, 1949, pp. 633-4, and in *Commentary*, March, 1956, p. 241.

⁴ See pp. 407-10.

⁵ See pp. 457-8.

³ See pp. 186-217.

⁶ See pp. 458-9.

as being the history of a series of two civilizations.¹ I took this line in spite of having accepted Breasted's interpretation of the character and history of the worship of Osiris, which, on his interpretation, had some striking features in common with the character and history of Christianity.² Now that Breasted's interpretation of the Osirian religion has been discarded by the Egyptologists of the next generation,³ any previously possible doubts about the continuity of Egyptiac history have been finally dispelled. There were, however, other cases in which the evidence for a break seemed to me to be sufficiently significant to warrant me in identifying what followed the break as being the history of a new civilization, as long as I did this only tentatively and provisionally.⁴ These cases that I decided to treat as being doubtful were those of the Orthodox Christian (main body), Arabic Muslim, Iranic Muslim, Hindu, Far Eastern (main body), Babylonian, Yucatec, and Mexic civilizations.

The element of subjectivity, that was inherent in the phenomena here, arose from the fact that there was this string of eight intermediate cases running all the way from the discontinuity between the Hellenic and the Western Civilization at one extreme to the continuity of the Egyptiac Civilization at the other.⁵ The intermediate series seemed to present an unbroken chain of gradations, linking the two poles of the gamut. If the history of the Egyptiac Civilization was to be regarded as being continuous, it seemed arbitrary to take the Babylonian Civilization as being a separate representative of the species instead of treating it as a late phase of the Sumeric Civilization. Towards the other end of the scale it seemed arbitrary to treat the Orthodox Christian Civilization as a late phase of the Hellenic if the Western Civilization was to be taken as being a separate representative of the species.⁶ I recognized⁷ that eventually I should have to come to a decision about the cases that I had left in doubt. The progress of archaeology has decided the cases of my supposed Mexic and Yucatec civilizations for me by making it clear that the civilization of Pre-Columbian Middle America has a continuity and a unity that over-ride the breaks in its course and the distinctiveness of its cultural provinces. I have had to decide the remaining cases myself at my peril, and I have done this in previous chapters of the present volume. I have decided that my supposed Babylonian,⁸ Far Eastern (main body),⁹ and Hindu¹⁰ civilizations must, on balance, be regarded as being merely later phases of the Sumeric, Sinic, and Indic civilizations respectively. On the other hand, I have decided that my Orthodox Christian (main body) and Islamic civilizations have the same claim as the Western Civilization has to be regarded as being separate civilizations in their own right.¹¹

¹ See i. 136-46.

² See i. 140-5 and the present volume, p. 184.

³ See p. 95, footnote 1, and pp. 184-5.

⁴ See i. 117-18, 133-6, 146, and the present volume, pp. 169-70.

⁵ This is a particular instance of a general phenomenon. 'Culture and the events of history are both continuous, over the inhabited Earth as well as in time. Every delimitation is therefore a choice' (A. L. Kroeber: *Style and Civilizations*, p. 154).

⁶ Even the West's title to rank as a separate civilization from the Hellenic has been disputed by so eminent an authority as E. R. Curtius (see p. 181, footnote 1).

⁷ See i. 117-18 and 133-46.

⁸ See p. 191.

⁹ See pp. 176-80.

¹⁰ See pp. 182-4.

¹¹ See pp. 180-2 and 458-9.

While I believe that these conclusions are correct, I recognize that there is an element of subjectivity in them, and I think that the subjectivity here is inherent in the phenomena and is therefore inescapable. It might well seem arbitrary, for example, to allow the claim of my supposed Orthodox Christian Civilization (main body) to be a separate civilization when I am disallowing the claim of my Far Eastern Civilization (main body).

In giving this different treatment to these two cases, I believe I have been right, and that this is demonstrated by the contrast between the respective states of affairs in Orthodox Christendom and in China at the end of the two stories, at a time when both civilizations were on the eve of losing their identities through Westernization. In A.D. 1961 the Eastern Orthodox Church was still the master-institution of the non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples, whereas the last of the successive avatars of the Roman Empire in the main body of Orthodox Christendom had faded out when the Ottoman Roman Empire had been liquidated in 1922.¹ By contrast, in China by that date Buddhism, which at one time had seemed to have attained the same dominance in Eastern Asia as Christianity in the Byzantine and Western worlds, had long since been appropriated by the indigenous Sinic Civilization.² In China in 1961 there were many people still alive who had been born under the regime of the Manchu avatar of the Ch'in (Ts'in)-Han Empire, could remember the Manchu regime's fall, and had been educated in the Confucian classics. This difference between the denouements of the two histories does perhaps warrant a differential treatment of them. Yet, when full allowance has been made for this difference, the resemblance between them remains remarkable. In both cases the life of the civilization in this phase was dominated by the relation between two institutions, one indigenous and secular, the other exotic and religious. In both cases the indigenous secular institution was a resuscitated universal state and the exotic institution was a missionary religion. The resuscitated Chinese and the resuscitated Roman Empire are unmistakable counterparts of each other, and so are Buddhism in China and Christianity in Eastern Orthodox Christendom. These two resemblances in the configurations of the two histories are of such obvious far-reaching historical importance that, even if the difference between the two histories is rightly held to be even more important, it still seems arbitrary to disallow the claim of the supposed Far Eastern Civilization (main body) to independence, while conceding the claim of the supposed Orthodox Christian Civilization. Here, however, I should say, the arbitrariness is inherent in the phenomena and has not been imported by me into the interpretation of them.

The next criticism that I have to examine is that I have treated all the full-blown civilizations as being 'philosophically equivalent' to each other³ and have not distinguished civilizations that are 'major' from those that are 'secondary or peripheral'. I have hesitated to divide the full-blown civilizations on my list into categories standing for supposed

¹ See p. 193.

² See I. 175-7 and the present volume, p. 170.

³ See pp. 176-82.

differences in importance and value. It would be particularly hazardous to try to estimate the relative value and importance of those civilizations that have been rediscovered by the archaeologists. These are welcome additions to our stock of specimens at our disposal for comparative study. For this purpose they are indispensable. At the same time, our knowledge of them is too scanty and too one-sided to allow us to attempt a valuation of them, since our knowledge is mostly derived from their material remains; and, even in the cases of disinterred civilizations that were literate, and whose documents have been partially recovered and deciphered, these literary remains are fragmentary.¹ It is also hazardous to try to put comparative values on civilizations about which we are less ill-informed. A comparative student's attitude and feeling towards the civilization into which he has been born, and also towards one in whose classical literature he has been educated, can never be the same as his attitude and feeling towards other civilizations with which his relation is less intimate.

Thus any attempt to classify civilizations according to their relative value will open the door wide for the intrusion of subjective judgements.² We cannot venture into this field profitably, or even safely, unless we can find some objective criterion. This is not provided by Bagby's proposed distinction between civilizations that are 'secondary and peripheral' and those that are 'major'. But it should be possible to distinguish objectively between civilizations that are 'satellites' of others³ and civilizations that are independent of any other contemporary civilizations, though they may be affiliated to one or more antecedent civilizations. In distributing the full-blown civilizations between these two categories⁴ we should be classifying them according to ascertainable matters of fact—though here we might find ourselves confronted by an unbroken chain of gradations between social units that were apparently separate civilizations, though satellites, and social units that were apparently not civilizations in their own right, but were merely more than usually provincial provinces of a civilization that displayed a number of provincial variants. How, for example, should we classify Elam and Urtu? Were they provinces of the Sumero-Akkadian World or were they satellites of it? And how should we classify the Italy of the last millennium B.C.? Was this a satellite of the Hellenic World or was

¹ Literary remains of the Aegean (i.e. Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean) Civilization have now been deciphered by Michael Ventris, but we still know much too little about this civilization to justify our classifying it, as Bagby does (in *op. cit.*, p. 169), as being in the 'secondary' rather than in the 'major' class.

² Bagby's judgement, *ibid.*, that the 'Syro-Phoenician Civilization' (my 'Syriac Civilization') was a secondary one will be contested by many users of the Phoenician alphabet and worshippers of the Jews' god. But a conflict of valuations is inevitably inconclusive.

³ A satellite civilization would not, of course, necessarily be less important or less valuable than the independent civilization from which it had derived its culture. The Russian and Iranian civilizations, for example, would figure as satellites, but the Russian Civilization could look the Byzantine or the Western in the face without being abashed, and equally the Iranian could hold its own against the Sumero-Akkadian or the Syriac.

⁴ Bagby points out, in *op. cit.*, p. 171, that 'all the surviving civilizations, whether major or secondary, have become peripheral to the Western-European within the last two hundred years'. In the same sense the Syriac, Egyptian, Sumero-Akkadian, and Iranic civilizations became 'peripheral' to the Hellenic in the Post-Alexandrine Age.

it a province of it? In all cases in which we are constrained to draw a dividing line at some point in a continuously graded series, there is inevitably something arbitrary and subjective about our decision, whatever this may be.

The next criticism—that my list of ‘arrested civilizations’ is capricious—is, I should say, justified. If I had used the phrase ‘examples of arrest’ instead of ‘arrested civilizations’, I should have escaped this criticism and still have made the point that I was trying to make in that chapter.¹ As it is, only one of my so-called ‘arrested civilizations’, the Nomadic, really qualifies for bearing the label ‘civilization’; and the Nomadic Civilization is in the ‘satellite’ class. The ‘Osmanlis and the Spartans were communities within societies of the species civilizations; but these two communities were each a fragment of a civilization; neither of them was an entire civilization in itself.’² As for the Esquimaux, they are a pre-civilizational society. Their culture is high, but not up to the civilizational level; and, in so far as they are arrested, they are in the situation in which all surviving pre-civilizational societies, of all species,³ find themselves today.⁴ If I had been including societies of all species in my survey, I could have taken the pre-civilizational societies, as a class, as one of my examples of ‘arrest’. Alternatively, confining myself to the ‘civilizational’ species of societies, I could have found examples of ‘arrest’ within this field that were complete civilizations, not fragments of some civilization, as the ‘Osmanlis and the Spartans were. I could have cited all those civilizations that, after entering into a universal state, have been caught in a monotonous round of recurrent avatars of it. But the eventual arrest of the societies in these two categories is not the most significant feature in their histories, and therefore it would be misleading to label them as ‘arrested civilizations’ simply on account of their having been arrested in the last phase of their careers. The phenomenon of ‘arrest’ is, I should still say, in itself a significant aspect of human affairs. I should also still say that the four examples that I took as my illustrations of it are all instructive. But, as these examples show, the phenomenon of ‘arrest’ can be illustrated without introducing a class of ‘arrested civilizations’ into the classification

¹ iii. I-III.

² W. Gurian puts a fair question when he asks whether Sparta is intelligible apart from the rest of Hellas (*The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1942), p. 513). The same point is made by J. Vogt in *Saeculum*, No. 2 (1951), pp. 557-74. All the same, a community is on the way to becoming a separate society, with a distinctive civilization of its own, when it has fallen out of step with the rest of its former society. Examples of this can be found in the modern chapter of the history of the Western Civilization. The Castilian and Portuguese-speaking peoples, both in the Iberian Peninsula and in the Americas, took part only partially and half-heartedly in the general Western spiritual revolution towards the end of the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Prussians did not share in the general change of feeling about the institution of war that began to come over other Western peoples in that age. These other Westerners came more and more to regard war as being a barbarous and criminal anachronism. The Prussians continued to glorify it. These divergences made other Westerners begin to look upon the Iberian peoples as being Don Quixotes, and to look upon the Prussians as being neo-barbarians—redoubtable but at the same time atrocious. The Spartans were the Prussians of the Hellenic World, and from the time when they developed their peculiar institutions they began to be looked at askance by other Hellenes.

³ Different species of pre-civilizational societies have been noticed on pp. 327-43.

⁴ See i. 179.

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of societies of this species. I shall therefore now drop this class out of my schedule.

As for my list of abortive civilizations, I agree that this was incomplete. Bagby is right in saying¹ that it was illogical not to have included the Monophysite Christian Civilization in this category when I had included the Nestorian. Here, again, as in compiling a list of 'satellite' civilizations, we need an objective criterion. An abortive civilization might be defined as one whose adherents have tried and failed to perform some particular role which has afterwards been performed successfully by the adherents of some other civilization. When this happens, the first of the two competing civilizations is eclipsed. It either disappears completely or survives as a remnant in holes and corners. For instance, the Nestorian and Monophysite Christian civilizations were two successive attempts to shake off an Hellenic ascendancy over the Christian Church and the Roman Empire. This ascendancy had become an anachronism in the fifth century of the Christian Era, in a world in which, by then, the former Syriac and Hellenic cultures had blended into a 'compost' that had become the common culture of all the former Syriac and Hellenic peoples except the Jews and the Samaritans. However, neither the Nestorians nor the Monophysites proved strong enough to get the better of the Hellenic 'Imperialists' (Melchites). The Nestorians were driven out of the Roman Empire; the Monophysites were driven underground. The enterprise which they had tried and failed to carry out was eventually achieved by the Muslims. In consequence the Syriac-Hellenic 'culture-compost' produced an Islamic Civilization, while the Nestorians and Monophysites have survived only in diasporá or in fastnesses.² Wherever we find that one civilization has been supplanted by another, this gives us a clue. Any supplanted civilization is a potential candidate for a place on the list of the civilizations that have been abortive.

We have next to take account of the changes—mainly due to the further progress of archaeological discovery—in our picture of the historical facts.

One such change has been a revision of our former estimate of the relative importance of the different provinces of this or that civilization. There are cases in which some particular province formerly loomed large because we were comparatively well-informed about it. In some of these cases the relative prominence of this once disproportionately

¹ In op. cit., p. 179.

² The principal Monophysite diasporás today are the Copts in Egypt and the Armenians, who are now scattered all over the World. The principal surviving Monophysite fastnesses are the Abyssinian plateau, the Tūr 'Abdín, and the Republic of Erivan at the north-eastern edge of the Armenian plateau. The Nestorians had a fastness in the Hakkari highlands in Kurdistan till they were uprooted and expelled from there by the Turks during the First World War. The present-day Nestorian diasporá has found a new home in Chicago, and the Patriarch of the Nestorian Church has settled there. In the thirteenth century of the Christian Era the peasantry of 'Iraq were still Nestorian Christians, in so far as they had not become Monophysites, and the Nestorian diasporá was scattered all the way from the east bank of the Tigris to the west coast of the Pacific Ocean across Iran, Transoxania, the Eurasian Steppe, and Northern China; but by then Nestorianism had already lost to Islam its once possible destiny of becoming one of the full-blown civilizations of the Syriac-Hellenic family, on a par with the Orthodox Christian and Western Christian civilizations.

conspicuous province has now diminished because we have become better acquainted with its neighbour provinces and have become more aware of the contribution to its and their common civilizations that they, too, made.

A classical example of a change of perspective produced by the progress of archaeological discovery is the change in our picture of Israel and Judah in the Syriac World. In A.D. 1961 it was less than a hundred years since the archaeological exploration of the Syriac World had begun,¹ and considerably less than that in most of its provinces other than Palestine. Before that the character and history of the Syriac Civilization had been known almost exclusively from one source, and therefore also almost exclusively in terms of the picture that this source presented. This once virtually unique source was the literature of the Israelites and the Jews, and this literature naturally gave Israel and Judah the beau rôle and put their neighbours in an unfavourable light. This distortion of the truth through the prejudices of one sole surviving literary source is now being progressively rectified by the disinterment of the material remains left by other communities of the Syriac World. When the disinterred artefacts include literary texts, such as the clay tablets, inscribed in the fourteenth century B.C. with Phoenician religious poems, that have been discovered at Ras ash-Shamrah, the rectification of the traditional picture can be considerable. In the case in point we can hardly expect to see the non-Israelite Syriac communities completely rehabilitated, whatever further successes may be in store for archaeological explorers in this field. The surviving literature of the Israelites and the Jews is not only magnificent; it has been entrenched in a position of privilege through having become the holy scriptures of both Judaism and Christianity. We may therefore guess that no amount of relevant new archaeological discoveries could ever reduce 'the People of the Book' in the sight of posterity to their true proportionate stature. All the same, even in this field, the progress of archaeological discovery, as far as it has yet gone, has already changed the traditional picture appreciably.

The changes in the perspective in which we see the Aegean and Middle American worlds seem likely to be more radical. In our former picture of these two worlds, Crete in the one case and the Petén and Usumacinta region in the other enjoyed for a time something of the unique prominence² that Israel and Judah have enjoyed, and still enjoy, in our picture of the Syriac World. This led me, in my original list of full-blown civilizations, to use the labels 'Minoan' and 'Mayan' to describe two civilizations that, in the light of subsequent archaeological discoveries, I should now prefer to label 'Aegean' and 'Middle American' respectively.

The disproportionate prominence of the Minoan province of the Aegean Civilization and the Central Mayan province of the Middle American Civilization was not, of course, ever so strongly entrenched as the disproportionate prominence of Israel and Judah in the Syriac World. It lacked the two powerful sanctions of antiquity and superstition.

¹ See ix. 102.

² See pp. 365-6 and 407.

The Minoans and the Central Maya had acquired their disproportionate prominence thanks to an accident in the history of archaeological discovery. They happened to have been brought into the light of modern knowledge earlier than their neighbours; and they were placed on a pinnacle by the archaeologists who had been dazzled by their discovery of them. But a king-maker always has it in his power to dethrone his favourite of yesterday. The archaeologists' temper is apt to be as ruthless as their progress is swift, and they have latterly been transferring their favours to other provinces that have been more recently explored. In the changing archaeological picture of the Aegean World, the Minoan province in Crete is now being made to dip its flag to the Helladic province on the mainland. The Mycenaean last phase of the Aegean Civilization, which followed the fall of Minoan Cnossos and which extended over Crete, the Archipelago, and the mainland alike, has also been rising once more in relative repute after a period during which the brilliance of the Minoan Age of the Aegean Civilization had temporarily put the subsequent Mycenaean Age out of countenance. There has been a similar change in the picture of the Middle American World. Here, as the achievements of a common Middle American Civilization in the Mayan highlands, on the Mexican plateau, and along the 'Olméca' sea-board of the Gulf of Mexico have come into view, this civilization's achievements in the Petén and Usumacinta region have become relatively less conspicuous. In the Anatolian archaeological field we may expect to see Khatti and Kizzuwadna and Troy suffer the same change of fortune as Crete and the Petén if the archaeologists who have been bringing to light the civilization of Anatolia in the third and second millennia B.C. follow up their discoveries in the east and the north-west by disinterring the still buried sites in the south-west. They have now made a beginning at Beyce Sultan, and their finds here have already been remarkable and illuminating.

These counter-swings of the pendulum may have gone too far. Archaeologists are not only apt to be ruthless; they are also apt to be temperamental and to allow themselves to be unduly swayed by passing fashions. Yet, even if their recent revisions of the picture may have to be revised in their turn, it seems likely that a picture in which all the provinces of a civilization have a place will prove, on the whole, to be nearer to the truth than a picture in which one province is starred at the expense of the rest. Changes in the picture in this direction therefore seem likely to last. The changes of this kind that I have here mentioned have occurred since the years (1927-34) in which I made my notes for this book and published the first three volumes. In previous chapters of the present volume, I have already taken note of the revisions, on my part, that these changes in the archaeological picture require. In this chapter I have to make the necessary consequent alterations in my list of civilizations.

The progress of archaeological discovery has also changed the picture in another way. It has bridged, or, short of that, has reduced in magnitude, certain breaks that appeared to interrupt the continuity of history in the picture as it used to be.

We have already noticed the revision, by later archaeologists, of Breasted's interpretation of the Osirian religion as a spiritual force that was both revolutionary and proletarian.¹ This change of interpretation has made the continuity of Egyptian history look still more closely knit than it looked already. The continuity of history in North China and in Middle America has similarly been underlined by the progress of archaeological discovery. The decipherment of the inscriptions on the 'oracle bones' discovered in North China at Anyang, the latest capital of the Shang, has shown that the script which the Shang were using in the thirteenth century B.C. was identical with the script still in use in China today. In the Shang version of this script, the characters retain, of course, older forms, but the present forms seem to have developed out of the Shang forms without any break in continuity.² This discovery brings out the continuity of the history of civilization in China from the Shang Age down to the present day. It is a piece of archaeological evidence that supports the testimony of the ensuing Chou Age's literary tradition. According to this, the Shang people and culture survived the Chou conquest in an asylum in the state of Sung. There was, no doubt, a certain break in continuity between the Shang Age and the Chou Age, and this break was due to the same cause as the more violent break in the Aegean basin between the Aegean Civilization and the subsequent Hellenic Civilization, and in India between the Indus Civilization and the subsequent Indic Civilization. In all these three cases alike, an established civilization suffered the impact of a barbarian *Völkerwanderung*. There is therefore something arbitrary and subjective in a judgement that puts one of these three cases in a different category from the other two. Yet an assessment of all the relevant facts known to us in each of the three cases does seem to lead to the conclusion that, in the Chinese case, the break of continuity was not great enough to warrant us in classifying the sequel as the history of a new civilization, whereas, in the Indian and Aegean cases, the break was so strongly pronounced that it would be misleading to treat the sequels as being epilogues to the histories of the previous civilizations rather than as being the histories of new civilizations.

In our picture of Middle American history, similarly, the break in continuity at the close of the 'Classic' Age looks less sharp, now that we can view it in the light of recent archaeological discoveries, than it looked when our only sources of information were the legends conveyed in enigmatic pictorial codices or recounted at second hand by Spanish investigators after the Spanish conquest. This literary evidence suggested

¹ See p. 550, footnotes 2 and 3, and the references there to earlier passages.

² On the other hand, the scripts of the Aegean Civilization and the Indus Civilization passed out of currency when these civilizations disappeared (except for the survival of versions of the Aegean script in a few outlying places, particularly Cyprus). In both the Aegean basin and India there seems to have been a subsequent period, lasting for some centuries, during which the art of writing was unknown, or at least in disuse. When it was revived, this came about through the introduction, from abroad, of a new script that had no historical relation to the last one. An Alexandrian Hellenic scholar of the third or second century B.C., whose mother-tongue was Greek but who wrote this in an alphabet of Phoenician origin, would not have had any better a start than Ventris had for deciphering inscriptions of the Mycenaean Age written in the Greek language in the Minoan 'Linear B' script.

that, down to the end of the Classic Age, civilization in Middle America had been confined to the Central Mayan area (the Petén and Usumacinta region), and that it was only in the Post-classic Age that it radiated from there northwards into Yucatan, north-westwards on to the Mexican plateau, and southwards into the Guatemalan highlands. Seen through this literary lens, Yucatan, for example, looked like new ground that had not been occupied by any civilization before the Post-classic Age, and that was then occupied for the first time by Maya emigrants from the abandoned Central Mayan area, followed by Toltec emigrants from the Mexican plateau. This picture suggested that there had been a Mayan Civilization in the Central Mayan area, and that the disintegration of this had been followed by the rise of two affiliated civilizations, one in Yucatan and the other on the Mexican plateau. This sketch of the configuration of the history of civilization in Middle America has now been proved wrong by changes in the picture that are results of the progress of archaeological discovery. We now know that civilization started as early on the Mexican plateau and in the Guatemalan highlands as in the Central Mayan area, and perhaps still earlier along the 'Olméca' sea-board of the Gulf of Mexico. We also now know that the Central Mayan variant of the Classic phase of the Middle American Civilization spread into Yucatan immediately after it had taken shape at Tikál and Uaxactun. The Post-classic Mayan variant of the Middle American Civilization thus turns out to have been a survival, not a new creation.

These archaeological discoveries lead to the conclusion that, in the history of civilization in Middle America, unity and continuity override discontinuity and diversity. This does not mean that there were no provincial idiosyncracies and no breaks in continuity. One such break was produced by the cumulative effects of the mysterious abandonment of the Classic sites and the subsequent irruption of waves of Chichimec barbarians—first a Toltec wave and later an Aztec one—from the northern hinterland of Middle America on to the Mexican plateau and then on, beyond that, into Yucatan. This particular break in continuity still looks considerable. At the same time, it now no longer looks considerable enough to justify the view that, at this point in Middle American history, an old civilization disappears and two new civilizations arise. On balance, it now seems more instructive to treat the whole of Middle American history as being the history of a single civilization.

We are now in a position to draw up our revised list of civilizations. This works out as follows.

I. Full-blown Civilizations


A. Independent Civilizations

Unrelated to Others

Middle American¹

Andean

¹ This covers not only the 'Mayan', 'Mexic', and 'Yucatec' civilizations that figure in the original list, but also the Classic phase of Middle American on the Mexican plateau and in Yucatan and in the Guatemalan highlands, which was left out of account in the original list.



*Unaffiliated to Others*Sumero-Akkadian¹

Egyptiac

Aegean²

Indus

Sinic³*Affiliated to Others (first batch)*

Syriac (to Sumero-Akkadian, Egyptiac, Aegean, and Hittite)

Hellenic (to Aegean)

Indic⁴ (to Indus)*Affiliated to Others (second batch)*

Orthodox Christian

Western

Islamic

(to both Syriac and Hellenic)

B. Satellite Civilizations

Mississippian } (of Middle American)

'South-Western'⁵North Andean⁶ } (of Andean)South Andean⁷

? Elamite (of Sumero-Akkadian)

Hittite (of Sumero-Akkadian)

? Urartian (of Sumero-Akkadian)

Iranian (first of Sumero-Akkadian, then of Syriac)

Korean

Japanese } (of Sinic)

Vietnamese

?Italic⁸ (of Hellenic)

¹ This includes the Babylonian as well as the Sumerian Civilization of the original list. The Babylonian last phase of the distinctive civilization of the lower Tigris-Euphrates basin was still Sumerian in its inspiration. Ashurbanipal's library was stocked with texts in the Sumerian language and with glossaries of it. But it would, nevertheless, be misleading to apply the label 'Sumerian' to the civilization current in Assyria and Babylonia in the seventh century B.C., considering that, by that date, the Sumerian language had been 'a dead language' for more than 1,000 years. Since the Age of Hammurabi the Semitic Akkadian language had replaced the Sumerian language as the living vehicle of the Sumerian Civilization. Therefore, Sumero-Akkadian is a more illuminating label than 'Sumerian' for the whole span of a civilization that did not lose its identity till the first century of the Christian Era.

² This covers not only the 'Minoan' Civilization of the original list, but also the contemporary 'Helladic' variant of the Aegean Civilization in Continental European Greece, as well as the 'Mycenaean' last phase of both 'Minoan' and 'Helladic'.

³ This covers not only the 'Sinic' Civilization of the original list, but also the 'Far Eastern (main body)', as well as the pre-Sinic 'Shang' Civilization of vols. vii-x.

⁴ This covers not only the 'Indic' Civilization of the original list, but also the 'Hindu' Civilization.

⁵ i.e. a Pre-Columbian civilization in what is now the South-West of the United States.

⁶ In what are now Northern Chile and North-Western Argentina.

⁷ In what are now Northern Chile and North-Western Argentina.

⁸ This would be a civilization common to the Etruscan immigrants into Italy in the last millennium B.C. and the peoples previously established in Italy. The common elements in their civilization (e.g. literacy in the Cumaeian alphabet) were of Hellenic origin. The indebtedness of the civilization of Italy in the Hellenic Age to the Hellenic Civilization was so great that it seems more instructive to regard Italy as having been,

South-East Asian (first of Indic, then, in Indonesia and Malaya only, of Islamic)

Tibetan¹ (of Indic)

Russian (first of Orthodox Christian, then of Western)²

II. Abortive Civilizations

First Syriac³ (eclipsed by Egyptiac)

Nestorian Christian⁴ (eclipsed by Islamic)

Monophysite Christian (eclipsed by Islamic)

Far Western Christian⁵ (eclipsed by Western)

Scandinavian⁵ (eclipsed by Western)

Medieval Western City-State Cosmos (eclipsed by Modern Western)

The accompanying chart⁶ displays the time-spans of all the civilizations included in this revised list, except for those possible satellite civilizations whose claims to rank as separate civilizations seem dubious.⁷

In this age, a province of the Hellenic World rather than a satellite of it. The Hellenic Civilization did acquire satellites, but not till the Post-Alexandrine age. In that age the Sumero-Akkadian, Egyptiac, and Syriac civilizations became satellites of the Hellenic Civilization before they lost their identities. As a consequence of having drawn the Syriac Civilization into its field, the Hellenic Civilization lost its own identity in an Hellenic-Syriac cultural amalgam.

¹ Including the Mongol and Calmuck converts to the Tibetan form of Mahayana Buddhism.

² The Russian Civilization was not the only one that had been drawn into the field of the Western Civilization since the closing decades of the seventeenth century. Two of the non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples—the Greeks and the Serbs—began to Westernize as early as the Russians. Since then, one non-Western society after another had followed in the Russians' wake. Indeed, in 1961 it might have been hard to find any living non-Western society, either of the civilizational or of the pre-civilizational kind, that had not become a satellite of the Western Civilization in some degree. This relation between them and the West might, however, turn out to have been only a passing phase, to judge by what happened after the Syriac Civilization had been drawn into the field of the Hellenic. In the light of this historical precedent it seemed possible that the civilizations of the West and its satellites would blend into a new ecumenical civilization drawing contributions from all of them.

³ See ii. 388-91.

⁴ This is, as Bagby points out in op. cit., p. 179, the abortive civilization labelled 'Far Eastern Christian' in my original list.

⁵ In an unpublished paper on my work, under the title 'Betrachtungen über Arnold J. Toynbee's Deutung des Menschheitsgeschehens', O. Höver questions whether I am right in classifying the Far Western Christian and the Scandinavian Civilization as having been abortive. He points out that both civilizations had a long history behind them. I agree, but, as I see it, Ireland before the fifth century of the Christian Era and Scandinavia before the ninth century were still in the pre-civilizational stage. See also eundem: 'Buchführung und Bilanz der Weltgeschichte in neuer Sicht: Zu A. Toynbee's Deutung des Frühzeitlichen Menschengeschehens', in *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Jahrgang 2, Heft 3 (1949/50), pp. 247-59.

⁶ On p. 559.

⁷ In each case the pre-universal-state phase of the civilization, if there was such a phase (and in most cases there was), has been marked in a different stipple from the universal-state phase, if the civilization in question ever entered into that phase. For this purpose the universal-state phase has been taken as including all successive avatars of the original universal state, in cases in which this was reconstituted either once, or more than once, after a temporary lapse, or repeated temporary lapses, into political disunity. In cases (e.g. those of the Aegean Civilization and the Indus Civilization) in which we do not know whether the society did or did not ever enter into the universal-state phase, this civilization's total time-span has been marked uniformly in a different stipple again.

In cases of affiliation the interregnum between the submergence of the antecedent civilization and the emergence of the affiliated civilization has been included in the time-spans of both civilizations, instead of being excluded from both. This has been

XIX. THE NEXT LEDGE

IN earlier volumes of this book¹ I have compared the situation of mankind in the present age to a climber's pitch. Below us lies the ledge that our pre-human ancestors reached in the act of becoming human. In the Age of the Civilizations mankind has been making a number of attempts to scale the cliff-face that towers up from the ledge reached by Primitive Man. The next ledge above, unlike the ledge immediately below, is invisible to climbers who are striving to reach it. All that they know is that they feel compelled to risk their necks in the hope of gaining this next ledge and in the faith that the endeavour is worth while.

This simile is a myth in the Platonic usage of the word.² Frankfort has pointed out³ that I have not arrived at it empirically: that is to say, not by induction from observed phenomena. The same point has been made, not *ad hominem* but in general terms, by Erdmann.⁴ The problem of 'Historismus' cannot, Erdmann contends, be solved by the progress of the social sciences. The *Geisteswissenschaften* (studies in the field of human affairs) are merely the anterooms of history; and Ernst Troeltsch recognized, as Erdmann here recalls, that 'Historismus' is 'a problem that points to something beyond itself (*ein über sich hinausweisendes Problem*)'. In this phrase Troeltsch is indicating the point at which Plato, whenever he reaches it, resorts to a myth deliberately. Myths are unenlightening if they do not transcend experience, and unwarrantable if they contradict it. My myth of the climber's pitch is, I should say, in accord with mankind's experience in the Age of the Civilizations. The civilizations themselves are movements; they are purposeful movements aiming at an objective; and they are not the only movements of the kind in the span of human history that is within our ken. They were preceded by a series of earlier new departures in which mankind's pace gradually accelerated and its impetus slowly gathered momentum. Moreover, within less than two thousand five hundred years of the date of the emergence of the earliest of the civilizations, the earliest of the done in order to make it clear that the time-spans of the two civilizations overlapped below the surface.

The time-spans of the five Christian and Islamic civilizations have been reckoned as starting from the date at which Islam and each of the four main Christian sects began to make mass-conversions. The starting-dates of the Christian and Islamic civilizations have, of course, to be distinguished clearly from the starting-dates of the two religions Christianity and Islam themselves. During the first three or four centuries of these two religions' existence, which were their formative centuries, their adherents amounted numerically to no more than a diaspora scattered among a majority that professed other religions; and the religion of a minority cannot provide the framework or basis for a civilization. The eventual mass-conversions made the emergence of Christian and Islamic civilizations possible for the first time. The Islamic diaspora became a ruling minority within twenty years of the Hijrah, whereas the Christian diaspora remained a subject minority until not much less than three hundred years after the Crucifixion. But this political difference is not to the point. The religion of a ruling minority is no more capable than the religion of a subject minority is of serving as the matrix of a new civilization. In the age in which the Umayyad and 'Abbasid Caliphate was at its zenith, there was an Islamic political power but not yet an Islamic society constituting a civilization.

¹ i. 192-4; iii. 2-3.

² See pp. 250-2.

³ H. Frankfort in *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 25-26.

⁴ K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 181-2.

higher religions appeared and, in appearing, stepped up the impetus to a still higher degree. After the World had suffered the shock of the First World War, Smuts remarked¹ that 'the tents have been struck and the great caravan of humanity is once more on the march'. This was true of the generation of which it was said; but it is no less true of all previous generations of which there is any surviving record.

Though the goal of mankind's continuous and increasing endeavours is still hidden below our horizon, we know, nevertheless, what it is. We can discern it, without having to divine the future, by looking inwards; for mankind's goal is written large in the constitution of human nature. What changed our pre-human ancestors into human beings like ourselves was the acquisition of consciousness and will.² These two spiritual faculties are human nature's distinguishing marks; and their character is ambivalent. They are both a treasure that gives us hope and a burden that puts us in peril. Their emergence in Man has split the unity of the Universe, and broken its harmony, for every conscious, wilful, human soul. The price of human knowledge and freedom is an intellectual and a moral relativity. Each of us sees the Universe divided between himself and all the rest of it; and each of us seeks to make himself the centre round which all the rest shall revolve. This constitution of human nature sets human nature's goal. Its goal is to transcend the intellectual and moral limitations that its relativity imposes on it. Its intellectual goal is to see the Universe as it is in the sight of God, instead of seeing it with the distorted vision of one of God's self-centred creatures. Human nature's moral goal is to make the self's will coincide with God's will, instead of pursuing self-regarding purposes of its own.

Few, if any, human souls have been entirely unaware of this goal or entirely indifferent to it. The saints have dedicated themselves to the pursuit of it, and some saints have come within a hair's breadth of attaining it—as it has seemed to spectators of ordinary spiritual stature, though never to the spiritual athletes themselves. The value of the goal lies in the goal itself; and therefore the goal cannot be attained unless it is pursued for its own sake. But, since the wages of sin is death,³ and this truth is continually being attested by experience, there has always been a utilitarian incentive, as well as a disinterested motive, for conduct that, when disinterested, is righteous. In our day this utilitarian consideration has become pressing, owing to a sudden immense increase in the power that knowledge and freedom have been accumulating in human hands. The human power that has increased is not a human soul's power over itself. There is no evidence of any increase in that within the time over which our records extend. So far as

¹ J. C. Smuts: *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion* (London 1918, Hodder & Stoughton), p. 71.

² The reality of human freedom is recognized by people who differ widely from each other in their account of it. 'The rationalists will . . . admit, probably, that, within certain biological limits, Man is free. This freedom, however, is not, to them, the freedom of "the law of God", nor is it evidence of the intervention of anything supernatural in human affairs. This freedom is a biological phenomenon, purely and simply' (M. Savelle in *The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. xxv, No. 1 (February, 1956), pp. 56-67).

³ Rom. vi. 23.

one can guess, human beings are no better, and saints are no more frequent, in the present-day world than they will have been in, let us say, the Lower Palaeolithic Age. The power that has been accumulating and increasing is collective power over both human souls and non-human nature. Now that mankind's collective power is within sight of becoming able to extinguish all human life, and perhaps all life of any kind on the face of the planet, the works of righteousness are being demanded of us urgently, not only for their own sake, but by our concern for self-preservation.

For approaching this objective we might seem to have a choice between two roads: one rough and narrow, the other smooth and broad. The hard way of doing the works of righteousness is to be righteous. It is hard, but it is unquestionably open, since it is the way that is followed by the saints. The easy way would be to be 'conditioned' to be incapable of choosing to do anything else. This is the way of the social insects on Earth—or of the angels in Heaven if we prefer to speak the language of Christian mythology. Till within living memory this bee-like or angelic way of doing righteous acts willy-nilly was not open to the human race. The possibility of 'conditioning' human souls, like the possibility of genocide, has appeared above Man's horizon within our own life-time. When Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* was published in 1932, the notion of 'brain-washing' was still little more than an anti-Utopian flight of fancy. By 1961 it had become part of mankind's ever-growing repertory of accomplishments. Considering that these two portentous new crimes—genocide and 'conditioning'—had become feasible simultaneously, mankind might be strongly tempted to seek security against genocide by acquiescing in 'conditioning'. If it were a question of choosing between the two evils, it would be difficult for human beings to decide that the self-annihilation of their own race was the lesser evil of the two. To be 'conditioned' would be likely to seem a less terrible option than to be extinguished; and, even if 'conditioning' were not commended by presenting itself as the only practical alternative to extinction,¹ it would have an attraction in itself for beings saddled with the burden of consciousness and will. This burden, inherent in human nature, is a grievous one. We are born with it on our backs; and it condemns us to serve a life-sentence of tension and struggle. If we could get rid of it, we could relax and rest. And, if the power to get rid of it has now at last come within our reach, why should we not avail ourselves of it? The burden has been imposed on us without our leave being asked. What obligation have we to go on putting up with it when once we have learnt how to relieve ourselves of it? The attraction of 'conditioning' is akin to the attraction of drugs and intoxicants.

¹ It can also commend itself insidiously by masquerading as its own antithesis: self-determination. F. A. Hayek makes the point that the demand for conscious control or direction of social purposes means, in effect, a demand for giving some single mind and will the control over all others. It means this, in Hayek's view, because "conscious" and "deliberate" are terms which have meaning only when applied to individuals' (*The Counter-Revolution of Science*, p. 87). There is, however, surely the alternative possibility that a conscious and deliberate control may be exercised jointly by a number of minds and wills achieving and maintaining agreement with each other. If this were not possible, there could be no such thing as human society. For this, unlike insect society, is not a product of automatic instinctive behaviour.

One specious argument in favour of submitting to being 'conditioned' would be that, after all, this would not be an entirely new departure. Should we be doing anything more novel or more questionable than just carrying to its logical conclusion a human practice that must be as old as, or older than, mankind itself? Human society may be inconceivable without conscious and deliberate agreement, but it is also hardly conceivable without the bond of habit; and, if it is true that our pre-human ancestors could hardly have managed to become human beings without having been social animals already,¹ habit must always have been one of the key-institutions of human life. Our habits are inculcated by our education. This, taken in the broad sense, is a life-long social drill. It teaches us to perform by mimesis, without reasoning why, all kinds of acts that we should never have dreamed of if we had been left to ourselves.² Between drilling and 'conditioning' is there any great gulf? Could not 'conditioning' be fairly described as being social drill that is made infallibly effective by being given a final twist to clinch it?

This argument is rebutted by a series of counter-considerations. It may be true that human beings have not been able to maintain society without having recourse to mimesis and inculcating it by social drill. But the road leading to sociality by mimesis is a short cut; and the fact that it may have been difficult to avoid taking it cannot blind us to the further fact that mimesis has been one of society's dangerous weaknesses.³ Mimesis is dangerous for the reason for which it is convenient. It partially anaesthetizes our human faculties of thinking and choosing, and this can dislocate a human society by paralysing human nature. If mimesis can work this havoc, 'conditioning' must be baneful *à fortiori*. For the difference between 'conditioning' and social drill is one of those differences of degree that amount to differences in kind.

Most of the social drill that has made the wheels of society go round has, at most times and places, been largely spontaneous and unorganized. Even where it has been applied consciously and deliberately, as, for instance, in commercial advertising, in religious indoctrination and ritual, and in the literal military drilling of the Spartan or the Prussian parade-ground, it has not had the power to produce an irreversible change in human nature. The cake of custom, formed by social drill, can be broken, and, when it is, human nature emerges intact. To break it in defiance of strong public feeling in its favour requires, no doubt, the courage and resoluteness of a hero; but the saints and the martyrs have successfully risen to the occasion; and ordinary human beings have found it easy to break the cake when they have escaped from the social environment in which it has been formed. The Spartan abroad was notoriously prone to react against his Lyncurgen training by going to extremes of licentiousness; and thousands of Germans who have emigrated to the United States after having been put through the mill of the Prussian Army have become admirable citizens of a democratic community. By contrast, the objective of 'conditioning' is to deprive human beings permanently of their capacity to think and to will, and, since this

¹ See i. 173.² See i. 191-2 and iii. 245-8 and 373.³ See iv. 119-33.

is the capacity that makes us human, for good or for evil, 'conditioning' is an attempt to destroy human nature itself. Perhaps we do not yet know enough about its results, up to date, to be able to tell whether or not its aim is actually attainable. We do know, however, that this has been the aim of its practitioners in our time; and we also know that the new science of psychology has equipped them with devilish devices which, in the past, were not at the drill-sergeant's, priest's, or advertiser's disposal.

Therefore we should stop and think, not just twice but many times, before we decide to commit ourselves to this psychological technique. This may look like a heaven-sent engine for hoisting us on to the ledge above us before the new military technique of genocide has had time to annihilate us. Yet the ledge on which the technique of 'conditioning' would deposit us would turn out not to be the one above our last ledge. That last ledge was the ledge that we reached in the act of becoming human. We should now find ourselves on the ledge below that: the ledge reached by our ancestors when they became pre-human animals: the ledge, in fact, on which the social insects are still marooned. Instead of having taken a quick step up, we should have taken two quick steps down. The psychological machine that we had mistaken for an elevator would have proved to be a dejector.

A student of the social insects has thrown out an interesting suggestion.¹ The stupendous altruistic social acts that are performed willy-nilly by the social insects as we know them may have been originally performed, by these 'conditioned' creatures' remote ancestors, as acts of free choice, guided by rational thought. In Hingston's mind this idea was perhaps no more than a *jeu d'esprit*; but a myth about a non-human order of living beings may throw light on mankind's past, as well as on our possible future. If it is true that our ancestors had become social animals before they became human beings endowed with consciousness and will, these pre-human social animals must have been 'conditioned' to perform their social functions, as the non-human social animals—bees, ants, and termites—still are. The act that turned our ancestors into human beings must have been a victorious revolt against their hereditary spiritual bondage. It must, in fact, have been a successful assertion of a previously undreamed-of freedom to think and to choose; and these are the faculties that we now recognize as being the distinctive characteristics of human nature.

And what about the mythical history of the angels? Christian mythology represents the angels as doing God's will willy-nilly, like the social insects. But it also tells the story of a war in Heaven, when Satan rebelled against God and Satan's fellow angels took sides either with God or with the rebel. This story presupposes that, at the time of Satan's rebellion, angels possessed the freedom of choice that is possessed by human beings. Are these two pieces of angelology to be reconciled by supposing that the loyal angels were rewarded by being made immune, thenceforth, against the possibility of committing Satan's sin? If their

¹ R. W. G. Hingston: *Problems of Instinct and Intelligence* (London 1928, Arnold), p. 268, quoted in iii. 108.

nature was indeed changed in this way, was that truly a reward? Would it not be nearer the truth to call it a preventive penalization? Regarded from a human standpoint, it would look like a spiritual mutilation that deprived the loyal angels of their greatest previous spiritual treasure. And, if the fallen angels preserved their anthropoid spiritual freedom, did not this more than compensate them for having been cast down from Heaven into the Abyss? Are not these free fallen angels in Hell on a spiritually higher ledge than their fellows who have remained in Heaven at the price of being 'conditioned'? Anyway, free angels, even though fallen, are nearer akin, spiritually, to us human beings than 'conditioned' angels are. Self-respecting human beings will assuredly endorse Zaehner's dictum¹ that 'Man is not an angel, and, in seeking to be one, he deprives himself of something that is essential to his being'.

The freedom of the human self is a curse inasmuch as it is the source of spiritual evil in Man, but at the same time it is an inestimable treasure inasmuch as it is also the only source, in Man, of spiritual good. We recognize its value for us when we find ourselves under threat of being deprived of it. To be 'conditioned' is a fatal evil in itself, even if our 'unconditioned' fellow human being who is 'conditioning' us is doing this in all good faith, not in order to serve his own self-centred ends, but in order to make our wills compulsorily conform to God's will as our human 'conditioner' sees it.² God's will cannot be done by human beings at some other human being's dictation. Each of us has to try to discover for himself, through his own travail and at his own peril, what God's will for him is. And, since Man is a social being, each individual's peril and travail is also peril and travail for his fellow men. This is the inalienable privilege and penalty of being human.³ We can escape it only by giving up being human, and human nature revolts against attempts to constrain it to make this renunciation. In the past, would-be tyrants have often been baffled by encountering something intractable in their intended victims. Fortunately for mankind, human nature is more mulish than it is sheep-like. This has been a saving human quality; but, until our day, our mulish human nature has never had to face the new psychological weapon that a present-day tyrant wields. In this new situation we may have to fight with all our strength to defend and preserve the freedom of our personalities which is our human birthright. We hold this precious gift not as owners but as trustees. Our free selves are ours to be used by us, not for self-centred purposes of our own, but

¹ R. C. Zaehner: *At Sundry Times* (London 1958, Faber), p. 168.

² Actually, a 'conditioner' who is sincerely trying to 'condition' his fellow human beings to do God's will must have a self-contradictory notion of what God's will is. The 'conditioner' himself will be 'unconditioned' *ex hypothesi*. If he himself were not still in possession of his native human consciousness and will, he would be unable either to set himself his objective of 'conditioning' his fellow human beings or to work towards it. But he cannot reasonably suppose that God wills him and his fellow human creatures to be different from each other in kind. What is good for one must be good for the rest where what is in question is the fundamental structure of human nature. Therefore, on the 'conditioner's' own premisses, God must will the 'conditioner' to be 'conditioned' like his intended victims, and must therefore will him to be incapable of carrying out his self-conferred mission; or, alternatively, God must will the 'conditioner's' intended victims, as well as the 'conditioner' himself, to be 'unconditioned', and must therefore disprove of the 'conditioner's' aim.

³ See E. Grster in *Die Neue Rundschau*, 13. Heft (Winter, 1949), pp. 140 and 141.

in God's service. The angels' and the social insects' involuntary way is not the way for human beings.

If this is our decision, it commits us to the other alternative. Human beings will have to try to follow the way of the saints; and this is hard indeed. A human being who enters on it is involving himself in a perpetual struggle and exposing himself to perpetual danger;¹ and, even at the price of this tribulation, the seeker's goal will never be reached to the seeker's satisfaction. It cannot be, because a human being who rises to sainthood does not undergo a spiritual mutation. He does not become a creature of another species.² The distinctive characteristics of human nature are the freedom of the human consciousness and the human will; and this freedom is a saint's, as well as an ordinary human being's, spiritual instrument. The goal of a saint's endeavour is, not to sterilize his spiritual freedom, but to put it to work in God's service. This service is perfect freedom if it is perfectly performed; but the saint will be painfully aware of the gulf—invisible to ordinary human eyes—between his achievement and his ideal of perfection. As Berkovitz has well said,³ there is perfection neither in this world nor in any other, but only in God; and this means that a human soul's—even a saint's soul's—fight with self-centredness will be unceasing.

If this is the truth, it tells us that the next ledge, if we succeed in reaching it, will not be a resting-place. Rest cannot be procured for human beings in this world by means of institutions, even if these are admirably designed for meeting the needs of the time, and even if they are accepted whole-heartedly and operated in good faith.

'Whatever may be achieved, in the nearer or more distant future, in the way of institutions, organisations, federations, it will remain true that nothing achieved in history can be made permanently secure. There is no such thing as a human organisation that can be established "securely" through being made weather-proof against the all-disintegrating action of time.'⁴

'The culture-cycle as a whole might be described as an alternation between rigid traditionalism and tendencies to disruption and chaos. And history knows of no resting-point in this up-and-down.'⁵

Rest would also not be one of the rewards of a spiritual effort that succeeded in transfiguring human society into a communion of saints. Even in a saintly society the victory over self-centredness, collective and individual, would never be complete, and the effort would therefore have to be unremitting. This means that the next ledge will be the scene of a spiritual struggle that will not be less intense than the struggle

¹ See i. 277-99 and iii. 373.

² In iii. 232, I quoted, and endorsed, a passage in Bergson's *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* in which Bergson seems to suggest that to become a saint means to become something like a 'superman'. If this is Bergson's meaning here, I find, on second thoughts, that I do not agree with him over this, if, by 'superman', one means an ex-human creature that has become immune to the human failing of making a wrong choice. This immunity could be acquired only at the cost of forfeiting the capacity to make choices of any kind, wrong or right.

³ E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, pp. 125-6.

⁴ E. Gûrster in *Die Neue Rundschau*, 13. Heft (Winter, 1949), pp. 141-2.

⁵ F. Borkenau in *Commentary*, March, 1956, p. 244.

to climb, from ledge to ledge, up the face of the cliff. Moreover, this conclusion about the conditions that await us on the next ledge above us raises a question about the ledge immediately below us. Perhaps this, too, was not, in truth, the resting-place that, so far, I have taken it to have been. Miss Oakeley reminds us¹ that 'we must not ignore the gigantic effort of "Primitive" Man in rising from the sub-human to the human'. This effort is one that I had taken into account: it is the effort of climbing the precipice next below ours. But the successful performance of this feat may not, after all, have been followed by an age of torpor. Christopher Dawson points out that, even where a culture is apparently static, a continuous effort is required for the task of merely keeping the culture in that condition.² Dawson's observation would, no doubt, be confirmed from personal experience if we could call as witnesses the elders responsible for the management of any one of the most primitive human societies still extant; and, in the age of the Egyptian or the Sinic universal state, a Pharaonic or Confucian civil servant would assuredly have given the same testimony. Like the physicist, the anthropologist recognizes that what looks, to an uninitiated eye, as if it were a motionless solid body is in reality a swirling legion of invisible dancers, each dancing with all its might for dear life.

The last word here may be left for a poet to speak. George Herbert has perceived³ that, when God at first made Man, rest was not included among the gifts with which He endowed him. The poet has also divined that this gift was withheld for a purpose. God's intent towards Man, as Herbert sees it, was that,

if goodness lead him not, yet weariness
may toss him to My breast.

The intrinsic imperfection of human nature does, indeed, both require and provide a spur. Yet struggle and danger—Man's two inseparable companions on his journey through this world—are no more than means to an end; and they are not the only means of advancing towards the goal of human endeavours that Man has at his disposal. The best means is identical with the end itself. This end is goodness; and, though human goodness never attains perfection, not even in the soul of the greatest saint, Man travels best when his imperfect goodness leads him.

If this is our conclusion, what, if any, practical bearing does it have on the urgent question of our time? What are we to do to save ourselves, here and now, in the alarming situation in which the human race now finds itself? Try to become saints? And this with the foreknowledge that, however far we may succeed in advancing towards this ambitious spiritual goal, we shall never succeed in reaching it, and, meanwhile, shall never win release from danger, struggle, and weariness? If we agree that this spiritual endeavour is the only alternative to self-annihilation *en masse* now that we possess the atomic weapon, is not that merely an indirect way of saying that mass-suicide is now mankind's

¹ H. D. Oakeley in *Philosophy*, vol. xi, No. 42 (April, 1936), p. 190.

² Chr. Dawson: *The Dynamics of World History*, pp. 451-2.

³ George Herbert: *The Pulley*.

inevitable fate? Is the suggested alternative really a practical proposition? What percentage of the thousands of millions of human beings who have lived and died so far has ever dreamed of aiming at sainthood? Can one imagine *l'homme moyen sensuel* devoting himself to an aim that calls for this degree of sacrifice, and that, even at that cost, is impossible to achieve more than approximately and imperfectly? Even if you could convince him that this is now his only alternative to self-destruction, and even if he were to do his best, is it conceivable that he would be capable of doing even the minimum necessary for saving the situation?

One answer to these questions is that the very thing that makes the pursuit of saintliness look like a thankless task is something that also makes it a practicable one. The task seems thankless because it cannot be achieved perfectly, and the reason why it cannot is because the aspirant to sainthood does not cease to be a human being. Unlike the imaginary superman, the saint is not an ex-human being who has turned into another kind of creature through some mysterious mutation that is none of his own doing. He is a human being who has raised himself above the average level of human goodness; and, if he believes, and is right in believing, that he could not have risen without the help of God's grace, this is a further indication that the saint himself is no more than a human creature. Sainthood, thus described, is a well-attested historical phenomenon, and the human beings who have risen to this higher spiritual altitude have done so in different degrees. What some human beings have achieved in some degree must be a practicable objective for others; if grace has been offered to some souls, it will have been offered to all, whatever Augustine and Calvin may say; and any measure of success in approaching sainthood will have spiritual value. It is not a case of being asked to attempt the impossible or of being faced with a choice between all or nothing. The road towards sainthood is, in fact, an open one on which even the worst and weakest human being can set foot, though this open road stretches away towards an ever-receding spiritual horizon.

One of the first steps on the road is to acquire some sense of responsibility and to act on this by restraining one's own self-centred impulses. All sane adult human beings are responsible-minded to some minimum degree. Indeed, this is one of the definitions of what sanity means. One field in which ordinary human beings in the mass have managed to behave more or less responsibly is the handling of tools. In making his tools progressively more effective, Man has also made the misuse of them progressively more dangerous. In harnessing atomic energy he has now acquired a tool which is so potent that, if used as a weapon, it might destroy, not merely a hostile army or people or merely the users themselves, but the whole human race. This new power has challenged the holders of it not to misuse it; and, since the dropping of the bombs on Japan in 1945, there have been indications that the holders of atomic power have been conscious of the new and awful responsibility that their possession of this power entails. The invention of the atomic weapon has made future resort to war a crime against the human race. And it is noteworthy that, since the end of the Second World

War, the World's most powerful nations and governments have shown an unc customary self-restraint on some critical occasions. They have given priority to their sense of responsibility for avoiding a world-war that would be fought, this time, with atomic weapons, and they have subordinated, to this paramount concern, their national *amour propre* and ambitions and even their ideological convictions.

On the road towards sainthood, this budding sense of obligation not to exterminate the human race is, no doubt, only a feeble and far-off step. The attitude is negative and the motive is largely self-regarding, since it is obvious that atomic war-makers could not exterminate their fellow men without exterminating themselves together with the rest. At the same time this step marks a notable breach with the habit of going to war, which is coeval with civilization. It is encouraging evidence of human nature's power to respond to the challenge of a revolutionary change of circumstances. It is also of great immediate practical importance, because it keeps mankind's foot in the door that opens into the future, and so promises to give time for Man's sense of responsibility towards mankind as a whole to take a more positive form.

If the first step on Man's road towards sainthood is the renunciation of Man's traditional role of being his brother's murderer, the second step would be an acceptance of Man's new role of being his brother's keeper; and, happily, this sense of responsibility for the positive welfare of Man's fellow human beings has already declared itself. It is, indeed, one of the fruits of the seventeenth-century Western spiritual revolution. We have noticed, in another context,¹ that, in the post-seventeenth-century Western World, the progressive recession of belief in Christianity's traditional doctrines has been accompanied by a progressive advance in the practice of Christianity's moral precepts; and that, although this advance has been opposed, in the West itself, by the reactionary ideologies that have raised their heads there in our generation,² the ideals of Howard and Wilberforce have, so far, not been driven off the field by the counter-ideals of Mussolini and Hitler, but have, on the contrary, been disseminated, in company with other elements of the modern Western Civilization, among the non-Western majority of the human race. As landmarks³ in the advance of this modern humanitarianism, we may single out the abolition of the slave-trade and of slavery itself, the abolition of barbarous forms of punishment, the humanization of the treatment of prisoners and lunatics, the establishment of old-age pensions and national health services, and, in general, the narrowing of the gulf between a poor majority's and a rich minority's conditions of life. This advance towards greater social justice through an increase in human kindness has been taking place in two fields simultaneously: as between different classes in a single country and also as between different countries in a world that is now in process of being unified morally and socially as well as technologically and militarily. The relatively rich minority of the human race has now recognized that it has an obligation to make material sacrifices in order to assist the relatively poor majority to raise its standard of living on both the material

¹ See pp. 532-3.

² See pp. 528-9 and 531-2.

³ See pp. 529-30.

and the spiritual plane. Peoples that are still exercising political control over other peoples have now come, thanks to an American lead, to expect to pay for this political privilege instead of any longer expecting to draw the traditional profits of empire.

These practical steps towards the vindication of fundamental and universal human rights leave us still far away from the achievement of a communion of saints. Yet this conscious and deliberate advance towards brotherhood in a community embracing the whole human race is surely even farther removed from the involuntary sociality of the beehive and the ant-heap.

II ANNEX

Ad Hominem

I. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND THANKS TO MY CRITICS

THE possible value of self-examination as an aid to the study of human affairs has been discussed in Chapter II. I there suggested that this might be a promising means for trying to mitigate the distorting effects of the human student's relativity to his cultural milieu and his personality. This suggestion is not original: it is made in passages that I have quoted from books and articles¹ that had already been published at the time when I was writing this chapter. Nor, I think, is it a controversial suggestion. At any rate, I have not come across any opposition to it. Disagreement begins when we put the question whether the self-analyst should make his findings public. No doubt, if he found sympathy and response, showing his cards might bring him valuable help in his undertaking. The significance of some of the evidence about himself that he put on the table—without, perhaps, having fully understood its significance himself—might be transparent to some of his readers, even if they were not professional psychologists. He would, however, be laying himself open to the cutting comment that, for his readers, his conscientious—or self-important—self-revelation was boring because it was superfluous. They did not need any commentary from him to enable them to size up and discount 'the personal factor' in his work; this leapt to the eye; he had already revealed himself, unintentionally and unconsciously.

I can illustrate this point *ad hominem* from some comments on the first ten volumes of this book. The presentation of history there given has been criticized as being 'personal'² and 'subjective'.³ Of course, all

¹ See p. 60, footnote 2.

² 'A Personal View of History' was the heading of Bagby's review of volumes vii-x of this book in *The Times Literary Supplement* (reprinted in *Toynbee and History*). Kohn calls the book 'an intensely personal document'; 'a profession of faith' (*ibid.*, p. 351); and he uses the same phrases in an article, headed 'Toynbees Glaubensbekenntnis', in *Der Monat* (Berlin, August, 1955), p. 465. Leddy, too, sees in it 'a highly personal work' (*The Phoenix*, vol. 11, No. 4 (1957), p. 140). Altree finds in the book 'a normative system based on a very private interpretation of the course of human destiny' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 271). Hourani comments that, while the book is 'in a sense conventional, for all its air of originality, in a more profound way it is deeply personal' (*The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 387). R. K. Merton observes that 'Toynbee's transcendental theology enacted upon the stage of human history is a matter of private faith, not historical sociology' (*The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xlvii, No. 2 (September, 1941), pp. 205-13). C. W. Weinberger remarks that 'the magnitude of the endeavour seems almost to have overwhelmed the author into putting far too much of his personal self into it' (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 17th October, 1954). R. H. Tawney notes that 'the book does not, in his judgment, lose, but gains, from the note of personal conviction which runs through its pages, and from the occasional confessions of faith in which conviction finds its voice' (*International Affairs*, November, 1939, p. 806). This consensus shows that in these volumes 'the personal factor' must be transparent.

³ Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, p. 92. M. Saville speaks of my 'extreme subjectivity'. 'Modern historians will find it impossible to accept "intuitive truth" as evidence of anything beyond the individual experience of the person whose intuitive experience it is' (*The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. xxv, No. 1 (February, 1956), pp. 55-67). T. R. Fyvel finds that 'on almost every page one can trace what appears

interpretations, and indeed all would-be objective statements of fact, are inevitably 'subjective' and 'personal' in the sense of the argument in Chapter II of this volume. They are all inescapably relative to the inquirer's own fundamental presuppositions. But my critics evidently mean something more than this, and their meaning is brought out by Sir Ernest Barker when he says of me that 'he has not discounted himself enough'.¹ These criticisms—which are, I am sure, deserved—imply that the critics have already been able to do the discounting for themselves, without needing aid from the author. It is therefore not surprising that, when I opened the bag of tools with which I had done the job, the critics should have 'thanked me for nothing'. The autobiographical information included in my 'acknowledgements and thanks'² was evidently distasteful to Sir Ernest Barker,³ and it has given Trevor-Roper an opening for making some amusing play with it.⁴

Having learnt my lesson 'in the hard way', I have tried to profit by it in the present volume by taking a new path that has been opened up for me by my critics. I have left the initiative to them, and have taken up the topics on which their comments have converged. Since the purpose of publishing books and reviewing them is, not to defend and attack personal positions, but to co-operate in working for the advancement of knowledge and understanding, I have concentrated, in the main body of this volume, on topics which seem likely to be of some general interest, and I have set as many as possible of my critics' comments, and my reflections on these, in this impersonal context. But this procedure has left, still unacknowledged, a considerable body of criticism that is concerned with 'the personal factor' in my book; and this has put me in a dilemma. If I follow my critics on to this ground, I expose myself again to being censured or ridiculed for setting foot on it. If I keep off it, I am ignoring a large part of my critics' work. I am sincerely grateful to my critics, even including the small minority of them who have seemed to me to show traces of personal animus or even of an intention to do me personal damage. These, among the rest, have at any rate done me the

[to be] a purely subjective approach to historical events and characters' (*The Tribune*, 21st March, 1947, p. 21). M. S. Bates feels that 'at times the subjectivism is oppressive' (*Christianity and Crisis*, vol. 15, No. 4 (21st March, 1955), pp. 27-30 and 32). In C. B. Joynt's eyes, 'such history is private, purely subjective history. Vast sections . . . are solipsistic in content' (*The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 201). A milder statement of the same judgement is that 'our author may not be as dispassionate and objective as he thinks he is' (A. N. Holcombe in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. xlix, No. 4 (December, 1955), p. 1151).

¹ Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, p. 92.

² See vol. x, pp. 213-42.

³ While criticizing me for not being more reticent, Barker suggests an interpretation of my motives which, besides being kindly, is correct. Mumford, in *Toynbee and History*, p. 141, also recognizes that my purpose was an impersonal one and not a wish to exhibit my personality. A. N. Holcombe finds that 'the author's candid intellectual autobiography, which explains how he came to set less store by politics and more by religion', is 'one of the most attractive features of the work' (*The American Political Science Review*, vol. xlix, No. 4 (December, 1955), pp. 1151-4). I have the impression, however, that, in passing this favourable judgement, Holcombe is in a minority among my critics.

Blackmur finds that the whole book is an intellectual autobiography, and that, in this sense, one of the three orders of apprehension that are to be found in it is the personal one, the other two being the documentary and the religious (*Kenyon Review*, Summer, 1955, pp. 357-70).

⁴ H. Trevor-Roper in *Encounter*, June, 1957. On the article as a whole, no comment.

service of spending some of their working time on giving their minds to my book, and the result has been a boon for me. Their pummellings have given me a mental massage that has loosened the joints and muscles of my mind and has set it moving on a new course. The least that I can do in return is to debate with them when they call on me to reply, as Geyl has been calling almost plaintively. I have therefore decided to take Geyl for the spokesman of the jury, and to do my critics the courtesy of giving them a reply, even when the questions that they raise are concerned with my personal outlook. I have put this more personal part of the debate in this annex, and, here too, I have concentrated, as far as I have been able, on topics that might be of some general interest, such as, for example, the effects of a classical education. Precautions, however, are no guarantee of security when one is venturing into a mine-field.

2. EFFECTS OF A CLASSICAL EDUCATION

(i) *Fortunate Effects*

In a review of previous volumes of this book Hourani has commented¹ that 'the very elements of which his theory is built are the commonplaces of an English classical education'. I agree with this comment, if I may supplement it by reminding the reader that this kind of education was not an English invention or peculiarity. The form current in England, during the years 1896 to 1911, when I was receiving my classical education there, had been established, between four and five hundred years back, in Italy. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this was still the standard form of higher education not only in England but throughout the Western World, including Western countries outside Europe. And at the same date an education in some 'classical' language and literature, though not, of course, in those that ranked as classical in the West, was also still the standard form of higher education in Eastern Asia, India, Persia, Turkey, and the Arab countries, as well as among the Jewish diaspora in what was then the 'Jewish Pale' of the Russian Empire. In fact, it still held the field in every one of the civilizations then in existence.² It had also been the standard form of higher education in civilizations that were then no longer in existence: for instance, the Sumero-Akkadian in its Babylonian phase and the Egyptian.

A 'classical' education may be defined as one in which the staple discipline is an initiation into some culture that is older than the present-day culture of the society in which this form of higher education is the established one. While being distinct from the present-day culture, the

¹ In loc. cit., p. 386.

² In Russia one of the effective forms of the process of 'Westernization' since the time of Peter the Great had been the introduction of a 'classical' education in the Greek and Latin languages and literature. The Greek language and literature had not been imposed on Russia by the Greek Orthodox Christian missionaries who had converted her to Christianity, and there had not been a renaissance of Greek culture there corresponding to the renaissance of Latin and Greek culture in the West. The Byzantine Greeks' abstention from the practice of 'cultural imperialism' is noteworthy, considering that they were enthusiasts for the classical literature of their Hellenic predecessors. The Greek classics were the staple of Byzantine higher education.

'classical' culture in which present-day higher education is given will have some historical relation with it. It will be the past culture of the same society in some earlier phase of its history, or it will be the culture of some earlier society to which the present-day society is 'affiliated' in the sense in which the Western Civilization may be said to be affiliated to the Hellenic. The medium in which an education in a 'classical' culture is given is usually that of language and literature. A knowledge of languages, and copies of the texts of books written in them, have often survived the other elements—states, laws, architecture, and so on—of the culture in which these languages and this literature were once current; and a literature, even if only fragments of it survive, can give a glimpse (though this may sometimes be a deceptive glimpse) into the rest of the life of the vanished society in which this literature was created.

The language in which the 'classical' literature is conveyed need not be a 'dead' language. A twentieth-century Persian peasant who knows a quantity of 'classical' Persian poetry by heart finds this easy because the language of Firdawsi, Sa'di, and Hafiz is not so very different from the peasant's own present-day mother-tongue. Even where the 'classical' language is one that has passed out of every-day use, or has never been used for every-day purposes at any date, it may not be 'dead' in the strict sense of being completely out of currency. In the Western World, for instance, the Latin language has had an unbroken history—going back to the time when it was one of the two official languages of the Roman Empire—as the liturgical language of the Roman Catholic Church; and even in every-day usage it still lives in the current form of English in Latin phrases—'ad hominem', 'dramatis personae', 'ceteris paribus', 'mutatis mutandis', 'pari passu', 'ipso facto', 'sine die', 'vice versa', 'pro' and 'con.', 'nem. con.', 'i.e.', 'e.g.', 'viz.' (i.e. videlicet), 'etcetera'—which are embedded there like flints in chalk.

At what value is the 'classical' kind of education to be appraised? Evidently it cannot just be taken for granted that it is valuable as well as venerable, simply because it has held the field so long and so widely. In retrospect we can see that its reign has been due partly to the inertia that accounts for so much in human affairs, and partly to cultural breakdowns resulting in 'intermediate periods' or 'interregna' or 'dark ages', after which the subsequent culture has been rightly felt to be inferior to the relics of a culture that had been prevalent before the catastrophe. In our own day we are seeing this kind of education being rapidly ousted from its traditional, once sacrosanct, position by a new kind that has for its staples a scientific knowledge of non-human nature and a technological 'know-how' for making natural processes serve human purposes. This is happening not only in the West, where modern science and technology originated, but in the rest of the World, where, today, the mastering of up-to-date Western technology and science is a crucial part of a process of 'Westernization' that has now come to be almost world-wide.

No doubt it is conceivable that the new oecumenical civilization that is now taking shape within a Western framework might bring on

itself a catastrophe comparable in magnitude, scale for scale, with the catastrophes that other civilizations have brought on themselves in the past, and it is also conceivable that, in that imaginary future situation, the present-day education in science and technology might, in its turn, become 'classical': that is to say, might become petrified in a pre-third-world-war form. This, however, seems improbable, because—in contrast to the 'timelessness' of great literature, which is its weakness as well as its strength—it is the strength, as well as the weakness, of science that it is cumulative. The piety towards the past, which is one of the virtues of 'humane studies',¹ stands condemned as a vice in science's intellectual and ethical code. For scientists it is an obligatory ambition that they should strive to supersede their own past achievements, and it is a point of honour for them that they should ruthlessly discard all findings that have been invalidated by science's subsequent advance. Therefore, if science survives, it seems likely still to keep on the move; and, therefore, again, it seems likely that, if the traditional kind of 'classical' education were to be ousted completely, it would not, in any circumstances, be replaced by a scientific equivalent.

If this forecast carries conviction, it makes an appraisal of 'classical' education a matter of great practical, as well as theoretical, interest in our day. This has, as we have seen, been virtually the only form of higher education since the civilizations of earlier generations came to be consecrated as 'classical' as a consolation prize for their failure to survive. If it were true that we are now within sight of seeing this traditional form of higher education driven off the field, this would mean that we are now at an epoch-making point in educational history, and this would make it seem prudent to 'stop, look, and listen', and not just forge ahead blindly.

What, then, is to be mankind's verdict on the traditional 'classical' kind of higher education? Individual judgements on this issue, as on others, are subject to the sway of relativity, and therefore differ as widely as the fundamental presuppositions by which they are governed. My own judgement, in this case, is implicit in my feelings about the 'classical' education that I myself received. My generation was almost the last in England to be given an education in the Greek and Latin languages and literature that remained faithful to the strictest fifteenth-century Italian standards. The aim was not merely to make us read Greek and Latin more fluently than French or German, and to have as great a familiarity with Greek and Latin literature as with English; it was to give us the ability to write Greek and Latin prose, and verse as well, with ever greater virtuosity. The ideal was to produce counterfeits of the original literature that a Greek or Latin author, in each *genre*, might have mistaken for authentic pieces if he could have been raised from the dead to read our productions. We were under no illusions about the possibility of attaining this ideal objective. The more skilful one became, by practice, in playing this literary game, the more sharply one became aware that one's most plausible *tours de force* would have seemed the most exquisitely absurd to an old master of Greek or Latin style, just

¹ See A. J. P. Taylor's phrase quoted in footnote 4 to p. 66.

because the lapses that would show our productions up, as being the fakes that they were, would be ridiculous minutiae.

As I describe the education that was given to me, it may sound like something fantastic to someone who has never had it, or even to someone who has had it only in an attenuated form. Perhaps the strangest thing about it is that, if I had been a Chinese child of my age, instead of being an English one, I should have come in for a classical education that would have been almost identical down to such details as being taught to write essays in the 'classical' language and 'classical' style. At opposite ends of the Old World, and also all the way across it between these extremities, societies engaged on second or third attempts at the enterprise of civilization had arrived independently at this queer system of education, and, after arriving at it, had persisted in it for hundreds of years. If 'classical' education has been one of Mankind's follies, it has, at any rate, not been a rare one.

I myself do not think that it has been a folly. I am aware of its shortcomings, and, *ad hominem*, of consequent effects on my own outlook and work that have been unfortunate. This unfortunate side of the effects has been pointed out by some of my critics and is discussed at a later point in this annex. Yet, when I try to strike as just a balance as I can between 'pros' and 'cons', I find myself now, as ever, counting it as a piece of supreme good fortune that, being born, as I was, in England, I happened to be born there just early enough to come in for this education in an uncompromisingly complete version of it. I feel no wistful regrets that I finished receiving my formal education just too soon to benefit by any of the new kinds of higher education that have been gaining ground in England since then. The judgement implicit in these feelings is piquantly different from the judgements of some of my younger contemporaries: for example, Philip Bagby. In a critique of me and my work¹ he sums up by pronouncing that

'we can only think it unfortunate that his education, like that of so many historians, was exclusively humanistic; he has been deprived of the tools he needed for his self-appointed task.'

I will now give my reasons for holding that a 'classical' education—in 'classical' Greek, Latin, Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, Chinese, or whichever of the consecrated languages it may be—is a rather valuable tool for the task on which Bagby and I have both been engaged. In Chapter I I have already made the point that no tool can ever be good for all purposes and that every tool has its own peculiar weaknesses. I shall be going on to say what I think the weaknesses of a 'classical' education are. I am aware of intrinsic weaknesses in it that come to light when one uses it—even if one does not push the use of it, as I may sometimes have pushed it, beyond the limits of its effectiveness.

The sovereign virtue that I find in a 'classical' education is that the subject of it is human affairs. The synonym 'humanistic', which Bagby uses in the passage just quoted, gives an accurate description of a 'classical' education's field. Of course, this is not the only possible kind

¹ In *Culture and History*, pp. 177-82.

of education in human affairs. 'Modern', as well as 'ancient', affairs can be made the staple for a formal 'humane' education; and by far the most important education in human affairs that a human being ever receives is not given in any formal course at all; it comes from the life-long experience of rubbing shoulders with one's fellows that a social animal, such as Man is, is bound to have. However, even this universal and never-ceasing practical education in 'the humanities' does not and cannot limit its temporal horizon to affairs that are contemporary in the strict sense. For phenomena present themselves to our human minds as if they were on the move, and human phenomena, like others, are not intelligible to us unless we apprehend them in their time-perspective. This applies to all minds, including those—and they are still a majority—that receive no formal education at all. In their practical education in human affairs they win their stereoscopic vision by seeing through the eyes of their parents and grandparents as well as through those of their brothers and sisters. So a 'classical' education shares with every other kind of 'humane' education the two merits of being a study of Man and being an historical study of him. And it is surely true that Man is 'the proper study of mankind'.

This study is 'proper' in the sense of being indispensable, whatever else our studies may or may not include. The study of Man is indispensable because, since at least as long ago as half-way through the Palaeolithic Age, Man has been the most awkward and dangerous presence in mankind's universe. Moreover, if this has been true for the last few hundred thousand years, the 'survival value' of taking this truth to heart, and of acting on it in education and in all other human activities, has been increasing *pari passu* with the increase in mankind's command over non-human nature; and this command has been increasing at an accelerating pace which, in our day, has reached a momentary climax in science's and technology's joint feat of splitting atoms. Man has never before been so dangerous to himself as he has now become in consequence of this latest of his discoveries in the field of the study of non-human nature; yet this is also the moment at which mankind is giving more and more room to a new kind of education in technology and science at the expense of education in the 'humanities'. In these circumstances, surely, we ought to think long and hard before we allow any form of 'humane' education, not excluding the traditional forms, to be crowded out.

As between the different possible forms of an education in the study of Man, the 'classical' form has one advantage over the 'modern' form that is an intrinsic advantage and a permanent one, but is also particularly valuable in the age into which we have now entered.

The human race has now condemned itself, by its technological prowess, to having to choose between committing universal genocide and learning to live as one family. The crucial difficulty, for us today, of learning to live as one family is manifest. We have suddenly all been brought into point-blank range of each other for military, political, and economic purposes by the recent unprecedented advance in technology that has been made in the West; but we are still divided from each other by being partakers in a number of different local cultures. The

differences between these local cultures are still sharp, and sharp cultural differences breed mutual misunderstanding, fear, and hostility. Fortunately, all mankind seems to be moving towards a future common cultural standing-ground through a world-wide process of 'modernization' (a euphemism for cultural standardization on a pattern of Western origin). But the pace of cultural change is much slower than the pace of technological change; and, while technological change seems to know no limits to its capacity for acceleration, the pace of cultural change seems to have limits set to it by the limits of the pace at which the human psyche is capable of adapting itself to changes in its environment. Therefore the time-lag of cultural change behind technological change, which has always been great, seems likely to grow greater.

This lengthening time-interval is a dangerous time-zone for mankind to traverse. It is the period during which we shall be capable, as we now already are, of annihilating ourselves, without yet having become capable of getting on with each other (or, as we say in our contemporary political jargon, 'coexisting'). One of the chief obstacles to our treating each other tolerantly, sympathetically, and considerately is the illusion, which we find it hard to overcome, that our own particular relative values and standards are universal and absolute. Any means at our disposal for dispelling this dangerous illusion, even partially, therefore has an unusually high value for mankind at the present day. And a 'classical' education is an effective means for dispelling the illusion, partially at least, inasmuch as a 'classical' education teaches one to appreciate and revere a culture that is not one's own.

This is a first step towards becoming aware of the relativity of one's outlook to one's social milieu and one's personality; and an awakening to this truth sets one's feet on the path towards intellectual and moral salvation. Learning to admire what one recognizes as being admirable in an alien culture opens one's eyes to the blemishes in one's own culture, and this makes one receptive to the sense of humility which is the necessary condition for achieving even the smallest measure of insight and discretion. The mere fact that the culture in which one is being educated is not one's own is enough in itself to teach one this lesson. But the lesson is also taught explicitly in the literatures of the earlier civilizations that have been canonized by subsequent civilizations as 'classics'. These literatures, like all literatures, reflect and convey something of the experience of the societies in which they were created. The participants in the civilizations of the first two generations lived to have the tragic but illuminating and regenerating experience of seeing their high hopes brought to naught by their own perverse acts. In the 'classical' literatures a student of them will catch the note of learning through suffering,¹ and will feel the awe inspired by the spectacle of the sinner's fateful progress from success through pride to catastrophe.² This wisdom is

¹ See further, pp. 609 and 617.

² Several critics have pointed out that the Hellenic doctrine of nemesis has been one of the formative ideas in the working out of my view of history. K. D. Erdmann finds that, for me, history is the tragedy of civilization (*Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 190). R. V. Chase finds that 'Toynbee has given us a new interpretation of the noblest concept of the Western mind: the idea that Man's life is a

enshrined in the Chinese 'classics', and it is also deeply embedded in the cultural background of the Western World. It is the common foundation of the otherwise different outlooks of classical Greek and Latin literature, the Old Testament,¹ and the New Testament.²

Thus a 'classical' education gives one a standing-ground from which one can look at one's own civilization from outside, and so see it with new eyes. A classically educated modern Westerner can see the Western World with the eyes of those fifteenth-century scholars who recovered for the West a first-hand knowledge of the Hellenic culture, as far as this could be found embalmed in Greek and Latin literature.³ Seen from this 'classical' standpoint, our familiar Western World undergoes a metamorphosis that is startling but instructive.

The only way of appraising a civilization is to measure it against at least one other representative of its own species. So long as a Western observer stays standing inside his own society's charmed circle, the Western World will appear to him to be coextensive with the World, and the Western Civilization to be identical with Civilization. Viewed from the Hellenist's observation-peak in the different world that can be conjured up in a Western mind that has been educated in the Greek and Latin classics, the self-expatriated Westerner's own world now looms less large and looks less grand. Its appearance on the scene strikes him as being, at best, an epilogue that makes an anti-climax. At worst it seems an impertinence or even an outrage. He and his Western forebears now appear to him as the Greeks' and Romans' diadochi and epigoni. Can we disown our descent from the barbarians who slunk in like hyaenas to feast on the dead giant's carrion corpse? So can our vaunted Western Civilization be anything better than a vain repetition

tragedy' (*The American Scholar*, vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 1947), pp. 268-82). As T. A. Sumberg sees it, 'it is clear that Toynbee's Protean volumes contain not one but two theories of historical development. The first and earlier in appearance is the naturalistic one: Man makes his own history in a world not made for him, but in which a favourable outcome of Environment-Man transactions makes for his prosperity; this prosperity, however, is always in a delicate balance under constantly changing conditions. This naturalistic view sometimes takes on the classical aspects of a Greek tragedy; every society is born with a taint which always results in its death, however desperately the fated victim struggles. But this view is increasingly driven off the stage by the traditional Christian eschatological conceptions' (*Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267-84). Sumberg is, I think, mistaken in holding that the characteristic plot of a Greek tragedy is an exposition of a philosophy of determinism. While catastrophe may be the almost unescapable nemesis of hybris, hybris is not the inevitable reaction to success. An alternative reaction to it is humility, and humility does not attract the thunderbolt. If I am right on this point, then Sumberg will be wrong in drawing so sharp an antithesis as he does draw between the Hellenic and the Christian view of life.

In M. C. Swabey's view, 'the presence of nemesis in an historical work marks its philosophical character' (*The Judgment of History*, p. 193).

¹ See p. 623, footnote 1. Rabbi J. B. Agus recalls, in *Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), pp. 330-1, that a belief in the spiritual fruitfulness of suffering is part of the core of the Jewish religion.

² I myself believe that this is a true insight, and that it gets to the heart of the problem that Man presents to himself. But this is, of course, a controversial issue. My insistence on 'the nemesis of creativity' strikes Geyl as being excessive (*Toynbee and History*, p. 17). Taylor notices, with disapproval, that, in my eyes, 'the worst sin is to believe that Man made himself' (*ibid.*, p. 117).

³ It would be still more illuminating if we could see our Western Civilization with the eyes, not of our own Italian Hellenists, but of the Hellenes themselves; but this is, of course, impossible, since the first shoots of the Western Civilization did not appear above the ground till at least three hundred years after the stubble of the previous crop had withered away in what had been the Roman Empire's western provinces.

of the glorious Hellenic cycle? As for the transplanted Western observer's mother-tongue, this and the other languages of the present-day European peoples grate on an ear that has been attuned to the music of Latin and Greek. In fact, the Western Civilization shrivels to dimensions that are, if anything, smaller than life but that, all the same, are perhaps nearer to life-size than the grandiose mirage that deceives the eye so long as it is viewing its native civilization from within, in 'splendid isolation'.

Besides making it possible for a Westerner to look at the West from an historical vantage-point in the past, a Greek 'classical' education will also enable him to look at it from a geographical vantage-point outside the West's own territorial domain. It is hardly possible to study Hellenic literature and history without becoming mentally familiar with the geographical setting in which the drama was acted; and, if a classically educated Westerner eventually finds an opportunity to visit the coasts and islands of the Aegean, he will discover, perhaps rather to his surprise, that here, beyond the bounds of his own Western World, present-day human affairs can be no less interesting or less instructive than those famous long-since-past affairs that have drawn him hither so far away from home. In the Aegean he will encounter, not only the physical remains of the defunct Hellenic Civilization, but living human participants in two other civilizations, the Byzantine and the Islamic, which are still going concerns and which, like the Hellenic Civilization, are distinct and separate representatives of this species of society from the civilization in which the visitor himself has been brought up. It is true that the Western Civilization has been impinging on the Byzantine and on the Islamic since the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries respectively. Yet, under the surface, both still retain their original distinctive characters, and the participants in each of them look at the present-day world, including the West, from a non-Western point of view.

Travelling in Greece in 1911-12 for the purpose of increasing my knowledge and understanding of the Hellenic Civilization by gaining a first-hand acquaintance with what was once its homeland, I received my first lessons on the subject of contemporary international politics, and received them from instructors who did not look at the contemporary world from a Western point of view. In speculating about the date at which the coming war between the Western Powers was going to break out, Greek peasants in 1912 were not concerned about the fortunes of the prospective Western belligerents. What interested them, and interested them intensely, was the bearing of this eagerly expected civil war in the West upon the prospects, for Greece, of acquiring Macedonia. For them the paramount interest in international politics was whether there was to be a fulfilment of Greek national aspirations. The question of the destiny of the Western World was, for them, incidental and subordinate to Greek interests. Thus, on Greek soil in the last stage of my classical education, I learnt, unexpectedly, a double lesson about the contemporary world in which I myself was living. I learnt that there was such a thing as international politics (a subject about which I had heard little or nothing at Oxford in the years 1907-11); and I learnt

simultaneously to look at this newly discovered province of human affairs from a non-Western standpoint. These two lessons, together, educated me for a subsequent professional career in this field of study, and their value for me has proved inexhaustible. Listening in 1957 to discussions in Arab countries about the bearing on Arab national aspirations of 'the Cold War' between the Soviet Union and the United States, I remembered those discussions in Greek villages to which I had once listened, now nearly half a century back; and I realized that the Arabs were as indifferent to the destinies of Russia and the West today as the Greeks had been on the eve of the First World War.

These would seem to be ways in which a classical education can be valuable to a student of human affairs. It can help, in some measure, to correct the distorting effects, on his vision, of the relativity of his point of view to his own cultural milieu. Of course, it is beyond the power of even the most thorough-going 'classical' education to prise the recipient of it right out of his native setting and replant him in an artificially acquired one;¹ and, even if the process of transplantation could be carried through completely, the changeling would not have got rid of the human mind's inescapable handicap. He would now find himself under the sway of his relativity to his new cultural milieu. A change of cultural milieu cannot exorcise the relativity to which an observer, everywhere and at all times, will find himself subject.

Actually, the half-and-half position of straddling between two worlds—his native world and his acquired 'classical' one—gives the classically educated observer what is, perhaps, the most favourable opportunity possible for overcoming the limitations set by relativity to some degree.²

¹ Geyl points out that I am inside the West, whatever I may think or say (*Toynbee and History*, p. 367). F. Neilson finds that the relativity of my point of view to the time that happens to be the present for me gets in the light of my observation of the past (*The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Supplement to vol. 14, No. 3 (April, 1955), p. 5. Cp. p. 19). I 'shall not escape the charge of patriotic prejudice and the taint of national outlook' (*ibid.*, p. 74). On this question, see further pp. 606-20.

² This straddling position does give the observer something like a binocular vision, but Trinkaus points out that I, at any rate, have still remained the prisoner of my relativity to my Western and Hellenic standpoints. As he sees it, I force the rest of history into the configuration that I fancy I have found in Hellenic and Western history. And, when I try to answer the questions that confront the West today by reference to the histories of other civilizations, these points of reference are not really external to the West, since I see the histories of these other civilizations in terms of Western and Hellenic history. "Therefore, in spite of all his protests against the Western attitude of contempt for 'natives' and for other civilizations, Toynbee remains, at a deeper level, enclosed within his conception of the Western way of life" (C. Trinkaus in *Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (New York, 1948), pp. 224-5). The same point is made by Frankfort. 'Toynbee's images betray an evolutionistic as well as a moral bias. . . . Toynbee merely projects postulates which fulfil an emotional need in the West into human groups whose values lie elsewhere. . . . Why should we characterise civilisations which have achieved a deep and lasting harmony (like those of the Zuni or certain Polynesians) as "arrested civilizations"? . . . Why should these chimaeras ["the road ahead"; "the cliff above"] disturb the satisfaction of people who have attained the double integration of individual and society, and society and nature? . . . Toynbee . . . remains completely under the spell of a nineteenth-century Western outlook. His evolutionary bias, his empiricism, and his treatment of civilizations as "specimens of a species" are all of a piece' (H. Frankfort: *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, pp. 24 and 26).

It has also been pointed out that I have likewise remained the prisoner of my Christian upbringing. In *Toynbee and History*, p. 345, Father L. Walker pronounces that my 'own beliefs are almost all entirely Christian in inspiration', and that a belief in charity in matters of religion is the only inspiration that I have derived from 'the Orient'. Against this judgement, I file two pleas. The first is a sophistical one: Christianity, as well as the

This is a valuable advantage; for the achievement of at least a minimum measure of detachment from the toils of relativity is, I am convinced, a necessary condition for making any serious study of human affairs for any purpose.¹ But, besides having this general utility, a classical education puts in one's hands an excellent tool for the particular purpose of trying to make a comparative study of civilizations; and this is the first step, and a big one, towards arriving at a comprehensive morphology of human affairs. Since, for Westerners, 'the classics' means the Greek and Latin literature that was one of the expressions of the Hellenic culture, the Hellenic Civilization is the obvious 'jumping-off ground' for a Western inquirer who has a comparative study of civilizations in view; and it is no accident that it has been put to this use by one after another of the Western explorers in this field, beginning, now more than two hundred years ago, with the pioneer Giambattista Vico, the most original and imaginative of any so far.

An acquaintance with the culture and history of the Hellenic Civilization is a promising tool in a Westerner's hands if he is trying to make a comparative study of civilizations, for the same reason that it is a promising one if he is trying to counteract the relativity of his outlook and standards to his native Western cultural milieu. In both mental operations the illuminating procedure is the drawing of a comparison between societies that seem to be distinct and different in character and 'style' from each other, yet, at the same time, seem to be representatives of one and the same species. As an instrument for study, the Hellenic Civilization has a second point in its favour besides the primary point of not being the Western student's native society. Unlike the Western Civilization the Hellenic is no longer in existence. So the whole of its history is known to us, more or less, from beginning to end; and, if it is a drama, and if this drama has a plot, we shall not be debarred from unravelling the plot by being unable to witness the performance of the closing acts. In our interpretation we may, of course, go astray; there will probably be more interpretations than one in the field, and judgements between them are unlikely to be definitive. But at any rate the whole story is on record, for us to make of it what we can. By contrast, the drama of the Western Civilization is still being played. We do not know what ending it is going to have. We do not even know that it is going to come to an end, if I am right in my contention² that, unlike organisms, institutions have no inexorable maximum span of duration. Nor do we know how the acts of this Western drama that have already been played by our time will look, in retrospect, to Western and non-Western eyes at successive dates in the future. In fact, there are so many open questions

charitable Indian religions and philosophies, came from 'the Orient' in the ordinary meaning of the term. My second plea is a serious one. If I have learnt from 'the Orient' the lesson of charity, that is a great lesson to have learnt from this source (*vide* Saint Paul on this subject). I myself should say that the most unfortunate single effect on my outlook that has come from my having remained a prisoner of my Christian upbringing is that I have hitherto seen Judaism almost entirely through Christian eyes (see p. 596, with footnotes 3-6, and p. 597, with footnote 1).

¹ This conviction of mine, too, is controversial. Geyl, for instance, feels that Toynbee's 'ostentation of detachment from his own heritage' is 'proudful', 'sinful', and 'ridiculous' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 368).

² See pp. 268-9.

about a specimen that is incomplete that its usefulness for purposes of study is restricted. The completeness of the Hellenic specimen of the species 'civilizations' is one of this specimen's most valuable properties.

Its value can be measured by the importance of the contribution to an understanding of human affairs that Vico was able to make by using the Hellenic Civilization as his key. It is true that he was a man of genius. Still, he had a knowledge of only two civilizations at his command, his own and the Hellenic, and, of these two, one, his own, was an incomplete specimen, as we have just noticed. Yet, by comparing this with the Hellenic, he succeeded in bringing to light the cyclic rhythm in the course of history in the Age of the Civilizations. One may not accept the thesis that this cyclic movement is the whole movement. One may hold, as I hold in company with many other inquirers, that the cyclic movement does not account for all the phenomena. But it would be hard to demonstrate that, short of accounting for everything, it is not at least a very important element in human affairs. And a comparison between two terms, one of which was the history of the Hellenic Civilization, was the operation by which Vico arrived at his illuminating results.

Since Vico's time the number of the specimens at the disposal of a Westerner for making a comparative study of civilizations has been considerably increased—partly through progress in Western knowledge of the cultures and histories of the surviving non-Western civilizations, and partly through the wonderful achievements of Western archaeologists in disinterring the material relics of defunct civilizations whose former existence had been almost or even quite forgotten. This increase in the quantity of relevant phenomena within a Western inquirer's knowledge has raised a number of new questions. How many specimens of the species 'civilizations' have now come within the observer's field of vision? On what criterion are we to establish which of these newly discovered entities is entitled to rank as a civilization? On what criterion, again, are we to demarcate them from each other? If a Western inquirer is exercised by these questions, his knowledge of the Hellenic Civilization places in his hand an exploratory—or, in the logicians' language, 'heuristic'—tool. He can take the Hellenic Civilization as a provisional 'model' of what a complete specimen of the species 'civilizations' might be expected to be. Since the species is a hypothetical construction based on the observation that the Hellenic and the Western Society exhibit an impressive number of common features, it follows, *ex hypothesi*, that any other society that resembles one or other or both of these prototypes, to the extent, more or less, of their resemblance to each other, can be recognized as being an additional specimen, and, in consequence, also an additional indication of the usefulness of the exploratory hypothesis.

Of course, the number of specimens identified and accredited in this way will not necessarily exhaust the list. The Hellenic Civilization is a key that will not unlock all doors, and other tools can and should be used as alternatives where the Hellenic tool fails to do the job. In the earlier volumes of this book I myself have used the Hellenic key to the uttermost of its capacity and, as I have now come to think, beyond it. I

have also neglected to try other keys where the Hellenic key has obviously not fitted the lock. These were faults, I confess, and in Chapter VI of this volume I have tried to take a first step towards correcting them. But a method is not discredited by a practitioner's faulty use of it. A 'model'¹ is a most effective tool if it is used skilfully and discriminately; and the Hellenic Civilization, which is the model readiest to the hand of a Western collector of other specimens of the same species, has been used recently, not only by me, in the present book, but by Spengler before and by Bagby since. Bagby uses as his model the completed history of the Hellenic Civilization, supplemented by the still continuing history of the Western;² and with this 'heuristic' instrument he identifies a pattern of the Hellenic-Western type in other civilizations. He finds this pattern strongly pronounced in the history of his Chinese and Indian civilizations,³ and detects traces of it in most of the other civilizations⁴ on his list of nine specimens of the species.

The Hellenic and Western pair of specimens can also be put to the further use of throwing light on the nature of the relations between civilizations; and this is a necessary part of any comprehensive study of human affairs. For civilizations are not in truth the windowless Leibnizian monads—each going its own way without influencing, or being influenced by, any of the others—that Spengler holds them to be. Encounters between civilizations that are contemporary with each other, and historical relations between civilizations of different dates, are as prominent and important features of human history in the Age of the Civilizations as the likenesses and differences between civilizations regarded as being so many specimens of one species. While a comparative study of the histories and 'styles' of civilizations can take its start in a comparison of the Western Civilization with the Hellenic, a study of the historical relations between civilizations of different dates can take its start in an examination of the historical relation in which the same two civilizations stand to each other. At the beginning of this book, I took the historical relation between the Western and the Hellenic Civilization as a 'model' for the historical inquiry, and the likenesses and differences between them as a 'model' for the comparative one. Looking back at my use of the historical 'model', I now think that I made the same mistake with it that I made with the typological 'model' for comparative study: I overworked it. But I still think that it is good for some work—good, in fact, for the important work of studying the historical relation between civilizations of different dates.

These considerations confirm my belief that a knowledge of the Hellenic Civilization is a valuable tool in a Western inquirer's hands for exploring two of the principal fields that have to be explored in a comprehensive study of human affairs. This tool's value has, in fact, received recognition in the practical form of employment. It has been employed, for instance, by three inquirers whom I have mentioned—Vico, Spengler, and Bagby—besides myself. Its employment by Vico and by me might not seem to have much significance if it had not also

¹ See Bagby's lucid definition of a 'model' in *Culture and History*, pp. 200-1.

² See *op. cit.*, p. 212.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 212-14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 215-17.

been employed by the other two. Vico and I both had the same fifteenth-century Italian classical education, and our use of the Hellenic Civilization, up to the hilt, might be dismissed with the cutting remark that this was, after all, the only tool that these two poor creatures had.¹ But this is not true of either Spengler or Bagby. Neither of these two inquirers, I believe, was brought up almost exclusively on the Greek and Latin classics, as Vico and I were. Spengler was a mathematician; Bagby puts his trust in anthropology. All the same, they, too, have both made use of the Hellenic Civilization, and, more than that, have used it, as Vico and I have, as their key-tool. That must surely mean that it is a tool of obvious value, and this, again, must mean that a classical education is something worth having.

(ii) *Unfortunate Effects*

(a) *Effects on my Writing of English*

I have, I hope, now convincingly made my point that a classical education has much to be said for it, and this both in general and for the particular purpose of trying to make a comprehensive study of human affairs. Since, however, this happens to be the kind of education that I myself have received, I must not blow its trumpet without also dwelling on some of the unfortunate effects that it has had for me. I am aware of these unfortunate effects—partly thanks to my critics' strictures on them. These reflect, of course, on me, and not on the classical kind of education; for many people have been drilled in this as thoroughly as I have been without taking the harm from it that I have taken.

For example, I have allowed my classical education in the Greek and Latin languages to have an unfortunate effect on the style in which I write my English mother-tongue. I often fall into writing English clumsily. A number of critics have castigated this in sharper words,²

¹ If I needed consolation for the hard words that Bagby uses in his critique of my work, I should find it in his treatment of Vico. 'In 1725 . . . Giambattista Vico, a half-educated Neapolitan literary hack, published the first version of his *Scienza Nuova*, which prefigures in a confused and ungrammatical manner many aspects of nineteenth-century historical thought' (P. Bagby: *Culture and History*, p. 12). If one is put in the stocks, it is indeed consoling to find oneself neck-and-neck with Vico there. This makes it an honour to be treated to the punishment. Companionship in the stocks becomes fellowship in a distinguished academy.

² See, for example, Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 93 and 97; P. Bagby, *ibid.*, p. 109; A. J. P. Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 116; H. Kohn, *ibid.*, p. 351, and in *Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 465 (Kohn kindly uses the gentle words 'old-fashioned' and 'ornamental'); J. F. Leddy in *The Phoenix*, vol. 11, No. 4 (1957), p. 140; A. Hourani in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 388; F. Neilson in *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Supplement to vol. 14, No. 3 (April, 1955), p. 48; C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 193; J. M. T. in *The Oxford Magazine*, 28th October, 1954; C. Poore in *The New York Times*, 17th October, 1954; W. O. Ault in *The Journal of Bible and Religion*, April, 1955, pp. 119-23.

Unfavourable judgements are partially offset by others. For instance, in *The Times Literary Supplement* of 17th August, 1956, a writer who comes down on the unfavourable side does also find some points in favour of my way of writing; and this is actually praised by some critics: e.g. F. J. Teggart in a letter to me of 8th January, 1936; F. L. Schuman in *The Nation*, 6th November, 1954; G. Mann in *Der Monat*, Jahrgang 1, Heft 4 (January, 1949), pp. 34-40; M. Savelle in *The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. xxv, No. 1 (February, 1956), pp. 55-67; T. A. Sumberg in *Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267-84; P. M. Sweezy in *The Nation*, 19th October, 1946; W. F.

and one of them, Sir Ernest Barker, has also given the correct diagnosis of the malady. He traces it to the effects of my classical education. I write English, he justly says, in a Ciceronian style, as if it were a foreign language. The stuff calls for a literary surgeon's knife to 'break up and rewrite the long rolling cryptic sentences' and cut out 'the ornate alias',¹ to chasten the metaphors, to prune the analogies.² The reviewer in *The Oxford Magazine* wittily remarks that I have 'never felt obliged to use one word if two would do'. The writer in *The Times Literary Supplement* who kindly credits me with a 'mastery over words' expressed 'in a clear prose of the most pliable steel', also justly debits me with 'another style . . . encumbered by its own wealth, like a man who loads himself with souvenirs from every resort he ever visited'.

'There are times [this writer finds] when the long sentences—every adjective and adverb inserted, all loopholes stopped up, and nothing left to the imagination—would clog the mind even if they were not further burdened with cumbrous Latinisations.'

Barker points out that this particular unfortunate result of a classical education is not universal and is therefore not inevitable. He cites his own case as an instance. He has had the same classical education that I have had, without succumbing to this malady; and this is true. If one's automatic reaction to an inoculation is excessive, that is one's own lookout. If one's error is only partly involuntary, and is partly the result of an irrational prejudice, one is still more to blame. But the question of culpability is beside the point. The point is that language is not a private plaything. It is a means of communication or nothing. A writer must write in the language that is current among the public that he wishes to reach; and, in writing this language, he must follow the usual practice of his and his readers' day. He writes in order to be read, and, in his encounter with his reader, the reader has the last word. At any moment the reader can stop reading if he wishes, but the writer can never stop wishing to have readers. If he were to become indifferent to his book's being read, this would make nonsense of his whole activity, and he would have done better if he had never put pen to paper. So, if he falls into writing in a style which is alien to the genius of his linguistic medium, or which, short of that, is noticeably discordant with ordinary current usage, he stands to lose more by his personal peculiarity than

Albright in *The Evening Sun* of Baltimore, 14th October, 1954, and in *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 97; F. H. Underhill in *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. xxxii, No. 3 (September, 1951), pp. 201-19.

I am very grateful to these favourable critics—the more so because I am not one of them myself.

G. Mann observes, in *Der Monat*, Jahrgang 1, Heft 4 (January, 1949), pp. 34-40, that it is the literary qualities of my work—e.g. a gift for describing, illustrating, and quoting aptly—that have won an entry for my ideas among 'the broad masses'. Mann remarks that what seems to the masses to be a merit is decidedly a defect in the eyes of the scientific world. In Mann's own opinion my method is, in truth, not altogether satisfactory from a scientific point of view. E. Fiess, in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 381-2, credits me with 'ability to use words evocatively', but notes that 'an unwitting simplification may thus creep in'. Fiess examines judiciously the case for and against my long sentences, my key words, and the allusiveness of my style.

¹ Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, p. 93.

² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

his reader does. The reader who finds his style difficult, or just irritating, has an easy remedy. He can put the book down and pick up another written in a more congenial style by a different author. But the price that the irritating author may have to pay for having indulged his literary eccentricity is to frustrate himself by defeating his own purposes. He will certainly reduce the number of his readers.

Here is an effect of a classical education that has been an unfortunate one for me. My Latinizing way of writing English is not, of course, deliberate. It is the unintended result of many hours spent, at an impressionable age, on writing Latin prose. But, as far as I have become conscious of this fault, I have, I think, been partly inhibited from correcting it by a distaste for the vernacular languages of the Western World which is also the result of a classical education. This is partly a classical scholar's irrational prejudice. I have been educated into seeing in French a vulgar deformation of Latin, and in English a barbarous substitute for it. But I also have a rational ground for finding these Western vernaculars inferior to Latin and Attic Greek, and also to Pre-Atatürk Ottoman Turkish (of which I have a smattering).

The grammar and the syntax of these three languages work together not only to allow, but to demand, a style that leaves the reader in no doubt about the logical connexion between the words and phrases in which the writer is addressing him. A writer employing such logical linguistic media as these can and should bring out clearly the distinction between subordinate clauses and the main clause on which they logically depend. And, if it is Latin or Attic Greek that he is writing, he also can and should link sentence to sentence by conjunctions expressing precise and finely differentiated logical relations. If one has been brought up on languages of this kind, and on the highly articulated structural style that comes natural to him when he writes in them, he will feel that the Western vernaculars, and the style in which, nowadays, they are usually written, are inferior inasmuch as they throw upon the reader the work of establishing the logical relations that it is the writer's business to indicate. And it is true that the natural style in these languages, in contrast to Attic Greek and Latin, is an uncoordinated series of short indicative sentences, linked together, if at all, by conjunctions with only vague and ambiguous logical connotations. It is also true, however, that this staccato style is not just a symptom of degeneracy and perversity. It, too, has its reason. Its first objective is simplicity, and it achieves this at the price of sacrificing logical clarity. The classically educated reader and writer are apt to overlook this valuable virtue of the loose-jointed vernacular style's obvious defects. On the other hand, a master of the vernacular style finds the integrated classical style clumsy even when the medium is an integrated language, and he finds it grotesque when a contemporary employs it, as I have done, in writing one of the current vernaculars.

Considering how much of the literature of the Western Civilization was written in Latin down to the fifteenth century, it is not surprising that the early modern writers in the vernaculars should have continued to employ the classical style, inappropriate though this was to their new

linguistic medium. But the impossibility of writing English satisfactorily in this style has been demonstrated, once for all, by the contrast between Milton's magnificent failure as a writer of prose and Dryden's adroit success. Dryden was not gifted with Milton's genius, but he had the sense to realize what could and could not be done with the English language, and to adapt his own style to the medium in which he and Milton both had to work. Subsequent writers of English have no excuse for not heeding this warning example. Where Milton failed, how can they expect to succeed? We have to take our linguistic medium as we find it. To apply the point *ad hominem*, the accident of my birthplace and cultural milieu has given me the English language for my mother-tongue; and it is my good fortune that this language, which I have never had to learn artificially, happens to be today the mother-tongue of many nations besides my own, and also to be a lingua franca of almost worldwide currency. So I must write in English, and therefore should try to write it in the style that is demanded by the language's genius and is prescribed by current usage.

I have found this difficult because I have had a classical education in Greek and Latin. Having been educated in this way, I should feel more at home if Greek and Latin were the media of communication between me and my public. It is a reflection on a classical education, as well as on one particular recipient of it, that it should have educated me into putting myself out of tune with my mother-tongue and, in consequence, also, to some extent, with the public among whom I hope to find readers.

(b) *Effects on the Range of my Knowledge*

In a criticism of me for my treatment of Judaism, Berkovitz remarks¹ that 'the friendliest thing one may say about him is that he is an ignoramus'. This may be friendly, but unfortunately it is not illuminating, because a state of general ignorance is not particularly distinctive either of me or of anyone else in the present-day world. Here and now, in fact, everybody is an ignoramus if his personal range of knowledge is measured against the total pool of knowledge on which he could draw if he had the capacity.² The pertinent question is how far his particular educational equipment falls short of what is required for the particular enterprise on which he is engaged. *Ad hominem* the question is how far my own equipment falls short of what is required for trying to make a comprehensive study of the morphology of human affairs.³ It goes without

¹ E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 42.

² See Chapter IV, pp. 105-6.

³ A catalogue of points in which he finds me ignorant is given by the late Professor D. M. Robinson in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*. A number of Robinson's shots hit the mark, but the percentage of misses is high enough to make it necessary for me to ask readers of this passage not to take Robinson's statements on trust without verifying them for themselves. They can do this by consulting my wife's admirable indexes to this book, without having to read the text.

For instance, Robinson says that 'Sparta is in the main sadly ignored' (op. cit.). Yet in volume iii there is a chapter on Sparta that runs to 29 pages (iii. 50-79). In my wife's index to vols. i-iii the entry 'Sparta' occupies more than 11 inches of a column; in her index to vols. iv-vi the corresponding entry occupies more than three and a half inches, with cross-references to Agis IV (two inches) and Cleomenes III

saying, of course, that, if the study is to be comprehensive, it must be panoramic, not microscopic, in its mental scale. A comprehensive study of the morphology of human affairs in detail has come, for the reasons considered in Chapter IV, to be an enterprise quite beyond the powers of any individual mind today. Nothing short of a third world war fought with atomic weapons could conceivably reduce our present vast common store of knowledge to the manageable proportions that would make relative omniscience possible, once again, for some future Bede or Alcuin in a re-barbarized Post-Western World.

Looking, from this point of view, at my own range of knowledge, I am ruefully aware that my classical education has left me almost entirely ignorant of modern Western discoveries, from the seventeenth century onwards, in the fields of mathematics and physical science. This is indeed a big blank. Yet I do not think that my education, in leaving this great gap in my knowledge, has thereby crippled me for attempting my particular enterprise. It is true that this personal ignorance about some of the characteristic achievements of the Western Civilization in its modern age is a serious handicap to an understanding of the Western Society's modern genius.¹ But, after all, the Western Civilization is only one of a number of specimens of the species of society that it represents; and, as we have seen,² it is an imperfect specimen in the sense that its history is still unfinished. At a pinch, therefore, we could dispense with this Western specimen in making a comparative study of civilizations. At any rate, an ignorance of even an important aspect of the Western Civilization is not fatal for inquiring into the morphology of the civilizations as a class. The intellectual equipment that is indispensable for this enterprise is a knowledge of at least the salient features of as many as possible of the known civilizations

(three and a half inches). In the index to vols. vii-x the corresponding entry occupies nearly two and a half inches.

Other inaccuracies in Robinson's catalogue are noted in the present volume, on p. 599, footnote 1, and p. 600, footnote 1.

In self-defence, I have to point these inaccuracies out, though I feel rueful about having to do this when Robinson is no longer in this world to stand up for himself. His misses illustrate the same general point as his hits. The point is that no human mind is impeccable, not even the mind of the finest scholar—and Robinson was a very fine one.

¹ This point is made by J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 155. Chr. Hill notes that I tend to 'treat as of secondary importance the sort of progress which is reflected in technique and economic production, and to regard all civilizations as "philosophically contemporaneous"'. He [Toynbee] approaches "Western Christendom" of the last 1000 years as a single civilisation: the technical and economic transformation of mediaeval society by the rise of capitalism is regarded as of secondary importance' (*The Modern Quarterly*, Autumn, 1947, p. 293). F. H. Underhill traces this outlook of mine back to the effect on me of a classical education. 'While Toynbee's mastery of the Oxford "Greats" [i.e. *Litterae Humaniores*] discipline gave him great advantages as a student of world history, it also made him liable to certain shortcomings. "Greats" is a purely literary discipline; the students learn little about Greek science and nothing about modern science. More than one critic has remarked on Toynbee's blindness to what science has achieved in our modern world and to the difference that this makes between us and all other civilizations. . . . Toynbee seems to me to brush aside much too easily any adequate consideration of the relation between technological progress and the growth of a civilization' (*The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. xxxii, No. 3 (September, 1951), pp. 201-19). References to some of the critics whom Underhill has in mind will be found on p. 600, footnote 2.

F. Borkenau discerns a turn of the tide of public feeling in the West against technology, as one of the reactions to the invention of the atomic weapon (*Merkur*, July, 1949, p. 625).

² On pp. 584-5.

that have already run their course. This is the province of knowledge on which I have concentrated my efforts since the end of my formal education in the Greek and Latin languages and literature.

This formal education, which I was given intensively over a period of fifteen years, has equipped me with a certain knowledge and understanding of one civilization, the Hellenic. It has also set me a standard to aim at in trying, under my own steam, to continue my education and to extend its range during these last fifty years.¹ In a busy working life, in which the first call on one's energies is the need to earn a living for one's family and for oneself, the governing factor in one's course of adult self-education is one's choice of priorities in laying out the use of a limited amount of spare working-time. The choice that one makes is not, of course, entirely planned and deliberate. It is partly determined by intellectual interests and preferences for which one can give no rational explanation. As far, however, as I have worked on a deliberate plan, I have given priority to trying to learn as much as possible about as many as possible of the other societies, living or 'dead', of the species of which the Hellenic Society has been the prototype for me.²

A study of the Hellenic Civilization leads one on, of itself, as I have noticed in this chapter already,³ to a study of two living civilizations, the Byzantine and the Islamic. A knowledge of Attic Greek, in the form in which it became the *lingua franca* (*koiné*) of the whole Hellenic World, makes accessible the medieval Byzantine literature in this language, and also makes it easy to pick up a knowledge of Modern Greek in its colloquial form and, still more, in its rather artificial literary one. As for Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, it has been my ambition, from an early age, to make myself as much at home in these three leading languages of the Islamic World as I am in Attic Greek and in Latin. But I have not found time to achieve this ambition so far; and, in this book, I have had to deal with the Islamic Civilization as best I could with only a smattering of Arabic and Ottoman Turkish and not even that minimum acquaintance with Modern Persian. Of these three languages, I have given the lowest priority to Persian for the same reason that has made me try to learn something about the Byzantine Civilization in Russia without having learnt Russian, and something about the civilizations of India without having learnt Sanskrit. Persian, Russian, and Sanskrit are languages of the Indo-European family to which Greek, Latin, English, and nearly all the living vernaculars of the Western World, besides English, belong. So, for a classically educated Englishman, the

¹ A. N. Holcombe notices (in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. xlix, No. 4 (December, 1955), pp. 1151-4) that I have not succeeded in teaching myself as much about any other civilization as I was taught about the Hellenic at school and at the university.

² Bagby, who divides his list of civilizations into a 'major' and a 'secondary' class, remarks, in *Culture and History*, p. 179, that I mention no more than two or three of his 'secondary' civilizations, and he wonders whether I am ignorant of the existence of the rest or have included them as parts of other civilizations on my list. The second of these two alternatives that he allows me hits the truth. My list of civilizations does not coincide with Bagby's list. But, whereas Bagby seems to be struck by the points in which the two lists disagree, I am struck by the points in which they correspond with each other. In revising my own list in this volume, I have introduced a 'satellite' class of civilizations. 'Satellite' seems to me to be a less subjective notion than 'secondary' (see pp. 551-3).

³ On pp. 582-3.

acquisition of yet another Indo-European language does not hold any great promise of widening his linguistic horizon. By contrast, even the slight acquaintance with Arabic and Turkish that I have gained has been, for me, an invaluable asset because it has given me a glimpse of two non-Indo-European linguistic worlds, the Semitic and the Ural-Altaic, in which the structure of the languages, and to some extent also the psychology that this structure reflects, are different from anything within the experience of someone whose mother-tongue is an Indo-European one and who has not broken out of the wide bounds of the Indo-European family.

Thanks to the marvellous work done by Western archaeologists in Egypt, South-West Asia, and the Aegean since the French invasion of Egypt in A.D. 1798, a knowledge of the Hellenic Civilization now leads, not only forwards in time to a study of the Byzantine and Islamic civilizations, but also backwards to a rediscovery of temporarily forgotten civilizations in the Hellenic Civilization's historical background. The Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean Civilization in the Aegean, which is the Hellenic Civilization's direct predecessor, has been rediscovered almost within my lifetime. The most recent outstanding achievement in this exciting series—Ventris's decipherment of the Minoan linear script 'B' and demonstration that the language conveyed in it is Greek—was made in 1952. This resurrection of the Pre-Hellenic past in the Hellenic Civilization's homeland is bound to be enthralling for a contemporary Hellenist, especially if he is interested in the Hellenic Civilization as being a prototype of one kind of society, and is on the look-out for other representatives of this. He is also bound to be interested in the Minoan-Helladic-Mycenaean Civilization's older, and earlier rediscovered, contemporaries in Egypt and 'Iraq (labelled 'Egyptiac' and 'Sumero-Akkadian' in my revised list of civilizations), and its younger contemporary in Anatolia (the 'Hittite' Civilization). In 1911-12 I was in Greece for ten months as a student of the British School at Athens. It is true that I spent all my time during that stay in walking about the country. I have never taken part in an archaeological excavation or learnt, by practising it, the archaeologist's swiftly developing technique. I have not mastered any of the temporarily forgotten scripts, languages, and literatures that the archaeologists have rediscovered and deciphered.¹ But, at second-hand, I have been an eager student of the additions that the archaeologists have made to our fund of knowledge. In pursuing civilizations backward in time beyond the point at which literary records begin, an inquirer ascends a trail that has been blazed for him by the archaeologists, and by them alone, in the huge dark forest of oblivion. An archaeologically uninstructed explorer of the comparative study of civilizations could not do without the precious additional specimens that the archaeologists have added to his collection.²

¹ Eduard Meyer was perhaps the last historian who was able, at least in some measure, to deal at first hand with original texts in Ancient Egyptian and in Akkadian, as well as in Greek and Latin. Meyer's example proves that this intellectual feat is possible, but I have found it beyond my strength.

² Bagby truly says that the distinction between history and archaeology 'is essentially one of technique rather than subject-matter; the historian digs in the archives and the

My own feeling towards the archaeologists is one of gratitude as well as admiration.¹

The conventional single-track diagram of history makes it all lead up to the observer's own time and place, and the Western variant of this scheme arrives at its own self-centred goal by making a succession of arbitrary side-steps in a westward direction: from 'Iraq and Egypt to the Aegean; from the Aegean to Italy; from Italy to Transalpine Western Europe; and thence to the Americas in the Post-Columbian Age. A Western explorer of the comparative study of civilizations has therefore to lean over eastwards in order to correct his own society's westward *penchant*. If he fails to make this readjustment of the conventional Western stance, he will be turning a blind eye to one half of the *Oikoumenê*; and this wilful blindness will halve, for him, the number of the civilizations that should have been within his ken. Since the rise of the civilizations of the earliest generation, some five thousand years ago, in the waist of the Old World, where the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf of the Indian Ocean all but touch the Mediterranean inlet of the Atlantic, civilization has fanned out symmetrically in both directions, eastward as well as westward. I have therefore made an effort to gain some foothold in the history and archaeology of the eastern wing of the *Oikoumenê*: that is, India, Eastern Asia, and Pre-Columbian Nuclear America, east of the Pacific. In this area I have deliberately neglected Sanskrit, have looked longingly at Pali (the vehicle of the Hinayana Buddhist scriptures), and have not dared to dream of memorizing Chinese characters. And in this area, too, I have been greatly beholden to the archaeologists, as far as an amateur can profit by their work. Here, again, within my own lifetime, they have lengthened the range of our vision of the past in India and in China by disinterring relics of the Indus Culture and the Shang Culture. As for the civilizations of the Andes and Middle America, with their satellites in what are now Colombia, Northern Chile, North-Western Argentina, and the south-western and south-east-central sections of the United States, we are indebted to the archaeologists for the whole of our knowledge, except for Spanish records of the phases during and immediately preceding the Spanish Conquest.

The two major Pre-Columbian civilizations in the Americas are, of course, particularly valuable for a comparative study of civilizations because of their separateness from the civilizations of the Old World. Whatever may be the final verdict on the alleged Pre-Columbian contacts, made perhaps from both directions, between the civilizations of the

archaeologist in the soil, but both are concerned with what happened to large groups of men and what they did in the past' (*Culture and History*, p. 28).

¹ Laurence Stone says (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 112) that in this book I have used little archaeological material dating from later than 1920. This may be partially true of vols. i-iii, which were started in 1930 and published in 1934. But it is certainly not true of vols. vii-x, which were published in 1954. Most of my references to articles in archaeological journals are, naturally, to be found in annexes in which I deal in detail with particular topics. If Stone had looked at the Annex on the Achaemenian Empire in vii. 580-689, or at the piece on chronology in x. 167-212, he would have found that here I have cited papers published up to the moment before I went to press, and that, while writing these pieces, I have been in personal communication with specialists who were working on the subjects at the time.

two hemispheres, it seems already to be established that these contacts were not factors of first-class importance in the history of either group. In essentials each of the two groups went through the processes of genesis, growth, breakdown, and disintegration independently of the other.¹

I have also tried to learn something about the Nomadic Civilization, which has lived in a symbiosis with the sedentary civilizations of the Old World from its rise, early in the second millennium B.C., down to its virtual suppression within the last two centuries. My main effort in my course of self-education has, in fact, been put into a study of Man's attempts, within the last 5,000 years, to rise above the level of pre-civilizational culture. Besides trying to make a panoramic study of as many specimens of the species 'civilization' as I could identify and handle, I have tried to do the same with the philosophies and the 'higher religions' that have made their appearance in and since the last millennium B.C., during the time when the civilizations of the second generation were disintegrating. This may read like a recital of efforts to extend my knowledge over a range that would be more or less commensurate with the enterprise on which I have embarked. But, for me, it is a reminder of how far I have fallen short of my aim. I have not attained, in any non-Hellenic field, anything like the standard of knowledge and understanding that has been given to me in the Hellenic field by my old-fashioned Western 'classical' education. In my knowledge of the non-Hellenic civilizations and the higher religions there are appalling gaps. And my knowledge of the aeons of history before these last 5,000 years is little better than sheer ignorance. A recital of some blank patches that are conspicuous to me will bring out some of my limitations. There will, no doubt, be others to which I am blind but which are no less conspicuous to my critics.

In my study of civilizations and higher religions I am acutely conscious of three dim spots and of one general shortcoming.

One of these dim spots is my neglect of the civilization in which I myself have been brought up. This neglect has been partly deliberate, and for this I have had three reasons. The first reason (mentioned already) is that the Western Civilization is an imperfect specimen of its species because its history is still unfinished. Then, as far as I do want to know about the Western Civilization, I feel that I can imbibe this knowledge through my pores, since, after all, this is the cultural atmosphere in which I live and move. My classical education has not made me immune to my Western cultural environment. It has not been as effective as all that. My third reason for deliberately neglecting the West is that the historical and sociological information about the West is voluminous out of all proportion to its value for a comparative study of civilizations. The bulk of it consists of details that, for my purpose, are not very significant or illuminating. If I were to plunge into this ocean of non-significant detail I might find myself unable to get my head above water again for the rest of my working life. These seem to me to be three rational grounds for treating the West rather cavalierly if one

¹ See Chapters X and XI, pp. 357-75.

is trying to make a comprehensive study of the morphology of human affairs. But I have also to confess to an irrational reaction to which I refer again at a later point in this chapter.¹ The West's self-adulation in modern times—since about the end of the seventeenth century—provokes me into depreciating the West emotionally some degrees below my rational appraisal of its peculiar defects and peculiar merits.

A second dim spot, of which I am aware, is my neglect of Israel, Judah, the Jews, and Judaism. I have neglected these out of proportion to their true importance. Judaism is one of half-a-dozen living higher religions, and two of the others, Christianity and Islam, are, in origin, denationalized versions of it.² When Jewish critics accuse me of seeing Judaism, not through Jewish eyes, but through those of the Christian Church, supplemented by Eduard Meyer's,³ I have to plead guilty to the charge. Though my personal religious beliefs are, in some points, nearer to Judaism⁴ than they are to orthodox Christianity, it is true that I have tended to see Judaism through Christian eyes in the sense that I have seen it, in the conventional Christian perspective, as a prelude to Christianity, and as one which rejected its manifest destiny when it repudiated the new religious insight or revelation to which it had been leading up.⁵ A Christian or Muslim gentile ought, of course, to try to correct his sectarian prejudice by trying to reverse his stand and to look at his own religion through Jewish eyes. After this deflating exercise, he might find himself in a condition to look at Judaism through Jewish eyes as a phenomenon in itself, and one that would still have had the supreme value that it does have, even supposing that Christianity and Islam had never come into existence.

I am ignorant of the Rabbinical Jewish literature and of the Jewish philosophy that flourished in an early Islamic and a medieval Western cultural environment.⁶ I know the Pharisees, not through their own writings, but through the denunciations of them in the Gospels (de-

¹ On pp. 626-30.

² See pp. 87-88 and 511-17.

³ 'A man whose only sources on Judaism are the New Testament and Eduard Meyer' (E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 41).

⁴ I am particularly grateful to Rabbi J. B. Agus for his testimony on this point. 'Seen in the light of the essential ideas of Judaism, his philosophy of history', Rabbi Agus says, referring to mine, 'is in line with the genuine impetus of the Hebrew prophets and of the master-builders of the Talmud. . . . In the most profound and real sense, Toynbee's main theses are faithful to the spirit of our Holy Scriptures and to the spiritual genius of Judaism' (Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, vol. 4, No. 4 (Fall, 1955), pp. 219 and 329).

⁵ 'All readers of Toynbee's work are impressed by the strong Christian bias. . . . Though he repudiates fundamentalism with the utmost scorn, he clings to the dogmatic view that the emergence of Christianity has rendered Judaism superfluous' (Agus in loc. cit., p. 319. Cp. Berkovitz, op. cit., pp. 10 and 13; M. Samuel: *The Professor and the Fossil*, pp. 72 and 104-5). In another place (*The National Jewish Monthly*, November, 1956, pp. 43-44) Rabbi Agus points out that, 'similarly, we who are non-Orthodox and therefore also non-fundamentalist, operate with the symbols and mode of thought of the Jewish tradition'. 'Failure to take account of the categories of thought of the non-Jewish World is one of the enduring factors in Jewish history, resulting in tragedies that were manifestly avoidable' (*Judaism*, Winter, 1956, p. 45). Agus's conclusion is an admirable one. 'Identity of approach is out of the question, but we can learn from one another if we continue to converse agreeably and with mutual respect. . . . There is . . . need for a continuous conversation to be carried on between the representatives of the two traditions, for their mutual benefit and enlightenment' (*The National Jewish Monthly*, November, 1956, pp. 43-44).

⁶ Samuel points out, in op. cit., pp. 22-23, that I do not mention the Talmud, the Mishnah, the Midrashim, or any Jewish philosopher—not even Spinoza.

nunciations that are echoes of a family quarrel within the bosom of the Jewish fraternity).¹ Worst of all, I have never learnt even a smattering of Hebrew. Since childhood, Hebrew has left me cold, whereas I have had a passionate desire to learn Arabic. This partiality is evidently irrational; for a knowledge of either of these two Semitic languages would have had the same liberating effect on a mind imprisoned in an Indo-European mother-tongue, and both languages alike open the door to a first-hand acquaintance with a great literature. A Jewish critic might jump to the conclusion that this coldness towards the Hebrew language was the effect of anti-Semitic or anti-Zionist feelings. But it dates back in me to a time before Zionism had become practical politics, and, though I am opposed to Zionism (identifying it, as I do, with Western nationalism and colonialism),² I have never felt any inclination to be anti-Semitic.³ There have always been more Jews than Arabs in my circle of friends—as was indeed to be expected, considering that my home has not been in Dar-al-Islam, and that in Christendom there is no Muslim diaspora comparable to the Jewish. So I cannot account for my acquiescence in this particular dim spot, but I am none the less conscious of its being there.

My third dim spot in my study of civilizations is South-East Asia, continental and insular. This region has not been the birthplace of any independent civilization; but the Indian, Chinese, and Islamic civilizations have all radiated into it and have all undergone modifications there as a result of the experiences of displacement and of contact with the indigenous cultures and with each other. The South-East Asian modifications of the Indian and Chinese civilizations are perhaps sufficiently differentiated from the originals to warrant a classification of them as separate civilizations of the satellite kind.⁴ I am only now beginning to enter this South-East Asian field. Except for having made the sea-passage through the Straits of Malacca in 1929, I did not find an opportunity of visiting either Indonesia or continental South-East Asia till 1956. As a matter of fact it might have been difficult to obtain anything like a true picture of South-East Asian history and culture at an earlier date than now; for South-East Asia, like Nuclear America, is an area in which the progress of archaeological discovery has only lately reached a point at which the picture revealed by it is beginning to come into focus.

¹ The following points about the Pharisees are made, among others, by Berkovitz in op. cit. The Pharisees were the Jewish community's 'creative minority' (p. 116). 'They were lay teachers and lay preachers' (p. 117). 'Some of the publicans might well have followed Jesus; the people followed the Pharisees' (p. 117). 'The Pharisees' greatest achievement was that their people followed them' (p. 123). Before the appearance of Christianity, the Pharisees had solved the problem of the spirit and the letter (p. 117). The concept of the fatherhood of God is a Pharisee insight (pp. 58-60). *Ad hominem*, Toynbee is a Pharisee without knowing it (p. 73).

Samuel, in op. cit., makes the point that 'the Pharisees were the heirs of the Prophets' (p. 88). He asks: 'Why does Professor Toynbee take the denunciations of the Gospels literally, and those of the Prophets metaphorically?' (pp. 92-93).

Klausner's recognition that all the logia attributed to Jesus appear in the rabbinical literature too has been cited in footnote 2 to p. 87.

² See pp. 627-8.
³ I am particularly grateful to Rabbi J. B. Agus for testifying that I am 'most certainly not' an anti-Semite (*The Jewish National Monthly*, November, 1956, p. 43).

⁴ See p. 552 and the chart on p. 559.

The general shortcoming in my study of the civilizations is, I should judge, a more serious weakness than any particular dim spot. In my attempt to explore their morphology I have taken too little note of some of the threads that weave the ever-changing pattern of a culture, and I have therefore made little contribution, so far, towards helping to bring to light either the distinctive cultural patterns or 'styles' of particular civilizations¹ or the common pattern, if there is one, on which the individual patterns of particular cultures, and the specific pattern of each of the species of culture, are so many variations.

My first concern has been to explore the uniformities that come to light when one takes a synoptic view of the histories of a number of different civilizations,² and this primary aim—abetted, no doubt, by unconscious and unintentional partialities in the distribution of my interests and values—has led me to concentrate my attention on two, above all, of the several provinces of human activity and experience:

¹ A. L. Kroeber comments, in *Style and Civilizations*, p. 120: 'The culture itself, as something substantive, is hardly examined by Toynbee except incidentally; its specific quality is scarcely portrayed; least of all is it viewed as a style or possible assemblage of styles' (cp. *ibid.*, p. 158). Toynbee 'did not really try to classify civilizations as cultures' (*ibid.*, p. 125). 'His "civilizations" are societies, not cultures' (*ibid.*, p. 126). 'The distinctive and differential qualities of his civilizations are largely missed or ignored' (*ibid.*, p. 127). In Kroeber's view, the medium in which the style of an entire culture is expressed is usually psychological.

Kroeber also comments, in *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 330-1, that my delineation of cultures is based too much on events, too little on quality. I agree with the second of the two points made by Kroeber in this last cited passage, but not with the first. I do not think that, in human affairs, there is really an antithesis between 'quality' and 'events'. It is of the essence of human affairs that they are perpetually on the move. T. J. G. Locher is interpreting my view correctly when he says that my theory of growth is 'dynamic-ethical', not 'biological-static' (*De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 16). So, as I see it, the style of a civilization cannot be viewed realistically if it is not viewed as something that is changing all the time under our eyes. A. R. Burn makes the point that, 'to a great extent, societies can change as one unit', and that, consequently, 'their changes are, to this extent, not amenable to the statistical methods of prediction, employed by insurance companies, which Toynbee stresses. There is a field of study here', he adds, 'to which one would like to see much attention devoted in any future *Study of History*' (*History*, February-October, 1956, p. 13).

David Thomson comments that, in my work, 'civilizations are judged primarily in terms of their survival value and longevity, and hardly at all in terms of their quality or the height of their achievement' (*The Spectator*, 17th January, 1947). H. Werner finds that I am 'not a physiognomist' (*kein physiognomiker*); I have not got beyond mere description. I do not go into any structural problems. I do not make any attempt at a self-contained 'holistic' (*ganzheitliche*) interpretation of cultural phenomena. At the most I have a doctrine of culture-phases, but have no doctrine of culture-morphology. In short I have come to grief over the task of constructing a genuine morphology (*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, No. 29 (1955), pp. 543-5). F. Borkenau finds that I do not make any serious attempt 'to discuss the specific characteristics of the various civilizations' (*Commentary*, March, 1956, pp. 240-1). In Trinkaus's view, 'Toynbee shrinks from a real analysis of social relations based on historical data' (*Science and Society*, vol. xxii, No. 1 (New York 1948), p. 229). I do not shrink from this; I just have not got round to it yet. I have a programme that has been keeping me on the run. But, whatever may be the cause of my being behind-hand in this field, there seems to be a consensus that, here, Spengler is a long way ahead of me (see p. 601, footnote 1).

² In Trinkaus's view, as expounded in *loc. cit.*, pp. 235-6, 'an alternative procedure ... is to analyse the inner structure of a given civilization, or a sample one, in order to find the contrasts with other civilizations rather than similarities'. If one had analysed the structural and dynamic interrelations of the elements of a civilization in a number of different cases, one might then be able to arrive at 'a rank-ordering of their comparative value and sequential role in Man's development. The criterion employed would be the degree of realisation of the human potential in the widest number of men within the society.'

namely, changes in social structure¹ and changes in religious attitude. These two topics are, of course, both important, and they lie at opposite extremes of the cultural gamut. Social structure is the most external element in a human being's life; religion is the most intimate. The gamut, however, includes other notes besides these two, and the music of cultural life is a symphony in which all notes play some part. An eye for changes in social structure leads one to dwell on politics and war; an eye for changes in religious attitude leads one to dwell on psychological phenomena and spiritual experiences. I have dwelt on these two elements in culture² perhaps out of proportion to the attention that I

¹ F. Engel-Janosi points out, in *Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, 2. Jahrgang, Heft 4 (October, 1949), p. 270, that my kind of history approaches sociology. Other critics, however, have censured me for not having studied sociology and not having used the sociologists' method. H. E. Barnes finds that I do 'not possess the indispensable command of the techniques and subject matter of cultural anthropology, historical sociology, and social history' (*An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, p. 729) and that 'there is no indication that he is familiar with American sociological literature' (*ibid.*, p. 724). D. G. Macrae finds that I have neglected or dealt very unsatisfactorily with the history of social organization (*The Literary Guide*, January, 1955, p. 14). Mumford notices my 'failure to recognise the important pioneer work, on parallel lines', of Sir Patrick Geddes. 'Toynbee never arrives at a theory of the city, such as Geddes brilliantly developed.' Toynbee unfortunately takes refuge mainly in a political and economic explanation of the rise of civilisations' (*The New Republic*, 27th November, 1935, p. 65). P. A. Sorokin (in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 178 and 189-90) points out my ignorance of sociological works, and suggests that, if I had studied Tarde on mimesis, I could have saved space and have avoided errors. My ignorance of Tarde's work is noticed by E. F. J. Zahn, too (in *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 20). R. K. Merton detects that I have not read Pareto (*The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xlvii, No. 2 (September, 1941), pp. 205-13). D. M. Robinson says that Toynbee 'neglects sociology, not even mentioning Durkheim, Max Weber, Boas, or Cole' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). If, before committing himself to this statement, Robinson had checked it by consulting my wife's index to vols. i-iii of this book, he would have found references there to both Cole and Boas. I not only cite them but quote passages from works of theirs. My two quotations from works of Cole's in these first three volumes contain statements of a point of capital importance for the study of human affairs: the point that societies are not organisms.

Postan's verdict on me is that, 'until he writes a work of sociology, he will not be able to rid himself of his vague images or to meet the challenge of his fruitful ones' (*The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii, p. 63). In Postan's eyes the virtue of the sociological method is that it is microscopic. I have done some of this watchmaker's work in some of the annexes to the present book, and have found it fascinating. But it gives no help towards solving the crucial current problem in the study of human affairs, which is, as I see it, the problem of quantity. For this reason, and also because, in practice, though not in principle, present-day Western sociologists confine themselves almost entirely to the microscopic study of tiny patches of contemporary Western social texture, and treat this, not historically, but as still life, I agree with Bagby, as I have said above in Chapter IV, in holding that the sociologists' work is not of much use for our purpose. On the other hand, I also agree with Bagby that in neglecting the anthropologists' method I have deprived myself of a valuable tool. When he pronounces that this has been fatal to my work, I suspect that he may be exaggerating. The anthropologists' method is, after all, only one of a number of tools in the workman's bag. But, of course, the value of one's own work is a question on which one's own judgement is worth little more than zero.

² Bagby censures 'the incredible poverty' of my subject matter. According to him, it is confined almost entirely to political and military affairs (*Toynbee and History*, p. 104). In the same article, however, he criticizes me (*ibid.*, p. 107) for having given too prominent and, worse still, too independent a place to religion, and complains elsewhere (in *Culture and History*, p. 6) that, before Bagby's own advent, 'an Englishman or an American who seeks to understand history must choose between Collingwood's unregulated intuitions and Toynbee's religious fantasies'. It seems inconsistent to prosecute on a charge of single-track-mindedness twice over, each time on a different count. But, if Bagby had said that I had paid too much attention to the two topics of religion and politics (including war), at the cost of unduly neglecting other human activities, his comment would have been fair and instructive.

have given to others: for instance, the fine arts,¹ science and technology,² and economics.³ The consequent deficiency in my work can be measured by contrasting it with a feature of Spengler's work that—to my mind and, I believe, in the judgement of most other students of him as well—is one of Spengler's most brilliant achievements.

¹ D. M. Robinson notes against me that 'he neglects art, without which no man can really understand history' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). J. K. Feibleman remarks that, in my work, the arts and sciences of peace are ignored, and that the failure to comprehend the place of these in history is one of my two major shortcomings—the second of them being my attempt to found my system on transcendental religion (*T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), pp. 22 and 152). Sorokin (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 179) finds me inadequate on art and science (as well as on philosophy, law, and all history except Hellenic). D. M. Robinson censures me for neglecting 'the fields of archaeology, numismatics, ceramics, glyptics, sculpture, and architecture', as well as sociology (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). For sociology see the present chapter, p. 599, footnote 1. As for archaeology, Robinson is answered in the following passage of W. H. McNeill's contribution to the same cooperative appraisal. 'The scope and content of *A Study of History* is dependent on the work done by archaeologists, much of it within the present century. If the goodly company of the archaeologists had not discovered and studied Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Minoan, Mycenaean, Hittite, Indus, Shang, and Mayan civilizations, Toynbee could not have conceived history as he did. In this most elementary sense, his book is a product of our age' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). T. J. G. Locher makes Robinson's criticism in *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 9, in gracious terms. Why, he asks, does an artistic personality draw so little on the history of art for his study? I plead guilty to this charge.

² This point has been touched upon already on p. 591, in footnote 1. J. Romein remarks (in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 348–9) that I depreciate the value and significance of rational science and technology. E. Fiess remarks (*ibid.*, p. 383) that I depreciate the value and significance of scientific method by perversely identifying it with mere technology; and the same charge is made by Feibleman (in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, loc. cit.). P. A. Sorokin is right in pointing out that, in my belief, there is no correlation between progress and recession in technology and progress and recession in culture. In Sorokin's view this is, at the least, an exaggeration of the truth, if it is not a sheer fallacy (Sorokin in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 180 and 185).

John Strachey, in an unpublished critique, observes that I grossly neglect Man's need to conquer his material environment, and therefore gravely underestimate the importance of technology. 'All his highest values—"etherialisation" and "self-determination"—are quite impossible of achievement without a higher technique than 99 per cent of the World has even yet realised.' E. Fiess (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 383) finds, in my interpretation of history, a strange depreciation of the importance of material progress. Cf. J. Madaule (in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 42), and T. J. G. Locher in *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 22. Lewis Mumford (in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 18) finds that I ignore the positive conditions for the growth of civilization, e.g. the importance of the acquisition of storeable foodstuffs. Lynn Thorndike criticizes me for neglecting material and technical advance (*The Journal of Modern History*, vol. vii, No. 3 (September, 1935), p. 317). A. H. Hanson castigates my 'extraordinary ignorance' of the materialist interpretation of history, and strongly objects to my describing the technical achievements of the civilizations that I label 'arrested' as being a reversion to animism (*Science and Society*, No. 13, 1949, pp. 118–35). In the particular case of the Nomads, Owen Lattimore points out, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1948, pp. 104–5, that 'the transition from marginal farming to the breeding of livestock has not usually been the result of the "challenge" of climatic desiccation. Rather, it has been the result sometimes of the discovery and sometimes of the imitation of a new technique'. P. M. Sweezy had already made this point in *The Nation*, 19th October, 1946, on the authority of Lattimore's masterly book *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*.

³ Crane Brinton notes that I believe that we ought to re-transfer our spiritual treasure from economics to religion (*The Virginia Quarterly Review*, vol. 32, No. 3 (Summer, 1956), pp. 361–75). R. H. Tawney has the impression that I am not much interested in the economic aspects of social growth and decay (*International Affairs*, November, 1939, p. 800). Allan Nevins puts his finger on my 'general inadequacy in treating the economic factors of history' (*The New York World-Telegram and Sun*, 7th December, 1934). Strachey, a propos of my eulogy of Pope Gregory the Great in vol. iv, pp. 184–5, for having built 'upon a religious rock and not upon economic sands', remarks that, while it is true that one needs to have an ideology, it is no less true that one needs to have an economy as well. F. Neilson (in *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, supplement to vol. 14, No. 3 (April, 1955), p. 3) remarks that my work lacks the economic foundations that are provided by Plato in *The Republic*.

Spengler's first concern in approaching a civilization is to divine its distinctive 'style' or character. In this particular civilization, what is the dominant activity? How do the other activities relate themselves to this one? What is the dominant activity, and the corresponding configuration of culture, in that other civilization over there? What does the dominance of different activities in different cultures tell us about the qualitative differences between those cultures? Spengler may have been rather less well versed in the details of history than I, for instance, may be. But he had the insight of genius, and his diagnoses of the distinctive characters of different civilizations are the field in which his genius most clearly displays itself.¹ These diagnoses may stand or may fall. It is quite likely that some of them will be rejected by an eventual consensus of Spengler's successors. Spengler himself arrived at his results largely by intuition, and in arriving at them he challenged other inquirers, endowed with different temperaments and different mental gifts, to follow in his tracks and to confirm or confute his findings by methodical investigations.

By good fortune, a promising method was being worked out at the very time when Spengler was thinking, writing, and publishing. It was being worked out, not in the sociologists' and historians' study of the civilizations, but in the anthropologists' study of the pre-civilizational societies. While the historians were ignoring the patterns in human affairs and the sociologists were poring over minute patches of them, the anthropologists of the 'cultural' school were learning to look at a culture as a whole and to trace out its 'configurations': Kroeber's felicitous word. Kroeber himself has taken a first step, and a long one, towards extending the application of the cultural anthropologists' outlook and method from the study of pre-civilizational societies to the study of civilizations. Dawson is on the same road.² Bagby started to follow Kroeber's lead, and was proposing to make a systematic study of the morphology of civilizations on anthropological lines.³

Thus the stimulus of Spengler's gift of insight has prompted other inquirers to bring to bear, in Spengler's field, a scientific intellectual tool by which Spengler's own findings can be tested and perhaps surpassed. Anthropological method is indeed a key that promises to unlock doors when it is applied to the study of civilizations. Since no particular

¹ By comparison with Spengler's presentation of history, M. E. Lauer finds that mine gives, not an inside view, but one seen from outside (*von aussen her*) (*Blätter für Anthroposophie*, January, 1952). To G. Masur's mind, I have not conjured up any arresting picture of civilizations as self-contained unities or 'wholes' (*Ganzheiten*), comparable to Spengler's 'Apollinean' or 'Faustian' culture (the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521-2). G. E. von Grunebaum finds that, unlike Spengler, I fail to characterize my collective agents from within by an exposition of their existential outlook and problems (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). Other judgements on my work on the same lines have been cited on p. 598, footnote 1. Christopher Dawson, however, finds not only me, but Spengler too, guilty of not taking account of the complexity of the elements of culture that make up a civilization (*The Dynamics of World History*, p. 423). Sorokin dismisses, as being 'misleading and inaccurate', 'the Spenglerian-Toynbee ascription of some specific perennial tendency to this or that civilization, regardless of the period of its history' (*Toynbee and History*, p. 186, quoted already on p. 288).

² See, for instance, what he writes in *Toynbee and History*, p. 138.

³ See *Culture and History*, pp. 7-9 and 18-21. Unhappily, these plans have been cut short by Bagby's untimely death.

key ever turns out to be a master-key, there will, no doubt, be some doors that will prove recalcitrant to this one.¹ The anthropological method of studying a culture has been devised for dealing with pre-civilizational cultures, and in these, as we have noticed, the degree of integration is high. In its application to societies of the species 'civilizations' the anthropological method might be less fruitful; and it might even be stultifying if we were to seek to apply it automatically to the unprecedented cultural situation that has been produced by the epiphany of the higher religions.² These, as we have seen, have broken away from the traditional association of religion with other cultural activities and have asserted their independence as representatives of a new species of society. Still, the anthropological method seems likely to produce valuable results for the study of the Age of the Civilizations down to this point at any rate. If it helps us to explore the cultural configurations of the civilizations of the first and second generations, it will have proved to be a tool of great value. From now onwards I shall pick this tool up and try it myself. 'Better late than never.'

I might have picked it up earlier, and therefore have found better opportunities for taking advantage of it,³ if I had paid more attention than I have to the study of the pre-civilizational societies.⁴ My neglect of these is, I should guess, the most serious single one of the many deficiencies in my equipment for making a study of human affairs. It is not just that a better acquaintance with communities in the pre-civilizational stage would also have made me better acquainted with the anthropologists and with their method of work. The pre-civilizational societies have an intrinsic importance and value of their own,⁵ and this for several reasons.

¹ Bagby appears to believe that the cultural anthropologists' approach is not just a key, but is *the* key, to success in a study of the civilizations. Spengler, he remarks, 'in spite of his wild exaggerations and his reliance on intuition, did have a concept of culture which approaches the anthropological one and used it far more systematically and with far more respect for the evidence than his successor' [i.e. myself] (*Culture and History*, p. 181). Bagby has certainly used his anthropological key with good effect and would, I am sure, have won further successes with it. But everyone is inclined to over-estimate the value of his own favourite tool. My favourite one has been the use of the Hellenic Civilization as a 'model', and I am conscious that I have fallen into the mistake of trying to apply this 'model' beyond its proper limits and of neglecting to experiment with alternatives. Bagby has been criticized by a reviewer in *The Times Literary Supplement*, 3rd October, 1958, for succumbing to 'the tendency to see cultural anthropology, not so much as a useful ancillary tool for the historian, as a panacea for all historiographical ills and, finally, an overall substitute for history'.

² This has been argued on pp. 81-85.

³ Other critics, besides Bagby, have censured me for not having done this. C. Trinkaus finds that, while I do apply the method of anthropology to history, I do this only very superficially (*Science and Society*, vol. xii, No. 1 (1948), p. 221). R. K. Merton detects (in loc. cit.) that I have not read Durkheim, and he pronounces that, in my account of the diffusion of culture, my 'unfamiliarity with detailed analytical studies of diffusion is painfully evident'.

⁴ See pp. 150-3. O. Höver criticizes my treatment of both the Palaeolithic and the Neolithic Age in a paper in typescript. See also the same writer's 'Buchführung und Bilanz der Weltgeschichte: Zu A. Toynbees Deutung des Frühzeitlichen Menschengeschehens', in the *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Jahrgang 2, Heft 3 (1949/50), pp. 247-59. I have tried to make some amends for my relative neglect of the pre-civilizational cultures by dealing with them—all too briefly and ignorantly—in Chapter IX of the present volume.

⁵ Christopher Dawson justly charges both Spengler and me with under-estimating the importance of both the primitives and the barbarians (*Toynbee and History*, pp. 137 and 139; *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 422).

In the first place, the pre-civilizational societies represent one out of three species of human society—and this the oldest and by far the longest-lived so far. One cannot see the other two—civilizations and churches—in their true historical perspective unless one is able to see them against the background of pre-civilizational culture. In the second place, it is too crude a classification to distribute all societies, other than churches, between just two species. The line that I have drawn between 'primitive societies' and 'civilizations' is too sharp.¹ In the course of the years during which I have been writing this book the progress of archaeological discovery has made it more and more clear that the Old-World group of civilizations and the New-World group each rises, like a cluster of pyramids, from a platform which, itself, already stands above ground level. Between the civilizations of the earliest generation and the primitive societies in those civilizations' historical background there intervenes the transitional stage of culture—labelled 'Neolithic' in the Old World and 'Formative' in the New World—that has been discussed in Chapter IX of this volume. And, in the background of this transitional stage, there is no undifferentiated primitive phase. Behind the Neolithic looms the Mesolithic, behind this the Upper Palaeolithic, and the Lower Palaeolithic behind that. At the earliest moment at which we catch our first glimpse of Man on Earth, we find him not only on the move but already moving at an accelerating pace. This crescendo of acceleration is continuing today. In our generation it is perhaps the most difficult and dangerous of all the current problems of the human race. We cannot plot the curve of this movement, not to speak of trying to explain it, unless we look at it as a whole. A study of human affairs must be comprehensive if it is to have any hope of becoming intelligible, and no study will be comprehensive if the pre-civilizational societies are left out of the picture.

Nor, in this comprehensive picture, are the pre-civilizational societies merely part of the furniture of the past. They are still represented in the living contemporary world.² And here their most important representatives are not the extant pre-civilizational societies still surviving as separate social entities in the interstices between the civilizations. These have been played upon by the radiation of the civilizations ever since the first civilizations made their appearance some five thousand years ago. This radiation has been increasing in intensity, and its disintegrating effects have been cumulative. Most of the surviving pre-civilizational societies are now within sight of dissolution, and the human beings who have participated in them are being caught in the meshes of the world-wide civilization that is taking shape within a Western framework. The most important, and by far the most numerous, representatives of pre-civilizational culture today are the peasants who have been living their own lives, unassimilated, under the surface of the civilizations ever since these came into existence.³ This peasantry still accounts, today, for nearly three-quarters of the living generation of mankind, and they are

¹ See pp. 150-3, with the references on p. 150, in footnote 6, to critics who have made this point.

² P. A. Sorokin, in *Toynbee and History*, p. 184, makes this point in more general terms.

³ See Mumford in *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 14.

still in the 'Formative' or 'Neolithic' stage in their state of mind and even in their way of life. This has remained substantially what it was, in spite of successive changes in technical equipment—from stone tools to stone and copper side by side, and from copper, via bronze, to iron and steel.¹ It is only in our day that this hitherto Neolithic-minded peasant majority of the human race is beginning to obtain some share in the amenities of the civilization whose burden it has been carrying on its shoulders for these last five thousand years.

It may be that the peasantry, in now taking the kingdom of civilization by storm, is unwittingly pushing its way into a slaughter-house. The revolutionary possibility of bringing the benefits of civilization within reach of all men has been conjured up by an acceleration of the advance of technology at an unprecedented rate during the last 200 years. This technological revolution has been a Western achievement, and it has now placed in the hands of the Western peoples and their accomplished Russian pupils new weapons potent enough for committing genocide. If the technocrat civilizations were to use this tremendous power for their own destruction, their exceptional progress in technology would be seen, in retrospect, to have been one of those cultural developments that make their ingenious authors unfit to survive; and then the Earth would be inherited, if it were still habitable, by the societies that had been saved from genocide by their comparative technological backwardness. With an eye to this possible event, it seems advisable that students of human affairs today should pay considerable attention to the most primitive societies now surviving in the most secluded natural fastnesses in the Southern Hemisphere. If the technocrat civilizations were to eliminate themselves without making the entire surface of this planet uninhabitable for human beings, human history might be carried on, and the Earth might eventually be repopulated, by those remnants of primitive peoples that are now living, on sufferance, in the interior of Sumatra and Borneo and Australia.

These are strong grounds for taking the study of pre-civilizational societies seriously if one is seriously concerned with the study of human affairs. But, behind and beyond anthropology, further fields of inquiry open up. There is geography in the sense of a study of Man in his interaction with his non-human environment. There is biology in the sense of a study of the physical structure and development of life. Beyond and behind geography and biology there is geology, bringing with it a perspective in which Man looks like a maggot, and life like a virus lately defacing the surface of a once aseptic planet. And behind and beyond geology there is astronomy, bringing with it another perspective again—one, this time, in which our planet looks like a mote, and our geology like a fleeting wisp of cloud. This regress of studies carries the inquirer back into the past behind the genesis of Man and the genesis of life; yet it is as relevant to the study of human affairs as the study of the pre-civilizational societies is to the study of the civilizations and the churches. Kroeber points out² that biology, geology, and astronomy are historical, not scientific, inquiries. He also observes³ that

¹ See pp. 151-2. ² In *The Nature of Culture*, pp. 54, 70, 80, 123. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

science and history differ, not in their field of inquiry, but in the nature of their approach, and that the historical approach can be applied to all phenomena of every kind. This observation is surely correct, and, at one stroke, it wipes out all those conventional 'inter-disciplinary' demarcation lines that might have offered an inquirer into human affairs a prospect of setting some limit to his expanding mental universe. A classically educated inquirer will find this levelling of traditional barriers formidable. I myself have been denounced, with justice, as a naïvely ignorant amateur trespasser, even in the more or less human province of geography.¹ When I have met with such a trouncing at so short a distance from home, how shall I dare to run the gauntlet of the biologists, geologists, and astronomers?

Worse still, the would-be student of human affairs has to pursue his foolhardy quest right through the flaming ramparts of the physical cosmos into the boundless mental spaces of philosophy.² Naturally I have been denounced as being no better a philosopher than I am a geographer,³ but here my classical education has left me in a better posture for self-defence. In 1909-11, when I was reading *Literas Humaniores* at Oxford, I got one foot in between the door-post and the door of the philosopher's closet; and I have just managed to keep it there since then. So this door cannot be slammed and bolted in my face. I can peep into the closet when I choose, and I have done so in this volume.

Such glimpses are, no doubt, all to the good. At the same time this survey of the range of my knowledge will have shown how inadequate it is for the enterprise on which I have embarked. 'The book is his education.'⁴ What is the verdict? Through the rumble of criticism, my ear seems to catch two rather different voices. One voice is saying: 'He has failed to achieve it. Of course he has. It cannot be done.' The other voice is saying: 'He has failed to achieve it. Of course he has. He has not the tools or the wits. But it *can* be done. I am doing it myself.' Of the two, the conceited voice sounds less forbidding than the defeatist one for the prospects of progress in the pursuit of the quest for knowledge. Conceitedness, of course, can unintentionally defeat itself. It is a parasite on ability, and it may strangle it. But the defeatist attitude gives ability no chance at all. And the study of human affairs cannot advance if ability will not venture into this perilous field.

¹ See O. H. K. Spate in *Toynbee and History*, p. 287; in *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cxviii, Part 4 (December, 1952), pp. 409-11; and, in fact, *passim*.

² See Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book I, ll. 72-77.

³ Like Spengler, Toynbee has not any philosophical system to give his scheme some rational objectivity (H. J. Morgenthau in *Toynbee and History*, p. 196). 'Toynbee crosses certain logical gaps on shaky bridges' (R. V. Chase in *The American Scholar*, vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 1947), pp. 268-82). His work is not philosophy; it is 'philosophy of history'. And what is that? Methodology? Metaphysics? Logic? (K. W. Thompson in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 200-1). 'Toynbee's *A Study of History* is, strictly speaking, not a philosophy of history. Modern philosophy of history, as represented among others by thinkers like Dilthey, Croce, Ortega y Gasset, or in England by R. G. Collingwood, has been chiefly concerned with the questions of historical knowledge itself' (Hajo Holborn in *The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947, p. 12). Toynbee is unfamiliar with philosophy and uncomplimentary to it (J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), pp. 17 and 148-50). 'Little interested in philosophy' (W. Gurian in *The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1942), p. 511). 'Toynbee is keen philosophisch-kritische Geist' (Zahn, op. cit., p. 45).

⁴ A. Hourani in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), p. 386.

3. EFFECTS OF HAVING BEEN BORN IN 1889 AND IN ENGLAND

'Genuine concern with problems [*Problematik*] always springs from roots in the life of the contemporary world and is implicated in the play of real contemporary opposing forces. It never hovers, free as air, withdrawn from the World and out of touch with Reality.'¹

Anyone in any country affected by the First World War who was alive and grown-up at the time of its outbreak is likely to have felt that this was an epoch-making event. Someone who was just grown-up, and whose country was England, will have been particularly sensitive to this feeling. Like his elders, he could look back, with a grown-up participant's eyes, on the life of a period that had now been abruptly and unexpectedly brought to an end; and, for English people, this period had been running, without any dramatic break, for almost twice as long as for the people of most other countries. For the English, August 1914 spelled the sudden end of a period of peace that they had been enjoying by then for all but a hundred years, since the last shot fired at the Battle of Waterloo. The breaches in this English century of peace had been minor disturbances that had not interrupted the even tenor of England's life. On the other hand, in most other parts of the World there had been a decisive break, for good or evil, about half-way through that century's course. France had suffered the *débâcle* and the *Commune* in the years 1870-1. The same years had seen the completion of the political unification of Italy and of Germany. For Italy this revolutionary change had taken twelve years (1859-70) and for Germany eight (1864-71). Canada, too, had attained political unity in a self-governing federation in 1867. The United States' unity had been preserved, but its internal balance of power had been at the same time revolutionized, in the Civil War of 1861-5, the greatest, bloodiest, and most devastating war of any in the World between 1815 and 1914. In Russia a new age had opened with the liberation of the serfs in 1861 and the accompanying reforms of other institutions. India had been through the shattering experience of the Mutiny of 1857, and China through the shattering experience of her war with Great Britain and France in 1858-60, which finally brought home to her a realization of her impotence in face of Western military power. These upheavals all round England had either left her untouched or had failed to touch her to the quick. And this exemption from the World's common lot in the eighteen-sixties and seventies made the shock of 1914 particularly severe for her. Having been born in England in 1889, I felt this shock in its full force, and it must have been affecting my outlook and my work continuously and profoundly ever since.

I certainly caught the Victorian Age by its tail, only to see it immediately slip out of my hands. This experience of mine is, of course, nothing individual or unique. It is common to all surviving representatives of my generation. All the same, it has attracted the attention of several of my critics. To Holcombe's eyes I display 'a large measure of the attitudes and spirit of a late Victorian Englishman'.² In Toynbee,

¹ E. F. J. Zahn: *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 7.

² A. N. Holcombe in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. xlix, No. 4, p. 1151.

Kohn signals to the German public, we are back in Gladstone's world. Toynbee is 'one of the last representatives of the Western humanistic culture'.¹ In this description, Kohn carries me back, in Gladstone's company, to the world of Giambattista Vico and of Poggio Bracciolini. His placing of me is, I believe, correct,² and it throws into relief the greatness of the break which an Englishman, brought up in this traditional culture, experienced in 1914. No doubt this explains why I strike at least three of my contemporaries³ as being out of tune with the age in which I have been living and working ever since: the new age that opened at the outbreak of the First World War. Neilson pronounces that 'thought today runs in other channels'. Saville sums up, more judiciously, that

'it is conceivable that Arnold Toynbee may prove to be the prophet of a new era in the intellectual and spiritual life of mankind. . . .⁴ On the other hand, *A Study of History* may prove to be an anachronism, a book, essentially backward-looking, that seeks to rationalise the failures of religion into the terms of an indomitable and unquenchable faith. . . . In this case the *Meisterwerk* must become but the most eloquent of all the voices of those who are still living in an age of faith that is past, who are not at home, and who, therefore, are not happy, in the atomic relativistic universe revealed by science—a universe of which they are integral parts but which knows them not.'

The impression made on these critics is noteworthy because two of them, at any rate, were older than I am, yet they evidently did not feel that they themselves had been affected in the same way. Is this estrangement from the present an advantage or a handicap for a student of human

¹ H. Kohn in *Der Monat*, August, 1955, p. 465. The word that I have translated 'culture' is *Bildung*, which means so much more than *Erziehung* or than 'education'.

² If it is correct, then Crossman has got me wrong. In *The New Statesman*, 8th March, 1947, Crossman reported that I have 'a medieval mind' and am a secular Thomist. Crossman's characterization of me and Kohn's are incompatible, and I think it is Crossman's that has gone astray. To be any kind of a Thomist, one must dote on Aristotle, and I have never succeeded in appreciating 'the philosopher', as he was, *par excellence*, for Saint Thomas Aquinas.

³ Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, p. 94; F. Neilson in *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Supplement to vol. 14, No. 3 (April, 1955), p. 1.; M. Saville in *The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. xxv, No. 1 (February, 1956), p. 67.

⁴ Short of being hailed as 'the prophet of a new era', I have been recognized by some critics as being, for evil or good or neither, a characteristic representative of my own generation. Holcombe, for instance, reports that, besides being a Late Victorian Englishman, I am 'a genuine citizen of our world'. M. Watnick, in *The Antioch Review*, No. 7 (Winter, 1947-8), pp. 587-602, finds that, 'whatever else it may be, Toynbee's theory of history is a superb guide to the temper of our times' in a manifestation of this that Watnick himself deplors. 'We are witnessing today a recrudescence of an extreme anti-rationalism, a transcendental escapism, and a general impatience with rigorous scientific method.' And Toynbee's general attitude is 'in perfect accord with the prevailing "failure of nerve"'. . . . If our technical age has written history in its own image, the theologian-historian Toynbee has rewritten it with a highly sensitive awareness of a different image.

In an article entitled 'Hedendaagsche Augustinisme' in *Historie en Metahistorie*, H. Baudet suggests that in both Spengler's work and mine one can see the reciprocal action on each other of an author and the age in which he is living (pp. 44-45). Like Spengler (Baudet finds), I have had some influence on my contemporaries. In both cases Baudet attributes this effect to the forcefulness of a 'primary vision' that is simple and therefore easily comprehensible, rather than to the enveloping mass of information and argument. 'The panoramic prognosis to which it . . . leads, answers to the needs of the present age' (p. 46. Cp. p. 61). 'Toynbee's *Study of History* plays the role of the latest theodicy thrown up by the history of Western Christendom' (*ibid.*, p. 61).

affairs? Bagby,¹ perhaps ironically, puts the question whether it is 'better to be a displaced Victorian or a disillusioned child of the times'. Spate takes it for granted that I am a disillusioned Victorian besides being a displaced one. He suggests² that a liberal humanism which has lost its self-assurance is slippery ground for the building of a big structure. If Spate is right about this, his own plight must be much the same as mine. But is he right? I do not think he is.

For a student of human affairs on the 'panoramic' scale, the experience of being catapulted out of the Gladstonian Age of Western history into the Hitlerian Age must surely have been professionally valuable in at least two ways. To be even partially detached from the age into which one happens to have been born must liberate one's mind, at least in some measure, from the warping and blinding effects of its relativity to its immediate social milieu. In fact, a pilgrim and sojourner in the Hitlerian Age will have profited by his abiding memory of a Gladstonian childhood and early manhood. This memory will have reinforced the enduring effect of a classical education in giving him a modicum of mental detachment,³ and this is a priceless treasure for a student of human affairs. In the second place, the jolt received in August 1914 will have made it impossible, for the rest of one's life, to forget that human affairs are perpetually on the move; and a consciousness of this is a priceless treasure for anyone who is trying to study human affairs from the historian's particular angle of vision.

As a child I was brought up with a great-uncle whose lifetime almost spanned the English century of peace. He had been born in 1820, five years after the date of the Battle of Waterloo, and he died in 1909, five years before the date of the outbreak of the First World War. Externally, his lifetime was as eventful as it could well have been. It had seen a transformation of the material conditions of life in England and, to a lesser extent, in other parts of the World. My great-uncle himself had been born and brought up on a farm in Lincolnshire, had gone to sea and risen to the command of an East Indiaman, and had ended his working life as an official in the newly established Meteorological Office in London. Yet, in spite of the external changes in his private station as well as in his cultural environment, my great-uncle's life had not been eventful psychologically. His experience of life had left him, I believe, unaware that life is not stable. If he had been an historian or a sociologist, he would have been unlucky in his generation. And, conversely, I believe that I have been lucky, professionally, in mine. In August 1914 I was twenty-five years old, and the lesson impressed on me in that month has remained with me ever since.

I have now lived through two world wars and have seen the second of these culminate in the invention and use of atomic weapons. We have since invented rockets capable of delivering far more destructive bombs from any point on the surface of this planet to any other point. It has been noticed by my critics that this experience, which has been the

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 110.

² *Ibid.*, p. 287.

³ Holcombe is perhaps reporting that this has been the effect of these experiences on me when he concludes, in loc. cit., that 'Toynbee is not only a late Victorian Englishman but also a timeless cosmopolitan'.

consequence of the date at which I was born, has coloured my attitude towards a number of issues; and these are issues that concern, not only the present age, but the whole of human history. I hate war, and at the same time I am fascinated by the study of it,¹ and give a very great deal of attention to it.² At the same time, too, I am reluctant to admit that the use of force has had decisive effects on the course of human history.³ In general, I minimize the effects of material factors of all kinds, economic and technological⁴ as well as military, and I magnify the effects of spiritual factors.⁵ In particular, I glorify suffering, and dwell on the creative spiritual effects that suffering has sometimes had.⁶ These attitudes of mine, applied to politics, have made me hostile to any form of nationalism at any time and place.⁷ In the world of my own day I condemn not only the Fascist Italian and Nazi German extremes

¹ J. K. Feibleman, in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 144. This combination of hating war with being intensely interested in it is, I think, what has made both Sir Ernest Barker (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 94) and Bagby (*ibid.*, p. 105) accuse me of 'ambivalence'.

² Bagby, *ibid.*, p. 104.
³ This is noticed—and criticized—by, for example, Pieter Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, p. 57; K. W. Thompson, *ibid.*, p. 218; J. K. Feibleman in *loc. cit.*, p. 142; T. J. G. Locher in *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 22; K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 217; H. Baudet in *Historie en Metahistorie*, pp. 54 and 57; G. Masur in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521–2; P. Kecskemeti in *The Modern Review*, vol. 1, No. 4 (June, 1947), pp. 308–13; H. D. Oakeley in *Philosophy*, April, 1936, p. 193; E. I. Watkin in *The Tablet*, 12th August, 1939; H. Holborn in *The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947; reviewers in *The Listener*, 19th October, 1939, and in *The Glasgow Herald*, 2nd August, 1939; and O. Höver in a paper in typescript.

These critics judge that I have tried to push my point farther than is warranted by the evidence of history. Force has been signally effective on a number of notable occasions. The classic example that they cite is the conquest of Middle America and Peru by the Spaniards: e.g. Geyl in *op. cit.*, pp. 55–56; K. W. Thompson in *op. cit.*, pp. 218–19; Erdmann in *op. cit.*, p. 218; Watkin in *loc. cit.*; Holborn in *loc. cit.*; and the reviewer in *The Glasgow Herald*. Erdmann also appeals to Hellenic history, and cites, as some of the causes of the decline and fall of the Hellenic Civilization, the impact on the Hellenic World of such external powers as the Persians and the Carthaginians and, at a later stage, the barbarians and the Christians. Watkin points out that, according to my own account, the Far Western Christian Civilization of 'the Celtic Fringe' succumbed to the superior force of the contemporary Roman Christendom, and that even the more formidable Scandinavian Civilization eventually capitulated to this. Other critics contest my inclination to depreciate the effectiveness of force in more general terms. Borkenau and Masur, for instance, point out that 'creative minorities' do not, as a matter of fact, ever rely exclusively on 'charm' as their means of retaining their leadership. Oakeley points out that geographical expansion is often impossible without the use of force, and that, 'in the early days of a people's development, expansion to some extent seems a necessary movement'.

⁴ See p. 591, footnote 1, and p. 600, footnote 2.

⁵ The Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. judges that, 'from a Christian point of view, the trouble with' my 'true religion' is that it is 'too purely spiritual' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). Pieter Geyl exclaims, in *Debates with Historians*, p. 142: 'This exclusive spiritualism is more than I can swallow.' C. B. Joynt criticizes me for taking 'a strongly dualistic view of the mind-body relation' (*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 195).

⁶ 'In a sense it would be even true to say that the prophet's [Deutero-Isaiah's] "suffering servant" is the key to the understanding of Mr. Toynbee's Study' (E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 36). F. Engel-Janosi notices that, in my attitude, there is an accent on suffering (*Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, 2. Jahrgang, Heft 4 (October, 1949), p. 269). Sorokin opposes this attitude of mine (in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 188–9). I have declared this attitude at a previous point in this chapter (on pp. 580–1), as well as in many other contexts.

⁷ Geyl judges that I unduly depreciate the importance of national units (*Toynbee and History*, p. 71) and that I do not do justice to the part played by local national life and culture within the framework of the Western Civilization (*ibid.*, p. 70). Renier (*ibid.*, p. 75) convicts me of being illiberal in my criticism of historians who write history within national frameworks.

of nationalism, but also British, French, and Dutch colonialism and the spirit that has led the United States and the Soviet Union into a competition for world-dominion at the risk of committing genocide and making the surface of this planet uninhabitable. I have a passion for unity,¹ and deplore the division of the World into sovereign independent local states.

I agree that I do have these feelings and attitudes, and that I have them partly as a result of my reactions to the public events through which I happen to have lived. These two admissions do not, in themselves, tell either for or against the effects that my experience has had on me. It may have darkened and confused my vision, or it may have made me see clearer than, perhaps, I might have seen if I had happened to live in a less catastrophic age. The help or hindrance, for a study of human affairs, that I have derived from my generation's experience is something that cannot be judged *a priori* or *en bloc*. Each point ought to be considered on its merits.

I do hate war and this for the familiar reasons that have made most people hate it for most of the time since this sinister institution was first established. War is an impersonal use of collective human force for the purpose of imposing the will of the rulers and people of one state on those of another. It is impossible to make war without having a political organization and an economic surplus; so war can hardly be older than civilization. In any case, since the rise of civilization, war has been one of its two chief scandals and scourges—the other being the system of social and economic inequality and injustice which expresses itself in class distinctions and which finds its extreme form in the institution of slavery. War is hateful—this is almost too trite to repeat—because it is wicked, because it causes suffering, and because it works havoc. The psychological havoc that it works—its *karma*, in the language of Indian philosophy—is both more devastating in its effects and more difficult to undo than the material damage that it inflicts. On the evidence of history, war has been the immediate cause of most of the breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations of which we have a record. Today, since the invention of atomic weapons, war has become capable of destroying, not only mankind's civilizations, but mankind itself. It has not become, because it could not become, more wicked than it always has been. But it has now become not only wicked but senseless, since weapons have now reached a potency that will obliterate the traditional distinction between victors and vanquished. Atomic weapons will bring not only defeat but annihilation on all belligerents alike.

Watkin suggests² that my consciousness of the present potentialities

¹ Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 94–95. There are, of course, two different ways in which this passion can declare itself. One may be eager for practical concord and fraternity, and one may be eager for a unitary vision of human affairs and of all other phenomena. These two forms of the passion are not incompatible. I plead guilty to the second as well as to the first. The first accounts for my animus against the concept of 'Europe' versus the World, which is noticed by Richard Pares in *The English Historical Review*, vol. lxxi, No. 279 (April, 1956), p. 266. In the matter of seeking for unity of vision, W. Gurian notices, in *The Review of Politics*, October, 1942, p. 511, that I have 'a passion for synthesis'. Christopher Dawson notices, in *Toynbee and History*, p. 136, that I am moved by the Hellenic quest for a synoptic vision and by the Hebrew quest for a theodicy. See also p. 9, footnote 1.

² In *The Tablet*, 12th August, 1939, p. 204.

of war may have coloured retrospectively my estimate of the actual effects of war in the past.

'In this vision and probable forecast we fear he is right. But it has, we think, led him to an inconsistent and hesitant view of the part actually played by war in human civilizations. At times he distinguishes between justifiable and unjustifiable war, between wars which preserve a growing civilization from barbarians without, and anarchy within, the pale, and wars of militarist aggression. For example, he seems to approve of Timur Lenk's (Tamburlaine's) wars against the Mongol Nomads, and to condemn only the wars waged by his mad ambition against the Persians, Turks, and Indians. But at other times—as, for instance, when he describes and condemns the palette whereon Narmer (Menes) depicts the war by which he united Egypt—he seems to condemn war indiscriminately. This confusion—in which he projects and enlarges the perception that national wars under present conditions must spell ruin for our civilization into an indiscriminate pacifism which condemns war throughout history—has, we think, damaged his historical picture. For it is abundantly clear that civilization could not have arisen and developed without the employment of war, however destructive its unbridled indulgence proved later.'

Watkin's analysis is acute; and I agree that one must try to distinguish between the different purposes for which wars have been fought, and the different degrees of the material and spiritual devastation that they have inflicted. This is a necessary step towards arriving—if that is possible—at a more or less dispassionate and objective appreciation of the role of war in history. As Watkin points out, I have been feeling my way towards drawing distinctions of these kinds, without having succeeded, so far, in drawing them clearly. On reconsideration, I find myself still holding that all wars are wrong, whatever may be their purposes and their consequences. But I agree that, in the past, the choice between going to war and not going to war has sometimes been a choice between two evils. If the evil in not going to war is greater than the evil in going to war—and this not just for the party that is having to make the choice, but for society as a whole—then, I suppose, going to war would be morally justifiable. Yet a war that, on these grounds, might rank as a 'just' war, according to the definition of this in Christian theology, would not, on that account, be a war that worked no havoc. A war always works havoc, even when one of the belligerents is not morally to blame for having started it. Moreover, it is part of the nature of war, once started, to get out of hand; and many belligerents who have made war 'justly' at the start have drifted into the commission of injustice before the end of the story. Watkin's contention that 'civilization could not have arisen and developed without the employment of war' is, I should say, non-proven, and is perhaps intrinsically impossible either to demonstrate or to refute. If it were accepted, the implications for the destiny of civilization would be grim. We should be confronted with the tragic fact that the price of civilization had been the imposition on mankind of a fatal load of *karma*; and we should have to face the tragic prospect that this *karma*—in the shape of an institution that is both

evil and uncontrollable—is likely, sooner or later, to destroy, not only civilization, but also Man its maker.

In diagnosing my attitude towards war as being 'ambivalent', my critics imply, I think, that my interest in the study of war shows that, while I hate it on one level of my psyche, I love it on another. If this is the implication, I do not admit that the diagnosis is correct. For, while it is true that one cannot love a thing without being interested in it, this does not prove the truth of the converse proposition that one cannot be interested in a thing without loving it. This is, in fact, disproved by familiar cases. An intelligence officer, for instance, is absorbingly interested in 'the enemy'. A surgeon or physiologist who is fighting cancer is absorbingly interested in cancerous growths. But in both these cases the feeling that inspires this interest is, not a love for one's opponent, but a desire to conquer him. For me, as for most other human beings, war is an enemy of the human race and a cancer preying upon human society and destroying the most valuable elements in human culture. The first step towards conquering a dangerous enemy or keeping at bay a dangerous disease is to take the danger seriously. This is one of the elementary rules of self-defence. The most fatal of all possible reactions to an opponent is to try to get rid of him by ignoring his existence. This is, surely, childishly irrational, and, if so, any student of human affairs in the Age of the Civilizations up to date ought to give far more attention to war than to all the arts of peace put together. It is an unhappy but undeniable truth that, during these last 5,000 years, mankind has spent on war by far the greater part of the hitherto meagre surplus, over and above our provision for the bare necessities of life, that we have succeeded in wresting from non-human nature. A derisively small fraction of this tiny surplus has been spent on the arts of peace—and, till within living memory, most of this fraction has been misappropriated to the unjust purpose of providing the amenities of civilization for a privileged minority.

On these considerations I maintain that my combination of hatred with interest in my attitude towards war does not convict me of psychological 'ambivalence' but does acquit me of trying to hide my head in the sands. On the other hand, I acknowledge that I have been guilty of some 'wishful thinking' in pushing my denial of the efficacy of the use of force as far as I have pushed it. If one believes, as I do, that war has had an important effect on the course of human affairs, it is inconsistent to maintain that the use of force has not been efficacious. On this point I accept two of Feibleman's *dicta*. 'An event', he says,¹ 'is never actual without some gentleness, nor possible without some violence.' Some measure of force is inherent in all organizations, and all of them are also ephemeral.² In other words, force is efficacious to no lesser an extent than the institutions in which it is an ingredient. If force has not proved efficacious in the long run, this is because all known human institutions have had short runs up to date measured by the age of the human race. I have argued, however,³ that human institutions, unlike human lives, have no inexorable maximum span of duration, but are

¹ In loc. cit., p. 144.

² Ibid., pp. 142-3.

³ See pp. 268-9.

capable, in principle, of lasting for an indefinite length of time when once they have been brought into existence. If I am right in thinking this, then I am bound to concede that the effects of the use of force might continue to make themselves felt in *saecula saeculorum*.

Pares suggests¹ that I do not fully believe my own thesis that no civilization has ever perished through the violent impact, from outside, of some alien human force. On reconsideration, I find myself still unable to cite a single case of the breakdown and disintegration of a civilization in which I think it is certain that this was the work of some external agency. In all cases in which our knowledge of the course of events is sufficient to enable us to diagnose the causes of breakdown and disintegration with any assurance, I believe now, as before, that the verdict suggested by the evidence is one of suicide,² not one of murder. But I also admit that, if I left it at that, I should not have given a full or a completely final answer to Pares' probing question. For one thing, the evidence, as I interpret it, does not only show that the civilizations that have come to grief have miscarried as a result of the operation of internal causes; it also shows that, at least in the later stages of the subsequent process of disintegration, external agencies—in the shape of barbarians, higher religions, or alien civilizations—have sped the disintegrating civilization on its course towards final dissolution or have at any rate administered the final *coup de grâce*. In the classical case of the two Pre-Columbian civilizations in the New World it is obvious that the Spanish invaders dealt these civilizations the final blow, even if this was only the last in a series in which the first had been self-inflicted.

The Middle American and the Andean Society did, I believe, each break down at least four hundred years before the Spaniards arrived in the Americas from the other side of the Atlantic. In the history of each of these civilizations the 'Classic' phase, in which it is evident that the civilization was prospering and progressing, seems to have broken down at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era.³ In the Andean World this breakdown is represented, in the archaeological evidence, by the advent of the Tiahuanacoid horizon; in the Middle American World it is represented by the sack of Teotihuacán and by the desertion of the lowland Maya 'ceremonial centres' in what is now Northern Guatemala. In taking this evidence as an indication of a breakdown in my sense of the term,⁴ I am perhaps on fairly strong ground, as I can appeal here, in support of my interpretation, to a consensus of the archaeologists working in this field. But I also have to admit that my concept of social and cultural breakdown is contested by many, perhaps by a majority, of my fellow historians, and I also have to

¹ In loc. cit., p. 267.

² R. L. Shinn remarks that this conclusion is made easy for me by my belief in original sin, and that, in some cases, destruction seems to be a disproportionately heavy penalty for the fault that I diagnose (*Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 228).

³ The absolute dating of Middle American history in terms of the Christian Era is still in dispute, though there is no disagreement about the relative dating of the successive phases of Middle American culture that have been brought to light by archaeological discoveries. The datings given here are those of the Martínez-Goodman-Thompson correlations. Spinden sets back the chronology by 260 years, and his correlation seems to be supported by recent carbon-14 tests.

⁴ See pp. 300-5.

ask myself what, as far as I can guess, would have been likely to happen supposing that military adventurers from the Far West of the Old World had succeeded in crossing the Atlantic in the generation of the Cid or in the generation of Tāriq instead of being kept waiting until the generation of Cortés. If Tāriq had ferried his expeditionary force across the straits of Dakar instead of the straits of Gibraltar, it would have reached Middle America and the Andean World in the eighth century of the Christian Era. According to either of the two present tentative correlations of Middle American chronology with the Christian Era, the invaders from the Old World would then have found the indigenous civilizations of the New World still in what would have been their 'growth stage' in my terminology. Can I guarantee to Richard Pares that, in these circumstances, the invaders would have been repulsed?

Evidently, in the light of what actually happened 400 years later, it would be unwarrantable to pronounce dogmatically that the indigenous civilizations of the New World would undoubtedly have held their own against invaders from the Old World if these had made their appearance before the New-World civilizations had broken down internally. I may be right in holding that one of the reasons for their failure to hold their own against the Spaniards in the sixteenth century was their own unhappy condition at that time. Middle America was then in the throes of being forcibly united by the particularly brutal and sadistic militarism of the Aztecs. The Andean World had just been forcibly united by the militarism of the Incas; and, though the Inca regime was comparatively benevolent, the effects of the antecedent Inca conquest, and of the warfare between local powers before that, had been destructive and exhausting. At the same time it would be arbitrary to ignore another, entirely different, factor which was also one of the obvious causes of the indigenous American civilizations' overthrow by the sixteenth-century Spanish conquerors. The Aztecs were hopelessly outmatched by the Spaniards in military equipment. The Andean World had only recently entered the Bronze Age, and Middle America was still in the Neolithic Age, whereas even the Far West of the Old World had been in the Iron Age for about two thousand years by this time.¹ If the invasion of the New World from the Old World across the Atlantic had taken place 800 years before its actual date, the magnitude of the disparity between the two parties in their military equipment would have been of the same order as it was in the sixteenth century.

Thus the balance was tilted continuously, as well as heavily, to the indigenous American civilizations' disadvantage in the military sphere. Might this disadvantage have been offset if the peoples of Nuclear America had been subjected to their ordeal of being attacked by far better armed invaders from the Old World at a date when the social and cultural situation in Nuclear America was more propitious? The possibility that, in this case, the Andean peoples, at any rate, might have

¹ In *The Glasgow Herald*, 2nd August, 1939, a reviewer comments: 'It was Spanish steel and gunpowder that overthrew the Andean Civilization of the Incas, and a comparable technical superiority may slay our civilization.'

held their own is suggested by the actual course of events there after the Spaniards' arrival. The mass of the population submitted docilely to their new conquerors, and we may guess that this was largely because the preceding Inca conquest and domination had conditioned them to submissiveness in advance. Thus the social and cultural conditions then prevailing in the Andean World reinforced the adverse effect of the Incaic armies' military weakness in face of Old-World armaments; and the two adverse factors in combination told heavily in favour of the Old-World invaders. The Incas themselves, however, had not been affected by the docility in which they had successfully schooled their subjects for the benefit, as it turned out, of their Spanish supplanters. And a remnant of them had the spirit to stand up to the terrible experience of being suddenly and unexpectedly overthrown by invaders, out of the blue, equipped with overwhelmingly superior weapons.

When they found themselves thus ousted from their established position as the unchallenged masters of a great empire, the survivors of the Incas were not cowed. They withdrew into the forest-clad tropical eastern slopes of the Andes; and, though they were hardly more at home in this *montaña* than the Spaniards were, they took full advantage of the difficulties of the terrain and managed here to keep the Spaniards at bay for a whole generation. Moreover, before their resistance was overcome, they had begun to master the use of the Spaniards' outlandish weapons. And, farther afield, beyond the extreme southern and northern fringes of Nuclear America, one of the most effective of the Spanish weapons, the horse, was adopted with such success by indigenous barbarians—the Araucanians in Central Chile and the Plains Indians in the Rio Grande and Mississippi basins—that these were able to hold out against the cumulative pressure of conquest and colonization from the Old World for more than three hundred years after the date at which the Spaniards had first set foot on continental American ground. It is significant that both the Araucanians and the Plains Indians had previously been beyond the range of the indigenous American civilizations and had been unaffected by their breakdown and disintegration. The Araucanians had resisted the Incas as successfully as they afterwards resisted the Incas' Spanish successors; the Plains Indians had never crossed the Aztecs' path.

The historical evidence does suggest that, if the Old-World invasion of the New World across the Atlantic had occurred at a date at which the civilizations of the New World were still healthy and flourishing, this auspicious social and cultural factor might indeed have gone some way towards offsetting the Old-World invaders' superiority in military equipment. But obviously it is impossible to guarantee that it would have offset this formidable advantage sufficiently to have enabled the peoples of Nuclear America to beat the invaders off and to go on making their own history independently.

Moreover, we have to take account of four now extinct Old-World civilizations—the Minoan, the Hittite, the Indus, and the Shang—whose histories, like those of the two now extinct indigenous civilizations of the New World, have been brought to light by archaeological

research. In these four Old-World cases, as in the two New-World cases, we know that the final blow was delivered by invaders from outside and that in each case it was a shattering one; but we do not know enough about the previous histories of any of the four to be able to tell whether or not it had suffered a previous internal 'breakdown' such as the two indigenous American civilizations seem to have suffered at the stage which is marked, in the archaeological record, by the ending of the 'Classic' phase of their culture. In the history of the Hittite Civilization we have the record of a great war between the two principal powers in the Hittite World, Khatti and Arzawa, at some date in the latter part of the fourteenth century B.C., and it seems possible that this war, in which Arzawa was overthrown, may have left Khatti, too, permanently weakened. There is evidence, in the record, that from that time onwards the Khatti Empire began to have increasing difficulty in holding its own against rebels at home and raiders from abroad. At the same time there was another drain on Khatti's resources—her long-drawn-out and inconclusive series of wars with Egypt over Syria—and here the source of weakness was a conflict with a power that was external to the Hittite World. In any case, the barbarian *Völkerwanderung* that overthrew the Khatti Empire and destroyed its capital city Khattušaš (Boghazqal'eh) round about the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. was an external force of sufficient magnitude to have wrecked the Hittite Civilization, even if this had not already wrecked itself before this final catastrophe overtook it.

On reconsideration, then, I agree that force has sometimes played a decisive part in human affairs, and I also agree that the force which has been the immediate cause of the destruction of civilizations may sometimes have been an external force and not a domestic one. I still cannot think of any case in which it can be demonstrated that the force which dealt a civilization its mortal wound was an external one, while I can think of several cases in which it is evident that the mortal wound was self-inflicted, and in which the stricken civilization did not become a prey to external forces until it was already moribund. Cases in point are, I should say, the histories of the Hellenic Civilization and the two indigenous civilizations of the New World. At the same time I agree that it is non-proven that a civilization has never been destroyed by blows from outside without any previous suicidal acts of its own.

As for the charge that I have unduly depreciated the importance, in human affairs, of material factors of all kinds, non-military as well as military, I have acknowledged the justice of this already in discussing the unfortunate effects that a classical education has had for me.¹ Here, I am afraid, my reaction to public events in my own lifetime has reinforced the influence of my education; and, together, they have led me to under-estimate the power of both matter and force over the course of human affairs.

I shall try, from now onwards, to see these two ugly but potent and important factors in something more like their true proportions. But proportions are, by their very nature, relative, and, in admitting that

¹ See p. 600, with footnotes 2 and 3.

matter and force count for more than I have hitherto been willing to allow, I am not conceding that matter has the same power as spirit, or force the same power as love. No doubt the mental dichotomy of Reality into love versus power or into spirit versus matter is a misrepresentation; but, if the argument in the first chapter of this volume¹ is valid, the distortion of Reality that is involved in all such mental articulations of it is the inevitable price of human consciousness and thought; and, in so far as we have to distinguish spirit from matter, and love from force, in thinking about human affairs, I still maintain that spirit, and particularly the creative spiritual effect of suffering for the sake of love, is the distinctive and significant feature of human nature.

The power of creative suffering must be evident to anyone of my age; for the generation into which I happen to have been born has not only been Hitler's generation in the West and Stalin's in Russia; it has also been Gandhi's in India; and it can already be forecast with some confidence that Gandhi's effect on human history is going to be greater and more lasting than either Stalin's or Hitler's. But a recognition of the truth that spiritual power speaks the last word in human affairs is not any one particular generation's monopoly. It is the lesson of human experience at all times and places; and anyone, at any time and place, can learn it, not only from his personal experience, but from the stored and transmitted experience of his society's cultural heritage. A Westerner of my age who has been brought up as a Christian or a Jew and has been given a classical education will have had this lesson borne in upon him from many quarters,² in addition to his personal experience in his own lifetime. I myself was first made conscious of the creative power of suffering by the Athenian poet Aeschylus in the chorus in his *Agamemnon* in which he speculates on the nature and purpose of Reality seen in the personal form of a supreme god. I followed up the lesson in the *Prometheus*, and then realized that, all the time, it had been staring me in the face in the figure of 'the Suffering Servant' in Deutero-Isaiah and in the figure of Christ in the New Testament. When I afterwards carried my self-education beyond the eastern bounds of the Syriac and Hellenic worlds, I found that Prometheus and the Suffering Servant and Christ had Indian counterparts in the Buddha and in the bodhisattvas that had been imagined in the Buddha's likeness. If I wanted to describe, in epitome, the nature and the motive of a bodhisattva's act of self-sacrifice, I could do it by quoting Saint Paul's description of Christ's act of self-sacrifice in his Epistle to the Philippians.³

I have still to reconsider the effect of the events in my lifetime on my political outlook. I admit that the experience of my generation has made me hate nationalism and deplore the division of the World into sovereign independent local states.⁴ But here I do not admit that my reaction to

¹ See pp. 8-13.

² See pp. 580-1.

³ Phil. ii. 6-8.

⁴ My hatred of nationalism has been noted by H. Baudet in *Historie en Metahistorie*, p. 51. My opposition to parochialism in all its forms has been approved by Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, Fall, 1955, p. 325. On the other hand, A. N. Holcombe holds that 'Toynbee's hatred of the Nazi version of the sovereign national state leads him to what seems to be an unbalanced condemnation of modern nationalism in all its forms' (*The American Political Science Review*, vol. xlix, No. 4 (December, 1955), pp. 1151-4).

my generation's experience has led me astray. Unrestricted local sovereignty and intemperate local patriotism are, surely, threatening at this moment to bring destruction on our present-day society, and perhaps on mankind itself. These are not only obvious dangers; they are also obvious anachronisms in a world in which the progress of technology has given human operations a planetary range and has at the same time armed the governments of local states with genocidal weapons. But one did not need to wait to be born in A.D. 1889 in order to become aware of the war-head of destructive power that local sovereignty and local patriotism carry with them. This has been manifest since the Sumeric Civilization broke down as the result of a crescendo of fratricidal wars between its local city-states, and the Sumerians brought that catastrophe on themselves not much less than four thousand five hundred years ago. A classically educated Westerner could learn the same lesson from his knowledge of the history of the Hellenic Civilization; a classically educated Chinese could learn it from his knowledge of the history of the Sinic World in the age of the Contending States. When my older contemporary, Sir Ernest Barker, declares, and repeats, that he believes in national states and in national churches,¹ I feel that he is strangely overlooking or ignoring what look to me like unmistakable signs of the times.

On the other hand, when Sir Ernest goes on to say that the proper aim in politics is a harmony between 'national' and 'universal',² I heartily agree with him. Where national states have claimed absolute sovereignty and have demanded unqualified loyalty from their respective subjects, the result hitherto has, I believe, invariably been a crescendo of warfare that has eventually wrecked the civilization in which this anarchy has been tolerated. On the other hand, where local variety and autonomy have been completely suppressed for the benefit of a standardized culture and a centralized government in a unitary empire coextensive with the whole domain of a civilization, I believe that the social and cultural consequences have been unfortunate in these circumstances too. The Roman Empire prospered under the principate, when it was administered as a commonwealth of still autonomous, but no longer sovereign, city-states; it decayed with the decay of local autonomy and with the transformation of the world-government from an instrument for keeping the peace into an agency for the centralized bureaucratic administration of local as well as common affairs. The history of the Chinese Empire tells the same tale. The Ch'in imperial regime, which put an end to the intolerable anarchy of the Contending States, went, in reaction against this, to a hardly more tolerable opposite extreme of centralization and bureaucracy. In consequence it was overthrown by internal insurrections within a few years of its founder's death. By contrast, the founder of the succeeding Han imperial regime, Liu P'ang, made a compromise between centralism and local autonomy on lines that were subsequently followed independently by Augustus at the other end of the Old World. In consequence the Chinese Empire, in the form in which

G. Masur maintains that 'nations have been the torch-bearers—of the Western Civilization, at any rate' (the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521–2).

¹ Sir Ernest Barker in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 96 and 101.

² *Ibid.*, p. 101.

Liu P'ang refounded it, lasted thereafter, on and off, for more than twenty-one centuries.

In the light of the success of Liu P'ang's and Augustus's policy, I agree with Sir Ernest Barker that a harmony between 'national' and 'universal' is the proper objective of statesmanship. But I do not know whether he would agree with me in holding that, if the harmony is to be effective and enduring, the authority of the 'universal', and the loyalty paid to it, must be paramount. This was one of the conditions of the compromise that was worked out by Liu P'ang and by Augustus, and this was, I should say, the secret of the success of the regime inaugurated by each of them. *A fortiori*, in our world-wide society in the present Atomic Age we shall not have assured the survival of the human race until we have established a world-government and have made the present national governments subordinate to it.¹ Of course, even in an age of world-wide communications, local administration, in a hierarchy of different geographical scales, will continue to be necessary. In the world-wide society into which we are now moving, national units will have the same part to play that the states have in a federation, and the counties or departments in a unitary national state. National loyalties in such fields as literature, art, and sport can continue to enrich our common human life without being the menace to the human race's existence that national loyalties are today when we are still indulging in them in the fields of politics and war. But, in an age when political nationalism has come to be a threat to the human race's survival, our paramount loyalty must be transferred from our local nation to mankind as a whole. To commit genocide in the name of local patriotism would be senseless besides being criminal; for, in perpetrating the destruction of the human race, one would be ensuring the destruction of one's own nation among the rest. In an age in which genocide has become a possibility, the only way of making sense of local loyalty is to subordinate it to a world-wide loyalty. This, and nothing short of this, will ensure the survival of each local nation; for this can now be ensured only by ensuring the survival of mankind.²

¹ This would be my answer to T. E. Sumberg's pertinent criticism that I have said nothing about the character of the political order that is to succeed national states if these are to be deprived of their sovereignty (*Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267-84).

² Perhaps this paragraph meets a point that has been put to me by Sir Geoffrey Vickers in a letter of 1st February, 1943.

³ The intense cultivation of the nation-state is an instinctive attempt to supply a double need.

⁴ For the first time, large communities have the power, and know they have the power, to create their own conditions. For this a machine is needed of size and scope altogether new—a machine capable of redistributing income, determining the use of land and property, enforcing standards of health, conditioning the adult, and educating the young. For a very large community, the state alone can provide such machinery; but, in doing so, it is assuming a wholly new function.

⁵ Further, for such an enterprise a sentiment is needed, embracing the whole group, sufficiently strong and enduring to make the individual put *Gemeines* before *Eigenes* and tomorrow before today—at least to the extent needed in order to agree upon and to carry out these long-term efforts at collective self-creation. The sentiments must centre on the community which is the subject and the object of this collective effort. . . .

⁶ The existing state machines are facts; they are incomparably the most powerful existing social machines. The sentiments of existing nations are facts. They are much the strongest existing collective sentiments, and are rooted in the realities of historical,

This is my belief. I believe it on the evidence as I see it; and I find this evidence both in the events of my own lifetime and in the previous course of history as far as I know it. But I do not just believe this as an intellectual proposition; I also most eagerly hope that, in our time, mankind is going to take the revolutionary new departure that our unprecedented new situation demands of us. I hope this because I believe that, if mankind cannot now bring itself at last to live as one family, the penalty, in our new situation, must be genocide sooner or later. And I wish, with all my heart, that the human race may survive, because I believe that Man has been given the capacity to see God, and I believe that this is the *summum bonum* towards which all creation groans and travails. Pieter Geyl says of me¹ that 'his dream is the unity of mankind in the love of God. Or rather, his dream is to participate in that loving vision and see its approach and realisation.' I am grateful to Geyl for the insight with which he has perceived what I feel, and for the sympathy with which he has described it. Obviously I am not the best judge of whether or not he is right in holding that the dream with which he credits me has overwhelmed my interest in particular phenomena and has made my thinking 'unhistorical'.² If this has been the price of my 'vision' it has been a high one; yet, whatever the price, 'I will not cease from mental strife'.

4. EFFECTS OF BEING WHAT ONE IS

(i) *Irreverence towards Pretensions to Uniqueness*

'What one is' might be expected, on first thoughts, to be the most easily identifiable of all things when the analyst is oneself. But it is notoriously difficult to disentangle 'nature' from 'nurture'; and I cannot feel sure, in my own case, that my irreverence towards pretensions to uniqueness is wholly the product of one of Nature's dice-throws in her game of genes. I may have inherited a tendency towards this attitude from unknown and perhaps remote ancestors, and I may have been led to develop it by influences that have been part of my informal education. I am a Londoner born and bred, and have lived and worked in London except for two years (1913-15) during which I was a don at Oxford. Since early childhood I have been constantly riding in London omnibuses and listening with delight to the conductors' running commentary on the human condition and the nature of the Universe. Perhaps I have caught some of my irreverence from the London bus-conductors,

social, and physical continuity. Are not these the only bases, rudimentary though they are, for a new advance?

I agree that they can be invaluable bases for a new advance towards an increase in welfare—particularly for the poverty-stricken three-quarters of mankind. But, if they are to serve this constructive purpose, they must not be the *only* bases. In an age of guided intercontinental missiles with atomic war-heads, national states will produce, not welfare, but genocide, if they are allowed to remain the only units of social organization and only focuses of loyalty. In order to turn them into welfare agencies we have to deprive them of their traditional sovereignty and subordinate them, both legally and emotionally, to a higher authority. This world-authority would be the servant of the whole human race, and its first duty would be to help the race to provide for its own self-preservation.

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 361.

² Geyl, *ibid.*

perhaps some of it from the London sparrows. Anyway, whether it is inborn in me or has seeped into me from my life-long cockney environment, I am conscious of the effects that it has had on my outlook.

I am convinced that irreverence, where irreverence is due, is one of the cardinal virtues. Even with my qualification 'where due', this conviction is, of course, a highly controversial one; and, without it, I myself should feel that, so far from being a virtue, irreverence would be a vice, and a very odious one. To be a virtue, irreverence must be discriminating: for there are other virtues, met with outside ourselves in our experience—above all, self-sacrifice for the sake of love—which are touchstones of our characters. They cry out to us to revere them; and, if we are irresponsible, we stand condemned. I am thinking, for example, of the passage in Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians in which he celebrates the great deed of loving self-sacrifice that is the Buddha's deed and the bodhisattvas' as well as Christ's.¹ I should feel that I had committed a grievous sin if ever I found myself reacting irreverently towards such deeds as this, or towards any lesser manifestations of spiritual greatness. The spiritual presence in the Universe that is greater than Man manifests itself to Man in more forms than one: in the 'myths' in which our human imagination penetrates perhaps farthest into the mystery of the Universe, as well as in the 'facts' presented in the records of the past or experienced at first hand in the present. In the face of this spiritual presence in any of its manifestations, irreverence would be impious and despicable. But, if one reveres this elusive yet ubiquitous essence of spiritual Reality, one is bound to reject all pretensions to uniqueness, whether these are put forward in Man's name or in God's. In the face of such pretensions, irreverence has, I am convinced, a salutary part to play. It can save us from the error of falling down and worshipping idols.

This sharp distinction that I make between idols and Reality, and between the irreverence and the reverence that are due respectively to each, has been overlooked, I think, by Stecchini in a critique of a previous volume of the present book.

'An examination [Stecchini says] of Toynbee's early writings, produced when he was merely a specialist in Greek history, reveals his surprising dislike of the characteristic values of Greek civilization. In this narrower context, there is laid bare the self-destructive bent of his thought: he feels ever compelled to subvert that which he avowedly stands for. The key to Toynbee's animus against the Jews is in that contradiction.'²

What I do feel ever compelled to subvert is not 'that which I avowedly stand for'; it is anything which seems to me to be an idol. And this horror of idolatry has been implanted in me by the heritage from Judaism in Christianity—a heritage that is made much of in the Protestant form of Christianity in which I was brought up. This Judaic iconoclasm of mine makes me reject, with particular vehemence, the claims to uniqueness that are made by the Judaic religions. Fitzsimons notes³ that I 'rebelled

¹ See p. 617.

² L. C. Stecchini in *Midstream*, Autumn, 1956, pp. 84-91.

³ In *The Review of Politics*, vol. 19, No. 4 (October, 1957), pp. 544-53.

against the exclusivism and complacency of the Victorian world. . . . He suffers', Fitzsimons says of me, 'from an unwillingness to believe that there can be an exclusive truth.'¹ My intransigence over this issue has been accurately noted in a critique of my work by Berkovitz. 'One of its basic principles', he writes,² 'indicates that there is nothing unique about either Judaism or Jewry, as there is nothing unique about anything else in human history.'

There is, of course, an epistemological sense, examined in Chapter I, in which every phenomenon is unique. When the intellect has acquired knowledge of a phenomenon by analysing and classifying all the features, shared by it with other phenomena, that the intellect is able to discern, there always remains an unexhausted, and perhaps inexhaustible, residue that is provisionally unique by definition, because it is still unclassified. But this unknown unique residue is not in the phenomenon itself. A phenomenon is, by definition, something that is perceptible to a human mind. The unique residue in each phenomenon is indistinguishable from the Reality beyond all phenomena; and the uniqueness of Reality precludes any phenomenon from being unique essentially and intrinsically. At the most, a phenomenon can be unique only momentarily and, so to speak, 'operationally': that is to say, if it is serving as a temporary vehicle or instrument for an act of creation.³ To this extent only, I agree that, 'if history reveals a purpose, there are people who are the instruments of this purpose'.⁴ In respect of this case in which the momentary vehicles of creation are human souls, the distinction between provisional uniqueness and intrinsic uniqueness has been finely drawn by Rabbi Agus:

"The quality of "uniqueness" is altogether legitimate in the vertical dimension of ideas and culture, for then the achievements of one group are held out as the potential possessions of all groups. But "uniqueness" as an innate quality of being is exclusive in character, invidious in intent, invariably offensive."⁵

It is the pretensions to uniqueness in the second of these two senses that move me to irreverence.

For a Westerner brought up in the Christian tradition, the Jews' claim to be 'the Chosen People' is the classical case of a pretension to

¹ This outlook of mine is called by Fitzsimons 'Toynbee's charitable universalism'. This is a charitable description of it; and it is indeed true that my outlook is derived from the bright as well as from the dark facet of the Jewish vision of God's character that Christianity has inherited. A God who is the loving father of all His creatures cannot have left the majority of them outside His fold; He cannot have concentrated His love and care on some 'chosen' minority. If the same God is also jealous of His status as the One True God of the whole Universe, He will have laid upon every one of His creatures the commandment 'thou shalt have no other Gods before me'. Jealousy and love are an incongruous pair of attributes, considering that a love which is genuine and pure is incompatible with any self-regarding feelings. But, if it were conceivable that God could be both jealous and loving, these two veins of feeling would work together on one issue. They would conspire to make the Judaic God intolerant of any claim to uniqueness except His own.

² E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 17, note 52.

³ The language in this sentence may (I am aware) be read as implying that creation is the act of a person, and even one of a human-like kind. I do not mean to imply this, but I cannot find any less anthropomorphic words in the anthropocentric vocabulary of human language.

⁵ Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, Fall, 1955, p. 328.

⁴ Stecchini, *ibid.*

uniqueness of the objectionable kind; but this is, of course, only one example of a common human aberration; and the aberration is a common one because its source is Man's besetting sin of self-centredness. I acknowledge, without misgiving or apology, that I tilt against pretensions to uniqueness wherever I encounter them. I react against them the most vigorously when they are put forward on behalf of some group or institution with which I happen to be associated, and for which I am therefore partially responsible to some infinitesimal extent. In the case in point, for instance, I feel more concern about pretensions to uniqueness on behalf of Jewry, Judaism, and Christianity than I feel about the corresponding pretensions on behalf of Islam. I do not find Islamic pretensions any less preposterous than I find Christian or Jewish pretensions. But, as my ancestral religious tradition happens to be the Christian one, and the Christian tradition has Jewish but not Islamic antecedents, I feel more responsible when such claims are made by Christians and Jews than when they are made by Muslims. Similarly, as my ancestral Christian tradition happens to be the Protestant one, and as I have not become a Catholic, I feel more responsible for Protestant pretensions than for Catholic pretensions. But I do combat pretensions to uniqueness abroad as well as at home. I combat them wherever I find them. In combating them I try, however, to distinguish between the pretension that I reject and other features in the institution or group or individual on whose behalf the pretension is made. An unacceptable pretension may be found in company with characteristics and achievements that call for love and admiration; and it is possible to love and admire something or somebody unreservedly without imagining that it or he or she is admirable or lovable uniquely.

I will now illustrate my attitude by giving a short catalogue of pretensions that I reject.

I reject the pretension to be 'a Chosen People' in whatever people's name it is made. The Jews, 'the British Israelites', the British 'sahibs' and Hindu Brahmans in India, the Japanese, my fellow Balliol men at Oxford, my fellow Teutons the German Nazis, all seem to me to have been chosen by no one except themselves. And, if that is the truth, it disposes of their claim, since every human institution, group, and individual is unique in its own estimation. When Joshua's and Sampson's Israelites ask me to acknowledge their uniqueness, I retort by looking at them through Canaanite and Philistine eyes. These are, after all, the eyes through which we should be seeing the Israelites today if the Books of the Law and the Prophets had come down to us in the version current in Sidon or Gath instead of our possessing them, as we do, only in the version current in Israel and Judah. As I see it, the mental dichotomy of mankind into Jews and gentiles, sheep and goats, is an illusion generated by the universal human malady of self-centredness.¹ Kipling's

¹ Jewish and Christian apologists sometimes try to mitigate the invidiousness of the pretension that the Jews are a chosen people by pointing out that, while the validity of the claim may be questionable, the consequence of its having been made is beyond dispute. The spiritual privilege, if it has indeed been conferred, has entailed a practical martyrdom. 'To be the chosen people of God' has been 'a temporal misfortune' for the Jews of the Mosaic dispensation (R. C. Zaehner: *At Sundry Times*, p. 177). 'If it was an

Recessional is eloquent and moving, but 'lesser breeds without the law' is a line in it that makes me smile, for here the sensitive poet is protruding the British Israelite's cloven hoof.

I reject the pretension of Christianity to be a unique revelation of the truth about Reality and a unique means of grace and salvation.¹ I reject the Christian Church's argument that it is unique in virtue of the uniqueness of Christ and of His incarnation. What Jesus thought and said about Himself cannot, I believe, be recovered from the words written of Him and put into His mouth in the New Testament. But, whatever Jesus may or may not have believed about Himself, we have to consider whether it seems to us credible that a God who, in Christianity's Judaic vision of Him, is another name for love, and who is believed to have demonstrated His love for Man by becoming incarnate in a human being, will have done this self-sacrificing deed of 'emptying Himself' at one time and place and one only.

Which is the more consonant with the Christian belief that God is love? The other Christian belief in the uniqueness of Christ's incarnation? Or the Hindu belief that Vishnu has subjected himself to more avatars than one,² and the Buddhist belief that more sentient beings

honour and a privilege to have been so chosen, it was full of danger, and exposed the bearer of it to the ill-will and jealousy of his fellow men. In this way the difficulty was got over of combining a religion meant for all mankind, and to which they were invited, with a religion confined in actual fact to one single nation' (R. Travers Herford: *Judaism in the New Testament Period*, p. 97). 'The Covenant grants no privileges but is the source of greater demands and heightened responsibility' (E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, p. 67). 'A divine destiny reluctantly assumed, everlastingly repudiated, everlastingly reclaimed' (M. Samuel: *The Professor and the Fossil*, p. 106). 'The concept of Israel's choice is one of humility not of arrogance. The selection is a burden, not a grace' (A. Eban in *Toynbee and History*, p. 327).

I find this apologia unconvincing. I agree that the role of 'Chosen People' has been 'everlastingly reclaimed' by the Jews, but I do not know of any evidence that it was 'reluctantly assumed' in the first instance. The Jews are not the only people who have been willing to offer up costly sacrifices on the altar of their collective self-centredness. But self-centredness remains the sin that it is, however high a price one may be willing to pay for the psychological satisfaction that one obtains from committing it. I agree with Rabbi J. B. Agus (in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 34) in deprecating the sense of self-importance and the pride that are apt to be engendered by a belief that one has been 'chosen' by God—whether God's choice is believed to have been signified by one's birth or by confession and observance or by conversion.

While the suffering that the Jews have brought on themselves through this self-centredness is not meritorious in them, any more than it is in anyone else, it certainly is a merit, and a great one, in the Jews that they learnt the spiritual lesson that can be found in suffering, but, more often than not, is missed. 'Judaism . . . taught the possibility of transmuting pain into spiritual greatness' (Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, Fall, 1955, p. 330). It is also a great merit of the Jews that, from the time of the Prophets onwards, there have always been Israelite, and subsequently Jewish, critics of 'the Chosen People's' claim to uniqueness. See, for example, Agus *ibid.*, pp. 325-8. 'It is not the Jews that are unique, but the Torah as the Word of God and the Jews as the bearers of the Torah' (*ibid.*, p. 326).

As for Antisemitism, this is a left-handed admission of the validity of the Jews' claim to uniqueness. 'Antisemitism, singling out the Jew as the demonic force in history, is manifestly the doctrine of "chosenness" with inverse valence. . . . There was a causal historical connexion between the Jew and the peculiar brand of hatred that was directed toward him' (Rabbi J. B. Agus in *Judaism*, 1956, p. 40).

¹ Edward Gargan—no doubt among many others—criticizes me for this in *Books on Trial*, March, 1955.

² The contrast between the uniqueness of Christ's incarnation according to Christian belief and the repeatedness of Vishnu's incarnations according to Hindu belief has been cited by Christopher Dawson (*The Dynamics of World History*, p. 236) as presumptive evidence in favour of the Christian belief's being the truth. Here, of course, Dawson is reproducing one of the traditional arguments of Christian apologists. But it is surely an

than one have taken the bodhisattva's tremendous vow to forgo his own self-liberation until he shall have shepherded all his fellow beings into the fold that he himself will have forborne till then to enter? Which, again, is the more consonant with the Christian conception of God's character? The Christian belief that there is only one revelation of the truth and one road to salvation? Or the belief, common to Hinduism and to the Pre-Christian religions of the Hellenic World, that the heart of the mystery of the Universe must be approachable by more roads than one? This Christian-hearted belief was expressed, in a letter to Saint Ambrose, by Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, the last non-Christian spokesman for religious liberty against an intolerant Christian Roman Government. If I am told that I cannot claim to be a Christian unless I take Ambrose's side against Symmachus's, I can only reply that, if so, I am not a Christian but a Symmachian,¹ or, in present-day terms, a Hindu.²

I also reject the pretension of Communism to be a unique discovery of the truth about Reality—at least in the province of human affairs—and a unique means of putting right what is wrong with human society, particularly in its 'capitalist' form. I am not blind to the importance of the social side of human life or to the shortcomings of all known social systems up to date. I do not know of any human society in which drastic social reform has not been overdue at every stage of its history. For this reason I do not believe that society under a Communist regime is, or is ever likely to be, the last word in social organization. I do not believe in the Jewish-Christian myth of the Millennium in its Communist version—the eventual 'withering' of the state—any more than I believe in it in its original Jewish-Christian context. We can, and I hope shall, humanize and civilize traditional methods of government and administration almost out of recognition; but I cannot foresee the complete elimination of the use of coercion in public affairs, because I cannot foresee a transformation of human nature that is going to deprive human beings of their freedom to do wrong and of their wish to do it on occasion. Individual human beings are the realities of human life, as I see it; and their problems are the fundamental human problems. Communism, it

argument in a circle. Uniqueness is deemed by Christians to be intrinsically superior to recurrence *because* they believe in the uniqueness of Christ's incarnation. On the other hand, recurrence is deemed to be superior to uniqueness by Hellenic philosophers, because they believe that what is general is superior to what is particular. Christian apologists have ignored this Hellenic argument; they have not refuted it.

¹ The Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. says: 'I am not sure that Toynbee is really as much on Symmachus's side as he thinks he is. . . . I really think he is closer to Ambrose than to Symmachus' (*The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*). I confess to being a bit shaken by this judgement, since I have a great respect for Dr. Hardy's acumen.

² Albert Hourani is stating my beliefs correctly when he says that Toynbee 'wishes for a truth that excludes nothing'; that it seems to me wicked in the adherents of any religion if they make an exclusive claim for their own particular faith; and that on this point the principal target of my censure is the Christian Church. He is, of course, also correct in declaring that, if one rejects the Incarnation, one is rejecting Christianity (see *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), pp. 393-5). In Christopher Dawson's eyes the philosophical equivalence of all the higher religions is a still more questionable notion of mine than the philosophical equivalence of all the civilizations (*Toynbee and History*, p. 134). In *The Observer*, 17th October, 1954, Dawson makes the impressive point that it is difficult to treat the higher religions as equivalent units, 'since religious values cannot be measured by empirical sociological criteria'.

seems to me, does not attempt to grapple with the problems of an individual human person, or to offer him or her the personal help that each of us needs for battling with the inescapable sufferings and trials that overtake us in the course of our individual lives. In this important negative point, Communism resembles Fascism, National Socialism, and the other Post-Christian Western ideologies in the present-day World,¹ and differs from the traditional higher religions of both the Judaic and the Indian group. This is, I should say, a radical defect in Communism. It would put Communism out of court for me even if I believed—as I do not—that Communism's prescription for social reform was absolutely—not just relatively—right; that it was practically attainable; and that, in the process of attaining it, the end justified the use of violent and oppressive means. Communism claims to be a prescription for something more than just a necessary and beneficial social reform; it claims to provide a comprehensive way of life. I should still reject this larger pretension, even if I accepted the smaller one.

A gentle Westerner bears more responsibility for Communism than he bears for Christianity. The Christian religion and church had taken their classical shape several centuries before the first shoots of the Western Civilization made themselves visible above ground. Communism, on the other hand, was incubated in the bosom of the modern Western World. Its founders, Marx and Engels, were born and brought up in the Rhineland, and they spent the best part of their working lives in England—Marx in London, reading and writing in the British Museum, and Engels in Manchester, managing a factory. As a Westerner and an Englishman, I should feel more responsible for Communism today than I do feel, if, within my lifetime, the Russians² and the Chinese had not run away with it—as the sailor ran away with 'the bottle imp' in Robert Louis Stevenson's thrilling story with that title.

I reject the pretension of the Western Civilization to be a unique representative of the species: the only civilization truly worthy of the name. When I ask my fellow Westerners what the West stands for, and am told, as I usually am, that it stands for justice, freedom, and humanity, I ask if there is any civilization on record—not excluding those once represented by the Assyrians and the Aztecs—that has not also claimed to stand for the self-same virtues. Surely these are virtues to which all

¹ Edward Gargan criticizes me, in *Books on Trial*, March, 1955, for my 'unwillingness to recognise the phenomenon of modern totalitarianism as a unique development, without historical precedent'.

² The Russians have run away with Communism, but there is no evidence that they have fallen into the error of imagining that they have become 'the Chosen People' in virtue of having embraced an ideology that they—or their rulers in their name—now accept as being the one true faith. This is not the first time that there has been a national conversion in Russian history. Russia became a Christian country more than nine hundred years before she became a Communist one; and in the past the Russians, or some of them, have regarded their country as being 'Holy Russia', and regarded Moscow as being 'the Third Rome', because they believed themselves to be the only surviving Christian people that was still truly Orthodox. But this conviction did not lead the Russians into looking down upon other peoples and treating these with contempt; and there is no reason to suppose that the replacement of Eastern Orthodox Christianity by Communism as the national faith of Russia has infected the Russian people with a sense of superiority from which they were previously free. This point has been put to me in a letter of 6th March, 1951, from J. Stolnikoff which has been cited already on p. 540, footnote 2.

human beings feel themselves constrained to pay homage, but to which no human beings have ever succeeded in living up. If I am asked whether I do not consider that the West has lived up to them, a catalogue of Western atrocities flashes through my mind faster than the revolutions of an unreeling film: the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, the Spanish conquest of Peru, the Catholic-Protestant Wars of Religion, the English slave-trade, plantation slavery in the Old South of the United States, present-day racial discrimination there and in Kenya, in Central Africa, and in South Africa, two world wars in one lifetime, the cold-blooded genocide of Jews by Nazis, the French war of repression against the national resistance movement in Algeria.

Two Jewish scholars, Talmon and Berkovitz, have analysed my attitude correctly. Talmon finds that my irritation at the Jews, like my opposition to a Europocentric presentation of history, comes from a sense of guilt towards the Western colonial powers' subject peoples. In my eyes the West is a perpetual aggressor. I trace the West's arrogance back to the Jewish notion of a 'Chosen People'. And there is, Talmon agrees, 'a distinctive Jewish ingredient at the very core of Western civilization'.¹ Berkovitz pronounces that, in my eyes, Nazi Germany's guilt is the West's. 'His loathing of the [Nazi] "caricature" of the West', Berkovitz says of me, 'is really a form of "self-contempt"'; and my hostility towards Zionism—which I associate with Nazism—is an externalization of this agonizing feeling. 'The unbridled vehemence of Toynbee's condemnation of Zionism is out of all proportion to the guilt on the Zionist side. Accusing Zionism of "Nazism" reveals the measure of Toynbee's condemnation of "Nazism" in his own West.'² This analysis is acute, and I think there is some truth in it. On reconsideration, I do not find that I have changed my view of Zionism. I think that, in the Zionist movement, Western Jews have assimilated gentile Western Civilization in the most unfortunate possible form. They have assimilated the West's nationalism³ and colonialism. The seizure of the houses, lands, and property of the 900,000 Palestinian Arabs who are now refugees is on a moral level with the worst crimes and injustices committed, during the last four or five centuries, by gentile West European conquerors and colonists overseas. This is still my judgement on the Zionist movement's record in Palestine since it first began to resort to violence there.⁴ At the same time, on second thoughts, I do think it may be true that the vehemence of my condemnation of Zionism has been out of proportion to the magnitude of Zionism's guilt; and I also think that, if I have exaggerated, the psychological explanation of this exaggeration that has been suggested by Berkovitz may be the right one. In

¹ J. L. Talmon in *Commentary*, July, 1957, pp. 5-7.

² E. Berkovitz: *Judaism: Fossil or Ferment?*, pp. 108-12.

³ Geyl points out (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 361) that this aspect of Zionism accounts for my opposition to it.

⁴ I also want to say, in the same breath, that I admire the objectivity, concern for righteousness, and civic courage of other Jews who have protested publicly against the injustices, wrongs, and cruelties committed by Israelis against Arabs. As a classic example, I will cite Rabbi Agus's judgement, given in *Judaism*, Fall, 1955, pp. 322-4. Since the days of the Prophets it has been one of the glories of the Israelites, and the Jews after them, that they have been the foremost denouncers of their own sins.

the German Nazis, as in the English 'Black-and-Tans', I see the detestable dark side of the countenance of the Western Civilization in which I myself am an involuntary participant, and in the Jewish Zionists I see disciples of the Nazis. The Jews are, of course, not the only persecuted people that has reacted to persecution by doing as it has been done by; and, of course too, the Jews who have reacted in this tragically perverse way are only one section of Jewry. Yet the spectacle of any Jews, however few, following in the Nazis' footsteps is enough to drive a sensitive gentile or Jewish spectator almost to despair. Of all peoples in the World, the Jews have had the longest and the harshest experience of what it means to be victims of injustice and cruelty. That any Jews should inflict on a third party some of the very wrongs that Jews have suffered at Western hands is a portent that makes one wonder whether there may not be something irredeemably evil, not in Jewish human nature in particular, nor again just in Western human nature, but in the human nature common to all men.

At this, Zionists may exclaim in protest: 'Are our misdeeds really as bad as those of our gentile Western neighbours?' And gentile Westerners may exclaim: 'Are our misdeeds really as bad as those of the Aztecs and the Assyrians?' My answer to such protests would be that, in my eyes, a synoptic view of the histories of the civilizations gives the impression that all of them were philosophically equivalent.¹ I do not think that the Western Civilization's record has been below the average,² but I find no evidence that it has been above it, and certainly no evidence that it is unique in its virtues any more than in its vices. I also note, with fear and trembling, that the West's record is still incomplete, and, in the Atomic Age into which I have now lived, my apprehension increases as I watch the Recording Angel's 'moving finger' indefatigably going on writing. Talmon is mistaken in thinking³ that I have 'missed a truth of awful import, a mystery of tragic grandeur—the ambivalence with which the whole of the Western achievement is charged from the start'.

If one rejects the Western Civilization's general pretension to uniqueness, one will also be critical of any particular pretensions to uniqueness that one finds this civilization making in particular provinces of its domain or in particular fields of its activity.

As I myself happen to have been born and brought up an Englishman,

¹ This impression of mine is noted and contested by Dawson in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 130-1. In *The Observer*, 17th October, 1954, Dawson concedes that 'it is possible to treat the civilizations as equivalent units on the ground of their limitations in time and space'. D. Thomson finds that my argument in favour of the 'philosophical contemporaneity' of civilizations is 'specious' (*The Spectator*, 17th January, 1947). Sweezy brands it as 'a disastrous doctrine' (*The Nation*, 19th October, 1946, p. 442).

² I do not accept Geyl's assertions that I have no regard for the Western Civilization (*Toynbee and History*, p. 363) and that I ignore its merits in the modern chapter of its history (*ibid.*, p. 368). I do not agree with his contention that the Nazi movement ought not to be debited to the West's account (*ibid.*, p. 370). If the Nazis were not Westerners, what were they? They were not Jews or Russians or Arabs. They were Germans, and the whole of Germany had been part and parcel of Western Christendom for the last 1,100 years before the date of Hitler's *Sending*. If German Western Christians or ex-Christians could do, and did do, what the Nazis did, no other Western Christians or ex-Christians can now be sure that, in similar circumstances, they might not find themselves doing the same. The Nazi movement is a modern Western phenomenon that should have pricked the bubble of modern Western self-complacency.

³ See *Commentary*, July, 1957, p. 9.

I am alive to my own countrymen's pretension to be *crème de la crème*. The self-same sense of superiority that all Westerners feel towards other human beings is felt by English Westerners towards other Westerners as well. In an Englishman's presence a Frenchman knows what being in a Frenchman's presence feels like to, let us say, an Algerian.¹ This English sense of superiority is, of course, a delusion and a ridiculous one. I was on the point of writing that I had not succumbed to it, when I was pulled up short by a sudden misgiving. I myself am an Englishman, after all, and, on this point, all Englishmen are probably incorrigible, however strenuously they may practise the wholesome exercise of leaning over backwards.²

¹ 'Some Brahmins are as white as Frenchmen.' These ingenuous words were published, in my lifetime, by a distinguished Englishman who was my older contemporary. In the present-day Anglo-Saxon language the adjective 'white' does not, of course, mean 'white' when the missing substantive is 'human skin'. It means 'exhibiting an abnormal deficiency of pigmentation'. In recent times this slight physical peculiarity has been taken, by some of those who suffer from it, as being a token of racial superiority, because peoples suffering from it have been enjoying a temporary ascendancy in the World. The passage quoted above reveals two assumptions in the mind of its English author. He takes it for granted that the deficiency is less conspicuous in Frenchmen's skins than it is in his English fellow countrymen's (he cannot ever have visited Normandy); and he also takes it for granted that, in a Brahmin's skin, the deficiency is a good mark—even if it comes up only to the French and not to the English standard. He does not realize that, in the Brahmin, this peculiarity is a birthmark of his ancestors' barbaric origin. It stamps him as an authentic unassimilated descendant of the Aryan Nomads who invaded India from Central Asia some time during the later centuries of the second millennium B.C.

² In 'leaning over backwards' it is easy to lean farther than one intends. Sir Llewellyn Woodward has noticed that in vols. i-iii of this book 'there is a certain petulance, at times even a lack of balance, in the treatment of the modern Western Civilization. This petulance can be understood', he concedes, 'at a time when fantastic nonsense is talked about "Nordic Man"; nevertheless, it is out of place', he suggests, 'in a philosophical study' (*The Spectator*, 6th July, 1934). This judgement seems to me to hit the mark exactly, and in the present volume I have had it in mind all the time, and have been trying to bring my attitude towards our Western Civilization into the balance that Woodward rightly recommends. I am as irreverent as ever towards Western pretensions that seem to me to be excessive. But irreverence can be good-tempered, and ought to be. When it is petulant, it defeats its purpose, which is to combat extravagances by ridiculing them. I plead guilty to occasional petulance, and also to not always being able to resist a childish temptation to pull provocative tails. I also acknowledge, without any sense of guilt, that, as a result of taking a classical education seriously, I have become psychologically detached to some extent from the Western Civilization in which I happen to have been born and brought up. But, when all these elements in my attitude towards the West are added together, they do not convict me of being anti-Western, or anything like it.

I might have let this go without saying it if I had not been denounced as a traitor to the West by at least two of my critics. Father G. F. Klenk, S.J., who calls me 'a deserter' (in *Stimmen der Zeit*, 1949/50, p. 145), makes amends, it is true, by bracketing me, in this role, with Thomas Mann. G. F. Hudson (in *The Twentieth Century*, November, 1954, pp. 403-12), quoting a statement of mine that I have spent 'two decades trying to read the map of history from a non-Western angle of vision', correctly presumes that I would not admit that this angle of vision was an anti-Western one. Hudson himself, however, attributes to me the view that the worst that could happen to the West would be no more than it deserved. 'Professor Toynbee . . . is profoundly alienated in spirit from the civilization that he has had the misfortune to inherit. His heart is in an earlier age of that civilization—the medieval—and he disapproves fundamentally of the course its development has taken since the latter half of the seventeenth century. He shares Mr. T. S. Eliot's antipathy for "decent godless people". . . . It is this that explains his obvious relish in "taking it out of" modern Western Man, and his *Schadenfreude* at the spectacle of the latter's recent tribulations.'

I am grateful to Hudson for bracketing me with T. S. Eliot. It is as great a distinction as it is to be bracketed with Thomas Mann. But his indictment is just brilliant nonsense. I have a substantial stake in the West's future: eleven grandchildren. How could it be supposed that I am licking my lips over the possibility that they may be wiped out of existence? There is nothing that I want more than that the West should survive. But,

Fortunately I have been pushed backwards in reaction against the pull of modern Western nationalism in the field of formal education. One of the virtues of the old-fashioned 'classical' education was that it taught one to put one's treasure in something outside the immediate here and now. The objective of a post-classical non-scientific education in the West is to soak the student's mind in the language, literature, history, and manners of his own country, on the assumption that this is a valuable training for citizenship in a democratic national state. At Oxford one day in the year 1910, when the end of my formal classical education was in sight, I picked up the current syllabus of the Oxford School of Modern History to consider whether, after taking my final classical examination at the University in *literis humanioribus*, I should spend the next year at Oxford reading modern history or spend it in Greece walking about the countryside. A brief glance at that syllabus was decisive. The quantity of English history that was prescribed in it as obligatory was enough to knock me over backwards—the more so when I found that what was not specifically English in the prescribed history course was still almost exclusively West European. Accustomed, as I had become by then, to roaming freely in the great open spaces of Hellenic history, with its vistas opening on to the still broader realms of the history of mankind and the history of the Universe, I felt as if I was being invited to put my head into a stuffy little closet that had not had an airing for years. I had been thrilled by English history at the age of four, when my mother had told the story to me in instalments, night by night, while she was putting me to bed. But my mother had made it thrilling by making it do for me what Hellenic history had been doing at a later stage. The prospect of studying English history in accordance with the specifications of the Oxford syllabus was unattractive to me; so I went to Greece, and have been thankful, ever since, that this was the alternative for which I then opted. Sir Ernest Barker is right in reporting¹ that I do not know English history and do not love it.

to survive, it must save itself. And I believe that irreverence such as mine is the most salutary attitude for Westerners to take towards their civilization in its present crisis. For the last two or three centuries the West has been enjoying an ascendancy over the non-Western majority of mankind. In our time this abnormal and unwholesome position of ours has become untenable. Our problem is how to climb down to a normal level of equality without having a great fall. Salvation for us Westerners today lies, I feel sure, in taking to heart the parable of the mote and the beam. A great fall is in store for us if we harden our hearts by nursing a pretension to uniqueness which is, as it always has been, irreconcilable with reality. In the present state of the West the attitude that, in a Westerner, is high treason is not irreverence towards our civilization, but adulation of it.

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 98–99. In this context Sir Ernest mentions that he has looked up the entries 'Egypt' and 'England' in my wife's index to volumes vii–x of the present book, and has ascertained, by applying a tape-measure, that 'England' occupies as much as one-sixth of the amount of space that is occupied by 'Egypt'. This remarkable figure just shows how difficult it is to rectify the distorting effects of one's relativity to one's cultural milieu. I really do not think that it would be possible to try harder or more sincerely than I have tried to get over the bias implanted in me by the accident that I am a Westerner and an English one. Yet here I stand hopelessly convicted by an eminent fellow Englishman and fellow historian of having given a disproportionately large space to my own country in a study that was intended to deal with human history generally and impartially.

To give one-sixth as much space to England as to Egypt is fantastic, and nothing but my being an Englishman can account for my having gone to that length. It is fantastic because the proper proportion would be, not one-sixth, but something nearer to one-sixtieth. Compared to Egypt, what is England, after all? Egypt has played a central part

He might have added that, for the same reason, I have no love for the barbarians. The nineteenth-century Englishman's self-esteem led him to extend his high estimate of himself to his Teutonic barbarian ancestors. J. R. Green and other English historians of his school fancied that they had traced back to primitive Teutonic institutions the origins of modern Western democracy. This hare that the disgruntled French aristocrat de Gobineau had started, and that the English had then chased, was pursued more laboriously by Continental Teutonic *Germanisten*, till in our day it has been run to death by Professor Hauer under Hitler's auspices. The one unquestionable service that the Nazis have rendered to scholarship is the unintended one of making the legend of a Teutonic barbarian golden age untenable by making it ludicrous.

I have always been embarrassed by this Anglo-German conspiracy with a French aristocrat to idealize our common barbarian ancestors. It has seemed to me to be just stuff and nonsense,¹ and the feel of the barbarian blood in my veins has made me shudder. No wonder, for I have the misfortune to have a double dose of it. When the Jewish Prophet Ezekiel wanted to shake the complacency of his fellow exiles, he gave them a reminder that 'your mother was a Hittite and your father was a wandering Aramaean'.² The corresponding confession that I have to make is an even more painful one. My mother was a Mercian and my father was a trespassing Dane. My great-grandfather was a farmer at Swineshead in the Lincolnshire fens, and the name of the village commemorates the historical fact that this part of Britain has been swamped by a Teutonic barbarian invasion not once only, but twice, since the withdrawal of the Roman garrison. Sveyn must have been a Danish invader who carved his hide out of land that previous Anglian invaders had stolen, in their time, from British subjects of the Roman Empire. Samuel declares that I envy the Jews;³ and it is true that, if it were possible to change one's lineage, as it is to change one's name, I might find myself tempted to barter my Anglo-Danish birthright for a Jewish,

in human history for the last 5,000 years at least. For the first 3,500 of those 5,000 years she was the seat of an entire civilization—and this one of the two first civilizations to make their appearance. During the last 1,500 years, it is true, Egypt has been only part of the domain of a civilization that has occupied a wider area. Yet in her Christian period Egypt gave monasticism to the entire Christian World, and in her Islamic period she served as a citadel for the whole of Islam from the beginning of the Crusades until the end of the Mongol *Völkerwanderung*. It would be hardly an exaggeration to say that Islam owes its survival today to the service that Egypt did for it in an age in which it came very near to being wiped out. In recent times again, Egypt has been the first country in the Arab World to modernize itself by adopting the Western form of civilization. This is why Egypt is the leading Arab country now.

What has England to show for herself in comparison with Egypt's record? England has never been the seat of an independent self-contained civilization. She has always taken over the civilization of the adjoining part of the Continent. She has never played a part of first-class importance in the World as a whole except during the quarter of a millennium including, but also ending in, the Second World War. And, even during the period of her greatness, she was still never more than one out of half-a-dozen Western 'great powers', and several dozen Western national states.

Sir Ernest's tape-measurement is indeed illuminating.

¹ Two of my Teutonic critics, H. A. L. Fisher and K. D. Erdmann, think that, in previous volumes of this book, I have underestimated the amount and value of the Teutonic barbarians' contribution to the Western Civilization (Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), p. 242; Fisher in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1934, p. 669).

² Ezek. xvi. 45.

³ M. Samuel: *The Professor and the Fossil*, p. 138.

Arab, Greek, Italian, Dravidian, or Chinese one. I hope I should resist the temptation if it were feasible for me to be exposed to it; for its attractiveness to me would do me no credit. I should be seeking the childish satisfaction of pulling Nordic Man's tail, and the snobbish satisfaction of grafting myself on to the family tree of people who came into the swim of civilization two or three millennia earlier than the Englishman's reputed progenitors, stallion Hengist and mare Horsa.

Here I am confessing a preference for a longer over a shorter cultural pedigree, but not a preference for any particular racial 'points' over any other set (I use the word 'points' in the dog-fancier's sense). I reject all pretensions to spiritual superiority on the score of physical race, whatever may be the human breed on whose behalf these pretensions are being put forward. I do not know of there being any evidence for any correlation between physical and spiritual characteristics. The pretension is, I believe, as unscientific as it certainly is offensive.¹ The worst offenders today seem to be the surviving descendants of the Sanskrit-speaking barbarian invaders of the domain of the Indus Culture and the Teutonic-speaking barbarian invaders of the domain of the Roman Empire. Happily, in both India and the Western World, traditional discriminatory practices are arousing feelings of guilt and shame among an increasing number of people in the racially privileged strata of society, and in India and the United States, at least, the upholders of racial discrimination are now fighting what looks as if it were going to be a losing battle. In Kenya some of them, to their credit, are beginning to reconsider their point of view. But they are holding out defiantly in South Africa and in Central Africa; and in England—whose Teutonic-speaking inhabitants have hitherto prided themselves on being relatively free from racial prejudice at home, though not in India—a small immigration of British subjects of African race has been enough to provoke ugly manifestations of race-feeling. At the moment at which I was writing these words, Notting Hill and Nottingham were in the news, side by side with Little Rock and Johannesburg. Race-feeling seems, indeed, to be a characteristic vice of the Teutonic-speaking peoples, whether their homes happen to be in Europe or overseas, and whether they happen to talk Teuton in the High Dutch, Low Dutch, or English dialect of the language. On this issue, at any rate, Romance-speaking Westerners and Muslims have a less humiliating record.

Race-feeling is an unfortunate expression of a sense of self-importance; and the Western peoples that have been indulging in it have been showing up, in this unflattering caricature, an unfortunate vein in the spirit of the modern West as a whole. The modern West has plumed itself particularly on its achievements in the fields of technology, science, economics, and general command over the material element in non-human nature. Moreover, it has persuaded the rest of mankind to adopt these modern Western standards—alien though they are to the traditional standards set for civilization in most other attempts at it, including

¹ I have, however, been criticized by Lynn Thorndike (in *The Journal of Modern History*, September, 1935, pp. 315-17) for minimizing untenably 'the unmistakable evidence of physical inheritance'.

the pre-modern Western one. The present Atomic Age is at the same time the Age of Westernization. Not only the Russians but the Asians and Africans are now rushing to take the kingdom of Western materialism by storm; and they are regarding their success or failure in reaching this exotic objective as being the measure of their success or failure in life. This spectacle, too, moves me to irreverence; and this has provoked me, as I realize, into writing off these 'boosted' Western achievements at what may prove to have been a lower valuation than is their due. Of course, no valuation could be low enough if mankind is going to seize the opportunity for committing genocide that the modern West's inventions have placed in our hands. But, if we manage to restrain ourselves from committing this suicidal crime and folly, we shall have in our hands, for the first time in history, the material means of making the benefits of civilization accessible to all men. And, if the fruits of modern Western science and technology are eventually used for this beneficent purpose, our successors may yet learn to bless the modern West in retrospect.

I also reject the pretensions which are, I think, made explicitly or implicitly by some present-day Western scholars. Here again, I feel misgivings; for, in venturing to criticize my kind, I am implying that I am entitled to dissociate myself from them. This is obviously hazardous, since I am a present-day Western scholar myself, and the mote that I spy in the eye of some of my colleagues may therefore be a beam in my own eye without my being aware of its presence there. All the same, I am going to stick out my neck, and utter two criticisms at my peril. My first criticism is that scholars of the school that I here have in mind are inclined to put all their faith and all their works too into specialization. My second criticism is that they are inclined to overrate the importance of their own contributions to the advancement of knowledge, and to under-rate the importance of the heritage that they have taken over from their predecessors.

On the question of specialization I do not dispute the argument that, in the present-day world, the accumulated and still fast accumulating store of knowledge is so great by comparison with the capacity of one mind in one lifetime that specialization has become an indispensable intellectual tool. But being indispensable is not the same thing as being all-sufficient; and the target of my criticism is an apparent unwillingness to recognize that specialization alone is not enough to give us the knowledge and understanding that we are seeking. The farther that specialization is carried, the more of the meaning of the phenomena is left unplumbed in the unexplored gaps between the specialists' deep but narrowly constricted borings. This method leaves critical questions not only unanswered but unasked. And they will remain unasked if the microscopic approach is not supplemented by a panoramic one.¹ Without

¹ See pp. 132-5. O. F. Anderle observes, in an unpublished paper, that the specialists are apt to assume that a panoramic view of history means just a collection of specialist views. He points out that this is a fallacy. W. H. Walsh points out (in *Toynbee and History*, p. 127) that it is philosophically naïve to imagine that, if only one accumulates a large enough amount of historical knowledge, this, in itself, will give a clue to the meaning of the historical phenomena. He attributes this *naïveté* to me. I think he would have

a combination of the two, there can be no stereoscopic vision. Turning a blind eye to the panoramic view is not one of my own sins, I should guess. And some of my severest critics would, I am sure, nod assent if I said the same thing in other words and confessed that a refusal to generalize was not one of my virtues. I should be happy if I felt sure that I was also free from the second of the two sins that I have just been attributing to some of the other practitioners of my profession.

In studying the work of some present-day scholars I have seen them succumbing to an illusion that is not, I should say, to their credit. When one or other of them makes a discovery that alters by, say, two per cent. the picture of the phenomena that he has inherited from eminent predecessors, he is apt to get the true proportions confused, or even transposed. He will feel, think, and write as if ninety-eight per cent. of the picture in its new look had been contributed by his own discovery, leaving a beggarly two per cent. to his eminent predecessors' credit. This is an intellectual illusion which is morally revealing, for it is the nemesis of a pair of moral failings—conceitedness and impiety. If the scholar had kept himself free from these failings he might have saved himself from succumbing to the illusion. If one has truly achieved a two-per-cent. improvement in knowledge and understanding, that is an achievement with which one could and should rest content. It is also an achievement which one could never have made at all if the ninety-eight per cent. had not been achieved already, thanks to the labours of predecessors in an endless regress. When one is standing on the shoulders of someone taller than oneself, it is a mistake to proclaim that one has forded the river on one's own feet and that Saint Christopher's contribution to the achievement has been a negligible one.

This comic illusion and the serious moral failings that permit it to arise do not figure in the catalogue of scholars' traditional faults. Traditionally they have been inclined to err in the opposite direction. In the Western World, for a thousand years ending in the seventeenth century, the characteristic mistake made by scholars was to pay too great deference to past authority. It was, no doubt, a bright day in the history of Western scholarship, science, and thought when Western minds began to dare to think for themselves. But the light would begin to fade if independence of mind were to degenerate into the vain conceit of fancying oneself to be Alpha and Omega. The most likely result of this hallucination would be a drop to Gamma Minus. This is, I fear, one of the dangers to which modern Western scholarship is exposing itself. The hallucination that is putting scholarship in jeopardy is the scholar's version of the pretension to uniqueness; and that, I believe, is the arch-sin of the modern Western World. If I am convicted of being one of the offenders,¹ I hope I shall lean over backwards, in revulsion from myself, till my head touches my heels.

When I am provoked by the self-complacency of present-day scholar-

been nearer the mark if he had attributed it to the specialists. My view is actually the opposite. I believe that history does not disclose its meaning if one does not go out in search of a meaning. I also believe that the right way to search for this is to frame hypotheses and to try these hypotheses out. This is anathema to some of the specialists.

¹ Charges against me on this count are cited on p. 638, footnote 2.

ship, I find myself wanting to restart the 'Ancients' seventeenth-century battle against the 'Moderns'.¹ Nevertheless, Sir Ernest Barker is right when he says of me² that 'he dislikes renaissances' and is 'more a critic than a disciple' of the Hellenic Civilization. I dislike renaissances because their record shows, I think, that, on balance, they have done more to stifle than to stimulate creativity in the societies in which they have been conjured up. So, in the case of the Italian renaissance of Hellenism, to which I myself owe so much, my head gets the better of my heart and sets me firmly on the side of the 'Moderns' against the 'Ancients' in their seventeenth-century settlement of accounts. As for my critical attitude towards Hellenism, I am provoked into it, not so much by the Hellenes themselves, as by their uncritical Western disciples.

When Western Hellenists pay the Hellenes the left-handed compliment of bracketing them with themselves as children of light in contrast with benighted 'Orientals', I rebel against this move to make the Hellenes partners in the West's self-conferred uniqueness.³ I then find myself siding with Darius against the Ionians and with Xerxes against the Hellenic Alliance. I call Xenophon and Alexander to witness that, when they came to know the Persians personally, they were deeply impressed by the sterling qualities of character that they found in them. Might it not, then, perhaps have been better for the Hellenes if unity and peace had been imposed on them by the Persians in the fifth century B.C.? This would have spared the Hellenes those four and a half centuries of tribulation that they brought upon themselves between the Emperor Darius's generation and the Emperor Augustus's.

I also rebel against the uncritical docility with which Western Hellenists have swallowed whole the Athenian account of Hellenic history.

¹ In one of O. H. K. Spate's critiques of my work (in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 296-7) I am mildly taken to task for having studied, and quoted at some length, the treatise on *Effects of Differences in Atmosphere, Water, and Location* in the *Corpus Hippocrateum*. How perverse, when I have shown such abysmal ignorance of the work of modern Western geographers! The implication is that the results of the study of geography in the Hellenic World in the fifth century B.C. have been put out of date by the work of Western geographers in the twentieth century of the Christian Era. So why waste one's time on this antiquated stuff, when there is such a wealth of up-to-date stuff to be mastered? This attitude is, it seems to me, revealing. It discloses the mental climate in which some present-day scholars work. As far as I can see, there is no reason to suppose that a Coan geographer of the fifth century B.C. is not just as worth studying and quoting today as, say, a living French one. The only conceivable ground for thinking otherwise would be an irrational conviction that present-day Western scholarship is something unique. Yet Heaven knows how it is going to stand comparison with Hellenic scholarship when the two come up for reappraisal by posterity, say, 5,000 years from now. No doubt, in the study of geography, the lapse of twenty-four centuries has brought with it a considerable net increase in the stock of information on which an inquirer can draw; but there is no evidence that this passage of time has been accompanied by any advance in human intelligence. The capacity of human minds to think about the relation between human beings and their non-human environment was not inferior in the fifth century B.C. to what it is today, and the stock of information accessible by that date was already sufficient for this purpose.

² In *Toynbee and History*, p. 92. My critical attitude towards Hellenism has been noticed by L. C. Stecchini in *Midstream*, Autumn, 1956, pp. 84-91, in a passage cited in the present chapter on p. 621. It has also been noticed by E. E. Y. Hales in *History To-day*, May, 1955, p. 322.

³ This is the answer to Hales' question, in loc. cit.: 'Why does the work of this scholar, nurtured in Hellenism, display so marked an anti-Greek bias?' He suggests that I am critical of Hellenism because I am critical of the Western Civilization to which Hellenism has made so large a contribution. But this would leave my critical attitude towards the Western Civilization still unexplained. I have tried to explain this on pp. 626-9.

We should surely be able to appreciate and admire Athenian literature, architecture, and art as they deserve without allowing the ambivalent Greek word *kalós* to hoax us into agreeing that what is beautiful is therefore also good. In this issue between Hellene and Hellene I am on the anti-Athenian side. I look askance at Attica from the Boeotian side of Mount Cithaeron. And, when I stand on the acropolis of Athens, I can never forget that the money with which those incomparable buildings and sculptures were paid for was not the Athenians' own and was not theirs to spend on Athenian public monuments. It was taken from contributions, intended for expenditure on common defence, which came out of the pockets of Athens' 'allies'; and the Athenians had the power to 'convert' these funds to an illegitimate use because they had reduced these nominal 'allies' to subjection by force of arms. As I mount from the Propylaea towards the Parthenon, the names Thasos, Naxos, Samos, Mytilene, Melos run through my head. And, when Hellenists lament the fall of Athens at the end of the Great Atheno-Peloponnesian War, I recall that Athens' antagonists and Athens' subjects were just as truly Hellenes as the Athenians were, and that, for them, the demolition of the Long Walls spelled liberation for the Hellenic World from the yoke of 'a tyrant city'.

In reacting against Athens in particular and against Hellenism in general, I am also exercising my human right of self-defence. Considering that my formal education has been an Hellenic one deriving from the renaissance of Hellenism in fifteenth-century Italy, I should be a lost soul if I allowed myself to be completely captivated by the double spell of Hellenism and Hellenism's Italian renaissance. I must react against this if I am not to succumb to it. But, in thus fighting for my intellectual independence, I am at the same time showing black ingratitude. I am remorsefully aware that my debt to the Italian renaissance and to Hellenism is immeasurable. The only extenuating circumstance that I can plead is that, after I have thoroughly seen through them both, and have thought and written the worst about them, I find myself still loving and admiring them as much as ever.

Sir Ernest also demurs¹ to my calling institutions² 'slums'. I think they really do deserve the name, considering the contrast that they present, in point of moral standards, to human relations of the intimate kind. Sir Ernest attended many more committee meetings in his life than I ever have; and I am sure that, as a committeeman, he recognized an experience of which I am conscious. As committeemen we accept, and even propose, enormities that we would never commit as human beings. On committees we behave more callously, meanly, and irresponsibly than we behave as individuals; and, in this ugly feature, committees are characteristic of all institutions.³ This seems an inevitable consequence of the nature of institutions and of their purpose. Institutions are contrivances for establishing and maintaining co-operation between human beings beyond the range within which co-operation arises spontaneously

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 96.

² A definition of the term 'institutions' has been offered on pp. 268-71.

³ See p. 270.

from direct personal intercourse. Institutions are indispensable for civilization because the maximum number of human beings with which any one of us can be in a personal relation is small compared with the minimum number that must be induced or constrained to co-operate for technological, economic, political, and religious purposes if co-operation is to be on a large enough scale to produce the surplus of time and energy that is civilization's mainspring.¹ But this indispensable institutional co-operation inevitably has its price. By definition, institutional relations are impersonal relations; and, as soon as human relations become impersonal, they lose the principal safeguards of which personal relations have the benefit within their narrow circle. So long as one is in personal touch with another human being, one may love him; and 'it's love that makes the World go round'. Alternatively, of course, one may hate him; but, even if one does hate someone with whom one is in personal touch, one can never completely repudiate one's responsibility towards him, or completely bring oneself to treat him as if he were not human, so long as one's personal contact with him continues. Domestic slaves, for example, have never been treated so badly as slaves on plantations, down mines, or in factories.² Social life on the institutional level lacks the saving grace that a personal relation carries with it; and in this sense institutions are truly slums, I should say.

Of course slums can be cleaned or even cleared; and this is one of the calls to a holy life that have been made upon human nature by the higher religions. This is the meaning, in social terms, of their gospel of the brotherhood of Man. All men, they proclaim, are brothers in virtue of a spiritual bond which, in their view, links each human soul with an absolute spiritual Reality. The Absolute makes this bond possible by presenting Itself to Man in the likeness of a personality. Different glimpses of the supreme Reality in this aspect of Its nature are caught from different angles. It may be seen as a god who feels and acts like a father towards the beings who owe their existence to Him as their creator. Or it may be seen as a being who loves His fellow beings so much that He sacrifices Himself for their sake. He may sacrifice Himself, as Christ does in Saint Paul's paean in praise of Him, by emptying Himself of power and glory; or He may sacrifice Himself, as a bodhisattva does in a Mahayanian Buddhist's conception, by forbearing to empty Himself of the pains and sorrows of sensuous life. In both conceptions the sacrifice is thought of as going to the uttermost extreme; and, in both, one part of its redemptive purpose is to redeem human beings from their institutional slum-life.

However, Sir Ernest feels that, for describing institutions, 'slums' is too offensive a label. So, in deference to him, I herewith withdraw it, and substitute the innocuous label 'public utilities'. So long as institutions are conducted as 'public utilities' *bona fide*—are conducted, that is to say, impersonally and unemotionally—it would be captious to quarrel with them on principle, though it would also be unrealistic ever to relax the eternal vigilance which alone can prevent even the best regulated institutions from generating unintended inhuman effects. Unfortunately,

¹ This point has been made on p. 270.

² See p. 308, footnote 2.

human nature is not content to be impersonal, even in spheres of life in which impersonalness is in place. Our irrepressible self-centredness is always seeking for new worlds to conquer, and the institutional world offers an irresistibly inviting opportunity for aggrandizement to self-centredness in the formidable collective form in which the first person swells from the singular number into the plural. Time and again, institutions have been captured by collective self-centredness and have been used by it to serve its anti-social and anti-human ends. In the specious name of loyalty to institutions the happiness, welfare, and life of millions of men, women, and children have been sacrificed again and again—and this without the victims' leave being asked, when they have not been induced to throw themselves voluntarily under the wheels of Jugger-naut's car. If Sir Ernest does not take care, he will lure me into asking him to agree with me that, if we are not to call institutions 'slums', we shall have to call them 'molochs'. When the votaries of an institution proclaim that it is something unique and that it must be idolized accordingly, they are serving a warning on us that they have converted a public utility into a public nuisance.

I cannot conclude this chapter without touching on the direst of all the many forms of the pretension to uniqueness that the saving virtue of irreverence has to combat. Self-centredness reveals itself nakedly in the arch-sin of pride;¹ and human pride culminates in the assumption that Man is the highest spiritual reality that exists. Irreverence in the face of hybris is a reaction that is not just my personal idiosyncrasy. The Hellenic and the Jewish attitude to life agree in reacting to hybris with abhorrence. The lesson that hybris leads inexorably and deservedly to catastrophe is proclaimed unceasingly in the New Testament as well as in the Old Testament and in the corpus of Hellenic poetry. If I myself stand convicted of hybris, as some of my critics hold that I do,² I acknowledge that I am a fair target for the retributive thunderbolt.

¹ See pp. 580-1.

² See p. 634. Mumford charges me with the sin of pride for fancying that, in my scheme for the comparative study of civilizations, I have a complete explanation of human affairs in my bag. I do not, he objects, make enough allowance for what is non-repetitive and unique (*Diogenes*, Spring, 1956, p. 25). E. E. Y. Hales' judgement is that 'it is necessary to say that he is misleading in treating his views about the births of civilizations as though they were laws arrived at by empirical analysis, and he is even more misleading in writing about the present and the future in the same sort of terms. This is where he himself yields to that same sin of *hybris* of which he is so conscious in history' (*History Today*, May, 1955, p. 322). T. R. Fyvel observes that, 'throughout the *Study*, Mr. Toynbee inveighs against the sense of *hybris*, of excessive pride, God-like ambition, which he attributes to a whole succession of characters in history. But to attempt a secular interpretation of history which should show the finality of the present crisis, which should tally with Professor Toynbee's Christian outlook, and which should show what is Britain's correct foreign policy today—wasn't there', Fyvel asks, 'a touch of *hybris* about the undertaking?' (*The Tribune*, 21st March, 1947). M. A. Fitzsimons finds that, 'in view of the boldness of his enterprise, the modesty of his description of it is not convincing. After all, Toynbee has tried—with success, so he believes—to read the design of God. Yet he refuses to accept the literal and exclusive truth of the teaching of a particular higher religion' (*The Review of Politics*, vol. 19, No. 4 (October, 1957), pp. 544-53). C. B. Joynt is the most severe. 'Toynbee really pretends to give an estimate of the total significance of the historical process, thus supplying indirect evidence of the dangers of the *hybris* he castigates so strongly. For to give an estimate of the total significance of the historical process is to pretend to the attributes of a transcendent mind. Pride could hardly carry anyone further than that' (*The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 34, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 202).

In considering these charges I find myself drawing distinctions between them. I do

Hybris is a sin that is not peculiar to human beings. It is the besetting sin of everything that has life in it, and a living god is not made immune against it by his divinity. When God empties Himself of His power and glory for His creatures' sake, He moves us, by the magnetic attraction of His love, to respond to Him with an answering love and with the added gratitude and adoration that the divine-human encounter evokes in the infinitely weaker of the two parties to it when the infinitely stronger party lays His strength aside. But God, when seen by Man in Man's own likeness, can present a malefic vision as well as a beatific one. If it pleases Him to take tyrannous advantage of His almighty power, instead of self-sacrificingly divesting Himself of it, He may thunder at Israel from Sinai or browbeat Job from the whirlwind or make Arjuna's hair stand on end at the horror of his gnashing teeth and flaming jaws, or lower gloomily, like Blake's Urizen, over a prostrate human race.

If God presents Himself, or is presented, in this odious epiphany as a superhuman *miles gloriosus*, irreverence is surely Man's proper reaction, and defiance his proper retort. In the last scene in the Book of Job the human hero is presented in as unflattering a posture as the divine villain of the piece. He penitently grovels in dust and ashes under the menace of a divine omnipotence that is aggressively unrepentant and unabashed. It would have become Job better if, instead, he had replied in kind like Ajax. If he had, then, no doubt, he would have forfeited his consolation prizes, and perhaps his life as well; but he would have saved his human dignity. How could he bring himself to accept a second batch of children as an adequate compensation for the first batch that Yahweh had given Satan permission to do to death? Human souls are not standardized interchangeable commodities like coins or crocks. The human reply that wins my respect and allegiance is not Job's; it is Epicurus's.

Humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret
in terris oppressa gravi sub religione
quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat
horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans,
primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contra
est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra;

not think it is presumptuous to try to take a comprehensive view of human affairs. There are, I think (as I have argued in Chapter V), some questions that can be asked only in these comprehensive terms and that nevertheless need asking—not least in the present chapter of human history. What would be hybris here would be to imagine that one's own particular attempt at a comprehensive view was complete and definitive, and that one's own questions and own answers to these were the last word. It would also be hybris to imagine that, if a human mind could give an account of human affairs which really was the last word in terms of human reason, this achievement would be Alpha and Omega. Even if human reason were to go as far as it is capable of going, and this without falling into error at any point, it would still have to reckon with the unfathomable residue of Reality that it would have failed to catch in the meshes of its analytic and classificatory mental net.

In the original plan of my work I was perhaps guilty of the hybris that Mumford imputes to me. I have admitted this at an earlier point in the present volume (see p. 85, footnote 1) and have pleaded in extenuation that I changed my plan when, in trying to carry it out, I discovered its limitations. I then went over from a rationalist approach to a 'trans-rationalist' one. This is, to my mind, the necessary consequence of taking Mumford's criticism to heart and acting on it. But to judge by his accompanying criticism of me on the score of excessive other-worldliness, this return of mine towards religion is not the reorientation that he was intending to recommend.

quem neque fama deum nec fulmina nec minitanti
murmure compressit coelum, sed eo magis acrem
irritat animi virtutem.¹

This is the limit to which human audacity can go. The devout poet, in the fervour of his anti-religious faith, feels sure that the saviour-philosopher has won a decisive victory, not only for himself, but also for all his fellow men. 'Ergo vivida vis animi pervicit.'² Others may not share Lucretius's confidence in the invincibility of the human mind's moral and intellectual prowess. But, when God is presented to me in the unedifying counter-transfiguration in which Arjuna is reported to have beheld Him for an instant, I take my stand at Epicurus's side.

(ii) *Disregard for Scholarly Caution*³

Caution is, in the abstract, a morally neutral attitude; but, in the abstract, it is also a meaningless term. It is an attitude that implies engagement in action of some kind; and, according to what kind it is, caution is either a virtue or a vice. In a surgeon, pilot, driver, or signalman, disregard for caution would, of course, be a crime. A practitioner of any of these professions has other peoples' lives in his hands to save or lose; and, if he were to throw lives away through being incautious, that would be unpardonable. In professions such as these a mistake, once made, may be irreparable; and it may have irreparable consequences, too, for the other people concerned. A scholar, however, is not in this grim position. Mistakes made by him will not put any life in jeopardy, not even his own. And his mistakes are certain to be repaired for him before he has time to repair them himself. They will be repaired by his critics. These will swoop down on his published work like kites, and with kites' eyes for the weak points in it. So the scholar has nothing to lose, either for other people or for himself, except his own personal reputation for scholarliness.

A reputation for scholarliness is expendable, and it is a scholar's duty to risk it. If the scholar adopts the surgeon's, pilot's, driver's, and signalman's cautionary maxim 'safety first', caution, in him, will be a vice. It will be a vice, in him, for two reasons. In a scholar, who has nothing but his reputation to lose, caution will be a self-regarding attitude; and scholarship is, or should be, an impersonal co-operative enterprise. In the second place, this self-regarding attitude will be inimical to the fulfilment of what is scholarship's purpose. Its purpose is the advancement of knowledge and understanding, and this is best served by an attitude that is undiplomatic.

¹ Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book I, ll. 62-70. 'When human life was lying conspicuously and shamefully prostrate, crushed under the weight of Religion, which was displaying its head from the heavens above and was lowering over mortals with a fearful countenance, a Greek human hero was the first to look the monster in the face, and the first to resist her. Nothing could cow him: not the gods' prestige, not thunderbolts nor heaven with its menacing rumble. These threats stimulated his piercing mind to deeds of all the greater prowess.'

² Op. cit., Book I, l. 72. 'Therefore the vital force of his mind won through' (I cannot find English words to reproduce the alliteration of the Latin).

³ 'Over-cautiousness is not one of Toynbee's defects' (The Rev. E. R. Hardy Jr. in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*).

Intellectual progress is achieved by the 'heuristic' method¹ of trial and error and the dialectical method of thesis and antithesis, exposition and criticism.² Its procedure is a continual debate, and this is perpetually producing results of two sorts: provisional answers to some of the questions that have already been subjects of discussion, and approaches to new questions that the course of the discussion has brought to light. An answer is never more than provisional, even when there is a momentary consensus in its favour. At any time it may be upset by fresh advances in understanding or in knowledge, and then the old question will become a new one again.³ As for the new questions, they may eventually be answered provisionally or may be judged to be unanswerable in their original terms, and therefore perhaps to have been wrongly formulated. So long as this intellectual activity continues, fresh advances in understanding and knowledge may be made; but activity is

¹ See pp. 41-45.

² Several critics have recognized that the dialectical method is the method that I follow. Sir Maurice Powicke, for instance, says of my work that 'it will endure, not because it will or should win general agreement, but because it is the best existing discussion—not an explanation to be accepted or rejected' (*The Manchester Guardian*, 29th September, 1939).

At least four critics (John Strachey, Owen Lattimore, Lewis Mumford, and A. R. Burn) have pointed out that I am at one with Marx and Engels in seeing in the dialectical process not only the most fruitful method of gaining increases in knowledge and understanding, but also one of the fundamental rhythms in the movement of human affairs, and perhaps in the movement of the whole phenomenal universe. I acknowledge this intellectual affinity, and can see how it has come about. Though I am Marx's and Engels' junior by several generations and have a high respect for their intellectual powers as far as I am acquainted with their work, I have to confess that I am as ill-read in them as I am in Tarde, Pareto, Durkheim, Geddes, and other outstanding intellectual lights of whom I have been convicted by my critics of being ignorant. I did not get my vision of a dialectical universe from Marx and Engels; I got it from a source to which their philosophy, too, can be traced back. In fact, I got it from the Old Testament. This is, of course, one of the fountain-heads of Western thought, and the theme that runs through, and binds together, this otherwise rather heterogeneous collection of Israelite and Jewish books is a constantly recurring dialectic of encounters between a series of human beings and God.

Strachey has drawn attention, in an unpublished critique of my work, to this Biblical pre-established harmony of mine with Marx and Engels (and, of course, also with other Biblical-minded thinkers). Lattimore, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1948, p. 105, notices that 'to a surprising extent many of Toynbee's intellectual devices for measuring both growth and disintegration, such as the dominant minority, the internal and external proletariat, withdrawal-and-return, the impact of new forces on old institutions, "schism in the soul", or alternative active and passive substitutes for old ways of behaviour, and in general his concept of the relation between society and the individual, are markedly dialectical—quite as dialectical as Marxism, though his trend towards religious mysticism is utterly un-Marxist.'

Mumford observes, in *The New Republic*, 27th November, 1935, p. 64, that 'Toynbee is conscious of some inner rhythm that may abet the process [of change]... In granting the possibility of such a rhythm, Toynbee is on the side of Marx and against most of the empirical historians. Surprisingly, Toynbee does not mention Hegel, Marx, or Engels, or, for that matter, Emerson, in connexion with this rhythmic interpretation, although he openly derives part of his terminology from Marx. But the fact is that Marx... is Toynbee's true spiritual progenitor.'

Burn suggests, in *History*, February-October, 1956, p. 12, that Toynbee 'never appears to have realised, even now, ... that in Marxism his formula of "challenge and response" is anticipated and made the basis of a very fruitful historical theory, that of the "dialectical" interplay of individual wills with social, and especially economic, circumstances'. I do not know what evidence Burn thinks he has for accusing me of this particular piece of ignorance. This time I do not plead guilty.

³ 'The relation of history and the human mind would ... appear to be dialectical in the sense that they constantly act and react upon one another, producing fresh insights into the relations between facts' (C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, December, 1956, p. 198).

dependent on atmosphere. The psychological atmosphere in which intellectual activity flourishes is one, not of cautious reserve, but of eagerness to explore the possibilities of unknown ground and readiness to take whatever risks may be entailed. In fact, the virtue that makes a good scholar is the opposite of the virtue that makes a good diplomatist or a good practitioner of one of the dangerous trades. It is more like the virtue that is required for business enterprise.

This last comparison should put the scholar on his guard against some of the vices that dog his virtue's heels. In the economic field an entrepreneur will be giving himself no chance of winning successes if he shrinks from taking risks; but he will also be courting failure if the risks that he takes are ill-considered. The more adventurous he dares to be, the more important it becomes for him to be careful and precise, and, above all, to exercise good judgement. This is an example that the scholar should take to heart. His duty to disregard caution is not a licence for bad judgement, superficiality, and inaccuracy. It is true that, if he does display these faults, this will double or treble the fire-power of the criticism that he will draw; and to draw criticism is his objective in putting a case, if it is true that the procedure of scholarship is the give-and-take of a debate. But, in provoking by sinning, he will be causing a wasteful expenditure of ammunition on unprofitable targets. And to sin deliberately, in order that criticism may abound, is as wrong-headed as it is to do this in order that grace may. It is also more wanton, since criticism, unlike grace, is sure to abound anyway; its economics are, indeed, those of abundance.

So a scholar must not expect that, if he shows a dutiful and valiant disregard for caution, this will earn him a free pardon for bad judgement and low standards of workmanship. These faults will still be the grave faults that they are. He is unlikely to be free from them altogether. In so far as he falls into them, perhaps he may hope to be half forgiven if he makes atonement by exercising a virtue that, in a scholar, is an even greater one than adventurousness.

In deliberately disregarding caution a scholar is not merely exposing himself to criticism; he is inviting it; and in doing so he is implicitly taking upon himself a moral obligation to respond in a constructive way to this criticism when it comes. If he succeeds in doing this, his initial disregard for caution may justify itself in retrospect. If he breaks down at this point, he will be convicted of having taken a course that he could not stay. So it is a counsel of enlightened self-interest, as well as a point of honour, for him to try to rise to the occasion. His implicit obligation, in the face of his critics, is a difficult and exacting one. However sharp the stings and stabs may be, he must not let them cut him to the heart. He must not wince and shrivel up. He must not turn surly and mulish. He will be his own worst enemy—a far worse one than the most malicious critic imaginable—if he mutters: 'what I have written I have written' and then spends the rest of his working life in trying to defend his past positions just because he happens to have adopted them once upon a time. The constructive response to criticism lies in profiting by it for the impersonal purpose of promoting the advancement of understanding

and knowledge. One must take the criticism to heart as a stimulus for thinking again. One must consider whether the encounter between theses and antitheses may not open the way for making some provisional syntheses and for propounding some new problems.

This enterprise calls, in its turn, for certain psychological attitudes and qualities: in the first place, for good humour, but still more, perhaps, for a sanguine temperament and for an insatiable zest. Other peoples' critiques of one's work make (*experto crede*) a low intellectual diet. When they are numerous and voluminous, the long task of studying them has the depressing effect of taking daily doses of weed-killer. The killing of the weeds is a salutary operation, however disagreeable it may be. But one would be paying for this benefit too dearly if one allowed the poison to kill the vegetables too. One would be allowing one's cabbage-patch to be reduced to a desert. A scholar who has made himself a target for criticism can guard himself against letting it have this devastating effect if he can manage to regard his critics as being his benefactors, even when they do not mean to be, and as being his fellow workers in the common cause of the advancement of understanding and knowledge, even when this is not their immediate aim. Private intellectual enterprise, unlike private economic enterprise, lives by co-operation, not by competition.

I will now put some of my critics in the witness-box. Their evidence may throw light on the questions how far I myself have lived up to the virtues that I have just been demanding in a scholar, and how far I have been guilty of the vices that I have been condemning in him.

Several critics have pronounced that my work is a contribution towards keeping thought moving, whatever else it may be or not be. Some critics describe it as being stimulating,¹ others as being provocative.² Discounting the differences between these critics' approaches, I think they are saying the same thing in different words.³ Spate, for instance, allows⁴ that orthodox-minded scholars will find in my work 'an irritant stimulus to re-thinking their own postulates'. Leddy sees in me⁵ 'the Oxford don seeking to stimulate rather than to instruct'.⁶ Taylor finds⁷ that 'the stimulus is to criticism and contradiction, not to acceptance'. Dyason describes my work as 'a spur and a warning'.⁸ Anderle⁹ weighs some 'pros' and 'cons':

'Much of what Toynbee has set out to do will certainly prove to be impracticable, and the system as a whole will hardly maintain itself in its present form. However, unless all appearances are deceptive, a great deal

¹ e.g. R. K. Merton in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xlvii, No. 2 (September, 1941), p. 213, and P. Geyl in *Toynbee and History*, p. 65. 'Could we but lay aside his system', Geyl here remarks, 'we could find in his analyses and parallels, in his interpretations and even in his terminology, so much to stimulate thought and to activate the imagination!'

² e.g. E. E. Y. Hales in *History Today*, May, 1955, p. 323.

³ Both words are used by A. N. Holcombe in *The American Political Science Review*, December, 1955, p. 1151.

⁴ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 304.

⁵ In *The Phoenix*, vol. 11, No. 4 (1957), p. 140.

⁶ Something has gone wrong here. It is true that I have been an Oxford don, but I was one for little more than two years, and those as long ago as 1913-15.

⁷ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 121.

⁸ E. C. Dyason in *The Australian Outlook*, March, 1949, p. 59.

⁹ In an unpublished paper.

of it will turn out to be fruitful as well as stimulating (*anregend*). . . . No theory is definitive. Every theory is provisional only. A theory will have yielded the best performance of which it is capable if it has kept going the flow of research. Toynbee's *Study* does more than that: it opens up an entirely new view of history.'

Taylor concedes¹ that I have asked some of the right questions, even though I have almost invariably given the wrong answers to them. Postan finds² that I have 'all the questions in the world to ask, but no patch on which even a single satisfactory answer can be raised'. Zahn points out³ that 'comprehension (*Erkenntnis*) sometimes consists in just a correct understanding (*Verstehen*) of questions that are unanswerable'.

Höyer finds⁴ that I have introduced a new scale of values; Schuman⁵ that the completion of the first ten volumes of the present book 'opens a wholly new chapter in Man's endless quest to comprehend the meaning of human experience'; Holborn⁶ that it 'opens entirely new vistas of history'; a reviewer in *The Economist*⁷ that it 'has opened doors which were previously closed'. Mumford finds⁸ that the questions that I ask open up new ground; and, in another critique,⁹ his conclusion is: 'This *Study of History*, then, is not a terminus, but a starting point, from which the roads radiate in many directions.'

Mumford's conclusion is not Bagby's. Bagby pronounces¹⁰ that

'Toynbee has done a great disservice to the comparative study of civilizations and tended to bring discredit on the whole enterprise by undertaking his investigations in so ill-conceived and unscientific a manner. He represents, even in comparison with Spengler, a step backwards towards the pre-scientific moralising philosophy of history; as the apocalyptic visions in the later volumes show, he is primarily a prophet—a prophet disguised as a "modern Western student of history".'

Here we are back in a controversy that has been touched on in this volume in Chapter III. What is to be made of ethics and religion in a study of human affairs? Is it possible to find common intellectual ground between rationalists and people who hold that there are things which cannot be ignored by any student of human affairs yet which also cannot be dealt with adequately if one tries to do it with the human reason's tools solely? As I have discussed these questions already, I need not reopen them here.¹¹

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 121.

² In *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), p. 63.

³ In *Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte*, p. 13.

⁴ Otto Höyer in a typescript paper, of which he kindly sent me a copy, with the title: 'Betrachtungen über Arnold J. Toynbees Deutung des Menschengeschehens'. See also the same writer's 'Buchführung und Bilanz der Weltgeschichte in Neuer Sicht: zu A. Toynbees Deutung des Frühzeitlichen Menschengeschehens', in the *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Jahrgang 2, Heft 3 (1949/50), pp. 247-59.

⁵ F. L. Schuman in *The Nation*, 6th November, 1954.

⁶ H. Holborn in *The Saturday Review of Literature*, 31st May, 1947, p. 29.

⁷ *The Economist*, 6th November, 1954.

⁸ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 141.

⁹ In *Diogenes*, No. 13 (Spring, 1956), p. 28.

¹⁰ In *Culture and History*, p. 181.

¹¹ Soon after I had written these words the sad news of Bagby's death at the age of forty on 20th September, 1958, was announced in *The Times* on the same day (3rd October, 1958) on which a review of his book *Culture and History* was published in *The*

Other critics have anticipated me, as was to be expected, in convicting me of faults that, in the present chapter, I have just been condemning in myself and in any other scholar who may have been guilty of them. Anderle, for instance, who certainly has no bias against me or my work, judges¹ that my critics are right in holding that my work does not come up to certain scholarly standards, and he justly adds that I cannot be exempted from being judged by these standards. I have been guilty, for instance, of inconsistencies, and of outright contradictions.² In a paper on the historical validity of my approach to the universal churches³ the Reverend E. R. Hardy Jr. finds that my knowledge in this field is largely on the handbook level, only in some places on the level of the scholar who consults original sources, and only in the case of Christianity on the level of the practising believer. Den Boer pronounces⁴ that 'Toynbee constructs and . . . does it haphazardly'. And Weil makes the same criticism in more gracious language.⁵ 'At times', as Weil puts it, 'the constructive artist in him triumphs . . . over the carefully weighing historian.' He concludes⁶ that my terms fail to provide a stable framework for the motley events of history. To Gurian's eyes⁷ 'the fundamental concepts appear as very thin', and 'they are means of subjective classification'. Shinn finds that my work 'is least convincing in its systematization'.⁸ 'Never', in Hook's experience, 'has such an imposing architectonic synthesis rested on such spindly theoretical foundations'.⁹ 'Doubts arise' in Burn's mind when he 'comes to consider the plan and execution of the work as a whole'.¹⁰ A reviewer in *The Listener*¹¹ finds the length and the relative irrelevance of some of my annexes aggravating in 'an already dangerously elaborated and burdened work'. Ralph suggests¹² that 'perhaps the enduring value of the *Study* will be found not in his schema . . . but in his defence of liberal human values and his incisive observations in passing'. In Tawney's judgement¹³ 'the frame is less important than the picture, and the plan of the book than the discussion

Times Literary Supplement. This has been a great and unexpected loss for the systematic study of human affairs. Bagby had a very clear mind as well as a very able one, and, in the years that would have lain before him in the normal expectation of life, he might have achieved the further results of which his published prolegomena gave promise. I have a much higher opinion of his work than he had of mine. If I had died at Bagby's age, I should have left behind me nothing of the present book beyond my manuscript notes for the first ten volumes. ¹ In op. cit.

² In the same unpublished paper, Anderle gives a list of contradictions pointed out by other critics, especially Hampel and Gurian. These cannot be condoned, and they would be even more reprehensible than they are if, in the writing of this book, I had had the benefit of the 'well-organized filing cabinets and industrious research staffs' with which W. Gurian credits me twice in five pages (see *The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 509 and 514). W. F. Albright, too, assumes that I have been provided with 'a staff of research assistants and secretaries' (*From The Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 96). These ministering legions of mine are creatures of Gurian's and Albright's imagination.

³ In *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

⁴ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 223.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁶ See *The Review of Politics*, vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1942), p. 511.

⁷ R. L. Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History*, p. 241.

⁸ A. S. Hook in *The Partisan Review*, June, 1948, p. 691.

⁹ A. R. Burn in *History*, February–October, 1956, p. 1.

¹⁰ *The Listener*, 19th October, 1939.

¹¹ P. L. Ralph in *The Saturday Review*, 16th October, 1954, p. 20.

¹² R. H. Tawney in *International Affairs*, November, 1939, p. 801.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

which fills it'. Kohn, too, finds¹ that my treatment of details is a more important feature of my work than the general framework in which I try to place them. On the other hand, O. Lattimore² and K. W. Thompson³ say, in identical words, that the 'architectural design' is much better than the 'building material'. When these criticisms are put together, both the content and the form of my work come out badly.

Other strictures are still more searching. Spate⁴ castigates my thought for a recklessness that is exhibited in my use of analogy.⁵ As Samuel sees me,⁶ 'he pursues any promising hint, no matter where it leads'. I should guess that this is what Kaufmann, too, has in mind when he says of me⁷ that he 'lacks the conscience of the sound historian'. This is serious, if it is true of me, as Sir Ernest Barker thinks it is,⁸ that his 'judgment is not equal to his knowledge'. Barker's opinion on this important point is supported by an identical one of Gurian's, who wonders at finding in himself 'this strange combination of respect for the immense erudition of the author and regret for the absence of balance in his judgment'.⁹ Macrae does not believe that the wealth of information that I have harvested from the past 'is in any way equalled by the understanding that' I attempt 'to give of human destiny'.¹⁰ My case begins to look almost hopeless if Vogt and Hourani are right in convicting me of arbitrariness and dogmatism too.¹¹ However, Guerard finds¹² that, 'in his boldest attempts, the British scholar'—i.e. Toynbee, in contrast to Spengler—'remains an empiricist, a Baconian'. Engel-Janosi, too, points out that I reject Spengler's determinism, and he finds that, by comparison with this great man, at any rate, I am tentative in my attitude.¹³ Anderle, too, comes to my rescue here. He points out¹⁴ that most of my critics have ignored my own explicit recognition that all historical work is always provisional, never definitive.

In recognizing this I have anticipated Caillois' forecast that my work will be superseded.¹⁵ This judgement of his is shown by the context not to be intended to be condemnatory. Anyway, I concur in it enthusiastically, and venture to add that, as I see it, the quicker my work is superseded, the more successful it will have proved to be, since this will have given the measure of the stimulating—or provocative—effect that it will have had; and success, for a work of scholarship, has, to my mind, to be gauged in these terms. If Spate is right in scheduling it¹⁶ as a house built on the sands, my comment on this is that, before the flood comes down

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 358.

² Owen Lattimore in *The Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1948, p. 105.

³ In *The Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1956, p. 367.

⁴ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 303.

⁵ This criticism has been cited already in a discussion of the uses of analogy on pp. 30–41.

⁶ M. Samuel: *The Professor and the Fossil*, p. 138.

⁷ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 306.

⁸ W. Gurian in *The Review of Politics*, October, 1942, p. 508.

⁹ D. G. Macrae in *The Literary Guide*, January, 1955.

¹⁰ Vogt in *Saeculum*, No. 2 (1951), pp. 557–74; Hourani in loc. cit., p. 388.

¹¹ A. L. Guerard in *The Herald-Tribune*, 28th October, 1934.

¹² F. Engel-Janosi in *Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, 2. Jahrgang, Heft 4 (October, 1949), pp. 267 and 265.

¹³ R. Caillois in *Diogenes*, Spring, 1956, p. 1.

¹⁴ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 304.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 92.

¹⁶ In op. cit.

and the temporary structure falls, the rebuilding programme will already have become overdue. When the spate has come and gone, the site will be clear for the erection of a rather more up-to-date temporary structure in place of mine—pending the next flood, the next clearance, the next rebuilding, and so on in *saecula saeculorum*. If Morgenthau is right in calling my work an 'Icarean effort',¹ my comment is that Icarus's crash was a tragedy, if it was one, for nobody but himself. When Icarus crashed, his more competent father Daedalus made a happy landing. And, in consequence, the experience of flying is today within the reach of any man, woman, or child, provided that the necessary money is forthcoming for buying the ticket. Today anyone can fly thanks to the adventurousness of the pioneers. Also, even today, travelling by air is still something of an adventure for the passenger; for though he can be sure that the pilot will put safety first, he cannot, even so, be quite sure that he is going to come down alive, when once he is up aloft.

Other critics who share Spate's and Morgenthau's opinion that I have come to grief have suggested two explanations: I have tried to straddle the whole of history; and I have tried to straddle both history and 'metahistory'² and have jumbled them up.

E. R. Curtius has done me the honour of saying that in this book 'we are given the whole of history. For the first time, the survey is a complete one.'³ With the same generosity, Hans Kohn says of me that a sense of unity will be my contribution⁴ and that 'he is perhaps the first to attempt to write the history of the human race in the genuine meaning of the phrase'.⁵ E. E. Y. Hales says that my work 'surveys the entire field more widely than it has ever before been surveyed'.⁶ In Hales' view this is where my interpretation of history 'has the advantage over all others'. On the other hand, Kohn says⁷ of my work, in the context of the passage just quoted, that, 'in its fundamental conception, it is an attempt at the impossible, and for this reason it miscarries'. The same point is made by H. Marrou. 'To write', he says,⁸ 'a universal history and, *a fortiori*, to think, as Toynbee does, about the totality of universal history, is an undertaking that runs up against a technical impossibility.' (Marrou shows himself as generous as Curtius and Kohn in adding the comment: 'Toynbee a trop osé, mais l'audace. . .')⁹ M. Postan suggests¹⁰ that, if I had been a social scientist, I would never have attempted, as I have, 'to solve the problems of civilization and society by a frontal attack on the massed evidence of all the historical societies'. T. J. G. Locher observes¹¹ that

'our age is asking for a total vision, now that the World has grown together into so close a unity. This superhuman task is the one at which Toynbee has tried his hand—and, in my judgment, he has miscarried in things of cardinal importance.'

¹ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 199.

² The meaning of this word has been examined on pp. 227–9.

³ E. R. Curtius in *Merkur*, 2. Jahrgang, 4. Heft [Heft 10] (1948), p. 528.

⁴ *Toynbee and History*, p. 359.

⁵ H. Kohn in *Der Monat*, August 1955, p. 469.

⁶ *History Today*, May, 1955, p. 323.

⁷ In *Der Monat*, pag. cit.

⁸ In *Esprit*, July, 1952, p. 121.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹⁰ In *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxviii (1936), pp. 62–63.

¹¹ In *De Gids*, May, 1948, offprint, p. 30, quoted already on p. 141.

It will be seen that the point made by Locher in the first sentence of this passage is the one that I have made in this volume in Chapter V.¹ In the new state of human affairs into which we have been moving in our time, a comprehensive study of human affairs is being asked for because it has become a crying need, and the intelligent public, all over the World, has become alive to this. If that is the truth, then it cannot be wrong to try to meet this need. Any scholar who ventures out on this enterprise will at least be showing public spirit, however he fares. If my own venture is judged to have miscarried, this is a trivial mishap. No one stands to lose by my failure except myself, and the way remains clear for any number of others to have their try and, it is to be hoped, to fare better. If we are faced here by nothing more serious than one man's failure—due just to his personal inadequacy for carrying out a big task—there is no reason for concern. But what if Kohn and Marrou are right? What if this is an enterprise that it is intrinsically impossible to achieve, so that my failure is not just my funeral but is also a warning that nobody else can be any more successful?

If this is the true situation, it is one that is both tragic and comic. It is tragic, if true, that the vision for which our age is asking should be unattainable. 'Where there is no vision, the people perish.' And we are now aware that today mankind is in danger of perishing by committing genocide if we cannot learn at last to live as one family. We shall hardly be able to make this revolution in human life without the inspiration of a new vision. And, if a new vision is unattainable, this is assuredly tragic. But it is also comic, if true, that we should be debarred from winning the understanding that we need by the abundance of the knowledge that we have at our disposal. This sounds too paradoxical to make sense. Yet this is, in effect, what Kohn and Marrou are saying. There is now, they are telling us, such a plethora of potential knowledge in our library stacks and in our filing cabinets that it has ceased to be possible to have in our heads any comprehension of its purport. The abundance in our larder condemns us to starve. So we must resign ourselves to drifting towards catastrophe without a hope of being able to take bearings or steer a course. How fortunate, compared to us, were our predecessors in the time of Dante and, still more, no doubt, in the time of Bede. Their understanding was not clouded, as ours is, by a surfeit of information. They could see a vision, and so could find their way in this mysterious universe in which we, their too well-informed successors, are now blindly floundering.

When I am asked to believe this, I find that my credulity is not equal to it. Human minds in the present-day world show no signs of being any less capable of coping with the perennial human situation than they were in the Western Middle Ages or in the Age of Neanderthal Man. I have no doubt that we shall discover how to administer the economics of abundance on the intellectual plane as well as on the material one. If the enterprise at which I have been trying my hand has miscarried, I cannot be acquitted on the plea that this was a superhuman undertaking and a technical impossibility. The failure is mine, and the blame

¹ See especially pp. 140-1.

for it is on my head. I do not pretend that I have solved the problem, but I also do not agree that it is impossible that it should ever be solved.¹

This brings me to the second explanation of the miscarriage that my critics report. I have tried to deal with metahistory as well as history, and I have confused these two different levels of understanding. Here there are two separate indictments which have to be kept distinct, because it is possible to be found guilty on the first count without being found guilty on the second. In fact, I plead guilty on the first, while on the second I plead not guilty.

I have extended my field of inquiry from history to metahistory consciously and deliberately. I have noted in Chapter II that I began my work in this book by trying to give an intelligible comprehensive account of history—since the emergence of the species of human culture that we call 'civilization'—in the form of a comparative study of all the known societies of this species that either are, or once have been, engaged on this enterprise. In the course of my inquiry, however, I came to the conclusion that the histories of the 'higher religions' could not be made intelligible within this conceptual framework, and that I must therefore make the experiment of reversing my previous plan of operations. I must see whether I could obtain a more intelligible picture of history by explaining civilizations in terms of higher religions than I had obtained by trying to explain these in terms of civilizations. I had already taken note of this new departure at the point in the book at which I was making it,² and a number of my critics have also put their finger on this inconsistency in my procedure and on the implicit rift in my system of thought.³

Hourani observes, in reviewing the four volumes of the book which were published in 1954, that 'in the last few years Toynbee's view of history and of the Universe has changed radically'. 'On the one hand, "civilization" is seen as something ultimate.' Alternatively, the goal is sainthood.⁴ Anderle observes⁵ that, unlike Spengler, I have a rift in my system, and that there are signs in my work of a tension of will and an inner conflict. As he sees it, I have missed fire in an attempt to produce an empirical-scientific morphology of civilizations to take the place of Spengler's artistic-intuitive one. In my eyes (Anderle correctly reports) Spengler's determinism is his Achilles' heel, and I have made the assumption that Man *must* be free, without realizing how gravely biased this point of departure is.

'One cannot construct a self-contained "holistic" (*ganzheitliche*) morphology of civilizations and at the same time interpret the civilizations as open processes. Toynbee was not willing either to renounce the first of these two objectives or to sacrifice the second. This makes a rift in his system and makes it untenable as a whole.'

¹ The problem of quantity in the study of human affairs has been discussed in this volume in Chapter IV.

² See vii, 420-3.

³ See the references on p. 27, footnote 2. See also p. 94, footnote 1, and p. 100, footnote 3.

⁴ A. Hourani in *The Dublin Review*, vol. 229, No. 470 (December, 1955), pp. 387-8 and 384-5.

⁵ O. F. Anderle in *op. cit.*

I acknowledge this rift, but I do not agree that it makes my system untenable. On the contrary, I believe that it would have become untenable if I had tried to escape the rift by making believe that the net of human reason has no holes in it. My system, in showing a rift, corresponds, I believe, to an inescapable dichotomy, in any human mind's vision of Reality, between uniformities that are intelligible and irregularities that are inexplicable because, for all that we can tell, they are unique. If we tidy up our mental panorama by drawing a veil over either of these two elements in it on the plea that we cannot admit their coexistence because we cannot see how they can be mutually compatible, we shall be deferring to logic at the cost of giving the lie to experience.

The rift that Anderle has found in my system has been noticed by other critics too. Indeed, they find that the 'openness' of my mental horizon extends not only to a belief in the freedom of human wills, but also to a belief in a spiritual presence beyond the phenomena which involves me in a trans-rational extension of my rational approach to the study of human affairs. Savelle, for instance, comments¹ on my work that,

'when he treats of historic civilizations upon the basis of empirical sources (especially in volumes i-vi), his history writing and his empiricism are brilliantly successful. It can be said, indeed, that his demonstration of natural law in human history—resting, as it does, upon historical evidence—is very substantially grounded and would be difficult to refute. But in his treatment of the "Soul" and the "One True God" he makes a leap of faith that a historian insisting upon empirical evidence cannot follow. That there is poetry in history, of course, can be agreed. But that there is a poetic licence for the historian to soar far beyond his empirically verifiable data for the enjoyment of a wholly subjective "beatific vision", the empirical historian could never admit.'

Sumberg attributes the rift in my work to a failure of nerve which he, as well as Watnick,² imputes to me.

'It seems fair [Sumberg says] to conjecture that [Toynbee] became frightened of the vision he was developing in the earlier portions of his work, a vision of Man's endless and repetitive suffering to no purpose. . . . He was driven, therefore, to bring Jesus on the stage as the *deus ex machina* of the drama.'³

Voegelin observes⁴ that, in the present book, from volume vii onwards, the history of religion becomes, for me, history proper, and that I now no longer take civilizations as being the intelligible fields of study. He correctly remarks that 'the plan, as it was conceived on the first existential level, was retained to cover the studies on the last existential level', and he makes the justified criticism that 'neither has the plan of the first level been completed, nor has the last level found an organisational level of its own'.⁵

¹ In *The Pacific Historical Review*, February, 1956, pp. 55-67.

² See p. 607, footnote 4.

³ *Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267-84.

⁴ In *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*.

⁵ Voegelin does me the honour of suggesting that vols. vii-x of my book stand to

It will be seen that Voegelin criticizes me not, as Anderle does, for having changed my plan of operations, but for having failed, so far, to construct the new intellectual framework that the new plan requires for its execution. This is a charge to which I plead guilty. In volumes vii-x of this book I did try to carry out the new plan within the original framework. This was a mistake in procedure, and in the present volume I am trying to take at least the first step towards correcting it. I am grateful to Voegelin for his constructive criticism, and still more grateful to him for approving of my unwillingness to remain the prisoner of a self-contained system of ideas of my own making, when once I had become convinced that, within the limits of this system, I should not find myself able to do justice to some of the most important of the phenomena that I was studying. After pointing out that the definitions which I successively propose have a way of each superseding its predecessors, Voegelin insists that 'under no circumstances must they be pitted against each other by a logic of the external world which ignores the logic of existence'.

The openness of my mental horizon, which Voegelin notices and commends, has also been noticed by Baudet. In my view, he points out, history is an open road, in contrast to Saint Augustine's view that its course is predetermined.¹ This is, I think, what Erdmann has in mind when he suggests² that the unity of my book is like the unity of an expedition or a pilgrimage.

vols. i-vi in the relation in which Saint Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* stands to Orosius's *Historia contra Paganos*. H. E. Barnes calls me 'Orosius and Augustine in modern dress' (*An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, pp. 717-36). Brinton notes that 'Saint Augustine's *City of God*, supplemented by the work of Orosius, supplied for a medieval Christian the psychological equivalent of the time series, charts, and the like which the modern mind demands. Some of Toynbee's most suggestive work', he adds, 'has been done in this field. Many of his phrases—"challenge-and-response", "creative minority", "mimesis", "rout-and-rally", "Herodianism or Zealotism", "knock-out-blow"—can help, used carefully, to do the work of the mere historian' (*The Virginian Quarterly Review*, Summer, 1956, pp. 361-75).

I have been associated with Saint Augustine by other critics too: for instance, H. Baudet: 'Hedendaagsch Augustinisme' in *Historie en Metahistorie*; M. Savelle in *The Pacific Historical Review*, February, 1956, p. 55; T. A. Sumberg in *Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267-84; C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, December, 1956, p. 202; Sir Llewellyn Woodward in *The Spectator*, 18th August, 1939; L. Mumford in *Diogenes*, Spring, 1956, p. 21; J. H. Nichols in *The Journal of Religion*, No. 28 (1948), pp. 99-119; H. Kuhn in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 21st August, 1947, p. 499; G. M. Bryan in *Social Forces*, vol. 26 (March, 1948), pp. 288-92; E. I. Watkin in *The Tablet*, 12th August, 1939; F. J. Teggart in a letter to me of 8th January, 1936.

Being paired with a giant is a formidable honour for a pygmy. He comes off badly in all situations. When the giant is estimated at his true stature, the pygmy's inferiority invites uncomplimentary comparisons—though, as the pygmy sees it, these might perhaps have gone without saying. Baudet finds it worth mentioning (in op. cit., pp. 50 and 61) that Augustine is greater, more heroic, more naïve, and more logical than I am in my 'Augustinism without God or Devil'. Brinton notes (in loc. cit.) that, unlike Augustine, I have 'no firm armature of accepted theology', and that I seem 'at times to attempt the really shocking combination of Saint Augustine and Pelagius'. Nichols also demurs to my Pelagianism, and pronounces that, on this point, I come off badly by comparison with Saint Augustine. When, however, the giant is given a box on the ear, I suffer from the repercussions. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, for example, after suggesting (in *The Spectator*, 11th August, 1938) that my work might have some 'therapeutic value because it is written, like the *De Civitate Dei*, under the strain of immediate social catastrophe', hastens to remind his readers and me that 'Saint Augustine's work is, in the last analysis, a great masterpiece of special pleading'.

¹ H. Baudet: 'Hedendaagsch Augustinisme' in *Historie en Metahistorie*, pp. 48 and 49.

² K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2, p. 189.

'The goal of the journey and the serial order of the stations on the way to it maintain their positions, but it is not possible to predict what discoveries and insights the journey may reveal.'

Mumford is, I believe, saying the same thing in non-metaphorical language when he remarks that Toynbee's questions 'cannot be answered in terms of the metaphysical and sociological framework that he has used';¹ and that 'the salvation towards which this . . . study points lies outside the field of history'.²

Mumford's observation is pursued farther by Erdmann in an analytical examination of four key concepts of mine: challenge-and-response; withdrawal-and-return, loss of self-determination, and transfiguration. Erdmann finds that all four of them have originated in the mental world of 'salvational history' (*Heilsgeschichte*).

'The four concepts have a "salvational" nucleus round which the historical material concentrates, in the way in which the introduction, from outside, of an isomorphic crystal makes it possible for a mass of matter that is ripe for crystallisation to come together in clear shapes. Through those four crystals [of Toynbee's], metahistory becomes visible in and beyond history. The Hellenic Civilization's property of serving as a transparent medium through which the primordial phenomenon (*das Urphänomen*) of culture itself becomes visible, is, as we have recognised, one of the presuppositions of Toynbee's thought. This experience now repeats itself on a larger scale. History itself now acquires the property of serving as a transparent medium for giving visibility to "salvational history".'³

Christopher Dawson, in an essay on the problem of metahistory,⁴ writes⁵ that 'the case of Toynbee is a difficult one, because he is at the same time an historian, a sociologist of comparative culture, and a meta-historian'. Morgenthau finds that I look to religion to give me a super-empirical standard, because, like Spengler, I have no philosophical system to give my construction of history some rational objectivity;⁶ and Erdmann observes⁷ that I try to combine Wells' view of the movement of history as non-recurrent and Spengler's view of it as cyclical by bringing the supernatural back into the picture. 'The tension between the natural and the supernatural order gives room for the world of freedom that reveals itself in history'.⁸ In my view, Erdmann suggests, 'the destiny (*Schicksal*) of the civilizations . . . is the subject matter of universal history, but its proper theme is the development of religion'.⁹ Progress, as it appears in my construction of history, is a protean phenomenon. It presents itself in the Age of Primitive Life as evolution, in the Age of Civilization as 'salvational history' (*Heilsgeschichte*), in the age following the Age of Civilization as eschatology.¹⁰ If this construction

¹ L. Mumford in *Toynbee and History*, p. 146.

² L. Mumford in *Diogenes*, Spring, 1956, p. 11.

³ K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2, p. 247.

⁴ Reprinted in *The Dynamics of World History*, pp. 287-93.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 292.

⁶ H. J. Morgenthau in *Toynbee and History*, p. 196.

⁷ In loc. cit., p. 235.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 236-7.

of mine had to be represented in some visual symbolism, my apocalyptic beast would have to be given a fish's tail, a man's body, and a saint's head.¹ On this humorous flight of fancy my own comment would be: 'Well, if the creature that I have drawn is indeed a chimaera, how true my drawing is to life as life's image is refracted through the human mind's cracked lens.'

Erdmann is not alone in convicting me of writing 'salvational history' (*Heilsgeschichte*). Baudet describes my work as 'a kind of doctrine of salvation' (*een soort heilsleer*).² And a number of other writers have made the same observation in more general terms. Holcombe remarks³ that 'what, in fact, Toynbee has finally given us is a religious interpretation of history'. Stecchini observes⁴ that 'Toynbee, who constantly stresses the importance of having a philosophy of history, knows well that philosophy of history is a form of theology'. Coulborn, too, says⁵ that I am a theologian masked as a philosopher. Joynt finds⁶ in my work 'a subtle blend of sound history and a great deal of theology' (though, in noting that 'metaphysics is not history', he seems to credit me with being a philosopher as well as a theologian). David Thomson finds⁷ that I am 'something of a mystic', and the same charge is made against me by L. S. Woolf.⁸ Sweezy finds⁹ that, in sharp contrast to Wells, I am 'at bottom a mystic who believes that Man is inherently incapable of shaping his own development and that therefore the only way to make life meaningful is to abandon the effort and embrace religion'.

Other critics see in my work not merely a religious interpretation of history but a 'theodicy': that is to say, an attempt to justify the ways of God to Man. Barnes classifies it¹⁰ as being "a theodicy" rather than straightforward history or scientific sociology'. It is called a theodicy by Leddy,¹¹ Walsh,¹² and Baudet,¹³ and 'an undisguised theodicy' by Watnick.¹⁴ B. D. Wolfe¹⁵ calls it—with some irony—'a masterpiece of Christian historical apologetics and exegesis'. R. Coulborn finds¹⁶ that my theodicy 'is too neat to be true'.

Other critics—Hughes and Coulborn, for instance—see a conflict in me between the believer and the scholar—a conflict without a decision, in Coulborn's view, since he reports that the scholar has not been driven off the field.¹⁷ Kohn suggests¹⁸ that the scholar, as a scholar, cannot

¹ *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2, p. 237.

² H. Baudet: 'Hedendaagsch Augustinisme' in *Historie en Metahistorie*, p. 48.

³ A. N. Holcombe in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. xlix, No. 4 (December, 1955), pp. 1151-4.

⁴ L. C. Stecchini in *Midstream*, Autumn, 1956, pp. 84-91.

⁵ R. Coulborn in *Phylon*, 1940, offprint, p. 4.

⁶ C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, December, 1956, pp. 200 and 202.

⁷ In *The News Chronicle*, 14th October, 1954.

⁸ In *The New Statesman and Nation*, 23rd September, 1939.

⁹ P. M. Sweezy in *The Nation*, 19th October, 1946.

¹⁰ H. E. Barnes in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, p. 719.

¹¹ J. F. Leddy in *The Phoenix*, vol. 11 (1957), No. 4, pp. 141-2.

¹² W. H. Walsh in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 126-7.

¹³ H. Baudet in op. cit., p. 61.

¹⁴ M. Watnick in *The Antioch Review*, No. 7 (Winter, 1947-8), pp. 587-602.

¹⁵ B. D. Wolfe in *The American Mercury*, No. 64 (1947), p. 756.

¹⁶ In *Toynbee and History*, pp. 156-7.

¹⁷ R. Coulborn, *ibid.*, pp. 148-9; H. S. Hughes: *Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate*, pp. 41 and 140. Hughes notes that Vico, too, was pulled in contrary directions by his critical faculty and by his Christian convictions.

¹⁸ H. Kohn in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 353-4.

accept the Jewish and Christian belief, taken on faith, that history is God's path.

This conflict, if demonstrable, might, I suppose, be taken as psychological evidence of an unresolved contradiction that other critics find in my thinking. Mumford and Sumberg see this as a contradiction between a thisworldliness and an Augustinian otherworldliness;¹ Löwith² as one between a cyclic classical and a purposeful and meaningful Christian tradition; Masur³ as one between 'Kulturkreisidee' and 'Theodiceegedanke'; Weil⁴ as one between 'the principles on which' my 'scheme of the development of civilization is based and' my 'personal judgment of historical phenomena'. Anderle interprets Weil's words⁵ as meaning, in more precise terms, a contradiction between the 'empirical-historical' and the 'a priori absolute aspect' and comments:

'The case shows clearly that one cannot dispense with the need to draw a tidy boundary-line between the two realms. This is required in the interests of both science and religion, since each of these can attain its highest point only by keeping within its own sphere.'

Werner says that I have mixed up history and 'salvational history' (*Heilsgeschichte*)⁶ and that, in my work, 'historical reflexion and "salvational" (*Heilsgeschichtliche*) expectation have not been brought into any convincing relation with each other'.⁷ Erdmann observes that

'"challenge and response" do not find their explanation in terms of research into historical causation. The interpretation that they offer is in terms of the Christian doctrine about the nature of Man (*Christliche Anthropologie*). History and metahistory—the inquiry into causes and the inquiry into meaning—operate on different levels of comprehension (*Erkenntnis*). One is bound to admit that Toynbee has not been tidy in drawing the distinction between the two. Evidently, for the purpose that he has in view, he does not feel any pressing need for this. Ought one to regret that he has not gone to work with greater philosophical precision? Instead, let us rejoice that someone has had the courage to cope, in a fulness of measure nowhere else achieved, with the mass of material presented by history on the world-scale (*den Weltstoff*), and to fit it all together into one picture.'⁸

These last sentences are generous to me. For all of us who have embarked on the same enterprise, they give warning, at the same time, of the enterprise's formidable magnitude. The crux of it, however, is not this intellectual problem of coping with an unprecedented amount of information. If necessity is the mother of invention, we may look forward to seeing human minds find ways and means of achieving this;

¹ L. Mumford in *Diogenes*, Spring, 1956, p. 21; T. A. Sumberg in *Social Research*, vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1947), pp. 267–74.

² K. Löwith: *Meaning in History*, pp. 12–13.

³ G. Masur in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 177 (1954), pp. 521–2.

⁴ In *Toynbee and History*, p. 285.

⁵ In *op. cit.*

⁶ H. Werner: 'Spengler und Toynbee' in *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 29. Jahrgang, xxix. Band, p. 531.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 533.

⁸ K. D. Erdmann in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, xxxiii. Band, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 206–7.

and, happily, the truth of this inspiring proverb is attested by the record of mankind's past. The crux is an issue that cannot be settled by one of those provisional agreements that sometimes result from intellectual debate. It is the issue between rationalism and trans-rationalism, discussed in this volume in Chapter III.

Rationalists hold that the clarity of the mind's intellectual vision is obscured, and the findings of its logical reason are adulterated and, at the worst, obliterated, if we allow our thinking to be contaminated by non-rational mental attitudes and processes. Rationalists may dismiss these as fantasies, or they may concede that they have some status in a mental domain of their own. A rationalist is less concerned to ascertain their status than he is to insulate the intellect from them and from their, in his view, intellectually pernicious influence. On the other side, trans-rationalists hold that the intellect has not the capacity to achieve its objective unaided. The intellect's objective, they agree with the rationalists, is to find explanations of the phenomena with which a human being is confronted. But they contend that the explanations arrived at by intellectual processes alone are unsatisfying, even intellectually, and are also inadequate for the practical conduct of human life. In their view those trans-rational mental attitudes and processes in which the rationalist sees the intellect's ruin are, in truth, the intellect's salvation. In the trans-rationalist's view, therefore, it is disastrous, even intellectually, to try to insulate the intellect from the other faculties of the human soul. Our aim, they hold, should be just the opposite. We should aim at a symphony between the intellect and the soul's trans-rational faculties. To try to dissociate them is unnatural; to keep them in their natural harmony is the key to finding our way in the mysterious universe into which we are born.

This perennial controversy is being conducted with unusual bitterness in the present-day world. My own work stands within the arena of this conflict; and this, I believe, partly accounts for the strength of the disapproval and dislike that it has aroused in some of its rationalist critics, and for the sharpness of the opposition between their judgements and some others.

Some critics maintain that the contradiction that they find in my thought has not only not been resolved by me but is one that does not admit of any solution. And they hold, as Anderle holds, that the different lines of inquiry that, in their judgement, I have jumbled up cannot be brought into any relation with each other. In my work, as Joynt sees it, 'categories which are the result of empirical generalisations, such as the balance of power and business cycles, are treated on the same level of meaning and as if they were derived in exactly the same way as "the laws of God"'. . . . Toynbee has attempted to blend two kinds of knowledge: religious and historical. The epistemology of the latter is empirical and it cannot be successfully joined to the former. What Toynbee has written is really much closer to theology than history.'¹

Walsh holds² that, in seeking a theodicy, I have ceased to be an historian;

¹ C. B. Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, December, 1956, p. 200.

² W. H. Walsh in *Toynbee and History*, pp. 126-7.

and Stone¹ that I am not justified in claiming to be an historian considering that what I produce is metaphysical stuff. Woodward makes the same point with what seems to me to be greater discernment:

"The answer to the question "why" would appear to lie outside the scope of history. In a sense Professor Toynbee realises, by turning to mythology, that he is looking in history for something he will never find; but the answers from mythology are really only guesses at the question "how", and guesses which are not so near to the point as the patient work of modern specialists. The answer appears as far off as ever."²

Mumford finds³ that my 'supernaturalism' is 'a radical defect' in my philosophy; Feibleman⁴ that an attempt to found my system on transcendental philosophy is one of two major defects in my work. In Nevins' expectation,⁵ 'countless readers will . . . view Toynbee's heavy emphasis on religion, as the one element in the human march through time which really justifies it, as another fundamental flaw'. Joynt puts on the judge's black cap.

'If this kind of practice is to be pursued, then historians might as well shut up shop and all take holy orders. . . . One can but conclude that this curious marriage of metaphysics and history has not succeeded and should end in a divorce.'⁶

Kuhn gives me a splendid funeral.

'As Hegel before him, so Toynbee undertakes to rewrite Saint Augustine's principal work by interpreting the City of Man as the City of God *in statu nascendi*. In both cases the result is a magnificent failure.'⁷

Happily for me, other critics seem to see my practice in a different light. Brinton, for instance, suggests⁸ that

'much of the quarrel between Toynbee and the historians is . . . in a purely rational sense unnecessary, since . . . they are not attempting the same task. . . .

'What is Toynbee's *Study of History*? It is not a theological system, not a prophetic work in the specific sense that word has in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, though it has something in common with these. . . . It is surely a theodicy; but, if we think of Milton or Leibnitz, of Joseph de Maistre, or even of the author of the Book of Job, it is a vague and imprecise theodicy. Indeed, at times so great is Toynbee's insistence on the freedom of the human spirit, his work sounds more like an "anthropodicy". It is most certainly a philosophy of history, . . . [but it] belongs in fact to a kind of sub-species within the species, a sub-species clearly marked by its own characteristics. Toynbee's work is best called a "City of God".

'By a "City of God" we understand an eschatological system in which

¹ L. Stone in *Toynbee and History*, p. 111.

² E. L. Woodward in *The Spectator*, 6th July, 1934, p. 21.

³ L. Mumford in *The Pacific Spectator*, No. 1 (1947), pp. 391-8.

⁴ J. K. Feibleman in *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xi, Nos. 1 and 2 (1940), p. 152.

⁵ A. Nevins in *The New York World-Telegram and Sun*, 7th December, 1954.

⁶ Joynt in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, December, 1956, pp. 200 and 202.

⁷ H. Kuhn in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 28th August, 1947, p. 499.

⁸ Crane Brinton in *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Summer, 1956, pp. 361-75.

evidence taken from the historical record . . . is used to transcend history. . . . For the empiricist, a "City of God", though it uses empirical evidence to arrive at conclusions, does so by adding something—shall we say the yeast?—that alters the empirical evidence in a way the empiricist himself thinks *his* mind does not alter it, a way he does not like. Shall we say modestly that the empiricist prefers the unleavened loaf?

I will close by quoting two anonymous appraisals of the book.

"The story of Mankind is not usefully written as one of perpetual frustration¹ and the unendingly unsuccessful quest for the earthly kingdom. In his sixth volume,² indeed, Dr. Toynbee comes very near to recognising that human history is the story of individual souls in a transcendental setting, and that the lowly role of societies and civilizations is to provide the stage for acts of moral choice, and that the only essential stage properties are dilemmas and temptations; and, so viewed, the scene disclosed to the historian is essentially satisfactory and good."³

"Two main problems are his [Dr. Toynbee's] special concern: what characteristic and typical patterns, if any, have civilizations followed in their development; and what dynamic forces have produced both the patterns and the development as a whole? At one level Dr. Toynbee is thus a student of what may be called the sociology of history; at another and far deeper level he is a seeker after, and an expounder of, what to him (and to many others) is the ultimate meaning."⁴

The passages last quoted bring out the sharpness of the religious cleavage, in the World today, between the rationalists and the 'many others' of whom my unknown reviewer and I are two representatives. This is a battle in which I myself am a combatant and in which my work is, in a minor way, contested ground. Since I am so deeply implicated, I am evidently in no position to try to deliver judgement on the issue at stake. The verdict—or perhaps a succession of differing verdicts—will be rendered, if it is ever rendered, by posterity.

¹ Cp. Aldous Huxley: 'History as the Experience of Frustration' in *The Magazine of the Year*, vol. 1, No. 7 (September, 1947), pp. 106-12.—A. J. T.

² This passage occurs in a review of vols. iv-vi. The reviewer might, I should guess, have said the same of vols. vii-x if these had been published at the time.—A. J. T.

³ *The Listener*, 19th October, 1939.

⁴ *The Economist*, 6th November, 1954.

IV ANNEX

Is there any Master-activity in Human Affairs?

HUMAN activities are numerous and various. There is technology: the invention, manufacture, and use of tools. There is economics: the winning of a livelihood for human beings from Nature, and the distribution of the product among the people who are competing for it. There is politics: the handling of the power that accumulates as a result of co-operation between people in large numbers. There is art: the expression of Man's appreciation of the beauty of the Universe in which he finds himself. There is study: the satisfaction of Man's curiosity about the Universe. There is religion: Man's impulse to get into touch, and into harmony, with an absolute spiritual Reality, whose presence behind the phenomena makes itself felt in the experience of many, perhaps most, human beings. Then there is recreation: the use that people make of the spare time that their work leaves them. There is education: not in just the formal sense of the word, but in the broader sense in which education means the transmission of the whole cultural heritage of the present generation and its predecessors to the rising generation and its successors. These are some of the main human activities. The list is a crude one, and it will not have covered the whole range of these activities; but it will perhaps have covered enough to show that human activities are remarkable for their variety.

In spite of this variety, the different activities are so closely interconnected that it is impossible to deal with any one of them without also having to take account of at least one or two of the others.

For instance, education is concerned with all the rest, in as much as it is concerned with handing on the whole of the cultural heritage, including ways of recreation.

Technology, it is obvious, cannot be insulated from economics, because tools are the means by which we win our livelihood from Nature. But, unfortunately, technology cannot be insulated from politics either, because some of the tools that technology makes are weapons, and weapons are used by human beings not only against non-human living creatures; they are used against other human beings as well; and war is one of the products of political power. Wars can be waged only by people living in communities that have achieved some degree of political organisation.

Economics, again, cannot be insulated from politics. The distribution of the product of economic activity is largely determined by the play of political power; and political power itself depends on economic resources. In order to be able to make war, a government needs to have at its command the economic sinews of war. It is not enough to have subjects who are willing to fight.

Politicians interest themselves in all activities that have some bearing on power. They are interested in religion if they can harness their subjects' religious feelings to serve their policy. Despotism governments in

our time have been interested in education as a means of influencing the rising generation of their subjects at an impressionable age. In the year 1961 all governments were interested in technological and scientific education as a generator of political power. The government of the Roman Empire was interested in recreation as a means of keeping the populace of the capital city in a good humour and diverting its attention from politics.

Art, it is evident, cannot be insulated from technology. It is impossible to define the points at which the so-called 'useful' arts and crafts end and the so-called 'fine' arts begin. Indeed, if art ceases to be useful—that is to say, if it ceases to satisfy some real human need—the life goes out of it. Of course, the need served by art may be a spiritual need. Art has often served religion and been inspired by it.

Study is closely akin to art; it is not without reason that we bracket together 'the arts and sciences'. Study shares with art and religion the virtue of being 'disinterested'. Like them, it is not pursued for economic or political motives. But, in the modern Western World since the close of the seventeenth century, the study of non-human Nature has been linked up with technology. This alliance has given both technology and science an unprecedented impetus; and in our time technology, inspired by science, has become the key to political power.

Recreation is bound up with economics: its cost is a charge on the livelihood that we win from Nature. In the Roman Empire the whole population had to pay for the 'bread and circuses' doled out to the populace of Rome, and afterwards to the populace of Constantinople. Recreation is also closely connected with education: in a child's life there is not that sharp line that there is in a grown-up person's between work and play. Recreation also fuses with art and study and technology. Students and artists, and craftsmen too, share with children the happiness of finding recreation in their work. And works of art give mankind in general its highest kind of recreation.

Thus human activities are not only very various; they are also very intimately inter-connected. At the same time they cannot be reduced to a unity by treating some single one of them as if it were paramount over all the rest. 'Quantitative measurements . . . will not help us to decide whether the political, the economic, or the religious point of view is more important for a general understanding of history.'¹ In fact, there is no master-activity: history is multi-dimensional.² 'General history must work with a number of factors rather than with only one',³ and we must use multi-dimensional blocks as our units of analysis.³ This is what is demanded of a student of human affairs by the structure of the phenomena that he is studying. But this demand on him makes his subject a formidably complicated one. For this reason, ever since the earliest attempts at understanding, interpreting, and recording human history, students of it have constantly been tempted to distort their picture of it by trying to simplify it. The would-be simplifier's obvious recourse is to single out some one of Man's various activities and to treat this as Man's

¹ M. R. Cohen: *The Meaning of Human History*, p. 226.

² *Ibid.*, p. 225.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

master-activity—subordinating all the others to it or even leaving them out of the picture altogether. This procedure is as ineffectual as it is high-handed. Some illustrations of it will bring out its weakness.

The oldest candidate for the role of master-activity is politics. Until only the other day, the conventional way of writing history was to give a chronicle of reigns, wars, battles, and military and political revolutions. E. A. Freeman, a nineteenth-century English historian, pronounced that 'history is past politics, and politics present history'.¹ Since that time, our picture of human affairs has become broader and ampler, and historians have paid deference to this change of outlook by interspersing their political narrative with paragraphs, or even whole chapters, on the progress of art or religion or technology. Few, however, so far, have attempted to write comprehensive narratives, taking account of all human activities and bringing out the interplay between them all the way through. Sir George Trevelyan has done this with brilliant success, but there are not many like him.

Why has the treatment of politics as the master-activity persisted so long? And why is it dying so hard?

One obvious reason why it is dying hard is that it makes the writing of history a fairly simple task compared with Trevelyan's method of keeping a number of different human activities in view simultaneously and all the time. The reason why the political approach to history has persisted so long is that it has behind it a greater weight of tradition than any other approach.

Political history is the history of pooled human power; and the earliest historians were rulers who wielded the power, not only to make military conquests, but to have these recorded. One of the oldest historical documents known to us is 'the palette of Narmer', on which a king of Upper Egypt, who had conquered Lower Egypt and had thus unified Egypt politically, had a record made of his achievement. This record is a pictorial one, in bas-relief. It was made round about the year 3000 B.C. at the very dawn, if not before the dawn, of the art of writing in Egypt. From Iraq we have a similar record—also in bas-relief, but with an explanatory inscription—of the Akkadian King Naramsin's invasion of the highlands to the east of the lower basin of the Tigris and Euphrates. Naramsin's record is six or seven hundred years later in date than Narmer's. We have much fuller records, dating from the twelfth century B.C. onwards, made by kings of Assyria. These Assyrian records, too, are military and political in their contents. But it is significant that, in form though not in fact, these are records, not of war and politics, but of technology, art, and religion. Some of these long Assyrian military and political records are given the form of appendixes to a brief record of the founding or restoration of a temple. Others take the form of predictions about future military and political events by a god, in

¹ In a memoir of J. R. Seeley, G. W. Prothero notes that, 'though he did not coin the phrase "History is past politics, and politics present history", it is perhaps more strictly applicable to his view of history than to that of its author' (Prothero in Seeley: *The Growth of British Policy* (Cambridge 1895, University Press, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. xii).

Prothero here assumes that the authorship of this dictum is a matter of common knowledge. Such evidence as I have found all points to Freeman.

answer to an inquiry on the king's part. These *soi-disant* predictions are really narratives of events that have already happened. It looks as if the kings of Assyria had suspected that architectural, artistic, and religious activities might really be the master-activities, but had been unable to resist the temptation to swamp their records of these comparatively disinterested and enlightened proceedings under an egotistic and boastful record of their military and political achievements.

The expansion of political history into general history has not been accomplished satisfactorily by the rather superficial device of interrupting a political narrative here and there and interpolating a chapter on one of the non-political human activities. This failure of the political school of history to reform itself effectively has opened the way for a revolutionary attack on it. Marx and Engels have set out to depose politics from its traditional place of honour in the presentation of history, and to enthroned economics in its stead. Marx has won general acceptance for his thesis that reigns and wars are not the master-key to the interpretation of history, but not for his further thesis that this master-key is to be found in economics. Marx's and Engels' theses were neither so crude nor so dogmatic as they have been represented as being by admirers as well as by opponents. Their thesis that economics is the key to history was hedged about with a number of qualifications and caveats. These bear witness to Marx's and Engels' intellectual ability. Still, in substance, Marx's doctrine is that the method of production of Man's means of livelihood, together with the system by which the means of production are controlled, governs and determines most other things in human life. The key to power is an economic key, not a political one; the key to an understanding of human affairs is to understand economics. Many people who are not ideological followers of Marx hold these Marxian views today.

In his outlook Marx was a child of his age, as even a genius is bound to be.¹ In the West in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, at least three things were happening which suggested that the most important of all human activities was economics. Westerners had just become aware of economics as being a distinct and important human activity; and this was an exciting new discovery. The discovery had been made as a result of two contemporary revolutions: a technological revolution by which muscle-power had been replaced by water-power and steam-power as the driving-force for machines; and an organizational revolution by which small-scale manufacture (in the literal sense of the word) had been replaced by large-scale production conducted by capitalists employing workers for wages. The third thing in the contemporary scene that drew attention to economics was the sufferings, during the first stage of the Industrial Revolution, of the new class of industrial wage-earners that this revolution had called into existence.

Unquestionably Marx was right in holding that economics was important, and also in holding that something drastic ought to be done to relieve the industrial workers' sufferings. All the World can agree with Marx on these two points without also having to agree with him

¹ See pp. 125-7.

that his remedy for the nineteenth-century industrial workers' sufferings was the best one, or that economics is not merely important, but all-important. The answer to the thesis that economics is all-important is: 'Man doth not live by bread only.'¹ If the thesis that politics is Man's master-activity will not work—and Marx has done us all a service in showing that it will not—the similar thesis that economics is Man's master-activity will not work either.

As a matter of fact, when people's economic interests and their political feelings have pulled different ways, people have usually given rein to their political feelings and have let their economic interests go hang. This subordination of economics to politics could be illustrated by any number of historical examples. Here two will suffice. In the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy before the First World War the port of Trieste possessed a hinterland that ensured its prosperity. Yet the Italian majority in the population of Trieste longed for the break-up of the Monarchy, on whose existence their livelihood depended, because of their political ambition, as Italians by nationality, to see Trieste annexed to Italy. In Palestine, after the First World War, the British, who had taken a mandate for administering the country, hoped that the Arab population would be reconciled to the influx of Jewish immigrants by the prospect that this would bring with it increases in land values and rises in wages. But the Arabs' minds did not work in that way. The prospect that preoccupied them was a political one. Jewish immigration threatened to reduce the Palestinian Arabs to the status of a subject minority. In their minds this political menace entirely outweighed the prospect of economic gains. These two examples are characteristic, and their significance is clear. If it is true that politics is not all-important, it must be true, *a fortiori*, that economics is not.

What other human activities, besides economics and politics, have been, or seem likely to be, put forward as candidates for the role of master-activity? Recreation, art, and study have never, so far, been in the running; and education seems unlikely to be, in spite of the fact that education commands the doorway to the future. There are, however, two other obvious candidates: technology and religion.

Technology is almost bound to look like Man's master-activity in the eyes of a student of the so-called Prehistoric Age of mankind's career. In this age human societies had not yet managed to produce a surplus over and above the requirements of bare subsistence. They were therefore unable to maintain a leisured minority. They were therefore illiterate, since the art of writing requires a leisured minority to invent and practise it. They have therefore left no written records. And therefore Man's tools are almost the only surviving evidences of Man's development, and even of his existence, for the first half million or million years of mankind's history. Compared with the abundance of the tools that have survived from the Palaeolithic Age, the fragments of human skeletons of the same antiquity have, so far, been rare finds. And perhaps even the oldest human bones so far found are young compared with the oldest tools in our museums.

¹ Deut. viii. 3, quoted in Matt. iv. 4 and Luke iv. 4.

Accordingly, the prehistorian is inclined to see Man as *homo faber* ('Man the technician') rather than as *homo sapiens* ('Man the possessor of a consciousness and a will'). Or perhaps the prehistorian would say that the invention and use of tools was the means by which Man educated himself into becoming intelligent and purposeful. We may agree that a process of self-education through technology may have speeded up Man's exercise of his intelligence. Man must, however, have been immensely intelligent already before he could dream of inventing his first tool. This first of his many inventions is, after all, his most brilliant technological achievement for all time. It already contained, in germ, such later feats as the splitting of the atom and the launching of artificial satellites to circle round the Earth and to lasso the Moon. When once Man had chipped his first flint, these derivative inventions were already on their way. But what would our picture of early Palaeolithic Man look like if, instead of having no evidence of him except his tools and a few of his bones, we had as wide a knowledge of all his activities as we have for our study of his descendants within the last 5,000 years? Even for the study of later Palaeolithic Man, perhaps 10,000 to 50,000 years ago, we have not only tools and bones but also paintings on the walls of the caves in which he lived; and these paintings open up vistas on fields of life that are blanks in our picture of these relatively recent men's predecessors. Later Palaeolithic Man's paintings tell us a great deal about his artistic skill and sense, and they even allow us to infer something about the character of his religion. If we had the same amount and variety of knowledge about early Palaeolithic Man, would his tools loom so large in our picture of him as they loom now in the absence of any other evidences of his doings? In other words, would prehistorians be as much inclined as they are now to think of technology as being Man's master-activity?

'Man doth not live by bread only, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth Man live.'¹ Here is the voice of religion making its claim to be Man's master-activity; and, of all the competing claims, this is surely the strongest. Its strength, however, lies in the fact that religion is not on a par with the other activities on our list. Religion is Man's attempt to get into touch with an absolute spiritual Reality behind the phenomena of the Universe, and, having made contact with It, to live in harmony with It. This activity is all-pervading. It comprehends all the others. Moreover, it is Man's life-line. When once a creature has acquired, as Man has, a conscious intellect and a free will, this creature must either seek and find God or destroy itself. 'Where there is no vision, the people perish.'² Religion, then, would be Man's master-activity if there were such a thing. But religion's claim can be vindicated only by being put in terms that transcend it. Religion is Man's master-activity only in the sense that religion embraces all Man's other activities in itself.

¹ Deut. viii. 3.

² Prov. xxix. 18.

VII ANNEX

Comment by Rabbi J. B. Agus on Professor Toynbee's Use of the Term 'Fossil' with Reference to the Jewish Community

I

THE connotation of the term 'fossil', which is repugnant to Jews, derives from the scale of values which is current in this, the century of Darwinism. In the pre-Darwinian world marks of antiquity were highly prized. Josephus in his *Contra Apionem* strives to prove the great antiquity of the Jewish people. To be put in the category of a 'coelacanthus', a living species of fish, belonging to a phylon of creation that is otherwise extinct, was always a point of pride for Jewish writers. The Jewish poet-philosopher, Jehudah Halevi, went so far as to describe the Jewish community as a 'body, without a head and a heart. Nay, even more, not even a skeleton, but scattered bones, like the bones which Ezekiel saw. . . .' But in Jehudah Halevi's view these bones were still better than the other religious communities, which in his view were like man-made dolls (*The Kusuri*, II, 29, 30).

In the realm of ideas and cultural values the 'test of time' is a measure of validity and worth; in the world of evolving species, resistance to change is the primary sin, leading to the penalty of fossilization and ultimately extinction.

Religious societies pre-eminently and national units generally are both value-centred and survival-centred. The philosopher of history is justified in applying biological categories to societies only in so far as they are survival-centred. Universal values, reflecting facets of truth, beauty, goodness, or holiness, are essentially imperishable.

Is then the Jewish community primarily survival-centred, or is it primarily value-centred? Professor Toynbee bases his analysis on the first assumption. He attributes the articulation of Judaism into a set of rites and observances and its creation of a complex communal structure to the 'will to live' of a harassed community. In this reasoning, Professor Toynbee is at one with all nationalist Jewish historians—in particular with Achad Ha'am and Simon Dubnow.

Nevertheless, this view is definitely one-sided. The continuous stream of Jewish literature demonstrates the value-centredness and idea-centredness of Jewish leadership. Admittedly, in the actual press of daily events, it is not feasible for people to distinguish between the needs of their group and its ideals. But, in so far as literature reflects the inner life of a community, the dominance of religious beliefs and values is clear. Those who did not share the values and beliefs of the community became participants in the prevailing faith.

The collective interests of the Jewish community by no means coincided with the collective ideals of the Jews. Throughout Medieval Europe, Jews were admitted into the ranks of the nobility when they

joined the Christian Church. The followers of Jacob Frank in eighteenth-century Poland achieved this rank, though their number was well in excess of 15,000. The self-image of the Jewish people included at all times the belief of being utterly committed to the service of the One God. The ethnic 'will to live' was a function and a corollary of the religious 'will to be true', not vice versa. Nationalist Jewish historians were impelled to reverse this relationship in keeping with a materialistic and biological bias. But their endeavours are utterly unconvincing. For the religious motivation of Jewish life is unmistakable, and religion is the domain of ultimate ends, not of manipulated means.

II

A subsidiary implication of the term 'fossil' is the judgement that vital energy is concentrated altogether upon the struggle for survival, ignoring the goals of survival, and that this undue emphasis makes the group overly defensive and armour-conscious.

No one who studies Jewish history can deny that the self-segregating impetus was at diverse times all-powerful. On the other hand, as Herbert Spencer pointed out, in every living society the things which make life possible are likely to take precedence over the things that life makes possible. This is particularly true in times of extreme emergency. Thus, the ethnic factor predominated in Jewish consciousness during periods of persecution.

As to this conflict of motivations within the Jewish soul, we may recognize it as the perennial issue between the rationalistic and the romantic schools of Jewish thought. To the rationalists, the ideas and ideals of Judaism were primary, and the Jews were only their temporary custodians waiting for the light of truth to dawn on all men. To the romanticists, the Jewish people in themselves were of supreme value, awaiting their vindication and the confounding of their enemies 'in the end of days'.

Because Jewish life and thought were not monolithic in the first century of our era even, as they certainly are not today, we cannot apply any one category to the entire community. Behold the Hellenistic Jews at the time of Philo and Jesus, who were universalistic and humanistic, glorying in the title 'citizens of the World'. Their disappearances from the stage of history was due more to external factors than to the lack of spiritual vigor.

It is, therefore, advisable to shun the use of the noun 'fossil' and speak instead of processes—a process of 'fossilization' as one tendency and a process of spiritualization as the other movement in the opposite direction.

XIII ANNEX

Comments by Rabbi J. B. Agus on the Notion of Uniqueness

I FULLY concur with the assertion of Professor Toynbee that the career of the Jew in history is not 'unique', in an ultimate sense. Nothing is so universal among nations as the claim of uniqueness. The romantic philosophers of Russia and Poland, of Germany and Italy, asserted the uniqueness of their respective 'national souls'.

The history of the Jews is unique in the same sense as are the histories of all human groups—i.e. as a compound reflecting diverse historical forces, not as an element, standing apart, defying analysis and *sui generis*.

But, inasmuch as nations and religions are generally placed in different categories, it is important to recognize the intimate bond of unity between the two domains in Judaism, though one or another aspect might predominate at any one time.

The 'non-uniqueness' of Jewry implies also the non-exceptional status of the Jewish diasporá. Along with all religious and cultural minorities, they should learn to maintain a healthy balance between their communal identity and the universal values of mankind. In this way they serve as vanguards of the evolving society of our emergent One World, which can only be of a pluralistic character.

XV ANNEX

Comments by Rabbi J. B. Agus on the Continuity of the Prophetic Element in Judaism

PROFESSOR TOYNBEE calls for the renunciation by the diaspora Jews of their 'communal identity' and for the repudiation of the Torah, so that they be free to convert mankind to the religion of the Prophets. This call emerges from his analysis of the role played by the Law and the national structure in the Greco-Roman world of antiquity.

The issue is stated in stark and rigid terms, as if the situation today was no different than in the first century. Neither the Law nor the national body is today a high and impassable barrier.¹

For more than a century the Reform and Conservative movements have been preaching that the *halachoth* were instruments of piety, not its substance. Transmuted into rites and ceremonies which enhance the drama of worship, the residual *halachoth* cannot possibly hinder the dissemination of the faith. And the nature of the Jewish 'communal identity' has also undergone a fundamental transformation. The ancient 'natural' community has been replaced by a plethora of voluntary organizations, with the Synagogue occupying the central place. There is no organization embracing all Jews, and, by the same token, no Jew can possibly belong to all Jewish organizations. In their turn the diverse organizations of Jewry are integrated into the total pattern of the voluntary associational life of the overall community.

The transformation of the Law and the transformation of the communal system were brought about in part by external factors and in part by the continued operation of the Prophetic strand within the Jewish tradition.

The Jewish community of America is presently an 'open society'—i.e. individuals are free not only to choose whether or not to belong, but also to determine the terms and extent of their affiliation. However, those contemporary movements which aim at the imposition of a totalitarian unity upon the Jewish community, converting it into a 'close society' of an ethnic character, are properly subject to Professor Toynbee's critique.

It is at this point that the dialogue between Judaism and Christianity approaches a crisis of mutual misunderstanding. To Christians, Jesus and Paul represent the acme of the Prophetic message—the one in transcending the Law, the other in transcending the national community. But, in the Jewish tradition, as Professor Toynbee and Herford point out, the Prophetic tradition was channeled through the Mishnah and Talmud, without any reference to Jesus and Paul. Within the Talmud the Prophetic tradition is continued as an undercurrent, with the priestly mentality predominating. And, alongside the Talmud, there was the philosophic tradition which was articulated so brilliantly by

¹ I have now revised my original draft of the last section of Chapter XV in the light of Rabbi Agus's comments in the present Annex.—A. J. T.

Philo. Coursing through subterranean channels, it emerged again in the tenth century, reaching a splendid climax in Maimonides. Through the lonely, titanic figure of Spinoza, philosophical Judaism helped to prepare the ground for the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The modern movements of Reform, Conservatism, and, I might add, Liberal Orthodoxy, are indeed continuations of the philosophical current in Jewish thought, and Jewish philosophy is essentially a continuation of the Prophetic current within the stream of Judaism.

But what is the essence of the Prophetic heritage, and what does conversion to the 'religion of Deutero-Isaiah' really mean?

The classical Prophets maintained that religion is a dynamic balance of two insights—that which is afforded by tradition and mystical experience, on the one hand, and that which is derived from the twin lights of intelligence and conscience, on the other hand. Subjective piety and loyalty were blended in their vision with objective reflection and ethical fervor. They transcended ritualism by the rational emphasis on inwardness; they transcended blind ethnicism by the ethical emphasis on the values of universal humanity. And, in transcending both ritualism and ethnicism, they created that dynamic equilibrium between faith and reason which is genuine religion, and that creative synthesis of loyalties that is humanistic, idealistic nationalism. The religious philosophers were the true heirs of the Prophets, in that they too saw religion as a living blend of subjective feeling and objective reflection.

From this analysis the implications of Prophetic religion for our day are clear. Not to reject the 'communal identity' into which we are born, but to transcend its limitations and narrow horizons, so that our national group might serve the larger cause of mankind. Not to repudiate the pattern of observances in one's religion, but to transcend their exclusiveness and absoluteness, that they might serve as fitting instruments of universal religion.

Hence, a mission for the Jews—yes, but not for Jews only. Precisely the same mission applies to those Christians and Moslems who, like the Prophets, recognize two sources of religion, subjective faith and objective reasoning. The liberals of all faiths assume a common domain of ethical values and rational principles. At the same time they may well employ the rituals and loyalties of their respective groups in their efforts to attain deeper levels of insight for themselves and for the communities to which they belong.

The liberals who would be heirs of the Prophets dare not secede from their respective communities, nor can they in conscience break with the ceremonial-organizational patterns of their respective faiths. The Prophets stayed with their people, spoke their language, and infused their volcanic fire into the actual cultural-social structure of their day. If they had not done so, they would have worked in a vacuum.

The great need of humanity today is to overcome the peril of 'the idolization of the temporary self'. This can be achieved by the application of the Golden Rule to groups as well as to individuals. The Golden Rule of ethics is actually the application of the objective approach to human relations. Yet absolute objectivity, making no allowance for the

sanctum sanctorum of the human heart, can be as totalitarian in its tyranny as absolute subjectivity. People must learn to guard the inner mystery of their being, refining it in art, articulating and cultivating it in the observances of religion, even while they pursue the objective pathway to Reality. Along both the inner and outer pathways to the mystery of being, the road ahead is infinite. By the same token, all human groups must not pursue the goal of objectivity so exclusively as to abolish their respective traditions. For then we should be left with blank, grey uniformity. Rather, like the Hebrew Prophets, they should seek to maintain a creative confrontation of their subjective tradition with the broad light of objective research and reflection.

Neither the policy of assimilating others by conversion nor the prospect of total dissolution in the grey ocean of humanity is in keeping with the intent of a Golden Rule for cultural and religious groups. Let us recall Immanuel Kant's formulation of this rule: 'Act so that your action may be a standard of action for all.' Manifestly, imperialism in the domain of the spirit may be as irksome as in the domain of politics. But in all healthy human relations a balance is maintained between self-assertion and self-surrender. All groups can contribute to the general welfare by integrating their subjective tradition into the objective structure of all-human values.

Conversion of the 'religion of Deutero-Isaiah' is to a 'church invisible', transcending denominational lines, and rising far beyond the parochial symbols of any one faith.

XVIII ANNEX

Spengler's Concept of 'Pseudomorphosis'

SPENGLER'S concept of 'pseudomorphosis' ('Deceptive Cultural Formation') is one of the most illuminating of his intuitions. It throws light, for instance, on the relation between a satellite civilization and the society into whose field it has been drawn.

In essence the idea is a simple one. When two civilizations are interacting with each other, their meeting may be on an unequal footing.¹ At the moment one of the two may be the more powerful, the other the more creative. In this situation the more creative civilization will be constrained to conform outwardly to the more powerful civilization's cultural configuration, like a hermit crab who fits himself into a shell that is not his own. But an observer would be allowing himself to be misled if here he were to take appearances at their face value. He must look below the surface, study what underlies it, and take due note of the difference between the two. 'The hands are the hands of Esau',² but only because they have been disguised in order to deceive. 'The voice is Jacob's voice.' That is authentic, and it is therefore telltale, provided that the listener is not bent upon being deceived.

Spengler uses the concept of 'pseudomorphosis' in his attempt to elucidate the configuration of the history of civilization in the Old World, west of India, since the beginning of the Christian Era. The eastward and southward expansion of the Hellenic Civilization, in and after the generation of Alexander the Great, had laid an Hellenic veneer—political, intellectual, and aesthetic—over South-West Asia and Egypt. Consequently, as Spengler sees it, his hypothetical 'Magian Civilization'—which, according to him, arose in this region at about the beginning of the Christian Era—was compelled to camouflage itself, during the first few centuries of its existence, by presenting itself in an Hellenic guise. It does not reveal itself in its true colours till a later stage, when it has mustered sufficient strength to break through the Hellenic veneer; but a student's discerning eye can divine its presence, below the surface, from the very beginning of the subterranean first chapter of its history.³ Though Spengler thus introduces 'pseudo-

¹ In contacts between two or more civilizations that are contemporary with each other, this seems to be the usual situation (see viii. 464-6).

² Gen. xxvii. 22.

³ F. H. Underhill, in *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. xxxvi, No. 3 (September, 1955), p. 255, has applied Spengler's notion of the 'pseudomorphosis' of a hypothetical 'Magian Civilization' to interpret my *Weltanschauung*.

Many critics have commented on how deeply Toynbee seems to be alienated from his own society. . . . I think a case could be made, using Spenglerian language, for the thesis that he is a Magian soul, born out of due time. In spite of his belief about himself that the Hellenic Civilization is his spiritual home, he is not really an Apollinian man. His spiritual home is in that part of the World beyond the Hellespont, in the society that produced the mystical magical "higher" religions which were eventually to defeat Hellenism. It is the historical development of this part of the World that fascinates him most; he devotes more of his pages to it than to any other area. I have a feeling that some day a psychologist who is interested in history will turn up and proceed to demonstrate that Toynbee's whole adult life has been spent in a long struggle by his subconscious

morphosis' and the 'Magian Civilization' in association with each other, we may reject his hypothetical 'Magian Civilization' without having to reject his concept of 'pseudomorphosis' as well. These two ideas of his do not stand or fall together, and the idea of 'pseudomorphosis' can be applied in alternative attempts to interpret the cultural history of the western half of the Old World during these last two millennia.

Two points, in particular, are unacceptable in Spengler's picture of his 'Magian Civilization'. He assumes that it was something entirely new, and he also assumes that it had nothing genuinely in common with the Hellenic Civilization whose outward form it was compelled to adopt during its subterranean formative age. This is not the picture that meets our eye when we look at the new configurations of culture that have actually made their appearance in the western half of the Old-World *Oikoumenê* since the beginning of the Christian Era. These authentic historical configurations are, as we know, two higher religions, Christianity and Islam, and five civilizations: four of them Christian and the fifth Islamic. None of these are new in the absolute sense of having inherited nothing from the past; and none of them is non-Hellenic in the sense of having no vein of Hellenism in its essence. These two religions and five civilizations have all sprung from ground fertilized by a blend between the debris of the Hellenic culture and the debris of the Syriac: a Syriac-Hellenic 'culture-compost', as I have labelled it. In the formative age of Christianity there was, nevertheless, a 'pseudomorphosis' in Spengler's sense. Christian art and Christian theology, for instance, did express themselves in Hellenic forms in which they did not find themselves completely at home. At the same time there was a genuine Hellenic ingredient in the very heart of Christianity, and this not only in the Eastern Orthodox and Western Catholic versions of it, but also in the Nestorian and Monophysite Christian resistance movements to 'Melchite' ecclesiastical and political domination. Part, at least, of this Hellenic ingredient was eventually communicated by Nestorian and Monophysite Christianity to Islam.¹

Magian self to overcome the Hellenic education imposed on his conscious English self at school and college.'

I find Underhill's analysis of me convincing. Before I began to be educated in Hellenism, I had been inoculated with Christianity, and the earlier influence usually proves to be the stronger. I have always sympathized with the Christians against the Hellenes in the Roman Imperial Age, and with the Persians against the Hellenes in Xerxes' day, as well as in Alexander's. Standing on the platform at Persepolis has been, for me, a more memorable experience than standing on the acropolis at Athens. My eyes inform me that the Parthenon frieze is a masterpiece and that the Persepolitan friezes are conventional and clumsy. Yet, in me, this obviously far inferior art strikes a more responsive chord.

This schism in my psyche, on which Underhill has put his finger, would not be worth mentioning if it were just an idiosyncrasy of mine. I fancy, though, that, in being thus inwardly divided in my spiritual sympathies and allegiances, I am typical of all the people who have been brought up in one or other of the civilizations of the Syriac-Hellenic family (as I call it in my jargon). These divided feelings can be traced back to Alexander himself. In the act of overthrowing the empire that the Persians had built, he became personally acquainted with the Persians, and their virtues impressed and attracted him so much that he half regretted the damage that he had done and had half a mind to try to repair it. The Syriac and the Hellenic ingredients in the 'culture-compost' from which the Christian and Islamic civilizations have sprung have failed to make a perfect blend, and the unresolved discord has been communicated to the crops grown on this fertile soil.

¹ Islamic theology has been worked out, on a pattern set by Christian theology, in terms of Hellenic philosophy; and this has led, in the cultural history of the Islamic Civilization, as it has in the cultural history of the Christian civilizations, to a renaissance

In consequence, Islam, too, is a member of the family of Syriac-Hellenic societies.

In the history of the encounter between the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations—an encounter from which the Syriac-Hellenic societies eventually sprang—the fusion that produced a ‘culture-compost’ had been preceded by a stage in which the Syriac Civilization had been the Hellenic Civilization’s satellite. In the relation between a satellite and the civilization into whose field it has been drawn, ‘pseudomorphosis’ has come into play in a number of other cases as well.

For example, when the Iranian culture was drawn into the field of the Syriac Civilization in the course of the Achaemenian age, one of the eventual results was a ‘pseudomorphosis’ on the linguistic plane in the shape of the Pehlevi language. In Pehlevi, some words are written alphabetically in the Aramaic *koiné*, but they are read as ideograms standing for the corresponding words in Middle Persian.¹ On this linguistic plane, in a later chapter of history, the Arabic language succeeded in penetrating into New Persian more deeply.² But at this price the submerged Iranian culture succeeded, in its turn, in giving New Persian the status of a literary language that was able to hold its own against Arabic in the Perso-Turkish half of the Islamic World. Since an early stage in the decline of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate, the Islamic World has been articulated into two distinct cultural zones: an Iranic zone and an Arabic one. Since the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, Iran has reasserted its distinctive communal identity on the religious plane as well. In acquiescing in Shah Isma’il’s imposition of the Imami Shi’ite version of Islam on his new subjects, the Persians acquired a distinctive national religion of their own for the first time since their conversion to Islam from Zoroastrianism after the overthrow of the Sasanian regime.³

of Hellenic philosophy itself and, with it, of Hellenic science (see p. 450, footnote 2). There is, however, one Hellenic element in Christianity—and this at Christianity’s core—which Islam has not taken over, but has, on the contrary, repudiated; and this is the deification of Jesus and the consequent conception of the Godhead as being a trinity. Muhammad and, following him, Islam have given Jesus the highest rank that it is possible to give Him without recognizing Him as being divine or as being the last and greatest of the prophets. According to Islamic doctrine, Jesus is the last and greatest of the prophets save for Muhammad, and miracles are ascribed to Him which Muhammad does not claim for himself. Muhammad adopted from the Monophysite Christian neighbours of the Arabia of his day the belief—branded by Orthodox Christians as docetism—that the Passion was an illusion, and that the figure nailed to the Cross was a substitute or a phantom, not Jesus Himself (see Qur’ān, iv. 156 (Fluegel’s numbering)). It is remarkable that Muhammad should have made this Monophysite Christian belief his own, since the Monophysites had been led to it by their thesis that Christ’s nature was exclusively divine, and by their agreement with the Jews and Greeks (1 Cor. i. 23) in holding that it was inconceivable that a divine being should have suffered death and, moreover, should have suffered it in a form devised as a punishment for criminal human beings. It might look as if Muhammad had seen, in Jesus, a superhuman being. In Muhammad’s belief Jesus is supported by the spirit of holiness, or is himself a spirit from God (Qur’ān, ii. 81, iv. 169, v. 109, xxi. 91). Nevertheless, Muhammad reacted, just as strongly as the Jews, against the Christian claim that Jesus is God. In Muslim eyes the deification of Jesus is *shirk* (see L. Gardet and M.-M. Anawati: *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane* (Paris 1943, Vrin), p. 438): a blasphemous association of one of God’s creatures with God Himself; the doctrine of the Trinity is polytheism.

Thus the vein of Hellenism goes less deep in Islam than it goes in Christianity, but at the same time it is present in Islam too. See also pp. 451, with footnote 1, 467, and 471.

¹ See pp. 433-4.

² See *ibid.*

³ The Arab Muslim conquerors’ Zoroastrian subjects seem to have been converted to Islam more readily and rapidly than their Christian subjects. In the light of this, it is

Since the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, Islam has captured Indonesia. In this case the conversion has been accomplished by peaceful missionary enterprise, not by force of arms, and therefore has not provoked the militant opposition that it did arouse among Hindus in India. Nevertheless, Islam in Indonesia has not succeeded in supplanting, below the surface, the Indian culture—Hindu and Buddhist—which had been paramount in Indonesia for more than a thousand years before Islam's arrival there. A present-day Indonesian Muslim reminds himself of his Hindu cultural heritage by assuming a Sanskrit name in conjunction with his Arabic one; and he celebrates the Prophet Muhammad's birthday (the *Mawlid*) by entertaining himself with puppet-plays in which the characters are the heroes of the Mahabharata. Here we can watch the Indian culture, which the Indonesians have never ceased to cherish, breaking through an Islamic veneer. The Islamic surface of present-day Indonesian culture is, in fact, a 'pseudomorphosis'. But so, too, was the Indian culture which preceded Islam in Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula and which, in the Hinayanian Buddhist version of it, is still paramount on the South-East Asian mainland in Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia. In South-East Asia the dissemination of Indian culture, like the later dissemination of Islam in the insular and peninsular parts of the region, was a peaceful process. But the Indian Civilization in South-East Asia experienced the same fortune that Islam experienced there later. The Indian Civilization, too, failed to supplant the previously prevailing local cultures. Below the surface these continued to hold their own. In South-East Asia the exotic forms of Indian architecture, art, and religion have been adapted to express a native South-East Asian content.¹

An example of 'pseudomorphosis' on an oecumenical scale is presented by the Western surface of the present-day world as a whole. The first non-Western societies to be Westernized were the Middle American and the Andean. By now, they have been nominally Western and Christian for more than four hundred years. Yet today, in the highlands of Guatemala and on the Las Casas plateau in the adjoining corner of Mexico, one can see Christian churches being used for the celebration of Pre-Christian rites by an unsophisticated peasantry. In Mexico City one can see the motifs and the spirit of the same Pre-Christian religion being resuscitated by sophisticated painters and sculptors trained in a Western school and using a Western technique. In the minds of these artists themselves this is conscious and deliberate archaism. But the artificially resuscitated Pre-Columbian religious art has a compelling power of its own. In souls less sophisticated than those of its resuscitators it might reactivate the ancient feelings and beliefs of which it is a potent symbol. In Mexico, as in Indonesia, we seem to be witnessing the bankruptcy of a 'pseudomorphosis'. The underlying reality is breaking through the veneer. In the history of the Westernization of Russia we can read the same story. Since the generation of Peter the Great, Russian the more remarkable that Iran should have preserved its cultural individuality so tenaciously under an Arabic and Islamic surface.

¹ See D. G. E. Hall: *A History of South-East Asia* (London 1955, Macmillan), *passim*.

novelists, philosophers, and ideologists have been conforming outwardly to Western conventions, but, in Russian hands, the Western mould has yielded unmistakably Russian products.¹ If the Westernization of the World calls into existence an oecumenical civilization, we may expect to see this new world-wide culture start on a Western basis; but, in the light of such precedents as those just cited, we may also expect to see the non-Western elements below the surface eventually break through the Western crust. Spengler's concept of 'pseudomorphosis' thus seems likely to be illuminating for the new chapter of history on which mankind is entering in our day.

¹ See p. 538.

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
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
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